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i 

52–943 2010

[H.A.S.C. No. 111–9] 

U.S. TRANSPORTATION COMMAND’S 

(USTRANSCOM) AIRLIFT, SEALIFT, AND 

SURFACE LIFT PROGRAMS 

JOINT HEARING 

BEFORE THE

SEAPOWER AND EXPEDITIONARY FORCES 

SUBCOMMITTEE 

MEETING JOINTLY WITH

AIR AND LAND FORCES SUBCOMMITTEE 

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

HEARING HELD 

FEBRUARY 25, 2009 
(II) 

SEAPOWER AND EXPEDITIONARY FORCES SUBCOMMITTEE 

GENE TAYLOR, Mississippi, Chairman 

SOLOMON P. ORTIZ, Texas 

JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island 

RICK LARSEN, Washington 

BRAD ELLSWORTH, Indiana 

JOE COURTNEY, Connecticut 

JOE SESTAK, Pennsylvania 

GLENN NYE, Virginia 

CHELLIE PINGREE, Maine 

ERIC J.J. MASSA, New York 

W. TODD AKIN, Missouri 

ROB WITTMAN, Virginia 

ROSCOE G. BARTLETT, Maryland 

J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia 

DUNCAN HUNTER, California 

MIKE COFFMAN, Colorado 

THOMAS J. ROONEY, Florida 

WILL EBBS, Professional Staff Member 

JENNESS SIMLER, Professional Staff Member 

ELIZABETH DRUMMOND, Staff Assistant 

AIR AND LAND FORCES SUBCOMMITTEE 

NEIL ABERCROMBIE, Hawaii, Chairman 

JOHN SPRATT, South Carolina 

SILVESTRE REYES, Texas 

ADAM SMITH, Washington 

MIKE MCINTYRE, North Carolina 

ELLEN O. TAUSCHER, California 

ROBERT A. BRADY, Pennsylvania 

JIM COOPER, Tennessee 

JIM MARSHALL, Georgia 

JOE SESTAK, Pennsylvania 

GABRIELLE GIFFORDS, Arizona 

NIKI TSONGAS, Massachusetts 

LARRY KISSELL, North Carolina 

FRANK M. KRATOVIL, Jr., Maryland 

ERIC J.J. MASSA, New York 

BOBBY BRIGHT, Alabama 

ROSCOE G. BARTLETT, Maryland 

CATHY MCMORRIS RODGERS, Washington 

MARY FALLIN, Oklahoma 

DUNCAN HUNTER, California 

JOHN C. FLEMING, Louisiana 

MIKE COFFMAN, Colorado 

HOWARD P. ‘‘BUCK’’ MCKEON, California 

W. TODD AKIN, Missouri 

JEFF MILLER, Florida 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

FRANK A. LOBIONDO, New Jersey 

ROB BISHOP, Utah 

MICHAEL TURNER, Ohio 

JOHN SULLIVAN, Professional Staff Member 

HEATH BOPE, Professional Staff Member 

JOHN WASON, Professional Staff Member 

BENJAMIN GLERUM, Staff Assistant 
(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF HEARINGS 

2009 

Page 

HEARING: 

Wednesday, February 25, 2009, U.S. Transportation Command’s 

(USTRANSCOM) Airlift, Sealift, and Surface Lift Programs .......................... 1 

APPENDIX: 

Wednesday, February 25, 2009 .............................................................................. 31 

WEDNESDAY, FEBRUARY 25, 2009 

U.S. TRANSPORTATION COMMAND’S (USTRANSCOM) AIRLIFT, 

SEALIFT, AND SURFACE LIFT PROGRAMS 

STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS 

Abercrombie, Hon. Neil, a Representative from Hawaii, Chairman, Air and 

Land Forces Subcommittee ................................................................................. 2 

Akin, Hon. W. Todd, a Representative from Missouri, Ranking Member, 

Seapower and Expeditionary Forces Subcommittee .......................................... 19 

Bartlett, Hon. Roscoe G., a Representative from Maryland, Ranking Member, 

Air and Land Forces Subcommittee ................................................................... 2 

Taylor, Hon. Gene, a Representative from Mississippi, Chairman, Seapower 

and Expeditionary Forces Subcommittee ........................................................... 1 

WITNESSES 

McNabb, Gen. Duncan J., USAF, Commander, U.S. Transportation Command ..................................................................................................................... 3 

APPENDIX 

PREPARED STATEMENTS: 

McNabb, Gen. Duncan J. ................................................................................. 37 

Taylor, Hon. Gene ............................................................................................. 35 

DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD: 

[There were no Documents submitted.] 

WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING THE HEARING: 

[There were no Questions submitted during the hearing.] 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING: 

[There were no Questions submitted post hearing.] 

(1) 

U.S. TRANSPORTATION COMMAND’S (USTRANSCOM) 

AIRLIFT, SEALIFT, AND SURFACE LIFT PROGRAMS 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON ARMED

SERVICES, SEAPOWER AND EXPEDITIONARY FORCES

SUBCOMMITTEE, MEETING JOINTLY WITH AIR AND LAND

FORCES SUBCOMMITTEE, Washington, DC, Wednesday, 

February 25, 2009. 

The subcommittees met, pursuant to call, at 10:07 a.m., in room 

2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Gene Taylor (chairman 

of the Seapower and Expeditionary Forces subcommittee) presiding. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. GENE TAYLOR, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM MISSISSIPPI, CHAIRMAN, SEAPOWER AND EXPEDITIONARY FORCES SUBCOMMITTEE 

Mr. TAYLOR. The subcommittee will come to order. Today, the 

Seapower and Expeditionary Forces and the Air and Land Forces 

Subcommittees will meet to receive testimony from the commander 

of the United States Transportation Command (USTC), General 

Duncan McNabb of the United States Air Force. 

General McNabb is uniquely suited to this challenging assignment. He is a graduate of the United States Air Force Academy 

class of 1974. He has significant experience as a command pilot in 

both transportation and rotary wing aircraft. 

General McNabb has commanded at every level, including commander of the 41st Airlift Squadron during Operation Desert 

Storm, the 89th Operations Group, which has responsibility for 

transporting the President on Air Force One. 

Prior to his current duties as commander of the United States 

Transportation Command, General McNabb served as the Commander of the Air Force Joint Military Command as Vice Chief of 

Staff of the Air Force. 

Thank you, General, for being with us today to discuss the challenges you face in supplying our troops around the world with the 

equipment and the supplies they need. 

The United States Transportation Command is the largest shipper of goods and material in the world. On an average day, Transportation Command (TRANSCOM) is moving 100 railcar shipments, has 44 ships loading, offloading or underway, has 1,000 

trucks moving with cargo, and executes 480 airlift missions. 

There is a staggering amount of transportation occurring on each 

and every day. 

To accomplish this mission, TRANSCOM relies on the Army Surface Deployment and Distribution Command, the Navy’s Military 
2 

Sealift Command, and the Air Force Air Mobility Command, along 

with commercial partners in rail, trucking and sea transportation. 

In addition to other issues that the general would care to discuss 

with us today, he has been requested to update the joint subcommittee on TRANSCOM’s current and future force structure 

needs, the current capability to accomplish all the assigned missions, and, particularly, the issue of sustainment of our forces in 

Afghanistan. 

As I am sure you are all aware, recently, the overland supply 

routes to Afghanistan by way of Pakistan have been targeted by insurgents. Lacking a different delivery route, the Pakistani overland 

supply routes are critical to resupplying our troops. 

I look forward to the general discussion the issues associated 

with the Pakistani routes and with alternative routes from the 

north that I know he and others have been working on. 

Again, General, thank you for being with us today. 

I now call on my good friend from Hawaii, the Chairman of the 

Air and Land Forces Subcommittee, Mr. Abercrombie. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Taylor can be found in the Appendix on page 35.] 

STATEMENT OF HON. NEIL ABERCROMBIE, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM HAWAII, CHAIRMAN, AIR AND LAND FORCES 

SUBCOMMITTEE 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. No comments at 

this time. 

Mr. TAYLOR. Mr. Bartlett. 

STATEMENT OF HON. ROSCOE G. BARTLETT, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM MARYLAND, RANKING MEMBER, AIR AND LAND 

FORCES SUBCOMMITTEE 

Mr. BARTLETT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

General McNabb, thank you for joining us today. It is a true 

privilege to have you before the committee today and I look forward 

to our discussion. 

We are all very aware that this Nation is in the midst of some 

difficult economic times. There is no doubt that tough decisions 

must be made if we are to continue to provide and maintain a military force that adequately supports our National Military Strategy. 

In making those decisions, it is critical that this body understand 

the equipping needs of our military in the context of joint requirements and integrated capabilities. 

In my 17 years of service on this committee, I have always found 

it very difficult to determine the Nation’s procurement priorities 

when we are given a budget that reflects the individual services’ 

procurement priorities. 

We are told that the new tanker is the Air Force’s number one 

priority and that Future Combat Systems is the Army’s number 

one priority. But no one seems to be able to tell us how those priorities stack up against each other. 

As an example, no one can tell us if the Air Force’s need for a 

new combat search-and-rescue-X helicopter outweighs the Army’s 

need for a new Armed Reconnaissance Helicopter and they certainly can’t tell us whether either of those helicopter programs 
3 

stack up—how they stack up compared to the Navy’s need for the 

Littoral Combat Ship. 

I am particularly pleased to have you with us today, General 

McNabb, because I believe you can shed some light on several recapitalization and modernization programs and help us understand 

their value, from their standpoint. 

