December 2020

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Indo-Pacific 

Perspectives
Indo-Pacific Perspectives

December 2020

from the Journal of Indo-Pacific Affairs

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3

6

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4 8

Introduction

Dr. Peter Harris, editor

The Indian Ocean’s Key Role 

in the Indo-Pacific...

Nilanthi Samaranayake

Chinese Vision of a Rulesbased Order

Dr. Benjamin Tze Ern Ho

Do Regimes Matter?

Dr. Laura Southgate

A Rules-based Order in the 

Indo-Pacific

Dr. Dewi Fortuna Anwar

Challenges in 

Institutionalizing Rulesbased Order...

Dr. Ngaibiakching

India’s Indo- Pacific 

Reckoning

Dr. Titli Basu

Next Priorities for Japan’s 

FOIP Vision

Dr. Kei Koga
Indo-Pacific Perspective │ 1

Introduction

A Rules-Based Order 

for the Indo-Pacific?

Dr. Peter Harris, editor

t is the policy of the United 

States government to ensure that 

the Indo-Pacific megaregion remains “free and open.” In no small 

part, this vision rests upon the wager that a single rules-based order 

can exist from the western reaches 

of the Indian Ocean to the vast expanses of the Asia-Pacific. However, developing and enforcing a 

cohesive international rulebook for 

the Indo-Pacific will be far from 

simple. For the United States and 

its allies, the urgent need to 

cement a rules-based order in the 

Indo-Pacific is driven, at least in 

part, by anxiety surrounding the 

rise of China—yet this ongoing 

movement in the balance of power 

is also a major reason for why a 

stable rules-based system will be 

difficult to maintain. Then there is 

the question of legitimacy. It is 

possible for a rules-based system to 

be truly fair and inclusive, or does 

international order inevitably reflect the interests of some more 

than others? Finally, it is not assured that America’s presence in 

the Indo-Pacific will continue to be 

welcomed by regional governments.

This, the first “Indo-Pacific Perspectives” roundtable from the 

Journal of Indo-Pacific Affairs, will 

offer some answers to these complex geopolitical (and “geolegal”) 

questions. As the name suggests, 

this new series of roundtables will 

showcase viewpoints from across 

the Indo-Pacific megaregion (and 

sometimes beyond). The goal is to 

facilitate a dialogue between academics and policy practitioners 

that will be of great interest—and, 

we hope, considerable use—to an 

international cast of scholars and 

decision makers whose work focuses on the Indo-Pacific. In this 

inaugural roundtable, the participants hail from the United States, 

United Kingdom, Singapore, India, 

I

1
Harris

Indo-Pacific Perspective │2

and Indonesia. They are academics, expert analysts, and seasoned 

policy advisers. Tasked with shedding light on the concept of a rulesbased order in the Indo-Pacific, 

they have provided a range of perspectives to clarify just how 

fraught and contentious such an 

order-building (and order-defending) project will be. 

The roundtable begins with Nilanthi Samaranayake’s keen analysis 

of US foreign policy toward the 

Indo-Pacific. She points out that, 

despite the inclusive rhetoric and 

phraseology of a “free and open 

Indo-Pacific,” America’s leaders 

sometimes betray a preoccupation 

with the Asia-Pacific at the expense of the Indian Ocean. For example, US officials sometimes discuss the entire Indo-Pacific region 

as bedeviled by maritime boundary 

disputes, whereas such disagreements are much more prominent 

and consequential in the Asia-Pacific than the Indian Ocean. If 

states from India to Japan are to 

remain committed to the idea of 

belonging to a single Indo-Pacific 

region, it will be important to clarify the interests that these states 

are supposed to share in common 

with one another.

Benjamin Ho turns to analyze the 

foreign-policy motivations of 

China, America’s supposed rival in 

the Indo-Pacific and another 

potential driver of a rules-based 

system for the region. According to 

Ho, China’s leaders are open to the 

broad concept of a rules-based international order, even if they (unsurprisingly) tend to support a different configuration of rules than 

that put forward by the United 

States. One of Ho’s major insights 

is that Chinese leaders desire a 

rules-based international system 

that will help them to ward off external threats to domestic security. 

This is the reverse of how international order is discussed in the 

West—that is, as a straitjacket to 

prevent domestic actors from upending international security. 

Laura Southgate agrees that

China has an interest in using international rules as tools to serve 

its national interests—and, moreover, that its growing power means 

that Beijing must be taken seriously as a rule-shaper in the region. This is true whether China 

chooses to be an active “maker” of 

new rules for the Indo-Pacific or 

whether it is expected to be a mere 

“taker” of rules made by others. 

Simply put, China is so powerful, 

and its interests are so expansive, 

that China’s willingness to comply 

with rules will be a decisive factor

in determining the success of any 

rule-based order. Southgate provides a case study of the United 

Nations Convention on the Law of 
Introduction

Indo-Pacific Perspective │3

the Sea—to wit, Beijing’s summary 

rejection of a 2016 ruling by the 

Permanent Court of Arbitration 

that held some of China’s maritime 

claims in the South China Sea to 

be incompatible with international 

law—to illustrate the central importance of China to the success of 

rules old and new.

Kei Koga offers a complementary 

analysis of Japanese foreign policy 

toward the Indo-Pacific. He points 

out Japan’s leaders were among 

the first to articulate the existence 

of a cohesive Indo-Pacific space. 

Koga points to the Quadrilateral 

Security Dialogue (“Quad”) as Japan’s primary means of operationalizing and institutionalizing its 

commitment to a free and open 

Indo-Pacific, but makes the important observation that Japan 

and the other Quad members (Australia, India, and the United 

States) cannot act imperiously toward smaller regional actors. Koga 

emphasizes the special importance 

of the Association of Southeast 

Asian Nations (ASEAN), noting 

that Southeast Asia is the geographical center of the Indo-Pacific. Without the endorsement of 

ASEAN, Japan’s leaders seem to 

have concluded, there can be no 

hope of maintaining a rules-based 

order to unite the Western Pacific 

and Indian Ocean. Such international-level considerations have 

interacted with domestic politics to 

shape Japanese policy toward order-building, Koga argues.

Titli Basu uses her contribution to 

bring India into the frame. Basu 

makes the incisive point that the 

coming multipolar world will be 

anchored in a multipolar Asia; how 

the competing powers of the IndoPacific can manage to live alongside one another will, in no small 

measure, determine the fate of 

global governance and security.

Basu argues that India must be 

considered a major player in the 

Indo-Pacific (and, by extension, the 

rest of the world), but she insists 

that India should not be regarded 

as a mere “balancer.” This is something that US analysts are sometimes guilty of—valuing India in 

geopolitical terms as a bulwark 

against Chinese expansion, but not 

taking the time to consider how 

Delhi intends to exert itself as a 

shaper of regional and global order 

in its own right.

Ngaibiakching provides a sweeping 

analysis of the issues facing IndoPacific nations, from the problem 

of institutionalizing regional order 

to the imperative of avoiding a new 

“Cold War” between the United 

States and China. She echoes both 

Southgate and Basu in observing 

the importance of power as a foundation for rule making; agrees with 

Koga that small and middle 
Harris

Indo-Pacific Perspective │4

powers will play a critical role in 

shaping the emerging Indo-Pacific 

order; and makes the forceful argument that multipolarity will not be 

kind to the Indo-Pacific if it is not 

accompanied by a firm commitment to multilateralism on behalf 

of the region’s major powers.

Finally, Dewi Fortuna Anwar offers her unique perspective as not 

just an eminent academician but 

also a former policy maker in the 

Indonesian government. Her description of ASEAN’s successes at 

order-building, rulemaking, and 

shared regional governance is another powerful reminder that the 

Indo-Pacific zone is far from monolithic. Even if there is ample reason to treat the Indo-Pacific as a 

single megaregion, this must 

surely be done while paying careful 

attention to variation at the subregional level. 

What future is there for a rulesbased order in the Indo-Pacific? It 

depends. Great powers like the 

United States, India, and China; 

middle and smaller powers like 

Australia, Japan, and Indonesia; 

regional blocs like ASEAN —all of 

these actors will have an impact 

upon the development of rules for 

the region. The contributions to 

this roundtable shed valuable light 

on the interests and decision-making processes of some of the parties 

involved. They suggest that a 

rules-based order from the Persian 

Gulf to Northeast Asia is possible, 

and perhaps even inevitable, but 

still as yet undetermined. ■

Dr. Peter Harris

Dr. Harris is an assistant professor 

of political science at Colorado 

State University, where his teaching and research focus on international security, international relations theory, and US foreign policy. 

He serves as the editor for the 

Journal of Indo-Pacific Affairs’ 

new “Indo-Pacific Perspectives” series. Dr. Harris has two main research projects underway: one focusing on great-power relations 

during periods of major international change (with a specific emphasis on US–China relations) and 

another focusing on the environmental protection of US military 

bases, including overseas bases in 

the Indo-Pacific, as well as installations in the US states and territories. He has conducted extensive 

research into Diego Garcia, the 

largest island of the Chagos Archipelago (British Indian Ocean Territory), which is home to one of the 

most important US military bases 

in the world. He received his PhD 

from the University of Texas at 

Austin and holds additional degrees from SOAS, University of 

London, and the University of Edinburgh. His work has appeared in 
Introduction

Indo-Pacific Perspective │5

journals such as the Journal of 

Indo-Pacific Affairs, African Affairs, Anthropology Today, Asian 

Security, Chinese Journal of International Politics, Environmental 

Policy and Law, International 

Journal, International Political Sociology, International Politics, Israel Journal of Foreign Affairs, 

Journal of Transatlantic Studies, 

Marine Policy, National Interest, 

Political Quarterly, PS: Political 

Science & Politics, and Review of 

International Studies. He is newsletter co-editor for the International History and Politics section 

of the American Political Science 

Association.

Disclaimer

The views and opinions expressed or implied 

in JIPA are those of the authors and should 

not be construed as carrying the official 

sanction of the Department of Defense, Air 

Force, Air Education and Training Command, Air University, or other agencies or 

departments of the US government or their 

international equivalents.
Indo-Pacific Perspective │ 6

The Indian 

Ocean’s Key 

Role in the 

Indo-Pacific 

Rules-based 

International 

Order

Nilanthi Samaranayake

n September 2020, the US secretary of defense gave a speech to 

promote the “international rulesbased order, rooted in our shared 

values, that has supported 

stability and prosperity around the 

world for more than seven decades.”1 The United States and its

allies and partners have played a 

decisive role in establishing international rules and norms since the 

end of World War II. This order, 

however, is now being challenged 

by a rising China and a resurgent 

Russia. The defense secretary referred specifically to the Indo-Pacific region and Washington’s work 

“to focus attention on our priority 

theater, the Indo-Pacific. Not only 

is this region important because it 

is a hub of global trade and commerce,” he elaborated, “it is also 

the epicenter of great power competition with China. And in the 

face of destabilizing activities from 

the PLA, particularly in the maritime domain, the United States 

must be ready to deter conflict, and 

if necessary, fight and win at sea.”

Yet, the Indian Ocean is not characterized by rampant territorial 

disputes and Chinese assertiveness, as the Pacific is. From such 

characterizations, it seems clear 

that US strategy is still focused on 

the Pacific segment of the Indo-Pacific and less so the Indian Ocean, 

which remains a secondary theater 

for US defense planners. The Department of Defense’s Indo-Pacific 

Strategy Report repeated a phrase 

that is often stated by US officials: 

“The United States is a Pacific 

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2
The Indian Ocean’s Key Role in the Indo-Pacific Rules-based International Order

Indo-Pacific Perspective │7

nation.”2 Whereas China has unquestionably challenged established rules and norms in the Pacific, it has, for the most part, been 

a lawful actor in the Indian Ocean. 

In considering the rules-based international order in the wider 

Indo-Pacific region, therefore, it is 

important to examine the Indian 

Ocean on its own terms and consider options for preserving the 

rules and norms of this still relatively peaceful maritime region. 

