GAO 

United States Government Accountability Office

Report to the Subcommittee on 

Economic Development, Public 

Buildings, and Emergency Management, 

Committee on Transportation and 

Infrastructure, House of Representatives 

EMERGENCY 

PREPAREDNESS 

Improved Planning 

and Coordination 

Necessary for 

Modernization and 

Integration of Public 

Alert and Warning 

System 

September 2009 

GAO-09-834 
What GAO Found

United States Government Accountability Office

Why GAO Did This Study

Highlights

Accountability Integrity Reliability

September 2009

EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS 

Improved Planning and Coordination Necessary for 

Modernization and Integration of Public Alert and 

Highlights of GAO-09-834, a report to the Warning System 

Subcommittee on Economic Development, 

Public Buildings, and Emergency 

Management, Committee on 

Transportation and Infrastructure, House 

of Representatives 

A comprehensive system to alert the 

American people in times of hazard 

allows people to take action to save 

lives. The Federal Emergency 

Management Agency (FEMA) is 

responsible for the current 

Emergency Alert System (EAS) and 

the development of the new 

Integrated Public Alert and Warning 

System (IPAWS). In this requested 

report, GAO examined (1) the 

current status of EAS, (2) the 

progress made by FEMA in 

implementing an integrated alert 

and warning system, and (3) the 

challenges involved in implementing 

an integrated alert and warning 

system. GAO conducted a survey of 

states, reviewed FEMA and other 

documentation, and interviewed 

industry stakeholders and officials 

from federal agencies responsible 

for public alerting. 

What GAO Recommends

To ensure a consistent direction for 

the public alert and warning 

system, GAO recommends, among 

other things, that FEMA develop 

strategic goals and processes for 

deployment of IPAWS and report 

periodically on program progress. 

In response, the Department of 

Homeland Security (DHS) agreed 

with all of the recommendations 

and provided examples of actions 

aimed at addressing the 

recommendations. However, 

FEMA’s planned actions to address 

some of the recommendations 

might be insufficient. DHS and the 

Federal Communications 

Commission (FCC) provided 

technical comments which have 

been incorporated in the report. 

As the primary national-level public warning system, EAS is an important alert 

tool, but it exhibits longstanding weaknesses that limit its effectiveness. EAS 

allows state and local officials limited ability to produce public alerts via 

television and radio. Weaknesses with EAS include lack of reliability of the 

message distribution system; gaps in coverage; insufficient testing; and 

inadequate training of personnel. Further, EAS provides little capability to 

alert specific geographic areas. EAS does not ensure message delivery for 

individuals with hearing and vision disabilities, and non-English speakers. 

FEMA has projects under way to address some of these weaknesses with 

EAS. However, to date, little progress has been made and EAS remains largely 

unchanged since GAO’s previous review, completed in March 2007. As a 

result, EAS does not fulfill the need for a reliable, comprehensive alert system.

Initiated in 2004, FEMA’s IPAWS program is intended to integrate new and 

existing alert capabilities, including EAS, into a comprehensive “system of 

systems.” However, national-level alert capabilities have remained unchanged 

and new technologies have not been adopted. IPAWS efforts have been 

affected by shifting program goals, lack of continuity in planning, staff 

turnover, and poorly organized program information from which to make 

management decisions. The vision of IPAWS has changed twice over the 

course of the program and strategic goals and milestones are not clearly 

defined, as IPAWS operated without an implementation plan from early 2007 

through June 2009. Consequently, as state and local governments are forging 

ahead with their own alert systems, IPAWS program implementation has 

stalled and many of the functional goals of IPAWS, such as geo-targeting of 

messages and dissemination through redundant pathways to multiple devices, 

have yet to reach operational capacity. FEMA conducted a series of pilot 

projects without systematically assessing outcomes or lessons learned and 

without substantially advancing alert and warning systems. FEMA does not 

periodically report on IPAWS progress, therefore, program transparency and 

accountability are lacking. 

FEMA faces coordination issues and technical challenges in developing and 

implementing IPAWS. Effective public warning depends on the cooperation of 

stakeholders, such as emergency managers and the telecommunications 

industry, yet many stakeholders GAO contacted knew little about IPAWS and 

expressed the need for better coordination with FEMA. FEMA has taken steps 

to improve its coordination efforts, but the scope of stakeholder involvement 

is limited. FEMA also faces technical challenges related to systems 

integration, standards development, the development of geo-targeted and 

multilingual alerts, and alerts for individuals with disabilities. For example, 

the standard intended to facilitate integration of systems is still under 

development and is not widely used. As a result of these coordination and 

technical hurdles, integration with state and local systems will likely be a 

significant challenge due to potential incompatibility, and FEMA does not yet 

have logistical plans to integrate these systems. 

View GAO-09-834 or key components. For 

GAO survey results, view GAO-09-880SP. 

For more information, contact Mark Goldstein 

at (202) 512-2834 or goldsteinm@gao.gov. 
Page i GAO-09-834 

Contents 

Letter 1

Background 2 

EAS Remains the Nation’s Primary Public Alert and Warning 

System, But Unaddressed Weaknesses Limit its Effectiveness 6 

While FEMA Has IPAWS Initiatives Under Way, Progress in 

Implementing an Integrated Alert System Has Been Limited 12 

FEMA Faces Coordination Issues and Technical Challenges in 

Implementing IPAWS 20 

Conclusions 26 

Recommendations for Executive Action 27 

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 28 

Appendix I Objectives, Scope, and Methodology 30 

Appendix II Comments from the Department of Homeland 

Security 32 

Appendix III GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments 35 

Table 

Table 1: Executive Order 13407 (2006) Functions of the Secretary 

of Homeland Security and Projects Carried Out by FEMA 13 

Figures 

Figure 1: IPAWS Conceptual Architecture 5 

Figure 2: PEP Station Daytime EAS Coverage Areas 8 

Figure 3: Examples of Incomplete IPAWS Projects with Missed 

Timelines 15 

Figure 4: FEMA’s Shifting Vision for IPAWS 16 

Figure 5: Survey Responses on IPAWS Pilots Projects from State 

Emergency Management Directors 20 

Figure 6: Survey Responses of State Emergency Management 

Directors on FEMA IPAWS Information, Training, 

Communication, and Coordination 23 

Public Alert and Warning
Abbreviations 

AMBER Alerts America’s Missing: Broadcast Emergency Response 

CAP Common Alerting Protocol 

CAP Profile IPAWS CAP v1.1-EAS Profile 

CMAS Commercial Mobile Alert System 

CMSAAC Commercial Mobile Service Alert Advisory 

Committee 

DEAS Digital Emergency Alert System 

DHS Department of Homeland Security 

EAS Emergency Alert System 

FACA Federal Advisory Committee Act 

FCC Federal Communications Commission 

FEMA Federal Emergency Management Agency 

GTAS Geo-Targeted Alerting System 

IPAWS Integrated Public Alert and Warning System 

NEMA National Emergency Management Association 

NOAA National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration 

NWR National Weather Radio 

NWS National Weather Service 

PEP Primary Entry Point 

PEPAC Primary Entry Point Administrative Council 

WARN Web Alert and Relay Network 

WARN Act Warning, Alert, and Response Network Act of 2006 

This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in the 

United States. The published product may be reproduced and distributed in its entirety 

without further permission from GAO. However, because this work may contain 

copyrighted images or other material, permission from the copyright holder may be 

necessary if you wish to reproduce this material separately. 

Page ii GAO-09-834 Public Alert and Warning
Page 1 GAO-09-834 

 

United States Government Accountability Office

Washington, DC 20548 

 

September 9, 2009 

The Honorable Eleanor Holmes Norton 

Chair 

The Honorable Mario Diaz-Balart 

Ranking Member 

Subcommittee on Economic Development, Public Buildings, and 

 Emergency Management 

Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure 

House of Representatives 

A comprehensive system to warn Americans about public safety 

emergencies allows people to take actions designed to save lives and 

reduce damage. The current Emergency Alert System (EAS) provides the 

President and authorized officials with limited capability to transmit 

emergency messages to the public via television and radio. The antiquated 

methods employed by EAS date back to 1963, exposing the system to 

weaknesses, including questionable reliability and versatility. In 2006, an 

executive order gave the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) the 

responsibility of modernizing the public alert and warning systems to 

ensure the capability of distributing alerts through varied 

telecommunications modes and based on factors such as geography. The 

Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), the entity within DHS 

responsible for the program, is working on the Integrated Public Alert and 

Warning System (IPAWS), which is intended to eventually integrate EAS 

into a larger warning network. When completed, EAS is expected to be 

superseded by the IPAWS “system of systems,” which will form the 

country’s comprehensive public alert system. In March 2007, we reported 

on identified limitations of EAS and the challenges of developing the new 

integrated system.1

 Building on our previous work, you asked us to 

provide information on the status of the nation’s emergency alert and 

public warning systems and FEMA’s IPAWS program. For this report, we 

examined (1) the current status of EAS, (2) the progress made in FEMA’s 

efforts to modernize and integrate alert and warning systems, and (3) the 

issues and challenges involved in implementing an integrated public alert 

and warning system. 

1

GAO, Emergency Preparedness: Current Emergency Alert System Has Limitations, and 

Development of a New Integrated System Will Be Challenging, GAO-07-411 (Washington, 

D.C.: Mar. 30, 2007). 

