GAO-09-968R Tactical Wheeled Vehicles 

United States Government Accountability Office

Washington, DC 20548 

September 28, 2009 

The Honorable Neil Abercrombie 

Chairman 

The Honorable Roscoe Bartlett 

Ranking Member 

Subcommittee on Air and Land Forces 

Committee on Armed Services 

House of Representatives 

The Honorable Gene Taylor 

Chairman 

The Honorable Todd Akin 

Ranking Member 

Subcommittee on Seapower and Expeditionary Forces 

Committee on Armed Services 

House of Representatives 

Subject: Defense Acquisitions: Department of Defense Needs a Unified Strategy for 

Balancing Investments in Tactical Wheeled Vehicles 

Ground-based military operations generally make use of two broad categories of 

vehicles: combat vehicles designed for a specific fighting function and tactical 

vehicles designed primarily for use by forces in the field in connection with or in 

support of tactical operations. Combat vehicles generally move on tracks versus 

wheels and include the Abrams tank, Bradley Fighting vehicle, and the Paladin selfpropelled howitzer. Tactical vehicles generally move on wheels and include the High 

Mobility Multi-purpose Wheeled Vehicle (HMMWV), the Mine Resistant Ambush 

Protected (MRAP) vehicle, and families of trucks and trailers. For fiscal years 2009 

and 2010, the Department of Defense (DOD) has requested an estimated $16 billion 

for the procurement of those tactical wheeled vehicles described in this report, 

including an estimated $6 billion for MRAP variants. 

In June 2007, you requested that we assess (1) the extent to which DOD had 

developed an overall tactical wheeled vehicle (TWV) investment strategy that 

considers timing, affordability, and sustainability; (2) the extent that the programs in 

the strategy fill identified gaps or provide duplicative capabilities; (3) the current 

status of selected tactical wheeled vehicle systems that are a part of this strategy; and 
(4) whether DOD is pursuing a knowledge-based acquisition1

 approach as a part of 

this strategy. On the basis of discussions with your staff, we initially focused on 

gathering and analyzing data related to the MRAP program. We provided the 

members of your staffs with a series of briefings between September 2007 and March 

2008, and summarized the results of our MRAP work in a July 2008 report.2

 Shortly 

thereafter, and on the basis of additional discussions with your staffs, we resumed 

the work related to our overall assessment of tactical wheeled vehicles and provided 

an interim briefing on the results of our work on April 30, 2009. For our assessment 

of the current status of selected tactical wheeled vehicle systems, we included the 

following systems: 

• MRAP; 

• MRAP-All Terrain Vehicle (M-ATV) variant; 

• HMMWV Expanded Capability Vehicle (ECV) variant; 

• HMMWV ECV2 variant; 

• Joint Light Tactical Vehicle (JLTV); 

• Armored Security Vehicle (ASV); 

• Family of Medium Tactical Vehicles (FMTV); and, 

• Heavy Expanded Mobility Tactical Truck (HEMTT). 

We have updated our interim briefing to include fiscal year 2009 supplemental and 

fiscal year 2010 base year tactical wheeled vehicle procurement budget data and 

summarized recent decisions related to selected tactical wheeled vehicle programs. 

Enclosure I contains our updated briefing. 

To determine whether DOD considered timing, affordability, and sustainability, we 

obtained relevant service strategies, reviewed them for these characteristics, and 

discussed the strategies with the military services. To determine whether there was 

potential for duplicative capabilities, we obtained requirements documents, 

compared the capabilities of the systems in question, and discussed the potential for 

systems to duplicate one another with program officials. To determine cost, 

schedule, and performance of selected tactical wheeled vehicles, we obtained and 

reviewed program documents such as selected acquisition reports3

 for systems that 

had them, program status briefings for those that did not, budget planning and 

execution documents for all systems, results of developmental and operational tests 

for selected systems, and met with service program officials. To assess DOD’s 

 

1

 Knowledge-based acquisition is a management approach which requires adequate knowledge at 

critical junctures (i.e., knowledge points) throughout the acquisition process to make informed 

decisions. 

