UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA 

 _________________________________________ 

 ) 

Todd M. Ladson, ) 

 ) 

 Plaintiff, ) 

 ) 

 v. ) Civil No. 14-cv-001586 (APM) 

 ) 

The George Washington University, ) 

 ) 

 Defendant. ) 

_________________________________________ ) 

MEMORANDUM OPINION 

I. INTRODUCTION 

Plaintiff Todd M. Ladson filed this lawsuit against his former employer, Defendant The 

George Washington University (“GW” or “the University”), alleging that he was terminated from 

his position as a campus police officer due to: (1) race discrimination in violation of Title VII of 

the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 1981, and the D.C. Human Rights Act; and (2) age 

discrimination in violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act and the D.C. Human 

Rights Act. This lawsuit stems from a complaint made in March 2013, when Plaintiff, a 24-veteran 

of the GW campus police, was accused by a fellow officer of making inappropriate comments 

about her sexual preference and activities. The University initiated a months-long investigation 

into the complaint, which uncovered more evidence of inappropriate comments by Plaintiff. 

Defendant ultimately determined that Plaintiff’s behavior violated the University’s policy against 

sexual harassment and created a hostile work environment for his colleagues. In September 2013, 

Plaintiff was terminated from his position. 

 Plaintiff views these events differently. He denies making the comments in question and 

argues that, even if he did, they were not harassing and discriminatory, but rather were innocent 
2 

and misinterpreted. He further argues that the University’s investigation was unfair and one-sided. 

Finally, Plaintiff contends that the University terminated him due to his race and age while it failed 

to punish other instances of similar, or more egregious, conduct by white officers and younger 

officers. 

 The court now considers Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment. Having reviewed 

the parties’ briefing and the evidence, the court finds that no reasonable jury could conclude that 

George Washington University discriminated against Plaintiff based on his race or his age when it 

terminated him. The court therefore grants Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment. 

II. BACKGROUND 

A. Factual Background 

1. The Complaint Against Officer Ladson 

Plaintiff Todd Ladson began working at The George Washington University (“GW” or 

“the University”) in 1989. Pl.’s Opp’n to Def.’s Mot. for Summ. J., ECF No. 15 [hereinafter Pl.’s 

Opp’n], at 8. By 2013, Plaintiff was serving a supervisory role as a Master Patrol Officer in GW’s 

police force. Def.’s Mot. for Summ. J., ECF No. 14 [hereinafter Def.’s Mot.], Def.’s Stmt. of 

Material Facts, ECF No. 14-2 [hereinafter Def.’s Stmt.], ¶ 1; Pl.’s Opp’n, Stmt. of Material Facts 

in Dispute, ECF No. 15-1 [hereinafter Pl.’s Stmt.], ¶ 1. In March 2013, one of Plaintiff’s 

colleagues, GW police officer Tiffany Justice, complained to the University that Plaintiff had made 

inappropriate comments about her sexual preference and activities. Def.’s Mot, Ex. 1, March 27, 

2013, Email from Tiffany Justice to Tara Pereira, ECF No. 14-3 [hereinafter Justice Email]. 

Specifically, Officer Justice alleged that Plaintiff had made three inappropriate remarks, namely: 

(1) he made comments to Officer Linda Queen regarding her (Queen’s) sexuality and suggesting 

that she was sexually involved with Officer Justice; (2) he suggested to another officer that Officer 
3 

Justice was “one of you,” thereby implying that Officer Justice was a lesbian; and (3) he warned a 

new officer that she will “have men and women after her.” Justice Email at 1; Def.’s Stmt. ¶ 2; 

Pl.’s Stmt. ¶ 2. 

GW prohibits sexual harassment by its employees. Def.’s Stmt. ¶¶ 3-4; Pl.’s Stmt. ¶¶ 3-4; 

see also Def.’s Mot., Ex. 2, Interim Sexual Harassment and Sexual Violence Policy and 

Procedures, ECF No. 14-4.1

 Pursuant to its policy, upon receiving Officer Justice’s complaint 

against Plaintiff, GW began an investigation into Plaintiff’s comments. Def.’s Stmt. ¶ 9; Pl.’s 

Stmt. ¶ 9. Plaintiff was suspended with pay on April 2, 2013, “pending an investigation regarding 

recent allegations that you have been improperly making unwanted comments of a sexual nature 

about a co-worker and her private life.” Def.’s Mot., Ex. 7, Letter to Officer Ladson from Chief 

Kevin Hay, April 2, 2013, ECF No. 14-9. 

