Survey of National Programs for 

Managing High-Level Radioactive 

Waste and Spent Nuclear Fuel

A Report to Congress 

and the Secretary of Energy

October 2009

United States

Nuclear Waste Technical Review Board

U.S. Nuclear Waste Technical Review Board

Survey of National Programs for Managing High-Level

Radioactive Waste and Spent Nuclear Fuel

A Report to Congress and the Secretary of Energy

October 2009

iii

U.S. Nuclear Waste

Technical Review Board

B. John Garrick, Ph.D., P.E.; Chairman

Consultant

Laguna Beach, California

Mark D. Abkowitz, Ph.D.

Vanderbilt University

Nashville, Tennessee

Thure E. Cerling, Ph.D.

University of Utah

Salt Lake City, Utah 

George M. Hornberger, Ph.D.

Vanderbilt University 

Nashville, Tennessee

Ronald M. Latanision, Ph.D.

Exponent Corporation

Cambridge, Massachusetts

William M. Murphy, Ph.D.

California State University

Chico, California

William Howard Arnold, Ph.D., P.E.

Consultant

Macatawa, Michigan

David J. Duquette, Ph.D.

Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute

Troy, New York

Andrew C. Kadak, Ph.D.

Massachusetts Institute of Technology

Cambridge, Massachusetts

Ali Mosleh, Ph.D.

University of Maryland

College Park, Maryland

Henry Petroski, Ph.D., P.E.

Duke University

Durham, North Carolina

v

vii

Contents

Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .ix

Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

Detailed Tables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13

United States, Belgium, Canada . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17

Institutional Arrangements. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18

Technical Approaches . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21

China, Finland, France . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25

Institutional Arrangements. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26

Technical Approaches . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29

Germany, Japan, Republic of Korea . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33

Institutional Arrangements. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34

Technical Approaches . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37

Spain, Sweden, Switzerland . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41

Institutional Arrangements. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42

Technical Approaches . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45

United Kingdom . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49

Institutional Arrangements. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50

Technical Approaches . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53

Glossary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57

ix

*e Board wishes to express its appreciation to the following individuals and institutions 

for the help and advice they provided in the preparation of the report.

In-Country Technical Reviewers

Georg Arens: Federal Ministry for the Environment, Nature Conservation, and 

Nuclear Safety (Germany)

Peter De Preter: National Agency for Radioactive Waste and Enriched Fissile 

Materials (Belgium)

Jo-Ann Facella: Nuclear Waste Management Organization (Canada)

*omas Flüeler: Federal Institute of Technology (Switzerland)

Erik Frank: Federal Nuclear Safety Inspectorate (Switzerland)

Atika Khan: Nuclear Waste Management Organization (Canada)

Matti Kojo: University of Tampere (Finland)

Simon Löw: Federal Institute of Technology and National Council for Nuclear 

Waste (Switzerland)

John Mathieson: Nuclear Decommissioning Authority (United Kingdom)

Claudio Pescatore: Nuclear Energy Agency, Organization for Economic 

Cooperation and Development

Esko Ruokola: Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority (Finland)

Eva Simic: Swedish National Council for Nuclear Waste

Mitsuo Takeuchi: Nuclear Waste Management Organization (Japan)

Ju Wang: China National Nuclear Corporation

Jooho Whang: Kyung Hee University (Republic of Korea)

Sta+ of the National Agency for Radioactive Waste Management (France)

In addition, reviewers from Belgium (1), Finland (1), Germany (2), Spain (1), 

Sweden (1), and the United Kingdom (1) asked to remain anonymous. 

Any errors that remain are the responsibility of the Board.

Acknowledgments
x

Credits for Cover Photographs (from back to front, left to right)

Swedish Nuclear Fuel and Waste Management Corporation: CLAB

U.S. Department of Energy: Aerial view of Yucca Mountain

French National Agency for Radioactive Waste Management: Underground Research 

Laboratory at Bure

Posiva Oy (Finland): Waste package

U.S. Department of Energy: Exploratory Studies Facility at Yucca Mountain

!e Board appreciates the permission granted by the International Atomic Energy 

Agency to use portions of its Radioactive Waste Management Glossary, 2003 Edition, 

Publication 1155, (IAEA: Vienna, 2003).
Overview 1

T

he creation of high-activity, long-lived radioactive waste is an inevitable 

consequence of generating electricity in nuclear power plants. It also is an 

inevitable consequence of engaging in a set of activities associated with national 

defense, ranging from propelling nuclear submarines to producing the ,ssionable 

materials needed to construct nuclear weapons. Early in the nuclear era, the very-longterm management and the ultimate disposition of those wastes was not a high priority. 

By the mid-1970s, however, most nuclear-capable nations had begun to focus more intently 

on developing plans to ensure over the very long term that the wastes would not endanger 

public health and safety or do serious damage to the environment. 

Especially within the last decade, those e+orts have bene,tted from increasingly fruitful 

international cooperation and coordination. *e International Atomic Energy Agency, an 

autonomous organization with a working relationship with the United Nations, carries out 

technical assistance programs and provides regulatory guidance to its members. It also 

supports the implementation of the Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel 

Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management, a treaty signed by 55 

entities, including all but ,ve of the 31 nations that now operate nuclear power plants. 

Under the auspices of its Radioactive Waste Management Committee, the Nuclear Energy 

Agency, part of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, has 

established a number of subsidiary bodies that sponsor multinational exchanges among 28 

industrial democracies.1

Today, there is strong international consensus that a deep geologic repository used to 

dispose of high-activity, long-lived radioactive waste “provides a unique level and duration 

of protection”2 of public health and safety and the environment. Such a system “takes 

advantage of the capabilities of both the local geology and the engineered materials to

1 Among those groups are the Forum on Stakeholder Con,dence, the Advisory Bodies to Government, the 

Regulators’ Forum, the Working Party on Decommissioning and Dismantling, and the Integration Group 

for the Safety Case of Radioactive Waste Repositories.

2 Nuclear Energy Agency, Radioactive Waste Management Committee, “Moving Forward with Geological 

Disposal of Radioactive Waste: An NEA RWMC Collective Statement,” NEA-6433, OECD, Paris, 2008, 

pp. 7, 14. *e other two quotations in this paragraph come from the same source.

Overview
2 A Survey of National Programs for Managing High-Level Radioactive Waste and Spent Nuclear Fuel

ful,ll speci,c safety functions in a complementary fashion providing multiple and diverse 

barrier roles.” Further, the international waste management community broadly agrees 

that developing a deep geologic repository is “technically feasible.” However, the route and 

pace in moving toward deep underground disposition of high-activity, long-lived 

radioactive waste vary considerably among countries with nuclear programs. Only one 

deep geologic repository is operating today: the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant in New Mexico. 

Transuranic waste from the U.S. nuclear weapons production program is the sole material 

that can be disposed of in that facility.

*e purpose of this report is to provide Congress, the Secretary of Energy, and other 

interested parties with up-to-date information on the status of selected national programs 

to manage high-activity, long-lived radioactive waste.3 *e report is not intended to 

provide a comprehensive and exhaustive survey of waste management programs in the 31 

countries that now operate nuclear power plants. Instead the report examines programs in 

13 selected countries, which account for 83 percent of worldwide nuclear power generating 

capacity. *ese countries illustrate well the broad range of options and considerations that 

structure national programs. Importantly, all of these e+orts are relatively transparent, 

thereby engendering some con,dence that the information provided here is reliable. Other 

countries that might have been selected were ultimately omitted from this survey because 

their programs are in their infancy or because the status of their programs could not be 

independently documented. In the future, the Board may update this survey and include 

additional national programs.

For each of the 13 national programs, the Board gathered detailed information on 30 

program attributes. Some of the attributes address the programs’ legal and institutional 

arrangements; others describe technical approaches that the programs have taken. (A 

de,nition of these attributes can be found starting on page 13.) *ese data are presented in 

a series of detailed tables, which were reviewed for accuracy by at least one and in some 

cases as many as three in-country experts. *e rest of this section highlights the following 

program attributes.4

t Context

t Organizational form of the implementer

t Independent technical/program oversight

t Current practices

t Geological investigations

t Status of the site-selection process

t Health and safety requirements for disposal

t Anticipated start of repository operations

3 Most of this material consists of liquid and vitri,ed high-level radioactive waste (HLW) from reprocessing plants and spent nuclear fuel (SNF).

4*e information contained in the tables found in the Overview section as well as in the detailed tables 

uses terminology provided by the in-country reviewers. Space limitations sometimes prevent expanding 

on the information provided.
Overview 3

CONTEXT

Commercial and defense spent nuclear fuel (SNF), 

high-level radioactive waste (HLW), long-lived heatgenerating waste, wastes from research and isotope 

production reactors are all potential candidates 

for disposal in a deep geologic repository. But the 

magnitude of this task is best approximated by the 

capacity of a country’s commercial nuclear power 

plants. 

*e 13 countries considered in the survey vary 

signi,cantly in that respect (Table 1). Belgium, 

Finland, Spain, and Switzerland have few nuclear 

power plants; France, Japan, and the United States 

have a substantial number. Further, the countries’ 

dependence on nuclear ranges from a small percentage of national electricity production to a large 

majority of it. 

In some nations, commitments have been made to 

construct a large number of new reactors, while, 

in others, the commitments have been more modest. In still others, legal or de facto moratoria on 

building nuclear power plants are in place. Finally, 

in many nations, a linkage exists, sometimes informal and implicit, sometimes formal and explicit, 

between ,nding a “solution” to the radioactive 

waste management problem and continued operation (or new construction) of nuclear power plants.

Table 1

NUCLEAR-GENERATED ELECTRICITY*

COUNTRY

OPERATING 

NUCLEAR 

POWER 

PLANTS

CURRENT 

GENERATING 

CAPACITY 

(GIGAWATTS)

PERCENTAGE 

OF TOTAL 

ELECTRICITY 

PRODUCTION

United States 104 101.1 19.7

Belgium 7 5.7 53.8

Canada 18 12.7 14.8

China 11 8.6 2.2

Finland 4 2.7 29.7

France 58 63.5 76.2

Germany 17 20.3 28.3

Japan 53 46.2 24.9

Republic of 

Korea

20 17.7 35.6

Spain 8 7.4 18.3

Sweden 10 9.1 42.0

Switzerland 5 3.2 39.2

United 

Kingdom

19 11.0 13.5

*As of May 31, 2009.
4 A Survey of National Programs for Managing High-Level Radioactive Waste and Spent Nuclear Fuel

ORGANIZATIONAL FORM OF THE

IMPLEMENTER

A broad international consensus exists among 

countries actively considering the very-long-term 

management of radioactive waste that establishing 

health, safety, and environmental standards for 

disposal and deciding whether a deep geologic 

repository should be sited, constructed, or operated 

are intrinsic governmental functions to be carried 

out by an independent regulator.5 *ere is 

considerably less agreement on what is the most 

appropriate organizational form for the 

implementing entity responsible for repository 

siting, construction, and operation. In the United 

States, for example, even as Congress gave 

implementing responsibility to the Department of 

Energy, it authorized the creation of a special 

commission to make recommendations about 

alternative means for ,nancing and managing that 

responsibility.6 No particular organizational form 

dominates national choices (Table 2). Although the 

language that individual countries use to describe 

the organizational form varies, four distinct types 

of organizations have been created: government 

agencies, private corporations, government-owned 

corporations, and public-private partnerships.

5 Although the regulatory responsibilities and arrangements vary from country to country, in all cases the 

regulator is an o-cial governmental body. See Nuclear Energy Agency, “Regulating Long-Term Safety of 

Geologic Disposal,” NEA-6182, OECD, Paris, 2007.

6 U.S. Congress, Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982, Section 303. See also Advisory Panel on Alternative 

Means for Financing and Managing Radioactive Waste Facilities, “Managing Radioactive Waste—A Better Idea,” December 1984.

Table 2

ORGANIZATIONAL FORM OF THE IMPLEMENTER

COUNTRY IMPLEMENTING 

ORGANIZATION

ORGANIZATIONAL 

FORM

United States Department of Energy

Office of Civilian Radioactive 

Waste Management

Government agency

Belgium National Agency for 

Radioactive Waste and 

Enriched Fissile Materials

Government agency

Canada Nuclear Waste Management 

Organization

Private corporation formed 

by the owners of nuclear fuel 

waste

China China National Nuclear 

Corporation, provisionally

Government-owned 

corporation

Finland Posiva Oy Joint waste management 

company created by the 

owners of nuclear power 

plants

France National Agency for 

Radioactive Waste 

Management

Government-owned Public 

Service Agency

Germany Office for Radiation 

Protection within the Federal 

Ministry for the Environment, 

Nature Conservation, and 

Nuclear Safety

Government agency

Japan Nuclear Waste Management 

Organization

Private nonprofit organization 

established by the owners of 

nuclear power plants

Republic of Korea Korea Radioactive Waste 

Management Organization

Government agency

Spain Spanish National Company 

for Radioactive Waste

Government-owned 

corporation

Sweden Swedish Nuclear Fuel 

and Waste Management 

Company

Private corporation formed by 

the owners of nuclear power 

plants

Switzerland National Cooperative for 

the Disposal of Radioactive 

Waste

Public/private consortium of 

radioactive waste producers, 

including the owners of 

nuclear power plants and the 

Federal State

United Kingdom Nuclear Decommissioning 

Authority

Radioactive Waste 

Management Division

Non-Departmental Public 

Body under the responsibility 

of the Department of Energy 

and Climate Change
Overview 5

INDEPENDENT TECHNICAL/

PROGRAM OVERSIGHT

In addition to the implementer and the regulator, in many countries, a third type of organization has been created: the independent 

technical/program oversight body (Table 3). 

