GAO 

United States Government Accountability Office

Report to the Committee on Homeland 

Security and Governmental Affairs, 

U.S. Senate 

DISASTER 

RECOVERY 

Experiences from 

Past Disasters Offer 

Insights for Effective 

Collaboration after 

Catastrophic Events 

July 2009 

GAO-09-811 
What GAO Found

United States Government Accountability Office

Why GAO Did This Study

Highlights

Accountability Integrity Reliability

July 2009

DISASTER RECOVERY

Experiences from Past Disasters Offer Insights for 

Effective Collaboration after Catastrophic Events

Highlights of GAO-09-811, a report to the 

Committee on Homeland Security and 

Governmental Affairs, U.S. Senate 

In the wake of the 2005 Gulf Coast 

Hurricanes, coordination and 

collaboration challenges created 

obstacles during the government’s 

response and recovery efforts. 

Because of the many stakeholders 

involved in recovery, including all 

levels of government, it is critical 

to build collaborative relationships. 

Building on GAO’s September 2008 

report which provided several key 

recovery practices from past 

catastrophic disasters, this report 

presents examples of how federal, 

state, and local governments have 

effectively collaborated in the past. 

GAO reviewed five catastrophic 

disasters—the Loma Prieta 

earthquake (California, 1989), 

Hurricane Andrew (Florida, 1992), 

the Northridge earthquake 

(California, 1994), the Kobe 

earthquake (Japan, 1995), and the 

Grand Forks/Red River flood 

(North Dakota and Minnesota, 

1997)—to identify recovery 

lessons. GAO interviewed officials 

involved in the recovery from these 

disasters and experts on disaster 

recovery. GAO also reviewed 

relevant legislation, policies, and 

the disaster recovery literature. 

What GAO Recommends

GAO recommends the Secretary of 

Homeland Security direct the 

Federal Emergency Management 

Agency (FEMA) to create a 

mechanism focused on sharing 

information and lessons learned 

regarding disaster recovery, 

including good collaborative 

practices. The Department of 

Homeland Security concurred with 

our recommendation.

Effective collaboration among stakeholders can play a key role in facilitating 

long-term recovery after a catastrophic event. Toward that end, GAO has 

identified four collaborative practices that may help communities rebuild 

from the Gulf Coast hurricanes as well as future catastrophic events: 

• Develop and communicate common goals to guide recovery. 

Defining common recovery goals can enhance collaboration by helping 

stakeholders overcome differences in missions and cultures. After the 

Grand Forks/Red River flood, federally-funded consultants convened 

various stakeholders to develop recovery goals and priorities for the city 

of Grand Forks. The city used these goals as a basis to create a detailed 

recovery action plan that helped it to implement its recovery goals. 

• Leverage resources to facilitate recovery. Collaborating groups bring 

different resources and capacities to the task at hand. After the Northridge 

earthquake, officials from the Federal Highway Administration and 

California’s state transportation agency worked together to review 

highway rebuilding contracts, discuss changes, and then approve projects 

all in one location. This co-located, collaborative approach enabled the 

awarding of rebuilding contracts in 3 to 5 days—instead of the 26 to 40 

weeks it could take using normal contracting procedures. This helped to 

restore damaged highways within a few months of the earthquake. 

• Use recovery plans to agree on roles and responsibilities.

Organizations can collectively agree on who will do what by identifying 

roles and responsibilities in recovery plans developed either before or 

after a disaster takes place. Learning from its experiences from the Loma 

Prieta earthquake, San Francisco Bay Area officials created a plan that 

clearly identifies roles for all participants in order to facilitate regional 

recovery in the event of a future disaster. 

• Monitor, evaluate, and report on progress made toward recovery. 

After the 1995 earthquake, the city of Kobe and the surrounding region 

established processes to assess and report on recovery progress. These 

jurisdictions required periodic external reviews over 10 years on the 

progress made toward achieving recovery goals. As a result of one of 

these reviews, the city of Kobe gained insight into unintended 

consequences of how it relocated elderly earthquake victims, which 

subsequently led to a change in policy.

Past recovery experiences—including practices that promote effective 

collaboration—offer potentially valuable lessons for future catastrophic 

events. FEMA has taken some steps to facilitate the sharing of such 

experiences among communities involved in disaster recovery. However, the 

agency can do more to build on and systematize the sharing of this 

information so that recovery lessons are better captured and disseminated for 

use in the future. 

View GAO-09-811 or key components.

For more information, contact Stanley J. 

Czerwinski at (202) 512-6808 or 

CzerwinskiS@gao.gov. 
Page i GAO-09-811 

Contents 

Letter 1

Background 3 

Effective Collaboration Has Facilitated Recovery in Past Disasters 6 

FEMA Has Taken Steps to Facilitate Collaboration among 

Stakeholders, but Could Do More to Share Recovery 

Experiences 15 

Conclusions 19 

Recommendation for Executive Action 19 

Agency Comments 20 

Appendix I Scope and Methodology 21 

Appendix II Loma Prieta Earthquake 25 

Disaster Impacts 25 

Long-term Recovery Snapshot 26 

Appendix III Hurricane Andrew 32 

Disaster Impacts 32 

Long-term Recovery Snapshot 32 

Appendix IV Northridge Earthquake 37 

Disaster Impacts 37 

Long-term Recovery Snapshot 38 

Appendix V Kobe Earthquake 41 

Disaster Impacts 41 

Long-term Recovery Snapshot 42 

Appendix VI Grand Forks/Red River Flood 48 

Disaster Impacts 48 

Long-term Recovery Snapshot 48 

Appendix VII Comments from the Department of Homeland 

Security 54 

 Collaboration Insights from Past Disasters 
Appendix VIII GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments 56 

Figures 

Figure 1: Five Disasters Included in this Review (1989–1997) 22 

Figure 2: Selected Facts about the Impact of the Loma Prieta 

Earthquake 25 

Figure 3: Examples of Federal Assistance for Recovery from the 

Loma Prieta Earthquake 26 

Figure 4: The Cypress Expressway Suffered Extensive Damage 

from the 1989 Earthquake (top); Oakland Moved the 

Expressway to Reconnect a Neighborhood that Had Been 

Previously Divided (bottom) 30 

Figure 5: Selected Facts about the Impact of Hurricane Andrew 32 

Figure 6: Examples of Federal Assistance for Recovery from 

Hurricane Andrew 33 

Figure 7: Florida City’s Water Distribution System Was Heavily 

Damaged 36 

Figure 8: Selected Facts about the Impact of the Northridge 

Earthquake 37 

Figure 9: Examples of Federal Assistance for Recovery from the 

Northridge Earthquake 38 

Figure 10: The Gavin Canyon Underpass, Part of Southern 

California’s Interstate 5, Suffered Severe Damage but Was 

Restored Within a Few Months 40 

Figure 11: Selected Facts about the Impact of the Kobe Earthquake 41 

Figure 12: Examples of National Government Assistance for 

Recovery from the Kobe Earthquake 42 

Figure 13: Although the City of Kobe Restored the Port of Kobe by 

March 1997, the Port Never Fully Recovered 44 

Figure 14: Japan Restored Damaged Railways and Highways 

Approximately 20 Months after the Earthquake 47 

Figure 15: Selected Facts about the Impact of the 1997 Grand 

Forks/Red River Flood 48 

Figure 16: Examples of Federal Assistance for Recovery from the 

Grand Forks/Red River Flood 49 

Figure 17: After the Flood, Grand Forks, North Dakota, and East 

Grand Forks, Minnesota, Took Steps to Address Their 

Cities’ Lack of an Adequate Flood-Control Infrastructure 

to Help Reduce Damage from Future Flooding 52 

Page ii GAO-09-811 Collaboration Insights from Past Disasters
Abbreviations 

CalTrans California Department of Transportation 

CDBG Community Development Block Grant 

DHS Department of Homeland Security 

EDA Economic Development Administration 

ESF #14 Emergency Support Function #14 

FEMA Federal Emergency Management Agency 

FHWA Federal Highway Administration 

HUD Department of Housing and Urban Development 

LLIS Lessons Learned Information Sharing Web Site 

SBA Small Business Administration 

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Page iii GAO-09-811 Collaboration Insights from Past Disasters
Page 1 GAO-09-811 

 

United States Government Accountability Office

Washington, DC 20548 

 

July 31, 2009 

The Honorable Joseph I. Lieberman 

Chairman 

The Honorable Susan M. Collins 

Ranking Member 

Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs 

United States Senate 

Successful recovery from catastrophic disasters requires a partnership 

involving federal, state, and local governments, as well as the nonprofit 

and private sectors. An extensive group of participants—both 

governmental and nongovernmental—were involved in recovery efforts 

after the 2005 Gulf Coast hurricanes.1

 Stakeholders included virtually all 

cabinet-level federal agencies, several Gulf Coast states, almost 600 local 

jurisdictions in Louisiana and Mississippi including municipalities, 

parishes, school and utility districts, and housing authorities as well as 

community groups and other nongovernmental organizations. In the wake 

of the 2005 Gulf Coast hurricanes, numerous reports have identified 

coordination and collaboration as a key challenge during the government’s 

response.2

 Our more recent work on Gulf Coast recovery efforts also 

identified collaboration and coordination as an obstacle to the recovery 

process as well.3

1

“The 2005 Gulf Coast hurricanes” refers to Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, which struck the 

Gulf Coast in August and September of 2005, respectively. For the purposes of this report, 

they are treated collectively as a single disaster event. When “the Gulf Coast hurricanes” is 

used, the term also includes Hurricanes Ike and Gustav, which struck the Gulf Coast in 

September 2008. 

2

U.S. Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, Hurricane 

Katrina: A Nation Still Unprepared, S. Rept. 109-322 (Washington, D.C.: May 2006); 

U.S. House of Representatives Select Bipartisan Committee to Investigate the Preparation 

for and Response to Hurricane Katrina, A Failure of Initiative, (Washington, D.C.: 

February 2006); White House Homeland Security Council, The Federal Response to 

Hurricane Katrina: Lessons Learned, (Washington, D.C.: February 2006); and GAO, 

Catastrophic Disasters: Enhanced Leadership, Capabilities, and Accountability Controls 

Will Improve the Effectiveness of the Nation’s Preparedness, Response, and Recovery 

System, GAO-06-618 (Washington, D.C.: September 2006). 

3

For example, see GAO, Disaster Recovery: FEMA’s Public Assistance Grant Program 

Experienced Challenges with Gulf Coast Rebuilding, GAO-09-129 (Washington, D.C.: 

December 2008). 

 Collaboration Insights from Past Disasters 
 

Experiences from past disasters can provide valuable insights to help 

communities overcome recovery challenges. At your request, last 

September we identified several key practices from past catastrophic 

disasters to help other communities when recovering from such events.4

 

In that report, we described actions taken by state and local governments 

during past disasters that facilitated recovery. Specifically, localities 

(1) created a clear, implementable, and timely recovery plan; (2) built state 

and local capacity for recovery; (3) implemented strategies for business 

recovery; and (4) adopted a comprehensive approach to combat fraud, 

waste, and abuse. Taken together, these actions provide state and local 

officials with a set of tools and approaches to consider when recovering 

from a catastrophic event. 

In this report, we focus on a key element involved in developing and 

carrying out many of these practices—collaboration. Because of the 

numerous partners and stakeholders involved after a disaster, effective 

collaboration is critical in order to accomplish many recovery-related 

tasks. As agreed with your offices, this report (1) presents examples of 

how federal, state, and local governments have collaborated in the past, 

identifying selected practices that may be helpful for communities 

recovering from the Gulf Coast hurricanes as well as future catastrophic 

events and (2) describes ways in which the Federal Emergency 

Management Agency (FEMA) supports collaboration among recovery 

stakeholders and the extent to which it facilitates the sharing of lessons 

and experiences from past recovery efforts. 

To conduct our review, we selected five catastrophic disasters: the 1989 

Loma Prieta earthquake in northern California; Hurricane Andrew, which 

struck southern Florida in 1992; the 1994 Northridge earthquake in Los 

Angeles, California; the 1995 Kobe earthquake in Japan; and the 1997 

Grand Forks/Red River flood in Grand Forks, North Dakota, and East 

Grand Forks, Minnesota. We visited four of these communities to meet 

with federal, state, and local officials and make observations of the 

conditions today. Although we did not visit communities affected by the 

Grand Forks/Red River flood, we were able to gather the necessary 

 

4

GAO, Disaster Recovery: Past Experiences Offer Insights for Recovering from 

Hurricanes Ike and Gustav and Other Recent Natural Disasters, GAO-08-1120

(Washington, D.C.: September 2008). The Federal Emergency Management Agency 

classifies an event where related federal costs reach or exceed $500 million as 

“catastrophic.” Under this definition, all the past disasters we reviewed qualify as 

catastrophic. 

Page 2 GAO-09-811 Collaboration Insights from Past Disasters
 

information through telephone interviews with key officials involved in the 

recovery as well as experts knowledgeable about the disaster. Further, we 

also obtained and reviewed relevant legislation, ordinances, policies, and 

program documents that describe steps taken to facilitate long-term 

recovery following each of our selected disasters. 

We interviewed officials at the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), 

FEMA, the Economic Development Administration (EDA) in the 

Department of Commerce, the Department of Housing and Urban 

Development (HUD), nongovernmental organizations, as well as academic 

experts who were knowledgeable about the recovery following each of 

our selected disasters and issues relating to coordination. To understand 

how FEMA supports collaboration among recovery stakeholders and the 

extent to which it facilitates the sharing of experiences from past recovery 

efforts, we interviewed FEMA staff and gained access to some of its online 

systems. For more information on our scope and methodology see 

appendix I. For detailed descriptions of the impact of the five disasters we 

reviewed as well as selected recovery strategies taken in the wake of each 

of these events, see appendix II to VI. 

