U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE

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EGYPT: SECURITY, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND REFORM

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON 

THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED FIFTEENTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

JULY 24, 2018

Serial No. 115–161

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs

(

Available: http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/, http://docs.house.gov,

or http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/

(II)

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

EDWARD R. ROYCE, California, Chairman 

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey 

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida 

DANA ROHRABACHER, California 

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas 

TED POE, Texas 

DARRELL E. ISSA, California 

TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania 

MO BROOKS, Alabama 

PAUL COOK, California 

SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania 

RON DESANTIS, Florida 

MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina 

TED S. YOHO, Florida 

ADAM KINZINGER, Illinois 

LEE M. ZELDIN, New York 

DANIEL M. DONOVAN, JR., New York 

F. JAMES SENSENBRENNER, JR., 

Wisconsin 

ANN WAGNER, Missouri 

BRIAN J. MAST, Florida 

FRANCIS ROONEY, Florida 

BRIAN K. FITZPATRICK, Pennsylvania 

THOMAS A. GARRETT, JR., Virginia 

JOHN R. CURTIS, Utah 

ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York 

BRAD SHERMAN, California 

GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York 

ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey 

GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia 

THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida 

KAREN BASS, California 

WILLIAM R. KEATING, Massachusetts 

DAVID N. CICILLINE, Rhode Island 

AMI BERA, California 

LOIS FRANKEL, Florida 

TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii 

JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas 

ROBIN L. KELLY, Illinois 

BRENDAN F. BOYLE, Pennsylvania 

DINA TITUS, Nevada 

NORMA J. TORRES, California 

BRADLEY SCOTT SCHNEIDER, Illinois 

THOMAS R. SUOZZI, New York 

ADRIANO ESPAILLAT, New York 

TED LIEU, California

AMY PORTER, Chief of Staff THOMAS SHEEHY, Staff Director

JASON STEINBAUM, Democratic Staff Director 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida, Chairman 

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio 

DARRELL E. ISSA, California 

RON DESANTIS, Florida 

MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina 

ADAM KINZINGER, Illinois 

LEE M. ZELDIN, New York 

DANIEL M. DONOVAN, JR., New York 

ANN WAGNER, Missouri 

BRIAN J. MAST, Florida 

BRIAN K. FITZPATRICK, Pennsylvania 

JOHN R. CURTIS, Utah 

THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida 

GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia 

DAVID N. CICILLINE, Rhode Island 

LOIS FRANKEL, Florida 

BRENDAN F. BOYLE, Pennsylvania 

TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii 

BRADLEY SCOTT SCHNEIDER, Illinois 

THOMAS R. SUOZZI, New York 

TED LIEU, California 

(III)

C O N T E N T S 

Page

WITNESSES 

Mr. Jared Genser, adjunct professor of law, Georgetown University Law Center .......................................................................................................................... 8

Mr. Samuel Tadros, senior fellow, Center for Religious Freedom, The Hudson 

Institute ................................................................................................................ 17

Michele Dunne, Ph.D., director and senior fellow, Middle East Program, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace ......................................................... 32

Mr. Andrew Miller, deputy director for policy, Project on Middle East Democracy ........................................................................................................................ 38

LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING 

Mr. Jared Genser: Prepared statement ................................................................. 12

Mr. Samuel Tadros: Prepared statement .............................................................. 19

Michele Dunne, Ph.D.: Prepared statement .......................................................... 34

Mr. Andrew Miller: Prepared statement ............................................................... 40

APPENDIX 

Hearing notice .......................................................................................................... 60

Hearing minutes ...................................................................................................... 61

The Honorable Ann Wagner, a Representative in Congress from the State 

of Missouri: Questions submitted for the record ............................................... 62

(1)

EGYPT: SECURITY, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND 

REFORM 

TUESDAY, JULY 24, 2018

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,

SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA,

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS,

Washington, DC. 

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:45 p.m., in room 

2172 Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Ileana Ros-Lehtinen 

(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. The subcommittee will come to order. So 

sorry about our delay due to votes. 

After recognizing myself and Ranking Member Deutch for our 

opening statements, I will recognize other members seeking recognition for 1 minute. We will then hear from our witnesses. 

Without objection, the witnesses’ prepared statements will be 

made a part of the record and members may have 5 days to insert 

statements and questions for the record, subject to the length limitation in the rules. 

I am going to recognize Mr. Cicilline in a minute and I also 

would like to note that Mr. Genser will only be able to stay with 

us until 3:30 or so. He needs to catch a plane to West Africa to 

see—for a meeting and because of the beautiful weather that we 

are having—where are you—there you are—he had to rearrange 

his flight. 

So we will do our best to get him out of here on time and on 

that—on the plane. 

And thank you—who do we have as our special guest? Mr. 

French—Mr. Hill, welcome to the committee. Who do you have 

with you there? 

Just you, because your interest that you’ve spoken to me about 

on your bill on the Christians—Coptic Christians. So thank you, 

Mr. French Hill. 

Welcome to our committee and thank you for your efforts in support of Egypt’s Coptic population, and as I will say in my opening 

remarks, I am proud to be a co-sponsor of your resolution supporting better treatment and increased protection for the Coptics 

and I thank you for being with us today, and we will recognize you. 

So let me first turn, if I could, Mr. Deutch, to Mr. Cicilline, who 

has to get to another place and but has an adopted journalist. 

Mr. CICILLINE. Yes. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you, Mr. Cicilline. 

2

Mr. CICILLINE. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman, and thank you, 

Ranking Member Deutch, for affording me this courtesy. 

Thank you for convening this hearing on security, human rights, 

and reforming Egypt. Egypt consistently ranks as one of the worst 

countries for freedom of the press. 

Under—ushering counterterrorism laws, President Sisi has 

censored the press and journalists are routinely harassed, arrested, 

and imprisoned without trial. 

This hearing is timely, as this Saturday, a court in Egypt will be 

deciding whether to execute over 700 individuals who were arrested during the violent dispersal of a protest in 2013. 

One of these individuals is photojournalist Mohammed Abu Zeid, 

who is professionally known as Shawkan. I was made aware of 

Shawkan’s case through the Lantos Commission’s Defending Freedoms Project and I am so outraged by the conditions surrounding 

his arrest and detention that I decided to advocate on his behalf. 

Shawkan is an Egyptian freelance photojournalist whose work has 

been published in international publications including the New 

York Times. 

On August 14th, 2013, while photographing the events occurring 

in Rabaa Square, he was taken into custody along with two other 

journalists. 

The other journalists, however, were foreign nationals and were 

released within 2 hours, while Shawkan, only 25 at the time, has 

been abused, beaten, and denied his freedom, due process, and adequate medical treatment ever since simply because he was doing 

his job. 

In 2016, the U.N. Human Rights Council Working Group on Arbitrary Detention issued a report on his case. It regarded his detention as arbitrary and recommended that he be released immediately. 

I sent a letter to President Sisi of Egypt today, urging him to 

support the immediate release of Shawkan or, at the very least, to 

support an individual trial so that evidence specific to his case can 

be heard and contested. 

To paraphrase Shawkan, photography is his passion, but he 

should not have to pay for his passion with his life. 

Thank you for convening this hearing and to our witnesses for 

taking the time to share their knowledge on these very consequential issues and I really thank the chairman for giving me an opportunity to make those comments, and I yield back. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Of course. Thank you very much, Mr. 

Cicilline. 

The Chair now recognizes herself for 5 minutes 

U.S. policy toward Egypt is an issue many of us on this subcommittee and, indeed, many of us generally in Congress have debated over the past few years but especially since the revolution of 

2011. 

I think many of us recognize the strategic importance of Egypt 

and the role that it plays in the greater Middle East, and we can 

all understand the challenges that Egypt has faced since 2011, particularly in respect to security—both national security and economic security. 

3

President Sisi has had a very difficult task in implementing some 

IMF-mandated reforms. We have seen some positive signs as he 

makes progress, particularly with reductions in food and fuel subsidies. 

There are signs that economic growth is on pace for its highest 

since 2008 and Egypt may even have a budget surplus this year. 

Egypt has begun to commercialize its natural gas resources. 

Yet, as positive as all those signs are, there is still many questions as to whether the reforms or the level of growth are enough. 

Egypt is the Middle East’s largest country with a rapidly expanding population. 

The struggles to keep the economy driving while also facing a 

growing terror threat from ISIS in the Sinai and the Muslim 

Brotherhood are daunting. 

But for many of us, while we appreciate the difficult position this 

puts President Sisi in, we worry that the human rights of Egyptians are being curtailed and that the government’s repressive behavior will undermine Egypt’s long-term stability. 

As such good friends, it is important for the United States to let 

our partners in Egypt know that we are there to support its counterterrorism efforts, but our ideals, our values, our interests will 

not countenance the erosion of human rights in the name of the 

fight against terror. 

After all, the United States has been one of Egypt’s largest supporters over the years in terms of economic assistance—in terms of 

military assistance. In just the past 5 years, the U.S. has provided over $7 billion in 

bilateral aid to Egypt, and Egypt has been key to holding the line 

against the Islamic State’s Sinai province affiliate, a U.S.-designated foreign terrorist organization. 

But at what cost? President Sisi launched an offensive earlier 

this year named Operation Sinai 2018. I am supportive of the objective but I am concerned about the effectiveness of the military’s 

tactics and the lack of transparency in its efforts against ISIS. 

I am concerned over allegations that Egypt has used counter terror operations as a means to crack down on its opposition. 

The state of emergency laws have been extended and we have 

heard reports of the rights of journalists, as Mr. Cicilline just 

pointed out, activists, and critics of the Sisi government—their 

rights have been curtailed. 

One of the most important roles that Congress has is that of 

oversight—oversight over the administration’s policies but also 

oversight over how the American taxpayer dollars are being spent. 

So, naturally, we want to be cautious. We want to ensure that 

our assistance is promoting our values and our ideals and longterm stability. 

We should continue to support Egypt’s legitimate operations 

against the terror groups. But this is by no means a green light to 

take whatever action the government wants. 

There must be protections for the citizens of Egypt and their 

human rights must be respected. I hope that Egypt, while implementing its economic reforms, will also assess making additional 

reforms to guarantee the human rights of all of its citizens. That 

includes revoking the controversial NGO law that President Sisi 

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enacted last year, which is making it difficult for civil society to operate and to promote democratic ideals and democracy programs. 

It also means ensuring that the rights of ethnic and religious minorities like the Coptic Christians, which Mr. French Hill is very 

concerned about, are protected and guaranteed. 

I have joined Mr. Hill in introducing House Resolution 673 expressing concern about the attacks against Coptic Christians in 

Egypt and it’s my sincere hope that Egypt protects all of its citizens. 

I also want to raise the issue of the 20 or so U.S. citizens and 

legal permanent residents who are currently being detained in 

Egypt, possibly under dubious causes. 

I urge Egyptian officials to ensure their rights, their safety, and 

their wellbeing are being taken care of and that their rights are not 

being violated. 

In addition to finding a fair and immediate resolution to those 

cases, I am hopeful for a resolution in the ongoing case against the 

43 NGO workers, an issue I’ve personally been engaged in from 

day one, and I know it’s an issue that many of our colleagues are 

eager to see resolved. 

I thank the Egyptian government for working with our State Department officials to try to find a way forward. It is my understanding that we continue to work toward that and to resolve it. 

But I encourage the Egyptians to resolve this as soon as possible. 

I encourage the Egyptian government to continue to work with 

Congress. We can find a way to build this relationship for the betterment of both of our countries. But we have to find a way to do 

it in a manner that both secures the country and secures the 

human rights of all of Egypt’s citizens. 

And with that, I am pleased to turn to Mr. Deutch, our ranking 

member. 

Mr. DEUTCH. Thank you, Madam Chair, for calling this hearing. 

I also want to extend my gratitude to this really terrific panel of 

experts. 

Egypt is an important ally for the United States and has been 

for decades. It is a leader in the Arab world and has been a strong 

counter terrorism partner to both the United States and Israel. 

I value the relationship that we share with Egyptians. But I 

must express my sincere concern about some of the activities and 

trajectory of the Egyptian government. 

The state of democratic governance and human rights in Egypt 

has continued to challenge me. We have watched as civil society 

and NGOs, including Americans and dissenting voices, are prosecuted and even unlawfully imprisoned. 

There continue to be reports of torture and other concerning 

human rights offenses in the country and the crackdown on journalists and the free press is shocking. 

Arrests of journalists and increased efforts to control the media 

and Egyptians’ access to social media are an affront to democracy 

and stand in stark contrast to the democratic change the Tahrir 

Square revolution called for. 

Many of Sisi’s actions appear to me as steps toward an authoritative strongman-led government. The Egyptians have striven and 

5

fought for democracy and a return—and deserve a move toward 

freedom and democracy, not a return to totalitarianism. 

Sisi’s recent reelection is further fodder for worry about Egypt’s 

prospects for a thriving democracy. The election was, by all accounts, theatrics, as potential challengers were intimidated and oppressed. 

There were mass arrests and dissenting voices in the media limited to only those at issue with the state’s official message. 

Women continue to face daily obstacles. Cairo has been listed 

among the most dangerous large cities for women. Assaults, harassment, verbal abuse, and fear are commonplace for Egyptian 

women. 

And while we have observed some progress, like Egypt banning 

the practice of female genital mutilation, girls continue to be cut 

in secret. 

Furthermore, Egypt’s discrimination against the LGBTQ community, often arrested under claims of membership in groups aiming 

to overthrow the government is, again, a key concern for Egypt’s 

overall trajectory. 

We have seen some indication Egypt’s economy is making gradual improvements but the country continues to lag behind in extending economic growth to rural and impoverished regions. 

Economic reform and improved economic opportunity will be key 

to Egypt’s future. In the realm of terrorism, Egypt has been a dedicated fighting force against ISIS cells throughout the country, particularly in the Sinai. 

ISIS is still a global terror group and its loss of territory in Iraq 

and Syria does not mean that the group has been defeated. Egypt’s 

dedication to fighting this dangerous terrorist group reflects common ground with the United States and we are most grateful for 

that. 

With that in mind, we, as Congress, must still emphasize the 

need for human rights while embarking upon a comprehensive coordinated counterterrorism counter insurgency strategy. 

The press needs to be free to report factual news and Egypt cannot implement domestic political policies under the guise of security. 

I’ve said this at every hearing that we have had on Egypt since 

the revolutions that took down Mubarak. It doesn’t matter who sits 

in the government—our message and respect for human rights 

must remain the same. 

While the United States desperately wants to see Egypt’s security and economy sectors be strengthened and bolstered, we cannot 

ignore the suffering of people and the challenge to democracy just 

to focus on economic and security assistance. 

I want to see a stable Egypt—one that continues decades of partnership with the United States. But there must be security and 

human rights improvements as well. 

Human rights are vital to the growth of a healthy democracy and 

these issues cannot be put on the back burner under the guise of 

focusing first on the economy or other factors. 

I look forward to the conversation today and I again want to 

thank all of our witnesses for being here and I yield back the balance of my time. Thanks. 

6

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you so much, Mr. Deutch. 

Now we will turn to members for their statements. Mr. Donovan, 

Ambassador Wagner, and Mr. Hill. 

Mr. DONOVAN. Thank you, Madam Chairman, and thank you, 

Ranking Member Deutch, for conducting this important hearing 

today on Egypt security, human rights, and reform. 

In the past, the United States and Egypt have enjoyed a friendship and partnership. But Egypt’s drift toward China, Russia, and, 

most especially, North Korea raises grave concerns. 

As we all know, 2 years ago, U.S. intelligence tracked a North 

Korean ship that was headed toward Egypt. U.S. officials warned 

Egyptian officials and an Egyptian naval vessel ordered the crew 

to halt for an inspection. 

In addition to the cargo listed on the ship’s manifest, there were 

also over 2,400 North Korean rocket-propelled grenades and completed components for 6,000 more. 

As the United Nations report concluded, this was the ‘‘largest 

seizure of ammunition in the history of sanctions against the 

Democratic People’s Republic of Korea.’’

The evidence against Egypt was clear. For example, each crate 

had been stenciled with the name of an Egyptian company. Many 

of the rounds were practice rounds, demonstrating that they were 

intended for training for a sizeable army. 

There is no doubt the shipment of North Korean weapons was intended for the Egyptian military. While the United States has cited 

this incident as a reason for delaying $300 million in aid, I am 

looking forward to hearing what more we could do to dissuade the 

Egyptians from violating international law and partnering with 

North Korea. 

We are happy to work with Egypt and honor our historic relationship. But Egypt must do its part as well. 

And with that, Madam Chairwoman, I waive the remainder of 

my time. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you very much, Mr. Donovan. 

Ambassador Wagner. 

Mrs. WAGNER. Thank you, Madam Chair, for hosting this hearing, and thanks to our witnesses for your expertise. 

Egypt has been a valuable partner in managing Israeli-Palestinian tensions, countering terrorism, and supporting U.S. military 

operations in the region. But, despite receiving significant support 

from the United States, Egypt remains a problematic partner due 

to its serious human rights abuses, especially persecution faced by 

Coptic Christians. 

Egypt’s historical importance to our regional policy goals 

shouldn’t give it a free pass. Our close relationship means we have 

an opportunity to help Egypt achieve real progress in safeguarding 

human rights and advancing democratic reforms. United States 

must continue to hold Egypt to a high standard. 

I thank you, Madam Chair, and I yield back. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you, Madam Ambassador. 

Mr. Issa of California. 

Mr. ISSA. Thank you, Madam Chair. And on a slightly different 

note, unequivocally, we need Egypt as much or more than Egypt 

needs us. 

