About the Report

In international peace and stability operations, reform of 

the interior ministry and the police forces under its control 

is critical to success. This is also an essential element in 

reforming the wider security sector, which includes the defense 

ministry and military forces. Yet surprisingly little has been 

written on the subject, and efforts to reform the interior 

ministries in Iraq and Afghanistan were done only on an adhoc basis. This report explains the role of the interior ministry, 

the needed steps in ministerial reform, and the role of foreign 

advisers in this process. It then describes the consequences 

of the U.S. failure to reform the interior ministry in Iraq and 

recommends changes in infrastructure and staffing that would 

enable the United States to conduct better ministerial reform 

in future operations. 

The report is based on interviews conducted through the 

United States Institute of Peace’s International Network 

to Promote the Rule of Law, with U.S. and foreign interior 

ministry advisers in Afghanistan and Iraq, and on the views 

expressed in two workshops organized by the Institute’s 

Working Group on Security Sector Reform: “Fixing the Interior 

Ministry and Police in Iraq,” on April 7, 2008; and “The Role of 

the Ministry Adviser in Security Sector Reform,” on March 13, 

2009. The report is also based on interviews with military and 

police officers who served in Iraq, Afghanistan, and previous 

peace and stability operations.

The author, Robert M. Perito, is a senior program officer in the 

United States Institute of Peace’s Center for Post-Conflict Peace 

and Stability Operations. He also directs the Institute’s Working 

Group on Security Sector Reform and the Project on Lessons 

Learned in Peace and Stability Operations. 

1200 17th Street NW • Washington, DC 20036 • 202.457.1700 • fax 202.429.6063

Special Report 223 MAY 2009

Special Report

© 2009 by the United States Institute of Peace. 

All rights reserved.

Contents

Introduction 2

Ministerial Reform 3

How Reform Misfired in Iraq 3

Essential Steps in Ministry Reform 7

Role of Advisers in Ministry Reform 11

Lack of Capacity Impedes Reform Programs 13

New Institutions 14

Conclusions 15

Robert M. Perito

The Interior Ministry’s Role in Security Sector 

Reform

Summary

•	 Efforts to create an effective interior ministry and a community-oriented police service 

cannot succeed unless they take place within an overall effort for security sector reform 

(SSR): the highly political and complex task of transforming the institutions and organizations responsible for dealing with security threats to the state and its citizens.

•	 The most critical—and most often neglected—focus of SSR is the bureaucratic agency 

responsible for the police and other internal security forces. In Iraq, Afghanistan, and 

earlier peace and stability operations, the United States went directly to the task of 

training indigenous police, giving little thought to the interior ministry—the institution to which the police would report.

•	 The U.S. effort to reform Iraq’s interior ministry provides an object lesson in the 

ruinous consequences of failure to transform the organization that controls internal 

security forces, particularly when confronting an insurgency and sectarian violence. 

•	 U.S. failure to reform Iraq’s interior ministry resulted from a failure to understand the 

ministry’s role and the steps involved in successful ministerial reform. These steps are 

assessment, strategic planning, technical assistance and training for ministry functions, evaluation, and incorporating lessons learned.

•	 U.S. efforts to reform Iraq’s interior ministry also suffered from lack of “counterpart 

entities” in the U.S. government and from the resulting reliance on military personnel 

and contractors. 

•	 Successful organizational transformation depends on ministerial advisers’ ability to 

convey recommendations for change in a manner acceptable to ministry officials. 

Successful ministerial advising requires careful selection of the adviser, the right 

training, and conscientious supervision.

United States Institute of Peace www.usip.org
2

•	 Creation of the State Department’s Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and 

Stabilization and also of the Civilian Response Corps, which will include security 

sector reform and police advisers, is a positive step, but the U.S. government will 

need more authority, manpower, and training to conduct effective reform of interior 

ministries and police forces in future peace and stability operations.

Introduction

Efforts to create an effective interior ministry and a professional and communityoriented police force cannot succeed unless they are part of an overall effort for security 

sector reform. SSR, a relatively new concept, refers to the highly political and complex 

task of transforming the institutions and organizations responsible for dealing with 

security threats to the state and its citizens. The United Nations defines the “security 

sector” as “the structures, institutions and personnel responsible for the management, 

provision and oversight of security in a country.” The institutions involved include those 

concerned with defense, law enforcement, corrections, intelligence, border management, customs, and civil emergencies, as well as the courts and tribunals adjudicating 

cases of criminal conduct. The UN definition also includes institutions responsible for 

the management and oversight of security, such as the executive and its ministries, 

legislative bodies, and civil society groups. Nonstate actors such as traditional authorities, militias, and private security services are also included. The United Nations sees 

SSR as “a process of assessment, review and implementation as well as monitoring and 

evaluation led by national authorities that has as its goal the enhancement of effective 

and accountable security for the state and its people without discrimination and with 

full respect for human rights” (UN Secretary General 2008).

Not everyone completely accepts the UN definition for SSR, and there are heated 

debates over which institutions and activities fall within the reform process, and which 

should be excluded. There are also questions about SSR’s most effective application. 

SSR can be a tool for conflict prevention and management, but the greatest attention 

has been focused on its applicability to post-conflict reconstruction. After repeated 

failures, it is increasingly acknowledged that foreign interventions that end with the 

training and equipping of indigenous security forces are unlikely to succeed. Instead, 

a comprehensive, whole-of-government approach by the host government and the 

countries participating in the intervention is needed to reform simultaneously all the 

institutions, both military and civilian, that are involved in providing security. The goal 

is a safe and secure society that enjoys good governance and operates under the rule 

of law (McFate 2008).

Along with the United Nations, the Organization for Economic Co-operation and 

Development (OECD), through its Development Assistance Committee, has emerged as 

a leader in the SSR field. The OECD’s policy on SSR was endorsed at an April 2004 ministerial meeting of its thirty member countries, including the United States. Later the 

policy was spelled out in a widely accepted SSR handbook that has become the basis 

for the SSR polices of most Western governments. According to the handbook, the basic 

approach for an effective SSR process consists of (1) local ownership, with a basis in 

democratic norms, human rights principles, and rule of law; (2) a whole-of-government 

approach involving donor and host nation agencies and civil society; (3) a broad assessment of the full range of security and justice needs of the population and the state; (4) 

the basic principles of good governance, including transparency and accountability; and 

(5) improvement of the human capacity required to make reformed institutions function 

in an effective and just manner (OECD 2007).

About the Institute

The United States Institute of Peace is an independent, 

nonpartisan institution established and funded by 

Congress. Its goals are to help prevent and resolve 

violent conflicts, promote post-conflict peacebuilding, 

and increase conflict management tools, capacity, and 

intellectual capital worldwide. The Institute does this by 

empowering others with knowledge, skills, and resources, 

as well as by its direct involvement in conflict zones 

around the globe.

