Report to the Subcommittee on Air and 

Land Forces, Committee on Armed 

Services, House of Representatives 

United States Government Accountability Office

GAO 

July 2009 DEFENSE 

ACQUISITIONS 

Opportunities Exist to 

Achieve Greater 

Commonality and 

Efficiencies among 

Unmanned Aircraft 

Systems 

GAO-09-520 

On July 31, 2009, figure 1 on page 8, was revised to correct 

a typographical error in the reported cost difference for 

the UCAS-D (Navy) program.
What GAO Found

United States Government Accountability Office

Why GAO Did This Study

Highlights

Accountability Integrity Reliability

July 2009

DEFENSE ACQUISITIONS

Opportunities Exist to Achieve Greater Commonality 

and Efficiencies among Unmanned Aircraft Systems

Highlights of GAO-09-520, a report to the 

Subcommittee on Air and Land Forces, 

Committee on Armed Services, House of 

Representatives 

From 2008 through 2013, the 

Department of Defense (DOD) 

plans to invest over $16 billion to 

develop and procure additional 

unmanned aircraft systems. To 

more effectively leverage its 

acquisition resources, DOD 

recognizes that it must achieve 

greater commonality among the 

military services’ unmanned 

aircraft programs. Doing so, 

however, requires certain trade-offs 

and complex budget, cost, and 

schedule interactions. 

GAO was asked to assess the 

progress of selected unmanned 

aircraft acquisition programs, 

examine the extent to which the 

services are collaborating and 

identifying commonality among 

those programs, and identify key 

factors impacting the effectiveness 

their collaboration. GAO analyzed 

cost, schedule, and performance 

data for eight unmanned aircraft 

systems—accounting for over 80 

percent of DOD’s total planned 

investment in unmanned aircraft 

systems from 2008 through 2013—

and two payload programs. 

What GAO Recommends

GAO recommends that DOD 

(1) direct a comprehensive analysis 

and develop a strategy to gain 

commonality among current 

unmanned aircraft programs and 

(2) require new programs to 

demonstrate that opportunities for 

commonality were adequately 

assessed. DOD agreed with the 

recommendations except for the 

need for a comprehensive analysis. 

GAO believes this recommendation 

remains valid. 

While proving successful on the battlefield, DOD’s unmanned aircraft 

acquisitions continue to incur cost and schedule growth. The cumulative 

development costs for the 10 programs GAO reviewed increased by over 

$3.3 billion (37 percent in 2009 dollars) from initial estimates—with nearly 

$2.7 billion attributed to the Air Force’s Global Hawk program. While 3 of the 

10 programs had little or no development cost growth and 1 had a cost 

reduction, 6 programs experienced significant growth ranging from 60 percent 

to 264 percent. These outcomes are largely the result of changes in program 

requirements and system designs. Procurement funding requirements have 

also increased for most programs, primarily because of increases in the 

number of aircraft being procured, changes in system requirements, and 

upgrades and retrofits to equip fielded systems with capabilities that had been 

deferred. Overall, procurement unit costs increased by 12 percent, with unit 

cost increases of 25 percent or more for 3 aircraft programs. Finally, several 

programs have experienced significant delays in achieving initial operating 

capability, ranging from 1 to nearly 4 years. 

Several of the tactical and theater-level unmanned aircraft acquisition 

programs GAO reviewed have identified areas of commonality to leverage 

resources and gain efficiencies. For example, the Marine Corps chose to 

procure the Army’s Shadow system after it determined Shadow could meet its 

requirements, and was able to avoid the cost of initial system development 

and quickly deliver capability to the warfighter. Also, the Navy’s Broad Area 

Maritime Surveillance system will use a modified Global Hawk airframe. 

However, other programs have missed opportunities to achieve commonality 

and efficiencies. The Army’s Sky Warrior—which is a variant of the Air 

Force’s Predator, is being developed by the same contractor, and will provide 

similar capabilities—was initiated as a separate development program in 2005. 

Sky Warrior development is now estimated to cost nearly $570 million. DOD 

officials continue to press for more commonality in the two programs, but the 

aircraft still have little in common. 

Although several unmanned aircraft programs have achieved airframe 

commonality, service-driven acquisition processes and ineffective 

collaboration are key factors that have inhibited commonality among 

subsystems, payloads, and ground control stations. For example, the Army 

chose to develop a new sensor payload for its Sky Warrior, despite the fact 

that the sensor currently used on the Air Force’s Predator is comparable and 

manufactured by the same contractor. To support their respective 

requirements, the services also make resource allocation decisions 

independently. DOD officials have not quantified the potential costs or 

benefits of pursuing various alternatives, including common systems. To 

maximize acquisition resources and meet increased demand, Congress and 

DOD have increasingly pushed for more commonality among unmanned 

aircraft systems. View GAO-09-520 or key components.

For more information, contact Michael J. 

Sullivan at (202) 512-4841 or 

sullivanm@gao.gov. 
Page i GAO-09-520 

Contents 

Letter 1

Results in Brief 2 

Background 5 

Unmanned Aircraft Acquisitions Have Experienced Cost Growth, 

Schedule Delays, and Performance Problems 7 

Efforts to Achieve Commonality and Efficiencies among 

Unmanned Aircraft Programs Have Had Mixed Success 13 

Service-Driven Acquisition Processes and Ineffective Collaboration 

Have Reduced Opportunities for Commonality 18 

Conclusions 25 

Recommendations for Executive Action 25 

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 26 

Appendix I Objectives, Scope, and Methodology 28 

Appendix II Summary of Unmanned Aircraft Program Ongoing 

and Future Efforts 30 

Appendix III Comments from the Department of Defense 66 

Appendix IV GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments 70 

Related GAO Products 71 

Tables 

Table 1: DOD’s Unmanned Aircraft by Class 5 

Table 2: Procurement Cost and Quantity Changes in Selected 

Programs 10 

Table 3: Changes in Development Schedule for Selected Unmanned 

Aircraft Programs 11 

Table 4: Commonality among Selected Unmanned Aircraft 

Programs 13 

 Defense Acquisitions
Table 5: OSD and Service Efforts to Achieve Predator and Sky 

Warrior Commonality 23 

Table 6: Characteristics of Selected Tactical and Theater-Level 

Unmanned Aircraft 30 

Table 7: Comparison of Key System Capabilities 31 

Table 8: DOD Planned Investment for Global Hawk, Fiscal Years 

2008-2013 35 

Table 9: DOD Planned Investment for Reaper, Fiscal Years 2008-

2013 38 

Table 10: DOD Planned Investment for Shadow, Fiscal Years 2008-

2013 41 

Table 11: DOD Planned Investment for Sky Warrior, Fiscal Years 

2008-2013 44 

Table 12: DOD Planned Investment for Predator, Fiscal Years 2008-

2013 47 

Table 13: DOD Planned Investment for VTUAV, Fiscal Years 2008-

2013 50 

Table 14: DOD Planned Investment for BAMS, Fiscal Years 2008-

2013 56 

Table 15: DOD Planned Investment for UCAS-D, Fiscal Years 2008-

2013 59 

Table 16: DOD Planned Investment for ASIP, Fiscal Years 2008-

2013 63 

Table 17: DOD Planned Investment for MP-RTIP, Fiscal Years 2008-

2013 65 

Figures 

Figure 1: Development Cost Changes in Selected Programs 8 

Figure 2: RQ-4 Global Hawk 32 

Figure 3: MQ-9 Reaper 36 

Figure 4: RQ-7B Shadow 200 (Tactical Unmanned Aerial Vehicle) 39 

Figure 5: MQ-1C Extended Range Multi-Purpose UAS (Sky Warrior) 42 

Figure 6: MQ-1 Predator 45 

Figure 7: Vertical Take-off and Landing Tactical Unmanned Air 

Vehicle (Navy Fire Scout) 48 

Figure 8: FCS XM157 Class IV Unmanned Aircraft System (Army 

Fire Scout) 51 

Figure 9: Broad Area Maritime Surveillance Unmanned Aircraft 

System 54 

Figure 10: Navy Unmanned Combat Air System Demonstration 57 

Figure 11: Airborne Signals Intelligence Payload 60 

Page ii GAO-09-520 Defense Acquisitions
Figure 12: Multi-Platform Radar Technology Insertion Program 64 

Abbreviations 

ASIP Airborne Signals Intelligence Payload 

AT&L Acquisition, Technology and Logistics 

BAMS Broad Area Maritime Surveillance 

BCT Brigade Combat Team 

DARPA Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency 

DOD Department of Defense 

DOT&E Director of Operational Test and Evaluation 

FCS Future Combat Systems 

ISR intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance 

JCIDS Joint Capability Integrated Development System 

JTRS Joint Tactical Radio System 

J-UCAS Joint Unmanned Combat Air Systems 

LCS Littoral Combat Ship 

LRIP Low Rate Initial Production 

OSD Office of the Secretary of Defense 

MP-RTIP Multi-Platform Radar Technology Insertion Program 

RDT&E Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation 

SIGINT Signals Intelligence 

TCDL Tactical Common Data Link 

UAS Unmanned Aircraft System 

UCAS-D Unmanned Combat Aircraft System Demonstration 

VTUAV Vertical Take-off and Landing Tactical Unmanned Air 

 Vehicle 

WIN-T Warfighter Information Network - Tactical 

This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in the 

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Page iii GAO-09-520 Defense Acquisitions
Page 1 GAO-09-520 

 

United States Government Accountability Office

Washington, DC 20548 

 

July 30, 2009 

The Honorable Neil Abercrombie 

Chairman 

The Honorable Roscoe Bartlett 

Ranking Member 

Subcommittee on Air and Land Forces 

Committee on Armed Services 

House of Representatives 

From 2002 through 2008, the number of unmanned aircraft in the 

Department of Defense’s (DOD) inventory increased from 167 to more 

than 6,000 in an effort to meet growing warfighter demand for these 

capabilities in Iraq and Afghanistan. DOD has noted that meeting this 

demand has been difficult because of the highly dynamic nature of 

supporting ongoing combat operations while developing new and 

emerging capabilities. The department plans to invest more than 

$16 billion from 2008 through 2013 to develop and procure additional 

unmanned aircraft systems. However, the growing number of national 

priorities competing for federal dollars will continue to challenge DOD’s 

efforts to meet escalating demands for unmanned systems. 

DOD recognizes that to more effectively leverage its acquisition resources, 

it must achieve greater commonality and efficiency among the military 

services’ various unmanned system acquisition programs. Achieving 

commonality, however, can be difficult. We have reported in the past that 

programs that involve more than one service require complex budget, 

cost, and schedule interactions and are likely to require the services to 

make more trade-offs than a single service development would.1

 We have 

also found that joint development efforts have often been hampered by an 

inability to obtain and sustain commitments and support from the military 

services and other stakeholders.2

 However, given your interest in how 

DOD is establishing requirements for new intelligence, surveillance, and 

reconnaissance capabilities—including unmanned aircraft systems—and 

1

 GAO, Ballistic Missile Defense: More Common Systems and Components Could Result 

in Cost Savings, GAO/NSIAD-99-101 (Washington, D.C.: May 21, 1999). 

2

 For one example of these challenges, see GAO, Defense Acquisitions: Restructured JTRS 

Program Reduces Risk, but Significant Challenges Remain, GAO-06-955 (Washington, 

D.C.: Sept. 11, 2006). 

 Defense Acquisitions
 

considering opportunities to leverage existing capabilities or achieve 

commonality, you asked us to assess DOD’s tactical and theater-level 

unmanned aircraft acquisition programs. Specifically, we (1) assessed the 

cost, schedule, and performance progress of selected tactical and theaterlevel unmanned aircraft acquisition programs; (2) examined the extent to 

which the military services are collaborating and identifying commonality 

among those programs; and (3) identified the key factors influencing the 

effectiveness of their collaboration. 

To conduct our work, we collected and analyzed cost, schedule, and 

performance data for 10 acquisition programs: eight unmanned aircraft 

systems—Global Hawk, Reaper, Shadow, Predator, Sky Warrior, Fire 

Scout, Broad Area Maritime Surveillance (BAMS), and Unmanned Combat 

Aircraft System Demonstration (UCAS-D)—and two payload development 

programs—Multi-Platform Radar Technology Insertion Program (MPRTIP) and Airborne Signals Intelligence Payload (ASIP). Collectively, the 

eight aircraft programs account for more than 80 percent of DOD’s total 

planned investment in unmanned aircraft systems from fiscal year 2008 

through fiscal year 2013. To determine the extent to which the military 

services are collaborating and identifying commonality and the factors 

affecting that collaboration, we reviewed and analyzed key program 

documents and prior GAO work and conducted numerous interviews with 

and received briefings from relevant DOD and contractor officials. For 

additional details on how we performed our review, see appendix I. 

We conducted this performance audit from August 2008 to July 2009 in 

accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those 

standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, 

appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and 

conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence 

obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions 

based on our audit objectives. 

Most of the unmanned aircraft programs we reviewed have experienced 

cost increases, schedule delays, performance shortfalls, or some 

combination of these problems. Development cost estimates for the 10 

programs we assessed, collectively, have increased more than $3.3 billion 

(37 percent in 2009 dollars) from initial estimates—with $2.7 billion 

attributed to the Air Force’s Global Hawk program. Global Hawk 

development cost estimates have increased more than 260 percent from 

original estimates, in large part to acquire a larger and unproven airframe 

with immature technologies. Procurement funding requirements have also 

Results in Brief 

Page 2 GAO-09-520 Defense Acquisitions
 

increased for most programs, primarily because of increases in the 

number of aircraft being procured, changes in system requirements, and 

upgrades and retrofits to equip fielded systems with capabilities that had 

been deferred. Overall, procurement unit costs increased by 12 percent, 

with three aircraft programs experiencing unit cost increases of 25 percent 

or more. Four programs have reported delays of 1 year or more in 

delivering capability to the warfighter. The Army’s Sky Warrior has already 

slipped its projected delivery date by nearly 4 years. Four unmanned 

aircraft systems—Global Hawk, Predator, Reaper, and Shadow—have 

been used in combat operations with notable success and key lessons 

learned. However, in some cases, rushing aircraft into service has led to 

performance issues and caused delays in development and operational 

testing and verification. 

DOD’s unmanned aircraft acquisition programs are collaborating and 

identifying areas of commonality to varying degrees. In some cases, 

programs have been able to leverage resources and achieve efficiencies. 

For example, the Marine Corps determined that the Army’s Shadow 

system could sufficiently meet its current requirements and chose to 

procure the existing Army system. By pursuing a common solution, the 

Marine Corps was able to avoid the cost of initial system development and 

quickly deliver useful capability to the warfighter. While the Navy expects 

to save time and money on BAMS by using the existing Global Hawk 

airframe, as well as payloads and subsystems from other programs, risks 

remain. A Navy official noted that the Navy plans to spend over $3 billion 

in development, primarily to integrate payloads, make airframe 

modifications, and purchase aircraft. The Army and Air Force have not 

effectively collaborated on their Sky Warrior and Predator programs. 

Greater savings could have been achieved given that the Sky Warrior is a 

variant of the Predator and is being developed by the same contractor. The 

Army initiated the Sky Warrior development program, which is estimated 

to cost nearly $570 million in 2005 despite the fact that Predator was 

already successfully providing reconnaissance, surveillance, and target 

acquisition capabilities to the warfighter. DOD officials continue to press 

for more commonality in these two programs, but the two aircraft still 

have little in common. 

Service-driven requirements and funding processes and ineffective 

collaboration are key factors that have limited the achievement of 

commonality. While several unmanned aircraft programs have achieved 

airframe commonality, most are pursuing service-unique subsystems, 

payloads, and ground control stations. Despite DOD’s efforts to emphasize 

a more joint approach to identifying and prioritizing warfighting needs and 

Page 3 GAO-09-520 Defense Acquisitions
 

to encourage commonality among programs, the services continue to drive 

program requirements. Service officials we spoke with cited specific 

reasons for service-unique requirements—some of which have raised 

concerns about potential inefficiencies caused by unnecessary 

duplication. For example, the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) is 

concerned that the Army and Air Force are unnecessarily developing two 

different electro-optical and infrared sensor payloads for Sky Warrior and 

Predator when a common payload could be achieved—currently the basic 

sensors are 80 percent common and manufactured by the same contractor. 