Although we do not expect you to be able to address the fiscal 

year 2010 budget request, I do believe that you should address 

your requirements and priorities as a combatant commander. 

As the commander of U.S. Transportation Command, you provide 

critical transportation services, air refueling support and terminal 

management, so that our frontline forces can successfully execute 

their mission. 

However, you cannot do your job unless your service components, 

the Army, Navy, and Air Force, are properly equipped and 

resourced to meet your requirements. 

Efforts to grow the Army and Marine Corps, theater requirements for heavily armored vehicles and increased demand for 

intra-theater aircraft due to roadside bombs and impassible terrain 

are just a few of the challenges that shape your requirements. 

If we don’t understand these requirements from a joint perspective, we will continue to have a military with capability gaps in 

some areas and duplication in others. 

This results in the inefficient allocation of our Nation’s precious 

resources at a time when we simply cannot afford it. 

For that, Mr. Chairman, I am thankful to you for holding this 

very important and very timely hearing. 

General McNabb, I look forward to your testimony. 

Mr. TAYLOR. Thank you, Mr. Bartlett. 

General, you are now recognized. 

STATEMENT OF GEN. DUNCAN J. MCNABB, USAF, 

COMMANDER, UNITED STATES TRANSPORTATION COMMAND 

General MCNABB. Chairman Taylor, Chairman Abercrombie, 

Congressman Bartlett, Congressman Akin, and distinguished members of the committees, it is indeed my privilege to be with you 

today representing the men and women of U.S. Transportation 

Command, more than 136,000 of the world’s finest logistics professionals. 

I am pleased to have this opportunity to highlight the state of 

our command and the strategic capabilities this team gives to our 

Nation. 

USTRANSCOM provides strategic lift, deployment and integrated end-to-end sustainment and distribution capabilities unmatched by any other nation. This total force team of active duty, 

Guard, Reserve, civilian, contractors and commercial partners delivers logistics solutions which enable the combatant commanders 

to succeed anywhere in the world. 

The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, Admiral Mike Mullen, visited 

TRANSCOM last week and described logistics capabilities at 

TRANSCOM as like oxygen—you take it for granted unless you 

don’t have it, because when you don’t have it, you die. 

We know the Nation and our war fighters depend upon us and 

we are honored to deliver. And this committee is well aware that 
4 

it is our great people that get it done. It is our total force, air crews 

flying combat approaches at night on night vision goggles, or 

airdropping supplies to sustain our troops in Iraq, Afghanistan and 

around the globe. 

It is our refueling crews that deliver five million pounds of fuel 

every day, at night and in the weather, extending the reach of our 

joint force and coalition partners. 

On any given day, our military and commercial crews, with 

maintenance teams and aerial porters behind them, execute more 

than 900 sorties. That is a takeoff and landing every 90 seconds, 

sometimes in the most austere places on the globe, like Antarctica, 

or the most dangerous, like a forward operating base under fire in 

Afghanistan. 

It is our merchant mariners and military and civilian port operators who are loading, offloading or sailing 35 to 45 ships every day 

to support the war fighter, carrying cargo, like hundreds of Mine 

Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAPs), life-saving vehicles for the 

men and women who put their lives on the line. 

It is our terminal operators executing hundreds of containers, domestic freight and railcar shipments, pushing units and their vital 

supplies to the fight and ultimately bringing home to the outstretched arms of a family and friends. 

It is our contingency response groups, a joint task force, port 

opening experts who arrive first to open up the flow in contingency 

or disaster relief operations. 

It is our commercial airlift and sealift partners standing with us 

side-by-side, enduring relationships that allow us to open up new 

avenues of supply, for instance, from the north into Afghanistan, 

or support the Nation during times of surge. 

It is our medical crews and critical care teams tending to our 

wounded warriors, rapidly delivering them from the battlefield to 

the finest world class care on the planet, saving lives and families 

at the same time. 

And it is our crews bringing back fallen comrades, transporting 

heroes dressed in our Nation’s colors, Americans returning with 

dignity to our country, which owes them so much. 

It is this logistics team that gives our Nation unrivaled global 

reach, committed to serving our Nation’s war fighters by delivering 

the right stuff to the right place at the right time and at the best 

value. 

Whether it is sustaining the fight, providing disaster relief to 

friends in need or moving six brigades simultaneously, we are 

there. Whether at home or abroad, this championship team succeeds by giving the combatant commanders what they need. 

And the support of these committees has been instrumental in 

providing the resources our team needs to win, and I thank you. 

Chairman Taylor and Chairman Abercrombie, we have learned 

many lessons as a Nation at war and your support on key programs has allowed us to take global mobility to new heights. 

You have given us the large, medium-speed, roll-on/roll-off ships 

and supported upgrades to the ready reserve fleet, all of which 

have been tremendously successful over the last seven years, and 

the new Joint High-Speed Vessels will give us even greater flexibility. 
5 

The C–130J and the C–17 have come of age since 9/11 and have 

allowed us to change how we support the combatant commanders 

by air. The current C–5, C–130 and KC–10 modernization programs will also make an enormous difference in our capability and 

reliability in support of the war fighter. 

And my top priority remains the recapitalization of our aging 

tanker fleet. The KC–X will be a game-changer. Its value as a 

tanker will be tremendous. Its value as a multirole platform to the 

mobility enterprise will be incomparable. 

It will do for the whole mobility world what the C–17 did for the 

theater and strategic airlift. It will be an ultimate mobility force 

multiplier. 

Chairman Taylor and Chairman Abercrombie, I am grateful to 

you and the committees for inviting me to appear before you today 

to discuss our TRANSCOM and distribution process teams, the 

critically important work we do, and the challenges and issues we 

face. 

I respectfully request my written testimony be submitted for the 

record, and I look forward to your questions. 

[The prepared statement of General McNabb can be found in the 

Appendix on page 37.] 

Mr. TAYLOR. Without objection. 

General, again, thank you for being with us. And I know there 

are a number of members that have their questions, but I would 

like to start off and, one, I want to compliment you for the job you 

are doing and I realize how difficult it is. 

You probably could not pick a worse place on earth to be involved 

in a conflict than Afghanistan. All one has to do is look at a map 

and realize there is just no easy way to get things there. 

So I do want to compliment you on the job you are doing thus 

far. 

I also have become aware that in the past year or so, about 130 

drivers for the contactor to Maersk have been murdered just 

transiting Pakistan. I am aware of the attacks on the convoys in 

Pakistan, the hijackings of trucks in Pakistan. 

And I have heard you talk about the different options, other than 

Pakistan, for getting things there, the 50-day overland route from 

the north, going through China, going through Russia. 

None of them appear to be very good ideas. And I realize that, 

again, we could not have picked a worse place to be in a conflict, 

in my opinion, as far as resupply. 

What I am curious is when you fly over Pakistan, particularly toward the Iranian border, you fly for hours and see virtually nothing. Virtually nothing. It is a very uninhabited area. 

Has any thought been given to using a port other than Karachi 

and using those roads closer to the Iranian border as an alternate 

route for getting into Pakistan, with the idea being that I would 

think it would be easier to defend a road where there are fewer 

people rather than more people? And that if someone is out there 

in that desert, they are most likely out there to cause you harm 

rather than, again, transiting these routes where, traditionally, I 

believe, the towns in Pakistan are one day’s walk apart from each 

other. Which means there are a lot of them that these trucks have 
6 

to transit, and you have got several hundred trucks a day 

transiting a dangerous area before they even get to Afghanistan. 

So I am curious. Again, I know you are at the Russian option, 

you are looking at the Chinese option, you are looking at the Turkish, Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan option. 

But it would seem that it would at least be worth exploring an 

alternative route through Pakistan to resupply our troops. And 

again, maybe the Pakistan government is saying that is all out of 

the question. 

But I am curious if you have even looked into that. 

General MCNABB. Chairman, in fact, we got that question and I 

think it was probably one of the visits that we had up here on the 

Hill, I think you either your or Chairman Abercrombie asked us to 

take a look at—— 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Would you move just a touch closer to your 

mike, please? Thank you. 

General MCNABB. Yes, sir. 

You or Chairman Abercrombie had asked about that and one of 

the places that they looked at, something that General Petraeus 

had actually asked us to examine. 

I think the big part there is that it is really the infrastructure 

after you get into the ports. It is what is the road like. As we look 

for connecting roads, large enough connecting roads, they estimate 

that it will take 5 years to build a road that would go up north and 

kind of join up with the rest of the lines of communications, and 

they are thinking even 10 years for a railroad, which eventually is 

probably good stuff to do that would probably be in Pakistan’s interest to do anyway. 

But I would just say that at this point, we would have to build 

that road, as well. So right now, your road network, if you came 

into that port, would still go back to the east to get up into those 

major highways. 

When you talk about lines of communication, you are looking at 

the whole types of networks, like your road and rail, to see what 

you can do for throughput. 

So when you go through mountains or you go through different 

areas, it is harder, obviously, if it is mountainous. And you have 

it exactly right. When you think about Afghanistan, you really are 

talking about different terrain than what we are used to, much different than Iraq. 

And so when you look at the number of ways and passes that you 

can get into in Afghanistan, they actually are fairly limited. 

I know that last week, Admiral Harnitchek showed you that 

there are five major ways to get into Afghanistan and that is from 

historic times. It is just tough to get through those very, very high 

mountains in a reasonable way, which is one of the reasons we 

have looked to the northern side today can we bring in things from 

the north. 

