## IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA

THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent,

v. ROBERT COOPER, Defendant and Appellant.

S273134

Second Appellate District, Division Six

B304490

Los Angeles County Superior Court

TA140718

May 25, 2023

Justice Groban authored the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Guerrero and Justices Corrigan, Liu, Kruger, Jenkins, and Evans concurred.1 PEOPLE v. COOPER

S273134

Opinion of the Court by Groban, J.

Assembly Bill No. 333 (2021

– 2022 Reg. Sess.) ( Assembly
Bill 333)

, effective January 1, 2022, amended the substantive offense of active participation “in a criminal street gang” as well
as the sentencing enhancement available for a felony committed “for the benefit of, at the direction of, or in association with a criminal street gang, with the specific intent to promote, further, or assist in criminal conduct by gang members.” ( Stats. 2021, ch. 699, § 3; Pen Code, § 186.22, subd s

. (a), (b)(1) .) 1 Among other changes, A ssembly B ill 333 now requires that

, in order to demonstrate a pattern of criminal gang activity for the purpose of establishing a criminal street gang

, the prosecution must

prove that the two predicate offenses “commonly benefited a criminal street gang, and the common benefit from the offenses is more than reputational.” (§ 186.22, subd. (e) (1) .) 2

1 All further unspecified statutory references are to the Penal Code.

2 In order to establish that a gang is in fact a criminal street gang within the meaning of the California Street Terrorism Enforcement and Prevention Act (STEP Act) , the prosecution

mus t prove that gang members “ collectively engage in, or have engaged in, a pattern of criminal gang activity .” (§ 186.22, subd. (f).) We refer to the offenses that are used to establish “ a pattern of criminal gang activity ” under the STEP Act as predicate offenses. ( § 186.20 et seq. ; see People v. Valencia (2021) 11 Cal.5th 818, 829 .)PEOPLE v. COOPER Opinion of the Court by Groban, J.

2 Defendant Robert Cooper was convicted of first degree murder (§ 187, subd. (a)) with gang (§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1)(C))
and firearm enhancements (§§ 186.22, subd. (b), 12022.53, subds. (b)

– (e)), and a prior strike conviction (§§ 667, subds. (b)

– (i)

, 1170.12, subds. (a)

– (d))

. We granted review in this case to determine whether any of Cooper’s sentencing enhancements
must be vacated due to this recent statutory change to section
186.22

. 3 The parties as well as the Court of Appeal below all agree that Cooper’ s jury was instructed under the prior law, that
the new requirements in section 186.22 appl y retroactively to Cooper’s case on appeal under In re Estrada (1965) 63 Cal.2d

740 , and that the prejudice from the instructional error is
assessed under Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18 ( Chapman )

. (See People v. Tran (2022) 13 Cal.5th 1169, 1207 [ the rule of Estrada applies to A ssem. B ill 333’s changes to §
186.22 and any instructional error resulting from the change in
law is assessed under Chapman ] .) Applying th e Chapman standard, we hold that the failure to instruct that the alleged predicate offenses must have “commonly benefited” the gang in a “more than reputational” manner (§ 186.22, subd. (e) (1) ) was not harmless bey ond a reasonable doubt

. Here, the record contains evidence that could rationally lead to a contrary finding regarding whether the gang as a whole (as opposed to the predicate offender s themselves ) benefited from the offense s in a nonreputational manner

. W e reverse Cooper’s gang enhancement, as well as the firearm enhancement that is contingent upon the gang enhancement, and remand the case to

3 Cooper’s first degree murder conviction is not at issue in this appeal.PEOPLE v. COOPER Opinion of the Court by Groban, J.

3 the Court of Appeal with instructions to remand the case to the superior court for any retrial of the same.
I. Background
Cooper was a member of the Lu e ders Park gang. 4 Nicos Mathis and Monique Peterson were members of a rival gang,
Mob Piru. On October 24, 2012, the three were all in Gonzales Park in Compton with a large group of peo ple

. Mathis challenged Cooper to a fight, but Cooper declined and walked

away. About 20 minutes later, a Buick drove into the park. Peterson recognized the two occupants of the Buick as Lu e ders Park gang members and urged Mathis to leave. Mathis refused
to leave because he was waiting for a fellow gang member
nicknamed “ Hit Man. ” Eventually Mathis drove away looking
for Hit Man with Peterson and two other friend s . Mathis pulled
over on the street where Hit Man had told him to meet. Peterson heard gunshots, and told Mathis to drive away, but they
remained parked

. Peterson testified that she turned and saw two cars pull up, the Buick and an Infiniti. Cooper, “Mousey,” and “Honcho”
were in the Infiniti. She saw two guns fire toward the vehicle
she was in . One of the guns was fired from the front passenger side of the Infiniti and the other from the rear passenger side.
The Buick crashed into Mathis’ s car but drove away. Mathis
was shot once in the head and four times in the body and later died of his wounds in the hospital.