However, according to Army officials, the Air Force sensor is more 

expensive and has capabilities, such as high-definition video, for which the 

Army has no requirements. Therefore, the Army does not believe a fully 

common solution is warranted. Likewise, the services independently make 

resource allocation decisions to support their respective requirements. 

DOD officials have not quantified the potential costs or benefits of 

pursuing various alternatives, including common systems. In general, the 

services have been reluctant to collaborate and efforts to do so have 

produced mixed results. However, to maximize acquisition resources and 

meet increased demand, Congress and DOD have increasingly pushed for 

more commonality among unmanned aircraft systems. 

To achieve the goal of more effectively leveraging resources and 

increasing the efficiency in unmanned aircraft acquisition programs, we 

are making two key recommendations. First, the Secretary of Defense 

should direct a rigorous and comprehensive analysis of the requirements 

for current unmanned aircraft systems to identify areas where further 

commonality can be achieved, and develop a strategy for making systems 

and subsystems more common. The findings of this analysis should be 

reported to Congress. Second, we are recommending that before initiating 

new unmanned aircraft development programs, the Secretary should 

require the services to demonstrate in their acquisition plans and 

strategies that they are taking an open systems approach and that the 

potential for commonality has been rigorously examined. In commenting 

on a draft of this report, DOD partially agreed with the first 

recommendation and agreed with the second. The department agreed that 

there is significant cost benefit to leveraging commonality, but believes 

that sufficient analyses have been conducted and that a separate 

comprehensive analysis across all unmanned systems, with the specific 

purpose of identifying opportunities for commonality, is not needed. While 

the various analyses cited by DOD have identified opportunities for 

commonality on a case-by-case basis, we believe that the department 

would benefit from a more comprehensive, quantitative analysis that 

Page 4 GAO-09-520 Defense Acquisitions
 

focuses on subsystems, payloads, and ground control stations across the 

unmanned aircraft portfolio. 

The intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, and strike capabilities 

provided by unmanned aircraft systems have proven to be a key asset in 

accomplishing combat missions in the Middle East. DOD is planning to 

expand unmanned aircraft capabilities to include persistent ground attack, 

electronic warfare, suppression of enemy air defenses, cargo airlift, and 

other missions. Unmanned aircraft systems generally consist of 

(1) multiple aircraft, which can be expendable or recoverable and can 

carry lethal or nonlethal payloads; (2) a flight control station; 

(3) information and retrieval or processing stations; and (4) in some cases, 

wheeled land vehicles that carry launch and recovery platforms. 

Unmanned aircraft fall into one of three classes: small, tactical, and 

theater (see table 1). From 2002 through 2008, the total number of 

unmanned aircraft in DOD’s inventory increased from 167 to over 6,000. 

Most of the increase has been in small aircraft, with the more complex and 

expensive tactical and theater-level aircraft increasing from 127 to 521. 

Background 

Table 1: DOD’s Unmanned Aircraft by Class 

Class 

Gross takeoff 

weight, in pounds 

Typical level of 

operational control Mission focus 

Small Less than 55 Ground combat teams Individual team priorities 

Tactical From 55 to 1,320 Operational units Battalion or brigade 

priorities 

Theater Greater than 1,320 Joint Force Commander Combatant Commander’s 

priorities 

Source: DOD, Unmanned Systems Roadmap 2007 – 2032.

Four major systems—Global Hawk, Predator, Reaper, and Shadow—have 

been deployed and used successfully in combat. Given this success, 

warfighters have demanded more systems and in many cases enhanced 

capabilities. However, we recently reported that some unmanned aircraft 

were not designed to meet joint service requirements or interoperability 

communications standards and, as a result, cannot easily exchange data, 

even within the same military service.3

 Additionally, certain 

 

3

 GAO, Unmanned Aircraft Systems: Additional Actions Needed to Improve Management 

and Integration of DOD Efforts to Support Warfighter Needs, GAO-09-175 (Washington, 

D.C.: Nov. 14, 2008). 

Page 5 GAO-09-520 Defense Acquisitions
 

electromagnetic spectrum frequencies that are required for wireless 

communications are congested because a large number of unmanned 

aircraft and other weapons or communications systems use them 

simultaneously. Furthermore, DOD has been unable to fully optimize the 

use of its unmanned aircraft in combat operations because it lacks an 

approach to allocating and tasking them that considers the availability of 

all assets in determining how best to meet warfighter needs. 

To manage the increased demand for unmanned aircraft systems and 

encourage collaboration among the military services, the department has 

created the Office of Unmanned Warfare, the Unmanned Aircraft Systems 

Task Force, and other entities. In addition, DOD has published the 

Unmanned Systems Roadmap (Roadmap) that provides a framework for 

the future development of unmanned systems and related technologies. 

The Roadmap states that there is the potential for an unprecedented level 

of collaboration to meet capability needs and reduce acquisition costs by 

requiring greater commonality among the military services’ unmanned 

systems. We have reported that taking an open systems4

 approach and 

designing systems with common subsystems and components can reduce 

both production and life cycle costs as well as improve interoperability 

among systems. For maximum benefit, commonality should be 

incorporated into the design of a system when requirements are being 

established. 5

 Unmanned aircraft systems can potentially achieve 

commonality in design and development, ranging from a complete system 

to a subsystem or component, as well as commonality in production 

facilities, tooling, and personnel. 

 

4

 Open systems allow the use of commercially available and widely accepted standard 

products from multiple vendors, rather than developing unique components. 

GAO/NSIAD-99-101. 

5 GAO/NSIAD-99-101. 

Page 6 GAO-09-520 Defense Acquisitions
 

Despite the proven success of unmanned aircraft on the battlefield and the 

growing demand for them, these acquisitions continue to incur cost and 

schedule growth (see fig. 1). The cumulative development cost for the 10 

programs we reviewed increased by over $3 billion, or 37 percent, from 

initial estimates. While 3 of the 10 programs had little or no development 

cost growth and 1 had a cost reduction, 6 experienced substantial growth 

ranging from 60 percent to 264 percent. In large part, this cost growth was 

the result of changes in program requirements and system designs after 

initiating development. Total procurement funding requirements have 

grown in the past because of increased quantities; however, many of the 

programs have also experienced growth in procurement unit costs. 

Finally, a number of these programs have experienced problems in testing 

and in performance that required additional development that contributed 

to cost growth and schedule delays (see app. II for more detailed 

information about each program). 

Unmanned Aircraft 

Acquisitions Have 

Experienced Cost 

Growth, Schedule 

Delays, and 

Performance 

Problems 

Page 7 GAO-09-520 Defense Acquisitions
 

Figure 1: Development Cost Changes in Selected Programs 

2009 dollars in millions

Aircraft programs

Initial estimate Current estimate Cost difference

Global Hawk

(Air Force) 

Reaper

(Air Force) 

Shadow

(Army / Marine Corps)

Fire Scout 

(Navy)a

BAMS

(Navy) 

UCAS-D

(Navy)b

Payload programs

ASIP

(Air Force) 

MP-RTIP

(Air Force) 

Sources: DOD and contractor (data); GAO (analysis and presentation).

Predator

(Air Force)

Sky Warrior

(Army) 

 $1,006.1 $3,657.5 $2,651.4 284

 195.4 385.5 190.1 97

 198.1 356.6 158.5 80

333.1 568.5 235.4 71

 267.3 428.2 160.9 60

 577.5 605.0 27.5 5

3,049.1 3049.1 0.0 0

 1,474.9 1,474.9 0.0 0

 219.5 461.0 241.5 110

 1,735.1 1,334.5 -400.6 -23

$9,056.1 $12,321.7 $3,264.7 37

Percentage difference

a

Data only represent the Navy portion of the Fire Scout program. The Army funding for Fire Scout is 

included in its Future Combat Systems funding and cannot be individually separated. 

b

UCAS-D is a demonstration effort and is not an official system development program. 

Page 8 GAO-09-520 Defense Acquisitions
 

In most cases, development cost growth was the result of beginning 

system development with unclear or poorly defined requirements, 

immature technologies, and unstable designs—problems we have 

frequently found in other major acquisition programs.6

 The Global Hawk 

program is a good example. In 2001, the Air Force began the Global Hawk 

program based on knowledge gained from a demonstration program and 

planned to incrementally integrate more advanced technologies over time. 

However, within a year, the Air Force fundamentally restructured and 

accelerated the program to pursue a larger and unproven airframe with 

multimission capability relying on immature technologies. The final design 

of the new airframe required more substantial changes than expected. 

Ultimately, frequent and substantive engineering changes drove 

development costs up nearly threefold. While BAMS has reported no cost 

growth, the program is just 1 year into its 7-year development, and the 

Navy plans to spend over $3 billion in development to modify the 

airframe—which is the existing Global Hawk airframe—and integrate 

payloads and other key equipment, modify ground stations, and purchase 

two developmental and three low rate production aircraft. BAMS program 

officials told us that they anticipate that the bulk of the development cost 

will result from modifying the size and shape of the existing radar payload 

to fit the Global Hawk airframe. Historically, similar weapons 

development efforts have had difficulty managing risk. Estimated 

development costs for MP-RTIP decreased 23 percent in large part 

because of a significant reduction in requirements caused by the 

termination of another aircraft program for which the radar was being 

developed. 

Procurement costs also increased for six of the seven systems that 

reported procurement cost data, a large portion of which is due to the 

planned procurement of additional aircraft (see table 2). For example, the 

Air Force planed to procure an additional 272 Predators, and the Army 

planed to procure an additional 84 Sky Warriors. As a result, unit costs for 

the Predator and Sky Warrior decreased by 41 percent and 9 percent, 

respectively.7

 However, Reaper and Shadow had unit cost growth despite 

 

6

 GAO, Defense Acquisitions: Assessments of Selected Weapon Programs, GAO-09-326SP

(Washington, D.C.: Mar. 30, 2009). 

7

 According to OSD, Air Force, Army, and contractor officials we spoke with, the Air Force 

no longer plans to procure additional Predators beyond 2009. This plan is clearly reflected 

in the Air Force’s fiscal year 2010 budget submission, in which it requested funding to 

procure 38 aircraft in 2009 and then no funding for procurement in 2010. 

Page 9 GAO-09-520 Defense Acquisitions
 

increased quantities. Reaper’s unit costs increased in part because 

requirements for missiles and a digital electronic engine control were 

added—which resulted in design changes and increased production costs. 

Unit cost increases in the Shadow program were largely the result of 

upgrades to the airframe that were needed to accommodate the size, 

weight, and power requirements for integrating a congressionally 

mandated data link onto the aircraft.8

 The Army is also retrofitting fielded 

systems with capabilities that it had initially deferred, such as a heavy fuel 

engine. The procurement unit cost for Global Hawk increased the most, in 

large part because the Air Force not only increased the program’s 

requirements but also reduced the number of aircraft it intended to 

purchase. 

Table 2: Procurement Cost and Quantity Changes in Selected Programs 

(2009 dollars in millions) 

Program Initial cost estimate Initial quantity

Current cost 

estimate Current quantity 

Percentage procurement

unit cost change 

Global Hawk $4,171.4 63 $5,929.7 54 66

Reapera508.7 33 2,405.7 118 32

Shadow 447.0 160 1,640.7 460 28

Fire Scoutb 1,625.1 168 1,743.0 168 7

BAMS 9,048.6 65 9,048.6 65 0

Sky Warrior 647.5 48 1,614.2 132 -9

Predator 642.8 48 2,546.4 320 -41

Total $17,091.1 585 $24,928.3 1,317 

12

(average)

Sources: DOD (data); GAO (analysis and presentation). 

Notes: MP-RTIP and ASIP procurement is managed and funded by the host platform program offices, 

primarily Global Hawk. Further, the Navy does not have any projected procurement costs or 

quantities for UCAS-D because it is a demonstration effort and not an official development program. 

a

Initial cost estimate provided for Reaper was based upon 33 aircraft. However, the Air Force initially 

planned for 63 aircraft. 

b

Data only represent the Navy portion of the Fire Scout program. The Army funding for Fire Scout is 

included in its Future Combat System funding and cannot be individually separated. 

Four programs have also experienced delays in achieving initial 

operational capability by 1 to almost 4 years (see table 3). In some cases, 

program delays have been the result of expediting limited capability to the 

 

8

 National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-163, § 141. 

Page 10 GAO-09-520 Defense Acquisitions
 

warfighter. For example, the production decision for the Sky Warrior was 

delayed by 2 years, and the Army now expects to deliver initial operational 

capability9

 to the warfighter almost 4 years later than originally planned. 

Similarly, initial operational testing to prove the larger Global Hawk 

airframe works as intended has been delayed by nearly 3 years. Delays for 

these two programs and BAMS and Fire Scout average more than 27 

months—6 months longer than the average delays we found in our recent 

assessment of other major weapons acquisitions.10 In contrast, the Reaper 

program expects to achieve initial operational capability 4 months earlier 

than originally planned—in large part because the Air Force expedited 

aircraft production to meet wartime demands. 

Table 3: Changes in Development Schedule for Selected Unmanned Aircraft Programs 

Program 

Original planned initial 

operational capability 

Current planned initial 

operational capability 

Change in achieving initial 

operational capability 

Sky Warrior May 2009 April 2013 47 months 

Global Hawka January 2007 October 2009 34 months 

BAMS August 2014 December 2015 16 months 

Fire Scoutb September 2008 September 2009 12 months 

Predator March 1999 March 1999 0 months 

Shadow December 2002 September 2002 -3 months 

Reaper December 2009 August 2009 -4 months 

Sources: DOD (data); GAO (analysis and presentation). 

Note: UCAS-D was not included in this assessment because it is a demonstration effort and has not 

established an initial operational capability date. 

a

Global Hawk does not report its initial operational capability dates, so its schedule slip was assessed 

using completion of initial operational testing. 

b

Fire Scout data represent the Navy portion of the program only. The Army Fire Scout is managed 

within the Army’s Future Combat Systems program—which has experienced significant schedule 

delays. 

While Global Hawk, Predator, Reaper, and Shadow have been deployed 

with notable successes in theater—as well as identified lessons learned—

rushing to field these capabilities resulted in a number of performance 

shortfalls and in some cases ultimately delayed meeting requirements. For 

 

9

 DOD defines initial operational capability as the date the warfighter first has the means to 

effectively employ a new weapon system or equipment item operated by an adequately 

trained, equipped, and supported military unit. 

10 GAO-09-326SP. 

Page 11 GAO-09-520 Defense Acquisitions
 

example, Predator—the oldest program in our sample—directly 

transitioned from a successful technology demonstration program into 

production, skipping the development process entirely. Because little 

emphasis was placed on testing, performance requirements, and 

producibility, Predator experienced numerous problems when it was 

initially produced and deployed, such as unreliable communications and 

poor targeting accuracy. 

Given the importance of supporting combat operations, Global Hawk 

demonstrators and early production aircraft were also quickly placed into 

operational service. Program officials noted that as a result, the availability 

of test resources and time for testing were limited, which delayed the 

operational assessment of the original aircraft model by 3 years. Similarly, 

in February 2009, the Air Force reported that initial operational testing for 

the larger more capable Global Hawk aircraft and the program’s 

production readiness review had schedule breaches. Air Force officials 

cite the high level of concurrency between development, production, and 

testing; poor contractor performance; developmental and technical 

problems; system failures; and bad weather as key reasons for the most 

recent schedule breach. In a recent letter to the Global Hawk contractor, 

the Air Force’s Chief Acquisition Executive noted that unless the 

program’s problems are resolved quickly, the Air Force may have to 

consider deferring authorization of future production lots, terminating 

future modernization efforts, and canceling development and production 

of the aircraft that are planned to carry the MP-RTIP radar. According to 

program officials, they are currently in the process of developing a plan to 

address the schedule breaches. 

