Research for Practice 

Learning From 9/11 

U.S. Department of Justice 

Office of Justice Programs 

OCT. 09 

National Institute of Justice

Organizational Change in the New York City 

and Arlington County, Va., Police Departments 

www.ojp.usdoj.gov/nij 
U.S. Department of Justice 

Office of Justice Programs 

810 Seventh Street N.W. 

Washington, DC 20531 

Eric H. Holder, Jr. 

Attorney General 

Laurie O. Robinson 

Acting Assistant Attorney General 

Kristina Rose 

Acting Director, National Institute of Justice 

This and other publications and products 

of the National Institute of Justice can be 

found at: 

National Institute of Justice 

www.ojp.usdoj.gov/nij 

Office of Justice Programs 

Innovation • Partnerships • Safer Neighborhoods 

www.ojp.usdoj.gov 
 

 

 

Oct. 09 

This Research for 

Practice summarizes 

a more detailed study 

prepared by 

Gwen Holden, 

Gerard Murphy, 

Corina Solé Brito and 

Joshua Ederheimer 

of the Police 

Executive Research 

Forum. 

Learning From 9/11: Organizational Change in 

the New York City and Arlington County, Va., 

Police Departments 

Gwen Holden, Gerard Murphy, Corina Solé Brito 

and Joshua Ederheimer 

The opinions and conclusions expressed in this document are solely those of 

the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the U.S. Department of 

Justice or the National Institute of Justice. 

This research was supported by grant number 2002-IJ-CX-0013 from the 

National Institute of Justice to the Police Executive Research Forum. 

NCJ 227346 
 

 

 

 

 

ReseaRch foR PRactice / oct. 09 

ABOUT THIS REPORT 

On Sept. 11, 2001, local first 

responders in two jurisdictions — New York City and 

Arlington County, Va. — were 

forced to deal with attacks 

on the World Trade Center 

and the Pentagon that were 

unprecedented in scope and 

loss of life. Following 9/11, 

the National Institute of Justice awarded a grant to the 

Police Executive Research 

Forum (PERF) to conduct 

case studies of the two law 

enforcement agencies most 

directly involved to learn 

what they could teach about 

best practices for responding 

to future incidents. 

What did the 

researchers find? 

■	 Proactive intelligence gathering within the community 

about terrorist threats and 

sharing that information 

within and among agencies are key to preventing 

and responding to terrorist 

attacks. 

■	 Counterterrorism policing is 

the same as crime policing. 

■	 The first priority in responding to a terrorist attack is to 

save lives, including those 

of first responders. Setting 

up a secure perimeter and 

avoiding over-responding to 

an initial attack can prevent 

loss of life in a second, 

more devastating attack. 

■	 Both the New York City 

Police Department and the 

Arlington County Police 

Department have greatly 

expanded counterterrorism training at all levels and 

have integrated that training 

into traditional police training exercises. 

■	 Setting up a media relations plan is essential to 

get accurate information 

out to both family members of victims and the 

general public, to control 

rumors and prevent the 

spread of misinformation, 

and to ensure that the 

presence of media does 

not interfere with evacuation and rescue efforts and 

traffic control. 

Who should read 

this study? 

Chiefs and managers of law 

enforcement and other firstresponder agencies. 

ii 
 

LeaRning fRom 9/11 

Gwen Holden, Gerard Murphy, Corina Solé Brito 

and Joshua Ederheimer 

Learning From 9/11: Organizational 

Change in the New York City

and Arlington County, Va., 

Police Departments 

About the Authors 

Gwen Holden, 


Gerard Murphy, 


Corina Solé Brito and 


Joshua Ederheimer are 


with the Police Executive 


Research Forum.
 

The attacks on the World 

Trade Center and the Pentagon on Sept. 11, 2001, were 

among the most dramatic 

events ever to have occurred 

on U.S. soil. They were unprecedented attacks by terrorists against icons of American commercial and military 

power. Although federal and 

state agencies have become 

involved in handling such incidents, the main responsibility 

for dealing with them falls to 

local law enforcement. The 

third report of the Advisory 

Panel to Assess Domestic 

Response Capabilities for 

Terrorism, issued three 

months after the Sept. 11 

incidents, makes this point 

clearly: “All terrorist incidents 

are local or at least will start 

that way. Effective response 

and recovery can only be 

achieved with the recognition 

that local responders are the 

first line of defense.”1 

Little exists in the way of 

“best practices” to help 

agencies prepare for and 

manage an incident of this 

importance. To help develop 

such best practices, the 

National Institute of Justice 

(NIJ) awarded a grant to the 

Police Executive Research 

Forum (PERF) to conduct 

case studies of the two law 

enforcement agencies most 

directly involved on Sept. 11 

— the New York City Police 

Department (NYPD) and 

the Arlington County, Va., 

Police Department. PERF 

staff interviewed agency 

representatives and reviewed 

internal documents to create the recommendations 

presented here. This report 

summarizes a more detailed 

study prepared by PERF. The 

police departments involved 

may have made additional 

changes since the original 

fieldwork that is not reflected 

in this report. This project is 

not a side-by-side comparison 

of the two agencies. Making 

such a comparison would be 

a disservice to both. First, the 

agencies responded to two 

different incidents in terms of 

1 
ReseaRch foR PRactice / oct. 09 

loss of life and property damage. Second, the two agencies and the jurisdictions they 

serve, although similar in 

some regards, are different in 

many ways. Exhibit 1 shows 

some of the key differences 

between the jurisdictions. 

New York City Police 

Department Case Study 

Unlike most major American 

cities, New York City had 

experience with terrorist incidents long before the attacks 

of Sept. 11, 2001. On Feb. 

26, 1993, a truck bomb exploded in the parking garage 

beneath the World Trade 

Center, leaving six dead and 

more than 1,000 injured. In 

June 1993, the FBI arrested 

eight people for plotting to 

bomb the Lincoln and Holland 

tunnels, major bridges, and 

the United Nations headquarters building. 

