IN THE 

TENTH COURT OF APPEALS 

No. 10-13-00049-CR 

DAVID DUANE GREER, 

 Appellant 

 v. 

THE STATE OF TEXAS, 

 Appellee 

From the 272nd District Court 

Brazos County, Texas 

Trial Court No. 12-03324-CRF-272 

O P I N I O N 

David Greer appeals his conviction for unlawful possession of a firearm by a

felon.  TEX. PEN. CODE ANN. § 46.04 (West 2011).  Greer complains that the evidence was

insufficient, that the trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress because of an

invalid traffic stop and an improper inventory search, that Greer received ineffective

assistance of counsel by failing to seek a timely hearing on the motion to suppress

evidence, and the trial court abused its discretion in the admission of evidence.  Because

we find no reversible error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
Greer v. State Page 2

Sufficiency of the Evidence

In his first issue, Greer complains that the evidence was insufficient for the jury

to have found beyond a reasonable doubt that he intentionally or knowingly possessed

a firearm that was discovered in the pocket of a jacket in the vehicle he was driving

when he was stopped and arrested by law enforcement.  The Court of Criminal Appeals

has expressed our standard of review of a sufficiency issue as follows:

In determining whether the evidence is legally sufficient to support a

conviction, a reviewing court must consider all of the evidence in the light

most favorable to the verdict and determine whether, based on that

evidence and reasonable inferences therefrom, a rational fact finder could

have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.  

Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 318‐19 (1979); Hooper v. State, 214 S.W.3d 9,

13 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007).  This “familiar standard gives full play to the

responsibility of the trier of fact fairly to resolve conflicts in the testimony,

to weigh the evidence, and to draw reasonable inferences from basic facts

to ultimate facts.”    Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319.    “Each fact need not point

directly and independently to the guilt of the appellant, as long as the

cumulative force of all the incriminating circumstances is sufficient to

support the conviction.”  Hooper, 214 S.W.3d at 13.

Lucio v. State, 351 S.W.3d 878, 894 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011).

The Court of Criminal Appeals has also explained that our review of “all of the

evidence” includes evidence that was properly and improperly admitted.    Conner v.

State, 67 S.W.3d 192, 197 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001).  And if the record supports conflicting

inferences, we must presume that the factfinder resolved the conflicts in favor of the

prosecution and therefore defer to that determination.   Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. at

326.   Further, direct and circumstantial evidence are treated equally:   “Circumstantial
Greer v. State Page 3

evidence is as probative as direct evidence in establishing the guilt of an actor, and

circumstantial evidence alone can be sufficient to establish guilt.”  Hooper v. State, 214

S.W.3d at 13.   Finally, it is well established that the factfinder is entitled to judge the

credibility of witnesses and can choose to believe all, some, or none of the testimony

presented by the parties.  Chambers v. State, 805 S.W.2d 459, 461 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991).

Unlawful Possession of a Firearm   

The State was required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Greer, a felon,

was in unlawful possession of a firearm.    See TEX. PEN. CODE ANN. § 46.04(a) (West

2011).  Greer does not dispute that he is a felon, but argues that there was insufficient

evidence to link him to the firearm.  We analyze the sufficiency of the evidence under

the same rules adopted for determining the sufficiency of the evidence in drug

possession cases.  Bates v. State, 155 S.W.3d 212, 216 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2004, no pet.).  

The State must prove Greer (1) exercised care, custody, control, or management over the

firearm; (2) was conscious of his connection with it; and (3) possessed the firearm

knowingly or intentionally.  See TEX. PEN. CODE ANN. § 1.07(a)(39) (West 2011); see Bates,

155 S.W.3d at 216.  The State does not have to prove that Greer had exclusive possession

of the firearm; joint possession is sufficient to sustain a conviction.   Cude v. State, 716

S.W.2d 46, 47 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986); Bollinger v. State, 224 S.W.3d 768, 774 (Tex. App.—

Eastland 2007, pet. refʹd).    Further, the State can meet its burden with direct or

circumstantial evidence, but it must establish that Greerʹs connection with the firearm
Greer v. State Page 4

was more than fortuitous.  Brown v. State, 911 S.W.2d 744, 747 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995);

Bollinger, 224 S.W.3d at 774.

Because the firearm was not found on Greerʹs person or in his exclusive

possession, additional facts must affirmatively link Greer to the firearm.  Bollinger, 224

S.W.3d at 774; Jones v. State, 963 S.W.2d 826, 830 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 1998, pet. refʹd).  

