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SIKORSKY FINANCIAL CREDIT UNION,

INC. v. WILLIAM D. BUTTS

(SC 19216)

Rogers, C. J., and Palmer, Zarella, Eveleigh, McDonald,

Espinosa and Keller, Js.*

Argued September 23, 2014—officially released February 3, 2015

William L. Marohn, for the appellant (plaintiff).

Joanne S. Faulkner, for the National Association of

Consumer Advocates as amicus curiae.
Opinion

ZARELLA, J. In this certified appeal, we consider

whether postmaturity interest on a loan continues to

accrue after the entry of judgment under General Statutes § 37-1, which provides that, in the absence of any

agreement to the contrary, interest shall accrue ‘‘as an

addition to the debt’’ at an annual rate of 8 percent

‘‘from the date of maturity of a debt . . . .’’ The trial

court and the Appellate Court concluded that it does

not, deciding instead that the entry of judgment terminated the accrual of postmaturity interest on the loan,

leaving any award of postjudgment interest to the trial

court’s discretionary powers under General Statutes

§ 37-3a (a), which allows a court to award interest ‘‘as

damages for the detention of money after it becomes

payable.’’ We disagree with those courts and conclude

that, under § 37-1 (b), postmaturity interest continues

to accrue on the unpaid balance of a loan even after

the entry of judgment. Consequently, we reverse the

judgment of the Appellate Court and direct that court

to remand the case to the trial court for a recalculation

of the interest award.

The facts are not in dispute. The defendant, William

D.Butts, financed his purchase of a used car with a retail

installment loan from the plaintiff, Sikorsky Financial

Credit Union, Inc. At the time of purchase, the parties

entered into a retail installment contract (contract),

which governed the terms of the loan. The contract

required the defendant to make regular payments on

the loan and set an annual interest rate of 9.14 percent.

The defendant granted the plaintiff a security interest

in his car. The contract further provided that, in the

event of a default, the plaintiff had the right to repossess

the car and to demand any deficiency from the defendant.1

If the defendant failed to pay the deficiency when

requested, the contract provided that the plaintiff ‘‘may

charge [the defendant] interest at a rate not exceeding

the highest lawful rate’’ until the deficiency is paid in

full.

The defendant later defaulted on the loan, so the

plaintiff repossessed the car and sold it. The fair market

value of the vehicle, calculated according to General

Statutes § 36a-785 (g), was not enough to cover the full

contract balance and the cost of repossession, so the

plaintiff demanded the deficiency from the defendant,

who did not pay it. The plaintiff brought the present

action against the defendant, seeking a deficiency judgment, interest, attorney’s fees, and costs as provided

for in the contract. The defendant failed to appear, and

a default judgment was entered against him.

Thereafter, the trial court held a hearing in damages

and awarded the plaintiffthe difference between the fair

market value of the car and the outstanding principal

balance on the contract, as well as the plaintiff’s costs
and reasonable attorney’s fees. The court also awarded

prejudgment interest under § 37-1 at the contract rate

of 9.14 percent and discretionary postjudgment interest

under § 37-3a at an annual rate of 2 percent.

The plaintiff filed a motion for reargument and reconsideration of the trial court’s postjudgment interest

award. The plaintiff argued that, under § 37-1 (b), the

trial court was required to award postmaturity interest

at the contractrate of 9.14 percent until the balance was

paid in full because the parties had expressly agreed to

allow postmaturity interest. The plaintiff contended

that it was entitled to postmaturity interest at the contractrate from the date of maturity (when the deficiency

balance became due) until the balance was paid in full.

According to the plaintiff, postmaturity interest at the

contract rate continues to accrue even after the entry

of judgment, leaving the trial court without discretion

to order a different rate of interest. In support, the

plaintiff cited this court’s decision in Little v. United

National Investors Corp., 160 Conn. 534, 280 A.2d 890

(1971), which held that, under General Statutes (1958

Rev.) § 37-1, if parties to a loan agreed to a specific

rate of postmaturity interest, that rate would apply to

any unpaid balance, even after the entry of a judgment

enforcing the loan agreement. See id., 541–42.

The trial court declined to modify its interest award.