Public Alert and Warning
 

To meet these objectives, we conducted a Web-based survey of emergency 

management directors in all 50 states and the District of Columbia in 

March and April 2009, with 46 states and the District of Columbia 

responding for an overall response rate of 92 percent. The survey asked 

questions regarding public alert capabilities at the state and local level, the 

FEMA IPAWS program, and stakeholder coordination. This report 

contains selected results from the survey. To view the survey and a more 

complete tabulation of the results, access the following link: 

http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-09-880SP. We met with officials 

from FEMA, the Federal Communications Commission (FCC), DHS, and 

the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA). We also 

interviewed representatives of state and local emergency management 

offices; industry stakeholder organizations; public and private sector alert 

and warning experts; and private sector stakeholders, including 

broadcasters, the wireless industry, emergency alert technology 

companies, emergency management associations, and consumer advocacy 

groups. In addition, we conducted interviews with state participants in 

FEMA’s IPAWS pilot programs. We examined federal agency 

documentation including planning, program status, and financial 

information; agency orders and rules; testimony statements; and briefings 

from FEMA, FCC, and NOAA. We also reviewed relevant literature on 

public alert and warning from public and private stakeholders. 

We conducted this performance audit from September 2008 through 

September 2009, in accordance with generally accepted government 

auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the 

audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable 

basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We 

believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our 

findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. A more detailed 

discussion of our scope and methodology appears in appendix I. 

EAS, the nation’s primary alerting system, provides capacity for the United 

States to issue alerts and warnings to the public in response to 

emergencies. FEMA is responsible for administering EAS at the national 

level, while FCC manages EAS participation by media-related 

communications service providers.2

 FCC provides technical standards and 

Background 

 

2

FCC manages EAS participation by media-related communications service providers, 

including radio and television broadcasters, cable television, satellite radio, and television 

and IP-based video services offered by wireline companies. See, 47 C.F.R. 11.2(c). 

Page 2 GAO-09-834 Public Alert and Warning
 

support for EAS, rules for its operation, and enforcement within the overthe-air broadcast, cable, and satellite broadcasting industries. Presidential, 

or national-level, EAS alerts use a hierarchical distribution system to relay 

important emergency messages. As the entry point for national level EAS 

messages, FEMA is responsible for distributing presidential EAS alerts to 

National Primary stations, often referred to as Primary Entry Point (PEP) 

stations. Broadcasts of these national-level alerts are relayed by the PEP 

stations across the country to radio and television stations that 

rebroadcast the message to other broadcast stations and cable systems 

until all EAS participants have been alerted. This retransmission of alerts 

from EAS participant to EAS participant is commonly referred to as a 

“daisy chain” distribution system. FCC rules require EAS participants to 

install FCC-certified EAS equipment. Radio and television broadcast 

stations, cable companies, wireless cable companies, direct broadcast 

satellite, and satellite radio generally must participate in the system and 

transmit alerts initiated by the President. State and local governments 

determine the content and transmission procedures of their alerts, in 

conjunction with local broadcast radio and television stations. These 

procedures are specified in state EAS plans filed with FCC. In 2007, FCC 

adopted a Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking to explore EAS-related 

issues, such as how non-English speakers may best be served by national, 

state, and local EAS; and to reexamine the best way to make EAS 

accessible to persons with disabilities.3

Organizations that participate in EAS planning and administration include 

the Primary Entry Point Administrative Council (PEPAC), the Society of 

Broadcast Engineers, and associations such as the National Association of 

Broadcasters and individual state broadcasting associations. States and 

localities organize emergency communications committees whose 

members often include representatives from broadcasters or local 

television and radio stations. These committees agree on the chain of 

command and other procedures for activating EAS alerts. 

In June 2006, the President issued Executive Order 13407, entitled Public 

Alert and Warning System, effecting a policy that the U.S. have a 

comprehensive integrated alert and warning system, and detailing the 

responsibilities of the Secretary of Homeland Security in meeting this 

 

3

Review of the Emergency Alert System; Independent Spanish Broadcasters Association, 

the Office of Communication of the United Church of Christ, Inc., and the Minority 

Media and Telecommunications Council, Petition for Immediate Relief, Second Report & 

Order and Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 22 FCC Rcd 13275 (2007). 

Page 3 GAO-09-834 Public Alert and Warning
 

requirement.4 The order also specified the level of support expected from 

other departments and agencies in meeting the requirements for a more 

robust federal warning system. The Secretary of Homeland Security was 

ordered to “ensure an orderly and effective transition” from current 

capabilities to the system described by the executive order, and to report 

on the implementation of the system within 90 days of the order, and on at 

least a yearly basis, thereafter. The FEMA IPAWS program was initiated in 

2004 and the development and implementation of IPAWS has become the 

programmatic mechanism to carry out the executive order. IPAWS is 

defined by FEMA as a “system of systems,” which is intended to eventually 

integrate existing and new alert systems, including EAS. That is, EAS is 

expected to be superseded as the nation’s primary alert function by 

IPAWS, with EAS acting as one of its component parts and as one of 

IPAWS’s mechanisms to disseminate alerts. Another intended partner 

system is NOAA’s National Weather Radio (NWR). NWR broadcasts 

National Weather Service forecasts and all-hazard warnings. Non-weather 

emergency messages are broadcast over NWR at the request of federal, 

state, and local officials in time-critical situations when public safety is 

involved. 

The Warning, Alert, and Response Network Act of 2006 (WARN Act)5

required FCC to adopt relevant technical standards, protocols, procedures, 

and other technical requirements to enable commercial mobile service 

providers (wireless providers) to issue emergency alerts. The act 

established an advisory panel called the Commercial Mobile Service Alert 

Advisory Committee (CMSAAC),6

 to recommend the technical 

specifications and protocols that will govern wireless providers that 

participate in emergency alerting. The CMSAAC was chaired by then-FCC 

Chairman Kevin J. Martin and included 42 other members, representing 

stakeholders in all levels of government and the private sector. FCC 

adopted most of the recommendations made by the committee regarding 

 

4

Exec. Order 13407, 71 Fed. Reg. 36975 (June 26, 2006). 

5

The Warning, Alert, and Response Network Act was enacted on October 13, 2006, as title 

VI of the Security and Accountability for Every Port Act, Pub. L. No. 109-347, 120 Stat. 1884 

(2006). 

6

Section 603(c) of the WARN Act required that FCC establish the CMSAAC to develop and 

recommend technical standards and protocols for the voluntary transmission of emergency 

alerts by Commercial Mobile Service Providers within one year from the date of enactment 

of the WARN Act (i.e., by October 12, 2007). 

Page 4 GAO-09-834 Public Alert and Warning
 

the required capabilities of wireless providers to transmit alerts, as well as 

the proposal to develop a Commercial Mobile Alert System (CMAS). 

Figure 1 displays the conceptual architecture of IPAWS, with EAS, NWR, 

and CMAS as mechanisms for disseminating alerts. 

Figure 1: IPAWS Conceptual Architecture 

Emergency Alert System

 • National Primary

 • State Primary

 • Local Primary

NOAA National

Weather Radio

CMAS

Other Commercial Alert

and Warning Services

State

Federal

Local

IPAWS

Source: FEMA.

The Common Alerting Protocol (CAP) is an open, non-proprietary digital 

message format being used as a standard for new, digitized alert networks 

using multiple technologies. CAP is compatible with multiple applications 

and telecommunication methods, and has been developed for use by 

emergency management officials in sending all types of alert messages. 

CAP can be used as a single input to activate multiple warning systems, 

and is capable of geographic targeting and multilingual messaging. 

FEMA—required by the executive order to adopt alert standards and 

protocols—intends to adopt CAP and to publish its IPAWS CAP v1.1-EAS 

Profile (CAP Profile) standard. In an FCC report and order released in July 

2007, FCC promulgated new rules, including a requirement for all 

mandatory EAS participants to accept messages using CAP, no later than 

180 days after FEMA adopts the CAP standard.7

 

7

22 FCC Rcd 13275 (2007). In July 2008, FEMA announced its intention to adopt CAP in the 

first quarter of calendar year 2009, but has since revised its plans to adopt CAP in fiscal 

year 2010. 

Page 5 GAO-09-834 Public Alert and Warning
 

EAS remains the primary national-level public alert system and serves as a 

valuable public alert and warning tool. It remains available as a 

mechanism for the President to issue national warnings, and it allows state 

and local governments to generate weather warnings, America’s Missing: 

Broadcast Emergency Response (AMBER) Alerts,8

 and other public 

emergency communications. Nonetheless, as we previously reported, EAS 

exhibits longstanding weaknesses that continue to limit its effectiveness.9

In particular, the reliability of the national-level relay system—which 

would be critical if the President were to issue a national-level alert—

remains questionable due to a lack of redundancy among key 

broadcasters, gaps in coverage, insufficient testing of the relay system, and 

inadequate training of personnel. Further, EAS alerts have limited 

coverage, dissemination means, and geographical specificity. FEMA has 

several projects under way to address some of these weaknesses, but little 

progress has been made and EAS remains effectively unchanged since our 

last report, issued in March 2007. 

EAS Remains the 

Nation’s Primary 

Public Alert and 

Warning System, But 

Unaddressed 

Weaknesses Limit its 

Effectiveness 

EAS Remains Available as 

a Means to Broadcast 

National-Level Alerts, but 

Is Primarily Used by State 

and Local Governments 

Although EAS was established to allow the President to communicate with 

the public, it primarily serves as a means of disseminating emergency alert 

and warning information at the state and local level. EAS has never been 

used to transmit a national-level alert, but instead has evolved into an 

important public alert and warning tool for state and local governments. 

