[PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

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No. 15-14646

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D.C. Docket No. 2:14-cv-14316-RLR

SHAUN FOUDY, 

TONI FOUDY, 

 Plaintiffs - Appellants,

versus

INDIAN RIVER COUNTY SHERIFF'S OFFICE, 

SHERIFF DERYL LOAR, 

in his official capacity as the Sheriff of the 

Indian River County Sheriff's Office and in 

his individual capacity, 

DAVID BAILEY, 

individually, 

ERIC CARLSON, 

individually, 

JOHN FINNEGAN, 

individually, et al.,

 Defendants - Appellees,

GREG LONG,

individually, et al.,

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 Defendants. 

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No. 15-14659

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D.C. Docket No. 2:14-cv-14318-RLR

SHAUN FOUDY, TONI FOUDY, 

 Plaintiffs - Appellants,

versus

CITY OF PORT ST. LUCIE, 

RICHARD S. GIACCONE, 

STEVE CAMARA, 

MICHAEL RYAN CONNOR, 

MEYER GHOBRIAL, et al.,

 Defendants - Appellees. 

________________________

No. 15-15015

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D.C. Docket No. 2:14-cv-14324-RLR

SHAUN FOUDY,

 Plaintiff,

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TONI FOUDY, 

 Plaintiff - Appellant,

versus

CITY OF FORT PIERCE, 

POLICEMAN JASON BRAUN, 

JANE AND JOHN DOES (1-10), 

 Defendants - Appellees. 

________________________

Appeals from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Florida

________________________

(January 9, 2017)

Before MARCUS and BLACK, Circuit Judges, and COHEN,

* District Judge.

BLACK, Circuit Judge:

In this consolidated appeal, Toni and Shaun Foudy challenge the district 

court’s dismissals on statute of limitations grounds of their lawsuits against the 

Indian River County Sheriff’s Office, the City of Port St. Lucie, the City of Fort 

Pierce, and numerous related individuals brought under the Driver’s Privacy 

Protection Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2721–2725 (the DPPA), and 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The 

Foudys assert the district court erred when it (1) applied an occurrence rule of 

 * Honorable Mark Howard Cohen, United States District Judge for the Northern District 

of Georgia, sitting by designation.

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accrual to their § 1983 claims, (2) refused to apply equitable tolling to their DPPA 

claims, and (3) refused to relate their amended complaints back to their initial 

complaint filed on December 31, 2012. After review and with the benefit of oral 

argument, we affirm.

I. BACKGROUND

The Florida Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles (DHSMV) 

maintains a Driver and Vehicle Information Database (DAVID). DAVID contains 

Florida drivers’ personal information including photographs, social security 

numbers, prior and current mailing addresses, and other similar data. See Foudy v. 

Miami-Dade Cty., 823 F.3d 590, 591 (11th Cir. 2016). Toni and Shaun Foudy

allegedly supplied their personal information to DHSMV, which was thereafter 

entered into DAVID. The Foudys claim the Appellees, consisting of law 

enforcement agencies, their employees, and other officials throughout the state of 

Florida, repeatedly accessed the Foudys’ private information through the DAVID 

database without their knowledge or consent, motivated at once by distaste for 

women in law enforcement (Toni Foudy is a police officer), attraction to Toni 

Foudy’s physical beauty, and “morbid curiosity.” The Foudys learned of the 

alleged accesses, which took place between July 2005 and June 2011, when they 

sought an audit of all accesses of their DAVID information in April 2011.

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On December 31, 2012, the Foudys filed suit in the Southern District of

Florida against the St. Lucie County Sheriff’s Office, the Indian River County 

Sheriff’s Office, and various unnamed entities, individuals, DHSMV employees, 

and Florida law enforcement personnel. The Cities of Port St. Lucie and Fort 

Pierce and their respective employees were added in an amended complaint on 

March 7, 2014. The Foudys charged all defendants with violating the DPPA. See 

18 U.S.C. § 2724 (“A person who knowingly obtains, discloses or uses personal 

information, from a motor vehicle record, for a purpose not permitted under this 

chapter shall be liable to the individual to whom the information pertains, who may 

bring a civil action in a United States district court.”). The Foudys brought their 

claims directly under the DPPA as well as under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in conjunction 

with the DPPA. On August 1, 2014, Judge Martinez, concerned the complaint 

constituted a mere “shotgun pleading,” entered an order severing the Foudys’ 

claims against the separate defendants. It was not readily apparent, the court 

observed, how the various claims constituted the same transaction. See FED. R.

