IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT NASHVILLE

Assigned on Briefs July 1, 2021

IN RE L.F., ET AL.

Appeal from the Juvenile Court for Franklin County

No. 2020-JV-48 Thomas C. Faris, Judge

___________________________________

No. M2020-01663-COA-R3-PT

___________________________________

This case involves a petition to terminate parental rights. The petition was filed by the 

Tennessee Department of Children’s Services against the biological mother of three minor 

children. The petition listed seven grounds for termination of the mother’s parental rights. 

After a final hearing on the petition, the trial court terminated Mother’s parental rights, 

finding five grounds for termination: (1) abandonment by failing to visit; (2) persistence of 

conditions; (3) substantial noncompliance with a permanency plan; (4) failure to manifest 

an ability or willingness to parent; and (5) severe child abuse. We affirm the trial court in 

part, reverse in part, and remand.

Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Juvenile Court Affirmed in

part, Reversed in part, and Remanded.

CARMA DENNIS MCGEE, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which D. MICHAEL 

SWINEY, C.J., and FRANK G. CLEMENT, JR., P.J., M.S., joined.

Glen A. Isbell, Winchester, Tennessee, for the appellant, Jamye K.1

Herbert H. Slatery, III, Attorney General and Reporter, and Jordan K. Crews, Assistant 

Attorney General, for the appellee, Tennessee Department of Children’s Services.

OPINION

I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

 

1

“Because this appeal involves . . . minor [children], all participants will be identified in a manner 

that protects the privacy of the minor[s],” such as using only the first name and last initial, or only the 

initials, of the participants. In re Bentley D., 537 S.W.3d 907, 909 n.2 (Tenn. 2017).

08/26/2021
- 2 -

Jamye K. (“Mother”) is the biological mother of L.V.F. (born January 2006), K.E.K. 

(born July 2018), and K.G.K. (born September 2019) (collectively “the children”). Korey 

K. (“Father”) is the biological father of K.E.K. and K.G.K. and the stepfather of L.V.F.2

L.V.F.’s biological father is deceased.

Prior to the birth of the youngest child, on March 1, 2019, L.V.F.’s school filed a 

petition for truancy, alleging that she had accrued a high number of unexcused absences. 

The Tennessee Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”) investigated the petition. 

During the investigation, thirteen-year-old L.V.F. stated that she had been sexually abused 

by Father (her stepfather). Based on these allegations, on March 20, 2019, DCS filed a 

petition for an ex parte no contact order between Father and L.V.F. That same day, the 

Juvenile Court of Franklin County, Tennessee, entered a restraining and no contact order 

against Father, barring him from having any contact with L.V.F. Shortly thereafter, the 

juvenile court ordered the parents to submit to drug screens. Mother and Father both tested 

positive for several illicit substances. Specifically, Mother tested positive for THC, 

oxycodone, methamphetamine, and amphetamine.

On March 27, 2019, DCS filed a dependency and neglect petition in the juvenile 

court. The petition alleged that L.V.F. and K.E.K. were dependent and neglected due to 

the parents’ illicit drug use and L.V.F.’s truancy. On the same day, the juvenile court found 

that there was probable cause to show that L.V.F. and K.E.K were dependent and 

neglected. As a result, the court placed the children in DCS custody and permitted Mother 

to have supervised visitation with the children. Subsequently, the parents waived the 

adjudicatory hearing on the dependency and neglect petition. On May 13, 2019, the 

juvenile court entered an order that found there was clear and convincing evidence to show 

that the L.V.F. and K.E.K. were dependent and neglected. The court also barred Mother 

from contacting the children but permitted her to attend the children’s medical 

appointments.

On April 16, 2019, prior to the trial court finding that L.V.F. and K.E.K. were 

dependent and neglected, DCS coordinated with Mother to draft a Family Permanency 

Plan. The plan detailed several responsibilities for Mother, such as: follow court orders 

regarding the children and Father, complete alcohol and drug assessments and follow any 

related recommendations, complete intensive outpatient alcohol and drug treatment, refrain 

from using any illegal drugs, obtain and show proof of a legal income and a stable 

residence, and complete a parenting education program. The juvenile court ratified the 

plan on April 24, 2019.

While L.V.F. and K.E.K. were in DCS custody, Mother and Father continued to 

have contact. In the summer of 2019, each parent obtained an order of protection against 

 

2 Because Mother is the lone appellant in this case, the focus of this section is on Mother’s history 

in this case.
- 3 -

the other.

In an effort to complete her permanency plan responsibilities, in June 2019, Mother 

began an intensive outpatient program for drug and alcohol treatment. Eventually, Mother 

completed the program, but she did not complete the aftercare recommendations. Mother 

also completed a parenting class program in August 2019. She continued to maintain her 

residence after L.V.F. and K.E.K. entered DCS custody. However, after a foreclosure in 

mid to late 2019, Mother relocated to a new residence.

While L.V.F. and K.E.K. remained in DCS custody, K.G.K. was born in September 

2019. Approximately one month before K.G.K. was born, in August 2019, Mother had 

tested positive for methamphetamine, amphetamine, and suboxone. Due to Mother’s 

positive drug test, the juvenile court barred Mother from having any contact with L.V.F. 

and K.E.K. A few days after K.G.K. was born, DCS filed a petition for legal custody of 

K.G.K., alleging that she was dependent and neglected and severely abused due to 

Mother’s drug use. Thereafter, the juvenile court found that there was probable cause to 

show that K.G.K. was dependent and neglected and placed her in DCS custody. Mother 

waived the adjudicatory hearing for the DCS petition regarding K.G.K. Accordingly, the 

juvenile court entered an order that found K.G.K. was dependent and neglected and she

remained in DCS custody.

3

In a separate order that was entered in November 2019, the 

juvenile court also determined that Mother was making some progress on her parenting 

plan responsibilities. As a result, the court permitted Mother to have supervised visitation 

with the children.

In October 2019, DCS worked with Mother to draft a revised Family Permanency 

Plan. The revised plan listed all three of the children and included many of the same 

responsibilities for Mother. Under the revised plan, Mother was also instructed to follow 

all aftercare recommendations related to her intensive outpatient treatment. She was also

tasked with visiting the children for a minimum of four hours per month.4 The juvenile 

court ratified the plan on October 30, 2019. Another revised Family Permanency Plan was 

drafted on January 30, 2020. This revised plan included the same responsibilities for 

Mother as the previous two plans. Additionally, Mother was required to maintain a home 

that was “free from substantiated perpetrators.” This requirement was added to ensure that 

the children would remain safely away from Father, who was a substantiated perpetrator at 

the time the final plan was drafted. The juvenile court ratified the final revised plan on 

February 19, 2020.

 

3 The court order finding K.G.K. to be dependent and neglected was silent as to the severe 

abuse allegation. 