We conducted this performance audit from June 2007 through July 2009 in 

accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those 

standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, 

appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and 

conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence 

obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions 

based on our audit objectives. 

State and local governments generally have the primary responsibility for 

disaster recovery while the federal government provides support when 

requested. Because there are many parties involved in this process—

including all levels of government as well as victims and businesses within 

the affected communities—effective collaboration is a key factor for 

successful recovery. In addition, collaboration among recovery 

stakeholders can continue for an extended period of time. Short-term 

recovery is immediate and an extension of the response phase in which 

Background 

Page 3 GAO-09-811 Collaboration Insights from Past Disasters
 

basic services are restored.5 Long-term recovery can include some of these 

short-term activities, but typically continues them for a number of months 

or years, depending on the severity and extent of the damage sustained.6

 It 

also involves restoration of both individuals and the community, including 

the redevelopment of damaged areas. 

To provide recovery assistance after a disaster, many federal agencies and 

program components are called upon to administer disaster supplemental 

programs and funding, re-program funds, or expedite normal procedures. 

For example, grants, loans, loan guarantees, temporary housing, and 

counseling are among the forms of disaster assistance available from 

federal agencies including FEMA; the departments of Agriculture, 

Commerce, HUD, Treasury, and Transportation; and the Small Business 

Administration (SBA). 

Some of these federal programs provide financial resources to state and 

local governments following disasters, while others provide technical 

assistance. For example, FEMA’s Public Assistance grant program 

provides funding to repair or replace public infrastructure; HUD’s 

Community Development Block Grant (CDBG) program provides formula 

grants for long-term recovery needs such as rehabilitating and building 

housing, EDA’s economic adjustment grant responds to the short- and 

long-term effects of severe economic dislocation events on communities; 

and DHS’s Flood Insurance Program enables individuals to purchase 

insurance against losses from physical damage from floods. Other 

agencies directly carry out rebuilding or recovery projects such as the 

reconstruction of levees by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers and the 

repair of federal roads by the Federal Highway Administration. Federal 

recovery assistance is also provided directly to disaster victims. For 

example, FEMA’s Individual Households Program provides housing, 

financial assistance, and other direct services while the Internal Revenue 

 

5

Short-term recovery includes actions such as providing essential public health and safety 

services, restoring interrupted utility and other essential services, reestablishing 

transportation routes, and providing food and shelter for those displaced by the incident. 

Although called short-term, some of these activities may last for weeks. 

6

Some examples of long-term recovery include providing permanent disaster-resistant 

housing units to replace those destroyed, initiating a low-interest façade loan program for 

the portion of the downtown area that sustained damage from the disaster, and initiating a 

buyout of flood-prone properties and designating them community open space. 

Page 4 GAO-09-811 Collaboration Insights from Past Disasters
 

Service provides information about how to claim casualty loss 

deductions.7

The federal government also provides technical assistance for 

communities to engage in long-term community recovery activities, 

through the Emergency Support Function #14 (ESF #14), as part of the 

National Response Framework.8

 ESF #14 coordinates federal and state 

long-term community recovery support and helps communities plan for 

and identify the necessary resources for recovery. Developed shortly 

before the 2005 Gulf Coast hurricanes, ESF #14 was not in place at the 

time of the five past disasters we studied. ESF #14 and FEMA’s Long-Term 

Community Recovery Branch in its Disaster Assistance Directorate, which 

supports this annex, provide assistance in coordinating federal, state, and 

local recovery efforts and developing community recovery plans. The 

Long-Term Community Recovery Branch also works with other federal 

agencies to help identify program gaps and the potential need for 

flexibilities and new authorities during the recovery process. 

Our previous work defines collaboration broadly as any joint activity that 

is intended to provide more public value than could be produced when the 

organizations act alone. Because of the large number and wide variety of 

stakeholders involved in the recovery from a catastrophic event, 

collaboration is a critical element of this process. We have previously 

reported that agencies can enhance and sustain their collaborative efforts 

by engaging in eight practices: defining and articulating a common 

outcome; establishing mutually reinforcing or joint strategies; identifying 

and addressing needs by leveraging resources; agreeing on roles and 

responsibilities; establishing compatible policies, procedures, and other 

means to operate across agency boundaries; developing mechanisms to 

monitor, evaluate, and report on results; reinforcing agency accountability 

for collaborative efforts through agency plans and reports; and reinforcing 

 

7

Federal agencies and types of federal assistance differ from disaster to disaster. As such, 

not all the federal agencies we discuss are appropriated funds to provide assistance in all 

domestic disasters. 

8

The Department of Homeland Security’s National Response Framework, issued in final 

form in January 2008, is a guide for how the federal, state, local, and tribal governments, 

along with nongovernmental and private sector entities, will collectively respond to and 

recover from all disasters regardless of their cause. The framework recognized the need for 

collaboration among the myriad of entities and personnel involved in response efforts at all 

levels of government, nonprofit organizations, and the private sector. While the Emergency 

Support Function #14 is included in this guide, the National Response Framework indicates 

that long-term community recovery is outside its scope. 

Page 5 GAO-09-811 Collaboration Insights from Past Disasters
 

individual accountability for collaborative efforts through performance 

management systems.9

Effective collaboration among recovery stakeholders can play a key role in 

facilitating disaster recovery. Because the recovery process requires 

partnerships among representatives from all levels of government as well 

as nongovernmental groups, effective collaboration is critical. We have 

previously identified a number of practices that can enhance and sustain 

collaborative efforts, which would help to facilitate disaster recovery.10 We 

found four of these collaborative practices in the past disasters we 

reviewed. Specifically, governments (1) developed and communicated 

common recovery goals; (2) leveraged resources to facilitate recovery; 

(3) used recovery plans to agree on roles and responsibilities; and 

(4) evaluated and reported on progress made toward recovery. 

Effective 

Collaboration Has 

Facilitated Recovery 

in Past Disasters 

Develop and Communicate 

Common Recovery Goals 

To overcome significant differences in missions, cultures, and established 

ways of doing business, collaborating groups must have a clear and 

compelling rationale for working together. We have previously reported 

that the compelling rationale for collaboration can be imposed externally 

such as through legislation or can come from the understanding that there 

are benefits to working together. In either case, collaborative efforts 

require staff working across organizational lines to define and articulate a 

common outcome or purpose they are seeking to achieve that is consistent 

with respective organizational goals and mission.11 In our September 2008 

report on disaster recovery, we discussed the importance of recovery 

plans and how clearly identified goals in such plans can provide direction 

and specific objectives for communities to focus on.12 Building on this, we 

identify two approaches of how stakeholders involved in the recovery 

process following the Kobe earthquake in Japan and the Grand Forks/Red 

River flood in Grand Forks, North Dakota, worked collectively to define 

and articulate common outcomes. 

 

9

GAO, Results Oriented Government: Practices That Can Help Enhance and Sustain 

Collaboration among Federal Agencies, GAO-06-15 (Washington, D.C.: October 2005). 

10GAO-06-15. 

11GAO-06-15. 

12GAO-08-1120. 

Page 6 GAO-09-811 Collaboration Insights from Past Disasters
 

A month after the 1995 Kobe earthquake, the national Japanese 

government formed a “reconstruction committee” to organize recovery 

efforts. The Japanese government created this body through national 

legislation that required the participation of numerous national, 

prefectural,13 and local agencies as well as nongovernmental organizations, 

such as the Kobe Chamber of Commerce and Industry. The Prime Minister 

personally managed the committee, and the Chief Cabinet Secretary and 

Minister of the National Land Agency served as deputy managers. The 

reconstruction committee also included representation from other highranking government officials—including cabinet ministers, the governor of 

Hyogo prefecture, and the mayor of the city of Kobe—as well as 

participants from academia. According to an official who participated in 

this committee, the involvement of these prominent leaders not only 

encouraged stakeholders involved in the reconstruction committee to 

collaborate in order to come to agreement on recovery goals, it brought 

national attention to recovery issues. 

Working together through this committee, these officials and stakeholders 

collaborated to create a national plan of action for recovery. This plan 

included broad proposals that provided insight for how the national 

government would assist in recovery, such as recommending that a longterm recovery plan be developed quickly as well as making housing 

reconstruction, debris removal, port reconstruction, and job creation a 

national priority. It also included more specific details to guide Hyogo 

prefecture and the city of Kobe’s recovery, such as promptly demolishing 

unsound structures and using excess concrete from the earthquake rubble 

for construction and repairs in the port area. 

In addition to providing an action plan, this committee also reviewed 

Hyogo prefecture’s and the city of Kobe’s recovery plans to help localities 

align their recovery proposals with the funding priorities of the national 

government. According to an evaluation of the recovery conducted by the 

city as well as outside recovery experts, the specific feedback provided by 

the reconstruction committee, along with the recovery goals previously 

clarified by the national government helped local officials to come to 

consensus on their recovery goals. Within 6 months of the earthquake, 

Hyogo prefecture and the city of Kobe completed recovery plans, which 

included specific recovery goals for their regions, such as rebuilding 

 

13In the Japanese governmental system, a prefecture is an administrative district about the 

size of a county. 

Page 7 GAO-09-811 Collaboration Insights from Past Disasters
 

damaged housing units in 3 years and completing physical recovery in 

10 years. According to this evaluation, the delineation of these goals at a 

local level played a critical role in helping to coordinate the wide range of 

participants involved in implementing recovery projects. 

After the Grand Forks/Red River flood in 1997, federal, state, and local 

officials worked together to define common goals when planning for the 

recovery of Grand Forks, North Dakota. Technical consultants, funded by 

a HUD grant, brought together federal and city officials as well as 

members of the community to discuss Grand Forks’s rebuilding priorities. 

According to a local official, because the city had no experience with the 

process of developing common goals for the city prior to the flood, this 

external facilitation helped the Grand Forks community and city officials 

come to agreement on a set of common recovery goals. The recovery goals 

resulting from these meetings were included in a comprehensive recovery 

plan for Grand Forks. A subsequent city evaluation found that the process 

of specifying goals within the recovery plan—which identified five broad 

goals and a number of supporting objectives and tasks to achieve those 

goals—helped the city to conceive and formulate projects in coordination 

with the city council and representatives from state and local 

governments. 

Leverage Resources to 

Facilitate Recovery 

We have previously reported that to effectively collaborate requires the 

identification of the human and financial resources needed to initiate or 

sustain collaborative effort.14 In doing so, collaborating groups can bring 

different levels of resources and capacities to the task at hand. In our 

September 2008 report, we discussed the importance of helping state and 

local governments take advantage of all available disaster assistance by 

enhancing their financial and technical capacity when needed.15 Following 

the Kobe and Northridge earthquakes, we found examples of how 

governments leveraged the knowledge and expertise of diverse 

stakeholders to produce effective collaboration and, in turn, facilitate the 

recovery process. 

In the wake of the 1995 Kobe earthquake, the Japanese government 

created a formal organization through which human capital resources 

from all levels of the government were leveraged to plan for and 

 

14GAO-06-15. 

15GAO-08-1120. 

Page 8 GAO-09-811 Collaboration Insights from Past Disasters
 

implement recovery strategies. A committee comprised of high ranking 

officials—including members of the Japanese House of Representatives 

and leaders of affected jurisdictions and their staff—developed 

intergovernmental recovery strategies. In addition to those high-ranking 

officials, the committee also included working-level staff from national 

ministries to provide expertise for developing specific details to be 

included in the recovery plan. For example, staff from the Ministry of 

Transportation brought expertise on infrastructure replacement while 

those from the Kobe Chamber of Commerce and Industry contributed 

knowledge regarding economic recovery matters. According to a Japanese 

official involved in the recovery, this committee combined the political 

know-how from the top-level officials and interdisciplinary expertise from 

line-level bureaucrats to propose many recovery proposals which laid a 

foundation for the national government’s approach to recovery. The 

Japanese government also leveraged human capital expertise through this 

committee to facilitate the implementation of recovery strategies. Upon 

the approval of certain recovery policies, working staff associated with the 

committee returned to their respective organizations to guide their home 

departments on how best to implement the strategies. A Japanese official 

involved in the committee said that this collaboration helped to ensure 

that disparate ministries understood and properly implemented the 

recovery strategies they helped to develop. 

After the 1994 Northridge earthquake, the city of Los Angeles, California, 

also leveraged human capital resources to accelerate the rebuilding of its 

freeway system. Using the technical expertise of staff from the Federal 

Highway Administration (FHWA) and the California Department of 

Transportation (CalTrans), the city of Los Angeles developed an expedited 

contracting process. To review construction proposals more efficiently, 

FHWA and CalTrans staff collaborated to review documents, discuss 

needed changes, and then approve projects together in one location. 

According to CalTrans officials, state and federal offices normally conduct 

separate reviews. This joint process helped to expedite the approval of 

projects while still meeting oversight requirements for both levels of 

government. Under standard contracting procedures, the contracting 

process could take 26 to 40 weeks to complete. However, this 

collaborative, co-located process enabled state highway officials to 

advertise and award construction contracts in just 3 to 5 days. By 

leveraging the knowledge and resources of state and federal staff in this 

way, Los Angeles successfully restored its highways within a few months 

after the Northridge earthquake. 