Whenever I think about a ground network, I would like to have 

lots of options. If you have one, you kind of are at risk. So as a 

logistician, you are always saying, ‘‘Well, I want to have multiple 

options. So that whatever way you go, I can go a different way if 

I end up having some trouble.’’ 
7 

The success on the northern distribution network—and we call it 

a network because it is not one line, it is a number of lines and 

what you want to do is use normal commercial routes that already 

have rail, the road infrastructure is already built, because anything 

that you have to go in and build, obviously, will be much harder, 

especially in another country where you go if you expected them to 

build that for you. 

So that is kind of where we are headed on looking at the lines 

of communication. I totally agree with you that Afghanistan is 

much harder. You couldn’t choose a harder place. 

Mr. TAYLOR. What is the—I am sure you measure your instantaneous rate of change as far as the security of those vehicles 

transiting Pakistan. 

General MCNABB. Right. 

Mr. TAYLOR. Is it getting better or is it getting worse? 

General MCNABB. What I would say is it has—over the last two 

or three months, we saw, in December, quite a few attacks. It actually has gone down on the number of vehicles that actually have 

been attacked. 

But again, it is something that gives us great concern. In fact, 

that is one of the reasons that we went to the north to say, ‘‘Hey, 

can we have some alternative ways of coming in.’’ 

When you get into Afghanistan itself, when you talk about the 

ring road, same thing applies. Something that General Petraeus 

and I talked about is that we are going to have to figure out as 

we go in there, as we increase the troop presence there, we will 

have to look at which areas will you secure, which areas will you 

convoy through, and which areas will you have to jump over, in 

other words, go by vertical lift, much like we did in Iraq between 

al Asad and al Taquaddum. 

It was a very dangerous road, so we went above it, took C–130s 

and C–17s and basically took all air eligible cargo for the Marines 

and took it over the place where they were under attack, and I 

think that we will look at the same way in Afghanistan. 

Mr. TAYLOR. Mr. Abercrombie. 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. General, I am a little disappointed in the testimony here with regard to what the chairman was just speaking 

about. 

There is no significant—at least I don’t have in front of me any 

significant maps or topography or any testimony that I can see 

with regard to where you get the idea that it would take 5 years 

to build a road or 10 years to build a railroad. 

You say in your testimony that you have made significant 

progress in partnership with the Department of State about establishing new routes, but there is nothing here, at least in the testimony to me, about anything—of consultations with the Pakistan 

government, about whether or not to have, say, a cooperative venture coming out of the Arabian Sea, moving toward southern Afghanistan. 

I mean, I suppose we can do this all on our own, but that is what 

I thought you were going to be talking about today. 

What is the origin of your idea 5 years for a road and 10 years 

for a railroad? 
8 

General MCNABB. Chairman, that was in discussion with the 

theater, talking to U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) and talking to Pakistan, taking a look at what those roads look like, using 

our intelligence (INTEL) sources. 

I would also say I am open to continuing to work that. I think 

that any alternative that we can do is useful, Chairman. Please 

don’t get me wrong. 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. And in your testimony, you say, for example, 

that you had to fly. You were apparently able to put something together pretty quick here, Georgian troops serving in Iraq back to 

Georgia in less than 92 hours. 

You flew 14 C–17 missions to get 1,700 Georgian troops back to 

Georgia. You had humanitarian rations that went. 

In other words, if it is a priority, one would think that the 

United States could move a hell of a lot faster than 5 years or 10 

years. In other words, an alternative route to this northern—various northern distribution routes, which includes, for example, 

going through Georgia, is not a priority. 

Can we conclude that? 

General MCNABB. Chairman, please don’t conclude that. What 

we have done is gone every place we can to see what kind of network we can come in by. 

I would tell you that the lines of communication are very different than, obviously, our ability to do air, and air is kind of your 

ultimate flexibility. And in fact, if we had to do everything by air 

into Afghanistan, that is what we would do. You would see like a 

Berlin—— 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. I understand that. I am talking about whether our sense of priority comes in. 

Let me ask you, then. Set aside the politics of it for the moment 

and consider, for our conversation’s sake, that we were making this 

a priority, moving in from the Arabian Sea, as directly north as 

possible out of port on the Arabian Sea near the Iranian border or 

west of Karachi, going into southern Pakistan. 

Now, I am presuming that if you know—if you even have a number of years attached to road and rail, that this has been looked 

at in some detail. 

What would it take to do it? Set aside the politics and set aside 

the rest of it. What would it take? 

General MCNABB. Chairman, I would have to take that for the 

record and come back to you, because if you are talking about 

building a new road network or a new rail network going through 

Pakistan on the west side, which is what I think you are referring 

to, we would have to go—we have looked at the initial portion. 

I would say that is right now what we understand the Pakistanis 

plan to do. As we look at that, we would have to come back to you 

and say, ‘‘Here is what we could do to help.’’ Obviously, there are 

very heavy political issues at bay there and, obviously, it goes kind 

of beyond—— 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Wait. The heavy political issues. You are talking about Pakistan, ostensibly an ally, whom you say wants to do 

this, so that it would just be Pakistan and ourselves on a project 

that both want to get done or could get—one wants to do and the 

other could be of assistance in doing, that we could control, that 
9 

we could monitor, as opposed to coming through China, coming 

through Russia, coming through God knows how many multiple political and regional issues elsewhere, along commercial routes that 

are impossible to monitor and to guard, let alone taking into account military cargo that has to go through. 

Commercial cargo is tough enough as it is. Forgive me, but taking it for the record, why isn’t that available right now? 

The reason that that is so important is I can’t even begin to figure out how many years we intend to stay in Afghanistan, let alone 

what we are going to do when we get there. 

Your own testimony this morning says you don’t have a clear 

idea of where troops are going, what they are going to do. You even 

talk about having to leapfrog different areas. 

You could be dealing with hundreds-of-thousands of troops before 

this is over. We are stumbling on into—well, I won’t get into the 

political side of it. You needn’t answer anything about that. 

But my point here is if we are going to stumble into Afghanistan 

the same way we stumbled into Iraq, which is, from what I can see, 

exactly what we are going to do, you have to have at least as much 

logistical control as possible. 

I sympathize and empathize with what you have to accomplish 

in the Transportation Command. This is one of these unified commands here. Believe me, I totally empathize with what you are trying to accomplish. 

I live in an area 2,500 miles from everything else. I understand 

the whole question of transportation, believe me, from supplies of 

everything, from food, from oil, from everything else that we have 

to get. I understand that. That is crystal clear what we have to accomplish just to get to Hawaii. 

But in this instance, I cannot understand how, if the Pakistan 

government wants to do this and we, at a minimum, have a 

logistical interest in trying to accomplish it, why this isn’t a higher 

priority. 

General MCNABB. Chairman, if I could, maybe I could answer it 

this way. 

When you look at the requirement that we have to do to make 

sure that we sustain our forces and take the unit equipment 

through, it ends up being about 78 to 80 containers a day. That is 

what it takes. 

We are trying right now—and the capacity to go through the Pak 

Lines of Communication (LOC) is probably three times that. So the 

current Pakistan LOC, that is what it takes. 

We are trying to open up, also, from the north, an ability to do 

100 to 200 containers a day so that we have another option to be 

able to make sure that we can do that. 

We are looking to the south, making sure that we can go with 

that, as well. We are making sure that we can go into Afghanistan 

by air, if, in fact, we have to do all of that. 

All of that is set in place. I will look for any way and we will— 

Chairman, we will look at that and we have been looking at that 

and I will say that if that ends up making sense overall, we will 

be glad to pursue it. 

And I will be glad to come back and say ‘‘Here is a way we could 

get that done.’’ Right now, building that road, given that you al-
10 

ready have an existing infrastructure, it just becomes a—going 

through those mountains will not be easy. 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. It all depends on how important it is. 

Let me ask you—just indulge me a moment more. Now, there is 

talk of sending more troops. Where they are going to be sent, nobody knows. It is just we are talking numbers now, as if numbers 

will do it. 

When you did the original report, you are having to do this as 

you go along, because the report that we have available to us from 

2005 and the updates and the one that you apparently are not 

going to be able to get to us until next month, right? The update 

report that we ordered you to do last year. 

When we get all these reports, they didn’t take into account—the 

2005 couldn’t take into account the increase in the end strength, 

those kinds of things. 

So whether we are talking about Afghanistan or elsewhere, you 

have lots more on your plate right now than you did when that 

baseline report of 2005 was given to us. 

Is that correct? 

General MCNABB. Chairman, that is true. The mobility capability 

study, the things that have changed will be in the new report, the 

mobility, capability and requirements study 2016. 

So we have taken into account that we are fighting a little bit 

differently, the way we are using assets, the growth of the Army 

and Marines, and the Future Combat System as the types of things 

that they are taking a look at, as well as updated scenarios. 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Let me just conclude then. I have gone over 

my time. 

Do you have then actively under consideration this what I will 

call a southern route? 

General MCNABB. Chairman, we look at every option. It is a network and I will look—I mean, we ended in Iraq, we built a route 

now that goes through Jordan to the port in Aqaba. 

We look at every way we could do that would make sense and 

this one we will look at, Chairman. And I would say that the more 

routes I have, as a logistician, the happier I am. 

If I have got four or five routes rather than one, we win. And 

what it allows me to do is to tell General Petraeus, ‘‘You do not 

need to worry about this.’’ We will figure out a way to get the stuff 

in so that our forces don’t need to worry about that. 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Excuse me. Did you say Aqaba? I want to 

make sure I understood. Did you say you are considering utilizing 

Aqaba? 

