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~LEVL

THE UNITED STATES AIR FORCE

IN SOUTHEAST ASIAThe Advisory Years To 1965

by

ROBERT F, FUTRELL

With-the-assistance-of

MARTIN )BLUMENSON

OFFICE OF AIR FORCE HISTORY

UNITED STATES AIR FORCE

WASHINGTON, D.C., 1281

DISTRIBUTION STATE. mN A -

Approved for public reloml j

Diatribution Unlimited , I
T

L~ibrary of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data

Futrell. Robert F-rank.

The advisory' years in Southeast Asia. to 1965.

(Thie United States Air Force in Southea! Asia series)

BitL..ography p.

Includes index.

Stipi. of Does, no.: 1) 301.2:5098

1 Vietnamese Conflict. 196f-1975 - Aerial operations.

American. 2. United States Air Force -- histor% Vietniamese Conflict, 1961-1975. 3. Asia. Southecasiernt History.

1. Bllunienson. Martin. joint author. 11. Title. 1ll. Series: United

States Air Force in Southeast Asia Series

1Lbrary of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data

DS558.81F87 959.074.348 80-24547

Stock #008-.070-.00445-3

F-or sate by the Superintendent of D)ocuments. U.S. Gosernmcnt Printing Office

Washington, D.C 20402
Foreword

This publication is tile first of a series titled The United States Air Force in

Southeast Asia. It tells the story of the Air Force's involvement in the region from

the end of the second World War until the major infusion of American troops

into Vietnam in 1965. During these years. and most noticeably after 1961, the Air

Force's principal role in Southeast Asia was to advise the Vietnamese Air Force

in its struggle against insurgents seeking the collapse of the Saigon government.

This story includes some issues of universal applicability to the Air Force:

the role of air power in an insurgency, the most effective way to advise a foreign

ally, and how to coordinate with other American agencies (both military and

civilian) which are doing the same thing. It also deals with issues unique to the

Vietnamese conflict: how to coordinate a centralized, technological modern air

force with a feudal, decentralized, indigenous one without overwhelming it, and

how best to adapt fighter. reconnaissance, airlift, and liaison planes to a jungle

environment.

Additional volumes in this series will tell the story of the Air Force in South

Vietnam. in Laos, and over North Vietnam until the cessation of the Air Force's

direct role in 1973-

JoIN W. HUtsIoN

Major General, USAF Accession For

Chief Qfice of Air Force listor ,NTIS GRA&I

DTIC TAB 0

Unannounced 0

Just ificati on

By ..- .

Availibility Codes

Avail and/or

Dist Special

A'off
Preface

Robert Frank Futrell's works on Air Force history span the decades from

the second World War to vietnam. For the former conflict he contributed

sections to The Army Air Forces in World War II, edited by Craven and Cate.

His volume The United States Air Force in Korea, 1950-1953 is the official

history of the Air Force in that action. His Ideas, Concepts, Doctrine book is a

fundamental primer of basic thinking about air power among American military

services from 1907 through 1964. Before his retirement in 1974, Dr. Futrell wrote

a detailed manuscript on the early years of the USAF involvement in the

Vietnamese war. I consider it an honor to have been called upon to prepare this

manuscript for publication.

I wish to thank Major General John W. Huston, Chief, Office of Air Force

History, for a hospitable environment; Dr. Stanley L. Falk, Chief Historian, for

invaluable counsel and support, Mr. Max Rosenberg, Deputy Chief Historian,

Mr. Carl Berger, Chief, Histories Division, Colonel John Schlight. Chief. Special

Histories Branch, and Mr. Jacob Van Staaveren, historian, for helpful comments; Dr. George M. Watson for responses to my requests for information; and

all the members of the Office of Air Force History for making me feel at home.

I am responsible for any omissions or distortions in this narrative.

Martin Blumenson
Contents

Page

Foreword.. .... .... .... .... .... .... ..... iii

Preface ........ ................. v

Part One: The Truman Years

1. Origins of the American Commitment

to Vietnam ...... ............. 3

Part Two: The Eisenhower Years

II. Dien Bien Phu .... ............ 15

111. The Geneva Agreements and French Withdrawal . 29

IV. U.S. Command Problems in the Pacific: Emphasis on

Southeast Asia ..... ............ 41

V. Strained Civil-Military Relations in South Vietnam,

1957-1960 .... ............. 49

Part Three: The Kennedy Years

VI. Initial Challenges and Actions .. ........ 63

VII. Opening Farm Gate . . . ......... 79

VIII. The Taylor Mission ... ........... 85

IX. U.S. Command Arrangements: 2d ADVON

and MACV .... ............ 93

X. Tactical Air Control, Mule Train,

and Ranch Hand ... ........... 103

XI. Air Policy: Too Cautious? .. ......... 119

XII. Farm Gate and the Vietnamese Air Force . ..... 127

XIII. Air Operations, 1962: Interdiction, Strikes, and

Reconnaissance ... ........... 135

XIV. Ap Bac and Related Matters .. ........ 151

XV. Air Operations. 1963 ... ........... 167

XVI. Collapse of the Diem Government .. ....... 185

Part Four: The Johnson Years

XVII. Objectives Confirmed, Methods Expanded . ..... 195

XVIII. The War in Vietnam, 1964 ... ......... 207

XIX. The Gulf of Tonkin Incident ... ......... 227

XX. Diffusion of Air Assets ... .......... 236

XXI. End of the Advisory Phase .. ......... 253

Appendices

I. Growth of Major United States Air Force and Vietnamese

Air Force Units to February 1965 ... ........ 271

- - t.
2. Development of a Viet Cong Antiaircraft Capability. g

1962-1965.................283

Notes.....................287

Glossary....................325

Bibliogiaphic Note.................347

Index . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35

viii
Photographs

F-9F Ileacats ferried to Vietnam:. C-47 and C-1 19s with French

m arkings .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8

11-26 bombers: Morane-500 Crickets: F-81F Bearcats at Dien Bienl

..................................................... 9

USAF C-I 24 at Ceylon airlifting French soldiers to Vietnam, French

paratroop drop;: French Foicign Legion .............. 20

President Eisenhower, Gen. Paul Ely. an(l Adm. Arthur W. Radford:

supplies unloaded in Indochina under the Military Defense Assistanice Programl ........................................... 21

Refugees fleeing from North Vietnam w~hen the country was divided al

the l7th parallel .......................................... 32

Richard M. Nixon. Plierr Mendes-France, and John Foster Dulles:

Operation Wounded Warrior: OSAF evacuation of' French Foreign

Legionnaires after Diern Bien Phil............................. 33

Gen. Nat 1&ut F. Twining: Gen. .). Lawton Collins and Premier Ngo Dinh

Diem: M AAGt lcadquar tels in Saigon ......................... 38

Gen. Latremce S. Kumer: Gen. Thomas 1). WVhite................... 45

L-19s of the Vietnamese Air Force:. Sikoisky 1--19 helicopter at Tanl Son

Nhut.................................................. 51

W. A erell H arrinman. President Kennedy',and Deatn Rusk: Robert S.

McNamara and Gen. Lyman L. Lemnitzer; members of the Vietnamese Self D~efense Corps fromn Biron Enao. female. members of the

Civil Defense Gurard at I lao Cain ......................... ... 66

T-28 fighter-bombers: Lt. Richard A. Mathison and A I C Tri Pham

Minh. VNAF, stand with a collection of Farm Gate aircraft: T-28 in

foregrotrnd. 11-26 in left background. A-IL in right background, and

C-47 in distance-, R F-10I1 Voodoo............................ 77

Gen. Maxwell 1). ' aylor. Gen. Emmett O'Donnell, Jr.. Adm. J. IL.

Sides, and Lt. Gen. C. A. Roberts. in Hawaii: Gen. Paul D. Harkins,

Adm. I larry 1). Felt, and Ambassador Frederick E. Nolting at Tan

Son Nhtrt Airport: Gen. Curtis E. LeMay ....................... 87
Page

Brig. Gen. Rollen Anthis and Air Force Secretary Eugene Zuckert on

tour in the Pacific ....... ......................... 99

Viet Cong prisoners unload rice from a C-123 at Quang Ngai during a

Mule Train resupply mission: supplies pushed from a C-1 23 for an

outpost at Binh Hung: C-1 23s at Da Nang: aerial view ofa

government outpost ....... ........................ 109

C-I 23s on a defoliation mission, brass sprayers in the rear of a C-1 23:

C-123K aircraft at Hickant AFB, Hawaii, enroute to Vietnam for

defoliation activities ....... ........................ 114

C-1 23B on defoliation mission near Saigon: view from inside a C-1 23

as it sprays foliage: USNS Core in Saigon harbor with a cargo of

Ranch hland spray and equipment .... ................. 115

Vietnamese officers and American advisems plan an airlift of Vietnamese

paratroopers at Tan Son Nhut: Ist Lt. Wilfred G. Narr demonstrates

aircraft maneuvers to Vietnamese students at Moody A-B, Ga.: A IC

H. R Wilson and AIC R. L. Fleury install rockets into a B-26

bonber at Bien Hoa: F-102 Delta Daggers .... ............. 130

Maj. Ivan L. Slavich briefs Gen. Earle G. Wheeler and Gen. Paul D.

Harkins on a rocket mount of the UH-I B helicopter: ARVN paratrooper prepares for a jump over Cu Chi: TSgt William W. Cameron

instructs Vietnamese airmen in the operation of the gunsight on a

T-28. Vietnamese tanks move toward the burning presidential palace

after its bombing ....... .......................... 164

ARVN paratroopers leap from USAF C-123: 0-I E Bird Dog FAC:

Capt. B. D. Lassman and Capt. 1). F. Schell with Vietnamese

observer ........ .............................. 180

Vietnamese troops outside the presidential palace in Saigon ........ 192

Pres. Johnson, W. Averell Harriman; Adm. U.S. Grant Sharp. Jr.:

Maj. Gen. Joseph H. Moore, Gen. Jacob E. Smart, with Maj. Xuan

Vinh, VNAF ...... .. ........................... 209

Air Commodore Nguyen Cao Ky and Col. William E. Bcthea:

Gen. William Westmoreland: Al E aircraft: VNAF CH-34

helicopter ........ ............................. 222

x
Outposts or hamlets of South Vietnlam. .. .. ... .... ... .. 223

U SS iwconleroga............................231

Canberra bomber-. rocket pod on 1-IOO0: Australian Caribou aircraft at 3

Tanl Son Nhut..................................23

A I C .eonard A. Rowe: SSgt I larold Inman: AC-47 at Tall Son Nhut:

7.62 minigun m1ounted in AC-47 ............................ 242

Loudspeakers installed in C-47, leafllets dropped from a C-47 .......... 249

13-57 destroyed by Viet Cong mortar attack: Brink~ 3OQ area. following

terrorist attack................................... ... 262
Maps, Charts, and Graphs

Page

Southeast Asia ......................................... facing p. 1

Organizational Chart - Far East Air Forces .... ............. I I

Principal USAF/ VNAF Airfields in South Vietnam, to

February 1965 .............................................. 51

South Vietnam 's Provinces ..................................... 57

U.S. Command Arrangements - Vietnam, July 1962 ............... 99

Air Operations - 1962 ........................................ 137

ARVN Cotps Areas (Until November 1962) ....................... 154

ARVN Corps Tactical Zones (After November 1962) ................ 155

Air Operations - 1963 ........................................ 176

Air Operations in South Vietnam. 1964 to February 1965 ............ 200

USAF Support Bases Outside Vietnam ........................... 231

Barrell Roll Campaign in Laos - December 1964 -

January 1965 ............................................... 258

Diagram of "L" or Triangular Defense System ..................... 284

RVN Countrywide Totals - VC Antiaircraft Incidents .............. 285

xlii

PRECEDING PAGE BLA -NOT FILMD
1 00. 102 04' 106* 109, 110,

CHINA

CHINA

22'

Nautica

o 100HAiOI 50 

LAOS________20____

o 50 10 KllNORTHr
Part One:

The Truman Years
I. Origins of

The American Commitment

to Vietnam

About 700 miles west of the Philippine Islands, across the China Sea. lies the

great Indochinese peninsula. China is to the north, Burma to the west, and

Malaysia to the south. The western part of the peninsula holds Thailand (ancient

Siam) while the eastern portion contains Laos. Cambodia, and Vietnam

(formerly elements of French Indochina). This area of Southeast Asia (SEA)

attracted little American interest and attention until the closing months of World

War It.

American policymakers who shared President Franklin D. Roosevelt's

anticolonial sentiments expected Indochina to be freed from French hegemony.

Yet France reestablished control over Laos, Cambodia, and Vietnam, which had

been part of the French Empihe since the 19th century. To some extent this

occurred because the British government wished to resuscitate France as a

European power to help Britain balance somewhat the growing strength of the

Soviet Union. The United States acquiesced in this aim, and increasingly so as

the confrontation of the postwar superpowers evolved into the cold war. It was

the cold war that drew the United States into this region.'

Japan had virtually occupied Laos, Cambodia, and Vietnam after the fall of

France in 1940. While allowing the French to maintain a presence and a measure

of control, the Japanese incorporated the Indochinese economic resources into

their system. In March 1945, with Metropolitan France liberated and a fullfledged member of the Allied coalition, the Japanese interned French civilian and

military officials and removed the pretense of a combined occupation.-2

French police agencies and other offics ot internal control having been

eliminated. indigenous groups seeking Vietnamese independence began to

expand their activities. The most vigorous organization was the Viet Minh.

Dominated by the Indochinese communist party and directed by Ho Chi Minh.

the Viet Minh launched guerrilla operations against the Japanese and soon

claimed to control much of northern Vietnam, the Tonkin provinces. To help

harass the Japanese and also to gather intelligence, the U.S. Office of Strategic

Services sent several small teams to Vietnam.

By the time of the Japanese surrender in August 1945, the Viet Minh had

emerged as the leading nationalist group in Vietnam. Viet Minh soldiers on

August 19 arrived in Hanoi, capital of Tonkin, and assumed de facto control. In

Hue, capital of Annam, the central provinces, Emperor Bao Dai, last of the

Vietnamese royal family and a puppet of both France and Japan, abdicated. In

Saigon, capital of Cochin China in the south, a committee took power while

3
THE ADVISORY YEARS

recognizing the overall authority of the Hanoi regime. On December 2 in Hanoi,

Ho Chi Minh proclaimed the independence of the Democratic Republic of

Vietnam.

Meanwhile, the war in Europe had closed and in July 1945 the Potsdam

Conference convened. The American, British, and Russian representatives

agreed to include French military forces in operations being planned in Asia,

chiefly to liberate Indochina. The conferees also acted to regulari7e operational

boundaries. The China Theater under Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek was

extended southward to the 16th parallel, just below Tourane (Da Nang). The

territory south of that line came under the Southeast Asia Command headed by

Admiral Lord Louis Mountbatten. This division determined who was to exercise

control after the Japanese capitulation. '

In August 1945, Chinese nationalist troops moved into Tonkin and part of

Annam, while British troops occupied the lest of Annam and all of Cochin

China. The British restored French authority in tile south, and the French

brought military forces into the country and ruthlessly suppressed Vietnamese

aspirations for independence. Despite some continuing guerrilla activity, the

French had regained their former colonial status and were well established in

Saigon by the end of the year.

In the north the Chinese refused to intervene in a contest between the

well-organized Viet Minh and the small numbers of French. Concerned by the

threat of the Chinese communists under Mao Tse-tung, the Chinese nationalists

were reluctant to see the triumph of Ho Chi Minh in Vietnam. They preferred the

return of the French if France would abandon territorial and economic rights

formerly granted as concessions in China. This generally neutral stance fueled the

struggle for power between the Viet Minh and the French. A guerrilla war of low

intensity soon developed.

When the French agreed to renounce their concessions early in 1946,

Nationalist China recognized French sovereignty in Indochina and moved

Chinese troops out of Vietnam. By the end of March, they were being replaced by

French military forces.

Ho Chi Minh had been negotiating with the French authorities for recognition of his new government and ultimate independence. The exchanges were

futile and incidents of violence multiplied. The climax came in November 1946

after a French patrol boat in Haiphong harbor clasned with Vietnamese militia.

The French responded by brutally bombarding the city ana killing an estimated

6,000 civilians. whereupon Ho broke off the talks. In December he moved his

government into the mountains of Tonkin and opened full-scale guerrilla war by

attacking the French in Hanoi.

American policymakers had conflicting feelings. Their sympathy for the

Vietnamese nationalists left them reluctant to see Fiance restore control by

force-they wanted French authority to enjoy the support of the Vietnamese

people. Oti the other hand, Americans were uneasy because Vietnamese independence might produce a communist state.4

4

C,,
THE ORIGINS OF AMERICAN COMMITMENT

Hoping that the Vietnamese were more nationalistic than communistic,

U.S. government officials urged the French to end the guerrilla warfare and to

find a political solution acccptable to both parties. If France made a bona fide

accommodation to ultimate Vietnamese sovereignty, Ho's strength might collapse. Continually advocating an equitable solution to the problem of conflicting

claims to power, the United States prohibited the export of war materials to the

French in Vietnam, although munitions sent to Metropolitan France could, of

course, be reshipped to Southeast Asia.5

While combating Ho's guerrilla activities, France entered into negotiations

with anti-Ho Vietnamese parties. To give these elements a native leader, the

French in the spring of 1949 installed Bao Dai. the former emperor, as the chief of

state of an entity formed by the union ofTonkin, Annam. and Cochin China. But

this was hardly more than a show of sovereignty. for the French retained control

of Vietnamese foreign and military affairs.'

Troubled American officials began to accept this arrangement as the cold

war intensified everywhere. The Greek civil war, the Berlin blockade, the coup

d'etat in Ciechoslovakia. as well as the successes of the Chinese communists

against the nationalists, led to a heightened concern vith worldwide communism

that appeared to be monolithic. Surely, Ho Chi Minh's communist affiliation

was part of a growing global menace. To cope with this and to rehabilitate

Western Europe as a force against communist encroachment, the United States

early in 1949 helped to form and joined the North Atlantic Treaty Organization

(NATO) for mutual defense.

The final triumph of tile Chinese communists in October 1949 seemed to

confirm the worst American fears. It spurred the Congress to pass the Mutual

Defense Assistance Act designed to deal with the cold war. Tle President was

empowered to dispense funds to various nations, including "the general area of

China" which was extended to cover Southeast Asia and specifically Vietnam. 7

The ongoing guerrilla war in Vietnam that weakened French support of

NATO and the defense of Western Europe, the arrival of Chinese communist

troops at the northern frontier of Vietnam at the beginning of 1950, the formal

recognition of Ho Chi Minh's Democratic Republic of Vietnam by Communist

China and the Soviet Union in January 1950-all persuaded the United States

government to adopt the Bao Dai solution. On February 7. 1950, the United

States extended diplomatic recognition to the State of Vietnam as well as to the

Kingdoms of Cambodia and Laos.

Nine days later. France requested American economic and military assistance for prosecution of the war in Indochina. Unable to bear the burden without

American aid, France was thinking of withdrawing from the region if lio Chi

Minh received increasing resources from China and tile Soviet Union.'

What the French needed immediately were ammunition, napalm, and

barbed wire to help defend perimeters around Hanoi and Haiphong against Viet

Minh attacks. Their air units in the Far East possessed only obsolete and
THE ADVISORY YEARS

miscellaneous aircraft.* Few fully trained military maintenance technicians were

on hand because ofa general shortage in Metropolitan France, where the French

Air Force depended in large part on contract aircraft maintenance. 9

President Harry S. Truman regarded the emergence of Communist China

as an extension of Soviet power and saw the growth of communist influence over

Asia as a threat to American interests. He instructed the National Security

Council to formulate a policy for strengthening non-communist Asian nations.

The result was a resolve to block communist expansion by collective and bilateral

security treaties. Since the Joint Chiefs of Staff(JCS) had already recommended

spending funds to support anti-communist forces in Indochina, S75 million

allocated in the Mutual Defense Assistance Act for "the general area of China"

wa- appropriately at hand.

The French wanted a substantial and long-term American commitment.

And in the spring of 1950, American decisionmakers all opposed what was called

losing Southeast Asia to communism. Consequently, the United States Government during fiscal year 1951 decided to provide S164 million in military aid to

France for use in Indochina.' 0

Whatever doubts some American officials may have had that French

military success, predicated on American military assistance, would necessarily

lead to a strengthened non-communist government in Vietnam vanished in the

face of two events. The first was intelligence confirmation of increasing aid to the

Viet Minh by the People's Republic of China. The second was the in\ asion of the

Republic of Korea on June 25, 1950, by the communist forces ofthe Democratic

People's Republic of Korea.

Now the struggle seemed absolutely clear. As President Truman told Americans on June 27, the communists had "paswed beyond the use of subversion to

conquer independent nations and will now use armed invasion and war." The

United States, he promised, would resist aggression in Korea and at the same

time accelerate military assistance to France and the Associated States in Indochina (Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia)."1 Even as he spoke, eight C-47 transp,,rts

weie being prepared for delivery to Metropolitan France. Because the situation

was critical in Southeast Asia, American pilots flew these planes direct to Saigon

and turned them over even before formal U.S. agencies were in the countiy to

coordinate shipments of assistance materials. These eight aircraft were the first

aviation aid furnished by the United States to the French in Vietnam.

As American forces entered the war in Korea and as the French resisted Viet

Minh attacks in Tonkin, Donald R. Heath became the U S. Minister to the

Associated States on July 6, 1950. The initial elements of the U.S. Militaiy

*tFrench Air Force Indochina Lonisted of two squadrons totaling fort -,x Britih MK-IX

Spitfire%. three squadrons of sixty-three American F-63 Kingeobras. two squaidrons oi tbirty-fise German JU-52 transports. and onu squadron of twenty American C-47s. plus some light haison

planes. 'I he I-rench Navy had a patrol squadron of eight American |'BY-5A Catahnas and a

reconnaissance squadron of nine British Superniarine-I Sea Otters A lack of speciah/cd aircraft

required the use of ftighters for reconnaissance. strafing, and bombing missions. In general, however.

bombardment was conducted by |ItY patrol planes and by .ItJ-52 transporis under contract.

6
THE ORIGINS OF AMERICAN COMMITMEN'I

Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG) entered Saigon on August 3. Brig. Gen.

Francis G. Brink, USA, assumed command on October 10, and Lt. Col.

Edmund F. Freeman. the Air Aiiaiciie ii, Saigon. handled air assistance duties

until the Air Force Section of MAAG-Indochina came into being on November 8

under Col. Joseph B. Wells.12

Mr. Heath was the Chief of Mission and the senior U.S. representative in

Saigon. General Brink, the MAAG chief, was his military advisor. MAAG

received and reviewed requests for American aid to the ground, naval, and air

forces, established requirements and, after coordinating with Heath, submitted

them to the Department of Defense (DOD).'"

Although Americans hoped to work directly with the Vietnamese as well as

with the French. the French termed the Bao Dai government and its military

forces incapable of dealing with assistance matters. French troops were carrying

the burden of the war, and the few Vietnamese units in existence had limited

capacities except as auxiliaries.

As a consequence, MAAG received requests from the French, transferred

title of military assistance program materials to them, and tried to insure the

proper use of the items supplied. On December 23, 1950. the United States.

France, Vietnam, Cambodia. and Laos signed the Mutual Defense Assistance

Agreement. A provision stipulated that American goods destined for Indochina

would pass through French hands.' 4

The military assistance effort had three priorities. The first was responding

to emergency requests to enable French forces to meet immediate threats. The

second was improving French military capabilities. The third and least important

was developing indigenous Vietnamese armed forces.

With respect to aviation requirements, not until October 1950, when forty

U.S. Navy F-6F Hellcats arrived in Saigon aboard a French carrier, could the

United States make available fighter aircraft to replace the old M K-I X Spitfires.

While the French requested F-63 Kingcobras primarily because of their

37-mm cannon, the United States Air Force (USAF)* had no spare parts or

ammunition for these obsolete aircraft and instead furnished ninety F-8F Bearcat fighters. which were ferried to Vietnam in February and March 195 I. Delays

in installing ground equipment postponed the arrival in Vietnam of five RB-26

reconnaissance planes until July. Twenty-four B-26 bombers were renovated and

transported to Hawaii by carrier in December. then flown to Tourane. Nine

others flew from Sacramento to Hawaii and on to Vietnam at the of the

year.

These deliveries completed the initial aviation schedules under the Mutual

Defense Assistance Program. The planes enabled the French to expand sortie

rates from an average of 450 a week in the summer of 1950 to 930 in the spring of

1951.15

* Hereafter in this work. the terms"Air Foicc.""Army.""Navy."'and "Marine Corps' will mean

'U S. Air Force." "'T S Army." 't.S. Navy." and "U.S. Marine Corps." Military forces of other

nations will be specifically designated. for example, "French Air Force

7
I III- AI)VISORYNYFARS

(Bottom) F-8F Bearcats ferried to Vettnam (Upper left) C-47 with French markings (Upper right) USAF

C-1 19s with French markings leave Haiphong to drop supplies at Dien Bien Phu

P 9 (Top) B-26s (Center) Morane-5OG Crickets (Bottom) F-8F Bearcats on Dien Bien Phu Airfietd

Courtesy Frencli E C P Armoes

44

Courtesy French ECO AimCOS
'I HE ORIGINS OF AMERICAN COMMITMEN']

Courtec French E C P Arrnes

I0
'IlE ADVISORY YEARS

Despite higher American priorities in Korea, U.S. materiel dispatched to

Vietnam helped the campaigning. High Commissioner and Commander in Chief

Gen. Jean de Lattre de Tassigny said in January 1951 that U.S. air resources,

.especially napalm bombs, arrived in the nick of time." Mr. I leath believed that

"French superiority in aviation and artillery was responsible for turning back a

Viet Minh offensive. hi particular, the use ofnapaln ... was a decisive factor in

the French holding operations."ib

Furthei French viciories in May 1951 compelled the Viet Minh to abandon

battles of confrontation and to retreat to lower-key guerrilla operations of

harassment and ambush. The war assumed the characteristics of a stalemate."

For a variety of reasons-to gain the initiative, to respond to Ametican

urging for a gieater Vietnamese stake in the struggle, to allow France to contiibute more to the NATO defenses in Europe- tile French acceded to a request

from Bao Dai and projected an expansion of Vietnamese military forces. They

opened an air training center at Nha Trang Airfield in June 1951 and a Vietnamese Air Force office in Saigon during hly. Furnishing for training several

Morane-500 Cricket liaison aircraft (French-built version of the German Fiescler

Storch). the French established the Vietnamese 312th Special Mission Squadron

at Tan Son Nhut Airfield near Saigon. Though the first Vietnamese flyers

received their training in Metropolitan France, French instructors at Nha Trang

started in March 1952 to train small numbers of pilots, observers, and maintenance len.

These efforts permitted the activation in 1953 of two Vietnamese Cricket

observation squadrons and in 1954 of a light combat assault liaison squadron

equipped with French Dassault M.D.-315 Flamants. The three squadrons were

reorganized on July I, 1954. into the Vietnarese Ist Liaison Group. Although

the air tiaining program had significance for the future, it yielded only a token

number of Vietnamese liaison pilots and observers who had begun to lly combat

missions tnder French control toward the end of 1952.1s

By then the new MAAG chief, Brig. Gen. Thomas J. 1-1. Tiapnell, USA.

and Col. Arvid E. Olson, chief of the MAAG Air Force Section., wei e concerned

over the effectiveness of French Air Force Indochina. It was iimited to a

personnel ceiling of 10,000 men and still suffered firom a scai city of technicians.

Aircraft maintenance an'. supply were consequently marginal. Plagued by poor

consumption records, the French found it difficult to project futule materiel

requirements. At the same time, the Korean War imposed its own needs.

American deliveries to Vietnam decreased, and F-8Fs and B-26s scheduled to

meet increasing attrition remained unsent during 1952. Yet ten C-47s arriving in

March and April 1952, and ten more in September and October bolstered the

French. 9

The French flew the C-47s to their limits to meet stepped-tip action by the

Viet Minh in October. The planes performed so well that Gen. Raoul Salan. who

had replaced de Lattre, asked General Trapnell for additional ones. Trapnell

passed the request to Washington and. toward the end of the year, Far East Air

Forces (FEAF) headquarters in Tokyo received instructions to fill the order.

10
-7

THE ORIGINS OF AMERICAN COMMITMENT

FEAF hurriedly dispatched twenty-one C47s to Clark Air Base in the Philippines. There, the 24th Air Depot Wing removed USAF insignia, added paradrop

equipment, and delivered the pla:cs to the French at Nha Trang. To provide

technicians for better maintenance and supply, the wing seti; .a temporary duty

force to Nba Trang on January 4, 1953. This was the first USAF coi.:;ngent.

exclusive of the MAAG, to deploy to Vietnam. They remained in the countiy

until French troops relieved them on August 14.20

While the United States was funding approximately one-third of the costs of

military operations, the French, despite limited success in northwest Tonkin,

became increasingly disheartened by their own casualties and expenditures.

Appropriations from Bao Dai's government and from the French National

Assembly for continuing military operations were difficult to obtain.2' As Secretary of State Dean Acheson informed President-elect Dwight D. Eisenhower in

November 1952, the French, in Paris as well as in Vietnam, were wavering in

their support for the war. They wanted international backing an6 additional

assistance for their efforts. 2

Dealing with this pioblem would be one of President Eisenhower's

concerns.

FAR EAST AIR FORCES

(Japan)

5TH AIR FORCE 13TH AIR FORCE 2 , TH AIR FORCE FAR EAST AIR MATERIEL

(Japan) (Philppines) (Olknawa and Guam) COMMAND (Japan)

JUNE 1950

II

- ,.
Part Two:

The Eisenhower Years
II. Dien Bien Phu

Early in his administration, President Eisenhower decided that three actions

were necessary for French success in Indochina. France had to give "greater

reality" to Vietnamese nationalistic aspirations and thereby deny the Viet Minh

their claim of struggling for independence. With the Vietnamese people thus

allowed a gicater stake in their destiny, the French had to place more reliance on

indigenous military forces, requiring better equipment and training facilities.

Finally, the free world had to furnish more assistance to France. which alone was

cai rying on what appeared to be an international struggle.'

In March 1953 Secretary of State John Foster )ulles advised French

authorities that the United States would enlarge its fiscal support if France

framed an acceptable plan for resolving the war. 2 Before the French government

could make a detailed response, the Viet Mini launched another offensive in

western Tonkin in April 1953, moved into Laos. and threatened Thailand.'

A NATO foreign ministers conference was in progress in Paris and French

officials asked Dulles for the loan of C-119 transports to lift tanks and other

heavy equipment into Laos. Although Eisenhower was unwilling to employ

USAF crews on these combat missions, he agreed to lend the planes if Civil Air

Transport contract crews from Taiwan flew them. These arrangements made,

FEAF received the order to provide the aircraft. In May USAF crews flew six

C-1 9s to Nha Trang where contract pilots took them to Cat Bi Airfield near

Haiphong. The 24th Air Depot Wing sent a supporting maintenance and supply

detachment to Cat Bi, and then to Gia Lar Airfield near Hanoi. The airciaft and

detachment withdrew from Vietnam late in July after satisfying the requirement.4

General Heni i Eugene Navarre, a new commander in chief, arrived in

Vietnam in May 1953, with instructions to defeat the Viet Mirth and bring the

war to a close in conformance with American provisos. Navarre drew a plan to

use mobile strike forces against main enemy units. lie hoped to expand support.

heighten cooperation among ground, naval, and air forces, secure fresh reinforcements from France, and improve Vietnamese forces. ie proposed to lure

the Viet Minh into open battle, break up their main forces by 1955. and reduce

them to a low level of guerrilla warfare that for the most part indigenous troops

could contain.5

To help Navam me and incidentally to observe the local conditions, an American joint military mission headed by Army Lt. Gen. John W. O'Daniel and

including Maj. Gen. Chester E. McCarty. commander of FEAF's 315th Air

Division (Combat Cargo). reached Saigon on .lune 20. O'l)annel was favorably

impressed with Navarre's plan. So was McCarty. Because of the personnel

shortages in French Air Force Indochina, McCarty noted, deliveries of more

U.S. aircraft without air and maintenance ciews made little sense. Navarre

wanted extra paratroop lift capacity. and McCarty proposed to lend the French

C-1 19s. The planes could be dispatched to Cat Bi a day before a planned

15 I"
TIHE ADVISORY YEARS

operation, flown in combat by French cews, and icturned to Clark Air Base for

la i nte na lice.6

The commander of French Air Foice Indochina rejected the C-119s.

Instead. he iequested MAAG in August 1953 to supply twenty-five C-47s plus

necessary equipment by October I. Palled out of units in the United States, these

aircraft were delivered to Vietnam in )ecember.'

The armistice in Korea. signed on hly 27. 1953. raised the possibility of

greater support not only by the United States for the French but by Communist

China for the Viet Minh as well. Ameiican officials nevertheless believed in the

efficacy of Navarre's plan. When tile Fiench government in September agreed to

tile ewentual independence of Vietnam, the United States promised to make

available- in addition to the assistance funds already committed to the French

and the Associated States of Vietnam. Cambodia, and Laos- S305 million b\

tile end of 1954. In March 1954 the United States would offer to boost the

amount and to icimburse Fiance up to S785 million for expendituies in Indochina during calendai year 1954.N

In Vietnam. Navarre said he would keep General Trapnell and MAAG

informed of operational plans and not limit their function simply to handling

materiel requests. Expecting M AAG to play a larger role in assisting the French.

Secretary of Defense Charles E. Wilson in January 1954 augmerted the Air

Force Section from seven officers and eight airmen to thiity officers and thirtyfive airmen. Yet, despite public announcements in Washington of all-out Amercan support. MAAG continued to have little influence on French activities.

MAAG complained (as other bodies with similar missions elsewhere normally

noted) that the French were reluctant to accept advice. They generally expected

the United States to delivereverything requested, regardless of theirability to use

or to maintain it.9

Starting his operations in the fall of 953. General Navarie focused on the

plain of' Dien Bien Phti. Located in northwest Tonkin and near tile boidei of

Laos, it controlled the main load between the two regions. A strongly fortified air

and ground base at )ien Bien Phu would reestablish French authoi itv in the area

and block Viet Minh incursions into the neighboring kingdom .

Paratrooper,;jumped onto an airstrip at Dien Bien Phti on November 20.

and began to fortify the area. They needed heav' equipment, including large

quantities of baibed wire. On December 5 FEAF started to feiry 315th Air

Division C-Il9s to Cat Bi Airfield for further flight by French militar% or by

civilian contract crews. At Cat Bi a detachment of the 483d Troop Can ier Wing,

the 8081 st Aerial Resupply Unit, and a provisional maintenance squad ron of the

Fa, East Air Logistics Foice supported from twelve to twenty-two C-1 l9sat any

given time."

As Navarre developed an enclave in northwestern Tonkin. he had to

weaken the French defenses of Ilanoi and Haiphong. In )ecember !953 and in

.anuary 1954. Viet Minh attacks threatened French security in those cities. Even

more serious was a glowing Viet Minh concentration around Dien Bien Phu.'

16
DIEN BIEN PHU

The American governnwnt noted the dangers, and Assistant Secretary of

Defense for International Security Affairs Frank C. Nash diiected tile military

services to give the highest priority to the Mutual Assistance Program without

regaid to funding. On January 16. 1954. President Eisenhower instructed

Defense Secretar\ Wilson to report to nim all that could be done to help the

French without actually committing U.S. forces to combat. To permit the

French to counter Viet Minh incursions into Laos, six long-range B-26s arrived

in Indochina in .lainuarv. When the French then requested twenty-two more, ten

to offset attrition and twelve to augment bombing capabilities, Assistant Secretary Nash on .lanuary 29 resolved to provide them even if they had to come from

opeational USAF squadrons in the Far East. Notified of the decision. FEAF

ferried sixteen of its planes from Japan to Clark Air Base where French markings

were painted on, then delivered them to iourane in mid-F,.oruary. These

aircraft remained on loan until sixteen B 26s ,nd three RB-26s, funded by

the Mutual Defense Assistance Progian, could reach Indochina later in

February and March. I

Despite talk of getting additional aviation personnel from France and of

using Vietnamese to augment French service troops. the French air units

remained approximately one-fourth undermanned. FEAF received instructions

on January 31 to organiie for duty in Vietnam several provisional C-47 and B-26

maintenance and supply units, with a composite strength of some three hundred

men. Brig. Gen. Albert G. Hewitt. commander of Far East Air Logistics Force.

arrived in Saigon on February 2, 1954. and established a B-26 detachment at

Tourane and a C-47 detachment at Do Son Airfield near Haiphong. Three days

later, the members of this highly classified undertaking began to be airlifted in.

President Eisenhower informed the American public that "some airplane

mechanics . . . who would not get touched by combat" had been sent to

Vietnam.' 4

Support of the French bothered Gen. Otto P. Weyland. FEAF commanding general. Because furnishing USAF personnel hampered his own combat

teadiness. he preferred the French to receive American funds for contract

maintenance. Traveling to Vietnam early in February. General Weyland gained

the impression that the French problems were "primarily political and psychological." The Vietnamese disliked the Fiench and seived pooi ly undel them.

More serious, the Vietnamese laborers who worked at the Hanoi airfields by day

might well be joining the Viet Minh at night.' 5

As growing communist forces gathered around Dien Bien Phu and cut the

surface routes to the garrison, General Navarre airlifted new French and Vietnamese troops into the airhead. By mid-January 1954. air supply required twenty

C-I19 and fifty C-47 sorties each day. The security of this airlift seemed threatened when radio intercepts reported Viet Minh stockpiling of 37-mm rapid-fire.

Soviet-made antiaircraft (AA) artillery ammunition nearby. At the request of the

Army attache in Saigon, two FEAF experts in antiaircraft warfare, Captains

Robert M. Lloyd and Robert W. Hicks. visited Vietnam between.lanuary 16and

February 5. They warned that 37-mm guns sited along the limited air approaches

17
THE ADVISORY YEARS

to Dien Bien Phu would have "considerable success" against low-flying tran.

ports. But aftei studying aerial photographs, the officers concluded that the

French had exaggerated the threat-there wee no enemy 37-mm guns in the

area. 6

President Eisenhower was apprehensive that the Viet Minh would overrun

the troops besieged in the isolated fortress at Dien Bien Phu. but Navarre

iemained optimistic. The position was attiacting a large part of the Viet Minh

military forces and if they attacked, the Fiench would inflict heavy casualties on

them. *rhe report of the American antiaircraft artillery experts was reassuring.

French Ministei of Defense Rene Pleven and Armed Forces Chief of Staff It.

Gen. Paul H. R. Ely visited the site in February and were impressed with the

strength of the defenses. General O'Daniel enthusiastically reported the land

garrison able to withstand any attack that the Viet Minh could launch "at

present." The USAF directorate of intelligence decided in March 1954 that Ho

Chi Minh would be "stupid" to attack and take heavy losses when "hit and run"

tactics weic so much nmore effective.'

in talks completed on February 18. 1954. France. the United States, Great

Britain, and the Soviet Union agreed to discuss political solutions for Korea and

Indochina at a conference to be held in Gene\a on April 26. Secretary of State

Dulles had opposed setting a specific date for further international negotiations.

arguing that a fixed time would tempt Ito Chi Minh into a spectacular

operation.,

His concern was prophetic-Ho sought aln all-out victory at Dien Bien Phu.

Chinese advisors had trained and equipped Viet Minh artillery and antiaircraft

units. Disassembled weapons, brought in on the backs of human carriers, had

been reassembled and placed in positions concealed under heavy vegetation in

the hills surrounding the French garrison. Artillery pieces included 75- and

105-mm howitzers. the latter of American manufacture that had been captured

ir Korea. Among the antiaircraft arms were Soviet-made 37-mam automatic

weapons and 12.7-mm heavy n'achineguns. A 100-mile road was opened to a

major depot on the Chinese border, and a fleet of 1.000 trucks arriving from

China assured sufficient shells for a high rate of lire. 19

Before the Viet Minh launched their attack against Dien Bien Phu. guerrillas struck the Gia Lain and Cat Bi airfields inside the Hanoi- Haiphong perimeter. On the night of March 3. infiltrators used plastic explosives to damage or

destroy ten civil transport aircraft at Gia Lain. IUhree nights later at Cat Bi.

guerrillas destroyed one B-26 and six Morane-500 Crickets and damaged three

parked B-26s.20

The attack against Dien Bien Phu began on March 10 with shelling or the

two airstrips. At nightfall on the 13th the Viet Minh mounted massed assaults

against outposts. Although the French dropped two paratroop battalionsi nto

Dien Bien Phu on March 14 and 16, the Vict Minh clung tu the surrounding hills

and sent artillery fire plunging down upon the garrison and airstrips. Ground

support came from all available air units of French Air Force Indochina. the

French aircraft carrier Arromanches, and from some naval patrol airmen flying

18
IIEN BIEN PIIU

P14Y-2 Pri\ateeis out ol Cat Hi. Sorties during the week ol March 11-17

averaged lorty-thiee per da\.

On the l4th communist gunneis closed the principal airstiip at Dien Bien

(lPhu, then destioved se\en F-8Ks. two C-47s. one C-119. ltr Clickets. and two

11-191B helicopteis on tile ground. A B-26 hit by antiairci ift ine crashed upon

landingat Cat Hi. Enemy fite the next day downed one [-61 and one [-8 -. 1 hat

same week. flak damaged three F-8Fs and one C-1 19. C-47, and sinallei planes

sneaked into the aistrip at night for two weeks to e\acuat casualties. These

missions ceased after an air ambulance was destroyed by artill n on Maich 28.- 1

French fighters and light bombers giving direct and close air support to the

ground troops had to operate from higher altitudes because of the accurate

antiaircraft fire. The crews theiefore found it harder to locate and hit dug-in and

carefully camouflaged positions. Since napalm dropped by C.47s seemed particularly potent. tile Fiench on March 18 asked to use FEAF C-119s for larger

napalm drops on moonlit nights. While General Weyland thought the C-I1 9S

rather vulnerable for such work. he agreed to furnish them. One plane carrying

4,000 gallons of drummed napaln crashed during takeoff from Cat Bi on March

23. Nevertheless, the French flew some C-1 19 drops with satisfactory results. But

napaln. effective i the rice paddies of the Red River Delta, was less suitable to

tile canopied and rain-soaked forest around Dien Bien Phu.22

With the major airstrip at Dien Bien Pihu closed, the 170 tons of ammunition and 32 of Iood required each day to sustain the garrison had to be dropped

into ever-shrinking zones. All military air transports, including American C-1 19s,

were committed to this resupply, even though high-altitude drops from 8.000 to

10.000 f-'. dispersed much cargo into Viet Minh territory. Drops from 3,000 to

4,000 feet were impossible because of the 3

7 -mm antiaircraft fire. Supplies in lieu

of aircraft and crews were sacrificed. and one-half to two-thirds of the items fell

into enemy hands.2-

President Eisenhower seriously considered a direct U.S. military intervention. But judging adequate gi ound forces to be already engaged, he was reluctant

to commit American ground troop in Southeast Asia or to employ air units

squarely in support of the French. He was unwilling to authori7e stronger U.S.

meaures unless a coalition of pow ers, including Britain in particular. gave moral

meaning to such an undertaking.24

Talk of using American air and naval forces to support the French

prompted Vice Chief of Staff Gen. Thomas D. White to direct a studs on how

best to employ the Air Force i Indochina. Army Chief of Staff Gen. Matthew 13.

Ridgway dispatched a team of officers under Maj. Gen. James M. Gavin to

Vietnam to gather facts on a possible ground force commitment. President

Eisenhower, noting that General Trapnell was due for rotation, directed that

General O'Daniel, an experienced combat commander who still visited Indochina periodically, be assigned as Chief of MAAG.25

In Washington on March 20, French General Ely met with President

Eisenhower, Secretary of State Dulles, and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

Admiral Arthur W. Radford. USN. who were gravely and sympathetically

19
T'HE ADVISORY YEARS

kAA

BZ

20
IIN MIEN NWI

P 20 (Top) USAF C-124 ait Ceylon airlifting French soldiers to Vietnam (Center) French paratroopers

(Bottom) French Foreign Legion

unloaded in Indochina under the Military Defense Assistance Program

A- 1
THE ADVISORY YEARS

concerned about the situation. Eisenhower directed Radford to give the French

whatever materials thcy requested ie was speaking of logistic assistance. but Ely

had the impression that much moic was involved in the offer. Dulles reiterated

the position that overt U.S. participation in the war would depeild on French

willingness to expand the training of indigenous forces and to give ultimate

independence to the Associated States. Radford was more encouraging. He

spoke of direct U.S. intervention by sixty B-29 bombers escorted by 150 carrier

aircraft of the Seventh Fleet against the Viet Minh at Dien Bien Phu.

In Paris, Ely reported Radford's personal assurance of naval air support if

the situation required it. The IFrench government on March 29 then sent Col.

Raymond Brohon to Vietnam to see if American intervention was needed to save

Dien Bien Phu.26

In Hanoi. Brohon told General Navarre of possible American airstrikes. At

first feeling that they might trigger overt Chinese intervention, Navarre informed

General Ely on the night of April 3 that direct American action might "have a

decisive effect particularly if it comes before the [next] Viet-Minh assault." The

Viet Minh had already launched a massed attack on the evening of March 30,

and were about to mount another on the night of April 4. They seemed to be

taking heavy casualties. 2

'

On the 3d of April in Paris, the French government asked the United States

to fly two battalions of French paratroopers and some naval personnel from

France to Vietnam. The Americans agreed and set the first aii lift for the 15th.2x

Alerted on Api il 3 to assume the mission, the United States Air Forces in Europe

planned to use C-119s of the 322d Air Division (Combat Cargo). On the 6th.

however, Pi ime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru refused to permit flights ovei India,

even though the troops transported would be unarmed and dressed in civilian

clothes. Air Force headquarters accordingly directed the 62d Troop Carrier

Wing to deploy C-I 24s from Larson Air Force Base. Vashington. On April 20.

six C-1 24s picked up 514 passengers in Paris and 'unis and traveled to Vietnam,

with intermediate refueling stops in Libya, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan,

Ceylon. and Thailand. The planes unloaded at Tourane on the 23d. A second lift

of five C-1 24s departed Marseilles with 452 passengers on May 5. followed much

the same route, and arrived at Tourane on the 8th.2 9

Meanwhile, at midnight on April 4. Premier Joseph Laniel asked Amba,;-

sador C. Douglas )illon for strikes by Navy carrier pilots against Viet Minh

artillery around the besieged French forces. As an alternative, he requested the

immediate loan of ten to twenty B-29s. these to be maintained by USAF

personnel and flown by French crews.)"

Secretary )ulles had earlier spoken of the determination of the United

sLia.cs 1.0 reZii Chinese aggression. In a speech to the Overseas Press Club in

Washington on March 29, he expressed strong opposition by "whatever means"

against the extension of communist power into Southeast Asia."

British Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden wanted to be sure exactly what

Dulles meant, for Eden thought it useless to encourage the French in an

adventure that would succeed only with more than limited military assistance.

22
)IEN 1I3EN PHU

Accoidingly, the British Ambassador Roger M. Makins info meed Dulles that his

government believed the French situation in Indochina to be beyond salvage. It

was therefore important, he said, to refrain from jeopardizing the negotiations to

be held in Geneva,) 2

Secretary Dulles, Admiral Radford, and Deputy Secretary of Defense

Roger M. Kyes on April 3 briefed a select group of congressional leaders. The

latter made it clear that the Congress would support no unilateral U.S. intervention in Indochina unless three conditions were met: unified action by the noncommunist nations in Southeast Asia and by the United Kingdom, complete

independence to be granted to the Associated States, and continuation by the

French of their military effort on the same scale after other nations entered the

conflict.,

Because congressional support for U.S. air and naval assistance to France

depended on a British alignment, President Eisenhower wrote Prime Minister

Winston Churchill a personal letter on April 4. Churchill's response three days

later indicated little enthusiasm for involvement.

On April 5 Dulles had revealed in testimony before the House foreign affairs

committee that the Chinese were "coming awfully close" to overt military

intervention. This, he said, Eisenhower would not countenance. Yet, given the

British position, the United States on the 6th informed France that other

circumstances were necessary for a direct American role in Vietnam. .

"

On the same day. Gen. Nathan F. Twining, Air Force Chief of Staff.

recommended against lending B-29 aircraft for two reasons. The French had

little ability to operate the planes and none to support them. Suitable targets for

the large bombers were absent) 6

General Navarre informed Paris on April 7 that he lacked Fiench flight

crews to man bot rowed B-29s. Furthermore, without fighter escorts, the B-29s

might be shot down if the Chinese sent in i IG jets. "

Convinced of Indochina's major importance to the free world, President

Eisenhower on the 7th explained to the press why he thought so. The surrender of

any free people to communism, he said, was inimical to freedom everywhere. The

loss of Vietnam would expose other nations in Southeast Asia to communist

aggression. "You have a row of dominoes set tip, you knock over the first one,

and what will happen to the last one is the certainty it will go over very quicklv."'

American military studies were far from optimistic about the prospect of

employing U.S. combat forces to support the French. A FEAF staff paper

stressed the point that the French still followed an "arrogant"colonial policy and

hiad so alienated native loyalties a,, to make a military solution probably impossible. Besides, rigid ceilings on French military manpower and a reluctance to

develop native forces had dashed what hope there might have been to deal with

the Viet Minh militarily. More specifically, the French had failed to exploit their

planes fully, for they had neither interdicted enemy supply routes nor properly

used air strikes against the hostile concentrations ringing the fortiess. 9

A USAF staff study concluded that air power would contribute to the

efforts of land forces, but several factors would sei iously inhibit air effectiveness.

23
THE ADVISORY YEARS

Cited were the character of the ground operations, the terrain, the weather, the

absence among the indigenous population ofa will to fight, the general scarcity of

good air targets, and the want of target information.40

The Army fact-finding team headed by General Gavin reported that eight

U.S. divisions plus thirty-five engineer battalions would have to fight in the

Hanoi Delta and possibly seize Hainan Island. Because Southeast Asia had no

good ports, airfields, and land communications, support requirements were

tremendous. "We finally decided when we were all through," Gavin said later,

"that what we were talking about doing was going to war with Red China under

conditions that were appallingly disadvantageous." Ridgway sent the report to

President Eisenhower who was struck by the enormity of the requirements

posited.4

'

Yet U.S. military commanders in the Far East tried to furnish all-out logistic

support to the French. even drawing equipment from American units. Gen. Earle

E. Partridge, who assumed command of Far East Air Forces on March 26, 1954,

directed "full, prompt, and effective" acion. Thu, when the French High

Commissioner asked Ambassador Heath early in April for eighteen C.47s to

replace losses, the planes were flown from Japan to Tourane on April 9 and

placed on loan. When the French wanted twenty-five B-26B aircraft, these too

were provided. Other expedited deliveries included H-19 helicopters taken from

Marine Corps units in the Far East, L-20 liaison aircraft from the Air Force, and

twelve F-8F replacement aircraft diverted from Thailand commitments. The

carrier Saipan brought twenty-five F-4U Corsair fighters to Tourane to augment

the F-6Fs aboard the Arromanches. While FEAF sent large air shipments of

munitions, paraflares. and white-phosphorus bombs, larger deliveries of heavier

ordnance came by surface vessels loaded in Korea and Okinawa.42

Maj. Gen. Jacob E. Smart, FEAFdeputy for operations, offered the French

on April 7 the Hail (Lazy Dog) munitions stored in Japan. These small finned

bullets had been manufactured for antipersonnel missions during the Korean

War but had never been used in combat. With 11,200 of the missiles packed in a

cluster adapter about the si7e and weight of a 500-pound bomb, the tactic was to

drop the clusters from 15,000 feet and burst them at 5.000 feet. This allowed the

finned bullets to gain lethal velocity as they approached the giound.41

Five million of these smll missiles and 500 cluster adapters arrived at

Haiphong on April 16, but th. ship was delayed on berthing and did not unload

until the 23d. When the shipment was unpacked, about half the missiles were

corroded and many had damaged fins that affected their ballistic flight. Two

FEAF technical experts, Lt. Col. William B. Sanders and Maj. Robert V.

Prouty, urged the French to employ the finned bullets in a fairly large strike

against enemy personnel. The French, however, preferred to use them against

antiaircraft artillery emplacements. Four PB4Y-2 aircraft, each carrying 12

cluster units, opened the attack and through May 2 dropped 227 units, B-26s

dropped 132.

Though Sanders and Prouty were unable to obtain concrete evaluations of

results, the French appeared to be happy with circumstantial evidence. On April

24
DIEN BIEN PHU

30 and May I the missile bombs were extensively employed in conjunction with

air resupply missions, and on these dates C-1 19 crews reported less antiaircraft

fire than usual. Perhaps more indicative, the Viet Minh dispersed their antiaircraft batteries. To Sandeis it seemed that "the finned bullet attacks were successfil but only due to volume rather than good delivery tactics."4

When Generals Partridge and Smart visited Vietnam during April 14-18,

General Navarre asked whether B-29 operations were feasible. On his way home,

Partridge iadioed Brig. Gen. Joseph D. C. Caldara, commander of the FEAF

Bomber Command (Provisional), to meet him at Haneda airport in Tokyo.

There Partridge told Caldara of Navarre's request. According to Navarre, B-29

operations had been cleared through diplomatic channels. Partridge had

received no such directive. In any case, Caldara was to go to Vietnam and see

whether B-29s would be effective. If so and B-29 flights were authorized, Caldara

would have complete operational control. Partridge wanted him to employ his

force as a total unit under mass-strike conditions. 45

Leaving Japan on the following day, Caldara flew to Saigon. After conferring with Robert McClintock. Charg6 d'Affaires at the American Embassy,

and with French officials, Caldara received an intelligence briefing. He then flew

over Dien Bien Phu. He concluded that there were "no true B-29 targets." But if

B-29s were "the only aircraft that can put the required tonnage on the roads and

supply areas, we can do the job if directed." The monsoon weather had set in,

limiting visual bombing. Hence bombing by shoran radar or by airborne radar

would be essential.

Believing that B-29 operations could best be mounted from Clark Air Base

in the Philippines, General Caldara planned to fly a maximum effort strike with

110-second-delay-fused. 500-pound general purpose bombs. Navy fighters

operating from carriers would escort the bombers. "The bombing raid," Caldara

later reminisced, "could have effectively destroyed the entire enemy force surrounding Dien Bien Phu."

This may have been wishful thinking. Although General Navarre repeatedly

sought information on the ability of the B-29s to destroy antiaircraft facilities, he

fe't that the absence of ground-based radar guidance made a mass strike so close

to the camp impossible. He preferred an American air strike against the major

Viet Minh supply base at Tuan Giao, a road-junction town about fifty miles

northeast of Dien Bien Phu. Caldara made a personal aerial reconnaissance of

the enemy supply lines from Dien Bien Phu to the Chinese border and presented

target information to the French. In Hanoi he discovered the French possessed

more fighter-bombers and light bombers than they could use on any given day

because of personnel and maintenance restrictions. Finally, Caldara judged a

mass bombing by B-29s to be impractical under the conditions. He also informed

Partridge, who directed him to return to Japan.46.

Arriving in Paris on April 19. Secretary Dulles learned that the situation at

Dien Bien Phu was "virtually hopeless." It could be saved only through U.S. air

intervention. Dulles suggested to the French government that Generals Navarre

and O'Daniel hold an emergency consultation. But on the 23d when Navarre

25
THE ADVISORY YEARS

asked for an American B-29 air strike, Dullcs told Foreign Minister Georges

Bidatilt that direct U.S. intervention required a prior political basis.

Dulles confei red with Admiral Radford when the latter reached Paris on

the evening of April24. and they concluded that it was too late for United States

action. In Geneva the following evening, Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden made

it quite clear that the United Kingdom opposed direct Amterican air involvement.

Discussions next turned toward a new policy on the basis of a French defeat in

northwest Tonkin.4

'

With direct American intervention ruled out. the sole hope for continued

French resistance at Dien Bien Phu rested on reinforcing the garrison. Palatroopers flown from France to Vietnam in USAF aircraft offered the prospect of

releasing experienced paratrooper battalions in reserve at Hanoi. Neverdeless,

the dispatch of relief was meaningful only if air transport supply was available.

Navarre dropped small numbers of paratroopers into Dien Bien Phu on the

nights of May 3, 4. and 5 but canceled another planned drop because of scarce

airlift. Through April and early May. French combat aircraft and transports

operated tinder the most severe restrictions ofadverse weather and terrain as well

as of hostile ground fire.4s

As the defensive perimeter at Dien Bien Phu contiacted, the drop ,one

diminished to a diameter of about 2,000 yards. Antiaircraft weapons sited on

high ridges alongside the ( cop zone caught aircraft flying through the slot in a

murderous crossfire. To escape flak. French C-47s dropped paiabundles from

10,000 feet and had to make several passes over the target before they could kick

out their complete loads. In deference to the ground fire. C-119s raised their drop

altitude to 5,000 feet, and dumped their loads quickly in a single pass. Hardly safe

from flak at that height, Civil Air l'ransport pilots complained that the C-47s

dropped parabundles through their flights and that escorting flak-suppression

aircraft were dropping bombs through flight formations. These were hazardous

conditions for civilian crews whose contracts nade no mention of flying inactive

combat areas.

To increase drop accuracy at 8,000 to 10.000 feet, French airborne technicians devised an ingenious procedure. They used a iefueling line to hobble a

cargo parachute until it neared the ground. I hen an explosive time-delay fuze cut

the line and allowed tie parachute to deploy. The device appeared to work. and a

detachment of the U.S. Army 8081st Quartermaster Airborne Supply and

Packaging Company. which loaded C-1 19s at Cat Bi, adopted the parachute

delay apparatus and used it on all C-1 19 drops during the last two weeks of the

Dien Bien Phu campaign a9

Fragments of a 37-mm shell severely injured Civil Air Transport pilot Paul

Holden on April 24. His fellow ci%,ilians refused to fly to Dien Bien Phu again

without adequate combat air support, so French military pilots manned the

C-1 19s. On the 26th. antiaircraft fire downed one F-6F and two B-26 ,. Flaksuppression missions (including a heavy concentration of Hail missiles), flown at

the expense of close air support strikes and supply line interdiction, ,rproved the

sittation. The civilian pilots returned to their planes on the 30th. Brcaking a short

26
DIEN BIEN PHU

period of silence, 37-mm guns on May 6 scored hits on one C-I 19 and shot down

another flown by civilian pilot James B. McGovcrn.*50

On the 6th planes delivered 196 tons of supplies to the garrison. What was

to be the final Viet Minh assault started that evening. At noon of the 7th,

soldiers broke into the heart of the French defenses. and the battle ended

several hours later. Ho Chi Minh had scored a decisive victory that coincided

with the negotiations in Geneva. There, delegates had failed to reach political

agreement on Korea and were about to take up the problem of restoring peace

to Indochina.5'

*A legendary figure in Asia. McGovern had come to be known as "Earthquake McGoon- in

deference to his huge siue and black beard, lie was a Fourteenth Air Force pilot in World War II and

remained in the Far East with the Civil Air Transport Company. lie died In the C-1 19 crash.

27
III. The Geneva Agreements

and French Withdrawal

Victory at Dien Bien Phu allowed the Viet Minh to move troops and

weapons toward the Hanoi-Haiphong perimeter. During the night of May 12,

500 Vietnamese regulars at Hanoi deserted with their arms. Grave doubts about

holding the Red River Delta arose among the French. Deciding that the safety of

the Expedition,'ry Corps in Vietnam had become the prime consideration, the

government directed the French commander to withdraw. He could retire as far

as the 18th parallel to safeguard the southern part of Vietnam.'

Although President Eisenhower believed overt Chinese intervention in

Indochina hardly likely, he permitted the military services to plan for the

contingency. Identifying the options open to the United States may have benefited French morale. At the time, Adm. Felix B. Stump, USN, was Commander

in Chief, Pacific Command (CINCPAC), the unified commander responsible for

U.S. military operations in Asia south of the 30th paiallel. He conceived that an

American commander of a Southeast Asia Defense Command ought to move

into Vietnam with U.S. naval and air forces, perhaps eight Army divisions, and

probably exercise operational control over the French forces.2

General Partridge, FEAF commander, promptly protested Admiral

Stump's concept because it would divide the unity of air command in the Pacific

and base air units on hazardous airfields. Less than enthusiastic about B-29s with

conventional weapons, Partridge favored using carriers. Believing the struggle to

be basically a civil war in which long-term pacification and unification rather

than destruction were the prim- objectives, he thought that conventionally

armed B-29s might produce favorable short-term psychological effects but no

lasting results. Indecisive and devastating air attacks would be counterproductive

because the real task was to build indigenous military, economic, political, and

psychological leadership.

Toward the end of May, the Joint Chiefs of Staff were reluctant to place

large numbers of American forces in Vietnam. They wished to avoid a defensive

Korea-type response and preferred an offensive against mainland China, including attacks against the Chinese war-making capability and "employing atomic

weapons, whenever necessary." 4

President Eisenhower sent General Trapnell, MAAG-Indochina chief, to

Paris at the end of May to discuss cooperative planning with General Ely, who

was preparing to go to Vietnam as Commander in Chief and High Commissioner. When Ely failed to receive positive assurance of U.S. intervention even in

the event of an overt Chinese attack, he was unwilling to accept an overall

American commander and was averse to having American ground troops,

except for one or two divisions as a show of good faith.5

29

P1iECEDING PAGE BANK-140T FIM-)
, 1 W

TIlE ADVISORY YEARS

After that, the prospects of American intervention diminished. Discussions

in Geneva on Indochina commenced May 8 between delegates from the United

States, the United Kingdom, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, France, the

People's Republic of China, the Kingdoms of Laos and Cambodia, the State of

Vietnam, and the Democratic Republic of Vietnam. The question was how to

end the war between France (and its adherents) and the Viet Minh. the former

supported by the United States and the latter by Communist China and the

Soviet Union. The Viet Minh delegate was hardly anxious to compromise. I le

felt that the French colonials had beetn defeated and that all of Vietnam lay within

Ho Chi Minh's grasp.

Seeing little chance of holding an enclave in Tonkin, the French in June were agtecable to a partitioning of Vietnam that would leave the southern part to

them. By then, the Viet Minh were establishing control over the central highlands. On the 24th. in Mang Yang Pass, they cut offand virtuallydestroyed 3.600

men of French Mobile Group 100 that was withdrawing toward Pleiku along

Route 19.

The Viet Minh continued their military successes and the Geneva negotiations dragged on. Between June 25-28 in Washington, President Eisenhower and

li ime Minister Churchill drew up a paper and offered it to the French as the

basis for an armistice. Pledging to press for a collective defense of Southeast

Asia. they warned that the international situation would be "seriously aggravated" if the French government refused to accept an agreement.6

The Soviet Union seemed more interested in Europe than in Southeast Asia.

Informed speculation indicated that Foreign Minister Vyacheslav M. Mo!otov

proffered Premier Pierre Mendes-France a somewhat favorable settlement in

Indochina if the French abstained from participating in a European I)efense

Community. At the same time. Chinese Foreign Minister Chou En-lai. apparently impressed with the atomic might of the United States, hoped to demilitari7e

Indochina to deny the Americans bases there.

On July 8 in Geneva, serious discussions centered around the place where a

dividing line could be drawn across Vietnam. The French insisted on the 18th

parallel, while the North Vietnamese argued for the 14th. After a private discussion between Mendes-France and Chou En-iai in Berni, the Viet Minh accepted

the 17th parallel as the demarcation, and the negotiations moved rapidly to a

conclusion on July 21,8

Signing an agreement on Vietnam. French and Viet Minh military representatives established two states separated at the 17th parallel, a demilitarized zone

on each side of the line, and the withdrawal of French troops from t.,. North and

of Viet Minh from the South. Tbey prohibited introducing fresh troops, arms.

and munitions, as well as building nev military bases in Vietnam, International

Control Commission teams from Canada, India. and Poland were to supe, vise

the implementation of the armistice and to report violations that might lead to

resumed hostilities. Finally, there were to be, by July 1956. elections throughout

Vietnam to unify the country. Consultations between representatives of the two

30
GENEVA AGREEMENTS AND FRENCH WITHDRAWAL

pan ts. North and South, were to start no later than July 20. 1955. to piepare for

the vote.

The Soviet Union wished all pat ties to accept the Geneva accoids formally,

but the United States preferted to keep them a matter between tie two principals.

Nevertheless the American delegate, Under Secretary of State Walter B. Smith,

gave assurance that the United States would "refrain from tile th:eat or the use of

force to disturb" the agreements and would "view any reneval of the aggression

in violation of the . agreements with grave concern and as seriously threatening international peace and security." The delegate from South Vietnam

solemnly protested that his country was not bound by agteements. lie objected

that the -ench I ligh Command had ariogated to itself the right to fix a date fora

future election, a political tather than a military decision.'0

The Geneva accords led to the temoval of USAF logistic support detachments. and General Partridge had started the withdrawal as early as May 13. But

vl, n the French need for support to hold the Red River Delta slowed the

evacuation, Partridge ditected the detachmetts to take necessary measures for

their own safety and security."I

The C-47 detachment at Do Son Airfield departed on lune 29. 'he C-1 19

detachment at Cat Bi moved on May 23 to Tourane and joined tile 13-26 support

group.' 2

On July 13 Defense Secretary Wilson ordered immediate suspension of all

materiel shipments to Indochina. The Air Force stopped all deliveries, started to

recover the B-26 and C-1 19 aircraft on loan, and arranged to evacuate its

personnel. Much materiel already en toute to Indochina in French-controlled

ships could not be diverted, and eventually ended up in French dumps and

depots. The B-26 and C-1 19 logistic support detachments remained at Tourane

on aircraft recovery missions until the last of the loaned planes ieturned to Clark

Air Base on September 6.'

The USAF units had little trouble evacuating their own people ftiom

Vietnam, but were hard-pressed to fulfill other personnel movements. The

French requested assistance to tepatriate wounded men from Notth Vietnam,

and five C-124s moved 504 individuals. The 315th Air Division and 6481st

Medical Air Evacuation Group handled these patients from Saigon hospitals via

Clark Air Base to Tachikawa Atr Base. Japan. where Military Air Transpot

Service (M ATS) craft flew them to the U nited States and finally to France and

North Africa. The Navy hospital ship Haven moved 725 men from Vietnam to

Oran, Algeria, and to Marseilles. 4

Air Force transports flew U.S. nationals from the Hanoi-1-Iaiphong area:

the Philippine Air Lines evacuated Filipino residents: Civil AirTransport planes

took out Chinese: U.S. Navy Amphibious Group One and the Military Sea

Transport Service lifted supplies and thousands of Vietnamese refugees to safety.

The latgest of these movements by far took place between July 10. 1954. and

July 30, 1955. Before the Viet Minh stopped the migration, about 880.000

Vietnamese fled from the North to the South.51

31
lIII AM) VSORN 'I ARS

Refugees 1'leing from

North Vietnam when

parallel

(our~ CSIA
(I1\lF\ A '\(i I 1M[IN IS A\ ) I-RIPNCII WIi'llR A\\ Al

(Right) Richard M Nixon PierreMendes-Franco and John Poster

Dulles 4

(Below) Ope, Ion Wounded

Warrior USAF ovacuatlon of

French For,iqr Legimrnaires after

Din ienPh

NCO _4

Courtesy Johni Schlight
iMITHE ADVISORY YEARS

Few efforts were mrade to evaluate the air operations of the Indochina War.

quite possibly because of a general feeling that it was pointless to draw lessons

from a conflict that was doomed from the start. The F'rench had been unable to

win the support of the people where the war was fought.

Even so. at General Twining's direction. General Hewitt % isited the region

and prepared a detailed report. His main conclusion was that the manpower

strength of the French A.r Force had been hopelessly inadequate to support

182.000 ground troops dispersed in many garrisons. Air operations were largely

responses to urgent ground force requests. In consequence the French had tried

to do too much. in far too many places, with much too little.' 6

Svinniariing the reasons for this lackluster performance. FEAF noted the

personuel shortages and the poor organization. Often more aircraft than pilots

were available, and too few maintenance men were on hand to keep planes

serviceable. Furthermore, tactical air p!anneis had been unable to develop

targets in the "monsoon mountain mass" of North Vietnam, and interdiction

missions had been relatively ineffective against enemy supply lines, particularly

against the flow of goods from China. 7 Both General Hewitt's and FFAF's

assessment implied that the existing peoblems were correctable. But neither

echoed an earlier estimate by Gen. G. ,i. M. Chassin, French air commandei.

who suggested that the Viet Minh tactics ofconcealment, dispersal. surpi ise, and

psychological warfare were extremely difficult to counter with fast-flying military planes.'I

Piesident Eisenhower welcomed the end of bloodshed in Indochina. Amencan assistance, he said, had been unable to cure an "unsound relationship

between the Asiatics and the French" and had therefore been "of only limited

value."19

Two Vietnams emerged. In both. most people lived in two great riverdeltas,

the Red in the north and the Mekong in the south, as well as in the lowlands

between the sea and the mountains.

North Vietnam, under 11o Chi Minh at Hanoi, had about 16 million people

including a commun.st political elite and battle-hardened military forces. Brutal

collectivi7ation progiams in 1954 and 1955 decreased the popularity of the

revolutionaries. The migration of nearly a million inhabitants south during the

year after the Geneva accords was a protest against the regime and the conditions

of life. But the communists confidently expected the national reunification

plebiscite in 1956 to deliver the other Vietnam peacefully to them.

In South Vietnam, with 14 million people, failure of the French to develop

indigenous leaders hampered the anti-communist nationalists. During the

absence of Bao Dai in France, control of the state devolved upon Ngo Dinh

Diem, a member of the Catholic minority. He became head of the cabinet in

Saigon on June 18. 1954, and a few weeks late; was invested as President of the

Council of Ministers. Not widely known in the country and somewhat aloof.

Diem depended heavily for advice on his immediate family. especially on his

brother and political counselor, Ngo Dinh Nhu.20

34

-- ---
GENEVA AGREEMENTS AND FRENCH WITHDRAWAL

Ho Cli Minh made no secret of his determination to extend his control over

all of Vietnam. Immediately after the Geneva agreemeats, he called for a "long

and arduous struggle" to win the south, which he described as "teriitories of

ours. "21 He soon sent cadres across the 17th parallel, and they became known as

Viet Cong. They expanded the communist apparatus in the south, prepared for

future infiltration of men from the north, and worked for eventual unification

under Hanoi through subversion as well as open conflict.