Page 12 GAO-09-520 Defense Acquisitions
 

Consistent with DOD’s framework for acquiring unmanned systems, 

several of the tactical and theater-level unmanned aircraft acquisition 

programs we reviewed have identified areas of commonality to leverage 

resources and gain efficiencies. However, others share little in common 

and have missed opportunities to achieve commonality and efficiencies. 

Even those programs that have achieved some commonality may have 

additional opportunities to leverage resources. Table 4 compares the 

levels of commonality for three of our case examples. 

Efforts to Achieve 

Commonality and 

Efficiencies among 

Unmanned Aircraft 

Programs Have Had 

Mixed Success 

Table 4: Commonality among Selected Unmanned Aircraft Programs 

Program Services Airframe Payloads 

Ground control 

station 

Shadow Army and Marine Corps X X X 

BAMS/Global Hawk Navy and Air Force X 

Predator/Sky Warrior Air Force and Army 

Sources: DOD (data); GAO (analysis and presentation). 

The Army and Marine 

Corps Have Achieved Full 

Commonality in the 

Shadow Program 

In assessing options for replacing an aging tactical unmanned aircraft 

system,11 the Marine Corps determined that the Army’s Shadow system 

could meet its requirements for reconnaissance, surveillance, and target 

acquisition capabilities without any service-unique modifications. An 

official from DOD’s Office of Unmanned Warfare emphasized that the 

Marine Corps believed that Shadow represented a “100 percent” solution. 

The Marine Corps also found that it could use the Army’s ground control 

station to pilot the Shadow aircraft as well as other Marine Corps 

unmanned aircraft. A memorandum of agreement was established in July 

2007 to articulate how the Marine Corps and the Army would coordinate 

to acquire Shadow systems. The agreement details the management 

structure, lines of accountability, and funding arrangements between the 

two services, and establishes that the Marine Corps will procure systems 

directly off the Army contract. While formal decisions to pursue common 

systems were made at the service executive level, Army officials told us 

 

11 Shadow was identified as a replacement system for the Marine Corps Pioneer unmanned 

aircraft. Specifically, the cost for maintaining the Pioneer fleet was cited as a reason for 

selecting the Shadow. The Marine Corps is considering a future replacement to the 

Shadow, which is not expected before 2015. 

Page 13 GAO-09-520 Defense Acquisitions
 

that collaboration initiated at the program office level was the primary 

driver in achieving commonality. 

By forgoing any service-unique modifications in order to achieve a high 

level of commonality, the Marine Corps was able to avoid the costs of 

developing the Shadow. Those costs were borne by the Army and totaled 

over $180 million. The Marine Corps plans to spend almost $9 million from 

fiscal years 2009 through 2015 to support development of additional 

capabilities for the Shadow, to include a backup takeoff mechanism for 

the automatic takeoff and landing system. Additionally, the Marine Corps 

and Army are likely to realize some benefits in supporting and maintaining 

the systems because the components are interchangeable. According to an 

official at the Navy, the Marine Corps has been able to realize savings or 

cost avoidance in other areas such as administration, contracting, and 

testing, although quantitative data on these savings were not available. The 

Army’s Shadow program office agreed that commonality has allowed the 

two services to realize economies of scale while meeting each service’s 

needs. 

Maintaining a high level of commonality in the Shadow program will 

require continued commitment from the services and careful management. 

Specifically, as the Army and Marine Corps explore ways to add additional 

capabilities to Shadow, the services will need to continue to collaborate to 

maximize efficiencies. For example, in order to maintain commonality 

with the Army, the Marine Corps is spending money to add capabilities 

that meet Shadow requirements established by the Army. Likewise, the 

Army is interested in adopting capabilities that the Marine Corps 

developed for Shadow. Army officials told us that the Marine Corps is 

exploring ways to retrofit the Shadow so that it can carry a weapons 

payload. They stated that although the Army does not have a requirement 

for a weapons payload and has no plans to spend money on its 

development, the Army would be interested in acquiring this capability. 

BAMS and Global Hawk 

Have Achieved Some 

Commonality, but Greater 

Efficiencies Are Possible 

The Navy BAMS and Air Force Global Hawk programs have achieved 

some commonality between their unmanned aircraft systems—

specifically, the airframes for the two systems are common. However, the 

payload and subsystem requirements differ; and while some BAMS ground 

station requirements are common with those of the Global Hawk, the 

BAMS contractor noted that the Navy also has some unique requirements. 

To meet its requirement for persistent maritime intelligence, surveillance, 

and reconnaissance capability, the Navy awarded the development 

contract to the Global Hawk contractor, which had proposed a variant of 

Page 14 GAO-09-520 Defense Acquisitions
 

the Global Hawk airframe. Given the commonality between the two 

airframes, the Navy expects to avoid some development costs and gain 

efficiencies in production. Since the development contract award, the 

Navy and Air Force have worked together to identify commonalities to 

gain additional efficiencies where possible. According to a Navy official, 

one of the goals of this partnership is for the BAMS program to benefit 

from lessons learned by the Global Hawk program and thereby avoid the 

types of problems Global Hawk experienced during development.12

Officials from the Defense Contract Management Agency emphasized the 

importance of using these lessons. 

The BAMS payload and subsystem requirements differ from those of 

Global Hawk. However, the Navy has identified opportunities to achieve 

commonality with other aircraft programs rather than developing a 

service-unique solution. For example, the Navy plans to equip BAMS with 

the same electro-optical and infrared sensor used on the Air Force’s 

Reaper unmanned aircraft. In addition, the Navy plans to equip BAMS with 

a maritime search radar based on radars used on the Air Force’s F-16 and 

F-22 aircraft. BAMS will also rely on communications equipment that has 

been fielded on multiple weapon systems. Furthermore, BAMS will use an 

open systems approach in developing its payloads. A BAMS program 

official told us that the Navy expects to gain efficiencies in development, 

operations, training, and manpower. 

Even with these areas of commonality, the Navy anticipates spending 

more than $3 billion on development, a substantial portion of which will 

be used to modify the airframe and ground stations and to integrate 

payloads, including the radar, to meet Navy-specific needs. According to a 

program official, the radar technology is mature because it has proven to 

be functional on fighter aircraft. However, the radar will require 

modifications to both size and shape before it can be integrated onto the 

airframe; these modifications are expected to constitute a large portion of 

the BAMS development cost. Although OSD certified that all BAMS critical 

technologies were mature at the start of development, OSD officials 

recently told us that they have some concerns about the radar’s level of 

 

12 GAO, Unmanned Aerial Vehicles: Changes in Global Hawk’s Acquisition Strategy Are 

Needed to Reduce Program Risks, GAO-05-6 (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 5, 2004), and 

Unmanned Aircraft Systems: Global Hawk Cost Increase Understated in Nunn-McCurdy 

Report, GAO-06-222R (Washington, D.C.: Dec. 15, 2005). Additionally, we have addressed 

problems with the Global Hawk program in our annual assessment of weapon systems. See 

GAO-09-326SP. 

Page 15 GAO-09-520 Defense Acquisitions
 

maturity. The Navy also plans to upgrade existing Global Hawk ground 

stations, in large part to allow analysts to view and assess information 

more quickly. This ground station upgrade will require both hardware and 

software development. 

Greater efficiencies may also be possible in production. While production 

of the first two BAMS aircraft will occur at the same California facility 

where Global Hawk is currently produced, the remaining BAMS aircraft 

are expected to be produced at another facility in Florida. We believe that 

this approach has the potential to create duplication in production by 

having two facilities staffed and equipped to conduct essentially the same 

work. However, contractor officials point out that while the California 

facility has the capacity to accommodate BAMS production, having two 

separate facilities would minimize the impact of potential work surges. 

They also note that using the California facility for initial BAMS 

production will give them time to gain knowledge that could help get the 

Florida facility up and running. Yet neither contractor nor Navy officials 

provided an analysis to justify using the Florida facility. According to an 

official with the BAMS program office, the Navy considers this a 

contractor business decision, and according to contractor officials, the 

official analysis will not be done for several years. In the meantime, it is 

unclear whether the benefits of a second production facility outweigh the 

costs—such as additional tooling and personnel. 

The Army and Air Force 

Have Missed Opportunities 

to Achieve Commonality 

and Efficiencies between 

Sky Warrior and Predator 

OSD’s efforts to consolidate and achieve greater commonality between the 

Army Sky Warrior and the Air Force Predator have generally not been 

successful. In 2001 the Army began defining requirements for a 

replacement to the aging Hunter unmanned aircraft system. According to 

the Army, the limited number of unmanned aircraft in DOD’s inventory 

and its lack of direct control over these assets drove its decision to pursue 

the development of Sky Warrior. The aircraft was originally intended to 

satisfy the Army’s requirement for wide-area, near real-time 

reconnaissance, surveillance, and target acquisition capability. However, 

both the Air Force and the Joint Staff responsible for reviewing Sky 

Warrior’s requirements and acquisition documentation raised concerns 

about duplicating existing capability—specifically, capability provided by 

Predator. Nevertheless, the program received approval to forgo an analysis 

of alternatives that could have determined if existing capabilities would 

meet its requirements. The Army noted that such an analysis was not 

needed and not worth the cost and effort. Instead, it conducted a source 

selection competition and began the Sky Warrior development program, 

citing battlefield commanders’ urgent need for this capability. 

Page 16 GAO-09-520 Defense Acquisitions
 

In 2005, the Army awarded the Sky Warrior development contract to the 

same contractor working with the Air Force to develop and produce 

Predators and Reapers. As a variant of Predator, Sky Warrior is now being 

assembled in the same facility. In 2006, the Army and Air Force signed a 

memorandum of understanding to work together to identify 

complementary requirements for the Sky Warrior and Predator programs. 

Despite this memorandum, limited progress was made, and in 2007, the 

Deputy Secretary of Defense directed the two services to combine their 

respective programs into a single acquisition program. The services 

subsequently signed a formal memorandum of agreement. However, the 

services have maintained separate program offices and funding for their 

respective programs and the two aircraft still have little in common. Sky 

Warrior is larger, longer, and heavier; has a wider wing span; and has 

significantly more payload capacity than Predator. The Air Force is also 

acquiring the Reaper—formerly Predator B—which is even larger and 

more capable than both the Sky Warrior and Predator.13 However, all three 

systems have similar missions to seek, target, and attack enemy forces. 

Although the ground control station the Army is developing for Sky 

Warrior is expected to be used to control other Army unmanned aircraft, it 

will not be common with the Predator and Reaper ground control station 

used by the Air Force. According to Army officials, however, they are 

currently using legacy ground control stations that are essentially the same 

as the Air Force’s. The Army officials further noted that the Sky Warrior 

systems that the Army plans to deploy this summer will each be deployed 

with both an Army-unique ground control station and a legacy ground 

control station, to provide backup takeoff and landing capability in case 

the automatic takeoff and landing technology on Sky Warrior encounters 

problems. 

The Army and Air Force are pursuing service-specific payloads and 

subsystems for these aircraft. For example, the services are pursuing 

separate solutions to meet similar requirements for a signals intelligence 

capability.14 Specifically, the Army is developing a unique signals 

intelligence payload for Sky Warrior, while the Air Force is developing the 

 

13 Reaper is designed to provide a ground attack capability to find, fix, track, target, engage, 

and assess mobile or fixed targets, and is capable of flying at greater speeds and higher 

altitudes than Predator. For more information on Reaper and Predator, see app. II. 

14 Signals intelligence is derived from communications, electronic, and foreign 

instrumentation signals, regardless of how they are transmitted. 

Page 17 GAO-09-520 Defense Acquisitions
 

Airborne Signals Intelligence Payload for Predator, Reaper, and Global 

Hawk. Further, the Army is developing its own electro-optical and 

infrared sensor for Sky Warrior—and potentially other Army aviation 

platforms—and awarded an $11 million sensor development contract to 

the same contractor producing the Predator’s electro-optical and infrared 

sensor. 

While several of the unmanned aircraft programs we examined have 

achieved commonality at the airframe level, factors such as service-driven 

acquisition processes and ineffective collaboration have resulted in 

service-unique subsystems, payloads, and ground control stations. Despite 

DOD’s efforts to emphasize a more joint approach to identifying and 

prioritizing warfighting needs and to encourage commonality among the 

programs, the services continue to drive requirements and make 

independent resource allocation decisions on their respective platforms. 

DOD officials have not quantified the potential costs or benefits of 

pursuing various alternatives, including systems with commonalities. With 

some notable exceptions, the services have been reluctant to collaborate 

and efforts to do so have produced mixed results. However, to maximize 

acquisition resources and meet increased demand, Congress and DOD 

have increasingly pushed for more commonality among unmanned aircraft 

systems. 

Service-Driven 

Acquisition Processes 

and Ineffective 

Collaboration Have 

Reduced 

Opportunities for 

Commonality 

Officials Cite the Need for 

Service-Unique 

Requirements 

In 2003, DOD implemented a new requirements generation system 

intended to identify warfighter needs from a joint, departmentwide 

perspective—not from an individual service or program perspective. This 

process, referred to as the Joint Capabilities and Integration Development 

System (JCIDS), provides a framework for reviewing and validating 

capability needs. However, as we reported in 2008,15 requirements 

continue to be driven primarily by the individual services with little 

involvement from the combatant commands,16 which are largely 

 

15 GAO, Defense Acquisitions: DOD’s Requirements Determination Process Has Not Been 

Effective in Prioritizing Joint Capabilities, GAO-08-1060 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 25, 

2008). 

16 Combatant commands are joint commands comprised of military equipment and 

personnel from each of the military services. Six combatant commands have geographic 

responsibilities to plan and execute military operations in their respective regions. Four 

combatant commands have functional responsibilities, for example, providing 

transportation services. 

Page 18 GAO-09-520 Defense Acquisitions
 

responsible for planning and carrying out military operations. In reviewing 

JCIDS documentation related to new capability proposals, we found that 

most—nearly 70 percent—were sponsored by the military services with 

little involvement from the joint community.17 By continuing to rely on 

capability needs defined primarily by the services individually, DOD may 

be losing opportunities to improve joint warfighting capabilities and to 

reduce duplication of capabilities. In a separate report issued that same 

year,18 we also noted that DOD did not have key management tools needed 

to ensure that its intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance 

investments reflected enterprisewide priorities and strategic goals. We 

further noted that DOD lacked assurance that its investments in 

intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities—including 

those in unmanned aircraft—were providing solutions that best minimize 

inefficiency and redundancy. 

For the unmanned aircraft systems we reviewed, the services established 

requirements that were often so specific that they demanded serviceunique solutions—thereby precluding opportunities for commonality. Yet 

none of the programs were able to provide us quantitative analyses to 

justify pursuing their unique solutions or to show why common solutions 

would not work. 

In some cases, service-unique requirements appear to be necessary. For 

example, the Navy requires BAMS for maritime missions, which are 

distinct from the land missions of its counterpart, Global Hawk. 

Specifically, radar functionality depends on the operational environment—

that is, water, a moving surface, compared to land, a relatively static 

surface. Distinct radar capabilities are required to create images of 

sufficient quality to recognize a target in these unique environments. The 

Navy is also modifying the Global Hawk design to accommodate BAMS’s 

altitude agility requirements. Unlike Global Hawk, which is designed to fly 

continuously at high altitudes, BAMS is intended to fly at low, medium, 

and high altitudes during a mission. Consequently, the wings on the 

airframe need to be structurally reinforced to handle the loads and wind 

gusts associated with frequent changes in altitude. Altitude changes also 

make BAMS more susceptible to icing conditions, and therefore require a 

 

17 GAO-08-1060. 

18 GAO, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance: DOD Can Better Assess and 

Integrate ISR Capabilities and Oversee Development of Future ISR Requirements, 

GAO-08-374 (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 24, 2008). 

