alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### In the Matter of Ernestine Austin, Petitioner, *v.*New York City Housing Authority, Respondent.

Supreme Court, Special Term, Queens County,

February 2, 1966.

*Lerner <& Jacobowits*for petitioner. *Harry Levy, Harold Weintraub*and *Julius Raffelson*for respondent.

Lester Holtzman, J.

Petitioner moves for an order reviewing respondent’s determination of eligibility ■ dated January 14, 1965; compelling respondent to follow its rules, regulations and opinions with respect to the question of petitioner’s eligibility; and for a review of all the facts and circumstances so that the said determination be annulled and petitioner’s eligibility as a tenant be reaffirmed.

On or about October 14, 1954, respondent, as landlord, and petitioner and her husband, as tenants, entered into a written agreement designated “Resident Monthly Lease Agreement” whereby respondent leased to the tenants an apartment in a project known as Hammel Houses. One of the paragraphs thereof provided that the landlord or the tenant may each terminate said lease and tenancy at the end of any montMy term by giving to the other one calendar month’s prior notice in writing. The apartment rented by the tenants was not subject to the rent control laws. After execution of said lease agreement the tenants entered into the said apartment and still occupy the same.

Thereafter and on or about September 29, 1964, the manager of the development forwarded to respondent’s tenant review board a summary of facts dated September 22, 1964, in which they demonstrated that the tenants and their family were undesirable tenants because of the reasons set forth therein. By letter dated October 27, 1964 said tenant review board invited *207the tenants to appear before a panel and to state their side of the case. By letter dated October 31, 1964 petitioner advised the board that she and her attorney would appear. On or about January 5, 1965, the manager of the project forwarded to said tenant review board a photostatic copy of a memorandum dated January 4, 1965 listing additional facts demonstrating the undesirability of petitioners as tenants.

Thereafter petitioner and her attorney appeared before a panel of three members of the board and stated her side of the case. Said board made a determination, dated January 14,1965, in which it stated that the petitioner was not eligible to remain as a tenant. On or about January 22, 1965, the respondent caused a notice terminating petitioner’s tenancy, effective at the end of February 28,1965, to be served upon petitioner herein.

In the court’s opinion, petitioner had a full hearing and respondent’s acts were not arbitrary or capricious and were in conformity with the rules and regulations promulgated by it. Accordingly, respondent is awarded judgment dismissing the petition.
No. 55574.

#### W. X. Huber Co. *v.*United States,

protest 845690-G (Los Angeles).

Opinion by

Cline, J.

In accordance with stipulation of counsel that certain items of the merchandise are the same in all material characteristics, respectively, as the articles having the corresponding exhibit designations and passed upon in *Oy Wo Tong Co.*v. *United States*(5 Cust. Ct. 70, C. D. 372), the claim of the-plaintiff was sustained.
# C_2012209EN.01001301.xml

| 14.7.2012 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 209/13 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

14.7.2012

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 209/13

---

Action brought on 30 May 2012 — Jyoti Ceramic Industries v OHIM — DeguDent (ZIECON)

(Case T-239/12)

2012/C 209/22

Language in which the application was lodged: German

Parties

Parties

Applicant: Jyoti Ceramic Industries PVT. Ltd (Nashik, India) (represented by: R. Egerer, D. Jochim and A. Kolb, lawyers)

Applicant:

Defendant: Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade Marks and Designs)

Defendant:

Other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal: DeguDent GmbH (Hanau-Wolfgang, Germany)

Other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal:

Form of order sought

Form of order sought

| — | Annul the decision of the First Board of Appeal of the Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade Marks and Designs) of 21 March 2012 in Case R 2546/2010-1; |
| --- | --- |

—

Annul the decision of the First Board of Appeal of the Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade Marks and Designs) of 21 March 2012 in Case R 2546/2010-1;

| — | Order the defendant to pay the costs. |
| --- | --- |

—

Order the defendant to pay the costs.

