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NEW CHALLENGES FOR INTERNATIONAL

PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS

HEARING

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

JULY 29, 2009

Serial No. 111–49

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/

(II)

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

HOWARD L. BERMAN, California, Chairman 

GARY L. ACKERMAN, New York 

ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American 

Samoa 

DONALD M. PAYNE, New Jersey 

BRAD SHERMAN, California 

ROBERT WEXLER, Florida 

ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York 

BILL DELAHUNT, Massachusetts 

GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York 

DIANE E. WATSON, California 

RUSS CARNAHAN, Missouri 

ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey 

GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia 

MICHAEL E. MCMAHON, New York 

JOHN S. TANNER, Tennessee 

GENE GREEN, Texas 

LYNN WOOLSEY, California 

SHEILA JACKSON LEE, Texas 

BARBARA LEE, California 

SHELLEY BERKLEY, Nevada 

JOSEPH CROWLEY, New York 

MIKE ROSS, Arkansas 

BRAD MILLER, North Carolina 

DAVID SCOTT, Georgia 

JIM COSTA, California 

KEITH ELLISON, Minnesota 

GABRIELLE GIFFORDS, Arizona 

RON KLEIN, Florida 

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida 

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey 

DAN BURTON, Indiana 

ELTON GALLEGLY, California 

DANA ROHRABACHER, California 

DONALD A. MANZULLO, Illinois 

EDWARD R. ROYCE, California 

RON PAUL, Texas 

JEFF FLAKE, Arizona 

MIKE PENCE, Indiana 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

JOHN BOOZMAN, Arkansas 

J. GRESHAM BARRETT, South Carolina 

CONNIE MACK, Florida 

JEFF FORTENBERRY, Nebraska 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas 

TED POE, Texas 

BOB INGLIS, South Carolina 

GUS BILIRAKIS, Florida 

RICHARD J. KESSLER, Staff Director 

YLEEM POBLETE, Republican Staff Director 

PEARL ALICE MARSH, Senior Professional Staff Member 

GENELL BROWN, Senior Staff Associate/Hearing Coordinator 

(III)

C O N T E N T S 

Page

WITNESSES 

The Honorable Susan E. Rice, U.S. Permanent Representative to the United 

Nations .................................................................................................................. 6

The Honorable Richard S. Williamson, Partner, Winston & Strawn, LLP 

(Former Special Envoy to Sudan and Ambassador to the U.N. Commission 

on Human Rights) ................................................................................................ 49

Ms. Erin A. Weir, Peacekeeping Advocate, Refugees International .................... 70

Mr. Brett D. Schaefer, Jay Kingham Fellow in International Regulatory Affairs, The Heritage Foundation ........................................................................... 78

Colonel William J. Flavin, USA, Retired, Directing Professor, Doctrine, Concepts, Training, and Education Division, U.S. Army Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute, U.S. Army War College ......................................... 97

LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING 

The Honorable Susan E. Rice: Prepared statement ............................................. 11

The Honorable Richard S. Williamson: Prepared statement ............................... 52

Ms. Erin A. Weir: Prepared statement .................................................................. 72

Mr. Brett D. Schaefer: Prepared statement .......................................................... 81

Colonel William J. Flavin, USA, Retired: Prepared statement ........................... 99

APPENDIX 

Hearing notice .......................................................................................................... 122

Hearing minutes ...................................................................................................... 123

Edward C. Luck, Ph.D., Special Advisor to the U.N. Secretary-General: Statement ...................................................................................................................... 125

The Honorable Howard L. Berman, a Representative in Congress from the 

State of California, and Chairman, Committee on Foreign Affairs: Prepared 

statement .............................................................................................................. 133

The Honorable Gerald E. Connolly, a Representative in Congress from the 

State of Virginia: Prepared statement ............................................................... 136

The Honorable Diane E. Watson, a Representative in Congress from the 

State of California: Prepared statement ............................................................ 138

The Honorable Keith Ellison, a Representative in Congress from the State 

of Minnesota: Prepared statement ...................................................................... 139

Written responses from the Honorable Susan E. Rice to questions submitted 

for the record by the Honorable Barbara Lee, a Representative in Congress 

from the State of California ................................................................................ 141

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NEW CHALLENGES FOR INTERNATIONAL 

PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS 

WEDNESDAY, JULY 29, 2009

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS, Washington, DC. 

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:03 a.m. in room 

2172, Rayburn House Office Building, the Honorable Howard L. 

Berman (chairman of the committee) presiding. 

Chairman BERMAN. The committee will come to order. This 

morning we are quite privileged to be joined by the United States 

Ambassador to the United Nations, Dr. Susan Rice, as well as a 

distinguished private panel that will follow her testimony and 

question period. 

I first want to begin on a somewhat different point by thanking 

Ambassador Rice for her tremendous efforts to rebuild the United 

Nations human rights mechanism, which has been badly compromised by a pathological focus on Israel, and tarnished by a failure to focus on some of the world’s worst human rights violators. 

But the purpose of this hearing is to examine the challenges 

faced by international peacekeeping operations and to explore various options for making such operations more effective, particularly 

in protecting innocent civilians. 

Since 1948, the member states of the United Nations have supported 63 peacekeeping operations on four continents. Today, the 

U.N. fields more than 90,000 uniformed peacekeepers and thousands of civilian personnel in 15 peacekeeping missions, from 

Congo to Haiti to Lebanon. 

We support U.N. peacekeeping efforts because it is in our national interest to see that states do not fail, that voids are not 

opened for terrorists to fill, and that economies and lives do not 

crumble under the weight of war. And for these reasons it is very 

important that we pay our U.N. peacekeeping dues in full, as we 

propose in the State Department authorization bill passed by this 

committee and the House last month. 

Around the world, many U.N. peacekeeping operations have 

yielded positive results on the ground. In the Balkans and East 

Timor, in Kashmir and Liberia, in Cyprus and the Golan Heights, 

U.N. blue helmets have worked to create the political space for 

peace, prevent mass atrocities, and avoid the collapse of states. 

As we consider the future of peacekeeping, it is important to recognize that such operations have become increasingly complex. 

More than ever before they are designed to address the root causes 

of conflict and to build sustainable peace. This is reflected in the 

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sheer scale of current operations, which have an average of nine 

times as many troops, observers and police, and 13 times as many 

civilians, as the average operation did 10 years ago. 

But these expanded peacekeeping mandates have put a severe 

strain on the system. The demand for resources often exceeds the 

supply provided by the international community, and as a result, 

peacekeeping missions frequently lack the troops, helicopters, and 

other equipment they need. At a time when peacekeepers are increasingly deployed in complex and unstable situations, and sometimes become the targets of combatants, that can be a recipe for 

disaster. 

The United States has taken some important steps to address 

the lack of capacity and resources. For example, the U.S. military 

has assisted in the strategic movement of troops, equipment, and 

supplies to support U.N. peacekeeping missions. In Darfur, we 

have funded over 25 percent of the cost of the hybrid U.N.-African 

Union peacekeeping operation and constructed and maintained 34 

Darfur base camps for over 7,000 African Union peacekeepers. And 

through the Global Peace Operations Initiative, we will provide 

training and material assistance to 75,000 troops from a number 

of African countries, many of whom will be deployed with U.N. 

peacekeeping missions. 

What else can the U.S. and other nations do to increase the capacity of the United Nations and regional organizations to respond 

to emerging crises? Are expanded peacekeeping mandates the right 

approach to dealing with the types of conflicts we face today? Or 

are we asking our peacekeepers to do too much? And what steps 

can we take to help ensure that U.N. peacekeeping operations have 

adequate personnel and resources to carry out their missions? 

One of the key tests of the international peacekeeping system is 

its ability to protect civilians consistent with the emerging international norm known as ‘‘the responsibility to protect.’’ This concept, endorsed by the U.N. Security Council in 2006, holds that 

states have a responsibility to protect their citizens from genocide, 

war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. Should 

they fail to do so, the international community has a responsibility 

to step in and protect threatened populations—with the use of force 

if absolutely necessary. 

But strong words have not always been matched by strong actions. Since 1999, when a U.N. peacekeeping operation was established in the Eastern Congo, over 5 million people have died as a 

consequence of war, and an additional 45,000 perish every month. 

And in conflict zones from Congo to Bosnia to Darfur, peacekeepers 

have been unable to prevent the use of rape as a weapon of war, 

and even genocide. 

How can we equip the United Nations to more effectively protect 

civilians and prevent mass atrocities? What can the United States 

do at the Security Council to discourage or overcome political footdragging—as we saw in Kosovo and Rwanda—that prevents rapid 

deployments at times of humanitarian crises? What is our strategy 

for making sure that women form a critical mass of peacekeepers 

and peacemakers, both to reduce sexual violence in conflict and to 

ensure that post-conflict reconstruction prioritizes the well being of 

women and girls? And finally, the key question: Is the interVerDate 0ct 09 2002 08:38 Nov 24, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00006 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\FULL\072909\51656 HFA PsN: SHIRL
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national peacekeeping system, as it is conceived today, capable of 

preventing genocide, ethnic cleansing and other mass atrocities? Or 

do we need to develop an entirely new model for our increasingly 

complex world? 

We thank Ambassador Rice and our other panelists for being 

here today to share their insights on this important set of issues, 

and we do look forward to your testimony. 

I now turn to my friend and the ranking member of the committee, the gentlelady from Florida, Ileana Ros-Lehtinen, for any 

opening remarks she might wish to make. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you so much, Mr. Chairman, as well. 

I welcome Ambassador Rice to our committee today, and this is an 

important and timely hearing. Promoting reform at the United Nations has been among my highest priorities for this committee, and 

I do this not as an enemy of the U.N. but as someone who is committed to helping the U.N. help itself. I hope that today’s session 

marks the beginning of a series of hearings and a comprehensive 

review of real U.N. reform, and that we will soon consider H.R. 

557, the United Nations Transparency, Accountability, and Reform 

Act. 

The peacekeeping section of this bill that I introduced requires 

the adoption of a uniform code of conduct that would apply equally 

to all U.N. peacekeeping personnel, military and civilian alike. It 

also requires the U.N. to maintain a database to track violations 

of that code of conduct which should be shared across all U.N. 

agencies. This will help ensure that those who have abused the 

very populations that they have been sent to protect are not simply 

recycled to other missions. 

Ambassador Rice, I would ask your cooperation on this legislation and your commitment to work together on the promotion of 

comprehensive reforms at the United Nations, particularly in regards to peacekeeping. 

U.N. peacekeeping has contributed to the promotion of peace and 

stability for more than 60 years, and the overwhelming majority of 

peacekeepers have served with honor and courage. But to allow the 

operational failures and the unconscionable acts of misconduct that 

have come to plague U.N. peacekeeping operations to go unchecked 

undermines the credibility of the U.N. 

The United Nations has over 116,000 personnel from 120 countries deployed across 17 peace operations, including two special political missions. Seven new missions requiring more than 54,000 

uniformed personnel have been authorized over the past 5 years 

alone. The budget for July 9 through June 2010 has swelled to $7.8 

billion, with more than $2 billion coming from us in the United 

States. 

The days of traditional peacekeeping—when peacekeepers were 

deployed only to places where there was a peace to be kept, monitored lines of disengagement and used force only in self-defense—

those days have long since passed. Experts say that we now have 

entered a second generation of peacekeeping, where missions are 

increasingly complex and dangerous. 

The mission in Haiti, which was preceded by a U.S.-led multinational interim force and was authorized in 2004, is not a traditional monitoring mission. The mission in Haiti has been charged 

4

with securing a stable environment, restructuring and reforming 

the Haitian National Police, assisting in disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration programs, supporting the political process, 

and monitoring human rights. 

The mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo was originally deployed in the year 2000 as a traditional monitoring mission 

with just over 5,500 uniformed personnel. Today it has an authorized strength of 19,815 uniformed personnel and an aggressive 

mandate to use force to protect civilians, forcibly disarm combatants, train and mentor the armed forces of the DRC, seize illegal 

arms shipments; and provide advice to strengthen democratic institution and processes at every level of the government. 

The complexity and dangerous nature of the Congo mission is 

eclipsed only by the hybrid U.N.-African Union mission in Darfur, 

Sudan, with multiple chains of command and direct interference by 

the Sudanese regime, the hybrid model presents unique challenges. 

And now the U.N. is being pushed to launch a new mission in 

Somalia, as the U.N. General Assembly has adopted the concept of 

responsibility to protect. Ambassador Rice, please discuss, if you 

could, how the U.S. interprets this responsibility, and how the U.S. 

views the requirements, if any, on individual nations stemming 

from the responsibility to protect, and when we expect this concept 

to be applied and how. This discussion is timely following last 

week’s debate at the U.N. 

The United States has a strong record of support for peacekeeping. Since 2004, we have supported the provision of training 

and equipment for 81,000 new peacekeepers worldwide through the 

Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI). Through GPOI, we have 

also supported the training of 2,000 instructors at the Center of 

Excellence for stability police units. We have facilitated the deployment of nearly 50,000 peacekeepers to 20 U.N. and regional peace 

support operations, and we have been at the forefront of efforts to 

secure critical mission enablers, including utility and tactical helicopters to support missions in Darfur, Chad, Congo, Afghanistan, 

and beyond. 

I look forward to your testimony, Ambassador Rice, on how we 

can make this assistance even more effective while coordinating efforts with regional combatant commands and other donors to ensure appropriate and equitable burden sharing. 

As conflicts rage and new models of peace operations emerge, it 

would seem that U.N. peacekeeping is currently faced with three 

fundamental questions: When is United Nations peacekeeping the 

right instrument? What tasks can United Nations peacekeeping actually accomplish? And how can United Nations peacekeeping become more effective? 

Thank you very much, Ambassador, for your testimony, and 

thank you, Mr. Chairman, for the opportunity. 

Chairman BERMAN. And thank you. We have a lengthy hearing. 

We have after the Ambassador finishes and the questions finish, 

we have a U.N. official, and then an excellent panel, so I am going 

to recognize the chairman and ranking member, if he shows up, for 

the appropriate subcommittee, and then hope to get directly to Ambassador Rice’s testimony, and so we can finish this sometime during the daylight hours. 

5

The chairman of the International Organizations, Human Rights 

and Oversight Subcommittee, Mr. Delahunt, is recognized for up to 

3 minutes. 

Mr. DELAHUNT. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman, and as you are 

aware there is a markup going on in the Judiciary Committee, and 

I am going to excuse myself for the first 20 minutes, but Ambassador Rice, welcome. 

The gentlelady alluded to Haiti and the peacekeeping mission 

there. I dare say if the United Nations was not present in Haiti 

today that there would be a significant United States both civilian 

and military presence there. Back in 2006, myself and the ranking 

member of the subcommittee, Mr. Rohrabacher, requested that the 

GAO compare the cost of the then current and still current U.N. 

peacekeeping mission in Haiti with the hypothetical costs of what 

a U.S. only mission of the same size would entail, and I read your 

testimony and you have referenced it, but in terms of the American 

taxpayer, I think it cannot be stated often enough that it certainly 

has proven to be simply on a financial basis a good investment. It 

would have cost the United States taxpayer to support a U.S. only 

mission there eight times of what it cost the United States taxpayer now. 

More importantly, as you well know, peacekeeping, and I think 

your words were it has saved the United States not only treasure 

but blood. Again, the gentlelady indicated that there is over 

100,000 people or personnel in terms of peacekeeping worldwide; 

93 of those are American personnel. So given the multiple challenges facing the United States and recognizing that there are 

problems that have to be addressed and improvements that can be 

made, it is my belief that one of the most favorable aspects of the 

United Nations in terms of the United States is the peacekeeping 

operations, and I know that many of us look forward to your testimony, your leadership, and I am sure there will be consultations 

over the course of your tenure and our tenure here regarding 

peacekeeping operations because the gentlelady, the ranking member, as well as the chair, are correct, there are increasing demands 

on the U.N. and I think it is critical that we have discussions and 

debate to determine how we can improve those missions, and welcome again, and I yield back. 

