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### UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SIXT H CIR CUIT

_________________
S HARON M AY R OCKWELL ,

Petitioner-Appellee,

v.

J OAN Y UKI NS , Responde nt-Appel lant. X - - - -
> , - - N No. 00-1992

Appeal from the United States District Court for the E astern D istrict of Michiga n at Detr oit. No. 97-71072—Avern Cohn, Senior District Judge.

Argued: December 11, 2002 Decided and Filed: August 27, 2003

Before: MARTIN , Chief Circuit Judge; NELSON, BOGGS, BATCHELD ER, DAUGHTREY, MOORE, COLE, CLAY , GIL

MAN, GI BBONS, and ROGER S, Circuit Judg es.

_________________ COUNSEL

ARGUED: Laura Grave s Moody, OFF ICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENER AL, Lansin g, Michigan, for Appellan t. Craig A. Daly, De

troit, Michigan, for Appellee. ON BRI EF: Lau ra Gr aves Moody, OF FICE OF THE AT TORNEY 2 Rockwell v. Yukins No. 00-1992

GEN ER AL, Lansing, Michiga n, for Appellant. C raig A

. Daly, Detroit, Michig an, for Appellee.
NELSON, J., delivered the opinion of the court, i n wh ich MARTIN, C. J., BOGGS, BATCHELDER, GI LMAN, GIB BONS, and ROGERS, JJ., joined. CLAY, J. (pp. 12-29), delivered a sepa

r ate dissenting opinion, in which DAUGHTREY, MOORE, and COLE, JJ., joined.

_________________ OPINION

_________________ DAV ID A. NEL SON, Circ uit Judge. The petit

ioner in th

is habeas corpus action, Sharon Rockwell, was convicted at trial i n a stat e court of conspiring with her sons to murder the boy s’ father, her husband. A federa l writ of habeas corpus
was subsequently g

ranted on the ground th at her Sixth Amendment rightto present a complete defense preclude d the state trial court from barring evidence that Mr. Rockwell had abused his sons sexually. Under the leg al stan dar d prescribed

by the Antiterrorism and EffectiveDeath Pe nalty Act of 1996, the writ shou ld not have been issu

ed unless exclusion of the evidence in question i n volved an “unreasonable”application of, or was contrary to, federal law clearly established by

the Unite d States Supreme Cour t. Concluding that the result reached in the state court passes muster under the

statutory test, we shall rev ersethe gr ant of habeas relief.

I

As we noted in an earlier appeal in this case, Rockwell v. Yukins
, 217 F.3d 4 21, 422-2 3 (6th Cir. 2000), Sh aron and Edward Rockwell had three sons. One of t he sons, acting with tw o friend s, attempted to kill Mr. Rockwell by cutting the brake lines on his car. Th e at tempt failed. Then, in a second unsuccessful attempt on Mr. Rockwell’s life, the twoNo. 00-1992 Rockwell v. Yukins 3

1 Alt hou gh t he pr osec ution ha d cited Rule 4 04 in argum ent, its releva nce is no t read ily app arent. R ule 40 4 pr ovid es that ev idenc e of a perso n’s charact er is gen er ally i nadmissible for t he purpose of proving that the person act ed in conformity t herewith on a particul ar occasion. fri ends hit him on the head with a baseball bat. Although Mrs. Ro ckw ell was not present on either occasion, she had
e ngaged in discussions with one or more of her sons abou t killing Mr. Rockw ell . On t he stren gth of these disc

ussions, the State of

Michiga n charg ed Mrs. Rockwell with conspiracy to commit murder.

Mrs. Rock

we ll’s defe

nse, as he

r lawy er desc ribed it a t a pretrial hear ing, was that her participation in the talk of killing Mr. Rockwell was no t in tended to further an actual murder; rather, according to counsel, Mrs. Ro ckwell’s purpose had been to let the boy s vent the extreme and abiding ha tred they harbore d again st their f

ather f or having abuse d them, sexually

and other

wise , wh en they we

re young er. “[Mrs. Rockwell ] felt

in her heart

that the o nly way she could keep the situation under control,” d efense counsel explained, “was to allow th e boy s to talk and fantasize about [killing the hated Mr. Rockwe ll.]” Far from agree ing to a murder, the the ory went, Mrs. Rockwell hoped to forestall a murder throu gh what her

lawy er seem s to have viewed as some sort of ta lk th er ap y.
Inconnect ion with this “therapy def ense,” as we characterized

it in our earlier opinion, Mrs. Rockwell wanted to show at tr

ial that Mr . Rockwel l had sexua lly a bused his
sons. The prosecution wa nted to exclude evidence of the alleged abuse. The state trial court ordered briefing and heard argument on the admissibility of

the evidence of abuse, after whichit ordered the evidence excluded as not “m ateri al” under Mich. Rule of Evid. 404. 1

When the case went to trial, Mrs. Rockwel l e lected n ot to take the stand. The jury re turned a verdict of guilty , and Mrs. 4 Rockwell v. Yukins No. 00-1992

2 Rule 403 – whic h had also b een c ited in ar gume nt befo re the sta te tri al cour t – pro vides that relev ant evid ence may b e ex clude d if its probative value i s subst anti ally outwei ghed by th e dan ger o f unfair prejudice. Rockwell was sentenced to imprisonment for life. An appeal to the Michigan Court of Appeals followed.

The Court of A

ppeals affirmed

the convi ction, suc cinctly explaining

its rationale as f

ollows:

“We fi nd no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s exclusion of

evidence of the victim’s alleged prior acts of abuseagainst defendant’s and the victim’s children. Peop le v. Watkins , 176 Mich. App. 428; 440 NW 2d 3 6 (1989). Defendant was merely limitedin t he method with which to present her

defense and not deprived [of] the oppor tuni ty to pres ent th e same. Alth ough marginally

releva nt, the evidence was properly excluded under MRE 403.” 2

Mrs. Rockwell applied to the Michigan Supreme Court for leave to appeal the affirmance of her c onviction, but further review was denied.

M rs. Rockwell

then file d her hab eas act ion in the U

nite d States District C ourt for

the Easte

rn Distric t of Michigan. The initial pleading raised two issue s, in sufficiency of the evidence and im

proper exclusion of the evidence of sexual abuse, both of which had been exhausted in the state courts. The district c ourt eve

ntually grante d Mrs. Rockwell

leave to amend her petition to include an unexhausted claim as well. Following a hearing at which arg um en ts were presented on the merits, the district court granted the w riton the ground that the state trial court’s decision to exclude evidence of the alleged sexual abu se clea

rly vio lat ed Mrs. Rockwell’s constitutional right to pre sen t a de fens e – an d “[n]o reasonable jurist could conclude otherwise.”No. 00-1992 Rockwell v. Yukins 5

The soundness of this proposition was notdecid ed in the initial appeal to our court. The panel that heard the a ppeal vacated the judgment on the ground that the district court should not have reviewed a “mixed” petition containing an unexhauste d claim

in addition

to the exha

usted cla ims. The first panel remand ed the case wi th a su gge sti on that the districtcourt

could reenter its original decision after allowing Mr s. Rockwell to dismiss her unexhausted claim. See Rockwell v. Yukins , 217 F.3d at 425.

