IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA

FIFTH DISTRICT

NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO

 FILE MOTION FOR REHEARING AND

DISPOSITION THEREOF IF FILED

JAHQUELL DAVIS,

Appellant,

v. Case No. 5D17-745

STATE OF FLORIDA,

Appellee.

________________________________/

Opinion filed August 31, 2018

Appeal from the Circuit Court 

for Orange County,

John H. Adams, Sr., Judge.

James S. Purdy, Public Defender, and 

Thomas J. Lukashow, Assistant Public 

Defender, Daytona Beach, for Appellant.

Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, 

Tallahassee, and Rebecca Rock 

Mcguigan, Assistant Attorney General, 

Daytona Beach, for Appellee.

EDWARDS, J.

This case deals with the application of the Melton1 elements to Appellant’s claim 

that his transport to and lengthy detention at the sheriff’s office constituted an “arrest” for 

purposes of Florida’s speedy trial rule, which requires a person charged with a felony to 

 

1 Melton v. State, 75 So. 2d 291 (Fla. 1954).
2

be tried within 175 days of arrest. See Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.191(a), (d).2 Appellant, Jahquell 

Davis, argues that he was “arrested” on May 29, 2014, when he and several others were 

transported to the sheriff’s office. Over a period of several hours, each was questioned 

in turn by a single detective as part of an investigation into a violent robbery that occurred 

earlier that day at a metal recycling facility. 

When it was Appellant’s turn to be interviewed he agreed to talk with the detective

and voluntarily submitted to DNA and gunshot residue testing at the station. Following a 

pre-trial evidentiary hearing, the trial court denied Appellant’s speedy trial-based motion 

for discharge. Appellant was tried, found guilty of attempted first-degree murder with a 

firearm, robbery with a firearm, and conspiracy to commit robbery with a deadly weapon, 

and sentenced to forty years in the Department of Corrections. We agree with the trial 

court’s factual findings and its legal conclusion that an investigatory detention took place 

on May 29, 2014, which did not constitute an arrest for speedy trial purposes. For the 

reasons set forth in more detail below, we affirm the trial court’s denial of Appellant’s 

motion for discharge.

A trial court’s ruling on a speedy trial-based motion for discharge presents mixed 

questions of fact and law. See State v. Glatzmayer, 789 So. 2d 297, 301 (Fla. 2001). 

The trial court’s factual findings must be sustained if supported by competent, substantial 

evidence, but its legal conclusions are subject to de novo review. Id.

 

2 The Florida Supreme Court adopted rule 3.191 in 1971 to provide a procedural 

mechanism for ensuring that the constitutional right to a speedy trial guaranteed by the 

Sixth Amendment is enforced in this state. State v. Lott, 286 So. 2d 565, 566 (Fla. 1973).
3

BACKGROUND FACTS

On May 29, 2014, sheriff’s deputies responded to a robbery and shooting at OU 

Metal Recycling. Video surveillance was used to identify the getaway vehicle involved in 

the robbery; it was later found outside a house. Using a loudspeaker, deputies ordered

the occupants out of the house. When nobody responded to that command, the S.W.A.T. 

team was deployed to the scene. The stand-off ended approximately ninety minutes later, 

when Appellant, four other males, and two females exited the house. The males were 

instructed to stand along the curb near the house while a show-up was conducted, during 

which one victim recognized one of the men—not Appellant—as the driver of the getaway 

vehicle. 

Deputies believed that it would be impractical to interview the five males at the 

house because it was in a high crime area, the S.W.A.T. team and news media 

surrounded the area, and the detective handling the investigation had multiple people to 

interview. Accordingly, the males were handcuffed, placed into individual squad cars, 

transported to the sheriff’s department, and placed in separate rooms in a secured area 

of the building, where their handcuffs were removed. After being read their Miranda3

rights, they were sequentially interviewed by the same detective. All the males were 

eventually swabbed for gunshot residue and DNA. 