President Eisenhower retained the U.S. Embassy in Saigon. an( worked to

strengthen the indigenous government in conjunction with the French. who had

agreed to stay in Indochina until national forces could emerge. To compensate

for and bolster the weak government. Secretary Dulles actively concerned

himself with stimulating strong native military forces.22

According to a National Security Council (NSC) paper in August 1954. the

Viet Minh victory in Tonkin had enhanced communist military and political

prestige in Asia. Now lie Viet Minh were certain to try to extend their influence

beyond North Vietnam by military and non-military pressures, that is. by overt

aggression and by exploiting internal political instabilities and economic weaknesses in neighboring free countries.

To counter this estimated course of action, the United States decided to

pursue three principal policies: negotiate a Southeast Asia security treaty pledging members to act promptly against armed aggression; swiftly support legitimate governments requesting and requiring assistance to defeat local subversion

and rebellion; and. more specifically, support France in assisting the South

Vietnamese to gain and maintain the military forces and theeconomic conditions

needed to meet foreign aggression and insure internal security.2

Moving speedily, the United States. Great Britain, France. Australia. New

Zealand, Pakistan. Thailand. and the Philippines signed the Southeast Asia

Defense Treaty in Manila on September8. 1954. The major threats triggeringthe

agreement were subversion from within and aggression from outside a country.

Although an individual nation had primary responsibility for countersubversive

activities, the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) would act as a

clearing house to exchange information among the members and to discuss

common policies. It was external armed aggression against any member that was

recognized as the main common danger, and this the members pledged to meet

collectively. Because the Geneva agreements prevented Vietnam. Laos, and

Cambodia from joining the organization. SEATO spi;ead its protection to them.

In the case of Vietnam. the United States would work through the French to

maintain the military forces "necessary for internal security." For all members.

the Unitcd States would discharge its treaty obligations by deploying mobile

forces iapidly into the area rather than by stationing units in the region. The

treaty became effective in February 1935.24

Since SEATO was to be a shield against external aggression. Secretary

Dulles felt that South Vietnam needed military forces for internal security only.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff were hesitant to spend scarce funds in Vietnam until a

stable government existed. They believed, however, that U.S. military assistance

35
THE ADVISORY YEARS

to Vietnam should afford both internal security and limited defense against

external attack. 2

Much of the American problem stenmed from the kind of government in

South Vietnam. The Saigon government had yet to consolidate its power, and

there were conspiracies to unseat Diem. The Joint Chiefs wanted a reasonably

strong civil government in control before the United States undertook a military

training mission. Secretary Dulles understood this concern, but he thought that

well-trained armed forces would strengthen the Vietnamese government. Under

pressure from Dulles. the Joint Chiefs conceded that five indigenous divisions

would permit Vietnam to maintain internal security and present a limited

response to external attack. But it would take two or three years to train that

force. If the United States decided to do the training, it should be assigned low

priority so as not to impair more promising programs elsewhere.

Between 1945-1954 the French had built up the Vietnamese regular and

paramilitary forces to varying degrees of effectiveness. The Vietnamese Air Force

consisted of the Ist Liaison Group with two squadrons of Morane-500 Cricket

liaison planes and one squadron of Dassault M.D.-315 light combat assault

aircraft, and a training center at Nha Trang. Few Vietnamese hai held high rank.

Most were inexperienced. Enlis'2d desertions were frequent and damaging."'

The French had declined the offer of American help in training the Vietnamese. but they changed their minds about the time of the Geneva accords.

Generals O'Daniel and Ely in Saigon agreed that the United States should

assume some responsibility. The Geneva agreements fixed the maximum

strength of the MAAG at 342 U.S. officers and men, the number in the country

when the accords were signed. Since this group was too small to do a great deal.

the French retained management of the programs.

In October the Joint Chiefs ruled that the MAAG in Saigon could execute a

training mission if this became a political necessity and if the French refrained

from interfering. After a National Security Council meeting, the President

ordered Ambassador Heath and General O'Daniel to "collaborate in setting in

motion a crash program designed to bring about an improvement in the loyalty

and effectiveness of the Free Vietnamese forces." He instructed the Joint Chiefs

to preparea long-range progi am to reorganize and train the minimum number of

Vietnamese forces iiecessiy to preserve internal security. "

The President also wrote to Diem to ask for Vietnamese-American cooperation on developing a strong and stable state capalle of resisting subversion and

aggression. In return for U.S. assistance, Eisenhower expected Diem to reform

his government, make it responsive to the nationaiist aspirations of tile Vietnamese people, and shape it into a representative and democratic regime.29

American policy statements stressed internal security considerations, btl

public announcements indicated the intention to stiengthen th,,' nation to repel

aggression as well as subversion. The military forces projected were modeled on

the U.S. tri-service pattern. They were more suitable for conventional military

operations than for internal security and counterinsurgency activities.

To dramati7e interest in Vietnam and to evaltate the situation, President

36
GENEVA AGREEMENTS AND FRENCH WITHDRAWAL

Eiscnhower sent General .. Lawton Collins, USA, to Saigon as a special U.S.

representative on November 3, 1954. Among other missions, Collins was to look

into the question of insuring the loyalty of the army to the government. Shortly

after Collins arrived, a Vietnamese general officer who had challenged Diem's

contrcl departed for France. This resolved a struggle for the direction of the

government in favor of Diem. Stability seemed enh,,nced. "

Working within strength figures stipulated by the Joint Chiefs of Staff,

Collins at first negotiated solely with the French. After January I, 1955. when the

union of the Associated States with France terminated, Collins conferred directly

with Diem's government. He secured agreement for American suppurt of a

Vietnamese army numbering 94,000 men, enough for a mobile battle corps of

three field divisions and one regimental combat team. MAAG was to assume full

responsibility for assisting the Vietnamese government to organize and train this

armed force. Due to the personnel ceiling on MAAG. the French would help. On

February 12, 1955, the United States formally took over all Vietnamese military

training. '

Initial Vietnamese ground operations against the Viet Cong were encouraging. To destroy communist domination in certain areas, a Vietnamese brigade

conducted a pacification operation in the Mekong Delta in February and March.

In April and May larger forces pacified the Quang Ngai and Binh Dinh Provinces on the coast of the South China Sea. The soldiers broke up armed bands,

destroyed arms caches, provided local security, and iesettled refugees from

North Vietnam on vacant lands."

During March, Diem's troops also put down a rebellion by the Pnh Xuyen

politico-religious sect, a revolt that spread to the Cao Dai and Hoa Hao sects.

Driving the dissidents out of the city, the Vietnamese aray crushed their armed

forces in a final campaign in the Rung Sat swamps southwest of Saigon in

September and October. Occupation of the Tay Ninh Province broke the Cao

Dai insurgency.

The army performed well and the air force afforded moderate aid in the

form of Cricket liaison flights that conducted surveillance, diiected artillery, and

dropped psychological warfare leaflets. These successes gave confidence to Diem

and optimism to the Americans, who hoped that continued support would

enable the government to "pull through."

Further encouragement came when Diem formed two new local defense

organizations. He recruited men for the Civil Guard and assigned them to work

with provincial chiefs as a rural police. He created the Self Defense Corps whose

members used obsolete weapons to protect their homes, villages, and hamlets

under the district chiefs. '-

Air Force studies suggested that the most immediate danger to Southeast

Asia was subversion. But this was out of context with proposals to equip national

air forces with conventional aircraft. In addition, there was need to develop

indigenous equipment and techniques in line with U.S. doctrine, so American jet

airc.'aft could function in the event of a U.S. deployment to meet a SEATO

emergency. On May 5, 1955, General Twining approved an Air Force Council

37
VM-1 AI)VISORY )'IARS

P (Left) Gen Nathan F Twining

(Center) Gen J Lawton Collins

"W and Premier Ngo Dinh Diem

(8E3low) MAAG Headquarters in

Saigon

MVI
GENEVA AGREEMENTS AND IFRENCI WITHDRAWAL

policy that the national air forces in the Pacific-Far East should be shaped to

cope with internal aggression, to defend to a limited degree against external

aggiession, and to furnish air base complexes suitable for USAF use if necessary. " Whether the thiee were compatible remained to be seen.

In September 1955 a program to forge indigenous countersubversive military forces seemed to demand highly mobile ground commando troops operating closely with tactical air, slow-flying conventional strike aircraft carrying

diveisified weapons and loitering over target areas for extended periods, p!us

visual and photo-ieconnaissance planes, light transports, and helicopters; and a

strong militia to overcome communist infiltration at local levels."7

The Joint Chiefs of Staff believed that a U.S. effort to defend South

Vietnam against external aggression under SEATO procedures would be substantial, costly, and difficult to manage, especially without atomic weapons. To

defeat a North Vietnamese invasion would call for two to four Army divisions

besides the South Vietnamese ground forces. To invade and occupy North

Vietnam would take eight U.S. divisions. Moreover, quite a few Air Force

tactical fighter wings would have to be committed, and this depended on proper

air facilities. To prepare to meet a North Vietnamese invasion in the near future.

the Joint Chiefs suggested increasing the efficiency of the South Vietnamese

forces and improving the air bases in the country and in neighboring states."

When Ho Cli Minh called upon Diem to open negotiations for a national

plebiscite, not only Diem but Dulles protested publicly. An honest election

would be impossible, they said, because the totalitarian regime in Hanoi would

direct the vote of the people it controlled in the more populous North. Diem on

August 9 positively rejected elections as longas the communist regime refused to

grant democratic freedoms and fundamental rights to the people of North

Vietnam. An October vote in South Vietnam gave Diem a mandate to set up a

republic under his presidency. On October 26. 1955, the Republic of Vietnam

came into being, and on the same day the United States extended recognition and

established diplomatic relations."

Because Ho Chi Minh was building a powerful artmy in North Vietnam, an

invasion of South Vietnam would overwhelm Diem's forces that were organi7ed

and equipped chiefly foi intei nal secui ity.' M AAG had therefoie suggested that

the Vietnamese army concentrate on repelling outside attack and that the United

States concentrate on training the Civil Guard and Self Defense Corps. Approving, the Joint Chiefs recommended that General Collins' ceiling of 94,000 men

for the Vietnamese military forces be raised to 150,000. This would be enough for

4 field divisions, 6 light divisions, 13 territorial regiments; and about 4,000 air,

4,000 navy, and 5,000 civilian employees. "

Lt. Gen. Samuel T. Williams, USA, was appointed the new MAAG chief in

Saigon. Arriving on November 15, 1955, lie had to deal at once with an

impending withdrawal of French forces to meet the revolt in Algeria.42 Under

arrangements made by General O'Daniel, French advisors were serving with

American personnel in a Training Relations and Instructions Mission. The

French departure required a large; American complement. While the Interna39
THE ADVISORY YEARS

tional Control Commission was unwilling to approve a bigger MAAG, it

allowed the United States to sent 350 men to Vietnam as a Temporary Equipment Recovery Mission to inventory and remove surplus euuipment. Stietching

the authority granted, MAAG employed these personnel as logistical advisors to

replace the French working with Vietnamese army units. They became the

Combat Arms Training and Organization Division of MAAG. On April 23,

1956, the last French commander in chief in Indochina closed his headquarters

and left for France."

According to General Williams, pacification duty left the Vietnamese army

little time for division combat training. Scattered miscellaneous units were hard

to organi7e into a cohesive field force. President Diem described the light

divisions as relics of the French colonial belief that the Vietnamese made poor

soldiers and therefore had to work in small units. Increasingly, Diem wished his

army to be organized and tiained for field operations in conjunction with the

SEATO nations. When British and Canadian authorities insisted that this would

violate the Geneva accords and provoke particular disaffection in India, the

United States refrained. "

South Vietnam's refusal to conduct elections to reunify the two Vietnams in

accordance with the Geneva agreement led American officials during the winter

of 1955-56 to expect a North Vietnamese invasion sometime after July 1956, the

date when the elections would have taken place. Nothing happened. and two

months later President Eisenhower decided to help South Vietnam build armed

forces for internal security and also for limited initial resistance to North Vietnamese attack. The United States encouraged the South Vietnamese to align

their military growth to U.S. military doctrine."

As the United States prepared the Vietnamese :o combat subversion and to

repel invasion as well, it seemed unable to decide which was the greater threat.

The objectives for expanded national and regional defenses - even the distinction between the two - were vague, confused, and at times conflicting. This

aggravated the problem American advisors faced in adapting U.S. materiel and

procedures to a stra .ge environment.

40
IV. U.S. Command Problems

in the Pacific:

Emphasis on Southeast Asia

Authorities in Washington had closely managed the assistance to France

during the Indochina War, but U.S. commanders in the Pacificexercised increasing influence afterward. They looked to American military interests on a divided

basis. The Far East and United Nations Commands existed on the one hand and

the Pacific Command on the other. Because of budgetary constraints, the latter

had no Air Force theater headquarters or tactical units. All USAF resources

were assigned to Far East Air Forces, headquartered in Tokyo. Under FEAF

were Fifth Air Force and 315th Air Division (Combat Cargo) in Japan, and

Thirteenth Air Force in the Philippines.i

After March 26, 1954, Admiral Stump, Commander in Chief. Pacific

Command, became responsible for revie,",', all military assistance programs in

this area, which took in Southeast Asia. Since Stump found it hard to manage

without an air headquarters, the Joint Chiefs on March 31 directed General

Twining to create a command at Hickam AFB. Hawaii. Hence Pacific Air Force

(PAF) came into being under Maj. Gen. Sory Smith on the Ist of July. While

Smith reported directly to Admiral Stump, he likewise answered to General

Partridge, FEAF commander. This reflected an understanding that all USAF

tactical air units in the Pacific and Far East would be assigned to FEAF in the

interest of command unity throughout both theaters. Stump, who was described

as "exceedingly if not unduly sensitive on the subject of command prerogatives,"

found it vexing, and understandably so, that FEAF should have a say in

CINCPAC's area of responsibility. Yet General Partridge considered that a

common USAF policy for the Pacific and Far East areas required him to be

abreast of events in both places. Ie directed the Far East Air Logistics Force to

have the 6410th Materiel Group support all air components in Southeast Asia.2

In February 1955, when General Partridge held a conference of air attaches

and MAAG-Air representatives from all nations in Southeast Asia to discuss

problems and programs, Admiral Stump reminded him of CINCPAC's primary

responsibility for that area. Stump wanted General Smith to help promote

projects consistent with U.S. military and political objectives in the Pacific

Command. Placing Thirteenth Air Force under PAF on June I facilitated his

wish.

Under revised directives issued by Defense Secretary Wilson in July, Admiral Stump gained more authority in carrying out the Mutual Defense Assistance

Program. Unified commander s like him were to be in the direct line of command

over the MAAGs in their areas. Thus Army. Navy, and Air Force personnel

assigned to MAAGs were no longer "allocated to CINCPAC" but rather placed

41
rHE ADVISORY YEARS

Lnder his direct command. Stump therefore integrated the control of assistance

programs in his headquarters. Only on technical matters did he allow MAAG

chiefs to communicate directly with their military departments, their component

commanders, and other service agencies. As for Stump's component Army,

Navy, and Air Force commanders, they were limited to advising CINCPAC.'

The Air Force's centralization of global logistics under the Air Materiel

Command further diluted FEAF influence over assistance concerns. General

Partridge insisted on controlling his logistics, but Gen. Laurence S. Kuter who

replaced him on June 4. 1955, accepted the new concept in the interest of

economy and efficiency. Tiansferred to Air Materiel Command on October I,

1955, Far East Air Logistics Force was redesignated Air Materiel Force Pacific

Area. Under this organization the Northern Air Material Area Pacific handled

support and technical assistance for Japan and Korea. The Southern Air Material Area Pacific at Clark Air Base similarly served Okinawa, Taiwan. the

Philippines, Laos, Thailand. Cambodia, Guam, and Vietiam.5

MAAG-Air personnel now went straight to these materiel commands with

their logistic problems. without need to go through the theater air command. In

November 1955 Far East Air Force headquarters invited MAAG-Air representatives to a conference in Tokyo. Again CINCPAC objected that FEAF had no

right to indoctrinate air sections with its philosophy and concepts.'

The inspection team dispatched by General Smith to Southeast Asia in

November-December 1955 reported that the Army appeared to be dominating

the MAAGs. To some extent, no doubt. this was in response to the desire of the

individual countries. Still most MAAG chiefs, deputy chiefs, and chiefs of staff

were Army officers. In Vietnam the MAAG-Air Section people were described

as being "relegated to a minor role and treated asjunior partners," without access

to current war pl, ns and unable to coordinate or consult with MAAG-Air

sections in neighboring countries. There was a "deplorable jack of definite

relationship" between the indigenous air forces supported by mutual defense

assistance programs and the overall strategic objectives of the United States.'

After remarking on the close association between the Japanese and Korean

Air Forces and Fifth Air Force, General Kuter urged Thirteenth Air Force (now

under PAF) to foster similar rapport with indigenous air forces in Southeast

Asia. On February 17, 1956, Smith charged Thirteenth Air l-orce with monitoring and reviewing assistance programs in SEA so that national air forces were

developed in line with U.S. strategic aims.8

Austerely manned, Thirteenth Air Force headquarters needed twenty-eight

more manpower spaces to perform the additional task. These slots were not to be

had because thie entire Air Force was trying to build to an authoriied 137 wings

without increasing personnel. Kuter and Smith conferred in April 1956 on how

to improve the review and monitoring of assistance activities. In May and

November, Air Materiel Force Pacific Area sponsored conlerences of MAAGAir representatives to the same cnd.9

Air commanders were disturbed by Admiral Stump's reliance on subordinate command organizations for local operations. As a matter of principle.

42

-- ----
U,S. COMMAND PROBLEMS IN THE PACIFIC

USAF leaders advocated centralized direction and control of air operations in

the Pacific and Far East areas. Local control of tactical air units would restrict

their operations to arbitrary and often meaningless geographic boundaries.

Furthermore, air units would go under operational control of a commander who

had little or no experience in training, equipping, and operating them.'"

General Smith therefore protested the assignment of tactical air units to a

subordinate unified ,ommand, It would, he said, partition ai power to defend

local pieces of scattered real estate, Smith, as Stump's theater air commander,

should manage all air operations in Pacific Command in order to use the

available units most effectively regardless of their Iocation,. Stump pointed out

that his area was too vast for overall direction of local operations from Hawaii.

Th2 division of command responsibilities between component commanders, he

said, had led to disaster at Pearl Harbor in 1941, an'd lie preferred a single

commander responsible ineach operational area forall military operations there.

Kuter called the potential commitment of USAF squadrons to local defenses in

Vietnam and elsewhere in Southeast Asia a "further emasculation of air

power.""

When President Eisenhower, the National Security Council, and the Joint

Chiefs directed CINCPAC in July 1956 to prepare a contingency plan for

defending South Vietnam against overt external attack. Admiral Stump thought

in terms of setting up a U.S.-Vietnam Defense Command. The commander was

to receive from Fifth Air Force the operational control of earmarked air defense

and supporting forces, and from PAF a senior Air Force officer as tle air

component commander, plus staff personnel. The Joint Chiefs accepted this

proposal. '

"

While the prospective proliferation of subordinate unified commands threatened the unity of air power, other developments changed the picture. The

consotidation of the United Nations, Far East, and Pacific Commands had come

under study in the spring of 1955, after Secretary of Defense Wilson objected to

the worldwide command structure that he deemed too large. unwieldy, and

expensive. He wanted the system simplified and reduced, and the Joint Chiefs

asked commanders for comments. General Kuter recommended a single U.S.

unified command in the Pacific. The Joint Chiefs agreed early in 1956, and

Secretary Wilson appovcd discontinuing tle Far East Command (FEC) in

favor of the Pacific Command, which was to be the single unified command in

the Pacific and Far cast areas. Headquarters Pacific Air Force then became

PACAF/ FEA F (Rear) on July I, which foreshadowed another change. and the

headquarters in Japan moved to Hawaii."

General Kuter suggested in August that the Pacific Command have three

principal component commands, namely U.S. Army Pacific, U.S. Nav% Pacific,

and U.S. Air Force Pacific. and four subordinate joint commands -- Hawaiian,

Southern Pacific, Northern Pacific, and Mariinas-Bonin. All forces allocated to

CINCPAC, Kuter thought, should be assigned to the principal component

commanders for operational control in peace and in war. The subordinate joint

commands should have no combat responsibilities but rather should support

43
- 7",

THE ADVISORY YEARS

ambassadors and M AAGs, coordinate administrative and logistic activities, and

perform other non-combat obligations in their areas. In a local war, a

CINCPAC-designated task force commander selected fhom the military service

predominantly involved would assume operational control of joint task forces.

Duting local engagements, the Commander in Chief, Air Force Pacific. should

have complete responsibility for air defense throughout the entire Pacific. '

In October Admiral Stump and Army Gen. Lyman L. Lemnitzer, FEC commander in chief, recommended three component commands - Pacific

Fleet. Pacific Air Forces, and Army. Pacific. each to administer, train, support,

and operate allocated forces. Stump and Lemnit7er wished to retain existing

subordinate unified commands and to establish two additional commands in the

northwest Pacific. The plan failed to meet Secretary Wilson's demand for

economy. It was reworked in Washington and resubmitted to the Secretary in

December. '"

Reorgani7ation as approved early in 1957 made the Pacific Command the

single unified command directly responsible to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. with the

Navy serving as executive agent. Under Cl NCPAC were three major component

commands: United States Army, Pacific (USARPAC). United States Pacilic

Fleet (PACFLT). and Pacific Air Forces (PACAF). each headed by a commandei in chief. According to CINCPAC instructions, PACFLT and PACAF

were to perform air tasks on a mutually supporting basis. Only three subordinate

unified commands remained. The Commander, Fifth Air Force, assumed

responsibility as Commander. United States Forces. Japan, and received a joint

staff but had no unified operational responsibilities. The Commanding General.

Eighth Army, headed 'Inited States Forces in Korea and also served as Commander in Chief. United Nations Command. The Taiwan Defense Command

continued unchanged. In the Philippines, Ryukyus. and Marianas-Bonin.

CINCPAC representatives coordinated matters. In countries where no U.S.

operating forces were located, the M AAG chief was the CI NCPAC representative. All MAAGs were diiectly responsible to CINCIPAC."

On the Ist of June, General Kuter opened his Headquarters Pacific Air

Forces at Hickam AFB. consolidating for the first time USAF tactical forces in

the Pacific and I-ar Last areas undei a single comma nder. I Inity of command of

all theater air power was nonetheless missing. Not only did PACAF and

PACFI.T have to cooperate on air tasks, but Admiral Stump -- not Kuter - had

the responsibility to develop indigenous air forces. Kuter could just advise Stump

whether assistance programs squared with U.S. policie, and objectives. In

Kuter's view, indigenous air forces in Southeast Asia were hardly being helped to

-t grow in harmony with USAF objectives. That is, the forces were not prepared to

cope with internal subversion, to give limited defense against overt external

aggression. and - perhaps most important - to offer suitable bases for U.S. air

units that might be committed operationally. National air forces were being

equipped with slow, conventional aircraft for combating insurgency. Air facilities that USAF jet aircraft could use in time of emergency were generally

lacking.

44
U.S. COMMAND PROBLEMS IN THE PACIFIC

iVIZ ! % g. '

(Left) Gen Laurence S Kuter

" (Above) Gen Thomas D White

Kilter instructed the commanders of the Filth and Thirteenth Air Forces in

August 1957 to act as "rallying points" for informal discussion with indigenous

air leaders. In November he invited air attaches and M AAG-Air representatives

to a conference in Haw iii, and urged them to work together to create a common

purpose in the "packets of demociatic air power" forming in Southeast Asia.

Improving air facilities ranked high on his agenda. "

Planning for the possible deployment of U.S. forces (luring the eat ly months

of 1958, the Commander in Chief, Pacific Air Forces, conceived of the mobile

strike force. It would depart its home base within 24 hours after receiving an

execution order, and engage in 15 days of self-supporting conbat in Southeast

Asia."' Since General Kiter wanted Thirteenth Air Force to have a dominant

role in SEA air activities, he charged Maj. Gen. Thomas S. Moorman (\, ho

became Thirteenth's commander on March 4) to take command of the PACAF

Mobile Strike Force when it deployed through Clark Air Base. The force

included three troop carrier squadrons and one combat airlift support unit from

the 315th Air Division (Combat Cargo): a fighter squadron, a bomber squadron,

a reconnaissance task unit with photo processing cell, and half ofan air rcfteling

squadron from Fifth Air Force: one fighter squadron from Thirteenth Air Force:

and a search and rescue detachment from the 31st Air Rescue Squadron of Air

Rescue Service (Pacific). Clark Air Base was to furnish logistic support. and

Thirteenth Air Force was empowered to draw on PACA F resources to establish

detachments at forward air bases. 2

45

Al
THE ADVISORY YEARS

Because commitment of this mobile strike force would ieduce the general

war deterrent elsewhere. Tactical Air Command (TAC) began to alert in the

United States a composite air strike force for rapid global deployment, mainly to

back tip an immediate response by PACAF to aggression. 2'

During April 1958 the PACAF mobile strike force concept was tested in a

SEATO exercise in Thailand against a simulated land aggressor force. For the

first time in a SEATO exercise. nuclear weapons were inserted into the scenario.

One observer, Lt. Gen. Frederic H. Smith, Jr., Fifth Air Force commander,

believed it vital to interdict an enemy land force by air. Upon returning to Japan,

he directed a staff study on the use of nuclear weapons if the Chinese invaded

Southeast Asia. 2

2 In contrast, CI NCPAC regaided forward defense in the Pacific

as resting upon the twin pillars of strong mobile U.S. forces and of allied ones

strengthened by American military assistance programs."'

The Department of Defense Reorganiiation Act of 1958 markedly broadened CINCPAC's authority as a unified commander. Army, Navy, and Air

Force units previously allocated to him were now tinder his "full operational

command." The roles of the miltary departments and of the component commanders were confined to the administration and support of Army, Navy, or Air

Force units assigned to the unified commanders. A new CINCPAC, Adm. Harry

1). Felt -- an experienced naval aviator whose exceptionally long tenure was to

last fior July 31. 1958. through June 1964 - would exercise operational

command through his component commanders or through the commanders of

subordinate unified commands.24

Responsible for the immense area of the Pacific and its islands - excluding

the Aleutians and the Bering Sea, but including Japan, Korea. Southeast Asia.

and the eastern part of the Indian Ocean - Admiral Felt as CINCPAC was

comparable to a theater commander in World War I1. All the U.S. armed forces

in that region were under him, and Vietnam was one of his obligations. Headquartered at Pearl Harbor, he also had at Hawaii the maior subordinate commands of USARPAC. PACFLr F, and PACAF, each headed by a component

commander. Logistic and support forces, subordinate unified or triservice commanders, area representatives and military assistance advisory groups like the

one in Vietnam were also under him. His mission was to defend the United States

against attack and "to support and advance United States policy and interests in

the Pacific Command area."2 '

An advocate of the twin-pillar strategy, Admiral Felt perceived the sepaiation between U.S. strategic planning and military assistance programs. The

remedy involved, on the one hand, completing a CINCPAC contingency concept for Southeast Asia as a whole and, on the other hand. relating each country

program to the entire strategy. A joint U.S. task force, he believed, should

r-,,pond to aggression in Southeast Asia. He accordingly arranged for Marine

forces ctn Okinawa to become the nucleus of a permanent CINCPAC Joint Task

Force (JTF) 116. Since Marines would be airlifted to meet an emergency, the

initial commander of this force was to be a Marine officer. When Army reinforcements arrived by air a-nd sea, -oinmand was to pass to an Army officer.

46

_ - - .... .. . . . .
U S COMMAND PROBI.EMS IN '1 dE PACIFIC

PACAI designa-'d the Thirteenth Air Force commander to head the air component of JTI- 116 in order to establish his authority ovei affairs in Southeast

Asia. "'

During the autunin of 1958. Admiral Felt began to show the MAAGS how

to relate their programs to regional as well as to country oeeds." PACAF's

major task was to build air lacilities and an air operating environment in

Southeast Asia. General Kuter and Lt. Gen Wiilhan F. McKee. vicecommandei

ot Air Materiel Command, felt that aviation pi ojects of the Military Assistance

Program (MAP)and of the International Cooperation Administration. Central

Intelligence Agency (CIA), weie oriented to individual countries. They saw no

ieason why these piojects could not be loosely connected to regional defense as a

whole. Better relations between PACAF and MAAG-Air personnel, they

belie\ed. would ensure that petroleum. oil. and lubricants (POiL). ammunition.

ground-to-air communications, fire trucks, refueling vehicles, and other essentials would be in place. Maintained by indigenous air forces, these services would

be available for USAF use if necessary. 2 In June 1959 the MAAGs received from

CINCPAC the first of a series of lists setting forth the priorities for accomplishing projects of this nature.-'

But cooidination between CINCPAC contingency planning against an

oeit aggression and individual country assistance programs continued to be

inadequate. For examp!e, the latter were not designed or funded to build facilities

that could be used by USA F units. These projects were the responsibility of the

Department of Defense . The Oflice of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for

Intei national Security Affairs. which reviewed assistance programs. was often

compelled to delete projects for indigenous military forces in Southeast Asia that

could not be justified according to the law. The MAAGs also hesitated to

recommend projects warranted onl\ by U.S. interest. In Laos, for instance, it wvas

"extreinely difficult to explain why you need an 8.000-foot heavy duty :'unway.

flat concrete, and sweepers to go with it in a country that uses Gooney Birds.""'

Another set of programs sprang from the Army orientation of the MAAGs.

I-or example, aviation equipment obtainable through military assistance programs was relatively high-priced and competed with oroiects desiied by the

Army. After visiting Pacific areas in 1959. Maj. Gen. Donald R. Hutchinson,

USAF assistant for mutual security, found that Army officers held 15 of 23

worldwide MAAG chief positions. This, he suggested, resulted in unbalanced

recommendations from the field. The Air Force sought a more equitable manning ratio, but it would take several years to bring about changes. "

Despite these difficulties. General White (who had replaced General Twining as Chief of Staff) wished PACAF to exert a strong influence on air matters

throughout the Pacific, to include assistance programs. Soon after Gen. Emmett

O'Donnell became Commander in Chief, PACAF, on August I, 1959, MAAGAir representatives were allowed to deal directly with the Air Materiel Force

Pacific Area. Amendments to USAF manuals in September and November 1959

permi.ted PACAF to administer contracted technical services for the military

assistance program. In February 1960 a change in a USA F regulation directed all

47
T- ,

THE ADVISORY YEARS

communications on air logistic matters to be routed through PACAI-, and a

revision of a DOD directive on inlitary assistance instructed unified commandeis to draw upon the adx ice of component commanders. What this meant, White

reminded O'Donnell on March 25. was O'Donnell's growing role in tile air

aspects of military assistance. "To an increasing degree," White %\,rote, "tb,

capability of MAPair forces must be oriented toward complementing the USAF

war effort, and your active participation in MAIP planning toward that end is

urged." ':

By spring of 1960. General O'Donnell had gained some informal influence

in military assistance matters, bat no more than advisory authority. His advice

was not regularly sought after nor was it always accepted when volunteered.

Essentially, PACAF could have little impact on military assistance programs

because it had no official part in starting, programming. and carrying out

country projects. Through communications to the MAAG-Air sections. which

were authorized to give technical support. PACAF view could be inserted into

assistance deliberations. All proposals, however. required M AAG chief approval

before submission to CINCPAC. The PACAF commander in chief as advisor

could silbmit assistance proposals direct to CINCPAC. but these were invariably

referied to the MAAG chief for comment. Though Air Force headquarters

looked to O'Donnell for information on military assistance programs. he was

outside the relevant command channe. A case in point was the construction

programs handled for CINCPAC by the Navy's Bureau of Pacific Docks.

Responsible Air Force officers in the field found it hard to get specific facts about

the exact status of these projects. "

As matters stood in 1960, the Southeast Asia Mutual Defense Assistance

Progiam activities in progress since 1954 had failed to fulfill emerging requirements for internal country defense or for cooperative regional defense. On the

whole, little stress had been given to developing indigenous air capabilities

despite the rather large allocation of efforts, funds, and manpower to indigenous

ground forces. The country air force's in Southeast Asia remained small and

lacked sufficient personnel with basic skills to achieve rapid expansion. None had

well-organized systems for operations and training, supply and maintenance.

intelligence and communications-electronics, or civil engineering. But organizational arrangements were in process of change.

48
V. Strained Civil-Military

Relations in South Vietnam

1957-1960

President Diem visited Washington in May 1957. Among other matters, he

wished American support for an army of 170,000 men and ten divisions.

Although Elbridge Durbrow, Ambassador to Vietnam, believed that a military

establishment this large would be a drain on the Vietnamese economy, President

Eisenhower seemed to give tacit approval when he and Diem issued a joint

communique. The two countries would continue to work for a peaceful unification of Vietnam. and the United States would support South Vietnam against

communist encroachment.

By 1958 the Army of the Republic of Vietnam was a force of 150,000 men

organied into seven infantry divisions, one small brigade, and five territorial

regiments. Diem had released the army from internal security duties to permit

intensive field training. General Williams, the MAAG chief, was confident that

these troops could deter North Vietnam from orthodox military attack. They

could delay an invasion for fifteen days before falling back to Da Nang, where

they could hold out for thirty days more. Presumably, outside assistance would

have arrived by then to launch a counteroffensive or to defend the SaigonMekong Delta area.'

But whethei the Vietnamese ground forces could eliminate subversion and

insurgency had yet to be seen.

While extraordinary priority was given to developing the army, only passing

attention was accorded the Vietnamese Air Force. for it was regarded as incapable of playing a substantial role in larger SEATO operations. Instead, it was to

deal with minor operations, mainly to give tactical support to ground activity in

the country through airlift, paradrops, visual and photo reconnaissance, and

medical evacuation. 2

Planning for the Vietnamese Air Force had begun in January 1955. when

General Collins. focusing chiefly on the Vietnamese army, explained that South

Vietnam would rely for the most part on SEATO air support. The Vietnamese

Air Force was to have an initial strength of 3,000 men organized in two liaison

squadrons and one air transport squadron "a small Air Force that will be used

for liaison purposes, observation, and adjustment of fire, that kind of thing."

Later, another transport squadron and a fighter squadron were to be added.

Few M AAG spaces were allocated to USAF advisors, for the French were

to organize and train the Vietnamese Air Force. U.S. aircraft deliveries to

Vietnam in August 1955 under the Mutual Defensc Assistance Program

equipped the Vietnamese Air Force with aircraft and materiel released by the

French -- twenty-eight F-8F fighter-bombers, thrty-five C-47 transports. and

49
THE ADVISORY YEARS

sixty L-19 planes. When tile French returned excess H-19 helicopters to Amencan custody. they were transferred to Vietnam for airlift and air rescue missions. 4

Because French officers had commanded Vietnamesc air units, Vietnamese

pilots gained little command experience. Vietnamese army officers were therefore permitted to tiansfer to high-level air force posts. Despite difficulties in

securing sufficient qualified personnel, VNAF units were created. The Ist Air

Transport Squadron came into being at Tan Son Nhut on July I, 1955. with

C-47s. It was organi/ed a year later as the Ist Air Transport Group consisting of

the Ist and 2nd Air Transport Squadrons and thiity-two C-47s. The Vietnamese

took over the Nha Trang training center on July 7, 1955, and using L.-19s formed

the Ist and 2nd l.iaison Squadrons. The French conducted an F-8F transition

course at Cap Saint Jacques (Vung Tau) Airfield, and on June I, 1956. the Ist

Fighter Squadron was born at Bien Hoa and assigned twenty-five F-8Fs. Apart

from these aircraft afforded by military assistance funds, the Vietnamese Air

Foice operated a special air mission squadron at Tan Son Nhut havingone L-26

Aero Commander light transport. three C47s. and three Beechcraft C-45s.

Created without helicopters at Tan Son Nhut on June I, 1957. the Ist Helicopter

Squadron flew \ ith the French unit that served the International Control

Commission. When the French left in Apiil 1958, the% gave their ten excess

H-19s to the Vietnamese. '

While the French presence officially ended in April 1956, the Vietnamese

govern-ient continued to contract with France for Air Force training. This

arrangement left the USAF officers assigned to MAAG with lew duties. lhcy

advised when requested to do so, tried to stay abreast of progiams. and underwent some special training in the United States. When the French tui ned o\ er the

depot at Bien Hoa to the Vietnamese and suddenly withdrew their suppl%

advisors, Air Foice personnel informally filled the vacutm. In November 1956

the French agreed to relinquish their training functions to USA I- advisors, and

after 1957 Diem refrained from renewing training contiacts with France. On

June I. 1957. complete responsibility for Vietnamese aviation assistance passed

to the United States."

American advisors discovered that Vietnamese air officei, weie fairly good

pilots, yet young and relatively inexperienced. Very few appealed to have

mastered basic concepts of how to employ aiicraft against any enemy. Consequently the Vietnamese army dominated the .Ioint Geneial Staff and frequently

Piesident l)iem himself directed aii missions. Diem pi leried aibor e opeiations over air strikes, for the latter often endangeied innocent people. Above all,

lie favored ground operations.'

Weak in command and staff experience, the Vietnamese Air Foice suiffered

especially in logistic support. Teams from the Southern Air Materiel Area

Pacific, based in the Philippines during 1957-58, converted l-rench systems to

USAF procedures. Still the F-8Fs. - old Navy fighters worn out when the

French transferred them - presented insoluble problems. lhe Vietnamese

possessed limited maintenance skills, and spare parts were in short supply. In

October 1958. when word came that armed 1-28 tiaineis would ieplace the

50
STRAINED CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS IN SOLUT-1 VIETINAM, 1957-1960

*()A NANO

NiTA TRANGO0

CAN TAN SO

$0cUN IPANG

PRINCIPAL USAFNNAP

AIRFIELDS IN SOUTH VIETNAM

TO FEBRUARY 1965

L-19s of the

Vietnamese Air Force

A USAF Sikorsky H-19 helicopter

at Tan Son Nhut Air Base
TH~E ADVISORY YEARS

I- .the Vietna mese wvei e disappointed. They wanted jet airci alt because the

I hais. Filipinos. and Chinese Nationalists had them. But the Geneva accords

pi ohibited thie ilt roduction of jets and. on thie ground of maintenance alone,

IAAG felt that tlii: Vietnamese establishinent was not sophisticated enough to

handle themn.

13\ mid- 1956 Amei lean aid built a 7.200-foot runway att Tain Sont Nhut.

So uthI Viet na in's i nterna ti onalI a iipoi t. The U. S International Coo pciat ion

Ad ministiation next started work onl another conci etc runway, this one 10.000

feet long. Though the Fi ench in I1953-54 had laid a NATO-standard 7.800-foot

asphalt runway at D~a Na ng, there were ino utnway lights or maintenance

buildings. The depot at Mlen I ba featured permanent wai ehousesarid hangais.

but its piciced-steel runways could not be greatly expanded. The French had also

opel atefl a 5.900-f oot pierced-steel runway at Cap Saint Jlacques. Even so, the

iirfield was st ripped of' nece, sa ry facilities at thle t imie I-1- transitloln t iainig

eildlel. At all of these airfields. tlle Vietnamese Alir Iorce looked to the Vietnamiese arm\ foi air base maintenance. oi dnance. quartermaster. signlal. and

other specialiied suppol t.

Yet all seemed to be going smoothly enough. Secietary of State D~ulles could

say iin 1958 that thle conimunist process "of tiying to pick uip one countly after

anthr as benpetty well brought to a stop by our collective defense ticaties

miound the world which give notice that thle Soviets cannot attack one without

everybody coming to its defense." In otherw~oids, the American threat of massive

retaliation and the collective flee world defensive alliances weic preserving tile

pcace in Southeast Asia.

In South Vietnam thei e w'as incipient tiouble. Cci talin conditions enhanced

enems\ effoi ts to disr-upt life. Fihe abolition of elected x illage councils in little

I1956. thle use of a conilsor\ labor as a tax in k ind. ec.pem ilileilts ill foi ced

iesettlement. maladroit attempts to Wuill peasanlts into landholdei s. and other

measues promloted discontent in the countiyside. 1 lieabsence of police in man\

u ira I ieas. a sea icit y of civil seiv~a nts oil local levels, aid t(lie i nabill t of nie\% anid

hastily oiganiied paiamilitai y foi ces to substitute foi an effectae coiistabulai N

badly handicapped the Saigon gomerimeilt ill (ealiig with guerrillas who exploited dissatisfact ioiis of onle soi t or allothl 131 1 99 manly pci ~oiis wedded to thle

unificationi of' Vietnam undei cont iol of the Northl wei e i ead "to launlch

i i itel nld aianed st ituggle" to sustainl the commluinist movement amid to

secuic its, forccs in the south."

lIn September 1958 North Vietnami proposed to South Vietilam an undeistaiiding oil peaceful i elations. I' lie Diem governilleit decli iiec t le offer because

comtin uiist guerrilIlas ini Sout i Viet na ill had k id napped 236 personsa nid assassiinatedl 193thait year-. Political kiliilgs in the soti would contiliuc to iiioujit. aild

thle local communists or Viet Coiig wvould step uip attacks onl South Vietinamese

ait med forces. 1?

The Central Committee oftlie Lao Doug Party iin North Vietnam coinveited

in ma 1959. It decided "to continue the nationlal democratic i evolution in.South

Viet na nl"and "to tise force to overthlrow thie feuidalist imiperialist iegime ini order

52
STRAINED CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS IN SOUTH VIETNAM. 1957-1960

to establish a revolutionary democratic situation and create the conditions for

the peaceful icunification of the l-athei Iand."

1 his signaled the beginning ol warfaic in South Vietnami and the iesumIption of %%arlaie in Laos. both of which coincided with Chinese probes across thle

boider of indict. "~ The People's Arnn of Vietniam. comimonix referied to as the

North Vietnamese arms,. sent several combat units to dIrive the Laotian military

hi omi the b)01der between Laos and South Vietnam. In theji wake came ti ansportation tinits to set uip i clay stations for a buildup and i nfilt ratlonl Into the two

cotintries.

'I hie Vie Cong opened guei rilla war in September 1959. when they

ambushed two Vietnamese army companies in thle marshy Plain of ed

sotithwest of Saigon. In October they attacked a smiall force in Kien Phiong

Province. In Viet Cong words. "the aimed struggle was lauinched.''" Hanoi's

policy diiecti'.es. ihe growth of North Viet na mese armnyactivities, and a marked

mnci ease in confiimed infiltrations into South Vietnam made clear Hanoi's

declai ation of warit onl the Republic of Vietnam and thle commilit mlent of its

political and nlilitar, apparatus to that end."

dimension of the thi eat. While his govei nment was apparently stimulating

economic gi owth and internal stability. P~resident Diem closely controlled its

inelignc activities, often for his own political pi poses. IlIe had little knowledge of V'iet Cong leadership, tactics, organi/ation. logistics, and plans."' As a

restilt. U.S. assistanice pi ograms in 1959 and 1960 were oriented less towaid

internal threat in South Vietnam than toward the overt thicat presented by

communist activities inl ILaos and particulai . ',in the spaisely populated cential

highlands of 'Vietnam adjacent to thle Laotiani boi der.

D~iein) had been interested in the latter area since 1957, when hie conceived a

progiam for building "agrov ilies" or- "new communities" wiound Pleiku. Kontum. and 1Ban1 Me 'I hulot. WVithout American assistance ftinds. D~iem settled

faimiis the eonl new agi ictiltural lands so as to strengthen secinit\ . By Febi mary

1959 hie had established twenty-eight outposts, andl onl July 7 hie announced an

expanded progiam to create more "*piospeiity and densit\ centers" in exposed

rulal awen".

In February 1960 the Government of Vietnam wanted trailwatchers and

commandos along the border to protect these new settlements.

Accordingly, the Vietlnmese i anger ti aining center was organiied at Dai

Naniig. At this time the Viet Cong weic thought to numbei 3.000-5.000 full-timei

elite and iegular ti oops. plus intelligence agents. reci uiteis. terroiists. service

troops, and part-timc guerrillas. Because the authority to keep in South Vietnam

peisonnel of the'l1emporary Equipment RecoveiNv Mission who augmented the

MAAG was expiring. the United States decided in May to double the MAAG

component to 685 men. *1 his was done in spite of Noi th Vietnam's protest to thle

International C'ontrol Commission. Several U.S. Army Special Forces teams

.triived dui ing the monith, and lDiemi formed a Vietna mese ianger force with a

piojectedl stiength of 10,000 men."

53

.!I
THE ADVISORY YEARS

By then the.1Joint Chiefs of Staff had dii ected the senior Ainei ican officials

iil Saigon and Cl NCIPAC to di aw II) at hr oad counterinsuligencN plan as a gude

to the Diemn go~ ci nient and to the simall 1NIAAG in South Vietnaml. Cl NClPAC*s plan contained among its key pr ovisions a Vietnamese command and

control system to Integrate militai x and civil counterinsugenc\ opel ations. A

bona tide militaiy ieldt command might end P~resident LDiem 's meddling in

operational atfairs. Also needed was fii st-rate. centrall\ controlled intelligence

and counterintelligence within thle Vietnamese goserment. Ambassador Duirbrow b)elieved these to be all-impoi tant. [hle problem \as to lpeisuade Diem to

alppi dW and implement them.

Othei proposed measures included better use of the Vietnamese forces to

fig ge t rillas wihu-eseigterability to meet anI ovei tattack. Improved

govcinmiental financial procedui s: border and coastal patrols to stop infiltration and outside support of thle antr-government guerrillas. better communicato ns nets. more attention to cis i aft airs a nd psychological waml a ie: closei

planning foi economic growth and political stabilit\:a nd moving thle Vietnamese

Civil Guard Iiom the Mirnistry of I ntetii to the M inrstr\ of Defenlse.

Ai my Lt Gen. Lionel C. McGarr became thle M AAG chief onl August 31.

1960. lie and Arnbassadoi IDurbrow elaborated the bi oad plan and v\ orked with

V'ietnamrese oficials during the autunand wintei of 1960. ]In October General

McGa rr i ecominenided and Adiii a!Felt concui l inI enlarging thle Viet namnese

arm\~ frorn 150,000 to 170.000 men. Durbrow ob~iected. A biggei a ihe

thought. would bring economic hardsh ip to thle cou nti I llalso desired to uise

the prospect of agieater miilitam y force as pressum e on l)rcrn f or politicalirefoiis

I oCeaseCOunItei mnsur gency opei ations. Diem ti a nsf err cc lie ('I% ii Guam d to

the N/I mist iv of Iefensemi Noxember, and in the folfowii-pmonith NI AAGi took

iesponsibilit\ for training and equipping it. Shortages inI rnibtar\ assistance

futnds limited support to 32.000 inistead of the planned 68.00)0 Coix (m amid

members.z.

lo 0 ISA I-of ficer-s the mieasures for Vie.tnamiese stabilit\ wereas Mal.GCen.

Theodom e ' . Milton. Uhiurteenth Alir I-or cc commander said. -entii el dominated by classic gi oond-t oree thinking." [hle Viet narnee Ari l'orce had

obsolescent aircraft and lacked trai ned pilots and techinicallN qualified support

personnel. Dierm had woi sened the tight pci sonnel situation inI August 1959 b\

terminating Contracts with I'mench aii ci ews and service technicians who opei -

a ed the Air Viet nami coinmci cia I airline, Ile i eplaced t hem with irlitair flight

ci c\ws and mechanics.

After a mysterious crash in August, President Diern giouiidel all1 the

0o'soioete 1--81-'s of thle 1t [ighiter Sq uadlron, then In September asked for jets to

ephace them. IlIe pointed to the .. lets ginsen to Thailanmd and the Philippines.

Sympathetic. Ad miral i-clt had two '1 -33 tirairs a nc four R'I -33 photo-recon

aircra ft addedc ii. the irlit a i assistance Pr ogramni funrd inrg for fiscal yea r (I'Y)

196 1. 1 hese wouli d be thle begi inni ng of a jet as wellI as a i econina issa nce f or Ce. lultt

the planes, while remaining pledged. wCi e not delivered because thle Genesa

accords prohibited introducing lets Into the couriti x. I o replace the h8s.tile

54
SI RAINED CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS IN SOUTH VII NAM, 1957-1960

first notion was to make A )-4s available Irom Navy stocks. *he Nav%. howevei.

could not forecast continued supplies lot these obsolete planes. Thus, the proti am was amended early in 1960 to include A D-6 aircraft still operational in the

U.S. Fleet. The first six arrived in Vietnam in September 1960. and twenty-fie

more werc delivered in May 1961.'

When in late 1960 some Vietnamese army rangers were icady for field

operations, the H-1913 helicopters handed down by the French to the Ist Helicopter Squadron weie worn out. MAAG secuied appioval for a hunied shipment of eleven H-34Cs from the Army. They were airlifted to Saigon without

renovation, four in I)ecember and tile others soon afterwaid."

The A D-6s and H-34s had no immediate impact on operations. The high

aircraft out-of-commission rates stemmed from poor maintenance and supply at

Bien Iloa. Also to blame was the long pipeline time for processing spare paits

requisitions through USAF logistic channels to Army and Na\\ sources. Yet

between August and October 1960, the Ist Fighter Squadion flew twenty combat

sorties, the L- 19 liaison planes logged 917 combat hours, the helicopters accumulated 166 hours on operational missions, and C-47s of the Ist Air Transport

Group flew thirty-two sorties. '

Only five airfields were usable for A D-6 operations: no communications

network served dispersed airfields: and President Diem belie\ ed that air units

could not operate effectively from dispersed locations distant from depot supplies. The Vietnamese Air Force was oriented to the support of the Vietnamese

army opeiations, but the ground troops gave little attention to spotting targets

suitable for air strikes. About ninety percent of the ground targets were located

by Vietnamese Air Force observers who flew in I - 19s. based at the same fields as

the fighters.

Approval for aircraft to strike ground targets was required fi om province

chief, regional commander, the ,Joint General Staff, and sometimes )iem himself. As a final guaranty against bombing mistakes that might hurt the government's image, politically cleared and technicallN competent obser\ers had to

mark appioved targets before air strikes could be launched against them - a rtile

of engagement repoitedly directed by l)iem.

A I ISA F team vi,,ifing Sout h Vietnam renolted. "The high level approval

iequiied for on-call fighter strikes, along with poor communications and o

proceduies for requesting strikes, builds in excessive delays for efficient use of

tactical air effort. This is particularly true in view of the hit-and-i un guerrilla

tactics of the Viet Cong."'

Internal subversion in Southeast Asia still seemed minor in 1960. In comparison, China appeared to be threatening stability and peace. 'I o counter this.

the United States continued to rely on the piesence of SEATO and on the

credibility of its own treaty commitments in the area to discourage Chinese

adventurism. 29

While the Chinese cited Nikolai lenin to piove that war was useful for

extending communism, Premier Nikita Kil ushchev spoke to the United Nations

General Assembly in September on "the grave danger of colonial wars growing

55
THE ADVISORY YEARS

into a new world war." Sino-Soviet doctrinal divergencies came under debate in

November 1960 in Moscow. The apparent outcome was a compromise

announced on January 6. 1961. when Khrushchev noted that "world wars" and

"local \; ars that would grow into a world thermonuclear war" were to be avoided

while "'national liberation wai s" through which colonial peoples could attain

independence were "not only admissible but inevitable" and merited full comm1tUllist stipport.

Meanwhile, the Lao l)ong Paity in Hanoi had announced on Septembel

10. 1960. the formation in South Vietnam of"a broad national united tront" of

workers. peasants. and soldiers dedicated to overthrowing the Diem governtlment. Thereafter. tile tempo of Viet Cong infiltration and insurgency quickened

Viet Cong units of 100-300 men began to mount raids around Saigon. Even moie

serious. Diem charged in October that attacks in the Kontum-Pleiku area

involved iegular North Vietnamese military units operating out of Laos. This

was aggiession in the formal sense. "

The inability of the Diem government to deal with the Viet Cong sparked

dissatisfaction within the Vietnamese atmy and ied to an attempted coup on

November II. A paratroop force sei/ed government centers in Saigon, prepared

to attack the presidential palace, and called for Diem's resignation on the

grounds of his autocratic rule, his nepotism. and his ineffective fight against

communistn. The chief of staff of the Joint General Staff led loyal troops into the

capital and subdued the rebels on the following day. ':

Although Diem's brother and political adviser, Ngo Dinh Nhu, announced

the introduction of some iefoi is, l)iem iemained ieluctant to decentrali/e his

authoritarian controls. Instead of delegating authority to military comma nders

as Admiral Felt and General McGarr had iecommended. Diem sought to

enhance his position by fragmenting and dividing the militat y hierarchy. l)iem

made army regional commanders (later cot ps tactical ione commande s) independent of one another but each responsible to him. Since he appointed and

removed province chiefs, many of whom were military officeis, Diem fiequently

gave thetn command over army units operating within their provinces. I lence the

field commanders looked to two superiors, their next higher military commander

in the chain of command and tile politico-military province chief. These tangled

lines checked the quick movement and close control of units and reserves.

including the employment of Vietnamese Air Foice units. But I)iem insisted on

tight control of operations, chiefly those of the air fotcc. because he teated a

revolt or a coup against his government.

There was also evidence that the Viet Cong benefited from security leaks at

high levels. At times Viet Cong fed false information into tile intelligence system

to pompt bombardment of innocent targets. Now and then a pro\ ince chief

requested C ai strikes for his own private purpose. lor example, in anothe

pr(vmice whose chief he disliked. Within this climate of suspicion, local officials

had to go on record as approving ,i ,trikes flown in their areas of authority. All

this spawned complexities, hesitations, and delays. '

56
SI'RAINED CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS IN SOUTH VIETlNAM. 1957-1960

GUANO IZI

II4GA TWIIN

*IUA NANG

GUANG NAM

'VANG TIN

OLUAN(, NAI

saum PRVINCE IEENA'S 

StNH D57

PLII~kl
THE ADVISORY YEARS

Appaiently viewing the Noxember coip attempt as prool of massi\e discontent within tile Republic of Vietnam Armed F-orces. Ilanoi swil tl\ set up a

shadow goveinment in the south. The National Iront for Iibeiation ol Soulh

Vietnm (NFI.SVN) was formall\ established (n l)ecembei 20. 1960 F;,en

though it embraced a broad range of Ion-communst and nationalist opposition

to President Diem, the Lao Dong Paity in Noith Vietnam oideied its

operations. 1

In Saigon. Diem and Nhu felt that American oflicials had laxored the

November coup. and relations with Ambassador l)urbi ow grew moic a nd more

strained. 1 he, e was also persistent discontent in tile Vietnamese armed Io ces. to

Diem's promise to liberalhe the go\,ei nment had built up hope among office s.

llis refusal to do so pioduced (lee) disappointment. "

By this time. warfare had erupted \\ thin neighboring Laos. On Decembei

14. 1960. CI NCPAC declared an alert or all units to compiise Joint 1 ask Foice

116 if the United States decided to intervene. Thailand was willing to tiansfei tell

T-6 aircraft to Laos in exchange for more model n T-37 jets from the United

States. President Eisenhower favoied a SEATO reaction in Laos and Admiral

Felt suggested offensive aim action, but the SEAI O allies were less than enthusiastic. Upon direction fi om Washington, Felt declared a highem alei t for .ITF 116

on December 31. and he requested a C-1 30 transportation squadron from tile

United States. With the arrival of the 773d Troop Can ier Squadron at Clark on

the 2d of January: the task force was fully prepaied to assist the Laotian

government. "'

Three days later, Piesident Charles De Gaulle made cleai Francc's retusal to

take part in a SEATO intervention. As instructed from Washington, CI NCPAC

reduced thL ale t on January 6. lhe State Department said on the 7th that the

United States would work with other I ree nations to pill sue whate\e measuies

seem lost promising."

Dispatches from Southeast Asia in 1959 and 1960 competed for attention

with louder signals from regions traditionally more vital to the U nited States. In

January 1959 Fidel Castro and his guem dtas became the Govei nnment of Cuba

As the months passed, Castro's orientation and outlook giew evei more Mai xist,

a development that evoked the whole complex ol policies and emotions arising

out of tile Monroe )octrine. At the same time, Piemier Khrushche\ repeatedl

drew attention to the precarious status of West Berlin. a small island in the sea ol

Soviet-dominated Eastern Eumope.

In Southeast Asia, along the northwestern frontiei of 'he lepmbhc ot

Vietnam and along the entire western frontic of North Vietnam was the Kingdorn of Laos. This geographically vulneiable, largely unadministered. politically

fragile cotunti v was an obvious avenue of approach tor infilti ators from Noi th

Vietnam to the northern provinces and central highlands of South Vietnam.

Given the difficulties of the Laotian government in making its wvill etfective. a

neutral Laos seemed to many U.S. officials only somewhat less a dangel to

Diem's government than did a communist L.aos.

58
17

 

777 

STRAINIEI)CIVIL-M ILITARY RELA I IONS IN S0OUTH VIFH NAM. 1957-1900

All of these problems wvere weighed by officials who were \crl uch awaic

that President Eisenhower's tcnuie would end inl J1anuary 1961. As Piesidett

Eisenhower latet explained. hie wanted to make n~o major commliitmienit inl thle

closing weeks of his administration that would obligate his% successor to at

pi edeterminted course of action. 13ricliig President-elect Johin F. Ketined\ on thle

19th of Janulary. Eisenhower emphiasized that L~aos as the ke\ to all of Southeast

Asia must be defended. It thle allies failed to do so, hie said. "ouir unilateral

intervention would be our last desperate hope."" What happened inl Laos. of

course. had mneaning for Vietnam.

59
F

Part Three:

The Kennedy Years
VI. Initial Challenges

and Actions

President Kcnnedv took office two weeks after Premier Khrushchev

announced Soviet support for what he termed "wars of national liberation."

These were neither the nuclear exchanges that had preoccupied American mIitarN thinkers nor limited wars like Korea. Rather. a war of national liberation

consisted of subversion and guerrilla actions at a level far below that likely to

trigger nuclear retaliation. Such a war could nevertheless erode thc will and

power of the target state until it was helpless.

The President tried to determine the real import of the Khrushche doctrine

and the exact nature of the communist threat to Southeast Asia. Rcaliuing that

the United tates had few troops specially trained and equipped for counterinsurgency warfare, he directed Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara on

February I. 1961. to increase them. On March 28 Kennedy asked the Congress

to give him the means to deal with "small externally supported bands of men."

Pointing to nonnuclear. limited, guerrilla warfare as the most constant threat to

free world scuritN since 1945. the President wanted to be able to respond to this

kind ofaggreision with nonnuclear weapons and to "help train local forces to be

equally effective" against their enemies. The main burden of defense against

over' attack, subversion, and guerrilla warfare had to rest on local populations

and their militar\ forces. Still. the United States needed strong and highly

mobile units ready to combat the so-called lesser forms of conflict.'

Pursuing this aim in June. President Kennedy specified that the Joint

Chiefs' "responsibility for the defense of the nation in the cold war [was] similar

to that which they have in conventional hostilities." Air Force officials assumed

that the new technique was to rank in importance with "preparation for conventional warlare." I his beliel seemed justified in July when the President transferred from the Central Intelligence Agency to the Department of Defense the

responsibility for preparing and mounting large paramilitary operations.

wholly or partially ,'overt, requiring many militarily trained personnel and the

type of equipment or military experience peculiar to the armed forces.2

Spurring these actions was the worsening situation in Laos. Fighting there

between the government force, and the pro-communist Pathet Lao intensified.

Both sides had outside support, alternating victories and defeats, and seveial

coups d'etat had taken place. American concern centered not only on Laos but

on the possible adverse consequences in Vietnam. During the first two months of

his administration. President Kennedy "probably spent more time on Laos than

on anything else." '

Events in Cuba, climaxing at the Bay of Pigs in April, shaped the President's

thnking. Urged to at least commit U.S. air power in Laos. Kennedy replied. "I

just don't think we ought to be involved in L'os. particularly wheic we might find

63

PlIECEDING PAGE RT..ANKX-NO' FIi
HIE1 AD)VISORY YEARS

out selves fighting millions of Cinese nioolps fin the ,ungles. InI anN e\ Cut. I don't1

eehow we canl make an\ move fin Laos, which is, 5.000 miles .it \\e don't

make a mlo~e In Cuba. whfich! Is oiilN 90 miles aa

I hie Soviets had called onl April 4 for a cease-Cite fin L aos and an internatifonal conference to cesol' e the pi oblemns. [he JIoint ('hi Nc ec troubled.

Diplomatic negotiations would probably iesuht in a nettaljied ILaos. pcrhaps

eventually a communist Laos. because SEAITO had faiiled to cluib the ob~ ious

aggression there. Laos behind the lion Cut tamn w~ould expose 1 hiailanld and

South Vietnamr to lither commiunist muflti ation. Most ol the 1 2.0(0 V'iet Cong

god rillas fin South Vietnam had come through the Laotian panhandle ot the

thinly populated northeastern coi ner of Camibodia.'

So serious did affairs appear that Kennedy onl April 20 changed the advisoi \

militar\ bod\ in Laos to a Military Assistance Advisor\ Gioup. Hie oideied the

M AAG members to put onl their uniforms and work closelh with the demnoraltied Laotian troops. At Canp Courtney. Okimiawa.Joint [ask Force 116 (it and

its air component redesignated SEATO Field Forces) readied foi action. Open

U.S. commitmenit in Laos looked iminrent until Great IBritainjoined the Soviet

U nion oii tile 24th in appealing for a cease-fire aiid an initerniational confei ence in

Geneva.,

*Vne coniference opened at Geneva fin May. a time wh'len ictired Genieral of

die Army Douglas MacAt thur advised [)resident Kenniedy against putting

Amnerican ground forces oii the mainland of Asia. If tile Uinited States intervened

in Southeast Asia, lie said1. it must be readv to use tiucleai weaponis to meet aI

Cinese entry inito tile conflict. The Joint Chiefs of 3taft categorically iniformedl

Defense Secre'ary McNamara that

an) int~ ienrtiot with UnI.iited States force% in I laos, either tinilaterai It oi tinider

SE:A 10 auispices. should he takent ortl~ ,fter firm (I S gowcromeirtal decisioit to the

effleci that the 1 toted States is thereb\ prepared anid cornmitted to succeed iII its

itiitar\ iiitersetttiott regardless of tile estetOt of Possible comteqtitt c orititilit

esCalati~tit. this I% an ii tiequis ocal positiont Mtuch is 111inda tttelili to I itited states

To Secretary McNa mara it seemed clear that the United States must soon

decide whether or not to stanid up and fight. Yet accordinig to Army. Chief of Staff

Geti George H. Decker. the United States could hardly hope to \%,fit a conenltional war ;n Southeast Asia. General Decker sutge'.e oigA eia

troops itito Thailand anid South Vietnatm to see if that wotuld Pt oduce a cease-fire

in Laos. B~ut iftlie United States went into Laos. "we should go in to wvin. aid that

mneans Hanoi, China, atnd miaybe eveti using niuclear bombs." Lackinig entliusiasm for a grotitd war in Laos, Decker said later that

this is, the last place int file wotrld I \ otild like to %cc [LI S forces] coimmritted tiiilcss

a bsolutely iteeessar\, If it owere only ithe Patliet 'ao that %\as III\ oh ed. there w ould

be ito problern. Butt tund oubtedly N ortht Vieitamnese wNotld coic iI antd probahl\ ftcChiniese Coitniimtsand wheit tltcv do. it s tard to predict whIere our cornitit ittet

would stop

Genieral Curtis E. LeMay. Air Force Chief of Staff, was dubious ot U.S.

policy on Laos, but lie believed a cease-fire i fi possible wit Itotit Americani military

(64
INITIAL CHALLENGES AND ACTIONS

action. That meant nuclear weapons if the Chinese entered tile conflict. General

O'Donnell at PACAFestimated that his air foices could prosecutea "small war"

in Laos with conventional weapons. He envisioned an enlarged conflict including

North Vietnam or China as requiring a "ti uly massive increase" in U.S. ground

and air forces.'

President Kennedy deferred sending U.S. ti oops into Laos, tried to salvage

as much as possible from a cease-fire, and offeied reassurances to Thailand and

South Vietnam. The Geneva negotiations produced no solution, but at a summit

meeting in Vienna onJune4, Khrushchev agreed with Kennedy's proposal -"we

all get out of Laos" and have "a neutral and independent Laos under a government chosen by the Laotians." But as late as April 1962, the State Department

would find it "very hard to prophesy what is going to happen in Laos.""

Part of the difficulties in dealing with a possible use of force, General Le May

believed, was due to President Kennedy's procedural habits and tendencies. The

President seemed to depend on ad hoc committees in lieu of the Joint Chiefs,

leading to vetoes, stalling, lengthy discussions, and too many people "in the act

and making decisions in areas wheie they weren't competent." This approach to

policy, LeMay believed, failed to recognize that "going to war is a very serious

business and once you make that decision that you're going to do that, then you

ought to be prepared to do just that.""

General LeMay's uneasiness with President Kennedy's methods came at a

time when other international crises clamored for attention. The Soviets were

again threatening allied rights of access to West Berlin, so Kennedy requested

and the Congress authorized the call to active duty of more than 147,700 Army.

Navy. Marine Corps. and Air Force personnel. Included were thirty-six squadrons and 26.575 members of the Air National Guard and the Air Force Reserve.

On September I the Soviet Union broke the nuclear test moratorium of several

years by exploding negatonic nuclear bombs in the atmosphere. The president

instructed Defense Secretary McNamara to resume American nuclear tests. ':

Though Laos overshadowed South Vietnam in SEA alfais during the first

months of President Kennedy's administration, the fates of the two countries

were intertwined. Soon after taking office the President considered plans to

combat the insurgency in Vietnam. He agreed to enlarge the Republic of

Vietnam Armed Forces by 20,000 men and to expand military tiainmng for the

Civil Guard. In Februaiy he directed Ambassadoi Durbrow to secuic Piesident

Diem's cooperation on these and other matters. 11

In November 1960 President Eisenhower had strengthened the role of

American Ambassadors in all countries. Each had "affirmative iesponsibility"

for all U.S. activities, including military assistance. The Ambassador was to be

infoimed on all that took place and to report "promptly to the President"

whenever necessary. In May 1961 President Kennedy reiterated this instruction.

However, he exempted American military forces in the field from the Ambassador's direct authority - they were responsible through military channels. In

Southeast Asia CINCPAC. an area commander, reported to the .loint Chiefs of

Staff. the Secretary of Defense, and the [)resident. While the Ambassador was

65
I IIP AI)\ISOR~t "lI ARS

CovrteSy John F Kennendy Obray (,owle"y UJ 1,N,

't, I-~ (Upper left) W Averell Harrman Pres. fr~ Kennedy and Dean Rusk

j (Above) Robert S McNamara and

~ ~ Gen Lyman L Lemfl'tzer

(Left) Members of the Vietnamesa Self

Defense Corps from Suon Enao

(8efow) Female memtbers, of thp Civil

*1. Defense Guard at Mao Cain
INITIAL CHALLENGES AND ACTIONS

outside this line, he was tile Chief of Mi sion. lie worked hand in glove with the

nilitary commander in the mutual exchange ot information, the coordination of

programs, and the formulation of policy. "

In early 1961, six Vietnamese Air Force squadrons weie combat-ready

one AD-6 fighter, two C-47 tiansport, two L-19 liaison, and one 11-19 helicopter. The fighter unit by March had upped its monthly sortie rate 200 percent.

from 40 to 120. "

The Army of the Republic of Vietnam comprised seven infantry divisions.

one airborne group, and nineteen separate battalions. Their limited combat

readiness reflected "inexperienced leadership above the battalion level, inadequate logistical and technical service development, and other deficiencies of an

organi'ational nature." The enduring need to divert troops to internal securit\

missions interrupted training. "

Complementing the army were several paramilitary forces. The 68.000 men

of tile Civil Guard (later called Regional Forces) had been organi/ed in 1955 and

were controlled by the piovince chiefs. Since October 1960 undei the Ministry of

Defense, the Civil Guard could neither arrest nor investigate. Members had the

mission of patrolling. The Self Defense Force of 40,000 men constituted a

full-time home guard defending its members' village.s, and it was under the

district chiefs. The United States moved quickly in 1961 to arm and train these

two foices so as to free the army from static defense missions. i

Against these forces and the general population, the Viet Cong had

redoubled their campaign of terror during the first part of 1961, perhaps to

disrupt presidential elections scheduled for April 9. The number of Viet Cong in

South Vietnam swelled to around 14,000. By March the North Vietnamese arm

units in southern Laos seemed strong enough to push across the border and set

up a "popular" government in the central highlands. If this took place, the

Sino-Soviet bloc might pursue the technique used in I aos recogni/e the

shadow regime as the legitimate government of South Vietnam and furnish

assistance. But what impressed President Kennedy above all were the assassinations. Sustained by North Vietnam, well-disciplined Viet Cong guerrillas in 1960

had killed over 4,000 civil officers, 2,000 state employees, and 2,000 police in

South Vietnam. i"

The elections in April were reasonably oiderly. and President Diem received

an overwhelming vote. With Diem's position as head of state thereby confirmed

and apparently secure, President Kennedy sent Chairman of the.loint Chiefs of

Staff General Lemnit/er and Under Secretary of State W. Averell Harriman to

Saigon to support Ambassador Durbrow who was pressing Diem to make

certain reforms. Calling on Diem. they urged him in particular to foi m a militai y

field command and a central intelligence organi/ation. Inasmuch as these creations might nurture potential political rivals. Diem found the decision hard to

make. lie did agree to try to upgrade the paramilitary forces, get better intelligence, start a junk navy to stop enemy infiltration by sea, establish internal

-ecurity councils, decentialie his government, and undertake fiscal reforms. "

67
THE ADVISORY YEARS

Afteiwards Diem reactivated the Nattonal Internal Security Council,

founded a National Intelligence Agency. and appointed a commander of the

Army Field Foices who was to work closely with General McGarr, the MAAG

clef, on counterinsungency. Abolishing the military regional headquarters,

Diem divided the country into thice tactical /ones and a special tactical zone foi

Saigon, the capital. The commandeis weie responsible to the Arnmy Feld Forces

commander, and they were to conduct all antiguerrilla military opei ations. The

tactical /ones could be further segmented into subiones coinciding for the n -st

part with provincial boundaries. In them the military chief might also be a

provincial chief and theiefore would be in both civil and militaly chains of

command. ")

On April 20. 1961, in Washington-- one day after the Bay of Pigs invasion

of Cuba collapsed - President Kennedy asked Deputy Secretary of Defense

Roswell L. Gilpatric to draw up a compiehensive program. It was to cover

militaly, social, and political actions, and be tailored to prevent a communist

takeover in South Vietnam. The deputy Defense secretary swiftly organized an

liteiagency committee and wrote a first-draft plan in about a week. tits pieface

set the tone of the paper, "Come what may, the U.S. intends to win this battle."

