GAO 

United States Government Accountability Office

Report to the Subcommittee on 

Strategic Forces, Committee on Armed 

Services, House of Representatives 

MISSILE DEFENSE

DOD Needs to More 

Fully Assess 

Requirements and 

Establish Operational 

Units before Fielding 

New Capabilities 

September 2009 

GAO-09-856 
What GAO Found

United States Government Accountability Office

Why GAO Did This Study

Highlights

Accountability Integrity Reliability

September 2009

MISSILE DEFENSE

DOD Needs to More Fully Assess Requirements and 

Establish Operational Units before Fielding New 

Highlights of GAO-09-856, a report to the Capabilities

Subcommittee on Strategic Forces, 

Committee on Armed Services, House of 

Representatives 

In 2002, the Department of Defense 

(DOD) began developing and 

rapidly fielding a global Ballistic 

Missile Defense System (BMDS) 

composed of elements that include 

radars, interceptors, and command 

and control systems. These 

elements are envisioned to be 

linked together to defend against a 

broad range of ballistic missile 

threats. In 2009, DOD began a 

broadly scoped review of missile 

defense policy and strategy 

intended to reassess the BMDS and 

set direction for the future. In 

response to congressional interest 

in missile defense requirements 

and operations, GAO reviewed the 

extent to which DOD has 

(1) identified the types and 

quantities of elements and 

interceptors it needs and 

(2) established the units to operate 

elements that have been put into 

use. GAO reviewed key analyses, 

studies, plans, and other 

documents from the Missile 

Defense Agency (MDA), the 

services, combatant commands, 

and Joint Staff; and interviewed 

officials from across DOD. 

What GAO Recommends

GAO is recommending that DOD 

perform a comprehensive analysis 

identifying its requirements for 

BMDS elements and interceptors 

and require, in the absence of an 

immediate threat, the 

establishment of operational units 

before making elements available 

for use. In comments on a draft of 

this report, DOD generally agreed 

with GAO’s recommendations.

DOD lacks the comprehensive analytic basis needed to make fully informed 

decisions about the types and quantities of elements and interceptors it needs. 

Such an analytic basis would include a comprehensive examination of the 

optimal mix of elements and interceptors needed to meet all of DOD’s ballistic 

missile defense requirements. DOD studies prepared to date were completed 

for specific purposes, such as addressing regional threats. However, none of 

the studies have taken a comprehensive approach that addressed the full 

range of requirements. The Joint Staff conducted studies, for example, to 

identify the minimum interceptor quantities needed for certain ballistic 

missile defense elements designed to defend against short-to-intermediaterange threats. Additionally, the combatant commands have analyzed their 

ballistic missile defense requirements for their specific regions, and the 

services have studied requirements for specific elements. Without a full 

assessment of its overall requirements, DOD lacks the information it needs to 

make the best possible policy, strategy, and budgetary decisions for ballistic 

missile defense. 

DOD has faced challenges in fully establishing units to operate five of eight 

ballistic missile defense elements that have been put into operational use. 

DOD typically requires that major weapon systems be fielded with a full 

complement of organized and trained personnel. To rapidly field missile 

defenses, however, DOD has in some cases put ballistic missile defense 

elements into operational use before first ensuring that the military services 

had created units and trained servicemembers to operate them. Three of the 

eight elements were modifications to existing systems, like the Navy’s Aegis 

ships, so units already existed to operate these modified elements. The five 

remaining elements—the midcourse defense system designed to defend the 

United States from long-range threats; the high-altitude, theater missile 

defense system; a powerful radar placed on a sea-based, movable platform; 

ground-based radars currently fielded in Japan and Israel; and the command 

and control system designed to link the BMDS together—were put into use 

before operational units were fully established. As a result, DOD has faced a 

number of challenges. For example, the Army faced personnel shortfalls to 

operate the midcourse defense system. These shortages affected the Army 

units’ ability to support ongoing research and development activities and 

ultimately resulted in operational readiness concerns. MDA and the military 

services are taking steps to establish the needed forces, but this may take 

years for some elements. DOD recognizes the challenges created by putting 

elements into early use, but has not set criteria requiring that operational units 

be in place before new elements are made available for use. Looking ahead, 

several new elements are in development, like the radars and interceptors 

currently being considered for deployment in Europe, and emerging threats 

could again cause DOD to press those capabilities into use. Unless fully 

trained units are in place to support missile defense elements when they are 

made operational, DOD will continue to face uncertainties and operational 

risks associated with the elements. 

View GAO-09-856 or key components.

For more information, contact John Pendleton 

at (202) 512-3489 or pendletonj@gao.gov. 
Page i GAO-09-856

Contents 

Letter 1

Background 3 

DOD Identified Its Initial Ballistic Missile Defense Needs but Has 

Not Determined Its Overall Ballistic Missile Defense 

Requirements 10 

Force Structure Not Fully in Place for Some Units Operating 

Ballistic Missile Defense Elements 19 

Conclusions 31 

Recommendations for Executive Action 32 

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 32 

Appendix I Scope and Methodology 35 

Appendix II Comments from the Department of Defense 39 

Appendix III GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments 42 

Table 

Table 1: Ballistic Missile Defense Elements That MDA Has 

Delivered to the Combatant Commands for Operational 

Use as of July 2009 5 

Figure 

Figure 1: Benefits of Integration 14 

 Missile Defense 
Abbreviations 

Aegis BMD Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense 

BMDS Ballistic Missile Defense System 

C2BMC Command, Control, Battle Management, and 

 Communications 

DOD Department of Defense 

MDA Missile Defense Agency 

NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization 

THAAD Terminal High-Altitude Area Defense 

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Page ii GAO-09-856 Missile Defense
Page 1 GAO-09-856

 

United States Government Accountability Office

Washington, DC 20548 

 

September 16, 2009 

The Honorable Jim Langevin 

Chairman 

The Honorable Michael Turner 

Ranking Member 

Subcommittee on Strategic Forces 

Committee on Armed Services 

House of Representatives 

Since 2002, the Department of Defense (DOD) has emphasized the 

development and fielding of a globally integrated, interconnected, and 

layered Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS) composed of “elements” 

that include radars, interceptors, and command and control systems,1

which together are to be capable of addressing all ranges of threatening 

ballistic missiles in all phases of flight.2

 With the submission of the fiscal 

year 2010 defense budget to Congress, DOD announced its intention to 

strike a new balance between developing new ballistic missile defense 

capabilities and fielding what it believes to be proven and effective 

weapon systems. The Missile Defense Agency’s (MDA) $7.8 billion budget 

request for fiscal year 2010 emphasized the fielding of specific BMDS 

elements to defend against near-term threats from rogue states and threats 

to U.S. forces and population centers abroad. For example, the Secretary 

of Defense announced that DOD’s budget request added $900 million to 

more rapidly acquire and field the Terminal High-Altitude Area Defense 

1

Ballistic missile defense elements include Airborne Laser; Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense; 

AN/TPY-2 forward-based radar; Cobra Dane Radar Upgrade; Command, Control, Battle 

Management, and Communications; European Interceptor Site; European Midcourse 

Radar; Ground-based Midcourse Defense; Patriot Advanced Capability-3; Sea-based X-Band 

Radar; Space Tracking and Surveillance System; Terminal High-Altitude Area Defense; and 

Upgraded Early Warning Radar. An interceptor is a component of some ballistic missile 

defense elements that is used to destroy an adversary’s ballistic missile. For example, the 

Missile Defense Agency is building the Standard Missile-3 to be used as a ballistic missile 

defense interceptor as part of the Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense element. 

2

A missile attack involves four phases from launch to impact: (1) the boost phase is the 

period immediately after launch when the missile’s booster stages are still thrusting and 

typically lasts 3 to 5 minutes for intercontinental ballistic missiles; (2) the ascent phase is 

when the booster stages have stopped thrusting and dropped away, leaving a warhead and 

possible decoys; (3) the midcourse phase, lasting for about 20 minutes for intercontinental 

ballistic missiles, begins after the missile has stopped accelerating and the warhead travels 

through space; and (4) the terminal phase begins when the warhead reenters the 

atmosphere and lasts approximately a minute or less. 

 Missile Defense 
 

(THAAD) and Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense (Aegis BMD) elements and 

their associated interceptors, while reducing investments in some 

developmental programs designed to address longer-term threats. As the 

military services increasingly take responsibility from MDA for these and 

other elements as they transition from research and development to 

operations, the cost to the services for operating and maintaining ballistic 

missile defense elements is likely to grow; typically, such costs account for 

70 percent of a weapon system’s life-cycle costs. 

To assist the subcommittee in its review of DOD’s approach to acquiring, 

fielding, and operating ballistic missile defenses, you asked us to review 

DOD’s overall requirements to perform worldwide ballistic missile defense 

missions. We focused on the types and quantities of ballistic missile 

defense elements (including inventories of interceptors) and the 

organizations, personnel, and training needed to operate these elements. 

Specifically, in addressing its overall force structure requirements, we 

reviewed the extent to which DOD has (1) identified the types and 

quantities of ballistic missile defense elements and interceptors that it 

needs for performing ballistic missile defense missions and (2) established 

the units to operate elements that have been put into use. To determine 

the extent to which DOD has identified the types and quantities of ballistic 

missile defense elements and interceptors that it requires, we identified, 

obtained, and reviewed key MDA and Joint Staff studies identifying 

ballistic missile defense requirements. We performed our analysis by 

comparing DOD’s analytical and funding approaches for ballistic missile 

defense against criteria for establishing a knowledge-based approach to 

acquiring major weapon systems, which provides evidence that 

warfighting requirements are valid and can be met with chosen concepts 

that are developed and produced within existing resources.3

 The 

documentation we reviewed also included direction and guidance from the 

Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Staff, and MDA; MDA plans 

for developing ballistic missile defenses; and direction from the Deputy 

Secretary of Defense outlining the BMDS Life Cycle Management Process. 

To determine the extent to which DOD has established the units needed to 

operate ballistic missile defense elements that have been put into use, we 

identified, reviewed, and assessed MDA development plans and fielding 

schedules, Joint Staff orders, and U.S. Strategic Command processes and 

 

3

For example, see GAO, Defense Acquisitions: A Knowledge-Based Funding Approach 

Could Improve Major Weapon System Program Outcomes, GAO-08-619 (Washington, D.C.: 

July 2, 2008), and Defense Acquisitions: Assessments of Selected Weapon Programs, 

GAO-08-467SP (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 31, 2008). 

Page 2 GAO-09-856 Missile Defense
 

plans for evaluating the operational performance of ballistic missile 

defense capabilities. The scope of our analysis included those ballistic 

missile defense elements that have been delivered to the combatant 

commands for operational use as of July 2009.4

 For both objectives, we 

interviewed officials from the Office of the Secretary of Defense, Joint 

Staff, MDA, Army, Navy, and Air Force. We also obtained documentation 

from key geographic combatant commands to understand their 

operational requirements for ballistic missile defense elements and service 

forces, the processes for establishing these requirements, and any 

challenges they have had or expect to encounter in obtaining the 

capabilities and forces that they need for operations. The combatant 

commands we visited were U.S. Strategic Command and the four 

geographic combatant commands—U.S. Central Command, 

U.S. European Command, U.S. Northern Command, and U.S. Pacific 

Command—that have participated in U.S. Strategic Command’s advocacy 

efforts to identify desirable characteristics and capabilities for the BMDS. 