Evolving US Policy toward the 

Indian Ocean: From the AsiaPacific to the Indo-Pacific

The 2017 National Security Strategy identified China and Russia as 

the major threats to US interests, 

and great-power competition has 

since become the organizing principle behind the implementation of 

Washington’s diplomatic3 and defense4 policies globally. Since 2017, 

Washington has adopted the term 

Indo-Pacific to describe the region 

stretching from “the west coast of 

India to the western shores of the 

United States.”5 This reflects the 

evolution of US policy toward this 

region over the past decade, especially the increased importance of 

the Indian Ocean. At the beginning 

of the decade, the region was referred to by the long-standing 

“Asia-Pacific” term. By 2011-2012, 

this geography was prioritized 

under the pivot6 (or “rebalance”)7

strategy to offset the operational 

focus of the United States in the 

Middle East. Then, this regional 

concept evolved as US diplomats 

began to link Southeast Asia with 

South Asia under an “Indo-Pacific 

Economic Corridor.”8 Among US 

defense officials, in 2013 Admiral 

Samuel Locklear, then the Commander of U.S. Pacific Command 

(PACOM), began to refer to the region as the “Indo-Asia-Pacific.”9

The term was used in US military 

service documents such as the US 

Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast 

Guard strategy in 2015. Finally, in 

2017 and 2018, the concept of the 

“Indo-Pacific” was adopted in 

Washington’s highest-level national strategy documents. This 

was in part due to recognition of 

how allies such as Japan and Australia had described the wider region. Even PACOM was renamed 

“Indo-Pacific Command” in 2018 as 

part of this alignment of terms.

Washington has expanded the articulation of its interests in this 

wider region over the past decade 

through shifts in geographic terms. 

Most recently, it has assigned a 

normative dimension to the region 

as well. By calling the region the 

“Free and Open Indo-Pacific,”10 the 

US acknowledges the rules, values, 

and norms that it seeks to defend 

and promote through the concept. 
Samaranayake

Indo-Pacific Perspective │8

Washington applies this vision to 

the Indian Ocean segment of the 

Indo-Pacific. Yet, even as the Indian Ocean has assumed greater 

importance in U.S. strategic planning through the Indo-Pacific concept, the United States continues 

to understand the region through a 

Pacific lens and risks overlooking 

the unique features of the Indian 

Ocean. 

A Rules-based International Order in the Indian Ocean

As a laboratory for cooperation, the 

Indian Ocean has seen many successes. This is due largely to the 

fact that the Indian Ocean’s strategic importance derives from its economics. The region effectively 

serves as a highway, connecting 

the bustling Pacific waters through 

the Malacca Strait and across to 

the Middle East and African 

straits of the Hormuz and Bab AlMandeb, respectively. The Indian 

Ocean sees significant traffic of hydrocarbons and container shipping. 

Due to the economic significance of 

this region, countries increasingly 

share a common interest in keeping the sea lanes open and safe. 

When piracy in the western Indian 

Ocean threatened to disrupt the 

stability of these waterways more 

than a decade ago, we witnessed a 

multinational response to secure 

them. Counterpiracy operations 

emerged, including from the USled coalition Combined Maritime 

Forces Task Force 151 and the 

NATO alliance’s Operation Ocean 

Shield. Meanwhile, China began 

its own counterpiracy operations as 

an independent deployer, as did India and Japan. Despite tensions in 

other domains, all three countries 

coordinate on escort convoys. 

In addition to counterpiracy, 

search and rescue is another area 

where countries have cooperated—

for example, in the search for the 

missing Malaysia Airlines 370 

plane. Beyond military operations, 

countries have pursued Indian 

Ocean seabed mineral exploration 

rights lawfully through the International Seabed Authority. This includes China, South Korea, and India, among other countries. The 

role of international law in the Indian Ocean has also been bolstered 

by the use of the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea and 

the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) to resolve maritime disputes between Bangladesh, India, 

and Myanmar.11 The respect for international law in these cases 

stands in contrast to China’s disregard for the PCA decision over the 

Philippines-China dispute in 2016. 

In addition to working within legal 

institutions, major extraregional 

powers such as the US and China 

have pursued membership roles in 
The Indian Ocean’s Key Role in the Indo-Pacific Rules-based International Order

Indo-Pacific Perspective │9

existing venues for cooperation in 

the Indian Ocean. This includes regional institutions such as the Indian Ocean Rim Association 

(IORA) and Indian Ocean Naval 

Symposium (IONS). Without obstacles such as major territorial 

disputes and with converging economic interests to protect the free 

flow of commerce, the Indian 

Ocean is not as contentious as the 

Pacific Ocean. 

Connecting US Strategic Goals 

in the Indo-Pacific with the Indian Ocean Order

This examination of the cooperative successes in the Indian Ocean 

does not intend to minimize the 

threat of major power rivalry in 

this region. In fact, this is a historical concern among countries in the 

Indian Ocean region. During the 

late 1960s and early 1970s, smaller 

countries promoted their vision for 

an Indian Ocean Zone of Peace due 

to the Cold War rivalry between 

the Soviet Union and the United 

States. Resident Indian Ocean 

countries face a similar challenge 

in a new era of great power competition.12 The regional security environment is even less stable when 

considering the broad-based militarization and increased acquisition 

of naval platforms, including in the 

undersea domain, by resident 

countries themselves. 

Yet, while many observers fear the 

implications of China’s expanding 

footprint through the Belt and 

Road Initiative, deployment of submarines to the Indian Ocean, establishment of a military base in 

Djibouti, and even undersea surveillance and exploration for seabed minerals, the reality is that 

China is mostly behaving according to the laws and norms in the 

Indian Ocean. In fact, even actions 

that India sees as intrusive, such 

as Chinese platforms operating in 

its exclusive economic zone (EEZ), 

are actually in line with the US interpretation of the United Nations 

Convention on the Law of the Sea 

(UNCLOS). As China becomes a 

global deployer, ironically this status helps underscore the order that 

the US wants—the freedom of navigation where international law allows. Many Indian Ocean countries 

reject the US interpretation of UNCLOS that would permit military 

activities in EEZs. They include 

Bangladesh, Myanmar, India, 

Iran, Kenya, Malaysia, Maldives, 

Mauritius, Pakistan, Somalia, Sri 

Lanka, Sudan, Thailand, and 

United Arab Emirates.13

Still, the United States should be 

vigilant about threats by China to 

disrupt the Indian Ocean order. 

One disturbing demonstration of 

this potential lies in the Chinese 

military’s lasering of US Air Force 
Samaranayake

Indo-Pacific Perspective │10

personnel in Djibouti in 2018. Such 

incidents suggest China’s assertiveness in the Pacific could carry 

over into the Indian Ocean region—which is precisely the fear of 

resident Indian Ocean countries 

that call for an Indian Ocean Zone 

of Peace.14

As Washington considers its 

broader Indo-Pacific strategy, it 

should call out the areas where 

China wants to benefit across the 

board. This is clear when Beijing 

seeks to limit international rules 

and norms to its advantage in the 

Pacific, yet free-ride off the lawful 

order and the interpretation of 

UNCLOS that the US seeks in the 

Indian Ocean. At the same time, 

Washington should also recognize 

the current strengths that exist to

underpin the lawful order in the 

Indian Ocean. More importantly, it 

should not ignore the key differences between this region and the 

Pacific while continuing to invoke 

the Free and Open Indo-Pacific 

concept as another decade begins 

in this dynamic region. ■

Nilanthi Samaranayake 

Ms. Samaranayake is the Director 

of the Strategy and Policy Analysis 

program at CNA, a nonprofit research organization in Arlington, 

VA. She is the author of numerous 

publications on Indian Ocean security issues. The views expressed 

are solely those of the author and 

not of any organization with which 

she is affiliated.
The Indian Ocean’s Key Role in the Indo-Pacific Rules-based International Order

Indo-Pacific Perspective │11

Notes

1 Secretary of Defense Dr. Mark T. Esper, “Secretary of 

Defense Speech at RAND (As Delivered),” September 

16, 2020, https://www.defense.gov/Newsroom/Speeches/Speech/Article/2350362/secretary-of-defense-speech-at-rand-as-delivered/.

2 US Department of Defense, Indo-Pacific Strategy Report: Preparedness, Partnerships, and Promoting a Networked Region, June 1, 2019, https://media.defense.gov/2019/Jul/01/2002152311/-1/-1/1/DEPARTMENT-OF-DEFENSE-INDO-PACIFIC-STRATEGY-REPORT-2019.PDF.

3 US Department of State, A Free and Open Indo-Pacific: Advancing a Shared Vision, November 4, 2019, 

https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2019/11/Freeand-Open-Indo-Pacific-4Nov2019.pdf. 

4 US Department of Defense, Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy, January 19, 2018, 

https://dod.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/2018-

National-Defense-Strategy-Summary.pdf.

5 The White House, National Security Strategy of the 

United States of America, December 2017, 

https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/NSS-Final-12-18-2017-0905.pdf.

6 Hillary Clinton, “America’s Pacific Century,” Foreign 

Policy, October 11, 2011, https://foreignpolicy.com/2011/10/11/americas-pacific-century/.

7 US Department of Defense, Sustaining U.S. Global 

Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense, January 

2012, https://archive.defense.gov/news/defense_strategic_guidance.pdf.

8 Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton, “Delivering on the Promise of Economic Statecraft,” Singapore 

Management University, November 17, 2012, 

https://2009-2017.state.gov/secretary/20092013clinton/rm/2012/11/200664.htm.

9 Donna Miles, “Locklear Calls for Indo-Asia-Pacific Cooperation,” American Forces Press Service, February 8, 

2013, https://archive.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=119243. 

10 US State Department, A Free and Open Indo-Pacific: 

Advancing a Shared Vision, November 4, 2019, 

https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2019/11/Freeand-Open-Indo-Pacific-4Nov2019.pdf.

11 Cornell Overfield, “Reflecting the Law of the Sea: In 

Defense of the Bay of Bengal’s Grey Area,” Center for 

International Maritime Security, July 22, 2020, 

http://cimsec.org/reflecting-the-law-of-the-sea-in-defense-of-the-bay-of-bengals-grey-area/44784.

12 Commodore Kazi Emdadul Haq, “The Indo-Pacific 

Strategy and Its Ramification on Weaker Countries,” 

Security World, June 22, 2020, http://securityworldbd.com/the-indo-pacific-strategy-and-its-ramification-on-weaker-countries/; P.K. Balachandran, “President Gotabaya reiterates Lanka’s plea to make the Indian Ocean a Zone of Peace,” NewsIn.Asia, October 5, 

2020, https://newsin.asia/president-gotabaya-reiterateslankas-plea-to-make-the-indian-ocean-a-zone-of-peace/; 

and Meera Srinivasan, “Indian Ocean Has to Remain a 

Zone of Peace: Ajit Doval,” The Hindu, December 1, 

2014, https://www.thehindu.com/news/international/south-asia/indian-ocean-has-to-remain-a-zone-ofpeace-ajit-doval/article6651325.ece. 

13 Congressional Research Service, U.S.-China Strategic Competition in South and East China Seas: Background and Issues for Congress, R42784, August 28, 

2020, 40, https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R42784.pdf. 

14 Nilanthi Samaranayake, “Asian Basing in Africa: India’s Setback in Seychelles Could Be Worse,” India in 

Transition, Center for the Advanced Study of India at 

University of Pennsylvania, September 24, 2018.

Disclaimer

The views and opinions expressed or implied in 

JIPA are those of the authors and should not be 

construed as carrying the official sanction of the 

Department of Defense, Air Force, Air Education 

and Training Command, Air University, or other 

agencies or departments of the US government or 

their international equivalents.
Indo-Pacific Perspective │ 12

Chinese Vision 

of a Rulesbased Order

International Order with 

Chinese Characteristics

Dr. Benjamin Tze Ern Ho

n recent years, the idea of a 

“rules-based order” (RBO) has 

been in vogue among scholars 

and practitioners of international politics, particularly in the Asia-Pacific (or 

Indo-Pacific) region amid heightened 

geopolitical rivalry between the 

United States and China. At first 

glance, the need for “rules” to ensure 

international order is stating the obvious: to have order, individuals and 

states need to operate with some rules. 

At the same time, however, what 

these rules might be (and ought to be) 

remains a vexing problem, particularly given the varying opinions and 

views among states regarding who 

gets to set the rules and, more fundamentally, whose interests the rules 

are meant to serve. 

To be certain, countries in the 

West are far from monolithic; competition for global influence exists 

even among states who subscribe 

to the liberal tradition. However, 

the idea that rules remain necessary to ensure a degree of predictability and regularity in international affairs is generally accepted 

by Western powers. From this 

view, only with rules can international stability—even as an idealized outcome—be sustained and 

safeguarded amid shifting domestic-political dynamics. 