Page 9 GAO-09-811 Collaboration Insights from Past Disasters
 

In addition to leveraging human capital expertise, Los Angeles also found 

ways to take advantage of resources from different federal programs to 

facilitate housing recovery for certain disaster victims. The city faced 

challenges in helping owners of housing units that had suffered extensive 

damage in the earthquake. When Los Angeles learned that some of these 

dwellings were not eligible for SBA disaster assistance because they had 

negative cash flows, the city identified resources available from a HUD 

program to help these property owners. Using these funds, the city 

allocated $322 million to an Earthquake Supplemental Disaster Relief fund 

which assisted property owners who were declined by SBA. To obtain 

information on owners who might benefit from this program, the city 

entered into a cooperative agreement with SBA to obtain direct referrals 

of individuals who were denied loans so that the city could inform them of 

this additional source of assistance. A city evaluation of this program 

found that Los Angeles received over 5,000 referrals, which represented 

more than 22,000 housing units. 

Use Recovery Plans to 

Identify Roles and 

Responsibilities 

Collaborating organizations can work together to define and agree on their 

respective roles and responsibilities. In doing so, they can collectively 

agree on who will do what, organize joint and individual efforts, and 

facilitate decision making.16 One way to delineate roles and responsibilities 

for disasters is through planning. For the emergency response phase, the 

National Response Framework sets out the roles and responsibilities of 

key partners at the local, tribal, state, and federal levels. Responsibilities 

for recovery stakeholders are detailed in ESF #14, the Long-Term 

Recovery Annex. The annex mostly addresses the responsibilities of 

federal agencies involved in recovery. 

Because state and local governments play a lead role in disaster recovery, 

it is also important for their roles and responsibilities to be clearly 

delineated. After past disasters, this information has been delineated 

through long-term community recovery plans. Communities can develop 

such plans either before or after a disaster occurs. Post-disaster recovery 

plans typically include detailed projects and approaches to rebuild a 

community based on the damage and impacts of the specific disasters. 

Some communities have supplemented post-disaster plans by conducting 

planning efforts prior to a disaster. 

 

16GAO-06-15. 

Page 10 GAO-09-811 Collaboration Insights from Past Disasters
 

Pre-disaster planning does not involve actually developing rebuilding 

programs in advance of a disaster because the patterns of damage from 

natural disasters are impossible to predict with sufficient accuracy to 

support detailed pre-planning. However, these plans can be helpful in 

other ways that foster collaboration, specifically in defining the roles and 

responsibilities of recovery stakeholders prior to a disaster. We have 

previously reported how effective recovery plans identify specific roles 

and responsibilities among various stakeholders.17 While these plans are 

often developed after a disaster takes place, we have identified some 

instances where this information was clarified beforehand. 

Los Angeles’s Recovery and Reconstruction Plan clearly identified the 

roles and responsibilities of key officials involved in recovery. In the 

aftermath of the Northridge earthquake in southern California, the city 

revised the plan for the purposes of recovery from that event. Specifically, 

the plan identified which city departments have responsibility for 

implementing pre-determined activities before and after a disaster in 

several functional categories, including residential, commercial, industrial 

rehabilitation, and economic recovery. An evaluation of the plan funded by 

the National Science Foundation found that the assignment of general 

responsibilities to the departments was useful because it helped the 

various components of city government to understand their post-disaster 

roles and responsibilities. Further, the process of developing the plan also 

improved collaboration among stakeholders. Specifically, representatives 

from many departments—including public safety, planning, public works, 

building, and community redevelopment—met several times to develop 

and revise the plan. 

A good plan is not simply a paper-driven exercise, but rather the result of a 

dynamic and inclusive process wherein key stakeholders are consulted 

and involved in the identification of priorities and the formation of 

strategies. Collaboration among recovery stakeholders was further 

enhanced through long-term recovery planning exercises held by the city 

of Los Angeles. In these exercises, police and fire officials engaged in role 

playing exercises in which they assumed the responsibilities of recovery 

officials. For example, a public safety officer played the role of a building 

inspector responsible for issuing building permits after an earthquake. A 

city official at the time of the earthquake told us that the process of 

developing the plan and conducting exercises was an important part of 

 

17GAO-08-1120. 

Page 11 GAO-09-811 Collaboration Insights from Past Disasters
 

developing relationships among stakeholders which facilitated 

collaboration among city officials after the Northridge earthquake. 

According to a federally-funded evaluation of this plan, the contacts 

established during the planning process facilitated the recovery after the 

Northridge earthquake. Another city official stated a positive outcome of 

the planning effort was that participants knew of others who worked on 

similar issues with whom they can initiate conversations. In addition, the 

process of preparing and testing the plan educated city staff on their postdisaster roles and responsibilities. 

More recently, two other communities have taken action to develop 

recovery plans prior to a disaster that identify roles and responsibilities for 

recovery. In the San Francisco Bay Area, state and local governments used 

pre-disaster planning to reinforce a regional approach to recovery as well 

as to assign regional roles and responsibilities for recovery. Learning from 

past experiences with natural disasters in California including the Loma 

Prieta earthquake, the Bay Area recognized the value of planning for 

recovery in anticipation of future disasters. Toward that end, Bay Area 

officials initiated a regional disaster response planning effort in 2004 

culminating with the Regional Emergency Coordination Plan in March 

2008, which included a subsidiary plan focused specifically on recovery.18

Specifically for recovery, the San Francisco Bay Area Regional Emergency 

Coordination Plan summarizes in a table organizations involved at each 

level of government and the primary role of each.19 For example, the table 

specifies that local governments will resume government functions and 

request state and federal assistance, that state agencies will implement 

state-funded recovery programs, and that regional infrastructure owners 

will initiate planning for and implementation of permanent repairs. We 

have previously reported on the challenges that state and local 

jurisdictions sometimes face with understanding the extent to which the 

 

18Governor’s Office of Emergency Services, San Francisco Bay Area Regional Emergency 

Coordination Plan RECP Recovery Subsidiary Plan, (San Francisco, Calif: March 2008), 

http://www.oes.ca.gov/WebPage/oeswebsite.nsf/Content/F39818FB706ECED68825743D007

38C6A?OpenDocument, accessed on July 29, 2009. 

19According to an official involved in the development of the Regional Emergency 

Coordination Plan, Bay Area state and local governments used $2.5 million in funds from 

the Department of Homeland Security’s Urban Area Security Initiative Grant (typically used 

for preparedness and response activities) to develop its pre-disaster recovery plan. 

Page 12 GAO-09-811 Collaboration Insights from Past Disasters
 

federal government will pay for disaster-related costs.20 Pre-disaster 

recovery plans that clearly identify the roles and responsibilities of various 

stakeholders may prove useful in clarifying the specific types of costs 

federal programs are likely to cover as well as some of the requirements of 

these programs before a disaster strikes. 

Partly as a result of experiences following Hurricane Andrew, Florida’s 

Palm Beach County developed the Palm Beach Countywide Post-Disaster 

Redevelopment Plan for guiding decision making and action during the 

disaster period as well as detailing actions that can be taken before a 

disaster strikes to speed the recovery process.21 Palm Beach County 

delineates roles and responsibilities for recovery by creating working 

groups who will be responsible for implementing different sections of the 

plan, including infrastructure, economic development, and government 

operations. Each working group is assigned several issues to cover along 

with a chairperson to spearhead those activities for the county. 

Additionally, city departments and agencies are represented in each of 

these working groups. 

As an outgrowth of this plan, a Business and Industry program was 

created that formally integrated business interests into the recovery 

process. Additionally, the program also created a private-public 

partnership comprising local, state, regional, and national businesses as 

well as governmental and nongovernmental organizations. According to a 

Palm Beach County official, partners in this program are fully engaged in 

the development and implementation of recovery initiatives. These 

collaboration efforts have resulted in improved relationships among the 

governmental, nongovernmental, and business entities involved in the 

program. 

Post-disaster recovery plans can also provide a vehicle to designate roles 

and responsibilities for recovery, among other things. We have previously 

reported that well-crafted post-disaster recovery plans can clarify roles 

and responsibilities and help jurisdictions make progress with recovery.22

 

20GAO, Gulf Coast Rebuilding: Observations on Federal Financial Implications, 

GAO-07-1079T (Washington, D.C.: Aug. 2, 2007) and GAO-09-129. 

21Palm Beach County Division of Emergency Management, Countywide Post-Disaster 

Redevelopment Plan, Palm Beach County, Florida, (West Palm Beach, FL: August 2006), 

http://www.pbcgov.com/publicsafety/emergencymanagement/resources/pdf/pdrp_AUG_06.

pdf, accessed on July 29, 2009. 

22GAO-08-1120. 

Page 13 GAO-09-811 Collaboration Insights from Past Disasters
 

For example, the city of Grand Forks’s recovery plan developed in the 

wake of the 1997 Grand Forks/Red River flood clearly identified which 

personnel—drawn from city, state, and federal agencies—would be 

needed to carry out each task. Specifically, the plan called for 

collaboration of staff from the city’s urban development and 

engineering/building inspection departments, FEMA, and the U.S. Army 

Corps of Engineers to create an inventory of substantially damaged 

buildings in the downtown area. By clarifying the roles and responsibilities 

of those who would be involved in accomplishing specific tasks, the plan 

provided detailed information to facilitate its implementation. 

Monitor, Evaluate, and 

Report Progress Made 

toward Recovery 

Organizations engaged in collaborative efforts need to create the means to 

monitor and evaluate their efforts to enable them to identify areas for 

improvement. Reporting on these activities can help decision makers, 

clients, and stakeholders obtain feedback for improving both policy and 

operational effectiveness.23 We have previously reported that effective 

recovery plans identify clear goals that can provide governments with a 

basis for subsequent evaluations of the recovery progress.24 As a next step, 

we identify how local jurisdictions impacted by the Kobe earthquake 

established a process through which government officials, community 

members, and recovery experts worked together to assess the recovery 

progress and recommend improvements. 

Hyogo prefecture and the city of Kobe established a system of periodic 

recovery assessments in the wake of the 1995 Kobe earthquake in Japan. 

Both governments designed a two-phase approach to evaluating the 

progress they have made toward recovery, the first taking place about 

5 years after the earthquake and the second about 10 years afterward. This 

design allowed for both a short- and long-term assessment of the recovery. 

Although the Hyogo and Kobe governments funded these evaluations, 

neither prefecture nor city employees were directly involved in conducting 

these assessments; rather, they used external staff to perform the reviews. 

Hyogo prefecture invited domestic and international disaster recovery 

experts to serve on its evaluation panels, while the city of Kobe staffed its 

reviews with members of local community groups. 

 

23GAO-06-15. 

24GAO-08-1120. 

Page 14 GAO-09-811 Collaboration Insights from Past Disasters
 

These evaluations focused on the goals established in the recovery plans 

approved by the national government 6 months after the earthquake. They 

enabled policy makers to measure the progress made by various 

stakeholders in achieving recovery goals, and identify needed changes to 

existing policies, and learned lessons for future disasters. The panels 

examined six broad recovery topics—including health, industry, 

employment, and urban development—which resulted in many 

recommendations to improve recovery from the Kobe earthquake. 

For example, as a result of its 10-year evaluation Hyogo prefecture gained 

insight into the unintended consequences of how it relocated elderly 

earthquake victims, which subsequently led to a change in policy. After the 

earthquake, the prefecture gave priority to the relocation of elderly victims 

and grouped them together in special care residences located outside the 

city. While this policy ensured that this vulnerable population received 

housing quickly, it also had the unintended effect of isolating the relocated 

seniors, who were removed from their communities. In fact, the 

verification committee attributed this housing arrangement as leading to 

untimely deaths for some seniors. After learning of this finding, the 

prefecture built new types of residential housing that offer comprehensive 

lifestyle support for seniors. In addition, for future disasters the prefecture 

plans to develop a system to track displaced populations as they move 

from temporary to permanent housing to help maintain better contact with 

victims. 

Recovery experiences from past catastrophes—including good 

collaboration practices—can offer lessons for such events in the future. 

FEMA has taken some actions to encourage recovery stakeholders to 

collaborate by sharing lessons and experiences related to recovery. 

However, in contrast to other phases of a disaster for which FEMA has a 

specific mechanism dedicated to sharing such information, this is not the 

case with the recovery phase. 

FEMA has taken steps to support collaboration through planning 

and sharing recovery lessons. FEMA has assisted state and local 

governments in developing post-disaster recovery plans in various ways, 

which in turn can help facilitate collaboration among stakeholders. 

First, FEMA, along with other federal agencies such as HUD and EDA, 

provided technical assistance for post-disaster recovery plans for several 

of the disasters we reviewed. Second, FEMA developed guidance for 

conducting the long-term recovery planning process. More specifically, the 

agency created a Long-Term Community Recovery Self Help Guide that 

FEMA Has Taken 

Steps to Facilitate 

Collaboration among 

Stakeholders, but 

Could Do More to 

Share Recovery 

Experiences 

Page 15 GAO-09-811 Collaboration Insights from Past Disasters
 

offers communities step-by-step guidance for implementing a recovery 

program and planning process. Third, FEMA created the Long-Term 

Recovery Assessment Tool to help communities analyze the impacts of a 

disaster while taking into consideration the local government’s capacity to 

assist in promoting its own long-term recovery. The assessment tool helps 

federal and other decision makers identity the type and level of 

supplemental long-term community recovery assistance that may be 

needed for full recovery from a disaster. The tool also includes processes 

and procedures for assessing long-term recovery needs, community 

evaluation protocols, standard planning templates, staffing strategies, and 

timetables for various levels of effort. 