We conducted this performance audit from August 2008 to September 2009 

in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 

Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain 

sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our 

findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that 

the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and 

conclusions based on our audit objectives. 

In 2002, the President reinforced ballistic missile defense as a national 

priority and directed DOD to proceed with plans to develop and put in 

place an initial capability beginning in 2004.5

 To expedite the delivery of an 

operationally capable BMDS, in 2002 the Secretary of Defense established 

MDA, granted the agency expanded responsibility and authority to develop 

globally integrated capabilities, directed it to manage all ballistic missile 

defense systems then under development, and transferred those systems 

controlled by the military services to the agency. The systems transferred 

Background 

 

4

Our scope did not include an evaluation of the Army’s efforts to establish the units needed 

to operate the Patriot Advanced Capability-3 element, which is the most mature ballistic 

missile defense element. Although MDA and the Army continue to work together to 

integrate the system’s capabilities into the overall BMDS, Patriot Advanced Capability-3 

transferred to the Army in 2003 and has been fully integrated into the Army’s existing force 

structure for the Patriot air and missile defense system. 

5

The White House, National Security Presidential Directive-23 National Policy on Ballistic 

Missile Defense (Dec. 16, 2002). 

Page 3 GAO-09-856 Missile Defense
 

from the services and the new systems whose development MDA initiates 

are all considered to be ballistic missile defense elements. 

Since its creation in 2002, MDA has developed, fielded, and declared ready 

for operations an increasingly complex set of ballistic missile defenses 

designed to defend the United States, deployed forces, allies, and friends 

from limited ballistic missile attacks. By leveraging existing service 

weapon systems and developmental concepts, MDA fielded an initial 

defensive capability beginning in 2004 to defend the United States from a 

limited, long-range ballistic missile attack. This initial defensive capability 

included the Ground-based Midcourse Defense system of interceptors and 

fire control systems, Upgraded Early Warning Radars, sea-based radars 

installed aboard Aegis cruisers and destroyers, and an early version of the 

Command, Control, Battle Management, and Communications (C2BMC) 

element. MDA first made these elements available for operations in April 

2005 by establishing the initial BMDS operational baseline.6

 DOD first put 

these elements to operational use by activating them in 2006 in response to 

North Korean ballistic missile activity. Since that time, DOD has added 

some elements to the operational baseline while declaring others ready for 

contingencies. Table 1 identifies the fielding locations and dates that MDA 

first delivered operational elements to the combatant commands as of 

July 2009. 

 

6

Missile Defense Agency, Ballistic Missile Defense System Operational Baseline, version 

1.0 (April 2005). The BMDS operational baseline is a management tool that MDA uses to 

determine the composition of the operational BMDS at any given point in time. 

Page 4 GAO-09-856 Missile Defense
 

Table 1: Ballistic Missile Defense Elements That MDA Has Delivered to the Combatant Commands for Operational Use as of 

July 2009 

BMDS element/lead service Element description Fielding location(s) Delivery date 

Ground-based Midcourse 

Defense/Army 

A ground-based system based on a 

developmental program transferred to 

MDA in 2002 that is designed to protect 

the U.S. homeland from intermediate- and 

intercontinental-range ballistic missile 

attacks from North Korea and the Middle 

East. The element employs ground-based 

interceptors to strike at threatening 

warheads as they travel through space 

toward their target(s). 

Ground-based interceptors 

located in Alaska and 

California; fire control 

operations centers located 

in Alaska and Colorado 

Included in the first 

operational baseline, 

published in April 2005. 

Aegis Ballistic Missile 

Defense/Navy 

A system that (1) provides a forwarddeployed capability to search, detect, and 

track ballistic missiles of all ranges and 

transmit track data to the BMDS and 

(2) employs sensors and interceptors to 

protect deployed forces and population 

centers. The element is based on a 

modification to existing Navy Aegis ships 

to provide these capabilities. The 

interceptors include the Standard 

Missile-3, designed to defend against 

short- to medium-range missile threats in 

the midcourse phase, and a modified 

Standard Missile-2 interceptor designed 

to defend against short-range threats in 

the terminal phase. 

Aegis-class Navy 

destroyers and cruisers 

homeported in Japan, 

Hawaii, California, and 

Virginia 

Sensor capabilities to 

support the Ground-based 

Midcourse Defense 

element were included in 

the first operational 

baseline, published in 

April 2005. Midcourse 

intercept capabilities were 

added to the baseline in 

November 2006. In 

September 2008 terminal 

defense capabilities were 

first made available for 

contingency operations. 

Cobra Dane Radar Upgrade/Air 

Force 

Radar element that provides missile 

tracking data to the Ground-based 

Midcourse Defense element, in addition to 

legacy missions. 

Alaska Included in the first 

operational baseline, 

published in April 2005. 

Upgraded Early Warning 

Radar/Air Force 

Radar element that provides missile 

tracking data to the Ground-based 

Midcourse Defense element, in addition to 

legacy Air Force missions. 

California and United 

Kingdom 

First radar included in the 

first operational baseline, 

published in April 2005; 

second radar added to the 

operational baseline in 

December 2007. 

Command, Control, Battle 

Management, and 

Communications/none 

designated 

A networked computer and 

communications element developed by 

MDA to integrate the BMDS by providing 

deliberate planning, situational 

awareness, sensor management, and 

battle management capabilities. 

Multiple combatant 

commands, the National 

Military Command Center, 

and other regional 

locations 

Included in the first 

operational baseline, 

published in April 2005. 

Page 5 GAO-09-856 Missile Defense
 

BMDS element/lead service Element description Fielding location(s) Delivery date 

AN/TPY-2 Forward-based 

Radara/Army 

A transportable, land-based radar, similar 

in design to the THAAD radar, which 

provides advance warning of ballistic 

missile launches to the BMDS from 

forward-based locations. 

Japan and Israel First radar, fielded in 

Japan, added to the 

operational baseline in 

September 2006; second 

radar, fielded in Israel, first 

made available for 

contingency operations in 

November 2008. 

Sea-based X-Band Radar/Navy An MDA-designed element, consisting of 

a radar built on a movable sea platform, 

which is to provide an improved ability to 

acquire, track, and discriminate 

threatening warheads from decoys, 

thereby improving the chances of a 

successful intercept by the Ground-based 

Midcourse Defense element. 

Pacific Ocean (based in 

Hawaii) 

First made available for 

contingency operations in 

July 2008. 

Terminal High-Altitude Area 

Defense/Army 

A ground-based system based on a 

developmental program transferred to 

MDA in 2002 that is designed to protect 

deployed U.S. forces and population 

centers from short- and medium-range 

ballistic missile attacks. The system 

employs interceptors designed to strike at 

threatening missiles both inside and just 

outside of the earth’s atmosphere. 

Texas First made available for 

contingency operations in 

September 2008. 

Source: GAO summary of DOD information. 

Note: Does not include the Patriot Advanced Capability-3 element, which the Secretary of Defense 

assigned to the Army in 2003 as an operational system. The Patriot Advanced Capability-3 element is 

designed to protect deployed U.S. forces from short-range and medium-range ballistic missile threats. 

a

AN/TPY stands for “Army Navy/Transportable Radar Surveillance.” 

As table 1 indicates, DOD has designated lead services for seven of the 

eight elements that have been delivered to the combatant commands for 

operational use; MDA currently plans to retain control of the eighth 

element delivered to date—C2BMC—and not transition it to a single lead 

service.7

 Lead military services are expected to provide the rest of the 

military force structure—the organizations, personnel, and training—

required for operations as the elements become more technically mature.8

 

7

Three other elements—Airborne Laser, European Midcourse Radar, and Space 

Surveillance and Tracking System—have been assigned to the Air Force as lead service, 

and the Army is taking responsibility for operating the European Interceptor Site. MDA has 

not made these elements available for operational use. 

8

In contrast, under standard DOD practices the services are generally responsible for 

declaring weapon systems to be operational and for developing both the weapon systems 

and the force structure needed for operations. 

Page 6 GAO-09-856 Missile Defense
 

Lead military services are also expected to begin funding operational and 

support costs as elements transition from MDA to the services.9

To develop ballistic missile defense capabilities, MDA both modified 

existing service weapon systems to perform ballistic missile defense 

missions and developed new elements, many based on previously existing 

concepts, expressly for ballistic missile defense purposes. For example, 

MDA developed the Upgraded Early Warning Radar and Aegis BMD 

elements as modifications to existing service weapon systems, whereas 

MDA developed the Ground-based Midcourse Defense and THAAD 

elements based on developmental programs transferred to MDA in 2002. 

MDA has spent about $56 billion since 2002 to develop these assets. 

Additionally, MDA’s fiscal year 2010 budget request proposes to develop 

more advanced Aegis BMD interceptors capable of addressing 

intermediate-range ballistic missile threats, enhance the C2BMC element’s 

capabilities, and undertake other developmental initiatives, including 

research into ascent phase technologies.10 These developments are likely 

to affect both element quantities and service force structure requirements 

as MDA begins to field these capabilities. 

MDA, under the direction and oversight of the Under Secretary of Defense 

for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics, is responsible for evaluating 

ballistic missile defense capabilities to determine which elements are 

ready to perform military operations, giving the Secretary of Defense the 

option of activating elements for operational use.11 Under MDA’s approach, 

an element is first available for crisis and contingency operations when it 

has achieved Early Capability Delivery, based upon MDA’s assessment of 

element-level tests and its determination that the element’s employment 

 

9

In developing an integrated BMDS, DOD’s intention was for MDA to develop BMDS 

elements and then “transition” the elements to the services that would operate and support 

them. The transition process may, for some elements, end at a point that DOD calls 

transfer—with MDA and the lead service sharing development, operations, and 

sustainment responsibilities as defined by agreement. 

10Since the release of the fiscal year 2010 budget request, MDA has changed the name of the 

ascent phase concept to “early intercept.” However, we continue to refer to the concept as 

ascent phase throughout this report. 

11According to DOD Directive 5134.9, Missile Defense Agency (MDA), October 2004, the 

Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics is responsible for 

recommending to the Secretary of Defense when Research, Development, Test, and 

Evaluation assets are available for emergency or contingency use. According to MDA’s 

May 2009 Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS) Master Plan, MDA supports such 

decisions by determining which assets are suitable for emergency activation. 

Page 7 GAO-09-856 Missile Defense
 

will not degrade other operational ballistic missile defenses. According to 

MDA’s current approach, an Early Capability Delivery declaration is the 

first point at which an element is made available for operational 

employment in defense of the United States and U.S. allies. Subsequently, 

MDA declares when an element is added to the operational baseline by 

declaring that it has achieved Partial Capability Delivery, and is capable of 

day-to-day operations, or Full Capability Delivery meaning that the 

element is able to sustain operations over longer periods.12 In May 2009, 

MDA updated its approach to making capability declarations so that it 

considers not only the agency’s own developmental assessments, but also 

a U.S. Strategic Command-led assessment of the element’s capabilities and 

limitations under operational conditions. MDA’s first capability review 

under this new approach is expected to occur later in 2009. 

