IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 21

- 0036 Filed January 12, 2022

VINCENT MICHAEL KOBLISKA , Plaintiff

- Appell ant ,
vs. IOWA CIVIL RIGHTS COMMISSION , Defendant

- Appell ee

.

________________________________________________________________ Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Black Hawk County, Joel A. Dalrymple , Judge.

A landlord appeals from a district court ruling that affirmed an agency finding of discrimination agai nst a tenant. AFFIRMED.

Gary Papenheim of Papenheim Law Office , Parkersburg , for appellant. Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Katie Fiala, Assistant Attorney General , Des Moines , for appellee.

Heard by Mullins, P.J. , and Schumacher and Ahlers, JJ.2

SCHUMACHER , Judge

. Vincent Kobli ska appeals the district court ruling affirming the Iowa Civil Rights Commission ’s (ICRC) finding he discriminated against his tenant by refusing to accommodate her need for an assistance animal. He alleges there is not substantial evidence to support the ICRC’s decision. 1 We find there is substantial evidence in the record to support the agency’s de cision. Accordingly, we affirm

. I. Background Facts & Proceedings Kobliska owns several apartment properties in Waterloo. He has been a property owner for about thirty year s and specializes in high

- efficiency sleeping

rooms. Due in part to his focus on hi gh

- density housing, he has a no

- pet s policy.
A n exception exists for service animals, such as seeing

- eye and hearing dogs. Jennifer Spencer suffers from post

- traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), a non

epileptic seizure disorder, anxiety, and depression. She was given Journey , a fifteen pound Pomerania n, for Christmas in 2016 by Teresa Perkins. Initially , the dog was not meant to be a service animal, but Spencer came to find the dog helpful in managing her emotions and keeping her on a medicatio n schedule. J ourney wakes Spencer when her alarm goes off

. The dog also help s her recover from
seizures. Journey assist s Spencer with panic attacks. S pencer obtained several letters from various medical professionals recommending she have a service
animal. 2

1 Kobliska does not specifically challenge the amount of damages assessed. 2 Five exhibits were admitted that purported to be medical documentation recommending a service animal or designating Journey as a service animal. The3 In the spring of 2017, Spencer planned to move to Waterloo to be closer to
her children. She initially planned to buy a trailer, but struggled to find one. As a result, she looked at two apartments owned by Kobliska with the intent to rent an apartment for a short time until she could purchase a trailer

. She signed a lease
with Kobliska on May 5, 2017

. There is significant disagreement surrounding the circumstances of the lease signing. Spencer alleges that she informed Kobliska she had a service
animal

. After telling him, Spencer alleges Kobliska was adamant that there was a

no - pet s policy despite Spencer informing him that Journey was a medical necessity. He also told her that it was disappointing she had not informed him
earlier because it wasted both of their time to show her the apartments. Due to her urgent need to find housing

— she was living in hotels and her car at the time

— she agreed to have Journey stay with Perkins. She testified that she only agreed to the arrangemen t because she believed she could not rent the apartment with Journey. She paid her security dep osit and rent that day, after which Kobliska gave her a receipt with the words “no pets” written on it and underlined.
K obliska’s version of events differs

. According to him, he never said anything to Spencer when she informed him about Journey. Ko b liska’s version reflects that after a brief period of silence, Spencer and Perkins worked out a plan where Perkins would take the dog and Spencer would see how she could manage

first is an unsigned and undated letter by Jeanne Anderson, who passed away before the events at issue on appeal

. There are three letters dated after the events at issue, from May 16, August 25, and September 1, 2017. The only letter that predates the lease signing that is definitively dated is from April 7, 2017, written by Ellen Folkers

- Jenkins, CADC.4

without it. Therefore, according to Kobliska, he never refused to allow Spencer to have Journey with her in the apartment

. Journey spent three days living with Perkins. Spencer testified that she was
an emotio nal wreck for those three days and quickly fell off her medication
schedule. S he suffered a seizur e on her third day without Journey. P erkins brought the dog back to Spencer that day. Spencer attested that her symptoms improved once Journey returned

. She moved to a different property Kobliska owned a few days later. The terms of her new lease we re identical to the terms of
her old lease

. After moving to the second apartment , Spencer recorded a conversation
between Kobliska and herself

