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55–598 PDF 2010

SHARING AND ANALYZING INFORMATION 

TO PREVENT TERRORISM 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

MARCH 24, 2010 

Serial No. 111–116 

Printed for the use of the Committee on the Judiciary 

( 

Available via the World Wide Web: http://judiciary.house.gov 

(II) 

COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY 

JOHN CONYERS, JR., Michigan, Chairman 

HOWARD L. BERMAN, California 

RICK BOUCHER, Virginia 

JERROLD NADLER, New York 

ROBERT C. ‘‘BOBBY’’ SCOTT, Virginia 

MELVIN L. WATT, North Carolina 

ZOE LOFGREN, California 

SHEILA JACKSON LEE, Texas 

MAXINE WATERS, California 

WILLIAM D. DELAHUNT, Massachusetts 

STEVE COHEN, Tennessee 

HENRY C. ‘‘HANK’’ JOHNSON, JR., 

Georgia 

PEDRO PIERLUISI, Puerto Rico 

MIKE QUIGLEY, Illinois 

JUDY CHU, California 

LUIS V. GUTIERREZ, Illinois 

TAMMY BALDWIN, Wisconsin 

CHARLES A. GONZALEZ, Texas 

ANTHONY D. WEINER, New York 

ADAM B. SCHIFF, California 

LINDA T. SA ́ NCHEZ, California 

DEBBIE WASSERMAN SCHULTZ, Florida 

DANIEL MAFFEI, New York 

[Vacant] 

LAMAR SMITH, Texas 

F. JAMES SENSENBRENNER, JR., 

Wisconsin 

HOWARD COBLE, North Carolina 

ELTON GALLEGLY, California 

BOB GOODLATTE, Virginia 

DANIEL E. LUNGREN, California 

DARRELL E. ISSA, California 

J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia 

STEVE KING, Iowa 

TRENT FRANKS, Arizona 

LOUIE GOHMERT, Texas 

JIM JORDAN, Ohio 

TED POE, Texas 

JASON CHAFFETZ, Utah 

TOM ROONEY, Florida 

GREGG HARPER, Mississippi 

PERRY APELBAUM, Majority Staff Director and Chief Counsel 

SEAN MCLAUGHLIN, Minority Chief of Staff and General Counsel 

(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

MARCH 24, 2010 

Page 

OPENING STATEMENTS 

The Honorable John Conyers, Jr., a Representative in Congress from the 

State of Michigan, and Chairman, Committee on the Judiciary ..................... 1 

The Honorable Lamar Smith, a Representative in Congress from the State 

of Texas, and Ranking Member, Committee on the Judiciary ......................... 2 

The Honorable Daniel E. Lungren, a Representative in Congress from the 

State of California, and Member, Committee on the Judiciary ....................... 4 

The Honorable Darrell E. Issa, a Representative in Congress from the State 

of California, and Member, Committee on the Judiciary ................................. 6 

The Honorable Steve King, a Representative in Congress from the State 

of Iowa, and Member, Committee on the Judiciary .......................................... 7 

The Honorable Ted Poe, a Representative in Congress from the State of 

Texas, and Member, Committee on the Judiciary ............................................. 8 

The Honorable Tom Rooney, a Representative in Congress from the State 

of Florida, and Member, Committee on the Judiciary ...................................... 9 

WITNESSES 

Mr. Russell Travers, Deputy Director for Information Sharing and Knowledge 

Development, National Counterterrorism Center 

Oral Testimony ..................................................................................................... 11 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 14 

Mr. Timothy J. Healy, Director, Terrorist Screening Center, Federal Bureau 

of Investigation 

Oral Testimony ..................................................................................................... 17 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 20 

Ms. Patricia Cogswell, Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary, Office of Policy, 

Department of Homeland Security 

Oral Testimony ..................................................................................................... 27 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 29 

The Honorable Patrick F. Kennedy, Under Secretary for Management, U.S. 

Department of State 

Oral Testimony ..................................................................................................... 44 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 47 

APPENDIX 

Material Submitted for the Hearing Record .......................................................... 75 

(1) 

SHARING AND ANALYZING INFORMATION 

TO PREVENT TERRORISM 

WEDNESDAY, MARCH 24, 2010 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 

COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY, 

Washington, DC. 

The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:15 a.m., in room 

2141, Rayburn House Office Building, the Honorable John Conyers, 

Jr. (Chairman of the Committee) presiding. 

Present: Representatives Conyers, Nadler, Scott, Watt, Jackson 

Lee, Delahunt, Pierluisi, Quigley, Chu, Schiff, Smith, Coble, Goodlatte, Lungren, Issa, King, Franks, Gohmert, Jordan, Poe, and Rooney. 

Staff Present: (Majority) Perry Apelbaum, Staff Director and 

Chief Counsel; Aaron Hiller, Counsel; Renata Strause, Staff Assistant; (Minority) Andrea Loving, Counsel; and Caroline Lynch, Counsel. 

Mr. CONYERS. Good morning, ladies and gentlemen. Someone 

said are we going to start anytime soon? And I know Dan Lungren’s voice when I hear it. So let’s begin. 

We are having an oversight hearing on ‘‘Sharing and Analyzing 

Information to Prevent Terrorism.’’ And I am privileged that this 

discussion could arise in the Judiciary Committee. The 9/11 attacks, the Fort Hood shootings, and the attempt to destroy Flight 

253 headed for Detroit this past Christmas all reveal limits of our 

government’s ability to use information to stop terrorist attacks. 

These are longstanding issues that predate both the Obama and 

Bush administrations. So today we have a valuable opportunity to 

explore what the government has done and what it is doing and 

what it needs to do to put these problems in perspective and to 

keep everyone in this country as safe as possible. 

Now, it is no secret that the Administration has faced a series 

of political criticisms in the wake of the attempted Christmas Day 

airplane bombing in Detroit because FBI agents gave Miranda 

warnings during their interrogation of the Flight 253 suspect. One 

of our Members in the other body called it irresponsible and dangerous. Another claims that there will be dire consequences. 

Now, in my view, these assertions ignore the reality the suspect 

was first questioned without Miranda warnings and gave up important information. Some criticisms ignore the fact that the Miranda 

warnings were not given until after the suspect had stopped talking of his own accord. Some ignore the fact that the suspect has 

2 

continued to cooperate and provide valuable information after receiving the Miranda warnings. 

They ignore the fact that under the prior Administration Miranda warnings were read to the so-called shoe bomber Richard 

Reid on four separate occasions. According to reports, the first 

warning was given 5 minutes after he was taken into custody. The 

same is the case with many complaints we hear now about trying 

terror cases in Federal court. Some ignore the fact that the prior 

Administration tried numerous terrorism cases in Federal court 

without major incident and pretty good success. It also is notable 

that in the recent conviction in the Federal court of David Coleman 

Headley for his role in the Mumbai Hotel attacks, Headley reportedly provided extensive intelligence after being charged and is now 

serving a life sentence. 

There is no issue that we face as a Nation that is more challenging than getting the balance right on terrorism. While none of 

us can predict the future, I can tell you our constitutional system 

of checks and balances has served our Nation well for more than 

230 years and has been a model for many nations around the 

world. As a matter of fact, some of us have gone to the countries 

that were trying to emulate our constitutional and democratic system of government. Now, if we follow that model, I believe we can 

and will defeat terrorists and protect our citizens’ liberties. I suppose that is, for my purposes, ladies and gentlemen, the purpose 

of the hearing. How do we protect our citizens and still keep our 

liberties? So in that spirit, some questions that I hope the distinguished national security professionals here today will address. 

In early January, the President issued a series of written directives to the executive branch agencies involved in national security. 

He described this memo as corrective additions and demanded 

monthly progress reports on their implementation. I hope some of 

our witnesses can update us as well on the progress of these corrective actions. Second, it seems that one of the biggest intelligence 

challenges we face is learning to deal with the larger volumes of 

information that we collect and developing methods to separate the 

wheat from the chaff. 

Do you think there is a point at which we are collecting so much 

information that we are actually making it harder to identify and 

separate out the action that really matters? Is there such a thing 

as collecting too much information? And, finally, we have become 

very expert here in figuring out what went wrong in a particular 

instance and fixing those gaps, but I think we have a broader view 

here. 

After 9/11, we improved our information sharing, and now after 

Flight 253, we will have new analysis teams and better systems to 

search our databases. I would like to know what you as our experts 

and guests here this morning are doing beyond this fighting the 

last war kind of mentality. What are we doing now to identify 

other possible gaps that may be existing in our security systems? 

And so I welcome you here this morning. And I would like to yield 

to my friend, Lamar Smith of Texas. 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab attempted to blow up Northwest 

Flight 253 on its way to Detroit on Christmas Day. Thankfully, his 

3 

attempt was thwarted and hundreds of innocent lives were spared. 

After failing in his attempt to murder 288 innocent Americans, 

Abdulmutallab was questioned for less than an hour and then 

given the right to remain silent. He then stopped talking to investigators for the next 4 weeks. The Administration brushes off criticism about its decision to Mirandize Abdulmutallab because he has 

since provided useful intelligence to investigators. But what vital 

intelligence was missed because of his 4 weeks of silence? Was a 

plea bargain for reduced sentence necessary to get information, and 

what questions did his lawyers refuse to let him answer? 

At the very least, Abdulmutallab’s month of silence gave his coconspirators time to cover their tracks. So the Obama administration forfeited an opportunity to obtain information inform that 

might have identified terrorists and prevented future attacks. That 

neither the President nor his national security advisors supported 

treating Abdulmutallab as an enemy combatant is worrisome. As 

the President has admitted under his new policies, the CIA has ‘‘a 

harder job.’’ The President’s policies make it easier for terrorists to 

get constitutional rights and harder for intelligence officials to keep 

America safe. Abdulmutallab should never have been allowed to 

board the plane to Detroit. Despite warnings from Abdulmutallab’s 

father about his son’s possible Muslim radicalization, the U.S. Visa 

he had been issued in 2008 was neither identified nor revoked. 

Mr. Chairman, I want to call a piece of legislation to your attention because it goes to the future, as you just were suggesting a 

minute ago. Earlier this month, I introduced legislation designated 

to help make the visa process more secure. H.R. 4758, the Secure 

Visas Act, requires placement of visa security units at U.S. Consular posts in high risk countries such as Algeria, Lebanon, and 

Syria. The placement of visa security units at U.S. consular posts 

will help address lapses in the current system and prevent terrorists from gaining access to the United States. H.R. 4758 explicitly 

grants the Department of Homeland Security Secretary the authority to revoke a visa and to delegate that authority to others in the 

agency. These are commonsense steps to help ensure that no one 

who wants to do us harm is able to enter and stay in the United 

States. 

The President says that we are at war with terrorist groups, but 

many of the Administration’s decisions have actually put the American people at greater risk. First, trying to close a terrorist detention facility at Guantanamo Bay has not made America safer. The 

Pentagon has reported that 20 percent of released Gitmo terrorists 

have returned to plotting attacks against Americans. Two former 

Gitmo detainees in Yemen are suspected of organizing the Christmas Day plot. Second, the Administration’s decision to try terrorists in Federal civilian court continues the trend of weakening national security. 

Bringing terrorists into the criminal justice system limits our 

ability to interrogate them and get intelligence that might prevent 

attacks and save lives. Abdulmutallab didn’t simply rob a convenient store. He tried to blow up a plane and kill nearly 300 innocent 

civilians. This was an act of war and should be treated as such. 

The American people agree. Sixty-seven percent of Americans favor 

military tribunals to try terror suspects. 

4 

And, third, the Obama administration released highly sensitive 

memos detailing interrogation tactics used against terrorists. The 

formerly classified Office of Legal Counsel memos gave terrorists a 

how-to manual on how to resist interrogation tactics. These are just 

a few of the ways the Administration has weakened our national 

security. 

