J-S11009-24 

 

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37 

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA 

 v. 

RASHAWN COMBS 

 Appellant 

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF 

 PENNSYLVANIA 

 No. 3161 EDA 2022 

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered September 22, 2022 

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at 

No(s): CP-51-CR-0006314-2018 

BEFORE: BOWES, J., McLAUGHLIN, J., and COLINS, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY BOWES, J.: FILED JULY 18, 2024 

 Rashawn Combs appeals from the aggregate judgment of sentence of 

thirty to eighty years of imprisonment imposed upon his convictions of murder 

of the third degree and conspiracy to commit murder of the third degree. We 

affirm. 

 In affirming a jointly-tried co-defendant’s judgment of sentence, this 

Court previously recited the factual and procedural background relevant to 

this matter as follows: 

In March 2022, a jury convicted Appellant, Michael 

Blackston, Chad Rannels, and [Semaj Armstead] of charges 

related to the December 2011 murder of Kevin Drinks 

(“Decedent”), whom they mistakenly believed was a witness to a 

prior murder for which Rannels was awaiting trial. . . . 

In 2011, Philadelphia police arrested Rannels for the July 

30, 2011 murder of Kristin Freeman. While in prison awaiting his 

____________________________________________ 

*

 Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court. 
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preliminary hearing, Rannels made fourteen recorded phone calls 

between September 27, 2011, and December 9, 2011, including 

several to Blackston and [Armstead]. Relevantly, during the calls 

Rannels provided an address and description of a person he 

believed was an eyewitness to the murder named John Fisher. 

The calls also included [references to Appellant’s telephone 

number]. Rannels repeatedly instructed the co-defendants to be 

on their “A-Game.” 

On December 10, 2011, four days prior to Rannels’s 

scheduled preliminary hearing, Blackston, while standing on a 

corner with Appellant, [Armstead], and Eugene Floyd, saw 

Decedent drive by them in a white [box] truck. Blackston said, 

“That is the guy right there.” Floyd, to whom the Commonwealth 

granted immunity, testified at trial that he understood 

[Blackston]’s statement to mean that the driver of the truck was 

the eyewitness to Mr. Freeman’s murder. It is undisputed that 

Decedent had an “uncanny” resemblance to the eyewitness, Mr. 

Fisher, and that Mr. Fisher and Decedent both drove white trucks. 

[At the encouragement of both Appellant and Armstead, 

the] four men immediately entered vehicles and followed 

Decedent in his white truck. Floyd drove Blackston in a Chevrolet 

minivan while [Appellant] drove [Armstead in] a white PT Cruiser. 

The police eventually discovered that [Armstead]’s sister owned 

the minivan and Blackston’s girlfriend owned the PT Cruiser. 

The co-conspirators followed Decedent for approximately six 

hours while Decedent made deliveries and while the coconspirators maintained constant communication with each other. 

At 6:17 p[.]m., after receiving confirmation of the truck’s location 

from [Appellant] in the PT Cruiser, Floyd parked the minivan close 

to where Decedent had parked the white truck. Blackston then 

exited the minivan, ran to the white truck, and fatally shot 

Decedent. The co-conspirators then left the area and reconvened 

at the house of [Armstead]’s sister[, where they agreed never to 

discuss the incident]. Police arrived at the murder scene minutes 

later and transported Decedent to the hospital where he was 

pronounced dead. 

During the initial investigation, police recovered the 

surveillance videos from several cameras in the area around the 

murder, from which they identified the PT Cruiser as a vehicle of 

interest. Detectives, however, did not connect the co-conspirators 
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to the crime until 2018. Ultimately, the Commonwealth charged 

Appellant and his three co-defendants with murder and related 

crimes. 

In March 2022, the trial court presided over a joint jury trial 

of Appellant and his co-defendants. Floyd testified to the narrative 

set forth above. The jury also viewed a compilation video of the 

surveillance camera videos. As described by the trial court, the 

video depicted the PT Cruiser following a white box truck and then 

passing the truck as it parked at 5:48 p.m. The video also showed 

the PT Cruiser and the minivan circling the murder scene between 

5:48 p.m. and 6:16 p.m., immediately before the 6:17 p.m. 

murder. 

