GAO 

United States Government Accountability Office

Report to the Subcommittee on Oversight 

of Government Management, the Federal 

Workforce, and the District of Columbia, 

Committee on Homeland Security and 

Governmental Affairs, U.S. Senate 

DEPARTMENT OF 

STATE 

Additional Steps 

Needed to Address 

Continuing Staffing 

and Experience Gaps 

at Hardship Posts 

September 2009 

GAO-09-874 
What GAO Found

United States Government Accountability Office

Why GAO Did This Study

Highlights

Accountability Integrity Reliability

September 2009

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Additional Steps Needed to Address Continuing

Staffing and Experience Gaps at Hardship Posts

Highlights of GAO-09-874, a report to the 

Subcommittee on Oversight of 

Government Management, the Federal 

Workforce, and the District of Columbia, 

Committee on Homeland Security and 

Governmental Affairs, U.S. Senate 

The Department of State (State) 

has designated about two-thirds of 

its 268 overseas posts as hardship 

posts. Staff working at such posts 

often encounter harsh conditions, 

including inadequate medical 

facilities and high crime. Many of 

these posts are vital to U.S. foreign 

policy objectives and need a full 

complement of staff with the right 

skills to carry out the department’s 

priorities. As such, State offers 

staff at these posts a hardship 

differential—an additional 

adjustment to basic pay—to 

compensate officers for the 

conditions they encounter and as a 

recruitment and retention 

incentive. 

GAO was asked to assess (1) 

State’s progress in addressing 

staffing gaps at hardship posts 

since 2006 and the effect of any 

remaining gaps, and (2) the extent 

to which State has used incentives 

to address staffing gaps at hardship 

posts. GAO analyzed State data; 

reviewed relevant documents; met 

with officials in Washington, D.C.; 

and conducted fieldwork in five 

hardship posts. 

What GAO Recommends

GAO recommends the Secretary of 

State (1) take steps to minimize the 

experience gap at hardship posts 

by making the assignment of 

experienced officers to such posts 

an explicit priority consideration, 

and (2) develop and implement a 

plan to evaluate incentives for 

hardship post assignments. State 

generally agreed with our findings 

and recommendations. 

Despite some progress in addressing staffing shortfalls since 2006, State’s 

diplomatic readiness remains at risk due to persistent staffing and experience 

gaps at key hardship posts. Several factors contribute to these gaps. First, 

State continues to have fewer officers than positions, a shortage compounded 

by the personnel demands of Iraq and Afghanistan. Second, while State has 

reduced its mid-level experience gap, the department does not anticipate 

eliminating this gap until 2012 and continues to face difficulties attracting 

experienced applicants to hardship posts—especially posts of greatest 

hardship. Third, although State’s assignment system has prioritized the 

staffing of hardship posts, it does not explicitly address the continuing 

experience gap at such posts, many of which are strategically important, yet 

are often staffed with less experienced officers. Staffing and experience gaps 

can diminish diplomatic readiness in several ways, according to State officials. 

For example, gaps can lead to decreased reporting coverage, loss of 

institutional knowledge, and increased supervisory requirements for senior 

staff, detracting from other critical diplomatic responsibilities. 

Examples of Overseas Posts with Various Hardship Differentials, as of September 2008 

Posts

Hardship differential 

(percentage of base pay) Hardship 

Greatest 

hardship 

Buenos Aires, Osaka, Paris 0 

Amman, Bogotá, Windhoek 5 

Istanbul, Kuala Lumpur, Sao Paulo 10 

Lima, Mexico City, Moscow 15 y

Jeddah, Manila, Sofia 20 y

Beirut, Kathmandu, Lagos 25 y y

Monrovia, Nairobi, Shenyang 30 y y

Baghdad, Dushanbe, Kabul 35 y y

Source: State. 

State uses a range of incentives to staff hardship posts, but their effectiveness 

remains unclear due to a lack of evaluation. Incentives to serve in hardship 

posts range from monetary benefits to changes in service and bidding 

requirements, such as reduced tour lengths at posts where dangerous 

conditions prevent some family members from accompanying officers. In a 

2006 report on staffing gaps, GAO recommended that State evaluate the 

effectiveness of its incentive programs for hardship post assignments. In 

response, State added a question about hardship incentives to a recent 

employee survey. However, the survey does not fully meet GAO’s 

recommendation for several reasons, including that State did not include 

several incentives in the survey. State also did not comply with a legal 

requirement to assess the effectiveness of increasing danger and hardship pay 

in filling certain posts. Recent legislation increasing Foreign Service Officers’ 

basic pay will increase the cost of existing incentives, thereby heightening the 

importance that State evaluate its incentives for hardship post assignments to 

ensure resources are effectively targeted and not wasted. 

View GAO-09-874 or key components.

For more information, contact Jess T. Ford at 

(202) 512-4268 or fordj@gao.gov. 
Page i GAO-09-874 

Contents 

Letter 1

Background 3 

Persistent Staffing and Experience Gaps at Hardship Posts Can 

Compromise Diplomatic Readiness 6 

State Has Wide Range of Measures and Incentives to Staff Hardship 

Posts but Their Effectiveness is Unclear Due to Lack of 

Evaluation 18 

Conclusions 28 

Recommendations for Executive Action 29 

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 29 

Appendix I Objectives, Scope, and Methodology 31 

Appendix II Department of State Generalist Staffing 

Surplus/Deficit by Career Track 35 

Appendix III 2009 Historically Difficult to Staff and Service 

Need Differential Posts 36 

Appendix IV Comments from the Department of State 39 

Appendix V GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments 44 

Tables 

Table 1: Number and Percentage of Mid-Level Generalist Positions 

Filled by Officers Working above Grade, as of September 

30, 2008 7 

Table 2: Foreign Service Mid-Level Generalists’ Surplus/(Deficit) 

across Career Tracks, as of December 31, 2008 10 

Table 3: Financial and Nonfinancial Incentives and Requirements 

for Service at Hardship Posts 21 

Table 4: Foreign Service Generalists’ Surplus/(Deficit) across 

Career Tracks, as of December 31, 2008 35 

 Department of State 
Table 5: Historically Difficult to Staff and SND Posts for 2009 

Summer Assignments Cycle 36 

Figures 

Figure 1: Distribution of Overseas Foreign Service Posts and 

Positions by Hardship Differential, as of September 30, 

2008 4 

Figure 2: Average Number of Bids per Position by Hardship 

Differential for Grades 2, 3, and 4 for 2008 12 

Figure 3: Average Bids per Generalist Career Track by Hardship 

Differential for 2008 14 

Abbreviations 

DRI Diplomatic Readiness Initiative 

FSO Foreign Service Officer 

GEMS Global Employee Management System 

HR/CDA Office of Career Development and Assignments 

MC minister counselor 

OC counselor 

OIG Office of Inspector General 

OPM Office of Personnel Management 

SND Service Need Differential 

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Page ii GAO-09-874 Department of State
Page 1 GAO-09-874 

 

United States Government Accountability Office

Washington, DC 20548 

 

September 17, 2009 

The Honorable Daniel K. Akaka 

Chairman 

The Honorable George V. Voinovich 

Ranking Member 

Subcommittee on Oversight of 

 Government Management, 

 the Federal Workforce, and the 

 District of Columbia 

Committee on Homeland Security 

 and Governmental Affairs 

United States Senate 

The Department of State (State) has designated roughly two-thirds of its 

268 overseas posts as hardship posts.1

 Staff working in such locations 

often encounter harsh environmental and living conditions that can 

include inadequate medical facilities, limited opportunities for spousal 

employment, poor schools, high levels of crime, and severe climate. In 

addition to the high number of hardship posts State must staff, the number 

of positions in locations too dangerous for some family members to 

accompany an officer has grown considerably in recent years, from more 

than 700 in 2006 to over 900 at the end of fiscal year 2008. Many hardship 

posts are of critical importance to U.S. foreign policy objectives and 

necessitate a full complement of staff with the right skills to carry out the 

department’s priorities. 

In recent years we have reported on a number of human capital issues 

facing State, including staffing deficits at hardship posts that negatively 

1

State defines hardship posts as those locations where the U.S. government provides 

differential pay incentives—an additional 5 to 35 percent of basic salary, depending on the 

severity or difficulty of the conditions—to encourage employees to bid on assignments to 

these posts and to compensate them for the hardships they encounter. For the purposes of 

this report, we refer to these differential pay incentives as hardship differentials. We define 

hardship posts as those posts where the hardship differential is at least 15 percent. We 

define posts of greatest hardship as those where the hardship differential is at least 25 

percent. We define posts with low differentials as those where the hardship differential is 5 

or 10 percent. We define posts with no differentials as those where the hardship differential 

is 0 percent. 

 Department of State
 

impact diplomatic readiness.2 We reported in 2002 that State’s staffing 

shortfalls and ineffective assignment system compromised diplomatic 

readiness at hardship posts.3

 Subsequently, we reported in 2006 that State 

had made progress in addressing overall staffing shortfalls since 

implementing its Diplomatic Readiness Initiative (DRI), which enabled the 

department to hire and train more than 1,000 employees above attrition 

from 2002 to 2004; however, the initiative did not fully meet its goals and 

mid-level vacancies remained a problem at critical posts.4

 Furthermore, 

the department faces the continuing challenge of staffing embassy 

compounds in the conflict zones of Iraq and Afghanistan. To help meet 

these challenges, the Congress authorized additional positions for State in 

2008—the first new positions outside the department’s consular and 

worldwide security upgrade programs since 2004, according to State. 

Moreover, State has requested over 700 additional Foreign Service Officer 

(FSO) staff in its fiscal year 2010 budget request. 

In response to your request, this report discusses (1) State’s progress in 

addressing staffing gaps at hardship posts since 2006 and the effect of any 

remaining gaps, and (2) the extent to which State has used incentives to 

address staffing gaps at hardship posts. 

