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i 

45–257 2009

[H.A.S.C. No. 110–154] 

AN UPDATE ON EFFORTS TO DEVELOP 

AND SUPPORT THE IRAQI SECURITY 

FORCES 

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

HEARING HELD 

JULY 9, 2008 
(II) 

HOUSE COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS

IKE SKELTON, Missouri, Chairman 

JOHN SPRATT, South Carolina 

SOLOMON P. ORTIZ, Texas 

GENE TAYLOR, Mississippi 

NEIL ABERCROMBIE, Hawaii 

SILVESTRE REYES, Texas 

VIC SNYDER, Arkansas 

ADAM SMITH, Washington 

LORETTA SANCHEZ, California 

MIKE MCINTYRE, North Carolina 

ELLEN O. TAUSCHER, California 

ROBERT A. BRADY, Pennsylvania 

ROBERT ANDREWS, New Jersey 

SUSAN A. DAVIS, California 

RICK LARSEN, Washington 

JIM COOPER, Tennessee 

JIM MARSHALL, Georgia 

MADELEINE Z. BORDALLO, Guam 

MARK E. UDALL, Colorado 

DAN BOREN, Oklahoma 

BRAD ELLSWORTH, Indiana 

NANCY BOYDA, Kansas 

PATRICK J. MURPHY, Pennsylvania 

HANK JOHNSON, Georgia 

CAROL SHEA-PORTER, New Hampshire 

JOE COURTNEY, Connecticut 

DAVID LOEBSACK, Iowa 

KIRSTEN E. GILLIBRAND, New York 

JOE SESTAK, Pennsylvania 

GABRIELLE GIFFORDS, Arizona 

NIKI TSONGAS, Massachusetts 

ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland 

KENDRICK B. MEEK, Florida 

KATHY CASTOR, Florida 

DUNCAN HUNTER, California 

JIM SAXTON, New Jersey 

JOHN M. MCHUGH, New York 

TERRY EVERETT, Alabama 

ROSCOE G. BARTLETT, Maryland 

HOWARD P. ‘‘BUCK’’ MCKEON, California 

MAC THORNBERRY, Texas 

WALTER B. JONES, North Carolina 

ROBIN HAYES, North Carolina 

W. TODD AKIN, Missouri 

J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia 

JEFF MILLER, Florida 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

FRANK A. LOBIONDO, New Jersey 

TOM COLE, Oklahoma 

ROB BISHOP, Utah 

MICHAEL TURNER, Ohio 

JOHN KLINE, Minnesota 

PHIL GINGREY, Georgia 

MIKE ROGERS, Alabama 

TRENT FRANKS, Arizona 

BILL SHUSTER, Pennsylvania 

THELMA DRAKE, Virginia 

CATHY MCMORRIS RODGERS, Washington 

K. MICHAEL CONAWAY, Texas 

GEOFF DAVIS, Kentucky 

DOUG LAMBORN, Colorado 

ROB WITTMAN, Virginia 

ERIN C. CONATON, Staff Director 

MICHAEL CASEY, Professional Staff Member 

STEPHANIE SANOK, Professional Staff Member 

CATERINA DUTTO, Staff Assistant 
(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF HEARINGS 

2008 

Page 

HEARING: 

Wednesday, July 9, 2008, An Update on Efforts to Develop and Support 

the Iraqi Security Forces ..................................................................................... 1 

APPENDIX: 

Wednesday, July 9, 2008 ......................................................................................... 41 

WEDNESDAY, JULY 9, 2008 

AN UPDATE ON EFFORTS TO DEVELOP AND SUPPORT THE IRAQI 

SECURITY FORCES 

STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS 

Hunter, Hon. Duncan, a Representative from California, Ranking Member, 

Committee on Armed Services ............................................................................ 2 

Skelton, Hon. Ike, a Representative from Missouri, Chairman, Committee 

on Armed Services ................................................................................................ 1 

WITNESSES 

Straub, Christopher C., Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Middle 

Eastern Affairs, Office of the Secretary of Defense ........................................... 4 

Dubik, Lt. Gen. James M., USA, Former Commanding General, Multi-National Security Transition Command–Iraq ........................................................ 5 

APPENDIX 

PREPARED STATEMENTS: 

Dubik, Lt. Gen. James M. ................................................................................ 45 

DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD: 

Letter dated February 12, 2008, from Lt. Gen. James M. Dubik to Hon. 

Joseph A. Benkert, with attached Force Generation FMS PERT Diagram ............................................................................................................... 59 

Letter dated September 17, 2007, from Headquarters, Civilian Police 

Assistance Training Team to Deputy Chief of Mission, U.S. Embassy, 

Baghdad, Iraq, regarding CPATT/MOI–TT Transition Plan ..................... 57 

WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING THE HEARING: 

Dr. Gingrey ....................................................................................................... 65 

Dr. Snyder ......................................................................................................... 65 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING: 

Dr. Gingrey ....................................................................................................... 70 

Ms. Sanchez ...................................................................................................... 69 

(1) 

AN UPDATE ON EFFORTS TO DEVELOP AND SUPPORT 

THE IRAQI SECURITY FORCES 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, Washington, DC, Wednesday, July 9, 2008. 

The committee met, pursuant to call, at 10:06 a.m., in room 

2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Ike Skelton (chairman 

of the committee) presiding. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. IKE SKELTON, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM MISSOURI, CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON ARMED 

SERVICES 

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order. 

We meet today to receive an update on the status of efforts to 

develop and support Iraqi security forces (ISF). Our witness today 

is Lieutenant General James Dubik, who less than a week ago left 

his post as the commander of the Multi-National Security Transition Command–Iraq (MNSTC–I). We welcome you and thank you 

for your service. I understand you are going to be retiring in the 

near future. 

We also have with us, as I understand it, to answer any questions you might have, Christopher Straub, the Deputy Assistant 

Secretary of Defense for the Middle East. 

So welcome to you, and thank you, General Dubik, for agreeing 

to appear with us today. We appreciate your service as the commander in charge of training the Iraqis, as well as your some–37 

years in the United States Army. We appreciate it. I understand 

that your wife, Sharon Basso is with us today, and daughters 

Karen and Katie. Am I correct? Where are they? Stand up so we 

can look at you. 

[Applause.] 

The CHAIRMAN. I know you are proud of your husband and your 

daddy. Thank you for being with us. It is a rare treat to have family with a witness. 

Recent events in Iraq, in particular the operations in Basra and 

Sadr City, have shown how far the Iraqi security forces have come 

in such a short time. But these operations also pointed out some 

problems that need to be addressed if any strategy that allows our 

forces to leave in the near future is to depend on effective, nonsectarian Iraqi security forces. 

The Iraqi security forces were able to move over a division in a 

short period of time. Combat operations in Basra relied almost entirely on Iraqis for ground forces with very few coalition troops in 

combat, as I understand it. But the operations also highlighted 
2 

weaknesses in planning, logistics, fire support, and command and 

control. 

In our last hearing with our friend General Dubik back in January of this year, I mentioned the meeting I had with the Iraqi Minister of Defense, Mr. Qadir. Then, he expressed his personal belief 

that Iraq might be able to take responsibility for their own internal 

security as early as the first quarter of 2009 and would probably 

be able to handle their external security by 2018. 

I hope, General Dubik, you can help us understand if that aggressive 2009 goal can be met and hopefully you can provide us 

with your best assessments of the strengths on one hand and the 

weaknesses on the other of the Iraqi security forces. 

We have been working on building the Iraqi security forces now 

for five years. We have spent billions of dollars. The redeployment 

of American troops out of Iraq is dependent on the Iraqis being 

able to provide for their own security, and that redeployment is 

tied to our own national security. We need not go into all of that, 

which we have done a good number of times in this hearing room. 

We need a real and clear sense of where we are, general, in this 

effort, and how long it will take for the Iraqi security forces to be 

able to operate without us, and what the strategy is for getting us 

there. So thank you for this. 

Mr. Straub, we have been told you have no opening statement, 

but you are here to answer questions. We appreciate very much 

your doing so. 

I now turn to my friend, Mr. Hunter. Please. 

STATEMENT OF HON. DUNCAN HUNTER, A REPRESENTATIVE 

FROM CALIFORNIA, RANKING MEMBER, COMMITTEE ON 

ARMED SERVICES 

Mr. HUNTER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Chairman, thank 

you for holding this very important hearing because this goes to 

the heart of the American operation in Iraq, and that of course is 

the development and deployment of a reliable Iraqi military force. 

General Dubik, let me join the chairman in congratulating you 

on 37 years of outstanding service to our country, and wish you the 

best of health and much happiness. And to your family that is with 

you today, congratulations on having such a hero for a father and 

for a husband. 

We are going to talk about today the coalition efforts to stand up 

the Iraqi forces. That is very critical. It is especially critical at this 

time because we are entering into formal agreements that detail 

roles, missions, and footprints for the future military presence in 

Iraq. Clearly, to determine the appropriate missions and force levels for U.S. troops, negotiators have to make certain assumptions 

about the ability of the Iraqi forces to shoulder more and more of 

the security burden over time. 

I know that both of our witnesses surely agree that the long-term 

solution to providing stability in Iraq has to rest with the Iraqis 

themselves, and that of course is in turn dependent on the capability and the reliability of the security forces. They have to be able 

and willing to, in General Dubik’s words from testimony earlier 

this year, defend themselves, their citizens, and their new-found 

freedom. 
3 

General, in your opinion, one thing I would like to know during 

this hearing is how close we are to realizing that situation, where 

the roughly 140 trained and equipped combat battalions, how well 

they perform in battle. 

Of course, in the unique situation with Iraq, it makes this somewhat different from an American training operation where we train 

forces, as we have in many other parts of the world. You have a 

real test laboratory here called a battlefield. 

So I know one thing that we are interested in is the performance 

of the Iraqis in the battlefield, in the battle space, their capabilities, their inadequacies, where those exist, and how we meet the 

gaps and move quickly to close them. 

As I understand it, we now have 139 line battalions, and you 

have 4 special operations battalions. So we have 143 Iraq battalions extant today. So if you could talk about that. 

In particular, I am concerned, as I have always been, about the 

ability of Iraqi battalions to saddle up, if you will, and move out 

and deploy in an area of operation (AO) that is different from the 

one where they are regularly stationed, perform a mission, and perform it largely independent of American support, and then move 

back to the area of operations to which they have been assigned. 

I know you have some examples of that, because of the Basra operation and of course the Sadr City operation. So the ability of the 

Iraqi forces to move out, accomplish a mission in a professional 

manner I think is of a lot of concern to us. 

On the hardware side, it seems to me that as U.S. forces draw 

down, for example the five surge brigades that are almost done redeploying out of Iraq, there is going to be a significant amount of 

major U.S. military equipment that will need to be shipped out of 

Iraq. 

It also seems to me that we may want some of this equipment 

to remain in Iraq, depending on various considerations, but not 

limited to Iraqi requirements, U.S. requirements, the condition of 

the equipment, and costs associated with transport and refurbishment. 

I think, General, it is important for the American people and for 

the effectiveness of the Iraqi military, to ensure that this equipment accountability is done with extreme professionalism, that we 

don’t end up getting rid of a lot of great U.S. military equipment 

for five cents on the dollar. 

One thing that I haven’t been able to pin down, and I hope you 

could get this for us, is how we arrive, if we leave equipment with 

Iraqi forces, at a price tag, if you move that through the foreign 

military supply system, for foreign military sales (FMS). I am reminded of, for example, when the Marines unhorsed their equipped 

Humvees, they had at one point 1,800 of them parked at 

Taqqadum as they moved up to the heavier-armored Humvees. 

So I know that while we have some old equipment and some 

heavily used equipment in Iraq, we also have a lot of equipment 

that hasn’t been used a lot. How much of that is moved to the Iraqi 

military, and how much of it is brought back to the United States 

is I think an important question for us. 

I think the worst scenario is for us to find out that we have a 

bunch of National Guard battalions, for example, that left their 
4 

equipment in Iraq, or parts of their equipment in Iraq, and find out 

a year from now that we have massive inadequacies or massive 

gaps in their equipage because of what they left over there, and 

then find later that we gave away a lot of that equipment or transferred it for next to nothing. 

So having a clear and professional roadmap on how we handle 

the equipment piece of this Iraqi drawdown is I think a really critical aspect of any program for the next four or five months. I would 

like your thoughts on that. How do we do that? And how do we 

maintain a decent inventory of what we have and what we need? 

Because a big piece of this is going to be coming out of this operation with an American military that is ready for other contingencies. 

The last thing we want to be doing is slapping our foreheads a 

year from now or two years from now saying, doggone it, we have 

these important enablers and we left them in Iraq, and we are not 

sure where they are. So if you could give us your thoughts on that 

that would be I think very important. 

I think also one thing that I wanted to know, and I think a number of other members had questions about it, is how we fix this 

thing with the payment for the Iraqi forces. As we have all learned 

early on, a lot of the Iraqi military leave their units to go home because we don’t have a pay system that enables them to stay put. 

Whether or not we are going to be able to change that cultural situation is unclear to me, and whether we have fixed that at all is 

also somewhat unclear. 

So if you could talk about that a little bit, and go over the basic 

pathway that an Iraqi unit or an Iraqi soldier takes now. As the 

chairman mentioned, we have been in this business for a long time 

now, longer than it took us to win World War II. So we ought to 

have a pretty good system in place to take that guy from a recruit 

status. 

And also the Sons of Iraq, who I understand are now being 

brought into the Iraqi army, how those people are taken from a recruit status through a training cycle, ultimately to a deployed unit, 

and how that unit is then integrated into the overall battlefield operation, if you could give us an idea on that, that would be excellent. 

So again thank you for being with us today. We appreciate your 

great service to the country, and we hope that we have the advantage of your wisdom for many years to come. Thank you. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Straub, we have been told that you have a 

brief opening statement, and that primarily you are here to answer 

questions. If that is correct, you may proceed with your opening 

statement. 

STATEMENT OF CHRISTOPHER C. STRAUB, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR MIDDLE EASTERN AFFAIRS, OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE 

Mr. STRAUB. Yes, sir. That is correct. 

I just want to join with the words of the chairman and the ranking member welcoming General Dubik, and saying what an honor 

it is to be at the same table with such a great trainer and inno-
5 

vator and developer of forces as General Dubik has been in his career. And also to join the committee in saluting Sharon Basso and 

their daughters Karen and Kate, representing military families 

throughout the country who have sacrificed so much for our country. 