The detective, who referred to Appellant’s status as “investigative detention,”

began his interview of Appellant by apologizing for the delay in getting to him. Appellant 

testified at his evidentiary hearing that he agreed to speak to the detective and consented 

 

3 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
4

to the gunshot residue and DNA testing because he wanted to help and also wanted to 

clear his name. During this time, Appellant was not informed he was free to leave. 

Indeed, outside the door of his interview room was a uniformed deputy who would not 

have permitted him to leave. During the approximately four to six hours that Appellant 

was at the sheriff’s department, he was never told he was under arrest, that he was 

suspected of committing the robbery, or that he was charged with any crime.

The detective ended his interview of Appellant by advising him that he was not 

under arrest and that he was free to leave. The detective offered Appellant transportation, 

which Appellant declined. At the time Appellant was released, there was no information 

connecting him to the robbery or shooting beyond his presence at the house where the 

getaway vehicle was found. 

Appellant was not formally arrested until June 17, 2015, after the investigation was 

essentially completed and after two different witnesses identified Appellant as one of the 

robbers. The information charging Appellant was filed on June 19, 2015. Appellant 

moved for discharge, arguing that his prosecution was barred by Florida’s speedy trial 

rule as far more than 175 days had passed since his May 29, 2014 detention.

Appellant preserved this speedy trial issue by making a pre-trial motion, seeking a 

writ of prohibition, renewing his motion during trial, and pursuing this timely appeal 

following his jury trial and conviction.

ANALYSIS

The only disputed legal issue is whether Appellant’s detention on May 29, 2014,

constituted an arrest for speedy trial purposes. If it was an arrest for speedy trial 

purposes, then he was entitled to a permanent discharge as requested because of the 
5

time that passed between detention and trial. However, as the trial court did below and 

as we do now, employing the four Melton elements to analyze Appellant’s May 29, 2014 

detention leads to the conclusion that the detention was not an arrest for speedy trial 

purposes. 

Before we begin our analysis of whether this was an “arrest,” it is important to 

recognize and acknowledge that a person may be “in custody” for purposes of requiring 

Miranda warnings, yet not have been “arrested” for purposes of the speedy trial rule. 

Williams v. State, 757 So. 2d 597, 599 (Fla. 5th DCA 2000) (citing Griffin v. State, 474

So. 2d 777, 779 (Fla. 1985)). Likewise, police “seizure” of an individual may trigger Fourth 

Amendment protection and yet not constitute an arrest for purposes of speedy trial. Id. 

The rights listed in the Miranda warnings and the Fourth Amendment’s protection against 

unreasonable search and seizure are triggered when a person is taken into custody or 

seized, regardless of whether any criminal charges are contemplated or levied. 

The Sixth Amendment guarantees the accused a speedy trial to limit the duration 

of possible public scorn, adverse impact on employment, and other consequences 

brought about by arrest or indictment that can only be cleared by a verdict of not guilty or 

permanent dismissal of the charges. See Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213, 222 

(1967). “This guarantee [of a speedy trial] is an important safeguard to prevent undue 

and oppressive incarceration prior to trial, to minimize anxiety and concern accompanying 

public accusation and to limit the possibilities that long delay will impair the ability of an 

accused to defend himself.” United States v. Ewell, 383 U.S. 116, 120 (1966); see also

State v. Lott, 286 So. 2d 565, 566 (Fla. 1973) (quoting Ewell with approval). Given that

the speedy trial rule is designed to protect against the adverse impacts of arrest or
6

indictment pursuant to criminal charges, it follows that the right to a speedy trial is 

triggered only “(1) when the person is arrested as a result of the conduct or criminal 

episode that gave rise to the crime charged or (2) when the person is served with a notice 

to appear in lieu of physical arrest.” Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.191(d). 