The rise of China complicates the 

Western-centric understanding of 

RBO given that the idea of a rulesbased order is not inherently selfevident within traditional Chinese 

political philosophy. Indeed, Beijing’s experience of encountering 

RBO (and multilateralism more 

generally) is a comparatively recent phenomenon; only after its reform and opening-up program in 

the 1980s was Beijing more amenable to considering its foreign policies in such terms—and even 

then, mostly with an eye to the 

I

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Chinese Vision of a Rules-based Order

Indo-Pacific Perspective │13

Taiwan issue. It was only after the 

2008–09 global financial crisis, 

whereby Chinese leaders perceived 

a notable decline in the West and a 

reduction of Western (particularly 

American) influence in global multilateral institutions that Beijing 

started to court multilateral institutions with greater deliberation.

As the thinking in China goes, diminished American influence 

would create an opportunity to 

modify the rules governing the international system. In addition, 

Beijing’s realpolitik vision of international politics leads it to conclude that most countries who 

aligned with the United States in 

the past did so not because of some 

higher ideational motivation (for 

instance, to preserve individual human rights, or believing that democracy was the best form of governance) but because their own national interests—often materially 

defined—were best served subscribing to the American-led international order. A Chinese-led order 

could therefore expect to command 

similar levels of support.

China perceives the present moment, marked by US domestic dysfunction and the especially the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic, as a 

golden opportunity to shape global 

norms and values in accordance 

with its own preferences. This does 

not mean entirely dismantling the 

present international structure 

and replacing it with a Chinese one 

(Beijing is aware that many countries would not go along with it),

but rather to continue to support a 

rules-based order (jiyu guize de 

guojizhixu 基于规则的国际秩序) 

that preserves “Chinese characteristics” and ultimately Chinese national interests.

To be clear, the safeguarding of national interests is hardly unique to 

China; most if not all countries 

prefer rules that favor themselves. 

What is problematic is that China’s 

national interests are defined primarily with respect to the preservation of its one-party rule. In liberal democracies, of course, political parties vie to see who can best 

articulate the national interest. As 

observed by Qin Yaqing, who previously headed the China Foreign 

Affairs University, “the most basic 

feature of socialism with Chinese 

characteristics is the leadership of 

the Chinese Communist Party.”1

Seen this way, it comes as no surprise that many Chinese scholars 

equate the pursuit of a rules-based 

order as being synonymous with 

the pursuit of a liberal international order, which runs fundamentally at odds with the CCP’s 

single-party rule. Indeed, the narrative the CCP frequently touts is 

that the pursuit of a liberal order 

by the United States is meant to 
Ho

Indo-Pacific Perspective │14

make other countries to become 

more “Western,” thus fundamentally threatening the CCP’s grip on 

power. 

Not surprisingly, when Chinese 

leaders discuss regional order, they 

frequently talk about building “a 

more just, equitable, fair, democratic and representative international political and economic order” 

in the future tense, a vision that 

China aims to have an influential 

role in helping to implement.2 Similarly, there is a deeply held belief 

among many Chinese scholars and 

policymakers that the United 

States—as a hegemonic power—

does not practice what it preaches 

in terms of living up to the ideals 

of the RBO. For instance, China 

points to the United States as having violated (or opted out of) core 

aspects of international order—

such as the 2003 invasion of Iraq 

or Washington’s nonratification of 

the UN Convention on the Law of 

the Sea (UNCLOS)—to argue that 

hegemons have the privilege of hypocrisy.3 Again, this suggests that 

China perceives the RBO as being 

conceived ultimately to preserve 

American international primacy 

while artificially constraining 

China’s own rise.

With this in mind, I contend that 

China’s approach to multilateralism is one which seeks not to acquiesce in existing ideas of RBO 

(which posits certain universal ideals) but rather one which call into 

question the relevance of multilateralism as framed by Western 

thinking and worldview. China 

takes a more flexible approach to 

international law by portraying 

such rules as less morally (and legally) binding than how the West 

views them. In other words, Beijing seeks to relativize the application of international rules for reasons of self-interest. Unlike the US 

vision of multilateralism and RBO, 

which is that international rulemaking can help to preserve international stability despite changing 

domestic-political circumstances, 

China’s goal for a revised RBO is 

far narrower, more limited, and 

conspicuously inverted: to ensure 

domestic stability amid a changing 

international environment. In sum, 

multilateralism and the RBO 

means different things to different 

state actors: the United States and 

the West see multilateralism as a 

means of entrenching global leadership and promoting a liberal vision 

of world order, while China sees 

multilateralism as a diplomatic 

tool to preserve China’s national interests and legitimize its one-party 

rule.

Moving forward, it will be more 

necessary than ever for countries 

to demonstrate that their support 

for RBO (if indeed they support 
Chinese Vision of a Rules-based Order

Indo-Pacific Perspective │15

such an order) is more than just an 

outgrowth of their alignment with 

the United States or a product of 

anti-China politics. In other words, 

states will have to articulate how 

and why abiding by the tenets of a 

RBO is inherently good for them, 

or else what the characteristics of a 

better, more equitable RBO ought 

to be like. Should their dispositions 

depart from the preferences of 

Washington and Beijing, then perhaps it is time the international 

community come together to examine what is problematic and how 

best to remedy it. On the other 

hand, if there are core aspects of 

Notes 

1 Yaqing Qin, Song Dexing, Zhang Yensheng, Zhang 

Xiaotong, Zhu Feng, and Lu Chuan Ying. “Zhuanjiabitan: Dabianjuzhong de zhongguo yu shijie” [Experts in conversation: China and the World in the 

Great Game], Shanghai Institute of International 

Studies conference, 2019, DOI: 

10.13851/j.cnki.gjzw.202001001 (accessed at CNKI), 

see 5.

2 See Mira Rapp-Hooper, Michael Chase, Matake Kamiya, Shin Kawashima, and Yuichi Hosoya. “Responding to China’s Complicated Views on International Order.” Carnegie Endowment for International 

RBO that speak to broader universal concerns, than China’s framing 

of international order as inherently 

biased in favor of the West will be 

exposed as self-interested and, indeed, irresponsible. ■

Dr. Benjamin Tze Ern Ho 

Dr. Ho is an assistant professor in 

the China Programme, S. Rajaratnam School of International 

Studies, Nanyang Technological 

University, Singapore.

Peace, October 10, 2019, https://carnegieendowment.org/.

3 Rapp-Hooper et al., “Responding to China’s Complicated Views on International Order.”

Disclaimer

The views and opinions expressed or implied in 

JIPA are those of the authors and should not be 

construed as carrying the official sanction of the 

Department of Defense, Air Force, Air Education 

and Training Command, Air University, or other 

agencies or departments of the US government 

or their international equivalents.
Indo-Pacific Perspective │ 16

Do Regimes 

Matter?

Implications of the 

2016 UNCLOS South 

China Sea Ruling for 

a Rules-based order 

in the Indo-Pacific

Dr. Laura Southgate

he Philippines’ 2013 decision 

to initiate proceedings against 

China at the Permanent Court 

of Arbitration (PCA) under Article 287 

and Annex VII of the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the 

Sea (UNCLOS) was a result of the ongoing, heated sovereignty dispute 

between the two countries over maritime territory in the South China Sea. 

China claims historical rights to all 

territory within the ‘nine-dash line’, 

an undefined demarcation that encompasses the majority of the South 

China Sea. This has created conflict 

with a number of small claimant 

states in Southeast Asia and other regional powers such as the United 

States, Japan, India and Australia. 

China’s militarization of islands in the 

disputed waters and the assertive tactics it has used to defend its sovereignty claims are symptomatic of its 

growing status as Great Power in the 

international system. These actions 

have also increasingly challenged the 

existing rules-based order in the IndoPacific. As stated by President Obama 

in April 2015, “where we get concerned with China is where it is not 

necessarily abiding by international 

norms and rules and is using its sheer 

size and muscle to force countries into 

subordinate positions.”1 The Philippines’ attempt to have its sovereign 

rights in the South China Sea 

acknowledged under international law 

represents a direct challenge to 

China’s regional claims. China’s response to the PCA ruling provides a 

window through which to examine 

both the existence of a rules-based order in the Indo-Pacific and its future 

prospects as China increasingly seeks 

to exert its influence in the international system.

T

4
Do Regimes Matter?

Indo-Pacific Perspective │17

UNCLOS Ruling and Its 

Aftermath

China responded dismissively to 

the Philippines’ arbitration case by 

refusing to participate in proceedings. China’s Ministry of Foreign 

Affairs released a ‘position paper’ 

in December 2014 claiming that 

territorial sovereignty over maritime features was beyond the scope 

of the Convention.2 This did not deter the PCA, which ruled in July 

2016 that China’s claim to historic

rights to resources in the South 

China Sea were “incompatible with 

the exclusive economic zones provided for in the convention” and 

that “there was no legal basis” for 

China to claim historic rights 

within the nine-dash line.3 The 

groundbreaking ruling had little 

immediate impact on the dispute, 

however. China dismissed the ruling as a “null and void decision” 

and “nothing more than a piece of 

paper.”4 The Philippines’ new President Rodrigo Duterte stated that 

he would “set aside the arbitral 

ruling” in favor of economic incentives from China.5 This was confirmed by the Philippines’ Foreign 

Secretary Perfecto Yasay Jr., who 

stated that the Philippines “won’t 

take any steps against China” and 

that he wanted “to make sure that 

there will be no further actions 

that will heighten the tensions between the two countries, 

particularly in the Scarborough 

Shoal.”6 Yasay concluded: “we cannot stop China at this point in 

time...we will continue to pursue 

peaceful means” to the dispute.7

Despite the brokering of a ‘statusquo’ between the Philippines and 

China, whereby the latter purportedly agreed to halt further expansion in the South China Sea,8 reports from as early as November 

2017 suggested that China had 

continued to develop facilities in 

the Paracel Islands, in addition to 

a military buildup in the Spratly 

Islands.9

In the wake of the UNCLOS ruling, China has also pursued a new 

legal basis for its territorial interests in the South China Sea. It has 

done so by re-packaging its sovereignty claims to appear more consistent with UNCLOS. Employing 

a new legal tactic referred to as a 

legal warfare, or ‘lawfare’ approach, China’s ‘nine-dash line’ 

narrative has been de-emphasized 

in favour of a ‘Four Sha’ claim.10

Translated as ‘four sands’, this new 

position sees China asserting sovereignty over four island chains: 

the Pratas Islands, Paracel Islands, Spratly Islands and Macclesfield Bank area. In adopting 

this approach, China has attempted to strengthen its legal 

claims in the South China Sea by 

claiming the Four Sha as part of 
Southgate

Indo-Pacific Perspective │18

China’s 200-mile Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), and by asserting that they are part of China’s 

extended continental shelf.11 As 

noted by two prominent international legal experts, while “this 

new Chinese legal strategy is even 

weaker than the Nine-Dash Line 

given [that] it clearly violates UNCLOS,” China “may have concluded that it can better shape (or 

undermine, depending on your 

viewpoint) the law of the sea by 

adopting UNCLOS terminology.”12

Thus China’s ‘Four Sha’ claim attempts to circumnavigate existing 

law and re-conceptualize the existing rules-based order in support of 

Chinese state interests.

Regimes, Sovereignty and 

Power

China’s actions raise a number of 

interesting questions regarding the 

importance of regimes in the international system and what happens 

when states seek to pursue their 

own interests to uphold state sovereignty. According to Hans Morgenthau, “international law owes 

its existence and operation to two 

factors, both decentralized in character: identical or complementary 

interests of individual states and 

the distribution of power among 

them.”13 In many respects, power 

dynamics are at the center of international law enforcement, whereby 

“it makes it easy for the strong 

both to violate the law and to enforce it, and consequently puts the 

rights of the weak in jeopardy.”14

Legal rules therefore only serve to 

satisfy the interests of the most 

powerful. This is supported by Robert Gilpin, who argues that “the 

primary foundation of rights and 

rules is in the power interests of 

the dominant group or states in a 

social system.”15 China’s reaction 

to the UNCLOS South China Sea 

ruling demonstrates how international laws exist and operate on 

the basis of powerful state interests. Great Powers will seek to undermine existing laws when conflictual matters of state sovereignty and territorial integrity are 

at stake. The doctrine of sovereignty is both an operating principle enshrined in international law 

and a principle that can be used as 

a tool to circumvent or manipulate 

international law in support of 

state interests.16 Underlying this 

argument is the crucial role of 

state power and the distribution of 

capabilities in the international 

system.

China’s largely successful attempts 

to reconfigure international law in 

the South China Sea is evidence of 

its growing regional and international power. It is also testament 

to the continued applicability of regimes insofar as they can be used 
Do Regimes Matter?