Page 19 GAO-09-520 Defense Acquisitions
 

de-icing capability for the wing, tail, and engine. Such differences in 

requirements have limited commonality in BAMS and Global Hawk beyond 

the basic airframe.19

While some of the differences between Global Hawk and BAMS 

requirements appear to be necessary, an OSD official we spoke with noted 

that there is concern that other distinctions in requirements that the 

services cited for other systems could lead to duplication and 

inefficiencies. For example, an Army official cited the need to develop an 

electro-optical and infrared sensor for the Army’s Sky Warrior that had 

unique capabilities from the sensor the Air Force uses on the Predator. 

The Army noted that it does not need specific sensor capabilities that the 

Air Force is pursuing, such as high-definition video, which could require 

costly upgrades to existing Army systems. Currently, however, Predator’s 

sensor does not use high-definition video and thus could be employed by 

the Sky Warrior system. Concerned that the government is paying a 

premium to build two separate sensors with essentially the same 

capability—the two systems are 80 percent common—OSD directed the 

services to evaluate the feasibility of and potential savings associated with 

purchasing a common sensor. An Army official, however, pointed out that 

the Army had negotiated a unit cost for its version of the sensor that is 

nearly $450,000 cheaper than unit cost of the Air Force sensor. Similarly, 

Army and Air Force officials cited the need for unique flight control 

requirements for Sky Warrior and Predator—“point and click” versus 

“stick and rudder”—because the Army uses enlisted operators to fly the 

aircraft, whereas the Air Force uses actual trained pilots. These different 

approaches require the services to develop and acquire unique ground 

control stations as well as other capabilities, such as automatic takeoff 

and landing capability, that have not been used before, resulting in 

additional cost and schedule risk. 

In some cases, the services collaborated to identify common 

configuration, performance, and support requirements, but ultimately did 

not maximize efficiencies. For example, the Army and Navy have different 

data link requirements for their respective variants of Fire Scout, primarily 

because of the Army’s requirement for its Fire Scout to operate within the 

Future Combat Systems network. However, the Future Combat Systems 

has been beset with problems and delays—which may not be resolved 

 

19 The BAMS program is leveraging technologies of other systems, like the radar from the F22 and Joint Strike Fighter and the electro-optical and infrared sensor from Reaper. 

Page 20 GAO-09-520 Defense Acquisitions
 

until 2015—and as a result, there are eight manufactured Fire Scouts 

sitting in storage that according to the Fire Scout contractor, could be 

equipped with the same data link as the Navy Fire Scout and the Army’s 

Shadow and Sky Warrior systems. Though the services could not agree on 

a common data link, the Army and Navy settled on common Fire Scout 

requirements for the air vehicle, engine, radar, navigation, and some core 

avionics subsystem requirements. The services also agreed to use one 

contract to procure the airframe. 

DOD’s Funding Process 

Can Hinder Collaboration 

and Commonality 

The majority of needs that the military services identify are validated and 

approved without accounting for the necessary resources to achieve 

desired capabilities. The funding of proposed programs takes place 

through a process called the Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and 

Execution system, which is not synchronized with JCIDS but is similarly 

service-driven. Within the funding system each service has the 

responsibility and authority to prioritize its own budget, which allows it to 

make independent funding decisions supporting unique requirements. 

Therefore, once a service concludes that a unique solution is warranted, 

the service has the authority to budget for that unique solution, to the 

exclusion of other possible solutions that could achieve greater 

commonality and efficiency among the services. While DOD collectively 

reviews the individual service budgets, this review does not occur until the 

end of the funding process, at which point it is difficult and disruptive to 

make changes, such as terminating programs. 

For example, OSD has directed the Army and the Air Force to merge their 

respective Sky Warrior and Predator programs. However, the services 

have concluded that continuing separate programs is warranted to meet 

their individual service needs. According to Air Force officials, the Air 

Force does not have a requirement for Sky Warrior, and it is not clear if 

the system would meet the service’s current operational needs. Therefore, 

the Air Force has moved forward with its plan to end Predator 

procurement entirely and transition to an all Reaper fleet. DOD officials 

noted that the Air Force’s future year budget plans have accordingly 

eliminated funding for Predator and increased the Reaper budget. OSD 

was concerned about the implications of this plan from a requirements 

and acquisition standpoint. Nevertheless, the Air Force will continue to 

procure its unique Reaper system and the Army will proceed with the 

development and production of its unique Sky Warrior system. 

Page 21 GAO-09-520 Defense Acquisitions
 

Efforts to Encourage 

Collaboration Have Had 

Limited Effect 

Seven of the 10 programs we reviewed have established memorandums of 

agreement to foster collaboration and drive the programs toward 

commonality. However, these agreements generally lacked rigor and did 

not specify areas of commonality to be pursued. Therefore, it is unclear to 

what extent these agreements have helped programs leverage resources, 

particularly considering that little commonality has been achieved. The 

agreements often included caveats that allowed the services to deviate 

from the agreement if they determined that service-unique requirements 

had to be met. In some cases, the agreement was so explicit about serviceunique needs and requirements that there was little incentive to pursue 

common solutions. In contrast, the memorandum of agreement between 

the Army and the Marine Corps for the Shadow program has specific 

statements that highlight their intention to meet both services’ 

requirements. For example, the memorandum states that the two services 

would procure a fully common aircraft off the same contract, assume the 

same requirements, and use the same documentation. 

At the department level, OSD established the Unmanned Aircraft Systems 

Task Force and the Office of Unmanned Warfare primarily to facilitate 

collaboration and encourage greater commonality among unmanned 

aircraft programs. While the two groups act as advisors and have 

implemented OSD’s recommendations regarding areas where further 

commonality might be achieved—most prominently, for the Sky Warrior 

and Predator programs—key officials from these groups emphasized to us 

that they do not have direct decision-making or resource allocation 

authority.20 OSD has repeatedly directed the services to collaborate on 

these two programs, and in recent memos has clearly expressed 

disapproval with the services’ amount and pace of progress in doing so. 

Despite this direction, the services have continued to pursue unique 

systems. In response to OSD’s most recent direction to merge their 

service-unique signals intelligence payload efforts into a single acquisition 

program, the Army and Air Force concluded that continuing their separate 

programs was warranted, and recommended that OSD direct an objective, 

independent organization—such as a federally funded research and 

development center—to conduct a business case analysis to assess the 

impact of merging the two programs. Table 5 summarizes OSD’s directions 

and the services’ responses over the past few years. 

 

20 GAO recently reported (GAO-09-175) that the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, 

Technology and Logistics created the task force in 2007 to lead a DOD-wide effort to 

coordinate critical unmanned aircraft systems issues and develop a way ahead to enhance 

operations and streamline acquisitions. 

Page 22 GAO-09-520 Defense Acquisitions
 

Table 5: OSD and Service Efforts to Achieve Predator and Sky Warrior Commonality 

OSD Services 

November 2006 Under Secretary of Defense for AT&L establishes goal for 

the programs to have a common aircraft, propulsion system, 

and avionics configuration 

September 2007 Deputy Secretary of Defense directs the services to combine 

the programs into a single acquisition program and to 

migrate to a single contract by October 2008

February 2008 Army and Air Force program executive officers 

sign a memorandum of agreement 

May 2008 Under Secretary of Defense for AT&L reiterates the Deputy 

Secretary of Defense’s directive to combine the programs 

into a single acquisition program, states that fiscal year 2009 

funds can only be used to purchase a common airframe, 

and expresses dissatisfaction with the progress made on 

achieving a common electro-optical and infrared sensor 

October 2008 Undersecretary of Defense for AT&L grants a waiver to the 

Air Force to buy 20 additional Predators, but also directs the 

Air Force to buy five common airframes and noted that no 

additional waivers would be granted 

January 2009 Deputy Under Secretary for Acquisition and Technology and 

the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Intelligence) for 

Portfolio, Programs, and Resources direct the services to 

conduct a comprehensive business case analysis to assess 

the impacts of migrating to a single signals intelligence 

payload acquisition program 

February 2009 Acting Assistant Secretary of the Army 

(Acquisition, Logistics, and Technology) and 

Assistant Secretary of the Air Force (Acquisition) 

issue a joint memorandum, noting that despite 

more than 15 months of work and a dozen 

meetings, neither service supports the assertion 

that a joint program makes sense, and 

recommend that an objective, independent 

agency or organization do the business case 

analysis 

Source: GAO. 

Congress and DOD 

Continue to Direct 

Increased Collaboration 

and Commonality 

In section 144 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 

2009, Congress directed “[t]he Secretary of Defense, in consultation with 

the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, [to] establish a policy and an 

acquisition strategy for intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance 

payloads and ground stations for manned and unmanned aerial vehicle 

systems. The policy and acquisition strategy shall be applicable 

throughout the Department of Defense and shall achieve integrated 

research, development, test, and evaluation, and procurement 

Page 23 GAO-09-520 Defense Acquisitions
 

commonality.”21 The Act further identifies the objectives that Congress 

expects the policy and acquisition strategy to achieve. Those objectives 

include, among others, the procurement of common payloads by vehicle 

class, achieving commonality of ground system architecture by vehicle 

class, common management of vehicle and payload procurements, ground 

station interoperability standardization, and common standards for 

exchanging data and metadata. Finally, DOD was directed to deliver a 

report containing the policy and acquisition strategy to Congress no later 

than 120 days after the enactment of the authorization act, which occurred 

on October 14, 2008. However, as of May 15, 2009, OSD had not issued the 

report. An OSD official within the Office of Unmanned Warfare told us that 

the department had requested an extension on the report.22

In an acquisition decision memorandum issued on February 11, 2009, the 

Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics 

(AT&L) identified the opportunity to adopt a common unmanned aircraft 

ground control station architecture that supports future capability 

upgrades through an open system and modular design. The memo notes 

that adopting a common DOD architecture using a core open architecture 

model would provide a forum for competition among companies to 

provide new capabilities. It also states that the military services can be 

given flexibility to adjust the man-to-machine interfaces for their 

respective ground control stations while still maintaining commonality on 

the underlying architecture and computing hardware. In addition, the 

memo identifies an opportunity to implement common technologies, such 

as autonomous takeoff and landing, across the military services. The 

military services are directed to work together—and with OSD in one 

instance—to assess various aspects of ground control station and 

technology commonality, and to report their findings to OSD. As of 

May 15, 2009, the services had not yet reported their findings. 

Similar to OSD’s approach to ground control stations, the Air Force 

Unmanned Aircraft Systems Task Force—which is currently developing a 

long-term unmanned aircraft plan—expects future unmanned aircraft to 

be developed as open, modular systems to which new capabilities can be 

added instead of developing entirely new systems each time a new 

 

21 Pub. L. No. 110-417, § 144. 

22 On July 6, 2009, we received a copy of the Department of Defense Report to Congress on 

Common Control Stations and Payloads for Manned and Unmanned Aircraft Systems

that was issued in late June 2009. 

Page 24 GAO-09-520 Defense Acquisitions
 

capability is needed. It anticipates that this open systems approach will 

allow the Air Force to hold competitions for new payloads that can simply 

be plugged into the aircraft—or “plug-and-play” payloads. In addition, the 

Air Force recognizes the need for more joint unmanned aircraft solutions 

and increased teaming among programs and services. A leading task force 

official told us that given the limited resources DOD has to work with, it is 

imperative that the services explore more joint solutions and work 

together and find commonality—which the official noted must begin in the 

requirements process. He also noted that DOD should be focused on 

providing incremental capabilities to the warfighter and upgrading them 

later as the need arises and the technology matures. He pointed out that 

for most missions the warfighters do not need an optimal system—a 100 

percent solution—they usually only need one or two of the functions the 

system can provide. 

DOD is challenged to meet the warfighter’s ever-increasing demand for 

unmanned aircraft systems within available resources. Many of DOD’s 

tactical and theater-level unmanned aircraft acquisition programs have 

experienced significant cost growth, schedule delays, and performance 

shortfalls. DOD recognizes that to more effectively leverage its acquisition 

resources it must achieve greater commonality among the military 

services’ various unmanned system programs. While the Army and the 

Marine Corps achieved a high level of commonality in the Shadow 

program, other programs had less success. In general, the military services 

continue to establish unique requirements and prioritize resources without 

fully considering opportunities to achieve greater efficiencies. As a result, 

commonality has largely been limited to system airframes and in most 

cases has not been achieved among payloads, subsystems, or ground 

control stations. An objective, independent examination of DOD’s current 

unmanned aircraft portfolio and the methods for acquiring future 

unmanned aircraft could go a long way to ensuring that DOD gets a better 

return on every dollar it invests in unmanned aircraft. 

To more effectively leverage resources and increase the efficiency in 

unmanned aircraft system acquisition programs, we recommend that the 

Secretary of Defense take the following two actions: 

Conclusions 

Recommendations for 

Executive Action 

 Direct a rigorous and comprehensive analysis of the requirements for 

current unmanned aircraft programs, develop a strategy for making 

systems and subsystems among those programs more common, and 

report the findings of this analysis to Congress. At a minimum, this 

Page 25 GAO-09-520 Defense Acquisitions
 

analysis should quantify the costs and benefits of alternative 

approaches, identify specific actions that need to be taken, and 

summarize the status of DOD’s various ongoing unmanned aircraftrelated studies. 

• Prior to initiating any new unmanned aircraft program, require the 

military services to identify and document in their acquisition plans 

and strategies specific areas where commonality can be achieved, take 

an open systems approach to product development, conduct a 

quantitative analysis that examines the costs and benefits of various 

levels of commonality, and establish a collaborative approach and 

management framework to periodically assess and effectively manage 

commonality. 

In written comments on a draft of this report DOD partially agreed with 

the first recommendation and agreed with all elements of the second. 

DOD’s comments are reprinted in appendix III. 

Agency Comments 

and Our Evaluation 

Regarding our first recommendation to conduct a comprehensive analysis 

of requirements and opportunities for commonality among current 

unmanned aircraft systems, the department agreed that there is significant 

cost benefit to leveraging commonality, but noted that the Unmanned 

Aircraft Systems Task Force had conducted such analyses. Therefore, the 

department did not agree that a separate comprehensive analysis across 

all unmanned systems with the specific purpose of identifying 

opportunities for commonality was needed. Going forward, we believe 

that the department could benefit from a more comprehensive, 

quantitative analysis that looks across unmanned aircraft systems and 

focuses on subsystems, payloads, and ground control stations as well as 

airframes. The analyses DOD has done to date have been done on a caseby-case basis, and have primarily resulted in airframe commonality. 

DOD agreed with each element of our second recommendation related to 

specific actions that the military services should be required to take before 

initiating new unmanned aircraft programs. The department believes that 

current requirements and acquisition policies and processes—some of 

which were recently revised—satisfy the intent of our recommendation. 

To ensure that resources are effectively leveraged to gain efficiencies, 

DOD must ensure the consistent and disciplined implementation of these 

policies and processes. 

Page 26 GAO-09-520 Defense Acquisitions
 

We are sending copies of this report to the Secretary of Defense, the 

Secretary of the Army, the Secretary of the Air Force, the Secretary of the 

Navy, the Commandant of the Marine Corps, and the Director of the Office 

of Management and Budget. The report also is available at no charge on 

the GAO Web site at http://www.gao.gov. 

If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact me 

at (202) 512-4841 or sullivanm@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of 

Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page 

of this report. A list of key contributors to this report can be found in 

Michael J. Sullivan, Dire

appendix IV. 

ctor 

Acquisition and Sourcing Management 

Page 27 GAO-09-520 Defense Acquisitions
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and 

Methodology 

Page 28 GAO-09-520 

Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and 

Methodology 

This report examines the Department of Defense’s (DOD) development 

and acquisition of unmanned aircraft systems. The primary focus of this 

work is to identify practices and policies that lead to successful 

collaborative efforts to field unmanned aircraft systems to the warfighter 

at the right time and for the right price. Specifically, our objectives were to 

(1) assess the cost, schedule, and performance progress of selected 

tactical and theater-level unmanned aircraft acquisition programs; 

(2) examine the extent to which the military services are collaborating and 

identifying commonality among those programs; and (3) identify the key 

factors influencing the effectiveness of their collaboration. 