Board of Directors

J. Robinson West (Chair), Chairman, PFC Energy, Washington, 

D.C. • George E. Moose (Vice Chairman), Adjunct Professor 

of Practice, The George Washington University, Washington, 

D.C. • Anne H. Cahn, Former Scholar in Residence, American 

University, Washington, D.C. • Chester A. Crocker, James R. 

Schlesinger Professor of Strategic Studies, School of Foreign 

Service, Georgetown University, Washington, D.C. • Ikram U. 

Khan, President, Quality Care Consultants, LLC., Las Vegas, 

Nev. • Kerry Kennedy, Human Rights Activist • Stephen D. 

Krasner, Graham H. Stuart Professor of International Relations 

at Stanford University • Kathleen Martinez, Executive Director, 

World Institute on Disability • Jeremy A. Rabkin, Professor of 

Law, George Mason University, Arlington, Va. • Judy Van Rest, 

Executive Vice President, International Republican Institute, 

Washington, D.C. • Nancy Zirkin, Executive Vice President, 

Leadership Conference on Civil Rights 

Members Ex Officio

Robert M. Gates, Department of Defense • Hillary Rodham 

Clinton, Secretary of State • Richard H. Solomon, President, 

United States Institute of Peace (nonvoting) • Frances C. 

Wilson, Lieutenant General, U.S. Marine Corps; President, 

National Defense University.

The views expressed in this report do not necessarily 

reflect the views of the United States Institute of Peace, 

which does not advocate specific policy positions.

To request permission to photocopy or reprint materials, 

e-mail: permissions@usip.org
3

Of these principles, the most important is the host country’s involvement and 

concurrence in SSR efforts. The stated objective in all peace and stability operations 

is to transfer responsibility for maintaining security from international forces to local 

military and police forces as quickly as possible. But this cannot be done effectively 

unless competent leadership is in place and violence and illicit gain are no longer the 

determining factors in political outcomes. The timing of the transition to local authority must be conditioned on the willingness and capacity of domestic institutions to 

govern by the rule of law and with the general consent of the population (Hartz, Mercean, and Williamson 2005).

Local ownership can be difficult to secure, because SSR can change existing power 

relationships and threaten vested interests. A wide range of local actors may have conflicting perspectives and priorities. There may also be a lack of local human capacity 

and financial and material resources. The long time horizon for SSR inevitably produces 

problems with donor coordination and donor fatigue. Major donors may be diverted by 

new crises or new priorities or may lose interest before local institutions are fully ready 

to assume responsibility for security (McFate 2008). One of the most important principles for international donors in SSR programs is to “do no harm,” by closely monitoring 

events so that initiatives do not produce unintended negative consequences. Donors 

must ensure that assistance programs reduce rather than aggravate tensions and that 

they do not empower warlords, extreme nationalists, and other undemocratic forces. 

Ministerial Reform 

The most critical—and most often neglected—focus of SSR is the bureaucratic agency 

responsible for the police and other internal security forces. In Iraq, Afghanistan, and 

earlier peace and stability operations, the United States and its allies went directly to 

the task of training indigenous police, giving little thought to the interior ministry—

the institution to which the police would report. The imperative to put “boots on the 

ground” was seen as so pressing that reform of the ministry that would supervise, 

manage, equip, and support the police could be addressed later. In some cases, it was 

assumed that the host government, the United Nations, or Coalition partners would 

take care of it; in others, the U.S. military believed that the State Department or the 

Justice Department would provide the needed funding and programs for institutional 

reform. In fact, neither the international community nor the U.S. government had the 

expertise, experience, funding, or interest in reforming an institution so closely identified with the host government’s sovereignty. At the same time, the host government 

was often unwilling or unable to challenge powerful interests that moved quickly to 

seize control of the institution that controlled not only the police but, often, the borders, local government, and other critical functions. As a result, newly minted police 

officers emerged from U.S. training programs to find themselves dependent on, and 

subservient to, an institution that was dysfunctional, corrupt, and controlled by leaders 

with their own political agendas (Hylton 2002).

How Reform Misfired in Iraq

The critical nature of ministerial reform, and the disastrous consequences of failure 

in such an effort, are evident in the history of U.S. involvement with Iraq’s Ministry of Interior (MOI). From the intervention in 2003 to the signing of the U.S.-Iraqi 

Status of Forces Agreement in 2008, the Iraqi MOI provides a negative case study 

in the consequences of failing to understand the importance and the process of 

ministerial reform. 

Neither the international 

community nor the U.S. 

government had the expertise, 

experience, funding, or interest 

in reforming an institution so 

closely identified with the host 

government’s sovereignty. 
4

Transforming a Critical Institution

In December 2006, the Iraq Study Group reported that the Iraqi MOI was rife with corruption, infiltrated by militias, and unable to control the Iraqi police. In July 2007, the 

Los Angeles Times reported that the MOI had become a “federation of oligarchs,” where 

various floors of the building were controlled by rival militia groups and organized 

criminal gangs. The article described the MOI as an eleven-story powder keg of factions, 

where power struggles were settled by assassinations in the parking lot (Parker 2007).

The congressionally mandated Independent Commission on the Security Forces of Iraq, 

in its September 2007 report, described Iraq’s MOI as a ministry in name only, dysfunctional, sectarian, and suffering from ineffective leadership (Independent Commission 

2007, 86). Even Iraq’s interior minister, Jawad al-Boulani, called for the comprehensive 

reform of his ministry.

Despite its problems, Iraq’s MOI was responsible for providing policy guidance, training, and administrative support for the four civilian security services:

•	 Iraqi Police Service: a 275,300-member force, controlled at the provincial level, providing basic police services throughout the country

•	 Iraqi National Police: a 32,389-member gendarmerie deployed in Baghdad and other 

parts of the country to assist U.S. and Iraqi military forces in counterinsurgency 

operations

•	 Iraqi Border Enforcement Service: a 38,205-member force stationed at strong points 

along Iraq’s borders to prevent infiltration, smuggling, and illicit trafficking 

•	 Facilities Protection Service (FPS): a 150,000-member force of largely autonomous 

units responsible for protecting government ministries 

In all, the MOI was responsible for an armed force of nearly 500,000 members—

roughly three times the New Iraqi Army, Navy, and Air Force combined. It was also 

responsible for assorted civil functions such as issuing passports, controlling immigration, and regulating private security companies.

From Backwater to the Front Line

How did such a severely troubled but vitally important institution come into being? 