Detectives also testified regarding the cell phone records 

and historical cell site data for the co-conspirators’ phones on the 

day of the murder. The records documented nearly [forty] 

connections between [Armstead] and Floyd’s phones between 

3:37 p.m. and 6:19 p.m. on the day of the murder and revealed 

that Blackston’s phone “went off the network” sometime after a 

nearly eight-minute phone call from [Armstead]’s phone 

beginning at 3:03 p.m. Historical cell site analysis tracked 

[Appellant’s] and [Armstead]’s phones traveling together along 

the path that Decedent took prior to the murder, in the area of 

the murder at the time of the murder, and driving to the Glenwood 

section of Philadelphia immediately after the murder. Finally, the 

jury heard the recordings of Rannels’[s] prison phone calls, 

including those on which [Armstead] participated [and Appellant’s 

phone number was mentioned]. 

Commonwealth v. Armstead, 1269 EDA 2022, 2024 WL 1478838, at *1-2 

(Pa.Super. 2024) (non-precedential decision) (cleaned up). 

 Additionally, the Commonwealth introduced testimony from Detective 

John Verrecchio relating to a prison call made by Appellant while incarcerated 

for unrelated charges. Appellant did not lodge a contemporaneous objection. 

However, when the detective finished testifying moments later, Appellant’s 

counsel moved for a mistrial outside the presence of the jury, arguing that the 

witness should not have made a reference to Appellant being in jail. The court 
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denied the motion and provided the following instruction to the jury: “Ladies 

and gentlemen, before we resume the testimony or presentation of evidence, 

I just want to tell you this instruction: The jury is not to consider or make 

any adverse or negative inference to any defendant being in custody.” N.T. 

Trial, 3/25/22, at 138. 

At the conclusion of trial, the jury acquitted Appellant of first-degree 

murder, but convicted him of third-degree murder and conspiracy to commit 

third-degree murder. Notably, the co-defendants were convicted of firstdegree murder and a corresponding conspiracy to commit the same. 

Appellant was sentenced as indicated hereinabove,1 and he timely filed a postsentence motion and supplemental post-sentence motion, contending that his 

consecutive sentences constituted a de facto life sentence and that the 

verdicts were against the weight of the evidence. The trial court denied the 

motion without a hearing. 

 This timely appeal followed. The court ordered Appellant to file a 

statement of errors complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b), 

and he complied. The trial court then issued a Rule 1925(a) opinion. 

Appellant presents the following issues for our review, which we have 

reordered for ease of disposition: 

I. Was the evidence insufficient to sustain the guilty verdict for 

conspiracy to commit murder[ of the third degree] as there was 

____________________________________________ 

1

 Specifically, the trial court imposed a consecutive term of fifteen to forty 

years of imprisonment on each conviction of murder of the third degree and 

conspiracy to commit murder of the third degree. 
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no direct evidence that Appellant agreed with the other codefendants to commit any murder, and furthermore the 

circumstantial evidence was insufficient to prove the existence 

of an agreement as, in part, there was no evidence Appellant 

was aware that anyone possessed a firearm or intended to 

shoot the murder victim? 

II. Was the evidence insufficient to sustain the guilty verdict for 

murder[ of the third degree] as there was no evidence that 

Appellant possessed any firearm, was aware of the existence 

of any firearm, fired a firearm[,] or otherwise caused the 

victim’s death? 

III. Were the verdicts against the weight of the evidence for 

murder[ of the third degree] and conspiracy to commit murder[ 

of the third degree] as the only evidence tying Appellant to the 

murder came from a self-interested, unreliable and un-indicted 

co-conspirator[?] 

IV. Appellant was convicted of murder[ of the third degree] and 

conspiracy to commit murder[ of the third degree], while the 

co-defendants were convicted of murder[ of the first degree] 

and conspiracy to commit murder[of the first degree], 

therefore, were the inconsistent verdicts against the weight of 

the evidence as Appellant was convicted of conspiring to 

commit a different crime than that committed by the codefendants[?] 

V. Did the trial court err in denying Appellant’s motion for a 

mistrial, as the prosecutor committed prosecutorial misconduct 

when [she] elicited through Detective Verecchio that Appellant 

had been incarcerated in an unrelated matter[?] 