2. The Investigation by GW Into Officer Ladson’s Comments 

Tara Pereira, GW’s then-Assistant Title IX Coordinator and Director of Campus Inclusion 

Initiatives, received the initial complaint from Officer Justice and conducted the investigation into 

Plaintiff’s alleged comments. Def.’s Mot., Ex. 10, Email from Tara Pereira to Officer Ladson, 

April 3, 2013, ECF No. 14-12. As part of her investigation, Ms. Pereira interviewed approximately 

13 people and met with Plaintiff multiple times. Def.’s Stmt. ¶¶ 13-14; Pl.’s Stmt. ¶¶ 13-14. 

Through her efforts, Ms. Pereira learned—among other things—that Plaintiff had made “lots of 

racist and sexually graphic” comments; that he had new officer trainees “bark like a dog” as they 

crawled through a small tunnel; and that he had taught an officer how to smoke marijuana without 

being caught. Officer Justice, in particular, told Ms. Pereira that Plaintiff’s comments “impacted 

 

1

 Plaintiff was well-aware of his employer’s policy prohibiting sexual harassment and had attended a training on 

preventing harassment as recently as March 2013. Def.’s Stmt. ¶¶ 5-8; Pl.’s Stmt. ¶¶ 5-8; Def.’s Mot., Ex. 6, 

Preventing Harassment Certificate of Completion, ECF No. 14-8. 
4 

her safety, her environment, her work performance, and the culture of [Plaintiff’s] shifts.” Def.’s 

Mot., Ex. 9, Dep. of Tara Pereira, ECF No. 14-11 [hereinafter Pereira Dep.], at 61-75. Officer 

Justice further reported that Plaintiff’s comments “mak[e] it hard to come to work,” and that 

Plaintiff had once asked her “[w]hy are you staring at me? Do I owe you child support?” Def.’s 

Mot., Ex 12, Pereira Investigation Notes, ECF No. 14-14. 

 When Plaintiff and his union representative met with Ms. Pereira as part of the 

investigation, he denied making these comments and suggested that the witnesses who had come 

forward were lying because they were jealous of him for “making the most overtime” and being 

“very popular” and a “happy-go-lucky person.” Def.’s Mot., Ex. 3, Dep. of Todd Ladson, ECF 

No. 14-5 [hereinafter Ladson Dep.], at 85-86. However, Plaintiff was unable to point to any 

evidence to corroborate his claim that the officers who had testified against him were jealous of 

him, id. at 86, or that his accusers had lied during the investigation, id. at 95. 

 At the conclusion of her investigation, Ms. Pereira found that Plaintiff’s conduct was “longstanding” and “pervasive” and had impacted numerous officers. Def.’s Stmt. ¶ 33; Pl.’s Stmt. 

¶ 22; Pereira Dep. at 100. After the investigation, Plaintiff and his union representative met with 

Ms. Pereira and Kevin Hay, Chief of the GW Police Department. Def.’s Stmt ¶ 34; Pl.’s Stmt. 

¶ 22. The parties were unable to reach a resolution and so, pursuant to University policy, Chief 

Hay requested that a formal hearing be held. Def.’s Mot., Ex. 15, Memorandum Requesting 

Formal Hearing Regarding Allegations Against Officer Ladson, ECF No. 14-17, at 1-2. 

 On August 1, 2013, the University convened a Special Panel2

 to hear the complaint filed 

against Plaintiff alleging sexual harassment and conduct that created a hostile work environment. 

 

2

 The members of the Special Panel were: (1) Christopher A. Bracey (Chair), Senior Associate Dean for Academic 

Affairs, and Professor of Law, GW Law School; (2) Kimberly D. Acquaviva, Director of Faculty Development, and 

Associate Professor of Nursing, GW School of Nursing; (3) Eric Annis, Production Manager, Lisner Auditorium; (4) 
5 

Def.’s Mot., Ex. 11, Special Panel Report Regarding Complaint Against Officer Todd Ladson, 

August 14, 2013, ECF No. 14-13 [hereinafter Special Panel Report], at 1. At the hearing, Chief 

Hay and Plaintiff made opening statements. Id. at 3. Chief Hay then presented five witnesses, 

including Officer Justice and Ms. Pereira. Id. Those witnesses “testified as to remarks and 

comments made by Officer Ladson regarding their sexuality or the sexuality of others.” Id. at 6. 