State and local emergency operations managers can request activation of 

EAS for state and local public alert and warning needs. EAS participants 

transmit state and local alerts via radio and television or other media 

facilities, such as cable or satellite. These alerts include weather warnings, 

AMBER Alerts, or other emergency communications, such as evacuation 

notices. EAS participants may decide individually whether to transmit 

alerts that originate at the state or local level. Approximately 90 percent of 

all EAS messages are weather alerts generated by NOAA’s National 

Weather Service (NWS). NWS broadcasts forecasts, warnings, watches, 

and other non-weather hazard information, and supplies such information 

to broadcast and cable entry points designated in approved EAS state and 

local plans. 

 

8

The AMBER Alert Program is a voluntary partnership between law-enforcement agencies, 

broadcasters, transportation agencies, and the wireless industry to activate an urgent 

bulletin in the most serious child-abduction cases. 

9

GAO-07-411. 

Page 6 GAO-09-834 Public Alert and Warning
 

EAS has longstanding weaknesses that have not been resolved since we 

reported on them in March 2007.10 These weaknesses continue to limit the 

effectiveness of EAS and include (1) a lack of redundancy, (2) gaps in 

coverage, (3) a lack of testing, and (4) inadequate training for EAS 

participants. In addition to these weaknesses, EAS is also hampered by 

how alerts are disseminated to the public. 

Weaknesses in Alert 

Distribution and 

Dissemination Hinder EAS 

Lack of redundancy. FEMA lacks alternative means of reaching EAS 

participants should its primary connection fail. Specifically, FEMA can 

distribute national-level alerts to 35 PEP stations (which serve as the entry 

points for Presidential alerts) and to 860 public radio stations across the 

country via EAS phone lines and satellite connectivity, respectively. 

However, FEMA lacks an alternative means of reaching these participants 

if those primary connections fail. Furthermore, if a primary connection to 

a PEP station failed, all of the other EAS participants that rely on that 

station via the daisy chain relay system would fail to receive alerts. This 

lack of redundancy could have serious consequences. For example, if a 

PEP station were disabled during a disaster in a major metropolitan area, 

an EAS alert would likely fail to reach a sizable portion of the population 

because FEMA, potentially, would not have access to other stations in that 

area. 

Gaps in coverage. Gaps in PEP station broadcast coverage could hinder 

the successful dissemination of EAS alerts, as some broadcast stations 

might have difficulty in monitoring their assigned PEP station because the 

station is geographically distant. Some states, such as Maine, are not 

covered at all by the PEP system and would have to pick up a nationallevel message from an alternate source, such as Public Radio.11 This might 

not be a fully reliable option, however. Unlike PEP stations, public radio 

stations do not necessarily have extra fuel and generators on-site to help 

ensure continuous operations following a disaster. Some broadcasters we 

contacted expressed concern that other factors might impede their ability 

to receive alerts from PEP stations. For example, some PEP broadcast 

signals are too weak to overcome geographical impediments, such as 

mountains; due to interference, broadcast signals generally do not travel 

as well during the day as at night and, therefore, have inconsistent EAS 

 

10GAO-07-411. 

11The State of Maine uses the Maine Public Broadcasting microwave system as its primary 

EAS backbone. Each station in the Maine EAS distribution system can receive nationallevel EAS alerts via National Public Radio. 

Page 7 GAO-09-834 Public Alert and Warning
 

coverage; and high definition radio signals can overpower or distort PEP 

broadcast signals. Some states, such as Washington, have developed 

systems to augment the PEP network to ensure that EAS messages are 

disseminated throughout the state, but not every state has taken such 

action. As shown in figure 2, PEP daytime broadcast coverage leaves large 

geographic areas uncovered by EAS. FEMA officials noted that there is a 

significant difference between daytime and nighttime coverage. FEMA 

estimated that 82 percent and 75 percent of the population are covered by 

nighttime and daytime PEP signals, respectively. 

Figure 2: PEP Station Daytime EAS Coverage Areas

Pa.

Ore.

Nev.

Idaho

Mont.

Wyo.

Utah

Ariz.

N.Mex.

Colo.

N.Dak.

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Tex.

Kans.

Okla.

Minn.

Iowa

Mo.

Ark.

La.

Ill.

Miss.

Ala.

S.C.

N.C.

N.H.

Mass.

Mich.

Calif.

Wash.

Wis.

Maine

Vt.

W.Va.

R.I.

Conn.

Del.

Md.

D.C.

Albany

Albany

Albuquerque Amarillo

Asheville Bakersfield

Big Spring

Billings

Bisbee

Bishop

Brunswick

Carlsbad Charleston

Colorado Springs

Corpus Christi

Daytona Beach

Durango

El Paso

Elko

Fargo

Fayetteville

Flagstaff

Fort Collins

Fort Dodge

Fresno

Gainesville

Gallup

Great Falls

Green Bay

Greenville

H Greenville untsville

Idaho Falls

Iron Mountain

Key West

Klamath Falls

Knoxville

Las

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Lewiston

Marble Canyon

Marinette

Marquette

Minot

Needles

Oshkosh

Palm Springs

Parsons

Pendleton

Pine Bluff

Portland

Provo

Rapid City

Redding

Roanoke

Rochester

Roswell

Salina

San Bernardino

Savannah

Scottsbluff

Scottsdale

Shreveport

St. Joseph

Tuscaloosa

Visalia

Waco

Watertown

Wichita

Winston-Salem

Buffalo

Casper

Cedar City

Champaign Chico

Del Rio

Dodge City

Duluth

Ely

Eureka

Grand Forks

Grand Island

Grand Junction

Guymon

Hastings

Hot Springs

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Ironwood

Lafayette

Laramie

Las Cruces

Los Alamos

Mankato

Mason City

Medford

Miles City

Monterey

Monticello

Odessa

Poplar Bluff

Pueblo

Pullman

Reno

Rock

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San Jose

Santa Maria

Sarasota

Shawnee

Sheridan

Sioux City

Temple

Texarkana

Tucson

Tulsa

Twin Falls

Wichita Falls

Williston

Winfield

Yakima

Dallas

Jacksonville

Kansas City

Miami

Norfolk

Oakland

Omaha

Orlando

Seattle Spokane

Vancouver

West Palm Beach

Birmingham

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Chicago

Houston

Los Angeles

Louisville

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Milwaukee

Minneapolis Portland

San Antonio

San Diego

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Albany

Atlanta

Augusta

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Bismarck

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Charleston

Cheyenne

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Denver

Des Moines

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Jackson

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Montgomery

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Olympia

Phoenix

Raleigh

Richmond

Sacramento

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Salt Lake City

Santa Fe

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St. Paul

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Page 8 GAO-09-834 Public Alert and Warning
 

Lack of testing. FEMA does not perform ongoing national-level tests of the 

daisy chain relay system to ensure that it would work as intended during a 

national-level alert. FCC requires stations to test their EAS equipment12

and FEMA is required to perform weekly tests of connections to the 35 

PEP stations, but there is no requirement for a national-level test of the 

relay system. In January 2007, in response to our ongoing work at that 

time, FEMA conducted a national-level EAS test. According to FEMA, the 

test demonstrated an effective satellite connection to public radio stations. 

However, three PEP stations failed to receive and effectively rebroadcast 

the national-level test message due to hardware and software issues, 

which FEMA stated have since been resolved. FEMA has not held another 

test since 2007, although DHS agreed with the intent of our previous 

recommendation that FEMA develop and implement a plan to verify the 

dependability and effectiveness of the relay distribution system. DHS had 

also stated that FEMA would begin to conduct new quarterly “over-the-air” 

tests, but these have not taken place. In addition, FEMA has no plans for 

testing the relay distribution system. Consequently, there is no assurance 

the national-level relay would work should the President need to activate 

EAS to communicate with the American people. The recent failure of an 

accidental national-level alert suggests that problems remain in the relay 

system. In this incident, a national-level (Presidential) alert, intended as a 

test, was inadvertently initiated in Illinois. Despite this false alarm, as 

intended for a national-level alert, the broadcast airways were “seized.” 

However, the alert failed to be properly disseminated by all EAS 

participants. In particular, cable companies, which should disseminate 

such an alert in an emergency situation, failed to receive it. According to 

FEMA officials and industry stakeholders, the failure was due to a 

malfunction of cable providers’ EAS equipment. While FEMA officials say 

this situation has since been rectified, no testing has been done to confirm 

that the equipment used by cable companies would work properly. 

Coupled with the results from the January 2007 test, these events raise 

concerns about the national-level relay system and further highlight the 

need for additional testing. 

Inadequate training for EAS participants. Another longstanding 

weakness of EAS is inadequate training for EAS participants, both in using 

EAS equipment and in drafting EAS messages. In 2007, we reported that 

several EAS stakeholders, including state and local officials, identified 

inadequate training as a limitation of EAS and cited a need for additional 

 

1247 C.F.R. § 11.61. 

Page 9 GAO-09-834 Public Alert and Warning
 

instruction in equipment use and message creation. Our current work 

indicates that such training is still lacking. For example, a state official 

told us that users and message originators need additional training to 

know how to properly craft and initiate a message, especially since 

emergency managers vary in their level of expertise. Similarly, a number of 

respondents to our state survey of emergency managers cited a need for 

training. For example, one state emergency management representative 

suggested that training courses be established for emergency managers, 

broadcasters, and cable providers. To address training inadequacies, we 

previously recommended that FEMA develop a plan to verify that EAS 

participants have the training and technical skills to issue effective EAS 

alerts. DHS agreed with the intent of the recommendation and noted that 

FEMA would improve training for EAS operators, as well as make the 

system more user-friendly. According to FEMA, it is currently analyzing 

and assessing EAS operator training needs, but it has not yet implemented 

any new training initiatives. 

