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DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

FISCAL YEAR 2009 BUDGET

HEARING

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON THE BUDGET 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

HEARING HELD IN WASHINGTON, DC, FEBRUARY 27, 2008

Serial No. 110–32

Printed for the use of the Committee on the Budget

(

Available on the Internet: 

http://www.gpoaccess.gov/congress/house/budget/index.html 

(II)

COMMITTEE ON THE BUDGET 

JOHN M. SPRATT, JR., South Carolina, Chairman 

ROSA L. DELAURO, Connecticut, 

CHET EDWARDS, Texas 

JIM COOPER, Tennessee 

THOMAS H. ALLEN, Maine 

ALLYSON Y. SCHWARTZ, Pennsylvania 

MARCY KAPTUR, Ohio 

XAVIER BECERRA, California 

LLOYD DOGGETT, Texas 

EARL BLUMENAUER, Oregon 

MARION BERRY, Arkansas 

ALLEN BOYD, Florida 

JAMES P. MCGOVERN, Massachusetts 

NIKI TSONGAS, Massachusetts 

ROBERT E. ANDREWS, New Jersey 

ROBERT C. ‘‘BOBBY’’ SCOTT, Virginia 

BOB ETHERIDGE, North Carolina 

DARLENE HOOLEY, Oregon 

BRIAN BAIRD, Washington 

DENNIS MOORE, Kansas 

TIMOTHY H. BISHOP, New York 

GWEN MOORE, Wisconsin 

PAUL RYAN, Wisconsin, 

Ranking Minority Member 

J. GRESHAM BARRETT, South Carolina 

JO BONNER, Alabama 

SCOTT GARRETT, New Jersey 

MARIO DIAZ–BALART, Florida 

JEB HENSARLING, Texas 

DANIEL E. LUNGREN, California 

MICHAEL K. SIMPSON, Idaho 

PATRICK T. MCHENRY, North Carolina 

CONNIE MACK, Florida 

K. MICHAEL CONAWAY, Texas 

JOHN CAMPBELL, California 

PATRICK J. TIBERI, Ohio 

JON C. PORTER, Nevada 

RODNEY ALEXANDER, Louisiana 

ADRIAN SMITH, Nebraska 

JIM JORDAN, Ohio 

PROFESSIONAL STAFF

THOMAS S. KAHN, Staff Director and Chief Counsel 

AUSTIN SMYTHE, Minority Staff Director 

(III)

C O N T E N T S

Page 

Hearing held in Washington, DC, February 27, 2008 .......................................... 1

Statement of: 

Hon. John M. Spratt, Jr., Chairman, House Committee on the Budget ..... 1

Hon. Paul Ryan, ranking minority member, House Committee on the 

Budget ............................................................................................................ 9

Hon. Gordon England, Deputy Secretary of Defense .................................... 11

Prepared statement of ............................................................................... 14

(1)

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

FISCAL YEAR 2009 BUDGET 

WEDNESDAY, FEBRUARY 27, 2008

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 

COMMITTEE ON THE BUDGET, 

Washington, DC. 

The Committee met, pursuant to call, at 10:08 a.m., in room 210, 

Cannon House Office Building, Hon. John M. Spratt, Jr., [chairman 

of the committee] presiding. 

Present: Representatives Spratt, Edwards, Allen, Becerra, 

Doggett, Berry, McGovern, Scott, Etheridge, Hooley, Bishop, Moore, 

Ryan, Barrett, Conaway, Tiberi, Smith, and Jordan. 

Chairman SPRATT. Let me open the hearing by welcoming a new 

member, Jim Jordan from Ohio recently elected. We are glad to 

have you. 

I would also like to welcome our witnesses. I beg your pardon, 

Mr. Ryan. 

Mr. RYAN. Thank you. I appreciate it, Chairman. I too just wanted to welcome our colleague, Jim, to the Committee. 

Just a couple of things on Jim. He is a champion wrestler. You 

can just kind of tell by looking at his ears. And he graduated from 

the University of Wisconsin with a degree in economics. He graduated from Ohio State with a masters in education; Capital University with a law degree. He served both in the Ohio General Assembly and the Ohio State Senate. He is a great addition to our Committee and we are all looking forward to working with you, Jim. 

Welcome to the Committee. 

Chairman SPRATT. I would also like to welcome our witness the 

Deputy Secretary of Defense, Gordon England who has been here 

before and we appreciate his coming again. The Under Secretary 

of Defense, the Comptroller, Tina Jonas who is an alumnus of the 

Hill and we are glad to have you. And the Vice Chairman of the 

Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Cartwright, you honor us with your 

presence. We appreciate your coming also. 

They are here of course to discuss the 2009 Defense budget. On 

behalf of the Committee we appreciate your coming, but above all 

we appreciate your service to our country. 

Our purpose is to gain a better understanding of the President’s 

2009 Defense budget. What it includes, what it excludes and what 

it portends, especially for the long-run future. 

There are two particularly noteworthy features of the Defense 

budget that we would like to explore with you this morning. First, 

the absence of a full year estimate for the war. There is only a $70 

2

billion so called place holder for war operations in 2009 and nothing, nothing at all, no additional amount beyond 2009. 

Second, the so called based Defense budget appears to us to decline in real terms beyond the budget year, 2009. This seems to us 

at odds with the Administration’s Defense plans as we understand 

them. 

We need to understand better your real, most likely budget if we 

are going to make the trade-offs and balance the priorities and put 

this budget on a sustainable fiscal course. We will all claim that 

our target is to balance the budget by 2012, but that balance will 

be a bogus objective if we don’t have good input, we won’t have 

good output. 

Without that understanding whether it be for the war or for base 

day-to-day Defense the so called base budget, we will be taking 

stabs in the dark as we try to plow the path to a balanced budget 

and it will be much more difficult than it needs to be. 

In fact, gaming the process helped put us in this hole. There are 

lots of reasons we are deep in deficit now. No question that the recession took its toll and could take its toll again. There is no question that the war has been costly or that the 9/11 episode was costly. All of these things have contributed. 

But you may recall that Secretary Rumsfeld deferred the submission of his first real Defense budget saying he needed first to consider it in terms of what he wanted to do by way of transformation. 

But when Secretary Rumsfeld finally submitted his real budget, I 

think that was in June, he acknowledged before the House Armed 

Services Committee that one reason he had delayed or deferred 

was that the President had asked that the tax cut bill come first. 

President Bush in effect told us that we could have guns and 

butter and tax cuts too and never mind the deficits. But in three 

years by 2013, the budget’s bottom line was no longer a surplus of 

$236 billion as it had been in 2000, but a deficit of $413 billion. 

And it appears to us that this same attitude underlies much of the 

budget submitted this year. 

It is with this against this back drop that we review the Defense 

budget. We have huge deficits, an economy that is or could be 

headed towards recession, and a bow wave of baby boomers all of 

which will put enormous pressure on the budget’s bottom line. 

There are monumental challenges in front of us and the first order 

of business today is to get a complete understanding of our Defense 

plan, which after all constitutes the lions share, far more than half, 

of all discretionary spending. 

Since the year 2000 the Defense budget has ridden the crest of 

a long wave. Experienced it’s largest, longest sustained build up 

since World War II. Spending, or outlays, on National Defense totaled $675 billion for 2009 and measured in 2008 constant dollars 

rank as the highest Defense budget since World War II, surpassing 

the peaks of Vietnam and Korea. 

Spending reaches this high level even though the budget includes 

only $70 billion in new budget of authority to finance just a portion 

of the total cost that we are likely to incur in maintaining the substantial forces in Iraq and Afghanistan in 2009. 

Looking beyond the budget year, projections reflect a $61 billion 

nominal cut in Defense for 2010 and cuts below the level needed 

3

to keep pace with inflation thereafter. There is no funding after 

2009. No funding for Iraq and Afghanistan. And the base budget 

appears to us to be cut in real terms, and that just seems to us 

to be at odds with reality. 

Costs have increased every year for operations in Iraq and Afghanistan and we believe the cost will probably continue at some 

level over the five-year budget window which we work with. For 

the base budget current Defense plans call for increases above inflation, not decreases. CBO in an update to it’s report on the longterm implications of current Defense plans which was issued in December concluded that current Defense plans excluding the war 

could cost billions more per year than the Administration’s budget 

shows. 

Let me just show you some slides to sort of wrap up my point 

and to give context about what we would like to talk about this 

morning. Jose, if we could just take them one by one, please, sir.

That is number four, I believe. This shows that even without full 

war funding, with only the $70 billion provided for 2009, the level 

of expenditure in real dollars, 2008 dollars is higher than Vietnam, 

higher than Korea, higher than any time since World War II. It is 

a substantial sum of money. 

Second slide.


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This shows the basic budget in layer cake fashion which we put 

together along with CBO. The bottom sliver is the baseline budget 

when the Bush Administration came to the office. The next layer 

is the Bush 2009 policy additions. And the next layer, several layers, are the future war costs, which I will come back to. But you 

can see from 2000 until 2010 or 2011 the Defense budget has more 

than doubled. 

Next chart.

And this shows you what the war costs have been from 2001 

through 2008. This would include the operations we had over Iraq 

during the period before the between the Persian Gulf War and the 

invasion of Iraq in 2003. Comes to a very substantial sum, over 

$800 billion. And of course the $70 billion bar there at the very far 


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right, one of the bookends, is in contrast to the $196 billion that 

was required last year. 

Next chart.

We asked CBO, we have asked DOD, but you have declined to 

give it us because of the variables involved in projecting this number. We said to them, Let’s make an assumption: That we draw 

down the force levels that are there today gradually so that by 

2013 in both theaters, Iraq and Afghanistan there is 75,000 troops, 

given the fact that nearly half that number in Afghanistan today 

and are likely to be there for some time. That is probably a pretty 

conservative assumption. 

But we assume that by 2013 the troop level would hit 75,000 in 

both theaters together and then would stay at a steady state for 

the rest of the projection period. We added up the total amount of 

the continued deployment in both of those places over the next ten 

years and the total comes to a trillion dollars on top of the $800 

billion already expended, is a substantial sum of money. 

Next chart.


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In addition, as we looked at last year’s budget and then again 

at this year’s budget, we found that there was a trend here. Namely, that in the out years beyond the current budget year, there was 

a downward decline in the budget for the base Defense operations. 

Day-to-day Defense operations. It is not huge, but it seems to be 

at odds with what we understand to be the likely course of the Defense budget. And when I asked Secretary Gates about this at the 

House Armed Services Committee, he indicated that this was the 

product of a negotiation with OMB. And it did result, if they complied with OMB’s growth Defense growth objectives, it would 

amount to a decline in real spending on National Defense. 

So one of the questions we have for you this morning is, is that 

a realistic forecast of likely Defense spending in the foreseeable future. Next chart.


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This shows you that the direct budgetary cost of the Iraq War 

alone exceeds $600 billion. That includes a request for 2008 and it 

assumes it will be appropriated. It comes to $608 billion, a substantial sum of money in sunk cost. 

Next chart.

We frequently here today talk that the Defense budget, President 

Bush came to the Citadel and made a speech during his campaign 

and then went back again and made another Defense speech. But 

he indicated then that we needed to get Defense spending up over 

and above three percent of GDP. Three and half to four percent 

was what he proposed. Well it appears to us if you look at National 

Security broadly considered, not just function O5O for the Pentagon, but of course the Nuclear Program at DOE, all of function 

O5O. If you look at international affairs or much of it which goes 

to National Security and if you look at Veterans programs, which 

after all are a collateral cost of maintaining a substantial military 

over the years. 

You get a total of expenditures of between around $800 billion 

and as a percentage of GDP that is 5.3 percent of GDP already. 

There is a lot of talk about having a resolution that would dictate 

that spending be at least 4 percent of GDP. As we see National Security and you continually define it that way yourselves, Homeland 

Security, National Defense, Veterans Affairs is well above 4 percent. Already it is 5.3 percent. 

Next chart.


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And this kind of rubs it in. It is not really fair. You might can 

call this the value of having allies. This is one reminder of what 

the first Persian Gulf War cost of us because we had contributing 

allies. We had the Japanese contributing, we had the Germans contributing. If they didn’t contribute troops they contributed real 

money and of course the Persian Gulf States put up substantial 

sums themselves. And the net cost to our budget was $2.1 billion. 

We are not suggesting you could pull that off again in today’s 

episode in Iraq, but it does raise the question, to what extent are 

we trying to build new alliances and a new division of labor in the 

world so that our allies in different regions of the world share a 

bigger burden of the total cost of Defense. 

Next chart.


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9

Well this should give you another ground for wondering if the 

out year numbers are good and that is the so-called SAR reports 

which is summarized periodically by GAO show that all of our 

major weapon systems are experiencing substantial cost growth, 

particularly those like the F-35, the F-222 of course has been a 

very expensive airplane to buy. The Navy is now buying a number 

of ships like the CVN–X Carrier which have a very high front-end 

cost on the theory that the operational cost and the life-cycle cost 

will be substantially less. Let’s hope it works out that way, but we 

have seen substantial overruns in the acquisition of military, on 

your watch, on everybody’s watch. It is the nature of the beast. I 

am not blaming—it is your lap it just happened in and nobody 

seems to have been able to contain the cost of major weapon systems. 

That just gives you the overview of why we are concerned this 

morning. We didn’t come here to berate you. We appreciate your 

service to the country, but we need good numbers. We need a good 

firm basis for projecting what likely costs for Defense are going to 

be so we can face squarely the hard decisions we have got to make 

if we are indeed genuine about trying to get this budget on a sustainable course back in balance by 2012. 

Thank you for coming, but before your testimony I would like to 

recognize Mr. Ryan for a statement. 

