alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
```

[115th Congress Public Law 215]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]

[[Page 132 STAT. 1544]]

Public Law 115-215
115th Congress

                                 An Act

 
To designate the facility of the United States Postal Service located at 
  515 Hope Street in Bristol, Rhode Island, as the ``First Sergeant P. 
    Andrew McKenna Jr. Post Office''. <<NOTE: July 24, 2018 -  [H.R. 
                                4685]>> 

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,
SECTION 1. FIRST SERGEANT P. ANDREW MCKENNA JR. POST OFFICE.

    (a) Designation.--The facility of the United States Postal Service 
located at 515 Hope Street in Bristol, Rhode Island, shall be known and 
designated as the ``First Sergeant P. Andrew McKenna Jr. Post Office''.
    (b) References.--Any reference in a law, map, regulation, document, 
paper, or other record of the United States to the facility referred to 
in subsection (a) shall be deemed to be a reference to the ``First 
Sergeant P. Andrew McKenna Jr. Post Office''.

    Approved July 24, 2018.

LEGISLATIVE HISTORY--H.R. 4685:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, Vol. 164 (2018):
            Mar. 5, considered and passed House.
            June 28, considered and passed Senate.

                                  <all>
```
# C_2012343EN.01000501.xml

| 10.11.2012 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 343/5 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

10.11.2012

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 343/5

---

Reference for a preliminary ruling from the Bundesgerichtshof (Germany), lodged on 31 July 2012 — Coty Prestige Lancaster Group GmbH v First Note Perfumes NV

(Case C-360/12)

2012/C 343/03

Language of the case: German

Referring court

Referring court

Bundesgerichtshof

Parties to the main proceedings

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant and appellant on a point of law: Coty Prestige Lancaster Group GmbH

Applicant and appellant on a point of law:

Defendant and respondent on a point of law: First Note Perfumes NV

Defendant and respondent on a point of law:

Questions referred

Questions referred

| 1. | Is Article 93(5) of Regulation (EC) No 40/94 (1) to be interpreted as meaning that an act of infringement is committed in one Member State (Member State A), within the meaning of Article 93(5) of Regulation (EC) No 40/94, in the case where, as a result of an act in another Member State (Member State B), there is participation in the infringement in the first-named Member State (Member State A)? |
| --- | --- |

1.

Is Article 93(5) of Regulation (EC) No 40/94 (1) to be interpreted as meaning that an act of infringement is committed in one Member State (Member State A), within the meaning of Article 93(5) of Regulation (EC) No 40/94, in the case where, as a result of an act in another Member State (Member State B), there is participation in the infringement in the first-named Member State (Member State A)?

1

| 2. | Is Article 5(3) of Regulation (EC) No 44/2001 (2) to be interpreted as meaning that the harmful event occurred in one Member State (Member State A) if the tortious act which is the subject of the action or from which claims are derived was committed in another Member State (Member State B) and consists in participation in the tortious act (principal act) which took place in the first-named Member State (Member State A)? |
| --- | --- |

2.

Is Article 5(3) of Regulation (EC) No 44/2001 (2) to be interpreted as meaning that the harmful event occurred in one Member State (Member State A) if the tortious act which is the subject of the action or from which claims are derived was committed in another Member State (Member State B) and consists in participation in the tortious act (principal act) which took place in the first-named Member State (Member State A)?

2

---

(1)  Council Regulation (EC) No 40/94 of 20 December 1993 on the Community trade mark (OJ 1994 L 11, p. 1).

1

(2)  Council Regulation (EC) No 44/2001 of 22 December 2000 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters (OJ 2001 L 12, p. 1).

2

---
Exhibit 32.2

     Certification by the Chief Executive Officer pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 1350
      as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002

In connection with the Annual Report of Sibling Entertainment Group, Inc. (the
"Company") on the Form 10-KSB for the period ended June 30, 2005 as filed with
the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), I,
James S. Cardwell, Chief Financial Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to
18 U.S.C. ss. 1350, as adopted pursuant to ss.906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of
2002, that:

(i) the Report filed by the Company fully complies with the requirements of
Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

(ii) The information contained in that Report fairly presents, in all material
respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company on
the dates and for the periods presented therein.

                                        SIBLING ENTERTAINMENT GROUP, INC.

