GAO

United States General Accounting Office

Report to the Chairman, Committee on 

Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate

January 2001 EMBASSY 

CONSTRUCTION

Better Long-Term 

Planning Will Enhance 

Program 

Decision-making

GAO-01-11

Page 1 GAO-01-11 Embassy Construction Program

Contents

Letter 3

Appendixes Appendix I: Funding for the State Department’s Embassy Security 

Construction Program 22

Appendix II: Overview of State’s Initial 10 Priority Projects 26

Appendix III: Factors Contributing to Costs of New Embassies and 

Consulates 53

Appendix IV: Initiatives to Improve Management and Project Delivery 

Processes at the Office of Foreign Buildings Operations 54

Appendix V: Comments From the Department of State 57

Appendix VI: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments 63

Tables Table 1: Expected Occupancy Date, Number of Personnel, and 

Estimated Cost for State’s 10 Priority Projects 7

Table 2: Status of U.S. Embassy and Consulate Security

Construction Funds 22

Table 3: State’s Planned Use of 1999 Emergency Supplemental 

Funds to Begin Replacing Seven Highest-risk 

Embassies and Consulates 23

Table 4: State’s Planned Use of Fiscal Year 2000 Funds to 

Continue Replacement Program 24

Table 5: New Embassy Project in Kampala, Uganda 27

Table 6: New Embassy Project in Doha, Qatar 29

Table 7: New Embassy Project in Tunis, Tunisia 32

Table 8: New Embassy Project in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania 35

Table 9: New Embassy Project in Nairobi, Kenya 38

Table 10: New Consulate Project in Istanbul, Turkey 40

Table 11: New Embassy Project in Zagreb, Croatia 42

Table 12: New Consulate Project in São Paulo, Brazil 45

Table 13: New Consulate Project in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil 48

Table 14: New Embassy Project in Luanda, Angola 51

Figures Figure 1: Construction Underway at Site in Kampala, Uganda, 

as of September 2000 9

Figure 2: Existing Embassy in Kampala, Uganda 27

Figure 3: New Embassy Planned for Kampala, Uganda 28

Figure 4: Embassy in Doha, Qatar, Prior to Bombings in Africa 30

Figure 5: New Embassy Planned for Doha, Qatar 31
Contents

Page 2 GAO-01-11 Embassy Construction Program

Figure 6: Existing Embassy in Tunis, Tunisia 33

Figure 7: New Embassy Planned for Tunis, Tunisia 34

Figure 8: Embassy in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, Before Bombing 36

Figure 9: Design for New Embassy in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania 36

Figure 10: Embassy in Nairobi, Kenya, Before Bombing 38

Figure 11: New Embassy Design for Nairobi, Kenya 39

Figure 12: Existing Consulate in Istanbul, Turkey 41

Figure 13: Design for New Consulate in Istanbul, 

Turkey 41

Figure 14: Existing Embassy in Zagreb, Croatia 43

Figure 15: New Embassy Planned for Zagreb, Croatia 44

Figure 16: Existing Consulate in São Paulo, Brazil 46

Figure 17: Existing Consulate in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil 49

Figure 18: Existing Embassy in Luanda, Angola 51

Figure 19: Design for New Embassy in Luanda, Angola 52

Abbreviations

USAID U.S. Agency for International Development
Page 3 GAO-01-11 Embassy Construction Program

United States General Accounting Office

Washington, D.C. 20548

Letr

January 22, 2001

The Honorable Jesse Helms

Chairman, Committee on Foreign Relations

United States Senate

Dear Mr. Chairman:

The State Department has determined that about 80 percent of overseas 

U.S. diplomatic facilities do not have adequate security and may be 

vulnerable to terrorist attack. In August 1998, after the U.S. embassies in 

Nairobi, Kenya, and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, were bombed by terrorists, 

the State Department began a program to replace its vulnerable facilities on 

an accelerated basis with new, secure embassies and consulates. State 

selected 10 projects that it believed should be built first.1

 State envisions a 

10- to 15-year program costing $15 billion or more for construction projects 

in more than 180 locations around the world where the existing facilities 

may be vulnerable. Planning and implementing this program will be a 

massive and difficult undertaking, requiring that State, other U.S. agencies, 

and the Congress work together to determine facility needs, priorities, and 

funding levels. The Congress has appropriated a total of about $1.1 billion 

for this program for fiscal years 1999, 2000, and 2001.

In response to your concerns regarding the planning and execution of this 

multibillion dollar program, we (1) determined the status of the 10 priority 

embassy and consulate construction projects and (2) assessed State’s plans 

for the overall construction program. As you requested, we also identified 

the steps State is considering to improve the management of its Office of 

Foreign Buildings Operations, which is responsible for managing the 

embassy construction program, as well as State’s efforts to increase the 

efficiency of its embassy construction processes. This information is 

contained in appendix IV. 

1

The priority projects are in Kampala, Uganda; Doha, Qatar; Tunis, Tunisia; Dar es Salaam, 

Tanzania; Nairobi, Kenya; Istanbul, Turkey; Zagreb, Croatia; São Paulo and Rio de Janeiro, 

Brazil; and Luanda, Angola.
Page 4 GAO-01-11 Embassy Construction Program

Results in Brief In September 1998, State expanded its capital construction program to 

accelerate replacing its most vulnerable embassies and consulates by 

acquiring sites and preparing plans at 10 priority locations. As of November 

2000, seven projects are in the construction phase.2

 The remaining three 

projects are on hold pending agreement between State and congressional 

committees regarding the Department’s construction proposals. The first 

replacement projects scheduled for completion are the embassies in 

Kampala, Uganda, and Doha, Qatar, in 2001; and Tunis, Tunisia, and Dar es 

Salaam, Tanzania, in 2002. Two more embassies and one consulate are 

expected to be completed in 2003, and completion dates for three projects 

have not yet been established. 

Although State envisions a long-term, multi-billion dollar program and has 

ranked over 180 facilities it may need to replace, it has not prepared a 

long-term capital construction plan that identifies (1) proposed 

construction projects’ cost estimates and schedules and (2) estimated 

annual funding requirements for the overall program. Long-term capital 

planning is a best practice that has proven useful to other organizations in 

the public and private sector for controlling capital costs and providing 

decisionmakers a rationale for allocating funding. Leading organizations 

develop long-term capital plans to guide implementation of organizational 

goals and objectives and help decisionmakers establish priorities over the 

long term. Moreover, preparation and use of a long-term capital 

construction plan would be in the mutual interests of both the executive 

and legislative branches in their efforts to reach consensus on the 

program’s requirements. A long-term plan would facilitate congressional 

consideration of State’s funding requests and could help to establish 

accountability for program results. 

To enhance program decision-making and accountability, we are 

recommending that the Department prepare and present a long-term 

capital construction plan to the Congress. Because the State Department 

indicated that it does not plan to implement our recommendation, we are 

also including a matter for congressional consideration to require that State 

prepare such a plan and present it to the Congress. 

2

Construction is underway and/or a construction contract has been signed.
Page 5 GAO-01-11 Embassy Construction Program

Background The State Department has security standards for U.S. diplomatic facilities 

to protect employees and property.3

 A key legal requirement is that new 

embassy and consulate buildings have a setback of 100 feet from the 

exterior wall of the building to the perimeter wall or fence to provide 

protection against blast and for other reasons. To provide adequate 

security, State has determined that it needs to replace most existing 

facilities that do not meet these standards.4

 Although the Department of 

State has made substantial security enhancements at U.S. embassies and 

consulates,5

 including acquiring adjacent properties to increase setback, 

building concrete barriers, and installing electronic cameras and sensors, 

these enhancements cannot bring most existing facilities in line with the 

desired setback and related blast protection requirements because the 

facilities are on small pieces of land. Larger building sites, which are 

expensive and frequently hard to acquire in urban areas, are typically 

needed to construct new facilities with sufficient setback to protect against 

attacks.6

After the Africa bombings, the administration established two 

Accountability Review Boards, pursuant to the Omnibus Diplomatic 

Security and Anti-Terrorism Act of 1986 (P. L. 99-399, 22 U.S.C. 4831, et seq., 

as amended), to review the circumstances surrounding the bombings and 

State’s vulnerability to terrorist threats.7

 In January 1999, the boards made 

recommendations on responding to terrorist threats, strengthening 

security standards and procedures, determining the size and composition 

3

State implements standards established by the Overseas Security Policy Board. These 

standards are contained in State’s “Foreign Affairs Handbook.”

4

At some posts, State has been able to acquire property adjoining the existing embassy or 

consulate, or make other security modifications, thereby enhancing security without 

replacing the existing facility. 

5

On March 8, 2000, we reported on State’s actions to improve security at existing facilities. 

(See State Department: Overseas Emergency Security Program Progressing, but Costs Are 

Increasing (GAO/NSIAD-00-83)).

6

According to State, the blast mitigation standard permits a setback of less than 100 feet if 

the protection offered by modified construction techniques is equivalent to that offered by a 

standard blast-resistant building with a 100-foot setback.

7

The two boards were led by Admiral William J. Crowe, Jr. One board focused on the 

bombing in Nairobi, Kenya, and the other focused on the bombing in Dar es Salaam, 

Tanzania. The boards issued a joint report in January 1999 entitled Report of the 

Accountability Review Boards on the Embassy Bombings in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam.
Page 6 GAO-01-11 Embassy Construction Program

of U.S. missions, and providing funding for safe buildings and security 

programs in the future. The boards recommended that State receive

$1 billion annually over a 10-year period to construct new, secure facilities.

The State Department’s Office of Foreign Buildings Operations is 

responsible for managing construction of embassies and consulates as well 

as performing construction-related security upgrades and maintaining 

overseas properties valued at over $12 billion. Throughout the 1990s, this 

Office typically received about $400 million yearly to carry out its routine, 

real property functions. In this time period, the Office also managed the 

completion of the construction of more than 20 new embassy and 

consulate facilities, most of which were authorized and funded under the 

Omnibus Diplomatic Security and Anti-Terrorism Act of 1986 (commonly 

called the “Inman Program”). 