Pleas in law and main arguments

Pleas in law and main arguments

Applicant for a Community trade mark: Jyoti Ceramic Industries

Applicant for a Community trade mark:

Community trade mark concerned: Figurative mark ‘ZIECON’ for goods in Classes 5, 10 and 40 (application No 8 272 271)

Community trade mark concerned:

Proprietor of the mark or sign cited in the opposition proceedings: DeguDent GmbH

Proprietor of the mark or sign cited in the opposition proceedings:

Mark or sign cited in opposition: Word mark ‘CERCON’ for goods in Classes 5, 9 and 10

Mark or sign cited in opposition:

Decision of the Opposition Division: Opposition rejected

Decision of the Opposition Division:

Decision of the Board of Appeal: Appeal allowed and registration refused

Decision of the Board of Appeal:

Pleas in law:

| — | Infringement of Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation No 207/2009 |
| --- | --- |

—

Infringement of Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation No 207/2009

| — | Infringement of Article 76 of Regulation No 207/2009 in conjunction with Rules 50(1) and 19(1) and (3) of the implementing regulation |
| --- | --- |

—

Infringement of Article 76 of Regulation No 207/2009 in conjunction with Rules 50(1) and 19(1) and (3) of the implementing regulation

---
No. 96-7808.

#### Woodall *v.*United States.

Ct. App. D. C. Certiorari denied.
[Federal Register Volume 72, Number 98 (Tuesday, May 22, 2007)]
[Notices]
[Page 28754]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: E7-9827]


=======================================================================
-----------------------------------------------------------------------

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Office of the Secretary


Aviation Proceedings, Agreements Filed the Week Ending May 11, 
2007

    The following Agreements were filed with the Department of 
Transportation under the Sections 412 and 414 of the Federal Aviation 
Act, as amended (49 U.S.C. 1383 and 1384) and procedures governing 
proceedings to enforce these provisions. Answers may be filed within 21 
days after the filing of the application.
    Docket Number: OST-2007-28173.
    Date Filed: May 8, 2007.
    Parties: Members of the International Air Transport Association.
    Subject: CAC/35/Meet/007/07 dated, Expedited Resolutions 801r, 809, 
809e, 819, 851 & 853 (Minutes relevant to the Resolutions are included 
in CAC/35/Meet/006/07 dated 1 May 2007).
    Intended effective date: 1 July 2007.

Renee V. Wright,
Program Manager, Docket Operations, Federal Register Liaison.
[FR Doc. E7-9827 Filed 5-21-07; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910-9X-P
# C_2012200EN.01001702.xml

| 7.7.2012 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 200/17 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

7.7.2012

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 200/17

---

Action brought on 25 April 2012 — European Dynamics Luxembourg and Evropaiki Dinamiki — Proigmena Sistimata Tilepikinonion Pliroforikis kai Tilematikis v European Police Office (Europol)

(Case T-183/12)

2012/C 200/36

Language of the case: Greek

Parties

Parties

Applicant: European Dynamics Luxembourg SA (Ettelbrück, Luxembourg) and Evropaiki Dinamiki — Proigmena Sistimata Tilepikinonion Pliroforikis kai Tilematikis AE (Athens, Greece) (represented by: V Christianos, lawyer)

Applicant:

Defendant: European Police Office (Europol).

Defendant:

Form of order sought

Form of order sought

By this action the applicants claim that the General Court should:

| — | annul the decision dated 16 February 2012 of the European Police Office (Europol) whereby it awarded to the company Capgemini Nederland BV the framework contract in the open tendering procedure No D/C3/1104; |
| --- | --- |

—

annul the decision dated 16 February 2012 of the European Police Office (Europol) whereby it awarded to the company Capgemini Nederland BV the framework contract in the open tendering procedure No D/C3/1104;

| — | order Europol to pay compensation to the applicants for the loss of opportunity which the award to them of framework contract would have brought, which they estimate at EUR 161 887, with interest from the date of delivery of the judgment; and |
| --- | --- |

—

order Europol to pay compensation to the applicants for the loss of opportunity which the award to them of framework contract would have brought, which they estimate at EUR 161 887, with interest from the date of delivery of the judgment; and

| — | order Europol to pay the entirety of the applicants’ costs. |
| --- | --- |

—

order Europol to pay the entirety of the applicants’ costs.

