GAO 

United States Government Accountability Office

Report to Congressional Committees

INTERAGENCY 

COLLABORATION 

Key Issues for 

Congressional 

Oversight of National 

Security Strategies, 

Organizations, 

Workforce, and 

Information Sharing 

September 2009 

GAO-09-904SP 
What GAO Found

United States Government Accountability Office

Why GAO Did This Study

Highlights

Accountability Integrity Reliability

September 2009

INTERAGENCY COLLABORATION 

Key Issues for Congressional Oversight of National 

Security Strategies, Organizations, Workforce, and 

Highlights of GAO-09-904SP, a report to Information Sharing

congressional committees 

While national security activities, 

which range from planning for an 

influenza pandemic to Iraq 

reconstruction, require 

collaboration among multiple 

agencies, the mechanisms used for 

such activities may not provide the 

means for interagency 

collaboration needed to meet 

modern national security 

challenges. To assist the 111th 

Congress and the new 

administration in developing their 

oversight and management 

agendas, this report, which was 

performed under the Comptroller 

General’s authority, addresses 

actions needed to enhance 

interagency collaboration for 

national security activities: (1) the 

development and implementation 

of overarching, integrated 

strategies; (2) the creation of 

collaborative organizations; (3) the 

development of a well-trained 

workforce; and (4) the sharing and 

integration of national security 

information across agencies. This 

report is based largely on a body of 

GAO work issued since 2005. 

What GAO Recommends

Since 2005, GAO has recommended 

that agencies incorporate desirable 

characteristics of national 

strategies, take actions to create 

collaborative organizations, 

address a wide range of human 

capital issues, and establish or 

clarify guidelines for sharing 

national security information. 

Agencies have taken some actions 

to enhance interagency 

collaboration, but much work 

remains. 

Based on prior work, GAO has found that agencies need to take the following 

actions to enhance interagency collaboration for national security: 

Develop and implement overarching strategies. Although some U.S. 

government agencies have developed or updated overarching strategies on 

national security issues, GAO has reported that in some cases, such as U.S. 

government efforts to improve the capacity of Iraq’s ministries to govern, U.S. 

efforts have been hindered by multiple agencies pursuing individual efforts 

without an overarching strategy. In particular, a strategy defining 

organizational roles and responsibilities and coordination mechanisms can 

help agencies clarify who will lead or participate in activities, organize their 

joint and individual efforts, and facilitate decision making. 

Create collaborative organizations. Organizational differences—including 

differences in agencies’ structures, planning processes, and funding sources—

can hinder interagency collaboration, potentially wasting scarce funds and 

limiting the effectiveness of federal efforts. For example, defense and national 

intelligence activities are funded through separate budgets. Disagreement 

about funding from each budget led to the initial operating capability date 

being pushed back 1 year for a new space radar system. Coordination 

mechanisms are not always formalized or not fully utilized, potentially limiting 

their effectiveness in enhancing interagency collaboration. 

Develop a well-trained workforce. Collaborative approaches to national 

security require a well-trained workforce with the skills and experience to 

integrate the government’s diverse capabilities and resources, but some 

federal government agencies lack the personnel capacity to fully participate in 

interagency activities. Some federal agencies have taken steps to improve 

their capacity to participate in interagency activities, but personnel shortages 

have impeded agencies’ ability to participate in these activities, such as efforts 

to integrate personnel from other federal government agencies into the 

Department of Defense’s (DOD) new U.S. Africa Command. Increased training 

opportunities and strategic workforce planning efforts could facilitate federal 

agencies’ ability to fully participate in interagency collaboration activities. 

Share and integrate national security information across agencies. 

Information is a crucial tool in national security and its timely dissemination is 

critical for maintaining national security. However, despite progress made in 

sharing terrorism-related information, agencies and private-sector partners do 

not always share relevant information with their national security partners 

due to a lack of clear guidelines for sharing information and security 

clearance issues. For example, GAO found that non-DOD personnel could not 

access some DOD planning documents or participate in planning sessions 

because they may not have had the proper security clearances. Additionally, 

incorporating information drawn from multiple sources poses challenges to 

managing and integrating that information. 

View GAO-09-904SP or key components.

For more information, contact Janet St. 

Laurent at (202) 512-4300 or Jacquelyn 

Williams-Bridgers at (202) 512-3101. 
Page i GAO-09-904SP 

Contents 

Letter 1

Enclosure I Developing and Implementing Overarching Strategies 

to Enhance Collaboration for U.S. National Security 11 

Enclosure II Creating Collaborative Organizations That Facilitate 

Integrated National Security Approaches 18 

Enclosure III Developing a Workforce to Enhance Collaboration in 

U.S. National Security 31 

Enclosure IV Sharing and Integrating National Security 

Information across Agencies 45 

Appendix I GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments 54 

Related GAO Products 55 

Figures 

Figure 1: Comparison of the State Department’s Regional Bureaus 

and DOD’s Combatant Command Areas of Responsibility 19 

Figure 2: Fiscal Year 2009 Funding for Key Agencies Involved in 

National Security 23 

Figure 3: Number of Civilian Government Employees and Military 

Personnel Employed by Key Agencies Involved in 

National Security 24 

 Interagency Collaboration 
Abbreviations 

DEA Drug Enforcement Administration 

DOD Department of Defense 

FBI Federal Bureau of Investigation 

ICE Immigration and Customs Enforcement 

NORTHCOM U.S. Northern Command 

USAID U.S. Agency for International Development 

This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in the 

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Page ii GAO-09-904SP Interagency Collaboration
Page 1 GAO-09-904SP 

 

United States Government Accountability Office

Washington, DC 20548 

 

September 25, 2009 

Congressional Committees 

As evidenced by the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, and other 

recent events, challenges to national security have expanded significantly 

from the traditional state-based threats of the Cold War era to include 

unconventional threats from nonstate actors. These new threats are 

diffuse and ambiguous and include terrorist threats from extremist groups, 

cyber attacks, drug trafficking, infectious diseases, and energy threats. 

They arise from multiple sources and—because their interrelated nature 

makes it difficult, if not impossible, for any single agency to effectively 

address them alone—they have required the U.S. government to enhance 

collaboration with interagency and international partners, among other 

actions.1

 In addition to changes in national security threats, the agencies 

involved in addressing these threats also have evolved. Beyond the 

traditional agencies of the Departments of Defense (DOD) and State, and 

the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), other agencies 

involved in national security include the Departments of Homeland 

Security, Energy, Justice, the Treasury, Agriculture, and Commerce. While 

national security activities require collaboration among multiple agencies 

and often across federal, state, and local governments, the mechanisms 

used for national security activities—such as developing strategies, 

planning and executing missions, providing resources for those activities, 

and sharing information—are based on a framework established to meet 

threats posed by the Cold War and may not provide the means for 

interagency collaboration needed to meet modern national security 

challenges. 

In our prior work, we have identified situations in which the lack of 

interagency collaboration has hindered national security efforts. For 

example, we have previously reported and testified that since 2005, 

multiple U.S. agencies—including the State Department, USAID, and 

1

For the purpose of this report we define “collaboration” as any joint activity by two or 

more organizations that is intended to produce more public value than could be produced 

when the organizations act alone. We use the term “collaboration” broadly to include 

interagency activities that others have variously defined as “cooperation,” “coordination,” 

“integration,” or “networking.” GAO, Results-Oriented Government: Practices That Can 

Help Enhance and Sustain Collaboration among Federal Agencies, GAO-06-15 

(Washington, D.C.: Oct. 21, 2005). 

 Interagency Collaboration
 

DOD—led separate efforts to improve the capacity of Iraq’s ministries to 

govern, without overarching direction from a lead entity to integrate their 

efforts. We found that the lack of an overarching strategy contributed to 

U.S. efforts not meeting their goal of key Iraqi ministries having the 

capacity to effectively govern and assume increasing responsibility for 

operating, maintaining, and further investing in reconstruction projects.2

Additionally, because of concerns about agencies’ ability to protect shared 

information or use that information properly, other agencies and privatesector partners are sometimes hesitant to share information. For example, 

we reported that Department of Homeland Security officials expressed 

concerns about sharing terrorism-related information with state and local 

partners because such information had occasionally been posted on public 

Internet sites or otherwise compromised.3

Congress has recently taken steps to strengthen interagency collaboration 

for national security issues. For example, in the fiscal year 2008 National 

Defense Authorization Act, Congress directed that the Secretary of 

Defense develop and submit to Congress a plan to improve and reform the 

department’s participation in and contribution to the interagency 

coordination process on national security issues.4

 Similarly, in the fiscal 

year 2009 National Defense Authorization Act, Congress gave authority to 

the Secretaries of Defense and State and the Administrator of USAID to 

jointly establish an advisory panel to advise, review, and make 

recommendations on ways to improve coordination among the agencies 

on national security issues, including reviewing their respective roles and 

responsibilities. The panel would be comprised of 12 members with 

national recognition and significant experience in the federal government, 

the armed forces, public administration, foreign affairs, or development.5

 

2

GAO, Iraq and Afghanistan: Security, Economic, and Governance Challenges to 

Rebuilding Efforts Should Be Addressed in U.S. Strategies, GAO-09-476T (Washington, 

D.C.: Mar. 25, 2009); Stabilizing and Rebuilding Iraq: Actions Needed to Address 

Inadequate Accountability over U.S. Efforts and Investments, GAO-08-568T (Washington, 

D.C.: Mar. 11, 2008); Stabilizing and Rebuilding Iraq: U.S. Ministry Capacity 

Development Efforts Need an Overall Integrated Strategy to Guide Efforts and Manage 

Risk, GAO-08-117 (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 1, 2007). 

3

GAO, Information Sharing: The Federal Government Needs to Establish Policies and 

Processes for Sharing Terrorism-Related and Sensitive but Unclassified Information, 

GAO-06-385 (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 17, 2006). 

4

Pub. L. No. 110-181 § 952 (2008). 

5

Pub. L. No. 110-417 § 1054 (2008). 

Page 2 GAO-09-904SP Interagency Collaboration
 

To better enable agencies to address today’s national security challenges, 

a number of commissions, research institutions, and congressionally 

mandated studies have put forth proposals to reform part or all of the 

national security system. Proposals range from far-reaching restructuring 

of the system to smaller-scale proposals such as increasing resources for 

civilian agencies. A recurring theme of many of these proposals is the need 

for changes to improve interagency collaboration on national security 

matters. 

Committed and effective leadership is a critical aspect of enhancing 

interagency collaboration for national security–related activities. We have 

previously reported that committed leadership by those involved in 

collaborative efforts from all levels of the organization is needed to 

overcome the many barriers to working across agency boundaries.6

National security experts also note the importance of and need for 

effective leadership for national security issues. For example, a recent 

report by the Project on National Security Reform notes that the national 

security system requires skilled leadership at all levels and, to enhance 

interagency coordination, these leaders must be adept at forging links and 

fostering partnerships all levels.7

To assist the 111th Congress and the new administration in developing 

their oversight and management agendas, we have provided a set of 

enclosures on the challenges to enhancing interagency collaboration in 

national security activities. These enclosures expand on issues related to 

national security facing this Congress and the new administration 

discussed on GAO’s transition Web site, 

http://www.gao.gov/transition_2009/index.php. Based on our prior work, 

to enhance interagency collaboration for national security, agencies need 

to enhance their efforts to do the following: 

• Develop and implement overarching strategies. Although some U.S. 

government agencies have developed or updated overarching strategies on 

national security–related issues, we have testified and reported that in 

some cases U.S. efforts have been hindered by the lack of information on 

roles and responsibilities of organizations involved or coordination 

mechanisms to integrate their efforts. For example, in May 2007 we 

reported that the lack of an overarching strategy with clear roles and 

 

6

GAO-06-15. 

7

Project on National Security Reform, Forging a New Shield (Arlington, Va.: Nov. 26, 2008). 

Page 3 GAO-09-904SP Interagency Collaboration
 

responsibilities led two law enforcement agencies—which were 

unknowingly working with different foreign law enforcement agencies in 

their efforts to assist foreign nations to identify, disrupt, and prosecute 

terrorists—to move in on the same subject. According to foreign and U.S. 

law enforcement officials, this action may have compromised other 

investigations.8

 Our prior work has found that strategic direction is 

required as the basis for collaboration toward national security goals. 

Defining organizational roles and responsibilities and mechanisms for 

coordination can help agencies clarify who will lead or participate in 

which activities, organize their joint activities and individual efforts, 

facilitate decision making, and address how conflicts would be resolved, 

thereby facilitating interagency collaboration. 

• Create collaborative organizations. Agencies have different 

organizational structures, planning processes, and funding sources to plan 

for and conduct their national security activities, which can hinder 

interagency collaboration. This can result in a patchwork of activities that 

waste scarce funds and limit the overall effectiveness of federal efforts. 

For example, differences in organizational structures for interacting with 

other nations require agencies to coordinate with a large number of 

organizations in their regional planning efforts, potentially creating gaps 

and overlaps in policy implementation and leading to challenges in 

coordinating efforts among agencies. Moreover, funding for national 

security activities is budgeted for and appropriated by agency, rather than 

by functional area (such as national security), resulting in budget requests 

and congressional appropriations that tend to reflect individual agency 

concerns. Given these organizational differences, adequate coordination 

mechanisms can facilitate the interagency collaboration needed to achieve 

integrated approaches to national security. We found that some agencies 

have established coordination mechanisms to facilitate interagency 

collaboration. For example, DOD, State Department, and USAID officials 

have established processes to coordinate projects in Iraq and Afghanistan 

related to humanitarian relief and reconstruction funded through the 

 

8

GAO, Combating Terrorism: Law Enforcement Agencies Lack Directives to Assist 

Foreign Nations to Identify, Disrupt, and Prosecute Terrorists, GAO-07-697 (Washington, 

D.C.: May 25, 2007). 

Page 4 GAO-09-904SP Interagency Collaboration
 

Commander’s Emergency Response Program.9 However, other 

mechanisms are not formalized or are not fully utilized, potentially limiting 

their effectiveness in enhancing interagency collaboration. 