In Baghdad in April 2003, with looters in the streets, and fires burning in government buildings, the U.S. military issued a call for Iraqi police officers to return to 

duty. On April 14, joint patrols of Iraqi police and American soldiers first appeared in 

the capital. Under the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA), Iraq’s military and civilian internal security agencies had been disbanded. The Interior Ministry and the Iraqi 

police survived, but their senior leadership and midlevel management were dismissed 

when the CPA purged Baathist party members from the government. On July 13, the CPA 

appointed a twenty-five-member Iraqi Governing Council (IGC), and Nouri Badran was 

named minister of interior. To prevent any one political faction from gaining control of 

the ministry, six deputy ministers were appointed, representing the major Shiite, Sunni, 

and Kurdish parties (Rathmell 2007).

The MOI was reorganized and assigned new responsibilities. A Department of Border 

Enforcement was created to handle customs, immigration, and border patrol—tasks 

that had previously been handled by the army or other ministries. But the CPA could 

not provide the hundreds of U.S. and international advisers that the State and Justice 

Departments deemed necessary to facilitate this expansion and train Iraqi personnel. 

To fill frontline policing positions and staff new institutions such as the immigration 

service and the border guard force, massive recruitment began. The United States 

pressured the MOI to rapidly recruit, train, equip, and deploy tens of thousands of 

new Iraqi police. Goals such as hiring 30,000 new policemen in thirty days were 

announced and implemented, with little regard for the quality or vetting of recruits 

To fill frontline policing 

positions and staff new 

institutions such as the 

immigration service and the 

border guard force, massive 

recruitment began...with little 

regard for the quality or 

vetting of recruits. 
5

(Offices of Inspector General 2005, 19). A report by the special inspector general for 

Iraq quotes Secretary of State Colin Powell and the commander of U.S. forces in Iraq, 

Lieutenant General Ricardo Sanchez, as stating that the U.S. Defense Department 

increased the numbers of Iraqi police and military forces while ignoring the fact that 

the quality of personnel was more important than numbers (Bowen 2009). The MOI was 

totally unprepared to conduct training for the massive influx of personnel. Training for 

former police officers was limited to three weeks, with most classes taught by U.S. 

military police in police stations. As the insurgency took hold and security deteriorated, 

the target for recruiting American police trainers and advisers to serve in Iraq plummeted from 6,500 to 1,500, to less than 350 by spring 2004 (Independent Commission 

2007, 101).

“Revolving Door” Leadership

From 2003 to 2007, Iraq had four national governments and five different interior 

ministers. This “revolving door” leadership aggravated the confusion generated by 

unrestrained growth in the number of police and by the impact of the insurgency. On 

April 16, 2004, the CPA instituted a new federalism, transferring powers to provincial 

governments in what had traditionally been a highly centralized state. CPA Order 71 

decentralized authority over police in Iraq, giving provincial governors responsibility for 

recruiting and supervising the Iraqi Police Service. Minister of Interior Badran opposed 

this action, pointing out that the provinces were unprepared for this responsibility and 

that it was uncertain who would control police in various parts of the country. When 

his protests were ignored, Badran resigned and was replaced by a technocrat, Samir 

Shakir al-Sumaida’ie (later Iraq’s ambassador to Washington). Though al-Sumaydi had no 

police experience, he was a skilled administrator with a vision for reforming the MOI. 

In his two months in office, he tried to put in place measures to improve management 

practices. He established a vetting procedure for the ministry’s leadership, created an 

inspector general, and supported militia demobilization, but unfortunately, he had neither the political support nor the time in office to make lasting changes in the ministry 

(Rathmell 2007).

In June 2004, the CPA transferred sovereignty to the Iraqi Interim Government. Under 

the new prime minister, Ayad Allawi, the CPA appointed a new interior minister, Falah 

al-Naqib. In his nine months in office, al-Naqib worked with General David Petraeus, 

then commander of the Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq (MNSTC-I), to 

increase the numbers of Iraqi police quickly. Al-Naqib also sought to provide the MOI 

with effective Iraqi constabulary forces after the poor performance of the police in 

battles against Shiite cleric Muqtada al-Sadr’s Mahdi Army. Al-Naqib created “commando units” of former soldiers from elite units such as Saddam’s Republican Guard. 

These units, commanded by al-Naqib’s uncle, Adnan Thabit, a former army general, 

were personally loyal to the minister. The commandos were raised initially without U.S. 

involvement, were under MOI control, and were outside the U.S. Civilian Police Advisory 

Training Team (CPATT) assistance program. The U.S. military provided arms and logistical 

support to these units, which proved effective under Minister al-Naqib’s stewardship in 

fighting alongside U.S. forces against Sunni insurgents and Shiite militias. 

On January 30, 2005, the United Iraqi Alliance, a coalition of Shiite political parties, 

won elections for the Iraq National Assembly. Ibrahim al-Jaafari became prime minister, 

and Bayan Jabr, a member of the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq 

(SCIRI), was named interior minister. The victorious parties, particularly SCIRI, saw 

the MOI as a prize. The Defense Ministry was under U.S. military control, and American 

soldiers were embedded in Iraqi Army units. There were only a few foreign advisers at 

the MOI, and no Americans were embedded in Iraqi police or commando units, which 

were under Iraqi control. Minister Jabr used his position to place members of the Badr 

Brigade (SCIRI’s militia) in key positions in the ministry and to replace Sunnis in the 
6

commando units with Badr Brigade militiaman (Independent Commission 2007). After 

the February 22, 2006, terrorist bombing of the Shiite al-Askari Mosque in Samarra, 

police commando units were used to terrorize, torture, and kill Sunnis and conduct 

ethnic cleansing. 

On December 15, 2005, elections were held for a permanent Iraq National Assembly, 

but it was not until May 20, 2006, that Iraqi politicians formed a new government. 

Nouri al-Maliki became prime minister, and Jawad al-Boulani was named to head the 

MOI. Al-Boulani, a Shia former air force engineer, had no political base but did have a 

reputation for administrative competence. He was given three powerful deputies from 

the Dawa, Badr, and Kurdish factions to ensure that no single party would control the 

MOI (Rathmell 2007). Al-Boulani publicly acknowledged the problems in the MOI and 

called for reform of the ministry and removal of sectarian factions from the police. The 

United States formed a 100-member Ministry Transition Team of military and civilian 

advisers to help improve operations. In April 2006, MNSTC-I persuaded the MOI to combine all the police commando units into a single organization, the Iraq National Police. 

In October, the U.S. military began a purge of INP units involved in sectarian violence, 

arresting their leaders and subjecting the rank and file to vetting and training (“rebluing”) in civilian police skills.

In December 2006, the “Year of the Police” proclaimed by the U.S. military ended 

with the announcement that MNSTC-I had met its target of training and equipping 

187,800 Iraqi police and border patrol personnel. It was an impressive achievement, 

but the reality behind the numbers was troubling. Neither the U.S. military nor the 

MOI could account for the number of trainees who had actually entered the police, the 

number of police currently serving, or what had happened to the uniforms, weapons, 

and equipment that had been issued to training center graduates (Offices of Inspector 

General 2005). Anecdotal reports abounded of former trainees selling their sidearms 

and uniforms on the black market and returning to their militia units or private life. 

