United States Court of Appeals 

For the Seventh Circuit 

Chicago, Illinois 60604 

Submitted October 17, 2022*

Decided October 19, 2022 

Before 

ILANA DIAMOND ROVNER, Circuit Judge 

DIANE P. WOOD, Circuit Judge 

AMY J. ST. EVE, Circuit Judge

No. 21-3067 

TIMOTHY W. ELKINS, JR., 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

v. 

KEITH FRAINEY, et al., 

 Defendants-Appellees.

 Appeal from the United States District 

Court for the Central District of Illinois. 

No. 20-cv-4093-MMM 

Michael M. Mihm, 

Judge. 

O R D E R 

 Timothy Elkins, Jr., a former Illinois prisoner, appeals the dismissal of his civilrights complaint for failure to prosecute. The district court dismissed Elkins’s case after 

he failed, in the court’s view, to participate in the case over several months and comply 

*

 We have agreed to decide the case without oral argument because the 

appellant’s brief and the record adequately present the facts and legal arguments, and 

oral argument would not significantly aid the court. FED. R. APP. P. 34(a)(2)(C). 

NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION 

To be cited only in accordance with FED. R. APP. P. 32.1 
No. 21-3067 Page 2 

with a directive to keep his address updated. Because Elkins had, in fact, done all that 

was required, we vacate the judgment and remand for further proceedings. 

 In late 2020, Elkins sued several prison officials over the conditions of his 

confinement. Elkins alleged that his cell was bitterly cold, constantly illuminated, and 

without a mattress. 

 In February 2021, Elkins sent a short letter to the court inquiring into the status of 

his case. In the letter he informed the court that he would begin mandatory supervised 

release on April 30, 2021, at which time he would “parole to 824 E. Mill Street Staunton 

Illinois 62088.” 

 By apparent coincidence, on April 30—the same day Elkins was released from 

prison—the district court screened his complaint, see 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, dismissed some 

deliberate indifference claims, and allowed him to proceed on others against certain 

defendants (“merit-review order”). With regard to Elkins’s letter of February 2021, the 

court construed it as a “motion for status” and denied it as moot. The court also 

directed Elkins to “immediately notice the Court of any change in mailing address.” 

The court mailed a copy of the order to Dixon Correctional Center, the prison Elkins 

had just left, instead of his new Staunton address. 

In August, Defendants filed an answer and mailed a copy to the prison. Later 

that month, Defendants moved for an order to show cause, explaining that documents 

they had mailed to Dixon had been returned, and that Dixon officials had confirmed 

that Elkins was no longer there. Citing a local rule requiring Elkins to notify the court of 

any change of address, see C.D. Ill. L.R. 16.3(K), Defendants asked the court to sanction 

Elkins by dismissing his complaint. 

On September 16, the district court ordered Elkins to file a current address 

within 14 days or face dismissal. The court sent a copy of the order to Elkins at Dixon, 

which the court identified as “the last known address of record.” 

On October 8, with no response from Elkins, the district court dismissed the case 

for failure to prosecute. See FED. R. CIV. P. 41(b). The court acknowledged that it was 

“unclear whether Plaintiff received the merit review order,” which instructed him to 

apprise the court of any change of address. But the court pointed out that the same 

instruction had previously appeared in the “Case Opening Notice to Pro Se Litigants,” 

which Elkins received. Because Elkins had not responded to the court’s warning or 
No. 21-3067 Page 3 

“participated in this case for more than 6 months,” the court concluded that dismissal 

was proper. 

Elkins promptly sought reopening to correct the court’s misunderstanding about 

his address. He explained that in May, after his release from prison, he had sent 

multiple change-of-address notices to all the district courts in which he had pending 

litigation. His motion to reopen included the same Staunton address that he had listed 

in his February letter. 

The court denied the motion as unsupported. 

Elkins appealed, arguing that the district court overlooked his February letter, 

which provided the court with notice of his change of address. Elkins attached that 

letter to his brief. 

A district court may dismiss a case on its own initiative if “the plaintiff fails to 

prosecute or to comply with [the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure] or a court order.” 

FED. R. CIV. P. 41(b); see McMahan v. Deutsche Bank AG, 892 F.3d 926, 931 (7th Cir. 2018). 

A district court must “show a record of delay, contumacious conduct, or that lesser 

sanctions proved unavailable, as well as the prejudice that the delay caused the 

defendant.” Thomas v. Wardell, 951 F.3d 854, 862 (7th Cir. 2020). We review a dismissal 

under Rule 41(b) for abuse of discretion. Salata v. Weyerhaeuser Co., 757 F.3d 695, 699 

(7th Cir. 2014) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). 

We recognize that the district court has broad discretion in managing its docket, 

but the court appears to have overlooked Elkins’s February letter, in which he referred 

to his upcoming move to a new address in Staunton. As a consequence of that 

oversight, the court incorrectly premised its dismissal on Elkins’s failure to “provide[ ] 

his updated contact information.” The court also premised its dismissal on Elkins’s 

having “not participated in this case for more than 6 months,” but that statement lacks 

context. Elkins was not required to do anything in the months leading up to midSeptember, when the court issued an order (that Elkins appears not to have received) 

directing him to update his address within 14 days or face dismissal. A Rule 41(b) 

dismissal is a harsh sanction that is appropriate only in extreme situations, such as a 

clear record of delay. Collier v. SP Plus Corp., 889 F.3d 894, 897 (7th Cir. 2018); Webber v. 

Eye Corp., 721 F.2d 1067, 1069 (7th Cir. 1983). This case does not present such a record. 
No. 21-3067 Page 4 

Defendants make three arguments in support of the district court’s ruling, but 

none is persuasive. First, Defendants contend that Elkins did not sufficiently develop 

his argument that the February letter provided notice of his new address. But we 

construe pro se briefs liberally, see Ebmeyer v. Brock, 11 F.4th 537, 542 n.4 (7th Cir. 2021), 

particularly where the pro se litigant has been prejudiced by the court’s own error. And 

by attaching the letter to his brief Elkins adequately signaled that the district court 

should have had his new address on file. 

Second, Defendants argue that Elkins did not comply with the court’s discoveryrelated instructions in its merit-review order, and that his non-compliance is further 

evidence of his failure to prosecute. But the court did not set any discovery deadlines, 

and so Elkins’s inactivity should not have been characterized as non-compliant. 

Third, Defendants argue that Elkins knew about the court’s misunderstanding 

regarding his address and thus should be accountable for not taking steps that would 

have assured receipt of the court’s 14-day warning. In support, Defendants rely on 

Elkins’s acknowledgment—set forth in his appellate brief—that a Dixon official 

forwarded the merit-review order to him soon after he was released. But our review is 

limited to the evidence available when the district court entered judgment, see Pruitt v. 

Mote, 503 F.3d 647, 659 (7th Cir. 2007) (en banc), and the court conceded at the time that 

it was “unclear whether Plaintiff received the merit review order.” 

Because we conclude that the district court abused its discretion by dismissing 

the complaint based on an erroneous finding of a record of delay, we VACATE the 

dismissal and REMAND for further proceedings.