IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

Docket No. 42442-2014

IN THE MATTER OF THE

TERMINATION OF THE PARENTAL

RIGHTS OF: 

JANE DOE (2014-22),

 Respondent-Appellant,

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Boise, December 2014 Term

2015 Opinion No. 11

Filed: January 26, 2015

Stephen W. Kenyon, Clerk

Appeal from the Magistrate Court of the Third Judicial District of the State of 

Idaho, in and for Payette County. Hon. Brian D. Lee, Magistrate Judge.

The judgment of the magistrate court is affirmed.

Virginia Bond, Bond Law Chtd., Payette, submitted a brief on behalf of appellant.

Brent R. King, Deputy Attorney General, Caldwell, submitted a brief on behalf of

respondent.

EISMANN, Justice.

This is an appeal out of Payette County from a judgment terminating the appellant’s 

parental rights in her child. We affirm the judgment of the magistrate court.

I.

Factual Background.

On August 15, 2012, Jane Doe’s three-year-old son was found wandering in a truck stop 

parking lot, where trucks were entering and leaving. He had walked from a recreational vehicle 

1.9 miles away, where Jane Doe and her boyfriend were living. When the police went to the 

recreational vehicle, they observed that there was insufficient food appropriate for a child. Jane 

Doe gave conflicting accounts as to why the child had been unsupervised. The police declared 

the child in imminent danger and took him into shelter care. The following day, proceedings 

involving the child were commenced under the Child Protective Act, I.C. §§ 16-1601 to 16-1643. 
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Pursuant to a stipulation of the parties, the magistrate court entered a decree on September 7, 

2012, finding that the child came within the purview of the Act and vesting legal custody of the 

child in the Idaho Department of Health and Welfare for an indeterminate time not to exceed the 

child’s eighteenth birthday. On September 26, 2012, the Department filed a case plan which set 

forth tasks to be accomplished by Jane Doe for the purpose of reuniting Jane Doe with her son.

The attempt at reunification was not successful, and on May 2, 2014, the Department 

filed a petition to terminate Jane Doe’s parental rights in her son. The termination proceedings 

were set for an evidentiary hearing to commence on August 5, 2014. On that date, Jane Doe did 

not appear, but her attorney was present. He stated that he had spoken with Jane Doe the prior 

afternoon and she was equivocal as to whether she would attend the evidentiary hearing. The 

court then proceeded with the evidentiary hearing.

On August 7, 2014, the magistrate court entered findings of fact and conclusions of law. 

On the same date, it entered a document titled “Decree,” which purported to terminate Jane 

Doe’s parental rights. However that decree did not comply with Rule 54(a) of the Idaho Rules of 

Civil Procedure, and it therefore did not constitute a final judgment. On August 21, 2014, Jane 

Doe filed a notice of appeal.

On September 12, 2014, the magistrate court entered more detailed findings of fact and 

conclusions of law. Based upon the facts found, the magistrate court concluded, by clear and 

convincing evidence, that Jane Doe had neglected her son and that it was in the child’s best 

interests to have Jane Doe’s parental rights terminated. On the same date, the court entered a 

document titled “Amended Decree.” However, the amended decree also did not comply with 

Rule 54(a), and so it did not constitute a final judgment terminating Jane Doe’s parental rights. 

On September 24, 2014, the court entered a document titled “Second Amended Judgment,”

which complied with Rule 54(a) and terminated Jane Doe’s parental rights in her son.

II.

Did the Magistrate Court Err in Entering Jane Doe’s Default?

Jane Doe contends that the magistrate court entered default against her for her failure to 

be present at the evidentiary hearing and that it erred in doing so because she was not given the 

three-day notice required by Rule 55 of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. The court did not 

enter Jane Doe’s default.
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In its document titled “Findings of Fact Conclusions of Law and Decree,” the court 

wrote:

That the termination of the parent-child relationship between [Jane Doe], 

parent and [her son], child, is justified on the grounds that said parent failed to 

appear for the scheduled termination hearing and failed to plead or otherwise 

defend against the Petition for Termination after notice was given. Such failure to 

appear or defend or plead constitutes a basis for the entry of a default judgment 

pursuant to Rule 55 of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure.

This paragraph did not constitute the entry of default against Jane Doe. Merely stating 

that the court believed Jane Doe’s failure to be present at the evidentiary hearing “constitutes a 

basis for the entry of default” does not constitute the entry of default. Pierce v. McMullen, 156 

Idaho 465, 470, 328 P.3d 445, 450 (2014). The entry of default requires the filing of a document 

stating that default was entered against the party. Id. That did not occur in this case.

Before a final judgment was entered in this case, the magistrate court apparently 

recognized its error, and on September 12, 2014, it entered more detailed findings of fact and 

conclusions of law which did not mention any purported default by Jane Doe. Therefore, the 

court did not base its decision upon the belief that it could enter default against Jane Doe for her 

failure to attend the evidentiary hearing.

III.

Did the Magistrate Court Err in Failing to Find Grounds for Termination by Clear and 

Convincing Evidence?

“The trial court must find that grounds for terminating parental rights have been proved 

by clear and convincing evidence.” Dep’t. of Health and Welfare v. Doe, 149 Idaho 207, 210, 

233 P.3d 138, 141 (2010). Citing the findings of fact initially entered by the magistrate court on 

August 7, 2014, Jane Doe argues that the court failed to make the required findings of fact by 

clear and convincing evidence.