Mr. RYAN. Thank you, Chairman Spratt. Welcome back, Secretary, Deputy Secretary England and welcome General Cartwright 

and Ms. Jonas to the Committee. I appreciate the work you do and 

the monumental task that you have managing an organization 

with over 3 million employees, facilities in over 5,000 locations and 

163 countries and a budget of over a half a trillion dollars. 

I also appreciate the work you do in managing an agency that 

is attempting to transform from a cold war footing to a more agile 

joint force while prosecuting a very challenging global war against 

terrorism. And I am particularly grateful to the men and women 

who put on a uniform each and every day and answer the call to 

protect our freedom while placing their lives on the line in places 

far away from their families and loved ones. 

I believe that providing for our national security is the highest 

obligation of the federal government. 

And if you could call up slide one, please.

10

The dramatic Defense cuts of the 1990’s left the Department of 

Defense ill-equipped to meet the new challenges we have faced over 

the last decade. I would hope, however, that with the funding levels provided since 2000 and an increase of over 80 percent to the 

base budget, the Department is getting on a more sound financial 

ground as we prepare to enter the next decade and the new challenges it will bring. 

The war on terror has been very costly, both in the sacrifice 

made by our fighting forces and in dollars, but not as costly as enduring the alternative, inaction in the face of adversity. As a member of this Committee, I have been and will continue to be supportive of providing the Department the fully funding it needs to 

continue to prosecute this war. I am disappointed, however, that 

the majority has failed to act on the President’s request of over one 

year ago for supplemental funding. 

I am also disappointed, though not surprised given the circumstances, that the Administration only requested a portion of 

funds for the war in 2009. This Committee has called for transparency in regard to war funding both in the Administration’s request and in the budget. Clearly, there is still room for improvement on this front. So it is my hope that we will use our time today 

to gain a better understanding of what the Department’s 2009 supplemental request will be. 

And if you could pull up number seven, please.


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This just gives you in perspective of where we are. And this is 

a real apples to apples comparison of National Defense spending as 

a percentage of GDP. We contributed more as a percentage of our 

economy under the Carter Administration than we are today, and 

we are facing a war that is global in reach. A war that is going 

to cost us a lot and a lot of time. 

And so I think it is important to put these things in perspective. 

I think it is important to consider the fact that this is our highest 

priority for our nation, for our federal government, but at the same 

time given all the dollars involved and all the sacrifices that we see 

from our men and women that we represent, we need to have more 

transparency in the way we spend our constituents dollars. 

And with that, I welcome our witnesses. Thank you. 

Chairman SPRATT. Thank you, Mr. Ryan. I ask unanimous consent that all members who did not have a chance to make an opening statement be able to submit one for the record at this point and 

Secretary England, General Cartwright, Secretary Jonas, you can 

submit your full statement for the record. We will make it part of 

the record so that you can summarize it as you see fit. 

We again thank you for coming and the floor is yours. We look 

forward to your presentation. 

STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE GORDON ENGLAND, DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE; ACCOMPANIED BY: THE VICE 

CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINTS CHIEFS OF STAFF, GENERAL 

JAMES E. CARTWRIGHT; TINA JONAS, UNDER SECRETARY 

OF DEFENSE (COMPTROLLER) 

STATEMENT OF GORDON ENGLAND 

Mr. ENGLAND. Chairman Spratt and Mr. Ryan, members of the 

House Committee on the Budget. First of all, thank you very much 

for the opportunity to be here. We do appreciate the opportunity to 

come and discuss the budget and the war cost with you. I will tell 

you for me I always, first of all, I learn something, it is always inVerDate 0ct 09 2002 07:32 Jun 09, 2008 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00015 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 Z:\DOCS\HEARINGS\110TH\110-32\HBU058.000 HOME PsN: DICK

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formative for me and I hope it is a benefit to this Committee. So 

I thank you for the opportunity to be here. 

Chairman SPRATT. We will give you a package of our charts to 

take back to the Pentagon with you. [Laughter] 

Mr. ENGLAND. It is a delight to have General Jim Cartwright 

with us, you know, because this is the first time with me before 

the Budget Committee that I have the General with me. So I welcome him and also to have Ms. Tina Jonas back with us again 

today. 

I will try to respond to a few of your comments. There will only 

be one opening statement, Mr. Chairman, and that will by my 

opening statement. And then because I know time is short we will 

get immediately then to questions and dialogue. 

I do want to comment that the President’s base budget as you know is $515.4 billion. But you need to know, I mean that is a lot 

of money, but on the other hand, we do respond to the threat in 

today’s environments. I mean this is in our very best estimate what 

it takes to defend this nation, defend our freedom and liberties and 

we are in a very complex security environment. It is distinguished 

by a number of very prominent factors. 

First of all, of course, terrorism and the war that we are in and 

our magnificent people are fighting every day. We still, obviously, 

concerned about the whole proliferation of WMD, failed and failing 

States, and emerging powers who’s intentions are unclear. 

So we are not only fighting the war, but we are also, obviously, 

trying to defer conflicts in the future and that requires military capabilities to deter future conflicts. Now each of those threats pose 

their own unique challenges and each demands a certain set of capabilities, but our total security relies on the comprehensive approach and that is distinguished by a balance set of capabilities for 

the entire spectrum of challenges. And that is what we try to do 

is balance across this entire capability. 

Now when appropriated the funds that we have asked for will 

provide the resources necessary to execute the national military 

strategy. Now $515.4 billion is a lot of money, but it does have to 

be considered. I have heard two sets of numbers today in terms of 

historical context. I mean we look at it in terms, obviously, by our 

Department of Defense spending. It has grown since 9/11 and we 

are now at about four percent of GDP. I think that is the charts 

that Mr. Ryan showed. 

Now that is, however, as the charts showed the lowest invested 

by this nation in time of war. I think in modern history at least, 

because while imperfect for point of reference it was about nine 

percent during Vietnam; 11.7 percent during the Korean War. So, 

fortunately, while our costs have gone up to defend the nation, so 

has the basic economics of the nation have grown considerably during that period of time. So we are to some extent a beneficiary of 

a vibrant economy, but we are also less of a cost for the economy 

than we have been in past conflicts. 

Now the question you raised about what is the cost in particular 

the cost of war relative to the $70 billion. I think Secretary Gates 

was clear on his testimony to both the SASC and the HASC. In addition to the $515, the Secretary stated at that time in addition to 

the $515.4 base budget as you know every request includes $70 bilVerDate 0ct 09 2002 07:32 Jun 09, 2008 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00016 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 Z:\DOCS\HEARINGS\110TH\110-32\HBU058.000 HOME PsN: DICK
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lion in an emergency bridge funding to take us, to bridge us, until 

we know what the right number is. 

Now the total requirement as you commented will indeed be larger. And later this year, once we have an accurate appreciation of 

the requirement, we will have a more detailed request submitted 

to you. 

Now when Secretary Gates was pressed on this matter, he offered a number of $170 billion as a total requirement, but he also 

said it was definitely imperfect and imperfect for a number of reasons, which is why we did not turn this number in earlier, but instead turned in a bridge. 

First, as mentioned, we do not yet have the appropriation for Fiscal Year 2008 in terms of our supplemental. So we have of that request we still have $102 billion outstanding. Frankly, we do not 

know when we are going to get it or if we will get that amount. 

And that will cause increased cost and disruption, but of course depending if we don’t get it then of course that will change completely as we go forward in your 2009 estimate. And then in addition what adjustments will be made from the upcoming recommendations that General Petraeus, which will be in about 

month. General Petraeus will come in and brief the Congress so 

that could indeed result in some significant change going forward. 

But in addition, as you know, there is definitely going to be a 

change in Administration and the fact is of this supplemental three 

quarters of it will be spent during the next Administration. So in 

the next Administration will, obviously, have some say about how 

they view this and what the expenditures should be. 

So I would and as we go forward I would like to say what is most 

important to us, and I think what is most important to the nation 

and to our men and women who are on the front lines is I would 

urge a Congress to support, first the budget request, but also to expeditiously appropriate the outstanding balance of the year’s war 

funding request so that we can fund our troops and provide them 

the support that they deserve. And importantly, to reduce any disruption of effort associated with this impending change in Administration. 

I mean last year when we had continuing resolutions, we did not 

have our war funding, that was hugely disruptive. And now we are 

about to go through a period of planned disruption, that is a 

change of Administration, people leave, policies change. And if we 

have an uncertain budget at that time I can tell you it will be extraordinary for the people who replace me and other people in the 

next Administration to carry on in any efficient and effective manner. 

So I would urge the Congress, particularly this year, to act expeditiously. I do want to comment that while we are all debating the 

budget, there are men and women who are on the front lines standing the watch securing our freedom and liberty, which is what the 

Department of Defense is all about. And so while these are important discussions, we should not lose sight of the fact that we do 

have people deployed every day and we do need to support them. 

And I believe that the American people do want to give them our 

full support. 

14

So we are prepared to have a dialogue, answer questions. Hopefully help this process along today. And so Chairman Spratt, Representative Ryan and members of the Committee, we look forward 

to the dialogue. And we thank you for the opportunity to be here 

for that opportunity. 

[The prepared statement of Gordon England follows:]


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Chairman SPRATT. Thank you again for coming. Does General 

Cartwright have a statement you would like to make? 

General CARTWRIGHT. I do not. 

Chairman SPRATT. Okay. Secretary Jonas? 

Ms. JONAS. No, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman SPRATT. Okay. The overarching question is, is the 

President’s budget submission a realistic budget? And I think the 

answer is, its not by at least $100 billion because that amount 

which the Secretary has authorized off the seat of his pants before 

the Senate Armed Services Committee has to be added to the $70 

billion that is in place, the place holder. 

Is the revised number now a rough approximation of $170 billion? 


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Mr. ENGLAND. Well it is a number. I mean, Mr. Chairman, I 

mean here is the dilemma we have. On one hand we are required 

to give you numbers that we can support and so we provide you 

rationale for the numbers when we give them to you. And in this 

case, I mean, we don’t have a basis because we don’t know what 

decisions will be made next month after General Petraeus comes 

on board. And we also don’t know the status of the money that we 

are spending today. 

So we are already spending money out of our base budget that 

is, frankly, going to the war cost. So we are already pretty much 

in the dilemma. I mean trying to justify the number with the uncertainties we have today puts us in a dilemma. So, frankly, the 

decision on the $70 billion is an OMB decision, but I will tell you 

that I felt that that was the right approach and I actually had a 

lot of discussions on that subject in terms of what was most realistic that we could do to provide some reasonable confidence in the 

numbers. So we know it is at least the $70 billion. 

And we have in the past, I think three or four times now, we 

have had a $70 billion bridge and that is how we have managed 

to go each year. And then last year, of course, we came in with a 

full budget, that actually turned out to be the worst of all for us 

because we didn’t get a budget approved. We ended up with a CR 

and we still haven’t gotten the war cost. 

So I understand there is frustration on behalf of this Committee, 

but there is also some frustration on our side in trying to find a 

way to work through all this that meets all the criterias that everybody would like us to meet. And we are trying to do that, sir. I 

mean I can assure you we are trying to be as open and forthright 

as we can in this matter and we will continue to be that way with 

you. 

Chairman SPRATT. Well lets take Afghanistan. What we have 

been there what now, six years? And we have just increased our 

presence there. And General Jones has just come back saying that 

he is disappointed with the progress we have made there. We have 

got a South Carolina contingent that Gresham Barrett and I are 

proud of, the 218TH brigade, and they are doing the damnest to 

help train the Afghan Army. 

We have got a long way to go and, nevertheless, we are also have 

a cost basis that goes back five or six years. Isn’t there some way 

we can—and we are likely to be there for some time to come. Isn’t 

there some way we could extrapolate for that cost and determine 

what a good number is for approximating the likely cost of the deployment to Afghanistan? 

Mr. ENGLAND. Mr. Spratt, I mean it would be, I think it would 

be wonder if we can do it. I mean the problem is war is inherently 

unpredictable. If it was predictable, obviously, this would be much 

easier on the battlefield and then easier to cost, but we have a foe 

that is not predictable. Obviously, they are a determined enemy we 

have. And so it is very difficult to look years ahead in terms of 

what the outcomes will be. 

Chairman SPRATT. Well, General Petraeus apparently is going to 

come back with—are we going to build down to 140,000 troops 

sending trimming some of the brigades that were added to faciliVerDate 0ct 09 2002 07:32 Jun 09, 2008 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00029 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 Z:\DOCS\HEARINGS\110TH\110-32\HBU058.000 HOME PsN: DICK
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tate the surge. But the troop level that he is shooting for is 140,000 

troops? 

Mr. ENGLAND. Let me let the Vice——

Chairman SPRATT. Is that—that be used as an approximation of 

the cost to this deployment? 

Mr. ENGLAND. Let me let the Vice address that and then I will 

comment. 

General CARTWRIGHT. General Petraeus will come in and comment on the plan that was laid out over the last year. The troop 

number is somewhere between 130 and 140,000 have been associated with the press. The actual numbers and the work that we are 

doing is on the classified side so that we can have another conversation about that for the details. But the intent was to get down 

to the pre-surge levels and counting the brigade combat teams, 15 

brigade combat teams by the middle of July. 

He will come in and assess his progress on that activity. We need 

to understand his assessment in order to make sure that we are 

going to be able to draw down to those levels. Where we will draw 

down between now and July and what implications that has beyond July. Those are the types of things that we hope to find out 

and then come back to you with numbers based on that testimony. 

Chairman SPRATT. But we do have those numbers within a fairly 

reasonable range, don’t we? We are talking about somewhere between 125 and 150,000 troops. 