Chairman BERMAN. The time of the gentleman has expired, and 

now Ambassador Rice. 

Ambassador Susan Rice serves as the U.S. Permanent Representative to the United Nations. She was unanimously confirmed 

to this Cabinet-rank position by the U.S. Senate on January 22, 

2009, with other confirmations coming so quickly. From 2002 to 

2009, Ambassador Rice was a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution where she focused on U.S. foreign policy, transnational security threats, league states, global poverty and development, and 

from 1997 to 2001, Ambassador Rice was Assistant Secretary of 

State for African Affairs, and prior to that served as Senior Director for African Affairs at the National Security Council under 

President Bill Clinton. 

Ambassador Rice received a master’s degree and a Ph.D. in international relations from Oxford University where she was a Rhodes 

Scholar, and her B.A. from Stanford University. 

6

We are very pleased to have you here, and your first appearance 

in this capacity before the committee, and welcome your testimony. 

Your entire statement will be included in the record. 

STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE SUSAN E. RICE, U.S. 

PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE TO THE UNITED NATIONS 

Ambassador RICE. Thank you very much, Chairman Berman, 

and thank you, Ranking Member Ros-Lehtinen. Distinguished 

members of the Foreign Affairs Committee, I am grateful for your 

convening this hearing on the opportunities and challenges of global peacekeeping, particularly in Africa. I deeply appreciate the committee’s broad interest in these questions, and with your permission, Mr. Chairman, I would like to summarize my testimony and 

submit it in its entirety for the record. 

I am particularly pleased to make my first appearance on the 

Hill as the U.S. Permanent Representative to the United Nation to 

discuss an issue that has enjoyed such strong bipartisan support 

for more than 60 years. From the Truman administration’s backing 

of the first dispatch of the U.N. military observers in the Middle 

East in 1948, to the Bush administration’s support for unprecedented growth in U.N. peacekeeping between 2003 and 2008, the 

United States has repeatedly turned to the United Nations and its 

peacekeeping capacity as an essential instrument for advancing our 

security. 

Increasing the effectiveness and the efficiency of peacekeeping is 

one of the Obama administration’s highest priorities at the United 

Nations. The administration recognizes that many of today’s peacekeeping operations face significant limitations and challenges, but 

like our predecessors, we know that U.N. peacekeeping addresses 

pressing international needs, and serves our national interests. 

There are five compelling reasons why it is in U.S. national interests to invest in U.N. peacekeeping. 

First, U.N. peacekeeping delivers real results in conflict zones. 

U.N. peacekeepers can provide the political and practical reassurances that warring parties often need to agree to and implement 

an effective cease fire. Their deployment can help limit or stop the 

escalation of armed conflict, and stave off wider war. 

But today’s U.N. operations do much more than just observe 

cease fires, they provide security and access so that humanitarian 

aid can reach the sick, the hungry, and the desperate. They help 

protect vulnerable civilians, and create conditions that will allow 

refugees to return home, and they help emerging democracies hold 

elections and strengthen the rule of law. 

Many countries are more peaceful and stable today due to U.N. 

peacekeeping. In recent years, U.N. peacekeepers helped divert an 

explosion of ethnic violence in Burundi; extend the fledgling government’s authority in Sierra Leone; keep order in Liberia; and 

take back Cite Soleil from the lawless gangs in Haiti. All of these 

countries, I should note, now enjoy democratically-elected governments. 

Second, U.N. peacekeeping allows us to share the burden of creating a more peaceful and secure world. America simply cannot 

send our fighting forces to every corner of the globe wherever war 

breaks out. Today U.N. peacekeeping enlists the contributions of 

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some 118 countries which provide more than 93,000 troops and police to 15 different U.N. operations. We are grateful for our partners’ efforts to forge a safer, more decent world. This is burden 

sharing at its most effective. 

The United States, as was mentioned earlier by MR. Delahunt, 

currently contributes 93 military and police personnel to U.N. operations, approximately 0.1 percent of all uniformed U.N. personnel 

deployed worldwide. Sixty-five countries contribute more than the 

United States, including the other four permanent members of the 

Security Council. 

Third, U.N. peacekeeping is cost effective. The total cost of U.N. peacekeeping is expected to exceed $7.75 billion this year. As large 

as this figure is, it actually represents less than 1 percent of global 

military spending. The United States contributes slightly more 

than a quarter of the annual cost for U.N. peacekeeping. The European Union countries and Japan together pay more than half of the 

U.N.’s peacekeeping bill. We estimate that the U.S. share of the 

Fiscal Year 2009 costs will reach, as Ms. Ros-Lehtinen pointed out, 

about $2.2 billion. We are grateful to Congress for the appropriations that will enable us to make our payments in full during fiscal 

2009, as well as address arrears accrued from 2005 to 2008. 

But let us be plain—$2.2 billion is a lot of money. But the cost 

of inaction would likely be far greater both in blood and treasure. 

According to the same GAO report that Mr. Delahunt referenced, 

in 2006, the United States contribution to the U.N. mission in 

Haiti was $116 million for the first 14 months of the operation; 

roughly an eighth of the cost of unilateral American mission of the 

same size and duration. That works out to 12 cents on the dollar, 

money that seems particularly well spent when one recalls that the 

arrival of U.N. peacekeepers in Haiti let American troops depart 

without leaving chaos in their wake. 

Fourth, the United Nations is uniquely able to mount multifaceted operations. We have learned in Iraq, Afghanistan and elsewhere how important it is to have an integrated comprehensive approach. The U.N. has particular expertise, it can pull together political, military, police, humanitarian, human rights, electoral and 

development activities under the leadership of a single individual 

on the ground. 

Fifth, sometimes warring parties will not let other outside actors 

in except for the U.N. Governments, rebels, warlords, and other antagonists often don’t want foreign forces in their country, but the 

U.N.’s universal character and its unique legitimacy can make it a 

little easier for some governments and opposition elements to decide to let constructive outside actors in. 

All these factors make U.N. peacekeeping an effective and dynamic instrument for advancing U.S. interests. At the same time, 

we must be clear about the very real challenges facing U.N. peacekeeping, especially its missions to Africa. Let me highlight three of 

these challenges. 

First, the sheer volume and growth of peacekeeping has put the 

U.N. and its missions under severe strain. Over the past 6 years 

the U.N. has had to launch or expand eight missions in rapid succession. In 2003, the U.N. had about 36,000 uniformed personnel 

deployed around the world. Today, as I just said, there are 93,000. 

8

U.N. officials are the first to acknowledge that it has been difficult 

to generate, recruit and deploy the numbers of personnel required, 

while keeping quality high and ongoing improvements on track. 

A series of initiatives started in 2000 and continued in 2007 

greatly enhanced the U.N.’s administrative and logistical support 

capabilities, but they never envisioned the scale and scope of today’s deployments, so there is much still to be done. 

Second, the U.N. is being asked to take on harder and riskier operations, often without the support and capabilities it needs from 

member states. The Security Council has recently given some very 

ambitious mandates to peacekeeping operations in Africa, such as 

protecting civilians under the threat of physical violence, including 

sexual violence, in vast and populous territories with limited infrastructure, faltering peace processes, ongoing hostilities, and uncooperative host governments. 

Consider what the world is asking of UNAMID, the hybrid African Union mission in Darfur. Darfur is about the size of California 

with a pre-war population of 6.5 million. Only 20,000 peacekeepers, 

and we are not even yet at that strength, are inherently limited in 

their ability to patrol territories so vast and to protect so many civilians. Imagine how much more difficult their task becomes, as it 

has, when the host government actively hinders their efforts, the 

parties balk at cease fire talks, and the peacekeepers are deployed 

below their full operating capacity. 

The Government of Sudan has repeatedly failed to cooperate 

with international peacekeepers and humanitarian workers, denying them access, expelling international humanitarian groups, refusing entry visas for desperately needed personnel, and blocking 

the delivery of critical logistical support. While President Obama’s 

special envoy on Sudan, General Scott Gration, helped persuade 

the Government of Sudan to let four new humanitarian NGOs in, 

we continue to urge Khartoum to fill the gaps in critical humanitarian aid services and to improve is cooperation with UNAMID. 

UNAMID is now only at 69 percent of the 19,500 troops it was 

authorized to field, and only at 45 percent of its authorized police 

strength. The United States has provided over $100 million worth 

of heavy equipment and training as well as $17 million worth of 

airlift assistance for African peacekeepers in Darfur, and we helped 

secure a pledge of five tactical helicopters for UNAMID from the 

Government of Ethiopia. But you may recall that UNAMID continues to plead with the international community for over 2 years 

for 18 medium-sized utility helicopters and about 400 personnel to 

fly them and maintain them. 

The missions in Chad and Congo also lack critical helicopter 

units to enable them quickly to deploy to areas where vulnerable 

civilians most need their help. 

And third, host governments often lack the security and rule of 

law capacities needed to take over successfully from U.N. peacekeepers when they leave. Let me flag one brief example. 

Liberia has made considerable progress during the last 6 years 

that UNMIL, the U.N. mission, has been on the ground. I saw this 

in May when I led a Security Council mission to Liberia. But Liberia’s army, police, justice system and prison systems are very weak. 

Poverty, unemployment and violent crime are high. Disputes over 

9

land and ethnicity persist. The country’s hard-won progress would 

unravel if peacekeepers leave too soon. 

So it will take concerted action by many actors to meet these difficult challenges facing U.N. peacekeeping. It will also take U.S. 

leadership in areas where we are uniquely able to provide it. The 

new administration is moving ahead swiftly on five particularly important fronts. 

First, we are working with our fellow Security Council members 

to provide credible and achievable mandates for U.N. operations, 

and we are working on a Presidential statement with our partners 

that would outline a better process for formulating peacekeeping 

mandates and measuring progress in their implementation. 

We have demonstrated our commitment to resist endorsing 

unachievable or ill-conceived mandates. For example, by opposing 

in the present circumstances the establishment of a U.N. peacekeeping mission in Somalia. Peacekeeping missions are not always 

the right answer. Some situations require other types of U.N. authorized military deployments such as regional efforts or multinational forces operating under the framework of a lead nation. 

And effective mediation needs to proceed and accompany all peacekeeping efforts if they are to succeed. 

Second, we are breathing new life into faltering peace processes 

where peacekeeping operations are currently deployed. Our objective is to get the parties in fragile peace talks to abide by their 

commitments, to cooperate with peacekeepers and build mutual 

trust. Our most immediate priorities in Africa are Darfur and Sudan’s North-South peace process, the Great Lakes region, and the 

Horn of Africa. 

Third, we will do more to help expand the pool of willing and capable troop and police contributors. Our immediate priority is to 

help secure the capabilities that the missions in Darfur, Chad and 

the Democratic Republic of Congo need to better protect civilians 

under eminent threat, but we are also pursuing more long-term efforts. 

Since 2005, the U.S. Global Peace Operations Initiative, or GPOI, 

and its African component, ACOTA, have focused on training the 

peacekeepers needed to meet the spike in global demand. And as 

of this month the program had trained more than 81,000 peacekeepers and helped deploy nearly 50,000 of them to peacekeeping 

operations around the world. 

We must also prime the pump to generate even more peacekeepers. Other countries willingness to provide troops and police is 

likely to increase if they see that key Security Council members, 

including the United States, not only value their sacrifice, but respect their concerns. The United States, for our part, is willing to 

consider directly contributing more military observers, military 

staff officers, civilian police and other civilian personnel, including 

more women I should note, to U.N. peacekeeping operations. We 

will also explore ways to provide additional enabling assistance to 

peacekeeping mission either by ourselves or together with partners. 

Fourth, we will help build up host governments’ security sectors 

and rule of law institutions as part of an overall peace-building 

strategy. Our immediate priorities in this regard are Haiti, Liberia, 

10

and the DRC; three places where such efforts could help let U.N. 

peacekeeping missions depart sooner. 

As a host government capacity grows, the role of a U.N. mission 

can be reduced, but we will not be rushed out of lasting results. 

We have made it abundantly clear to our Security Council partners 

that while we seek to lessen the peacekeeping load as appropriate, 

we will not support arbitrary or abrupt efforts to downsize or terminate missions. 

And finally, the United States will pursue a new generation of 

peacekeeping reforms from the U.N. Secretariat. We support reforms that help achieve economies of scale and realize cost savings; 

that strengthen oversight transparency and accountability; that improve field personnel and procurement systems; that strengthen 

the process of mission planning, reduced deployment, delays and 

encourage stronger mission leadership; and clarify the roles and responsibilities of all U.N. actors in the field and at headquarters. 

The administration is also encouraging reform efforts that elevate performance standards and prevent fraud and abuse, including sexual exploitation. The U.N. has taken several critical steps 

in recent years to establish and implement a zero tolerance policy 

for sexual exploitation and abuse by U.N. peacekeeping personnel, 

including establishing a well-publicized code of conduct and creating conduct and discipline units in the field to perform training, 

carry out initial investigations, and support victims. The administration strongly supports these measures and we will remain vigilant to ensure that they are implemented effectively. 

Chairman Berman, Ranking Member Ros-Lehtinen and distinguished members, I hope that this provides a helpful starting point 

for our discussions today. It is pragmatism and a clear sense of 

America’s interests that drives us to support U.N. peacekeeping, 

and it is also pragmatism and principle that drive us to pursue 

critical reforms in this important national security tool. We need 

peacekeeping missions that are planned well, deployed quickly, 

budgeted realistically, equipped seriously, led ably, and ended responsibly. 

I look forward to your questions, your good counsel, and your 

continued support as we work together to build a more secure 

America and a more peaceful world. It is a pleasure to be with you. 

Thank you, and I look forward to your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Ambassador Rice follows:]

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Chairman BERMAN. Well, thank you very much, Madam Ambassador, and I yield myself 5 minutes. 

You present both a compelling case for why peacekeeping is in 

so much of our interests as well as a recognition of serious problems and a strategy for addressing those problems. I wanted to ask 

you just a couple of questions. Three issues I want to raise with 

you, and then give you a chance to comment. 

First, the issue in these conflicts that the soldiers use of rape as 

a weapon of war in Bosnia, Rwanda, Darfur, Congo, we need a 

mechanism to hold the individuals accountable for their crimes. 

Have you any thoughts on the question of whether a U.N. Charter 

could be amended to hold member states responsible for prosecuting their nationals who commit criminal acts while serving in 

international peacekeeping operation? Or in the alternative, should 

there be an international mechanism, a military tribunal established for these kinds of cases? 

The other issue I would like you to address, you touched on an 

interesting point in pointing out some of the priorities, particularly 

in Africa, for the sustaining and strengthening of peacekeeping operations, and then mentioning that Somalia was a case where that 

wasn’t appropriate, and I am curious. Could you expand on that a 

little bit, the notion of where it makes sense and where it doesn’t, 

in your mind? So with my remaining 3 minutes. 

Ambassador RICE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Two very important issues you raise. Let me begin with the first, about accountability for sexual crimes and other abuses. I presume you mean to 

focus on peacekeeping, is that right? 

Chairman BERMAN. Well, I mean——

Ambassador RICE. Or do you mean criminals in war? 

Chairman BERMAN. Both. But let us start with the peacekeepers. 

Ambassador RICE. Okay. 

Chairman BERMAN. You touched on the peace——

Ambassador RICE. The answers would be quite different. 

Chairman BERMAN. Okay. 

Ambassador RICE. First of all, obviously, the United States, the 

administration, Congress, we are all deeply concerned about the 

prevalence of rape as a crime of war. It is not a new phenomenon. 

Unfortunately, it is as old as time, but it is particularly egregious 

and strikingly prevalent in places like the Democratic Republic of 

Congo, which I visited recently in May, and spoke with victims of 

sexual abuse and rape. It is prevalent in Congo, Liberia, Sudan 

and elsewhere. These situations need to be addressed in a very serious way when they are committed by combatants as well as by 

peacekeepers. 