In addition to the aforementioned weaknesses, EAS is also hampered by 

how alerts are disseminated to the public. Much as gaps exist with PEPstation coverage and through weaknesses in EAS participants’ 

distribution, large portions of the population remain uncovered because 

EAS relies on certain media, such as radio and television broadcast, to 

provide alerts. Specifically, EAS’s reliance on broadcast and other media 

currently exclude other communications devices, such as cell phones. In 

addition, it remains difficult for EAS to reach distinct segments of the 

population. For example, alerts are typically provided only in English and 

alerting mechanisms provide unequal access for persons with disabilities. 

In particular, individuals with hearing and vision disabilities may be 

subject to inconsistent aural and visual information in EAS alerts. Further, 

effective public alerting via EAS is also hindered by its limited ability to 

target alert messages to specific geographic locations. For example, a local 

emergency manager told us that a message generated by his county would 

be automatically sent to 10 neighboring counties, potentially causing 

unnecessary alarm for alert recipients in surrounding areas. 

Page 10 GAO-09-834 Public Alert and Warning
 

FEMA officials stated that projects are under way to address some of 

EAS’s operational weaknesses. For example, to improve EAS coverage, 

FEMA is planning to expand the number of PEP stations from 35 to 69 by 

2011. However, since the PEP expansion effort was initiated in 2006, of 

three PEP stations scheduled for addition in 2007, FEMA completed only 

one in 2008, with the other two only partially completed.13 At the time of 

our review, FEMA had selected six additional area locations for new PEP 

stations and initiated negotiations with radio stations in three of the areas. 

FEMA cited several challenges in expanding the number of PEPs. 

Specifically, officials told us that the process is often slowed by 

negotiations with broadcast stations, soil sampling, and construction. In 

addition, PEPAC representatives said regulatory procedures, such as those 

requiring stations to house fuel on-site, lengthen the process. 

FEMA Has Introduced 

Projects to Address Some 

of EAS’s Operational 

Weaknesses, but Little 

Progress Has Been Made 

To add redundancy and improve the reliability of the relay system, FEMA 

is also developing the Digital Emergency Alert System (DEAS). DEAS is 

expected to provide additional connections with EAS entry points—the 

PEP stations—and provide for the direct transmission of a voice, video, or 

text alert to stations using the public broadcast system satellite network. 

According to FEMA, DEAS was successfully piloted twice. However, 

despite concluding the pilots in 2007, FEMA had not begun implementing 

DEAS at the time of our review. FEMA planned to deploy DEAS in 2008 to 

13 states and 1 territory, including those that participated in the second 

pilot; followed in 2009 by a deployment to 16 additional states prone to 

weather hazards, and then to all states. However, DEAS deployment did 

not occur and FEMA did not provide an explanation for this delay. 

Currently, FEMA plans to implement DEAS using a phased approach 

beginning in mid-2009. 

Other FEMA initiatives related to EAS include the integration of XM 

satellite transmission paths and the implementation of CAP. Specifically, 

FEMA plans to deliver national-level EAS messages from FEMA to PEP 

stations by establishing a satellite connection via XM Satellite Radio to 

complement its existing phone connection. FEMA targeted completion of 

XM satellite connectivity to key EAS sites by 2007; however, it is now 

scheduled for completion in 2009. While no reason was provided for the 

apparent delay, FEMA noted that it is currently working on certification 

and accreditation issues. Separately, FEMA is working to develop and 

 

13FEMA officials told us that one station was fully complete, but two others still required 

circuits in order to be fully operational. 

Page 11 GAO-09-834 Public Alert and Warning
 

implement the CAP Profile; however, FEMA has not defined how CAP will 

work within EAS, including how EAS participants will rebroadcast a CAP 

message.14 Further, CAP is not currently capable of carrying a live audio 

message. Alternatively, to satisfy the requirement to carry a presidential 

message, EAS participants will be required to link to a FEMA server to 

stream audio messages. Finally, broadcasters expressed concern that CAP 

is not ready to be used with EAS, thereby leading broadcasters to question 

its utility, as well as the necessity of obtaining CAP-compliant equipment. 

FEMA began initiatives related to IPAWS in 2004, yet national-level alert 

capabilities have remained unchanged and new standards and 

technologies have not been adopted. IPAWS has operated without a 

consistent strategic vision and has been adversely affected by shifting 

program vision, lack of continuity in planning and program direction, and 

poorly organized program information from which to make management 

decisions. Therefore, as state and local governments are forging ahead 

with their own alert systems, IPAWS program implementation has stalled 

and many of its functional goals have yet to reach operational capacity. 

Additionally, FEMA’s investment in the IPAWS pilot projects—seed 

initiatives intended to test alert technologies and form the foundation of 

IPAWS—has resulted in few lessons learned and few advances in alert and 

warning systems. Furthermore, FEMA does not report on IPAWS spending 

or progress in achieving goals, which limits transparency and 

accountability for program results. 

While FEMA Has 

IPAWS Initiatives 

Under Way, Progress 

in Implementing an 

Integrated Alert 

System Has Been 

Limited 

FEMA Has Begun Some 

Projects, but Has Yet to 

Integrate Alert Systems or 

Adopt New Technologies 

and Standards 

Although IPAWS has existed since 2004 with the original objective of 

modernizing and integrating public alert and emergency warning systems 

across federal, state, and local governments, national-level alert system 

capabilities remain unchanged and have yet to be integrated. In June 2006, 

Executive Order 13407 specified the responsibilities of DHS and FEMA 

with respect to a public alert and warning system, establishing 10 

functions for the Secretary of Homeland Security. Since the executive 

order, FEMA has launched or continued, under the IPAWS program, 

several projects intended to address the 10 functions specified in the 

order. Table 1 displays the functions of the executive order, FEMA’s 

 

14According to FEMA officials, FEMA is developing a CAP Profile Implementation Guide 

that will define how CAP will work within EAS. The DHS Directorate for Science and 

Technology has been tasked with developing CAP to EAS translation specifications. 

Page 12 GAO-09-834 Public Alert and Warning
 

ongoing projects aimed at satisfying those functions, and the status and 

progress of the projects. 

Table 1: Executive Order 13407 (2006) Functions of the Secretary of Homeland Security and Projects Carried Out by FEMA 

Function FEMA projects Status/progress/timeline 

Inventory and assess existing alert 

infrastructure 

IPAWS Inventory and Evaluation Survey, 

beginning 2009. 

Information collection has yet to begin. 

Completion of inventory scheduled for 2012. 

Develop alert standards and 

protocols 

CAP Profile standard adoption proposed early 

2009. 

Limited use of CAP was intended for 2007. 

CAP Profile under review, pending approval 

and adoption in fiscal year 2010. 

Geo-targeted, risk-based alerts FEMA/NOAA Geo-Targeted Alerting System 

(GTAS) Demonstration Project. CMAS under 

development. 

GTAS project continued through June 2009. 

CMAS scheduled for 2012 completion. 

Alerts for non-English speakers and 

the disabled 

No projects currently under way. In 2010, IPAWS intends to engineer, plan, and 

begin implementation of these capabilities. 

Augment infrastructure DEAS for redundant EAS distribution path. 

PEP station expansion. Satellite distribution of 

EAS messages. Integration of NOAA Weather 

Radio. 

DEAS initiated in 2004, plans to be 

implemented in 9 states in 2009. PEP 

expansion initiated in 2007 with 1 station 

added in 2008; expansion to 69 stations to be 

complete in 2012. Initial NOAA alert 

integration, beginning in 2009, targeted to be 

complete in 2013. 

Conduct training and testing Partnership with FEMA Resource Center and 

NOAA to provide alert and warning message 

origination training. 

No training or national-level system testing to 

date. NOAA conducting training independently.

Provide public education on uses 

and access to the public alert and 

warning system 

Launched IPAWS Web site Limited changes to IPAWS Web site 

completed March 2009. No additional public 

education projects planned. 

Consult, coordinate, and cooperate 

with private sector 

Federal, Practitioner, and Industry Working 

Groups formed to discuss CAP Profile. 

Working groups’ scope will be expanded to 

gather input on development and 

implementation of IPAWS. 

Administer EAS as component of 

public alert and warning system 

FEMA acts as executive agent for EAS, 

maintaining the PEP stations in cooperation 

with PEPAC. 

Continue ongoing administration of EAS. 

Ensure Presidential alert and 

warning capability under all 

conditions 

Maintain EAS and PEP stations, integrate 

NOAA network with IPAWS. 

Status of presidential alert and warning 

capability is undetermined: A Presidential alert 

has never been issued, nor nationally tested. 

Source: Executive Order 13407 and GAO analysis of FEMA documentation. 

While there are IPAWS projects under way designed to meet the 

requirements of the executive order, these projects have shown little 

progress. Many IPAWS initiatives have been ongoing for several years with 

little functional contribution to the improvement or modernization of 

public alert and warning. In fact, some of the projects cited by FEMA as 

initiatives satisfying the requirements of the executive order have been 

under development since the inception of IPAWS and have yet to be 

Page 13 GAO-09-834 Public Alert and Warning
 

completed. For example, one intention of IPAWS is to integrate various 

alert systems into a “system of systems.” There are both federally- and 

locally-operated alert systems, which are to be integrated under IPAWS. 