Gilpatric's military recommendations apparently aimed to heatten national

policy after the Bay of P;gs and to affit in explicitly American resolve to pay the

cost of commitments in Southeast Asia. The iecommendations included the

installation of radar surveillance in South Vietnam, which would involve the

U.S ,*, Forcc: increasing the MAAG so it could tiain and support 20,000 more

Vietnamese soldiers, thus building the army to 170,000: supplying arms and

training to the paiamilitary forces: and furnishing equipment for a small naval

force

At a National Security Council meeting on the 29th. Kennedy approved

several measures: establishing a combat development and test centei in Vietnam.

expanding civic action and economic development programs, augmenting the

685-man MAAG by appioximately 100 advisors, and adding to the Military

Assistance li ograin for F-Y 1961 a heavy radar facility to be sited neai Da Nang

to observe and report Soviet flights across the laotian border 2

Meeting on May 4 with Senator .1. William Fulbright, :hairman of the

foreign relations committee, Kennedy discussed the possibility of sending U S.

combat forces into South Vietnam. Probably asa result of this talk, the President

told newsmen the next day that U.S. intervention would be inappropriate

without prior discussions with Vietnamese eaders. he Air Force plans division

informed General LeMay that the Illesident's statement was "the first example of

the type of over-all plan that the Air Force has advocated fo; some trime." The

division advised strong support. By May 10. however, the plans division was

opposing premature commitment of U.S. forces to South Vietm.m because it

might "reduce pressuie on Vietnam for initiative and forcelul action." provoke

the Chinese communists into intervening, and have a bad effect on American

allies.2-

68
INIi IAt. CHALLENGES AND ACTIONS

In contlast. JCS Chairmn , Gne ,,i emnitzer let a sense of urgency. He

frequently spoke of the possib'e "loss of \ ietnam" termed tile military threot

extremely serious, and deplolcd th: .i.d-ncy of the U.S. government to waste

time in quibbling oxer policy.2'

At Secretary McNanara's request to consider the commitment of American foices, the Joint Chiefs on May 10 lavored an immediate deployment to

pi ovide a visible and "significant" (feter rent to Noi th Vietnamese and Chinese

Inter\ention. They believed it would release Vietnamese ai mcd forces from static

missions and enable active counterinsurgency operations. help train Vietnamese

Iorces, be a nucleus for a U.S. buildup in the case of allied SEATO operations,

and show the firm intent of American policy in Southeast Asia. The JCS leaned

to\,ard dispatching two reinforced infantry battalions to the central highlands to

set upand opelate two division trainingcenters for the Vietnamese army. Having

U.S. combat foices in the country was bound to bolster Vietnamese morale.

Asked to estimate U.S. force requirements. Admiral Felt, CINCPAC.

discussed the matter with l:is component commanders on May II. To General

O'Donnell, South Vietnam was so deficient in airfields and ground facilities that

only a few turnaround B-57s and F-102s could operate from Tan Son Nhut for

short periods.

Admiral Felt recommended the dispatch to Vietnam of one Army infantry

division with supporting troops: eight 13-57s for border surveillance, close support, and anti-Viet Cong operations: four F-102s for air dlfense: and possibly

two or three jet reconnaissance aircraft. If Amer ican forces were committed. 1-elt

,uggested that the MAAG cluef be designated Commander. United States

I orces. Viczran.ia. and becharged witl ontrol. under CIN('PACdirection, of all

U.S. forces there. -

4

By then President Kennedy had decided against an open and substantial

commitment of con\entronal U.S. combat tioops. On May I I he diiected the

Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) and tile Joint Chiefs to continue

studying potential U.S. task force structures for Vietnam and to asses the value

and the cost of increasing tile Vietnamese armed forces from 170,000 to 200,000

men. These actions were to signify "an intensified endeavor to win the st uggle

against communism and to further the social and econonicadvance of Vietnam"

i cooperation with Iesident Diem. '1 he rationale, provided by the National

Security Council. was "to prevent Communist domination Ii South Vietnan: to

cieate in that country a viable and increasingly democratic society, and to

initiate, on an accelerated basis. a series of mutually supporting actions of a

military, political, economic. psychological and covert characte designed to

achieve this objective." 2'

On the same day. the President committed an Army Special I-orc.s gi oup of

400 men to Vietnam. Its task was to orga.,i/e tile '1 ribal Area Development

Program to clear and hold certain Viet Cong-controlled areas, mainly along the

land border. lhis was tie beginning of the Civilian Irregular Defense Group,

iitially super vised by the Central Intelligence Agency. Raising, training, leading,

69
TFE ADVISORY YEARS

and supporting irregular forces would haidly bo possible wit hout airlift, medical

evacuation, and close aii support. The Air Force would soon be involved.2'

Also on May II. the President sent Vice President Lyndon 13. Johnson to

Saigon to demonstiate continuing U.S. support for Diem. Johnson's visit was

designed to ,,tiengthen Diem's position at hone, to make hin feel safe enough to

delegate power to ,.ubordinates (chiefly to a functioning field foice command), to

encourage accelerated Vietnamese and American actions, and to gi'.e Diem

confidence in the United States. Johnson carried a letter from Kennedy promising more U.S. assistance if Diem pi omoted the economic and political development of his country.:'

Johnson and Diem discussed the question of committing U.S. forces to

South Vietnam. and Johnson had tile impression that "Asian leaders - at this

time- do not want American troops involved in Southeast Asia other than oil

training missions." The Embassy confirmed this point of view. )iem would

welcome American combat forces solely in the case of o,.crt aggression. 2

'

When Johnson asked Diem what he thought his country's military needs

weie. Diem said he would give a detailed answer later. He obsei ved dryly that the

Vietnamese were not "accustomed to being asked for our own views on our

needs."2' A conmunique issued on May 13 at the conclusion of their talks made

no mention of committing U.S. forces.

Upon his return to Washington. the Vice President said he saw no need for

American troops in Vietnam except to help the Vietnamese train their force,. The

nations of Southeast Asia had to make decided efiorts. w\,ith stronger American

support, to develop their economic and political systems and to provide for their

own defense. He passed on Diem's concern that the communists would employ

tile same strategy they had used in l.aos - infiltration, aerial resupply. and

establishment of a recogniiable government. "Any help." Johnson said. "economic as well as military, we give less developed nations to sectire and maintain

their freedom must be pait of a mutual effort. These nations cannot be saved by

the United States alone. To the extent the southeast Asian nations are piepared

to take tile necessary measures to make our assistance effective, we can be - and

must be - unstinting in our assistance."'"

Deputy Defense Secretary Gilpatiic's Committee oil Vietnam consisted of

members of the State and Defense Departments. On May 19 it pioposed these

objectives for American forces that might be deployed to Vict~iam: deter the

North Vietnamese and Chinese, release Vietnamese forces for fuller use in

operations, train local troops, form a nucleus for future U.S. buildup. and

demonstrate American firmness. The committee favored the founding of two

training centers, each to be run by a reinfoiced U.S. infantry battalion, and the

sending of minimal air and naval forces to stop infiltiation and act against tile

insurgents. The Army urged deploying an infantry division plus special forces.

The Air Force was reluctant to place combat units in a country where the major

threat appeared to be insuigency and where the Vietnamese Air Force could

afford the limited air suppoi t required by that threat.''

70
INITIAL CHALLENGES AND ACTIONS

Hoping to help the people of South Vietnam help themselves. Ilesident

Kennedy sent to Admiral Felt and to Ambassador Frederick E. Nolting. It. (who

had replaced Dtirbrow) thirty separate actions he wished carried out. The

program encompassed: political activities to buttiess Diem's conlidence in the

United States, to heighten his popular support at home, and to improve Vietnam's relations with its neighbors, chiefly Cambodia: economic measuies to let

Vietnam support laiger military forces: and military proposals including the

installation of a radar surveillance system, a 20.000-man expansion of the

Vietnamese at med forces, more support for the Civil Guard and Sell Defense

Corps. and an augmented M AAG. The President also desired a stop to infiltration into South Vietnam and a facility to test new techniques against insurgency. 2

Diem issued decrees to carry out the counterinsurgency measti es proposed

by the Americans. but the extent of his implementation was far from clear. ie

went on using command and ,ntelligence agencies for political ends, mostly to

maintain a ba!ance among several local Vietnamese factions and their senior

officers of the armed forces competing for favor a-id power."

It soon became evident to Americans that the threat to Vietnam was more

severe than had been suspected. At the summit in Vienna early in Jutne 1961.

Kennedy found Khrushchev willing to accept a neutralization of Laos but not of

Vietnam. Reflecting upon this refusal, Secretary of State Dean Rusk later

suggested that the United States should have said quite simply. "You can't have

South Vietnam." Perhaps that would have prevented misundeistanding within

the communist world of the American position on Southeast Asia. '

Although the Joint Chiefs and Cl NCPAC advocated deploying U.S. forces

for combat in South Vietnam to counter the Viet Cong. the President put faith in

his program of helping the Vietnamese. Yet there were warnings in June 1961

that "the prospects for stability and progress are not too bright," due to intensified communist warfare and "a lack of real populai support for Diem's

governlent." "

In that month President Diem asked the United States to suppoita Vietnamese army of 270,000 (one airborne and fourteen infantry divisions). An expanded

MAAG to onerate training centers, he said. "would serve the dual purpose of

providing an expression of the United States' determination to halt the tide of

Communist aggression and of preparing our forces in the minimum of time.""

In iesponse the Joint Chiefs on June 21 recommended building the Vietnames. armed forces to 200,000 nen and adding "two division equivalents, including

necessary Navy and Air Force augmentation." Gilpatric counseled deferral of

this action until the earlier 20.000-man increase had been

assimilated. "

To see if the South Vietnamese economy could sustain enlaiged military

forces. Kennedy sent a financial survey group headed by Dr. Eugene Staley to

Saigon. Repolting in July. Staley favored further aid for Vietnam but warned

against expecting military operations to achieve lasting results without economic

71

;z1
THE ADVISORY YEARS

progress. A free society and a self-sustaining economy in Vietnam gave the best

basis of hope for the future. "

Military planners in Washington came to the same conclusion in .July and

August 1961. Adding to the Vietnamese armed forces or deploying two reinforced American battalions would hardly solve the problems. Preventing the

communist domination of South Vietnam had to come through a series of

mutually supporting political, military, economic, psychological, and covert

actions. "

Cool to Diem's request for more soldiers, the Joint Chiefs of Staff on

August 3 decided that a nine-division force of 200,000 Vietnamese was sufficient

They thought piiority should go to training the 20,000-man increase, the Civil

Guard, and the Self Defense Corps, as well as to retraining existing forces. On

August I I President Kennedy approved U.S. support for a Vietnamese military

establishment of 200.000 men. As Secietary of Defense McNamara told his

principal subordinates a week later, internal security was the first priority.

although military operations would give no lasting results without "continued

and accelciated" economic and social progiess. But in September the Viet

Cong intensified the conflict. occupying towns, cutting roads, slowing the flow of

rice to market, and impeding other commercial traffic. They also assassinated

about 1.000 people each month, mainly intermediate government officials.

Although the Vietnamese army had mauled several laige guerrilla units in the

Mekong l)clta during .lune. it was able to do so because the foe stood and fought

in the open. This was an ominous sign, since Viet Cong strength in corbat units

was now an estimated 13.000-15,000 men. The evaluation division of the Air

Staff in Washington felt that "the communists are making a determined bid to

take over that nation, and perhaps all of Southeast Asia. in the very near

futuie."'"

Infiltrators in 1959 and 1960 had been chiefly administrators, propagandists, and logisticians. In 1961 combat soldiers- mostly trained vetetans of the

war against Fiance and many of them born in South Vietnam-- an ived and

formed main force battalions and combat support companies. They had pushed

south along two routes. The primary one was a corridor along the border. I he

other. 100 kilometer's to the east wa, called Ilo Chi Mulnh Trail by thle Aniericans, a name they later gave the whole system.

These small determined men moved beneath the forest canopy, brushed

Wr wv their tcks when necessary, preserved rigid march discipline, and kept

thleirnovements secret. Theytraveled in gi oups ofseveral hundred, an estimated

6.200 in 1961. 13,000 in 1962. Their presence was mirrored in the usc of incidents

involving the assassination of officials, the destruction of government outposts.

and the eagerness of guerrillas to fight in the open. 4

2

There were 41 reported battles in the country during August 1961 but 450 in

September. A telling action took place on the 18th of September. Around 1.500

guerrillas overran PLhuoc Vinh. the capital of Phuoc Thanli Province. They'

publicly beheaded the province chief, held the town most of the day. and left

before the Vietnamese troops arrived. President Diem was alarmed by the

72
INIFiAL CHALLENGES AND ACTIONS

infiltrators streaming from North Vietnam through Laos and by the Viet Cong's

ability to assemble large units, to operate in battalions, to use extensive radio

command nets, and to raid key provincial cities. On September 29 Diem asked

Ambassador Nolting for a bilateral defense treaty w\ith the United States. He

pressed Admiral Felt, CINCPAC. for a "large increase in advisors of all type,,"

and for American tactical air squadrons to help bleak up big communist units

massing for attack. Diem's appiehension colored his address before the National

Assembly on October 2: "It is no longer a guerrilla war. It is a wai waged by an

enemy who attacks us with regular units fully and heavily equipped and who

seeks a strategic decision in Southeast Asia in conformity with the oide, of the

Communist International."4

'

Controiling infiltration into the country was virtually impossible. South

Vietnam's land border stretched 900 miles along neighboring Cambodia, Laos,

and North Vietnam. Three-quarters of this distance consisted of rugged mountains, the test of swamps and jungles. Portions of tile frontier had never been

precisely delineated. MAAG suggested using helicopteis to patrol the boider, but

maintenance facilities were in short supply or entirely lacking. Sum veillance by

high-performance aiicraft was hardly enough. Requesting SEATO forces to

exercise border control would only place these units in a vulnerable position,

grossly complicate communications and logistical support, and ieduce but certainly not stop Viet Cong crossings.

The best technique came into being about the time of the ILaotian crisis in

May. The Vietnamese set up patrol bases and piimitive ailields along the

border. Manned by regular army troops. iangers, Civil Guard companies, and

Montagnard scouts, these facilities were home for the roving patrols that located.

harassed, and ambushed infiltiators. The landing strips made air iesupply by

C-47s possible. The ranger training center, which had been moved from Da Nang

to Nha Trang, recruited and instructed Montagnard scouts. But the cote of the

system was the group of 400 Special Force,, troops committed by Piesident

Kennedy. They brought direction and substance to the borde-contiol

program. 4

To fulfill president Kennedy's desire for developing counteinsuigency

methods, )efcnse Secretary McNanlaa directed tile Defense l)epatient's

Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA) to ceate a Combit )evelopment

and Test Center in Vietnam. When its functions appeared to ovei lap and conflict

with the MAAG's, Vietnamese and American officials agreed on ,lunc 29 to

locate a small center within the Vietnamese armed forces headquartmsin Saigon,

to work with the .loint General Staff. With diiect channels to ARPA and

CINCPAC, the center served as a focal point for technical contract analysts

dispatched to thecountry by AR PA and by thedmiector of l)efensc iescich and

engineering. By the 5th of August. the center was searching for a chemical agent

to kill tile tapioca plant (a food source for guerrillas). probing the use ol pati ol

dogs, and consider ing the employment of chemical defoliants to depi i e the Viet

Cong of assembly and ambush areas.4

71
THE ADVISORY YEARS

Installing surveillance radar to recoid Soviet overflights in clandestine

supply and intelligence missions as PIesident Kennedy wished was not eas\.

The Vietnamese armed foices were without aircilaft control and wai ning. At "an

Son Nhut their Ist Radar Squadron owned two light TPS-I) search radars and

two TPS-l 0D height finders. This equipment was stored from 1954 to 1958. then

the Vietnamese Air I-olct utilieed it merely for training. 1 he Ist Squadron had

never actually controlled aircraft, and mail\ of its U.S.-tiained technicians were

assigned elsewhere, often in unrelated jobs.46

Military Assistance Program funds covered the installation of two heav.

combination FPS-20 -6 radars at Tan Son Nhut and Da Nang. but delivery was

impossible before September 1962. To fill the gap and to speed refresher tiaining

of Vietnamese technicians. Admiral Felt requested and Air Force headquarters

directed on September II. 1961. the deployment of a mobile combat reporting

post to Vietnam. It came from the 507th Tactical Control Group at Shaw Air

Force Base. South Carolina.

The combat reporting post comprised 67 men plus M FPS-l I search and

M PS- 16 height-finder radars. This secret movement (all identification markings

on boxed equipment were painted out) was airlifted to Vietnam during September 26-October 3. The installation started operating at Tan Son Nhut on the

5th of October and eventually received 314 more USAF personnel. A center was

organized to control and report flights. and training of Vietnamese technicians

commenced.

As the first USAF unit to arrive in Vietnam on a permanent duty status. the

combat reporting post formed the nucleus of a tactical air control system. The

personne supervised construction of a tent city, met incoming aircraft, and in

general ease,. ,ie arrival of other officers and airmen ordered to Vietnan. They

began "a radar capability to support interceptor and other combat activities in

the event that U.S. or other allied forces must at some point be deployed to the

country in an emergency."'

Other USAF resources soon arrived to bolster photo reconnaissance. A

single R'I-33 had reconnoitered L.aos until May 1961. but the United States

suspended the mission to respect the cease-fire and the Geneva conference on

Laos. The flights resumed on October 4. Shortly after the Saigonl government

asked for more photo reconnaisance to aqqist intelli ence gathering. Fifth Air

Force was ordered to move a detachment of its 15th Tactical Reconnaissance

Squadron from Okinawa to Saigon. The detachment got to Tan Son Nhut on the

morning of October 18.just after the Mekong River had overflowed its banks.

The severe flooding spread to the greater part of three delta provinces. lelt

320.000 people homeless, and destroyed 1,000 kilometers of roadsand 10 million

acres of crops.

The four RF-101 aircraft, six flight crews, a photo processing unit, and

support personnel were all known as Pipe Stem. Flights got under way on

October 20, photographirng the Mekong floods as well as areas controlled by the

Viet Cong. During a month of operations. Pipe Stern fle\\ sixty-seven photo

sorties within the country, along the border, and to the 'I chepoi area of L.aos.

74

,i1
INITIAL CIIALLENGES AND ACTIONS

Another detachment of four Filth Air -orcte RI '-101. flight :, hoto

processing unit. and support personnel ieached I)on Muang. Thailand. on

November 6. Nicknamed Able Mable, it took over the reconnaissance missions

on the 10th, leaving the RT-33 to transport film to a pi ocessing cener at Tan Son

Nhut or Clark. I-illing the needs of the MAAGs in Laos and Vietnam. the first

flights weie mostly over Laos. But before long the pilots were flying seventv-fixe

peicent of their soities over South Vietnam. n 4- '

Despite the buildup of American assistance. signs in Viet.;ain wei e mixed.

Piesident I)iem had formed a Cential Intelligence Organibation. was improving

the Civil Guard, was adding 20,000 men to the at my. and bad created a ilanger

force. American advisors were working down to compan, level, and small.

helicoptei-borne, quick-ieaction units were being organiied. Yet Diem's

National Internal Security Council (lid a poorjob of super\ isulg the execution of

military, political, and economic measures. Military units had scant time for rest

and ietiaining. Province chiefs paid slight attention to the chain of command.

Vietnamese forces diverted aiicraft from troop lift to administiative purposes.

Perhaps most disheaitening, several Vietnamese military leaders asked U.S.

officials what American ieaction might be to a coup dletat against President

Diem.

Inefficiency abounded. A typical example took place in autumn 1961.

Se\eral Vietnamese AD-6s got orders to strike Viet Congtroops gathered on the

Bien Hoa side of a river dividing that province from Phuoc Thanh. By the time

tile fighteis came, tile guerrillas had crossed the river. While the planes orbited

for three hours, the Phuoc Thanh Province chief could not be found to appiove

the strike.4"

The Vietnamese Air Force was rated combat ready. Plans to expand it

gained Military Assistance Progiam backing for second fighter and helicopter

squadrons. one photo reconnaissance unit, and a third L-19 liaison squadron.

Even though the Geneva accords forbade introducng jet aircraft into tile country, there was some talk in American circles during 1961 of giving the Vietnamese

surplus F--86 jets. This, it was said, would merely match the many communist

violations since 1954."

The Joint Chiefs of Staff frankly suggested that T- RT-33jets be delivered

to the Vietnamese for reconnaissance. Even a few jet planes would impel the

Vietnamese to expand and upgiade ground facilities extremely valuable

actions in light of possible future commitment o' U.S. aii units. Admilal Felt.

CINCPAC, favored turning over several photo jets to the Vietnamese. The

USAF planners in Washington warned, "immediate and serious degradation in

the military effect: ,eness of the Vietnamesc could iesult" from the absence ofjets.

The State Department stood solidly against the idea and in October Ambassador

Nolting stopped trying to equip the Vietnamese with jet planes. Secretary

McNamara told the Navy to send thirty piston-engine T-28 fighters to Saigon.

The Air lorce handled the transportation of these aircraft from the west coast to

Vietnam. "l he first fifteen were in place by mid-Decenber.'

75

N

tL
THE ADVISORY YEARS

All this was- in ictrospect at least- a prelude to two decisions made by

piesident Kennedy on October II. 1961. The President perused Diem's address

of October 2 to the National Assembly that termed hostilities in Vietnam as

changcd and extremely serious. He also noted the stream of threat and vituperation flowing from Hanoi. Then Kennedy on the morning of the I I tI ordered a

USAF combat detachment to Vietnam. In the afternoon he sent his military

adviser, Gen. Maxwell ). Taylor, to Saigon to find out how best to help the

Diem gov'ernment.

76
(Left) T-28 fighter bomrbers

(Cnter) Lt Richard A M~athison and

AIIC T. rt Pham Mmnh VN'AF stanc! wipi

a collecton of Farm Gate aircraft

T-28 in toregrounu a B-26 in left

background A-IE in rigtt backqrcund

and a C-47 in distance

(8ttb m) RF -1O 1 Voodoo

'CE
VII. Opening Farm Gate

I he USA" 1combat detachment that President Kennedy oldered to Vietnam on October I I, 1961. had its roots m a small, secret organiation created in

the late 1950s when General LeMay was Vice Chief ol Staff. In March 1961

LeMay iesponded to thtk Piesident's instructions for the armed services to

examine ho, each could best contribute to counterinsurgency. When there was

no doubt, about communist aggression. LeMay personally fax ored a direct and

open American response with the necessary strength. He defined "necessar "as

"more than is actually necessary to do the job," hitting "with overwhelming

weight"io avoid "stretchingthings out over a period of time." L.eMay, soon to be

Chief ot Staff, was very much avare that the military services had to abide by

different rules. Tactical Air Command was therefore diiected to form a small,

elite. volunteer unit around the oranization. Its mission would be

air operations in support of ground forces to be flown in older conventional

aircraft.

The 4400th Combat Crew Training Squadron (nicknamed Jungle Jim)

came into beingat Eglin Air Force Base. Florida. on April 14. 1961. Commanded

by Col. Benjamin H. King. the unit had 124 officers and 228 airmen, sixteen

C-47s. eight B-26s. and eight T-28s. Equal numbers of the same types of aircraft

were In temporary storage. The squadron's mission of training indigenous air

forces in counteinsurgency would combine with a mission of air operations.i

Officers and airmen of the 4400th- at times called air commandos - were

volunteers, aboxe average in physique, haidiness. and sense of adenture. Each

was closel, interviewed and approved by Colonel King. Next came psychiatric

screening at lackland Air Force Base, Texas. and survival indoctrination at

Stead Air Force Base. Nevada. Those completing the program were certified to

be emotionaily mature, highly motivated, and stable. Unfortunately, not all wele

mentally attuned to teaching members of other cultuies or in fact to perform a

training mission- they were combat-oriented. Later, several men would piove

unable to work with Asian officers. As volunteers dwindled, the ligorous standards were eventually lowered. The picturesque air commando uniform, personally picked by General LeMay, featured an Australian-type bush hat (with

turned-up brim), fatigues. and combat boots.2

Two of the three types of Jungle Jim aircraft were extensively modified. The

T-28 received armorplate and carried about 1,500 pounds of bombs and rockets,

plus two .50-caliber ,nachineguns with 350 rounds per gun. Loaded, the aircralt

could speed at 160 knots to a target 200 miles distant then return to ba., The

C-47 (rcdesignated SC-47after modification) boasted twice the normal fuel load.

a stronger landing gear suited to dirt strips, and jet-assisted takeoff (,IATO) racks

for operations fiom short fields. The 13-26 twin-engine attack bomber needed no

modification, carrying 6,000 pounds of bombs and rocKets, plus machineguns.

79

PkECEDING PAGE ANK-NOT F11=
T HE ADVISORY YEARS

WVhen fully loaded. it had a combat i adios of 400 miles at a not mal speed of 200

knots and could loiter 30 to 45 minutes. 'tile B~-26 was designed for a, glide

bomib-deltx cry pattern, not lor dix c-bombing with rolling pullouts nor I or

landing with extet al ot dnancc inI place alter an aborted imission'

To hialt communist infiltration into South Vietnam. thle Joint Chiels onl

August 24 suggested to Sect etar\ MecNamara air intel diction ol thle inland trail"

over which thle Viet Cong secured supplies. It the United States had no desite to

commit American lot ces openly. wxhy not instit ute unconventional, guerrillatype operations.4I

'I h),. lPesident had mentioned sex eral littes, to thle Secrctarx ol Defense thle

bencfits ol testing counterinsuigenc\ techniques in Vietnam. On September 5

McNamat a infoitried the three service sect etai ics that hie intended to establish an

experimental command under Ni AA(; as a laboratot y for clfint ng organii/ational and operational procedu es. General Le Ma\ at this point m tited Secretar\

of the Air Foice Eugene Nil. Zucket t's attention to the 4400thl Combat Ciecx

Training Squadron. Sending an element of the ut to Viet nam would be an ideall

xvav vto dc i.e and evaluate specialwai fare miethods. On Septemibet 19 Secietat

Zuckert recom mended i tts to Sect et Iry McNa ma ta. A detachmenIIt lie 4400th

had just become operationally ready. If' imed to Vietnam. it xvould acquire

Countet insurgency experience and at the same timle train thle Viet na mese.'

McNamaia liked the proposal. asked the .Ioint Chiefs ol Stall or commilent.

anMd on October 5 had theiri iecommiiendaition to piace adetachmient ol .1tigle Jimi

with N/iAAG in Vietnam. Thle Sect etat v next made the idea known to thle

lPresident.6,

President Kennedy weighed thle burgeoning Viet Cong smength. thle mote

liequent reference in planning papers to U.S. covert opet ations. the desite ol thle

.1011nt Chiels to make a t eassuring commit ment of air strength to V'ietnam. and

Piesident lDiem's change of heart on acceptanice of American combat units inI his

country. Onl thle morning of October 11. 1961. the Commander in Chief authot -

iied thle deployment of thie Junigle im isqua,,dronI to Vietnam **to serxe undet thle

M AAG as a training mission and not lot combat at the piesent timec."'

Butl the 4400th xvas not specifically a t iainlinl unit it was -designed to

I ighi." It had been "'singled out'" Ior depioylknt bcius iz- combat capacitN and

imolxement xwould shote uip -South Viet namlese sagging morale"'

'I hie Presidlent's decision five months earlici to senid anI At my Special I-orces

group to Vietnam noxv enuinciated aI nexw nussion statement fol- .1ingle JIim. It Was

to train indigenous airmen while xvoiking xwith and suppot ting the Special

l'orces. rangers. and iiiregular fot ces along the hot der. InI this light. Genet al

Ie May saxw the USA FL11 uitS, saegular part of the triseix ice team. Iissentiall\,

hoxver. Ju ngle J1 in was anI experiment and one o1 its purposes was to fot ge

counterinsuirgcrncy tactics. It could use sod it unxxaxs and opetate austerely in

temlote areas: carrv out strike, reconnaissance, and airlift missions: fly clos,

support lor ground troops-. drop small forces up to comnpan\-siie- (helix i supplies; and perform medical evacuiat ion."

80t
OPENING FARM GATE

Thus it was that 155 Air Force officeis and airmen. ,,oluntecis to suppolt

friendly guerrillas. flying eight extem pot ied fighter-bombers, four light bombe s

ol World War II vintage, and four twin-engine transports designed prior to the

second World War, learned that they would go to Vietnam to suppoi i the

government of President Diem. Exactly how was in some dispute.",

On the 13th of October. Colonel King and two of his officeis visited I lawali

to coordinate Jungle Jim's movement with Admiral I-elt, CINCPAC, who

"enthusiastically supported the approved deployment." In Saigon the three

officcis briefed Ambassador Nolting who was happy to have.ungle Jim to tiain

Vietnamese. develop tactics and techniques, and conduct other operations "as

directed by the Ambassadot." He asked that all aircralt ar i e with Vrttnamese

insignia.

Returning to Hawaii. King was assured by PACAF officers that no majjor

problems existed. A tent camp would be ready fot the detachment's arrival at

Bien I-oa Airfield and support arrangements were underway. On October 28

Felt asked that the detachment be sent forward at once, without waiting for the

Air Force to proctre some L-28 Helio Super Courier light aircraft and Sidewinder air-to-air missiles for the T-28s. 2 At Eglin the task force designated

for Vietnam receis ed the formal name of Detachment 2A. 4400th Combat Crew

'I raining Squadron, and the code name ol Farm Gate.'

Meantime. members of the 6009th 'lactical Support Group under Col.

Claude G. McKinney, Jr.. entered Vietnam with the utnost secrecy during late

October. These officers and airmen deployed on temporary duty from

1 achikawa Air Base,. Japan, to Clark. then to Bien tloa whet e the\ prepared the

base facility for I-arm Gate. Additional detachments came from Thirteenth Ai

Force and PACA- (clhefl\ from the 6010th Tactical Suppoit Group) to ser\ ice

and support the beginnings of an expanded USAl- presence in Vietnam ,ind

elsewhere in Southeast Asia. All were formed into numbered temporary duty

detachments on November 15- 7and Rat Fan Son Nhut.9at Bien tloa,and 10

at Don Muang. Thailand. Detachment 7 was a headquarte: sstaff: 8 opeiated the

"prime set-up" for an air operations and a combat reporting center, as well a" a

photo processing cell: while 9 and 10 maintained and ser'iced aucraft. 4

Farm Gate dcparted Floi ida on the 5th of November. Foui SC-47, lk:\ to

Clark Air Base. Eight *1-28s were disassembled in Calor ,na and. together \\ ith

140 officers and air men, were ferried to Clark bs MATS. Alter ieassembl\.

Colonel King led two flight,, of'1 -28s to Tan Son Nhut. I he detat hicl becamle

operationally read, on the 16th. though a week passed belote the last of the

SC-47s and T-28s arrived. Farm Gate accepted Jour B-26s previously sent to the

I-ar East. These hardnosed. strafing-model, light bombcrs reached Bien I loa

near the close of December.'"

At Bien floa the Farm Gate detachment found a rundown -rench air base

with a Plight surface consisting of a single pierced-steel-plank runway 5,800 b\

150 feet. Tearl-outs in the steel tie strips demanded constant attention of welding

crews, and the 315th Air )ivision C-130s bringing in communications eqtipment for a tactical air control system further tore up the runway. About 700

81
THE ADVISORY YEARS

Vietnamese soldiers defended the airfield, because heavy vegetation and swam p.

terrain nearby afforded good cover for Viet Cong troops suriounding the air

base. Farm Gate at once contacted the two USA F mobile reporting posts at I an

Son Nhtit. and set about to organie a tactical air control system 'f sorts and to

establish communications and supp~y requiienents.Y6

The membeis of i-arm Gate thought they \,,ere to conduct combat ope ations while training the Vietnamese. That was how General ILeMay had biiefed

Colonel King, and King was mote than willing to make his unit combat capable

and r'esponsive to Ambassador Noltig and to Ameiic,can military authorities In

early familiarization flights. T-28 crews trailed Vietnamese AD-6s to targets.

observed their attack pi ocedtres. and,. when authorized, fired on targets. '1 he 155

men were highly motivated and eager to fight

Neveitheless. on November 16 Admiral Felt tasked I-arm Gate with conducting tactical training and pilot upgrading for the Vietnamese. Pliesident

Kennedy was advised that the unit was "tiaining Vietnamese aiicrews and

supporting Vietnamese operations against the Viet Cong."'11

Uncertainties of mission and the absence of combat lowered moiale horn

the start. I'he pilots expected to carry an air offensive to the Vet Cong. Instead.

they trained and supplemented the Vietnamese Air Force. seeking to e\ot'e

techniques for what McNamaia described to the press as "not full-scale warlare

but guerrilla warfare." Without clearcut agreement at higher levels on 1-arm

Gate's mission, the early operations tended to be impiovised and experimental

rathlt than systematic."

Farm Gate's first regular employment was to reconnoiter and count the

junk and sampan traffic in Vietnam coastal waters, a tedious Job lasting horn

Decembei 6 through 22. 1961. C-47s and pairs of T-28s flew fout-hour search

patterns and recorded sightings.Thirty-seven sorties turned tp 6.294 vessels. but

the airciews had no way to tell how many weie enemy. MAAG was equally at a

loss to interpret the findings. 'I he long uneventful flight patterns were a physical

hardship for the 1-28 crews. They were not allowed to crack their canopies in

flight, even though weakened by the cockpit heat from the tropical sun. A second

series flown during February 5-7. 1962. furnished no meaningful intelligence. -

11

Farm Gate likewise also acquired the mis-sion of supporting the Arnl

Special Forces and their Civilian Irregular l)etense Group. The ('-47s operate,'

under an ad hoc sstem free of MAAG and Vietnamese army control, to keep

matei icl. transportation, and futnds in U.S. hiands The airciaft delivered locallh

procuied items and emergency ones flown in from the United States. (Fot mal

supply accountability was discarded.) These operations weie sn, ,. -arn Gate

flying just 205 sorties in the fist six months of 1962.2i

While valuable, these missions were outside of what Farm Gate wanted to

do. When Admiral Felt on December 4. 1961. diiccted General O'l)onnell at

PACAF to ready plans for operations. O'Donnclt a

t once permitted -arm Gate

to fly combat missions "with at least one South Vietnamese na.,onal aboai d an\

aircraft so committed." Secretar., McNamara. meeting with the Joint ( hiets that

day. approved combat with mixed crews. On l)ecember 6 the Joint ('hiek

82
OPENING FARM GATE

granted foi mal authority for l-arm Gate airci aft to fly combat if Vietnamese were

aboaid for training.22

On the 6th PACAI- submitted to CINCPAC the same concept for operations. Actually. U.S. aircraft and petsonnel would support Vietnamese armed

forces and help them deny the Viet Cong supply ioutes and concentiation arcas.

fly armed pati ols of South Vietnam's land and sea bordeis, and seek out and

destroy Viet Cong headquarters as well as communist airlift into South

Vietnam. 2 1

Together. Vietnamese and Americans weie to destroy Viet Cong lifelines

and suppoit bases From Bien Hoa, Tan Son Nhut, and combat air bases to be

developed at Da Nang and Pleiku. air opeiations weic to stress photo reconnaissance, surveillance, interdiction. and close support of gi ound operations.24

Needed at once were a tactical air control system and a jointly manned

American-Vietnamese air opeiations center. When Admiiral Felt approved a

limited tactical air control system on December 8. it appeared that o-perations

would get under way. Thirteenth Air Force issued a draft plan on the 10th and

distinguished between combat actions performed in support ol the Vietnamese

within South Vietnam and advisory and trainingactions. On the 15th. Ainbassador Nolting directed that no combat mission of any description be undertaken

without his consent.21

The next day. General Lemnitier suggested that Farm Gate should not wait

for "tailor-made jobs" but should center on training. Secretary McNamara

repeated his approval of combat missions if the planes had Vietnamese aboaid.

lowever, he wanted all such flights to be confined to South Vietnam owing to

the experimental nature of the program. Stressing the difference between " iding

double" combat training missions and operational missions, lie charged CI NCPAC with the latter. lie wanted Admiral Felt to use combat missions solely for

"important jobs" and to monito them closely. In other woids, according to

McNamara, "Jungle .Jim is to be used for training and operational missions in

South Vietnam with Vietnamese riding rear seats."2-

On December 19 the Joint Chiefs sent a message "to insure no iisunderstanding in the authority granted for the use of.ungle .im aircraft." Farm Gate's

principal purpose 'vas training Vietnamese Air Force personnel. On the following day, Admiral Felt made known his conviction that Farm Gate. besides

training Vietnamese. could carry out "all kinds of conventional combat and

combat support flights" if a Vietnamese was on board to receive training.:"

Admiral Felt's conviction sparked a reexamination of American policy in

Washington. The National Security Council inclined toward authori/ing U S.

unifor med personnel in Vietnam for "instruction in aad execution of an-ground

support techniques." That appeared broad enough to embace all 1U.S. air

actions. Yet the State l)epartment view, later voiced by W. Averell Ilarriman.

held that the statement hardly covered intcrdrction air strikes far from friendly

ground troops. General I.ernnrter forwarded detailed clarrfying instructions to

Admiral Felt and General McGarr on December 26. lie wanted irri Gate to

conduct combat missions only when the Vietnamese Air Force could not.

83
THE ADVISORY YEARS

Combined crews on combat missions would fulfill the purpose of training-to

allow Vietnamese to fly these missions alone as soon as possible.

When General Lemni.,er's directive reached Farm Gate on the afternoon of

the 26th a strike mission was in the air. Two Farm Gate T-28s were escorting two

Vietnamese AD-6s to hit Viet Cong houses and rice fields about fifty miles north

of Saigon. Despite recall efforts, the strike went on. But thereafter, the possibility

of an independent American combat role came to an end.28

Determining Farm Gate's mission and its place in the organizational and

command structure would be the subject of continuing discussion and controversy. Meanwhile General Maxwell Taylor had visited Vietnam and had

reported his observations to the Piesident, thereby shaping and refining the

purpose and direction of national policy.

84
VIII. The Taylor Mission

Several hours after announcing on October II. 1961. the dispatch of Farm

Gate to Vietnam. President Kennedy disclosed that he was sending his military

adviser General Taylor to Saigon. Taylor was to make an "educated military

guess," of the situation in the countiy and to find "ways in which we can perhaps

better assist the Government of Vietnam in meeting this threat to its independence." In his letter of instructions to the general, Kennedy said. "the initial

iesponsibility for the effective maintenance of the independence of South Vietnam rests with the people and government of that country." Concerned with

political, social, and economic matters in addition to military problems, the

President appointed Walt W. Rostow as Taylor's deputy. Actually. Taylor was

to advise the President whether to deploy U.S. combat forces for a direct role in

Vietnam, or to continue U.S. training and support functions only.'

Public knowledge of Taylor's mission produced an immediate reaction

from the communists. On October 12 Premier Chou En-lai warned that China

could scaicely "be indifferent to the increasingly grave situation caused by United

States impeiialism in South Vietnam." Ho Chi Minh went to Peking foi discussions. The Soviet Union linked the Taylor mission with flagging diplomatic

discussions at Geneva and charged the United States with planning to send

troops to Vietnam to bring pressure to bear on the situation in Laos. On October

14 North Vietnam protested to the International Control Commission that the

Taylor mission was meant to "intensify United States intervention in South

Vietnam and prepare the way for introducing United States troops."2

What was the exact state of affairs in South Vietnam'? Increases in Viet

Cong numbers, aggressiveness, and incidents constantly su prised the Vietnamese National Intelligence Agency. United States intelligence estimates placed

the strength of Viet Cong main forces at 17,000 men, eighty to ninety peicent of

whom were recruited locally.' President Diem was complaining to the International Control Commission of the international threat to his government.

Hanoi's determination to "liberate the south," the massive infiltration of crnmmut..sagents. t hless stratey of terror waged aganst the Soth Viet ni mev

people, and the endeavors to establish "liberated territory" in the central reaches

of the Republic. susceptible of gaining recognition and support from the communist powers. CINCPAC intelligence assessments identified cncm, goals as

consolidating control over the richer agricultual areas of the country, isolating

Saigon and the Diem government from the people, and keeping the infiltration

approaches into South Vietnam open.4

What military assistance did the South Vietnamese want? As the Vietnamese defense minister told Ambassador Nolting on October 13, l)mem wished

American combat units or "combat training units" to be stationed near the 17th

parallel to make a show of force and also to free Vietnamese units for antiguerrilla action.)
THlE AD)VISORY YEARS

Fit route to Saigon. 1avlor and Rostow stopped ol InII I iawaii I or a hiiciing

b\ AdmiralI I-clI. I lie admii aI sti essed that Ithe Viet nanesce quired pa ompt U.S

asI'sistance, Ile p~inpointed two serious Vietnamese weaknesses the tende'ic of.

pa ovi nce chiels to meddle lin i ita iv matwi as. and the penchant of in ili ti 

y

coiniandei s to ~txin static defensive p~ositions. I-eit indoa sed the l'ai lin Gate

commitment, but saw no pi esent need lot otheci Ainca ican combl~a foiceN to take

aI diiect pai t lin the wi lie i ecommendedi continuing LISA I' reconniaissac

Iflight s, accele iat I ng thle delciivery of I -28s, andlie fiingi I iita i coin iliili tt 01.

lie wanted the piimitive an strip at Plerku enlarged and stoics of ainiunit ion,

eqip[ment. and \%ar consuimables positioned at bases for a possible anti oduction

of SEA IC) forces."

'Ihle 1 ylor-RIostow miiission an t\ e(l at Ian Son Nhut on Octobei IS. spent

111\ dax i Vietinm. and depai ted for llaguiointhe IPhilippinies,\whea e thie gaoup

scn II hi esidt:iit Kenniedx anl interit i icpoi t. lBy N ovembci 3 thle membei s (I ess' up

a lceigi h\ finlal iepl)O

Cica cal I avloi (lI ned t he situtationI in SouthI Viet nam als', "anacute ci Isis of

(oif (kne at cxci\ social level doubt onl theseriousniess of the U.S. commnitient.wroncii oxca Viet (ong successes, and discouragement ovei aecent floods

that buldenled an ''a iiea dv st iamiied state "' I hie ni iiita iv cirisis in io ied political

weak ness I)wiii was "anI o1(1 fashioned Asian a tiler. seekiiig to maintain all twe

'i ings of p~owa III Is own hianads, while fi aganentang power beneath him." The

inilitai suf ici ed f ioni skimpy intelligence, scant command control, and sparse

noiohlt A '"lack of taget ielligeniceaiid a frutstiating st uctuac" hampered the

"slaa ill h a pa ble' V ict nalic se Alir Foace. It had made nio sign ificanat cont ri bution to the sti uiggle. because thei e had been little photo i econnaissance bcf'oae the

USA [ Able Mable missions. "While the very nature of gucra lla war makes good

targets ha idc to find.- 1 aylor noted. "sophisticated aerial photogr'aph\~ should

fid suich good taa gets as thea,- arc." 1-mnalls, the gcneral sass "none of the

controlling structure necessaa v for effective tactical operationls.'

Thei c wei e less than 800 American imilitai'y personnel andI( even fewer

civilians in the counti v. None worked inside Vietnamese nmiastiis. and few sveac

anI the field. foi' Diem pi efet red Americans to aemnain in Saigon. Some U.S..

officials appinentl\ thought at improper to a eport anything ci itacal of the lDaem

govei iiieit. As at aestilt, it was ant easy to suit thorough estimate Off the1

situation. Still the uinsettled I aotian situation had pa oba bly lessented %. rianese

coanfidence in the Uniarted States, and a moic visible I.S~ militaa y presence might

restore Vietnamaese moa ale,

Genci al I aylor's recommendations included continuing UI. A reconnissance flights InI Vietnam, setting up a U.S.. tactical aia -grouind system a tin partially

as a training piogiam. giving I-arim Gaite a libeaal aathier thanl a aestrictive

mission, anid ianpi oving Victnamese irI facilities. lie saw no~ reasoin to coimamit

U.S. combat forces ant a direct a ole for the mnomenlt. lie envisioned success as

hioiging onl Iiemn's willinginess to undertake political and social reformis.'

With a clear amn1piession that "aI U.S. anilataa y prescaice of som': Kaid" was

ga eatly desia cc. Geneiral TFaylor aepoa ted that lie leaned toward bolstei g Amery 86
1111 1 IAYI OR M ISSION

LIL

-

(fop) Gon Maxwell D Taylor Gen Emmett

0 onnell Jr Adrin J H1 Sides and Lt Gee C A

Robert,, in Hawaii

(Cpnter) Geer Paul D Hlarkins Adm Harry 0 Felt and

Ambassador Frederick E Nolting at Tan Son Nt'~

~kI Airport

(Bottom) Gen Curtis E LeMay
THE ADVISORY YEARS

can military aid and advisory support foi a broadly conceived counterguerrilla

campaign. Central to his concept was making MAAG an opcrational headquarters for a theater of war, with 8,000 military advisors to quicken Vietnamese

training. upgrade intelligence and communications, enrich research and development, and give quick military and economic support to Vietnamese offensive

operations. An alternative was to deploy perhaps 10,000 U.S. ground troops for

defense, to release the Vietnamese army for active counterinsurgency.

Though Taylor and his colleaguc believed American support for counterinsurgency inside Vietnam to be basic, they warned against sending more I.S.

reinforcements until the nature of any final settlement in Laos and tile way In

which Hanoi adjusted to it were clear. If Hanoi persisted in its guerrilla infiltration. the United States would be forced "to attack tile source of guerrilla

aggression in North Viet-Nam and impose on the Hanoi government a price for

participating in the current war which is commensurate with the damage Inflicted

on its neighbors to tile south." 8

The Joint Chiefs of Staff did not care for the interim and inal ! aylorRostow reports. They wanted a positive American commitment to the cleai

objective of preventing the fall of South Vietnam, even if that meant U.S. militar

forces must fight. The loss of South Vietnam would lead to communist control

over neighboring nations, and the chiefs favoied an immediate deployment ol

stiong American combat forces instead of a gradual entry of combat Support

tinits. They proposed to wai n Hanoi of punitive action unless Viet Cong aggres

sion ceased. Theic was little chance of staving off the fall of South Vietnam

without U.S. forces "on a substantial scale." The United States could persuade

North Vietnam of its serious intent solely by a "clear commitment"to keep South

Vietnam out of the communist camp. plus a diplomatic warning to Hanoi that its

continued support of the Viet Cong would bring American retaliation. A long

war and perhaps the intervention of the People's Republic of China might ensue.

If it did, tile United States would have to put at least 205,000 mrlitarN men into

the field.9

Secretary McNamara discussed the matter with the .Joint Chicfs. On

November 8 he informed President Kennedy of his and their suppoit of th~c

Taylor-Rostow recommendations as "first steps" toward reahi/ng the Amcican

aim- averting the fall of Souti Vietnam. Defending Southeast Asia \\ould take

no more than six U.S. divisions. about 205.000 men. The United States. ho\%e\er.

should introduce major U.S. units into Vietnam only if it was willing to make an

unalterable espousal of that goal 10

McNamara and the .Joint Chiels were candid in saying that success would

tui n upon many factors "not within our control notably the conduct of Diem

himself and other leaders in the area." They were uneasy about Amer can

domestic political problems, but expected Congress to "responld better to a firm

initial position t k. i to courses ol action that lead us in on lx graduall . and that in

the meantime are sure to Involve casualties."The key. of course, was tile i inness

of American intent. Without that. there was no point to deploy si/ablc units.''

88
Il ETAYLOR MISSION

As chairman of the State D~epartment Policy Planning Council. Wait

Rostow argued foi a contingency policy of ictaliation against North Vietnamr. a

program grad uated to match the intensity of I lanloi's support of thle Viet Cong.

Upon his request. 1PACAF furnished Rostow w\,ith two lists of' aerial targets InI

North Vietniam.' 2

Admiral F-elitlug tolhis earlier opiniion.I lihe U nited States should not send

large combat for ces unft il thle lesserI mea sutres. suggested b i n usatal

approvedl by General Taylor. were implemented.

President Kennedy was loath to approve an extensive open-ended commtiitmerit. "'[hey want a force of Amcrican troops," hie told an aide, and lie likened

that force to the units sent to Germany earlier in the year.

I hey a i\ ri ce~sir\ in order restore confidence and nit,,in morale nut it ml bi e

just rike Ierlin I lie troop' will ma: reh in. t lie ha nd~ N \ill pli\. the cro% \ ill checer.

anid in four da\New r\ one \%ilr haw~ f orgotten r hen % " ill heiotld \ % ha~le i ld ini

1111e troopN It l ike taking a drink I lie effctr \% ear oil. and .oti haw t o iake

aniother

According to Kennedy. thle war could be wont onl\ so long as it remained

Vietnam's war. Other wise, the Americans would lose like thle French.i43

Onl November 8 Secretary of Defense McNamara. together with the Jloint

Chiefs. had been -inclined" to recommend a firm commitment to preclude thle

takeover of South Vietnam even if it meant direct inilitary action '1 lire days

later, McNamara joined withi Secretary of State Rusk inl proposing a more

moderate starite inl line with President Kenniedy's thinking. 'Tle D~efense secretary urged tile instant dispatch of modest support units arid further study before

resolving to senid large orgariiied units for actual or potential comlbat.

Thle National Security Council arid Stale and D~efense repi eseritatiVes

weighed onl November I I American riiitarv options iii Viettiam. Onl the 13th a

State-lDefense memorandum generally fol lowed the Rus~k-McNarnara view.

'[here was to be rio swift overt commitment of U.S. combat troops to Vietnam. A

urirlaceral employment independent of SEA1O action might iiigger a militar \

escalation, Provoke apathly and pci iaps hostrlit\ anmong South Vietnramese.

jeopardi/e thle chances for- a political settlement inl Laos. arid promote domestic

pofilical repercu,,siowm in thle Unirted States.",

Also on November 13 Kennedy appro\ ed thle lesser meastires more airlift

(hielicopters, light planes, arid transports) for tile Dir forces, along with thle

USAlP per sonnd and planes for reconnaissancearid defoliationr. Nine days later

the President advised Diem of Armericari willingness to expand aid. men, arid

equipment for a coribitned undertaking to speed Vietnamese trairiingarid to help

fashion better Commt111iriCatioris arid intelligence. InI return, lDiem wotuld have to

put South Vietnram onl a firmi wair footing. rnobili/e his rcoulces. give his

gover inent adequate authority, and over haul the military establishment arid

command structu -e. M ea nwhile, uiiifor riled ,I .S. mihita rv person nel inI thle counitry would furnish airlift for Vietnamese forces, air reconnaissance, photography.,

Instruction iii and execution of air-grouid support techniques, and special

initelligenlce."'

89
TIE ADVISORY YEARS

Theie was neithei a statement of American national objectihes nol a

provision for stronger U.S. military actions should these fiist-phase meastuies

pi ove insufficient. The Ai" Staff iegarded this as a nuch "watei ed down" policy.

It differed mainly from the Joint Chiefs' position by adding the quid pro quo

approach to the Republic of Vietnam. 'I hat is. Ametican commitments would

grow solely in response to positive Vietnacilc actions. .

1

At a meeting of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on )ecember 5. Geneial LeMay

expressed his grave concern, lie labeled what Rusk and McNamaia had proposed and what the President had approved as inadequate. "1 lie greater U.S.

assistance was still insufficient to defeat the Viet Cong. Southeast Asia was the

best place for a showdown between the United S,,ites and the communists. This

was not because of the local terrain or political ,ituation. It was because "U.S.

military intervention in Southeast Asia, including the use of nuclear weapons,

could be followed by many layeis of escalation befoic ie ultimate confrontation

would occur." In contrast, the Secretaries cf State and Defense had apparentl

tried to "obscure. play-down, or delay the detetimined and decisive action

required to effectively combat" the communist threat.'9

LeMay urged the Joint Chief., to suggest that Piesident Kennedy deploy

sizable American forces to Vietnam. He wanted them to "press for high-level

accord" on a "clear statement of U.S. objectives in the area." and to tell

McNamara that "timely, positive military actions aie essential."2 11 ie desiied at

least a definite contingency commitment to insert U.S. forces into Vietnam lor

open operations when required. What tile Air Force chief thought were suitable

forces for the commitment would be an Army brigade task force: a Maiine

division and its complementaiy air wing: plus a tactical fighter squadron. a

tactical bomber squadron. and i tactical reconnaissance task force.2

' These units

would lice the bulk of Diem's forces to root out the guerrillas and to secure South

Vietnam's borders -hey would also "bolster Diem's political position and insule

his regime and tenuie in office." L.eMay envisaged no open engagement with the

enemy but could not rule it out. "Enemy militauy actions." he said, "would not

alter the political objective, but such actions may compel militaiy iesponses

which would not necessarily be confined to South Vietnam." But there was "no

feasible military alternative of lesser magnitude" that would prevent the "loss of

South Vietnam and ultimately of Southeast Asia. "

-

The Joint Chiels referred L.cMay's proposal to the Joint Stiategic Sur\ey

Council, a group of senior officei s freed from day-to-day mattei s so they could

take a detached view of bi oad militai y and political questions. Asked to examine

the rationale for deploying U.S. troops to South Vietnam, they leplied oil

)ecember 7. "The recently authoried measures, even when implemented," the\

said, "will prove to be inadequate."The council called attention to "the deteriorating military situation and the tentous character of the South Vietnam

government," which made it "imperative that the United States government take

tile initiative." To "reassure President Diem that the United States will support

his government and will discouiage and oppose any internal factions whi.'h seek

to overthrow him," U.S. combat foiccs and those of its Asian allies shoild go to

90
THE TAYLOR MISSION

South Vietnam strong enough "to assure the South Vietnanese of our determination to support their government and to defeat commnuni,,t aggression." There

should be "a military command and modus opelandi in ',outh Vietnam which

will assute loyalty and maximum combat eftectiveness in the campaign against

tile communists. "a'

Secietar\ McNamara was not con inced. As he alterwards told the President, "I am not piepaied to endoise the views of the Chiefs until we have had

more experience with our present program in South Vietnam." Kennedy

ag ricd 4.2

(Gencial I.eMay cleaily doubted if tile administiation actually had a firm

and deinite Vietnam policy. In his opinion, he later observed, none of the

American military chiefs "really believed"that the United States was undertaking "anything except [having] some diplomatic fiddling around with a little more aid

progl am."21

Pait of this leeling might have flowed from ILe Mavs,, frustration over major

constiaiits hindei ing the Air Force's influence !n SEA--too few and too junior

USAI- olficeis in the MAAGs. PACAF's restticted voice in Vietnamese affairs.

the inability of the indigenous aii forces to cope with the insurgency, and

I"inadequate ground environment for employment of USAF air power on a large

scale." Moreover, Secietary McNamara kept a tight rein on the military services.

In mid-November, for example, the moement ot three single-engine liaison

aiicraft to Vietnam requiied his permission. Little wonder that USAF leadership

felt cramped and uncomfortable.26

Maybe it was no coincidence that on December 5-the day General LeMay

voiced his concern to the JCS-- Admirai Felt dispatched a warning to the Joint

Chiefs. lie reported that General McGarr. MAAG chief in Saigon. and Sir Robcit G. K. Thompson,* head of a ltitish advisory mission to Saigon, were

both uneasy because the situation in South Vietnam was "more than serious. It is

critical, with the peak of the crisis possible at any moment."2'

Sir Robert had igiied proinincntl in .ubduig the gucrrilla- , Mahlansi

91

( -
IX. U.S. Command

Arrangements:

2d ADVON and MACV

Acceptance of the Taylor-Rostow recommendations of November 3. 1961.

marked a shift in American policy "from advice to limited partnership and

working collaboration" with the Vietnamese. More material assistance would

accompany increased American participation in the war. American advisors, "as

friends and partners," were to show the Vietnamese "how the job might be

done--not tell them or do it for them."'

By November 13, using such expressions as "proceed urgently"and "with all

possible speed," Defense Secretary McNamara had authori7ed a host of measures. Among them were increased airlift, including sixteen C-123s. for the

Vietnamese armed forces: help with aerial reconnaissance, photography, airground support, and installing a tactical air control system: small naval craft with

advisors and crews to cut enemy waterborne infiltration and resupply: training

and equipment for the Civil Guard and Self Defense Corps to free Vietnamese

army units for offensive operations: personnel and equipment to enhance

military-political intelligence at all levels: more economic support to afford better

military pay, food, and medicine: relief and rehabilitation in the flooded areas:

'individual administrators and advisors for insertion into the governmental

machinery of South Viet-Nam in types and numbers to be agreed upon by the

two governments": and surveys in all provinces to discover how best to deal with

the insurgency.2

Assuming that Diem would formally agree later, the Defense secretary

instructed the Joint Chiefs of Staff to proceed. McNamara persc'tally monitored

the aid piogram. requiring a progress report every Monday. He wanted men and

materiel for a tactical air control system to go to Vietnam as soon as possible. He

wanted thirty T-28s rushed out to give the Vietnamese a second fighter squadron.

And he wanted more U.S. advisors in place. By June 30, 1962, there would be

6.419 Americans in South Vietnam.)

As McNamara informed Admiral Felt and General McGarr:

Political uncertainty of Diem's position and doubt as to his willingness to take steps to

make his government more effective mut not prevent us from going ahead full blast

(without publicity, until political discussions, are completed) on all possible action%

short of large scale introduction of US combat forces, .. Fundamentally, we must

adjust ourscles to a perenmally unclear political framework and to a policy that for

oscrall national reasons sets limits on mihliary actions a

Early in December, President Diem made an affirmative but hedged

response to the Kennedy program. His memorandum distinguished between

domestic and military matters and clearly defined the latter. For example,

93

PRECEDING PAGE BLANK-NOT FIUV/)
THE ADVISORY YEARS

American helicopter and naval units were to be Linder exclusive U.S. command.

Dicim's government would take no decisions or actions entailing combined

opeiations "'without full prior consultation with the qualified U.S. agencies."

Although doubting that Diem's reply would be fully acceptable. Ambassador

Nolting radioed the State Department, "I nevertheless think memorandum

represents U.S. moving confidently ahead."I

The new Kennedy program dictated that the MAAG in Saigon be icorgani,ed and augmented. Then it could better help subdue the subversion and

insurgency, and as "an advanced party" command forces sent to Vietnam to

oppose aggression in S EATO terms. In the latter case. Task Force 116 was the

ready force. Admiral Felt had said in May 1961 that. if large-scale U.S. combat

forces entered Vietnam. he would name the MAAG chief as the Commander.

United States Forces, Vietnam. This commander would function under

CINCPAC control.

Now there was talk of appointing a four-star general to command U.S.

forces in Vietnam. As early as November I. the State Department was skeptical

about the necessity. Secretary Rusk said. "While attaching greatest possible

importance to security in Southeast Asia, I would be reluctant to see"the United

States further commit "American prestige to a losing horse." Ambassador John

K. Galbraith in India pointed to Diem as "a wasting asset" who was "losing. not

gaining, popularity." Tie United States. he thought. should iefrain from putting

American ground tioops into Vietnam and from overcommitting.6'

On November 22 the Joint Chiefs recommended to the Secietary of )efense

a new subordinate unified command under CINCPAC. It would be designated

as United States Forces. Vietnam. and organi7ed in Saigon with Army, Nay.

and Air Force component commands. The commander in Vietnam was to have

four stars and be coequal with the Ambassador. lie would draw together all

American military activities in the country related to counterinsurgency including intelligence. MAAG, and whatever economic assistance had militai % replications. A four-star commander would signal a consid-~erable commitment of

American prestige and a major endorsement of Dicn's government. Consequently the Joint Chiefs wished, before alte ing the command sructume, to have

the United States clearly spell out its objectives in Vietnam and extiact a pledge

for a suitable military program from Diem. McNamara approved on

November 27.?

The proposed command ran counter to CINCPAC contingency planning

fora possible deployment ofJTF 116. Admiral Felt nonetheless admitted that it

was justified in light of an enlarged MAAG. PACAF units deployed into

Vietnam, and the arrival of Army helicopter companies. Drawing up a detailed

table of distribution, Felt suggested an Army general as the commander and a

small joint staff with USAF officers as chief of staff, J-2 (Intelligence), and .1-5

(Plans). The new command, the CINCPAC thought, might well give Diem the

assurance of American support that he appeared to need before cat rying out his

own program. 8

94
2d ADVON AND MACV

United States Aimy, Pacific (in lawaii) favored a sepaiate theater of

opelations for Vietnam removed from CINCPAC control, but acquiesced in

"dotible batting" the M AAG chief as commander of U.S. forces. On that basis.

General McGarr took opetational contiol of Farm Gate. Admiral Felt acco ?ted

this for Farm Gate's training mission, but PACAF pointed out that the detachment had a second mission of combat opeiations. By law M AAGs could not

command opeiational forces. Foieseeing widespiead air activities in Victnam

and othei parts of Southeast Asia, PACAF wanted to establish an advanced

echelon ol Thirteenth Air Force in Saigon to command USAF units in SEA."

Admiral I-elt agreed. The MAAG chief, working with his Air Foice Section

chief, would handle Farm Gate's training missions, while CINCIIAC through

PACAF and an advanced echelon of Th iteenth Air Force, would take care of

any combat opeiations. The MAAG Air Force Section chief and the commander

of the advanced echelon could be the same officer. Assigned to MAAG, he would

have dual responsibilities to MAAG and to PACAF. Above all, there was to be

no appearance of a new American command moving into \ictnai.10

To fill the two hats, General O'Donnell ol PACAF nominated Brig. Gen.

Rollen H. Anthis, an outstanding olficer setving as Thirteenth Air Force vice

commander. Admiral Felt, CINCPAC. appioved the choice. Gencial Anthis

assumed command of 2d Advanced Echelon (ADVON)'I and, needing personnel for the ot ganation, took conti ,l ol the four small temporai y duty detachments (7, 8. 9. and 10). Detachment 7 at Saigon became in effect the 2d ADVON

sta ff. '

2

On November 20 Anthis settled 2d ADVON at the Miink lotel in downtown Saigon, shating space with the MAAG Air Foice Section. The newv

commander realid after a clewdays that he was too far trom his opei ating units.

Whereupon, he moved 2d ADVON to Tan Son Nhut and into a building near

Vietnamese Air Foice headquarteis. I lis Vietnamese neighbois weic put/led by

Anthis' presence.

When Ambassador Nolting first found out about 2d A i)VON on the 24th.

he was not only punvled but surprised. General Anthis told him that 2d A I)VON

controlled USAF operating units in Vietnam but not the training units. Nolting

found it "incompiehensible" for American atithoi ities to form a new U.S.

mihtat y headqtiaiteis without constilting him and the Vietnamesc government.

Th. Ambassador instructed the 2d ADVON commander to delay further oigani/ational activities until Nolting received clarification of the relationship of the

headquarters to the Embassy. He solicited from Anthis "a precise understanding

that any combat operation in Viet Nam carried out by elements of this command

will be cleaied in advance with me (Nolting]."

Apprised of the Ambassador's reaction. Admiral I-elt advised Anthis to

avoid cicating a new headquarters. He was to locate in General McGarr's

MAAG headquarters and "conduct his advance echelon business through

Dct[achment] 7 in Saigon." After fresh study. Felt termed 2d AI)VON neither a

command nor a headquarters. Since its purpose was to administer, control, and

support units, it was simply a "facility" for coordination. Nolting might have

95
THE ADVISORY YEARS

thought this a distinction without a difference, but he learned that the Diem

government had no objection. He accepted 2d ADVON as needed to administer

and control 1PACAF elements that might be deployed to Southeast Asia in

coordination with MAAG.I

Thirteenth Air Force specified that 2d ADVON execute with the Vietnamese Air Force "sustained offensive. defense. and ieconnaissance air operations aimed at the destruction or neuttialation of Viet Cong forces. resouices,

and communications within the borders of South Viet nam." Geneial Anthis was

to "set the pattern for Vietnamese Air Force operations."' 4 In short, he was to act

as the commander of a tactical air foice.

But the peculiarly ad hoc nature of the organivation led to problems. Foi

example, what control did unit commanders have o~cr their logistic support? In

the standard USAF command, such questions had been caiefully worked out

through the yeais. but for 2d ADVON they needed to be rethought. Fuithermore. General Anthis faced a somewhat more complex chain of command. I le

reported to CINCPAC through IPACAF on operational matters, but he \\ent

direct to Thirteenth Air Force on strictly USA|F operational. logistic, and

administiative issues.15

Colonel King. the Farm Gate commandei. was also confused. When 2d

ADVON's Detachment 9 at Bien Hoa tried to take operational control of his

unit. King protested this as inconsistent with General I.eMay's instructions. lie understood that Detachment 9 was limited to furnishing base logistic suppoit.

King prevailed in this matter, but pioved less successful in clardying his own

operational mission. Hie visited Saigon and was unable to see Geneial Anthis.

But the 2d ADVON operations officer speculated that it was highly unlikely for

Farm Gate even to be cleared fordaylight combat. King's officers thell boriowvcd

seveial aerial flares from the Vietnamese. pressed an SC-47 into service for

improvised flai edrops. and under the illumination made strike passes with thei

T-28s. Colonel King went back to Saigon and iepoited that his unit could make

night attacks.

As King later recalled. 2d ADVON dispatched a C-47 and some T-28s on at

least two night attacks later in November. Against an enemy position In the

junglc south of Da l.at. the T-28 pilots nccr saw an exact target under the

flarelight. and meiely placed their ordnance into the trees. Flying to the aid of a

fort in the delta under attack, the T-28 crews found the aii strike request to be

several days old. When they arrived on the scene, there were no targets. Another

mission in late November responded to a epot t of Viet Cong intention to cut the

railroad between Bien Hoa and Nha Trang. Bearing flames in addition to their

guns. four T-28s reconnoitered the rail line. They illuminated and inspected

possible ambush sites but saw no sign of the enemy.' 6

While the Departments of State and Defense discussed organi/ing the

American command in Vietnam. MAAG was "over its head in opeations and

intelligence planning to the neglect of its primary duty, the training and advisoi ,

effomt." l7 Authori/edastrength of 685 persons in May 1961. MAAGat theend of

the year had 2.394 Military Assistance Program spaces and 5.435 others.'

96
2d ADVON AND MACV

A compromise worked out by Secretaries McNamara and Rusk in

December envisioned a Militai y Assistance Command. Vietnam (M ACV) under

CINCPAC. roughly modeled on the United States Taiwan Defense Command.

To highlight the "positive impact of change" in American policy. McNamara

desied the MACV commander to be a four-star Army general. He suggested Lt.

Gen. Paul 1). larkins to the President as "an imaginative oflicel, fully qualified

to fill what I consider to be the most difficult job in the U.S. Army.'

""

Commander of United States Army. Pacific, and a pmotege of Generals

George S. Patton. ,r., and Maxwell D. Taylor, Harkins was summoned to

Florida in January 1962. Thee in a brief interview. President Kennedy said he

was pleased that the general spoke French, told him to assist Die.a and the South

Vietnamese people, and wished him well.

With Diem's blessing. CINCPAC created the new command it, Saigon on

February 8. 1962. Harkins became commander with a pi omotion to full general.

On the 10th PACAFdesignated General Anthis, 2d ADVON commandei. to be

the air component commander and to further serve as Thirteenth Air Foice and

I"ACAF air commander for all USAF matters in Southeast Asia.21

The ,Joint Chiefs of Staff had recommended status for General la kins

"co-equal" with Ambassador Nolting. but the term was absent from the MACV

mission statement. Harkins nonetheless owned broader than normal authority.

lie was to assist and support the Government of Vietnam in its quest for security

through defeating communist insigency and resisting overt aggression. He was

charged with all American military policy. opeiations, and aid in South Vietnam.

On U.S. and Vietnamese military operations, he could go straight to President

Diem and other governmental leaders. He had direct access to CINCPAC and

through him to theICS and the Secretary of Defense. He was to consult with the

Ambassador on political affairs and keep him abreast of military matters. As

CINCPAC's single spokesman in South Vietnam, larkins exercised operational

command of all U.S forcesand military agencies assigned or attached to MACV,

including the Military Assistance Advisoiy Group. -'

For M ACV'sjoint staft, Admiral Felt had recommended USA F officers as

chief of staff, ,-2 (Intelligence), and J-5 (Plans). Even so, General Ilarkins picked

a Marine officer. Maj. Gen. Richaid G. Weede. to be his chief of staff and

advocated Air Force officers for J-3 (Operations), .1-2, and .1-5. Secretaly

McNamara wanted the Army to have the ,-3 billet, but Felt believed this would

unbalance the staff. He proposed upgrading .1-5 to a brigadier geneial slot and

allocating it to the Air Force, while the deputy .1-3 would be a USAF colonel.

General LeMay tried in vain to persuade McNamara to change ls mind on the

chief of staff and ,-3 positions. The MACV manningauthority was approved by

the Defense Secretary on March 2. It gave the Air Force none of the key

operational spots and only one of the five general officer billets- .1-5, filled by

Brig. Gen. John A. Dunning. Of the 105 officer spaces. the Army got 54

compared to 29 for the Navy and Marines and 22 for the Air Force.22

General Harkins shifted M AAG's operations and intelligence functions to

MACV. lIe appointed Maj. Gen. Charles J. Timmes, USA. to be MAAG chief

97
THE ADVISORY YEARS

(Tinmles hac been McGarr's deputy). The M AAG was split into Army, Navy,

and Air I-orce Sections. Each handled mitarv assistance, plans and programs,

training and logistic advice to the Vietnamese. and administnrmion of American

field advisory detachments.2:

Yet the separation of functions between MACV and MAAG remained

fuz'y. General lila kin, opposed Anthis" serving as both the MACV air cornp..-

nent commander and chiet of the MAAG Air I-oice Section. lie suggested and

Adirnal F'elt directed on May 12, 1962. thal Geneial Anthis be relieved as

- MAAG chief of Ai Force Section and replaced by the USAF colonel who was

the deputy.