Jane Doe is correct that the initial findings of fact make no mention of having found the 

necessary facts by clear and convincing evidence. However, in the findings of fact that the court 

entered on September 12, 2014, the court expressly found that the grounds for termination were 

proved by clear and convincing evidence.

A court may terminate a parent-child relationship if the court finds that termination is in 

the child’s best interests and one of the statutory conditions exists. I.C. § 16-2005(1). In this 
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case the magistrate court expressly found by clear and convincing evidence that termination was 

in the best interests of the child. In its September findings of fact, it stated that “the termination 

of the parent-child relationship is in the best interest of the above mentioned child by clear and 

convincing evidence.” (Emphasis added.)

The court found that two of the statutory conditions existed. One of the conditions was 

that Jane Doe neglected the child because he was “without proper parental care and control, or 

subsistence, medical or other care or control necessary for his well-being because of the conduct 

or omission of [Jane Doe],” as provided in Idaho Code section 16-2002(3)(a), which incorporates 

the definition in Idaho Code section 16-1602(28). The court expressly found that termination 

was “justified on the grounds that said parent neglected said child, as defined in section 16-

2002(3)(a), and 16-1602(28), Idaho Code by clear and convincing evidence.” (Emphasis added.) 

The court also found that Jane Doe neglected the child because she failed to comply with the 

case plan, the Department had custody of the child for fifteen of the recent twenty-two months, 

and reunification had not occurred by the last day of the fifteen-month period, as provided in 

Idaho Code section 16-2002(3)(b). The court expressly found that termination was justified “on 

the grounds that said parent neglected said child, as defined in section 16-2002(3)(b), Idaho 

Code, by clear and convincing evidence.” (Emphasis added.) Thus, the court did not err in 

failing to find the grounds for termination by clear and convincing evidence.

IV.

Were the Magistrate Court’s Findings Supported by Substantial and Competent Evidence?

“In an action to terminate parental rights where a trial court has noted explicitly and 

applied a clear and convincing standard, an appellate court will not disturb the trial court’s 

findings unless they are not supported by substantial and competent evidence.” State v. Doe, 144 

Idaho 534, 535, 164 P.3d 814, 815 (2007). “Substantial and competent evidence is relevant 

evidence that a reasonable mind might accept to support a conclusion.” Anderson v. Harper’s, 

Inc., 143 Idaho 193, 195, 141 P.3d 1062, 1064 (2006). “It is the province of the trial court to 

determine the credibility of witnesses, the weight to be given their testimony, and the inferences 

to be drawn from the evidence.” KMST, LLC v. Cnty. of Ada, 138 Idaho 577, 581, 67 P.3d 56, 

60 (2003).
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Jane Doe cites various statements in reports filed by the Department prior to the 

evidentiary hearing held on August 5, 2014, and concludes that “the Department’s allegations of 

neglect have little probative value.” Jane Doe does not mention any of the evidence that was 

presented at the evidentiary hearing; she does not point to any lack of evidence at that hearing;

she does not mention the magistrate court’s findings of fact filed on September 12, 2014; and she 

does not identify any findings that were allegedly unsupported by substantial and competent 

evidence. 

The magistrate court found that the three times Jane Doe’s son was placed back in her 

home ended prematurely—the first time with her leaving the child with someone who called 

police because she could not care for him, the second time with Jane Doe being incarcerated, and 

the third time with her being arrested. The court also found, among other failings, Jane Doe did 

not become financially stable because her reported income “included income from forgery, 

prostitution, and drug dealing”; that “[d]uring the time [Jane Doe’s son] has been in foster care, 

[Jane Doe] has been incarcerated at least five times”; that “[d]uring the time [her son] has been 

in foster care, [Jane Doe] did not achieve stable housing as she has moved more than ten times 

during the case” and was homeless since being released from incarceration; and that she did not 

complete her case plan.

With respect to the best interests of Jane Doe’s child, she stated in her Appellant’s Brief

that a court may consider various factors including

whether the parent has the ability to change his or her conduct to assume parental 

responsibilities, whether the parent has provided financial support, whether there 

is a good relationship between the child and foster parent, whether the child has 

improved in foster care, whether the child’s needs are being met, the child’s need 

for stability and certainty, and the parent’s employment status and history.

The magistrate court found that Jane Doe’s son “has been in the legal custody of the 

Department of Health and Welfare for twenty-four months and is in need of stability”; that Jane 

Doe “has a history and pattern of instability in her life, showing that she will not be able to 

parent [the child] in the foreseeable future”; that she “did make some progress on her case plan, 

[but] she failed the major aspects of the plan and failed to change her parenting”; that her “lack 

of motivation to change is shown by her failure to attend her own trial which would decide the 

issue of whether to terminate her parental rights”; and that the child “is doing well in his foster 

parent’s home and has been provided the structure he needs.” Jane Doe does not present any 
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argument that these findings are insufficient to show that termination of her parental rights is in 

the child’s best interests.

Jane Doe has failed to show that the magistrate court erred in terminating her parental 

rights.

IV.

Conclusion.

We affirm the judgment of the magistrate court, and we award respondent costs on 

appeal.

Chief Justice BURDICK, Justices J. JONES, HORTON and Justice Pro Tem WALTERS

CONCUR.