United States Government Accountability Office

Washington, DC 20548 

July 17, 2009 

Congressional Committees 

Subject: Defense Critical Infrastructure: Actions Needed to Improve the 

Consistency, Reliability, and Usefulness of DOD’s Tier 1 Task Critical 

Asset List 

The Department of Defense (DOD) relies on a global network of defense critical 

infrastructure so essential that the incapacitation, exploitation, or destruction of an 

asset within this network could severely affect DOD’s ability to deploy, support, and 

sustain its forces and operations worldwide and to implement its core missions, 

including current missions in Iraq and Afghanistan. Because of its importance to DOD 

operations, this defense critical infrastructure could be vulnerable to attacks by 

adversaries, and vulnerable to natural disasters and hazards, such as hurricanes and 

earthquakes. Since September 2003, the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense 

for Homeland Defense and Americas’ Security Affairs (ASD[HD&ASA]) has been 

responsible for developing and ensuring implementation of critical infrastructure 

protection policy and program guidance. To identify and help assure the availability 

of this mission-critical infrastructure, in August 2005 DOD established the Defense 

Critical Infrastructure Program (DCIP),1 assigning overall responsibility for the 

program to ASD(HD&ASA).2

In April 2008, DOD issued an instruction that further 

assigned responsibilities and prescribed procedures for the implementation of DCIP, 

among other things.3In October 2008, DOD formalized the process for identifying 

and prioritizing its critical infrastructure.4

 

Since 2006, ASD(HD&ASA) has collaborated with the Joint Staff to compile a list of 

all DOD- and non-DOD-owned infrastructure essential to accomplish DOD’s missions. 

To support this effort, the combatant commands and military services are to identify 

and place their critical assets into prioritized tiers,5

 including Tier 1 Task Critical 

1

 DOD Directive 3020.40, Defense Critical Infrastructure Program (DCIP), (Aug. 19, 2005). 

2

 Earlier programs analogous to DCIP can be traced back to 1998. 

3

 DOD Instruction 3020.45, Defense Critical Infrastructure Program (DCIP) Management (Apr. 21, 

2008). 

4

 DOD Manual 3020.45-M, Defense Critical Infrastructure Program (DCIP): DOD Mission-Based 

Critical Asset Identification Process (CAIP), Volume 1 (Oct. 24, 2008). 

5

 According to DOD’s critical asset identification guidance, the definitions of the tiered Task Critical 

Assets are: Tier 1—An asset the loss, incapacitation, or disruption of which could result in mission (or 

function) failure at the DOD, military department, combatant command, sub-unified command, 

GAO-09-740R Defense Infrastructure 
Assets, which are assets of such extraordinary importance that their incapacitation or 

destruction would have a serious, debilitating effect on the ability of one or more 

military services, combatant commands, or DCIP Defense Infrastructure Sector Lead 

Agents to execute the mission essential tasks they support. Defense Critical Assets,6

on the other hand, are the assets most critical for fulfilling overall DOD missions and 

are identified from the universe of Task Critical Assets. The Joint Staff worked with 

the combatant commands, military services, and Defense Infrastructure Sector Lead 

Agents to develop the current departmentwide list of Tier 1 Task Critical Assets. In 

October 2008, ASD(HD&ASA) formally accepted the Joint Staff’s Defense Critical 

Asset nomination list as an initial list of Defense Critical Assets. 

In its May 2008 report on H.R. 5658,

7

 the House Committee on Armed Services 

addressed DOD’s lack of progress in analyzing the risks of electrical power outages to 

critical DOD missions through DCIP and, among other things, directed that GAO 

continue its review of DCIP. As a result, we initiated our on-going review of the 

assurance of electrical power supplies to DOD’s critical assets. We originally planned 

to select a random sample of DOD Tier 1 Task Critical Assets to survey for this 

review; however, based on discussions with DOD officials and our analysis, we 

determined that the universe of critical assets did not represent an accurate, 

comprehensive list of DOD Tier 1 Task Critical Assets, and that this issue in and of 

itself warranted further analysis.8

 Therefore, we are reporting separately on issues 

relating specifically to the Tier 1 Task Critical Asset list with recommendations, so 

DOD can take action in a timely manner to update and improve its list of Defense 

Critical Assets in the fall of 2009 and prioritize funding. We plan to issue a separate, 

related report later this year on our on-going review of the assurance of electrical 

power supplies to DOD critical assets. 

As discussed with the committees of jurisdiction for this report, we examined (1) the 

extent to which the combatant commands and military services applied consistent 

 defense agency, or defense infrastructure sector level. Tier 2—An asset the loss, incapacitation, or 

disruption of which could result in severe mission (or function) degradation at the DOD, military 

department, combatant command, sub-unified command, defense agency, or defense infrastructure 

sector level. Tier 3—An asset the loss, incapacitation, or disruption of which could result in mission 

(or function) failure below the military department, combatant command, sub-unified command, 

defense agency, or defense infrastructure sector level. (Emphasis added by GAO.) 

6

 Defense Critical Assets are of such extraordinary importance to DOD operations in peace, crisis, and 

war that their incapacitation or destruction would have a very serious, debilitating effect on the ability 

of DOD to fulfill its missions. Defense critical assets are a subset of Tier 1 Task Critical Assets. 

Currently, there are about 675 Tier 1 Task Critical Assets and 29 Defense Critical Assets. 

7

 H.R. Rep. No. 110-652, pp. 523-524 (May 16, 2008). 

8

 Although we found a number of duplicate assets on the Tier 1 Task Critical Asset list, combatant 

command officials said that duplication of Task Critical Assets is not a serious issue and is due mainly 

to the different naming conventions between the military services and combatant commands. 

Moreover, combatant command officials noted that if several combatant commands identify an asset 

as a Task Critical Asset, then this merely reflects its criticality to multiple mission owners. 