Pleas in law and main arguments

Pleas in law and main arguments

The applicants consider that the contested decision should be annulled, under Article 263 TFEU, because Europol altered in the course of the tendering procedure many of the award criteria in relation to the assessment both of the technical and financial offers of the tenderers, blatantly infringing the applicable provisions of the Financial Regulation 1605/2002 (1) and the Implementing Rules 2342/2002 (2) and settled case-law.

1

2

---

(1)  Council Regulation (EC, Euratom) No 1605/2002 of 25 June 2002 on the Financial Regulation applicable to the general budget of the European Communities.

1

(2)  Commission Regulation (EC, Euratom) No 2342/2002 of 23 December 2002 laying down detailed rules for the implementation of Council Regulation (EC, Euratom) No 1605/2002 on the Financial Regulation applicable to the general budget of the European Communities.

2

---
#### Asbury B. Porter, plaintiff in error, *vs.*Thomas W. Lane, defendant in error.

*Error to*Henry.

The addition of the similiter is mere matter of form and is not ground of error, after trial by consent especially.

If demurrers ate undisposed of when parties go to trial upon issues of fact, they will be considered as waived by the demurant, and the Supreme Court will not disturb the judgment below in consequence of such irregularity.

This was an action of debt brought by Lane against Porter, in the District Court of Henry county, upon a prommissory note for $100, *198given by Porter to Lane, November 24, 1838, payable one day after date.

The cause was tried at the September term 1841, before Judge Mason, and judgment for plaintiff.

Porter, plaintiff in error, by Hall, his attorney,

assigns:

1. There were no issues made up upon which this case can be decided.

2. There is no assessment of damages, either by the court, clerk or jury.

G. W. Teas, for defendant in error.

Per Curiam,

Mason, Chief Justice

The first error assigned by the plaintiff in error, is, that there were no issues made up upon which the case was decided. The defendant below, who is the plaintiff here, had filed two special pleas. To these there were special demurrers and also general replications, broadly traversing the allegations of those pleas, and concluding to the country. The addition of the similiter was a mere matter of form, the omission of which does not render the proceedings substantially defective; especially after going to trial by consent.

The fact, that the demurrers of *the*defendant in error were undis-posed of, cannot be successfully objected to here. By consenting to go to trial on issues of fact, the party filing the demurrers must be understood as having waived them, for they should have been disposed of before the issues of fact were taken up, if they were to have been considered at all. At all events no objection can be taken by the plaintiff in error, on account of the demurrers to his plea never having been taken up and decided upon.

The other error assigned is that there is no assessment of damages, either by the court, clerk or jury. The record shows that the case was submitted to the court, and judgment rendered for the plaintiff for the sum of one hundred dollars debt, and six dollars and seventy-five cents damages. Now if this submission was in relation to the issue of fact, there has clearly been no error so far as appears from the record. The case was submitted and judgment rendered for the plaintiff below. It is contended there was no assessment of damages by the court; but how does that fact appear *1*The record states no such thing. The cour must have arrived at the amount of the verdict in some manner or other. *199After finding for the plaintiff, the amount was the subject of computation. There is no allegation that any error was made in that computation. It is immaterial therefore, in what manner the result; was reached. We see no eror in the case. The judgment below will be affirmed.
# C_2015138EN.01001701.xml

| 27.4.2015 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 138/17 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

27.4.2015

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 138/17

---

Judgment of the Court (Second Chamber) of 5 March 2015 (request for a preliminary ruling from the Tribunal do Comércio de Lisboa — Portugal) — Estado português v Banco Privado Português SA, in liquidation, Massa Insolvente do Banco Privado Português SA