CIV. P. 20(a)(2)(A). The order dismissed all defendants except the first named 

defendant and granted the Foudys two weeks to refile separate actions against the 

dismissed parties. It specifically provided the newly-severed actions, when refiled, 

would be considered continuations of the prior action for statute of limitations 

purposes. The Foudys refiled thirteen separate actions within the allotted time.

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Three of those suits form the basis of this consolidated appeal. Each 

complaint was filed August 15, 2014: one against the City of Port St. Lucie and 

certain related individuals (the Port St. Lucie Case); one against the Indian River 

County Sheriff’s Office and related individuals (the Indian River Case); and one 

against the City of Fort Pierce and related individuals (the Fort Pierce Case). On 

January 16, 2015, Judge Rosenberg, presiding over the refiled cases, entered three 

identical paperless orders dismissing the Foudys’ complaints in each case. The 

orders asserted the Foudys did not clearly demonstrate their claims against the 

various defendants arose out the same transaction, and adopted the reasoning of 

Judge Martinez’s August 2014 dismissal. They stated Judge Martinez’s order had 

“required Plaintiffs to show, if Plaintiffs proceeded against multiple defendants, 

how the conduct of the Defendants constituted the same transaction for the 

purposes of joinder.” The Foudys not having done so, the court dismissed each 

case without prejudice, but did not provide for tolling of the statute of limitations 

as Judge Martinez’s order had done. The Foudys were given fifteen days to refile 

separate actions against appropriate defendants and expressly state in any 

complaint naming multiple defendants how such parties’ conduct constituted the 

same transaction for the purposes of joinder. By the morning of February 2, 2015,

the Foudys had not refiled. The district court entered paperless orders closing each 

case, stating the Foudys could reopen the cases only by filing a motion explaining 

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their failure to comply with court orders and an amended complaint meeting the 

requirements of the January 16 order. Later that same day, the Foudys filed 

motions to reopen in each case, attaching their amended complaints. The Foudys 

provided no explanation as to how the claims against the defendants arose out of 

the same transaction. The next day, the district court denied each of the motions, 

noting the Foudys had failed to explain how joinder was permissible, as the court 

had ordered them to do. It gave the Foudys the opportunity to refile a motion 

responsive to the court’s joinder concerns. On February 18, 2015, the Foudys did 

so, and the court reopened the Indian River Case on June 3, 2015, the Port St. 

Lucie Case on June 11, 2015, and the Fort Pierce Case on June 19, 2015.

In each suit, the defendants moved to dismiss, asserting the Foudys’ claims 

were barred by the statute of limitations. The court issued two sets of nearly 

identical orders1 on July 27 and 28, 2015 and September 9, 2015, which together 

held the occurrence rule applied to the Foudys’ DPPA and § 1983 claims; thus, the 

statute of limitations began to run on the date the alleged violations occurred and 

not when they were discovered. The district court determined the effective dates 

of the refiled complaints were March 5, 2015 with respect to the St. Lucie Case, 

 1 In each of the three consolidated cases, each of the district courts orders are materially 

identical, down to the language used in the orders. Unless otherwise stated, then, references to 

reasoning or action of the district court pertain to all three consolidated cases. Initially, the 

district court found the § 1983 claims to be governed by a discovery rule and thus not necessarily 

time-barred, but revised its reasoning and conclusion in the September 9 orders. 

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June 23, 2015 with respect to the Indian River Case, and March 12, 2015 with 

respect to the Fort Pierce Case.2

 In each instance, the Foudys had alleged no 

violations less than four years prior to such dates. Accordingly, all of the Foudys’ 

claims were time-barred, and the district court entered judgment in favor of the 

defendants and closed the cases. 