*ese organizations can make ,ndings and 

recommendations to the responsible governmental agencies and branches of government or to the implementer; but they have 

no authority or control over either the implementer or the regulator. Some of these bodies 

consciously were established to bolster the 

credibility of other organizations charged with 

programmatic responsibilities. Others were 

created to institutionalize a “second opinion” 

into what are o.en technically and politically controversial activities. Further, these 

oversight bodies di+er in their charters. Some 

focus exclusively on technical matters while 

others have a broader mandate, which includes 

waste management’s ethical, legal, social, and 

policy dimensions as well as its technical ones.

Table 3

INDEPENDENT TECHNICAL/PROGRAM 

OVERSIGHT

COUNTRY OVERSEER ROLE

United States Nuclear Waste Technical 

Review Board

Advises Congress and the 

Secretary of Energy

Belgium None

Canada Independent Technical Review 

Group

Advises the Nuclear Waste 

Management Organization

China No decision made.

Finland None

France National Review Board Advises Government and 

Parliament

Local Information and 

Oversight Committee

Advises National Agency for 

Radioactive Waste on the 

operation of the underground 

research laboratory at Bure

Germany Nuclear Waste Management 

Commission

Advises the Ministry for 

the Environment, Nature 

Conservation, and Nuclear 

Safety

Japan None

Republic of Korea None

Spain None

Sweden National Council for Nuclear 

Waste

Advises the Ministry of the 

Environment

Switzerland Nuclear Safety Commission Advises the Federal Council, 

the Department of the 

Environment, Transport, 

Energy, and Communication, 

and the Federal Nuclear 

Safety Inspectorate

United Kingdom Committee on Radioactive 

Waste Management

Advises Government and 

the Devolved Administration 

Ministers
6 A Survey of National Programs for Managing High-Level Radioactive Waste and Spent Nuclear Fuel

CURRENT PRACTICES

Until the mid-1970s, the nuclear power 

community worldwide believed that the fuel 

assemblies from commercial nuclear power 

plants would be removed when spent, cooled 

on-site for a relatively short period of time, and 

then sent to chemical reprocessing plants. At 

the reprocessing plants, the plutonium, created 

by neutron absorption, and the remaining 

uranium would be separated out and recycled 

into either light-water or fast reactors. *e 

HLW from reprocessing plants would be 

vitri,ed and ultimately disposed of in a deep 

geologic repository. Adopting this approach 

meant that the nuclear fuel cycle was “closed.” 

In part out of concerns about nuclear-weapon 

materials proliferation, some nations 

subsequently adopted a nuclear fuel cycle that 

was “once-through”—that is, the SNF removed 

from reactors would be cooled, stored either 

on-site or at an independent centralized 

facility, and then disposed of directly in a deep 

geologic repository. 

*ere is considerable variety in materials 

authorized for disposal in di+erent countries 

(Table 4). *e variety is, to a large degree, a 

re/ection of nuclear-fuel-cycle choices, some 

of which are still in /ux. Countries also vary 

in whether they have established an 

independent centralized storage facility either 

for HLW or SNF or for both forms of waste.

Table 4

CURRENT PRACTICES

COUNTRY

MATERIAL 

AUTHORIZED TO 

BE DISPOSED OF IN 

A DEEP GEOLOGIC 

REPOSITORY

INDEPENDENT 

CENTRALIZED 

STORAGE FACILITY 

ESTABLISHED

United States* High-level radioactive waste, 

commercial spent nuclear fuel, 

naval reactor fuel, Department 

of Energy spent nuclear fuel

No

Belgium High-level radioactive waste No

Canada Commercial spent nuclear fuel No

China High-level radioactive waste No

Finland Commercial spent nuclear fuel No

France High-level radioactive waste 

and long-lived intermediatelevel waste

No

Germany High-level radioactive waste, 

commercial spent nuclear 

fuel, and heat-generating 

intermediate-level waste

Yes, at Gorleben and Ahaus

Japan High-level radioactive waste No

Republic of Korea Commercial spent nuclear fuel Envisioned, but no schedule 

for beginning to site such a 

facility has been established

Spain No decision made. A siting process for a 

Centralized Temporary 

Storage facility has been 

initiated.

Sweden Commercial spent nuclear fuel Yes, at Oskarshamn (CLAB)

Switzerland High-level radioactive waste 

is the only form currently 

considered waste. 

Yes, at Würenlingen 

(ZWILAG)

United Kingdom High-level radioactive waste, 

commercial spent nuclear fuel, 

intermediate-level waste, and 

low-level waste not suitable 

for near-surface disposal. 

Uranium and plutonium if 

these elements are declared to 

be waste.

No

*Does not include waste authorized to be disposed of in the Waste Isolation 

Pilot Plant.
Overview 7

GEOLOGICAL INVESTIGATIONS

An in/uential 1957 report by the U.S. National 

Academy of Sciences’ National Research Council 

identi,ed geological disposal as a technically 

defensible option for the very-long-term 

management of HLW. Further, the report pointed 

to salt as an acceptable host rock because the 

presence of salt implied the absence of water and 

because the plasticity of salt would seal fractures 

that otherwise could preferentially conduct water 

/ow through the waste emplacement zones.7 *is 

report provided the technical rationale that led the 

United States to focus almost exclusively until the 

mid-1970s on identifying a site in salt for a deep 

geologic repository.

Finding a salt formation where a repository might 

be sited was not an option, however, for many other 

countries. Sweden, for example, began to explore 

the possibility of disposing of its waste in granite, 

which underlies most of that country’s landscape. 

Out of that exploration eventually came the KBS-3 

approach: SNF ,rst is encapsulated in copper, and 

the copper canisters then are placed in granite 

basement rock at a depth of about 500 meters and 

surrounded by bentonite clay. *e acceptance by 

the radioactive waste disposal community that a 

combination of geological and engineered barriers 

might provide su-cient protection of public health 

and safety and the environment opened the door to 

investigate a large number of potential host rocks.8

Indeed, even countries that are thinking about or 

actually developing a deep geologic repository in 

clay, and thus believe there is no need for a robust engineered barrier system, take a 

systems approach in developing their safety cases. 

Numerous types of rock have been considered or have been investigated, and many 

countries have constructed an indigenous underground research laboratory to carry out 

in situ investigations of a formation’s potential to isolate and contain radioactive waste 

(Table 5).

7 National Research Council, !e Disposal of Radioactive Waste on Land, (Washington, D.C.: National 

Academy of Sciences Press, 1957).

8 *e United States abandoned its salt-centric siting strategy in 1976. Studies by the U.S. Geological Survey 

and the American Physical Society argued that what matters is the performance of the entire system of 

geological and engineered barriers. *is view was adopted for the most part in 1979 by an interagency 

group created by President Jimmy Carter to develop an Administration-wide policy on managing radioactive waste. See Interagency Review Group on Nuclear Waste Management, Report to the President, 

(TID-29442), Washington D.C., 1979.

Table 5

GEOLOGICAL INVESTIGATIONS

COUNTRY

GEOLOGIC 

ENVIRONMENTS 

CONSIDERED OR 

INVESTIGATED

INDIGENOUS 

UNDERGROUND 

RESEARCH 

LABORATORY 

ESTABLISHED

United States Salt, basalt, granite, tuff, clay, 

and shale

The Exploratory Studies 

Facility at Yucca Mountain 

served the function of an 

underground research 

laboratory (tuff).

Belgium Clay and shale Mol (clay)

Canada Granite and sedimentary rock Pinawa (granite)*

China Granite None

Finland Granite, gneiss, grandiorite, 

and migmatite

Construction of ONKALO 

underground rock 

characterization facility in 

Eurajoki began in 2004 and 

is continuing (granite).

France Argillite and granite Bure (argillite)

Germany Salt Gorleben (salt)

Japan Granite and sedimentary rock Tono (granite)

Mizunami (granite)

Horonobe (sedimentary rock)

Republic of Korea Granite Korea Underground Research 

Tunnel (granite)**

Spain Granite, clay, and salt None

Sweden Granite Äspö (granite)

Switzerland Clay and granite Mont Terri (clay) and Grimsel 

(granite)

United Kingdom No decision made. None

*In the process of being decommissioned

**At shallow depth only
8 A Survey of National Programs for Managing High-Level Radioactive Waste and Spent Nuclear Fuel

STATUS OF THE SITE-SELECTION

PROCESS

Experience over the years in many countries has 

made clear that potential deep geologic repository 

sites have to pass through both a technical ,lter 

and a political ,lter. Some countries identify 

potential sites based ,rst on technical 

considerations and then determine whether 

political realities will permit the site’s 

development as a repository. Other countries 

reverse the order, looking ,rst for volunteer 

communities and then evaluating a site’s technical 

merits. Still other countries have concluded that 

moving forward at this time is simply premature.

Experience over the years also has made clear that 

a siting process can get bogged down because 

either technical or political obstacles have arisen. 

In some countries, programs have had to be 

altered fundamentally to overcome either barrier 

or both barriers. *ese reorganizations have, at 

the very least, resulted in signi,cant 

programmatic delays. In other countries, technical 

or political controversies, or the prospects of 

them, have lead policy-makers to defer for many 

decades the development of a deep geologic 

repository. Table 6 provides information on the 

status of the site-selection process in the 13 

nations considered here.

Table 6

STATUS OF THE SITE-SELECTION PROCESS

COUNTRY STATUS

United States Site at Yucca Mountain was selected.*

Belgium Formal siting process not initiated.

Canada Siting process initiated.

China Preliminary investigations underway at Beishan in the Gobi 

Desert.

Finland Site at Olkiluoto near the municipality of Eurajoki has been 

selected.

France Site near the village of Bure has been selected.**

Germany Siting process on hold.

Japan Siting process initiated.

Republic of Korea Formal siting process not initiated.

Spain Formal siting process not initiated.

Sweden Site in the municipality of Östhammar was selected.

Switzerland Siting process initiated.

United Kingdom Siting process initiated.

*

The Administration recently indicated its intention to terminate funding for the Yucca 

Mountain repository program and to appoint a Blue Ribbon Commission to consider 

nuclear waste management alternatives. To date, licensing hearings before the Nuclear 

Regulatory Commission continue.

**A 250-square-kilometer area has been identified. The selection of a specific location 

within that area for development as a deep geologic repository is under way.
Overview 9

HEALTH AND SAFETY REQUIREMENTS

FOR DISPOSAL

Although a deep geologic repository can provide a 

unique level and duration of protection, questions 

remain in many countries about what the protective 

level should be, how standards should be formulated, 

how long the duration should last, what methodology should be used to judge compliance, and what 

the spatial domain should be where the regulation 

is enforced. Further, in some countries, the regulations are very prescriptive, and in others, they are 

very general, providing only broad guidelines for the 

implementer. 

*ree aspects of the regulations seem to be of particular importance. In the terminology used by the 

radioactive waste management community, the 

minimal acceptable protective level is measured by 

either a dose constraint or a risk limit. *e dose constraint is the e+ective dose or the equivalent dose to 

individuals that may not be exceeded. *e dose constraint is usually measured in millisieverts per year.9

 

No consensus obtains on the de,nition of a risk 

limit. Typically, however, the term is taken to mean 

the probability of a person living in the vicinity of a 

repository su+ering genetic or serious health e+ects, 

including cancer, during the course of his or her lifetime as a result of radioactive material released from 

the repository.10 *e risk limit is always measured in 

terms of the probability per year, for example, one 

in a million or 10–6/year. Finally, the duration over 

which the regulation applies is measured by a compliance period. *ese regulatory choices represent 

social judgments informed by technical analyses.11

Some of the 13 nations discussed in this report have 

not yet established radiological health and safety 

requirements for the disposition of radioactive waste. 

Among those that have, there are some important 

similarities and di+erences (Table 7). If one looks 

only at the ,rst 10,000 years a.er repository closure, all the countries regard as acceptable a dose 

9 One millisievert (mSv) equals 100 millirems.

10*is de,nition is consistent with how the term is used by the International Commission on Radiological 

Protection and the regulators in Germany and the United Kingdom.

11 In addition to satisfying regulatory requirements for protecting public health and safety, the implementing organization typically has to prepare environmental impact assessments and have them approved by 

relevant governmental authorities.