In fiscal years 1999, 2000, and 2001, State received a total of about

$1.1 billion to build new, secure embassies and consulates.8

 State had also 

requested an advance appropriation of $3.35 billion for fiscal years 2002-

2005 to ensure a steady stream of funding for an expanded construction 

program, but this was not approved by the Congress. The Conference 

Committee Reports on State’s appropriations for embassy construction 

have directed State to submit a plan on how it plans to use the money. The 

reports also direct State to receive approval of the appropriations 

committees before an obligation or expenditure of funds for capital and 

rehabilitation projects.9

 If issues arise with a particular proposal or project, 

State pursues a number of options with the Committees, including making 

adjustments to the planned project and/or reprogramming of appropriated 

funds for other projects. Appendix I provides greater detail on State’s 

budget requests and related Committee actions. 

8

In addition to replacing vulnerable facilities under the embassy security construction 

program, State’s budget included about $40 million for other capital projects during fiscal 

years 1999 to 2000. 

9

Pursuant to the Omnibus Consolidated and Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act, 

1999 (P.L. 105-277), the Consolidated Appropriations Act for Fiscal Year 2000 (P.L. 106-113), 

and the State Department’s Fiscal Year 2001 Appropriations Act (P.L. 106-553), and the 

accompanying Conference Reports (H. Rept. 105-825, H. Rept. 106-479, and H.Rept. 

106-1005, respectively). 
Page 7 GAO-01-11 Embassy Construction Program

Status of Initial 

Projects 

Following the 1998 embassy bombings, State placed a priority on 10 

projects.10 These projects were for five posts in Africa—Kampala, Uganda; 

Dar es Salaam, Tanzania; Nairobi, Kenya; Tunis, Tunisia; and Luanda, 

Angola—and five posts in other regions—Doha, Qatar; Istanbul, Turkey; 

São Paulo and Rio de Janeiro, Brazil; and Zagreb, Croatia. Seven of the 10 

projects are moving forward, and 3 are on hold. State also began to identify 

sites and perform preliminary planning for projects at more than 30 other 

posts. (See app. I.)

Table 1 shows scheduled occupancy dates, planned number of personnel at 

the post, and estimated cost for State’s first 10 priority projects, as of 

November 2000. Appendix II provides a detailed description of the status of 

the 10 priority projects.

Table 1: Expected Occupancy Date, Number of Personnel, and Estimated Cost for State’s 10 Priority Projects

a

According to State, project costs are not easy to compare to each other because of unique local 

conditions, such as local economy and workforce, taxes, fees and permits, delivery system, weather, 

and site topography.

b

Preliminary cost estimates.

10In addition, State reestablished operations in interim facilities in Nairobi, Kenya, and 

Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, and moved the embassy in Doha, Qatar, into more secure interim 

facilities.

Dollars in millions

Location of project Project phase

Expected occupancy 

date

Facility size by number

of personnel Estimated cost a

Kampala, Uganda Construction Jan. 2001 96 $32.5

Doha, Qatar Construction Apr. 2001 74 22.5

Tunis, Tunisia Construction Sept. 2002 104 86.0

Dar es Salaam, Tanzania Construction Nov. 2002 98 51.2

Nairobi, Kenya Construction Mar. 2003 278 67.8

Istanbul, Turkey Construction Apr. 2003 141 83.2

Zagreb, Croatia Construction May 2003 142 66.9

São Paulo, Brazil Design (on hold) Undetermined Undetermined 101.9b

Rio de Janeiro, Brazil Site purchase (on hold) Undetermined Undetermined 96.8b

Luanda, Angola Design completed (on 

hold)

Undetermined 98 39.2c

Total $648.0
Page 8 GAO-01-11 Embassy Construction Program

c

Cost estimates are based on initial State assumptions that a construction contract would have been 

awarded in October 2000.

Source: Department of State data.

The estimated costs for these projects ranged between $22 million and 

about $100 million. According to State, these costs are much higher than 

for a typical commercial office building of similar size in the United States 

due to several factors, including basic structural requirements, the unique 

access control and security requirements, and the difficulties associated 

with construction in developing countries. Appendix III provides more 

information about some of the factors contributing to the costs for 

constructing diplomatic facilities. 

Seven Projects Moving 

Ahead

Seven of the 10 priority projects are progressing and are in the construction 

phase. The first project scheduled for completion is in Kampala. State 

signed a design/build contract for this project with a major U.S. contractor 

in September 1999 and move-in is scheduled for January 2001. Because of 

security concerns at the post, the Kampala project was “fast-tracked” on 

the most compressed schedule ever attempted by State. Construction is 

scheduled to be completed in about 15 months, which is about half the time 

normally required for the construction phase of a project of similar size.11

Figure 1 illustrates the status of construction.

11According to State, in the past it has taken 5 to 7 years to acquire a site, design, and 

construct a typical new embassy under traditional (design, bid, and build) delivery systems. 
Page 9 GAO-01-11 Embassy Construction Program

Figure 1: Construction Underway at Site in Kampala, Uganda, as of September 2000

Source: State Department.

The second project scheduled for completion is in Doha, Qatar. State has 

leased an unfinished building in Doha to replace its current embassy. 

Construction by a local firm began in August 1999 to retrofit the building to 

meet embassy requirements, and the move-in is scheduled for April 2001. 

In Nairobi and Dar es Salaam, the contractor is preparing the site for 

construction (site mobilization). In September 1999, State hired a major 

U.S. construction firm to design and build these embassies.12 Construction 

contracts have been signed for the projects in Zagreb, Tunis, and Istanbul. 

Three Projects Are on Hold As of November 2000, State’s site acquisition/design proposal for a new 

consulate in Rio de Janeiro, its design proposal for a new consulate in 

12The compounds include separate facilities for the embassy and offices for the U.S. Agency 

for International Development (USAID). Construction funding for the USAID facility in 

Dar es Salaam has been received, and funding for the USAID facility in Nairobi was included 

in State’s fiscal year 2001 budget request.
Page 10 GAO-01-11 Embassy Construction Program

São Paulo, and its construction proposal for a new embassy in Luanda, 

were on hold.

According to State officials, State’s site acquisition proposal for Rio de 

Janeiro encountered congressional concerns that State had not adequately 

considered options for reducing post size by (1) combining some post 

functions in regional operations and (2) right-sizing consular operations in 

Brazil, which include major operations in both Rio de Janeiro and 

São Paulo. In addition to the existing embassy in Brasilia, Brazil, State 

proposed to spend about $200 million to build two new consulates—one in 

Rio de Janeiro to accommodate about 145 personnel and one in São Paulo 

to accommodate 97 staff. The congressional concerns are consistent with 

overseas staffing issues identified in our prior work.13 For several years, we 

have encouraged the executive branch to rethink its overseas presence 

with a view to right-sizing posts and conducting regional operations where 

feasible. Because the Congress has not approved State’s proposal for the 

Rio de Janeiro project, State has notified the Congress of its intent to 

reprogram $22.8 million from the fiscal year 1999 supplemental 

appropriation for this project to partially fund the project in Abu Dhabi, 

United Arab Emirates.14 In September 2000, State signed a design/build 

construction contract for a new embassy in Abu Dhabi.

For the project in São Paulo, site acquisition has been approved but 

according to State officials, the Senate Appropriations Committee has not 

approved State’s plan to demolish buildings on the site. The Committee 

suggested that State attempt to incorporate the existing buildings into its 

overall construction design. State does not believe that it would be feasible 

to bring the existing buildings up to security standards and plans to discuss 

other options with the Committee. 

The proposed construction project in Luanda is not moving forward 

because of congressional concerns that it does not meet the 100-foot 

setback requirement. State proposed building a facility with a 65-foot 

setback, which is 35 feet less than required by State’s current security 

13Our July 19, 2000, testimony high-lighted the ongoing attempts to right-size U.S. overseas 

presence at embassies and consulates as one of the management challenges facing State 

(State Department: Progress and Challenges in Managing for Results

(GAO/T-NSIAD/AIMD-00-254)). 

14State had initially planned to use $2 million in fiscal year 2000 funds to conduct a site 

survey and initiate design for a new facility in Abu Dhabi.
Page 11 GAO-01-11 Embassy Construction Program

standards. The Secretary of State granted a waiver from the security 

standards based on State’s plan to design the building to meet blast 

standards at the lesser distance. According to State, potential blast effects 

on the planned facility would be mitigated by strengthened construction 

methods and techniques, providing equal security performance to that of a 

standard blast-resistant building with a 100-foot setback, thus providing the 

same level of protection. State indicated that the alternative sites it had 

identified that would meet the setback requirements did not have a secure 

title due to uncertainties regarding land ownership in Luanda. According to 

State officials, as of November 2000, the Congress had not agreed to 

provide security appropriations for the Department’s Luanda project. 

State Has Ranked 

Future Projects, but 

Has Not Developed a 

Long-Term 

Construction Plan

State envisions a long-term program, but it has not prepared a long-term 

capital construction plan for facility replacement that identifies the 

estimated cost and construction schedules for planned projects, as well as 

projected annual funding requirements for the overall program. According 

to State officials, it is difficult to accurately estimate long-term 

construction costs and schedules and they cited changing staffing needs 

and space requirements as one of the primary reasons. State also indicated 

that construction schedules will depend on the level of funding provided by 

the Congress. Industry and local government leaders use long-term capital 

plans as management and oversight tools even when the plans are based on 

preliminary assumptions and estimates. Those estimates and assumptions 

are typically revised and refined as information becomes available, further 

enhancing the decision-making process. 