Appellant, the State, the trial court, and this court all agree that the seminal case 

on what constitutes an arrest under the speedy trial rule is Melton v. State. In that case, 

the Florida Supreme Court defined an arrest as follows:

It is uniformly held that an arrest, in the technical and restricted sense 

of the criminal law, is “the apprehension or taking into custody of an alleged 

offender, in order that he [or she] may be brought into the proper court to 

answer for a crime.” When used in this sense, an arrest involves the 

following elements: (1) A purpose or intention to effect an arrest under a 

real or pretended authority; (2) An actual or constructive seizure or 

detention of the person to be arrested by a person having present power to 

control the person arrested; (3) A communication by the arresting officer to 

the person whose arrest is sought, of an intention or purpose then and there 

to effect an arrest; and (4) An understanding by the person whose arrest is 

sought that it is the intention of the arresting officer then and there to arrest 

and detain him. 

Melton, 75 So. 2d at 294 (internal citations omitted).4 All four Melton elements must be 

present to conclude that an arrest has occurred. Brown v. State, 623 So. 2d 800, 802 

(Fla. 4th DCA 1993).

The first Melton element is “[a] purpose or intention to effect an arrest under a real 

or pretended authority.” 75 So. 2d at 294. Here, the detective testified that it was not his 

purpose or intent to arrest Appellant on May 29, 2014, because Appellant was not 

suspected of having committed any crime at that point. Thus, the trial court’s pretrial 

factual finding that there was no purpose or intent to effect an arrest on May 29, 2014, is 

 

4 Although Melton was decided in 1954, it remains the benchmark for defining 

“arrest” and has been repeatedly cited for that purpose, including as recently as 2012 by 

our court. See Ehmke v. State, 86 So. 3d 591, 591 (Fla. 5th DCA 2012).
7

supported by competent, substantial evidence. The trial court received additional 

evidence as the case progressed which confirmed that there was initially no probable 

cause to support a legal arrest, and that Appellant was not a suspect on May 29, 2014.

The DNA testing was inconclusive as to Appellant, and the deputy who performed the 

gunshot residue testing could not recall the outcome of the test performed on Appellant. 

The testimony at trial established that he only became a suspect much later, when a codefendant identified Appellant as the shooter in exchange for a plea. As another result 

of their ongoing investigation, the police located somebody who was very familiar with 

Appellant and testified that Appellant was one of the robbers in the surveillance video, 

based on his physical traits, clothing, and other mannerisms. This additional evidence 

was relevant to Appellant’s repeated renewal of his motion for discharge.

There are many similarities between the subject case and State v. Lail, in which 

detectives went to Lail’s house and told him they received a complaint that he sexually 

abused his stepdaughter. 687 So. 2d 873, 873 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983). Lail agreed to go 

with them to further the investigation. Id. After reading Lail his Miranda rights, they placed 

him in a police car and drove him to the station where he remained for seven hours. Id.

at 873-74. Initially, Lail was left alone in a holding cell for two hours while an officer went 

to the hospital to interview the victim. Id. at 874. After Lail again confirmed his willingness 

to talk and executed a Miranda-rights waiver form, a detective from the sex crimes unit 

interviewed Lail for approximately an hour and a half. Id. When his interview was 

completed, Lail stayed two more hours at the police station in order to voluntarily submit 

to a physical body inspection during which he provided hair and blood samples. Id. The 

detective testified that at that time the evidence was insufficient to establish probable 
8

cause to justify an arrest. Id. Lail was released. Fifteen months later, Lail was arrested 

on a warrant and formally charged with sexual battery. Id. The trial court ordered Lail 

discharged, ruling that he had been arrested for speedy trial purposes when he was 

detained initially for questioning. Id. The Second District reversed, finding that the 

detention was an investigatory detention that did not trigger the running of the speedy trial 

time period. Id. at 875. 

We note that there are two factual distinctions between Lail and this case. First, it 

is unclear from the opinion whether Lail was handcuffed, whereas here Appellant was 

cuffed for several hours on the day of his initial interview.5 However, the fact that a 

defendant was handcuffed does “not convert [a] detention for questioning into an arrest.” 