7

Our relationship with Egypt has been strained, but it was 

strained in no small part because the Obama administration allowed the Muslim Brotherhood to take over, run the country, persecute Christians in a way that no Coptic Christian I know had 

ever seen. 

Since the takeover of the new regime, we have shown indifference to them. We have gone out of our way to withhold funds, so 

much so that they have in fact—and I regret that they have made 

this decision—I think it’s a bad decision—looked elsewhere at 

times for military weapons. 

The bottom line is the only safe border that Egypt has is the one 

with Israel, and even that border takes divisions to guard against 

operatives ISIS in the Sinai. 

So I will say to my colleagues, yes, I would like to see better 

human rights. But ask a Coptic Christian which they’d rather 

have—the last regime that my previous President endorsed, or the 

regime today that’s fighting ISIS and other enemies on all its borders while defending Israel’s border so that it need not worry nearly the way it had in the past. 

And I yield back. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you, Mr. Issa, and to talk about the 

Coptic Christians, Mr. Hill is recognized. Welcome to our subcommittee. 

Mr. HILL. Thank you, my friend from Florida, the chairwoman, 

and the ranking member for the opportunity to speak today. 

I am proud to be a sponsor of House Resolution 673, which expresses concerns over a tax on Coptic Christians in Egypt. 

While I give full credit to President el-Sisi for his work to promote religious tolerance and support for Egyptian Copts, I believe 

there is much more than can be done to ensure that the President’s 

message trickles down and is implemented by his government’s 

educational, cultural, and provincial officials. 

On the heels of the recent Department of State report, I’ll look 

forward to hearing today from witnesses on the ways that Egypt 

can improve in this area. 

I thank the chairwoman and Mr. Cicilline for their friendship 

and their work and original co-sponsor on this resolution and I 

thank the five other members of this subcommittee and 14 members of the full committee to co-sponsor this message of appreciation for efforts made and call for continued progress. 

And with that, Madam Chair, I thank you and I yield back. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you so much, Mr. Hill. 

And now I would like to introduce and recognize to speak first 

Mr. Jared Genser—I hope that you make your flight—managing director of the Perseus Strategies and adjunct professor of law at 

Georgetown University Law Center. 

Mr. Genser is known for his work freeing political prisoners and 

is a recipient of the American Bar Association’s international 

human rights award. Thank you for being here today and we will 

recognize you, first off. 

8

STATEMENT OF MR. JARED GENSER, ADJUNCT PROFESSOR 

OF LAW, GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY LAW CENTER 

Mr. GENSER. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman, Ranking Member 

Deutch, and distinguished members of the committee. 

It’s great to be with you all this afternoon. First, I’ll discuss my 

prospective on the situation of human rights in Egypt. 

Second, I’ll talk about some of the important issues between 

Egypt and the United States and the bilateral relationship and 

then, lastly, I’ll provide my recommendations about how I believe 

the U.S. should use its leverage from our annual appropriations to 

Egypt to secure important reforms. 

For the sake of time, let me just summarize first that the situation of human rights in Egypt, which I have expounded more upon 

in my written testimony, because the situation I think is well 

known to all of you, under President Sisi crackdowns on freedom 

of speech, expression, assembly, and religion are commonplace, 

today there are tens of thousands of political prisoners. 

Police forces employ arbitrary arrests, extrajudicial execution, 

and enforced disappearances to punish dissent, not only political 

opponents—lawyers, NGO workers—but also journalists and 

bloggers as well. 

Travel bans and asset freezes are deployed against human rights 

defenders and national security officers routinely torture political 

detainees with techniques that include beatings, electric shocks, 

stress positions, and sometimes even rape. 

And, of course, we have already heard mentioned from all of you 

this afternoon the situation of the Coptic Christian community, 

which continues to face serious repression and persecution as well 

as the GLBT community in Egypt as well. 

While the Egyptian people have faced the brunt of the abuses 

under Sisi’s authoritarian rule, there are three especially important 

human rights concerns directly connected to the United States Sisi 

has inexplicably allowed to fester, despite the U.S. having provided 

more than $76 billion of foreign assistance since 1948 and $1.3 billion annually in military assistance alone in recent years. 

First, some 5 years after the felony convictions of the 43 Egyptian and foreign NGO workers, 17 of whom are Americans, the affair has remained an unfortunate irritant in U.S.-Egypt relations. 

It appears Cairo and Washington are close to a resolution of the 

case and I can only hope for all those impacted that we see a fair 

and expedient resolution. 

I know both the U.S. and Egypt have remained actively engaged 

in discussion this issue and I believe if it were to get a fair resolution, it could be an important measure that shows Egypt’s willingness to improve our bilateral relations and in a small part its 

human rights record, although I would note, of course, that the 

NGO law that President Sisi promised not to sign after visiting the 

Congress and with the President here in Washington, he did in fact 

sign and despite promises now that it’s not going to be enforced, 

in fact, we have already seen enforcement well underway, as I 

know some of the other panelists will discuss. 

Second, the government of Egypt continues to wrongly imprison 

close to 20 American citizens and legal permanent residents. 

9

This includes Mustafa Kassem, an American auto parts dealer 

caught up in the crackdown in Rabaa Square, and it includes two 

clients of mine, Ola al-Qaradawi and Hossam Khalif, a married 

couple who were approved for green cards during the Trump administration and have eight American citizen family members. 

In the last month, the U.N. High Commissioner for Human 

Rights called for Ola and Hossam’s immediate release and the U.N. 

Working Group on Arbitrary Detention found that they were being 

held arbitrarily and in violation of international law. 

Both have been held incommunicado in terrible conditions and 

without regular access to counsel or any access to family for more 

than a year. 

Ola is the longest held female political prisoner in solitary confinement by the Egyptian regime and she’s been on a hunger 

strike, demanding her most basic human rights and her immediate 

release. 

And while the Trump administration did secure the release of 

two Americans—Aya Hijazi and Ahmed Etiwy—more hostages 

have been taken by this purported ally of the United States. 

Finally, there is the case of April Corley, a U.S. citizen who’s also 

a client of mine and who was seriously injured in Egypt’s Western 

Desert in an attack by the Egyptian military using a U.S.-funded 

and supplied Boeing AH-64 Apache helicopter in September 2015. 

April is now permanently disabled, unable to work, and in constant pain. Yet, while the government of Egypt has expressed its 

remorse, it has offered less money as a settlement in the cost of 

the medivac out of Egypt, which she had to pay for herself. 

Sisi has so far rightly concluded that U.S. military assistance 

comes with a license to kill or injure Americans with total impunity. 

Because he actually has the full protection of our legal system to 

do so, April in fact cannot even sue Egypt for her injuries because 

of the Foreign Sovereignty Immunities Act, and, inexplicably, neither President Trump nor President Obama nor the U.S. Congress 

has imposed any consequence on Egypt for refusing to fairly resolve 

April’s case or secure a final resolution of the case, despite the fact 

that it was U.S.-funded equipment that she, as a taxpayer, paid for 

that led to her plight. 

Lastly, let me talk about my recommendations about how to improve Egypt’s human rights record. As a human rights lawyer, I 

am often asked to comment on the most effective ways to improve 

the compliance of governments with their binding obligations under 

human rights treaties to which they are a party. 

That is, indeed, generally, an enormous challenge. But in the 

case of the bilateral relationship between the United States and 

Egypt, our government has enormous leverage. 

Contrary to the view of the government of Egypt, which sees our 

foreign assistance as an entitlement and not as a privilege, the 

United States has no legal obligation to provide assistance to 

Egypt. 

While it is in our regional strategic interest to support Egypt in 

its fight against Islamic extremism and terrorism, today it is a less 

important and less effective ally as it is both at times aligned itself 

10

with Russia and North Korea and its own capabilities to support 

our objectives have been degraded from within. 

It is equally a major error in judgement for the United states to 

ignore the way that Sisi is governing, which works directly in contravention of that goal. 

Indeed, our country knows from experience that radicalization occurs in environments in which an authoritarian ruler suppresses 

the population’s democratic aspirations for self-governance, seriously represses its rights, and poorly manages an economy that has 

a lack of good-paying jobs, especially for young people. 

All of these elements exist in Sisi’s Egypt today. Surely, Egypt 

can find a way to address this legitimate security concerns while 

ensuring both the rule of law and human rights are respected. 

Indeed, this is in the interests of both the U.S. and Egypt, as its 

stability and leadership is important for a secure and stable Middle 

East. 

Yet, right now, unfortunately, it’s business as usual here in 

Washington, with Egypt’s aid flowing, basically unimpeded. 

This not only sends the wrong message to Cairo but it puts our 

regional strategic interests at greater risk in both the medium and 

longer term. 

The smartest way forward for the United States is for President 

Trump and Secretary Pompeo as well as the U.S. Congress to send 

a clear and consistent message to Sisi that while the United States 

views Egypt as an important ally, the American people expect our 

allies to act in certain ways. 

First, the United States must say that Egypt’s actions targeting 

American citizens and legal permanent residents must stop. 

For President Trump, who has spoken of America first, this 

motto is empty rhetoric if he tolerates any of this behavior by the 

Sisi government. 

The President should tell Sisi privately, as a start, that if he 

doesn’t permanently resolve the NGO cases, pardon the wrongly 

imprisoned Americans in LPRs and pay appropriate compensation 

to April Corley, all three of which Sisi can do today within his powers as President. 

Then President Trump will have no choice but to make serious 

cuts in Egypt’s aid. It is particularly worrying that the administration way waive the human rights conditions on and release the 

$195 million in fiscal year 2017 funds that have been held back, 

which will undoubtedly be taken by Sisi as a clean bill of health 

on human rights. 

Second, the U.S. Congress needs to speak in one voice about the 

path that’s easiest taken as being unacceptable. While the fiscal 

year 2019 foreign operations appropriations bill in the Senate imposes human rights conditions on 30 percent of Egypt’s proposed $1 

billion in reduced military assistance, the House bill maintains 

$1.3 billion in military assistance and imposes no conditions of any 

kind. 

As authorizers, you have the ability to advocate with your colleagues and, ultimately, help ensure that the final bill that will 

come out from the conference committee and will go to the floor of 

the House and the Senate imposes the human rights conditions 

from the Senate version of the bill. 

11

If those human rights conditions are dropped, the message sent 

to Sisi would be unmistakable—that the United States will ignore 

his abuse of numerous Americans, his evisceration of Egypt’s democracy, and the egregious abuses that he’s imposed on his own 

population, all in the name of a so-called greater good. 

Finally, we need transparency and visibility here in Washington, 

not only about the U.S.-Egypt relationship but the way in which 

the Sisi government treats its own people. 

This hearing is an important start. Nonetheless, I can’t remember the last time I saw any administration official from the Trump 

administration or Obama administration before it actually testify 

before the U.S. Congress about the realities of the U.S.-Egypt relationship, and it is important for the Congress to hear directly from 

victims of the Sisi government, both American and Egyptian. 

Thank you for the opportunity to testify before you today and I 

am happy to also answer any questions. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Genser follows:]

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Statement RefiJre 

U.S. House of Representatives 

Committee on Foreign Affairs 

Subcommittee on Middle East and North Africa 

"Egypt: Security, Human Rights, and Reform" 

Testimony: 

Jared Genser 

Adjunct Professor of law, Georgetown University Law Center 

July 24, 2018 

Thank for you for opportunity to testify before you today about the situation in Egypt and 

the important and complex relationship between Egypt and the United States. 

In my remarks this afternoon, I will first discuss my perspective on the situation of 

human rights in Egypt and its impact on the security situation. Second, I will focus on 

especially important human rights issues impacting the bilateral relationship. And 

finally, I will provide my recommendations as to how the United States should use its 

leverage from its annual appropriations to Egypt to secure important reforms. 

I. The Situation of Human Rights in Egypt 

After the Egyptian military's coup ousting President Mohamed Morsi in July 2013, the 

Egyptian people hoped that the social and political upheaval wrought by the toppling of 

Hosni Mubarak following by the authoritarian rule ofMorsi would yield to a new 

stability. But the next month, the army attacked a demonstration in Rabaa al-Adawiya 

Square, killing more than a thousand Morsi supporters and then held a mass trial where 

739 people, real and imagined supporters of the Muslim Brotherhood, were sentenced to 

death. President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi's election in June 2014 was supposed to restore 

economic and political stability, but today Egypt is more authoritarian than it has been in 

decades. 

Under Sisi, crackdowns on freedoms of speech, expression, assembly, and religion are 

commonplace and new repressive laws have effectively outlawed dissent. Just a few 

months into office, for example, Sisi signed a law banning demonstrations without police 

approval. Since then he has adopted new laws to weaken fair trial guarantees and expand 

the executive branch's ability to imprison dissenters- today there are tens of thousands 

of political prisoners. Police forces employ arbitrary arrests, extrajudicial execution, and 

enforced disappearances to punish dissent. Travel bans and assets freezes are deployed 

against human rights defenders. And national security officers routinely torture political 

detainees with techniques including beatings, electric shocks, stress positions, and 

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sometimes rape. Coptic Christians, an estimated 10 percent of Egypt's population and a 

historic target oflegal and societal discrimination, have been victims of sectarian attacks 

with impunity. And the government has also relentlessly targeted sexual and gender 

minorities for serious repression, with Human Rights Watch having reported 230 LGBT 

people prosecuted and 50 sentenced on "debauchery" charges. 

Under Sisi, there has also been an unprecedented crackdown on NGOs. Tn May 2017, Sisi 

ratified the new NGO law- despite having just come from a trip in Washington where he 

told President Trump and Members of Congress he wouldn't sign it- which is effectively 

eradicating independent civil society groups. The law prohibits NGOs from conducting 

activities that "harm national security, public order, public morality, or public health"; 

allows the government to cancel a foreign NGO's license at any time; and imposes 

onerous requirements for accepting domestic or foreign funds. More than 180 NGO 

workers have been arrested or prosecuted in recent years. Sisi now says he won't enforce 

the law, but it appears it is already being applied. 

While the country has faced major security threats and attacks by armed groups aniliated 

with ISIL in the Sinai, it is also using counterterrorism and state-of-emergency laws to 

target legitimate dissenters, some of whose cases have been transferred to the Emergency 

State Security Courts, a parallel judicial system operating since October 2017, which has 

limited fair trial guarantees and whose decisions are not subject to appeal. Among those 

detained, for example, has been Amal Fathy, a political activist and wife of the head of 

the Egyptian Commission for Rights and Freedoms. 

On April 2, 2018, Sisi was reelected president with 97 percent of the votes, with lower 

than expected turnout and despite all the economic, security, and human rights challenges 

the country faced during his first term. The only opponent allowed to run against Sisi 

had supported his campaign until the day before he registered as a candidate. 

II. Human Rights Issues in the Bilateral Relationship 

The Egyptian people have faced the brunt of the abuses under Sisi's authoritarian rule. 

But there are three especially important human rights concerns directly connected to the 

United States that Sisi has inexplicably allowed to fester, despite the U.S. having 

provided more than $76 billion in foreign assistance since 1948 and $1.3 billion annually 

in military assistance alone in recent years. 

First, some five years after the felony conviction of 43 Egyptian and foreign NGO 

workers, 17 of whom were Americans, the atiair has been an unfortunate irritant in U.S.-

Egypt relations. lt appears Cairo and Washington are close to a resolution of the case, 

and I can only hope that for all of those impacted by this case, we see a fair and expedient 

resolution. 1 know that both the United States and Egypt have remained actively engaged 

on this issue, and I believe if it were to get a fair resolution, it could be an important 

measure that shows Egypt's willingness to improve our bilateral relations and its human 

rights record. 

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Second, the Government of Egypt continues to wrongly imprison close to 20 American 

citizens and legal permanent residents. These include Mustafa Kassem, an American auto 

parts dealer caught up in the crackdown in Rab'aa Square. And it includes two clients of 

mine, Ola AI Qaradawi and Hossam Khalaf a married couple who were approved for 

green cards during the Trump Administration, and have eight American citizen family 

members. In the last month, the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Zeid Ra' ad 

AI Hussein called for Ola and Hossam's immediate release and the UN Working Group 

on Arbitrary Detention found they were both being held arbitrarily and in violation of 

international law. Both have been held incommunicado, in terrible conditions, and 

without regular access to counsel or any access to family for more than a year. Ola is the 

longest held female political prisoner in solitary confinement by the Egyptian regime. 

Ola has also been on a hunger strike demanding her most basic human rights and her 

immediate release. While the Trump Administration secured the release of two 

Americans, Aya Hijazi and Ahmed Etiwy, more hostages have been taken by this 

purported ally of the United States. 

Finally, there is the case of April Corley, a U.S. citizen who is also a client of mine, who 

was seriously injured in Egypt's Western desert in an attack by the Egyptian military 

using a U.S.-funded and supplied Boeing AH-64 Apache helicopter in September 2015. 

April is now permanently disabled, unable to work, and in constant pain. Yet while the 

Government of Egypt has expressed its remorse, it has offered less money as a settlement 

than the cost of the Medevac out of Egypt, which April had to pay for out of her own 

pocket. Sisi has rightly concluded that U.S. military assistance comes with a license to 

kill or injure Americans with total impunity because he actually has the full protection of 

our legal system to do so. April, in fact, cannot even sue Egypt for her injuries because 

of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act. Inexplicably neither President Trump nor 

President Obama nor the U.S. Congress has imposed any consequence on Egypt for 

refusing to fairly resolve April's case or secured a final resolution of the case, despite the 

fact that it was U. S.-funded equipment that led to her plight 

TTl. Recommendations to Improve Egypt's Human Rights Record 

As a human rights lawyer, I am often asked to comment on the most effective ways to 

improve the compliance of governments with their binding obligations under human 

rights treaties to which they are a party. That is indeed, generally, an enormous 

challenge. 