• Develop a well-trained workforce. Collaborative approaches to national 

security require a well-trained workforce with the skills and experience to 

integrate the government’s diverse capabilities and resources, but some 

federal government agencies lack the personnel capacity to fully 

participate in interagency activities. For example, DOD’s U.S. Africa 

Command was originally intended to have significant interagency 

representation, with experts from the Departments of State, the Treasury, 

and Agriculture, USAID, and other civilian agencies; however, due in part 

to a shortage of available personnel at those agencies, the command has 

received limited interagency participation.10 Moreover, some federal 

government agencies do not have the necessary capabilities to support 

their national security roles and responsibilities. For example, in 

September 2009 we reported that 31 percent of the State Department’s 

generalists and specialists in language-designated positions did not meet 

the language requirements for their position, an increase from 29 percent 

in 2005.11 In addition, agencies’ personnel systems do not always facilitate 

interagency collaboration, with interagency assignments often not being 

considered career-enhancing or recognized in performance management 

systems, which could diminish employees’ interest in serving in 

interagency efforts. Two tools could facilitate federal agencies’ ability to 

fully participate in interagency collaboration activities: (1) increasing 

training opportunities, which can help personnel develop the skills and 

understanding of other agencies’ capabilities needed to facilitate 

interagency collaboration, and (2) focusing on strategic workforce 

planning efforts, which can support agencies’ efforts to secure the 

personnel resources needed to collaborate in interagency missions. 

 

9

The Commander’s Emergency Response Program was designed to enable local 

commanders in Iraq and Afghanistan to respond to urgent humanitarian relief and 

reconstruction requirements within their areas of responsibility. See GAO, Military 

Operations: Actions Needed to Improve Oversight and Interagency Coordination for the 

Commander’s Emergency Response Program in Afghanistan, GAO-09-615 (Washington, 

D.C.: May 18, 2009), and Military Operations: Actions Needed to Better Guide Project 

Selection for Commander’s Emergency Response Program and Improve Oversight in 

Iraq, GAO-08-736R (Washington, D.C.: June 23, 2008). 

10GAO, Defense Management: Actions Needed to Address Stakeholder Concerns, Improve 

Interagency Collaboration, and Determine Full Costs Associated with the U.S. Africa 

Command, GAO-09-181 (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 20, 2009). 

11GAO, Department of State: Comprehensive Plan Needed to Address Persistent Foreign 

Language Shortfalls, GAO-09-955 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 17, 2009). 

Page 5 GAO-09-904SP Interagency Collaboration
 

• Share and integrate national security information across agencies.

Information is a crucial tool in national security and its timely 

dissemination is critical for maintaining national security; however, 

agencies do not always share relevant information with their national 

security partners. More than 8 years after 9/11, federal, state, and local 

governments and private-sector partners are making progress in sharing 

terrorism-related information. For example, we reported in October 2007 

that most states and many local governments had established fusion 

centers—collaborative efforts to detect, prevent, investigate, and respond 

to criminal and terrorist activity—to address gaps in information sharing.12

However, agencies may not always share all relevant information with 

their national security partners for a variety of reasons, including a lack of 

clear guidelines for sharing information with other agencies and security 

clearance issues. For example, we reported in May 2007 that non-DOD 

personnel could not access some DOD planning documents or participate 

in planning sessions because they may not have had the proper security 

clearances, hindering interagency participation in the development of 

military plans.13 Additionally, we have found that incorporating 

information drawn from multiple sources poses challenges to managing 

and integrating that information. For example, we reported in December 

2008 that in Louisiana, reconstruction project information had to be 

repeatedly resubmitted separately to state and Federal Emergency 

Management Agency officials during post–Hurricane Katrina 

reconstruction efforts because the system used to track project 

information did not facilitate the exchange of documents. Information was 

sometimes lost during this exchange, requiring state officials to resubmit 

the information, creating redundancies and duplication of effort. As a 

result, reconstruction efforts in Louisiana were delayed.14

As we discuss in the enclosures, we have made a number of 

recommendations to executive branch agencies, including DOD, the 

Departments of State and Homeland Security, USAID, and others, to 

address these issues in recent years. In commenting on draft reports, 

agencies generally agreed with our recommendations and, in some cases, 

 

12GAO, Homeland Security: Federal Efforts Are Helping to Alleviate Some Challenges 

Encountered by State and Local Information Fusion Centers, GAO-08-35 (Washington, 

D.C.: Oct. 30, 2007). 

13GAO, Military Operations: Actions Needed to Improve DOD’s Stability Operations 

Approach and Enhance Interagency Planning, GAO-07-549 (Washington, D.C.: May 31, 

2007). 

14GAO, Disaster Recovery: FEMA’s Public Assistance Grant Program Experienced 

Challenges with Gulf Coast Rebuilding, GAO-09-129 (Washington, D.C.: Dec. 18, 2008). 

Page 6 GAO-09-904SP Interagency Collaboration
 

identified planned actions or actions that were underway to address the 

recommendations. While agencies have taken some actions to enhance 

interagency collaboration, much work remains in developing and 

implementing overarching strategies, creating collaborative organizations, 

developing a well-trained workforce, and sharing and integrating national 

security information across agencies. 

The issues discussed in the attached enclosures are largely based on 

completed GAO work. We reviewed GAO’s body of work on interagency 

collaboration related to national security, which includes reports and 

testimonies on a variety of issues, including stabilization and 

reconstruction efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan, DOD’s establishment of 

U.S. Africa Command, planning and coordination for an influenza 

pandemic, information sharing, critical infrastructure protection, disaster 

recovery, acquisitions and contracting, strategic planning, human capital, 

and foreign aid reform. We did not update the findings from those reports, 

but are reporting our findings as of the time the prior reports were issued. 

To frame the issues and place them in strategic context, we also examined 

studies from U.S. government agencies and research institutions. We 

developed the scope of these external studies through a literature review, 

followed by contacts with key researchers and organizations to ensure 

that our review included an overview of the significant work on challenges 

to collaboration on national security. We conducted this performance 

audit from February 2009 through September 2009. This report is generally 

based on completed GAO work that was performed in accordance with 

generally accepted government auditing standards. Those standards 

require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate 

evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions 

based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained 

provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our 

audit objectives. 

We are sending copies of this report to the congressional committees 

listed below. In addition, we are sending copies of this report to the 

President and the Vice President of the United States and executive 

branch agencies. The report also is available at no charge on the GAO Web 

site at http://www.gao.gov. If you have any questions, please contact 

Janet A. St. Laurent at (202) 512-4300 or stlaurentj@gao.gov or 

Jacquelyn L. Williams Bridgers at (202) 512-3101 or 

williamsbridgersj@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of 

Congressional Relations and Public Affairs can be found on the last page 

Page 7 GAO-09-904SP Interagency Collaboration
 

of this report. For press inquiries, please contact Charles Young at (202) 

Janet A. St. Laurent 

512-3823. Key contributors to this report are included in appendix I. 

Managing Director, Defense Capabilities and Management 

Jacquelyn L. Williams-Bridgers 

Managing Director, International Affairs and Trade 

Page 8 GAO-09-904SP Interagency Collaboration
 

List of Committees 

The Honorable Carl Levin 

Chairman 

The Honorable John McCain 

Ranking Member 

Committee on Armed Services 

United States Senate 

The Honorable John F. Kerry 

Chairman 

The Honorable Richard G. Lugar 

Ranking Member 

Committee on Foreign Relations 

United States Senate 

The Honorable Joseph I. Lieberman 

Chairman 

The Honorable Susan M. Collins 

Ranking Member 

Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs 

United States Senate 

The Honorable Daniel K. Akaka 

Chairman 

The Honorable George V. Voinovich 

Ranking Member 

Subcommittee on Oversight of Government Management, 

 the Federal Workforce, and the District of Columbia 

Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs 

United States Senate 

The Honorable Ike Skelton 

Chairman 

The Honorable Howard P. McKeon 

Ranking Member 

Committee on Armed Services 

House of Representatives 

Page 9 GAO-09-904SP Interagency Collaboration
 

The Honorable Howard L. Berman 

Chairman 

The Honorable Ileana Ros-Lehtinen 

Ranking Member 

Committee on Foreign Affairs 

House of Representatives 

The Honorable Bennie G. Thompson 

Chairman 

The Honorable Peter T. King 

Ranking Member 

Committee on Homeland Security 

House of Representatives 

The Honorable Edolphus Towns 

Chairman 

The Honorable Darrell Issa 

Ranking Member 

Committee on Oversight and Government Reform 

House of Representatives 

The Honorable John Tierney 

Chairman 

The Honorable Jeff Flake 

Ranking Member 

Subcommittee on National Security and Foreign Affairs 

Committee on Oversight and Government Reform 

House of Representatives 

Page 10 GAO-09-904SP Interagency Collaboration
Enclosure

Overar

C

 I: Developing and Implementing 

ching Strategies to Enhance

ollaboration for U.S. National Security 

Page 11 GAO-09-904SP 

Enclosure I: Developing and Implementing 

Overarching Strategies to Enhance 

Collaboration for U.S. National Security 

National security challenges covering a broad array of areas, ranging from 

preparedness for an influenza pandemic to Iraqi governance and 

reconstruction, have necessitated using all elements of national power—

including diplomatic, military, intelligence, development assistance, 

economic, and law enforcement support. These elements fall under the 

authority of numerous U.S. government agencies, requiring overarching 

strategies and plans to enhance agencies’ abilities to collaborate with each 

other, as well as with foreign, state, and local governments and 

nongovernmental partners. Without overarching strategies, agencies often 

operate independently to achieve their own objectives, increasing the risk 

of duplication or gaps in national security efforts that may result in 

wasting scarce resources and limiting program effectiveness. Strategies 

can enhance interagency collaboration by helping agencies develop 

mutually reinforcing plans and determine activities, resources, processes, 

and performance measures for implementing those strategies. 

Issue Statement 

Strategies can be focused on broad national security objectives, like the 

National Security Strategy issued by the President, or on a specific 

program or activity, like the U.S. strategy for Iraq. Strategies have been 

developed by the Homeland Security Council, such as the National 

Strategy for Homeland Security;

1

 jointly with multiple agencies, such as 

the National Strategy for Maritime Security, which was developed jointly 

by the Secretaries of Defense and Homeland Security; or by an agency that 

is leading an interagency effort, such as the National Intelligence 

Strategy, which was developed under the leadership of the Office of the 

Director of National Intelligence. Congress recognized the importance of 

overarching strategies to guide interagency efforts, as shown by the 

requirement in the fiscal year 2009 National Defense Authorization Act for 

the President to submit to the appropriate committees of Congress a 

report on a comprehensive interagency strategy for public diplomacy and 

strategic communication of the federal government, including benchmarks 

and a timetable for achieving such benchmarks, by December 31, 2009.2

Congress and the administration will need to examine the ability of the 

 

1

The National Security Council also has developed strategies for national security issues. 

The National Security Council was established in 1947 to advise the President with respect 

to the integration of domestic, foreign, and military policies related to national security to 

allow agencies to collaborate more effectively. After September 11, the Bush 

administration created the Homeland Security Council. The Obama administration has 

combined the staffs of the Homeland Security Council and National Security Council. 

2

Pub. L. No. 110-417 § 1055 (2008). 

 Interagency Collaboration
Enclosure I: Developing and Implementing 

Overarching Strategies to Enhance 

Collaboration for U.S. National Security 

executive branch to develop and implement overarching strategies to 

enhance collaboration for national security efforts. 

Key Findings 

Although Some Agencies 

Have Developed 

Overarching Strategies, the 

Lack of Information on 

Roles and Responsibilities 

and Lack of Coordination 

Mechanisms Can Hinder 

Interagency Collaboration 

Although some U.S. government agencies have developed or updated 

overarching strategies since September 11, 2001, the lack of information 

on roles and responsibilities and lack of coordination mechanisms in these 

strategies can hinder interagency collaboration. Our prior work, as well as 

that by national security experts, has found that strategic direction is 

required as the basis for collaboration toward national security goals.3

Overarching strategies can help agencies overcome differences in 

missions, cultures, and ways of doing business by providing strategic 

direction for activities and articulating a common outcome to 

collaboratively work toward.4

 As a result, agencies can better align their 

activities, processes, and resources to collaborate effectively to 

accomplish a commonly defined outcome. Without having the strategic 

direction that overarching strategies can provide, agencies may develop 

their own individual efforts that may not be well-coordinated with that of 

interagency partners, thereby limiting progress in meeting national 

security goals. Defining organizational roles and responsibilities and 

mechanisms for coordination—one of the desirable characteristics for 

strategies that we have identified in our prior work—can help agencies 

clarify who will lead or participate in which activities, organize their joint 

activities and individual efforts, facilitate decision making, and address 

how conflicts would be resolved.5

Desirable Characteristics for 

Strategies

In GAO-04-408T, we identified six desirable 

characteristics to aid agencies in further 

developing and implementing strategies, to 

enhance their usefulness in resource and 

policy decisions, and to better assure 

accountability. These characteristics are: 

(1) why the strategy was produced, the

scope of its coverage, and the process

by which it was developed; 

(2) the problems and threats the strategy is

 directed toward; 

(3) what the strategy is trying to achieve,

steps to achieve those results, as well as

 the priorities, milestones, and

 performance measures to gauge results; 

(4) what the strategy will cost, the sources

and types of resources and investments

 needed, and where resources and

 investments should be targeted based

 on balancing risk reductions with costs; 

(5) who will be implementing the strategy,

 what their roles will be compared to

 others, and mechanisms for them to

 coordinate their efforts; and 

(6) how the strategy relates to other

strategies and plans. 

 

3

See, for example, GAO, Results-Oriented Government: Practices That Can Help Enhance 

and Sustain Collaboration among Federal Agencies, GAO-06-15 (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 

21, 2005); Combating Terrorism: The United States Lacks Comprehensive Plan to Destroy 

the Terrorist Threat and Close the Safe Haven in Pakistan’s Federally Administered 

Tribal Areas, GAO-08-622 (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 17, 2008); and Project on National 

Security Reform, Forging a New Shield (Arlington, Va.: Nov. 26, 2008). 

4

GAO-06-15. 

5

GAO, Combating Terrorism: Evaluation of Selected Characteristics in National 

Strategies Related to Terrorism, GAO-04-408T (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 3, 2004). 