The trial court determined that postmaturity interest

was the equivalent of prejudgment interest, such that

interest after maturity would accrue at the contract

rate only until the entry of judgment. The court further

determined that postmaturity interest could continue

to accrue at the contractrate afterthe entry of judgment

only if the parties had made a specific agreement for

postjudgment interest. Because the parties in this case

had made no such agreement, the trial court determined

that any postjudgment interest could be awarded only

pursuant to the trial court’s discretionary powers under

§ 37-3a, which the trial court had granted at a rate of

2 percent.

The plaintiff appealed from the trial court’s judgment

to the Appellate Court.2 Sikorsky Financial Credit

Union, Inc. v. Butts, 144 Conn. App. 755, 756, 75 A.3d

700 (2013). The plaintiff claimed that the trial court

improperly awarded discretionary postjudgment interest at a rate of 2 percent pursuant to § 37-3a because

it was required, pursuant to Little and § 37-1 (b), to

award postjudgment interest at the contract rate of 9.14

percent or, in the alternative, at the legal rate of 8

percent set forth in § 37-1 (a). Id., 759, 761.

The Appellate Court affirmed the trial court’s judgment. Id., 763. It determined that the postmaturity interest under the parties’ contract terminated when the trial

court rendered judgment. See id., 760–61. The Appellate

Court also determined that the plaintiff could receive

postmaturity interest at the contract rate after the entry
of judgment only if the parties had expressly agreed to

postjudgment interest, which they had not. Id., 761.

The plaintiff filed a petition for certification to appeal

to this court, which we granted, limited to the following

question: ‘‘Did the Appellate Court correctly conclude

that contractual postmaturity interest was properly terminated upon the entry of the judgment?’’ Sikorsky

Financial Credit Union, Inc. v. Butts, 310 Conn. 931,

78 A.3d 857 (2013). The defendant has not appeared or

argued before this court. We granted a request by the

amicus curiae, National Association of Consumer Advocates, to file an amicus brief and to present oral

argument.

I

On appeal, the plaintiff maintains its claim that, under

§ 37-1, it is entitled to postmaturity interest on the deficiency balance beginning from the date of maturity and

continuing until the balance is paid in full. The plaintiff

asserts that the trial court therefore was required by

§ 37-1 to order prejudgment and postjudgment interest

at the applicable rate. The plaintiff argues that the applicable rate of postmaturity interest in this case is the

contract rate of 9.14 percent. In the alternative, the

plaintiff argues that, if the rate of postmaturity interest

is not clear from the parties’ contract, then it nevertheless is entitled to postmaturity interest at the legal rate

of 8 percent pursuant. The amicus disagrees and argues

that the Appellate Court properly construed the applicable statutes. We conclude that the plaintiff is entitled

to postmaturity interest at the rate of 8 percent.

The principles that guide our interpretation of statutes are set forth in General Statutes § 1-2z and are

further elaborated on in Marandino v. Prometheus

Pharmacy, 294 Conn. 564, 574–75, 986 A.2d 1023 (2010).

We note that we also are guided by our prior interpretations of the meaning and interrelationship of the current

interest statutes and their predecessors.

We begin our analysis with a review of the interest

statutes at issue in this appeal and their respective

functions. Sections 37-1 and 37-3a both relate to interest, but they serve markedly different purposes. They

reflect our law’s long-standing recognition of two distinct types of interest: (1) interest, usually by agreement, as compensation for a loan (interest eo nomine);3

and (2) interest as damages for the detention of money.

See, e.g., Selleck v. French, 1 Conn. 32, 33 (1814) (noting

distinction between interest ‘‘allowed on the ground of

some contract express or implied to pay it’’ and interest

‘‘as damage[s]’’); see also Hubbard v. Callahan, 42

Conn. 524, 530 (1875) (‘‘[when], in a bill or note, interest

after maturity is expressly reserved, it is treated as

interest eo nomine, and never as damages’’ [emphasis

in original]).