2

 GAO, Rapid Acquisition of Mine Resistant Ambush Protected Vehicles, GAO-08-884R (Washington, 

D.C.: July 15, 2008). 

3

 Selected acquisition reports are standard, comprehensive, summary status reports of major defense 

acquisition programs required for periodic submission to Congress. SARs include estimates of cost, 

schedule, and technical status. 

Page 2 GAO-09-968R Tactical Wheeled Vehicles 
knowledge-based approach to acquisition strategy, we obtained and reviewed system 

acquisition plans and discussed them with service program managers. 

We conducted this performance audit from September 2008 to September 2009, in 

accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those standards 

require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence 

to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit 

objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our 

findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. 

SUMMARY 

During our April 30, 2009, interim briefing and our August 13, 2009 updated briefing, 

we made the following major points: 

• DOD does not have a unified TWV strategy that considers timing, affordability, 

and sustainability. The advent of improvised explosive devices/roadside 

bombs has had a significant effect on designing for survivability and the 

services are incrementally adapting their TWV capabilities in light of 

technology and funding limits. One unified strategy would help to coordinate 

efforts. 

• While we did not identify any unfilled program gaps, the introduction of 

MRAP, M-ATV, and eventually the JLTV creates a potential risk of unplanned 

overlap in capabilities; a risk that needs to be managed. A critical contribution 

to the management of the risk will likely be the JLTV Analysis of Alternatives. 

The purpose of the analysis is to assess alternatives for capitalizing the fleets 

of Light Tactical Vehicles operated by the services. The Under Secretary of 

Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics provided guidance for the 

analysis in January 2009. The guidance stated that the analysis will compare 

the performance of JLTV alternatives against each of the legacy Light Tactical 

Vehicles, including the HMMWV, Up-Armored HMMWV, ECV2, and MRAP. 

• Many TWV systems are in production and have remained stable. JLTV is early 

in its development and will require close oversight to ensure requirements, 

technologies, and resources are well understood before making significant 

commitments of time and money. MRAP and M-ATV are being procured 

exclusively with supplemental funding. Over 16,000 MRAPs were procured in 

fiscal years 2007 and 2008 for an estimated $20.9 billion. In addition, at least 

5,244 M-ATVs will be procured in fiscal years 2009 and 2010 for an estimated 

$6 billion. The Army and Marine Corps spend billions annually on TWV 

procurement; the Air Force, Navy, and Special Operations Command spend 

considerably less. 

• Generally, the acquisition programs we reviewed are effectively using 

knowledge-based acquisition practices. 

Page 3 GAO-09-968R Tactical Wheeled Vehicles 
CONCLUSIONS 

While DOD does not have a comprehensive TWV investment strategy, the individual 

services—particularly the Army and Marine Corps—have multiple studies under way 

which address different aspects of TWV strategic planning. The Army and Marine 

Corps have also collaborated on joint studies of TWV issues. A unified, 

comprehensive, long-term TWV strategy would be beneficial to DOD and the services 

in minimizing the potential for unplanned overlap or duplication as they: 

• define the specific roles and capabilities of similar vehicles; 

• adapt their TWV capabilities to current and anticipated threats; 

• address long-term TWV sustainability issues; and 

• determine how best to take advantage of MRAP capabilities for the long term. 

The strategy should balance protection, payload, and performance needs with 

available resources, especially for Light Tactical Vehicles. 

RECOMMENDATION FOR EXECUTIVE ACTION 

To improve DOD’s ability to plan for and manage the development, production, and 

sustainment of TWV across the department, we recommend that the Secretary of 

Defense develop a comprehensive and unified strategy and implementation plan for 

making sound investment decisions for tactical wheeled vehicles that: 

• assess and prioritize the capabilities and requirements of similar vehicles 

needed in the near and long term; 

• estimate the funding, time, and technologies that will be required to acquire, 

improve, and sustain these systems; 

• balance protection, payload, and performance needs with available resources, 

especially for Light Tactical Vehicles; and 

• identify contingencies in case there are development problems, delays with 

key systems, or funding constraints. 