General MCNABB. Chairman, right now, as you think about the 

Jordan route, we go all the way to the sea. 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. That is to go into Iraq. 

General MCNABB. Yes, sir. I am just saying that we have developed routes that are completely different than when we started, if 

we can figure out a way to make that make sense. We work with 

everybody involved. 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. If you are using Aqaba, you are certainly 

talking about tough conditions, as well, are you not? 

General MCNABB. Yes, sir. 
11 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. You don’t have to see ‘‘Lawrence of Arabia’’ 

for the 16th time to understand that. 

General MCNABB. And when you look at the ports in Iraq, when 

you think about where we started, coming directly up from Kuwait, 

if you look at today, we use Umm Kasar, we use the Jordan route. 

We have worked with Turkey to use them, as well. 

What we do is we constantly work it to say any way possible. 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. I would like to be—I, certainly, Mr. Chairman, request, I would like to be briefed by your command with regard to what kind of activity has taken place in either your command or the Pentagon or both with regard to a serious—I am presuming a serious look at coming out of the Arabian Sea into Afghanistan. 

If we are going to be involved in Afghanistan, we have to have 

a supply route that we can control as much as humanly possible 

and the fact that there may be logistical or monetary or political 

difficulties, to me, is entirely beside the point, particularly in the 

context of what the President said last night with regard to what 

he considers important or central or crucial to the question of terrorism. 

General MCNABB. Chairman, and you all have always been very 

supportive. If we can come up with a way, you all have helped us. 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Thank you. 

General MCNABB. And that has not changed and I appreciate 

that. 

Mr. TAYLOR. Thank the gentleman. 

General, for the record, we have approximately 30,000 troops in 

Afghanistan now and you are saying it takes about 70 twenty-foot 

equivalent units (TEUs) a day to resupply them. 

General MCNABB. Seventy-eight for the stuff that we use by 

ground. 

Mr. TAYLOR. So if the force is increased by 17,000, you would expect half, again, as many TEUs would be necessary. 

General MCNABB. Yes, Chairman. And then, obviously, as we 

move the forces in, obviously, the movement of those forces would— 

the unit equipment will be higher until we get them moved in and 

stabilized. 

So that is kind of what we are thinking along the lines of. That 

will be the requirement. Obviously, everything that we take that 

is sensitive we take in by air now and that is what we will continue to do. 

So what we are talking about is the stuff like construction material, food. That is what we bring in by surface. 

Mr. TAYLOR. Thank you, sir. 

The chair recognizes the gentleman from Maryland, Mr. Bartlett. 

Mr. BARTLETT. Thank you very much. 

General McNabb, I have in front of me a Congressional Research 

Service article, October 10, 2008, entitled ‘‘Military Airlift: The 

Joint Cargo Aircraft Program.’’ 

It is a very interesting story of the rather tortured history of developing intra-theater lift. 

I would gather that in Iraq and Afghanistan, that is quite important. And my question is: what are your thoughts on the value of 
12 

the Joint Cargo Aircraft (JCA) to the Air Force and, in particular, 

to TRANSCOM? 

General MCNABB. Certainly, Congressman Bartlett. I have supported the Joint Cargo Aircraft both for the Air Force and Army 

as part of our intra-theater airlift capability that I think will bring 

great value to the fight. 

Today, we do intra-theater airlift primarily with C–17s and C– 

130s, C–130 being the workhorse, but C–17 as we need them, and 

that is actually paid great dividends for us both in Iraq and in Afghanistan. 

And I know many of the members of the committee, if not all, 

have flown on both C–17s and 130s into both Iraq and Afghanistan. 

The JCA is smaller than a 130 and would allow us to—it kind 

of fills a very nice niche of the direct support to the Army. That 

is where they are planning to use it. 

They were finding that they were burning up CH–47 blades. So 

when you look at it from an enterprise standpoint, it would make 

sense that you could reduce the wear and tear on them. 

You still will have to do helicopter lift, but that allows you to 

only do it when you need to do the vertical lift using helicopters. 

The Special Operations Forces (SOF) also have a need. So you 

put those two in and, from our standpoint, sometimes tails are 

more important than capacity, especially when you talk about a 

dispersed operation, where we anticipate we will have in Afghanistan, where you have these smaller forward operating bases where 

you need to get one or two pallets in, you don’t need six or eight 

pallets. 

So the JCA will allow us to more optimize the 130s and the C– 

17s. And so it kind of fills a very nice niche in there, especially 

when you talk about unconventional warfare or being able to resupply a dispersed force. That is what we see. 

Mr. BARTLETT. Thank you very much. 

I have a question about heavier lift, the C–5 and the C–17. The 

early assessment indicated that we needed 111 re-engined and 

modernized C–5s. The cost went up and so our need, in quotation 

marks, kind of ‘‘went down.’’ We now have 52. 

And my question is: Is 52 enough? If it is not enough, what is 

the way forward, to look at the other 59 or look at the C–17? 

General MCNABB. Congressman Bartlett, you and I and this committee, we have talked a lot about this over the years before as the 

Air Mobility Command commander. 

As Chairman Abercrombie talked about, the mobility/capability 

study was kind of at the forefront and it said, at the end of that, 

we need about 300, it is 292 to 383, but we need about 300 strategic lifters and, at that point, we said that would be 180 C–17s 

and 111 C–5s, 112, at that point, modernized, so re-engined. 

But like anything, that was based on price and as the cost on the 

re-engining of the C–5 went up, then you have to make tradeoffs 

and decide what do we do about that increased cost of the C–5 reengining program. 

The Nunn-McCurdy breach, which we came back to the Congress 

with, had everybody involved, to include the requirements side 

under the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC), got all 
13 

the services, got TRANSCOM, and said, ‘‘Okay, what are we going 

to do about this and what is the best way forward given that cost 

increase, what should we do.’’ 

And out of that Nunn-McCurdy, we decided that the 205 C–17s 

that we have now, if you modernize the 52, as you mentioned, and 

then do an avionics modernization program on the remaining C– 

5s, we actually grow the force structure a little bit, but we still 

meet the requirements of 33.95 million ton miles that we must 

have in our organic fleet. 

So that is where it sits right now. The Nunn-McCurdy was very 

well vetted. Everybody played in that and that is kind of what we 

did to make up for the fact that the re-engining program became 

too costly to do on the C–5As. 

I would say that if that cost comes down, in other words, our 

first one has been delivered, we will see how it does. The test has 

gone well. The reliability has gone well. We are very hopeful and 

that does give us an option that if, in fact, that cost comes down 

or other events, like the outcome of the new study dictates, we can 

take another look to see if we want to do more of those. 

But it does give us a little bit of an insurance policy, if, in fact, 

we want to do that. But again, it will really be on cost and that 

is tended to be the big issue that has always come up on this. 

As with any acquisition program, competition really does work 

and, in fact, that you have other options, it allows you to say, 

‘‘Okay, what are we going to do best now if that is going to be a 

cost overrun.’’ 

Mr. BARTLETT. I understand that competition in this program is 

a little difficult since we don’t own the technical data which we 

paid for. 

Are we going to stop this kind of contracting so that we can, as 

you indicated, achieve the advantages of competition in the future? 

General MCNABB. Congressman Bartlett, I would have to defer 

to the services on that, but I would say that anything that makes 

our acquisition process better, obviously, all of us are for. 

And I would say that the fact that when you really bring competition and you make it full in every way you can, it really does 

pay big dividends for us and certainly does for me as the 

TRANSCOM commander. 

Mr. BARTLETT. But isn’t it true on this program that we really 

can’t compete it because we don’t own the data? 

General MCNABB. Well, the competition, obviously, has been 

whether or not you do additional C–17s. That has been the competition against the re-engining program. 

Mr. BARTLETT. I am talking about the C–5 program. We really 

cannot compete that one, can we, because we do not own the data? 

General MCNABB. You mean within the C—you mean have somebody else do the C–5, the upgrade. 

Mr. BARTLETT. Yes. My understanding is we do not own that 

data, so we cannot compete it. 

General MCNABB. Congressman, that would be my understanding, as well, but I would have to come back for the record. 

Mr. BARTLETT. This has happened a number of times and I 

think, as a committee, we are concerned that we ought not contract 

this way. 
14 

The taxpayer is paying for it. The taxpayer ought to own it. And 

we find that the contracts are written such that, at the end of the 

day, we pay for it, but somebody else owns it, so that we have a 

noncompetitive situation. 

This is not in the best interest of either the taxpayer or our services and I would hope that we would end this kind of contracting. 

General MCNABB. Congressman Bartlett, that certainly makes 

sense to me and we will certainly pass that back to the services, 

because I do think they are looking at all of those things to make 

sure that they enhance that. 

Mr. BARTLETT. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. TAYLOR. Thank you, Mr. Bartlett. You have raised an excellent point. 

I am going to ask Captain Ebbs to see if that is the law of the 

land now and if it is not, we will certainly welcome a Bartlett 

amendment to the Seapower markup this year that says that from 

now on, whenever we purchase something, we get technical rights. 

The chair now recognizes, in the order that people were here, by 

seniority, that were here at the gavel, the gentleman from Texas, 

Mr. Ortiz. 

Mr. ORTIZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

General, thank you so much for your service and for testifying 

before this committee today. 

The mobility capability study didn’t account for 159 percent utilization rate of the current fleet of C–17 aircraft and, as Chairman 

of the Readiness Subcommittee, I am very concerned that the continued utilization rate of our strategic airlifters will affect our longterm readiness. 

What steps are being taken to reduce utilization rates to avoid 

the unnecessary aging of the aircraft? 