Provincial police chiefs hired personnel without MOI approval and inflated budgets with 

lists of fictitious “ghost officers” and pocketed their salaries. Despite the appointment 

of a new minister, Shiite militias continued to exert undue influence over all aspects of 

MOI operations. The ministry also continued to suffer from widespread corruption and 

severe shortfalls in planning, program management, personnel, procurement, logistics, 

communication, and maintenance.

Despite these problems, the MOI was given a major new responsibility. On 

December 27, 2006, Prime Minister al-Maliki ordered the MOI to exert control over the 

estimated 150,000 members of the Facilities Protection Service (FPS), which guarded 

ministries, public buildings, and essential infrastructure in Iraq (Independent Commission 2007). The political parties that controlled the various government ministries had 

been allowed to recruit security units with firearms, badges, and police-style uniforms. 

These private armies were a source of patronage jobs and a means of funding militia 

groups. The prime minister ordered the MOI to supervise, downsize, and retrain the 

FPS—a task clearly beyond the capacity of an institution already overwhelmed by its 

existing responsibilities for nearly 200,000 employees and police personnel.

Misplaced Priorities, Political Rivalries

Within the MOI, political loyalty or intimidation trumped efficiency and professionalism, 

with all but a very few officials willing to challenge authority or put the general good 

ahead of cronyism and private gain. At the same time, the effort for administrative 

reform made some progress. The MOI developed a small but growing cadre of trained 

professionals who understood modern administrative procedures and were working to 

improve performance. There also was noticeable improvement in the ministry’s planning, 

budgeting, procurement, and personnel management. The ministry produced a strategic 

plan that would be synchronized with the budget process. Efforts by U.S. advisers and 

Political loyalty or intimidation 

trumped efficiency and 

professionalism, with all but 

a very few officials willing to 

challenge authority or put 

the general good ahead of 

cronyism and private gain.
7

Iraqi officials in the Internal Affairs Office resulted in the removal or reassignment of 

some criminal elements. Responsibility for control of the police academies and police 

training was transferred to the Iraqis, with international advisers playing a limited role. 

Nonetheless, the United States remained far from its goal of creating an effective interior ministry and Iraqi police forces that could protect Iraqi citizens, prevent terrorism, 

and control violent crime (Sherman and Carstens 2008).

Essential Steps in Ministry Reform

There were two principal reasons for the U.S. failure to effectively reform the interior 

ministry in Iraq. The first was a lack of familiarity with the role of such bureaucratic 

entities and with the steps required for effective institutional reform. The second was 

the absence of counterpart entities in the U.S. government and of an institution and a 

cadre of personnel trained and experienced in effecting such reforms. The remainder of 

this report discusses these two problems and recommendations for a solution.

The Role of the Interior Ministry

U.S. failure to reform the MOI in Iraq resulted from a failure to understand the ministry’s critical role in providing policy guidance, administrative and logistical support, 

and training for Iraq’s various police forces. It also stemmed from an incomplete 

understanding of the steps required for institutional reform, and a lack of experience 

in reforming similar institutions elsewhere. In Iraq, as in many European countries, the 

interior ministry is responsible for policy, funding, and oversight of civilian law enforcement organizations including police, border security, and special investigation units. In 

some countries, the interior ministry also has responsibility for prisons, immigration, 

and local governance, including provincial, municipal, and district administration. 

Leadership of these component organizations is assigned to individuals with specific 

technical expertise who have been appointed to head them, but all rely on the interior 

ministry for policy guidance, funding, and administrative support. The interior ministry 

should be based on an appropriate legal foundation, have a clearly articulated mission, 

function according to established administrative and operational policies, and comprise 

competent, properly supervised personnel. Transforming an interior ministry requires a 

reasoned and informed process of assessment, strategic planning, technical assistance, 

training, and evaluation (Mayer 2009).

Assessment of the Interior Ministry

A successful effort to reform the interior ministry in a postintervention state must 

begin with a comprehensive assessment of the ministry, its role in the justice sector, 

and its role in the conflict. A multidisciplinary team of international experts assisted 

by carefully selected local nationals should undertake the assessment. The team should 

have a range of competencies including civilian police, public administration, management, public finance, governance, culture, and history. It should be representative of 

the countries and international organizations taking part in the intervention and should 

include personnel from relevant ministries in their own countries and from the host 

government. The work of a joint assessment team will likely attract broader support 

than the work of a single organization. The broader the team’s expertise and experience, 

the more likely it is to identify critical needs and make useful recommendations. The 

assessment should examine the country’s security sector and determine how police and 

military relate to one another, and evaluate the prospect of their future cooperation. 

There should be a discussion of risks, as well as opportunities, for the international 

Transforming an interior 

ministry requires a reasoned 

and informed process of 

assessment, strategic planning, 

technical assistance, training, 

and evaluation.
8

intervention force. There must be a sophisticated understanding of who will win and 

who will lose from reforming the ministry (OECD 2007, 42–56).

The assessment should be designed to obtain current information in the following 

broad categories:

1. The general environment in which the MOI is functioning, with all factors 

relevant to accomplishing its mission, including

a. history and continuing effects of the recently concluded conflict;

b. national and cultural context, including all pertinent criminal justice–

related issues; 

c. historic overview of the MOI and its component organizations, 

including previous levels of public support and voluntary compliance 

with law enforcement; 

d. identity, length of service, and summary of qualifications of every 

senior ministry official;

e. table of governmental organization, depicting the position(s) superior 

to the MOI having direct responsibility for its performance;

f. conditions, organizations, and forces that could impede MOI 

development or reform.

2. The functions lawfully assigned to the MOI by the constitution or properly 

delegated by a senior authority lawfully empowered to do so.

3. Review of the criminal code and the criminal procedure code to determine 

police powers relative to the courts. The review should identify missing 

legislation important in dealing with modern criminal activities, such 

as laws governing official corruption, cyber crime, money laundering, 

terrorism, aircraft hijacking, and organized crime.

4. Evaluation of the extent to which the MOI is performing assigned 

functions, including an analysis of all causative factors for deficient 

performance in

a. existence and clarity of legal authority for assigned functions;

b. ministry leadership and management competency in planning, 

organizing, directing, inspecting, coordinating, evaluating, and 

budgeting activities;

c. intragovernmental relationships, both with superior authority and 

with other ministries and organizations that compose and support the 

criminal justice system;

d. adequacy (quantity and quality) of facilities, equipment, and supplies;

e. competency of personnel at all levels below that of senior ministry 

executives (Mayer, interview, January 29, 2009).