It is important to note that while there have been some very unacceptable egregious instances of abuse by U.N. personnel, that is 

a very small fraction of the problem. The vast majority of peacekeepers, as Ms. Ros-Lehtinen pointed out, are responsible, principled, and are contributing to the protection of civilians, rather 

than the alternative. 

But where abuses occur by peacekeepers, there does need to be 

accountability which is why we have been so supportive of the 

U.N.’s zero tolerance policy, and its placement in the field of code 

26

of conduct teams that can investigate, train, and enable mission 

leaders to hold personnel accountable and remove them. 

The present circumstance, however, is that every national government, every troop contributing country is responsible ultimately 

for the prosecution and the disposition of its own troops in cases 

of crimes. That is, as you know, a privilege we jealously guard ourselves. So while I think it is certainly worth considering and exploring what additional international legal mechanisms might be 

available to ensure that when perpetrators are identified and convicted that they are in fact held accountable, we need to be realistic 

about what member states are prepared to allow their own personnel to be subjected to in the form of international justice. It is 

analogous to the debate that we are all familiar with in this country and elsewhere with respect to the International Criminal Court, 

which is a vehicle theoretically that might be appropriate in this 

instance. 

And so in talking about an amendment to the U.N. charter, we 

are talking about adoption by two-thirds of the member states of 

the General Assembly, and ratification by our own Senate. I think 

it is a high bar because if we were to sponsor it, we would have 

to be willing to subject ourselves to it. 

Chairman BERMAN. I take your point. My time has expired, and 

the 5 minutes is both—I would love to hear the answer to the Somalia issue, but I——

Ambassador RICE. I imagine somebody else will raise it and I 

will certainly address it specifically. 

Chairman BERMAN. All right. I am pleased to recognize Ms. RosLehtinen for 5 minutes. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you so much, Mr. Chairman. Thank 

you for your testimony, Ambassador Rice. 

The first question—although it does not relate to peacekeeping—

I would like to ask your views on the U.N. Human Rights Council 

and your plans for reforming this failed body. For example, a few 

months ago the council praised the Cuban tyranny’s human rights 

record, and it repeatedly condemns Israel. Its membership includes 

Cuba, Saudi Arabia, Russia, China. Over 80 percent of their country-specific condemnations target Israel while Zimbabwe, for example, escapes scrutiny because it has serial human rights abusers on 

the panel. 

On Haiti, I recently traveled to Haiti with some of my south 

Florida congressional colleagues—Congressman Meeks, Wasserman-Schultz, and Diaz-Balart—and we witnessed the important 

role played by the U.N. mission in Haiti. I strongly believe that the 

objectives and the success of the mission there are crucial to Haiti’s 

future as a stable democratic and prosperous nation, and this is 

what we hoped for Haiti. I also witnessed U.S. programs at work 

in Haiti. 

How is coordination going with the U.N. peacekeeping mission 

there to help ensure maximum impact and efficiency of our own efforts in Haiti, and how do you see the appointment of former President Clinton as facilitating this coordination and helping to 

strengthen Haiti’s capacity to help its own people, and again move 

into a new phase marked by growth and stability? 

27

And lastly, on Lebanon, there were repeated reports of UNIFIL 

engaging in anti-Israel, pro-Hezbollah behavior during Israel’s defensive war against Hezbollah in 2006. UNIFIL reportedly displayed Israeli troop movements on its Web site. Last year, UNIFIL 

soldiers saluted a passing convoy that was bedecked by Hezbollah 

flags and carried the coffin and picture of a Hezbollah militant. 

UNIFIL has essentially shrugged off criticism of this outrageous 

behavior. What will the administration do to enforce accountability 

regarding these incidents and weed out potential Hezbollah sympathizers from this UNIFIL force? 

Thank you, Madam Ambassador. 

Ambassador RICE. Thank you, Ranking Member Ros-Lehtinen. I 

will do my best in the 21⁄2 minutes that I have to deal with those 

three questions, but it is going to be a challenge. Let me begin first 

with the Human Rights Council, and forgive me if I start talking 

fast to try to be responsive. 

We made the decision that the United States would be better off 

inside the Human Rights Council fighting for what we believe in, 

playing an active role in trying to call attention to those countries 

in the world that are the most egregious human rights abusers, 

and standing up against and actively pushing back on the outrageous and ridiculous focus on Israel that has been the pattern in 

the Human Rights Council. 

We know very well that this is a body that has not lived up to 

its expectations, and that it is flawed. But we think the United 

States can best lead on human rights and democracy, which we 

care so deeply about, from within. We will play a very active and 

energetic role in focusing effort on those countries that deserve attention, and ensuring that there is balance and a reasonable approach to the issue of Israel. From inside, we will work on the universal periodic review mechanism, which is a good opportunity to 

deal with a number of countries we have a particular interest in, 

and we will be actively engaged in the review of the council in 2011 

to ensure that it is enhanced and improved. 

With respect to Haiti——

Chairman BERMAN. I am going to ask unanimous consent that 

the gentlelady have 1 additional minute just to finish. 

Ambassador RICE. Thank you. Does that mean I can talk a little 

less fast? 

Chairman BERMAN. No, fast is good, but you have a lot to cover 

here. 

Ambassador RICE. Okay. I, too, had the privilege of visiting Haiti 

in recent months. I was with the Security Council delegation there 

in March, and in my judgment, this is a mission that is performing 

well and has done a tremendous job of helping to bring stability 

and security to parts of the country, particularly the slums of Portau-Prince that were completely lawless, and creating the space for 

the police to be trained to take over a critical role in Haiti’s security. This is a mission that is, in my judgment, on track, and well 

led with good coordination among its civilian police and military 

elements. I was pleased to see American police officers serving with 

distinction and finding their work to be a very worthwhile contribution. 

28

With respect to President Clinton, I think that Haiti and indeed 

the United Nations and the United States are blessed to have 

somebody of his commitment and stature actively engaged in supporting Haiti. He will, among other things, help with Haiti’s economic development and bring attention, and I hope investors and 

resources, to Haiti at this critical point. Getting Haiti on its feet 

economically and reducing poverty is a critical element of success, 

as you well know. 

With respect to Lebanon, I share your concerns about the incidents that you have raised. We clearly have cause for even greater 

concern in recent days with the explosion of the arms cache which 

we believe to have been in violation of 1701, likely sponsored by 

Hezbollah. We think that there is reason for continued vigilance 

and scrutiny not only with respect to violations of 1701 and the 

arms embargo, and we will do that and continue to do that, but we 

will also ensure that UNIFIL and its troop contributors act in a 

fashion consistent with their mandate and their purpose. 

Many of these troop contributors, as you know, are some of our 

closest allies and partners. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you. 

Chairman BERMAN. The time of the gentlelady has expired. The 

chairman of the Africa and Global Health Subcommittee, Mr. 

Payne, is recognized for 5 minutes. 

Mr. PAYNE. Thank you very much, and let me welcome you, Dr. 

Rice, and I am so pleased that you have been appointed to your position. Your background as assistant secretary and national security at Brookings Institute really prepared you well for the position, 

and from what I have gotten from other member states your presence there has changed the image of the U.S., and I really appreciate that. Let me also commend you for the work you did on 

Human Rights Commission to insert the United States again in. 

We know that there is still a lot of work to be done, but it is far 

from where it used to be, and the fact that you had the courage 

to present United States in the election, which is won maybe 97 

percent of available votes show that your judgment was right. 

I certainly also appreciate the work you did on making the Durban Conference, you know, less stringent. I certainly believe we 

should have participated, but I think that your work there made 

the conference better. My position is, we know what Ahmadinejad 

is going to say. He says it every year. I think if someone is there 

to refute what he says makes more sense than no one there to answer it; or if you dare, you walk out. We confront in my city in my 

town where I grew up, we sit eye to eye with our enemy, and we 

do battle. We do not become invisible. 

Let me just ask a quick question, two quick ones. One, some 

countries say that they are unable to have troops because of the 

wet lease issue where in many instances the troops are not fully 

prepared with equipment and so forth. Is the U.N. looking at how 

you can assist countries that are willing to provide troops but do 

not have the equipment and uniforms or other things to provide? 

Secondly, as relates to Somalia, as you know that is probably one 

of the most important countries right now. If Somalia is lost to extremists, it will be a disaster for the Horn, and therefore what can, 

number one, AU has the current mandate and their mandate is not 

29

Chapter 7, so their troops cannot even fight back under the AU, is 

there any consideration to attempt to change the mandate for AU 

to U.N., and that there could be ample forces put in place because 

it is so key, and I think that with help from the U.N. that Sheikh 

Sharif Sheikh Ahmed’s troops if given the proper training will be 

able to defend themselves and defend Mogadishu and the general 

Somalia area, but they need help as Sheikh Sharif told me in my 

recent trip to Mogadishu. 

The hijackers have money because they get it from the shipping 

industry, and that whole group. The al-Shabob and Hezbollah, 

Islam—yes, Islam Balad—have funds from al-Qaeda, the government lacks the funds that they need, and so the enemies have the 

funds, but the government lacks it. 

So, is there any way that we can move that forward, and finally, 

will the mission in Haiti remain, and do you see development going 

with the new emphasis that the U.N. has with President Clinton 

being there so that development in some way can expand in Haiti? 

Ambassador RICE. Thank you, Mr. Payne, and thank you for your 

kind comments about my service and for your long friendship and 

support on these very critical issues. I will try my best. 

Troop contributors lack of equipment is, as you know, a perennial 

challenge, particularly as we are searching for more and more 

troops and needing to look in different locations to find them. The 

U.N. has turned often to countries that have the will to contribute 

but may not have the resources, and they have sourced equipment 

externally to provide to such troop contingents. The United States 

has supported in certain instances, including in Darfur, the equipping of contingents so that they could deploy with what they need. 

It remains a challenge. It is far from perfect, but there are efforts 

to match troops with equipment packages so that they can be functional. 

I would like to come back to Somalia. Let me address Haiti 

quickly and say yes, I think the mission should stay there for some 

time, through at least the upcoming elections. I am hopeful that 

President Clinton’s leadership will be very constructive with respect to accelerating Haiti’s development. 

Chairman BERMAN. Just to balance it out, 1 additional minute, 

and then from now on remember questions/answers all in 5 minutes so we might have to limit our questions in order to hear answers. 

Mr. PAYNE. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I was going 

to ask about Cote d’Ivoire if you have a second too. 

Ambassador RICE. Whoa. Okay. [Laughter.] 

Let me treat Somalia if I might because the chairman also asked 

about it, and I wasn’t able to touch on it. 

We are very concerned, obviously, about the situation in Somalia. 

We have an enormous stake in the survival of the transitional Federal Government, and in the defeat of al-Shabaab, and other extremist groups that are affiliated with al-Qaeda and are gravely 

imperiling the transitional Federal Government. That is why the 

United States has provided 80 tons of military equipment, including ammunition, to support the TFG; that is why we have been the 

principal supporter of AMISOM in funding its logistic support 

package. 

30

AMISOM is playing a very important role even within the 

bounds of its mandate. It is helping to defend the TFG and we 

think that is vitally important. 

With respect to whether it is a circumstance ripe for U.N. peacekeeping, we think it is a circumstance where we need a credible security support for the government. AMISOM has committed to play 

that role. We think it is the best approach at present because there 

is a history in Somalia, as you will recall, with the United Nations 

which isn’t entirely a happy one, to put it mildly. 

There is a tradition of really violent opposition to outsiders of all 

sorts. AMISOM has succeeded to a substantial extent in being accepted by the population, particularly in Mogadishu. It has engaged in medical outreach and support, provision of services to the 

population. It is not viewed with the same skepticism and hostility 

that the U.N. might be. Additionally, we have just discussed the 

problem of giving the U.N. mandates that it cannot fulfill. This is 

a case where even AMISOM is not staffed at its full complement. 

So, to hand AMISOM over to the U.N. with the current deficit, as 

well as the gaps between the authorized strength and the actual 

troops available in Darfur and Congo would only be to exacerbate 

the problem. 

Chairman BERMAN. The time of the gentleman has expired. Now 

back to the 5-minute rule, Mr. Smith. 

Mr. SMITH. Just in time for me. 

Ambassador Rice, thank you for your testimony and for your 

leadership. Let me just say at the outset, Mr. Chairman, for the 

entirety of my 29 years in the House my support for U.N. peacekeeping has been strong and consistent, but not unqualified. Peacekeepers must always be on the side of protection, not some of the 

time but all of the time. So in my very limited time let me ask you 

to address two of my ongoing concerns, first on the issue of mandates. 

Ambassador Williamson makes some 14 incisive observations 

that I agree with him on each and every one of them, including especially the issue of mandates or rules of engagement. I will never 

forget, because I was very active in the Balkans, went over there 

many times during the Balkans War, was in Vukovar just before 

it fell, and the shame of Srebrenica where some 8,000 Bosniacs 

were slaughtered, and I have been back to Srebrenica several times 

since, in the so-called safe haven. Hopefully there were lessons 

learned with regards to UNPROFOR’s mandate which was very, 

very ineffective. 

I will never forget on a trip to Darfur meeting with a Major 

Ajumbo who was with the AU, he was also in the Balkans, and he 

said our rules of engagements here are very similar in terms of 

protection as they were in the Balkans. 

Now, we know the mandate or the rule of engagement has been 

changed. My hope is, and I would ask you to comment on this, 

whether or not in real terms it will really be all about protection. 

Secondly, on the issue of the Congo, the DR Congo, and the 

abuse of children especially by peacekeepers, held three hearings 

on this outrageous behavior. Jane Holl Lute, who is now back in 

the administration, was the U.N. Assistant Secretary General for 

mission support, she was outraged as were others in the U.N. She 

31

said the blue helmets have become black and blue through self-inflicted wounds in some of our number, and we will not sit idly by 

until the blue helmet is restored. 

Many good things were put into effect. Prince Zeid’s recommendations have been followed, but only to some extent. The 

database, to the best of my knowledge, is not U.N.-wide, and 

maybe you want to comment on that. But my concern that I had, 

I visited Goma in 2008, and was shocked to learn that the 

UNOIOS, the U.N. Office of Internal Oversight Service had been 

redeployed out of Goma. Just today the general who operates the 

MONUC said that he is concerned that there are several cases of 

exploitation that have gone undetected, particularly in the remote 

areas, and I was told by the OIOS leadership in Goma right before 

they were redeployed out of the area, how can you investigate 

when you are not there, you know, in proximity to where the 

abuses are taking place. 

So my question would be is there an effort to get OIOS back to 

Goma? Are they back? I have been unable to discover whether or 

not they are back. And what can we do to really make zero tolerance stick? 

At our hearings we kept hearing from—particularly the private 

witnesses—zero tolerance has really meant zero compliance, which 

I think is a bit of a hyperbole, but it does raise some serious questions about the seriousness that this is being combatted. 

Ambassador RICE. Thank you, Mr. Smith, and let me also thank 

you for your deep and longstanding concern about this whole panoply of issues. It is a concern that we share, and indeed the theme 

of your questions comes back to civilian protection, including that 

which is being perpetrated in the worst instances, rare but severe, 

by United Nations personnel, and you referenced both Darfur and 

Congo. Whether children or women, I think it is all, in effect, the 

same question. 

So, let me say this. In both Darfur and Congo mandates have 

been strengthened to focus very directly and specifically on the 

challenge of civilian protection, and this is—particularly in the case 

of Congo—the principal focus of MONUC now. I was there in May, 

and I saw some of the specific steps that the U.N. is taking to deal 

with this problem. In the Congo, as you know, the bulk of the violence is being perpetrated by the FDLR, the LRA, some renegade 

elements of the FARDC, the Congolese forces. What MONUC is 

doing is creating joint civilian/military protection teams which are 

rapid response capable, so that in many areas of the Kivus they 

can reach civilians at risk within 7 minutes, which is a huge improvement over the past. So there is an improved civilian protection response capability that I was, frankly, surprised by and impressed by in parts of north Kivus. That is progress. 