Section 37-1 governs interest eo nomine, whereas
§ 37-3a (a), by its express terms, applies to interest ‘‘as

damages for the detention of money . . . .’’ A more

detailed history of these two statutes (and their predecessors) and our cases interpreting and applying them

can be found in Ballou v. Law Offices Howard Lee

Schiff, P.C., 304 Conn. 348, 373–83, 39 A.3d 1075 (2012)

(Zarella, J., concurring), and Little v. United National

Investors Corp., supra, 160 Conn. 537–38, 541.

Section 37-1 applies to interest eo nomine as compensation for loans of money or property, as long as the

parties have not disclaimed or waived any right to

receive interest on the transaction. Section 37-1 provides in relevant part: ‘‘(a) The compensation for forbearance of property loaned at a fixed valuation, or for

money, shall, in the absence of any agreement to the

contrary, be at the rate of eight per cent a year . . . .

‘‘(b) Unless otherwise provided by agreement, interest at the legal rate from the date of maturity of a debt

shall accrue as an addition to the debt.’’ This provision

embodies a number of principles, as reflected in our

cases.

Section 37-1 (a) sets a default rule that a loan of

money or property shall be compensated with interest

eo nomine at a rate of 8 percent. The phrase ‘‘in the

absence of any agreement to the contrary’’ in § 37-1

(a) recognizes, however, that parties may agree to a

different interest rate, subject to usury restrictions, or

may waive or disclaim any interest on the loan. See,

e.g., Little v. United National Investors Corp., supra,

160 Conn. 537–38, 541; Hubbard v. Callahan, supra, 42

Conn. 527. Accordingly, unless the parties to a loan

agree to a different rate of interest, or they specifically

disclaim any right to interest, a creditor will be entitled

to interest eo nomine at the legal rate of 8 percent as

compensation for the loan. See General Statutes § 37-

1 (a); Little v. United National Investors Corp., supra,

537–38; Hubbard v. Callahan, supra, 527.

Section 37-1 (b) allows the parties to decide whether

interest eo nomine will continue to accrue after a loan

matures and the balance remains unpaid. See Little

v. United National Investors Corp., supra, 160 Conn.

541–42; Globe Investment Co. v. Barta, 107 Conn. 276,

279–80, 140 A. 202 (1928); Hubbard v. Callahan, supra,

42 Conn. 527; see also Ballou v. Law Offices Howard

Lee Schiff, P.C., supra, 304 Conn. 373–76. Under § 37-

1 (b), unless the parties agree otherwise, postmaturity

interest will accrue at the legal rate on the unpaid balance of the loan. Thus, if the parties fail to specify

whether interest will accrue after maturity, or fail to

specify the rate of postmaturity interest, § 37-1 (b) mandates that interest eo nomine shall continue to accrue

after maturity at the legalrate. See Ballou v. Law Offices

Howard Lee Schiff, P.C., supra, 376. Furthermore, postmaturity interest under § 37-1 (b) continues to accrue

even after the entry of judgment and until the outstand-
ing balance is paid in full. See Little v. United National

Investors Corp., supra, 542 (agreed on postmaturity

interest rate applies to any unpaid loan balance, even

after entry of judgment). Consequently, an award of

prejudgment and postjudgment interest on a loan that

carries postmaturity interest is not discretionary; it is

an integral part of enforcing the parties’ bargain. See,

e.g., id., 541–42; see also Selleck v. French, supra, 1

Conn. 33 (‘‘[i]nterest will be allowed in all cases [when]

there is an express contract to pay it’’). The trial court

must, therefore, as part of any judgment enforcing a

loan, allow prejudgment and postjudgment interest at

the agreed rate, or the legal rate if no agreed rate is

specified. The trial court is relieved of this obligation

only if the parties disclaim any right to interest eo

nomine after maturity. See General Statutes § 37-1 (b);

Ballou v. Law Offices Howard Lee Schiff, P.C., supra,

376; Little v. United National Investors Corp., supra,

537–38, 541.