On the federal level, NOAA directs the NWS alerting network; and at the 

state level, 42 emergency management directors who responded to our 

survey reported existing or planned systems in their state. According to 

FEMA briefings and documents, it is the intention that local, state, and 

tribal systems be interoperable with IPAWS; however, states and localities 

operate their own distinct systems. In fact, of the 42 state survey 

respondents with alert systems, only 11 have systems that have been 

integrated with or are automatically triggered by the existing EAS. At 

present, the extent of efforts to integrate state and local systems is a 

nationwide inventory of systems and there are not yet any architectural or 

logistical plans to integrate these systems. In effect, as deployment of state 

and local alert systems continues, integration into the IPAWS system could 

become increasingly complicated and difficult. 

As another example, FEMA’s efforts to have IPAWS deliver warnings 

through diverse media have been limited. As early as 2005, FEMA planned 

efforts to provide warning messages to subscribers via email and to 

telephones, text message devices, cell phones, pagers, and Internet 

desktops. These capabilities were tested under various IPAWS pilot 

projects, but the development and implementation of the methods were 

discontinued when the pilots were completed. At present, IPAWS efforts 

to expand alert dissemination through methods other than standard radio 

and television broadcast are limited to participation in CMAS, a cellular 

broadcast text alert initiative. FEMA has accepted the responsibility for 

collecting and disseminating alerts, but it is unclear, at this point, how 

CMAS will be integrated with IPAWS. 

FEMA has missed numerous timelines that it set for IPAWS initiatives. 

Various projects were originally intended to be completed to form the 

foundation of IPAWS, but have experienced delays and are still not yet 

functional. Figure 3 demonstrates some of the IPAWS programs whose 

timelines were surpassed and have still yet to be realized. 

Page 14 GAO-09-834 Public Alert and Warning
 

Figure 3: Examples of Incomplete IPAWS Projects with Missed Timelines

2005 2006 2007 2008 2009

EAS Satellite 

connectivity to 

PEPs and States

4th quarter fiscal 

year 2005

DEAS deployment 

to all states

December 2007

Adoption of the CAP 

Profile

First quarter 2009

XM Satellite alert 

transmission and EAS link

August 2007

Digital Presidential video, voice, 

and text messaging capability

January 2009

PEP expansion to 90 

percent coverage

Fiscal year 2008

Source: GAO analysis of FEMA information.

GTAS initial capability in 

National Capital region

September 2007

Aside from implementing an integrated public alert and warning system, 

FEMA has responsibility for providing training on and testing of alert and 

warning systems; public education on use and access to the system; and 

consultation, coordination, and cooperation with public and private sector 

stakeholders. According to emergency management and industry 

stakeholders, FEMA has not sufficiently met this responsibility. About half 

of the state survey respondents reported that FEMA had not provided 

them with a clear understanding of the IPAWS vision or program goals and 

66 percent were somewhat or very dissatisfied with FEMA’s level of 

consultation and coordination. Ultimately, among states, there is a general 

lack of satisfaction with FEMA’s outreach and a clouded understanding of 

what IPAWS actually is. Although survey respondents generally evaluated 

FEMA as having done little to no outreach, education, and coordination, 

FEMA has made recent progress in these efforts. FEMA officials have 

convened federal, industry, and practitioners’ “working groups” to discuss 

the adoption of the CAP Profile, which they plan to expand to include 

broader discussions about public alert and warning. In interviews, public 

and private sector stakeholders have expressed frustration with the lack of 

communication and coordination with IPAWS in the past, but have also 

noted recent improvements. 

Shifting Program Vision 

and Lack of Continuity in 

Planning Have Adversely 

Affected Efforts to 

Modernize and Integrate 

Alerts 

FEMA’s efforts to create an integrated and modernized alert and warning 

system have been affected by (1) shifting program vision, (2) a lack of 

continuity in planning and program direction, (3) a lack of collection or 

organization of program information from which to make management 

decisions, and (4) staff turnover. 

Shifting program vision. The IPAWS program vision has changed several 

times, slowing progress toward an integrated system. FEMA originally 

Page 15 GAO-09-834 Public Alert and Warning
 

planned to build an infrastructure to deliver state and local alerts through 

multiple pathways. However, according to FEMA officials, in the second 

quarter of calendar year 2007, the vision changed to focus exclusively on 

dissemination of presidential messages and setting alert and warning 

technical standards. In early 2009, the vision of the program shifted to 

again focus on a comprehensive system that included infrastructure for 

state and local alerts. Figure 4 shows the evolution of the IPAWS vision. 

Figure 4: FEMA’s Shifting Vision for IPAWS 

2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009

Integrated public alert and warning system 

that provides federal, state, and local 

officials with multiple means to provide 

timely public alerts.

Goal: Alert all people on all 

communications devices.

IPAWS architecture will ensure that the 

President will be able to send an alert to 

the public during any hazardous event.

Goal: Deliver the presidential message to 

the nation.

Build and maintain an integrated and 

comprehensive system that enables people to 

receive alerts and warnings through as many 

means as possible.

Goal: IPAWS will provide local, state, and 

federal authorities integrated services and 

capabilities to alert and warn their communities, 

via multiple communications methods of any 

hazard impacting public safety.

Late 2004 to early 2007 Early 2007 to early 2009 Early 2009 onward

Sources: FEMA and GAO.

Lack of continuity in planning and program direction. FEMA’s efforts to 

create an integrated and modernized alert and warning system have 

encountered difficulties in program planning and management. As we have 

reported, effective project planning involves establishing and maintaining 

plans; defining the project mission, scope and activities; and determining 

overall budget and schedule, key deliverables, and milestones for key 

deliverables. It also involves ensuring that the project team has the skills 

and knowledge needed to manage the project and obtaining stakeholder 

commitment to the project plan. Furthermore, agencies can use 

performance information to make various types of management decisions 

to improve programs and results.15 Although the executive order requires 

an implementation plan to be updated yearly, from early 2007 through 

June 2009, the IPAWS effort operated without a designated 

 

15GAO, Managing For Results: Enhancing Agency Use of Performance Information for 

Management Decision Making, GAO-05-927 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 9, 2005) 

Page 16 GAO-09-834 Public Alert and Warning
 

implementation plan and no specific processes for systems development 

and deployment.16 The current implementation plan, completed in June 

2009, does not adequately satisfy the project management and planning 

practices essential for effective program execution. In contrast to the plan 

from 2006, this plan provides few program details. Additionally, the new 

plan includes only a vague overview of IPAWS initiatives, few definitive 

milestones toward reaching program goals, and a lack of clarity in how 

IPAWS systems will be integrated. Other planning documentation that 

exist—consisting mostly of briefing slides outlining IPAWS initiatives or 

broad, conceptual program requirements—indicate a lack of continuous 

overall strategic vision with disparate projects not tied together by a 

cohesive plan.17

Lack of collection or organization of program information from which 

to make management decisions. We found organized IPAWS program 

information that officials might use for decisionmaking and establishing 

project plans is also lacking. Throughout the course of our work, FEMA 

officials told us that many key IPAWS documents did not exist or were 

irretrievable. Moreover, a consultant18 at FEMA who is assessing IPAWS 

has found that there is no cogent organization system to locate program 

information, that information exists in multiple locations across FEMA 

office spaces, and that data searches on program information take an 

inordinate amount of time and effort. The consultant also found more 

robust and realistic documented internal controls are necessary. 

We requested documentation on FEMA and DHS reporting requirements 

or performance measures for which the IPAWS program prepared 

documented updates of its progress. However, neither FEMA nor DHS 

regularly report on IPAWS.19 FEMA was able to provide a performance 

information worksheet and spreadsheet, but this documentation provided 

only vague program parameters, without progress updates on reaching 

 

16The executive order required the Secretary of Homeland Security to submit to the 

President an implementation plan no later than 90 days after the date of the order and, 

thereafter, to submit a report not less than once each year. 

17FEMA indicated that a strategic plan is under development, and that it has other 

documentation and processes for system design that were in the process of internal 

coordination when our review was being completed. 

18In October 2008, FEMA contracted with a professional services firm providing 

management, assurance, and financial services. 

19The DHS performance and accountability reports do not include information on IPAWS. 

Page 17 GAO-09-834 Public Alert and Warning
 

specific goals or milestones. FEMA has taken steps to assess the IPAWS 

program and has contracted with a consultant to perform a full 

assessment of the IPAWS program and to implement internal controls and 

performance measures. However, the absence of accurate periodic 

reporting on IPAWS leaves valuable program information unavailable. 

Such information would help increase program transparency, establish 

greater program accountability, and assure a reasonable assessment of 

return on financial investments. Additionally, periodic reporting on IPAWS 

would provide FEMA’s private sector partners and those in government at 

the federal, state, and local level with information necessary to help 

establish an integrated alert and warning system. Such reporting would 

also assist the Congress as it oversees issues related to public alert and 

warning. 

Staff turnover. Progress toward an integrated alert system has also been 

slowed by frequent changes in organizational leadership of the IPAWS 

program office and other staffing related issues. During our review, IPAWS 

was operating under an acting director—its third director since the 

program began—and at the time of our review was searching for a 

permanent director. According to FEMA, a new director took charge of the 

program on August 3, 2009. Additionally, according to FEMA officials, high 

turnover of program staff has made it difficult to consistently manage 

IPAWS programs. FEMA’s heavy use of contract employees has also 

resulted in concerns from stakeholders. In one state, emergency 

management officials participated in an IPAWS project, relying solely on 

contract staff without actually knowing that FEMA was involved. Another 

state official said that IPAWS is dominated with outside contractors who 

do not fully understand alert and warning needs. At the program office 

itself, there is a preponderance of contract staff. As of June 2009, 27 

contractor staff and 5 FEMA IPAWS staff positions were filled out of 11 

noncontract full-time equivalent positions that were available. 