With respect to zero tolerance and making that real on the 

ground, the U.N. has put investigative teams in place. I will check 

into your specific question of OIOS and get back to you, but the 

broad story is that there are real efforts underway to have the U.N. 

investigate itself and hold itself accountable. I am confident that 

this will yield improved results. 

[The information referred to follows:]

32

WRITTEN RESPONSE RECEIVED FROM THE HONORABLE SUSAN E. RICE, U.S. PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE TO THE UNITED NATIONS, TO QUESTION ASKED DURING THE

HEARING BY THE HONORABLE CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH

The Administration believes that UN peacekeepers must be held to the highest 

standard of conduct, and that they should be held accountable if they abuse the people they are there to protect. In order to promote the UN’s zero-tolerance policy, the 

UN has deployed Conduct and Discipline Units (CDU) in each mission to provide 

training for new arrivals on the UN’s code of conduct and disciplinary procedures. 

The CDUs publicize the code and reporting procedures, so that members of the public can report allegations of abuse. They review allegations and evidence, refer cases 

of minor misconduct to supervisors, and refer serious allegations to OIOS for criminal investigation. CDU-handled cases include consensual relationships (if there is 

a ‘‘no fraternization’’ policy), violations of ‘‘out of bounds’’ regulations, and consorting 

with prostitutes. 

The UN’s Office of Internal Oversight Services (OIOS) investigates allegations of 

serious offenses of all kinds, including sexual exploitation and abuse, fraud, serious 

misconduct, and other potentially criminal acts, and responds to requests for support from UN agencies as well as from UN peacekeeping operations. OIOS currently 

has three permanent positions in the UN Organization Mission in the Democratic 

Republic of Congo (MONUC): two investigators—one in Goma and one in 

Kinshasa—and one support staff member. In addition, there are 15 OIOS investigators assigned to the regional hub in Nairobi currently operating on a pilot basis. Investigators are able to deploy to Goma from Nairobi more quickly than they can 

from Kinshasa. 

OIOS has proposed moving its investigators to regional hubs, both to reduce costs 

and to speed deployment of investigators as needed to field missions. This approach 

is also designed to give OIOS greater flexibility in positioning investigators in relation to the volume and complexity of their caseload. In addition, OIOS believes that 

having a more centralized system improves recruitment of more qualified investigators, allows expertise and best practices to be developed and shared, and increases 

efficiencies by shared services and availability. OIOS also believes that posting investigators regionally rather than in missions helps to preserve objectivity. 

Rather than approving the proposal outright, the United States chose to support 

the pilot project in order to see how the regional hub system works in practice. We 

considered this approach prudent and will review results during the next round of 

budget discussions. Meanwhile, we are monitoring the situation closely. 

OIOS is currently investigating 31 allegations of sexual exploitation and abuse involving MONUC peacekeepers, including civilian, military and police personnel. 

Since these investigations are ongoing, OIOS cannot provide information on the severity or nature of the allegations.

Chairman BERMAN. The time of the gentleman has expired. The 

gentlelady from California, Ms. Woolsey, is recognized for 5 minutes. 

Ms. WOOLSEY. Thank you very much, and what an honor to be 

with you, Ambassador Rice. 

I am going to change the subject just a little bit it is about the 

U.N. For a long time I have been a supporter of moving from military peacekeeping to what I call ‘‘Smart Power,’’ and I believe that 

fits right in with President Obama and Secretary Clinton’s missions as well; a smart security platform where we move from the 

military into diplomacy and economic support, and health care, and 

alternatives to a military mission. 

So, I am going to segue that into something that I think is smart 

power, and I question why the United States doesn’t ratify the conventions, the U.N. conventions that we are becoming a very—a 

part of a very small group of holdouts in not ratifying the rights 

of the child, the discrimination against women, CEDAW and the 

Kyoto Convention on climate change, and I am not sure, did they 

sign the U.N. CRPD, the disabilities this week? The President 

signed it on Friday night in the White House. 

Ambassador RICE. He instructed me to sign it later this week. 

33

Ms. WOOLSEY. All right. 

Ambassador RICE. Yes, we will be signing. 

Ms. WOOLSEY. All right. Well, you are setting a precedent, but 

could you tell me what is going on with—I mean, I can tell you that 

I have introduced CEDAW in the House because it is not ours, it 

is a Senate, but asking the Senate to do their part so that it could 

be ratified, and I have done this every Congress since 1993, and 

we have 123 co-sponsors on it this year alone. I mean, we want it 

ratified along with these other conventions. So my question is do 

you know what is happening with all of them? 

Ambassador RICE. Thank you very much. We share your commitment to effective employment of smart power, and also your belief 

that in a number of instances these treaties, particularly those 

which are critical to the respective human rights, advance our ability not only to protect and promote human rights internationally, 

but enhance our smart power. Let me treat the three treaties that 

you raised with specificity. 

As I just mentioned, and as you can imagine, the administration 

is going through a process, as we get our personnel in place, of reviewing a number of treaties that have not been ratified, some not 

signed, and some signed but not submitted for ratification. This is 

a lengthy legal process but we are pursuing it expeditiously. The 

first one to emerge from that review process has been the disabilities convention. As you mentioned, on Friday the President announced our commitment to sign it. I will sign it tomorrow in New 

York, and we will look forward to Senate action on it. 

Ms. WOOLSEY. Congratulations. 

Ambassador RICE. With respect to the CEDAW, as Secretary 

Clinton has said, as I have said, and others, this is an important 

treaty that the administration wants to see ratified, and ratified 

swiftly. I think we have strong champions of that in the Senate. 

I do not know when exactly it might be able to be considered, but 

we have certainly indicated informally, and we will ultimately do 

so formally, that this is an important priority for the administration. 

The Convention on the Rights of the Child as you know was 

signed by the Clinton administration in 1995; 193 countries have 

ratified it. The United States and Somalia are the two countries 

that have not ratified it. It is a complicated treaty and we will have 

to consider whether we can adapt it to our very complex state and 

local laws. We are in the process, or we will soon launch a process 

I should say, of reviewing that treaty and considering whether or 

not we can craft a complex set of reservations that meet our concerns, and then make a decision on how to pursue that particular 

convention. Thank you. 

Ms. WOOLSEY. Thank you very much. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman BERMAN. Thank you, and Mr. Smith tells me he 

thinks it was President Bush who signed the Convention on the 

Rights of the Child. 

Ambassador RICE. Well, I will certainly check. 

Mr. SMITH. Will the gentleman yield? 

Ambassador RICE. It was 1995. 

Chairman BERMAN. The gentleman from California, Mr. Royce. 

Mr. ROYCE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

34

Ambassador Rice, good to see you again. It was nice to see you 

in New York, and I appreciate very much the working relationship 

we have had on issues regarding Africa in your previous positions. 

I was going to ask you about Eritrea, the concern there, expressed to me by different ambassadors from sub-Saharan Africa 

now that the AU has gone on record with kind of an unprecedented 

step of asking for sanctions on Eritrea because they are training 

these jihadists that end up killing African Union troops in Somalia. 

They would like to know what we could do—maybe up in New 

York—regarding this new problem, or old probably actually, but 

one which has taken on an increasing toll. 

Ambassador RICE. Thank you, Mr. Royce, and thank you for your 

kind words. I certainly have been grateful for our cooperation over 

the years, and I, too, enjoyed our time together in New York. 

I am glad you raise the issue of Eritrea because it is a timely 

and topical issue in our deliberations in New York. We have considered Eritrea twice in the last month in the Security Council, both 

in the context of Somalia and Djibouti, and I will share here and 

repeat essentially what I said in New York. The United States is 

deeply concerned and very frustrated with Eritrea’s behavior in Somalia where it is arming, supporting, funding al-Shabaab and 

other extremist elements, and undermining the security of the 

transitional Federal Government which, as I mentioned earlier, is 

important to our national security. Eritrea is taking steps at destabilizing Somalia and the region, which has a direct impact on our 

security and that of others. It is unacceptable, and we will not tolerate it, nor will other members of the Security Council. We take 

note that the EGAD and African Union called for sanctions. This 

is indeed, as you point out, highly unusual. We will continue to discuss with colleagues in the Security Council appropriate measures, 

including potentially sanctions, against Eritrea for its actions in 

Somalia. 

There is another issue, however: Djibouti. The Security Council 

passed a resolution following Eritrea’s incursion into Djibouti and 

the killing of 40 Djiboutian soldiers in a border incident last year. 

The council demanded that Eritrea acknowledge this dispute and 

act to resolve it. Djibouti has upheld its obligations. Eritrea has 

not. It has essentially stiffed and stonewalled the U.N. and others 

on this. 

The United States and the new administration had hoped, and 

continues to hope, that there may be a window for improved relations with Eritrea; that Eritrea will step back from its destabilizing 

activities in Somalia and the broader region, and return to a more 

constructive role. 

We have tried to convey that message very directly to the Government of Eritrea and they seem not to be particularly receptive 

to hearing it from us or others. As I said in New York, there is a 

very short window for Eritrea to signal through its actions that it 

wishes a better relationship with the United States, and indeed the 

wider international community. If we do not see signs of that signal in short order, I can assure you that we will be taking appropriate steps with partners in Africa and the Security Council to 

take cognizance of Eritrea’s actions both in Somalia and in the 

wider region. 

35

Mr. ROYCE. Thank you, Ambassador Rice. 

One step we could take would be to put Eritrea back—put them 

on the list of state sponsors of terrorism, but let me go to another 

issue. 

The issue in Cyprus, it seems that the Greek Cypriots, Turkey 

Cypriots probably would work out a resolution of some type, but 

there are 40,000 Turkish soldiers on the island, and it would seem 

to me that if the United States could persuade Turkey that this 

standing army is not needed for any legitimate security purpose, 

and to draw that force down, it could go a long way in terms of 

reconciling and creating an atmosphere on the Island of Cyprus 

that would be conducive to harmony. I wanted to get in on that. 

Chairman BERMAN. I stand totally behind the gentleman’s question. I think it is very important, and there is no time to answer 

it now. 

Ambassador RICE. I would be happy to talk off-line about that. 

Chairman BERMAN. The gentlelady from Texas, Ms. Sheila Jackson Lee is recognized for 5 minutes. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Madam Ambassador, thank you so very much 

for your presence here today and for the longstanding friendship, 

and the mileage that you bring to the ambassadorship and the mission in the United Nations. Might I take a moment of personal 

privilege to acknowledge the very distinguished brother that you 

have as well, that we are excited about the efforts that he is making for our country. 

Ambassador RICE. Thank you. I am very proud of my brother. 

Thank you so much. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. And your whole family. I don’t want to leave 

anyone out, but I very much appreciate his leadership. 

You mentioned some important issues. First of all, I want to 

thank my colleague and friend, the chairman, Chairman Berman 

and the ranking member, and also my friend Congressman 

Delahunt and his subcommittee, which I am on, that really laid the 

groundwork for saying what is the cost of not doing peacekeeping, 

and that is where I would like to focus my line of questioning, and 

just take, for example, your words about U.N. peacekeeping allows 

us to share the burden of creating a more peaceful and secure 

world. I think America needs to focus on that a little bit more as 

we relate to what the United Nations actually does. 

And then there is a point that you made, maybe you were not 

able to elaborate on, that the issue—I will keep looking at it as I 

try to ask—the difficulty of doing peacekeeping. So let me try to 

focus my questions on the cost and give you these three issues. 

Haiti, what progress have we made, and how is the envoy, President Clinton doing as it relates to Haiti? 

With respect to Sudan, I met with the African Union before the 

peacekeeping status was set up, and I know that it was slow in 

moving, and I am interested in how the peacekeeping processes in 

Sudan as we talk about the comprehensive peace agreement and 

certain that we have an envoy there. 

I also believe it is important that we look at questions dealing 

with peacekeepers, and I would be interested in the work that the 

United Nations is taking to establish and implement a zero tolerVerDate 0ct 09 2002 08:38 Nov 24, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00039 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 F:\WORK\FULL\072909\51656 HFA PsN: SHIRL
36

ance policy for sexual exploitation and abuse by U.N. peacekeeping 

personnel. 

I would appreciate a brief on that issue, particularly as sometimes they are noted as transmitting STDs and how we are handling that. If I might yield to you for those questions. 

Ambassador RICE. Thank you very much, Ms. Jackson Lee, for 

those questions. Let me try as best I can in the time we have to 

cover as much ground as I might. 

You asked about the cost of not supporting U.N. peacekeeping, 

and I think that is a very important issue. It is one I touched upon 

in my testimony. 

The U.N. currently is in 15 different conflict areas around the 

world and I think it is fair to say that if the U.N. were not present 

in many of those zones, the conflicts would continue to rage on; 

fragile peace processes would collapse; elections would not be held 

in places as critical as the Democratic Republic of Congo, or Liberia, or Haiti; and we would, as would other members of the international community, face the consequences of conflict because as 

we know, conflict zones not only cost the lives, the precious lives 

of innocents, it impedes development, it spills over and can infect 

an entire region, and we saw that in Liberia, we saw that in the 

Great Lakes region. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. So it is not just a cheap way of doing it, it 

is actually impacting saving lives and the United States involvement in conflicts around the world overspilling. 

Ambassador RICE. It is saving lives and it is preventing conflict 

zones from being exploited as they often are by extremists and 

criminals, where they can also often become breeding zones for disease and other transnational security threats that can affect America’s security. We cannot as the United States be involved in every 

one of those conflict zones and be the peacekeepers ourselves. But 

through the United Nations where we have a 93,000 military and 

police personnel from 118 other countries doing that work, we contribute 93 military and police personnel to U.N. operations. The 

rest of the world is doing the bulk of this important work without 

which our security would be negatively impacted. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. How are we doing in Sudan in the sexual exploitation? My time, I just don’t want to miss getting your great 

answers on that, Sudan and the sexual exploitation? 

Ambassador RICE. I spoke earlier about sexual exploitation and 

zero tolerance. I also spoke about Haiti. With respect to zero tolerance, the U.N. has taken important steps to implement this policy 

on the ground in critical places like Congo and Sudan. We continue 

to be dismayed by the fact that cases of abuse occasionally still do 

arise, but the steps that the U.N. has taken to investigate, prevent, 

and hold accountable those who have committed crimes. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Thank you. 

Ambassador RICE. On Sudan, that is a bigger and longer question, but let me say this: The United States is deeply committed 

to two critical things in Sudan. One is effective implementation of 

the North-South Peace Agreement, the CPA, and the other is saving lives and ending the suffering in Darfur. The President has 

placed top priority on this issue. He has appointed General Scott 

Gration as his special envoy to work actively on both of those 

37

issues. We are committed to doing our utmost to achieve success 

in both regards. Thank you. 

Chairman BERMAN. The time of the gentlelady has expired. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Thank you very much for your leadership. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman BERMAN. And I might remind the committee that at 

2:30 the committee will be having a private briefing with General 

Gration regarding Sudan, and I invite all members to come. 

The gentleman from Florida, Mr. Klein is recognized for 5 minutes. 

Mr. KLEIN. Thank you, thank you, Mr. Chairman, and Madam 

Ambassador. I am all the way over here to the far left. [Laughter.] 

Chairman BERMAN. So to speak. 

Mr. KLEIN. Figuratively and physically. 

Thank you for being here. Congratulations on your appointment. 

Ambassador RICE. Thank you. 

Mr. KLEIN. The ranking member discussed this briefly, talking 

about UNIFIL and the mandate, and obviously the fact that it is 

coming up and there is concerns over the last number of weeks 

based on the munitions depot in south Lebanon, and the fact that 

UNIFIL soldiers attempted to investigate this incident. A mob of 

civilians attacked the soldiers who, at least from the observations 

we have, instead of confronting the mob abandoned the investigation and the responsibilities, it is our understanding, and additionally reported that Lebanese civilians crossed the blue line to plant 

Hezbollah flags at a makeshift observation point several years into 

Israel. 