To address these objectives, we reviewed GAO and State Office of 

Inspector General (OIG) reports and analyzed staffing, bidding, and 

position data. We also examined surveys conducted by State, analyzed 

State documents that outline incentives for hardship service, and collected 

data on participation in and funds expended on hardship incentive 

programs. Additionally, we met with officials in State’s Bureau of Human 

Resources, Bureau of Consular Affairs, Bureau of Administration, six 

regional bureaus, and the American Foreign Service Association. To assess 

the impact of staffing gaps and State’s use of hardship incentives firsthand, 

we conducted fieldwork in Lagos and Abuja, Nigeria; Shenyang, China; 

and Riyadh and Jeddah, Saudi Arabia. We selected these posts for their 

level of hardship, their strategic importance to the United States, and the 

 

2

State defines diplomatic readiness as its “ability to get the right people in the right place at 

the right time with the right skills to carry out America’s foreign policy.” 

3

GAO, State Department: Staffing Shortfalls and Ineffective Assignment System 

Compromise Diplomatic Readiness at Hardship Posts, GAO-02-626 (Washington, D.C.: 

June 18, 2002). 

4

GAO, Department of State: Staffing and Foreign Language Shortfalls Persist Despite 

Initiatives to Address Gaps, GAO-06-894 (Washington, D.C.: Aug. 4, 2006). 

Page 2 GAO-09-874 Department of State
 

low number of staff applying for each position. Specifically, the locations 

in Nigeria and Shenyang are posts of greatest hardship and the locations in 

Saudi Arabia are hardship posts which, at the time of our visit, had 1-year 

tours. In addition to our fieldwork, we conducted telephone interviews 

with senior officials in several additional hardship locations, including 

Bangladesh, Cambodia, Liberia, and Tajikistan. We also convened an 

expert roundtable of several retired senior State officials, all of whom 

previously served as ambassadors to hardship posts. 

We conducted this performance audit from April 2008 through September 

2009, in accordance with generally accepted government auditing 

standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to 

obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for 

our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe 

that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings 

and conclusions based on our audit objectives. 

State is the lead agency responsible for implementing American foreign 

policy and representing the United States abroad. It staffs approximately 

268 embassies, consulates, and other posts with over 8,000 Foreign Service 

positions overseas.5

 Roughly two-thirds of these posts are in locations that 

qualify for a special salary differential6

 to compensate officers for the 

harsh living conditions experienced there. The differential ranges from 5 

to 35 percent of basic pay and is determined by a number of factors 

including extraordinarily difficult living conditions, excessive physical 

hardship, or notably unhealthy conditions affecting at least a majority of 

employees stationed at such a post.7

 Figure 1 shows the distribution of 

overseas posts and positions by hardship differential. In general, tours of 

duty are two years in the United States and at 20 percent and 25 percent 

Background 

 

5

State’s overseas workforce also includes locally employed staff. This report focuses on the 

Foreign Service. 

6

A post differential may be granted on the basis of conditions of environment which differ 

substantially from conditions of environment in the continental United States and warrant 

additional pay as a recruitment and retention incentive. 5 U.S.C. § 5925. For the purposes of 

this report, we refer to State’s post differential as hardship differential. 

7

State pays an additional 15 percent to 35 percent of salary for danger pay at designated 

posts. The danger pay allowance is designed to provide additional compensation above 

basic compensation to all U.S. government civilian employees, including chiefs of mission, 

for service in foreign areas where there exist conditions—such as civil insurrection, civil 

war, terrorism, or war—that threaten physical harm or imminent danger to employees. 

Page 3 GAO-09-874 Department of State
 

hardship posts. Tours at other posts are generally three years, although a 

number of posts in locations too dangerous for some family members to 

accompany an officer carry 1-year tours. 

Figure 1: Distribution of Overseas Foreign Service Posts and Positions by Hardship 

Differential, as of September 30, 2008 

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

90

100

Posts Positions

Percentage

25–35%

15–20%

0–10% 

Source: GAO analysis of State data.

Posts with 

no or low 

hardship 

differential

(28%)

2,008

(25%)

3,843

(48%)

(29%)

79 2,233

50

(19%)

139

(52%)

Hardship

posts

Posts of 

greatest 

hardship

 Hardship differential percentage

Note: Percentages may not add to 100 due to rounding. 

FSOs serving abroad fall into two broad categories: generalists and 

specialists. FSO generalists help formulate and implement the foreign 

policy of the United States and are grouped into five career tracks: 

management, consular, economic, political, and public diplomacy. FSO 

specialists provide support services at overseas posts worldwide or in 

Washington, D.C., and are grouped into seven major categories: 

administration, construction engineering, information technology, 

international information and English language programs, medical and 

health, office management, and security. State requires its FSOs to be 

available for service anywhere in the world, and reserves the ability to 

direct officers to any of its posts overseas or to its Washington 

headquarters. However, directed assignments are rare. The process of 

Page 4 GAO-09-874 Department of State
 

assigning FSOs to their positions typically begins when the staff receive a 

list of upcoming vacancies for which they may compete. Staff then submit 

a list of positions for which they want to be considered, or “bids,” to the

Office of Career Development and Assignments (HR/CDA) and consult 

with their career development officer. The process varies depending on an 

officer’s grade and functional specialty: 

try Level Division 

of HR/CDA with little input from the posts or bureaus. 

s. Subsequently, HR/CDA convenes 

panels to finalize the assignments.8

vel officers, HR/CDA convenes a panel to 

finalize the assignments. 

ning 

ary 

to countries 

of increasing strategic importance such as China and India. 

 

• Entry-level officers’ assignments are directed by the En

• Mid-level officers consult with bureaus and overseas posts to market 

themselves for their desired position

• Senior-level officers are selected for their positions by the Director

General,9

 following approval of policy-level positions by a special 

committee. As with mid-le

In recent years, State has taken a series of measures to address gaps and 

reallocate staff to emerging priority nations. In 2002, State implemented 

the Diplomatic Readiness Initiative (DRI) to address staffing and trai

gaps that, according to the department, endangered U.S. diplomatic 

readiness. Through the DRI—a 3-year, $197 million program—State hired 

1,069 new foreign and civil service employees above attrition. However, as 

we previously reported, most of this increase was absorbed by the demand 

for personnel in Iraq and Afghanistan. In 2006, State introduced the Global

Repositioning Program, which reallocated existing positions to emerging

high-priority countries in the Middle East, Asia, and Africa. The prim

focus of this program was to move political, economic, and public 

diplomacy officers from places like Washington and Europe 

8

In terms of the Foreign Service grade structure, mid-level positions include FS-03, FS-02, 

and FS-01 and are equivalent to the civil service GS-13, GS-14, and GS-15, respectively. 

9

The Director General is the official who heads State’s Bureau of Human Resources. 

Page 5 GAO-09-874 Department of State
 

Despite some progress since we last reported in 2006, State has continued to 

face staffing and experience gaps at hardship posts that may compromise its 

diplomatic readiness. Several factors contribute to gaps at hardship posts, 

including State’s overall staff shortage, which is compounded by the 

significant personnel demands of Iraq and Afghanistan, and a mid-level 

staffing deficit that has been reduced, but not eliminated. Moreover, State 

continues to experience difficulty in attracting officers to hardship posts and 

its assignment system does not explicitly address the experience gap at these 

posts. Staffing and experience gaps at hardship posts can diminish diplomatic 

readiness in a variety of ways, according to current and former State officials, 

including by reducing reporting coverage, weakening institutional knowledge, 

and increasing the supervisory burden on senior staff. 

Persistent Staffing 

and Experience Gaps 

at Hardship Posts Can 

Compromise 

Diplomatic Readiness 

Staffing and Experience 

Gaps Remain at Key 

Hardship Posts 

State continues to face staffing and experience gaps at hardship posts, 

including many of significant strategic importance to the United States. 

First, State has faced difficulty in filling critical positions at hardship 

posts. In its FY 2007 Annual Performance Report, State identified staffing 

of critical positions—designated positions at the posts of greatest hardship 

(those with hardship differentials of at least 25 percent)—as a key priority, 

noting that such positions are often on the forefront of U.S. policy 

interests. As such, State established a target for fiscal year 2007 of filling 

90 percent of such critical positions with qualified bidders by the end of 

the assignments cycle.10 However, State reported filling 75 percent of its 

critical positions, thereby missing its target. State further noted that it 

would be unable to fill more than 75 percent of critical positions until its 

resource needs were met. Subsequently, the department lowered its target 

to 75 percent for fiscal year 2008, which it reported it met. 

In addition to staffing gaps specific to critical positions, State faces its 

highest rate of vacancies at the posts of greatest hardship.11 As of 

September 2008, State had a 17 percent average vacancy rate at the posts 

of greatest hardship—nearly double the average rate of 9 percent at posts 

with no hardship differentials.12 Vacancies at posts we visited during our 

 

10According to State, the assignments cycle for a given year includes both the summer and 

winter assignments cycles. 

11We used data from State’s Global Employee Management System (GEMS) database to 

calculate vacancy rates. Due to limitations in the GEMS data on positions in Iraq, we do not 

include Iraq in our vacancy rate calculations or figures. 

12As of the same date, the average vacancy rate for all hardship posts was 15 percent, as 

compared to an average rate of 10 percent for all posts with no or low differentials. 

Page 6 GAO-09-874 Department of State
 

review included a mid-level public affairs position in Jeddah, Saudi 

Arabia,13 that was vacant as of September 2008 and, at the time of our 

March 2009 visit, was not expected to be filled until June 2009. Similarly, a 

section chief in Lagos, Nigeria,14 stated that prior to his arrival at post in 

August 2008, his position had been vacant for nearly a year. Although there 

were few vacancies in Shenyang, China,15 at the time of our visit, nearly 

one-quarter of the staffed positions had been vacant for 4 months or more 

before their current incumbents arrived. 

Beyond higher position vacancy rates, posts of greatest hardship face 

experience gaps due to a higher rate of staff filling positions above their 

own grades (see table 1).16 As of September 2008, about 34 percent of midlevel generalist positions at posts of greatest hardship were filled by 

officers in upstretch assignments17—15 percentage points higher than the 

upstretch rate for comparable positions at posts with no or low 

differentials. Furthermore, as of the same date, 25 of 34 (over 70 percent) 

of all overseas generalists working two grades above their rank were 

located at hardship posts.18

Table 1: Number and Percentage of Mid-Level Generalist Positions Filled by 

Officers Working above Grade, as of September 30, 2008 

Posts with no or low 

differentials Hardship posts 

Posts of greatest 

hardship 

210 of 1,093 (19 percent) 328 of 1,053 (31 percent) 189 of 551 (34 percent) 

Source: GAO analysis of State data. 