We selected 10 programs to include in our review: eight unmanned aircraft 

programs and two payload development programs. The eight unmanned 

aircraft programs included in our review—Global Hawk, Reaper, Shadow, 

Predator, Sky Warrior, Fire Scout, Broad Area Maritime Surveillance 

(BAMS), and Unmanned Combat Aircraft System (UCAS)—make up more 

than 80 percent of DOD’s planned investment in unmanned aircraft 

systems from 2008 through 2013. The two payloads—Multi-Platform Radar 

Technology Insertion Program (MP-RTIP) and Airborne Signals 

Intelligence Payload (ASIP)—are being developed for use on unmanned 

aircraft. 

To assess the extent to which selected tactical and theater-level unmanned 

aircraft systems are meeting their cost, schedule, and performance targets, 

we compared current data to baseline cost, schedule, and performance 

data for the 10 programs in our review. We collected and reviewed data 

from acquisition program baselines, acquisition decision memorandums, 

selected acquisition reports, presidential budget documents, and 

technology and operational assessments. We worked with knowledgeable 

GAO staff to ensure the use of current, accurate data and incorporated 

information, where applicable, from our recent assessment of major 

weapon programs.1

 

To examine the extent to which the military services are collaborating and 

identifying commonality among those programs, we reviewed key 

documents such as acquisition decision memorandums and policy 

directives, as well as program acquisition strategies and program briefings. 

We examined the acquisition approaches of the 10 programs included in 

our review to identify any collaborative efforts taken among programs. We 

 

1 GAO, Defense Acquisitions: Assessments of Selected Weapon Programs, GAO-09-326SP

(Washington, D.C.: Mar. 30, 2009). 

 Defense Acquisitions
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and 

Methodology 

also reviewed relevant DOD and Joint Staff policies and guidance to 

identify established criteria for effective collaboration. As part of our 

analysis, we compared and contrasted requirements for the systems in our 

review in order to assess areas of potential or apparent similarity as 

possible opportunities for collaboration. We did not assess the validity of 

the military services’ requirements for the selected unmanned aircraft 

programs in our review. 

To identify and assess which factors influenced the effectiveness of 

collaboration among the selected programs in our review, we examined 

the roles and responsibilities of DOD and military service acquisition and 

requirements organizations in fostering collaboration among programs. 

We examined the impact that officials and organizations within the 

acquisition and requirements communities have on collaboration. We also 

reviewed recent DOD acquisition initiatives, such as portfolio management 

and configuration steering boards, as well as service-level plans and 

activities related to collaboration and commonality among unmanned 

aircraft programs. 

In performing our work, we obtained information and interviewed 

unmanned aircraft systems program officials from Wright-Patterson Air 

Force Base, Ohio; Hanscom Air Force Base, Massachusetts; Redstone 

Arsenal, Alabama; and Patuxent River, Maryland, and officials from the Air 

Force, Army, and Navy acquisition and requirements organizations, the 

Office of the Secretary of Defense, and Joint Chiefs of Staff offices, 

Washington, D.C. Further, we interviewed officials from the UAS Joint 

Center of Excellence, Nellis Air Force Base, Nevada; the Air Force UAS 

Task Force, Washington, D.C.; and U.S. Central Command, MacDill Air 

Force Base, Florida. We also met with officials from defense contractors 

General Atomics in Rancho Bernardo, California, and Northrop Grumman, 

in San Diego and Palmdale, California, to obtain information on the 

development and production efforts of seven of the eight unmanned 

aircraft system programs in our review. 

We conducted this performance audit from August 2008 to July 2009 in 

accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those 

standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, 

appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and 

conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence 

obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions 

based on our audit objectives. 

Page 29 GAO-09-520 Defense Acquisitions
Appendix II: Summary of Unmanned Aircraft Appendix II: Summary of Unmanned Aircraft Program Ongoing and Future Efforts 

Program Ongoing and Future Efforts 

This appendix provides additional information about the eight unmanned 

aircraft1

 and two payload programs assessed in the body of this report. 

Each program summary in this appendix includes an aircraft photo, a brief 

description of the system’s mission and program status and our 

observations on program execution and outcomes, and where applicable, 

the summaries also highlight recent GAO work. To provide additional 

insights into the magnitude of recent and expected future investments in 

these programs, the summaries include details on DOD’s planned 

investment from 2008 through 2013 as contained in the department’s fiscal 

year 2009 budget.2

 The budget information in tables 8 through 17 is 

expressed in then year dollars, and due to rounding the numbers may not 

add exactly. The fiscal year 2008 funding shown in the tables has been 

appropriated by Congress. The funding requested in DOD’s fiscal year 2010 

budget submission for each program is captured in notes to the tables—

DOD’s fiscal year 2010 budget did not contain any funding projections 

beyond 2010. Tables 6 and 7 detail many key characteristics and compare 

the capabilities of the systems discussed in this appendix. 

Table 6: Characteristics of Selected Tactical and Theater-Level Unmanned Aircraft 

Aircraft 

Length 

(feet) 

Wing span 

(feet) 

Gross weight 

(pounds) 

Payload capacity 

(pounds) 

Endurance 

(hours)a

Maximum altitude 

(feet)

Predator 27 55 2,250 450 24+ 25,000

Sky Warrior 28 56 3,200 800 40 25,000

Reaper 36 66 10,500 3,750 24 50,000

Shadow 11 14 375 60 6 15,000

Fire Scout 23 28 3,150 600 6+ 20,000

Global Hawkb 48 131 32,250 3,000 28 60,000

BAMS 48 131 32,250 3,200 34+ 60,000

UCAS-D 38 62 46,000 4,500 9 40,000

Sources: DOD, Unmanned Systems Roadmap 2007 – 2032, and BAMS program office. 

a

Endurance capacity reported here is the maximum endurance possible, without external payloads. 

For some aircraft, the addition of external payloads can affect endurance capacity. 

b

Information on the RQ-4B Global Hawk is presented in this table. 

 

1

 The appendix contains 11 program summaries because the Navy and Army Fire Scout 

programs are reported separately. 

2

 Because the Army Fire Scout is considered a part of the Future Combat Systems program, 

no funding details are presented in the program summary. 

Page 30 GAO-09-520 Defense Acquisitions
Appendix II: Summary of Unmanned Aircraft 

Program Ongoing and Future Efforts 

Table 7: Comparison of Key System Capabilities 

Imagery intelligence Signals intelligence 

System 

Electro-optical/ 

infrared 

Synthetic 

aperture radar

Full motion 

video 

Communications 

intelligence 

Electronic 

intelligence Weapons 

Global Hawk X X X X 

Predator X X X X X 

Reaper X X X X X 

Sky Warrior X X X X 

Shadow X X 

Fire Scout - 

Navy 

X X 

Fire Scout - 

Army 

X X X X X 

BAMS X X X 

ASIP X X 

MP-RTIP X 

Sources: DOD (data); GAO (analysis and presentation). 

Note: While we also assessed the Navy’s Unmanned Combat Aircraft System Demonstration (UCASD) as part of our review, UCAS-D is a demonstration effort and will not be equipped with any mission 

payloads. 

Page 31 GAO-09-520 Defense Acquisitions
Appendix II: Summary of Unmanned Aircraft 

Program Ongoing and Future Efforts 

Figure 2: RQ-4 Global Hawk 

Source: DOD.

Mission The Global Hawk system is a high-altitude, long-endurance unmanned 

aircraft with an integrated sensor suite and ground segment that provides 

intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities. The 

system is intended to provide high-resolution, high-quality, digital 

synthetic aperture radar to include ground moving target indicator, plus 

electro-optical and infrared imagery of targets and other critical areas of 

interest. A signals intelligence payload and advanced radar are also being 

developed. 

Program Status Global Hawk is being developed and procured in four configurations. 

Block 10 aircraft, designated RQ-4A, are based on an airframe similar to 

the original demonstrators and employ imaging intelligence sensors 

(synthetic aperture radar, electro-optical, and infrared). The other three 

configurations are larger and more capable systems, designated RQ-4B. 

Block 20 aircraft employ enhanced imaging intelligence sensors. Block 30 

aircraft provide multiple intelligence capabilities—signals intelligence as 

well as the enhanced imaging intelligence sensors. Block 40 aircraft will 

Page 32 GAO-09-520 Defense Acquisitions
Appendix II: Summary of Unmanned Aircraft 

Program Ongoing and Future Efforts 

employ an advanced radar being developed by the Multi-Platform Radar 

Technology Insertion Program. 

According to the original contract, the contractor was expected to deliver 

19 Global Hawk systems by the end of December 2008. However, as of 

January 2009, the contractor had only delivered 14 systems, 9 of which 

were more than 8 months late. All seven Block 10 aircraft have been 

delivered to the Air Force and have supported ongoing military operations. 

All six Block 20 aircraft have also been delivered. The Block 20 aircraft are 

currently in testing and recently underwent an operational assessment. 

DOD’s top acquisition official noted that the assessment provided useful 

insight into the performance of the enhanced integrated sensor suite. 

Block 20 initial operational test and evaluation (IOT&E) was expected to 

be completed in October 2009. However, the Air Force reported in 

February 2009 that operational testing had slipped beyond the acquisition 

program baseline threshold date, but did not specify the expected length 

of the delay. According to program officials a high level of concurrency in 

the program—concurrent development, production, and testing—coupled 

with developmental testing delays, unforeseen system failures, and 

excessive weather-related flight test cancellations were to blame for the 

schedule slip. 

The Air Force received the first of a planned purchase of 26 Block 30 

aircraft from the contractor in November 2007—10 months later than the 

original contract delivery date. The aircraft was subsequently equipped 

with an Airborne Signals Intelligence Payload (ASIP) sensor, and began 

developmental flight testing in September 2008. While ASIP developmental 

testing on the Global Hawk has gone relatively well, Block 30 IOT&E has 

been delayed in concert with Block 20. 

According to the contractor, the critical design review for Block 40 has 

been completed, and the first Block 40 aircraft is in the final stages of 

assembly. Contractor officials also noted that the MP-RTIP sensor will be 

integrated onto Global Hawk and begin testing in May 2009. Block 40 

operational testing—which was originally expected to begin no later than 

November 2010—has been delayed, and no new date has been established. 

The Air Force currently plans to purchase a total of 15 Block 40 Global 

Hawks. 

GAO Observations Global Hawk concurrently entered development and limited production of 

the RQ-4A in March 2001, after completing a successful demonstration 

program. One year later, the Air Force chose to pursue the larger, more 

Page 33 GAO-09-520 Defense Acquisitions
Appendix II: Summary of Unmanned Aircraft 

Program Ongoing and Future Efforts 

capable RQ-4B airframe. Although the two airframes were expected to 

have substantial commonality, differences were much more extensive than 

anticipated. The final design of the RQ-4B required more substantial 

changes than expected to the fuselage, tail, and landing gear. Frequent and 

substantive engineering changes during the first year of production 

increased development and airframe costs and delayed delivery and 

testing schedules. The system unit cost has more than doubled since 

development began, and the program has been restructured three times. 

Completion of Block 20 operational testing has been delayed more than 3 

years from initial estimates. Developmental test results indicate that the 

Block 20 aircraft’s enhanced sensors did not achieve the desired level of 

clarity. However, DOD’s top acquisition official in an October 2008 

acquisition decision memorandum directed the Air Force to go ahead with 

the procurement of the Block 20 sensors—noting that the sensor 

performance requirement was a subjective measure and current 

performance was satisfactory. The Air Force expects to have purchased 

more than 60 percent of total Global Hawk quantities before Block 20 

testing is complete. 

In October 2008, 1 month after beginning Block 30 ASIP testing, the Office 

of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) issued an acquisition decision 

memorandum stating that the ASIP development appeared to be on track 

to meet user requirements and approving the purchase of a limited number 

of sensors—pending successful completion of the sensor calibration. 

According to ASIP program officials, sensor calibration and developmental 

testing are finished. They also noted that they were planning to conduct 

dedicated ASIP operational testing on the U-2, which they believe will 

further reduce risk in the program before beginning Global Hawk Block 30 

operational testing, which has been delayed indefinitely in concert with 

Block 20 operational testing. 

According to a recent Director of Operational Test and Evaluation 

(DOT&E) report, the Air Force’s plan to complete Block 40 development 

in 2010 is in jeopardy because development of the advanced MP-RTIP 

radar has experienced delays. The report cites a failure to design useful 

sensor calibration and poor system software stability as the primary 

culprits. In addition, the DOT&E notes that the potential exists for the 

contractor to deliver up to 6 of the 15 planned Block 40 systems before 

MP-RTIP will be able to deliver any operational capability. 

Page 34 GAO-09-520 Defense Acquisitions
Appendix II: Summary of Unmanned Aircraft 

Program Ongoing and Future Efforts 

The Air Force’s 2009 budget request contained over $5 billion for Global 

Hawk development and procurement. The Global Hawk procurement 

budget includes funding to purchase and integrate the ASIP and MP-RTIP 

payloads. ASIP and MP-RTIP development are funded separately. 

Table 8: DOD Planned Investment for Global Hawk, Fiscal Years 2008-2013 

Then year dollars in millions 

FY 2008 FY 2009 FY 2010 FY 2011 FY 2012 FY 2013 Total

RDT&Ea$274.7 $284.3 $243.9 $195.9 $168.7 $170.7 $1,338.2

Procurementb 580.9 712.2 517.0 533.5 558.7 475.1 $3,377.4

Total $855.6 $996.5 $760.9 $729.4 $727.4 $645.8 $5,186.4

Source: DOD fiscal year 2009 budget. 

a

DOD’s fiscal year 2010 budget, released in May 2009, reflects a fiscal year 2009 Research, 

Development, Test, and Evaluation (RDT&E) funding amount of $268.6 million and a fiscal year 2010 

RDT&E budget request of $245.4 million for Global Hawk. 

b

DOD’s fiscal year 2010 budget, released in May 2009, reflects a fiscal year 2009 procurement 

funding amount of $710.0 million and a fiscal year 2010 procurement budget request of $667.8 million 

for Global Hawk. 

Page 35 GAO-09-520 Defense Acquisitions
Appendix II: Summary of Unmanned Aircraft 

Program Ongoing and Future Efforts 

Figure 3: MQ-9 Reaper 

Source: DOD.

Mission The Air Force's MQ-9 Reaper is a multirole, medium-to-high-altitude, longendurance unmanned aerial vehicle system capable of flying at faster 

speeds and higher altitudes than its smaller predecessor, the MQ-1 

Predator. While Predator is primarily a surveillance and reconnaissance 

asset, Reaper is designed for armed reconnaissance missions. It is 

expected to provide around-the-clock capability to detect, attack, and 

destroy mobile, high-value, time-sensitive targets. Reaper will carry 

missiles, laser-guided bombs, and the Joint Direct Attack Munition. Reaper 

also will support net-centric military operations. Each system consists of 

four aircraft, a ground control station, and a satellite communications 

suite. 

Program Status Because of recent budget increases, the Reaper program may soon be 

designated a major defense acquisition program. Based on current 

projections, Reaper will achieve initial operational capability in August 

2009. Its full-rate production decision was recently postponed over a year, 

pending the decision about its acquisition category. It recently completed 

initial operational testing, receiving a rating of partially mission capable. 

The Air Force has taken delivery of 27 aircraft to date. Total aircraft 

quantity requirements have increased from 63 to 118, and may increase 

even further since the Air Force plans to increase procurement in its 

upcoming budget submission. Reaper’s second increment, comprising the 

Page 36 GAO-09-520 Defense Acquisitions
Appendix II: Summary of Unmanned Aircraft 

Program Ongoing and Future Efforts 

small diameter bomb and automatic takeoff and landing capability, is 

scheduled to begin development in late fiscal year 2010. 