4 The original Family Permanency Plan permitted Mother to visit L.V.F. and K.E.K., but as we 

previously mentioned, between May and November 2019, Mother was barred from contacting the children 

outside of their medical appointments.
- 4 -

The juvenile court held a review hearing regarding the children on February 19, 

2020. After the hearing, the court determined that Mother was not making progress on her 

permanency plan responsibilities. As a result, the court suspended Mother’s visitation 

rights and barred her from contacting the children.

On May 26, 2020, DCS initiated the instant case by filing a petition to terminate 

Mother and Father’s parental rights. In its petition, DCS asserted seven grounds for 

termination of Mother’s parental rights: (1) abandonment for failing to provide a suitable 

home; (2) abandonment for failing to visit the children; (3) abandonment for failing to 

support the children; (4) persistence of conditions; (5) substantial noncompliance with the 

Family Permanency Plans; (6) failing to manifest an ability or willingness to parent; and 

(7) severe child abuse. DCS further alleged that it was in the best interest of the children 

to terminate Mother’s parental rights.

Mother filed an answer to the termination petition on October 22, 2020. In her 

answer, Mother did not raise a lack of willfulness as an affirmative defense to her alleged 

failure to visit or support the children.

On November 6, 2020, the trial court held a final hearing on the termination petition. 

Several witnesses testified at the hearing, including Mother; the DCS family service worker 

who was assigned to the case, Christina Cremeans; the foster mother for K.E.K. and 

K.G.K.; and L.V.F., who testified in the trial court’s chambers.

Mother testified on her efforts to complete her permanency plan requirements, her 

history of drug use, and L.V.F.’s allegations of sexual abuse. Mother testified that she 

believed L.V.F.’s statements about Father sexually abusing her. She stated that she was 

“in shock” by the allegations and that it was the first time L.V.F. reported any such abuse. 

Although L.V.F. subsequently recanted her allegations, she reasserted the allegations prior 

to DCS filing its termination petition. At trial, Mother asserted that she did not encourage 

L.V.F. to recant her allegations.

In regards to her permanency plan responsibilities, Mother claimed that she was 

steadily employed since DCS filed its initial dependency and neglect petition. She testified 

that she worked at several different companies from April 2019 to spring 2020 (when the 

COVID-19 outbreak began). Although Mother testified that she has maintained constant 

employment, she also admitted that she is currently receiving unemployment benefits. 

Regardless, Mother admitted that she did not provide proof of her employment to DCS for 

several employment positions that she held after the children entered DCS custody. Mother 

verified that she completed a parenting class program and the initial portion of an intensive 

outpatient program for alcohol and drug treatment. As support for the children, in May 

2020, Mother made a “lump sum” child support payment of $850.00. Thereafter, Mother 

continued to make regular child support payments while the children remained in DCS 

custody.
- 5 -

Although Mother completed some of her responsibilities in the Family Permanency 

Plans, she failed to complete many of the required tasks. At the final hearing, she admitted 

that she did not complete the aftercare recommendation of the intensive outpatient 

treatment program. Despite Mother being allowed to visit the children between November 

2019 and February 2020, she only visited the children one time during this period. Mother 

testified that after this period, when a no contact order was reimplemented, Mother did not 

make any efforts to lift the no contact order.

Mother also testified on certain other permanency plan requirements that she failed 

to complete. Although Mother obtained a new residence after the children entered DCS 

custody, she did not provide DCS with information on her new residence. As a result, DCS 

was unable to verify whether the residence was a “safe and stable household.” When 

questioned on why she failed to maintain contact with DCS, Mother stated that “[t]here 

was no excuse, I should have.”

At the final hearing, Mother was also questioned on her history of drug use 

throughout the case. Mother was subject to random drug tests throughout the custodial 

episode. Although Mother passed certain tests, there were multiple instances when she 

tested positive for illicit substances. At the final hearing, Mother claimed that several of 

the results, including the drug test that indicated she was using methamphetamine while 

pregnant with K.G.K., were “false positives” or “inconclusive.” Mother further testified 

that, at times, she refused to submit to drug screens “[b]ecause [she] would have failed.” 

Mother claimed that if she was drug tested on the day of the final hearing, she would not 

test positive for any illicit substances except for potentially THC. The trial judge 

questioned whether Mother was under the influence of an illicit substance and ordered a 

recess for Mother to submit to a drug test. During the recess, Mother took a drug test and 

tested positive for methamphetamine, amphetamine, THC, and benzos.5 When the trial 

court indicated that Mother had failed the drug test, Mother admitted to using several 

different illegal drugs within a week of the final hearing. After Mother previously stated 

that she would only test positive for THC, the trial court stated that it found “very little 

credibility on the part of [Mother]” and that it questioned her statements on her other 

positive tests being false positives.

Ms. Cremeans testified that she had been involved with the children since L.V.F. 

and K.E.K. first entered DCS custody. She testified on her role in helping draft and 

establish Mother’s Family Permanency Plan responsibilities, the contents of the Family 

Permanency Plans, her involvement in the case, and her efforts and Mother’s attempts (or 

lack thereof) to complete the permanency plan requirements. Ms. Cremeans verified that 

Mother completed her parenting classes and an intensive outpatient program. However, 

 

5

It is evident from the transcript of the proceedings that the Court was referring to 

unidentified Benzodiazepines simply as “benzos.”
- 6 -

she stated that Mother violated several requirements under the plans, including the directive 

to not allow a “substantiated perpetrator” to live in her home. Ms. Cremeans explained 

that Mother violated this requirement by allowing Father to live in the home after he was 

substantiated. She testified that she previously witnessed Father at Mother’s residence and 

outside of the children’s medical appointments. She further stated that Mother’s contact 

with Father violated the no contact orders that the parents obtained against each other, 

which made her home unsuitable for the children.

There were various times throughout the custodial episode when Mother did not 

respond to Ms. Cremeans or refused to follow the directives of DCS. When Mother was 

permitted to have therapeutic visitation with the children between November 2019 and 

February 2020, DCS attempted to contact Mother several times. According to Ms.

Cremeans, those attempts were largely unsuccessful. She explained that the no contact 

order between Mother and the children was reimplemented in February 2020 because 

Mother was contacting L.V.F. without DCS’s permission. She also testified that Mother 

would not cooperate to allow Ms. Cremeans to verify the suitability of Mother’s new home 

and that Mother never provided proof of an income. Although Mother submitted to random 

drug screens throughout the custodial episode (many of which indicated Mother was using 

illegal drugs), Ms. Cremeans testified that there were several instances when Mother would 

thwart her attempts to conduct drug screens. Although Mother was initially responsive to 

DCS, near the end of 2019, Mother ceased communicating with Ms. Cremeans.

Ms. Cremeans detailed Mother’s recent criminal history. In March 2020, Mother 

pled guilty to two counts of passing a worthless check. The worthless check offenses took 

place in January 2019. As a result of her guilty plea, Mother was sentenced to one year of 

probation. On July 24, 2020 Mother was arrested for fabricating or tampering with 

evidence and for possession of drug paraphernalia. Her arrest resulted in an additional 

charge for violating her probation. At the time of the final hearing in November 2020, 

these charges were pending.