 

13At the time of our visit, Jeddah had a 20 percent hardship differential and a 25 percent 

danger pay allowance. 

14At the time of our visit, Lagos had a 25 percent hardship differential. 

15At the time of our visit, Shenyang had a 30 percent hardship differential. 

16We used data from State’s GEMS database to calculate rates of staff filling positions 

above their own grades. Due to limitations in the GEMS data on positions in Iraq, we do not 

include Iraq in these calculations of staff filling positions above their own grades or in 

table 1. 

17An upstretch assignment is an assignment to a position above one’s current grade. 

18By comparison, slightly fewer than half of all overseas generalist positions are located at 

hardship posts. 

Page 7 GAO-09-874 Department of State
 

At posts we visited during our review, we observed numerous officers 

working in positions above their rank. For example, in Abuja, Nigeria,19

more than 4 in every 10 positions were staffed by officers in upstretch 

assignments, including several employees working in positions two grades 

above their own. We also found multiple officers in upstretch assignments 

in Shenyang, including one mid-level consular position that officials stated 

has never been filled at grade. 

Department of State

A number of factors lead to gaps at hardship posts, including: 

• State’s overall staff shortage, which is compounded by the significant 

personnel demands of Iraq and Afghanistan; 

Several Factors Contribute 

to Gaps at Hardship Posts 

• a persistent mid-level staffing deficit exacerbated by continued low 

bidding on hardship posts; and 

• an assignment system that does not explicitly address the continuing 

experience gap at hardship posts. 

As of April 2009, State had about 1,650 vacant Foreign Service positions in 

total. Approximately 270 of these vacancies were due to State not having 

enough employees to fill all of its positions—a shortfall that has grown 

since our last report.20 Officers attending training or rotating from post to 

post without replacements to fill their positions accounted for most of the 

remaining 1,380 vacancies.21 As we reported in 2006, State implemented 

DRI with the intention of hiring enough new employees above attrition to 

allow staff time for critical job training—also referred to as a “training 

float”—and to respond to emerging crises. However, as we previously 

reported, this goal became quickly outdated largely due to staffing 

demands for Iraq and Afghanistan. In particular, due to the overall 

shortage of FSOs and the high priority of meeting Iraq and Afghanistan’s 

Overall Foreign Service Staffing 

Shortage Compounded by 

Personnel Needs of Iraq and 

Afghanistan 

 

19At the time of our visit, Abuja had a 25 percent hardship differential. 

20In August 2006, we reported an overall staffing shortage of about 200 employees, based on 

State data from September 2005. According to a senior State official, the current shortfall 

of about 270 will decline over the course of 2009 as several cadres of new hires are brought 

on board. 

21Of the approximately 1,380 additional vacant positions, about 1,020 were due to officers 

serving in training or rotating from post to post without replacements to fill their vacated 

positions. The approximately 360 remaining vacancies were due to officers on medical 

leave, temporary duty, or short tours. 

Page 8 GAO-09-874 
 

staffing needs, bureaus have had to identify nearly 670 positions to leave 

unfilled, or “frozen,” since 2005. As a result, State has generally been able 

to find candidates to fill positions in Iraq and Afghanistan22—its top 

priority posts—but doing so has created gaps elsewhere, including at other 

hardship posts. For instance, positions that bureaus decided not to fill in 

the 2009 assignments cycle included several positions at hardship posts, 

such as an economic officer in Lagos, a management officer in Shenyang, 

and three or more positions each in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia; Mexico City, 

Mexico; and Moscow, Russia. 

State officials also noted that the pressing need to staff Iraq and 

Afghanistan has led officers serving elsewhere to interrupt or cancel their 

current tours and volunteer for service in those two countries, thereby 

leaving other posts with unexpected gaps. For example, a senior official 

stated that a key political/military officer position in Russia was vacant 

due to the incumbent volunteering for a year of service in Afghanistan. The 

senior official further stated that he anticipated it would be difficult to find 

a temporary replacement for the unexpected vacancy. Similarly, officials 

in the Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs told us an officer who 

received nearly a year of language training in Vietnamese cancelled her 

tour in Vietnam to serve in Iraq. 

Although State recently received a significant increase in resources and 

has requested more, the extent to which this influx will allow the 

department to eliminate vacancies is unclear. State received funding for 

about 140 additional Foreign Service positions in fiscal year 2008. 

Subsequently, in fiscal year 2009, State received about 720 additional 

Foreign Service positions that, according to the department, largely 

allowed it to fill vacancies created by personnel serving in Iraq and 

Afghanistan and increases in language training.23 The department has 

requested nearly 740 additional Foreign Service positions for fiscal year 

2010 that, according to State’s 2010 Congressional Budget Justification, 

will allow it to begin expanding its presence according to strategic 

priorities. However, given that about 1,650 positions were vacant as of 

 

22To fill positions in Iraq and Afghanistan, State has frequently assigned officers to 

positions above their grade. As of September 2008, over 40 percent of officers in Iraq and 

Afghanistan were serving in upstretch assignments. 

23A forthcoming GAO report discusses challenges State faces in meeting its foreign 

language proficiency requirements in further detail. See GAO, Department of State: 

Comprehensive Plan Needed to Address Persistent Foreign Language Shortfalls, 

GAO-09-955 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 17, 2009). 

Page 9 GAO-09-874 Department of State
 

April 2009, it is unclear if the approximately 1,600 positions received or 

requested will enable State to both eliminate vacancies and expand its 

operations as stated.24

While new resources may enable State to partially address vacancies and 

the department has reduced its mid-level deficit since 2006, the remaining 

shortage of mid-level officers represents a continuing experience gap. As 

of December 2008, State had 85 fewer mid-level generalist officers than 

positions (see table 2)—an improvement on the deficit of 316 that we 

previously reported. However, as of the same date, State faced a 28 

percent greater deficit at the FS-02 level than it did in 2006, with mid-level 

positions in the public diplomacy and consular cones continuing to 

experience the largest shortages of staff overall. 

Despite Some Progress, MidLevel Experience Gap Remains 

Table 2: Foreign Service Mid-Level Generalists’ Surplus/(Deficit) across Career Tracks, as of December 31, 2008 

Grade 

level Management Consular Economic Political

Public 

diplomacy 

Surplus/

(Deficit) by 

grade level

Total 

Surplus/

(Deficit)

Mid level 1 (37) 17 44 57 (67) 14

2 (84) 51 36 16 (223) (204)

3 87 (129) 19 8 120 105

Total (34) (61) 99 81 (170) (85)

Source: GAO analysis of State data. 

According to a senior State official, the department will continue to face a 

deficit at the FS-02 level until 2012. The official told us that the department 

plans to manage this experience gap by assigning officers in the FS-03 

grade to stretch positions. However, as we discuss later in this report, 

positions filled by officers in upstretch assignments can compromise 

diplomatic readiness. State has also accelerated promotions of FS-03 

officers to address the experience gap. For instance, State’s Five-Year 

Workforce Plan for Fiscal Years 2008 through 2012 projects that it will 

take about 8 years for officers hired in 2008 to be promoted to the FS-02 

level. By contrast, officers promoted to the FS-02 level in 2003 had an 

average time-in-service of 10.7 years. However, according to State, 

 

24State has attempted to temporarily address vacancies through its Expanded Professional 

Associates Program. According to State, 105 positions, equivalent to entry-level officer 

positions, were established through this program in 2009 and filled by eligible Foreign 

Service family members. 

Page 10 GAO-09-874 Department of State
 

additional acceleration of promotions is unlikely given the potential risks 

associated with promoting officers with insufficient experience. 

Although hardship posts have experienced an increase in bidding since we 

last reported, they continue to have difficulty attracting bids from 

experienced officers. Figure 2 shows the average number of bids on FS-02, 

FS-03, and FS-04 positions at overseas posts by differential rate for the 

2008 summer assignments cycle.25

Despite Improvements, Low 

Bidding on Hardship Posts 

Continues to Exacerbate MidLevel and Other Staffing 

Deficits 

 

25We analyzed bidding for these positions to remain consistent with our 2006 report, which 

included our analysis of bids on FS-02, FS-03, and FS-04 positions in the 2005 summer 

assignments cycle. Because State staffed Iraq through a special assignments cycle in 2008 

separate from the regular summer assignments cycle, we did not include Iraq in our 

analysis of bidding. 

Page 11 GAO-09-874 Department of State
 

Figure 2: Average Number of Bids per Position by Hardship Differential for Grades 2, 3, and 4 for 2008 

0 5 10 15 20 25+

0

10

20

30

40

Muscat

Matamoros

Rabat

Berlin

Prague

Paris

Gaborone

Bridgetown

Osaka-Kobe

Helsinki

Santiago

Wellington

Montevideo

Nagoya

Toulouse

Buenos Aires

Barcelona

Belfast

Toronto

Nicosia

Sydney

Singapore

Perth

Amman

Hermosillo

Johannesburg

Bogota

Reykjavik

Port Louis

Windhoek

Chiang Mai

Belmopan

Suva

Median bids for 2005

Median bids for 2008

Sofia

Juba

Shenyang

Lagos Abuja Monrovia Georgetown

Phnom Penh

Nairobi

Kathmandu

Baku

Beirut

Dili

Dushanbe

Manila

Podgorica

Riyadh

Abidjan

Kolonia

Bandar Seri Begawan

Bucharest

Lima

Belgrade

Mexico City

Beijing

Moscow

Ciudad Juarez

Kingston

Kuala Lumpur

Bratislava

Bangkok

Riga

Istanbul

Sao Paulo

Durban

Kuwait

Brasilia

Adana

Nuevo Laredo

Bids/position

Hardship differential percentage

Dhahran

Jeddah

Minsk

Lusaka

Source: GAO analysis of State data.

Median

2008: 18.3

2005: 22.0

Median

2008: 11.8

2005: 13.3 Median

2008: 12.4

2005: 12.4

Median

2008:10.0

2005: 9.7

Median

2008: 7.9

2005: 6.0

Median

2008: 4.5

2005: 3.2

Note: The lines in the graph show the median of the average number of bids for each differential rate. 

Selected posts are named as examples of locations at each hardship differential. 