VI. Did the trial court abuse its discretionary aspects of sentencing 

by entering an excessive consecutive-in-nature sentence that 

was more than necessary to protect the public, vindicate the 

complainant’s family, overly harsh in light of the numerous 

mitigating factors and Appellant’s need for rehabilitation[?] 

Appellant’s brief at 6-7 (cleaned up, argument omitted). 
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In his first two issues, Appellant challenges the evidentiary sufficiency 

of both of his convictions. We consider Appellant’s position mindful of the 

following well-settled standard of review: 

When reviewing a [sufficiency] claim, we face a question of law. 

Accordingly, our standard of review is de novo. We view the 

evidence in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, as the 

verdict winner, and we draw all reasonable inferences therefrom 

in the Commonwealth’s favor. Through this lens, we must 

ascertain whether the Commonwealth proved all of the elements 

of the crime at issue beyond a reasonable doubt. 

The Commonwealth may sustain its burden of proving every 

element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt by means of 

wholly circumstantial evidence. Moreover, we may not weigh the 

evidence and substitute our judgment for the factfinder. Any 

doubts regarding a defendant’s guilt may be resolved by the 

factfinder, unless the evidence is so weak and inconclusive that, 

as a matter of law, no probability of fact may be drawn from the 

combined circumstances. 

Commonwealth v. Roberts, 293 A.3d 1221, 1223 (Pa.Super. 2023) 

(cleaned up). 

As noted, Appellant was found guilty of conspiracy to commit thirddegree murder and third-degree murder. “[T]o sustain a conviction for 

criminal conspiracy, the Commonwealth must establish that the defendant (1) 

entered into an agreement to commit or aid in an unlawful act with another 

person or persons, (2) with a shared criminal intent and, (3) an overt act was 

done in furtherance of the conspiracy.” Commonwealth v. Fisher, 80 A.3d 

1186, 1190 (Pa. 2013) (citation omitted). With respect to murder of the third 

degree, our High Court has summarized thusly: 
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To convict a defendant of the offense of third[-]degree murder, 

the Commonwealth need only prove that the defendant killed 

another person with malice aforethought. This Court has long held 

that malice comprehends not only a particular ill-will, but also a 

wickedness of disposition, hardness of heart, recklessness of 

consequences, and a mind regardless of social duty, although a 

particular person may not be intended to be injured. 

Commonwealth v. Fisher, 80 A.3d 1186, 1191 (Pa. 2013) (citation 

omitted). 

Further, our law directs that under certain circumstances, an actor may 

be held liable for the actions of others pursuant to the doctrine of 

conspiratorial liability: 

Where the existence of a conspiracy is established, the law 

imposes upon a conspirator full responsibility for the natural and 

probable consequences of acts committed by his fellow 

conspirator or conspirators if such acts are done in pursuance of 

the common design or purpose of the conspiracy. Such 

responsibility attaches even though such conspirator was not 

physically present when the acts were committed by his fellow 

conspirator or conspirators and extends even to a homicide which 

is a contingency of the natural and probable execution of the 

conspiracy, even though such homicide is not specifically 

contemplated by the parties. 

Commonwealth v. Geiger, 944 A.2d 85, 91 (Pa.Super. 2008) (citation 

omitted). 

On appeal, Appellant argues that his conspiracy conviction cannot stand 

because “the only evidence tying [A]ppellant to the murder was . . . unindicted co-conspirator Floyd’s testimony and unimpressive historical cell site 

analysis, which arguably narrowed down position location to one mile, which 

encompasses a wide swath of North Philadelphia.” Appellant’s brief at 39. He 
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highlights that no fingerprints taken from the PT Cruiser matched his own. 

Id. at 40. Appellant also contends that he was “in a separate car, had no 

knowledge of any firearm, and therefore had no knowledge of an impending 

murder.” Id. At most, he believes that the evidence merely showed his 

presence near the crime scene, which is insufficient. Id. 

Similarly, Appellant maintains that the conviction for third-degree 

murder must be vacated because the Commonwealth’s only eyewitness to the 

crime, Floyd, testified that “[A]ppellant did not possess any firearm, had no 

knowledge of any firearm, and did not shoot any firearm.” Id. at 41. He 

argues that there was no proof that he thus “committed any murder with 

malice.” Id. Appellant suggests that the Commonwealth proved neither the 

criminal act nor the intent required for murder. Id. at 41-42. 