Indo-Pacific Perspective │19

to support a state’s agenda. As this 

case study shows, a powerful state 

will seek to challenge international 

law if it is in its interest to do so, 

particularly as it relates to a core 

security concern such as state sovereignty. This treatment of international law is certainly not new, 

nor limited to actions conducted by 

China. However, it is indicative of 

the type of behavior we can expect 

to see repeated as China seeks to 

exert its influence over the IndoPacific as its power rises. If successful, a new type of rules-based 

order may develop, one that does 

not necessarily reflect the existing 

status quo. As far as the existing 

order reflects US interests, Great 

Power security competition cannot 

be ruled out. For smaller states in 

the international system, the 

Notes

1 “Obama says China bullying smaller nations in 

South China Sea row,” The Guardian, April 10, 2015, 

https://www.theguardian.com/.

2 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic 

of China, “Position Paper of the Government of the 

People’s Republic of China on the Matter of Jurisdiction in the South China Sea Arbitration Initiated by 

the Republic of the Philippines,” December 07, 2014, 

http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/.

3 Permanent Court of Arbitration, The Hague, “Press 

Release: The South China Sea Arbitration (The Republic of the Philippines v. The People’s Republic of 

China,” July 12, 2016, https://pca-cpa.org/.

4 Richard Javad Heydarian, “Has Duterte’s China 

engagement backfired?,” Asia Times, July 14, 2017, 

http://www.atimes.com/.

UNCLOS ruling will undoubtedly 

act as a valuable lesson: that while 

all states, regardless of their size, 

have recourse to the international 

courts, little can be done to enforce 

a ruling if a powerful state chooses 

to ignore it. ■

Dr. Laura Southgate

Dr. Southgate is lecturer in politics 

and international relations at Aston University, deputy co-director 

of the Aston Centre for Europe, 

and author of ASEAN Resistance to 

Sovereignty Violation: Interests, 

Balancing and the Role of the Vanguard State (Bristol University 

Press, 2019).

5 Jim Gomez, “Duterte says he’ll set aside sea feud 

ruling against China,” Philstar, December 17, 2016, 

http://www.philstar.com/.

6 Gomez, “Duterte says he’ll set aside sea feud ruling 

against China.”

7 Ibid.

8 Manuel Mogato, “Philippines says China agrees on 

no new expansion in South China Sea,” Reuters, August 15, 2017, https://www.reuters.com/.

9 “As attention focuses on North Korean threat, Beijing quietly expanding South China Sea militarisation,” Japan Times, November 1, 2017, 

https://www.japantimes.co.jp/.

10 Mark J. Valencia, “China, US Both Using Lawfare 

in the South China Sea,” The Diplomat, October 12, 

2017, https://thediplomat.com/.

11 Patricia Lourdes Viray, “South China Sea: China 

has new claim to nibble more land from Taiwan, Vietnam, the Philippines? “The Four Sha Claim,” 

Philstar, September 27, 2017.
Southgate

Indo-Pacific Perspective │20

12 Julian Ku and Chris Mirasola, “The South China 

Sea and China’s “Four Sha” Claim: New Legal Theory, Same Bad Argument,” Lawfare, September 25, 

2017, https://www.lawfareblog.com/.

13 Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations: The 

Struggle for Power and Peace (New York: Alfred 

Knopf, 1965), 277.

14 Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, 294.

15 Robert Gilpin, War and Change in International 

Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 

1981), 35.

16 Anthony Clark Arend, “Do Legal Rules Matter? 

International Law and International Politics,” Virginia Journal of International Law 38, no. 2 (1997): 

107–53, at 142.

Disclaimer

The views and opinions expressed or implied in 

JIPA are those of the authors and should not be 

construed as carrying the official sanction of the 

Department of Defense, Air Force, Air Education 

and Training Command, Air University, or other 

agencies or departments of the US government 

or their international equivalents.
Indo-Pacific Perspective │ 21

Next Priorities 

for Japan’s 

FOIP Vision

The Quad, ASEAN, 

and Institutional 

Linkages in the IndoPacific

Dr. Kei Koga

ne of Japan’s most important 

diplomatic agendas has become the realization of a 

“Free and Open Indo-Pacific” (FOIP), 

which was launched by former Prime 

Minister Shinzo Abe in 2016 to maintain and facilitate the existing rulesbased order in the region.1 And yet, it 

was not clear to what extent new 

Prime Minister Yoshihide Suga would 

emphasize this strategic vision. In 

fact, the question of Japan’s commitment to the FOIP has drawn much international attention from practitioners and foreign policy experts because 

of Japan’s potential preoccupation 

with a number of domestic issues, 

ranging from COVID-19, economic recovery, and the 2021 Tokyo Olympics.2

Indeed, Suga’s political priorities appear to focus on domestic affairs, such 

as unemployment and revising the 

small and medium-sized enterprise 

basic law. The Prime Minister is also 

said to lack diplomatic experience, 

which was well illustrated by his 

statement during the campaign for 

President of the Liberal Democratic 

Party in September 2020, when Suga 

stated that he cannot emulate Shinzo 

Abe’s summit diplomacy and that he 

would consult with the Minister and 

Ministry of Foreign Affairs as well as 

former Prime Minister Abe about Japan’s diplomacy.3

As a result of this apparent inertia, 

diplomatic continuity has ensued. 

Since Suga was inaugurated on 

September 16, 2020, he emphasized the importance of Abe’s foreign-policy agendas. The FOIP remains Japan’s core strategic vision, with the US-Japan alliance 

playing a pivotal role.4 Japan 

hosted the second Japan-AustraliaIndia-US Foreign Ministers’ 

O

5
Koga

Indo-Pacific Perspective │22

meeting (the so-called “Quad”) on 

October 6 to further coordinate 

their policies to realize the FOIP 

region.5 Suga regards Southeast 

Asia as the geographical center of 

the Indo-Pacific, and he made his 

very first diplomatic trips to Vietnam (2020 ASEAN chair) and Indonesia (the largest Southeast 

Asian country) in October. Based 

on these early moves, there appears to be no diplomatic upset: 

Suga seems likely to follow 

through on what Abe has envisioned for the FOIP.

However, this diplomatic posture is 

not sustainable in the long-term. 

Eventually, Japan needs to provide 

a clear strategy to realize the FOIP 

in the context of the rapidly evolving US-China great power rivalry. 

There are three reasons for this.

The Need for Flexible 

Adaptation

First, Japan’s FOIP vision is essentially evolutionary, which requires 

conceptual updates over time. As 

many have already pointed out, 

the concept of Japan’s FOIP has 

been changing since its inception 

in 2016. Initially, Japan aimed to 

maintain and strengthen the rulesbased international order in the 

Indo-Pacific region, which has been 

largely shaped by the United 

States in the post-Cold War era.6

Japan’s interest has been to blunt 

China’s increasing political influence in the region, which is 

thought to be detrimental to existing international rules and norms. 

Most notably, China’s rejection of 

the 2016 South China Sea Tribunal Award disrespected international laws, while China’s “Belt 

and Road Initiative” has been responsible for setting new international standards for development.7

However, Japan’s strategy to protect the FOIP principles was unclear to begin with. Japan initially 

emphasized the importance of “fundamental rights” such as the rule 

of law, human rights, and democracy.8 Yet, because there are many 

non-democratic states in the region, such an emphasis soon disappeared. Moreover, the FOIP vision 

was initially called the “Free and 

Open Indo-Pacific Strategy” but 

Japan eliminated “strategy” from 

the phraseology because some 

ASEAN member states were concerned about its diplomatic implications—that FOIP aimed to counterbalance or contain China, for example.9 As such, Japan flexibly 

changed the FOIP concept in accordance with reactions from other 

states.

Currently, Japan’s FOIP vision 

consists of “three pillars”: (1) “promotion and establishment of the 

rule of law, freedom of navigation, 

free trade, etc.”; (2) “Pursuit of 
Next Priorities for Japan’s FOIP Vision

Indo-Pacific Perspective │23

economic prosperity (improving 

connectivity and strengthening 

economic partnership including 

EPA/FTAs and investment treaties)”; and (3) “Commitment for 

peace and stability (capacity building on maritime law enforcement, 

HA/DR cooperation, etc.).”10 These 

are all international rules and 

norms that Japan has long supported. Nevertheless, these pillars 

might change in the future, depending on the development of the 

region’s strategic environment. 

Particularly, as power diffuses 

across the region, a renewed rulesmaking mechanism may become 

necessary. The Suga administration must prepare for this challenge in the future. 

Navigating Great Power 

Rivalry

Second, Japan still seeks a balance 

in its diplomatic relations with 

both the United State and China. 

Currently, Japan’s foremost ally, 

the United States, has begun to 

take a much tougher stance on 

China in terms of COVID-19, economics, and technological modernization. Many in Washington now 

believe the past approach of “engagement” to have been a mistake. 

The experience of the COVID-19 

pandemic has exacerbated this 

trend.11 To be sure, the Trump administration’s confrontational 

approach toward China faces severe criticism, and there are debates over a means to manage its 

relations with China. Nevertheless, Washington’s tough posture 

toward China has garnered broad 

bipartisan support. America’s 

FOIP strategy is now part of an 

anti-China strategy, designed to 

force Beijing to follow existing international rules and norms. This 

trend will not easily be reversed. 

On the other hand, Japan still attempts to engage China. Earlier 

this year, Abe invited Xi Jinping to 

Japan as a state visit in April and 

attempted to draft the “fifth document,” the fifth symbolic official 

document after the Sino-Japanese 

diplomatic normalization in 1972 

that highlights the future vision of 

Sino-Japanese relations.12 The 

visit was postponed because of the 

COVID-19 pandemic, however, and 

rising tensions over the East China 

Sea mean that both leaders seem 

to have lost political traction for bilateral initiatives. 

Suga recognizes the importance of 

Japan-China relations for national, 

regional, and global stability. He 

has advocated the need for common agendas.13 Even as he maintains a firm stance on territorial 

sovereignty and the rule of law, 

then, Suga has shown interest in 

persuading China to follow international rules and norms by 
Koga

Indo-Pacific Perspective │24

maintaining channels of communication at various levels, including 

the summit level.14 In this sense, 

there is a divergence in diplomatic 

posture between Japan and the 

United States. Yet, since the USJapan alliance is the core of the 

FOIP vision, it will be necessary 

for both states to coordinate how to 

maintain consistency between Japan’s softer and US tougher FOIP 

stance vis-à-vis China. 

Realigning Institutions

Third, Japan’s institutional strategy in the Indo-Pacific has yet to 

be clearly articulated. In the initial 

concept, Japan’s emphasis was on 

the Quad as a central framework

to realize FOIP.15 However, given 

diplomatic concerns raised by several ASEAN member states in 

2018, Japan and the Quad members began to emphasize the importance of ASEAN unity and centrality.16 In response, with a strong 

push from Indonesia and a diplomatic coordination by Thailand as 

ASEAN chair, ASEAN issued its 

“ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific” (AOIP) statement in 2019, 

which emphasized the “inclusiveness” of regional architecture and 

regional cooperation over “rivalry.”17 ASEAN’s priority is thus 

to neutralize great power rivalry 

and its negative spill-over effect to 

Southeast Asia and other subregions of the Indo-Pacific. Japan 

immediately supported the AOIP. 

That said, it is still not clear what 

Japan and the Quad members expect from ASEAN. If the Quad 

members regard ASEAN’s utility 

only as a dialogue convenor that 

provides multilateral communication channels, and if they attempt 

to create “effective multilateralism” that gets things done as the 

US Secretary State Pompeo indicated, some ASEAN member states 

would likely view this as diplomatic marginalization.18 To reassure ASEAN and garner its support for their FOIP vision, Japan 

and the Quad members need to 

clearly delineate ASEAN’s role in 

the Indo-Pacific. 

The Future of FOIP

These three factors show that more 

work needs to be done to realize 

Japan’s FOIP vision—constructing 

a new regional rules-based order. 

This is the work that the Abe administration left out, and that the 

Suga administration needs to work 

on. 

Two tasks should be prioritized. 