The concerns we have had for the last number of months and for 

a period now is that UNIFIL is not fulfilling what we believe is 

necessary to keep things in check there, and although the rockets 

haven’t been coming, there has been a massive re-arming of that 

area, and I had the chance to travel to Lebanon a number of 

months ago in a bipartisan group. We spoke to the Lebanese Government about it and expressed our significant concern, and for all 

practical purposes we did not get a response that we believe was 

forthcoming. 

We want to work with Lebanon, and we appreciate the fact that 

the Lebanese people had a very—expressed themselves politically 

in a way that I think would be consistent with our beliefs, but the 

specific question I have for you is what can we do to strengthen 

this mandate that UNIFIL has to really take on and fulfill the 

U.N. resolutions? 

Ambassador RICE. Thank you, Mr. Klein. I think you posed the 

question precisely and correctly because, as you know, UNIFIL is 

currently limited to a Chapter 6 mandate. Others can provide the 

history better than I, as this mandate was passed and updated 

prior to my tenure. But it was a contentious discussion and debate, 

and there were those who didn’t want to give UNIFIL the enhanced capacity that it has today. The strengthening of the mandate is an interest that I understand many good people on the Hill 

share. We certainly are sympathetic to it, but I don’t think as a 

practical matter that we will be able to muster the support in the 

Security Council that would be necessary to substantially strengthen the mandate. 

38

So, we are dealing with a Chapter 6 operation that has about 

12,000 personnel. Many are contributed by some of our most important allies in Europe. We, frankly, think that all of the problems 

you have described and that others have described notwithstanding, on balance the role that UNIFIL is playing adds value 

rather than the opposite, even as we wish it would be able to do 

more. 

UNIFIL is, in fact, taking active steps to visibly mark the blue 

line; 40 points along the blue line have been agreed by the parties; 

17 markers have been installed; eight are under construction. It is 

investigating where it can, consistent with its mandate, violations 

of 1701, including arms flows. It did not succeed in investigating 

the arms cache that exploded on the 14th of July, not because it 

lacked the will but because it lacked the mandate to repel with 

force the——

Mr. KLEIN. I guess what I would ask you though, and I appreciate your explanation, you know, sometimes there is a role that—

it has ‘‘a legitimate role’’ there, that has been established. But I 

think many of us think that the role of legitimacy, if in fact it is 

limited in its capacity, sometimes provide cover for what is actually 

going on there. Again, we are happy that nothing is—there are no 

attacks on Israel right now, but I mean, I think it is a ticking time 

bomb just waiting to happen, and you know, whether UNIFIL is 

playing a role, I hear you. We may not be able to go any farther 

with it, but you know, are you satisfied with just continuing this 

on indefinitely and saying that——

Ambassador RICE. I don’t think anybody could say they are satisfied with UNIFIL in its current capacity, but I think we support 

it because its presence contributes, on balance. It is better than the 

alternative. Were there no UNIFIL there would be no ability to demarcate the blue line to investigate these abuses, nor to provide 

some eyes and ears on what is transpiring in this very, very sensitive zone. 

Mr. KLEIN. The only other thing I would like to add on a separate note is Durban, and I do want to express my appreciation. I 

know this country did try to work through and change what was 

prepared for the Durban conference. I appreciate the approach we 

did take, and I appreciate the fact that we did not participate, and 

I do appreciate the fact that we are trying in a constructive way 

through the Human Rights Council to change the dynamic there as 

well. 

Chairman BERMAN. The time of the gentleman has expired. The 

gentleman from Massachusetts, Mr. Delahunt is recognized for 5 

minutes. 

Mr. DELAHUNT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Ambassador Rice, as I look at the challenges that are facing the 

United Nations in terms of peacekeeping, the one that I think that 

is most striking is the issue of timeliness of response, and I know 

that you are familiar with the statistics. You know, it is 15 percent 

of a force is on the average deployed within 90 days, and again 

looking at the averages, it is 14 months or 13 months, I guess, before a force is fully deployed, and it is like just about everything 

in life. Early intervention is the key to success, and the idea of 

39

rapid deployment I know is a concern to you, and a concern to the 

administration. 

What ideas are out there at this point in time in terms of accelerating the response, the crises which if allowed to fester over time 

really change the facts on the ground, and most often in a negative 

fashion, making the challenge even more serious and that much 

more difficult to address? 

Ambassador RICE. Thank you, Mr. Delahunt. You absolutely put 

your finger on what is a critical and frankly growing challenge over 

the course of the last decade for the United Nations. 

There was a time in the 1990s, even as there was a fair demand 

on peacekeepers, that the rate of full deployment was substantially 

swifter than it is today. In large part this is a function of the fact 

that we are at a level and complexity of deployment of U.N. missions that has never been seen before. There are 93,000 uniformed 

personnel, as you know, across 15 missions, and even within some 

of those missions, notably Darfur and Congo, are not yet at authorized strength. 

The reality is there is a gap between supply and demand. We are 

doing what we can to help increase supply and be more rational 

on the demand side. But we believe we need those additional troops 

in Darfur and in Congo. They are roughly 6,000 troops short when 

you add those two together. There is about 4,000 short even though 

it is not a U.N. mission for AMISOM in Somalia. 

We, the international community, including the peacekeeping, 

need to increase the supply of available well-trained, well-equipped 

forces, and we need to be more rational as we put increased demands on the United Nations. 

Secondly, the United Nations’ Secretariat is looking at means to 

speed the dispatch of those who are available to go. We often have 

trouble with airlift, and with contracting procedures that we, the 

United States, have insisted be very, very rigorous for good reason 

with respect to accountability and transparency. Yet the current 

procurement process and the contracting procedures impede rapid 

deployment. 

So we are looking at ways that we can help the United Nations 

speed deployment as was done under the previous administration 

in Darfur, and as we assisted in Somalia and other places getting 

the AU in there. We are also working with the U.N. as it is working on its own new horizons initiative for ways it can streamline 

and expedite the procurement process. 

Mr. DELAHUNT. Might there be a role for a small increase in the 

number of U.S. military given the expertise and the professionalism of the U.S. military forces to accelerate a quick response, 

particularly in a crisis that does not require substantial amounts 

of military personnel? 

Ambassador RICE. I want to be sure I am understanding your 

question. We have contributed, as you know, through airlift. 

Mr. DELAHUNT. Right. 

Ambassador RICE. Through training to enable——

Mr. DELAHUNT. I guess what I am talking about is a leadership 

cadre of American military officers to coordinate and to assist in 

the effort to accelerate that response. 

40

Ambassador RICE. I think it is an interesting idea and I would 

certainly be interested in exploring it further with you. As I said 

in my testimony, we are willing to consider the contribution of additional military observers, staff officers and the like that could 

support strengthening these missions. 

Chairman BERMAN. The time of the gentleman has expired. The 

gentlelady from California, Ms. Barbara Lee. Ms. Lee. 

Ms. LEE. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Welcome, Ambassador Rice. Let me just also congratulate you, and just say how 

excited we are that you are at the United Nations. We are confident of your abilities to represent the United States. I mean, you 

have demonstrated already your brilliance, and also your commitment to the fundamental principles of cooperation and human 

rights. 

Ambassador RICE. Thank you. 

Ms. LEE. And so it is really wonderful to see you. 

Let me just take a moment and associate myself with the remarks of Chairman Don Payne as it relates to the conference on 

racism, and I do appreciate your hanging in there and working to 

try to make sure that the document was one that the United States 

could support. Unfortunately, that did not happen. 

Let me also just for the record say that I know, and Chairman 

Berman was very helpful in this, that we wanted that conference 

on racism to be just exactly what it was about, racism, and in fact 

we worked to make sure that the document was 99.9 percent what 

the United States wanted, and that 0.1 percent, unfortunately, was 

not, and that determined our lack of participation, and I am, unlike 

Mr. Klein, as a minority and many members of the Congressional 

Black Caucus feel this way, we were very disappointed that we did 

not have a voice, a United States voice at that conference. 

So I hope as we move forward we will figure out ways to be able 

to participate formally in that conference because who better, what 

country has had the experience of dealing with racial discrimination and racism, and have come so far and can lead on this, but 

yet have many issues that we need to address in an international 

forum. So I am very sorry that we did not participate, and hopefully we will be able to figure this out next time. 

Let me ask you about the appropriations for the United Nations 

and how it impacts the arrears issue, how it impacts peacekeeping 

operations. Now, it is my understanding that in the Foreign Ops 

bill which recently passed we provided $2.1 billion, which is about 

$135 million below the President’s request, and $263 million below 

2009 for our contributions to international peacekeeping activities. 

And given the increasing demands, I want to make sure that we 

have adequate resources to meet the growing peacekeeping needs 

around the globe. 

Also I want to find out how you are attempting to reverse the 

trend of United States arrears to the United Nations. I mean, what 

do we need to do here in Congress? Are we addressing benchmarks? What do we need to do? What do we need to know? And 

also, what impact has the United States arrears had on the growing peacekeeping missions and their ability to address the severe 

strain of the missions around the globe? And finally, if you could 

just quickly just make a distinction between peacekeeping and 

41

peacemaking, and what mandates of the United Nations authorize 

peacekeeping versus peacemaking? 

Thank you very much, and again good to see you. 

Ambassador RICE. Thank you so much, and thank you for your 

kind words and for your leadership on so many of these issues. Let 

me turn swiftly to the arrears question since we have very little 

time left. 

It is complicated and I can give you more specifics and backup, 

but the short version is that given what Congress appropriated for 

fiscal 2009 as well as in the Iraq and other war supplemental, and 

assuming, as we hope, that Congress will fully fund the President’s 

2010 request, we will be in good shape to meet our obligations with 

respect to our peacekeeping commitments and our regular budget 

obligations. We will also have eliminated significant arrears on the 

peacekeeping side accrued between 2005 and 2008, where there 

was a gap between what Congress appropriated and what we were 

assessed called cap-related arrears, and the funding in the 2009 

supplemental bill will enable us to pay back those arrears, and that 

accounts for the vast bulk of our outstanding peacekeeping arrears 

that the United States is committed to pay, and that we feel we 

are rightly being asked to pay. 

There is a long history of contested arrears that precede the year 

2000 that I won’t bore you with. We are focused on the recent arrears and getting current on both the peacekeeping and the regular 

budget, and we are doing that. So I am able to now say to my colleagues in New York that the United States is soon to be up to 

date, and lead from a position of responsibility and strength, and 

I am very grateful to Congress for that. 

Chairman BERMAN. The time of the gentlelady has expired. The 

gentleman from Minnesota, Mr. Ellison is recognized for 5 minutes. 

Mr. ELLISON. Good morning, Ambassador. My name is Keith 

Ellison, and I want to join everyone who has said such nice things 

about you, and this is my first time meeting you, but I have read 

a lot about you, and I am really pleased you are doing the job you 

are doing. 

In your prepared remarks, I think you did an excellent job at 

making a good case for the U.S. to support peacekeeping, and I 

know it was not your point to sort of raise questions about whether 

we could do more, your point was to say we are doing a lot, and 

it is a good thing to do. But I couldn’t help wondering what your 

thoughts were regarding whether we could do more given that 

other countries have more people in uniform than our country does, 

and we are a pretty big country, and that when I look at a figure 

like $2.2 billion, I say, yeah, you are right, it is a lot of money, but 

is it 1 week in Iraq? I don’t know. Can you offer your thoughts, can 

we, should we be doing more to support peacekeeping around the 

globe? 

Ambassador RICE. Thank you very much for your kind words. I 

look forward to getting to know you better. I have followed your career as well. You ask a very important question about how the U.S. 

can contribute. 

First of all, I think it is important to acknowledge how we are 

contributing. We are paying slightly more than 25 percent of the 

cost of these operations. We are contributing over and above that 

42

on a voluntary basis to lift, equip, support, train and deploy many 

of the peacekeepers that are active in the most complex and important operations. Through the Global Peace Operations Initiative, as 

I mentioned in my testimony, we have trained 81,000 peacekeepers. This is actually an initiative that had its antecedents back 

in the middle of the Clinton administration, in my previous incarnation. It grew through the Bush administration, and it continues 

to be an important element of the U.S. contribution to building 

global peacekeeping capacity. It is costly and it is important. 

I did say in my testimony, to answer what I think is the real 

thrust of your question, that the new administration is prepared to 

consider where we can make contributions with respect to military 

officers, observers, and civilian police are a very important component of what is necessary for strong leadership of these missions, 

even as we obviously are making enormous contributions outside of 

the U.N. context in places like Afghanistan and indeed Iraq. Our 

ability to contribute more than that at this stage is obviously constrained and I think we would also have some questions about the 

wisdom of a different form of U.S. contribution, but it is something 

that we are open to and will consider, as appropriate, down the 

road. 

When it comes to the specific capabilities that we can provide 

through military observers, through staff officers, and through police, we have really made real contributions, as I personally witnessed in both Haiti and Liberia. U.S. police personnel are really 

adding value. These are areas that we are open to when we receive 

a specific request from the United Nations for such contributions. 

We will weigh requests carefully and make judgments on a caseby-case basis. 

Mr. ELLISON. Somalia. I appreciate you mentioning the 80 tons 

of weapons and ammunition, those sort of materials are important. 

But there is about, I think, at least 2.3, maybe more than that, millions of people who are food insecure in Somalia. Can you talk 

about other things in the nature of socioeconomic aid that we 

might be doing in Somalia in order to help stabilize that country? 

Ambassador RICE. Yes. The prior question where I mentioned 

this didn’t really give me an opportunity to elaborate on the extent 

of our contributions, and I think it is important to explain. 

First of all, our assistance to Somalia goes well beyond. The bulk 

of our assistance is in the humanitarian realm where we are by 

and large the most generous contributor of humanitarian assistance in Somalia. We have provided almost half of the WFP’s food 

aid just this year, in 2009, for Somalia. We have also, in just Fiscal 

Year 2009, provided more than $149 million for humanitarian assistance programs in Somalia. This is crucial, obviously, to respond 

to the enormous suffering that is facing the people of Somalia in 

the current insecure environment, and in particular as the transitional Federal Government faces the threat that it does from alShabaab and others. 

That said, the long-term stability and security of Somalia won’t 

be accomplished by the delivery of ammunition or of life-saving humanitarian assistance. It requires an effective stable government 

that is broad-based, that is representative and that has the capacity to deliver for its people. This is why we are investing and trying 

43

to support the TFG, which is the best prospect for that in a long 

time. But it is fragile and it needs our support and the support of 

others. 

Chairman BERMAN. The time of the gentleman has expired. The 

gentleman from New York, Mr. McMahon. 

Mr. MCMAHON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and Ambassador, I 

want to associate myself with the remarks of Congressman Ellison 

in regard to the work that you are doing, and certainly for someone 

who believes in the overall mission of the United Nations it is great 

to have an ambassador there from the United States who believes 

in that as well, and puts such a good face, if you will, on American 

interests and American involvement there. 

I represent Brooklyn and Staten Island, New York, the great city 

from which I know you come as well, and my district is incredibly 

diverse. In fact, as you talk about all the regions that the peacekeeping efforts are involved in, it sounds like you are describing my 

district. We have the largest Liberian TPS population, actually the 

largest Liberian population outside of Monrovia; a large Sri 

Lankan population; the largest mosque in New York City; the largest Muslim voting population outside of Michigan is located in the 

district; the fastest growing Jewish population in the City of New 

York as well. 

I tell you all of that as a segue to my invitation to you to please 

come to my district and I would love to have you at an event, 

maybe at the college, to talk about some of the work that you are 

doing because the issues are very relevant to the folks in my district. I have sent a letter to your office, and would like to just call 

it to your attention, so that is my first request. 

Ambassador RICE. Thank you. 

Mr. MCMAHON. And if you would take that under advisement. 

