SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-3451-16T4

I.L.R.

Plaintiff,

v.

R.T.R.,

Defendant-Appellant.

_____________________________

IN THE MATTER OF ALEXANDER H.

CARVER, III, 

Respondent.

_____________________________

Argued May 24, 2018 – Decided June 28, 2018

Before Judges Reisner and Mitterhoff.

On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey, 

Chancery Division, Family Part, Bergen 

County, Docket No. FM-02-1634-13.

R.T.R., appellant, argued the cause pro se.

Alexander H. Carver, III, argued the cause for 

respondent (Harwood Lloyd, LLC, attorneys; 

Alexander H. Carver, III, of counsel and on 

the brief; Eileen P. Kuzma, on the brief).

PER CURIAM

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." 

Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the 

parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
2 A-3451-16T4

Appellant R.T.R. appeals from the March 17, 2017 Family Part 

order granting respondent Alexander H. Carver, III, counsel fees

for his service as defendant's guardian ad litem. We affirm.

On February 1, 2013, plaintiff I.L.R. filed a divorce 

complaint against appellant. Appellant's then counsel filed an

answer. Shortly thereafter, however, appellant terminated his 

relationship with his counsel, and proceeded pro se; notably, 

appellant is an attorney, but he has never practiced family law. 

On July 22, 2014, the Family Part judge presiding over the 

divorce action sua sponte appointed Carver as guardian ad litem 

(GAL) for appellant because he "suffered a brain injury [o]n or 

about July 27, 2011, which has prevented him from participating 

in his divorce action in a timely manner." The order also stated 

that Carver, would "be compensated for his services at an hourly 

rate of $400.00." The judge selected Carver based on his extensive 

experience in family law. The order also authorized respondent 

to:

negotiate on [d]efendant's behalf, settlement 

of the issues ancillary to the parties' 

divorce including but not limited to custody, 

parenting time, spousal support, child 

support, equitable distribution, counsel fees 

and any other ancillary issues relating to the 

parties' anticipated divorce . . . . [as well 

as] enter into a final agreement . . . .
3 A-3451-16T4

In August 2014, respondent assisted appellant in retaining 

counsel, Mark P. McAuliffe, Esq., to represent him in his divorce 

action. Respondent was relieved as GAL in August 2015. On January 

27, 2016, however, after the trial judge granted McAuliffe's motion 

to be relieved as counsel, the judge re-appointed respondent as 

GAL for appellant. 

On or about October 18, 2016, plaintiff and appellant reached 

a settlement, and on November 16, 2016, the judge entered a dual 

final judgment of divorce. The judge entered an amended final 

judgment of divorce on February 3, 2017. 

On February 16, 2017, respondent submitted a certification 

in support of his counsel fee application. Respondent submitted 

an itemized list of hourly services expended on R.T.R.'s behalf 

in support of his application. R.T.R., acting pro se, opposed the 

counsel fee application in multiple submissions to the court. 

On March 17, 2017, the Family Part heard oral argument, and 

on the same date granted respondent's motion and awarded him a 

total of $50,049.90 in attorney's fees and costs.

1 The judge 

observed that the matter was highly contentious, complex, and 

spanned several years. She noted she was intimately familiar with 

 

1 After reviewing the parties' submissions, the judge reduced 

respondent's counsel fees request by $1,200. Of the total sum, 

R.T.R. had already paid $23,747.86, leaving a balance of $26,302.04 
4 A-3451-16T4

the case having "sat with [it] from beginning to end." The judge 

also found respondent's submissions persuasive, stating, "I've 

received [respondent's] certification of services, which carefully 

describe[s] the services performed on a day-to-day basis. I've 

read [R.T.R.'s] response where [he] dispute[s] some of the services 

raised. I'm making a finding that the certification satisfies the 

appropriate rules." The judge further ordered these fees be paid 

out of R.T.R.'s equitable distribution. This appeal ensued. 

On appeal, appellant makes the following arguments : (1) the 

judge erred in awarding respondent counsel fees because under Rule

5:3-5(c), fee-shifting only applies to the parties to the action, 

and therefore either: (a) plaintiff was responsible for 

respondent's counsel fees, or (b) the Family Part erroneously 

exercised jurisdiction over the matter; (2) the judge erred in not 

holding a plenary hearing; (3) respondent failed to act as a GAL, 

but instead acted as a legal advisor; and (4) the judge erred in 

awarding respondent counsel fees because his fees were "neither 

reasonable nor necessary." 

I. Whether the Family Part properly exercised jurisdiction 

over respondent's counsel fee application.

Appellant first argues that Rules 4:42-9 and 5:3-5 only permit 

a counsel fee award to be paid to a party in the action, and 

therefore, the judge erred in awarding respondent, a non-party, 
5 A-3451-16T4

counsel fees. Thus, appellant argues the court should have 

required plaintiff to pay respondent's counsel fees. 

Alternatively, appellant argues that the court should have 

required respondent to file a separate action seeking his counsel 

fees in the Law Division. 

As a general rule, an attorney may not obtain a counsel fee 

award against his or her own client in a family action. Cohen v. 