The Special Panel heard numerous examples of inappropriate comments made by Plaintiff and 

their effect on his coworkers, including: 

 Officer Justice testified that Plaintiff had told the parents of another officer that their 

daughter was in a relationship with Officer Justice; 

 Security Officer Octavia Livingston testified that Plaintiff had told her that he did not 

approve of homosexuals and tried “to convince her that she should be with men”; 

 Former Police Officer Suzanne Combs testified that she had heard Plaintiff make 

negative comments following her marriage to her female partner in 2011; 

 Security Officer Livingston testified that Plaintiff had made graphic comments while 

interrogating her about her sexual behavior. She further testified that she had 

“submit[ted] herself” to Plaintiff’s treatment and did not file a formal complaint 

because Plaintiff’s recommendation was critical to her own status as an officer in the 

GW Police Department; 

 Officer Queen testified that Plaintiff had inquired whether she and Officer Justice 

“were fucking” and recalled being told that Plaintiff described her as “crazy as shit” 

and that she “fucks with girls when she wants to”; 

 Three witnesses testified that Plaintiff’s conduct made it more difficult for lesbian 

officers to work among and be accepted by their fellow officers, and mentioned specific 

ways in which that “chilling effect” changed their feelings or behavior; and 

 Witnesses testified that they “dreaded their training period” with Plaintiff and at least 

two witnesses testified that they had requested not to be assigned to serve with Plaintiff. 

Id. at 6-7. 

 

Huda M. Ayas, Executive Director, International Medical Programs; (5) Moira E. Secrest, Business Manager, National 

Health Policy Forum; and (6) Joyce M. Whitmore, Serials Acquisitions Manager, Gelman Library. 
6 

When it was his turn to present evidence, Plaintiff “did not . . . present any witnesses, 

testimony, or evidence.” Id. at 3. According to the Special Panel Report, Plaintiff was “given 

multiple opportunities” to offer witnesses, testimony, or evidence to show that the statements heard 

by the panel were false, but declined to do so, instead offering only a “blanket denial of all 

allegations” in his opening and closing statements. Id. at 7. Plaintiff admits that he “presented no 

evidence that any of the testimony [heard by the panel] was false.” Pl.’s Stmt. ¶ 31. He complains, 

however, that his counsel who was present at the hearing “was not allowed to speak or utter a work 

[sic] and/or interrupt the proceedings.” Pl.’s Opp’n at 13. 

 Following the hearing, the Special Panel found that there was “ample evidence” to support 

Officer Justice’s original allegations, along with additional evidence of inappropriate comments 

made by Plaintiff. Id. at 4, 6. Those allegations led the Special Panel to conclude that “Officer 

Ladson’s conduct created a hostile work environment.” Id. Rather than recommend a punishment, 

the Report deferred to the GW Police Department to determine how best to sanction Plaintiff. Id. 

at 7. The Report urged the GW Police Department to consider, among other things, “[t]he duration 

of Officer Ladson’s service at the University and, in particular, his long record of relatively 

distinguished service” and that this was the first complaint alleging harassment brought against 

him. Id. 

On September 4, 2013, Chief Hay sent Plaintiff a letter terminating his employment. Def.’s 

Stmt. ¶ 48; Pl.’s Stmt. ¶ 35; see also Def.’s Mot., Ex. 17, Notice of Termination of Employment, 

ECF No. 14-15, at 1. Chief Hay explained during his deposition that he had determined that 

Plaintiff should be fired due to the “[t]otality of circumstances based on the finding of the 

investigation conducted by Tara Pereira,” “[t]he egregiousness of the testimony given at the 

hearing, the fact that there was multiple victims involved, and the fact that he was essentially in a 
7 

supervisory role as a field training officer, and as a master patrol officer.” Def.’s Mot., Ex. 24, 

Dep. of Kevin Hay, ECF No. 14-26 [hereinafter Hay Dep.], at 21. 

B. Procedural History 

On August 14, 2014, Plaintiff filed a Complaint in the Superior Court for the District of 

Columbia. See Ladson v. George Washington University, Case No. 2014 CA 005029 B. 

Defendant removed the case to this court on September 18, 2014. See Notice of Removal, ECF 

No. 1. On September 25, 2015, after discovery concluded, Defendant filed a Motion for Summary 

Judgment arguing that Plaintiff was not discriminated against on the basis of his race or his age, 

but rather that he was terminated from his employment for a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason, 

namely, multiple instances of sexual harassment in violation of University policy. See generally

Def.’s Mot. On October 23, 2015, Plaintiff filed his Opposition to Defendant’s Motion for 

Summary Judgment, contending that his termination constituted discrimination on the basis of his 

race and age. See generally Pl.’s Opp’n. On November 6, 2015, Defendant filed a Reply to 

Plaintiff’s Opposition. See generally Def.’s Reply to Pl.’s Opp’n, ECF No. 16 [hereinafter Def.’s 

Reply]. 