With that, sir, I am ready for your questions. 

The CHAIRMAN. General Dubik, let’s proceed now with your testimony. Your statement has been filed for the record and will be admitted in its entirety in the record. You can summarize it as you 

see fit. 

STATEMENT OF LT. GEN. JAMES M. DUBIK, USA, FORMER COMMANDING GENERAL, MULTI-NATIONAL SECURITY TRANSITION COMMAND–IRAQ 

General DUBIK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Ranking Member 

Hunter and members of the committee. Thanks to each of you for 

this opportunity to have a conversation upon the completion of my 

tour in Iraq. 

I would like also to thank the committee for your continued support for the men and women in uniform for the trips that many of 

you have made into the Iraq theater of operations and for the difficult work you have done on our behalf here. Without your support, this last year could not and certainly would not have been as 

successful as it was. 

The Iraqis are growing confident in their security forces. Operations in Basra, Sadr City, Mosul, Amarah, and other places have 

been initiated and primarily sustained by Iraqis. Certainly, the 

Basra operation was off to a rough start, but equally certain is this, 

that the Basra operation was tactically and strategically successful 

in the end in that each of the other operations in Mosul, Sadr City, 

and Amarah have been progressively better. Each one has helped 

develop the confidence and competence of the military and police, 

and each one cements in their minds the kinds of capabilities that 

they know they have to develop, and they are committed to their 

success. 

Since June of 2007, which was the high point of violence in Iraq, 

the Iraqi security forces have been increased in both size and capability. The total security force grew some 58,000 in the defense 

forces and 64,000 in the interior forces. Of course, numbers and 

quantity are insufficient. 

Important quality indicators are also up. Gains in the percentage 

of leaders in the units, the percentage of soldiers who are present 

for duty, the numbers of air missions and naval patrols per week, 

and the overall operational readiness ratings are all trending in a 

positive direction. 

In the last 12 months, the Iraqis have built 11 brigade headquarters and 35 battalions. In another important indicator, the 

confidence the Iraqi citizens themselves have in their own security 

forces, has improved every month since November of 2007. 

Challenges remain, however. The Iraqi security forces are still 

reliant on our enablers. Their training is basic. Their leader shortages still exist, and distribution of leaders is uneven. There are 

still pockets of sectarianism. And last, the problems of rapid 
6 

growth that any nation would face are evident in the Iraqi security 

forces. 

To help ensure that we hold onto the successes that our soldiers, 

Marines, airmen, and sailors with Iraqi partners, who are fighting 

and dying at two to three times the rate of coalition forces, to hold 

onto those successes and achieve the quality improvements and 

professionalization that we all want, continued coalition advisory 

and training teams, along with partnership units, is necessary, as 

is Iraqi security force funding. 

From my standpoint, we should not underestimate the difficulty 

of the task remaining. The successes of the past year-plus are significant and are dramatic, but can be reversed, and they can be 

stymied. The enemies of the new Iraq are still very active, as recent reports have seen. They are still capable, though in diminishing frequency, of conducting violent attacks against the innocent. They still seek to destabilize and de-legitimize the government of Iraq. They want to reverse the gains of the last 15 months. 

They have not given up, nor does anyone expect them to. They 

recognize that they have lost the initiative, but they still seek to 

regain it. Our assistance may change in organization and size, to 

be sure, but some form of partnership and assistance consistent 

with our two nations’ strategic objectives, in my opinion, is still 

necessary. 

Key to the development of the Iraqi security ministry’s capacity 

has been their budget execution. The Iraqis’ two security ministries 

have executed approximately $1.5 billion to $2 billion more each 

year from 2005 to the present. In 2008 will be the third year in 

a row that they will have executed more money in their ministries 

of defense and interior than that in the Iraqi security force fund. 

We expect that to be the case also in 2009. 

The minister of interior has improved his execution rate since 

2007, spending 89 percent of his budget. In 2008, he is continuing 

along that improved spending trajectory. The ministry of defense, 

however, only spent 75 percent of its 2007 allocation and continues 

to have difficulty in executing his budget. Both ministries have requested and will receive supplemental funding. The minister of defense requested $1.8 billion more. The minister of interior asked for 

$2.5 billion more. The MNSTC–I advisers will continue to do their 

best in helping the Iraqis spend their money for their defense. 

Aggressive use of foreign military sales programs is helping to 

equip the Iraq security forces. Delivery of FMS-purchased equipment with Iraqi money remains satisfactory. I thank you for your 

support, and your colleagues, and thanks also to the Secretary of 

Defense’s special task force on foreign military sales. One year ago, 

the total delivered in this category was only $115 million worth of 

equipment. Today, the total is over $1.4 billion. This accelerated 

delivery has made important positive contributions to the Iraqi security forces’ capability. 

Two problems remain in foreign military sales, however. The 

first is processing time—too long here and too long in Baghdad. 

And second is the lag time between the Iraqi final decision to purchase equipment and the delivery. For example, as of today, the 

Iraqis have received, as I said, over $1.4 billion worth of equip-
7 

ment, but they have ordered $2.7 billion. From their perspective, 

this gap is unsatisfactory. 

I would like to thank you again, Mr. Chairman and Ranking 

Member Hunter and the committee, on behalf of all the men and 

women of the Multi-National Transition Command—Iraq, for your 

support this past year. We have asked a great deal of the men and 

women and their families, and they have made enormous sacrifices. 

Our elected officials and fellow citizens have done a tremendous 

job in supporting our soldiers and Marines and airmen and civilians and sailors and their loved ones. We all appreciate that. We 

all acknowledge that. And the knowledge that our country appreciates its warriors’ sacrifices and those of its families bolsters all 

of our determination. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

[The prepared statement of General Dubik can be found in the 

Appendix on page 45.] 

The CHAIRMAN. General, thank you very much. 

I have two quick questions, one for the secretary and one for you, 

then I will ask my colleague from California if he has questions. 

Mr. Straub, recent Department of Defense reports have said that 

the eventual size of the Iraqi security forces will be between 

600,000 and 646,000 members. My simple question is, then, is that 

a U.S. plan or an Iraqi plan? 

General DUBIK. Sir, that number came from a conjunction of 

studies. 

The CHAIRMAN. Wait. Does Mr. Straub know the answer? 

Mr. STRAUB. Sir, I would have to defer to General Dubik for the 

expert answer on that. 

The CHAIRMAN. Okay. General. 

General DUBIK. Sir, that number came from a conjunction of 

studies done by the ministry of defense, joint headquarters, and the 

ministry of interior, as well as a Center for Army Analysis study 

and a commander’s study. All four were done last summer and all 

four have similar assumptions, and all cohered about the number 

600,000 to 650,000 as the right number for Iraqi army, air force 

and navy, police, national police, and border police. 

The CHAIRMAN. General, a very basic question. We have been, 

you have been, our country has been working on the Iraqi security 

forces now for several years. We have literally spent billions of dollars in that effort. In your opinion, when will the Iraqis be able to 

handle their own security so our troops will no longer have to do 

it? 

General DUBIK. Sir, I think there are several parts to that answer. They are handling much of their security today. Nine of the 

18 provinces are under provincial Iraqi control. Coalition forces occasionally conduct operations in those provinces, as we did in 

Basra, under certain circumstances, but by and large security is 

handled in those provinces by the Iraqi police and the Iraqi army. 

More provinces will go under provincial Iraqi control in the future. 

So that movement toward their responsibility will continue. 

Second, as we have seen in the series of operations from around 

Easter to now in Basra, Mosul, Sadr City, and Amarah, each of 

those operations were primarily conducted by Iraqi security forces, 

again national police, police and army, with our assistance in some 
8 

command and control, intelligence, some logistics, and in fires and 

aviation support. 

That said, the aviation support in Basra by the two C–130s of 

the Iraqi forces, and the four MI–17s, was very significant, as was 

the Iraqis’ CH–2000 intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance 

aircraft flying several hundred hours. So each operation I think has 

depicted their growing strength on the maneuver side, and identified the areas on the enablers that we all know that they still need 

some more development in. 

The CHAIRMAN. General, assume there is a great big calendar 

right there beside you, and you had to put an X on the month 

which would be in answer to the question that I put to you. Where 

would you put that X? 

General DUBIK. I would not put an X on a calendar, Mr. Chairman. There are some aspects of the development plan which we are 

sure of, but others are still reliant on decisions not yet made in 

terms of Iraqi investments. For example, aircraft purchases that 

they know they have to make, those decisions have not been made. 

Until they are made, I don’t know—— 

The CHAIRMAN. I don’t want to split hairs with you. Let’s just 

look at the ground forces. What would your answer be? Where 

would you put that X as to ground forces? 

General DUBIK. The ground forces will mostly be done by the 

middle of next year. Their divisions, brigades, and battalions are 

on a very good timetable there. 

The CHAIRMAN. That would be June or July of next year? 

General DUBIK. Yes, sir. It depends on slippage of some dates. 

It would be June or it could be July. 

The CHAIRMAN. I am asking you to put the X up there. Where 

would you put it today? 

General DUBIK. Well, again, I can’t put an X. 

The CHAIRMAN. In your best judgment? 

General DUBIK. It is going to be the middle of next year sometime. It could be as early as April or could be as late as August. 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Hunter. 

Mr. HUNTER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Again, thank you for 

having this very important hearing. 

General, as we turn over equipment or transfer equipment to the 

Iraqi military, let me understand the process. Help me to understand it. Is there some equipment on the battlefield that we have 

already turned over to them that we have basically given to them, 

like trucks, vehicles, maybe artillery pieces, small arms? 

General DUBIK. Yes, sir. The only piece of transferred equipment 

to date are up-armored Humvees. We have transferred a little over 

1,000, and the intent is to transfer about 8,500 by the end of next 

year. This equipment was first requested by us in theater, and sent 

to the Department of the Army and the Secretary of Defense’s office for approval. That process took about five months. We began 

last March in transferring up-armored Humvees to the Iraqi security forces. 

We have paid for the refurbishment of that equipment, and they 

paid for all of the maintenance of that equipment. They also pay 

for the long-term sustainment of that equipment, for the radios, for 

the weapons inside the Humvees. 
9 

Mr. HUNTER. Let me get this straight. You say we paid for the 

equipment. We paid for the refurbishment of the equipment. You 

say, they paid for the maintenance. 

General DUBIK. Yes, sir. 

Mr. HUNTER. Does that mean we gave it to them, and they have 

to maintain what we gave them for free? 

General DUBIK. That is right. 

Mr. HUNTER. But there was no price-tag on that equipment? 

General DUBIK. The price-tag for the equipment for the Iraqis 

was none. We paid for that through the Iraqi security force fund, 

the fund that you appropriate for our use for the Iraqi security 

forces. We used that fund to accelerate the fielding of that equipment. 

The Iraqis have purchased with their own money about 1,500 

Humvees, and they are arriving at a certain rate. The refurbishment program allowed us to accelerate that rate, and that is part 

of the reason you see that they have been growing in confidence 

and in deployment throughout their country. 

Mr. HUNTER. Now, the Humvees we gave them, were those new 

up-armored Humvees? 

General DUBIK. No, sir. These were the old versions of Humvees 

that were replaced by mine resistant ambush protected vehicles 

(MRAPs). As the MRAPs come into theater, these older versions— 

114s, 1114s, and 1115s—then get refurbished and cascaded into 

the Iraqi security forces. 

Mr. HUNTER. But the 114s, that is without necessarily the frag 

doors, are the latest generation of Humvees. They are not MRAPs, 

but MRAPs are not Humvees. 

General DUBIK. Right. The latest generation of Humvees are 

1151s. 

Mr. HUNTER. Yes, but we gave them around 1,000 114s? 

General DUBIK. So far. 

Mr. HUNTER. Are we coordinating with our own requirements 

with the National Guard, for example, with 114s? Because if you 

talk to the Guard here, a lot of them shed their vehicles when they 

went over to Iraq and didn’t get them back. Presumably, we are 

going to have to re-equip them back here. Who made the decision 

to give the 114s away at no cost to the Iraqis? 

General DUBIK. Sir, that decision comes into the Pentagon. The 

Army looked at all their requirements and made the final determination that this would be a satisfactory transfer. So in terms of 

the thought process that went back here through the Department 

of the Army and Secretary of Defense’s office, you will have to call 

another witness for that. 

Mr. HUNTER. Okay. So you just know that they made that transfer. 

General DUBIK. Yes, sir. 

Mr. HUNTER. With respect to other equipment, would it be wise 

for us if you have a slowdown in the sale of equipment, you said 

there is $1.4 billion that has been received, but $2.7 billion that 

has been ordered. Especially if we are giving away things like the 

Humvees we gave away, it took us five months to decide to give 

them to them, it looks like you have a pretty slow bureaucracy in 

terms of moving equipment to the Iraqis. If we are going to be sell-
10 

ing equipment to them, do we have a force or a team at the SecDef 

level that is ensuring that this thing takes place fairly quickly? 

General DUBIK. Yes, sir. In fact, the Secretary of Defense had 

put together a special task force for FMS to Iraq. There have been 

several pretty significant successes. One is the acceleration of delivery. Again, at this time last year, we were at $100 million worth 

of equipment delivered, which was nothing. In a matter of 9 

months, it is now at $1.4 billion. That is a huge success. 

Second, the standard for FMS processing in the United States 

around the world is generally about 120 days. For Iraq, the average 

is about 90 days, so that is again 30 days faster than anyone else, 

and oftentimes it is as low as 30 days or 35 days, so that is also 

important. That said, as I commented in my opening remarks, 90 

days is still too slow. When you add in Baghdad’s 60 days to make 

a decision, you are up to 5 months again processing decisions. So 

that is something that the task force has in its sights and continues to work on, and one that I certainly would like to bring 

down another 30 days. 

Mr. HUNTER. Okay. Who is paying for the personnel costs for the 

Iraqis—personnel in their security services? Is there any part of 

that that we are paying for? 

General DUBIK. No, sir. They pay 100 percent of their salaries. 

They pay now since December 100 percent of their life support. 

They are paying most of their maintenance, and they are growing 

in their maintenance costs. The Humvees, for example, they purchased $85 million worth of spare parts for the first group of 

Humvees, and that will be a sustaining cost that they will incur. 

So more and more, they are paying their bills. 

In 2006, as I said in my statement, they started to spend more 

money in the ministry of defense and ministry of interior than we 

had access to in Iraqi security force funds. Their trend of spending 

is about $1.5 billion to $2 billion more every year on their security 

forces, which for still-developing ministries is a pretty hefty leap 

every year. 