GAO Observations The Reaper program began in January 2002 in the aftermath of the 

September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks. Since inception, Reaper—designated 

an urgent operational need—has followed a nontraditional acquisition 

path, resulting in concurrent development and production and increased 

risk. Shortly after development began, the user required accelerated 

aircraft deliveries to achieve an interim combat capability. Two years later, 

the user required additional aircraft for an even more robust early fielding 

capability. In response to user demands, the Air Force has contracted for 

over 30 percent of the total quantity before completing initial operational 

testing. 

Performance enhancements, such as adding missiles and a digital 

electronic engine control, increased the weight of the aircraft, requiring 

stronger landing gear, fuselage, and flight control surfaces. In addition to 

requirements changes, the aircraft quantity increased 87 percent since the 

start of development. The increase—from 63 to 118 aircraft—was due in 

part to demands of the war on terror. The quantity may increase even 

further because the Air Force plans to curtail future Predator procurement 

and buy only Reapers. Despite the significant quantity increase, 

procurement unit costs have not decreased; they have increased about 32 

percent since development began. This cost growth is due to inefficiencies 

associated with the early fielding process and requirements changes. 

Although initial operational testing was completed in August 2008, two of 

three key capabilities were not fully assessed. Reaper was effective in 

destroying targets, but radar problems prevented the test team from 

completing an assessment of its ability to detect and identify targets. The 

net-centric operations support capability was not assessed at all. Other 

areas of concern included operator workload, off-board communications, 

and system reliability. Because tests were limited by weather, climate, and 

radar reliability and training, additional testing will be required to assess 

these capabilities. The Air Force testers gave Reaper a rating of partially 

mission capable; DOD’s independent test organization has not yet 

completed its assessment of the test results. 

Reaper has been funded under the Predator program element since its 

inception. In its fiscal year 2008 budget, the Air Force began reporting 

Reaper as a separate program element, thereby isolating program costs. 

Page 37 GAO-09-520 Defense Acquisitions
Appendix II: Summary of Unmanned Aircraft 

Program Ongoing and Future Efforts 

Table 9: DOD Planned Investment for Reaper, Fiscal Years 2008-2013

Then year dollars in millions 

FY 2008 FY 2009 FY 2010 FY 2011 FY 2012 FY 2013 Total

RDT&Ea $63.9 $43.6 $37.7 $37.2 $19.7 $20.1 $222.2

Procurementb 58.1 161.4 193.4 193.0 144.8 147.2 $897.9

Modifications 20.4 24.6 30.2 31.5 31.0 31.5 $169.2

Supplemental 340.7 $340.7

Total $483.1 $229.6 $261.3 $261.7 $195.5 $198.8 $1,630.0

Source: DOD fiscal year 2009 budget. 

a

DOD’s fiscal year 2010 budget, released in May 2009, reflects a fiscal year 2009 RDT&E funding 

amount of $46.4 million and a fiscal year 2010 RDT&E budget request of $39.2 million for Reaper. 

b

DOD’s fiscal year 2010 budget, released in May 2009, reflects a fiscal year 2009 procurement 

funding amount of $248.6 million and a fiscal year 2010 procurement funding request of 

$489.5 million for Reaper. 

Page 38 GAO-09-520 Defense Acquisitions
Appendix II: Summary of Unmanned Aircraft 

Program Ongoing and Future Efforts 

Figure 4: RQ-7B Shadow 200 (Tactical Unmanned Aerial Vehicle) 

Source: DOD.

Mission The Shadow 200 unmanned aircraft system provides reconnaissance, 

surveillance and target acquisition and force protection at the Army 

brigade level. One Shadow system consists of four air vehicles and 

associated ground control equipment, including two ground control 

stations and an air vehicle launcher. 

Shadow is equipped with automatic takeoff and landing capability and 

operates at up to 15,000 feet in various weather conditions. The air vehicle 

has electro-optical/infrared capabilities. Planned system upgrades include 

integration of the Tactical Common Data Link (TCDL) and the Army’s 

heavy fuel engine. As a brigade-level asset, the Shadow aircraft is intended 

to allow for mission payloads to be changed on the aircraft within 30 

minutes. 

Program Status The Shadow program is an acquisition category II program and grew out 

of an advanced concept technology demonstration program. The Shadow 

program entered full-rate production in 2002 without the TCDL or the 

heavy fuel engine. Program funding after 2002 has been used for Shadow 

fleet upgrades, such as integrating the heavy fuel engine. TCDL 

development is ongoing; retrofitting is scheduled to begin in 2009. 

Page 39 GAO-09-520 Defense Acquisitions
Appendix II: Summary of Unmanned Aircraft 

Program Ongoing and Future Efforts 

According to program officials, 252 Shadow aircraft have been fielded to 

the Army, with an additional 104 aircraft procured but not yet delivered to 

the warfighter. The Army plans to procure a total of 460 aircraft. In 

addition, the Marine Corps signed a memorandum of agreement with the 

Army in 2007 to acquire 52 Shadow aircraft. The Marine Corps systems are 

identical to the Army’s, and are being procured through the existing Army 

contract. 

GAO Observations Shadow systems were intended to be fielded as quickly as possible with 

“no bells and whistles,” eventually evolving into more capable systems 

with the TCDL and heavy fuel engines. According to program officials, 

initial research and development funding was designated for the basic 

Shadow system, which program officials estimated to cost $198.1 million. 

Program officials told us that when Shadow achieved initial operational 

capability in 2002—effectively ending development—the Army had only 

spent $181.2 million, or 9 percent less than the initial estimate. Officials 

stated that development funding since 2002 has been used to upgrade the 

basic Shadow system. The cost of these upgrades, officials told us, was 

initially estimated at $99.1 million, but the current estimate has risen to 

$175.4 million. 

According to the program office, total research and development costs for 

the Shadow system have increased 80 percent since program start in 1999, 

while total procurement costs have increased 267 percent. Program 

officials stated that increases in the number of aircraft being procured, 

which has nearly tripled from 164 to 460, along with upgrades and retrofits 

have contributed to cost growth in the Shadow program. 

By following an incremental approach for the Shadow program, the Army 

was able to minimize program risk by delivering basic capability to the 

warfighter within the initial development cost estimate. To field a more 

capable, robust system, the program has continued to pursue development 

of additional capabilities that were not available when the system was 

initially fielded, such as the TCDL and heavy fuel engine. However, risk 

remains as the costs for retrofit and upgrade activities have increased. 

The Marine Corps has benefited from the Army’s development of the 

Shadow system by avoiding the costs of initial development and 

purchasing a mature system. However, as the Army upgrades and retrofits 

Shadow, the Marine Corps will also have to fund these efforts if it wants to 

maintain the same level of commonality with the Army. Program officials 

told us that the Marine Corps is exploring ways to add additional 

Page 40 GAO-09-520 Defense Acquisitions
Appendix II: Summary of Unmanned Aircraft 

Program Ongoing and Future Efforts 

capabilities to Shadow aircraft to allow it to carry a weapons payload. 

Although the Army has no requirement for this capability, the service 

would be interested in retrofitting Shadow systems with a weapons 

payload if the capability were developed. Consequently, we believe that 

the Army and Marine Corps need to carefully manage how they maintain 

commonality. 

Table 10: DOD Planned Investment for Shadow, Fiscal Years 2008-2013

Then year dollars in millions 

FY 2008 FY 2009 FY 2010 FY 2011 FY 2012 FY 2013 Total

RDT&Ea$7.9 $8.2 $7.9 $8.1 $9.1 $41.2

Procurementb 72.7 0.0 258.3 58.9 $389.9

Supplemental 223.9 $223.9

Total $304.5 $8.2 $266.2 $67.0 $9.1 $655.0

Sources: DOD fiscal year 2009 budget and Army Shadow program office. 

Note: This includes Army funding only. 

a

DOD’s fiscal year 2010 budget, released in May 2009, reflects a fiscal year 2009 RDT&E funding 

amount of $12.2 million and a fiscal year 2010 RDT&E budget request of $70.8 million for Shadow, of 

which $29.5 million is for overseas contingency operations. 

b

DOD’s fiscal year 2010 budget, released in May 2009, reflects a fiscal year 2009 procurement 

funding amount of $87.9 million and a fiscal year 2010 procurement budget request of $609.4 million 

for Shadow, of which $326 million is for overseas contingency operations. 

Page 41 GAO-09-520 Defense Acquisitions
Appendix II: Summary of Unmanned Aircraft 

Program Ongoing and Future Efforts 

Figure 5: MQ-1C Extended Range Multi-Purpose UAS (Sky Warrior) 

Source: General Atomics Aeronautical Systems, Inc.

Mission The Extended Range Multi-Purpose unmanned aircraft system (Sky 

Warrior) is intended to perform reconnaissance, surveillance, and target 

acquisition missions at the Army division level. Additionally, Sky Warrior 

is equipped with four missiles. One Sky Warrior system consists of 12 MQ1C air vehicles along with associated ground equipment, including five 

ground control stations. 

Operating at 25,000 feet in a near all-weather environment, Sky Warrior 

will be equipped with automatic takeoff and landing capability. 

Communications with the Sky Warrior system will be via the TCDL. The 

air vehicle will be equipped with electro-optical/infrared and synthetic 

aperture radar capabilities, as well as a signals intelligence payload. 

Program Status The Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics 

elevated the Sky Warrior program to an acquisition category I program in a 

May 2008 memorandum. This directive supported the OSD decision that 

the Army Sky Warrior and Air Force Predator unmanned aircraft system 

programs migrate to a single contract for airframe procurement. Currently, 

Page 42 GAO-09-520 Defense Acquisitions
Appendix II: Summary of Unmanned Aircraft 

Program Ongoing and Future Efforts 

Predator is built on an airframe designated the MQ-1B, but OSD is pushing 

the Air Force to transition its Predators to the same airframe the Army is 

using for the Sky Warrior, designated the MQ-1C. While the Air Force is 

planning to procure 5 MQ-1C airframes—in response to recent OSD 

direction—it is in the process of assessing how many additional airframes, 

if any, it needs to purchase. 

According to program officials, the demand for intelligence, surveillance, 

and reconnaissance capabilities to meet current operational needs has 

resulted in concurrent development and production of the Sky Warrior 

system. The Army has purchased 40 interim Sky Warrior air vehicles, 21 of 

which are built on the existing Predator airframes. Although the remaining 

19 air vehicles are built on the new MQ-1C airframe they do not provide 

full Sky Warrior capability. According to the Army, these interim air 

vehicles are intended to provide some capability to the warfighter until the 

full Sky Warrior system is fielded. A February 2009 memorandum from 

OSD authorizes the Army to procure four production-ready MQ-1C air 

vehicles to begin initial testing for the full Sky Warrior system. 

GAO Observations The Sky Warrior program has experienced both cost growth and schedule 

delays, which, according to program officials, can be explained by the 

need to deliver systems to the warfighter as quickly as possible. 

Production quantities have increased from 4 systems at program start to 

11 systems; total program costs have increased over 138 percent. 

Milestone C—the point at which a system is approved to begin 

production—has been delayed by 2 years; therefore, the full Sky Warrior 

system will not enter low-rate production until November 2009. 

Furthermore, because the systems being fielded early do not possess all of 

the intended capabilities of a full system, costs will likely increase as other 

capabilities are integrated into the existing systems. Additionally, Sky 

Warrior has been designated an acquisition category I program and is 

currently undergoing a program rebaseline. This new baseline, once 

completed, may incorporate further schedule delays and cost increases. 

OSD approved the Sky Warrior program’s acquisition strategy in January 

2009, despite the fact that the synthetic aperture radar the Army planned 

to use on the system had proven to be unreliable. The radar’s poor 

performance forced the Army to select a new radar entirely. However, 

according to the program office, given the Army’s acquisition strategy, the 

new radar will not be ready until after Sky Warrior finishes initial 

operational testing in 2011 and a full-rate production decision has been 

made. This approach greatly increases the risk in the program. 

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During the most recent GAO annual assessment of DOD major weapon 

programs, the Sky Warrior program office indicated that all four of the 

system’s critical technologies were mature. However, a recent 

independent Army test concluded that three of the four technologies are 

not yet mature, including the automatic takeoff and landing system and the 

TCDL. As of May 2009, Army officials recognized that the automatic 

takeoff and landing system was still an immature technology. As a result, 

the Army will deploy each of its early Sky Warrior systems this summer 

with two ground control stations, an Army One Ground Control Station 

and a legacy ground control station—with stick and rudder controls—as a 

backup system in case the auto takeoff and land capability fails. Much of 

our prior work in DOD weapon systems acquisition and commercial best 

practices has shown that conducting technology development concurrent 

with product development greatly increases cost, schedule, and 

performance risks. 

Table 11: DOD Planned Investment for Sky Warrior, Fiscal Years 2008-2013

Then year dollars in millions 

FY 2008 FY 2009 FY 2010 FY 2011 FY 2012 FY 2013 Total

RDT&Ea$48.7 $12.7 $3.9 $4.1 $6.4 $6.6 $82.4

Procurementb137.8 189.7 339.0 316.2 123.8 128.9 $1,235.4

Total $186.5 $202.4 $342.9 $320.3 $130.2 $135.5 $1,317.8

Sources: DOD fiscal year 2009 budget and Sky Warrior program office. 

Note: RDT&E and Procurement include funding for weaponizing the Sky Warrior air vehicle. 

a

DOD’s fiscal year 2010 budget, released in May 2009, reflects a fiscal year 2009 RDT&E funding 

amount of $61.767 million and a fiscal year 2010 RDT&E budget request of $83.571million for Sky 

Warrior. 

b

DOD’s fiscal year 2010 budget, released in May 2009, reflects a fiscal year 2009 procurement 

funding amount of $239 million and a fiscal year 2010 procurement budget request of $666.2 million 

for Sky Warrior, of which $250 million is for overseas contingency operations. 

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Figure 6: MQ-1 Predator 

Source: DOD.

Mission The Air Force’s MQ-1 Predator is a single-engine, propeller-driven, 

remotely piloted aircraft designed to operate at medium altitudes for longendurance missions. The program began in 1994 as an advanced concept 

technology demonstration, and the aircraft proved its military utility with a 

successful operational deployment in Bosnia. Its original mission was to 

provide continuous ISR coverage to the theater commander/joint 

warfighter. In 2001, the Air Force added weapons to Predator, thus 

expanding its role to include a limited strike capability. Predator provides 

full-motion video of the battlefield with high-resolution sensors in near 

real time. Each Predator system includes four aircraft, a ground control 

station, and a satellite communications suite. 

Program Status Future procurement of the Predator is uncertain. After more than a decade 

of operational use, it is now considered a legacy program. The Army is 

procuring a more modern, capable variant of Predator—Sky Warrior. In 

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2007, OSD directed the services to merge these two programs, using the 

newer Army platform as the baseline configuration. However, because of 

differences in service requirements and operations, the Army and Air 

Force have made limited progress. For example, the Army needs a tactical 

capability that operates with existing Army platforms like the Apache 

helicopter. In contrast, the Air Force needs a strategic capability that 

satisfies the needs of the joint warfighter. The Air Force has not completed 

testing of the newer Sky Warrior aircraft, and in fact is planning to 

purchase another variant—Reaper—as a replacement for Predator. 

GAO Observations Because Predator transitioned directly from a technology demonstrator 

into production, it did not follow a typical acquisition process. Its 

performance and quantity requirements have changed significantly since 

inception. For example, Predator was initially designed to provide the 

warfighter continuous ISR and targeting information. The user 

subsequently required that it carry missiles, giving it a limited strike 

capability. In addition, Predator’s quantity requirements have more than 

doubled since it began. The Air Force originally planned to procure 12 

systems (48 aircraft), but because of the increasing demand for its 

capability, the total quantity has been increased to 26 systems. 