And I just came from another part of the world, some of us, as 

you know, Okinawa and Guam and Korea, and we have another serious problem with North Korea. 

And I know that for you to be able to move some of the equipment or personnel, maybe it takes tankers to refuel them and I 

know it probably takes so many tankers to refuel so many jet fighters or so many Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS). 

As far as equipment, for you to be able to do the job that you 

will have to do, do you feel that you have adequate equipment to 

do that now? 

General MCNABB. Congressman Ortiz, I do and I think especially 

with the modernization programs that we have on the books and 

the great support of both these committees, when I look at the airlift and sealift accounts, you all have been very good about helping 

us make sure we have the resources that we need. 

Obviously, that never stops. You have got to constantly continue 

resourcing that, recapitalizing and modernizing the fleet. 

As you know, we use our commercial partners to a great degree, 

our civil reserve air fleet, on the air side, our visa program on the 

sea side, and when you think about what that brings, those fleets 

are being constantly upgraded and I would say that that really has 

paid big dividends for us. 

Our merchant mariners, their ability to man that, we have got 

that all worked out. So whenever we have to surge, they are all set. 
15 

And I think those programs have really shown their value, especially over the last seven years. 

And I think that one of the things that we are watching very 

closely, especially with the downturn in the economy, is to make 

sure that if there is excess capacity out there, that we upgrade 

both our sealift fleet and our air fleet on the commercial side with 

the newer, more modern types of vessels and aircraft. 

And it is an opportunity and I have talked to all the carriers 

about that, and I think that that is the way we stay at this. We 

just constantly make sure that we are getting the best value out 

of the ships that we hold and I do think that is working. 

Mr. ORTIZ. Have you had problems getting the equipment to the 

areas? I know that drivers have been killed and we are talking 

about moving so many containers and stuff like that. 

Are we losing any of the equipment? 

Chairman Abercrombie raised a question. If we bring in 30,000 

more troops to Afghanistan and if we are having problems equipping them now because of the violence and because they are attacking our convoys, can we do that in a way where we don’t put our 

troops in harm’s way? 

General MCNABB. Congressman Ortiz, I believe so and one of the 

things that I—with the tools that you all have given us, again, we 

have lots of options to make sure that we get the equipment that 

they need in. 

As we were talking before about the 78 containers a day that we 

need to kind of hold even, make sure that we get the stuff in to 

the theater that they need, again, that is stuff that comes in by 

ground, if you think about it, that is stuff that if, in fact, you don’t 

get it, we can get it in the next day, it is stuff like construction 

materials, cement. 

It is food, it is water. It is things that as long as we get more 

in than that 78, we are okay. And we watch our 7-day average. Our 

7-day average this week was—if you look at how much we have 

been getting in, it is about 140 containers a day. 

I watch that every day to make sure that we can get that 

through. As we do the surge of the—as we increase the number of 

troops in Afghanistan, there will be a new number that we want 

to make sure that we can get in. 

As Chairman Abercrombie and I were discussing, we will look at 

every avenue that we can get in and try to figure out the cheapest 

and best way and if that cheapest and best way doesn’t work, we 

will figure out another way. 

Sometimes it is more expensive and I will say, ultimately, if we 

have to bring it in by air, obviously, that is much more expensive, 

but we can do that. And that is how we said it for General 

Petraeus to say however you need—my job is to make sure that we 

can get that stuff through no matter what the threat will be. 

You bring up a great point. If you ask me what I worry about 

at night, it is the fact that our supply chain is always under attack. 

My job, I think, that you have given to us is to make sure that we 

get that through regardless of the attacks on it, because you don’t 

want to make this a vulnerability. You don’t want to have people 

think that it is a vulnerability, and I, quite, frankly, do not think 

it is. 
16 

I think we will get the stuff through. That is the part that I 

would play in. 

Mr. ORTIZ. And the reason I ask you, General, is because I know 

that there have been thousands of weapons missing that we cannot 

account for, into the hundreds of thousands of guns and weapons, 

even though we know that most of the lethal weapons are airlifted, 

not sent on convoys. 

But still, I just hope that whatever we send to our troops get to 

our troops, because we hate to see these types of lethal weapons 

be used against our troops. So that is another concern that I have. 

General MCNABB. Chairman, that is an absolutely excellent concern and that is why when we say any sensitive, any kinetic kinds 

of material for our forces we bring in by air. 

Right now, all the MRAPs come in by air into Afghanistan, 

Strykers, all of that stuff will be moved by air because of the sensitivity. We will not send that through the ground line of communication because of the attacks. 

But when I think about the ground lines being under attack, I 

think about piracy, I think about shooting at our aircraft. Obviously, again, with the support of these two committees in support 

of our defensive systems that go on our aircraft, all of that plays 

to allow us to make sure that we get the stuff through and that 

is our job and that is what we will do. 

The fourth area that we, quite frankly, get attacked at is our 

cyber and we have people looking every day, because if you can figure out what people are doing logistically, you many times can figure out what they are doing. 

And we know that, but the nature of our job, we end up saying, 

‘‘Here is how we will do that.’’ 

Mr. ORTIZ. Thank you, sir. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. TAYLOR. Thank you. 

The chair recognizes the gentleman from Connecticut, Mr. Courtney, for five minutes. 

Mr. COURTNEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Actually, I just have a quick follow up to Mr. Bartlett’s questions 

regarding the Joint Cargo Aircraft. 

General, as you know, the issue of where the home is for that 

program has been kind of a punching bag up here for the last couple of years. 

The quadrennial roles and missions review report that was 

issued last month stated that the Department found that the option that provided the most value to the joint force was to assign 

the C–27 to the Air Force and the Army, which would be a very 

good outcome as far as Air National Guards are concerned. 

And I just want to ask you, for the record, do you agree with that 

conclusion? 

General MCNABB. Yes, Congressman. What I would say is as 

long as we have common standards and that when you bring it forward, it fits into our existing system, which everybody has agreed 

it will do, whether it is Army, whether it is Air Force, whether it 

is Air National Guard, Army National Guard, and everybody has 

agreed to that. 
17 

And that has to do with not only the direct support to the forces 

on the ground providing that capability, but it is also the ability 

that if you have got those excess, that they fall into the common 

user pool so that we can use them. 

All of that movement, especially as a distribution process owner, 

I care about all of that stuff, so as long as it fits in there. And right 

now, everybody has agreed that it will. 

Mr. TAYLOR. Thank you, Mr. Courtney. 

The chair now recognizes the gentleman from Georgia, Mr. Marshall. 

Mr. MARSHALL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I guess I will start by following up on JCA issues, as well. 

The program, as originally envisioned, contemplated a lot more 

platforms and now I think both services have greatly reduced what 

they anticipated taking advantage of. 

Where are we as far as making decisions concerning long-term 

sustainment, modernization, maintenance is concerned? 

There was a split of view between the Army and the Air Force. 

The Army doesn’t really have the depot capacity that must be 

maintained for the good of the country over a long period of time 

and, consequently, filled with work. So the Army was heading towards Contractor Logistics Support (CLS), contractor maintenance. 

And the Air Force, of course, was pretty anxious to get data 

rights and to have an understanding with the contractor concerning the transfer of responsibility to a depot in the original acquisition agreements, both by the Army and the Air Force. 

Where are we on that, do you know? 

General MCNABB. Congressman, I would have to go back and 

take that for the record. But in general, I think they are still have 

the discussion, especially as they are working through the Special 

Operations Force buy, as well, to make sure that as you look at 

all—because you will have SOF, Army and Air Force—how do we 

best look at it as an enterprise and how we will best do that. 

I know there are a lot of discussions that are going on and I 

know that in the Pentagon, it doesn’t come under me as 

TRANSCOM. So I would have to make sure that folks got an answer back to you on that. 

Mr. MARSHALL. I think it is widely conceded at this point that 

the C–17 acquisition process was flawed because we simply didn’t 

take into account, appropriately take into account the need for a 

gradual transition to depot maintenance, sustainment and modernization. 

And so we are just sort of struggling back and forth with Boeing 

on how we are actually going to accomplish that, and I am sure it 

is costing us a lot more money than it should have had we properly 

planned for this in advance. 

So whatever influence you and TRANSCOM can have on the acquisition teams to get this done right. There is an additional challenge, obviously, and that is you have got two branches, not just 

one, that are detailed with the responsibility to somehow come together and make this happen appropriately. 

Are we in the process now of stockpiling, trying to stockpile critical commodities now that commodity prices are lower? 
18 

Some of the dramatic cost increases, whether it is modernization 

or it is initial development, some of the dramatic cost increases 

have been associated with the contractor referencing huge, extraordinary increase in commodity prices for critical components. 

Are we taking advantage right now of very low commodity prices 

to go ahead and stockpile? 

General MCNABB. Chairman, I would have to check the specifics, 

but it is kind of the same issue we were talking about on our sealift and airlift fleet. You want to take advantage of the market 

when it is like this, to make sure that you don’t miss an opportunity, and I will definitely take that back and ask that question. 

Obviously, it is an acquisition and a service question, but I will 

go back and ask it. I couldn’t agree with you more. 

Mr. MARSHALL. Well, thank you. Ultimately, it is going to wind 

up affecting your mission to the extent you are not able to acquire 

the assets that you need to accomplish the mission, because it is 

just too costly. 

There has been this back-and-forth concerning whether or not to 

Reliability Enhancement and Re-engining Program (RERP) the C– 

5As and we have got the C–5A which has been RERP’d and Avionics Modernization Program (AMP)’d and is now being tested. 