Table 7

HEALTH AND SAFETY REQUIREMENTS FOR 

DISPOSAL

COUNTRY DOSE 

CONSTRAINT RISK LIMIT COMPLIANCE 

PERIOD

United States 0.15 mSv/year Not specified Less than 10,000 

years

1.0 mSv/year* Not specified Greater than 

10,000 years but 

less than 1,000,000 

years

Belgium Expected to be 

0.1–0.3 mSv/year

Not specified May be as much as 

1,000,000 years

Canada An upper limit of 

1.0 mSv/year 

established; 

0.3 mSv/year 

proposed.

Not specified Not specified

China No decision made. No decision made. No decision made.

Finland Less than 

0.1 mSv/year. 

Not specified First several 

thousand years

Release limits 

for various 

radionuclides 

established.

Impacts should be 

comparable to those 

arising from natural 

radioactive materials 

but should remain 

insignificantly low.

Not specified Beyond first several 

thousand years.

France 0.25 mSv/year for 

normal scenarios.

Not specified 10,000 years

Germany Not specified Less than 10-4/lifetime 

for probable scenarios;

Less than 10-3/lifetime 

for less probable 

scenarios

1,000,000 years

Japan No decision made. No decision made. No decision made.

Republic of 

Korea

No decision made. No decision made. No decision made.

Spain No decision made. No decision made. No decision made.

Sweden Not specified Less than 10-5/year 100,000 years

Switzerland Complete 

containment

Not specified 1,000 years

0.1 mSv/year for 

probable scenarios

Not specified As much as 

1,000,000 years

Not specified Less than 10-6/year for 

less probable scenarios

As much as 

1,000,000 years

United 

Kingdom

No decision made. Guidance calls for less 

than 10-6/year.

No decision made.

*Applicable only to a repository constructed at Yucca Mountain. 
10 A Survey of National Programs for Managing High-Level Radioactive Waste and Spent Nuclear Fuel

constraint that falls within a range of 0.1–0.3 mSv/year. However, some of those countries 

require that the dose constraint also be satis,ed for compliance periods that extend as far 

out as 1,000,000 years. Risk limits span a similarly large range—10-3 to 10-6/year—depending on the compliance period and the likelihood that a particular scenario evolves. 

ANTICIPATED START OF REPOSITORY

OPERATIONS

*ree of the four countries that have selected a site 

for a deep geologic repository—Finland, France, 

and Sweden—have announced when they 

anticipate the start of operations: they all expect to 

begin emplacing radioactive waste within roughly 

the next 10 to 15 years (Table 8). *ree other 

countries have projected a time 30 to 40 years 

from now, although only one of them, Switzerland, 

has initiated a formal siting process. *e 

remaining seven nations have made no decision 

about when repository operations will begin, 

either because the timing depends on ,nding a 

volunteer community and reaching an agreement 

with it or because a formal siting process is on 

hold or has not been initiated.

Table 8

ANTICIPATED START OF REPOSITORY OPERATIONS

COUNTRY DATE

United States No decision made.*

Belgium Anticipated in roughly the 2040 time-frame.

Canada No decision made.

China Anticipated in roughly the 2050 time-frame.

Finland 2020

France 2025

Germany No decision made.

Japan No decision made.

Republic of Korea No decision made.

Spain No decision made.

Sweden 2023

Switzerland No sooner than 2040

United Kingdom No decision made.

*

The Administration recently indicated its intention to terminate funding for the Yucca 

Mountain repository program and to appoint a Blue Ribbon Commission to explore 

nuclear waste management alternatives. To date, licensing hearings before the Nuclear 

Regulatory Commission continue.
Overview 11

A CONCLUDING COMMENT

When the radioactive waste management community in the United States and abroad 

began work on developing a deep geologic repository, the task was perceived to be a simple 

one. A technically suitable site would ,rst be identi,ed. *en scienti,c and engineering 

talents would be mustered to complete what was viewed as a relatively straightforward 

construction project. Since then, it has become clear that performing convincing technical 

analysis in the face of considerable temporal and spatial uncertainties is more complex and 

challenging than earlier anticipated. Creating a supportive institutional environment—

founding credible implementing and regulatory agencies, creating trusting relationships 

with local communities, and putting into place legitimate decision-making processes—has 

proven to be challenging as well. *at many national programs have had to be reconstituted in fundamental ways is testimony to the di-culties encountered over the years.

With only the three countries identi,ed above close to implementing a technically and 

politically accepted e+ort to develop a deep geologic repository, it is di-cult to infer what, 

if anything, is a “magical recipe” for success. *is question, however, will be explored in 

greater depth in a subsequent Board report. At this point, we simply note that these 13 

countries are strongly committed to managing radioactive waste for the very long term in 

ways that do not impose burdens on future generations. *e precise path taken by each 

will strongly depend on its technical and political cultures. In the end, it may very well be 

that the many paths all lead to the same outcome: successful disposal of long-lived, highactivity radioactive waste in a deep geologic repository.

Detailed Tables 13

Detailed Tables

T

he Board identi,ed 30 key attributes associated with national radioactive waste 

management programs. Half of them relate to the institutional arrangements that 

have been established in each country. *e other attributes relate to the technical 

approaches that have been adopted. Detailed tables containing information about 

the attributes, which appear as column headings, were then constructed using o-cial documents released by each nation. Most helpful were a series of reports submitted to the 

International Atomic Energy Agency as part of the *ird Meeting held under the provisions of the Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and the Safety of 

Radioactive Waste Management.

Dra.s of the detailed tables were sent out to in-country experts for peer review. At least 

one expert from each country, and as many as three, reviewed the tables and provided 

comments. (Reviewers that wished to be recognized are acknowledged in the beginning 

of this report.) *e comments were incorporated, and the tables were revised. Typically, 

the comments ,lled in “blanks” on the dra. tables, updated the information contained in 

the dra.s, and provided more information than could be found in the o-cial documents. 

Every e+ort was made to harmonize the various table entries so that their meaning would 

be consistent across countries. To achieve that end, de,nitions for the 30 attributes were 

developed. *ese de,nitions are provided below. 1

To facilitate the viewing of the detailed tables, they are laid out so that the information for 

three countries is grouped together. *e attributes related to institutional arrangements 

for each group are presented ,rst followed by the attributes related to technical approaches. 

With the exception of the United States, the nations are grouped in alphabetical order. 

Each group is color-coded so that the reader can quickly locate any country of interest.

12 In the detailed tables, the reader will ,nd two entries that appear similar on their face: “no decision 

made” and “none.” When the ,rst entry is encountered, it should be interpreted to mean that the country 

has not addressed the particular attribute either implicitly or explicitly. When the second entry is encountered, it should be interpreted to mean that the country has made the decision indicated in the table. 

Detailed Tables 13

12
14 A Survey of National Programs for Managing High-Level Radioactive Waste and Spent Nuclear Fuel

KEY ATTRIBUTES—INSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS

1. Legislation speci"c to radioactive waste management: Laws passed that establish the 

rules under which radioactive waste will be managed.

2. Implementing organization: *e entity charged under the law with the responsibility 

for siting, constructing, and operating facilities for managing radioactive waste.

3. Independent regulator: *e entity charged under the law with the responsibility for 

establishing health, safety, and environmental standards for managing radioactive 

waste and for approving/disapproving or recommending for approval/disapproval the 

licensing of facilities for managing radioactive waste.

4. Independent technical/program oversight: Entities that are independent of the implementer and the regulator that provide advice on technical and other issues associated 

with the management of radioactive waste. *e entities can give their advice to the 

Government, the legislature, or the implementer. *ey can be appointed either by the 

Government or the implementer.

5. Dedicated funding source for repository development: Money, segregated from general 

government revenues, that ,nances the siting, construction, and operation of a deep 

geologic repository and other facilities. *e source of the money may be payments by 

waste generators directly or by the users of nuclear-generated electricity.

6. Regulations and decrees applicable to licensing a deep geologic repository—site-selection: 

Rules and standards created by government agencies and Ministries that structure the 

processes used to choose a candidate or ,nal location for a deep geologic repository. 

7. Regulations and decrees applicable to licensing a deep geologic repository—environmental impact assessment: Rules and standards created by government agencies and 

Ministries that structure the processes and the required analysis for evaluating the 

environmental e+ects of developing a deep geologic repository. 

8. Regulations and decrees applicable to licensing a deep geologic repository—health and 

safety protection: Rules and standards created by government agencies and Ministries 

that structure the processes and the required analysis for evaluating whether a proposed deep geologic repository is likely to comply with applicable requirements for 

protecting public health and safety.

9. Formal legislative/executive approvals required for developing a deep geologic repository—selection of a waste management option: Decisions about whether to develop a 

deep geologic repository or to adopt some other option, such as separation and transmutation or storage, for the very-long-term management of radioactive waste. *e 

decision is made using political, as opposed to administrative, processes. It may occur 

before or a.er a regulatory decision or the submission of regulatory advice to the legislature or Government. 

10. Formal legislative/executive approvals required for developing a deep geologic repository—site-selection: *e decision to choose a candidate or ,nal location for a deep 

geologic repository. *e decision is made using political, as opposed to administrative, processes. It may occur before or a.er a regulatory decision or the submission of 

regulatory advice to the legislature or Government.
Detailed Tables 15

11. Formal legislative/executive approvals required for developing a deep geologic repository—facility construction and operation: *e decision to permit the construction 

and operation of a deep geologic repository. *e decision is made using political, as 

opposed to administrative, processes. It may occur before or a.er a regulatory decision or the submission of regulatory advice to the legislature or Government.

12. Interactions with local jurisdictions—local veto: Legally prescribed rules under which 

either a locality must give its approval before an action is taken (usually the selection 

of a site for a deep geologic repository) or the locality can reject a decision a.er it has 

been made.

13. Interactions with local jurisdictions—limitations on local veto: Legally prescribed rules 

under which any veto power held by local jurisdictions can be overridden or otherwise 

modi,ed.

14. Interactions with local jurisdictions—bene"ts to be provided to local community for 

accepting a facility: Bene,ts include, among other things, dedicated tax and other payments, increased governmental services, and infrastructure development. Bene,ts may 

be legally prescribed or established through negotiations.

15. Explicit adoption of a staged decision-making process: Almost by necessity, the 

development of a deep geologic repository must take place in stages. However, some 

national programs are designed to require at every step intensive deliberation, recursive safety case evaluations, and explicit consideration of the option of not proceeding.

KEY ATTRIBUTES—TECHNICAL APPROACHES

1. Operating nuclear power plants/generating capacity: *e number and gross generating 

capacity (in gigawatts electric) of plants operating as of May 31, 2009. *e number of 

plants under construction is de,ned as the projects that have broken ground as of May 

31, 2009. *e generating capacity of those plants is the nominal capacity reported to 

authorities.

2. Reprocessing included in fuel cycle: Whether SNF has ever been reprocessed, either in 

the country or in a facility located outside of the country. 

3. Transportation system in place to move SNF/HLW to a deep geologic repository: 

Transportation options available for those countries where a site has been selected or 

where particular sites are being actively considered.

4. Independent centralized interim storage facility established: Facilities that fall into 

this category store SNF or HLW from more than one generator. Such facilities are 

distinguished from storage installations at either operating or shut-down nuclear 

power or reprocessing plants.

5. Geologic environments considered or investigated for a repository: Host rocks that 

appear to be potentially suitable for a repository. *e hosts rocks may have been 

considered or investigated in bench or desk studies, by surface investigation, or by 

at-depth exploration.
16 A Survey of National Programs for Managing High-Level Radioactive Waste and Spent Nuclear Fuel

6. Indigenous underground research laboratories: Laboratories that have been created 

(either operational or under construction) where experiments can be conducted to 

evaluate the long-term suitability of a particular host rock to isolate and contain 

radioactive waste. Experiments conducted in another country’s underground research 

laboratory are not included.

7. Status of site-selection process: *e stage of the national decision for selecting a site for 

a deep geologic repository.

8. Long-term health and safety requirements: Speci,c regulations and standards 

establishing dose constraints, risk limits, and compliance periods that must be 

satis,ed before a deep geologic repository can be licensed.

9. Requirements for retrievability: Speci,c laws or regulations establishing the time 

period within which waste must be able to be retrieved from a deep repository. Also 

speci,c laws and regulations establishing how the entire disposal process can be 

reversed.

10. Requirements for defense-in-depth: Speci,c laws or regulations establishing the 

degree to which various barriers must be able to isolate and contain radioactive waste 

independently of other barriers.

11. Methodology for demonstrating compliance with postclosure standards: Approaches the 

implementer must use to conduct its performance assessment or to advance its safety 

case for licensing a deep geologic repository.

12 Engineered barrier system—design: How the man-made part of the deep geologic 

repository system is to be constructed.

13. Engineered barrier system—importance to safety case: In comparison to the natural 

system (host rock, near-,eld environment, hydrogeology, and other factors), the role of 

the engineered barrier system in isolating and containing radioactive waste.

14. Waste forms authorized to be disposed of in a deep geologic repository: *e type of 

material that would be required to be disposed of in a deep geologic repository.