Richard Cohen, a very liberal columnist, recently wrote in The 

Washington Post that ‘‘There is almost nothing the Obama administration does regarding terrorism that makes me feel safer.’’ Last 

month, national security officials warned that another terrorist attack is certain within the next 3 to 6 months. But we don’t need 

national security officials to predict attacks. We need them to prevent attacks. That means we need to apprehend and interrogate 

terrorists. 

Many believe that the war on terror is over and that the threat 

from al Qaeda and other terrorist groups is nothing more than a 

vague memory from 9 years ago. The Christmas Day bombing attempt is proof that the war on terror continues and that radical 

jihadists are as committed as ever to killing Americans. The Administration must be equally committed to stopping them. The 

time for complacency is over. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I yield back. 

Mr. CONYERS. Thanks, Lamar. 

I now recognize Dan Lungren, the senior former Attorney General of the largest State in the union. 

Mr. LUNGREN. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I understand how serious the issues are that are before us today. I respect 

the professionals that are here before us. But I would be less than 

honest if I did not say that I have profound differences with the 

approach this Administration has taken in a number of different 

areas. I understand the importance of things such as the Miranda 

warnings. I recall when I had the opportunity to personally argue 

a case before the U.S. Supreme Court on an essential concept, what 

is the constitutional definition of reasonable doubt given to juries 

in criminal cases, seemingly an elementary question but one that 

caused the court to grant a case consideration from two states in 

the union, my state being one of them. 

At the same time, I have always understood the distinction between a criminal justice matter and a matter of national security 

and particularly a matter of national security based on a terrorist 

threat. And what we have to do is somehow deal with that area 

where they come into contact, and the question therefore is a serious one, whether it is appropriate for us to take those concepts, 

some would say that are bedrock in our criminal justice system, 

and somehow place them over into the national security arena, particularly in the area of terrorism. 

The 9/11 Commission told us that one of the major criticisms of 

our actions before 9/11 was our failure to connect the dots, and 

there were those that suggested that part of that was our confusion 

in that area of nexus between the criminal justice system and the 

national security system. In responding to that, we attempted to 

make changes. I don’t know anybody who believes what we did in 

responding to the threat during the Christmas period by this particular bomber—anybody thinks it was sufficient. 

5 

Mr. Leitner has told us that Mr. Abdulmutallab should not have 

stepped on the plane, the counterterrorism system failed. And I 

told the President we are determined to do better. So our question 

is how do we do better? 

And one of the areas I would I guess directly disagree with the 

Chairman, with all due respect, is the idea that somehow 

Mirandizing people makes it more likely that they are going to 

speak to us than if they are not Mirandized, almost as if there is 

some psychological impact on people that once we grant them their 

Miranda rights, they feel obligated to tell us something. In fact, in 

law enforcement circles, while we know we are required to doing 

Mirandizing, we recognize that oftentimes that interferes with our 

ability to gain useful information, but we believe that is acceptable 

under our Constitution. 

But I would suggest that we are in dangerous territory if we 

blithely transfer the same concept of Miranda warnings that the 

Supreme Court has put forward into the area of suspected terrorists. One of the things that bothers me, and I think bothers everybody, is why did we not connect the dots here, the information that 

was there, a father that comes to an American entity and says, I 

suspect my son may have fallen under the influence of terrorist 

groups in Yemen. 

Somehow that doesn’t get through the system and I know we are 

going to hear some in detail on that. But in response to that, I have 

been informed that while the previous Administration instructed 

the government to identify and collect information on individuals 

‘‘appropriately suspected,’’ or ‘‘reasonably suspected’’ of terrorist 

connections, or for whom there was an articulate and reasonable 

basis for suspicion, that we now have adopted a new standard that 

says this: To meet the reasonable suspicion standard, the nominator, based on the totality of circumstances, must rely on 

articulable intelligence, or information, which taken together with 

rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant a determination that an individual is known or suspected to be or have 

been knowingly engaged in conduct constituting in preparation for, 

in aid of, or related to terrorism or terrorist activities. 

And I will inquire of the four of you how you believe that that 

gets us where we need to go, that somehow that makes it more rational and somehow with that standard that is going to get the information flow unclogged as it was clogged in the case that we are 

talking about. 

I would argue that that kind of legalistic, almost CYA language, 

is going to make it more difficult. And if I am the person involved 

in the system and I am told that is the standard to which I will 

be held, and if I fail that standard, I will be disciplined or perhaps 

punished, how that is going to encourage people in the Intelligence 

Community to do the kind of creative thinking and thinking out of 

the box that is necessary to protect this country so that we don’t 

come here after another incident that may be successful and say, 

you know, we created a wall that we didn’t intend to create that 

somehow mandated that our people were not creative in their 

thinking and did not think out of the box and, therefore, because 

the bad guys thought out of the box, we have lost lives. 

I thank the Chairman for the time. 

6 

Mr. CONYERS. Thank you very much. 

I now turn to Darrell Issa, who is not only the Ranking Member 

on Government Reform, but served with distinction on the Intelligence Committee itself. 

Mr. ISSA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And I want to associate myself in a broad sense with all of you. 

I think today’s hearing for all of us who serve on this Committee 

and other Committees is the beginning of a process of reevaluating 

the work we have done over the last 9 years. I am personally a civil 

libertarian, as the Chairman knows. I very much believe that Miranda is an important right of individuals against self-incrimination. However, when we choose areas of specific protection, not the 

battlefield, where as an Army lieutenant I was never given a copy 

of Miranda to read to somebody that if I were so fortunate as to 

find them on the battlefield, those are opportunities in which investigations begin well afterwards. But our domestic ports of entry 

are, by definition, controlled environments in which the scenario 

and the plan of what to do if someone is found entering or exiting 

with a plan to bomb or in some other way commit a terrorist act 

is a scenario we can plan and predict. 

There is no question that the FBI should have known what they 

were going to do if a man with explosives in his pants was found 

and whether or not the best course of action was to Mirandize him, 

as Mr. Lungren said, in the hope that that somehow would cause 

him to tell us more or not Mirandize him because ultimately they 

had what they needed in order to effectively prosecute him for one 

or more crimes, while at the same time, they had no idea who the 

other terrorist conspirators could be. 

I think that is a point that Government Oversight and Reform 

will continue to look at. The question of in controlled space, do we 

really have the scenarios, are they well thought out, and are they 

leading to the best outcome from prosecution standpoint when appropriate but clearly from a standpoint of safety of American travelers and the American people overall? On that, I believe we can 

all agree there was a failure. Additionally, I happen to be an Arab 

American, and so I want to associate myself broadly with the fact 

Arab Americans have been the victims of a loss of civil liberties. 

Those who were innocent Americans, including my poor nonArab 

wife, who just happens to be cursed with the last name Issa, Arabic 

for Jesus, finds herself on a No-Fly List. I am equally concerned 

that the No-Fly List can somehow get Katherine Issa onto it and 

have to be taken off, while somebody’s whose own father says he 

is going to try to commit a crime, he is a terrorist, he is an extremist, don’t let him in, somehow does not rise to the level in any one 

of the many cables alone nor are the cables connected in a way that 

will lead to that outcome. 

I am deeply concerned because I have been reluctantly supporting legislation that often goes beyond my comfort level including some elements of the PATRIOT Act, and yet we don’t seem to 

have gotten what we were promised. Again, beyond the scope of 

just this Committee, but well within the scope of all of us as people 

who swore allegiance to the Constitution. 

Last, as the Chairman was kind to mention, in my service on the 

select Select Intelligence Committee and now my membership as 

7 

the Ranking Member of Government Oversight, we have invested 

countless—hundreds and hundreds of billions of dollars in creating 

databases that can, in fact, serve us to prevent stovepiping. The excuse that the dots were not connected this time is a self-inflicted 

wound, not created by money—or not prevented by lack of money 

and certainly not by lack of a directive from all of us on the dais 

and all of the people in the last Administration that we connect the 

dots. 

I don’t think it is a secret by any means that our Intelligence 

Community can take disparate information, pieces and bits of 

words, put them together, and with analysis, sometimes automated, sometimes by talented human beings, reach a conclusion 

that there is a threat. We do that when we look outward. 

Today, with the indulgence of the Chairman, I am going to task 

the individuals here to explain to us in open session why we don’t 

turn that same analysis inward so that disparate cables, as we are 

being told, each one not being sufficient to cause a triggering of the 

No-Fly List, were not connected by some sort of software which we 

certainly have paid for, we certainly own, and we certainly believe 

failed us on Christmas Day. 

Mr. Chairman I thank you for your indulgence and yield back. 

Mr. CONYERS. Thank you, Darrell. 

I now recognize Steve King of Iowa, who serves in addition to our 

Committee on Small Business and Agriculture as well. 

Mr. KING. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I appreciate this hearing and the witnesses coming before this 

panel today. And as I listened to the opening statements of yours 

and Ranking Member Smith and others that have discussed this 

issue, it comes back to me that we had a shoe bomber and that 

happened years ago. That was the heads-up for something like this. 

And when we set up our security system, the Department of Homeland Security and all of the pieces of Federal legislation that put 

the tools in place so that we could prevent terrorists from hijacking 

airplanes, set up the filters as much as we could, this is one of the 

things that we had in mind. 

I mean it isn’t a new tactic. It was a tactic that had already been 

used when this—when these parameters were set up, when the 

people that are in charge in the departments are thinking about 

what could happen bad to the United States, this had to be a model 

of no more shoe bombers. I mean, I have taken my shoes off so 

many times I know that is model. And yet the dots weren’t connected and I can’t understand why the device itself wasn’t discovered, and that is a problem. That is a serious problem on how we 

would actually be able to identify individuals getting on airplanes 

that are might have devices like that. 

So our heads up that is back through the visa program and the 

visa security program, and when I think about the one reason that 

was given, one of several, that there was—that the exact spelling 

of his name didn’t exactly match up; so therefore they believed that 

there wasn’t a visa that had been issued to—I always have to look 

that up—Abdulmutallab—I have got Abdul Farouk Abdulmutallab, 

and it takes a little practice. But I have to go back and I look at 

that and I think all right, that is understandable if you are matching up paper records or if you are putting a name in quotes and 

8 

sending it off in a software search, but when I do that on a Google 

page, it comes up and says ‘‘didn’t you mean’’ and it will give me 

an alternative spelling. 

One of the things I am going to be interested in now, do we have 

at least a Google software so we could resolve that problem? And 

I am also interested in how it was that his father himself who said 

my son has disappeared and I believe that he has gone over to the 

other side and been radicalized, that should have been powerful 

enough for there to be individual attention to follow it. 

And the third thing would be he was a high-ranking Nigerian official who had credibility. It wasn’t just someone off the street and 

it wasn’t just a lineup of many cases. This was a case that should 

have had a red flag on it in several different ways. And then I am 

also interested in the difference in the philosophy of how we are 

going to go forward and fight their global war on terror. The philosophy of it is a law enforcement action, it has been clear that this 

Administration has put down marker after marker after marker 

that they believe it is law enforcement and not a war. And I contemplate what we do when we have terrorists that fit a whole series of different kinds of definitions. 

You could have a terrorist that was born, raised, bred, and 

trained and committed or attempted to commit an act against 

American interests in a foreign country and never set foot in the 

United States. You could go clear to the other side, a born, raised, 

bred and trained American terrorist who never set foot outside the 

United States but still was radicalized and still was part of that 

same network. 

And I think I could give you about six other definitions that fit 

in between those two extremes. Yet they are all part of the same 

movement that is attacking the United States, and we can’t do this 

as just a law enforcement endeavor and we can’t have terrorists 

that are committing similar acts that fit different categories of terrorism that go into a different system in our justice. We have got 

to look at this as a war and we have got to put the enemies we 

are fighting in the same category. 

So I am going to suggest that as we go through this discussion 

today, we consider an idea that I generated some months ago, and 

that is the idea of establishing a new set of laws for our terrorists 

and to adjudicate them immediately as a terrorist, and not read 

them their Miranda rights, and let them be subjected to the 

amount of interrogation necessary to protect the American people, 

try them all in a military court, get them all off of U.S. soil and 

out of the hands of our Federal judges as quickly as we can so that 

we can effectively fight this war. 