Page 2 GAO-09-740R Defense Infrastructure 
and clear criteria in identifying and prioritizing their submissions of assets to DOD’s 

Tier 1 Task Critical Asset list; (2) the actions ASD(HD&ASA) has taken to promote 

coordination among the Joint Staff, the combatant commands, and the military 

services to identify critical assets; and (3) the extent to which ASD(HD&ASA) 

developed effective program management practices related to the identification of 

Tier 1 Task Critical Assets, such as formal milestones, schedules, and a feedback 

process. 

We focused the scope of our review on DOD’s list of Tier 1 Task Critical Assets as of 

March 16, 2009, a universe of about 675 assets from which a list of Defense Critical 

Assets was developed.9 In addition, Defense Infrastructure Sector Lead Agents also 

identify Tier 1 Task Critical Assets; however, we did not include them in the scope of 

this review because they nominated relatively few assets compared to the combatant 

commands and military services. 

To evaluate these objectives, we conducted interviews with DCIP officials at the U.S. 

Army, the U.S. Navy, and the U.S. Air Force; U.S. Pacific Command; U.S. Strategic 

Command; Joint Staff (J-34); and ASD(HD&ASA). To determine the extent to which 

the combatant commands and military services applied consistent and clear criteria 

in identifying and prioritizing their submissions of assets to DOD’s Tier 1 Task 

Critical Asset list, we compared information regarding specific DCIP criteria used 

from our interviews with the combatant command and military service officials with 

prior and existing DCIP guidance, including the Defense Critical Infrastructure 

Program Criticality Process Guidance Document;10 the draft Critical Asset 

Identification Process,

11 the final DOD Manual 3020.45, DOD Mission-Based Critical 

Asset Identification Process;

12 DOD Directive 3020.40;13 DOD Instruction 3020.45;14

DCIP strategy documents;15 and relevant guidance from the military services.16 To 

 

9

 The actual number of Tier 1 Task Critical Assets can change frequently, since critical assets are 

regularly added and deleted from the list by the combatant commands, military services, defense 

agencies, and Defense Infrastructure Sector Lead Agents. 

10 Department of Defense, Defense Critical Infrastructure Program Criticality Process Guidance 

Document (Dec. 21, 2006). 

11 Department of Defense, Critical Asset Identification Process, Draft, Version 2.0 (Sept. 1, 2007). 

12 DOD 3020.45-M Volume 1 (Oct. 24, 2008). 

13 DOD Directive 3020.40 (Aug. 19, 2005). 

14 DOD Instruction 3020.45 (Apr. 21, 2008). 

15 These include the Department of Defense, Strategy for Defense Critical Infrastructure (Washington, 

D.C.: March 2008) and Department of Defense, National Defense Strategy (Washington, D.C.: June 

2008). 

16 See, for example, U.S. Air Force, The Identification of Critical Assets and Infrastructures—

Methodology, Version 2.0 (Apr. 7, 2006); Air Force Policy Directive 10-24, Air Force Critical 

Infrastructure Program (CIP) (Apr. 28, 2006); and U.S. Army, Critical Infrastructure Risk 

Management; The Identification of Critical Assets Methodology (Jan. 6, 2007). 

Page 3 GAO-09-740R Defense Infrastructure 
determine what actions ASD(HD&ASA) has taken to promote coordination among 

the Joint Staff, the combatant commands, and the military services, we conducted 

interviews with appropriate DOD officials regarding steps taken and planned, and 

evaluated the actions against current DCIP guidance related to coordination. Finally, 

to determine the extent to which ASD(HD&ASA) has developed effective program 

management practices related to the identification of Tier 1 Task Critical Assets, such 

as formal milestones, schedules, and a feedback process, we compared DCIP 

program management strategies and documents with criteria cited under our 

previous work on internal controls in the federal government.17 We also interviewed 

ASD(HD&ASA) and Joint Staff officials to determine what program management 

efforts they were developing to identify and prioritize Tier 1 Task Critical Assets. We 

conducted this performance audit from April 2009 to June 2009 in accordance with 

generally accepted government auditing standards. Those standards require that we 

plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a 

reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We 

believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and 

conclusions based on our audit objectives. 

Results in Brief

While DOD has made some progress in developing a Tier 1 Task Critical Asset list, 

this progress was limited by DOD’s lack of consistent criteria for identifying and 

prioritizing Tier 1 Task Critical Assets. When selecting and submitting their most 

recent lists of Tier 1 Task Critical Asset submissions to the Joint Staff, the combatant 

commands and the military services used disparate sets of guidance, including draft 

and nonbinding guidance, as their criteria. Air Force officials, however, told us they 

developed formal critical asset identification guidance based on DOD’s draft critical 

asset identification manual. According to military service and combatant command 

officials, DOD’s draft and nonbinding guidance contained unclear definitions of asset 

tiers, Task Critical Assets, and other key terms, such as “mission essential tasks.” 

Additionally, while DOD encouraged the combatant commands and military services 

to use the Criticality Process Guidance Document and a draft DOD Mission-Based 

Critical Asset Identification Process manual to determine their Tier 1 Task Critical 

Assets, it did not require them to do so because DOD’s final DOD Mission-Based 

Critical Asset Identification Process manual had not yet been issued. Our prior work 

on DCIP management18 and the Standards for Internal Control in the Federal 

Government19 both emphasize the importance of management controls to guide 

program implementation, which includes the development and issuance of formal 

guidance. The use of disparate sets of guidance, including draft and nonbinding 

 

17 See GAO, Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government, GAO/AIMD-00-21.3.1 

(Washington, D.C.: November 1999). 

18 GAO, Defense Infrastructure: Actions Needed to Guide DOD’s Efforts to Identify, Prioritize, and 

Assess Its Critical Infrastructure, GAO-07-461 (Washington, D.C.: May 24, 2007). 