The foster mother for K.E.K. and K.G.K.6also testified at the final hearing. The 

foster mother stated that K.E.K. was initially placed in a separate foster home and that he 

entered her home in October 2019. K.G.K. entered the foster mother’s home in September 

2019, only a few days after she was born. She testified that K.G.K. had feeding and 

stomach issues when she first entered the home. However, by the time of the final hearing, 

those concerns had been remedied. The foster mother stated that both K.E.K. and K.G.K. 

are doing “excellent” in the home and that they have bonded with the foster family. The 

foster mother further testified that she had allowed Mother to contact her ever since the 

children entered her custody. Despite her welcoming communication with Mother, she 

stated that Mother contacted her only two times since K.E.K. and K.G.K entered her 

custody. The foster mother stated that her family would “[a]bsolutely” adopt K.E.K. and 

 

6 L.V.F. was placed in a separate foster home than the other children.
- 7 -

K.G.K. if they become available for adoption.

The last witness to testify at the final hearing was L.V.F., who testified in the trial 

court’s chambers. L.V.F. testified on the events regarding her sexual abuse allegations 

against Father. She stated that Mother did not know about the abuse until after L.V.F.

informed the authorities. According to L.V.F., when Mother learned of the allegations, 

“she just kind of shook her head . . . [and] acted like it was not a big deal.” She explained 

that Mother encouraged her to recant her allegations and that “[Mother] made [her] feel 

terrible.” Despite Mother encouraging L.V.F. to recant her allegations, L.V.F. reaffirmed 

that the abuse did occur.

L.V.F. also stated that she wants the termination proceeding to go forward and that 

she is comfortable with K.E.K. and K.G.K. being adopted. When asked whether she 

wanted to be adopted, L.V.F. stated that she wanted to remain near her siblings.7

At the conclusion of the final hearing, the trial court rendered an oral ruling. Its

ruling was memorialized in a written order that was entered on December 3, 2020.

In its written order, the trial court found that Mother’s testimony was not credible

and that DCS established multiple grounds for termination of her parental rights. 

Specifically, the court found five grounds for termination: (1) abandonment by failing to 

visit; (2) persistence of conditions; (3) substantial noncompliance with the permanency 

plans; (4) failure to manifest an ability or willingness to parent; and (5) severe child abuse.

Under its severe child abuse finding, the court explained that Mother failed to protect 

L.V.F. by pressuring her to recant her statements and by continuing to associate with 

Father. Additionally, the trial court found that DCS failed to establish the grounds of 

abandonment by failing to provide a suitable home and abandonment by failing to provide 

support.8 Having found multiple grounds to terminate Mother’s parental rights, the trial 

court further found that termination of Mother’s rights was in the best interest of the 

children. As a result, the court terminated Mother’s parental rights.9

Mother timely appealed.

II. ISSUES PRESENTED

Mother raises two issues on appeal, which we have reworded:

 

7 Ms. Cremeans explained that L.V.F. has “mixed feelings about adoption” because she has a “strict 

criteria for what she wants for her future.”

8 On appeal, DCS does not take issue with the trial court’s findings on these grounds.

9 The trial court also terminated Father’s parental rights, finding seven grounds for termination: (1) 

abandonment by failing to provide a suitable home; (2) abandonment by failing to visit; (3) abandonment 

by failing to support; (4) persistence of conditions; (5) substantial noncompliance with the permanency 

plans; (6) failure to manifest an ability or willingness to parent; and (7) severe child abuse.
- 8 -

1. Whether DCS established grounds to terminate Mother’s parental rights; and

2. Whether it is in the best interest of the children to terminate Mother’s parental 

rights.

For the reasons stated herein, we affirm the trial court’s decision to terminate 

Mother’s parental rights, reverse the finding of “severe child abuse” as a ground for 

termination, and remand.

III. STANDARDS IN PARENTAL TERMINATION CASES

“A parent’s right to the care and custody of her child is among the oldest of the 

judicially recognized fundamental liberty interests protected by the Due Process Clauses 

of the federal and state constitutions.” In re Carrington H., 483 S.W.3d 507, 521 (Tenn. 

2016). “No civil action carries with it graver consequences than a petition to sever family 

ties irretrievably and forever.” In re Kaliyah S., 455 S.W.3d 533, 556 (Tenn. 2015). 

However, parental rights are not absolute. In re Carrington H., 483 S.W.3d at 522.

A party wishing to terminate the parental rights of another must prove two elements: 

(1) that there is at least one ground for termination; and (2) that terminating parental rights 

is in the best interest of the child. Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(c); In re Gabriella D., 531 

S.W.3d 662, 681 (Tenn. 2017). To ensure a parent’s fundamental liberty interest is 

adequately protected, certain procedural safeguards are afforded to parents in termination 

cases. In re Carrington H., 483 S.W.3d at 522. One such safeguard is that the petitioner 

must prove both elements by clear and convincing evidence. Id.; In re Dakota C.R., 404 

S.W.3d 484, 496 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2012). Clear and convincing evidence “establishes that 

the truth of the facts asserted is highly probable and eliminates any serious or substantial 

doubt about the correctness of the conclusions drawn from the evidence.” In re Audrey S., 

182 S.W.3d 838, 861 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2005) (citations omitted). It must “eliminate[] any 

serious or substantial doubt about the correctness of these factual findings.” In re 

Carrington H., 483 S.W.3d at 522 (quoting In re Bernard T., 319 S.W.3d 586, 596 (Tenn. 

2010))

In regard to this Court’s role in cases that involve the termination of parental rights:

Rule 13(d) of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure supplies 

the standard that governs an appellate court’s review of a trial court’s 

determination in a parental termination proceeding. Under Rule 13(d), 

appellate courts review factual findings de novo with a presumption of 

correctness, unless the evidence preponderates otherwise. A trial court’s 

determination as to whether facts amount to clear and convincing evidence 

supporting termination of parental rights is a conclusion of law. As such, an 
- 9 -

appellate court reviews this determination de novo, affords no deference to 

the trial court’s decision, and makes its own determination about whether the 

facts amount to clear and convincing evidence of the elements necessary to 

terminate parental rights. 

In re Neveah M., 614 S.W.3d 659, 673-74 (Tenn. 2020) (citations omitted).

IV. DISCUSSION

At the outset of our discussion, we note that the termination of Father’s parental 

rights is not a subject of this Opinion. Shortly after the children entered DCS custody, 

Father ceased responding to inquiries by DCS or his attorney. Father was absent from the 

final hearing on the termination petition, and his counsel indicated that he had not spoken 

with Father for an extended period of time. After the trial court entered its final written 

order that terminated the parents’ parental rights, Father did not file a notice of appeal. 

Despite his absence and lack of communication, counsel for Father filed a brief on his 

behalf. In the brief, Father’s counsel states that he has not spoken with Father for a 

significant period of time and that, as a result, he cannot say whether Father opposes the 

termination of his parental rights. 