III. LEGAL STANDARD 

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 provides that a court should grant summary judgment 

if “there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and [ ] the moving party is entitled to a judgment 

as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 56(a)). A material fact is one that is capable of affecting the 

outcome of litigation. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). 

Rule 56 “mandates the entry of summary judgment, after adequate time for discovery and 

upon motion, against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of 

an element essential to that party’s case, [ ] on which that party will bear the burden of proof at 
8 

trial.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). The party moving for summary 

judgment “bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion” 

and identifying those portions of the record that it believes “demonstrate the absence of a genuine 

issue of material fact.” Id. at 323. 

Once the moving party has made an adequate showing that a fact cannot be disputed, the 

burden shifts to the party opposing summary judgment to “set forth specific facts showing that 

there is a genuine issue for trial.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 250 (citation and internal quotation marks 

omitted) (footnote omitted). The nonmoving party may oppose the motion using “any of the kinds 

of evidentiary materials listed in Rule 56(c), except the mere pleadings themselves, and it is from 

this list that one would normally expect the nonmoving party to make the showing to which [the 

Court has] referred.” Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 324. “The evidence of the non-movant is to be 

believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his favor.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255 

(citations omitted). However, “to defeat a motion for summary judgment, the non-moving party 

must offer more than mere unsupported allegations or denials.” Dormu v. District of Columbia, 

795 F. Supp. 2d 7, 17 (D.D.C. 2011) (citing Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324). In other words, if the nonmovant’s evidence is “merely colorable” or “not significantly probative,” summary judgment may 

be granted. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249-50. Summary judgment, then, is appropriate when the nonmoving party fails to offer “evidence on which the jury could reasonably find for the [nonmovant].” Id. at 252. 

IV. DISCUSSION 

The court first considers whether a reasonable jury could conclude that Plaintiff’s 

termination constituted illegal discrimination based on race. The court then turns to Plaintiff’s 

claim that he was terminated due to his age. 
9 

A. Plaintiff’s Race Discrimination Claim 

Plaintiff claims that Defendant’s decision to terminate him constituted unlawful race 

discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a); 42 U.S.C. 

§ 1981; and the District of Columbia Human Rights Act, D.C. Code § 2-1401.01 et seq. The legal 

standards applicable to his claims are the same: All three “require proof of intentional 

discrimination, which may be shown by direct or indirect evidence.” Lemmons v. Georgetown 

Univ. Hosp., 431 F. Supp. 2d 76, 86 (D.D.C. 2006) (citations omitted). “Where, as here, the 

plaintiff has proffered no direct evidence of intentional discrimination, race discrimination claims 

under both the DCHRA and Section 1981 are evaluated using the same framework as claims 

arising under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.” Id. (citations omitted). Thus, the court 

analyzes all three race discrimination claims under the framework set out in McDonnell Douglas 

Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). See Weber v. Battista, 494 F.3d 179, 182 (D.C. Cir. 2007). 

 A Title VII plaintiff bears ‘[t]he ultimate burden of persuading the trier of fact that the 

defendant intentionally discriminated” against him. Texas Dep’t of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 

450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981). To proceed under the McDonnell Douglas standard, a plaintiff “must 

carry the initial burden under the statute of establishing a prima facie case of [race, sex, age] 

discrimination.” Bennett v. Solis, 729 F. Supp.2d 54, 59 (D.D.C. 2010) (citing McDonnell 

Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802). However, in cases where the employer has asserted a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the decision, “the district court need not—and should not—decide 

whether the plaintiff actually made out a prima facie case under McDonnell Douglas.” Brady v. 

Office of Sergeant at Arms, 520 F.3d 490, 494 (D.C. Cir. 2008). Instead, the court “must resolve 

one central question: Has the employee produced sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to find 

that the employer’s asserted non-discriminatory reason was not the actual reason and that the 
10 

employer intentionally discriminated against the employee on the basis of race, color, religion, 

sex, or national origin?” Id. (citations omitted). 

