2020 IL App (4 th) 190305-U NO. 4-19-0305 IN THE APPELLATE COURT
OF ILLINOIS
FOURTH DISTRICT

HENRY ERIC McNEIL , Plaintiff -Appell ant , v. JOHN BALDWIN , in His Official Capacity as the Acting Director of the Illinois Department of Corrections; and CRAIG FINDLEY , in His Official Capacity as Chairman of the Illinois Prisoner Review Board, Defendant s-Appell ees . ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) Appeal from the Circuit Court of Sangamon County No. 18MR798
Honorable Rudolph M. Braud Jr., Judge Presiding.

JUSTICE HARRIS delivered the judgment of the court. Presiding Justice Steigmann and Justice DeArmond concurred in the judgment. ORDER ¶ 1 Held : The appellate court held p laintiff ’ s request for mandamus relief is moot. Plaintiff completed his term of mandatory supervised release (MSR) and the Illinois Department of Corrections ( DOC ) discharged him from its custody. ¶ 2 Plaintiff, Henry E ric McNeil, appeals the trial court ’s order dismissing his petition

see king mandamus relief against defendants , John Baldwin, in his official capacity as the Acting
D irector of the Illinois Department of Corrections and Craig Findley, in his official capacity as Chairman of the Prisoner Review Board (Board) . For the following reasons, we dismiss plaintiff ’s appeal as moot. ¶ 3 I. BACKGROUND ¶ 4 On November 6, 2015 , the trial court sentenced defendant to a term of one year imprisonment and four years’ MSR for domestic battery (720 ILCS 5/12-3 .2(a)(1) (West 2014)). 

## FILED June 15, 2020 Carla Bender 4 th District Appellate Court, IL NOTICE This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and may not be cited as precedent by any party except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).- 2 - On January 15, 2016, plaintiff completed his term of imprisonment and began serving his MSR

term

. ¶ 5 On October 1, 2016, DOC issued a parole violation report, stating p laintiff received positive drug screens o n February 2, 2016, and June 18, 2016, and “ fled the day reporting center after testing positive for THC and PCP” on August 31, 2016. Plaintiff’s whereabouts remained unknown until he was arrested in Arizona on October 21, 2016. ¶ 6 In January, March, and June 2017, the Board entered a series of orders and found plaintiff in violation of certain conditions of his MSR on February 2, 2016, and August 31, 2016. The Board ultimately contin ued plaintiff’s MSR

. Plaintiff received day

- for -day good-conduct credit while serving his MSR term in confinemen t and completed his MSR term at Lawrence Correctional Center because he did not have an approved host site. On October 13, 2018, DOC discharged plaintiff from its custody. ¶ 7 On October 15, 2018, plaintiff, pro se , filed a petition seeking mandamus relief , alleging defendants improperly denied him additional earned good-conduct credit for time spent on MSR and electronic home monitoring. Plaintiff argued defendants incorrectly calculated his remaining sentence based on the February 2016 violation date— stat ing that violation led only to

a “verbal warning”—instead of the August 2016 violation date

. “As a result of defendants and their agents[’] actions,” by refusing to apply the additional sentencing credit, plaintiff a sserted he would suffer “irreparable damages and be subjected to spending 0 to 41⁄4 months extra time incarcerated .” ¶ 8 On February 1, 2019, defendants filed a motion to dismiss plaintiff’s petition pursuant to section 2-619 of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2-619 (West 201 8)) and a memorandum in support of the motion. Defendants argued the petition was moot and should be- 3 - dismissed as plaintiff had been discharged and “there is no sentence remaining to which additional credits can be applied .” ¶ 9 On February 21, 2019, the tri al court entered a written order granting defendants’ motion to dismiss stating, “ The claim is moot pursuant to 735 ILCS 5/2-619, as Plaintiff has been fully discharged from the custody of [DOC].” ¶ 10 On March 15, 2019, plaintiff filed a motion to reconsider t he trial court’s dismissal of his mandamus petition , which the court denied. ¶ 11 This appeal followed. ¶ 12 II. ANALYSIS ¶ 13 On appeal, plaintiff claims the trial court erred in dismissing his mandamus petition in which he requested 259 days of additional sentencing credit. In his mandamus petition, plaintiff claimed he was entitled to having his projected discharge date changed from October 1 3, 2018, to June 4, 2018. Defendants argue this appeal is moot because both dates have long since passed and plainti ff has failed to argue any exception to the mootness doctrine applies. According to defendants, plaintiff’s appeal should be dismissed because “it is undisputed that [plaintiff] completed his entire sentence .” ¶ 14 Appellate jurisdiction requires an actual con troversy. Reviewing courts will generally not hear abstract, hypothetical, or moot questions. In re Andrea F. , 208 Ill. 2d 148, 156, 802 N.E.2d 782, 787 (2003). “A case is moot if the issues involved in the trial court have ceased to exist because intervening events have made it impossible for the reviewing court to grant effectual relief to the complaining party.” People v. Roberson , 212 Ill. 2d 430, 435, 819
N.E .2d 761, 764 (2004). Thus, a claim for additional sentence credit is moot when a defendant has completed serving his sentence. Id.- 4 - ¶ 15 A reviewing court may examine an otherwise moot issue when “ ‘the magnitude or immediacy of the interests involved warrant [s] action by the court.’ ” People v. Jackson , 231 Ill. 2d 223, 227-28, 897 N.E.2d 752, 755 (2008) (quoting People ex rel. Black v. Dukes , 96 Ill. 2d 273, 277, 449 N.E.2d 856, 858 (1983)). The public interest exception to the mootness doctrine requi res (1) the existence of a question of public importance, (2) the desirability of an authoritative determination for the purpose of guiding public officers in the performance of their duties, and (3) the likelihood that the question will recur

. Andrea F. , 208 Ill. 2d at 156. This exception is construed narrowly and requires a clear showing of each element before it may be applied. Roberson , 212 Ill. 2d at 436. ¶ 16 Here, there is no question p laintiff completed his term of imprisonment on January 15, 2016, and completed MSR on October 13, 2018. Thus, it is impossible to provide plaintiff his requested relief as he has completed serving his entire sentence. As stated, plaintiff fail s to argue any exception to the mootness doctrine applies, and given the law as se t forth above, no public interest is served by addressing the merits of the petition

. Because no effectual relief can be granted, we conclude this appeal is moot. ¶ 17 III. CONCLUSION ¶ 18 For the reasons stated, we dismiss this appeal as moot

. ¶ 19 Dismissed

.