On appeal, the Foudys initially argued the district court erred when it applied

the occurrence rule to both the DPPA claims and the § 1983 claims. After the 

parties had submitted their briefs, however, a panel of this Court held the 

occurrence rule applies to DPPA claims in the separate case of Foudy v. MiamiDade County. See Foudy, 823 F.3d at 593. In their supplemental brief, the Foudys 

concede that case has become the law of this Circuit. See Smith v. GTE Corp., 236 

F.3d 1292, 1300 n.8 (11th Cir. 2001) (“[T]he holding of the first panel to address 

an issue is the law of this Circuit . . . .”). That issue is now foreclosed, and we 

need address only the remaining matters in this consolidated appeal.

II. STANDARDS OF REVIEW

We review a district court’s interpretation and application of a statute of 

limitations de novo. Harrison v. Dig. Health Plan, 183 F.3d 1235, 1238 (11th Cir. 

1999). “In reviewing an order granting a motion to dismiss, the appellate court 

must accept the factual allegations of the complaint as true and may affirm the 

 2 No party challenges the district court’s determination of these dates.

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dismissal of the complaint only if it is clear that no relief could be granted under 

any set of facts that could be proved consistent with the allegations.” Mesocap 

Ind. Ltd. v. Torm Lines, 194 F.3d 1342, 1343 (11th Cir. 1999) (quotation omitted).

We review a district court’s decision to dismiss a case for failure to comply 

with an order of the court for an abuse of discretion. See Gratton v. Great Am. 

Commc’ns, 178 F.3d 1373, 1374 (11th Cir.1999). Although we review a district 

court’s interpretation of its own orders for an abuse of discretion, Cave v. 

Singletary, 84 F.3d 1350, 1354–55 (11th Cir. 1996), we do not extend such 

deference to one district judge’s interpretation of the orders of another judge, Alley 

v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 590 F.3d 1195, 1202 (11th Cir. 2009).

III. DISCUSSION

Though the DPPA contains its own cause of action, it does not provide its 

own statute of limitations. The applicable statute of limitations on DPPA claims is 

found in 28 U.S.C. § 1658. Section 1658(a) applies to all causes of action arising 

under federal statutes enacted after December 1, 1990 that do not otherwise set 

forth a specific limitations period. 28 U.S.C. § 1658(a) (“[A] civil action arising 

under an Act of Congress enacted after the date of the enactment of this section 

may not be commenced later than 4 years after the cause of action accrues.”). As 

noted above, we recently held that a DPPA violation “accrues” within the meaning 

of § 1658(a) when the violation occurs. Foudy, 823 F.3d at 593. But Foudy v. 

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Miami-Dade County did not decide when a § 1983 claim based on the DPPA 

accrues. We do so now.

A. Accrual of § 1983 Claim

We have held that the DPPA, though it sets forth its own express right and 

remedy, is also actionable under § 1983. Collier v. Dickinson, 477 F.3d 1306, 

1310 (11th Cir. 2007). The primary issue in this case is one of first impression: 

namely, whether a § 1983 claim for breach of the DPPA accrues at the time the 

alleged violations are or should have been discovered or, alternatively, at the time

the violations occur. The Foudys acknowledge this Court’s prior decision in 

Foudy v. Miami-Dade County is binding precedent and accordingly they accept 

their standalone DPPA claims are governed by the occurrence rule. They 

nevertheless maintain their § 1983 claims, though premised entirely upon the 

DPPA, accrued only upon discovery.

It is true that in many contexts, our cases have held § 1983 claims are 

governed by a discovery rule, such that the statute of limitations begins to run on a 

claim when “the facts which would support a cause of action are apparent or 

should be apparent to a person with a reasonably prudent regard for his rights.” 

Rozar v. Mullis, 85 F.3d 556, 561–62 (11th Cir. 1996) (quotation omitted). On the 

other hand, according to the Supreme Court, the ordinary rule is that a § 1983 

claim accrues “when the plaintiff has ‘a complete and present cause of action.’” 