Page 12 GAO-09-904SP Interagency Collaboration
Enclosure I: Developing and Implementing 

Overarching Strategies to Enhance 

Collaboration for U.S. National Security 

The lack of overarching strategies that address roles and responsibilities 

and coordination mechanisms—among other desirable characteristics that 

we have identified in our prior work—can hinder interagency 

collaboration for national security programs at home and abroad. We have 

testified and reported that in some cases U.S. efforts have been hindered 

by multiple agencies pursuing individual efforts without overarching 

strategies detailing roles and responsibilities of organizations involved or 

coordination mechanisms to integrate their efforts. For example, we have 

found the following: 

• Since 2005, multiple U.S. agencies—including the State Department, U.S. 

Agency for International Development (USAID), and Department of 

Defense (DOD)—had led separate efforts to improve the capacity of Iraq’s 

ministries to govern without overarching direction from a lead entity to 

integrate their efforts. As we have testified and reported,6

 the lack of an 

overarching strategy contributed to U.S. efforts not meeting their goal of 

key Iraqi ministries having the capacity to effectively govern and assume 

increasing responsibility for operating, maintaining, and further investing 

in reconstruction projects.7

• In July 2008 we reported that agencies involved in the Trans-Sahara 

Counterterrorism Partnership had not developed a comprehensive, 

integrated strategy for the program’s implementation.8

 The State 

Department, USAID, and DOD had developed separate plans related to 

their respective program activities that reflect some interagency 

collaboration, for example, in assessing country needs for development 

assistance. However, these plans did not incorporate all of the desirable 

 

6

GAO, Iraq and Afghanistan: Security, Economic, and Governance Challenges to 

Rebuilding Efforts Should Be Addressed in U.S. Strategies, GAO-09-476T (Washington, 

D.C.: Mar. 25, 2009); Stabilizing and Rebuilding Iraq: Actions Needed to Address 

Inadequate Accountability over U.S. Efforts and Investments, GAO-08-568T (Washington, 

D.C.: Mar. 11, 2008); Stabilizing and Rebuilding Iraq: U.S. Ministry Capacity 

Development Efforts Need an Overall Integrated Strategy to Guide Efforts and Manage 

Risk, GAO-08-117 (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 1, 2007). 

7

The State Department hired a contractor in 2008 to develop a strategic planning document 

for ministry capacity development in Iraq. Additionally, the United States shifted its 

emphasis to helping Iraqi ministries execute their capital investment budgets based on the 

update to the U.S. strategy in Iraq in 2007. 

8

The Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership is a multiyear, multiagency effort to 

support diplomacy, development assistance, and military activities to strengthen country 

and regional counterterrorism capabilities and inhibit the spread of extremist ideology. Key 

agencies in the effort are the State Department, USAID, and DOD, with the State 

Department’s Bureau of African Affairs as the program lead. 

Page 13 GAO-09-904SP Interagency Collaboration
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characteristics for strategies that we have previously identified. For 

example, we found that roles and responsibilities—particularly between 

the State Department and DOD—were unclear with regard to authority 

over DOD personnel temporarily assigned to conduct certain program 

activities in African countries, and DOD officials said that disagreements 

affected implementation of DOD’s activities in Niger. DOD suspended 

most of its program activities in Niger in 2007 after the ambassador limited 

the number of DOD personnel allowed to enter the country. State 

Department officials said these limits were set in part because of embassy 

concerns about the country’s fragile political environment as well as 

limited space and staff available to support DOD personnel deployed to 

partner countries.9

• At the time of our May 2007 review, we found that the State Department 

office responsible for coordinating law enforcement agencies’ role in 

combating terrorism had not developed or implemented an overarching 

plan to use the combined capabilities of U.S. law enforcement agencies to 

assist foreign nations to identify, disrupt, and prosecute terrorists. 

Additionally, the national strategies related to this effort lacked clearly 

defined roles and responsibilities.10 In one country we visited for that 

review, the lack of clear roles and responsibilities led two law 

enforcement agencies, which were unknowingly working with different 

foreign law enforcement agencies, to move in on the same subject. 

According to foreign and U.S. law enforcement officials, such actions may 

have compromised other investigations. We also reported that because the 

national strategies related to this effort did not clarify specific roles, 

among other issues, law enforcement agencies were not being fully used 

abroad to protect U.S. citizens and interests from future terrorist attacks.11

• In our work on the federal government’s pandemic influenza preparedness 

efforts, we noted that the Departments of Homeland Security and Health 

and Human Services share most federal leadership roles in implementing 

the pandemic influenza strategy and supporting plans; however, we 

 

9

GAO, Combating Terrorism: Actions Needed to Enhance Implementation of TransSahara Counterterrorism Partnership, GAO-08-860 (Washington, D.C.: July 31, 2008).

10Three strategies that provide some strategic-level guidance for U.S. law enforcement 

agencies to help foreign nations identify, disrupt, and prosecute terrorists are the National 

Security Strategy, the National Strategy for Homeland Security, and the National 

Strategy for Combating Terrorism.

11GAO, Combating Terrorism: Law Enforcement Agencies Lack Directives to Assist 

Foreign Nations to Identify, Disrupt, and Prosecute Terrorists, GAO-07-697 (Washington, 

D.C.: May 25, 2007). 

Page 14 GAO-09-904SP Interagency Collaboration
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reported that it was not clear how this would work in practice because 

their roles were unclear. The National Strategy for Pandemic Influenza

and its supporting implementation plan described the Secretary of Health 

and Human Services as being responsible for leading the medical response 

in a pandemic, while the Secretary of Homeland Security would be 

responsible for overall domestic incident management and federal 

coordination. However, since a pandemic extends well beyond health and 

medical boundaries, to include sustaining critical infrastructure, privatesector activities, the movement of goods and services across the nation 

and the globe, and economic and security considerations, it is not clear 

when, in a pandemic, the Secretary of Health and Human Services would 

be in the lead and when the Secretary of Homeland Security would lead. 

This lack of clarity on roles and responsibilities could lead to confusion or 

disagreements among implementing agencies that could hinder 

interagency collaboration, and a federal response could be slowed as 

agencies resolve their roles and responsibilities following the onset of a 

significant outbreak.12

• In March 2008, we reported that DOD and the intelligence community had 

not developed, agreed upon, or issued a national security space strategy. 

The United States depends on space assets to support national security 

activities, among other activities. Reports have long recognized the need 

for a strategy to guide the national security space community’s efforts in 

space and better integrate the activities of DOD and the intelligence 

community. Moreover, Congress found in the past that DOD and the 

intelligence community may not be well-positioned to coordinate certain 

intelligence activities and programs to ensure unity of effort and avoid 

duplication of efforts. We reported that a draft strategy had been 

developed in 2004, but according to the National Security Space Office 

Director, the National Security Council requested that the strategy not be 

issued until the revised National Space Policy directive was released in 

October 2006. However, once the policy was issued, changes in leadership 

at the National Reconnaissance Office and Air Force, as well as 

differences in opinion and organizational differences between the defense 

and intelligence communities further delayed issuance of the strategy. 

Until a national security space strategy is issued, the defense and 

 

12GAO, Influenza Pandemic: Continued Focus on the Nation’s Planning and 

Preparedness Efforts Remains Essential, GAO-09-760T (Washington, D.C.: June 3, 2009); 

Influenza Pandemic: Sustaining Focus on the Nation’s Planning and Preparedness 

Efforts, GAO-09-334 (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 26, 2009); and Influenza Pandemic: Further 

Efforts Are Needed to Ensure Clearer Federal Leadership Roles and an Effective National 

Strategy, GAO-07-781 (Washington, D.C.: Aug. 14, 2007). 

Page 15 GAO-09-904SP Interagency Collaboration
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intelligence communities may continue to make independent decisions 

and use resources that are not necessarily based on national priorities, 

which could lead to gaps in some areas of space operations and 

redundancies in others.13

• We testified in March 2009 that as the current administration clarifies its 

new strategy for Iraq and develops a new comprehensive strategy for 

Afghanistan, these strategies should incorporate the desirable 

characteristics we have previously identified.14 This includes, among other 

issues, the roles and responsibilities of U.S. government agencies, and 

mechanisms and approaches for coordinating the efforts of the wide 

variety of U.S. agencies and international organizations—such as DOD, the 

Departments of State, the Treasury, and Justice, USAID, the United 

Nations, and the World Bank—that have significant roles in Iraq and 

Afghanistan. Clearly defining and coordinating the roles, responsibilities, 

commitments, and activities of all organizations involved would allow the 

U.S. government to prioritize the spending of limited resources and avoid 

unnecessary duplication.15

In recent years we have issued reports recommending that U.S. 

government agencies, including DOD, the State Department, and others, 

develop or revise strategies to incorporate desirable characteristics for 

strategies for a range of programs and activities including humanitarian 

and development efforts in Somalia, the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism 

Partnership, foreign assistance strategy, law enforcement agencies’ role in 

assisting foreign nations in combating terrorism, and meeting U.S. national 

security goals in Pakistan’s Federally Administered Tribal Areas. In 

commenting on drafts of those reports, agencies generally concurred with 

our recommendations. Officials from one organization—the National 

Counterterrorism Center—noted that at the time of our May 2007 report 

on law enforcement agencies’ role in assisting foreign nations in 

Past GAO 

Recommendations 

 

13GAO, Defense Space Activities: National Security Space Strategy Needed to Guide 

Future Space Efforts, GAO-08-431R (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 27, 2008). 

14We noted in that testimony that for Afghanistan, the strategy should address risks posed 

by neighboring countries that can profoundly influence security and stability—particularly 

Pakistan. We have previously recommended that the United States establish a 

comprehensive plan for countering terrorist threats in Pakistan that have tended to 

destabilize Afghanistan. 

15GAO-09-476T. 

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combating terrorism, it had already begun to implement our 

recommendations.16

• What steps are agencies taking to develop joint or mutually supportive Oversight Questions strategies to guide interagency activities? 

• What obstacles or impediments exist to developing comprehensive 

strategies or plans that integrate multiple agencies’ efforts? 

• What specific national security challenges would be best served by 

overarching strategies? 

• Who should be responsible for determining and overseeing these 

overarching strategies? Who should be responsible for developing the 

shared outcomes? 

• How will agencies ensure effective implementation of overarching 

strategies? 

• To what extent do strategies developed by federal agencies clearly identify 

priorities, milestones, and performance measures to gauge results? 

• What steps are federal agencies taking to ensure coordination of planning 

and implementation of strategies with state and local governments when 

appropriate? 

 

16GAO-07-697. 

Page 17 GAO-09-904SP Interagency Collaboration
Enc

Or

Nationa

losure II: Creating Collaborative 

ganizations That Facilitate Integrated 

l Security Approaches 

Page 18 GAO-09-904SP 

Enclosure II: Creating Collaborative 

Organizations That Facilitate Integrated 

National Security Approaches 

U.S. government agencies, such as the Department of State, the U.S. 

Agency for International Development (USAID), and the Department of 

Defense (DOD), among others, spend billions of dollars annually on 

various diplomatic, development, and defense missions in support of 

national security. At a time when our nation faces increased fiscal 

constraints, it is increasingly important that agencies use their resources 

efficiently and effectively. Achieving meaningful results in many national 

security–related interagency efforts requires coordinated efforts among 

various actors across federal agencies; foreign, state, and local 

governments; nongovernment organizations; and the private sector. Given 

the number of agencies involved in U.S. government national security 

efforts, it is particularly important that there be mechanisms to coordinate 

across agencies. However, differences in agencies’ structures, processes, 

and resources can hinder successful collaboration in national security, and 

adequate coordination mechanisms to facilitate collaboration during 

national security planning and execution are not always in place. Congress 

and the administration will need to consider the extent to which agencies’ 

existing structures, processes, and funding sources facilitate interagency 

collaboration and whether changes could enhance collaboration. 

Issue Statement 

Key Findings 

Organizational Differences 

Can Hinder Collaboration 

on National Security 

Activities 

Based on our prior work, organizational differences—including 

differences in organizational structures, planning processes, and funding 

sources—can hinder interagency collaboration, resulting in a patchwork 

of activities that can waste scarce funds and limit the overall effectiveness 

of federal efforts.1

Differences in organizational structures can hinder collaboration for 

national security efforts. Agencies involved in national security activities 

define and organize their regions differently. For example, DOD’s regional 

combatant commands and the State Department’s regional bureaus are 

aligned differently, as shown in figure 1. 

 

1

GAO, Results-Oriented Government: Practices That Can Help Enhance and Sustain 

Collaboration among Federal Agencies, GAO-06-15 (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 21, 2005), and 

Managing for Results: Barriers to Interagency Coordination, GAO/GGD-00-106 

(Washington, D.C.: Mar. 29, 2000). 

 Interagency Collaboration
Enclosure II: Creating Collaborative 

Organizations That Facilitate Integrated 

National Security Approaches 

Figure 1: Comparison of the State Department’s Regional Bureaus and DOD’s Combatant Command Areas of Responsibility 

U.S. Northern Command

DOD

U.S. Southern Command

U.S. Africa Command

U.S. Central Command

U.S. Pacific Command

U.S. European Command

Excluded region Shared betwen U.S. Northern Command

and U.S. Pacific Command

Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs

State Department

Bureau of African Affairs

Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs 

Bureau of South and Central Asia Afairs

Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs

Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs

State Department regional bureaus DOD combatant commands

Note: The state of Alaska is assigned to U.S. Northern Command’s area of 

responsiblity. Forces based in Alaska remain assigned to U.S. Pacific Command.

Source: DOD and State Department.

In addition to regional bureaus, the State Department is organized to 

interact bilaterally through U.S. embassies located within other countries. 