The trial court thoroughly addressed both claims in its Rule 1925(a) 

opinion. See Trial Court Opinion, 8/15/23, at 45-51. With respect to the 

conspiracy, it noted that the co-defendants used coded language when 

discussing the plan to eliminate Decedent. Id. at 48. While Appellant did not 

directly participate on the initial jail calls with Rannels, his phone number was 

nonetheless discussed by the co-defendants. Id. The court recounted that 

Appellant was the driver of the PT Cruiser and that he followed Decedent 

throughout Philadelphia for hours while, along with Armstead, providing 

locations to Floyd by cell phone. Id. Additionally, Appellant continued to 
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circle the block as Blackston approached and shot Decedent. Id. at 49. Based 

on this evidence, the trial court reasoned as follows: 

The evidence thus demonstrates that Appellant entered into an 

agreement to help eliminate the eyewitness in Rannels’[s] murder 

case. Blackston and Armstead had originally made this agreement 

with Rannels over the recorded prison calls. When Blackston 

mistakenly identified [Decedent] as the eyewitness in Rannels’[s] 

case, Appellant instructed Blackston, Armstead, and Floyd to get 

some vehicles to begin following [Decedent]. According to Floyd, 

Appellant had been part of previous conversations about a witness 

who could identify Rannels. Accordingly, Appellant’s conduct and 

the circumstances surrounding that conduct thus sufficiently 

indicated that he had also agreed to join the conspiracy to 

eliminate the eyewitness. 

Id. at 49-50. 

Furthermore, the trial court highlighted that Appellant committed other 

acts in furtherance of the conspiracy after the murder, which included 

agreeing with the co-defendants not to speak of the incident and making a 

prison call expressing his concern for being involved in the shooting. Id. at 

50. The court finally concluded that despite the lack of evidence showing 

Appellant possessed or utilized a firearm, he was nonetheless guilty of thirddegree murder “under a theory of conspiratorial liability.” Id. at 51. 

On review, we agree with the trial court that the evidence was sufficient 

to sustain both of Appellant’s convictions. With respect to conspiracy, 

Appellant was not merely an unlucky bystander present during the shooting, 

as he claims. The testimony bore out that Appellant’s cell phone number was 

specifically discussed by the co-defendants in the months before Rannels’s 

preliminary hearing. Appellant conversed about the eyewitness to the murder 
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of Mr. Freeman with the co-defendants leading up to the initial encounter with 

Decedent and encouraged the others to get into the vehicles. He further 

stalked Decedent for hours and directly enabled the co-defendants to do the 

same, providing them updates as to Decedent’s location. Finally, Appellant 

retreated to the residence of Armstead’s sister afterwards and agreed with the 

co-defendants never to discuss the murder. 

While the proof of Appellant’s agreement to murder Decedent was 

circumstantial, it was not “so weak and inconclusive that, as a matter of law, 

no probability of fact may be drawn from the combined circumstances.” 

Roberts, 293 A.3d at 1223. The jury was within its right to infer that 

Appellant conspired to eliminate Decedent as an eyewitness, despite his not 

being the gunman or even in possession of a firearm. It is additionally 

irrelevant that Appellant purports to have had no intent to kill Decedent. See 

Fisher, 80 A.3d at 1195 (stating that “the absence of intent to kill does not 

preclude a defendant from being convicted of conspiracy to commit third 

degree murder”). 

Furthermore, as the trial court correctly concluded, the evidence 

supports a verdict for third-degree murder, even though Appellant was not 

the gunman. While Blackston was the person who fired the rounds, the jurors 

could find that Appellant was nevertheless fully accountable for the killing 

pursuant to the doctrine of conspiratorial liability because Decedent’s death 

was a “natural and probable consequence” of the conspiracy to eliminate an 
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eyewitness and was done in furtherance of its design. See Geiger, 944 A.2d 

at 91. In other words, assuming Appellant’s assertion that he lacked 

possession of a firearm was true, this does not preclude his responsibility for 

the murder, especially in light of the evidence showing that the co-defendants 

sought to silence the witness to Mr. Freeman’s slaying. Also, because the 

murder entailed stalking the victim for hours before fatally shooting him at 

close range, we have no difficulty in finding that the evidence demonstrated 

sufficient malice for a conviction. Appellant is therefore not entitled to relief 

on these claims. 