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Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 388, 127 S. Ct. 1091, 1095 (2007) (quoting Bay 

Area Laundry and Dry Cleaning Pension Trust Fund v. Ferbar Corp. of Cal., 522 

U.S. 192, 201, 118 S. Ct. 542, 549 (1997)); see also Chardon v. Fernandez, 454 

U.S. 6, 8, 102 S. Ct. 28, 29 (1981) (holding a § 1983 action for unlawful 

termination of public employment accrued when the unlawful act, namely the 

decision to terminate, took place). This is the ordinary accrual rule for statutes of 

limitations generally. See TRW Inc. v. Andrews, 534 U.S. 19, 37, 122 S. Ct. 441, 

452 (2001) (Scalia, J., concurring) (“The injury-discovery rule . . . is bad wine of 

recent vintage. Other than our recognition of the historical exception for suits 

based on fraud . . . we have deviated from the traditional rule and imputed an 

injury-discovery rule to Congress on only one occasion.” (citations omitted)). 

Accordingly, it should be clear that our application of the discovery rule in other 

§ 1983 cases does not require us to apply it to a new circumstance. C.f. Hillcrest 

Prop., LLC v. Pasco Cty., 754 F.3d 1279, 1281–83 (11th Cir. 2014) (considering 

whether to apply discovery rule to a facial takings challenge to a zoning ordinance 

pursuant to § 1983), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 1844 (2015). And indeed, though 

many of our own cases profess adherence to the discovery rule, the constructive

knowledge element can cause it to function as an occurrence rule, holding a 

plaintiff “should have known” about an injury at the moment it occurs. See, e.g., 

id. at 1283 (concluding harm occurred when ordinance was passed and finding

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plaintiffs knew or should have known of their injury at that time); McNair v. Allen, 

515 F.3d 1168, 1174 (11th Cir. 2008) (holding an Eighth Amendment method of 

execution claim accrues on the later of the date on which state review is complete, 

or the date on which the capital litigant becomes subject to a new or substantially 

changed execution protocol); Rozar, 85 F.3d at 561–62 (finding equal protection 

claims accrued when allegedly discriminatory county board vote was taken 

because that is when injury occurred and plaintiffs had not met burden to show 

they were “justifiably ignorant” of the action at that time).

Section 1983 cases in which we have invoked the discovery rule have 

typically involved constitutional or general civil rights claims. See Chappell v. 

Rich, 340 F.3d 1279, 1281, 1283 (11th Cir. 2003) (§ 1983 deprivation of civil 

rights claim for denial of access to the courts); Rozar, 85 F.3d at 560, 562–63

(equal protection and takings claims); Mullinax v. McElhenney, 817 F.2d 711, 714, 

716–17 (11th Cir. 1987) (conspiracy, false accusation and arrest, entrapment, 

harassment, and discrimination). In these ordinary § 1983 cases, the forum state’s 

statute of limitations for personal injury actions applies. See Chappell, 340 F.3d at 

1283; Rozar, 85 F.3d at 561; accord City of Rancho Palos Verdes v. Abrams, 544 

U.S. 113, 123 n.5, 125 S. Ct. 1453, 1460 n.5 (2005) (“The statute of limitations for 

a § 1983 claim is generally the applicable state-law period for personal-injury 

torts.”).

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On the other hand, when a § 1983 claim arises under a federal statute

enacted after December 1, 1990, and the underlying statute does not provide its 

own limitations period, the limitations period set forth in § 1658—not the forum 

state personal injury statute—governs. See Jones v. R. R. Donnelley & Sons Co., 

541 U.S. 369, 382, 124 S. Ct. 1836, 1845 (2004) (asserting § 1658 applies to all 

claims “made possible” by a post-1990 enactment); Baker v. Birmingham Bd. of 

Educ., 531 F.3d 1336, 1337–38 (11th Cir. 2008) (holding § 1983 limitations period 

is determined under § 1658(a) for action based upon post-1990 amendments to 42 

U.S.C. § 1981); see also Abrams, 544 U.S. at 123 n.5, 125 S. Ct. at 1460 n.5

(“Since the [§ 1983] claim here rests upon violation of the post-1990 

[Telecommunications Act], § 1658 would seem to apply.”). As stated above, the 

DPPA, enacted in 1994, is governed by § 1658, see Foudy, 823 F.3d at 593, so the 

§ 1983 claim based on the DPPA is as well.