Before deploying, the leading members of the assessment team should develop a 

brief assessment plan that will describe (1) the assessment’s purpose and methodology; (2) the composition of the team; and (3) the timing and schedule of meetings 

and events for the assessment mission. The team members should receive copies of 

the assessment plan, and an orientation so that they are thoroughly familiar with the 

assessment’s goals and methods. Once deployed, they must be given enough time to 

consult with relevant officials across a number of ministries and levels of government, 

including the police and the military. Often assessments are rushed and superficial, 

leading to problems in implementing future assistance programs. The assessment team 

must meet with both official and nonstate security and justice providers. In postconflict environments, sectarian militias, home guards, and private security forces may 

hold enough power to challenge or overwhelm state institutions. The team must also 

consult with representatives of civil society who have an informed perspective, such as 

academics, journalists, and non-governmental organization (NGO) members. While it is 

unlikely that written records or statistical materials will be available (or reliable) after 

the conflict and periods of authoritarian rule, any surviving records may still provide 
9

insights, if only to highlight the extent of the corruption and unauthorized activities 

of the previous regime (OECD 2007).

Research on the assessment should begin at home, before the assessment team 

departs. In the field, several well-tested assessment methodologies can be useful. 

These include the UN Office on Drugs and Crime’s Criminal Justice Assessment Tool and 

various survey techniques, such as focus groups, opinion polls, and direct interviews 

to determine current conditions and attitudes. Sufficient time should be allotted to 

meet with people who live in rural or remote areas or who may be less accessible, such 

as women, minorities, the poor, and those in marginalized communities. The team also 

needs time to verify findings with national officials or resident experts to ensure accuracy and relevance. Finally, it is important that the team block out enough time to consider and draft its report (OECD 2007). Although assessments are often composed on the 

flight home or cabled ahead of the team’s return, this is not the best approach. Ample 

time to consider the team’s conclusions is critical despite the inevitable pressure to act 

quickly and move on to the next stages: strategic planning and implementation.

Strategic Planning to Ensure a Common Vision

A multidisciplinary strategic planning team should be appointed to develop the ministry’s mission statement, goals, and objectives and identify the means to attain 

them. The team should include personnel from all relevant criminal justice sectors 

and agencies. It should work with multinational and local partners so that its efforts 

are aligned with local, U.S., and international priorities. It should include functional 

specialists and regional or country experts who understand the operational context. 

Strategic planning will require full-time commitment by those involved, and commitment of adequate resources. The team’s first activity will be to review the assessment 

and develop an integrated understanding of the interests and key assumptions, contingencies, resource availability, and dynamics of the local, regional, and international 

context. The strategic planning team should seek to avoid time pressures, inadequate 

information, turf contests, and problems with technological interoperability. After an 

initial review, it should move forward with developing the strategic plan (U.S. Joint 

Forces Command 2005).

Strategic planning is the process by which the ministry can visualize its future and 

develop the necessary operations to achieve that vision. Of the three critical steps 

involved, the first is to draft a mission statement clarifying the host of issues present 

at the start of the planning process. Key issues to identify are the ministry’s major 

areas of responsibility; the major objectives for the ministry and its constituent components; and the major policy questions, key actors, supporting tasks, and potential 

“showstoppers” (Hawley and Skocz 2005). The second step is a study of the ministry’s 

internal environment, including analysis of its strengths and weaknesses, major challenges that must be addressed, and potential barriers to progress. The third step is 

to assess the external environment, particularly opportunities and threats. What is 

the political, economic, and social context? The level of technology? Who are the key 

stakeholders, including legislative and regulatory bodies and civil society groups? This 

“SWOT” (strengths, weakness, opportunities, and threats) process should generate a 

strategy for reform by analyzing how the ministry can use its strengths, improve its 

weaknesses, exploit and capitalize on opportunities, and mitigate threats (Bushnell 

and Halus 1992).

Technical Assistance and Training for Ministry Functions

The task of helping ministry staff implement the strategic plan requires a team of carefully chosen civilian advisers and trainers, experts in the major areas of the ministry’s 

operations. Members should be recruited based on extensive experience in their areas 

Strategic planning is the 

process by which the ministry 

can visualize its future and 

develop the necessary operations 

to achieve that vision.
10

of specialization in institutions engaged in law enforcement and security operations. 

Members should be knowledgeable about the findings of the initial assessment and 

fully conversant with the elements of the strategic plan. They need not be Americans. 

In fact, interior ministry reform is an area where Europeans have a distinct advantage, 

given their experience helping twenty-one countries reform their interior ministries in 

the process of qualifying for membership in the European Union (Serwer and Chabalowski 2008). In many parts of the world, particularly the Middle East, the administrative approach followed by Europeans is often more appropriate than the American model 

because of colonial or other historic relationships between countries. This is particularly 

true in countries that base their legal systems on the French model of civil law. In both 

Iraq and Afghanistan, for example, the justice systems were more akin to European 

models than to the U.S. system.

The major areas for administrative reform will vary with the interior ministry’s history, culture, and bureaucratic infrastructure and with its role in the conflict. Areas 

of intervention may include change management, internal control and accountability 

mechanisms, problem solving, communications, organizational design, corruption control, personnel management, and procurement tracking systems. Improving accountability may require personnel reforms such as a disciplinary policy, codes of conduct, 

mechanisms for responding to citizen complaints, autonomous internal inspection 

regimes, improved supervisory practices, and merit recruitment and promotion. Improving community relations may require strengthening public information services, media 

training, and outreach to civil society (USAID 2005). Although a detailed discussion of 

the reforms needed in each function is beyond the scope of this study, a representative 

list would include the following:

•	 Command and Control: leadership, senior management, first-line supervision, policy 

and procedures, chain of command, and performance accountability at all organizational levels

•	 Strategic Planning and Operations: design and oversight of activities and reporting

•	 Intelligence: collection, analysis, assessment, and production 

•	 Budget and Programming: planning, allocation of resources, operational expenses

•	 Logistics: infrastructure management, warehousing, inventories, uniforms and equipment, vehicles, fuel, weapons and ammunition

•	 Procurement: ordering, contracting, purchasing 

•	 Human Resources: personnel management, recruitment, assignment, training, compensation programs, career development, disciplinary actions

•	 Public Affairs: public information, citizen education and outreach, media 

•	 Communications and Information Services: telephones, computers, information management, operational information network administration and maintenance, data 

management and security

•	 Inspector General: prevention of abuse and corruption 

• Internal Audit: evaluation of the ministry’s economy, efficiency, and effectiveness 

• Internal Affairs: review of citizen complaints, officer discipline, dismissals for cause

Evaluating Progress and Incorporating Lessons Learned

A primary challenge to institutional reform is to get an objective and informative 

evaluation of the usefulness of assistance programs, and of progress achieved toward 

institutional transformation. The evaluation should measure against baseline data 

gathered in the original assessment and against the goals and objectives outlined in 

the strategic plan. Criteria for evaluation of the assistance and reform activity should 

include relevance to the priorities established in the strategic plan; effectiveness in 

achieving established goals; efficiency, both qualitative and quantitative, in achieving 

Interior ministry reform is an 

area where Europeans have 

a distinct advantage, given 

their experience helping 

twenty-one countries reform 

their interior ministries.
11

stated results; impacts, both positive and negative, of the changes produced by the 

international intervention; and sustainability, including the local government’s ability to 

fund these innovations over the long term from its own resources (OECD 2007).