Unlike § 37-1, § 37-3a applies to interest as damages

and allows a trial court to award interest as compensation for the detention of money when the duty to pay

arises from an obligation other than a loan of money or

property, or when the parties to the loan have decided

against interest on the loan. See, e.g., Sosin v. Sosin,

300 Conn. 205, 230, 14 A.3d 307 (2011) (interest for

detention of money was allowed when spouse withheld

payment of money under divorce settlement); Winsted

Savings Bank v. New Hartford, 78 Conn. 319, 323–24,

62 A. 81 (1905) (interest after maturity may be awarded

as damages for detention of money even if parties

expressly agreed that contractual interest terminated

at maturity). Section 37-3a (a) provides in relevant part:

‘‘[I]nterest at the rate of ten per cent a year, and no

more, may be recovered and allowed in civil actions

. . . including actions to recover money loaned at a

greater rate, as damages for the detention of money

after it becomes payable.’’4

The purpose of § 37-3a ‘‘is not to punish persons who

have detained money owed to others in bad faith but,

rather, to compensate parties that have been deprived

of the use of their money.’’ Sosin v. Sosin, supra, 300

Conn. 230; see Neiditz v. Morton S. Fine & Associates,

Inc., 199 Conn. 683, 691, 508 A.2d 438 (1986). An award

of interest under § 37-3a may include either or both

prejudgment and postjudgment interest. See Salce v.

Wolczek, 314 Conn. 675, 696–97, A.3d (2014)

(trial court may award postjudgment interest while

declining to award prejudgment interest); DiLieto v.

County Obstetrics & Gynecology Group, P.C., 310

Conn. 38, 50 n.12, 74 A.3d 1212 (2013) (‘‘[§] 37-3a is not

limited by its terms to prejudgment interest, and . . .

postjudgment interest also may be awarded under that

provision’’). Whether a prevailing party will receive

interest as damages pursuant to § 37-3a is principally

an equitable question lying within the trial court’s dis-
cretion. See, e.g., DiLieto v. County Obstetrics & Gynecology Group, P.C., supra, 54; Sosin v. Sosin, supra,

227. The trial court also has discretion to choose the

rate of prejudgment and postjudgment interest, up to

the statutory maximum rate of 10 percent.5 Sosin v.

Sosin, supra, 246 n.26; see Sears, Roebuck & Co. v.

Board of Tax Review, 241 Conn. 749, 765–66, 699 A.2d

81 (1997); see also General Statutes § 37a-3 (a).

The Appellate Court’s conclusion that postmaturity

interest is akin to prejudgment interest and that it terminates upon the entry of judgment; see Sikorsky Financial Credit Union, Inc. v. Butts, supra, 144 Conn. App.

761; is inconsistent with our case law and § 37-1 (b).

For example, in Little v. United National Investors

Corp., supra, 160 Conn. 534, this court held that, under

General Statutes (1958 Rev.) § 37-1, if parties to a loan

expressly agree to a rate of postmaturity interest, interest eo nomine will accrue on the unpaid balance of the

loan from the date of maturity and will continue to

accrue as long as the debt remains unpaid, even after

the entry of judgment. See id., 541–42. Shortly after this

court decided Little, the legislature amended § 37-1 to

add subsection (b). See Public Acts 1971, No. 783, § 1.

This new subsection expanded on the decision in Little

by creating a new default rule for postmaturity interest.

Section 37-1 (b) provides: ‘‘Unless otherwise provided

by agreement, interest at the legal rate from the date

of maturity of a debt shall accrue as an addition to the

debt.’’ The addition of subsection (b) to § 37-1 accomplished two things. First, it made clear that, unless the

parties agree otherwise, postmaturity interest eo

nomine will accrue on a loan. Second, if the parties do

not choose a specific rate of postmaturity interest, the

applicable interest rate will be the statutory legal rate.

Applying these principles to the present case, we

conclude thatthe AppellateCourtimproperly construed

the interest statutes and our case law. Although the

Appellate Court concluded that postmaturity interest

terminates upon the entry of judgment in the absence

of a specific agreement for postjudgment interest; see

Sikorsky Financial Credit Union, Inc. v. Butts, supra,

144 Conn. App. 761; neither § 37-1 (b) nor Little contains

such a requirement. The decision in Little makes clear

that postmaturity interest accrues even after the entry

of judgment, and § 37-1 (b) did not alter that result but

codified it. Only if the parties to a loan expressly reject

postmaturity interest will the trial court then have discretion under § 37-3a to award interest as damages for

the detention of money. See, e.g., Winsted Savings

Bank v. New Hartford, supra, 78 Conn. 323–24 (trial

court may award interest as damages even when parties

agreed to waive interest eo nomine).