Mr. HUNTER. Okay. Mr. Chairman, I will have some more questions. I will wait. We have a lot of folks here. I will wait until the 

end of the hearing here, but I think we ought to focus on the transfer of equipment and the payment for equipment that is going to 

be turned over to Iraqi forces, and the accountability of that equipment. 

Because at the other end of this thing, you are going to have 

Guard units and some active units here in the states that have 

shed their equipment in Iraq, that we are going to be re-equipping 

with a pretty good price tag. So I think making sure that we account for everything and that we are paid for the good equipment 

that is transferred over is I think an important responsibility for 

this committee. 

Thank you. 

The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentleman from California. 

The gentleman from Mississippi, Mr. Taylor. 

Mr. TAYLOR. Mr. Chairman, I am going to yield my time to Iraqi 

veteran, Mr. Murphy. 

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Pennsylvania, Mr. Murphy. 

Mr. MURPHY. Thanks, Mr. Chairman. 
11 

And thank you general and Mr. Straub for being here today. 

General, when I was in Iraq with the 82nd Airborne in 2003, I 

helped train 600 of the Iraqi forces. I am concerned that now five 

years later after I was there, the Iraqi security forcers are still not 

coming off the sidelines and standing up for their country. I think 

in your testimony that we all read, you rightly point out the difficulty of growing and training an army for a country, let alone a 

nation that is as troubled as Iraq. 

Sir, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) report that 

came out last September that stated that the Iraqi battalions rated 

as capable of operating independently of U.S. forces had actually 

decreased from 10 to 6 battalions. So in the Iraqi army, attrition 

levels are so high that only 81 percent of authorized personnel are 

actually on duty at a given time. So I am concerned that our growing and training of the Iraqi forces is a mile wide, but only an inch 

deep. 

So when you look at the number that keeps increasing on the 

amount trained, but the increased operational capability does not 

seem as though it is coming along on an equal number. So I think 

the Department of Defense (DOD) has focused on the total number 

of Iraqi forces trained, when our focus should really be on the readiness and capability of those forces. 

So my question for you, sir, has the number of Iraqi army battalions capable of independent operation increased since September of 

2007 when the last GAO report came out? And if not, if you could 

elaborate why, I would appreciate that. 

General DUBIK. Well, first off, if I could, the focus is not just on 

numbers. It is very much on quality indicators. We began in September, for example, with a unit-set fielding system where the 

Iraqi soldiers come out of the training base, then go to a common 

training center, one of several around the country, receive at that 

time their leaders and their equipment, and go through another six 

weeks or more of training as a unit. Then, they are sent into the 

battle space with embedded teams and partnership units, as one of 

several examples of clear emphasis on quality. 

Second, I would say that the percentage of leaders in the Iraqi 

army units are now in the high 60 percent, close to 70 percent, 

both noncommissioned (NCOs) and officers. One year ago, those 

numbers were well below 50 percent. So the percentage of leaders 

is growing. That percentage, though, even at 66 percent, will empirically not allow a unit to reach readiness level one. But it has 

not in any way stopped their organizations from fighting, from 

standing in the fight. 

Mr. MURPHY. I will be very respectful, sir, and I understand, and 

I know the backbone of our Army, sir, is our NCO corps. I got that, 

and I understand, and that is great, that the NCOs and the leaders, the mid-level leaders in the Iraqi army is increasing at 50 percent to 60 percent. But still, when you look at the operational 

forces, it went from 10 battalions to 6 battalions. That is obviously 

a concern. 

General DUBIK. First off, I don’t know the date of that report, because there are right now 12 Iraqi battalions that are in the Operational Readiness Assessment (ORA) level one, which is independent operations, but there are 90 in ORA level two, which is a 
12 

significant increase just since last January. The ORA ratings, if I 

might suggest, are not really the best indicators to use on fighting 

power. Many of our own organizations are at readiness level two 

in fighting. Well, we fought an entire war, World War II, where a 

good number of organizations were less than the highest rating, 

with less than full complements of leaders. 

So my observation would be that in the beginning of the Baghdad security operation, where the Iraqis had a tough time getting 

nine battalions together, compared to an organization that moved 

one division under its own power, one brigade from Al Anbar to 

Basra, another national police brigade from Basra to the south, 

moved them into combat and conducted combat operations, and 

then within another month shifted a national police brigade and 

another brigade from Al Anbar up to Mosul, while it was sustaining operations throughout the rest of the country, then made 

another shift to Sadr City and another shift to Amarah, is an example of Iraqi security forces who are growingly capable of executing operations, even at ORA levels two and three. 

True, with our enabler requirements, no doubt about that, but 

that had been part of the strategy to develop the maneuver forces 

first, and then once we got close to the end of maneuver forces, to 

begin developing enablers. We have done that. By the end of this 

year, they will be substantially independent in their logistics operations. 

By the end of this summer, they will have air-to-ground capability with machine guns and rockets. By the beginning of next 

year, they will have air-to-ground capability with some kind of precision weapon not yet determined. So they are growing in their capability of the enablers, which is one of the things that we have 

to do so that we can get more into the fully independent category. 

Mr. MURPHY. Well, I appreciate the question. My time is up. 

That report was in September 2007, so it is less than a year ago. 

General DUBIK. A long time ago in Iraq, congressman. 

Mr. MURPHY. So is five years ago. I am glad I am on this side 

of the ocean. 

Thank you, sir. 

Thanks, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from New York, Mr. McHugh, 

please. 

Mr. MCHUGH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

General, first of all thank you for your service, certainly in your 

most recent posting, but in a career of dedicated service to this Nation, to the men and women that wear the uniform of this Nation. 

We all deeply appreciate that, and wish you and yours the very 

best in the future, in whatever path you may choose to follow. 

I have a hard time—I am still not sure which was your daughter 

and which is your wife. [Laughter.] 

It is a beautiful family. 

General DUBIK. On her behalf, I thank you. 

Mr. MCHUGH. You have a beautiful family, and I wish you all 

the best. 

With respect to the Iraqi forces, we look back on the history of 

that nation, and it has always been one of sectarian strife. Certainly the government that was headed by Saddam Hussein was a 
13 

sectarian minority, ruling over a majority. The last thing I think 

any of us want to see is just a switching from one sideline to the 

other as to a divided nation. 

Key among the challenges it would seem to me at least is putting 

together an effective ISF across the board—the police, the army, et 

cetera—is to try to bring together some sectarian cooperation. How 

would you assess that effort as it stands right now among these 

forces? 

General DUBIK. Sir, I will use the national police, if I could, as 

an example because that had been last summer the subject of quite 

a bit of description in their sectarian behavior. The minister of interior, and the minister of defense as well, but I will use the national police as the primary example, has been very attentive to 

eliminating the sectarian behavior of the national police. 

He chased out all of its senior leadership, both division commanders, 9 of the 9 brigade commanders, and 17 of 28 battalion 

commanders. When he replaced them, he put either a Sunni or 

Shia in charge. Where there was a Sunni commander, there was 

a Shia executive officer. The split is roughly 70 percent Shia and 

30 percent Sunni. He has also done a very good job in recruiting 

Sunnis specifically for the rank-and-file of the national police so 

that they are representative of the nation itself. 

The minister of defense, in a joint headquarters, similarly with 

the division commanders and below, is attentive to their loyalty to 

the government and their proficiency. There is certainly the case 

that there are pockets of sectarian behavior in both police and military, but it is not lost on either of the ministers their requirement 

to produce a national force. It will take some more time to flush 

that out of the system because of the horrific sectarian violence 

that did occur in late 2005 and 2006 and early 2007. 

Mr. MCHUGH. The Anbar awakening led to a movement that has, 

certainly in the Sunni areas, been particularly important toward 

turning the tide. And yet it has at the same time created a parallel 

structure, if you will, be it militias at the hardcore end or locally 

based security forces. How would you judge the path ahead as to 

integrating those forces in a routine way or disbanding them, or 

whichever path we take? What kind of insight can you give us on 

that process? 

General DUBIK. Sure. I would like to start first by recognizing 

how important that awakening and the Sons of Iraq movement 

that fell from the awakening, have been to the improved security 

situation. They have contributed significantly to the downturn in 

violence, to the discovery of more and more caches of equipment, 

arms, and explosives, and in that way have been a very important 

force in moving forward in the past 15 months. 

Right now, there are about 100,000 Sons of Iraq. So far, about 

14,000 have been assimilated into the security forces, mostly police, 

in a system that is somewhat bureaucratic, but I think a necessary 

bureaucracy because each of these Sons of Iraq are vetted through 

the Iraqi security system and then hired officially as policemen by 

the minister of interior. So once these 14,000 are hired, they are 

no different from any other policeman in Iraq, hired on central orders and working there. 
14 

There still are tens of thousands that need to transition. Most 

want not to be in the security forces, but just to have jobs in the 

local area. Our census that we take as they come in indicates that 

somewhere between 20 percent and 30 percent want to go into the 

army or the police. Most want just jobs in the area once the security situation is better. 

So the first step in that regard, the government has allocated about $196 million to start assuming the payment of these Sons of 

Iraq while they are security contracts and have initiated two nonsecurity programs to make the assimilation occur once the security 

situation permits. 

The first is an Iraqi civil service corps, very similar to the Civilian Conservation Corps that we had in our Depression period, 

where they are attempting to bring these Sons of Iraq into conservation kinds of jobs, cleanup jobs, fixing jobs, reconstruction 

kinds of jobs which are very prevalent. So as soon as the situation 

is good enough that they are not needed for security, we are going 

to figure out how to bring them in. The minister of interior is very 

much involved in coming to that kind of plan. 

The second is a plan for education and vocational training that 

will bring Sons of Iraq in, give them education and vocational 

training, and send them to a job. Until the job sector is more fully 

developed, that program will be a little slower than the first program. But my expectation is that in the coming months, those programs will start taking on greater importance, and we will see 

some of the Sons of Iraq transition not into the security forces, but 

into these other kinds of jobs. 

The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentleman. 

Mr. Reyes. 

Mr. REYES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

General Dubik, welcome to you and your family, and thank you 

for your service. 

In January, the Iraqi minister of defense suggested that it was 

his personal belief that the Iraqi security forces would be able to 

take responsibility for internal security as early as the first quarter 

of 2009. My question is similar to the chairman’s question that he 

asked you earlier. But what I would like to know is, given that 

today The Washington Post reported that Iraq’s national security 

advisor had indicated yesterday that his government would not 

sign an agreement governing the future role of U.S. troops in Iraq 

unless it includes a timetable for their withdrawal. 

There are a number of issues that I think I have heard you comment on here today. But I would like to know, in your view, what 

would it take to make this possibility a reality, number one. And 

number two, how does this feeling on the part of the Iraqi government influence or drive our own withdrawal timelines? And I guess 

in your opinion, is this realistic, given the short conversation you 

and I had about just one aspect of it, which is the air support aspect of it? So could you comment to the committee on that? 

General DUBIK. Yes, sir. With respect to the first quarter of 2009, 

the minister of defense in another forum talked about a period beginning somewhere in the first quarter of 2009 ending in 2012 as 

the period in which he thought he could take on full responsibility 

for the counterinsurgency fight. 
15 

I think that is an accurate period because of the time necessary 

to develop an air force, the time necessary to finish the development of the navy, for border security, and to make other purchases 

of equipment that he knows he has to make. By the time that is 

bought, delivered and used, that period is a good period. 

In terms of accelerating, one of the main accelerants and why we 

are in a position now that we are in, one of the reasons is the judicious use of the Iraqi security force funds that you appropriate for 

our use. This is a huge accelerant, and we were able to use in the 

last 14 months this money to bring online brigades, battalions, divisions, and in some small cases other capabilities, faster than the 

Iraqis would have by themselves. 

They would have ultimately formed this, but maybe not for another year. So using the Iraqi security force funds partially, again 

from Representative Hunter’s question, accelerating the development of refurbished Humvees, these kinds of capabilities we can 

bring on faster. I just want to say how much I appreciate the 

money that you appropriate for that use. 

Mr. REYES. And given the, not so much the current situation or 

the current challenges that are there now, but the potential for deterioration as it involves influence by the Iranians or others in the 

region, how realistic is it in terms of a withdrawal by our troops 

that they would be able to stand up and take care of their own 

country? 

General DUBIK. The last conversation I had with the minister of 

defense was very clear in this assessment and his understanding 

that there are still capability deficiencies in his force, most notably 

in aviation, in direct fires capability, and in sustainment, and secondarily in intelligence fusion and command and control. 

He has, with a joint force, plans to fill those deficiencies, but in 

every one of those areas, those are not going to be fixed in any 

short term. So what is said at the policy level, of course, that is 

beyond my ability to comment on, but in terms of his assessment 

of actual capabilities, that was our conversation. 

Mr. REYES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentleman. 

Mr. Bartlett, the gentleman from Maryland. 

Mr. BARTLETT. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Remembering all those years I sat in the front row with great 

questions I never had a chance to ask, I yield my time to Mr. Conaway. 

Mr. CONAWAY. Well, thank you, Mr. Bartlett. I appreciate that. 

You put a high bar that I have great questions. 

Gentlemen, thank you for coming today. On a going-forward 

basis, General Dubik, and this transition period that we are going 

to be in between now and when the Iraqis take full control of their 

country as they should, what do you see as the pitfalls or the greatest risks to the contingent success of moving the Iraqi security 

forces to the point where they are in full control of the country? 

General DUBIK. Sir, from my perspective, there are several. First, 

on both sides, coalition forces and Iraq, declaring full success too 

early is itself a risk. There has been huge progress. There has been 

significant improvement in every possible way you can measure it, 

but full success is not yet at hand. 
16 

Second, the enemy is of course a thinking enemy, a very cunning 

enemy that has not given up, that we don’t know what they are 

thinking. We do know that they remain capable. They do want to 

derail the improvement in the security situation and derail the 

progress in the political front as well in Iraq. What they are going 

to do and what they might do and the reaction that they might get 

is still an unknown. 

From the purely capability standpoint of the Iraqi security forces, 

time necessary to finish building the combat enablers that I refer 

to, the fires and aviation, and logistics and command and control 

and intelligence. These capabilities take time. It was hard enough 

to build the divisions, the brigades, and the battalions, but then 

putting all those together with the other enablers will require some 

additional training and some additional time. 

The last related, as I indicated earlier, the decision-making process within the ministry of defense does not keep pace all the time 

with the capability development timeline that his joint staff has 

laid out for the ministry. So the slowness in decision-making is also 

a risk that may not be significant, but could be and this bears 

watching all the time. 