In a proceeding involving the potential termination of parental rights, our Supreme 

Court has stated that “no appeal should be taken . . . without specific authorization from 

the client.” In re Bentley D., 537 S.W.3d at 914, 914 n.7 (discussing other states that “have 

confirmed the importance of a party’s consent to an appeal in a termination of parental 

rights case”). As we stated, Father did not appear for the final hearing. Father’s counsel 

states that there has been a lack of contact with his client and that he “cannot say whether 

[Father] opposes the termination of parental rights.” He goes on to state that he did not 

have “specific authorization” to file a notice of appeal on behalf of Father, but avers that 

he has the authority to contest the court’s findings against Father based upon this Court’s 

ruling in In re David S., No. E2019-01190-COA-R3-PT, 2020 WL 1303733 (Tenn. Ct. 

App. Mar. 18, 2020). We disagree. In In re David S., the trial court terminated the parental 

rights of both parents. Id. at *3. Although the father took the appropriate steps to challenge 

the trial court’s decision, the mother did not make an appearance in the appeal or participate 

in the appeal in any way. Id. at *4. Prior to the final hearing, despite receiving service of 

process, “[the m]other was not provided any date regarding the initial hearing.” Id. at *7. 

On appeal, this Court determined that the mother did not receive sufficient notice of the 

termination proceedings and “was never properly served.” Id. at *4. Although the mother 

did not make an appearance or otherwise participate in the appeal, this Court stated that 

“considerations of due process and fundamental fairness require us to address the manner 

in which [the m]other’s parental rights were terminated.” Id. However, in the present case, 

the record indicates that Father received adequate service of process for the termination 

proceedings. After filing its petition to terminate the parents’ parental rights, DCS and the 

trial court took the appropriate steps to ensure that Father received service by publication. 
- 10 -

See Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 21-1-204 (stating the requirements to serve a party by publication), 

37-1-125(a) (stating that a party to a juvenile court proceeding may be served by 

publication under § 21-1-204 “[i]f, after reasonable effort, [the] party cannot be found, or 

the party’s postal address cannot be ascertained, regardless of whether the party is within 

this state”). The trial court appointed counsel for Father and then specifically found that 

“[p]ublication was completed for proper service regarding [Father].” As such, the concerns 

in In re David S. are not present here. 

Because there is no indication in the record that Father authorized his counsel to 

proceed with an appeal on his behalf, it is appropriate for this Court to disregard the brief 

filed on his behalf. We believe that our holding “strikes the appropriate balance between 

protecting the fundamental rights of parents and acting in the best interests of children.” In 

re Bentley D., 537 S.W.3d 907, 914-15 (Tenn. 2017). See also In re Carrington H., 483 

S.W.3d at 533 (“Due process unquestionably requires States to provide parents with 

fundamentally fair procedures, but it does not require States to ignore the other interests at 

stake in parental termination proceedings.”). 

Although the termination of Father’s parental rights is not at issue in this appeal, we 

will proceed to review the trial court’s decision to terminate Mother’s parental rights.

A. Grounds for Termination

According to the Supreme Court’s directive in In Re Carrington H., “in an appeal 

from an order terminating parental rights the Court of Appeals must review the trial court’s 

findings as to each ground for termination and as to whether termination is in the child’s 

best interests, regardless of whether the parent challenges these findings.” 483 S.W.3d at 

525-26. In this case, the trial court found that there were five grounds for termination of 

Mother’s parental rights. Therefore, we will address each ground in turn.

1. Abandonment by Failing to Visit

In Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-1-113(g), abandonment is listed as the first 

potential ground for termination of parental rights.10 The statutory scheme provides several 

alternative definitions of abandonment in Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-1-102(1), 

including situations when a parent fails to visit his or her child. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 

36-1-102(1)(A)(i). Under section 36-1-102(1)(A)(i), “abandonment” occurs when a parent 

fails to visit the child for a period of four consecutive months immediately preceding the 

filing of a petition to terminate parental rights. Id.

DCS initiated the present case by filing its termination petition on May 26, 2020. 

 

10 The portions of the Code discussed in this Opinion are cited according to how they appeared 

when DCS initiated this case on May 26, 2020.
- 11 -

Accordingly, the relevant four-month period under Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-

1-102(1)(A)(i) is from January 26, 2020, to May 25, 2020. It is undisputed that Mother 

did not visit the children at any point during this four-month period. In fact, Mother’s only 

visit with the children after they entered DCS custody took place in November 2019, 

outside of the relevant four-month period. Mother failed to visit the children despite DCS

making multiple attempts to arrange therapeutic visitations. At the final hearing, Ms.

Cremeans testified that she made several attempts to contact Mother between November 

2019 and February 2020. Mother admitted that she failed to remain in contact with DCS.

On appeal, Mother argues that her failure to visit the children is excused because of 

the no contact order between Mother and the children that was reimplemented on February 

19, 2020. Mother’s argument fails to recognize that approximately one month of the 

applicable four-month period took place prior to the no contact restriction being 

reimplemented. During that time, Mother did not make efforts to coordinate visits with 

DCS. Further, the no contact order between Mother and the children raises the issue of 

whether Mother’s failure to visit was willful. “Effective July 1, 2018, the General 

Assembly amended Tennessee Code Annotated [section] 36-1-102(1) to render the absence 

of willfulness to be solely an affirmative defense . . . .” In re Jude M., 619 S.W.3d 224, 

236 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2020). Meaning, because this case was initiated in May 2020, DCS 

was not required to prove that Mother’s failure to visit was “willful” in order to establish 

the ground of “abandonment” under subsection -102(1)(A)(i). Instead, Mother was 

permitted to raise a lack of willfulness as an affirmative defense to abandonment. See 

Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-102(1)(I). However, in Mother’s answer to the termination 

petition, she did not raise a lack of willfulness as an affirmative defense. As a result, she 

has waived this issue. See Pratcher v. Methodist Healthcare Memphis Hosps., 407 S.W.3d 

727, 735 (Tenn. 2013) (citing Tenn. R. Civ. P. 12.08) (stating that “[a]s a general rule, a 

party waives an affirmative defense if it does not include the defense in an answer or 

responsive pleading”); In re Imerald W., No. W2019-00490-COA-R3-PT, 2020 WL 

504991, at *4 n.5 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 31, 2020) (stating that a parent waives a lack of 

willfulness as an affirmative defense when the parent fails to raise the defense at trial).11

It is undisputed that Mother did not visit the children during the applicable fourmonth period under Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-1-102(1)(A)(i). Additionally, 

Mother waived a lack of willfulness as an affirmative defense to abandonment. 

Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s conclusion that Mother abandoned the children by 

failing to visit.

2. Persistence of Conditions

“Persistence of conditions” is another ground for termination of parental rights. 