Oversight of MDA is executed by the Under Secretary of Defense for 

Acquisition, Technology and Logistics. Because MDA is not subject to 

DOD’s traditional joint requirements determination processes and because 

it utilizes flexible acquisition practices, DOD developed alternative 

oversight mechanisms. For example, in 2007 the Deputy Secretary of 

Defense established the Missile Defense Executive Board,13 which is to 

provide the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and 

Logistics or Deputy Secretary of Defense, as necessary, with a 

recommended ballistic missile defense strategic program plan and feasible 

funding strategy for approval. In September 2008, the Deputy Secretary of 

Defense also established the BMDS Life Cycle Management Process, and 

directed the board to use the process to oversee the annual preparation of 

 

12We have previously reported that MDA’s effort to conform to a schedule of Early, Partial, 

and Full Capability Deliveries has resulted in making such declarations based on a more 

limited understanding of system effectiveness than planned. See GAO, Defense 

Management: Key Challenges Should be Addressed When Considering Changes to Missile 

Defense Agency’s Roles and Missions, GAO-09-466T (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 26, 2009), and 

Defense Acquisitions: Production and Fielding of Missile Defense Components Continue 

with Less Testing and Validation Than Planned, GAO-09-338 (Washington, D.C.: 

Mar. 13, 2009). 

13The Missile Defense Executive Board is chaired by the Under Secretary of Defense for 

Acquisition, Technology and Logistics. The board’s members are the Director, Defense 

Research and Engineering; Under Secretary of Defense for Policy; Director, Program 

Analysis and Evaluation; Assistant Secretary of the Army for Acquisition, Logistics, and 

Technology; Deputy Under Secretary of Air Force Space Programs; Under Secretary of 

Defense for Intelligence; Commander, U.S. Strategic Command; Assistant Secretary of 

State for International Security and Nonproliferation; Director, Operational Test and 

Evaluation; Vice Chief for Naval Operations; Director, Missile Defense Agency; and Vice 

Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff. 

Page 8 GAO-09-856 Missile Defense
 

a required capabilities portfolio and develop a program plan to meet the 

requirements with Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation; 

procurement; operations and maintenance; and military construction in 

defensewide accounts. 

DOD is currently undertaking a review of its approach and requirements 

for ballistic missile defenses. In the Duncan Hunter National Defense 

Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2009,14 Congress required DOD to 

prepare a review of the ballistic missile defense policy and strategy of the 

United States. Among other matters, the congressionally mandated review 

is to address the full range of ballistic missile threats to the United States, 

deployed forces, friends, and allies; the organization, discharge, and 

oversight of acquisition for ballistic missile defense programs; roles and 

responsibilities of the Office of the Secretary of Defense, defense agencies, 

combatant commands, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and military departments 

in such programs; DOD’s process for determining the force structure and 

inventory objectives for ballistic missile defense programs; the near-term 

and long-term affordability and cost-effectiveness of such programs; and 

the role of international cooperation on missile defense in the ballistic 

missile defense policy and strategy of the United States. Congress required 

DOD to provide a report on its review by January 31, 2010. 

This report is one in a series of reports we have issued on ballistic missile 

defense that have identified key acquisition, management, and operational 

challenges associated with the development of the BMDS. In August 2009 

we published a report identifying actions that DOD needs to take to 

improve planning and to increase the transparency of total costs for the 

proposed European Interceptor Site and European Midcourse Radar 

elements.15 In March 2009, we issued our sixth annual assessment of 

DOD’s progress in developing the BMDS; this report concluded that 

although MDA had shown the benefits of its flexible acquisition practices 

by fielding and improving upon an initial ballistic missile defense 

capability since 2005, this approach also has limited the ability of DOD and 

congressional decision makers to measure MDA’s progress on cost, 

schedule, testing, and performance.16 In September 2008, we found that 

 

14Pub. L. No. 110-417, § 234 (2008). 

15GAO, Ballistic Missile Defense: Actions Needed to Improve Planning and Information 

on Construction and Support Costs for Proposed European Sites, GAO-09-771 

(Washington, D.C.: Aug. 6, 2009). 

16GAO-09-338. 

Page 9 GAO-09-856 Missile Defense
 

although DOD had begun preparing for BMDS operations and support, 

difficulties in transitioning these responsibilities from MDA to lead 

services had complicated long-term planning to operate and support the 

elements over their life cycle.17 In July 2008, we reported that DOD had 

taken some steps to address the combatant commands’ ballistic missile 

defense needs, but had yet to establish an effective process for identifying 

and addressing the overall priorities of the combatant commands when 

developing ballistic missile defense capabilities.18 We reported in May 2006 

that DOD had begun preparations to operate ballistic missile defenses, 

such as identifying lead services, but had not established the criteria that 

must be met before the BMDS can be declared operational.19

DOD has identified its needs for establishing an initial and evolving 

ballistic missile defense capability, but lacks the comprehensive analytic 

basis needed to make fully informed decisions about the overall mix of 

elements and interceptors that it requires. A knowledge-based decisionmaking approach can help to provide the comprehensive analytic basis 

needed to establish missile defense policies and strategies and determine 

funding priorities. For ballistic missile defense, such an approach would 

require full examination of the optimal type and quantity of various 

ballistic missile defense elements and interceptors needed to meet all of 

DOD’s requirements—a complex task due to the many factors that should 

be considered, including the evolving nature of the threat and emerging 

technologies. For example, the same mix of Aegis BMD ships and THAAD 

batteries provides different defensive coverage depending on whether the 

elements are acting autonomously or are integrated with another X-band 

radar. However, DOD’s assessments of missile defense requirements 

prepared to date were limited in scope primarily because they were 

prepared for specific purposes. The Joint Staff, for example, conducted 

studies to identify the minimum interceptor quantities needed for certain 

ballistic missile defense elements designed to defend against short-toDOD Identified Its 

Initial Ballistic Missile 

Defense Needs but 

Has Not Determined 

Its Overall Ballistic 

Missile Defense 

Requirements 

 

17GAO, Missile Defense: Actions Needed to Improve Planning and Cost Estimates for 

Long-Term Support of Ballistic Missile Defense, GAO-08-1068 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 25, 

2008). 

18GAO, Ballistic Missile Defense: Actions Needed to Improve Process for Identifying and 

Addressing Combatant Command Priorities, GAO-08-740 (Washington, D.C.: July 31, 

2008). 

19GAO, Defense Management: Actions Needed to Improve Operational Planning and 

Visibility of Costs for Ballistic Missile Defense, GAO-06-473 (Washington, D.C.: 

May 31, 2006). 

Page 10 GAO-09-856 Missile Defense
 

intermediate-range threats. Additionally, the combatant commands have 

analyzed their ballistic missile defense requirements for their specific 

regions, and the services have studied requirements for specific elements. 

Without a comprehensive analytic basis that identifies the full range of 

operational type and quantity requirements for ballistic missile defense 

elements, DOD may not be acquiring the optimized mix of elements and 

interceptors that would provide the most effective missile defense. 

DOD Has Identified the 

Types and Quantities of 

Ballistic Missile Defense 

Elements Needed for an 

Initial and Evolving 

Defensive Capability 

MDA identified how many and what type of ballistic missile defense 

elements were needed to begin fielding an initial set of capabilities in 2004 

and to evolve the BMDS over time. Directed by the President in 2002 to 

begin fielding an initial set of missile defense capabilities in 2004, MDA 

undertook the major early assessments that established DOD’s initial and 

evolving ballistic missile defensive capability, which formed the 

foundation of the current BMDS. According to a February 2004 MDA 

briefing, the initial defensive capability prepared in response to the 

President’s policy direction included the Cobra Dane Radar Upgrade, the 

Beale Upgraded Early Warning Radar, up to 20 ground-based interceptors 

located in Alaska and California, command and control in Colorado, and 

sea-based radars deployed aboard Aegis ships. Additionally, based on the 

President’s policy direction and direction from the Secretary of Defense, 

also issued in 2002, MDA planned to expand the initial capability over 

time. To do so, MDA conducted internal studies and developed plans in 

2002, 2003, and 2004 that identified the quantities of elements and 

interceptors it needed for research and development purposes and to 

defeat long-range ballistic missiles from rogue states. As of February 2005, 

these studies resulted in plans for fielding 48 ground-based interceptors to 

address the long-range ballistic missile threat, with 36 of the interceptors 

planned for fielding in Alaska, 2 in California, and 10 in Europe.20 The 

studies also resulted in plans to establish a network of sensors—including 

 

20The total number of planned deployed ground-based interceptors remained 48 until the 

President’s fiscal year 2008 budget request when the total number increased to 54—40 in 

Alaska, 4 in California, and 10 in Europe. The President’s fiscal year 2010 budget request 

did not alter the total number of ground-based interceptors but changed the number of 

emplaced interceptors in Alaska and California from 44 to 30. In explaining this change, 

MDA reported to Congress in July 2009 that the 2002 projection of threat missiles was 

reassessed to be off by 10 to 20 missiles. Additionally, the report explains that the number 

of long-range missiles the interceptors would have to engage at any one time was limited 

because of the low number of launch complexes for these missiles. The report concludes 

that 30 emplaced interceptors is sufficient to defend the United States and that the number 

could be expanded if the threat grows. 

Page 11 GAO-09-856 Missile Defense
 

radars aboard Aegis ships and land-based radars in North America, Asia, 

and Europe. Additionally, MDA planned to build up to 48 THAAD 

interceptors and 101 Aegis BMD interceptors by the end of calendar year 

2011 as part of its efforts to develop and field capabilities to defeat short-, 

medium-, and intermediate-range ballistic missiles. However, these initial 

plans did not define DOD’s overall requirements for ballistic missile 

defense elements and interceptors. In particular, MDA’s analyses were 

primarily focused on addressing the requirements of an initial and evolving 

ballistic missile defense capability and were not intended to address all of 

DOD’s operational requirements for performing ballistic missile defense 

missions worldwide. 

Determining the Quantity 

of Ballistic Missile Defense 

Elements and Interceptors 

Required for All Missions 

Involves Many Factors 

Establishing requirements for ballistic missile defense involves balancing 

several interrelated factors. A comprehensive analytic basis would include 

determining the optimum types and numbers of ballistic missile defense 

elements and interceptors for performing missile defense missions 

worldwide. However, optimizing the quantities of each element and 

interceptor involves many factors, including the integration of various 

types of ballistic missile defense elements, various risk assessments, the 

potential contributions of friends and allies, optimizing elements that can 

address multiple threats, and the evolving nature of the threat and 

emerging technologies. Our prior work shows that a knowledge-based 

decision-making process can help to provide the comprehensive analytic 

basis needed for establishing funding priorities, including determining the 

affordability of DOD’s missile defense policies and strategies.21 A 

knowledge-based decision-making process includes providing decision 

makers with evidence that warfighting requirements are valid, that they 

can be met with the chosen weapon system designs, and that the chosen 

designs can be developed and produced within existing resources. 

Optimizing the numbers and types of each element and interceptor needed 

involves looking across the BMDS to see how the different elements can 

best work together as an integrated system. According to the Director of 

MDA, the integration of the many ballistic missile defense elements into a 

system makes the BMDS more effective than would the individual 

elements operating independently. Integration may include improving 

systems integration among elements, adding a different type of 

interceptor, adding a sensor, or a combination of these and other options 

Integrated Elements Are More 

Effective Than Elements 

Operating Independently 

 

21GAO-08-619 and GAO-08-467SP. 