19 GAO/AIMD-00-21.3.1. 

Page 4 GAO-09-740R Defense Infrastructure 
guidance, resulted in the selection and submission of assets to the Tier 1 Task Critical 

Assets list based on inconsistent criteria, thus limiting the usefulness of the Tier 1 

Task Critical Asset list to DOD decision-makers in determining DOD’s most critical 

assets and prioritizing funding to address identified vulnerabilities. In October 2008, 

DOD formally issued the current guidance on the identification of critical assets—

DOD Manual 3020.45, DOD Critical Asset Identification Process—that all 

stakeholders are required to use when identifying and prioritizing Task Critical 

Assets. Nevertheless, officials from U.S. Pacific Command and the Air Force we 

spoke with said that certain definitions contained in this current guidance are still 

subjective. According to officials from U.S. Pacific Command, as long as the process 

requires a determination of tier levels after an objective analysis of missions, mission 

essential tasks, and criticality, there will be a subjective element to certain 

definitions. Based on our analysis of the guidance and discussions with various 

officials, elements within those definitions may need to be further clarified. For 

example, Air Force officials stated that determining what constitutes a mission 

essential task for combatant command missions is a continuing challenge. In 

discussions with us, ASD(HD&ASA) and Joint Staff officials acknowledged that the 

critical asset identification process is still subjective. In the absence of consistent and 

clear definitions for determining appropriate asset tiers and asset criticality, 

combatant commands and military services applied definitions of Tier 1 Task Critical 

Assets inconsistently and, going forward, may continue to do so until these 

definitions are further clarified. 

DOD has taken some actions toward promoting coordination among the combatant 

commands, military services, and Joint Staff in compiling DOD’s Tier 1 Task Critical 

Asset list. For example, in August 2005, DOD issued DOD Directive 3020.40, which 

calls for coordination among the Joint Staff, combatant commands, military services, 

and other defense agencies for the purpose of identifying and assessing critical assets 

needed to implement DOD missions. Additionally, in October 2008, DOD issued DOD 

Manual 3020.45, which defines the combatant command, military service, and Joint 

Staff roles in the critical asset identification process. However, DOD has not yet 

developed formal coordination responsibilities and an effective coordination 

mechanism within DCIP, including a forum for coordination between the military 

services and combatant commands when identifying critical assets. Combatant 

command and military service officials told us that, in considering which assets to 

submit to DOD’s Tier 1 Task Critical Asset list, they coordinate only minimally with 

each other when determining which assets are critical to combatant command 

missions. Based on our analysis of the October 2008 manual and discussions with 

DCIP officials, we found that the Joint Staff, combatant commands, military services, 

and other DOD agencies still lack clearly defined coordination responsibilities and a 

mechanism for effective coordination within DCIP. As a result, the communication 

and coordination efforts among these key DCIP stakeholders when considering 

assets to nominate as Tier 1 Task Critical Assets have been insufficient and 

inconsistent. For example, Army officials stated they were unaware that an Armyrelated critical asset was submitted as a Defense Critical Asset during the previous 

data call and did not know who submitted it. Army officials think this will continue to 

be a problem under the new asset identification process. This is important because 

Page 5 GAO-09-740R Defense Infrastructure 
the asset owner—the Army in this case—typically uses this information to help 

develop strategies to mitigate risks and provide funding to address the asset’s 

identified vulnerabilities. Officials we spoke with from all three military services 

stated that lack of coordination with the combatant commands to identify task 

critical assets may continue. Joint Staff officials also acknowledged that coordination 

needs to be strengthened between the military services and combatant commands. 

Without effective coordination, the Joint Staff, combatant commands, and military 

services cannot agree on an accurate identification and prioritization of assets most 

critical to fulfilling combatant commands’ missions or reach agreement on how to 

prioritize funding to help develop effective actions to protect and mitigate against 

possible attacks on DOD’s critical infrastructure. 

While DOD has developed a strategy and comprehensive management plan for DCIP, 

it has not fully developed some DCIP program management elements for identifying 

Tier 1 Task Critical Assets, which could enhance the effectiveness of the program. 

DOD Directive 3020.40 requires ASD(HD&ASA)—the lead office for DCIP—to 

develop and ensure the implementation of DCIP policy and program guidance for the 

identification, prioritization, and protection of defense critical infrastructure. This 

directive also requires the Joint Staff to assist ASD(HD&ASA) in the development and 

maintenance of DCIP standards. DOD’s formal critical asset identification process 

manual issued in 2008 lacks some key elements necessary for sound program 

management, including clearly defined schedules and milestones for meeting 

performance goals and a formal feedback process. According to our work on sound 

management practices, comprehensive program schedules and formal 

communication strategies assist agencies in effectively implementing programs by 

providing relevant stakeholders with timelines to follow, performance milestones to 

meet, and shared expectations to guide their efforts. Because DOD lacks a formal 

process for submitting critical assets, including milestones and formal feedback from 

ASD(HD&ASA) or the Joint Staff on meeting program goals, the combatant 

commands and military services are limited in their ability to effectively select, 

compile, and validate their final nominations to DOD’s Tier 1 Task Critical Asset list. 

For example, according to the combatant command and military service officials we 

spoke with, the Joint Staff asked them to submit their final nominations for DOD's 

Tier 1 Task Critical Asset list in 2008 with relatively little prior notice. As a result, 

these officials expressed concern that they did not receive adequate time to develop 

their submissions thoroughly or accurately, and that they did not receive any formal 

feedback from the Joint Staff once their lists were submitted. Recognizing this 

problem, ASD(HD&ASA) officials told us that they are planning to develop a formal 

schedule for the combatant commands and military services to follow in developing 

their Tier 1 Task Critical Asset submissions. However, until ASD(HD&ASA) finalizes 

and formally issues this schedule, there may continue to be discrepancies in the 

expectations among the combatant commands, military services, and the Joint Staff 

regarding the timeframes for submitting assets. As a result, DOD’s Tier 1 Task Critical 

Asset list may continue to include assets that should not be on the list, or exclude 

assets that should be on the list if the services and combatant commands are not 

allowed sufficient notice or time for completing their asset submissions. In addition, 

without formal feedback from the Joint Staff on how DCIP stakeholders are adhering 

Page 6 GAO-09-740R Defense Infrastructure 
to program guidelines, the combatant commands and military services may not be 

aware that some of their asset submissions to the Tier 1 Task Critical Asset list do not 

conform to DCIP criteria. 