 

11 We also note that, at the final hearing, Mother admitted that she made no efforts to lift the no 

contact order.
- 12 -

Under Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-1-113(g)(3)(A), the ground of “persistence 

of conditions” is present when:

The child has been removed from the home or the physical or legal custody 

of a parent or guardian for a period of six (6) months by a court order entered 

at any stage of proceedings in which a petition has been filed in the juvenile 

court alleging that a child is a dependent and neglected child, and:

(i) The conditions that led to the child’s removal still persist, 

preventing the child’s safe return to the care of the parent or 

guardian, or other conditions exist that, in all reasonable 

probability, would cause the child to be subjected to further 

abuse or neglect, preventing the child’s safe return to the care of 

the parent or guardian;

(ii) There is little likelihood that these conditions will be remedied 

at an early date so that the child can be safely returned to the 

parent or guardian in the near future; and

(iii) The continuation of the parent or guardian and child relationship 

greatly diminishes the child’s chances of early integration into a 

safe, stable, and permanent home.

The necessary order of removal is “the threshold consideration” for this ground. In 

re Alleyanna C., No. E2014-02343-COA-R3-PT, 2015 WL 4773313, at *14 (Tenn. Ct. 

App. Aug. 10, 2015). The failure to remedy the conditions that led to the removal need not 

be willful. In re Jaylah W., 486 S.W.3d 537, 556 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2015). The “persistent 

conditions” may include the original conditions that caused the child to be removed from 

the parent’s custody or others that “in all reasonable probability would cause a child to be 

subjected to ‘further abuse and neglect.’” In re Audrey S., 182 S.W.3d at 872 (citing Tenn. 

Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(3)(A)(i)). When DCS’s sustained efforts to “improve the 

parenting abilities . . . have proved ineffective, the conclusion that there is little likelihood 

of such improvement as would allow the safe return of the child to the parent in the near 

future is justified.” In re T.S., No. M1999-01286-COA-R3-CV, 2000 WL 964775, at *7 

(Tenn. Ct. App. July 13, 2000).

Turning our attention to the facts of this case, L.V.F. and K.E.K. were removed from 

Mother’s custody on March 27, 2019, after DCS filed a petition that alleged they were 

dependent and neglected. In September 2019, a few days after K.G.K. was born, DCS filed 

another petition that alleged K.G.K. was dependent and neglected due to Mother’s drug 

use during her pregnancy. On September 10, 2019, the juvenile court removed K.G.K. 

from Mother’s custody, finding that there was probable cause to show that she was 

dependent and neglected. The petition to terminate Mother’s parental rights was filed on 
- 13 -

May 26, 2020 and the final trial occurred on November 6, 2020. Therefore, all three of the 

children were clearly removed from Mother’s custody for more than six months. See Tenn. 

Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(3)(A).

L.V.F. and K.E.K. were removed from Mother’s custody after Mother tested 

positive for several illegal drugs. After Mother waived an adjudicatory hearing, the 

juvenile court adjudicated L.V.F. and K.E.K. dependent and neglected on May 13, 2019. 

Similarly, K.G.K. was removed from Mother’s custody after Mother tested positive for 

multiple illegal drugs while she was pregnant with K.G.K. K.G.K. was adjudicated 

dependent and neglected by the juvenile court on November 5, 2019. The record is clear 

that Mother’s drug issues continued to persist up until the final hearing.

Although Mother completed intensive outpatient treatment for her illegal drug use, 

she did not complete the aftercare component of the program. Additionally, Mother asserts 

that multiple negative drug screens indicate that she made attempts to adjust the 

circumstances of her life. Mother is correct in that she passed multiple drug screens in 

August 2019. However, as a whole, the record indicates that Mother’s drug use persisted 

after the children entered DCS custody. Since the children entered DCS custody, Mother 

failed several drug tests, often testing positive for methamphetamine, amphetamine, and 

THC. At the final hearing, Mother admitted that she often refused to submit to drug screens 

because she knew that she would have failed. On the day of the final hearing, Mother 

submitted a drug test and tested positive for methamphetamine, amphetamine, THC, and 

benzos. Thereafter, Mother testified that she used several illegal drugs less than a week 

before the hearing.

Aside from Mother’s drug use, other conditions persisted to prevent the safe return 

of the children to Mother’s custody. At the time of the final hearing, Mother was on 

probation and had pending criminal charges for fabricating or tampering with evidence and 

for possession of drug paraphernalia. Additionally, Ms. Cremeans testified that Mother’s 

previous home was unsuitable for the children because Mother continued to associate with 

Father, which violated no contact orders between Mother and Father. Although Mother 

later moved to a new residence, she did not allow Ms. Cremeans to examine the home to 

verify its suitability. Regardless of whether Ms. Cremeans examined the physical aspects 

of the new home, Mother continues to use illegal drugs and engage in criminal activity. As 

a result, Mother’s inability to provide a suitable home is a condition that continues to 

prevent the safe return of the children.

Considering the length of time that the children have been in DCS custody, and the 

sustained efforts by Ms. Cremeans to help improve Mother’s circumstances, we find that 

“[t]here is little likelihood that these conditions will be remedied at an early date so that 

the child[ren] can be safely returned to [Mother] in the near future.” See Tenn. Code Ann. 

§ 36-1-113(g)(3)(A)(ii); see also In re T.S., 2000 WL 964775, at *7. Many of Ms.

Cremeans’s efforts to assist Mother were either unsuccessful or thwarted by Mother.
- 14 -

Pursuant to section 36-1-113(g)(3)(A)(iii), we further find that the continuation of 

the children’s relationship with Mother would “greatly diminish[] [their] chances of early 

integration into a safe, stable, and permanent home.” K.E.K. and K.G.K. are thriving in a 

pre-adoptive home. The young children have bonded with the foster family, and the foster 

mother indicated that the family intends to adopt them if they become available. Although 

L.V.F. has “mixed feelings” about being adopted, placement of the children in a preadoptive foster home is not required to find that the final element of persistence of 

conditions under Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-1-113(g)(3)(A)(iii). See, e.g., In re 

Kayden A., No. W2020-00650-COA-R3-PT, 2021 WL 408860, at *2, *10 (Tenn. Ct. App. 

Feb. 5, 2021); In re Bryson B., No. E2019-00729-COA-R3-PT, 2019 WL 6487241, at *5-

6 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 2, 2019); In re Jeffery B., No. W2012-00924-COA-R3-PT, 2012 

WL 4854719, at *15, *18 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 12, 2012). Despite the tumultuous nature 

of this case, L.V.F. is described as an intelligent, mature, and goal-oriented child who earns 

high grades in school. Although she is hesitant about the prospect of adoption, L.V.F. has 

flourished since entering DCS custody. “The purpose behind the ‘persistence of 

conditions’ ground for terminating parental rights is ‘to prevent the child’s lingering in the 

uncertain status of foster child if a parent cannot within a reasonable time demonstrate an 

ability to provide a safe and caring environment for the child.’” In re Jaylah W., 486 

S.W.3d at 556 (quoting In re Dakota C.R., 404 S.W.3d at 499). Accordingly, the 

continuation of the children’s relationship with Mother greatly diminishes their chances of 

integrating into a “safe, stable, and permanent home.”