The first is to evolve the Quad into 

the Quad-Plus as an Indo-Pacific 

institutional framework. While 

agreeing the basic principles of the 

FOIP, Quad-Plus member and 

partner states will have to understand that there are diverging 
Next Priorities for Japan’s FOIP Vision

Indo-Pacific Perspective │25

national interests among them, 

and that cooperation will not be 

possible in all issue areas. Rather, 

an expanded Quad-plus could emulate the division of labor modeled 

by the Japan-Australia-US “Trilateral Partnership for infrastructure 

investment in the Indo-Pacific,” 

and the partnership between the 

United States and Japan on energy, infrastructure, and digital 

connectivity.19 In short, the Quad(-

Plus) can function best as a forum 

to flexibly coordinate policies that 

advance the FOIP vision where 

possible. This means that the Quad 

can also expand its membership to 

any states that agree with the 

FOIP principles. Accordingly, it is 

in Japan’s interests to ensure that 

the Quad-Plus formula it utilized 

to include more regional states, 

such as Vietnam and Indonesia, as 

well as European states, such as 

the United Kingdom, France, and 

Germany, to buttress the provision 

of international public goods such 

as knowledge-transfer rules, infrastructure development, and management of non-traditional security 

issues. 

The second task is to strike a balance between ASEAN and the 

Quad. As mentioned above, some 

ASEAN member states are skeptical about the development of the 

Quad framework, which threatens 

to diplomatically marginalize 

ASEAN and intensify great power 

rivalry with China. Without close 

consultation, institutionalizing the 

Quad could exacerbate ASEAN’s 

concerns and skepticism. Also, 

given ASEAN’s consensus-based 

decision-making process, it is important to reassure all member 

states in this regard. Therefore, 

Japan should propose to enhance 

ASEAN’s role in the Indo-Pacific 

by forming “webs” of regional institutions. The starting point might 

be to create a Quad-ASEAN TrackII dialogue, as well as to link the 

Quad and ASEAN-X formula. The 

Quad’s strength is its flexibility: it 

should actively engage ASEAN and 

its individual member state, offering reassurance and building partnerships. At the same time, in order to enable regional states to engage in deeper multilateral, strategic discussions and prevent great 

powers from irreversible political 

and economic decoupling, Japan 

should encourage ASEAN to further institutionalize the East Asia 

Summit, such as strengthening its 

secretariat functions and conducting more frequent Senior-Official 

level exchanges. 

Japan’s FOIP vision under the 

Suga administration aims to avoid 

an intensive confrontation between 

the United States and China by developing regional rules and norms 

that are based on the existing 
Koga

Indo-Pacific Perspective │26

international order. This will be a 

difficult task given that the consolidation of rules and norms will require a regional consensus. If the 

attempt fails, it will result in exposing intraregional divides. However, such a window of opportunity 

has not been closed yet. Japan is in 

a good strategic position to bridge 

the various regional powers. Proactively taking a normative leadership role in the Indo-Pacific by 

evolving the Quad, encouraging 

ASEAN to further institutionalize 

Notes

1 Kei Koga, “Japan’s ‘Free and Open Indo-Pacific’ 

Strategy: Tokyo’s Tactical Hedging and the Implications for ASEAN,” Contemporary Southeast Asia 41, 

no. 2 (2019): 286-313; Yuichi Hosoya, “FOIP 2.0: The 

Evolution of Japan’s Free and Open Indo-Pacific 

Strategy,” Asia-Pacific Review 26, no. 1 (2019): 18–

28.

2 See, for example, Zack Cooper and Jeffrey Hornung, “The US-Japan alliance after Abe,” Los Angeles 

Times, September 8, 2020, https://www.aei.org/.

3 “Jiminto sosaisen no kokai toronkai—Ishiba, Suga, 

Kishida-shi no hatsugen Yoshi” [Public Debated for 

the LDP Presidential Election—summary of statements by Ishiba, Suga, and Kishida]. Nihon Keizai 

Shimbun, September 12, 2020, https://www.nikkei.com/.

4 Prime Minister’s Office of Japan. “Dai nihyakusan 

kai kokkai ni okeru suganaikakusouridaijin shoshin 

hyomei enzetsu” [203th Diet Session: The Suga administration’s Policy Speech], October 26, 2020, 

https://www.kantei.go.jp/.

5 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan (MOFA), “The 

Second Japan-Australia-India-U.S. Foreign Ministers’ Meeting,” October 6, 2020, 

https://www.mofa.go.jp/.

6 MOFA, “Address by Prime Minister Shinzo Abe at 

the Opening Session of the Sixth Tokyo International 

Conference on African Development (TICAD VI),” 

EAS, and creating the linkages between them — all of these are 

goals worth trying for. ■

Dr. Kei Koga 

Dr. Koga is an Assistant Professor 

at the Public Policy and Global Affairs Programme, School of Social 

Sciences, Nanyang Technological 

University, Singapore.

August 27, 2016, https://www.mofa.go.jp/.

7 Kei Koga, “Japan’s ‘Indo-Pacific’ Question: Countering China or Shaping a New Regional Order?” International Affairs 96, no. 1 (2020): 49–73.

8 MOFA, “State Minister for Foreign Affairs Kishi’s

Speech at the Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA) 

Summit,” March 8 2017, https://www.mofa.go.jp/ ;

and MOFA. “Japan-U.S. Working Lunch and JapanU.S. Summit Meeting,” November 6, 2017, 

https://www.mofa.go.jp/ .

9 “Indo taiheiyo, kieta ‘senryaku’ seifu ga ‘koso’ ni 

shusei” [Indo-Pacific: Disappeared ‘Strategy’: The 

Japanese Government Altered It to ‘Vision’]. Nikkei 

Shimbun, November 13, 2018.

10 MOFA, “Free and Open Indo-Pacific,” n.d., 

https://www.mofa.go.jp/ .

11 Matthew Lee, “At Nixon library, Pompeo declares 

China engagement a failure,” The Washington Post, 

July 24, 2020, https://www.washingtonpost.com/; and 

Alice Su and Tracy Wilkinson, “New Analysis: How 

bad could U.S.-China relations get?” Los Angeles 

Times, July 26, 2020, https://www.latimes.com/.

12 “Japan, China to craft new political document for 

Xi’s state visit,” Kyodo News Service, January 9, 

2020, https://english.kyodonews.net/.

13 Prime Minister’s Office of Japan, “Dai nihyakusan 

kai.”

14 MOFA, “Japan-China Summit Telephone Talk,” 

September 25, 2020, https://www.mofa.go.jp/.

15 MOFA, “Priority Policy for Development 
Next Priorities for Japan’s FOIP Vision

Indo-Pacific Perspective │27

Cooperation FY 2017,” 9, https://www.mofa.go.jp/.

16 Charissa Yong, “Singapore will not join Indo-Pacific bloc for now: Vivian,” The Straits Times, May 15, 

2018, https://www.straitstimes.com/; and MOFA. “Japan-Australia-India-U.S. Consultations,” June 7, 

2018, https://www.mofa.go.jp/.

17 ASEAN Secretariat. “ASEAN Outlook on the IndoPacific.” June 23, 2019, https://asean.org/.

18 US Department of State, “Briefing with Senior 

State Department Officials on Secretary Pompeo’s 

Visit to Japan,” October 6, 2020. 

https://www.state.gov/.

19 Prime Minister of Australia, “Joint Statement of 

the Governments of Australia, Japan and the United 

States,” November 17, 2018. https://www.pm.gov.au/;

and White House, “U.S.-Japan Joint Statement on 

Advancing a Free and Open Indo-Pacific through Energy, Infrastructure and Digital Connectivity Cooperation,” November 13, 2018,

https://www.whitehouse.gov/.

Disclaimer

The views and opinions expressed or implied in 

JIPA are those of the authors and should not be 

construed as carrying the official sanction of the 

Department of Defense, Air Force, Air Education 

and Training Command, Air University, or other 

agencies or departments of the US government 

or their international equivalents.
Indo-Pacific Perspective │ 28

India’s IndoPacific Reckoning

Dr. Titli Basu

S-China disorder presents a 

defining moment in international history. A fractured 

power structure and contestation 

over the rules of the international 

system have been sharpened by 

the COVID-19 pandemic. Beijing’s 

ascent in the international order 

and the ensuing disequilibrium in 

the balance of power between the 

United States and China at the 

global level, and China and India 

at the regional level, are making 

policy elites in Delhi fiercely debate key strategic choices in pursuit of the national interest. Stakes 

are high with trade, technology, 

the fourth industrial revolution, 

and infrastructure all defining 

great power contestation in the 

strategic theatre of the Indo-Pacific.

Disequilibrium in US-ChinaIndia Triangle

China frames its pursuit of power 

within the narrative of “great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation,” 

anchored in an historical interpretation of the Middle Kingdom’s 

“century of humiliation” from the 

First Opium War through the SinoJapanese War. Beijing’s path to 

primacy is anchored not only in 

military modernization and economic statecraft but also soft and 

sharp power instruments to advance grand strategic designs like 

the Belt and Road Initiative. With 

China’s rise, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) seeks a renegotiation of the asymmetry that exists between the distribution of 

power and the distribution benefits

in international society. Offering 

Chinese solutions to international 

problems, Beijing has challenged 

the US-led liberal order with alternative rules and norms, ideas, and 

institutions.

At the regional level, the growing 

U

6
India’s Indo-Pacific Reckoning

Indo-Pacific Perspective │29

power differential in India-China 

relations is manifesting beyond 

contested Himalayan borders. Chinese checkers in Pakistan, South 

Asia, and the wider Indian Ocean 

Region further complicate geopolitics. In the last two decades, Beijing’s defense spending has witnessed around a seven-fold increase, rising from $39.6 billion in 

1999 to $266.4 billion in 2019.1 The 

reality of China’s economy being 

one-sixth larger than America’s (in 

purchasing power parity terms) is 

upon us.2 It is imperative for India 

to adjust to the profound impact of 

China’s rise in the immediate 

neighborhood, and especially when 

it comes to addressing Chinese aggression along its land border with 

India. In recent times, India has 

managed incidents like Doklam, 

Chumar, and Depsang—but the 

Galwan standoff was the definitive 

moment when Beijing has “strategically lost India.”3 In India, the 

debate over China is increasingly 

turning in favor of making the cost 

of unilaterally altering the status 

quo unsustainable for Beijing.4

Beijing’s Proposition of a 

Unipolar Asia in a Chinese 

Century

The narrow prism of analyzing India as a mere “balancer” in great 

power game is flawed. Sharper 

strategic articulation from Delhi is 

positioning India as a leading 

power in a multi-polar world. 

Delhi’s strategic quest for a multipolar world was shaped amid apprehension of US hegemony in the 

post-Cold War years. India believes 

that a multipolar world should be 

anchored by a multipolar Asia at 

its core.5 But today, the prospect of 

a unipolar Asia has become more 

pronounced with President Xi 

Jinping’s “China Dream.” While 

India is seeking strategic equilibrium, China is relentless in its pursuit of engineering a hierarchical 

Asian order, with Beijing at top,6

fueling its vision of a Chinese century as opposed to an Asian century.7

Judging from key policy pronouncements, India aspires to be a 

stabilizing power bringing its capacities to bear on the international system for the purpose of 

promoting the global good.8 It 

wants to be a net-security provider 

rather than a disruptionist power 

in the Indo-Pacific. India’s Foreign 

Minister Dr. S. Jaishankar has 

deftly articulated that today’s 

multi-polar world reflects strong 

bipolar characteristics, with not all 

the poles being of the same size, 

and the United States and China 

being relatively more influential 

than other players.9

Shaking off “hesitations of history”10 and debunking the 
Basu

Indo-Pacific Perspective │30

narrative of India as a reluctant 

power, Delhi aims to be a rulesshaper and not an abstainer – recognizing that “rule of force” underwrites the “rule of law.” At the 

Shangri-La Dialogue, India has argued that the Indo-Pacific should 

be anchored in rules and norms 

based on the consent of all and not 

the power of a few. Strategic conversations have urged for a New 

Delhi Consensus, characterized by 

a call for a more inclusive, equitable, and participatory world order.11 The experience of the liberal 

rules-based order was “neither liberal, nor particularly orderly”12 for 

all. History shows that great powers have often customized rules of 

the international system and have 

taken an a la carte approach in 

pursuit of their national interest 

and strategic ambitions. Rulesbased order has at times been overridden by power-based order.

The rules of the international system need to be overhauled and India cannot afford to be a passive 

player. India largely has a ruletaker instinct. For instance, unlike 

Beijing’s disregard for the PCA’s 

ruling in favor of the Philippines, 

Delhi respected the ruling by a 

PCA-established tribunal in favor 

of Bangladesh in the Bay of Bengal 

Boundary Arbitration. But India’s 

rising political capital as a ruleshaper makes it imminent for 

Delhi to make tough policy choices 

and shape global conversations setting standards on pertinent issues, 

for instance, global trade rules, 

tech rules and digital governance. 