Date: October 25, 2005                  By:  /s/ James S. Cardwell
                                             ---------------------
                                             James S. Cardwell
                                             Chief Financial Officer

This certification accompanies this Report pursuant to Section 906 of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 and shall not be deemed filed by the Company for
purposes of Section 18 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended. A
signed original of this written statement required by Section 906, or other
document authenticating, acknowledging, or otherwise adopting the signature that
appears in typed form within the electronic version of this written statement
required by Section 906, has been provided to the Company and will be retained
by the Company and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its
staff upon request.
#### Esther ZOOK, Plaintiff/Respondent, v. CNA INSURANCE COMPANY, d/b/a Continental Assurance Company, Defendant/Appellant.

No. 73063.

Missouri Court of Appeals, Eastern District, Division Four.

July 14, 1998.

Motion for Rehearing and/or Transfer to Supreme Court Denied Sept. 30, 1998.

Application for Transfer Denied Nov. 24, 1998.

James E. Whaley, John P. Rahoy, St. Louis, for appellant.

Robert D. Huelskamp, Ste. Genevieve, for respondent.

Before ROBERT G. DOWD, P.J., and SIMON and HOFF, JJ.

ORDER

PER CURIAM.

Defendant, CNA Insurance Companies, d/b/a/ Continental Assurance Company, appeals from a judgment in favor of Plaintiff, Esther Zook, awarding her the sum of $100,-000.00, plus prejudgment interest in the amount of $57,254.79. Defendant alleges two points of error: (1) the trial court erred in declaring a contract existed between Mervin Zook and Defendant because Mr. Zook failed to satisfy all conditions precedent to receiving coverage; and (2) the trial court erred in concluding that alleged ambiguities in an application for insurance and conditional premium receipt may be construed to create a contract of insurance.

No jurisprudential purpose would be served by a written opinion. However, the parties have been furnished with a memorandum for their information only, setting forth the facts and reasons for this order. The judgment is affirmed pursuant to Rule 84.16(b).
Before the First Division,

January 13, 1939

No. 40413.

#### Protest 946568-G of Columbia Co. (San Francisco).

*539Opinion by

Bbown, J.

In accordance with stipulation of counsel and on the authority of *Rapken*v. *United States*(25 C. C. P. A. 268, T. D. 49393) the claim at 20 cents per pound and 25 percent ad valorem under paragraph 24 was sustained.
N O T FO R PUB L ICAT IO N UNITED STATES C OUR T OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH C IR C UIT

OSC AR GAR C IA, Pla i ntiff-Appe lla

nt,

v. R EGIONAL TR

USTEE SER

VIC ES C OR POR ATION a nd M O R TGAGE ELEC T R ONIC R EGISTR ATION SYSTEM S, INC .,

De fe nda n ts-Appe lle e s. No. 13-16528 D.C . No. 3:11-c v-00470-R C J-VPC
M EM O R ANDUM *

Appe a l from

the Unite d

Sta t e s Distric t C ourt for the Distric t of Ne v a da R obe rt C live Jone s, Distric t Judge , Pre siding Subm itte d Oc tobe r 21, 2016 * * Sa n Fra n c isc o , C a lifornia 

# FIL ED
OCT 26 2016 M OLLY C. DW Y ER, CLERK U

. S

. CO URT O F APPEALS

* This disposition is not a ppropria te for public a tion a nd is not p re c e de nt e xc e pt a s provide d by

Ninth C irc uit R

ule 36-3.

* * The pa ne l una nim ously c onc lud es t h is cas e is suita ble for de c i sion without ora l a rgum e nt. S

e e Fe d. R . App. P. 34(a )(2).B e fore : HAW KINS a n d C ALLAHAN, C irc uit Judge s, a nd SOTO, * ** Distric t Judge

. Osc a r Ga rc i a (“ Ga rc ia ” ) a ppe a ls the R

u le 12(b)(6) dism issa l a nd a dve rse gra nt of sum m a ry judgm e nt. W e a ffirm

. The re wa s no abuse o f disc re tion in judic ia lly notic ing m ortga ge a n d fore c losure doc um e nts re la t e d to Ga rc ia ’ s Ne va da pr o p er ty
. As m a tte rs of public

re c o rd t he y a re prope r s ubje c t s of judic ia l notic e . Se e Ormsby v . First Am. Title C

o. of N e v . , 5 91 F.3d 1199, 1203 (9th C ir. 2 010) (re c ords o f re a l prope rty tra n sa c tions a re