With the addition of MQ-9 Reaper and the Army’s Sky Warrior, the 

contractor’s business base has significantly expanded. This expansion 

raised concerns about the contractor’s capacity, particularly given its 

history of late aircraft deliveries. Last year, however, the contractor 

delivered 10 Predator aircraft ahead of schedule. According to program 

officials, these aircraft were completed early to provide time for the 

contractor to move its equipment into newly expanded facilities. Despite 

these deliveries, the contractor’s more recent aircraft deliveries have once 

again been late. Although the Air Force was directed to begin purchasing 

the newer MQ-1C aircraft—the Sky Warrior configuration—it plans to buy 

Reapers in lieu of Predators. Given the lingering uncertainty about how 

many of which configurations will be purchased, program officials are 

concerned that future aircraft deliveries will be affected. 

Early Predator cost data are limited. Once Predator became an acquisition 

program, the Air Force projected an acquisition cost of $910 million (base 

year 2009 dollars) for 12 systems. Since that time, the number of 

operational systems has more than doubled, the performance and payload 

requirements have changed, and the flying hours and attrition rates have 

increased. This hampers a direct comparison. The total program cost is 

about $3.61 billion (base year 2009 dollars). 

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Table 12: DOD Planned Investment for Predator, Fiscal Years 2008-2013 

Then year dollars in millions

FY 2008 FY 2009 FY 2010 FY 2011 FY 2012 FY 2013 Total

RDT&Ea$33.8 $24.8 $21.0 $20.7 $21.1 $21.5 $142.9

Procurementb 276.1 378.7 247.7 149.1 131.8 109.9 $1,293.3

Modifications 74.2 148.5 138.9 137.5 101.3 100.1 $700.5

Total $384.1 $552.0 $407.6 $307.3 $254.2 $231.5 $2,136.7

Source: DOD fiscal year 2009 budget. 

a

DOD’s fiscal year 2010 budget, released in May 2009, reflects a fiscal year 2009 RDT&E funding 

amount of $36.906 million and a fiscal year 2010 RDT&E budget request of $18.101 million for 

Predator. 

b

DOD’s fiscal year 2010 budget, released in May 2009, reflects a fiscal year 2009 procurement 

funding amount of $377.674 million and no procurement funding in fiscal year 2010 for Predator. 

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Figure 7: Vertical Take-off and Landing Tactical Unmanned Air Vehicle (Navy Fire 

Scout) 

Source: DOD.

Mission The U.S. Navy Vertical Take-off and Landing Tactical Unmanned Air 

Vehicle (VTUAV) will provide local commanders real-time imagery and 

data to support ISR requirements. A VTUAV system is composed of up to 

three air vehicles with associated electro-optical/infrared/laser designatorrangefinder sensors, two ground control stations, one recovery system, 

and associated spares and support equipment. The air vehicle launches 

and recovers vertically and operates from ships and land. Interoperability 

is achieved through use of a common data link and standard 

communications. 

VTUAV is being designed as a modular, reconfigurable system to support 

various operations, including potential surface, antisubmarine, and mine 

warfare missions. Future capabilities currently under consideration 

include surface search radar, signal intelligence, enhanced data and 

communications relay, and integration of weapons. 

Program Status The Navy expects the VTUAV to achieve initial operational capability in 

late fiscal year 2009. The program began in fiscal year 2000, after market 

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research and a competitive ship-based vertical takeoff and landing 

demonstration were conducted. A competitive contract was awarded to 

Northrop Grumman for delivery of system development air vehicles and 

the first lot of low-rate initial production (LRIP) systems. During fiscal 

year 2002, the program was de-scoped to a technology demonstration 

effort, and two LRIP options were not exercised. 

In fiscal year 2003, the VTUAV program was restructured to support the 

Littoral Combat Ship (LCS), and received increased funding from 

Congress in fiscal year 2004 toward that goal. The restructured program 

was expected to cost about $2.3 billion, and as a result in August 2006 it 

was designated as an acquisition category IC program. The program 

received Milestone C approval in May 2007 to procure up to 4 air vehicles 

in the first lot of LRIP. The Navy plans to procure a total of 168 air 

vehicles, plus 9 developmental LRIP vehicles. VTUAV is currently 

undergoing test and evaluation. 

GAO Observations The VTUAV program was restructured in 2004 to support the LCS. At the 

time of the restructuring, Congress authorized funding for an upgraded 

VTUAV variant, the MQ-8B, which addressed requirement shortfalls—

including time on station—of an earlier version, the RQ-8A. In February 

2008, after being advised of at least a 2-year delay in the LCS program, the 

Navy decided to continue VTUAV development using an alternate ship—a 

frigate. Navy officials estimated that the move to the alternate ship would 

require $42.6 million of additional funding and result in a 9-month 

schedule delay. 

VTUAV efforts are funded under cost-type contracts for system 

development and firm-fixed price for production. The program uses 

common, mature technologies as much as possible. The air vehicles are 

based on a commercial manned helicopter that has been in service for 

over 20 years. The MQ-8B is undergoing developmental and operational 

testing and has landed successfully aboard ship. 

The Army, in September 2003, chose VTUAV to meet Future Combat 

System (FCS) unmanned aerial requirements. According to contractor 

officials, the two services were able to achieve about 97 percent 

commonality for the airframe. However, service-specific payloads will 

hinder further collaboration. 

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Furthermore, FCS delays could affect Fire Scout production efficiency. 

According to Northrop Grumman officials, they need to produce a 

minimum number of airframes per year to break even; they are currently 

producing three airframes per year for the Navy to support system 

development. If FCS continues to delay the Army portion of the Fire Scout 

program (or other potential buyers do not make a purchase), airframe 

production will be difficult to sustain. 

Table 13: DOD Planned Investment for VTUAV, Fiscal Years 2008-2013

Then year dollars in millions 

FY 2008 FY 2009 FY 2010 FY 2011 FY 2012 FY 2013 Total

RDT&Ea $32.8 $9.7 $26.2 $5.0 $1.3 $1.4 $76.4

Procurementb 38.6 62.3 73.8 76.1 97.1 103.6 $451.5

Total $71.4 $72.0 $100.0 $81.1 $98.4 $105.0 $527.9

Source: DOD fiscal year 2009 budget. 

a

DOD’s fiscal year 2010 budget, released in May 2009, reflects a fiscal year 2009 RDT&E funding 

amount of $9.6 million and a fiscal year 2010 RDT&E budget request of $25.6 million for VTUAV. 

b

DOD’s fiscal year 2010 budget, released in May 2009, reflects a fiscal year 2009 procurement 

funding amount of $57.1 million and a fiscal year 2010 procurement budget request of $80.0 million 

for VTUAV. 

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Figure 8: FCS XM157 Class IV Unmanned Aircraft System (Army Fire Scout) 

Source: DOD.

Mission The XM157 Class IV unmanned aircraft system (UAS) will provide 

reconnaissance, surveillance, targeting, mine detection, communications 

relay, wide area surveillance, chemical detection, and meteorological 

survey capabilities for the FCS Brigade Combat Team (BCT). The Class IV 

UAS will operate in conjunction with manned aircraft. The air vehicle will 

vertically take off and land from unprepared surfaces, and will be 

controlled by light tactical vehicles equipped with launch control units and 

by command and control manned ground vehicles within the FCS BCT 

over the FCS network. 

The Class IV UAS is part of the FCS family of systems made up of 

integrated, advanced, networked combat and sustainment systems; 

unmanned ground and air vehicles; and unattended sensors and munitions. 

Complementary programs external to FCS development provide many of 

the major Class IV UAS subsystems and payloads, including 

communications equipment such as the Warfighter Information NetworkTactical (WIN-T) and the Joint Tactical Radio System (JTRS). 

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Program Status The Army is pursuing a joint acquisition strategy with the Navy. The Army, 

in September 2003, chose the Navy Fire Scout for its Class IV UAS. 

Program officials indicated that the Navy is the lead service for system 

development. The Army purchases common airframes under a separate 

line item in the Navy contract, and then provides the airframes to the FCS 

lead system integrator as government-furnished equipment. The Army is 

leveraging Navy testing to mitigate risk and provide early test data; its own 

first developmental flight testing is not scheduled to begin until the second 

quarter of fiscal year 2011. 

The Army plans to support 15 BCTs, each equipped with 32 Class IV air 

vehicles, and will procure 500 air vehicles overall, including 20 for 

development and low-rate initial production. The Army has taken delivery 

of eight airframes. 

The Class IV UAS schedule depends on complementary programs—

specifically WIN-T and JTRS—and the overall FCS schedule, which has 

slipped. The fiscal year 2011 first flight date represents a 42-month delay 

from the Army’s original baseline estimate. 

GAO Observations According to contractor officials, the Army and Navy achieved about 97 

percent commonality for the airframe. A Defense Contract Management 

Agency official estimated about $125 million in development cost savings 

attributable to commonality. Contractor representatives maintain that 

operations and maintenance would provide greater opportunity for cost 

savings from commonality. 

However, the Army’s requirements for FCS-based, mission-specific 

subsystems and payloads are hindering further collaboration. According to 

both program and contractor officials, the delivered airframes were 

intended for testing, but they cannot be tested without WIN-T and JTRS, 

which are not currently available. WIN-T will be the data link that allows 

control of the Class IV UAS from mobile ground stations, and JTRS will 

provide a communication relay capability. Neither program nor contractor 

officials seemed confident that these subsystems would be available soon. 

Furthermore, DOD’s recent proposal to terminate the FCS ground segment 

raises additional uncertainty over the Army’s plans. 

While the Navy identified an alternate ship to continue Fire Scout 

development when it learned that the projected host platform was 

delayed, the Army seems to be holding to FCS standards. Contractor 

representatives believe the Army is forgoing providing capability to the 

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warfighter as a result. They envision the Class IV UAS not being available 

to the warfighter until 2015. In their opinion, however, were the Army to 

install an existing data link and payload into the aircraft, they would be 

useful, for example, in detecting improvised explosive devices in Iraq or 

Afghanistan. 

Because it is a part of the FCS program, the Class IV UAS is funded 

through the FCS reconnaissance platforms budget, which also includes the 

Class I UAS. Therefore, we are unable to provide details on the Class IV 

UAS budget projections using the fiscal year 2009 budget. However, DOD’s 

fiscal year 2010 budget, released in May 2009, contains an RDT&E budget 

request of $44.005 million in fiscal year 2010 specifically for the Class IV 

UAS.

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Figure 9: Broad Area Maritime Surveillance Unmanned Aircraft System 

Source: DOD.

Mission The Broad Area Maritime Surveillance (BAMS) unmanned aircraft system 

will give DOD a unique persistent capability to detect, classify, and identify 

targets over a wide area of maritime battlespace. Operating both 

independently and cooperatively with other assets, it will provide a more 

effective and supportable ISR capability than currently exists. Along with 

future systems—the P-8A Multi-mission Maritime Aircraft and the EP-X 

electronic surveillance aircraft—BAMS will be part of a maritime patrol 

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and reconnaissance force family of systems integral to the Navy’s 

recapitalization of its airborne ISR. The Navy intends to position BAMS 

mission crews with maritime patrol and reconnaissance personnel to 

closely coordinate missions and use a common support infrastructure. To 

meet its objectives, the BAMS program is modifying a version of the Air 

Force Global Hawk air vehicle. 

Program Status DOD approved the start of system development for BAMS in April 2008, 

but the source selection was subject to a bid protest that delayed system 

development to August 2008. The program briefed the Joint Requirements 

Oversight Council on the source selection results, joint efficiencies being 

pursued, and potential future synergies in December 2008 and conducted 

the System Requirements Review in January 2009. The LRIP contract 

award is planned for fiscal year 2013, and the Navy expects to purchase 70 

total aircraft—2 in development, 3 in low-rate production, and 65 in 

production. 

BAMS is being developed using the Global Hawk airframe; however, the 

Navy plans to make upgrades, such as a wing de-icing technology, to 

accommodate the maritime operations. It also plans to use different 

subsystems, such as sensors and communications equipment. Program 

officials explained that the BAMS air vehicle is about 78 percent common 

with Global Hawk and uses sensor components or entire subsystems from 

other existing platforms. The BAMS program is leveraging lessons learned 

from the Global Hawk program to avoid similar cost, testing, and 

technology problems, and the two programs have established a 

memorandum of agreement. 

Northrop Grumman is currently considering whether to assemble BAMS in 

two locations: Palmdale, California, where the Global Hawk is being 

assembled, and a new facility in St. Augustine, Florida. Though the 

Palmdale facility has the capacity to assemble BAMS, contractor officials 

told us that the decision will be based on both economic and program risklevel assessments. They were not able to provide quantitative analysis 

associated with their pending decision to assemble BAMS in two locations 

and told us that the calculations will not be made until the 2011-2012 time 

frame. 

GAO Observations In February 2008, before initiating development, DOD and the Navy 

concluded that all BAMS technologies were approaching maturity—that is, 

they had been demonstrated in a relevant environment. Therefore, the 

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Navy insists that the BAMS program has no critical technologies. Despite 

repeated requests, Navy officials did not provide us with the list of 

technologies that were assessed for maturity. Nevertheless, the program 

office has identified six subsystems, such as radar software, that could 

cause cost, schedule, or performance issues during development. Program 

officials indicated that they are monitoring development risks for these 

subsystems. The Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology 

and Logistics’ decision allowing the program to begin development also 

required that an independent technology readiness assessment be 

conducted at the completion of preliminary design review and that the 

results be submitted for DOD review. 

While there is a benefit to using an existing airframe, the Navy plans to 

make changes to Global Hawk that introduce additional risk to the 

program. Already the initial operational capability has been delayed from 

August 2014 to December 2015, but program officials are planning to 

achieve full operational capability by 2019—in time to avoid a capability 

gap that otherwise would be created by the retirement of the P-3C Orion 

aircraft. 

Table 14: DOD Planned Investment for BAMS, Fiscal Years 2008-2013

Then year dollars in millions 

FY 2008 FY 2009 FY 2010 FY 2011 FY 2012 FY 2013 Total

RDT&Ea $115.9 $480.1 $557.0 $462.8 $383.7 $279.2 $2,278.8

Procurement 

Total $115.9 $480.1 $557.0 $462.8 $383.7 $279.2 $2,278.8

Source: DOD fiscal year 2009 budget.

a

OSD’s fiscal year 2010 budget, released in May 2009, reflects a fiscal year 2009 RDT&E funding 

amount of $432.5 million and a fiscal year 2010 RDT&E budget request of $465.8 million for BAMS. 

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Figure 10: Navy Unmanned Combat Air System Demonstration 

Source: DOD.

Mission The Navy Unmanned Combat Air System Demonstration (UCAS-D) 

program will demonstrate critical technologies for operating a low 

observable unmanned aerial system from aircraft carriers. The first 

capabilities to be proven are launch and recovery and deck surface 

operations. The demonstration will inform a follow-on acquisition decision 

at Milestone A or B. 

In the 2020-2025 time frame, the Navy plans to change program focus to a 

strike-fighter aircraft possibly to replace F/A-18 aircraft in a future Carrier 

Air Wings mix with the Joint Strike Fighter. The Navy wants a carrierbased, air-refueled, very long-endurance aircraft capable of operating at 

greater distances from the carrier battle group, defeating heavily defended 

targets, expanding payload options, and providing continuous maneuvers. 

Program Status The Navy conducted a limited source selection between two contractors 

that had been involved in prior UCAS-related efforts, and in August 2007 

awarded Northrop Grumman a $635.9 million contract to design, develop, 

integrate, test, and demonstrate two unmanned combat air systems. The 

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contract includes cost, technical, and schedule incentives. The first flight 

is planned for November 2009 at Edwards Air Force Base, and the first 

landing on an aircraft carrier is expected to occur at the end of 2011. 