Gener'al LeMay saw the change as a complication, tor the USAF liaison

officels with Vietnaamese army divisions. who should have been under Anthis'

command, were instead assigned to the MAAG. L.eMay also protested the

proposed reduction in rank of the M AAG chief of Air Force Section. General

Anthis held his two jobs a while longer.

Felt and Ilarkins agreed in October to accept Brig. Gen. Robert R.

Rowland a,,s M AAG chief ol Ai I-orce Sction. On Dccember 1. 1962. Rovland

relieved Anthis of his M AAG dut%. Although Anthis and Rowland worked well

together. some M AAG-Air officer s wondered how far they might go in advising

and training before entering into operational acti'ities.-' a

Believing that lie was "responsible for all that U.S. military do or fail to do in

South Vietnam." General Harkins argued for full operationa, ., rmanid over all

American military resources in the country. to include projected covert operations. Admiral Felt thought otherwise. On April 20, 1962. lie placed under

M ACV operational command those units having the primary mission of advising and assisting tile training of Vietnamese military and paramilitary forces.

Other units were to remain under Cl NCPACcomponent commanders. General

Anthis deemed this interpretation important because the Air Force was meagerly

tepresented on the MACV staff.2

The United States Army, Pacific- unlike the Air Foice- elected to give

MACV operational command over the Army helicopter companies in Vietnam.

Created as the MACV component Army command. the United States Army

Support Group, Vietnam. ftirnislied administrative aid logistic support to Army

units in the country. General Harkins exercised direct operational command

over U.S. Army helicoptercomparies through the MA AG senior Armvadvisor

at each Vietnamese corps headquarteis.

This arrangement appeared contrary to tile principle restraining a unified

commander from personally commanding a component force. Moreover. the

MACVjoint staff had to handle peculiarly Army matters that might have been

more properly the work of an \rmy component command staff. The extra

workload was often cited as a compelling reason for so many Army personnel oi

the MACV staff. -6

Since MACV's birth on 1-ebruary 8, 1962. had been publici/ed. Lt. Gen.

Thomas S. Moorman. ,ice commander in chief of PACAI-. saw no reason wiy

2d ADVON shotuld stay a paper organi/ation. On February 20 General Moor98
2d AI)VON AND) MAC\'

U& COMMAND ARRANGEMENTS

VIETNAM JULY 1962

JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

CIN CPA C

FLEET CINCFACAF CINCPAC

I3TH AF jCMSAY7TH FLEET

20ADVON USAM UPR

Brig Gen Roln Aflthis and Air Force Secretary Eugene Zuckert on tour in the Pacific

99
THE ADVISORY YEARS

man asked Admiral Felt to accept a reorganization of 2d ADVON to make it a

standard USAF air division. This meaningful designation would clear up the Air

Force organiiation in Southeast Asia.2 1

Timing of the proposal was inopportune. The International Control Commission was examining MACV to see if its presence in the country violated tile

Geneva agreements. Under Secretary of State George W. Ball igedl the United

States to go along with the commission and "play the game partly their way." In

response to questions from the piess, President Kennedy insisted that no U.S.

combat forces were in Vietnam. He did admit that tiaining units were authori/ed

to fire in self-protection if fired upon. Consequently, Felt and I larkins consid-

- et ed it impolitic to reorganize 2d ADVON into an air division at this time. Doing could be misconstrued -so as the introduction of a large operational command.

Visiting Vietnam in April 1962, General LeMay decided that something had

to be done about 2d ADVON and its nondescript detachments. On some bases

there were as many as nine separate air detachments, and no one person or

organi7ation was in charge. The Chief of Staffcalled for an air division to replace

2d ADVON and for an air base structure at each major operating location. Air

Force headquarters prepared to replace 2d ADVON with a iegularly constituted

unit to which other units and personnel could be legitimately assigned. 29

Two events haszened acceptance of this action. When American forces were

deployed to Thailand on May 15, General Harkins was additionally designated

commander of United States Military Assistance CommanJ. "1 hailand. And on

June 2 the Internatioii! Control Commission labeled North Vietnamese activities as aggression and tile establishment of MACV as a violation."'

Meanwhile the decision had been made to reveal the USAF iole in Vietnam.

Speaking in Los Angeles on April 27, General LeMay announced that tile Farm

Gate air commandos had the code name of Jungle Jim and were instructingallied

crews in all phases of aii operations. "This is a realistic training program." the

Chief of Staff concluded. "Those people. the Vietnamese. are at war. Our

instructors occasionally accompany them on combat missions. Our pilots are

armed. They will protect themselves if fired upon."''

The New York Tines remarked that the Air Foi ce, besides stiessing massive

retaliation with nuclear weapons, was as much involved "in tle guerrilla-warfare

training" and in counterinsurgency as the other aimed services.12 Radio Hanoi

broadcast that U.S. officers served in combat while instructing Vietnamese,

adding: "American pilots are often at the controls in air strikes." Radio Peking

depicted Faii Gate doings with considerable precision." The ieaction of the

Farm Gate personnel- or air commandos, as they might now be styled- was

that LeMay's speech legitimized their existence.' 4

Under Secretary of State George W. Ball spoke in Detroit on May I.

stressing that no American combat forces were in Vietnam and that the United

States was neither fighting nor running tile war." The press reported Farm

Gate's activities as follows: "None of these men are designated combat troops per

se. but some will be fighting.just as their counterparts are today.... Sometimes

an American instructor pilot has been at the controls in a strafing pass at jungle

I 00
2d ADVON AND MACV

targets or on a bomb run.' 1

'6 Again: "Amei icans arc also flying on bombing and

strafing missions. .. U.S. Air Force pilots fly B-26 bombers and T-28 fighterbombers in air strikes against the Viet Cong and in support of ground troops." "

Still the Air Force was generally hidden behind the name Farm Gate, even

though newspapeis covered Army and Marine helicopter operations and the

work of the Special Foices. If the air commandos and the USAF' echelons above

then weic denied the recognition they wished, there was nevertheless a movement toward the conventional. On May 20 FPACAF suggested and Air Force

headquai ters later approved redesignating the supporting detachments in South

Vietnam. The 6220th, 62 21st, 6222d, and 6223d Air Base Squadrons weie

formed respectively at Tan Son Nhtit. Bien Hoa. Da Nang, and Nha Trang. All

four units were assigned to 2d ADVON on June 7. Detachment 7 became

Headquarters 2d Advanced Echelon. Thirteenth Air Force, and Detachment 10

became Headquarters 6010th Tactical Group.

Converting 2d ADVON to an air division w\,as eased oil ,uly 19. when

Ambassador Nolting no longer opposed the iedesignation if it could be done

without publicity. With the discontinuance of Hcadquaitels 2d ADVON oil

October 8. the 2d Air Division was organized at Tan Son Nhut under General

Anthis and assigned to Thirteenth Air Force. h'lis regulari/ation of USAF unit

organiation indicated a movement away from counterinsurgency concepts and

toward the conventional.

General Anthis served as the air component commander both in South

Vietnam and Thailand, under General Harkins as commander of MACV and of

Military Assistance Command, Thailand. Anthis was also iesponsible for U.S.

aircounterinsurgency in Vietnam, ' PACAF saw that 2d Air Division, a folward

echelon of Thirteenth Air Force and an operating headquarters in a forward

area, could not do air planning for Southeast Asia as a whole. Since Thirteenth

Air Force and FPACAF afforded administrative and logistic support for air

activities and plans, the MACV staff (though composed chiefly of Army officers)

became the air planning agency. Although Thirteenth Air Force sent temporary

duty officers to atigment 2d Air Division planning, the command arrangement

was awkward and hindered air actions.

Generals LeMay and O'Donnell wanted the MACV commande to have

oino and closer day-to-day associations with senior USAF officers. During his

visit to Saigon in April 1962, LeMay had tried to persuade General lHarkins to

put more Air Force officers on the MACV staff, Harkins was unsympathetic but

agreed to consider it if Anthis or Dunning could make a comvincing case.

Upon returning to Washington, the Chief of Staff was critical of the MACV

commander, believing air activities to be "depreciated in South Vietnam rather

than appreciated." At a JCS mecting attended by Defense Secretary McNamara.

General LeMay charged that air planning was often omitted from field operations, that General Anthis had difficulty seeing General I iarkins. and that neither

Harkins nor his chief of staff, General Weede, understood air operations.

Asked to comment, Anthis said he had direct access to General Harkins and

had never been reluctant to give his views. Admiral Felt, CINCPAC, confirmed

101
TIE ADVISORY YEARS

Anthls' ability to speak with the MACV commander at any time. He further

certified that Harkins and Weede were superior officers and fully experienced in

air-ground tactics. Harkins was angered by what he described as General

Le May's"preferring char'ges"against him in Washington. lie explained that the

Air Foice chief seemed to be thinking of command and control of large numbet

of aiiciaft as in World War I1. whereas theie were essentially limited tactical

opportunities for relatively few USAF aircraft in Viet nam.4 0

Throughout 1962 the MACV staff defciencies were clear to Air Force

officei s who sotight to unite air and ground power in utmost cooperation against

the insurgency. But the defects were scarcely understood by those who believed

that coti ntetrinsurgetcv was chiefly an Army mission and that USAF conti ibtitions could be bit secondary. Secretary McNamara for one argued that the

Army must be in the driver's seat. "If you have two or three men engaged in an

operation." he explained. "one has to be primary. The Army ha% to be primary in

land war. The Air Force is there to serve the Army in the airlft role and the close

suppoit role, and the Air Foice must tailor its activities to the Army."4i

As CINCPAC divorced PACAF from operational considerations and

confined its authority to logistic support of 2d ADVON and, of late. to the 2d Air

Division. General Anthis found it hard to sectire a prompt hearing at M ACV for

his proposals. He discovered that several of his wiitten communications were

slow to reach General Harkins. The MACV commander's duties often took him

from Saigon, and his staff carried on mnuch of the business ofcommand. I larkins

followed Army practice in using his .1-3 (Operations) for daily opeiational

planning. Hence his .1-5 (Plans), General Dunning, was frequently outside the

routine MACV activty. especialiv since the .1-5 division was situated in another

part of Saigon away from the major MACV staff offices - .

42

102
X. Tactical Air Control,

Mule Train, and

Ranch Hand

The Viet Cong thought in November 1961 that N ictory was virtually in their

grasp. Completing tile first phase of insurgency, they bad surrounded Saigon and

other urban centers and blocked many highways. For the second phase. they set

up subversive appaiatus and were mounting overt attacks by guerrillas., many of

whom had been trained in the north. During each of the fiist lour months of

1962. an eimated 1.000 communists enteied South Vietnam. Soviet aicrafl

stood ieady to support two North Vietnamese regiments, poised in the Laotian

panhandle for a possible thrust across the border. Either the North Vietnamese

meant to move through the central highlands to cut South Vietnam in half, or

they were forging an infantry division for attacks on Saigon. Both seemed likely

alternatives.,

To hide its control over the insurgency. Hanoi in late 1961 renamed the

southerii bianch of the lao Dong Party thc"People's Re\,oltitionar\ Party."On

December 7 the Provincial Committee of the Lao Dong Party i South Vietnam's Ba Xuyn Plovince declaied:

I he People', Ret olutionat PrtI ha', onl, the appearance ol at Independent e\itene.actlla our p~art> , tnoihlle ' dt the I ao l)oiig Part oi Viet-Nam. uified Irom

North to Soth. tnder the d, iectiolt ot the Central FeCtime ('on ittee of the Pat t\

the Chief oi muich iN Pre'dent Ito

Secuting a copy of this statement. President Diem sent it to President Kennedy

with the comment, "Here at last is a public admission of what has always been

clear-the Viet Cong campaign against my people is led by communists." 2

I hi e was nothing new In tis -the point was, how to combat it? The

actions of' President Diem's government in November and December 1961 did

nothing to reassuie Ainei it, obscrcrs. The apparent response to American

demands for reforms appeared in a series of newspaper articles. Presumably

piepared i the presidential palace. these pieces denounced the United States for

imperialism. Still fearing a coup, Diem resisted forming an unbroken military

command chain and giving confidence and authority to the chief of the Field

Command. Diem was not alone in feeling that the U nited States was pushing too

hard. At times several Vietnamese officers refened to counter insurgency meastires as thle "American plan." They were far from convinced that U.S. ideas and

methods would woik in their country. In consequence Diem continued to

appi ove every U.S. military advisor, explaining that he "didn't want to give the

monopoly on nationalism to Iio Cli Minh."'

laving commenced resettlement ptojects, President i)lem was drawn to the

ideas of Sir Robert G. K. Thompson (former secretary of defense of the Federal03
THE ADVISORY YEARS

tion of Malaya). Sir Robert arrived in Saigon during September 1961 as head of

a British advisory mission. lie suggested a program of strategic and defended

hamilets to clear communists from the Mekong Delta. That same month, Diem

started the Strategic Hamlet Program under the sponsorship of his brother. Ngo

Dinh Nhu. It would take more than military activity to subdue the guerrillas.

Dien judged. and permanent victory rested on restoring the faith of the people in

the government. Resettlement. he felt. would help.-

In contrast. American officials pinned their hopes on a centiali,ed nationwide counterinsurgency strategy to secure Saigon. othei major centers, and lines

of "ommunications. It would also keep the Viet Cong off-balance with searchand-destroy operations to clear., seiie. and hold what were becoming si;,able Viet

Cong base areas known as iones. The strategy further sought to seal off the

border against infiltrators.'

In January and Februar% 1962. Diem gradually conceded the need for a

national concept of action, and he seemed to tilt towaid a nastei plan by

approving a series of separate projects in various places. The Vietnamese president desired that his and Farm Gate's aircxalt attack Viet Congsupply routes. He

appeared willing to authori7e saturation air atta,-ks against communist zones

without exact targeting. Because his troops could not enter these areas, he

deemed them solidly hostile.

In comparison, Generals O'Donnell and McGarr believed indiscriminate

bombing might well disturb pacification efforts. Sir Robert Thompson also

thought that innocent casualties would alienate potentially friendly people. At

least two influential men in the State Depaittment. W. Averell Hart iman and

Roger Hilsman, shared Thompson's view.6

Amei ican officials devised strategic guidelines for a massi\ e countel insurgency operation. Due to internal political reasons. l)iem refused to accept an

overall Vietnamese military commander. He opted for each corps tactical zone

commander's having a "forward comnmand post." More to Diem's liking \;as his

decree of February 3 that designated an Inter-Ministry Committee for Strategic

Hanlets to draw up a national plan. Besides the 784 defended hamlets completed

and the 453 being built. ie planned 6.066 more in 1962.

Failing to convince the Vietnamese to accept all-out military counterinsurgency. Defense Secretary McNamara acceded to a concept of smaller clear-andhold operations. CINCPAC wished them to begin in Binh l)uong Proince

where large communist groups threatened Saigon and Bien I loa. But Thompson

pointed out that a cleared Binh Duong would be hard to hold without pouring il

thousands of troops. Diem okayed the Binh Duong mission. which got under

way in March as the publicized beginning of the countrywide Strategic Hamlet

Program. As he told Thompson."It makes the Americans happy. and it does not

worry either me or the Viet Cong." Decentraliied clear-and-hold operations and

the Strategic Hamlet Program comprised the major ventures against the Viet

Cong.7

Having repeatedly order ed the U.S. military services to come up with special

measures for,..ountering the insurgency. President Kennedy remained dissatis104
TACTICAL AIR CONTROL. MULE TRAIN, AND RANCH HAND

fied with iesults. Urged by the Joint Chiefs and CIA to create a single authority in

Washington to fuse all efforts, he formed oil January 18. 19'2. the Special Group

(Counterinsurgency) chaired by Gencial Taylor. The group worked on the

premise that subversive insurgency was a valid form of poltico-military conflict.

equal in status to conventional warfaie. That perception was to be properly

reflected in the oiganiation and doctrine of all American programs. The group

was tojudge how %ell U.S. ,esources and actions dealt with subversion in South

Vietnam. Laos. and Thailand. To coordinate with the group, the joint staff of the

.ICS gained a new office- the Special Assistant to the Director for Counterinsuigency and Special ActivitiesY

Indecision m autumn 1961 over American advisois engaging in combat now

vanished. The special gi oup pinpointed the particulai character ofcounterinsurgencN. Subtly but perhaps not alh\ ays clearly . the group pushed for less American

and more Vietnamese involvement in the war. This point of view clashed with

President Kennedy's intent to have 1.S. armed services use Vietnam as a

laboratory for studying and testing cotnterinsurgency techniques and equipment. The President encouraged civil and military agencies to send senior

officials on temporary duty to Vietnam for orientation and learning.

By November 1962 the Joint Chiels of Staff mirrored the lie%\, outlook. The

"scale of United States involvement and the level of force." they said. "should be

limited" and merely supplement that of indigenous forces. Where guerrilla

warfare flared. American militar men were to give "operational assistance" to

show U.S. resolve. They were to extend material aid and planning guidance, and

to furnish intelligence. operational. and communications facilities that could be

further expanded should the United States enter the war. American representatives were to "'bring the combat conditions under control and . . . reestablish

stability" by using Vietnamese forces in "well coordinated, integrated, and

adequately supported operations." Yet the United States might have to act

"outside the ... host country" to den\ safe havens to insurgents spilling across

country borders. Somewhat contrary to the prevailing emphasis on training

Vietnamese armed forces, the U.S. military services were expressly directed to

refine their own doctrine, tactics. procedures, organiiation. and equipment.'I

A wide assortment of schemes was tried amid a lingering uncertainty about

the thrust of American policy and strategy. Nevertheless, President Kennedy s

and Secretary McNamara's program of expanded American assistance sparked

some noteworthy achievements.

For the United States Air Force in Vietnam, "the most pressing requirement" was a strong countrywide tactical air control system. The system would

enable "effective and responsive Vietnamese Air Force tactical air operations,"

and squeeze the most from scarce Vietnamese and American air power. If

President Diem saw how well central control worked, he might scrap the divided

control of military and provincial chief, Since the Vietnamese could not run a

control system, it would be "US manned and oriented."i"l

A tactical air control system had proved its worth in World War II and the

Korean War both for air defense and close support. An air operations center

105
'Rim

TlE ADVISORY YEARS

afforded centralized planning, direction, and control of air operations in a

combat theater. Supporting it was a reporting center for radar and other warning

services. In each major ground command area were subordinate air suppoit

operations centers and warning posts.

PACAF and Thirteenth Air Force planned such a system for Vietnam in

l)ecember 1961. Tied in with a combat operations center manned by U.S. and

Vietnamese personnel for the .Ioint General Staff, an air operations center for

overall control at Tan Son Nhut would also support the I1l Corps Tactical Zone

headquarters. Two subordinate air support operations centers at Da Nang and

Pl~cku would serve the I and II Corps headquarters. Secretary McNamara

rejected the idea of phasing in this system. He directed Genei al O'Donnell to set it

tip at once from PACAF assets.

Transports from the 315tni Air Division airlifted men and equipment into

South Vietnam from January 2 to 14, 1962. The USAF 5th Tactical Control

Group worked at Tan Son Nhut and Da Nang, while Vietnamese operated at

Pleiku. The Al. Force ran a communications center at ran Son Nhut. and sent

high-frequency ra'lio teletype circuits to Da Nang, Bien Hoa. Pleiku. and Nha

Trang.' 2

The initial system began operating on January 13, 1962. To avoid innocent

targets, air strikes needed President Diem's prior personal approval. General

Anthis briefed Diem and stressed how the system's instant information on enemy

and friendly air activities led to quick response. Persuaded, he permitted thejoint

operations center to authori7e air strikes.

This austere system brimmed with problems. Corps commanders reserved

specific strike and transport aircraft for their own purposes. thereby taking them

out of central control. Additional duties of officers at the center consumed part of

theii time. Vietnamese personnel were accustomed to afternoon siestas precisely

during the hours when plans were readied and warning orders issued for tile next

day. Several Americans had no background for their jobs. Many grew impatient

because work took longer when Vietnamese were involved. Quite a few of them

were highly competent, but the air operations center was certainly not a Vietnamese "directed and operated facility" as eventually intended. It was rather "a

USAF facility with some Vietnamese Air Force participation." Still the workers

at Da Nang and Pleiku skipped siestas and performed well. due to insistence by

their USAF counterparts that the Vietnamese themselves plan and monitor

missions.'

A number ofjunior Vietnamese officers acted as forward air controllers and

as air liaison officers with the ground forces. They were as hesitant to control

strikes or to give advice as the ground commanders were to accept their services.

Lacking authority and seemingly uninformed, these young officers appeared

merely to transmit requests for information to their headquarters over communications nets not always secure.

Five UISAF forward air controllers came to the country on February 15,

1962. They weie pilots who weie highly qualified to direct strike aicraft to

targets by talking with them from observation planes in the area. The initial Air

106
TACTICAL AIR CONTROL. MULE TRAIN, AND RANCH HAND

Force liaison olficers to advise and assist Vietnamese ground comianders got to

Vietnam in April.

At first tile USA F controllers were attached to Vietnamese ground forces

likely to'clash with the enemy. President Diem wished only rated Vietnamese

observers to control strikes, so the Americans worked mainly as assistant air

liaison officers. They also flew the L-19 for the Vietnamese observer-forward air

controller and would help him. And they served as duty officers in the air

operations center.1'

Crippling the tactical air control system were the limited and failure-prone

communications between the centers and the airfields. Through the early breakin period, numerous communications equipment failures took place. PACAF

had obtained newly developed AN TSC-15 high-frequency single-sideband

radios for long-distance voice and teletype channels. The sets reached Clark on

Decembei 30, 1961. for field installation by the Ist Mobile Communications

Group. Problems arose at once. Operators in the small mobile vans sweltered as

temperatures often soared to 130 degrees Fahrenheit. Atmospheric conditions

caused poor transmission and extensive use jammed the bands.

Mr. McNamara in January 1962 approved a JCS request for a civilian

contractor to install an M RC-85 tropospheric scatter communications system.

Page Communications Engineers. Inc.. set about supplying many main link

channels that joined Saigon, Nha Trang. Pleiku. and Da Nang. One channel

linked Pleiku with Ubon. Thailand. Not until Page wound up its work in

September 1962 were there rapid, positive, and dependable communications for

central control over air cperations. 5

The air control system in being sufficed for a few forces, but an entirely

integrated countrywide structure would enhance air power and train Vietnamese. It would in addition be a framework, under American command and

control, for directing Farm Gate and USAF operational units later deployed to

Vietnam.

Yet General McGarr. the MAAG chief, undermined the concept of a

centralized tactical air control system by his handling of the two Army H-21

helicopter transport companies deployed to Vietnam in November 1961.1 He

assigrncd them to serioi Aimy advisois of coips. then umged the Joint General

Staff to reorganize the three Vietnamese L-19 liaison squadrons and the one

H-34 helicopter squadron into four composite groups. He wanted three of the

groups located at the three corps field headquarters and the fourth held in general

support. That would give each Vietnanese army coi ps the helicopters and planes

to conduct reconnaissance, move platoon- or company-size combat patrols.

transport critical supplies, evacuate casualties, and perform staff and command

liaison. When McGarr asked for Army CV-2 Caribou light transports, L-20 and

L-18 liaison aircraft, and UH-I (formerly HU-1) Iroquois helicopters for better

support of the MAAG Army field advisors, lie planned to place this air fleet

under local rather than central control.' 7

Some Vietnamese questioned this parceling out of pilots and technicians of

tile Vietnamese Air Force, for it seemed to point to an "army air force."The main

107
THE ADVISORY YEARS

hope for expanding tactical fighter stiength lay in upgrading [-19 and C-47

pilots. 1 his would be impossible if the liaison squadrons passed to army control.

Beyond that, maintenance and repair facilities at the corps headquarters for

helicopters and liaison craft were few.I ,

Impetus for centralized airlift control came from the arrival in.lanuary 1962

of Mule Traii. a temporary duty detachment designed to give logistic support to

Vietnamese and American forces. Mule Train drew its aircraft and personnel

from Tactical Air Command's 346th Troop Carrier Squadron (Assault) at Pope

Air Force Base. North Carolina. Sixteen C-123 Providers arrived overseas in

January, the first four touching down at Tan Son Nhut on the 2d. Mule Train

had 243 officers and airmen and was complete with its own maintenance, air base

personnel, medical detachment, and loadmasters. The commander was Lt. Col.

Floyd D. Shofner.

In March permanent duty personnel from the 776th Troop Carrier Squadron started to replace the original Mule Train. The transfer was finished in .jlune.

Of the sixteen Mule Train C-1 23s, four were at Clark in the Philippines, ten

at Tan Son Nhut, and two at Da Nang. Operational control rested with

CINCPAC through PACAF, Thirteenth Air Force. and 2d ADVON. A joint

aircraft allocation board in the MAAC J-4 (Logistics) represented interested

agencies and commands, set movement priorities, and designated space requirements. The airlift branch of the joint operations center, part of the tactical air

control system, directed flights. Specialists on temporary duty from PACAF's

315th Air Division (Combat Cargo)joined Vietnamese Air Force officers in the

airlift branch to control Mule Train. And they often helped the Vietnamese work

the Ist Transpoit Group.9

In the initial seven weeks. Mule Train flew more than 500 sorties of 1,693

flying hours, moved 695 tons of cargo and over 3,600 passengers. and kept an

operational readiness rate of eighty-five percent. Every C-123 was scheduled for

50 flying hours monthly, leaving time for training, testing. and flight to Clark for

maintenance. The number of sorties rose steadily, front 296 in.lanuary to 1.102 in

June.20

In February alone, Mule Train conveyed 1.035 passengers and 449 tons of

cargo, dropped 174.5 tons of resupply to outposts, and transpo ted 996 tioops

for airborne training. Frequently employed in long hauls with light loads, the

C-123s operated at about ninety percent of capacity. They % ere supposed to

support tactical operations, but made mostly routine cargo and passenger flights

through 1962. The airlift system was not very efficient.2

'

Management of the Vietnamese C-47s was worse. The airlift branch could

not consistently obtain firm priorities, and sudden shifts in daily orders stirred

confusion at the operating and air terminal levels. Many times USAF personnel

scheduling C-123s accepted Vietnamese requests based on sketchy C-47 mission

reports. While C-47 crew shortages prevented peak operations, the Ist Transportation Group devoted about twenty-five percent of its effort to transporting very

important persons (VIPs).22

108
I AC IICA I AIR CONTROl I. II I-RAIN.AND RANCH I AN D

2 / (Upper left) Viet Cong prisoners unload

rice from a C-123 at Quang Ngai during a

Mule Train resupply mission

(Above) Supplies pushed from a C-123 for

an outpost at 8B Hung

(Left) C-1 23S at Da Nang

(Beiow) Aerial view of a government

outpost

109
THE ADVISORY YEARS

Upgrading Vietnamese C-47 pilots to fill T-28 cockpits stripped the transport group. and Secretary McNamara authorized thirty USAF pilots to augment

the unit. The pilots reached Tan Son Nhut in March and April. At once their

relations with the Vietnamese pilots become prickly. Tension built until August

when the commander. Lt. Col. Nguyen Cao Ky, assembled them all and asked

that they work together. The meeting cleared the air, cemented close cordial

relations, and boosted the sortie rate.2

To meet Army needs, the Air Force had developed the C-123 as an assault

transport capable of carrying eight tons. In the late 1950s, however. the Army

procuted the CV-2 Caribou transport featuring a 21/2-ton capacity and good

short-takeoff-and-landing characteristics. By March 1962 Army leaders were

pressum ig Admiral Felt, CINCPAC. to approve a Caribou company for Vietnam. Late that month, General I larkins put in foi a Caribou company and one

squadron of C-123s. He intended that the Caribous concentiate on delivering

supplies (chiefly food) to Amei ican advisors and isolated troops at remote spots.

Of the 182 airfields in Vietnam. Harkins pointed out that 162 could accommodate CV-2s while only 115 could handle C-1 23s. To avoid additional overcrowding at Tan Son Nhut, he planned to base the Caribous at the unoccupied airfield

of Vung Tau.24

To check General Flarkins'evaluation of airfields, the 2d ADVON surveyed

opeiating conditions. Aerial photographs disclosed fewer fields than listed, foi

some had been duplicated under Frencl and Vietnamese names. Many small

ones were unfit for either C-I 23s or CV-2s due to low load-bearing capacity.

vegetation, or danger from the Viet Cong. At first 83 airfields seemed possible for

C-123s. but anothei survey showed that 145 of thecurrent 153 fields were suitable

in dry weather.2 '

Admiral I-elt was out of sympathy with General Harkins' desile for extra

airlift. The Aimy's 18th Fixed Wing Aviation Company at ia Nang already

owned sixteen U- I Otters for cot ps support. A light utility plane. the Otter could

haul one ton of small bulk cargo or seven to eight passengers. Additional aircraft.

Felt believed, would ovei load the few facilities in South Vietnam. lie favored

better use of the C-123s and C-47s on hand. 21

6

I ike Felt erFa I eMay ay-e and his party visiting Vietnam in Api ml 1962

thought moie transports, whether C-123s or CV-2s. to be tnnecessaiy. 1 oattain

better airlift, they suggested assigning an experienced officer to establish tighter

contiol. Col. George M. Fostei. formerly PACAF diiector of tiansportation.

reported to General Anthis for duty on May I. Later in the month. Tactical Air

Foice Transport Squadron Provisional-I was formed at 'fan Son Nhut to bring

the management of Mule Train and other C-1 23s under a single commandei.-'

General Harkins was still bent on sectiring CV-2 Caiibous. He suggested

using C-123 Providers to handle the main-line. long-halu airlift to thirty-nine

ailheads. At the same time, Caribous would take care of short-haul, feeder air

transport to fifty-foti locations. (The CV-2 could manage items too bulky and

heavy for the U-I Otteis and UIlI-I helicopteis.) Once moie the MACV commander requested an additional C-123 squadron and an Arny CV-2 company.

110
TACTICAL AIR CONTROL. MULE TRAIN. AND RANCH HAND

Five of tie C-123s weic earmarked for Mule Train. five for airstrip alert, two for

training, and four for maintenance and ieserve. l'wo of the CV-2s weie tagged

for each corps to directly support advisois, four for the air tianspolt system, two

for MACV staff suppoit, and four for maintenance and reserve.2

Admi al Felt acceded but told General lai kins that daily air supply to

fifty-foui points through thirty-nine airheads meant "many of you, custome s

are eating too high on the hog." The Army's Ist Aviation Company of CV-2

Caribous went to Thailand with Joint Task Foice 116. mainly for testing under

field conditions. From Thailand the Army sent six CV-2s to Vietnam fol

dispersal in pairs to the corps advisors. American activities in Thailand tapeied

off during December, and General Harkins ieassembled the whole Caribou

company in Vietnam. He gave as his reasons the increased need for airlift and the

desire for further field tests.29

When the JCS ordered Tactical Air Command to deploy a second C-123

unit to Vietnam. the 777th Ti oop Car ier Squadron at Pope fturnished sixteen

aiiciaft. These C-123s staged through Clark, four ofthem flying on to Thailand.

The other twelve arrived at Da Nang on June I5. 1962. going under the 'I actical

Air Force Transport Squadron Provisional-2. "I

General Moorman, PACAl. vice commander in chief, had proposed that

the 315th Air Division (Combat Cargo) form a lower headquarters in Vietnam to

control the C-123s. General Milton, Thirteenth Air Force commander, protested

the proposal. IH" said it would add another air headquarters in Vietnam independent ofl2d ADVON. thereby tangling relations with MACV. Moorman next

asked Milton to set up a combat cargo group in Vietnam under the opeiational

control of General Anthis, the MACV air component commander. In addition

to the airlift units assigned or attached to 2d ADVON. Anthis would control all

USAF air terminal facilities in Southeast Asia. Moorman thought a Southeast

Asia Airlift System complete with a combat caigo group to be "the damnedest

exercise in overstaffinga proposal that I have ever heard of." Milton accepted the

idea because it achieved professional supervision "without creating another littlc

empire.""

General Moorman asked Admiral Felt to approve the plan for centrali'ed

control of iegional aii lift, and lie requested Genei al larkins to establish an airlift

allocations boaid. The board would iequire fifty more people in Thailand and

Vietnam along with small movement control sections at Tan Son Nhut and Da

Nang and in Thailand. Moorman also wanted an aerial port squadron in

Vietnam. The overall concept appealed to larkins, but he thought that the

MACV i-4 cotld discharge the duties of the airlift allocation board, lie agreed to

let the system take in all Aimy. Navy. Marine. and Air Force airlift save

helicopters. Felt then directed the MACV commandcr to form a joint airlift

allocation board within his .1-4. and told Moorman to cieate a combat cargo

group as planned. At 'fan Son Nhut PACAF organi7ed the 6492d Combat

Cargo Group (Troop Carrier) and its 6493d Aerial Port Squadron. Both provisional units were replaced in December 1962 by the 315th Troop Carrier Group

(Assault) and the 8th Aerial Port Squadron. 2

IlI
THE ADVISORY YEARS

General Ilarkins directed tile Joint Airlift Allocations Boaid in .- 4 to

approve all C-! 23 missions in Southeast Asia. But his chief of staff. General

Weede. deviated from CINCPAC guidance. Weede neither defined General

Anthis' responsibilities in the airlift system as the air component commander. nor

made clear the combat cargo group's functions in running the air terminals.

Nevertheless, the Southeast Asia Airlift System was broad enough to encompass

Army Caribous. Marine R-4Ds. Vietnamese and Air Force C-47s. and USAF

C-123s.

Airlift specialists were interested in a clean and straight-line organilation.

At the same time. General Anthis expected the C-123s also to fly tactical airlift

generated through the air operations center of the tactical air control system. The

arrival of the additional C-123s in Jtine 1962 allowed the creation of a fire

brigade, quick reaction force. Placed on a thirty-minute alert for emergency

employment twenty-four hours a day. this composite force consisted of five

C-123s, five (later six) C47s. one L-19. and five hundred Vietnamese airborne

troops.

The planes dropped all the paratroopersduringa demonstration on June 5.

Impressed. the Joint General Staff and the 2d Air Division planned to locate

paratroop battalions and transport aircraft together at eight dispersed location,,.

The concept was never completely carried out, and despite its intrinsic merit the

fire bi igade idea fell into disuse. T'ying down C-47s and C-123s to alert status

turned out to be a waste of airlift. 1

Between June and December 1962. the C-123s for the most part flew cargo

and passenger missions instead of the tactical airlift for which they had been

intended. This was due chiefly to the country's surface transportation being

vulneiable to Viet Cong ambush. 4

Along with Mule Train had come six C-123s equipped for defoliation

operations and known as Ranch Hand. These planes plussixty-nine men selected

from the Special Aerial Spray Flight at Langley Ail Force Base. Virginia. and the

464th Troop Carrier Wing at Pope made up the Tactical Air Force 'I ransport

Squadron Provisional-I. With Capt. Carl W. Marshall as officer-in-charge, the

unit reached Clark on December 6. 196l. and there awaited policy decisions. It

was assigned to PACA F and 2d A DVON but M AAG handled the planning and

coordinating."

The Advanced Research Projects Agency had been conducting small-scale

defoliant tests in South Vietnam since August 1961. Pleased with the results.

President Diem became an ardent advocate of the use of herbicides both to

destroy crops and to strip away foliage concealing enemy activities. The M AAG

readied a plan to try defoliant chemicals against border areas, Viet Cong crops.

and Viet Cong base areas in Zone D. The.ICS endorsed this plan on November 3.

and Defense Secretary McNamara on the 7th ordered the Air Force to send

planes, crews, and chemicals to South Vietnam. On November 30 President

Kennedy approved the defoliation guidelines suggested by the Departments of

State and Defense.Y'

112
I ACTICAI. AIR CONTROL., MULE TRAIN. AND RANCH HAND

'1 he approvals wer. cautious. They called for carefully controlled defoliation flights along key roads and railways before undertaking food denial. There

was to be no spraying in Zone D or along the border "tintil there are realistic

possibilities of immediate military exploitation." In other wOlds, spraying for the

sake of'spraying was out- it had to be linked with ground tactical operations. III

theot y the Vietnamese government was managing the operations and the United

States was simply supplying the means and serving as a consultant.

United States planners saw thie technique as an excellent measure to counter

anibush. the classic guerrilla tactic mastered by the foe. Killing foliage would

deny him hiding along roads and railways. The outcome of wiping out his crops

was less certain." But into the sutmmer of 1962. General O'Donnell and Ambassador Nolting continued to harbor reservations on the untried chemicals. The

State l)epartment remained apprehensive that the common nontoxic herbicides

would provoke communist charges of chemical warfaie. In the meantime,

however. Secretary McNamara was eager to continue defoliation activities.

Since the Viet Cong had already gathered their seasonal crops when the

splay planes entered the counti y. the initial plan was to defoliate along 300 miles

of stiategic roads north and northeast of Saigon. President Kennedy seveicly

pared this proposal on .lanuary 3. 1962. lie authori/ed experimental spraying

against separate targets that compi ised maciely 16 of the nearly 60 miles between

Bien Hoa and Vung Tau on Route 15.1h

The State l)epartment wanted no advance notice aside from local and

low-key warnings. Still, the Vietnamese government on January 10. 1962,

"announced plans to conduct an experiment to rid certain key communications

routes of thick tropical vegetation. U.S. assistance has been sought to aid

Vietnamese personnel in this undertaking." Because the C-123 spray planes

had no armorplating, General O'I)onnell voiced concern that advance notice of

flights would expose them to Viet Cong ground fire. The 2d ADVON consequently scheduled fighter cover from Farm Gate. 9

Accotdingto the rules then in force, a Vietnamese needed to be aboard each

splay plane. The planes were to stay clear of areas where food crops were

growgng. Province chiefs had to be alerted three days in advance of flights so they

could explain the nontoxic spraying to their citi/ens.

"hliee C-I 23s, each fitted with an intel nal 1,000-gallon chemical tank and

removable spray bars attached under the wings. departed Clark and arrived at

Tan Son Nhut on .lanuary 7. 1962. After poring over aerial photos. the crews flew

two familiari/ation sweeps along I lighway 15 before embarking on their first

full-scale mission on the 13th. For three days the planes sprayed a 200-metetwide swath on both sides of selected segments of Route 15. Complete defoliation

in ten days was counted on. lowever the leaves turned brown slowly, the

vegetation remained alive, and few immediate military advantages resulted.

Scxeral tries at burning the spiayed areas fizlled.

The Viet Cong turned the spraying into a propaganda advantage. They

claimed that the spray was chemical warfare and led the peasants to believe it was

to blame for all dying plants. A Vietnamese government board established to

113
It4_

1 14
I ACIICAI AIR (ON I R()I MUI F I RAIN. ANI) RANCH IIANI)

P 114 (Top) C-123 on a defoliation mission

(Center) Brass sprayers in the rear of a C-123

(Bottom) C-123K aircraft at Hickam AFB. Hawaii.

en route to Vietnam for defoliation activities

P 115 (Right) C-123B on defoliation mission near

Saigon

(Center) View from inside a C-123 as it sprays foliage

(Bottom) USNS Core in Saigon harbor with a cargo of

Ranch Hand spray and equipment

115
THE ADVISORY YEARS

evalua teclaims for accidental destructton angered those people whose suits wetic

denied.

On February 2. 1962. a C-123 on a low-level training mission was lost. The

cause of the crash was not clear. Eneny ground fte or sabotage was suspected.

but the exact reason was never officially proved."0 The thit crewmen w\eie the

first USAF fatalities in South Vietnam.

By February several U.S. officials concluded that the spray project was

badly managed. General O'l)onnell termed it "a blooper fi om start to finish." lie

soight to discontinue the program. teconvert the C-123s to standaid tianspol ts.

and give them to Mule Train. lie told Secietary McNamara that the spray

operations were a vaste of aircraft, and he iecommended temoval of the tanks

and spray plumbing. General Moorian joined O')onnell i calling the project

militarily ineffective, and the State Department labeled it "too reminiscent ol gas

warfare." In the face of this opposition, McNamara wvent for continued herbicide

experiments, lie decided to press ARPA to make the spray woik, sending a

scientific team to Vietnam in April foi a technical assessment. Brig. Gen. Fied J.

Delmore, USA. commanding general of the Chemical Corps Reseaich and

Development Command, headed the team. 4'

General Delmore quickly discovered what had gone wrong with the Ranch

land defoliant missions. Most of the plants had been dormant, and the herbicide was a growth-regulating chemical that worked only on actively gr,,wing

plants. Furthermot e, the spray system had dispensed too light a dose of chemicals. The system iequied readjustment and modifications.

These findings eassured President )iem. lie was willing to begin herbicide

operations against Viet Cong crops in the central highlands, whete auerrillas

were seizing food from the Montagnaid tribal people. Relocating the Montagnards to strategic hamlets and destroying the crops would cause the Viet Cong to

go htingly. '

Secretaiv McNamara agiced to seek approval for the tise of heibicides

against Viet Cong crops. Ambassador Nolting and Geneial larkins il .filly

forvaided a specific pi oposal to allow the Sotith Viet naimese to spray 2,500 acres

in Phil Yen Province."'

Following the Viet Cong's killing of two Vietnamese perimeter giatds neai

the Bien lioa Airlield. Adnihal Felt suggested spraying tie atleas around ailstiips. Appioal caie in late .hine from Washington for defoliating the forest

area noith of the Bien Hoa itinwav. Vietnamese 11-34 helicopteis made these

flights in Ahlly.

General larkins next tirged that Ranch land C-123s ticat some 9,000 acres

(around fourteen square miles) of mangrove forests bordering the rivets and

canals of the Ca Mai Peninsula to deprive the communists of ambush covet.

After approval, two C-123s started the spray operations on Septembei 3.

Another spray-equipped C-123 sent from the United States joined in later.

Finished on Octobet II, the flights killed ninety to ninety-five percetit of the

vegetation along the waterway. It was estimated that the view from the air was

five to seven times bettei than before.

116
TACTICAL AIR CONTROL. MULE TRAIN. AND RANCH HAND

This success spurred the Vietnamese armed forces on December 3 to se.-k

widespread defoliation of around 90,000 acres alongside Vietnam's main highways. The State and Defense Departments let Harkins and Nolting approve

operations to clear roadsides, powerlines, iilroads, and areas adjacent to depots,

airfields, and other field installations. Other targets took presidential approval.

Inasmuch as the Vietnamese now wanted to spray on their own. McNamara

wondered aloud why Diem did not buy weed-killing chemicals on the open

market and go ahead."

Viet Cong propaganda scoring defoliation handed Diem's government an

unfoieseen advantage. The Montagnards, who had been impressed with Ilo Chi

Minh's victory over the Fiench, came to believe that the power to kill tiees would

bring victory to the Republic of Vietnam. Many of them left the highlands for

resettlement in strategic hatmlts. This migration reduced the Viet Cong's food

supply, and guerrillas hao to switch from fighting to farming. "

In Washington on September 25. 1962, the Vietnamese Deptity Minister of

Defense pressed President Kennedy to authorize the use of chemicals to destroy

crops. Kennedy agreed a few days later, and the State and Defense Departments

authorized Harkins and Nolting to proceed with limited test crop destruction

operations as long as they took precautions to prevent damage to innocent

people and to feed refugees from sprayed areas. State insisted on approving every

crop-destruction target, however.4'

The rice crop in Phu Yen Province had matured by this time and appeaied

to be no longer a valid target. The State Department approved an alternate area

in Phuoc Long Province and, on November 21 and 23, five Vietnamese H--34

helicopters treated about 775 acres of rice, potatoes. manioc, beans, and peanuts.

This operation destroyed food sufficient to feed 1.000 communists for over a

year. During February. May,and June 1963, Vietnamese ground troops sprayed

portions of Thua Thien Province by hand."

In general the Joint Chiefs of Staff favored fuither ,,paying. but President

Kennedy withheld blanket authority. He did not wish it to appear that Americans were making war upon Vietnamese peasants."4

117
XI. Air Policy:

Too Cautious?

During a conversation with President Kennedy in November 1961, Secretary of Defense McNamara had "volunteered to look after"the Vietnam War. To

do this he set up monthly conferences in Hawaii or Saigon.' There, he and a Joint

Chiefs of Staff member (usually the chairman) met with tile Commander in

Chief, Pacific Command, the Ambassador to Vietnam. and various compo:.ent

and unified commanders. The conferees discussed problems, courses of action,

and progress. They traded views, reports. and briefings, and kept each other

current on cvents in Southeast Asia and in Washington. Secretary McNamara

often settled things on the spot, accepting or rejecting subordinates' suggestions.

A case in point was the first Secretary of Defense Conference held on

December 16, 196 1, in Hawaii. M r. McNamara opened the meeting by stressing

that the President did not desire to introduce American combat troops openly

into Vietnam at that time. The Secretary conveyed his concern over the danger of

alienating the Vietnamese people by careless bombing. The Army "has a particularly important role to play," he said. "While naval and air support operations are

desirable, they won't be too effective, and we should not think they will win the

war." McNamara wanted the C-I 23s in Vietnam used not for taxi service but for

tactical airlift in support of the combat effort, to include drops of materiel and of

Vietnamese troops. His one objective in Vietnam was "to win this battle."2

A chief order of business was the CINCPAC plan "to guide"the Vietnamese

armed forces in a field campaign against the insurgents. The operations projected

were in terms of task forces. Three or four battalions of infantry with supporting

artillery and logistic units would attack Viet Cong bases, cut lines o.'communication, and clear and hold ground gained. No one knew what resources President

Diem would give to this program. If Diem refused to take American advice, JCS

Chairman Lemnitzer pointed out, the United States would be "in a bad fix." Mr.

McNamara brushed this aside and brusquely told his followers to get on with

their jobs.

General O'Donnell, PACAF commander in chief, was impressed with

McNamara's extremely strong statements of American determination to keep

Vietnam from falling to the communists. But it soon became evident to him that

strong talk did not necessarily mean strong action. The United States had chosen

a prudent - perhaps too prudent - course and was accenting ground rather

than air action. O'Donnell said that he personally deplored "overcontrol from

the Washington level" but"as a soldier would comply with the spirit of the policy

to be ultra cautious." Admiral Felt, CINCPAC, likewise believed that policies

curbing air power were scarcely in the best American interest. General LeMay.

Air Force chief, was also impatient with "our own military rules to handicap

ourselves." He later reminisced: "If Khrushchev had been running it [the war], he

119

PREOEDING PAGE BLANK-NOT FlJIv)
HF ADVISORYWYARS

couldn't haime (lone an\ betici . as tar as handicapping uts. b\y \%flat we (lid t(,

ouisetses all through *he thing hiomn Start to tiliish."

InI Januarx pani f921Sl elt suic thle\ had Solsed thle problem ot

creating a"clea. ealistic. joinitlyagi eed concept I or the elimination ot Vjet ('ong

influence." 'I heir idea calledl for aI quick ieact ion f orce ot V"ietnamese aiiborne

troop,,. lifted and suppoi ted b\ .S. oi Vietnamese transport and strike airci alt

All would respond to iadio calls t'rom x illages tinder communist attack, thus

supplying the -missing ingredient ot triil\ eftectix e action in South Vietnamn

This simple and direct reaction to oxci t enerif\ assatilts onl \ illages would entail

inte Vietnamese battalions of paratroopers. ten C-1 23s, tort\ 1 -28s, and eighty

11-34 hielicopters. Split amiong several locations, thle foice wotuld be onl twenit\-

f'our-hot ir alert - (l1j~ek to ieact to calls, for help from communications teamns in

\ill-ages.

Since I-arm (ate was to take part in thle piogram., precise targeting was a

mtI ist. Guterril la wai fiI bilurred d ist inct ions The insurgents disguised themnselses

as civilians, f ound shelter amiong thle populace. and depended onl innocent

inhabitants for food and othcr Items. President lDim emphatically insisted that

his airmen exercise tmost care to aw id angei ing the people by injii Ing inno1-

cents. Carelessness during ain aii stiike could lead to aI prison sentence.'

Thirteenth Air I-orce asked IPACA F to lay dlown rules of enigagemnent I ot

Fati Gate. and the request was ieferred to Cl NCPAC for iesolution. Admiral

I-elt stress;ed caution." *Fhe 1-rench Foreign Legion in Indochina had tried to work

tree of' restraints hamstringirig operation,,, onl the basis that the natis e people

knew that innocent aild guility would suiffer alike if thley' harboi ed Viet MIinh

members. The French command had rejected this view, and -moie temperate

policies foi usii1- air power prevailed although mIany\ tiagic errors In tadiget

designation continued to be made until the end of thle ssar." According to I-elt. at

realistic polic\ pis oted onl good air-grouind communications and on being "as,

careful as possible when shooting things upiptiround friendls for~es."

Farmi Gate bombs hit a Cambodians% illage by accidenit on .lanuarx' 21. 1962.

killing sesveral civilians. The incident !,:.ked at the "highest level" of thle US.

government thle q utjon of how to select targets without imperiling innocent

people. '! o guide thle dliscussion expected at thle next conference attended by thle

Secretars ofl Defenrse. PACA I offeredWe imist e xerei%e the grcatest powbhle co i iota rid di%cretion to aNtirc thai v\e achies e

our object i\ e% s% ithout undute or tin necc~a r\ abiatiton oif the ei\ iha in populaie it ss

are to awiod the iittpositioit of ighI\ 11tingtit control% on tite appieat ion of I auimi

Gaute. %%c mim~ make ew r\ effort to asoid another incident aitd . in addition. demonstrate the effccti ncnm of ouir control anid abilii\ to discriminate in the Nelect ion atnd1

dcsignation oft a rgctN aN %\ell %N in zIie conduct oi air ,trikc%

At thle February conference. General Anthis depicted targeting and control

of air strikes as oriented to protect thle lives and property of friendly ci\ ilians, lieI

said that all ground foice reqtiests for close air support or interdiction were

carefully verified asjustifiable before being met. Air Force peisonneCIl ritinliied

every strike request and had iccently denied two. Once a daylight sti ike was

120
AIR POLICY. 100 CAUTlIO.S?

apploed. a Vietnamese Iot waid air controller directed it. Anthis knew of no

attacks on friendl\ people.

l)elense Secietary McNamara answered the 2d Al)VON commander b\

s,,pelling out guidelines Air i-orce personnel we ei not to engage in strikes on

Cambodian territol\. Thxe\ wveic to balance risk against gain. For example, a

mission was probabl\ unacceptable if eight Americans weic training a single

Vietnamese or if thete \%as a chance of killing innocent people to get a few Viet

Cong.

13, reason of this policy, mote than half of the] -28s flying strike missions in

1962 ieturned to base with unused ordnance. One LSAF forward air controllei

had seen Vietnamese troops alter an engagement "put 60 artillery rounds into a

\ illage tor no appatent reason and kill women and childien." Yet he knew of no

instance when "we tndiscrimtnatel\ went into any area and just for the heck of it

bombed and straled." In contrast, armed helicoptets seemed almost free of the

rules of engagement. These ciaft had no rigid target selection, no i adar control

lot tatget location, and no forward air contiollets to monitor their firing.'

l)uring the night of March I, 1962. the Viet Cong stot meed an outpost about

ti t% miles not th of Saigon. The call fot help flashed to the air operations center

thence to Farm Gate. Ani SC-47 flateship and two T-28s (carrying napalm.

rockets, and .50-cal machineguns) scrambled, with iadar at Tan Son Nhut

\ectoring them to the scene. Undei the light of the blossoming flares, the T-28s

pummeled the enemy. lie broke off the assault and ihe outpost held. Five

communist bodies wete found the following day, along with evidence that more

had been wounded.

On March 3, II Cot ps asked fot an immediate strike on a Viet Cong meeting

neat a \ illage 105 miles northeast of Saigon. After clearance b\ Field Command.

the ail opetations center sent one 13-26 and two AI)-6s. loaded with napalm.

fragmentation bombs, rockets. .50-cal machmieguns, and .20-mm cannon. The

ait taft art ived to find the Viet Cong in the mdst ofa training exercise. The strike

killed twelve. ''

At times coordination failures hurt opetations. On Match 2, for example.

eleven U.S. Army helicopters lifted and landed four ranger companies. a teconnaissance company. and a platoon of 105-mm howit/ers in the Vinh Binh aica to

encit cie a Viet Cong vllage. The Vietnamcsc and Farn Gate gave air cover with

two 1 -28s 'lnd two I.- 19s. But the ground units were in the wrong places, and

ait-ground communications were absent. Although the two strike aircraft and

the two liaison planes were overhead and available, they could deliver no

supporting fire. The ground troops killed one Viet Cong and captured thirtythree sutspects.'2

While lapses in coord, nation and communications marred some operations. results in general infused mild optimism. On March 4 a Vietnamese !.-19 set ving

with an army task force spied a company of Viet Cong (fifty to seventy men).

They were situated near the bend of a river about thirty miles northeast of Tan

Son Nhut. Vietnamese AI)-6s scrambled within fifteen minutes, armed solely

with 20-mm cannon since the planes were forbidden to carry bombs. Asked to

121
THE ADVISORY YEARS

assist, Farri Gate flew a series of strikes. Vietnamese reports the next day claimed

fifty to sixty Viet Cong dead. A U.S. advisor put the figure at twenty-five. "

As MAAG told Defense Secretary McNamara on February 19, 1962:

"South Vietnam had carlier been described as a country going down a steep slope

to disaster. We can't say that the direction has been reversed, but for the moment

the slope has leveled out a bit."'"

For Farm Gate personnel the slope still seemed to be downhill. Their tasks

were largely routine, and morale sagged. Being specially chosen, highly motivated survivors of rigorous training and selection, they expected to work with

friendly guerrillas fighting behind enemy lines. But apai t from a few challenging

Special Forces missions, they performed close air support, airlift. medical evacuation, and psychological warfare - not at all what they had volunteered to do.

The rules of engagement stymied these men -- carry Vietnamese insignia and a

Vietnamese airman, and do nothing that the Vietnamese Air Force can do itself. '

A chance to tackle something more exacting in psychological warfare had

arisen in December 1961. Because certain areas controlled by the Viet Cong were

open only to counterpropaganda by air, 2d ADVON turned to Farm Gate for

testing loudspeaker and leaflet operations. Targets embraced the town of Pan

Me Thuot, Pleiku, and Kontum. along with the villages of Polei Klengand Polei

Krong. Farm'Gate planes carried out the broadcast and leaflet flights. To stave

off starvation in Polci Krong. the aircraft further dropped rice and salt. '

Brig. Gen. Edward G. Lansdale. USAF counterinsurgency specialist, questioned the rationale of the tests. He suggested that unless technical experts knew

precisely what they wished to achieve, probably nothing could be accomplished. "

On January 30. 1962. 2d ADVON put in for three officeis, two specialists,

and one clerk, all well-versed in "military-political-economic-psychological

aspects" of this type of warfare. They would develop, test, and conduct operations in the "ideal environment" of South Vietnam. Missions suggested were

dropping leaflets, food, and clothing. Unfortunately, no psychological wal fare

specialists were on hand. There had been several hundred trained officers in the

early 1950s, but the Air Force had inactivated psychological warfare units in

1958. '"

Farm Gate nonetheless flew seven missions from December 14, 1961, to

February II, 1962, dropping leaflets and making aerial broadcasts. The initial

flights impressed Vietnamese villagers, but speaker quality was marginal. For the

messages to be heard from the speakers in the belly of the SC-47. the run over the

target needed to be at 600 feet at an airspeed of 100 knots or less. Even then, the

mebsage could not exceed sixty seconds. The speakers were later mounted on a

rack in the plane's door. This let the aircraft circle an area while a crewman aimed

the speakers at a specific spot. Still, the run had to be at a dangerously low 500

feet.

On February II an SC-47 took off in good weatner for a routine leaflet

mission south of Da Lat. The aircraft crashed for reasons unknown, killing eight

Americans (six Air Force and two Army) plus one Vietnamese. This flight was

122
AIR POLICY: TOO CAUTIOUS?

portiaved without success as an attempt to train the lone Vietnamese aboard.

Press and congressional reports characterized as "fiction" the labeling of American missions as "solely in the transportation and training of Vietnamese units."'"

During the third Secretary of Defense Conference in Hawaii in February,

Mr. McNamara said he wanted the Vietnamese to take over psychological

warfare operations as soon as they could equip their C-47s with speakers.

Admiral Felt, CINCPAC, remarked that, although U.S. personnel "engaged in combat" from time to time, this was purely incidental to their training

missions. He deemed these combat ventures as nothing more than support

operations, and said "this should be fixed in the minds of the pilots and other

U.S. personnel." McNamara then ordered action "to eliminate references to U.S.

activities as combat operations; they are to be spoken ofand reported as training

or support activities regardless of the fact that incidental combat may be

involved."To inquiries from the press, McNamara's office underscored the US.

role as limited to advice, logistics, and training. '

United Press International pubh,hed the essence of the Farm Gate combat

story on March 9, 1962, reporting that U.S. airmen for two months had taken a

direct part in attacks, and that Vietnamese had acted as copilots on these flights.

According to the official explanation, the story added, this was an emergency

measure until the Vietnamese Air Force could be trained. General Anthis, 2d

ADVON commander, commented on the story's origin: "Due to the joint

USAF-VNAF status of Farm Gate and the large number of people of both

nationalities involved, it is extremely difficult to maintain strict secrecy concerning this operation."2?

This situation bred difficulties regarding the amenities of life in the field for

Americans. The first USAF arrivals had been hurried to South Vietnam to

operate under wartime conditions. They and their successors over several years

were bound by peacetime directives and procedures. These strictures were rendered more onerous by Secretary McNamara's centralizing decision-making at

the highest Defense levels. Freshly arrived officers and airmen had their earliest

brush with Vietnam at an airfield that was not a USAF base. At a military or civil

Vietnamese base, the Air Force was a tenant because the U.S. government

adhered to Article 18 of the Geneva agreement forbidding new military installations in South Vietnam.:'

The physical layout of Vietnamese bases was crude. At some the main roads

crossed runways, arid at others the roads sliced through military areas next to the

runways. Many fields wanted fences. Not until 1965 were there revetments to

shelter aircraft. 21

Tan Son Nhut, the Saigon airfieh", was an international facility run by the

Vietnamese Department of Civil Aviation. The Vietnamese Air Force was a

tenant located in the southwest part of the field. The U.S. Air Force was

supposed to approach the Department of Civil Aviation through the Vietnamese

Air Force. In practice, however, the Americans made contacts with the government civilian aviation personnel who could give help and support. The Air Force

borrowed one side of a hangar and an officer for the flight line. An arbitrary

123
THE ADVISORY YEARS

announcement solved flight control any USAFaircraft operating at Tan Son

Nhut would be under 2d AI)VON authority and would file its flight plan with

base operations. The Army and MAAG cooperated in filing flight plans and

juggling parking space. Space was so scaice that the alei t pad blocked the flow of

planes taxiing tor takeoff. But the civilian authorities we1 e undeistanding and

helpful. 2'

Bien lioa was about ten miles from the outskirts of Saigon. This airfield's

chief problem. aside from limited runways, was security. Thc field was garrisoned

by a battalion of regular infantry. rcinforced by a rifle company, two mortar

companies, four armored cars, and two 105-am howit/ers. A company of

angers provided distant patrols, and a sixty-man Vietnamese Air Force police

detachment gave interior secu ity. Farm Gate formed twelve fifteen-man combat

teams, each with at ieast one Browning automatic rifle, and fused them into base

defense plans. The flight-line area was the final defensive position. 2'

In general USAF personnel coped with the poor facilities, but the supply

pictie was bleak. Paperwork was sketchy on the stocks prepositioned in South

Vietnam beloe the Ail Force buildup. Most FPOI. came through the port of

Saigon and was distributed commercially. a system vulneiable to inten uption

and blackmail. There were no on-hand reserves of electiic generators, portable

buildings, bulldoci s. crash fiefighting equipment, giaders, or construction

equipment. Due to the distance, expendable items trickled in fi om the United

States through Clark. Large items coming by ship took sixty days. 2"

The supply problems had a number of offshoots. In late February 1962, for

example, 2d ADVON reque:sted the removal of grass and the renovation of

fencing and lighting at the transmitter site. Theie was no action until a giass lire

nearly destroyed antennas, cables, and the building itself. The grass was bulldo/ed the next day, but nothing was done to fix the fences and lights. Thirteenth

Air Force refused a March request for six hundred dollars to shelter the 'I SC-15

vans. in which the daytime temperatures of the workingareas rose to 130 degiees

Fahrenheit. Thirteenth suggested that the Workei s be moved to tents.

Men departing the United States for Vietnam duty in many cases did not

know their destination in advance. Unable to bring tseful items wth them, they

often went to the nearest town and bought minor things out of thei own poi-kCts.

MAAG was generous and shared its meager stocks inlormally. Scrounging was

frequently iesoited to. Short supplies, particularly of paper. affected billeting.

mess, pay, and mail. 2

'

In the early days, the cramped quartcrs were lean-to tents or quickly built

Vietnamese-style hutments. Numerous rats and insects made it difficult to sleep.

There was no hot water even after USAF personnel had been in the country fora

year. Offices were crowded and desks, chairs, and tables often improvised. 2'

After adjusting to their quai ters, the new arrivals faced ha/ards in the mess.

Baked goods and ices were souices of infection. Unsanitary practices in local

baking firms finally ended local procurement. There was too little refr'igeration

space under U.S. control, and ice fice/cis for the field were not to be had. L.ocally

124
AIR POLICY: TOO CAUTIOUS?

hired employees at snack bars in officers' and service clubs were poorly supervised. The outcome was a high sick rate.2'

No wonder that General LeMay. during his Vietnam visit in April 1962.

found USAF aircraft to be unde-rutilied. "

Lowered vitality and loss of energy anong the men grew out of chlonic

low-level fevers. dysentery attacks, and too few fresh fruits and vegetables.

Medical detachments of the U.S. Army gave local area medical support. Hospitali/ation became available on April 18. 1962. when its 8th Field Hospital opened

at Nha Trang."

Pay was erratic. Checks regularly arrived late and at times never. Men could

not meet mess bills and travel expenses. Emergency casual payments often

resulted in overpayments. '

Mail service was primitive. Units outside of Saigon received no regular

deliveries, and no arrangements existed to buy stamps, cash money orders, or

dispatch classified mail. Mail came through Clark on Mondays. Wednesdays.

and Fridays. The U.S. Army post office in Saigon was closed on Saturdays and

Sundays. Recipients of classified or registered mail were notified informally and

needed to make their own delivery arrangements. "

Aggravating these problems were austere maintenance procedures. 2d

A DVON's tnconventional organi/ation, adherence in Washington to peacetime

practices in procurement and purchase. and the general inability to forecast the

numnhcr of Americans committed to South Vietnam. Ironically. USAF peisonnel were not in the jungle with guerrillas but were for the most part in or near

metropolitan Saigon. a seaport and industrial center of almost two million

people in 1962. There, the Air Force engaged in routine tasks and trained the

Vietnamese Air Force, which began to expand and to fly more operational

mis1ions.

F 125
XII. Farm Gate and the

Vietnamese Air Force

Farm Gate, Detachments 7 through 10, and miscellaneous units contained

838 USAF personnel by the end of 1961. Together these units made up a modest

strike, photo-reconnaissance, and airlift force. But far more significant, they were

the nucleus of a rapidly expanding American effort. Since the rules of engagement confined IJSAF planes to missions the Vietnamese were unable to perform,

strengthening the Vietnamese Air Force was all-important.

The Ist Fighter Squadron at Bien Hoa owned twenty AD-6s, each capable

of flying one operational sortie per day. The 2d Fighter Squadron at Nha Trang

was being readied for combat. Because it was to receive thirty T-28As and

fourteen T-28Bs, the pilots would require transition training in gunnery, bombing, and rocketry. The Ist, 2d, and 3d Liaison Squadrons had fifteen L- 19s apiece

and needed more pilots. Hence additional officers would undergo flight training

in the United States.

The AD-6 pilots were proficient in daytime flight, but their former carrier

aircraft lacked landing lights. This and the frequently inoperable flight instruments prevented pilots from gaining experience in night and all-weather flying.

They showed slight interest in flying night combat, even though the Viet Cong

operated mostly during the hours of darkness.

To secure combat missions, Colonel King had proved that T-28s and B-26s

could fly night missions under flarelight furnished by SC-47s. But when saddled

with training the Vietnamese, the Farm Gate commander was surprised and

disappointed. He continued to discuss with General Anthis, 2d ADVON commander, whether training was the cover for combat or the primary mission. As

King later frankly admitted, he "resisted" Anthis' instructions.

Grudgingly, Farm Gate commenced the training. Vietnamese AD-6 pilots

served as crewmembers on B-26s and T-28s, but disliked flying in the T-28 rear

seats. Yet, they could not take over the front seat on combat missions until they

were qualified in every respect. At that point no need existed for a Farm Gate

instructor in the rear seat. Backseat combat training was more political than

practical.

The basing of Farm Gate and the Vietnamese AD-6s at Bien Hoa might

have eased combined missions, but the air operations center went on issuing

separate orders. Colonel King nevertheless promoted training and demonstrated

that air detachments could operate from remote locations a long while. This

success eventually moved the Ist Fighter Squadron to stage two AD-6s each to

Pleiku and Da Nang. King also sent four T-28 pilots to Nha Trang to give

Vietnamese instructors flight training.'

More to Farm Gate's liking was the mission of January 3, 1962. Alerted to

Viet Cong sampans drawn up undei camouflage south of Saigon, Colonel King

i27

PR ECEDING PAGE BLANK-NOT FiUO
THE ADVISORY YEARS

and It. Col. Robert L. Gleason made an afternoon flight and took photographs

of the exact spot. Shoitly after dark, King led a bomb and rocket stfike. The

SC-47 flareship approached the target area with the T-28s in trail and about

2,000 feet higher. After the flares ignited, the strike aircraft swooped down and

demolished the enemy boats. Photos revealed that one 500-pound bomb.

dropped by Capt William E. Dougherty. scored a perfect strike in the middle of

the sampans.2

Such rapid reaction induced the joint operations center to place an SC-47

on strip alert, ready to join T-28s and B-26s in night action. While these tactics

failed to wipe out enemy units. they forced the Viet Cong to bicak off attacks and

fade into the jungle. Meanwhile. Vietnamese C-47 crews were sufficiently trained

by Februai y 1962 to fly night missions with Farm Gate.

Farm Gate experience in the first months of 1962 dictated a change in

ordnance loads. The detachment sharply cut back on general purpose bombs.

and shifted from the 250-pound bomb to the I-IA2 cluster of six 20-pound

bombs. By June. Farm Gate upped its use of rockets, napalm, and strafing.

Sometimes more than one canister of napalm was required to burn a hole in the

ground cover.

Strike aiicraft inhibited the Viet Cong from filing. If the aircrews spied the

source, they quickly opened up with formidable firepower. The T-28 packed two

.50-caliber machineguns. the B-26eight. Both planes carried bombs and rockets.'

The white smoke of the M-19 marker dissipated too swiftly. while the

airci ews rarely saw the red smoke of the M-18 thi ough thejungle canopy. Smoke

bombs in geneal were unreliable, and the method of dropping them on poorly

defined targets was "most ineffective. "

'

The first combined American-Vietnamese air operation occurred near the

end of December 1961. Two U.S. Army helicopter companies whisked 360

Vietnamese troops to five landing /ones in the Viet Cong-dominated Zone D.

then several days later brought in additional ta oops. A Vietnamese L-19 forward

air controller and two AD-6 bombers orbited the area but saw no taigets. The

troops failed in their main mission -- capture ofa radio transmitter - but killed

two Viet Cong. wounded one, and captuied forty-six suspects.

A larger operation took place on January 5. 1962. to reqcue prisoners in a

Viet Cong camp near Saigon. A Vietnamese forward air controller directed

AD-6s, T-28s, and B-26s to fly preparatory strikes. Undei this cover, thirty-one

11-21 helicopters shuttled in 1,000 Vietnamese troops. These efforts went for

naught - the information about the prison camp proved to be erroneous. '

A number of the problems in search-and-destroy operations stemmed from

three factors: preliminary air reconnaissance tended to destroy surpi ise. plans on

occasion were too complex for the fledgling Vietnamese Air Foice to carry

through, and coordination between ground and air units was weak.'

The air defense system likewise left much to be desired. Since the Soviet

Union had transport aircraft at Hanoi. a key aim of the American presence was

to deter this airlift from extending to Laos and from affording air support to the

Viet Cong. Rumors in early 1962 told of Viet Cong in the central highlands

128
FARM GATE ANt) TIlE VIETNAMESE AIR FORCE

recci\ ing secret air I est p ply (II ops. Time arid again the air warning radars at Tan

Son Nhtit and )a Nang together with the light radar at Pleiku picked tip

unidentified tracks. At times these turned otit to be tricks of the atmospheie. but

often weic U.S. Army' aircraft on flights the iepo ting center knew nothing of. On

the other hand, the )a Nang radai could not detect planes flying al low and

middle levels because the terrain to the west scieened them. Furthermore, the

Al)-6s. T-28s. and B-26s weie unsuitable for intercepting communist aircraft

penetrating South Vietnamese airspace. In Februai 1962 General O'Donnell

called for unified air act ion. To establish "law and order in the air." lie suggested

that the air operations centei control and coordinate all air operations, including

helicopter combat stpport. '

Two nutinous Vietnamese flyers fii st tested the air defense system, designed

to signal communist intrusion. Oii the morning of February 26, 1962, the two

diverted their AD-6s from a planned strike ini the delta, and /eroed ill on

President I)iem's palace. The Ist Fighter Squadron scrambled two flights of

AD-6s to intercept the rebels, bit the planes merely gathered hits from smallarms fite. Farm Gate aircraft took to the air to elude possible destruction on the

ground. Antiairciaft fire downed one of the two attacking planes. and its pilot

was captured. The other escaped to Phnom Penh, Cambodia. where lie emerged

unscathed from a crash landing. Interrogation of the captuied flyer confirmed

that the two pilots were engaged in a vendetta against Diem's bi other. Ngo Dinh

Nhti.