Id. (quoting State v. Christian, 442 So. 2d 988, 990 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983)). Second, Lail

voluntarily accompanied the police to the station, whereas here Appellant was taken there 

involuntarily, although he testified that he voluntarily remained there to “help” and to “clear 

his name.” In Christian, the Second District rejected the trial court’s reasoning “that 

involuntary custodial interrogation by the police at the station was equivalent to an arrest 

which began the running of the speedy trial time.” 442 So. 2d at 989–90. Therefore, 

those two factual differences do not change the applicability of Lail or the analysis of the 

first Melton element—there was no evidence of an intent to arrest on May 29, 2014.

According to Brown, the May 29 detention cannot constitute an arrest because

one of the Melton elements was not present. 623 So. 2d at 802. Therefore, the trial 

court’s decision that the speedy trial rule was not triggered can be affirmed based on the 

 

5 The trial court stated that Lail had been placed in a holding cell and handcuffed, 

while the court of appeal simply stated that there was no evidence that Lail was ever 

handcuffed. Lail, 687 So. 2d at 875.
9

absence of the first element alone. Nevertheless, for the purpose of completeness, we 

will look at the presence or absence of the other three elements.

The second Melton element is “[a]n actual or constructive seizure or detention of 

the person arrested by a person having present power to control the person arrested.” 

Melton, 75 So. 2d at 294. It is undisputed that Appellant was actually seized and detained 

by the sheriff’s deputies and the detective. Thus, the trial court’s finding that the second 

Melton factor was satisfied is supported by competent, substantial evidence and is legally 

correct.

The third Melton element is “[a] communication by the arresting officer to the 

person whose arrest is sought, of an intention or purpose then and there to effect an 

arrest.” Id. On May 29, 2014, Appellant was not formally arrested, in the sense that no 

booking report was prepared, no booking photos were taken, and Appellant was not 

fingerprinted. When initially denying Appellant’s motion for discharge, the trial court found 

that there had been no actual communication from the detective to Appellant that he was 

under arrest or that the detective intended to arrest him. In fact, Appellant was not told

on May 29, 2014, that he was under arrest. Following Appellant’s voluntary submission 

to testing that day, the detective told Appellant that he was free to walk out of the sheriff’s 

office, which is exactly what he did. Appellant’s unconditional release parallels Lail, where 

that defendant was released following his lengthy detention. See Lail, 687 So. 2d at 874. 

Thus, the trial court’s finding here that the third Melton element was absent is supported 

by competent, substantial evidence and is legally correct as well. 

The fourth and final Melton element is “[a]n understanding by the person whose 

arrest is sought that it is the intention of the arresting officer then and there to arrest and 
10

detain him.” Melton, 75 So. 2d at 294. Appellant argues that he had a reasonable belief 

that he had been arrested because he was forced from the house, handcuffed, 

involuntarily taken to the police station in a police car, and locked in the interview room 

for several hours. Although nobody told him he was under arrest, nobody told him until

the end of the day that he was free to leave. These facts could support a finding that the 

detective’s actions reasonably led Appellant initially to believe that he was under arrest,

but Appellant’s belief as to whether he was under arrest was not static. As part of its 

reason for denying the motion for discharge, the trial court noted Appellant testified that 

after being at the sheriff’s office for a period of time, he was cooperative in the interview 

and voluntarily submitted to testing. The trial court stated that Appellant presented no 

evidence that an arrest was contemplated, and further found the fact that Appellant was 

released rather than arrested would have led to the understanding that the police did not 

intend to arrest him then and there. Thus, the trial court’s determination that the fourth 

Melton element was lacking is supported by competent, substantial evidence and is 

legally correct.

Appellant relies heavily on this court’s opinion in Griggs v. State, 994 So. 2d 1198 