State has ranked the more than 180 facilities that it proposes to replace 

and/or provide with major security enhancements into groups or “bands” of 

20 in order from the most vulnerable to the least vulnerable to terrorist 

attack. The ranking, which is provided to the Congress annually, is intended 

to serve as a guide for which embassies and consulates State would replace 

first. In addition to its 10 priority projects, State’s planned uses of funds 

appropriated and/or requested for fiscal years 1999-2001 included initial 

project planning, site identification, and/or site acquisition stages for 

potential construction projects at more than 30 posts. State had also 

requested an advance appropriation of $3.35 billion as part of the fiscal 

year 2001 budget to continue the replacement program in fiscal years 2002 
Page 12 GAO-01-11 Embassy Construction Program

through 2005.15 In its budget request, State did not identify specific 

projects, or their potential costs and replacement schedules, for the 

requested advance appropriation. According to State officials, although the 

request did not identify specific projects, costs, and schedules, they had 

intended to use the funds to address projects primarily in the first three 

bands. 

However, State officials said that some of State’s initial site acquisition 

proposals at these posts have encountered congressional opposition. For 

example, the Senate Appropriations Committee approval was denied in 

April and later in September 2000 for the acquisition of proposed sites in 

Antananarivo, Madagascar; Bamako, Mali; Bujumbura, Burundi; Karachi, 

Pakistan; and Sarajevo, Bosnia-Herzegovina. According to State officials, 

issues that have led to difficulties in obtaining Committee approval 

included questions about the location of proposed sites and the priority of 

projects. State indicated that it is working to resolve these issues and that it 

hopes to receive congressional support so it can move forward on 

proposals and will remain able to acquire its preferred sites in the future.

State’s planning for the program focuses on its ranking of banded projects 

along with a more detailed budget submission for the upcoming fiscal year. 

State does not clearly indicate the order that projects will be done; identify 

estimated costs for critical project elements, such as site acquisition and 

construction; or indicate project completion schedules beyond the 

upcoming fiscal year. 

State officials questioned the value of preparing and presenting a longerterm, more detailed plan at this time largely because of uncertainties 

involving future funding and the limited availability of acceptable sites. 

They also cited uncertainties about estimating project costs early in the 

program cycle; the difficulties sometimes encountered with other “tenant” 

agencies in planning their personnel and space requirements in new 

embassies; and the risks associated with working in overseas 

environments. While we agree such factors affect programs, their existence 

dictates the need for sound planning to ensure program objectives are met 

in the most effective and efficient manner. The advantages of long-term 

planning have been endorsed by industry and local government leaders as 

15As mentioned earlier, the Conference Report on State’s Fiscal Year 2001 Appropriations 

Act did not include this amount (H.Rept. 106-1005).
Page 13 GAO-01-11 Embassy Construction Program

an effective management tool for controlling costs and making more 

effective decisions.

Industry and Local 

Government Leaders 

Prepare Long-Term Capital 

Plans

In our December 1998 Executive Guide on Capital Decision-Making,16 we 

reported that leading private sector and local state organizations not only 

rank their future capital projects based on applicable criteria, but they also 

prepare long-term capital plans based on preliminary assumptions and 

estimates to identify specific planned projects, plan for resource use over 

the long term, and establish priorities for implementation. These plans 

usually cover 5-, 6-, or 10-year periods and are updated either annually or 

biennially. Industry and state government leaders have also found that

long-term plans help control capital costs. Developing long-term capital 

plans also enables these organizations to review and refine a proposed 

project’s scope and cost estimates over several years, which helps reduce 

cost overruns. 

For example, one medium-sized state government we have studied 

prepares a 5-year capital plan that assists the government in refining the 

scope and cost estimate of individual project requests. An annual review of 

capital project proposals in the plan allows the state budget office to 

determine if a project continues to meet the goals and objectives outlined 

by the agencies. State governmental officials believe that this up-front 

planning and continuous reviews are key factors in why the state has 

limited cost overruns and few surprises once project funding is approved.

While the cost estimates contained in long-term capital plans are 

preliminary, they provide decisionmakers with an overall sense of a 

project’s funding needs. Moreover, the Office of Management of Budget 

encourages federal agencies to develop long-term agency capital plans as 

part of their capital planning process. Our prior work at the General 

Services Administration has shown that long-term strategic planning for 

federal courthouse construction is critical to helping congressional 

decisionmakers compare and evaluate the merits of project proposals and 

priorities and to providing a rationale for providing resources to the highest 

priority projects.17

16Executive Guide: Leading Practices in Capital Decision-Making (GAO/AIMD-99-32, 

Dec. 1998).

17Courthouse Construction: Improved 5-Year Plan Could Promote More Informed 

Decision-Making (GAO/GGD-97-27, Dec. 31, 1996).
Page 14 GAO-01-11 Embassy Construction Program

Moreover, in a recent prepared statement for the Congress,18 Admiral 

Crowe, Chairman of the Accountability Review Boards set up to investigate 

the embassy bombings in Africa, supported the formulation of a long-term 

capital plan for embassy construction in view of the threats staff face at 

overseas embassies and consulates. 

Studies Undertaken for 

Planning and Managing 

Construction Program 

While State has expressed a reluctance to prepare a long-term plan for 

embassy and consulate replacements, it is conducting a series of studies 

that could provide valuable inputs into the preparation of a long-term plan 

that would strengthen the overall management process. These studies 

represent a significant part of State’s efforts to determine future resource 

and funding needs of the program. In May 2000, the Office of Foreign 

Buildings Operations initiated several studies. One study is underway to 

identify alternative construction schedules for the life of the program based 

on preliminary cost and funding assumptions. Preliminary results of the 

study have been submitted to Office management, but completion dates for 

the study have not been set.

A second study is assessing potential industry bottlenecks that could affect 

construction. Potential problems to be addressed include availability of 

appropriately cleared U.S. labor; construction materials; and unique 

security materials, such as glazing for windows and forced entry- and 

ballistic-resistant doors. The Office of Foreign Buildings Operations 

expects that the study will be completed in fiscal year 2001.

A third study is determining what additional staffing and contractor 

resources may be necessary to implement and manage the program. The 

Office of Foreign Buildings Operations has had a staffing increase19 since 

the Africa bombings, but its officials indicated that additional staffing or 

contracting resources to manage the construction program may be 

required. Although no date has been set for completion of this study, the 

Office expects that preliminary results will be available in the third quarter 

of fiscal year 2001.

18House Committee on International Relations, Feb. 2, 2000. 

19As of September 30, 2000, the Office had filled 71 of 84 of the direct hire and personal 

services contractor positions authorized under the emergency security appropriation. 

Approximately 771 personnel were on board at that time.
Page 15 GAO-01-11 Embassy Construction Program

The State Department is also studying the size and deployment of the U.S. 

overseas presence, which are key factors affecting construction 

requirements and costs at overseas posts. The January 1999 report of the 

Accountability Review Boards concluded that as the United States works 

to upgrade the physical security of U.S. missions, it should also consider 

reducing the costs and number of embassies through the use of modern 

technology and regional operations. To begin implementing this 

recommendation, a State-appointed panel reviewed the overseas 

operations of the U.S. government and concluded that the U.S. presence 

has not adequately adjusted to the new economic, political, and 

technological landscape. In November 1999, the panel recommended that 

the President establish an interagency committee to determine the right 

size and composition of overseas posts.

In March 2000, State announced that a committee had been formed to look 

at how to implement right-sizing and to conduct pilot programs at selected 

posts.20 According to State officials, the Department has prepared a draft 

report on the results of the pilot programs that may help the Department 

determine the size of and other requirements for new embassies and 

consulates. 

Results of the studies by the Office of Foreign Buildings Operations, as well 

as efforts to right-size embassies and consulates, could provide valuable 

inputs to preparation of a long-term capital plan. Although not all the 

studies and efforts have been completed, the studies’ preliminary results 

could be used by State to develop an initial capital plan, with modifications 

after additional study results become available.

Conclusions State’s large-scale embassy and consulate construction effort is underway, 

and State is making progress on most of its initial priority projects. 

Sustained funding will be needed for State to make substantial progress in 

replacing its vulnerable embassies and consulates, and State must work 

effectively with the Congress in charting the future course, priorities, and 

funding levels for the program. State has asked for advance appropriations 

through fiscal year 2005 for the program but has not developed a detailed 

capital construction plan detailing how these funds would be used that 

20These posts are Amman, Jordan; Bangkok, Thailand; Mexico City, Mexico; New Delhi, 

India; Paris, France; Tbilisi, Georgia; and Lagos and Abuja, Nigeria.
Page 16 GAO-01-11 Embassy Construction Program

would provide a sound foundation for moving this important and costly 

program forward. 

Long-term capital plans have been used by leading organizations to 

effectively establish project priorities, plan for resource use, control costs, 

and provide decisionmakers a rationale for allocating funding. A long-term 

capital construction plan will strengthen State’s ability to support and 

sustain its funding needs, encourage dialogue with congressional 

committees, and promote consensus by decisionmakers in the executive 

and legislative branches on funding levels and expectations for program 

progress. A long-term plan would also improve accountability and 

transparency (openness) over State and congressional decision-making for 

a program that is likely to be in the forefront of the U.S. government’s 

foreign affairs agenda for many years. 

Recommendation for 

Executive Action 

To enhance management and decision-making regarding the replacement 

of embassies and consulates that are vulnerable to terrorist attack, we 

recommend that the Secretary of State prepare and present to the Congress 

a long-term capital construction plan that identifies proposed construction 

projects and their estimated costs and when the Department plans to start 

and complete site acquisition, design, and construction. This plan should 

cover at least 5 years and be updated annually. It should be modified 

periodically as funding decisions are made and cost estimates and building 

schedules are revised, as well as to adjust to key management factors that 

could potentially influence program implementation, such as program 

staffing and private industry supply capacity and other significant factors 

that may affect construction requirements and priorities, including future 

decisions concerning right-sizing of overseas posts. Recognizing that 

precise estimates cannot be easily made in the later years, we nevertheless 

believe that State’s plan should include notional estimates of the overall 

program cost and duration, including estimated annual funding 

requirements over the life of the program.