As a result of these differing structures, our prior work and that of 

national security experts has found that agencies must coordinate with a 

large number of organizations in their regional planning efforts, potentially 

creating gaps and overlaps in policy implementation and leading to 

Page 19 GAO-09-904SP Interagency Collaboration
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challenges in coordinating efforts among agencies.2 For example, as the 

recent report by the Project on National Security Reform noted, U.S. 

government engagement with the African Union requires two of the State 

Department’s regional bureaus, one combatant command (however, 

before October 2008, such efforts would have required coordination with 

three combatant commands), two USAID bureaus, and the U.S. 

ambassador to Ethiopia.3

 Similarly, in reporting on the State Department’s 

efforts to develop a framework for planning and coordinating U.S. 

reconstruction and stabilization operations, the State Department noted 

that differences between the organizational structure of civilian agencies 

and that of the military could make coordination more difficult, as we 

reported in November 2007.4

Agencies also have different planning processes that can hinder 

interagency collaboration efforts. Specifically, in a May 2007 report on 

interagency planning for stability operations, we noted that some civilian 

agencies, like the State Department, focus their planning efforts on current 

operations. In contrast, DOD is required to plan for a wide range of current 

and potential future operations. Such differences are reflected in their 

planning processes: we reported that the State Department does not 

allocate its planning resources in the same way as DOD and, as such, does 

not have a large pool of planners to engage in DOD’s planning process. We 

found almost universal agreement among all organizations included in that 

review—including DOD, the State Department, and USAID—that there 

needed to be more interagency coordination in planning.5

 However, we 

have previously reported that civilian agencies generally did not receive 

military plans for comment as they were developed, which restricted 

agencies’ ability to harmonize plans. Interagency collaboration during plan 

development is important to achieving a unified government approach in 

 

2

See, for example, GAO, Military Operations: Actions Needed to Improve DOD’s Stability 

Operations Approach and Enhance Interagency Planning, GAO-07-549 (Washington, D.C.: 

May 31, 2007); Project on National Security Reform, Forging a New Shield (Arlington, Va.: 

Nov. 26, 2008); and Center for Strategic and International Studies, Beyond GoldwaterNichols: U.S. Government and Defense Reform for a New Era, Phase 2 Report 

(Washington, D.C.: July 2005). 

3

Project on National Security Reform, Forging a New Shield. 

4

GAO, Stabilization and Reconstruction: Actions Are Needed to Develop a Planning and 

Coordination Framework and Establish the Civilian Reserve Corps, GAO-08-39 

(Washington, D.C.: Nov. 6, 2007). 

5

GAO-08-39 and GAO-07-549. 

Page 20 GAO-09-904SP Interagency Collaboration
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plans; however, State Department officials told us during our May 2007 

review that DOD’s hierarchical approach, which required Secretary of 

Defense approval to present aspects of plans to the National Security 

Council for interagency coordination, limited interagency participation in 

the combatant commands’ plan development and had been a significant 

obstacle to achieving a unified governmentwide approach in those plans.6

DOD has taken some steps to involve other agencies in its strategic 

planning process through U.S. Africa Command. As we reported in 

February 2009, in developing its theater campaign plan, U.S. Africa 

Command was one of the first combatant commands to employ DOD’s 

new planning approach, which called for collaboration among federal 

agencies to ensure activities are integrated and synchronized in pursuit of 

common goals. U.S. Africa Command officials met with representatives 

from 16 agencies at the beginning of the planning process to gain 

interagency input on its plan. While a nascent process, involving other U.S. 

government agencies at the beginning of the planning process may result 

in a better informed plan for DOD’s activities in Africa.7

Moreover, agencies have different funding sources for national security 

activities. Funding is budgeted for and appropriated by agency, rather than 

by functional area (such as national security or foreign aid). The 

Congressional Research Service reported in December 2008 that because 

of this agency focus in budgeting and appropriations, there is no forum to 

debate which resources or combination of resources to apply to efforts, 

like national security, that involve multiple agencies and, therefore, the 

President’s budget request and congressional appropriations tend to 

reflect individual agency concerns.8

 As we have previously testified, the 

agency-by-agency focus of the budget does not provide for the needed 

integrated perspective of government performance envisioned by the 

Government Performance and Results Act.9

 Moreover, we reported in 

March 2008 that different funding arrangements for defense and national 

 

6

GAO-07-549. 

7

GAO, Defense Management: Actions Needed to Address Stakeholder Concerns, Improve 

Interagency Collaboration, and Determine Full Costs Associated with the U.S. Africa 

Command, GAO-09-181 (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 20, 2009). 

8

Catherine Dale, Nina M. Serafino, and Pat Towell, Congressional Research Service, 

Organizing the U.S. Government for National Security: Overview of the Interagency 

Reform Debates, RL34455 (Washington, D.C.: Dec. 16, 2008). 

9

GAO, Results-Oriented Government: GPRA Has Established a Solid Foundation for 

Achieving Greater Results, GAO-04-594T (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 31, 2004). 

Page 21 GAO-09-904SP Interagency Collaboration
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intelligence activities may complicate DOD’s efforts to incorporate 

intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance activities. While DOD 

develops the defense intelligence budget, some DOD organizations also 

receive funding through the national intelligence budget, which is 

developed by the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, to provide 

support for national intelligence efforts. According to a DOD official, 

disagreement about equitable funding from each budget led to the initial 

operating capability date being pushed back 1 year for a new space radar 

system.10 In an April 2008 Comptroller General forum on enhancing 

partnerships for countering transnational terrorism, some participants 

suggested that funding overall objectives—such as counterterrorism—

rather than funding each agency would provide flexibility to allocate 

funding where it was needed and would have the most effect.11 Similarly, 

as part of the national security reform debate, some have recommended 

instituting budgeting and appropriations processes—with corresponding 

changes to oversight processes—based on functional areas to better 

ensure that the U.S. national security strategy aligns with resources 

available to implement it. 

Agencies receive different levels of appropriations that are used to fund all 

aspects of an agency’s operations, to include national security activities. 

As shown in figure 2, DOD receives significantly more funding than other 

key agencies involved in national security activities, such as the 

Departments of State and Homeland Security. 

 

10GAO, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance: DOD Can Better Assess and 

Integrate ISR Capabilities and Oversee Development of Future ISR Requirements, 

GAO-08-374 (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 24, 2008). 

11GAO, Highlights of a GAO Forum: Enhancing U.S. Partnerships in Countering 

Transnational Terrorism, GAO-08-887SP (Washington, D.C.: July 2008). 

Page 22 GAO-09-904SP Interagency Collaboration
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Figure 2: Fiscal Year 2009 Funding for Key Agencies Involved in National Security 

0

100 200 300 400 500 600 700

Department of State,

foreign operations, and

related agencies

Department of

Homeland Security

Department of Defense

Dollars (in billions)

Source: Congressional Research Service.

Appropriations

576.0

41.3

44.0

Note: Funding data include annual appropriations, supplemental appropriations, and funding from the 

American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-5 (2009). 

As shown in figure 3, DOD also has a significantly larger workforce than 

other key agencies involved in national security activities. As of the end of 

fiscal year 2008, DOD reported having 1.4 million active duty military 

personnel and about 755,000 government employees,12 while the State 

Department and Department of Homeland Security reported having almost 

31,000 government employees and almost 219,000 government employees 

and military personnel, respectively. 

 

12DOD also reported having almost 840,000 personnel in its National Guard and Reserve 

forces. 

Page 23 GAO-09-904SP Interagency Collaboration
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Figure 3: Number of Civilian Government Employees and Military Personnel 

Employed by Key Agencies Involved in National Security 

0

500

1,000

1,500

2,000

2,500

State Department

Department of

Homeland Security

DOD

Agency

Number of active duty military personnel

Number of civilian government employees

Source: DOD, State Department, and Department of Homeland Security.

Number of personnel (in thousands)

755

1,400

31 177

42

Notes: Data do not include contractor personnel. Numbers are rounded. 

Because of its relatively large size—in terms of appropriations and 

personnel—DOD has begun to perform more national security–related 

activities than in the past. For example, as the Congressional Research 

Service reported in January 2009, the proportion of DOD foreign 

assistance funded through the State Department has increased from 7 

percent of bilateral official development assistance in calendar year 2001 

Page 24 GAO-09-904SP Interagency Collaboration
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to an estimated 20 percent in 2006, largely in response to stabilization and 

reconstruction activities in Iraq and Afghanistan.13

The Secretaries of Defense and State have testified and stated that 

successful collaboration among civilian and military agencies requires 

confronting the disparity in resources, including providing greater capacity 

in the State Department and USAID to allow for effective civilian response 

and civilian-military partnership.14 In testimonies in April 2008 and May 

2009, the former and current Secretaries of State, respectively, explained 

that the State Department was taking steps to become more capable and 

ready to handle reconstruction and development tasks in coordination 

with DOD. Specifically, former Secretary of State Rice explained that the 

State Department had redeployed diplomats from European and 

Washington posts to countries of greater need; sought to increase the size 

of the diplomatic corps in the State Department and USAID; and was 

training diplomats for nontraditional roles, especially stabilization and 

reconstruction activities.15 Additionally, the current Secretary of State 

noted in testimonies before two congressional committees that the State 

Department is working with DOD and will be taking back the resources to 

do the work that the agency should be leading, but did not elaborate on 

which activities this included.16 Enclosure III of this report further 

 

13We did not validate these data. According to the Congressional Research Service, official 

development assistance consists of aid activities of a development nature. This includes 

some DOD programs providing humanitarian assistance, civic action activities, training and 

equipping of foreign militaries, counternarcotics programs, and even some health-related 

assistance, such as DOD’s HIV/AIDS assistance to some foreign militaries. See Susan B. 

Epstein and Connie Veillette, Congressional Research Service, Foreign Aid Reform: Issues 

for Congress and Policy Options, RL34243 (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 27, 2009). 

14See, for example, Hillary Rodham Clinton, Foreign Policy Priorities in the President’s 

FY2010 International Affairs Budget (May 20, 2009); Hillary Rodham Clinton, FY 2010 

Budget for the Department of State (May 20, 2009); Robert M. Gates, A Balanced Strategy: 

Reprogramming the Pentagon for a New Age, Foreign Affairs (January/February 2009); 

Robert M. Gates, Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates Testimony Before the House 

Armed Services Committee (Apr. 15, 2008); and Condoleezza Rice, Testimony of Secretary 

of State Condoleezza Rice Before the House Armed Services Committee With Secretary of 

Defense Robert Gates (Apr. 15, 2008). 

15Condoleezza Rice, Testimony of Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice Before the House 

Armed Services Committee With Secretary of Defense Robert Gates. 

16Hillary Rodham Clinton, Foreign Policy Priorities in the President’s FY2010 

International Affairs Budget, FY 2010 Budget for the Department of State, and 

Testimony Before the Senate Appropriations Committee (April 30, 2009). 

Page 25 GAO-09-904SP Interagency Collaboration
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discusses the human capital issues related to interagency collaboration for 

national security. 

Some Agencies Have 

Established Mechanisms 

to Integrate Efforts, but 

Challenges Remain 

Some agencies have established mechanisms to facilitate interagency 

collaboration—a critical step in achieving integrated approaches to 

national security—but challenges remain in collaboration efforts. We have 

found in our prior work on enhancing interagency collaboration that 

agencies can enhance and sustain their collaborative efforts by 

establishing compatible policies, procedures, and other means to operate 

across agency boundaries, among other practices.17

Some agencies have established and formalized coordination mechanisms 

to facilitate interagency collaboration. For example: 

• At the time of our review, DOD’s U.S. Africa Command had undertaken 

efforts to integrate personnel from other U.S. government agencies into its 

command structure because the command is primarily focused on 

strengthening security cooperation with African nations and creating 

opportunities to bolster the capabilities of African partners, which are 

activities that traditionally require coordination with other agencies.18

DOD’s other combatant commands have also established similar 

coordination mechanisms. National security experts have noted that U.S. 

Southern Command has been relatively more successful than some other 

commands in its collaboration efforts and attributed this success, in part, 

to the command’s long history of interagency operations related to 

domestic disaster response and counterdrug missions.19

• As we reported in March 2009, an intelligence component of the Drug 

Enforcement Administration rejoined the intelligence community in 2006 

to provide a link to coordinate terrorism and narcotics intelligence with all 

intelligence community partners. According to a Department of Justice 

Office of the Inspector General report, intelligence community partners 

 

17GAO-06-15. 

18At the time of our review, U.S. Africa Command had taken initial steps to integrate 

personnel from other U.S. government agencies into the command but had not finalized the 

extent of interagency representation. See GAO-09-181. 

19Nora Bensahel, Olga Oliker, and Heather Peterson, Improving Capacity for Stabilization 

and Reconstruction Operations (Arlington, Va.: RAND Corp., 2009); Project on National 

Security Reform, Forging a New Shield; National Defense University, Civilian Surge: Key 

to Complex Operations (Washington, D.C.: December 2008). 

Page 26 GAO-09-904SP Interagency Collaboration
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found the Drug Enforcement Administration’s intelligence valuable in their 

efforts to examine ongoing threats.20

• DOD, State Department, and USAID officials have established processes to 

coordinate projects related to humanitarian relief and reconstruction 

funded through the Commander’s Emergency Response Program21 and 

Section 1206 program.22 We reported in June 2008 that Multinational 

Corps–Iraq guidance required DOD commanders to coordinate 

Commander’s Emergency Response Program projects with various 

elements, including local government agencies, civil affairs elements, and 

Provincial Reconstruction Teams. DOD, State Department, and USAID 

officials we interviewed for that review said that the presence of the 

Provincial Reconstruction Teams, as well as embedded teams, had 

improved coordination among programs funded by these agencies and the 

officials were generally satisfied with the coordination that was taking 

place.23 Similarly, Section 1206 of the National Defense Authorization Act 

 

20GAO, Drug Control: Better Coordination with the Department of Homeland Security 

and an Updated Accountability Framework Can Further Enhance DEA’s Efforts to Meet 

Post-9/11 Responsibilities, GAO-09-63 (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 20, 2009). 

21The Commander’s Emergency Response Program was designed to enable local 

commanders in Iraq and Afghanistan to respond to urgent humanitarian relief and 

reconstruction requirements within their areas of responsibility. Guidance issued by the 

Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) establishes authorized uses for these funds, 

including transportation, electricity, and condolence payments. See GAO, Military 

Operations: Actions Needed to Improve Oversight and Interagency Coordination for the 

Commander’s Emergency Response Program in Afghanistan, GAO-09-615 (Washington, 

D.C.: May 18, 2009), and Military Operations: Actions Needed to Better Guide Project 

Selection for Commander’s Emergency Response Program and Improve Oversight in 

Iraq, GAO-08-736R (Washington, D.C.: June 23, 2008). 

22Section 1206 of the National Defense Authorization Act of 2006 (Pub. L. No. 109-163, § 

1206 (2006), as amended) authorizes DOD to provide equipment, supplies, or training to a 

foreign country to build its capacity to (1) conduct counterterrorism operations or 

(2) participate in or support stability operations in which the U.S. military also participates. 