FEMA has also taken actions to encourage collaboration among state and 

local officials to share experiences and expertise related to disaster 

recovery. For example, FEMA’s Long-Term Community Recovery Branch, 

working through ESF #14, hosted a teleconference linking officials in 

Florida, Mississippi, Colorado, and Iowa with experience recovering from 

previous disasters to provide information to officials in Texas recovering 

from Hurricane Ike. In this way, officials with direct experience in the 

recovery process were able to share good practices related to recovery 

planning, disaster funds administration, and coordinating regional efforts 

with the participants from Texas. According to FEMA officials, this 

collaboration helped the Texas officials identify recovery projects and 

develop a community recovery plan. In addition, FEMA is considering 

ways to further facilitate the sharing of lessons learned for disaster 

recovery, including creating a peer-to-peer mentoring program where 

experienced local officials can provide technical assistance, advice, and 

support to communities impacted by the 2005 Gulf Coast hurricanes. 

However, these officials told us that this idea is still at an early stage and 

additional specifics are not yet available. 

FEMA’s information sharing Web sites do not include a focus on 

recovery. FEMA has systematic approaches for sharing lessons regarding 

three of the four phases of a disaster—preparedness, response, and 

mitigation; however, as of June 2009, the agency does not have an 

information sharing system focused on recovery. Officials involved in the 

preparedness and response phases of a disaster can share lessons through 

FEMA’s Lessons Learned Information Sharing (LLIS) Web site. LLIS is a 

national online network of lessons learned and best practices for the 

emergency preparedness, response, and homeland security communities. 

Online since April 2004, LLIS provides users access to over 12,000 

documents including state and local plans, after-action reports, best 

practices, and lessons learned that are culled from real-world experiences 

Page 16 GAO-09-811 Collaboration Insights from Past Disasters
 

and exercises. Because the Web site includes some sensitive information, 

its registration process is limited to domestic users with “a need to 

know.”25 Information on LLIS is organized through a number of “featured 

topics,” such as critical infrastructure, exercise planning and program 

management, and wild-land fires. Materials are also organized by 

numerous “disciplines” that have an emergency management focus such as 

emergency communications, mass care and human services, mortuary 

services, as well as search and rescue. 

While LLIS does contain materials relating to recovery, the issue is neither 

a featured topic nor a discipline, making it challenging to access recoveryrelated information in an easy or intuitive way. Additionally, the message 

boards that allow LLIS users to discuss a variety of homeland security 

topics are rarely used to exchange information about recovery. For 

example, while almost 600 messages have been exchanged on forums 

discussing preparedness and response issues as of June 2009, only two 

messages have been posted to the message board focused on disaster 

recovery (and they were both from the same individual). A FEMA official 

with responsibility for LLIS told us that there is an increasing recognition 

that recovery is an underserved area of disaster management, and the 

agency can see benefits of potentially including more information about 

recovery in LLIS. 

To share lessons related to the mitigation phase, FEMA has created a 

searchable online portfolio of case studies and best practices submitted by 

individuals and communities describing the measures they have taken to 

reduce the loss of life or property from future disasters. Communities that 

have taken creative steps in implementing good mitigation practices can 

submit those stories to FEMA where officials will review and possibly 

include them in the online best practices portfolio. 

Unlike the information sharing mechanisms it has in place for the 

preparedness, response, and mitigation phases of a disaster, FEMA does 

not have a similar approach for sharing lessons focused on recovery. 

Recovery lessons from specific disasters are sometimes available through 

 

25For example, according to the Lessons Learned Information Sharing (LLIS) system 

project manager, applications from individuals with a “.gov” or “.us” Email address are 

approved immediately. However, applications from other types of Email addresses need to 

be affiliated with a recognized domestic organization and demonstrate a “need to know” in 

order to obtain access to LLIS. According to a FEMA official, the agency is working to 

provide limited LLIS access to international members. 

Page 17 GAO-09-811 Collaboration Insights from Past Disasters
 

the FEMA Web site under the listings for specific disasters, although the 

amount and nature of recovery information available this way varies 

greatly. In addition, the Long-Term Community Recovery and ESF #14 

Web site contains considerable information on recovery, but this site is 

mostly dedicated to providing technical guidance for planning and does 

not permit recovery officials to share lessons or learn about recovery best 

practices. FEMA officials told us that that they plan to develop a document 

compiling community-based best practices for disaster recovery, but they 

do not know when it will be available. 

Perhaps more useful than the sharing of reports and other written 

accounts of recovery lessons and experiences is the ability to directly 

network with other recovery officials who can answer questions and relate 

insights first-hand. In the course of our work, we learned of instances 

where this type of personal connection was particularly valuable. For 

example, a Watsonville, California, official told us of his efforts 

immediately after the Loma Prieta earthquake to contact a local official in 

southern California because he had read that the official had experienced 

an earthquake a few years earlier and he wanted to solicit his guidance. 

The official from southern California agreed to help and traveled to 

Watsonville the next day to share his experiences and provide insights on 

potential recovery strategies. In another example, when Hurricane Katrina 

hit the Gulf Coast in 2005, officials from Grand Forks, North Dakota, 

offered to help city leaders in Biloxi, Mississippi, based on their 

experiences with the 1997 Grand Forks/Red River flood. 

Through one-on-one exchanges like these, state and local officials 

involved in recovery can obtain tailored advice from individuals who have 

addressed similar challenges themselves. For emergency managers 

involved in the disaster preparedness and response phases, FEMA’s LLIS 

Web site has a network-building feature that can be used to foster this type 

of exchange. LLIS provides its users with access to a directory of other 

registered users that can be searched for a number of variables including 

name, affiliation, and emergency management function (primarily 

disciplines such as mass care and human services or public health). The 

online directory mostly consists of officials and researchers involved in 

various aspects of emergency management.26 Such a directory, or one 

similar to it, might be very useful to recovery officials seeking to network 

 

26As of July 2009, LLIS had over 51,000 active registered members. 

Page 18 GAO-09-811 Collaboration Insights from Past Disasters
 

with, and learn from, others with experiences or expertise in disaster 

recovery. 

Collaboration is essential for an effective partnership between the wide 

range of participants involved in the disaster recovery process. While 

effective collaboration has helped to facilitate recovery in past disasters, 

experiences from the 2005 Gulf Coast hurricanes reveal that more can be 

done in this area. Specifically, we have identified a number of practices 

used during past disasters that can offer insights for effective 

collaboration: developing and communicating common goals to guide 

recovery; leveraging resources to facilitate recovery; using recovery plans 

to agree on roles and responsibilities; and monitoring, evaluating, and 

reporting on progress made toward recovery. While there is no one right 

way for how jurisdictions should manage recovery nor is there a recipe of 

techniques that fits all situations, the examples we describe in this 

report—which were tailored to the specific needs and conditions of those 

particular disasters—may provide insights into improving collaboration 

among the many stakeholders involved in the ongoing recovery efforts in 

the Gulf Coast as well as for future catastrophic events. 

Recovery stakeholders have a responsibility for fostering collaboration 

during disaster recovery. State and local governments have taken the lead 

in defining roles and responsibilities within pre- and post-disaster recovery 

plans, a step that has helped to facilitate the recovery process. The federal 

government has also played an important role in fostering collaboration 

for recovery. For example, FEMA has supported post-disaster planning 

efforts and hosted videoconferences between experienced officials and 

those currently in the recovery process. However, the agency can take 

additional steps to share information focused on recovery so that it is 

captured and preserved for the future. In the absence of a mechanism for 

compiling and disseminating recovery information, valuable expertise 

from officials who have first-hand recovery knowledge may be lost. 

To improve the ability of the federal government to capture and 

disseminate recovery information, we recommend that the Secretary of 

Homeland Security direct the Administrator of FEMA to establish a 

mechanism for sharing information and best practices focused on disaster 

recovery, including practices that promote effective collaboration such as 

those discussed in this report. Options for doing this could include 

(1) creating an approach, similar to the LLIS Web site or the mitigation 

best practices portfolio, through which disaster recovery lessons can be 

Conclusions 

Recommendation for 

Executive Action 

Page 19 GAO-09-811 Collaboration Insights from Past Disasters
 

compiled and shared, and personal networks among interested recovery 

officials encouraged; and/or (2) modifying the LLIS Web site to add a focus 

on recovery by taking steps such as including more recovery documents, 

creating a recovery topic area within LLIS, and creating an online 

directory for recovery officials to encourage networking and facilitate 

further sharing of recovery experiences. 

On June 19, 2009, we provided a draft of this report to the Secretary of 

Homeland Security for comment. We received written comments on July 

22, 2009. In its written comments, which are reprinted in appendix VII, 

DHS concurred with our recommendation. In addition, the department 

provided technical clarifications that we incorporated where appropriate. 

We also provided drafts of relevant sections to public officials, 

nongovernmental stakeholders, and recovery experts involved in or 

knowledgeable of the specific examples cited in this report and 

incorporated their comments as appropriate. 

Agency Comments 

As agreed with your offices, unless you publicly announce the contents of 

this report earlier, we plan no further distribution until 30 days from the 

date of this letter. We will then send copies of this report to the Secretaries 

of Homeland Security and Housing and Urban Development, the FEMA 

Administrator, the Assistant Secretary of Commerce for Economic 

Development, and the state and local officials we contacted for this 

review. In addition, the report will be available on our Web site at 

http://www.gao.gov. 

If you or your staff have any questions regarding this report, please 

contact me at (202) 512-6806 or by email at CzerwinskiS@gao.gov. Contact 

points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may 

be found on the last page of this report. GAO staff who made major 

contributions to this report are listed in appendix VIII. 

Stanley J. Czerwinski 

Director 

Strategic Issues 

Page 20 GAO-09-811 Collaboration Insights from Past Disasters
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology 

Page 21 GAO-09-811 

Appendix I: Scope and Methodology 

To identify recovery lessons from past experiences, we selected 5 

catastrophic disasters: the 1989 Loma Prieta earthquake, Hurricane 

Andrew in 1992, the 1994 Northridge earthquake, the 1995 Great HanshinAwaji (Kobe) earthquake, and the 1997 Grand Forks/Red River flood to 

 Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) 

“catastrophic” event as one where the related federal costs reach 

illion. Under this definition, all the disasters selected for 

this review qualify as catastrophic. We chose these disasters because they 

had devastating communitywide or regional impact and occurred in urban 

areas of developed nations. Additionally, these disasters occurred far 

enough in the past that we could observe the long-term recovery process, 

occurred recently enough so that key officials and supporting 

documentation are still available, and represent different types of natural 

disasters. 

We interviewed officials from national, state, and local governments and 

nongovernmental organizations, as well as academic experts, involved in 

or knowledgeable of the recovery following each of our selected disasters. 

We also obtained and reviewed legislation, ordinances, policies, and 

program documents that described steps that were taken to facilitate longterm recovery following each of these disasters as well as the disaster 

recovery literature. In some instances, our review was limited by the 

availability of historic documents and the accessibility of key officials 

engaged in recovery from past disasters. To better understand the federal 

government’s role in recovery from these disasters, we interviewed 

officials at the Department of Homeland Security, FEMA, the Economic 

Development Administration in the Department of Commerce, and the 

Department of Housing and Urban Development. 

review (see fig. 1). The

defines a 

or exceed $500 m

 Collaboration Insights from Past Disasters 
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology 

Figure 1: Five Disasters Included in this Review (1989–1997) 

Source: GAO; Art Explosion (map).

NY

WV

UT

KY

SD

WY

OR

WI

CA

IL

MT ND

AR

AL

NV

VA

NE

MS

LA

IA

MI

OH

PA

GA

FL

OK

MN

NC

SC

ME

NH

MI VT

TN

CO

WA

ID

IN

AZ

TX

MO

NM

KS

Northridge Earthquake, 1994 

(Southern California)

Loma Prieta Earthquake, 1989

(Northern California)

Grand Forks Red River Flood, 1997

(Grand Forks, ND and East Grand Forks, MN)

Hurricane Andrew, 1992

(South Florida)

Japan

MD

MA

CT

RI

DC

NJ

DE

Kobe Earthquake,1995

(Southeastern Japan)

Page 22 GAO-09-811 Collaboration Insights from Past Disasters
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology 

We visited the ke

our study to meet official

y communities impacted by four of the five disasters in 

s involved in the recovery effort and examine 

current conditions. Although we did not visit communities affected by the 

1997 Grand Forks/Red River flood, we were able to gather the necessary 

information through telephone interviews with key officials involved in the 

recovery as well as recovery experts knowledgeable about the disaster. 

The scope of our work did not include independent evaluation or 

verification regarding the extent to which the communities’ recovery 

efforts were successful and the practices we discuss in this report only 

represent a selection of the many recovery actions taken after these 

disasters. 

To identify examples of good collaboration among recovery stakeholders, 

we applied eight key practices we have reported on in prior work that 

enhance and sustain collaboration: (1) define and articulate a common 

outcome; (2) establish mutually reinforcing or joint strategies; (3) identify 

and address needs by leveraging resources; (4) agree on roles and 

responsibilities; (5) establish compatible policies, procedures, and other 

means to operate across agency boundaries; (6) develop mechanisms to 

monitor, evaluate, and report on results; (7) reinforce agency 

accountability for collaborative efforts through agency plans and reports; 

and (8) reinforce individual accountability for collaborative efforts 

through performance management systems.1

 We used this framework to 

assess the ways in which recovery stakeholders collaborated in the five 

disasters included in our review. While we found examples related to four 

of these good collaborative practices, others that enhance coordination 

may also exist.2

To understand how FEMA supports collaboration among recovery 

stakeholders and the extent to which it facilitates the sharing of lessons 

and experiences from past recovery efforts, we interviewed officials from 

FEMA’s Long-Term Community Recovery Branch and staff responsible for 

managing the agency’s Lessons Learned Information Sharing (LLIS) Web 

site. We also obtained access to LLIS and FEMA’s online mitigation best 

 

1

GAO, Results Oriented Government: Practices That Can Help Enhance and Sustain 

Collaboration among Federal Agencies, GAO-06-15 (Washington, D.C.: October 2005). 

has previously reported on regional coordination in the context of emergency 

preparedness, see GAO, Homeland Security: Effective Regional Coordination Can 

Enhance Emergency Preparedness, GAO-04-1009 (Washington, D.C.: September 2004). 