(Case C-667/13) (1)

1

((Reference for a preliminary ruling - State aid - State guarantee underwriting a loan - Decision 2011/346/EU - Questions concerning validity - Admissibility - Article 107(1) TFEU - Statement of reasons - Effect on trade between Member States - Article 107(3)(b) TFEU - Serious disturbance in the economy of a Member State))

(2015/C 138/21)

Language of the case: Portuguese

Referring court

Referring court

Tribunal do Comércio de Lisboa

Parties to the main proceedings

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: Estado português

Applicant:

Defendants: Banco Privado Português SA, in liquidation, Massa Insolvente do Banco Privado Português SA

Defendants:

Operative part of the judgment

Operative part of the judgment

Examination of the questions referred for a preliminary ruling by the Tribunal do Comércio de Lisboa (Portugal) has disclosed nothing capable of affecting the validity of Commission Decision 2011/346/EU of 20 July 2010 on the State aid C 33/09 (ex NN 57/09, CP 191/09) implemented by Portugal in the form of a State guarantee to BPP.

---

(1)  OJ C 93, 29.3.2014.

1

---
# C_2014052EN.01003503.xml

| 22.2.2014 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 52/35 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

22.2.2014

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 52/35

---

Judgment of the General Court of 16 January 2014 — Steiff v OHIM (Metal button in the middle section of the ear of a soft toy)

(Case T-433/12) (1)

1

(Community trade mark - Application for a Community trade mark consisting of fixing a metal button in the middle section of the ear of a soft toy - Absolute ground for refusal - Lack of distinctiveness - Article 7(1)(b) of Regulation (EC) 207/2009)

2014/C 52/66

Language of the case: German

Parties

Parties

Applicant: Margarete Steiff GmbH (Giengen an der Brenz, Germany) (represented by: D. Fissl, lawyer)

Applicant:

Defendant: Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade Marks and Designs) (represented by: A. Pohlmann, Agent)

Defendant:

Re:

Re:

Action brought against the decision of the First Board of Appeal of OHIM of 23 July 2012 (Case R 1693/2011-1) concerning an application for registration of a sign consisting of fixing of a metal button in the middle section of the ear of a soft toy as a Community trade mark.

Operative part of the judgment

Operative part of the judgment

The Court:

| 1. | Dismisses the action; |
| --- | --- |

1.

Dismisses the action;

| 2. | Orders Margarete Steiff GmbH to pay the costs. |
| --- | --- |

2.

Orders Margarete Steiff GmbH to pay the costs.

---

(1)  OJ C 366, 24.11.2012.

1

---
No. 47063.

#### Protest 55326-K of Edward Boote (New York).

Opinion by

Oliver, P. J.

It appeared from a special report by the appraiser that the chinaware is not chiefly used for the amusement of children and would now be returned for duty at 45 percent under paragraph 212 and T. D. 49753. In accordance therewith the protest was sustained.
Exhibit 32.1


                    Bingham Canyon Corporation

                 CERTIFICATION OF PERIODIC REPORT
    Pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002
                      18 U.S.C. Section 1350

The undersigned executive officer of Bingham Canyon Corporation (the
"Company") certifies pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002
that:

a.   the quarterly report on Form 10-QSB of the Company for the quarter ended
     June 30, 2006, fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or
     15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

b.   the information contained in the Form 10-QSB fairly presents, in all
     material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of
     the Company.


                               /s/ Brett D. Mayer
Date: August 8, 2006           __________________________________________
                               Brett D. Mayer
                               Principal Executive Officer
                               Principal Financial Officer
No. 46471.

#### Protest 62882-K of S & M Segerman (New York).

Opinion by

Walker, J.