Although there appeared to be no general p ot against the government,

Diem grounded the Vietnamese Air Force temporarily. Later lie permitted the

Vietnamese strike planes to carry only 20-mrm ammunition. Still later lie ostensibly atrthorieed the planes a full ariay of oidnance, but the Joint General Staff

iestricted bombloads for missions in II and Ill Corps. Ambassador Nolting

secured pei mission from Washington for Farm Gate aircraft to support giound

opciations. To dispel the impression that the United States was taking over the

fighting. AD-6s had to accompany American planes.9

In March 1962 a total of 1,861 incidents (attacks, acts of terrorism, sabotage. and subversion) stiried apprehension that the communists were about to

step tip the war. "' Pleik u radar on the evening of the 19th showed seven unknown

flight tracks over the central highlands Farm Gate wcrambled a 11-?6 from Bien

Hoa. and when it reached the area. radarcontrol placed the aircraft directly over

one of the tracks. The crew saw nothing. The next day, reconnaissance pilots

noticed some bundles in the zrees. On the night of the 20th. Tan Son Ntut radar

detected unknown tracks leading out of Camboda. Two Farm Gate T-28s were

scrambled but the tracks faded. Soon after these T-28s were recalled, Pleiktr

repo ted ten to fifteen low-altitude tracks emerging from Cambodia. One SC-47

and two RB-26s were dispatched from Bien lloa. The SC-47 dispensed flares

while the R B-26s searched in vain.'

Upset over the sharp rise in Viet Cong incidents. President l)ieii asked for

U.S.jet interceptors to deal with enemy overflights. Ambassador Nolting quickly

cleated the request with Washington. On March 22 the 405th Tactical Fighter

129
TIIE ADVISORY YEARS

(Above) Vietnamese officers and American

advisors plan an airlift of Vietnamese

paratroopers at Tan Son Nhut.

(Top right) I1st Lt. Witfred G. Narr

demonstrates airlift maneuvers with model

of a T-28 aircraft as two Vietnamese

students took on at Moody AFB, Ga

(Right) AIC H. A. Wilson and AiC R. L

Fleury install rockets into a B-26 bomber at

Bien Hoa

(Betow) F-102 Detta Daggers.

130

V
FARM GATE AND TIlE VIETNAMESI AIR FORCE

Wing deployed a detachment of the 509th Fighter Inteiceptor Squadron from

Clark Air Base to Tan Son Nhut. The detachment's aircraft consisted of three

single-seat F-102s and one TF-102 with side-by-side seating. The Joint Chiefs of

Staft authoriyed Americans to engage and destioy hostile aircraft encounteied

over South Vietnam.':

The speedy ai rival of the F-102s pleased the Vietnamese government. ' Still

the air defense system was far from perfect. In training exercises. the F-102s flew

much too fast to inteicept the slow liaison planes that acted as enemy inti uders.

Experience also taught that two pilots in a TF-102 had a better chance to

intercept than one pilot in an F-102. Further TF-102s were thei efoic drawn from

the Fifth and Thirteenth Air Forces. On.luIly 21 Admiral Felt ordered three Navy

AD-5Q intercepton from Cubi Point. Philippines, to relieve the F-102s. From

then on. F-102s and Navy interceptors alternated six-week tours of air defense

dtty. 1.

As air defense and traffic control improved, the unknown radar tracks

diminished. To help radar tell friendly from enemy planes. MACV on August 22

ordered every American military aircraft to emit Identification li iend or Foe

impulses if equipped to (1o so. When months passed without enemy air activity.

General Harkins said it was certain there \wis "no air battle in Vietnam, and there

arc no indications that one will develop."'

The sudden jump in Viet Cong incidents during March 1962 led USAF

officers to raise the question of enlarging Farm Gate with four l1-26s now in the

Far East and with four T-28s. They reasoned that B-26s were the best tactical

aircraft for counterinsurgency. T-28s ''ere needed for detachments at smaller

airfields, and Vietnamese forces weic still learning how to use air power with

ground operations. General Harkins and Ambassador Nolting backed the proposal. Defense Secretary McNamara. however, noted that the Vietnamese 2d

Fighter Squadron was becoming operational. He asked how much longer American pilots had to fly with the Vietnamese. General Anthis replied that Farm Gate

would have to serve as a demonstration force and to check the state of Vietnamese training and standardization for quite a while. McNamara okayed the request

but deliver y of the planes to Farm Gate was delayed oue to the Vietnamese Air

Force buildup. "

During General LeMay's Vietnam visit in April 1962. the initial expansion

of Vietnamese strike aicraft neared its end. The thirty LISAF C-47 pilots

assigned to the Ist Transportation Group had released seasoned Vietnamese

pilots to fighter cockpits. Moreoever, twenty-five T-28 pilots were conbat-ready

for the 2d Fighter Squadron. With thirty flying hours a month planned for T-28s

and twenty-five for AD-6s, the Vietnamese could complete 140 T-28 and fiftyfive A D-6 sorties each week. Since the training of T-28 pilots was drawing to a

close, Farm Gate found it haider to get Vietnamese crewmen for its flights.

Though LeMay noticed marked improvement among the Vietnamese, he

doubted they could meet all their operational demands for some time to come.

Because Farm Gate was flying !ess than it could, LeMay wanted the crews to log

more missions. This would allox% American airmen rotating through Vietnam to

131
TIlE ADVISORY YEARS

attain vamed experience that might well be needed elsewhelte. lie suggested

relaxing the restlictions calling for a Vietnamese crewman to be aboard Farm

Gate planes and confining Farm Gate to offensive missions beyond the competence of the Vietnamese. i

General LeMay won little support for these proposals in Washington.

Secletar. Mcamara sought to shave American participation in Vietnam, so as

to attain an all-out Vietnamese rilitai ., effort. Collnterinsurgency doctrine

required indigenous forces to fight their own war. McNamara was thus intei ested

in having the Vietnamese take over the Farm Gate planes as soon as possible.

Ilampet ced by the oiginal rules and restrictions and the scarcity of Vietnamese ttainees, General Anthis secured the assignment of ele\en Vietnamese aviation cadets to Farm Gate. Until they could attend flight i ainng in the United

States, the cadets served as the Vietnamese membei ofevery Farm Gate crew.

Based at Nha Trang but with a detachment of six T-28s at Da Nang. the 2d

Fightei Squadron became fully o',erational in mid-1962. This alforded muchneeded aii power in the central .ind noithern iteas of Viet nam. freeing the Ist

Fighter Squadron and Faim Gate for ope:'ations in the south. As a i esult.

Vietnamese and Farm Gate sorties multiplied. mainly oi interdiction and close

support. Still the Victnane,e asked lot too few an missions. They neglected to

have ail craft cover convoys and trains, to esco It helicoptei assaltll opelations,

and to fly even more inteldiction and close support stiikes.

But augmenting the Vietnamese Air Force seemed to ha\e been successful.

Secietat\ McNamata was so pleased with the progiess that he told Genetal

ilarkins to firm tip a program for phaseout of major U.S. combat. ad\ isot) .and

logistic activilies within thiec years.

The Secretary was unaware of the glaring deficiencies that impeded the

Vietnamese. Pilots continued in short supply and man\ of those flying needed

more training. The two fighter squadrons had fewer than a docn qualifi,.d flight

leaders. and ground petsonnel weie generally inefficient, *lhe T-28s lacked ample

filepowet and would someday have to be replaced. calling toi moie pilot

training. A lack of proficiency in night and all-weather flying diluted efficiency.

Ra her than the aveiace of one hoti or less. Vietnamese tutnatound time

between missions avetaged between two anci thiec houts. I he fastest sct amble

time for a Vietna mee C-47 flateship was fotty minutes, and ovci an hour was

normal. The Vietnamese were cleated to opelate with a full iiay ot ordnance, but their strike aircraft were armed solely with napalm. m ockets. small fi agmentation bombs, and :annons. They were meluctant to move aicialt to advanced

locations because of poor housing and messing at l)a Nang and Pleiku. and the

low pay for temporaiy duty.

Gener.l Anthis estimated that the two Vietnamese fightet squadrons, with

twenty-seven I -28s and twenty-two AD-6s. should genetate 1.470 opelattonal

sorties a month - seventy percent for combat and thirty peicent fot taining and

maintemance. Actually an average of seven AD-6s. eleven 1-28s, cleven l,-Its,

and eight C-47s weme available each day to the tactical aim conti ol system.

132
FARM GATE AND TIlE VIETNAMESE AIR FORCE

Since the number of Vietnamese combat sorties fell short of meeting the

rising demands for air missions. Farm Gate operations leached new high levels.

By August it was clear that Farm Gate had to have ftesh aircraft and crews. lhe

coming of two new U.S. Army helicopter companies in September meant even

greater requirements for escort and supply sorties by strike aiiiaft. This clashed

with Secietarl McNainaa's des ie to plhase out Alei icall units.',

General Anthis had foieseen that mission demands would compel i-arl

Gate planes to stietch beyond monthly programmed llying houls. lie suggested

that additional USAF units be allocated to Vietnam. chiefly to allow air strike

teans to be kept permanently on station at Pleiktiand Soc I rang. 1 hirteenth Air

Force in mid-August sent Farm Gate four 13-26s from -ar East assets.

Farm Gate continued to fly too many hous, and in September Anthis asked

for ten more 13-26s, five T-28s, and two C-47s. Genetal I larkins made no reply.

but PACAF iccommended that the Air Staff put the proposal oi the agenda of

tile October Secretary of Defense Conference. Gen. Wallet C. Sweency, Jr..

commander of Tactical Air Command, and Brig. Gen. Gilbert .. Piitchard,

Special Air Warfare Ceiiter collmander, agreed that the Air Force could furnish

tile planes and ciews. However. they cautioned Antlis to "go slow" in adding to

Farm Gate until lie was completely convinced that the Vietnamese wet e doing as

much as they could. Sweeney did not want Farm Gate "to become a ct utch to

compromise progressive and objective development of indigenous capabilities." ''

Allegedly to confuse the Viet Cotg. the Vietnamese renumbered their

squadrons in September."' With tile new designations went ain emphasis on the

orj~ani/ational unity of tile Vietnamese Air Force. Perhaps tile structure was

partly inspired by the pioposal ofthe U.S. Army Chief of Staff, Genl. Geoige I.

Decker, to transfer Vietnamese helicopter and liaison squadrots to the Vietnamese army. 2

Securing the go-ahead from the Ail Staff in October to give additional

aircraft to Farm Gate. IACAF suggested this action to Cl NCPAC. Briefed on

October 8 in Hawaii. Defense Secretary McNamara was still bent on building 

a

wholly adeqtuate 'ietnamuese Air Force. lie said theie should not be 130 but 300

or mote Vietnamese officeis taking flight training in the United State,,. Since no

Viet naiese pilots wcrc in training to fly B-26s, the Secretarv asked Admiral l'elt

to explore the prospect of proctiring thirty Chinese Nationalists for the Vietnam- I ese C-47s. This would release thirty transpot t pilots for B-26 ti ansitional tiaining.

As for Farm Gate expansion, McNamara said, if Genetal Ilaikins needed a

bigger pi ogiaml he should present his case to the .1 otnt Chiefs of Staff. I lc himsell

was "cool" to the idea, for it was contiary to the President's desire to build

indigenous foices. Fain i Gate ought to train Vietnamese lather than to operate.

Farm Gate operations in August had soated to sixty-t epeicentiove those

in .hlily. But in September they had to be pruned to thitty-seven peicent of the

July totals. owing chiefly to the one-ciew-per-aircraft manning ratio not

enough to sustain tie high rate of missions. The Vietnamese wanted the eleven

aviation cadets retuined for language training before going on to the United

133
THE ADVISORY YEARS

States to become pilots. To furnish the crewmen required on Farm Gate planes,

the Vietnamese Air Force sent fifteen noncommissioned officers to Farm Gate.

This plugged the gap btt was a subterfuge. because the enlised Vietnamese were

uninterested in flight training. When General Moorman. Thirteenth Air Force

commander, heard of the arrangement, he urged Anthis to do hIs best to meet

McNamara's wishes. "

Admiral Felt visited Vietnam in late October and talked with Anthis. He

,aid Vietnamese oppositicn had scuttled the prospect of using Chinese pilots to

fly Vietnamese transports. Any Farm Gate growth would have to be small and

piec meal. :

Acting on Anthis' suggestion to shore up Farm Gate, General Harkins in

November asked for five T-28s, ten B-26s, and two C-47s. More, he said. would

likely be required in the future. Admiral Feit routed the request to the Joint

Chiefs, adding that he saw no other way to secure the urgently needed combat jir

power.

The Joint Chit.fs of Staff well knew that President Kennedy wished the

Amer icans to prepare the Vietnamese to fight their own war. Hence in November

and December the chiefs carefully weighed the question of bolstering Farm Gate.

They likewise plumbed the oft-stated position that counterinsurgency was for the

most part a ground war, with air forces accounting for maybe ten percent of the

effort. Some USAF officers viewed counting Viet Cong casualties as an

"unpleasant task"and "not necessarily the military objective." Even so, statistics

on the number of enemy killed, wounded, and captured were important. In all

known cases where ground forces entered areas struck by air, their actual body

count exceeded aircrew claims. (Of the estimated number of enemy casualties in

1962, twenty-eight percent were due to Vietnamese and American air power.) Yet

air operations did more. they shrunk the enemy's options, crimped his movements and attacks, flew in men and supplies to assault him, protected surface

convoys and trains as well as heliborne assaults, and thwarted the foe from

massing large forces in the field. Air power had proved - at least to USAF

officers - that it held equal rank with ground operations in any cotnterinsurgency venture. 1o

This assessment was not altogether shared in Washington. Following a visit

to Southeast Asia in December 1962, Roger Hilsman, Assistant Secretary of

State for Fr Eastern Affairs, and the President's Special Assistant for Far

Eastern Affairs, Michael V. Forrestal, reported:

On the use of air power and the danger of adverse political effects our impression i%

that the controls on air strikes and the 1 -ocedurcs for chccking intelligence against all

sourcesarc excellent In spite of thif .however. it isdifficult tobe urethat. rpower is

being used in a way that minimiies the adverse political effects mid the Ise of air

power is going up enormously i

In December the Joint Chiefs recommended expanding Fa.in Gate. so it

could keep abreast of the burgeoning requests for air support. The Secretary of

Defense concurred, the State Department agreed. and on the last day of the year

the President approved the requested increase in Farm Gate aircraft. '

"

134
7-111 "NIP, "

XIII. Air Operations, 1962:

Interdiction, Strikes,

and Reconnaissance

In World War ii and the Korean conflict, interdiction had slowed the flow

of enemy forces, supplies. and equipment into and within battle areas. in

Vietnam. according to General Anthis. "the most lucrative targets" were Viet

Cong training areas, troop concentrations, supply depots, and sampans. Admiral Felt and General O'Donnell had the same impression. Interdiction air attacks

against Viet Cong base areas held a speial attiaction because the Vietnamese

ground forces seldom penetrated to them.'

Yet air interdiction was very com plex. The Viet Cong rarely wore distinctive

uniforms, and they mingled freely with civilians. To tell them from the general

populace called for timely intelligence and reliable aerial reconnaissance. Unfortunately. the Vietnamese Air Force owned but two C-47s rigged with cameras for

day photography. The single air photo intelligence center and its twelve photo

observers were situated in the J-2 division of the Joint General Staff. The L-19

observers could do visual reconnaissance, but the best of them were being shifted

to tactical fighters,2

Able Mable RF-101s operated out of Don Mujang Airport near Bangkok,

Thailand. They sustained a daily sortie rate of 2.8 flights, and photographed

high-priority areas of interest to MACV and the Vietnamese. When over South

Vietnam, these planes as a rule staged through Tan Son Nhut. where they turned

over their film to the small USAF photo processing cell for interpretation.

Although the RF-101 was good for general reconnaissance of clearly fixed

targets. it was not suited to spotting an enemy who hid under heavy foliage by

day and moved at night. Furthermore. processing and interpreting the photography in Saigon. then delivering it to requesting units by U.S. Army courier

plane, usually took several days. Some ground commanders complained that the

interval between a request and a delivery was at times thirty to forty-five days.'

Intelligence from members of the enemy forces was needed, and it wa,

scarce. Starting in December 1961, U.S. intelligence advisors did their best to

teach their methods to Vietnamese. Besides the 44 specialists in N' CV J-2

(!ntelligence), 230 Americans worked with V;etnamese units in the field. U3nproductive from the USAF point of view, MACV intelligence was oriented toward

ground operations,

Normally, Vietnamese interrogations of prisoners should have yielded significant information. But the law authorzed the military to hold prisoners only

two days before handirg them over to provincial authorities for a court hearing.

This was not time enough to learn about enemy activities vulnerable to air

interdiction.

135
I lip AI)VISORY YfEARS

V'etnatnese armn, units ill the field, pro\ incial officials, and coe cit agents

could request Saigon for specific stiikes. If Saigon appi osed. Vietna'nese pilots

wete hie' to attack these tat gets. usually marked b\ air observers. While USAIofficets \\ee not empowered to question an appioved ,trike, General Anthis

asked Ioi "positive control"by iadar oi lot wa, d air conti oilers when Firm Gate

ait craft took pat t. I at gets were often described in \ague terms like "gioups of

huts," "toop concentratiols." or 'VC strong points," and \%ere fiequently

hidden under jungle co\er.'

In spite o! piecautions air strikes wete dangerous. particulatly mli heavil%

populated and poot ly mapped legions. Ii .Ianuarx 1962, for example. Viei n'.,nese officet s \''anted an :.ir strike at dawn on the Viet Cong-held village of Ba Thu

in the Parrot's Beak close to the Cambodian border in Wai Zone C Because the

Vietnamese could not handle preda\% n takeoffts. Farm Gate was asked to fly tile

mission. At first Colonel Gleason. I-at in Gate commander, thought tile target

too close to Cambodia. but accepted the zask when the Vv- namese labeled it

crucial.

Rada, at 'I an Son Nhut monitored the flight, \\arning the planes as they

neared the canal that supposedly was the bot der. The aircraft failed to ieceive the

message. but ant SC-47 that had petformed weathe icconnaisance \%as flying

back a:nd forth over the canal to mark it. -rom another SC47 positioned along

twe border, Colonel Gleason led and an airborne coordinator directed the strike.

'\s eight T-28s and three 13-26s bombed, rocketed. napalmed. and strafed. the

Ministei of Defense and the Ill Cotps commander watched from a C-47.

The t-arm Gate commander felt stlte no one had made a mistake. Yet a few

days later, the Cambodian government charged T-28s with having ciossed the

frontier, killed a villager. and injured three othets. The Vietnamese defense

ministet shrugged off the protest. saying that the whole area was a"VC hot bed."

The State Department. however, wished to preent disruption of VietnameseCambodian telations. \t American insistence Saigon apologiied and awarded

compensation. General Anthis, 2d A I)VON commander, forbade Fat in Gate to

stnke within five miles of ..e border diiiing daylight and ten miles at night.

Moteovet a forward air controllet. airborne or on tile ground. had to mark tile

tariget s. ThIese rest|i ict ions migh t ha\ cafi, rded thle Viet Cong complete sanictua 1 y

along tile border. but tile i ule, did not apply to Vietnanes i ot whcod

operate more treeiv.'

Towa rd I he end of laanua i y, all availa ble Vietnraticse a nd F:arut Gate plantes

at Bien Hoa. Pleiku, and lDa Nang simultaneously attacked fourteen carefully

pinpointed targets in five areas. After-action reports revealed good results. The

defense minister said the strikes were so timely and accurate that tle Viet Cong

suspected spies in their midst. All the same, top American officials had nagging

doubts about the validity of the targets selected by the Vietnamese. They stressed

to the .loint General Staff the value of intelligence, proper contiols. and serious

poststrike assessments.'

Admiral Felt. CINCPAC, knew the pioblems of bombing areas where

friendly and hostile people intermingled. Impressed by Vietnamese officers who

136
AIR OPERATIONS. 1962

wanted to avoid using weapons against innocent persons. he sponsored better

air-ground communications for close air support.'

At the Secretary of Defense Conference on February 19, 1962, Geieral

Anthis showed how air interdiction hurt the Viet Cong. l)efense Secretary

McNamara evinced interest in using flares for strikes to relieve outposts unde"

night assault. He ordered CINCPAC and MACV to furnish hamlets cheap but

efficient short-range VHF-FM voice radios, so they could call for help when

attacked. The Secretary warned that U.S. advisors were to do nothing that the

Vietnamese could do for themselves, and were to risk lia~ards only when

inescapable.9

Well-managed interdiction based on hard intelligence worked remarkably

well. On March 2 the II Corps commander requested an immediate strike against

a group of Viet Cong holding a meeting in the village of Hung Nhon. The air

operations center validated the request and dispatched two Vietnamese AD-6s

and a Farm Gate B-26. They killed at least twelve. "'

Even so. the issue of haphazard a'r attacks lived on. Two U.S. Army

advisors informed Army Brig. Gen. Harvey .. Jablonsk,, the MACV J-4

(Logistics), that the Viet Cong were exploiting strafing and bombing attacks for

propaganda purposes. By removingjust the killed and wounded males. 11-y slave

the villagers the idea that the women and children left behind were the targets and

victims of air strikes. Jablonsky passed this information on to Ambassador

Nolting. who on March 3 met with Generals Hai kins, Timmes. Jablonsky. and

WAR ZONE

X DAIK KET

HUNG NHON

BAN ME IHUOT

WAR ZONE

WAR ZONE

BATHIU

AIR OPERATIONS

137
THE ADVISORY YEARS

Anthis. Nolting at first thought of curtailing air activity, but Jablonsky would

not cite instances of air attack. Harkins then pointed out that tighter curbs would

benefit merely the Viet Cong."

General Jablonsky in Hawaii repeated the charge he had made it; Saigon,

and the question was reexamined at the Secretary of Defense Conference of

March 21. Ambassador Nolting urged close scrutiny to prevent killing innocent

people, and Defense Secretary McNamara agreed to allow air operations to go

on under strict controls and stringent intelligence criteria. Roger Hilsman.

Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs, laterdefined thisdecision as

the worst of two worlds - military men disturbed by air restrictions and

diplomats fretting about propaganda benefits to the enemy. '-

To assist the Vietnamese in gathering better intelligence of air force interest,

Admiral Felt authorized and the Air Force sent a detachment of the 6499th

Support Group to Saigon. Six officer and six enlisted intelligence specialists

arrived in March, but two officers weie unqualified and removed. Denied direct

access to enemy prisoners, the others could ask questions only through Vietnamese interrogators. i"

An additional obstacle was the lengthy procedure in processing a request for

a preplanned interdiction strike. The 2d ADVON intelligence directorate could

propose a target, and the Joint General Staff's air photo intelligence center

researched and prepared data sheets and folders. One copy went to the province

chief for checking, a second to the air operations center for preliminary planning.

Field Command next decided if the target was susceptiblk to ground action.

which took precedence over air. These steps could consume several days or

several weeks. Actually, most intelligence rose from the ground force division

and province chief levels. These authorities often suggested targets to the corps

commander who routed the requests to tbe operations center. Yet no matter how

intelligence generated strikes, the province chief was the key. He alone determined whether bombing a target would imperil his people. '"

To pinpoint Viet Cong radio transmitters for air intelligence, the Air Force

delivered a C-54 to Vietnam in March 1962. The transport featured infrared

detectors, cameras, and a high-frequency direction finder. ' About the same

time, the U.S. Army Security Agency put airborne radio homing units in three

Army L-20s. During their first operational flight on the 12th of April. the C-54

and L-20s came upon far more Viet Copg radio transmitters than expected

However, the direction finding equipment could not give a precise fix on the

radio sites. The Viet Cong radios were short-range, low-power sets, and they

operated in periodic short bursts. Though the American eqipment was not

advanced enough to place the signals accurately, the C-54 flew 102 special

missions in ten months. The cameras worked fine for ordinary photography, but

the infrared and the direction finder did poorly.'

The USAF pilots could return fire against "a known source"in self-defense,

but needed to be very careful for they rarely knew a source's exact location. In the

daytime, Farm Gate planes could not fire unless under positive control of a Vietnamese forward air controller, and cooperation with Vietnamese 1- 19 con138
AIR OPERATIONS, 1962

trollers was frequently difficult. In addition the elaborate reconnaissance and the

target marking no doubt alerted the Viet Cong to impending strikes. This

impeded action against an already elusive foe. "'

In the spring of 1962, interdiction focused on small groups of guerrillas and

sampans near Vietnamese army positions. Then late in May, the Joint General

Staff and MACV targeted the Do Xa War Zone headquarters area of Interzone

V. With utmost care they identified, authenticated, and pinpointed nineteen

targets spread over an area of 230 square miles. As a final validation, a plane flew

a Viet Cong defector over the area.

Vietnamese and American aircraft - eleven B-26s, eleven AD-6s, and six

T-28s - took off on May 27. Bad weather obscured five of the targets, but the

planes made repeated strikes on the other fourteen. Regardless of the careful

preparations, a B-26 pounded the friendly village of Dak Ket, killing four persons

and demolishing a do7en buildings. The strike pilots saw no Viet Cong on any of

their runs, but bomb damage assessment photography showed a command post

wiped out, fourteen other structures burned and destroyed, and thirty damaged.

The Vietnamese field commanders hailed the attacks as a "total success," and

Ngo Dinh Nhu (President Diem's brother) reported about four hundred enemy

killed. Some Viet Cong defectors later credited their change of heart to the

bombings. i

Both PACAF and 2d ADVON were willing to accept the mission of

disrupting Viet Cong security in base areas beyond the reach of ground forces.

The American Embassy in Saigon nonetheless questioned the wisdom of the

attacks. Some U.S. observers were positive that air power at Dak Ket had killed

no more than fifty of the enemy. The commander of lnterzone V had escaped.

Innocents had been killed. Consequently, General Anthis ordered Farm Gate ino

longer to fly free-area missions without a forward air controller. "

As spring wore on, a more extreme belief nudged aside assertions of how air

inter diction hurt pacification because it endangered guiltless people. On April 15

M ACV published the first extensive Viet Cong order of battle, listing eighteeen

battalions, seventy-nine companies, and 137 platoons. The overall strength was

put at 16,305, less than the 25,000 estimated by the Vietnamese. But backing up

the rcgular troops wcrc paramilitary organizations of around 10,000 part-time

guerrillas. And over the first two weeks of May, 1,000 to 1,800 more Viet Cong

had stolen into Zone D from Laos to form a new battalion. After weighing this

information, MACV J-2 (Intelligence) concluded that air interdiction had no

military effect on the Viet Cong.20

What then could isolate the Viet Cong from the populace who furnished

them food and other supplies? Or from their logistic routes that brought them

weapons, ammunition, medical materials, and fresh troops? There was no other

way than by air interdiction and ground thrusts into evemy base areas. Admiral

Felt desired these missions continued. He especially wanted Vietnamese rangers

and regular units to fight guerrilla-style in the Viet Cong war zones. "It is, of

course, basic to our side," Felt told General Hai kins, "that the initiative be denied

the VC. Our concept is to harass them, push them down and extend them far

139
THE ADVISORY YEARS

beyond the capabilities of their logistics support. thus destroying them." On the

other hand, Harkins deemed nearly all of tile ground commanders too inexperienced for large-scale efforts, and the rangers lacked leaders for extended field

operations. 2

Unlike tile army. the Vietnamese Air Force could carry the w"ar into tile

jungle areas held by the Viet Cong. What the pilots needed was valid target

intelligence. In August Col. Ralph A. Newman, air liaison office with Vietnamese Air Foice Field Command, instructed liaison officers to work closely with the

ground forces at division and regimental levels. The aim was to identify targets

for interdiction, chiefly for Vietnamese planes returning from sorties with unused

ordnance. Most crews hesitated to land with bombs and rockets hanging outside

the aircraft, and since 1958 had jettisoned them on vacant land near the airfields.

Aware of this waste, Gereral Anthis proposed assigning preplanned targets.

preferably ln Zone D, so "t least the munitions would fall on Viet Cong territory.

Anthis and the air liaison officers pressured I and II Corps to accept this

proposal. They stressed that a backlog of such targets would ease scheduling.

distribution, and use of aircraft, as well as keep the Viet Cong off-balance. B3y

September 1962, however, the suggestion was still hanging fire.22

Admiral Felt asked General Harkins. MACV commander. whether "area

denial" methods might make Zone D too hot for the Viet Cong. Felt advised:

Flrtire extent of tech niqties a nd de\ ices available for such purpose shoild be used We

hae e in nund. for exanple. scatter bombing with butternN bomb,. prowen leithi in

Korea. and other type AP- ininec%, We also isutiah/c use of chemical irritants and

defoliants. to expose targets for air strikes In other words %%e want to dcstro, or

dri',e sick. starved, bhlitered, and blasted Viet Cong from Zone 1) so that %%e can scoop

thei t tip outside of their nest or p esecut it m11 Iront setllrig foot Iii thi. ,re, ag,ain I

Thus spurred. MACV and the loint General Staff started to target War

Zones D and X (headquarters of Viet Cong Inter/one V) for an intensive air

campaign. On October 3 the 5th Division submitted 129 specific targets. P[resident Diem next ordered a five-day bombing attack in Zone D to begin on

November I, followed by a Special Forces ground penetration. He also called for

the land II Corps to cooperate in a similar bombingand to follow tip penetration

into War Zone X which lay in the mountai;;s dividing the two corps. Gradually.

the corps commanders and Field Command obtained many more targets

through military channels. Provincial cluefs designated fiee areas for am attack.

Vietnamese crews could strike these areas without a forward air controller, but

Farm Gate had to have targets marked by a V'ctnaincse 1-19. :

"

Review of the free areas came when Vietnan's strained relations with

Cambodia worsened. Feeling threatened by both South Vietnam and Thailand.

Cambodia on August 20. 1962, had appealed to President Kennedy fora neutial

status like that of Laos. President Diem resented the implication that South

Vietnam was an aggressor. lie said there was little question that Viet Cong

redoubts drew support from across the border. Vietnamese troops who carried

out sporadic raids into Cambodia !,ad captured communist weapons and

ammunition destined for the Viet Cong. Undeterred, Prince Norodom Siha140
AIR OPERATIONS, 1962

nouk, Cambodian Chief of State, charged on September 10 that Vietnamese

amphibious craft under air cover had violated his country's soil. Any more such

aggressive acts, he threatened, would lead to severed diplomatic relations, tccognition of North Vietnam. and closer ties with China. Five weeks later, Vietnam- ese naval forces moved against the island of Phiu Quoc necat tile Camlbodianl

coast. They seized seventeen tons of ingredients for making explosives.

Sihanouk's threat to invite Chinese assistance startled the State Department. Ambassadoi Nolting met with President Diem and stressed there niust be

no military action that might bring Chinese Communist forces onto Vietnam's

flank. In compliance the Joint General Staff banned ground and ail operations

within ten kilometers of the Cambodian border. Ifa river, road. er other physical

feature clearly marked the border. Vietnamese forces could pursue the enemy to

within two and one-half kilometers. Otherwise the chase would cease at eight

kilometers. Vietnamese pilots could open fire on a hostile aircraft ten kilometers

inside South Vietnam. if certain that the plane would fall inside Vietnamese

ten itory if shot down.",

Though the border restrictions did not sit well with Vietnamese officials,

Secretary of State )ean Rusk and the .Joint Chiefs of Staff wondered whether

the restraints went far enough. "Militarily," Rusk cabled Nolting,

there is general agreeient that uccess lies not in drawing tight cordon s, IIIIre Iii

Maginot manner along vaguely defined frontier but primarily in woiking outwards

from rural areas v on and. secondarily, through strike , agaimt VC strongholds

iseftilness of latter. when carried out ieadfrontier. iust e eonsidered less imiporta nt

than political-diplomatic problem.

The .oint Chiels suggested a new name be found for "free areas." Admiial

Felt did not object, and 2d Air Division (formerly 2d ADVON) commenced to

call them "approved interdiction targets."2'

To Gencial Anthis, sponsorship of"area denial"by Admiral Felt "smacked

of indiscriminate bombing." Even in Zone D it was impossible to know positively

that all victims were Viet Cong. When Felt proposed having C-123s drop ten

thousand pounds of napalm on marked targets during a gi ound offensive into

Zone D, Secretary Rusk objected. lie wanted napaln confined to high-priority

targets that were clearly Viet Cong installations. Moreover, the State Department retained the right to pass on all plans meaning to use napalm in large

amounts.

In the end, General Harkins withheld tSAF aircraft from delivering

napalm in Zone D and allowed the Vietnamese to do so. Ambassador Nolting

supported this decision. The curbs put on Americans made it hard to carry the

war to the heart of the enemy sanctuaries. 'The best that General Anthis could do

was to allow F-102s to fly across Zone D at night, breaking the sound barrier and

causing sonic booms. "It may not destroy anything." Anthiz, said, "but I can say

positively there has been considerable VC sleep lost in the last few weeks.".

Scarcely less important than interdiction was USAFsupport of Vietnamese

ground operations. Air Force officers constantlK offered air support to ground

commanders through the tactical air control system. To sell this support, steps

141
THE ADVISORY YEARS

were taken to strengthen the air operations center at Tan Son Nhut and the radar

facilities at Da Nang and Pleiku, procure and employ American air liaison

officers and forward air controllers, and persuade locally powerful army commanders to coordinate with air forces. In general these commanders were jealous

of their authority secretive about their plans, and inexperienced in applying

tactical air support. Inasmuch as the air operations center depended on day-today knowledge of Vietnamese ground operations, U.S. Army and Vietnamese

liaison officers were assigned to the center in February 1962. The idea was to

inject tactical air into operational planning at the outset. 29

If Vietnamese grolind commanders had but an inkling of how the support

system was supposed to work, U.S. Army advisors had not the air experience to

qualify them as air liaison officers. They refused to accept the tactical air control

system outright, and from the USAF view were "quick to criticize, slow to

help. "

Bolstering of the joint operations center was one of the benefits accruing

from the April 1962 visit of General LeMay. He ordered several USAF officers

assigned to the center, Lt. Col. Charles J. Bowers assuming the duties of deputy

director. These officers monitored and encouraged the submission of daily

requirements for air support, and allocated sorties on the basis of available

aircraft. "

Quite a few things weakened centralized control of tactical aircraft. Inexperienced personnel and unreliable equipment bred problems. In April, for example, communications between Tan Son Nhut and Da Nang remained out for

three days. Moving aircraft from rotationial duty at Da Nang and Pleiku

demanded special approval from Vietnamese Air Force headquarters. Consequently, the air operations center could not route these planes rapidly to areas of

greater need. Also, the center was heavily committed to operations requested by

Field Command and IlI Corps. This led I Corps at Da Nang and 11 Corps at

Pleiku to look upon the AD-6s at these fields as theirs to use without telling the

center. Likewise, the fighter squadron at Nha Trang now ai'd then flew T-28

strikes in response to local requests without the center's knowledge. When

General Anthis made staff visits to corps, division, regimental, and battalion

headquarters, he found little understanding of how the tacticai air control

system was meant to function 32

Attempts to bring helicopter activities under the air operations center did

not go well. General Harkins in April directed armed tactical aircraft to accompany helicopter assault missions. He was therefore certain that the center was

wholly aware of all U.S. Army flight operations in the country. Yet Army ground

liaison officers readily admitted that the MACV order for escort planes was

observed only about ten percent of the time.

The figure of ten percent was misleading, seeing that these ground operations mostly involved small forces of company or platoon size in very brief

firefights. Since the air operations center was unable to coordinate all air

operations, it could not wholly exploit available air support. Data on ground

operations being planned was often not to be had. The commanders were

142
AIR OPERATIONS, 1962

sensitive to Viet Cong espionage, and personally drew up and launched actions

with scant notice even to their own staffs. A few commanders went so far as to

suspect the center to be a Viet Cong source of information - and with r'ason.

The Vietnamese Air Force dispatched fragmentary operations orders from Tan

Son Nhut to its squadrons in the clear. Because the teletype circuits were possibly

insecure, there were inevitable leaks. "

U.S. Army officers disliked the tactical air control system, deeming it too

rigid. Accordingly, there was no realistic policy governing the relationship

between fixed-wing aircraft and helicopters. In June MACV gave General

Anthis "coordinating authority" over all air operations. In July General Harkins

ordered helicopter support missions to have proper air escort, unless the helicopter unit commanderjudged it unnecessary. In August Admiral Feit considered it

essential to have every type of air operation coordinated by the air operations

center, and to have air cover from fixed-wing aircraft for each helicopter operation. Not until December 1962 did the latter requirement go into force. "

Air strikes close to friendly troops called for close cooperation between air

missions and the movement and fire of ground units. As in Korea, tactical air

cotrol parties came to be used. The Air Force supplied a seasoned fighter pilot

to set ve as the air liaison member of the control pa, ty. The Army furnished the

vehicles and mechanics, radio gear and operators. The ANiVRC-30 ground

mobile radiojeep carried the air liaison officer and Army members of the control

party. The vehicle's radios linked with the forward air controller and the strike

pilots above, and with ground and air units. The control party's work was

thwarted whenever the jeep was slowed or stopped by cut and mired roads.

ambush parties, and jungles and swamps.

A further frustration was the meager experience of Vietnamese in coordinating air-ground operations. The shortage of L-19 pilots prevented the assignment

of air liaison officers to ground units. The foremost need was to secure sufficient

two-man L-19 crews (pilot and observer) to place AD-6 strike aircraft on the

target. So in lieu of an air liaison officer. the Vietnamese Air Force sometimes

designated an L-19 crew to serve as f.ward air controller for a ground unit

during a single operation. The pilot and observer repaired to the unit, received

briefings on the planning action, and tried to become familiar with the procedures and terrain. The crew then returned home to conduct other air control and

reconnaissance missions. On the day of the operation, however, the L-19 crew

flew back and controlled air stnikes for the ground unit.

Unable to operate at night. L-19 crews in daytime usually flew at 3,000 to

5,000 fcet. far too high for good surveillance and target marking. The air observer

marked targets for fighters by radio direction or hand-thrown smoke grenade,

commonly by both methods. Criticism and penalty awaited an L-19 crew if

ground fire damaged the plane. The observer was subject to severe punishment if

lie erred in marking a target and friendly casualties resulted. '

To communicate with regular tioops, the Civil Guard, and the Self Defense

Corps units, L-19s carried AN! PRC-10 Army radios lashed to their backseats.

Because the plane could power only its own radios or the PRC-10, the crew could

143
THE ADVISORY YEARS

not converse with strike aircraft and ground forces at thesame time. The P RC-10

lash-up was a poor makeshift, and ground units wanted man-pack radios that

could mesh with existing UlH F; VlH Fairborne sets. No such radios weie obtainable in 1962. The U.S. Agency for International Development was giving large

numbers of radio, to provincial paramilitary forces. These sets were the commercially procured il-I and TR-20 with Lharacteristics similar to those of the

PRC-10. An an interim meastue, MAAG refitted U.S. Aimy helicopteis and

Vietnamese and Farm Gate aircraft with the AN AC-44 Army' iadio. '1 his set

could tie in with the PRC-10. iT-I. and TR-20.

Complications of this sort paled beside the genetal insulficiency of the

L-19s. They were often simply unavailable. In April, for example, Farm Gate

pilots arrived over the target and could see a firelight on the giound. But the

Vietnamese controller never showed up. "

Toward the end of 1962, Farm Gate received two L-28As (later known as

U-IOAs) for forward air controller duty. They w,,ere too costly for such use.

Moicover, Farm Gate still had to have Vietnamese air observers or air guides on

the ground to mark targets for strikes."

Three U.S. Army helicopter companies, each attached to a corps, enabled

troops to move swiftly against the Viet Cong. On the way to the target areas, tile

chopper pilots liked to fly at 700 feet and hug the ternain. Their success led

Secretary of )efense McNamara to deploy a Marine squadron of twenty-four

UH-34D helicopteis to Vietnam. Afterwards he moved two more Artmy H-21

companies to the country, plus a company of fifteen armed UIil-I A and U Il-I B

helicopters from Okina wa and Thailand. Manned by Americans. these gunship,

were to deliver "suppressive fire," now deemed to be self-defense. In September

1962 the Joint Chiefs of Staff ordeied all helicopter gunships bearing U.S.

markings to carry a Vietnamese observer. "

In July 1962. strike aircraft flew 139 combat sorties in support of helicopters. Farm Gate (now commanded by Lt. Col. Eugene II. Muelle . Jr.) perlected

tactics whereby two T-28s supported each helicopter flight. One T-28 swooped

down to 200 feet. flew slightly ahead of the leading helicopter, and made slow

turns to search for the enemy. The second T-28 staved above the lot ination. set to

make a tiring pass on a tanget. As thc hclicopters approached in tail for landing.

the strike aircraft flew on each side and strafed the flanks to suppiess enemy fiie. "'

Despite Admiral Felt's belief that tiansport helihcoptets constantly tequileo

fighter escort, General Harkins authori/ed helicoptet gunships to opelate alon,

if need be. Bad weather now and then grounded strike aitcraft but not necessarily

helicopters. In addition, escorts were hard put to fly slowly enough to stay with

the helicopters. Seeking to pet U.S. Army air openations under the tactical all

control system, General Anthis war,-ed I larkins against fighting two distinct air

wars. On the other hand, Army officers tended to see aimed helicoptet s best used

when under a ground commander's control and carrying out local opetations In

August, MACV gave the tactical air control system supiemacy solely over air

traffic control. 4

'

144
AIR OPERATIONS. 1962

The Viet Cong ambushed 462 road convoys during tile I-ist seven months of

1962. most of them in Ill Corps north of Saigon and near Zone 1). On the

moining of June 16. some four to five hundred Viet Cong took tip ambush

positions along the road to Bien I oa about five kilometers south of Ben Cat.

Opening fire on the convoy in mid-morning, the communists killed two American advisors and twenty-thiee Vietnamese. The column requested air support,

and three hours elapsed befoie the strike units at Bien Hoa got oiders t3 take off.

By that time, the enemy was withdrawing towaid Zone 1). Even so. a H-26 and

two AD-6s under I.-19 control killed fifty enemy and enabled mursuing Vietnamese troops to recover nearly all the equipment and weapons stolen from the

convoy. Air Force officers pointed out to Vietnamese commanders that a single

L-19 over the convoy would probably have sighted and reported the enemy, and

no doubt would have prevented the ambush.' 2

On ituly 14a Viet Cong battalion ambushed a convoyen route fron Saigon

to Phuoc Long, killing twenty-five persons (including a U.S. Army advisor) and

wounding twenty-nine othei s. The convoy had not asked for air cover. In fact.

neither III Corps nor Field Command had known that the column was on the

road. The request for air support came one and one-half hours after the fighting

erupteo. By then the guerrillas had long been gone. "

General Anthis emphasized to MACV the advantages of air cover for

convoys and rail movements. Not only would tactical air enhance security, it

would also absorb Vietnamese and Farm Gate sorties currently unused. At

General Harkins' suggestion, President Diem in August directed his army commandeis to call on the Vietnamese Air Force to protect tiains and convoys

conveying arms, ammunition, and other critical cargo."

The simple presence of the unarmed L-19 often broke tip an ambush. On

August 3, two L-19s spied 200 guerrillas lying in wait between Quang Ngat and

Da Nang for an ammunition train headed north. When the planes appeared. the

Viet Cong fled. Later that month, an .- 19 stopped the first vehicle ora convoy

just short of an explosive charge. "

In contrast to the 32 requests for convoy escort from .lanuati y to July 1962.

there were 506 between August and October. Doing most of the train and truck

convoy escort, l.-19s flew ahead of the movement and searched for signs of

ambush. They radioed for ground or air reinforcement as required. Except for

the compulsory combat air cover for high-priority cargoes, tactical aircraft

selected to escort usually stayed on ground alert. The combination of planes

devoted to this duty constituted about ten percent of the total tactical air effott.

Convoys would have incurred less damage, had they kept travel to days and

hours when aircraft were on hand to afford covet and protection. The technique

was effective. From ituly on. no train or convoy escorted by air ran into ambush

for several months. "

Helicopter assatilt operations proved more complex than tiain or convoy

escort. On August 30, I Coi ps mounted an air-ground operation fifty-five miles

south of Da Nang. Plans envisioned ten Vietnamese 1l-34s and twelve U.S.

Army H-21s to lift two hundred rangeis and two hundred Special Forces troops

145
THE ADVISORY YEARS

to the battle at ea. Four T-28s would ily helicopter escort while foiur A )-6s. four

T-28s. and one 13-26 readied the landing /one. A CV-2 Caribou out of Ia Nang

was to be the airbot ne command post. The I Cot ps air liaison officer. l.t. Col.

Byron R. Kalin. pointed ou, in vain that the Caribou lacked the fuel capacity for

ot biting during the whole opet ation. The plane would have to return to Da Nang

for refueling.

Early on D-day, six C-123s ferried two hundred Vietnamese troops from Da

Nang to Quang Ngai tojoin the others. The Caribou command post checked the

weather in the battle area and signaled for the first heli-lift of two hundred troops.

The strike planes made their prelanding attacks but. by the time the helicopters

came, fog had rolled into some of the landing areas. The Caribou sent the

helicopters back to Quang Ngai. When the fog lifted, the Caribou called for the

mission to continue. Although the foutr T-28s escorting the helicopters completed

another pielanding strike, the Viet Cong opened up on the choppers with sharp

fire. A damaged 11-21 e,:caped to an emergency landing area. After the crew was

rescued, a T-28 destroyed the craft to :wvert its capture.

Subsequent to the sfe landing ofa second wave of helicoptei s, the Caribou

needed to go to Da N;ng for refueling. While it was away for over an hour.

orbiting fighters relayed messages to the commander. But he was out of direct

contact with his troops.

The fighting on the ground was inconclusive, and in mid-afternoon helicopters began extiacting the forces. As the last chopper left the scene, the Viet Cong

opened file, downing another 1-1-2 1. The wounded crewmen were rescued, and a

T-28 shattered the copter on the ground.4

'

Why were the T-28s unable to suppress the Viet Cong fire? The Cat ibou's

limited communications for directing fighters and ground troops were frequently

interrupted for one reason oi othet. Target marking was poor. An American

forward air controller fle\\' an L-19 over the area fot three hours at 2.000 feet. I Its

Vietnamese observer marked just one target. the smoke bomb missing by 3.000

fe-t. Lastly, the delay between the prelanding strikes and the fitst helicopter

landing had likely aletted the Viet Cong."

At Da Nang on September 22. the 2d Division commander planned a

heliborne attack to begin on the 24th. The six Vietnamese T-28s on station could

not muster the iirepower for the air support requiied. Delayed until fresh aircraft

arrived, the operation went on September 26. 1y then. the Viet Conig had slipped

away. 9

The growing accuracy of Viet Cong ground fite against aitciaft caused

concern among USAF officers. 'fihe toll of Farm Gate planes shot down

mounted - a T-28 on August 28, 1962. a U-10 on October 17, and a low-flying

B-26 on November 5. Other aircraft were damaged. Following a night napalm

strike. I.t. Col. Miles M. Doyle nursed his 13-26 home after losing an engine to

.30-caliber rounds. To silence enemy gunners. tile Farm Gate commander

ordered h.s pilots to strafe while delivering ordnance at low levels. '

Army pilots of armed helicopteis weie optimistic about the delensive

abilities of tile U Il-I. The chopper carried two cight-ttbe 2.75-inch rocket

146
AIR OPERATIONS, 1962

pods and two .30-caliber machineguns (each mounted on a landing skid).

General Anthis continued to plead for the U li-I and other U.S. Army aii craft

to go under the tactical air control system. Meanwhile, the Army used the

gunships for firepower formerly furnished by artillery, explaining that the

U Is supplemented rather than replaced strike aircraft.5'

A vital adjunct to interdiction and close support was ati reconnaissance, and

MAAG in April 1962 had projected a program for the V-etnamese. Its centerpiece was the transfer to them of four RT-33 photo jets. Since the State

Depattment did not at first object to the transfer, Thirteenth Air Force made

ready to train pilots for the planes. Next, MAAG formally asked for tile R I'-33s

together with three RC-47s and fourteen RT-28s. The RC.47s would get photo

coverage ,nder way at once, and small Vietnamese photo processing cells at

Pleiku and Da Nang could supplement the American facility at Tan Son Nhut.

Examining the proposal in .ue, CINCPAC recommended that three

camne a-,-quipped C-47s be secured, one for each corps: two Able Mable R F- 10 Is

be coin' iteely committed to missions in Vietnam: a Vietnamese photo processing

cell be opened at Tan Son Nhut: and an austere USAF Ieconnaissance technical

squadion be set up in Saigon for detailed photo interpretation and talget

production for all of Southeast Asia. '

:

At tile Secretary of Def~ense Conference in Hawaii on .luly 23. 1962,

Admiral Felt spoke out strongly for givingthe Vietnatnese RT-33 photo jets. Mr.

McNamara was negative because of the Geneva accolds. and he questioned tile

superioi ity of the RT-33 over conventional aircraft. General Harkins favoied the

photo jets but suggested a compromise - bring two USAF RF-10Is to Vietnam

and furnish the Vietnamese RC47s and RT-28Bs. Two weeks later, Admiral Felt

urged the .Joint Chiefs to approve tile RT-33s as supei ior reconnaissance planes

needed for intelligence. ie noted that the Army had sent some jet turbinepowered U II-I A helicopters to Vietnam. The admiial opposed RC-47s because

in Laos they were vulnetable to ground fire. He thought it difficult and expensive

to modify the RT-28 into a cameia plane that at best would have moderate

performance. "

The State Department now strenuously opposed jet photo planes for the

Vietnamese on political grounds. And Secretary McNamara remained unconvinced that Admiral Feh had made hi, case. Although the RT-33s stayed in the

Military Assistance Program, three camera-equipped RC-47s and eighteen RT28s ai rived to buttress reconnaissance. At Tan Sol Nhut the Vietnamese activated the 716th Composite Reconnaissance Squadron. It accepted two C-45

photo aircraft, one havih.ga six-inch and the other a twelve-inch vertical camera.

While awaiting nore planes. pilots of the 716th Squadron flew strike missio!,s in

T-28s. Not until mid-1964 would the Vietnamese attain a fully operational

reconnaissance program. Meantime, the Air Force's 13th Reconnaisance Technical Squadron (thirteen officers and eighty-four airmen) would be formed at

Tan Son Nhut.'

Until tile Vietnamese could do their own air reconnaissance, Able Mable

R F-10 Is were for a while deployed to Saigon. In July 1962 the Geneva agreement

147
TIlE ADVISORY YEARS

suspended aerial ieconnaissance over Laos. and by Octobe Able Mable was

flying about eighty-eight percent of its sotties over Vietnam. This sparked the

move in December of all tour RF-101s to 'I an Son Nhut, whete they continue( to

fly 2.8 sorties a day. HIying from Vietnam rather than hl'hailand widely expanded

the total photo covetage per sot tie."

Detecting the Viet Cong from the atr demanded night , nd infraled photography. side-looking airborne radar, and infrared "snooper scope" techntques.

Most of these methods wete still in development. In Aptil 1962 MACV had

secured two R13-26C night photo airctaft for Farm Gate. the rlanes teaching

Bien Iloa in May."' During the last hall of 1962. they gave good service in the

face of obstacles. Flash-illuiminant cartridges were in short supply. Reflections

ft om flooded rtce paddies blurred night photos. A ground accident on October

20 put one R B-26C permanently out of action. "

The coming of the Army',, 23d Special Air Wat fare Detachment to Nha

Trang in September 1962 teinlotced teconnaissance. I he detachment had six

OV-I Mohawk turboptop ob,ervation airctaft. rigged with cameras and .50-

caliber machineguns. It further featured two portable laboratoies to process

I hotographs at division headquartet sand at remote locations. Split into teams of

two, the O'v-ls assumed direct support of Vietnamese ground units. The

Mohawks flew mostly visual an! photo reconnaissance. but carried Vietnamese

observers who could apptove targets. "

General Anthis still felt it foolish to give aircralt to ground unit commanders. When he protested to Genetal Harkins, the reply was, "We must all be

objective." A USAF forward ait contiollet with the 23d Division at Ban Me

Thuot noted in November that the Mohawk detachnent could make a nine-hour

delivery on photo requests. compared to the normal USAF time of se\en days.

Appt ised of this. Anthis could only hope that the U.S. Air 1-otce might not lose

assigned roles and missions because of a failure to provide resources to perforrm

them. Even with RF-101s flying from Tan Son Nhut and the photo piocessing

cell working at peak efficienc\, photo delivery took from three and one-hall to

more than five hours. The local Mohawks could deli\er emergency photo

iequests within two to thiee hours. '9

Admiral Felt pondered the status ol the OV-Is. Was their local employment

an economical use of force? Or did their piesence ignote the basic U.S. policy of

having Americans train the Vtetnamcse instead of fighting their war for them?

Yet General Harkins cited the excellent results chalked up by Mohawks, and on

December 14 asked for four more. Like the helicopter gunships. larkins

explained, the OV-ls complenented but did not compete with ISAF air

power."'

Ncvcrtelcs.,, by December 1962 the Army had 199 aircraft in Vietnam. the

Air Forec c .1thece were eight Army generals. three Air Force. As the USAF

director of I tani roled:

I. rmt y be inni oper to, y we are at war with the Arrn 'lowv, or, we bhelie\ that if the

Arms effort,. are successful. the , man hac a long term adere effect in the t' S

mitary posture that could be more important than the battle preentl, being w aged

with the Viet Cong 61

148
AliR OP~ERATIONS. M92

Both im n and V'iet namese Ali' Foice an ci aft icinained outside thle

tactical aii control systemn. As eadyl as Ma\ I1962. Bi ig Gen. Stephen I).

icli oy. I hiiteenth Alir Foice vice cOnlmandlcr. commented onl the situation to

Genei a! Anthis. Ai ILorce 'I -28s flew combat \s hule Viet namese 'I -28s wei e onl

the gi ound. Arm\ helicopters made combat lifts wh[ile Vietnamese 11-3"'\, "sere

unused. unieported. or transporting passengeis. In response. Anthis acknowledged this **sensitise subject.'"iProgress." hie said. "can onl\ be measuied in small

units" meaning inchics/2.

A teami from thle Royal Ausiralian Ali 1-orce noticedl the sanne -Londition.

The Vietnamese Aui 1-oice (along with the na\\~) (lid niot pci form uip to its ftill

potential. Perhaps this was due to the absence of properiepi esentat ion at senior

milai y les els. H ence there was no joint phlanning as practiced in mol e sophisticated armied sci sices. and ir fop,. -v"messs and icquiremrents iccise little

considcuat ion. 6

In little 1962 the foil ts-nine Vietnamese strike ait craft flew but 412 of thie

1,029 sorties of which thle\ were capable I oo few flight leadci s. no desii e to fly

combat. and scarce tairgets were thle causes, lHying fell off markedl\ diiiing

weekends. siesta how s. nighits. and bad weather. At an\ late, thle pictuie was niot

entirel\ dismral - thle 412 sorties in Junite were it decided impros ement oxer thle

150) in .1 n ua r\.6

'I hie signs v\ ci e mixed as 1962 closed. But it was unmistakably clear that the

Republic of Vietnam. so shaky at thle stai t of the year. had niot collapsed. Bsen

moile encouraging was the attitude of the National Liberation IH ont. 1 lanoi's

political struct uie in South Vietnam. Its pi ess release in J1ul\ 1962 called for thle

creation of at neutral state much like Laos. Was I lanoi thinking of abandoning

the effort to unif\ Vietnam by' force?! And what was the meanling of Hlo Cli

Willhs quoted statement piaising Diemn's pa triot ism? In 1959 Hlo had predicted

thle defeat of South Vietnam in a \ear. In September i962 hie began saying that

victor\ might take fifteen to twents years. Was hie concerned thai thle Americans

might bomb North V'iet na m?' 6

The war against the Viet Cong. President Diemn informed the National

A~ehl o Otoer9, had ta ken an -incontestable turn" for- thle better I ater

that month, Admiral Felt and Arnbassadoi Nolting bolstered IDiemn by assuring

himi that the American resolve to resist communism in Vietnam would not

weaken. 6

6

Obviously, then, the step-uip in U.S. support for Vietnam that had startedi

late in 1961 seemed to be working.

149
XIV. Ap Bac and Related

Matters

American support arrested many adverse trends in Vietnam, and by May

1962 Secretary of Defense McNamara was looking ahead to the end of the

counterinsurgency. As he said at is conference in Honolulu, the Military

Assistance Program for Vietnam would then be somewhere between S50 million

and S75 million a year.' McNamara was hoping to phase out the war in Vietnam

and in the near future to send home major U.S. combat, advisory, and logistic

activities. No doubt heartened by the signing of a new agreement on Laos. he

directed General Harkins, M ACV commander, to draw upa program. The plan

would prepare Vietnamese armed forces to fight and win the war themselves, so

that a systematic withdrawal of American forces could be geared to the headway

made.

"Six months ago." said the Defense secretary. "we had practically nothing

and we have made tremendous progress to date. However, we have been

concentrating on short term crash-type actions and now must look ahead to a

carefully conceived long-range program." ie then asked how Ic ig it would take

to eliminate the Viet Cong as a "disturbing force." General Harkins rephed.

"About one year from the time that weare able to get ... [the Vietnamese] fully

opeiational and really pressing the VC in all areas." Assuming that it would take about three years to bring the Viet Cong"under

control." the Secretary ditected Harkins to plan on tis basis. Besides training tile

Vietnamese to manage the war themselves. Harkins was to arrange a turnover of

materiel to them. "The objective," McNamara said. "is to give SVN an adequate

military capability without the need for special U.S. military assistance "2

The size of the American contributions was substantial. By mid-August

there would be 11.412 U.S. personnel in Vietnam- 2.282 Air i-orce. 7,946 Arms.

643 Na, .and 541 Marine Coi ps. Of the S767 million in i,ttet ic pi oianned

since 1956, more than S600 million had been delivered. Airfields refurbished, ol

set to be, included Tan Son Nhut, Bien Hoa, Pleiku, Nha Trang, Da Nang. Qui Nhon. Ban Me Thuot. Hue, and Tuy lloa. A like upgrading of land and naval

facilities was underway. The Military Assistiuncc Progiam. subject to congressional approval, called for S177 million in fiscal year 1962 and S167 million the

next year. Over and above these totals, the United States had given Vietnam over S1.5 billion for roads. railways. electric lines, water. communications, hospital.,,.

and schools.'

U.S. advisors operated from.loint General Staff to battalion level and some

worked with province chiefs and training centers. Farm Gate had trained and

certified sufficient Vietnamese crews to man a second fighter squadon that flew

missions out of Nha " rang. The Air Staff had aproved sending foui L.-28s to

Farm Gate for forward aircontroller duty. "1 wo more glass-nosed 13-26s weit on

151

pECFE~ PAGE BLANK-NOT FILM
THE ADVISORY YEARS

hand for reconnaissance. Mule Train was supplied a second C-123 squadron to

achieve the quick ieaction General LeMay desired.4

Ignoring these hopeful signs, l.eMay remained skeptical. The Air Force

chief's disagietement with the war strategy was widely known amoug the top U.S.

leades, ahd Admiral Felt alluded to it at tile May Secretary of Defense Conference. General O'Donnell, PACAF commander in chief, was disappointed \with

the emphasis on politics and econonics at the conference. So many civilians were

there that he could not make his points. Instead of preparing for victory in three

years, he wanted to urge actions at once- "better utilization of available air in

South Vietnam. improved air lift management, and ... [a] three-stai slot for the

Air Force deputy" to Harkins.5

General Anthis told the conferees that the basic stumbling block to expanding the Vietnamese Air Force-a precondition to removing USAF elements--

was the shortage of pilots. There was no debate on this."

What mattered was that McNamara had set 1965 as tile planning date for

ending U.S. involvement in Vietnam and Harkins needed to make it possible.

By September MACV piepared a National Campaign Plan as a guide.

Aftei biicfing Mr. McNamara in October, General Harkins presented the plan to

the .Joint General Staff and the Vietnamese president. Diem informally approved

the blueprint in pi inciple, and on November 26 did so formally. No immediate

implementation followed, but rather a discussion of when execution should

begin. Not really a series of maneuvers, the plan was moie an organizational and

conceptual framewoi k, a setting for the process of rooting out the gueri illas. A

key provision was the lestructuring of the Vietnamese armed forces. This would

deprive provincial chiefs of control over para military forces in their areas, and of

their freedom to appeal directly to Diemn. Placing the paramilitary forces

squarely in the militaiv chain of command would do away with the p ovincial

chiefs' private armies.

CINCPAC harbored reservations as to the costs and the abilit\, of the

Vietnamese to tain sufficient personnel in time, and MACV revised tile plan in

l)ecembe 1962 and again in early 1963. i he plan's intelligence annex contained

merely territorial data and a nmap of what MACV thought were the Viet Cong

tactical /one,; and ,ecret bases. Missing was an enemy order of battle. The Joint

Chiefs nevertheless approved the plan oil Maich 4, 1963. They iecogni/ed that

success hinged on the "parallel development of many mutual supporting" prograins, meant to lead ninety percent of the native population to identily with the

l)iem govei nment. 1 he trouble was that many pi ograms laN outside the mlitai y

spheic e. Civilian agencies were to work on political, economic, and social problems, and much would lest on additional deticit ,pending by the Vietnamese

government. Theie were no doubts expiessed on l)iem's administration or tile

course of the wa:. The Air Staff. howevei. wondered where the gove nment

could find enough trainees to fill the pilot spaces."

These seemed to be m'ere details. More to the point was Adm;,al Felt's

comment that l)iem had "finally delegated opeiational au: hority"to his military

connandel s.

152
All BAC AND RELATE) MATTERS

The National Campaign Plan called for nine iegular divisions plus other

Vietnamese units- a total ground combat force of about fifty-one divisions.

Operating under four autonomous corps tactical /one field commanders, these

troops weie to decimate local Viet Cong elements, cut off ieplacements, and

desti oy supply, communications, control, and suppoi t facilities. *1 he communists would first be h'emmed into specific aieas. Next would come a general

offensike to annihilate them by simultaneous "explosion" operations in the four

corps 7ones. This explosion of effort was supposed to drive the Viet Cong out of

the country within a year.

"Sounds reminiscent of Koea, of course." someone said, referiing to

General McArthur's famous communique. "out of the trenches by Christmas."

General Weede. MACV chief of staff, estimated that the "militai\ effort to at

least drive VC underground should be concluded in one to two years. It would

then be up to GVN [Government of Vietnam] to take over to win minds of

people, improve economy. conduct civic action. etc." According to Geneial

Harkins. the plan could eliminate the Viet Cong as early as 1963. Picsident Diem

appaiently believed so too, but later would feel that the stiategic hamlet piogram

first had to be completed. This could not be done befoie the spiing of 1964."

Diem reorgani7ed the military. Inactivating the central Field Command, lie

divided Vietnam into four corps tactical /ones, created the new IV Corps in the

Mekong Delta with headquarters at Can Tho. and established the Capital

Military District around Saigon. The corps tactical /one commanders would be

given greater responsibilities. They were to exeicise operational contiol not only

over their ground foices but over supporting Vietnamese Ai Force elements as

well. '

O

Exactly what control the 2d Air Division commande was to have over air

operations was unstated, but General Anthis protested placing air power in the

hands of the corps commanders. He wanted as always a strong tactical air

control system.''

A related issue was how to compute the ai iequirements foi the "explosion"

ground operations. Preliminary estimates showed a doubled strike sortie rate

along with an upturn in calls for reconnaissance, target spotting and identification, and aeiial eulpplY. 11ow much and ho\w fast the Vietnamese Ail !'olce

could be expanded was the cential question.'2

General Rowland. chief of the MAAG Air Force Section, outlined an

ambitious program. Besides a second AD-6fightersquadron in fiscal year 1964,

lie projected two more fighter squadrons in fiscal year 1966. Both would be

equipped with the Northrop N-156 light jet fighter (later designated the F-5

Freedom Fighter). Rowland envisioned the replacement of the T-28s in one

squadron and the A-I Hs in another with F-5s sometime between 1966 and 1968.

He called for a total of nine L-19 liaison squadrons (one for each regular ground

division) and four helicopter squadrons. lie visual,/ed air reconnaissance

handled by a squadron of four Ri -33s and eighteen RT-28s. Air transpoit would

be performed by a single squads on of C-47s during fiscal year 1965 and by two

153
THE ADVISORY YEARS

SCORPDA ANG

AREA

I CORPS

AREA

II RCORPS

AAREA

SAIGON

SPECIAL CAPITAL

DISTR ICT

ARN CORPS AREAS

(Unbl Novi'nber 19Z)

C-123 squadrons, one each in 1965 and 1968. This program was eveniually

trimmed. The nine liaison squadrons, for example, were cut to four.'3

Rowland also pointed out the advantages of pilot training in Vietnam. In

October a detachment of the Air Training Command was scheduled for movement, to open an 11-19 helicopter pilot training program at Tan Son Nhut. Two

months later, a second detachment was dispatched to give liaison pilot tiaining at

Nha Trang.1'4

To meet the rise in air requirements envisaged by the National Campaign

Plan, General Anthi in October and November 1962 asked for these new

squadrons: one T-28 (25 aircraft), one B-26 (25 planes), a third C-123 (at least),

two RF-101. two RB-26. and three liaison. Anthis justified ,he liaison units on

several grounds. General Rowland's program had been whittled down, a current

shortage of forward air control craft had delayed or ,eferred many strike

missions, and a step-up in visual reconnaissance and convoy cover could be

foreseen.''5

The MACV ,I-4 set forth airlift requirements in support of the National

Campaign Plan. Ilis ideas of "wholesale" and "retail" operations resembled

Army thinking. He specified sealift to five port areas, then C-123 lift to various

airfieids where U-I Otters, CV-2 Caribous, and helicopters working with the

:orn', were to pick up the cargo for ultimate delivery. He estimated having to

move 36.000 short tons per month byair (4.3 million ton miles ofairlift). This was

almost twice the capacity of the two C-123 squadrons and the CV-2 company

154
All BAC AND RELATED MATTERS

ODA NANG

I CTZ

PLEIKU

11 UTZ

WAR

ZONE ZONE III CTZ

D

SAIGON

IV CTZ CAPITAL

0MITARY CAN 1110 DISTRICT ARVN CORPS TACTICAL ZONES (AFTER NOVEMBER 1962)

already in Vietnam. In December General Harkins requested two more C-123

squadrons (thirty-two aircraft) and an additional CV-2 company (sixteen planes)

for arrival in the first three months of 1963.16

At first the Civilian Irregular )efense Group program was managed out of

the American Embassy by the CIA. Later the program went under MACV and

the U.S. Army Special Foices (Provisional), formed at Nha Trang on September

15, 1962. Working through the tactical air control system and the air operations

center, Farm Gate had serviced these units. While General Anthis wished to

continue the practice, General Harkins preferred to give the Special Forces their

own orvanic airlift and fire support a miniature tactical aii folLe. Hai kins was

thinking of setting aside four L-20s or L-28s for iiaison, four CV-2 Caribous for

airlift, and twelve UH-I armed helicopters and four OV-I Mohawks for strikes.

These craft were to be controlled by the Special Forces commander at Nha

Trang.

General Anthis dissented on the ground that the twenty-four aircraft would

displace the Vietnamese planes at Nha Trang. lie remarked that every ground

unit could not have "its own separate air force." Admiral Felt ruled in favor of

central control of air support. He expressly said that lie would allow no assignment of air power direct to the Vietnamese irregulars or to the U.S. Special

Forces. Harkins next proposed to use Air America contract airlift for this

purpose. In the end, a compromise was arranged. The Mohawks and Caribous

disappeared from the proposal. With Defense Secretary McNamara's approval,

155
THE ADVISORY YEARS

the Secretaries of the Army and Aii Force sent twelve nonorganic helicopters

and four liaison planes to Vietnam for the Special Forces, to enable team chiefs

to visit remote and otherwise inaccessible posts. Harkins agieed to use the other

craft within the tactical air control system. But in Decembet and over Felt's

objections, he withdrew the four Army Caribou tiansports fiom the Southeast

Asia Military Airlift System and committed them to direct support of the Special

Forces.'7

Preliminary "explosion" operations got under way in late October 1962.

Ranger forces gathered fora penetration into Viet Cong Zone D in Phuoc Long,

Binh Long. and Phuoc Thanh Provinces (called a Special Tactical Zone). In spite

of poor weather and deficient target marking. AD-6s on November 20 conducted

prelanding bombardment. Five Mule Train C-1 23s and twelve Vietnamese C-47s

dropped five hundred paratroopers at a site selected as a base camp on the

eastern edge of Zone 1). On December 19 tioops moved into Zone D. where

double tree-canopy-cover towered to eighty feet. Planes flew eight interdiction

strikes and also close support missions. On the 23d a B-26 dropped napalm. and

on January I, 1963. a B-26 and two T-28s attacked with general purpose bombs.

Results in this thickly forested but fairly dry terrain turned out better than

expected. An Armyadvisor who visited four interdiction targets found proof ofa

hasty enemy retreat. Rockets and .50-caliber rounds had pierced the jungle

canopy, and 500-pound bombs had smashed trees to scatter lethal wood fragients. There were ten fresh Viet Cong graves. In three weeks the rangers killed

sixty-two Viet Cong and took ten prisoners, at a cost of twelve killed and

sixty-eight wounded.'8

When a report revealed a large Viet Cong assenbly east of the city of Tay

Ninh in northern Tay Ninhl Province. II Corps hurriedly launched a three-day

heliborne assault by the 5th Division on December 19. The size of the enemy

force was overstated but the troops caught three Viet Cong. The pmsoners gave

the locations, functions, and staffing of twelve headquarters ol the National

Liberation Front. After special agents verified this information. Ill Corps asked

the Joint General Staff to authori7e a three-day strike against the headquaiters.

Most oftlhc twclvc lay % ithin ten miles of the Cambodian border. too close in the

opinion of Americans. The Joint General Staff disapproved the air attacks, but

Piesident Diem considered the chance too attractive. He set the operation for

January 2, 1963.

The operation was planned to kick off with a heavy hour-long air attack

against nine targets most distant from the border. Some delayed-action bombs

would be used. Next was to be a diop of 1,250 paratroops and a helicopter

landing of a ranger battalion, covered by "light strafing attac's." The fighters

would fly airborne alert from daybieak to dark, with C-47s helping out through

the night. President Diem wanted American pilots to keep an eye on Vietnamese

troops, and prevent them from straying across the border into Cambodia. So

that advance reconnaissance flights would not warn the enemy. key commanders

flew ovem the terrain in a C-123.