Limited Program 

Accountability for IPAWS 

Projects Has Contributed 

to Inconclusive Results 

and Lessons Learned 

To demonstrate the integration and expansion of new alerting 

technologies, and to work toward the functionality described in the 

executive order, FEMA has implemented a series of IPAWS pilot projects, 

but they have ended inconclusively, with few documented lessons learned. 

The IPAWS pilots were first introduced in 2004, prior to Executive Order 

13407, and focused on testing various alerting systems in different areas of 

the country with the intent that successfully piloted technologies could 

eventually be used in a fully integrated “system of systems.” At various 

stages of our work, FEMA provided different accounts of the number and 

breadth of the pilot projects, as well as inconsistent documentation on the 

Page 18 GAO-09-834 Public Alert and Warning
 

goals, costs, and results of the full IPAWS pilot programs. Specifically, 

FEMA documents and interviews revealed inconsistent information on the 

purpose of the pilot programs and how they supported broader IPAWS 

goals. According to FEMA officials, the pilot projects were intended to be 

discrete tests of alert capability, with clear goals and specified durations. 

However, there is a dearth of documentation describing the actual plans 

and results of the pilots. Although we requested reports documenting the 

plans, lessons learned, and technological or operational outcomes, for 

most pilot projects, such formal documentation was never produced.20

Rather, the extent of the documentation FEMA provided on the pilots 

includes general briefing slides with broad program descriptions. FEMA 

equipment deployed during the pilots was left, for the most part, unused 

with pilot participants. According to FEMA officials, there is an inventory 

accounting for the equipment and the equipment is intended to be 

repurposed in the future. As a result of the lack of project assessments, 

reporting, and documentation, it is unclear which aspects of the IPAWS 

projects, if any, are currently being utilized or are planned to be utilized in 

the future or whether the projects informed actions or decisions with 

respect to IPAWS programming. Initial findings from an IPAWS program 

assessment, performed by a FEMA consultant, revealed that, in most 

cases, key project deliverables, for which the government contracted, 

could not be accounted for. FEMA’s consultant was unable to locate or 

verify the status of deliverables for 18 of the 28 projects it identified. The 

consultant was able to verify only partial completion of 6 other projects, 

while the status of deliverables for the 4 other projects was incomplete, 

ongoing, not available, or unknown. 

Responses from our survey of state emergency management directors 

indicate that most of the 12 states that reported participating in the pilot 

projects reacted unfavorably when asked about the outcomes and lessons 

learned from the pilots. Lack of coordination, poor management, 

incomplete execution, and short project duration were cited, among other 

things, as lessons learned or outcomes from the pilots. Figure 5 identifies 

the states who reported participating in IPAWS pilot projects, including 

select open-ended feedback provided by states. 

 

20Sandia National Laboratories was contracted to implement the Web Alert and Relay 

Network (WARN) pilot. Sandia produced a final report for the second phase of the pilot, 

WARN2, whose results, according to FEMA officials, were not accepted by the FEMA 

IPAWS program management office. 

Page 19 GAO-09-834 Public Alert and Warning
 

Figure 5: Survey Responses on IPAWS Pilots Projects from State Emergency Management Directors

Source: GAO; Map Resources (map).

WA

AK

OK

LA

MS

AL

FL

SC

NC

ME

WI

NJ

Lack of coordination 

over entire life of 

program... Too little 

information, too late.

State input would have 

been valuable to the 

program in its earlier 

development stages... 

IPAWS appeared to be 

hastily conceived and 

poorly executed. 

IPAWS was, in the state's

opinion, not ready for 

operations during that 

one-year pilot period... 

The system was slow, 

taking about 8 hours to 

send out the prerecorded 

message. 

The one-year pilot 

period was not enough 

time to evaluate a

system of this scope. 

At least two counties

were pleased with the 

ability to alert the public.

Length of program 

should have been 

longer. Many of our 

participant counties

were reluctant to 

promote or utilize the 

system because of the 

short duration. 

The pilot was poorly 

managed... There were 

no results...the 

equipment was never 

installed. Lessons

learned: beware of federal 

contractors bearing ‘gifts

that will work.’

The pilot program 

emphasized the need 

for additional capabilities

in regards to alert and 

warning for our citizens

during periods of 

emergencies and/or 

activations.

All of these systems

have proven effective 

and reliable as another 

tool in the warning and 

notification toolbox.

Non-conclusive testing. 

Equipment installed but 

never worked correctly. 

Some states cited positive outcomes and were generally more optimistic 

about their participation. For example, one state was encouraged by the 

promise of new alerting technology being pilot tested and said that the 

pilot technologies proved effective and reliable and should be components 

of an overall strategy. Another emphasized the need for additional 

capabilities to alert and warn citizens during emergencies. 

FEMA faces coordination issues in successfully implementing IPAWS. 

While there is broad consensus regarding the need for coordination among 

diverse stakeholders, many stakeholders we contacted generally lack 

specific knowledge of IPAWS and would like more opportunities to 

interact with FEMA on public alert and warning issues. FEMA also faces 

technical challenges related to integrating state and local systems; 

adopting standards; and the development of geo-targeted, risk-based, 

multilingual, and disabled population alerting capabilities. These elements 

are required aspects of the public alert and warning system and are crucial 

to IPAWS implementation, yet remain largely unresolved. 

FEMA Faces 

Coordination Issues 

and Technical 

Challenges in 

Implementing IPAWS 

Page 20 GAO-09-834 Public Alert and Warning
 

To effectively develop and implement IPAWS, FEMA depends on the 

efforts and expertise of diverse stakeholders, yet coordination was cited 

as the primary challenge facing the implementation of IPAWS. Specifically, 

FEMA relies on partners such as the DHS Directorate for Science and 

Technology, NOAA, the Organization for Advancement of Structured 

Information Standards, and CTIA - The Wireless Association, an 

association of wireless telecommunications providers, which is involved in 

the development of CMAS. In addition, given that the IPAWS vision relies 

heavily upon state and local investment in CAP-based warning systems, 

organizations at these levels of government have a range of interests in 

IPAWS planning efforts. In fact, many respondents to our state survey seek 

opportunities to contribute to IPAWS planning and consider collaboration 

among all levels of government to be imperative to the delivery of public 

alerts and warnings. 

Coordination Among 

Diverse Stakeholders is 

Necessary, but Has Been 

Insufficient According to 

Many Stakeholders 

Executive Order 13407, in laying out FEMA’s IPAWS role, recognized the 

need for stakeholder involvement for an effective alert system to work and 

required FEMA to “consult, coordinate, and cooperate with the private 

sector, including communications media organizations, and federal, state, 

territorial, tribal and local governmental authorities, including emergency 

response providers.” Many stakeholders we contacted from various levels 

of government and the private sector expressed support for a 

collaborative, consensus-based forum that could increase the flow of 

information and best represent stakeholder interests. In March 2007, we 

recommended that FEMA establish a forum for stakeholders involved with 

emergency communications to discuss issues related to IPAWS, with 

representation from federal agencies, state and local governments, private 

industry, and the affected consumer community.21 DHS agreed with the 

intent of this recommendation, noting that FEMA would continue to work 

with stakeholders through meetings, conferences, and other forums. As 

recently as May 2008, FEMA said it intended to create a stakeholder 

subcommittee under an appropriate DHS departmental advisory 

committee in compliance with the Federal Advisory Committee Act 

(FACA).22 Also, FEMA informed us of plans to establish state advisory 

committees. However, FEMA subsequently told us that neither the federal 

advisory subcommittee nor state advisory committees have been 

implemented and there are no current plans to establish such groups. 

 

21GAO-07-411. 

22FACA sets requirements regarding how agencies establish federal advisory committees 

and how the activities of the committees are conducted. 5 U.S.C. App. 2. 

Page 21 GAO-09-834 Public Alert and Warning
 

While there is broad consensus regarding the need for coordination, 

FEMA’s efforts to date have been insufficient, according to many 

stakeholders we contacted. For example, broadcaster associations and 

local government officials were unaware of IPAWS program goals and 

milestones. Also, the majority of our state survey respondents received 

little to no information from FEMA and communicated with FEMA to little 

or no extent. Further, only one survey respondent indicated that FEMA’s 

communication and coordination efforts have provided him with a clear 

understanding of the IPAWS vision and program goals, with the majority 

of respondents having little or no understanding of the program. Local 

officials we contacted had little to no communication with FEMA, were 

generally unaware of the IPAWS program, and overall, lacked an 

understanding of the CAP alert standard. 

FEMA officials acknowledged that they have, thus far, insufficiently 

engaged state-level stakeholders and have recently taken steps to increase 

their communication and collaboration efforts. Many of FEMA’s recent 

initiatives are driven by its July 2008 – September 2009 IPAWS Stakeholder 

Engagement Plan, which describes FEMA’s strategy for establishing, 

developing, and maintaining partnerships with alert and warning 

stakeholders. Among other things, this plan details FEMA’s intent to 

continue its participation in alert and warning and emergency 

management conferences; to engage relevant congressional committees; 

to build relationships with FEMA Regions, which can pass information to 

state and local government officials; and to build relationships with other 

organizations and media outlets. In addition, FEMA launched an updated 

Web site in March 2009, which allows users to submit questions regarding 

the IPAWS program. The Web site lacks detailed program information, 

however. 