 In this case, Defendant has asserted a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for terminating 

Plaintiff—namely, that he violated the University’s policy on sexual harassment. Thus, the court 

turns to the central issue: whether Plaintiff has produced evidence sufficient for a reasonable jury 

to find that the employer’s stated reason was not the actual reason and that instead it intentionally 

discriminated against him based on his race. See id. at 495. Plaintiff asserts three arguments to 

suggest that GW’s stated reason for firing him was pretext for racial discrimination: (1) that GW 

terminated Plaintiff based on “subjective” criteria; (2) that the investigation into Plaintiff’s 

comments was “one-sided”; and (3) that Defendant punished white officers less harshly for similar 

conduct. See generally Pl.’s Opp’n. The court considers each argument in turn. 

1. Whether Plaintiff was Fired Based on Subjective Criteria 

Plaintiff argues that the allegations of sexual harassment brought against him were “vague, 

ambiguous, subjective and open to any thousands of possibilities and interpretations,” suggesting 

that the stated reason for his termination was pretext for a more nefarious purpose. To support this 

allegation, Plaintiff points to the three incidents that Officer Justice included in her initial 

complaint and implies that all three could have been interpreted in a non-sexual, non-offensive 

way. Pl.’s Opp’n at 2. Plaintiff also points to the testimony of Suzanne Combs, a fellow GW 

police officer, who testified that Plaintiff had not made any comments to her about her own sexual 

orientation, but that she had heard from her colleagues that Plaintiff was homophobic and that “his 

aura and his energy” suggested that he held antipathy for gays. Pl.’s Opp’n at 3; see also Pl.’s 

Opp’n., Ex. 4, Dep. of Suzanne Combs, ECF No. 15-4 [hereinafter Combs Dep.], at 13, 28, 38. 

According to Plaintiff, whether his alleged comments to Officer Justice and others were offensive 
11 

and harassing is an entirely subjective assessment. What might be offensive and harassing to one 

person, he seems to argue, might be viewed as in perfectly good fun to someone else. From that 

questionable premise, he contends that his termination—based on a subjective evaluation of his 

behavior—is inherently “suspect.” Pl.’s Mot. at 15. 

 Plaintiff is correct that “courts traditionally treat explanations that rely heavily on 

subjective considerations with caution.” Aka v. Wash. Hosp. Ctr., 156 F.3d 1284, 1298 (D.C. Cir. 

1998). To that end, courts should view with caution explanations for employment decisions based 

on language such as “dedicated,” “enthusiasm,” “interpersonal skills,” and “being upbeat.” 

See Bennett, 729 F. Supp. 2d at 66. But the court in Aka also explained that “employers may of 

course take subjective considerations into account in their employment decisions.” Id. If an 

employer uses subjective criteria to make an employment decision but has “other, well-founded 

reasons” for the decision, summary judgment for the defendant may be appropriate. Id. 

Furthermore, employers often have to make employment decisions “based on credibility 

assessments, circumstantial evidence, and incomplete information.” Brady, 520 F.3d at 496. 

If GW had fired Plaintiff based solely on Officer Combs’ view that Plaintiff had an “aura” 

and an “energy” that suggested he disapproved of homosexuals, Plaintiff might have reason to 

complain. But Defendant’s consideration of Plaintiff’s well-documented boorish and crude 

behavior is not the kind of “subjective consideration” that is cautioned against by the court in Aka. 

The uncontested evidence shows that, following a wide-ranging investigation, Plaintiff was fired 

because he was found to have repeatedly made offensive and inappropriate sexual comments to 

multiple colleagues, while occupying a supervisory role. Hay Dep. at 21. Officer Justice originally 

complained about three statements concerning her sexuality, which made her “feel disrespected, 

uncomfortable, and uneasy and has created a hostile work environment for me.” Justice Email 
12 

at 1. But those comments were only the tip of the iceberg. The subsequent investigation uncovered 

numerous similar comments made to multiple GW officers, including Plaintiff telling a coworker 

he did not approve of “homosexuals”; trying to convince a coworker “that she should be with men 

– that ‘this is what G-O-D intended’”; using crude and inappropriate language; and asking if female 

coworkers were involved sexually. Special Panel Report at 6. The University’s Title IX 

investigator described Plaintiff’s conduct as “one of the most significant sexual harassment cases” 

that she has seen. Pereira Dep. at 77, 100. The Special Panel confirmed the investigator’s findings. 

Special Panel Report at 5-6. 

There is nothing “subjective”—in the Aka sense—about the foregoing evidence, and thus 

there is nothing about GW’s reliance on such evidence that would give rise to an inference of 

discriminatory intent. Indeed, Plaintiff admitted as much when he conceded that if, in fact, he had 

said the things that Officer Justice and others accused him of saying, that he should have been 

fired. See Ladson Dep. at 89-90 (“Q: You agree that if you said these things that you’re accused 

of, you should very [sic] fired, right? A: Yes, sir.”). 