Page 12 GAO-09-874 Department of State
 

Since our 2006 report, the median average26 of all bids on hardship posts 

has increased by about 20 percent (from 5 to 6).27 The increase has been 

more pronounced for posts of greatest hardship, which received a median 

average of 4.5 bids per post in 2008—about 40 percent higher than the 

median average of 3.2 bids we previously reported. However, hardship 

posts continue to have difficulty attracting bids from experienced officers. 

Specifically, positions at hardship posts received a median average of 4 

bids from at-grade officers, including a median average of 2.7 at-grade bids 

for positions at the posts of greatest hardship. By contrast, posts with no 

or low hardship differentials received a median average of over 9 at-grade 

bids. Furthermore, as of September 2008, hardship posts comprised over 

90 percent (62 of 67) of posts that State classified as historically difficult to 

staff28 for 2009. 

Low bidding on hardship posts exacerbates State’s staffing deficits—

particularly its shortage of mid-level consular and public diplomacy 

officers. Figure 3 shows the average number of bids per generalist career 

track for each hardship differential in the summer 2008 assignments cycle. 

While all generalist career tracks received about 3 to 4 times fewer bids at 

the posts of greatest hardship than at posts with no differentials in 2008, 

consular and public diplomacy positions received among the fewest bids 

on average—3.6 and 4.3, respectively. Given that State faces its largest 

staff shortages in mid-level consular and public diplomacy positions, low 

bidding for such positions at hardship posts increases the difficulty of 

filling them. 

 

26We use the term median average to refer to the midpoint of the average number of bids 

per post for each differential rate. For example, if there are three posts with a hardship 

differential of 25 percent and their average bids are 4, 5, and 7, the median average is 5. 

27This calculation includes bids on all posts with hardship differentials of at least 15 

percent. 

28The list of historically difficult to staff posts for a given year is created the prior year. A 

post is considered historically difficult to staff if it is designated most difficult to staff for 3 

out of the last 4 years. Most difficult to staff means that over half of the jobs available for 

that post in a given bidding cycle are designated hard to fill. A position is considered hard 

to fill if it attracts fewer than 3 at-grade, in-cone bids in a given assignments cycle. 

Page 13 GAO-09-874 Department of State
 

Figure 3: Average Bids per Generalist Career Track by Hardship Differential for 

2008 

Economic

Management

Political

Consular

Public diplomacy

0

5

10

15

20

25

0 5 10 15 20 25+

Bids/position

Source: GAO analysis of State data.

Hardship differential percentage

State has taken steps in recent years to prioritize staffing of hardship 

posts. For example, in the 2007 assignments cycle, State assigned staff to 

hardship positions it considered critical—including in Iraq and 

Afghanistan—prior to assigning staff to positions elsewhere. Similarly, in 

the 2008 assignments cycle, State assigned staff to the posts of greatest 

hardship before assigning staff elsewhere. However, as we noted earlier in 

this report, hardship posts face a higher rate of upstretch assignments than 

posts with no or low differentials—an experience gap that State’s 

assignment system does not explicitly address. For example, while State’s 

instructions to bidders for the 2007 and 2008 assignments cycles did 

emphasize the staffing of hardship positions, the instructions did not 

differentiate between filling the positions with at-grade officers and filling 

them with officers below the positions’ grades. Although State’s 

instructions to bidders clearly state that employees bidding on stretch 

assignments compete against at-grade bidders, the low number of at-grade 

bids on hardship positions limits the likelihood that such positions will be 

State’s Assignment System 

Prioritizes Staffing of Key 

Hardship Posts, but Does Not 

Explicitly Address Continuing 

Experience Gap 

Page 14 GAO-09-874 Department of State
 

filled by at-grade officers. Furthermore, in the assignments cycles for 2007 

through 2009, State consistently permitted upstretch assignments to 

hardship posts 1 to 3 months prior to permitting upstretch assignments to 

posts with low or no hardship differentials, which may have encouraged 

officers with less experience to bid on hardship posts. According to State, 

upstretch assignments can be career-enhancing in some cases; however, 

the experience gap they represent—particularly at the mid-levels—can 

compromise diplomatic readiness. 

Staffing and Experience 

Gaps at Hardship Posts 

Can Compromise 

Diplomatic Readiness 

Current and former State officials, including recently retired ambassadors 

and former directors general who participated in a GAO expert 

roundtable, staff currently posted overseas, and officials in Washington 

told us that staffing gaps at hardship posts diminish diplomatic readiness 

in a variety of ways. According to these officials, gaps can lead to 

decreased reporting coverage, loss of institutional knowledge, and 

increased supervisory requirements for senior staff, which take time away 

from other critical diplomatic responsibilities. 

Senior management at selected posts had concerns that vacant positions 

caused an increased workload on officers at posts, which may detract 

from important functions. For example, the economic officer position in 

Lagos, whose responsibility is solely focused on energy, oil, and natural 

gas, was not filled in the 2009 cycle. The incumbent explained that, 

following his departure, his reporting responsibilities will be split up 

between officers in Abuja and Lagos. He said this division of 

responsibilities would diminish the position’s focus on the oil industry and 

potentially lead to the loss of important contacts within both the 

government ministries and the oil industry. A 2008 Office of Inspector 

General (OIG) inspection of Freetown, Sierra Leone, noted concern over 

the effect of a sudden vacancy when the embassy’s sole political/economic 

officer cut his tour short to serve in Iraq.29 This vacancy deprived the 

embassy of its only reporting officer and the resulting transition period 

caused officials in Washington to be dissatisfied with economic reporting 

on issues such as the diamond industry and its impact on political 

instability, money laundering, drug smuggling, and, perhaps, terrorism. 

Similarly, an official told us that a political/military officer position in 

 

29Department of State, OIG, Report of Inspection: Embassy Freetown, Sierra Leone, ISP-I08-18A (Washington, D.C., March 2008). As of March 2008, Freetown had a 30 percent 

hardship differential. 

Page 15 GAO-09-874 Department of State
 

Russia was vacant because of the departure of the incumbent for a tour in 

Afghanistan, and the position’s portfolio of responsibilities was divided 

among other officers in the embassy. According to the official, this 

vacancy slowed negotiation of an agreement with Russia regarding 

military transit to Afghanistan. 

Another potentially adverse effect of staffing gaps is that important postlevel duties, such as reporting and staff development, may suffer from 

inexperience when entry-level officers are staffed to mid-level positions. 

While officials at post said that some officers in stretch positions perform 

well, others told us that the inexperience of entry-level officers serving in 

mid-level capacities can have a negative impact. For example, the 

economic section chief at one post we visited stated that reporting 

produced by an entry-level officer in a mid-level position lacked the 

necessary analytical rigor. The political section chief at the same post 

noted that a mid-level position responsible for reporting on terrorism was 

staffed by an officer serving two grades above his current grade level with 

no previous reporting experience. A 2008 OIG inspection of N’Djamena, 

Chad, found that difficulties attracting staff with the requisite skills and 

experience contributed to deviations from standard operating 

procedures.30

Another consequence of staffing gaps is that senior-level staff at posts with 

no experienced mid-level officers are diverted from key responsibilities by 

the need to supervise inexperienced entry-level staff. In 2006, we found 

that senior staff at several posts spent more time on operational matters 

and less time on overall planning, policy, and coordination than should be 

the case. On our recent visits, we found that there are still inexperienced 

officers taking on mid-level responsibilities and that these officers require 

more supervision and guidance from senior post leadership than more 

experienced mid-level officers would require; as a result, the senior 

officers have less time to perform high-level planning and policy 

implementation. According to officials we met with, inexperienced 

officers sometimes perform essential tasks such as adjudicating visas, 

identifying political trends, and assisting American citizens abroad; 

therefore, they often require guidance on how to carry out such activities. 

When senior-level officials must serve as the only source of guidance, post 

 

30Department of State, OIG, Report of Inspection: Embassy N’Djamena, Chad, ISP-I-09-02A 

(Washington, D.C., December 2008). As of December 2008, N’Djamena had a 30 percent 

hardship differential. 

Page 16 GAO-09-874 Department of State
 

officials explained, they have less ability to plan and coordinate policy. For 

example, the ambassador to Nigeria told us spending time helping officers 

in stretch positions is a burden and interferes with policy planning and 

implementation. The consular chief in Shenyang told us he spends too 

much time helping entry-level officers adjudicate visas and, therefore, less 

time managing the section. A 2008 OIG inspection of N’Djamena, Chad, 

reported that the entire front office was involved in mentoring entry-level 

officers and that this was an unfair burden on the ambassador and deputy 

chief of mission, given the challenging nature of the post.31

In addition to gaps in established positions, some State officials at 

overseas posts told us that there are not enough authorized positions to 

manage the heavy workload at some posts. These officials stated that even 

if the department had an adequate number of people to fill all current 

positions, there would still be a need for additional positions and officers 

to fill them because the current workload outweighs the workforce. For 

example, a senior official at one post told us that her embassy did not have 

enough authorized management positions to support the rapid increase in 

staff for all government agencies located there. As a result, the 

ambassador placed a moratorium on the addition of any new staff from 

any agency until the embassy received more management officer 

positions. The official explained that the moratorium has prevented some 

agencies from adding staff to implement important programs related to 

health, education, and counternarcotics efforts. During the GAO expert 

roundtable of former ambassadors to hardship posts, a former director 

general said that one of his former posts had so many visitors that four 

officers had to deal primarily with visits and not their other 

responsibilities. In addition, according to the ambassador to Liberia, the 

embassy in Monrovia lacks adequate staff positions to meet its goals. She 

said it is not uncommon for one section to work twenty hours of overtime 

in one week. The ambassador listed four new positions that she believes 

should be authorized but, according to her, will not likely be added in the 

next few years. The State OIG also commented on the need for reasonable 

growth in Monrovia in a 2008 mission inspection.32 A 2009 OIG inspection 

of Nouakchott, Mauritania, noted concern that without another political 

officer in the embassy, the post would not have the depth needed to 

 

31ISP-I-09-02A. 

32Department of State, OIG, Report of Inspection: Embassy Monrovia, Liberia, ISP-I-08-

20A (Washington, D.C., March 2008). As of March 2008, Monrovia had a 30 percent 

hardship differential. 