Results can be evaluated through surveys by small teams of experts according to 

prespecified performance indicators. Qualitative study by competent observers is often 

less costly and allows judgments that cannot be made through mere evaluation of numbers. The goal of U.S. programs for ministry reform should be to change the mission of 

the police from defending the state to providing security for citizens and their property. 

Evaluations should include multiple efforts to seek the opinions of individual citizens 

and civil society groups, particularly those representing minorities, to determine their 

views on the police and the efficacy and fairness of their service to the community. 

Other signs of success are replication of training programs by local authorities, routine 

maintenance programs, implementation of procedures, and continued support by the 

ministry leadership despite personnel changes.

It is crucial that reviews and evaluations focus on results achieved rather than 

on inputs and outputs of the programs undertaken. In Iraq, the U.S. military carefully tracked the numbers of trainees entering and graduating from U.S.-run training 

programs, number of uniforms and amount of equipment issued, number of vehicles 

delivered, and amount of office furniture provided. Numbers were routinely reported 

without reference to whether the graduates actually entered on duty, whether they 

could perform police functions, or whether they were agents of sectarian conflict. In a 

similar manner, the work of U.S. advisers at the MOI was evaluated in terms of number 

of hours the advisers spent at the ministry rather than on the impact of their advice or 

the acceptance of their recommendations. In December 2006, the “Year of the Police” 

ended with the claim that the U.S. assistance program had succeeded because the target number of 187,800 Iraqi trainees had passed through one of various U.S.-provided 

police training programs. U.S. advisers were credited with providing 100,000 hours of 

advisory service to ministry officials.

Role of International Advisers in Ministry Reform

Successful organizational transformation often depends on the ability of ministerial 

advisers to convey recommendations for change in a manner that makes the change 

palatable to their local counterparts. The “Commander’s Guidance for MNSTC-I Advisers” to the MOI in Iraq notes that advisers are the Coalition’s public face to the highest 

levels of the Iraqi government, and reminds them that their actions reflect directly 

on MNSTC-I and affect the success of the U.S. effort in Iraq. The advisers’ goal should 

be to “learn as well as seek to mentor, partner, and advise,” while remaining strategically and tactically aware of emergent trends and keeping their command informed 

(MNSTC-I 2009).

The MNSTC-I commander’s guidance provides a useful introduction to the responsibilities of ministerial advisers in all peace and stability missions. To work effectively, 

foreign advisers to interior ministries must accomplish the following tasks:

• Establish a close personal relationship. In crisis countries, particularly in the developing world, establishing personal relationships takes time. Advisers must tailor their 

approach to the person being advised, based on local circumstances, taking advantage of opportunities to create rapport and trust. This can mean sipping numerous 

cups of tea during hours of conversation about non-work-related subjects, to reach 

an understanding on backgrounds, interests, and values. Without establishing a personal relationship, an effective working relationship is typically impossible. 

• Understand the workings of the ministry and the host government. The adviser 

must be conversant with the organization and function of the ministry and the host 

The goal of U.S. programs for 

ministry reform should be to 

change the mission of the police 

from defending the state to 

providing security for citizens 

and their property. 
12

government. This includes awareness of informal power relationships, the importance 

of tribal or ethnic affiliations, legal restraints, traditions, and unspoken assumptions. 

As reform goes forward, local counterparts will expect advisers to be aware of recent 

developments, areas of progress, and current challenges. Advisers must have a detailed 

understanding of the position that the advisee holds, his background, his relationship 

to other officials, and his actual authority to make and influence decisions. 

• Provide subject matter expertise and policy guidance. Advisers must be technical 

experts in their field, but they must also be able to translate and adapt their knowledge and skills to local circumstances. In some cases, this may involve teaching the 

advisee a skill or new method of operation, but more often it involves suggesting 

alternatives and providing options. Advisers must understand the political context 

of their advice, and the consequences for the host country official of following their 

suggestions. Suggesting a course of action with adverse consequences for the host 

government advisee can set back the entire advisory mission.

• Connect the advisee with essential services. One of the adviser’s key roles is to 

provide the host government official with access to information, administrative support, and contacts that would otherwise be unavailable. This function can range from 

briefings on the latest techniques in the field to providing a computer, to arranging 

for teams of experts to visit the ministry and work with its staff. In conflict countries, 

advisers may feel the need to provide their counterparts with VIP protection or an 

armored vehicle to prevent intimidation or assassination. Providing services is one 

way for advisers to demonstrate their usefulness and dependability, thereby building 

trust and confidence. 

• Coordinate with the intervention force. The adviser’s role includes continual reporting to his or her command or organization on the situation in the ministry and the 

status of the advisee. This involves providing updates on decisions and actions taken 

by the ministry, new issues, personnel changes, the status of relationships between 

leading ministry figures, and important personal issues of the host country official 

being advised. This reporting will enable the intervention force to plan effectively, 

anticipate problems, and provide appropriate help and protection for its local partners. Good reporting will ensure greater effectiveness of both adviser and advisee 

(Panarelli 2009).