Factors that may establish affirmative links include the following:  whether the firearm

was in a car driven by the accused, whether the firearm was in a place owned by the

accused, whether the firearm was conveniently accessible to the accused, whether the

firearm was found in an enclosed space, and whether the accused made any affirmative

statement connecting him to the firearm.  Bollinger, 224 S.W.3d at 774; Corpus v. State, 30

S.W.3d 35, 38 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2000, pet. refʹd).  No set formula of facts

exists to dictate a finding of affirmative links sufficient to support an inference of

knowing possession.   Bollinger, 224 S.W.3d at 774; Taylor v. State, 106 S.W.3d 827, 830

(Tex. App.—Dallas 2003, no pet.).   

Arrest warrants had been issued for Greer and Campbell, who were in a dating

relationship with each other.   Multiple law enforcement officers had set out to locate

Greer and Campbell in order to execute the warrants.  When law enforcement located

Greerʹs truck, a traffic stop was initiated.  The truck driven by Greer was owned by his

father.    After about a block of being pursued, Greer was forced to stop when a law
Greer v. State Page 5

enforcement vehicle pulled in front of him.  Greer and Campbell got out of the vehicle

and were arrested for the warrants.   

After the arrest of Greer and Campbell, the truck was impounded and an

inventory search of the vehicle was made.  The truck was an extended cab with a small

area behind the front seats.  A large black leather jacket was found in the area behind

the front seats on top of other assorted clothing.   A duffle bag filled with Campbellʹs

clothing was also found in the same area.  When the black leather jacket was lifted, the

officer conducting the inventory noticed that one pocket was substantially heavier than

the other.  A loaded small .22 revolver was found in the pocket of the jacket.

When questioned about the jacket at the scene, Greer denied ownership of it.  It

was noted by law enforcement that when Greer got out of the truck, he was wearing

only a tank top and camouflage pants.  Campbell was wearing a jacket.  The weather

was cool.  Campbell identified the black leather jacket as belonging to Greer and denied

knowledge and ownership of the gun.  Campbell asked the officer if Greer was ʺgoing

to get in trouble for a long time.ʺ    Campbell stated that she knew that Greer was a

convicted felon and that it would be bad if he were caught with a gun.  Campbell also

told the officer who transported her to jail that she had no idea that there was a gun in

the car.  At trial, Campbell identified the jacket as belonging to Greer, having been a gift

from his mother.
Greer v. State Page 6

At trial, Campbell, a convicted felon, claimed that the gun was hers and that she

had wrapped it in clothes and stuffed it into the duffle bag.  However, the gun had not

been found wrapped in clothes nor was it found in the duffle bag.    Campbell also

erroneously claimed that the black jacket was in the duffle bag and that Greer was

wearing a camouflage jacket when they were arrested.     

Inside the duffle bag, officers found a .22 long rifle bullet in the pocket of a pair

of jeans belonging to Campbell.  However, it was determined that the bullet would not

fire in the .22 revolver found in the jacket pocket because it was too long.  The bullet

was returned to Campbell without testing or further investigation because officers felt

that the bullet was not related to the .22 revolver and was not evidence of another

crime.

Using the appropriate standards and giving due deference to the jury as the

factfinder, we find that the evidence was sufficient for the jury to have found that Greer

was in possession of the firearm.  The gun was found in a jacket that belonged to Greer

and Campbellʹs statements at the scene indicated that the firearm belonged to Greer.  

Additionally, the inconsistencies in Campbellʹs testimony at trial regarding how the

firearm was stored and located could have led a reasonable juror to find that Campbell

did not possess the firearm and that there were adequate links connecting Greer to the

firearm.  We overrule issue one.
Greer v. State Page 7

Motion to Suppress—Unlawful Traffic Stop

In his second issue, Greer complains that the trial court abused its discretion by

denying his motion to suppress because the initial traffic stop of Greer was improper.  

Greer complains that law enforcement stopped the vehicle Greer was driving based

solely on a tip by a confidential informant that was not corroborated by law

enforcement prior to the stop.  However, the traffic stop of Greer was initiated because

law enforcement was seeking to execute arrest warrants for Greer and Campbell, and

law enforcement visually determined that Greer was the driver of the vehicle prior to

initiating the stop.   