We have had various estimates concerning the appropriate number, the total number of C–17s that we are going to need and what 

the size of our fleet, C–17/C–5, should be. 

If I recall correctly, in the Mobility Capabilities Study (MCS), 

they were contemplating that the C–5As would all be RERP’d and 

AMP’d. 

General MCNABB. Right. 

Mr. MARSHALL. Does that say that the MCS really—the figure 

adopted by the MCS, which is a flawed study and I think we all 

concede that it is a flawed study at this point, that figure should 

be higher, assuming that we don’t RERP the C–5A. 

General MCNABB. Right, yes. In fact, when you look at the fact 

that right now our program is to have 350, that is what came out 

of the—315, which came out of the Nunn-McCurdy, before we were 

at the 292 and then to 300 level, it was to make up for that lost 

capacity on not re-engining the C–5As. 

Again, I think that is one that, as we get more tests on the C– 

5s—as you mentioned, we have got three flying, one delivered, that 

we are going to start taking a good, hard look at and if the reliability and the cost stays down, I think that gives us—that will be 

one thing that we will consider. 

I tell all of the major suppliers that what I am looking for is the 

perfect airplane for free and then we can negotiate from there. Obviously, if they can get that cost down, it changes the dynamics and 

then things that may not have made sense before make sense now. 

And I think that now that the C–5 is starting to move, that reengining program, I think it could sell itself and I think that is a 

good incentive for them. 

Mr. MARSHALL. I appreciate the realism of your approach. Would 

you like to take over Wall Street for us? 

Thank you, sir. 
19 

Mr. TAYLOR. The chair recognizes Mr. Akin and then we will 

take a recess. There are three votes on the floor and I think it is 

about eight minutes until we have to be on the floor. 

Mr. Akin. 

STATEMENT OF HON. W. TODD AKIN, A REPRESENTATIVE 

FROM MISSOURI, RANKING MEMBER, SEAPOWER AND EXPEDITIONARY FORCES SUBCOMMITTEE 

Mr. AKIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And I had really—you did a great job in a private meeting a couple of weeks ago answering a lot of my questions. 

Just one quick one. The maps you have given us are not scaled. 

What is the distance across Pakistan there if you go—assume that 

you have got containers ships or whatever it is in the Arabian Sea. 

You want to go across Pakistan into Afghanistan. 

How many miles is that really before you hit the Afghanistan 

border? 

General MCNABB. Depending on where you go, I think it is in the 

neighborhood of 400 to 500. That is what hits me, but I will—— 

Mr. AKIN. Four to 500. 

General MCNABB. That is what I would say. 

Mr. AKIN. So you are still talking about a hike and a lot of mountains in the process, right? 

General MCNABB. Right. 

Mr. AKIN. Yes, okay. Thank you very much. That is all I had. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. TAYLOR. General, we are going to take about a 20-minute 

break for those three votes. 

We have got a rather large map of Pakistan and Afghanistan and 

I do think it would be worthwhile for the committee members if 

you could give us the visual of where the ships land in Karachi— 

it is my understanding it is about a five-day truck route just to 

transit Pakistan—and for the committee to get a full understanding of the challenges that you face and thus far have done a 

very good job of overcoming. 

General MCNABB. Absolutely. 

Mr. TAYLOR. Thank you. 

[Recess.] 

Mr. TAYLOR. General, thanks again for being with us and I apologize for the delay. There will be votes again in about 20 minutes. 

I regret that none of my Republican colleagues have made it back 

yet, but I hope they will forgive us if we continue. 

During the break—we had asked the General prior to the break 

if he would explain the route through Pakistan, how the ships are 

unloaded at the port of Karachi, and he made, during the break, 

a very good point that we have already lost about 130 contract 

drivers transiting Pakistan. 

We don’t really need to tip our hand to our foes and potential 

foes any further. 

So I would hope that you would make yourself available to any 

member of the committee that would like this information, but I 

very much respect your point that we just don’t need to tip our 

hand any further to our foes. 
20 

Having said that, the chair now recognizes the gentleman from 

Arkansas, Dr. Snyder. 

Dr. SNYDER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for letting me 

participate in your hearing, even though I am not a member of this 

subcommittee. 

One of the reasons, General McNabb, I wanted to attend today 

is I think what you do is one of the most complicated things that 

is done in the military, how to figure out how to keep things moving around in a timely way, both on an ongoing basis, but then, 

also, on an emergent basis. 

And I had two questions I wanted to ask about. One is very specific about the C–130 and then a more general question. 

My C–130 question is: On page 8 of your written statement, you 

say, ‘‘The Air Force also needs the flexibility to retire and replace 

aircraft at the end of their service life,’’ and I think you are talking 

about the C–130E models there. 

I have C–130s in my district, but I don’t find there is any value 

in keeping planes that you don’t want, that don’t fly or we don’t 

think are reliable. 

I don’t understand the issue. Mr. Saxton and I, before he retired, 

we kept pushing to give you all the flexibility that you want. On 

the Senate side, there is resistance to that. 

Would you explain to me where the breakdown is, because it is 

not as simple as just members want to have tails in their district? 

I think it is more complicated than that. 

Why are we having the problem that we are having and have we 

made any improvement in the last year or two on the language in 

the defense bill? 

General MCNABB. Thanks, Congressman Snyder, and great to 

see you again, sir. 

We have asked the committees on a number of occasions, that is, 

you bring in new airplanes like ‘‘Js’’, we would like to get rid of the 

older stuff because our requirements are—we roughly need 400 C– 

130s, equivalents, and right now our plan is to make that up of C– 

130Js and C–130Hs through H1, 2 and 2.5 and 3s. 

And our plan is to do avionics modernization program upgrades 

on the ‘‘Hs’’ so that they are a common fleet. Right now, 222 is 

what we plan to do on that. 

You put the ‘‘Js’’ in there and then we have the ‘‘H’’ model 130s 

that we are taking a good look at, at whether or not it is better 

to put the avionics modernization program in there or replace them 

with the ‘‘Js’’ as they become available. 

The older airplanes, like the ‘‘E’’ models, obviously, having opportunities that if, in fact, we wanted to take one of those and put a 

center wing box and do all the upgrades to them. 

I think there are airplanes like the C–130Es, they don’t have the 

-15 engines, so it really doesn’t make sense for us to put any kind 

of additional investment into the C–130Es. So basically, we are 

ready to retire those as we get the ‘‘Js.’’ 

Where we stand now, you all have been very supportive of that 

and we have been able to start clearing those 130Es off the ramps. 

The same thing we can say about the KC–135Es. 

Dr. SNYDER. You still have legal restrictions, though, do you not, 

on the ability of you all to manage the ‘‘E’’ model fleet? 
21 

General MCNABB. We have type 1000 storage that says we want 

to be able to get to them if we need to. I think that once we get 

the airplanes in place, the crews are all trained up, again, we 

would come back to the committee and say, ‘‘We really would like 

to be able to just kind of get away from the type 1000 storage and 

so forth,’’ because we would like to use some of those parts. 

The other one that I would mention for the committee is some 

of these airplanes we probably could put into foreign military sales. 

If you put a center wing box, they may not need the avionics upgrades, depending on where the countries are. 

And there is some resale value of that equipment that, while it 

wouldn’t be pertinent perhaps to what we are doing in Afghanistan 

or other places, there are other countries that perhaps could put 

a little investment in there and be able to have a pretty good 130. 

Dr. SNYDER. There also is the cost of putting them in the type 

1000 storage, is there not? 

General MCNABB. Right. 

Dr. SNYDER. Which you are all are being required to do and you 

would prefer not to do and yet it is millions-of-dollars that are 

going to maintain these planes in a status that you would just as 

soon not have them in. 

General MCNABB. Absolutely. 

Dr. SNYDER. Would you provide me and the committee with the 

language that you would think would be helpful? 

General MCNABB. Absolutely. 

Dr. SNYDER. I don’t think a light ever went on, Mr. Chairman, 

but I wanted to ask just one final question. 

How do you test whether or not a product or commodity, a part, 

goes from A to B in a timely way? What kind of test do you run 

that tells you that something that is on a shelf at a depot somewhere in the Continental United States (CONUS) actually ends up 

in the hands of the mechanic that wants to put the fan belt in the 

vehicle? 

General MCNABB. Last year was our year of metrics and one of 

the big things you have to do on an enterprise like this is to be 

able to watch the stuff and be able to say—and track it en route, 

if you can. 

I would tell you that is one of the big improvements that have 

been made. I would talk even on the Pak LOC. Our ability to do 

in-transit visibility on the containers has made a big difference on 

knowing where things are in that supply chain, all the way to the 

point of being able to say we need to reprioritize the flow because 

the pipeline—we have had the bridge go down, so we have got to 

reprioritize how we get the flow in. 

Dr. SNYDER. Now, when you say that last year was the year of 

the metrics, are we saying the first five or six years of this was not 

a year of measuring how things go? 

General MCNABB. No, sir. I would say that we have been doing 

the metrics, but we have said that we are getting to the point 

where, as the distribution process ownership, with my other hat, 

our ability to watch all this and measure it and say, ‘‘Here is how 

that flow goes from beginning to end,’’ shortening that supply 

chain, just like industry, you save lots of dollars. 
22 

If you can build trust into the system, basically, people don’t 

order stuff two and three times. I use FedEx and UPS as an example. They changed the culture, because you really did trust that 

they would get it there, and you also knew you could go check on 

it if you had to. 