Matter for 

Congressional 

Consideration

The State Department indicated that it does not plan to implement our 

recommendation to prepare, and does not see the merits of, a long-term 

capital plan for its multiyear, multibillion-dollar program to replace 

embassies and consulates. In view of the State Department’s position, the 

Congress may wish to consider requiring that State prepare such a plan, 

consistent with our recommendation, to assist the Congress in considering 
Page 17 GAO-01-11 Embassy Construction Program

State’s requests for program authorizations and appropriations and for 

conducting program oversight. 

Agency Comments and 

Our Evaluation

In commenting on a draft of this report, the State Department disagreed 

with the report’s conclusions and recommendation regarding long-term 

planning. State indicated that it had already established a long-term capital 

plan based on its ranking of facilities into bands of priority. It said that 

these priority bands, combined with the information it provides the 

Congress on projects to be executed in the current fiscal year and the 

semiannual reports on these projects, constituted a sound approach to 

program decision-making and accountability. State said that development 

of a capital plan along the lines that we recommend would be of no value 

because it would be prone to guesswork, would be impractical given 

uncertain future funding levels and project costs, and would be resource 

intensive. State also emphasized that sustained long-term funding was 

needed for its program, and criticized our report for not adequately 

addressing this need and the interrelationships between program planning 

and funding. State’s comments are reprinted in appendix V. State also 

provided technical comments that we incorporated in the report where 

appropriate. 

Despite the best practices of leading organizations and the need to work 

with the Congress to determine funding needs, State’s comments reflect a 

view that no change is needed in its approach to planning and 

implementing a multibillion-dollar overseas construction program. State 

believes it should wait until it knows how much funding it is likely to 

receive before preparing a long-term plan consistent with our 

recommendation. In contrast, we believe that State should prepare a

long-term plan with project cost estimates and schedules for at least a

5-year period, to assist decisionmakers in deciding program scope and 

funding. We also believe that the information that State has provided the 

Congress is not sufficient to guide judgments regarding long-term program 

funding and direction because it does not clearly indicate the order that 

projects will be done, their estimated costs, or when the projects will be 

completed. Our report noted that leading organizations use long-term 

capital plans to define capital asset decisions, promote informed choices 

about resource needs, and provide decisionmakers with an overall sense of 

projects’ merits and funding needs. Information on the scope and 

composition of the overall program envisioned by State would encourage 

dialogue with congressional committees regarding funding levels and 

program expectations over the life of this long-term program. Without a 
Page 18 GAO-01-11 Embassy Construction Program

long-term capital plan that includes such information, it will be difficult for 

State and congressional decisionmakers to accurately judge how much the 

program will cost; when it can be reasonably expected to be completed; 

and how key factors, such as funding and changes in the size of overseas 

posts, may affect program implementation. A long-term capital plan would 

also improve the accountability and transparency of decisions made by 

State, other agencies, and the Congress that affect this important program. 

State’s comments indicate that it has interpreted our recommendation as 

requiring the development of detailed plans that accurately predict the 

exact space requirements, precise cost, and construction schedule of each 

of more than 180 projects over the life of this program. This was not our 

intention. Our recommendation was intended to provide decisionmakers 

with better information on the potential long-term costs and schedules for 

this effort to enable them to weigh the merits of individual projects and 

make related funding decisions. We believe it is reasonable for State to 

prepare a detailed plan over a 5-year or longer period. As noted in our 

report, leading organizations not only rank projects by priority, but they 

also provide more detailed cost estimates and other information in plans 

covering 5-, 6-, or 10-year periods. State already has the foundation to adopt 

this best practice. We share State’s view that precision in planning 

estimates becomes less practical and important for the later years of the 

overall program. However, we believe that it is reasonable to expect 

notional estimates for the program’s later years so that decisionmakers 

have better information on the overall cost and duration of the program. 

We have modified our recommendation accordingly. 

Scope and 

Methodology

To determine the status of the 10 priority embassy and consulate projects, 

we met with project managers in State’s Office of Foreign Buildings 

Operations and officials that oversee the work of the Office. In addition to 

obtaining overall information on the status of the construction effort, such 

as State’s quarterly internal reports on its progress in implementing the 

emergency security supplemental program, we obtained detailed 

information on the history and status of the 10 priority projects for 

replacement identified by the Department shortly after the bombings of the 

two embassies in Africa. Those priority posts were Kampala, Uganda; 

Doha, Qatar; Tunis, Tunisia; Dar es Salaam, Tanzania; Nairobi, Kenya; 

Istanbul, Turkey; Zagreb, Croatia; São Paulo and Rio de Janeiro, Brazil; and 

Luanda, Angola. 
Page 19 GAO-01-11 Embassy Construction Program

We also met with a representative of J.A. Jones Construction Co., which is 

the contractor responsible for building the new embassy complexes in 

Nairobi, Dar es Salaam, and Zagreb. Issues discussed included cost and 

implementation challenges facing those projects as well as potential 

options for reducing the time to construct new embassies.

To assess State’s plans for the overall program, we met with senior State 

officials to discuss their vision for the program, their method for 

establishing project priorities, and their approach to requesting funding. We 

also examined State’s requests for appropriations in fiscal years 1999-2001 

and the supporting material. We received briefings on State’s ongoing 

studies to identify program requirements, alternatives, and obstacles. We 

also identified leading best practices in capital planning decision-making 

that could be applied to State’s construction program. 

To identify steps State is taking to improve the management of the Office of 

Foreign Buildings Operations and the efficiency of its construction 

processes, we received briefings from the Office on its initiatives and plans.

We conducted our review from March through November 2000 in 

accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 

We are sending copies of this report to the Secretary of State and interested 

congressional committees. We will make copies available to others upon 

request. 
Page 20 GAO-01-11 Embassy Construction Program

Please contact me at (202) 512-4128 if you or your staff have any questions 

about this report. An other GAO contact and staff acknowledgments are 

listed in appendix VI.

Sincerely yours,

Jess T. Ford, Director

International Affairs and Trade
Page 21 GAO-01-11 Embassy Construction Program
Page 22 GAO-01-11 Embassy Construction Program

Appendix I

Funding for the State Department’s Embassy Apendxies

Security Construction Program ApendxiI

The Department of State has received about $1.1 billion for security 

construction since the bombings in Africa. As of September 30, 2000, State 

estimates that it had obligated over half of the $604 million it had received 

for fiscal years 1999 and 2000. In December 2000, State received its fiscal 

year 2001 appropriation of about $515 million for the program. State also 

requested $3.35 billion in advanced appropriations to continue the program 

through fiscal year 2005,1

 but this request was rejected. This appendix 

describes in more detail the funds requested and received, as well as the 

planned uses of the funds.

Of the $604 million State received in fiscal years 1999 and 2000 for its 

embassy security construction program, State estimates it obligated about 

$341 million through the end of fiscal year 2000, mostly for large-scale 

construction contracts, as well as to acquire sites and procure design and 

other immediate goods and services. Table 2 provides appropriation, 

obligation, and expenditure data for State’s embassy and consulate 

replacement program.

Table 2: Status of U.S. Embassy and Consulate Security Construction Funds

a

According to State, obligations represent orders placed, contracts awarded, services purchased, or 

any other actions requiring the U.S. government to make a payment. 

b

According to State, this represents funds that will be obligated in accordance with project schedules 

for activities such as project supervision, construction security, furniture, and furnishings. 

c

Expenditures reflect the issuance of checks, cash disbursements, and the electronic transfer of funds 

to liquidate an obligation.

Source: Department of State data.

1

The Secure Embassy Construction and Counterterrorism Act of 1999 authorized 

$900 million a year for embassy security, construction, and maintenance for fiscal years 

2000 through 2004, Title VI of Division A of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act for 

Fiscal Years 2000 and 2001, Public Law 106-113.

Dollars in millions

Status of funds

Fiscal yea

1999

Fiscal year

2000

Fiscal year

2001

Appropriated $304.1 $300 $515

Obligated (as of Sept. 30, 2000)a

 $230.3 $110.8 _

Unobligated (as of Sept. 30, 2000)b $73.8 $189.2 _

Expended (as of Sept. 30, 2000)c $75.3 $16.5 _
Appendix I

Funding for the State Department’s Embassy 

Security Construction Program

Page 23 GAO-01-11 Embassy Construction Program

Emergency Supplemental 

Funding in 1999

Included in State’s 1999 emergency security supplemental funding was 

about $119 million to build new embassy compounds in Nairobi, Kenya, 

and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania. State also allocated $185 million of its 

emergency supplemental appropriations to begin replacing facilities at 

other posts. Table 3 provides State’s planned uses for most of these funds. 

In May 1999, State notified the Congress that it intended to also use part of 

the funds to pursue the acquisition of construction sites for embassies and 

consulates in 26 other locations.

Table 3: State’s Planned Use of 1999 Emergency Supplemental Funds to Begin 

Replacing Seven Highest Risk Embassies and Consulates

Source: State Department data. 

Fiscal Year 2000 Funding State requested and received $300 million in fiscal year 2000 funds for 

security construction projects. Specific planned uses of the funds cited by 

State in March 2000 included the projects listed in table 4. 

Dollars in millions

Location of 

project Funding Planned use of funds

Doha, Qatar $22.5 To retrofit an unfinished building for use as 

an embassy.

Istanbul, Turkey $2.0 To reserve a site and begin design of a new 

consulate.

Kampala, 

Uganda

$31.6 To design and build a new embassy.

Rio de Janeiro, 

Brazil

$23.2 To acquire a new site and design a new 

consulate.

São Paulo, Brazil $26.8 To acquire a new site and design a new 

consulate.

Tunis, Tunisia $6.7 To design a new embassy.