Greerʹs complaint is based on the concept that the traffic stop was warrantless,

but it was not warrantless.  The State offered the arrest warrants into evidence at the

beginning of the motion to suppress which was conducted during the trial.    In a

suppression hearing, the defendant bears the initial burden of rebutting the

presumption that the police encounter was proper.  Russel v. State, 717 S.W.2d 7, 9 (Tex.

Crim. App. 1986).  This is done by showing that the search or seizure occurred without

a warrant.  Id.  After the defendant makes this showing, the burden then would to the

State to either produce a warrant or prove that the warrantless search or seizure was

reasonable.    Id. at 9‐10.    Greer did not meet his initial burden by showing that his

detention occurred without a warrant.
Greer v. State Page 8

An outstanding arrest warrant may be executed by law enforcement officers at

whatever time and place they choose.    Swanson v. State, 722 S.W.2d 158, 162 (Tex.

App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1986, pet. refʹd); Shannon v. State, 681 S.W.2d 142, 145 (Tex.

App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1984, pet. refʹd).  Greer does not challenge the validity of

the warrant.    Therefore, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying his

motion to suppress because of an improper traffic stop.  We overrule issue two.

Motion to Suppress—Improper Vehicle Search  

In his third issue, Greer complains that the trial court erred by admitting

evidence of the gun found in the vehicle driven by Greer because the search which led

to the discovery of the gun was unreasonable.    Greer argues that law enforcement

should have called his father, who was the registered owner of the vehicle, to come and

pick it up rather than impounding the vehicle.  The State argues that impoundment was

proper because the only occupants of the vehicle, Greer and Campbell, were both

arrested and there was no one at the scene to take possession of the vehicle.  Greer also

argues that law enforcementʹs search of the vehicle was not a proper inventory search

because it was not performed according to the departmentʹs policy for inventory

searches.

A peace officerʹs inventory of the contents of an automobile is permissible under

both the Texas Constitution and the United States Constitution if conducted pursuant to

a lawful impoundment.  South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 375‐76, 96 S. Ct. 3092,
Greer v. State Page 9

3100, 49 L. Ed. 2d 1000 (1976); Benavides v. State, 600 S.W.2d 809, 810 (Tex. Crim. App.

1980); Lagaite v. State, 995 S.W.2d 860, 865 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1999, pet.

refʹd).  Inventories serve to protect (1) the ownerʹs property while it is in custody, (2) the

police against claims or disputes over lost or stolen property, and (3) the police from

potential danger.    Opperman, 428 U.S. at 369, 96 S. Ct. at 3097.    Inventories must be

conducted in good faith pursuant to reasonable standardized police procedures.  

Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367, 374, 107 S. Ct. 738, 742, 93 L. Ed. 2d 739 (1987).

Reasonable cause for impoundment of an automobile may exist when the driver

is removed from his automobile, placed under custodial arrest, and his property cannot

be protected by any means other than impoundment.  Lagaite, 995 S.W.2d at 865.  We

note that peace officers need not independently investigate possible alternatives to

impoundment absent some objectively demonstrable evidence that alternatives did, in

fact, exist.  Mayberry v. State, 830 S.W.2d 176, 180 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1992, pet. refʹd).

In this case, both occupants of the vehicle were arrested and there is nothing in

the record to indicate that any reasonable alternatives to impoundment existed.   The

truck driven by Greer was stopped on the roadside and Greer was being arrested for a

felony offense.  The impoundment of Greerʹs truck was not unreasonable.  Because the

impoundment of the truck was not unreasonable, it was not unreasonable for law

enforcement to conduct an inventory search of the vehicle.   
Greer v. State Page 10

However, Greer further argues that the inventory search was not conducted

according to the written policy for inventory searches, and therefore, the search was

merely a pretext to search for incriminating evidence of other crimes.    The Brazos

County Sheriffʹs office inventory policy was admitted into evidence which requires that

ʺ[a]ll items of value shall be recorded on the Vehicle Inventory Report.ʺ  The policy also

requires an officer to seize any property discovered during the inventory search that is

contraband or evidence of another criminal offense and process it accordingly.

Greer argues that because the officer who conducted the inventory did not list

the gun, did not adequately specify the items of clothing that were located inside the

truck, or list the .22 long rifle bullet that was found, the inventory was not conducted

according to the written policy.   The inventory did list various items specifically that

were found in the bed of the truck as well as inside the passenger compartment.  The

inventory merely listed assorted clothing, but did not list specific items of clothing

individually.  The bullet and gun were not included on the inventory list at all.