(Fla. 5th DCA 2008), to argue that the deputies’ actions and what happened to him during

his four- to six-hour detention amounted to a de facto arrest that triggered the speedy trial 

rule on May 29, 2014. First of all, Appellant’s reliance on Griggs is misplaced because of 

significant factual differences between the two cases. In Griggs, the police performed a 

traffic stop of Griggs because they already had information of his involvement in a drug 

transaction. Id. at 1199. While at the scene of the traffic stop, a K-9 unit alerted to 

methamphetamines in Griggs’s car and the drugs were removed from the vehicle by one
11

of the ten police officers present. Id. A police investigator then asked Griggs if he wanted 

to “come down to my office and talk about it.” Id. Thus, unlike in the instant case, the 

police in Griggs had every reason to suspect that Griggs had committed a crime before 

they began their encounter and certainly as they took him in. While Griggs agreed to go 

to the station where he was questioned, our court predicted that had Griggs refused the 

invitation, “[h]e would instead have been taken directly to jail.” Id. at 1201. In fact, the

investigator told Griggs he would only let him go if he agreed to act as a drug informant 

for the investigator. Id. at 1199. After agreeing to be an informant, Griggs was released.

Id. The investigator testified that if Griggs had not agreed at that time to act as an 

informant, he would have been immediately booked and jailed. Id. That testimony 

established an intent to effect an arrest which would not be carried out only if, first, Griggs 

spoke with them and, second, he agreed to be an informant. In both cases the police 

officers denied they ever used the word “arrest.” Id. Importantly, Griggs “testified that he 

thought he was under arrest because he had been told by police officers on two occasions 

that he occupied that unfortunate status.” Id. On the other hand, here, Appellant never 

claimed that an officer told him he was under arrest. 

In Griggs, our court analyzed the facts using the Melton elements and concluded 

that all four elements were present, meaning that Griggs had been arrested for speedy 

trial purposes and was entitled to discharge because he had not been charged or tried

until more than a year after the traffic stop and custodial questioning. Id. at 1201. 

Somewhat confusingly, although this court acknowledged that the right to a speedy trial 

was a Sixth Amendment right codified in a rule of criminal procedure, the opinion 

discusses Florida’s stop and frisk law, which protects the Fourth Amendment rights to be 
12

free from unreasonable search and seizure. However, Griggs did not raise any Fourth 

Amendment issues. Continuing down that same path, the Griggs opinion then cites to 

and quotes from several cases that each dealt with Fourth Amendment search and 

seizure issues, but none of which dealt with speedy trial issues. Similarly here, Appellant 

claimed no violation of his Fourth Amendment rights. Thus, Appellant erroneously relies 

upon the discussion of Fourth Amendment law in Griggs to argue that the Melton 

elements are trumped by involuntary, custodial questioning. 

Notably, eight years before deciding Griggs, we decided Williams v. State, in which 

we explicitly stated that it was possible to be seized for Fourth Amendment purposes 

without being arrested for speedy trial purposes. 757 So. 2d 597, 599 (Fla. 5th DCA 

2000). Twenty-seven years before Griggs, we decided State v. Naughton, in which we

noted that even an actual or constructive seizure or detention of the person to be arrested 

would not constitute being “in custody” for speedy trial purposes. 395 So. 2d 581, 582–

83 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981). Our opinion in Griggs makes no mention of the Williams or 

Naughton cases, nor does it mention any of the many other cases that noted the 

importance of distinguishing between an “arrest” for speedy trial purposes and a “seizure” 

for Fourth Amendment situations or being placed in “custody” for Miranda rights 

purposes.6 The Sixth Amendment guarantees the accused a speedy trial. As the 

 

6 See Griffin v. State, 474 So. 2d 777, 779 (Fla. 1985) (noting that a seizure may 

trigger Fourth Amendment protections without being a technical arrest, and that a person 

may be “in custody” for Miranda but not speedy trial purposes); Christian, 442 So. 2d at 

989 (noting that “[a] person may be deemed ‘in custody’ for purposes of his Miranda

rights, yet not ‘in custody’ for purposes of the speedy trial rule”); Dean v. Booth, 349 So. 

2d 806, 807 (Fla. 2d DCA 1977) (holding that although defendant taken to the police 

station for questioning was “in custody” for Miranda purposes, he was not “in custody” 

within the meaning of the speedy trial rule); Snead v. State, 346 So. 2d 546, 547–48 (Fla. 

1st DCA 1976) (finding that defendant taken to station for questioning and released 
13

discussion of Fourth Amendment seizure has no bearing on being arrested for speedy 

trial purposes, Appellant’s reliance on that portion of the Griggs opinion is unavailing.