Dividends of India’s Doctrine 

India’s search for solutions in managing differences and protecting 

strategic equities has renewed the 

debate on strategic autonomy versus alliances. The strategic assessment in Delhi is that “the more India rises, the more it must expect 

Chinese opposition.”13 With the 

Galwan misadventure, Beijing has 

incentivized Delhi’s pivot to Washington, but the current border crisis might not fundamentally reorient Indian policy towards alliance, 

but it may rebalance some of its 

priorities.14

Sieving the conversation in Delhi 

shows that, while alliance continues to remain the “wrong answer” 

for India, greater “realism” is permeating policymaking. Political 

discourse suggests that while India 

cannot give any other country a 

veto over its policy options, there is 

a need to look beyond dogma and 

enter the real world of convergences.15 Today, military alliances 

are neither being offered to nor 

sought by Delhi. The very discourse in India has pivoted to encompassing issue-based multialignments and coalitions in 
India’s Indo-Pacific Reckoning

Indo-Pacific Perspective │31

pursuit of shared strategic interests and leveraging partnerships to 

further India’s national interests. 

Indeed, this new discourse has echoes in India’s history of trysts with 

various shapes and forms of alliances, all of which were influenced 

by the evolving nature of international threats.16

While the Trump administration 

has treated Delhi relatively more 

gently than Beijing and even some 

of its formal allies,17 India is 

keenly aware that the United 

States has fed the rise of China 

and that a US-China “grand bargain” at some point is not impossible. To date, India’s strategy of engagement-with-all without having 

to choose between rival great powers paid rich dividends in terms of 

sourcing capital and technology. 

“Balance of interest” has remained 

the guiding principle of Indian foreign policy.

Between National Interests and 

International Responsibilities 

India’s Indo-Pacific strategy, while 

being a critical component of 

Delhi’s China policy, also enumerates an open, inclusive, and cooperative construct to maximize geopolitical advantages and geo-economic guarantees in advancing India’s global influence. 

Maritime security is at the heart of 

Indo-Pacific construct. While the 

geography extends from the 

“shores of Africa to that of the 

Americas,” the India Ocean remains the primary theater for 

Delhi. Despite the natural geographic advantages in the littoral, 

India’s policy elites have long had 

a continental orientation. But 

China’s strategic ambition in the 

Indian Ocean, manifested in its expanding military footprint and the 

21st Century Maritime Silk Road 

projects, has compelled Delhi to reorient its focus. As such, island nations and smaller littoral states situated in the strategic geography 

across Indian Ocean, Pacific 

Ocean, and even the Caribbean are 

gaining more attention in New 

Delhi’s strategic thinking.18

Securing a stable maritime order -

and the rule of law at sea - has 

driven Indian maritime diplomacy. 

To uphold rule of law and freedom 

of seas, Delhi is weaving a deeper 

security-cooperation network 

among Indo-Pacific stakeholders. 

This is taking the form of a growing number of logistics agreements, intelligence sharing arrangements, advancing maritime 

capacity building, maritime domain awareness, and strengthening interoperability between navies 

through joint drills like the Malabar exercise in key theatres. India 

has conceived the Indo-Pacific 

Ocean Initiative (IPOI), building 
Basu

Indo-Pacific Perspective │32

on the Security and Growth for All 

in the Region (SAGAR) doctrine, in 

its quest for securing maritime 

global commons and present governance solutions to shared maritime challenges. In designing a 

rules-based regional architecture, 

India’s IPOI rests upon the seven 

pillars of maritime security, maritime ecology, maritime resources, 

capacity building and resource 

sharing, disaster risk reduction 

and management, science, technology and academic cooperation, and 

trade connectivity and maritime 

transport.19 This has gained traction with other maritime democracies like Japan and Australia, and 

also features in the India-ASEAN 

Plan of Action (2021-2025). 

Strategic pursuit of a free, open, 

and inclusive Indo-Pacific is shaping India’s issue-based alignments 

with various Indo-Pacific stakeholders, especially the United 

States, Japan, Australia, and 

France in addition to ASEAN and 

the European Union in bilateral, 

trilateral, quadrilateral and “Quad 

plus” strategic geometries. While 

the Quadrilateral Security dialogue (“Quad”) is anchored by a desire to keep maritime highways 

free and open, coordination under 

the India-Japan-Australia Supply 

Chain Resilience Initiative (SCRI) 

is driven by the need to map and 

manage supply-chain 

vulnerabilities in key sectors like 

pharmaceuticals, medical devices, 

semiconductors, automotives, and 

chemicals. India’s recent involvement along with Japan in the Five 

Eyes intelligence-sharing framework is designed to navigate tensions between law enforcement 

and the encryption policies of tech 

companies – another demonstration of Delhi’s rising interest in 

forming global coalitions. 

India accords primacy to advancing 

regional connectivity and infrastructure across the Indo-Pacific. 

Doing so not only connects the economic growth poles and advances 

regional economic linkages, production networks and value chains, 

but also acts as strategic leverage 

in the great power game. As host 

nations today have several financing options, including BRI, India 

advocates infrastructure projects 

underpinned by consultative practices involving local stakeholders. 

India’s infrastructure outreach is 

driven by compliance with global 

governance standards, including 

respect for sovereignty, responsible 

debt financing practices, and ecological sustainability. As such, India has steered a Coalition for Disaster Resilient Infrastructure and 

International Solar Alliance.

Infrastructure financing is a vital 

geo-economic instrument of statecraft and India is catching up by 
India’s Indo-Pacific Reckoning

Indo-Pacific Perspective │33

tapping into the joint capacities of 

strategic partners like Japan and 

the United States to deliver on the 

shared responsibility of addressing 

the infrastructure gap. The IndoPacific Infrastructure Trilateral 

Forum aims to channel the assets 

and resources of the India-JapanUnited States private sectors to address the infrastructure gap. Moreover, India is inching towards joining forces with the US-Japan-Australia-led Blue Dot Network 

(BDN), seeking to advance high 

quality infrastructure. Japan has 

emerged as India’s preferred partner in third country co-operation 

with a few success stories to boast 

in the Bay of Bengal.

Beyond hard infrastructure, strategic competition also centers on 

technology and data. Given the vitality of digital connectivity and secured networks, India is coordinating with like-minded partners at 

the D-10 on strategic vulnerabilities and national-security challenges posed by critical technologies including 5G. The Open Radio 

Access Network (O-RAN) is driving 

the discourse and an O-RAN Policy 

Coalition is formed to advance 

open and interoperable solutions 

aimed at enabling innovation. Mutual interests could drive momentum on key verticals including artificial intelligence, quantum technologies, space technologies and in 

strategic metals and minerals.

Revisiting the global economic order became apparent following 

Covid-19. The pandemic unleashed 

severe economic contraction across 

the world, and tentatively dialed

down India’s growth story. The disruption has made Delhi devise the 

Atmanirbhar Bharat strategy 

which has sparked a fierce debate 

on globalization versus economic 

autarky. To be clear, Prime Minister Modi’s self-reliance policy is not 

about being self-contained or being 

closed to the world but is driven by 

India’s determination to enhance 

its economic contribution to the 

global economy. India’s exit from 

the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) pact, 

which took place even before the 

COVID-19 pandemic struck, underscores the domestic compulsions and urgent need to accelerate 

structural reforms and enhance 

competitiveness.

India’s ability to economically engage with the region remains imperative since economic isolation is 

not an option. But the RCEP negotiations proved that the world is 

perhaps unwilling to accommodate 

India’s interest despite the size of 

its market. India’s target of becoming a US$5 trillion economy is contingent on becoming able to withstand global competition and seize 

benefits from export opportunities 
Basu

Indo-Pacific Perspective │34

that external markets offer. Multilateral agreements create such expanded opportunity.20

Walking the Talk 

While the Indo-Pacific is dominating the political lexicon and strategic thinking in Delhi, the biggest 

challenge will be matching political 

intent with material and national 

capacity. The conversation on the 

Indo-Pacific gained traction with 

Japanese Prime Minister Abe 

Shinzo’s landmark speech in the 

Indian Parliament – “Confluence of 

the Two Seas” - capturing the dynamic coupling of the Indian and 

Pacific Oceans as seas of freedom 

and prosperity. India’s “Look East 

Policy,” meanwhile, pivoted to “Act 

East” and subsequently the idea of 

a “Free and Open Indo-Pacific.” If 

geopolitical churning in the major 

capitals of the world have positioned India at the heart of their 

respective Indo-Pacific strategy, 

India has, for its part, shed its 

Notes

1 “What Does China Really Spend on its Military?,” 

CSIS China Power, September 15, 2020, 

https://chinapower.csis.org/.

2 Graham Allison, “China Is Now the World’s Largest 

Economy. We Shouldn’t Be Shocked,” National Interest, October 15, 2020, https://nationalinterest.org/.

3 Ananth Krishnan, “For Minor Tactical Gains on the 

Ground, China has Strategically Lost India, Says 

Former Indian Ambassador to China,” The Hindu, 

June 21, 2020, https://www.thehindu.com/.

4 Brahma Chellaney, “China Alone,” Project 

initial reluctance and is ready to 

step up to the challenge. Structural 

organization in the Indian foreign 

ministry (the creation in 2019 of an 

Indo-Pacific division) and institution of key 2+2 dialogues with major Indo-Pacific powers like the US, 

Japan, and Australia; elevating the 

Quad’s profile; and the rise of IndoPacific trilaterals with India-Japan-US, India-Japan-Australia, India-Australia-France, and IndiaIndonesia-Australia – all of these 

developments demonstrate Delhi’s 

quest to engage in a collaborative 

and cooperative framework to design a free and open Indo-Pacific.

Without doubt, India is now walking the walk when it comes to 

Indo-Pacific order. ■

Dr. Titli Basu 

Dr. Basu is an associate fellow at 

the Manohar Parrikar Institute for 

Defence Studies and Analyses.

Syndicate, August 21, 2020, https://www.project-syndicate.org/.

5 “Multipolar World Should Include Multipolar Asia: 

Jaishankar,” The Hindu, September 19, 2020, 

https://www.thehindu.com/.

6 S D Muni, “While seeking equilibrium with China, 

diplomatic adjustments through give-and-take must 

be explored,” Indian Express, August 25, 2020, 

https://indianexpress.com/.

7 Raja Mohan, “China’s hegemonic ambitions mean 

that Beijing’s focus is now on building Chinese century,” Indian Express, July 7, 2020, https://indianexpress.com/.
India’s Indo-Pacific Reckoning

Indo-Pacific Perspective │35

8 Ministry of External Affairs, “External Affairs Minister in Conversation at Raisina Dialogue 2020: The

India Way,” January 16, 2020,

https://www.mea.gov.in/.

9 Ministry of External Affairs, “Geopolitics of Opportunity: As World Rebalances, How should India Capitalise?,” YouTube, July 20, 2020, 

https://www.youtube.com/ .

10 Ministry of External Affairs, “External Affairs

Minister's speech at the 4th Ramnath Goenka Lecture, 2019,” November 14, 2019, https://mea.gov.in/.

11 Shashi Tharoor and Samir Saran, “The New 

World Disorder and The Indian Imperative - an extract,” World Economic Forum, January 22, 2020, 

https://www.weforum.org/.

12 Shivshankar Menon, “China-US Contention Has 

Opened Up Space for Other Powers, Including India,” 

The Wire, December 24, 2018, https://thewire.in/.

13 Shinvshankar Menon, “India’s Foreign Affairs 

Strategy,” Impact Series, Brookings Institution, May 

2020, https://www.brookings.edu/.

14 Arzan Tarapore, “India does not need a Cold War 

alliance,” East Asia Forum, July 27, 2020, 

https://www.eastasiaforum.org/.

15 Ministry of External Affairs, “EAM's interaction at

USIBC India Idea Summit,” July 22, 2020,

https://www.mea.gov.in/.

16 C. Raja Mohan, “Confusion reigns on what the 

Quad is and its future in India’s international 

relations,” Indian Express, October 6, 2020, 

https://indianexpress.com/.

17 Suhashini Haidar, “More ups than down, and 

many surprise turns in Trump’s foreign policy for India,” The Hindu, November 1, 2020, https://www.thehindu.com/.

18 Darshana M. Baruah, “India in the Indo-Pacific: 

New Delhi’s Theater of Opportunity,” Carnegie Working Paper, June 2020, https://carnegieendowment.org/.