On Sept. 11, 2001, the New 

York City Police Department 

had about 36,000 sworn 

officers and 14,000 civilian 

employees, making it the 

largest law enforcement 

agency in the world. A total 

of 2,749 people died in the 

World Trade Center attacks 

on Sept. 11, the largest loss 

of life from a hostile attack 

on U.S. soil in the nation’s 

history. The New York City 

Fire Department suffered 

343 fatalities — the largest 

loss of life of any emergency 

Exhibit 1. New York City and Arlington County, Va., 2000 

Arlington County New York City 

total population 189,453 8,008,278 

total housing units 90,246 3,200,912 

total sworn officers 483 36,000 

officers per 1,000 residents 2.5 4.5 

number of patrol areas 4 districts 76 precincts 

sources: “Population, housing Units, area, and Density: 2000,” U.s. census Bureau website, 

www.census.gov; Reaves, Brian a., and hickman, matthew J., Law Enforcement Management 

and Administrative Statistics, 2000: Data for Individual State and Local Agencies with 100 

or More Officers, Washington, D.c.: U.s. Department of Justice, office of Justice Programs, 

Bureau of Justice statistics, march 2004, available online at www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/ 

lemas00.pdf; arlington, Va., Police Department website, main Page, www.arlingtonva.us/ 

Departments/Police/Policemain.aspx. 

2 
LeaRning fRom 9/11 

response agency in history. 

The Port Authority Police 

Department, a specialized 

law enforcement agency of 

1,600 employees, suffered 

37 fatalities — the largest 

loss of life of any police 

force in history. The NYPD 

suffered 23 fatalities — the 

second largest loss of life of 

any police force in history. 

All told, 72 law enforcement 

officers perished on Sept. 11, 

2001.2 

The ever-present specter of 

a future terrorist attack has 

provided the backdrop for, 

and given a sense of urgency 

to, shaping the NYPD’s counterterrorism strategy. That 

has been no easy job, nor is 

combating terrorism likely 

to decrease in importance 

within the department in the 

future. “It has taken constant 

attention. It’s extremely difficult,” Police Commissioner 

Raymond W. Kelly says. 

“But make no mistake: It’s 

something we have to do 

ourselves.”3 

Introducing a new mindset on counterterrorism 

readiness: Organizational 

changes within the NYPD 

Within one month of taking 

office in January 2002, Commissioner Kelly revamped the 

NYPD’s Intelligence Division 

(ID) and created a new counterterrorism presence within 

the department. 

The Counter Terrorism 

Bureau. The NYPD’s Counter Terrorism Bureau (CTB) 

is managed by the Deputy 

Commissioner of Counter 

Terrorism. The CTB, with 

205 officers, works with the 

FBI’s Joint Terrorism Task 

Forces. The CTB analyzes 

the worldwide terrorist threat 

for NYPD executives, runs 

counterterrorism training exercises for NYPD personnel, 

does research, and develops 

plans for protecting key sites 

within New York City. 

The Intelligence Division. 

According to one Intelligence 

Division official, the division 

today is “very different than 

what it was before” 9/11. 

Before 9/11, primary responsibilities of the division were 

protecting dignitaries and developing criminal intelligence. 

Today, one division official 

stated, the ID is “proactively” engaged in efforts to 

detect and prevent terrorism. 

Division personnel are devoting 95 percent of their work 

to examining possible links 

to terrorism before an event 

occurs. 

Developing intelligence and 

investigative leads. With the 

FBI’s Joint Terrorism Task 

“It has taken 

constant 

attention. It’s 

extremely 

difficult,” 

Police 

Commissioner 

Raymond W. 

Kelly says. 

“But make no 

mistake: It’s 

something 

we have to 

do ourselves.” 

3 
ReseaRch foR PRactice / oct. 09 

Rumor 

control is better 

served by 

sharing facts as 

they become 

available rather 

than allowing 

incorrect and 

misleading 

reports to fill 

an information 

vacuum. 

Forces, personnel from the 

NYPD’s Intelligence Division and Counter Terrorism 

Bureau and the department’s 

counterterrorism hotline 

are key parts of intelligence 

gathering. Field intelligence 

officers are assigned to the 

NYPD’s 76 precincts as well 

as commands at the borough, housing, transit and 

school levels.4 Through Operation Nexus, the NYPD actively encourages businesses 

to notice anything unusual or 

suspicious and to report such 

instances to authorities.5 

Controlling rumors and 

misinformation. The department has also revamped how 

it communicates with the 

news media and the public. 

Officials of the NYPD’s Public 

Information Division say that 

their experience on 9/11 underscored the importance of 

getting the facts to the media 

as they emerge during a critical incident. Rumor control is 

better served by sharing facts 

as they become available 

rather than allowing incorrect 

and misleading reports to fill 

an information vacuum. 

The Public Information 

Division’s media contact 

list reflects efforts to reach 

large and small media outlets 

the public is most likely to 

turn to for information in an 

emergency. The division has 

expanded its contact list to 

200 media outlets. 

Since 9/11, the Public Information Division also has 

been holding training exercises to perfect its ability to 

set up a media staging area 

during a critical incident. One 

division official explained that 

media staging is critical during an emergency because 

reporters at a critical incident 

site can interfere with first 

responders’ evacuation and 

rescue efforts and traffic 

control. 

Training officers in 

counterterrorism tactics 

The work of the NYPD’s 

Training Bureau today 

reflects a philosophy of 

training all NYPD officials 

in anti-terrorism tactics and 

procedures. Prevention, say 

Training Bureau officials, is 

all about broadening officers’ 

perspective on terrorism and 

encouraging them to “think 

abstractly and globally” about 

counterterrorism measures. 

Achieving these objectives, 

these officials continued, begins with increasing officers’ 

awareness of the threat of 

terrorism. The NYPD’s recruit 

training curriculum includes 

a new section on terrorism 

prevention. 

4 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

LeaRning fRom 9/11 

Response-related training 

focuses on saving lives, 

including those of first 

responders. According to 

a Training Bureau official, 

NYPD officers are now 

taught that setting up a 

strong, secure and safe inner 

perimeter is the first order 

of business at the site of a 

critical incident. Officers also 

are taught that an incident 

may be only the first in what 

terrorists have planned as a 

series of attacks. Thus, first 

responders are cautioned not 

to rush into the target site, 

where they could be injured 

or killed in a later attack. Nor 

should they “over respond” 

to an early incident that may 

be intended by terrorists to 

divert responders’ attention 

away from a second, more 

devastating attack. 