One way of minimizing mistakes is to give advisers pre-deployment training tailored 

to their assignment. Few subject matter experts know intuitively how to mentor foreign 

officials without at least an introduction to basic principles and techniques. Unfortunately, few advisers receive any training before deployment, and upon their return, 

little effort is made to collect lessons learned. Any preparation course for ministerial 

advisers must cover several key topics. Beyond lectures in the history, culture, politics, 

and economics of the country of assignment, the training course should cover the following subjects: 

•	 Cultural awareness: recognizing cultural assumptions and bias

•	 Interpersonal communication: verbal, nonverbal, and through interpreters

•	 Exerting Influence: empathy versus sympathy, consensus building, respect, humility

•	 Understanding power relationships: formal, informal, illicit

•	 Negotiation and mediation: nonviolent dispute resolution

•	 Problem solving: interpersonal and institutional

•	 Organizational development: leadership, planning, implementation, evaluation 

•	 Transition to independent operations: working oneself out of the job (Panarelli 2009)

Providing services is one way 

for advisers to demonstrate 

their usefulness and 

dependability, thereby building 

trust and confidence. 
13

Lack of U.S. Government Capacity Impedes Reform Programs

The second major reason for the failure of U.S. efforts to reform Iraq’s and Afghanistan’s 

interior ministries and build professional, efficient police forces there was the lack of 

(1) counterpart entities in the U.S. government and (2) a cadre of trained and experienced personnel. Whereas European governments have powerful interior ministries and 

national police forces, the United States has a bureaucratic “black hole,” resulting from 

the constitutional separation of powers between the executive and judicial branches of 

government and from the delegation of most judicial and law enforcement functions to 

state and local authorities. The United States has an Interior Department, but its functions are quite different from those of European interior ministries. The U.S. Department 

of Interior is the nation’s primary conservation agency. Its mission is to manage the 

national parks and forests, provide recreation opportunities, and “honor the national 

trust responsibilities to Native American Tribes” (U.S. Department of Interior 2009). 

The U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) is the nation’s “law firm,” the world’s largest law office, and the central agency for enforcing federal law. The DOJ is staffed by 

U.S. attorneys, who prosecute cases in federal courts. The department does not have 

responsibility for federal courts, which are in a separate branch of government, and its 

responsibility for international relations is limited to enforcing U.S. criminal statutes. 

The DOJ Office of International Affairs, for example, is primarily concerned with negotiating legal assistance agreements and managing the extradition of foreign criminals 

to the United States for trial (Department of Justice 2009). The DOJ includes four major 

federal law enforcement agencies: the FBI; the Drug Enforcement Agency; the Bureau 

of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives; and the Marshals Service. Legislation, 

politics, bureaucratic habit, and lack of expertise restrict these agencies to dealing 

with the domestic impact of various types of organized crime. Federal law enforcement 

agencies are inadequately staffed and have little capability to strengthen crisis states 

or confront foreign insurgencies. Their officers normally do not wear uniforms, nor do 

they perform the broad range of policing functions that are common for state and local 

police forces (Gompert, Gordon, and Grissom 2008). 

The DOJ does not have the capacity to build comprehensive foreign criminal justice 

systems in post-conflict environments. Its Criminal Division has two small offices whose 

mission is to train indigenous police and prosecutors abroad. The International Criminal 

Investigative Training Assistance Program (ICITAP) has provided training for police 

in more than eighty countries, including Haiti, Bosnia, and Kosovo. ICITAP is totally 

dependent on the State Department for policy guidance and project funding and is not 

a line item in the DOJ budget. In recent years, State has all but excluded ICITAP from 

Afghanistan and Iraq. The Office of Prosecutorial Development and Training (OPDAT) 

provides assistant U.S. attorneys (AUSAs) as advisers to foreign governments (ICITAP 

2009). OPDAT provides a small number of AUSAs as rule-of-law officers in provincial 

reconstruction teams in Iraq. Like ICITAP, OPDAT depends on the State Department for 

policy, guidance, and funding. 

The United States has no national police force on the model of the Royal Canadian 

Mounted Police or the French Police Nationale. There is no federal law enforcement 

entity in Washington, D.C., responsible for managing the police component of U.S. 

intervention forces. There is also no federal entity to represent this function in the 

government’s interagency policy process or to provide assessments and strategic planning for stability operations. Instead, this mission has been assigned to the State 

Department’s International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Bureau (INL). In turn, INL 

has outsourced the tasks of recruiting, training, and supporting U.S. police contingents 
14

in peace and stability missions to commercial contractors. Currently, INL has only one 

career law enforcement professional on its staff, which is otherwise composed of Foreign Service officers and civil servants who develop policy and administer contracts. 

Federal contracting regulations limit the State Department’s ability to supervise closely 

the selection and conduct of contract personnel, and the quality of American police 

who have served in Iraq and Afghanistan and earlier peace and stability operations has 

varied widely. As a RAND National Defense Research Institute study for the Defense 

Department pointed out, “Using contractors to perform niche services is unavoidable; 

using them to perform functions of critical national importance borders on dereliction” 

(Gompert, Gordon, and Grissom 2008). Provision of experienced and trained American 

civilian police personnel for advisory, training, and operational missions in peace and 

stability operations is a chronically unmet U.S. national security challenge.

Beyond the lack of counterpart institutions, the United States was handicapped by 

the sort of personnel it assigned to the task of ministerial and police reform in Iraq 

and Afghanistan. No American adviser had worked in an interior ministry responsible 

for managing a national police force. Few of those selected had held senior executive positions in major city or state police departments. In the United States, senior 

law enforcement executives normally have a university education, with perhaps an 

advanced degree. They have graduated from advanced training programs in police skills 

and program management and have extensive management experience in running largescale enterprises. In contrast, most of those assigned as ministry and police advisers 

in Iraq and Afghanistan were junior patrol officers from municipal police forces, deputy 

sheriffs, or others who had served in small police departments in rural areas. In many 

cases, they were less experienced than the Iraqis and Afghans they were assigned to 

advise, and they were often younger than their counterparts in societies that place 

great value on age, rank, and social status. U.S. advisers had difficulty relating to 

their older and higher-ranking counterparts on a personal basis. Senior Afghan National 

Police generals had over thirty years of experience and had attended training programs 

in Russia and central European countries. It was difficult for them to accept advice 

from a U.S. contractor with less than ten years of experience as a highway patrolman, 

for example. Contractors of commercial firms were also handicapped by not being U.S. 

government officials and therefore being unable to make decisions or speak on behalf 

of the United States (Nikita 2008; Pumphrey 2008).

Assigning responsibility for ministerial reform and police training to the Defense 

Department also proved an inadequate solution. The Defense Department and the U.S. 

military may be able to run a police and justice system temporarily using military police, 

courts martial, and tribunals, but these are inappropriate substitutes and poor models 

for a justice system in an emerging democracy. Military officers who were assigned as 

advisers to the interior ministries in Iraq and Afghanistan knew little about the administration of justice and generally were asked to operate beyond the limits of their core 

competencies (Gompert, Gordon, and Grissom 2008). Occasionally, the U.S. military 

could assign U.S. Army Reserve officers or National Guard members who were senior law 

enforcement professionals in civilian life, but the number of such people was limited, 

and once they had served a tour—normally less than a year—they were not available for 

follow-on assignments. More often, Reserve and National Guard soldiers, often serving 

in Civil Affairs units, were junior officers or from the enlisted ranks.