But in the case of the bilateral relationship between the United States and Egypt, our 

government has enormous leverage. Contrary to the view of the Government of Egypt, 

which sees our foreign assistance as an entitlement and not a privilege, the United States 

has no legal obligation to provide assistance to Egypt 

While it is in our regional strategic interests to support Egypt in its tight against Islamic 

extremism and terrorism, today it is actually a less important and less effective ally as it 

has aligned itself with Russia and North Korea and its own capabilities to support our 

objectives have degraded from within. lt is equally a major error in judgment for the 

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United States to ignore the way Sisi is governing, which works directly in contravention 

of that goal. Indeed, our country knows from experience that radicalization occurs in 

environments in which an authoritarian ruler suppresses a population's democratic 

aspirations for self-government, serious represses its rights, and poorly manages an 

economy that has a lack of good paying jobs, especially for young people. All of these 

elements exist today in Sisi's Egypt Surely Egypt can find a way to address its 

legitimate security concerns while ensuring that both the rule of law and human rights are 

respected. Indeed, this is in the interests of both the U.S. and Egypt as its stability and 

leadership is important for a secure and stable Middle East 

Yet it is business as usual here in Washington, with Egypt's aid flowing, basically 

unimpeded. This not only sends the wrong message to Cairo, but it puts our regional 

strategic interests at great risk in both the medium and longer term. The smartest way 

forward for the United States is for President Trump and Secretary Pompeo as well as the 

U.S. Congress to send a clear and consistent message to Sisi that while the United States 

views Egypt as an important ally, the American people expect our allies to act in certain 

ways. 

First, the United States must say that Egypt's actions targeting American citizens and 

LPRs must stop. For President Trump, who has spoken of"America First," this motto is 

empty rhetoric if he tolerates any of this behavior by the Sisi government The President 

should tell Sisi, privately as a start, that if he doesn't permanently resolve the NGO cases, 

pardon the wrongly imprisoned Americans and LPRs, and pay appropriate compensation 

to April Corley- all three of which Sisi could do today, fully within his powers as 

president- then he will have no choice but to make cuts to Egypt's aid. Tt is particularly 

worrying that the Administration may waive the human rights conditions on and releasing 

the $195 million ofFY 17 funds that have been held back, which will undoubtedly be 

taken by Sisi as a clean bill of health on human rights. 

Second, the U.S. Congress needs to speak in one voice about the path that Sisi has taken 

as being unacceptable. While the FY 19 foreign operations appropriations bill in the 

Senate imposes human rights conditions on 30 percent of Egypt's proposed $1 billion in 

reduced military assistance, the House bill maintains $1 J billion in military assistance 

and imposes no conditions of any kind. As authorizers, you have the ability to advocate 

with your colleagues here in the House to ensure that regardless of the amount of money 

ultimately appropriated for Egypt that the final foreign ops approps conference 

committee bill contains the proposed human rights conditions from the Senate version. If 

those human rights conditions are dropped, the message sent to Sisi would be 

unmistakable- that the U.S will ignore his abuse of numerous Americans, his 

evisceration of Egypt's democracy, and the egregious abuses that he has imposed on his 

own population. 

Finally, we need greater transparency and visibility here in Washington not only about 

the U.S.-Egypt relationship but also the way in which Sisi's government treats its own 

people. This hearing is an important start Nonetheless, I can't remember the last time I 

saw any Administration official- from the Trump Administration or Obama 

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Administration before it- testify before the U.S. Congress about the realities of the U.S.-

Egypt relationship. And it is also important for the Congress to hear directly from 

victims of the Sisi government, both American and Egyptian. 

Thank you for the opportunity to testify before you today. I look forward to answering 

your questions. 

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Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you so much, Mr. Genser. We appreciate you being here and thank you to our panelists for extending 

that courtesy to him. 

We are delighted to welcome back Mr. Samuel Tadros, senior fellow at the Hudson Institute Center for Religious Freedom. Mr. 

Tadros is also a professional lecturer at Johns Hopkins University 

School of Advanced International Studies and a distinguished visiting fellow of Middle Eastern Studies at Hoover Institution. 

Thank you for being here again. I still can’t say your name right. 

We look forward to your testimony. 

And next, we are delighted to welcome Dr. Michelle Dunne, director and senior fellow of the Middle East Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. 

Prior to this post, Dr. Dunne served in the U.S. missions in Cairo 

and Jerusalem as well as at the National Security Council. Thank 

you for your service. We look forward to your testimony, Doctor. 

And, finally, we are delighted to welcome Mr. Andrew Miller, 

deputy director for policy at the Project on the Middle East and Democracy and a nonresident scholar at the Carnegie Endowment for 

International Peace. 

Previously, Mr. Miller served at the U.S. Department of State 

and the National Security Council. Thank you for your service. 

We welcome your testimony as well, and we will begin with you, 

Sam. 

STATEMENT OF MR. SAMUEL TADROS, SENIOR FELLOW, 

CENTER FOR RELIGIOUS FREEDOM, THE HUDSON INSTITUTE 

Mr. TADROS. Thank you, Madam Chair, Ranking Member Dutch, 

distinguished members of the subcommittee. Thank you for holding 

this hearing and for inviting me to testify today. 

I have submitted the written testament with the detailed description of the challenges facing Egypt and recommendations for 

U.S. policy. 

But let me devote those few minutes to discussing the EgyptAmerican relationship in general. 

For the previous four decades, the U.S.-Egypt alliance has been 

a cornerstone of the American order in the Middle East. After two 

decades of tensions and conflict between both countries, Secretary 

Kissinger and President Sadat forged a new basis for the American-Egyptian relationship, helping attain key U.S. objectives during the Cold War. 

In return for U.S. aid to Egypt, successive administrations hoped 

that the country that led the region to war and destruction would 

now lead it to peace and cooperation. 

Despite this, the relationship between the two countries has 

never been a smooth one. Egypt was always a problematic ally. 

From Egypt’s conduct during the Achille Lauro affair and attempt 

to smuggle missile components under President Reagan, from its 

attempt to stop economic cooperation between Arab countries and 

Israel and its pressure on Nasser Arafat not to give any concessions during the Camp David Summit under President Clinton to 

the Mubarak Regime’s refusal to reform under President Bush’s 

tenure, throughout those three decades there were deep U.S.-EgypVerDate 0ct 09 2002 08:25 Oct 29, 2018 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00021 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 Z:\WORK\_MENA\072418\30888 SHIRL
18

tian disagreements over a variety of issues ranging from the peace 

process, U.S. policies in the region, democracy, and human rights. 

Moreover, despite continued U.S. economic and military assistance to Egypt, the Egyptian press allowed to buy the government 

control by the government, continued to traffic in anti-American 

and anti-Semitic arguments. 

And yet, these previous disagreements and frustrations pale in 

comparison with attention, disappointment, and mistrust that has 

shaped the previous decade in U.S.-Egyptian relations. 

Policies followed by the Obama administration perceived in 

Egypt as one that’s in support of the Muslim Brotherhood, the condemnation of the military coup, and threats to cut U.S. military aid 

to the country have led to growing antagonism in Cairo. 

In turn, Egypt has shown an unwillingness to cooperate on regional security challenges such as joining the fight against Islamic 

State in Iraq and Syria, pursue them in dependent policy in Libya, 

deepen its military and economic ties to the Russian Federation, or 

pursue a scorched earth strategy to wipe out the Islamic State’s affiliate in Sinai, crack down on all forms of dissent in the country, 

stifling civil society and any independent media, engaged in appalling human rights abuses, continued to attempt to undercut U.S. 

resolutions in the United Nations, and most importantly, engaged 

in an unprecedented wave of anti-American propaganda and conspiracy theories at home. 

The American-Egyptian alliance is crumbling. For some in Washington, while unfortunate, and end to the alliance is inevitable. 

Cold War rationale should no longer be the basis of a continued 

alliance with a problematic partner and the two countries do not 

see eye to eye on many important issues. 

Moreover, Egypt’s regional importance has vastly diminished. 

Egypt has continued to decline on all levels—economically, culturally, and politically. 

It is no longer today the key player in the Middle East that it 

was in the past. As an external power, Egypt is a shadow of its 

former self and there are well-founded doubts about its capacity to 

play a leading and constructive role, even if it wanted to. 

Instead, Egypt itself has increasingly become a locus of the region’s unfolding strategic competition, an unprecedented political 

and ideological crisis of the state-based order. 

The regional decline is a reflection of deeper ills within Egypt 

itself. The inability of the country’s leadership to reform the economy through market-oriented policies, combatting corruption, and 

addressing the dysfunctional bureaucracy has worsened the lives of 

millions of Egyptians. 

But continue with all the failures of the government, I hope that 

the U.S. is able to develop a coherent strategy to deal with these 

challenges. 

Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Tadros follows:]

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Written Testimony 

Samuel Tadros 

Senior Fellow -Hudson Institute Center for Religious Freedom 

The U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Foreign Affairs 

Subcommittee on the Middle East and North Africa 

Egypt: Security, Human Rights and Reform 

July 24, 2018 

Madame Chair, Ranking Member Deutch, distinguished Members of the 

Subcommittee, thank you for inviting me to testify at this hearing on "Egypt: 

Security, Human Rights and Refonn." 

The U.S. Egyptian Alliance 

For the previous four decades, the U.S-Eh'YPt alliance has been a cornerstone of the 

American order in the Middle East. The largest country in the Middle East in terms 

of population, with a quarter of the Arabic speaking peoples living within its 

borders, and for a long time the region's political and cultural capital, Cairo had 

often set the pace for the whole region. After two decades of tensions and conflict 

between both countries, Secretary Kissinger and President Sadat found an opening 

in the aftermath of the 1973 war to forge a new basis for the American-Egyptian 

relationship. Key American Cold war strategic objectives were achieved as 

President Sadat agreed, in retum for the complete retum of Sinai to Egyptian 

sovereignty not only to seek a lasting peace between his cotmtry and Israel, but 

also to detach Egypt from the Soviet orbit and put it formally in the U.S. camp. In 

retnm for U.S. financial, military and developmental assistance, Egypt would 

become a U.S. ally and successive U.S. administrations hoped that the country 

would lead the region away from the path of destmction and war introducing a new 

era of peace and cooperation. 

Yet despite the attainment of key U.S. strategic objectives during the Cold war 

through the American-Egyptian alliance: from diminishing the Soviet Union's role 

in the Middle East, Eh'YPt'S commitment to its peace treaty with Israel, and a 

variety of security services it has provided the United States from participation in 

the Gulf War, cooperation in the war on terror and providing the United States with 

access to the Suez Canal and overflight rights through its airspace, the relationship 
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between the two cotmtries has never been a smooth one. Egypt was always a 

problematic ally. 

The historical record is long: President Mubarak lying during the Achille Lauro 

incident in 1985 and Egypt's attempt to smuggle missile components from the 

United States for its secret missile program during President Reagan's tenure; 

Egypt's flamboyant Foreign Minister, Amre Moussa, leading the charge against 

economic cooperation with Israel across the region for fear oflsraeli economic 

dominance, and President Mubarak encouraging Yasser Arafat not to compromise 

during the Camp David Summit, during President Clinton's tenure; or Mubarak's 

refusal to retom1 that shaped his uneasy relationship with President George W. 

Bush. Throughout those three decades there were deep U.S. Egyptian 

disagreements over a variety of issues ranging from the peace process, U.S. 

policies in the region, democracy, and human rights. Moreover, despite continued 

U.S. economic and military assistance to Egypt, the Egyptian press continued to 

traffic in anti-American and anti-Semitic tirades. 

And yet, these previous disagreements and frustrations pale in comparison with the 

tension, disappointment and mistrust that has shaped the previous decade in U.S. 

Egyptian relations. President Obama's decision to call tor Mubarak to step down, 

the administration's pressure on the military leadership to hold elections swiftly, 

the decision to engage with the Muslim Brotherhood without pressuring it for 

concessions, continued U.S. assistance to human rights organizations in Egypt, the 

perceived closeness between the administration and the Muslim Brotherhood 

leadership, U.S. condemnation of the military coup, and threats to cut U.S. military 

aid, led to growing antagonism in Cairo. In tum Egypt has shown an unwillingness 

to cooperate on regional security challenges such as joining the fight against the 

Islamic State in Iraq and Syria, pursued an independent policy in Libya, deepened 

its military and economic ties to the Russian Federation, pursued a scorched earth 

strategy to wipe out the Islamic State's affiliate in Sinai, cracked down on all forms 

of dissent in the country stifling civil society and any independent media, engaged 

in egregious htill1an rights abuses, continued to attempt to undercut U.S. 

resolutions in the United Nations, and most importantly engaged in an 

unprecedented wave of anti-American propaganda and conspiracy theories at 

home. 

The American-Egyptian alliance is crumbling. As the Center for American 

Progress' Daniel Benaim eloquently put it: the U.S.-Egypt relationship "has been 

buffeted by upheaval, mired in mutual mistrust, and saddled with unmet 

expectations." For some in Washington, while unfortunate, an end to the alliance is 
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inevitable. Cold war rationale should no longer be a basis for a continued alliance 

with a problematic partner, and the two countries do not see eye to eye on many 

important issues. Moreover, Egypt's regional importance has vastly diminished. 

The Egypt of today is not the one with which Secretary Kissinger built a lasting 

partnership. Egypt has continued to decline on all levels, economically, culturally, 

and politically. Arab eyes and ears are no longer set on Cairo. Egypt is no longer 

the key player in the Middle East having been replaced by Iran and Turkey. Even 

among Arabic speaking countries, its historical role has been replaced by Saudi 

Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and Qatar. That regional decline did not start 

with President Mubarak but in fact was a reflection of its 1967 defeat following 

which Egypt accepted its diminished regional role and surrendered to Saudi Arabia 

in the Khartoum Summit in 1967. 

As an external power, Egypt is a shadow of its former self, and there are wellfounded doubts about its capacity to play a leading and constructive role even if it 

wanted to. Instead, Egypt itself has increasingly become a locus ofthe region's 

unfolding strategic competition and the tmprecedented political and ideological 

crisis of the state-based order. Instead of being a regional player leading the region 

to peace, E~,>ypt has now become a playing field where a variety of international, 

regional and local forces compete in an all-out war to shape the com1try's future 

trajectory. Egypt is no longer a contestant but instead is itself contested. 

The regional decline is a reflection of deeper ills within Egypt itself. The inability 

of the country's leadership to refom1 the economy through market-oriented 

policies, combatting corruption, and addressing the dysftmctional bureaucracy has 

worsened the lives of millions of Egyptians. The slow collapse of state institutions 

has continued, undem1ining people's confidence in these institutions. The failure to 

develop a sustainable governance compact and failure to address its citizens' 

grievances through democratic means has eroded the com1try's social compact. 

Decades of discrimination against the country's native Christian population has 

tom apart the fabric of the Egyptian nation. And the government's failure to refom1 

its internal security forces and the military, has diminished Egypt's ability to 

confront terrorist threats. 

Despite these changes, U.S. policy has not adjusted to the changing conditions. 

The United States continues to base its policies on an Egypt that no longer exists. 

This has to change. As E~,>ypt continues to face severe challenges on various 

security, economic, and political fronts, the United States needs to adjust its 

policies towards the country to face those challenges. Renewing a strong American 

Egyptian alliance that can deal with the challenges of the 21st Century-not only 
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the ongoing implosion of order in the Middle East, but the worsening crisis in 

Egypt itself, is the key challenge today. 

U.S. interests in Egypt cannot be limited to maintaining the peace treaty with 

Israel, which Egypt's national interest itself dictates its continuation, securing free 

passage through the Suez Canal and flights for U.S. military aircraft in its skies. 

Instead U.S. strategy should be adjusted to help Egypt face its current challenges 

and overcome them. A state collapse in Egypt would pose a grave threat to the 

United States-led order in the Middle East, open the doors for an Islamic State 

emirate in the cmmtry, threaten Israel's security, and likely result in an 

m1precedented wave ofinm1igrants knocking on Europe's doors. Averting such a 

scenario should be the priority of U.S. policy towards Egypt. 

The case for continued American engagement with Egypt and investment in a 

robust U.S.-Egyptian alliance remains, although it must not be based on outdated 

understandings. Despite Egypt's declining regional position and influence, the 

country still matters. The regional order of nation-states is faltering, the result of 

decades of neglect, a deepening crisis of governance, an unprecedented ideological 

convulsion, and intensifying strategic-sectarian rivalries. Et,>ypt, where the Middle 

East's first nation-state model emerged a century ago, will be key ifthe Middle 

Eastern order of nation-states is to survive and rejuvenate itself in the twenty-first 

century. In the absence of a serious U.S. strategy for Egypt, the two countries will 

continue to drift apart, and Egypt's decline will likely accelerate, leaving the nation 

more vulnerable to the forces of regional disorder and chaos. 

Egypt's Challenges: 

Terrorism in Sinai: 

Egypt is today in its sixth year of war against terrorism in Sinai. Despite continued 

military campaigns against the Islamic State's affiliate in the Peninsula, and 

deepening security cooperation with Israel which has provided important 

intelligence, Egypt has failed to end the terrorist threat. The Islan1ic State in Sinai 

has carried spectacular attacks both in Sinai where it has continued to target 

security and military positions and personal, and in mainland Egypt where it has 

carried out numerous attacks on military positions and bombings and shootings of 

Coptic Christians that have left over a htmdred dead. 