Onremand, the district court accepted this sugg estion. Mrs. Rockwell moved for dismissal of

her unexha

usted cla im and reentry of the habeas judgment, and the dist rict court granted the motion.

The ward en again appealed to our court. Reac hing the merits of the case, a divided three-judge panel reve rsed th e districtcourt’s judgment. The full c ourt then voted to rehear the case en

banc. Supplemental briefs having been filed, and the case having been rea rgued, the appeal is now ready f or decision by t he full c ourt.

II

As amended

by t he Antite rrorism a nd Effec tive Dea th Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), Pub. L. No. 10 4-132, 1 10 Stat. 1214 (1996), subsection (d) of 2 8 U.S.C. § 2254 provides , in rele

vant par t, as follows: “(d) An application for

a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a

State court sha ll not be g ranted w ith respect to any

claim that
was adjudica

ted on the merits in State court procee dings unless the adjudication of the claim – (1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unrea sonable a

pplication of, cle arly established

Feder al law, a s determi

ned by the Supre

me Court of the United States . . . .” 6 Rockwell v. Yukins No. 00-1992

3 The condi ti on of

this “con trary to” clause would be m et if “the state court arri ve[d] at

a conclus ion opposit e to th at reac hed by [th e U.S. Supreme] Court

on a que sti on of l aw or if the st ate court

deci de[d] a case differen tly than [the U.S . Sup reme Co urt has] o n a set o f materia ll y indis tin guish able f

acts. ” Wi llia ms , 529 U.S. at 413. This version o f the stat

ute applies to habeas applications filed,
as Mrs. Rock

well ’s w as, after April 24, 1996, the effective date of AEDPA. See Lindh v. Murphy , 521 U.S. 320 (1997).

The statute means what it says. See W illiam s v. Taylor
, 529 U. S . 362, 402- 13 (2000) . What the s tatute sa ys, to repeat , is that habeas relief may not be granted

unless the

state court’s decision was either “contrary to . . . clearly e stablished federal law, as determ in ed by the Supreme Court of the United States,” 3 or “involved an unreasonable application of . . . [such] law.”

Mrs. Rockwell does not contend that the affirmance of her convicti o n by t he state court of appeals was “contra ry to” clear Supreme Court caselaw. Sh e does contend, however, that it involved an unreasonable application of such law.

For this contenti on to be accepted, Mrs. Rockwell must do
more than persuade us that the Mich igan judiciary ’s applicationof federal law was incorrec t. A s Justi ce O’Connor said, speaking for the Court in Williams :
“In § 2254(d)(1), C ongre ss specifically used the word ‘unreasonable,’ and not a term like ‘e rroneo us’ or ‘incorrect.’ Under § 2254(d) (1) ’s ‘unre asonable application’ clause, then, a federal habeas court may not issue the writ simply

because that cour t conclud es in its independent

judgmen

t that the r

elevant stat e-court d e cision applied clearly established federal law
errone ously

or in co rr ec tl y. Rather, that appl ication mu st also be unreason able .” Willia ms, 529 U.S. at 411 (emphasis supplied).No. 00-1992 Rockwell v. Yukins 7

“[ A]n unreasonable application of federal law is different froman incorrect

or e rroneous application of federal law.” Id. at 412 (emphasis in original). And i n making the “unreasonable application” inquiry, we “should ask whether the state co

urt’s ap plication of clea rly established

federal law was ‘objectively ’ unreasonable.” Id. at 409.

InMrs. Rock

well’s c ase , as we have seen, the Michigan Courtof Appeals concluded that the probative value of the evidence of Edward

Rockwell’s alleged abuse of his sons was substantia lly outweig hed by the dang er that u

nfair pr eju di ce would ensue were the e vidence to be admi tted. This conclusionmay or may

not have be en erroneous, but we cannot say that it repre s entedan objectively unreasonable applica tion of cle arly

established Supre

me Court pr

eceden t.

A Su preme Court decision that the district court found “parti cu larly

instructive,” Davis v. Alaska , 415 U.S. 308 (1974), he ld th at th e d ef en da nt in a b ur gl ar y case ha d a constitutional right to cross-examine a crucial pr osecution witness about a

juvenile burglary

adjudication for which the witness was on pr

obatio n, notwit

hstanding a state rule making
ev idence of juvenile adjudications inadmissible. The C our t emphasized

that “[c]ross- examination is the principal means by which the believa

bility of a witne ss and the

truth of h

is test imon y are tested,” adding that the juvenile’s testimony “provided ‘a cruciallink in the proof . . . of [the

defenda nt’s] act.’” Id. at 316 and 317 (citation omitted). “In

this setting,” the Court concluded, “ . . . th e [Sixth Amendment] right of confrontation

is paramo

unt to the State’s policy of protecting a juvenile offender.” Id. at 319.

Inthe case at bar, by

contras t, the evide

nce of se xual abuse
was not being proffered to attack the believability of

a crucial witness against Mrs. Rockwell. The rule under which the tria l court excluded the evi dence, moreover, is not aimed at protectingjuvenile

offende rs. The in

terests a t stak e in this
caseare entirely

di ffere nt than those at stake in Davis

. Becau se Dav is is readily distinguishable, a nd because the 8 Rockwell v. Yukins No. 00-1992

glo ss Mrs. Rockwell would have us put on the case f lies i n the face of a line of authority (to whichwe shall

tu rn sh or tl y) culminating in United States v. Scheffer , 523 U.S. 303 (1998),
we reject the claim t

hat the Michigan court’s decision represented an unreasonable a pplication of Davis

. Mrs. Rockwell attempts to extract fr om D avis and other Supreme Court cases a general

rule that a criminal defendant must be permitted to present any evidence that she deem s cr itical to her de fense. I

n this connection sh e cites Crane v

. Kent uc ky
, 476 U.S. 683 (1986), which holds that “the Constitution guarantees criminal d efendants ‘a meaningful opport u nity to present a complete defense.’” Id. at 690 (citations omitted).