Page 12 GAO-09-856 Missile Defense
 

in order to increase a defended area. For example, figure 1 illustrates how 

the same mix of Aegis BMD ships and THAAD batteries provides vastly 

different defensive coverage depending on whether the elements are 

acting autonomously (smaller coverage) or are integrated with a radar 

(larger coverage).22 Increased integration could therefore affect 

requirements, perhaps lessening the quantity of elements needed to defend 

an area. However, Air Force officials told us that the cost of integrating 

elements could be high enough in some circumstances that it may be more 

efficient to purchase additional elements and interceptors. 

 

22Areas on the figure do not signal current or intended deployment locations of the assets. 

Page 13 GAO-09-856 Missile Defense
 

Figure 1: Benefits of Integration 

Source: GAO analysis of Missile Defense Agency data.

THAAD defended area

Aegis BMD defended area

THAAD element

Aegis BMD element

X-Band radar

Defended area with elements operating individually Defended area with elements integrated together with a radar

Notional Notional Notional

Note: The same number of elements acting individually provides a smaller defended area than when 

those elements are integrated together with a radar. 

Assessments of the threat and other risk assessments are also factors 

affecting overall requirements for the types and quantities of missile 

defense elements and interceptors. According to the Director of MDA, 

optimizing the size and type of the ballistic missile defense force requires 

an operational risk assessment of the adversary’s ballistic missile arsenal 

that would have to be engaged. It also requires understanding the 

Risk Assessments Factor into 

Overall Requirements 

Page 14 GAO-09-856 Missile Defense
 

capabilities and limitations of BMDS elements needed to counter these 

threats, an understanding that continues to improve with additional 

testing. For example, the required number of ground-based interceptors 

needed to defend the United States from long-range threats would be 

affected if additional testing were to reveal an increase or decrease in the 

expected capability of that type of interceptor. Office of the Secretary of 

Defense and U.S. Strategic Command officials told us that risk 

assessments should also consider the extent to which different kinds of 

elements and interceptors provide redundant coverage. Air Force officials 

added that redundant capabilities should be considered when optimizing 

force structure, stating that even if there were a single element that could 

provide defensive coverage for an entire region, an optimized force 

structure may include additional elements so that the area would still be 

defended if the original element were incapacitated. 

The extent to which the United States can depend upon contributions 

from friends and allies also can affect the determination of DOD’s 

optimized ballistic missile defense force structure. For example, U.S. 

Central Command officials told us that coordination with friends and allies 

on ballistic missile defenses and their purchase of ballistic missile defense 

elements and interceptors may allow the command to reorient its forces to 

fill other gaps. Similarly, U.S. Pacific Command told us that close ballistic 

missile defense cooperation with Japan has improved overall ballistic 

missile defense protection in the command’s area of responsibility, 

allowing the command to expand protection of critical assets. The 

Director of MDA testified before Congress in June 2009 that if cooperative 

efforts with Russia were successful in integrating some radar facilities, it 

could enhance the ability of ground-based interceptors in Alaska and 

California. Finally, in regard to the proposed ballistic missile defense sites 

in Europe, DOD and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) have 

been exploring ways to link U.S. missile defense assets with NATO’s 

missile defense efforts. In April 2008, NATO declared its intention to 

develop options for a comprehensive missile defense architecture to 

extend coverage to all allied territory and populations not otherwise 

covered by the proposed U.S. system. 

Allied Contributions Can Affect 

Quantity Requirements 

A key factor affecting the requirements for some elements is that they are 

designed to address multiple types of ballistic missile threats. For 

example, potential choices about whether to use the interceptors based in 

Europe as a reserve to defend the United States or to use them to intercept 

all incoming long-range threats regardless of the intended target could 

significantly affect how many ground-based interceptors would be needed 

overall. Similarly, the Aegis BMD element was designed to provide search 

Some Elements Are Designed 

to Defend against Multiple 

Threats or Perform Different 

Missions 

Page 15 GAO-09-856 Missile Defense
 

and track capabilities to help the Ground-based Midcourse Defense 

element defend the United States, and as a stand-alone element capable of 

defending deployed U.S. forces and population centers abroad from 

shorter-range threats. In addition, Navy and U.S. Pacific Command 

officials told us that Aegis ships are also in high demand to perform other 

maritime missions, such as antisubmarine warfare. As a result, the use of 

Aegis ships as ballistic missile defense weapon systems may constrain the 

ability of combatant commanders to use those ships for other purposes 

without increasing the size of the available force structure. In coming 

years, as the Aegis BMD element takes on new roles to intercept 

longer-range missiles that are targeting the United States,23 regional 

combatant commanders who rely on the Aegis ships for multiple missions 

may be further constrained in how they deploy those assets. Consequently, 

even as the Aegis BMD element becomes more capable, requirements for 

Aegis force structure may increase in order to satisfy the multiple 

missions. 

The evolving nature of the threat and emerging technologies also have 

implications for the quantity requirements for ballistic missile defense 

elements and interceptors. For example, MDA reported to Congress in 

July 2009 that the requirement for emplaced ground-based interceptors 

was reduced, in part, because the original intelligence estimate of the 

number of missiles that the ground-based interceptors were intended to 

counter was later assessed to be off by 10 to 20 missiles. Similarly, 

improvements in BMDS capabilities affect requirements. For example, the 

Director of MDA testified before Congress in May 2009 that new ascent 

phase capabilities will eliminate the need for the Multiple Kill Vehicle 

program and would reduce overall the number of ballistic missile defense 

interceptors needed to defeat an attack. 

Changes in Threat and Evolving 

Missile Defense Technology 

Will Likely Affect Future 

Requirements 

DOD’s Analyses to Date 

Have Been Limited in 

Scope 

Our review of DOD’s analyses of its type and quantity requirements for 

ballistic missile defenses show that the studies prepared to date have been 

limited in scope and did not create the comprehensive analytic basis for 

making programwide decisions about policies, strategies, and investments. 

MDA’s initial analyses were completed for the purpose of establishing an 

initial and evolving set of ballistic missile defense capabilities, not to 

 

23MDA is developing the Standard Missile-3 Block II interceptor, which is expected to be 

able to intercept intermediate-range missiles during the midcourse phase of flight. These 

interceptors are expected to be deployable on Aegis ships by 2015. 

Page 16 GAO-09-856 Missile Defense
 

determine DOD’s overall operational requirements. Similarly, we found 

that the assessments of ballistic missile defense quantity requirements 

conducted by other DOD organizations were prepared for specific 

purposes: 

• The Joint Staff conducted two analyses beginning in 2006 that identified a 

minimum baseline need to double the number of THAAD and Aegis BMD 

interceptors planned in the fiscal year 2008 budget as well as a need for an 

additional THAAD battery and an upgraded AN/TPY-2 forward-based radar 

with self-defense capability. The Joint Staff focused on THAAD and Aegis 

BMD interceptor inventory requirements because production decisions for 

additional interceptors needed to be made in DOD’s fiscal year 2010 future 

years’ funding plan in order to avoid the possibility of closing down 

production. Combatant commands were also voicing a demand for these 

capabilities in order to protect deployed U.S. forces and population 

centers abroad. The Joint Staff characterized the studies as an “initial 

mark on the wall” because the studies made assumptions that tended to 

drive down the identified quantities in the baseline. For example, the 

studies did not factor in quantities needed for spares, training, testing, or 

in transit; assumed the lack of enemy countermeasures; and assumed that 

ballistic missile defense command and control systems would work 

perfectly under operational conditions. Acknowledging these limitations, 

Members of Congress and DOD officials nevertheless have cited the Joint 

Staff studies as identifying the requirement for boosting THAAD and Aegis 

BMD quantities and affecting DOD’s fiscal year 2010 budget request. 

• The geographic combatant commands regularly assess their individual 

requirements for ballistic missile defense forces, but these analyses are 

limited in scope to each command’s unique area of responsibility, as 

assigned by the President. For example, U.S. Central Command officials 

told us that their requirements for ballistic missile defenses are driven by 

the need to protect against short- to medium-range threats from within the 

command’s own theater. U.S. Northern Command officials told us that 

their requirements for ballistic missile defense forces are driven primarily 

by the command’s need to protect against long-range strikes from states 

outside of their area of responsibility. U.S. Northern Command conducted 

an independent three-phase study on where to field ground-based 

interceptors that included looking at the operational benefits of an 

interceptor site located in the eastern United States in order to augment 

the planned European Interceptor Site. However, this study did not 

address whether MDA’s budgeted requirement of ground-based 

interceptors—which at the time of the study included 44 interceptors in 

the United States and 10 in Europe—was sufficient to meet the command’s 

requirement. 

Page 17 GAO-09-856 Missile Defense
 

• The military services have also started to perform assessments on ballistic 

missile defense quantity requirements, but these assessments have been 

limited in scope and do not attempt to optimize the number of ballistic 

missile defense elements and interceptors worldwide. For example, in 

2007, the Navy completed a study assessing its requirement for making 

Aegis ships capable of performing the ballistic missile defense mission. 

Based on the study’s findings, the Navy concluded that the entire Aegis 

fleet should have this capability and that ballistic missile defense was a 

core Navy mission. However, the Navy neither attempted to assess the 

requirements for the number and type of interceptors to be used aboard 

these ships, nor scoped the assessment to try to vary the mix of other 

elements and interceptors in order to optimize the number of Aegis BMD 

ships. For example, the Navy did not vary the number of THAAD, Patriot 

Advanced Capability-3, AN/TPY-2 forward-based radar, or other elements 

in order to see if that affected the requirement for Aegis BMD ships. The 

Army also recently undertook a short-turnaround study to identify 

whether it is a better option to maintain the THAAD battery procurement 

plan outlined in the fiscal year 2010 budget or to buy fewer batteries and 

instead develop and field a more capable THAAD interceptor. The Army 

study intends to explore different options for gaining the same capability 

that a new interceptor could provide, including placing THAAD 

interceptors forward of the battery and operating them remotely, as well 

as the use of sea- and land-based Aegis BMD interceptors. However, Army 

officials told us that while the study is looking at several combat 

scenarios, it is not intended to establish the global quantity requirements 

for THAAD or establish a global optimum mix of joint BMDS elements and 

interceptors. 

DOD Has Opportunities to 

Establish What Type and 

How Many Elements and 

Interceptors Are Needed 

for All Missions and to 

Refine Ballistic Missile 

Defense Policy 

Having prepared various but limited assessments of ballistic missile 

defense quantity requirements to support an initial and evolving ballistic 

missile defense capability, DOD now has the opportunity to build upon 

these studies to better define its overall requirements for ballistic missile 

defense elements and interceptors. The newly established BMDS Life 

Cycle Management Process, which DOD has started using to prepare an 

annual capabilities portfolio and program plan to meet requirements, has 

broadened the participation of stakeholders from across DOD in 

developing the annual budget proposal for ballistic missile defense 

capabilities development, operations, and support.24 The Life Cycle 

Management Process is designed to allow DOD to balance long-term and 

 

24For a discussion of GAO’s perspective on DOD’s progress and challenges to improving 

oversight of the BMDS through the Life Cycle Management Process, see GAO-09-466T. 