2

GAO 

Page 23 GAO-09-811 Collaboration Insights from Past Disasters
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology 

practices portfolio, after which we reviewed the content and operations o

those systems. 

We conducted this performance audit from June 2007 through July 2009 in

accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those 

standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient

appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our finding

conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence 

obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions 

based on our audit objectives. 

f 

, 

s and 

Page 24 GAO-09-811 Collaboration Insights from Past Disasters
Appendix II: Loma Prieta Earthquake 

The Loma Prieta earthquake, which occurred in the Santa Cruz mountains 

in 1989, severely

Page 25 GAO-09-811 Collaboration Insights from Past Disasters 

 impacted four cities in northern California. San Francisco 

experienced damage to several areas, including its Embarcadero freeway, 

Impact of the Loma Prieta Earthquake 

Appendix II: Loma Prieta Earthquake 

Disaster Impacts 

Marina district, and City Hall. In Oakland, the earthquake caused the 

collapse of the Cypress Expressway as well as damage to other 

infrastructure and low income housing. The cities of Santa Cruz and 

Watsonville, both located near the earthquake epicenter, suffered 

devastating destruction to their downtown districts (see fig. 2). 

Figure 2: Selected Facts about the 

a

According to the U.S. Geological Survey, an earthquake registering magnitude 6.3 on the Richter 

scale is considered to be “strong.” 

Sources: GAO presentation of information from the National Academy of Sciences, U.S. Geological Survey, Earthquake Engineering 

Research Institute, and GAO/RCED-96-136.

Date: October 17, 1989 

Location: Northern California

Disaster type: Magnitude 7.1 

earthquake on the Richter scalea

Casualties: 63

Injuries: 3,757

Displacement: 12,000 people

Estimated overall cost: $10 billion 

property damage ($15 billion in 

2009 dollars)

Residential impact: 24,000 

properties damaged

Economic impact: 2,600 

businesses damaged

0 10 20 mi

California

Los Angeles

San Francisco

Pacific Ocean

San Andreas fault

Monterey

Salinas

Santa

Cruz

Mountains

San Jose

Berkeley

Oakland

Watsonville

Epicenter of

earthquake

Santa Cruz

280

1

San Francisco
Appendix II: Loma Prieta Earthquake 

Collaboration Insights from Past Disasters

The federal government provided significant funding to the affected areas 

to facilitate its recovery from the 1989 Loma Prieta earthquake. Some 

examples of federal assistance for recovery are shown in figure 3. 

Figure 3: Examples of Federal Assistance for Recovery from the Loma Prieta 

Earthquake 

The areas most impacted by the earthquake were Oakland, San Francisco, 

and other cities in Santa Cruz county, including Santa Cruz,1

 and 

Watsonville.2

 Key aspects of disaster recovery include planning, housing, 

economic development, and infrastructure. The following presents an 

overview of selected recovery efforts after the Loma Prieta earthquake in 

each of these areas. However, it does not provide a comprehensive 

account of recovery actions taken. 

appointed a citizen group to develop an overall plan to rebuild the 

devastated downtown area. Santa Cruz faced the challenge of reaching 

consensus for decisions regarding recovery. The city facilitated decision 

making during the recovery from the Loma Prieta earthquake as a result of 

growing tension between citizens and local officials. To do so, the city 

 

Two months following the earthquake, the Santa Cruz City Council 

 ndustries in the city of Santa Cruz, located about 74 miles south of San 

rancisco, include agriculture, tourism, manufacturing, food processing, and high-tech 

rms. The population in 1990 was approximately 49,000. 

bout 20 miles from Santa Cruz and close to the epicenter of the 

Loma Prieta earthquake. Agriculture and food processing are the main industries in 

Watsonville. The population in 1990 was approximately 31,000. 

ry 

1

The major i

F

fi

2

Watsonville is located a

Long-term Recove

Snapshot 

Sources: Presentation of GAO analysis of Appropriation Acts, GAO/RCED-92-141, and data from the Economic Development 

Administration.

$3.2 billion for 1989 domestic disasters

($5 billion in 2009 dollars) 

Public Laws 101-130 (Oct. 26, 1989) and 103-211 

(Feb. 12, 1994)

• Federal Emergency Management Agency Public 

 Assistance grants: $514 million for permanent

 work projects ($816 million in 2009 dollars)

• Department of Housing Community Development

 Block Grants: none

• Commerce Economic Development Administra-

 tion grants: $7 million for 8 projects ($11 million

 in 2009 dollars)

Congressional supplemental appropriation Assistance from selected federal agencies

Planning 

Page 26 GAO-09-811 
Appendix II: Loma Prieta Earthquake 

devised a formal structure that incorporated time frames that helped 

different community groups reach consensus on a unified recovery pla

created Vision Santa Cruz, a 36-member citizen advisory body that 

n. It 

included wide representation from the neighborhood and community 

itate 

official, time limits were instituted so that if Vision Santa Cruz did not 

agree on a plan by a certain date, city officials would finalize the plan 

without the group’s consensus. Further, once a consensus was reached on 

an issue, it could not be opened for discussion again. Although faced with 

the challenge of uniting political groups with differing views in the 

community, Vision Santa Cruz succeeded in bringing the community 

together by forging a compromise among different stakeholders for 

recovery. Vision Santa Cruz completed the Downtown Recovery Plan in 

September 1991, which provided the policies, standards, and guidelines to 

direct the downtown rebuilding. 

The Downtown Recovery Plan provided guidance for building form, 

haracter, and height; housing; accessibility; open space and streetscape; 

il 

estrians and low speed traffic (as 

opposed to being pedestrian-only), preserved on-street parking, and 

idened sidewalks. This plan is still in use today to guide development 

ing, 

urban design, development goals, and marketing strategies. Watsonville 

groups, business, finance, labor, and nonprofit organizations. To facil

decision making among these groups, according to a former Santa Cruz 

c

circulation; and parking. According to a former Santa Cruz official, the 

Downtown Recovery Plan took into account the needs of the reta

community by redesigning the business center. For example, the plan 

proposed new design guidelines that made buildings more suitable for 

retail purposes, such as requiring large ground floor windows to ensure 

that stores received more lighting. Specifically, the main street was 

designed to accommodate both ped

w

projects in downtown Santa Cruz. 

Watsonville relied on planning assistance offered by the Urban Land 

Institute to create a redevelopment plan. The city followed the plan it 

developed to rebuild and revitalize its downtown with a specific focus on 

implementation and an ancillary focus on development potential, plann

Page 27 GAO-09-811 Collaboration Insights from Past Disasters
Appendix II: Loma Prieta Earthquake 

took the opportunity to make improvements to address changing 

demographics of many blocks that became empty as a result of the 

earthquake. However, not all aspects of the plan were successfully 

implemented. For example, one of the plan’s goals was to support and

open a department store. However, because the store’s upscale retail 

marketing did not fit with the changing demographics, sales dropped, an

the store closed within one year. 

The Urban Land Institute also offered planning assistance to the city of 

Santa Cruz; however, the final plan focused heavily on housing, which was 

not the direction in which the city was interested. Therefore, the cit

Santa Cruz did not implement the plan. According to a former Santa C

official, a key finding of the Urban Land Institute was the need to est

a decision-making process to overcome the differing political and busines

interests in the community. Toward that end, the city established Vision 

Santa Cruz which helped to facilit

 red 

y of 

ruz 

ablish 

s 

ate the planning process for the city’s 

downtown recovery. 

oma 

ncy 

ce 

n 

ned 

ers. Watsonville 

received approximately $15 million through Measure E which helped to 

f 

almost 50 percent of the damaged housing units in Watsonville were 

repaired or replaced. 

The Loma Prieta earthquake resulted in the loss of many single-room 

occupancy units in the cities of Oakland and Santa Cruz. Oakland 

experienced destruction or severe damage of 1,300 single-room occupancy 

units, which provided housing to many minority and elderly residents. 

Oakland financed the replacement of single-room occupancy units through 

Approximately 850 housing units in Watsonville (almost 10 percent of th

city’s housing stock) were severely damaged or destroyed after the L

Prieta earthquake. According to a report funded by the Federal Emerge

Management Agency, Watsonville planners drafted a rebuilding ordinan

within the first four days after the earthquake that suspended the limits o

rebuilding nonconforming construction. The ordinance also streamli

the permitting process. Santa Cruz County, which includes the city of 

Watsonville, passed a temporary one-half-cent sales tax increase for 

6 years, called Measure E. The proceeds were targeted to damaged areas

within the county based on an allocation approved by vot

Housing e 

repair the damaged housing. Further, Watsonville also used portions o

existing Department of Housing and Urban Development’s Community

Development Block Grant funds that it received prior to the earthquake 

(and not part of a supplemental or special disaster appropriation) to repair 

and replace damaged housing units. Within 1 year of the earthquake, 

Page 28 GAO-09-811 Collaboration Insights from Past Disasters
Appendix II: Loma Prieta Earthquake 

California’s Disaster Assistance Program. In Santa Cruz, single-roo

occupancy units were built in several new buildings. According to a 

subsequent evaluation of the earthquake, these buildings represente

overall improvement in the housing stock. 

The cities of Watsonville and Sant

m 

d an 

a Cruz adopted strategies for economic 

development after the Loma Prieta earthquake. Watsonville, which 

ral 

e 

t approximately 20 percent of its sales tax due to 

earthquake damage, worked with community groups to construct seven 

rge aluminum and fabric pavilions where local businesses that suffered 

e 

 Oakland. To address community concerns, 

CalTrans and FHWA moved the expressway so that it runs along the edge 

is 

for 

Economic Development 

suffered about $60 million in damage (or equal to 350 percent of its gene

fund annual budget prior to the earthquake) had the highest per capita loss 

of any impacted city. To help restore its damaged downtown, Watsonvill

built a new parking garage with retail space on the first floor, improved 

the façades of rebuilt or refurbished buildings, helped to secure federal 

funding for restoration of a local department store, and constructed a 

performing arts center to replace a damaged high school auditorium. 

Santa Cruz, which los

la

physical damage temporarily relocated. Santa Cruz also constructed a 

parking garage with retail space on the first floor, and a nine-screen 

cinema complex that brings 750,000 people a year downtown, benefiting 

many other businesses because of the increased foot traffic. As a result of 

these strategies, a lively and youthful atmosphere in the downtown 

currently exists. 

The Loma Prieta earthquake damaged several major transportation 

structures in the San Francisco Bay Area, including the Embarcadero 

Freeway and the Cypress Expressway. The California Department of 

Transportation (CalTrans) worked with the Federal Highway 

Administration (FHWA) to finance the replacement of the Cypress 

Expressway with a cost sharing ratio of 90 percent of the funding from th

federal government and 10 percent from the state. However, construction 

did not begin until 1994 partly because of community opposition to 

rebuilding the expressway in its original location, which divided a 

neighborhood in West

Infrastructure 

of the residential area. The space previously taken by the expressway 

now occupied by new businesses, housing, and parks. See figure 4 

images of the Cypress Expressway before and after the replacement 

project. 

Page 29 GAO-09-811 Collaboration Insights from Past Disasters
Appendix II: Loma Prieta Earthquake 

Figure 4: The Cypress Expressway Suffered Extensive Damage from the 1989 Earthquake (top); Oakland Moved the 

Expressway to Reconnect a Neighborhood that Had Been Previously Divided (bottom) 

Sources: Photographs courtesy of the California Department of Transportation, District 4, Oakland, Calif. Photographer: Bob Colin (top 

right and top left). Photographer: William R. Hall (bottom).

Replacement freeway

Original location of Cypress Viaduct

Before

1989 1989

2008

After

Page 30 GAO-09-811 Collaboration Insights from Past Disasters
Appendix II: Loma Prieta Earthquake 

In San Francisco, the controversial decision to demolish the Emba

Freeway caused business owners to worry that that the lack of a freeway

rcadero 

would negatively impact travel to the waterfront. Today, the Embarcadero 

Freeway has been replaced with an above-ground park that connects the 

city to the waterfront. Other affected jurisdictions in Northern California 

also experienced significant infrastructure damage. For example, 

Watsonville’s sewer system was heavily damaged as a result of uneven 

ground settlement, which took more than 5 years to repair.

Page 31 GAO-09-811 Collaboration Insights from Past Disasters
Appendix III: Hurricane Andrew 

Page 32 GAO-09-811 Collaboration Insights from Past Disasters Collaboration Insights from Past Disasters 

Hurricane Andrew made landfall over southern Miami-Dade County in 

Florida as a category 5 hurricane, severely impacting several cities in 

southern Florida, including Homestead and Florida City (see fig. 5). As a 

result of the hurricane, the city of Homestead suffered a 31 percent declin

to its population, 60 percent of the aggregated residential property value, 

and 29 percent of its average commercial real estate value. Additio

the Department of Defense’s decision to scale down the presence of the

Homestead Air Force Base contributed to the loss of thousa

Appendix III: Hurricane Andrew 

Disaster Impacts 

e 

nally, 

nds of jobs. In 

Florida City, located near Homestead, Hurricane Andrew damaged every 

building, reducing residential property value by 78 percent, and the 

average commercial real estate value by 32 percent. 