4 The brief summary of facts is drawn from the Court of Appeal’s opinion

.PEOPLE v. COOPER Opinion of the Court by Groban, J.

4 An information charged Cooper with conspiracy to commit murder (§ 182, subd. (a)(1)); the murder of Mathis (§ 187, subd. (a)) ; and three counts of attempted murder (§§ 664

, 187, subd. (a))

. Each count also alleged firearm allegations (§ 12022.53,
subds

. (b), (c), (d), & (e)(1) ) , and that the crimes were committed for the benefit of, at the direction of, or in association with a

gang (§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1)(C) )

. The information also alleged a prior strike conviction (§§ 667, subds. (b)

– (i)

, 1170.12, subds. (a)

– (d)).

A jury initially acquitted Cooper of three counts of attempted murder (§§ 664

, 187, subd. (a)), but hung on a murder

count (§ 187, subd. (a)) and conspiracy to commit murder count (§ 182, subd. (a)(1)). A retrial was held on the murder count only, with the gang (§ 186.22, subd. (b )(1)) and firearm enhancements alleged as before (§ 12022.53, subds. (b)

– (e))

. The jury then convicted Cooper of first degree murder (§ 187, subd. (a)) and found true the gang (§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1)) and firearm enhancements (§ 12022.53, subds. (b)

– (e)). The trial court accepted Cooper ’s admi ssion that he had suffered a prior
strike conviction

. (§§ 667, subds. (b)

– (i)

, 1170.12, subds. (a)

– (d)

. )
The trial court sentenced Cooper to 75 years to life in prison, consisting of 25 years to life for the murder, doubled by the strike, plus a consecutive 25 years to life for the firearm
enhancement pursuant to section 12022.53, subdivisions (d) and (e)(1). The trial court stayed the rem aining gun and gang
enhancements.
At the retrial, the jury was instructed on the gang
enhancement pursuant to the former section 186.22 with
CALCRIM No. 1401

. The jury was instructed that to prove the gang enhancement, the prosecution must prove the “defe ndant committed or attempted to commit the crime for the benefit of,PEOPLE v. COOPER Opinion of the Court by Groban, J.

5 at the direction of, or in association with a criminal street gang; and [¶] That the defendant intended to assist, further, or promote criminal conduct by gang members.” The jury was
ins tructed that the definition of a “criminal street gang” requires a “pattern of gang activity” and “as one or more of its primary activities, ” the commission of the predicate offenses of robbery and the sales of narcotics

. To establish a “pattern of

gang a ctivity,” the prosecution must prove “ at least one of ” the predicate robbery and the sales of narcotics offenses and that the offenses “were committed on separate occasions or were personally committed by two or more persons.” Pursuant to the former law, the jury was instructed that the predicate offenses “if any, that establish a pattern of criminal gang activity, need not be gang

- related.” The jury was not instructed , as A ssembly
B ill 333 now requires, that the predicate offenses , if any, must have “commonly benefited [the] criminal street gang, and the common benefit from the offenses is more than reputational.” (§ 186.22, subd. (e) (1) .)

The records of conviction and gang expert testimony establishing the predicate offenses at the re trial show that two
Lu e ders Park gang members committed one crime each : Ricky Lee Vaughn committed a robbery in violation of sectio n 211 in
2012 and Donald Wayne Mahan sold narcotics in violation of
Health and Safety Code section 11351.5 in 201 2

. 5 The gang expert testified that both Vaughn and Mahan are Lu e ders Park gang members . The gang expert had contacted Vaughn
“numerous times ” and Vaughn has “identified himself as a

5 The Court of Appeal states this narcotics sale occurred in 2016, but the record of conviction and gang expert testimony reflect it occurred in 2012.PEOPLE v. COOPER Opinion of the Court by Groban, J.