In his third issue, Appellant argues that his convictions were against the 

weight of the evidence. The following law applies to our review of Appellant’s 

claim: 

A motion for a new trial based on a claim that the verdict is against 

the weight of the evidence is addressed to the discretion of the 

trial court. A new trial should not be granted because of a mere 

conflict in the testimony or because the judge on the same facts 

would have arrived at a different conclusion. Rather, the role of 

the trial judge is to determine that notwithstanding all the facts, 

certain facts are so clearly of greater weight that to ignore them 

or to give them equal weight with all the facts is to deny justice. 

An appellate court’s standard of review when presented with a 

weight of the evidence claim is distinct from the standard of review 

applied by the trial court. Appellate review of a weight claim is a 

review of the exercise of discretion, not of the underlying question 

of whether the verdict is against the weight of the evidence. 

Commonwealth v. Arias, 286 A.3d 341, 352 (Pa.Super. 2022) (cleaned up). 

Therefore, we must determine whether the trial court, in rejecting Appellant’s 

challenge, “abused its discretion by reaching a manifestly unreasonable 
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judgment, misapplying the law, or basing its decision on partiality, prejudice, 

bias, or ill-will.” Commonwealth v. Clay, 64 A.3d 1049, 1056 (Pa. 2013) 

(cleaned up). 

 As to this claim, Appellant reiterates that the Commonwealth’s most 

potent evidence came from “an un-indicted co-conspirator with transactional 

immunity in exchange for testimony against the defendants.” Appellant’s brief 

at 35. He contends that because Floyd agreed to testify in order to save 

himself from charges, this rendered his testimony “tainted and unreliable.” 

Id. Appellant also asserts that that the verdicts were against the weight of 

the evidence because there was no video surveillance showing Appellant 

getting into or out of the PT Cruiser, and that the cell phone location data was 

too broad to place Appellant precisely at the murder scene. Id. at 36. 

In rejecting this contention, the trial court determined that “the 

testimony and evidence presented at trial was not so tenuous, vague and 

uncertain such that the jury’s verdict shocked the conscience of th[e c]ourt.” 

Trial Court Opinion, 8/15/23, at 33. It noted that the jury was properly 

instructed to consider and weigh the testimony of Floyd as a corrupt and 

polluted source, and that the law presumes the jury will follow this instruction. 

Id. at 33-36. The court also stated that there was additional evidence offered 

by the Commonwealth, beyond the testimony of Floyd, tying Appellant to the 

murder. In particular, the court cited the numerous jail calls between the codefendants that identified Appellant’s phone number, a subsequent interview 
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between police and the mother of Appellant’s child that alluded to Floyd, 

Appellant’s own jail recordings expressing concern that he would be caught, 

and the historical cell site analysis showing Appellant following Decedent for 

hours on the day of the murder. Id. at 37-38. The court was not persuaded 

by Appellant’s argument that he could not be the driver of the PT Cruiser due 

to a lack of his fingerprints being on the vehicle, as law enforcement was not 

able to collect prints until roughly three months after the murder. Id. at 39. 

It also discounted the notion that there was no video showing Appellant driving 

the PT Cruiser because there was no evidence showing anyone else driving it, 

either. Id. at 39-40. 

We cannot conclude that the trial court abused its discretion in denying 

Appellant’s motion for a new trial. By all accounts, the court’s analysis 

demonstrates that it considered the evidence admitted at trial in a manner 

that was not manifestly unreasonable or based upon “partiality, prejudice, 

bias, or ill-will.” Clay, 42 A.3d at 1056. The court accounted for any 

purported weaknesses in the Commonwealth’s case in deciding that it was not 

shocked by the jury’s verdict. Accordingly, Appellant is not entitled to a new 

trial on this basis. 

In his fourth claim, Appellant maintains that his verdicts were 

inconsistent, and therefore against the weight of the evidence. See

Appellant’s brief at 37-38. In advancing this position, he avers that this is 

because the remaining co-defendants were all convicted of first-degree 
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murder and conspiracy to commit the same, whereas Appellant was only found 

guilty of charges relating to third-degree murder. Id. at 37-38. Accordingly, 

Appellant argues that “[he] could not have conspired with co-defendants who 

acted intentionally whereas [he] did not act intentionally. There was no 

meeting of the criminal minds.” Id. at 38. 