Zagreb, Croatia $66.9 To acquire a new site; design and build a new 

embassy.
Appendix I

Funding for the State Department’s Embassy 

Security Construction Program

Page 24 GAO-01-11 Embassy Construction Program

Table 4: State’s Planned Use of Fiscal Year 2000 Funds to Continue Replacement 

Program 

a

On July 25, 2000, State notified the Congress of its intent to allocate an additional $91 million in fiscal 

year 1999 and 2000 funds to award a contract for the design/construction of a new embassy in Abu 

Dhabi, United Arab Emirates.

Source: State Department data.

State also identified 13 posts for potential site acquisition using fiscal 

year 2000 funds. These posts are Asmara, Eritrea; Conakry, Guinea; Dakar, 

Senegal; Harare, Zimbabwe; Peshawar, Pakistan; Phnom Penh, Cambodia; 

Tbilisi, Georgia; Yerevan, Armenia; Antananarivo, Madagascar; Bamako, 

Mali; Bujumbura, Burundi; Karachi, Pakistan; and Sarajevo, BosniaHerzegovina. 

Fiscal Year 2001 Funding 

Request

State requested $500 million for fiscal year 2001 to continue replacing its 

highest risk facilities. Projects identified by State as having priority for 

construction were Cape Town, South Africa; Damascus, Syria; Rio de 

Janeiro2

 and São Paulo, Brazil; Sofia, Bulgaria; and Yerevan, Armenia. In 

Dollars in millions

Location of project Funding Planned use of funds

Abu Dhabi, United 

Arab Emirates

$2.0a To study site characteristics and initiate design 

of a new embassy.

Cape Town, South 

Africa

$4.0 To acquire a site and determine scope of new 

embassy compound.

Damascus, Syria $8.0 To acquire a site and determine scope of new 

embassy compound.

Istanbul, Turkey $80.8 To complete design and construction of a new 

consulate.

Kingston, Jamaica $7.0 To acquire a site (a hotel complex) and begin 

renovations for a new embassy and staff 

housing.

Luanda, Angola $37.0 To construct a new embassy.

Sofia, Bulgaria $4.0 To acquire a site and determine scope of new 

embassy compound.

Tunis, Tunisia $79.3 To construct a new embassy.

2

Due to a lack of congressional concurrence with State’s proposal, the project in

Rio de Janeiro has been delayed. State hopes to acquire a site in fiscal year 2001, with 

construction to follow.
Appendix I

Funding for the State Department’s Embassy 

Security Construction Program

Page 25 GAO-01-11 Embassy Construction Program

addition to these projects for which site acquisition and/or design was to be 

funded in previous years, State planned to use the funds to acquire five to 

eight additional sites for which construction funding would be sought in 

subsequent years. State’s request for fiscal year 2001 included $50 million 

to construct separate, on-compound U.S. Agency for International 

Development (USAID) facilities in Kampala, Uganda, and Nairobi, Kenya. 

State also requested an additional advance appropriation of $3.35 billion to 

continue the facility replacement program through fiscal year 2005. 

However, it did not indicate the projects it planned to construct with this 

advance appropriation or provide estimates of project costs and 

construction schedules. 

The House Committee on Appropriations3

 recommended full funding of 

State’s $500 million request for security construction but did not 

recommend approval of the request for an advance appropriation in its 

June 19, 2000, report to the full House. The Committee also did not approve 

the use of $50 million to construct USAID facilities, explaining that funding 

requirements for USAID would first have to be considered by another 

Subcommittee with jurisdiction. 

In its September 2000 report, the Senate Appropriations Committee also 

rejected the request for an advance appropriation and recommended 

funding for fiscal year 2001 totaling $271.6 million for replacing embassies 

and consulates (planning, site acquisition, design, and construction), which 

is about $228 million less than State had requested. The Committee 

expressed concerns that State was accumulating large, unfunded 

construction requirements. The Committee report recommended that the 

Congress limit the number of new construction starts and, where possible, 

only fully fund ongoing projects to prevent the unfunded requirements 

from growing. Projects recommended for construction funding in the 

report were Sofia, Bulgaria ($78.3 million); Yerevan, Armenia ($64 million); 

Damascus, Syria ($69.7 million); and Abidjan, Côte d’Ivoire ($6.2 million). 

The Conference Report on State’s Fiscal Year 2001 appropriations, issued in 

October 2000, provided $515 million for the program (H.Rept. 106-1005). 

Legislation enacting this provision was passed in December 2000.

3

Departments of Commerce, Justice, and State, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies 

Appropriations Bill, Fiscal Year 2001. 
Page 26 GAO-01-11 Embassy Construction Program

Appendix II

Overview of State’s Initial 10 Priority Projects ApendxiI

This appendix provides an overview of the 10 embassy and consulate 

projects State gave priority for replacement shortly after the 1998 

bombings in Africa. These projects are in Kampala, Uganda; Doha, Qatar; 

Tunis, Tunisia; Dar es Salaam, Tanzania; Nairobi, Kenya; Istanbul, Turkey; 

Zagreb, Croatia; São Paulo, Brazil; Rio de Janeiro, Brazil; and Luanda, 

Angola. The overview presents a description of the facilities’ status and 

history, as well as tables showing construction cost estimates and pictures 

of the current and planned facilities, where available.

Kampala, Uganda

Project History and Status The existing embassy in Kampala is located on a major street whose 

activities cannot be controlled, and it lacks adequate setback on three 

sides. Unclassified functions are in an annex, which also is not secure. 

State had initiated the design of a new embassy before the August 1998 

embassy bombings in Africa. In fact, State had planned to build a new 

facility as part of the Diplomatic Security Construction (Inman) program of 

the late 1980s/early 1990s. The project did not proceed at that time largely 

due to problems in obtaining title to a site. In the aftermath of the 1998 

bombings, relocation of the embassy became a high priority. In December 

1998, State issued a solicitation seeking qualified firms to bid on the 

building project. State prequalified three contractors to bid and in 

September 1999 awarded a design/build contract to Washington Group 

International, formerly Morrison Knudsen Corporation. (See table 5 for the 

project cost estimates,1

 fig. 2 for the existing embassy, and fig. 3 for the 

planned new embassy.) The master plan for the new embassy compound 

includes a USAID annex, but its construction has not started. Building 

costs for the annex are estimated at $19.5 million. Fiscal year 1999 and 2000 

funds are being used for the design and preconstruction site improvements 

of the USAID facility. Fiscal year 2001 State funds will be used for the 

construction of the new USAID facility, assuming congressional approval.

1

Project cost estimates include site acquisition, design, construction, and support.
Appendix II

Overview of State’s Initial 10 Priority 

Projects

Page 27 GAO-01-11 Embassy Construction Program

Table 5: New Embassy Project in Kampala, Uganda

a

Shortly after the bombings in Africa, State developed rough estimates for its internal use based on 

replacement facilities having the same square footage and number of occupants as existing facilities. 

b

According to State, cost estimates are difficult to compare among projects overseas because of 

unique local conditions, such as local economy and workforce, taxes, government procedures, fees 

and permits, weather conditions, and site topography. 

Source: State Department. 

Figure 2: Existing Embassy in Kampala, Uganda

Source: State Department.

Dollars in millions

Initial estimatesa Current estimates

Costb $21.4 $32.5

Number of personnel 64 96

Occupancy date Apr. 2002 Jan. 2001
Appendix II

Overview of State’s Initial 10 Priority 

Projects

Page 28 GAO-01-11 Embassy Construction Program

Figure 3: New Embassy Planned for Kampala, Uganda

Source: State Department.

Doha, Qatar

Project History and Status Plans to build a new embassy in Doha began with State’s diplomatic 

security construction program that started in the late 1980s. Funding 

allocated for the new embassy totaled nearly $19 million under that 

program, but the project did not progress beyond the design stage because 

of high estimated costs and other factors. The current project is an 

operating lease and construction agreement for an unfinished villa that is 

locally owned. The Qatari owners will finish construction of the facility 

based on State’s floor plan and other specifications. The Qatari landlord 

hired the design and building contractors, both uncleared local firms. All 

work is being coordinated on site by State personnel, and certain secure 
Appendix II

Overview of State’s Initial 10 Priority 

Projects

Page 29 GAO-01-11 Embassy Construction Program

areas of the facility will be completed by cleared American contractors 

after the building is turned over to State, scheduled for late 2000. A contract 

for construction of a limited, controlled access area by cleared Americans 

has been awarded, and most of the orders for furniture and furnishings 

have been issued. Construction began in August 1999, and occupancy is 

scheduled for April 2001. The estimated project cost of $22.5 million (see 

table 6) includes the cost of a temporary embassy (about $3 million) and 

the first 2 years of lease payments (about $1.2 million per year). The initial 

lease is for 6 years but can be renewed for five additional 6-year periods. 

Over 36 years, the total cost will be more than $60 million: $22.5 million for 

the project plus more than $40 million in lease costs. See figures 4 and 5 for 

the embassy prior to the attacks in Africa and the planned embassy in 

Doha.2

Table 6: New Embassy Project in Doha, Qatar

a

 Shortly after the bombings in Africa, State developed rough estimates for its internal use based on 

replacement facilities having the same square footage and number of occupants as existing facilities.

b

According to State, cost estimates are difficult to compare among projects overseas because of 

unique local conditions, such as local economy and workforce, taxes, government procedures, fees 

and permits, weather conditions, and site topography.

Source: State Department.

2

After the attacks on embassies in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam, State moved embassy 

functions into a more secure interim embassy.

Dollars in millions 

Initial estimatesa Current estimates

Costb $20.0 $22.5

Number of personnel 57 74

Occupancy date June 2001 Mar. 2001
Appendix II

Overview of State’s Initial 10 Priority 

Projects

Page 30 GAO-01-11 Embassy Construction Program

Figure 4: Embassy in Doha, Qatar, Prior to Bombings in Africa

Source: State Department.
Appendix II

Overview of State’s Initial 10 Priority 

Projects

Page 31 GAO-01-11 Embassy Construction Program

Figure 5: New Embassy Planned for Doha, Qatar

Source: State Department.