For these reasons, we find that DCS has satisfied the elements of Tennessee Code 

Annotated section 36-1-113(g)(3). Thus, we further find that it has established “persistence 

of conditions” as a ground for termination of Mother’s parental rights.

3. Substantial Noncompliance with the Permanency Plans

In Tennessee, DCS is required “to prepare a permanency plan for each child in foster 

care under its supervision.” In re K.F., No. M2008-01742-COA-R3-PT, 2009 WL

1025829, at *6 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 14, 2009). Permanency plans are developed to help 

ensure each foster child receives adequate care. In re Jamel H., No. E2014-02539-COAR3-PT, 2015 WL 4197220, at *7 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 13, 2015). Under Tennessee Code 

Annotated section 36-1-113(g)(2), one potential ground for termination of parental rights 

is present if “[t]here has been substantial noncompliance by the parent . . . with the 

statement of responsibilities in a permanency plan.” To terminate a parent’s parental rights 

under this ground, the parent’s noncompliance with the plan must be substantial and the 

plan’s requirements must be “reasonable and related to remedying the conditions which 

necessitate[d] foster care placement.” In re Valentine, 79 S.W.3d 539, 547 (Tenn. 2002).

Analyzing a parent’s compliance with a permanency plan “involves more than 

merely counting up the tasks in the plan to determine whether a certain number have been 
- 15 -

completed[.]” In re Carrington H., 483 S.W.3d at 537 (citing In re Valentine, 79 S.W.3d 

at 547) (emphasis added). “Trivial, minor, or technical deviations from a permanency 

plan’s requirements will not be deemed to amount to substantial noncompliance.” Dep’t 

of Children’s Servs. v. T.M.B.K., 197 S.W.3d 282, 293 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2006). Instead, 

DCS must show “that the parent’s noncompliance is substantial in light of the degree of 

noncompliance and the importance of the particular requirement that has not been met.” 

In re M.J.B., 140 S.W.3d 643, 656 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2004) (citing In re Valentine, 79 S.W.3d 

at 548-49; In re Z.J.S., No. M2002-02235-COA-R3-JV, 2003 WL 21266854, at *12 (Tenn. 

Ct. App. June 3, 2003)). When analyzing this ground, “[o]ur concern is with the parent’s 

efforts to comply with the plan, not the achievement of the plan’s desired outcomes.” In 

re Daniel B., Jr., No. E2019-01063-COA-R3-PT, 2020 WL 3955703, at *5 (Tenn. Ct. App. 

July 10, 2020) (citing In re B.D., No. M2008-01174-COA-R3-PT, 2009 WL 528922, at *8 

(Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 2, 2009)) (emphasis added). 

In the present case, three versions of a Family Permanency Plan were developed and 

ratified by the juvenile court. The plan was first drafted on April 16, 2019, and ratified on 

April 24, 2019. The initial version of the plan listed L.V.F. and K.E.K. as the subject 

children. On October 8, 2019, the plan was revised to list all three of the children. The 

juvenile court ratified the revised plan on October 30, 2019. The plan was revised a final 

time on January 30, 2020, and ratified on February 19, 2020. The three versions of the 

plan included several requirements for Mother, including following court orders regarding 

the children and Father, completing alcohol and drug assessments and following any 

related recommendations, completing intensive outpatient alcohol and drug treatment and 

following all aftercare recommendations, refraining from using any illegal drugs, obtaining

and showing proof of a legal income and a stable residence, completing a parenting 

education program, visiting the children on a regular basis, and maintaining a home that 

was “free from substantiated perpetrators.” The children entered DCS custody due to 

Mother’s use of illegal drugs and due to concerns regarding her ability to care for and 

protect the children. We find Mother’s responsibilities under the permanency plans 

reasonable and related to remedying those conditions.

During the children’s time in DCS custody, Mother has made minimal efforts to 

complete her permanency plan requirements. Although she completed an intensive 

outpatient program for drug and alcohol treatment, she never participated in the 

recommended aftercare treatment. At the final hearing, Mother claimed that she did not 

complete the treatment because she went into labor with K.G.K. However, the trial court 

explicitly found that Mother’s testimony was not credible, and we afford considerable 

deference to the weight and credit that a trial court places on a witness’s testimony. See 

Kelly v. Kelly, 445 S.W.3d 685, 692 (Tenn. 2014). Similarly, Mother claimed that she sent 

DCS proof of her employment, but Ms. Cremeans testified that no such proof was provided. 

The final version of the permanency plan instructed Mother to regularly visit the children. 

As we previously discussed, Mother visited the children only one time since they entered 

DCS custody, and she admitted to making no efforts to lift the February 2020 no contact 
- 16 -

order regarding the children. Further, Mother did not make efforts to satisfy the 

requirements related to establishing a suitable home. Initially, she continued to allow 

Father to frequent her residence, which violated no contact orders between the parents. 

According to Ms. Cremeans, the parents’ violation of the no contact orders made the home 

unsuitable by DCS standards. When Mother changed residences, she did not contact DCS 

to allow Ms. Cremeans to examine the suitability of the home.

As we have discussed at length, Mother’s illegal drug use has persisted since the 

children entered DCS custody. She tested positive for illegal drugs several times 

throughout this case, including the day of the final hearing. Considering the primary 

concern when the children entered DCS custody was Mother’s drug use, we find the 

directives to abstain from illegal drug use and to complete all treatment recommendations 

particularly important. Therefore, Mother’s noncompliance with the drug-related 

responsibilities under the plans was substantial.

Taken together, we cannot say that Mother’s noncompliance with the permanency 

plans was simply “[t]rivial, minor, or technical deviations” from the requirements. See 

T.M.B.K., 197 S.W.3d at 293. Instead, we find that Mother’s noncompliance was 

substantial. Therefore, we affirm the trial court’s finding that there was clear and 

convincing evidence to terminate Mother’s parental rights under Tennessee Code 

Annotated section 36-1-113(g)(2).

4. Failure to Manifest an Ability or Willingness to Parent

The next ground that we must address is listed in Tennessee Code Annotated section 

36-1-113(g)(14). This section of the Code states that parental rights may be terminated 

when:

[a] parent or guardian has failed to manifest, by act or omission, an ability 

and willingness to personally assume legal and physical custody or financial 

responsibility of the child, and placing the child in the person’s legal and 

physical custody would pose a risk of substantial harm to the physical or 

psychological welfare of the child.

Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(14). As indicated in the text of subsection 113(g)(14), to 

succeed under this ground, a petitioner must prove two elements by clear and convincing 

evidence. First, the petitioner must prove that the “parent or legal guardian failed to 

manifest an ability and willingness to personally assume legal and physical custody or 

financial responsibility of the child.” In re Neveah M., 614 S.W.3d at 674. Second, the 

petitioner must establish that “placing the child in the parent’s legal and physical custody 

would pose a risk of substantial harm to the physical or psychological welfare of the child.” 