Those are the parameters that I view this as I listen to this discussion. I am looking forward to the testimony of the witnesses. 

And Mr. Chairman I appreciate your indulgence and I yield back 

the balance of my time. 

Mr. CONYERS. Thank you, Steve. 

I now turn to Judge Ted Poe of Texas. He serves on Foreign Affairs and on both the Crime and Immigration Subcommittees. 

Mr. POE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

With all of the U.S. resources and money and intelligence and information, our security system in this incident boils down to the 

9 

fact that we had to rely on an individual from the Netherlands who 

saw the underwear bomber doing something he shouldn’t be doing, 

like setting his pants on fire and jump across several other people 

in an airplane to tackle him and then with the aid of other passengers, he was subdued. But for that person from the Netherlands, I believe we would have had a tragedy. I don’t think that 

is a good security system that we have to rely on passengers to be 

our hope for defense of preventing airplanes from being blown up. 

Everybody wants to say somebody else is at fault. But the bottom 

line is there is information available and it wasn’t used. We have 

a watchlist. We have a No-Fly List. And it seems like those are just 

lists that don’t do anything except keep certain people from not flying. And the watchlist with the thousands and thousands of other 

people, I guess we are just watching those folks. I think we need 

to do some obvious things and that is get our house in order and 

secure the system so that we keep outlaws from getting on our airplanes. 

And it starts all the way back to the embassy that gets information from Daddy that this guy is a threat to the United States. A 

lot of people fell down on their jobs but some day somebody is going 

to die because people don’t share information and pass information 

on. So I think excuses, there are no excuses for why the system 

fails. We cannot let it fail. Otherwise we will have tragedy and 

maybe we need to rethink some of the ways that we talk to folks 

who show up at airports. I think the Israelis have set up a model 

that has been quite successful for their nation. 

In any event, we ought to at least talk to them about how they 

are able to be so successful and maybe we should adopt their procedures in some of our airports. But the American people deserve 

better. They deserve better from a Nation that is supposed to be 

the world’s superpower, and they deserve better than to expect that 

some passenger from the Netherlands is going to save us all from 

disaster. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back. 

Mr. CONYERS. Thank you. Tim Rooney, did you have a comment? 

The gentleman from Florida is recognized. 

Mr. ROONEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It is Tom Rooney but 

that is okay. I am a new guy. 

Mr. Chairman, it has been almost 9 years since the attacks of 

September 11, 2001, and I clearly remember in the days following 

the attacks of 9/11 we committed as a Nation to never allow such 

a failure of intelligence ever to happen again. I clearly remember 

the formulation and the makeup of why and what Homeland Security was going to be, that we would never have a communications 

breakdown again between agencies of the Federal Government so 

that Americans could feel safer, that the communications between 

the various agencies would be more fluid. I wasn’t sure how creating a new agency was going to do that, but of course had the confidence in our government to be able to figure that out for me as 

a regular constituent at that time and to keep us safe. 

And we have, as the Chairman said, over the last 9 years been 

kept safe. But in the last year there has been some serious flags 

that have been raised as you have heard in the various opening 

statements so far. Fort Hood, Texas, where I was formerly staVerDate Aug 31 2005 10:30 Nov 05, 2010 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00013 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 H:\WORK\FULL\032410\55598.000 HJUD1 PsN: 55598
10 

tioned, we came to know a guy named Major Nidal Hasan, who we 

have since come to know as a captain was a very substandard 

Army officer who was communicating with people that should have 

raised red flags. We have also come to know that these communications separate from his officer evaluation reports were known by 

people in the Intelligence Agency and may or may not have been 

shared with the Department of Defense or the Department of 

Army. 

And my immediate question after that is how after 9/11 with 

Homeland Security and everything that we talked about, that these 

agencies would communicate better, how does Intelligence Agency 

not communicate with the Department of Defense and say one of 

your own is talking with people, Awlaki, who has been in communications with 9/11 pilots, and as we will come to see, 

Abdulmutallab himself. Then we see, of course, what we are here 

today to talk about and that is the communications failures leading 

up to the attack on Christmas. 

The President said that after this attempt by the so-called underwear bomber that there was a mix of human and system failures 

that contributed to this potential catastrophic breach of security. I 

kind of disagree with that. I think that it was not potential catastrophic. I think it was catastrophic when it comes to you and your 

jobs. I think there can be nothing more discomforting to the American people to know that over the last year, we have had these two 

breaches of security, and I think that they are catastrophic and 

hopefully that is one of the things that we can try to figure out 

here today. 

But my questions are where is the disconnect? We have heard 

before by other opening statements, where are the dots not connected? And I have a chart to discuss with you later during Q&A, 

but when and where are we allowed to do and not to do for the 

sake of national security? What are we allowed to do? And that 

goes with, as we said, Miranda. What constitutional protections 

come to these people? And then juxtapose that to what the American people expect of us. 

I have seen the databases. I have seen the Visa VIPER, the 

TIDE, the Selectee, the No-Fly List, who qualifies, who doesn’t 

qualify, what standard of proof is needed to put somebody on these 

lists. It is very confusing. And it seems like a lot of people have 

their fingers in this game. And again, I am just not sure that that 

was the purpose after 9/11. The sale that was made to the American people that you would be kept safe by a more streamlined system, it doesn’t seem that way to me. As was said I am also very 

concerned about the fact that Abdulmutallab’s name was misspelled and that somehow bounced him out of these databases as 

somebody to keep an eye on. Reports that the NSA reportedly 

intercepted communications between Awlaki and Abdulmutallab. 

Again, where were the dots there? Even if the intelligence officials 

didn’t know his full name, how much did they know? What about 

his dad, a doctor in Yemen, who Petraeus said to us on the Armed 

Services Committee just last year that Yemen is a place we need 

to seriously look at and a doctor—and I imagine the people in 

Yemen aren’t very friendly to the people of the United States. 

11 

So if a guy goes to the U.S. embassy and he is a doctor and he 

makes a complaints about his son wanting to blow up—he is taking 

some risk there I would imagine; so it probably should be taken seriously. 

And I don’t mean to disparage our Intelligence Community or 

anybody on this panel. I understand you guys have a very difficult 

job. I understand that you are trying to do that job and it is not 

easy. But we have an obligation, as you know, to the American people so that another Christmas Day or another Nidal Hasan does 

not happen. So being 9 years after 9/11, I personally, as many 

members on this panel, would love to know how the dots are connected and whether or not it is streamlined enough and if we can 

and should make it better. 

I yield back Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. CONYERS. Thanks Tom. I should have mentioned that you 

were also a military prosecutor in your other career. 

Mr. ROONEY. I was actually good at that job, sir. Thank you for 

mentioning it. 

Mr. CONYERS. You underestimate how highly we think of you 

here in 111th Congress. 

Mr. ROONEY. I can feel it. Thank you, sir. 

Mr. CONYERS. Bill Delahunt? Oh, he is not here. Bob Goodlatte, 

do have you a comment? 

Well, we want to welcome all of our witnesses here today. Patrick 

Kennedy, Patricia Cogswell, Timothy Healy. We will start with 

Russ Travers, Deputy Director for Information Sharing and Knowledge Development for the National Counter Terrorism Center. He 

has been in the job since 2003 and is in charge of TIDE Terrorism 

Database and prior to that, he worked in the Defense Intelligence 

Agency and Army intelligence for 25 years. 

All of your statements will be included in the record and we welcome your testimony. 

TESTIMONY OF RUSSELL TRAVERS, DEPUTY DIRECTOR FOR 

INFORMATION SHARING AND KNOWLEDGE DEVELOPMENT, 

NATIONAL COUNTERTERRORISM CENTER 

Mr. TRAVERS. Chairman Conyers, Congressman Smith, Members 

of the Committee, thanks very much. It is a pleasure to be here. 

Mr. CONYERS. Pull your mic up closer. 

Mr. TRAVERS. My written statement is going to detail NCTC’s 

role in support of watchlisting and specifically focuses on the attempted attack on Christmas Day. At your staff’s request, I am 

going to expand on that statement and use my opening remarks to 

address the somewhat broader context that a number of you have 

addressed in your statements. 

I will begin by distinguishing 12/25 issues from those of 9/11, and 

then I am going to talk specifically about what NCTC has been 

doing since Christmas. First, the issues raised by 12/25 were not, 

in any way, like those of 9/11. It was not a failure to share information. The key pieces of intelligence related to 12/25 were broadly 

available across the Intelligence Community and that is important. 

Why? Because it highlights the fact that simply sharing information does not guarantee accurate intelligence analysis. In that 

sense, information sharing is necessary but it is certainly not suffiVerDate Aug 31 2005 10:30 Nov 05, 2010 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00015 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 H:\WORK\FULL\032410\55598.000 HJUD1 PsN: 55598
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cient. I would also note as a number of you have mentioned information sharing has expanded dramatically since 9/11. 

There are difficult legal policy, privacy issues that remain. I 

would be happy to talk about those in the Q&A if you would like. 

12/25 was also not—did not call into question the basic 

watchlisting architecture that has existed since 2003. It is complicated. I absolutely agree with that. I think it is necessary, 

though. That architecture that was designed in 2003 was intended 

to ensure that all screeners had the benefit of any information collected by any collector in the United States Government. That was 

very different than it was before 9/11. 

And in that regard I think we succeeded. In that regard I think, 

again, we have enhanced information sharing. It is certainly not 

perfect. It is a names-based system, and 12/25 highlighted a number of seams that my colleagues and I will discuss. For instance, 

standards as to who gets on a watchlist. We could lower that bar. 

If we do so, it has significant balance issues. How big do you want 

the list to get, and what are the associated tradeoffs? Long lines, 

false positives, and so forth. And we are working through those balance issues. So what did fail on Christmas Day? And here I think 

the bumper sticker description is that we failed to ‘‘connect the 

dots.’’ But what does that actually mean? 

Personally I do not believe it is a good metaphor. It conjures up 

the notion of the puzzle that our preschool kids use. You have got 

a sea of dots. They are numbered from 1 to 29. You follow the line 

and you get a duck or in our case you get a terrorist plot. Intelligence has never worked that way and it never will. You do have 

a sea of dots. They aren’t numbered. Lots of them are wrong. Many 

others are ambiguous or contradictory, and still others are just innocuous. You just don’t know a priori which ones are important, 

and that was the problem with 12/25. 

Father comes into the embassy in Abuja. His son is involved with 

extremists in Yemen, as a number of you have noted. That given 

the standards of the time doesn’t come close to getting him 

watchlisted. It does put him on the screen. It doesn’t get him 

watchlisted. There was one other piece of information that was out 

there. It was in the noise. On a daily basis the terrorism intelligence traffic includes something like 10,000 names every day. 

In this case we had a partial name, no last name, differently 

spelled than the name that we got from the father, and that is 

where we failed. We did not connect those two pieces of information, and that is what we are working very hard to do better in the 

future. 

The question I think is how do we do a better job of exploiting 

the information that is down in the noise? Is all of that background 

information in the sea of data that we confront? Conceptually, if 

you envision that sea of dots, what we are trying to do is lower the 

bar so there is less information that we are not able to exploit 

given the resource and time constraints under which we operate. 

Let me give you three initiatives that we are focused on at NCTC. 

First, a presidential directive, we are establishing a record enhancement capability for our terrorist identities database, and that, 

in effect, is improving our ability to build a fuller dossier on indiVerDate Aug 31 2005 10:30 Nov 05, 2010 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00016 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 H:\WORK\FULL\032410\55598.000 HJUD1 PsN: 55598
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viduals that are nominated to the National Counterterrorism Center. 

Secondly, NCTC has also fenced off about 40 individuals into 

what we call pursuit teams and these individuals have been relieved of writing intelligence analysis. What they are doing is focusing on data points of potential interest and they are charged with 

following them through until resolved. 