Despite the continued failure to end the terrorist threat, there have been 

increasingly positive signs in the past few months. The latest military operation 
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latmched in February following the massacre of more than three htmdred 

worshipers at a local mosque, has managed to significantly disrupt IS 

communications and diminish the group's ability to carry out large scale attacks. 

During the past few months, despite a serious attempt at the lives of the Defense 

and Interior ministers, there has been a noticeable drop in daily attacks. Moreover, 

the Islamic State's increasing adoption of indiscriminate targeting of civilians has 

alienated the local population. Despite these successes, the potential for a 

regrouping by the Islamic State remains high. The group has managed to outlive 

previous military campaigns and still has a solid number of dedicated fighters and 

sophisticated weaponry. 

Libya: 

The continued civil war in Libya remains a serious security threat to Egypt. 

Significant attacks in Egypt's Western Desert bordering Libya by both the Islamic 

State and AI Qaeda's Murabitun, have left over one hundred security personal 

dead. Libya serves as both a launching site for attacks, a training ground for 

terrorists and a source of weapons. The challenge from Libya is especially critical 

given the military's tmfamiliarity with the terrain and the absence of a capable 

partner on the other side ofthe border similar to the role Israel plays in aiding 

Egypt's operations in Sinai. 

Egypt has pursued a minimalist policy in Libya. While it has continued to support 

General Haftar, Egypt's strategy is not driven by a desire to stabilize Libya. The 

country's leadership recognizes the inability of Egypt to achieve such a result and 

continues to hope for a Western led effort to stabilize its neighbor. Instead the best 

Egypt can hope for is for the Libyan menace to be played away from the Egyptian 

borders. As long as General Haftar controls the border areas and thus stops attacks 

on Egypt, the Egyptian regime is content with the current situation in its 

neighboring country. 

The Muslim Brotherhood: 

Following the overthrow of the Muslim Brotherhood President, Mohamed Morsi, 

in 2013, the Egyptian regime has been engaged in a continued battle with the 

group. 

Despite the Muslim Brotherhood's claims that it maintains a non-violent approach, 

it is undisputed today that a significant portion of the movement has turned to 

violence with the early blessing of some of the Brotherhood's leadership. What 
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began as organized protection of Brotherhood demonstrators in late 2013 has 

morphed into aggressive violence directed at the state. This radicalization process 

has been abetted by the new amalgam of various Tslamist organizations and 

tendencies that formed in reaction to the 2013 massacre at Rab'a and the 

Brotherhood's own ideological weakness, which pem1itted other Tslamists to fill 

the vacuum of ideas with revolutionary Salafist ones. 

The first wave of violence by Muslim Brotherhood members was in the fom1 of 

both widespread violence across the country in August 20 13 that targeted Churches 

and police stations and through organized units that were created to protect 

Brotherhood demonstrations and which quickly began to engage in low level 

violence. By the early months of2014, these actions quickly fizzled as Muslim 

Brotherhood popular mobilization and demonstrations lost steam. 

By September 2014, the second wave of violence began with the emergence of two 

groups named Popular Resistance and Revolutionary Punishment. These groups 

were formed from Muslim Brotherhood members and organized, financed and 

supported by some elements within the group's leadership especially fom1er 

Guidance Bureau member Mohamed Kamal, who was killed in October 2016 by 

security forces. During the second wave, these groups were engaged in violence 

both in the form of attacks on the country's infrastructure especially the electricity 

grid, and attacks on multinational companies operating in Egypt, as well as 

targeted attacks against security officials believed to have played a role in the 

Rab'a massacre. The most successful operation was the assassination of Hesham 

Barakat, Egypt's Prosecutor General in Jtme 2015 by a group offormer Muslim 

Brotherhood members. By early 2016 the second wave of violence lost steam 

following a heavy crackdown by security forces that proved successful in 

dismantling their cells. 

The third wave ofviolence began in July 2016 with the announcement ofthe 

establishment of Hasm followed a month later by Liwa AI Thawra. These two 

groups have carried more sophisticated attacks than their predecessors including 

attacks on police checkpoints and assassinations of Judges and otlicers. The two 

groups have been designated as terrorist groups by the United States in January 

2018. ln recent months, successful security operations have dismantled their cells 

leading to decreased attacks. 

As a result ofthe regime's crackdown, internal tights over strategy, and the 

Brotherhood's failure to develop a coherent strategy to defeat the regime, the 

Mus lim Brotherhood has split into competing factions. One of these factions has 
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embraced violence both on political grounds as well as through developing a 

theological grounding for violence. The Muslim Brotherhood maintains a number 

of TV channels in Turkey that have engaged in open calls for violence and 

justification for these attacks as well as continued incitement against the regime 

and Coptic Christians. 

The Political Landscape 

During the past five years, Egypt has witnessed an unprecedented attack on free 

expression and civil society. The regime's crackdown was not limited to lslamists 

but has targeted activists and politicians from all backgrounds and ideologies. The 

aim of the crackdown is the complete closing of public space in the country. The 

regime's actions have been driven by a firm belief that Egypt is facing a 

conspiracy that aims to destabilize the country through internal forces including 

civil society groups and the media. The regime believes that President Mubarak's 

greatest mistake has been his surrender to American pressure to open the country 

in his last decade of nile. 

As such the regime has sought and succeeded in taking control of the media and 

closing all outlets for free expression and opposition. The regime has also removed 

legal and procedural constraints on security agencies, giving them virtually free 

rein to protect the country from internal threats as they see fit. This new approach 

reverses policies that Presidents Sadat and Mubarak had both promulgated. While 

neither were democrats, both understood the need to maintain a half-open society 

to alleviate pressure on the regime, while also upholding clear redlines and a legal 

framework for state oppression. The result has been flagrant human rights abuses 

and growing public fear. 

The recent Presidential elections were the culmination of these etiorts. The 

Egyptian regime has barred any significant candidate from competing in these 

elections against President Sisi and has arrested or intimidated those who dared 

challenge him. The Egyptian parliament, while including a small number of 

independent members has become a rubbers tamp body with little room for serious 

debate oflegislation. Local elections have in turn been continuously delayed. 

In the absence of any organized political body to express citizen concerns in the 

country, President Sisi has turned to the military as the base of his regime. The 

military today enjoys unrivaled and virtually uncontested power. Yet the past tour 

years have also brought numerous challenges and placed novel demands on an 

institution that is not equipped to govern a country of ninety-four million. The 
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military's heavy involvement in political and economic affairs has compromised 

its reputation as an impartial actor defending the nation's interests. 

Despite prioritizing the rebuilding of state institutions, the decay of state 

institutions continues apace, leaving the country's leaders with few mechanisms to 

confront growing challenges, including a rolling economic and sectarian crisis. On 

its current path, Egypt, a country of ninety-four million, is at growing risk of 

becoming a failed state. 

The Sectarian Crisis: 

Egypt is a tom country - its social fabric in tatters. There is no reason to think of 

Egypt today as above the disarray and state collapse that we have witnessed 

elsewhere all across the region. Such assumptions have long held sway as Egypt's 

image of a modem country above the sectarian and etlmic divides of its 

surroundings have been taken for granted. In reality, Egyptian nationalism was 

never as solid as imagined, its social fabric never as strong as portrayed, and its 

divides much deeper than acknowledged. At every level, Egypt is today a tom 

country; between the Brotherhood and its enemies, between lslamists and nonlslamists, and between Copts and Muslims. No resolution appears in sight for the 

divisions. 

Persecution and discrimination against the cmmtry's native Christian population, 

Copts, continues to be one of the most important challenges facing the country. 

While President Sisi has publicly spoken about viewing all Egyptians as equal, and 

took some public gestures towards Copts, discriminatory policies remain in place. 

A long-promised Church building law was passed in December 2016, albeit with 

significant restrictions on church construction. Furthermore, the government 

committee tasked with legalizing pre-existing churches that lack government 

recognition has been extremely slow in the process recognizing less than five 

percent of the 3730 applications submitted to them. Furthem10re, Christians 

continue to be systematically excluded from important government positions. The 

current Egyptian government has only one Christian minister, while there are no 

Copts serving as provincial governors. Similar discrimination is practiced among 

university presidents, school deans, the military, judiciary, the foreign service with 

Christians completely excluded from serving in the country's state security and 

intelligence services. The E~,>yptian government also continues to uphold 

discriminatory regulations such as blasphemy laws, which are almost exclusively 

used to target Copts and other religious minorities; inheritance laws, which force 

Copts to divide inheritance according to shari a; and prohibiting adoption. 
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Most significantly, the Egyptian govenunent has failed to stop attacks on Copts 

and has repeatedly refused to punish the attackers. In the past five years there have 

been over five htmdred sectarian attacks on Copts. Most of these attacks are in the 

fonn of mob attacks in villages driven by attempts to deny Copts from building a 

Church or as punishment for perceived insults by the community. In every single 

one of those attacks the government has forced both collllllunities to attend 

reconciliation sessions, which force majoritarian demands on tl1e Copts without 

holding the attackers accountable. This has created a culture of impunity and 

encouragement that has led to a drmtic increase in the munber of attacks on 

Copts in recent years. 

Ethiopia 

No issue occupies Egypt today more than tl1e Ethiopian question. Ethiopia, long 

viewed from Cairo as a backward country is modernizing and, more importantly, is 

witnessing a demographic explosion, having surpassed Egypt in population. With 

the demographic pressure comes the need for water and electricity, both tied to the 

river. The agreement governing the river had been arranged by the British, and 

they tavored Egypt for its cotton industry supplying the mills of Lancashire. 

Ethiopia, however, will no longer accept the injustice. 

The dam being built in Ethiopia presents a threat to Egypt's national interest and 

survival, and repeated attempts to reach an accommodation between both countries 

have continued to falter. While the dam has not been completed yet, the Egyptian 

government has already taken steps to adjust to the possibility of diminished water 

resources as it prepares for alternatives. While a military conflict between both 

countries is not inevitable, it remains possible. 

Economic 

The Egyptian economy taces a multitude of stmctural problems, including an 

m1sustainable system of subsidies inherited from the Nasser era, which successive 

governments have failed to control; a large and expanding bureaucracy of seven 

million whose salaries are a huge and tmsustainable burden on a state budget 

already stretched thin; the overall low productivity of workers, a consequence of 

poor education and lack of serious technical training; an over -dependence on 

volatile sources of revenue such as the Suez Canal, tourism, and remittances by 

Egyptians abroad; a massive infonnal economy that the govenunent fails to 

regulate and also fails to derive tax revenues from; an unwelcoming business and 
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legal environment that discourages investment; and a weak banking system with 

limited penetration and minimal financial capacity to empower ordinary people 

and start-ups, aside ftom loans to big businesses and government bonds. 

Egypt's overall economic trajectory has further worsened because of noneconomic factors in the past few years. The deteriorating security situation and a 

legal framework that allows courts to cancel economic decisions have both 

discouraged economic reforn1 and investment. Further, the tourism sector has 

failed to rebound since 20 II, while the downing of a Russian airplane and a 

botched military operation in Sinai that killed Mexican tourists have also hurt the 

industry. 

While the Egyptian government had taken in its first years some steps to adjust the 

budget imbalance through targeting the fuel subsidies, it has tor a long time 

ignored the need for a coherent economic strategy and refused to allow the free 

floating ofthe Egyptian pound, wasting the country's foreign currency reserves. 

More drastically the government has been engaged in mega projects such as the 

New Suez Canal, a 1.5-millionacre reclamation project that has little chance of 

becoming viable, and an equally far-fetched new capital complex, both of which 

have cost the country billions of badly needed dollars. 

In November 2016, the government was forced by its deep economic troubles and 

pressure from the International Monetary Ftmd to devalue the Egyptian currency. 

Despite massive inflation that have eroded the middle class' savings, the move has 

significantly improved Egypt's economic condition. Further increases in the prices 

of fuel, electricity and water have further helped the government in stabilizing the 

economy and avoiding worse scenarios. Despite these welcome steps, Egypt 

remains dependent on cash infusions from foreign powers. With a population of 

ninety-four million, Egypt is today too big to save with foreign aid alone. A serious 

plan to address the country's structural economic problems and stimulate growth is 

necessary. 

Recommendations for U.S. Policy: 

Despite deep disagreements between both countries, Egypt carmot be simply 

ignored by the United States. Abandom11ent is not a strategy nor will imaginary 

solutions of cutting U.S. aid result in E~,rypt's transformation into a liberal 

democracy. Instead the United States needs sustained engagement with Egyptian 

officials ifthe alliance is to be salvaged. 
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Any new American effort to restore the alliance requires clarity about Egypt's 

rapidly deteriorating conditions and help for the country to deal with it. As such, a 

new U.S. strategy towards Egypt is required that is based on the Egypt of reality 

and not of imagination and that focuses on the cmmtry's internal challenges and 

not on Egypt's regional role. 

The U.S. should insist that for a healthy bilateral relationship, President Sisi must 

publicly repudiate the anti-American conspiracy theories rampant in the country. It 

is important for Cairo to make the case that the alliance with the United States is 

important to the Egyptian people and to repudiate conspiracy theories-especially 

those propagated by the Sisi regime itself-that claim there is American ill will 

toward Egypt. 

The U.S. should penalize Egyptians who deliberately create and propagate antiAmerican conspiracy theories. For example, Washington could make perpetrators 

ineligible to participate in American-Egyptian exchange programs, receive funding 

from the U.S. government, or receive visas to visit the U.S. 

One core focus of U.S. diplomacy in Ebrypt needs to be contesting the spread of 

anti-Americanism and conspiracy theories that have undern1ined political support 

in Egypt for the alliance. U.S. public diplomacy programs should also make 

debunking false infom1ation a top priority by reaching out directly to the Egyptian 

people through social media or short online videos and through the U.S. media in 

Arabic. The deepening mistrust between Cairo and Washington presents a major 

obstacle to any real cooperation. The weakness of the American-Egyptian alliance 

largely stems from Washington's failure to cultivate a dependable constituency in 

Egypt with shared interests and principles. This may be the biggest failure of U.S. 

diplomacy in Ebrypt. 

The ongoing conflict between Egypt and Ethiopia over water supplies, provides the 

United States with an opportunity at mediation. Success in avoiding military 

conflict between the two countries and in reaching an agreement acceptable to both 

sides can play an important role in strengthening the U.S. Egyptian alliance and 

winning the hearts and minds of Egyptians. 

The U.S. needs to rethink and expand its longstanding educational mission in 

Ebrypt to address the country's educational deficit and decaying state institutions. 

In addition to working with Egyptian partners to expand opportunities in each 

governorate, the U.S. should support Egyptian efforts to reforn1 the educational 

curriculum through a cross-disciplinary approach that instills civic republican 
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principles. This is essential for winning the stmggle of ideas with lslamism, 

establishing civic peace, and fostering progress. 

To help Egypt create a civil economy, the United States should expand its 

economic mission to engage a wider spectmm of businesses and sectors, including 

small business associations and new organizations focusing on encouraging 

entrepreneurship. 

The United States should devote special attention to bureaucratic refom1s and to 

expanding the banking system, which has an extremely low participation rate. 

These are major hurdles for small businesses and for developing entrepreneurship. 

In its economic and development aid to Egypt, the United States should develop a 

local approach that rewards governorates and municipalities based on metrics 

related to good governance and equal opportunities for all citizens. 

American military aid to Egypt should focus on improving Egypt's capacity to 

conduct complex political-military operations at home and along its periphery. ln 

addition, the United States should reexamine its military education and exchange 

programs with Ehryptian officers. While some military training initiatives target 

lower-ranking otllcers, the important and coveted strategic studies programs 

engage only top commanders. Expanding programs for the lower ranks on 

counterinsurgency, civilian security, and intelligence practices based on rule-oflaw principles should be a top priority. 

The United States should examine organizational and economic ties between 

designated terrorist groups Hasm and Liwa Al Thawra and the Muslim 

Brotherhood. Leaders and members ofthe Muslim Brotherhood with ties to these 

groups should be designated as terrorists. 

The United States should encourage the government of Turkey to examine the the 

content of Muslim Brotherhood TV channels engaged in incitement and support 

tor terrorist attacks in Egypt. It should tllrther encourage the government of Turkey 

to examine ties between individuals residing in Turkey and terrorist activities in 

Egypt. 

The United States needs to engage the Egyptian diaspora in the United States and 

in other Western countries as part of its efforts to help Eh'YPt. Working with the 

diaspora, the United States can develop numerous educational, economic, and 

developmental programs to implement in Egypt. The model of private-public 

partnership should be utilized in creating educational initiatives and 
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entrepreneurship opportunities in Egypt. The Egyptian diaspora in the West has 

developed civic values, including hard work and personal social responsibility, and 

avenues can and should be opened for these experiences and values to be 

transferred back to Egypt. Just as the United States invites thousands of Egyptians 

to come to America on exchange programs, it should conduct reverse programs 

through which Egyptian-Americans bring their experiences back home. 

Thank you again for holding and chairing this hearing and I look fonvards to your 

questions. 
32

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you so much, Mr. Tadros. Did I get 

it? All right. 

Dr. Dunne. Nate corrected me. 

STATEMENT OF MICHELE DUNNE, PH.D., DIRECTOR AND SENIOR FELLOW, MIDDLE EAST PROGRAM, CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACE 

Ms. DUNNE. Chairman Ros Lehtinen, Ranking Member Deutch, 

and members of the subcommittee, thank you for inviting me to 

testify. 

I am going to focus in my brief remarks here on developments 

in Egypt’s political scene that have implications for the country’s 

stability as well as for U.S. interests. 

With your permission, I’ve submitted a slightly longer written 

statement. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Without objection. 

Ms. DUNNE. During the first half of 2018, President Abdel Fattah 

el-Sisi eliminated five Presidential challengers, four of them senior 

and well-known figures, through arrest or intimidation. 