In accordance with stipulation of counsel and on the authority of *Brachman*v. *United States*(5 Cust. Ct. 153, C. D. 389) the claim for free entry under paragraph 1681 was sustained.
EXHIBIT 32.2


            CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934
                         RULE 13a-14(b) OR 15d-14(b) AND
                             18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
                             AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002


In connection  with the transition  report of Petrogen Corp.  (the "Company") on
Form 10-KSB for the period ended December 31, 2003, as filed with the Securities
and  Exchange  Commission  on the date  hereof  (the  "Report"),  I, L.  William
Kerrigan,  Executive Vice President of the Company, certifies for the purpose of
complying with Rule  13a-14(b) or Rule 15d-14(b) of the Securities  Exchange Act
of 1934 (the  "Exchange  Act") and Section 1350 of Chapter 63 of Title 18 of the
United States Code, that:

1. the Report fully complies with the  requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of
the  Exchange  Act;  and 2.  the  information  contained  in the  Report  fairly
presents,  in all material  respects,  the  financial  condition  and results of
operations of the Company.




Dated: April 14, 2004                       By:  /s/ L. WILLIAM KERRIGAN
                                                 ____________________________
                                                     L. William Kerrigan
                                                     Executive Vice President
#### James Anderson, plaintiff in error, *vs.*Martin Brown, defendant in error.

*Error to Desmoines.*

It is not a misdescription of a note to state that the defendant “ at Burlington ” made, &c., altho’ it does not appear on the face of the note, that it was given there.

This was an action of assumpsit on a promissory note given by Anderson to Brown, for $176,96. Judgment was rendered at March term, 1842, in the District Court of Desmoines county. Chief Justice Mason, presiding.

Anderson, the defendant below, brings the case hereby writ of error.

Rorer, for plaintiff in error.

Grimes & Starr, for defendant in error.

By the Court,

Mason, Chief Justice.

This was an action brought on the following promissory note:

> “ On or before the first day of January next, I promise *to*pay Martin Brown the sum of one hundred and seventy-six dollars and ninety-six cents, for value received of him.

> “July 23, 1842. JAMES ANDERSON.”

The declaration commences: “ For that whereas the said defendant heretofore, to wit: on the 23d day of July 1841, at Burlington, in the county afoiesaid, made his certian promissory note, &c. The only error assigned is that the declaration sets forth the note as having been made at Burlington, whereas the copy does not show the place of its execution. If the declaration had stated the note to have been dated at Burlington, it would have been a misdescription, but even then, agree*159ably to the decision in Walker & Ene vs. Ayers, decided at this terra of the court, no advantage could have been taken of the variance except by special demurrer, in as much as the copy seems to be correct.

At all events there is nothing to show a variance between the copy and the original note.

But in the present case, there is no misdescription, which even a special demurrer would have reached. The declaration states that the ’ note was executed at Burlington, and what is there to show that such was not the fact ? It is true the note does not on its face purport to have been executed there, but the declaration made no allegation of that kind. There is no variance, and the judgment below will be affirmed.

Judgment affirmed.
(Reap. Dec. 9465)

#### Fabius & Company, Inc. *v.*United States

Entry No. 816384.

(Decided June 16, 1959)

Plaintiff not represented by counsel.

*George Ooehran Louh,*Assistant Attorney General, for the defendant.

Lawrence, Judge:

When the above-enumerated appeal for a re-appraisement was called for hearing, there was no appearance on behalf of plaintiff. The court thereupon ordered the case submitted.

Rule 5 (a) of the rules of the court provides that—

> The submission for decision of any case shall be made in open court by the parties thereto or their attorneys, or by stipulation, or by written request to the court, or by the court on its own motion. Where the plaintiff, petitioner, or appellant, or his attorney, in a case does not appear when the same is called, and after the opposite party has had opportunity to present evidence on the issues, it may be deemed submitted and may be decided by the court on the record as it appears therein.

Accordingly, I have examined the record in the appeal before the court and find nothing therein which tends in any way to overcome the presumption of correctness which attaches to the decision of the appraiser. I find and hold, therefore, that the proper value of the merchandise is the value returned by the appraiser.

Judgment will be entered accordingly.