15. Anticipated start of repository operations: Year in which either the implementer or an 

appropriate governmental authority has stated publicly that a deep geologic repository 

will be available to begin to accept waste for disposal.
17

United States, 

Belgium, Canada

UNITED STATES, BELGIUM, CANADA
18 A Survey of National Programs for Managing High-Level Radioactive Waste and Spent Nuclear Fuel

UNITED STATES, BELGIUM, CANADA

Institutional Arrangements

Legislation Specific 

to Radioactive Waste 

Management

Implementing 

Organization Independent Regulator Independent Technical/ Program Oversight Dedicated Funding Source for Repository Development

United States*

Nuclear Waste Policy Act (1982)Nuclear Waste Policy Amendments Act (1987)Energy Policy Act (1992)

Department of EnergyOffice of Civilian RadioactiveWaste Management (Government agency)

Environmental Protection Agency (Sets environmental standards)Nuclear Regulatory Commission (Implements standards and licenses facilities)

Nuclear Waste Technical Review Board(Advises Congress and the Secretary of Energy)

Nuclear Waste FundGenerators of nuclear electricity pay a $0.001 per kilowatt-hour surcharge into the Fund.

Belgium

Law of 8 August 1980, modified by Law of 11 January 1991 and Law of 12 December 1997 [Implementation]Law of 29 March 1958, modified by Law of 15 April 1994 [Regulation]

National Agency for Radioactive Waste and Enriched Fissile Materials(Government agency)

Federal Agency for Nuclear Control

None Long-Term Fund

Costs of developing a repository will be fully paid by waste generators.

Canada

Nuclear Fuel Waste Act (2002)Nuclear Safety and Control Act (2000)

Nuclear Waste Management Organization, subject to Government approval of key policies and decisions(Private corporation formed by the owners of nuclear fuel waste)

Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission

Independent Technical Review Group(Advises the Nuclear Waste Management Organization)

Nuclear Fuel Waste Act Trust FundOwners of nuclear power plants pay money into the Fund, subject to the formula approved by Government.

* Does not include institutional arrangements for the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant.
United States, Belgium, Canada 19

UNITED STATES, BELGIUM, CANADA

Institutional Arrangements

Regulations and Decrees Applicable to Licensing 

 a Deep Geologic Repository

Formal Legislative/Executive Approvals Required 

for Developing a Deep Geologic Repository 

Site-Selection Environmental Impact Assessment Health and Safety Protection Selection of Waste Management Option Site-Selection Facility Construction and Operation

United States*

Nuclear Regulatory Commission 10CFR60Department of Energy10CFR960 and 10CFR963(Radioactive wastespecific)

Council of Environmental Quality40CFR1500(Generic)

Nuclear Regulatory Commission10CFR60 and 10CFR63Environmental Protection Agency40CFR191 and 40CFR197(Radioactive wastespecific)

Department of EnergyGeneric Environmental Impact Statement (1980)

Nuclear Waste Policy Act (1982)

Congressional approval of the Yucca Mountain site recommendation by President (2002)

After approval by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission of licenses to construct and possess/receive waste, no further action is required. 

Belgium

Decision by the Council of Ministers limiting siting activities for a low- and intermediate-level waste repository to nuclear or non-nuclear volunteering sitesNo specific law for HLW/SNF repository(Radioactive wastespecific)

Strategic Environmental Assessment (Law 13 of February 2006)(Radioactive wastespecific)

Federal Agency for Nuclear Control Royal Decree of 20 July 2001GRR-2001(Radioactive wastespecific)

Strategic Environmental Assessment (Law 13 of February 2006) triggered the development of a Waste Plan by National Agency for Radioactive Waste and Enriched Fissile Materials, but no decision has been made.

No decision made. Construction and operating 

licenses granted by Government through a Royal Decree on the advice of Federal Agency for Nuclear Control.

Canada

Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission Regulations under the Nuclear Safety and Control Act Clauses 3 and 4(Nuclear facility-specific)Geological Considerations in Siting a Repository for High-Level Radioactive Waste R-72(Radioactive-waste specific)

Regulations under the Canadian Environmental Assessment Act (Generic)

Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission Regulatory Guide G-320(Radioactive wastespecific)

Government approved a recommendation by the Nuclear Waste Management Organization to implement a geologic disposal strategy of Adaptive Phased Management. An optional strategy of shallow underground storage also was adopted.(2007)

Once the Federal Minister of the Environment approves the environmental assessment, the Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission has the full authority to decide on the Site Preparation License.

After the approval by the Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission of licenses to construct and possess/receive waste, no further action is required.

* Does not include institutional arrangements for the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant.
20 A Survey of National Programs for Managing High-Level Radioactive Waste and Spent Nuclear Fuel

UNITED STATES, BELGIUM, CANADA

Institutional Arrangements

Interactions with Local Jurisdictions

Explicit Adoption of a 

Staged Decision-Making 

Process

Local Veto Limitations on Local Veto

Benefits to be Provided 

to Local Community for 

Accepting a Facility

United States*

Yes, by governor State veto can be exercised only when 

President recommends site for Congress’s approval. Veto can be overridden by majority vote in both Houses of Congress

A schedule for providing benefits to the State of Nevada and to any state or tribe hosting a centralized interim storage facility or a repository was included in the Nuclear Waste Policy Amendments Act. Nevada has never requested benefits.

No

Belgium

No decision made for HLW/SNF repository.No formal legal right of veto for lowand intermediate-level waste disposal site. But without the agreement of the local partnership, the disposal facility will not be built.Volunteer nuclear community (Dessel) agreed to host a low- and intermediatelevel waste disposal site.

No decision made for HLW/SNF repository.“Gentleman’s agreement” that a lowand intermediate-level waste disposal facility will not be sited without community consent. As the project develops, implementer can veto decisions by the local community that adversely affect safety.

No decision made for HLW/SNF repository.None provided to date for low- and intermediate-level waste disposal facility. Discussions are on-going about providing benefits in the future.

No decision made.Expectation is that the process will be flexible and iterative.

Canada

Under the Adaptive Phased Management strategy, only communities willing to host a geologic repository will be considered.

No decision made. No decision made. Yes

* Does not include institutional arrangements for the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant.
United States, Belgium, Canada 21

UNITED STATES, BELGIUM, CANADA

Technical Approaches

Operating Nuclear 

Power Plants/

Generating Capacity

Reprocessing Included 

in Fuel Cycle

Transportation System 

in Place to Move 

SNF/HLW to a Deep 

Geologic Repository

Independent 

Centralized InterimStorage Facility 

Established

Geologic Environments 

Considered or 

Investigated for a 

Repository

United States*

104 nuclear power plants (101.1 GWe)One nuclear power plant is under construction. (1.2 GWe)

The U.S. reprocessed SNF as part of its weapons plutonium production program.Small amounts of commercial SNF were reprocessed at West Valley, N.Y. Two other commercial reprocessing plants were constructed but never operated.The U.S. does not currently reprocess commercial SNF.

Depends on where the repository is developed. No rail transportation system is available for the Yucca Mountain site.

No Salt, basalt, tuff, granite, clay, 

and shale

Belgium

Seven nuclear power plants(5.7 GWe)Additional nuclear power plants and operation beyond 40 years for existing nuclear power plants were prohibited in 2003.

Commercial SNF was reprocessed at La Hague. Moratorium on new reprocessing contracts was instituted in 1993 and confirmed in 1998 by the Council of Ministers.A small amount of commercial SNF was reprocessed by the pilot facility Eurochemic in Dessel.

No decision made. No Clay and shale

Canada 18 nuclear power plants (12.7 GWe) No No decision made. No Granite or sedimentary rock* Does not include institutional arrangements for the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant.
22 A Survey of National Programs for Managing High-Level Radioactive Waste and Spent Nuclear Fuel

UNITED STATES, BELGIUM, CANADA

Technical Approaches

Indigenous 

Underground 

Research Laboratories

Status of Site-Selection 

Process

Long-Term Health and 

Safety Requirements

Requirements for 

Retrievability

Requirements for 

Defense-in-Depth

United States*

The Exploratory Studies Facility at the Yucca Mountain site served the function of an underground research laboratory.(Tuff)

The Yucca Mountain site has been characterized and was approved by Congress in 2002.The Administration has recently indicated its intention to terminate funding for the Yucca Mountain repository program and to appoint a Blue Ribbon Commission to explore nuclear waste management alternatives. Licensing hearings before the Nuclear Regulatory Commission continue.

For Yucca Mountain: 0.15 mSv/year for 10,000 years; 1 mSv/year thereafter up until 1,000,000 years.For any other site: 0.15 mSv/year for 10,000 years.

Within 50 years from the start of waste emplacement

Multiple barriers (both natural and engineered) required.No requirement for defense-indepth or redundancy.

Belgium

HADES Project initiated in 1974 in Mol.(Clay)

No active siting process for a HLW/SNF repository being carried out.

No decision made.Dose constraint expected to be in the range 0.1–0.3 mSv/year.Compliance period may be as long as 106 years

No decision made. No decision made.

Safety philosophy includes defense-in-depth and some degree of redundancy in barrier function.

Canada

Pinawa Laboratory in Manitoba.(Granite)(In the process of decommissioning)

The Nuclear Waste Management Organization has proposed a process for selecting a site.No schedule has been set to complete the site-selection process.

Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission has specified a public dose limit of 1 mSv/year. Implementer is required to provide rationale for dose constraint. An example of a proposed dose constraint is 0.3 mSv/year.

The Adaptive Phased Management plan includes “potential for retrievability of the used fuel for an extended period, until such time as a future society makes a determination on the final closure and the appropriate form and duration of postclosure monitoring.”This requirement has not yet been incorporated into regulations.

The Adaptive Phased Management plan recognizes the value of multiple barriers and redundant systems. This recognition has not yet been translated into regulations.

* Does not include institutional arrangements for the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant.
United States, Belgium, Canada 23

UNITED STATES, BELGIUM, CANADA

Technical Approaches

Methodology for 

Demonstrating 

Compliance with 

Postclosure Standards

Engineered Barrier System

Waste Forms 

Authorized to be 

Disposed of in a Deep 

Geologic Repository

Anticipated Start 

of Repository 

Operations

Design Importance to Safety Case

United States*

Mean value of Monte Carlo realizations generated by a probabilistic Total System Performance Assessment

Double-shelled waste package composed of Alloy 22 (outer) and carbon steel (inner); titanium drip shield

Very important Vitrified commercial and defense 

HLW, commercial SNF, Navy SNF, and DOE SNF

No decision made.

Belgium

No decision made.A host-rock specific (Boom clay) performance assessment (SAFIR-2) has been carried out (2001):©[ww | w y{w

and altered scenarios

©i{ xwxy {{{©FDI iE{w z{ yw©Ywyw yw{z   w

least 106 years

Current reference design developed after SAFIR-2 considers stainless steel canisters holding HLW and a carbon steel overpack surrounded by thick concrete. The so-called Supercontainer is placed in concrete-lined drifts and backfilled with cementitious materials.

Relatively unimportant, although preliminary safety assessments do not support conclusively the isolation and containment capacity of Boom clay.(SAFIR-2)

Only HLW because SNF is not considered “waste.” However, National Agency for Radioactive Waste and Enriched Fissile Materials must study geological disposal for both HLW and SNF.

No decision made.Likely to be in the 2040 time-frame.

Canada

According to the Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission Regulatory Guide G-320, an applicant to site, construct, or operate a geologic repository can choose among the following methodologies in developing its safety case:©iy} w{{©Xz} w{{©h{wy x{ {w{ |

performance

©Y{w{ ywyw©Z{{y  xwxy

calculations

No decision made. No decision made. Commercial SNF No decision made.

* Does not include institutional arrangements for the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant.
24 A Survey of National Programs for Managing High-Level Radioactive Waste and Spent Nuclear Fuel

CHINA, FINLAND, FRANCE
25

CHINA, FINLAND, FRANCE

25

China, Finland, 

France
26 A Survey of National Programs for Managing High-Level Radioactive Waste and Spent Nuclear Fuel

CHINA, FINLAND, FRANCE

Institutional Arrangements

Legislation Specific 

to Radioactive Waste 

Management

Implementing 

Organization Independent Regulator Independent Technical/ Program Oversight Dedicated Funding Source for Repository Development

China

Law of the People’s Republic of China on Prevention and Control of Radioactive Pollution (2003)

China National Nuclear Corporation(Government-owned corporation)

National Nuclear Safety Administration within the Ministry of Environmental Protection

No decision made. No decision made.

Finland

Nuclear Energy Act (1987)Nuclear Energy Decree (1988)Nuclear Energy Act Amendments (1994, 2003, 2008)

Posiva Oy (Joint waste management company created in 1995 by two utilities, Fortum Power and Heat Oy and Teollisuuden Voima Oyj.)

Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority(Advises Government on the safety of proposed facilities)

None Nuclear Waste Management 

FundGenerators estimate cost of radioactive waste disposal and nuclear power plant decommissioning. They pay annually the difference between Fund target and amount existing in the Fund. Payment can be in securities. Excess payments can be recovered.