Sisi was then reelected after running against a virtual unknown. 

One of the would-be candidates, former army chief of staff Sami 

Anan, suffered a stroke in prison and is now in critical condition. 

There has been also a recent wave of arrests of those who have 

criticized Sisi publicly. Again, some of these are quite well-known 

people. 

Abdel Moneim Aboul Fotouh, the founder of the Strong Egypt 

Party, himself a previous Presidential candidate, blogger Wael 

Abbas, youth activist Shady al-Ghazaly Harb, human rights defender Amal Fathy, as well as others. 

They’ve joined tens of thousands of other political prisoners who 

have been detained for months, in some cases years, and often in 

harsh conditions, including prolonged solitary confinement and denial of adequate medical care in addition to the even harsher measures that Mr. Genser discussed—torture and so forth. 

So why all these arrests now? Well, they come amid signs that 

President Sisi might try to stay in office beyond the end of his second term. The 2014 Egyptian constitution, which was written after 

the 2013 military coup but before Sisi became President, stipulated 

that the President is limited to two 4-year terms and, of course, the 

writers of the constitution wrote that because President Mubarak 

stayed in office for 30 years. 

During his first term, Sisi promised that he would leave office 

after 8 years. But he has not repeated that pledge either during his 

reelection campaign or since, beginning his second term. 

His supporters are now saying that 8 years are not enough and 

it’s widely reported that amendments to the constitution will be introduced into the Parliament to remove term limits and perhaps 

extend the Presidential term from four to 6 years as well as make 

other changes to strengthen Presidential powers. 

President Sisi has also taken steps that appear designed to ensure the loyalty of senior military officers to him personally. He 

has recently replaced the ministers of defense and interior, the 

head of general intelligence, the army chief of staff, and the Parliament recently passed a law that would grant designated security 

33

officers lifelong immunity for crimes committed following the 2013 

coup—for example, the mass killings at Rabaa and other acts of violence. 

This law gives the President the right to designate which senior 

officers would enjoy such immunity and thus will be a highly effective tool in the hands of President Sisi to ensure loyalty to him. 

Now, why should the United States care if Sisi paves the way to 

remain President for life? First of all, if he succeeds, at best the 

lack of new blood in political leadership would bring back the stagnation, corruption, and lack of responsiveness to citizens, lack of 

accountability that led to the revolt against Mubarak but with 

much more brutal repression in the case of the Sisi regime. 

That’s a recipe for trouble in this nation of 100 million people 

and neighbor to Israel. And if Sisi tries to secure a lock on the 

presidency and he fails but there are no credible political processes 

to sort things out, then the country might well be headed for violent unrest before too long. 

While the United States cannot and should not try to micro manage Egypt’s politics, the U.S. Government and particularly the Congress can scrutinize engagement with Egypt and aid to Egypt to be 

sure that the United States is promoting stability for the entire nation rather than repression and one-man rule. 

My specific recommendations include keep conditions on security 

assistance. They’re working. The U.S. administration has become 

bolder in using the human rights conditions that Congress has 

written into legislation and has withheld assistance. 

Based on some of the concerns that Mr. Genser articulated—the 

conviction of NGO workers in 2013, the draconian new NGO law 

that would crush civil society, and Egypt’s dealing with North 

Korea. 

These problems have not yet been resolved. There are signs, 

though, of greater responsiveness on the part of the Egyptian government since the suspension of aid. 

So keep writing those conditions into legislation and encourage 

the administration to use them, which, of course, means not releasing aid until the benchmarks are met. 

I would recommend a bottom-up review of security assistance to 

be right sized to make sure that it meets Egypt’s actual defense 

needs rather than the military’s desire for impressive weapons systems. 

Insist on vigorous implementation of end use monitoring to ensure that equipment provided is not used for human rights abuses 

because, as we’ve already heard, it has been. 

Consider shifting some assistance from security to address some 

of the urgent needs of the population such as modernization of the 

country’s water infrastructure. It is headed for a water crisis. 

Ultimately, it’s for Egyptian citizens to decide the future they 

want for their country. But it’s for American citizens and their representatives to decide how much faith we have in that vision and 

to what extent we are willing to support it. 

Thank you very much. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Dunne follows:]

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tJ 

CARNEGIE 

ENDOWMENT FOR 

INTERNATIONAL PEACE 

EGYPT: SECURITY, HUMAN RIGHTS, 

AND REFORM 

Michele Dunne 

Director and Senior Fellow 

~Middle East Program 

Carnegie Endowment for International Peace 

Testimony before U.S. House Subcommittee on 

the J\Iiddle East and North ~\frica 

July 24, 2018 

THE G.lOBA:. THINK TANK ! BEIJING P!:!RlJT BRUS'StlS. MOSCOW NfW DHHi WASHJNGTON 
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30888b-2.eps

Ch;1irnun Ros-l.ehtinen, r,mking member Deutch, m1d members of the Subcommittee, thank you for 

in'i'iting me to testify. \\'1lile Egypt is not in the headlines these days, there arc important and 

\VClrt}'1ng develclpments in ecclllcJmy. fcJreign policy, hum~m rights, ~md pcllihcs-all elf \Vh1Ch 

have 1mplications for the stability. 1 n my testimony, 1 'ivill focus on domestic pol!tics. 

\\'ith the beginning ofPreslllcnt Abdcl Fattah al-Sisi's second term, undergomg a deepcnmg 

of authorit:manism verging on totalitarianism. ~'\s you are aware, rocky attempt at a 

democratic transition began in early 201l and ended \v-ith a military coup in July 20 l3. During the tirst 

half of 2018, President Sisi dimmated, through imprisonment or intimidabon, tl\T pn.:sickntial 

challengers (four of them his supporters preYlOusly) :1nd 'ivas re-elected on ~larch 29. Three of the 

would-he c:mdidates were from the mihtar~. One iSm pnson, one under house arrest, and the third, 

former Army Chief of Staff Sami Anan, suffered a stroke in prison and is nmv in critical condition. 

~-\nan's imprisonment was part of a ne\\' wave of repress10n who ha\'e critinzed Sisi. 

Others arrested duri11g the presidential nlCe or shortly included Strong I (gypt 1\trty fmu1der 

Abdcl ::vloncun _\boul Fotouh, •;vl10 '\Vas accused of terrorism after crihcizmg Sisi on satellite tcleY-ision 

and is now suffering dire health consequences due to prolonged solitary contlnement under harsh 

cond1t.ions. 'lhe campr1ign has also extended to mrmy young liberals mcluding hlogger \Vael Abbas, 

)Outh actlnst Shad: al-Gha:.-:aly Harb, and human rights defender \mall~'ath)· They have jomed tens 

of thous:1nds of other political prisoners, many detamed for months or ye:1rs \vithout charge, or 

com-icted m mass tnals. 

Recent efforts to eliminate potential rivals and silence independent voices come amid growing signs 

that Sisi might try to sta~ in oftlce beyond the end oflus second tenn in 2022. \\'hen the Egyptian 

constitution was re\Hitten after the 2013 coup, the drafters were still hoping to some gains of 

the 2011 revolution including constn1ints on prcsiderltlal power. The 201...J- stipulated that 

the president is limited to t\vo terms (unlike fonner President Hosni Mubarak, who serYnl 

for 30 _-\11 runendments to constitution must be apprm-ed by a popular referendum as well 

as but the drafters added a speci<ll pronsion th<lt articles relating to the re-elect1o11 of the 

president may not be ,tmended. 

'll1e dr,lfters of the 201...J- constitution hml re<lson to '>vorry. that he 

\Vould respect the constitution and leave office <lfter a maximum did not repeat 

that pledge during his recent campaign for re-election and his sug,gcstcd publicly and 

in parliament that he should stay longer. Sources \1.rithin the parhament now that there is 

a process to 111troducc amendments that '\Vould remove the prm,~ision 

relating to the of the president may not be amended, extend the 

four to six years, and remo'\T term hmits, among other changes. 

Nmv Sisi appears to be \Vorking on removing any opposition. Independent political parries formed 

since the 2011 reyolution haYc been systematically undermined by security agencies, and there iS now 

pressure on the 20 or so parties represented in parliament to co:1lesce mto just t\vo or three, all 

supporting Sisi. 

There are :1lso efforts to quell any opposit1011 v<.rithm the regime. Sisi has replaced m:1ny senior secunty 

oftlcials-the ministers of defense and interior. army chief of staff. and director of mtelligence-in 

recent months. The parliament also passed on Jul; 16 a b\\ that would grant design<lted selllor 

1 
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30888b-3.eps

milit<1ry ofticers lifelong immunity from prosecution for crimes committed in the years fol\m;;-ing the 

2013 The lmv gh-cs the president the right to designate the officers enjoying such immunity. a 

highly tool to use in managing any dissent\vithin the mihtary. 

\\'hy should the Cnitcd States, a long-term ally ofFgypt that has gin'n more than $78 billion in 

assistance, care if S1si pa\TS the \vay to remmmng presllknt for hfc? l3ecause if he succeeds, at best it 

\\;ill bring hack the stagnation, corn1pt10n, and lack of responsiveness to ci11zens that led to the revolt 

against \·lubarak-but\vith much more brutal repression. '!'hat is a for trouble in this most 

populous country of the :\'Iiddle East and neighbor to Israel, \vhich 1s 

insurgency 1t1 Sin:-ti. And if S1s1 tries to secure :1 lock on the presidency and 

lacking any outlets for peaceful of opposition in politics, med1a, or civil soc1ety-might 

soon be headed for ·dolcnt unrest. better for Sisi to allow the n.:-emergence of free politics and to 

leave office on 11me. 

'111ere ts not much the United States c1n or should do directly about the intemal sttwltion in 

Egypt. \\1ut the C.S. go\-cmment, and particularly the Congress, can do 1s cng~tgement\vith 

and ass1stance to Egypt in order to ensure that they promote stab1hty for the nat1on rather than onemrm rule . 

.i\Iy specific recommendations include: 

Keep conditionality: it's working. The L' .S. adrmnistrattotl h<lS become bolder (wer the past 

year in using the conditions hcts legislated to send a clear security ctssistancc 

\\'ill he \\·ithheld unless the addresses longstanding concerns 

including the 2013 coll\-iction for ·\menc1n 1'-GOs, a draconian new NGO L1\\ 

that\Yould cmsh ct;;-t\ society ctnd tmpede future asststctncc, m1d ongoing dealings \Vith North 

Korea. These problems have not yet been resolved, but there arc positi\T signs since the 

suspetlStOtl of atd. the course. Keep writing conditions into legislation and keep 

et1coun1ging the to use them with confidence. 

Do a bottom-up review of security assistance and right-size it. '1 'he U.S.-Egyptian 

secunty relationship has been on autopilot at $1.3 h.ilhon annually for too long \\-.ithout a 

reYie'>v of ,_,-hether the st:.--:e and composition of the assistance suits the 1 (gypttatl 

<Lcmal challenges. The Congress should also insist on ,~igorous implementation of 

end-usc monitoring to ensure that equipment proYided by U.S. t<C{paycrs is not used to carry 

out human nghts \ ioLltiOllS, which et1tl1me rmlicali:.--:ation ,1.nd perpeh.t<lte terronsm. 

Support the Egyptian people, not only the military. '1\vo of the crying needs of l ·:brypt 

right no\V arc 1) labor force den'lopment through education to address nun pant youth 

unemployment and 2) modemt:.--:ation of water infrastmcture, particularly in agriculture, to 

help mitigdte an impending shortage. \'('hik an 0\Trctll incn.'<lSe in Ll.S. ctssistance seems 

unlikely, the United States could shift funds from security to these categories. 

Express support for democracy and rights. Finally, L.S. officials ;md members of 

Congress cctn their support, publicly and priYatcly, for dcmocrctttc procedures <lnd 

human rights in They can cite salutary proYisions in the country's constimtion such as 

term limits, and express hope that they \"\'lll be upheld. Lltimatcly it is for Egyphan citizens to 

decide the future they \vant for the1r country, :-tnd for ~\mencan c1tizens and the1r 

representatives to decide \vhat support they arc willing to proYidc to secure that fuhm.'. 

2 
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30888b-4.eps

Thank you for this opportunity to testify. 
38

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you, Dr. Dunne, very much. 

Mr. Miller. 

STATEMENT OF MR. ANDREW MILLER, DEPUTY DIRECTOR 

FOR POLICY, PROJECT ON MIDDLE EAST DEMOCRACY 

Mr. MILLER. Chairman Ros-Lehtinen, Ranking Member Deutch, 

distinguished members of the subcommittee, thank you for inviting 

me to testify. 

With your permission, I will summarize my written testimony, 

which I’ve submitted for the record. I will describe three defining 

and concerning characteristics of Egypt under President Abdel 

Fattah el-Sisi. 

Then I will offer two recommendations regarding security assistance that can help advance U.S. interests while right sizing the bilateral relationship. 

The first key characteristic of Egypt today is that the country is 

no longer as important to U.S. interests as it once was. Due both 

to its own internal decline and the growing influence of wealthy 

Gulf states, Egypt has ceased to be a regional power. 

Egypt still matters to the U.S. but more because we cannot afford the Arab world’s most populous country becoming a basket 

case that generates refugee flows or terrorist threats abroad. 

A second characteristic is how poorly Sisi’s military-backed government is managing these problems. Dr. Dunne already addressed 

the dangers of Sisi’s attempt to create a total autocracy in Egypt. 

In the security arena too, Sisi has been unable to defeat ISIS 

Sinai and other terrorist groups. In fact, 2017 saw the most fatalities from terrorist attacks in modern Egyptian history—756—while 

the mass incarceration of peaceful citizens is worsening the 

radicalization problem. 

On the economic front, Sisi has made some important fiscal reforms, but his policies have led to deteriorating living standards 

threatening the country’s stability. 

Third, Egypt is a very difficult partner for the United States. Despite the $1.3 billion in FMF funds we provide each year, Sisi has 

continued to cooperate with North Korea and imprisoned U.S. citizens on trumped up charges. 

Even where we share common interests, Egypt has often rejected 

cooperation. For example, Egypt has spurned U.S. offers to train its 

military in the modern counterterrorism tactics essential to defeating groups like ISIS. 

It is becoming harder to argue that the U.S. is getting a good return on its investment in Egypt? What can the U.S. do to break 

out of this unsatisfactory cycle? 

There are two steps that Congress could take that would advance 

the vital U.S. interests in Egypt’s long-term stability while ensuring a better return on investment. 

For Washington to send a clear message, U.S. military aid, which 

the Egyptian leadership values greatly, will have to be put on or 

off the table. 

First, Congress, should keep human rights conditions on military 

assistance in the fiscal year 2019 appropriations bill. The Trump 

administration made use of this conditionality last August when it 

39

suspended $195 million in FMF funding in part over human rights 

concerns. 

As a result, after years of stalling, Egypt finally arranged for a 

retrial in an infamous 2013 case in which 17 Americans received 

prison sentences on outrageous political charges. 

Egypt also reportedly forced North Korea to reduce the size the 

of its Embassy in Cairo, Pyongyang’s largest in the region. While 

neither step merits releasing the $195 million, they suggest that 

U.S. pressure is indeed having some effect. 

In fiscal year 2019, Congress should continue such conditionally 

and seek an end to Sisi’s crackdown on civil society, the release of 

political prisoners, and access for U.S. military officials to the Sinai 

for end use monitoring. 

These steps would both open up the political space that is so important to Egypt’s long-term stability and show that Sisi is willing 

to address legitimate U.S. concerns. 

My second recommendation is that Congress should reduce annual military assistance to $1 billion as proposed in the Senate appropriations committee markup. 

Egypt views military aid as an entitlement and expects that the 

U.S. will ultimately back down from any threat or attempt to use 

it as leverage. This perception undermines U.S. influence. 

Consequently, reducing Egypt’s military aid would send an unmistakable signal that we expect more in return for our support. 

The risks of imposing human rights conditionality and reducing 

military aid are often exaggerated. 

The Israeli-Egyptian peace treaty is no longer dependent on U.S. 

aid or mediation. Egypt will not abandon the U.S. in favor of Russia or China and cutting this aid will not degrade the capabilities 

of an Egyptian military that needs better training, not more weapons. 

If these steps are taken, the U.S. will be in a stronger position 

to persuade Sisi’s government to open up political space, reform 

Egypt’s military doctrine, and address radicalization. 

At the very least, cutting Egypt’s military aid will be a service 

to the American taxpayer who has seen little return on their investment in the present Egyptian government. 

In closing, the U.S.-Egyptian relationship is no longer working. 

I hope Congress will take this chance to recalibrate it for a new 

era. 

Thank you. I look forward to your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Miller follows:]

40


30888d-1.eps

Congressional Testimony 

--------------~-----------~-~ 

House Foreign Affairs Committee 

Middle East and North Africa Subcommittee Hearing 

EGYPT: SECURITY, HFMAN RIGHTS, AND REFORM 

Testimony of 

Andrew Miller 

Deputy Director for Policy 

Project on Middle East Democracy 

Tuesday, July 24,2018 

1730 RHODE ISLAND AVENUE. NW, SUiTE 617" WASHINGTON. DC 20036 .. 
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Chairman Ros-Lehrinen, Ranking ,\1ember Demch, :md disringuished l'v1embers of rhe Subcommirree, 

allmv me to thank you for inviting me to resti~,, on this important topic. I am going to present what I 

Yie\v as the three key--and concerning-char:lcteristics ofEt,rypt under President Abdd-Fattah al--Sisi, 

and explain their implications for U.S. interests. In dosing, I will of6::'r t\vo recommendations for how 

Congress can help to advance vital U.S. interests in Egypt vvhile rightsizing the bilateral relationship. 