We are recommending that ASD(HD&ASA) clarify key elements within the DCIP 

definitions of a Task Critical Assets, formalize coordination responsibilities and 

mechanisms within DCIP, and develop processes for compiling the Tier 1 Task 

Critical Asset list, including the development of a formal schedule with timelines and 

milestones and a formal feedback process for key DCIP stakeholders when 

identifying and prioritizing critical assets for submission to the Tier 1 Task Critical 

Asset list. 

In written comments on a draft of this report, DOD partially concurred with all three 

of our recommendations. For each recommendation, DOD described relevant 

guidance in place or in draft and additional actions it would take in response. Our 

responses to these comments are presented in the Agency Comments and Our 

Evaluation section of this report, and DOD’s comments are reprinted in enclosure I. 

We also received technical comments from U.S. Pacific Command, and we 

incorporated these as appropriate. 

Background 

In response to the guidance contained in Homeland Security Presidential Directive 

7,

20 DOD formalized its critical infrastructure efforts in August 2005 by issuing DOD 

Directive 3020.40, Defense Critical Infrastructure Program (DCIP), which 

established the program and assigned overall responsibility to ASD(HD&ASA). DOD 

Directive 3020.40 requires, among other things, that ASD(HD&ASA) develop and 

ensure implementation of DCIP policy and program guidance for the identification, 

prioritization, and protection of defense critical infrastructure. 

Under DCIP, ASD(HD&ASA) and the Joint Staff have tasked the combatant 

commands, military services, and Defense Infrastructure Sector Lead Agents with 

nominating infrastructure necessary to accomplish the goals specified in the 

National Defense Strategy.

21 The combatant commands, in collaboration with the 

Joint Staff, identify and prioritize DOD missions that are the basis for determining 

infrastructure criticality, while the military services, as the principal owners of DOD 

infrastructure, identify and link infrastructure to the specific mission requirements of 

the combatant commands in coordination with defense infrastructure lead agents. 

Based on these efforts, the combatant commands and military services then nominate 

 

20 Homeland Security Presidential Directive 7, issued in December 2003, requires, among other 

things, that all federal departments and agencies identify, prioritize, and coordinate the protection of 

critical infrastructure and key resources from terrorist attacks. DCIP encompasses the full spectrum of 

threats—ranging from terrorist attacks to natural disasters and catastrophic accidents—that can 

adversely affect critical defense infrastructure. 

21 Department of Defense, The National Defense Strategy of the United States of America 

(Washington, D.C.: June 2008). 

Page 7 GAO-09-740R Defense Infrastructure 
assets to DOD’s consolidated draft critical asset list, which ASD(HD&ASA) uses as 

the basis for developing a final Task Critical Asset list and the Defense Critical Asset 

list. 

According to DCIP guidance for identifying defense critical infrastructure, the 

process used by DCIP stakeholders provides a consistent, repeatable, missionfocused analysis process to identify Task Critical Assets and an effects-based analysis 

to identify Defense Critical Assets from the list of Tier 1 Task Critical Assets. A Task 

Critical Asset is an asset of such extraordinary importance that its incapacitation or 

destruction would have a very serious debilitating effect on the ability of DOD, a 

military department, combatant command, sub-unified command, defense agency, or 

Defense Infrastructure Sector Lead Agent to execute the task that the asset supports. 

In October 2008, DOD issued DOD Manual 3020.45 that outlined a process for the 

combatant commands, the military services, the Defense Infrastructure Sector Lead 

Agents, and other DOD organizations to follow when identifying assets for 

submission as DOD Task Critical Assets. This process results in a DOD-wide list of 

Task Critical Assets that are tiered into three groups (Tier 1, Tier 2, and Tier 3) based 

on the criticality of their supported missions. The manual then tasks the Chairman of 

the Joint Chiefs of Staff to recommend a list of DOD Defense Critical Assets—

selected from the Tier 1 Task Critical Asset list—to ASD(HD&ASA) for review and 

approval. 

ASD(HD&ASA) has issued numerous documents with guidance related to DCIP, 

including DOD directives, manuals, and instructions. Figure 1 illustrates the timeline 

of issuance of key pieces of DCIP guidance related to the identification of Task 

Critical Assets and Defense Critical Assets. 

Figure 1: Timeline of Issuance of Key DCIP Guidance 

 

DOD Lacks Consistent Criteria for Identifying and Prioritizing Critical 

Assets to Develop Its Tier 1 Task Critical Asset List 

While DOD has made some progress in developing an evolving Tier 1 Task Critical 

Asset list, this progress has been limited by DOD’s lack of consistent criteria, 

Page 8 GAO-09-740R Defense Infrastructure 
including unclear definitions, for identifying and prioritizing Tier 1 Task Critical Asset 

nominations. The Joint Staff formally requested submissions of task critical assets 

from the military services, combatant commands, and other DCIP stakeholders in 

January 2007, and early in 2008, the Joint Staff asked that the military services and 

combatant commands update their list of their Tier I Task Critical Assets. However, 

the combatant commands and military services used different sets of guidance, 

including draft and non-binding guidance, as criteria during their identification and 

prioritization processes for their Tier 1 Task Critical Asset submissions. For example, 

DCIP officials at U.S. Pacific Command, the Army, the Air Force, and the Navy told us 

they had used internally developed guidance to identify and prioritize their Tier 1 

Task Critical Asset nominations, while U.S. Strategic Command officials said that 

they had used the draft version of the DOD Critical Asset Identification Process

manual that was available during the 2007 data call to develop their submissions. Air 

Force officials also told us they developed formal critical asset identification 

guidance based on DOD’s draft critical asset identification manual. Based on our 

review of the various forms of guidance, the definitions were varied for Tier 1 and 

Task Critical Assets and some versions of the guidance did not contain definitions for 

Tier 1. Similarly, for their nominations to the most recent Tier 1 Task Critical Asset 

list compiled in 2008, the combatant commands and military services continued to 

use different sets of draft and non-binding guidance as criteria for selection and 

submission of assets to the Joint Staff, since ASD(HD&ASA) had not yet finalized the 

DOD Critical Asset Identification Process Manual. 