Mr. CONAWAY. With respect to the resources needed to train 

those enablers, if you would speak to us about what, if anything, 

should be our role in building that capacity. And also, we have 

heard recently where Iraq has begun to negotiate contracts with 

the major oil companies—ExxonMobil, BP, Shell, Chevron. Who 

will provide the security necessary for those companies to operate 

the way that they should? 

General DUBIK. Well, sir, on the first part of your questions on 

resources needed for training, right now the Iraqis pay for the life 

support for all the training that goes on in their training base. 

Mr. CONAWAY. The fighting force is fine. I am talking about the 

logistics, aviation, intelligence—what role should we have going 

forward with those guys? 

General DUBIK. Our role has been in the logistics area to assist 

them in laying out a correct plan. Right now, 8 of the 13 logistics 

commands are already built. The other five will be built by the end 

of the year. The national depot system started online three months 

ago and will be finished coming online by the middle of next summer. On motor transport regiments, 9 of the 13 are already formed 

and the other 6 will be formed. Half of the general transport regiment is formed. The other half will be formed this summer. 

So our role here is to now partner with their logistics units like 

we have partnered with their combat units to help them develop 

the systems and the organizations and the habits that will make 

that infrastructure come alive with the right processes and managerial techniques. 

On the aviation side, the commitment is a little different in that 

they are starting building their air force really from scratch. It is 

pilot training. It is English language training. It is infrastructure 

requirements. It is the coaching that we provide and the assistance 

and training we provide for the Iraqi air force in putting together 

what is a very complex and a long-term plan for the building of the 

Iraqi air force. In each of the other areas, there are similar kinds 

of advisory roles. 
17 

On the security for the pipeline, sir, that is yet to be determined. 

The facility protection service, the oil protection service part of it, 

has just been given to the ministry of interior, so he will have part 

of that responsibility. The minister of defense has the 12th infrastructure division, which is also responsible for partial protection 

of the pipeline. How this new arrangement will be is still very 

much unknown at this point. 

Mr. CONAWAY. Thanks, Mr. Chairman. 

Thanks, Mr. Bartlett, I appreciate that. 

The CHAIRMAN. Dr. Snyder. 

Dr. SNYDER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you, general, for your service, and for your family. 

I don’t think anyone has asked you yet about the letter that you 

sent on February 12 to the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Global Security Affairs, Mr. Benkert, with some suggestions. I assume 

that was kind of a winding-down letter, here is what I have 

learned, here is what I think you ought to do. Do you have a copy 

of your letter there in front of you? 

General DUBIK. I do. 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on 

page 59.] 

Dr. SNYDER. I would like you to kind of run through that. First 

of all, have you received either an informal or a formal response 

back to your letter yet? 

General DUBIK. Informal, yes, sir. But if I could, in February, I 

didn’t feel like it was very much winding down. This was just part 

of my job. 

Dr. SNYDER. Part of your job, if somebody comes to visit and you 

were responding. 

I would like to run through these. First, in the second paragraph, 

you talk about, you say the first of these Iraqi army units requires 

the delivery of substantial foreign military sales supplied equipment in the first week of July, 2008. We are now past the first 

week of July, 2008. Did that occur? 

General DUBIK. I am trying to find it. 

Dr. SNYDER. It is the second paragraph. 

General DUBIK. Yes, quite a bit has been delivered, not all, but 

quite a bit has been delivered. 

Dr. SNYDER. And then you go through a list of specific suggestions. I would like to skip the first one and go to one that applies 

to Congress. You offer the following recommendations to speed action along the critical path of getting equipment, reduce congressional notification time requirements. You say, ‘‘Preparing for and 

obtaining congressional approval is the most time-consuming component along the critical path; I ask you to consider options to reduce these days to an absolute minimum,’’ and you go on. 

Would you talk about that more? Are there things that we should 

be doing at this end to help with that process? 

General DUBIK. Well, I attached, Mr. Congressman, to the letter 

a diagram that I think you probably received that my staff put together. 

Dr. SNYDER. Is this the diagram here? I think it is. 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on 

page 62.] 
18 

General DUBIK. Yes, sir. We put it together from our standpoint. 

Again, I am in Iraq, not here, but from our standpoint this is the 

sequence of events and number of days. So I just asked Secretary 

Benkert to look at the congressional notification and see if there 

were some areas that together working with the committees could 

be scrunched down. I didn’t know which ones specifically because 

I am not an expert in this, but I suggested to him as the expert 

to at least do some detailed analysis and see where there might be 

some time efficiencies gained. 

Dr. SNYDER. To your knowledge, has that analysis been done? 

Has anyone come back to you and said, ‘‘We now have this worked 

out’’? It is now 63 days instead of 74 days, and we are moving in 

the right direction. Or is that still a work in progress? 

General DUBIK. No one has come back to me with that kind of 

specific answer, but if I could turn to Mr. Straub. 

Mr. STRAUB. I can’t tell you specific days of reduction. However, 

I can tell you that Secretary Benkert takes this on as one of his 

most important missions and is constantly driving his team to do 

this both here and in visiting Iraq, to try to get these numbers 

down. 

Having said that, sir, the Department doesn’t have a legislative 

recommendation at this time for changing the law on how foreign 

military sales are approved. 

Dr. SNYDER. We all play a role in these things. It is an appropriate role. On the other hand, when we see—and certainly the 

general had no malicious intent by including the congressional notification process in here. When you see our notification process 

cited as one of the problems, we want to get it resolved. It is to 

the advantage of everyone. 

So I would hope that you would get back to us in a timely fashion if there are things we need to do. There may be some statutory 

issues. There may be some courtesy issues, some procedural issues. 

But if we are part of the problem, we would want to know about 

it. So I hope that you would get back to us on that, Mr. Straub. 

Mr. STRAUB. Okay. Happy to. 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on 

page 65.] 

Dr. SNYDER. Is there anything else on that list, general, in the 

letter that you have there that you would like to comment on in 

terms of any additional information you have since this letter was 

sent in terms of either better or worse than what you have cited? 

General DUBIK. Sir, I only would cite the next bullet that begins 

‘‘conducts simultaneous actions.’’ Our recommendation had been to 

determine in the set of activities which could be done simultaneously, rather than sequentially. We did on the chart again identify several of those to suggest, rather than moving from one office 

and then the next and then the next, maybe we could work more 

collaboratively. We have begun to do some of that, but I still think 

that there is lots more work to be done in that regard. 

Dr. SNYDER. Right. Thank you. 

I guess my final question is, when you retire, are you going to 

teach philosophy? I notice that is what your background was in. 

Thank you for your service. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 
19 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Before I call on Mr. Jones, Mr. Straub let me ask you, what is 

the Department of Defense doing to ensure that the transition 

teams in the ministries of defense and the interior are fully staffed, 

and not only fully staffed, but staffed with the right people? 

Mr. STRAUB. Sir, it is a very high priority. In our personnel system, we are doing everything we can to get those teams out there 

and to have them be the right people. I recognize that we still have 

some work to do to get to 100 percent in a number of those areas, 

particularly so on the police training team side, but we understand 

how important it is. That was particularly demonstrated in the 

Basra operation, how important those teams are with Iraqi troops. 

So we mean to have them there. 

The CHAIRMAN. My understanding is that in many instances, 

some colonels are being sent over there to do the work that civilian 

types could do. Are you familiar with that? 

Mr. STRAUB. No, sir, I am not. 

The CHAIRMAN. Okay. 

Mr. Jones. 

Mr. JONES. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. 

General, thank you, as everyone else has, for your leadership and 

all the good that you have done for this country, as well as all of 

our men and women in uniform. I have Camp Lejeune Marine Base 

in my district, which I have the privilege to represent. 

My question really will go back to Mr. Straub. Mr. Secretary, I 

was listening very intently to the testimony by General Dubik. My 

question is, do you agree? I think we all are pleased to hear the 

positive, and obviously not everything is positive, but most of it has 

been very positive. Progress is being made. 

I look at the situation in Afghanistan, and because we have had 

our Marines from Camp Lejeune extended another 30 days, and I 

have great respect for Secretary Gates, and Gates said in this committee and the press that when they go, they will be coming back 

in the time deadline, and then it is being extended for 30 days. It 

is probably going to be two months. 

My concern as a member of this committee, and more importantly as an American citizen, is I believe the Iraqis are doing the 

best they can do. I think progress is being made. But Mr. Secretary, my question to you is if three years from now, and nobody 

knows what three years brings, but if three years from now a general and an assistant secretary is sitting before those who are in 

Congress, and I might not be here at that time, and we are hearing 

about the same thing—we are almost there, but we are not quite 

there. 

My concern is in this period of time, what are we doing to our 

military? Everything I am reading in the paper, and I will let you 

answer in a moment, but this is from Admiral Mullen, the Taliban 

and their supporters have without question grown more effective 

and more aggressive in recent weeks as the casualty figures clearly 

demonstrate. We are getting into a situation that I realize that 

when a statement has been made for five years by the White House 

and everyone else, when the Iraqis stand up, we will stand down. 

Where are we in that statement? I am very concerned about the 

Army. I am very concerned about the Marine Corps. They are 
20 

stressed beyond imagination, and this has nothing, General, to do 

with the success that you and others have achieved. 

General DUBIK. When General Petraeus testified most recently, 

he did acknowledge the fact that one of the facts bearing on his decision in terms of force adjustments is the status of the Army and 

Marine Corps primarily. We do all think about that. These are our 

professional colleagues. These are our families. So all of us are 

aware of the stress that has been on the force for the past years. 

That being the case, to answer your specific question, we have 

nearly completed the reduction of the first five brigades. Given the 

security situation, the expectation is that we will be able to further 

reduce the force structure in Iraq. These reductions will have a 

positive effect on both the Army and the Marine Corps, and the 

families that support their members. 

The success that we have had, though, is a success that we don’t 

want to preemptively return to the enemy. So the issue for us, as 

always, is what is the minimum required to do the job that we 

have been given. We think that in Iraq anyway, that requirement 

will need a continued some set of advisers, some set of trainers, 

and some set of partner units. That will diminish and has been diminishing over time, no doubt about it, but to provide training and 

assistance and advice until the force is fully self-sufficient or until 

the two governments feel it is satisfactory enough, is something 

that we should remain committed to. 

Mr. STRAUB. Sir, could I just add to what General Dubik said, 

trying to give it more from what we see from the Pentagon perspective as far as where are we on this continuum of the Iraqi security 

forces so that we are not having similar testimony in two years, 

three years, four years. 

I think this year of 2008 has been a very significant year because 

it is a year in which the Iraqis themselves deployed their forces on 

their own initiative and took big risks to do it and have had success in a series of operations. That success has given them confidence in those forces. We are hearing that confidence in their 

statements about their sovereignty and their concern for their sovereignty. We are seeing it in the greater political support that they 

are giving their prime minister. 

Is this reversible? Sure it is, for the reasons that General Dubik 

gave. But there is a confidence in these forces now that they can 

do things. With that confidence comes an impatience to do more. 

That is a healthy thing. So I think we are fairly well down that 

continuum in Iraq. Of course, as you know, Iraq is a country with 

great resources. Afghanistan, conversely, and Afghanistan is not in 

my area of responsibility, but Afghanistan lacks resources by comparison, so it could be a more enduring challenge than Iraq. 

Mr. JONES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. SPRATT [presiding]. Mrs. Tauscher. 

Ms. TAUSCHER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

General Dubik, good to see you again. I think we visited last 

when I was in Iraq in August. 

Mr. Straub, good to see you, too. 

I have been concerned for quite a long time about the police 

training. Certainly, any successful counterinsurgency strategy 

would include a regular constabulary. As we all know, this is a 
21 

mission set that normally falls under the State Department, but 

they have for many reasons—lack of resources and frankly the security environment in Iraq not meeting their minimum standards—this has been a mission that the Pentagon and our military 

has been executing since we invaded Iraq in 2003. 

Clearly, the Jones report, the independent commission that came 

out last year, had a scathing indictment on the ministry of interior, 

basically saying that it was riddled, that it was a sectarian fight, 

that if you went up the elevator over the five- or six-story building 

you had to be careful if you were a Sunni or a Shia what floor you 

got off on. 

I am not sure that that has improved a lot, but it doesn’t bode 

well for the kind of cohesion and training that we would expect for 

a constabulary force which is part of the overall security blanket 

that we need. We need, obviously, military. We need border security. We need customs people. But we need people that are going 

to adjudicate normal little things that happen in communities. 

Since the Iraqi government fell, clearly all the prisons were 

emptied. Local law enforcement disappeared, so that is a big part 

of the security problem. 

I have introduced a bill that would free our troops to go back to 

their normal duties as warfighters and put the State Department 

back in charge of building a constabulary force. I have already told 

you two of the problems. One is resources, and two is the security 

in Iraq doesn’t meet the minimum standards of the State Department and they don’t want to send people in to do that job. I have 

met with General Paxton. I have met with Assistant Secretary 

David Johnson about coming up with a transition plan. 

I would just like to have your ideas, both you General Dubik and 

Mr. Straub, on whether you think that that is something that we 

could accomplish in the mid-term or short-term. And where do you 

actually place the emphasis on police training? And is there good 

news about the department of interior? I know that we have academies like the Kabbalah Academy, which I think has some good 

news, too. So if you could just chat a little bit about that and give 

us an assessment of whether you think the State Department can 

take this mission anytime soon, I would appreciate it. 

General DUBIK. Yes, ma’am. The first part of the question on the 

status of the ministry of interior, the description of the Jones Commission in the last summer of the ministry of interior building was 

accurate. It would be completely inaccurate today. I personally 

have had several conferences held in the ministry of interior building. We have had press conferences there. We have had multi-national force conferences with General Petraeus presiding. 

The air of the ministry is simply different one year later. The 

numbers of armed guards and all that stuff that he described are 

gone. The upgrades of the building at Iraqi expense are significant. 

The physical appearance is much different than it was a year ago. 

The physical appearance is reflective of a significant change in the 

minister of interior. In 2007 to the present, I think he relieved 33 

brigadier generals and 8 major generals, and 130-some colonels and 

lieutenant colonels or equivalents. 

He has been on a clean sweep that he understands is going to 

have to go on for a good while longer, but he is on a very important 
22 

sweep of the ministry of interior on their proficiency and behavior. 

He has adopted his own strategic planning seminar. He has adopted his own semiannual and quarterly business reviews of his sectors. He is decentralizing many of his decisions. 