But the Supreme Court has made it perfectly clear that the right to present

a “complete” defense is not an unlimited right to ride roughshod over reasonable evidentiar y restrictions. A defenda nt “does not have an unfettered rig ht to offer testimony that is inc ompetent , privileged, or otherwise inadmissib le under s tanda rd rules of evidence.” Taylor v. Illinois
, 484 U.S. 400, 410 (1988). Rather, she “must comply with established

rules of procedure and evidence designe d to
assure both fairness and reliability in the a scertainment of guilt and innocence.” Chambers v. Mississippi , 410 U.S. 284, 302 (1973). As the Supr

eme Court

explained

inScheffer :
“state and federal rulemakers have broadlatitude under the Constitution to establish rules exc luding evidence fromcriminal

trials. Suc

h rules do

not abrid

ge an accused’s right to present a defense so long as they are not‘arbitr

ary ’ or ‘disp

roportiona te to the purposes they
are designed to serve.’” 523 U.S. at 308 (c i tations omitted).

A defendant’s right

to present a “complete” defense, in other words, does not a

utoma tic ally trump stat

e eviden tiary rules.No. 00-1992 Rockwell v. Yukins 9

4 By t he sam e toke n, the ruling did no t bar M rs. Ro ckwe ll fr o m
s imply test ify ing t

hat t he boys had an

int ense hat

red of t heir f ather . I f such test imony had gone u nchal leng ed, the jury mig ht wel l have a ccepted it

. If the pro secutio n had cross-e xam ined M rs. Ro ckwe ll as to the b asis of the hatre d, on th e other hand , or if it had presented the husb and as a wit ness and evok ed a denial that he had don e anythin g to ca use the b oys to hate him, t

he doo r wou ld then have b een o pen ed, in all probabi li ty , f or The competing interest s must be balanced, and “a defenda nt’s interest in pr es en ti ng

. . . e vi de nc e m ay [h ave to] bow to
accommo date other le gitimate interest s in th e criminal trial process.” Id. (Internal quotation marks and citations omitted.)

It was not objectively unre asonable, in our v ie w, for the Michigan court to conclude that “oth er leg itimate int erests in the criminal tri al pr ocess” outweighed Mrs. Rockwell’s interest in presenting evidence of h er husband’s prior conduct. The evidence of se xual abuse posed a substantial danger of unfair prejudice – a risk that the ju ry would be t

empted to acquit Mr s. Ro ck we ll no t b ec au se of an y sense that she was innocent of conspi ring wit h her sons to kill Mr. Ro ckwell

but because of a sense that killing would be too good for such a
man.
Inadd iti on to the danger of unfair prejudice , the sexual abuseevidence presented a risk of undue delay a

nd confusion of the issues. The facts that Mrs. R ockwell wished to introduce into evidence we re dis puted. Re solution of this tangential dispute would have complicated the trial and could ha ve te nd ed to mi sl ea d t he ju ry.
It is true tha

t the cha nces of t he jury ’s acce

pting Mr s. Rockwell’s “therapy

defense” may

have been

diminished by exclusion of the sexual abuse evidence. But it would not be correct to say that Mrs. Rockwell was de pri ved of her defense. Exclusion of the evidence would not have prevented her from testifying

that her sons hated their father because of his unspeak

able behavior tow ard them over the ye ars. 4 I t 10 Rockwell v. Yukins No. 00-1992

M rs. Ro ckwe ll to pre sent evid ence of the alle ged sexua l misco nduc t.

5 Even if the M ichi gan court acted unr easonably

in concl uding t

hat exclusion of the sexu al abuse evidence was const itu tional , anyerror was pro bab ly harmles s. There was evidence a t trial that M rs. Ro ckwe ll herself had att empted to acqui re a bomb, th at she had conti nued to discuss ki lling her husband even af

ter s he knew there ha d be en an a ctual attem pt on his lif e, and that, on the night of the se cond a tt emp t, s he had tak en her younger chi ldre n ou t of the ho use so that t hey would not be present during the attack. This evidence severely und ercuts th e defense theory that Mrs. Rockw ell believed he r sons were m erely engaging in harm less talk. would not have b arred her from t ellin g the jury that she thought such talk had a he althy

prophy lacti c effec t; that she did not think it would

lea d to overt action; and that she had
never been a party

to any mutual understanding or

agreement to commit murder. The court’s ruling barred Mrs. Rock

well only from testifying

that her husband’s abuse of her sons was sexual in nature. Explication

of the sexual aspect of the a buse, in short, did notgo to the essence

of the “t alk ther apy ” defen se. Rathe

r, it
was a d etail – an important detail, to be sure, but a de tai l nonetheless.

It is far from certain, mor eover , that pre sentation of this detail to the jury

would hav e incre ased the likelihood

of Mrs. Rockwell’s acquit

ta l. The more heinous Mr. Rockwell’s offense s, the jury could re asonably have concluded, the more like ly it was that Mrs. Rockwell understood the talk o f murder to be in earnest. If, on the other hand, testimony that the abuse was sexual would have made the jury more like ly to acquit Mrs. Rockwell, it might well have done so on the improper basis mentioned above –

a sense that the conspiracy
was justified – rather

tha n on any

legitima te basis. In the se circumst ances, we believe it was not unreas onable for the Michigan Courtof Appea

ls to weig h the comp eting in

terests as it did. 5No. 00-1992 Rockwell v. Yukins 11

The decision

made by the Michigan court

was a jud gment c all of the sort that jud ges m ake all the time. Some members of this court, ha

d they been on the state

bench, would have made
a differ en t call. We cannot say they would have acted
unreasonably

indoing so, particularly in view of the fact that the danger of undueprejudice could have been minimized by
a cautionary instruction. See Lewis v. Wilkinson , 30 7 F.3 d 413, 422 (6th Cir. 2002). What we can say , however, is that the call ma de by t he Michigan court was well within that court’s discretion. The d ecision to exclude evidence of the sexual nature of the victim’s mistreatment of his sons did not
, inour opinion, in

volve an u

nreasonable app lication o f clear ly established federal law as determined by the Supre

me Court of the Un ited State s.
The decision of the district c ourt is REVERSED , and the
caseis REMANDED

with instruc t ions to dismiss the petition. 12 Rockwell v. Yukins No. 00-1992

______________ DISSENT

______________ CLAY, Circuit Judge, dissenting. The majority’ s conclusionthat the Mi chigan Court of Appeals did not
unr easonab ly

apply Supreme C ourt pre cedent i n rejec tin g Petitioner’s claim that she was denied her Fif thAmendment right to present a complete defense rests u pon an interpretation

of § 2254(d) (1) that has no basi s in the law. As the term “ unreasonable” i s commonly knownand appli ed in the juris pru dence, the state appellate court’s dec ision represented

an objectively unr

eas onable application of the Court’s precedent.