In addition, according to various combatant command and military service officials, 

the draft and non-binding guidance also contained unclear definitions for Task 

Critical Assets and for Tier 1 Task Critical Assets. In our discussions with officials 

from the U.S. Pacific Command, the military services, and the Joint Staff, these 

officials explained that the definitions for a Task Critical Asset and for a Tier 1 Task 

Critical Asset contained in the draft and non-binding guidance were subjective and 

could be interpreted differently by combatant commands or military services based 

on their respective missions. For example, officials from one military service stated 

that they were not sure why certain assets they owned were nominated by a 

combatant command. Combatant command officials also acknowledged this and 

added the value of an asset to a combatant command mission may not be readily 

apparent to asset owners at DOD installations. DCIP officials from the Army, the Air 

Force, and the Navy told us that clearer descriptions of the combatant commands’ 

mission essential tasks—which are used to identify Task Critical Assets—would 

improve the critical asset identification process for DCIP. The military services use 

information about tasks essential to completing combatant command missions to 

help them identify their potential submissions to the Tier 1 Task Critical Asset list by 

providing specific information about combatant command missions that they use to 

identify assets needed for those missions. For example, Air Force officials said they 

have a lot of knowledge regarding tasks needed to complete their Air Force-specific 

missions, but do not always have similar knowledge of combatant command 

missions. According to these officials, the military services typically obtain 

combatant command mission task information from the Defense Readiness Reporting 

Page 9 GAO-09-740R Defense Infrastructure 
System,22 as the combatant commands do not provide this detailed information 

directly to the military services. However, Air Force and Navy officials stated that this 

information is often inconsistent. Better developed information about tasks essential 

to completing combatant command missions, including standards and conditions to 

determine what constitutes a mission failure or mission degradation,23 would provide 

additional clarity in identifying and prioritizing Task Critical Assets. 

In the absence of formal DCIP guidance on the critical asset identification process, 

ASD(HD&ASA) encouraged, but did not require, the combatant commands and 

military services to use their draft and non-binding guidance to identify and prioritize 

their Tier 1 Task Critical Asset submissions in 2007 and 2008. This guidance included 

the Criticality Process Guidance Document, issued in December 2006, and the draft 

version of the DOD Critical Asset Identification Process manual, issued in 

September 2007. 

Our prior work on DCIP management24 and the Standards for Internal Control in the 

Federal Government25 both emphasize the importance of management controls to 

guide program implementation, which includes the development and issuance of 

formal guidance. Based on discussions with combatant command and military service 

officials, the lack of consistent criteria, including varying definitions of key terms, in 

the selection of Tier 1 Task Critical Asset submissions and the absence of binding 

guidance from ASD(HD&ASA) have resulted in a Tier 1 Task Critical Asset list of 

limited usefulness to decision-makers in determining DOD’s most critical assets. 

Specifically, the list may continue to include assets that should not be on the list. 

Also, as noted in our prior work, the absence of formal DCIP guidance and policies 

has led DOD components, such as the combatant commands and military services, to 

pursue varying approaches to identify and ensure the availability of their critical 

assets. ASD(HD&ASA) and Joint Staff officials acknowledged that the current version 

of the Tier 1 Task Critical Asset list is problematic and that they expect the current 

list of Tier 1 Task Critical Assets to change significantly over the next year because 

the military services and combatant commands are now required to use formal 

critical asset identification criteria to submit an update to their Tier 1 Task Critical 

Asset lists. ASD(HD&ASA) officials believe the use of this new guidance will improve 

the quality of the list. 

 

22 The Defense Readiness Reporting System is a real-time information system that measures and 

reports on the readiness of military forces and the supporting infrastructure to meet missions and 

goals assigned by the Secretary of Defense. 

23 According to the DOD Critical Asset Identification Process manual, a Tier 1 Task Critical Asset is 

defined by mission failure if the asset is lost, incapacitated, or disrupted. However, a Tier 2 Task 

Critical Asset is defined by severe mission (or function) degradation if the asset is lost, incapacitated, 

or disrupted. 

24 GAO-07-461. 

25 GAO/AIMD-00-21.3.1. 

Page 10 GAO-09-740R Defense Infrastructure 
DOD issued the final version of the DOD Critical Asset Identification Process 

manual in October 2008. However, officials from the Air Force and U.S. Pacific 

Command we spoke with said that certain definitions contained in this current 

guidance are still subjective and elements within those definitions still need to be 

clarified. For example, Air Force officials stated that determining what constitutes a 

mission essential task for combatant command missions is a continuing challenge. In 

addition, U.S. Pacific Command officials explained that tiering critical assets is an 

inherently subjective process with asset and mission owners relying on their own 

individual perspectives and interpretations of the definitions to determine the 

appropriate tier of an asset. For example, military services typically have different 

mission-essential tasks and, in some cases, the military services will assign the same 

asset to different tier levels. In discussions with us, ASD(HD&ASA) and Joint Staff 

officials acknowledged that the critical asset identification process is still subjective 

and further clarification may be needed. Though DOD has issued the final version of 

the DOD Critical Asset Identification Process manual, based on our analysis of this 

manual and discussions with military service and combatant command officials, 

further clarification of the tier definitions and certain elements within those 

definitions may be warranted to prevent future inconsistencies in the combatant 

commands’ and the military services’ submissions of assets to DOD’s Tier 1 Task 

Critical Asset list. 