Secondly, I would like to go over the issues that the ranking 

member talked about, the situation in Lebanon with the recent 

bombing as you mentioned, or the explosion at Kir bet Salem, obviously a munitions depot that was in violation of U.N. Resolution 

1701, and you spoke about your concerns about that issue. I would 

like to just maybe ask a little bit further. What specific actions do 

you see? For instance, should the resolution itself be tightened, be 

more specific language? Is more enforcement, vigilance needed, and 

what can we do to make sure that the forces of Hezbollah, which 

are bent on bringing down Israel, are not allowed to get anymore 

arms in that area? 

Ambassador RICE. Thank you very much. I am fascinated to hear 

about the diverse composition of your district. It sounds like a tremendous place, and I would be honored to have the opportunity to 

spend time there with you. Let us definitely follow up on that. 

Turning to Lebanon, we have touched on this a couple of times 

already. There are challenges, as I pointed out in response to Mr. 

Klein’s question, about changing the mandate of UNIFIL pursuant 

to 1701. It is a Chapter 6 mandate with built-in limitations and 

there are a number of relevant countries that have a say in this 

and that take a different view than we do. 

That said, as I mentioned earlier, we take the view that on balance UNIFIL’s contributions are beneficial even if they fall short 

of what we would like to see. 

44

In terms of next steps, UNIFIL and the Lebanese Armed Forces 

are conducting a joint investigation of this arms cache. We think 

that is important. The preliminary indications as reported to the 

Security Council by the U.N. Secretariat are in fact that it was a 

Hezbollah-related arms cache. This underscores the fact that arms 

continue to flow into Lebanon, and it makes the principal foundation of 1701, that the only forces that should have access to arms 

in Lebanon are the Lebanese Armed Forces and UNIFIL, all that 

much more urgent. 

So, we are going to be pushing on effective investigation and enforcement of 1701 within the confines of its mandate. We are pushing very hard on all concerned players, and urging the Government 

of Lebanon to assert its responsibilities in this regard to the maximum extent possible. 

As I also said earlier, we can by no means say we are satisfied. 

We will continue to push for better performance. Yet, I do insist 

that on balance having UNIFIL there, even with its limitations, is 

far better than the alternative of no international presence in that 

very sensitive area. 

Mr. MCMAHON. Is the UNIFIL force large enough, in your opinion? 

Ambassador RICE. I think at 12,000, roughly, it is substantial. I 

have not been persuaded, based on what I have heard thus far, 

that the issue is the need for more troops. I think we certainly 

would be open to considering that as we talk about how to 

strengthen UNIFIL, but I think at this stage the real issue is to 

ensure that it is doing its utmost with the troops it has, within the 

mandate it has. 

Chairman BERMAN. The time of the gentleman has expired. The 

Ambassador needed to leave here at noon. We have four people 

who have not yet questioned. For our good behavior, can we get 10 

more minutes out of you? 

Ambassador RICE. I have——

Chairman BERMAN. 10 minutes past noon. 

Ambassador RICE. I meant to join Secretary Clinton and Foreign 

Minister Miliband for a luncheon as soon as I am due to leave here. 

Chairman BERMAN. All right. 

Ambassador RICE. I will be as generous as I can without getting 

fired, if you don’t mind. 

Chairman BERMAN. Right, no. [Laughter.] Or missing lunch. 

Mr. Scott, the gentleman from Georgia is recognized for some 

number of minutes. 

Mr. SCOTT. Thank you. 

Chairman BERMAN. No more than 5. 

Mr. SCOTT. I will be as quick as I can. 

Madam Secretary, may I ask you about the virulent use of rape 

as a weapon, and particularly in the war in the Congo, Darfur, 

Bosnia, Rwanda? Having visited over there a few months ago visiting the hospitals and seeing that particularly, and I brought this 

up with Secretary Clinton as well, that the most prominent injury 

to women have been sexual violence; not just rape but the violence 

that happens to women. 

Without mechanisms to hold individual soldiers accountable for 

their crimes, this tragedy will continue. Should the U.N. charter be 

45

amended to hold member states responsible for prosecuting these 

individuals who commit criminal acts while serving in an international peacekeeping operation? 

Ambassador RICE. Thank you, Mr. Scott. I think I was asked a 

very similar question by Chairman Berman. I did respond on the 

question of the amendment to the charter, but let me address, in 

addition, the broader question you raise, which is the use of rape 

as a weapon of war. 

This is a horrific phenomenon in many hot conflict zones, including those where the United Nations is present. As I mentioned earlier, I was recently in the Democratic Republic of Congo, in Goma. 

I, too, visited these hospitals where rape victims are being cared 

for. I met with them, I spoke with them, and as a human being 

and as a woman I can tell you that I take this issue very personally, and I feel it deeply, and so did my colleagues on the Security 

Council with whom I traveled. 

A lot of the focus when we talk about rape somehow falls on 

peacekeepers. That is not because there have not been outrages 

and abuses by peacekeepers. There have been and they must be 

held accountable. I have described earlier the mechanisms that are 

in place, and where the gaps remain. 

But the bulk, the vast bulk of the abuse that is being committed 

against women in the Congo is being committed by the FDLR, and 

by the LRA, and to a lesser but terrible extent, by elements of the 

Congolese Armed Forces themselves. 

Mr. SCOTT. Right. 

Ambassador RICE. And the effort that MONUC and indeed the 

Congolese Armed Forces are making to try to deal with the remnants of the FDLR and the LRA are an essential part, albeit a very 

costly in terms of humanitarian consequences, part of dealing with 

this problem of violence against civilians. We cannot have it both 

ways. We cannot say that we don’t support MONUC and others 

trying to deal with these negative forces, the FDLR and the LRA, 

and then say we are deeply concerned about abuse of civilians. 

I want to add one other point if I might. The Security Council 

delegation gave to President Kabila a list provided by the U.N. of 

five names of senior FARDC Congolese commanders that we believe to be responsible for crimes against women and children. We 

have demanded that they be removed. President Kabila has agreed 

that they be removed. We are going to follow up to be very sure 

that the Congolese leadership hold accountable their own people 

who are committing these atrocities. 

Mr. SCOTT. Thank you so much, and I want to ask just one other 

thing. I think I have got 1 minute left. But the other point about 

this is beyond the soldiers what happens is it becomes a way of life. 

After these soldiers leave, they get back into society, and they continue this, and it is so despicable and shameful. 

In my minute left I want to touch on Somalia and it is so complex there. I visited over there as well at the height of this thing 

going over there. What is our attitude toward the existing Somalian Government, and do you side with the position of—regardless 

of the difficulties there but because of al-Shabaab and all of that 

going in there that we should get behind that existing government 

and help them stand against this al-Qaeda front? 

46

Ambassador RICE. Yes is the short answer. The United States 

supports the transitional Federal Government in word and deed. 

Mr. SCOTT. Would that mean putting money to them to help 

them fight? 

Ambassador RICE. Yes. We have given money and we have given 

80 tons of ammunition. We have given humanitarian assistance. 

We have given political support. We support the Djibouti process, 

the political peace process to shore up the TFG. 

Mr. SCOTT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman BERMAN. The time of the gentleman has expired. The 

gentleman from Virginia, Mr. Connolly. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. I thank the chair, and Ambassador Rice, great 

privilege being with you, and hope some day you will come to our 

district as well just across the river and maybe speak at George 

Mason University. 

Chairman BERMAN. You better watch out for this. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. I don’t want you just going to Staten Island. My 

district, by the way, is 27 percent foreign born from well over 100 

countries, so lots of diversity. 

Mr. Chairman, I would ask without objection my opening statement be entered into the record. 

Chairman BERMAN. It will be, so ordered. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. I have got two sets of questions. The first is, 

peacekeeping operations, because we hear so much criticism of the 

United Nations. Have they served U.S. foreign policy over those 61 

years since the first one? 

Ambassador RICE. Absolutely. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Can you think of a peacekeeping operation undertaken by the United Nations that went against the desires and 

wishes and even the vote of the United States? 

Ambassador RICE. I am sorry. The vote? 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Can you think of one peacekeeping——

Ambassador RICE. There is not a peacekeeping mission that can 

be established without the United States support. 

Now have there been instances where peacekeeping operations 

have fallen short of our desires and expectations? 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Different question. I am going to get to that. 

Ambassador RICE. Okay. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. But in terms of serving U.S. diplomatic interests 

there is not a single example you can think of, is there, in 61 years 

where the U.N. tried to undertake a peacekeeping operation 

against the interest or desires of the United States? 

Ambassador RICE. No. By definition, because we have the veto, 

unless we believe it——

Mr. CONNOLLY. Right. 

Ambassador RICE [continuing]. Serves our interest, we would not 

support it. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Right, because sometimes there is some rhetoric, 

Ambassador Rice, you would think that some peacekeeping operations are against U.S. interests. As a matter of fact, as you say, 

they have never been against U.S. interests. For 61 years, they 

have served our interest, and you have laid it out pretty well in 

your testimony all the various aspects of that. 

47

The second question has to do with efficacy, and I guess the example I would give is the tragic example of Srebrenica. Peacekeeping operations are not always what we would like them to be, 

as you were just about to say. What discussions have been going 

on at U.N. headquarters in New York, and what discussions have 

we, the United States, undertaken to try to strengthen the role of 

peacekeeping operations and to clarify their instructions when 

something as tragic as what happened at Srebrenica, for example, 

occurred? 

Ambassador RICE. Thank you very much, Mr. Connolly. I have 

been to your district. I am sure I will go back many times. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. You would be welcome. 

Ambassador RICE. Thank you very much. 

There is much to be done to strengthen U.N. peacekeeping, and 

that has been, as you know, the theme we have been discussing 

and its various aspects most of the morning. There are things that 

we can do as members of the Security Council, for example, to ensure the mandates that we give U.N. missions are well tailored, 

achievable, and rational. That has not always been the case to the 

extent necessary. 

We need to match supply with demand, and we have talked 

about that as well today. There are 93,000 peacekeepers in the 

field. The U.N. is overstretched. There are several critical operations where the authorized strength is not met by the number of 

troops on the ground, and there is a gap, a major capacity gap that 

needs to be filled. We are doing our best in terms of training, recruiting, supporting, equipping and lifting peacekeepers, but it is 

a gap that needs to be closed lest this tool that serves our interests 

risks falling into irreparable disrepair. 

We also can strengthen the U.N.’s own internal management, 

and there have been a series of reforms, first in 2000, and more 

recently in 2007. Today the U.N. is again looking at, in the current 

context, which is unprecedented and was in fact unanticipated in 

the last waves of reform, as to what can be done to close the gap 

between demand and supply, to enable the U.N. to deploy more 

rapidly, to ensure that its operations are performed with greater 

transparency and efficiency and cost effectiveness, and all of these 

are areas that we are very much focused on and committed to pursuing. 

I spoke earlier about procurement and economies of scale. All of 

these are important things that we think need to be pursued in the 

interest of reforming U.N. peacekeeping. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Right. My time is up, Mr. Chairman, and I yield 

back. Thank you. 

Ambassador RICE. Thank you, Mr. Connolly. 

Chairman BERMAN. The time of the gentleman has been given 

up. Ambassador Rice, meet Ambassador Watson, 5 minutes. 

Ms. WATSON. Thank you. I want to see that you get to your lunch 

pretty much on time, and yield back most of my time, but I just 

want to say to you we are so proud that you are there representing 

us in the U.N. I have been sitting here listening to your enthusiasm. You mentioned a word that we very seldom hear. You said 

‘‘wisdom,’’ and I would hope that we would act with more wisdom. 

It is not used a lot in this place, and I just want you to know that 

48

your broad base of knowledge on all the issues that have been 

raised at this table today indicates to us that our presence at the 

U.N. was most needed, and there has been moves in the past to 

withdraw our membership and not pay our dues. So thank you so 

much for serving us well. 

I yield back my time. Give my greetings to those you are having 

lunch with, and get on your way. 

Ambassador RICE. Thank you so much, Ambassador Watson, for 

those very kind words. I am very grateful. 

Chairman BERMAN. Thank you, Ambassador Watson, and we are 

done with the questions. I am going to give 15 seconds to the gentleman from New Jersey first just to correct the record. 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Let me just say, Ambassador Rice, that you were right. The Clinton administration did sign it. George Bush I, and Ronald Reagan, 

as we all know, negotiated the treaty. I actually gave the speech 

on November 10, 1989, on behalf of the administration at the 

United Nations in favor of the Convention of the Rights of the 

Child, and I remember my conversations——

Chairman BERMAN. You forgot to get a signature. [Laughter.] 

Mr. SMITH. Exactly. So I will give you a copy of my speech if you 

would like to see it. 

Ambassador RICE. I would like to see that speech. 

Mr. SMITH. Okay. 

Ambassador RICE. Do you still favor——

Mr. SMITH. I believe in accuracy even when it is inconvenient. 

Chairman BERMAN. It was virtually signed 1989. 

Ambassador RICE. Thank you. 

Chairman BERMAN. Ambassador Rice, thank you very, very 

much. I am just going to make one last point. The gentlelady from 

California, Ms. Lee, and my friend from New Jersey, Mr. Payne, 

and I could disagree on the final decision, but I have to say because 

I know how hard you worked to get that Durban document in the 

right shape. We can quibble about it was 1⁄10 of 1 percent, or a substantial issue, but the fact is no one worked harder than you did 

to try and make it happen, and we all appreciate that, however we 

view the final decision. Thank you very much for being here. 

Ambassador RICE. Thank you so much, Mr. Chairman. Thank 

you, Ms. Ros-Lehtinen, and all of the members for your support, 

and your great commitment to this issue. I very much appreciated 

this opportunity. 

Chairman BERMAN. Great. And with that you go to lunch and we 

don’t. 

I am going to ask the committee—just 1 second here. Dr. Luck, 

you are next on board, and I am going to ask the committee to indulge a process where we have first Dr. Luck who is Special Advisor to the U.N. Secretary General give his briefing to the committee, and then the rest of the panel give their statements, and 

then if there are any questions afterwards we either submit them 

for the record because my fear—I don’t want the people who came 

for the hearing not to be able to share their testimony, and we will 

see what time remains because there will be votes in less than 1 

hour, and we will never get people back after those votes, and 

49

hopefully we will be able to complete the testimony, and if we don’t 

have the votes, to maybe even ask some questions. 

[Discussion off the record.] 

Chairman BERMAN. Ambassador Williamson is a familiar face to 

many of us on the committee. He is a partner in the law firm of 

Winston & Strawn. He recently completed an assignment as the 

President’s Special Envoy to Sudan. Earlier he served in the 

Reagan White House as Special Assistant to the President and 

Deputy to the Chief of Staff, and then onto the White House senior 

staff as Assistant to the President for Intergovernmental Affairs. 

His many diplomatic posts have included serving as Ambassador 

to the United Nations offices in Vienna, Assistant Secretary of 

State for International Organizational Affair; Ambassador to the 

United Nations for Special Political Affairs, and Ambassador to the 

U.N. Commission on Human Rights. It is great to have you here 

again. 

Erin Weir is the peacekeeping advocate at Refugees International. She has participated in field missions to Sudan, Democratic Republic of the Congo, and Somalia. Before jointing Refugee 

International, she spent 1 year as a research associate with the 

Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Center in Accra, 

Ghana. Ms. Weir coordinates the Partnership for Effective Peacekeeping, a forum that promotes peace operations policy. 

Brett Schaefer is the Jay Kingham fellow in International Regulatory Affairs at The Heritage Foundation. He analyzes a broad 

range of foreign policy issues, focusing primarily on international 

organizations, and sub-Sahara and Africa. A frequent visitor to the 

region, he has written extensively on economic development and 

peace and security issues there, and how they affect U.S. national 

interests. From March 2003 to March 2004, Schaefer worked at the 

Pentagon as an assistant for International Criminal Court Policy. 