Tunis, Tunisia

Project History and Status Efforts to construct a new, fully secure embassy compound in Tunisia 

began with the Inman program initiated in the late 1980s. A 21-acre site was 

purchased in 1992 but, due to funding priorities and other reasons, the 

project did not enter the construction phase. After the 1998 bombings in 

Africa, this project again became a high priority. Facility design by Tai Soo 

Kim Partners began in September 1999. State also prequalified five 

construction firms as potential builders of the new facility. Bids for 

construction were solicited in August 2000. (See table 7 for estimated 

project costs.) A construction contract was awarded to Bill Harbert 

International Construction Company in September 2000. The embassy 

compound will be a campus-style complex and include a classified 

chancery as well as separate general services, marine security guard, and 

warehouse buildings. Figure 6 shows the existing embassy, and figure 7 

depicts the planned new embassy. 
Appendix II

Overview of State’s Initial 10 Priority 

Projects

Page 32 GAO-01-11 Embassy Construction Program

Table 7: New Embassy Project in Tunis, Tunisia

a

Shortly after the bombings in Africa, State developed rough estimates for its internal use based on 

replacement facilities having the same square footage and number of occupants as existing facilities.

b

According to State, cost estimates are difficult to compare among projects overseas because of 

unique local conditions, such as local economy and workforce, taxes, government procedures, fees 

and permits, weather conditions, and site topography.

Source: State Department.

Dollars in millions

Initial estimatesa Current estimates

Costb $96.3 $86.0

Number of personnel 144 104

Occupancy date Nov. 2003 Sept. 2002
Appendix II

Overview of State’s Initial 10 Priority 

Projects

Page 33 GAO-01-11 Embassy Construction Program

Figure 6: Existing Embassy in Tunis, Tunisia

Source: State Department.
Appendix II

Overview of State’s Initial 10 Priority 

Projects

Page 34 GAO-01-11 Embassy Construction Program

Figure 7: New Embassy Planned for Tunis, Tunisia

Source: State Department.

Dar es Salaam, 

Tanzania

Project History and Status Following the August 1998 terrorist bombing that destroyed the embassy in 

Dar es Salaam, State started the process to relocate the embassy. To 

temporarily restore embassy operations, State converted a residential 

compound to function as the interim embassy, which opened in February 

1999 at a cost of approximately $12.3 million. Concurrent to that activity, 

State issued a solicitation in November 1998 seeking qualified firms to bid 

on the design and construction of a new permanent embassy. Three 

design/build contractors were prequalified and allowed to compete. 

However, in May 1999, the project was placed on hold because the 

purchase of the proposed site fell through, and State had to look for 

another site. Once State identified a second site and was reasonably certain 

that the acquisition would go through, the competition resumed.

State awarded a design/build contract to J.A. Jones Construction Co. in 

September 1999. The contractor began the design of the new embassy in 
Appendix II

Overview of State’s Initial 10 Priority 

Projects

Page 35 GAO-01-11 Embassy Construction Program

October 1999. Initial groundwork at the 21-acre site began in August 2000, 

and occupancy is expected in November 2002. (See table 8 for estimated 

project costs.) Figure 8 shows the embassy before the 1998 bombing, and 

figure 9 shows the design for the new embassy. All other U.S. agencies are 

scheduled to be in the compound, including USAID, whose facility will be 

constructed as a separate, unclassified facility. According to USAID data, 

$15 million was available in its fiscal year 2000 budget for construction. 

Table 8: New Embassy Project in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania

a

Shortly after the bombings in Africa, State developed rough estimates for its internal use based on 

replacement facilities having the same square footage and number of occupants as existing facilities.

b

According to State, cost estimates are difficult to compare among projects overseas because of 

unique local conditions, such as local economy and workforce, taxes, government procedures, fees 

and permits, weather conditions, and site topography.

c

Does not include USAID costs.

Source: State Department.

Dollars in millions

Initial estimatesa Current estimates

Costb, c $51.2 $51.2

Number of personnel 59 98

Occupancy date Dec. 2002 Nov. 2002
Appendix II

Overview of State’s Initial 10 Priority 

Projects

Page 36 GAO-01-11 Embassy Construction Program

Figure 8: Embassy in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, Before Bombing

Source: State Department. 

Figure 9: Design for New Embassy in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania

Source: State Department.
Appendix II

Overview of State’s Initial 10 Priority 

Projects

Page 37 GAO-01-11 Embassy Construction Program

Nairobi, Kenya 

Project History and Status Following the August 1998 terrorist bombing that destroyed the embassy in 

Nairobi, the embassy temporarily moved into the offices of USAID. 

Subsequently, State searched for an office building to renovate and use as 

an interim embassy. Renovation of the building started in January 1999, and 

the interim embassy became fully operational in August 1999, at a cost of 

about $21.7 million. Concurrently, State issued, in November 1998, a 

solicitation seeking qualified design/build firms to bid on the design and 

construction of a new, permanent embassy compound. Three contractors 

were prequalified and allowed to compete.

State awarded a design/build contract to J.A. Jones Construction Co. in 

September 1999. (See table 9 for estimated project costs.) The contractor 

started the design of the new embassy in October 1999. Initial groundwork 

at the 16-acre site began in August 2000, and occupancy is expected in 

March 2003. Figure 10 shows the previous embassy in Nairobi, and figure 

11 depicts the new embassy. All other U.S. agencies are scheduled to be in 

the compound, including USAID, whose facility will be constructed as a 

separate unclassified facility. Additional building costs for USAID’s facility 

are estimated at $36.1 million. Fiscal year 1999 State funds are being used 

for the design and preconstruction preparation of the new USAID facility.3

Fiscal year 2001 funds were requested to fund the facility’s construction. 

3

According to State officials, USAID will reimburse State for these costs.
Appendix II

Overview of State’s Initial 10 Priority 

Projects

Page 38 GAO-01-11 Embassy Construction Program

Table 9: New Embassy Project in Nairobi, Kenya

a

Shortly after the bombings in Africa, State developed rough estimates for its internal use based on 

replacement facilities having the same square footage and number of occupants as existing facilities.

b

According to State, cost estimates are difficult to compare among projects overseas because of 

unique local conditions, such as local economy and workforce, taxes, government procedures, fees 

and permits, weather conditions, and site topography.

c

Does not include USAID costs.

Source: State Department.

Figure 10: Embassy in Nairobi, Kenya, Before Bombing

Source: State Department.

Dollars in millions

Initial estimatesa Current estimates

Costb, c $67.8 $67.8

Number of personnel 194 278

Occupancy date May 2003 Mar. 2003
Appendix II

Overview of State’s Initial 10 Priority 

Projects

Page 39 GAO-01-11 Embassy Construction Program

Figure 11: New Embassy Design for Nairobi, Kenya

Source: State Department.

Istanbul, Turkey

Project History and Status The existing consulate office building is 125 years old and is built on 

unreinforced masonry construction, which makes it unstable in case of 

earthquakes. It also has insufficient setback and is very vulnerable to 

attack because narrow and busy urban streets bound the property on three 

sides. Planning for a new facility began as part of the Inman program; 

funding allocated for the facility totaled $34.9 million as of November 1990. 

This Inman project did not proceed largely because of difficulties 

encountered at that time in acquiring a suitable site. In the aftermath of the 

August 1998 embassy bombings in Africa, the relocation of the consulate 

again became a high priority. State awarded the office building concept 

design to Zimmer Gunsul Frasca Partnership. (See table 10 for estimated 

project costs.) 

The building site was under purchase contract as of August 2000. 

Occupancy is expected in April 2003. For construction of the consulate, 
Appendix II

Overview of State’s Initial 10 Priority 

Projects

Page 40 GAO-01-11 Embassy Construction Program

State issued a solicitation in December 1999 seeking qualified construction 

firms to bid on the project. Five contractors were prequalified to bid, and 

State awarded a construction contract in September 2000 to Caddell 

Construction Company. See figure 12 for the existing consulate and figure 

13 for the design of the new consulate. 

Table 10: New Consulate Project in Istanbul, Turkey 

a

Shortly after the bombings in Africa, State developed rough estimates for its internal use based on 

replacement facilities having the same square footage and number of occupants as existing facilities.

b

According to State, cost estimates are difficult to compare among projects overseas because of 

unique local conditions, such as local economy and workforce, taxes, government procedures, fees 

and permits, weather conditions, and site topography.

Source: State Department. 

Dollars in millions

Initial estimatesa Current estimates

Costb $78.7 $83.2

Number of personnel 138 141

Occupancy date June 2003 Apr. 2003
Appendix II

Overview of State’s Initial 10 Priority 

Projects

Page 41 GAO-01-11 Embassy Construction Program

Figure 12: Existing Consulate in Istanbul, Turkey

Source: State Department.

Figure 13: Design for New Consulate in Istanbul, Turkey

Source: State Department.
Appendix II

Overview of State’s Initial 10 Priority 

Projects

Page 42 GAO-01-11 Embassy Construction Program

Zagreb, Croatia

Project History and Status The planned new embassy in Zagreb will replace the existing facility 

located on the corners of two very busy streets in the center of the city. All 

U.S. mission elements in Zagreb will be consolidated into the new embassy. 

State started the process for replacing the existing facility in January 1999. 

Because the selected site had multiple parcels with different owners, the 

acquisition negotiations were prolonged, lasting until March 2000. 

Concurrent with this activity, State issued a solicitation in March 1999 

seeking qualified firms to bid on the design and construction of a new 

office building. Three contractors were prequalified and allowed to 

compete. State awarded a design/build contract to J.A. Jones Construction 

Co. in September 1999. (See table 11 for estimated project costs.) 

Occupancy is expected in May 2003. Figure 14 shows the present embassy, 

and figure 15 depicts the planned new embassy. 

Table 11: New Embassy Project in Zagreb, Croatia

a

Shortly after the bombings in Africa, State developed rough estimates for its internal use based on 

replacement facilities having the same square footage and number of occupants as existing facilities.

b

According to State, cost estimates are difficult to compare among projects overseas because of 

unique local conditions, such as local economy and workforce, taxes, government procedures, fees 

and permits, weather conditions, and site topography.