P etitioner sought to introduce evidence of Edw ar d Rockwell’s allege d sexual ab use of his sons for t

he purpo se of establishing that she e ngag ed in talk of killing

Rockwell with her sons, not for th e purpose of formin g an ag reemen t to kill, bu t f or th e p ur po se of

al lo wi ng th e b oys to vent the ir anger and hatred of

Rockwell

. Thus, evidence of Rockwell’s alleged sexual abuse provided the substantive basis of Petitioner’s defense

and, without the evidence, Petitioner was prevented from e stabl ishi ng an y d efense at all. Th e state appella te court’s

finding that omi ssion of this evidence merely limited Petitioner in the “method” of presenting her defense thereby constitute s a n objecti

vely unreasonable applicationof Supreme Court preced ent. As a resu

lt, the sta te
a ppel late court’s

conclusi on that the

evidenc e was pr

operly
ex cluded on eviden

tiary ground s constitut

es an obje cti vel y unreasonable application of the Court’s precede ntas well. I would therefore affirm

the district

court’s order granting the petition for a wr

it of habeas corpus filed by

Petitioner, Sharon May Rockwell.No. 00-1992 Rockwell v. Yukins 13

I. “U n reasonabl e Application” Prong of 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)

This Court’s r

eview of th e Michi gan Cour

t of Appe als’ decisionregarding Petitioner’s claim is circumscribed by § 2254(d)(1) of

the Antite

rrorism a nd Effec tive Dea thPenalty Act of 196 6 (“AEDPA”), meaning that the state cour t’s decis ion will not be

disturbe d on habe as revie w unless the decisionwas “co ntrary to , or involv ed an unr easonab le applicationof, clearly e stablished Federallaw, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States . . . .” In this case, it is the “unreasonable application”prong of § 2254(d)(1) that guides our

review. Under this prong, “‘a f ederal habeas court
ma y grant the writ if the state court identifies the corr ec t governing legal principle from [the] [Supreme] Court’s decisions but

unreasonably

applies that princ iple to the fac ts of the prisoner’s case.’” Lockyer v. Andrade , ___ U.S. ___, 123 S. Ct. 1166, 1174 (2 003) ( quot ing Williams v. Taylor
, 529 U.S. 362, 413 (2000)). Said differently, “ a federal court may grant habeas r

elief [und

er this pr

ong] base d o n an applicationof a governing leg al principle to a se t of fac ts different from those of

t he case in which the principle was announced.” Id. (citi ng Williams , 529 U.S. at 407). “‘[A] federa

l habeas court ma y no t i ssu e the wri

t simply because that court concludes in its independent judgment that the state-court decision applied [a Supreme Court case] incorrectly .’” Price v. Vincent , ___ U.S. _ __, 123 S. Ct. 1848, 1853 (2003) (alteration in Price ) (quot ing Bell v. Cone
, 535 U.S. 685, 699 (2002)). Rather, “[ i]n order for a federal [habeas] court to find a s tate court’s application ‘unreasonable,’ the state court’s decision must have be en more than incorrect or erron eous[ ,] [it] must have been ‘object ively unreasonable.’” Wiggi

ns v. Smith , ___

U.S. ___, 123 S. Ct. 2527, 2534 (2003) (citi ng L ockyer , 123 S. Ct. at 1175; Williams , 529 U.S. at 409); see al so Woodford v. Visciotti , 537 U.S. 19, 24-25 (2002) ( per curiam )

. 14 Rockwell v. Yukins No. 00-1992

We are not w

ithout gu idance, however , as to whe n a state court’s decision

rises to the level o f being “object ively unreasonable” for pur

po ses of granting a petitioner habe as relief under § 2254(d)(1). I n Wiggi ns v. Smith
, 123 S. Ct. at 2538-539, a death penalty case, the Supreme Court

held that th e Maryland Court of Appe als unreasonably applied the governing principle s of Strickland v. Washington , 466 U.S. 668 (1984) in rejecting the petitioner’s claim that he had been denied his Sixt h Amen dment right to effective assistance of counsel. The Court

found tha

t the state court of

appeals ’ conclus ion that counsel’s perform ance wa s within profession al norms was objectively unr easonable under Strickland inasmu ch as counsel had failed to make a
reasona ble in ve st ig at io n i nt o t he pe ti ti on er ’s so ci al hi st or y. Id. (noting that under Strickland , “strateg ic choic es made after
a less than complete investig ation ar

e reasonableprecise ly to the extent that rea sonable

professional judgments support the limitations on investigation”) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). This, in turn, made the state court’s deferenceto counsel’s strategic decision not to pre sen t mitigating evidence of the petitioner’s social history objectiv ely

unreasonable a s well. Wiggins , 123 S. Ct. at 2538-539 (“[C]ounsel chose to a bandon th eir

investigation at
a nunreasonable juncture, making a fully informed deci sio n with respect to sentencing strategy impossible.”).

The Wiggi

ns majority rejected the dissent’s contentionthat “the Court’s ha

nds [were ] tied unde

r § 2254(d

), by the state court’s factua l determinations that [the petitioner’s] trial counsel did investigate and were aware of [the pe

titioner’ s] b a ckground.” Id. at 2539 (internal quotation marks and citationomitted; em phasis in original). The Court reasoned that the disse nt’s positi on was unf ounded be cause the state appella te court’s conclusion t

hat “ the scope of counsel’s investigation

into petitioner’s background m et the legal standards set in Strickland represented an objective ly
unreasonableapplication of our precedent.” Id. (emphas is in origina l). In other words, the state court’s finding that
cou nsel investigated and knew of the petitioner’s socialNo. 00-1992 Rockwell v. Yukins 15

histor y did not tie the Court’s hands because the scope o f counsel’s investigation was objectively un rea sonable under the principles of Strickland

. Id. Thus, Wiggi

ns instructs us that while we defer to state court de cisions under § 2 254(d)( 1), the de ferenc e is not ab solute inasmuchas a petitioner

may be af

forded habeas relief when the state court’s decision reaches a re sult not suppo rted by Supreme Court precedent. See id.

II. Michigan C ourt of Appe als’ Ruling

The Michi gan Cour

t of Appe als issued

a divided ruling i n this case. While the two-judge majority found that Petitioner
was not entitle d to r elief on her claim that the trial court abused its discretion in excluding evidence of Edw ar d Rockwell’s prior acts of alle ged sexual abuse again st Rockwell’s and Pe titi oner’s child ren, a d issen ting j udge sharply disagreed. See People v. Rock well , No. 124359 (Mich. Ct. App. May 23, 1991) (unpublished)

. Sp ec if ic al ly, as to Petitioner’s claim on this issue, the twojudge majority opine d:

We find no abuse o f

discretion in the trial court’s exclusion of evidence of the victim’s allege d prior a cts of abuseagainst defendant’s and the victim’s children. People v Watkins , 176 Mich App 42 8; 44 0 NW2d 36 (1 989). Defendant was merely limited in the method with which to present her

defen se and not deprived the opportuni ty to present the same. Although m a rginal ly releva nt, t he evidenc e was pr

operly excluded u

nder MRE 403.