“ o f f ic ia l public re c ords” ); Fe d

. R
. Evid. 2 01(b). M ore ove r, ta king judic ia l notice o f the doc u m e nts did not pre judic e Ga rc ia be c a

u s e the distric t c ourt did n o t re ly on the m in dism issing his c la im s. S e e A l l s t a t e I ns. C o. v . He rron , 634 F.3d 1 101, 1110 (9th C ir. 2011) (re ve rsa l ba se d on e rrone o us e vide n tia ry rulings re q

ui re s showing pre j udic e ). Nor did the distric t c o urt a buse it s disc re tion in a dm itting M e lissa H jorton’ s d e c la ra tion. Hjorton de m onstra te d pe rsona l knowle dge in he r de c la ra tion. S

ee Barthe le my v . Air Line

s Pilots A s s ’ n , 897 F.2d 999, 1018 (9th C ir. 1990) (c ourt c a n infe r pe rsona l k

n owle dge from

a n a ffida vit itse lf).

* * * Th e H o n o r ab l e Jam es A l an S o t o , U ni t ed S t at es D i st r i ct J ud g e f o r t h e Distric t of Ariz ona , sitting by de signa tion. 2Fina lly , be c a u se Ga rc ia did not spe c ific a l ly

a n d distinc tly

a ddre ss othe r issue s in his ope ning brie f, the y ar e ab a ndone d on a ppe a l. Mille r v . F

airc hild Indus., Inc

. , 797 F.2d 7 2 7 , 7 38 (9th C ir. 1986) (c ourt of a ppe a l s will not o rdina

rily c onside r
m a tte rs not spe c ific a lly

a nd distinc tly a rgue d in the ope ning brie f). AFFIRM E D.

3
**Exhibit31.1**

 

**CERTIFICATION**

 

I, Henry J. Boucher, Jr., President, Chief ExecutiveOfficer of IWT Tesoro Corporation, certify that:

 

1.          I have reviewed this annual report on Form 10-Q/A of IWT TesoroCorporation for the quarter ended March 31, 2004;

 

2.          Based on my knowledge, this annual report does not contain any untruestatement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to makethe statements made, in light of the circumstances under which such statementswere made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by this annualreport;

 

3.          Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financialinformation included in this annual report, fairly present in all materialrespects the financial condition, results of operations and cash flows of theregistrant as of, and for, the periods presented in this annual report;

 

4.          The registrant’s other certifying officer and I am responsible forestablishing and maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined inExchange Act Rules 13a-14 and 15d-14) for the registrant and we have:

 

a)designed such disclosure controls and procedures to ensure that materialinformation relating to the registrant, including its consolidatedsubsidiaries, is made known to us by others within those entities, particularlyduring the period in which this annual report is being prepared;

 

b)evaluated the effectiveness of the registrant’s disclosure controls andprocedures as of a date within 90 days prior to the filing date of thisannual report (the “Evaluation Date”); and

 

c)presented in this annual report our conclusions about the effectiveness of thedisclosure controls and procedures based on our evaluation as of the EvaluationDate;

 

5.          The registrant’s other certifying officer and I have disclosed, basedon our most recent evaluation, to the registrant’s auditors and the auditcommittee of registrant’s board of directors (or persons performing theequivalent function):

 

a)all significant deficiencies in the design or operation of internal controlswhich could adversely affect the registrant’s ability to record, process,summarize and report financial data and have identified for the registrant’sauditors any material weaknesses in internal controls; and

 

b)any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other employeeswho have a significant role in the registrant’s internal controls; and

 

----

 

6.          I have indicated in this annual report whether or not there weresignificant changes in internal controls or in other factors that couldsignificantly affect internal controls subsequent to the date of our mostrecent evaluation, including any corrective actions with regard to significantdeficiencies and material weaknesses.

 

 
| Date: September 23, 2004 | By:                                    | /s/ Henry J. Boucher, Jr. |   |
|--------------------------|----------------------------------------|---------------------------|--------|
|                     | Henry J. Boucher, Jr.,                 |
|                     | President and Chief  Executive Officer |

 

----
No. 95-9133.

#### Jones, aka Lee *v.*United States.

C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.
#### In the Matter of Elsie De Mers, Respondent, *v.*Noel Nocks, Appellant.

County Court, Westchester County,

March 10, 1966.

*668
      *Kobaclc é Chase*for appellant. *Leonard Rubenfeld, District Attorney,*for respondent.