Funds may be obligated only with the concurrence of the Secretary of State. See GAO, 

Section 1206 Security Assistance Program—Findings on Criteria, Coordination, and 

Implementation, GAO-07-416R (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 28, 2007). A related program—

Section 1207—authorizes DOD to transfer to the State Department up to $100 million per 

fiscal year in defense articles, services, training, or other support for reconstruction, 

stabilization, and security activities in foreign countries. The Secretary of State must 

coordinate with the Secretary of Defense in the formulation and implementation of a 

program of reconstruction, security, or stabilization assistance to a foreign country that 

involves the provision of these services or transfer of these defense articles or funds. 

Pub. L. No. 109-163, § 1207 (2006), as amended by Pub. L. No. 110-181, § 1210 (2008) and 

Pub. L. No. 110-417, § 1207 (2008). 

23GAO-08-736R. 

Page 27 GAO-09-904SP Interagency Collaboration
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of 2006 gave DOD the authority to spend a portion of its own 

appropriations to train and equip foreign militaries to undertake 

counterterrorism and stability operations. The State Department and DOD 

must jointly formulate all projects and coordinate their implementation 

and, at the time of our review, the agencies had developed a coordinated 

process for jointly reviewing and selecting project proposals. We found 

that coordination in formulating proposals did not occur consistently 

between DOD’s combatant commands and the State Department’s 

embassy teams for those projects formulated in fiscal year 2006; however, 

officials reported better coordination in the formulation of fiscal year 2007 

proposals.24

While some agencies have established mechanisms to enhance 

collaboration, challenges remain in facilitating interagency collaboration. 

We have found that some mechanisms are not formalized, may not be fully 

utilized, or have difficulty gaining stakeholder support, thus limiting their 

effectiveness in enhancing interagency collaboration. 

• Some mechanisms may be informal. In the absence of formal 

coordination mechanisms, some agencies have established informal 

coordination mechanisms; however, by using informal coordination 

mechanisms, agencies could end up relying on the personalities of officials 

involved to ensure effective collaboration. At DOD’s U.S. Northern 

Command, for example, we found that successful collaboration on the 

command’s homeland defense plan between the command and an 

interagency planning team was largely based on the dedicated 

personalities involved and the informal meetings and teleconferences they 

instituted.25 In that report we concluded that without institutionalizing the 

interagency planning structure, efforts to coordinate with agency partners 

may not continue when personnel move to their next assignments.26

 

24GAO-07-416R. 

25The Incident Management Planning Team is an interagency team created by the 

Department of Homeland Security to provide contingency and crisis action incident 

management planning based on 15 national planning scenarios. Participating organizations 

include DOD; the Departments of Homeland Security, Justice, Energy, Transportation, and 

Health and Human Services; the Environmental Protection Agency; and the American Red 

Cross. 

26GAO, Homeland Defense: U.S. Northern Command Has Made Progress but Needs to 

Address Force Allocation, Readiness Tracking Gaps, and Other Issues, GAO-08-251 

(Washington, D.C.: Apr. 16, 2008). 

Page 28 GAO-09-904SP Interagency Collaboration
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• Some mechanisms may not be fully utilized. While some agencies have 

put in place mechanisms to facilitate coordination on national security 

activities, some mechanisms are not always fully utilized. We reported in 

October 2007 that the industry-specific coordinating councils that the 

Department of Homeland Security established to be the primary 

mechanism for coordinating government and private-sector efforts could 

be better utilized for collaboration on pandemic influenza preparedness. 

Specifically, we noted that these coordinating councils were primarily 

used to coordinate in a single area, sharing information across sectors and 

government, rather than to address a range of other challenges, such as 

unclear roles and responsibilities between federal and state governments 

in areas such as state border closures and vaccine distribution. In 

February 2009, Department of Homeland Security officials informed us 

that the department was working on initiatives to address potential 

coordination challenges in response to our recommendation.27

• Some mechanisms have limited support from key stakeholders. While 

some agencies have implemented mechanisms to facilitate coordination, 

limited support from stakeholders can hinder collaboration efforts. Our 

prior work has shown that agencies’ concerns about maintaining 

jurisdiction over their missions and associated resources can be a 

significant barrier to interagency collaboration.28 For example, DOD 

initially faced resistance from key stakeholders in the creation of the U.S. 

Africa Command, in part due to concerns expressed by State Department 

officials that U.S. Africa Command would become the lead for all U.S. 

government activities in Africa, even though embassies lead decision 

making on U.S. government noncombat activities conducted in a country.29

In recent years we have issued reports recommending that the Secretaries 

of Defense, State, and Homeland Security and the Attorney General take a 

variety of actions to address creating collaborative organizations, 

including taking actions to 

Past GAO 

Recommendations 

 

27GAO, Influenza Pandemic: Sustaining Focus on the Nation’s Planning and 

Preparedness Efforts, GAO-09-334 (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 26, 2009), and Influenza 

Pandemic: Opportunities Exist to Address Critical Infrastructure Protection Challenges 

That Require Federal and Private Sector Coordination, GAO-08-36 (Washington, D.C.: 

Oct. 31, 2007). 

28GAO/GGD-00-106. 

29GAO-09-181 and GAO, Force Structure: Preliminary Observations on the Progress and 

Challenges Associated with Establishing the U.S. Africa Command, GAO-08-947T 

(Washington, D.C.: July 15, 2008). 

Page 29 GAO-09-904SP Interagency Collaboration
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• provide implementation guidance to facilitate interagency participation 

and develop clear guidance and procedures for interagency efforts, 

• develop an approach to overcome differences in planning processes, 

• create coordinating mechanisms, and 

• clarify roles and responsibilities. 

In commenting on drafts of those reports, agencies generally concurred 

with our recommendations. In some cases, agencies identified planned 

actions to address the recommendations. For example, in our April 2008 

report on U.S. Northern Command’s plans, we recommended that clear 

guidance be developed for interagency planning efforts and DOD stated 

that it had begun to incorporate such direction in its major planning 

documents and would continue to expand on this guidance in the future.30

• What processes, including internal agency processes, are hindering further 

interagency collaboration and what changes are needed to address these 

challenges? 

Oversight Questions 

• What are the benefits of and barriers to instituting a function-based 

budgeting and appropriations process? 

• What resources or authorities are needed to further support integrated or 

mutually supportive activities across agencies? 

• What steps are being taken to create or utilize structures or mechanisms to 

develop integrated or mutually supportive plans and activities? 

• What is the appropriate role for key agencies in various national security–

related activities? 

• What strategies might Congress and agencies use to address challenges 

presented by the various funding sources? 

 

30GAO-08-251. 

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Enhan

Sec 

 III: Developing a Workforce to 

ce Collaboration in U.S. National 

urity

Page 31 GAO-09-904SP 

Enclosure III: Developing a Workforce to 

Enhance Collaboration in U.S. National 

Security 

As the threats to national security have evolved over the past decades, so 

have the skills needed to prepare for and respond to those threats. To 

effectively and efficiently address today’s national security challenges, 

federal agencies need a qualified, well-trained workforce with the skills 

and experience that can enable them to integrate the diverse capabilities 

and resources of the U.S. government. However, federal agencies do not 

always have the right people with the right skills in the right jobs at the 

right time to meet the challenges they face, to include having a workforce 

that is able to deploy quickly to address crises. Moreover, personnel often 

lack knowledge of the processes and cultures of the agencies with which 

they must collaborate. To help federal agencies develop a workforce that 

can enhance collaboration in national security, Congress and the 

administration may need to consider legislative and administrative 

changes needed to build personnel capacities, enhance personnel systems 

to promote interagency efforts, expand training opportunities, and 

improve strategic workforce planning, thereby enabling a greater ability to 

address national security in a more integrated manner. 

Issue Statement 

Key Findings 

Some Agencies Lack 

Personnel Capacity to 

Fully Participate in 

Interagency Activities 

Collaborative approaches to national security require a well-trained 

workforce with the skills and experience to integrate the government’s 

diverse capabilities and resources, but some federal government agencies 

may lack the personnel capacity to fully participate in interagency 

activities. When we added strategic human capital management to our 

governmentwide high-risk list in 2001, we explained that “human capital 

shortfalls are eroding the ability of many agencies—and threatening the 

ability of others—to effectively, efficiently, and economically perform 

their missions.”1

 We also have reported that personnel shortages can 

threaten an organization’s ability to perform missions efficiently and 

effectively.2

 Moreover, some agencies also lack the capacity to deploy 

personnel rapidly when the nation’s leaders direct a U.S. response to 

crises. As a result, the initial response to a crisis could rely heavily on the 

 

1

GAO, High-Risk Series: An Update, GAO-01-263 (Washington, D.C.: January 2001). 

Strategic human capital management remains on our high-risk list in 2009. See GAO, HighRisk Series: An Update, GAO-09-271 (Washington, D.C.: January 2009). 

2

GAO, Defense Management: Actions Needed to Address Stakeholder Concerns, Improve 

Interagency Collaboration, and Determine Full Costs Associated with the U.S. Africa 

Command, GAO-09-181 (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 20, 2009). 

 Interagency Collaboration
Enclosure III: Developing a Workforce to 

Enhance Collaboration in U.S. National 

Security 

deployment of military forces and require military forces to conduct 

missions beyond their core areas of expertise.3

Some federal government agencies have taken steps to improve their 

capacity to participate in interagency activities. For example, in response 

to a presidential directive and a State Department recommendation to 

provide a centralized, permanent civilian capacity for planning and 

coordinating the civilian response to stabilization and reconstruction 

operations, the State Department has begun establishing three civilian 

response entities to act as first responders to international crises.4

 Despite 

these efforts, we reported in November 2007 that the State Department has 

experienced difficulties in establishing permanent positions and recruiting 

for one of these entities, the Active Response Corps. Similarly, we also 

reported that other agencies that have begun to develop a stabilization and 

reconstruction response capacity, such as the U.S. Agency for 

International Development (USAID) and the Department of the Treasury, 

have limited numbers of staff available for rapid responses to overseas 

crises.5

Moreover, some federal government agencies are experiencing personnel 

shortages that have impeded their ability to participate in interagency 

activities. For example, in February 2009 we reported that the Department 

of Defense’s (DOD) U.S. Africa Command was originally intended to have 

significant interagency representation, but that of the 52 interagency 

positions DOD approved for the command, as of October 2008 only 13 of 

 

3

GAO, Human Capital: Actions Needed to Better Track and Provide Timely and Accurate 

Compensation and Medical Benefits to Deployed Federal Civilians, GAO-09-562 

(Washington, D.C.: June 26, 2009). 

4

This civilian response capability is comprised of an Active Response Corps, a Standby 

Response Corps, and a Civilian Reserve Corps. Active Response Corps staff would deploy 

during the initial stage of stabilization and reconstruction operations to assess countries’ or 

regions’ needs and help plan, coordinate, and monitor a U.S. government response. Standby 

Response Corps staff would deploy during the second stage of a surge to stabilization and 

reconstruction operations to support activities of the Active Response Corps when 

additional staff or specialized skills are required. While the Active and Standby Response 

Corps are both comprised of government employees, the Civilian Reserve Corps would be 

made up of U.S. civilians who have skills and experiences useful for stabilization and 

reconstruction operations, such as civil engineers, police officers, and judges, that are not 

readily available within the U.S. government. These reservists would work in their normal 

jobs unless called upon for service, in which case they would deploy within 30 to 60 days. 

5

GAO, Stabilization and Reconstruction: Actions Are Needed to Develop a Planning and 

Coordination Framework and Establish the Civilian Reserve Corps, GAO-08-39 

(Washington, D.C.: Nov. 6, 2007). 

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these positions had been filled with experts from the State, Treasury, and 

Agriculture Departments; USAID; and other federal government agencies. 

Embedding personnel from other federal agencies was considered 

essential by DOD because these personnel would bring knowledge of their 

home agencies into the command, which was expected to improve the 

planning and execution of the command’s programs and activities and 

stimulate collaboration among U.S. government agencies. However, U.S. 

Africa Command has had limited interagency participation due in part to 

personnel shortages in agencies like the State Department, which initially 

could only staff 2 of the 15 positions requested by DOD because the State 

Department faced a 25 percent shortfall in mid-level personnel.6

 In 

addition, in November 2007 we reported that the limited number of 

personnel that other federal government agencies could offer hindered 

efforts to include civilian agencies into DOD planning and exercises.7

Furthermore, some interagency coordination efforts have been impeded 

because agencies have been reluctant to detail staff to other organizations 

or deploy them overseas for interagency efforts due to concerns that the 

agency may be unable to perform its work without these employees. For 

example, we reported in October 2007 that in the face of resource 

constraints, officials in 37 state and local government information fusion 

centers—collaborative efforts intended to detect, prevent, investigate, and 

respond to criminal and terrorist activity—said they encountered 

challenges with federal, state, and local agencies not being able to detail 

personnel to their fusion center.8

 Fusion centers rely on such details to 

staff the centers and enhance information sharing with other state and 

local agencies. An official at one fusion center said that, because of 

already limited resources in state and local agencies, it was challenging to 

convince these agencies to contribute personnel to the center because 

they viewed doing so as a loss of resources. Moreover, we reported in 

November 2007 that the State Department’s Office of the Coordinator for 

Reconstruction and Stabilization had difficulty getting the State 

Department’s other units to release Standby Response Corps volunteers to 

deploy for interagency stabilization and reconstruction operations because 

the home units of these volunteers did not want to become short-staffed or 

 

6

GAO-09-181. 

7

GAO-08-39. 

8

GAO, Homeland Security: Federal Efforts Are Helping to Alleviate Some Challenges 

Encountered by State and Local Information Fusion Centers, GAO-08-35 (Washington, 

D.C.: Oct. 30, 2007). 

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Security 

lose high-performing staff to other operations.9 In the same report, we also 

found that other agencies reported a reluctance to deploy staff overseas or 

establish on-call units to support interagency stabilization and 

reconstruction operations because doing so would leave fewer workers 

available to complete the home offices’ normal work requirements. 

In addition to the lack of personnel, many national security experts argue 

that federal government agencies do not have the necessary capabilities to 

support their national security roles and responsibilities.10 For example, in 

September 2009, we reported that 31 percent of the State Department’s 

Foreign Service generalists and specialists in language-designated 

positions worldwide did not meet both the language speaking and reading 

proficiency requirements for their positions as of October 2008, up from 29 

percent in 2005.11 To meet these language requirements, we reported that 

the State Department efforts include a combination of language training, 

special recruitment incentives for personnel with foreign language skills, 

and bonus pay to personnel with proficiency in certain languages, but the 

department faces several challenges to these efforts, particularly staffing 

shortages that limit the “personnel float” needed to allow staff to take 

language training. Similarly, we reported in September 2008 that USAID 

officials at some overseas missions told us that they did not receive 

adequate and timely acquisition and assistance support at times,12 in part 

because the numbers of USAID staff were insufficient or because the 

USAID staff lacked necessary competencies.13 National security experts 

 

9

GAO-08-39. Standby Response Corps volunteers serve normal duty rotations at overseas 

posts or within State’s various bureaus and offices within the United States. 