AGENCY COMMENTS AND OUR EVALUATION 

In commenting on a draft of this report, DOD concurred with our assessment and 

recommendations. The department agreed that a unified, comprehensive tactical 

wheeled vehicle strategy would be beneficial and outlined a plan to unite several 

ongoing studies into a comprehensive strategy that dovetails with the services’ 

strategies for equipping their forces. In implementing the strategy, DOD will 

endeavor to align requirements, resources, and acquisition strategies into a unified 

plan to guide investment decisions. We believe that the various ongoing studies 

should provide valuable insight for DOD in developing a unified strategy, which will 

assist the department and the services in balancing their near- and long-term needs 

and resources. We look forward to seeing the final results next year. 

Enclosure II contains the full text of the department’s comments. 

Page 4 GAO-09-968R Tactical Wheeled Vehicles 
We are sending copies of this report to the Chairmen and Ranking Members of other 

Senate and House committees and subcommittees that have jurisdiction and 

oversight responsibilities for DOD. We will also send copies to the Secretary of 

Defense; the Secretaries of the Air Force, Army, and Navy; and the Director, Office of 

Management and Budget. Copies will also be available at no charge on GAO's Web 

site at http://www.gao.gov. 

If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact me at (202) 

512-4841. Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs 

may be found on the last page of this report. Major contributors to this report 

included William Graveline, Assistant Director; Dayna Foster; Danny Owens; Bob 

Swierczek; Hai Tran; Alyssa Weir; and Paul Williams. 

Michael J. Sullivan, Director 

Acquisition and Sourcing Management 

Enclosures 

cc: Mr. Doug Roach 

 Mr. Jesse Tolleson 

 Mr. Doug Bush 

 Mr. John Wason 

Page 5 GAO-09-968R Tactical Wheeled Vehicles 
Enclosure I 

Page 6 GAO-09-968R Tactical Wheeled Vehicles 

1

Briefing to the

House Armed Services Committee,

Air and Land Forces, 

and Seapower and Expeditionary Forces Subcommittees

August 13, 2009

Status of DOD Tactical 

Wheeled Vehicle Strategy
Enclosure I 

Page 7 GAO-09-968R Tactical Wheeled Vehicles 

2

Briefing Overview

• Introduction

• Summary

• Findings

• Conclusions

• Scope, Methodology, and Auditing Standards
Enclosure I 

Page 8 GAO-09-968R Tactical Wheeled Vehicles 

3

Introduction

• Although there is no precise definition, tactical wheeled vehicles (TWV) 

tend to have military characteristics designed primarily for use by forces in 

the field in connection with or in support of tactical operations.

• As requested, we assessed the following.

• The extent to which DOD has developed an overall investment strategy for TWVs that considers timing, affordability, and 

sustainability.

• The extent to which TWV programs provide duplicative capabilities.

• The current cost, schedule, and performance of selected TWVs.

• Whether DOD is pursuing a knowledge-based approach as part of the acquisition strategy. 

• This briefing summarizes the results of our work.

• Our scope and methodology are described at the end.

• We obtained DOD and service comments for this briefing and made 

changes where appropriate. 
Enclosure I 

Page 9 GAO-09-968R Tactical Wheeled Vehicles 

4

Summary 

• DOD does not have a unified TWV strategy. 

• The advent of improvised explosive devices (IED)/roadside bombs has had a significant 

effect on designing for survivability and the services are incrementally adapting their TWV 

capabilities in light of technology and funding limits.

• Introduction of Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) and MRAP-All Terrain Vehicle 

(M-ATV) and eventually Joint Light Tactical Vehicle (JLTV) creates potential risk of unplanned 

overlap in capabilities; that risk needs to be managed.