The first key diaGKterisric of to day's Egypt is that the cmmtry is no longer as important to U.S. 

interests as it once \vas. President al-Sisi has been unable to reverse years of internal state decay and, 

with the increasing assertiveness of \vealthy Gulf states, Ef,ypt has ceased to be a ref,ional power in rhe 

]\lliddle East. The Egyptian government currently possesses neither the \\"C\Jith, the military po\ver, nor 

the administrative efficienq' to events Jnd outcomes elsewhere in the region, with the exceptions 

of Libya and Gaza. Even rhe soft power across t-he region has dissipated. 

The days when the United States could rely upon Et,rypt ro serve as an anchor for U.S. imnesrs in 

the region are long gone. Egypt is not the key to resolving the crisis inS) ria, is not at the forefront 

of efforts to roll back Iranian influence in the Middle East, and lad..s the e:x.peditiona.ry capability to 

deploy outside of its borders in suppon of the Unired States. 1 \Yhile Egypt has inAuence over the 

economic situation in Caza due to its control of the border, it has scant influence in the Wht Bank, 

and is in no pmirion to deliver the Palestinians to a peace agreement with !sracl.1 

Hmvever, Egypt still matters to the United States, albeit for different reasons than before. Despite its 

diminished regional importance, ongoing internal deterioration could have serious implications 

for U.S. interests. \X/hile ourright state does not appear imminent, prolonged insG1bility in Egypt 

could lead to both new refugee flows from this conn tty of 100 million people or facilitate the rise of 

terrorist groups with transnational reach. stability, defined not as a ruling regime imposing 

connul through repression bur as does not create security risks beyond its borders, rhus 

of p:1ramounr concern w che Unitr'd States. 

Unfonunarely, and !:his is the second key characterisdc of wday's Et,'YPC al-Sisi's military-backed 

goYemmem is doing poorly ar managing rhc coumry's imcrnal challenges. Repression is reaching 

alarming levels as al-Sisi rakes steps that are more char:1cteristic of toralit:nian than authorirari;m 

regimes. Since !v1arch's presidential election, al-Sisi has escalated his c..ampaign of arrests against his 

political in .an apparent attempt to consolidate and extend his rule. Just in the past several 

weeks, there been a new spate of arrests targeting people like Amal Fath!'• a democrat..)' activist 

\vho was detained aft-er publicly against sexual hara<>sment.5 With as many as 60,000 

political prisoners already in Egyptian the detention of peaceful political activists shows no signs 

of abating:1 [ n contrast to previous amhoritarian regime<> in Egypt, which allowed some space for 

civil society to operate. al-Sisi seem<> determined to snuff out all room for activity independent of the 
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30888d-3.eps

stare. And. while some amhorirarian regimes haYe proYen durable, totalitarian ones are seldom srabte. 

tending ro collapse in ·ways that are deeply dangerous fOr their neighbors. 

The sr-curicy situation in Et.J1Pt also remains worrisome. Over four years after his first election, and 

despite extraordinarily repressive measures, President al-Sisi is still yer to neutralize the threat posed by 

terrorist groups lik:e the Islamic State ofiraq and Syria (ISIS)'s Sinai-based affiliate, "vhich is believed 

to be responsible tOr dw downing of a Rmsian ;tirliner and the bombing of churdws, among many 

other attacks. New groups, such as the U.S.-designated foreign terrorist (fTO) 1--LASI\1, 

have also emerGed to condun lmver-level attacks in the Egyptian Attesting to the Egyptian 

government's lack of progress on counterterrorism, 2017 set the record fur the mm.'t deaths in terrorist 

attacks (756) in modern Egyptian history.r, Furthermore, ¥-e have seen no concrete evidence that the 

Egyptian military's much-hyped "Sinai 2018'' campaign has extinguished the ISJS threat in the Sinai. 

To the contrJ~!, Human Rights Watch reports that an .lCJditional 3,000 homes "\Vere destroyed during 

the operation, fueling resentment tow:1rd the government and impairing the type of cooperation 

bet\veen the state and rhe public char is the hallnurk of successful coumenerrorisrn campaigns. 

President al-Sisi's government ha..'> received kudos for its economic performance, but even here the 

picture belo\v the surface is deeply troubling. In return fe-r a $12 billion loan from the International 

i'...ionetary Fund (I Mf), al-Sisi undenook a number of strucLmal adjustments that have helped to 

stabilize macroeconomic situation. Foreign currency reserves have recovered after reaching 

and the economy is expected to grow by 5.2 percent in 2018. 8 But just as 

once-vaunted economic refOrms ma..\ked deeper problems and public discontent that 

ultimately led w u~e 2011 uprising, conditions in the real economy in which Ebryptia.ns liYe are getting 

harder. Indeed, al-Sis.i's goYernmenr has neglected rhe impact of economic rt'f0rms on rhc Ebl)lJtian 

people. whose living standards have declined sharply. The poverty rate in E!_.,ry-pt ha..<> jurnpt>d from 

27.8 percent in 2016 to an estimated J5 percent in 2017, partly due to IMP-mandated subsidy cuts 

on which the poorest Egyptians depended. ·J Tile government, moreover, has no dear plan to create 

the 700,000 to 1,000.000 jobs per year prevent the unemployment rate from increasing 

flnther.H.' Even middle class Egyptians are badly, as rh~ combined effects ofinfl.ation-14.4 

percent as ofJune-and devaluation spending powerY 'T11e growing role ofthe 

miliury in the economy has made it even more difficult for the to reap the benefits 

of al-Sisi's refOrms, and al-Sisi's financing of w;1stcful ''megaproject-s'' massive harrowing has 

turned public debt, which is currently 107 percent of GDT~ into a ticking time bomb. 
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30888d-4.eps

lr is rhus nor surprising rhat Et:,'YPt has averaged more rhan one protest per day-252 in total-in rhe 

first half of 2018, most of them over economic dlscontcnt. 11 Another looming threat on rhe horizon 

is Ebrypr's ;,varer supply, a problem that successive E~:-,ryptian governments havC' bacUy mismanaged. 

Simply put, Egypt already does not have enough \Vater for its population, a.nd experts 1uve estimated 

that, once operational, the Gcmd Ethiopian Renaissance Dam could temporarily reduce water 

supply by :-lS much as a further 25 percem.u Given Egypt's dependence on \Vater f01 and 

electricity generation. ;md such a development could prove crippling for a weak 

economy. \X/hile it may be roo an agreement with Ethiopia rhat would mitigate the dam's 

impact on Egypt, al-Sisi's government hJs largely f.1iled to regulate highly water-intensh·e ar,ricultural 

and construction pracrice.s that coulJ insulate Et,rypt from the worst effects of the d,1m. 

The third ch~uacteristic of roday's Egy11t is that it is an extremely difficult panner for the United States. 

"The Cold \Var consensus that held together the U.S.· Ef0'ptian relationship no longer hold.s, and 

Ef:,ryptian interests often diverge from those of the United States. For example, Egypt has continued its 

political, economic, and militaty coopcradon "vith North Korea, helping l'yont:,'}7

J.ng to acquire badly 

needed fOreign currency, at rhe precise rime rhe Trump administration has sought w apply maximum 

pressure on King _Tong Un's regime. 11 Ef.,rypr is also determined to build a closer relationship \Vith 

Russia, regardless ofhmv the United States And, at the United Nations Security Council, 

Egypt has opposed U.S. positions on Syria. and 

Even \vhere the United State:l and E~'!'Pt share common interests, Eg;11t has often rejected U.S. 

co<Jperationand assistance. Counterterrorism (CT) is a case in point. \)'/hile Ef:,'}rpt has gladly accepted 

miliraty equipment funded by A.merican taxpayer money, it has largely ~~pur-ned other forms of 

support rhar are arguably more lmporr:mc ro irs CT success, including training and advice. 15 This is 

particularly derrimenral to CT in Ef.,rypt, as the Ef,')'Ptian milira1y's struggles again1-1: rhe ISIS affiliate 

in the Sinai appear to be a flinc-rion of poor doc-rrine and tactics rather than equipment shortfalls. 

lvloreover, al-Sisi's government has ignored U.S. concerns that its political repression .and mass 

incarceration of peaceful anors is fueling radicalization trends in the country, in effect creating nevv 

terrorists.' 6 As one former prisoner noted, "In the beginning [2013], no one had even heard ofDaesh, 

but by the timeT left, maybe 20 percent \vere openly supporting their ideas ... after all those years of 

being in jail with no explanation, m,mywanted revenge.''L Yet, repeated U.S. warnings that Egypt 

needs to take prison radicalization seriously have fallen on deafeJrs. 

Egypt's declining utility to the United States as a partner is all the more striking g!ven how much 

money the United States has irwested in Egypt. [n recent years, the U.S. government has contlnued 
44


30888d-5.eps

to provide Egypt vvith an annual $1.3 billion in military assiscmce, \vhich in Fisc:1l Year (FY) 2018 

ac-counted for 21 percent of all U.S. Foreign l\1ilitary Financing (FlvlF) flmds glob:1lly~ making the 

counrry the second large-st recipient ofFlvfF \vorldwideY And this is on top of the $47 billion in 

military assistance and ~24 billion in economic aid that the United States has given to Egypt ovt>r the 

last forty years. 

As a whole, it is bel-oming increasingly diHlcult to argue that the United States is getting a good return 

on its investment in Egypt. lost regional influence, but the United States continues to 

provide ai-Sisi's the second l:ugest FMF package in the \vorld. Egypt is moving in the 

endangering key U.S. intere~'ts in human rights and countenerrorism, while 

on how to turn around this negative trajectory. \Vhat can the United States do to om 

of this unsatisfactory cycle? 

There are two steps that Congress could take that would both advance vital U.S. intere&t:s and ensure 

that the U.S. investment in Egypt is proportional to its return. Both concern U.S, military assistance to 

Egypt, v·,rhich is no coincidence. The government values U.S. military assistance above all else. 

Tfthe U.S. government is to to aJ-Sisi's government, lJ.S. aid will have to be put on (or ofF) 

the table. 

First. Congress should retain human rights conditions on Egypt's military assistance package in the 

FY19 State and Foreign Operations bill. 1l1e Tmmp administration made use of this 

conditionality last August when it $195 million in FMF funding for EgyptY' As a result of 

this pressure, the Egyptian government finally arranged for a retrial in the Infamous foreign funding 

case, in which 43 ernployees of U.S. and German-b.1...;;ed NGOs, including 17 AmericJns, received 

prison seutences on politicized charges in 2013Y Ef:.rypt also reportedly fOrced North Korea to reduce 

the sraffleYel of its embas~T in Cairo, largest mission in the region.~ 1 While neither step 

is sufficient m jusrifY the release of the [hey indicate dnr U.S. pressure is having some 

effect. 1n FY19, Congress should condition a portion of military assistance to Eb"}'Pt on progress in 

several important areas, including a cessation of the investigation and arrest of activists and democracypromotion organizations, the release of political prisoners, and granting U.S. military officials access to 

the Sinai to perform end-use monitoring ofU.S.-made military equipment. 

Second, Congress should reduce military assistance to Egypt from S 1.3 bitlion to $1 billion in the 

FY19 appropriations bill, as proposed in the Senate Appropriations Committee's markup. As things 

currently stand, Egypt both views U.S. military suppon as an entitlement and believes itself to be more 

imporrant to the United States than vice versa. Based on these perception.;;, the Egyptian government 

the Lln!ted States will ultimately back down from any rhreat or sanction, which undermines 

influence in Egypt. Reducing Egypt's annual military assistance Jppropriati0n would send the 
45


30888d-6.eps

unmistakable message rhar rhe United Sures expects more in rerum fOr irs support ro Et:,rypr. In 

addition, by disabm;ing Et,rypt of the notion that it can takf: its exi.<..Ling level offimding fOr gr:mred, 

Congress can restore U.S. leverage over the Egyptian governrnenrY 

The risks of cutting Eb'YPt's milit:lry :1ssistance and retaining human rights conditionality are often 

exaggerated. Contrary to popular belief, the United States did not undertake :m indefinite commitment 

to provide Egypt v'lith any speci:6c level of military support at Camp David; reducing military ~lssistance 

vvould thus not put the United S(ates in breach of the Israeli-Egyptian Peace Treaty. Moreo\er, 

is no longer dependent on U.S. mediation; Tsrael and Egypt have becom~ solid. if 

quiet, allies. Nor will Egypt abandon the United States in fwor of Russia or China in response w 

a reduction in assistance. Russia and China. in contrast to the United Stares, do not provide Egypt 

,..,-ith military equipment as grant assistJncc, and the Egn1tian r;overnment has no desire to be wholly 

dependent on any external patron, whether it is the United States or Russia. And, finally, a reduction in 

U.S. milita1y a)sistance will not degrade the Ebryptian military's ability or interest in combating terrorist 

groups. Et,'}'pt needs betrer training, \vhich is relac.iYdy inexpensive, nor l1e\-V cools. 

Egypt is on a dangerous course. one with grave implications for the United States. 1t \vill be difficult to 

reverse this trajenory, but Congress has an important opportunity to help the Trump administration 

tackle this thorny challenge by restoring U.S. credibility and influence with Egypt. If military assistance 

to Eg;1ft is reduced and conditioned, the Trump administration will be in a stronger position ro 

persuade al-Sisi's government ro open up political space, rdOrm lts military doctrine, and address 

the country's growing radicalization problem. At the Yery least, cutting E~:,rypt's military aid will be a 

service ro rhe American ta..xpayer, who has seen lirclc rerum on their investment in the current E!:,J'Prian 

governmenL The U.S.-Ehryprlan military assi,~;rancc relationship no longer makes se'nse in irs current 

form; I hope Congress ·will tal.;:e this chance to recalibrate U.S. aid fOr a nev.,r era. 

Thank you. 
46

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Excellent recommendations from all of you. 

Mr. Genser, you have represented some of the most well-known 

human rights activists and political prisoners in recent years, securing their freedom, their release, from a wide variety of countries. 

Please compare the case of your clients in Egypt to those in other 

countries and are there certain aspects of Egypt’s legal system and 

approach to human rights that stand out and what are the specific 

challenges that the accused face in Egypt? 

Mr. GENSER. Thank you, Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. You have been 

an extraordinary partner for so many victims of human rights 

abuses around the world and especially in support of families of political prisoners, and it’s going to be very sad to see you depart the 

Congress at the end of this term. We’ll all miss you. 

So with respect to the situation in Egypt and political prisoners, 

I think it’s unmistakable that when you have tens of thousands of 

people detained at any one time, the reality is that most of them 

are being detained not even on trumped up charges but on no 

charges at all, and you can’t have due process of law when you 

have tens of thousands being detained at once, let alone probable 

cause for arresting these kinds of people. 

What my clients, Ola al-Qaradawi and Hossam Khalaf, have suffered these USLPRs is emblematic of the problem. You know, they 

were accused in media of being associated with the Muslim Brotherhood, although they were, of course, cleared by President Trump 

for their green cards. 

So I would not find that to be a very credible accusation, and 

they’ve been held on renewable detention orders for a year and 

counting. Brought before judges that, you know, first heard 15-day 

renewals. Now it’s every 45 days they appear. 

They have had no access to their family for more than a year. 

Neither of them have been able to have access to their families, 

and even when they’re brought to court, they aren’t even able to 

access their counsel. 

They’re in a glass aquarium all the way across the courtroom 

and unable to even talk to their own lawyers, and Egypt has presented no evidence of any kind that they have committed any 

crimes, let alone that they would be prosecuted for them and they 

are in this permanent state of renewable detention. 

This is a phenomena we see wide across Egypt, not just against 

U.S. legal permanent residents or American citizens but against ordinary Egyptians and real or imagined political opponents of the 

regime. 

You also have, of course, the reinstitution of the emergency law 

which now has provided these alternate courts that don’t have 

basic due process protections and no right of appeal and this is, obviously, a very, very dangerous trend where in the name of counter 

terrorism operations people are being sent to these kinds of court 

systems that have built-in endemic and systematic problems, and 

ultimately, the judiciary in Egypt, of course, is not independent or 

impartial as well. 

So I think that this would—the situation in Egypt is very analogous to the kind of situations that I have worked with around the 

world in lots of different authoritarian contexts, whether it be, you 

47

know, in Iran or a Cuba or Venezuela, you know, or any one of a 

number of African countries that I’ve worked in—the Gambia, you 

name it. 

And I think the reality is that this is an authoritarian ruler and 

President Sisi, who is determined to have his way not only 

electorally but in terms of ensuring that there is no legitimate 

peaceful dissent that has any power of any kind to be able to challenge his rule, and I think that we see that playing out in the form 

of the number of political prisoners. 

I think that in any country around the world where you see political prisoners that should be for everybody around the world, a sign 

that this is a country that is moving in the wrong direction rather 

than the—rather than the right direction and Egypt, having tens 

of thousands or more political prisoners, not even all of whom have 

been documented, and the way that they’re treated in prison is 

very emblematic of the repression of the Sisi regime. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you very much, Mr. Genser. Thank 

you for your defense of political dissidents and we wish you much 

success in your human rights work. 

Thank you very much. I will ask Mr. Donovan to take over for 

me, if he could, while I have some constituent appointments in the 

side room, and with that I am pleased to yield to the ranking member, my good friend, Mr. Deutch, of Florida. 

Mr. DEUTCH. Thank you, Madam Chairman. 

Egypt has seen a multitude of changes since 2011’s uprising that 

led to a revolution. But looking at Egypt in its current state, I 

think the message that a lot of us have here is our concern about 

democracy. 