Navy UCAS-D is only a demonstration effort; no acquisition program has 

been approved, and no milestone events have been scheduled. However, 

the program is trying to mitigate risks through modeling and simulation, 

surrogate flight testing, and shore-based testing before conducting sea 

trials. Additionally, the demonstration aircraft will use various systems 

already in use on other aircraft, such as F-18 landing systems and F-16 

engines, according to officials. 

The program appears generally to be on schedule and within budget. 

According to program officials, the program has the funding needed to 

complete the demonstration by fiscal year 2013 as planned, despite a 

funding reduction of almost $400 million in the 2009 President’s budget. 

GAO Observations Navy UCAS-D can trace its origin to Defense Advanced Research Projects 

Agency (DARPA) unmanned combat air vehicle advanced technology 

demonstration programs started in the late 1990s. In 2003, OSD established 

a joint Navy and Air Force program, designated the Joint Unmanned 

Combat Air System (J-UCAS), to be managed by DARPA. In 2005, the joint 

program transitioned from DARPA to the Air Force. However, a late 2005 

program decision memorandum recommended terminating the J-UCAS 

program and funding separate Navy and Air Force programs. As a result, 

the Navy initiated the Navy UCAS-D program in 2006. 

Prior to holding a Milestone B decision, the program is leveraging 

DARPA’s J-UCAS efforts in conjunction with current risk mitigation 

efforts, to evolve required technologies to the level at which DOD 

considers technology to be mature. While risk mitigation is a positive step, 

and the program seems to be on schedule, significant challenges remain. 

For example, development of an airborne data network radio that is 

critical to carrier landing and aerial refueling operations has been 

suspended indefinitely, according to program officials. While the program 

is proceeding with an earlier version of the radio, program officials note 

that the future is uncertain. Furthermore, the Defense Contract 

Management Agency expressed concern about the UCAS-D program 

entering system development; the program may use different technologies 

than are currently being demonstrated, likely resulting in significant 

additional development costs. 

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In addition to the $1.4 billion in funding detailed in table 1, we noted fiscal 

year 2007 funding of $97.1 million, and program officials identified 

$1.3 billion of known funding for either the Navy UCAS-D or DARPA JUCAS programs before fiscal year 2007—yet acknowledged the amount 

may not represent total previous funding. DOD, assuming no future cost 

increases, will have spent at least $2.8 billion for two demonstration 

aircraft. 

Table 15: DOD Planned Investment for UCAS-D, Fiscal Years 2008-2013

Then year dollars in millions 

FY 2008 FY 2009 FY 2010 FY 2011 FY 2012 FY 2013 Total

RDT&Ea $158.2 $275.8 $315.8 $271.9 $222.1 $170.4 $1,414.2

Procurement 

Total $158.2 $275.8 $315.8 $271.9 $222.1 $170.4 $1,414.2

Source: DOD fiscal year 2009 budget. 

a

DOD’s fiscal year 2010 budget, released in May 2009, reflects a fiscal year 2009 RDT&E funding 

amount of $274.7 million and a fiscal year 2010 RDT&E budget request of $311.2 million for UCAS-D. 

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Figure 11: Airborne Signals Intelligence Payload 

Source: DOD.

Mission The Air Force’s Airborne Signals Intelligence Payload (ASIP) is a common, 

scalable family of sensors designed for medium- and high-altitude aircraft. 

ASIP is expected to provide the warfighter with automatic, real-time, 

battlefield surveillance, situational awareness, and intelligence 

information that may be composed of communications and electronic 

signals—commonly referred to as signals intelligence (SIGINT). 

Within the ASIP program, the Air Force is developing three different 

sensor variants: (1) a baseline variant to be integrated onto the U-2 and 

unmanned Global Hawk aircraft; (2) a scaled-down variant, designated the 

ASIP 1C, to be integrated onto the unmanned Predator; and (3) a midsized 

variant, the ASIP 2C, to be integrated onto Reaper and potentially the 

Army’s Sky Warrior, which are also unmanned aircraft. The ASIP program 

office is responsible for developing and testing the sensors, while the 

individual aircraft program offices will be responsible for sensor 

production and integration. 

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Program Status The ASIP baseline sensor underwent an operational assessment in 

February 2008. The results of that assessment indicated that the program 

was on track to meet its effectiveness and suitability requirements. The 

program completed developmental testing in February 2009 and plans to 

begin operational testing using a U-2 aircraft in March 2009. Officials noted 

that the Air Force intends to use the operational testing on the U-2 to 

assess the baseline sensor’s readiness for initial operational testing on 

Global Hawk. Depending on the results of the U-2 tests, the Air Force may 

leave the developmental unit on the U-2 for continuing operational use. 

Flight testing on Global Hawk began in September 2008, and initial 

operational testing is scheduled to begin in late fiscal year 2009. However, 

the Global Hawk program officials recently indicated that the program will 

not meet its planned starting date for operational testing, and according to 

the ASIP Program Manager, it will most likely not begin until early 2010. 

The Global Hawk program office plans to purchase a total of 25 ASIP 

sensors for its Block 30 aircraft beginning in fiscal year 2009. According to 

the program office, those ASIP-equipped aircraft will not be fielded, 

however, until 3 years later, because of sensor production and integration. 

In October 2008, DOD approved the purchase of 2 sensors and the 

program will seek approval for an additional 3 sensors in spring 2009, 

depending upon successful completion of developmental testing. 

Integration and developmental testing of the ASIP 1C sensor will begin in 

summer 2009. According to the program office, the total number of ASIP 

1C sensors to be produced is critically linked to the Air Force’s Predator 

purchases and has not yet been finalized. Regardless, ASIP program 

officials are operating under the assumption that ASIP 1C production will 

begin in 2010. 

Air Force officials noted that uncertainties about 1C and 2C production 

quantities are in large part the result of uncertainties about the number of 

Predators and Reapers the Air Force will ultimately purchase. In addition, 

officials stated that if the Air Force purchases the Army’s Sky Warrior 

airframe to upgrade its Predators, it will have to purchase more 2C sensors 

and fewer 1Cs. However, according to DOD officials, the Air Force is 

planning to end Predator procurement and pursue an all-Reaper fleet. 

ASIP program officials noted that developmental efforts on the 1C sensor 

will continue regardless of final production decisions because knowledge 

gained from the 1C sensor is an integral part of the 2C sensor’s 

development. Because of the modular design of ASIP and the high level of 

commonality between the three ASIP variants, the program office plans to 

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seek approval to bypass a formal 2C development program and enter 

directly into production. 

Under DOD’s direction, all three ASIP sensor efforts have been combined 

under one major defense acquisition program—recently designated 

Acquisition Category ID. However, officials stated that the Air Force will 

continue to manage the program as though it were three separate 

programs. 

GAO Observations According to the program office, the ASIP baseline sensor has experienced 

110 percent cost growth from its original estimate, primarily because of 

capability enhancements, schedule impacts, and increased hardware 

deliveries. Program officials stated that although the baseline sensor’s 

development is on schedule, the program is affected by fluctuations within 

Global Hawk. Since Global Hawk’s schedule has continued to slip, ASIP 

program officials recently sought and received approval to begin ASIP 

operational testing on the U-2. The program office noted that the Air Force 

had not originally planned to conduct ASIP operational tests, but given the 

disconnect between ASIP developmental test completion and the 

beginning of Global Hawk initial operational testing, officials believe that 

additional operational testing on the U-2 would allow them to gain 

knowledge and further reduce risk before beginning Global Hawk testing. 

In January 2009, DOD directed the Army and the Air Force to analyze ASIP 

and the Army’s Tactical SIGINT Payload in an effort to move to a common 

SIGINT sensor. However, in response the services emphasized that after 

15 months of collaboration, a joint program does not make sense and 

recommended that an independent organization conduct the analysis and 

provide further direction. 

Page 62 GAO-09-520 Defense Acquisitions
Appendix II: Summary of Unmanned Aircraft 

Program Ongoing and Future Efforts 

Table 16: DOD Planned Investment for ASIP, Fiscal Years 2008-2013

Then year dollars in millions 

FY 2008 FY 2009 FY 2010 FY 2011 FY 2012 FY 2013 Total

RDT&Ea

$66.197 $110.252 $106.963 $102.455 $99.846 $105.384 $591.097

Procurement 

Total $66.197 $110.252 $106.963 $102.455 $99.846 $105.384 $591.097

Source: DOD fiscal year 2009 budget. 

Note: Procurement funding for the sensors is included in the procurement budgets of the respective 

host platforms. 

a

Because they are part of the same program element, ASIP Baseline and 1C-2C efforts are reported 

together. DOD’s fiscal year 2010 budget, released in May 2009, reflects a fiscal year 2009 RDT&E 

funding amount of $107.6 million and a fiscal year 2010 RDT&E budget request of 

$119.2 million for the ASIP program. 

Page 63 GAO-09-520 Defense Acquisitions
Appendix II: Summary of Unmanned Aircraft 

Program Ongoing and Future Efforts 

Figure 12: Multi-Platform Radar Technology Insertion Program 

Source: DOD.

Mission The Air Force’s Multi-Platform Radar Technology Insertion Program (MPRTIP) is being designed as a modular, scalable, two-dimensional active 

electronically scanned array radar. The Global Hawk MP-RTIP variant will 

provide persistent imaging on a long-endurance platform, with improved 

ground moving target indicator, limited air moving target indicators, and 

synthetic aperture radar imaging over current capability. 

MP-RTIP was originally intended for multiple platforms, including the E10A multisensor command and control aircraft, a large variant of the 

Boeing 767 aircraft. However, the E-10A program was canceled in 2007 

and all current development efforts are directed to integrating the radar 

into the Block 40 configuration of the Air Force Global Hawk unmanned 

aerial vehicle. The weight and power restrictions of the Global Hawk 

platform require a smaller radar than the variant designed for the E-10A 

aircraft. 

Program Status In September 2006, flight testing began after installation of a Global Hawk 

MP-RTIP development unit on a Proteus, a surrogate test bed aircraft. 

Proteus flight testing is planned to be complete in March 2009, which is a 

Page 64 GAO-09-520 Defense Acquisitions
Appendix II: Summary of Unmanned Aircraft 

Program Ongoing and Future Efforts 

delay from September 2007. According to program officials, radar antenna 

calibration issues caused significant delays in maturing software. By June 

2009, the MP-RTIP program plans to deliver one MP-RTIP development 

unit to the Global Hawk program for developmental testing though 

officials told us that delivery could be delayed further if Global Hawk is 

not ready to receive the radar at that time. Thereafter, the MP-RTIP 

program office will support the Global Hawk program through completion 

of initial operational testing, which is planned to start no later than 

November 2010. The Air Force currently funds development of the radar 

through the MP-RTIP program, while production will be funded through 

the Global Hawk program. Furthermore, officials told us that the Air Force 

continues to investigate other platforms for the radar. 

GAO Observations According to program officials, the MP-RTIP program office coordinates 

with the Global Hawk program office to prepare to integrate the radar on 

the Global Hawk Block 40 configuration in June 2009. Officials also told us 

that the two offices coordinated the fit tests for the radar in fall 2008, and 

continue coordination as they conducted radar system performance-level 

verification through March 2009. 

Development costs for MP-RTIP have decreased, largely because of the E10A program cancellation, according to officials. In total, these costs have 

decreased by 23 percent, from $1.7 billion at the program’s December 2003 

start to $1.3 billion as of December 2007. 

Table 17: DOD Planned Investment for MP-RTIP, Fiscal Years 2008-2013

Then year dollars in millions 

FY 2008 FY 2009 FY 2010 FY 2011 FY 2012 FY 2013 Total 

RDT&Ea$38.664 $42.215 0 0 0 0 $80.879

Procurement 

Total $38.664 $42.215 0 0 0 0 $80.879

Source: DOD fiscal year 2009 budget. 

a

DOD’s fiscal year 2010 budget, released in May 2009, reflects a fiscal year 2009 RDT&E funding 

amount of $42.1 million and a fiscal year 2010 RDT&E budget request of $71.9 million for Global 

Hawk. 

Page 65 GAO-09-520 Defense Acquisitions
Appendix III: Comments from the Department Appendix III: Comments from the of Defense 

Department of Defense 

Page 66 GAO-09-520 Defense Acquisitions
Appendix III: Comments from the Department 

of Defense 

Page 67 GAO-09-520 Defense Acquisitions
Appendix III: Comments from the Department 

of Defense 

Page 68 GAO-09-520 Defense Acquisitions
Appendix III: Comments from the Department 

of Defense 

Page 69 GAO-09-520 Defense Acquisitions
Appendix IV: 

A

GAO Contact and Staff 

cknowledgments 

Page 70 GAO-09-520 

Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff 

Acknowledgments 

Michael J. Sullivan (202) 512-4841 or sullivanm@gao.gov GAO Contact 

In addition to the contact named above, principal contributors to this 

report were Bruce Fairbairn, Assistant Director; Travis Masters; Rae Ann 

Sapp; Karen Sloan; Leigh Ann Nally; Raffaele Roffo; Brian Smith; and 

Laura Jezewski. 

Acknowledgments 

 Defense Acquisitions 
Related GAO Products Related GAO Products 

Defense Acquisitions: Assessments of Selected Weapon Programs. 

GAO-09-326SP. Washington, D.C.: March 30, 2009. 

Unmanned Aircraft Systems: Additional Actions Needed to Improve 

Management and Integration of DOD Efforts to Support Warfighter 

Needs. GAO-09-175. Washington, D.C.: November 14, 2008. 

Defense Acquisitions: DOD’s Requirements Determination Process Has 

Not Been Effective in Prioritizing Joint Capabilities. GAO-08-1060. 

Washington, D.C.: September 25, 2008. 

Defense Acquisitions: A Knowledge-Based Funding Approach Could 

Improve Major Weapon System Program Outcomes. GAO-08-619. 

Washington, D.C.: July 2, 2008. 

Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance: DOD Can Better Assess 

and Integrate ISR Capabilities and Oversee Development of Future ISR 

Requirements. GAO-08-374. Washington, D.C.: March 24, 2008. 

Defense Acquisitions: Greater Synergies Possible for DOD’s Intelligence, 

Surveillance, and Reconnaissance Systems. GAO-07-578. Washington, 

D.C.: May 17, 2007. 

Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance: Preliminary 

Observations on DOD’s Approach to Managing Requirements for New 

Systems, Existing Assets, and Systems Development. GAO-07-596T. 

Washington, D.C.: April 19, 2007. 

Defense Acquisitions: Better Acquisition Strategy Needed for Successful 

Development of the Army’s Warrior Unmanned Aircraft System. 

GAO-06-593. Washington, D.C.: May 19, 2006. 

Unmanned Aircraft Systems: Improved Planning and Acquisition 

Strategies Can Help Address Operational Challenges. GAO-06-610T. 

Washington, D.C.: April 6, 2006. 

Unmanned Aircraft Systems: New DOD Programs Can Learn from Past 

Efforts to Craft Better and Less Risky Acquisition Strategies. 

GAO-06-447. Washington, D.C.: March 15, 2006. 

Unmanned Aircraft Systems: Global Hawk Cost Increase Understated in 

Nunn-McCurdy Report. GAO-06-222R. Washington, D.C.: December 15, 

2005. 

Page 71 GAO-09-520 Defense Acquisitions
Related GAO Products 

Unmanned Aircraft Systems: DOD Needs to More Effectively Promote 

Interoperability and Improve Performance Assessments. GAO-06-49. 

Washington, D.C.: December 13, 2005. 

Unmanned Aerial Vehicles: Improved Strategic and Acquisition 

Planning Can Help Address Emerging Challenges. GAO-05-395T. 

Washington, D.C.: March 9, 2005. 

Unmanned Aerial Vehicles: Changes in Global Hawk’s Acquisition 

Strategy Are Needed to Reduce Program Risks. GAO-05-6. Washington, 

D.C.: November 5, 2004. 

(120762) Page 72 GAO-09-520 Defense Acquisitions
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