2. Whether GW’s Investigation was Unfair 

Next, Plaintiff contends that GW’s investigation was “botched and one-sided” because GW 

“intentionally ignored non-collaborating evidence from other witnesses and also refused to 

interview Ladson’s witnesses.” Pl.’s Opp’n at 16. Plaintiff also contends that his counsel was not 

allowed to question witnesses at the Special Panel hearing and was “instructed not to say a word.” 

Id. at 3, n. 16. 

It is true that an “employer’s investigation that is so unsystematic and incomplete that a 

factfinder could conclude that the employer sought, not to discover the truth, but to cover up its 

own discrimination can also permit a factfinder to find pretext.” Burley v. Nat’l Passenger Rail 
13 

Corp., 801 F.3d 290, 296 (D.C. Cir. 2015). But here, Plaintiff does not in any meaningful way 

identify how the investigation against him was deficient, let alone “so unsystematic and 

incomplete” as would enable a trier of fact to infer pretext. 

Plaintiff asserts that Ms. Pereira failed to interview witnesses that would have been 

favorable to him, see Pl.’s Opp’n at 11, but he does not identify any such witness by name or what 

such a witness would have said, see id. at 11, 16. Moreover, Plaintiff argues that Ms. Pereira 

ignored evidence from officers who had worked with Plaintiff but had never heard him utter any 

harassing comments. See id. at 12. However, this argument is difficult to understand, as Plaintiff 

does not explain whether Ms. Pereira simply refused to interview such witnesses or whether she 

buried favorable evidence after interviewing them. Nor does he explain how such evidence would 

have either negated the specific accusations against him or bolstered his denials. See id. In any 

event, even if Plaintiff had identified shortcomings in the investigation, he cannot argue that he 

was prevented from calling favorable witnesses before the Special Panel. After all, he elected to 

call no witnesses. See Special Panel Report at 3, 7 (stating that Plaintiff declined the opportunity 

to present witnesses, testimony, or evidence at the hearing). 

Plaintiff’s assertion that the Special Panel was a “kangaroo court” because his counsel was 

unable to speak on his behalf is equally without merit. Pl.’s Opp’n at 3 n.16. Whatever one thinks 

of university procedures that minimize the role of the accused’s counsel or advisor at a hearing—

and there are critics of such policies3

—Plaintiff has not pointed to any deviation from Defendant’s 

 

3 See, e.g., Emily D. Safko, Are Campus Sexual Assault Tribunals Fair?: The Need for Judicial Review and Additional 

Due Process Protections in Light of New Case Law, 84 Fordham L. Rev. 2289, 2330 (2016) (“Congress should enact 

legislation that requires schools to allow students representation during disciplinary proceedings. In the due process 

and Title IX contexts, courts generally have not recognized an absolute right to attorney representation for students at 

school disciplinary proceedings.”); Robert B. Groholski, The Right to Representation by Counsel in University 

Disciplinary Proceedings: A Denial of Due Process of Law, 19 N. Ill. U. L. Rev. 739, 800 (1999) (“Given the 

importance of the interest at stake and the existence of procedural safeguards which would reduce any burden placed 

on a university, the right to representation by retained counsel should be required as an element of due process in 

university disciplinary proceedings.”). 
14 

established policies in this case that would give rise to an inference of pretext. See Def.’s Mot., 

Ex. 2, The George Washington University Interim Sexual Harassment and Sexual Violence Policy 

and Procedures, ECF No. 14-4, at GWU 01019 (providing that “[n]o advisor, including an attorney 

who may be acting as an advisor, may speak on behalf of the party, make an opening or closing 

statement, present testimony or examine witnesses”). 

3. Whether GW Selectively Enforced its Sexual Harassment Policy Based on 

Race 

Lastly, Plaintiff argues that Defendant’s decision to terminate him was inconsistent with—

and more harsh than—the University’s treatment of white officers who have engaged in similar 

conduct. Pl.’s Opp’n at 4. He points to three current or former GW campus police officers who, 

according to Plaintiff, made comparable comments or committed comparable acts but were treated 

with more leniency by the University: George Brittle, Reed Jones, and Christopher Brown. Id. at 

5. Plaintiff argues that, due to the similarities in their employment statuses and because they too 

were subject to GW’s sexual harassment policy, the only explanation for why the three officers 

were “treated better for doing and saying much worse” than Plaintiff is because they are white. Id. 

at 17-18. If true, Plaintiff avers that such evidence suggests that the stated reason for Plaintiff’s 

termination was pretext for racial discrimination. Id. The court first describes the evidence 

concerning these comparators, and then analyzes whether that evidence aids Plaintiff. 

 a. The comparators 

i. George Brittle 

Plaintiff claims that George Brittle, a white officer, referred to another officer by her badge 

number, “69,” which refers to a sexual position, and “made frequent sexual comments about gay 
15 

men.” Compl., ECF No. 1, ¶¶ 27-28. Plaintiff further contends that Officer Brittle received fiveday suspensions for those transgressions but was never terminated. Id. 