. During the co nversation, Spencer again raised the issue of Journey living with her. Several details stand out. First, Kobliska indicates
that while the lease allows service animals, it is limited to pets that assist in sight and hearing and is always subject to his approval, which he never gave. Kobliska
also points out many residents had asked about bringing the ir own pets because Journey was living with Spencer. Ultimately, Kobliska is adamant that he was not telling Spencer she could not have Journey, and that she should “do what the hell [she] please.” Kobliska never evicted Spencer. She moved out in June , and Kobliska returned her full security deposit

. The ICRC brought an action against Kobliska based on his refusal to accommodate Spencer’s need for a service animal for the three days she was without Journey. A trial was held in August 2019. The admini strative law judge (ALJ) issued a proposed decision finding Kobliska had failed to reasonably5

accommodate Spencer ’s request and awarded Spencer $5000 compensation for
emotional distress and ordered Kobliska to participate in two hours of anti

discrimination training at his own expense

. Kobliska was also ordered to implement written standards for receiving and handling requests made by people with disabilities for reasonable accommodation. The ICRC adopted the ALJ’s
decision

. On appeal , the district court affirmed the ICRC’s decision. Kobliska appeals.
II. Standard of Review Judicial review of an agency decision is controlled by the provisions of Iowa Code section 17A.19(10) (2019). Renda v. Iowa Civ

. Rts

. Comm ’n , 784 N.W.2d 8, 10 (Iowa 2010). “We will apply the standards of section 17A.19(10) to determine if we reach the same results as the district court.” Id. The court may grant relief if the agency decision “prejudiced the substantial rights of the pe titioner and if the agency action meets one of the enumerated criteria contained in section 17A.19(10)(a) through (n).” Id. The burden of showing the agency erred is on the party asserting the error. Simon Seeding & Sod, Inc. v. Dubuque Hum

. Rts

. Comm’n , 895 N.W.2d 446, 455 (Iowa 2017).

“ [ O ] ur standard of review depends on the aspect of the agency’s decision that forms the basis of the petition for judicial review.” Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Burton v. Hilltop Care Ctr. , 813 N.W.2d 250, 256 (Iowa 2012)). Kobliska alleges the ICRC decision was not supported by substantial evidence in the record. See Iowa Code § 17A.19( 10)(f). Substantial evidence “means the quantity and quality of evidence that would be deemed sufficient by a neutral, detached, and6

reasonable person, to establish the fact at issue.” Iowa Code § 17A.19(10)(f)(1). We review “all the relevant evidence in the rec ord cited by any party that detracts from the finding as well as all of the relevant evidence in the record cited by any party that supports it.” Id. § (10)(f)(3). We also may consider “any determinations of veracity by the presiding officer who personal ly observed the demeanor of the witnesses.” Id. In determining if there is substantial evidence to support the agency finding,
T he question this court must ask is not whether the evidence might support a different finding, but whether there is substantial evidence to support the finding actually made by the board. Where the evidence is in conflict or where reasonable minds might disagree about the conclusions to be drawn from the evidence , the court is bound to accept the board ’ s findings. While w e take all record evidence into account in our review , we must grant appropriate deference to the board ’ s expertise. The court must broadly and liberally apply the board ’ s findings in order to uphold rather than defeat the decision. The board ’ s fa ctual findings are binding on appeal unless a contrary result is demanded as a matter of law. Aluminum Co. of America v. Emp. Appeal Bd. , 449 N.W.2d 391, 394 (Iowa 1989) (citations omitted).
III. Discussion The ICRC found that Kobliska discriminated against Spencer in violation of Iowa Code section 216.8A(3)(c)(2), which prohibits the “refusal to make reasonable accommodations in rules, policies, practices, or services, when the accommodations are necessary to afford the person equal op portunity to use and enjoy a dwelling.” The plaintiff bears the burden of proving each of the elements required for a reasonable accommodation cause of action: ( 1) the complainant is
disabled within the meaning of the act; (2) the defendant knew or should7

reasonably have been expected to know of the disability; (3) the accommodation is necessary to afford the complainant the equal opportunity to use and enjoy the dwelling; (4) the requested accommodation is reasonable; and (5) the defendant refused the req uested accommodation. State, ex rel. Henderson v. Des Moines
Mun. Hous. Agency