In figure 6, we display the survey responses of state emergency 

management directors on the extent to which they believe FEMA officials 

adequately communicated or coordinated with state and local 

governments with respect to public alert and warning programs. States 

largely reported inadequate levels of training, testing, and alert exercises, 

as well as inadequate public education efforts. The survey results indicate 

that a set of stakeholders crucial to establishing a public alert and warning 

system do not believe FEMA is communicating and collaborating 

adequately. 

Page 22 GAO-09-834 Public Alert and Warning
 

Figure 6: Survey Responses of State Emergency Management Directors on FEMA IPAWS Information, Training, 

Communication, and Coordination 

0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100

Participate in FEMA public

education efforts on integrated

alerts and public warning

Participate in FEMA training, tests,

and exercises for IPAWS

Solicited for input to FEMA on

issues related to emergency

alerts and warnings

Receive invitations to or participate

in formal meetings or working

groups with FEMA or DHS

Exchange communications with

FEMA representatives about IPAWS

Receive communiqués from

FEMA regarding IPAWS program

Receive information or updates from

FEMA on adoption of the CAP

Source: GAO survey of state emergency management directors.

Survey item

Percentage

Great extent (no pattern) or some extent (pattern)

Little extent (no pattern) or no extent (pattern)

According to our survey results, overall, 31 states were either somewhat 

dissatisfied or very dissatisfied with the level of consultation, 

coordination, and communication shown by FEMA with respect to its 

public alert and warning programs. Many stakeholders we contacted and 

respondents to our state survey desire greater dialogue with FEMA and 

want FEMA to better coordinate its efforts with public and private 

partners. Some of these sentiments were echoed by federal partners, such 

as NOAA, which noted that coordination could be improved. The DHS 

Office of Science and Technology, which cited its relationship with FEMA 

as a primary challenge to developing an integrated alert system, told us 

that FEMA’s frequent periods of transition made planning difficult. To 

improve federal coordination and assert its lead role in federal alert and 

warning programs, FEMA has established memorandums of agreement 

and understanding with federal partners and meets regularly with them. 

The IPAWS stakeholder engagement plans call for FEMA to host annual 

alert and warning summits with its federal partners, starting as soon as the 

first quarter of fiscal year 2009, and FEMA also formed three working 

Page 23 GAO-09-834 Public Alert and Warning
 

groups to review and validate requirements for the CAP Profile.23 FEMA 

said it plans to eventually expand the scope of these working groups 

beyond CAP to solicit feedback on the continued development and 

implementation of IPAWS. 

Although some of FEMA’s communication and coordination efforts appear 

promising, their effectiveness is not yet clear. For example, one survey 

respondent has been encouraged by his state’s inclusion in FEMA’s 

Practitioner’s Working Group, yet nonetheless reported a lack of 

communication and coordination with FEMA. The scope and range of 

stakeholder involvement in each new effort is limited and, as such, FEMA 

remains without a mechanism to bring together all interested 

stakeholders. This raises the possibility that many stakeholders will 

remain uninformed of FEMA’s efforts pertaining to IPAWS and leaves 

FEMA without a means to thoroughly collaborate on a range of alert and 

warning issues. 

Technical and Other 

Challenges Have Not Been 

Fully Addressed 

FEMA faces an array of technical and other challenges in developing and 

implementing IPAWS that have not been fully addressed. These challenges 

include (1) integrating systems; (2) adopting CAP standards; and (3) 

developing and implementing geo-targeted and risk-based alerting, alerts 

for individuals with disabilities, and multilingual alerts. 

Integrating IPAWS with state and local systems. As states and local 

governments develop and deploy their own alert systems, a key challenge, 

according to stakeholders, is the integration of IPAWS with these 

disparate alert systems. In our survey, 42 states responded that they have 

implemented or plan to implement alternate methods to disseminate 

emergency alert information outside of EAS, such as email or text alerts. 

Current and planned capabilities vary widely, however. In addition, 20 

state respondents indicated that their states have no plans to wait for 

information or guidance from the federal government before investing in 

emergency alert and warning systems. States that are moving ahead 

without federal guidance and investing in alert methods cited a 

responsibility to provide their citizens with emergency communications. 

The prevalence of alternate alerting methods at the state level that lack 

 

23Through DHS, FEMA formed a Federal Working Group, Practitioner Working Group, and 

Industry Working Group consisting of federal partners, emergency managers and broadcast 

community members, and broadcast vendors, respectively. 

Page 24 GAO-09-834 Public Alert and Warning
 

compatibility with federal investments could lead to increased diversity 

among systems, making future integration more difficult. To address 

challenges related to integrating IPAWS with state and local alert systems, 

FEMA is planning to inventory and evaluate federal, state, local, territorial, 

and tribal alert and warning capabilities by surveying approximately 3,500 

emergency operations centers. This effort, initiated in late 2008, is required 

by the 2006 executive order, and will be carried out over a 3-year period 

ending in 2012, according to FEMA. 

Adopting CAP standards. Integration of IPAWS and state and local 

systems hinges largely on whether these systems use the same alert 

standards. FEMA intends to adopt CAP as the standard by which 

information will be transported among alerting systems. Currently, only 10 

respondents to our state survey are using CAP, indicating that the prospect 

for seamless integration of existing systems may be limited. However, 42 

states responding to our survey plan to use CAP in future investments in 

emergency alert and warning equipment, suggesting that the use of CAP 

will expand. Several survey respondents cited funding as an obstacle to 

CAP usage and system integration, reporting that further investment 

would be required to make necessary system upgrades. Additional 

challenges to integration exist at the local level due to the potential 

diversity among systems and similar financial constraints. For example, 

one state survey respondent indicated that cities are purchasing 

notification systems, yet the state has set no standards for such systems. 

FEMA officials acknowledged that federal grant programs would likely be 

necessary to support IPAWS deployment, and are currently exploring the 

use of grant programs to make funding available to states and local 

jurisdictions for the procurement of CAP-compliant equipment. 

Developing and implementing tailored alerting: geo-targeted and riskbased alerting, alerts for individuals with disabilities, and multilingual 

alerts. CAP messages can be disseminated with the multiple streams of 

information necessary to facilitate tailored alerting, and according to 

FEMA, adoption of the CAP Profile is the first step in developing the 

flexibility to provide such alerts. However, the current CAP Profile under 

consideration does not address multiple languages or special needs.24 Riskbased alerting—that is, the capability to tailor alerts based on a person’s 

threat risk or level of danger—is a requirement of the executive order, yet 

 

24According to FEMA officials, IPAWS intends to address multiple languages and special 

needs in future revisions of the CAP Profile. 

Page 25 GAO-09-834 Public Alert and Warning
 

FEMA does not have plans to address this functionality.25 FEMA noted that 

state and local practitioners have developed innovative warning systems 

and methods for alerting those with disabilities and non-English speakers. 

To address these challenges, in 2009 and 2010, FEMA intends to plan, 

engineer, and implement capabilities to extend alerts to these groups. 

Emergency communications are critical in crisis management and for 

protecting the public in situations of war, terrorist attack, or natural 

disaster; yet, FEMA has made limited progress in implementing a 

comprehensive, integrated alert system as is the policy of the federal 

government. Management turnover, inadequate planning, and a lack of 

stakeholder coordination have delayed implementation of IPAWS and left 

the nation dependent on an antiquated, unreliable national alert system. 

FEMA’s delays also appear to have made IPAWS implementation more 

difficult in the absence of federal leadership as states have forged ahead 

and invested in their own alert and warning systems. 

Conclusions 

The IPAWS program has been slowed and has suffered setbacks due to a 

lack of consistent program goals, clear performance measures, and 

program management information. In the absence of systematic 

performance measures, project milestones and schedules have been left 

undefined and little progress has been made in achieving the objectives of 

Executive Order 13407, which called for a comprehensive solution in the 

way public alert and warning is conducted in the United States. In order 

that IPAWS achieve the federal government’s public alert and warning 

goals, it is essential that FEMA define the specific steps necessary in 

realizing a modernized and integrated alert system. While the executive 

order requires an implementation plan to be updated yearly, separately, 

periodic reporting on progress toward achieving an integrated public alert 

and warning system would improve program transparency and 

accountability. Such reporting would match program goals to their 

respective timelines and provide government and private sector 

stakeholders with information necessary to help establish an integrated 

alert and warning system. 

 

25FEMA signed an interagency agreement with NOAA to perform a Geo-Targeting Alert 

System Demonstration Project, which, according to FEMA officials, contains a risk-based 

alerting component. The GTAS Demonstration Project continued through June 2009. 

Page 26 GAO-09-834 Public Alert and Warning
 

EAS, one of the mainstays for public alerting, and the only operational 

aspect of IPAWS, has remained largely unchanged since our previous 

review in 2007. Although projects are under way to address longstanding 

weaknesses, the lack of reliability of alert distribution and dissemination 

functions to the public limits EAS’s effectiveness. Specifically, a lack of 

training and national-level testing raises questions about whether the relay 

system would actually work during a national-level emergency. Previously, 

we recommended that FEMA work in conjunction with FCC to develop 

and implement a plan to verify (1) the dependability and effectiveness of 

the EAS relay distribution system, which is used to disseminate nationallevel alerts; and (2) that EAS participants have the training and technical 

skills to issue effective EAS alerts. As sufficient action on EAS testing and 

training has not been taken and since IPAWS is years away from full 

implementation, these recommendations remain applicable to help ensure 

EAS is capable of operating as intended. Further, as IPAWS is developed 

and deployed, it is important that the dependability of those systems be 

verified and that IPAWS participants are adequately trained. 