We find that the trial court’s factual conclusions are supported by competent, 

substantial evidence, and its legal conclusion—that Appellant was not arrested on May 

29, 2014, for speedy trial purposes based on the Melton elements—is also correct. 

Accordingly, we affirm the denial of Appellant’s motion for discharge.

We agree with the Fourth District’s conclusion in Brown, 623 So. 2d at 802, that 

under the present state of the law all four Melton elements must be present for a custodial 

detention to constitute an arrest. In our opinion, requiring the presence of all four 

elements demands a level of clarity and certainty that is often lacking in these situations.

It places too much emphasis on the presence or absence of any single element. 

Furthermore, two elements in the current test require the trial court to perform very 

subjective analysis. For element one, the court must somehow determine whether the 

officer subjectively intended to effect an arrest, and for element four, the court must divine 

the defendant’s subjective understanding of whether the officer subjectively intended to 

effect an arrest. We believe that all concerned would be better served when considering 

speedy trial issues if a “totality of the circumstances” standard were employed, using more 

objective factors. Under the proposed changes no one element would be determinative, 

the need for analyzing predictable testimony regarding the subjective intent or 

understanding of the police or defendant would be minimized, and a proper balance could 

be struck between (1) giving the State leeway to investigate and build a case and (2) 

 

without being charged was not in custody for speedy trial rule purposes, while declining 

to discuss whether in custody for Fourth Amendment purposes).
14

protecting the accused from unreasonably prolonged subjection to the potential personal, 

social, and economic harm attendant to being arrested for or charged with a crime. We 

recognize that under Hoffman v. Jones, 280 So. 2d 431 (Fla. 1973), we are not authorized 

to make these changes; so, we certify the following question to be of great public 

importance:

Should the determination of whether an arrest has occurred for 

speedy trial purposes be based on an objective consideration of the totality 

of the circumstances, including but not limited to: (1) whether the person

was detained with the intent to effect an arrest under a real or pretended 

authority; (2) whether there was an actual or constructive seizure or 

detention by someone with the present power to control the person 

detained; (3) whether there was a communication by the detaining officer to 

the person whose detention is sought of an intention or purpose then and 

there to effect an arrest; and (4) whether a reasonable person in the 

detainee’s position would have understood that he or she was under arrest?

AFFIRMED; QUESTION CERTIFIED. 

SAWAYA, J., concurs.

ORFINGER, J., concurring in result with opinion.
15

ORFINGER, J., concurring in result with opinion. CASE No. 5D17-745

Because I am bound by our supreme court’s decision in Melton v. State, 75 So. 2d 

291 (Fla. 1954), I concur, albeit reluctantly, with the result reached by the majority. 

However, I believe the four-part test established in Melton to determine when an arrest 

occurs is overly formalistic and relies too heavily on the subjective intent of the law 

enforcement officer who is questioning or detaining the individual. 

The trial court denied Appellant’s motion to discharge based on the first Melton

element—“[a] purpose or intention to effect an arrest under a real or pretended authority,” 

75 So. 2d at 294—and concluded that the detective had no purpose or intent to arrest 

Appellant. In affirming that decision, the majority places great weight on both the first 

Melton element as well as the fourth Melton element—“[a]n understanding by the person 

whose arrest is sought that it is the intention of the arresting officer then and there to 

arrest and detain him,” id.—in concluding that the officer never communicated an intent 

to arrest Appellant. Both of these conclusions depend on the subjective intent of the 

police officer.

In my opinion, the subjective views of a police officer who detains an individual 

should have little bearing on whether the detention constitutes an arrest. Rather, an arrest 

should be determined using an objective standard—whether the individual’s freedom of 

action is curtailed to a degree associated with a formal arrest, Park v. Shiflett, 250 F.3d 

843, 850 (4th Cir. 2001), and how a reasonable person in the individual’s position would 

have understood his or her position, Caso v. State, 524 So. 2d 422, 423 (Fla. 1988). The 

objective standard assesses the coercive effect of the police conduct, as a whole, and 

not the isolated details of the conduct. 5 Am. Jur. 2d Arrests § 5 (2018). In making this 
16

assessment, the objective standard examines the totality of the circumstances, including 

the particular police conduct and the setting in which the conduct occurs. Id. Such an 

examination involves exploring, among others, the length of the detention; the restrictions 

placed on the individual’s personal movement; the force, if any, that was exerted; the 

information conveyed to the individual; and the severity of the intrusion. United States v. 