Ms. TAUSCHER. General, I understand that there is now a major 

change. I take your word for it, but I am running out of time. You 

didn’t get to my specific question. Can the State Department take 

his mission over? 

General DUBIK. Yes, ma’am. On the other part in terms of the 

State Department assuming responsibility, I think this is desirable, 

but for several other reasons besides those you stated, I think we 

are not quite there yet. Personally, I would like to see the State 

Department assign to MNSTC–I now 7, 8, 9, 12 officers that act 

as deputies within the ministry of interior and police forces so they 

start building the capacity so as we get closer to the security situation and budget situation, and it is no longer counterinsurgency policing, but community policing, they can assume responsibility and 

they have an experience base to do that. We would welcome those 

assignments. I have sent a letter to the State Department asking 

for that about nine months ago. 

Ms. TAUSCHER. About nine months ago? Could we have a copy 

of that letter please? 

General DUBIK. I can get them to you. Yes. 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on 

page 57.] 

Ms. TAUSCHER. Thank you very much. 

Mr. SPRATT. Mr. Kline. 

Mr. KLINE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you, gentlemen, for being here. 

Congratulations, General, on a terrific career and a great job in 

your assignment in Iraq. It is nice to have your family here. You 

may not yet be celebrating the end of a long career, but I suspect 

that they are. I would assure you that there is life after retirement. 

I might not recommend politics, but there is life after military retirement. 

I think you are to be commended, as all of our forces, our young 

men and women have done a great job. The security situation in 

Iraq is clearly improved. You said that in your testimony and we 

have heard it in every report. Mr. Conaway talked about the move 

toward bringing in private companies to develop oil resources in a 

way that we would not have considered a year or two ago. Remarkable successes, and we are all thrilled to see the drawdown in the 

number of American forces. 

I think you reassured us in your testimony that your expectation 

is that we would continue to see U.S. forces draw down. Perhaps 

you couldn’t put an X on the calendar that the chairman was asking for, but I believe I heard you say it was your expectation that 

we would continue to draw down. We are seeing the Iraqi forces 

taking responsibility for their own security in province after province, about nine so far, and more to come—all terrific stuff. 

I want to pick up where Mrs. Tauscher was, on the differences 

between the Iraqi army forces, the ministry of defense forces, and 

the ministry of interior forces. As she pointed out, General Jones 

in his testimony and in his report was I would say harshly critical 
23 

of the ministry of interior and the state of the police forces. There 

was some confusion over national police forces, local police forces, 

constabulary, and so forth. 

So could you pick up on that a little bit? We know that the quality of some of the Iraqi army forces, their counterterrorism forces 

for example, are just superb. I am sure that some of the army 

forces are. But there has been an unevenness. 

So either in the ministry of defense or ministry of interior, could 

you comment on that unevenness, but particularly in the police 

forces and how they are developing in their ability, with the corruption and some of the problems that you have addressed already, 

the quality of the building, but in their abilities. 

General DUBIK. I will separate and talk first about the Iraqi police, which are local police, and then the national police. On the 

local police side, the better security situation has improved policing. One of the difficulties during the heavy violence period, with 

the proficiency of local police, had been the intimidation of their 

families. Local police live in the local area. When whatever type of 

insurgent was operating, when they could hold hostage policemen’s 

families, policemen didn’t perform, as you would expect. You saw 

what they had done. 

As military forces swept through and eliminated that intimidation, the police forces then were much more capable of performing. 

Minister Bilani had fired quite a few policemen who didn’t perform, 

and replaced them with minimally trained policemen, with 80 

hours, which is not much, but now has gone back and begun a program of aggressive retraining of local police so that all local policemen will get the full 400 hours of training that we all know they 

want. 

One of the professional arguments that we had with the Jones 

Commission was how to balance getting a satisfactory policeman 

out on the street once the security situation was better, versus 

waiting to get a fully formed policeman. We had a difference of 

opinion with that commission. 

They thought that we should delay fielding policemen until they 

were all completely fully trained. Our understanding was that we 

couldn’t wait that long because we had the war to win, so we would 

put out a minimum-trained policeman and then come back and retrain. Those are both legitimate perspectives. In general, the Iraqi 

police are performing much better across the country now that levels of violence are down, and we are able to go back and begin the 

re-training period. 

On the national police, the minister of interior took the Jones 

Commission report to heart and did his own study, his own afteraction review, so to speak, and analysis, and accelerated reformation of the national police, starting with the change-out of the leadership, finishing then with the first phase of their re-training. 

They are now in the second phase of their re-training, using the 

Italian Carabinieri to conduct the leadership training for each battalion in the national police. That has been hugely successful. We 

have four done. The minister of interior would like to double that 

now, rather than do one every eight weeks. He would like to do two 

every eight weeks. The Italian Carabinieri are analyzing whether 
24 

or not they can support that and under what conditions. We think 

that that will work out over the next few months. 

So the proficiency of the national police has also grown. They 

have moved to Basra and were welcomed by the citizens of Basra 

in their operations. They moved then to Mosul, which is a much 

different ethnic composition of the citizenry in Mosul, and were 

well-accepted in Mosul. Now, they are in Amarah and well-accepted 

in Amarah. So we have seen just a growth in proficiency and acceptability of the national police and regular police. 

Mr. KLINE. Thank you, general. 

I am sorry, Mr. Chairman. I went past my time. 

Thank you very much, general. 

Mr. SPRATT. Mrs. Davis. 

Mrs. DAVIS OF CALIFORNIA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

General Dubik, it is good to see you. It was a year ago that we 

were there. It really is hard to describe the different level of positive comments that you have. I really appreciate that. 

I wondered, in continuing with some of the discussion already, 

one of the issues that we know repeatedly over the last number of 

years is asking the question, what will turn the situation around? 

I think a lot of the responses were that when the Iraqi people begin 

to have confidence in their government. How do you assess the 

level of legitimacy for the Iraqi security forces on the part of the 

Iraqi people? Do you have a position from which you can actually 

assess that? What would you like to tell us about that? 

General DUBIK. Thank you, ma’am. I do have lots of positive to 

say, and I am glad that I also have been given the opportunity to 

talk about the areas that still need development. The confidence in 

Iraqi security forces has grown every month, both military and police, since November. 

There are a series of polls done by a variety of organizations inside Iraq that indicate confidence of citizens in their security forces. 

There are questions like: Do you believe the army in your area is 

sectarian? Do you have confidence in the police of your area? Do 

you believe that the army or the police or national police are corrupt? 

It is questions like that. In each case, I believe all six questions— 

three about the army, three about the police—are in the above 50 

percent positive category and have grown every month again since 

November. Certainly, we would like them to get up in the 60’s and 

70’s and 80’s, but we are very happy with the direction they are 

going, and the relatively uniform across-the-board growing confidence. 

Mrs. DAVIS OF CALIFORNIA. So no matter what community? I 

think there have certainly been concerns about whether you call it 

ethnic cleansing, but that that is an issue. 

General DUBIK. Yes. There are still [INAUDIBLE]. Yes, ma’am. 

There are still [INAUDIBLE] where policemen or army guys are involved with sectarian behavior. Those are arrested and pulled off 

the street when they are investigated, but in general in a positive 

direction. 

Mrs. DAVIS OF CALIFORNIA. May I just clarify for a moment. You 

mentioned in looking at the internal security versus external security, the ability of the Iraqis to take on a foreign force. The defense 
25 

minister when he was here I think was referring to quite a number 

of years beyond 2012. When you said 2009 to 2012, is that internal 

security that he was talking about? 

General DUBIK. Yes, ma’am. 

Mrs. DAVIS OF CALIFORNIA. You also referenced the air force and 

obviously the navy in terms of external security supports and 

enablers. What would you assess to be kind of a ballpark figure in 

terms of the external security issue? 

General DUBIK. The minister of defense said 2018, and that is 

the vision that he has. 

Mrs. DAVIS OF CALIFORNIA. In 2018? 

General DUBIK. In 2018, but that is his vision. There are so 

many decisions yet not made that would have to be made to buy 

the right aircraft, to buy the right air defense systems, to improve 

the navy, to purchase additional equipment for the army, that I 

wouldn’t even begin to guess whether 2018 is correct. These are 

major purchases that will have to be decided upon in the period between now and 2015 to start getting some of this equipment. None 

of those decisions have been made. So I think his vision is still yet 

an aspiration more than anything else. 

Mrs. DAVIS OF CALIFORNIA. Thank you. I appreciate that. 

Just when we think in terms of the enemy today, how would you 

assess Iraq’s knowledge of the elements that they are fighting 

today? What kind of a handle do they have on that? 

General DUBIK. I think they have a very good understanding of 

the enemies that they face, whether those are the residual al 

Qaeda operators, other insurgents associated with al Qaeda, but internal to Iraq, criminal militias or organized crime. 

Mrs. DAVIS OF CALIFORNIA. Where would they put the Iranian 

militia in that? 

General DUBIK. I would say that they are influencers in the 

criminal militias. I think they very much understand who is doing 

what to whom inside their country. 

Mrs. DAVIS OF CALIFORNIA. And the influence of the Provincial 

Reconstruction Teams (PRTs), I must quickly ask you that. 

General DUBIK. The PRTs, again thanks for your support and 

continuing interest, are all fully manned now and are out and having a tremendous positive impact in each of the provinces. We continue now to be in the replacement mode, which is a good mode to 

be in. Now, we are not searching to fill or searching to replace as 

people’s tours end up. 

Mrs. DAVIS OF CALIFORNIA. Thank you. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. SPRATT. Dr. Gingrey. 

Dr. GINGREY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

General Dubik, I want to thank you and your family for your distinguished career and your service to our country—the ultimate 

definition of ‘‘jointness’’—and we appreciate all that you have done. 

It has to be a good feeling to be in the position that you have been 

in in the past year. You are probably the fourth person in charge 

of the transition of the security forces in Iraq, and the cumulative 

effort of all of you is to be commended. I especially want to commend you for your service over the last year in that regard. 
26 

I want to ask you about this issue concerning a date certain for 

withdrawing our forces. Apparently, Prime Minister Maliki or 

maybe the minister of defense of Iraq made a statement recently 

regarding the status of forces agreement (SOFA), which is an ongoing negotiation, and that it would include a timeline for withdrawal 

of our troops. 

Some of my colleagues on this committee, some of the Democratic 

majority, have raised that question today. Some of the talking 

heads on CNN have raised that question as well and implied that, 

aha, we were right all along to have a date certain and to vote on 

this a number of times over the last couple of years. Fortunately, 

we rejected that vote. 

Would you agree with me that it is different for the government 

of Iraq to ask us to have a date certain to leave, a big difference 

in that, and the Members of Congress to demand that our Commander in Chief and our combatant commanders withdraw our 

troops at a date certain and put funding at risk in regard to that? 

I want you to answer that question if you can, because I know 

that I have heard, and I am sure you would agree, and Mr. Straub 

would agree, that the President has said on a number of occasions, 

and the Secretary of Defense has said on a number of occasions, 

that we will stay until the job is done, but if the government of 

Iraq wants us to leave, we will leave. If they want us to leave tomorrow, we will leave tomorrow. I would like for you to comment 

on that, if you would. 

General DUBIK. Well, sir, if I could just use a few seconds to say 

thank you for acknowledging my family. My family is a joint family. My wife is a retired senior intelligence officer in the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). My older daughter had been in the Army 

as an intelligence officer herself. My younger daughter, Katie, at 

the other end of the spectrum, was a Peace Corps volunteer in 

Thailand. So we cover the whole spectrum, I think, of peace operations. 

On the policy side, sir, you know I cannot comment on that. The 

ongoing negotiations are just that—negotiations. I don’t know for 

sure what is in the mind of Dr. Rubahi or the prime minister in 

talking about timetables, how precise or how rough those are. 

I will say, though, my professional military advice remains as it 

has been, that precise, firm, fixed timetables are less helpful than 

periodic assessments and condition-based reviews. Part of the conditions are certainly security, but also the capability of Iraqi security forces. In those, we have shared aspirations with Iraqis and 

the coalition forces. We do want more self-reliance on the Iraqi security forces. We do want to get to a position where our presence 

is unnecessary. We both have a desire to fully depart. 

So my personal, again professional military advice, is to let those 

aspirations play out and let the conditions speak for themselves 

and let things go as fast or as quickly as the conditions will allow, 

and let the two sovereign governments decide on what policies we 

want to pursue. 

Dr. GINGREY. General, I thank you for that. My time is about to 

expire. 

I wanted to ask Mr. Straub a different question in the remaining 

few seconds. The ranking member, Mr. Hunter, at the outset, was 
27 

asking the question about turning over equipment to the Iraqi government. We were talking about up-armored Humvees. I did a little quick math, and if we gave them 8,500 up-armored Humvees 

at $100,000 apiece, that is $850 million worth of equipment. 

Mr. Straub, do you think that the Secretary of Defense or the 

combatant commanders should be making that decision of giving 

away money that the Congress has appropriated to buy this equipment? Shouldn’t that come back to the Congress? If the chairman 

would allow you to respond to that, shouldn’t we have some input 

into how that equipment is transferred and what we get in the way 

of reimbursement for that equipment? 

Mr. STRAUB. Sir, I am just going to have to get the committee 

the facts on that decision. I am not sure of the numbers that you 

quoted for the costs to the United States. But I can assure you that 

I am not aware of any plan, and I don’t think there is any, to provide any equipment that is in Iraq now to the Iraqis that our services want to have returned, addressing Mr. Hunter’s point about 

shorting someone in the U.S. forces for the benefit of the Iraqi 

forces. 

I am going to just have to get you the additional facts on the 

Humvee transfer—8,500, that is the total number, but only about 

1,000 have been transferred thus far. 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on 

page 65.] 

Mr. SPRATT. Mr. Sestak. 

Mr. SESTAK. General, could I follow up on the question about a 

date certain, from my colleague from Georgia? Would you comment 

upon how well we are prepared to defend our 28,000 troops in 

South Korea? 

General DUBIK. Sir, I haven’t been to South Korea in—— 

Mr. SESTAK. All right. Could you comment upon how well we are 

doing in Afghanistan against al Qaeda, now that General Hayden 

says they have a safe haven in nearby Pakistan? 

General DUBIK. Sir, I have been focusing on Iraq. 