Most of us don’t check. If somebody says they FedEx’d it, we 

don’t check it unless it didn’t make it there. But we trust that it 

will get there. 

It is the same thing here. It also allows us to make decisions on 

multimodal. In some cases, it is faster to do a combination of surface and air rather than trying to do it all by air. 

That is what TRANSCOM is doing, as the distribution process 

owner, is taking a look at all of those and saying, ‘‘Okay, what is 

the best way we can do this.’’ 

Some of our earlier discussion, the more options we have means 

that we can do this a lot of different ways. In many cases, using 

normal commercial practices, using normal commercial routes and 

letting our commercial carriers take care of this is a much better 

way than if we put a military solution in there, and you all have 

seen where we have done that and what a difference it is made. 

Dr. SNYDER. Part of that commercial practice is how you order, 

too. You don’t necessarily need to order one fan belt to be delivered. 

You all would probably do better if you delivered a box of fan belts 

so you only had to do it one time. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for your courtesy. 

Mr. TAYLOR. The chair recognizes the gentleman from California, 

Mr. Hunter. 

Mr. HUNTER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

General, thank you. 

Could you tell me about your involvement with ARCENT, Army 

Central Command, at Camp Arifjan and how you are going to be 

working with them for the Iraq exfiltration? 

General MCNABB. Sure. Congressman Hunter, great to see you. 

In fact, I was just down seeing General Lovelace, about two 

months ago, went by and saw them, talked about as they look at 

what they need to do across the theater, but certainly in Iraq, as 

to how do we make sure that we have got the flow right. 

In fact, we did have discussions about the different avenues by 

which we can have stuff go in and come out of that theater, especially Iraq. 

One of the big discussions was, for instance, the port at Umm 

Kasar. The other one was that line of communication through Jordan and talking about how we can look at the types of things that 

we need to have come out and then what is the best route to do 

that by; also, discussion about what we need to do by air, by surface, to make sure that we sort that out. 

So I think that the discussion that CENTCOM is having, in general, we have been in the middle of and, certainly, General 

Lovelace and that—with the Coalition Forces Land Component 

Commander (CFLCC), that is obviously one that will be big-time on 

how we do that with them. 

Mr. HUNTER. Got you. I was there about five days ago talking to 

him, the general there at Camp Arifjan, and they were not too— 

they didn’t know when exactly we were going to have our expel at 
23 

that point. That was last week. We now know, seeing the paper, 

it might be August of next year. 

Their timeline, from what they were saying, that timeline would 

be extremely difficult to meet to leave properly in a ‘‘non-dirty’’ 

way, because that is about 18 months out. That is about the bare 

minimum that they would need to get everything out. 

Are you guys involved with them to speed that up and make that 

a non-dirty move from Iraq out? 

General MCNABB. Congressman, what we have done is looked at 

what will they need us to do and I would say that the strategic lift 

portion of this is not the showstopper. So we have more than 

enough to be able to handle their needs, if they need to accelerate 

it, but that is not the chokepoint. 

Obviously, they are working with that. What we have made sure 

is that we have ship availability and aircraft availability to be able 

to make sure that we can handle that, whatever service requirement they have. 

Mr. HUNTER. Are there things you can do that they aren’t asking 

for? 

General MCNABB. From my end, we have plenty and they know 

it. So it is just not that kind of an issue. 

One thing we have said is, ‘‘We will work with you, whatever you 

all need,’’ to be able to make sure that we can open up that pipeline to whatever they need. 

As you say, it is really the issue of how much time they need to 

prepare the equipment to move it as we bring it back. 

Mr. HUNTER. True, yes. That is a big chokepoint, with the wash 

rags and the Agriculture Department (AG) check and everything 

else. 

General MCNABB. You bet. 

Mr. HUNTER. Thank you, General. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. TAYLOR. Are you through, Mr. Hunter? 

Mr. HUNTER. Yes, Mr. Chairman, thank you. 

Mr. TAYLOR. Thank you very much. 

The chair recognizes the gentleman from Virginia, Mr. Wittman. 

Mr. WITTMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

General McNabb, thank you for joining us today, appreciate your 

great work there in moving our folks and all their supplies around. 

So we really appreciate that. 

One question. When I was most recently in Afghanistan, there 

was some discussion about the movement of supplies from Pakistan 

into Afghanistan and some interruption in those supply chains, and 

then I know, as we previously talked about, about air transport 

and the number of C–17s available. 

Can you shed a little more light on the current status of movement of supplies into Afghanistan, what the challenges are, what 

your contingencies are to deal with interruptions there? 

And I know there was some talk there, Chairman Taylor and 

myself had some discussions about airlift capacity, what capacity 

is there, and what are the contingencies to deal with the things we 

are facing, the interruption of supply chain. 

General MCNABB. Thank you, Congressman. 
24 

As we look at that theater, what we are trying to do is make sure 

we have as many options as we have, especially on the ground 

kinds of transportation. 

Obviously, getting into Afghanistan, being a landlocked country, 

there is not a whole bunch of ways to come in and basically there 

are five major gates, if you will, that allow us to come in. 

And from the south, we use the Torkham gate and the Chaman 

gate. There are also three from the north, Termez being the major 

one that goes that. 

What we try to do is make sure that we can—by having multiple 

options, you also have competition between these different ways 

and we try to make sure that we are not taking sensitive—everything that is sensitive/kinetic we take by air. 

The things that we are talking about are like food, like water, 

like fuel, like construction material, those kinds of things, APs and 

foreign military sales. 

What we are trying to do is make sure we have lots of ways to 

be able to increase that flow if we need to, especially as we increase 

forces in Afghanistan, and that if, in fact, one way is shut down, 

for whatever reason, we have other ways to be able to surge so that 

it doesn’t impact the war fighter. 

Today, I use a measure of 78 containers a day. It kind of keeps 

us even with the forces that we have and kind of keeps everything 

flowing. That, obviously, will increase a little bit. And what I do 

is try to make sure that we are always beating 78 on the average, 

of which we do. Our average is about 138 for this week, to give you 

an example, and we have averaged about 90 since the beginning 

of January. 

So we have kind of stayed ahead of the flow. The second part to 

that is we know that, again, if you have multiple options, if we end 

up having to do some of the stuff by air, we will do that, and we 

have promised the folks on the ground that ‘‘If you have something 

that was supposed to get to you on a surface and, for some reason, 

it doesn’t make it through, you let us know and we will bring that 

in by air.’’ 

I have not had to do that. So that is kind of the ultimate guarantee, if you will. 

The other portion to that is we have worked with the folks in Afghanistan, along with CENTCOM, to look at all of the airfields and 

the ports going in there to see how we can streamline that so you 

can make the pipe larger. 

Termez would be an example that we would like to be able to increase the throughput through there. The airfields in Bagram, 

Kandahar and Bastian are the three major places that we will be 

going into, and we have increased our throughput into those all the 

way from an extra—increasing by 50 percent all the way up to increasing by four times. 

That is what we have done, again, in conjunction with the folks 

in theater to make sure that we have that option. We haven’t had 

to use it, but I would say that we want to make sure that if we 

do need it, we have it there for General Petraeus, so that nothing 

will stop this. 

So that is kind of where we are. 
25 

Mr. WITTMAN. One other question. How are our relationships 

with the Pakistani groups that are working with us to do the transport? 

I know at some time, there was discussion about how that dynamic existed between us, as contractors, and them, as providers. 

General MCNABB. Absolutely. That is one that is probably Pakistan—we do normal commercial carriers that will go through there. 

A lot of discussion about how the Pakistanis can secure their 

routes. 

A lot of that is done as the contractors work with the different 

trucking companies that they do. They have different ways of doing 

that. 

In fact, that is exactly what we are going to do in the north, as 

well. It is going to be completely commercial. It is their relationships they already do and it is the movement of normal commercial 

cargo. 

Lots of discussion that they like to hide in the open, meaning 

that you don’t want to have this designated that people would 

know that it is a shipment by us, and that seems to work very well, 

because, obviously, it is part of the normal commerce that goes 

through there and it brings capital to that region. 

We keep working with them to make sure that we have different 

ways of watching this. One thing that we do have almost completely on the Pak LOC is satellite trackers so we can see if something has slowed down, maybe pilferage, maybe attacked, and we 

can basically know that very quickly. So if we have got to supplement, we can do that. 

It also allows us, quite frankly, when you have a major disruption, let’s say, a bridge, it allows you to reprioritize the flow en 

route and say, ‘‘Okay, now, the unit equipment that was in the 

back that is en route, it now needs to go to the front.’’ 

We are doing that. That is the folks, to be honest with you, the 

folks in CENTCOM and our surface deployment and distribution 

folks, and they make magic happen and I am still going, ‘‘Man, it 

is amazing you can do that,’’ but that is what they are doing and 

that is why you are not hearing the—when you hear a bridge go 

down, we are working through coming different ways. 

So that I want everybody to know we will get the stuff through. 

We have other options. Don’t ever think that we totally depend on 

you and that actually helps the whole system. 

Mr. WITTMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield the balance of 

my time. 

Mr. TAYLOR. The chair thanks the gentleman. 

The chair now recognizes the gentleman from Hawaii, Mr. Abercrombie. 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. General McNabb, has the issue between the 

Army and your command been resolved with regard to the C–130 

and the man-ground vehicle or the future combat system? 

General MCNABB. Chairman, I think that they have decided that 

the future combat system, we would put that on a C–17. I think 

they have come to us and said, ‘‘Yes, given the size of it, we will 

need to be dependent on the C–17 to move that.’’ 