Counterterrorism 

operations in the field 

and on patrol 

The Special Operations 

Division. The Special Operations Division (SOD) is an 

important part of the NYPD’s 

efforts to prevent a future 

terrorist attack. A unit of 

the NYPD’s Patrol Services 

Bureau, the SOD has more 

than 400 sworn and civilian 

personnel. Its primary role is 

to protect potential terrorist 

targets in the city. That role, 

one division official explained, 

is carried out in close collaboration with the Intelligence 

Division. Everything the SOD 

does, this official continued, 

is “funneled through” the 

ID. “We get a list of hard and 

soft targets” from the ID, 

this official noted, and the 

department uses directed 

patrols to protect these sites 

under Operation Hercules, 

which has been operational 

since before Sept. 11, 2001. 

Strategically, the Hercules 

teams’ objective is to disrupt terrorists’ surveillance 

of New York City landmarks 

or other potential targets by 

“providing the appearance of 

a randomized, heavily armed 

police presence,” one official 

explained. At each site, “we 

‘show the flag,’ deploy, and 

look for anything suspicious.” 

The SOD works closely 

with the U.S. Coast Guard 

in observing and surveying 

potential targets such as 

bridges, tunnels, air vents that 

open onto water sites, and 

marinas. The SOD worked 

with the city’s Department of 

Health to train SOD personnel 

in the use of air-monitoring 

“meters” to detect possible 

radioactive material. The 

Department of Health runs 

the city’s Biowatch. It alerts 

the SOD about calls reporting 

the presence of a suspected 

biological substance, such as 

Responserelated training 

focuses on 

saving lives, 

including 

those of first 

responders. 

5 
 

 

 

ReseaRch foR PRactice / oct. 09 

a white powder suspected to 

be anthrax. 

The Operations Division. The 

NYPD’s Operations Division 

(OD) is the communications 

link between the executive 

command and the police 

officer on the street. The 

OD coordinates all personnel 

details for the department, 

including those placed with 

special events and emergency incidents. According to 

one OD official, the division 

“acts as the information 

hub of the NYPD” during 

an emergency, running the 

NYPD’s Emergency Operations Center (EOC), which, in 

turn, communicates information to command staff 

and watch commanders. 

According to an OD official, 

the division’s telephone communications system includes 

digital, cellular, satellite and 

analog capabilities. The EOC 

also manages and promotes 

interagency cooperation 

during a critical incident. The 

EOC’s responsibilities during 

a critical incident include: ■	 Providing 24-hour-a-day 

monitoring of any major 

incident in the city, from 

building collapses to major 

crimes. 

■	 Tracking all officer-related 

information arising from 

or occurring during an 

incident, including line-ofduty injuries, resignations 

and suspensions as well 

as misconduct by any city 

employee. 

■	 Coordinating all personnel 

placement planning for 

scheduled events. 

■	 Coordinating all requests 

for more police personnel 

during scheduled and unscheduled events, assessing whether requests are 

necessary and reasonable, 

and making the final determination of how many officers to place in response 

to a request. 

■ Coordinating moving onduty personnel assigned 

to the eight borough task 

forces. 

The Disorder Control Unit. 

The department created the 

Disorder Control Unit (DCU) 

in 1992 in the aftermath of 

three days of rioting in the 

Crown Heights neighborhood 

of Brooklyn in August 1991. 

The unit is charged with 

“the mission of preventing 

and suppressing civil disorder” within New York City, 

whether planned or spontaneous. The DCU works closely 

with the patrol boroughs, in­

cluding conducting drills, table­

top and no-notice exercises to 

ensure readiness. It identifies 

6 
LeaRning fRom 9/11 

sites within NYPD precincts 

that could be targets for civil 

disorder or a terrorist attack, 

and develops response plans. 

The Community Affairs Unit. 

The NYPD’s Community 

Affairs Unit is charged with 

reassuring the public in an 

emergency and setting up a 

mass casualty and missing 

persons center at the incident site. For unit officials, 

9/11 was a learning experience. They had to set up and 

manage a mass casualty center quickly. There had been 

no planning for such a center 

before the Sept. 11 attack, 

one unit official explained. 

The Performance Analysis 

Section. Since 9/11, the 

Performance Analysis Section of the NYPD Personnel 

Bureau’s Employee Management Division has assigned a 

priority to improving its ability 

to reach out to and provide 

psychological counseling 

services for NYPD personnel during emergencies. A 

critical part of this mission 

has centered on overcoming 

long-standing fears among 

police agency personnel that 

admitting to and seeking help 

for emotional or psychological problems will have negative effects for their careers. 

Major conclusions 

and lessons 

Defining the organizational 

philosophy 

Incorporate a counterterrorism philosophy throughout 

the department. Police Commissioner Raymond W. Kelly 

described the department’s 

post-9/11 philosophy as 

“thinking about the unthinkable — what a few years ago 

was the unthinkable.”6 

Create a counterterrorism 

role within the department. Commissioner Kelly 

revamped the NYPD’s Intelligence Division and created 

the new Counter Terrorism 

Bureau. 

Recognize that counterterrorism policing is the 

same as crime policing. The 

department’s emphasis on 

counterterrorism is premised 

on the belief that terrorism 

policing is the same as crime 

policing. Moreover, because 

terrorist groups commit traditional crimes to finance their 

work, good police work will 

uncover terrorist groups and 

their plans. 

Police 

Commissioner 

Raymond W. 

Kelly described 

the department’s 

post-9/11 

philosophy as 

“thinking about 

the unthinkable 

— what a 

few years ago 

was the 

unthinkable.” 

7 
ReseaRch foR PRactice / oct. 09 

Appoint specific people to 

drive the counterterrorism 

philosophy. Commissioner 

Kelly created the position of 

counterterrorism inspector, 

assigning an inspector to 

each NYPD patrol borough 

and major command. The inspectors work for the deputy 

commissioner for counterterrorism and serve as the point 

people on terrorism issues 

for the borough chiefs and 

precinct commanders.7 

Educate the community. 

Consistent with its internal 

changes, the department has 

set up a public awareness 

campaign to increase the 

community’s understanding 

about terrorism, including its 

role in noting potential terrorist activity and reporting it to 

the police. 