Mr. ENGLAND. So, Mr. Spratt, if I can. The NDAA requires, I believe and someone can correct me here, but I believe we are now 

required to provide monthly to the Congress projections including 

three months into the future in terms of troops. And there was 

about a week ago people from the Department of Defense came and 

briefed our Committees of record and that is classified document, 

but it is available. And I my view is that may give you some better 

insight, but again that is today’s projection and that is why even 

the 140 number as I think General Hamm had a number of qualifiers with that pretty much along the lines of which you just heard 

from General Cartwright. 

Chairman SPRATT. The chart that we put up which is taken from 

CBO and it shows the out-year cost beyond this year, assuming a 

build down to 75,000 troops in both theaters. Does that number 

ring true to you? Is that approximation something that you find a 

reasonable take on based upon the assumptions? 

Mr. ENGLAND. Of course everything is based on the assumptions, 

Mr. Spratt, so I mean pick whatever the assumptions are and I am 

sure you can get a number. And however you multiply that out, but 

it is all based on what those assumptions are. And of course I don’t 

know how you, I mean I don’t frankly know how you arrive at 

those assumptions. I mean we don’t have those assumptions built 

in. I mean it is a set of assumptions. I would guess for planning 

whatever you feel is appropriate to do that. 

But we don’t have a set of numbers like that in terms of assumptions that far into the future. I mean we are still, frankly, in the 

debate today in terms of what the Fiscal Year 2009 GWOT costs 

will be. Right? And we won’t get any clarity, more clarity than that 

for another month or two, at which time we will have more clarity 

and I think be able to give you a more precise estimate. 

27

But going out that period of time and estimating the war I just 

think is extraordinarily difficult. 

Chairman SPRATT. Let me ask you about the chart five, please, 

Jose. 

This is something was presented in the last year’s budget and it 

occurs again. It is somewhat different numbers in this year’s budget, namely in real terms over five years the future Defense budget 

that you submitted to us is shown as declining; negative real 

growth. Is this a realistic betrayal of what the Defense budget is 

likely to be over that five year period of time? 

Mr. ENGLAND. So, first of all, I guess the validity is depending 

on what the inflation is over the future. And I guess that is one 

thing we don’t know now. It is that is the case by the way the 

budget right now based on our latest projection OMB projection of 

inflation, it is below inflation. 

I know the Secretary would like, obviously, to have a budget that 

accounts for inflation with at least some modest growth, but we 

have not had those discussion with OMB because I mean we do 

that the year we are in the year of the budget and then we work 

that year and we update it. But for 2010 we will leave we will have 

a budget for 2010 and in 2010 we will discuss with OMB, you 

know, the basis of the budget going forward. But I would, again, 

the Secretary said what he would like is to have it at least accommodate inflation hopefully with some modest growth, but that is a 

discussion we will have in the 2010 budget going forward. 

Chairman SPRATT. Well CBO, Congressional Budget Office and 

the Congressional Research Service have both done studies of your 

plans for the foreseeable future, the so called fit up. And they simply can’t conceive of the budget costing less than inflation will require. In fact, they think additional cost will be substantially above 

inflation, unless you make major changes in weapons system procurement or in force levels. 

Mr. ENGLAND. So, Mr. Spratt, in the past I can tell you my own 

experience is now in the last seven years there was a period where 

we were below inflation. We did indeed have it adjusted and OMB 

agreed to adjust it for inflation. And by the way, that was about 

the time we also agreed to grow the force. So you are right, the 

budget actually went up after that point, because we decided to 

grow the Army and the Marine Corps so we actually had a growth 

in the budget. 

But certainly the Department of Defense would recommend that 

we have at a minimum a flat budget to accommodate for inflation, 

but we will not have that discussion with OMB for some time yet. 

Chairman SPRATT. Let me ask you two more questions. One is 

about weapons systems and I said it has been the frustration of 

every Administration, Democrat and Republican. But, nevertheless, 

GAO has done an overview of cost growth in major acquisition programs, the so called selected acquisition program, the SARs. And 

found that from 2002 through 2007 it was cost growth of $392 billion. A large sum of money. What are you doing to contain the cost 

growth of major weapons systems, new weapons systems coming off 

the production line? 

Mr. ENGLAND. So, Mr. Ryan, I believe that we have now incorporated into the system some fundamental changes. And the fundaVerDate 0ct 09 2002 07:32 Jun 09, 2008 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00031 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 Z:\DOCS\HEARINGS\110TH\110-32\HBU058.000 HOME PsN: DICK
28

mental changes is, if I could discuss one or two here. One of the 

fundamental changes we now look at what we call capability portfolios. That is we used to look at individual programs of which we 

have thousands of individual programs. But the fact of the matter 

is, you can lump these programs into capabilities where a lot of 

programs come together that have to work together to provide a 

top level capability. 

So we have now put these programs together and we manage 

them differently. And we are also telling people that they can no 

longer just have cost growth, they have to go back and look at the 

fundamental requirements and do trade offs in terms of requirements and cost. 

So we are working to tighten the system internally. I will tell 

you, however, when you listen to our contractors, what the contractors require is stability and predictability in terms of programs. 

And so I mean these when we get delays in budgets or we don’t 

get supplementals, I can tell you what it does. It adds instability 

and unpredictability in our contractor force. And, therefore, they do 

not invest for the long term for our programs. 

So we are already at low rates and disruptions are very costly. 

So I think this is an area where we both need to work together, 

both at Congress, the DOD and our contractors. But I believe this 

problem does run deep and it has to do with both budgeting and 

the way programs are managed and requirements. And we are 

working at it as hard as we can, sir. 

Chairman SPRATT. One final question. 

Mr. ENGLAND. Can I have the——

Chairman SPRATT. Yes, sir. 

Mr. ENGLAND [continuing]. Say one word here please? 

General CARTWRIGHT. Real quick on that. 

Chairman SPRATT. General Cartwright. 

General CARTWRIGHT. What we have done over the last year is 

in the management between defining what the requirement is and 

defining the acquisition strategy. We have brought the acquisition 

community into the requirements discussion. We have set trip 

wires and expectations on cost that get tripped based on the selected acquisition reports. 

So we have a way of monitoring and setting the expectation up 

front so the acquisition community understands what is tradable 

and what is absolutely essential to the war fighter. That helps us 

provide stability on the requirements side so that these requirements don’t grow over the life of the program. 

Chairman SPRATT. Do you think that if we have a substantial deployment in Iraq throughout the next ten years and a substantial 

deployment in Afghanistan you are going to be able to complete the 

recapitalization of the Armed Forces based upon the systems that 

are now in acquisition and those that you know will be coming out 

of the pipeline? 

And we have got a pretty substantial investment account increase coming, right now upon us, and it is to continues for some 

time to come for R&D and for procurement. Do you think that you 

can sustain that level of procurement to modernize our forces, 

transform our forces, and at the same time maintain this level of 

troops in some sort of engagement in those two theaters? 

29

Mr. ENGLAND. Well, of course, right now, Mr. Spratt, the war 

cost is separate from the base budget. So in the base budget we do 

include and thanks to the Congress and the support of both the 

R&D budgets are up and this year for the first time our procurement budgets are over $100 billion. So for the first time we have 

substantially, I believe when I came in we were down like $40 billion or something back in 2001. We are now at about $100 billion 

in terms of modernization accounts. 

So those accounts, what we have factored into the FYOP up in 

terms of our modernization is accommodated within those base 

budgets. The war costs, though, are independent and that is, for us, 

a separate appropriation. But I would tell you the base budget and 

we do balance and make sure that we do have affordable programs 

in that budget. 

Chairman SPRATT. Okay. We have got a vote coming in a few 

minutes, but we have time for Mr. Ryan. Mr. Ryan. 

Mr. RYAN. Thank you, Chairman. First off, Secretary England, I 

have got a list a questions I wanted to ask you in writing, if you 

could respond——

Mr. ENGLAND. Yes, sir. 

Mr. RYAN [continuing]. Instead of taking up all this time on your 

DODs budget and health care costs. So I will submit this to you 

and if you could get this back to me in writing, I would appreciate 

that. 

Mr. ENGLAND. Yes, sir. 

Mr. RYAN. One of my concerns is that as we do these 

supplementals, which we believe the notion of a supplemental is to 

reimburse the incremental costs of war. That things that ought to 

belong in the base budget get pushed into the supplemental budget. 

And that is just a concern of ours just for basic good budgeting 

principles. 

And if you look at your supplementals since 2001 you will notice 

that the investment account funding has grown from a billion to 

over $70 billion in 2008, if this current request is actually enacted. 

And combined with your regular 2008 appropriation, investment 

account spending is $250 billion. For reference in 2001 it was $104 

billion. 

Why has the spending increased by 140 percent over the last 

seven years in the procurement, research and development, testing 

and evaluation accounts? That is question number one. 

Question number two is, obviously, if we have equipment that is 

damaged or worn out in the theater, we replace that and it is logical to assume that that is done in the supplemental request, but 

help me disaggregate what is equipment that is lost in war and 

what is equipment in procurement that belongs in the base budget? 

And it seems to me that base budget stuff is creeping into these 

supplementals. Can you just please elaborate more on that? 

Mr. ENGLAND. So, Mr. Ryan, it may be we try not to let it migrate, frankly. So we do review every one of these request. So in 

the base budget we do have an attrition number for equipment for 

normal training operations that we would normally do in our base 

budget. 

So there is an attrition number for some replacement equipment 

in the base budget. And so if an airplane goes down on just, you 

30

know, a training unrelated mission that goes that is replaced in the 

base budget. But if it is all war related in the global war, then that 

goes in the supplemental. 

So we do try to parse that. I can’t tell you we are perfect at this, 

but we do work at it to make sure that we can support it when 

we turn it in to you, sir. 

Mr. RYAN. And I understand we have a 140 percent increase in 

the investment account in the base budget, but we have gone from 

a billion in the first supplemental to $70 billion in this supplemental. 

Am I to take from that, that is all attributable to war and war 

costs and in theater problems? I mean this is, you know, this is research, development, test, evaluation, procurement. That is my concern is we are seeing a lot of migration. A billion to $70 billion over 

just you know 2001 to this last supplement. 

Mr. ENGLAND. So I will ask Tina to comment, but for example, 

the MRAP vehicles alone 15,000 vehicles is 20 some billion dollars. 

So that one procurement, which is a war cost because it is for men 

and women deployed in Iraq and Afghanistan. So that alone is 20 

some billion dollars for that one vehicle. 

Mr. RYAN. That is why, if you could just walk me through the 

numbers, that would be helpful. 

Mr. GORDON. Okay. Tina, can you help there? 

Ms. JONAS. That was, I think, a great example because of course 

the MRAP vehicle if you think about our annual ship building 

budget it is about $14 billion. So for that one procurement alone 

and that is in force protection. 

And I would say one area of procurement growth has definitely 

been in the force protection area. We also are using our vehicles 

at rates that we never envisioned. So they are just wearing out and 

it is in some cases it is five, six, seven times what was expected. 

In other cases it is combat losses. We have lost unmanned arial vehicles. In fact, we were just told the other day that we have recently lost at least four UAVs. So it is the rate and usage that is 

driving a lot of the procurement associated with the GWOT budget. 

Mr. RYAN. I think it would be helpful to us, because obviously, 

we realize we need to invest. I just want to make sure we are investing in the right budget, you know, aisle and the column. 

Ms. JONAS. Yes. 

Mr. RYAN. If you could possibly break that $70 billion down in 

the investment account that is in the supplemental for us and explain, you know, how this belongs in the supplemental column and 

not in the base budget. That would be very helpful. 

Ms. JONAS. Well, of course, the $70 billion that we have is a 

bridge right now. It does not have any detail associated with it. 

Mr. ENGLAND. No, this is a different $70 billion. 

Mr. RYAN. That is a different——

Ms. JONAS. I am sorry. 

Mr. RYAN. Not the $70 in the investment account. 

Mr. ENGLAND. I believe, see I am not familiar with the $70. I 

have never sort of parsed it out that way. But I believe, Mr. Ryan, 

you are asking in the $189 billion total——

Mr. RYAN. That is right. That is what I am asking. 

Mr. ENGLAND. Tina, I think the question is——

31

Ms. JONAS. Okay. 

Mr. ENGLAND [continuing]. In the $189 total there is $70 billion 

in the investment account——

Mr. RYAN. That is right. 

Ms. JONAS. Yes, we——

Mr. ENGLAND [continuing]. Can we break that out? 

Ms. JONAS. Yes, we certainly have that. As a matter of fact, that 

would be available on our website from last year. We have the 

Global War on Terror. That is all broken out. 

Mr. RYAN. And an explanation how it belongs in the incremental 

war funding and not in the base budget? 

Ms. JONAS. Certainly. And I would be happy to come by and walk 

you through it, sir. 

Mr. RYAN. Yes. I am just interested in that. 

Ms. JONAS. Yes. 

Mr. RYAN. We are worried about this migration. I know we have 

a couple minutes left. Perhaps, this one is for you, Secretary, or 

maybe for you, General. It is my understanding that the Chairman 

of the Joint Chiefs recently endorsed the idea of putting a budget 

floor tied to GDP of four percent of GDP for DOD. What is your 

position and opinion of that proposal? Who ever wants to comment, 

I would appreciate it. 

Mr. ENGLAND. If I can comment, Mr. Ryan. There has been discussions, I know the Secretary has discussed this a number of 

times. And so I would and it has come up a number of times with 

the Chairman, the Secretary, and myself. And I would tell you this 

is still a source of discussion in the Department of Defense. I am 

not sure we have settled that that is the right approach or not, although there has been discussion in that regard. 

So, I mean I would like to defer that, because I don’t believe we 

are in a position to say yes, that is what we believe the right way 

forward is. 

Mr. RYAN. But the Department is actually actively considering 

whether or not to support this bill? 