The parties’ loan contract in the present case did not

disclaim postmaturity interest, and, thus, the plaintiff

was entitled to postmaturity interest under § 37-1 (b).
The parties agreed that, if the defendant failed to pay

the deficiency when due, the plaintiff ‘‘may charge [the

defendant] interest at a rate not exceeding the highest

lawful rate’’ until the deficiency is paid in full. Although

the parties did not specify a specific postmaturity interest rate, they clearly did not disclaim any right to postmaturity interest.6 Accordingly, the plaintiff is entitled

to postmaturity interest under § 37-1 (b), and § 37-3a

does not apply.

This conclusion requires us also to determine the

properrate of postmaturity interest. The plaintiff claims

that it should be the contract rate of 9.14 percent, but

we disagree. The parties’ contract did not enumerate a

specific postmaturity interest rate but, instead, used

the phrase ‘‘highest lawful rate . . . .’’ This reference

falls short of adopting a specific postmaturity interest

rate. Because the parties did not disclaim postmaturity

interest, but also did not agree to a specific postmaturity

interest rate, the legal rate in § 37-1 applies, and the

plaintiff is entitled to interest at the legal rate of 8

percent from the date of maturity until the deficiency

is paid in full.

II

Although we have concluded in part I of this opinion

that the rationale of the Appellate Court is untenable,

the amicus has offered other arguments in support of

the Appellate Court’s judgment. Many of those arguments, which were directed at the interest statutes and

the language of the parties’ contract, are resolved by

our analysis in part I of this opinion. There is, however,

one other contention that merits separate consideration. In addition to its other arguments, the amicus

argues that the repossession statute; General Statutes

§ 36a-785; pursuant to which the plaintiff brought its

deficiency action, does not allow interest eo nomine

under § 37-1 on deficiency judgments. According to the

amicus, the common law did not allow for deficiency

actions in cases of repossession because repossession

of the collateral eliminated a creditor’s ‘‘right to enforce

the underlying contract.’’7

In the absence of a commonlaw remedy, the amicus asserts that any recovery of a

deficiency by the plaintiff is limited to that expressly

allowed by the statute that authorized the deficiency

action, § 36a-785, which does not directly address

awards of interest. Thus, the amicus argues that,

because § 36a-785 does not expressly authorize the

recovery of postmaturity interest under § 37-1, any

award of interest is left to the trial court’s discretionary

powers under § 37-3a.

The plaintiff acknowledges that its right to recover

is governed by § 36a-785 but maintains that the statute

expressly permits it to recover ‘‘the balance due under

the contract,’’ which includes any interest that would

be due under the contract. We agree with the plaintiff.
We begin our analysis, as we must, with the text of the

statute at issue. The statutory authority for deficiency

actions for retail installment loans is found in § 36a785. This statute allows creditors to repossess a motor

vehicle if the debtor defaults, subject to certain restrictions. See General Statutes § 36a-785 (a) and (b). If

the debtor does not redeem the motor vehicle after

repossession, the creditor must sell it. See General Statutes § 36a-785 (c) and (d). The proceeds of the resale

then must be applied ‘‘(1) to the payment of the actual

and reasonable expenses thereof, (2) to the payment

of the actual and reasonable expenses of any retaking

and storing of said goods, [and] (3) to the satisfaction

of the balance due underthe contract.’’ General Statutes

§ 36a-785 (e). Any surplus must be paid to the debtor.

See General Statutes § 36a-785 (e). If the proceeds do

not cover the creditor’s repossession expenses and the

balance due under the contract, the creditor may not

recover the deficiency, except to the extent provided

in § 36a-785 (g). See General Statutes § 36a-785 (f).

Section 36a-785 (g) generally allows creditors to

recover a deficiency for motor vehicles with a cash

price of more than $2000, subject to certain restrictions.