6 [ Lu e ders ] Park Piru gang member.” The gang expert testified
that Mahan ’s son “ Doc ” is “[p]robably the most senior [ Lu e ders ] Park Piru gang member on the street right now.” He also
testified that the Lu e ders Park gang claims territory in Compton and its primary activities are “theft, burglary, robbery, vehicle theft, narcotic sales, narcotic possession, weapons sales,

weapons possession, assault to murder.” The gang expert explained that “ most gang members play that role of a gang
member and act hard . But there’s a specific group within each specific gang that are really your most active guys

. ” He added: “They’re out there g oing on missions, they’re doing shootings, they’re doing robberies, they function to do gang banging things. And that gets that gang’s name out there.” The gang expert
further testified that t hrough the generations, Lu e ders Park has had “different groups that do robberies, shootings, run girls, [and] sell narcotics.”
In response to a hypothetical question

, the gang expert testified to how the underlying murder benefited the gang, but did not testify as to how the alleged predicate offenses benefited
the gang

. The gang expert explained that a murder like the one
in this case would benefit the gang by eliminating a rival and by maintaining respect , but that money is the “number one” gang
function

. During the pendency of Cooper’s appeal, A ssembly B ill
333 amended section 186.22’s definition of a “criminal street gang” to require proof of additional elements. As relevant here, in order to prove “a pattern of criminal gang activity” for the purpose of establishing a criminal street gang, the prosecution
must now prove both that the required predicate offenses “commonly benefited [the] criminal street gang ” and that “ the common benefit from the offenses is more than reputational.”PEOPLE v. COOPER Opinion of the Court by Groban, J.

7 (Stats. 2021, ch. 699, § 3; § 186.22, subd. (e)(1).) A ssembly B ill
333 cl arifies that “ E xamples of a common benefit that are more than reputational may include, but are not limited to, financial gain or motivation, retaliation, targeting a perceived or actual gang rival, or intimidation or silencing of a potential current or

pr evious witness or informant.” (Stats. 2021, ch. 699, § 3; § 186.22, subd. (g).) 6
Based upon the evidence presented at the retrial , the Court of Appeal found that the absence of a jury instruct ion on the new requirement that the alleged predicate offens es must have “commonly benefited” the gang in a “more than reputational” manner (§ 186.22, subd. (e) (1) ) was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. The Court of Appeal reasoned that the gang expert “ testified that the offenses were committed by [ Lu e ders ] Park gang members and that robbery and sale of narcotics are some of the gang’s primary activities. The evidence was uncontradicted. The benefit to the gang of robbery
and sale of narcotics is more than reputational.” ( People v. Cooper (Jan. 14, 2022, B304490) [nonpub. opn.] .) We granted
review.

II. Discussion
Cooper argues that the Court of Appeal erred in finding
that the lack of jury instruction o n A ssembly B ill 333 ’s new
elements was harmless. Here, the jury was never instructed

6 A ssembly B ill 333 also made several other changes to section 186.22 that are not at issue in this appeal . These changes includ ed narrow ing the definition of “criminal street gang” to “an ongoing, organized association or group of three or more persons,” whose members “ collectively ,” rather than just individually, “engage in, or have engaged in, a pattern of criminal gang activity.” (§ 186.22, subd. (f), italics added.)PEOPLE v. COOPER Opinion of the Court by Groban, J.

8 that , as A ssembly B ill 333 now requires, the predicate offense s
must have “commonly benefited [the] criminal street gang, and
the common benefit from the offenses is more than reputational.” (§ 186.22, subd. (e)(1).) W e agree with Cooper
and find that the absence of jury instruct ion on this new requirement was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.

C hapman holds “that before a federal constitutional error can be held harmless, the court must be able to declare a belief that it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.” ( Chapman,

supra , 386 U.S. at p. 24.) The jury instruction here implicates Cooper’s due process rights by lessening the prosecution’s burden to prove elements of the crime. (See People v. Harris (1994) 9 Cal.4th 407, 438 [“jury instructions in a state criminal trial omitting the requirement of proof of every element of a
crime beyond a r easonable doubt are erroneous under the Fourteenth Amendment’s due process clause”].) The due

process “ requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt and the Sixth Amendment requirement of a jury verdict are
interrelated

. ” ( Sullivan v. Louisiana (1993) 508 U.S. 275, 278.) Chapman applies to a jury instruction that omits an element of an offense. ( Neder v. U nited S tates (1999) 527 U.S. 1, 4.) When

a jury instruction has omitt ed an element of an offense , our task

“ is to determine ‘whether the re cord contains evidence that could rationally lead to a contrary finding with respect to the
omitted element

. ’ ” ( People v. Mil (2012) 53 Cal.4th 400, 417 ( Mil ) , quoting Neder, at p. 19

. ) 7

7 The Attorney General incorrectly characterizes the Chapman inquiry before us as asking whether the jury could draw a reasonable inference that the alleged predicate offensesPEOPLE v. COOPER Opinion of the Court by Groban, J.