Mr. ENGLAND. Well, we are definitely having discussions and 

whether we will go forward to OMB or not I think is still an open 

point at this time. But there is a discussion about particularly the 

2010 budget what should we be doing going forward in the 2010 

budget? What is a rational way to do this in terms of having built 

in modernization for our military and particularly for the volunteer 

force, which is an expensive force. But when I commented before, 

predictability is very important and stability. If we had a predictable right floor or just number that we could go forward with it, 

it would help immensely in terms of managing our programs. 

So that is something we are discussing still and we would like 

to get back with you on that subject. 

Mr. RYAN. Okay. General Cartwright, any——

General CARTWRIGHT. Same lines. It may not be the whole budget. It may be a portion of the budget that we can put some predictability, particularly in our acquisition programs, to allow us to 

move forward. There is also the attribute of just what is appropriate based on what the need is at the time. And should that be 

pegged to a hard number. 

Mr. RYAN. Yes. 

32

General CARTWRIGHT. So we are trying to straddle the fence here 

between two needs and we are not yet at a point where we are 

ready to articulate exactly how that comes. 

Mr. RYAN. Yes. I just as a budgeteer, I think that this idea needs 

to be looked at a little more closely than some might have done. 

I think that is right. We need predictability. We need to be able 

to plan out. It saves us money in the long run with contracting and 

all of those things, but to put some arbitrary number for just this 

part of our federal budget, to me, just seems like bad budgeting. 

But I just, you know, we have go to find a better way of getting 

that predictability, of getting the commitment and the investment 

made, and this is just my personal opinion, than pegging some percentage of GDP which is setting aside this portion of our budget, 

which is a significant portion, to be treated different than any 

other portion of our budget. And that is something as I would just 

encourage you as you deliberate on this to really think that one 

through. 

Mr. ENGLAND. Yes, sir. 

Mr. RYAN. I know we have got to get going here. So I appreciate——

Chairman SPRATT. We have got four and a half minutes to make 

a vote if you can bear with us we will be back as quickly as possible. 

Mr. ENGLAND. That would be fine. 

Chairman SPRATT. We appreciate your forbearance. 

Mr. ENGLAND. Absolutely. 

Chairman SPRATT. The Committee will stand in recess subject to 

the call of the Chair. 

[Recess.] 

Chairman SPRATT. In the interest of time, I think what we will 

do is turn to Mr. Edwards now and then we will come back to Mr. 

Ryan when he returns. Mr. Edwards. 

Mr. EDWARDS. Mr. Chairman, thank you. Secretary England, 

welcome back to our Committee. Secretary Jonas, General Cartwright, thank you all, the three of you, for your incredible service 

and sacrifices on behalf of our country. And as a fellow Texan, Secretary England, it is a special privilege to have you back before this 

Committee. 

Mr. ENGLAND. Thank you. 

Mr. EDWARDS. Before I ask a question, Mr. Chairman, I just 

want to say for the record for future debates in this Committee, I 

think it is fair to say I have been known, as you have, as someone 

who has supported a strong National Defense and significant increases in Defense spending. And so in that sense I have worked 

with the Bush Administration in support of their Defense request. 

Where I differ with the Administration, Mr. Chairman, is in the 

argument that we can balance the budget over the next five years 

while extending trillions of dollars of tax cuts and maintaining investments in our critical priorities for this country. And what I 

would like to say for the record, it now appears based on this testimony today that to claim that we could balance the budget through 

the President’s budget proposal over the next five years while extending the President’s temporary tax cuts would require a $52 billion cumulative cut in current services for Defense programs and 

33

that is added to a $20 billion cut in present services for veterans 

programs. And $17 and a half billion of those cuts in the VA would 

be out of VA health care programs. 

So my point isn’t so much to ask Secretary England a question 

about that, but to just lay down the foundation so when we hear 

in the months ahead that we can have it all; we can fight a war, 

we can have a Defense build up, we can afford massive extensions 

of tax cuts without under funding our nation’s top priorities, I for 

one just simply don’t believe that is possible. Unless one thinks it 

is a good idea to cut $52 billion out of real services in Defense and 

$20 billion out of veterans programs during a time of war over the 

next four years. 

With that having been said, Secretary England, let me ask you, 

one of the programs through my Energy and Water Appropriations 

Committee, that I have been involved in for the last decade is supporting the Nunn-Lugar program. And President Bush and John 

Kerry one of the things they both agreed on in their presidential 

campaign in 2004 was our greatest unmet challenge that should be 

our highest priority should be defending America against the 

threat of nuclear terrorism. 

I know we have done a lot in the area of intelligence funding and 

increases there, but as I understand it the 2009 request would actually on the DOD side of Nunn-Lugar would actually be $21 million below current services. And the Department of Energy Nuclear 

Non-Proliferation Programs, tied in Nunn-Lugar, would be nearly 

a 40 percent cut; $411 million cut below the 2008 levels. 

Given the importance of protecting Americans against the threat 

of nuclear terrorism and given the massive amount of nuclear materials, enough in Russia to build literally thousands of nuclear 

bombs if a terrorist, God forbid, were able to steal that material. 

Is there a rationale behind requesting cuts and current services for 

this important program? 

Mr. ENGLAND. Mr. Edwards, I didn’t realize we had cuts and so 

I have to ask Tina. Tina, can you answer that or do we need to 

get it back? It is in current services so? 

Ms. JONAS. Yes. 

Mr. EDWARDS. A $21 million cut below current services according 

to our Committee staff——

Ms. JONAS. Actually——

Mr. EDWARDS [continuing]. On the DOD part of it, $411 million 

cut in the Department of Energy part of the Nunn-Lugar program. 

Ms. JONAS. Mr. Edwards, the amount that we have in the budget 

is about $414.1 million and that is actually $11 million lower than 

the enacted level. And we would be happy to get back to you with 

a little bit of the details. I will say that and maybe the Vice Chief 

could talk to that a little bit in terms of the importance, the strategic importance, as you know his background. 

But we would be happy to talk to you about that. I think this 

program as in past also had some unobligated funds. It is multiyear money. And so we want to make sure——

Mr. EDWARDS. Right. 

Ms. JONAS [continuing]. That we get it right. 

Mr. EDWARDS. But I would and that is a fair point to make. I 

would want to emphasize, though, sometimes you have to leave an 

34

account of unobligated funds so that when an agreement is accepted between Russia and the United States, we have got the money 

to follow through on that. And without those unobligated funds, 

you hit a brick wall in terms of even negotiating those critical——

Mr. ENGLAND. Mr. Chairman, I can say this: That as a budget 

item this never came to my attention in all of our discussions. So 

I would expect it is the answer is probably somewhere along the 

lines that Tina said, because as far as I know, I mean, we fully 

funded the request in this area at the Department. So this is an 

area we may just need to look at this and get back with you. 

But this was not an issue in any of the budget discussions with 

me. 

Mr. EDWARDS. Okay. 

Ms. JONAS. If I could add, there programmatically the you may 

know that the chemical weapons destruction activity at Schuchye 

has been completed. So that may be part of the levels——

Mr. EDWARDS. Okay. I would welcome any additional follow up. 

Ms. JONAS. Absolutely, Mr. Edwards. 

Mr. EDWARDS. And my time is up, although, perhaps for the 

Chairman, if did General Cartwright wanted to comment? 

I just my final comment before you say anything, General Cartwright, would just be we are spending $515 billion to try to protect 

the American people and that is what the Department of Defense 

is all about. And God bless our service men and women for what 

they do in that effort. It just seems to me to be quibbling over a 

few million dollars on a program that is about a billion dollars or 

so out of that $500 billion. A program designed to protect the 

American cities from nuclear holocaust, I don’t know why we quibble. 

Mr. ENGLAND. Mr. Edwards, I don’t believe that is the case. I 

mean I don’t believe we are there is any quibbling. And again it 

is, I mean my view is we did fully fund the request in this matter, 

but we will get back. 

Mr. EDWARDS. Okay. 

Mr. ENGLAND. And give us an opportunity to look at this. 

Mr. EDWARDS. That is very fair. 

Mr. ENGLAND. We will definitely follow up. 

Mr. EDWARDS. I would welcome a further discussion. And thank 

you, Secretary England on that. 

General CARTWRIGHT. Just real quick. The good news story here 

is over the last four years our execution rate has gotten significantly better. 

Mr. ENGLAND. Right. 

General CARTWRIGHT. We have completed projects. 

Mr. ENGLAND. Right. 

General CARTWRIGHT. We need to enter into the discussion about 

how we go beyond the current limits of Nunn-Lugar and expand 

our work against weapons of mass destruction to a more global 

basis——

Mr. EDWARDS. Right. 

General CARTWRIGHT [continuing]. Rather than just focus so 

much. 

35

Mr. EDWARDS. Right. I salute you for the good work you have 

done. I hope we can even do more together in the future. Thank 

you. 

Mr. ENGLAND. Thank you. 

Chairman SPRATT. Secretary Jonas, I didn’t understand your 

statement. Did you say that Schuchye had been completed? 

Ms. JONAS. That is my understanding, that the work there is 

scheduled for completion in 2009 so. 

Chairman SPRATT. I think issue there is that the Russians have 

taken over the project and they haven’t let the subcontracts on it. 

General CARTWRIGHT. And we are having some real challenges 

with the MOX facility and so we can get you the exact details. 

Chairman SPRATT. MOX as well. 

General CARTWRIGHT. Right. 

Chairman SPRATT. But Schuchye was a separate——

General CARTWRIGHT. That was a separate one, but we have got 

two that are causing us some challenges. 

Chairman SPRATT. And even when you finish with Schuchye that 

is, at most, 15 percent of the chemical weapons stock. So it is just 

a down payment on the problem. 

Mr. Gresham Barrett, 

Mr. BARRETT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Secretaries Jonas and 

England, thank you and General Cartwright. Thank you for being 

here today. 

Secretary England, I want to go back to the four percent that we 

were talking about a little bit today. I am a big proponent of that. 

I think that there needs to be a set base line of GDP. And you 

talked you said that you all were still talking about within the Department. 

Do you think that the talk is because four percent is too low? 

Does it need to be higher? I mean have you had any discussions 

like that or you are just not sure that is the direction you need to 

go into? 

Mr. ENGLAND. Well I think it is a combination of those things, 

Mr. Barrett. This is sort of a broad issue and it has some profound 

implications. So on one hand it gives us a floor, it gives us stability, 

it gives us predictability and that is all to the positive. 

Mr. BARRETT. Right. 

Mr. ENGLAND. The down side is, obviously, if the economy accelerated then, fine, we would be happy with maybe more money than 

we thought. Go in the other direction, however, you ended up in 

a recession and you would find yourself in a very bad situation. 

So, I mean on one hand we ask that Congress for the money that 

we believe we need based on the circumstances at that time. And 

the circumstances change and that percentage could be up or down. 

So I mean personally I have some hesitation because while it provides for predictability which I and stability which I am a huge 

proponent of, it does worry me that we are still subject to the economy itself in terms of variations. 

And so again it is a big question and I am not sure we have come 

down in balancing this exactly, but we are having those kind of discussions. And there is lots of other facets to this also. I think the 

General Cartwright brought up an interesting point, there may be 

that there is some aspects of the budget that you definitely want 

36

to baseline and that in the procurement accounts, for example, if 

we had predictable procurement accounts that we knew for certainty in terms of availability of funds, not just year to year. I 

mean if you look at our procurements, multi-years are terrific of us, 

right? 

Mr. BARRETT. Yes, sir. 

Mr. ENGLAND. And then our and the industrial base. So to the 

extent we can get closer without across our procurement accounts 

that would be very beneficial to us. 

Mr. BARRETT. Well please keep us informed on that, because I do 

think that, you know, you got to have national security first because if you don’t nothing else matters. So I think——

Mr. ENGLAND. Absolutely. 

Mr. BARRETT [continuing]. A baseline approach is certainly, some 

type of baseline approach, I think, makes perfectly good sense. 

Lets talk just briefly about what would happen if we needed to 

fight another front. There has been a lot of talk about what is 

going on in the Middle East with a lot of partners over there. We 

are stretched to the limit, lady and gentlemen. And I am concerned 

about have you talked about what the estimated cost, what the estimated troop size if we need to open up another front, what that 

entails. If you have done any preplanning or looked at anything 

about men, material, cost, the whole nine yards. And, General, that 

might be your bailiwick, I am not sure. 

General CARTWRIGHT. We do a substantial amount of what if 

type planning. And we have done that and given the diversity of 

the threat that we are facing with Iraq and Afghanistan ongoing 

and instability in that region the challenges that we have in the 

Pacific, the challenges that we are starting to understand better in 

Africa and South America. There is more than enough opportunity 

to try to look at each of these and see what would be our regret 

factor if they went in a direction that we had to react to. And we 

try to work our way through that. 

Clearly, we believe we have the forces for the most significant 

threats that we have out there and we try to make sure that that 

is the case. Any additional threats will impose some significant 

strain on the military. We will take people that are currently at 

home resting and have to deploy them and that will be hard. And 

the duration of that deployment if it extends out two years, it will 

be very difficult for us to handle. 

Mr. BARRETT. Have you——

Mr. ENGLAND. With a—could I just add one proviso, though? 

Mr. BARRETT. Yes, sir. 

Mr. ENGLAND. And I think the Vice Chairman would agree with 

this. It depends on the nature of the conflict. I mean, frankly, our 

Air Force is not stressed at the moment, neither is the United 

States Navy. So there are different it is an uneven with the military. I think, though, I can unequivocally say and the Chairman 

has said before, if we are faced with a major threat to America, we 

do have the resources to respond and will do so. 