Id.
- 17 -

In In re Neveah M., the Tennessee Supreme Court detailed the proper interpretation 

of the first element of this ground. Id. at 674-75. The Court stated that the petitioner 

satisfies the first element of this ground if “a parent or guardian has failed to manifest either

[an] ability or willingness” to parent the child. Id. at 677. Meaning, this element places “a 

conjunctive obligation on a parent or guardian to manifest both an ability and willingness 

to personally assume legal and physical custody or financial responsibility for the child.” 

Id.

Applying the Supreme Court’s directive in In re Neveah M. to the facts of this case, 

we find that Mother failed to manifest an ability and willingness to assume custody or 

financial responsibility of the children. When considering whether the parent has 

demonstrated an ability, “we focus on ‘the parent’s lifestyle and circumstances.’” In re 

Jaxx M., No. E2018-01041-COA-R3-PT, 2019 WL 1753054, at *9 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 

17, 2019) (quoting In re Cynthia P., No. E2018-01937-COA-R3-PT, 2019 WL 1313237, 

at *8 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 22, 2019)). When analyzing the willingness of a parent, “we 

look for more than mere words” and consider whether the parent has attempted “to 

overcome the obstacles that prevent [her] from assuming custody or financial responsibility 

of the child.” Id. “A lack of effort can undercut a claim of willingness.” Id.

Mother has failed to manifest an ability to assume custody of the children due to her 

ongoing drug use and her unresolved legal issues. Similarly, although she claims that she 

was employed at various times throughout this case, at the time of the final hearing, she 

admitted that she was no longer employed and that she was reliant on unemployment 

assistance. Mother’s claim that she is willing to regain custody and financial responsibility 

of the children appears to be mere words. Recent events indicate that she continues to live 

an unstable lifestyle that is filled with illegal drug use and criminal activity. Rather than 

attempt to overcome these obstacles, Mother admitted that she made no effort to lift the no 

contact order that was implemented in February 2020. Therefore, we find that there is clear 

and convincing evidence to support the trial court’s conclusion regarding the first element 

of this ground.

For similar reasons, we further find that there is clear and convincing evidence to 

show that placing the children in the custody of Mother would subject them to a risk of 

substantial harm. Mother’s current lifestyle is not the appropriate setting for raising 

children. She continues to use illegal drugs and has pending criminal charges. These 

unresolved issues present “a real hazard or danger that is not minor, trivial, or 

insignificant.” In re Braelyn S., No. E2020-00043-COA-R3-PT, 2020 WL 4200088, at 

*17 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 22, 2020) (quoting In re Maya R., No. E2017-01634-COA-R3-

PT, 2018 WL 1629930, at *7 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 4, 2018)). In contrast, the children are 

thriving in their current foster placements. Although L.V.F. is placed in a separate foster 

home than K.E.K. and K.G.K., she is receiving high grades in school, is receiving regular

counseling, and has exhibited mature and goal-oriented aspirations. K.E.K. and K.G.K. 

have bonded with their foster family and have adapted well to entering a new home. 
- 18 -

K.G.K. entered the foster home with health concerns, but the foster mother explained that 

those concerns have subsided and that she is healthy. Considering the record as a whole, 

we agree with the trial court that returning the children to Mother’s custody would likely 

cause the children substantial physical or psychological harm.

In sum, we find that DCS satisfied both prongs of Tennessee Code Annotated 

section 36-1-113(g)(14) as a ground for termination of Mother’s parental rights. Therefore, 

we affirm the trial court’s conclusion regarding the ground of failure to manifest an ability 

or willingness to parent the children.

5. Severe Child Abuse

Pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-1-113(g)(4), a court may 

terminate a parent’s parental rights when “[t]he parent . . . has been found to have 

committed severe child abuse, as defined in § 37-1-102, under any prior order of a court or

is found by the court hearing the petition to terminate parental rights or the petition for 

adoption to have committed severe child abuse against any child.” Under section 37-1-

102, there are five alternative definitions of “severe child abuse.” See Tenn. Code Ann. § 

37-1-102(b)(27)(A)-(E). In its brief on appeal, DCS concedes that “[t]he trial court did not 

specify which of those definitions it was relying on[.]”

This Court reviewed a similar order in In re S.S.-G., No. M2015-00055-COA-R3-

PT, 2015 WL 7259499 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 16, 2015). We noted that the ground of severe 

child abuse contained in Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-1-113(g)(4) “refers to 

definitions contained in another statute, i.e., Tennessee Code Annotated Section 37-1-102.” 

Id. at *12. We explained that “Tennessee Code Annotated Section 37-1-102(b)(21)12

contains several definitions of what constitutes ‘severe child abuse’ for purposes of 

termination of parental rights under Tennessee Code Annotated Section 36-1-113(g)(4).” 

Id. In In re S.S.-G., the trial court had “failed to specify the particular definition of ‘severe 

child abuse’ upon which it relie[d].” Id. It did generally cite Tennessee Code Annotated 

Section 37-1-602, but again, that statute also contained many definitions of what 

constitutes “child sexual abuse.” Id. Even taking these references together, “the trial court 

did not specifically list the exact definition(s) it relied upon in reaching its conclusion that 

termination of Appellant’s parental rights was warranted on grounds of severe child abuse.” 

Id. After considering this Court’s holdings regarding other grounds for termination and 

the necessity of specific findings, we concluded that “[w]here the statute provides several 

possible definitions for a ground, the trial court must specify the exact definition that it 

relies upon in reaching its ultimate conclusion. In the absence of such specificity, this 

Court cannot conduct a meaningful appellate review.” Id. Ultimately, we concluded that 

because the code sections the trial court relied on contained “numerous definitions” of 

severe child abuse and child sexual abuse, “in the absence of specific citation to the exact 

 

12 The definition of “severe child abuse” has since been redesignated as subsection (b)(27).
- 19 -

definition(s) relied upon, we cannot make a meaningful review of the trial court’s 

decision.” Id. at *1. The same is true here. The trial court only generally mentioned that 

Father “sexually abused” the child and that Mother “failed to protect” her, and it referenced 

only 36-1-113(g)(4) and 37-1-102(b)(27). Thus, it is not clear from the order whether the 

trial court relied on one of the many offenses listed in definition (C) or some other 

definition.

In In re S.S.-G., the ground of severe child abuse was the only remaining ground for 

possibly terminating parental rights, so we vacated and remanded for specific findings by 

the trial court. Id. Because the case before us involves four other grounds that we have 

already found were proven by clear and convincing evidence, we do not deem it necessary 

to remand for further consideration of this ground. See, e.g., In re Adaleigh M., No. E2019-

01955-COA-R3-PT, 2021 WL 1219818, at *9 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 31, 2021) (“Because 

four other statutory grounds support termination of Father’s and Mother’s parental rights, 

we decline to remand this case for further factual findings on one element of the failure to 

manifest ground.”); In re Rosylyn W., No. E2019-01838-COA-R3-PT, 2020 WL 6053523, 

at *13 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 13, 2020) (finding “a remand to the Trial Court for further 

consideration of this ground to be unnecessary due to our ultimate conclusion affirming 

the termination of Father’s parental rights on another ground”). Permanent placement of a 

child “‘should not be unnecessarily delayed due to a remand for findings on alternate 

grounds.’” In re Adaleigh M., 2021 WL 1219818, at *9 (quoting In re D.L.B., 118 S.W.3d 

360, 367 (Tenn. 2003)).13

Based on the foregoing discussion, we reverse the trial court’s finding that “severe 

child abuse” under Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-1-113(g)(4) served as a ground 

for termination of Mother’s parental rights.