DOD Has Taken Steps to Promote Coordination among Key DCIP 

Stakeholders but Still Lacks an Effective Coordination Mechanism for 

Identifying and Nominating Critical Assets 

DOD has taken some actions toward promoting coordination among the combatant 

commands, military services, and the Joint Staff in developing DOD’s Tier 1 Task 

Critical Asset list, such as issuing the October 2008 DCIP critical asset identification 

guidance. However, it has not yet developed formal coordination responsibilities and 

an effective coordination mechanism within DCIP, including a forum for coordination 

between the military services and combatant commands when identifying critical 

assets. According to combatant command and military service officials, they conduct 

minimal coordination when determining which assets are critical to combatant 

command missions—a key step in identifying assets to nominate to DOD’s Tier 1 

Task Critical Asset list. In addition, Navy and Army officials stated they only 

coordinate minimally with the Joint Staff once they submit their assets for the Tier 1 

Task Critical Asset list. Combatant commands are charged in the DCIP guidance with 

conducting analyses of command mission and mission essential tasks with their 

associated conditions and standards and providing the results of these analyses to the 

appropriate DCIP stakeholders to support Task Critical Asset identification. In 

contrast, the military services own most of the assets and, in some cases, are 

responsible for providing resources, such as funding, to protect those assets, thereby 

assuring the capabilities needed to implement missions. Consequently, the combatant 

commands and military services each have a role in identifying and prioritizing 

critical assets through DCIP. 

Page 11 GAO-09-740R Defense Infrastructure 
In August 2005, DOD issued DOD Directive 3020.40, which calls for coordination 

among the combatant commands, military services, the Joint Staff, and other DOD 

agencies for the purpose of identifying and assessing critical assets needed to 

implement combatant command missions. Additionally, in October 2008, DOD issued 

DOD Manual 3020.45, which further defines combatant command, military service, 

and Joint Staff roles in the critical asset identification process. However, based on 

our analysis of the October 2008 manual and discussions with DCIP officials, DCIP 

continues to lack clearly defined coordination responsibilities and a mechanism for 

effective coordination within the program among the combatant commands and 

military services. As a result, the communication and coordination efforts among 

these key DCIP stakeholders are insufficient and inconsistent, which hinders the 

ability of the military services to identify critical assets needed to fulfill combatant 

command missions. 

Officials we spoke with from all three military services stated that, while the new 

guidance outlines a critical asset identification process, lack of coordination with the 

combatant commands may continue. Military service officials rely on the combatant 

commands to provide detailed information about their missions to help the military 

services identify critical assets. For example, Air Force officials told us that they rely 

on combatant commands to provide them with combatant command-related mission 

essential task information, but that this information is not always accurately and 

consistently provided by the combatant commands. Similarly, Army officials stated 

they were unaware of the submission of a particular Army-owned critical asset by a 

combatant command to the Tier 1 Task Critical Asset list—and its subsequent 

selection as a Defense Critical Asset—during the previous Joint Staff data call for 

Task Critical Asset submissions until the Army officials viewed the final Tier 1 Task 

Critical Asset list. According to these Army officials, their lack of awareness of this 

asset’s status as a Defense Critical Asset hindered their ability to develop and share 

effective risk mitigation strategies for this asset with senior Army leaders. Air Force 

and Army officials stated that the new guidance will not specifically address these 

coordination issues. 

ASD(HD&ASA) and Joint staff officials acknowledge that DCIP-related coordination 

between the combatant commands and military services could be strengthened. 

Officials at U.S. Strategic Command stated they are in the process of developing an 

electronic information sharing field within the critical asset database used to track 

DOD’s Task Critical Assets for DCIP. U.S. Strategic Command manages the database 

used to track DOD’s critical assets. These officials also told us that this information 

sharing mechanism may help the combatant commands, military services, and the 

Joint Staff improve their coordination efforts, but that this mechanism has not yet 

been finalized and is still being tested within the DCIP community. Until 

ASD(HD&ASA) formalizes coordination responsibilities among key DCIP 

stakeholders and develops an effective coordination mechanism, coordination among 

the combatant commands, military services, and the Joint Staff for DCIP will 

continue to be limited. Without effective coordination, the Joint Staff, combatant 

commands, and military services cannot agree on an accurate identification and 

prioritization of assets most critical to fulfilling combatant commands’ missions or 

Page 12 GAO-09-740R Defense Infrastructure 
reach agreement on how to prioritize funding to help develop effective actions to 

protect and mitigate against possible attacks on DOD’s critical infrastructure. 

DCIP Lacks Some Key Program Elements Needed to Facilitate the Critical 

Asset Identification and Prioritization Process 

While DOD has developed a strategy and a comprehensive management plan for 

managing DCIP and issued a new DOD Mission-Based Critical Asset Identification 

Process manual,26 DCIP still lacks certain key elements for nominating Tier 1 Task 

Critical Assets, which could enhance the effectiveness of the program, including 

development of clearly defined schedules for meeting performance goals and a 

formal feedback process. According to our work on sound management practices,27

comprehensive program schedules and formal communication strategies assist 

agencies in effectively implementing programs by providing relevant stakeholders 

with timelines to follow, performance milestones to meet, and shared expectations to 

guide their efforts. To date, the Joint Staff has not requested Tier 1 Task Critical Asset 

submissions from the combatant commands and military services using a routine and 

consistent timeline with milestones. Instead, the Joint Staff has requested asset 

submissions from the combatant commands and military services primarily on an adhoc basis, without providing a formal schedule or deadlines for the responsible 

organizations to follow. Subsequently, the military services expressed concern that 

they were not allowed adequate time to generate thorough and accurate nominations 

for DOD’s Tier 1 Task Critical Asset list prior to the required 2008 deadline for 

submission to the Joint Staff. For example, according to the combatant command and 

military service officials with whom we spoke, the Joint Staff asked them to submit 

their final nominations for DOD's Tier 1 Task Critical Asset list in 2008 with relatively 

little prior notice. As a result, these officials expressed concern that they did not 

receive adequate time to develop their submissions thoroughly or accurately. 