Page 17 GAO-09-874 Department of State
 

adequately cover the rapidly evolving political situation and achieve 

department goals in the country.33 Similarly, officials in Jeddah, Saudi 

Arabia, noted that the creation and filling of a political/economic section 

chief position, as they have requested in their Mission Strategic Plan, 

would alleviate the current need for entry-level officers to report directly 

to the consul general. 

State uses a range of incentives to staff hardship posts, but their 

effectiveness remains unclear due to a lack of evaluation. Incentives to 

serve in hardship posts range from monetary benefits to changes in service 

and bidding requirements. In 2006, we recommended that State evaluate 

the effectiveness of its incentive programs for hardship post assignments, 

but the department has not yet done so systematically. Further, recent 

legislation will increase the cost of existing incentives, thereby increasing 

the need for State to fully evaluate its incentives to ensure resources are 

effectively targeted and not wasted. 

State Has Wide Range 

of Measures and 

Incentives to Staff 

Hardship Posts but 

Their Effectiveness is 

Unclear Due to Lack 

of Evaluation 

State Has a Wide Range of 

Measures and Other 

Incentives to Staff 

Hardship Posts 

State has created a wide range of measures and financial and nonfinancial 

incentives to encourage mid-level officers to seek assignments to—and 

remain at—hardship posts around the world. These have included some 

measures designed for all hardship posts, as well as others tailored 

specifically to fill positions in Iraq and Afghanistan, posts State has 

declared to be the highest priority. 

In addition to hardship and danger pay, incentives to bid on—and remain 

in—hardship posts, particularly those considered historically difficult to 

staff, include: 

• The opportunity to include upstretch jobs on core bid list. Mid-level 

officers may include bids for upstretch positions in their “core bid” list, 

provided that the position is at a hardship post or the officer is serving at a 

hardship post when the bid list is due.34 State generally requires employees 

 

33Department of State, OIG, Report of Inspection: Embassy Nouakchott, Mauritania, ISP-I09-23A (Washington, D.C., March 2009). As of March 2009, Nouakchott had a 25 percent 

hardship differential. 

34A core bid is one on a position in an employee’s cone/skill code and grade for which the 

employee has either the required language proficiency, or time to acquire it, between his or 

her transfer eligibility date and that of the incumbent. 

Page 18 GAO-09-874 Department of State
 

to maintain a list of six “core bids” on positions at their grade level. State 

often offers upstretch assignments as a reward for strong performance and 

as a career-enhancing opportunity. 

• Eligibility to receive student loan repayments. Officers who accept 

assignments to posts with at least a 20 percent hardship differential or any 

danger pay allowance may be offered student loan repayments as a 

recruitment or retention incentive. 

• Extra pay to extend tour in certain posts. Employees who accept a 3-year 

assignment at certain historically difficult to staff posts qualifying for the 

Service Need Differential (SND) program are eligible to receive an 

additional hardship differential over and above existing hardship 

differentials, equal to 15 percent of the employee’s basic compensation.35

• One year of service at unaccompanied or certain difficult to staff posts. 

State has established a 1-year tour of duty at posts considered too 

dangerous for some family members to accompany an officer, in 

recognition of the difficulty of serving at such posts. Additionally, 

employees may negotiate shorter tours to historically difficult to staff 

posts, provided it is in the interest of the service. 

• Consideration for promotion. State instructs the selection boards who 

recommend employees for promotion to “...weigh positively creditable and 

exemplary performance at hardship and danger posts...” However, the 

instructions only identify Iraq and Afghanistan by name. 

State has taken special measures to fill positions in Iraq and Afghanistan, 

including assigning officers to these two posts before assigning them to 

other posts. Incentives for officers to serve in Iraq and Afghanistan 

include: 

• Priority consideration for onward assignments. State has instituted a 

program whereby a Foreign Service employee may be selected for his/her 

assignment for 2010 at the same time as he/she is selected for a 2009 Iraq 

assignment. 

 

35State regulations say that in order to qualify for SND, an employee must be assigned to a 

post that has at least a 15 percent differential and the combined SND and danger pay 

allowance do not exceed 35 percent. 

Page 19 GAO-09-874 Department of State
 

• The option to serve in Iraq or Afghanistan on detail and extend current 

assignment. State allows officers to serve in Iraq or Afghanistan on detail 

from Washington or their current post of assignment, which provides 

financial and other benefits. For example, officers serving on detail from 

Washington, D.C., retain locality pay.36 Moreover, according to State 

officials, officers who leave their families at their current post of 

assignment to serve on detail avoid the disruption of moving their families 

and may extend their tour at their current post of assignment from 3 years 

to 4 years, which may be particularly attractive for officers with school age 

children as it enables more educational continuity.37

• Favorable consideration for promotion. State’s selection boards that 

recommend employees for promotion are expected to look favorably on 

service in Iraq and Afghanistan. In particular, State instructs the boards to 

“particularly credit performance in Provincial Reconstruction Teams and 

other regional operations in Iraq, which the President and Secretary of 

State have determined to be of the highest priority.” 

In addition to incentives, State has rules requiring certain employees to bid 

on positions at hardship posts. These Fair Share rules require designated 

FSOs to bid on a minimum of three posts with a 15 percent or higher 

differential pay incentive in two geographic areas.38

Table 3 lists the various incentives and requirements across posts, based 

on hardship differential. 

 

36Locality pay is a salary comparability benefit, typically available to domestic federal 

employees only to attract workers in the continental United States to the federal 

government versus the private sector. Historically, FSOs posted overseas have not received 

locality pay. Current locality pay for Washington, D.C., is 23.1 percent. 

37The standard tour of duty at posts with no differentials is three years. 

38An employee is considered Fair Share if he or she has not served at least (1) 20 months at 

a post with a combined hardship and danger pay differential of 15 percent or greater, or (2) 

10 months at a post with a 1-year standard tour of duty during the 8 years prior to the 

employee’s upcoming transfer eligibility date. 

Page 20 GAO-09-874 Department of State
 

Table 3: Financial and Nonfinancial Incentives and Requirements for Service at Hardship Posts 

Category 5% & 10% 15% 20% 25% to 35% Combat Zones 

Financial Hardship differential Hardship differential Hardship differential Hardship differential Hardship differential 

Danger pay Danger pay Danger pay Danger pay 

SND SND SND 

Student loan 

repayment programa 

Student loan 

repayment program 

Student loan 

repayment program 

Student loan repayment 

program 

Retain DC locality pay 

Family stays at post if 

sent on 1-year TDY OR 

can elect separate 

maintenance allowance 

Special differential (20%

for FS-01, FS-02, FS-03, 

and FS-04 levels if serve 

more than 180 days) 

Nonfinancial Meets Fair Share 

requirements 

Meets Fair Share 

requirements 

Meets Fair Share 

requirements 

Meets Fair Share 

requirements (after 6 

months in Iraq, 10 

months in Afghanistan) 

Staff eligible to bid 

for a position one 

grade higher than 

their current grade 

level 

Staff eligible to bid 

for a position one 

grade higher than 

their current grade 

level 

Staff eligible to bid 

for a position one 

grade higher than 

their current grade 

level 

Staff eligible to bid for a 

position one grade 

higher than their current 

grade level 

Onward assignments 

Negotiated toursb Negotiated tours Negotiated tours Negotiated tours 

Favorable 

consideration in 

promotion boards 

Favorable 

consideration in 

promotion boards 

Favorable 

consideration in 

promotion boards 

Favorable 

consideration in 

promotion boards 

Favorable consideration 

in promotion boards 

Extension of previous 

assignment 

Source: GAO analysis of State data. 

a

Officers who accept assignments to posts with at least a 20 percent hardship differential or any 

danger pay allowance are eligible for student loan repayments. 

b

Nonstandard tours of duty may be negotiated if a post is historically difficult to staff and the tour 

length is in the interest of the service. 

Although State offers a range of incentives, it does not routinely track or 

report on their total cost. In response to our request for cost information, 

State queried its payroll system and estimated that it spent about $83 

million on hardship pay, $30 million on danger pay, and about $3 million 

on SND in fiscal year 2008. The cost information indicates that the amount 

spent on financial incentives has increased in recent years. According to 

the State OIG, in fiscal year 2005, the department spent about $65 million 

Page 21 GAO-09-874 Department of State
 

on hardship pay, $16 million on danger pay, and $3 million on SND.39

Separately, State reports the amount spent on student loan repayments to 

the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) as part of that office’s 

statutory requirement to report annually to the Congress on agencies’ use 

of student loan repayments.40 According to our analysis of data from 

OPM’s report for 2007, State repaid about $2.5 million of student loans to 

FSOs in that year. 

Although not all incentives cost money, they may present other tradeoffs. 

First, State officials report that the 1-year tour of duty to Iraq has been a 

useful recruitment tool.41 However, these and other officials told us that 

the 1-year tour length makes it difficult for FSOs to form the relationships 

with their counterparts in other governments necessary for the conduct of 

U.S. diplomacy. For example, a State official told us of a recent instance 

where the U.S. government needed information on a Middle Eastern 

country’s relationship with another nation in the region. However, none of 

the four political officers at the U.S. embassy in the country had sufficient 

contacts with the host government to obtain the information required. 

Consequently, the U.S. embassy needed to ask State headquarters to 

obtain the information from the host government by way of that country’s 

embassy in the United States, resulting in delayed reporting of the 

information. A former Director General told us that 1-year tours result in a 

loss of institutional knowledge and program continuity. Second, the 

opportunity to bid on stretch assignments is an incentive because such 

assignments may be career-enhancing. However, as noted earlier in this 

report, senior officials may need to supervise and guide officers in stretch 

positions more than officers in positions at their current grade levels. 

State Has Not 

Systematically Evaluated 

Effectiveness of Incentive 

Programs for Hardship 

Post Assignments 

State has not systematically evaluated the effectiveness of its incentive 

programs, despite recommendations to do so. Agency officials cited the 

difficulty of evaluating the impact of any single incentive because of the 

numerous factors involved, but State has not taken advantage of available 

tools to evaluate incentive programs. State has not generated sufficient 

data to evaluate the impact of the favorable consideration for promotion 

 

39Department of State, OIG, Report of Inspection: Bureau of Administration, Office of 

Allowances, ISP-I-06-51 (Washington, D.C., September 2006). 

405 U.S.C. § 5379. 

41One year is also the standard tour of duty in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Jeddah, Saudi 

Arabia. 