Building organizational 

capabilities 

Provide up-to-date counterterrorism information to officers. The Counter Terrorism 

Bureau prepares daily terrorism “briefing packages” that 

are tailored to various audiences within the department. 

Get intelligence information to the patrol officer and 

provide the patrol officer 

with access to the intelligence information collector. 

Patrol officers are in the best 

position to identify suspicious 

events within their assigned 

areas. 

Train new officers in counterterrorism tactics. Counterterrorism training begins 

at the recruit level. An innovative part of that training 

includes providing recruits 

with a daily one- to two-page 

summary that highlights 

reports of terrorism-related 

activity around the world. 

Train the patrol force. A 

new roll-call training program 

is introduced every month. 

Instructors spend 20 minutes 

per roll-call training session 

discussing such topics as 

counterintelligence and information gathering. 

Conduct counterterrorism 

training in large groups. 

NYPD training for all personnel occurs in large groups 

and includes first responders from other city emergency response agencies and 

neighboring law enforcement 

agencies. 

Train police managers to 

lead and make good decisions. NYPD police executives receive training in 

standing up a command post 

and mobilizing to mount an 

incident response. 

8 
 

 

LeaRning fRom 9/11 

Preventing terrorist 

incidents 

Regularly assess the vulner­

ability of your community’s 

assets. The Counter Terrorism 

Bureau conducts extensive 

assessments of vulnerable 

sites within the city. 

Keep a proactive intelligence 

role. Gathering intelligence 

involves fostering a sense 

of confidence in the department so the public is willing 

to provide information, and 

developing good confidential 

informants. 

Engage in strategic terrorist 

threat assessment. Keep a 

detailed awareness of groups 

or individuals worldwide who 

may be interested in targeting the United States or your 

community. 

Reach out to local and 

regional businesses (including businesses outside your 

agency’s jurisdiction) as 

intelligence sources. The 

NYPD’s Nexus Program was 

created as a bridge between 

the department and businesses within a 150-mile radius of the city that potentially 

could be exploited by groups 

or individuals in support of 

terrorist activities. 

Randomized presence can 

be an effective deterrent. 

The department’s highvisibility Hercules Teams are 

used to interrupt surveillance 

of potential targets by any 

terrorist cells working in the 

city. 

Collaborate with organizations to leverage expertise. 

The Special Operations Division works closely with the 

U.S. Coast Guard in observing and surveying potential 

targets such as bridges, tunnels, marinas, and air vents 

that open onto water sites. 

The SOD has also developed 

a partnership with the city’s 

Department of Health to train 

SOD personnel in the use of 

air-monitoring “meters” to 

detect possible radioactive 

material and to respond to 

calls reporting the presence 

of other potential radiological 

and biological threats, such 

as white powders that could 

be anthrax. 

Preparing for a 

critical incident 

Before an incident, appoint 

a lead agency to avoid 

conflict. Since 9/11, the 

city has rewritten its emergency operations plan, which 

identifies the authorities and 

responsibilities of emergency 

services agencies during critical incidents. 

9 
ReseaRch foR PRactice / oct. 09 

Plan responses based on 

geographical areas and 

responsibility. The NYPD 

keeps and annually updates 

disorder control plans that 

contain information about 

critical and sensitive locations 

within each precinct. 

Prepare for outside agencies 

to respond and help. The 

NYPD has mutual aid agreements with law enforcement 

agencies to provide help during critical incidents. 

Ensure that all personnel 

know their responsibilities. 

Specialized response units 

know their responsibilities 

and train for them regularly. 

Plan for the response of offduty officers. Procedures for 

recalling off-duty officers are 

critical during an emergency. 

Control rumors and misinformation. Public Information 

Division officials say that 

quelling the spread of rumors 

is a priority during a critical 

incident. 

Meet the needs of the public 

and victims. Police agencies, with other emergency 

response agencies, must 

develop plans for setting up 

mass casualty centers. These 

centers are the primary point 

of contact for individuals 

who are desperately seeking information about the 

whereabouts and condition 

of family members or friends. 

“Line management” is a 

critical part of establishing 

order. Crowds can become 

volatile, and keeping people 

as comfortable as possible 

and informed of the process 

is essential. Food and water 

must be available to people 

waiting in line. 

Improve mental health 

outreach and services. 

Employee assistance resources must be visible and 

readily accessible to agency 

personnel. 

Arlington County 

Police Department 

Case Study 

Arlington County, Va., is an 

urban county of slightly less 

than 26 square miles, making 

it the smallest county in area 

in the United States. Located 

directly across the Potomac 

River from Washington, D.C., 

the county has no incorporated cities or towns. The 

county had a residential population of 189,453 in 2000, 

according to the Census Bureau. The daytime population 

is much larger on workdays; 

the county has more than 

196,000 jobs. The Pentagon 

10 
LeaRning fRom 9/11 

alone has a workforce of 

more than 23,000 military 

and civilian personnel. In addition, about 25,000 people 

visit Arlington’s tourist attractions each day, including the 

Arlington National Cemetery, 

the Iwo Jima Memorial, and 

the Pentagon. Ronald Reagan 

National Airport has an average of 50,000 passengers 

daily.8 

The Arlington County Police 

Department (ACPD) provides 

law enforcement services 

to Arlington County’s residential and business communities. On the day of the 

attack, the department had 

an approved strength of 362 

full-time sworn officers and 

85 civilian staff. However, 

the department’s sworn 

strength was closer to 320. 

Moreover, on Sept. 11, 2001, 

a significant number of the 

command staff were out of 

town at various conferences 

and a staff retreat. The ACPD 

provides 24-hour protection, 

using three shifts to patrol 10 

police beats within four districts that follow the natural 

boundaries within Arlington 

County. 

The Arlington County Fire Department, the ACPD, and the 

Pentagon’s Defense Protective Service all act under an 

Incident Command System 

(ICS) in responding to emergencies. However, on Sept. 

11 terrorists attacked the 

Pentagon, which is no ordinary building. An enormous 

complex, the Pentagon houses critical national security offices. Although the Pentagon 

is in Arlington County, it is a 

U.S. military facility under the 

direct control of the Secretary of Defense. The Defense 

Protective Service controls 

access to the building. 