156
AP BAC AND RELAIED MAITERS

The entire force of twenty-six Vietnamese AD-6s and Farm Gate's sixteen

13-26s and twenty-four T-28s at Bien Hoa engaged in the operation. Theii

day-long support was called "splendid." The paiatroopeis and rangers suffered

nine casualties but killed zxventy-six Viet Cong and captured individual weapons and documents. Early assessments based on pr~soner of vai inter rogations and

on an intercepted Viet Cong radio message credited the air strikes with killing

about foul hundred persons. Later information coming from Cambodia raised

the number to between eight hundred and one thousand. American observers

praised the operation as the most successful ever undertaken in II Corps.

terming it an intelligent use of tactical air support. 19

Oershadowing these encouraging successes was the failure near the village

of Ap Bac in IV Corps. Ap Bac involved the 7th Division. reputed to have killed

more Viet Cong in the Mekong Delta than any other division. So well had the 7th

performed in the important Plain of Reeds that it appealed to have wrested

control from the communists. The enemy leaders seemed on the point of pulling

back their regular units to sanctuary bases.

Late in December 1962. intelligence pinpointed a Viet Cong radio in a

relatively out-of-reach arca near Ap Bac. The % illage was situated in a c'mplex of

hamlets thirty-five miles southwest of Sa.gon and around fifteen miles northwest

of the 7th Division command post at My Tho, capital of )inh Tuong Province.

In this rice-growing delta region, canals, dikes, and dirt roads channeled mo\ement. Villages and tree lines offered cover and concealment to defenders. Soft

fertile earth made digging foxholes easy. and paddies gave good fields of fire.

Nearly a company ol Viet Cong troops was suspected to be in positron to protect

the iadio, which was supposed to transmit for the Viet Cong Central Office for

South Vietnam. On December 29 the newly appointed 7th Division commander

decided to knock out this priie.

He selected two battalions from different regiments, a company of mechani7ed infantry in M-1 13 amphibious armored personnel carriers, a ranger

company, and three battalions of artillery (two of 105-mam and one of 155-mm

howitzers). A paramilitary provincial force of three battalions would help out.

The division commander planned heliborne landings north and west of Ap Bac.

these troops to sweep south and meet the M-! l3s rolling north. Lt. Col. John P.

Vann. senior U.S. Army advisor, wished to start the operation at once to axet

intelligence leaks. He suggested December 31 at the latest, but helicopters wele

not to be had before .lanuary 2, 1963.

Maj. Ilerbert L. Prevost. a USAF air liaison officer first learned ol the

operation on I)ecembe 30. lie readied a plan for strike aircraft support. but

discovered on the 3 Ist that tll available aircraft would be supporting the opelation in northern Tay Ninh Province. The U.S Army 93d Helicopter Cornman

nonetheless agreed to go ahead with the helicopter landings. it furnished ten

transport helicopters plus one U 1-IB and four IIU-IA helicopter gurships

(armed with rockets and machineguns) to fly cover and fire-support missions At

the final briefing on January I Major Prevost accented the absence ol ighte!

157
THE ADVISORY YEARS

support. Perhaps, he suggested, the air operations center would respond to

emergency strike requests. He alerted the center to the possibility.

The provincial troops deployed at 0630 on the 2d of January, and the

operation commenced shortly thereafter. Instead of meeting a Viet Cong company near Ap Bac, 7th Division ran into a battalion. Armed with heavy machineguns, automatic rifles, and 60-mm mortars, the foe was dug in under the tree lines

bordering the helicopter landing zones. The first three helicopter lifts from Tan

Hiep airfield landed safely, but during the landing of the fourth an H-21 was

downed by enemy fire. The U H-I gunships sought in vain to suppress the ground

fire. They used up 8,400 rounds of .30-caliber and 7.62-mm machinegun ammunition along with one hundred 2.75-inch rockets. An H-21 trying to rescue the

crew of the downed helicopter was shot out of the sky, and a U H-I B was disabled

and it crashed. Two other damaged H-2 Is made it back to Tan Hiep.

At 1005 a Vietnamese L-19 over Ap Bac radioed the air operations center

for help. The center diverted two AD-6s armed for strafing and they arrived at

1035. Afterwards the center kept B-26s and T-28s, also armed for strafing,

continuously active in the Ap Bac area. These planes failed to quiet the enemy

guns. Not until the arrival of a Farm Gate B-26 at 1540 did things look up. This

aircraft's repeated runs with napalm, bombs, rockets, and guns broke the Viet

Cong defensive position near the village.

By then the communists had won the battle. They pinned down the heliborne forces, and put the armored company out of action by focusing fire on the

gunners of the personnel carriers. (The gunners were exposed from the waist lip.)

The I V Corps commander and the senior U.S. Army advisor. Col. Daniel B.

Porter. Jr., had reached Tan Hiep at noon. They suggested a paratrooper drop

east of Ap Bac to block Viet Cong escape routes. The division commander and

Colonel Vann agieed, and that afteinoon the Joint General Staff chose three

paratrooper companies from nearby Tan Son Nhut. Boarding six C-123s. 319

troops floated down close to Ap Bac at 1815. Because their drop zone placed

them west rather than east of the village, they were in no position to stem the

enemy retreat.

Dtuing the night separate Vietnamese units engaged in firefights with one

another while the Viet Cong battalion escaped with its wounded and all but four

of its dead. As regular troops moved cautiously into Ap Bac the next day,

advance elements caine under the fire of friendly mortars. Five men were killed

and fourteen wounded.

The final reckoning was sixty-five Vietnamese and three Americans killed,

one hundred Vietnamese and six U.S. advisors wounded: fourteen helicopters hit

by enemy fire and five shot down. The Vietnamese captured two Viet Cong,

found four bodies, and killed an estimated one hundred enemy. Aftei wai ds the

Viet Cong admitted eighteen killed, thirty-three woundcd. three missing, plus

twenty-nine civilians killed Clearly the combat had been poorly managed and

poorly fought. The Vietnamese and Americans lost in prestige and in reputation

for power. Colonel Vann subsequently suggested that several Vietnamese officers

158
AP BAC AND RELATED MATTERS

should be relieved of command. He spoke bitterly to newsmen of wrong decisions during the battle.20

On General Harkin's orders, the Vietnamese Joint Operations Evaluaton

Group came up with the reasons for the Ap Bac defeat. There had been no prior

air-ground pianning and no fighter escort for cover. When Vietnamese Air Force

and Farm Gate strike aircraft were diverted to Ap Bac. the crews did not know

the local situation. Communications between friendly forces had been deficient

and no fire support coordination center existed. Armed H-2 Is had tried to rescue

downed ciews before Viet Cong fire was silenced. Paratroopers dropped shot tly

before nightfall had been improperly loaded and briefed. They had fought

friendly troops. Without waiting for the formal ieport. Harkins asked the

Vietnamese to relieve two commandeis.2

'

To Admiral Felt the unescorted helicopter operation at Ap Bac was wrong.

Visiting Vietnam, he spoke with Diem and senior Vietnamese and American

officials. ie told Harkins, "Experience has taught us that the VC are not

surprised by helicopter landings and are able to ambush helicopters." Felt could

"not understand" how commanders could ignore "the fundamentals of warfare"

by failing to prepare the landing area. He could not conceive how they could have

decided to conduct a key operation when available air support was busy elsewhere. It was time that everyone learned that armed "helicopteis were no

adequate substitute" for fighter suppor't. All helicopte lifts needed strike aiicraft.

When Felt questioned whether MACV was downgrading air activities. Gencial

Harkins explained that there were too few tactical aircraft in Vietnam to cover

every heliborne mission. As a matter of fact. he said, twenty-four operations in

the pieceding montl, had been without air cover.22

General Anthis pi oposed exact procedumes to make certain that Vietnamese

ground commanders and U.S. Army helicopter companies coordinated helicopter assault actions. Only the air operations center could assure tha fightels

preceded and protected every heliborne landing. The Vietnamese Air Force

could fum nish corps commanders with stiafing. close air support, reconnaissance.

photography, and airlift. But centrali/ed control over all air power guaranteed

fast emergency reaction.21

That each corps commander wielded virtually absolute control over air

power within his boundaries led to peculiar situations. In January 1963, for

example. air interdiction was out of the question in IV Corps. The corps

commander simply refused such missions to avoid political repercussions if

noncom. 'tams were accidentally killed or wounded. On the 2d of.lanuary the I

Corps commander ordered no strikes to be flown without his personal approval.

Inasmuch as he was often away from his headquarters at Da Nang. it was usually

impossible to fill requests from the field for immediate help. Later that yeam. a

new I Corps commander used the Vietnamese C-47 flareships as his personal

transports. lie assigned helicopters and liaison planes to divisions and task foices

permanently rather than in line with mission needs. The Joint General Stall

required no advance notice from corps on operations being planned and executed, unless the commander wanted more airciaft from Saigon. Given these

159
THE ADVISORY YEARS

cond ,tions~it Nvell-cooi di nated countrywide irl caimpaign against tile Viet Cong

was unthinkable 24

Also impeding well-integrated aii operations was the U.S. Ai my practice of

mla k inIgaviatlonl unlits an integral part of the ground forces The billei ness of the

roles-a nd-missions aigu ment spilled over when General Anthis several mionthis

later pinnedl the failnie at Ap Bac onl the Army's air concepts. lie du (bbed the

AriN "a customer that is also a competitor." Seeing "thle specti e of more Ap

liac's to come," hie :,,id that

ua soil it wouild be better it thre A rum suffered a le\%~ retii\ mior ieweisesat

ttil lttle ('ertainhl it \%outd be bet ter it their concept ot close ill suppori \%ere

disci edited no\% in a relatimek iiw 'peimi e .a thani to %%m ai Ior tire ultimate cata%-

trophe their Coincept mnltt lead u% to ata time anid place ".here %%c N01 i not haw tile

Ielastierit ue pre~eiitl emo>

Adimial Felt also believed that thle air operations centci and the aii ift

coordlinating board hatd to be "Iiu1y exploited" foi combined and joint ground

and air opei ations. Hie judged this the way to make best tise of limited air

resource and facilities. "Until the Army ani effo; t joins thle club," General

O'Donnell stated. "wvith the intent to cooperate wholeheai tedly inl the achievemlent of Valid opei ational objectives, there will not be unity' in the air ef fort."21

The USA F element of Strike Command, it joint ieadiiv.,ss foi ce in thle

United States. pioposed zt icturn to \Voi Id War 11 organizational pi ocedtircs

That is, the Air Foice would own and mana aiequest commuitnicat ions down to

Army battalion level. To expand communications loi aii liaison officers and

forward air controllers, thle Air Staff furnished 2d Air Division with twenit\

contingency teams,. Each consisted of anl airman opei ator and a comlmei cial

KWM-2A single-sideband -suitcase" radio. Although messages wce speeded to

the air operations center. there wete too few\ teais to go around. Genei al Ant his

eventtually suggested setting up an air i equest net within the Vietnamese gi ound

for ces. 27

General O'lDonnell felt smie that the tactical air control system had pi ovecl

its worth inl the battle for Ap Bac. After all it had diverted planies to aid

Vretnaese t oop, at a Ci iical tinte WVith ani ani request net, hie stuggested. thle

system would be flexible enotugh to support thie decentiali/ed National Cail)-

paign Plan. General H arkins disagreed. lie said geography and( imperfect coinmnunications titled otit dii ect centralized conti ol of thle total aii effort. liette, hie

thought. to commit teams of Vietnamese and USAI- strike aiiciaft to the corps

tactical /ones and uinder their control. I larkins said theilmain futnction of the joint

operations center was to redlisti ibute planes among the several /onies according to

the temnpo of local opei ations.21

I hese and other factoi s induced MACV inl March to form a Hlight Service

Center and Network at Ian Sont Nhut to which evet y military flight would

epoi t. Geineral Harki ns sought by this action to satisfy inl part Admiiral I-cet's

wish fot- Cencial Anthis, thle MA('V air component commander, to possess

complete "coordinating authority" over air operations inl Vietnm.

160)
A P BAC AN It E~LMA] D M A ITERS

Seek ing to set tlet lie mattei 011ccand for all. Ad mii aI Felt coin jromised. I Ie

as-,ked I larkins to operate 1,IS AI-aiiciaft in Viet nam undert the tacticalI airconti(l

system. I lie aii opei Itions centei was to assign oi alIlocatIe all ci alt tot the control

oft the tactical corps I or fixed periods I1-clt also iequested I larkins t o bring I .S.

Arms as itiOn unit[S tinlder thle conti ol system. Placing aii opei ations under

cent ialiied control would jpiew nt mtutal interference. facilitate flight lollowing.

simplils it delense idlentification pi obkmns. and upgradlc conmbat stippIort. 29

Cienci al I fat kins iesponoleo that thle tactical air conti ol system had nlot thle

- commnications tor piecise cooi dination In .Jtily hie gave thle MACV .1-3 At mn\

ani opetations section genetal stiper-vision ovei I. 5 Mali in Corps and( L 1.S.

Ai my aiat ton. I le designated thle Mat tine Coi ps headqti teis inl I Corps ar.d Ithe

Arm aviation battalion headquarters inl the other corps /ines to dlirect their aii

opei ations. Genet al Anthis protested the artangeinent. saying it would create

twso andl pet hat1s fise sepatate air control systems and sepal ate air wat s

wsithin Vietniam. IHarkins teplied. "Let s give these things a three or- fotii month

ttital." IlFe promised to change the setuip if' it f~ailed to wsoi k."'1

'I hie coniti osci s\ ! eflected anl oserall decentraliuation Aftet Michael V.

[ot testal of thle White HFouise stalffand Roger hitsman of the State D~epartment

sisited Vietnlamin I ecember 1962. thley, crittci/ed the -elaborate. set-piece"

iiitary opet ations and the tuse of air pos\c'r. Too mnany people. thle\, itfoinied

lPiesident Kennedy. were managing thle American eft ott. I here was nto osetall

dii ection. I hey' tecominendeol a single strong exectitise possibl\ a genetal.

Pt ef'era bI a ciiha n (an a inbassad o ) - to domtntnate all depart me nts and agencies inl thie cotuntriy and to give a single thi tist it) thle multiple activities."~

The USA I' ditectoiate of Iplans drafted a position paper lot possible uise by

General I e May at the Joint Chiefs meeting of.lanutmy7. 1963. Accot ding to thle

paper. the sittuation swas of' the "gi eatest concern." es'en thotigh many U.S.

pi ograins enjoyed a long leadtime. "Buit when I see the Viet Cong continue to

gilow in stitengt h. I can only assutme that JJ"'EA REA'O0I'IN'NING." Armsi and

Ali I-ot cc ooct iial disputes ought to be ta ken otut of Viet namn. Cl NC;AC's

teoltests shoutld iccets e p)1ompt attention. H ark ins swas in need of thle "best

possible ads ice" throuigh an Aiu Force depttyand Anthis should manage all at

Operations. I lie major political obstacle of thle war was IDiem's lailtie to sectite

the real stupport and backing of his people. The majot military obstacle was

vling to erase thle guierrillas inl the face ot a seemingy endless st teaml of

repla-ceimenlts. Needed wveic gicater U.S. air power tuttil the Vietnamese All

1-oice cotild go it alone.ili-cottiitry' pilot tiiinig oI Viettiatniese. and (lest rut itoti

of Viet Cotig food ci ops. "We shotuld consider nio\\ the applteatioti of selected,

inleaisdt(F sanctions against the North Vsiet naise." Actions would tange f rotn

inlilti ating agents throtugh ait bombardmient to lblockade

Whateset was said at the Januat \ 7 mneeting, the chuels chose to sell(d Gen

Fat le G. \Vheelet . Am my Chief of Staff, and a team ot setuor otfficets f romn the

inilitat s sers tees to Viet nain. file group's mission was "to form a inulttat y

judgmuent as to thle pm ospects lot a successf ul Conclusion ol tile Conflict withiti at

teasonable period ofl ttme,""

161
THE ADVISORY YEARS

The team spent January 14-30 in Vietnam, soon after the battle at Ap Bac.

lhe membeis examined the National Campaign Plan and endorsed the concept

of"many small operations with decentralized control," undertaken "at anac-.

crated pace by each corps. division, and sector commander in his own area."

They noted with appi oval that the tempo of small actions was quickening to 450

per month, and they looked foran upsurge in the futue. The group was pleased

with what appeared to be adequate coordination of political. economic, and

military matters. 4|

Paying little attention to the battle of Ap Bac. the team heard General

Harkins announce satisfaction with the air organiiation. Ills staff necded no

stronger Air Force representation. The OV-l Mohawks could do more than

reconnaissance. Could they be armed with lockets? Could the rtule prohibiting

armed helicopters from returning fire except in self-defense be changed?"

The Joint Chiefs of Staff swiftly authorized U.S. Army helicopters "to

engage clearly identified Viet Cong elements which are considered to be a threat

to the safety of the helicopters and their passengers." Admirai Felt then permitted

arming the Mohawks N ith 2.75-inch rockets.",

While the Wheeler team was sympathetic toward augmenting Air Force

units, the civilian leadership in Washington was more concerned with turning the

conflict over to the Vietnamese. On February 2 Hanoi called upon the International Control Commission to eject from Vietnam the USAF units that were

"playing a key role" and causing widespread damage. Secretary of State Rusk

was disturbed. Fie could hardly prevent American repoi ters from observing and

writingabout U.S. operations. However, he wanted the Embassy and MACV to

release no information on American combat air actions. The United States.

Rusk said, ought not to hand the communists an excuse to escalate hostilities, 7

'I he U.S. newspapers publif:ized the authorization for American helicopters

to fire on the enemy. Secietary McNamara refused to comment except to say that

Amei ican military personnel were under instructions to fire their weapons only

when theii own safety was at stake. Secretary Rusk reiterated, "Our policy

remains that the American role in Vietnam be strictly limited to advisory.

logistic, and training functions.""

Wheeler's assessment in January 1963 rang With optimism.

The situati, ,n Vietnam, Wheeler said, had been "reoriented, in the space of a

year and a half, from a circumstance of near despetation to a condition where

victory is now a hopeful prospect." A heartening sign was the steep rise in

Amet ican advisory strength from nine hundred at the start of 1962 to more than

thiee thousand. At first there had been no advisors with battalions, but now theie

weic over foui hundred. In a yeai the number of advisors helping province chiefs

had grown from two to one hundied or more. Though "we have not given Ho

Chi Minh any evidence that we are prepared to call him to account for helping

keep the insurgency alive," Wheeler said. "we are winning slowly in the present

thrust." Theic was "no compelling reason to change."' 9

Air Force officers on the team did not quite agree with General Wheeler's

evaluation. They believed sizable and long-lasting U.S. help a must. The war

162
AP IIAC AND RELATED MATTERS

could not be won quickly. nor could it be won finally until the Vietnamese people

got behind the government. This demanded military, political, and economic

actions - "U.S. assistance is ,itvily engaged in building a countiy, not in

defending a weak country against superior foices."41

'

MACV intelligence estimates showed that the number of full-time Viet

Cong guerrillas had risen through infiltration and local recruitment to between

twenty-two thousand and twenty-five thousand. Each month about five hundred

stole into Vietnam by way of Laos and Cambodia. Late in January 1963 a

meeting was repot tedly held in the Chinese Embassy at Phnom Penh, Cambodia. Representatives of Hanoi, the National Liberation Front and the Soviets

agreed to add twelve battalions to the Viet Cong. Eight were to be transferred

from Laos and four recruited in Vietnam.4

'

To the Viet Cong the battle of Ap Bac was appaiently a major turning point

in the war. It instilled confidence in theii ability to fight Amel ican helicopters and

armored vehicles. Enemy leader s too., credit for a new tactic- the deliberately

invited battle, described as "wipe-out-enemy-posts-and-annihilate-enemy reinforcements." They would often resort to this tactic in the Mekong Delta, almost

always to good advantage.42

On the Vietnamese side, there was a lull in mriltary action after Ap Bac.

Admiral Felt believed the caln to have "both visible and hidden meaning." The

Vietnamese seemed to be in no hurry to launch opetauons. General Harkins in

February 1963 wrote Pi' ce,cnt Diem. urging him to swiftly exploit the initiative

that his forces seemed to have seized ft om the foe. "Time and weather." Harkins

said. "are either for us or against us."The communists, he added. "must not be

allowed to regroup or rest. We must attack and destroy them. We must hurt them

so badly that they will be forced to apply all their remaining resources merely to

survive." Otherwise the Viet Cong might "neutralize much of the gain we won at

great cost and effort. '

But the Ap Bac engagement and American press coveiage had damaged

relations with the Diem government. Newspaper accounts of the battle aroused

serious resentment in Vietnamese officials, particularly David Halberstam's

criticism in the New York Ties of Vietnamese performance. Newsmen spread

their belief that U.S. advisors had died while trying to lead Vietnamese troops

who would neither follow noi fight. Embittered Vietnamese leaders complained

that coriespondents were interested merely in splashing sensational news on the

front pages when Americans were hurt. Madame Ngo Dmh Nhu recalled the

presidential palace bombing. when she and her children were in grave danger.

She said that U.S. reports revealed solely an "ill-concealed regret that the

bombing had failed in its objective." The Wheeler report commented on the

"mutual dislike and distrust" between the Vietnamese government and the

American press. Embarrassed by the news reports ol Vietnamese battlefield

misconduct, President Kennedy strove to repair the eroding trust between the

two governments. In his State of the Union Message to Congress on January 14,

he declared that the spearhead of aggression had been blunted in Vietnam.4

163
1111l- AD)VISORY YE ARS

(Top left) Maj Ivan L Slavich briefs Gen Earle G Wheeler (center) and Gen Pout-, D Ha~kins on a rocket

mount of the 9UH 18 helicopter

(Top right) An ARVN paratroonor prepares for a lump over Cu Chr

(Center) TSgt William W Cameron instructs Vietnamese airmen in the operation

of the gunsight on a T-28

(Below) Vietnamese tanks move toward the burning presidential palace atter its bombing

1064
Al 13AC AND RELATED MA*ITERS

Signs of dissension and mistrust were all too obvious. Back in No\ ember

1962. reports had reached Admual I-elt that Dliem was withdrawing more into

seclusion and lea ing many decisions to his brother. Ngo )inh Nhu. Both

sometimes iegaided the numerous American advisois as an encroachment on

Vietnamnese so,.ereignty. I hey feaied that the cautious U.S. policy in Laos

inirroied a weakening inteiest in Vietnam. I he\ were upset by Senate Majoi ity

Leader Mike Mansfield's ieport in February 1963. It said that after seven years

and four billion dollars of Amettican aid. "'tlie sa i difficulties remain. il. indeed.

thie, have not been compotinded." Vietnam was less stable and "mote ,lemoved

fi oi ... populaily esponsible and iesponsive govetmnent." Did this foreshadow dwindling U.S. support?

TVhe ldef ense minister scoied American allegations of hit-or-nuss Vietnamese

bombing as a "%oii iosi\ e influence" on the militaiy effott. American attempts to

help the Go\ ermnet of Vietnain create an intelligence capability were probably

scen by l):em as a threat to his ,egime. I he Minister of Interior resented the

im ol\enent of Americans in the counti as a dangei to the republic's internal

politics. Pi esident l)iem labeled the Special i-orces rural aid ad isos and the

sectoi ad\ isors as "particularly iritating." Fxen th(ugh U.S. economic assistance financed nearly all of the counte imsuigenc\. Diem objected to American

contiols o\er imatching counteipart ftinds. IIc called them degrading to Vietnam 's independence.4'

In a series of private and public statements diing Apiil 1963. Ngo Dinh

Nhu dwelt upon U.S. "inlringements" of Vietnamese sovereignty. Aid came. he

said. \\ith too many strings attached. He told CIA Chief John H. Richatdson

that it would help it the American presence weie ieduced anywhere from five

hundred to three oi four thousand men. Richardson got the imlpiession that Nhu

feated an emei ging U.S. protectorate. Diem. Nhu said, had received many

complaints hom suboidinates about ithei American counterparts. Publicly. Nhu

was quoted as demanding thie \vithdrawal ofover two thousand U.S. advisors at

lower unit levels. Obviously referring to Ap Bac. he said that sonie American

casualties had occurred because the advisors were "daredevils" who exposed

themselves needlessly to enemy fire. Taking this statement as a fore, tnne of

things to come. the "vietnamese Air F-orce commander alerted Ils key peisonnit

to the possible withdrawal of U.S. fotces. lie warned them to conser\e reserves.

piepare to go it alone. and get ready for hard days ahead.'

1 he Vietnamese government did not officially request a reduction of Amencan personnel, but Nhu's statements induced a review of U.S. troop levels.

Evidence scemed to fa\ o a lesser commitment of foices. Sit Robeit Thotnpson

in Match had reported the gomernmnent as "beginning to win the shooting war

agaist the Viet Cong." due chiefly to the American helicopters. He proposed a

psychological ploy that Adinal Felt passed to the Joint Chiefs by message. "If

things go tight by end ol 1963," Pelt said. "we should take one thousand military

petsonnel out of RVN at one time. make big proclanmation out of this and

publicize widely. 'I his would show (I) RVN is winning: (2) take steam out of

anti-Dienttes: and (3) dramatically illustrate honesty of U.S. intentions."

105
THE ADVISORY YEARS

In April a U.S. National Intelligence Estimate perceived improvement in tile

situation, despite the absence of persuasive signs that the Viet Cong had been

"grievously hurt." Ambassador Nolting in May depicted relations between

Washington and Saigon as "delicate," btl the political and socioeconomic

conditions were promising. An excellent rice crop brightened the economic

outlook. Completion of about fifty percent of the strategic hamlet program

extended shelter to sixty percent of the people in defended areas. During April

the Vietnamese armed forces took part in nine hundied offensive actions.47

These hopeful signs encouraged Secretary McNamara at his conference in

Hawaii in May. He said he would remove one thousand Americans from

Vietnam by the end of the year to show that things were going well. He would try

to pull out units in lieu of individuals, and upon departure their equipment would

be tuined over the the Vietnamese. The conflict was "not a U.S. war." and the

United States did not intend to fight it.4

Since more Americans were still arriving in Vietnam, units and individuals

then en route ;ere to continue their travel. There would be no personnel

increases, however, either temporary or permanent. Each of the armed services

was to take a comparmble cut. To hurt operations the least. most of the returnees

would come from logistic units. In November and December, 2d Air Division

would lose 244 people. 49

Maybe McNamara's action impressed the Vietnamese In June the Joint

General Staff ordered all ground forces to operate a minimum of twenty days

eveiy month. starting Jluly I. This was to be a "total general offensive" to attain

"complete annihilation of the enemy" and "complete Vietnamese control."'

General Harkins was enthusiastic. The all-out campaign was soon to begin

in earnest. He knew the strategy-"saturate the countryside" with small and large

nilitaiv actions--was correct. It would fragment and destroy the Viet Cong.5

1

Unfortunately, the Viet Cong had embarked on their own general offensive.

166
XV. Air Operations, 1963

Although some U.S. units were scheduled to leave Vietnam by the end of

!963, the JCS earlier that year had suggested and Secretary McNamara

approved an additional C-123 Provider squadron for Da Nang. Arrival of the

777th Troop Carrier Squadron in April 1963 with sixteen C-1 23s augmented the

airlift of the twenty-nine C-1 23s at Tan Son Nhut. Crew manning permitted each

Provider to fly sixty hours per month. In addition eight U-I Otters, sixteen 0-I A

Bird Dog observation planes, ten UH-113 Iroquois helicopters, and a second

CV-2 Caribou company reached Vietnam to support the corps tactical /ones and

Special Foices.i

General Harkins. M ACV commander, had agreed to place the CV-2s under

the coordinated airlift system. However. Army headquarters in Hawaii urged

Admiral Felt to recognize the special features of the Caribou. The Army had

purchased the planes for short-takeoff-and-landing, which rendeied them

instantly responsive to ground commanders in combat zones. While centralized

control of airlift was more efficient for cargo deliveries, swift reaction to a field

commander's needs came first. in this context Harkins assigned the two Caribou

companies to centralized airlift control, but one of these had the further mission

of immediate support to the senior corps advisors.2

The Southeast Asia Aiilift System managed the forty-eight Air Force

C-123s. thirty-two Vietnamese C-47s, and thirty-two Army CV-2s. Though the

C-123s normally made deliveries to four major depots and twenty-nine other

distribution points, they actually operated at ninety-five different airfields and

sixty-five drop ,ones. Carrying a lighter load than the C-123, the CV-2 could use

shortei runways. But reversible propellers let the Provider land on wet surfaces in

distances impossible for the Caribou, not yet so equipped)

The 8th Aerial Port Squadron expanded in May by creating Detachments 6

and 7at Qui Nhon and Catl Tho. Temporary duty personnel served 120-day duty

tours at the new sites.4

Much of the Southeast Asia Airlift System's work dealt with tactical

operations. About thirty percent of the troop cartier flights were paradrop

resupply, paratrooper drops, and assault air landings. Resolute efforts to support

ineote stations drew grateful praise from the ground troops. They deemed the

system reliable and responsive.5

Uncertain surface travel, the conservative bent of logistic planners, and the

use of scaled U.S. planning factors tended to inflate requirements. In Octobei the

airlift system's excess capacity prompted plans for reduction. In December

MACV strength was pared by one thousand. Released were personnel of the

Ai my's Ist Aviation Company (Caribou), the thirty USAF C-47 pilots flying

with the Vietnamese Air Force, and half of the 8th Aci ial Port Squadron's

people. The 61st Aviation Company (Caribou) with twenty-five CV-2s stayed

behind to support senior corps advisors. Some of these Caribous became spaics

167
THE AD)VISORY YEARS

t nsu i a cei ta I Uin uber of Opel at ional aircra ft at evel\ coi ps tactical ionle.6'

I lie A\ir I-oice's 19th I actieal Ali Suppoit Squaclroni was actiated at IBiel

Hloa in J uls 1903 and assigned to PA CAV. 'I hie niew% unit's an eral t and crews

(ticidled in. Foul 0-Is and twenty-two ciews weie onl boai d bN .Is. and the

remaining eighteen planies arrived onl the U SS Card in Auigust. Since Americans

were foi bidden to direct air strikes, eleven seasoned Vietnamese obseisers sxeie

Integi ate'I into the squadron to do so. Operational in Septembei . thle unit

f urnished more and more ltiward air controllers arnl air. liaison ol ficci s I or thle

National Ca mpaign Plan. Its pi marN mission was to ti aini Vietnamlese hlasonl

pilots in f orward an control, visuial i econnaissance. comonat support. and

obsei ci proceduies. The aim was to I eplace those Pilots di aIied offto fill fighter

cock pits. The squmad ron was to icinain in Vietnam no mioi ethan ayeai . then tui ni

its 0-Is ovei to the Viet namnese.

lPiepinrations to open a training center at Nhla Trang were delayed because

American pilots needed proficiency in the U.S At my [-19 (0-I)aiicraft. Genci al

LeMav had ordei ed this plane sent ini lieui of depleting the few I -28s in USAFP

stocks. As his Diiector of Plans, Maj. Gen .John W. Carpenter. Ill. said. -rile

Chief clearly expressed his desi, es towaid getting onl with the war against the

communists in Vietnam as opposedl to woi iying about the source of light

aircraft." Altei twenty-fise officers and sixty-nine airmen tinder went lactol\

training in .July and August. they opened thle Nba 'I rang center in Septembei.

Trainees took one month of piellight instituction and three monthis of primary

flight training that included eighty hours of actual flying. Vietna mese liaisonl

pilots in ieasonable numbers weic ready for combat in eat IN, 1964.'

1 welxe Au lFoi cc oflficers and foi t v-seven a ii men i eached Ta n Son N hutt i n

.January 1963 to train Vietnamese hielicoptei pilots. By Jutne they gi aduated

fifteenl stuident pilots who weie quialified to fly 11-19s. 1 lie tiaining went onl

thiotighotit the N eai.1

Adimial Felt hoped that thle Vietnamese cotildlibae the loti R1 -33 Jets

attori/ed bythe Military Assistaniice Pr-ogramii. In Pebrtrary . iosese-. Seci etal

of State Rutsk annouinced that -over-ridiiig political considerations" and "inte, -

national risks" rufled out their deliv'ery 1;hortlyI dieicalier the Jloini Chiels

approved a boost in USAF P rconnaissanceanircaft. incltuding fotir R l3-26s and

two more R1-0 lIs for Fai in Gate. Fhie R B-26s reached *1 a n Son Niltit i n Ma reli

Iiom Poi tWoi th. I ex. 'Iwo of themn weiceeqtrippedl br night photogi aph . and

thie othei two wei e expel irnental R B-261.s specially otitfitted with night photo

and Reconolax IV inrlat ed sensing devices. Ini May. P-iftil Ail Porce's 609 1s1

Reconnaissance Squadi on less'two R B-57s to a temporaly(Itity site at ' an Son)

Nhitrt. These jets feat tii ed adlva need and improse co (ay-anid-night K-52 panoiamic cameras arnd Recoriolax V I infraied sensoi s.-)

Airborne hiighif-eI reqeniey' ii ectioni finders had d iffictilty locating Viet Cong

adio transmittei s. More than two huid ied enemy sets ss'eie act ise. btitl it was

Iim possible to fix lhei i exact sites. GjeneralI Anit iis anid ot Iiei 0ofIicial., thought it

might be bettci to listeni to the tratlic instead ofl disrtriptinig ordestioyinlg it. laln

eveint, knowing wshere the iadios weie Opel ating was (deemied essential.'"

168
AIR OPERATIONS, 1963

Infrared devices were meant to detect thermal radiation ,emitted by campf,,es, vehicles, structuresand tatfic oil trails and streams. 1ll theory tie senso..

could pinpoint activities hidden Ii om noi mal photography. But the Reconofax

IV imhared photo equipment on tle R1B-261.s bi oke down. and the technical

:( tepic,,entative in Vietnam could not make the system (originally designed lotB-58s) work. Climatic conditions. chiefly d ust and dampness. fouled tile sensois.

I leat from the photoflare cartridge ejectors forward of the infiared system

sattlated the infraicd detectoi and ruined zihe film.

As for the RB-57E's iniared sensors, integral components were missing.

I he plane's panoiainic cameias piovided very clear hori7on-to-horizon pictures

even at high speed and low altit tide. Having both hori/ons in tile shot enhanced

the pei spective of tile photo inte piete,, but he id to learn :,ow to compensate

for disto, tion in the wide lateral coverage. I

When equipment worked, the intelligence apparatus was often unable to

exploit the information gathered. The zonal concept of ground operations

worked against a centraliyed air reconnaissance network. Separating intelligence

data by corps tactical /one was not easy because planes flew across corps

boundaries. Moieover. there were no courier aircraft to deliver reconnaissance

film iapidly throughout Vietnan before the coming of two U-3s from the United

States in May. Army OV- I Mohawks attached to Vietnamese ground divisions

icacted quickly to shifting situations. However, the intelligence they collected

was not fed into the national intelligence-reconnaissance setup. General Htarkins

still labeled the Mohawks as "complementary" rather than "competitive" to

USAF and Vietnamese tactical air reconnaissance. He saw no need to coordinate

them with the standaid activities. saying they were "outside the speciali/ed

capabilities of other photo aircraft."' 2

Air Foice planes flew nearly all the icconnaissance in 1963. yet the flights

failed to glean a great deal of intelligence. fly reason of weather, jungle. and

forested teriain, linding and photographing the small and fleeting enemy targets

was a stiff proposition."

Air defense radar control centers were situated at Tan Son Nhut. Da Nang.

and Pleiku These and the radai at Ubon. Thailand. gave high-altittide surveillance. The interceptor fleet consisted of Air Force F-102 and Navy EA-I-

(AI)-5Q) all-weather f'1hters rotated to Saigon. Mountain screening clutteied

radar coverage belox 00 feet. The F-102s perfoi med marginally in low-level

interceptions, while the tA- I Fs lacked the speed to intercept aircraft intruding in

areas distant fi on Saigon. "I o stretch tile covei age and especially to scan much oi

south-centrai Vietnam. th," Vietnamese Ail Force moved a TI'S-I -101) training

radar rom I an Son Nhut :o Ban Me 'I huot in February 1963.14

From Febrtary 10 to 15 mn unusual number of low-level, slow-flying radar

tracks appeared before midnight neai Pleku and Da Nang then disappeared

befome Jawn. Air Foice and Navy inteiceptors investigated, using flares and

other techniques. t'hey found nothing. tile tracks vanishing from ground and air

radas as the planes approached. Aiound Da Nang on February 14, a Navy

169
THE ADVISORY YEARS

aircraft intercepted a flight of ducks. Consequently officials concluded that

migrating waterfowl had caused the unknown tracks.1-

Convinced that no air battles would be fought in Vietnam, General Harkins

ncvertheless sensed the need for flight following. Since November 1961. Mule

'I ram transport squadrons had used their network of high-frequency radios.

F-arm Gate crews reported their inflight positions to the nearest rada. control

center every thirty minutes. On January 10, 1963, an Army OV-I was lost during

an unieported flight out of Qui Nhon. and it took over two hundred fifty search

sorties to find the plane. In March the Filght Service Center and Network was

born at Tan Son Nhut.1'6

The reduced likelihood of communist aii intruions and the birth of the

Flight Service Center and Network threw into question the need for the F-102s

and EA-I s at Tan Son Nhut. Safcty considerations alone seemed to warrant

their removal, lor 233 nitaly aiiciaft of all sorts used the airfield, along with

commercial planes. General Anthis wanted to clear the 10,000-foot runway by

moving out some of the helicopters, but PACAF suggested keeping the interceptors on call in the Phi!ippmes. These planes withdrew in May. The supersonic

F-102s could return to Tan Son Nhut within twelve hours, the EA-I Fs within

forty-eight. There was no call for them in 1963 however.'

Triggeied by President Kennedy's approval on December 31, 1962, to

augment Farm Gate, the Ail Force in 1963 acted to regu.arize the status of its

units in Vietnam. Admiral Felt furnished the impetus when he spurned the

principle hitherto held that USAF personnel sent to the country had to have

prior training in counterinsurgency. Farm Gate, he said, was flying conventional

mi,sions. Airmen could accordingly be ,-signed on a routine permanent change

of station basis. This would cleai the way for doubling the number of aircrews

and maintenance men, and could raise the sortie rate by twenty-five or thirty

percent. Felt in addition wished to boost the number of liaison aiicraft and

forward air contiollers by a fll' two squadrons, to furnish visual reconnaissance

beyond anything already on hand. This, he said, would be the key to a successful

National Campaign Plan."'

General LeMav in early February pressed foi putting U.S. markings on

Farm Gate, aircraft. He said that "current classification restrictions on Fat in Gate

are considered unnecessary. Actual operation is well known through SVN and

classification has become an administrative burden." The State Department

queried Ambassador Nolting on a series of articles in the press on U.S. combat

air activities. particu!arly those.of American-piloted aircraft. In his reply Noltirg

pointed out tile rather "gradual (and inevitable) uncovering of facts by U.S.

journalists." That Americans flew combat aircraft was common knowledge. This

was expressly true after the deaths of Capts. John P. Bartley and .'ohn F.

Shaughnessy, Ir., in an R B-26downed by Viet Cong fii e on February 7. and tile

loss of Maj. James E. O'Neill in a crash three days later.' Secretary of State

Rusk. however, continued to accent the American role as "strictly limited to

advisoiy, logistic, and training functions." 2

"

170
AIR OPERATIONS. 1963

Geneial l~eMay ii, March again asked for permission to declassify Farimi

Gate but Ambassador Nolting said, "We ae winning without such overt U.S.

action."'2

By June 1963 MACV had 16,652 people, 4.790 of them Air Force. On the

28th. Secretary of Defense McNamara froze MACV sttength. *I o clear up the

confusing anay of USAF units. PACAI- lot reed new ones without expanding

manpower authoriations.22 On July 8 Farm Gate at Bien I loa became the Ist

Air Commando Squadron (Composite), a regular PACAF olganization.

Although PACAF wanted the code name Farm Gate dropped, Ali Foice

headquarters disapr,roved because vatious logistic facilities supporting Fa il

Gate were thoroughily familiar with the name and all it implied As Ist Air

Commando Squadron, Farm Gate contained two strike sections. ile lust

consisted of ten B-26s with twenty-three ciews (pilot and navigator) and two

RB-26s. The secord had thirteen T-28s with two crewiembers per plane. In

addition there wee two support sections, one of four psychological warfille

U- 10s and the oth r of si, C-47s. The remainingeight B-26s weie in detachments

at Pleik and Soc Trang.2'

Likewise on July 8 the 33d and 34th Tactical Groups came into being. Based

at Tan Son Nhut and under the 33d Tacticai Gioup were the 33d Air Base

Squadron. the 33d Consolidated Aircraft Maintenance Squadron (CAM RON),

and Detachment I (a reconnaissance element). The 33d Group also had detachments at Can Tho and Nha Tiang.

At Bien Iloa the 34th Tactical Group consisted of the 19th "lactical Air

Supprt Squadron, the 34th Air Base Squadron. and the 34th CAMRON.

Detachment,, of the 34th Group were at Pleiku and Soc Trang.

Directly under 2d Air Division was the 23d Air Base Group, activated at l)a

Nang with its 23d CAM RON. A detachment of tile group at Qui Nhon was

previously he 6222d Air Base Squadron.

General Anthis wanted a single control point for tile packets of teconnaissance detachments called Able Mable, Black Watch, Pan icia Lynn. and Sweet

Sue. He therefore requested a tactical air reconnaissance squadron for his 2d Air

Division, but tile Air Staff could not create the unit within tile authol tied foice

structure. In consequence the commander of Detachment I ,d " act ical Gioup.

exeicised a loose central direction over the reconnaissance operations.

The Mule Train C-123 units became troop carrier squadrons - the 309th

and 310th at Tan Son Nhut and the 311 lth at Da Nang. They were part of the

315th I roop Carrier Group (Assault), attached to 2d Air Division but assigned

to PACAF's 315th Air Division (Combat Cargo) headquartered in Japan.

The upshot of this sweeping reorganiiation was to tree Geneal Anthis from

dealing directly with twelve or more major subordinate units.-"

Farm Gate gained fresh aircraft in .anuary 1963 - five 1 -28s. ten B-26s.

and two C-47s - and by February boasted forty-two planes and 275 men.

General Anthis fashioned an air strike team of six B-26s and one C-47 at I'leiku,

which had been revamped to tw ke B-26s. Ile formed another ol five ' -28s and

171
THE ADVISORY YEARS

one C-47 at Soc Trang, whet e the unmproved 3.200-foot runway admitted only

T-28 operations."

Until General Ilarkins in midyear gave the Vietnamese border control

troops some aircraft of their own. Farm Gate flew combat support for then.

These forces embraced about five thousand Vietnamese army. rangets. and

Civilian Iriegular Defense Group personnel, accompanied by U.S. Special Forces advisors. They manned 103 outposts along Vietnam's 900-mile land botdei to

cut down on Viet Cong infiltration. Varying in si/e from platoon to battalion,

they further carried out covert penetrations across the ft ontier. State Department pressure prompted the Joint General Staff to forbid ground and air

operations within ten kilometers of the border without prior approval. MACV

termed the restriction "completely incongi uous," for this stt ip of de facto demil;-

tat iied territoi y afforded the Viet Cong safe haven 2'

Over the last days of Match 1963, U.S. Special Forces mounted an opetation in tile SLyen Mountains of southwestern Vietnam. Farm Gate bombing

before the assault killed about one hundied fifty enemy and iet the ground troops

move into the hills Capt. John Sercel. the 2d Air i)ivision forward air controller

assigned to the operation, went with the troops on foot and directed air strikes

with a PRC-10 radio. Even though the attack biought Vietnamese ten itor\

under government contt ol. the IV Cot ps commander protested the intrusion into

his /one. The Joint Genet a Staff then ruled that Special Foices teams had to

-equest aii support through Vietnamese channels. 2

Ien days later tile .Joint General Stall removed carliet curbs on boidet

operations. Vietnamese ground forces could now operate to tie border wherever

a geographical feature such as a river or toad cleat Il marked it. lse\Nhetc they

could go to withln one thousand meters ot the bordet. except along the not thel n

patt where a strip of ten thousand metes applied. Vietnamese aircralt could

operate to the border wheie it was clearly visible, elsewhcie to two thousand

metets if a forwatd air controller was at hand, and to fi\e thousand meteis

without air control. Corps hcadquarters rather than the.! oint Gencial Staff had

to apptove all actions along the fiontier. '

'I he State Department ordered Ambassador Nolting to ptess lot suspension

of the new plocc durcs since they could inflame Cambodia. North Vietnam. and

China Nolting was sympathetic to the new t tiles because of the considerable

supplies coming actoss the borders to the Viet Cong. All the same, he and

Genetal Ilarkins talked with Vietnamese otfictals about how boder violations

set iously disturbed the common intei ests of Vietnami and the United States.

Admiral -elt knew botder incidents could be disituptive, but thought that

ti imming infilti ation was \votth the risk. Gencial O'Donnell pl oposed hax m g

U.S. aitcialt surxcy the botder to cotrect map et tots. Ilis proposal \\as ,hel\ ced

lot Icat ot bieaching the 1962 Geneva agecment on Laotian neuttaht.lt

At the Sectetary of Defense Conference in Ilawaii on May 6. the participants agieed that the ti oops stationed along the border must do their utmost to

slow down enemy movements. But they believed putting pressure on I lanoi to be

a better way to end infiltration. In April the .Joint Chicts had identified eight

172

_I
I|~

Alit OIERATIONS. 1963

targets in Noith Vietnam that weie vulnerable to attack from American carrierand Thailand-based aircraft. Among them weie the Dong lloi and Vinh airfields, several highway bridges, lOI. storage, the I haiphong thermal powerplant.

a rolling mill, and a chemical plant. Bombing would be a warning to Ilo Chi

Minh but risked bringing Chinese air assistance to North Vietnam.

Mr. McNamara now recommended to theconfeiees that CINCPAC embody

an strikes against North Vietnam for" planning options. Perhaps tile State

Depaittment fetters on covert operations into North Vietnam could be

loosened. "

Roger Hilsman of the State Department informed the group that lie was

optimistic about tile border control exercised by the Special Forces and Montagnards. Strategic hamlets combined with MontagnaRd opetations were making dramatic gains. He predicted. -You have circles; in the center- of each circle is

a Special Forces team. These circles are getting bigger. When they close up, I

think you will see a noticeable choking down of the use of the infiltration

groups. '

Admiral Felt said lie also expected solid progress from theairstiikes agalist

Viet Cong war zones and bases. He scoied these power centeis as the "nuclei of

the VC 'governmental' structure," giving "protective sanctuat its" for offensive

enemy operations. and providing "little arsenals and installations." Unforturwtely, all-out interdiction clashed with the individual interests of the largely

indi(epeident corps commanders. While USAF liaison officers called for interdiction. air attacks not tied directly to ground operations began to decline. '

Vietnamese probes into Viet Cong Zone D during February and Match

made good use of preplanned air interdiction strikes. Rangers swept into the area

later and burnt enemy headquarters and camps along the Ma Da Rtiver. '1 hey

discovered deep, log-coveied bunkers built by the communists to piotect against

air attacks. Inasmuch as fighters usually circled befoi strikiig, there was enough

time for everybody to take cover.

In March the Air Force and Army advisors in that area got the go-ahead for

a piolonged low-priority interdiction bombiiig piogram. Planes ietut ning to

base with unused ordnance cotld attack targets uiider thediiection ol a Vietnamese lorward air controller. Strikes got under way on April I and went oii almost

every dav. It was difficult to assess results due to the jungle cover. On Aprli 30

fighters surprised a gathering of Viet Cong and attacked. Inspect ing the alea the

next day, the Phuoc 'hanh Province chie estimated that over one hundred

enemy had been killed. Viet Cong deselters confirmed that the strikes inflicted

casuialties, damaged morale, and kept evei yone on the move. but said the attacks

were no serious threat to their existence. The communists kept a fii m grip on

Zone D. continuing to collect road taxes and to exact ilibute Irom plantation

owners.

Between April 24 and May 24 the II C'orps commandcr speal headed a drixe

into the Do Xa War Zone headquarters arca of Viet Cong Inter/one V. in the

mountains on the borders of Quang Ngai, Koiturn, and Quang Ii Pr ovirces.

IIis five regiments of ground troops and two battalions oif Vietnamese ma iries

173
THE ADVISORY YEARS

totaled about ten thousand men, assisted by an air support operations center.

The three days of preliminary interdiction generated thirty-six A-I 1. fourteen

T-28, and thirty-four 13-26 sorties. Throughout the month-long operation. pilots

flew 115 A-I tl. 108 T-28. and seventy-four B-26 sorties. Besides killing five Viet

Cong, these timely and potent air strikes destroyed 238 structures and damaged

77. The badly scattered enemy would need several months to return and reestablish Vict Cong Region 5 which, like the old Inter/one V, guarded infiltration

routes to base areas. "

Air Force and Vietnamese pilots faithfully followed the rule that air strikes

had to be handled by a Vietnamese forward air controller. Although the procedure precluded armed reconnaissance aircraft from attacking targets of opportunity, it was a sound precaution against indiscriminate bombing. Crews staging

to and fi om forward airfields were encouraged to fly low and seek out the enemy

Before they could attack, however, they needed an airborne forward air controller. Army OV-l ctews enjoyed less stringent rules of engagement. Tiley

frequently flew as low as fifty feet, enticing the Viet Cong to open file so they

could shoot back. "b

Lt. Col. David S. Mellish, III Corps air liaison officer, secured authority in

September to stait an air interdiction program. Vietnamese province chiefs

certified certain areas free of friendly people. The air operations center scheduled

air strikes under forward air controllers into these legions. Provincial officials

reviewed each target belt weekly.

Tls interdiction paid off in Tay Ninh and Plhuoc Thanh Provinces duting

October, though the Viet Cong learned to disperse and take cover as soon as the

L-19 dropped smoke gienades to mark targets for the strike planes. Mellish

persistently urged armed reconnaissance in wholly Viet Cong sect ions. "Vietnamese pilots." he said. "should sweep these areas and shoot VC on sight. At plesent.

we are ineflective because our politically inspired target-marking is the best

possible air raid warning the VC could hope to hae."

Col. )onald If. Ross, 2d Air Division director of opei ations. ieminded lus

associates that the Vietnamese - not the Americans - wete waging the war.

Forward air controllers were vital to protect friendly people. "

Carefully targeted and controlled interdiction strike% on Viet Cong base

camps. assembly areas, and logistic in,,tallations were designed to help ground

troops clear and hold Vietnam. But the overriding air mission was support,

preparation and cover for heliborne landings, night hamlet defense, and escort

for convoys and trains a

Over the first half of 1963, Vietnamese L-19s usually escorted truck convoys

a lnd trains but strike aircraft covered those transporting lugh-priority calgoes.

Vietnamese and USAF planes flew close to one thousand sorties in these

missions. The Viet Cong ambushed no surface movement having air cover, yet

were quick to pounce on motor columns and trains wanting aerial escort.

Developed from original Farm Gate tactics, night flare,"strike missions in

defense of outpo;ts and hamlets under attack remained effective. One Vietnamese C-47 flareship stayed on night ground alert at Pleiku, a second stood similar

174
AIR OPERA I ONS. 1963

duty at Da Nang, and a third flew airborne altkrt every night ovei Ill and I\V

Corps. Yet the commander ol the 514th Fighter Squadion leliused to accept

oideis lor A-i l ,night-strike crews alerted at Bien Iloa and I'leiku. Ile argued

that his pilots were not leady to fly at night, but yielded to Amei can piessutic and

accepted about hall ol the missions icquested. Fighters w\oi king with a flareship

could commonly dispense with a lot ward air controller dui ing .,trikes in defense

ol an installation. I lowever. for close air stippoi t of friendly ti oops under attack

at night, a controller was iequiied to n ark targets.

Success of flare strike defensive missions depended upon the speed with

which those under attack could report to an air support operations center. By

May 1963 most villages had radios, and the time lapse between attack and report

aveiaged about torty-eight minutes. The delay stemmed chiefly from the shoit

ranges of the provincial ladio ti ansmitte s that demanded retransmission of

messages, often at district. sector, and division lexels. Viet Cong attacks on

hamlets and outposts from .lanuary thiough April wecie few. and an avet age of

thirty-three C-47 sorties was flown each month. The enemy customarily bioke

of an attack when a flare plane came oi the scene."

hi the far northern I Coi ps. the Ist and 2d Divisions controlled the coastal

plain to the mountains. The Viet Cong owned the mountains aside from Special

F-orces camps along the L.aotian border and in the A Shau \alley corridor

toward Da Nang. In mid-.lantiary 1963 the U.S. Marine Corps hl.hcopter

squadron 1 M M- 162 became operational at )a Nang. with staging areas at Ilue

and at a point midway between Da Nang and Qtang Ngai. This unit's 11-34s

supported the border outposts with resupply and troop-exchange missions that

normally needed no strike aircraft support. But air mobile troops assatilt operations took cai eful advance planning for fightei escort, landing-vone prepaiation.

and air cover. Ini these operations the 11-34s flew in three-ship elements, one

mtute apart. en route to the landing /one. The helicoptei commanders ian tile

whole affair, calling for sti ike aircraft to neutralic enemy file. Even though tile

Marine Coi ps helicopter commandei s evaluated tile Vietnamese A-I 11 pilots as

outstanding," they favored USAF fighters because there was no communications language problem. When a platoon of Army U II-I helicopters at Da Nang

was attainable in April. these gunships protected landing ,ones.

The I Corps commandei had to approve all requests for air strikes.

Menbet s of 2d Air l)ivision who visited the air operations center timc had the

impression that U.S. Arny advisors dominated the scene. [or example, the

advisors funneled many air support requests 'o " two armed OV- I Mohawks

stationed at )a Nang."

In the II Corps eight USAF 13-26s joined the four Vietnamese A-I Is at

lIleku. At once air support sorties rose, probably because Vietnamese ground

officeri could see the aiicralt on hand. But communications with the division

command posts at Qui Nhon and Quang Ngai were regulaly tmnrehable. And

bad weather in the moutains east and northeast of Pleiku iepeatedly impeded

flights to tile coastal provinces. '

175
'I lIe ADVISORY YEARS

DO XA HO

REA

AN IS"

AN Ou,l NIION

AN ME IHUO

WAR

WAR ZONE

ZONE 0

SEVEN

I MOUNTAINS AP A

RACH GIA

SO LN~ AIR OPERATIONS

CAI NUOC IEU

To shake weather restrictions. M ACV shifted two B-26s from Pleiku to Da

Nang. Since the Vietnamese pilots were unable or unwilling to operate out of Qui

Nhon and Quang Ngai. aircraft from Pleiku or Nha Trang suppo, ted the 9th and

25th Divisions."1 The division commanders complained that they had to divulge

their operational plans before they wanted to. Also for a short while, the 110th

Liaison Squadron commander declined to send L-19s to Quang Ngai. He

iesented the time a ground foice office had "usurped the job"ofa Vietnamese air

observer adjusting artillery. The T-28s dispatched to Qui Nhon and Quang Ti

were regularly late for planned operations, despite two days advance notice. Ihis

deprived at least one heliborne operation ol air cover. "When wc :;peak of

immediate air strikes in this division." wrote Lt. Col. Henry C. Meier. 9th

Division air liaison officer, "the ARVN only laugh and I can hardly blame

Vietnamese aiicrews executed well in the II Corps attack on the Do Xa

headquarters area during April 24-May 24. 1963. Their perfol mance was below

par in June. when the 9th Division triggered a 800-man heliboi ne attack around

An Khc. 1l he L.-19 chosen to work the landing /one was late. only on of the four

piestrike A-I Ifs properly deliveied napalm. and the 11-21 helicopters had to

cucle and wait for the air preparations. I wo days later, a Vietnamese forward air

controller brought piestrike A-I Ils to a landing ,one ten minutes early. On five

sepalate occasions in the coti se of the action. 1- 19 pdlots and observers were

176
AIR OPERATIONS. 19-63

unable to accept strike aircraft at ass;gned rendeivous points. Ail l-oice 1.-19s

with American pilots and Vietnamese observeis solved the problems. 4

'

Pooi perlormance by Vietnamese aiicrews imperiled se\eral ground operations in the II Corps. Openations nonetheless made marked gains m ound Saigon.

disrupting a key Vict Cong base and defending strategic hamlets in Quang Ngai

Province against severe conmunist attacks. More and more local residents came

lorth with infotniation on Viet Cong movements, and the Popular Forces

defending the hamlets killed 383 enemy while losing 33 of their o'n."

In the III Co'ps north of Saigon. Vietnamese forces were busy. Rangeis

pi obed into Zone D, the 5th Division engaged the enemy in Zone C of I ay Ninh

Province. and the 23d Division attacked Viet Cong bands and protected hamlets

in the Ban Me Thuot area. Not one of these operations teceiveed enough tactical

air support. The L-19s of the 112th Liaison Squadron at Tan Son Nhut worked

both IliI and IV Cot ps, ana thus weie olten unavailable to one or the other. Poor

communications between II Corps headquarters and Ban Me Thuot led to

authorizing the 23d Division eight T-28 sorties each day from Nha T'rang. As the

division pushed deeper into Tay Ninh Province and outran dependable landline

communications. iadio equipment troubles incicasingly impeded ir support.

The use of U.S. Army armed helicopteis for fire support came to be routine.4

The IV Corps employed the 7th and 2 Ist Divisions in the generally flat and

water-sodden terrain of the densely populated Mekong Delta, where transporiation was mostly by canal but some by road. The ground favored the guerrillas

who massed at places and tlmes of their choosing. Skimpy landline communications made for heavy radio tiaffic. At Soc Trang the five USAIF T-28s. together

with a detachment of l.-19s from the 122d Liaison Squadron at Can Tho.

affoided air stiikes and forward air control. like all other airfields in the delta.

Soc Tiang needed development. Its unlighted 3,300-foot runway was suited

solely to daytime T-28 operations. The glide slope \as too steep for a 1-28 to

touch down safely in wet weather. Though a T-28 could take offat night or in bad

weather to land after a mission it had to go to Saigon. MACV proposed

constructing an airfield at Can l'Iio to replace Soc Trang. Even so, building a

6.000-foot ru ,ay would take nearly S4.5 million in Military Assistance Program fund- and about two years to complete. Tlhe project continued under study

in Hawaii.- ,

The 7th Division was distinctly less aggressive following the battle of Ap

Bac. The division coinmander, believing that the Viet Cong were monitoring his

iadio. directed unit commanders to handcarmy requests for air support to the

division headquarte s. The 21st Division engaged extensively in helibo ne operations through February and March. Plans weie usually too ambitious for the

troops committed, and the enemy was never where he was supposed to be.

Postponements and no-notice changes in plans complicated the ai,scheduhing of

escort and strike planes. After three visiting Americans were pinned down by

enemy fiic for an hour while strike aircraft weme cimcling overhead and no

forward air controller was to be had, three USAF pilots were assigned to the

Vietnamese L.-19 detachment at Can Tho.4 9

177
I lHE ADVISORY YEARS

C~~ In April a dari ng scenario called or 2lst Division tioops to go to thle town

k ol Rach (ha by motor Convoy and to leint away ti om the obieeti\ e thle Viet

Cong tegional headquarters in w'iterii Kien (hang Pt oxince between Sexeni

Mountains and thie Cambodian botlder. Onl thle tollowing day. helicopters would

land ti oops to stoi mi the hecadquai ters andl to cut ofl pi obable escape rotutes to

the mountains. Aircraft were to fly coxer and stippot t. I hie plan ia\ haime been

compi omised. or the Viet Cong withdrev; front their sites sexeral da s beioic thie

satlt, Then a classic demonstration 0! oider. cotiet oidet . and disot der took

place. I hie di\ ision altered all helicopter radio licquencies and soin pat ticipants

faitled to teceix e notice. Sex etal ,trike diews orbited target areas waiting lot

helicoptersthiat niever appeat ed. hie gi ound ti oops did not clash xx th thieIoe.

btitl his fitie hit txxo U11I-1 and sex en 11-21 helicopters. Inteidiction bombing ii,

Sex en M ountains b\ .S*. and] Vietnamese strike pilots was Saidl to hax e\ killed

I o pre~ ent 'whitnisical tincoot ditiated changes in planned helicopter cpet -

tions diiectl\ affecting the escort." General Anthis asked thle NI ACV Joint

Iiequenie\ Cootditiating Board to set tip standard tadio frequenicies lot hieliboi ne operations and to insist oti their use. [he 2d Air lDivision assigned onc ol

its K\VWM-2A tadios and ant opera~tor to tile 21st Ditvision. 1 his gaxe tile U.S. aii

liaison olfiet a rapid communications link to cope with stidden chaniges in aii

slippot t tneeds. An Air-Groutid Operations School ot ettation teami front thle

Uniited States promoted uniderstanding amiotg 21st Division pet sotitiel of thle

procedlures for aii- suppot t at battalion and comipaniy lexels. Piestrikes. escort.

aild ait coxer wete ieqtiired itemns in 21st Division planninlg."i

Onl thle 14th and 15th oflittle tin Kien Ciiang Prox .tce. B-26 prestrikes and

'1 -28 coxer arnd escort helped thle 21st Division kill 33 enetnm (2 b\ air) atid

capture thirty. In An Xuxen P~rovince late in .litte. 107 communists weie killed

(55 ntvtwoPt ai). ex soni stakn. tidinaix rms an 1 rinitiois capttired.

"Air suppot t coorditnation." it was, repot ted. "was absolu..av mutstatiding"

In contrast was the clear neglect of air suppom t by the 7th DIix ion early in

J ul .' lie dix sioti commandet aimied a hieliborne thrtust at a Viet Cotig force tin

Kien I-oa P~rovinice, relying onl the litepower ol four 1,4-- gtunships. Thcse

hielicoptet s could not knock out the guns dug in at the tree line adjiacent to tile

landing ,one. B~efore thle afternioon was oxer. grountd lire hit elexen helicopters

tit! \omiedthiec I '.S. Arm\ crewmen. C alled to thle scene, two 13-26s. six

'I -28s. atd two AI)-6s tangled with tile comimunlists. The \'iet Cong reticated at

nightfall, leaxing behinid the tweimt our men killedi by air strikes '

I lie loss to enemy gi ound fire of twvo B-20s i. lcbruai y atid a 1-28 in Jtine

spturred a boost in tit strike fiiepoxver. With two 13-26s inl lieu ol onie and fotir

I1-28s rathet thani two, thecmexvs c~itild cover each other duting loxx-lexel passes.

Unfoit tnatelv. bigger flights meatnt fewer ni'ssiotls. General Anthis accetltedl the

iimportanlce of good defensive flyintg. mutual cover. stipprecssion of hostile fitec b\

stiaflg. evastixe mraneuveIrs. atnd avoiding tneedless exposure to ground fire.i4

Statitoning Vietnamese atit units at smnall outlying airfields closer to tlie

grountd action was well-nigh itipossmblc. Acuti: shortages existed inl creccfs.

178
AIR OPERATIONS. 1963

electi ical specialists. arnorei s, and other skilled men. There was also a deai tl of

specialist tools, test sets. as well as bomb-handling trailers and other groundhandling equipment. In consequence the Vietnamese aircitet at forward fields

weie quickly out of commission." Yet Col. Harvey E. Henderson, deputy

commandei of 2d Air Division, could say, "In my six months here, I have been

amazed at the rapidity with which the VNAF have learned and improved their

operations.""6

Belying the progress was the resurgence of Viet Cong attacks. In July the

communists successfull\ struck hamlets south of Ban Me Thuot, and ambushed

the roads leading into the area. They cowed the Montagnards, who became less

helpful intelligence sources. In a ten-minute attack just before midnight on July

16. twenty to thirty 60-m mortar rounds slaimed into troop housing at Can

Tho Aifield and wounded seventeen Vietnamese and U.S. Special Forces

troops. The guerrillas slipp,:L away without casualties. "

Statistics revealed a rising trend in Viet Congattacks and other incidents but

a diop in the number of communist casualties, weapon losses, and defections.

Even though General larkins was pleased with the fifteen thousand Vietnamese

operations per month in July and August, the National Campaign Plan needed a

shot in the arm. Many offensive forays failed to find the foe. There were too

manv one-day-only operations, too few night ones. The Vietnamese did not

patrol deep within Viet Cong areas, pursue enemy troops that broke contact. and

captali/e on air reconnaissance." ,

Beginning in September, the Viet Cong swept over exposed hamlets in the

area south of Ban Me 'I huot In the better-defended hamlets of Quang Ngai

Prosince. enemy, "activity teams" of three to five men achieved some gains.

Vietnamese intelligence identified a large-scale, well-planned communist offensi\e in 0,,' Mekong Delta. 9

Visiting Vietnam during the last week of September. Secmetaiv McNamara

and Geneial Taylor deened the military situation good but political conditions

explosive. A week later in Saigon. General larkins told members of the House

foieign affairs I-ar East subcommittee that the military effort was going well

despite the shaky political scene. A significant JCS assessment suppoited this

view.60

The faster tempo of Viet Cong attacks created new air support needs as

Vietnamese and USAI' ait power diminished. Vietnamese Air l-orce units

appeal :d to be more inteiested in training than in combat. The 5I 6th Fighter

Squadron commander trimmed the T-28s in his detachment at )a Nang from

'eight to four. He based his action on the desire to release some '1-28 pilots for

upgrade training to A-I Ils. In September the 514th Fighter Squadron commander gave on the average just nine of his twenty-six A-I Il Is to the air operations center for daily strike missions, saying he had to divert flying hous to A-I H

pilot upgrading. For reasons unclear to Alne icans. he egularly ignored equests

foi napalm strikes. This happened principally in the III and IV Corps during the

rainy season. even though incendiaries worked better than explosives in the

179
I AMIO ) ~ -I 

-F. (Top) ARMN paratroopers teap Irom USAF

C-123 Providers ini a combat training exercise near Saigon

reconnaissance mission in S Vietnam

(Bottom) After ffyin, convoy escort in the,, , 0 Bird Dog Capt B U, -,ks;man (left) ano

Capt D F Scholl (iright) confer with

F RO ai~ os~c
Al! RO ER AION S, 1963

water-soaked terrain. Clews deployed Ior a while away 1i om home bases seemed

to be unmotivated, uneaget. and unreliable.1

,

Under the rules ol engagement. Farm Gate continued to fly those combat

mission that te Vet fmse could not. Though gi\en more people Farm ate

failled to increase its sortie late. "[ he unit hand been permitted to scale down

eormal maintenance because on the field operating condition. Moeo\er, the

planes We being he overworked, and by autumn tihre were i becoming less safe to

fly. The operational teadiness rate ieached only fifty to sixty percent, detchigte

to spare parts shortages. Inflight mechaica catl misreand enny action likewis

took their 'oil.

A major cause of -26 fatigue not yet identified in the field was thre

eight 750-pound bombs hung o specially designed racks under the aircraft's

wings. When the 3-26 was airborne this weighoto ovei stress the wings. But

taxiingthe heavily arned plane for many months over iough rutwaysand aps

imposed excessive "negative G-force" th bgoigthe wings to thce fatigue ciol an lost e-26 appIroac and recombat mission ony Augst 16. killing

A lm it r or1 I wi "On Magh rkB-6 bing ifiihdi h ntdSae

two Americans and Vietnamese. C p September . was no better. 1wenty-three aircraft suffered battle damag . Anotherag3 o inin T-28 clasha d becutelve

support~~-2 Vitdms plane ground of'nies

mechanical faiues. On the 23d. three Vit Cong gueraillas cut taough the

perimeter fence at Nha Trang and with package explosives blew tip two C47so oeneral Anthis hoped to keep the B-26s going by havrng tie crews then aly 

cautiously and se 1soft approach and raco\ery tactics. In afl event. every 3-26

was set for rotation through depot maintenance contactd ith A As i

Taiwan. Anthis urged replacing twe battle eary 1-26s with dual-control Navy

A-1 E fightr or with "O(I Mark" B-26Ks being iefuibishd in the litd State

by the Oo Mak Engineering Company. n August and September te Ist Air

Commando Squadron ws down r i to n a\erage of nine T-28sand nine to twelve

13-26s. Still, Farm Gate was supposed to Ap its sottic Sq rate by venua rcdnt to

sdipport planned Vietnamese ground offensives.s i

Altho gh Farm Gate owned fwer planes after October 1963. standld

USAF maitntenance procedures by the 3401 CAMRON at Bien lloa lifted tile

operaitionially eady rateto a: ound ~.,ecnty-eighit percent. Past t i Gate practice culd thir'ty to forty f,"erna.'unws to refute L real m. and Itirn aiud l(h

of two '1 -28%,. ewsafety checklists made two-hout tur'narounds for *I -28s and

thtce-hou, ones, for B-26s (lie norm. 'I oo Jew aircialt and a cutback in flyingL

dampened morale in tile over manned I st Air Comnmando Squadron. Depressed

cr ews, wa ted I or day., to 11\y a st i ikc imission."'

A dearth of IL-19s (0-1s) and crews for forward air control also sharply.

curtailed combat operations. Between May and August, 431 air support requests

had to be turned down. The arrivwd of the Armly's, 73d Aviation Company and tile

activation of the Air Foice's 19th'"1actical Air Support Squadron did not ctie the

trouble. Instead of placing tile twenty-two O-Is of the 73d Aviation Company under the tactical air control system, MACV assignecd them to support Army advisors. 'I lie Vietnamese promptly withdr-ew their 1,-19s from tile glound

divisions becatuse tiey felt that thleir ciaf't were no longer needed, Armny0-I sflew
T*HE ADVISORY YEARS

the local \isual reconnaissance and consov escoi t pieviously flown by thle

Viet namlese Ilaison planes. I lowce i, ienmal ol thle L195 depi aved for ward airI

conti ollers anrd aii liaison ol ficei s oftiansportation. uinless th(. could hot row

0-Is Irom the Airily advisois.

As I or tile 19111 *ULctical Air Support Squtadron. it was full\ operational by

September 15. The unit. commanded by L~t. Col. John J. Wilf'ong. kept sixteenl

0-Is at Bien I ba and six at CanTlio. Dv year'send t hey hlew 3.862 sorties, chielis

483 lorward air control. 1.221 \isuial reconlna issa nce, and 1.518 combat support

liaison. The "pi omnpt response and can-do attitude" of thle crews bred a hutge

demand foi theni services,. The Americans met with slight success inl tiving to

augment rather than supplant Vietnamese liaison operations.f1

A few IJ SA F pilots who hless with Vietnamese f orwardl ir controllers

icali/ed that these men had been doing a boiing and fairly thankless job forimany

years withI no end inl sight. Since thle average Vietnamese pilot saw thie law of

averages working against him. lie was reluictanlt to fly below two thousand feet. If

lie directed anl attack oii r r1 ndly people. criminal prosecuition awaited bli.