9 Since A ssembly B ill 333’s new elements did not exist at the time of Cooper’s trial, the prosecution made no attempt to prove that the alleged predicate offenses provided a more than reputational common benefit to the gang and Cooper made no such concession. Instead, t he rec ords of conviction and gang expert testimony establishing the predicate offenses at the

re trial merely show that two Lu e ders Park gang members
committed one crime each: Ricky Vaughn committed a robbery
in 2012 and Donald Mahan sold narcotics in 2012 . The gang expert also testified that Lu e ders Park’s primary activities are “theft, burglary, robbery, vehicle theft, narcotic sales, narcotic possession, weapons sales, weapons possession, assault to
murder.” The Attorney General suggests , and t he Court of App eal appears to have concluded

, that crimes that have an inherent financial benefit and that are identified as the gang’s primary activities qualify as a common benefit to the gang that
is “more than reputational” under A ssembly B ill 333. (See People v. Cooper

, supra , B304490 [“The benefit to the gang of robbery and sale of narcotics is more than reputational”].) However, the record does not disclose the circumstances surrounding the predicate offenses and the prosecution never introduced any evidence ab out how the gang commonly benefited from them. While robbery and the sale of narcotics typically provide a financial benefit to the offender

, the record contains evidence that could rationally lead to a contrary finding regarding whether the fruits of the offenses were intended to or

commonly benef

ited the gang. This, however, is not the proper standard. As noted above, our task “is to determine ‘whether the record contains evidence that could rationally lead to a contrary finding with respect to the omitted element.’ ” ( Mil,
supra , 53 Cal.4th at p. 417 .)PEOPLE v. COOPER Opinion of the Court by Groban, J.

10 did benefit the gang as a whole

. As the Attorney General concedes, robbery and narcotics sales “may of course be committed by gang members only for personal gain (which, relatedly, may benefit the gang only reputationally).” Indeed

, “[n]ot every crime committed by gang members is related to a

gang

. ” ( People v. Albillar (2010) 51 Cal.4th 47, 60

. ) In this way,
the question of whether an offense is within the gang’s primary activities is distinct from the question of whether a particular offense has “commonly benefited a criminal street gang.” (§ 186.22, subd. (e)(1).) A jury determination regarding the gang’s pri mary activities merely constitutes a conclusion about the types of activities in which a gang typically engages, whereas the question about a common benefit asks about how the specific predicate offense actually benefited the gang. ( See People v. E.H. (20 22) 75 Cal.App.5th 467, 473, 478

– 480 ( E.H. ) [ finding that though the predicate offenses included crimes that could, in theory, provide a monetary benefit to the gang, the evidence did not show that these predicate offenses actually benefited the gang ]. ) F urthermore, the jury here was specifically instructed that the predicate offenses “that establish a pattern of criminal gang activity[] need not be gang

- related

, ”
in accordance with the former law as set forth in People v. Gardeley (1996) 14 Cal.4th 605

, 621

– 622 , disapproved of on other grounds by People v. Sanchez (2016) 63 Cal.4th 665

, 686,
fn. 13

. This instruction directly contradicts A ssembly B ill 333 ’s new requirement that the predicate offenses “commonly benefited [the ] criminal street gang, and the common benefit from the offenses is more than reputational.” (§ 186.22, subd. (e)(1).) Based upon the record, a jury could have reasonably
conclude d that the predicate offenses at issue were committed for personal gain alon e.PEOPLE v. COOPER Opinion of the Court by Groban, J.