Assessing emergency 

preparedness in the 

aftermath of 9/11 

On July 23, 2002, Arlington 

County officials released a 

report that examined the 

county’s response to the 

9/11 attack.9

 The report, 

funded by the U.S. Department of Justice, Office of 

Justice Programs, assessed 

practices employed during 

the 9/11 response. The report highlighted strengths of 

the county’s 9/11 response. 

These included management 

of mutual aid assets and outside support, adherence to 

the county’s Comprehensive 

Emergency Management 

Plan, and use of the county’s 

employee assistance 

program.10 

11 
ReseaRch foR PRactice / oct. 09 

. . . in the 

aftermath of 

the 9/11 attack, 

teaching the 

incident 

command 

philosophy at 

the command 

and line officer 

levels alike 

has become 

a priority. 

Improving police 

preparedness 

Targets for possible terrorist attacks. Arlington County 

is a “target-rich” environment, ACPD officials noted, 

that has numerous government agencies and installations that might be potential 

targets for a terrorist attack. 

ACPD officials list 120 targets 

based on threat assessments 

carried out by ACPD district 

commanders. These targets 

include the Pentagon; Reagan National Airport; bridges 

into Washington, D.C.; Washington Metropolitan Area 

Transit Authority subway 

stations; and the offices of 

the U.S. Drug Enforcement 

Administration, the Federal 

Deposit Insurance Corporation and the U.S. Marshals 

Service. 

Advancing the ICS and 

emergency management 

planning. ACPD officials 

reported that in the aftermath 

of the 9/11 attack, teaching the incident command 

philosophy at the command 

and line officer levels alike 

has become a priority. The 

need to bring training in ICS 

“down to the officer level” 

is reinforced by a central 

principle of the ICS approach — that “anyone who 

responds may have to take 

charge of an incident,” one 

official noted. In addition, the 

ACPD is aware of the addition of ICS standards that 

police agencies must meet 

for accreditation purposes 

(e.g., by the Commission on 

Accreditation for Law Enforcement Agencies). To help 

with this mission, the AfterAction Report recommended 

that all command officers and 

supervisors receive a pocketsized field guide containing 

instructions for setting up 

law enforcement ICS roles.11 

The assistant chief who 

sketched out the ACPD’s 

first incident response plan 

on 9/11 agrees. She said she 

based her actions on 9/11 on 

a card that she carries that 

spells out the central steps 

in developing an ICS. She received that card in an incident 

command course sponsored 

by the International Association of Chiefs of Police in the 

early 1990s. 

Training in support of ICS. 

ACPD officials reported that 

training for critical incidents, 

“both mass and smaller attacks,” has increased significantly since 9/11. According 

to these officials, ACPD 

training now covers activeshooter incidents, hazardous materials, and “general 

education on domestic and 

international terrorism.” 

The training curriculum for 

ACPD recruits now includes 

12 
LeaRning fRom 9/11 

terrorism topics. The number 

and frequency of tabletop 

exercises in ICS also have 

increased, officials say. A 

recent exercise involved 

local, state and federal law 

enforcement agencies; the 

fire service; the public health 

agency; airport security; and 

the Virginia Hospital Center, 

a major medical facility in 

Arlington County. 

ACPD officials used the opportunity provided by a mock 

exercise at the Pentagon 

to test hospital and police 

cooperation as they work out 

a security plan with area hospitals. The ACPD chief has 

told officers to respond directly to the hospital “if they 

hear anything on the radio” 

signaling that an incident has 

occurred that may require 

a hospital lockdown. ”Hospitals are strategic assets,” 

one ACPD official asserted. 

A hospital lockdown requires 

law enforcement officials’ 

help to secure the buildings, 

control traffic and set up 

decontamination lines for an 

incident involving a biological 

or chemical agent. 

Upgrading communications abilities. ACPD uses 

the U.S. Government Emergency Telecommunications 

Service, a Department of 

Homeland Security program 

designed to ensure that key 

people can use the telephone 

system even if it becomes 

overloaded. Several ACPD 

officials have priority access 

to cell phones by punching 

in certain codes. Since 9/11, 

critical entities such as the 

Virginia Hospital Center, the 

county health department 

and the county public school 

system have bought police 

radios to ensure seamless 

communication in an attack 

or other critical incident. 

Confronting the results 

of hypervigilance. ACPD 

officials reported that the 

heightened state of alert 

that has been in effect constantly since 9/11 is creating 

stress and frustration among 

ACPD personnel. In particular, one department official 

noted, officials of the county’s Office of Emergency 

Management (OEM) “always 

are on top of our cops” to 

remain hypervigilant. ACPD 

officials’ comments also suggest that OEM officials’ hypervigilance post-9/11 is not 

the only source of pressure 

that department personnel 

feel. Keeping emergency services personnel countywide 

in a high-alert status tries 

their patience. “Since 9/11, 

we’ve had the anthrax scare, 

13 
ReseaRch foR PRactice / oct. 09 

a winter storm, the sniper 

case, and a hurricane,” an 

official said. 

Coordinating intelligence 

sharing countywide 

One ACPD official said 

initiatives to prevent terrorist 

attacks should begin “way 

back in the intel stage.” 

Since 9/11, the ACPD, in fact, 

has improved intelligence 

coordination countywide. 

ACPD officials reported that 

briefings are held regularly 

with representatives of the 

Pentagon, the Department 

of Homeland Security, and 

the Metropolitan Washington Council of Governments (Metro COG). The 

Metro COG meetings have 

facilitated regional information sharing. The ACPD also 

takes part in weekly regional 

conference calls hosted by 

the FBI. Other participants 

include area police chiefs; the 

Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, 

Firearms and Explosives; 

and representatives of the 

military.12 

In addition, one official 

explained, the ACPD 

“could do a better job with 

data-sharing” within the 

department to reduce conflict 

around the issue of defining 

the “need to know” during 

sensitive operations. During 

the October 2002 sniper case 

that resulted in the deaths of 

10 individuals in the Washington, D.C., Maryland, and 

northern and central Virginia 

regions, some department officials felt that other officials 

were inappropriately keeping 

information from them.13 

Improving collaboration 

with other responders 

ACPD officials said ties with 

federal agencies since the 

9/11 attack have been “good 

for some time,” but there is 

a need to address internal 

issues that inhibit the transfer of information between 

federal and local agencies. 

Experiences with the FBI, in 

particular, have been extensive and favorable. 