 Evidence shows that in 1991, Officer Brittle admitted saying to a female officer that she 

“still use[s] the [locker] number 69.” Def.’s Mot., Ex 18, Memorandum Regarding Verbal 

Counseling – Corporal George Brittle, ECF No. 14-20 [hereinafter Brittle Verbal Counseling 

Letter]. Officer Brittle apologized for the remark and was “counseled and warned” by his 

supervisor, Captain Anthony RoccoGrande, not to make jokes or engage in sexual innuendo about 

his colleagues. 

 Officer Brittle was involved in another incident in 2008, where he “made comments 

perceived as homophobic and racially insensitive that belittled and embarrassed [his] 

subordinates.” Def.’s Mot., Ex. 19, Letter of Warning to Lieutenant George Brittle, ECF No. 14-

21 [hereinafter Brittle Letter of Warning]. The Letter of Warning also referenced a third incident 

in 2007 when Brittle “made a sexually coercive remark that embarrassed” his subordinate and 

“created a situation of professional embarrassment” for the subordinate, for Brittle, and for the 

GW Police Department. Id. Brittle’s supervisor at the time, Executive Assistant Chief Isom, 

expressed disappointment and “great concern” over his behavior and required that Brittle 

(1) apologize to his shift; (2) take a University class in diversity; and (3) take a departmental class 

on working in a diverse environment. Id. 

ii. Reed Jones 

Plaintiff next alleges that Officer Reed Jones, a 26-year old white officer, frequently used 

a racial slur to refer to African-American officers, for which he was suspended but not terminated. 

Compl. ¶ 29. In 2012, the GW Police Department received an anonymous complaint alleging that 

Officer Jones had used racial slurs in reference to people of color. Def.’s Mot., Ex 25, Memo. 
16 

From Frank Demes Regarding Compl. Against Officer Reed Jones, ECF No. 14-27 [hereinafter 

Jones Memo]. In response to that complaint, GW began an investigation into Officer Jones’ 

conduct that involved more than 42 interviews. Id. Of all the individuals interviewed, one 

remembered hearing Officer Jones use the actual term “racial slur” but no one recalled him actually 

uttering a racial slur. Id. The investigation determined that the complaint was “unfounded and 

completely without merit.” Id. 

iii. Christopher Brown 

Finally, Plaintiff contends that Officer Christopher Brown sexually harassed fellow officer 

Linda Queen when he asked her out on a date but was not fired for his conduct. Ladson Dep. at 

165. Plaintiff admits that he is unaware of any other allegations against Officer Brown. Id. at 166. 

An investigation by Ms. Pereira concluded that Officer Brown did, in fact, ask Officer Queen and 

other officers to have breakfast with him in an attempt “to get to know his staff.” Pereira Dep. at 

25. 

 b. Analysis of comparator evidence 

 “One way to discredit an employer’s justification is to show that similarly situated 

employees of a different race received more favorable treatment.” Royall v. Nat'l Ass’n of Letter 

Carriers, AFL–CIO, 548 F.3d 137, 145 (D.C. Cir. 2008). “For a plaintiff to prove that she is 

similarly situated to another employee, she must demonstrate that she and the alleged similarlysituated employee ‘were charged with offenses of comparable seriousness,’ and ‘that all of the 

relevant aspects of her employment situation were nearly identical to those of the other 

employee.’” Wheeler v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 812 F.3d 1109, 1115-16 (D.C. Cir. 2016) 

(quoting Burley, 801 F.3d at 301 (alteration omitted)). “Factors that bear on whether someone is 

an appropriate comparator include the similarity of the plaintiff’s and the putative comparator’s 
17 

job and job duties, whether they were disciplined by the same supervisor, and, in cases involving 

discipline, the similarity of their offenses.” Id. at 1116 (quoting Burley, 801 F.3d at 301) (internal 

quotation marks omitted). 

