NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

FARID GHALEHTAK ; SHIRIN TABATABAI,

Plaintiffs

- Appellants,

v.
FAY SERVICING, LLC ; MTC FINANCIAL, INC., DBA Trustee Corps,

Defendants

- Appellees. No. 18

- 15722

D.C. No. 3:17

- cv

- 05976

- EMC

MEMORANDUM *

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of California Edward M. Chen, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted March 12, 2019 **

Before: LEAVY, BEA, and N.R. SMITH, Circuit Judges.

Farid Ghalehtak and S hirin Tabatabai appeal pro se from t he district court’s

judgment dismissing their action alleging federal and state law claims arising from

foreclosure proceedings. We have jurisd iction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36

- 3.

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). 

# FILED

MAR 19 2019

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLER K U.S. COURT OF APPEAL S2 18

- 15722

rev iew de novo a district court’ s dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

12(b)(6). Cervantes v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc ., 656 F.3d 1034, 1040 (9th

Cir. 2011). We may affirm on any ground supported by the re cord. Franklin v.

Terr , 201 F.3d 1098, 1100 n.2 (9th Cir. 2000). We affirm.

D ismissal of plaintiffs’ Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (“FDCPA”) claim

under 15 U.S.C. § 1692f(6) was proper because plaintiffs failed to allege facts

sufficient to show tha t the entity on behalf of which defendants sought to foreclose

lacked “ the present right to possession of the property claimed as collateral through

an enforceable security interest. ” See 15 U.S.C. § 1692f(6) (A) ; Ashcroft v. Iqbal
, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (to avoid dismissal, “a complaint must contain sufficient

factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its
face” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)).

The district court did not abuse its discretion in retaining jurisdiction over
plaintiffs’ state law claims after its dismissal of the ir FDCPA claim s

. See Satey v.
JPMorgan Chase & Co ., 521 F.3d 1087, 1091 (9th Cir. 2008) ( explaining factors

governing determination of whether to re tain jurisdiction over pendent state

- law

claims ).

The district court properly dismissed plaintiff’s state law claims beca use
plaintiffs failed to allege facts sufficient to support the theory underlying all of

the ir state law claims that FNBN I, LLC was no t the true beneficiary under the3 18

- 15722

loan. See Iqbal , 556 U.S. at 678.
The district court did not abuse its discretion by taking judicial notice of

certain public records and district court and bankruptcy court documents

. See Lee
v. City of Los Angeles , 25 0 F.3d 668, 688

- 89 (9th Cir. 2001) (setting forth standard

of review, and describing documents that a district court may take judicial notice

of when ruling on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion).

We do not consider matters not specifically and distinctly raised and argued

in t he opening brief. See Padgett v. Wright , 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).

Fay Servicing, LL C’s request for judicial notice (Docket Entry No. 15) is

granted.

AFFIRMED.