Id. In sh arp cont

radistinc tion, the d

issenti ng ju dge found Petitioner’s claim on this issue meritorious and would have reversed Petitioner’s conviction and remanded for a

new tria l. That judge p ersuasi

ve ly refutes the ma

jority’s arg

ument as follows: 16 Rockwell v. Yukins No. 00-1992

The m ajori ty o

pinion ag

rees tha t the evid

ence in question is rel eva nt . If

it is rele vant it is on

ly so becau se it relates to a legally

recognized

defense . That de fense

is that defenda nt’ s pa rticipation in the conversations was not, from her

persp ect ive, part of the conspiracy or agreement

to commit murder, but, rather, it was her way of allowing her sons to ventila te their anger at the sexual abusehe r h us ba nd ha d b ee n p er pe tr at in g o n t he bo ys over a period of

time. Her defense might not beaccepted by a jury and he

r belief, if, indeed, she had such a belief, th at the boys should be allowed to express their ra g e throu gh such conversations may have been misguided. Nevertheless, I believe she should have be en allowe d to tell her version of the

events to the ju ry and to submit evidenc e it suppor

t of it.

Icome to this conclusion because I believe her version goes to the very

heart of her defense, i.e., that there was no conspiracy

between her and any

one else. The absence of a conspiracy , i.e., an

ag reement, depends on whether she had a factu al basis f

or allowi ng the b oys

to express their anger in this manner and this, in turn, depends on whether the sexual abuse actually oc curred. If it did not occur, her defense disappears and if it did occur
, she has
anexplanation, however tenuous it might be, for why she participated

in th e c on ve rs at io ns an d f or he r t he or y tha t she was not seriously conspiring to murder

her husband.

From this perspective, the need to establi shthe sexual abusebecomes

crucia l. I w ould not wa

nt t he t rial to deteriorateinto acriminal sexual conduct case with each allegation of se x ab use being proved and then being disproved by o ther witnesses but

Iam satisfied that the trial judge c an place

adequa te contr ols and limits on the flow of testimony given the purp os e o f s uc h t es ti mo ny. It would be sufficient for

the tr ial j udge to allow enough evidence to establish that defendant’s view of the situation was suppor

ted by an adeq uate fa ctual ba sis.No. 00-1992 Rockwell v. Yukins 17

If all she can show is that her

behavior was based on

a vague an d genera lized hatre d for h er h usband by herself and bythe boys, she is deprived of the essence of her defense. A defend

ant must be

permitte d to off e r proofs of each elem ent of a valid defense. See Washington v Texas , 388 US 14, 19; 87 S Ct 1920; 18 L Ed 2d 1019 (1 967); People v Callington , 123 Mich App 301, 305; 333 NW2d 260 (1 983 ). I wish t o emp hasiz e that I do not take the po sit ion that defendant would be justified in conspiring to kill her husband if he h ad perpetrated

sexual abu se u pon the boys. Rather, m y position is that she m ust be permitted to argue and submit proofs that the exist

ence of the sexual

abuse formed a basis for her belief that she was not a knowing particip ant in a c onspirac y a t all.

I wou ld reverse and re

mand for a new tri al.

Id. (Shepherd, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).

III. Analysis

At the outset, it should be noted t hat altho ugh the state appella te court’s reason

for concluding that the evidence was properl y excluded under Rul e 403 is sig

nifican t, what ismost sign ifican tis the court’s finding that the exclusion of Rockwell’s sexual abu se o f his sons merely limited the “method” by which Petitioner could pr esen t her defense. Thi s is so because the state appellate court made a n objectiv ely

unreasonable determination under Supreme Court precedent that Petitioner was only limited in the “method” and notthe substa

nce of he r defen se through the exclusion of this evidence, which

thereby r endered the court’s conclusion that the evidence was prop er ly excluded under Rule 403 objectiv ely

unreasonable as well. Said diffe rentl y, althou gh it is true that

Supreme Court precedent indicates that the right to pr e sent a de fense is at times lim

ited by reasona ble evidentiary

rules, if in deciding to exclude evidence under an evidentiary

rule the cour

t makes a n objecti vely unreasonable 18 Rockwell v. Yukins No. 00-1992

determination

as to Petiti oner’s a

bility to present

her def ense i nthe absence of this evidence, the decision to exclude t h e evidence under the rul e is itself unreasonable. See Wiggins , 123 S. Ct. a t 2538-539 (holding that if the court makes an
unreasonabledetermination as to the basis for counsel’s st ra te gy, the deci sion to def er to cou nsel’s str ategic choice i s itself unreasonable).

A. Petitioner’s Right to Pre sent a Defense

The state ap

pellate c ourt held

that Petitioner was not denied her constitutional ri ght t o present a defense because the exclusion of evide

nce regarding

Rockwell ’s sex ual abuse “merely limited [] the

method” by w

hich Petiti oner cou

ld present her defense theo ry . Under clearly established Supreme Courtpreced

ent, the s tate app ellate

court’s holding
was objectively unrea sonable becaus e evidence of Rockwell ’s al leged sexual abuse provided the substantive basis f o r Petitioner’s defense such that without this evidence Petitioner was left with no defense at all.

The Co urt has long he ld that an accuse d’s rig

ht to “establ ish a defense” is a “fundamental element of due process.” Washington v . Texas , 38 8 U. S. 14, 19 ( 196 7). In Washington
, the Court was called upon for the first time “to de cide whether the right of an accuse d to have compulsor y process for obtaining witnesses in his fav or, gua rantee d in federal trials by the

Sixth Amendment, is so fundamental and
es sential to a fair trial that it is incorporated in the Du e ProcessClause of

the Fourteenth Amendment.” Id. at 17-18. Relying on In re Oliver , the Court observed that, among other th ings, an accused’s right “‘to offe r testimony’” is a b asi c component of

his right to offer a defense. Id. at 18 (quoting In re Oliver , 333 U.S. 257, 273 (1948)). The Court therefore concluded

that “[t]he right to offer testimony of witnesses and to compel th eir atte

ndance [] is in plain te

rms the ri ght to present a defense” because “[j]ust as an accused ha s the right to confront the prosecution’s witnesses for the purpose of challenging

their tes timony , he has the rig h t to prese

nt hisNo. 00-1992 Rockwell v. Yukins 19

ownwitnesses to establish a defense.” Id. at 19. It is then up to the jury to “decide

where the truth lies.” Id.