11 Moreover, the Attorney General’s interpretation would render superfluous much of the new amendment that requires both that predicate offenses “commonly benefited” the gang and that the common benefit is “more than reputational.” (§ 186.22, subd. (e)(1) .) Section 186.22, subdivision (e)(1) lists numerous predicate offenses that typically involve a financial benefit to the
offender. 8 Prior to the amendments, section 186.22, subdivisions (e)(1) and (f), which define “pattern of criminal gang activity” a nd “a criminal street gang,” have long required that the gang must have “as one of its primary activities the commission of one or more of” the enumerated predicate offenses. (§ 186.22, subd. (f ).) The Legislature then decided to
amend section 186.22 to require a heightened showing both that the predicate offenses “commonly benefited a criminal street gang” and that the common benefit is “more than reputational.” (§ 186.22, subd. (e)(1).) If all that were required to prove a predicate offense is that th e prosecution show that the gang member committed as one of the gang’s primary activities any one of the enumerated predicate offenses that typically involve a financial benefit, then the additional requirement that the predicate offenses also “commonly be nefited a criminal street gang” in a “more than reputational” manner would be mere surplusage. Finally, such an interpretation is inconsistent with the legislative history indicating the Legislature was concerned

8 Specifically, the list of predicate offenses in section 186.22, subdivision (e)(1) includes: robbery (§ 211 et seq.), sale or possession for sale of a controlled substances (Health & Saf. Code, § 11007 ), grand theft (§ 487), grand theft of a firearm or vehicle (§ 487, subd. (d)), burglary (§ 459), money laundering (§ 186.10), felony extortion (§§ 518, 520), carjacking (§ 215), sale of a firearm (§ 27500 et seq.), and vehicle theft (Veh. Code, § 10851).PEOPLE v. COOPER Opinion of the Court by Groban, J.

12 with “lax” interpretations of the prior la w that allowed for overly expansive application of gang enhancements ( S tats. 2021, ch. 699, § 2) and therefore sought to amend the law by “making the standards for applying a gang enhancement more rigorous.” (Sen. Com. on Public Safety

, Analysis of A ssem

. B ill 333, as amended May 28, 2021, p. 6.) 9
The Attorney General tries to save his argument by claiming that because Mahan was a “ ‘senior’ ” member of the gang and Vaughn was “a well

- known” member, a reasonable inference is that Mahan and Vaughn were among the “most active” gang members committing the gang’s primary activities, making it in turn reasonable to infer that they committed the predicate offenses for the common benefit of the gang. However, even assuming arguendo that senior or well

- known gang
member ship could possibly be evidence that predicate offenses commonly benefited t he gang, the record does not support the Attorney General’s characterization of Mahan and Vaughn as
senior or well

- know n members of the gang. Rather, the gang expert testified, when asked if he was familiar with Mahan, that “I know Doc, his son. Doc’s a [Lueders] Park Piru gang member.

9 At oral argument, defense counsel acknowledged that one interpretation of A ssembly B ill 333 is that, though the evidence presented here does not suffice, it is permissible, as a general matter, to use circumstantial evidence to prove a common benefit th at is more than reputational. It is also worth noting that a financial gain is not the only way that the prosecution can prove a more than reputational common benefit to the gang. A ssembly B ill 333 provides several other examples of a more than reputatio nal common benefit, including, but not limited to,

“ retaliation, targeting a perceived or actual gang rival, or intimidation or silencing of a potential current or previous witness or informant.” (§ 186 .22 , subd. (g).)PEOPLE v. COOPER Opinion of the Court by Groban, J.

13 Probably the most senior [Lueders] Park Piru gang member on the street right now. Been a long time in prison. I think he’s been out maybe three or four years now. But just saw him a couple weeks ago. Probably there tod ay. He sets up on Saunders and Bradfield and goes to sell his narcotics.” The most plausible read of this testimony is that the gang expert testified that Mahan’s son (and not Mahan himself) was “the most senior” Lueders Park gang member

. At a minimum, this testimony does
not allow us to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the gang expert was referring to Mahan himself. Moreover, to the

extent the Attorney General is suggesting that we can determine beyond a reasonable doubt that Mahan was a senior

gang m ember simply because a family member was a senior gang member, we reject that argument out of hand. As for Ricky Vaughn, though the Attorney General contends that the gang expert characterized him as a “well

- known” gang member, the

gang expert actually te stified that “I’ve contacted Ricky numerous times. I’ve spoken to Ricky. He identified himself as a [Lueders] Park Piru gang member. I’ve taken photographs of him throwing up the [Lueders] Park Piru Hand sign. [¶] I’ve recently assisted on another cas e where Ricky Lee Vaughn has identified himself as a [Lueders] Park Piru gang member again.” Again, even assuming arguendo that senior or well

- known gang membership could possibly be evidence that predicate offenses commonly benefited the gang, this testi mony does not support the Attorney General’s characterization. The gang expert testified not that Vaughn was a well

- known or senior gang member , but simply that Vaughn was known to the gang expert
thr ough several prior contacts with him

. In sum, t he grand total of evidence relied on by the Attorney General for proving that the alleged predicate offenses providedPEOPLE v. COOPER Opinion of the Court by Groban, J.