19 Harsh Vardhan Shringla, “More and more countries now share India’s vision for the region,” Indian 

Express, November 7, 2020, https://indianexpress.com/.

20 Pradeep S. Mehta and Amol Kulkarni, “Why India 

Shouldn’t View its Refusal to Join RCEP as a Victory,” The Wire, November 6, 2019,

https://thewire.in/.

Disclaimer

The views and opinions expressed or implied in JIPA

are those of the authors and should not be construed 

as carrying the official sanction of the Department of 

Defense, Air Force, Air Education and Training Command, Air University, or other agencies or departments of the US government or their international 

equivalents.
Indo-Pacific Perspective │ 36

Challenges in 

Institutionalizing 

Rules-based 

Order in the IndoPacific

Defending or Reordering 

the Status Quo

Dr. Ngaibiakching

he rules-based international 

order led by the West is undergoing a crisis, with post-World 

War II (“liberal international”) institutions seeming particularly vulnerable to the relative decline of 

the United States. Meanwhile, the 

tectonic shift of power from the 

West to Asia has intensified the geopolitical and strategic relevance of 

the Indo-Pacific,1 with China’s 

challenge to US leadership (alongside the rise of regional middle 

powers) amplifying existing criticisms of the international rulesbased order as inadequate or biased. Indeed, what is happening in 

the Indo-Pacific region can be considered a microcosm of global politics, underscoring the need for a reinforced yet reshaped rules-based 

order.

The Importance of Rules in 

the Indo-Pacific

Rules-based order is a “system”—

the basic principles and standards 

of conduct in a “society of states” 

where members share a “sense of 

common interest,” rules and institutions, and seek to facilitate these 

rules effectively in the form of international organizations, treaties, 

and law.2 In other words, rulesbased order is a shared commitment by states based on consensus. 

The rules-based international order formulated under the United 

Nations and the Bretton Woods institutions seven decades ago 

brought much prosperity and order. In Asia, the West assumed 

that as China opened up to the 

world, it would slowly embrace liberal and democratic values. However, this turned out not to be the 

case: China has kept its core 

T

7
Challenges in Institutionalizing Rules-based Order in the Indo-Pacific

Indo-Pacific Perspective │37

traditional values intact despite 

embracing capitalism, and now 

represents a challenge to America’s 

vision of regional and global order.3

Dissensus seems to have replaced 

consensus: China’s exponential 

rise, a growing US-China rivalry, 

widespread unwillingness or inability to enforce rules, the waning 

of US leadership - all these factors 

and more have the rules-based order to the test. In such a volatile 

environment, sustaining a rulesbased Indo-Pacific has become critical to attaining a rules-based globally.4

Paradoxically, the United States -

the key proponent of rules-based 

order—retreated from multilateralism under the Trump administration,5 leaving regional partners on tenterhooks. Meanwhile, 

the Chinese Communist Party under President Xi Jinping became 

more nationalistic, assertive, and 

expansionist. The signal that 

China sends out concerning power 

projection is perplexing, at times 

displaying “Wolf Warrior diplomacy”6 while, on other occasions, 

appearing to operate within the existing rules-based order. The result 

is that most maritime nations in 

the littorals of the Indo-Pacific harbor at least some apprehension 

about China’s assertiveness. 

Malcolm Jorgensen has observed 

that, rather than overturning 

existing international laws, China 

has preferred to “fragment” the 

rules, furthering its own “security 

and strategic interest” by slicing 

out a new “geolegal” space. What is 

more, some small states are ready 

to concede to China because of the 

incentives and inducements that 

Beijing provides.7 In a similar vein, 

Vijay Gokhale opines that China 

(perhaps the highest beneficiary of 

economic globalization and Western-led multilateral institutions) 

need not overthrow the global order when it can simply take over 

the order instead.8 From this view, 

reinventing a new system of order 

or rules would not be necessary for 

China to serve its self-interest.9 As 

Fu Ying has argued, China’s actions are “complementary to the 

existing international system,” 

helping to facilitate a “gradual evolution into a fairer and more inclusive structure.”10 It is to be expected, after all, that emerging 

powers will seek to attain “greater 

voice and weight” within the rulesbased system.11

Seen from another lens, however, 

China’s ambitions have ideological 

underpinnings and are directed toward changing the status quo. 

Consider, for example, the establishment of the Asian Investment 

and Infrastructure Bank and the 

Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). 

When a country accumulates 
Ngaibiakching

Indo-Pacific Perspective │38

enough wealth and influence, it 

eventually desires political clout 

commensurate with its economic 

power. In China’s case, its attempts to expand political and economic influence have attracted 

criticisms; the BRI faced a backlash for “debt-trapping” poorer nations as a new form of colonialism 

with exploitative practices, for example.12

The overall picture is that China 

observes the existing rules-based 

order where it suits the Chinese 

national interest but will seek to 

change rules and laws that do not 

align with its needs and wants. 

There is a risk that smaller states 

will accede to China’s revisionism 

out of fear of punishment or desire 

for material benefits (inducements), which result in a “snowball” effect: Beijing would become 

emboldened, its ambitions to alter 

the status quo might expand, and 

other states would be put in the position of choosing whether to validate China’s demands or put up a 

costly fight to preserve the existing 

order.

Institutionalizing RulesBased Order in Indo-Pacific

In the Indo-Pacific megaregion, 

charting out rules-based order is a 

colossal task. The region is multilayered with several major stakeholders at play, such as ASEAN, at 

geographic the core of the Indo-Pacific region; the “Quad” of Australia, India, Japan, and the 

United States; and regional powers 

like South Korea. The viability of 

the Free and open Indo-Pacific 

(FOIP) strategy in upholding rulesbased order rests on how (or 

whether) regional stakeholders 

like ASEAN can fully embrace the 

FIOP strategy put forward by the 

Quad countries.13 There is reason 

to believe that a broad agreement 

can be found, for despite some competing agendas and diversity in 

how the “Indo-Pacific” narrative is 

being interpreted, all of the aforementioned regional stakeholders 

are confronted with the same 

China threat and, as such, seem to 

be advocating a rules-based order 

in response.

In the current international context, the concept of a global 

“hegemon” has become anachronistic.14 There are several stakeholders and middle powers that now 

help to shape international politics, which is quite unlike the earlier Cold War-era of bipolarity. 

Even the concept of the 

“Indo-Pacific” is at a nascent stage: 

“the litmus test for the Indo-Pacific 

[...] is whether it can be institutionalized; that is, whether states 

are willing to develop meaningful 

institution-building mechanisms 

on the basis of Indo-Pacific 
Challenges in Institutionalizing Rules-based Order in the Indo-Pacific

Indo-Pacific Perspective │39

concept.”15

The fact is, there is no monolithic 

consensus on the rules-based order; it is entirely subject to interpretation. Rules often work on the 

terms and dictates of the majority 

and the powerful, given that, at 

some point, all great powers flout 

the rules whenever such rules do 

not align with their interest—

China’s disregard for the United 

Nations Convention on the law of 

Sea (UNCLOS) ruling in 2016, for 

example. If Louis Henkin’s famous 

statement is true that “almost all 

nations observe almost all principles of international law and almost all of their obligations almost 

all of the time,” it is partly because 

powerful states that fail to adhere 

to rules and obligations are often 

successful at justifying their violations.16

If the existing norms are compromised, does rules-based order 

mean anything? According to Ian 

Hall and Michael Heazle, “the 

rules-based order is [...] neither 

fixed nor uncontested.”17 States follow the rules because one way or 

another, it benefits them - or, at 

least, does not compromise their 

interests. Besides, rules create an 

“element of stability and predictability.”18 For Ben Scott, “rules matter even when they are violated.” 

Along similar lines, Greg Raymond 

maintains that it is an 

overstatement to assume that 

rules are made purely at the 

whims of great powers, as all international rules need some “consensus and legitimacy.” Even concerted attempts by small “likeminded states” can go a long way 

toward achieving reform.19 And of 

course, great powers face at least 

some reputational costs whenever 

they flout rules. In sum, rules are 

better than no rules despite the 

shortcomings of multilateral international organization.

In the evolving region of the IndoPacific, the need for new rules is 

evident in areas such as climate 

change, cybersecurity, and non-traditional security threats such as 

terrorism, infectious disease pandemics, and more.20 Along with the 

challenges brought by globalization, all countries big and small 

face common challenges, which 

makes inclusive collaborative efforts necessary. It is an opportune 

moment to see the relevance of the 

existing rules and then reshape 

and reorder those rules to cater to 

the current exigencies.

Conclusion

The feasibility of a rules-based order in the Indo-Pacific depends on 

the degree to which regional states 

can come up with a concerted response. Rules and norms are indispensable, as is compliance with 

those rules and norms. 
Ngaibiakching

Indo-Pacific Perspective │40

Multipolarity with shared commitment to multilateralism has the 

potential to make the Indo-Pacific 

peaceful, predictable, and rules-oriented. The task of the new US 

President Joe Biden is to undo 

Trump’s legacy, which undermined 

the cause of a rules-based order in 

the Indo-Pacific; salvage US leadership and influence; and resuscitate multilateralism for the common good. At the same time, it is 

necessary for other powers to engage both the United States and 

Notes

1 The Indo-Pacific is a regional construct that includes Northeast Asia, the South China Sea, and the 

extensive sea lines of communication in the Indian 

and Pacific Oceans. The geographical realm of IndoPacific region represents over 50 percent of global 

GDP and population.

2 Stewart Patrick, “World Order: What, Exactly, are 

the Rules?” The Washington Quarterly 39, no. 1

(2016): 7–27.

3 Tarik Oğuzlu, “Understanding China’s Challenge 

to the International Order,” Daily Sabah, 23 July 

2019, https://www.dailysabah.com/.

4 Harsh Vardhan Shringla, “More and more countries 

now share India’s vision for the region,” Indian Express, 7 November 2020, https://indianexpress.com/.

5 Trump has an apparent aversion to and disdain for 

the United Nations, World Trade Organization, and 

NATO. He withdrew from the Paris Climate Accord

the Trans-Pacific Partnership, and Iran Nuclear 

Deal. See: Alex Pascal, “Against Washington’s ‘Great 

Power’ Obsession,” 23 September 2019, 

https://www.theatlantic.com/.

6 Zhiqun Zhu, “Interpreting China’s ‘Wolf-Warrior 

Diplomacy’,” The Diplomat, 15 May 2020, https://thediplomat.com/.

7 Malcolm Jorgensen, “International law cannot save 

the rules-based order,” Lowy Institute, 18 December 

2018, https://www.lowyinstitute.org/.

China to prevent the Indo-Pacific 

region from becoming a theater of 

the “new cold war,” and to ensure 

that freedom and openness across 

the region are enough to abate the 

risk of coercion and instability. ■

Dr. Ngaibiakching 

Dr. Ngaibiakching is a researcher 

in Indo-Pacific Studies at Jawaharal Nehru University.

8 Vijay Gokhale, “China Doesn’t Want a New World 

Order. It Wants This One,” New York Times, 4 June 

2020, https://www.nytimes.com/.

9 Greg Raymond, Hitoshi Nasu, See Seng Tan, and 

Rob McLaughlin, “Prospects for the Rules-Based 

Global Order,” ANU College of Asia & the Pacific,

June 2017, http://bellschool.anu.edu.au/.

10 Fu Ying, “Is China’s Choice to Submit to the U.S. 

or Challenge It?” Huffington Post, 26 May 2015, 

https://www.huffpost.com/.

11 Patrick, “World Order.”

12 Caitlin Byrne, “Securing the ‘Rules-Based Order’ 

in the Indo-Pacific,” Security Challenges 16, no. 3 

(2020): 10–15.

13 Ryosuke Hanada, “ASEAN’s Role in the Indo-Pacific: Rules-Based Order and Regional Integrity” in

Mind the Gap: National Views of the Free and Open 

Indo-Pacific, ed. Sharon Sterling, (Washington, DC: 

German Marshall Fund of the United States Report, 

2019): 7–12.

14 Maja Groff and Joris Larik, “Strengthening the 

Rules-Based Global Order: The Case for an International Rule of Law Package,” Stimson Center, September 2020, https://www.stimson.org/.

15 Kai He and Huiyun Feng, “The Institutionalization of the Indo-Pacific,” International Affairs 96, no. 

1 (2020): 149–68.

