### IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE AT KNOXVILLE Assigned on

Briefs D ecember

18, 2001 STATE OF TENN ESSEE v. BOBBY GEN E GOODSON Appeal from the Criminal Court for Sullivan County Nos. S42,000 & S43,579 Phyllis H. Miller, Judge

No. E2001-00925-CCA-R3-CD July 29, 2002
The defenda

nt, Bobby G ene Good son, appe als as of right his Sullivan County Criminal Court conviction in case number S42,000 for driving on a suspended license, a C l ass B misdemeanor, claiming that (1) the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction, (2) he has a c o nstitut ional rightto trave l, and (3) the trial court e rred in de nying his request to dismiss his trial attorney and reappoint co unsel. The defendant also appeals his remaining two convictions in S42,000 for violation of

the registration law and violation of the seat belt law, both Class C misdemeanors, and his convicti on in case

number S43 ,579 for d

riving on a

su s pended license. As to the defendant’s appeal of his conviction for driving on a suspended license in case number S42,000, we aff irm the judgmentof the trial court. With regard to the remaining convi ct ions, the d efenda nt’s appe al is dismissed because the judgments of conviction are not in the record on appe al. Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Criminal Court Affirm ed; Appeal Dismissed in Part
J OSEPH M. T IPTON , J ., delivered the opinion of the court, in which T HOMAS T. W OODALL and R OBERT W. W EDEMEYER , JJ., joined. Stephen M. Wallace, District Public Defender, and William A. Kenne dy, Assistant Public Defender, for the appellant, Bobby Gene Goodson.
Paul G. Summers, Attorney General and Reporter; Angele M. Gregory, Assistant Attorney Genera l; H. Greeley Wells, Jr., District Attorney Genera l; and Greg Newman and Robert Montgomery, Assistant District Attorneys General, for the appellee, State of Te nnessee. OPINION
In case num

ber S42,0 00, the de

fendant was origi nally con

victed in general sessions court of driving on a suspended license, violating the registration law, and violating the seat belt law. See Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 55-50-504, 55-4-101, 55-9-603. The defendant appealed his convictions to the criminal court. D uring a be nch tria l, Trooper John Taylor of the Tennessee Highwa y Patrol testified-2-

that on October 19, 1998, he appeared in gener al session s court to

testify against the defendant, who had been ch arged w ith driving on a suspe

nded lice nse. He s aid

the defe ndant’s c ase was dismissed because Trooper Taylor failed to bring a c opy of the defenda nt’s cer tified dr iving rec ord to cou

rt. He said that he left the courthouse and drove away in his patrol car. He said that while his patrol car was stopped at

an intersection, he saw the defendant driving a Ford LTD. He said that he stopped the defendant and that the defendant gave him a photocopy of a driver’s license. He said that he ra n a check of the defendant’s licen se through police dispatch and that dispatch confirmed the defendant’s driver’s license had been suspended. He said th e defen dant told

him that the defendant didnot need a

driver’ s license

because he was tr

aveling, not drivin g. He said that i n addition to driving on a suspended license, the defendant was not wea ring a seat belt and

the defenda

nt’s lice nse tag had expired. Trooper Taylor testified that the defe ndant said he did not have to wear a seat bel t or register his car.
The state intr

oduced in to evid ence a ce rtified copy of the defendant’s Tennessee driving record. The trial court noted that accord ing to the record, the defendant’s driver’ s license had been suspended on November 17, 1997, for his failure to provide proof of insuranc e after a previous conviction for driving on a suspended license. See Tenn. Code Ann § 50-12-115. The trial court also noted that the defendant’s driving record indicated that notice of the suspension had been sent to the defendant on that date. The defendant pr esented no pro of at trial, and the trial court reconvicted

him of all t

hree of fenses. Less than

two months l ater, a

Sullivan Cou

nty Criminal Court jury convicted the defendant of driving on a suspended license in case number S43,579.
After a senten cing hea

ring, the trial cou rt senten ced the d efenda nt in case number S42,000 to six months for driving on a suspe nded lice nse and th irty days for viola

ting the re gistratio n law to be served c oncurre

ntly on supe

rvised pr obation. T

he defe ndant wa s ordere d to pay cour t costs for violating the seat

belt law. In case

number S43 ,579, the

defenda nt also re ceived a

six-month sentence to be served on supervised probation. The sente nces in bo th cases are to r

un conse cutively for an effective sentence of one year on supervised probation.
As noted above, the defendant is appealing all four of his convic tions. However, this court’s jurisdiction extends only to the review of the final judgments of trial courts. Ten n. Code Ann. § 16-5-108(a); State v. McCary , 815 S.W.2d 220, 221 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1991). Rule 3(b), T.R.A.P., provides : In criminal actions an appeal as of right by a defendant lies from any judgment of