The Courtspoke again on the constitutional significance of allowing a defendant

to prese nt testimon

y in connec tion with his defense in Crane v. Kentucky , 476 U. S. 683 (1986). Specific ally
, in Cra ne , the Court held that the exclusion of testimony surrounding the circumstances of a def endant’s confession

deprived the defendant of h is fundamental right—wh ethe r

under the Due Process Clause of the Fourtee nth Amendment or under

the Compulsory Process or Confrontation Clauses of the Sixth Amendment—to present
a defense. Id. at 690-91 . The Cour t reasoned that t

h e opportuni ty to be heard “would be an empt y one if the

State
were permitted to exclude co mpete nt, reliable evidence bearing on the cr edibility of a confession when such evidence is centra l to th e defend ant’s claim of innocence.” Id. As a result, the Court concluded that the “exclusion of this kindof exculpatory

evidence deprives a defendant of the basic right to have the prosecutor’s case enc ounter and ‘ su rvive the crucibl e of meaningful adversarial testing .’” I d. at 690-91 (quoting United States v. Cronic , 466 U.S. 648, 656 (1984)).

In Davis v. Alaska , 415 U.S. 308, 315-16 (1974), the Court examined an accused’s right to present a de fe nse i n the context of the cross-examination of witnesses offere d again st him. The Court

recog nized that “ [c]ross-exami nation is the principal means by which the believability of a witness and the truth of his testimony

are tested[,]” and that severalmeans o f discrediting a witness are essential to effe ctive c ross

examination. Id. at 316. T he petitioner in Davissought to discred it a government witness by showing the existence of possible bias and prejudi ce. Id. Specifically, the pe titioner sought to question a key witness for the prosecution regarding the witness’ adjudication as a juvenile delinque nt and his pro bationstatus in or

der to de monstrate that the w

itness ide ntified the petitioner as the perpetrator out of f ear o f possible probation revocation. Id. at 310-11. The trial court refused to allow the petitione

r to cross-examine the witness as 20 Rockwell v. Yukins No. 00-1992

to his probationary status as a juvenile offender based on a state statute protecting the anony mity of j uvenil e offen

ders. Id. at 311. As a resu

lt, the petitioner’ s counsel “did his be st” to expose the witness’s state of mind at the time, but much of the witness’ testim ony

went unchallenged. Id . at 312-14. The petitioner

was convicte d, and his a

ppeal ma de its way to the Alaska Supreme Court wh ic h affirmed the petitioner’s conviction, concluding that “‘co uns el for the defendant was able adequately

to question the youth in cons iderable deta il concerning the possibility of bias or motive.’” Id. 314-15.

The Sup reme Court granted certiorari limited to the question of whether the petitioner was denied hi s constitutional right

to adequately c

ross-examine the witness, which“turn[ed] on the correctness of the Alaska court’s
eva lua tion of the ‘a

dequacy’ of the sc ope of crossexamination permitted.” Id. The Court reversed, finding that it could not “acc e pt the Alaska Supreme Court’s conclusion that the cros s-examina

tion that w as permi

tted def ense counsel
was adequate to develop the issue of bias prope rly to the jury.” Id. at 318. The Court reasoned:

Whi le counsel was permitted to ask [the witnes s ] whether he was biased, counsel was unable to make a record from which

to argue why

[the witness] might have been biased or

otherwis e la cke d that degree of impartia lity expecte d of a witne ss at tria l. On the b asis of the limited cross-examination that was permitted, the jury might well have thought that defense couns el was engaged in a spec ulative a nd basele ss line of attack on the credibility of an a

pparently bl am eless witness or, as the prosecu

tor’s obje ction put it
, a ‘reha sh’ of pr ior cros sexamination. On thes e facts , it seems c lear tous that to make any such

inquiry effe ctive, defense counsel should have been permitted to expose to the jury the facts from whichjurors, as the sole t riers of fa ct an d c re di bi li ty, could appro pri ately draw

inferences relating to the reliabil ity o f the witness.No. 00-1992 Rockwell v. Yukins 21

Id. (emphasis added). Agains tthis backdrop, it is clear that the Michigan Court of Appeals’ ruling—that exclusion of Rockwell ’s sexual a

buse of the boys “mere ly limited [Petitioner] in the method” by whichshe could present her de fense—was objectively
unreasonableinasmuch

as this ev idence was at the very substance of

Petitioner’s defense. Through the exclusion of this evidence, Petitioner was deprived of her right

to present testimony in connec

tion wit h and in support of

her def ense pursuant to Washington and Crane

, and she was denied her right to effectively

cross-ex amin e key witnesse s and demonstrat e the acc

uracy and truth fulness o f her de fense under Davis , all of which ultimately denied Petitioner he r due process right to present a defense

. Indeed, at the hear ing on t he motion in limine before the t rial court, Petitioner’s counsel argued the substantive
s ignificance of the sexual abuse evidence as it related t o Petitioner’s defense:

Your Honor, in this case, my client, Sharon Rockwell
, is charged with conspiracy to murder E dward Roc

kwell, her husband. The facts will show in this case that there were several conversations throug houtthe period of the conspiracy

in which my client and

the other conspirators and the other parties discussed death, way s of accomplishing death of father.

The prosecution intends to show that my client engag ed in these conversations in an effort to convince the jury that my client is g

uilty of conspiring to murder.

* * * My client knew of the extreme—and I underline—extreme

hatred her childr en ha d for the ir father. She knew this because she lived with it every da y she raised the children. Her defense, y

ou Honor, is that 22 Rockwell v. Yukins No. 00-1992

she knew the situation was a volatile, explosive situation and she felt i nher heart that the only wa

y she could kee

p this situation u

nder con trol was t o allow the

boy s to talk and fantasize about the se thing s that wer e appar ently in their minds. And, therefor e , her att itude was talk will diffuse the situ ation rather than silence causing an explosion. So her defense is that she did not make an agreement

with anyone. She

allowed t his talk because it was just talk.
Now, t he sex acts involved in this case and father’s prior conduct intreating his family

so shabbily will show that this hatre d was re al and wil l show that w hy t his talk was engaged in. (Trial Tr., Vol. I at 12-13.) The f o llow ing colloquy then
occurr ed betwe en the tr

ial cour t and Petiti oner’s c ounsel:

THE COURT: Assuming everything you sa y i s true, [] assuming that there was hated [ sic ] based uponall these activities, what type of a legal d efense is it?

* * *

PETITI ONER’S COUNSEL: Because mother [Petitioner] say s the re was not an agree me nt to murder . Mother s ay s this was nothing more than talk.

THE COURT: Then

how i s your cl ient harmed by not including the sexual—prior sexual conduct?

