SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-4806-17T2

THERESA HICKSON,

Petitioner-Appellant,

v.

BOARD OF TRUSTEES,

POLICE AND FIREMEN'S

RETIREMENT SYSTEM,

Respondent-Respondent.

___________________________

Argued September 23, 2019 – Decided October 2, 2019

Before Judges Geiger and Natali.

On appeal from the Board of Trustees of the Police and 

Fireman's Retirement System, Department of the

Treasury, PFRS No. 3-74255.

Samuel Michael Gaylord argued the cause for appellant 

(Gaylord Popp, LLC, attorneys; Samuel Michael

Gaylord, on the brief).

Amy Chung, Deputy Attorney General argued the cause 

for respondent (Gurbir S. Grewal, Attorney General, 

attorney; Melissa H. Raksa, Assistant Attorney 

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the 

internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
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General, of counsel; Stephanie Kozic, Deputy Attorney 

General, on the brief).

PER CURIAM 

Petitioner Theresa Hickson appeals from a May 14, 2018 final decision of 

respondent the Board of Trustees (Board), of the Police and Firemen's 

Retirement System (PFRS) denying her application for accidental disability 

retirement benefits. We affirm. 

The facts are essentially undisputed. Hickson was employed by the New 

Jersey Department of Corrections as a Senior Corrections Officer assigned to 

New Jersey State Prison. Her usual shift began at 7:00 a.m. and concluded at 

2:00 p.m. On September 13, 2012, she drove her own car and arrived at the 

employee parking lot at 5:45 a.m. The State owns and controls the parking lot, 

which is located two blocks from the prison. Hickson parked and began walking 

across the lot when she was struck by a vehicle. At the time she was in uniform

but did not have a radio. She suffered injuries to her left knee, tailbone, and 

hands. Hickson walked approximately two blocks to the prison entrance and 

reported the incident to her shift commander. She was sent to the hospital for 

examination and treatment. 

Hickson applied for accidental disability retirement. Pertinent to this 

appeal, the Board determined the reported disability was "not the direct result 
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of a traumatic event, as the event is not caused by a circumstance external to 

[Hickson]," but rather "is the result of a pre-existing disease alone or a preexisting disease that [was] aggravated or accelerated by the work effort." The 

Board found the accident "did not occur during and as a result of your regular 

or assigned duties." 

The Board granted Hickson ordinary disability retirement benefits but 

denied accidental disability retirement benefits. Hickson appealed the Board's 

denial of accidental disability retirement benefits. The matter was transferred 

to the Office of Administrative Law as a contested case. The trial was bifurcated 

so that "the only issue to be determined was whether or not [Hickson] was 

injured on a premise owned or controlled by the employer during and as a result 

of her regular or assigned duties as required by N.J.S.A. 43:15A-43." 

The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) conducted a one-day hearing;

Hickson was the only witness. The record was closed after submission of 

written closing arguments. The ALJ issued an April 19, 2018 written Initial 

Decision affirming the Board's determination that petitioner is not eligible for 

accidental disability retirement benefits. The ALJ made the following findings:

In her application for accidental retirement 

benefits, Hickson wrote that she was struck by a car 

while in the parking lot of the prison; that she sustained 
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injuries; and that she can no longer perform her regular 

or assigned duties.

At the hearing, Hickson provided greater detail. 

Hickson testified that she arrived at the employee 

parking lot at approximately 5:45 a.m. She parked at 

the fence and, as she traversed a portion of the parking 

lot near the apron of the entrance, she was struck by a 

car.

Hickson described her job duties as providing 

"safety and security of the inmates" as well as 

"supervising inmates." She indicated the role of a 

corrections officer as "you're always on duty." "If you 

see something happening you have to respond to it 

because all of the public is going to expect you to do 

something because you're in uniform." She noted that 

they used to tell you if "you're on your way home if 

something happens you have to do something."

More significantly, Hickson was required to 

report to work in full uniform but did not have a radio 

on her person at that time because it was located in the 

booth where her shift was to begin. She was never 

issued any work vehicle and simply drove her personal 

car.

The ALJ noted "the traumatic event must have occurred during and as a 

result of the member's regular or assigned duties." The ALJ distinguished the 

facts in this case from those in Kasper v. Board of Trustees of the Teachers’ 

Pension and Annuity Fund, 164 N.J. 564 (2000), Pollara v. Board. of Trustees.

of the Police and Fireman's Retirement System, 183 N.J. Super. 505 (App. Div. 

1982), and In re Carlson, 174 N.J. Super. 603 (App. Div. 1980). Unlike the 
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petitioners in those cases, the ALJ found Hickson "was in the process of walking 

the approximate[ly] two blocks to the prison when she was struck by the car 

while still in the parking lot." She was not providing "safety and security of the 

inmates" or "supervising inmates" in the parking lot. The ALJ noted that 

"[u]nlike Pollara, Hickson had not already started the actual performance of her 

regular or assigned duties. And unlike Kasper, Hickson was not engaged in an 

activity preparatory but essential to that duty." Thus, "she was not injured 

'during and as a result of the performance of her regular or assigned duties.'" 