It is only logical that the occurrence rule applicable to the DPPA’s statute of 

limitations would travel with it in § 1983 cases. As the Supreme Court has

recognized, “the accrual date of a § 1983 cause of action is a question of federal 

law.” Wallace, 549 U.S. at 388, 127 S. Ct. at 1095; see also Mullinax, 817 F.2d at 

716. Here, our law interpreting the word “accrues” in § 1658 is clear with respect 

to the DPPA. Per Foudy v. Miami-Dade County, a DPPA cause of action 

“accrues” under § 1658(a) when the alleged DPPA violation occurs. Foudy, 823 

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F.3d at 593. Thus the Foudys’ § 1983 claim, governed as it is by the same statute 

of limitations, also accrued when the alleged violations occurred.

In the present case, any other conclusion would be anomalous. It would be 

incongruous to confer upon the Foudys’ § 1983 claim, entirely dependent as it is 

upon the DPPA, a more generous accrual rule than the underlying DPPA claim 

itself. To paraphrase Baker v. Birmingham Board of Education, “[w]ere it not for 

the [DPPA, the Foudys’] complaint would fail to state a claim under § 1983.” 

Baker, 531 F.3d at 1338. We will not permit the Foudys to employ § 1983 to 

resuscitate their expired DPPA claims.

Finally, our holding supports the policies underlying all limitations 

provisions; namely, “repose, elimination of stale claims, and certainty about a 

plaintiff’s opportunity for recovery and a defendant’s potential liabilities.” Gabelli 

v. SEC, 133 S. Ct. 1216, 1221 (2013) (citing Rotella v. Wood, 528 U.S. 549, 555, 

120 S. Ct. 1075, 1081 (2000)). Defendants should not be forced to sleep with one 

eye open while claims against them “slumber until evidence has been lost, 

memories have faded, and witnesses have disappeared.” Id. (citing R.R. 

Telegraphers v. Ry. Express Agency, Inc., 321 U.S. 342, 349, 64 S. Ct. 582, 586

(1944)).

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Accordingly, we hold that a § 1983 claim based solely on the DPPA accrues 

at the same time as one brought under the underlying statute itself: upon the 

occurrence of the alleged violation. 

B. Equitable Tolling

Despite our holding in Foudy v. Miami-Dade County, the Foudys insist their

direct DPPA claims are not time-barred because although the causes of action 

accrued at the time of the alleged violations, the limitations period has been 

equitably tolled. Equitable tolling by concealment is established either through 

“affirmative actions by the defendant constituting concealment” or “where the 

wrong is of such a character as to be self-concealing.” Hill v. Texaco, Inc., 825 

F.2d 333, 335 & n.2 (11th Cir. 1987). The Foudys do not allege affirmative 

concealment by the Appellees; indeed, they appear to have received their data 

access audit promptly upon request. Instead, they contend the DPPA violations 

were self-concealing.

The alleged DAVID accesses cannot be categorized as self-concealing

wrongs. We stated as much, albeit in dicta, in Foudy v. Miami-Dade County. See 

Foudy, 823 F.3d at 594 (“The alleged DPPA violations are not by their nature selfconcealing . . . .” (quotation omitted)). A self-concealing wrong is one in which 

the clandestine nature of the activity is essential to the act itself, where a

“deception, misrepresentation, trick or contrivance is a necessary step in carrying 

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out the illegal act,” not merely “separate from the illegal act and intended only to 

cover up the act.” Hobson v. Wilson, 737 F.2d 1, 33–34 n.102 (D.C. Cir. 1984), 

overruled in part on other grounds by Leatherman v. Tarrant Cty. Narcotics 

Intelligence & Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 163, 113 S. Ct. 1160 (1993); see also 

Hill, 825 F.2d at 335 n.2 (citing Hobson with approval). The alleged database 

accesses cannot be so described. True, they may have been difficult to discover 

without an audit, but the illegal act of accessing the database without a legitimate 

purpose does not by necessity involve a deception, misrepresentation, trick, or 

contrivance. A DPPA violation consists of “knowingly obtain[ing], disclos[ing] or 

us[ing] personal information, from a motor vehicle record” for a prohibited 

purpose. 18 U.S.C. § 2724. To accomplish the prohibited activity requires no 

deception—unlike, for example, a fraud.