Furthermore, Air Force and U.S. Pacific Command officials expect their future 

processes for generating more accurate Tier 1 Task Critical Asset submissions to 

take, on average, a total of 18 months and 3 years, respectively. However, 

ASD(HD&ASA) and Joint Staff officials indicated they hope to revise the current Tier 

1 Task Critical Asset list using the new DCIP critical asset identification process in 

approximately 4 months, or by October 2009. However, until ASD(HD&ASA) clarifies 

a timeline and milestones for submitting critical assets to the combatant commands 

and military services, there may continue to be discrepancies in the expectations 

among the combatant commands, military services, and the Joint Staff regarding the 

expected timeframes for submitting assets. As a result, DOD’s Tier 1 Task Critical 

Asset list may continue to include assets that should not be on the list, or exclude 

assets that should be on the list if the services and combatant commands are not 

allowed sufficient notice or time for completing asset submissions. 

 

26 DOD 3020.45-M Volume 1 (Oct. 24, 2008). 

27 GAO/AIMD-00-21.3.1. 

Page 13 GAO-09-740R Defense Infrastructure 
DCIP guidance does not contain a process for providing formal feedback to the 

combatant commands and military services regarding their selection of assets for the 

Tier 1 Task Critical Asset list. Based on discussions with combatant command, 

military, and Joint Staff officials, only minimal informal feedback has occurred to 

date. Our prior work, including Standards for Internal Control in the Federal 

Government,28emphasizes the need for formal feedback as a management control. 

The lack of formal feedback from the Joint Staff may result in a Tier 1 Task Critical 

Asset list that includes inappropriate assets that do not meet DOD criteria. For 

example, Army, Navy, and Air Force officials we spoke with stated they would find 

formal feedback useful when submitting future nominations for the DOD Tier 1 Task 

Critical Asset list to the Joint Staff. Without any formal feedback, the combatant 

commands and military services may continue to either submit assets for the Tier 1 

Task Critical Asset lists that should not be on the list or may exclude assets that 

should be on the list from their submissions. As a result, DOD’s Tier 1 Task Critical 

Asset list maintained by the Joint Staff may continue to include assets that are not 

appropriate. Without fully developed timelines for data submissions and a formal 

feedback process regarding those submissions within DCIP, combatant commands 

and military services might not accurately identify the assets most critical to their 

missions and make fully informed budgetary and resource allocation decisions 

necessary to protect those assets from possible threats or hazards. 

Conclusions 

DOD’s recent issuance of DOD Manual 3020.45 Volume 1, DOD Critical Asset 

Identification Process, is a positive step toward developing a consistent and reliable 

Tier 1 Task Critical Asset list; however, further action is needed. Having a complete 

and reliable list of prioritized and assessed critical assets will enable DOD to target 

resources to its most mission-critical assets at highest risk. Subjectivity and a lack of 

clarity regarding the appropriate guidance to clarify key definitions may continue to 

result in inappropriate assets being nominated by the combatant commands and 

military services, and prevent DOD from having a complete and accurate list of 

critical assets. DOD officials acknowledged that the current definitions of Task 1 and 

Task Critical Asset are subjective. Also, until coordination within the program is 

formalized and strengthened, the military services, combatant commands, and the 

Joint Staff may not be in a position to coordinate effectively with each other to 

determine which assets are most critical to DOD and levels of funding to address 

identified vulnerabilities. Finally, while DOD has made progress in issuing a strategy 

for critical infrastructure, DOD’s lack of effective program management practices 

may continue to limit the program’s effectiveness in identifying and prioritizing 

critical assets. 

 

28 GAO/AIMD-00-21.3.1. 

Page 14 GAO-09-740R Defense Infrastructure 
Recommendations for Executive Action 

We are recommending that the Secretary of Defense take the following three actions: 

• To improve the consistency and reliability of the Tier 1 Task Critical Asset list, 

direct the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and Americas’ 

Security Affairs and the Joint Staff to further clarify the definitions of a Tier 1 

Task Critical Asset contained in DOD Manual 3020.45 Volume I, Critical Asset 

Identification Process, along with definitions of key elements, such as “mission 

essential tasks.” Potential approaches could include establishing and issuing a set 

of test questions to apply to a proposed critical asset or providing a set of 

hypothetical examples to use in identifying critical assets. 

• To facilitate effective coordination among the combatant commands, military 

services, and the Joint Staff in compiling the Tier 1 Task Critical Asset list, direct 

the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and Americas’ Security 

Affairs and the Joint Staff to develop specific coordination responsibilities and a 

coordination mechanism within DCIP for each of those stakeholders to use when 

compiling the list. 

• To improve the overall effectiveness of DOD’s process to develop a list of Tier 1 

Task Critical Assets, direct the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland 

Defense and Americas’ Security Affairs and the Joint Staff to formalize processes 

for compiling the Tier 1 Task Critical Asset list, including the development of a 

formal schedule with timelines and milestones for submitting Tier 1 Task Critical 

Asset data and a formal process for the Joint Staff to provide feedback to the 

combatant commands and military services regarding the assets they propose to 

include on the Tier 1 Task Critical Asset list.

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 

In written comments on a draft of this report, which included three draft 

recommendations, DOD partially concurred with all three of our recommendations. 

For each recommendation, DOD described relevant guidance in place or in draft and 

additional actions it would take in response. Also, U.S. Pacific Command provided 

technical comments, which we incorporated in the report where appropriate. DOD’s 

comments are reprinted in enclosure I. 

DOD partially concurred with our first recommendation, which called for 

clarification of definitions of a Tier 1 and a Task Critical Asset, and elements within 

those definitions. In its written comments, DOD stated that Manual 3020.45 Volume 1, 

Mission-Based Critical Asset Identification Process provides comprehensive 

procedures for identifying critical assets through a mission-focused process. They 

added that when considering the impact to the mission, the concept of “mission (or 

function) failure” depends on the organizational level, nature, scope, conditions, and 

standards associated with the mission and that each mission is different. While we 

recognize the validity of this observation, we continue to believe that the 

Page 15 GAO-09-740R Defense Infrastructure 
identification of a set of Tier 1 Task Critical Assets with similar levels of mission 

criticality would be facilitated by the use of consistent definitions. Based on our 

interviews with military service officials, these different determinations of mission 

failure make it difficult for the services to determine which assets are critical for 

combatant command missions. Further, while DOD stated in its written comments 

that guidance already exists on mission essential tasks, such as the Joint Mission 

Essential Task List Development Handbook, this guidance is not referenced in DCIP 

directives and instructions. Finally, DOD stated that ASD(HD&ASA) will work with 

the Joint Staff to provide additional clarification in their critical asset guidance, an 

action we believe is responsive to our recommendation. 