Mr. SESTAK. Would it be fair to say that your comments on a 

date certain only had to do with Iraq, and that others may see the 

date certain as helping us address national security issues elsewhere in the world? So that while your input is helpful for us on 

a date certain with regard to Iraq, and specifically what you were 

responsible for—training and mentoring Iraq’s forces—that a larger 

view of a date certain on America’s national security might come 

out with a different answer? 

General DUBIK. Absolutely. 

Mr. SESTAK. Thank you. 

I wanted to ask you, you commented how well your troops, the 

Iraqi troops, which you have done a wonderful job mentoring and 

training, have done, and without a question there is improvement. 

What was the impact upon Basra by Iran in helping to decrease 

the violence there once it erupted? Because obviously that had an 

impact and you had to make an assessment upon it. 

General DUBIK. It was one fact bearing on the problem. With all 

military operations, diplomacy occurs simultaneously with combat 

operations. 
28 

Mr. SESTAK. Did you consider it inconsequential or consequential? 

General DUBIK. It was consequential, but only one of many factors. 

Mr. SESTAK. How can we better, Mr. Secretary, address this 

issue if Iran has a positive influence, since it helped decrease violence? How can we better go about bringing them in to helping us 

do more of that throughout the country? 

Mr. STRAUB. Sir, they of course preceded their possibly positive 

influence in Basra with a negative influence by probably being the 

source of the weaponry, munitions, and training of the dissident 

militias. 

Mr. SESTAK. Those, if I might interrupt, are very similar to how 

the Soviet Union provided North Vietnam with arms against us in 

the Vietnam War. I am not interested in the past. All I am interested in is the positive influence and how to bring that about more 

in Iraq. 

Mr. STRAUB. There is no question that as neighbors, as countries 

with a great deal in common in terms of religion and heritage, that 

Iran and Iraq could have a very positive relationship with each 

other. In fact, that relationship—— 

Mr. SESTAK. Should we be doing more vis-a-vis diplomatically 

with Iran to bring that about? 

Mr. STRAUB. Sir, I think that is mainly a function for the Iraqi 

government, to demand positive behavior from Iran and to minimize the negative behavior. I believe the Iraqi government has 

taken that up with the Iranians. 

Mr. SESTAK. General, of the 600,000 to 650,000 troops that I 

gather, if I remember correctly, the interior department, the ministry of defense, and our own Army’s assessment, was that the 

number needed for both internal and external threats? 

General DUBIK. No, sir. That was required for counterinsurgency 

forces at levels of violence that we saw in mid–2007. Like all security assessments, there has to be an ongoing assessment, given the 

levels of threat as they go up and down. If and when the insurgency ends, there will have to be another assessment of whether 

or not that number is adequate for external security. 

Mr. SESTAK. And the tools needed. 

General DUBIK. And the tools needed, sir. 

Mr. SESTAK. The last question I had is—well, I had two, but I 

don’t think I will have time—we had a witness here about a year 

ago who said that it is not so much an issue of the training of the 

Iraqis, it was more an issue, he said, of their loyalty and willingness to fight. Set aside the willingness to fight, you spoke on that 

a bit. How about their loyalty, when all is said and done? 

Another witness from the intelligence said when asked where 

would you place your individuals, where would you embed our 

trainers, he said it is an art, not a skill, because we don’t know 

really about their loyalties ultimately. How do you assess that comment? 

General DUBIK. Well, as the government has gotten stronger, 

that itself is an incentive to be loyal to that government. I think 

we have seen a huge shift in the last 15 or 16 months in the 

strength of the Iraqi government, in their legitimacy as seen from 
29 

the eyes of their citizens. That itself, again, is a positive contribution to the security forces. 

They have a government to be loyal to. This government has 

taken on of their own volition, with their own forces, criminal militias on the Shi’ite side, to al Qaeda and Sunni insurgents on the 

other side. The Maliki government has been very forceful with all 

opposition to legitimate government. That has had a positive effect 

on gelling the security force itself. 

While loyalty is not something you can measure with litmus 

paper, it is certainly the case that forces from one part of the country, whether national police forces or army forces, have been willing to and have fought in every other part of the country regardless 

of sectarian makeup of the country. 

The CHAIRMAN [presiding]. I thank the gentleman very much. 

Mr. Franks. 

Mr. FRANKS. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you both for being here. 

General Dubik, I never want to miss an opportunity to thank 

loyal soldiers of freedom like yourself. I believe in so many ways 

not only have you had to defeat terrorism on many fronts, but you 

have had to carry the Congress on your back as you went. 

Sometimes you have been undermined at home, and for any part 

that any us played in that, I would apologize on behalf of all of us, 

because I think you have been such an example of someone that 

loves what is behind them, more than that hate what is front of 

them, and that you have done this on the basis of trying to make 

a better world. 

So I don’t want to put any words in your mouth here, because 

I know there are two kinds of people that predict the future: those 

who don’t know and who don’t know they don’t know. So I think 

that what I would like to ask you is, are we making serious 

progress in Iraq? It is a fundamental question. 

The CHAIRMAN. Would the gentleman pause for a moment? 

I would ask the two ladies that are sitting in the staff section to 

move out of the staff section. No signs are permitted to be displayed. Would you please do that before Mr. Franks resumes his 

questioning? You are sitting in the staff seats. Thank you. 

[AUDIENCE OFF MIKE] 

The CHAIRMAN. You may sit in the non-staff seats. 

Mr. Franks, proceed. 

Mr. FRANKS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

General, I know it is a subjective question. I know it is pretty 

broad. But do you think in terms of winning peace in Iraq that we 

are gaining? Are we gaining in suppressing the insurgents and trying to bring about stability in that region? 

General DUBIK. Yes, sir. I think we have made significant 

progress on the security front in the past 15 months. It is empirically verifiable, and it is a feeling that you get when you travel 

around, a feeling from fellow Iraqis. That said, it is reversible, as 

I said in my opening statement. There is nothing guaranteed. We 

are not on any kind of automatic pilot. It is no time to declare full 

victory. 

Mr. FRANKS. Right. You know, the road to success is always 

under construction, isn’t it, but sometimes it is passable. I guess 
30 

the next question I would ask you is: Do you, again understanding 

that you are not prescient in terms of seeing the future, see a time 

when Iraq will be able to be a stable democratic government that 

will be able to defend themselves at least nominally against terrorism? At some point in the future, do you see that time coming? 

General DUBIK. I see that as entirely possible. Yes, sir. 

Mr. FRANKS. Do you have concerns related to the weapons that 

Iran is giving to insurgents in Iraq? What impact is that having 

on the war? What is your perspective there as far as the explosiveformed penetrators and things like that that Iran is bringing in, or 

at least putting in the hands of insurgents in Iraq? 

General DUBIK. Those weapons have been very destructive, and 

have caused a significant number of casualties in coalition forces, 

as well as Iraqi security forces, as well as innocent civilians that 

have been in the area of their attacks. Sometimes, those trained in 

those weapons are used specifically to target civilians. 

Mr. FRANKS. General, I know that all of us struggle with the situation in Iraq. We struggle with any kind of circumstance where 

war takes place. But I believe, at least some of us believe, that the 

dynamic in Iraq was really between two different directions. If Iraq 

had fallen to terrorists, if America had withdrawn precipitously 

and left it to its own ways, I am afraid that terrorism and the ideology that supports it could have been supercharged in the region, 

and they could have gained a great base of operation from which 

to launch terrorist attacks across the world, and that perhaps could 

have brought nuclear jihad to this country and to the world. 

It looks as if we may be going in a different direction, where Iraq 

may become a free nation and help turn the Middle East into a 

more hopeful region and turn the entire direction of humanity in 

a more hopeful direction. For your part in that, sir, I want to salute 

you with all my heart and thank you for your good work. 

I yield back, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Loebsack is next, please. 

Mr. LOEBSACK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you, general and Mr. Straub, for being here today. Thank 

you for your service. 

Early on, general, you said that there are pockets of sectarianism 

in both the military and the police. I know you have been speaking 

to that issue a lot this morning. I am sorry to have to repeat some 

of that, but I think it is really important that we do so. Can you 

elaborate initially on what you mean by ‘‘pockets’’ of sectarianism? 

General DUBIK. I mean, sir, that we still run into some leaders 

who are acting more in the sectarian way than in a completely professional way, that when that occurs and we find out about it, investigations occur and that person is either removed or retired or 

replaced, and in some cases arrested. 

Mr. LOEBSACK. Is that principally in the military, or is it in the 

police, or is it in both? 

General DUBIK. It is in both. In previous times, during my tour 

in Iraq, it had been primarily police, but that is also reducing very 

significantly. Often, what we called sectarian behavior was merely 

behavior resulting from intimidation, as I talked to Representative 

Kline. 
31 

In those areas where the insurgent influence was very strong 

and the Iraqi security force or coalition presence was not strong, 

they intimidated police to behave in a way that matched the insurgent behavior. Now that the security situation is better, that kind 

of behavior has reduced significantly, but there are still some 

places in Iraq that that is occurring. 

Mr. LOEBSACK. Who controls the military and who controls the 

police? Is it Shi’ites who control both those organizations? 

General DUBIK. No. It is the government that controls the police 

and the army. The police force is made up of local residents, and 

they are either mixed or not mixed depending on the community 

from which they are recruited. The military is different, as is the 

national police. These are recruited from a broad base of the nation 

and reflective of the sectarian mix of the nation. 

Mr. LOEBSACK. But in Baghdad, is it not the case that there has 

been an ethnic cleansing of sorts that has happened over time in 

Baghdad? Therefore, is it not the case that in particular parts of 

Baghdad perhaps Shi’ite control the police and in other parts, perhaps Sunni? Is that fair to say? 

General DUBIK. I don’t think that is fair to say. I think it is fair 

to say that communities in Baghdad have shifted in their sectarian, 

as you describe, and the police reflect the current community that 

is there. Some communities are mixed and some communities are 

not. The police in those communities are recruited to reflect that 

mix. 

Mr. LOEBSACK. Can I shift for a second over to Anbar Province 

because as you are very aware, throughout Iraqi history, at least 

recent history, it has been a tribal society in many ways. Depending on who the colonial power was, sometimes the tribes had more 

power than at other times. 

Certainly with the awakening and the Sons of Iraq movement, 

clearly those folks have served our interests. Many of them obviously were initially aligned with al Qaeda, then they turned 

against al Qaeda, and we all know that story and how that happened. 

There are some who are concerned that as the Iraqis assume 

more control, which is a good thing because we can leave sooner 

rather than later as that happens, that tribal loyalties might begin 

to reassert themselves again. Do you have a concern about that? 

And how do you see that going? Not necessarily that you have a 

crystal ball, but there is a concern, is there not, that some of those 

tribal loyalties may reassert themselves? 

General DUBIK. Yes, sir. When the awakening began and the 

Sons of Iraq program began, it was rightful to be concerned about 

this turn. But since then, there has been an awful lot of tribal engagement by the government of Iraq through the governor of Al 

Anbar and other provinces, I might add, in helping link the tribes 

to the legitimate government, both at provincial level and national 

level. 

How that will turn out in the future, you don’t know, but there 

is a clear recognition from my perspective both at the provincial 

and the national level, the tribal engagements and tying the tribes 

to the legitimate government is something that the Maliki government sees as necessary and important. 
32 

Mr. LOEBSACK. Okay. Thank you very much, general. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Mr. Shuster. 

Mr. SHUSTER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you, General, for your service. I wish you well in the future. I also want to thank your wife and your daughter and your 

entire family for their support and sacrifice. I think sometimes 

Americans don’t realize just how much support and sacrifice is required of the family to enable you to do your job. So we thank you, 

the entire family, for your service to the country. 

A third question I was going to ask, I will follow up on what my 

colleague from Iowa was talking about in Al Anbar Province. I read 

a story, I think it was in The Washington Post on Sunday or Saturday, I don’t remember when, how very effective the police commander in Al Anbar is, who has been fired by the governors of Al 

Anbar, but he has actually been appointed by the national government. Can you talk about that? In that situation, where do we 

come in advising? It seems to me it is very effective, by all reports, 

with an effective police commander out there. 

General DUBIK. Well, if I could paint the—this is the provincial 

director of police for Al Anbar, who was appointed by the minister 

of interior, which is the correct methodology. The local governor 

produces three candidates and the minister of interior selects from 

among those candidates. There is a tug-and-pull between the governor and the central government. 

This is I think a very good example of how the process in Iraq 

is moving into a political argument. A year ago, this wouldn’t be 

a political argument. Guns would have been drawn and we would 

have figured it out by the numbers of bodies who was going to be 

in charge. 

But this is a very good example of the government of Iraq trying 

to figure out how to act centralized and decentralized. Powers given 

to the governor and powers given to the central government, sharing of powers and the checks and balances that we are all familiar 

with because of the long history in the United States are still very 

much fledging in Iraq. This is an example of trying to figure that 

out. I believe that they ultimately will come to the right accommodation, that whatever final decision is made will be made in the 

spirit of compromise between the province and the government. 

Mr. SHUSTER. That is good to hear. In my several trips to both 

Afghanistan and Iraq, the one thing in training that our folks 

would talk about, in Iraq particularly, was the lack of an NCO 

corps. Can you report on how is that going? I know it is a pillar 

of any military to have a strong NCO corps. So can you talk about 

that? 

General DUBIK. Yes, sir. There was not a strong NCO corps in 

Iraq during the Saddam period, and a little bit before. There was 

before that, from the British influence, but that went out of use for 

quite a few years. The NCO corps has grown in the last couple of 

years, but mostly in the last year significantly, mostly at the junior 

ranks. 

The Iraqis have understood that they need an NCO corps. They 

developed an NCO education system, starting with corporals to sergeants to platoon sergeants to first sergeants. All that instruction 
33 

is in place. All that has begun. They take the top 10 percent of 

their graduates from basic training and put them into corporal’s 

course. That number has grown in every five-week cycle of the corporal’s course. They are almost at 70 percent fill in the aggregate. 

Mr. SHUSTER. At 70 percent? 

General DUBIK. Almost, about 68 or 69 percent in the aggregate 

for their NCO corps, but the distribution of those NCOs lies mostly 

at the lower end, not the higher end, so there are more juniorgrade NCOs than senior-grade, and that distribution will not be 

fixed for another good number of years, probably 10 years. 

Mr. SHUSTER. And a final question, as I see I have very limited 

time. We walked about the Shi’ites and the Sunnis, but didn’t mention the Kurds. How are they fitting and integrating into the overall military police force? 