16 Patrick, “World Order.”

17 Ian Hall and Michael Heazle, “The Rules-Based 

Order in the Indo-Pacific: Opportunities and 
Challenges in Institutionalizing Rules-based Order in the Indo-Pacific

Indo-Pacific Perspective │41

Challenges for Australia, India and Japan,” Griffith 

Asia Institute, Regional Outlook Paper No. 50 (2017), 

https://www.griffith.edu.au/ .

18 Hall and Heazle, “The Rules-Based Order in the 

Indo-Pacific.”

19 Raymond, Nasu, Tan, and McLaughlin, “Prospects 

for the Rules-Based Global Order.”

20 Byrne, “Securing the ‘Rules-Based Order’ in the 

Indo-Pacific.”

Disclaimer

The views and opinions expressed or implied in JIPA

are those of the authors and should not be construed 

as carrying the official sanction of the Department of 

Defense, Air Force, Air Education and Training Command, Air University, or other agencies or departments of the US government or their international 

equivalents.
Indo-Pacific Perspective │ 42

A Rules-based 

Order in the 

Indo-Pacific

A View from Jakarta

Dr. Dewi Fortuna Anwar

n In recent years, there has been 

a lot of talk about the importance 

of ensuring a rules-based international order in the Indo-Pacific region. The increasing use of the “IndoPacific” terminology to replace the 

more familiar “Asia-Pacific” has been 

promoted by the United States, Japan, 

India, Australia, and Indonesia among 

others in recognition of the integration 

of the Indian and Pacific Oceans as a 

single geostrategic theater and the 

growing importance of the maritime 

domain. Various initiatives proposed 

by different countries to promote a cooperative framework in the Indo-Pacific, such as a “Free and Open IndoPacific” (FOIP) by Japan and the 

United States and the “ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific” by the Association of Southeast Asian Nations 

(ASEAN), each stress the importance 

of adherence to international laws and 

a rules-based international order. On 

the one hand, this emphasis on a 

rules-based international order could 

be seen as nothing out of the ordinary, 

since naturally all regional and international initiatives would and should 

be based on commonly accepted international conventions and laws that 

regulate international relations. On 

the other hand, however, it also reflects the growing concerns that a 

rules-based international order in the 

Indo-Pacific is being threatened by 

certain events and actions.

The current rules-based international order is understood as a 

broad architecture of global governance which has developed since 

the end of World War II.1 This 

rules-based international order is 

centered on multilateral organizations, with the United Nations 

(UN) as its primary custodian; a 

set of universal norms, values and 

principles; and international laws 

all designed to maintain international peace, prevent conflicts, and 

promote common prosperity. In an 

inherently anarchical international 

I

8
A Rules-based Order in the Indo-Pacific

Indo-Pacific Perspective │43

system where nation-states tend to 

maximize their respective power 

and compete with each other to 

gain relative advantage, a rulesbased international order is aimed 

at constraining power and curbing 

the illegitimate use of power. The 

UN Security Council has the ultimate, and in the eyes of most 

states, the only legitimate authority to enforce compliance to the 

rules-based international order by 

punishing violations of the principles of the UN Charter and other 

international laws. As a complement to the UN system, regional 

organizations have played important roles in acting as early 

warning systems, and in promoting 

regional cooperation that help 

maintain peace and stability in 

their immediate neighborhoods.

It must be admitted that a rulesbased international order has remained more of an aspiration than 

a reality. Since the establishment 

of the UN in 1948, world politics 

was first dominated by the Cold 

War between two opposing ideological blocs led by the United States 

and the Soviet Union respectively 

(1948-1990), while in the post-Cold 

War period there has been a proliferation of interstate and intrastate

conflicts. Great power competition 

has made a rules-based international order difficult to achieve, as 

adherence to international laws 

has often been subjected to the 

vested interests and military might 

of major powers. In Southeast 

Asia, international laws could not 

protect the sovereignty and territorial integrity of regional states, as 

major powers used the former as 

proxies in the Cold War. At the 

multilateral level, the international community has often found 

it difficult to take collective actions 

to maintain a rules-based international order as the veto-wielding 

powers on the UN Security Council, particularly the United States 

on the one hand, and China and 

Russia on the other, have taken opposite positions in dealing with international crises and supported 

different sides in conflicts. Moreover, unilateral actions carried out 

by major powers also often undermine the multilateral system underpinning the rules-based international order. 

The Indo-Pacific is a vast and diverse region with many security 

flash points, such as the IndiaChina border dispute, the IndiaPakistan conflict over Kashmir, 

North Korea’s nuclear threat, the 

Taiwan issue, and the East China 

Sea and South China Sea territorial disputes. At the same time, 

there are also myriad nontraditional threats to security such as 

transnational crimes carried out by 

nonstate actors including 
Anwar

Indo-Pacific Perspective │44

terrorism, people-smuggling, drugtrafficking, and illegal fishing. Despite all these traditional and nontraditional security threats, however, a rules-based international 

order has overall prevailed in the 

Indo-Pacific region. This region has 

become a dynamic center of economic growth, made possible by 

the existence of relative regional 

peace and stability which has enabled countries to devote their 

scarce resources to more productive uses and to engage in international trade, investment, tourism 

and other economic activities. The 

relations between peace and development are shown to be inextricably linked. In East Asia since the 

1979, there have been significant 

reductions in deaths from interstate conflicts as countries prioritized economic development as the 

primary strategy for achieving 

their national objectives, resulting 

in the so-called “developmental 

peace.”2

While many intractable disputes 

remain unresolved, regional states 

have for the most part acted with 

restraint to prevent open conflicts 

and respect international laws, 

while devoting their energies to 

pursue economic development and 

improve the welfare of their citizens. ASEAN has succeeded in developing norms, values, principles, 

and promoting ever widening and 

deepening regional cooperation 

that has transformed the formerly 

conflict-ridden Southeast Asian region into a security community 

where wars between the member

states are becoming unthinkable.3

The ASEAN Treaty of Amity and 

Cooperation (TAC) in Southeast 

Asia has played an important role 

as a regional code conduct which 

stresses the importance of adherence to international laws, peaceful 

settlements of disputes, and the rejection of the use or threat of use of 

force in resolving conflicts. ASEAN 

has also tried to promote the principles of the TAC to other countries 

and, in fact, made accession to the 

TAC as one of the conditions for 

the dialogue partners to be accepted in the ASEAN-driven East 

Asia Summit, now comprising the 

10 ASEAN member states, Australia, China, India, Japan, New 

Zealand, South Korea, the United 

States, and Russia.

In the past few years, however, the 

rules-based international order has 

come under greater challenge due 

to the intensifying rivalry between 

the China and the United Sates -

the ascending and incumbent superpower, respectively - and 

China’s increasingly assertive policy in the East and South China 

Seas to enforce its territorial 

claims. While the 1982 United Nations Convention on Law of the Sea 
A Rules-based Order in the Indo-Pacific

Indo-Pacific Perspective │45

(UNCLOS) has provided the legal 

basis for maritime governance, 

particularly the extent of waters 

and continental shelves that come 

under the sovereignty and jurisdiction of littoral states, it has also 

engendered new disputes due to 

overlapping claims between countries separated by narrow seas. 

Several ASEAN countries have not 

fully demarcated their maritime 

boundaries, but they accept the 

1982 UNCLOS without reserve, 

carrying out drawn-out bilateral 

negotiations to achieve mutually 

satisfactory agreements, and in 

certain cases submitting their disputes to the International Court of 

Justice (ICJ) and accepting the 

Court’s decisions. For instance, 

Malaysia accepted the ICJ’s decision to award the disputed island 

Pedra Blanca to Singapore in 2008, 

while Indonesia accepted the ICJ’s 

ruling which favored Malaysia over 

the disputed islands Sipadan and 

Ligitan in 2002. 

Based on UNCLOS, the Spratly Islands in the South China Sea are 

claimed in parts by four ASEAN 

countries (Brunei, Malaysia, the 

Philippines, and Vietnam) whose 

claims do not overlap, and by Taiwan. China, on the other hand, 

claims the entirety of the South 

China Sea, based on historical and 

traditional rights not recognized by 

UNCLOS, which has become the 

major focus of contention in the 

area. Although Indonesia is not a 

claimant in the Spratlys, China’s 

so-called “nine-dash line” impinges 

on Indonesia’s Exclusive Economic 

Zone (EEZ) in the North Natuna 

Sea. While relations between 

China and ASEAN countries have 

become increasingly close, and 

both sides try to manage conflicts 

in the South China Sea through 

the nonbinding 2002 Declaration of 

the Conduct of Parties in the South 

China Sea (DOC) and are currently 

negotiating a binding Code of Conduct (COC), China has reclaimed

and militarized islands while its 

navy and coast guards enforce 

China’s claims through displays of 

force. China has also refused to 

recognize the Permanent Court of 

Arbitration (PCA) ruling of 2016 

which affirmed the Philippines 

rights to its claims in the Spratlys 

based on the 1982 UNCLOS. Although it has ratified the 1982 UNCLOS, China clearly does not feel 

bound by it in pursuing its claim in 

the South China Sea, while its 

growing economic and military 

prowess has given China the confidence to flout the UNCLOS openly.

The United States, while it still 

has not ratified the 1982 UNCLOS, 

has played a leading role in promoting the concept of a rules-based 

international order in the Indo-Pacific, joining others in adopting the 
Anwar

Indo-Pacific Perspective │46

language of a FOIP strategy, such 

as that proposed by President 

Trump in 2017. The United States 

is particularly concerned about disruptions to the freedom of navigations and overflights in the disputed areas in the East and South 

China Seas due to China’s military 

actions. Under the Trump administration, the United States increased the frequency of Freedom 

of Navigation Operations (FONOP) 

in the South China Sea and revitalized the Quadrilateral Security 

Dialogue (the Quad) between the 

United States, Japan, India, and 

Australia as a deterrent to China’s 

military actions. China undoubtedly regards the emphasis on a 

rules-based international order 

propounded by the United States 

and the other Quad members as a 

strategy to contain China, thus 

perceiving this concept to be exclusive rather than inclusive.

Southeast Asia as the frontline in 

the US-China rivalry has no desire 

to see the region being forced to 

take side and divided again as had 

happened during the Cold War. 

Both China and the United States 

are important partners of ASEAN 

and its member states. While most 

tacitly accept that the US initiatives in promoting a rules-based 

order in the Indo-Pacific can play 

an important role in deterring 

China’s hegemonic ambitions in 

the region, Southeast Asian countries do not wish to see the rivalry 

between the existing superpowers 

escalate and destabilize the region 

as a whole, which could disrupt the 

peace, stability and economic development that the ASEAN region 

has enjoyed. ASEAN has played an 

important role as the primary regional convenor in bringing together all the main stakeholders in 

the Indo-Pacific region into 

ASEAN-led regional mechanisms 

such as the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) and the EAS. In 2019, 

ASEAN launched the ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific, which emphasized openness, transparency, 

inclusiveness, and adherence to international laws, including the UN 

Charter and the UNCLOS, and the 

principle of ASEAN centrality.4

Faced with increasing major power 

competitions, ASEAN has tried to 

put itself as a bridge to promote dialogues and cooperation within an 

inclusive regional architecture to 

build trust, foster preventive diplomacy, and resolve conflicts through 

peaceful means, that in turn may 

contribute to a more inclusive 

rules-based order in the Indo-Pacific region. ■

Dr. Dewi Fortuna Anwar 

Dr. Anwar is a research professor 

at the Indonesian Institute of Sciences.
A Rules-based Order in the Indo-Pacific

Indo-Pacific Perspective │47

Notes

1 Ben Scott, Madeleine Nyst, Sam Roggeven, Australia’s Security and The Rules-Based Order. Tracking a Decade of Policy Institution, https://interactives.lowyinstitute.org/. 2 Stein Tønnesson, “Explaining East Asia’s Developmental Peace: The Dividends of Economic Growth”, 

Global Asia 10, no. 4 (December 2015),

https://www.globalasia.org/. 3 Kishore Mahbubani and Jeffery Sng, The ASEAN 

Miracle. A Catalyst for Peace (Singapore: NUS Press, 

2017).

4 Dewi Fortuna Anwar, “Indonesia and the ASEAN 

Outlook on the Indo-Pacific,” International Affairs 96, 

no. 1 (2020): 111–29.

Disclaimer

The views and opinions expressed or implied in JIPA

are those of the authors and should not be construed 

as carrying the official sanction of the Department of 

Defense, Air Force, Air Education and Training Command, Air University, or other agencies or departments of the US government or their international 

equivalents.
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