Although couched as a weight of the evidence claim, Appellant’s 

argument actually invokes the abrogated common law rule of consistency, 

which required consistent verdicts as to co-conspirators.2 See 

Commonwealth v. Fremd, 860 A.2d 515, 521 (Pa.Super. 2004) (concluding 

that the rule of consistency “has basically been overruled by” prior cases 

decided by both the Pennsylvania Superior and Supreme Courts). 

In Commonwealth v. Campbell, 651 A.2d 1096, n.2 (Pa. 1994), our 

Supreme Court rejected application of this rule in the scenario where Campbell 

____________________________________________ 

2

 As our High Court has noted: 

The development of the rule of consistency was a product of the 

pre-twentieth century English system of appellate review. Prior 

to 1907, a criminal defendant could only seek review by a writ of 

error, which was limited to the arraignment, the plea, the issue 

and the verdict. Because the evidence presented at trial was not 

reviewable, a jury’s inconsistent verdict in a conspiracy trial of two 

or more defendants was incapable of review upon sufficiency of 

evidence grounds. Thus[,] as a way to protect the criminal 

defendant against jury prejudice or misapplication of the law, the 

conspiracy rule of consistency developed. 

Commonwealth v. Campbell, 651 A.2d 1096, 1098 n. 2 (Pa. 1994) (citation 

omitted). 
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was convicted of conspiracy to sell drugs following a joint trial, whereas the 

only other co-defendant was acquitted. In determining that Appellant was not 

entitled to relief on appeal, the Court stated that “consistency in verdicts in a 

joint trial for conspiracy is not necessarily required.” Id. at 1099. Rather, 

“the acquittal of the sole alleged co-conspirator does not per se preclude the 

conviction of the remaining defendant, even if the defendants are jointly 

tried,” so long as the record supports the apparently inconsistent verdict. Id. 

The Campbell Court’s conclusion was based in part on the longstanding 

principles that (1) a jury may make an inconsistent decision based on 

compromise or leniency, and (2) consistency in verdicts should not be required 

because it would entail “inquiries into jury’s deliberations that courts generally 

will not make.” Id. at 1100 (discussing United States v. Powell, 469 U.S. 

57 (1984)). 

We readily dispose of Appellant’s claim here because, as discussed 

supra, the evidence introduced at trial supported both of Appellant’s 

convictions. Even if we were to agree with Appellant that his convictions were 

inconsistent with the verdicts rendered as to the co-defendants, his assertion 

that he is entitled to a new trial because of this cannot succeed. In light of 

our High Court’s decision in Campbell, an inconsistent verdict as between 

jointly tried co-defendants is simply not grounds for a new trial when the 

convictions are otherwise supported by the evidence. No relief is due. 
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In his fifth issue, Appellant argues that the court erred in denying his 

motion for a mistrial based on alleged prosecutorial misconduct, arising from 

the fact that Detective Verrecchio informed the jury that Appellant was 

incarcerated, albeit for reasons unrelated to the underlying charges. See

Appellant’s brief at 42-45. 

A motion for a mistrial is within the discretion of the trial court. A 

mistrial upon motion of one of the parties is required only when 

an incident is of such a nature that its unavoidable effect is to 

deprive the appellant of a fair and impartial trial. It is within the 

trial court’s discretion to determine whether a defendant was 

prejudiced by the incident that is the basis of a motion for a 

mistrial. On appeal, our standard of review is whether the trial 

court abused that discretion. 

Commonwealth v. Bennett, 225 A.3d 883, 890 (Pa.Super. 2019) (citation 

omitted). 

 In discussing this issue, the trial court opined, inter alia, that a mistrial 

was not warranted because any alleged prejudice was ameliorated when it 

provided an instruction to the jury “not to consider or make any adverse or 

negative inference to any defendant being in custody.” Trial Court Opinion, 

8/15/23, at 55 (citing N.T. Trial, 3/25/22, at 138). Appellant does not directly 

address this contention in his brief, instead baldly asserting that “there was 

no way to sanitize prison calls except through minimizing attention to 

[A]ppellant’s incarceration. Disclosing his incarceration . . . hardened the 

blow.” Appellant’s brief at 45. 