General DUBIK. Well, there are two sets of discussions going on 

now with the Kurds, first in the army is how to bring on two of 

the Kurdish regional government divisions into the Iraqi security 

forces. That will not occur until they are fully integrated into the 

government of Iraq under the Iraqi minister of defense’s control. So 

that discussion is going on. 

With the ministerial forces, some of the special police in the 

Kurdistan regional government will be incorporated into the Iraqi 

national police. The discussion is now how many, what frequency, 

and under what conditions. Mostly the conditions will have to do 

with language proficiency. So the discussions are ongoing. I 

thought that we might have had a decision on those already. We 

have not. 

Mr. SHUSTER. Thank you very much. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Mr. Shuster. 

Ms. Shea-Porter. 

Ms. SHEA-PORTER. Thank you. 

I would like to thank you for your many years of service. It has 

made a difference for this country and we certainly appreciate it. 

As a former military spouse, I thank your family as well. When one 

is in, they are all in. We know that, so thank you. 

The question I have to ask is really sort of a potpourri of questions here. I was in Taji this spring, and I walked in the marketplace. I have to tell you that we were told that was probably the 

most dangerous thing we were going to do. There were extraordinary steps that they had to take in order for us to be there. 

While I was very grateful to our military that took such good 

care of us there, you know, I wonder how this is playing into the 

reports that we are hearing that things are calmer, things are better? If it were, how come we had to go to so many extraordinary 

procedures just to walk down a very short little marketplace? 

General DUBIK. Well, mostly it is who you are, ma’am. Those extraordinary protective measures are not taken for everyone. 

Ms. SHEA-PORTER. Not everybody is there. That is the whole 

point. I didn’t see anybody except us. 

General DUBIK. All I can say is we don’t want anything to happen to you while you are visiting. 

Ms. SHEA-PORTER. It just didn’t feel like—— 

General DUBIK. It is hard. I have to admit to you, I have the 

same kind of experience. When I walk down the street, I don’t walk 
34 

alone. At the same time, the minister of interior does drive around 

alone with a very small group. More and more of the policemen are 

unarmed on the street. 

The traffic police direct traffic without weapons in many parts of 

the country. Though still not dominant, it is growingly the case 

that people come to work in their uniforms. It is also the case that 

more and more markets are open. As you drive down a street now 

where there had been last year 5 markets, now there are 300. 

Ms. SHEA-PORTER. I certainly want it to go well. Like I said, I 

am grateful for it. But the other thing is that I was concerned that 

we had Ugandans guarding the gates. I wondered why we don’t 

have Iraqis guarding the gates. 

General DUBIK. Iraqis do guard some gates where we conduct 

meetings, where we have our ministries. They do guard some forward operating base (FOB) gates. 

Ms. SHEA-PORTER. Are you comfortable with contractors from 

Uganda guarding the gates? Or do you think we should be at the 

point where we actually have the Iraqis, who should be interested 

in protecting us, guarding the gates? 

General DUBIK. I guess I am a little hesitant. Who guards what 

gates is very much a mixed affair. Some are contractors, some are 

Iraqis, and some are U.S. soldiers or Marines. I have driven 

through any number of locations that were solely guarded by Iraqis 

and any number that were mixed with Iraqis and contractors, or 

coalition force and contractors. 

Ms. SHEA-PORTER. Okay. The other question I had, I just wanted 

to read to you, and I know you already saw it in The Washington 

Post, but this does concern me. Last summer, half of the Iraqi parliament asked us to leave. President Bush said in May 2007, said 

if they were to say leave, we would leave. And then obviously we 

have them saying they want us to go, but we are not ready to 

leave. 

I am quoting from the Post right now that U.S. officials said the 

remarks were aimed at local and regional audiences and do not reflect fundamental disagreements with the Bush Administration. Do 

we have a problem with what Iraq leaders are saying to regional 

audiences and what they are saying to us? Is there a difference 

there? 

General DUBIK. I will let Mr. Straub answer that. 

Mr. STRAUB. If I could take that, I think it is more of a national 

policy question. 

Ms. SHEA-PORTER. Sure. 

Mr. STRAUB. We are in a negotiation, so a number of things are 

being said. We think that our concern about conditions for withdrawal, because for us it has always been a matter of conditions, 

rather than timetables, and the key condition there, of course, is 

the condition General Dubik has been working on, which is the 

readiness of the Iraqi forces and the size of the Iraqi forces. 

So I think the Iraqis, with these comments in the last couple of 

days about a timetable, are looking at a time that their forces will 

be ready. I don’t think there is such a spread between us. We are 

very much focused on conditions. We are in a negotiation here, and 

so a wide variety of positions will be said. 
35 

If I could say one more thing about the ability for the Iraqis to 

tell us to leave. We are under the United Nations Security Council 

(UNSC) resolution under which the Iraqis can voluntarily end the 

resolution at any time, and with that resolution end the basis of 

our presence. 

Ms. SHEA-PORTER. Okay. Thank you both. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Before I call on Mr. Wilson, Mr. Straub let me ask you, recently 

Prime Minister Maliki made the Iraqi special forces answerable directly to him, rather than to a minister, where they previously 

were made answerable to. Now, how do we ensure that these special forces are not used to target or harass political opponents? 

Mr. STRAUB. Sir, let me quickly respond to you, and then General 

Dubik may have some additional points, because I know he has 

looked at this issue in close detail. First of all, as you know, sir, 

we have embedded advisers with Iraqi special forces. In fact, they 

have been with Iraqi special forces longer than with any other organization. They go back to 2003. 

Second, I would say that there are some intervening organizations between the prime minister’s office and the special forces 

units themselves. I will ask if General Dubik has any more comment on the possible misuse of the ISOF. 

General DUBIK. Yes, sir. The Iraqi special operations forces brigade is subordinate to two other headquarters that intervene between the prime minister and the special forces. The first is the 

Counterterrorist Bureau, which is a ministry-like entity. The 

Counterterrorist Bureau chief sits at the National Security Council 

meeting every week, the equivalent to other ministries, and over 

time may become a ministry. Subordinate to the Counterterrorist 

Bureau is a Counterterrorist Command, and that is the command 

of the Iraqi special operations brigade and soon-to-be-formed commando brigades. 

As targets get passed to the special operations forces brigade, 

they go first to the bureau and then to a special committee of interministerial composition, and then passed from there to the 

Counterterrorist Command and special forces. So it is not a direct 

shot, prime minister to the special operations forces, but through 

a chain of command. 

The CHAIRMAN. And we have advisers in each unit. Is that correct? 

General DUBIK. Yes, sir. That is correct. 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Wilson. 

Mr. WILSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

General Dubik, Mr. Secretary, thank you very much for being 

here. 

General, I want to join with everyone in thanking you for your 

13 months of extraordinary service in Baghdad. It has truly made 

a difference. It has been terrific today to find out about your wife 

and daughters. What a family involvement this has been. I also 

want to commend you. Behind you, I recognize a number of your 

staff people who I visited in Baghdad in the nine visits that I have 

had there. We have extraordinary young people serving our country. I say this as a Member of Congress. I say this as a 31-year 

veteran of the Army Guard and Reserve. 
36 

I also have another perspective. One of my sons was a doctor 

serving in the Navy under your command this year, and I just had 

faith in what you were doing and General Petraeus. You have certainly lived up as a parent to what we want for the young people 

serving our country. In fact, he actually followed an older brother 

who served for a year in Iraq with the field artillery. So our family 

truly has seen the extraordinary success that has occurred. 

As I visit in Iraq, I get to visit with the junior officers and enlisted personnel from my home state. Every time, I am so impressed to see young people understand that the best way to protect American families at home is to defeat the terrorists overseas. 

As we are looking at these issues, I have been particularly 

pleased, and I just can’t hear enough, about the progress being 

made with the national police. I painfully remember being here and 

having the hearings where the only solution for the national police 

was their dissolution, start over again. But in fact, there has been 

a re-bluing effort, an effort to reform the police. Phase one is completed. Phase two has completed. We are not into phase three. Can 

you tell us again about the different phases and where we are? 

General DUBIK. Yes, sir. Thank you very much for your complimentary comments on the soldiers and airmen and sailors and 

Marines and civilians serving in Iraq. On their behalf, thank you. 

The national police reform did have four phases. Actually, all 

four are going on at the same time. The first phase was assessment 

of leadership and removal of leaders that were not proficient. As 

I commented before, the minister changed both of the division commanders, 9 of the brigade commanders, 17 of his battalion commanders. Subsequent to the initial removal, he has removed one 

more brigade commander and several more battalion commanders. 

So this is a constant reassessment of leadership. 

Second is to provide collective training for every brigade. We had 

completed the initial sets of brigades in the fall, and now we are 

bringing them back for continuous training. So while we completed 

phase two, so to speak, by doing it once, the minister and the commanding general of the national police are unsatisfied with just 

doing it once, and they want to keep refreshing that training. 

Third is professional training in leadership by the Italian 

Carabinieri. We began this about seven months ago. We are on the 

fourth cycle. This has been very, very beneficial. The Carabinieri, 

by their very presence, have inspired the national police to become 

what they see the Carabinieri are. In addition to that, the skills 

and leadership training the Carabinieri have provided have now 

started to see their impact. The first battalion trained by the 

Carabinieri went into Basra and performed very, very well. We are 

going to try to expand that program. 

The last phase is regionalization, which again has begun, where 

the minister of interior and the commanding general of the national police desire to set the conditions for transition to rule of 

law, where when we get to the point that the military is no longer 

needed inside for security of Iraq, that local police, backed up by 

national police regionally stationed, will provide the security for an 

Iraq no longer in an insurgency. That process has begun by selecting the regions, and beginning to form a third national police divi-
37 

sion so that the three major regions can be identified, and slowly 

moving battalions in each province. 

Mr. WILSON. Well, it is a great success story. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

The gentleman from Connecticut, Mr. Courtney. 

Mr. COURTNEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you, general, and your family, for your sacrifice and commitment to our country. 

General, in your testimony, you concluded pretty much with a 

comment that our assistance may change in organization and size 

over the coming months or years, but some form of partnership and 

assistance consistent with strategic objectives is still necessary. 

The Los Angeles Times on July 2, just a few days ago, reported 

a fairly solidly sourced story that spy satellites of our country are 

being trained on the Iraqi army to follow their movements and 

their training facilities. Again, this was a front page story with lots 

of backup and confirmation from folks who have seen some of the 

slides from the satellites. 

This obviously raises a pretty large question about the nature of 

the relationship between a country that basically created the Iraqi 

army, as embedded as we have heard over and over again this 

morning, but still feels the need to use some of our most sophisticated spy technology to find out what they are doing. I was wondering if you could comment on that? 

General DUBIK. I cannot comment on that. I didn’t see the article 

and I don’t know of the program. I don’t know if Mr. Straub can. 

Mr. STRAUB. I have not seen it and couldn’t comment on it if I 

had. 

Mr. COURTNEY. Well, again, this is not some sort of non-mainstream news organization that is reporting on this. Perhaps you 

can follow up with our committee to get some sort of response to 

that. Certainly, I think the American people who are paying $12 

billion a month for operations there would like to know why we feel 

the need to use some of our most valuable technology. There are 

clearly other things that we should be probably tracking in that region, but certainly the movements of our ally shouldn’t be one of 

them. 

With that, Mr. Speaker, I would yield back. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you so much. 

I have one question, but I will call on my friend from California 

first. Mr. Duncan. 

Mr. HUNTER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I think this has been a very fulsome hearing, gentlemen. Thank 

you for your testimony. 

Your overall take on the field-grade officer corps. One to 10, 

where do you think they are at right now? 

General DUBIK. The U.S. field-grade officer corps? 

Mr. HUNTER. No, the Iraqi officer corps. 

General DUBIK. I think that in the spread of officers, they are 

very proficient at the junior ranks. They are thin in the field-grade 

ranks, and they are overly heavy in the senior ranks. 
38 

Mr. HUNTER. Do you think that we have a good system, or that 

there has been a good system in terms of noticing meritorious service and moving the talented folks to the fore? 

General DUBIK. I think in general, yes, sir, but like every system, 

I am sure that there are some deserving officers not being promoted. But in general, the move from lower ranks to more senior 

ranks will be a positive one. 

Mr. HUNTER. Basra operation, if you gave it a 1 to 10, what 

would you give it? Where would you put the Iraqi forces in that operation? 

General DUBIK. I think they did very well in the execution phase. 

I think they learned a lot about the need to do better planning and 

preparation. Then when you saw Mosul, Sadr City, and Amarah, 

that the planning and preparation was pretty impressive in each 

of those cases and they learned a lot from Basra. 

Mr. HUNTER. The battalions, the 139 line battalions, you have 

obviously 4 special operations battalions that get a lot of work. But 

of the 139 line battalions, do you think there is a pretty good 

spread of responsibility in terms of operational assignments that 

test the capability of the battalions? Are they mixing them and 

moving them to a fairly large degree? 

General DUBIK. Not all of them are moving, sir, but quite a few 

are moving from Al Anbar throughout the country, and moving 

from the 2d and 3d divisions, switching their operational areas 

from the 8th and 10th divisions in the center, down to the south 

and a little bit north. So they are moving quite a few of their forces 

around. 

Mr. HUNTER. If you were going to describe this operation at this 

point, would you say that we are succeeding in Iraq? 

General DUBIK. I would say we are succeeding in Iraq right now, 

that we have seized the initiative from the insurgents, but that 

success is not cemented in any guaranteed way just yet. 

Mr. HUNTER. Okay. 

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I think we have had an 

excellent hearing today. 

General, thank you. Thanks for your endurance. 

General DUBIK. Thank you, sir. 

The CHAIRMAN. General, before I ask you the final question, let 

me again thank you for your service for some 37 years. You certainly end on a high note, and we thank again your two daughters 

and your wife for being with us today. 

You earlier said that you had asked the State Department for 

help in training the Iraqi police, and they were not forthcoming. 

Have you asked the State Department or any other agencies for 

any other help and (a) been turned down; or (b) been helped? 

General DUBIK. No, sir, not specifically. The assignment that I 

requested from the Department of State was not directly in training of the police, but looking to the day when training of the police 

would no longer be a Department of Defense function, but a State 

function. I wanted to present an opportunity to begin training of 

State Department officials in understanding the situation in Iraq. 

That was the offer. They have not rejected it yet, but they haven’t 

identified the—— 

The CHAIRMAN. How long ago was that, General? 
39 

General DUBIK. This was about six months, maybe seven months 

ago. But I will get the letter, sir, to you. 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on 

page 57.] 