And the recent Egyptian election indicator is that they weren’t 

free and fair. Minorities and opposing voices are being repressed 

and Egypt’s press and media are more and more restricted. 

Mr. Miller, you proposed retaining human rights conditions on 

our assistance. We’ve had those conditions now in place over the 

past several years. To what extent have they worked or what more 

can be done to ensure that they do? 

Mr. MILLER. Thank you, Congressman, and I think that they 

have, as I mentioned in my testimony, produced some results. We 

have seen that—we have seen that—there’s finally movement in 

the 2013 NGO trial in which 17 Americans, 43 defendants overall, 

were charged and sentenced to up to 5 years of jail. 

We’ve also seen, according to the Egyptians, that they forced the 

North Koreans to reduce the size of their presence within Cairo. In 

prior years, conditionality played an important role in getting the 

release of political prisoners—Aya Hijazi, Mohamed Soltan, other 

figures. It does produce results. 

Now, they may seem small bore, but I think there’s a reason for 

that. Part of the challenge is pressure only works if the other side 

believes that you’re going to stick by it—that you’re going to adhere 

to the conditions you laid out, and, unfortunately, over the past 40 

years, the U.S. has tended to capitulate after applying pressure on 

the Egyptians. 

And that’s part of why I think coupling the conditionality with 

a reduction in assistance overall to send a message that the $1.3 

billion isn’t sacrosanct, that is not simply enough to fulfil these 

48

conditions but we want a genuinely different approach, will translate into better results. 

There really hasn’t been a good test of conditionality partly because we haven’t stuck firm. If we stick firm in the future, I am 

fairly confident that we are going to get better results as well. 

Mr. DEUTCH. Thank you. 

Dr. Dunne, so other than reducing the amount of assistance, 

what’s the best way to message—the most effective way to message 

on human rights to the Sisi government and has the administration done it? What more can the administration do to send that 

very clear message? 

Ms. DUNNE. Thank you, Congressman. 

Well, two things—I would say what the current administration 

has done that I think is effective is establish some specific benchmarks. It seems to be that when they withheld the $195 million 

last summer, they established some specific benchmarks that they 

were looking for and that is I think the Obama administration 

didn’t do that as clearly. 

They withheld some assistance after the military coup but it 

wasn’t really clear and then they ended up releasing it without 

gaining anything. So that wasn’t very effective. 

What the Obama administration did that I think was, in a way, 

better though was the public messaging. I haven’t seen as much. 

I’ve seen a little bit. There started to be a little bit of public messaging from the Trump administration about concerns. 

There was a little bit about the concerns about how the elections 

were run and so forth. But particularly, I think, as we move forward into a situation in which President Sisi I think is going to be 

looking around to see is it all right with everyone if he stays in office indefinitely and so forth—is there going to be any reaction to 

that internationally. 

You know, there could be, I think, better public messaging and 

clearer and more consistent private messaging about these issues 

as well as conditions on aid—I mean, just discussing human rights 

and democracy issues. 

Mr. DEUTCH. So you talked about benchmarks being one way to 

effectively move the needle on this. But what should that public 

messaging look like and who should it be coming from? 

Ms. DUNNE. The public messaging that is most heard in Egypt, 

I think, is from either very senior members of the U.S. administration, such as the President and Cabinet members, or from Members of Congress. 

Whether they speak here or whether they speak when they visit 

Egypt and so forth, I mean, that’s the—it has to be a news maker, 

so to speak, in order to get across because I think it’s very important that not only the Egyptian government hears the message. 

Of course, Egyptian government figures can hear the message 

privately. But when it’s made public, that indicates, you know, to 

the Egyptian public and so forth that these issues are being—are 

being raised with their government and I think it’s important to 

get that across. 

Mr. DEUTCH. Great. Thank you. 

I yield back, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. DONOVAN [presiding]. The gentleman yields. 

49

The Chair recognizes himself, since I am the only one left up 

here. 

Let me just ask all of you one question and maybe everybody 

could contribute or give me their thoughts. It seems that in order 

to try to correct bad behavior in the area of human rights, we withhold military aid. 

The Egyptians probably, I suppose, say then we still have to protect our own nation—we’ll have to go elsewhere for that military 

aid. And where do they go? North Korea. 

So we tell them, you can’t go to North Korea or we are going to 

withhold more military aid. So it seems like we are squeezing a 

balloon a little bit, to me. 

So could you guys give me your opinion on how we could be more 

successful to get them to crackdown on the violations on human 

rights and at the same time not let them go to an area where 

they’re violating international laws and going somewhere else for 

the aid that they need to protect their own nation from their enemies? 

Mr. MILLER. Thank you, Congressman. I think that’s very much 

a legitimate concern and we have to be attentive to the second 

order effects of the policy positions that we take. 

I think it’s worth emphasizing, though, that the $1.3 billion 

Egypt receives is well in excess of what they actually need in order 

to combat their problems. 

As I said before, it’s really not an equipment problem. I spoke 

with many U.S. senior military officials and they told me that the 

Egyptians are obsessed with magic boxes. 

They think there’s a technological solution to everything that will 

deal with IEDs, that will deal with insurgents, when in actuality 

it’s a question of how they use the equipment. 

And, unfortunately, the Egyptians haven’t been receptive when 

the U.S. has offered training in counter terrorism doctrine and tactics. 

Regarding the assistance level where they’re going to go, what 

they want from North Korea, primarily, is missile parts and the 

reason they want that is because no one else will sell it to them. 

If they don’t get equipment from the United States, they’re as 

equally likely to go to France or the U.K. as they are to go to Russia or China. 

Now, there may be employment consequences for that and there’s 

a concern about whether we are appropriately subsidizing U.S. defense contractors. 

But in my—based on my personal experience, if we took the 

money we took away from Egypt and gave it to another country, 

they’re going to order a lot of the same stuff. So there actually isn’t 

going to be a net impact on how much money is going to subsidize 

the American arms industry. 

Mr. DONOVAN. Anyone else care to comment? 

Yes, Doctor. 

Mr. TADROS. I think the issue is often framed and discussed in 

terms of the money itself and the value of the money has, obviously, diminished over the years. 

50

The $1.3 billion, and it was even much more—$2 billion at the 

time that the peace treaty with Israel was signed—is, obviously not 

the same as what it buys today. 

But more important to Egypt is the spare parts that they need 

for the weapons that they have been buying for 30, 40 years from 

the United States, and also the very fact of a relationship with the 

United States. 

It matters to be an ally of the world’s superpower in terms of 

prestige in the region, in terms of many things for them, getting 

economic aid from the World Bank and the IMF. 

So I think the issue is not just the money there but there’s also 

a lot of things involved. In terms of actually impacting their policies, I think it depends on how life and death issue the policy is 

for them. 

The question of whether to—how to deal with the Muslim Brotherhood, for example, is viewed by the regime as a life and death 

issue. They did conduct a military coup. 

They removed these guys and put them to prison. You don’t conduct a coup and then go home and relax. You either rule or you’re 

jailed or die for it. So there are questions that, for them, no matter whether it’s $1.3 billion or $10 billion, he’s not going to put his life in danger for 

that amount of money. 

But there are many other issues where we can have a serious 

discussion with the Egyptian regime on things that don’t threaten 

the regime’s continuation—questions related to media, to bloggers. 

Dr. Dunne mentioned bloggers who are not even a threat to the 

regime or not part of any threat that there is for them. The question of the conditions of Christians in the country and many other 

issues that you can have an impact and leverage on because they 

are not life-threatening for them. 

Mr. DONOVAN. Dr. Dunne. 

Ms. DUNNE. In my experience, Congressman, I don’t see President Sisi as resorting to other countries like North Korea or even 

Russia because the United States has put pressure on him. 

The Egyptian-North Korean relationship goes very, very far 

back, and what I have seen is that President Sisi wants to diversify 

and sort of have all of the above—have all the relationships with 

all these different players as much as he can. 

Now, the only question, I think, in terms of the United States is 

that is that all right with us. So, obviously, it wasn’t all right with 

the United States for Egypt to have the kind of security relationship it has with the United States and also be buying weapons illicitly from North Korea. 

Another issue that arose recently was the Russian government 

asked for access to Egyptian air bases, you know, and so that’s a 

question—is that all right for the United States for—you know, I 

think that President Sisi will have as many—as many relationships as he can and it’s not a question of he’s taking one because 

he isn’t getting it from someone else. 

He just wants to diversify his relationships as much as possible 

and then we will have to decide if we are going to have a close security relationship—how much of that is okay with us and how 

much is not. 

51

Mr. DONOVAN. I thank you all for your comments. 

The Chair now recognizes Mr. Schneider. 

Mr. SCHNEIDER. Thank you and, again, thank you to the witnesses for joining us today. 

Normally, I try to go from the general to the specific but I think 

I am going to flip that on its head today and start with a specific 

and, if there’s time, talk more general. 

One of my particular concerns is the status of the LGBTQ community in Egypt. Last fall, as you may know, dozens of LGBTQ 

Egyptians and their allies were arrested and detained after a 

young Egyptian flew a rainbow flag at a concert in Cairo. 

And prior to that there have been other mass arrests dating back 

all the way to the Queen Boat incident more than 15 years ago. 

So, Dr. Dunne, I will start with you, but open the question to 

anyone. Essentially, three questions—any update on the situation 

for the LGBTQ community in Egypt and has the recent crackdown 

ended or is it still going. 

The second question would be are there ways that the broad 

international community can have an impact on the environment 

for the LGBTQ people within Egypt, and the third piece is I would 

love your thoughts on the U.S. Government’s response to these 

human rights abuses in Egypt. 

Ms. DUNNE. Thank you, Congressman. 

Yes. Sadly, I mean, this has been a long-running story in 

Egypt—you know, targeting, harassment of the LGBTQ community 

and it was—has been very much revived in the last couple of years 

and, unfortunately, it really has happened mostly under militarydominated governments and so—in Egypt specifically. 

What I have seen, Congressman, is that it—there are times, and 

it’s hard to explain why the government or actors—security actors 

within the government will decide to go after to target, to beat 

members of this community and to prosecute them, humiliate them 

publicly, and so forth. 

What I have seen is that will tend to—that kind of harassment 

will tend to abate when there is international attention and also 

when Egyptians themselves start speaking up, which happened in 

a case a couple of years go where Egyptians themselves started to 

object. 

But in the case that you mentioned with the people who were arrested at the concert, I believe that not all of them have been released yet—that some of them have been stuck in detention, because there wasn’t quite as much attention to that case from the 

U.S. administration as there had been to some previous cases. 

There was a bathhouse case, the Queen Boat case you mentioned 

from many years ago. So it’s really important to speak about these 

things publicly and for Egyptian officials to hear about them from 

Members of Congress as well as the administration. 

Mr. SCHNEIDER. Great. 

Mr. Tadros. Mr. Miller. 

Mr. TADROS. I think there’s the reality of the nature of society 

there. It’s a winning social issue for the government. 

When they engage in such practices they are intended to shore 

public support for the government so that the government is defending values of the Egyptian people and tie the community and 

52

the Western attention to it to Western attempts to weaken Egypt 

and conspire against it. 

So I think the regime periodically engages in such practices 

when it serves the intention of shoring up local support for its policies. 

Mr. SCHNEIDER. Mr. Miller. 

Mr. MILLER. I think this speaks to an important point. There’s 

an assumption that the secular ex-general must be more progressive or more socially tolerant than the former Islamist President, 

and the reality—President Sisi’s policies are often no better and, in 

some cases, worse than former President Morsi’s on social indicators. 

LGBTQ rights is one example—also, blasphemy cases. There 

have been an increase in blasphemy cases under President Sisi as 

compared to President Morsi, which has a disproportionate impact 

on Coptic Christians, for instance. 

While most of the cases involve Muslims, most of the defendants 

who go to prison are Christians. 

So in many respects, partly because Sisi is not labelled as an 

Islamist, he feels freer to cater to the conservative impulses in 

Egypt that Mr. Tadros mentioned. 

Mr. SCHNEIDER. Great. Thank you. 

And with the few seconds I have left, the big question, more general, more than half of Egypt’s population is under the age of 25—

actually, 24. 

The population is expected to grow to 130 million in the next decade. They’re trying to bring that number down. But demographics 

has to play into the economic impact and also broader human 

rights expectations of both these young people and it could be a 

challenge but it could also be an opportunity. 

So if I could have the indulgence of another minute I would love 

your thoughts on that as well. 

Ms. DUNNE. Yes, Congressman. This is the mega issue for Egypt 

is its rapidly growing and youthful population. Population growth 

in Egypt had been slowly declining but now it’s turned around and 

it’s been growing rapidly again. 

The labor force is growing rapidly and even with an economic 

growth statistic, a GDP growth right now of I think 5.4 percent, 

that sounds good. 

To us in the United States, that sounds excellent. But with the 

population growing with, you know, more than 2 million Egyptians 

joining the population every year, that doesn’t go very far. 

So, you know, there’s a crying need to address the population 

growth issue itself. Egypt has done some things but not nearly as 

much as some others, even others in the Middle East region have 

done about that. 

And then there’s a great need to generate jobs and that is another problem of the economic program of President Sisi. While he 

has instituted important austerity measures, there’s been much 

less in terms of facilitating private sector growth, the growth of 

small and medium enterprises that really could generate a lot of 

jobs. 

It remains an economy and even increasingly is an economy in 

which the playing field is heavily tilted toward the military in 

53

which the military has really been gobbling up a lot of the state 

contracts and so forth and therefore, you know, it’s a very worrisome issue. 

Just the last thing I would say is about water. Egypt is going to 

be, because of its population growth, facing a very serious water 

shortage within not too many years. 

Mr. SCHNEIDER. Great. 

Thank you. I am out of time. Thanks for the extra time. 

Mr. DONOVAN. Did you want to comment, sir? 

Mr. SCHNEIDER. Oh, thank you. 

Mr. TADROS. If I may. I think the demographic challenge is, obviously, there. The economic part of it is important. So is the educational part. 

Egyptian education does not prepare this new generation for the 

kind of jobs that the new world needs from them. I think there a 

need to look into U.S. efforts to support educational reform to 

Egypt both in terms of addressing radical ideas that exist in the 

textbooks and the kind of anti-tolerance messages that are there as 

well as looking at the educational system as a means to help the 

country address its problems. 

The water resource issue is very important as well. The conflict—

the growing conflict between Egypt and Ethiopia has the potential 

of becoming an actual war and I think it’s in the best interests of 

the United States to deal with this issue before it truly reaches an 

explosion point. 

Mr. DONOVAN. I thank you. 

The Chair now recognizes the ranking member. 

Mr. DEUTCH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Just before we wrap up, I wanted to ask a couple questions about 

the Egyptian military operations, particularly in Sinai. They have 

sustained significant losses. 

Can someone speak to the U.S. counterterrorism support for the 

Egyptian forces? Mr. Miller, can you speak to that? 

Mr. MILLER. I would be happy to, Congressman. 

There is ongoing support and it’s largely of two dimensions. One 

is intelligence support. We provide them with information on the 

location and identity of extremists who are operating in the Sinai 

and that helps them to intercept them. 

But the major problem, as I said before, was the training dimension. Egypt employs a conventional obsolete approach to asymmetric threats that isn’t appropriate to dealing with insurgents, 

that isn’t appropriate to dealing with terrorists, and repeatedly the 

United States, going back to the late Bush administration—the 

George W. Bush administration—has tried to have this conversation with the Egyptian military—the need to reform how they approach these threats, to focus on building allegiances with local 

populations, understanding that the intelligence they provide is the 

key to success and paying attention to how they’re impacted by 

what’s taking place. 

The impact has been tremendous. You have 3,000 additional 

homes destroyed during just this operation. You have over 3,000 

families who have been forcibly relocated. That’s not the way you 

win a counterinsurgency campaign. 

54

But I think that the U.S. Government would be happy and the 

military will be happy to provide additional training in those areas. 

Unfortunately, every time we’ve offered it the Egyptians normally 

say, well, you guys, you failed. 

You failed in Afghanistan. You failed in Iraq. You have no idea 

what you’re doing. Just give us the weapons and let us do the job 

our way. 

And while we understand their frustration and we understand 

that we are not perfect—we made mistakes—we wish they would 

make use of our mistakes and incorporate them into their approach, moving forward. 

But until they’re willing to accept that type of training, to have 

a dialogue on how they approach these threats, unfortunately, I 

don’t think they’re going to achieve sustainable success against 

these militants. 

Mr. DEUTCH. And so just to follow up, given the focus on military 

strikes as the response—the sole response—are there efforts to address the drivers of the extremism—of the ideology in Sinai? 

Mr. MILLER. We tried to have those conversations with Egyptian 

officials, and Mr. Tadros was talking about the need to have these 

conversations. 

In my experience, not just in the Obama administration but in 

the first months of the Trump administration, the Egyptians wanted to treat the relationship like a Chinese menu. They wanted to 

discuss what was important to them and they wanted to ignore 

what was important to us, and often that meant these types of 

issues. They ignore the connection between radicalization—between 

imprisonment, between torture, and radicalization and they say, 

we know how to deal with it. 

I remember being in a meeting with President Sisi where he 

said, there are two ways to deal with terrorists—you either lock 

them up or you kill them. 

Obviously, that leaves something to be desired, according to modern understandings of how you deal with terrorists and insurgents, 

and while that may be emotionally appealing at a certain level, it’s 

unlikely to be efficacious. 

It’s unlikely to produce those results, and that’s one of the reasons why I think we need to reset the relationship. Under the current construct, we are not able to have the conversations we need 

with the Egyptians because we are overwhelmingly focused on 

what equipment they want and what equipment they’re going to 

receive rather than having a genuine strategic discussion about our 

goals and their goals and how we can better work together. 