I mean there is no ambiguity there for anyone around the world 

who may want to take advantage of the situation. The United 

States military is extraordinarily strong and capable and would respond to any threat and does have resources to do so. 

37

Mr. BARRETT. And I see my time is up. Thank you, gentleman. 

Chairman SPRATT. Mr. Doggett. 

Mr. DOGGETT. Thank you very much for your testimony and your 

service. Yesterday, as you know, Army Chief of Staff General 

George Casey said that he had no reason to doubt Senator Obama’s 

account by an Army Captain of a rifle platoon in Afghanistan that 

his platoon was short on men, short on ammunition, and short on 

Humvees. 

That incident, though a while back in time in Afghanistan, is 

hardly isolated. Only this Sunday there was another report on the 

173rd Airborne Combat Team in Northeastern Afghanistan that 

noted, ‘‘The soldiers were on a 15-month tour of duty that included 

just 18 days off.’’ Many of them were stop lost meaning their contracts were extended because the Army is stretched so thin. You 

are not allowed to refuse these extensions. And, ‘‘We don’t get supplies, assets. We scrounge for everything and live a lot more rugged.’’

Admiral Fallon, the head of U.S. Central Command, I think has 

been quite candid and frank in recent months in describing the 

Taliban as having been more successful in regaining their strength 

because of the invasion of Iraq. In Afghanistan there was, to use 

Admiral Fallon’s words in January, ‘‘Kind of a little bit of neglect.’’ 

And in another interview Admiral Fallon said our Afghan problems 

began occurring when, ‘‘The attention and the resources were focused in Iraq not where Osama bin Laden is hiding and not where 

those who aided and abetted him were regaining their force.’’

As you know the bipartisan Afghan study group co-chaired by retired Marine Corp General James Jones, for whom I know you and 

the Pentagon have a great deal of respect, has described the dire 

situation that this mismanagement has caused, concluding that Afghanistan risk sliding into a failed state and becoming a forgotten 

war. 

His report found that in Afghanistan there were, ‘‘Too few military forces, insufficient economic aid, and no clear and consistent 

comprehensive strategy.’’ The assessment that he made concluded 

and recommended that we stop tying together, as the Administration has wrongly done, Afghanistan and Iraq because this creates, 

in their words, ‘‘The false impression that they consist of the same 

mission.’’ Something many of us in Congress have been saying 

since the outset. 

My questions to you, Secretary England, are number one, isn’t 

General Jones and his bipartisan group correct that our allies will 

be unwilling to provide the resources that we need to get the job 

done in Afghanistan as long as the Administration continues to 

lump Afghanistan and Iraq together in the mislabeled global war 

on terrorism? 

Second, while the cost of the war which you are here to testify 

about today in Iraq is measured in blood, is measured in the $12 

billion a month you have been spending there lately. Isn’t part of 

the cost also the job that was left undone in Afghanistan as these 

resources were diverted to Iraq? 

And, third, when we look at the claim that we were going to capture Osama bin Laden dead or alive and weaken the Taliban, 

38

aren’t we farther from that objective today than when you testified 

before this Committee last year? 

Mr. ENGLAND. So a lot of questions and I will turn some of them 

over here to the Vice who is probably more capable than I am. I 

know General Jones well. He was in my office just the other day 

having lunch with me. 

Mr. DOGGETT. I assume so. 

Mr. ENGLAND. I haven’t gotten that kind of report directly from 

General Jones, so I guess I am a little surprised. 

Mr. DOGGETT. Well I am reading from the report that he chaired 

and signed. And I am sure you have copies of that because the Pentagon made a fairly short reaction to it. But I am reading directly 

from the report. I am sure you and your office have at least read 

the report, haven’t you? 

Mr. ENGLAND. I have, but also have not picked out just a few 

words out of the report. So I think you have to take the report in 

context. I don’t want to debate the report. I mean I am not here 

to do that. The report is the report. 

Mr. DOGGETT. Well my question is the conclusion. Do you agree 

that as they concluded and recommended that we are not going to 

get the help we need until we decouple the Afghan war and that 

effort from Iraq. 

Mr. ENGLAND. So my understanding is a number of people supporting us in Iraq has actually grown so that the NATO has committed——

Mr. DOGGETT. Really? Don’t we really have a phased redeployment already underway in Iraq as Poland leaves, as Australia 

leaves, as Canada leaves. And you supplement it by hiring the 

Georgians to come in? 

Mr. ENGLAND. So there is discussions. The Secretary was just in 

Europe and so I don’t want to preempt him, but he Secretary was 

in Europe talking to our NATO allies. Our NATO allies understand 

the importance about Afghanistan. It is a separate——

Mr. DOGGETT. Have they sent any new troops there? 

Mr. ENGLAND. There are——

Mr. DOGGETT. If I understand what Secretary Gates asked for. 

Mr. ENGLAND. Well there are discussions with the NATO allies. 

And I am not going to preempt those——

Mr. DOGGETT. Discussions don’t help. 

Mr. ENGLAND. And I am not going to preempt those discussions, 

sir. But——

Mr. DOGGETT. Well the discussions have been going on for a long 

time and the troops haven’t come. Do you disagree with the recommendation of the Afghan study group that Afghanistan and Iraq 

have to be decoupled before we get the help we need? 

If you do, I will respect your disagreement. 

Mr. ENGLAND. Sir, my view is we are funding the effort. I mean 

this is the Budget Committee. And we are funding the effort in Afghanistan. We are doing what we need to do. Unfortunately, I will 

tell you that in the budget itself where we have requested funds 

today, we do not have the funds we need in Afghanistan, because 

we are still waiting approval by the Congress. 

So I would say that——

Mr. DOGGETT. I understand that is the dodge——

39

Mr. ENGLAND [continuing]. It is——

Mr. DOGGETT [continuing]. That is pretty standard to avoid——

Mr. ENGLAND. It is what——

Mr. DOGGETT [continuing]. With inability of our allies to do their 

fair share so it is not all American blood, and not all American taxpayers, and not somebody up in Northeastern Afghanistan who has 

to scrounge for supplies. 

Mr. ENGLAND. Well——

Mr. DOGGETT. You have not gotten those resources and this bipartisan Committee came out with a report in January that the 

Pentagon has been dodging that made a clear recommendation 

from the former head of the Marine Corps. And I am just asking 

you for a straight answer. Do you agree that we have got to decouple to get somebody to share a little of this burden or are we going 

to have to keep carrying it all by ourselves because of an ideological commitment that tie these two unrelated conflicts together? 

Mr. ENGLAND. Mr. Doggett, we have a global war on terror and 

we fight that on different fronts. And we fight that in Afghanistan 

and we fight that in Iraq and we have troops deployed in other 

parts of the world. And so this a global war——

Mr. DOGGETT. And I understand that is the party line, but it is 

the party line that General Jones bipartisan commission rejected. 

And I take I will take your answer as a respectful disagreement. 

Just get a response to my last question. Aren’t we in a worse position today with reference to the Taliban, with reference catching 

Osama bin Laden than we were when you were here last year? 

Mr. ENGLAND. I will let the Vice Chairman answer that. I would 

tell you this: We are against a determined foe. I do not think you 

can predict day to day and month to month the fight against the 

Taliban. It is a long—pardon me, sir. It is a long fight against the 

Taliban. It is not something we are going to measure day to day 

or week to week. And so this is a determined foe and it will ebb 

and flow, but we have forces in Afghanistan to deal with those 

issues along with our NATO allies. And so this is a combined coalition fight in Afghanistan. 

Mr. DOGGETT. Mr. Secretary, I will accept your answer, but I 

found your answer earlier to Chairman Spratt and again now that 

the reason you can’t budget is because we have an unpredictable 

foe to be, frankly, astounding. If in the history of military history 

of this country we have ever had a predictable foe, I would like to 

know when it was. 

Mr. ENGLAND. And I agree, by the way, and that is the way we 

have funded in the past. We fund our war cost as we have war cost. 

And that is what we are asking this Congress to do again is to fund 

the war cost. And it is important that those costs be funded, otherwise, we cannot prosecute the war. It does take funds to do that. 

And it has been very disruptive to have to go from hand to mouth 

when we do not have those funds appropriated. 

Mr. DOGGETT. You have got the funds to carry this war on 

through July, don’t you? That is the report that the Congressional 

Research Service provided as an objective analysis. If we don’t do—

if we folded our tents and went home, which we certainly don’t 

plan to do, you have got the resources now. It is not because of any 

inaction here, you don’t have the resources from our allies, of 

40

course, because you have been unable to get them because you 

won’t accept the recommendations of people like General Jones. 

I yield back. 

Chairman SPRATT. Mr. Tiberi. 

Mr. TIBERI. Thank you three for coming today. Kind of going 

along on that point, Mr. Secretary, reading your bio you led a private sector company before, now you are helping lead a very large 

public sector operation, the Pentagon, with men and women in the 

field. With respect to that budgeting issue, and maybe the two others can help us with this as well. How difficult is it, and what impact does it have, not only on you but the men and women on the 

ground in combat when there is uncertainty of money coming? An 

uncertain flow. An uncertainty of when we will be passing a supplemental, not only this year but in the past. And what measures 

does it cause you to go through and what measure does it cause 

the commander on the ground to go through? Can you share a little 

bit of that with us? 

Mr. ENGLAND. So, I would be pleased to. First of all, I will tell 

you the good news and the bad news. The good news is, is that we 

try to accommodate, obviously, everything we can in the budget so 

there is no impact. The bad news is there appears to be no impact 

and therefore there is no urgency. 

I mean we do try to accommodate. We, obviously, do not want 

to impact our men and women in uniform so we do everything we 

can so they are not impacted as we allocate funds. Some of this 

does not show up immediately. I mean if we do not have funds 

enough in terms of resets, or buying procurement or buying at a 

lower level or keeping an efficient rate at a factory. I mean that 

it doesn’t show up. It will show up at some future time. 

So we do everything we can to minimize the effects. It is important to our men and women in uniform to know that the nation is 

behind them. And one way that that is demonstrated is the funding 

that is provided to the Department of Defense in their behalf so 

that they can execute the war. There is no question that it is meaningful that we have some consistency in terms of our funding. 

I don’t think people in the military sit there and ponder what is 

going on at the national budget level, obviously, because it is very 

local to them. So I don’t think you can draw any direct connection 

to that, but it is meaningful, I think, in terms of the response to 

our Department. And, Chairman, I will——

General CARTWRIGHT. I would just add to that the types of budget issues that interruptions will be manifested out in the field are 

those types of funds like the CERP fund where local commanders 

are setting the priorities with the people that they deal with in the 

community to help them move along. And if we walk out and, for 

instance, say what we will do is help you put together a sewer line 

that will give you a quality of life or potable water or something 

like that. When they start to see that those funds are not going to 

be available to them, to those commanders, that kind of resource 

is more valuable than bullets most of the time, because it builds 

the opportunity to let the, pick your country, whether it is Afghanistan or Iraq, allow them to build the capacity to do for themselves. 

So they tend to look at, in the field, day to day what is the status 

of those funds? Will I have them? Will I be able to make commitVerDate 0ct 09 2002 07:32 Jun 09, 2008 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00044 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 Z:\DOCS\HEARINGS\110TH\110-32\HBU058.000 HOME PsN: DICK
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ments to these people that I can keep, and therefore, validate their 

trust in me. 

The other things that the local commanders see are the repair 

up forces. When a Humvee is damaged, do I have the spares on the 

shelf? Or am I starting to cut back there because we are not sure 

we are going to have the money to commit the contracts, etcetera. 

So those are the types of things locally that we see. Back here 

on the Pentagon side, the acquisition, the interruptions of the acquisitions at the home forces. And the Congressman brought up the 

173rd. In places like Vincenza where the 173rd is based. The resources that are start to be in jeopardy of child care, of services, 

things like that, start to affect families, indirectly affect the war 

fighters. 

These are the kinds of things that they will see. 

Mr. TIBERI. Thank you. 

Mr. ENGLAND. But we work very hard not to have that happen 

to our men and women in uniform. I mean so we do everything we 

can so that they are not affected. 

Mr. TIBERI. Thank you. Another direction. I had a call last night 

from a constituent, military retiree, Mr. Secretary, who was concerned about a proposal of yours that will increase fees and co-payments. Two questions. 

Do you believe Congress has to approve that? And number two, 

can you just give us a brief history as to why you believe you need 

to do it? 

Mr. ENGLAND. Our current health care cost is I believe about $42 

billion a year. It is about six percent of our budget. It is projected 

to grow to $60 some billion or by 11 or 12 percent of our budget 

in the out years. About 65 percent of that is retirees. We had in, 

I believe 1996 a co-pay for drugs, etcetera. That has not changed 

since 1996. So we propose that we change that literally to account 

for inflation. And since then, of course, everybody’s retirement income, everything has gone up significantly. 

So this does not apply to our active men and women. It does not 

apply to people, I believe, over age 65. It applies to those people 

who have retired and also in most cases working with significant 

income. So this is a way to just put some more balance into the 

system. It certainly wasn’t owners at all, it was to adjust for those 

levels. And, yes, my understanding is Congress I believe we have 

been precluded by the NDAA from imposing any change in fees. So 

those fees are now more than ten years old in terms of the co-pay. 

And we were recommending adjusting as a way of just good business practice. 

And so that, I believe, is the—is that clear? Do I have it right, 

Tina? 

Ms. JONAS. You have got it exactly right, sir. 

Mr. ENGLAND. Okay. And so that was, again, a prudent business 

practice which would be meaningful in terms of trying to moderate 

this significant increase in cost we have in this area. 

Mr. TIBERI. Thank you. I will yield back. 

Mr. EDWARDS [presiding]. Mr. Berry. 