10Catherine Dale, Nina M. Serafino, and Pat Towell, Congressional Research Service, 

Organizing the U.S. Government for National Security: Overview of the Interagency 

Reform Debates, RL34455 (Washington, D.C.: Dec. 16, 2008). 

11GAO, Department of State: Comprehensive Plan Needed to Address Persistent Foreign 

Language Shortfalls, GAO-09-955 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 17, 2009). We explained that 

although it can be difficult to link foreign language shortfalls to a specific negative outcome 

or event, these shortfalls could be negatively affecting several aspects of U.S. diplomacy, 

including consular operations, security, public diplomacy, economic and political affairs, 

the development of relationships with foreign counterparts and audiences, and staff 

morale. 

12Over the last few decades, as the U.S. government has increasingly come to rely on the 

private sector to perform various functions, USAID has shifted from conducting its own 

activities to managing acquisition and assistance instruments, which are awarded to and 

implemented by mainly nongovernmental organizations. 

13GAO, USAID Acquisition and Assistance: Actions Needed to Develop and Implement a 

Strategic Workforce Plan, GAO-08-1059 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 26, 2008). 

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have expressed concerns that unless the full range of civilian and military 

expertise and capabilities are effective and available in sufficient capacity, 

decision makers will be unable to manage and resolve national security 

issues.14

In the absence of sufficient personnel, some agencies have relied on 

contractors to fill roles that traditionally had been performed by 

government employees. As we explained in October 2008, DOD, the State 

Department, and USAID have relied extensively on contractors to support 

troops and civilian personnel and to oversee and carry out reconstruction 

efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan.15 While the use of contractors to support 

U.S. military operations is not new, the number of contractors and the 

work they were performing in Iraq and Afghanistan represent an increased 

reliance on contractors to carry out agency missions. Moreover, as 

agencies have relied more heavily on contractors to provide professional, 

administrative, and management support services, we previously reported 

that some agencies had hired contractors for sensitive positions in 

reaction to a shortfall in the government workforce rather than as a 

planned strategy to help achieve an agency mission.16 For example, our 

prior work has shown that DOD relied heavily on contractor personnel to 

augment its in-house workforce.17 In our March 2008 report on defense 

contracting issues, we reported that in 15 of the 21 DOD offices we 

reviewed, contractor personnel outnumbered DOD personnel and 

 

14Project on National Security Reform, Forging a New Shield (Arlington, Va.: Nov. 26, 

2008). 

15GAO, Contingency Contracting: DOD, State, and USAID Contracts and Contractor 

Personnel in Iraq and Afghanistan, GAO-09-19 (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 1, 2008). 

16GAO, Defense Contracting: Army Case Study Delineates Concerns with Use of 

Contractors as Contract Specialists, GAO-08-360 (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 26, 2008). For 

example, in April 2009 we testified that of the 30 DOD program offices we reviewed who 

reported information about the reasons why they use contractor personnel, 22 said they 

hired contractors because of a shortage of civilian personnel with a particular expertise. 

GAO, Acquisition Workforce: DOD Can Improve Its Management and Oversight by 

Tracking Data on Contractor Personnel and Taking Additional Actions, GAO-09-616T 

(Washington, D.C.: Apr. 28, 2009). 

17GAO-09-616T. 

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constituted as much as 88 percent of the workforce.18 While use of 

contractors provides the government certain benefits, such as increased 

flexibility in fulfilling immediate needs, we and others have raised 

concerns about the federal government’s services contracting.19 These 

concerns include the risk of paying more than necessary for work, the risk 

of loss of government control over and accountability for policy and 

program decisions, the potential for improper use of personal services 

contracts,20 and the increased potential for conflicts of interest. 

Given the limited civilian capacity, DOD has tended to become the default 

responder to international and domestic events, although DOD does not 

always have all of the needed expertise and capabilities possessed by 

other federal government agencies. For example, we reported in May 2007 

that DOD was playing an increased role in stability operations activities, 

an area that DOD directed be given priority on par with combat operations 

in November 2005. These activities required the department to employ an 

increasing number of personnel with specific skills and capabilities, such 

as those in civil affairs and psychological operations units.21 However, we 

found that DOD had encountered challenges in identifying stability 

operations capabilities and had not yet systematically identified and 

prioritized the full range of needed capabilities. While the services were 

each pursuing efforts to improve current capabilities, such as those 

associated with civil affairs and language skills, we stated that these 

initiatives may not reflect the comprehensive set of capabilities that would 

be needed to effectively accomplish stability operations in the future. 

Since then, DOD has taken steps to improve its capacity to develop and 

maintain capabilities and skills to perform tasks such as stabilization and 

reconstruction operations. For example, in June 2009, we noted the 

 

18GAO, Defense Contracting: Additional Personal Conflicts of Interest Safeguards Needed 

for Certain DOD Contractor Employees, GAO-08-169 (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 7, 2008). We 

judgmentally selected 21 DOD offices for review that were identified by DOD officials as 

having a large contractor workforce and representing a cross-section of DOD 

organizations. In the remaining 6 of the 21 offices included in that review, contractor 

personnel constituted from 19 to 46 percent of the workforce. 

19GAO-08-360. 

20The Federal Acquisition Regulation generally prohibits the use of personal services 

contracts because of the employer-employee relationship they create between the 

government and contractor personnel. 

21GAO, Military Operations: Actions Needed to Improve DOD’s Stability Operations 

Approach and Enhance Interagency Planning, GAO-07-549 (Washington, D.C.: May 31, 

2007). 

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increased emphasis that DOD has placed on improving the foreign 

language and regional proficiency of U.S. forces.22

In February 2009, the Secretary of Defense acknowledged that the military 

and civilian elements of the United States’ national security apparatus 

have grown increasingly out of balance, and he attributed this problem to 

a lack of civilian capacity.23 The 2008 National Defense Strategy notes that 

greater civilian participation is necessary both to make military operations 

successful and to relieve stress on the military. However, national security 

experts have noted that while rhetoric about the importance of 

nonmilitary capabilities has grown, funding and capabilities have remained 

small compared to the challenge.24 As a result, some national security 

experts have expressed concern that if DOD continues in this default 

responder role, it could lead to the militarization of foreign policy and may 

exacerbate the lack of civilian capacity.25 Similarly, we reported in 

February 2009 that State Department and USAID officials, as well as many 

nongovernmental organizations, believed that the creation of the U.S. 

Africa Command could blur the traditional boundaries among diplomacy, 

development, and defense, regardless of DOD’s intention that this 

command support rather than lead U.S. efforts in Africa, thereby giving the 

perception of militarizing foreign policy and aid.26

Agencies’ Personnel 

Systems Do Not Always 

Facilitate Interagency 

Collaboration 

Agencies’ personnel systems do not always facilitate interagency 

collaboration, with interagency assignments often not being considered 

career-enhancing or recognized in agency performance management 

systems, which could diminish agency employees’ interest in serving in 

interagency efforts. For example, in May 2007 we reported that the Federal 

Bureau of Investigation (FBI) had difficulty filling permanent overseas 

positions because the FBI did not provide career rewards and incentives 

 

22GAO, Military Training: DOD Needs a Strategic Plan and Better Inventory and 

Requirements Data to Guide Development of Language Skills and Regional Proficiency, 

GAO-09-568 (Washington, D.C.: June 19, 2009). 

23Robert M. Gates, A Balanced Strategy: Reprogramming the Pentagon for a New Age, 

Foreign Affairs (January/February 2009). 

24Nora Bensahel, Olga Oliker, and Heather Peterson, Improving Capacity for Stabilization 

and Reconstruction Operations (Arlington, Va.: RAND Corp., 2009). 

25Bensahel et al., Improving Capacity. 

26GAO-09-181. 

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to agents or develop a culture that promoted the importance and value of 

overseas duty.27 As a result, permanent FBI positions were either unfilled 

or staffed with nonpermanent staff on temporary, short-term rotations, 

which limited the FBI’s ability to collaborate with foreign nations to 

identify, disrupt, and prosecute terrorists.28 At the time of that review, the 

FBI had just begun to implement career incentives to encourage staff to 

volunteer for overseas duty, but we were unable to assess the effect of 

these incentives on staffing problems because the incentives had just been 

implemented. Moreover, in June 2009 we reviewed compensation policies 

for six agencies that deployed civilian personnel to Iraq and Afghanistan, 

and reported that variations in policies for such areas as overtime rate, 

premium pay eligibility, and deployment status could result in monetary 

differences of tens of thousands of dollars per year.29 OPM acknowledged 

that laws and agency policy could result in federal government agencies 

paying different amounts of compensation to deployed civilians at 

equivalent pay grades who are working under the same conditions and 

facing the same risks. 

In addition, we previously identified reinforcing individual accountability 

for collaborative efforts through agency performance management 

systems as a key practice that can help enhance and sustain collaboration 

among federal agencies.30 However, our prior work has shown that 

assignments that involve collaborating with other agencies may not be 

rewarded. For example, in April 2009 we reported that officials from the 

Departments of Commerce, Energy, Health and Human Services, and the 

Treasury stated that providing support for State Department foreign 

 

27GAO, Combating Terrorism: Law Enforcement Agencies Lack Directives to Assist 

Foreign Nations to Identify, Disrupt, and Prosecute Terrorists, GAO-07-697 (Washington, 

D.C.: May 25, 2007). The FBI has expanded the role of its legal attachés overseas to be a 

dynamic operational partnership with foreign counterparts that includes operationally 

assisting foreign law enforcement agencies to identify and prosecute terrorists involved in 

terrorist attacks against U.S. interests around the globe, as well as to proactively assist 

foreign nations to identify, disrupt, and prosecute terrorists. 

28Both FBI headquarters staff and agents in the field at all four countries we visited for that 

review said that it was essential to have long-term rotations in a country in order to 

establish the types of working relationships with foreign law enforcement agencies that are 

needed to effectively assist them to identify, disrupt, and prosecute terrorists. 

29GAO, Human Capital: Actions Needed to Better Track and Provide Timely and Accurate 

Compensation and Medical Benefits to Deployed Federal Civilians, GAO-09-562 

(Washington, D.C.: June 26, 2009). 

30GAO, Results-Oriented Government: Practices That Can Help Enhance and Sustain 

Collaboration among Federal Agencies, GAO-06-15 (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 21, 2005). 

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assistance program processes creates an additional workload that is 

neither recognized by their agencies nor included as a factor in their 

performance ratings.31 Furthermore, agency personnel systems may not 

readily facilitate assigning personnel from one agency to another, which 

could hinder interagency collaboration. For example, we testified in July 

2008 that, according to DOD officials, personnel systems among federal 

agencies were incompatible, which did not readily facilitate the 

assignment of non-DOD personnel into the new U.S. Africa Command.32

Training Opportunities and 

Strategic Workforce 

Planning Could Facilitate 

Collaboration 

Increased training opportunities and focusing on strategic workforce 

planning efforts are two tools that could facilitate federal agencies’ ability 

to fully participate in interagency collaboration activities. We have 

previously testified that agencies need to have effective training and 

development programs to address gaps in the skills and competencies that 

they identified in their workforces.33 Training and developing personnel to 

fill new and different roles will play a crucial part in the federal 

government’s endeavors to meet its transformation challenges. Some 

agencies have ongoing efforts to educate senior leaders about the 

importance of interagency collaboration. For example, we reported in 

February 2009 that DOD’s 2008 update to its civilian human capital 

strategic plan identifies the need for senior leaders to understand 

interagency roles and responsibilities as a necessary leadership 

capability.34 We explained that DOD’s new Defense Senior Leader 

Development Program focuses on developing senior leaders to excel in the 

21st century’s joint, interagency, and multinational environment and 

supports the governmentwide effort to foster interagency cooperation and 

information sharing. 

 

31GAO, Foreign Aid Reform: Comprehensive Strategy, Interagency Coordination, and 

Operational Improvements Would Bolster Current Efforts, GAO-09-192 (Washington, D.C.: 

Apr. 17, 2009). 

32GAO, Force Structure: Preliminary Observations on the Progress and Challenges 

Associated with Establishing the U.S. Africa Command, GAO-08-947T (Washington, D.C.: 

July 15, 2008). 

33GAO, Human Capital: Federal Workforce Challenges in the 21st Century, GAO-07-556T 

(Washington, D.C.: Mar. 6, 2007). 

34GAO, Human Capital: Opportunities Exist to Build on Recent Progress to Strengthen 

DOD’s Civilian Human Capital Strategic Plan, GAO-09-235 (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 10, 

2009). 

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Training can help personnel develop the skills and understanding of other 

agencies’ capabilities needed to facilitate interagency collaboration. A lack 

of understanding of other agencies’ cultures, processes, and core 

capabilities can hamper U.S. national security partners’ ability to work 

together effectively. However, civilian professionals have had limited 

opportunities to participate in interagency training or education 

opportunities. For example, we reported in November 2007 that the State 

Department did not have the capacity at that time to ensure that its 

Standby Response Corps volunteers were properly trained for 

participating in stabilization and reconstruction operations because the 

Foreign Service Institute did not have the capacity to train the 1,500 new 

volunteers the State Department planned to recruit in 2009.35

Efforts such as the National Security Professional Development Program, 

an initiative launched in May 2007, are designed to provide the training 

necessary to improve the ability of U.S. government personnel to address a 

range of interagency issues.36 When it is fully established and implemented, 

this program is intended to use intergovernmental training and 

professional education to provide national security professionals with a 

breadth and depth of knowledge and skills in areas common to 

international and homeland security. It is intended to educate national 

security professionals in capabilities such as collaborating with other 

agencies, and planning and managing interagency operations. A July 2008 

Congressional Research Service report stated that many officials and 

observers have contended that legislation would be necessary to ensure 

the success of any interagency career development program because, 

without the assurance that a program would continue into the future, 

individuals might be less likely to risk the investment of their time, and 

agencies might be less likely to risk the investment of their resources.37

Some national security experts say that implementation of the program 

has lagged, but that the program could be reenergized with high-level 

attention.38 The Executive Director of the National Security Professional 

 

35GAO-08-39. 