Is this an important piece of information or is it not? And, third, 

we are continuing to focus on the basic data access, technical infrastructure and tools that are necessary to help find what we call 

‘‘unknown unknowns.’’ In effect, to help us find linkages between 

dots when we just don’t know a priori that there is any linkage 

there. A very complicated problem. 

In sum, Mr. Chairman, NCTC has been working very closely 

with all our interagency partners to try to rectify the problems 

identified by 12/25, and certainly I look forward to answering any 

questions you may have thank you. 

Mr. CONYERS. Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Travers follows:] 

14 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF RUSSEL TRAVERS


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TESTIMONY OF TIMOTHY J. HEALY, DIRECTOR, TERRORIST 

SCREENING CENTER, FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION 

Mr. CONYERS. Timothy Healy is the director of The Terrorist 

Screening Center at the FBI. And that group is responsible for the 

maintenance of terrorist watchlist including the No-Fly List. He 

has been with the FBI for 25 years and helped create the Terrorist 


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Screening Center. He has received the Director’s Award for outstanding work in his responsibilities. 

We welcome you here this morning. 

Mr. HEALY. Chairman Conyers, Ranking Member Smith, Members of the Committee, thank you for the opportunity to talk about 

the Terrorist Screening Center and its role in the interagency 

watchlisting process. 

The attempted terrorist attack on Northwest Flight 253 on 

Christmas Day highlights the ever-present threat to our homeland. 

Over the past 7 years, the TSC has played a vital role in its fight 

against terrorism by integrating the terrorist information from the 

law enforcement intelligence community into a single database 

known as the Terrorist Screening Center database, the TSDB, or 

the terrorist watchlist. 

Following Christmas Day, the attempted attack provided an increased intensive scrutiny that has been placed on the requirements to nominate individuals to the watchlist, particularly the No 

Fly and Selectee list, which are subsets to TSDB. These requirements or standards have evolved over time based on the experience 

of the watchlisting community and the issuance of additional presidential directives. Throughout this process, the TSC has remained 

committed to protecting the American people while simultaneously 

protecting privacy and safeguarding civil liberties. 

As our efforts have evolved in response to new threats and intelligence, your support has been vital. Let me tell you about the 

watchlisting process, but understand the Terrorist Screening Center, the watchlisting process is half of it. We work the watchlisting 

process to get names out to the screeners. We also—when we encounter the terrorists, we coordinate the operational response with 

the FBI. But with regard to the watchlisting process, it is best described as a watchlisting enterprise that requires the collaboration 

between the Intelligence Community, the FBI, NCTC, and TSC. 

The NCTC relies upon information provided by the intelligence 

and law enforcement community. The TSC relies upon information 

that NCTC provides us where they analyze and provide accurate 

and credible information and the screening community relies on 

the TSC to manage the information and efficiently export it to their 

screening systems. Once an onerous suspected terrorist has been 

identified and included in the TSDB, the TSC ensures the timely 

dissemination of that terrorist identity data to our screening partners. The utility of the watchlisting process is greatest when the 

information is efficiently disseminated to those who could use it 

most. 

TSC has subject matter experts who are composed of experienced 

analysts and from designated agency representatives who review 

nominations to determine if they meet the criteria for inclusion 

into the screening systems. Four major U.S. Government systems 

support the TSC. The Departments of State, Consular Lookout and 

support systems are CLASS, and that is for passports and visa 

screening; the Department of Homeland Security tech system for 

border and port entry screening; the No Fly Selectee list used by 

the Transportation Security Administration for air passenger 

screening; and the FBI’s National Crime Information Center of 

19 

known or suspected terrorist file for domestic law enforcement encounters. 

The criteria for inclusion into each one of these systems is tailored to its mission, its legal authorities, its information technology 

requirements for each particular agency. Before Christmas Day, 

the TSC had not received a nomination for Umar Farouk 

Abdulmutallab and as a result, he was not watchlisted. Following 

the attempted attack, the President issued a directive for the TSC 

to review all facts surrounding this incident. As a result, the TSC 

was given two basic instructions. The first was to conduct a thorough review of the TSDB to determine the current visa status of 

all known or suspected terrorists beginning with the No-Fly List, 

and that process has been complete. 

The second was to develop recommendations on whether adjustments are needed to the watchlisting nomination criteria, including 

the biographical and derogatory information for inclusion into 

TIDE and the TSDB as well as the No Fly and Selectee list. To do 

so, the TSC convened the Policy Board Working Group with representatives from the National Counterterrorism Center, the Central Intelligence Agency, the National Security Agency, the Federal 

Bureau of Investigation, the Department of Homeland Security, 

Department of Defense, Department of Justice, and Department of 

State to achieve this interagency consensus. That process is underway, and TSC is working with our interagency partners to develop 

appropriate recommendations to the White House. Also at the direction of the White House and in conjunction with NCTC, the TSC 

has made some temporary and limited additions to the watchlist to 

counter the specific threat that was observed on Christmas Day. As 

a result a threat related target group was identified and individuals from specific high-threat countries already residing in TIDE 

and TSDB were either upgraded, added to the No Fly or Selectee 

list, and this was to prevent future attacks. 

TSC remains focused on fulfilling its presidential mandates and 

interagency mandates to share terrorist screening information with 

our domestic and foreign partners. We have a standing commitment to improve our operational processes, to enhance our human 

capital and technological capabilities, and to continue to protect the 

Americans from terrorist threats while protecting privacy and safeguarding civil liberties. 

The terrorism watchlisting system is a vital tool in the 

counterterrorism effort for the United States Government and continues to be. 

I look forward to answering any questions you may have. Thank 

you. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Healy follows:] 

20 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF TIMOTHY J. HEALY


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Mr. CONYERS. Our next witness is Patricia Cogswell, a lawyer, 

who is Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary for the Office of Policy 

at the Department of Homeland Security. Most of her career has 

been spent at the Department of Homeland Security and the INS 

before that, and she has served as Executive Director of the Department of Homeland Security Screening. Welcome. 


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TESTIMONY OF PATRICIA COGSWELL, ACTING DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY, OFFICE OF POLICY, DEPARTMENT OF 

HOMELAND SECURITY 

Ms. COGSWELL. Chairman Conyers, Congressman Smith, and 

Members of the Committee, thank you very much for this opportunity to testify on sharing and analyzing of information to prevent 

terrorism. 

DHS has a number of screening programs in place and works 

closely with foreign governments and air carriers in our efforts to 

strengthen global aviation security. Information sharing and analysis plays a critical role in these programs. 

This Administration and all of us here today are determined to 

find and fix the vulnerabilities that allowed Umar Farouk 

Abdulmutallab to board a U.S.-bound plane and prevent such 

breaches in the future. Today I will describe the screening conducted in the aviation environment, including the changes DHS 

has put in place since December 25, and how we are moving forward to further bolster aviation security. 

First, most noncitizens need a visa, or if traveling under the Visa 

Waiver Program, a travel authorization issued through the DHS 

electronic system for travel authorization, or ESTA, prior to travel 

to the United States. DHS screens each ESTA applicant to assess 

whether he or she could pose a risk to the United States, including 

potential links to terrorism. At certain embassies and consulates, 

DHS has also placed Visa security program personnel to assist the 

State Department in identifying visa applicants who may pose a security concern. 

DHS also conducts predeparture screening in partnership with 

the airline industry. Individuals on the No-Fly List should not receive a boarding pass. Individuals on the Selectee List must go 

through additional screening before boarding an aircraft. 

Through the implementation of the Secure Flight program which 

is underway now, DHS is checking passenger manifests against 

these lists directly, a job previously performed by the air carriers. 

For international travel, carriers are also required to provide DHS 

with access to certain passenger reservation information, basic 

identifying and itinerary information referred to Passenger Name 

Record, 72 hours prior to departure to the U.S. 

Carriers must then transmit their flight manifest containing 

complete and standardized information on a traveler, as shown on 

their Official Travel Document, through the Advanced Passenger 

Information System no less than 30 minutes before the flight. DHS 

uses both of these data feeds to be able to do risk assessments and 

conduct checks against the Known or Suspected Terrorist Watch 

List, lost or stolen passport information, prior immigration or Customs violations, visa revocations, and other records such as State 

Department records indicating potential terrorism concern. 

If the flight departs from an airport where DHS has an immigration and advisory program officer station, the IAP officers make 

use of this information to interact with individuals, and can make 

no-board recommendations to the carriers or host governments. In 

non-IAP locations, DHS will directly contact the airline, when appropriate, to recommend a person not board a flight. This is a 

change since December 25. 

28 

The next step in the process is the physical screening of passengers, their accessible properties, their checked baggage, by utilizing a combination of x-ray systems, walk-through metal detectors, full body pat-downs, explosive trace detection equipment, 

trained canines, advanced imaging technology, and behavioral detection, depending on the location. In the U.S., DHS conducts such 

screening. Overseas, the screening is conducted by the foreign government, the air carriers, or their respected airport authority. 

Since the 25th, DHS has put in place security directives and 

emergency amendments for increased use of enhanced screening 

technologies and threat-based and random screening procedures. 

These measures have been implemented with the extraordinary cooperation from our global aviation partners. 

DHS also conducts security assessments in accordance with 

standards set by the International Civil Aviation Organization at 

approximately 300 foreign airports. If an airport does not meet 

these standards, DHS works with the appropriate host government 

authorities to raise the airport security posture. 

In addition to all these immediate activities we have already 

taken to further enhance our processes, we are also taking action 

to address the systemic vulnerabilities highlighted by this failed attack. As announced by the President and Secretary Napolitano, as 

part of the overall U.S. Government approach, DHS is pursuing 

five objectives to enhance the protection of air travel through acts 

of terrorism. These include: Working with our interagency partners 

to reevaluate and modify the criteria and process used to create the 

Terrorist Watch List; establishing a partnership on aviation security with the Department of Energy and its national labs to develop 

future technologies that deter and disrupt threats; accelerating the 

deployment of advanced imaging technology as well as increasing 

our use of explosive trained canines and explosive detection equipment, augmenting law enforcement aviation, and working with our 

partners to strengthen international security measures and standards for aviation security. 

While we address the vulnerabilities associated with the December 25 attempted bombing, we must also recognize the evolving 

threats posed by terrorists and take swift and appropriate action 

to ensure that our layers of security continue to evolve in order to 

defeat them. 

Thank you for this opportunity to testify. I will be pleased to answer any questions. 

Mr. CONYERS. Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Cogswell follows:] 

29 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF PATRICIA COGSWELL


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Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Patrick Kennedy, Under Secretary for Management at the Department of State, has been a career Foreign 

Service officer for more than 30 years. And in addition to other responsibilities, heads the Bureau of Consular Affairs, which issues 

visas overseas. Welcome. 

TESTIMONY OF THE HONORABLE PATRICK F. KENNEDY, 

UNDER SECRETARY FOR MANAGEMENT, U.S. DEPARTMENT 

OF STATE 

Mr. KENNEDY. Thank you very much, Chairman Conyers, Ranking Member Smith, distinguished Members of the Committee. 

After the attempted bombing of Flight 253, Secretary Clinton 

stated that we are all looking hard at what did happen in order 

to improve our procedures, to avoid human errors, mistakes, oversights of any kinds, and we are going to be working hard with the 

rest of the Administration to improve every aspect of our efforts. 

This introspective review and the concurrent interagency review 

are ongoing. We appreciate this Committee’s interest and support 

as we continue the review process. 

We recognize fully the gravity we face, and we consider ourselves 

the first line of defense in our national security efforts. We acknowledge that processes need to be improved, and here are the 

steps we have already taken. 

The Department of State misspelled Umar Farouk 

Abdulmutallab’s name in our Visa VIPER’s report; as a result, we 

did not have the information about his current U.S. visa. To prevent this from occurring again, we have instituted new procedures 

to ensure comprehensive visa information is included in all Visa 

VIPER reporting. This will highlight the visa application and 

issuance material also available in the data already shared with 

our national security partners. 

We are also reevaluating the procedures and criteria used to revoke visas. The State Department has broad and flexible authority 

in this matter. Since 2001, we have revoked 57,000 visas for a variety of reasons, including over 2,800 for suspected links to terrorism. 