According to ACPD officials, 

since 9/11 a mutual aid 

agreement has been completed with the Pentagon. 

Importantly, the updated 

agreement allows the ACPD 

to have concurrent jurisdiction on Pentagon grounds 

(i.e., outside the building) for 

criminal and traffic concerns, 

if necessary. 

The ACPD has appointed 

liaisons to preserve regular 

contact with the Arlington 

14 
LeaRning fRom 9/11 

County Fire Department 

and the Pentagon. In addition, protocols for engaging 

mutual aid partners in future 

emergencies require that 

responding agencies contact 

the requesting agency before 

sending help. 

Strengthening 

community ties 

Communications between 

the ACPD and the public 

have improved since 9/11. 

ACPD officials believe the 

Arlington County community 

“feels the hypervigilance” 

that its emergency services 

personnel are experiencing 

post-9/11, but expects that 

police and fire officials can 

handle it. Volunteers have 

helped develop “Arlington 

Alert,” an emergency e-mail 

and text messaging service. 

Citizens can sign up to receive the service.14 

The county has bought a 

radio station and is testing a 

siren system, both for alerting residents. Community 

emergency response teams 

(CERT teams) have been set 

up within the county to enlist 

citizen volunteers in performing “some light emergency 

response duties” if first 

responders cannot immediately get to a site. CERT 

teams currently include some 

120 to 140 volunteers. Team 

members are not certified, 

but receive training in search 

and rescue, firefighting, first 

aid, freeing victims from 

buildings and vehicles, and 

traffic control. An ACPD official said that experience with 

CERT team volunteers during 

Hurricane Isabel served as a 

model for integrating them 

into future incidents. 

Major conclusions and 

recommendations 

Preventing terrorist incidents 

Expand intelligence-sharing 

efforts. Realizing that initiatives to prevent terrorist 

attacks should begin as early 

as possible, the ACPD has 

improved intelligence coordination countywide. 

Conduct threat assessments 

of local assets. The ACPD 

now has access to a list of 

120 targets. 

Engage residents in prevention activities. Community 

policing can provide avenues 

to engage residents in watching their neighborhoods for 

suspicious activities. 

15 
ReseaRch foR PRactice / oct. 09 

Command 

officers and 

supervisors 

should have 

pocket-sized 

field guides. 

Preparing for a 

critical incident 

Ensure the agency is adept 

at incident management. 

Training agency personnel to 

use the Incident Command 

System during a critical incident requires continual work 

to inculcate this idea into the 

department’s culture. 

Diligently prepare for outside law enforcement agencies to respond and help. 

Even in northern Virginia, 

where agencies regularly 

work together under mutual 

aid agreements, differences 

in the procedures and laws 

that govern the nature and 

extent of help can be exposed during the pressures 

that critical incidents impose 

on organizations. 

Neighboring jurisdictions 

must coordinate assigning 

their personnel with the 

host agency. On Sept. 11, 

ACPD officials seemingly 

were overwhelmed at the 

staging area when mutual 

aid officers arrived without 

notice that they were on their 

way. 

Coordinate traffic management and evacuation protocols. One jurisdiction’s decision to evacuate can have an 

enormous influence on traffic 

in neighboring jurisdictions. 

Develop strong ties with 

other emergency responders in the jurisdiction. Police, 

fire, emergency medical and 

emergency management 

agencies all play key roles 

during a critical incident. 

Develop protocols with 

emergency medical services 

and hospitals. Develop a plan 

with local emergency medical 

services and local hospitals 

for transporting the injured 

to area hospitals, including 

provisions for hospital diversions because of closures or 

inadequate capacity at some 

facilities and excess capacity 

at others. 

Exercise plans regularly. Developing plans is not enough. 

They have to be exercised, 

reviewed and adjusted. 

Include private security. Include private-sector property 

managers and private security in training and exercises. 

Ensure that every officer is 

prepared. ACPD personnel 

now have specific procedures and protocols to follow 

when alerted to the threat of 

a terrorist attack. 

Provide agency managers 

with policies and procedures. Command officers 

and supervisors should have 

pocket-sized field guides. 

16 
LeaRning fRom 9/11 

Keep enough local and 

regional maps in command vehicles. The ACPD 

has placed maps of the area 

in command supervisory 

vehicles. 

Provide officers with equipment and ensure that it 

works. Since 9/11, the ACPD 

has bought better equipment 

for department personnel, 

including personally fitted 

masks. 

Organize and use citizen 

volunteers. Community 

emergency response teams 

have been set up within 

the county to enlist citizen 

volunteers in performing light 

emergency response duties 

if first responders cannot immediately get to a site. 

Develop and exercise protocols for on-scene management. Improve protocols for 

coordinating response units 

and the incident command 

post. 

Review procedures for setting up perimeters. If an 

outer perimeter is set up too 

close to the incident site, a 

significant portion of the onsite incident command may 

be placed at risk if there is 

another attack. 

On-scene personnel need to 

be identified and controlled. 

The influx of people at the 

scene may require developing an identification system 

for use in controlling access 

to incident sites. 

Develop a system for telling 

officers about assignments 

and shift changes. Supervisors and line officers need 

timely notice of assignments 

and regular status updates 

during a critical incident. 

Check officers to prevent 

fatigue. Ensure that officers 

do not work more than one 

12-hour shift without rest 

unless necessary. 

Be prepared to address both 

immediate and long-term effects of the incident on first 

responders and their family members. Call on local 

mental health or employee 

programs and outside groups 

such as the Red Cross, which 

has specific units trained in 

addressing first responders’ 

mental health concerns in 

response to disasters. 

Communicate with residents. Agencies need to 

work with government 

leaders to develop and institutionalize procedures for 

warning citizens of a terrorist 

attack and keeping the public 

informed about post-attack 

conditions. 

17 
ReseaRch foR PRactice / oct. 09 

The principles 

for preventing 

and responding 

to traditional 

crimes and 

terrorism are 

the same. 

Be prepared to receive donations and volunteers. Donated goods and volunteers 

can overwhelm an agency. 

Set up a media relations 

plan. This plan should include 

where to stage the media 

and who will deliver briefings. 