• While many systems are in production with stable cost, schedule, and performance metrics, 

continuous improvement of these systems also needs to be managed. JLTV is early in its 

development and will require close oversight.

• Although development dollars are small, the Army and Marine Corps spend billions 

annually on TWV procurement. The Air Force, Navy, and Special Operations Command 

(SOCOM) spend considerably less.

• Procurement of MRAPs and M-ATVs are funded exclusively with supplemental funding.

• Several examples demonstrate that knowledge-based acquisition is being used effectively. 

• The Army and JLTV Program have begun to address Other Topics of Interest: Long-Term 

Armor/Protection Strategy and Fully Burdened Cost of Fuel, respectively. Additional focus on 

these issues will be needed.
Enclosure I 

Page 10 GAO-09-968R Tactical Wheeled Vehicles 

5

1. Tactical Wheeled Vehicle Investment 

Strategy—Strategies Reviewed

• February 2006 Army Tactical Wheeled Vehicle Modernization Strategy 

Report to Congress

• Army-only perspective, projected fleet mix to FY 2018, provided limited 

funding/affordability data.

• August 2008 Marine Corps Ground Combat and Tactical Vehicle Strategy

• Marine Corps-only perspective, projected fleet mix to FY 2024, 

provided limited funding/affordability data.

• August 2008 Army and Marine Corps Tactical Wheeled Vehicle Strategy 

and Response to Office of Management and Budget (OMB) briefing

• Combined Army and Marine Corps perspective on OMB-selected 

systems and topics, projected fleet mixes, provided limited 

funding/affordability data.

• Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology, and 

Logistics) acknowledges DOD does not have a unified strategy
Enclosure I 

Page 11 GAO-09-968R Tactical Wheeled Vehicles 

6

1. Tactical Wheeled Vehicle Investment 

Strategy—Numerous Strategies In Process

• Services have multiple studies under way which address different aspects 

of TWV strategic planning

• The Army Capabilities Integration Center is working on a new Tactical 

Wheeled Vehicle Study. Marine Corps is updating its Ground Combat 

Tactical Vehicle Strategy. Study results scheduled for completion later 

this year.

• The Army and Marine Corps plan to integrate MRAPs into the fleet mix 

and are studying ways to achieve the integration; Army and Marine 

Corps study results scheduled for completion at the end of 2009.

• The Navy is developing a TWV Strategy; scheduled for completion at 

end of 2009.

• SOCOM is developing an Initial Capabilities Document (ICD) based on 

a 2007 Capabilities Based Assessment for Ground Mobility; ICD 

scheduled for completion in August 2009.

• Service-specific strategies do not constitute a unified strategy
Enclosure I 

Page 12 GAO-09-968R Tactical Wheeled Vehicles 

7

2. Observations on Potential Overlap or 

Duplication of TWV Capabilities

• Introduction of MRAP, M-ATV, and eventually JLTV creates the risk of a potential unplanned 

overlap in capabilities; risk needs to be managed.

• Ideally, the Army would prefer to have all JLTVs for its light tactical vehicle (LTV) fleet. 

However, given the size of the LTV fleet, it will have a variety of generations of LTVs in the 

force at any given time.

• Highly Mobile Multi-purpose Wheeled Vehicle (HMMWV), Up-Armored HMMWV 

(UAH)/Expanded Capability Vehicle (ECV), possibly ECV2, and JLTV

• MRAP is a theater asset that replaces the UAH for some missions outside the forward 

operating base. It fills a niche for better protection than the UAH, but at the loss of 

maneuverability.

• Developmental ECV2 is 30 percent common with the UAH but with more payload and better 

performance while maintaining protection against IEDs; the Army and Marine Corps have 

no current plans to procure ECV2s.

• JLTV armor will provide protection comparable to MRAP except MRAP has better underside 

protection, in trade for increased weight. However, JLTV unit costs could be significantly 

higher than ECV2, but much lower than MRAP and M-ATV.
Enclosure I 

Page 13 GAO-09-968R Tactical Wheeled Vehicles 

8

3. Status of Selected Systems

• Mine Resistant Ambush Protected Vehicles 

• Family of multimission platforms capable of mitigating IEDs, underbody mines, and small 

arms fire threats.