B. Best Interest of the Children

Having found that DCS has established at least one ground for termination of 

Mother’s parental rights, we must now determine whether termination of Mother’s rights 

is in the best interest of the children. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(c); In re Gabriella 

D., 531 S.W.3d at 681. At the time DCS filed its petition in May 2020, Tennessee Code 

Annotated section 36-1-113(i) listed the following best interest factors:

(1) Whether the parent or guardian has made such an adjustment of 

circumstance, conduct, or conditions as to make it safe and in the child’s 

best interest to be in the home of the parent or guardian;

 

13 As we previously discussed, Father’s parental rights are not at issue in this appeal. We note, 

however, that the trial court’s finding that Father sexually abused L.V.F., his stepdaughter, is not lessened 

in anyway.
- 20 -

(2) Whether the parent or guardian has failed to effect a lasting adjustment 

after reasonable efforts by available social services agencies for such 

duration of time that lasting adjustment does not reasonably appear 

possible;

(3) Whether the parent or guardian has maintained regular visitation or other 

contact with the child;

(4) Whether a meaningful relationship has otherwise been established 

between the parent or guardian and the child;

(5) The effect a change of caretakers and physical environment is likely to 

have on the child’s emotional, psychological and medical condition;

(6) Whether the parent or guardian, or other person residing with the parent 

or guardian, has shown brutality, physical, sexual, emotional or 

psychological abuse, or neglect toward the child, or another child or adult 

in the family or household;

(7) Whether the physical environment of the parent’s or guardian’s home is 

healthy and safe, whether there is criminal activity in the home, or 

whether there is such use of alcohol, controlled substances or controlled 

substance analogues as may render the parent or guardian consistently 

unable to care for the child in a safe and stable manner;

(8) Whether the parent’s or guardian’s mental and/or emotional status would 

be detrimental to the child or prevent the parent or guardian from 

effectively providing safe and stable care and supervision for the child; 

or

(9) Whether the parent or guardian has paid child support consistent with the 

child support guidelines promulgated by the department pursuant to § 36-

5-101.

“The relevancy and weight to be given each factor depends on the unique facts of 

each case.” In re Audrey S., 182 S.W.3d at 878. Although courts are instructed to consider 

each factor, a court is not required “to find the existence of each factor before it concludes 

that terminating a parent’s rights is in the child’s best interest.” In re Matthew T., No. 

M2015-00486-COA-R3-PT, 2016 WL 1621076, at *16 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 20, 2016)

(citing In re Dominique L.H., 393 S.W.3d 710, 719 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2012)). Application 

of the best interest factors must be viewed from the perspective of the child, not the parent. 

In re Gabriella D., 531 S.W.3d at 681. If the best interest of the child and the interest of 

the parent conflict, such conflict must always be resolved in favor of the child. Id. at 681-
- 21 -

82.

As we have previously discussed, Mother has several unresolved issues, including 

continued use of illegal drugs, pending criminal charges, a lack of employment, and an 

inability or unwillingness to respond to DCS. Mother has failed to adjust these

circumstances—and in certain instances they have worsened—despite the assistance 

provided by DCS. Ms. Cremeans testified that since the children first entered DCS 

custody, she met with Mother multiple times to discuss the requirements of the permanency 

plans and that she referred Mother to programs to help complete certain requirements. She 

also attempted to coordinate with Mother to administer drug screens and to verify the state 

of Mother’s employment and suitability of her new home. Many of these efforts were 

thwarted by Mother. As a result, we find that factors (1) and (2) weigh in favor of 

termination.

Since L.V.F. and K.E.K. first entered DCS custody, Mother visited the children only 

one time. Although at times Mother was prohibited from visiting, Mother made no effort 

to lift the February 2020 no contact order. Further, the children do not share a meaningful 

relationship with Mother. L.V.F. stated that she is in favor of Mother’s rights being 

terminated; the foster mother testified that K.E.K. does not remember anyone except his 

siblings and the foster parents, whom he perceives as his parents; and K.G.K. entered DCS 

custody when she was only a few days old, making Mother “essentially [a] stranger[]” to 

K.G.K. See In re Braelyn S., 2020 WL 4200088, at *21. For similar reasons, removing 

the children from their current caretakers and physical environments is likely to cause them

harm. The children are thriving and healthy in their current foster placements. Factors (3), 

(4), and (5) also weigh in favor of termination.

Under factor (6), the older children were removed from the home after allegations 

of abuse of L.V.F. by Father, truancy charges regarding L.V.F, and Mother’s drug use. Ms.

Cremeans testified that Mother continued to associate with Father after the children entered 

DCS custody. Mother also testified that Father continues to harass her. Although Ms.

Cremeans testified that, at one point, Father continued to reside with Mother, it appears 

that he no longer resides in Mother’s home. However, all of the children were adjudicated 

dependent and neglected while in Mother’s care. Therefore, factor (6) weighs in favor of 

termination.

When Mother changed residences, Ms. Cremeans stated that she was unable to 

verify the suitability of Mother’s new home. Regardless of the physical aspects of 

Mother’s new home, it is clear that Mother continues to consume illegal substances,

rendering her consistently unable to care for the children in a safe and stable manner. 

Factor (7) weighs in favor of termination.

There was no proof presented on Mother’s mental or emotional status (other than 

her continued drug use). Therefore, we find factor (8) to be inapplicable.
- 22 -

The record indicates that Mother made a large child support payment in May 2020. 

Thereafter, Mother continued to consistently provide child support of varying amounts. 

Thus, we find that factor (9) weighs against termination.

After considering all of the applicable factors from the perspective of the children, 

we find that it is in the best interest of the children to terminate Mother’s parental rights. 

V. CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing discussion, we affirm the trial court’s findings that DCS has 

proven four grounds for termination of Mother’s parental rights by clear and convincing 

evidence. However, we reverse the finding of “severe child abuse” as a ground for 

termination. We also affirm the finding that it is in the best interest of the children to 

terminate Mother’s parental rights. As a result, we affirm the trial court’s order to terminate 

Mother’s parental rights to the children.

This case is remanded to the trial court for such further proceedings as may be 

necessary and are consistent with this Opinion. Costs of this appeal are assessed against 

Appellant, Jamye K., for which execution may issue if necessary.

_________________________________

CARMA DENNIS MCGEE, JUDGE