Robert E. Dempsey, J.

The judgment of the lower court is reversed. The appeal is from a judgment of the Court of Special Sessions of the Town of North Castle, wherein the appellant defendant was convicted of a violation of section 116 of the Agriculture and Markets Law. Sentence was imposed as follows : *‘ ‘*Under the circumstances the Court finds you in violation and the Court fines you $10.00 and we are going to suspend sentence, subject to the understanding that the dog will be confined. ’ ’

The complaint in this action was sworn to by one Elsie De Mers and seeks the destruction of a certain ‘ ‘ bull mastiff dog owned by the defendant ’ ’ or such other relief as may be prescribed by statute. The complaint is a form complaint and at the very top of the form is an indication that it was prepared pursuant to section 116 of the Agriculture and Markets Law, which provides in pertinent part that: “If satisfied, from such inquiry, that the dog is a dangerous dog, such justice or magistrate shall order the owner, if within the territorial jurisdiction of the court, and if not within such jurisdiction, then any peace officer, to kill the dog immediately; or may order the owner securely to confine such dog during a time to be specified in the order. If the owner fails to kill or to confine the dog as required by such order, any peace officer or a designated representative of the commissioner shall kill such dog on or off the premises of the owner.”

There is no basis for imposing a penalty on the owner of a dangerous dog under the above section. But even if this court assumes that such imposition is justified under any construction of any other provision of the laws of this State the judgment cannot stand as the complaint (information) is insufficient to properly apprize the defendant of the crime for which he is charged. This proceeding cannot be said to stand on a different ground than a traffic ticket where certain minimum standards of notice and related procedure are required. (Code Crim. Pro., §§ 147-c, 147-d.)
<PAGE>


                  CERTIFICATION OF CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER AND
                             CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER
                                   PURSUANT TO
                             18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
                             AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

I,  Buko  von  Krosigk , certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted
pursuant  to  Section  906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that the Quarterly
Report on Form 10-QSB of Wineshares International, Inc. for the quarterly period
ending October 31, 2002 fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or
15(d)  of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and that the information contained
in  the Quarterly Report on Form 10-QSB fairly presents in all material respects
the  financial condition and results of operations of Wineshares, International,
Inc.

                   By:
                             /s/ Buko  von  Krosigk
                             ----------------------
                   Name:     Buko  von  Krosigk
                   Title:    Chief Executive Officer and Director

                   Date:      May  7,  2003

 I,  Gerard  Darmon,  certify,  pursuant  to  18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted
pursuant  to  Section  906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that the Quarterly
Report on Form 10-QSB of Wineshares International, Inc. for the quarterly period
ending October 31, 2002 fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or
15(d)  of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and that the information contained
in  the Quarterly Report on Form 10-QSB fairly presents in all material respects
the  financial condition and results of operations of Wineshares, International,
Inc.

                   By:
                             /s/ Gerard  Darmon
                             ------------------
                   Name:     Gerard  Darmon
                   Title:    Chief  Financial  Officer  and  Director

                   Date:     May  7,  2003
No. 47691.

#### Protests 679006-G, etc., of J. G. Braun Co., Inc. (New York).

Opinion by

Dallinger, J.

In accordance with stipulation of counsel and on the authority of *Blum*v. *United States*(5 Cust. Ct. 119, C. D. 381) the protests were sustained.
PUBLIC LAW 111–107—NOV. 30, 2009 123 STAT. 3019 

LEGISLATIVE HISTORY—H.R. 3386: 

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, Vol. 155 (2009): 

Sept. 15, considered and passed House. 

Nov. 9, considered and passed Senate. 

Æ 

Public Law 111–107 

111th Congress 

An Act 

To designate the facility of the United States Postal Service located at 1165 2nd 

Avenue in Des Moines, Iowa, as the ‘‘Iraq and Afghanistan Veterans Memorial 

Post Office’’. 

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of 

the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

SECTION 1. IRAQ AND AFGHANISTAN VETERANS MEMORIAL POST 

OFFICE. 

(a) DESIGNATION.—The facility of the United States Postal 

Service located at 1165 2nd Avenue in Des Moines, Iowa, shall 

be known and designated as the ‘‘Iraq and Afghanistan Veterans 

Memorial Post Office’’. 

(b) REFERENCES.—Any reference in a law, map, regulation, 

document, paper, or other record of the United States to the facility 

referred to in subsection (a) shall be deemed to be a reference 

to the ‘‘Iraq and Afghanistan Veterans Memorial Post Office’’. 