 We conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying 

Appellant’s request for a mistrial. Assuming that this issue was preserved for 
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our appeal despite Appellant’s failure to timely object, it merits him no relief. 

“It is well-settled that jurors are presumed to follow the trial court’s cautionary 

instructions.” Commonwealth v. Goods, 265 A.3d 662, 672 (Pa.Super. 

2021) (citation omitted). After the collective reference from the prosecutor 

and Detective Verrechio that Appellant was in jail for charges unrelated to this 

case, the court informed the jury that it was not to consider the fact that 

Appellant was incarcerated. Appellant has not convinced us through any 

argument or citation to pertinent law that the instruction given by the trial 

court was insufficient to cure any prejudice arising therefrom. This is 

especially true as, in this instance, the reference arose in the context of 

discussing Appellant’s jail calls, which by necessity communicated to the jury 

that he was behind bars when they were made. Thus, the remark concerning 

Appellant being incarcerated was not “of such a nature that its unavoidable 

effect is to deprive” Appellant of a “fair and impartial trial.” Bennett, 225 

A.3d at 890. 

In his final issue, Appellant challenges the length of his aggregate 

sentence. The following legal principles guide our determination of whether 

the claim is properly before us: 

[A]n appellant challenging the discretionary aspects of his 

sentence must invoke this Court’s jurisdiction. We determine 

whether the appellant has invoked our jurisdiction by considering 

the following four factors: (1) whether appellant has filed a timely 

notice of appeal; (2) whether the issue was properly preserved at 

sentencing or in a motion to reconsider and modify sentence; (3) 

whether appellant’s brief has a fatal defect; and (4) whether there 
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is a substantial question that the sentence appealed from is not 

appropriate under the Sentencing Code. 

Commonwealth v. Solomon, 247 A.3d 1163, 1167 (Pa.Super. 2021) (en 

banc) (cleaned up). In addressing whether a defendant has presented a 

substantial question, “[o]ur inquiry must focus on the reasons for which the 

appeal is sought, in contrast to the facts underlying the appeal, which are 

necessary only to decide the appeal on the merits.” Commonwealth v. 

Rhoades, 8 A.3d 912, 616 (Pa.Super. 2010) (cleaned up). 

Here, Appellant timely appealed and preserved this issue in his postsentence motion. He also included a Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f) statement in his brief, 

asserting that he raised a substantial question because “the term of 

confinement was more than necessary, and the consecutive nature of the 

sentence was excessive, especially since [A]ppellant was deemed the least 

culpable of all defendants . . . and the trial court seemed not to consider the 

tremendous mitigating factors, and his need for and potential for 

rehabilitation.” Appellant’s brief at 26. This constitutes a substantial question 

for our review. See Commonwealth v. Raven, 97 A.3d 1244, 1253 

(Pa.Super. 2014) (“[A]n excessive sentence claim—in conjunction with an 

assertion that the court failed to consider mitigating factors—raises a 

substantial question.”). 

Turning to the merits of Appellant’s challenge, our standard of review is 

as follows: 

Appellant must demonstrate that the sentencing court abused its 

discretion. In this context, an abuse of discretion is not shown 

merely by an error in judgment. Rather, Appellant must establish, 
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by reference to the record, that the sentencing court ignored or 

misapplied the law, exercised its judgment for reasons of 

partiality, prejudice, bias or ill will, or arrived at a manifestly 

unreasonable decision. 

Solomon, 247 A.3d at 1168 (cleaned up). Furthermore, “[w]here the trial 

court is informed by a [pre-sentence investigation (“PSI”) report], it is 

presumed that the court is aware of all appropriate sentencing factors and 

considerations, and that where the court has been so informed, its discretion 

should not be disturbed.” Commonwealth v. Torres, 303 A.3d 1058, 1065 

(Pa.Super. 2023) (cleaned up). 

A trial court’s sentence “should call for confinement that is consistent 

with the protection of the public, the gravity of the offense as it relates to the 

impact on the life of the victim and on the community, and the rehabilitative 

needs of the defendant.” 42 Pa.C.S. § 9721(b). “When imposing sentence, a 

court is required to consider the particular circumstances of the offense and 

the character of the defendant. In considering these factors, the court should 

refer to the defendant’s prior criminal record, age, personal characteristics 

and potential for rehabilitation.” Commonwealth v. Taylor, 277 A.3d 577, 

593 (Pa.Super. 2022) (cleaned up). 