Page 18 GAO-09-856 Missile Defense
 

near-term needs by reviewing ballistic missile defense capability 

developments as a portfolio. However, to date the Missile Defense 

Executive Board, which oversees the process, has not commissioned a 

broad-based analysis of DOD’s overall requirements, and instead has 

depended on more limited analyses of quantity requirements to inform its 

deliberations over the missile defense budget. For example, in preparing 

DOD’s fiscal year 2010 budget proposal, and again in beginning to prepare 

for the fiscal year 2011 proposal, the board relied on the Joint Staff’s 

limited analysis of THAAD and Aegis BMD requirements. The Joint Staff is 

completing additional studies focused on the impact of countermeasures 

on ballistic missile defenses and plans on studying how ballistic missile 

defense and air defense can be integrated. However, according to Joint 

Staff officials, these studies do not assess ballistic missile defense 

requirements in their entirety. As part of the congressionally mandated 

review of ballistic missile defense policy and strategy, DOD expects to 

examine, among other things, the appropriate balance among elements to 

defend against ballistic missiles of all ranges; the role of allied 

contributions; and options for defending Europe from Iranian ballistic 

missile defense attack. The review is required to be completed by January 

2010 and is expected to inform future budget requests. Given its broad 

charter and short time frame, the review is not expected to include an 

underpinning, comprehensive analysis of all requirements. However, the 

policy and strategy review could potentially lead to revised ballistic 

missile defense requirements. 

DOD has faced challenges in fully establishing units to operate five of the 

eight ballistic missile defense elements that have been put into operational 

use. DOD typically requires that major weapon systems be fielded with a 

full complement of organized and trained personnel. To defend against 

potentially catastrophic threats posed by rogue states armed with ballistic 

missiles, however, DOD has in some cases put ballistic missile defense 

elements into operational use before first ensuring that the military 

services had created units and trained servicemembers to operate them. 

DOD had in place operational units to operate the three elements that 

were based on existing service weapon systems, such as Aegis ships and 

Air Force early warning radars that were upgraded to take on ballistic 

missile defense capabilities. However, the five remaining elements that 

have been put into operational use represent new capabilities designed 

expressly for ballistic missile defense purposes and for which new 

operational units had to be created. As a result, early fielding meant that 

units were not fully in place and required, in some cases, that personnel be 

temporarily assigned or borrowed from other organizations when the 

Force Structure Not 

Fully in Place for 

Some Units Operating 

Ballistic Missile 

Defense Elements 

Page 19 GAO-09-856 Missile Defense
 

elements are put into operational use to address these potential threats. 

For example, the Army has faced personnel shortfalls to operate the 

Ground-based Midcourse Defense element, which necessitated 

augmentation with personnel from the Army National Guard to overcome 

operational readiness concerns. These personnel shortages primarily 

resulted from the need for Army units to participate in MDA research and 

development activities, which are important to improving the element’s 

capabilities. MDA and the military services are taking steps to establish the 

forces needed for operations, but this may take years for some elements. 

DOD recognizes the challenges created by putting elements into early use, 

but has not set criteria requiring that operational units be in place before 

new elements are made available for use. In the future, emerging threats or 

crises could again require DOD to press developmental capabilities into 

use. However, until DOD reconsiders its approach to making elements 

available for operational use before the units are fully organized, manned, 

and trained to perform all of the missions they will be expected to 

execute, the combatant commanders will lack certainty that the forces can 

operate the elements as expected. 

DOD’s Approach to 

Ballistic Missile Defense 

Has Focused on Early 

Fielding of Capabilities 

DOD’s approach to ballistic missile defense development differs from its 

standard weapons development process in order to stress the early 

fielding of new capabilities. DOD practices for developing military 

capabilities typically require that major weapon systems complete 

developmental activities and then be fielded with a full complement of 

organized and trained personnel so that servicemembers are capable of 

operating the systems on behalf of the combatant commands.25 DOD 

customarily prepares planning documents that identify organizational, 

personnel, and training requirements that must be established before a 

new weapon system can be declared operational for the first time. These 

requirements typically include an assessment of the military specialties 

needed; identification of personnel requirements; and the development of 

individual, unit, and joint training programs. The individual services also 

typically require the establishment of an operational unit that is manned 

with trained servicemembers before new weapon systems are used 

operationally. According to Army officials, the Army declares new weapon 

 

25DOD’s traditional requirements process is described in Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff 

Instruction 3170.01G, Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System 

(Mar. 1, 2009). DOD’s acquisition process is described in DOD Directive 5000.01, The 

Defense Acquisition System (May 12, 2003), and DOD Instruction 5000.02, Operation of 

the Defense Acquisition System (Dec. 8, 2008). 

Page 20 GAO-09-856 Missile Defense
 

systems to be initially operational only after units have been activated and 

soldiers have completed collective training requirements for operating the 

systems. Navy and Air Force practices also emphasize establishing the 

organizations, personnel, and training needed to operate a weapon system 

before it is declared operational. 

DOD adopted a unique acquisition approach for ballistic missile defense 

capabilities in order to meet the President’s direction to begin fielding in 

2004 an initial capability to defend against ballistic missiles that may carry 

weapons of mass destruction. In establishing MDA, the Secretary of 

Defense directed it to use prototype and test assets to provide early 

capability, if necessary, and improve the effectiveness of deployed 

capabilities by continuing research and development activities and 

inserting new technologies as they become available. Further, the 

Secretary gave MDA the flexibility to field ballistic missile defense systems 

in limited numbers when available, and to base production decisions on 

test performance. Although the Secretary directed that the services 

provide forces to support ballistic missile defense operations, he also 

canceled the services’ requirements documentation prepared for 

then-developmental programs—such as THAAD and Ground-based 

Midcourse Defense—because the service-generated requirements were not 

consistent with the BMDS developmental objectives. Additionally, the 

Secretary directed that BMDS development would not be subject to DOD’s 

traditional joint requirements determination processes and would utilize 

certain flexible acquisition practices until a mature ballistic missile 

defense capability had been developed and was ready to be handed over to 

a military service for production and operation. Consequently, the services 

initially had little basis on which to determine force structure 

requirements for some ballistic missile defense elements, even as MDA 

began to develop elements and add them to the BMDS operational 

baseline. 

Units Are in Place to 

Operate Existing Systems 

That Were Modified for 

Ballistic Missile Defense 

Our analysis determined that the units operating the existing service 

systems that were modified for ballistic missile defense have been 

organized, manned, and trained to execute their ballistic missile defense 

capabilities. Such systems make up three of the ballistic missile defense 

elements that DOD first put into operational use by activating them in 2006 

in response to North Korea’s ballistic missile threat: 

• Upgraded Early Warning Radars. Air Force early warning radars, such as 

those at Beale Air Force Base and Royal Air Force Base Fylingdales, 

United Kingdom, were first developed and operated in the Cold War. As 

Page 21 GAO-09-856 Missile Defense
 

these radars have been modified for ballistic missile defense missions, the 

Air Force assigned responsibility to the 21st Space Wing for operating the 

Beale Upgraded Early Warning Radar, while the United Kingdom has 

agreed to provide forces to operate and maintain the Fylingdales radar. 

The Air Force has provided stand-alone training equipment to train and 

qualify site personnel at the two Upgraded Early Warning Radars that DOD 

has already declared operational, and has certified that operational crews 

are fully trained at these radar sites. The Air Force has made similar 

preparations to begin operating a third Upgraded Early Warning Radar, 

located at Thule, Greenland, later in 2009. 

• Cobra Dane Radar Upgrade. In accepting the transfer of the Cobra Dane 

Radar Upgrade from MDA, which was approved by the Under Secretary of 

Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics in February 2009, the 

Air Force agreed to continue to manage the radar on behalf of its multiple 

missions and stakeholders, while MDA agreed to fund missile defense 

mission-specific operations and maintenance training and to assist the Air 

Force in identifying mission-specific operations costs. MDA also is 

providing maintenance support through fiscal year 2013, when 

maintenance support becomes an Air Force-funded responsibility. 

• Aegis BMD. Aegis BMD-capable ships are operated by the Navy, and the 

Navy supports those ships through existing service-based infrastructure 

and processes. Servicemembers have been initially qualified on the 

ballistic missile defense mission through existing Navy commands and 

according to Navy practices. The Navy updated its training and personnel 

requirements and relied on established procedures to certify the 

performance of Aegis crews to perform the full range of Aegis BMD 

missions. 

Units Operating Newly 

Developed Ballistic Missile 

Defense Elements Have 

Not Been Fully Organized, 

Manned, and Trained for 

All Tasks 

Our analysis determined that DOD has not yet put into place operational 

units that are fully organized, manned, and trained to execute all of their 

ballistic missile defense responsibilities for the remaining five ballistic 

missile defense elements, which were designed expressly for ballistic 

missile defense and thus required DOD to create new units. In order to 

address existing and emerging threats, DOD used flexible acquisition 

practices to make these elements available for operational use before the 

services were fully ready to operate them. However, without fully 

established organizations, personnel, and training, these units faced 

challenges in dealing with the rapid fielding of elements, the ongoing 

research and development activities involving fielded elements, and the 

lack of an established force structure for operating the BMDS command 

and control system. 

Page 22 GAO-09-856 Missile Defense
 

Operational units have faced challenges resulting from the rapid fielding of 

elements before the units have had all of the necessary organizations, 

personnel, and training in place. For example, the Army had only a few 

months after being named lead service to organize and train a detachment 

for managing the AN/TPY-2 forward-based radar, which MDA fielded in 

Japan and added to the BMDS operational baseline in September 2006.26 In 

contrast, the Army generally requires years to organize an operational unit, 

establish personnel requirements, and train servicemembers for operating 

a new weapon system. The rapid fielding required the Army to deploy 

soldiers without a complete and approved force structure for sensor 

management operations when MDA added the radar to the baseline. For 

example, the Army did not yet have a program to train Army soldiers; to 

mitigate this shortfall, MDA provided the first group of Army sensor 

managers with an orientation of the AN/TPY-2 forward-based radar and of 

the radar management software then in use. A U.S. Army Space and 

Missile Defense Command official told us that the initial servicemembers’ 

orientation lacked the requirements, curriculum, training devices, 

standards, and evaluations that are generally expected to be in place as 

part of an initial qualification training course when the Army fields a new 

weapon system. As a result of the Army’s initiative, the initial sensor 

managers developed their own tactics, techniques, and procedures for 

managing the radar before the Army had in place a training course to 

qualify servicemembers in sensor management. Since that time, the Army 

has established a training course, which has graduated a sufficient number 

of servicemembers projected to meet combatant command needs. 

Rapid Fielding of Elements Has 

Challenged Operational Units 

Despite the Army’s successes in training servicemembers, DOD still faces 

interrelated organizational and personnel challenges for the sensor 

management of the second AN/TPY-2 forward-based radar, which MDA 

fielded in Israel and made available for contingency operations in 

November 2008. At the time DOD fielded the radar, the Europe-based 

Army unit responsible for sensor management operations lacked both the 

organizational structure and sufficient personnel to perform these 

functions on a continual basis.27 Rather, the unit was organized and 

 

26Sensor management operations include integration and management of the sensor with 

the Ground-based Midcourse Defense element and are executed from a remote location. 