Rasberry, 882 F.3d 241, 247 (1st Cir. 2018).

In this case, the detective described Appellant as being held in “investigative 

detention.” One court defined “investigative detention” as

a seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment but, 

unlike an arrest, it need not be supported by probable cause.

. . . An officer can stop and briefly detain a person for 

investigative purposes if the officer has a reasonable 

suspicion supported by articulable facts that criminal activity 

may be afoot, even if the officer lacks probable cause. 

Cortez [v. McCauley], 478 F.3d [1108,] 1115 [(10th Cir. 2007)] 

(quotations omitted). An investigative detention evolves into 

an arrest when the scope of police conduct is no longer 

reasonably related to the circumstances initially justifying the 

seizure. United States v. Melendez-Garcia, 28 F.3d 1046, 

1051 (10th Cir. 1994). “An arrest is distinguished by the 

involuntary, highly intrusive nature of the encounter.” Cortez, 

478 F.3d at 1115 (quotation omitted).

Manzanares v. Higdon, 575 F.3d 1135, 1148 (10th Cir. 2009). Here, Appellant was 

handcuffed and detained for four to six hours. The duration of detention alone provides 

strong evidence that Appellant was under arrest rather than merely subject to an 

investigative detention. Id. (indicating that detention of 90 minutes or longer constitutes 

arrest, rather than investigative detention). 

Further, it is well-established that an officer may temporarily detain an individual 

and investigate if the circumstances reasonably indicate that the detained individual has 

committed, is committing, or is about to commit a crime. § 901.151(2), Fla. Stat. (2014); 
17

see also Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 38 (1968). However, the detention “shall not extend 

beyond the place where it was first effected or the immediate vicinity thereof.” § 

901.151(3), Fla. Stat. (2014). “Where . . . the detained individual is physically removed 

from the scene and involuntarily transported to the police station for questioning and/or 

investigation, the courts have had little difficulty in construing such a detention to be a de 

facto arrest . . . .” Griggs v. State, 994 So. 2d 1198, 1201 (Fla. 5th DCA 2008) (quoting 

Saturnino–Boudet v. State, 682 So. 2d 188, 193 (Fla. 3d DCA 1996)). Here, Appellant 

was handcuffed, placed in a squad car, and transported away from the scene and to the 

sheriff’s office where he remained under guard and not free to leave for the next four to 

six hours. This is further evidence that Appellant was under arrest rather than simply 

subject to an investigative detention.7 

The majority holds the Appellant was not under arrest. But if not under arrest, what 

was his status? Is there something between a Terry stop and an arrest? I think not. To 

effectuate a Terry stop, the detention must be temporary, based on reasonable suspicion, 

and at the location of the stop. See § 901.151(3), Fla. Stat. (2014). To make an arrest, 

law enforcement needs probable cause. Here, the detective admittedly had neither and 

yet Appellant was detained for four to six hours. The majority never states what 

Appellant’s status was while being detained. And if law enforcement needed more time 

to investigate, could Appellant’s detention have been extended indefinitely? 

To view the detention here as authorized creates a new level of citizen encounter 

not countenanced by Terry, a case decided well after Melton. I believe that we would be 

 

7 While the cases that I rely on are either search and seizure or Miranda cases, I 

believe they are applicable to the analysis here because an objective test is easier to 

apply and less influenced by the subjective views of the investigating officer.
18

well served by adopting an objective, totality of the circumstances test to determine if an 

arrest has taken place for speedy trial purposes. However, because Melton continues to 

be controlling, I concur in the result reached by the majority.