New Institutions, but More Civilian Capacity Needed

Within the past few years, the U.S. government has begun to put in place the institutional infrastructure and personnel capacity that would be required to undertake successful security sector reform, particularly ministry and police reform. On December 7, 

2005, President Bush signed National Security Presidential Directive 44, which assigned 

The United States was 

handicapped by the sort of 

personnel it assigned to the 

task of ministerial and police 

reform in Iraq and Afghanistan.
15

responsibility to the secretary of state for planning and coordinating the activities of 

U.S. government civilian agencies during post-conflict interventions. The State Department delegated leadership to the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stability Operations (CRS), which was authorized to create a Civilian Response Corps (CRC) 

of civilian experts to assist the U.S. military in peace and stability operations, among 

other duties. In October 2008, the president signed the “Reconstruction and Stabilization Civilian Management Act” as part of the “National Defense Authorization Act 

for 2009,” which provided the legislative authority for CRS and the creation of a CRC. 

After passage of the law, CRS began implementing a plan to provide the United States 

with a limited capacity to deploy police and other critical civilian elements relatively 

quickly at the outset of a peace and stability operation. The elements of a CRC could be 

deployed unilaterally or as part of a multinational or UN force. 

Conclusions and Recommendations

Creating the CRS and recruiting the CRC are steps in the right direction, but the United 

States needs substantially greater institutional authority and personnel capacity to 

achieve security sector reform in current and future peace and stability operations. 

The United States needs to develop a federal capability to deploy several thousand 

operational police and judicial personnel to serve alongside U.S. military forces in postconflict interventions. A whole-of-government approach—the integration of the U.S. 

military’s efforts with those of civilian government agencies—is essential for success 

in post-conflict interventions. This has been perhaps the most important lesson learned 

in Iraq and Afghanistan. 

But effective integrated programs are impossible when there is no common strategy 

and when the Defense Department has the vast preponderance of personnel and financial, and material resources. In Iraq and Afghanistan, the U.S. military has taken over 

missions that were managed by civilian agencies in the Balkans and earlier operations. 

This was not because of a desire to seize authority or expand its writ, but because 

civilian agencies are understaffed and underfunded. Effective integration in the U.S. 

government’s efforts is impeded by gaps in its civilian institutional infrastructure. This 

is particularly true in the critical area of rule of law, where the lack of a national police 

force and the inability to deploy federal law enforcement, judicial, and corrections 

officials have obliged the United States to use commercial contractors to staff police 

and judicial contingents in peace and stability operations. Lack of federal government 

civilian counterparts inhibits cooperation in the field with the United Nations, other 

international organizations, and allied governments. The U.S. military’s preponderant 

role and the lack of a robust and effective civilian government component also severely 

restrict the willingness of NGOs to work with the United States.

The Office of the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR), in its 

report Hard Lessons: The Iraq Reconstruction Experience, pointed out that the lack of 

executive authority over interagency coordination was “at the heart of the failures in 

Iraq reconstruction” and that “in the U.S. system, only the president has the decisive 

authority necessary to require interagency coordination for contingency relief and 

reconstruction operations” (SIGIR 2009). Regardless of where in the executive this 

authority is located, there is the need for a government entity fully empowered by 

the president to manage the civilian aspects of post-conflict interventions. This entity 

would be authorized and staffed to conduct operations and coordinate the actions of 

civilian agencies, particularly in managing the justice and police component of security 

sector reform. Such an institution would have to be positioned within the executive 

branch and supported by Congress in a manner that would correct the weak interagency 

cooperation that is an endemic problem of the U.S. national security system. 

The U.S. military’s preponderant 

role and the lack of a 

robust and effective civilian 

government component also 

severely restrict the willingness 

of NGOs to work with the 

United States.
16

This entity would be led by a senior official of sufficient stature to command the 

respect of the interagency community and foreign officials, and staffed by a permanent 

cadre of specialists with extensive experience in peace and stability operations. These 

federal employees would have responsibility for policy formulation and for directing the 

civilian aspects of U.S. involvement in post-conflict interventions. In times of crisis, 

they would be augmented by officials from other government departments and by a 

civilian reserve component activated to meet expanding needs. They would be guided 

by a whole-of-government approach, which would require contributions from the military and civilian agencies. 

This reform would provide the United States with a federal cadre of skilled advisers 

and trainers in the critical areas of interior ministry reform and police development and 

would limit the current need to outsource these activities to commercial contractors. 

Moreover, it would enable the government to develop policy and doctrine for stabilization, reconstruction, and security sector reform. It would also allow the government 

to develop and use standardized procedures and curricula for advising and training 

local officials and police, replacing the current practices that force advisers and 

trainers to improvise based on personal experience. Such an organization could guard 

against the recurrence of the failures of Iraq and Afghanistan, where the lessons from 

previous operations were ignored and where untrained and inexperienced personnel 

made unfortunate decisions when faced with terrorist violence from insurgents and 

criminal elements.

SSR is the key to security and to establishing the legitimacy of the state. The police 

are the face of the state to its citizens, and if citizens have confidence that the police 

will protect them and provide emergency services, citizens are likely to be loyal to the 

state. Similarly, if citizens believe they can rely on the judicial system to provide justice, they are likely to view the state as legitimate and worthy of their support. More 

important than the police and courts, however, are the institutions that stand behind 

them. The interior and justice ministries are essential to providing good governance. 

If the ministries that support the police and the judges are dysfunctional, corrupt, or 

politicized, police and courts will have little chance of fulfilling their missions and will 

impede efforts to rebuild the state. Unfortunately, the United States has been slow to 

recognize the importance of SSR in peace and stability operations and has paid even 

less attention to developing the capacity to conduct ministerial reform. The price of 

this failure, though largely unreported and hidden from public scrutiny, has been high 

in both Iraq and Afghanistan. The United States needs to build on recent progress to 

improve its capacity for undertaking comprehensive approaches to SSR. The lessons 

identified in this report, and the steps recommended, can help with that process.

The United States has been 

slow to recognize the 

importance of SSR in peace 

and stability operations and 

has paid even less attention 

to developing the capacity to 

conduct ministerial reform. 
17

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www.usip.org

An online edition of this and related 

reports can be found on our Web site 

(www.usip.org), together with additional 

information on the subject.

Of related interest: 

•	 The Role of the Ministerial Advisor in Security Sector Reform: Navigating Institutional Terrains by Liz Panarelli (USIPeace Briefing, April 2009)

•	 The Private Sector in Security Sector Reform: Essential But Not Yet Optimized by 

Robert Perito (USIPeace Briefing, January 2009)

•	 Securing the Future: A Primer on Security Sector Reform in Conflict Countries by 

Sean McFate (Special Report, September 2008)

•	 Iraq’s Interior Ministry: Frustrating Reform by Robert Perito (USIPeace Briefing, 

May 2008)

•	 Reforming the Iraqi Interior Ministry, Police, and Facilities Protection Service by 

Robert Perito (USIPeace Briefing, February 2007)