Sensor management of the radar fielded to Japan in 2006 is executed by an Army unit 

located in Hawaii, and sensor management of the radar fielded to Israel in 2008 is executed 

by an Army unit located in Germany. 

27Israel is located within the U.S. European Command area of responsibility and sensor 

management operations are performed remotely from Germany by the 357th Air Defense 

Artillery Detachment. 

Page 23 GAO-09-856 Missile Defense
 

manned to perform air and missile defense operations on behalf of 

U.S. European Command, including command and control operations of 

Patriot air and missile defense forces, and air and missile defense 

operational and exercise planning. To minimize the potential risk to the 

unit’s primary missions as it performed the newly assigned sensor 

management operations, the Air Force has deployed servicemembers, at 

U.S. European Command’s request, and will deploy them throughout 2009 

to augment the unit. However, these deployments have not fully addressed 

the stress to the unit. In March 2009, the Commander, U.S. European 

Command, testified that the unit’s increasing requirements were “a moving 

target” and would demand considerable flexibility to identify and resource 

them in the near- to mid-term. U.S. Army Space and Missile Defense 

Command officials told us that the Army has established an operational 

unit in its force structure planning system to provide sensor management 

for the second AN/TPY-2 forward-based radar; however, the officials 

added that the Army has not activated the unit because DOD has not 

determined whether the radar will be permanently fielded in Israel. 

The Sea-based X-Band Radar was first declared available for contingencies 

in 2008, and has been made operational for brief periods, without the full 

Navy force structure in place. Unlike Aegis BMD, which is based on 

existing Navy ships and support systems, the Sea-based X-Band Radar is a 

new system. In March 2007 the Navy agreed in principle to become the 

lead service for the Sea-based X-Band Radar, which could transfer to the 

Navy as early as 2011. However, to transfer to the Navy, the Sea-based 

X-Band radar element must pass a Navy inspection; and the combatant 

commands must determine not only that the element can perform all of its 

assigned missions, but also that the operator crew understands its current 

capabilities and limitations. Additionally, the Navy has agreed to the 

transfer of the element as long as funds for operating it are also 

transferred to the Navy; however, as we testified in March 2009,28 the 

transfer agreement does not specify how these funds will be transferred to 

the Navy in the long term. Further, the Navy had yet to determine 

personnel requirements for the radar. To mitigate the potential risk of an 

incomplete force structure before the radar transfers, MDA has provided 

contractor personnel to support day-to-day operations, as needed. 

MDA also declared the THAAD element to be available for contingencies 

in September 2008, and the Secretary of Defense activated the element in 

 

28GAO-09-466T. 

Page 24 GAO-09-856 Missile Defense
 

the Pacific region twice during 2009, before the Army had the opportunity 

to fully establish the unit that will operate the first THAAD battery.29 The 

Army activated a unit of 99 soldiers in 2008 to operate the first THAAD 

battery, but does not expect to complete the training and organizational 

activities needed to fully establish the unit and declare an initial 

operational capability until late in fiscal year 2010.30 As a result, 

U.S. Pacific Command and other combatant commands are operating the 

element during contingencies with a unit composed of a mix of MDA 

personnel, contractors, and Army soldiers. According to MDA’s August 

2008 assessment of the element’s capabilities and limitations at the time it 

was declared available for contingencies, the nonstandard unit lacks 

experience in tactical operations, has not completed collective training, 

and requires significant external support. Despite these force structure 

limitations, a U.S. Pacific Command official told us that the command 

requires THAAD in the event of a crisis. Further, Army and MDA officials 

told us that Army’s approach to prepare forces to operate THAAD has 

been closely coordinated with MDA’s schedule to acquire the element. 

Army officials added that the Army modified its approach from standard 

Army practices to more rapidly achieve an initial operational capability. 

However, Army officials told us that until the Army fully establishes the 

force structure to operate THAAD, the combatant commands may 

overestimate the Army’s preparedness to deploy an operational unit to 

defend U.S. forces and population centers during a drawn out contingency. 

As a result, the benefit of rapidly fielding THAAD could be offset by the 

risks associated with depending on a unit that does not have the full 

complement of organized and trained personnel. 

Operational units have also faced challenges resulting from ongoing 

research and development activities for which the units have not been 

organized, manned, and trained. U.S. Army Space and Missile Defense 

Command officials told us that involving operational units in BMDS 

research and development activities can be beneficial because it allows 

the lead service and operational personnel to directly affect an element’s 

Operational Units Have Faced 

Challenges Caused by Ongoing 

Research and Development 

Activities 

 

29This unit is the A Battery (THAAD), 4th Air Defense Artillery Regiment, 11th Air Defense 

Artillery Brigade, 32nd Area Air and Missile Defense Command. The Army also plans to 

activate the A Battery, 2nd Regiment, in fiscal year 2010; the D Battery, 2nd Regiment, in 

fiscal year 2012; and the B Battery, 2nd Regiment, in fiscal year 2013. 

30DOD defines an Initial Operational Capability as the first attainment of the capability to 

employ effectively a weapon, item of equipment, or system of approved specific 

characteristics that is manned or operated by an adequately trained, equipped, and 

supported military unit or force. 

Page 25 GAO-09-856 Missile Defense
 

development. Like other BMDS elements, the Ground-based Midcourse 

Defense element was put into operational use to address existing threats, 

but is also simultaneously being tested and refined by MDA. Consequently, 

the Army units responsible for operating the element are also responsible 

for sending operational crews to participate in MDA-sponsored tests of 

new capabilities,31 such as upgraded versions of the Ground-based 

Midcourse Defense element’s fire control software. However, like most 

other Army units, the Ground-based Midcourse Defense units are not 

organized, manned, and trained for tasks such as the testing associated 

with research and development activities. As a result, the Commanding 

General, U.S. Army Space and Missile Defense Command, concluded in 

May 2009 that the units’ mismatch between the available crews and 

mission responsibility was creating an adverse impact on their operational 

readiness and performance of the Ground-based Midcourse Defense 

mission. Lacking additional crews and funding, the Commanding General 

determined that the units’ operational requirements would preclude them 

from fully contributing to MDA’s developmental efforts, which in turn 

would have a negative impact on both the operational crews’ readiness 

and the efforts to rapidly develop the Ground-based Midcourse Defense 

element. To address this mismatch, the Army has agreed to temporarily 

activate Army National Guard soldiers to augment the units’ personnel. 

However, the Army has not solved the long-term mismatch between 

operational requirements and available personnel, and has requested that 

U.S. Army Space and Missile Defense Command evaluate and present 

alternatives for meeting the long-term requirements that the mission 

entails. 

Ongoing research and development, as well as upgrades to elements, also 

create uncertainty about the preparedness of some operational units to 

operate elements under realistic conditions. For example, as new versions 

of the Ground-based Midcourse Defense element’s fire control software 

are installed, Army soldiers operating the software typically complete their 

initial qualification training, and crews are certified, according to standard 

Army practices. However, in August 2008, following the Army’s 

participation in an MDA test using high-fidelity modeling and simulation 

capabilities, U.S. Northern Command determined that the existing training 

equipment provided by MDA did not adequately simulate how other 

 

31The Army established the 100th Ground-based Midcourse Defense Brigade, based in 

Colorado, and the 49th Ground-based Midcourse Defense Battalion, based in Alaska, to 

operate the Ground-based Midcourse Defense element. 

Page 26 GAO-09-856 Missile Defense
 

ballistic missile defense elements interact with the fire control system.32 As 

a result, the Deputy Commander, U.S. Northern Command, stated that the 

Army’s operational crews would no longer be certified on the fire control 

software until the crews had access to training systems that better 

reflected the operational behavior of BMDS elements. Since that time, 

MDA has installed an upgraded training system for Army operators to use. 

U.S. Northern Command officials stated to us that the upgraded training 

system is an improvement over the prior capability, and the Army units 

were using the upgraded system to train servicemembers on the next 

version of the fire control software. Officials from the 100th Brigade, U.S. 

Strategic Command, and MDA told us that MDA delayed declaring the 

upgraded fire control capability to be operational until the units had an 

opportunity to train on the upgraded operational system. However, as of 

July 2009 the Commander, U.S. Northern Command, had not determined 

whether the upgraded training capabilities were sufficient to certify the 

crews for operations. 

MDA retains lead responsibility for the command and control element, or 

C2BMC, unlike the other ballistic missile defense elements, which are 

being made part of the military services’ force structure. According to 

MDA, retaining responsibility of C2BMC helps the agency control the 

configuration of the element as it is upgraded to more capable versions. 

Therefore, none of the services have been required to create units, train 

personnel, or provide servicemembers to the combatant commands to 

operate the C2BMC element. However, unlike the services, MDA lacks the 

responsibility for providing forces to support military operations. As a 

result, the combatant commands have had to identify and organize C2BMC 

operators from within their existing resources by drawing upon 

servicemembers who are already deployed to the commands for other 

warfighting responsibilities. 

DOD Plans for Establishing the 

Force Structure for the BMDS 

Command and Control Element 

Are Unclear 

MDA has provided personnel and training to support the combatant 

commands’ C2BMC operational requirements, but additional steps are 

needed to ensure that the combatant commands’ needs are met. The 

C2BMC element is the integrating element that makes the BMDS a global 

system by providing combatant commanders with communications links, 

real-time battle information to make decisions, and a planning capability 

 

32The operational crews of the 100th Ground-based Midcourse Defense Brigade are 

certified by U.S. Army Space and Missile Defense Command in support of U.S. Northern 

Command. 

Page 27 GAO-09-856 Missile Defense
 

to optimize the fielding of ballistic missile defense forces on a global scale. 

It is also used to perform sensor management of the AN/TPY-2 forwardbased radar, and future C2BMC versions are expected to have the 

capability to control additional sensors. To help meet the combatant 

commands’ operational needs, MDA has trained hundreds of 

servicemembers who were already assigned to the combatant commands;33

through the end of 2008, MDA trained more than 200 personnel at 

U.S. Pacific Command and the Navy Pacific Fleet, 250 personnel at 

U.S. Northern Command, and more than 175 personnel at U.S. Strategic 

Command. MDA also deploys its own personnel to 26 locations around the 

world to help the combatant commands and other users operate the 

element. However, according to U.S. Army Space and Missile Defense 

Command officials, the inability to identify and request additional 

personnel from the services to operate the C2BMC element creates a 

potential personnel shortfall in combatant commanders’ operations 

centers, which may become acute during a crisis when there are not 

enough personnel to effectively perform all required activities. Officials 

from U.S. Army Space and Missile Defense Command and the 

U.S. Pacific Command-based Army unit using the C2BMC element also 

told us that the detachment responsible for managing the AN/TPY-2 

forward-based radar can become overtaxed by the responsibility to 

operate the C2BMC element for other functions and purposes. 

Though none has been designated the lead service for the C2BMC element, 

the Army, Navy, and Air Force have started preparing to support the 

organizational, training, and personnel requirements to operate ballistic 

missile defense command and control and battle management systems. 