Approved November 30, 2009. 

Nov. 30, 2009 

[H.R. 3386] 


ccoleman on DSK8P6SHH1 with PUBLIC LAWS
#### Franklin Simon & Co. *v.*United States

No. 6861.

Entry No. 754222.

Invoice dated Derby, England, April 25, 1942.

Certified April 27, 1942.

Entered at New York, N. Y., June 10, 1942.

(Decided February 11, 1947)

*Lane & Wallace*for the plaintiff.

*Paul P. Bao,*Assistant Attorney General, for the defendant.

Tilson, Judge:

This appeal raises for determination the question of whether or not the amount of a so-called British purchase tax was properly included by the appraiser as a part of the export value of the merchandise. The appeal has been submitted for decision upon a stipulation to the effect that the issues herein are similar in all material respects to the issues involved in *United States*v. *Pitcairn,*C. A. D. 334, and the record therein has been admitted in evidencefin this case.

Accepting this stipulation as a statement of fact, and following the cited authority, I find and hold the proper dutiable export values of the merchandise to be the values found by the appraiser, less any amounts added by the importer on entry to meet advances made by the appraiser in similar cases then pending on appeal. Judgment will be rendered accordingly.
No. 42046.

#### Protest 161502-G of R. H. Macy & Co. (New York).

*373Opinion by

Tilson, J.

In accordance with stipulation of counsel embroidered laces were held dutiable at 75 percent under paragraph 1430 as claimed.
#### Raymond C. GIUFFRIA v. METRO BANK, Gulf Coast Bank, et al.

No. 99-CA-0052.

Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Fourth Circuit.

June 2, 1999.

Robert A. Mathis, Newman, Mathis, Brady, Wakefield & Spedale, Metairie, Louisiana, for Defendant/Appellee.

Raymond C. Giuffria, New Orleans, Louisiana, in proper person, for plain-tiffiappellant.

Court composed of Judge JOAN BERNARD ARMSTRONG, Judge MIRIAM G. WALTZER and Judge Pro Tempore PHILIP C. CIACCIO.

|,ARMSTRONG, Judge.

This is an appeal by the plaintiff from a judgment dismissing his action upon an exception of res judicata. We affirm.

The plaintiff previously has sued the same defendants in a case which became our appeal No. 98-CA-1951. The allegations made by the plaintiff in our appeal No. 98-CA-1951, and the plaintiffs allegations in the present case involve the same foreclosure upon an office building owned by the plaintiff. In fact, the allegations of wrongdoing in the present case are identical to some of the allegations of wrongdoing in the first case. Judgment was rendered in favor of the defendants in the first case and was affirmed by us on appeal.

The pertinent statute, governing res ju-dicata in Louisiana, provides as follows:

> Except as otherwise provided by law, a valid and final judgment is conclusive between the same parties, except on appeal or other direct review, to the following extent:

> (1) If the judgment is in favor of the plaintiff, all causes of action existing at the time of final judgment arising out of the transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of the litigation are extinguished and merged in the judgment.

> (2) If the judgment is in favor of the defendant, all causes of action existing at the time of final judgment arising out of the transaction or | ^occurrence that is the subject matter of the litigation are extinguished and the judgment bars a subsequent action on those causes of action.

> (3)A judgment in favor of either the plaintiff or the defendant is conclusive, in any subsequent action between them, with respect to any issue actually litigated and determined *944if its determination was essential to that judgment.

La.R.S. 13:4231.

It is clear that the present case arises from the same transaction or occurrence as did the first action. Consequently, under La.R.S. 13:4231, the present action is barred by res judicata as a result of the judgment in the first action. *See, e.g., Avenue Plaza, L.L.C. v. Falgoust,*96-0173 (La.7/2/96), 676 So.2d 1077, 1079; *Ensenat v. Edgecombe,*97-2239 (La.App. 4 Cir. 3/11/98), 707 So.2d 1059, 1061, *unit not considered,*98-1188 (La.6/19/98), 719 So.2d 473.

Lastly, the plaintiff complains of the transfer of the present case, in the trial court, from the Section to which it was originally allotted to the Section which had heard the plaintiffs first case. The transfer was effected pursuant to the trial court’s local rules and, in view of the relatedness of the two cases, was perfectly proper.

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

AFFIRMED.