William Flavin is the directing professor of Doctrine, Concepts, 

Training, and Education Division at the U.S. Army Peacekeeping 

and Stability Operations Institute located in the U.S. Army War 

College in Carlisle, Pennsylvania. Before this assignment he was a 

senior foreign affairs analyst at Booz Allen and Hamilton on contract to assist the U.S. Army Peacekeeping Institute for Doctrine 

Development. From 1995 to 1999, he was a colonel in the U.S. 

Army serving as the deputy director of special operations for the 

Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, at Supreme Headquarter Allied Powers, Europe. 

We are very pleased to have all of you here and, Ambassador 

Williamson, why don’t you begin the testimony. 

STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE RICHARD S. WILLIAMSON, 

PARTNER, WINSTON & STRAWN, LLP (FORMER SPECIAL 

ENVOY TO SUDAN AND AMBASSADOR TO THE U.N. COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS) 

Ambassador WILLIAMSON. Thank you very much, Chairman Berman, Ranking Member Ros-Lehtinen, and the committee members 

and my friend Don Payne who I look forward to seeing later today 

at your subcommittee’s hearing on Sudan, and request that my full 

statement be put in the record. 

50

Chairman BERMAN. It will be. All the witnesses’ statements will 

be included in their entirety. 

Ambassador WILLIAMSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The U.N. is useful. It deserves engagement and support, but 

there is plenty of room for reform. Similarly, U.N. peacekeeping operations are helpful for burden-sharing, they have an acceptance 

and legitimacy, and capacity that has served us well in many instances. Some have been very successful, such as Sierra Leone, 

Kemerlest, Liberia and others and some have a decidedly mixed result, including in Sudan with both UNMIS, which failed to act appropriately to stop the destruction of Abyei in May 2008, and 

UNAMID, which still faces many difficulties. 

Leadership is very important, and let me note that under Secretary Generals Alain Le Roy and Suzanna Malcorra, the Under 

Secretaries for Peacekeeping and Field Support have bought 

brought a vigor enthusiasm and creativity to their new positions, 

and let me note that there needs to be a recognition that some risktaking is desirable, especially in field support. Failure to take some 

risk to make sure the equipment and other support is provided results in greater risk for the peacekeepers and the political process. 

United Nations peacekeeping operations, like all mechanisms of 

foreign and security policy, are imperfect. There are times peacekeeping is very useful. There are times they deserve the support 

and there are times they need reform, and let me just quickly go 

through a list of reforms I would urge the committee to consider 

as it deals with ongoing peacekeeping operations. 

One, the United States must be realistic about what a peacekeeping mission can do, the limits of its capacity. There are limits 

of available peacekeepers from contributing countries. There are 

limits to available equipment such as helicopters with night vision. 

There are limits to political leverage and influence of the United 

Nations, especially when dealing with deeply entrenched sovereign 

governments. These limits and others must be understood, acknowledge, and be part of the analysis of whether or not to support 

authorization of any new peacekeeping mission. 

Two, the United States must be steely eyed and crystal clear in 

assessing the real support within the Security Council for any new 

mission. Both political will and material support is required not 

only at the launch of a peacekeeping operation but it must be sustained throughout, especially if one or more of the Security Council 

permanent members have direct interest in the conflict or if one 

part of a conflict, the effectiveness of the peacekeeping operation 

can be compromised on various fronts. In such situations the likelihood of success is substantially limited. 

Three, the United States should not be so anxious to launch a 

peacekeeping mission that it accepts inadequate mandates with too 

small a force size to get the job done. 

Four, peacekeeping ought not to be immortal. Some peacekeeping 

in positional forces such as in Cyprus and Western Sahara were 

deployed in acute situations that over time have calmed down. The 

dispute is resolvable but the pain on either side is not acute 

enough to compel compromise. The status quo may not be preferable but it is acceptable. The peacekeepers allow comfort to set 

in, unresolved issues remain unresolved due in part to the peaceVerDate 0ct 09 2002 08:38 Nov 24, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00054 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 F:\WORK\FULL\072909\51656 HFA PsN: SHIRL
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keepers themselves. We should move forward and look at which 

peacekeeping missions should be withdrawn to force the parties to 

resolve it. 

Five, peacekeeping must be more flexible. 

Six, there has to be a recognition that in difficult environments 

a lead country can be very useful, such as the United Kingdom, 

with the peacekeepers in Sierra Leone and France and Cote 

d’Ivoire. 

Seven, there needs to be reform of the work program on the U.N. 

Fifth Committee. That body spends an entire year on the U.S. regular budget of approximately $3 billion. However, it devotes only 

1 month, the month of May, for the U.N. peacekeeping budget of 

almost $3 billion. 

Eight, U.N. peacekeeping operations, like other U.N. bodies and 

mechanisms, should conform to the highest standards of procurement and management. Unfortunately, since such standards are 

not always met to ensure appropriate oversight and accountability, 

the U.N. Office of Internal Oversight Services should be supported 

politically and financially. 

Nine, progress must be made to standardize peacekeeping equipment, especially common communication systems, throughout the 

system. 

Ten, often the most important determinant of a successful peacekeeping operation is the Special Representative of the Secretary 

General and the Deputy SRSG. The personality, energy drive, political skill, innovation, and overall talent of the SRSG and Deputy 

RSG can be critical. There should be a more rigorous selection 

process imposed on both the Secretary General and the Security 

Council. 

Eleven, similarly peacekeeping force commanders often are 

picked because of nationality and politics, not competence. This 

must end. 

Twelve, there should be common training for peacekeepers whatever their country of origin, a common procedure manual and practice. 

Thirteen, progress has been made but more is required for peacekeeping activities to be integrated with the World Food Program 

and other important U.N. humanitarian agencies. 

And fourteen, there needs to be better training and monitoring 

of peacekeepers on human rights, especially exploitation of women 

and children and HIV/AIDS. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

[The prepared statement of Ambassador Williamson follows:]

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Chairman BERMAN. Thank you, Ambassador. 

Ms. Weir. 

STATEMENT OF MS. ERIN A. WEIR, PEACEKEEPING 

ADVOCATE, REFUGEES INTERNATIONAL 

Ms. WEIR. Chairman Berman, Ranking Member Ros-Lehtinen, 

and members of the committee, thank you for this opportunity to 

testify today, and thank you for sticking with us for so long. I will 

keep my testimony brief. 

I am here representing Refugees International. We are an independent Washington, DC-based organization that advocates for solutions to refugee crises. 

In the past 2 years I have assessed peacekeeping efforts and humanitarian activities in Sudan, Chad, Democratic Republic of 

Congo, and Somalia. I know firsthand what a crucial role peacekeeping can play in the area of aid, the maintenance of stability 

and the protection of civilians in some of the most dangerous places 

in the world. I have also seen the limitations of peacekeeping and 

the consequences of confusing mandates and under resourced missions. 

The U.S. needs to learn from those examples and work to ensure 

that mandates are clear and achievable; that peacekeepers are well 

trained and equipped; and that the norms that underpin the international effort to protect civilians from harm are strengthened. 

The demands on peacekeepers have changed and expanded exponentially over the past 20 years. Today, peacekeeping mandates include everything from providing support to cease fire agreements 

and peace processes to the role of reform of security sector institutions, and the physical protection of civilians. In just one example, 

the mandate of the U.N. peacekeeping operation in the Democratic 

Republic of Congo includes 45 different tasks. 

Civilian protection has become a priority, but protection is a 

tricky thing to do in practice, and there is no one-size-fits-all protection strategy. In the field I have seen civilians coping with many 

different threats to their safety, but broadly speaking there are 

three types of danger that they face. In Darfur and in eastern 

DRC, there is often classic military style violence, coordinated attacks on villages and displacement camps by armed groups. In 

eastern Chad, the day-to-day threat facing civilians and humanitarian workers is banditry. It is looting and violence perpetrated by 

criminals who capitalize on chaos and impunity that prevails in 

conflict zones. And a third type of threat falls somewhere in between. Looting and violence perpetrated against civilians by individual members of armed groups or even national militaries for individual gain; again, something we see in DR Congo. 

Unfortunately, these are not mutually exclusive. A colleague and 

I were in Goma in Eastern Congo this past October when a rebel 

attack brought all three types of violence to bear at once, and the 

peacekeepers there were so overstretched, their mandate so convoluted that they weren’t able to handle anyone of the threats effectively. The failure precipitated a humanitarian crisis, and I 

think we all saw the images on the news when several hundred 

thousand Congolese civilians were displaced. 

71

The point here is that in order to address each of these threats 

peacekeeping missions need to be equipped with different combinations of diplomatic, military, and policing tools every time that they 

are sent out to the field, and so it is crucial that peacekeeping 

mandates are reflective of the types of threats that civilians are 

facing on the ground. 

As one of the most powerful members of the Security Council, it 

is essential that the U.S. take a leadership role and ensure that 

peacekeeping mandates are clear and achievable. It is also important that the U.S. use is influence within the wider U.N. system 

to ensure that peacekeeping missions get the resources and support 

that they need to fulfill expectations. 

At present the U.N. is having difficulty generating enough 

troops, and even more difficulty finding troop contributing countries willing or able to staff and equip the missions with specialized 

skills and resources that are needed to fulfill these difficult mandates. 

The U.S. has these capabilities and should be committing more 

of them to U.N. peacekeeping operations. The commitment of specialized U.S. forces and enabling units such as engineers, medics, 

and transport units, would have a huge impact on the ground and 

allow new missions to deploy quickly and operate effectively. 

All that said, sometimes U.N. peacekeeping isn’t the answer. 

History has taught us that U.N. peacekeeping operations are only 

effective in situations where the mission is deployed with the consent of the host government. Missions without host country consent 

require peace enforcement operations, or coalitions of the willing. 

Dr. Luck spoke today already about the responsibility to protect 

or R2P, but in order to make R2P operational the United States 

needs to support regional bodies and work with allies like the African Union, the European Union and NATO to develop the capabilities necessary to deploy robust peace enforcement missions when 

civilians are at risk of genocide, ethnic cleansing, war crimes and 

crimes against humanity. 

Lack of political will is another hurtle to realizing the responsibility to protect. Permanent members of the U.N. Security Council, 

including the United States, have been extremely reluctant to authorize the deployment of international forces without the consent 

of the host government. In one example, the recent concessions 

made to the Government of Sudan in order to secure its consent 

for a peacekeeping deployment in spite of the fact that the government itself was implicated in the violence against its people made 

a complete farce of the commitment to protect. 

The U.S. needs to work with allies and engage with skeptics to 

improve the acceptance and acceptability of all three pillars of the 

responsibility to protect. 

In conclusion, the U.S. needs to use its clout within the Security 

Council to ensure that peacekeeping mandates are clear and 

achievable, that missions are well resourced, and that new deployments are only made where U.N. peacekeeping is the most effective 

tool for the job. Where it isn’t, the U.S. needs to work to make R2P 

a political and operational reality by working to strengthen the 

norm and helping to build the robust peace enforcement capabilities that are needed to keep people safe. 

72

Congress can help to do this by continuing to raise important 

questions about protection, and the need for the international community as a whole to perform better. Congress can also support 

U.N. peacekeeping and the ongoing reforms within the U.N. system 

by continuing to pay its share of U.N. peacekeeping costs in full, 

and on time. 

Thank you again for the opportunity to testify before you today. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Weir follows:]


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Chairman BERMAN. Thank you very much. 

Mr. Schaefer. 

STATEMENT OF MR. BRETT D. SCHAEFER, JAY KINGHAM FELLOW IN INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY AFFAIRS, THE HERITAGE FOUNDATION 

Mr. SCHAEFER. Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Ros-Lehtinen, 

other members of the committee, thank you for inviting me to 

speak before the committee today on U.N. peacekeeping issues. 

One of the United Nations’ primary responsibilities and one with 

which most Americans agree is to help maintain international 

peace and security. A critical component of this responsibility is the 

ability and willingness of the U.N. to engage in peacekeeping operations. U.N. peacekeeping operations can be useful and successful 

if entered into with an awareness of their limitations and weaknesses. This awareness is crucial because there is little indication 

that the demand for U.N. peacekeeping will decline in the foreseeable future. 

Indeed, in recent years we have seen an unprecedented expansion of the size and expense of U.N. peacekeeping operations. At 

the end of June 2009, there were 16 peacekeeping operations and 

two other political missions overseen by the United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations. The current peacekeeping 

budget is $7.75 billion. This involves some 93,000 uniformed personnel and over 20,000 U.N. volunteers and other civilian personnel. This is a three-fold increase from as recent ago as 2003. 

As noted by DPKO itself, ‘‘The scope and magnitude of U.N. field 

operations today is straining the Secretariat infrastructure that 

was not designed for current levels of activity.’’ Frankly, DPKO is 

overwhelmed. This has contributed to serious problems of mismanagement, fraud, and misconduct. For instance: (1) Incidents of 

sexual exploitation and abuse have taken place in nearly every 

U.N. peacekeeping operation. In fact, the U.N. just launched a factfinding mission into new allegations of sexual abuse in the Congo 

mission; (2) a 2007 report by the U.N.’s Office of Internal Oversight 

Services, the U.N.’s quasi-inspector general, found that over 40 percent of the total value of $1.4 billion worth of peacekeeping contracts was tainted by corruption; (3) the OIOS also revealed in 

2008 that it was investigating about 250 instances of wrongdoing, 

and according to the head of OIOS, ‘‘We can say that we found mismanagement, fraud, and corruption to an extent that we really 

didn’t expect.’’

These problems cry out for improved accountability and transparency. Unfortunately, U.N. oversight is far less than it should be. 

For instance, the lead OIOS investigator of charges against the 

U.N. peacekeepers in the Congo was ‘‘appalled to see that the oversight office’s final report was little short of a white wash’’ raising 

questions about OIOS’s independence itself. 

Meanwhile, the only truly independent investigator unit in the 

United Nations, the Procurement Task Force, was recently terminated for performing its job too well. Countries led by Russia and 

Singapore opposed renewing the mandate for the Procurement 

Task Force for 2009 after investigations by that task force led to 

convictions for their nationals. 

79

There is also a political problem with peacekeeping. In general, 

the U.N. and its member states had accepted the fact that U.N. 

peacekeeping operations should not include a mandate to enforce 

peace outside of limited circumstances. 

After reviewing past peacekeeping failures and drawing lessons 

from them, the Brahimi report stated very plainly, ‘‘The United 

Nations does not wage war.’’ Ignoring this lesson can be costly in 

terms of lives and long-term peace and stability. It also places excessive demands on resources management and personnel. As recently reaffirmed by DPKO in its report this month, ‘‘U.N. peacekeeping can only succeed as part of a wider political strategy to end 

a conflict and with the will of the parties to implement that strategy. . . . In active conflict, multinational coalitions of forces or regional actors operating under U.N. Security Council mandates may 

be more suitable.’’

Yet, the U.N. is increasingly ignoring this lesson. The former 

Under Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations expressed 

concern that the council was approving missions without observing 

the conditions essential for success, including having clear, credible 

mandates and a peace-to-keep or a viable peace process in place. 

Indeed, it is precisely these types of situations—ones where conflict 

reigns; or where there is little genuine commitment by the parties 

to work toward peace; or there is insufficient support and engagement by neighboring countries and regional actors; or where the 

host country commitment to unhindered operations and freedom 

movement is lacking—which currently consume the bulk of U.N. 

peacekeeping budget and account for most uniformed personnel involved in U.N. peacekeeping. 

In sum, being more judicious in approving missions would free 

up resources for other missions that are vitally important. Quite 

simply, the Security Council has gone overboard in is attempts to 

be seen as being effective and doing something even if it violates 

the dearly learned lesson that U.N. peacekeepers are not war fighters. 

Another aspect of the political problem is the great discrepancy 

in the financial burden among member states. The notion that 

wealthier nations should bear a larger portion of the cost is strongly entrenched in the United Nations, but a system that has the 

United States paying $2 billion for peacekeeping while other states 

pay less than $8,000 is indefensible and creates a free rider problem wherein countries paying virtually nothing have little reason 

to conduct due diligence on whether a proposed mission is appropriate, an existing mission is meeting its mandate, or if U.N. funds 

are being used properly. 