Noinethieless. the prevailing A ni iicanl view pic:tired VietniamIese ci ews ats uinaggressise aiid unreliable. lBy October this disapprosal was being expressed by the

overwhelming sentiment that "we must run things.""

As sorties swelled to ineet \'let Cong atak.peison gifr~ sr

seldom iiPracical. Responding to requests. Viemnariese for sard air coiti ollers

ft equten tlI flew mans miles to a irifa miliar area -1 hey radioed the gi ound unit

to find out the locations of friendlx anrd enemy troops. thein miarked targets for

the strike crews.Air Force officers repeatedly urged] the Vietnamese to attach air

liaison officers and for svard air conitrollers to divisions. so they could get to know

th ilca conditions. The Vietnamese Ai Force said rno.,itn th sarcity of

qutalifired ofi icer s. the failure of the voting ones to work well when removed froml

close supei vision, and the discoid between air and gi ound officers.'"

IDisisioris teiided to rely tipor ihelicopter firepower. I'or exarmple. inl tinier -

otis small operatirolns inl Ban Me I litot area throtughout Septeiiber . the 23Ld

lDisisiori requested ighter alr stipport onl\ once. *1 lie lone C-47 flireship standinn alert for- tlie Saigon area cotild not copte with the bill geoniirz night attacks iil

the Ill and IV Corps Moreover. whlen the Viet Cong sti tick thle Pho Sirih

outpost onl the Ca Mail Peninsula ditrg thle night of August 10. thle pr-o'irice

comriaiidei 's indecision delayed that (C-47. IiI the one hour arid Iortx -lise

Mintutes bef oie it cariic. the comiiiunists oserr an the otutpost. A few days later.

fle enemy sacked the Beii 1 uorig strategic hamlet that had been fouinded a sear

before with Muintch IiIanfaire. Uisinrg flireshirps to light t he ssa\ for hielicopter air lifts

(if coiiparis-si/c forces into besieged hamlets pr ovedh impractical.] 1 is, was dire to

tile great riuriber of hiamilets (some twelve hiunrid l ile I II ('or ps) and thle Slow

eactiot i tme oil liborne r errioceriieit units fly ing iii thle dar k

I lie 2d1 Alir hDm sioii wrestled with the pi oblcriis N iglitl\ ever v alerted A-1Il

Iloadedco strike or dnanrce anrd two I hi s. t lhtter for use if fbai es lips were niott to(

be had. [cii add(1ittioriaI fliare misiionis. tilie best bet appeared to be the C - I 23 whwhI

cart ed a spare Vietniamese navigator comniiiiicator . I losse i \%hen this

182
AIR OPERATIONS, 1963

ciewman hand-dropped the Mark V and VI flares, they often hit the sides of the

aircralt and were swept back into the open icar cargo door. To prevent this, local

shops de, ised a flarebox that dispensed flares flom the C- 123's rear cargo ramp.

This device let the C-123s at Tan Son Nhut join the Vietnamese C-47s. and in

Septeniber 172 flaic and 132 strike sorties were flown against Viet Cong night

attacks. Fewer communist forays in October resulted in 60 flare and 94 strike

sorties. But the pace accelerated, and up to three flareships each night were kept

in the air over the I V Corps. At least one of these planes could reach any point in

the delta within twenty to thirty minutes. The Viet Cong captured no outpost or

haiilet alter a flare stiike team arrived. Even so, the hamlet plogram was so

o\erextended that in many cases the defenders could not hold off the attackers

until air support got theie.69

"1 he vulnetable Mekong Delta induced the Viet Cong to escalate the war

from simple guerrilla tactics to sustained field operations. A five-day battle

ei upted in the wee hours of Septembei 10 as 8 I-mm mortar rounds anced onto

Soc Tiang Airfield. Inside of five minutes, four Farm Gate pilots scrambled two

T-28s. called for Ilareship and more fighters. and stiafed the moitar nuzle

flashe, This swift air support along with Vietnamese mortar fire drove off tile

communists. foiling their bid to neutralime and destroy the American fighters and

helicopters on the airstrip. The aggressive action of the pilots was "commendable." All the same. they had broken the rules of engagement by attacking without

Vietnamese crewmen and without target assistance from a forward air controller

o0 flareship."()

At about the same time. Viet Cong battalions pounded the district headquartet s town of Dam Doi and Cai Nuoc near the tip of the Ca Mau Peninsula.

Swaiming over Ca Nuoc, they set up roadblocks and laid mines on the sole

surfaced road between Bac l.icu and Ca Mail. Right after daybreak. T-28s out of

Soc Trang escortec' heliborne Vietnamese marines to Dam Doi and carried out

prelanding strikes. Most landings went %%ell. but that afternoon a 1-28 crashed

fiorn fiie eceived during a third pass over an enemy machinegun. A UH-I

gunship iescued the crew, and tile T-28 was destroyed to keep its machmnegun out

of communist hands. While marines encircled [,am l)oi, ten C-47s and seven

C- I 23s flew 498 paatroopers of the 21st Division to the scene.

Th batle Cost thle Ienmy 122 killed (30 b air strikes) and huge .,tores of

munitions. Around Cai Nuoc the paratioopers killed 50 communists, captured

eight., aId sei/ed weapons. The sortie rate for September 10exceeded all past IV

Corps records for a single day. Over September 10-14 the sortie total ran to

,eveiltv-two aii cove, ten escort. eighteen prelandimg, and twenty-two forward

air coitrol. The government ti oops won a victory but the \'let Cong red uced the

towns to rubble a:nd left 153 civilians killed or wounded." l

I he most ci itmcal shortcoming was too few strike aircraft to support the

bittei war i the delta. Only one 13-26 could be spaied to cover heliborne

operations in the 2d Division area. The five USA F 'I -28s at Soc Ii aug were

inmahuable toi quick icaction but the piimitiye airstiip hampered them, and

theii guns wer c too light to silence ground fire. iheavier-ar med A- Ils or B-26s at

181
THF ADVISORY YEARS

Bien H oa had to make a thirty-minute flight to Can Tho ora one-hour one to the

deep delta. Aware of this lag, tile Viet Cong usually attacked in mid-afternoon to

make it difficult for aircraft to get into *! ,area, to swing into position. and to

strike during the few remaining hours of daylight. 2 In J.anuary 1964 CI NCPAC approved the construction ofa new aii field at Can Tho, to beready a year later.'

Planning a helicopter assault into three lading /ones in mid-Octobei, the

21st Division asked for strong tactical aii support. Five USAF T-28s, two

A-I IIs. and one 13-26 were available for cover. escort and prelanding strikes. On

the morning of October 19. T-28s supported the first helicopter lilt ot troops

which met with light ground fire at the landing ,one. The Viet Cong put stiffer

fire on the second heli-lift and pinned down the troops that landed. The\ also hit

and damaged a 13-26 and a T-28, forcing the planes to leave their covering

stations. The third heli-lift overshot its landing zone. and enem, fire downed an

11-21. injui ing two of the four Americans aboai d. With troops in the second and

third heli-lifts nailed down, Vietnamese foI ward air controllers divei ted all of

their air cover to close air suppoit strikes.

In iesponse to the division commander's call for more air suppoit. tile

planes returned and ienewed their strikes that afternoon. Army advisors praised

teie aggressiveness of the support. chiefly that of the 13-26. It pursued the attack

with other ordnance after its guns quit. even though under fire from six to eight

automatic weapons. The Viet Cong held firm in their trenches and fired doggedly

at attacking aiiciaft. When they withdrew at nightfall under covei ofamin, pursuit

by flaieship and fighters was out of the question because locations of govei nment

forces were unceitain. During the battle. Vietnamese flew six A-I ll and eight F-28

sorties while USAI- crews flew sixteen T-28 and two 13-26 sorties. Ground file

Strutck two Vietnamese T-28s. four USAF 1 -28s. and two USAF 13-26s. t-iiendl

losses included forty-one killed, eighty-four wounded, (twenty-tI ee Americans)

and one H-21 shot down. Thirty-two of the enemy were killed aid in addition

fifty-nine fieshly dug graves were found.'

Early on the morning of November 7. some two hundied Viet Cong

attacked a pagoda and then holed tip in a imud-walled fishing settlement aboti

twenty miles fr'om Soc Trang. Il late atternoon, regular giound foices and Cni\l

(Juaid troops located and sunotnded theri. Although no1liendly people were in

the ,,illage. the government troops made no assault. Instead, they let four i -28s

Ii om Soc 1 rang conduct iepeated strike,. The next da\. blood marks %% ithin the

enclosure suggested that the aircraft had killed about forty Vict Cong .1

B3y the end of 1963 the government military offensive was collapsing. despite

occasionlal iid isolated sticcesse. Ile Vict ('oig were ,e/irig the initrati\ e neaidll

evervwliere. 1 he limited number of IrSAI- and V.etnarnese aircialt in VietnaIi

had neietheless scored some tactical gains ill the face of se\eic handicaps. "

184
XVI. Collapse of the

Diem Government

At the Sectetar'y of I)cfcnse Conference in tlonolulu oil May 6. 1963, the

participants discussed the tensions between the American and Vietnamese

governments. Ambassador Nolting labeled Amelican-Vietnameec relations as

"somewhat less than good." President Diem was intimating that the United

States was infringing on Vietnamese sovereignty. Nhu. his brother and counselor. was suggesting that the American advisory effort was -appearing to tamper

with Diem's political base." Both were suspicious of the strength of the American

commitment and the thrust of U.S. policy. Nevertheless. Nolting said. Nhu was "efficient and continues to accumulate power." Despite causes for concern. the

Country Team is of the unanimous opinion that the curient leadership is the best

the U.S. can get. It is sincere, albeit not particularly adept, but it is better than

most in Southeast Asia.'

Two days later in Saigon. d.monstratois celebrating Buddha's birthday

paraded with religious flags, banners, and devotional images. The procession

violated the 1950 ordinance forbidding the flying ofany flag in public without the

national emblem beside it. A monk delivered a sermon protesting the Diem

government's discrimination against Buddhists. When Civil Guard troops

moved to break up the tally. an explosion killed several persons including

children. In a communiqu6 to the press. Buddhist leaders demanded that the

government admit responsibility for the loss of lilte. iescind the flag iegulation.

and give Buddhists equality with Catholics.2

Some eight million Vietnamese were Buddhists. as compaied with one and

one-half million Christians. Diem. Nhu, and their families had connections with

French missionaries who represented the old order.

When a Washington newspaper published an anti-American statement

attributed to Ngo Dini Nhu. RCejc.scntati,,c Otto Passman. charman of tile

Subcommittee on Appropriations vented his indignation tc l)cfense Secretary

McNamnra. "Certainly." Passman said. "the l)iem goveinment ought to be

made to understand that the American people have no interest in popping up an

unpopular regime i it is more concerned with the pursuit ol personal aims than

with the protection of the country from communism." An embarrassed Pre ident

Kennedy told newsmen that he hoped to withdraw some Americans by the end of

the year.'

Diem meanwhile offered no rcdres, to a Buddhist delegation but piomlsed

to investigate the parade incident, whichl he believed had political rather than

religious roots. l)issatisfied, Buddhists demonstiated early in .lte in I lue.

Several deaths resulted, and disoiders spread to Quang Tri and Nha I rang.

While the Defense l)epartment ordeied U.S. aircraft not to transpoit Vietnamese troops on anti-Buddhiust missions, and while General Ilarkins mnstiticted

185
THE ADVISORY YEARS

Americans to stand aloof from the controversy, Diem acknowledged various

errois by his officials.

In Saigon on June II, an aged Buddhist monk burned himself alive in

public. Three days later, a New York newspaper carried a Washington correspondent's story that the United States would condemn Diem if he failed to settle

the Buddhist grievances. The Vietnamese foreign minister told William C.

l'ruehart, in charge of the Embassy during Nolting's temporary absence, that he

was "deeply distressed and angry" over the news report. Truehart then asked and

received permission to publicly reaffirm U.S. support of Diem. Within a few

days, the government acceded to most of the Buddhist demands but refused to

accept icsponsibility for the deaths in Hue.'

Buddhists demonstrated again on July 16. Crowds of monks and nuns

milled in front of Nolting's residence in Saigon. calling on the United States to

compel the Diem government to keep its promises. Violence erupted on the

fc aowing day.

The U.S. air attach in Saigon. Lt. Col. Robert L. F. Tyrrell, informed the

l)efense Intelligence Agency that the Buddhist situation was "causing continuing

animosity between the government and the armed forces and is spreading to all

segments of the population. It is now common to hear Vietnamese discuss the

possible overthrow of the present government." At a dinner party on July 17,

Maj. Gen. Duong Van Minh, Diem's military adviser, stated that "the present

govelninent cannot continue." There was speculation that Minh or Maj. Gen.

1 ran Van Don. chief of staff of the ,oint General Staff, might head a coup. "We

cannot determine if a coup is imminent," Tyrrell concluded, "[but] all of the

elements are present and it appears to us to be only a matter of timing.'

A radio addlress by Diem oni July 19 seemed cold to American observers,

and Madame Nhu was said to have termed the Buddhist suicide a "barbeque."

Admiral Felt. CINCPAC. estimated, "In view of the widesprcad distrust and

hatred of the Nhus. man and wife, far overshadowing the popular consensus to

Diem himself, it seems most likely that the Nhus would be a primary target for

any setious coup gioup." The government's "failure or unwillingness to handle

pioperly" the Buddhist demonstrations made a coup "more likely if the Diem

government faIls to accomplish reasonable and acceptable concessions to the

Buddhists or if the Btuddhist contagion. fanned by political olmI)ot tuniss and te

VC, sp.,ads into the countryside to the extent that it adversely affects the

progress of the war."

President Kennedy had meanwhile annuunc, on June 27 that Ilenry

Cabot ILodge. a major poittical liguie, would ticceed Ambassador Nolting. a

caicer civil servant. Preparing for his new post, ILodge had a long talk in

Washington with a "distiinguished Vietnamese" who said that "unless they left the

country. no power on earth could pre, 'enl the assassination of Mr. )iem. ls

brother Mr. Nhu. and Mr. Nhu's wife ... theni deaths were inevitable."

Over Augast 14-16 several more immolations took place as expressions of

discontent. Madam Nhu favored ignoring the burnings and charged the lS.

Embassy wit piessurig the )ien government to silence her.'

186
COLLAPSE OF THE DIEM GOVERNMENT

To General Anthis, 2d Air Division commander, Diem was "fairly well

liked" by his people. even though lie had not developed all the reforms they

desiied and tie United States wished. In contrast, Anthis deemed the Nhus "not

too popular.' 1

Informed people in Saigon expected sweeping changes from Ambassador

Lodge, who appeared to be proconsul for Piesident Kennedy. Perhaps to clear

the decks before Lodge's arrival, Diem held an emergency meeting with the.loint

Geneial Staff on August 20. He appointed Tran Van Don the armed forces chief

of staff, and Nht, invited the senior generals to sign a paper calling upon the

government to seize and silence the Buddhist leadeis. At midnight )iern declared

martial law and a state of siege. Under nominal army atthority the Vietnamese

Special Forces and police stormed Buddhist pagodas in Saigon and Hue befoie

dawn. They rounded up monks, nuns, and students, but the Buddhist leadels

escaped and took refuge in the U.S. Embassy. The pagoda raids strengthened

those officials in Washington who had always questioned the fitness of I)iem and

his family to govern. On August 21 Under Secretary of State Geoige W. Ball

released an official statement that the United Stated deplored the repressive

actions against the Buddhists."

Ambassador Lodge reached Saigon on August 22. lie found Embassy

officials thinking that the Vietnamese gencials could depose Diem, but General

Don told General Harkins that they wete too weak to do so. The gencials wanted

to end martial law quickly, to have the United States support Diem while folcing

him to clean house and showing him how to delegate authority, and possibly to

create an interim cabinet of officers and civilians. 1'

On August 24 Ball, Hat riman, Hilsman. and Foiiestal drafted and cleated

with the ["resident by phone a message of instructions to Lodge. The United

States could no longer tolerate the systematic suppression of the Buddhists or

Nhu's domination of tile government. "We wish togive )icm reasonable oppoi -

tunity to remove Nhus, but if lie remains obdurate, then we aie plepared to

accept the obvious implication that we can no longer suppoi t Diem." Lodge was

to tell the Vietnamese genetals that tie United States would ienounce l)iem

unless he righted tile Buddhist wiongs and folmed a mote responsi\c and

representative government. The United States would take no pat i any ouster,.

but would recognize an interim anti-communist militai v regime as tile succcssor

to tile Diem government."

On the 26th a Voice of America broadcast in Vietnamese said that lugh

Ameican officials blamed Nhu for tie pagoda attacks and the mass arrests ol

monk,, and students. The United States. it continued, might shai pl\ ci tail aid

unless [)resident l)iem rid himelf of certain associates. I he Joint Genelal Stalf

iefuted the broadcast on the following day. Responsible military cominande s.

tile piess commtnique announced, had unanimously proposed martial Ilaw and

related measures to )iemn. "

Ambassador L.odge became convinced during his iist week in Saigon that

the l)iemn government was dying. the abuse of police power ha ing caused (Jeep

resentments amiong the Vietnainese Ihe Bhudd hst ililniolations had also tinl tied

187
THE ADVISORY YEARS

tile American people and government against l)iem. Secretary of State Rusk

told Nolting when he returned to Washington. "We can't stand any more

burning," Rusk said."'

At a National Security Council discussion, Nolting made the point that

iefusal to support Diem and Nhu would ienege on past commitments. Ball

argued that continued support for them risked losing the war against the Viet

Cong: moreover. Diem and Nhu had massively violated their promises. I larnman felt that Nolting had been profoundly wrong for quite some time."'

Replying to the cabled instiuctions, Ambassador Lodge suggested telling

the generals hostile to Diem that the United States had grave |eservations about

the Nhus. The State Department approved on August 28 and commented that

the Nhus would have to go and "a coup will be needed." Lodge responded on the

29th, "We are launched on a course from which there is no respectable turning

back: the overthrow of the Diem government." President Kennedy weighed this

appraisal then ordered Lodge and Harkins to support a coup if it had a good

chance of success but to avoid any direct American involvement. He authoried

them to suspend U.S. aii support to the Diem government whenever they wished.

Also on the 29th. Secretary of State Rusk permitted Lodge to explole

Ilarkins' suggestion that a threat to withdiaw U.S. assistance might well force

Diem to dli op the Nhus. This seemed to Lodge to cancel the earlier msti umentatiois to "make detailed plans as to how we might bi ing about Diem's replacement.' I le now understood the President to want him "not to thwart"a coup, not

to help plan a coup. but rather to keep in close touch with plotteis so he could let

Kennedy know of developments that might need American decisions. Looking

for the imminent overthrow of the govei nment. Lodge stopped seeing Diem and

Nhu.I"

1v August 29 CINCPAC alerted two Marine Corps battalions foi possible

commimert, and moved naval task forces and air transports to within supporting distance. Plans were set for the air evacuation from Saigon of 1,574 U.S.

dependents, 1,103 civilian employees, 981 U.S.-sponsoed aliens, twcnty-fixe

tourists, and seventeen alien dependents, and from lue another 157 persons."

Cambodia broke diplomatic relations with Vietnam on August 27. citing

bordei violattions ,nimd ill-teittment of Buddhists. Two da\s later. Charles de

Gaulle offered his good offices to restore peace and harmony in Indochina by

reunifying North and South Vietnam in "independence and neutrality." At the

request of Asian and African members, U "1 hant. United Nations Secretary

Genc ral. wrote on August 31 to ask Diem to insure "the exercise of fundamental

hunimn rights to all sections of the population." On that day Chiang Kai-shek

talked at length with Gen. Jacob E. Smart, PACA I- commander. Chiang said it

was essential to win the war because Asian states were closely watching the

United States in Vietnam. In Thailand influential figures told Smart that some

officials doubted if the United States could be depended upon in a crisis.

In a national television addrcss on September 2, Kennedy said that the

Government of Vietnam could win the war only if it had popuhla support. In his

opinion the government was out of touch with the people. The Buddhist repres188
COLLAPSE OF i'IE D)IEM GOVERNMENIl

sions had been unwise. Could thfe governmtient iegain the atlection ofithe people'!

"Witlt changes in policy and peihaps with personnel."the lPresident said. I think

it can. If it doesn't make those changes. I would thintk tha-t the chantics of xwining

would not be \eivy good.

D~e Gauttlle 's scemtie to unilyand neuti ali/e Vietnlam led Ngo Dinhl Mill to

admit having contacted Viet Cong leaders of thle National Liberation F-ront of'

South Vietnam. Appai ently hie was also inl touch with H anoi. Oil September 2 hie

told ILodge of his talk with thle Polish membei of the International Control

Commission. TUhe Pole had sought Nhu's reaction to De Gauille's proposal, so

that hie could f*oi ward it to thle North Vietnamese foreign miinistler. 2, Manly

top-level Vietnamese olhiceis wvere convinced that Nhu would make at deal with

Hanoi if hie felt it to be inl his best intei est.

Diem answered U Thant's letter onl September 5. He stressed his government's actions to free the Buddhist hierai chy from political agitation and propaganda. which benefited f'oreign interests and harmed the Buddhist iehgion and

thte Vietnamese state. lie invited U Thant to send a fact-finding mission to

Vietnami. WVhen a United Nations group Visited, it icehed no conclusions.

Nevei theless. the Costa Rtican member said that hie personally had found no

ieligiotis discrimination or persecution. lie believed that thle troubles wvere

political and involved butl a small part of the Buddhist commutnity. 2'

Onl 8 September General Smait iadioed General LeMay:

NI \ \\11 I leellig is tlhai if %\ C In[ienld t o remtain comm ittled inl Viei Naim and I

belies e i at ii is sti ongl\ InteIIatotlitrs that s\ edo Si then %%c 0105!support

lDiern Whether \%.e like hinm or hIl la mil\ is not germa ne M\ conclusioin is t hat \\ e

Iiilist stick \kst icil~it and that ms must qmiikl demionstrate this b\ posilis actioni

cs en t houigh \%c ma ima ae to pay some price inl terms ot etitarrassmleflt We mite

probably going to lame to 555 alloss thle fact thtat tDieml still not eile Is brother and

front m\ discuissionis I aml ilot at all (:oil\ ined that this should be our objectise I get

distiiti impressiontIrom V'iet namnese that hie isauahle aid Inmporiant to tDiem. iutmas

t iCem is Iiiporianti to tile niation 24

Unlike Nolting who had used the country teami to secuie policy consensus.

Lodge was ordeicd by Kennedy to guard closely the cables, they exchanged.

Keeping even H arkins inl the dark, he thus appeai ed to be ruinning thle U.S.

mkssioll a, "a one-man opei ation. conducted inl total seciecy." General Sinait

noted, "The American team ... left mie with the imiplessionl of a divided house

and divergent diicctions." Opinions about Dietmas observed by Smart. ianged

from the view held by John II. Richardson, CIA station chief,. that lieml could

he suppol ted and Nhu w\as useluil. to the view that the lDiemi government must go

no matter what to')k its place.2' Repoi t-, to Washington hiom thle Embassy.

MACV. and the aii aitach16 diffeied markedly. Joseph A. Mendenhall of thle

State D~epartment and Majl. (;en. Victor If. Krulak of the Marine Corps visited

thie countiNv together to dletermine '. ietniamese attitudoes toward Diem's governmient. Alter heai g their dispai ate f indings, Pi esident Kennedy'asked whether

they had visited the same couintry.

Suspending U.S. alid to piessuie Diem, as Lodge now suiggested. seemed to

Secretaries Rusk and McNamara to thi eaten the wvar eff ort. li esident Kennedy
TIE AI)VISORY YEARS

inclined to agree. On September 2 i he again sent McNamara and Gencral Taylor

(JCS Chairman since Octobei 1962) to gather information and to encourage

Diem to solve his problems. I odge in his briefing was pessimistic about the

survival of the l)iem regime. But other observations led McNamaa and Taylor

to conclude that the l)iem government was consolidating its control throughout

the country, and that the military effort still had momentum. Some militai v men

were hostile toward the government but they weic mote hostile toward the Viet

Cong. Reluctant to cut off economic aid. McNamara wanted more potent

military action against the insurgents. More dangerous than the political ferment

in Vietnam was the rising dissent anong Americans at home. A need existed to

build a case to be put to the people and Congress, to cemeat their confidence in

the Kennedy administration and its handling of the war. Consequently,

McNamara emphasied to Diem that he must conduct hIk militar and political

aflairs in a way that would win the support of the American people. Finally.

McNa maia aiid raylor weie convinced that the war could be favorably ended in

1965. with the insurgency then shrinking to sporadic banditiy in outlying areas.

The\ accordingly announced that as scheduled there \vo u ,,- c une thousand

fewer U.S. military advisors by the close of 1963.2'

On October 2. subsequent to a National Security Council discussion of the

McNamara-'laylor repoit and Lodge's recommendations, Plresident Kennedy

approved the following policy satement: Since the mihtary progiam i Vietnam

was sound in principle and progressing, the United States would go on working

with the Vietnamese people and their government. "1 he goal would be to deny the

cotuntrv to communism and to suppress the externally sttmulated aind supported

Viet Cong insurgency. Ftirlthermote. the "United States had made clear its

continued opposition to any iepiessive actions in South Viet-Nam. While such

actions have not yet significantly affected the riihtar.v effort, they could do so in

the f'tture." '

Events in Saigon \\'ere far from eas,,tring. On Octobe 3 Vietnamese

plainclothesncrn a.,saulted American newsmen. and Lodge protested The next

day a Buddhist monk bulned himself, the sixth and most publicized case. On

October 16 the Senate foreign relations committee approxed an amendment to

the forcign aid authortation bill. It empowered the President to extend to

Vier ram assistance designed ptiely"to further the obejctives of victory in the war

against communism and the return to their homeland of Americans inolvcd in

the sti tiggle." Nhu on the 17th de . red to the press that he failed i- understand

\h the United States had "initiate i, process of disintegration in Vietnai." I le

accused the CIA of inciting a cow" against the government. Five days later, the

United State announced the en. of support to the Vietnamese forces unless they

were shifted fh on police duties to field operatrons or related training programs.""

At this point, a major plot against Dieri was hatching under the leader ship

of Generals l)uong Van Minh, Tian Van )on, arnd I.e Van Kiri. They reprcsented a coalition of older men who wanted a neutralist solution to the war, aInd

of younger men who .,ought a military victory and felt stie they could secure it.

With the pi omise of cooperation from the I, II, aind 'II Corps commandes, the

190
COLLAAPSE DFIItE DIEM GOVERNMENT

coalition iesolhed to reinov tle IV Corps commander who was also nltar\

go\ei nor of Saigon and loyal to Diem.

Although American of icials took care to aoid any part in the coup. so ,se

I .S. military circles r(ceived persistent reports that a conspiracy was afoot. On

October 28 the Joint Chiefs diiected CINCPAC to sail a naval task force to

positions off Vietnamn. and that same day thiee USAF F-102jet inteceptois flew

to lan Son Nhut. General Ilarkins was taken aback when told of these moves.

lie had no idea that Diem, overthiow was near."'

On the moining of November I the conspitatois gatheied in the Joint

General Staff compound, and began to bring troops into Saigon. General Don

announced that a coup had begun, aod in the afternoon American CIA personnel were informed. Troops w\ith ied neckerchiefs poied into Saigon from tile

north. By midafternoon they captuied and imprisoned all Vietnamese Special

Forces in the city who weie loyal to Nhu.

Hie iebellion ran with precision. Troops took oer key installations and

sutri ounded Diem and Nhu in the palace. Four A-I lls and two T-28s made gun

and rocket strikes against th, presidential compound. Elorts of the IV Corps

commander to march troops to the capital fi,,led. That exening )ien and Nhi

escaped from the palace through an underground passage. On the following day

they surrendered. %. hey weie assassinated while being taken to the Joint General

Staff complex. "

As the fighting in Saigon ceased on November 2. a Military Revolutionaiy

Council of twenty-four geneials and colonels under Genials Duong Van Minh

and Tran Van Don became the provisional government. Besides dissolving the

National Assembly. it suspended the 1956 constitution and decreed an interim

one. The United States recogniied the new% governmen: on November 8. z

Judging that the council was united and set on stepping tip the war,

Ambassador L.odge proposed that the United States not piess for instant political reforms. The generals had agiced to pui sue the strategic hamlet program

(now% called "fortified hamlets") and to consolidate and upgrade their defenses.

They spoke of massing all military, paramilitary, and ci\ il forces for an all-out

campaign against the communist threat. In addition they iecugnized the Joint

Gene ai Staff.

Despite their designs, major tasks remained stalled. Wholesale ptiges and

transfers sowed concern. There was little military moxement.

North Vietnam exploited at once the confusion cicated by tile coup. Viet

Cong attacks rose. Becausc the Vietnamese Air Force was temporarily on "coup"

duty, USAF clews shouldered the bulk of the operational load. On the night of

November I, for example, tile mere appearance of flareships caused the Viet

Cong to break off attacks on eight outposts, Over the following week the

guerrillas assa tilted seventy-one outposts and hamlets. Enemy pressure prompted a total of 284 flare and 298 stiike sorties in November. The insurgents

n,:vertleless inflicted about twenty-eight htndred casualties that month. dlemorali/ing the Civil Guard and Self Defense Corps. Though Viet Cong losses wle

191
THE ADVISORY YEARS

put at twenty-nine hundied for the period, government forces lost nearly three

weapons for every one they captured. '

President Kennedy on November 14 announced that Rusk and McNamara

were going to I lonolulu lot a meeting on the 20th. Its purpose was to sie tIp the

,ituation and to find out how to intensify the struggle and to end the American

in\ olxnent. "Now." the President said. "this is our objecti\e. to bring Americanrs home, pei mit the South Vietnamese to maintain themselves as a free and

independent countr\. and permit democratic foices within the country to

operate .""

Among the impiessive group at the meeting in Honolulu \%ere Secretaries

Rusk and McNamara, Ambassador Lodge, presidential aide McGeoige Bundy,

CIA Director John A. McCone. ICS Chairman Taylor. Admiral Felt, and

Geneials Smart. Harkins, and Anthis. Secretary McNamara iemarked that "a

certain euphoria" had set in since the coup, but actually "the Generals head a \cry

fragile government." Rusk asked whether "an increase in dollars would make a

diffeience in shortening the war." Lodge said he thought the Vietnamese had

enough dollars-, what they needed was "greater motivation." McNamala a igued

that more funds would help.

Despite continuing difficulties tile conferees resolved to adhere to present

plans. The United States would hurry the growth of Vietnamese military power

and pare U.S. personnel in Vietnam. The much publici/ed withdrawal of one

thousand Americans would therefore proceed as scheduled. The first three

hundred departed on December 3. the rest ten days later. "

But the assassination of President Kennedy in November 1963 signaled the

end of an era, and the accession of Lyndon B. Johnson to the presidency marked

the beginning of another.

IT I

Vietnamese troops outsde the presid'ntial palace in Saigon.

192
Part Four:

The Johnson Years
XVII. Objectives Confirmed,

Methods Expanded

Four days after taking office, President Johnson reaffirmed past American

objectives in Vietnam. The United States was to help the republic win the war

against the externally directed and sustained communist conspiracy, assist the

government in developing public support, and keep U.S. military and economic

aid at the same level. "This is a Vietnamese war." the President said, "and the

country and the war must in the end be run solely by the Vietnamese." He

reiterated the October 1963 pledge to withdraw some Americans from the

country. Yet at the same time he instructed the State Department to prepare a

white paper, documenting Hanoi's control of the Viet Cong and its supply of

them through Laos. He further solicited JCS plans for stepped-up clandestine

warfare on North Vietnam and for cross-border incursions into Laos to check

infiltration.'

Informing General Taylor on December 2, 1963. that Vietnam was the

"most critical military area" for the United States. President Johnson asked the

chairman to have the Joint Chiefs assign the best available officers to Harkins

-"blue-ribbon men" at every level. He aiso sent Secretary McNamara to visit

Vietnam again. "

During December 19-20 in Vietnam, the Defense secretary found General

Minh's government "fragile"and "indecisive and drifting." Unless current trends

were reversed in the next two or three months, they would lead "to neutraliation

at best and more likely to a Communist-controlled state." The dilemma for

American policymakers was that potoring in personnel and other resources to

prosecute the war would hinder rather than help the Vietnamese stand on their

own feet.

Unable to resolve the basic problem, the secretary listened to CINCPAC

plans for covert actions against North Vietnam. Vietnamese troops were to carry

out a wide variety of sabotage and psychological operations to pressure the

insurgents with minimum risk. As for extensive forays envisioned along the

Laotian border. McNamara doubted if they would be politically acceptable or

militarily effective. But he approved having U-2 high-altitude photo planes in

Vietnam to obtain better information on enemy infiltration routes.

At McNamara's suggestion, the President on December 31 assured Minh of

lasting American support. He gave final approval to clandestine actions against

North Vietnam and to the U-2 flights. The movement of Strategic Air Command's U-2s to Bien Hoa proceeded so swiftly that PACAF first knew of it when

the planes entered the traffic pattern at Hickam. The high-level photography

later revealed extensive logistic networks in North Vietnam and Laos, supply

routes capable of infiltrating large numbers of trucks, men, and material into

South Vietnam.4

195

PRIECEDING PAGE BLANK-NOT FILM
THE ADVISORY YEARS

General Ilarkins felt hopeful that the Viet Cong attacks had peaked immcdiately after the coup. His optimism was short-lived. Government ground

actions that had decreased after Diem's downfall sprang back to between five

hundred and six hundred a day by November 20. but they were blunted by

mismanagement and defeat. A new commander spurred the lethargic 7th Division south o Saigon. but he was relieved before the month was up. Neither of

two battalions conducting clearing operations in Long An Province knew that

the other was there, and they fired on each other. The clash killed two men and

wounded twenty. exerting a "demoraliiing effect on both units. '

Befoie dawn on November 24. the aggressive 2 Ist Division fell victim to a

carefully planned and executed ambush in An Xuyen Province. After the Viet

Cong sti tick the Cha La outpost and a strategic hamlet near the tip of the Ca

Mau Peninsit', . the division hurried four hel-lifts of troops into two landing

iones, with tactical aircraft flying prestrike, escort, and air cover. Enemy fire

downcd an H-21 and damaged ten H-2 Is and U H-Is. While the ground ttoops

took cover. USAF and Vietnamese A-I tls. B-26s. and T-28s made repeated

attacks in which valor at times outweighed discretion. C-47s and C-i 23s paradropped a battalion to pinch off the foe's withdrawal route. The guerrillas

escaped because the C-123s put most of thetroops on the farside of the Cai Nuoc

River. Three bodies were discovered and there were signs that at least one

hundred fifty insurgents had been carried away in sampans.

Brig. Gen. Robert H. York, USA. who saw the entire operation. commended the fine work of tactical air. The operation was nevertheless costly to the

aircrews. most damage coming from .50-caliber fire. Aircraft losses included an

H-21. a 13-26 shot down with loss of the crew. and the crash landings after battle

damages of two Vietnamese A-I ls and one T-28. Ground file hit twenty-five

planes. The helicopter force had consisted of twelve 11-2 is and thirteen U 1-Is.

Its support came from four "1-28s foi prestrike missions, two B-26s for escor:

and three B-26s. eight A-I I-s, and twelve T-28s for cover. It was the largest

one-day close aii support operation to date. '

In an otherwise cheerless month Capt. Richard W. Von Hake, air liaison

officer, engineered one small air victory against the guerrillas along the Dong Nai

River. The Viet Cong habitually fired at aircraft but slipped through a sweep of

tle aiea by a goxcrnmcnt battalion. On December 8 Von Hake persuaded the

province chief tojoin him on an IL-19 flight over that ground. Since the battalion

had just finished its sweep, the chief felt sure he was wasting time. To his great

surprise, he saw more than fifty people as the L-19 diew brisk fire.

Von Hake drafted an air strike plan and on the 9th and 12th dropped leaflets

to warn that peisons working with the Viet Cong were in danger. Because the

area was bordered by strategic hamlets, the hamlet chiefs blocked egress from

dawn to noon on December 14. On that morning Von iakc and a Vietnamese

observer flew into the area. discreetly fiailed by three T-28sand two B-26s. When

the L-19 was fired upon. the observer marked the target and the strike planes

swept in. Twenty-three enemy were killed and others wounded.' This modest

victory showed that armed reconnaisance could succeed iii Vietnam.

196
OBIIECTIVES CONFIRMED. METHODS EXPANI)ED

Twice in December. guet rillas in Zone 1) ambushed little convoys lacking

air escort. 'I he Viet Cong waylaid one in Binh Long Pro\:1ce on the 23d.

resulting in lourteen men killed, seven wounded. and fixe missing.'

Vietnamese and U.S. Air Force planes flew seventq-three helicopter escort

sorties In Novcmbei and eight\-three in l)ecembei .a deciease from earlier in the

year. In part the decline miiored the slowing of Vietnamese ground operations.

It also stemmed from the growing piactice of letting U.S. Army helicopter

gunships take the place of stiike aiiciaft this despite MACV directives

iequiring the use of Vietnamese airciaft befoic bringing in American planes. '

In III Corps the 5th )ivision's penchant for helicopter gunships contributed

to a major defeat oi the afternoon of December 3 1. A ranger battalion ran into

about two battalions of Viet Cong ten miles west of Ben Cat and eight miles

southeast of Dau *Ticnig. The outnumbeied rangers formed a defensive perimete

and fought bravely, but they needed help. Thc 5th Division had several battalions

at Ben Cat and Dau Tieng. close enough to the scene of action and sufliciently

strong to smash the insurgents. An 1.-19 forward air controller and at least two

A-I Its weic constantly on station over the enc||cled rangers. Besides the twelve

100-pound bombs and eight hundred rounds of 20-mm ammunition carried by

each A-I 1, more strike aircraft wete available at Bien Hoa and Tan Son Nhut.

Capt. Ken C. Speas. Ir.. air liaison officer, titne and again asked that the

A-I [is be ,llowed to strike what weie clearly enemy positions. But his calls fell on

deaf eais. The ei biting telays of A-I Hs returned to Bien Iloa without firing a

shot. The sole air strikes came from three flights of at med 1ill-Is and failed to

uproot the guerrillas. Rescue battalions arrived at noon on .lanuary I. 1964. long

after the rangers had scattered. Ranger losses totaled six killed, twelve wounded.

andl thirty-one nmissing. Ani engagement that mnight have been a victoi vendled in

another disheartening defeat.

Col. Hal vey E. Henderson. acting 2d Air Division commander. conside ed

the failure to capitalize on strike aircraft fit epower "to border on being criminal."

Ambassador Lodge cabled the same conclusion to Washington. citing"Vietnamese failures to take advantage of superiority of firepower which can be obtained

by rapid teaction to VC troop concentrations." Admiral Felt bluntly told General Harkins that A-I II firepower was quite superior to that of the U 1-I. "It

appears to me." Felt said. "that [our] education program on the use of air power

is unsatisfactory." '

'1 he Vietnamese A-I II and T-28 squadrons boosted their strike sorties in

November and December 1963. Still. they could not compensate for the fewer

serviceable USAF B-26s and T-28s that were further diminished by battle

damage. Moreover, the work of the Vietnamese forward air controllers left a lot

to bedesired. On December 6. for example.an !.-19and two T-28s responded to

a request for an immediate strike on a Viet Cong battalion. When just tel

minutes from the target, the controller pleaded the need to refuel his half-full

tanks. lie and the fighter pilots touched down at 'lay Ninh airport, lunched

duing the refueling, and went on their way. By then the enetny battalion had

vanished.

197
THE AI)VISORY YEARS

Assessn-rnts of the political and military conditions in Vietnam at the close

of 1963 \\,ere decidedl\ pessimistic. Seveming relations with South Vietnam and

the United States. Cambodia sought closer relations with China. Although

communist suppO t of the Viet Cong stealing into the delta through Cambodia

had already proved 'very woi nsome.' prospects swiftly worsened. The geneial

situation in Vietnam had akso eroded since the assassination of Diem. and would

continue to be bad in 1964.'2

Diuing .anuary-May, 1964 Hanoi sent an estimated forty-seven hundred

troops into South Vietnam. Formerly most of the infiltiators weie ethnic southenters. Now there were growing numbers of native noithernters, many of themt

drafted into the North Vietnamese Army. The Viet Cong had earlier ielied on

French and American weapons. chiefly from stockpiles captured before 1954 in

Indochina and Korea. Ciirrently most of the weapons w\,ere Chinese. brought by

land and sea from North Vietnam. i

On Jantuary 22. 1964. the Joint Chiefs of Staff responded to President

Johnson's November 1963 request by presenting a ten-point program of"bolder

actions to arrest SVN's military political decline." This proposed a virtual

takeover of the war from the Saigon government by overt and covert bombing of

North Vietnam. large-scale commando raids, mining the sea approaches. ground

operations into Laos. and extended reconnaissance over both Laos and Cambodia. The plan also called for committing more U.S. forces to support combat in

Vietnam and against North Vietnam. "

At Da Nang. where lie commanded the I Corps. ttirty-seven-year-old Maj.

Gen. Nguyen Khanh kept close watch on the new government. He believed that

some members of General Minh's 12-man Executive Committee w\ere plotting to

arrest Minh and other officers, including him. and declare for Vietnamese

neutialism. After notifying General Harkins of lus intentions. Khanh flew to

Saigon and on Jantiary 30 headed a coalition of youngel generals who managed

a relatively bloodless coup. lie told larkins the next day that the coup was

pro-American. pro-Western, and anti-neutialist. The new government would

step up the war at once. Harkins termed Khanh the "strongest military character

in the country"even though he lacked political appeal and complete control over

the armed forces. Ambassador Lodge thought the United States was "beginning

to make real progress" with the Minh government, but Khanh's one-man rule

might be more effective. President Jlohnson then sent Khanh a personal note of

support. i"

A few days later. JCS Chairman Taylor readied a plan to revitalie the

counterinsurgency. The key points embraced improved intelligence: a stabilized

Klhanh government through reforms of land tentie: liquidation of land debts.

and other measures: the prospect of no more coups: a quickened campaign

tempo: boldei actions against North Vietnam, maybe by Vietnamese bombing:

and U.S. warnings to Hanoi to stop its aid to the Viet Cong. i", The CIA warned

that the government and armed forces of South Vietnam must show definite

improvement. If not, there was an even chance at best that Khanh's admmnistiation would not sum vive during tie following few months.' "

198
OIBJEC'lIVES CONI:IR MElD. METHODS EXPANDED

Ilhe new gomernment could not immediatel, tuirn ,he tide. About twelve

miles south ol 'I aN Ninh vitl tIhe \ illage of Ben Cau, a cluster ol six strategic

hamlets housing some six thousand people. Beloi e dawn on l-ebruary 6, neai lv

one thousand guerrillas diove the Vietnamese militia out of Ben Cau. While

waiting for the go\ei nmcnt oices to appcar. the Viet Cong olced the villagers to

dig firing positions and shelters. Alhhough USA F ofliceis thought that precise air

attacks would dislodge the insui gents with least danger to civilians, the I II Corps

commander auithoii/ed filing into the village b\ aitillery. strike aircraft, and

helicopter gunships. Paii s of A-I Iis. B-26s, and T-28s struck as directed by

\' ietlamese forward air controllei s.

The insurgents Iled after dai k. leaving ele\ en of their dead behind. Civilian

casualties numbeied foI ty-six killed. sixty wounded, and 670 burned It varying

degiees. The bombardment demolished 670 houses and damaged two hundied

others, depriving two thousand people of shelter. Though American relief supplies soon came. the stir\ ivors were more grateful to the enemy who made them

dig for cover. Vietnamese officeis said there would be no complaint about the

civilian casualties. Yet the USAF counterinsurgency expeit. Maj. Gen. Edward

G. Iansdale. pointed out that the government forces had violated a caidinal rule

by not protecting people under Viet Cong attack.I"

Cambodia posed a prickly problem to the Khanh regime. Prince Sihanouk

charged on February I I that two Vietnamese aircraft had attacked a Cambodian

village and killed five people. lie held the United States pai ly to blame because it

had "overarmed" Vietnam and "toi pedoed" plans foI an international conference to establish Cambodia's neutirality. I.ater border incidents impelled

Sihanouk to accept arims fromt China and the Soviet Onion. During Vietnamese

border actions on March 19. Cambodian T-28s shot down a USAF 0-I. The

Antet ican pilot. Capt. Uwe-Thoisten Scobel. and the Vietnamese obserxer were

killed." '

In the interim, intelligence estimates in Washington highlighted Ilanoi's

intent to expand support foi the Viet Cong. South Vietnam's situation was seen

as extremely ,erious. On February 20 President Johnson ordemed Secietarv

McNamata to have the Joint Chiefs study the question of how to decrease

I lanoi's activities. McNamaa sent the Piesidents directi\e to .ICS Chairman

Taylor on the 21st. adding that among alternatives being considered was "a

caefully planned progiam designed to exert increasing military pressures" on

North Vieilnain.:0

Johnson said publicly on f-ebruary 21 that those dii ecting and supplying the

Viet Cong Wei c playing "a deeply dangerous game." lie also formed the Vietnam

Coordinating Committee to run the Washington side of the wai The chairman

was Mr. William 1H. Sullivan, a [oiieign Service officer and the United Nations

adviser to the State l)epartments Bureau of Far Eastern Affaiis. Membeis

epresented the Depaitment of Defense. the Agency for Inte national Development. the Central Intelligence Agency. and the White House. The President told

Sullivan to find a way to speed operations against North Vietnam and to

examine how to make I lanoi desist from its hostile actions.2

199
'111' AI)VISORY YEARtS

DA NANG

TAM KY*

.'LUKU

MA,'C. YANG 6 OUI N14ON

VUNG 90

SAY

SIN CAI t01 L01 0 w00t'S * DfN CAS)

0 RUNG LAP

SIN"1 01 AP SAC

LONCM AIR OPERATIONS IN SOUTH VIETNAM~

0 1964 TO FEBRUARY 1965 KIEN tONG

As the war seemed a bout to enter a new phase, there was talk InI Washingtoll, H awaii. and Saigon of voluntar rv epatrliat ion of' U.S. dlependents hioni

\'ietnin1. 13ut thle hope of keeping Khanhl III power led to tile dlecision not '

move dependents out ol'the country.-2

Gcnei al Khanh onl I-ebruary 22 published the National Pacilcation Plan

thlat NI ACV had desii ed since IDieng's ovei thi ow. The concept calledI br local

"spi eading oil stain" oi, "oil spot" operations. Ihese were militai\ c lear-and-hold

aetions starting in) Safe areas andl rolling back thle Vijet Cong. Within paeified

regions a new "life dlevelop~ment program-wotild enhance thle eivilia n standa i d of

hl ing. I'lhese pacification measui ',, were to be completed in I and 11 Corps b\

J1an~ua ry I1, 1965. antd in Ill and I V Corps a yeai later.21

Coips commanders were to write their own p~lans foi 1)111stung thle ovetall

goal. In the Ill Corps. for example. a program commencing inh. ine was expeeted

to push outward in concentric circles until the adjacent provinces ol Gia Dinh.

Blien I ba. B~inh IDuong. Ilu Nghia. I ong An. and Phuitoc I uv wei e firmnly un1dei

government control.24

CGeneral H arkins concluded that the offensive would work "if theme aic no

mloi e coups and K ha ul stays alive." 25 And the .loint Chiefs accepted the oil spot

Idea as pai t of "an integrated political. socio-eeoonmic. and psychological

offensive to suippoi t moli fully thle military effort."I hie Chiefs enldoi sed giving jet

an eralt to the Vietna mese Ail Force and to the Farm Gate Ist Air Commando

20W
OBJECTIVES CONFIRMED. METHIODS EXPANDED

Squadron. lhe\ likewise urced studies of how to escalate operations against

Noith Vietnam.2

To PACAF. the papers and studies flowing out of Washington and Hawaii

mirrored "the uneasiness with which U.S. authorities view the possibility of

engaging U.S. giound forces with Communist foices anywheie." There was

another way, however. Strictly USAF opelations "with initial non-nuclear

strikes" would hand the Air Force strong arguments for building its tactical

foices. At the same lime the United States would be able to ieact rapidly to

thieats. to control operations caiefully. and to pull out at once il need be. 2'

General LeMay as usual had little confidence in the "very limited" actions

and studies iecommended by the .loint Chiefs of Staff. "We are swatting flies." he

said. "when we ought to be going after the manure pile." lie wanted "more

positive and bolder actions" to include bombing targets in North Vietnam "now."

The Air Foice Chief fa\ored expanded interdiction. ci op destruction, attacks on

guerrillas in Laos. (lestroving dams and dikes in Noithern Vietnam to flood croplands, disrupting powver sources, bombing North Vietnamese militai centeis.

and mining poi ts. lie advocated sending more aircraft includingjets to enlarge

airdropped and airlanded operations. gieater bombing of taigets beyond the

reach ol giound forces, and heavier escoit and cover, lie wished to iclax the

barrici s to cross-bordei actions. To keep the United States from getting bogged

down in a ground war on the Asian mainland, the only hope was massive air

operations.

Pi odded by General L.cMay and pursuing tile President's explessed views.

the Joint Chieis in early March proposed overt military actions against North

Vietnam. The initial phase would witness low-level reconnaissance over Laos

and Noi th Vietlnam. Air stiikes., amphibious raids, sabotage, and harassment of

shipping were to follow. Then would come destruction of highway bridges.

airticlds. POi. dumps. and other supply targets. The climax would be full-scale

aii and naval air opeiations against North Vietnam.

Walt W. Rostow. chairman of the Policy Planning Council at the Depaitmcnt of State. thought Noith Vietnam vulhnerable to bombing. After all, Ilo Chi

Milli was io1 longer a guerrilla with nothing to lose he had an industrial

complex to protect W Averell Harriman and Roger Hilsman of the State

l)epai tment opposed escalated measuies against Noi til Vietnam, since the I.aotian infiltiation routes seemed to be used but little.2

1

On Maich 6 Khanh fired three corps commandeis and five ot the nine

dlvision commanders. Soon a wholesale iemoval oftwenty-thliee provilce chiefs

eisted. The disruption of leadership shook the confidence of the armed forces

and of the people. Militaiy desertions soaied. Meanwhile the piestige of the Viet

Co ng i ose. 2

'

Weakness at Saigon and decentrali/ed military command let tile corps

com mandeis store up power. Rancor between ground comillaildels and prov'-

ince and district chiefs bred confusion and disagreement. Air Foice officers

sensed that icooidinated air strikes might permit some party to make the

Americans a scapegoat for a tiagic incident."'

201
TiHE AD)VISORY YEARS

Belore making uip his mind oin thle options at hand, Piesident Johnson sent

Secretai v McNamara and General Taylor to Vietnam. D)uring M/ai cii8-10 the\

aomanied General Khanh onl his speechmaking visits to Canll .iaeIiu

the Ii oa I lao area. II te, and Saigon. Onl the platform. McNamara and 1 aylor

stood onl either side of' Kha nh and lifted his hands inl the air as a \isible signl ol

U.S. suipport.U1

[In pi iv~ate talks. Mc Nama i and TI* olr gained thle impiesvion that the

milita rvsit nat ion had goniedcown hill. Nearly forty peicent oP, the countryside v~as

tinder Viet Cong influence and control. includ~ing the ci itical pi o\ inces at otind

Saigon. Ini eight of the forty-three provinces thle instilgents held sewenty-fiw to

ninety percent of the land. K hanh was stile that his gow i nment troops could

clear the cotintry but doubted if' they could keep it. lie pieleried covei t actions

against North Vietnam until "icar-at ea secuirity" was set tip. No one was optimilstic abotit limited covert operations although clandestine activities could be

ex~pandled by easing cturbs onl bombardment. "Men. money, and materiel wec no

objiect." McNamara said. The U nited States had to piess onl. Aftet discussing thle

aerial mining ol North Vietnamese waters, thle D~efense secretat\ y diected that

mine-laying training f'or Viet~namese p~ilots begin at once.

Ambassador Lodge objected to -massive clesti tiction" betoic ti inga "ca

rot and stick" approach. The United States cotild otfer North Vietnam adu ntages for- ceasing aggiession. while at the same ltme confronting I ianoi with

cm~ert actions stch as iniackniowledeged ir iistrikes. Photos by RI- 101 t econnatssance planies revealed aictive Viet Cong bases right actoss thle boi dci in ('ambo-

(lii. Buit hot ptutit across the frontier was i tiled ott in light of American

negotiations to keep) Cambodia fromt giving tip) neuitiality and winding up inl thle

I lanoi and Peking camp. The political damage wotuld (,it- otime igh antit militaty

worth. '2

Sect etarv Mc Nanat aasked it it wvas better to shote tip) the Vietnamese Ai

Foice or to sendi more USA Faircraft. lie learned that Amecricans hlad to "f ill In

the gaps catused by lack of motivation" onl the part ot the Vietnamese Air I-orce.

"'it s i natbi lit y to produtce fast w act ion stikes. and1( its ilci cta nce to I l\ at night and

onl weekends."

Alter a it ind ot talks inl I a wa ii. Mc Namaria and 1 ayvi tIle%% ba. K to

Washington. 'I hie lDefense secietary proposed twelve steps to Pi esidenlt .iohnsonl

for changing tiw couise of the wvar. Though stiessing actions within the country.

thle sect etary stiggested that plans be laid lot hot cer-conti ol act ions inside I aos

and Cambodia ov seventy-two hotis notice. These woulid be "tit-l ot-tat" bomlb

sti ikes and commando raids by Viet namnese forces onl such North Vietnamese

targets its communications centers. training' camips, and infiliation rottleN. i-or

the piesent, McNanmai a resistedl boi der-conti ol or gi aduated military pi essute

operations. lie nevet thlcess thouight thet e ought to be standby plin" lot gi adttally tigliteniqn, the screws onl North Vietnami. The planls wotuld be t mgget cc on

thitty dlays notitee and tinvolve at - attacks on i ita ry and possibl ) vndulstitm

tatI get s.

202
OBJECTIVES CONFIRMED. METHODS EXPANI)ED

'The Joint Chiefs judged the )efense secretary's progiam to be too

spatse unless quick decisive action against North Vietnam was added. John A.

McCone, CIA director, labeled McNamara's proposals "too little, too late." lie

urged swift operations ill the south to match intensixe aii and naval moves on the

notth. General LeMay spoke to the point, lie did net think that the 'military

tools and concepts" weie "generally sound and adequate." IIc deplored the

shackling of sound military activities with artificial political bonds that events

had long made obsolete.

The National Security Council concuned in the Secretary of Defense's

iccommendations bit warned, "The United States should commit itself to the

cleat objective of preventing the fall of South Viet-nam to Commutnism."Otherwise the restrlt would "destroy SEATO." Plesident Jiohnson harborcd doubts btt

approved the proposals, prefer ing the secretar v's approach to that of the Joit

Chiefs of Staff. 'I he political and military base in South Vietnam seemed too

fragile to invite expanded cnemN hostilities. lurthernore, strking North Vietnam might bring the Chinese and Soviets into the war. The President asked all

agencies to support energetically the actions called for. '

Shortly fterwads the ioint Chiefs answered a question put by Johnson on

Match 4: 1lad all possible support been given American and Vietnamese units

since he had become President? The chiefs satd they had hoped for stronger U.S.

action to encompass air reconnaissance in Laos and Cambodia, clandestine

intelligence operations in Cambodia, hot pusuit by ground troops, inspection of

Cambodian shipping in the Mekong Delta, and jet fighters for South Viet narn.

But all had been turnid down due to national policy. "

In a major address oil March 26. 1964. Secretary of Defense McNamara

explained the four options open to the President. The United States could

withdraw from Vietna m but this was completely untenable. Victnam could be

neutralized, risking an eventual communist takeover. Military actions could be

spread into North Viet nam, a choice being carefully studied. Or the United States

could locus oil helping the Vietnamese win, the option already appieyed by

,Johnson. Even if fighting beyond South Vietnam was needed, it would stipplement rather than substitute for general progress and stability in the country.

[he decision to center on the battle inside Victnam underscored the demand

to iclax the rules of engagement for air operations. On March 27 MACV

authoried stike aircraft to operate to the border if it was a river or road.

Elsewhere they could fly as close as two thousand meters when directed by a

forward air controller, five thousand meters when not. Aircraft were forbidden to

fire across or violate the frontier without diplomatic clearance.

The State Depa tmient sympathi'ed with tle.ICS stand for hot puttsuit into

Cambodia under certain conditions but contested any easing of the curbs. This

position governed in 1964 and was reiterated firmly by MACV in October and

November after aircraft flew over the border by accident.7

Following a SEATO Council meeting in Manila on April 15, Secretary

Rusk and General Wheeler went to Saigon. With Ambassador Lodge they

weighed the chances of squeezing North Vietnam by Vietnamese covert opera203
THE ADVISORY YEARS

tions, by coeit U.S. support for Vietnamese aerial ,mining and strikes, and lastl

b\ covert American-Vietnamese naval displays. bombardments, and air attacks.

Rusk felt that the limited resources given Vietnam inhibited U.S. officials from

daring new efforts. lie wondered whether enough Americans were aiding civil

administrative setvices in cleared areas that had to be held. On Apiil 28 the

Presidenxt theiefore suggested to Lodge that "two or thlee hundred" troops be

replaced b\ civilian advisois to shift the emphasis toward "the art of peace. "

'"

Ianoi meanwhile became more belligerent. On April 13 Ho Chi Minh

declared that if the U nited States cartned the war to North Vietnam. he had

"pox\crlul friends ready to help" him. In the Laotian panhandle. North Vietnamese construction crews, signalmen. and truckdrivers improved infiltration routes.

Also in Apiil a North Vietnamese regiment was recalled from Laos and g;\ en

special militai y and political training for operations in Vietnam. Hanoi began to

form new regiments for dispatch southward.19

Ilaving probed Laotian govcrnment forces since November 1963. Pathet

Lao and Noi:h Vietnamese troops on April 27 launched heavy attacks oti the

Plain of .ais.4 After boasting that they could take ally district headquarters in

the Mekong )elta. the Viet Cong on the night of April 12 overran the district

capital of Kien Long on the Ca Mau Peninsu!a. In the ensuing air-ground battle.

the etiemy lost at least fifty-five men killed including the commander. Yet 283

Vietnamese and 9 Almericans were casualties, the capital was in i uins, and somle

two hundred civilians were killed or wounded. On May 2 a Viet Cong undeiwater demolition tean sank the Ut.S. aircraft ferry Card while it was berthed in

the Saigon River and delivering helicopters.

Stung by these siccesses. General Khanh told L.odge on May 4 that lie

wanted to declare wai on North Vietnam. lie wished to have ten thousand

Special Forces troops "to cover the whole Cambodian-Laotian boider. Would

the United States start bombing beyond the confines of South Vietnam?" 1|

On this question there was a serious split between American policymakeis

and cxen within the .Joint Chiefs of Staff. General l.eMay and Gen. Wallace M.

Gicene. Jr.. USMC. had urged low-lexel reconnaissance and air strikes against

the north by U.i. aircraft. In a shift of opinion the other JCS menlbeisChairman 'laylor. Gen. IHarold K. Johnson. USA. and \di. )avid L.

McDonald. USN- behe\ed that heavv piessure was not wai ranted, at least for

the present.

In its study of how to tighten the sciews on North Victnatm. Sulli\aF's

Vietnam Coordinating Committee noted that North Victnams economy was

chiefly agiarian. There weic relativey few industiial targets that if wiped out

would have an immediate militaiy impact. Still a steady stepup in ail power, from psychological applications to selective strikes, could hurt Hanoi and slow

its suppont to the 'iet Cong.42 CINCPAC meantime firmed up plans tor- the

United States to take part in military operations in Laos. Cambodia. and North

Vietnam if the author ities in Washington so oidered.4

Communist activites in the Laotian panhandle prompted theJoint Clucfs to

plan with the Government of Vietnam for airlifting Vietnamese intelligence

204
OBJECTIVES CONFIRMED. METHODS EXPANDED

teams into the a ea ai ound Tchepone. When Secretrv McNainara and General

"laylor \isited Saigon during May 12-13. McNamara let Khanh know that

bombing Nolth Vietnam would be no substitute for clearing the Viet Cong out of

South Vietna in. The two lound larkins optimistic. Westmoreland less so. and

I.odge satistied with the size and composition of U .S. efforts. "Further largescale

contiibutons." he said. "aie not warranted." 4

[he collapse of government defenses on the Plain of Jars on May 17

demanded iapid reaction within l.aos and a second look at the merits of exerting

pressure on North Vietnam. A National Security Council working group.

chaied b\ Assistant Secretary of State William P. Bundy. prepared a thirty-day

scenario of political actions leading to air strikes against North Vietnamese

targets and a call for an international conference on Vietnam. The Joint Chiefs

.1-3 (Opeiations) listed targets in these categories of ascending importance: to

convince Hanoi that it was too risky to back the Viet Cong and Pathet Lao. to

deter lanoi from escalating the conflict, and to destroy the North Vietnamese

industrial base. 4

'

In meetings on May 24 and 25. the executive committee of the National

Securit\ Council put forward selected portions of the scenario. President

Johnson then enjoined his senior advisers to hold a major strategy conference in

Hawaii on .lune I and 2.46

The Soviet U mon early in 1964 had advocated new meetings of the Geneva

powers on Vietnam and Cambodia. and on May 27 a Polish diplomatic initiative

called loi a conference on Laos. After hearing charges of border violations. the

United Nations Securit Council suggested that obser\ers be placed along the

Cambodian frontier to ease tensions. The United States and South Vietnam

welcomed the propesal. btit the Viet Cong and Cambodia spurned it.4'

As acting chairman. LeMay advised the Joint Chiefs on May 28 that the

United States was "losing Southeast Asia fast." The chiefs, he argued. ought to

present at the upcoming Ilonolulu military confeience a clear record on how to

'suart winning." He said the only way to end Hanoi's support of the insurgency in

Victnam and Laos would be to destroy its means to do so. Airattacks should be

made on infiltration points at Dien Bien Phu and Vinh to show the sharp change

in American outlook and resolve. On the 30th the Joint Chiefs accepted LeMay's

views and passed them to McNamaia. Upon his return, Chaiiman Tayloi

disagreed with these views and sent his own to the Defense secretary, initially

proposing more limited actions agains- targets less risky than Vinh and Dien

Bien Phu. The purpose. he stated, would be to impress upon Hanoi U.S.

icadiness to take more diastic action should North Vietnam enlarge its support

for the Viet Cong.46

Present at the Secretary of Defense Conference on June I and 2 were

Secrctar 3 Rusk. Ambassador Lodge. General Taylor. Admiral Felt. and Mi.

Sullivan of the President's Vik-timi Coordinating Committee. General Harkins.

whose relations with Lodge had soued, did not at'end. The atmosphece was

gloomy. The talk focused on getting congressional approval for wider action in

Southeast Asia. Envisioned were commitment ol American divisions, a partial

205
THE AD)VISORY YEARS

U1.S. mobiliiation. and air attacks on Noi th Vietnam. L~odge favoied a caiefuil

bombing campaign. lie beliesed it would bolster the sh: ky Khanh goveirnment

and imipart a feeling of unity to (lhe wa i-weary South Vietnamese. At the end the

conlCsenss Wa, to wait and See wvhat dev'eloped. 4 1)

Ni i. JIames 13. Scaborn. the Canadian member of thle lntci national Control

Commission. \isited No01th Vietnam and apprised the govci ment of Amei ican

thoughts onl a negotiatedl peace based onl concessions by both sides. It' Hanoi

would stop sending men and ai Ills South. Washington would i espond with

economic aid. lDenying any attempt to thi eaten, the U nited States was well aware

of Ilianlois strigs on the \'iet Cong. If the warlheated up. the greatest (levastatlonl

would be loosed upon Noth \'ietnam. Seaboi stiessed President Johnson's

desiie lor- a settlement based on H anois promise to abide by the Geneva

acitcements of' 1954 and 1962. North Viet namese officials wet e uinimpi essed.

They wanlted the U nited States to withldi aw totlly f' omi Vietnam. This would be

followed by a -nteutral" iegime in Saigon, with thle National Liberation I' out

charting. the utme of the country. Seaborn during a second trip In Auigust

conle\e(l thle warning that American patience was wearing thin. I lanoi's ieply

was hardly encotua.i ng for peace.1'

Secietaiy McNatnai a andf General Taylor had asked the J1CS and

Cl NCPIAC to forge a tic-hsaistikplngistNoi th Vietiiam. If set in

motion it would signal Atmtican eadiness to attack all maior militar\ tai gets in

the country. On-l1uly I Ithe planners settled on ninety-four air sit ike obh ectives in

North Vietnam eighity-m~o targets and twelve armed reconlnaissanlce routes.

They' next set about drafting detailed plans for tis mlassi\e air. action."t

Cl NCIPAC rather than MIACV wais to have ometall direction of opetations

against North Vietnam. throtigh the IPACA Fand PACF1I'I commanders. But

the pt incipal thrust of American policy continuied to be countering the insurgency withinl thle boiders of Souith Vietnam. ~lo that end the M AC\'commander

was to devote his full attention.12

206
XVIII. The War in

Vietnam, 1964

Once asked why the United States should not hae command omcr the

Vietna miesea rned loices. General Ilai kinsi eplied that this would be contiaiy to

U.S. national polhc\. More to the point, the Vietnaniese go\ ernenit \\ould not

aice to the at langement. since iI jealousl guarded its smo\cieign light to accept

or itelect American advice.' Although this question and this position weie never

olicially challenged. certain other command problems continued to \ex the

carvilng out ol the counterinhsuigency. Anong then \%er the tie-in of MACV

and M AAG: tile role and influence ol the U.S. Ail I-orce inl dilecting polic\ ill the

cotintiy. chiel in the contio\eis\ o~ ci the single management ol atlcraft: and

the oigani/ation ol the Vietnamese Air Foicc. These received attention in 1964.

In the USAF \iew. the piincipai command problen in Vietinal since 1962

was, the absence of experienced high-ianking airofficers on the MACjoint staff

to explain what air power could and could not do. The MiACV staff wa.,,

dominated b\ Armin olficers iather than ieally jointli manned. No component

Arms and Navy units existed tinder MACV with the equis alent status of the 2d

Air )i\ islon.

Admital I-elt was sympathetic to having a senior USAF officer in the

mainsticam of MACV curtent operations. In September 1963 he had proposed

filling the MACV chief of staff slot with a USAF officer when it became vacant in

mid-1964. The Joint Chiels of Staff approved but the Secretary of Defense did

not. After talking with I larkins during his )ecembcr 1963 \ isit to Saigon. the

Defense sectetary was set on making changes along lines suggested b\ the Army.

Early inl 1964 lie created the new position of Deputy Commander. MACV. and

named At my Lt. Gen. William C. Westmoreland to it. He placed Brig. Gen. Blen

Sternbeig. USA. in the J-I (Personnel) niche. He downgraded the USAF colonel

serving as .1-2 (Intelligence) to Deputy .I-2 and put a Marine Corps brigadier

general over hum. lie directed Harkins to reorgani/e M ACV and the subsequent

alterations shrunk the USAF allocation of.J-staff jobs to the post of J-5 (Plans)

held by Maj. Gen. Milton B. Adams. McNama!a nevertheless believed the Air

Force to be well-represented. He pointed to the 2d Air Division conmander and

the MAAG Air Force Section chief who weie both general officers and present in

Saigon.2

Admiral iFelt and Gen. Jacob E. Smart, PACAF commander, questioned

the wisdom of revamping MACV while the Vietnamese government was trying

to recover from the shock of two coups. They had not concurred in a Joint Chiefs

suggestion on February 15 to merge M AAG and M ACV. But a study by General

Sternberg addressed the broader question. The existence of tile two headquartel s

had surely led to duplication of effoit. occasional lapses in coordination, and a

needlessly complicated advisory progratn. If the functions were fused under

207
THE ADVISORY YEARS

MACV. Steinberg favoied MACV as a "specified army command" in lieu of a

"suboidinate joint command."'

That would enhance the Army's role at the expense of the Navy and Air

I-oice. While General Smait assented to the need for a large Army share in the

advisor% assistane effort, he failed to understand the logic of A ly piedominance. When McNamara and ' aylor came to Iiawaii in March, Smart argued

for placing senior USA F officei s in decisionmaking positions in the reorgani,ed

headquarters so that air power could be best employed. The secretaiv said he

knew of no operation that had suffered from want of air support. Taylor had

heaid of such instances but blamed poor communications instead of faulty

organi/ation or unsound policy. Admiral Felt asserted that at times Army

advisors neglected to pass along air support requests, because they wanted to use

Army aii craft to further Army doctrinal concepts. McNamara refused to change

his outlook.4

Gencial Westmoieland, former commander of the XVIII Airborne Corps.

became the deputy commander of MACV on January 27. 1964. Maj. Gen.

Joseph H. Moore-- a close friend of Westmoieland since boyhood replaced

General Anthis as 2d Air l)ivision commander on the 3 1st. Air 'oice officials

hoped that Moore's close ties with Westmoreland would help brighten the image.

expand the influence, and eniarge the number of senior staff personnel of the Ail

Force, as well as cleat up air problems. General Wheeler, Army Chief of Staff,

ordered Wcstmoieland "to get the aii missions straightened out." lie said he

would not tolciate a fight for"hide bound doctrinal concepts." If Army doctitine

got in the wa% ofthe wareffort, Wheeler could and would change doctrine with a

stioke of his pen.'

Blesides 104 airciaft, the 2d Air Division had about foi ty-six hundred people

in .anuai v 1964- nearly sixty on the M ACV staff, four hundred in M AAG. and

more than four thousand in USAF units.1' Yet hope foi a bigger Ai Foice part in

counterinsuigency soon vanished. The MACV .1-3 complained that his USAF

deputy. who was highly regaided by the 2d Air Division. was unable to "look at

.1-3 matters except through USAF-tinted glasses." knew nothing about giound

operation, and was of little use. The deputy was succeeded b\ an Army officer.'

Gencral Moore pressed for the asignnent ofa USAF officer as MACV chief of

staff when General Weede of the Marine Corps wound up his tout in May.