Observations and 

Implications for Law 

Enforcement From 

New York City and 

Arlington County’s 

Experiences 

Coordination is fundamental 

to a successful response 

to any critical incident (e.g., 

weather-related disasters, 

terrorist attacks, significant 

fires, major crime scenes). 

Although the federal government has produced response 

guidelines,15 many state and 

local emergency response 

agencies have improved 

coordination themselves. 

The private sector is on the 

front line of homeland security efforts and is important to 

identifying and finding terrorists as well as disrupting terrorist networks. According to 

the Department of Homeland 

Security, the private sector 

oversees about 85 percent 

of the nation’s critical infrastructure.16 The experiences 

of the New York City Police 

Department and the Arlington 

County Police Department 

can provide perspectives that 

will help law enforcement 

agencies develop effective 

strategies and approaches to 

make our communities safer. 

Though very different in size 

and organizational structure, 

these two agencies provide 

many similar lessons learned. 

Defining an organizational 

strategy 

■	 Incorporate a counterterrorism philosophy throughout 

the department. 

■	 Create a counterterrorism 

role within the department. 

■	 Embrace the notion that 

anti-terrorism policing is 

the same as crime policing. 

The principles for preventing and responding to traditional crimes and terrorism 

are the same. 

■	 Choose specific personnel 

to drive the counterterrorism philosophy. 

■	 Educate the public about 

its role and the department’s initiatives. 

■	 Recognize that community 

policing principles can help 

law enforcement meet 

18 
LeaRning fRom 9/11 

the demands of homeland 

security. 

Building organizational 

abilities 

■	 Provide up-to-date counterterrorism information to 

officers. 

■	 Get intelligence information 

to the street officer and 

provide the street officer 

with access to the intelligence information 

collector. 

■	 Train officers in counterterrorism tactics. 

■	 Conduct counterterrorism 

training in large groups. 

■	 Train police managers 

in critical incident 

management. 

Preventing terrorist 

incidents 

■	 Regularly assess your 

community’s vulnerable or 

valuable assets that might 

be targeted by terrorists. 

■	 Keep a proactive intelligence role. 

■	 Reach out to local and 

regional businesses as 

intelligence sources. 

■	 Use randomized presence 

as a deterrent. 

■	 Collaborate with emergency response organizations 

to leverage expertise. 

■	 Build regional intelligence 

talent. 

■	 Engage residents in prevention activities. 

■	 Develop information-sharing protocols with other 

agencies. The FBI, the 

Department of Homeland 

Security and local law enforcement should share intelligence information with 

other emergency service 

providers, such as fire and 

emergency management 

officials. 

Preparing for a 

critical incident 

■	 Cities and counties 

should conduct vulnerability assessments and 

gather information about 

potential targets, and 

then share those results 

with neighboring jurisdictions to develop a regional 

understanding of risks and 

threats. 

■	 Learn from the best practices established by other 

agencies. 

19 
 

 

 

ReseaRch foR PRactice / oct. 09 

Institute 

counterterrorism 

training at 

all levels of 

local law 

enforcement — 

from line 

officers to 

command level 

to the chief 

executive level. 

■	 Develop strong relationships with other emergency 

responders — fire, 

emergency medical and 

emergency services — 

in your jurisdiction. 

■	 Before an incident, choose 

a lead agency to avoid 

conflict. 

■	 Plan responses based on 

geographical areas and 

responsibilities. 

■	 Develop protocols with 

emergency medical services and hospitals. 

■	 Ensure that the agency is 

adept at incident management. Local law enforcement and other emergency 

responders must incorporate the National Incident 

Management System17 into 

emergency response plans. 

■	 Prepare for outside agencies to respond and help, 

including coordinating 

assigning their personnel 

with the host agency. 

■	 Coordinate traffic management and evacuation 

protocols with neighboring 

law enforcement agencies. 

■	 Exercise plans regularly. 

Conduct honest selfassessments after exercises and revise policy based 

on lessons learned. 

■	 Include private-sector property managers and private 

security in training and 

exercises. The partnerships 

could include target hardening through environmental design, other guidance, 

and response procedures 

for effective preparedness, 

prevention and response 

roles. 

■	 Institute counterterrorism 

training at all levels of local 

law enforcement — from 

line officers to command 

level to the chief executive 

level. Training should address street-level indicators of terrorism, the link 

between traditional crime 

and terrorism, information 

analysis, targeting and 

profiling issues, privacy 

concerns and other important ideas. 

■	 Focus training on areaspecific target hazards. 

Train members from 

various disciplines 

simultaneously. 

■	 Embed counterterrorism 

training in existing training. 

Many agencies have 

developed creative methods to conduct training 

exercises that can serve 

as an example for others. 

20 
LeaRning fRom 9/11 

■	 Provide officers with equipment and ensure that it 

works. 

■	 Plan for the response of 

your agency’s off-duty 

officers. 

■	 Provide agency managers 

with policies and procedures. 

■	 Keep an acceptable supply 

of local and regional maps 

in command cars. 

■	 Organize and use citizen 

volunteers. 

■	 Plan for rumor control and 

misinformation. 

■	 Improve mental health 

outreach and services for 

employees. 

Responding to a critical 

incident 

■	 Review procedures and 

criteria for setting up perimeters. Work together to 

set up zones and staging 

areas. Consider the possibility of second strikes. 

Where there is a potential 

biological, radiological or 

chemical hazard, there is 

also a need to stem contamination. First responders must work together 

to set up an exclusion or 

“hot” zone, a decontamination or “warm” zone, and 

a staging and support area 

or “cold” zone. The staging 

area should always be located upwind from the incident, preserved by trained 

personnel and protected by 

a secure crowd-control line. 

■	 Create a method for easy 

identification and control 

of on-scene personnel. 

■	 Develop a system for telling officers about developments and assignments. 

■	 Check officers to prevent 

excessive fatigue. 

■	 Be prepared to address 

both immediate and longterm effects of the incident 

on first responders and 

their family members. 

■	 Communicate with residents about the incident 

and agency responses. 

■	 Be prepared to receive 

donations and volunteers. 

■	 Set up a media relations 

plan. 

Notes 

1. Advisory Panel to Assess 

Domestic Response Capabilities for 

Terrorism Involving Weapons of 

Mass Destruction (Gilmore Commission), Third Annual Report to the 

21 
ReseaRch foR PRactice / oct. 09 

President and the Congress of the 

Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic 

Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass 

Destruction, December 15, 2001, 

p. 7. Available online at www.rand. 

org/nsrd/terrpanel. 