Appellant argues that “[t]he sentencing court abused [the] discretionary 

aspects of sentencing and completely discounted and ignored mitigating 

factors that are mandated to be considered by the Sentencing Code, while 

entering a consecutive in nature sentence.” Appellant’s brief at 29. He 

contends that the court condemned him to a de facto life sentence and treated 

his conviction for third-degree murder as akin to a conviction for first-degree 
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murder, as with the co-defendants. Id. at 29, 32-33. Appellant further 

maintains that the sentence was unduly punitive because “[A]ppellant was 

deemed by the jury the least culpable of the defendants, showed great 

remorse at sentencing, and is in need of rehabilitation.” Id. at 30. He 

highlights that he had a prior record score of zero, and that a standard 

guideline sentence could have been as low as six years per charge, far shorter 

than the aggregate of thirty to eighty years he received. Id. at 31. 

In its Rule 1925(a) opinion, the trial court noted that the sentences 

imposed fell within the standard range of the sentencing guidelines. See Trial 

Court Opinion, 8/15/23, at 28. It further stated that it considered the PSI 

report, which indicated that Appellant had engaged in additional criminal acts 

in the years between the murder and when he was charged. Id. at 30. The 

court also highlighted that Appellant’s sentence was lighter than those 

received by the co-defendants, which reflects the fact that the jury found him 

to be less culpable. Id. Ultimately, it recounted the following reasons that it 

stated on the record for Appellant’s sentence: 

This case on many levels is very, very disturbing. [Decedent] was 

thought to be a witness in a homicide, but he wasn’t. Now, even 

if he was, it doesn’t make it any better, but it is even more - I 

don’t know how to put it exactly - outrageous that a person who 

had nothing to do with this case, but looked like the witness, 

wound up getting stalked and killed. 

Appellant was one of [the] people involved, but he was not 

convicted of first-degree murder, because the jury saw his 

involvement as different than the other three defendants, who are 

and should be serving life. The question is what’s the appropriate 

sentence here. I’m also concerned about Appellant’s actions 
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afterwards; not because they reflect on the guidelines, but just 

the criminal conduct. 

I understand what Appellant’s counsel is saying about people who 

are [eighteen] and they do things that people when they’re 

[thirty] wouldn’t and the whole situation with juvenile lifers and 

everything else, but [Appellant’s] criminal conduct did continue 

after this incident, which was not resolved for -- I think -- almost 

six or seven years with an arrest. 

There is absolutely nothing we can do to bring [Decedent] back or 

to change what you’re going through or will go through, and I also 

understand what [Decedent’s] widow is saying. We’re just the 

[c]ourt here. We’re not the heavenly court. We’re not the 

ultimate justice. We are just on earth trying to do justice as we 

can under the system that has been created in our democracy. 

What I think is appropriate here is the following sentence, which 

will give [Appellant] an opportunity, potentially, to come out, but 

under proper supervision. I’m taking into account the factors of 

why this killing occurred and [Appellant’s] conduct afterwards, but 

not as to a prior record score, and the facts and circumstances of 

how the killing occurred, as well. 

Id. at 28-29 (citing N.T. Sentencing, 9/22/22, at 30-32). 

The certified record leads us to conclude that the trial court did not 

abuse its discretion in sentencing Appellant to an aggregate thirty to eighty 

years in prison. Based on the reasons it articulated at sentencing, the court 

correctly noted that while Appellant had a prior record score of zero, he 

nonetheless continued to engage in criminal activity for years before he was 

arrested for this crime. This undercuts Appellant’s assertion that the sentence 

was unduly punitive or that Appellant was a strong candidate for rehabilitation. 

The court was also clearly cognizant of the jury’s finding that Appellant was 

less culpable than the co-defendants, which is shown by a sentence that gives 

Appellant hope of parole during his lifetime. Finally, as the court had access 
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to a PSI report, we further presume that it was “aware of all appropriate 

sentencing factors and considerations.” Torres, 303 A.3d at 1065. 

In sum, since none of the issued raised by Appellant warrants relief, we 

have no cause to disturb his judgment of sentence. 

Judgment of sentence affirmed. 

Date: 7/18/2024