Effectively implementing an integrated alert system will require 

collaboration among a broad spectrum of stakeholders, including those at 

the federal, state, and local levels; private industry; and the affected 

consumer community. Executive Order 13407 requires such collaboration. 

As states and localities invest in their own alert systems in advance of 

IPAWS deployment, it is critical that FEMA coordinate with stakeholders 

to help facilitate the integration of these alert systems. We previously 

recommended that FEMA establish a forum for the diverse stakeholders 

involved with emergency communications to discuss emerging and other 

issues related to the implementation of an integrated public alert and 

warning system. While FEMA has established stakeholder “working 

groups,” a robust forum of diverse public alert stakeholders does not exist 

and further action on stakeholder engagement is necessary. As technology 

continues to evolve and states implement their own systems, it is all the 

more relevant that a permanent collaborative body be put in place to 

support the development and implementation of IPAWS. 

In order that the public alert and warning system be conceived of, 

designed, and implemented, we recommend that the Secretary of 

Homeland Security direct the Administrator, FEMA to take the following 

actions: 

Recommendations for 

Executive Action 

• To improve program management and align IPAWS’s vision with the 

requirements established in the executive order, implement processes for 

Page 27 GAO-09-834 Public Alert and Warning
 

systems development and deployment, including (1) updating IPAWS 

strategic goals and milestones, implementation plans, and performance 

measures; (2) prioritizing projects in consultation with stakeholders; and 

(3) creating the necessary documentation on system design and specific 

release schedules for IPAWS. 

• To improve program transparency and accountability, report periodically 

to the Congress and the Secretary of Homeland Security on progress 

toward achieving an integrated public alert and warning system. The 

report should include information on ongoing IPAWS projects, financial 

information on program expenditures, and status updates in achieving 

performance measures and reaching milestones. 

• To help ensure system dependability, as IPAWS is developed and 

deployed, establish and implement a plan to verify (1) the dependability 

and effectiveness of systems used to disseminate alerts, and (2) that 

IPAWS participants have the training and technical skills to make use of 

IPAWS infrastructure and to issue effective public alerts. 

We provided a draft of this report to DHS and FCC for their review and 

comment. In its comments, DHS focused on the report’s recommendations 

and indicated that it agrees with all our recommendations to improve 

public alert and warning. DHS provided examples of actions aimed at 

addressing our recommendations. In particular, FEMA said it is developing 

an IPAWS Strategic Plan and that existing plans have been modified to 

align IPAWS with the requirements of Executive Order 13407. FEMA 

believes IPAWS has documentation and processes for system design and 

that detailed requirements for specific IPAWS components have been 

coordinated extensively with federal, industry, and public stakeholders. 

FEMA noted that it will continue to brief Congress on IPAWS and provide 

project status updates to DHS on its progress in achieving milestones. 

FEMA also said as IPAWS is developed, it plans to include testing methods 

to ensure deployed systems are dependable and effective, and to 

coordinate with FCC on enforcing new testing procedures without placing 

an undue burden on industry. FEMA further said that it is working with its 

Emergency Management Institute to develop specific training for 

stakeholders. 

Agency Comments 

and Our Evaluation 

Although FEMA noted preexisting IPAWS actions as addressing 

documentation and processes on system design, our performance audit 

concluded that such actions do not amount to a specific definition of the 

steps necessary in realizing a modernized and integrated alert system. 

Additionally, the actions detailed in DHS’s response do not fully address 

Page 28 GAO-09-834 Public Alert and Warning
 

the need for documented plans and a schedule for IPAWS’s 

implementation. Regarding previous reporting on IPAWS projects, 

expenditures, and status in achieving performance measures and reaching 

milestones, while FEMA noted that they brief House and Senate 

appropriation subcommittees, we found during our review that briefing 

information about IPAWS’s overall progress, project status, and program 

expenditures was vague or non-existent. Given the important role that 

state and local governments and private-sector stakeholders have in 

IPAWS, the intent of our recommendation is that periodic reporting 

information on IPAWS be more broadly available so that stakeholders are 

fully aware of the IPAWS program’s direction and progress. See appendix 

II for written comments from DHS. In addition to the above comments, 

DHS and FCC both provided technical comments that we incorporated 

into the report as appropriate. 

As agreed with your offices, unless you publicly announce the contents of 

this report earlier, we plan no further distribution until 30 days from the 

report date. At that time, we will send copies of this report to the Secretary 

of DHS, the Chairman of the FCC, and interested congressional 

committees. In addition, the report will be available at no charge on our 

Web site at http://www.gao.gov. 

If you or your staff have any questions concerning this report, please 

contact me at (202) 512-2834 or goldsteinm@gao.gov. Contact points for 

our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on 

the last page of this report. Key contributors to this report are listed in 

Mark Goldste

appendix III. 

in 

Director, Physical Infrastructure Issues 

Page 29 GAO-09-834 Public Alert and Warning
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and 

Methodology 

Page 30 GAO-09-834 

Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and 

Methodology 

The objectives of this report are to provide information on issues relating 

to public alert and warning, the Emergency Alert System (EAS), and the 

Federal Emergency Management Agency’s (FEMA) Integrated Public Alert 

and Warning program (IPAWS); specifically, (1) the operational capability 

of the nation’s current EAS, (2) the progress made in FEMA’s efforts to 

modernize and integrate alert and warning systems, and (3) the issues and 

challenges involved in implementing an integrated public alert and 

warning system. 

To obtain information related to all three objectives of this report, we 

conducted a Web-based survey of state emergency management directors. 

We asked them questions related to public alert and warning capabilities 

at the state or local level, the current status and integration of EAS with 

other alert capabilities, the use of the Common Alerting Protocol (CAP), 

the FEMA IPAWS program, and the level of coordination between FEMA 

and state officials. The survey was deployed by email to all 50 states and 

the District of Columbia and was conducted in March and April 2009. 

Contact information for each state was provided by the National 

Emergency Management Association (NEMA). We obtained contact 

information for state directors for whom NEMA did not have correct 

contact information directly from state departments. We obtained 

responses from 47 survey recipients (92 percent). Despite repeated 

inquiries, the emergency management directors from California, New 

Mexico, Tennessee, and Texas did not respond to the survey. The survey 

was also deployed, in text form, to select local emergency management 

agency officials whose contact information was provided to us as a part of 

the state survey. The results of local surveys were not included in the state 

survey results in this report. Additionally, this report does not contain all 

of the results from the survey. The survey and a more complete tabulation 

of the results can be viewed by accessing the following link: 

http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-09-880SP. 

To obtain information on the operational capability of the current EAS and 

the progress that has been made in FEMA’s efforts to plan and implement 

a modernized and integrated alert and warning system, we reviewed and 

analyzed relevant documentation and literature, interviewed public and 

private sector stakeholders, and collected information from our survey of 

state emergency management agencies. We examined federal agency 

documentation, including planning, program status, and financial 

documents; agency orders and rules; testimony statements; and briefings 

from FEMA and the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration 

(NOAA). We also reviewed relevant literature on public alert and warning 

from public and private sector stakeholders, including the Congressional 

Public Alert and Warning
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and 

Methodology 

Research Service and various industry consortia. We interviewed federal 

officials from FEMA, FCC, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), 

and NOAA. We also spoke with representatives of state and local 

emergency management offices, industry stakeholder organizations, and 

public and private sector alert and warning experts. Stakeholders we 

interviewed included the Society of Broadcast Engineers, the Primary 

Entry Point Advisory Committee, the National Center for Accessible 

Media, the Association of Public Safety Communications Officers, the 

Emergency Interoperability Consortium, the EAS-CAP Industry Group, the 

Association of Public Television Stations, the Telecommunications 

Industry Association, and CTIA - The Wireless Association. 

To obtain information on the challenges of implementing FEMA’s IPAWS, 

we interviewed a broad set of government and industry stakeholders, as 

indicated above, and obtained information through our survey of state of 

emergency management directors. In addition to stakeholders previously 

mentioned, we conducted interviews with state and local officials and with 

organizations involved with the public alert and warning, such as the 

International Association of Emergency Managers. We also conducted 

interviews with officials from state participants in FEMA’s IPAWS pilot 

programs and state emergency managers. Additionally, we interviewed 

private sector stakeholders and participants in public alert and warning, 

including broadcasters, the wireless industry, emergency alert technology 

companies, and consumer advocacy groups. Information on IPAWS 

challenges from each state was collected as part of our survey of state 

emergency management directors and select local emergency 

management officials. 

We conducted this review from September 2008 to September 2009, in 

accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those 

standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient 

and appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings 

and conclusions based on our review objectives. We believe that the 

evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and 

conclusions based on our audit objectives. 

Page 31 GAO-09-834 Public Alert and Warning
Appendix II: Comments from the Department Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Homeland Security 

of Homeland Security 

Page 32 GAO-09-834 Public Alert and Warning
Appendix II: Comments from the Department 

of Homeland Security 

Page 33 GAO-09-834 Public Alert and Warning
Appendix II: Comments from the Department 

of Homeland Security 

Page 34 GAO-09-834 Public Alert and Warning
Appendix III: GAO

A

 Contact and Staff 

cknowledgments 

Page 35 GAO-09-834 

Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff 

Acknowledgments 

Mark L. Goldstein, (202) 512-2834 or goldsteinm@gao.gov

In addition to the contact above, other key contributors to this report were 

Sally Moino, Assistant Director; Ryan D’Amore; Simon Galed; Andrew 

Stavisky; and Mindi Weisenbloom. 

Public Alert and Warning

GAO Contact 

Staff 

Acknowledgments 

(543223) 
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