PETITI ONER’S COUNSEL: Because then a finder of fact say s, well, if there was—You know, the finder o f fact c onclu des th at this is just nothing more than a smoke screen by the Defe ndants. My

client mus tshowNo. 00-1992 Rockwell v. Yukins 23

th a t, in fact, this is true , her def ense is true, because otherwise, a rational finder of fact ca n believe that mothe

r is just making u

p a story to g et out of somet hing.

* * * My client’s argument is that th ere was no agree ment; thi s was just talk. And that’s very cr

i tica l in this ca se beca

use the evidence and the facts will show that this talk occ

urred be cause of

this extreme hatred.

Her entire def

en se is built around showing tha t, i n fact, this was nothing but talk, a nd to disallow the evidence to
come in makes it

— make s her def

ense one so weak t

hat it is o f

dubious nature at best. ( Id. at 14, 24.) Ruling on the record, the trial court excluded the evidence, stat ing as fo llows: “The Court will not allow inquiry into the collateral issues with regard to sexual matters. The Court

finds that i t is no t mate

rial unde r [MRE ] 404. ” (Trial Tr., Vol. I at 24.)

Th us, the exclusion o f this evid ence did not mere ly li

mit Petitioner “in the method” by whic h she could presen t her defense; rather, the exclusion of this evidence prevented Petitioner from establishing

her def ense. As arg ued by her counsel before

the trial court, testimony of

Rockwell’s sexual abuseprovided

the very basis a s to why

Petitioner allowed and particip ated in c onversa tions with her sons regarding Rockwell’s death, and why these conver sations did not amount to anagree

ment to kill . Petitione

r could no t establish her defense without suc

h test imon y, which she could ha ve introduced

through her

own testimony

as well as that of other 24 Rockwell v. Yukins No. 00-1992

witnesses, including her

co-defendants who testifie d at trial

. Inother words, the trial court’s ruling deprived Petitioner of “the right to p resent [ her] own witnesses to establish a defense[,] thu s dep riving Petitioner of a “fundamental element of due process of law.” Washington , 388 U.S. at 19. Ac co rd in gl y, the state appellate court’s ruling that Petitioner
was merely

limited in

the method by which she c ould present her defense was obje ctively

unreasonableunder Washington

. The same may be sa

id of the state appellate court’s ruling under Crane v. Kentucky , inasmuch as without t he evidence of Rockwell’s abuse, Petitioner’s defense had no foundation and “deprive[d] [Petitioner] of the basic right to hav e the prosecutor’s case en

counter and ‘sur vive the c

rucib le of meaningful adversarialtesting.’” Crane , 476 U.S. at 690-91 (quoting United Sta tes v. Cron ic , 466 U.S. 648, 656 (1984)). Similar to Crane , evidenc e of why Petitioner

particip ated in the talk of Rockwell’s death—that it was a means of allowing the boys to vent their hatred for their father that had

resulted fromhis sexual abu se—was “ centra l to [Petitioner’s] claim of innocenc e” beca

use wi th ou t t he ev id en ce as to wh y th e b oys hated their father, Petitioner’s defens e ha d little chance of
succee ding. See id. at 691. I ndeed, w

ithout m ore , Petitioner’s “talk therap y” def ense may ve

ry well have worked against Petitioner inasmuch as the jury may have believed that Pe t itioner’s sons hated their father because he dema nded that they excel in school, or bec ause he strict l y prevented them from using drugs or alcohol. In other words, withoutmore, the jury may have thought the s ons hated Rockwell because he was being a good , albeit p erhaps s trict, father, such that

Petitioner’s approval of the boy s speaking of killing Rockwell as a form of “talk therapy ” may have

hurt her defense as opposed t o hel ping it. Without knowing the
reason behind the boys’ hatred of Rockwell, the jury may

also have believed that they

hated him

at Petitioner’s be

hest, thereby add ing cr edence to the prosecution’s claim that Petitioner formed a

n agre ement wit

h her sons

to kill Rockwell

. Thus, evidence of why the boy s hated their father and why Petitioner

allo wed o r participated in talk ofNo. 00-1992 Rockwell v. Yukins 25

Rockwell’s death was “all but indispensable to any chance of [her defense ] succee ding” thereby render ing th e state appella te court’s

ruling o

bjective ly u

nreaso n able under Crane

. Id. at 691.

Davisv. Alaska provides further support as to why the state appella te court’s ruling that Petitioner was mere ly li

mited in the “method” by whic

h she could present her

defe nse was objectiv ely

unreasonable. T

his is so because, as indicated, the Courtin Davisheld

that “the jurors were entitled to have the benef it of th e d ef en se th eo ry b ef

or e t he m s o t ha t t he y c oul d make an informed judgment as to the weight to place on [the witness’] testimony which provided a crucial link

in the proof

. . . of petitioner’s act.” Id. at 317 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted; emphasis in o rigin al). The Court reasoned that “[t]he

accura cy and truth fulness o f [th e ke y witness’] testimony

were ke y e lements in the State ’s claim against the petitioner.” Id.

The accura

cy and truth fulness of testimony provided by the prosecution’s witnesse s in con nection with Petitioner’s participation

in discus sions to kill Rockwell were key elements in the state’s conspiracy case against Petitioner. Indeed, without suc

h evidenc e, the sta

t e would have been at
a loss in pro ving tha

t Petitione

r formed an agr eement to kill. For example, prosecution w itness Peter Earl Granger, who identified himself as a family frie

nd, testified at length that he had been privy to discussions that Petitioner had with her sons abou t killing Ro ckw ell . (T ria l Tr . Vo l. IV. a t 9 6-1 17. ) If Petitio ner ha d been a

llowed to c

ross-exa mine Gra nger a s to the context or

circumstances under which these dis cussions t

o kill arose—the boy s’ hatred of Rock well due to his alleged sexual abuse—Granger’s statements may have served t

o aid Pet itio ner and not the state. Similarly, co-def endant Jeffrey Greene, the y

oung ma n upon who m Rockwel l had alle gedly made a sexual advance on the night in question, tes tifie d at trial; and had Petitioner been allowed to question Greene as to R ockwe ll’s histor

y of sexual abu se on the R ockwell children, Petitioner’s “talk therapy ” defense woul d hav e 26 Rockwell v. Yukins No. 00-1992