The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals has long held that, to be constitutional, an

inventory search must not deviate from police department policy and that the State may

satisfy its burden by showing (1) an inventory policy existed and (2) the policy was

followed.  Moberg v. State, 810 S.W.2d 190, 195 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991); Evers v. State, 576

S.W.2d 46, 50 n.5 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978).  The State established that an inventory policy

existed and there was testimony that the policy was followed.  The inventory form was
Greer v. State Page 11

admitted into evidence that showed the listing of items in Greerʹs truck.   We do not

believe that the omission of the gun or the bullet from the inventory listing is sufficient

to establish that the trial court abused its discretion in determining that the inventory

policy was followed.   

The value of the single bullet was inconsequential and, alone not evidence of a

crime or contraband.  While the gun should have been listed in the inventory, there is

no evidence that it was not, in fact, found in the pocket of the jacket found in the truck.  

We find that the testimony of the officers that they followed the written policy is

sufficient for the trial court to have found that the inventory search was properly

conducted.  We overrule issue three.

Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

Greer complains in his fourth issue that, in the event that this Court determines

that the suppression issues were not properly preserved, he received ineffective

assistance of counsel because those issues were not properly preserved.  We have not

found that the suppression issues were not properly preserved; therefore, issue four is

overruled.

Improper Admission of Evidence

Greer complains in his fifth issue that the trial court abused its discretion by

allowing the admission of a statement he allegedly made while in jail awaiting trial on

this offense.  According to a jailer who testified, Greer made a statement to the effect
Greer v. State Page 12

that he was in jail for not following the rules when he was told by the jailer that he

needed to follow the rules in jail.    Greer objected to this statement on the basis of

relevance and rule 403 of the rules of evidence.

In his argument, Greer does not explain how the statement is not relevant or how

it did not have ʺany tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to

the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without

the evidence.ʺ  TEX. R. EVID. 401.  The statement that he was in jail because he did not

follow the rules could reasonably lead to an inference that he knew and chose not to

follow the  ʺruleʺ that he was not allowed to be in possession of a firearm because he

was a felon.   We find that the statement was relevant to whether or not he was the

individual who was in possession of the firearm.

Greer further argues that the statement should have been excluded because its

prejudicial effect substantially outweighs any probative value the statement may have

had.  See TEX. R. EVID. 403.  Evidence may be excluded under rule 403 if the danger of

unfair prejudice substantially outweighs the probative value of the evidence.   TEX. R.

EVID. 403.   Rule 403 favors admission of relevant evidence and carries a presumption

that relevant evidence will be more probative than prejudicial.  Allen v. State, 108 S.W.3d

281, 284 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003); Jones v. State, 944 S.W.2d 642, 652‐53 (Tex. Crim. App.

1996).  The trial court has broad discretion in conducting a rule 403 balancing test, and

we will not lightly disturb its decision.  Allen, 108 S.W.3d at 284.
Greer v. State Page 13

A proper rule 403 analysis by either the trial court or a reviewing court includes

balancing the following factors:  (1) the inherent probative force of the proffered item of

evidence—that is, how strongly it serves to make more or less probable the existence of

a fact of consequence to the litigation—along with (2) the proponentʹs need for that

evidence against (3) any tendency of the evidence to suggest a decision on an improper

basis, (4) any tendency of the evidence to confuse or distract the jury from the main

issues, (5) any tendency of the evidence to be given undue weight by a jury that has not

been equipped to evaluate the probative force of the evidence, and (6) the likelihood

that presentation of the evidence will consume an inordinate amount of time or merely

repeat evidence already admitted.   Gigliobianco v. State, 210 S.W.3d 637, 641‐642 (Tex.

Crim. App. 2006); Erazo v. State, 144 S.W.3d 487, 489 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004).

The Stateʹs need for the evidence was to assist in establishing that Greer was the

individual that possessed the firearm, and that he intentionally or knowingly did so.  

We do not believe that the statement would improperly influence the jury in any way.  

The testimony surrounding the statement was very narrowly limited, constituted a very

brief section of the record, and was not repetitive.  Using the above standards, we do

not find that the admission of the statement constituted an abuse of discretion by the

trial court.  We overrule issue five.
Greer v. State Page 14

Conclusion

Having found no reversible error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

       TOM GRAY

Chief Justice

Before Chief Justice Gray,

Justice Davis, and

Justice Scoggins

Affirmed

Opinion delivered and filed March 20, 2014

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