Mr. BERRY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and thank you for holding 

this hearing. Secretary England and General Cartwright and Secretary Jonas, I have absolutely no doubt that you all love this counVerDate 0ct 09 2002 07:32 Jun 09, 2008 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00045 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 Z:\DOCS\HEARINGS\110TH\110-32\HBU058.000 HOME PsN: DICK
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try. You care just as much about it as I do and all the other people 

in this room. I know that you are doing the best job that you can 

do. You serve a different master than we do. You have a Commander in Chief and we have got about 660,000 commanders in 

chief. 

All that being said, it is very distressing to me that we hold a 

hearing in this Committee and are presented with a budget and 

with testimony in the face of a deficit that has exploded over the 

last seven years. And we use things like unpredictability and then 

we talk about well we don’t want any disruption and certainly we 

don’t. None of us do. We don’t want our troops not to have what 

they need. If there is a tool out there from repairing a sewer line 

to a water line or whatever, if that saves lives and creates stability 

and peace and prosperity some place and we can afford to do it, 

lets do it. 

I don’t see how we can possibly continue in this country to carry 

on this, what I consider to be a false debate, and not lay all of our 

cards on the table and recognize the fact that the country is fiscally 

in horrible condition. And that this is a very expensive enterprise. 

And that we are going to all have to sit down to the table, face the 

reality of the situation, and deal with it in an appropriate way or 

this country is going to get sucked into the black hole of fiscal irresponsibility. We are going to be the next sub prime victim in the 

countries of history. And this concerns me a great deal. I don’t see 

how that we can possibly continue on the path that we are on. And 

I know you all are doing what you consider to be your job and you 

have no ill will or bad intentions whatsoever. And I don’t intend 

to suggest that, but I can tell you we have got to get real about 

it. 

Having said that, I have a question that is much more specific 

than my comment. According to several press reports the Marine 

One Helicopter Program is being significantly delayed and is well 

over budget. According to these reports, initial feeling of the new 

helicopters to transport the President may be delayed by up to five 

years and the price tag has ballooned from $7 to $11 billion. Including at least an additional one billion for the second phase of 

the program. 

These schedule issues and cost increases are a result of nearly 

2,000 program requirement changes. It is my understanding that 

in the light of these issues the Pentagon and Lockheed Martin, 

along with its European partner Agusta Westland are now looking 

at ways to restructure the VH–71 Helicopter Program. 

Mr. Secretary, you are requesting over a billion dollars for further Navy development of the program in this year’s budget, a significantly higher amount than what the Department requested in 

the last couple of years. What Congress ultimately appropriated 

and at a time when we have ever growing cost for the wars in Iraq 

and Afghanistan. Can you please provide a little detail into the 

budget request for the VH–71 and put the request in context of the 

reports I just mentioned. 

Mr. ENGLAND. Mr. Berry, I can. That is the program, I think it 

is the VH–71 Program which is the new Presidential helicopter. 

That program is in the development phase. The program has what 

we call two increments. Increment one and increment two. And the 

43

money in the program is primarily for increment one. I believe that 

we may need additional funds, but that is something we are looking at on increment one and two. 

So your reporting, and I am not sure all those numbers are right, 

but we are re-looking at the program because the program for both 

contractors was a commercial derivative that has added some cost 

as we put in some security safety requirements into the helicopter. 

So that is an area that is being looked at right now. I am not in 

the position to give you any answers, because we don’t have any 

answers except I am quite certain we will continue with the program because it is a needed program, but we will just have to come 

back with you and tell you how if and how we decide to restructure 

the program. 

Mr. BERRY. Right. Thank you, sir. I yield back, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. EDWARDS [presiding]. Mr. Conaway. 

Mr. CONAWAY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, appreciate that. One 

of the concerns that a lot of us have is that our job really is to look 

a 20-year horizon as to threats against this country and yes we 

have got to fund this year’s threat and this year’s hype. But we 

also ought to have some folks that are on your side of the table 

that are looking 20 years down the road to see what we are doing, 

because we have got I suspect an immense investment in platforms 

that are not a part of the fight today, but will be a part of a fight 

that could possibly be there in the future. 

And so, Secretary, if you could give me some sense of things that 

may have happened within the 2009 budget that would have an 

impact on this issue of how we make sure we can fight and invest 

for the fight 20 years from now, as well as continuing to be able 

to fund the fight that we are under right now and the type of fight 

that we have got on now. 

Does that make any sense in terms of what I am asking? 

Mr. ENGLAND. No, it makes a lot of sense, Mr. Conaway. As a 

matter of act you know our Quadrennial Defense Review requires 

us to look out 20 years and obviously it is less fidelity as you move 

out. It is very good close in and very poor as you look out, but we 

do try to look out. And so I mean we look at all the projection, all 

of our intelligence, all of our classified everything so that we can 

get some feel for what is going on in the world in terms of what 

could happen to us in the future. 

In the 2009 budget the Vice Chairman and I actually together 

chair all the groups dealing with the 2009 budget and so we look 

at both near and long term. Keep in mind, a lot of our programs 

are very long term just because of the nature of what we do as a 

long time developing the program. So to some extent our most 

things in our procurement account in the base budget are actually 

long term. I mean they are destroyers, or replacement equipment 

and submarines. And a lot of this is replacement, new equipment, 

better capability for dealing with future threats. 

A lot of the very, very near term is in the supplemental because 

it is, obviously, buying equipment for today’s war. In the 2009 

budget in the groups that the Vice Chairman and I chair we basically looked at $30 some billion in terms of, you know, applicability 

and where it should it best fit, etcetera. So we bring all the people 

in from the entire Department and this is part of the debate when 

44

the budget is put together in all the services and in OSD in terms 

of trying to strike that right balance. 

And the Vice. 

General CARTWRIGHT. I might just add just a couple of points. As 

we look at ten, because we are in the process of building the budget 

for ten right now. The beginning of that process is to look at the 

20-year threat assessment to understand and baseline ourselves. 

So we bring in our think tanks places like DARPA. We also look 

at industry. We ask them to come in. And so we have just finished 

a couple of weeks at looking at those threats and then trying to understand what it is that is going to address them, because building 

an aircraft carrier today that a high school student is 40 years 

hence into the future, that aircraft carrier will still be in our inventory. Will it be relevant against the threats we have out there? 

What are the attributes that would make it relevant? 

We have started to adjust in taking those looks and I will be one 

to tell you that the recent activity that we had associated with the 

satellite was the result of not knowing a specific threat, but putting 

together systems that could respond to the unexpected. One other 

piece that we are doing that the Secretary instituted are these 

portfolio management approaches. So we have services that look at 

the sea service, the air, etcetera, but these portfolios take common 

things like command and control that if we build them in these 

stove pipes may not talk to each other. These portfolios are designed to look for our seams; look for those areas where we might 

be vulnerable so you will see investment in this budget that you 

are dealing with right now that is looking at those seams and trying to understand and make sure that we are not surprised in 

those seams, nor that we are not surprised in a way that would 

disadvantage us in the future. We may have to adjust, but we 

won’t have to wait four or five years for the solution is the hope. 

That is where we try to point ourselves. 

Mr. CONAWAY. Just one quick—is there anything in the 2009 

budget in circumstances where you had to rob Peter to pay Paul 

in this context? 

General CARTWRIGHT. I would say to you that more often than 

not what we looked for is where we can build a hedge? Where 

should we be building something that we put definite dollars 

against the war we are in and the fight that we are in, but what 

do we want to do with whatever we are investing in? Lets take the 

MRAP as an example. Something that we know we need right now 

for the fight that we are in. What are we going to be able to do 

with that? What is usable in the future? Are the dollars against 

that for command and control? Is the chassis something that we 

can use in another way? 

We have looked at those types of investments and tried to lay in 

the seed corn for the event that we will be surprised or as we look 

out to the future is it likely that we are going to need something? 

So some of these vehicles as an example are set up to work in a 

chem-bio environment, because we know likely in the future we are 

going to address that and we don’t want to have to start from 

scratch to do it. 

Mr. CONAWAY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman SPRATT [presiding]. Mr. Scott. 

45

Mr. SCOTT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Let me follow up on a 

couple of those questions we just asked. 

There is an article recently on CNN about the MRAPs. Have 

we—what is the problem with getting them out in the field? 

Mr. ENGLAND. I don’t know a problem, Mr. Scott. I mean the 

MRAPs probably go under the fastest programs ever gone through 

the Department. And we are producing about 1,000 a month. And 

they get processed into Kuwait and into the field. So as far as I 

know it is moving. Obviously, would be nice if you could have this 

done instantly, but they are large vehicles. And so they are being 

shipped. They were being flown over and now they are being 

shipped. And now I think the queue is sufficient, it is only by ships. 

Mr. SCOTT. Okay. And General Cartwright, you mentioned figuring out where the seams are. Are you making full use of modeling and simulation upon those seams? 

General CARTWRIGHT. I will tell you that I probably drive people 

crazy with modeling and simulation, because I absolutely demand 

it. It——

Mr. SCOTT. Say again? 

General CARTWRIGHT. I demand it. 

Mr. SCOTT. Okay. 

General CARTWRIGHT. It is just it cuts time off, it cuts expense, 

trial and error. I mean it is one of the great tools that have come 

available to us. 

Mr. SCOTT. Secretary Gordon, as I understand the Navy budget 

and you probably have to get back to me on this. The budget is sufficient to keep the aircraft carriers on schedule? 

Mr. ENGLAND. Yes, sir, I believe it is. 

Mr. SCOTT. And if you could report back to me what I can tell 

my ship repair companies as to what the OMN budget is going to 

do to ship repair. I assume that is something you can’t just say off 

the top of your head. 

Mr. ENGLAND. We will get—Mr. Scott, I will have the Navy get 

back with you directly. I will just pass on to Navy, have them get 

back with you directly, sir. 

Mr. SCOTT. Okay. And Representative Drake who represents 

Langley——

Mr. ENGLAND. Right. 

Mr. SCOTT [continuing]. Is interested in what the budget does for 

the Hornets. 

Mr. ENGLAND. Okay. 

Mr. SCOTT. Our Air National Guard has an interest in that too. 

So if you could get back on that. And as you know, Representative 

Joanne Davis recently passed one of her passions, which was getting those ships out of the ghost fleet out of the James River which 

constitute a major potential environmental hazard. They have been 

slowly but surely getting out and we want to make sure the budget 

continues that program. 

Mr. ENGLAND. You know, Mr. Scott, I actually asked that question the other day myself just because of my own Secretary of the 

Navy they asked how that fleet was coming. They told me it was 

going down, but again I will get the Navy to respond. But I am 

quite confident they have money in the budget to do that. 

46

Mr. SCOTT. BRAC well there is $1.9 billion to effectuate the 

BRAC closings. As you know the costs for Fort Monroe went from 

$70 some million to $270 some million overnight without including 

the cost which could be hundreds of millions of dollars for cleaning 

up the mess left behind. Do we have enough money in the BRAC 

line item? 

Mr. ENGLAND. I will confirm it with you, but Mr. Scott, everywhere where we know we had either you know deficiencies in the 

budget or an overrun or a problem to be addressed. As far as I 

know we put that money in the budget this year. 

Tina, right? So we should be totally whole in the budget for 

BRAC. 

Ms. JONAS. I think we are——

Mr. ENGLAND. If we are not——

Ms. JONAS. Yes. We have a very healthy BRAC budget, but we 

will follow up with you, sir on the issue that you raise with Fort 

Monroe. 

Mr. SCOTT. Fort Monroe specifically. 

Mr. ENGLAND. Yep. 

Mr. SCOTT. The budget includes an increase in personnel, 7,000 

Army, 5,000 Marines. Is that sufficient to maintain a decent rotation schedule or are we still going to be on these extended multiple 

rotation schedules that we are on now? 

Mr. ENGLAND. Well it will take a while to get to the new level, 

202,000 Marines and we are still growing, and also Army is still 

growing. But I will let you address—we are not at the end point 

because we just started that growth last year, Mr. Scott. So it 

takes a while to get to the new——

Mr. SCOTT. And we are having trouble recruiting at the level we 

are at. And so when you respond, if you could tell me what affect 

the increase might have on our ability to actually recruit quality 

personnel. I would appreciate that. 

One of the recruitment tools we have is the GI Bill. As you know 

my Senator Jim Webb has introduce a GI Bill which would restore 

the education benefits to what they used to be during the Vietnam 

War. And we would appreciate comments on that in writing. I am 

running out of time so I just mention the questions that I have. 

Last year’s budget included language that Representative Barbara Lee had proposed to go through the GAO study of ways that 

the military could save money. There were dozens of potential cost 

saving items and we put money in there for you to actually pursue 

those cost savings. And if you could bring me up to date on the status of that. 

And two last questions in just in accounting. Has the use of, excessive use of contractors run up the cost of the war more than it 

would have been if we had used military and civilian military personnel? 

And, finally, the accounting cost. We keep hearing about $8 billion lost in Iraq that hadn’t been that is not accounted for. If you 

could give us an update on——

Mr. ENGLAND. I think that is Iraqi funds, but we will look into 

it. 

Mr. SCOTT. Okay. If you could just bring me up to date on what 

the status of that is. 

47

Mr. ENGLAND. If you will, just to make sure, if you will give us 

all those questions we will be sure we get back with you, Mr. Scott. 

Mr. SCOTT. Okay. Thank you. 

Mr. ENGLAND. You bet. 

Chairman SPRATT. Mr. Ethridge. 

Mr. ETHRIDGE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Let me thank each of 

you for being here this morning and let me echo my friend Mr. Berry’s comment. Thank you for your service. It is a difficult job, but 

we also have one to do on this side of the mic as well as you could 

appreciate. 