The creditor first must calculate the fair market value

of the motor vehicle using a formula specified in the

statute. See General Statutes § 36a-785 (g). ‘‘If [the fair

market] value of the motor vehicle . . . is less than

the balance due under the contract, plus the actual and

reasonable expenses of the retaking of possession, the

holder of the contract may recover from the retail buyer

. . . as a deficiency, the amount by which such liability

exceeds such fair market value, as defined in . . . subsection [g].’’ General Statutes § 36a-785 (g).

Section 36a-785 (h) requires a creditor to elect its

remedy. That subsection provides in relevant part:

‘‘After the holder retakes possession as provided in

subsection (a) . . . the retail buyer or anyone who has

succeeded to his obligations shall not be liable for any

balance due, except to the extent permitted by subsection (g) of this section. The holder may seek a monetary

judgment on the contract against the buyer unless the

goods have been repossessed, with or without judicial

process. Goods purchased under the contract shall not

be executed upon to satisfy such judgment. When such

judgment becomes final, the holder’s security interest

in the goods shall be extinguished. . . .’’ General Statutes § 36a-785 (h).

According to the amicus, subsection (h) limits the

plaintiff’s recovery of a deficiency to the extent permitted in § 36a-785 (g), which must be construed narrowly

in favor of consumers. See, e.g., Jacobs v. Healey FordSubaru, Inc., 231 Conn. 707, 722, 652 A.2d 496 (1995).

The amicus contends that, because subsection (g) does

not provide expressly that the plaintiff may obtain interest eo nomine on its underlying contract, the plaintiff
may notreceive interest eo nomine and that any interest

award is left to the trial court’s discretion to award

interest as damages under § 37-3a.

We disagree that repossession under § 36a-785 (g)

terminates the plaintiff’s rights under the contract or

prohibits the recovery of interest eo nomine under § 37-

1. Subsection (g)limits the extent of a creditor’s remedy

for a deficiency claim, but only to the extent that it

requires the creditor to reduce the balance due under

its contract by either the fair market value of the collateral or the actual price for which the creditor sells it,

whicheveris greater. It does not terminate the operation

of the parties’ contract.

The text of subsection (g) specifically contemplates

the survival of the parties’ contract following repossession and defines the deficiency due as ‘‘the balance due

under the contract,’’ less the fair market value of the

vehicle8 and the reasonable expenses incurred in repossessing the vehicle.(Emphasis added.) General Statutes

§ 36a-785 (g). Notably, the statutory language does not

limit a creditor’s recovery to only the remaining principal balance. See General Statutes § 36a-785 (g). The

statute’s use of the broader phrase ‘‘balance due under

the contract’’ therefore indicates an intention to include

principal, interest, fees and other amounts due under

the contract. Furthermore, the text of subsection (g)

contemplates that the balance due under the contract

may change as interest continues to accrue because it

does not prescribe a terminus date for determining the

contract balance. See General Statutes § 36a-785 (g).

This stands in contrast to the directive in the same

subsection that the fair market value of the vehicle be

determined ‘‘as of the date of repossession.’’ General

Statutes § 36a-785 (g). We presume that the legislature’s

decision to require that the fair market value be set at

a specific date, on the one hand, and its omission of

any similar requirement for determining the contract

balance, on the other, were intentional and reflect an

acknowledgment that the contract balance will change

as interest accrues. Cf. State v. B.B., 300 Conn. 748,

759, 17 A.3d 30 (2011) (‘‘[when] a statute, with reference

to one subject contains a given provision, the omission

of such provision from a similar statute concerning a

related subject . . . is significant to show that a different intention existed’’ [internal quotation marks omitted]).