Page 22 GAO-09-874 Department of State
 

and the SND program in attracting employees to bid on, or remain in, 

hardship post assignments. State also did not comply with a congressional 

mandate to evaluate recent increases in hardship and danger pay. 

State’s efforts to evaluate hardship incentives remain insufficient. We 

previously reported that State created a number of incentives to address 

the growing number of vacancies at hardship posts to achieve its goal of 

having the right people in the right place with the right skills.42 However, in 

2006, we reported State had not measured the effectiveness of hardship 

incentives, and recommended State systematically evaluate the 

effectiveness of such measures, establishing specific indicators of 

progress and adjusting the use of the incentives based on this analysis. 

State responded to this recommendation by including a question on the 

impact of incentives to its biennial employee quality of life survey, but this 

step does not fully respond to our recommendation for three reasons. 

State’s Effort to Evaluate 

Effectiveness of Incentive 

Programs for Hardship Posts is 

Insufficient 

First, the survey’s incentive question is not specific enough. State included 

the question “How important was each of the following in your decision to 

bid on overseas positions during the last assignment cycle in which you 

submitted bids?” in its most recent Quality of Life at Work survey. The 

question then listed 11 items, some of which are incentives (e.g., hardship 

pay) and others are generic aspects of overseas assignments (e.g., 

security). While the survey provides some limited information, the survey 

question does not ask about the influence of the incentives on officers’ 

willingness to bid on—and remain in—hardship post assignments. 

Further, by mixing incentives and other aspects of hardship post 

assignments, the question dilutes the focus on the incentives. Moreover, 

the list of incentives included is incomplete. For example, it does not ask 

employees about the extent to which the opportunity to include upstretch 

jobs on their core bid list or the favorable promotion consideration by 

selection boards impact their decisions to bid on hardship post 

assignments. Excluding some incentives from the survey hampers State’s 

ability to evaluate the effectiveness of programs for hardship post 

assignments individually and collectively. 

Second, the overall survey design has limitations preventing State officials 

from segregating responses by post and also does not collect key 

demographic information. For example, the survey data do not allow State 

officials to determine which responses came from posts with no hardship 

 

42GAO-06-894 and GAO-02-626. 

Page 23 GAO-09-874 Department of State
 

differential, such as London, United Kingdom, and which came from posts 

of greatest hardship, such as Lagos, Nigeria. The survey also does not ask 

respondents for key demographic information, such as age and family 

status. The absence of this information makes it difficult to assess the 

effectiveness of the incentives as they apply to posts differently. Further, 

the appeal of one incentive relative to another incentive may differ based 

upon an officer’s personal circumstances. 

Third, State did not establish specific indicators of progress against which 

to measure the survey responses over time. As previously noted, State 

tracks the percentage of critical positions filled with qualified bidders by 

the end of the assignments cycle. However, State has not attempted to link 

this information to the survey results, as suggested by government 

management standards.43 Since the survey incentive question is so vague, 

tracking it over time would not provide a useful indicator of progress to 

assess the outcomes of its programs for hardship post assignments. 

State has not taken advantage of available tools to evaluate incentive 

programs for hardship post assignments. State officials maintain that 

external constraints make it challenging to evaluate the department’s 

incentive programs. They reported that, in their view, it is not possible to 

isolate the effectiveness of a single incentive because of the large number 

of factors staff consider when bidding on assignments. Specifically, the 

department cited the difficulties of capturing the personal and family 

preferences and values that influence bid decisions in a database.44 While 

acknowledging the challenges of this type of analysis, there are statistical 

methods and procedures to help determine the extent of association 

between the key variables of interest, while controlling for the effect of 

other measurable factors that could influence outcomes. Further, costeffectiveness analysis—which attempts to systematically quantify the 

While State Cites External 

Constraints for Evaluating 

Incentives, Proper Evaluation 

Design and Execution May 

Help Meet This Challenge 

 

43In conjunction with the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) and GAO, OPM issued a 

strategic human capital framework—called the Human Capital Assessment and 

Accountability Framework—to provide a consistent, comprehensive representation of 

human capital management to guide federal agencies. OPM’s framework provides six 

standards, along with associated indicators, or practices, for achieving success. One of the 

effectiveness indicators under the Talent Management standard is the reporting of 

appropriate metrics to senior managers and human resource executives to assess the 

outcomes from retention strategies. 

44At posts we visited in 2008 and 2009, we heard concerns similar to those we reported on 

in 2006, when we found that family considerations—child-related and spousal employment 

concerns, in particular—were a significant obstacle to attracting mid-level officers to 

hardship posts. 

Page 24 GAO-09-874 Department of State
 

costs of alternatives and assumes that each alternative results in achieving 

the same benefits—can be an appropriate evaluation tool when dollar 

values cannot be ascribed to the benefits of a particular program. 

While State has taken steps to improve its data collection effort, it does 

not collect sufficient information to determine whether the SND program 

or the instructions to selection boards to weigh service at hardship posts 

positively are having an impact on bidding on hardship posts. State has 

increased the amount of data it collects on the SND program since we last 

reported in 2006, but more information is needed to evaluate the 

program’s effectiveness. In 2006, we reported State was able to provide 

information on the number of officers who actually enrolled in the 

program, but was not able to provide information on the number of 

eligible officers who did not. Since we last reported on this issue, State has 

begun collecting data on which officers decline SND. However, State has 

not gathered the additional information necessary to measure the 

effectiveness of the program. According to a department official, State has 

considered the calculation of the worldwide rate at which officers extend 

their tours of duty to be a lower priority than other human resources 

initiatives. The State official said that it is not possible to evaluate the 

program’s effectiveness without this information. 

State Has Not Generated Data 

to Measure Key Incentives 

The manner in which State tracks employees serving in Iraq and 

Afghanistan makes it difficult to analyze the impact of the promotion 

consideration outlined in the instructions to selection boards. As 

previously noted, officers may serve in Iraq and Afghanistan on detail from 

Washington or another post of assignment; however, while they are on 

detail, State’s personnel database continues to reflect the officer’s current 

post of assignment. Furthermore, we reported in June 200945 that State 

does not have a mechanism for identifying and tracking its employees 

deployed to Iraq or Afghanistan and recommended the department 

 

45GAO, Human Capital: Actions Needed to Better Track and Provide Timely and Accurate 

Compensation and Medical Benefits to Deployed Federal Civilians, GAO-09-562 

(Washington, D.C.: June 26, 2009). State officials compiled their list of civilian employees 

who had been deployed to and returned from Iraq or Afghanistan between January 1, 2006, 

and April 30, 2008 by querying GEMS. According to a responsible State official, GEMS is a 

human resources system designed to document a personnel action from its initial request 

until it is completely processed. 

Page 25 GAO-09-874 Department of State
 

establish policies and procedures to do so.46 The lack of readily available 

data on FSOs deployed to Iraq and Afghanistan may make it difficult to 

comply with a June 2009 congressional direction to State that it report on 

the promotion process at the department as it relates to any preferential 

consideration given for service in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Pakistan, as 

compared to other hardship posts.47 According to officials, State has not 

yet attempted to analyze the impact of the instructions to the selection 

boards on promotions. 

State has not complied with a congressional mandate to assess the 

effectiveness of increasing hardship and danger pay ceilings to recruit 

experienced officers to certain posts, hampering oversight of State’s use of 

the authority to increase such differentials. In December 2005, Congress 

passed legislation authorizing State to raise the hardship differentials and 

danger pay allowances from 25 percent to 35 percent as a recruitment and 

retention incentive.48 The law required the department to (1) notify several 

congressional committees of the criteria to be used in adjusting the 

hardship and danger differentials and (2) study and report by 2007 on the 

effect of the increases in hardship differential and danger pay allowance 

ceilings in filling “hard to fill” positions.49 In response, State notified 

Congress in March 2006 that it would increase the threshold for posts to 

qualify for the 30 and 35 percent differentials and allowances under the 

present criteria it uses to calculate its hardship and danger pay differential 

calculations, rather than add new criteria.50 However, State officials 

confirmed that the department did not study the effect of these increased 

differentials and allowances on filling “hard to fill” positions and did not 

provide the required report to Congress. A State official said that, as of 

July 2009, the department had begun an effort to comply with the 

State Did Not Undertake 

Congressionally Mandated 

Report to Assess Impact of 

Increased Hardship and Danger 

Pay on Staffing Shortfalls 

 

46In response to our recommendation, State committed to consulting and coordinating with 

the Department of Defense and other executive agencies to determine the best way to 

establish policies and procedures to accurately identify and track standardized information 

on deployed civilians. 

47H.R. Rept. No. 111-151, at 123 (2009) (Conf. Rept.). 

48To provide certain authorities for the Department of State, and for other purposes, Pub. L. 

No. 109-140, § 4, 119 Stat. 2650, 2651 (2005). 

49Id. 

50State uses a point system to determine the appropriate differential and danger pay rates 

for posts. State informed Congress that posts would need to reach higher thresholds to 

qualify for the 30 and 35 percent levels. 

Page 26 GAO-09-874 Department of State
 

congressional mandate. According to State’s comments on this report, the 

department expects to fulfill the mandate by October 2009. 

Despite the hardship and danger pay increases, these high-priority posts 

continue to have difficulties attracting bidders. Specifically, 17 of the 26 

posts with either danger or hardship pay differentials above 25 percent 

were designated historically difficult to staff as of May 2008. The lack of an 

assessment of the effectiveness of the danger and hardship pay increases 

in filling positions at these posts, coupled with the continuing staffing 

challenges in these locations, makes it difficult to determine whether these 

resources are properly targeted. 