New watchlisting information is continuously checked against 

the database of previously issued visas. We can and do revoke visas 

in circumstances where an immediate threat is recognized. We can 

and do revoke visas at the point that people are seeking to board 

an aircraft, preventing their boarding. In coordination with the National Targeting Center, we revoke visas under these circumstances 

almost daily. We have standardizing procedures for triggering revocations in the field, and we are adding revocation recommendations to the Visa VIPER report. Visa VIPER reports received since 

December contain this fuller information. 

At the same time, expeditious coordination with our national security partners is not to be underestimated. There have been numerous cases where our unilateral and uncoordinated revocation 

would have disrupted important investigations that were underway 

by one of our national security partners. Although not the case 

here, in those circumstances, the individual is under active investigation, and our revocation would have disclosed the United States 

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forcement colleague’s ability to quietly pursue the case and to identify the terrorist plans and co-conspirators. 

We will continue to closely coordinate visa revocation processes 

with our intelligence and law enforcement partners while also constantly make enhancements to the security and integrity of the 

visa process. Information sharing and coordinated action are foundations of the border security systems put in place since 9/11, and 

they remain sound principles. 

The Department has close and productive relationships with our 

interagency partners, particularly within the Department of Homeland Security. The State Department brings unique assets and capabilities to this partnership. Our global presence, international expertise, and highly trained and language-qualified personnel provide a singular advantage in supporting the visa function throughout the world. We developed and implemented an intensive screening process requiring personal interviews and supported by a sophisticated global information network. Our front line of border security has visa offices in virtually every country in the world, and 

they are staffed by highly trained, multilingual, culturally aware 

personnel of the Department of State. We support them with the 

latest technology and access to information and screening tools. We 

are introducing a new generation of visa software to more efficiently manage our growing mission and the increasing amounts of 

data we do handle. 

We are pioneers in the use of biometrics, a leader in the use of 

facial recognition, and we are expanding into the field of high risk 

screening. We have and will continue to automate processes to reduce the possibility of human error. 

The State Department makes all our visa information available 

to other involved agencies, giving them access to over 13 years of 

data. We introduced online visa applications in 2009, which expanded our data collection tenfold and provides new information 

that is readily available for analysis by State and other agencies. 

This system will be rolled out worldwide by the end of this fiscal 

year. 

We have embraced a layered approach to border security screening which results in multiple agencies having an opportunity to review information, and requires separate reviews at both the visa 

and admission stage. No visa is issued, no visa is issued without 

it being run through security checks against our partners’ database. We screen applicants’ fingerprints against U.S. databases, 

and we run our facial recognition software against a photo array 

provided by our law enforcement and intelligence colleagues as 

well. 

At the same time, we believe that U.S. interests and legitimate 

travel, trade promotion, and educational exchanges are not in opposition to our border security agenda. In fact, the United States 

must strive to meet both goals to guarantee our long-term security. 

Again, the multi-agency team effort, to which each agency brings 

its particular strengths and expertise, results in a more robust and 

secure process, a process based upon broadly shared information. 

We remain fully committed to correcting mistakes and remedying 

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nection with this incident; however, we are working and will continue to work not only to address shortcomings, but to continually 

enhance our border security screening capabilities and the contributions we make to the interagency effort. 

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I would be pleased to take 

any questions that you or your colleagues might have. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Kennedy follows:] 

47 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE PATRICK F. KENNEDY


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Mr. CONYERS. I want to sincerely thank all the witnesses and 

ask Subcommittee Chairman Jerry Nadler to begin the questioning. 

Mr. NADLER. Thank you very much. I am not sure which witness 

I will address the first two questions to. 

The Christmas bomb plot obviously exposed certain longstanding 

gaps in how we use and analyze threat information, and we are 

told you are working to fix these. 

What are you doing to identify any other gaps, ones that weren’t 

revealed by this plot, but maybe the next plot? In other words, ones 

you haven’t thought about yet. 

Mr. KENNEDY. If I could, sir. One of the things that we are doing 

is, in the past, the State Department received a visa application, 

and then we ran the individual’s name and other particulars 

against a 27-million-count database that we received from our colleagues and information that we have developed ourselves. We 

have turned that into now—and we will have, by the end of this 

fiscal year—a completely automated process where the visa application will come into us electronically. We are then going to push 

that visa application information immediately to all of our partners 

in the Intelligence Community and law enforcement community so 

they can look at that data in real-time, as we are also looking at 

it, to see if there is information they may have in the broader fields 

of information submitted by the applicant, not just the name, date 

and place of birth, passport number, and other data. So our goal 

is to push off all the information we can to our colleagues and enable them to provide us with more and fuller information that they 

might have in their possession so we can make decisions. We already reject almost 2 million visa applicants a year, and we want 

to make sure that we reject everyone who would threaten our national security. 

Mr. NADLER. Thank you. As long as you added those last few 

words. 

After the Christmas bomb plot, the Administration announced 

that travel to 14 nations would be subjected to heightened scrutiny. 

Most of these 14 nations are Muslim nations. Some have said that 

terrorists will be able to plan their travel to avoid these countries, 

but innocent travelers will not. Why do you think this is not the 

case, and how does this really increase our national security? Some 

have said this is simply religious profiling. How does this really increase our national security? 

Ms. COGSWELL. Thank you very much. I would just like to note 

that the 14 countries, we do not consider the objective of the 14 

countries to be a permanent list of countries. It was a way to have 

a quick mechanism in response to the immediate threat. They were 

compiled through a list of individual countries who are currently 

on the list of State Sponsors of Terrorism, state havens, or otherwise linked to the current threat streams that are being tracked. 

As I noted, we at DHS are going to continue to evaluate these 

designations and we will update them when appropriate. I think it 

is important to note that it is unrelated to religion; it is focused on 

individuals who are traveling to, from, or through countries where, 

again, we have noted that there is a safe haven, a state sponsor 

of terrorism, or something linked to the current threat stream. 

58 

Mr. NADLER. Thank you. Let me ask you a different question. 

Everything we have heard thus far is about information linked to 

visas or air travel. What about train travel within this country? 

What are we doing to make train travel safe? I take the train every 

week from New York to Washington and back. It is a great convenience that I don’t have to be screened, I am very happy about that. 

On the other hand, I could bring almost anything I wanted onto 

that train and no one would be the wiser. 

Ms. COGSWELL. Thank you very much. We do recognize very 

much that aviation tends to occupy an awful lot of our attention 

and resources. This is in part because of the continuing threat 

streams that we are seeing. At the same time, we very much do 

recognize there are threats to other modes of transportation in particular. Congress has directed specific legislation also around areas 

such as maritime ports for us to follow. These are very much a 

focus of ours, and something we do look into very closely in terms 

of what are the appropriate measures to take in each of these environments to work through, what is a sustainable process? Perhaps 

it might be appropriate to set up a follow-on conversation to talk 

more specifically. 

Mr. NADLER. Let me just ask one further question on that, since 

you brought it up—I was going to ask it anyway, it was my next 

question in any event. I was the chief author of the legislation 3 

years ago to require that every container be inspected and sealed 

before it is put on a ship bound for the United States in the foreign 

port, given that it would be a little late to find a nuclear device 

while being inspected in an American port. 

The Bush administration, as far as I could tell, made no effort 

to implement that. The Obama administration, as far as I can tell, 

has made no effort to the implement that legislation. It has told 

us that it will not be able to do it within the time frame—although 

the legislation provides for waivers up to a certain point—but I see 

no evidence that the Administration is making any attempt actually to implement that legislation. Could you tell us differently? 

Ms. COGSWELL. I would just like to note that we have got several 

programs in this arena, Container Security Initiative being a key 

one. It is an environment where we work both with the various individuals here in the United States and overseas. 

Mr. NADLER. Excuse me. Let me stop you right there. There is 

a fundamental difference. On the one hand, there are people in the 

security field under both Administrations who have told us that it 

is impractical to inspect every container. We will look at threats, 

we will inspect five or 6 percent of the containers based on threat 

analysis and so forth. On the other hand, Congress made the judgment—and the President signed the bill—that is not sufficient, 

that we want to inspect every container, we want to get to that capability in a reasonable period of time. So my question is, what is 

the Administration doing to implement that determination? 

Ms. COGSWELL. Sir, I cannot answer that question to your satisfaction. As you have stated, the Administration’s position is that 

we are focusing on the risk procedure. And given the resources, we 

are—— 

Mr. NADLER. Surely you are not telling us you are ignoring the 

congressional directive? 

59 

Ms. COGSWELL. Of course not, sir. I would not say that. 

Mr. NADLER. But you would say what? 

Ms. COGSWELL. I would say that the Administration is working 

very hard to implement in a way that it believes is risk based and 

appropriate to the threat, understanding that the direction is 100 

percent. 

Mr. NADLER. Okay, thank you. 

Mr. CONYERS. Thank you, Jerry Nadler. 

Lamar Smith. 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I actually have several questions about the same subject, and I 

think the questions will go to Mr. Kennedy and Ms. Cogswell. This 

is the subject of the 2,800 individuals with suspected ties to terrorism whose visas have been revoked since 2001, I think that is 

around 350 a year. Mr. Kennedy, the first question is, how many 

of these individuals are still in the country, to your knowledge? 

These are the individuals with ties to terrorism whose visas we revoked. 

Mr. KENNEDY. Sir, who is in this country or not, I would have 

to defer to my colleagues at DHS. They keep the records of individuals who are or are not in the United States. 

Mr. SMITH. Ms. Cogswell. 

Ms. COGSWELL. We have analyzed all those records and forwarded out to certain individuals to the fields for investigation. If 

possible, perhaps we can follow up with your staff for a more restricted briefing on the results of that analysis. 

Mr. SMITH. Why can’t you tell me now? Do you consider that to 

be classified information? 

Ms. COGSWELL. We consider the results related to how the reviews are going to be restricted, yes. 

Mr. SMITH. I am not asking about how the reviews are going, I 

am just wondering how many are still in the country. 

Ms. COGSWELL. I cannot answer that at this time; I just don’t 

have the number with me. 

Mr. SMITH. Can you get it from staff in the time we are in the 

hearing today? 

Ms. COGSWELL. We can. 

Mr. SMITH. How many of these individuals have appealed their 

revocation of the visa? Is that a number you need to get as well? 

Ms. COGSWELL. We would not have that. 

Mr. SMITH. Who would have that? 

Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. Smith, if I could, we would not entertain an 

appeal for revocation of visa. We would not reinstate. Once a visa 

is revoked, it is revoked. The individual is free to apply for a new 

visa, but after that circumstance—— 

Mr. SMITH. How many of these individuals then have been removed, deported? 

Mr. KENNEDY. Again, sir, that is a question for Homeland Security. 

Mr. SMITH. Okay. Ms. Cogswell, my other question was, of the 

individuals with suspected ties to terrorists whose visas have been 

revoked, how many of those individuals have actually been removed from the country? 

60 

Ms. COGSWELL. I would need to follow up, sir, I am not aware 

at this time. We were evaluating how many have stayed and then 

referring those for investigation—— 

Mr. SMITH. Of those 2,800, how many have been removed from 

the country? You don’t know that either? 

Ms. COGSWELL. It is important to note that of most of those, very 

few were even in the country in the first place. 

Mr. SMITH. And the ones who were in the country, you are going 

to get that for me later, and then how many were removed of that 

figure? 

Ms. COGSWELL. Sir, right now we are in the process right now, 

so I don’t believe of the very small number who are still here, we 

have not reached that stage yet in the investigation, but I will need 

to follow up. 

Mr. SMITH. And what are you doing to try and find these individuals and remove them? 

Ms. COGSWELL. Sir, these have been forwarded out to the Immigration and Customs Enforcement, ICE agents, to evaluate the information and go after and investigate these in conjunction with 

the FBI’s part of the terrorism review. 

Mr. SMITH. And the earlier figures you can give me in the next 

few minutes from staff you think? 