, No. 09

- 1905, 2010 WL 4484005, at *5

- 6 (Iowa Ct. App. Nov. 10, 2010). Kobliska challenges the ICRC’s findings on each prong.
A. Disability First, Kobliska argues that Spencer faile d to establish her disability. A disability is (1) “a physical or mental impairment which substantially limits one or more major life activities” or (2) someone who “has a record of such an impairment,

o r (3) is regarded as having such an impairment. ” Id. at *6. A physical or mental impairment includes “ [ a ] ny mental or psychological disorder, such as . . . emotional or mental illness.” Id. at * 7 (alteration in original)

. A major life activity includes, but is not limited to, “ functions such as car ing for one’s self, performing manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, learning, and working.” Iowa Admin. Code r. 161

- 8.26(3). The ICRC and both parties focused on the major life
activities prong. W e follow the same focus.
Kobliska cites Henderson for the proposition that the complainant must produce documentation to establish they are disabled. 3 He alleg es that Spencer

3 Henderson does state that it was “not one in which the information provided by the resident is so lacking in detail as to be insufficient as a matter of law.” 2010 WL 4484005, at *7

. However, it is not clear that it imposes an absolute duty to bring cert ain document ation to establish a disability, particularly when the complainant is not relying on the “record of such impairment” method of demonstrating a disability

. Id. at * 6. In any event, Spencer did have documentation.8

failed to do so and therefore was not disabled within the meaning of the law. However, the record does n ot support Kobliska’s argument. Spencer testified that she suffers from PTSD, which was diagnosed eight or nine years prior to the trial. She was diagnosed with a seizure disorder in 2012. She also suffers from anxiety and depression. She took multiple forms of medication to treat each of those
illnesses

. She had at least one letter at the time of the events at issue indicating she suffered from PTSD, which we have recognized as a disability. See
Henderson , 2010 WL 4484005, at *7. A reasonable fact f inder could also find the unsigned letter written by Anderson supported Spencer’s contentions. There is substantial evidence that Spencer suffered from physical or mental impairments. 4 There is also substantial evidence that Spencer’s PTSD, seizures, an xiety , and depression interfere with major life activities. Spencer testified that her PTSD causes her to feel unsafe and unsecure. She cannot be around groups of people
and avoids her own friends and family due to her illness. Her struggles to feel safe make it difficult for her to sleep. Between her anxiety and seizures, she cannot drive or maintain a job. Her illnesses also make it difficult for her to care for herself

— she testified that when she gets off her medication sch edule she struggles to eat, hydrate, sleep, or perform basic self

- care. T here is substantial evidence to support the ICRC’s finding that Spencer is disabled within the meaning of the law.

4 Spencer had three additional letters dated just after the events at issue on appeal, from May 16, August 25, and September 1, which all indicate she suffers from depression, anxiety, PTSD, and a seizure disorder. Due to the date being after the events in question , these do cuments are not beneficial to Spencer’s claims.9

B. Defendant Knew or Should Have Known of Disability Kobliska argues that Spencer should have the burden of presenting documentation to him establishing her disability to impute knowledge of her disability

. Both parties agree that no documentation was ever shown to Kobliska, although there is a dispute over whether she had the documents in her car when signing the lease. K obliska asserts a bsent Spencer showing him documentation establishing her disability, he did not know and could not be reasonably expected
to know that Spencer was disabled. He argues that he should have been given a
reasonable period to investigate her claims and make a decision regarding the requested accommodation.
A ssuming Kobli ska is correct in claiming Spencer bears the burden of present ing documentation and that he should be given some period to investigate,
the record still supports the conclusion that he knew she was disabled. Both Spencer, Perkins , and Kobliska testified Spencer told Kobliska about her disabilities just before signing the lease. According to Perkins and Spencer

— who the ALJ found more credible than Kobliska

— he responded by adamantly refusing to allow any service animals. In response to Spencer offering to show him her documents in support of her need for a service animal, Kobliska merely responded “sorry.” His f irm stance on the issue is reflected on the receipt that he gave Spencer after she signed the lease, which ha s “no pets” written on it and underlined
twice. The recorded conversation indicates Kobliska believed he need only accommodate dogs that assist with hearing and sight.10

Kobliska can not escape liability by claiming Spencer failed to show him
documentation when he categorically refused to view it. This is not a case in which Kobliska would have granted the accommodation if Spencer had only shown him the right fo rm; he believed that Spencer’s disability was not one that he must accommodate