Figure 5: Selected Facts about the Impact of Hurricane Andrew 

Date: August 24, 1992

Location: South Florida

Disaster type: Category 5 hurricane 

on the Saffir-Simpson scale (which 

ranges from a minimum of 1 to a

maximum of 5) 

Casualties: 15 direct and 29 indirect

in Florida

Displacement: More than 1 million 

ordered to evacuate; approximately 

160,000-180,000 homeless after the 

storm

Estimated overall cost: $25 billion in 

Florida ($36 billion in 2009 dollars)

Residential impact: Approximately 

25,000 properties destroyed; 37,000 

suffered major damage; 51,000 

suffered minor damage

Economic impact: More than 100,000 

jobs affected

Key Biscayne

Miami

Miami Beach

Sands Key

Key Largo

Homestead

Air Reserve Base

1

MIAMI-DADE COUNTY

Perrine

Cutler Ridge

Homestead

Florida City

Florida

Homestead

Florida City

Naranja

Miami

0 10 km

Sources: GAO presentation of information from the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, the Economic 

Development Administration, the International Hurricane Center, and GAO/RCED-93-186.

The federal government provided significant funding to the affected area 

to facilitate its recovery from Hurricane Andrew in 1992. Some examples 

of federal assistance for recovery are shown in figure 6. 

Long-term Recovery 

Snapshot 
Appendix III: Hurricane Andrew 

Figure 6: Examples of Federal Assistance for Recovery from Hurricane Andrew 

Sources: Presentation of GAO analysis of Appropriation Acts as well as data from the Federal Emergency Management Agency and the 

Department of Commerce Office of Inspector General.

$6.2 billion for natural disasters including Hurricane 

Andrew ($9 billion in 2009 dollars) 

Public Laws 102-368 (Sept. 23, 1992) and 103-50 

(July 2, 1993)

• Federal Emergency Management Agency Public

 Assistance grants: $822 ($1.2 billion in 2009

 dollars) with $245 million for permanent work

 projects ($355 billion in 2009 dollars)

• Department of Housing Community Development

 Block Grants: $85 million ($123 million in 2009

 dollars); also includes funds for Hurricane Iniki

and Typhoon Omar

• Commerce Economic Development Administra-

 tion grants: $50.9 million for 28 projects

 ($73 million in 2009 dollars)

Congressional supplemental appropriation Assistance from selected federal agencies

Key aspects of disaster recovery include planning, housing, economic 

development, and infrastructure. The following presents an overview of 

selected recovery efforts after Hurricane Andrew in each of these areas. 

However, it does not provide a comprehensive account of recovery actions 

taken. 

To help plan for the recovery from Hurricane Andrew, community leaders 

created a nonprofit organization called We Will Rebuild. The organization 

was led by the publisher of the Miami-Herald as well as other political, 

business, and civic leaders in Miami-Dade County. A key role that We Will 

Rebuild played was to coordinate the distribution of nearly $28 million of 

private and public funds. We Will Rebuild worked to devise recovery 

strategies through 29 committees that focused on different issue areas, 

including agriculture, business and economic development, housing, social 

services, as well as families and children. Committee members developed 

plans to achieve goals within those areas and in some instances 

implemented those strategies directly. For example, to achieve the goal of 

preventing the complete closure of the Homestead Air Force Base, one 

ommittee successfully advocated for the base to be changed into a 

vil and military facility. 

l 

from the public and private sectors presented proposals for how to rebuild 

Planning 

c

combined ci

We Will Rebuild also funded planning meetings, coordinated through loca

universities, which brought together as many as 300 professionals over a 

3 week period to create solutions for rebuilding Miami-Dade County. 

Teams comprised of architects, engineers, planners, and as well as others 

Page 33 GAO-09-811 Collaboration Insights from Past Disasters
Appendix III: Hurricane Andrew 

communities and neighborhoods. Eventually these meetings produced 

16 projects focused on many issues such as site-specific neighborhood 

revitalization plans focused on urban planning, transportation, historic 

preservation, and natural resources for 28 communities in the county. 

Many of these plans served as the basis for the redevelopment of 

neighborhoods and future regional developments related to water 

management, transportation development, and the preservation of 

buildings and open space. 

Hurricane Andrew caused devastating housing damage in Miami-Dade 

County, resulting in the destruction of over 25,000 homes and major 

damage to over 37,000 homes. According to a city official, Florida City 

worked with the Department of Housing and Urban Development to create 

a program that provided second mortgages for homeowners to repair 

amaged housing. Today, the population of Florida City is approximately 

 of 

ion, left the city, leaving many abandoned properties that created 

challenges for the city to redevelop some areas. Some residential 

erests of 

e 

cts 

ed away after the hurricane to return 

to the county once more. 

Housing 

d

10,000, a significant increase from the 3,000 still remaining in the wake

the hurricane. 

Over 8,000 Homestead residents, or 31 percent of its pre-hurricane 

populat

communities that suffered significant damage from the hurricane were 

eventually rebuilt. For example, the Naranja Lakes development, a private 

condominium community of thousands of residents, was razed and is 

being rebuilt with a mix of condominium and single family homes. 

To rebuild the economy in the wake of Hurricane Andrew, a number o

economic development organizations in Miami-Dade County worked to 

revitalize affected communities. One of these groups, the Economic 

Development Council was founded by local business leaders in response 

to Hurricane Andrew to represent the economic development int

the unincorporated portions of Miami-Dade County. The group led efforts 

to beautify a major roadway and commercial center through the area. Th

Economic Development Council hoped that such improvement proje

would attract residents who had mov

Economic Development f 

The mission of the Vision Council, another organization that promoted 

economic redevelopment after Hurricane Andrew, was to attract new 

businesses to Miami-Dade County. The council serves Homestead, Florida 

City, and other parts of southern Miami-Dade County. The Vision Council 

Page 34 GAO-09-811 Collaboration Insights from Past Disasters
Appendix III: Hurricane Andrew 

experienced mixed success in its economic development efforts. For 

example, the Vision Council assisted Homestead’s efforts to market and

build a 270 acre commerce park, called Park of Commerce. The Vision 

Council also supported the creation of the Homestead-Miami Speedway

which sponsors professional car racing events year round. Howev

all of its projects have been successful. For example, we observed 

Park of Commerce which the Vision Council supported was mostly 

today. A Vision Council off

, 

er, not 

that the 

vacant 

icial explained that factors such as the 

perceived risk of another storm in the area, high insurance rates, and 

opulation decline has deterred some businesses from relocating to 

n. Because the city’s public funds were insufficient to 

rebuild the new government center complex, it used funding from the 

f 

o 

ithout 

those infrastructure enhancements, these projects could not have been 

eveloped. Florida City also sustained extensive damage to its water 

lt 

Infrastructure 

p

Miami-Dade County. 

Hurricane Andrew destroyed much of the public and transportation 

infrastructure in southern Florida. For example, Florida City lost every

public building to Hurricane Andrew, according to a city official. The city 

rebuilt the government center complex, which included the city hall, jail, 

and police statio

Economic Development Administration (EDA) in the Department o

Commerce and the state to complete the center. 

Homestead and Florida City suffered sustained damage to their water 

systems. In Homestead, EDA provided $7.7 million partly for the 

construction of water and sewer lines, which extended these services t

the Miami-Homestead Speedway and Park of Commerce facilities. W

d

delivery system. EDA provided almost $5 million for the repair, 

replacement, and expansion the city’s water system (see fig. 7). As a resu

of the water system’s expansion, the State Farmers Market was also 

restored, creating almost 400 jobs. 

Page 35 GAO-09-811 Collaboration Insights from Past Disasters
Appendix III: Hurricane Andrew 

Figure 7: Florida City’s Water Distribution System Was Heavily Damaged 

Sources: Lou Toman, Sun Sentinel (left); Carl Seibert, Sun Sentinel (right).

1992 2002

Miami-Dade County also used its recovery efforts from the hurricane to

improve its transportation infrastructure. A local leader explained tha

departure of some county residents following Hu

t the 

rricane Andrew resulted 

in the widespread dispersion of employees and employers. For example, 

the lack of transportation impacted the ability of the construction industry 

to find adequate labor, increasing both operating costs and stifling

competition. To provide access to employment for individuals who work 

in the county, the Federal Emergency Management Agency provided at 

least $38 million to increase transportation services to the county. 

Page 36 GAO-09-811 Collaboration Insights from Past Disasters
Appendix IV: Northridge Earthquake Appendix IV: Northridge Earthquake 

The epicenter of the 1994 No

Los Angeles county, causing 

rthridge earthquake was located in western 

significant physical and economic damage 

(see fig. 8). The earthquake devastated damaged southern California’s 

freeway system, including the collapse of 11 overpasses on some of the 

busiest freeways in Los Angeles. The earthquake also caused widespread 

residential damage throughout many neighborhoods in the San Fernando 

Valley and other pockets in central and south central Los Angeles. Until 

the domestic terrorist attacks in 2001, the Federal Emergency 

Management Agency spent more money on the response to, and recovery 

from, Northridge than any previous disaster. 

Figure 8: Selected Facts about the Impact of the Northridge Earthquake 

Disaster Impacts 

a

According to the U.S. Geological Survey, an earthquake registering magnitude 6.3 on the Richter 

scale is considered to be “strong.” 

Date: January 17, 1994 

Location: Southern California

Diaster type: Magnitude 6.8 

earthquake on the Richter scalea

Casualties: 57

Injuries: More than 9,000

Displacement: More than 20,000 

displaced from their homes

Estimated overall cost: $20 billion 

($28 billion in 2009 dollars)

Residential impact: Over 250,000 

housing units damaged

Economic impact: $327 million in lost 

state and local taxes ($453 million in 

2009 dollars) 

Sources: GAO presentation of information from the U.S. Geological Survey, the city of Los Angeles, and GAO/RCED-94-193.

Pacific Ocean

0 2 4 6 8 10 mi

California

Los Angeles

San Francisco

Northridge

Simi fault

Northridge fault

VENTURA

COUNTY

5

101

Canoga Park

Reseda

Santa Monica

San Fernando

Sherman Oaks

Woodland Hills

Beverly Hills

Hollywood

Pasadena

Thousand Northridge Oaks

Santa Monica Mountains

San Gabriel Mountains

San Susana Mountains

Downtown

Los Angeles

Epicenter of

earthquake

LOS ANGELES COUNTY

1

Page 37 GAO-09-811 Collaboration Insights from Past Disasters 
Appendix IV: Northridge Earthquake 

Collaboration Insights from Past Disasters

The federal government provided significant funding to the affected area 

to facilitate its recovery from the 1994 Northridge earthquake. Some 

examples of federal assistance for recovery are shown in figure 9. 

Figure 9: Examples of Federal Assistance for Recovery from the Northridge 

Earthquake 

Key aspects of disaster recovery include planning, housing, economic 

development, and infrastructure. The following presents an overview of 

selected recovery efforts after the Northridge earthquake in each of these 

areas. However, it does not provide a comprehensive account of recovery 

actions taken. 

developed a Recovery and Reconstruction Plan in preparation for a future 

disaster. In the aftermath of the Northridge earthquake, the city adapted 

this plan to guide its recovery efforts. According to an evaluation funded 

by the National Science Foundation, the plan contributed to fostering good 

working relations between city officials and other stakeholders. The 

process of developing the plan itself strengthened relationships between 

city departments and agencies which in turn helped to facilitate 

collaboration during the recovery process. City departments also 

ses unable to receive Small Business 

dministration loans, establishing an interdepartmental group to adapt the 

recovery plan for Northridge, streamlining permit processing, establishing 

utual aid agreements, and forming reconstruction task forces. 

ry 

In 1987, prior to the Northridge earthquake, the city of Los Angeles 

implemented several strategies outlined in the plan, such as developing 

loan programs for busines

A

m

Long-term Recove

Snapshot 

Sources: Presentation of GAO analysis of Appropriation Acts, GAO summary of documents from the city of Grand Forks, N.D., and data

from the Federal Emergency Management Agency and the Economic Development Administration.

$8.7 billion for the Northridge earthquake and other 

disasters ($12 billion in 2009 dollars) 

Public Laws 103-211 (Feb. 12, 1994), 103-317 

(Aug. 26, 1994), and 103-327 (Sept. 28, 1994)

• Federal Emergency Management Public Assistance

 grants: $4.4 billion ($8 billion in 2009 dollars), of that

amount, $3.9 billion was spent on permanent work

 projects

• Department of Housing Community Development

 Block Grants: $725 million ($1 billion in 2009

 dollars)

• Commerce Economic Development Administration

 grants: $85 million for 21 projects ($117 million in

 2009 dollars)

Congressional supplemental appropriation Assistance from selected federal agencies

Planning 

Page 38 GAO-09-811 
Appendix IV: Northridge Earthquake 

Collaboration Insights from Past Disasters

After the earthquake, the city of Los Angeles designated 17 areas that 

suffered extensive damage as “ghost towns,” to received priority atten

The vacating of 7,500 housing units in those areas resulted in criminal 

tion. 

trespassers such as drug dealers, prostitution rings, and squatters. In turn, 

nd 

department collaborated with the police, public works, and building 

departments to create a special work unit to focus on security and offer 

refinancing to help property owners in the ghost towns rebuild. A 

subsequent evaluation of the housing reconstruction after Northridge 

found that this program contributed to the successful rebuilding of those 

areas and helped to stabilize surrounding neighborhoods. 