conviction entered

by a trial court from which an appeal lies to the Supreme Court or the Court of Criminal Appeals: (1) on a plea of not guilty . . . i f the defen dant seeks review of the sentence and there was no plea agreement c oncerning the sentence . . . . (emphas is added). The record on appea l contains a judgment of conviction only for the defendant’s driving on a suspended license in case number S42,000. Theref ore, his appeal as to his other two convictions in S42,000 and his one conviction in S43,579 is dismissed because we lack jurisdiction-3-

in these ca ses. We w ill address the issu es raised on appeal only for his remaining conviction of driving on a suspended license in case number S42,000. I. INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE
Th e defendant contends that the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction bec aus e the state presented no proof at trial that he had received notice from the De partment of Safety that his driver’s license had been suspende d. He con

tends tha t although his driving r

ecord “ purports to show that notice was sent

to the defendant, . . . it does not indicate receipt.” The state a cknowledges that it offered no proof that the Tennessee De partment of

Safety hadproperly notified the defendant of the susp ension. How ever, it contends that it was not required to prove notification or that the defendant had received notification. In addition, the state argues that this cou rt should a ffirm the defendant’s conviction because from the evidence pre sented at trial, a reaso nable trier of fact could infer the defendant knew of the license suspe nsion.
O ur standard of review when the sufficienc y of the evidence is questioned on appeal i s “whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could havefound the essential elements of the crime beyond a rea sonable doubt.” Jackson v. Virgini a , 443 U.S. 3 07, 319, 99S. Ct. 2781, 2789 (1979). We do not reweigh the evidence but presume that the jury has resolved

all conflicts in the testimony and drawn all reasonable inference s from the evidence in favor of the state. See State v. She ffield , 676 S.W.2d 542, 547 (Tenn. 1984); Sta te v. Cabbage , 571 S.W.2 d 832, 835 (Tenn. 197 8). Ques tions abou t witness c

redibili ty wer e resolved by the jury. See State v. Bland , 958 S.W.2d 651, 659 (Tenn. 1997).
A defendant is guilty of driving on a suspended, revoked, or canc elled licens e if he drives a car on any public

highway o f the stat

e at a time

when the

defenda nt’s privi lege to do

so is cancelled, suspended, or revoked. T enn. Cod e Ann. § 55-50-504. A prerequisite to convicting a defendant for driving on a suspended license is that the defenda nt’s driver’s license

was lega lly suspended at the time of the alleged crime. See State v. Loden , 920 S.W.2d 261 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1995); see also

Tenn. Code. Ann. § 55-50-504.
In support of his argu ment that the sta te was required to

prove he receiv ed notice

of his driver’s license

suspensio n, the def

endant c ites State v. Michael Ray Swan , No. M2000-00539-CCA-R3-CD, Davidson County (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 27, 2001). In that case, the defendant’s driver’s license was suspended for his failure to pa y a traffic citation in another state. Subsequently, he was charged with and conv ic ted of driving on a suspended license. This court stated that unde

r Tenn. Co de Ann. § 5 5-50-502 (a)(9) , the Dep artment o f Safety had the autho

rity to suspend the de fe ndant’s driver’s license for his failure to pay the tra ffic citation if the department notified him of the proposed suspension. This court reversed the defendant’s conviction bec ause the state present ed no evid

ence at trial to show that the department had sent notice of the suspension to the defendant or that he received the notice

. Michael Ray Swan , slip op. at 5.-4-

We believe that the defendant’s reliance on Michael Ray Swan is misplaced. In the present case, the defendant’s certified driving recor d shows that his license was suspended under Tenn. Code Ann. § 55-12-1 15 for his failure to file proof of insurance upon conviction of driving on a suspended license. Thus, Tenn. Code Ann. § 55-50-50 2 and the s tate’s bu rden of p roof est ablished by this court’s analysis in Michael Ray Swan are ina pplicabl e. In add

ition, on the day of t

he offe nse in question, the defendant had appeared in court on another charge of drivingon a suspended license. Therefore, we believe the proof in the record shows that the defendant knew his driver’ s license had been suspended and conclude that he is not entitled to relief. II. RIGHT TO TR

AVEL Next, the defenda

nt conten ds that he

is not req uired to h ave a dr

iver’s li cense because

he has a constitutional right to travel. The state, citing State v. Booher , 978 S.W.2d 953 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1997), contendsthat this c ourt has a lready r esolved t his issue a nd deter mined tha t a state may require a motorist to have a valid driver’s license. We agree with the state.
In Booher , this court stated,
T he ability to d

rive a mo tor vehic le on a pub lic highwa y is nota fundamental “right .” Instead , it is a revocable “privile ge” that

is granted upon compliance with statutory licensing procedures.
Stateand loca

l governm

ents poss ess an inherent power, i.e. police power, to enact

reasonable legislation for the health, safety, welfare, morals, or convenience of the public. Thus, our legislature, through its police pow er, may prescribe conditions under which the “privilege” of opera

ting automo

biles on pu

blic high ways may be exercised.
Id. at 956 (citations omitted). The defendant claims, without any legal argumen t, that “the Booher ruling is wrong and should be set aside.” However, we see no re ason to re ject the r ationale in Booher and refuse to grant the defendant re lief. III. REQUEST T O DISMISS TRI AL COUNSEL Finally, the defendant con ten ds that the trial court erred by refusing to dismiss his court appointed attorney and reappoint counsel. The state contends that the trial court properly denied the defendant’s request to dismiss his attorney. We agree with the state