Cohen, 146 N.J. Super. 330, 337 (App. Div. 1977)(quoting R. 4:42-

9(a)(1)) ("Appellant [improperly] suggests [Rule 4:42-9(a)(1)] 

authorizes the court to fix the fee to be paid by any party to his 

[or her] own attorney. Not so. The rule is concerned with 

allowances to other parties — not one's own counsel."). 

Rule 4:42-9(7), however, does allow for an award of fees 

"[a]s expressly provided by these rules with respect to any 

action." Rule 4:26-2(b)(4) provides the "[t]he court may appoint 

a guardian ad litem for a minor or alleged mentally incapacitated 

person on its own motion." Pursuant to the rule, the trial court 

clearly had the authority to appoint a GAL for appellant based on 

his representation to the court that his brain injury prevented 

him from focusing or effectively prosecuting his divorce action. 

Rule 4:26-2(c) expressly permits an appointed GAL to apply for an 

allowance of fees on notice to all parties. Rule 4:86-4(e)

provides that "[t]he compensation of the . . . guardian ad litem, 
6 A-3451-16T4

if any, may be fixed by the court to be paid out of the estate of 

the alleged incapacitated person or in such other manner as the 

court shall direct." Generally, a GAL's fees are paid by the 

alleged incapacitated party. See Julius v. Julius, 320 N.J. Super. 

297 (App. Div. 1999).

Because the trial court's fee award was expressly authorized 

by Rule 4:26-2(b)(4), Rule 4:26-2(c), and Rule 4:86-4(e), the 

trial court did not err in awarding the GAL counsel fees.

II. Whether the judge abused her discretion by not holding a 

plenary hearing and in concluding the fees sought were 

reasonable.

Appellant next contends the judge violated his due process 

rights by denying his request for a plenary hearing and the 

opportunity to cross-examine respondent. Specifically, appellant

asserts respondent's counsel fee application was "unreasonable and 

unnecessary . . . [and] manifestly foundationless, meritless, 

unethical, illegal and/or fraudulent." 

"Our Supreme Court has 'strongly discourage[d] the use of an 

attorney-fee application as an invitation to become mired in a 

second round of litigation." Triffin v. Automatic Data Processing, 

411 N.J. Super. 292, 308 (App. Div. 2010) (quoting Furst v. 

Einstein Moomjy, Inc., 182 N.J. 1, 24 (2004)). Therefore, "[a] 

plenary hearing should be conducted only when the certifications 

of counsel raise material factual disputes that can be resolved 
7 A-3451-16T4

solely by the taking of testimony." Furst, 182 N.J. 1 , 24. "Such 

hearings 'will be a rare, not a routine, occurrence.'" Ibid.; see 

also Jacobitti v. Jacobitti, 263 N.J. Super. 608, 619 (App. Div. 

1993) (finding no need for an "extensive and time-wasting hearing" 

on counsel fees in a matrimonial action). "As such, the trial 

courts have 'wide latitude in resolving attorney-fee 

applications,' and appellate courts will not disturb the decision 

to deny a plenary hearing unless there is a 'clear abuse of 

discretion.'" Id. at 619 (quoting Furst, 182 N.J. at 25). Rule

4:42-9(b) "implicitly suggests that an affidavit is sufficient to 

determine the amount of attorney's fees." Triffin, 411 N.J. Super.

at 309. 

In this case, respondent submitted a certification in support 

of his counsel fee application that conformed with the requirements 

of Rule 4:42-9(b) and R.P.C. 1.5(a). The judge found respondent's 

submission persuasive. She found that appellant protracted the 

litigation by insisting on taking unreasonable positions with 

regard to settlement. The judge noted that appellant had expressed 

satisfaction with respondent's services. In addition, the judge 

considered all of appellant's opposing papers, which raised 

virtually the same objections that are presented on this appeal.

The judge rejected appellant's assertion that the fee 

certification contained inaccurate or fraudulent 
8 A-3451-16T4

misrepresentations. Having presided over the case from its 

inception, the trial judge was in the best position to evaluate 

the reasonableness of the attorney's fees sought by respondent. 

This was not the rare case where testimony was necessary to resolve 

material issues of fact. We therefore find no abuse of discretion 

in the court's awarding respondent counsel fees without a plenary 

hearing. For the same reasons, the judge did not abuse her 

discretion in finding that the fees sought were reasonable in 

light of the length and complexity of the case.2

The remaining issues raised by appellant concerning the role 

of the GAL and the alleged bias of the trial judge do not have 

sufficient merit to warrant discussion in a written opinion. Rule

2:11-3(e)(1) (E).

Affirmed.

 

2 In his brief, appellant takes issue with the judge's order

appointing him a GAL because "there was absolutely no evidence 

that [d]efendant was 'mentally incapacitated' . . . ." 

Appellant's notice of appeal and case information statement, 

however, cite only the March 17, 2017 order awarding attorney's 

fees and did not mention or attach the judge's July 22, 2014 order 

appointing respondent as GAL. Because the record lacks 

documentation of transcripts or findings regarding defendant's 

alleged incapacitation, that issue is not properly before us and 

we will not address the court's decision appointing a GAL for 

appellant. See Rule 2:5-1(f)(2)(c); Rule 2:5-3.