Ms. COGSWELL. I will attempt to do so; otherwise, we will follow 

up. 

Mr. SMITH. I am sure your staff will be able to do that. Thanks. 

Mr. Healy, a couple of questions for you. The first is, in regard 

to the watchlist system, should the system be changed so that if 

we had the equivalent information again that we had about 

Abdulmutallab, should we change the system so that that would 

trigger action that was not triggered this time? Or is the failure 

that we had the information, we just didn’t have the right spelling, 

and if we had had the right spelling, that would have triggered action? Which is the case? 

Mr. HEALY. Congressman, as I mentioned, we are in the process 

of reviewing the issues that occurred as a result of the Christmas 

day event. Some of those, not necessarily in terms of the 

watchlisting standard, but more so in terms of the implementation 

and how that process worked. 

Mr. SMITH. It was an implementation problem, not a standards 

problem? 

Mr. HEALY. That is one of the things that we have taken a look 

at and we are leaning toward. There are issues, as you have mentioned and some of the Congressman here have mentioned, regarding the ability to credit Dr. Mutallab when he first came into the 

embassy. There was specific implementation regarding sole source, 

and it has to be credited, you have to define credibility. We are recommending that with that particular case, we leave it up to the 

Consular Affairs to assess the credibility of the source in situations 

like that. Based on his standing with the community, he would be 

deemed credible, and that would move up as well. Things like that 

we are taking a look at and making recommendations. 

Mr. SMITH. Trying to decide whether a human error or a lack of 

standards, or standards that might be too high and we might need 

61 

to adjust the standards to trigger action next time; that is what 

you are studying. 

Mr. HEALY. Based on the President’s report, they talked about 

the difficulty in connecting the dots. As my colleague, Russ, has 

mentioned, there is a lot of noise out there. There was a result of, 

we believe, one of connecting the dots issue—— 

Mr. SMITH. As opposed to standards. 

Mr. HEALY. As opposed to standards. But we are looking at the 

standards and we are making some adjustments or recommendations for the implementation of that, sir? 

Mr. SMITH. Mr. Healy, a final question. You mentioned a minute 

ago in your testimony that you conducted a thorough review of the 

Terrorist Screening database to ascertain the current visa status of 

all known or suspected terrorists. What are the results of that? 

Mr. HEALY. We identify those individuals and refer to our State 

colleagues. I believe most of those have been revoked. They are 

under review right now. There were approximately 1,100 individuals that had received visas that were in the Terrorist Screening 

Center database, and that information was coordinated with our 

Department of State colleagues. 

Mr. SMITH. Okay. And do we know where those individuals are? 

Have they been removed or not? That gets back to the same question I was asking Ms. Cogswell. 

Ms. COGSWELL. That is the number I asked for 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. CONYERS. Thank you. 

Bobby Scott, Chairman of the Subcommittee on Crime. 

Mr. SCOTT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Just a brief question. We are getting all this information, some 

of it in foreign languages; do we have enough foreign language people on staff to listen to some of these wiretaps, or do we need more 

staff knowledgeable in foreign languages? 

Mr. TRAVERS. I would just say, sir, that foreign language training 

has been an issue for the community about as long as I have been 

in that community. We have obviously spent a great deal of money 

focused on many of the difficult languages in particular, but at the 

same time, I think everyone would acknowledge that there are 

shortages in a number of languages. 

Mr. SCOTT. Have you asked for us to do anything in response, 

like more funding, more scholarships, more courses? 

Mr. TRAVERS. From NCTC’s perspective, no, sir. I would have to 

check with ODNI and the various organizations—— 

Mr. SCOTT. Well, you recognize the shortage, and you haven’t 

recommended that we do anything about it. 

Mr. TRAVERS. It wouldn’t be NCTC to make that recommendation, sir. I can check with the broader community and get back to 

you on what requests have been made. 

Mr. SCOTT. Ms. Cogswell, if the Christmas bomber had been on 

the extra search list, would the extra search have revealed his 

plan? 

Ms. COGSWELL. Sir, when you say ‘‘extra search’’ list, you mean 

the changes that we have made since December? 

Mr. SCOTT. Well, you have a No-Fly List and you have a selectee 

list; and selectee means you have got extra screening. 

62 

Ms. COGSWELL. Correct. 

Mr. SCOTT. If you had been given extra screening, could we have 

revealed the threat? 

Ms. COGSWELL. If he would have been given extra screening, 

there would have been a greater likelihood we would have found 

the threat. As has been noted, given where we believe or how he 

was transporting the material—if, for example, it was in his carryon baggage and his baggage was hand searched, it is highly likely 

it would have been found. Given if he was holding it where it eventually was detonated, that takes a very personal type of pat-down 

in order to find that. That is something since the 25th we have 

been focusing very much with our foreign partners on, as well understanding how can you best find these types of threats. 

Mr. SCOTT. Would the x-ray machine, the see-through thing, 

would that have revealed it? 

Ms. COGSWELL. Thank you. This is an important distinction from 

what has been our current process. Under a traditional magnetometer and x-ray machine, it is primarily looking for metal. The 

advanced imagining technology has the benefit in that it identifies 

any foreign material by the fact that it shows up as an anomalous 

object on the body as a way to identify material. Again, given the 

location, we cannot say with certainty that it would have found it, 

but it is a significant improvement enhancement over what we 

have today. 

Mr. SCOTT. Does that mean he could have gotten it through anyway? 

Ms. COGSWELL. In all of these circumstances we say that we can 

never say any specific layer and any specific technology is 100 percent solution. We do also say this is why we must have the various 

layers so that you would have both these types of advantaged technologies in order to scan as well as things like behavior detection 

or canines so that you have the best likelihood of identifying these 

threats rather than relying on one single aspect. 

Mr. SCOTT. When we started the debate on the Department of 

Homeland Security, the problem we were trying to solve was the 

fact that the Department of Justice had information, CIA had information, Department of Defense and Department of State all had 

information but they weren’t talking to each other. Our solution for 

four people not talking to each other was to establish a fifth organization in which none of the other four landed. So now you have five 

people not talking to each other. Can you explain to me how the 

Department of Homeland Security has actually helped things? 

Ms. COGSWELL. I would like to start out by noting that the Department of Homeland Security was made up of 22 separate agencies who were originally part of that larger group. So I would say 

that, while it does look like a fifth new agency, all of the components within DHS—such as Customs and Border Protection, Immigration and Customs Enforcement, the Secret Service, all were very 

much part and parcel of this process well before these events, so 

that it is important to understand that these relationships, these 

processes have really advanced and improved. We have streamlined many of them, and very much inculcated a number of these 

to enhance our screening processes since that time. 

Mr. KENNEDY. Sir, can I add something to that? 

63 

Prior to 9/11, the State Department had a screening database 

that we used before we issued visas, somewhere on the order of 9 

or 10 million hits, and obviously that number has grown in the last 

years. Right now, sir, before we issue a visa, we run that database 

against 27 million possible individuals of concern. It is a 400 percent increase since 9/11. Five million of those records come from 

the Department of Homeland Security, 11 million of those records 

come from the FBI, others come from elsewhere in the community. 

We also now have full access to the FBI’s fingerprint database, 

other material provided to us from elsewhere, including Homeland 

Security. When we run our facial recognition software, that is 83 

million facial images, including material received from throughout 

the law enforcement and Intelligence Community. 

I am not saying that we are there or it is perfect, but by bringing 

all this information together in the sharing process that we have, 

at least from the State Department’s view, we have access to an 

incredibly expanded and diverse database that we never had before 

in order to help us make our decisions. 

Mr. SCOTT. And the Department of State didn’t end up in the Department of Homeland Security, so you didn’t need the Department 

of Homeland Security to do that. 

Let me ask another question, because I am running out of time. 

The issue of torture has come up, and my question is, if Timothy 

McVeigh had been caught either shortly before or shortly after the 

Oklahoma bombing, if we are going around torturing people, how 

would we have known whether he should have been tortured as an 

American citizen or not? 

Mr. TRAVERS. Sir, I think I probably speak for all of us that that 

question would be way outside the lane of responsibility for any of 

our organizations. NCTC, for instance, looks at analysis and integration of information—— 

Mr. SCOTT. If he had been captured and if he was kind of foreign 

looking, people have suggested he shouldn’t have been given Miranda rights and ought to have been tortured to get information. 

Are you suggesting that torture is always outside the line? 

Mr. TRAVERS. No, sir. I am just saying that that particular question is outside the lane of any of our organizations here. 

Mr. SCOTT. Any of your organizations, it was not outside the lane 

of the United States policy. 

Mr. TRAVERS. I would refer you to Department of Justice and 

operational organizations. 

Mr. SCOTT. Mr. Healy, you are in the Department of Justice. Is 

torture outside the lanes? We need to get information. 

Mr. HEALY. Well, sir, as a father of seven, when you talk about 

torture, I think about what my children would say. I would not, 

with the word ‘‘torture,’’ condone torture, but with regard to your 

question, sir, I would refer you to the Department of Justice or my 

director. 

Mr. SCOTT. So how would you know whether to use—what do you 

call it—enhanced interrogation techniques, how would you know 

whether to apply those techniques or give Miranda warnings to 

someone—if it is an American citizen, I would assume they would 

be entitled to Miranda warnings; is that right? 

64 

Mr. HEALY. In a law enforcement action—and I go back to my 

24 years as an FBI agent—in a criminal matter, if I arrest someone, as a matter of policy prior to interrogating him, I would issue 

Miranda warnings. 

Mr. SCOTT. If they look foreign, does that—— 

Mr. HEALY. Sir, I am talking in general in my law enforcement 

days. 

Mr. SCOTT. Would a person’s right to the Miranda warning be 

less if they looked foreign? 

Mr. HEALY. Again, sir, the policy for law enforcement actions, if 

I have two components, custodial and interrogation, as part of my 

policy that I follow in any type of law enforcement case, I would 

Mirandize them. With regard to specific cases or operational decisions, I would refer you to, if it’s a counterterrorism case or on a 

particular case, I would refer you to the assistant director over that 

particular case. 

Mr. SCOTT. So you would not treat someone who looked a little 

different than everybody else different than Timothy McVeigh? 

Mr. HEALY. Pardon me, sir? 

Mr. SCOTT. You would not treat someone who looked foreign differently than you would have treated Timothy McVeigh. 

Mr. HEALY. Yes. 

Mr. SCOTT. Yes, you would treat them differently—— 

Mr. HEALY. No, sir. I am acknowledging. 

Mr. SCOTT. I guess we are in the 5-minute honor system, I think 

my 5 minutes is up. 

Mr. CONYERS. Does the gentleman need more time? 

Mr. SCOTT. Well, let me ask another question then since you 

have invited the other question. 

With all the information we have, how do we limit the number 

of people who can see the information that may be embarrassing— 

medical, mental health—about people; how do we limit the number 

of people that have access to that information and at the same 

time, have enough people connecting the dots? 

Mr. TRAVERS. Excellent question, sir. 

As all of my colleagues have indicated, I believe that by any objective standard every department and agency in this government 

is pushing more and more electrons to relevant organizations to 

help do this ‘‘connect the dots.’’ While we do so, we are also incredibly careful about what information is being passed. And so issues 

of privacy concerns are foremost on all of our minds. We have significant conversations with any organization, for instance, that has 

a database with commingled data, a database that may have U.S. 

persons as well as foreign individuals in that data set; how do we 

get that information; what can we do with it; how long can we keep 

it? We have extensive auditing to ensure that information is being 

properly utilized. And so we have gone to great strides to both promote information sharing, but at the same time, be good stewards 

of information. 

Mr. SCOTT. And confidentiality, because a lot of information you 

get will certainly be embarrassing, confidential. I mean, you are 

talking about medical information, mental health, family situations, a lot of things that people would just assume not be public 

and not have a lot of people—I mean, if you are in Northern VirVerDate Aug 31 2005 10:30 Nov 05, 2010 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00068 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 H:\WORK\FULL\032410\55598.000 HJUD1 PsN: 55598
65 

ginia, it is very likely that some of your neighborhoods and friends 

may be government officials. How do you limit the number of people who can actually see it and at the same time make best use 

of it? 