2. This NYPD case study relies on 

the following sources: DeBlasio, 

Paul, Terrance Regan, Margaret Zinker, F. Brian Day, Michelle Crowder, 

Kathleen Bagdons, Robert Brodesky, 

and Dan Morin, “Effects of Catastrophic Events on Transportation 

System Management and Operations: New York City — September 

11, 2001,” draft report submitted 

to the U.S. Department of Transportation, ITS Joint Program Office, 

2002; McKinsey & Co., Improving 

NYPD Emergency Preparedness 

and Response, New York: McKinsey & Co., 2002; McKinsey & Co., 

Increasing FDNY’s Preparedness, 

New York: McKinsey & Co., 2002; 

National Commission on Terrorist 

Attacks Upon the United States, The 

9/11 Commission Report, New York: 

W.W. Norton & Co., 2004 (hereinafter 9/11 Commission Report); 

Thompson, Paul, and the Center for 

Cooperative Research, The Terror 

Timeline, New York: Regan Books, 

2004. 

3. Horowitz, Craig, “The NYPD’s 

War on Terror,” New York Magazine, 

Feb. 3, 2003. Available online at 

www.newyorkmetro.com/nymetro/ 

news/features/n_8286/. 

4. Although New York City is divided 

into five administrative units — the 

boroughs of Manhattan, Brooklyn, 

the Bronx, Queens and Staten Island 

— the NYPD subdivides Manhattan, 

Brooklyn and Queens into north and 

south, creating a total of eight patrol 

boroughs. 

5. For more information about 

Operation Nexus, see the NYPD’s 

Crime Prevention web page, www. 

nyc.gov/html/nypd/html/crime_ 

prevention/counterterrorism.shtml. 

6. Rashbaum, William K. and Judith 

Miller, “New York Police Training for 

Catastrophic Terrorism,” New York 

Times, N.Y. Region, Feb. 15, 2004. 

Available online at www.nytimes. 

com/2004/02/15/nyregion/15THRE. 

html. 

7. In the NYPD, the rank of inspector 

is the military equivalent of colonel. 

8. This ACPD case study relies on 

the following sources: Carter, Mark 

R., Mark P. Howard, Nicholas Owens, David Register, Jason Kennedy, 

Kelley Pecheux, and Aaron Newton, 

“Effects of Catastrophic Events on 

Transportation System Management and Operations: The Pentagon 

and the National Capital Region — 

September 11, 2001,” draft report 

submitted to the U.S. Department 

of Transportation, ITS Joint Program 

Office, Vienna, Va.: Science Applications International Corporation, 2002; 

National Commission on Terrorist 

Attacks Upon the United States, 

9/11 Commission Report (see note 

2); Thompson and the Center for 

Cooperative Research, The Terror 

Timeline (see note 2); Titan Systems 

Corporation, Arlington County: AfterAction Report on the Response to 

the September 11 Terrorist Attack 

on the Pentagon, Arlington, Va.: 

Titan Systems Corporation, 2002 

(hereinafter Arlington County AfterAction Report). 

9. “Arlington County Creating Emergency Preparedness Blueprint from 

9/11 After-Action Report Recommendations and First-hand Experience,” Press Release, Arlington 

22 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

LeaRning fRom 9/11 

County Public Affairs Division (July 

23, 2002), available online at www. 

arlingtonva.us/NewsReleases/ 

Scripts/ViewDetail.asp?Index=843. 

10. Ibid. 

11. Titan Systems Corporation, 

Arlington County After-Action Report 

(see note 8), p. C-19. 

12. These weekly calls started after 

9/11. In October 2002, during the 

Beltway Sniper experience, the calls 

became a daily occurrence. 

13. For a complete report on law 

enforcement actions related to the 

Beltway Sniper case, see Murphy, 

Gerard R., and Chuck Wexler, Managing a Multijurisdictional Case: Identifying the Lessons Learned From 

the Sniper Investigation, Washington, D.C.: Police Executive Research 

Forum, 2004. 

14. For more information on this 

service see the following website: 

www.arlingtonalert.com/index. 

php?CCheck=1. 

15. For example, under Homeland 

Security Presidential Directive-5 

(HSPD-5), the National Incident Management System (NIMS) “provides 

a consistent framework for incident 

management at all jurisdictional 

levels regardless of the cause, size 

or complexity of the incident.” The 

National Response Framework uses 

NIMS and “establishes a comprehensive, national, all-hazards approach 

to domestic incident response.” For 

more information, see U.S. Department of Homeland Security, National 

Response Framework (NRF) — Fact 

Sheet, n.d., available online at www. 

fema.gov/emergency/nrf/aboutNRF. 

htm. 

16. See U.S. Department of Homeland Security, “Critical Infrastructure 

Sector Partnership” web page. 

Available online at www.dhs.gov/ 

xprevprot/partnerships/ 

editorial_0206.shtm. 

17. See note 15 above. 

Additional references 

Jones, Radford W., Margaret A. 

Kowalk, and Patricia P. Miller. “Critical Incident Protocol — A Public and 

Private Partnership.” East Lansing, 

Mich.: Michigan State University, 

School of Criminal Justice, 2000. 

National Commission on Terrorist 

Attacks Upon the United States. 

Staff Statement No. 13: “Emergency 

Preparedness and Response” 

(n.d.). Available online at www. 

9-11commission.gov/staff_ 

statements/staff_statement_13.pdf. 

Safe Cities Project. Timothy P. 

Connors and Georgia Pellegrini, 

eds. Hard Won Lessons: Policing Terrorism in the United States. New York: 

The Center for Policing Terrorism at 

the Manhattan Institute, and Newark, 

N.J.: The Police Institute at Rutgers 

University, July 2005. Available online 

at www.manhattan-institute.org/pdf/ 

scr_03.pdf. 

Tierney, Kathleen J. “Strength of a 

City: A Disaster Research Perspective on the World Trade Center 

Attack,” Social Science Research 

Council: Essays, July 18, 2002. 

Available online at www.ssrc.org/ 

sept11/essays/tierney.htm. 

23 



 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

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