. Before trial, the defendant refused to represe nt himself pro se and asked the tria l court to appoint counsel. The trial court appointed the public

defende r to repr esent the defenda nt. At tria

l, the follow ing excha

nge occ urred be

tween the defenda nt and the trial cou rt:-5- THE COURT: All r

ight. All right, now Mr. Goodson, we’re in a trial here. You k eep rai sing your h and. Oka y. Do you h ave some problem? [Defendant]: Yes, I do. THE COURT: Okay. [Defendant]: I h ave seve

ral prob lems. THE COURT: Okay. [Defendant]: One of

them is with Mr. Kennedy, here. He don’t use the Constituti on or Bill of Ri ghts to def end me wit

h. We’ve got a conflict of interest and I can’t use h im. He’s a card carrying Communist

and I can’t use hi m becau se I’m no t subject t o these codes and [statutes]. . . .

. . . . THE COURT: Oka

y. All righ

t. Well, your motion to dismiss Mr. Kennedy is denied. You’ve not presented any eviden ce he’s a card carrying Communist and I’m not sure that that would

disqualif y him if he were. He is a licensed attorney. . . . After Trooper Taylor testified on direct exa mination, the following exchange occurred: [Defen dant]: Ye ah, can

I ask him so me questio ns?
THE CO URT : No, you c an not. You have a n attorne y who is representing you. [Defendant]: No, I don’t have an attorney. I fired him. I can’t use a card carrying Communist that’s got a bar license.
THE COURT: Well, I’m sorry. You’re represented by the onl y attorne y I’m goin g to reco gnize in t his Court.

. . . . THE COURT: Oka

y. Now, le

t me tell you somethin g, just one little thing, here. You keep this up and we will try this case. You will be removedfrom the c ourtroom if you keep disrupting the Court, and we-6- will go ah e ad with the trial. Do you understand this is a Court of Law? It’s not a circus. It’s not a tent rev ival. It’ s not anyth ing else but a Court of Law. We will have order. You requested

an appointed attorney. You got one. He has to be a licensed attorney and so that’s that. Now, Mr. Kennedy, do you have any questions for the officer?
MR. KENNEDY [to the defendant]: Do you have any questions you want me to

ask him?
THE COURT: Okay. If he wants to turn his back on yo u, Mr. Kennedy, that’s fine with the C o urt. Do you want to go ahead and ask this of

ficer a ny questio ns?
MR. KENNEDY: Arethere any questions that you want to know? I would ask that the record reflect that I am -- -- that he will not cooperate with me. So, okay. I have no questions, Your Honor.
The trial court ma

y, upon goo d cause s hown, per mit the withdrawal of an attorney appointed to represent an indigent defendant. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40- 14-205(a ). A def endant seeking to substitute counsel

has the burden of establishing to the satisfaction of the trial judge that (a) the representation being furnished by coun sel is ineffective, inadequate, and falls below the range of compet ency expected of defense couns el in criminal prosecutions, (b) the accused and appointed counsel h ave bec ome embr oiled in a

n irrec oncilabl e c onflic t, or (c) th

ere has been a c omplete b reakdown in communications between them.
Statev. Gilmore , 823 S.W.2d 566, 568-69 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1991) (footnotes omitted). However, the “fact th at the de fendant chose not to cooperate with competent appointed counsel d oes not en title him to the appointment of other counsel.” State v. McClennon , 669 S.W.2d 705, 707 (Tenn. Cr im. App. 1984). The trial court has wide discretion in matters regarding the appointment and relief of counsel, and its de cision wil l not be se t aside on appeal u nle ss the defendan t shows an abuse of discretion. Statev. Rubio , 746 S.W.2d 732, 737 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1987). The issue of whether a defendant is entitle d to substitu

te counse l comes within this discretion. Gilmore , 823 S.W.2d at 569.
Before trial, the defendant asked for and rec eived appointed counsel. During trial, the defendant explained that

he could n ot use his a

ppointed a

ttorney b ecause

his attorney was a “card carrying Communist.” We believe that the re cord ind icates th e defen dant woul d have re fused to coopera te with any appointed attorney licensed to practice law in this state. We conc lude that the trial cou rt did not a

buse its dis cretion

in refus ing to appo int new co unsel to the defen dant.-7-

Based on the foregoing and the record as a whole, w e affirm the judgment of the trial court.

________________________________ JOSEPH M. TIPTON, JUDGE