36The National Security Professional Development Program is being developed under the 

management of a steering committee and an integration office. The integration office was 

established to provide support to the steering committee and coordinate the 

implementation and monitoring the progress of the program. 

37Catherine Dale, Congressional Research Service, Building an Interagency Cadre of 

National Security Professionals: Proposals, Recent Experience, and Issues for Congress, 

RL 34565 (Washington, D.C.: July 8, 2008). 

38Bensahel et al., Improving Capacity. 

Page 40 GAO-09-904SP Interagency Collaboration
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Security 

Development Integration Office testified in April 2009 that the current 

administration is in strong agreement with the overall intent for the 

program and was developing a way ahead to build on past successes while 

charting new directions where necessary. 

Agencies also can use strategic workforce planning as a tool to support 

their efforts to secure the personnel resources needed to collaborate in 

interagency missions. In our prior work, we have found that tools like 

strategic workforce planning and human capital strategies are integral to 

managing resources as they enable an agency to define staffing levels, 

identify critical skills needed to achieve its mission, and eliminate or 

mitigate gaps between current and future skills and competencies.39 In 

designating strategic human capital management as a governmentwide 

high-risk area in 2001, we explained that it is critically important that 

federal agencies put greater focus on workforce planning and take the 

necessary steps to build, sustain, and effectively deploy the skilled, 

knowledgeable, diverse, and performance-oriented workforce needed to 

meet the current and emerging needs of government and its citizens.40

Strategic human capital planning that is integrated with broader 

organizational strategic planning is critical to ensuring agencies have the 

talent they need for future challenges, which may include interagency 

collaboration. Without integrating strategic human capital planning with 

broader organizational strategic planning, agencies may lose experienced 

staff and talent. For example, in July 2009 we reported that the State 

Department could not determine whether it met its objective of retaining 

experienced staff while restructuring its Arms Control and 

Nonproliferation Bureaus because there were no measurable goals for 

 

39The five key principles that strategic workforce planning should address are: (1) involve 

management, employees, and other stakeholders in developing and implementing the 

strategic workforce plan; (2) determine the critical skills and competencies needed to 

achieve results; (3) develop strategies to address gaps in human capital approaches for 

enabling and sustaining the contributions of all critical skills and competencies; (4) build 

the capability to address requirements important to support workforce planning strategies; 

and (5) monitor and evaluate the agency’s progress toward its human capital goals and the 

contribution that human capital results have made. GAO, Human Capital: Key Principles 

for Effective Strategic Workforce Planning, GAO-04-39 (Washington, D.C.: Dec. 11, 2003). 

40GAO-01-263. 

Page 41 GAO-09-904SP Interagency Collaboration
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retention of experienced staff. As a result, some offices affected by the 

restructuring experienced significant losses in staff expertise.41

Additionally, in March 2007 we testified that one of the critical needs 

addressed by strategic workforce planning is developing long-term 

strategies for acquiring, developing, motivating, and retaining staff to 

achieve programmatic goals.42 We also stated that agencies need to 

strengthen their efforts and use of available flexibilities to acquire, 

develop, motivate, and retain talent to address gaps in talent due to 

changes in the knowledge, skills, and competencies in occupations needed 

to meet their missions. For example, in September 2008 we reported that 

USAID lacked the capacity to develop and implement a strategic 

acquisition and assistance workforce plan that could enable the agency to 

better match staff levels to changing workloads because it had not 

collected comprehensive information on the competencies—including 

knowledge, skills, abilities, and experience levels—of its overseas 

acquisition and assistance specialists.43 We explained that USAID could 

use this information to better identify its critical staffing needs and adjust 

its staffing patterns to meet those needs and address workload 

imbalances. Furthermore, in December 2005 we reported that the Office of 

the U.S. Trade Representative,44 a small trade agency that receives support 

from other larger agencies (e.g., the Departments of Commerce, State, and 

Agriculture) in doing its work, did not formally discuss or plan human 

capital resources at the interagency level, even though it must depend on 

the availability of these critical resources to achieve its mission. Such 

interagency planning also would facilitate human capital planning by the 

other agencies that work with the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, 

which stated that potential budget cuts could result in fewer resources 

being available to support the trade agency. As a result, since the Office of 

the U.S. Trade Representative did not provide the other agencies with 

 

41GAO, State Department: Key Transformation Practices Could Have Helped in 

Restructuring Arms Control and Nonproliferation Bureaus, GAO-09-738 (Washington, 

D.C.: July 15, 2009). 

42GAO-07-556T. 

43GAO-08-1059. 

44The U.S. Trade Representative leads and coordinates the development and 

implementation of U.S. trade policy through an interagency trade policy process that is 

comprised of 19 federal agencies and offices. It is a highly networked organization that 

performs an interagency leadership and coordination mission, working in concert with 

other agencies. 

Page 42 GAO-09-904SP Interagency Collaboration
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specific resource requirements when the agencies were planning, it shifted 

the risk to the other agencies of having to later ensure the availability of 

staff in support of the trade agenda, potentially straining their ability to 

achieve other agency missions.45

In recent years we have recommended that the Secretaries of State and 

Defense, the Administrator of USAID, and the U.S. Trade Representative 

take a variety of actions to address the human capital issues discussed 

above, such as staffing shortfalls, training, and strategic planning. 

Specifically, we have made recommendations to 

Past 

Recommendations 

• develop strategic human capital management systems and undertake 

strategic human capital planning, 

• include measurable goals in strategic plans, 

• identify the appropriate mix of contractor and government employees 

needed and develop plans to fill those needs, 

• seek formal commitments from contributing agencies to provide personnel 

to meet interagency personnel requirements, 

• develop alternative ways to obtain interagency perspectives in the event 

that interagency personnel cannot be provided due to resource limitations, 

• develop and implement long-term workforce management plans, and 

• implement a training program to ensure employees develop and maintain 

needed skills. 

In commenting on drafts of those reports, agencies generally concurred 

with our recommendations. In some cases, agencies identified planned 

actions to address the recommendations. For example, in our April 2009 

report on foreign aid reform, we recommended that the State Department 

develop a long-term workforce management plan to periodically assess its 

workforce capacity to manage foreign assistance. The State Department 

noted in its comments that it concurs with the idea of further improving 

employee skill sets and would work to encourage and implement further 

training.46

• What incentives are needed to encourage agencies to share personnel with Oversight Questions other agencies? 

 

45GAO, International Trade: USTR Would Benefit from Greater Use of Strategic Human 

Capital Principles, GAO-06-167 (Washington, D.C.: Dec. 6, 2005). 

46GAO-09-192. 

Page 43 GAO-09-904SP Interagency Collaboration
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Enhance Collaboration in U.S. National 

Security 

• How can agencies overcome cultural differences to enhance collaboration 

to achieve greater unity of effort? 

• How can agencies expand training opportunities for integrating civilian 

and military personnel? 

• What changes in agency personnel systems are needed to address human 

capital challenges that impede agencies’ ability to properly staff 

interagency collaboration efforts? 

• What incentives are needed to encourage employees in national security 

agencies to seek interagency experience, training, and work 

opportunities? 

• How can agencies effectively meet their primary missions and support 

interagency activities in light of the resource constraints they face? 

• How can agencies increase staffing of interagency functions across the 

national security community? 

• What are the benefits and drawbacks to enacting legislation to support the 

National Security Professional Development Program? 

• What legislative changes might enable agencies to develop a workforce 

that can enhance collaboration in national security activities? 

Page 44 GAO-09-904SP Interagency Collaboration
Enclosure

Nationa

Agen

 IV: Sharing and Integrating

l Security Information across 

cies 

Page 45 GAO-09-904SP 

Enclosure IV: Sharing and Integrating 

National Security Information across 

Agencies 

The government’s single greatest failure preceding the September 11, 2001, 

attacks was the inability of federal agencies to effectively share 

information about suspected terrorists and their activities, according to 

the Vice Chair of the 9/11 Commission. As such, sharing and integrating 

national security information among federal, state, local, and privatesector partners is critical to assessing and responding to current threats to 

our national security. At the same time, agencies must balance the need to 

share information with the need to protect it from widespread access. 

Since January 2005, we have designated information sharing for homeland 

security as high risk because the government has faced serious challenges 

in analyzing key information and disseminating it among federal, state, 

local, and private-sector partners in a timely, accurate, and useful way.1

Although federal, state, local, and private-sector partners have made 

progress in sharing information, challenges still remain in sharing, as well 

as accessing, managing, and integrating information. Congress and the 

administration will need to ensure that agencies remain committed to 

sharing relevant national security information, increasing access to 

necessary information, and effectively managing and integrating 

information across multiple agencies. 

Issue Statement 

Key Findings 

Agencies Do Not Always 

Share Relevant 

Information 

Our prior work has shown that agencies do not always share relevant 

information with their national security partners, including other federal 

government agencies, state and local governments, and the private sector. 

Information is a crucial tool in addressing national security issues and its 

timely dissemination is absolutely critical for maintaining national 

security. Information relevant to national security includes terrorismrelated information, drug intelligence, and planning information for 

interagency operations. As a result of the lack of information sharing, 

federal, state, and local governments may not have all the information they 

need to analyze threats and vulnerabilities. 

More than 8 years after 9/11, federal, state, and local governments, and 

private-sector partners are making progress in sharing terrorism-related 

information. For example, we reported in October 2007 that most states 

 

1

GAO, High-Risk Series: An Update, GAO-05-207 (Washington, D.C.: January 2005) and 

High-Risk Series: An Update, GAO-09-271 (Washington, D.C.: January 2009). 

 Interagency Collaboration
Enclosure IV: Sharing and Integrating 

National Security Information across 

Agencies 

and many local governments had established fusion centers—

collaborative efforts to detect, prevent, investigate, and respond to 

criminal and terrorist activity—to address gaps in information sharing.2

 In 

addition, in October 2008 we reported that the Department of Homeland 

Security was replacing its information-sharing system with a follow-on 

system. In our analysis of the follow-on system, however, we found that 

the Department of Homeland Security had not fully defined requirements 

or ways to better manage risks for the next version of its informationsharing system.3

 Additionally, in January 2009 we reported that the 

Department of Homeland Security was implementing an informationsharing policy and governance structure to improve how it collects, 

analyzes, and shares homeland security information across the department 

and with state and local partners.4

Based on our prior work, we identified four key reasons that agencies may 

not always share all relevant information with their national security 

partners. 

• Concerns about agencies’ ability to protect shared information or use 

that information properly. Since national security information is sensitive 

by its nature, agencies and private-sector partners are sometimes hesitant 

to share information because they are uncertain if that information can be 

protected by the recipient or will be used properly. For example, in March 

2006, we reported that Department of Homeland Security officials 

expressed concerns about sharing terrorism-related information with state 

and local partners because such information had occasionally been posted 

on public Internet sites or otherwise compromised.5

 Similarly, in April 

2006, we reported that private-sector partners were reluctant to share 

 

2

GAO, Homeland Security: Federal Efforts Are Helping to Alleviate Some Challenges 

Encountered by State and Local Information Fusion Centers, GAO-08-35 (Washington, 

D.C.: Oct. 30, 2007). 

3

GAO, Information Technology: Management Improvements Needed on the Department of 

Homeland Security’s Next Generation Information Sharing System, GAO-09-40 

(Washington, D.C.: Oct. 8, 2008). 

4

GAO-09-271. See also GAO-09-40; GAO-08-35; and GAO, Information Technology: 

Numerous Federal Networks Used to Support Homeland Security Need to Be Better 

Coordinated with Key State and Local Information-Sharing Initiatives, GAO-07-455 

(Washington, D.C.: Apr. 16, 2007). 

5

GAO, Information Sharing: The Federal Government Needs to Establish Policies and 

Processes for Sharing Terrorism-Related and Sensitive but Unclassified Information, 

GAO-06-385 (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 17, 2006). 

Page 46 GAO-09-904SP Interagency Collaboration
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Agencies 

critical-infrastructure information—such as information on banking and 

financial institutions, energy production, and telecommunications 

networks—due to concerns on how the information would be used and 

the ability of other agencies to keep that information secure.6

• Cultural factors or political concerns. Agencies may not share 

information because doing so may be outside their organizational cultures 

or because of political concerns, such as exposing potential vulnerabilities 

within the agency. As we noted in enclosure II of this report, we stated in a 

May 2007 report on interagency planning for stability operations that State 

Department officials told us that the Department of Defense’s (DOD) 

hierarchical approach to sharing military plans, which required Secretary 

of Defense approval to present aspects of plans to the National Security 

Council for interagency coordination, limited interagency participation in 

the combatant commands’ plan development and had been a significant 

obstacle to achieving a unified governmentwide approach in those plans.7

Moreover, in our September 2009 report on DOD’s U.S. Northern 

Command’s (NORTHCOM) exercise program, we noted that 

inconsistencies with how NORTHCOM involved states in planning, 

conducting, and assessing exercises occurred in part because 

NORTHCOM officials lacked experience in dealing with the differing 

emergency management structures, capabilities, and needs of the states.8

Additionally, in our April 2008 report on NORTHCOM’s coordination with 

state governments, we noted that the legal and historical limits of the 

nation’s constitutional federal-state structure posed a unique challenge for 

NORTHCOM in mission preparation.9

 That is, NORTHCOM may need to 

assist states with civil support, which means that NORTHCOM must 

consider the jurisdictions of 49 state governments and the District of 

Columbia when planning its missions. NORTHCOM found that some state 

 

6

GAO, Information Sharing: DHS Should Take Steps to Encourage More Widespread Use 

of Its Program to Protect and Share Critical Infrastructure Information, GAO-06-383 

(Washington, D.C.: Apr. 17, 2006). 

7

GAO, Military Operations: Actions Needed to Improve DOD’s Stability Operations 

Approach and Enhance Interagency Planning, GAO-07-549 (Washington, D.C.: May 31, 

2007). 

8

GAO, Homeland Defense: U.S. Northern Command Has a Strong Exercise Program, but 

Involvement of Interagency Partners and States Can Be Improved, GAO-09-849 

(Washington, D.C.: Sept. 9, 2009). 

9

GAO, Homeland Defense: Steps Have Been Taken to Improve U.S. Northern Command’s 

Coordination with States and the National Guard Bureau, but Gaps Remain, 

GAO-08-252 (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 16, 2008). 