 Applying these principles, not one of the three GW campus police officers identified by 

Plaintiff is a valid comparator. Beginning with former Officer Brittle, he cannot be considered a 

comparator to Plaintiff because he was not supervised by Chief Hay. See Wheeler, 812 F.3d at 

1116 (citing as a factor “whether [the plaintiff and putative comparator] were disciplined by the 

same supervisor”). Plaintiff seems to admit as much. Pl.’s Opp’n at 6 (“even if we were to exclude 

Brittle out of the comparator calculus because he was not supervised by Chief Kevin Hay...”). 

 With respect to Officer Jones, the GW Police Department conducted an investigation into 

an anonymous complaint that he made racial slurs about people of color and, after more than 

42 interviews, concluded only that Officer Jones used the term “racial slur,” but did not actually 

use any racial slurs. Jones Memo at 1. The unsubstantiated allegation against Officer Jones in no 

way compare to the ultimately proven, repeated instances of sexual harassment committed by 

Plaintiff. See Wheeler, 812 F.3d at 1116 (citing as a factor “the similarity of [the plaintiff’s and 

comparator’s] offenses”). 

 Plaintiff fares no better with Officer Brown. He contends that Brown sexually harassed 

his coworker Officer Queen when he “tr[ied] to date” her. Ladson Dep. at 165. Plaintiff offers no 

other evidence that Brown violated GW’s policy against sexual harassment. Ms. Pereira 

investigated Brown’s alleged conduct, but concluded that Brown had asked Officer Queen and 

other officers to have breakfast with him in an attempt to get to know his staff. Pereira Dep. at 25-

26. But even if Officer Brown had asked Officer Queen out on a date, and thereby violated 

University policy, the seriousness of that behavior pales in comparison to that of Plaintiff. He was 
18 

found to have asked Officer Queen—the very same officer who Brown allegedly asked out on a 

date—if she and Officer Justice “were fucking” and told another officer that Officer Queen “was 

crazy as shit” and “fucks with girls when she wants to.” Special Panel Report at 6. Any suggestion 

of comparability between Plaintiff and Officer Brown is wildly off the mark. 

 In sum, none of the officers Plaintiff cites are valid comparators. As a result, Defendant’s 

treatment of Plaintiff in comparison to its treatment of those officers is not evidence of pretext. 

More generally, Plaintiff has not offered a shred of evidence that would allow a reasonable jury to 

conclude that he was terminated because of racial discrimination, rather than due to the numerous 

acts of sexual harassment that his employer found him to have committed. For the reasons stated 

above, the court grants summary judgment in favor of Defendant as to Plaintiff’s race 

discrimination claims. 

B. Plaintiff’s Age Discrimination Claim 

Plaintiff also alleges that his termination was based on improper age discrimination under 

the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, see id. ¶¶ 69-78, and under the DCHRA, see Compl. 

¶¶ 44-52. But Plaintiff does not address his age discrimination claims in his summary judgment 

opposition; in fact, those claims are not even mentioned. As a result, the court will treat 

Defendant’s motion as to Plaintiff’s claims of age discrimination as conceded. See Wilkins v. 

Jackson, 750 F. Supp. 2d 160, 162 (D.D.C. 2010) (“It is well established that if a plaintiff fails to 

respond to an argument raised in a motion for summary judgment, it is proper to treat that argument 

as conceded.”); Sykes v. Dudas, 573 F. Supp. 2d 191, 202 (D.D.C. 2008) (“[W]hen a party responds 

to some but not all arguments raised on a Motion for Summary Judgment, a court may fairly view 

the unacknowledged arguments as conceded.”). 
19 

 Moreover, even if Plaintiff has not conceded the claim, Defendant has put forth a legitimate 

non-discriminatory reason for terminating Plaintiff—his violation of the University’s sexual 

harassment policy—and Plaintiff has not responded with any evidence whatsoever that suggests 

that that reason was pretext for an age-based motive. See Chappell-Johnson v. Powell, 440 F.3d 

484, 487 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (“The McDonnell Douglas framework applies to both Title VII and 

ADEA claims.”) (citation omitted). Plaintiff had the burden to show that age was the “but-for” 

cause of his termination. Bennett, 729 F.Supp.2d at 59-60 (citing Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc.,

557 U.S. 167, 180 (2009)). He has offered no evidence that would allow him to meet his burden. 

V. CONCLUSION 

For the foregoing reasons, the court grants Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment. 

A separate order accompanies this Memorandum Opinion. 

 

Dated: September 1, 2016 Amit P. Mehta 

 United States District Judge