The city of Los Angeles implemented different strategies to assist 

businesses that were impacted by the earthquake. According to city 

officials, the Los Angeles used the Department of Housing and Urban 

Development’s (HUD) Community Development Block Grant (CDBG) to 

create a $24 million commercial recovery loan program that included a 

race period for loan repayment so to provide businesses with a window 

nt 

nt at California State University at Northridge that resulted 

in the creation of 1,600 new jobs. Further, the city helped to fund an 

utreach and counseling program developed by a local nonprofit to 

ing for the 

er 

780,000 vehicles per day before the earthquake. This caused significant 

disruption to commuting patterns as well as the transportation of freight. 

Economic Development 

Housing 

those activities increased burglaries in surrounding neighborhoods a

resulted in local businesses losing their customer base. The city’s housing 

g

of time to get reestablished after the disaster. The city also used grants

from the Economic Development Administration (EDA) in the Departme

of Commerce to develop projects that created new jobs. For example, an 

EDA grant funded the construction of a biomedical facility for research 

and developme

o

provide direct technical assistance to affected businesses in the San

Fernando Valley. Specifically, the nonprofit provided guidance to 

businesses on obtaining federal and local governmental financial 

assistance, as well as strategies for adjusting to changes in the business 

environment. 

According to Los Angeles officials, the city prioritized the replace

restoration of its highway infrastructure to restore the region’s 

transportation networks. To maintain partial traffic flows immediately 

after the earthquake, the city established alternative detour rout

highways. The earthquake resulted in 480 damage locations to federal, 

state, and local roads throughout the Los Angeles area and forced the 

closure of four major highway corridors that, together, carried ov

Infrastructure ment and 

Page 39 GAO-09-811 
Appendix IV: Northridge Earthquake 

To expedite the completion of highway rebuilding projects, the Califor

Department of Transportation (CalTrans) included financial incentives in 

its contracts for each major restoration or repair contract. Under this 

approach, bonuses were available to each contractor who completed 

projects early. CalTrans calculated bonuses based on an analysis of the 

economic cost incurred to the region as a result of the disruption to traffic 

and associated delays. As a result of this approach, bonuses were awa

to 9 out of the 10 eligible contractors. According to a CalTrans official, 

these incentives allowed the city to restore these freeways within a

months after the earthquake (see fig. 10). 

Part of Southern California’s Interstate 5, Suffered Severe Damage

nia 

rded 

 few 

Figure 10: The Gavin Canyon Underpass, but Was 

Restored Within a Few Months 

n its regulations to facilitate infrastructure recovery. For 

example, the agency granted exemptions from certain regulations, such as 

llowing the California Department of Transportation to proceed without 

 

Sources: U.S. Department of Transportation (left), California Department of Transportation (right).

January 1994 June 1994

The Federal Highway Administration also granted other measures of 

flexibility withi

a

conducting environmental impact statements as required under the 

National Environmental Policy Act.1

 

1

GAO, Los Angeles Earthquake: Opinions of Officials on Federal Impediments to 

Rebuilding, GAO/RCED-94-193 (Washington, D.C.: June 17, 1994). 

Page 40 GAO-09-811 Collaboration Insights from Past Disasters
Appendix V: Kobe Earthquake 

On January 17, 1995, a magnitude 7.3 earthquake caused significant 

damage to the Japanese city of Kobe in Hyogo prefecture.1

 As a result of 

the earthquake, the affected areas sustained heavy damage and many 

casualties. For example, over 6,000 people were killed and 40,000 injured.

In addition to destroying over 400,000 homes and buildings, the 

earthquake caused extensive damage to roads, railroads, highways, and 

subway stations (see fig. 11). The port of Kobe, Japan’s leading container 

shipping port at the time, also experienced heavy damage to almost all 

container berths. 

Appendix V: Kobe Earthquake 

Disaster Impacts 

Figure 11: Selected Facts about the Impact of the Kobe Earthquake 

Sources: GAO presentation of information from the Japanese central government; Stephanie Chang, Ph.D.; David Edgington, Ph.D.; and 

Haruo Hayashi, Ph.D.

Date: January 17, 1995

Location: Japan

Disaster type: Magnitude 7.3

earthquake on the Richter scalea

Casualties: 6,433

Injuries: 40,071 

Displacement: 316,678 evacuees

Estimated overall cost: More than 

$150 billion in property loss ($204 

billion in 2009 dollars)

Residential impact: About 400,000 

damaged houses and buildings

Economic impact: As much as $50 

billion in direct economic disruption 

($68 billion in 2009 dollars). Kobe’s port 

was shut down for 2 years and suffered 

an estimated $10 billion in damages

($14 billion in 2009 dollars). As a result 

of the decrease in traffic volume during 

the port’s closure, its ranking dropped 

from 6th in the world to 24th by 1995.

Sapporo

JAPAN

Kobe City

Tokyo

Osaka

Kobe

Fault lines

HYOGO PREFECTURE

AWAJI

High damage areas

Epicenter of

earthquake

Wards

Port of Kobe

Port City

0 1 23 4 mi

a

According to the U.S. Geological Survey, an earthquake registering magnitude 6.3 on the Richter 

scale is considered to be “strong.” 

 ut the 1

In the Japanese governmental system, a prefecture is an administrative district abo

size of a county. 

Page 41 GAO-09-811 Collaboration Insights from Past Disasters 
Appendix V: Kobe Earthquake 

Collaboration Insights from Past Disasters

The Japanese government provided significant funding to facilitate 

recovery from the 1995 Kobe earthquake. Some examples of national 

government assistance for recovery are shown in figure 12. 

Figure 12: Examples of National Government Assistance for Recovery from the 

Kobe Earthquake 

Recovery after the Kobe earthquake was generally a top-down process of 

post-disaster planning and financing. The government prioritized the rapid 

rebuilding of infrastructure and economic stabilization and later focused 

on housing and social recovery. The physical reconstruction process took 

less than 3 years to complete. Specifically, the city of Kobe designated 24 

areas to prioritize for rebuilding, using national government funds to 

widen roads, add parks and open spaces, and construct other public 

facilities. For the first 3 to 4 years after the earthquake, the focus was 

mainly focused on physical reconstruction. In subsequent years, the 

government shifted it focus to community development, economic 

development, and the restoration of communities. Key aspects of disaster 

recovery include planning, housing, economic development, and 

infrastructure. The following presents an overview of selected recovery 

efforts after the Kobe earthquake in each of these areas. However, it does 

not provide a comprehensive account of recovery actions taken. 

implemented a 2-month moratorium where it did not approve any building 

cal governments could finalize planning before the 

omplementary recovery plans within 2 months of the earthquake—in 

arch 1995—which prioritized projects that replaced infrastructure as 

well as others that would help stabilize the economy and attract new 

businesses. 

ry 

Immediately following the earthquake, Japan’s national government 

permits so that the lo

rebuilding process began. Hyogo prefecture and the city of Kobe adopted

c

M

Long-term Recove

Snapshot 

Sources: GAO presentation of data from Laurie Johnson, Ph.D. and Professor Kenneth Topping.

• The central government allocated more than $58 billion ($79 billion in 2009 dollars) in first three years 

 following earthquake to reconstruct basic infrastructure, housing, and other physical facilities.

• The central government helped Kobe City and Hyogo Prefecture establish a special loan fund of

approximately $9 billion ($12 billion in 2009 dollars) repayable in 10 years, to support reconstruction 

activities not covered by other national programs.

• Special financial assistance legislation was created on March 1, 1995 to provide indirect individual 

assistance to small businesses, homeowners, and local public authorities.

Planning 

Page 42 GAO-09-811 
Appendix V: Kobe Earthquake 

After the earthquake, there was a relatively short amount of time to 

proposals for the national budget in order to be considered for the com

year. To ensure that they could take advantage of national go

submit 

ing 

vernment 

funding as soon as possible, the city of Kobe and Hyogo prefecture 

als 

y 

broad recovery goals to provide a basis for budget requests to meet the 

national budget deadline. After that initial planning phase, the 

governments then collaborated with residents to develop detailed plans 

for specific communities. 

The national government funded a 3-year emergency housing plan to build 

about 72,000 permanent new housing units throughout Kobe and Hyogo to 

replace an estimated 82,000 houses lost due to the earthquake. They 

lanned to provide around 8,200 through the private rental market and 

ult 

d 

cluding 

the port and small businesses. The port of Kobe, Japan’s leading container 

o 

 in 

e relocation of many container cargos to other ports during 

the port of Kobe’s closure contributed to its decline. Further, changing 

trends in the international trade industry introduced increased 

Housing 

Economic Development 

completed its recovery plans promptly. Facing this deadline, local offici

devised a two-phase strategy to develop a plan that could quickly identif

p

more than half through public housing agencies. This overall target level 

was achieved by March 1998 when more than 120,000 new housing units 

were constructed. The accumulated number of new housing units built by

2005 was estimated to be over 222,000. Almost all the replacement housing

was provided in multi-rise condominium structures, with approximately 56

percent of those available as public housing units. Both the public and

private sector used a variety of strategies, aimed at many levels of the

population, to ensure that replacement housing would be built. The res

was that more housing was built than had been lost. According to an 

expert on Japan’s recovery, the city of Kobe has recently experience

challenges in attracting new occupants—especially younger families—to 

move into these units. 

The Kobe earthquake had lasting impacts on several industries, in

shipping port, sustained heavy damage to almost all container berths. Port 

repairs took almost 1 year to complete, during which time the port 

disruption was estimated to be an amount equivalent to the income of 

40,000 workers. The city of Kobe completed its port restoration by March

1997 (see fig. 13). However, port activity stalled at around 80 percent of 

pre-earthquake levels. In October 1998, exports from the port of Kobe t

Asian countries declined by 24.3 percent from the previous year. The 

negative impact of damage to the local economy and regional exports,

addition to th

Page 43 GAO-09-811 Collaboration Insights from Past Disasters
Appendix V: Kobe Earthquake 

competition from other Asian ports. As a result of these factors, the port of 

Kobe has not fully recovered. For example, while the port ranked 6th in 

the world for volume in 1994, it dropped to the 24th position in 1995 and

the 33rd in 2006. 

Figure 13: Although the City of Kobe Restored the Port of Kobe by March 1997, the Port Never Fully Recovered 

Source: City of Kobe.

1995 1997

Local industries, such as chemical and steel manufacturers as well as 

small businesses, were also affected by the earthquake. Chemical and

manufacturers did not operate for several months after the event. Larg

companies, such as Kobe Steel and Mitsubishi Industries, were able to 

map out effective recov

 steel 

e 

ery strategies and were less affected by the 

earthquake. On the other hand, smaller industries, also severely damaged 

y the earthquake, were unable to recover as easily as the larger 

ith 

e 

ot have 

b

manufacturers. For example, smaller businesses such as shoe 

manufacturers, sake breweries, and roof-tile makers never fully recovered 

from the earthquake. 

The city of Kobe took several actions to stimulate the local economy w

mixed success. For example, Kobe established support systems for 

affected businesses such as special no-interest loans and subsidies for th

construction of temporary stores and factories. The city also created the 

“Luminaire,” a festival of illuminated lights which began in the winter 

following the earthquake to boost morale of local residents and to attract 

tourists. In 2003, the event drew 28.1 million visitors, which increased the 

number of tourists by 115 percent from pre-earthquake levels. However,

not all of its efforts were successful. For example, the city did n

Page 44 GAO-09-811 Collaboration Insights from Past Disasters
Appendix V: Kobe Earthquake 

enough funds to help all the small businesses that needed financial 

assistance. Some small businesses could not recover from the earthquake 

and closed. 

Recognizing the need to diversify Kobe’s economy from its traditional port 

d develop 

infrastructure projects to change the industrial base of the city. Soon after 

the disaster occurred, the city conducted a study to assess economic 

conditions in Kobe. This study showed that although some of the 

economic challenges the city faced were a result of the earthquake, a more 

fundamental problem was Kobe’s continued reliance on “old economy” 

industries, such as shipbuilding, steel, and shoe manufacturing. With this 

information, the city, in coordination with Hyogo prefecture, targeted new 

industries—such as medical, pharmaceutical, robotics, and information 

technology companies—to establish businesses in the region. 

To attract companies from these targeted industries, the city of Kobe and 

Hyogo prefecture offered loans, subsidies, tax incentives, and inexpensive 

office space. Further, these jurisdictions proposed reductions in existing 

government regulations for the medical and information technology 

sectors. These plans allowed foreign researchers to work in Kobe without 

verly rigorous visa regulations. Additionally, the city sought to remove 

cal 

 as well. 

transportation network in affected areas. Extensive rail and roadway 

ubway 

the 

and manufacturing businesses, the city took steps to attract an

several new industries. Kobe recognized that it could benefit from new 

o

regulations that prevented foreign firms from participating in the medi

industry and thereby encourage the entry of foreign researchers and 

business persons. Overall, Kobe and Hyogo achieved success in 

diversifying its economy. About 10 years after the earthquake, over 285 

new companies moved to the city, 40 of which were foreign firms. 

Additionally, six public facilities—including centers for business, 

developmental biology, and heath care—had relocated to the city

Infrastructure The Kobe earthquake caused significant damage to the infrastructure and 

damage included the collapse of significant portions of three major 

freeway routes, damage to rail systems, and the collapse of Kobe’s s

stations. There was also significant damage to the water, gas, and sewer 

systems. Over a million households lost access to water, gas, electricity, 

and sewage after the earthquake. The national government prioritized 

replacement of the public infrastructure and set aside the largest portion 

of its financial support for the reconstruction of essential infrastructure 

(such as water and sewage systems) and transportation networks. 