Mr. DEUTCH. Mr. Tadros or Dr. Dunne, do either of you have 

comments? 

Mr. TADROS. I think for—I mean, Egypt has been fighting the 

group in Sinai—the Islamic State affiliate—for 6 years now. 

All previous military campaigns—there have been large military 

campaigns—they have all failed. The Egyptian regime has announced numbers of about 3,000 or more that they’ve killed of 

these terrorists and arrested another 16,000 of terrorists in Sinai 

while all estimates of the actual number of fighters of the Islamic 

State ranges from 700 to 1,000. 

55

So they’re, obviously, not ending the threat there. They’re killing 

and arresting the wrong people and not ending the threat. The last 

military campaign that was started in February shows much more 

positive signs of success. 

For the first time, they focused on the communications of the Islamic State, which has both diminished the ability of them to carry 

coordinated attacks because they operate more as independent cells 

that coordinate then large attacks but each is focused on its own 

area of operation—as well as limited their ability to use media and 

to talk about their operations and build support. 

I think also a very important development is the fact that this 

operation comes after the major massacre of more than 300 peaceful Moslems praying in their mosque. The brutality of the Islamic 

State—the fact that they targeted normal Moslems—not the security forces, not the Christians, but just regular guys. 

I think this also helped build popular support in the Sinai for the 

military to finally deal with that situation. So while the potential 

for a return of major attacks by the Islamic State remains, I think 

we’ve seen more positive signs in the last couple of months. 

Ms. DUNNE. Just briefly, Congressman, I want to add that 

while—you know, we will see what the results of the most recent 

military campaign in the Sinai were, you know, perhaps there—we 

will see a diminution of the militancy in the Sinai. It’s really too 

early to say yet. 

But what really concerns me is what is going on inside of Egyptian prisons. When we see tens of thousands of people, almost all 

of them young people—the vast majority young men—and we hear 

about the kinds of conditions—the torture, the brutality, the solitary confinement, the lack of medical treatment, and that they’re 

often exposed in prison to militants from ISIS and other extremist 

groups who seem to have free rein to talk to people and recruit and 

so forth, it really makes me worried. 

I mean, that’s another reason to pay a lot of attention to the 

human rights problems in Egypt—first of all, from the point of 

view of principle but also out of concern that this is a radicalization 

factory—that it will be producing militants, you know, for many 

years to come, I fear. 

Mr. DONOVAN. The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from 

California, Mr. Rohrabacher. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Thank you very much. I apologize to—I 

missed most of hearing today. As usual, you’re scheduled for at 

least two or three really important things at exactly the same time. 

Any discussion of Egypt is an important thing. It is vital because 

if the Egyptian government would happen to come under the domination of a radical Islamist, the entire Middle East would be destabilized and there would be war. There would be war and millions 

of people killed. 

I remember, and I understand when we can look at—with a very, 

how do you say, principled look and say, this is the standard we 

have. Even if—and no matter what’s going on in a country they 

can’t do this. 

But I think that when we look at Egypt today, we better calculate what the danger is and not—I mean, I remember when the 

Shah of Iran was overthrown. I remember that, and I remember 

56

how we basically threw him under the bus, as they say, and what 

did we get for that? 

What did we get for demanding that the Shah restrained himself 

in the street demonstrations and these organizations efforts to get 

rid of him? 

Well, what we got was a brutal mullah dictatorship that even 

today, as we speak, is murdering its own people and trying to suppress those people’s aspirations. 

And let us note for the record I hope that if anything comes out 

of this hearing it’s that we support the people of Iran who are trying to overthrow the mullah dictatorship. 

And with that said, I would hope that if they manage to do that 

and they manage to set up an interim government that we don’t 

all of a sudden start having such a high standard that we are judging them by that another mullah regime can beat them down and 

take power. 

We saw it with Qaddafi. Qaddafi was a bad guy. Qaddafi made 

some deals with us and with the Russians to get rid of his nuclear 

weapons. He made a deal with us to make sure that the radical Islamic terrorism would not be used in Libya. 

And guess what? We decided to go with the pure Democrats and 

what do we have now? We have terrorists who were in control of 

about a third to a half of Libya and total chaos. 

Saddam Hussein—Saddam Hussein was a bad guy, and I don’t 

think it was—I certainly believe that we should have tried to help 

the people in Iraq at the time but we ended up sending U.S. soldiers down there. 

When the United States is trying to make up its mind what to 

do, we better do it rationally and we shouldn’t be doing it based 

on some—on an analysis that is not in firm ground of reality. 

So with that said, just what you just mentioned about President 

el-Sisi, who I think is one of the great champions of stability in 

that part of the world and without him I believe that there would 

be many more people dying. 

I believe that the—especially if as Morsi would have continued 

the direction he was going, just the same direction Erdogan is 

going today, I think that leads to death, instability, and it leads to 

far less freedom in the long run. 

Yes, someone who is a terrorist, yes, it doesn’t bother me that he 

wants to either string him up or whatever he wants to do with him. 

Quite frankly, it is a good thing when a terrorist is put out of commission, whichever way they figure out how to do that. 

Now, I realize that I’ve spoken too long now, but I should give 

you all a chance to refute everything I just said, which is fine—

which is part of the process here. 

But let me just say we better be darn realistic when we are dealing with these—with these challenges because if we end up with 

more people dying and more tyranny in the long run because we’ve 

held someone up to a standard that is not appropriate for that particular moment, shame on us. 

And by the way, I just—I will finish up with saying much of the 

criticism I’ve heard of el-Sisi and is regime has been just that. It’s 

been criticism based on a standard that should not be used at this 

moment. 

57

So with that said, go right ahead and—I know you have some 

disagreement with me so but go right ahead and do so. Whoever——

Ms. DUNNE. Thank you, Congressman Rohrabacher. 

You know, I have to say I really share your concerns that if 

Egypt would come under the domination of a radical Islamist regime or leader that it would destabilize the entire region. I agree 

with you entirely. 

My worry is that the degree of repression under President Sisi 

could be taking the country in exactly that direction—you know, 

that there is really—at this point there are not—the normal channels through which, you know, peaceful differences of opinion 

through formal politics, electoral competition in the Parliament, 

through a free media, through civil society organizations and so 

forth—frankly, things that Egypt had to a greater degree under 

President Mubarak in the past than they have now, you know, and 

even then Egyptians, you know, eventually revolted against Mubarak—that without these outlets, I really fear that there could be a 

breakout of violent radical, you know, opposition to President Sisi, 

particularly, you know, if he tries to remain in officer more or less 

indefinitely. 

So, you know, that is my concern. I don’t think anyone here is 

suggesting that the United States should do anything like intervene in Egypt or the way it did in Iraq or even participate in an 

intervention the way it did in Libya. 

But to somehow use what influence we have to try to persuade 

the Egyptian leadership to open up those channels for the peaceful 

expression of dissent and for peaceful political competition so that 

Egyptians can find their way forward without future destabilization and an increase in violence. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Thank you very much. 

Mr. DONOVAN. Seeing that there’s no other members seeking recognition, I thank the witnesses for sharing your expertise and your 

opinions with us. 

This committee stands adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 4:09 p.m., the committee was adjourned.] 

(59)

A P P E N D I X 

MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

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SUBCOMMITTEE HEARING NOTICE 

COMlVITTTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

WASHINGTON, DC 20515-6128 

Subcommittee ou the Middle East aud North Africa 

Ileana Ros-Lehtiueu (R-FL), Chairman 

July 17,2018 

TO: MEMBERS OF THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

You are respectfully requested to attend an OPEN hearing of the Committee on Foreign 

Affairs to be held by the Subcommittee on the Middle East and North Atiica in Room 2172 of the 

Rayburn House Office Building (and available live on the Committee website at 

http·/ /v.Iww. F orei gnAffai rs. house. gov). 

DATE: 

TIME: 

SUBJECT: 

WITNESSES: 

Tuesday, July 24, 2018 

2:00p.m. 

Egypt: Security, Human Rights, and Reform 

Mr. Samuel Tadros 

Senior Fellow 

Center for Religious Freedom 

The Hudson Institute 

Michele Dunne, Ph.D. 

Director and Senior Fellow 

Middle East Program 

Carnegie Endowment for International Peace 

Mr. Jared Genser 

Adjunct Professor of Law 

Georgetown University Law Center 

Mr. Andrew Miller 

Deputy Director for Policy 

Project on Middle East Democracy 

By Direction of the Chairman 
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COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

MINUTESOFSUBCOMMITTEEON ______ T_1w_M_id_d_le_E_·a_st_a_"_"N<_o,_1l_•A-'!f_r,_·c,_, _____ HEARING 

Day _ _:1::..:l.:..:le:::.s::.da::<yc___Da!e ___ .::_0.:..:7/..::'2_.::41c:1c:8 ___ Room, ___ _:2c:l:_72=----

Starting Time --"2"':"-4"-S"p"".m.,.~_Ending Time 4:09p.m. 

Recesses (_to __ ) (_to __ ) (_to __ ) ( __ to____) ( __ to __ ) (_to __ ) 

Presiding Membcr(s) 

Chainmm Ileana Ro.fi-Lehtinen, Rep. Donovan 

Check all of the following that apply: 

Open Session G'J Executive !rl!>sed) Session 0 

Televised [2] 

TITLE OF HEARING: 

Egypt: Security, Human Right.•; and Reform 

SUBCOMMITTEE MEMBERS PRESENT: 

Electronically Record!&{ taped) G'J 

Stenographic Record LL.I 

GOP- Rep. lssa, Kinzinger, Zeldin, Donovan, Wagner, Fitzpatrick, Curtis 

Dem- Rep. Deutch, Cicil/ine, Frankel, Boyle, Schneider, Lieu 

NON-SUBCOMMITTEE MEMBERS PRESENT: (Mark with an *if they are not members o}fiill committee) 

Rep. Hill, Rohrabaclter 

HEARING WITNESSES: Same as meeting notice attached? Yes Q No 0 

(1/ "no", please Ust belo-w and include title, agency, depar1ment, or organization.) 

STATEMENTS FOR THE RECORD: (List any statements submitted for the record) 

Rep. Ann Wugner Questions fin· the Record 

TIME SCHEDULED TO RECONVENE ___ _ 

or 

TIME ADJOURNED 4:09p.m. 
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Rep. Wagner's Questions for the Record 

For Middle East and North Africa Subcommittee Hearing 

"Egypt: Security, Human Rights, and Reform" 

Response from Mr. Samuel Tadros 

Question: Mr. Tadros, J'm glad you mentioned the violem persecution fixed by Coptic 

Christians. President Sisi ·s "reconciliation sessions" are a meaningless response to mob 

attacks 011 the Coptic community. Minority groups will not be safe until the government 

pr<J\'es that it ll'ill not tolerate majoritarian l'iolence. How can Congress hold the Fgyptian 

govemmem accountableforfailing to protect its minority communities? 

Response: The Ee,>yptian government's record on addressing rampant discrimination against 

Copts and protecting the Christian community from attacks has been dismal. The Egyptian 

government has engaged in various discriminatory policies against Christians in tive areas· 

Firstly, laws on building churches are highly restrictive, making the building of churches in 

Egypt a nearly impossible task. In the past six years. only twelve church building permits have 

been granted by the various presidents ruling Egypt. After repeated promises of a solving the 

problem. a church building law was passed last year which poses significant limitations on the 

building of churches. The Churches supported the law hoping that the provision allowing the 

recognition of existing churches would be implemented. Despite government promises. security 

forces have continued to close existing places of worship to stop them from being registered. 

Secondly, Christians have been systematically excluded from important government positions. 

The current Egyptian government has only one Christian minister out of thirty-four ministers. 

Not a single Christian serves in the position of governor or university president. Christian 

representation in the military. police. judiciary. and foreign service are around 1% while not a 

single Christian is allowed in the state security service or intelligence services. 

Thirdly. Coptic history, heritage. and culture are excluded from the country's schoolbooks and 

official government media. Egyptian schoolbooks ignore the Coptic period tram Egyptian 

history. Moreover. negative portrayals of Christianity remain widespread in the Egyptian 

curriculum. 

Fourthly. the Ee,>yptian government continues to uphold discriminatory laws such as blasphemy 

laws that have been used to mainly target Copts and other religious minorities, inheritance laws, 

which force Copts to divide inheritance according to Islamic Sharia, and legal punishments for 

converts to Christianity. 

Lastly. the government has failed to stop attacks on Copts and has repeatedly retused to punish 

attackers. Attacks on Copts result in government-initiated reconciliation sessions which result in 

the perpetrators not facing any legal action creating a culture of impunity and encouragement 

that has led to a dramatic increase in the number of attacks on Copts in the past decade. 

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Necessary steps: 

1. Encourage Egypt to address the problem of building churches. The Egyptian Churches 

reluctantly supported the current law passed in December 2017 because of the provision 

allowing the recognition of existing churches within one year, despite the heavy 

restrictions on building new ones. The Churches hoped that once existing churches were 

recognized, they could challenge the law's constitutionality in the Supreme Court. Their 

hopes have been dashed. Security forces routinely close existing churches in order to stop 

them from being recognized. Congress should raise restrictions on building churches with 

Egypt's President urging him to pass a new law allowing church building and treating 

places of worship belonging to all religions equally. Congress should specifically 

mention security forces' practice of closing churches especially in the province of Minya, 

where numerous churches were closed in the past year. 

2. Encourage Egypt to offer protection for Copts from attacks in Egypt's villages and small 

towns. While terrorist attacks are harder to foil, security forces are regularly informed by 

Copts themselves of mob attacks before they take place in villages in Egypt's southern 

provinces. Security services should not arrive only after an attack takes place, but should 

instead attempt to prevent it. 

3. Highlight the problem of reconciliation sessions that deny Copts attacked any form of 

justice. Egypt should enforce the basic rule of law by arresting and prosecuting attackers 

instead of resorting to reconciliation sessions that deny justice and let attackers walk free. 

In over 500 attacks on Copts in the past three decades not a single case has been brought 

to court. Congress should highlight that these reconciliation sessions not only create a 

culture of impunity, but also encourage further attacks as these sessions often agree to 

attackers' demands. 

4. Encourage Egypt to address discriminatory laws against religious minorities. Congress 

should ask Egypt's President why non-Muslims are forced to divide their inheritance 

according to Islamic law giving males double what female receive. Blasphemy laws 

should also be addressed especially that they are exclusively used against religious 

minorities. Recent victims of such accusations include underage children that have been 

forced to seek asylum in Switzerland. 

5. Encourage Egypt to enforce a merit-based system in government appointments that does 

not discriminate against Copts. President Sisi needs to take some bold steps in addressing 

government discrimination. 

6. Ask Egypt to address the problem of intolerance and incitement in its educational system 

and especially in the AI Azhar curriculum. Egypt needs to reform its educational system 

and offer curriculum that promote equality and educate students on the important 

contributions that all Egyptian regardless of their religions have made to the country. 

7. Congress should ask USAID and other agencies to include religious discrimination in its 

criteria for projects in Egypt. A system that creates local incentives for governates by 

which governates that attempt to protect the Coptic population and reject reconciliation 

sessions should be rewarded, while other governates where the local authorities show no 

interest in addressing the issue should not be receiving the latest aid project from the 

United States. 

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In general it would be real! y beneficial for members of Congress in their conversations with 

Egyptian authorities to mention the important contributions that Copts make in America. Coptic 

Americans are a vibrant community that includes distinguished people in all fields from Dina 

Powell previously of the NSC to Rami Malek, the Emmy best actor. Congress should highlight 

its concern not in religious freedom tenns but as a challenge for Egypt which is losing some of 

its best talents that could contribute to its advancement. 

Response from Michele Dunne, Ph.D. 

Question: in some ways, the U.S.-t:gypt relationship parallels the U.S.-l'akistan 

relationship-we rely on the partnership, but struggle to control our counterpart's 

behavior. The Administration has withheld aid from both countries in response to their 

ji1ifure to cooperate with the United States. Dr. Dunne, should Congress seek to codijj; 

explicit conditions on U.S. aid to }..gypf? 

Response: While it is ditlicult for Congress to control remotely a bilateral relationship managed 

by the executive branch, the Congress has acted wisely in writing explicit human rights 

conditions into legislation providing funds for aid to Egypt. Such conditions compel the 

administration to incorporate the values of human rights and democracy-which administrations 

often disregard--into foreign policy and assistance decisions, and to consider the reputational and 

practical costs to the United States when it blindly supports governments that are major rights 

abusers. In the case of Ee,>ypt, as human rights abuses have soared since the 2013 military coup, 

Congress has gradually increased the percentage of assistance subject to such conditions, and has 

recently demanded that the administration make public its reports to Congress on these issues. In 

addition to the possibility of diminishing the aid itself, the remaining piece of leverage Congress 

has is to eliminate the waiver for national security reasons. The Trump administration recently 

suspended some military assistance to Egypt based on three conditions (two of them related to 

rights), but then restored all of the assistance without the conditions being met. If the 

administration is not able to show results from its approach within a few months, Congress 

should consider removing the national security waiver in legislation for FY20 assistance. 

Question to Mr. Jared Genser 

Question: Protecting lnonan rights is one of my most important duties as a member of 

Congress. Last week, the House overwhelmingly passed my bill, the £fie Wiesel Genocide 

and Atrocities Prevention Act, to jumps/art reforms in preventing mass atrocities. Mr. 

Genser, how should the United States re;pond to reports that }.,'g).ptianforces stationed in the 

Sinai Peninsula have committed human rights abuses against civilians? 

[Note: No response was received to the above question prior to printing.] 

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