Source: State Department.

Dollars in millions

Initial estimatesa Current estimates

Costb $36.1 $66.9

Number of personnel 199 142

Occupancy date Sept. 2001 May 2003
Appendix II

Overview of State’s Initial 10 Priority 

Projects

Page 43 GAO-01-11 Embassy Construction Program

Figure 14: Existing Embassy in Zagreb, Croatia

Source: State Department.
Appendix II

Overview of State’s Initial 10 Priority 

Projects

Page 44 GAO-01-11 Embassy Construction Program

Figure 15: New Embassy Planned for Zagreb, Croatia

Source: State Department.

São Paulo, Brazil

Project History and Status The existing consular facility in São Paulo is considered highly vulnerable 

to terrorist attack because of the lack of setback and other undesirable 

security characteristics. The consulate consists of floors 1 through 5 of a 

14-floor commercial office building, and several other agencies are located 

in even more vulnerable space at separate locations. A new consular site 

costing $19 million has been located, and site negotiations were complete 

as of August 2000 (see table 12 for estimated project costs). State prepared 

to demolish existing buildings on the site. Congressional committees 

approved site acquisition, but the Senate Appropriations Committee is 

encouraging State to make use of existing buildings on the site. State does 

not believe that it would be feasible to bring the existing building design up 

to security requirements and is working with the Committee to discuss 

options. Figure 16 shows the current consulate in São Paulo; the new 

consulate has not yet been designed.
Appendix II

Overview of State’s Initial 10 Priority 

Projects

Page 45 GAO-01-11 Embassy Construction Program

Table 12: New Consulate Project in São Paulo, Brazil

a

Shortly after the bombings in Africa, State developed rough estimates for its internal use based on 

replacement facilities having the same square footage and number of occupants as existing facilities.

b

According to State, cost estimates are difficult to compare among projects overseas because of 

unique local conditions, such as local economy and workforce, taxes, government procedures, fees 

and permits, weather conditions, and site topography.

c

The cost estimates are preliminary, as discussions are ongoing concerning construction options.

Source: State Department.

Dollars in millions

Initial estimatesa Current estimates

Costb $95.4 $101.9c

Number of personnel 97 Undetermined

Occupancy date Aug. 2003 Undetermined
Appendix II

Overview of State’s Initial 10 Priority 

Projects

Page 46 GAO-01-11 Embassy Construction Program

Figure 16: Existing Consulate in São Paulo, Brazil

Source: State Department.
Appendix II

Overview of State’s Initial 10 Priority 

Projects

Page 47 GAO-01-11 Embassy Construction Program

Rio de Janeiro

Project History and Status Similar to the situation in São Paulo, the existing Rio de Janeiro consular 

facility is considered highly vulnerable to terrorist attack because of the 

lack of setback and other undesirable security characteristics. The 13-story 

consulate office building had served as the U.S. embassy until Brazil’s 

capital was moved to Brasilia in the 1960s. The consulate is in a crowded, 

high-crime area of the city. Progress on the project has been slow due to a 

number of factors, including difficulties in finding suitable sites. State 

officials eventually identified a potential site and negotiated a price (see 

table 13 for estimated project costs). As of August 2000, State documents 

indicated that the Senate Appropriations Committee had not approved the 

acquisition of this site. According to State officials, the Committee cited 

concerns that State had not sufficiently considered options for reducing the 

size of the post by regionalizing its operations in Brazil. (In addition to its 

existing embassy facility in Brasilia, State was proposing to spend 

$200 million to build two consulate facilities in Brazil—one in Rio de 

Janeiro and the other in São Paulo.) According to State, the purchase 

contract on the Rio de Janeiro site has expired, and State is no longer 

pursuing its purchase. Figure 17 shows the existing consulate in Rio de 

Janeiro; a design for the new consulate is not available.

On July 25, 2000, State notified the Congress of its intent to reprogram 

$22.8 million of the funds appropriated for Rio de Janeiro to meet part of 

the requirements for a new embassy in Abu Dhabi, United Arab Emirates. 

The Congress approved the reprogramming and in September 2000 State 

signed a design/build contract for a new embassy in Abu Dhabi. August 

2000 State documents indicate that the Department is developing a revised 

staffing pattern for the Rio de Janeiro facility, that State officials have 

visited the post to review additional potential sites, and that State is 

evaluating alternative uses of the existing consulate site.
Appendix II

Overview of State’s Initial 10 Priority 

Projects

Page 48 GAO-01-11 Embassy Construction Program

Table 13: New Consulate Project in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil

a

Shortly after the bombings in Africa, State developed rough estimates for its internal use based on 

replacement facilities having the same square footage and number of occupants as existing facilities.

b

According to State, cost estimates are difficult to compare among projects overseas because of 

unique local conditions, such as local economy and workforce, taxes, government procedures, fees 

and permits, weather conditions, and site topography.

c

Cost estimates are preliminary because decisions on the site and other project elements have not 

been made.

Source: State Department.

Dollars in millions

Initial estimatesa Current estimates

Costb $90.6 $96.8c

Number of personnel 145 Undetermined

Occupancy date Aug. 2003 Undetermined
Appendix II

Overview of State’s Initial 10 Priority 

Projects

Page 49 GAO-01-11 Embassy Construction Program

Figure 17: Existing Consulate in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil

Source: State Department.
Appendix II

Overview of State’s Initial 10 Priority 

Projects

Page 50 GAO-01-11 Embassy Construction Program

Luanda, Angola 

Project History and Status Luandan embassy functions are housed in prefabricated buildings and 

trailers, some of which are virtually on the perimeter wall. The lack of 

setback from the streets on three sides and the temporary nature of the 

facility make its occupants unusually vulnerable to attack. Other functions 

are housed outside the embassy above an auto repair shop, which provides 

no perimeter protection and also gives no protection from violence or 

terrorist actions. State has proposed to construct the embassy on the 

present site, even though it would have a setback of 65 feet and therefore 

would not meet the 100-foot minimum security standards for setback. State 

indicated that alternative properties it has identified that would permit the 

required setback were not in desirable locations or did not have secure 

titles because of land ownership uncertainties. The very small size of the 

existing site dictated a design for a compact, multistory building located in 

the center of the compound, completed in phases to minimize disruptions 

to embassy operations. (See table 14 for estimated project costs.) All other 

U.S. agencies, including USAID, would be co-located in the new embassy. 

The Secretary of State granted an exception to the setback policy based on 

State’s plans to achieve blast resistance through other means, such as 

thicker walls and windows. According to State, the blast effects on the 

proposed new embassy would be mitigated by strengthened construction 

methods and techniques, which would provide performance equivalent to 

that of a standard blast-resistant building with a 100-foot setback. 

According to State officials, the project design is complete, but the House 

and Senate Appropriations Committees have not approved the use of fiscal 

year 2000 funding for construction. The House Committee believed that all 

new construction should result in buildings that fully comply with State’s 

own standards, and therefore it rejected State’s plan to spend $39.2 million 

in appropriations on a facility with insufficient setback. The House 

Committee reconsidered its position, granting State approval to move 

ahead if it uses the proceeds from the sale of other properties to finance the 

project. As of September 2000, the Senate Committee had not approved the 

project. If that Committee does not approve the current plan, State plans to 

reprogram funds to other projects until it can find another site in Luanda 

and prepare a new facility design. In November 2000, State officials said 

that the Congress had not agreed to provide security appropriations for this 

project. Figure 18 shows the existing embassy, and figure 19 depicts the 

design for the new facility.
Appendix II

Overview of State’s Initial 10 Priority 

Projects

Page 51 GAO-01-11 Embassy Construction Program

Table 14: New Embassy Project in Luanda, Angola

a

Shortly after the bombings in Africa, State developed rough estimates for its internal use based on 

replacement facilities having the same square footage and number of occupants as existing facilities.

b

According to State, cost estimates are difficult to compare among projects overseas because of 

unique local conditions, such as local economy and workforce, taxes, government procedures, fees 

and permits, weather conditions, and site topography.

c

This estimate is based on State’s proposal, which has not been approved. 

Source: State Department.

Figure 18: Existing Embassy in Luanda, Angola

Source: State Department.

Dollars in millions

Initial estimatesa Current estimates

Costb $25.6 $39.2c

Number of personnel 67 98

Occupancy date Dec. 2002 Undetermined
Appendix II

Overview of State’s Initial 10 Priority 

Projects

Page 52 GAO-01-11 Embassy Construction Program

Figure 19: Design for New Embassy in Luanda, Angola

Source: State Department.
Page 53 GAO-01-11 Embassy Construction Program

Appendix III

Factors Contributing to Costs of New 

Embassies and Consulates ApendxiI

The estimated costs for the 10 initial priority new office buildings vary 

between $22 million to retrofit a leased facility in Doha1

 to about 

$100 million for constructing a government-owned facility in Sao Paulo. 

State officials believe that in some other locations, costs to replace existing 

facilities could exceed $200 million. State estimates that constructing a 

new embassy costs roughly three times as much as it would cost to build a 

commercial office building of similar size in the United States.

Several factors contribute to the additional expenses of constructing a new 

embassy compared to the costs of constructing a typical commercial 

building. For example, the basic structure for a typical commercial building 

uses steel columns and one-way steel beams, steel decks/light-weight 

concrete floors, and steel joisted roofs and a steel deck. In comparison, a 

new embassy is typically constructed almost entirely of reinforced 

concrete, thicker roof and floor slabs, and other elements to meet State’s 

blast standards. 

Other key cost factors include substantially higher design costs partially 

due to unique perimeter access control and communications requirements; 

specialty construction for communications and access control; use of 

American contractors overseas; perimeter walls; material shipping and 

transit security; shielding against electronic surveillance; substantial 

construction supervision and site security costs; and unique designs and 

tailoring of each building to the requirements of each co-located agency. 