France

Research on Radioactive Waste Management Act (1991)Planning Act Concerning the Sustainable Management of Radioactive Materials and Waste (2006)Transparency and Security in the Nuclear Field (2006)

National Agency for Radioactive Waste Management reporting to the Ministries of Environment, Industry, and Research(Government-owned Public Service Agency)

Nuclear Safety Authority National Review Board 

(Advises Government and Parliament)Local Information and Oversight Committee (Must be consulted on issues relating to the operation of an underground research laboratory.)

YesThe National Agency for Radioactive Waste Management must estimate costs of designing, constructing, operating, and closing a repository. The waste generators must contribute to a Fund, which is supervised by an independent commission established under the 2006 Planning Act.
China, Finland, France 27

CHINA, FINLAND, FRANCE

Institutional Arrangements

Regulations and Decrees Applicable to Licensing 

 a Deep Geologic Repository

Formal Legislative/Executive Approvals Required 

for Developing a Deep Geologic Repository 

Site-Selection Environmental Impact Assessment Health and Safety Protection Selection of Waste Management Option Site-Selection Facility Construction and Operation

China

National Nuclear Safety Administration Guidelines on Siting of a Radioactive Waste Geological RepositoryHAD-406/06(Radioactive wastespecific)

Decree on Environmental Protection (Generic)

National Nuclear Safety Administration Regulations on the Safety Control for Civilian Nuclear Installations HAF001Regulations on Radioactive Waste Safety HAF401(Radioactive wastespecific)

Law of the People’s Republic of China on Prevention and Control of Radioactive Pollution (2003)

No decision made. No decision made.

Finland

Government Decree 736-2008 on the Safety of the Disposal of Nuclear WasteRadiation and Nuclear Safety AuthorityLong-term Safety of Disposal of SNF YVL 8.4(Radioactive wastespecific)

Decree on Environmental Impact Assessment Procedures (Generic)

Government Decree 736-2008 on the Safety of the Disposal of Nuclear WasteRadiation and Nuclear Safety AuthorityLong-term Safety of disposal of SNF YVL 8.4Operation of the final disposal facility for SNF YVL 8.5(Radioactive wastespecific)

Nuclear Energy Act (1987, 1994, 2008)

Decision-in-Principle by Government (2000)Confirmation of Decisionin-Principle by Parliament (2001, 2002)

Construction and operating licenses are granted by the Government on the advice of Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority.

France

Nuclear Safety AuthoritySafety Guide for Final Disposal of Radioactive Waste In Deep Geologic Formations(Radioactive wastespecific)

Code of EnvironmentArticles L121 and R121-R125(Generic)

Nuclear Safety AuthoritySafety Guide for Final Disposal of Radioactive Waste In Deep Geologic Formations(Radioactive wastespecific)

Research on Radioactive Waste Management Act (1991)

Approval of a site near the village of Bure in the Meuse/Haute-Marne region in the Planning Act Concerning the Sustainable Management of Radioactive Materials and Waste (2006).

After a license application is submitted, Parliament will prescribe reversibility conditions that have to be met. Afterward, the Council of State can grant the license.
28 A Survey of National Programs for Managing High-Level Radioactive Waste and Spent Nuclear Fuel

CHINA, FINLAND, FRANCE

Institutional Arrangements

Interactions with Local Jurisdictions

Explicit Adoption of a 

Staged Decision-Making 

Process

Local Veto Limitations on Local Veto

Benefits to be Provided 

to Local Community for 

Accepting a Facility

China No decision made. No decision made. No decision made. No decision made.

Finland

Yes, by Municipal Council. The Eurajoki nuclear community approved a positive statement, thereby not vetoing the siting of a HLW/SNF repository.

Veto shall be exercised before the Government makes a Decision-in-Principle on the repository. Veto cannot be overridden.

A benefits package was negotiated between Eurajoki Township and Posiva Oy and Teollisuuden Voima Oyj in 1999. The scale of benefits is minimal, including a loan to construct a new home for the elderly. The former home was renovated and rented to Posiva Oy.

No

France

None, but the local governments in the Meuse/Haute-Marne region volunteered for an underground site-characterization program.

Not applicable The 2006 Planning Act defines a series of 

measures to support local development, including a dedicated tax on Basic Nuclear Installations.

Yes
China, Finland, France 29

CHINA, FINLAND, FRANCE

Technical Approaches

Operating Nuclear 

Power Plants/

Generating Capacity

Reprocessing Included 

in Fuel Cycle

Transportation System 

in Place to Move 

SNF/HLW to a Deep 

Geologic Repository

Independent 

Centralized InterimStorage Facility 

Established

Geologic Environments 

Considered or 

Investigated for a 

Repository

China

11 nuclear power plants(8.6 GWe)16 nuclear power plants are under construction.(16.0 GWe)

YesA small reprocessing plant located in northwest China is expected to begin operation in 2010.

No decision made. No Granite, shale, tuff, mudstone, 

and diorite

Finland

Four nuclear power plants(2.7 GWe)One nuclear power plant is under construction. (1.6 GWe)

No No final decision has been 

made about transportation mode. Readily available options include sea, truck, and rail.

No Granite, gneiss, granodiorite, 

and migmatite

France

58 nuclear power plants(63.5 GWe)One nuclear power plant is under construction.(1.6 GWe)

Yes Meuse/Haute-Marne region 

is accessible only by truck, but studies are under way to explore alternatives.

No Argillite and granite
30 A Survey of National Programs for Managing High-Level Radioactive Waste and Spent Nuclear Fuel

CHINA, FINLAND, FRANCE

Technical Approaches

Indigenous 

Underground 

Research Laboratories

Status of Site-Selection 

Process

Long-Term Health and 

Safety Requirements

Requirements for 

Retrievability

Requirements for 

Defense-in-Depth

China

None Preliminary investigations are 

under way at the Beishan site (granite) in the Gobi Desert in Gansu Province in Northwest China.Site-Selection is not anticipated before 2020.

No decision made. No decision made. No decision made.

Finland

Construction of ONKALO underground rock characterization facility in Eurajoki began in 2004 and is continuing. Experimental work is being conducted during construction.(Migmatite)

Olkilouto, a site at Eurajoki in migmatite, has been approved by Government (2000) and by Parliament (2001). It is being characterized at depth.

For the first several thousand years, dose limit is less than 0.1 mSv/year for normal events.Release limits for selected radionuclides established. Beyond the first several thousand years, impacts can be comparable to those arising from natural radioactive substances but should remain insignificantly low.

The regulatory requirement for retrievablility was eliminated in 2008. However, Posiva is still required under the 2000 Decision-in-Principle to present a plan and cost estimate for retrieving the waste when it submits an application for a construction license.

The barriers should complement each other so that a deficiency in one will not jeopardize longterm safety.

France

Construction of the Meuse/Haute-Marne facility near the village of Bure began in 1999.(Argillite)

The National Agency for Radioactive Waste Management is deciding, in consultation with local communities, where in the transposition zone, a 250km2area north of Bure, the repository should be sited.

Dose limit is 0.25 mSv/year for normal scenarios.Compliance period is 104years.

The repository must be designed so that it is “reversible” for at least 100 years. Reversibility is a management concept that requires technical retrievability.

RequiredSafety Guide for Final Disposal of Radioactive Waste In Deep Geologic FormationsChapters 5.1 and 6.1
China, Finland, France 31

CHINA, FINLAND, FRANCE

Technical Approaches

Methodology for 

Demonstrating 

Compliance with 

Postclosure Standards

Engineered Barrier System

Waste Forms 

Authorized to be 

Disposed of in a Deep 

Geologic Repository

Anticipated Start 

of Repository 

Operations

Design Importance to Safety Case

China No decision made. No decision made. No decision made. HLW Around 2050

Finland

Compliance is to be demonstrated by means of a deterministic, conservative safety case that addresses both the expected evolutions and unlikely disruptive events affecting long-term safety. The safety case consists of a numerical analysis based on experimental studies and will be complemented by qualitative expert judgment whenever quantitative analyses are not feasible or are too uncertain.

Double-shelled waste package composed of copper (outer) and cast-iron (inner); the annulus between the canister and the rock wall will be filled with highly compacted bentonite.

Very important Commercial SNF 2020

France

Compliance is shown through the deterministic evaluation of several normal and altered scenarios. In addition, deterministic sensitivity calculations are used to evaluate the impact of uncertainty.

Vitrified waste placed within stainless steel packages.

Minimal HLW and long-lived intermediatelevel waste 2025
32 A Survey of National Programs for Managing High-Level Radioactive Waste and Spent Nuclear Fuel

GERMANY, JAPAN, REPUBLIC OF KOREA
GERMANY, JAPAN, REPUBLIC OF KOREA

33

Germany, Japan, 

Republic of Korea
34 A Survey of National Programs for Managing High-Level Radioactive Waste and Spent Nuclear Fuel

GERMANY, JAPAN, REPUBLIC OF KOREA

Institutional Arrangements

Legislation Specific 

to Radioactive Waste 

Management 

Implementing 

Organization Independent Regulator Independent Technical/ Program Oversight Dedicated Funding Source for Repository Development

Germany

Atomic Energy Act (1959)Nuclear Licensing Procedure Ordinance (1977)Federal Mining Act (1980)Waste Disposal Advance Payments Ordinance (1982)Precautionary Radiation Protection Act (1986)Radiation Protection Ordinance (2001)

Federal Office for Radiation Protection within the Federal Ministry for the Environment, Nature Conservation, and Nuclear Safety may make use of “third parties,” such as the private German Service Company for the Construction and Operation of Waste Repositories(Government Agency)

Supervisory authority and author of rules and guidelines: Federal Ministry for the Environment, Nature Conservation, and Nuclear SafetyLicensing authorities: States (Länder) Ministries under the Atomic Energy Act, State authorities for water use and protection, and competent State mining authorities under the Federal Mining Act

Nuclear Waste Management Commission(Advises the Ministry for the Environment, Nature Conservation, and Nuclear Safety)

None, but research and development costs for a repository are recovered from the waste generators.

Japan

Final Disposal of Specific Radioactive Wastes Act (2000, 2007)Reactor Regulation Law (1957, amended in 2007 to establish a safety regulation system for the disposal of HLW and transuranic waste)

Nuclear Waste Management Organization(Private nonprofit organization established by the owners of nuclear power plants)

Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency, a unit within the Ministry of Economy, Trade, and Industry

None, although the Nuclear Safety Commission advises the Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency.

Yes. With respect to HLW, each year, the Ministry of Economy, Trade, and Industry notifies nuclear power plant owners how much they need to deposit in the High-Level Waste Fund.Yes. With respect to Transuranic Waste, the Ministry of Economy, Trade, and Industry notifies the owners of reprocessing plants and mixed-oxide fuel fabrication plants how much they need to deposit in the Transuranic Waste fund.

Republic of Korea

Atomic Energy Act (1988)Enforcement Decree of the Atomic Energy Act (1988)Radioactive Waste Management Law (2008)

Korea Radioactive Waste Management Organization(Government Agency)

Ministry of Education, Science, and Technology(Advised by Korea Institute of Nuclear Safety and Nuclear Safety Commission)

None “Polluter pays” principle 

adopted in Atomic Energy Act Radioactive Waste Management FundNo decision made on implementation except that the generator pays only after waste is accepted for centralized storage or disposal.
Germany, Japan, Republic of Korea 35

GERMANY, JAPAN, REPUBLIC OF KOREA

Institutional Arrangements

Regulations and Decrees Applicable to Licensing 

 a Deep Geologic Repository

Formal Legislative/Executive Approvals Required 

for Developing a Deep Geologic Repository 

Site-Selection Environmental Impact Assessment Health and Safety Protection Selection of Waste Management Option Site-Selection Facility Construction and Operation

Germany

No decision made. Environmental Impact 

Assessment Act (Generic)

Federal Ministry for the Environment, Nature Conservation, and Nuclear Safety Safety Requirements Governing the Final Disposal of HeatGenerating Radioactive Waste(Radioactive waste-specific)

Atomic Energy Act (1959)

No decision made. Plan Approval by the State 

where the site is located, subject to supervision by the Federal Government.

Japan

NoneThe Nuclear Safety Commission has published guidelines (not regulations) that the Nuclear Waste Management Organization must follow.

No decision made. Federal Ministry for the 

Environment, Nature Conservation, and Nuclear SafetyRules for Category 1 Waste Disposal for Nuclear Fuel Material(Radioactive waste-specific)

Final Disposal of Specific Radioactive Wastes Act (2000, revised in 2007)

With the consent of the Cabinet, the Minister of Economy, Trade, and Industry must give approval.

With consent of the Cabinet, the Minister of Economy, Trade, and Industry must give approval.