• More than 16,000 procured to date; deliveries of Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) variants 

will be complete by November 2009; performance limited by size/weight.

• MRAP All Terrain Vehicle (M-ATV) variant

• Lighter weight and smaller than OIF MRAP vehicles to support improved off-road 

maneuverability in Afghanistan.

• Procurement funding for fiscal years 2009 and 2010 estimated at about $6 billion 

depending on Explosively Formed Penetrator (EFP)/Rocket Propelled Grenade (RPG) 

protection kit requirement.

• Quantities between 5,244 and 10,000 units; 3,944 units are under contract. 

• According to acquisition officials, the Marine Corps and Army are installing independent 

suspension systems on some OIF MRAPs for Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) 

operations in Afghanistan. Marine Corps initiative may reduce the number of M-ATVs 

required for OEF operations.
Enclosure I 

Page 14 GAO-09-968R Tactical Wheeled Vehicles 

9

3. Status of Selected Systems

(cont.)

• Expanded Capability Vehicle

• HMMWV variant with upgraded suspension, additional carrying capacity, and 

integrated armor package with the capability to accept add-on armor.

• Over 45,000 ECVs procured since 1993; the Army plans to buy 21,209 ECVs 

from 2009 through 2010 for about $3.2 billion. 

• Vehicles are being procured in support of Special Operations Forces Light 

Tactical Vehicle programs, and Army National Guard and Army Reserve units.

• Expanded Capability Vehicle 2

• HMMWV variant which was developed to return the payload and performance 

that was lost by adding increased protection to earlier variants of the HMMWV; 

• The Army and Marine Corps have decided not to procure ECV2s in FY 2009, 

as originally planned.
Enclosure I 

Page 15 GAO-09-968R Tactical Wheeled Vehicles 

10

3. Status of Selected Systems

• Joint Light Tactical Vehicle

• A family of vehicles focuses on balancing personnel protection, payload, and performance; 

will provide defensive measures covering troops while in transport, increases payload 

capability, and improves the logistics footprint.

• Quantities and total program cost could be substantial but will not be determined until 

Milestone B; three technology development contracts awarded in October 2008; Milestone 

C expected in FY 2013 and initial capability in FY 2016.

• Technology development phase is scheduled to end in April 2011. According to Acquisition 

Decision Memorandum approving technology development phase, consideration will be 

given to (a) carrying multiple contractor teams through engineering and manufacturing 

development phase, and (b) the start of low-rate initial production for some or all variants.

• December 2007 Defense Acquisition Executive guidance states that production of some or 

all JLTV variants should be considered toward the end of the Technology Development 

phase and during development of the acquisition strategy.
Enclosure I 

Page 16 GAO-09-968R Tactical Wheeled Vehicles 

11

3. Status of Selected Systems

(cont.)

• Joint Light Tactical Vehicle

• Balancing protection, payload, and performance may require trade-offs 

among key performance parameters (KPP) or non-KPP attributes to 

achieve air transportability by rotary wing aircraft of a vehicle in 

combat configuration. Considerations include vehicle size, weight, 

power, and mission role. Potential trades could include operational 

limitations. The Marine Corps has expressed concerns regarding 

weight. 

• An Analysis of Alternatives (AOA) is required to support Milestone B 

and will be provided to Program Analysis and Evaluation 60 days in 

advance of Defense Acquisition Board review.

• The AOA will compare the performance of JLTV alternatives against 

the light tactical vehicle fleet expected in FY 2013. These include 

HMMWV, UAH, MRAP, and possibly ECV2. 
Enclosure I 

Page 17 GAO-09-968R Tactical Wheeled Vehicles 

12

3. Status of Selected Systems

(cont.)

• Armored Security Vehicle (ASV)

• Used by the military police to perform area security and other 

missions; the ASV has been in the production phase for several years; 

through January 2009, 1,702 ASVs have been produced.