Such requirements could grow as MDA continues to add functions to the 

C2BMC element. Although the services have not established personnel 

requirements for operating the C2BMC system, DOD officials told us that 

future versions of the software may require crews of up to five personnel 

per shift. Moreover, at present MDA trains only individual 

servicemembers, not crews, to operate the C2BMC system. Furthermore, 

as of July 2009, the services’ effort to establish requirements for the 

C2BMC element is in its very early stages. Until the services determine 

their respective requirements for manning and training for the C2BMC 

element, operational risks and impacts will persist. 

 

33The MDA-provided training does not include training for sensor management of the 

AN/TPY-2 forward-based radar, which the Army has provided to servicemembers since 

2008. 

Page 28 GAO-09-856 Missile Defense
 

DOD has taken steps to evaluate the operational capabilities and 

limitations of ballistic missile defenses when they are first made available 

for operations. DOD recognized the potential operational risk of using 

developmental ballistic missile defense elements for military operations 

following the fielding of the AN/TPY-2 forward-based radar to Japan in 

2006. In 2006, we also recommended that DOD develop operational criteria 

for evaluating ballistic missile defense elements before the Secretary of 

Defense declares the elements operational.34 We found that without such 

criteria, the Secretary of Defense lacked a baseline against which to 

objectively assess the combatant commands’ and services’ preparations to 

conduct ballistic missile defense operations. Moreover, we found that 

lacking clear criteria, DOD may have difficulty determining whether the 

return on its significant development investment in the BMDS can be 

realized. Since our report was issued, U.S. Strategic Command’s functional 

component for integrated missile defense has developed and begun 

evaluating ballistic missile defense elements against operational criteria to 

help the combatant commands and element operators understand the 

capabilities and limitations of ballistic missile defense elements as they are 

added to the BMDS operational baseline. However, these criteria were not 

designed to evaluate the extent to which the services had fully established 

the organizations, training, and personnel needed to operate ballistic 

missile defense elements. 

DOD Has Taken Steps to 

Evaluate Operational 

Capabilities and 

Limitations, but Potential 

Risks Remain When 

Elements Are First 

Declared Operational 

In May 2009, MDA updated its BMDS Master Plan to more fully consider 

the extent to which the services are developing the organizations, 

personnel, and training needed for operations when declaring that an 

element has achieved Early Capability Delivery,35 which is the first point 

where the element is made available for operational employment in 

defense of the United States or U.S. allies. MDA’s plan incorporates 

reviews of the elements’ performance under the commands’ operational 

criteria before the MDA Director makes capability delivery declarations. 

The updated plan also states that MDA will support service and combatant 

command requirements for new equipment training, unit training, and 

certification, and that MDA will provide appropriate training facilities and 

support. These steps could help coordinate the services’ force structure 

development with MDA’s capability delivery schedule in the future. 

However, MDA’s updated plan does not require that organizations, 

 

34GAO-06-473. 

35Missile Defense Agency, Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS) Master Plan, version 

9.1 (April 2009). The plan was signed by the MDA Director on May 18, 2009. 

Page 29 GAO-09-856 Missile Defense
 

personnel, and training of the operational unit be in place before MDA 

makes an Early Capability Delivery declaration, or before the Secretary of 

Defense subsequently activates the element. 

The tension between the early fielding of ballistic missile defense 

capabilities and the desirability of preparing units to operate these 

capabilities was reflected in the views expressed by officials from across 

DOD during our review. Officials from the Office of the Secretary of 

Defense told us that MDA’s flexibility to shift resources when developing 

and fielding ballistic missile defenses has allowed DOD to employ ballistic 

missile defense capabilities more quickly than if the services had been 

responsible for their development. Such flexibilities continue to reflect the 

urgency and national priority of the ballistic missile defense mission. 

However, they stated that it was appropriate to consider a ballistic missile 

defense element to be part of the respective service’s force structure when 

MDA declared that the element had achieved Early Capability Delivery. 

Office of the Secretary of Defense, U.S. Strategic Command, and Army 

officials emphasized the need to establish a lead service early in 

development and to provide adequate lead time to establish an operational 

force structure before operating elements. For example, Army officials 

told us that the Army has established the operational units needed to 

perform ballistic missile defense missions, but agreed that the previous 

lack of coordination with MDA on the timing of fielding missile defense 

elements and declaring them operational has been problematic. Navy 

officials told us that the Navy does not recognize distinctions among 

MDA’s capability delivery declarations; the Navy does not consider a 

ballistic missile defense element to be operational until the element has 

been fully incorporated into the Navy force structure. A U.S. Pacific 

Command official told us that some crises could require DOD to put 

developmental capabilities to operational use, adding that shifting 

emphasis to the establishment of the services’ force structure could delay 

the availability of ballistic missile defense capabilities to the combatant 

commanders. However, the official agreed that it was reasonable for DOD 

to ensure that the services had fully established the units’ organizations, 

personnel, and training needed to operate ballistic missile defenses before 

the elements were declared available for operations, provided that such 

assurances reflected a broader shift in DOD’s policy goals from fielding 

systems quickly to the more deliberate development of capabilities that 

can be readily operated over sustained periods. 

Better linkage between force structure development and element fielding 

plans is important because the currently configured BMDS is the starting 

point for additional capabilities and elements that await future 

Page 30 GAO-09-856 Missile Defense
 

deployment. For example, MDA plans to field and declare operational 

additional AN/TPY-2 forward-based radars; although the Army now has in 

place the units to operate these radars in its force structure plans, the 

Army requires time to activate these units and prepare them for 

operations. Similarly, although both the Army and the Air Force have 

started planning to operate the proposed European Interceptor Site and 

European Midcourse Radar elements, which would be fielded in Europe to 

defend against ballistic missiles launched from the Middle East, both 

services will require time to prepare the operational units in order to be 

ready when MDA completes the development and fielding of these 

systems. Additionally, DOD’s fiscal year 2010 missile defense budget 

proposal shifts emphasis toward developing new ascent phase capabilities, 

which are expected to intercept ballistic missiles before they can release 

countermeasures to defeat U.S. defenses. As DOD makes this shift, MDA 

and the services will need to closely coordinate their efforts in order to 

avoid the challenges that affected the operations of elements that have 

been previously fielded. 

Ballistic missile defense elements and interceptors of various types are in 

demand from the geographic combatant commands, but DOD faces a high 

price tag to develop, acquire, operate, and support ballistic missile defense 

capabilities over the long term. Thus far, decisions regarding the shape 

and structure of the BMDS have been made based on policy first 

established in 2002 and on limited analyses of force structure options. 

DOD’s analyses to date have helped the department understand some of 

its requirements and inform its policies, but these analyses are incomplete 

and have not covered the full range of ballistic missile defense missions. 

DOD’s ongoing review of its ballistic missile defense policy and strategy 

provides a good opportunity for DOD to reassess its ballistic missile 

defense priorities and needs. However, the review is moving forward 

without the benefits that a comprehensive assessment of DOD’s quantity 

requirements would provide. Lacking the solid foundation of a 

knowledge-based, comprehensive analytic basis for making decisions, 

which includes careful assessments of DOD’s overall ballistic missile 

defense quantity requirements, DOD will continue to lack crucial data it 

needs to make the best possible policy, strategy, and budgetary decisions 

for ballistic missile defense. 

Conclusions 

Making BMDS elements available for operational use before units were 

fully established reflected DOD’s sense of urgency to rapidly field defenses 

against potentially catastrophic threats. However, now that some ballistic 

missile defenses are in place, the risk of putting additional elements in use 

Page 31 GAO-09-856 Missile Defense
 

before operational units are fully established must be weighed against the 

marginal benefits, absent an imminent threat. Looking forward, 

reassessing this approach is important because DOD has several elements 

in development that may be fielded in coming years, including additional 

forward-based radars, the interceptors and radars that are planned for 

fielding in Europe, and new elements associated with ascent phase 

intercept. 

To establish the foundation needed to make effective policy, strategy, 

budgetary, and acquisition decisions, we recommend that the Secretary of 

Defense take the following two actions: 

• Direct the preparation and periodic updating of a comprehensive analysis 

of the types and quantities of ballistic missile defense elements and 

interceptors that are required for performing ballistic missile defense 

missions worldwide. The analysis should consider the integration of 

elements; risk assessments of the threat, capabilities and limitations of the 

BMDS, and redundancy requirements; allied contributions; the 

employment of elements that can perform multiple types of ballistic 

missile defense missions and other missions; and any other relevant 

factors identified by the department. 

• Use this analysis as a foundation for evaluating DOD’s ballistic missile 

defense developmental and acquisition priorities in future budget requests 

as well as its overall ballistic missile defense policy and strategy direction. 

To reduce the potential risks associated with operating ballistic missile 

defense elements with insufficient force structure, we further recommend 

that the Secretary of Defense require, in the absence of an immediate 

threat or crisis, that operational units be established with the 

organizations, personnel, and training needed to perform all of their 

ballistic missile defense responsibilities before first making elements 

available for operational use. 

In written comments on a draft of this report, DOD partially concurred 

with one and concurred with two of our recommendations. DOD’s 

comments are reprinted in appendix II. DOD also provided technical 

comments that we incorporated as appropriate. 

Recommendations for 

Executive Action 

Agency Comments 

and Our Evaluation 

DOD partially concurred with our first recommendation to prepare and 

periodically update a comprehensive analysis of the types and quantities 

of ballistic missile defense elements and interceptors that are required for 

Page 32 GAO-09-856 Missile Defense
 

performing ballistic missile defense missions worldwide. In its comments, 

DOD validated the need for a comprehensive and recurring analysis. DOD 

indicated that the ongoing ballistic missile defense review will develop the 

strategic themes and analytic bases to be used in future analyses. DOD 

also noted the interrelationships between ballistic missile defense and air 

defense, and that a comprehensive assessment must include these 

defenses. Moreover, DOD stated that decisions related to ballistic missile 

defenses must factor in the priorities of other government agencies, like 

the State Department. In our recommendation, we stated that DOD should 

consider any other relevant factors it identifies, and the inclusion of air 

defense and priorities of other government agencies can reasonably be 

seen as such relevant factors. DOD intends to perform a detailed 

assessment for ballistic missile defense requirements during each 

Quadrennial Defense Review cycle and once in the intervening years.36

Overall, we generally agree with DOD’s suggested approach to implement 

our first recommendation; such steps, if taken, would meet its intent. 

In its response to our second recommendation that DOD use the 

comprehensive analysis as a foundation for future ballistic missile defense 

budget requests as well as setting policy and strategy direction, DOD 

concurred and indicated that this analysis would be used to shape ballistic 

missile defense developmental and acquisition priorities in future budget 

requests, and to shape overall ballistic missile defense policy, strategy, and 

future deployment options. However, until DOD conducts this detailed 

assessment of its overall ballistic missile defense quantity requirements, it 

will continue to lack crucial data needed to make policy, strategy, and 

budgetary decisions. 

DOD concurred without comment with our third recommendation to 

require, in the absence of an immediate threat or crisis, that operational 

units be established with the organizations, personnel, and training needed 

to perform all of their ballistic missile defense responsibilities before first 

making elements available for operational use. Our recommendation 

recognizes that facing an immediate threat or crisis, DOD may need to 

field elements without first fully establishing operational units. However, 

now that some ballistic missile defenses are in place, we continue to 

 

36Section 901 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000, Pub. L. No. 