Page 47 GAO-09-904SP Interagency Collaboration
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and local governments were reluctant to share their emergency response 

plans with NORTHCOM for fear that DOD would “grade” their plans or 

publicize potential capability gaps, with an accompanying political cost. 

• Lack of clear guidelines, policies, or agreements for coordinating with 

other agencies. Agencies have diverse requirements and practices for 

protecting their information, and thus may not share information without 

clearly defined guidelines, policies, or agreements for doing so. We 

reported in April 2008 that NORTHCOM generally was not familiar with 

state emergency response plans because there were no guidelines for 

gaining access to those plans.10 As a result, NORTHCOM did not know 

what state capabilities existed, increasing the risk that NORTHCOM may 

not be prepared with the resources needed to respond to homeland 

defense and civil support operations. We also reported in March 2009 

about the lack of information sharing between the Drug Enforcement 

Administration (DEA) and Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE). 

Since 9/11, DEA has supported U.S. counterterrorism efforts by 

prioritizing drug-trafficking cases linked to terrorism. DEA partners with 

federal, state, and local agencies—including ICE—to leverage 

counternarcotics resources. However, at the time of that review, ICE did 

not fully participate in two multiagency intelligence centers and did not 

share all of its drug-related intelligence with DEA. In one center, ICE did 

not participate because they did not have an agreement on the types of 

data ICE would provide and how sensitive confidential source information 

would be safeguarded. Without ICE’s drug-related intelligence, DEA could 

not effectively target major drug-trafficking organizations due to the 

potential for overlapping investigations and officer safety concerns.11

• Security clearance issues. Agencies often have different ways of 

classifying information and different security clearance requirements and 

procedures that pose challenges to effective information sharing across 

agencies. In some cases, some national security partners do not have the 

clearances required to access national security information. Specifically, 

we reported in May 2007 that non-DOD personnel could not access some 

DOD planning documents or participate in planning sessions because they 

may not have had the proper security clearances, hindering interagency 

 

10GAO-08-252. 

11GAO, Drug Control: Better Coordination with the Department of Homeland Security 

and an Updated Accountability Framework Can Further Enhance DEA’s Efforts to Meet 

Post-9/11 Responsibilities, GAO-09-63 (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 20, 2009). 

Page 48 GAO-09-904SP Interagency Collaboration
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participation in the development of military plans.12 Additionally, in 

October 2007 we reported that some state and local fusion center officials 

cited that the length of time needed to obtain clearances and the lack of 

reciprocity, whereby an agency did not accept a clearance granted by 

another agency, prevented employees from accessing necessary 

information to perform their duties.13 In other cases, access to classified 

information can be limited by one partner, which can hinder integrated 

national security efforts. For example, we reported that DOD established 

the National Security Space Office to integrate efforts between DOD and 

the National Reconnaissance Office, a defense intelligence agency jointly 

managed by the Secretary of Defense and the Director of National 

Intelligence. However, in 2005, the National Reconnaissance Office 

Director withdrew full access to a classified information-sharing network 

from the National Security Space Office, which inhibited efforts to further 

integrate defense and national space activities, including intelligence, 

surveillance, and reconnaissance activities.14

Managing and Integrating 

Information from Multiple 

Agencies Continues to 

Present Challenges 

When agencies do share information, managing and integrating 

information from multiple sources presents challenges regarding 

redundancies in information sharing, unclear roles and responsibilities, 

and data comparability. As the Congressional Research Service reported in 

January 2008, one argument for fusing a broader range of data, including 

nontraditional data sources, is to help create a more comprehensive threat 

picture.15 The 9/11 Commission Report stated that because no one agency 

or organization holds all relevant information, information from all 

relevant sources needs to be integrated in order to “connect the dots.”16

Without integration, agencies may not receive all relevant information. 

Some progress had been made in managing and integrating information 

from multiple agencies by streamlining usage of the “sensitive but 

 

12GAO-07-549. 

13GAO-08-35. 

14GAO, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance: DOD Can Better Assess and 

Integrate ISR Capabilities and Oversee Development of Future ISR Requirements, 

GAO-08-374 (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 24, 2008). 

15John Rollins, Congressional Research Service, Fusion Centers: Issues and Options for 

Congress, RL34070 (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 18, 2008). 

16National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, The 9-11 Commission 

Report (Washington, D.C.: July 22, 2004). 

Page 49 GAO-09-904SP Interagency Collaboration
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unclassified” designation. In March 2006, we reported that the large 

number of sensitive but unclassified designations used to protect missioncritical information and a lack of consistent policies for their use created 

difficulties in sharing information by potentially restricting material 

unnecessarily or disseminating information that should be restricted.17 We 

subsequently testified in July 2008 that the President had adopted 

“controlled unclassified information” to be the single categorical 

designation for sensitive but unclassified information throughout the 

executive branch and outlined a framework for identifying, marking, 

safeguarding, and disseminating this information.18 As we testified, more 

streamlined definition and consistent application of policies for 

designating “controlled but unclassified information” may help reduce 

difficulties in sharing information; however, monitoring agencies’ 

compliance will help ensure that the policy is employed consistently 

across the federal government. 

Based on our previous work, we identified three challenges posed by 

managing and integrating information drawn from multiple sources. 

• Redundancies when integrating information. Identical or similar types 

of information are collected by or submitted to multiple agencies, so 

integrating or sharing this information can lead to redundancies. For 

example, we reported in October 2007 that in intelligence fusion centers, 

multiple information systems created redundancies of information that 

made it difficult to discern what was relevant.19 As a result, end users were 

overwhelmed with duplicative information from multiple sources. 

Similarly, we reported in December 2008 that in Louisiana, reconstruction 

project information had to be repeatedly resubmitted separately to state 

and Federal Emergency Management Agency officials during post–

Hurricane Katrina reconstruction efforts because the system used to track 

project information did not facilitate the exchange of documents. 

Information was sometimes lost during this exchange, requiring state 

officials to resubmit the information, creating redundancies and 

 

17GAO-06-385. 

18GAO, Information Sharing: Definition of the Results to Be Achieved in TerrorismRelated Information Sharing Is Needed to Guide Implementation and Assess Progress, 

GAO-08-637T (Washington, D.C.: July 23, 2008). 

19GAO-08-35. 

Page 50 GAO-09-904SP Interagency Collaboration
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Agencies 

duplication of effort. As a result, reconstruction efforts in Louisiana were 

delayed.20

• Unclear roles and responsibilities. Agency personnel may be unclear 

about their roles and responsibilities in the information-sharing process, 

which may impede information-sharing efforts. For example, we reported 

in April 2005 that officials in Coast Guard field offices did not clearly 

understand their role in helping nonfederal employees through the 

security clearance process. Although Coast Guard headquarters officials 

requested that Coast Guard field officials submit the names of nonfederal 

officials needing a security clearance, some Coast Guard field officials did 

not clearly understand that they were responsible for contacting 

nonfederal officials about the clearance process and thought that Coast 

Guard headquarters was processing security clearances for nonfederal 

officials. As a result of this misunderstanding, nonfederal employees did 

not receive their security clearances in a timely manner and could not 

access important security-related information that could have aided them 

in identifying or deterring illegal activities.21

• Data may not be comparable across agencies. Agencies’ respective 

missions drive the types of data they collect, and so data may not be 

comparable across agencies. For example, we reported in October 2008 

that biometric data, such as fingerprints and iris images, collected in DOD 

field activities such as those in Iraq and Afghanistan, were not comparable 

with data collected by other units or with large federal databases that 

store biometric data, such as the Department of Homeland Security 

biometric database or the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) 

fingerprint database. For example, if a unit collects only iris images, this 

data cannot be used to match fingerprints collected by another unit or 

agency, such as in the FBI fingerprint database. A lack of comparable data, 

especially for use in DOD field activities, prevents agencies from 

determining whether the individuals they encounter are friend, foe, or 

neutral, and may put forces at risk.22

 

20GAO, Disaster Recovery: FEMA’s Public Assistance Grant Program Experienced 

Challenges with Gulf Coast Rebuilding, GAO-09-129 (Washington, D.C.: Dec. 18, 2008). 

21GAO, Maritime Security: New Structures Have Improved Information Sharing, but 

Security Clearance Processing Requires Further Attention, GAO-05-394 (Washington, 

D.C.: Apr. 15, 2005). 

22GAO, Defense Management: DOD Can Establish More Guidance for Biometrics 

Collection and Explore Broader Data Sharing, GAO-09-49 (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 15, 

2008). 

Page 51 GAO-09-904SP Interagency Collaboration
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Agencies 

Since 2005, we have recommended that the Secretaries of Defense, 

Homeland Security, and State establish or clarify guidelines, agreements, 

or procedures for sharing a wide range of national security information, 

such as planning information, terrorism-related information, and 

reconstruction project information. We have recommended that such 

guidelines, agreements, and procedures 

Past 

Recommendations 

• define and communicate how shared information will be protected; 

• include provisions to involve and obtain information from nonfederal 

partners in the planning process; 

• ensure that agencies fully participate in interagency information-sharing 

efforts; 

• identify and disseminate practices to facilitate more effective 

communication among federal, state, and local agencies; 

• clarify roles and responsibilities in the information-sharing process; and 

• establish baseline standards for data collecting to ensure comparability 

across agencies. 

In commenting on drafts of those reports, agencies generally concurred 

with our recommendations. In some cases, agencies identified planned 

actions to address the recommendations. For example, in our December 

2008 report on the Federal Emergency Management Agency’s public 

assistance grant program, we recommended that the Federal Emergency 

Management Agency improve information sharing within the public 

assistance process by identifying and disseminating practices that 

facilitate more effective communication among federal, state, and local 

entities. In comments on a draft of the report, the Federal Emergency 

Management Agency generally concurred with the recommendation and 

noted that it was making a concerted effort to improve collaboration and 

information sharing within the public assistance process.23 Moreover, 

agencies have implemented some of our past recommendations. For 

example, in our April 2006 report on protecting and sharing critical 

infrastructure information, we recommended that the Department of 

Homeland Security define and communicate to the private sector what 

information is needed and how the information would be used.24 The 

Department of Homeland Security concurred with our recommendation 

and, in response, has made available, through its public Web site, answers 

to frequently asked questions that define the type of information collected 

 

23GAO-09-129. 

24GAO-06-383. 

Page 52 GAO-09-904SP Interagency Collaboration
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and what it is used for, as well as how the information will be accessed, 

handled, and used by federal, state, and local government employees and 

their contractors. 

• What steps are being taken to promote access to relevant databases? Oversight Questions • What steps are needed to develop and implement interagency protocols 

for sharing information? 

• How do agencies balance the need to keep information secure and the 

need to share information to maximize interagency efforts? 

• How can agencies encourage effective information sharing? 

• What are ways in which the security clearance process can be streamlined 

and security clearance reciprocity among agencies can be ensured? 

Page 53 GAO-09-904SP Interagency Collaboration
A

A

ppendix I: GAO Contacts and Staff

cknowledgments 

Page 54 GAO-09-904SP 

Appendix I: GAO Contacts and Staff 

Acknowledgments 

Janet A. St. Laurent at (202) 512-4300 or stlaurentj@gao.gov GAO Contacts 

Jacquelyn L. Williams-Bridgers at (202) 512-3101 or 

williamsbridgersj@gao.gov 

In addition, the following staff contributed to the report: John H. 

Pendleton, Director; Marie Mak, Assistant Director; Hilary Benedict; 

Cathleen Berrick; Renee Brown; Leigh Caraher; Grace Cho; Joe Christoff; 

Elizabeth Curda; Judy McCloskey; Lorelei St. James; and Bernice 

Steinhardt. 

Acknowledgments 

 Interagency Collaboration
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Preparedness Efforts Remains Essential. GAO-09-760T. Washington, D.C.: 

June 3, 2009. 

U.S. Public Diplomacy: Key Issues for Congressional Oversight. 

GAO-09-679SP. Washington, D.C.: May 27, 2009. 

Military Operations: Actions Needed to Improve Oversight and 

Interagency Coordination for the Commander’s Emergency Response 

Program in Afghanistan. GAO-09-61. Washington, D.C.: May 18, 2009. 

Foreign Aid Reform: Comprehensive Strategy, Interagency 

Coordination, and Operational Improvements Would Bolster Current 

Efforts. GAO-09-192. Washington, D.C.: April 17, 2009. 

Iraq and Afghanistan: Security, Economic, and Governance Challenges 

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Drug Control: Better Coordination with the Department of Homeland 

Security and an Updated Accountability Framework Can Further 

Enhance DEA’s Efforts to Meet Post-9/11 Responsibilities. GAO-09-63. 

Washington, D.C.: March 20, 2009. 

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Improve Interagency Collaboration, and Determine Full Costs 

Associated with the U.S. Africa Command. GAO-09-181. Washington, 

D.C.: February 20, 2009. 

Combating Terrorism: Actions Needed to Enhance Implementation of 

Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership. GAO-08-860. Washington, 

D.C.: July 31, 2008. 

Information Sharing: Definition of the Results to Be Achieved in 

Terrorism-Related Information Sharing Is Needed to Guide 

Implementation and Assess Progress. GAO-08-637T. Washington, D.C.: 

July 23, 2008. 

Page 55 GAO-09-904SP Interagency Collaboration
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Stabilization and Reconstruction: Actions Are Needed to Develop a 

Planning and Coordination Framework and Establish the Civilian 

Reserve Corps. GAO-08-39. Washington, D.C.: November 6, 2007. 

Homeland Security: Federal Efforts Are Helping to Alleviate Some 

Challenges Encountered by State and Local Information Fusion Centers. 

GAO-08-35. Washington, D.C.: October 30, 2007. 

Military Operations: Actions Needed to Improve DOD’s Stability 

Operations Approach and Enhance Interagency Planning. GAO-07-549. 

Washington, D.C.: May 31, 2007. 

Combating Terrorism: Law Enforcement Agencies Lack Directives to 

Assist Foreign Nations to Identify, Disrupt, and Prosecute Terrorists. 

GAO-07-697. Washington, D.C.: May 25, 2007. 

Results-Oriented Government: Practices That Can Help Enhance and 

Sustain Collaboration among Federal Agencies. GAO-06-15. Washington, 

D.C.: October 21, 2005. 

(351314) Page 56 GAO-09-904SP Interagency Collaboration
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