Mr. TRAVERS. Just speaking from the intelligence and national 

counterterrorism perspective, we would not be privy to that information. The only information that I get from the Federal Bureau 

of Investigation is related to terrorism investigations, for instance, 

or information that could be associated with terrorism. And the 

same thing with Homeland Security, I am not getting any medical 

records or anything like that at NCTC. 

Mr. HEALY. And Congressman, if I may also point out, the way 

the system is set up, NCTC or TIDE actually holds identifying information and the derogatory information, so they withhold that, 

and it is a very highly classified system. The process that we set 

up with the Terrorist Watch List was that that identifying informational alone would be forwarded down to our screening partners. So 

the detail and information that you are talking about would not be 

available to the State or local law enforcement officer, it wouldn’t 

be available to the thousands of Customs Border Protection people 

or the Consular Affairs. The way the process is set up is taking 

into consideration privacy, liberty, civil liberties, and things like 

that as well so that once a name goes through that process or an 

individual goes through that process, it gets vetted with NCTC, 

and they push down only identifying information. 

Once we look at it, we push down only identifying information. 

So the only information that is available to a law enforcement officer is the individual that I have stopped may or may not be a 

known or suspected terrorist. For additional action, call the Terrorist Screening Center and confirm that. Once that confirmation 

is made, a series of events occurs—again, as I spoke before, a coordination between the FBI for some type of operational response. 

So the whole system was set up to, one, allow every law enforcement officer that queries into NCIC, every Border Protection officer 

and every Department of State person when someone applies for a 

visa to have that terrorist information available to them in their 

existing system, but yet balance civil liberties. And I think that we 

have really worked hard to strike that balance collectively with all 

of us. 

Mr. SCOTT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. CONYERS. Thank you, Mr. Scott. 

We now turn to Dan Lungren. 

Mr. LUNGREN. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate 

that. 

And just an observation I had listening to all this, I have often 

wondered why some people think that telling someone that ‘‘you 

have the right to remain silent’’ would make it more likely that 

they would talk to you. That is the only thing I never tried with 

my kids, I guess, but maybe the world works differently than my 

experience has been. 

I also say, to ask someone questions without Mirandizing them 

is not torturing them. One of the questions previously was do you 

Mirandize them or do you torture them? There is a whole world in 

66 

between that, and it sort of goes to some of the confusion we have 

here. 

Would the gentleman from Florida allow me to use his slide? Can 

we put that up? It helps me visually to be able to see exactly how 

this information flow goes. Can you read that? This is a schematic 

that Mr. Rooney has that was taken from some testimony by the 

State Department previously and CRS actually put it together. It 

tries to show the flow of information. And the reason I ask that is, 

in my opening statement, I mentioned that I have some concern 

about us using a different standard for watchlisting, and that in 

the previous Administration, as I understand it, the standard was 

‘‘appropriately suspected’’ to now this new ‘‘reasonable suspicion’’ 

standard that appears to me to come right out of Terry versus 

Ohio, which is a criminal justice standard. 

And so Mr. Healy, I guess I would ask you, why has the Administration decided that the Terry standard should apply to aliens 

outside the United States who, by my understanding of the Supreme Court decisions, have no right to Fourth Amendment protections? 

Mr. HEALY. Thank you, Congressman. Prior to the reasonable 

suspicion standard that began—actually, it was enacted with the 

community in February of 2008, there wasn’t a standard. I had the 

unique position of being at the Terrorist Screening Center during 

those early days when we started learning how the watchlisting 

process was. What occurred, actually, was as we progressed 

through the process, we identified an issue of making a standard 

so that the community could agree with it. 

As you mentioned, Terry versus Ohio is a legalistic opinion by 

the Supreme Court, but that was used as a baseline to help define 

reasonable suspicion. And from there, it was adopted and adjusted 

to meet the intelligence and law enforcement requirements. That 

process was very similar to the process that we are ongoing right 

now, Congressman, that involved all of the different agencies to 

come up with a unified standard so that they knew. 

The problem before that, Congressman, was that the CIA felt an 

individual should have been watchlisted that went through the 

process and it was or wasn’t and it was inconsistent. 

Mr. LUNGREN. Here is my question, as I understand what you 

said in response to Mr. Smith’s question, you indicated the Christmas bombing response as a failure to connect the dots. And I 

thought Mr. Travers suggested it wasn’t so much a question of connecting the dots, but actually establishing what the dots were. And 

if I understand that correctly, there seems to be somewhat of a difference. 

And my question would be then to both of you, does the standard 

that has been adopted, the one that you articulated, which is the 

nominator, based on the totality of the circumstances, must rely on 

articulable intelligence or information which, taken together with 

rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant a determination that an individual is known or suspected to be, or have 

been knowingly engaged in conduct constituting in preparation for, 

in aid of, or related to terrorism or terrorist activities. Does that 

definition help you in the case of the Christmas bomber or hinder 

you, or make no difference whatsoever? 

67 

Mr. HEALY. With the review process, that particular standard, 

the reasonable suspicion standard that we have identified that we 

have been using, based on the review, we feel that the reasonable 

suspicion standard is adequate. We have looked at some of the implementation that we used—— 

Mr. LUNGREN. Well, adequate for what purposes? Adequate for 

protecting you against legal action later on or adequate for purposes of putting the people on the list who ought to be on the list? 

Because this was an individual who wasn’t on the list. 

Mr. HEALY. Right. With regard to the Terrorist Screening Center 

and NCTC, and all of my colleagues here, we work with this terrorism issue every day. It is not an issue of I am concerned about 

being prosecuted, it is an issue of every day I sit down and talk 

to my staff and tell them this: If we make a mistake, people die. 

It is that easy. And as a result of that, we work to ensure that we 

don’t have people get on planes and hurt people. 

The reasonable suspicion standard that we have, based on what 

occurred and based on the review, I think collectively we feel that 

that is a reasonable standard. It is low enough to be able to include 

people, it is high enough to make sure that we balance civil liberties and protection of the American people. 

Mr. LUNGREN. So, should Mr. Abdulmutallab have met the 

standard based on the totality of circumstances relying upon 

articulable intelligence or information which, taken together with 

the rational inferences from the facts, reasonably have warranted 

a determination that he was known or suspected to be or had been 

knowingly engaged in conduct constituting in preparation for or in 

aid of or related to terrorism or terrorist activities? 

Mr. HEALY. And the question was, sir? 

Mr. LUNGREN. The question is very simple. I asked you whether 

or not Mr. Abdulmutallab meets that standard. That is my question. That is what we are here for. 

Mr. HEALY. If all of the intelligence was put together, he would 

have met that standard in my view. 

Mr. LUNGREN. Well, here is my whole question: if someone is 

starting off with that standard, does he even begin to go into the 

process? Does the person at the consulate in Kenya or Yemen, or 

wherever, if they get that information from his father, does this 

standard give them a reason to put him in the system, or does this 

standard become so restrictive that if I take that information and 

knowing nothing else, I don’t begin to put it into the process. That 

is my question. 

Mr. HEALY. Actually, it does. The way the process is set up with 

TIDE and NCTC—and I will let my other colleagues speak as 

well—and with the Terrorist Screening Center, TIDE actually has 

a lower standard and it starts the process. 

Mr. LUNGREN. Okay. That is what I want to know. So what 

should the standard have been that the State Department should 

have paid attention to to at least enter that bit of information with 

enough significance so that you would have put it into the system? 

I mean, that is what I am trying to get at. We have heard a lot 

of stuff here, but I am trying to get at what happens in this case 

if it is repeated, what standard is used at that entry point that 

would start it going? 

68 

Mr. TRAVERS. And I think the complexity here, sir, is that, with 

respect to Umar Farouk, the information that came in from the 

State Department on the 20th of November with everything they 

had with respect to the derogatory, that amount of derogatory at 

the time—as you, I think, correctly quoted—under the influence of 

extremists in Yemen, or something along that line—would not have 

been sufficient to get him watchlisted. The failure on the part of 

NCTC was there was this other piece of information that had we, 

in fact, connected it to the Visa VIPER cable, I think everyone 

agrees would have crossed the bar, would have gotten—— 

Mr. LUNGREN. Okay. My question is very precise—I hope—which 

is, was it the failure of the intake officer—I will call him the intake 

officer, whoever got that information from his father—was it the 

failure of him to put significant facts into this entry point, or was 

it that the system didn’t automatically take that bit of information 

and connect it with several other pieces of information? 

Mr. TRAVERS. The system at the time said, Militants, extremists, 

jihadists should not be nominated without particularized derogatory. The State Department had no other information from the father that would have come to me that would have led my analyst 

to nominate the individual. 

Mr. LUNGREN. So what is the difference now? Same scenario, 

comes in today, same information, no more information, it is not 

after the fact, it is before the fact, the father comes in with that 

information, what difference would it make today? 

Mr. TRAVERS. And that is the discussions ongoing within the 

interagency right now, but I think that as a general proposition, 

the quality of the source coming in would weigh quite heavily. 

Mr. LUNGREN. The father? 

Mr. TRAVERS. The father, exactly. And so that you could have 

sufficient flexibility to get an extremist nominated to a watchlist. 

Mr. HEALY. And additionally, sir, the label ‘‘extremist,’’ we are 

taking a look at that as well and—again, the implementation process, judging that as well. 

Mr. LUNGREN. My other question will be on this: When you folks 

got the information from State Department, did you not know the 

source? That is, did you not know it was his father and the significance of his father being a reliable source, someone who—if you 

look back now, and I know it is easy to look back now, if you look 

back now, it is the father, he’s got some prominence. He obviously 

is putting himself in jeopardy by bringing this information forward 

or maybe bringing his son into jeopardy. That, to me, if I am an 

investigator, even in law enforcement, suggest, hey, this guy might 

be credible. So was that information passed on to you? 

Mr. TRAVERS. I have actually forgotten whether or not that fact 

was in the Visa VIPER cable itself. I don’t think it was. But, frankly, that would not have, at the time, given the standards and the 

way we were interpreting the standards, would not have been sufficient. The father was concerned. He, frankly, wasn’t concerned that 

his son was going to go blow up an airplane, wasn’t concerned his 

son was going to be a terrorist. 

Mr. LUNGREN. I know, but he was concerned enough to come to 

us to tell us there was a problem. 

69 

Mr. TRAVERS. Sure. But I will tell you that we get tons of data 

pieces over the course of days and weeks about extremists and people being concerned about relatives and so forth. It is a function of 

separating the real important ones from whose those that are of 

less importance. 

Mr. LUNGREN. I understand that, and I have heard this before. 

My question, is it going to be different next time? I realize you get 

all kinds of information, I realize that. 

Mr. HEALY. Congressman, one of the things that we’ve looked at 

and recommended changes for is that single source coming in and 

the ability for that receipt officer to be able to judge the credibility 

of the source. In this case, because of the prominence of the individual, because of the fact that he is reporting on his son, that 

would give additional weight to the nomination process. 

Mr. LUNGREN. My concern is this—and you know this, being in 

the FBI for your career and having any exposure to law enforcement, particularly at the local level, often it is a small piece of information from an investigator, from someone who has got some 

sense that something is wrong that triggers an entire investigation. 

Goodness gracious, Watergate. We know that started with somebody who put something together. You put a piece of tape on a door 

jam and the government implodes. No one would have figured that. 

My point is, we understand the significance of an intuition by 

trained people in the field. I just want to make sure that this 

standard doesn’t go counter to that. That is all I am trying to do 

is to make sure we are not putting a harness on good people in the 

field who are beginning to sense that something is wrong, and I 

don’t want them to have this fear that, oh, my God, you are going 

to be accused of this, that, or the other thing by not entering it into 

the system. That is my fear, and that is my concern. And that is 

all I am trying to get to here. 