(Quoting N.J.S.A. 43:15A-43(a)). 

Hickson filed exceptions to the Initial Decision. The Board adopted the 

Initial Decision and affirmed the denial of accidental disability retirement 

benefits. This appeal followed. Hickson argues the accident occurred during 

and in the course of her regular and assigned job duties. 

"Our review of administrative agency action is limited." Russo v. Bd. of 

Trs., Police & Fireman's Ret. Sys., 206 N.J. 14, 27 (2011) (citing In re 

Herrmann, 192 N.J. 19, 27 (2007)). "Judicial review of an agency’s final 

decision is generally limited to a determination of whether the decision is 

arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable or lacks fair support in the record." 

Caminiti v. Bd. of Trs., Police & Fireman's Ret. Sys., 431 N.J. Super. 1, 14 (App. 
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Div. 2013) (citing Hemsey v. Bd. of Trs., Police & Firemen’s Ret. Sys., 198 

N.J. 215, 223 (2009)). The factual "findings of an ALJ 'are considered binding 

on appeal, when supported by adequate, substantial and credible evidence.'" 

Oceanside Charter Sch. v. N.J. State Dep't of Educ., 418 N.J. Super. 1, 9 (App. 

Div. 2011) (quoting In re Taylor, 158 N.J. 644, 656 (1999)). "However, we are 

not bound by an agency’s statutory interpretation or other legal determinations." 

Mattia v. Bd. of Trs., Police & Fireman's Ret. Sys., 455 N.J. Super. 217, 221

(App. Div. 2018) (citing Russo, 206 N.J. at 14, 27).

A PFRS member may be retired on an accidental disability pension if the 

"employee is permanently and totally disabled as a direct result of a traumatic 

event occurring during and as a result of the performance of his regular or 

assigned duties." N.J.S.A. 43:15A-43(a). See also Richardson v. Bd. of Trs., 

Police & Fireman's Ret. Sys., 192 N.J. 189, 213–15 (2007) (holding that in order 

to qualify for such benefits, a member of the retirement system must establish, 

among other things, that "the traumatic event occurred during and as a result of 

the member’s regular or assigned duties").

Hickson argues the Board erred by determining the accident did not occur 

during and in the course of her regular and assigned job duties. We disagree. 
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Shortly after the Board rendered its final decision, we held that a Senior 

Correction Officer who drove to work in his own car, parked his car in the 

employee parking lot, exited the car, then slipped and fell on ice in the parking 

lot as he walked towards the entrance portal of the prison to begin his shift, "had 

not yet completed his commute when he was injured, and was not performing 

any function connected to his work assignment when he was injured." Mattia, 

455 N.J. Super. at 219, 223. We noted Mattia "was not chasing an escapee, but 

merely walking from his car to the prison entrance, when he slipped and fell on 

ice in the parking lot." Id. at 223-24. 

The same reasoning applies here. Hickson's shift had not yet begun. She 

was walking across the parking lot when struck by a car driven by another 

employee. She was approximately two blocks from the entrance to the prison. 

She was not chasing an escapee or performing any other job duty. Hickson was 

not assigned any essential preparatory work-related task at the time of her injury. 

Thus, her "injury was not causally connected to [her] work." Id. at 224. She 

was simply going to work. 

Hickson argues the Board misapplied the law in disqualifying her from 

accidental disability retirement benefits, and Kasper compels a different result. 

We are unpersuaded by this argument. 
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In Kasper, the employee had "parked her car, crossed the street to the 

school, and was negotiating the stairs" of the school when the incident occurred, 

therefore her commute was completed and she was in the performance of her 

duties when she was injured. Id. at 588. The Kasper Court made clear that to 

qualify for accidental disability retirement benefits, an employee cannot merely 

be coming to, or going from work. Id. at 581. Rather, the employee "must be 

engaged in his or her employment duties on property owned or controlled by the 

employer." Ibid. Therefore, "in order to qualify for accidental disability 

benefits, employees must satisfy the statutory criteria that they were on the work 

premises and performing a function causally connected to their work." Mattia, 

455 N.J. Super. at 223 (citing Kasper, 164 N.J. at 588). Hickson does not meet 

these requirements. 

We conclude from our review of the record that the Board's decision was 

not arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable. The ALJ's findings, which the Board 

adopted, are fully supported by the stipulated facts in the record. Hickson's 

claim does not satisfy the criteria for eligibility for accidental disability 

retirement benefits. Accordingly, there is no basis to disturb the Board's 

decision. See In re Young, 202 N.J. 50, 71 (2010) (upholding an agency decision 
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where "there was substantial credible evidence in the record as a whole to 

support the agency’s findings").

Affirmed.