Our interpretation is also supported by the text of a

related statutory provision that governs the calculation

of interest in retail installment agreements. General

Statutes § 36a-772 regulates the calculation of interest

on retail installment loans. Subsection (a) of § 36a-772

limits interest rates on motor vehicle installment loans,

subsection (b) limits interest rates on retail installment

loans for any good other than a motor vehicle, and

subsection (c) governs the computation of finance
charges. The final sentence of § 36a-772 (c) provides

in relevant part: ‘‘Nothing contained in sections 36a770 to 36a-788, inclusive . . . shall be construed to prohibit the computation of the interest component of the

finance charge by application of an interest rate to the

actual balance of such principal amount financed as

may be outstanding from time to time.’’ This sentence

expressly authorizes parties to compute interest using

the simple interest method. We find this sentence significant to the present case because it applies, by its

express terms, to the entire Retail Installment Sales

Financing Act, General Statutes § 36a-770 through 36a788, including the repossession statute at issue, namely,

§ 36a-785. See General Statutes § 36a-772 (c). The specific reference in this sentence to the repossession and

deficiency provisions in § 36a-785 indicates that interest

will continue to be computed on the outstanding principal of the loan, even after repossession.9

In light of the language of the foregoing statutes, we

conclude that repossession under § 36a-785 does not

terminate the parties’rights underthe contract and thus

preserves the general rule that interest eo nomine (at

either the contractual or legal rate) continues to accrue

after maturity under § 37-1 (b). The plaintiff is entitled

to postmaturity interest at the rate of 8 percent from

the date of maturity until the balance is paid in full.

The judgment of the Appellate Court is reversed and

the case is remanded to that court with direction to

reverse the judgment of the trial court with respect to

the award of interest and to remand the case to the trial

court to reconsider the award of interest in accordance

with this opinion.

In this opinion the other justices concurred.

* This appeal originally was argued before a panel of this court consisting

of Chief Justice Rogers and Justices Palmer, Zarella, Eveleigh, McDonald

and Espinosa. Thereafter, Judge Keller was added to the panel and read

the briefs and appendices, and listened to a recording of oral argument

prior to participating in this decision.

1

In the event the fair market value or resale value of the car exceeded

the amount owed under the contract, the plaintiff was required under the

contract to credit the difference to the defendant.

2 The defendant did not appear before the Appellate Court.

3 The Latin phrase ‘‘eo nomine’’ means ‘‘by or under that name . . . .’’

Webster’s Third New International Dictionary (2002) p. 760.

4 Section 37-3a does not apply to: (1) negligence claims; see General

Statutes § 37-3b; (2) condemnation proceedings; see General Statutes § 37-

3c; or (3) awards of prejudgment offer of compromise interest. See General

Statutes § 52-192a.

5

In the case of debts arising from the provision of hospital services, § 37-

3a (b) sets the maximum rate of interest as damages at 5 percent.

6 The amicus argues that the provision in the parties’ contract concerning

postmaturity interest was indefinite because it stated that the plaintiff ‘‘may’’

charge interest and therefore did not amount to a valid contractfor postmaturity interest. The plaintiff, on the other hand, maintains that the contract

used the term ‘‘may’’ as a means to comply with the plain language requirements for consumer contracts. See General Statutes § 42-152. We need not

resolve this dispute because, even if the parties’ contract was indefinite, it

would have no impact on our conclusion. What matters for our purposes

is that the parties did not disclaim or waive postmaturity interest. In the

absence of such a disclaimer or waiver, the default rule in § 37-1 (b) applies,

and postmaturity interest accrues pursuant to statute.
7 We take no position on the validity of the assertion of the amicus that

the common law forbade deficiency actions after the repossession of an

automobile. In light of our conclusion that the text of § 36a-785 permits the

plaintiff to recover interest eo nomine on a deficiency claim, an analysis of

the common law and its relationship to the statute is unnecessary. See

General Statutes § 1-2z; see also, e.g., Marandino v. Prometheus Pharmacy,

supra, 294 Conn. 574–75.

8

If the vehicle is resold and the actual resale price exceeds the fair market

value of the vehicle, the actual resale price controls for purposes of this

equation. See General Statutes § 36a-875 (g).

9 Although it could be argued that the reference in § 36a-772 (c) to the

entire Retail Installment Sales Financing Act (act) was merely a matter of

convenience, other portions of that act demonstrate that, when the legislature intended to render certain provisions inapplicable to the repossession

statute at issue, § 36a-785, it did so expressly. See, e.g., General Statutes

§ 36a-778 (‘‘[t]he restriction on charges herein provided shall not apply to

any expenses permitted under section 36a-785’’).