I have just returned from a trip to Iraq meeting with our soldiers, because representing Fort Bragg and Pope which is now 

transitioning through BRAC. I have the privilege of representing 

some of America’s finest. And they are being deployed just like our 

neighborhood folks down at LeJeune on a in a very rapid basis and 

many of them I met with over there were on their third tour, some 

on their fourth rotation, which was sort of set a little of the tone 

for one of my questions. But before I do, I want to back up and ask 

either one of you who want to comment on this. 

You did mention we were in pretty good shape with BRAC, but 

given the movement of facilities coming to Fort Bragg, I would ask 

specifically and you may need to get back to me on this if you don’t 

have it right now, that we do have adequate funding still in those 

accounts currently. And an additional question that I will need developed for me, one of the real issues that is being batted around 

in the adjacent counties to Fort Bragg is because of the build up 

we are seeing significant increase in needs for education and other 

issues that we have. I don’t think we have anticipated in the BRAC 

funding. And I would appreciate a feed back on that of what that 

cost is. 

And specifically the question is this: If you have students in a 

school in a unit where the base is, you are funded at a far higher 

level than the students in the adjoining county. Last time I 

checked they usually cost about the same amount to educate students. Having been State Superintendent of Schools for eight years. 

And one of the real challenges we are facing is those counties tend 

to be counties with less resources. That is patently unfair to our 

men and women in uniform who we are sending overseas. Those 

children are in those schools. So I would appreciate feedback as 

soon as possible as we work through this budget process. 

Mr. Chairman, thank you again for this hearing. Let me take one 

other point I want to make because as we made this CODEL over 

there, one of the things I saw we visited the MRAP facility as vehicles were coming in. And I would encourage the speeding up of that 

process, anything we can do to speed it up, would make a difference. I was we were informed that we have not lost a single life 

of a service person that was moving about in one of those vehicles 

except one that happened to be in the gun turret outside the vehicle. I think it is imperative we do that very quickly. 

And of what we saw is that the violence is down for a variety 

of reasons. One of which is our men and women doing a marvelous 

job, certainly working with local officials. But now that that has 

happened, I think the Iraqi leadership needs to step up to the 

plate. We have given the room and the opportunity to get the job 

48

done. We just can’t continue this forever, standing up there as you 

well know. 

We have talked about dollars today and budgets are about 

money. And we need to continue and I certainly have supported 

every budget for our military and will continue to do so. But I 

think you are aware that we are spending about $12 billion a 

month in Iraq by recent estimates, $500 plus whatever that number may be. But we are not—I have been fortunate enough having 

a new grand child born in the last few weeks and that child is now 

being faced with a lot of money that we are borrowing from foreign 

governments. We have to get a handle on this. We have to have 

help from our neighbors in that area, they are the ones who stand 

the lose the most as we start drawing down. 

So my question would be as we look at this, the continued numbers of troops we are talking about keeping there. Mr. Secretary, 

there are those who say when we talk about drawing down they 

talk about a precipitous withdrawal. We are not talking about that. 

We weren’t even talking about cutting and running. I think what 

we are talking about is being realistic. We have got to all sit at the 

table and get a realistic handle of how we balance this federal 

budget. The dollar dropped yesterday at new lows around the 

world. There is a reason for that and that is because we are spending dollars that we don’t have. 

How much longer can we ask our men and women to continue 

these extended deployments, multiple deployments? It is bringing 

a heavy toll on our men and women that I represent, that you represent as Secretary in the Department of Defense. And, Mr. Chairman, I know from your standpoint you feel it from our men and 

women that I met with at Anbar Province. They are doing a marvelous job. They tell you that. They love the job they are doing, but 

they are tired. They are absolutely tired. 

So who would like to respond to that? It may be a philosophical 

question, but it is an important question that we have to answer. 

Mr. ENGLAND. Well——

Mr. ETHERIDGE. It reflects our budget responsibilities. 

Mr. ENGLAND. No. And so it really is dealing with the dwell and 

the time on station. And that is part of the reason, Mr. Etheridge, 

that we decided to grow the force and the Congress concurred with 

that. So we are actually growing the force as a way to increasing 

supply. 

Mr. ETHERIDGE. I couldn’t agree more, but in the short term that 

is not helping those guys and gals out there who are rotating. 

General CARTWRIGHT. You know, my sense is that we have to 

grow the force in the longer term initiatives that we have put in 

place that you have been so helpful with. But in the nearer term 

as General Casey eluded to yesterday, we are waiting for this 

March/April report from General Petraeus, but as you saw on the 

ground, the conditions are improving and we are starting to transition from being the fighting force to moving to an over watch position which will allow us to reduce the forces, hopefully, over time, 

conditions permitting. 

If we can do that we can get these tours back into a manageable 

state. We need to get to that condition because the families also 

feel this stress. But if we keep it the rate that we are going, it will 

49

challenge our ability to retain the quality of people that we need 

to recruit the quality of people we need. There will be challenges 

out there. We are handling those challenges today. How long that 

can go, I have to I mean I have to agree it is not forever. And we 

are doing the best that we can to address these issues on the 

etches, the long term, the near term. 

Like you, and I don’t want to put words in your mouth, but I was 

very heartened with my last trip to the AOR with what we have 

accomplished and how much the Iraqis in particular are stepping 

up to the ball and they just did a budget $49.9 billion a lot of which 

is going to their security and that is heartening. 

Mr. ETHERIDGE. Thank you. I would hope that they spend some 

of that on their police, because I really think that is the critical 

area right now that it really hurting. 

General CARTWRIGHT. Yes, sir. 

Mr. ETHERIDGE. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. I yield back. 

Mr. SPRATT. Mr. Becerra. 

Mr. BECERRA. Mr. Secretary and General, thank you very much. 

Madam Secretary. Thank you very much for being with us again. 

And by the way, I think it needs to be said that it is our role to, 

obviously, ask you tough questions, your role to give us as best you 

can an answer to that. And I think the men and women in uniform 

understand that we are suppose to do our job to make it possible 

for them to have the best equipment, the best training, the most 

efficient policy making shop, and Pentagon that we can. 

So as we talk about this, I hope that we will continue to convey 

the thoughts that to every warrior that is out there wearing a uniform for this country, we say thank you for their service. And, General, to you to but if you will continue to convey that to every person in uniform from the highest ranking general to our newest enlistee that we want to make sure that they understand that we can 

have a vigorous conversation here but we ultimately know where 

the fight is. 

I have a couple of questions I would like to get to. I am concerned about—if I can have chart the chart on page eight come up. 

On the cost of the 1991 Gulf War. 

To me this is what is very telling about this situation we are in 

Iraq and Afghanistan. If we look at the net cost to this government, 

the U.S. Government of the Gulf War, dollar wise. Again, we could 

never reclaim the lives that were lost. But in terms of dollars, to 

come out with a net cost of $2.1 billion. I think George Bush, Sr., 

could certainly say that we had a coalition that helped us fight this 

war, even though we put most of the boots on the ground. We had 

the support of many other countries, equipment, soldiers, but also 

to help pay for the cost of this. 

My understanding is that as of today we have spent in Iraq and 

Afghanistan, but mostly in Iraq, a total of some $800 billion. You 

are requesting $70 billion in this next budget and you have already 

acknowledged that that is not enough. Eight hundred billion dollars. Of the $800 billion, Mr. Secretary, that we spent, how much 

have our members of the coalition of the willing, how much have 

they willingly contributed to offset the costs of the war so far? 

50

Mr. ENGLAND. So, I don’t know, sir. I mean I don’t know what 

that number is. Obviously, they funded troops and all. So I mean 

I just don’t know what their budgets are and I just I can’t tell you. 

Mr. BECERRA. So compared to the Gulf War, is it possible for you 

all to provide us with a number of how much the our willing coalition partners have provided in kind or equipment contributions or 

cash contributions to fight this effort in Iraq and Afghanistan? 

Mr. ENGLAND. I would expect we can give you an estimate of 

that. I mean I don’t know what it is. 

Mr. BECERRA. I would appreciate that. 

Mr. ENGLAND. But——

Mr. BECERRA. I would appreciate that. I think it is obvious that 

our fighters, our warriors are giving their all. And I think it is important, incumbent upon us to say that our military and policy 

thinkers are giving their all and their best as well. 

But when I take a look at the fact that today we are approaching 

the 5th anniversary of this U.S. invasion in Iraq, compared to the 

less than four years it took us to be in World War II, the little over 

two years that we were in World War I, the little over three years 

we were in Korea. The fact that the most expensive war we have 

ever faced, World War II cost us about you could put it in today’s 

dollars and in terms of our troops, it cost us about $50,000 per soldier to conduct the war. 

Today’s war put in those same dollars is costing us about $400,000 per soldier. We are spending about $12 billion a month 

just in Iraq. We as a government spend as much as every other 

country in the world spends on its military budgets combined. So 

that the six countries that President Bush has called the rogue 

States and that would even include Lybia which apparently is no 

longer a rogue State, but Cuba, Iran, Lybia, North Korea, Sudan, 

and Syria spend 1⁄29th on all their military budgets of what we 

spend. So we spend 29 times as much as they do. 

If you add with those six countries Russia and China together 

they combine spend about 30 percent of what we spend on our military, yet we are the ones that are spending hundreds of billions of 

dollars in a country that couldn’t put one plane up in the air 

against us when we invaded it in Iraq. And we can’t figure out how 

to get out. 

And so I am not sure if there is a question here, other than to 

say, what is demoralizing, what is very frustrating is that while we 

see our men and women in uniform doing the best they can, following every order they are given, somehow while we spend more 

than anyone else in the world, while we have committed more than 

anyone else in this willing coalition, we are in a rut. And I would 

hope that the message that goes back to the Pentagon, our policy 

makers, our military thinkers, is that we can only ask so much of 

our men and women in uniform. And we can only continue to do 

this in ways that show that we value and reward what our men 

and women are willing to do when they enlist into the service. 

I can’t tell you that with all the numbers that I cited and that 

I continue to see on the horizon, that there is a lot of good that 

we can tell the men and women who are going to be sent to Iraq 

soon. Afghanistan, I think, the fight is a little different and I hope 

wish could devote more there. 

51

But I will conclude by just saying, Mr. Secretary, that we know 

we have a lot of good folks that serve this country, especially in 

uniform. And we who wear this different uniform want to be as 

supportive as we can, but I must tell you, by God, it is very difficult to find the value in having gone into Iraq the way we did and 

this so called coalition of the willing which doesn’t seem too willing 

compared to the Gulf war. 

Mr. ENGLAND. So, just one reminder for you with all these numbers. 

Mr. BECERRA. Yes. 

Mr. ENGLAND. Small data point. Two airplanes probably worth, I don’t know, $100 million or something caused probably a trillion 

dollars worth of damage to the U.S. economy on 9/11/01. So I mean 

this is a different kind of war and I don’t think talking about encapsulated traditional warfare. 

Mr. BECERRA. Yes. 

Mr. ENGLAND. And I don’t think it applies to the threat we have 

there. So I don’t think we can forget what happened to our economy. I don’t know what the total amount was that damaged our 

economy, but it was certainly dramatic compared to the cost of two 

airplanes, plus Pennsylvania and the Pentagon. 

So, I would just change the perspective somewhat. I mean I find 

all this interesting, but I frankly, Congressman, I think it is a different perspective for the world we are in today. 

Mr. BECERRA. I think so. 

Mr. ENGLAND. And we look at it differently. 

Mr. BECERRA. Mr. Secretary, I take the point. And I think if 

President Roosevelt were alive he would tell you that on December 

7 back in the 1940s we didn’t expect that Hawaii would be facing 

what it did. That President Eisenhower and President Kennedy did 

not expect that Sputnik would beat us up in space. And so we have 

been challenged on many occasions, but the fact remains that the 

resources we put in, the men and women we have sacrificed for an 

endeavor that has no end in sight it is tough to swallow, because 

we have always been able to give our men and women in uniform 

a much better sense of what they are fighting for. 

Mr. ENGLAND. But I——

Mr. BECERRA. I take with full understanding your point and I 

hope you take a full understanding of my point. 

Mr. ENGLAND. Certainly. 

Mr. BECERRA. That we are working in this together. As I said at 

the very beginning, we want the young man who is about to enlist 

to recognize that there is value that even though we have vigorous 

debate here, they by putting on that uniform make it possible to 

have this vigorous debate here, because they are challenging others 

to make sure that we have those——

Mr. ENGLAND. Well, we welcome it. But I would tell you if you 

talked to our men and women in uniform who serve, they would 

tell you, I think they would disagree with you. They would tell you 

they have made immense progress. And they are a doing wonderful 

things——

Mr. BECERRA. Mr. Secretary, don’t get me wrong, I agree with 

what——

Mr. ENGLAND. So——

52

Mr. BECERRA. I would disagree with me if I said that, but I didn’t 

say that. They have made immense progress. They are men and 

women on the ground with boots on it, they have made the 

progress. Absolutely. 

I don’t know if we can say that we have made commensurate 

progress given what they have done with the orders that they have 

been given. Someone should give us a little bit better order, because for us to be spending so much to not to be able to tell them 

when they are going to have to or when they are going to have a 

chance to come home after that third or fourth tour of duty. That 

is where are failing is. 

And so what I am saying to you, I have full confidence in what 

our men and women in uniform can tell us. I can’t say that our policy makers and military thinkers have held up their end of the bargain. 

So with that, Mr. Chairman, I thank you for the opportunity to 

speak. 

Chairman SPRATT. Mr. Secretary, I understand you need to be 

back at the Pentagon for a meeting at 12:30? 

Mr. ENGLAND. I do. I don’t know what—I have sort of lost track 

of time. But I have—what is the time now? 

General CARTWRIGHT. 12:15. 