Is that the question you were asking about? 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Yes. 
26 

General MCNABB. Yes, sir. 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. That is if it moves forward. 

What about the utilization rate then of the C–17? You weren’t 

able to anticipate that it is much higher. 

Do you need more replacements, what? What is the answer 

there? 

General MCNABB. Chairman, you all have been—if I go back 2 

years, the 10 airplanes that you added took us from 180 to 190. 

That was really because of the wear and tear on the fleet, as you 

have said, basically, the flying hours that we have used up. 

But a lot of it is the type of flying hours that we are doing in 

theater. You all have been great about making sure that our fleetwide—we are staying about even with the wear and tear on that 

fleet. 

The additional 15 airplanes, what it will allow us to do is take 

the newer airplanes, put them into places where we are going to 

do a higher utilization rate and be able to transfer some of the 

older airplanes and fly less hours on them. 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Is there discussion of having more in the upcoming budget? 

General MCNABB. Chairman, I know that at the highest levels 

in the Pentagon, that is one of the issues that we know we need 

to come back to you, and I know that they are discussing that. 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Part of your testimony—sorry to keep rolling, 

but we have to go back and vote again. 

Part of your testimony, on page 3, ‘‘U.S. Africa Command grows 

and expands its mission,’’ one of the scariest sentences that I have 

seen, I mean this, one of the scariest sentences that I have seen 

in any testimony, ‘‘as the U.S. Africa Command grows and expands 

its mission.’’ 

What is its mission, as you understand it? 

General MCNABB. Well, obviously, I would defer to General Ward 

on that, but what I would say is that I know that given what that 

continent looks like, the kinds of things that he is talking about 

and the kinds of infrastructure they have, I know that he will be 

dependent on what TRANSCOM can bring him to whatever he is 

asked to do. 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. You say you are going to leverage your resources and expertise to support this new command. You must 

have some idea, then. What is their intention? What have you been 

told the Africa Command is supposed to be doing in Africa? 

General MCNABB. I think it is partnering with the other countries. It is disaster assistance. It is the kinds of things that, as you 

look at U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM) and you look at the Africa continent, it is the kinds of things that we did in Rwanda. 

It is kind of the things that we have done on—— 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Are you preparing? 

General MCNABB [CONTINUING]. Evacuation operations. 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Are you now engaged in scenarios and preparing budgets and materiel and personnel for these scenarios? 

General MCNABB. Chairman, one thing that they are doing, they 

do a number of scenarios that we used to take a look at what kind 

of force we need. That is done by the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD). They set different criteria. 
27 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Were you brought into it? 

General MCNABB. Yes. 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Are you currently engaged in gaming scenarios with regard to the United States, through its Africa Command, going into Africa? 

General MCNABB. I would say that we have an illustrative scenario that would—like Africa and other places in the world which 

we know that we may be asked to do, and, yes, we do game those 

kinds of scenarios. 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. The Nigerian delta? 

General MCNABB. Chairman, I think I would rather talk about 

that on a closed session. 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. I think we ought to have a closed session. I 

think we are, once again, in a situation where we are getting into— 

this goes way beyond mission creep. 

We have got an African Command. Nobody knows anything 

about it. We haven’t the slightest clue as to what is involved in 

commitments that we may or may not find ourselves in and with 

whom. 

And so far as I know, there is nothing coming forward in terms 

of budget from you—budget implications. Don’t you think that that 

is something that this committee ought to have a very clear handle 

on in the upcoming 2010 fiscal year? 

General MCNABB. Chairman, I believe this committee absolutely 

should be aware of those kinds of discussions, absolutely. 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. If you had to summarize what you have been 

told to this point as to what the mission of the African Command 

is, could you summarize that for me? 

General MCNABB. Chairman, my—— 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. In terms of what TRANSCOM is expected to 

do. 

General MCNABB. I think given the distances and the kinds of 

scenarios where we have had to do courses of action in Africa, 

those are the kinds of things that I would expect that General 

Ward would come to me and ask me, ‘‘I need your help to do these 

things’’ and to be ready to do this if called upon. 

When it was under the U.S. European Command (EUCOM), 

when Africa responsibilities sat under EUCOM, it was the same. 

In other words, EUCOM had responsibilities to Africa and they 

made sure that we were ready to support them, if called upon, and 

that is kind of where we have been. 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. And it is astounding that we are having this 

conversation. Africa is a continent. So we now have a command— 

we are now taking an imperial power orientation toward the entire 

continent of Africa. 

General MCNABB. Chairman, I certainly don’t believe that to be 

true. 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. So you have limited scenarios. 

General MCNABB. Chairman, when I think about what you—this 

country may ask TRANSCOM to do, it may be anywhere in the 

world. That could include Africa, that could include South America. 

We do humanitarian assistance and disaster relief to all parts of 

the globe. What I try to do is make sure that wherever you ask us 
28 

to go, we have the flexibility to deliver to the combatant commander. 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. I am concerned. I am concerned, General, 

that we won’t be asking you to do it, that we are going to find ourselves involved in something again or multiple situations in Africa 

that are an extension of foreign policy that may not have been vetted at all in the United States Congress. 

But for purposes of the committee, I think perhaps, then, Mr. 

Chairman, we might need to have—even at full committee level 

and I think we need to bring it to Chairman Skelton’s attention 

that we have got to have a thorough vetting of what is expected 

of General McNabb and his unified command with respect to the 

continent of Africa. 

Thank you, General. 

General MCNABB. Thank you, sir. 

Mr. TAYLOR. General, again, I, on behalf of the committee, want 

to thank you for what I consider to be a magnificent job the men 

and women in your command do resupplying our troops in Afghanistan and Iraq, extremely dangerous places for all involved, and, to 

the absolute best of my knowledge, you all have done a magnificent 

job. 

We have asked some questions showing our concerns about what 

might happen in Pakistan and I think it is smart for us to be asking these questions upfront rather than get hit blindsided should 

the Pakistani government, either by omission or commission, decide that they are not going to let us use that as a route to resupply our troops. 

The last thing I would ask you is—and I know that the President 

only made these remarks last night, with the President’s announced desire to have American combat troops out of Iraq by August of 2010. 

To what extent have you been involved in the discussions as to 

what stays in Iraq, what comes back, because, obviously, it is going 

to have enormous budgetary implications for the Defense Department if an extraordinary amount of equipment is left behind? 

And I only raise this question because I remember the enormous 

amount of material that was left behind in Panama and I thought 

that was terribly wasteful. For the failure to budget the necessary 

resources to bring things home, we left hundreds of millions of dollars of things that the American taxpayer paid for, that had to be 

replaced someplace else. 

And I would certainly hope that you will keep the committee informed of what the plan is, what is going to be left behind, what 

do we bring with us, and I would certainly hope that nothing is left 

behind that is of value because of the failure to appropriate the 

necessary funds to get it home. 

General MCNABB. Chairman, I would say that in my discussions, 

for instance, with General Lovelace, my discussions with General 

Odierno, my discussions with Ann Dunwoody, for instance, the 

commander of the Army Materiel Command, they are focused on 

that to make sure that we have thought through that and made 

sure that we have done that as smartly as possible. 
29 

I have been given gross numbers that said this is about the 

amount of stuff that we need to move. That is kind of what I need 

in scheduling ships and aircraft. 

But I do know that they are taking that seriously along the lines 

of exactly what you say, to make sure that we are doing this as 

smart as possible. 

Those discussions, I could tell you, I know that they are having. 

I know that we are working through what exactly we would bring 

back, what we may end up leaving there. 

But I would just say that that is what I have heard so far. I do 

know that we have plenty of lift to be able to handle any requirements they have. So I know that I am not the long pole in the tent 

and I just try to make sure that I never am. 

So that is kind of where we go. 

Mr. TAYLOR. So what is your target date for that plan to be in 

place? 

General MCNABB. On this one, given that the President talked 

about that last night, they are working those final options now. I 

would expect that—I mean, we have been—we, the Department of 

Defense (DOD), have collectively been working that to say, hey, depending on what orders he gives, we want to make sure that we 

can respond as quickly as possible. 

So I know they are into that final phase now. 

Mr. TAYLOR. General, I want to be fair with you, but I also think 

it is important for Congress to have some idea of what you intend 

to leave behind, some idea of what you intend to leave behind, 

some idea of what you intend to either bring back to the continental United States or transport to Afghanistan. 

So what would be a reasonable amount of time to give you in 

order for you to get back to us as to what that plan is? 

General MCNABB. Let me take that for action and I will get with 

CENTCOM and be able to come back, and with OSD and the department, and let them provide that answer back to you, but say 

that we have got to do that in a quick manner. 

Mr. TAYLOR. Is 120 days a fair amount of time? 

General MCNABB. We can start with 120 and then we can—but 

it really isn’t part of what I would be in the middle of. 

Mr. TAYLOR. Because that was a real-life scenario that ended up, 

I believe, on ‘‘60 Minutes’’ or ‘‘20/20,’’ for the lack of spending 

$3,000 or $4,000 to transport something, we left behind a $0.5 million piece of equipment here, generator there. 

All of those things could certainly have been used if not by our 

Federal Government, by the local and state governments, who 

would have welcomed those things, and I just don’t want to see 

that happen again. 

General MCNABB. Chairman Taylor, I couldn’t agree with you 

more. I mean, that is exactly right. It is exactly the way we should 

do it. 

Mr. TAYLOR. Again, thank you for the great job that the men and 

women in your command do. 

We are adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 12:10 p.m., the subcommittees were adjourned.] 

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