To conclude, I believe that the U.S., the U.N. Security Council 

and other members states should: First, not let the pressure to do 

something trump consideration of whether an operation would improve or destabilize the situation; possess a clear mandate and 

achievable objectives; and have an exit strategy in case the mission 

goes south. 

Second, they should improve oversight and accountability 

through an independent inspector general, perhaps modeled after 

the Procurement Task Force, dedicated to peace operations. 

80

Third, the investigators and auditors should be embedded in 

every peacekeeping operation. 

Fourth, the U.N. peacekeeping scale of assessment should be 

flattened out to make sure that all U.N. member states, particularly those on the Security Council, have skin in the game to encourage them to take their oversight responsibilities seriously. 

Fifth, hold states that fail to fulfill their commitments to discipline their troops to account by barring them from participating 

in peacekeeping operations until they make a commitment to do so. 

Finally, build up peacekeeping capabilities around the world. For 

its part, the United States should increase its commitment for the 

Global Peace Operations Initiative which contributes significantly 

to bolstering the capacity and capabilities of regional troops, especially in Africa. 

Mr. Chairman, thank you for inviting me today and this concludes my statement. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Schaefer follows:]

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Chairman BERMAN. Thank you. Then to conclude testimony, 

Colonel Flavin. 

STATEMENT OF COLONEL WILLIAM J. FLAVIN, USA, RETIRED, 

DIRECTING PROFESSOR, DOCTRINE, CONCEPTS, TRAINING, 

AND EDUCATION DIVISION, U.S. ARMY PEACEKEEPING AND 

STABILITY OPERATIONS INSTITUTE, U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE 

Colonel FLAVIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and members of the 

committee for allowing me to share some information with you. 

The Peacekeeping Stability Institute for the past 12 years have 

been engaged in looking at these various activities, and what I 

would like to do is summarize some of the initiatives that have 

taken place, and some that potentially will bear some fruit to aid 

and assist in this. 

The great watershed events of the Balkans, Rwanda and postconflict Iraq have served as catalysts to develop doctrine and concepts in various places. The U.N. Capstone Doctrine developed last 

year identified the key that safe and secure environment is a key 

issue for the U.N. governance, and getting all of the various parts 

of the U.N. together to act in unison, and also that local/national 

ownership was a key principle that the U.N. ought to look at. 

Given the fact that this is the first capstone and the first time 

that these various principles were enunciated in a larger forum, 

the issue is how does that then provide guidance to the force commander and the force SRSG on how do you achieve a safe and secure environment. 

The Challenges Forum, a 16-nation forum that has been around 

for about 10 years sponsored by the Folke Bernadotte Academy out 

of Sweden is a forum that can provide a place where various participants can provide papers to the U.N. in order to address this. 

The U.S. is part of this forum and right now they are focusing on 

how do you provide a safe and secure environment; how do you provide that guidance to the force commander? 

The U.S. is paired with Pakistan on a working group to bring 

some of those thoughts to bear. There will be a meeting this November in New York where the initial thoughts will be put out, 

with a final meeting in Australia in 2010, reporting how you establish a safe and secure environment, how you can establish governance, and how you can bring all the people, portions of the U.N. 

together in an integrated manner in order to do this. So this challenges forum is an opportunity to fill one of the gaps that is out 

there. 

Another gap is in the area of doctrine and concepts for field support. We discuss some of that in here, and the U.N. is beginning 

to develop significant doctrine on how they provide good field support. The U.S. has a lot of expertise in that over the last couple 

of years in their various deployments and others, and we are coordinating with the Department of Field Support in order to bring 

the expertise from the U.S. military in order to aid and assist, 

which we think is a useful way to do that. 

The other thing is police. The essential task matrix and the essential task for police have just been established and put out there, 

so the police now have some standards and a good way ahead to 

98

begin planning and training. This has happened in the last several 

months. We support the police through GPOI, which was mentioned, and CoESPU, the center at Vincenza where we have a U.S. 

military officer serving in that center. That is another opportunity 

to begin to push and encourage these essential tasks, and then 

take what the police has learned and move these essential tasks 

back into the military formations in order to assist them in developing some essential tasks. 

As far as the U.S. is concerned, the U.S. Institute for Peace is 

just publishing a document, hopefully by the end of this week, on 

guiding principles for stabilization and reconstruction. These principles are based upon significant information gathered from the 

United Nations, from the NATO, from the EU, from the AU, and 

from the U.S., getting out a framework on how to establish safe 

and secure environments, how to go ahead with economics, how to 

go ahead with governance, and provide some excellent thoughts 

and guidance on that, and I think we are looking forward to taking 

that document to U.N. and moving forward. 

The U.S. Army doctrine itself is coherent with this new U.N. 

Capstone Doctrine. After 5 or 6 years of work, our doctrine has 

come into line with this. As a matter of fact the framework in the 

new Field Manual 3–07 stability is very similar to the framework 

in the U.N. Capstone Doctrine. Discussing such things as security 

sector reform, which had never been discussed before. The joint 

doctrine will be developed later in accordance with that. 

The key here is, how do you then move from doctrine to application in some of the areas? One of the areas is what if you are faced 

with mass atrocities, what if you are faced with some significant 

problems out there. 

In that case the Harvard School, the Carr Center at Harvard and 

the Peacekeeping Institute have developed the Mass Atrocity Response Options and Operations, a way to take a planning process, 

take this doctrine, and figure out how do you respond to mass 

atrocities and the responsibility to protect, and that will be part of 

an ongoing process developing with the U.N. and with the Department of Defense in the Mass Atrocities Response Project. 

The last, of course, is knowledge, knowledge by the troop contributing countries on how the U.N. works and what the U.N. needs 

and how to interface well with the U.N. in assisting in what they 

are doing. The U.S. and other key permanent five members, we 

have found out, are relatively ignorant of how the U.N. works in 

the military staffs and what the U.N. needs except for a small 

number of folks that actually have worked in the U.N., and so 

there is a project out there being initiated by the Joint Knowledge 

Online, at the Joint Warfighting Center, to begin to bring U.N. 

training online for all U.S. forces to take a look at what that is 

about and how they can interface directly with that, and other 

projects out there to bring training and awareness on these various 

things under the idea if we know better how the U.N. works, how 

the U.N. needs to function, and what are the opportunities out 

there we can then better address those opportunities. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

[The prepared statement of Colonel Flavin follows:]

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Chairman BERMAN. Well, thank you, and thank all of you. There 

is so much you have given us here, and the vote bells have gone 

off so we have about 6 or 7 or 8 minutes just to take a few of these 

ideas up. 

I earlier indicated that we would go to Mr. Payne first, but I now 

am going to—no, go ahead. He raised the issue of the word. Take 

a few minutes. 

Mr. PAYNE. Okay, I will just use half of the time, that will be 

fine. 

Just quickly, you know, there has been the notion of a U.N. army 

standing group. What is your opinion on that real quickly? Each of 

you can respond. Well trained sort of special force type, that, or a 

standing kind of army waiting. Yes. 

Colonel FLAVIN. I will go ahead and make the first mention on 

that. Part of the issue that we discussed here is the lag time between U.N. resolutions and the fact you have to be on the ground, 

and as I see, maybe there is some opportunity for some element to 

go in and fill that lag time while the U.N. begins to generate its 

force. The Share Brig used to be a concept for that, the Standing 

High Readiness Brigade that Denmark had supported. That, of 

course, has disappeared and gone away. 

I know the Latin American colleagues down there are talking 

about a potential of putting some type of standing organization together that can fill that gap. I see that this is an opportunity that 

we may want to push, especially since we have some of our allies 

and others talking about such various things and opportunities, 

and I think that would go a long way to sort of stabilizing the situation until the U.N. can go through and generate the appropriate 

force and get in there. We know the Share Brig was used initially 

in the Eritrea/Ethiopia adventure to some effect. Thank you. 

Mr. SCHAEFER. The U.N.——

Chairman BERMAN. Quickly, if you want to weigh in on this. 

Mr. SCHAEFER. Yes, please. The U.N. does have a standby arrangement system wherein countries can pledge certain parts of 

their armed forces, or police or other support units to have ready 

at the request of the United Nations for deployment rapidly. That 

is their prerogative, and some 87 countries are already part of that 

system. Japan just announced that they would be part of it, which 

is rather remarkable step for them considering their constitutional 

constraints on use of armed force. 

The U.S. through GPOI is contributing greatly to the capabilities 

of regional troops to participate in U.N. peacekeeping operations. 

I think that Ambassador Rice earlier noted that about 50,000 

troops trained through GPOI are currently deployed or have been 

recently deployed on U.N. peacekeeping operations, so the U.S. is 

contributing greatly through that program to increase the amount 

of troops available for deployment on U.N. peacekeeping operations. 

As far as the idea of having a U.N. army or any kind of armed 

force independent of a national government, I think that is a very 

risky idea; something that the United States specifically should 

avoid. Having armed forces outside of the responsibility of a sovereign government is nearly always a bad idea, and we see the 

117

ramifications of that in a number of unstable states around the 

world. 

Chairman BERMAN. Ambassador Williamson. 

Ambassador WILLIAMSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Congressman Payne, let me make just a couple quick points. 

One, some countries like Canada have made peacekeeping a 

principal objective of their armed forces, and my suggestion of 

standardized training, standardized processes and standardized 

equipment could accelerate deployment, and it should be done. 

However, I do think we have to keep in mind that peacekeeping 

operations are not unlimited. There are, unfortunately, problems 

where we will not have the capacity, the resources, et cetera, to deploy; and second, governments should be mindful of a realistic deployment schedule. 

In Sudan, when UNAMID made its transfer, the Secretariat 

made very clear they would not be able to successfully do that until 

June 2008. One permanent member of the Security Council found 

that unacceptable, and pushed for January deployment. It was unready, mistakes were made that we are still paying for now. Thank 

you, Mr. Chairman. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Mr. Chairman, I will be glad to give my time 

to the members on your side. 

Chairman BERMAN. One question which is bugging me and we 

have a few more minutes here. Ms. Weir talks about the clear mandate, achievable mandate, but you have got a political process that 

decides the mandate. Is the absence of clarity a product of a lack 

of discipline, a lack of knowledge, or is it a result of a political negotiations at the Security Council between different parties with 

different interests that end up clouding the mandates? 

In other words, is it something you can’t take politics out of politics, and therefore the desire for the clarity is something that conceptually makes sense but impractical life in this structure cannot 

be achieved? 

Ms. WEIR. I think the lack of clarity in the mandate, if I could, 

the political discussions are actually just a desire to do more better. 

What you see at the Security Council is a lot of people, a lot of 

countries with interests, but also a desire to keep people safe and 

to stabilize these countries. 

Chairman BERMAN. So it is not a tension between the countries, 

it is almost an effort to try and do more than you can really pull 

off. Do you agree with that? 

Ms. WEIR. If I could just finish. I think it is all of these things, 

but what you see when you get a mandate so complex that it incorporate everything that everyone wants to pile onto it is a mission 

that actually cannot achieve any of the things that anyone set on 

the table. 

So if you look at the MONUC mandate, for example, prior to October, there were so many conflicting roles that the Security Council decided they wanted this mission to play, that in fact they were 

paralyzed. They could not do anything with it. So what I am suggesting is that I think the politics needs to be taken into account, 

and all of these interests need to be discussed, but at the end of 

the day the Security Council has the responsibility to sit down and 

decide amongst themselves what are the priorities; at the end of 

118

the day what do they want to get done, and to make those priorities clear within the mandate and then resource the mission to fulfill those priorities. 

Ambassador WILLIAMSON. Mr. Chairman, both when I was Assistant Secretary and when I was Ambassador for Political Affairs, 

I dealt with negations of actual practical getting it done. Churchill 

said there are two things you shouldn’t watch. One of which is 

making sausage and the other was making laws. And the United 

Nations Security Council is a sausage factory. This is not some abstract diplomatic exercise, academic exercise. It is 15 countries 

with interests, perspectives with drive, and I would suggest to you 

you are absolutely correct that it is a very rambunctious political 

process where compromise is made. 

The question is United States as a permanent member has to 

have greater clarity of what is acceptable, when is there overreach, 

and when it has gone too far because some time in our anxiousness 

to deploy a peacekeeping operation we have failed that very operation by not demanding minimum standards of clarity and operational effectiveness. Thank you, sir. 

Chairman BERMAN. Thanks. Bill? Ileana? Anybody. I have more 

if you are running out. 

Mr. DELAHUNT. Ambassador, give us an example of where we 

failed, where the U.S. failed to demand clarity. 

Ambassador WILLIAMSON. Let me give you a practical example 

that I think I make reference in my written testimony. The African 

Union peacekeepers in Sudan were inadequate, inadequate because 

of their mandate which was just to observe and report, inadequate 

because of their number, inadequate because of their resources. 

The United States was actually the biggest contributor. We spent $400 million building the bases for the African Union. We wanted 

to move that to a joint U.N.-African Union force which is very understandable. But a key decision was made to get that that has impinged on UNAMID’s ability to be effective, and that is the words 

predominantly African force. 

As soon as we did that both the African Union and Khartoum 

had a veto over the composition. U.N. no longer could operate——

Mr. DELAHUNT. I am familiar with that, and I remember. I 

mean, you were an advocate for more boots on the ground, and an 

advocate for more NATO involvement, and yet at the same time we 

couldn’t deliver NATO, and I have a memory of, I think it was your 

recommendation that we jam, and yet the administration said no. 

I mean, I think innately inherently structural you have got to remember that this is a consensus party. We don’t have a U.N. per 

se that exists that has the authority of a sovereign state, and I 

think—I guess I would conclude by saying it is still, for the dollars 

spent and the money and the blood and the treasures saved, it is 

a good investment. Thank you. 

Chairman BERMAN. Don? We have got about 2 minutes and 20 

seconds. 

Mr. PAYNE. The U.S. mainly stays out of any U.N. operation. I 

am not looking for boots on the ground, but maybe Ambassador 

Williamson, do you think that the U.S. could be more of assistance 

like with drones or with telecommunications? You know, Sheikh 

Sharif said he could take care of the hijackers if he could just have 

119

communications from some intelligence. They could take care of 

them on the ground. They don’t want to take care of them on the 

sea. But do you think—and the U.S. is not there, but that the 

United States and Britain and France could be of more assistance, 

or the U.S., let us stay with the U.S., we don’t want troops on the 

ground, but we have so many assets that could assist the other 

people on the ground. What do you think about that? 

Ambassador WILLIAMSON. Mr. Chairman, let me first respond to 

the final comment of your predecessor. Congressman, I agree 100 

percent, which is why my statement began with the importance to 

U.S. in projecting its policies and the value of U.N. and U.N. peacekeeping. So we are in agreement there. It is a question of how we 

make it even better. 

Secondly, I think, Congressman Payne——

Chairman BERMAN. Real quick. 

Ambassador WILLIAMSON. Okay. Congressman Payne, my view is 

we should not allow the major engagements which are serious and 

consequential to allow our military capabilities to take a pass on 

some of these other issues of consequence morally and for regional 

stability which is in our interest. So, sir, I would argue that if it 

is a legitimate inquiry for elected members in the Congress to raise 

the question if there can be some de minimis contribution to more 

effective peacekeeping from across the river. Thank you. 

Chairman BERMAN. Thank you all very much. The area that I 

am confused at—you don’t have the time to help me get out of the 

confusion—is this whole issue that a number of you mentioned of 

the host country’s role. First of all, and to responsibly protect, 

sometimes it is to protect civilians against the host country. 

Secondly, the host country may not in some areas have the capability to deal with the issue, and so this notion of the critical nature of that host country’s permission or invitation is a little confused in my own mind in terms of how you sort through that. 

Thank you all very much. We have got to run. 

[Whereupon, at 1:01 p.m., the committee was adjourned.] 

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