Page 45 GAO-09-811 Collaboration Insights from Past Disasters
Appendix V: Kobe Earthquake 

The national Ministry of Construction was directly involved to assist

city and prefecture with the reconstruction. For example, the ministry 

provided reso

 the 

urces for the replacement of electric power, water, and other 

utilities. Because of the government’s prioritization of these issues, the 

ained 

damaged infrastructure was restored in a relatively short time. 

Reconstruction of rail lines, some of which are privately owned, was 

completed within 7 months. Collapsed freeways, including the Hanshin 

Expressway, were restored within 20 months of the earthquake. See figure 

14 for images of restored rail lines and freeways after the earthquake. 

Similarly, utility services were also quickly repaired. Residents reg

electricity in about 6 days and were able to access gas, water, and waste 

system services in less than 3 months after the earthquake. 

Page 46 GAO-09-811 Collaboration Insights from Past Disasters
Appendix V: Kobe Earthquake 

Figure 14: Japan Restored Damaged Railways and Highways Approximately 20 Months after the Earthquake 

Source: City of Kobe.

January 1995 August 1995

January 1995 September 1996 Above left and above right: Damaged 

railways were restored by August 1995, 

seven months after the earthquake.

Far left and near left: The Japanese 

government restored collapsed highways, 

including the Hanshin Expressway. The 

project was complete 20 months after the 

earthquake.

Page 47 GAO-09-811 Collaboration Insights from Past Disasters
Appendix VI: Grand Forks/Red River Flood Appendix VI: Grand Forks/Red River Flood 

Page 48 GAO-09-811 Collaboration Insights from Past Disasters 

The 1997 Grand Forks/Red River flood devastated Grand Fo

Dakota, and East Grand Forks, Minnesota. Following a season of record 

rks, North 

snowfall, the Red River flooded up to 2,200 square miles in these states, an 

area about twice the size of Rhode Island. The flood damaged 83 percent 

of affected homes and impacted all downtown businesses. In East Grand 

Forks, 99 percent of homes and businesses were damaged (see fig. 15). 

Figure 15: Selected Facts about the Impact of the 1997 Grand Forks/Red River 

Flood 

The federal government provided significant funding to the affected area 

to facilitate its recovery from the 1997 Grand Forks/Red River flood. Some 

examples of federal assistance for recovery are shown in figure 16. 

Disaster Impacts 

Sources: GAO presentation of data from the Federal Emergency Management Agency and the National Oceanographic and 

Atmospheric Agency.

Date: April 1997

Location: East Grand Forks, Minnesota,

and Grand Forks, North Dakota

Disaster type: Flood

Casualties: None

Displacement: 56,025 total for both 

Grand Forks, N.D., and East Grand

Forks, Minn.

Estimated overall cost: $3.6 billion

($4.7 billion in 2009 dollars)

Residential impact: More than 80 

percent of homes damaged in Grand 

Forks and East Grand Forks

Economic impact: Every business in 

downtown Grand Forks and East Grand 

Forks suffered damage

Red River

29

East Grand

Forks,

Minnesota

(pop. 9,000) Red River

2

Grand Forks

 North Dakota

(pop. 52,500)

N. Dakota

S. Dakota

Iowa

Minnesota

Wisc.

CANADA

Grand

Forks

East Grand

Forks

0 .5 1 mi

Area covered by floodwater

Levee and floodwall system

State/city boundary

Long-term Recovery 

Snapshot 
Appendix VI: Grand Forks/Red River Flood 

Figure 16: Examples of Federal Assistance for Recovery from the Grand Forks/Red 

River Flood 

Sources: Presentation of GAO analysis of Appropriation Acts; GAO summary of documents from the city of Grand Forks, N.D.; and data

from the Federal Emergency Management Agency and the Economic Development Administration.

$5.8 billion for flooding and other natural disasters

($7.6 billion in 2009 dollars) 

Public Law 105-18 (June 12, 1997)

• Federal Emergency Management Agency Public

 Assistance grants: $357 million ($466 million in

 2009 dollars)

• Department of Housing Community Development

 Block Grants: $142 million ($186 million in 2009

 dollars)

• Commerce Economic Development Administration

 grants:$66 million for 124 projects ($86 million in

 2009 dollars)

Congressional supplemental appropriation Assistance from selected federal agencies

Key aspects of disaster recovery include planning, housing, economic 

development, and infrastructure. The following presents an overview of 

selected recovery efforts after the Grand Forks/Red River flood in each of 

these areas. However, it does not provide a comprehensive account of 

recovery actions taken. 

In the wake of the flood, the mayor of Grand Forks asked directors from 

the city’s urban development, public works, and finance departments to 

collaborate in order to contribute their respective expertise to help the 

city create a recovery plan. The mayor delegated much of her authority to 

these civil servants, known as the Tri-Chairs, allowing them to set 

priorities for recovery, submit action steps for approval, and collectively 

manage the city’s recovery resources. The Tri-Chairs, City Council, 

representatives from the federal Department of Housing and Urban 

Development (HUD), and other city staff collaborated to create a detailed 

flood recovery action plan for the city that identified (1) broad recovery 

oals, (2) roles and responsibilities associated with specific projects, and 

 sources for funding those activities. Specifically, the plan 

entified five broad recovery goals covering areas such as housing and 

Planning 

g

(3) potential

id

community redevelopment, business redevelopment, and infrastructure 

rehabilitation. The plan details a number of supporting objectives and 

tasks to be implemented in order to achieve the stated goals. Additionally, 

the plan identified a target completion date for each task. 

Page 49 GAO-09-811 Collaboration Insights from Past Disasters
Appendix VI: Grand Forks/Red River Flood 

Consultants that provided technical assistance on the planning process 

were hired using HUD’s Community Development Block Grant (CDBG). A 

key role that these federally-funded consultants played was to maintain 

good communications and coordination between the city and HUD. The 

consultants facilitated communications through scheduling and 

publicizing meetings, providing workspace, and convening weekly 

conference calls. According to a subsequent evaluation of the consultants’ 

efforts, these activities helped to build a team mentality among 

stakeholders by encouraging the sharing of information and common 

problem-solving. An important result of this communication was the 

completion of Grand Forks’ recovery plan. A city evaluation of the 

recovery plan found that the process of specifying goals and identifying 

funding sources allowed the city to conceive and formulate projects in 

collaboration with the city council and representatives from state and 

vernments. This helped Grand Forks meet its recovery needs as 

ut 

0-year floodplain of the Red River. Grand Forks 

eloped a buy-out program that purchased nearly 800 homes, 

aged 

ed a task force on business redevelopment comprised of 15 

rominent business leaders to address issues such as getting access to 

funding for business recovery and increasing opportunities for business 

Housing 

local go

well as adhere to federal and state disaster assistance funding laws and 

regulations. 

The cities of Grand Forks and East Grand Forks took measures to buy o

housing located in the 10

officials dev

which was about 10 percent of the city’s housing stock at the time. To 

determine the value of properties in the buy-out program, the city created

teams to assess each home and based the value on pre-flood price of the 

home along with a deduction of insurance payments. According to a Grand 

Forks official, the city also changed existing land-use ordinances to 

prevent future building in the 100-year flood zone. 

In East Grand Forks, where nearly 99 percent of the homes were dam

by the flood, officials also established a buy-out program for 

approximately 400 homes located in the 100-year floodplain. The city used 

local realtors to determine property values, and the city provided a 7 to 10

percent premium above the house value to account for rebuilding costs. 

East Grand Forks used U.S. Army Corps of Engineers and the Federal 

Emergency Management Agency’s (FEMA) Hazard Mitigation Grant 

Program funding to support its buy-out program. 

Economic Development To focus on issues of economic recovery, the mayor of Grand Forks 

form

p

Page 50 GAO-09-811 Collaboration Insights from Past Disasters
Appendix VI: Grand Forks/Red River Flood 

development and growth. The business redevelopment task force 

comprised of seven committees that met regularly to discuss these issues. 

Grand Forks created several business redevelopment programs using 

federal funding. For example, using almost $2 million from HUD’s CDBG

program and over $5 million from the Economic Development 

Administration, the city constructed Noah’s Ark, a large industrial b

developed for the purpose of providing temporary office space to any 

displaced small business in the Grand Forks region. According t

Forks official, the Noah’s Ark building was converted into an Amazon.

call center in 1999. The city also developed several projects which 

incorporated mitigation techniques so those structures would be be

prepared for a future flood. For example, the city changed the design of a 

convention center by raising the main event arena space of a convention

center to ground level to mitigate against future flooding. The Universit

North Dakota also incorporated disaster resistant features into its 

construction of a new $100 million hockey arena to protect it from 

blizzards, flo

uilding 

o a Grand 

com 

tter 

y of 

ods, and wind. 

ccording to East Grand Forks officials, the city’s business community 

After the flooding, Grand Forks and East Grand Forks took steps to 

e U.S. Army 

f 

 the city built 

a nonpermanent floodwall that can be taken down and assembled when 

eeded, because of concerns about keeping the city open to the view of 

e 

Infrastructure 

A

relied upon the University of Minnesota’s School of Architecture to 

development a strategy for economic recovery. As part of its economic 

redevelopment after the flood, East Grand Forks entered into an 

agreement with a major outdoor retailer to build a $7 million store if it 

were to employ local residents in the store. Since its opening, the retailer 

has thrived in East Grand Forks and is one of the fastest growing stores in

this nationwide chain. 

address their cities’ lack of an adequate flood-control infrastructure to 

help reduce damage from future flooding of the Red River. Th

Corps of Engineers assisted both cities in the construction of new flood 

protection consisting of levees and floodwall systems. The Grand Forks 

levees have a diversion channel to redirect water around to the west side

of the city. Its flood walls were elevated an additional 3 feet making it 

possible to add clay to levy to provide more protection in the event o

severe flooding. In East Grand Forks, officials explained that

n

the river. See figure 17 for images of the Red River before and after th

infrastructure construction project. 

Page 51 GAO-09-811 Collaboration Insights from Past Disasters
Appendix VI: Grand Forks/Red River Flood 

Figure 17: After the Flood, Grand Forks, North Dakota, and East Grand Forks, Minnesota, Took Steps to Address Their Cities’ 

Lack of an Adequate Flood-Control Infrastructure to Help Reduce Damage from Future Flooding 

1997 1997

Sources: Photographs courtesy of Grand Forks Herald, Photographer: Eric Hylden (top left); North Dakota State Water Commission

(top right); National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (bottom).

East Grand Forks, Minn., side of Sorlie Bridge

1st Avenue at North 3rd Street, Grand Forks, N.D.

1st Avenue at North 3rd Street, Grand Forks, N.D. East Grand Forks, Minn., side of Sorlie Bridge

After

Before

2006

Page 52 GAO-09-811 Collaboration Insights from Past Disasters
Appendix VI: Grand Forks/Red River Flood 

In December 1998, Grand Forks and East Grand Forks jointly agreed to 

create a “greenway,” which would manage the impact of rising river water 

as well as provide a natural space located between the levee system and 

river banks for recreational uses. For example, the greenway includes 

trails, golf courses, boat-ramps, campgrounds, athletic fields, and a 

wildflower garden. These infrastructure improvements, including the 

greenway and permanent river dikes, have successfully reduced property 

damage in subsequent floods. During a severe flood in 2006, Grand Forks 

only incurred minor infrastructure and property damage, as compared to 

the damage suffered in the 1997 flooding. 

After the 1997 flood, Grand Forks’ water treatment and distribution 

facilities were inundated with flood water and suffered heavy damage, 

resulting in no water service for 13 days and no drinkable water for 23 

days. Grand Forks’ water system suffered significant damage and needed 

repairs to restore the water distribution and treatment facilities. The city 

used various federal and state funds for the restoration, including 

approximately $5.3 million from FEMA. The city experienced challenges 

during the sewer and water treatment system’s closeout process (the last 

step of the program’s process, during which FEMA certifies that the 

recovery work has been completed and eligible costs have been 

reimbursed). FEMA questioned whether certain damage was pre-existing 

or occurred as a result of the flood. The city and FEMA came to an 

agreement after the city provided over 40-hours worth of video 

documentation of the sewers, showing both previous damage and floodrelated damage, which eventually resulted in the successful closeout of the 

projects. 

Page 53 GAO-09-811 Collaboration Insights from Past Disasters
Appendix VII: Comments from the 

Department of Homeland Security 

Page 54 GAO-09-811 

Appendix VII: Comments from the 

Department of Homeland Security 

 Collaboration Insights from Past Disasters 
Appendix VII: Comments from the 

Department of Homeland Security 

Page 55 GAO-09-811 Collaboration Insights from Past Disasters
Appendix VIII: GAO Contact and Staff 

Acknowledgments 

Page 56 GAO-09-811 

Appendix VIII: GAO Contact and Staff 

 Collaboration Insights from Past Disasters Collaboration Insights from Past Disasters 

Stanley J. Czerwinski, Director, Strategic Issues Team, (202) 512-6808 or 

CzerwinskiS@gao.gov. 

In addition to the contact named above, Peter Del Toro, Assistant Director, 

and Shirley Hwang were the major contributors to this report. 

Additionally, Patrick Breiding, Keya Chateauneuf, Christopher Harm, 

Donna Miller, and Diana Zinkl also made key contributions. 

Acknowledgments 

GAO Contact 

Acknowledgments 

(450580) 
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