Republic of Korea

Ministry of Education, Science, and TechnologySiting Criteria for Spent Fuel Interim Storage FacilitiesNotice Number 2008-58No decision made for HLW/SNF repository.(Radioactive waste-specific)

Ministry of Education, Science, and TechnologyRegulation on the Environmental Radiation Survey and Impact Analysis in the Vicinity of Nuclear FacilitiesNotice Number 2008-28(Radioactive waste-specific)

Ministry of Education, Science, and Technology Criteria for Radioactive DoseNotice Number 1998-12 and 2005-17 promulgated by the Ministry of Education, Science, and Technology’s predecessor body, the Ministry of Science and Technology(Radioactive waste-specific)

Atomic Energy Act (1988) No decision made. No decision made.
36 A Survey of National Programs for Managing High-Level Radioactive Waste and Spent Nuclear Fuel

GERMANY, JAPAN, REPUBLIC OF KOREA

Institutional Arrangements

Interactions with Local Jurisdictions

Explicit Adoption of a 

Staged Decision-Making 

Process

Local Veto Limitations on Local Veto

Benefits to be Provided 

to Local Community for 

Accepting a Facility

Germany

No decision made. No decision made. No decision made. “Stepwise optimization” is mandated 

under the Safety Requirements Governing the Final Disposal of Heat-Generating Radioactive Waste.

Japan

The Mayor of host community and the Prefectual Governor must agree to participate in the siting process.

None If a local community agrees to be included 

in a literature survey of potential sites, it and its neighboring communities will receive up to $18 million. If the community subsequently allows surface-based site investigations, it and its neighboring communities will receive up to $65 million.

Yes

Republic of Korea

No decision made for HLW/SNF repository.A volunteer nuclear community (Kyongju/Gyeonju) agreed in a referendum to host a low- and intermediate-level waste disposal site.

No decision made on HLW/SNF repository. None for a low- and intermediate-level waste disposal site.

No decision made for HLW/SNF repository.$300 million provided local community for low- and intermediate-level waste disposal site; in addition, the community will receive $10 million per year after the facility begins operation. Other benefits are possible.

No decision made for HLW/SNF disposal.A staged decision-making process for low- and intermediate-level waste disposal is in place.
Germany, Japan, Republic of Korea 37

GERMANY, JAPAN, REPUBLIC OF KOREA

Technical Approaches

Operating Nuclear 

Power Plants/

Generating Capacity

Reprocessing Included 

in Fuel Cycle

Transportation System 

in Place to Move 

SNF/HLW to a Deep 

Geologic Repository 

Independent 

Centralized InterimStorage Facility 

Established

Geologic Environments 

Considered or 

Investigated for a 

Repository

Germany

17 nuclear power plants(20.3 GWe)

Before 1994, commercial SNF had to be reprocessed. Between January 1, 1994, and June 30, 2005, nuclear power plant owners had the option of reprocessing their commercial SNF. Under amendments to the Atomic Energy Act in 2002, transport of commercial SNF to reprocessing plants after July 1, 2005, was prohibited. Most of the reprocessing of German commercial SNF was done at La Hague, although smaller amounts were reprocessed at Sellafield, EUROCHEMIC, and Karlsruhe.

No decision made. Facilities at Gorleben and 

Ahaus store small amounts of commercial SNF. HLW is stored at Gorleben.Under the amendments to the Atomic Energy Act in 2002, commercial SNF has to be stored at nuclear power plants.

Salt

Japan

53 nuclear power plants(46.2 GWe)Three nuclear power plants are under construction.(3.7 GWe)

Yes. Commercial SNF from Japan has been reprocessed in France and the United Kingdom. In addition, reprocessing takes place in a small facility at Tokai and, pending the results of preservice testing, will take place at a large facility at Rokkasho Village.

No decision made. No Granite and sedimentary rock

Republic of Korea

20 nuclear power plants(17.7 GWe)Six nuclear power plants are under construction. (6.7 GWe)

All SNF used in light-water reactors is of U.S. origin. The U.S. has refused to permit the reprocessing of that fuel. 

No decision made. Envisioned, but no schedule for 

beginning to site such a facility has been established.

Granite
38 A Survey of National Programs for Managing High-Level Radioactive Waste and Spent Nuclear Fuel

GERMANY, JAPAN, REPUBLIC OF KOREA

Technical Approaches

Indigenous 

Underground 

Research Laboratories

Status of Site-Selection 

Process

Long-Term Health and 

Safety Requirements

Requirements for 

Retrievability

Requirements for 

Defense-in-Depth

Germany

Underground exploration of the Gorleben site was launched in 1986 but was suspended in 2000.(Salt)

The Site-Selection process, which focused on the Gorleben site, was suspended in 2000 for no longer than 10 years. The suspension was agreed to by the Government and the nuclear power plant owners.The Federal Ministry for the Environment, Nature Conservation, and Nuclear Safety published a concept for the siteselection process in 2006.

The additional risk of serious health damage must be less than104- /lifetime for probable scenarios.*The additional risk of serious health damage must be less than 10-3/lifetime for less probable scenarios.*Compliance period is 106years.* lifetime means 100 years for humans

Retrievability of HLW and SNF need not be provided in the disposal concept. However, shielding of the ionizing radiation has to be guaranteed so that the waste will be manageable for possible retrieval for a period of 500 years after repository closure, taking into account probable developments.

The safety after repository closure has to be secured through a robust and graded barrier system. The functions of this system should be fulfilled passively and without any maintenance. In addition, the functionality should be maintained in a sufficient way even for the case that individual barriers will not provide their full effectiveness.

Japan

Tono (granite)Two laboratories are under construction: Mizunami (granite) and Horonobe(sedimentary rock).

The Nuclear Waste Management Organization has adopted a transparent and voluntary approach for finding candidate sites. One town (Toyo-cho) initially agreed to participate but then withdrew.The national government may take a more proactive role in identifying sites in the future.

No decision made. No decision made. No decision made.

Republic of Korea

Korea Underground Research Tunnel at shallow depth (Granite)

No schedule for beginning to site a HLW/SNF repository has been established.A volunteer nuclear community (Kyongju/Gyeonju) has agreed to host a low- and intermediatelevel waste disposal site.

No decision made for HLW/SNF disposal.For low- and intermediate-level waste disposal, 0.1 mSv/year for normal events; risk limit of 10-6/year for probabilistic disruptive events; 1 mSv/year for human intrusion.

No decision made, but, in the conceptual-level Reference Design, waste packages had to be retrievable for an indeterminate period.

Safety philosophy includes defense-in-depth and some degree of redundancy in multibarrier function.
Germany, Japan, Republic of Korea 39

GERMANY, JAPAN, REPUBLIC OF KOREA

Technical Approaches

Methodology for 

Demonstrating 

Compliance with 

Postclosure Standards

Engineered Barrier System

Waste Forms 

Authorized to be 

Disposed of in a Deep 

Geologic Repository

Anticipated Start 

of Repository 

Operations

Design Importance to Safety Case

Germany

Deterministic calculations have to be carried out on the basis of modeling as realistically as possible, using, for example, median values as input parameters.

No decision made. No decision made. HLW, commercial SNF, and 

heat-generating intermediate-level waste

No decision made.

Japan

No decision made.A generic performance assessment (H12) has been carried out (1999):©d {y¢y ~ y z{{zD©W w}{ | y{w

evaluated deterministically.

©i{ ywyw

addressed uncertainty.

©Ywyw yw{z   w

least 108 years.

©f{w z{ w { ~w

0.1mSv/year.

No decision made.In the H12 performance assessment, vitrified waste in stainless steel containers is disposed of in a carbon steel overpack that is surrounded by bentonite.

No decision made.In the H12 performance assessment, all packages were assumed to fail at 103 years.

HLW No decision made.

Republic of Korea

No decision made.A quantitative approach for up to 10,000 years is envisioned, with qualitative assessments carried out for subsequent periods.

No decision made.A conceptual-level Reference Design was developed in the late 1990’s. In the Reference Design, options considered for the canisters were high-nickel alloys, stainless steel, and copper. The canisters would be surrounded by bentonite.

In the conceptual-level Reference Design, the engineered barrier system was very important.

Commercial SNF No decision made.

SPAIN, SWEDEN, SWITZERLAND

41

Spain, Sweden, 

Switzerland
42 A Survey of National Programs for Managing High-Level Radioactive Waste and Spent Nuclear Fuel

SPAIN, SWEDEN, SWITZERLAND

Legislation Specific 

to Radioactive Waste 

Management

Implementing 

Organization Independent Regulator Independent Technical/ Program Oversight Dedicated Funding Source for Repository Development

Spain

Nuclear Energy Act, Law 25/1964, modified by Law 24/2005Act Creating the Nuclear Safety Council, Law 15/1980,modified by Law 33/2007

Spanish National Company for Radioactive Waste(Government-owned Corporation) 

Nuclear Safety CouncilThe Ministry of Industry, Tourism, and Trade legally makes the final decision but cannot overturn the Nuclear Safety Council’s report if it is negative or conditional.

None Nuclear Decommissioning 

Fund paid into by the waste producers.(Covers both decommissioning of nuclear power plants and radioactive waste management)

Sweden

Act on Nuclear Activities (1984)Radiation Protection Act (1988)Environmental Code (1998)

Swedish Nuclear Fuel and Waste Management Company (Private corporation formed by the owners of nuclear power plants)

Radiation Safety Authority, within the Ministry of the Environment, was established in 2008 by merging the Radiation Protection Institute and the Nuclear Power Inspectorate.

National Council for Nuclear Waste (Advises the Ministry of the Environment)

Nuclear Waste FundOwners of nuclear power plants pay a fee based on the estimated costs of disposing of SNF. The fee varies from year to year and varies as well from plant to plant.Owners provide a guarantee to cover the difference between money paid into the Fund and the total estimated cost of disposal. 

Switzerland

Atomic Energy Act (1959, modified to the Nuclear Energy Act in 2003)Environmental Protection Act (1983)Radiological Protection Act (1991)Radiological Protection Ordinance (1994)Ordinance on the Collection of Radioactive Waste (2002)Nuclear Energy Ordinance (2004)Nuclear Safety Inspectorate Act (2007)Ordinance on Decommissioning and Waste Management Fund (2008)

National Cooperative for the Disposal of Radioactive Waste (The National Cooperative for the Disposal of Radioactive Waste is a public/private consortium of radioactive waste producers, including all the owners of nuclear power plants and the Federal State.)

Department of Environment, Transport, Energy, and Communications, advised by the Federal Nuclear Safety Inspectorate and the Federal Nuclear Safety Commission

Nuclear Safety Commission(Advises Federal Council, Federal Department of Environment, Transport, Energy, and Communications, and the Federal Nuclear Safety Inspectorate)

Radioactive Waste Disposal Fund for Nuclear InstallationsConsumers of nucleargenerated electricity pay into the Fund a surcharge for each kilowatt-hour produced.Current expenses incurred by the National Cooperative for the Disposal of Radioactive Waste are paid for annually by the nuclear power plant owners.

Institutional Arrangements
Spain, Sweden, Switzerland 43

SPAIN, SWEDEN, SWITZERLAND

Institutional Arrangements

Regulations and Decrees Applicable to Licensing 

 a Deep Geologic Repository

Formal Legislative/Executive Approvals Required 

for Developing a Deep Geologic Repository 

Site-Selection Environmental Impact Assessment Health and Safety Protection Selection of Waste Management Option Site-Selection Facility Construction and Operation

Spain

Royal Decree 775/2006 established process for siting the Centralized Temporary Storage facility.No decision has been made for a HLW/SNF repository.

Royal Decree 1/2008 Royal Decree

1836/1999, modified by Royal Decree 35/2008Nuclear Safety CouncilRegulation on Nuclear and Radioactive Facilities

No decision made. No decision made. No decision made.

Sweden

None The Environmental Impact 

Assessment process is consistent with Directives from the European Union.

Regulations promulgated by the Radiation Protection Institute and the Nuclear Power Inspectorate have been adopted by the Radiation Safety Authority. SSIFS 1998 :1SSIFS 2005:5SKIFS 1998:1SKIFS 2002 :1SKIFS 2004: 1

In 1983, the Government decided that the KBS-3 approach formed an acceptable basis for the Swedish Nuclear Fuel and Waste Management Company to use in its plans for developing a repository.

In 2001, the Government approved a proposal by the Swedish Nuclear Fuel and Waste Management Company to investigate sites in Östhammar and Oskarshamn to determine whether they were suitable for developing a repository.

The Radiation Safety Authority will review a license application, scheduled to be submitted in 2010, and advise the Government on its acceptability. Concurrently, an Environmental Court will rule on the application.Taking the Radiation Safety Authority’s advice and the Environmental Court’s ruling into account, the Government will decide whether to approve the license application.There also may be a nonbinding vote of Parliament.

Switzerland

Federal Council in 2008 approved the concept of the Sectoral Plan (Sachplan).

Federal Office for the Environment reviews Environmental Impact Assessments.

Federal Nuclear Safety InspectorateProtection Objectives for the Disposal of Radioactive Waste Guideline G03 (2009) replaces HSK-R-21 (1993).