The CHAIRMAN. That would be helpful. We have been very concerned on this committee about the interagency cooperation. If they 

did not want to do it, I think the best they could do would be to 

write you a letter and say not now or something to that effect. 

Listen, thank you very much, general. Mr. Straub, we thank you 

for being with us, too. 

The meeting is adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 12:23 p.m., the committee was adjourned.] 

A P P E N D I X 

JULY 9, 2008 

PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD 

JULY 9, 2008 

(45) 
46 
47 
48 
49 
50 
51 
52 
53 

DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD 

JULY 9, 2008 

(57) 
58 
59 
60 
61 
62 
WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING 

THE HEARING 

JULY 9, 2008 

(65) 

RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY DR. SNYDER 

Mr. STRAUB. The Department of Defense has taken reduction of Foreign Military 

Sales (FMS) case processing times as a priority item, and the FMS Task Force, 

headed by Assistant Secretary of Defense Benkert, has significantly reduced those 

times. As of September 16, 2008, our rolling five-month average for processing time 

of FMS cases from Letter of Offer and Acceptance (LOA) presentation to LOA signature has dropped to 54 days. 

The Congress has been extremely helpful in reducing the time required to process 

FMS cases. Committees have waived the standard 20 day informal notification for 

all 18 notifications and have processed each formal notification within the 30 day 

requirement. Congressional flexibility regarding these priority FMS cases has been 

a key factor in reducing FMS case processing times and providing needed defense 

articles to the Iraqi Security Forces. These notifications are done in parallel with 

other procurement actions, resulting in a streamlined process. 

Our avenues to further improve the FMS process at present focus more on processes internal to the Government of Iraq and the interaction between DoD elements 

and the Iraqi Ministry of Defense. Nonetheless, there are two things Congress can 

do to further help. As stated in a November 14, 2007 letter from Deputy Secretary 

of Defense England and Deputy Secretary of State Negroponte, Congress might review the current notification thresholds in the Arms Export Control Act, which have 

not been updated since 1981 and have not kept pace with the increased costs of 

military equipment. Secondly, Congress might consider establishment of a Coalition 

Support Account, which would allow the U.S. military to more rapidly support the 

deployment and integration of Coalition partners when a rapid response is required. 

[See page 18.] 

RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY DR. GINGREY 

Mr. STRAUB. Neither the Department of Defense, the Services, nor the Combatant 

Commands are giving away money appropriated by Congress, nor are they giving 

away new equipment or equipment needed by U.S. forces to the Iraqi military. U.S. 

forces are in the process of refurbishing and transferring 8,500 HMMWVs that have 

been used extensively in Iraq. The vehicles would be costly to return to CONUS and 

no longer meet U.S. operational requirements. The Army and National Guard will 

replace the 8,500 HMMWVs with newer M-1151 HMMWVs that meet current U.S. 

operational requirements. 

The Department of the Army received the proceeds from the purchase of the 

HMMWVs. The cost of the new HMMWVs will be offset by avoiding the significant 

post-deployment costs to reset the older vehicles. The decision made by the Army 

to meet the Combatant Commander’s request to sell the HMMWVs to Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq (MNSTC-I) was based on a business analysis of returning the vehicles to CONUS for overhaul ($1.5 billion) versus the cost 

of procuring new tactical vehicles ($1.8 billion), a difference of approximately $35K 

per vehicle. 

The $11K per vehicle purchase price is transferred to the Department of the Army 

for its use. A detailed analysis was conducted by OSD Comptroller and OSD AT&L 

to determine the fair market depreciated value based on the age and condition of 

the vehicles. Most of the vehicles were five to seven years old and used heavily in 

a war zone. The decision for making this transaction went through an extensive review process involving the Army, USCENTCOM, Joint Staff, and OSD to ensure the 

proper legal authorities were exercised. The purchase was in the best interest of the 

U.S. Army and best supported the mission to develop the capabilities of the Iraqi 

Security Forces. 

The HMMWVs have had a positive effect on Iraqi Army operations and have contributed to their improved performance throughout Iraq. [See page 27.] 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING 

JULY 9, 2008 

(69) 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MS. SANCHEZ 

Ms. SANCHEZ. I am looking at the State Department’s ‘‘Iraq Weekly Status Update’’ from June 25, 2008. According to this report, as of April 25, 2008, there were 

a total of 478,524 trained Iraqi Security forces. If you look back at the 9010 Report 

from December 2007, it stated that there were a total of 439,678 trained forces. This 

is an increase of 38,846 in trained forces, over the four months between December 

2007 and April 2008. I understand that the end objective is to create a self-sufficient 

Iraqi Security Force that will be able to provide and maintain security in the region. 

Lt General Dubik and Deputy Assistant Secretary Straub, can you tell us: a. How 

many more forces need to be trained for the Iraqi Security Forces to be fully capable 

of maintaining security in the region? b. How much additional U.S. support will be 

required to achieve this goal? c. And what is the proposed timeline for the Iraqi Security Force to be self-sufficient and no longer need to rely on the Coalition? 

Mr. STRAUB. Between Coalition and Iraqi training efforts, a sufficient number of 

Iraqi soldiers, police, and other security forces must be produced to meet the force 

levels determined by the Government of Iraq as necessary to maintain security. U.S. 

and Iraqi studies have recommended an end-state trained force of between 601,000 

and 646,000 by 2010. The current force level is approximately 590,000. A U.S. role 

in training the units still forming and in developing the ISF ability to conduct its 

own training remains important. As the ISF become more proficient at training 

Iraqi soldiers and units, the Coalition requirement for training them will decrease. 

In answering sections (b) and (c), it may be better to look at unit training levels 

and percentage of assigned versus authorized personnel rather than cumulative 

total trained for insights on ISF effectiveness. Those measures reflect how many ISF 

have actually been trained and remain with their units. By those measures, U.S. 

support continues to be essential to building a fully self-sustaining ISF capable of 

independent counterinsurgency operations. The monetary component of U.S. support 

to training and equipping ISF is the Iraqi Security Forces Fund (ISFF). The FY09 

request for ISFF is $2 billion. Subsequent requests, if any, will be significantly reduced. 

There is no measurable timetable at present for the ISF to be entirely independent of Coalition training and operational support. During 2007-2008, the ISF 

made significant gains in operational readiness and have taken the lead in an increasing number of provinces and operations. The assessment that the ISF are fully 

self-sufficient will be based on conditions rather than on a timetable. This will occur 

when unit training levels, ministerial capacity, logistics, and other key enablers are 

fully developed and functional. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. I am looking at the State Department’s ‘‘Iraq Weekly Status Update’’ from June 25, 2008. According to this report, as of April 25, 2008, there were 

a total of 478,524 trained Iraqi Security forces. If you look back at the 9010 Report 

from December 2007, it stated that there were a total of 439,678 trained forces. This 

is an increase of 38,846 in trained forces, over the four months between December 

2007 and April 2008. I understand that the end objective is to create a self-sufficient 

Iraqi Security Force that will be able to provide and maintain security in the region. 

Lt General Dubik and Deputy Assistant Secretary Straub, can you tell us: a. How 

many more forces need to be trained for the Iraqi Security Forces to be fully capable 

of maintaining security in the region? b. How much additional U.S. support will be 

required to achieve this goal? c. And what is the proposed timeline for the Iraqi Security Force to be self-sufficient and no longer need to rely on the Coalition? 

General DUBIK. ISF assigned strength continues to grow, and is expected to reach 

just over 590,000 in September 2008. The original target strength for 2010 was 

601,000 to 646,000. However, this estimate does not include additional growth based 

on the consolidation of other security force—e.g. Facilities Protection Services, Oil 

Police, and Dignitary Protection Services. The assimilation of these additional forces 

will occur from the end of this year until the Government of Iraq is satisfied with 

its command and control and support relationships for these additional forces. It is 

important to note that this is a force to provide security for Iraq . . . not the region, 

at large. 
70 

Regarding additional U.S. support, that is a very broad and open-ended question. 

MNSTC-I’s role will be a) the generation of the remaining counterinsurgency force, 

b) development of key enablers and c) continued ministerial and institutional develop of key functional capabilities including force management and management 

systems, such as logistics. The timing table for Iraq reaching the end of the build 

of the counterinsurgency force is conditions-based. We believe it is feasible under 

current conditions to achieve the build for the initial projection of the counterinsurgency ground force by the end of 2009. This is the force we assess will, once enabled 

with logistics and other force management capability, allow the government of Iraq 

to sustain security within its borders. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. One of the major challenges I foresee is our inability to keep track 

of how many trained forces are on duty in the Iraqi Security Force. Currently, the 

Department of Defense does not ensure that forces that are trained and equipped 

by the Coalition actually stay on duty. Without this information the Coalition is at 

risk of wasting its resources. It is imperative that we are accountable for our equipment, personnel and other resources. a. How important does the Department of Defense believe it is to ensure that Coalition trained and equipped forces actually stay 

on duty? b. Why wasn’t there a system in place from the very beginning to track 

how many Coalition trained forces stayed on duty? c. How is the Department of Defense addressing this situation? d. Has the Department started to develop a system 

for tracking trained, on-duty personnel? 

Mr. STRAUB. The Department believes that it is important for the Iraqi Security 

Forces (ISF) to retain its trained personnel and account for its equipment. Accordingly, MNSTC-I and other DoD elements with a role in training the ISF emphasize 

personnel and equipment accountability as a priority. The Iraqi military personnel 

system must deal with a steady outflow of personnel due to combat deaths, illness, 

expiration of terms of service, absence without leave, and other factors. In the early 

days of forming the ISF, moreover, dangerous security conditions resulted in a high 

loss rate for trained personnel. 

DoD has placed emphasis on tracking the capabilities of trained ISF units, as opposed to the retention of individual soldiers. While such retention is important, it 

is traditionally more a personnel administration than a training function and has 

not been tracked in equal detail. DoD has developed detailed measures of unit authorized and assigned strength, in addition to the total number of individual soldiers that have been trained. These readiness assessments, coupled with personnel 

accountability measures within the Iraqi Ministry of Defense, continue to mature 

and now provide greater fidelity on the number of trained ISF personnel still serving in active units as well as their collective mission readiness. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. One of the major challenges I foresee is our inability to keep track 

of how many trained forces are on duty in the Iraqi Security Force. Currently, the 

Department of Defense does not ensure that forces that are trained and equipped 

by the Coalition actually stay on duty. Without this information the Coalition is at 

risk of wasting its resources. It is imperative that we are accountable for our equipment, personnel and other resources. a. How important does the Department of Defense believe it is to ensure that Coalition trained and equipped forces actually stay 

on duty? b. Why wasn’t there a system in place from the very beginning to track 

how many Coalition trained forces stayed on duty? c. How is the Department of Defense addressing this situation? d. Has the Department started to develop a system 

for tracking trained, on-duty personnel? 

General DUBIK. Regarding item a), neither MNSTC-I nor USCENTCOM can respond on behalf of the Department of Defense. Likewise, for item b), the current 

MNSTC-I/USCENTCOM staff cannot comment on decisions regarding the initial 

structure and functions of MoD and MoI systems since it would be conjecture. It 

is also important to note that these are Iraqi systems built to service perceived Iraqi 

challenges. 

Recruiting is not an issue and the lack of a codified retention mechanism does 

not appear to measurably impact the month-to-month payroll data for MoD or MoI 

aggregate personnel manning or unit strengths. Both ministries share monthly personnel data and payroll data with the MNSTC-I advisory staff. These reports provide MNSTC-I visibility on updated strength of all MoD and MoI units as of the 

reporting date. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY DR. GINGREY 

Dr. GINGREY. General, we studied the progress of the ISF in the Oversight and 

Investigations Subcommittee last year under the guidance of then Chairman Meehan and Ranking Member Akin. There were a number of challenges that seemed 
71 

to continually surface during our discussions that I’d like to follow-up on today. The 

first is that the Iraqi Police Service still reports that the force only has approximately 50% of the issued pistols, machine guns, and body armor on hand. At the 

time of the O&I investigation, the DOD Inspector General, General Claude 

Kicklighter, was leading an investigation regarding American supplied weapons for 

the ISF; the New York Times had published accounts that weapons provided for or 

intended for the ISF had been used in crimes in other countries (Turkey); and a report from the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction indicated that a 

very small percentage of small arms provided to the ISF had been registered with 

the DOD’s Registry of the Small Arms Serialization Program. Can you address these 

points? Is there a chance that because of the lack of accounting for the weapons we 

provide that they are possibly being used against us right now in Iraq or elsewhere? 

Can we fully account for the ISF’s receipt of U.S. funded equipment? How are we 

working to improve our knowledge of where the weapons we provide are, and how 

are we working to ensure they are not ending up in the hands of bad actors? A second point that kept coming up was that desertion rates were high, and a lot of times 

soldiers and police would not report for duty. This was due in part to the lack of 

a central banking system—soldiers would collect their pay and leave to take it home 

to their families—and many would never report back for duty. How are we mitigating circumstances such as this—are the Iraqis improving in this area? 

General DUBIK. We invited the DOD Inspector General to Iraq in order to provide 

MNSTC-I with an external assessment of weapons control and accountability procedure in an effort to improve MNSTC-I processes and to provide better accountability. MNSTC-I has implemented remedial or corrective measures for all the 

DODIG findings. Our primary consideration in requesting this assessment was that, 

in the period prior to 2006, some accountability procedures appear to have been insufficient. For example, we recently discovered that serial numbers for a small number of Glock pistols recovered in Turkey are linked to shipment from the 2004-2005 

timeframe. Transfer procedures from MNSTC-I to Iraqi Security Forces include a 

complete serial number inventory of all weapons. Current issue procedures for individual weapons in both the MOD and the MoI entail serial number inventories, signature, photographs and biometric data for each soldier or policeman receiving a 

weapon. To put this in context, these measures are far more rigorous than the accountability control procedure we have for our own soldiers, who sign for their 

weapons by serial number. 

Desertion is not a significant factor in getting Iraqi troops into the security fight. 

The lack of an automated pay mechanism is still a challenge. The process does create periodic authorized absences—however, most soldiers who take their pay home 

return to duty. This is mitigated by increasing assigned strengths in five of 14 divisions to 120% of authorizations and nine of 14 to 135%. Likewise, it is important 

to remember that desertion is symptomatic of many, variable issues, not simply the 

lack of automated pay. As development of ministerial and institutional systems and 

processes continues, we will continue to focus on professionalization of the leadership in the ISF and enforcing professional standards of conduct. 

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