Seismic concerns, and the costs of large sites in urban areas, further 

contribute to the high costs of new embassies and consulates. Another 

fundamental issue affecting costs is the special difficulties often associated 

with performing construction in developing countries. These difficulties 

involve obtaining host country permits in a timely fashion, ensuring work 

quality, planning for worker illness and disease, adjusting to cultural 

differences, and working out technical communication difficulties. 

1

The capital investment amount for Doha does not include an estimated $40 million in

long-term lease costs.
Page 54 GAO-01-11 Embassy Construction Program

Appendix IV

Initiatives to Improve Management and 

Project Delivery Processes at the Office of 

Foreign Buildings Operations ApendxiIV

This appendix briefly describes State’s key initiatives to improve 

management and project delivery processes at the Office of Foreign 

Buildings Operations.

Management Processes A key recommendation of State’s November 1999 overseas presence panel 

dealt with the management capacity of State’s Office of Foreign Buildings 

Operations. The panel recommended that a new, federally chartered 

government corporation be established to replace that Office. Such a 

corporation would exercise responsibility for building, renovating, 

maintaining, and managing the federal government’s overseas civilian 

facilities. The issues that led to the panel’s recommendation included the 

perception that projects managed by the Office of Foreign Buildings 

Operations took longer and cost more than comparable private sector 

projects, that time lines were not always met, and that staffing levels 

appeared too high for the number of projects managed. State has not 

agreed with the recommendation in the belief that the staff work leading to 

the recommendation was faulty and did not give due consideration to 

security requirements and special overseas needs. State noted, however, 

that it has established special study teams that are giving serious attention 

to related panel proposals. 

Special teams are studying the critical business practices and other issues 

affecting the performance of State’s Office of Foreign Buildings Operations. 

These include 

• business process reengineering, with the objective of optimizing current 

processes and identifying and resolving overlaps, gaps, inefficiencies, 

and non-value-added activities; 

• capital funding issues, with the goal of developing alternative sources of 

financing to supplement congressional appropriations, such as charging 

capital rent, making asset sales, and seeking federal loans; 

• organizational structure, with the goal of providing an assessment of the 

benefits and consequences of becoming a performance-based 

organization; 

• communications strategy, with the goal of better communicating 

internally and externally and addressing what the Office perceives to be 

a lack of confidence in its work by overseas posts, headquarters 

agencies, and the Congress; and 

• customer focus, with a goal of developing a strategy to better meet State 

and external needs. 
Appendix IV

Initiatives to Improve Management and 

Project Delivery Processes at the Office of 

Foreign Buildings Operations

Page 55 GAO-01-11 Embassy Construction Program

These studies and related efforts are scheduled to be completed after 2001. 

Actions that may be taken on the study results will depend on several 

factors, including “doability”, other agency participation, and costs.

Project Delivery 

Process

• Design/Build Contracting: State is using this contracting method, 

which involves providing design and construction services under a 

single, lump-sum contract. This is being used for projects in Nairobi, 

Kenya; Dar es Salaam, Tanzania; Zagreb, Croatia; and Kampala, Uganda. 

State’s objective is to receive faster product delivery through concurrent 

design and construction activities. Generally, it is anticipated that total 

project implementation time can be reduced as much as 6 months using 

this contracting method. Construction industry experience also 

indicates that project costs can be reduced slightly by this form of 

contracting. However, deterrents to greater use of the approach are the 

reductions in time available for project definition, design, development 

and review, and overall quality control. 

• Fast-tracking: State is implementing its first fact-track project in 

Kampala, Uganda. Essentially, fast-tracking involves using innovative 

scheduling to speed up delivery of the completed facility. The post is the 

first one set to move into a secure replacement facility since the 

bombings in Africa. State officials acknowledge that the compressed 

schedule has added costs to the project, but said that its subsequent 

development of an “evaluated total cost method” for determining a 

contract’s best value award, validated its contract award decision for the 

Kampala project. 

• Site-adapted Office Building: State has initially identified projects in 

the Africa region for potential use of this concept, which involves a 

single building design that can be used at a number of posts with similar 

functions, staffing, and tenant agency complement. The base building 

would be modified to respond to unique site conditions and local 

culture, and the concept is expected to save design time and costs by 

reusing design documentation. Posts identified as potential candidates 

include Addis Ababa, Ethiopia; Bamako, Mali; Bujumbura, Burundi; 

Kigali, Rwanda; Yaounde, Cameroon; Nouakchott, Mauritania; 

Antananarivo, Madagascar; Asmara, Eritrea; Conakry, Guinea; Dakar, 

Senegal; Lomé, Togo; Maputo, Mozambique; and Harare, Zimbabwe. 

• Standard Delivery Approach: State reported that it has developed a 

standard delivery approach based on standardizing elements of project 

designs. Benefits expected include replicating project design elements 

on multiple projects. Posts identified by State for potential application 
Appendix IV

Initiatives to Improve Management and 

Project Delivery Processes at the Office of 

Foreign Buildings Operations

Page 56 GAO-01-11 Embassy Construction Program

of this initiative included Abidjan, Côte d’Ivoire; Damascus, Syria; 

Tashkent, Uzbekistan; and Yerevan, Armenia.
Page 57 GAO-01-11 Embassy Construction Program

Appendix V

Comments From the Department of State ApendxiV

Note: GAO comments 

supplementing those in the 

report text appear at the end of 

this appendix.
Appendix V

Comments From the Department of State

Page 58 GAO-01-11 Embassy Construction Program

See comment 1.

See comment 2.

See comment 3.

See comment 4.

See comment 5.
Appendix V

Comments From the Department of State

Page 59 GAO-01-11 Embassy Construction Program

See comment 6.

See comment 7.
Appendix V

Comments From the Department of State

Page 60 GAO-01-11 Embassy Construction Program
Appendix V

Comments From the Department of State

Page 61 GAO-01-11 Embassy Construction Program

The following are GAO’s comments on the Department of State’s letter 

dated December 19, 2000.

GAO Comments 1. The basic premise of our report is that State can do a better job of 

planning its capital construction program to help decisionmakers make 

more informed decisions about the program in the long term. Our 

report acknowledges that State has ranked more than 180 projects for 

potential replacement. However, as noted in our report, leading 

organizations not only rank capital projects by priority, but they also 

provide more detailed cost estimates and other information in plans 

covering 5-, 6-, or 10-year periods. State has the foundation to adopt this 

best practice, which we believe would be useful to the Department, 

other agencies operating overseas, and the Congress for decisionmaking and other purposes.

2. We believe that the planning information that State has provided the 

Congress is not sufficient to guide judgments regarding long-term 

program funding, accountability, and direction. Our report noted that 

leading organizations use long-term capital plans to define capital asset 

decisions, promote informed choices about resource needs, and 

provide decisionmakers with an overall sense of projects’ merits and 

funding needs. Information on the scope and composition of the 

program envisioned by State, including the estimated cost and schedule 

of planned projects, would encourage dialogue with congressional 

committees regarding funding levels and program expectations over 

the life of this program. Without a long-term capital plan that includes 

such information, it will be difficult for State and congressional 

decisionmakers to accurately judge how much the program will cost; 

when it can be reasonably expected to be completed; and how key 

factors, such as funding and changes in the size of overseas posts, may 

affect program implementation. A long-term capital plan would also 

improve the accountability and transparency of decisions made by 

State, other agencies, and the Congress that affect this important 

program. 

3. We disagree with State’s view that implementing our recommendation 

would involve too much guesswork because of uncertainties regarding 

funding and future projects’ exact scope and estimated costs. A 

long-term plan is typically based on assumptions about the future and 

estimates that are imprecise and subject to change. Once prepared, a 

plan can be adjusted to reflect changes and refinement of estimates in 
Appendix V

Comments From the Department of State

Page 62 GAO-01-11 Embassy Construction Program

projects’ scope, cost, and implementation schedule, and to adjust to 

funding decisions and other factors. State has many years of experience 

in estimating construction schedules and costs and has already begun 

several studies that would provide valuable inputs to such a plan.

4. We agree that sustained funding will be needed for State to make 

substantial progress in replacing its vulnerable embassies and 

consulates, and we have modified the report’s conclusion to recognize 

this. However, we do not agree with State’s view that it should wait 

until it knows how much funding it is likely to receive before preparing 

a long-term plan consistent with our recommendation. Our report title 

reflects the message of the report that better planning will enhance 

program decision-making. Regarding funding, our report describes 

State’s requests for funding and the appropriations it has received in 

detail, including State’s request for $3.35 billion in advance 

appropriations for fiscal years 2002-05 that was rejected.

5. In appendix I, we describe the concerns expressed by the Senate 

Appropriations Committee in September 2000 that State was 

accumulating large, unfunded construction requirements. We also 

describe the Committee’s recommendations that the Congress limit the 

number of new construction starts and provide substantially less 

funding for the program than what State requested.

6. In its September 2000 report, the Senate Appropriations Committee did 

not say that it did not intend to fund long-term planning efforts. Rather, 

the report expressed the view that land acquisition, site preparation, 

and building design are relatively inexpensive, allowing the Department 

to pursue a large number of projects at a very modest up front cost, and 

that this had led to the accumulation of large, unfunded construction 

requirements.

7. State’s comments indicate that it has interpreted our recommendation 

as requiring the development of detailed plans that accurately predict 

the exact space requirements, precise cost, and construction schedule 

of each of more than 180 projects over the life of this program. This was 

not our intention. We have modified our recommendation, calling for 

State to prepare a long-term plan that covers at least 5 years and to 

provide notional estimates of the overall program’s cost and duration. 
Page 63 GAO-01-11 Embassy Construction Program

Appendix VI

GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments ApendxiVI

GAO Contact John Brummet (202) 512-5260

Staff 

Acknowledgments

In addition to the contact named above, Lynn Moore, Jesus Martinez, and 

Rona Mendelsohn made key contributions to this report.

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