Nuclear Energy Acts of 1959 and 2003

General License granted by Federal Council and approved by Parliament.General License may be challenged in a national Facultative Referendum.

Construction and operating licenses granted by Federal Department of Environment, Transport, Energy, and Communications.
44 A Survey of National Programs for Managing High-Level Radioactive Waste and Spent Nuclear Fuel

SPAIN, SWEDEN, SWITZERLAND

Institutional Arrangements

Interactions with Local Jurisdictions

Explicit Adoption of a 

Staged Decision-Making 

Process

Local Veto Limitations on Local Veto

Benefits to be Provided 

to Local Community for 

Accepting a Facility

Spain

No decision made for a HLW/SNF repository. The process established for siting the Centralized Temporary Storage facility requires voluntary participation by local communities.

No decision made for a HLW/SNF repository.

No decision made for a HLW/SNF repository.

No decision made for a HLW/SNF repository.

Sweden

Local community can veto the choice of a site.

National override of veto only if there is no alternative location for the repository in a community more willing to accept it.

Oskarshamn, the community not selected, will receive, in an added-value package, $180 million for participating in the siting process. Östhammar, the community selected, will receive $60 million.

A license for a geological repository for SNF will be granted in two steps. The first step involves the full licensing of a facility. After several years of trial operation, regular operation will begin.

Switzerland

None, although informal participation and formal consultations are required at all stages of the Sectoral Plan.

Not applicable No decision made.

To be decided in Stage 3 of the Sectoral Plan.

The Sectoral Plan contains three stages.
Spain, Sweden, Switzerland 45

SPAIN, SWEDEN, SWITZERLAND

Technical Approaches

Operating Nuclear 

Power Plants/

Generating Capacity

Reprocessing Included 

in Fuel Cycle

Transportation System 

in Place to Move 

SNF/HLW to a Deep 

Geologic Repository

Independent 

Centralized InterimStorage Facility 

Established

Geologic Environments 

Considered or 

Investigated for a 

Repository

Spain

Eight nuclear power plants(7.4 GWe)

Some commercial SNF from the Vandellós I plant was reprocessed at La Hague. Additional commercial SNF from the Santa María de Garoña plant was reprocessed at Sellafield.Current national policy does not contemplate any additional reprocessing.

No decision made. A process was initiated in 

2006 to site a Centralized Temporary Storage facility. No site has been chosen.

Granite, clay, and salt No geological environments are currently under consideration.

Sweden

10 nuclear power plants(9.1 GWe)

NoAlthough small amounts of commercial SNF have been reprocessed in France and the United Kingdom, no vitrified waste was returned to Sweden.

Waste can be moved to the Östhammar site by a specially designed ship, the Sigyn.

Yes, the CLAB facility in Oskarshamn was commissioned in 1985.

Granite

Switzerland

Five nuclear power plants(3.2 GWe)

Commercial SNF has been reprocessed in France and the United Kingdom. Some HLW has been returned to Switzerland. Some extracted plutonium and some extracted uranium has been used to make MOX assemblies. Discharged SNF not covered by reprocessing contracts in place in 2002 may not be reprocessed until at least 2016.

No decision made. A Central Storage Facility 

(ZWILAG) in Würenlingen, near the Beznau Nuclear Power Plant, holds HLW and SNF.

Clay and granite
46 A Survey of National Programs for Managing High-Level Radioactive Waste and Spent Nuclear Fuel

SPAIN, SWEDEN, SWITZERLAND

Technical Approaches

Indigenous 

Underground 

Research Laboratories

Status of Site-Selection 

Process

Long-Term Health and 

Safety Requirements

Requirements for 

Retrievability

Requirements for 

Defense-in-Depth

Spain

None No decision made. For low- and intermediatelevel waste disposal, dose 

constraint is 0.1 mSv/year for high-probability scenarios; risk limit of 10-6/year is for lower probability scenarios.No decision made for HLW/SNF repository.

No decision made. No decision made.

Sweden

Construction of the Äspö laboratory in Oskarshamn began in 1990 and was completed in 1995.(Granite)

A site in the municipality of Östhammar was selected in 2009.

Risk limit of 10-6/year for 105years. The risk analysis should be carried out for no longer than 106 years.

None The barrier system shall 

comprise several barriers so that, as far as possible, the necessary safety is maintained in spite of a failure in one barrier.

Switzerland

Mont Terri near Saint Ursanne (clay) and Grimsel in the Berne Canton (granite)

Sectoral Plan is at Stage 1, in which potential regions are examined based on their geological characteristics. The National Cooperative for the Disposal of Radioactive Waste has recommended three regions for further exploration. All are in Opalinus clay and are in northern Switzerland.The proposals are under review by Department of Environment, Transport, Energy, and Communications, advised by the Federal Nuclear Safety Inspectorate, the Federal Nuclear Safety Commission, and the Commission for Nuclear Waste Disposal.

Dose constraint relevant to high-probability scenarios 0.1 mSv/year; risk target of 10-6/year for lower-probability scenarios. Complete containment is required for 1,000 years.The protection of man and the environment is “permanent.” However, as a practical matter, safety assessments will be carried out for 107 years.

The retrievability of HLW has to be considered when designing the repository. The technical feasibility of retrieving the waste has to be demonstrated in experiments on a 1:1 scale before the repository starts operation.

The regulations require that the long-term safety of a repository shall be ensured by a system of multiple passive safety barriers. Although some “redundancy to ensure insensitivity to uncertainties” is required, the regulations do not specify any particular level.
Spain, Sweden, Switzerland 47

SPAIN, SWEDEN, SWITZERLAND

Technical Approaches

Methodology for 

Demonstrating 

Compliance with 

Postclosure Standards

Engineered Barrier System

Waste Forms 

Authorized to be 

Disposed of in a Deep 

Geologic Repository

Anticipated Start 

of Repository 

Operations

Design Importance to Safety Case

Spain No decision made. No decision made. No decision made. No decision made. No decision made.

Sweden

The regulations do not prescribe a specific methodology for demonstrating compliance. Both deterministic and probabilistic approaches can be used.Three types of scenarios are to be evaluated:©cw y{w3⁄4xw{z  ~{

probable evolution of the external conditions using realistic or pessimistic assumptions.

©b{ xwx{ y{w3⁄4{w{z

for the evaluation of uncertainties. Include variations on the main scenario with alternative sequences of event.

©h{zw y{w3⁄4yz{

sequences of events and conditions that illustrate the significance of individual barriers and barrier functions.

Commercial SNF is placed in a copper canister that has a castiron insert for support. The canister is surrounded by bentonite clay.

Very important Commercial SNF 2023

Switzerland

No decision made.In a study, Project Entsorgungsnachweis, evaluating the feasibility of the Opalinus clay disposal concept, a deterministic performance assessment of a “Reference Scenario” was carried out. In addition, five other (“whatif”) scenarios, often containing subscenarios, were evaluated to explore the effects of uncertainty. Complementing the deterministic calculations were some probabilistic analyses.

The disposal concept evaluated in Project Entsorgungsnachweis envisions canisters for HLW and commercial SNF made out of cast iron. HLW is contained in a stainless steel flask inside the canister. The canisters are surrounded by bentonite clay.

Relatively unimportant compared to the Opalinus clay.

HLW Not earlier than 2040
48 A Survey of National Programs for Managing High-Level Radioactive Waste and Spent Nuclear Fuel

UNITED KINGDOM
UNITED KINGDOM

49

United Kingdom
50 A Survey of National Programs for Managing High-Level Radioactive Waste and Spent Nuclear Fuel

UNITED KINGDOM

Institutional Arrangements

Legislation Specific 

to Radioactive Waste 

Management

Implementing 

Organization Independent Regulator Independent Technical/ Program Oversight Dedicated Funding Source for Repository Development

United Kingdom

Nuclear Installations Act (1965)Radioactive Substances Act (1993)

Nuclear Decommissioning Authority Radioactive Waste Management Directorate(Non-Departmental Public Body under the responsibility of the Department of Energy and Climate Change; for some aspects of its functions, it is also responsible to Scottish Ministers.)

Environment Agency(for England and Wales)Scottish Environment AgencyNorthern Ireland Department of Environment Health and Safety ExecutiveDepartment for Transport

Committee on Radioactive Waste Management(Advises Government and ministers of the devolved administrations of Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland)

NoneGovernment will pay the costs of managing legacy waste. The policy of the Government is that owners and operators of new nuclear power plants set aside funds to cover their full share of waste management and disposal costs. 
United Kingdom 51

UNITED KINGDOM

Institutional Arrangements

Regulations and Decrees Applicable to Licensing 

 a Deep Geologic Repository

Formal Legislative/Executive Approvals Required 

for Developing a Deep Geologic Repository 

Site-Selection Environmental Impact Assessment Health and Safety Protection Selection of Waste Management Option Site-Selection Facility Construction and Operation

United Kingdom

None European Union 

Environmental Impact Assessment Act transposed in the United Kingdom by the Planning (Environmental Impact Assessment) Regulations

Environment AgencyGeological Disposal Facilities on Land for Solid Radioactive Wastes: Guidance of Requirements for Authorisation (2009)

Department of Environment, Food, and Rural Affairs Response to the Report and Recommendations of the Committee on Radioactive Waste Management(2006)Department of Environment, Food, and Rural Affairs White Paper on Managing Radioactive Waste Safely (2008)

Government must ultimately approve the site.However, under the voluntarism and partnership approach, at each stage of site-selection the process, the decisionmaking body for the local community will decide whether to proceed with the next step. 

After authorization by the Environment Agency, planning permission/development consent, and licensing by the Health and Safety Executive, no further action is required.
52 A Survey of National Programs for Managing High-Level Radioactive Waste and Spent Nuclear Fuel

UNITED KINGDOM

Institutional Arrangements

Interactions with Local Jurisdictions

Explicit Adoption of a 

Staged Decision-Making 

Process

Local Veto Limitations on Local Veto

Benefits to be Provided 

to Local Community for 

Accepting a Facility

United Kingdom

The Government has committed to siting a repository only in a “willing” community.

The right of the community to withdraw from the process can be exercised until the point that underground construction and operations begin.

No decision made.The Government believes that any benefits package should be developed among the communities, Government, and the Nuclear Decommissioning Authority, taking account of local needs, affordability, and the value of money.

The Managing Radioactive Waste Safely program contains six stages.
United Kingdom 53

UNITED KINGDOM

Technical Approaches

Operating Nuclear 

Power Plants/

Generating Capacity

Reprocessing Included 

in Fuel Cycle

Transportation System 

in Place to Move 

SNF/HLW to a Deep 

Geological Repository

Independent 

Centralized InterimStorage Facility 

Established

Geologic Environments 

Considered or 

Investigated for a 

Repository

United Kingdom

19 nuclear power plants (11.0 GWe)

Yes, at Sellafield.The Government’s position is that the decision to reprocess in the future should be left to the commercial judgment of the owners of the SNF. SNF is not classified as waste.

No decision made. No No decision made.
54 A Survey of National Programs for Managing High-Level Radioactive Waste and Spent Nuclear Fuel

UNITED KINGDOM

Technical Approaches

Indigenous 

Underground 

Research Laboratories

Status of Site-Selection 

Process

Long-Term Health and 

Safety Requirements

Requirements for 

Retrievability

Requirements for 

Defense-in-Depth

United Kingdom

None The Government has solicited 

expressions of interest from local governments and communities. So far, there have been three expressions of interest, from the Copeland Borough Council, from the Allendale Borough Council, and from the Cumbria Borough Council. All of these localities are close to the Sellafield site.

According to regulatory guidances, radiological risk from a disposal facility to a person representative of those at greatest risk should be consistent with a risk limit level of 10-6/year.

No decision made, but planning and guidance require that the option of retrievability not be foreclosed.

A requirement of regulatory guidance.
United Kingdom 55

UNITED KINGDOM

Technical Approaches

Methodology for 

Demonstrating 

Compliance with 

Postclosure Standards

Engineered Barrier System

Waste Forms 

Authorized to be 

Disposed of in a Deep 

Geologic Repository

Anticipated Start 

of Repository 

Operations

Design Importance to Safety Case

United Kingdom

No decision made. No decision made. No decision made. HLW, commercial SNF, 

intermediate-level waste, and low-level waste not suitable for near-surface disposal. Uranium and plutonium if these elements are declared to be waste.

No decision made.

Glossary 57

Glossary1 

analysis, deterministic A simulation of the behavior of a system utilizing a single-valued 

set of parameters, events, and features. See also analysis, probabilistic.

analysis, probabilistic A simulation of the behavior of a system de,ned by parameters, 

events, and features whose values are represented by a statistical distribution. *e 

analysis gives a corresponding distribution of results. 

analysis, risk An analysis of possible events and their probabilities of occurrence 

together with their potential consequences. 

argillite A compact rock derived from either claystone, siltstone, or shale, that is more 

indurated than its constituent source rock but less laminated and ,ssile than shale and 

lacking the cleavage of slate. 

assessment, environmental impact An evaluation of radiological and nonradiological 

impacts of a proposed activity where the performance measure is overall environmental impact, including radiological and other global measures of impact on safety and 

environment. 

assessment, performance An assessment of the performance of a system or subsystem 

and its implications for protection and safety at a planned or an authorized facility. 