106-65 (1999), codified at 10 U.S.C. § 118, directed DOD to conduct comprehensive 

Quadrennial Defense Reviews every 4 years to examine elements of the defense program 

and policies of the United States, including the national defense strategy, force structure, 

modernization, infrastructure, and budget plan. 

Page 33 GAO-09-856 Missile Defense
 

believe that DOD must carefully weigh the risk of putting additional 

elements in use before operational units are fully established against the 

marginal benefits of rapid fielding. 

We are sending copies of this report to the Secretary of Defense; the 

Director, Missile Defense Agency; the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff; the 

Commander, U.S. Strategic Command; and the Chiefs of Staff and 

Secretaries of the Army, Navy, and Air Force. In addition, this report will 

be available at no charge on the GAO Web site at http://www.gao.gov. 

If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact me 

at (202) 512-3489 or pendletonj@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of 

Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page 

of this report. GAO staff who made major contributions to this report are 

John H. Pendleton 

listed in appendix III. 

Director 

Defense Capabilities and Management 

Page 34 GAO-09-856 Missile Defense
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology Appendix I: Scope and Methodology 

During this review, we evaluated the Department of Defense’s (DOD) 

assessments, prepared since 2002, of the types and quantities of ballistic 

missile defense elements required for ballistic missile defense missions, 

and DOD’s efforts to establish the units to operate elements that have been 

put into use through July 2009.1

 To determine the extent to which DOD has 

identified the types and quantities of ballistic missile defense elements that 

it requires, we identified, obtained, and reviewed key guidance, studies, 

and analyses from the Office of the Secretary of Defense, Missile Defense 

Agency (MDA), the Joint Staff, U.S. Strategic Command, other combatant 

commands, and the military services. These documents included 

memorandums from the Office of the Secretary of Defense and DOD 

Directive 5134.9, Missile Defense Agency (MDA), dated October 9, 2004, 

which established MDA and directed the development of the Ballistic 

Missile Defense System (BMDS); Office of the Secretary of Defense budget 

guidance establishing the goals and objectives of the BMDS; and direction 

from the Deputy Secretary of Defense establishing the Missile Defense 

Executive Board and BMDS Life Cycle Management Process. We obtained 

and reviewed classified briefings summarizing MDA studies, including the 

September 26, 2002, Missile Defense Agency Response to Defense 

Planning Guidance Tasking; the October 26, 2004, briefing titled Missile 

Defense Capability; and the March 23, 2007, European Site Technical 

Rationale. We confirmed with MDA officials that these studies constituted 

the key initial MDA analyses outlining the types and quantities of elements 

and interceptors constituting the BMDS. We also obtained and reviewed 

unclassified briefings summarizing MDA’s 2002-2004 plans to establish an 

initial and evolving defensive capability against ballistic missile threats. To 

understand the Joint Staff’s roles and contributions to determining DOD’s 

quantity requirements for ballistic missile defense elements and 

interceptors, we obtained and reviewed briefings summarizing the Joint 

Staff’s studies of Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense (Aegis BMD) and Terminal 

High-Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) quantity requirements, including the 

2006 Joint Ballistic Missile Defense Capability Mix Study and the 

subsequent Ballistic Missile Defense Joint Capability Mix II and 

Ballistic Missile Defense Joint Capability Mix Sensitivity Analysis

 

1

Because Patriot Advanced Capability-3 is not among the Ballistic Missile Defense System 

(BMDS) elements that the Missile Defense Agency (MDA) has declared ready for 

operations, we did not evaluate the Army’s efforts to establish the units needed to operate 

the element. Although MDA and the Army continue to work together to integrate the 

system’s capabilities into the overall BMDS, Patriot Advanced Capability-3 transferred to 

the Army in 2003 and has been fully integrated into the Army’s existing force structure for 

the Patriot air and missile defense system. 

Page 35 GAO-09-856 Missile Defense 
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology 

studies. To understand how these studies were used to develop MDA’s 

fiscal year 2010 budget request, we obtained and reviewed key 

memorandums from the Joint Staff and the Office of the Secretary of 

Defense. We also obtained and reviewed guidance approved by the Deputy 

Secretary of Defense establishing the Joint Staff’s and U.S. Strategic 

Command’s roles to develop analytical studies that are to be used as the 

basis for developing annual BMDS budget proposals. From U.S. Strategic 

Command, we obtained and reviewed Strategic Command Instruction 

538.3, Warfighter Involvement Process, dated June 2008, and the 2007 

Prioritized Capabilities List to help us to understand the command’s role 

in identifying and advocating for BMDS quantity requirements. We also 

used the U.S. Strategic Command documentation to identify key 

geographic combatant commands with ballistic missile defense 

requirements. These commands are U.S. Central Command, U.S. European 

Command, U.S. Northern Command, and U.S. Pacific Command. We then 

obtained and reviewed briefings and other documents to understand the 

extent to which these commands had identified quantity requirements for 

ballistic missile defense elements and interceptors. We also identified and 

reviewed Army and Navy analyses to identify the quantities of key 

elements. We analyzed DOD’s various studies by comparing them with 

criteria for establishing a knowledge-based approach to acquiring major 

weapon systems, which we established based on our prior work on 

knowledge-based acquisition2

 and on DOD documentation. We also met 

with officials from the Office of the Secretary of Defense, Joint Staff, MDA 

headquarters and element program offices, key geographic combatant 

commands, U.S. Strategic Command, and each of the military services to 

discuss DOD’s efforts to establish type and quantity requirements for 

ballistic missile defense force structure, their respective roles and 

responsibilities in preparing such analyses, and the challenges of doing so. 

To determine the extent to which the military services have established 

the units needed to operate ballistic missile defense elements, we 

performed our work at each of the military services, MDA, the Office of 

the Secretary of Defense, and key combatant commands. During our work 

at each of the services, we adopted an element-by-element approach to 

review the progress made by each service: 

• To review the extent to which the Air Force has established units for 

operating the Upgraded Early Warning Radars and the Cobra Dane Radar 

 

2

GAO-08-619 and GAO-08-467SP. 

Page 36 GAO-09-856 Missile Defense
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology 

Upgrade, we obtained and reviewed Air Force plans for declaring the 

Beale and Fylingdales radars operational. We obtained Air Force 

memorandums declaring whether the radars had met Air Force 

operational criteria for being considered initially operational. We also met 

with officials from the Air Force Air Staff and Air Force Space Command, 

and submitted questions to Air Force Space Command, which provided us 

with written responses. We also reviewed an agreement between the Air 

Force and MDA describing each organization’s roles and responsibilities 

upon the transfer of the Cobra Dane Radar Upgrade from MDA to the Air 

Force. 

• To review the extent to which the Navy has established the force structure 

for Aegis BMD and Sea-based X-Band Radar elements, we obtained and 

reviewed Navy certifications of the Aegis BMD capability and the Pacific 

Fleet’s December 2008 draft Sea-based X-Band Radar Concept of 

Operations. We also reviewed an agreement between MDA and the Navy 

describing each organization’s roles and responsibilities for providing 

operational forces for the Sea-based X-Band Radar until the radar 

transfers to the Navy. We also met with Navy officials from the Office of 

the Chief of Naval Operations and from the Office of the Commander, 

Pacific Fleet. 

• To review the extent to which the Army has established units with the 

required organizations, training, and personnel for the Ground-based 

Midcourse Defense, THAAD, and AN/TPY-2 forward-based radar elements, 

we reviewed documentation establishing each of the Army units covered 

by our review. We obtained and reviewed Army doctrine for THAAD and 

Ground-based Midcourse Defense operations and the Army’s 2009-2013 

and 2010-2015 force structure plans. We obtained and reviewed key 

U.S. Army Space and Missile Defense Command documentation regarding 

a command initiative to review and update the force structure for 

Ground-based Midcourse Defense. We met with officials from the Army 

staff, U.S. Army Space and Missile Defense Command, 100th Missile 

Defense Brigade, 49th Missile Defense Battalion, Forward-based X-Band 

Radar Detachment, 94th Army Air and Missile Defense Command, and 

357th Air Defense Artillery Detachment. 

In addition to our work at the services, we also met with officials from 

MDA to discuss the agency’s perspectives and contributions to the ballistic 

missile defense force structure, particularly for the Command, Control, 

Battle Management, and Communications element. We submitted 

questions to each element program office and received written responses. 

We also obtained and reviewed key documents from the Office of the 

Secretary of Defense, including the BMDS 2007 Transition and Transfer 

Plan, which was published in February 2008. We established criteria for 

assessing the services’ efforts to establish units with the required 

Page 37 GAO-09-856 Missile Defense
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology 

organizations, personnel, and training by reviewing our prior work on 

planning for ballistic missile defense operations,3

 and by obtaining and 

reviewing key DOD and service documents. These included Chairman, 

Joint Chiefs of Staff, Instruction 3170.01G, Joint Capabilities Integration 

and Development System; Army Regulation 71-11, Total Army Analysis; 

Army Regulation 71-32, Force Development and Documentation—

Consolidated Policies; and Air Force Instruction 10-601, CapabilitiesBased Requirements Development. We obtained and reviewed documents 

outlining MDA’s process and criteria for declaring elements to be available 

for operational use; these included MDA’s Ballistic Missile Defense 

(BMDS) Master Plan, version 9.1, which was signed in May 2009, and 

prior versions of this plan; integrated master schedules; and other MDA 

guidance. We determined when MDA had first delivered capabilities to the 

combatant commands for operational use by reviewing MDA’s initial 

operational baseline, dated April 2005, and subsequent memorandums 

issued by the MDA Director to update this baseline or declare elements to 

be available for contingency operations. We met with officials from 

U.S. Strategic Command and from the four geographic combatant 

commands that have identified ballistic missile defense priorities: 

U.S. Central Command, U.S. European Command, U.S. Northern 

Command, and U.S. Pacific Command. We also met with officials from 

U.S. Strategic Command’s Joint Functional Component Command for 

Integrated Missile Defense, who provided us with the component’s most 

recently completed Force Preparation Campaign Plan that outlines the 

command’s approach and operational criteria for assessing ballistic 

missile defense element performance. 

We conducted this performance audit from August 2008 to September 2009 

in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 

Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain 

sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our 

findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that 

the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and 

conclusions based on our audit objectives. 

 

3

GAO-06-473. 

Page 38 GAO-09-856 Missile Defense
Appendix II: Comments from the Department Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense 

of Defense 

Page 39 GAO-09-856 Missile Defense 
Appendix II: Comments from the Department 

of Defense 

Page 40 GAO-09-856 Missile Defense
Appendix II: Comments from the Department 

of Defense 

Page 41 GAO-09-856 Missile Defense
Appendix III: GAO

A

 Contact and Staff 

cknowledgments 

Page 42 GAO-09-856

Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff 

Acknowledgments 

John H. Pendleton, (202) 512-3489 or pendletonj@gao.gov 

In addition to the contact named above, Marie Mak, Assistant Director; 

David Best; Colin Chambers; Tara Copp Connolly; Nicolaas C. Cornelisse; 

Susan Ditto; and Kevin L. O’Neill, Analyst-in-Charge, made significant 

contributions to this report. 

 Missile Defense 

GAO Contact 

Acknowledgments 

(351260) 
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