Legislative Changes May 

Result in Increased 

Expenditures on 

Incentives for Hardship 

Post Assignments 

Several measures passed by Congress this year may raise the cost of 

hardship post incentives already in place and provide additional 

incentives. Legislation enacted in 2009 authorized locality pay adjustments 

for fiscal year 2009 for members of the Foreign Service stationed overseas 

comparable to that if such member’s official duty station were in the 

District of Columbia, and appropriated $41 million for this purpose.51

According to a State official, the legislative change will result in an 

approximately 8 percent increase in basic pay for FSOs, beginning in 

August 2009. Locality pay is not itself an incentive for hardship post 

assignments. However, the resulting increase in basic pay will lead to an 

increase in hardship pay, danger pay, and SND, all of which are calculated 

as percentages of basic pay. Officials we interviewed, both at hardship 

posts and in Washington, D.C., cited the lack of locality pay as a deterrent 

to bid on overseas positions. We have reported in the past that differences 

in the statutes governing domestic locality pay and differential pay for 

overseas service created a gap in compensation, which State officials, the 

American Foreign Service Association, and many officers have reported 

effectively penalizes overseas employees compared to employees based in 

Washington, D.C.52

Congress also recently enacted legislation authorizing State to pay 

recruitment, relocation, and retention bonuses to all FSOs other than 

 

51See Pub. L. No. 111-32, § 1113; Omnibus Appropriations Act, 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-8, § 4, 

123 Stat. 524, 525 and Explanatory Statement, submitted by Mr. Obey, Chairman of the 

House Committee on Appropriations, Regarding H.R. 1105, Omnibus Appropriations Act, 

2009, 155 Cong. Rec. H 1653, 2404 (daily ed. Feb. 23, 2009). 

52GAO-06-894 and GAO-02-626. 

Page 27 GAO-09-874 Department of State
 

ambassadors and chiefs of mission who are on official duty in Iraq, 

Afghanistan, and Pakistan.53 Previously, Foreign Service generalists were 

not entitled to receive recruitment, relocation, and retention bonuses.54 As 

of the end of fiscal year 2008, there were about 340 Foreign Service 

generalist positions in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Pakistan. Further, State also 

plans to increase the number of FSOs in Afghanistan and Pakistan. The 

large—and growing—number of FSOs serving at these posts represents a 

potentially significant increase in recruitment, relocation, and retention 

bonus payments.55

The conduct of U.S. diplomacy compels State to assign staff to hardship 

posts where conditions are difficult and sometimes dangerous, but that 

nonetheless are at the forefront of U.S. foreign policy priorities. State has 

made progress since 2006 in reducing its deficit of mid-level officers and 

increasing the average number of bids at hardship posts. Despite these 

advances, State continues to face persistent staffing and experience gaps 

at such posts—especially at the mid-level—which can compromise its 

diplomatic readiness. The department has generally been able to fill its top 

priority posts in Iraq and Afghanistan, but key positions at other hardship 

posts remain vacant or are filled by officers who may lack the necessary 

experience to effectively perform their duties, potentially compromising 

State’s ability to advance U.S. international interests. Although State plans 

to address staffing gaps by hiring more officers, the department 

acknowledges it will take years for these new employees to gain the 

experience they need to be effective mid-level officers. The department 

plans to manage this experience gap in the near term by continuing to 

assign officers to positions above their current grade level. However, the 

frequent assignment of officers to stretch positions in hardship posts 

brings some risks, which will likely persist since State’s assignment system 

does not explicitly address the continuing experience gap at hardship 

posts as a priority consideration in making assignments. Furthermore, 

despite State’s continued difficulty attracting qualified staff to hardship 

posts, the department has not systematically evaluated the effectiveness of 

Conclusions 

 

53See Pub. L. No. 111-32, § 1115(d). 

54State has had the authority to offer recruitment, retention, and relocation bonuses to 

Foreign Service specialists and civil service employees. 

55According to OPM, in calendar year 2007, State paid approximately $6 million in retention 

bonuses to 594 informational technology specialists, unrelated to FSO staffing in Iraq, 

Afghanistan, and Pakistan. 

Page 28 GAO-09-874 Department of State
 

its incentives for hardship service. These incentives cost the department 

millions of dollars annually—an investment that will grow given recent 

legislative initiatives that raise FSO basic pay and expand the use of 

bonuses for recruitment, relocation, and retention. Without a full 

evaluation of State’s hardship incentives, the department cannot obtain 

valuable insights that could help guide resource decisions to ensure it is 

most efficiently and effectively addressing gaps at these important posts. 

To ensure that hardship posts are staffed commensurate with their stated 

level of strategic importance and resources are properly targeted, we 

recommend the Secretary of State take the following two actions: 

• Take steps to minimize the experience gap at hardship posts by making 

the assignment of at-grade, mid-level officers to such posts an explicit 

priority consideration. 

• Develop and implement a plan to evaluate incentives for hardship post 

assignments. Such a plan could include an analysis of how the hardship 

assignment incentive programs work individually and collectively to 

address the department’s difficulty in recruiting staff to accept—and 

remain in—positions at hardship posts. 

State provided written comments on a draft of this report. The comments 

are reprinted in Appendix IV. State generally agreed with the report’s 

findings, conclusions, and recommendations. For example, the department 

acknowledged that many hardship posts may face experience gaps. State 

also provided us with a draft analysis of the impact of increased hardship 

and danger pay on staffing shortfalls and indicated that it plans to 

continue tracking employee attitudes toward hardship incentives through 

future surveys. While these are positive steps, they do not fully respond to 

our recommendation to implement a plan to evaluate hardship incentives. 

In addition, State provided technical comments, which we incorporated as 

appropriate. 

Recommendations for 

Executive Action 

Agency Comments 

and Our Evaluation 

Page 29 GAO-09-874 Department of State
 

As agreed with your offices, unless you publicly announce the contents of 

this report earlier, we plan no further distribution until 30 days from the 

report date. At that time, we will send copies of this report to the Secretary 

of State and interested congressional committees. In addition, the report 

will be available at no charge on our Web site at http://www.gao.gov. 

If you or your staffs have any questions concerning this report, please 

contact me at (202) 512-4268 or fordj@gao.gov. Contact points for our 

Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the 

last page of this report. Key contributors to this report are listed in 

appendix V. 

Jess T. Ford 

Director, International Affairs and Trade 

 

Page 30 GAO-09-874 Department of State
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and 

Methodology 

Page 31 GAO-09-874 

Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and 

Methodology 

To assess the Department of State’s (State) progress in addressing staffing 

gaps at hardship posts since 2006 and the effect of any remaining gaps, we 

• reviewed GAO and State Office of Inspector General reports (OIG), as well 

as applicable legislation and budget documents; 

• analyzed staffing, bidding, and position data; and 

• interviewed officials in State’s Bureau of Human Resources, Bureau of 

Consular Affairs, and six regional bureaus regarding staffing issues. 

To determine State staff surplus/deficit figures, we analyzed State staffing 

data and compared the number of positions in each career track with the 

number of Foreign Service Officers (FSO) in each track. For example, if 

the total number of employees in the consular career track is 1,055 and the 

total number of consular positions is 1,866, the deficit in officers would be 

811. 

We analyzed bid data from the 2008 summer assignments cycle to 

determine the average number of bids per post, the median number of bids 

for each differential rate, and the average number of bids per generalist 

career track for each differential rate. In order to compare 2008 data with 

the 2005 data from our previous report and remain consistent, we used FS04, FS-03, and FS-02 bid data. The bid data include the number of positions 

to be filled at each post and the number of bids received for each position. 

We used the bid data for the summer assignments cycle because, 

according to State officials, most employees are transferred during this 

cycle, compared to the winter cycle. Because State staffed Iraq through a 

separate assignments cycle in 2008 that involved a different bidding 

process than the regular summer assignments cycle, we did not include 

Iraq positions in our analysis. 

We used the following methodology to obtain our results: 

• To obtain the average number of bids per post, we took the total number 

of bids received on all positions at each post and divided it by the total 

number of positions to be filled at the post. For example, in the 2008 

summer assignments cycle, Lagos had 9 positions to be filled and received 

a total of 23 bids, resulting in an average of 2.6 bids for this post. 

• To obtain the median number of bids at each differential rate, we arranged 

in ascending order the average number of bids for each post at the 

corresponding differential rate and used the middle average. For example, 

 Department of State
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and 

Methodology 

assuming there are 5 posts at the 25 percent differential rate and their 

average bids are 3, 5, 7, 9, and 16, the median of the average bids is 7. 

• To obtain the average number of bids per generalist career track at each 

differential rate, we took the total number of bids received on all positions 

in each career track per differential and divided it by the total number of 

positions to be filled in the career track per differential. For example, 

assuming there are 3 management positions at the 15 percent differential 

rate receiving a total of 12 bids, the average number of bids for 

management positions at 15 percent differential posts is 4. 

We also analyzed data on all State Foreign Service positions as of the end 

of fiscal year 2008 to determine the vacancy rate for each post, the average 

vacancy rate for each differential rate, and the proportion of mid-level 

generalist positions filled by officers working above their grades for each 

differential rate. The position data include the number of positions at each 

post, the career track and grade of each position and, for positions that are 

staffed, the career track and grade of the incumbent. We used position 

data as of the end of the fiscal year because, according to State officials, 

most employees moving on to their next assignments have arrived at their 

new posts by that time. Due to limitations in the position data for Iraq, we 

did not include Iraq positions in our analysis. 

We used the following methodology to obtain our results: 

• To obtain the vacancy rate for each post, we took the total number of 

vacant positions at each post and divided it by the total number of 

positions to be filled at the post. For example, assuming there are 10 total 

positions at a given post and 2 vacancies, the vacancy rate is 20 percent. 

• To obtain the average vacancy rate for each differential rate, we took the 

sum of all vacancy rates for posts with a given differential and divided it by 

the total number of posts with that differential. For example, assuming 

there are 5 posts at the 25 percent differential rate and their vacancy rates 

are 10 percent, 12 percent, 15 percent, 17 percent, and 20 percent, the 

average vacancy rate is 14.8 percent. 

• To obtain the proportion of mid-level generalist positions filled by officers 

working above their grades for each differential rate, we took the total 

number of generalist positions at the FS-03, FS-02, and FS-01 levels filled 

with officers in upstretch assignments for each differential and divided it 

by the total number of generalist positions at those levels with that 

differential. For example, assuming there are only 7 mid-level generalist 

Page 32 GAO-09-874 Department of State
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and 

Methodology 

positions at posts with a 20 percent differential and 2 are filled by officers 

in upstretches, the upstretch rate is 29 percent. 