14 a common benefit that is more than reputational to the gang is that there was a robbery and a sale of narcotics by gang
member s and that a primary activity of the gang is to commit
robberies and the sale of narcotics

. Under these circumstances

, we cannot conclude “beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained.” ( Chapman, supra , 386 U.S. a t p. 24.) 10
III. Disposition

For the above reasons, we reverse the Court of Appeal’s affirmance of Cooper’s gang enhancement. 11 Since the firearm

10 As Cooper argues, the Court of Ap peal’s holding is an anomaly among opinions considering A ssembly B ill 333 and which have reversed gang enhancements. (E.g., E.H. , supra , 75 Cal. App. 5th at pp. 476

– 480; People v. Lopez (2021) 73 Cal.App.5th 327, 343

– 346 ( Lopez ) ; People v. Sek (2022) 74 Cal.App.5th 657, 664

– 670; People v. Rodriguez (2022) 75 Cal.App.5th 816, 822

– 823; People v. Vasquez (2022) 74 Cal.App.5th 1021, 1032

– 1033.) In each case, the predicate offenses and the evidence supporting them are different and, as the Attorney General maintains, these decisions have distinguishing features. Nevertheless, though we do not her e decide the unique facts of those cases, Cooper is correct that in each case the Court of Appeal reversed a gang enhancement after the enactment of A ssemb ly B ill 333 for a trial that occurred without A ssembly B ill 333’s guidance. Indeed, the decision below is the only Court of Appeal opinion cited in the parties’ briefing affirming a gang enhancement after the enactment of A ssembly B ill 333 for a trial tha t occurred before A ssembly B ill 333 was enacted.

11 As noted above, A ssembly B ill 333 also requires that gang members “collectively” engage in a pattern of criminal gang activity under section 186.22, subdivision (f). Cooper requests that if we do not rev erse the gang enhancement based upon the new requirement that the predicate offenses commonly benefitPEOPLE v. COOPER Opinion of the Court by Groban, J.

15 enhancement alleged under section 12022.53, subdivision (e)(1),
is contingent on a true finding on the gang enhancement under
section 186.22 , we reverse the Court of Appeal’s affirmance of
th at firearm enhancement as well , and remand the case to the Court of Appeal with instructions to remand the case to the superior cou rt for any retrial of the same

. (See Lopez

, supra , 73 Cal.App.5th at pp. 346

– 3 48 ; E.H.

, supra , 75 Cal.App.5th at

p. 480 [“The proper remedy for this type of failure of proof

— where newly required elements were ‘never tried’ to the jury

— is to remand and give the People an opportunity to retry the affected charges”] .)

GROBAN, J.

We Concur: GUERRERO, C. J. CORRIGAN, J. LIU , J. KRUGER, J. JENKINS, J. EVANS , J.

the gang in a more than reputational way, that we instead remand the case to the Court of Appeal so that the failure to instruct on the element of collect ive action by the gang can be briefed there. Cooper has also filed a motion for eventual remand or, alternatively, to expand the issues on review based upon similar reasons. Since we are reversing Cooper’s gang enhancement on the issue that we granted re view upon, Cooper’s requests that we remand or expand the issues based upon another theory is rendered moot.See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who

argued in Supreme Court.

Name of Opinion People v. Cooper

__________________________________________________________
Procedural Posture (see XX below) Original Appeal Original Proceeding Review Granted (published) Review Granted (unpublished) XX NP opn. filed 1 / 1 4 / 22

– 2 d Dist.

, Div. 6 Rehearing Granted

__________________________________________________________ Opinion No. S273134 Date Filed: May 25

, 202 3

__________________________________________________________
Court: Superior County: Los Angeles Judge: Allen Joseph Webster, Jr.

__________________________________________________________
Counsel:

Elizabeth K. Horowitz , under appointment by the Supreme Court, for Defendant and Appellant

. Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant Attorney General, Michael C. Keller , Idan Ivri and Charles S. Lee, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for

publication with opinion):

Elizabeth K. Horowitz Law Office of Elizabeth K. Horowitz, Inc. 5272 S outh Lewis Ave nue , Suite 256 Tulsa, OK 74105 (424) 543

- 4710

Charles S. Lee Deputy Attorney General 300 South Spring Street, Suite 1702 Los Angeles, CA 90013 (213) 269

- 6068