• The Army plans to buy an additional 150 ASVs with a unit cost of

$721,000 in FY 2010 for the Military Police; ASVs will also be used for 

convoy protection for Combat Support and Combat Service Support 

units.
Enclosure I 

Page 18 GAO-09-968R Tactical Wheeled Vehicles 

13

3. Status of Selected Systems

(cont.)

• Family of Medium Tactical Vehicles (FMTV) provides up to five tons 

capacity for long-distance and local hauling, and unit resupply missions

• In mid-summer 2008, the contractor began to fall behind in delivering trucks. Due to production issues and parts shortages,

trucks were being manufactured but were incomplete and could 

not be delivered to the government. By May 2009, the contractor 

was late in delivering more than 2,100 trucks and, in June, slowed 

production of new trucks to focus on the incomplete trucks. As of 

July, about 2,000 trucks had not yet been delivered. The backlog

is clearing and Defense Contract Management Agency officials 

expect the contractor to catch up with deliveries by the end of 

November.

• Competition is under way for the next buy and three manufacturers—BAE, Navistar, and Oshkosh—submitted 

proposals in May 2009. The contract for an estimated 23,341 

vehicles (trucks and trailers) is scheduled to be awarded in 

September.
Enclosure I 

Page 19 GAO-09-968R Tactical Wheeled Vehicles 

14

3. Status of Selected Systems

(cont.)

• Heavy Expanded Mobility Tactical Truck (HEMTT), one of a 

family of heavy tactical vehicles, provides for up to ten tons of 

long-distance and local hauling, unit resupply, and other 

transport missions

• New trucks are still being produced with two option years 

remaining on the current contract. The Army has begun 

planning for the next buy.

• Recapitalization program for older trucks began in 2001 to 

reduce operating and support costs and improve armor 

protection. Recap results in a truck that is equivalent to a 

new truck at about 80 percent of the average unit cost.
Enclosure I 

Page 20 GAO-09-968R Tactical Wheeled Vehicles 

15

3. Status of Selected TWV Systems—Projected 

Procurement Funding for FY 2009-2010

Total $569 $11,890 $2,190 $164 $1233 $16,046

HEMTT $0 $1,965 $0 $0 $0 $1,965

FMTV $49 $2,638 $0 $0 $0 $2,687

ASV $0 $469 $0 $0 $0 $469

JLTV $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0

ECV2 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0

ECV $61 $3,208 $396 $32 $22 $3,719

M-ATV $409 $2,810 $1,604 $82 $1,101 $6,006

MRAP $50 $800 $190 $50 $110 $1,200

System Air Force Army Marine Corps Navy SOCOM Total

(Dollars in millions)

Source: GAO analysis of DOD funding and program data.

Note: M-ATV amounts are MRAP Joint Program Office estimates of planned procurement amounts needed to 

meet current increased requirement of 5,244 vehicles, each equipped with EFP/RPG protection kits.
Enclosure I 

Page 21 GAO-09-968R Tactical Wheeled Vehicles 

16

4. Knowledge-Based Acquisition

Being Used Effectively

• DOD relies on proven commercial technologies for subsystems 

such as axles, drive trains, and transmissions.

• Protection subsystems such as opaque and transparent ballistic 

armor, situational awareness, and countermeasures are developed 

elsewhere and integrated onto vehicles.

• Rapid acquisition for M-ATV dictated that production representative 

prototypes be delivered within 3 days of contract award for testing.

• This requires that technologies are mature, designs are stable, 

and production processes are mature. 
Enclosure I 

Page 22 GAO-09-968R Tactical Wheeled Vehicles 

17

4. Knowledge-Based Acquisition Being Used 

Effectively (cont.)

• JLTV development includes three competing prototypes to reduce 

technology risk before Milestone B and achieve a better balance 

between protection, payload, and performance.

• Prototypes will undergo developmental testing and limited user 

assessments in a relevant environment at government facilities.