To assess the extent to which State has used incentives to address staffing 

gaps at hardship posts, we 

• reviewed GAO and State OIG reports, as well as applicable legislative 

documents and guidance from the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) 

and the Office of Management and Budget; 

• examined surveys conducted by State; 

• analyzed State documents that outline incentives for hardship service, 

including those available to officers serving in Iraq and Afghanistan; 

• collected data on participation in and funds expended on hardship 

incentive programs; and 

• interviewed officials in State’s Bureau of Human Resources, Bureau of 

Administration, and six regional bureaus regarding State’s use of 

incentives. 

We obtained bidding data from State’s FSBID database and staffing and 

position data from State’s Global Employee Management System (GEMS) 

database. Since we have previously checked the reliability of both these 

databases, we inquired if State had made any major changes to the 

databases since our 2006 report. State indicated that it had not made major 

changes to either. We also tested the data for completeness and 

interviewed knowledgeable officials from the Office of Resource 

Management and Organizational Analysis and the Office of Career 

Development and Assignments (HR/CDA) concerning the reliability of the 

data. Based on our analysis of the data and discussions with the officials, 

we determined the bidding and staffing data to be sufficiently reliable for 

our purposes. We also determined that the position data for all posts but 

Iraq were sufficiently reliable for the purposes of this engagement. Given 

the limitations associated with Iraq positions in the position data, we 

obtained a separate set of Iraq-specific position data from the Bureau of 

Near Eastern Affairs (NEA) to use to analyze staffing in Iraq. To assess the 

reliability of the Iraq position data provided by NEA, we asked State how 

the data are collected, entered, and checked. State indicated that the data 

are collected and maintained manually by authorized assignment 

personnel and constantly updated through coordination between NEA and 

human resources officials in Iraq, among others. Based on this assessment 

Page 33 GAO-09-874 Department of State
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and 

Methodology 

and our analysis of the data, we determined NEA’s Iraq position data to be 

sufficiently reliable for the purposes of this engagement. 

We conducted fieldwork in Lagos and Abuja, Nigeria; Shenyang, China; 

and Riyadh and Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, to study the impact of staffing gaps 

at selected hardship posts and State’s use of incentives for hardship 

service. In deciding where to conduct our fieldwork, we considered 

factors such as the historic difficulty of staffing a given post; the mix of 

incentives available; strategic importance; and recommendations from 

cognizant State officials. We selected the posts in Nigeria because of their 

historically low bidding, their 25 percent hardship differentials, and 

because each offers Service Need Differential (SND). We selected 

Shenyang because of the post’s 30 percent hardship differential, 

historically low bidding, and SND. We selected the posts in Saudi Arabia 

because, in addition to their historically low bidding and 20 percent 

hardship differentials, both were unaccompanied 1-year posts at the time 

of our review. In addition to our fieldwork, we conducted telephone 

interviews with senior officials in several additional hardship posts, 

including Bangladesh, Cambodia, Liberia, and Tajikistan. We also 

convened an expert roundtable of several retired senior State officials. The 

participants in the roundtable had all served as ambassadors to hardship 

posts in the last 10 years. Two participants were also former directors 

general. 

We conducted this performance audit from April 2008 through September 

2009, in accordance with generally accepted government auditing 

standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to 

obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for 

our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe 

that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings 

and conclusions based on our audit objectives. 

Page 34 GAO-09-874 Department of State
Appendix II: Department of State Generalist Appendix II: Department of State Generalist Staffing Surplus/Deficit by Career Track 

Staffing Surplus/Deficit by Career Track 

Table 4 shows staffing surpluses and deficits by career track for foreign 

service generalists as of December 31, 2008. 

Table 4: Foreign Service Generalists’ Surplus/(Deficit) across Career Tracks, as of December 31, 2008 

Grade level Management Consular Economic Political

Public 

diplomacy 

Surplus/

(Deficit) by 

grade level

Total 

Surplus/

(Deficit)

Senior level MC (8) 13 - 7 (4) 8

OC (34) (14) 31 40 (29) (6)

Subtotal (42) (1) 31 47 (33) 2

Mid level 1 (37) 17 44 57 (67) 14

2 (84) 51 36 16 (223) (204)

3 87 (129) 19 8 120 105

Subtotal (34) (61) 99 81 (170) (85)

Jr. level 4 165 (595)a 108 152 199 29 29

Total 89 (657) 238 280 (4) (54) (54)b

Source: GAO analysis of State data. 

Note: Senior Foreign Service grades include minister counselor (MC) and counselor (OC). 

a

Although there is a deficit of 595 entry-level officers in the consular cone, State does not consider 

this a true deficit because nearly all entry-level generalists serve in consular positions during their first 

or second assignment, regardless of cone. 

b

The total deficit decreases from 54 to 42 when junior grades 05 and 06 are included. We omitted 

these positions from the table to remain consistent with our 2006 report, in which we noted that we 

did not include these grades because we were told that they were training positions that are not 

counted against the deficit. 

Page 35 GAO-09-874 Department of State
Appendix III: 2009 Historically Difficult to 

Staff and Service Need Differential Posts 

Table 5 lists posts that State designated as historically difficult to staff or 

eligible for Service Need Differential (SND) for the 2009 summer 

assignments cycle. 

Table 5: Historically Difficult to Staff and SND Posts for 2009 Summer Assignments 

Cycle 

Regional bureau/ 

country Post 

Historically 

difficult to staff (3) SND (3) 

Bureau of African Affairs 

Angola Luanda 3 3

Benin Cotonou 3 3

Burkina Faso Ouagadougou 3 3

Burundi Bujumbura 3 3

Cameroon Douala 3 3

Yaounde 3 3

Cape Verde Praia 3 3

Central African Republic Bangui 3 3

Chad N’Djamena 3 3

Congo, Democratic 

Republic of the 

Kinshasa 3 3

Congo, Republic of Brazzaville 3 3

Cote d’Ivoire Abidjan 3 3

Djibouti Djibouti 3 3

Equatorial Guinea Malabo 3 3

Eritrea Asmara 3 3

Gabon Libreville 3

Gambia, The Banjul 3 3

Guinea Conakry 3 3

Liberia Monrovia 3 3

Malawi Lilongwe 3 3

Mali Bamako 3 3

Mauritania Nouakchott 3 3

Niger Niamey 3 3

Nigeria Abuja 3 3

Lagos 3 3

Rwanda Kigali 3 3

Sierra Leone Freetown 3 3

Sudan Khartoum 3 3

Appendix III: 2009 Historically Difficult to 

Staff and Service Need Differential Posts 

Page 36 GAO-09-874 Department of State
Appendix III: 2009 Historically Difficult to 

Staff and Service Need Differential Posts 

Regional bureau/ 

country Post 

Historically 

difficult to staff (3) SND (3) 

Togo Lome 3 3

Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs 

Brunei Bandar Seri 

Begawan 

3

China Guangzhou 3 3

Shenyang 3 3

Indonesia Medan 3 3

Japan Naha 3

Marshall Islands Majuro 3

Micronesia Kolonia 3 3

Papua New Guinea Port Moresby 3 3

Timor-Leste Dili 3 3

Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs 

Armenia Yerevan 3

Belarus Minsk 3 3

Bosnia and Herzegovina Banja Luka 3

Kosovo Pristina 3 3

Moldova Chisinau 3 3

Montenegro Podgorica 3

Russia Vladivostok 3 3

Yekaterinburg 3 3

Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs 

Iraq Baghdad 3

Israel Jerusalem 3

Jordan Amman 3

Saudi Arabia Jeddah 3

Riyadh 3

Yemen Sanaa 3 3

Bureau of South and Central Asian Affairs 

Afghanistan Kabul 3

Bangladesh Dhaka 3 3

India Calcutta 3

Kazakhstan Astana 3 3

Pakistan Islamabad 3

Lahore 3

Tajikistan Dushanbe 3 3

Turkmenistan Ashgabat 3 3

Page 37 GAO-09-874 Department of State
Appendix III: 2009 Historically Difficult to 

Staff and Service Need Differential Posts 

Regional bureau/ 

country Post 

Historically 

difficult to staff (3) SND (3) 

Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs 

Guyana Georgetown 3 3

Haiti Port-au-Prince 3 3

Jamaica Kingston 3

Mexico Ciudad Juarez 3

Hermosillo 3

Nogales 3

Suriname Paramaribo 3 3

Source: State. 

Page 38 GAO-09-874 Department of State
Appendix IV: Comments from the Department Appendix IV: Comments from the of State 

Department of State 

Note: GAO’s comment 

supplementing those in 

the report text appears at 

the end of this appendix. 

Page 39 GAO-09-874 Department of State 
Appendix IV: Comments from the Department 

of State 

Page 40 GAO-09-874 Department of State
Appendix IV: Comments from the Department 

of State 

See comment. 

Page 41 GAO-09-874 Department of State
Appendix IV: Comments from the Department 

of State 

Page 42 GAO-09-874 Department of State
Appendix IV: Comments from the Department 

of State 

The following is GAO’s comment to the Department of State’s letter dated 

September 2, 2009. 

While State’s analysis of hardship differential and danger pay increases and 

its request to OPM to include customized questions about hardship 

incentives in future surveys are positive steps, they do not fully respond to 

our recommendation to implement a plan to evaluate hardship incentives. 

State expects to fulfill the mandate to study and report on the effect of the 

increases in hardship differential and danger pay ceilings in filling “hard to 

fill” positions in October 2009. However, as noted earlier, State offers other 

incentives which it has not evaluated. Furthermore, we also note that 

State's last survey had several limitations. For example, the survey lacked 

the requisite specificity, included an incomplete list of incentives, and did 

not collect key demographic information. Unless State addresses these 

issues, the survey’s utility as an evaluation tool will remain limited. 

GAO Comment 

Page 43 GAO-09-874 Department of State
Appendix V: 

A

GAO Contact and Staff 

cknowledgments 

Page 44 GAO-09-874 

Appendix V: GAO Contact and Staff 

Acknowledgments 

Jess T. Ford, (202) 512-4268 or fordj@gao.gov

Key contributors to this report include Anthony Moran, Assistant Director; 

Richard Gifford Howland; Aniruddha Dasgupta; Brian Hackney; Joseph 

Carney; Martin de Alteriis; Grace Lui; Michael Courts; Zina Merritt; Gloria 

Hernandez-Saunders; and John Brummet. Technical assistance was 

provided by Robert Alarapon, Gena Evans, and Thomas Zingale. 

 Department of State 

GAO Contact 

Staff 

Acknowledgments 

(320585) 
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