Mr. KENNEDY. Sir, if I might add, when the information came to 

the State Department—we get lots and lots of poison information 

every day, former business partners, former boyfriends, former 

girlfriends come in all the time and attempt to—using a law enforcement term—dime out their people. The State Department took 

this seriously enough, as we do things, and that is the entire purpose of the Visa VIPER program. 

Somebody comes in and we say, this doesn’t look right. We then 

send that information off to Washington so that our colleagues in 

the law enforcement and Intelligence Community can integrate 

that single piece of information, just as you said, the investigator 

seeing something—— 

Mr. LUNGREN. Did the VIPER report indicate that it was the father and that the father was prominent? 

Mr. KENNEDY. It was collateral reporting that we can discuss in 

another venue, sir. 

Mr. LUNGREN. Well, I mean, that is pretty important. That is 

pretty doggone important. 

Mr. KENNEDY. There is collateral reporting that—— 

Mr. LUNGREN. And I appreciate everything you have done, I appreciate the entire panel, but, sir, you said we took it seriously, or 

seriously enough, or something; obviously we didn’t take it seriously enough. 

70 

Mr. KENNEDY. I was talking about the State Department’s taking 

the father’s reporting to us, the sufficient severity descended into 

Washington and not dismiss it as raving. 

Mr. LUNGREN. I hope the State Department has purchased the 

Yahoo software that if you have a different spelling—— 

Mr. KENNEDY. We have that already installed. 

Mr. CONYERS. Thank you, Dan Lungren. 

Sheila Jackson Lee. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Let me ask Mr. Healy, how many years have you served at the 

Bureau? 

Mr. HEALY. Approximately 24. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. So you were at the Bureau during the Bush 

administration? 

Mr. HEALY. Yes, ma’am. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. And to your knowledge, Miranda was used in 

previous Administrations on alleged terrorists, Miranda? 

Mr. HEALY. Yes. I believe in previous cases when individuals 

were arrested, they Mirandized them, yes, ma’am. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. And do you feel that the security of the Nation 

was diminished because Miranda was used in certain instances? 

Mr. HEALY. I don’t think I had an opinion on it, ma’am. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Would you use it? I don’t see why you don’t 

have an opinion, I don’t understand that. Do you believe that the 

security of the Nation was diminished at times that Miranda was 

used? Your title seems to be over the Director of Terrorism Screening, so you have some sense of terrorism. I don’t know what you 

mean you don’t have an opinion. Does Miranda equal the diminishment of national security for the United States if it is used? 

Mr. HEALY. I don’t think it is a factor. I have never seen it used 

where it is a factor in that, ma’am. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. And where it is a factor in that it can be considered a problem in the security of America; is that my understanding? 

Mr. HEALY. Again, with my experience in criminal matters, I 

have not worked terrorism cases other than my involvement 6 

years ago with the shift in the direction of the Bureau. Whether 

a Miranda warning was issued or not is an operational decision 

that is made at the time. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. And so you would not oppose operational decisions like that if the parties involved felt that Miranda was appropriate? 

Mr. HEALY. I would refer decisions like that to the operational 

components on the ground and my superiors. As the Director of the 

Terrorist Screening Center with regard to this particular case, my 

involvement didn’t involve the operational component, it was already ongoing. The only time that my involvement with the Terrorist Screening Center and any type of terrorist subjects that are 

watchlisted, the operational component is during the screening 

process. 

The extent of my involvement in that is to coordinate with the 

FBI to get the operational components on the ground connected 

with the screening entities. Once that has occurred, then they take 

71 

over the investigation or whatever results of that. As a result of 

that, they report—— 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. I will pose a question to others on the panel 

and see whether they have an answer, but let me continue to work 

with you on this question, particularly the Christmas Day bomber. 

What was the breakdown between the information received in 

Nigeria with the State Department—the State Department is here, 

I know—in getting this information transferred and interpreted 

such that this alleged perpetrator could be on the watchlist? 

Mr. HEALY. The initial information, as my colleagues have said, 

based on the father coming into the embassy, resulted in a Visa 

VIPER. That Visa VIPER was referred to NCTC and entered into 

TIDE. That Visa VIPER, as Mr. Travers has said, had enough biographical information to be in TIDE, or watchlisted, lacked enough 

derogatory information to put it into the reasonable suspicion 

standard. So from that standpoint, the name wasn’t watchlisted 

based on that single reporting piece of intelligence and it wasn’t 

pushed over to the Terrorist Screening Center database. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. So where do you think the collapse came or 

the failure came? 

Mr. HEALY. As I have said, if we have a magic ball, if there was 

something that would allow us to connect the dots on everything, 

every piece of intelligence that came in and it automatically connected to everything else that we had, that would be very beneficial. If you could look at the totality of the facts to be able to 

make a nomination, that would be helpful. 

Unfortunately, right now what we get from NCTC is between 400 

and 1,200 add, modifies, and deletes a day. What they look at is 

significantly bigger than that. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Do we need more resources, more trained professionals in human intelligence? Let me try to, without probing 

into classified information, I assume that the father publicly told 

the point person in Nigeria that the individual had been to Yemen 

and that he felt he was being trained in Yemen. Was that not information that the desk officer had? 

Mr. HEALY. I would have to refer to the desk officer on that, 

ma’am, I am not sure. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. So you are not privy to what information was 

then sent through Visa VIPER and then on to the various areas? 

Mr. HEALY. The way the process works, the information, the derogatory information is in TIDE. And I will refer to my colleague 

to talk about the TIDE information. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. All right. Colleague, would you answer that, 

please, Mr. Travers? 

Mr. TRAVERS. The Visa VIPER cable that came in, Umar Farouk 

Abdulmutallab, came into one of my desk analysts with a Viper 

cable that had a pretty short statement of derogatory—under the 

influence of extremists in Yemen, or something to that effect. What 

she did was exactly what she has been taught, she went and 

searched Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab across all the other databases and got exactly zero hits. Why? Because there was no other 

Abdulmutallab anywhere in the database. 

The problem came that there was other information out there associated with Umar Farouk, that is all—spelled differently. And 

72 

the challenge for her, the challenge for all of my analysts is that 

roughly 350 names are nominated to the National 

Counterterrorism Center every day, and they span a wide range of 

derogatory information—suicide bomber, facilitator of terrorism, extremist. In the case of Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab, he would have 

been at the very, very low end of our level of concern. That is why 

in my opening statement, I said the two things that we are trying 

to do to enhance our ability to catch the next one of these kind 

would be to bolster the resource base associated with populating 

TIDE so that instead of a relatively rudimentary data set, we are 

enhancing the record so that the analysts will go out and search 

for other information that might enhance the record so that we 

would cross that reasonable suspicion bar to push the information 

to Director Healy. 

Similarly, we have a pretty substantial organization that is being 

built within our Director of Intelligence to help us with these random dots. It may not be a name, it may be a concept, but these 

are the kinds of things that are designed to help us exploit the tremendous amount of information that is out there. Are there resource implications? Yes, ma’am, absolutely. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Let me just quickly move to Mr. Kennedy of 

the State Department. Have you had any change in procedure 

based on what happened in Nigeria? 

Mr. KENNEDY. Yes, Congresswoman. What we have done is we 

have increased the information that we put into the Visa VIPER 

reporting cable. There was an interagency-agreed process that we 

provide the following data points. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. What about training of your staff? Because I 

am still concerned that the staff in Nigeria, obviously they are not 

terrorist experts, but I think if someone indicates that I believe my 

son is being trained in Yemen, that it should raise the level that 

maybe rather than you inputting it, you get on the phone and call, 

and maybe your call could convince the other receivers of information to heighten their sensitivity to the information. 

Mr. HEALY. Congresswoman, we have added additional information, but just as a matter of technicality, by turning this into a Visa 

VIPER cable and reporting it, this information goes to the entire 

intelligence and law enforcement community. 

It is like a broadcast. Calling one person is good but we might 

call the wrong person and that person may not have—so we prefer 

as a matter of course to send it to the entire law enforcement and 

Intelligence Community so that if anyone is aware of concerns 

about this individual, we are raising the flag throughout that entire community rather than just with one individual who may or 

may not have that next piece that Mr. Lungren referred to. We are 

the frontline. We are out there—— 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Let me just finish up on my question so I can 

yield back. Can you tell me what determination brings about the 

14-country list? Did that come after the Christmas Day bomber? 

There is a 14 country list that Pakistan is on. 

Mr. KENNEDY. That is a list that was proposed by the Department of Homeland Security. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Let me move to the Department of Homeland 

Security. Would you explain that list and why, please. 

73 

Ms. COGSWELL. Yes, ma’am. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Thank you, sir. 

Ms. COGSWELL. Immediately after the event DHS moved to put 

in place immediate enhancements to our security and screening 

posture in order to address the immediate threat stream. In doing 

so, we looked at a process we already had in place, the ability to 

issue those security directives and enhanced emergency amendments to increase the level of screening, and we focused on a way 

to designate certain individuals for that enhanced screening. We 

selected the countries based on those that were designated as state 

sponsors of terrorism, safe havens or links to the current threats 

streams that were in the environment. These were meant to be not 

permanent but near term to address the threat. They will evolve. 

They will change and—— 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. When did you establish the list? 

Ms. COGSWELL. I would have to check the date, but within a couple days. I think it was like 3 days after the event. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. I would ask that you submit the full list to 

the Committee and the analysis short of being classified, I assume, 

the general analysis that you utilized. Do you have a recollection 

of some of them without the whole list? I know you couldn’t recite 

the whole list. 

Ms. COGSWELL. Other than remembering, of course, that Nigeria 

and Yemen are on the list, I cannot recall the full list. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Would you provide us with that list, please? 

Ms. COGSWELL. I will. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. It seems that my good friend from California 

was diminishing the Miranda as a basis of getting information. I 

don’t know why Mr. Healy—I guess he is limiting himself to the 

terrorists, but I know that he was an FBI agent previous to that, 

and I am not sure why he is not able to give some sense of why 

the Miranda would diminish the rights—or the ability to secure 

America. 

But I would suggest that the problem that we have—and I am 

prepared to yield back, Mr. Chairman, and I thank you for this 

hearing, and I sit on the Homeland Security Committee—is the unfortunate sense that I get is that we are repeating post-9/11. It was 

the same lack of transfer of information that did not transfer a 

memo from an agent in the Midwest to the understanding of individuals who were training and used cash to be trained in Florida 

to take off and not land. 

So I don’t know where we are going to go with this sharing of 

information. We put more layers on, Mr. Chairman, but I don’t 

know if the layers are more effective. I think it will be interesting 

for us to continue to pursue this and collaborate with other Committees because our responsibility on securing the Nation is based 

on, I believe, human intelligence and the transfer of such. 

And as I listened to Mr. Healy talk about from Visa VIPER to 

so many acronyms, I don’t know where you get to the point where 

somebody stops and says this is enough for me to pick up the telephone, something that we don’t use anymore because we are too 

busy e-mailing and people are too busy not reading their e-mail, 

pick up the telephone and say I may be in error, but let’s move forVerDate Aug 31 2005 10:30 Nov 05, 2010 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00077 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 H:\WORK\FULL\032410\55598.000 HJUD1 PsN: 55598
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ward and put Mr. X—Ms. XYZ on this watchlist. I believe privacy 

is crucial and I don’t believe we should do this willy nilly. 

And I will be meeting with a group who are very concerned about 

the terrorists, about the list that DHS has put on, and I am concerned about that list because I don’t think it was done with thoroughness. But the point is that we have got to find some way to 

be more keen on how we transfer information to avoid Fort Hood, 

the devastating loss of life, and to avoid what could have been another devastating loss of life. 

Mr. Chairman I yield back 

Mr. CONYERS. Ladies and gentlemen, the bells are not working, 

but the voting has commenced on the floor. 

We will stand in recess until floor votes are disposed of and then 

we will resume. 

The Committee stands in recess. 

[Whereupon, at 12:20 p.m., the Committee recessed for votes on 

the House floor and the hearing was not resumed.] 

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