3

 Indeed, here, the unlawful act could be 

committed with the plaintiff’s full knowledge. As a result, DPPA violations are 

not self-concealing and the Foudys cannot reap the benefit of equitable tolling.

 3 The Hobson court’s elucidation of the concept is helpful: 

An example of [a self-concealing wrong] would be a scheme in 

which deception or misrepresentation affected the behavior of 

another, where that change in behavior enabled the would-be 

defendant to carry out his scheme—as where a person knowingly 

sells a fake vase as a real antique. In that instance, the statute 

would toll until the buyer discovered or should have discovered the 

deception. 

Hobson, 737 F.2d at 33–34 n.102.

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C. Dismissal and Relation Back

The Foudys claim the district court erred when it dismissed their actions for 

misjoinder on January 16, 2015, contending the district court misread Judge 

Martinez’s severance order as requiring an explanation of any joinder of multiple 

defendants. As a result, they assert their complaints should relate back to date of 

the first complaint filed on December 31, 2012. See FED. R. CIV. P. 15(c).

The district court may have misconstrued Judge Martinez’s order as 

requiring the Foudys to explain why joinder was appropriate when they refiled 

their amended complaints on August 15, 2014. We would extend no deference to 

the court’s interpretation of that order were it necessary to decide the issue. Alley 

v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 590 F.3d 1195, 1202 (11th Cir. 2009). 

But whether or not the district court’s dismissals were appropriate in the first 

instance, the Foudys’ subsequent failure to obey court orders warranted closure of 

each case. In the January 16 orders dismissing the cases, the court specifically 

stated that “[i]f Plaintiffs’ amended complaint is directed towards more than one 

Defendant, Plaintiffs shall clearly specify how the alleged conduct of each 

Defendant arises out of the same transaction or is otherwise permissible in light of 

this Order.” The Foudys provided no such explanation when they refiled on 

February 2, despite the fact that each complaint named multiple defendants. 

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Federal courts possess an inherent power to dismiss a complaint for failure 

to comply with a court order. Goforth v. Owens, 766 F.2d 1533, 1535 (11th Cir. 

1985); see also Degen v. United States, 517 U.S. 820, 827, 116 S. Ct. 1777, 1782

(1996) (“A federal court has at its disposal an array of means to enforce its orders, 

including dismissal in an appropriate case.”); Link v. Wabash R.R. Co., 370 U.S. 

626, 630–31, 82 S. Ct. 1386, 1388–89 (1962) (noting the inherent power of courts 

to dismiss an action is not precluded by FED. R. CIV. P. 41(b)). The district court’s 

January 16 paperless orders clearly instructed the Foudys to explain their grounds 

for joinder in any complaint naming multiple defendants. The Foudys failed to 

abide by this requirement when they refiled substantially similar complaints on 

February 2, 2015, unaccompanied by any such explanation. Here, both the district 

court’s February 3 refusal to accept the Foudys’ amended complaints and its 

decision to deny their motions to reopen the cases were entirely appropriate and 

operated as a second dismissal without prejudice. 

“Dismissal of a complaint, without prejudice, does not allow a later 

complaint to be filed outside the statute of limitations.” Bost v. Fed. Express 

Corp., 372 F.3d 1233, 1242 (11th Cir. 2004) (citing Stein v. Reynolds Sec., Inc., 

667 F.2d 33, 34 (11th Cir. 1982)). The statute of limitations is not automatically 

tolled in such a situation, absent some additional reason. Justice v. United States, 6 

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F.3d 1474, 1479–80 (11th Cir. 1993). Here, as discussed above, there is none. As 

a result, the complaints cannot relate back to December 31, 2012. 

IV. CONCLUSION

The statute of limitations began to run on the Foudys’ claims when the 

alleged DPPA violations occurred. The Foudys have failed to present any theory 

that would entitle their claims to be treated as filed within the limitations period. 

Accordingly, their actions are time-barred, and the judgments of the district court 

are

AFFIRMED.

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