DOD partially concurred with our second recommendation, calling for the 

development of coordination responsibilities and a coordination mechanism within 

DCIP for stakeholders to use when compiling the Tier 1 Task Critical Asset list. DOD 

stated that its current guidance establishes coordination responsibilities within DCIP; 

DOD Directive 3020.40, DOD Instruction 3020.45, and DOD Manual 3020.45 Volume 1 

outline coordination responsibilities among key DCIP stakeholders. We acknowledge 

this DOD guidance in our report. However, based on our discussions with military 

service and combatant command officials, we continue to believe that these 

coordination responsibilities need to be specifically identified. DOD stated that the 

Joint Staff uses a formal Joint Staff Action Process, which provides ample 

opportunity for military service and combatant command feedback and a means for 

seeking clarification of guidance. However, we were told by a Joint Staff official that 

a formal Joint Staff Action Process was not issued for the March 2009 Tier 1 Task 

Critical Asset list, and we have not found evidence of the issuance of one since 

January 2007. In addition, DOD also stated in its written comments that coordination 

mechanisms exist within DCIP, such as the Operational Advisory Board and the 

Defense Critical Infrastructure Integration Staff. According to DOD, both of these 

forums meet quarterly and are specifically designed to facilitate information sharing. 

However, military service and combatant command officials told us that the 

coordination promoted by these existing mechanisms does not address asset 

identification, prioritization, and mission impact assessment. Finally, DOD stated it 

will work with the Joint Staff to determine what further coordination guidance is 

needed and why existing coordination mechanisms are not being used to identify and 

prioritize assets. We agree that this is a necessary action for DOD in order to improve 

coordination within DCIP and, if pursued, could be responsive to our 

recommendation. 

DOD partially concurred with our third recommendation, calling for the development 

of a formal schedule, milestones, and feedback process for critical asset 

identification. According to DOD’s written comments, ASD(HD&ASA) has developed 

a draft DOD Manual 3020.45 Volume 6 Defense Critical Infrastructure Program 

(DCIP) Execution Timeline. DOD intends for this manual to provide uniform 

procedures for the execution of DCIP activities and timelines for DCIP stakeholders 

to use in coordinating the execution of DCIP activities outlined in current DCIP 

guidance and ensure that feedback is provided to the components. With regard to the 

DCIP Critical Asset Identification Process Collaboration Tool that DOD intends to 

Page 16 GAO-09-740R Defense Infrastructure 
use as a way to establish a standard timeline and milestones, we note that this tool 

could potentially improve the critical asset identification process once it is 

implemented if the military services and combatant use the tool. We continue to 

believe that the military services and combatant commands could benefit from a 

more formal data call with deadlines, milestones, and an opportunity to receive 

feedback from the Joint Staff. 

- - - - - 

As agreed with your offices, we are sending copies of this report to the Chairmen and 

Ranking Member of the Senate and House Appropriations Subcommittees on Defense 

and on Military Construction, Veterans Affairs, and Related Agencies; Senate and 

House Committees on Armed Services; and other interested congressional parties. 

We also are sending copies to the Secretary of Defense; the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of 

Staff; the Secretaries of the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force; the Commandant of 

the Marine Corps; and the Director, Office of Management and Budget. In addition, 

the report will be available at no charge on GAO’s Web site at http://www.gao.gov. 

If you or your staff have any questions concerning this report, please contact me at 

(202) 512-5431 or by e-mail at dagostinod@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of 

Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this 

report. GAO staff who made key contributions to this report are listed in enclosure II. 

Davi M. D’Agostino 

Director 

Defense Capabilities and Management 

Enclosures - 2 

Page 17 GAO-09-740R Defense Infrastructure 
List of Committees 

The Honorable Carl Levin 

Chairman 

The Honorable John McCain 

Ranking Member 

Committee on Armed Services 

United States Senate 

The Honorable Daniel Inouye 

Chairman 

The Honorable Thad Cochran 

Ranking Member 

Subcommittee on Defense 

Committee on Appropriations 

United States Senate 

The Honorable Tim Johnson 

Chairman 

The Honorable Kay Bailey Hutchison 

Ranking Member 

Subcommittee on Military Construction, 

 Veterans Affairs, and Related Agencies 

Committee on Appropriations 

United States Senate 

The Honorable Ike Skelton 

Chairman 

The Honorable Howard McKeon 

Ranking Member 

Committee on Armed Services 

House of Representatives 

The Honorable John P. Murtha 

Chairman 

The Honorable C.W. Bill Young 

Ranking Member 

Subcommittee on Defense 

Committee on Appropriations 

House of Representatives 

Page 18 GAO-09-740R Defense Infrastructure 
The Honorable Chet Edwards 

Chair 

The Honorable Zach Wamp 

Ranking Member 

Subcommittee on Military Construction, 

 Veterans Affairs, and Related Agencies 

Committee on Appropriations 

House of Representatives 

Page 19 GAO-09-740R Defense Infrastructure 
Enclosure I Enclosure I 

Comments from the Department of Defense 

Page 20 GAO-09-740R Defense Infrastructure 
Page 21 GAO-09-740R Defense Infrastructure 
Page 22 GAO-09-740R Defense Infrastructure 
Page 23 GAO-09-740R Defense Infrastructure 

Enclosure II Enclosure II 

GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments 

GAO Contact

Davi M. D’Agostino, (202) 512-5431 or dagostinod@gao.gov

Acknowledgments

In addition to the contact named above, Mark A. Pross, Assistant Director; David G. 

Artadi; James D. Ashley; Yecenia C. Camarillo; Gina M. Flacco; Brian K. Howell; 

Katherine S. Lenane; Michael S. Pose; Terry L. Richardson; and Cheryl A. Weissman 

made key contributions to this report. 

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