• The demonstrators must achieve a minimum technology 

readiness level of 6 across all areas before milestone B.
Enclosure I 

Page 23 GAO-09-968R Tactical Wheeled Vehicles 

18

5. Other Topics of Interest—Army Long-term 

Armor Strategy

• 2006 Army Strategy identified a two-phase Long-Term Armor Strategy, 

which consists of developing mission-specific A-cabs and B-kits for 

selected vehicles.

• A-cabs with attachment points for armor

• B-kit armor plates are added as the mission dictates

• Phase I limited to FMTV, HEMTT, and HMMWV

• Phase II will expand armor kits for Palletized Load System, Heavy 

Equipment Transporter System, M939 truck, and M915 semitractor truck 

• JLTV will be designed so that new armor developments can be 

retrofitted without major retrofit cost.

• The Army will adopt a long-term protection strategy, which is a more 

holistic approach to survivability.
Enclosure I 

Page 24 GAO-09-968R Tactical Wheeled Vehicles 

19

5. Other Topics of Interest—Fully Burdened 

Cost of Fuel

• In 2007, the Under Secretary of Defense (AT&L) established a policy to 

include the fully burdened cost of delivered energy in trade-off analyses 

conducted for all tactical systems with end items that create a demand for 

energy and to improve the energy efficiency of those systems, consistent 

with mission requirements and cost effectiveness. The policy was based 

on the results of several studies that concluded that 

• reducing energy demand provides operational forces more flexibility 

and makes them less dependent on the logistics infrastructure. 

• The DOD acquisition process undervalues technologies that can improve energy efficiency, and

• applying the fully burdened cost of delivered energy—total ownership cost of buying, moving, and protecting fuel used in systems—should 

be considered in acquisition decisions over the life cycle of a system. 

• JLTV is one of the pilot programs initiated to implement this policy. It is 

unclear at this point how this policy will affect JLTV requirements and 

designs.
Enclosure I 

Page 25 GAO-09-968R Tactical Wheeled Vehicles 

20

Conclusions

• OMB saw value in requesting a combined TWV strategy briefing 

from the Army and Marine Corps

• A unified, comprehensive, long-term TWV strategy would be 

beneficial to DOD and the services as they

• define the specific roles and capabilities of similar vehicles,

• adapt their TWV capabilities to current and anticipated threats via the long-term armor (and protection) strategy,

• address long-term TWV sustainability issues, and

• determine how best to take advantage of MRAP’s capabilities for the long term. 

• The strategy should include balancing protection, payload, and performance needs with available resources, especially for LTVs.

• This should help to identify and minimize unplanned overlap or 

duplication.
Enclosure I 

Page 26 GAO-09-968R Tactical Wheeled Vehicles 

21

Scope, Methodology, and Auditing Standards

• To determine whether DOD’s investment strategy considered the timing, affordability, and 

sustainability of planned actions, we obtained the relevant strategies, reviewed them for these 

characteristics, and discussed the strategies with the military services.

• To determine whether there was potential for duplicative capabilities, we obtained requirements 

documents, compared the capabilities of the systems in question, and discussed the potential for 

systems to duplicate one another.

• To determine the cost, schedule, and performance of selected tactical armored vehicles, we 

obtained and reviewed program documents such as selected acquisition reports for systems that 

had them, program status briefings for those that did not, budget planning and execution 

documents for all systems, and results of developmental and operational tests for selected 

systems, and met with service program officials. 

• We based our table on projected program funding on DOD data and program office projections. 

• To assess DOD’s knowledge-based approach to acquisition strategy, we obtained and reviewed

system acquisition plans and discussed them with service program managers. 

• We conducted this performance audit from September 2008 to September 2009, in accordance with generally accepted government 

auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a 

reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a 

reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. 
Enclosure Il 

Page 27 GAO-09-968R Tactical Wheeled Vehicles 
Enclosure Il 

Page 28 GAO-09-968R Tactical Wheeled Vehicles 

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