Mr. ENGLAND. 12:15. No, so if I am here until—I actually 

planned to be here until 12:30 but at 12:30, Mr. Chairman, I do 

need to leave. 

Chairman SPRATT. That is great. Ms. Hooley. 

Ms. HOOLEY. Thank you, Mr. Chair. Thank you, Mr. Secretary, 

for being here. I am going to quickly go through five questions. You 

can answer as many as you can in that time period, but I would 

like a written response to those that you don’t get to. 

Mr. ENGLAND. Certainly. 

Ms. HOOLEY. The first question is, I have been on Budget Committee before when you have come in with a budget that is really 

under what we expect to expend. I mean you have got a $70 billion 

request. We keep doing supplementals. I would like to see the what 

you think the war is going to cost us for the next year and actually 

have that number in the budget as opposed to a budget number 

that we know we are not going to be able to—it is not going to be 

accurate and we are going to need a lot more. 

Second question is, the Department proposes to increase the 

TRICARE fees for military retirees. I think that contradicts the notion that this is a shared sacrifice during time of war. Well, the 

men and women have already made that sacrifice and this proposal 

asks them to once again sacrifice. Do you think this policy is fair, 

especially during the time of war? 

Question number three is, the Commission on the Guard and Reserve issued a report January 30th, that concluded the U.S. military isn’t ready for a catastrophic attack on this country. It said 

the National Guard is ill trained and ill equipped to handle the job. 

It says our military does not have sufficient trained ready forces 

available to respond to a chemical/biological or nuclear incident. 

They reported that there are even fewer Army National Guard 

units that are combat ready than just a year ago, which was only 

88 percent. 

53

What will it take to turn this readiness problem around? And 

what specifically does the Defense budget do with regard to resolving this issue? And will significant funding commitments be needed 

for 2009 and beyond? 

Question number four: Mr. Secretary, due to equipment not 

being rightfully transferred back to the States, and I will use my 

State as an example. The Oregon Guard units lack of supply of 

trucks, equipment, and people is around 50 percent of capacity. 

Our Governor is dealing with flood season and soon thereafter fire 

season. We know this is going to happen in Oregon. Because of the 

DODs policy of not returning what should rightfully be at our 

State’s disposal, my State doesn’t have the equipment or the troops 

it needs to fully be prepared for these likely events. 

Mr. Secretary, when is the equipment going to be returned to our 

States? 

And the last question is, last year we authorized and mandated 

establishment of a national reintegration program entitled Beyond 

the Yellow Ribbon Program. And it is very different for a guardsman or a guards woman coming home where they are dispersed, 

their buddies aren’t there, they don’t have a base, they don’t have 

medical facilities. And reintegration is incredibly important for our 

returning Guard and Reserve. 

I want to know when we are going to get this program started. 

We need the support staff in the States. We need an allowance for 

the guards people when they come home as opposed to a couple of 

days, as they look for jobs, find out what educational opportunities 

are, and get reacquainted with their families. I think a reintegration program is incredibly important. We already have nine started 

in Oregon and Minnesota, I think, have been the two examples of 

how to do this. And I have been very involved in that. 

So I would like to know when Beyond the Yellow Ribbon Program is going to start. And if you would be willing to embed an 

experienced guardsman on your staff to be a liaison to this program and for all other matters of support to reserve component 

servicemembers and their family in our geographically dispersed 

and uniquely challenging environment. 

So you have 20 seconds to answer any question you can. 

Mr. ENGLAND. So I will just comment. I will just comment, but 

we will get you answers too. So if I can, number two. Actually I 

just can’t remember what number one was. Number two was the 

co-pay. 

Ms. HOOLEY. Right. 

Mr. ENGLAND. Why is it the people retired. There is already a 

co-pay. It hasn’t been updated since 1996. So the request was to 

make this consistent with inflation, basically. And it didn’t apply 

to active duty. It didn’t apply to people over 65. It applied to people 

typically retired with a job. 

And so that was a way to try to constrain the budget, which is 

otherwise going out of sight on medical care. We will answer more. 

CBNR. We do not agree with the findings of the Commission. We 

agree with many of their findings. There were 95 recommendations 

in the second report. The Secretary has directed a group to look at 

all that. But I don’t believe that, frankly, National Guard Bureau 

would agree with that conclusion, because we have equipped a lot 

54

of the guard units that deal with that issue, but we will look at 

it and come out more definitive when that review is completed. 

National Guard. We are putting a lot of equipment. We met with 

the Governors just the other day and Steve Blum, had General 

Steve Blum with me. I think when it comes to trucks and all those 

things, I do not think there is an issue in terms of dealing with 

natural disasters and we have funded that. Trucks there is compacts between States. I mean trucks, obviously, can drive one State 

to the other. So I think there is a general concurrence that that is 

really not a major issue. But we will address the specific numbers 

with you. 

Ms. HOOLEY. I would like you to do that, because——

Mr. ENGLAND. And the——

Ms. HOOLEY [continuing]. If you talk to our Governor and our 

guards they say it is a real problem. 

Mr. ENGLAND. We will follow up. And I will have the National 

Guard Bureau do that. The Yellow Ribbon Reintegration Program 

has came out with the NDAA this year and we actually had 83 

mandates from the National Defense Authorization Act. This was 

one of those to go do. It is obviously not in the budget, because it 

just came out. We will address the Program when we are putting 

the structure in place. But then I will comment again, when we do 

that we have to find the money from somewhere. As the year goes 

on it gets hard to do. We are almost halfway through this fiscal 

year. 

So as we juggle accounts it gets more difficult as time goes on. 

It is an important program. So we are going to do it. But it just 

gets hard to do. 

Ms. HOOLEY. It is a relatively small amount of money for a program that really means a lot to our people coming home. It is a 

critical program. 

Mr. ENGLAND. I understand. No, look, I understand. I agree. I 

mean it is a good program. We are going to do it. I said we are 

going to do it. We are putting the structure in place to do it, but 

I only comment again, I mean it is one of a lot of other mandates 

that were not in the budget. And so we just have to find money 

to do it and it gets harder as the year goes on. That is my point, 

particularly when we are still trying to juggle money in other accounts. 

But we will get you a more specific answer on all five of those. 

Ms. HOOLEY. Thank you. 

Chairman SPRATT. Ms. Hooley, we have got to move on. 

Ms. HOOLEY. I am done. 

Chairman SPRATT. Thank you. Mr. Allen. 

Mr. ALLEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Secretary England, thank 

you very much for being here. General Cartwright and Under Secretary Jonas, thank you all for being here. 

The U.S. Navy has stated that the nation needs no fewer than 

313 ships to respond to threats to our national security. But if you 

look at what we budgeted for ships over the last few years, we are 

not even close to building at a rate which will get us to that particular goal. 

With the Navy hoping to get that to that goal by 2024 we need 

to be building 12 ships a year, but the President’s budget this time 

55

has only eight ships being funded. And my question, first question 

is, do you disagree with the Navy’s goal of and its need for getting 

to a 313 ship Navy? 

Mr. ENGLAND. No, I don’t. 

Mr. ALLEN. How and when are you going to be able to get us to 

a place where we are closing in on that goal instead of falling farther behind? 

Mr. ENGLAND. Sir, Congressman, I think where the Navy has 

fallen behind to that number is large in the area of Littoral Combat Ships because I know they planned to buy 55. They had some 

set backs with that program, but they are still pursuing this. So 

that is a reasonable portion of those ships. And when we tried to 

come out with an approach that we could have a more affordable 

ships along with the more expensive so that there would be a right 

mix to satisfy that requirement. 

So Navy is on the track. That is their objective. We do not disagree with the objective. But they have had trouble, frankly, getting started. I understand that they have now turned on the new 

destroyer. I believe they have put that recently under contract. And 

hopefully get Littoral Combat Ships squared away and increase in 

the submarines. 

So they are in the line now to increase. That said, the budget I believe this year is $14 billion. It is a lot more than when I was 

back Secretary. So they have increased the budget, but the cost has 

gone up. So they still have a little bit of a hockey stick in the out 

years and that will have to be dealt with. 

Mr. ALLEN. Yes. From my review of the budget, I mean I don’t 

see that LCS Program, first of all, they are small ships. They don’t 

sustain the ship building industry the way the larger ships do. But 

they also, you know, they are not in the budget as I recall at a level 

to get us to 313 ship Navy by 2024. 

I understand that by 2010 China will have almost twice the 

number of submarines, not the same capability, but almost twice 

the number of submarines as the United States. And their Navy 

will surpass ours, in numbers again, not all its capability by 2015. 

And Russia’s target is to be the second largest navy in the world. 

My question is, how can you expect us to get to a place where 

we are competitive in this area if we don’t substantially and quickly ramp up our ship building account. And last year the House did 

that. They increased the ship building account by $3 billion. The 

Senate wouldn’t go along so we wound up with about $300 million, 

I believe it was, over funding for the year before. But how are we 

going to ramp up that ship building number, particularly with the 

conflict in Iraq taking different estimates, $10 to $12 billion a 

month. 

Mr. ENGLAND. Well, I mean Iraq doesn’t come out of this base 

budget and the procurement accounts have gone up. The ships cost 

have gone up significantly so the Navy, I know and the destroyer 

now has a limited in terms of the cost of that ship because it is 

about twice what the prior ships cost. 

My view is this, is they are going to they just have to bring the 

Littoral Combat Ship along to get a mix of vessels, otherwise it just 

will be unaffordable, sir. I mean they are going to have to have a 

mix of ships if they are to get to that number with any kind of a 

56

reasonable budget. I mean otherwise the costs will just be too 

much. 

Mr. ALLEN. And coming back, finally, just to the cost of the conflict in Iraq. It has to be true, Mr. Secretary, doesn’t it, that the 

spending $500 billion so far in direct cost for the war in Iraq has 

diminished the amount of money available for ship building? 

Mr. ENGLAND. Well, Mr. Allen, our base budget is going up. I mean this year our base budget is up $35 billion independent of the 

war in Iraq. So the Navy budget went up this year. I mean we 

were up not only inflation, but five percent above inflation. So the 

base budget and procurement accounts have been going up. I mean 

basically the problem has been not that the budget—$14 billion I 

mean again back when I was Secretary of the Navy, wow, that just 

seemed like a huge amount of money back then because our budgets were much smaller. 

Mr. ALLEN. But, Mr. Secretary——

Mr. ENGLAND. So I believe it is more of a cost of the——

Mr. ALLEN. Mr. Secretary, regardless of what is the base budget or not, it has to be the case that $500 billion over five years for 

Iraq has diminished amount of money that might otherwise be 

available for Navy ship building, isn’t that right? 

Mr. ENGLAND. But it is not evident to me that if we weren’t in 

this war that we would have another $500 billion. I mean our base 

budget handles all of our needs except for the war cost, Mr. Allen. 

So I mean it is not evident to me we just have that added tacked 

onto our budget. 

I doubt if it would have been. But in the meantime, our budgets 

have gone up and it is now our responsibility to find a way to fit 

within those budgets and do those the balance across the services 

and across ship building. That is a Navy challenge. They need to 

do that. 

Chairman SPRATT. Thank you, Mr. Allen. Ms. Moore, we have got 

about three minutes to make a vote if we make it and the Secretary needs to be across the River. If you have got one or two 

questions. 

Ms. MOORE. I just have one or two questions. One question, actually, and I will be very brief. 

I am very concerned that the Department of Defense and Mental 

Health Taskforce last July indicated that the Department had was 

insufficient, their system of care for psychological health is insufficient to meet the needs of today’s forces, their beneficiaries. And 

insufficient to meet their needs in the future. Thirty-eight percent 

of soldiers, 31 percent of Marines and 49 percent of the National 

Guard are showing psychological symptoms when they come home. 

That this is a shortage of mental health clinicians. And so, sir, 

when you say that you know this is a very carefully designed budget and there is something like a .0006 percent increase for health 

care and others of my colleagues have talked about the co-pays, 

just a shortage of health care. I am very, very concerned that we 

are that our soldiers are getting short shrift. 

Mr. ENGLAND. We—can I go quick to answer to it, because I 

know we all have to go. We have had a number of taskforces, we 

have addressed this. I would be pleased to send you the reports on 

what we are doing, but we now do health assessments for our 

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troops before anyone deploys, they do face to face when they come 

back. We are greatly expanding this whole area. 

So I would be pleased to provide you information on that. But 

this is an area that is getting a lot of attention by DOD and VA. 

And we——

Ms. MOORE. Your budget request really doesn’t reflect that you 

are shifting monies into this training and stuff. I mean there is 

only $150 million increase in your $23.6 billion health care budget. 

And so I am worried that a lot of taskforces and I don’t know 

exactly what you are going to do. 

Mr. ENGLAND. We will send you the information so you will know 

that, Ms. Moore. 

Ms. MOORE. All right. Thank you, sir. 

Mr. ENGLAND. You bet. 

Chairman SPRATT. Mr. Secretary, Madam Secretary, and General 

Cartwright, thank you very much for coming and thank you for 

your answers and your participation in the hearing this morning. 

We very much appreciate it. 

Mr. ENGLAND. Mr. Chairman, you are welcome. It is good to be 

with you again, sir. 

Chairman SPRATT. Thank you. 

General CARTWRIGHT. Thank you. 

Ms. JONAS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Ms. MOORE. When you see me asking questions you always know 

it is the end. That is how you know. [Laughter] 

Chairman SPRATT. I ask unanimous consent to members who 

didn’t have the opportunity to ask questions of the witness be given 

seven days to submit such questions. 

Mr. ENGLAND. Absolutely. 

Chairman SPRATT. Thank you again. 

Mr. ENGLAND. We will be pleased to respond, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you. 

[Whereupon, at 12:32 p.m., the Committee was adjourned.]

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