*is di+ers from safety assessment in that it can be applied to parts of a facility and 

does not necessarily require assessment of radiological impacts. 

† Most of these de,nitions have been taken from International Atomic Energy Agency, Radioactive Waste 

Management Glossary, 2003 Edition, Publication 1155, (IAEA: Vienna, 2003). *e de,nitions of some 

terms have been altered to make them more applicable to this report, and other terms have been added. 

*e IAEA is not responsible for those changes. De,nitions of geologic terms are derived from the American Geological Institute Glossary of Geology, *ird and Fourth Editions (AGI: Alexandria, VA, 1987 and 

1997).

†
58 A Survey of National Programs for Managing High-Level Radioactive Waste and Spent Nuclear Fuel

assessment, safety An analysis for evaluating the performance of an overall system and 

its impact where the performance measure is radiological impact or some other global 

measure of impact on safety. 

back:ll *e material used to re,ll excavated parts of a repository (dri.s, disposal rooms, 

or boreholes) during and a.er waste emplacement. 

barrier A physical or chemical feature that prevents or delays the movement of radionuclides or other material between components in a system — for example, a waste 

repository. In general, a barrier can be an engineered barrier that is constructed or a 

natural geological, geochemical, or hydrogeological barrier. 

barriers, multiple Two or more natural or engineered barriers used to isolate radioactive 

waste in, and prevent radionuclide migration from, a repository. See also barrier.

basalt A dark-colored ma,c igneous rock, commonly extrusive as lava /ows or cones but 

also intrusive as dikes or sills. 

bentonite A so. light-colored clay formed by chemical alteration of volcanic ash. 

Bentonite has been proposed for back,ll and bu+er material in many repositories. 

characterization, site Detailed surface and subsurface investigations and activities at 

candidate disposal sites for obtaining information to determine the suitability of the 

site for a repository and to evaluate the long-term performance of a repository at the 

site. 

clay A sediment composed of rock or mineral fragments smaller than 4 microns. Clays 

typically have relatively low permeability and relatively high capacity for sorption of 

positively charged chemicals. 

closure Administrative and technical actions directed at a repository at the end of its 

operating lifetime — for example, covering the disposed of waste (for a near-surface 

repository) or back,lling and/or sealing (for a geological repository and the passages leading to it) — and termination and completion of activities in any associated 

structures. 

compliance period *e length of time over which a repository is expected to satisfy 

either the dose constraint or the risk limit.

containment Methods or physical structures designed to prevent the dispersion of radioactive substances. 

crystalline rock See rock, crystalline.

decommissioning Administrative and technical actions taken to allow the removal of 

some or all of the regulatory controls from a facility. *is does not apply to a repository or to certain nuclear facilities used for mining and milling of radioactive materials, for which the term closure is used. 

defense-in-depth *e application of more than one protective measure for a given safety 

objective so that the objective is achieved even if one of the protective measures fails.

direct disposal Disposal of spent nuclear fuel as waste.

disposal Emplacement of waste in an appropriate facility without the intention of 

retrieval.
Glossary 59

disposal facility Synonymous with “repository.” 

dose constraint *e value of the e+ective dose or the equivalent dose to individuals from 

releases from a repository that may not be exceeded. 

dri; A horizontal or nearly horizontal mined opening.

engineered barrier system *e designed, or engineered, components of a repository, 

including waste packages and other engineered barriers. See also barrier. 

environmental impact statement A set of documents recording the results of an evaluation of the physical, ecological, cultural, and socioeconomic e+ects of a proposed facility (e.g., a repository), of a new technology, or of a new program. 

fuel cycle All operations associated with the production of nuclear energy, including 

mining and milling; processing and enrichment of uranium or thorium; manufacture 

of nuclear fuel; operation of nuclear reactors; reprocessing of nuclear fuel; related 

research and development activities; and all related radioactive waste management 

activities including decommissioning. 

fuel cycle, once-through Refers to the fuel cycle option where spent fuel is disposed of 

directly a.er use and is not reprocessed. See also direct disposal.

fuel, spent nuclear (SNF) Nuclear fuel removed from a reactor following irradiation that 

is not intended for further use in its present form because of depletion of ,ssile material, buildup of poison, or radiation or other damage. 

geologic barrier See barrier.

geologic disposal See repository, geologic.

geologic repository See repository, geologic.

glass (waste matrix material) An amorphous material with a molecular distribution 

similar to that of a liquid but with a viscosity so great that its physical properties are 

those of a solid. Glasses used in the solidi,cation of liquid high-level waste are generally based on a silicon-oxygen network. Additional network formers, such as aluminum, or modi,ers, such as boron, lead to aluminosilicate or borosilicate glass. 

granite Broadly applied, any holocrystalline quartz-bearing plutonic rock. *e main 

components of granite are feldspar, quartz, and, as a minor essential mineral, mica. 

Granite formations are being considered as possible hosts for geological repositories. 

groundwater Water that is held in rocks and soil beneath the surface of the earth. 

heat-generating waste See waste, heat generating.

high-level waste (HLW) See waste, high-level.

host medium/rock See rock, host.

intermediate-level waste See waste, low- and intermediate-level.

implementing organization *e entity charged under law (and its contractors) that 

undertakes the siting, design, construction, commissioning, and operation of a nuclear 

facility. 
60 A Survey of National Programs for Managing High-Level Radioactive Waste and Spent Nuclear Fuel

in situ testing Tests to determine the characteristics of the natural system that are conducted within a geological environment that is essentially equivalent to the environment of an actual repository. 

license An authorization issued by the regulatory body granting permission to perform 

speci,ed activities related to a facility or an activity. *e holder of a current license is 

termed a “licensee.” 

lithostatic pressure Pressure due to the weight of overlying rock and/or soil and water. 

long-lived waste See waste, long-lived.

long-term In radioactive waste disposal, refers to periods of time that exceed the time 

during which active institutional control can be expected to last. 

low- and intermediate-level waste See waste, low- and intermediate-level.

model A conceptual, analytical, or numerical representation of a system and the ways in 

which phenomena occur within that system, used to simulate or assess the behavior of 

the system for a de,ned purpose. 

multiple barriers See barriers, multiple.

nuclear fuel cycle See fuel cycle.

nuclear waste See waste, radioactive.

once-through fuel cycle See fuel cycle, once through.

overpack A secondary (or additional) outer container for one or more waste packages, 

used for handling, transport, storage, or disposal. 

package, spent fuel A vessel containing conditioned spent fuel in a form suitable for 

transport, storage, and disposal. 

package, waste *e waste form and any container(s) and internal barriers (e.g., absorbing materials and liners), prepared in accordance with the requirements for handling, 

transport, storage, and disposal.

postclosure *e period of time following the closure of a repository and the decommissioning of related surface facilities. See also closure.

probabilistic analysis See analysis, probabilistic.

regulator An authority or a system of authorities designated by the government of a 

nation as having legal authority for conducting the regulatory process, including 

issuing authorizations, and thereby for regulating the siting, design, construction, 

commissioning, operation, closure, decommissioning, and, if required, subsequent 

institutional control of nuclear facilities or speci,c aspects thereof. 

repository, deep geologic A facility for disposal of radioactive waste located underground (usually several hundred meters or more below the surface) in a geological 

formation intended to provide long-term isolation of radionuclides from the biosphere. 

reprocessing A process or operation the purpose of which is to extract radioactive isotopes from spent fuel for further use or to separate out various waste streams.
Glossary 61

risk A multiattribute measure expressing hazard, danger, or chance of harmful or 

injurious consequences associated with actual or potential exposures. It re/ects the 

probability that speci,c deleterious consequences may arise and the magnitude and 

character of such consequences. 

risk limit *e probability of a person living in the vicinity of a repository su+ering 

genetic or serious health damage, including cancer, during the course of his or her lifetime as a result of radioactive material released from the isolating rock zone.

rock A solid aggregate composed of naturally occurring substances including either one 

or more minerals, glasses, or organic matter.

rock, crystalline A generic term for igneous rocks and metamorphic rocks as opposed to 

sedimentary rocks. See also granite.

rock, host A geological formation in which a repository is located. 

rock, igneous Rock or mineral that solidi,ed from molten or partly molten material. 

*is includes plutonic rock such as granite and volcanic rocks such as basalt.

rock, sedimentary A type of rock resulting from the consolidation of loose material that 

has accumulated in layers. *e layers may be built up mechanically or by chemical 

precipitation. 

safety assessment See assessment, safety.

safety case An integrated collection of arguments and evidence for demonstrating the 

safety of a facility. *is will normally include a safety assessment but could also typically include independent lines of evidence and reasoning on the robustness and reliability of the safety assessment and the assumptions made therein. 

salt In geology, generally used to refer to naturally occurring halite (sodium chloride). 

scenario A postulated or assumed set of conditions or events. Scenarios are commonly 

used in performance assessments to represent possible future conditions or events to 

be modeled, such as the possible future evolution of a repository and its surroundings.

sedimentary rock See rock, sedimentary.

shale A consolidated clay rock that possesses closely spaced, well-de,ned laminae. 

site *e area containing, or under investigation of its suitability for, a nuclear facility 

(e.g., a repository). It is de,ned by a boundary and is under e+ective control of an 

operating organization. 

site characterization See characterization, site.

site con:rmation *e ,nal stage of the siting process for a repository. Site con,rmation 

is based on detailed investigations of the preferred site that provide site-speci,c information needed for safety assessment. 

site selection See siting.

siting *e process of selecting a suitable disposal site. *e process comprises the following stages: concept and planning; area survey; site characterization; site con,rmation. 

spent nuclear fuel (SNF) See fuel, spent nuclear. 
62 A Survey of National Programs for Managing High-Level Radioactive Waste and Spent Nuclear Fuel

spent nuclear fuel management All activities that relate to the handling or storage of 

spent nuclear fuel.

spent fuel package See package, spent fuel.

storage *e holding of spent nuclear fuel or of radioactive waste in a facility that provides for its containment, with the intention of retrieval. 

storage, interim See storage.

transuranic waste See waste, transuranic.

tu< A rock composed of compacted volcanic ash. 

underground research laboratory A facility where in situ testing can take place. 

vitri:cation *e process of incorporating materials into a glass or glass-like form. 

Vitri,cation is commonly applied to the solidi,cation of liquid high-level radioactive 

waste from the reprocessing of spent nuclear fuel. See also glass.

vitri:ed waste See waste glass.

waste Material in gaseous, liquid, or solid form for which no further use is foreseen. 

waste, heat generating Radioactive waste that is su-ciently radioactive that the decay 

heat signi,cantly increases its temperature and the temperature of its surroundings. 

In practice, heat-generating waste is normally high-level waste, although some types 

of intermediate-level waste may qualify as heat-generating waste. 

waste, high-level (HLW) *e radioactive liquid containing most of the ,ssion products 

and actinides present in spent fuel — which forms the residue from the ,rst solvent 

extraction cycle in reprocessing — and some of the associated waste streams; this 

material following solidi,cation; spent fuel (if it is declared a waste); or any other 

waste with similar radiological characteristics. Typical characteristics of HLW are 

thermal powers that are above about 2 kW/m3 and long-lived radionuclide concentrations exceeding the limitations for short-lived waste.

waste, intermediate-level See waste, low- and intermediate-level.

waste, long-lived Radioactive waste that contains signi,cant levels of radionuclides with 

half-lives above 30 years. 

waste, low- and intermediate-level Radioactive waste with radiological characteristics 

between those of waste exempted from regulation and high-level waste and spent 

nuclear fuel. *ey may be long-lived waste or short-lived waste. Many countries subdivide this class in other ways — for example, into low-level waste and intermediatelevel waste or medium-level waste, o.en on the basis of waste acceptance requirements 

for near-surface repositories.

waste, radioactive Waste that contains or is contaminated with radionuclides at concentrations or activities greater than clearance levels as established by the regulatory body. 

It should be recognized that this de,nition is purely for regulatory purposes and that 

material with activity concentrations equal to or less than clearance levels is radioactive from a physical viewpoint. 

waste, transuranic Alpha-bearing waste containing nuclides with atomic numbers 

above 92, in quantities and/or concentrations above regulatory limits. 
Glossary 63

waste, vitri:ed See waste glass.

waste disposal See disposal.

waste disposal system Refers to the disposal environment as a whole, including the geological surroundings, the engineering system of a repository (e.g., barriers), and the 

waste packages. 

waste form Waste in its physical and chemical forms a.er treatment. 

waste generator *e operating organization of a facility or an activity that produces 

waste. 

waste glass *e vitreous product that results from incorporating waste into a glass 

matrix. See also glass. 


United States

Nuclear Waste Technical Review Board

2300 Clarendon Boulevard 

Suite 1300

Arlington, VA 22201

(703) 235-4473

www.nwtrb.gov