. Moreover, Kobliska never suggests that Spencer did not inform
him of her disability and never indicates that he did not believe her sincerity when she informed him at the lease signing. Kobliska’s claim that he should be given a reasonable time to investigate Spencer’s claim is similarly defeated by the fact that he categorically refused to consider her cl aim. Kobliska also argues that he could not have known of Spencer’s disability because three of her five documents offered at trial were dated after the lease was signed. However, that argument ignores the two other documents available to him indicating Spencer was disabled. And again, he refused to look at any of the
documents or consider an accommodation. There is substantial evidence Kobliska knew Spencer was disabled. C. Accommodation is Necessary
Kobliska next argues that there is insufficient evidence Journey is necessary for Spencer to use and enjoy the apartment. Necessary accommodations are those that “affirmatively enhance a disabled plaintiff’s quality of life by ameliorating the effects of the disa bility.” Id. at * 9 (citation omitted)

. Our
case law has indicated that support animals may be necessary accommodations. Id.11 Spencer testified that Journey helps her stay on track with her seizure medication by waking her up when her alarm goes off. Journey assists Spencer in her recovery from her from her seizure s quicker than she would without Journey

. Journey also provides emotional support. S pencer testified that it was “a nightmare” without Journey, causing her to “[cry] all the time,” miss med ication,
and have trouble managing her sleep schedule

. After Journey’s return, she got
back into her routine

— eating, sleeping, and hydrating, all of which help prevent
her seizures. She took her medications on time and was less anxious. There is
substan tial evidence Journey is a necessary accommodation.
D. Accommodation is Reasonable Kobliska contends that allowing Spencer to keep Journey in the apartment
was not a reasonable accommodation. He points out that no

- pet policies are common for landlords beca use pets cause damage. He alleged that multiple other tenants wanted to bring in pets once they saw Spencer had one, suggesting that by allowing her the accommodation he would have to grant them for everyone. He
also argues that allowing Spencer’s five c hildren, two dogs, which included Journey and a Great Dane, a cat, and several kittens is unreasonable given the size and density of the apartment property.
There is substantial evide nce supporting the ICRC ’s finding that the requested accommodation was r easonable. We note first that Spencer’s children,
the s econd dog, and cats are not relevant to the analysis of reasonableness for the accommodation because Spencer’s requested accommodation was for Journey alone. Kobliska was under no obligation to allow the other pets that did12

not serve as support animals. Second, Kobliska obtains security deposits from all
tenants , including Spencer. F unds from the security deposit were available for any damages caused by Journey. Third, he was under no obligat ion to grant the requests of the other tenants if they did not qualify for an accommodation under
the law. Finally, Kobliska testified he has allowed two other tenants to keep service animals in the past. His prior acceptance of service animals indicate it would be a
reasonable accommodation to allow them

. E. Defendant Refused to Make the Requested Accommodation Kobliska’s final argument is that he never refused to make the accommodation Spencer requested. In particular, he alleges that when Spencer
told him she needed Journey, he responded with silence. After a period of silence, Spencer and Perkins voluntarily agreed to have Perkins take Journey while Spence r would try to get by without Journey

. This version of events contrasts with Spencer and Perkins ’s testimony , who allege Kobliska was clear that h e would not waiver from his no

- pets policy. We find substantial evidence Kobliska refused to grant Spencer’s requested
accommodation. First, t he ALJ found Spencer and Perkins’s version of events
more cred ible. Spencer testified that she only had Perkins take Journey because

s he felt she needed to do so in order to obtain housing. T he recording of the conversation between Kobliska and Spencer reflects Kobliska ’s refusal to allow the dog when the lease was signed. For instance, after Spencer claimed the lease allowed service animals, Kobliska noted that it was limited to “blind and hearing” dogs and conditioned on whether “it’s okay with [him] and it wasn’t.” The two13

receipts Kobliska gave Sp encer after paying rent both have “no pets” written on
them and underlined twice. Kobliska’s insistence that he assumed Spencer would take Journey back eventually does not c hange the fact that he refused to make the accommodation. In fact, his testimony reveals that he assumed Spencer would take Journey back not because of their agreement, but because “anybody else that bring in pets they just go ahead and they do it.” There is substantial evidence in the record to support the ICRC’s finding that Koblisk a refused to grant the reasonable accommodation.
IV. Conclusion Substantial evidence supports the ICRC’s decision finding Kobliska refused to grant Spencer’s request for a reasonab le and necessary accommodation. As such, we affirm the agency decision that found Kobliska violated Iowa Code section 216.8A(3)(c)(2).
AFFIRMED.