1 The majo rity’s conc lusion tha t Da vis is “readi ly di sti nguis hable” fli es in the f

ace of habeas review und er the u nreas onable appli cati on prong of § 2254(d)(1) inas much as under thi s prong, reli ef may be g ranted “based on an appli cati on of a gover n ing lega l princip le to a se t of facts different from th ose of t

he case i n which the pri nciple was announce d.” Lockyer v. Andr ade , 123 S. Ct. at 1174. gained credence thus making

it less “speculative.” Davis , 415 U.S. at 317-18. Accordingly
, Davis is further indication that excluding evidence of Rockwell’s sexual abuse deprived Petitioner of the su bstan ce of he

r defen se, makin

g the sta te appella te court’s determination tha

t Petitione

r was mer

ely limitedin the “method” of presenting her defense objectiv ely unreasonable. 1

B. Excluding the Evidence Under Rule 403

The majority contends that the Michig anCourtof Appea ls exclude d evid ence of Rockwell’s sexual abuse of his sons because the court found that the probative value of the evidence wa s s ub st an ti al ly o ut we ig he d b y the danger that unfair prejudice would have en suedhad the evidence been admitted. The m a

jority goes on to hold that it was not objectiv ely

u nreas onable f

or the sta

te appel late cou

rt to exclude the evidence on

this basis because, “[t]he evidence of sexual abused pose d a substa ntial dan

ger of unfair prejudice—a

ri sk th at th e j ur y wo uld be tem pted to ac quit Mrs. Rockwell

not beca use of an y se nse that she was innocent of conspiring with her sons to kill Mr. Rockwell , but beca use of a sense t hat killing

would be t

oo good f or su ch a ma

n.” However, the majority’s conclusion in this reg ard is based on pure speculation and what amount s to an inappropriate de
novo revie w of the case inasmuch as the Michigan Court of Appeals ’ two-judge majority merely stated tha

t“ [a]l thou gh marginally

relevant, t he evidence was properly excluded under MRE 403.” Indeed, the same be said for the majority’s speculation

tha t t he evidence was properly excluded under Rule 403 because it would have complicated the trial or have te nded to mislead

the jury . There

is nothing

to support

thisNo. 00-1992 Rockwell v. Yukins 27

2 There is nothi ng in the t rial court’ s decision gr anting the state’s moti on in l imine t o indicat e that the evi dence was excl uded because i t s probative value was substa ntially outw eighed by the d ange r of unfa ir prejudice inasmuch as the s tate tri al court excluded t

he evidenc e under M ichigan Rule o f Evid ence 404 . (J.A. at 3 6.) conclusion, particu

larly where the decisi on whethe r to admit the e vidence was decided in a motion in limine and the tri a l court could easily have

limited the parameters of the evidence while cautioning the jury

as to the scope of its consideration. Michig an’s Rule of Evidence 403 is identical to Federal Ru le of Evidence 403 and provides: “Although releva nt , evidence ma y be exc luded if it s probati ve value is substant ia lly

outweighed by

the danger of unfair prejudice
, confusionof the issues, or misleading the jury , or by considerations of undue delay , waste of time, or n eedl ess prese ntation of cumulative evidence.” M ICH

. R. E VID

. 4 03

. Thus, the Michigan

Court of Appeals may

have excluded the evidence under Rul e 403 for any of the re aso ns p rovided under the rule. Inde ed, there is nothing in the state court’s majority opinion to indicate that it excluded the evi d ence because the probative value of the evidence was substa ntially outweighed

by the dang er

of unfair prejudice. 2 In fact, when consideringthe sentence in the state appellate court’s opinion i mmediate ly

proceeding the sentence whe re it is found tha t the evidenc e was properly exclu ded under Rul e 403—“ Defendant

was mere ly li

mited in the

method wit

h whichto present her defense and not deprived the opportuni

ty to present the same ”—it

logically f

ollows that evidence was excluded as being cumulative.

That aside, the state appel late court’s ruling that the evidence was properly

excluded under Rule 403, for whatever reason, is obje ctively unrea sonable inasmuch as its conc lusio n that Petitioner

was “mer ely limited in the method with which to present her defense and not deprived the opport uni ty to present the same” was in itself objectively unreasonable. See Wiggins , 123 S. Ct. at 253 8-539 (c oncluding that the st

ate 28 Rockwell v. Yukins No. 00-1992

3 Bec ause the de nial of he r right to p resen t a defe nse w ould be “constit utional error of the fi rst magnitude and no amount of showing of want of prejudi ce would cur e it ,” see Davis v. Alaska , 415 U.S. 308, 318 (1974), the ma jority’s co ntention that s uch error woul d have been harml ess is unf

ounded. court of appea

ls overa ll applica

tio n of Strickland was o bjective ly

unreasonable be cause 1) the cour t’s findin g th a t defense counsel had adeq

uately investig ate d the petitioner’s background

was objectively unr

easonable under Strickland which2) thereby made

the state court’s subsequent deference to counsel ’s strategic choice objectively unreasonable as well).

It is true, as the majority

contends
, that the Supreme Court has held that a defendant’s right to present re levant evidence is subject to reasonable res t rictions for the purpose of accommodating“‘other legitimate interests in the criminal trial process.’” United States v. Scheffer , 523 U.S. 303, 308 (1998) (quot ing Chambers v. Mississippi , 410 U.S. 284, 295 (197 3)). To the exte

nt that the

Michiga n Court of A

ppeals excluded the evidence under

Rule 403, for whatever reason, it would appear

that under the deferential standard set forth by AEDPA, thi s Court would be in a position to conclude that th e st ate appellate court’s decision was not unreasona ble. However, inasmuch as the stat e co urt was ob jectivel y unreasonablein con cludi ng t h at exclusion of the evidence merely denied Pe

tit i oner the

“method”

by w hich she c ould pr ese nther defense, its conclusion that the evidence was properl y excl ud ed under

Rule 403 wa s objectiv ely
unreasonableas well. 3 See Wiggins , 123 S. Ct. at 2538-539;

see also Sche

ffer , 52 3 U.S. at 30 8 (reco gnizing that it is unconstit utionally arbitrary or disproportionate to exc lude evidence if, in doing so, an accused’s we igh ty in terest is infringed).No. 00-1992 Rockwell v. Yukins 29

IV. Conclusion

The Cons t itution guarantees criminal defendants “a

m eaningfulopportunity to present a complete defens e. ” California

v. Trombetta , 467 U.S. 479, 485 (1984). Becau se the exclusion of evidence regarding Rockwell ’s sexual a

buse deprived Petitioner of her opp ortunit y to be hear

d for purposes of est ablis hing a defen se and claiming her in nocence, the Michigan Court of Appeals’ ruling that Petitioner was merely

limited in the “method” of p rese nting her defense was objectively

unreasonable, thereby

making i ts ruling that the e

vidence was prop erly

excl uded unde

r Rule 403 object ive ly u

nreasonable as w ell. I

theref ore woul d affirm the district court’s grant of Petitioner’s application for a writ of habeas c orpus, an

d respec tfully dissent.