Instead. Maj. Gen. Richard G. Stilwell moved from J-3 to chief of staff and

anothei Army officer. Brig. Gen. William E. l)ePuy. took ovei the i-3 job.'

Perhaps foreshadowing the end of the advisory era. MAAG was closed out

on May 15. 1964 Its functions went to an expanded MACV headquarters, and

the Army corps advisory groups fell directly undei MACV. The MAAG Air

Foice Section became the Air Force Advisoiy Group, assigned to MACV but

with operational control vested in General Moore as the USAF component

commander. Moore also came to be the senior advisor to the Vietnamese Air

I'orce. General Rowland, chief of the Air Force Advisory Group, acted as

Mooie's deputy for the Vietnamese Air Force military assistance program."

208
(Top left) President Johnson and W Avenel) Harriman

(lop right) Adrn Ulysses S Grant Sharp Jr

(Bottom) Mal Gen Joseph H Moore and Gen Jacob E Smart discuss air tactics with Mal Xuan Vinh

commander of the 23d Air Support Group VNAF

Courtesy U S Park Servic Courresy U S Navy

F A
THE ADVISORY YEARS

To General Smait the new setup did little to extend air knowledge and

expei ence at MACV. Rather than i imming the headquarters, the change

triggered a request to rwise stafl spaces b% 310(283 U.S. Army. 24 Na\'y Maiine

Corps. and 3 lISAI). Smart iccoimended at least 38 moic UISA [ oflfeers as

directorate and branch chiefs.'' l)isregarding his desires. MACV in September

asked for 71 new USAF spaces mostly for field advisoiy work."

General Westmoreland rose to M ACV commander when General llarkin,

leached retirement age on June 20. Ambassador Lodge resigned on the 23d to

join in the national elections at home, and Piesident Johnson selected General

Taylor lot the post. On .Juiv 15 Admiral Felt retired and Adin. Ulysses S. Giant

Sharp. Jr.. became CI NCIPAC. A wlole new leadership emerged.

Should an Air Force officer be named as Westmoreland's deputy? Westmoieland had said in early .une that he needed no deputy. But General I.cMay

argued ir, .JCS discussions that a deputy fiom another soimice was a mutst to

pieserve ,he unified nature of MACV. Because of broadening air operations he

thought the deptity should be a USAF geneial. The Navy and Marine Corps

thought so too. General Wheeler. Army chief, suggested that the 2d Air Division

commandei be designated Deputy Commander for Air as an additional duty il

air operations grew. Chairman Taylor was for giving the deputy position to an

officer who could afford across-the-board assistance to Westmoreland. Owing to

the nature of operations, he wished to see a two- or three-star Army general in the

job. Taylor queried Westmoreland who then said he %%anted an Army general.

After McNamara's approval on lune 18. L.t. Gen. John L. Throckmorton was

assigned.

General LeMay reiterated the need for USA l- expertise on the M ACV stafl

In September Westtmoreland proposed to give the 2d Air Division commandel

the second hat of l)eptity Commander lor Air Operations. M ACV. The Au Stalf

and PACAF opposed this action because it offered the MACV staff no real

additional help. Westmoreland nonetheless went ahead with the proposal. On

November 12 CI NCPAC bowed to tile "political climate" and put it forward to

the Joint Chiefs.' 2 Not tintil seven months later was the nmiw title approved.

Still the reshuffling of May 15 bestowed some benefits. Tucking the Air

:Force Advisory Group under 2d Air Division was long overdue and fostered

unity and control.' The harmony between Westinoreland and Moore nturled

better working relations between MACV and 2d Air l)ivision.14

Yet General Westmoreland continued to command U.S. Army components. violating tile principle that commanders of unified activities must be

divorced from service operations. In effect the MACV air component commander answered to the Army component commander.

Moreover, the sparse service expertise on the MACV staff made it hard to

pursue joint matters properly. A case in point was the MACV airlift allocation

board itin by one overworked USAF officer in .-41S Army officers so ruled tile

vlACV Joint Research and Test Activity that the Air Force hesitated to test

combined concepts for combinations of equipment.' .lust eight of the forty-five

210
TiIlF WAR IN VIETNAM. 1964

at thori/ed otlicer spaces in .1-3 weic Air I-orce. Only one was a cclonel's slot, the

ne\lv created Deputy Assistant Chiel of Staff.1-3 for Air."

.1-3 for the most part entrusted air matters to the 2d Air Division staff, but

more and more assumed control of day-to-day air operations. This was done at

list through an American MACV staff element in the Vietnamese armed forces

joint operations center. Later an Army air operations section was formed with

.1-3 personnel. to allocate Army aircraft to the coi ps and to control other Army

aviation iesouices. To coordinate Army and Air Force infraied reconnaissance,

the MACV Target Research and Analysis Center was fotinded in December

1964. This .1-2 function took care of centralived targeting.i1

The tactical air control system survived and outwaidly appeaied to meet

doctrinal needs. Still it was soon evident that the status of the tactical air

commander was severely eroded-the 2d Air Division commander had no

command authoiity. no diiect operating duties, and no staff support. Senior

USAF officers peiceived that the local situation in Vietnam dictated several

de\ iations from proven tactical air doctrine. But they cautioned against adopting

the MACV air control system as a model for worldwide air command and

control procedures. 19

The performance of the Vietnamese Air Force also sti red concern. Central

to the Vietnamese military concept was the parceling out of resouices among the

four corps commanders who governed all ground. air, naval, and paramilitary

forces within their areas. Air Force officers, notably General Smart, protested

splintering the meager Vietvamese air power. Even so, many Army officers

believed this grouping was requiied in what they saw as largely a ground

struggle.2

"

Col. Nguyen Cao Ky had won command of the Vietnamese Air Force for

his part in the Minh coup, and polished his prestige by supporting the Khanh

coup. lie assured Generals Moore and Rowland that he did not intend to

relinquish centrali/ed control over air power. New wings. Ky said. wele to be

assigned to geographical corps areas rather than to corps commanders. On

March 15. Vietnamese tactical wing headquarters were transferred to the corps

areas and located at Da Nang, Pleiku, and Bien Hoa. Another was projected for

Can Tho when the new aii field was finished. A composite airlift and reconnaissance wing continued to operate under the air operations center.2

' The proposal

to place liaison and helicopter squadrons tinder the coi ps came up in April. Ky

dissented and MACV sided with him. The transfer was not carried out.22

General Moore worked to keep the tactical aii control system intact.

including the air support operations centers. Since the Vietnamese wing coinmanders at Da Nang and Pleiku advised and planned with corps commanders.

the role of the I and II Corps air support operations centers declined. The

sub-operations center at Nha Trang was shut down. 2

' On the whole, Moore

considered the Vietnamese Air Force organi/ation a deviation but close enough

to classical air concepts to be acceptable. Maj. Gen. Sam Maddux. Jr.. Thirteenth Air Force commander, decided not to dwell on the defects.24

211
TIlE ADVISORY YEARS

I1\ itctainng the integrity of his command, Ky could deploy his units as a

national countei-coup Iorce. Yet American influence over Viet namese air operations diminished. For examiple. the 41st Tactical Wing and I Corps staffs planned

for Maich 30 a night meditim-level bombing laid against a Viet Cong training

center. Army and Air Io e advisors first leamned of tile attack when planning

was well underway and white-phosphorus bombs wei c iequested from American stocks. Twelve 1 -28s and lout A-I I Is participated. Colonel Ky. who rode in

one of the 1 -28s, depicted the strike as a highly successful demonstration of a "ne\v night bombing capability." Vietnamese army photo interpreteis gave a

glowing account of damages to tile Viet Cong. but U.S. Army interpreters failed

to find the same iesults.2

"1 he word for the Air Force in Vietnam," General Anthis had written in

Novernbei 1963. "is austerity." having both American and Viet namese components in mind. War-weary air commando aircraft, a fledgling Vietnamese Air

Force, and a slow air icquest net made it difficult to seiie combat opportunities. 6 ,

The USAF 34th Tactical Group was scheduled tn phase out of Vietnam.

Withdrawal would begin in mid- 1964 with the departure of the 19th Tactical Air

Support Squadron which furnished forward air controller,. The Ist Air Commando Squadron, due to recccve in .hne 1964 the first two of eighteen lebuilt On

Mai k B-26Ks, was to leave in mid-1965. Farm Gate's B-26s wei e nearly worn out

but the 2d Air Division expected them to survive with careful flying, if the Viet

Cong introduced no heavy weapons with antiaircraft sighting devices. The new

Vietnamese 51 8th Fighter Squadi on was to get A-I Hs in March 1964. Also that

month the 716th Composite Reconnaissance Squadron was programmed to

have its eighteen RT-28s and thi ee RC-47s )uring the second quarter of 1964,

USAF T-28s were to be replaced on a one-for-one basis with dual-piloted

A- I lis.2'

By 1964 Vietnamese and American aircraft were furnishing but one-half of

the suppot t asked for. The reasons lay in air request net ti oubles and the rising

damage to planes from Viet Cong ground defense,;.

On February II, after the wing ofa B-26at Eglin Air Force Base brke off in

flight, all B-26s in Vietnam were taken out of combat. They could fly only

straight and level with the lightest of ordnance loads.-K

The uncertain combat worthiness of the old B-26s led PACAF to suggest

deploying a squadron of the 3d Bombardment Wing's light jet B-57s from .lapan

to Bien lloa. These planes were being withdrawn from the wing, but they weie

admirable for the war. Then jet speed spelled swift response to air suppolt

requests.29

The MACV commanderand CINCPAC voiced graveconcern over the loss

of the B-26s, which General Westmorcland called his "Sunday punch." Both

headquarters poposed a squadion of B-57s with Vietnamese markings and

mixed crews to optiate out of Bien ltoa under Farm Gate rules. On March 2 the

,Joint Chiefs made the same suggestion to Defense Secretary McNamara."

At March confeences in Saigon, McNamara questioned Geneal Moore

egarding Vietnamese Air Foice needs. The secretary judged it cheape to give

212
THE WAR IN VIETNAM. 1964

the Vietnamese furthei airciaft than to bring in fresh USA F planes. He settled on

equipping all Vietnamese lighter units with A-I [ts, twenty-five tagged for the

514th Fighter Squadron in the Ill Corps area to replace the T-28s. In addition he

eaimarked thirty for the Ist Air Command Squadron to take over fi om the

wornout B-26s and T-28s. 1

General Smart tol McNamaia in lawaii that tactical air chalked tip more

than thirty percent of the enemy casualties in South Viet nam- 14,944 out of

49.100 in 1962 and 1963. Ifa few obsolete aircraft could do this damage. think of

what new and better planes could achieve. McNamara replied that he appreciated why B-57s weie desired. -iist, however, the United States should exploit

the easier method of sending in more nonjet planes to help win the war. What

interested him was the possible use of B-57s in covert operations against North

Vietnam. The l)efense secretary's iecommendations, approved by President

.Iohnson. embodied equipping the Vietnamese with twenty-five A-Ilis in

c\change for T-28s. At the close of Match, forty-eight B-57s and crew, Ile\\ from

Yokota Air Base in .lapan to Clark Air Base in the Philippines. '

2

Col. Benjamin S. Preston. Jr.. commander of the 34th Tactical Group at

Bien I loa. went all out to keep his B-26s in the air. But clearly they could not be

saved- eveiy plane had cracked stress plates and loose rivets throughout its

wings. On April 8 the last of the B-26s and R B-26s were to be fei ried to Clark Air

Base for salvage."

So long as the T-28s faced no heavy ground fire, they (lid the job despite

their fairly slow speed and small armament load. As Viet Cong firing heated tip.

however. they became vulnerable. On February 18 a T-28 took a hit while flying

interdiction, but the crew foi tunately escaped serious injury in the crash-landing.

The next day a second T-28 was shot down while strafing in suppoi t ofa ground

operation. and the crewmen were killed. Three Vietnamese A-I Hs shared a like

fate in February. 4

Since the T-28s had outlived their safe employment in Vietnam. leplacement A- I Skyraiders caite in. On March 18 the newly formed Vietnamese 518th

Fighter Squadion, with ten of twenty-five authori ed A-Itls. began to Ily

combat from Bien lboa. 5-

Col. George I. Ruddell. deputy to the M ACV J-3, surveyed the ground-fire

threat. lie thought that a return to the Air Force's standaid four-aircraft fighter

flights was in order, with each echelon of two protecting the othel duling

low-level passes. This called for more planes. so Ruddell recommended that the

34th Tactical Group get two squadrons each of twenty-five A-I Es in lieu of a

single squadron of thirty. larkins. Smart, and Felt approved and passed the

proposal to the Joint Chiefs of Staff.-'

Compelled to stand down the combat-worn 13-26s. Colonel Pieston wondered how he could keep the Ist Air Commando Squadron going. On March 24

a T-28B lost a wing and crashed while on a bomb run near Soc Trang. killing the

pilot. Capt. Edwin G. Shank. .Jr.. and the Vietnamese ciewman. All T-28s had

been closely inspected and aircraft maintenance was excellent. Even so. the loss

: 213

(.
TIHE ADVISORY YEARS

ol the 1-28 so soon after the B-26 wing I ttes impaired pilot morale 13% April I

the 2d Air l)ivision was "practically flat out ol business."

On April 9 a 1-28 crew was completing a thud strafing pass oMer a

well-defended target when the wing snapped off and the plane clashed. I-wo

specialists from the North American Aviation. Inc.. lew to Bien Iloa and ran

inspections. They said that the 1 -28 could not take the "slam-bang type flying"

because it was a trainer- not a properly stressed fighte-bomber. At their

suggestion, Colonel Preston retired the five remaining Farm Gate 1-28s that had

been in combat since Novemer 1961. lie boi rowed nine newer 1 -28s from the

Vietnamese. biinging the Ist Air Commando Squadron's combat-read\ aircraft

to fifteen, lie warned pilots about G-limits, cautioned them not to land il

carrying external ordnance, and placed limits on loading the wing stations o

11-model T-28s. I o cut damages Irom small-arms tile, Pieston set a minimtum

altitude of 1,000 leet for attack runs. The T-28s stayed in opeiation until A-I Es

took their place. "

At least 1.546 air strike requests were ieceived in the first thiec months o

1964. Of the 424 not honored, 230 were due to a shortage of planes. I hese ligures

(lid not present a true picture. for ground comnmanders and forward air controlleis disliked to file new requests after being turned down.' ,

'

Air-ground operations yielded slight results. I3etween.lanuar\ 16and 19 the

21st Division in An Xuyen Province was supported by the most tactical air

sorties yet flown in the division area- lorty-four on the first day. Ilowever, the

helborne troops came to grips with no si/able enemy forces on the ground. '

During January 17-28 the 7th Division mounted a massive search-and-clear

heliborne and water invasion into the Thanh Phu )istrict of Kien I loa Pro\ ince.

Artillery fire and prelanding strikes by B-26s and T-28s supported the operation.

Still. tile enem' poured withering ground fire into the first waves of helicopters.

peppering all thirty-two craft and downing one, a U Il-I gunship. On tile 18th

another armed U H-I was hit and plunged into the water. Only the copilot and a

crewman were rescued. Even with constant air cover, friendly losses totaled

twenty dead. twenty-five wounded, and two U Il-Is destroyed. The Viet Cong

lost forty-six killed and ninety-seven captured.4 "

The main problem probably lay in the lack of directives on act ial coordiiation and comnad over a helibonc landing area. The sole pe:son actua!ily

allowed to tell tactical air what to do was the Vietnamese forward air controller.

And lie had neither the rank nor the experience to be an air coiiiander,

Problems also pervaded the snialler air operations for provincial forces. li

the 5th Division area of Ill Corps, forexample, the USAF liaison olficer pointed

out that the Viet Cong kindled cooking fires at dusk. They could take this risk

because Vietnamese strike pilots were not routinely ready to fly at night. An

exception occurred on January 16 when a Vietnamese C-47 flaneship and four

A-I Hs struck an assembly point in Tay Ninh Province. Most night air requests

were not honored. As for day pinpoint strikes, just fourteen of sixty-seven

requested interdiction targets were attacked in -ebruary. Pilots of the 514th

214
TlHE WAR IN VIETNAM. 1964

Fighter Squadron said they were "sick and tited of expending their ordnance on

nothing but empty fields, tices and jungles. '42

This frust rat ion ste in med from tie (Ira wn-out air request handling iequired

by tie 5th Division conmander all immediate sightings of the enemny vanished

before being targeted. Theie weie, however, some good results from strikes

against enemy-held areas that provincial troops could not enter. These were the

"remlote locations" in the east coast provinces of III Corps. The Phuoc Tuy

forwaid air controller had good rapport with the province chief, who knew the

enemy's movements and could and would approve targets for air action. Elsewhere, air strikes were hindered by controllers unfamiliar with the atea. and by

Popular Foices commanders who feared close fire suppoit by artillery. armed

helicopters, or fighters.4

In light of the lag in strike aircraft response. Army advisors in III and IV

Corps accented the importance of helicopter assaults. The Vietnamese as a rule

needed thirty minutes to scramble fighters, while processing a iequest commonly

consumed one hour. Colonel Mellish. fit' liaison officer of Ill Corps. urged the

forward staging of'aircraft to shave this delay. "lhre T-28s were sent on ground

alert to Phan Thiet, where Viet Cong attacks were foreseen. When the foe failed

to appeal. the little-used T-28s remained exposed to the ha/ards of a primitive

a i rst ri p.44

The number of tactical air sorties available to the Ill Corps on a busy day

was around 30. This contrasted sharply with the average of 275 sorties a day

flovn by U.S. Army planes in support of Ill Corps. Th, Arm\ aviation assigned

to the corps was siable - seventeen utility UH-Is. eleven I.1I-I gunsl;ps,. two

CV-2 transports. four U-I utility transports. two OV-I atmed reconnaissance

planes, andi eight [-19 liaison aircraft. 4

1

Lesser operations in the difficult IV Corps entailed up to four ot five

helibo, tie missions every day in the 7th and 21st Division areas. Five USAF

T-28s at Soc Trang could react swiftly, but it took 1 hours to ge' ground alert

aircraft from Bien I loa. Though the Vietnamese 112th Liaison Squadron kept a

detachment of five O-Is at Can Tho. the planes were confined to forward air

control and target-marking duty. The USA! liaison officers hitched rides on

Arm\, liaison aircraft when they could. Most of the time, however. they were

grounded at the division command post. Ilence their sole knowledge of the air

situation at a target area ca me from an At my liaison coininiinication-relay plane

that flew cover over heliborne landing zones.46

During March barely 71 of 126 air support requests from the 7th Division

could be satisfied in the IV Corps. and in April merely 84 of 148 requests were

approved. The air liaison officer and forward air controller spent a lot of their

time in keeping ground officers from becoming discouraged with tile sparse air

support. According to Lt, Col. Clarence R. Osborne, .lr., instant air support

from arme(] U H-I helicopters often "saved the day."4 1

7

Oi April 12 the Viet Cong destroyed the district town of Kien l.ong in

Chuong Thien Province. The Vietnamese Air Force turned in a splendid perfornmance, featuring an A-I1- hit on a 105-mni howitver befole dawn and a

215
THE ADVISORY YEARS

steady sticam of air support strikes throughout the day. The tactical air support

system squeezed thirty to forty-five sorties out of the aircraft at Bien I loa. but this

Was not enough to stave off a serious government defeat.48

Meanwhile, the Joint Chiefs asked if two separate air control systems

operated in Vietnam and if Vietnamese commanders w\,ere getting conflicting

advice from U.S. Army and USAF advisors. MACV replied that one system

directed Air Force aircraft, while the other was a separate aviation headquarters

that managed Army and Marine Corps air units. Since these units afforded

special assistance and had "no role in the development of the Vietnamese air

structure, I have been free to employ them as I see fit to [the] maximum support

of the ground effort." 49

The U.S. Army senior advisor at III Corps. a colonel, was an extieme

partisan of Army aviation who slighted tactical air support. lie never invited the

corps USAF liaison officer to planning conferences, and as a matter of fact was

not on speaking terms with him. The senior advisor prepared pacification plans

that made no mention of tactical air support. When General Moore offered help.

he was turned down. Moore told General Westmorcland of this, and MACV

directed that province pacification plans contain an air operations annex drawn

by USAF advisors. From then on, the colonel called the air liaison officer to all

briefings and planning conferences.")

Air advisors were few among the ground units. The 2d Air Division had

authority for seventeen lieutenant colonels as air liaison officei s with corps and

divisions, and Army advisors outranked them. There were thity-two captains

and lieutenants as aii-advisor forward air controllei s with iegiments. In conparison Army advisors numbered tip to five hundred in a cot ps. with assignments

going down to company level. General Moore had kept the rank of air advisors

low to avoid dwarfing relatively junior Vietnamese counterparts. Gencial

Maddux. Thirteenth Air Force commander. wanted a senior USAF colonel to

be assigned to the Joint General Staft. lie fui ther wished corps air liaison office, s

to be colonels, thus giving them equal prestige with Army senior corps advisors.'

General Westmoreland was dead-set against raising the coi ps aim liaison

officers to the rank ol colonel, lie regarded the Army senior advisois as MACV

senior advisors, responsible for all military matters to include the use of aii

power. Corps air liaison officers were supposed to ad,. ie tne senior advisors, and

Westmoreland assured General Moote that they would be listened to. When

Moore learned that Vietnamese wing commanders would be the chief air advisors to the corps commanders, he acceded to the MACV commander's point of

view.-2

Indeed. the 2d Air l)ivision commander felt that conflict between the two

distinct control systems was overdrawn. Confident of cooperation he said. "The

Army isjust as strongly opposed to Air Force control of its aircraft as we are for

the Army to control ours."'' Even so, Moore desired to enlaige the tactical air

control system by adding an air request communications net, manned and

operated by the Air Force. It would resemble the U.S. Strike Command- I actical

Air Command system worked out during maneuvers in the United States. lie

216
TIlE WAR IN VIETNAM. 1964

hoped to do away with the long delays in pas:,ig air requests tip through

challels over Vietnamese arim' co tlliiiCat ions,.

General Moore's; poposed net for handling Vietnamese air requests would

enhance LISAF advice at lower ground echelons. An Air l-oice pilot (forwaid air

cont rolli) and two radio operators were to man tactical air control parties at all

levels down to battalion. They would process ar suppoit requests. provide

advice, and direct close airsupport strikes. To man this countrywide setup. the 2d

Air Division was to draw pilots from the USAF 19th Tactical Air Support

Squadion. Moore envisioned a continuing need for Vietnamese contiollers to

mark remote and hard-to-find interdiction targets. Ilowever he saw no reason

why Air Force controllers. Army liison pilots, and Army and Vietnamese

forward air guiides could not mesh their efforts to designate targets for air

strikes."

Moore counted oil speeding up the reaction of the Vietnamese Air Force by

tiaining and assigning Vietnamese down to battalion level, first as counterparts

and eventually to ieplace USAF personnel, lie also wanted an Air Force liaison

officer appointed to the Joint General Staff and moie Vietnamese woi king in its

operations center. General Westmoieland added a LUSAF colonel as advisor to

tile Joint General Staff. and lie authori/ed Moore to use PACAF resources to

establish the air request net in the Ill Corps area. In Washington. ICS Chairman

Wheeler secured McNamara's assent for the air request net. The Defense secretary let the Air Force deploy combat-ready tactical air control parties from the

Tactical Air Command. They were to serve on temporary duty in Vietnam

pending the procuiement of personnel and equipment for the 2d Air Division.'

With plans for the new air request net nearing fruition. with the B-26s

al cady retired, with the T1-28s in stress trouble, with McNamara against having a

B-57 squadron in South Vietnam. General Moore wrote to General LeMa\ in

April asking for an expansion fiom two to three A-I E squadrons of twenty-five

planes each. Two of these units at Bien Iloa would peimit standaid four-ship

fighter formations and provide for the predicted upturn in air strikes created by

the air icquest system. The third squadron was to be based at the new Can Tho

airfield being built in the Mekong )elta and slated for completion in early 1965.

Without disparaging Vietnamese progress, Moore stressed that a third USAF

A-I E squadron would enable planes to respond quickly to oncall air support

missions. This would set a proper example for Vietnamese airmen. whose moiale

tended to be low. 7

Richard T. Sandborn. 2d Air )ivision operations analyst. showed that fifty

A-I Es and seventy-five A-I Hs would genci ate 3.038 sorties per month, with ten

percent for training. Considering the rise in air support requests and the demand

for larger aircraft flights, Sandborn computed combat sorties at 4.476 by August

1964. He foresaw further rises in the ftiture.s

General Maddux. Thirteenth Air Force commander, pointed out that a

third A-I E squadron might end retention of the B-57s at Clark. But lie saw no

reason for making an issue of the new unit so soon. since it could not be

accommodated at Can Tho until 1965. However Gen. William II. Blanchard, Air

217
I liE ADVISORY YEARS

Force Vice Chief of Staff. stated that the Air loice was planning for tie third

squadron to be fully equipped at Can Tho by March 1965. General Wheeler

justified the A-i [ expansion because of low Vietnamese performance. Nevertheless. the additional USAF planes would dlay Vietnamese "elf-suficiency and

undermine the principle that Americans \\ere to help rather than to fight."9

Two events revealed that the rule restricting USAF advisors from engaging

in battle was being strained if not entirely broken. The first took place on March

8 when Col. Thiomas M. Hergert. deputychief of the MAAG Air Force Section.

was killed. lie was flying an A-1 I as wingman to a Vietnamese flight leader on

an interdiction mission. Both had made a dozen passes to deliver ordnance when

HIergert's plane crashed. Smoke was seen billowing from the right-wing root just

before the right wing exploded. 01

Investigation disclosed that eighty-nine USAF pilots were flying Vietnaiese aircraft. But no advisor could lead a flight, be the first to expend

ordnance, or continue a mission if me Vietnamese flight leader aboited. Colonel

I leigert was the twenty-eighth USA F combat fatality in Vietnam since January

1962.6 1

The second exent concerned Captain Shank who had died in a T-28 crash

on March 24. On April 21 U.S. Congressmen and the press were furnished

several letters Shank had written home. He had criticized the airworthiness of

U.S. aircraft and told of Ist Air Commando pilots flying combat missions with

Vietnamese basicairmen. popularly called "sandbags."The airmen went along as

the required Vietnamese crewmen, for to obtain qualified crewmembers meant

diverting fifty to seventy-five Vietnamese pilots from their own planes. Seeing

'hat these pilots were assigned on the basis of 1.5 for each cockpit. this would

severely hamper Vietnamese air power. If legitimate Vietnamese observers flew

with Ameiicans, the liaison and forward air controller programs would be

bankrtipt. Consequently. General Moore stiggested that the arbitrary requirement for a Vietnamese aboard a U.S. strike aircraft be lifted. Nonrated airmen

scarcely contributed to the missions normally flown to augment Vietnamese

pla nes.62

On Apiil 29 the Joint Chiefs of Staff proposed that the number of USAI.

A-IEs in Vietnam be upped at once to fifty (two squadrons) and to a third

squadion later. Secretary of Defense McNamara consented to the immediate

increase to two sq uadrons. which was in line with Admiral Felt's hope for a thid

squadron in 1965. McNamara also accepted General Smalt's suggestion to hold

the 13-57s at ClaIk as an "ace in the hole" for a contingency."'

Visiting Saigon in May. Secretary McNamara and General Taylor were

cool toward a third A-I E sqtradron. Taylor said it would not sell in Washington.

McNamara reiteiated that U.S. forces were not to take part in combat. The

secretary directed General Moore to get the Vietnamese trained so that tley

could do everything themselves. He oidered the Vietnamese pilot ratio iaised

from 1.5 to 2 per plane and the Vietnamese 716th Composite Reconnaissance

Sqtadron fitted out with twenty-five A-I Hs by October I and converted to a

218
TIlE WAR IN VIETNAM. 1964

fourth lighter squadion. This would take the place of a third U.S. A-IF

squa d I on."-,

pon lieturn to \Vaiihngton. the Dlefense secretary in) a news interview

eniphlisl/ed that IUSAI- personnel were in Vietnam to tiam the Vietnamese to

light an -'aliti-guerrilla wai ." Within the l)efense establishment he made known

his intentioi to phase down the stiike operations of the Ist Air Comlando

Squadron and his goal to haxe that unit out of Vietnam in 120 days,'<

A le\\w da, later. 1 avlor reaffirmed the policy that U.S. military personnel

i\eie not to join in combat. Farm Gate aircraft could only "fly bona fide

operational tiaining inissions against hostile targets to prepare the participating

VNAF persoilriel for eventual replacement of U.S. pilots." U.S. helicopter

rissions would keep on introducing Americans into combat situations. but

"lielicopte's alie for use a, transport.'* Their weapons were for self-protection.

"Arned helicopters will not be used as a substitute for close air support strikes."

On June 3 Smart asked Felt and Westmoreland to clarify theJCSdirectivel"

that forbade Farm Gate from entering into combat bu' let Americans ft.

operational training missions against hostile targets. They replied that Fartn

Gate was to fly combat but to be more circumspect. Farm Gate was to further

insure that Vietnamese personnel aboard American aircraft were pilot aspirants

or undergoing flight training. Westmoreland thought that MACV coulk live

with the directive and keep Farm Gate fighting. Its effect, lie said, would "-.et be

appreciable" oil the 2d Air Division and on U.S. hiehcoptes.

Toward the close of April. seventeen Vietrnamese A-I Hs were combatloaded and deployed from Bien Hoa to Da Nang. The unannounced mission

turned out to be the start ofa seven-battalion search-and-clear lieliborne sweep in

the ii Corps. During April 27-May 31 the sorties flown by tile Vietnamese Air

Force totaled 266 1.-19 and I.-20. 420 A-I H and T-28, and 102 H-34. The

helicopters did psychological warfare, medical evacuation. resupply, and crop

destruction. A daily average of ten A-I His were onl tap at Da Narig. and the 5 6th

Fighter Squadron kept five T-28s at the Quang Ngai airfield for immediate air

support.

The operation apparently caught the Viet Cong by surprise. Not only were

many automatic weapon,; captured and destroyed. but enemy installations were

broken up. Yet when the fighting was over, it was impossible to leave three

irregular companies behind as p!tnned because the foe had been scattered but

not wiped out. Nonetheless. this example of wel!-coordinated combat aviation

gave Smart confidence that Vietnamese air power was clearly oil the upswing.(7

Despite this burnishing of Vietnamese Air Force prestige. tile month-long

operation consumed almost one-half of all Vietnamese combat sorties in May.

Besides. Vietnamese and USAF aircraft conversions were cutting into Vietnarnese aircraft. The Ist Air Commando Squadron had borrowed fifteen T-28s

from the 516th Fighter Squadron, which sent pilots to Bien Hoa for A-I

transition training given by the U.S. Pacific Fleet's Naval Air Squadron VA-152.

The A-I H was bigger than the T-28 and twisted about more from the propeller

torquc. It had a tailwheel rather than the tricycle landing gear that the pilots were

219
THE ADVISORY YEARS

used to. I lence several A-I I Is suffeted damage kn ground accidents, When ten

A-I Is art ived in May. they sat on the ramps at Da Nang. Since the Vietnamese

4 Ist CA M RON was Unfamiliar with the ahicraft, the in-commission tate aveiaged

merely Iour or live a day and at times dipped to three.'

At Bien Iloa the Ist Aii Commando Squadion stayed opetational with the

bort owed 1"-28s. One was lo.,t in a takeoff accident and six were translerted on

May 20 to combat in Laos. This left onl\ eight.69

Due chiefly to fewet T-28s. combat sorties dwindled in May exen as iequests

for air support climbed. In mid-month USAF personnel followed McNamara's

guidance to the letter. They worked to lift the Vietnamese fighter pilot ratio to

two per plane. The\ pushed the enlargement of the fighter fotce to four A-I H

squadrons so that the Ist Air Commando Squadron could be withdrawn. The

)efense secretary wanted tie tactical reconnaissance squadron converted to the

fourth fighter squadron by October. And he autthoried air ttanspot t and other

Vietnamese pilots to fly fighters.

As the crash plan for the sectetary's progran neared completion. tile .ICS

ditective banning U.S planes fron combat without giving bona fide training to

Vietnamese ctewmembers foreshadowed a decline in USAFcombat sottics. 1 his

came at the time when there were too few aitcraft to meet tequirements and the

Vietnamese were building two new A-I H squadrons. Recognizng the emergency. MACV uled that the Ist Air C 'tmando Squadron could continue to fly

its eight T-28s carrying Vietnamese crewmen who were not potential pilots. As

soon as A-I Es replaced T-28s. however. A-I E combat operations would be held

strictly to genuine training.7

0

On May 28 MACV decided to equip the present three Vietnamese fighter

squadrons to attain t\\o pilots per plane by October I. It likewise intended to

form thtee mote fighter squadrons as soon as aircraft became available, by

February 15, 1965. if all went well. Only Vietnamese pilots were to attend the

intensive A-I H nilot training progiam. The 34th Tactical Group would plesent

the initial two-week indoctrination, Naval Air Squadron VA-152 was to furnish

tile five-week transition cotse, and the 34th would administer the final

training."

Meeting with the Joint Chiefs on June 8. Secretary McNamara directed that

the first four Vietnamese fighter squadrons receive primary attention, the two

others secondary. On June 17 Admit al relt accepted a PACAI- evaluation and

reported to the chiefs that MACV was trying to do too much too fast. He

suggested that the 516th Fighter Squadron oe brought to full strength in September and that the 520th Fighter Squadron be made operational at Can Tho by

the end of the year. lie judged that the Vicmainese could man four fighter

squadrons without inactivating their two C-4/ transport units. On July 24 the

JCS agreed to the four-squadron projection.12

On May30 It. Col. John M. Porter, commander of the Ist Air Commando

Squadron, had led the original flight of six A-I Es from the Philippines to Bien

Hoa. Colonel Preston noted that his 34th Tactical Group had "mnoved up into the

big league ... with a first-line aircraft." On the 3 1st ,le A-I Es flew their maiden

220
THE WAR IN VIETNAM, 1964

strike sotties. Col. William E. 13ethea., who assumed conmmnd of lhe 34tl iGioup

in hne. was inpiessed by the plane's large and varied ordnance, takeoff from a

4,000-foot runway fully loaded, extiemely long iange, and good loittciing. Still

the A-I E's nornal cruising speed of 155 knots retarded iapid response to anr

support requests. chiefly in the fiar eaches of the Mekong De lta. Aizd the aircalft

could baiely defend itself in aerial combat. With twelve A-I Es on site by .ne 30.

the T-28s were retired. The 34th Tactical Group set about giving ti ansition

training to Vietnamese pilots."

Ai support requests totaled 1.546 during January-March 1964 and 2.040

from April through .)tine. Lack of aircraft accounted tor 68 of the 807 requests

that could not be honored in the second quarter. "

*

Generally. USAF communications were deemed better than those ol tile

U.S. Army. General Westmorcland therefore ordered the Ai my aviation battalion control center, situated in the joint operations center of tile Joint General

Staff, to relocate within the USAF-Vietnamese air operations center. General

Moore expected the move. which commenced on May 18. to enhance coordination among Army. Air Force, and Vietnamese airactivities. This did not occur.

The single-sideband PRC-47 and KWM-2A radios were the backbone of the

Vietna mese air request net. But the sets did not always work properly due to the

tropical climate and inexperienced operators. "' In acdition ground commanders

were unwilling to allow the air request system to fun,.on as designed. The. oint

General Staff issued no directive and the ground commanders refused to be

bypassed on strike firepower. In consequence the air request net served mere!3 to

provide information. All official requests continued to travel the tortucas route

cver the old Vietnamese army air request net."'

Nor did the Joint General Staff relax its ban on strike aircraft releasing

ordnance close to ground forces except at the direction of a Vietnamese forward

air controller. On April 23. USAF T-28s were ovc Vietnamese rangers who

were trapped near Trung Lap. Although the planes had voice communications

with a U.S. Army L-19 and with wounded American advisors on the ground.

they were not permitted to attack. Armed Army helicopters arried. were fired

upon. and returned the fire. But th:e T-28s jettisoned their untsed ordnance and

returned to base. "

'

r'hle were other problems. I Inless Vietnamese pilots could speak English,

USAF controllers were unable to communicate with them. Air liaison officer

and forward air controller duties were clearly unpopular among Vietnamese.

And the maiming ratio of two pilots to each fighter aircraft sharply curtailed the

numbe, and caliber of Vietnamese pilots who cculd be spared for such duties.

Finally, the human and natural environment worked against grouod tactical air

control parties. Their heavy bulky radio gear was hard to lug through thejungle.

Sometimes it was out of the question to direct an air strike safely from the

ground. because of the preence ofcivilians who could be seen solely from the air.

Mountains and heavy vegetation hampered the ground view and the flat ground

of the delta pffered no elevations to help determine range. Numerous tree lines

and canal ridges also obstructed the view. "

221
-1 HF ADVISORY \'FARS

M!r

222
I lIE WAR IN V111: 1 NANI. 1904

P 222 (Top left) Air Commodore

Nguyen Cao Ky and Col William E

8ethea

(Top right) Gen William

Westmoreland

(Center) AlE aircraft

(93ottom) A VNAI' Sikorsky CH-34 __

helicopter at Tan Sor, Nhut

P 223 Outposts or hamlets of S

Vietnam

14

oft-

"22
THE ADVISORY YEARS

In nl id-1964 it was gene all y agreed that g ound tactica I air control parties

could not take lie place of airborne control. Yet potent air support demanded

something better than tie plodding Vietnamese 1-19s and their often indifferen t

obser\,eis. Strong pleas to pievent the demise of the 19th I Tactical Ai Support

Squadi on proved fir tilc. The unII it remained rdeolders to tiansfei its aicmaft to

the Vievianiese.

Like the building of the Vietnamese air strike force. the Vietnamese ail

strike system held promise for the future. However. neither Vietnalmcse air power

norcontrol proced tires were able to withstand Viet Cong attacks. Over the earlier

months of 1964. C-47 and C-123 flare support for outposts arnd villages more

than doubled arid night sorties grew.'" But on the night of July 6. when the Viet

Cong assaulted tile Nam Dong Special Forces camp near the demilitariied zone.

a flareship orbited overhead and dropped flares till dawn. Not until first light did

two A-I his and an 0-1 forward air controller arrive ove the target. Then they

were unable to strike because the controller could not make radio contact with

the besieged fo c,., to verify tile target. The insurgents partially ove ran thecamp.

killed fifty-five South Vietnamese. two U.S. Special Forces soldiers, and an

Australan advisor. The delay in A-Il reaction stemmed from the 516th Fighter

Squadron pilots being unable to fly at night. A further factor was the operating

rule that barred the 0-1 from making a target close to friendly forces without

positive identificatioi. 2

A more grievous failure ensued on .uly 21 in Cliuong Thien Province. Viet

Cong stormed the Xang Cut outpost before dawn and set ambush positions

along the road to be taken by relief forces. Within the one hour needed to get a

Vietnamese controller to the scene, the aribush decimated the friendly troops

-- killing forty-one and wounding fifty-six. Two Vietnamese A-I lis oil ground

alert came one and one-half houis after the air support mission was requested."

On the morning of .uly 28. the Viet Cong hit two hamlets and a post

immediately north of Ben Cat in Birh Dtnong Province. A battalion responded.

lost a lead tank to 57-am recoilless rifle fire, and broke apart under assault. In an

initial air support strike, four USAF A-I Es accepted targets froni a U.S. Army

0-I pilot. But the Vietnamese A-Ill pilots next on station refused to act without a

Vietnamese air controller, even though the Army liarson pilot and Vietnarnese

ground observer marked enemy positions with smoke rockets. By the rime a

Vietnamese controller got there, tie guerrillas had faded into the jungle. "

The policy of defining counterinsurgeicy as something distinctly different

from other states of armed conflict resulted ir not developing enough air

firepower to defeat tile Viet Cong. Occasional two-plane air strikes on wellknown enemy base areas (lid little more than hatass. One proposed soltion was

to ask the civilians to leave Viet Coig havens.Then large-scale bombing ofthese

havens could be ca ried out by USAF tactical aircraft from bases in Thailand.

Okinawa. and thle Philippines. With inflight rcftelhg tie planes need not ever

land in South Vietnam. "

n mid-1964 General Westmoreland was "deeply concerned"with the surge

in successful Viet Cong hamlet and cutpost attacks and ambushes of troop units

224
THlE WAR IN VIETNAM. 1964

and convoys. His basic appioach lay in sending more U.S. forces into the

provinces at the district level. Their piesence spurred Vietnamese patamilitary

and lower-level units to speed up pacification. ' Concluding that the air reaction

time to night attacks was too slow. Westmoreland diiected Army advisors to

keep armed helicopters (some Ilaic-equipped) on night alert at provincial headquarters. " He requested mole Army Special Foices troops. And he asked for

one helicopter company in direct support of each Vietnamese division, plus

additional armed helicopter companies and platoons."

In addition the MACV commander instructed General Moore and Brig.

Gen. Delk M. Oden. commander of the United States Army Support Command.

Vietnam. to shore up all American air support of troop movements, convoys.

and reaction forces. Moore and Oden issued a formal agreement that Westmoreland placed in a MACV directive dated September 7. To refine coordination,

Army and Marine Corps aviation was to be collocated as would Air Force and

Vietnamese control agencies. Ground reaction forces would not normally move

without air support. In many cases, ai red helicopters would engage and pinpoint the enemy until more heavily armed fighters an ived. If too few fighters

were to be had, extra armed helicopters would be used. 9

The Moore-Oden agreement was perhaps useful as an interim measure

required by conditions in South Vietnam. Still it differed in important re, pects

from proven tactical air doctrine. The agreement perpetuated two separa: a iIr

control systems (Air Force and Army-Marine Corps). which made it possible for

a ground commander to receive conflicting advice. Time and again General

LeMay protested the presence of armed helicopters in Vietnam, because tactical

fighters performed better. Even so, the Moore-Oden agreement recogni/ed

complementary needs for both types of aircraft."

Some USAF officers believed that the 2d Air Division was being "hoodwinked" in the roles and missions agreement, but theory had to give way to

practicality. With the absence of enemy air power, armed helicopters proved

useftl. Theii instant reply to ground fire offset their inaccurate and rather light

firepower. But the Viet Cong's introduction of more .50-cal and 40-m weapons

trimmed the helicopters' advantages.

'1 he Air Force concept of centraliied control of all air resources remained

"fundamental and sound" in the words of Col. Allison C. Brooks. General

Moore's deputy. However, since the fairly slow A-I aircraft in Vietnam could not

be moved rapidly from one base to another, Brooks agreed they should be

dispeised into the areas where the battles occurred. So Iorg as there was no

deviation from the principle of centrali ed control. the planies could be shifted as

required without fragmenting the effort."

225
XIX. The Gulf of Tonkin

Incident

President Johnson had intimated shortly after taking office that he was

inclining toward expanded covert operations against North Vietnam. With the

least risk he wanted to put pressure on Hanoi. to force lessened support for the

Viet Cong. The President early in January 1964 approed additional resources

for covert actions. including beach landings and airdrops of Vietnamese intelligence and commando teams. Closely managing this work were the Office of the

Special Assistant for Counterinsurgency and Special Activities of the Joint

Chiefs of Staff(headed by General Anthis. now in Washington) and 1he MACV

Special Operations Group in Saigon.'

Az in other international waters, U.S. Navy patrols were routinely operating

in the Gulf of Tonkin to monitor various North Vietnamese activities by visual

and electronic sightings. In February U-2 aircraft from Strategic Air Command

resumed their reconnaissance missions. Averaging one or two sorties a day. they

photographed the border areas of Laos, Cambodia, and North Vietnam.2 In

March more naval patrolling was deemed necessary. Done by air as well as by

sea, it focused on naval movements.' By April the sum of this intelligence

suggested that Hanoi was readying forces to invade South Vietnam through

Laos. So General LeMay's repeated announcements to the Joint Chiefs seemed

to be sound - there could be no satisfactory solution to the situations in Laos

and South Vietnam without military action against North Vietnam."

At the end of June the President selected General Taylor to succeed Henry

Cabot Lodge as Ambassador to Vietnam. In recognition of Taylor's prior role as

one of the major architects of the war, Johnson entrusted the entire military

effort to his hands. He authorized the new ambassador to wield whatever

command control he thought piopei. If Tayloi acted independently of CINCPAC, lie would infringe on the command prerogatives of Admiral Sharp, the

newly installed commander in chiet. He might also split the unity of air power

into three packages -- operations in Vietnam and in Laos plus those planned

against North Vietnam. Gen. Hunter Harris. Jr., picked to head PACAF on

August I. would find that possibility frustrating. After talking with Admiral

Sharp in Hawaii, Ambassador Taylor reached Saigon on July 7. He told General

Westmoreland that he would not interfere with MACV's "day to day business."'

To Taylor the Khanh government seemed weak. As lie later wrote. "We

lived dangerously in this period, never sure from night to night when a new coup

might overthrow another feeble government or when we might lose some

important town to a surprise attack or a military base to mortar fire."'

CThe weakness of the Saigon government, heavy deliveries of modern weapons by North Vietnam to the Viet Cong. and infiltration of North Vietnamese

Army units into the south called for greater American effort. Since ,Ianuary the

227

PREOEDING PAGE BLANK-NOT 1IJ.3D

L
THE ADVISORY YEARS

.ICS had been advocating a shift from advisory assistance to moie diiect aid.

No' in May they proposed assigning U.S. Special Forces teams to provinces and

districts as advisors to Regional and Popular Forces. General Westmorelald

opposed flooding the country with American servicemen, lie believed the key to

success was honing the cutting edge of the small fighting units. Ilence on June25

and again on July 16, he recommended that U.S. military stiength in Vietnam be

expanded by about forty-two hundied men to work as advisors at the district

level. Admiral Sharp agreed.'

On July 18 Genet al Khanh delivered an emotional address at a rally to mark

Vietnam's "day of shame," the anniversary of the country's division in 1954. lie

asserted that his government was unwilling to remain indifferent in the face of the

fimi determination of tile people who wanted a "push northward" as "an

appropriate means to fulfill our national history." The next day a government

statement d.;clared. "If Communist China and Communist Vietnam obstinately

continue their way of aggression, the government and entire pcople of Vietnam

will step up the war with determination until total \ ictory liberates the whole of

outr national territory." '

One week earlier a detachment of C-130s from the USAF 6091st Reconnaissance Squadron, recently moved from Japan to Don Muang near Bangkok.

had begun flying communication intercept missions off the North Vietnamese

coast. On the 28th a Navy DeSoto patrol. consisting solely of the destroyei

Madlox. also commenced sailing cl'lse to the coast to collect radar and commtnications intelligence and to make a "show of force."'

lIlanoi broadcasts tevealed that the North Vietnamese knew ofthe burgeoning covert activity. In a talk with newsmen inl July. Air Commodore Nguyen Cao

Ky admitted that troops were being parachuted into North Vietnam. lie said

training was in progless for bigger special missions, entailing ground attacks and

airboi ne operations beyond the confines of South Vietnam."'

Conferring with Ambassador Taylor on July 23. General Khanh insisted

that the war had entered a new phase - South Vietnam needed to be on tile

offensive. But the next day he asked Taylor whether he should resign. It a cable

to the State Department, the Ambassadorsaid that if the United States opposed

a march to the north, tie Vietnamese might break with American policy. A single

"maverick pilot taking off for Hanoi with a load ol bombs" could touch off an

unwarranted extension of hostilities. This would cloud the chances for internal

pacification in Vietnam. The chief need. Taylor felt, was a stable Vietnamese

government and that required time. To gain this time, he suggested that the

Vietnamese military make contingency plans for heightened actions against

North Vietnam."

But the Vietnamese chafed for action. Four of their patrol boats, operating

under U.S. guidance. left Da Nang on July 30 and sailed north. That night they

shelled a radar station on Hon Me Island and a radio transmitter on lion Ngu

Island. Both installations were off the North Vietnamese coast near Vinh. and

both were deeply involved in Hanoi's sea infiltration. 1

'

228
TIll" GULFOF TONKIN INCIDENT

During late afternoon on August 2. three high-speed North Vietnamese

Swatow patrol boats fired on the destroyer Maddox. which was tn intei national

waters twenty-eight miles off the enemy's coast. The Maddo.\ and planes flom

the carrier 7Tonderoga returned the fire.

At first )efense Secretary McNanaia thought that the attack was either a

miscalculation by the government or an impulsive act ofa local connandei. In

any event. President Johnson immediately dispatched a note of protest to Hanoi.

He made public his orders that the Navy continue patrols in the Gull of Tonkin

and add a second destroyer. On August 3 the Maddo.v, now accompanied by the

C. TutrnerJo *'. ieentered the gulf. Air patrols from the "'icon(deroga coveted both

destroyers by day. That night. South Vietnamese forces raided a radar station on

Cape Vinh Son and a security station near Cua Ron. After dark and in bad

weather on the 4th. the Ma&lox reported that it was being fired upon. "

Admiral Sharp. CINCPAC, asked the J CS for a new rule of engagement

allowing U.S. aiicraft to pursue planes into hostile aii space instead ofstoppingat

a three-mile line off the North Vietnamese coast. lie also sought authority to

launch instant punitive air strikes on North Vietnani as retaliation forthe attacks

on the Maddox. 14

Piesident Johnson shared this ieaction - the United States had to show it

meant business. Ile stiessed in a radio and television address to the American

people that the U.S. response to the hostile action would be "limited and fitting."

Even so, lie directed the Pacific Fleet on August 5 to make a single all-out assault

on the North Vietnamese Swatow boat bases and their suppoi ting P10. stolage

at Vinh.

Together with the reprisal attack, the President appioved and the JCS

ordeied emergency actions to move additional forces to the Pacific. especially

into Southeast Asia. Saigon hud previously agieed to positioning mole USA F

units in the country, and on August 5 planes began to arrive.

Six F-102 jet interceptors of the 509th Fighter Squadron flew from Clark

Air Base to Da Nang. Six others from the 16th Fighter Squadron at Naha Air

Base. Okinawa, touched down at Tan Son Nhut. Eight F-100s of the 615th

Tactical Fighter Squadron, still on rotational deployment at Clark. went to Da

Nang. On the evening of August 5. thirty-six B-57s of the 8th and 13th Bombe

Squadrons had trouble getting into Bien Hoa. The rain obscured the pilots'view

and made the runway slick. One plane during approach crashed in Viet Cong

territory, and two suffered damage upon landing. Six RF-1Os out of Kadena

and M isawa Air Base. Japan, augmented the Able Mable reconnaissance planes

at Tan Son Nhut. The 405th Tactical Wing sent ten F-100s from Clark to Takhli.

Thailand. Eight KB-50s from PAC NF' 42 1st Air Refueling Squadron moved

from Yokota to Tan Son Nhut a d 1 aknli. Eight F-105 jet fighters of the 36th

Tactical Fighter Squadron flew from Y,,kota to Clark, then to Korat in Thailand

on August 9.

Under JCS direction the Commander in Chief, United States Strike Command, deployed a TAC composite air strike force. F-100s of the 522d and 614th

Tactical Fighter Squadrons landed at Clark on August 8-9. Six RF-10lIs of the

229
TIE ADVISORY YEARS

363d Composite Reconnaissance Unit leached Kadena on the 13th. Forty-eight

C-130 transports from tile 314th, 463d. and 516th Troop Carrier Wings arrived

at Ca k and Kadena between the 9th and 21st of Augtust. For intlight refueling

the Strategic Air Command furnished forty-eight KC-1 35jet tankers that operated mainly from Ilickam Air Force Base in llawaii and Andeisen Air Foice

Base on Guam. SAC further formed a task force of eight KC-135s at Clark. "

General Moore on August 6 created a 2d Air Division command post at

Tan Son Nitit. separate from the combined Vietnamese-USAF air operations

center. Using just the U.S. side of the tactical air control system. he began to tie

togethei all the USA F units in the area."'

On August 5 General Westmoreland had met with General Khanh and

Vietnamese commanders to outline the purpose for the retaliatory strike on the

Swatow boat bases and oil storage sites. Westmoreland advised and Khanh

agreed to place the Vietnamese on maximum alert against Viet Cong reprisals.

The MACV commander added that if the North Vietnamese or Chinese attacked

South Vietnam, he would loose air strikes on targets of his choice without

requiring "a green light from Washington." Ambassador Taylor afterwards

called on Khanh. He handed him a letter from President Johnson underlining the

need for the closest bilateral consultation. Khanh asured Taylor that he fully

understood and accepted this requirement.

The U.S. retaliatory attack on August 6 involved sixty-four aircraft.

launched in two waves from the carriers Ticonderoga and Con.stellaton. The

strikes on five boat bases and the Vinh oil storage destroyed eight boats and

danaged twenty-one, put the oil reservoirs ninety percent out of commission.

and lost two planes to antiaircraft fire.

Shortly thereafter, at the request of the United States, the Canadian

member of the International Control Commission visited the North Vietnamese

piemier in Hanoi. The Canadian said that the United States viewed Hanoi's role

in Laos and South Vietnam as critical and threatening. He warned that if North

Vietnam persisted in its aggression. it would expect to stiffer the consequences.

The premier was "utterly unintimidated" and "calmly resolved" to pursue his

course.

His indifference night have reflected a recent increase in am strength. Noi th

Vietnamese aircraft had included thirty trainers, fifty tianspots., and foum light

helicopters. But on August 7. aerial photos of ihuc Yen airfield near Hanoi

showed thirty-nine M IG-l 5 -17jet fighters apparentlyjust flown in from China.

More of these jets were on Hainan Island and South China bases. i

Genemal i larris, PACAF commander, saw that the M IGs on Phuc Yen

posed a direct threat to his fomces in Southeast Asia. lie proposed to Admiral

Sharp that destroying the communist jet aircraft would be a "sharp lesson" to

China. and would deter any fresh enemy plans for attack. The USAF F-105s at

Korat could conduct the operation, but the F-100s on alert at Da Nang were

closer to the target. With cluster bomb unit (CBU-2A) munitions. ifhe planes

could prosecute a low-level, high-speed, surprise attack on the parkd aiicraft.

Then using AG M- 1213 missiles as well as rockets, llak-supprcssion missions and

230
BASE South Korea (MSW OUTDEVIETNAJ /,,Japan

fAHIAW *eYOKOTA

China

& KADENA

UDOR((cHING CHUAN 61C KANG

TAk ILI 0 UBON (KUNG KUAN)

fORAT*

~SONCLARK PiippineOs

phtMACTAN

LA ANDERSEN

U ,S Ticondefoga 'okwet~y LIS Navy
"I liE AI)VISORY YEARS

strikes against individual surviving aircraft could be carried out. " But Sharp

needed the go-ahead fiom higher authority, and it was not given.

On August 7 General Westnoieland suggested that MACV and the Vietnamlese government make General Moore the comnbined air comnnmander. Wth a

Vietnamese deputy. Mooie could exercise operational control over U.S.-

Vietnalmese air power for all missions. These would encompass ,h strikes into

North 'v ietnam and Laos. defensive actions in South Vietnam and air support of

mobile ground forces in the northern provinces of South Vietnam. Assisted by

MACV, the Vietnamese armed forces were to have the primary task of controlling the counterinsturgency inside the countily.

Admiilal Sharp made it clear that lie as CINCPAC would manage the air

activities against North Vietnan through PACA Fand the Pacific Fleet. PACAF

would work through Thirteenth Air Force and 2d Air Division. Since the latter

ieported to both MACV and PACAF, coordination would be easy. As for the

M ACV commander, he was to center on purging the Viet Congand pacifying the

country. Although events in Laos disturbed policymakers during the summer of

1964. intelligence officers looked for the most serious escalation of the conflict to

occur in Vietnam. Peking and Hanoi evidently felt there was a better chance to

gain power by dint of a collapse of the Saigon government. '"

Ambassador Taylor estimated the chance of such a collapse at about fifty

percent. The Khanh government had been unable to rebuild the political conti ol

structure between Saigon and the hamlets, which had disappeared following the

overthrow and death of Diem in November 1963. Morale had plummeted.

assisted in its drop by the constant threat of assassination or another coup. To

Taylor the most valid and realistic objectives were to bolster Saigon. press the

campaign against the Viet Cong, and be prepared to act against North Vietnam

by Jauiary I. 1965.

At President Johnson's request. the Senate and House on August 10

enacted a joint resolution giving him authority to prosecute military operations

as lie saw fit. Tied to the North Vietnamese attacks on the destroyer Madhlo., in

the Gulf of Tonkin. the resolution read in part:

('onsonant with the Constittitnon of the Unitcd States ind the CIlarter of the Iniited

NaiO l and ls in accordannc with it% obhigations under the Soteast Asia Colleeise

)elense I reary, the Uited States is prepared. a the Piesdent delermines. to taLke

all iceessary steps. including the use ofirnid force, to as1sta ny member or protocol

siate, reqleting aistance in defense of it% frecdom

Yet there was a nagging doubt as to whether the Maddox had actually been

attacked on the night of August 4. High-speed naval operations at night made

precise observation and rapid and accurate reporting difficult. In September

Hanoi would publish a lengthy white paper to justify the August 2 attack as

proper defense against a covert operation. But it declared that notm: of its naval

craft was in the area two nights later. 22

William 1). Bundy, Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs. was

impressed by Ambassador Taylor's assessment of the Khanh government's

veakness. He therefore drafted a policy memorandum for the National Security

232
"Il iF GI.iI- OF TONKIN INCIDE"NT

Council entitled "Next Couses of Actions in Southeast Asia."Therc was to be o

initial short "holding phase" fot the remainder of August to avoid actions that

might intensify the war. Then would come a "limited pressure" phase lasting

thil ough tile lest of the year, to maintain the moiale of the Khanh go\crnment

without risking escalation. 'I his phase would witness covert operations against

North Victnam. training of Vietnamese pilots to fly jet aircraft, moves across the

bordei into the I.aotian panhandle, reinstatement of naval patrols in the Gulf of

Tonkin, and "tit for tat" reprisals Finally. more serious pressures were to start on

January I, 1965. For example, initial measures to destroy enemv infiltration

routes and facilities would progress to the bombardment of military targets in

North Vietnam. 2'

Exactly how unstable the Khanh government was became clear on the 16th

of August. The Military Revolutionary Council elected Khanh president and

made Gen. l)uonL, Van Minh supreme adviser. Student and Buddhist demonstiations instantly erupted.

In Hawaii. far from the turmoil in Saigon, Admiral Sharp thought that tle

United States could not afford to lose the momentum that the Tonkin Gulf

iesponse had created. He wanted to exert more pressure against the communists

in Laos. both on the Plain of Jars and in the panhandle. lie also wanted to

expand and continue covert operations and naval patrols. Because the USAF

units at Da Nang, Bien Hoa, and Tan Son Nhut were vulnerable to Viet Cong

attack, he suggested that U.S. ground troops be brought to Vietnam to defend

the bases. He further advocated that the United States set up a major base at Da

Nang, to show that Americans meant to stay in Southeast Asia until American

ains wele attained.2 '

In the midst of the rioting in Saigon, Ambassador Taylor recomlmended

that tile United States try to gain time for the Khanh government. He opposed

getting deeply involved with Notth Viet nam and possibly China. Like Bundy, lie

thought that Hanoi should be checked in its infilt; ation by limited pressuie until

Januat v I. 1965. Then such measures a, coveit operations. extensive patrolling.

U-2 flights over North Vietnam. air and ground strikes in Laos, and bombing of

the north should be stepped up.

Oin August 24 Ambassador Taylor chaired a long session of the mi,sion

council lie had formed to include General Westmoreiand. "I he members discussed alternative options in Vietnam, but found it difficult to define an incident

that warranted A merican reprisal. 26

On the sameday the Joint Chiefs of Staff were reviewinga list of ninety-four

possible bombing targets in North Vietnam. compiled in June and July. The

,argets fell into five categories - airfields, lines of communication. military

installations, industrial facilities, and armed reconnaissance route "

president Khanh resigned on the 25th of August. Two da ,s later, the

Military Revolutionary Council named a triumvirate of provincial leaders as an

interim ruling body. 2

Undeterred by these developments, the JCS sent the list of bombingtargets

to CINCPAC and d: cted that strike plans be devised for four patterns of attack

233
THE ADVISORY YEARS

in an ascend.ing oider of seveiit. The Joint Chiefs informed Secleary McNama a of theii disagreement with Ambassadoi 1 aylor's position. They considered

mluch stronger militaix \pessures on Noith Vietnam to be needed, i particular to

provide a psychological boost to the Saigon goxerient. 'lhe chiefs urged

bombing the listed targets in Noith \ietnain at once..

Sec:!;'ary McNanara on August 31 asked tile Joint Chiefs to ,ns\\cr three

questions about the ninety-four targets. After a full-scale assault on the targets.

would enough ordnance and POI. be left to defend Southeast Asia from Chinese

attack? What would be the effects of each of the four patterns of attack on the

North Vietnamese economy, ol its capacity to support the Pathet Lao and the

Viet Cong. and on its ability to enlarge North Vietnamese military forces in

South Vietnam and Laos? And finally, if the destruction of the ninety-four

targets failed to stifle FH,;oi's will to wage war, what course of action was

feasible? These were tough questions indeed. "'

In Saigon ol September 3 a fifteen-man leadership committee replaced the

ruling triumvirate and picked Khanh as acting premier and Minh as chairman.

A short time later. Ambassador Taylor. Secretary of State Rusk, Secretary

of Defense McNamara, and JCS Chaii man Wheeler gathered to weigh courses

of action for the United States. The group sharply revised Bundy's prior outline

of graduated pressures.The members agreed that the Saigon government would

be too weak for two or three months for the United States to take any major and

deliberate action risking escalation. The communists were not likely to provoke

the United States. But Saigon should be assisted to show that the United States

was serious in its aims, while keeping risks low and under control. American

naval patrols in the Gulf ofTonkmn. suspended after the MadMoxaffair. could be

resumed. The patrols ought to stay outside the twelve-mile limit and be clearly

divorced from the South Vietnamese covert operations, which should concentrate on maritime raids. South Vietnamese air and ground operations. linked to

air strikes by Laotian pilots in the panhandle. should begin. Lastly, tile United

States should be alert to answer an attack upon American personnel or a special

enemy action against Vietnam. Yet it should not deliberat. ly provoke aa incident

to justify a retaliation. "

These proposals went to the President and to the joint Chiefs of Staff. On

September 8 Genetal LeMay told the chiefs that the courses of action did not

convey a clear and positive signal to Htanoi of U.S. r ,olution. Gen. Wallace M.

Greene, Jr., Marine Corps Commanoant, sided with 1 May for he also thought that the ninety-four targets should be bombed. The ne,t day, McNamara and

Wheeler talked about the Joint Chiefs' feelings. They saw the danger to be drastic

American action triggering a strong reaction that the Saigon regime could not

meet. :

President Johnson accepted the more cautious course on September 10. He

ordered U.S. naval patrols to be resumed. covert operations to be reviewed, and

talks with the Laotin government to be opened on limited air and ground

operations in the panhandle. But the first order of business was shoring up the

Saigon government.,

234
TIE GULF OF TONKIN INCIDENT

AmeriLtar- attempts to do so met with lslight success. On September 13 the IV

Corps commaiindei tarted a coup. Proclaiming that Khanh had capitulated to

Buddhist and student demands, he led armored elements into Saigon. occupied

public buildings, and disarmed the national police. The Vietnamese Al Force

stayed loyal to Khanh and made a show of force against the coup. The U.S. State

Department announced firm support for Khanh. The rebellious foices then

withdiew. Khanh carried out sweeping changes among his military commanders,

and appointed a I High National Council of ,e,'enteen civilians to draft a constitution and designate a civil chief of state. Outwardly, this seemed a step toward

stabili/ing the government. By October I. however, American intelligence estimated scant impiovement. Meanwhile, pacification efforts virtually collapsed

because the partlyied milita ry staff in Saigon could not reach decisions."

As President .Johnson desired. U.S. destroyers Morton and Edwards

entered the Gulf of Tonkin on patrol. During the night of September 17,

however, the ships reported and fired on radar contacts. A" .Joint Chiefs direction. CINCPAC called for siable reprisal air attacks on North Vietnam.

Targets and weapons were changed seveial time.-.. and the 2d Air )ivision

command post was swamped with ordei sand counterordi'rs. In the end, the air

attacks were canceled because the Navy could not be absolutely sure that Not th

Vietnamese action had actually occurred. The Joint Chiefs next enjoined

CINCPAC to be ready to execute immediate air strikes against preselected

targets when naval patrols were in the gulf. CINCPAC dictated that U.S. jets at

Da Nang and Bien Hoa be alerted for attacking P'huc Yen airfield. When a

SAC RB-47 was committed to weekly electronic intelligence flights over the

Gulf of Tonkin. the naval patrols were abandoned."

It began to appear that unless the United States assumed a more direct role

in the struggle. the situation would go out of control.

235
XX. Diffusion of Air Assets

General Moote. the 2d ,,ir Division comnmndei. cou1,ted Geneial Westmoteland as the biggest "booster" of tactical air support ii Vietnam., But

Westmoieland's, requests for mote air icsoutces in mid-1964 hmed to Army

aviation doctrine. lie asked foi a fourth C- 123 squadron (sixteen planes) to take

catc of -wholesale" supply under the Southeast Asia M ihtai \ Airlift System. a

sccond Ai my CV-2 Caribou company to handle "ietail" delivei es within the

corps aneas. two new Army helicopter companies numbering seventi UIH-I Bs

(somc foi command use. othets for gunship.s), and two additional airmobile

platoons with twenty U li-I 13s. Among the forty-eight hundied personnel in the

package weie forty air liaison officer and forwaid ,:A controller team,s.

IPACA F understood and agieed to the need for the C-123 squadron. in light

of Viet Cong success in attacking surface ttansportation. But an extra Cat bou

company seemed unnecessary, if the CV-2s already in Vietnam wete put under

central control of the airlift system fot common use. Geneial Le May disliked thc

Moore-Oden position of "complementary" needs for armed helicopters and

tactical air. He objected strongly to helicopter gunships. Despite the Air -olce

chief's contention that stiike aircraft gave mote firepowet. Secretary of DefensL

McNamara on August 7. 1964. approved Westmoteland's list of requirements."

Three days later, a Royal Austi alian Air Foice detachment ofsix Cat ibous

arrived at Tan Son Nhut and went under control of the arlift system. But the new

Army Caribou company reaching Vietnam in September remained outside

systematic control. The Air Force Reserve furnished the fresh squtadion of

C-123,. the planes flown to Tan Son Nhut in mid-Septembel by rotating

rcplacement cre%,s. In early October the 19th Air Commando Squadron (I roop

Cat ier) was formed and assigned to the 315th Troop Cal ier Group.

In August the Joint Chiefs of Staff had forwarded General l.eMa 's question on the comparative merits of tactical air and armed helicopters. General

Westinoreland. M ACV commander, responded and asserted that the latter had

numerous advantages over strike aiicraft support. Geneial Moore took exception and argued that many of the alleged benefits were invalid. Continuing

discussions consumed a lot of staff eneigy that might bettei have gone to the

combat situation. '

Westmoreland did not neglect tactical aviation, even though he heartily

endorsed armed helicopters. For the first time. M ACV critiques of Vietnamese

ground operations pointed out missed opportunities for tactical air support. l-ot

example, in Phlu Yen Province on August 19. thiec battalions attacked about five

hundred Viet Cong without once calling for strike aircraft. This. MACV cornmented. was "the major fault" of the operation.

Pa',t counterinsurgency experts had viewed air strikes as impeding pacification. Then Leon Gome. an analyst with The RAND Corporation, interviewed

Viet Cong prisoners and concluded that the adverse effects wete far less than

236
I)IFFUSION OF AIR ASSETS

assume(]. He further found that since the Viet Cong weic oil tile lookout for

strike ailcraft, they feared even liaison planes."

Yet MACV desired more helicopters because str'ke aircraft aind liaison

planes were too few, a shortage seen by General Moore as the most important

limiting factoi in the USAF effort.' Due to training demands, only eignt of the

t\\enty-nine A-I Es of the Ist Ail Commando Squadion were on hand for twelve

combat sorties a day. An avelage ofjust thirty Vietnamese A-I Hs were available

for thirty-five to forty-five combat sorties.' Eight aircraft of the Ist Air Commando Squadron crashed, at least two due to enemy ground file. These A-I Es

weie shot down on the night of September 23. when silhouetted by flaies while

making a low-level napalm pass.'

Geneial Mooie had poposed in August that the Vietnamese be given a fifth

and a sixth A- i-I squadron, and he asked that the 13-57 and F-100jets at Bien

Hoa and l)a Nang be used within the country. MACV and the JCS conctil red.

When the loin( Chiefs took tip in September the mattet of lagging tactical air

support. they suggested usingjets but President Johnson was unwilling to do so.

To up USAF sorties, Ambassador Tayloradvocated deleting the need fora bona

fide Vietnamese trainee pilot aboard an A-I E during a combat mission. Perhaps,

the Joint Chiefs said, USAF A-I Es could fly combat while carryinga Vietnamese

observer if a pilot was not on hand. Although at fiist "entirely negative,"

Secietary McNamara on September 25 agreed to prmmit A-I F combat operations with a Vietnamese obseiver or student pilot aboard.

The JCS tiled again to allow USAF crews to respond to immediate and

emergency air requests. But Ambassador Tayloi still iesisted opening the door to

wider use ,I American ciews. and McNamaia agreed. III mid-October the Joint

Chiefs authori/ed A-I Es to engage in combat with a Vietnamese pilot ol

obser~er aboard. I-or the Vietnamese Air Force they recommended a fifth A-I Ii

squadron in May 1965 and a sixth in October 1965. Until then, two USAI- A-I E

units were requiied in the country. "'

During October-lDecember 1964 the 34th Tactical Group and the Vietnamese Air Force slightly expanded their strike aircraft. Oigani/ed under the 34th

Group on October 12. the USAF 602d Fighter Commando Squadron began to

build in both personnel and planes. The 520th or foui th Vietnamese fighter

squadron, formed at Bien Hoa in October, prepaied to move to the new Can Tho

ain field.

In December the 34th Group flew about fifty A-I sortie.ia day. seventeen of

them available for combat. The planes performed admirably on strike missions

but proved hard to maintain, chiefly due to inflight engine failures. The Americans nonetheless kept eighty percent of the aircraft operational. In contrast, the

Vietnamese could muster only fifty-eight percent. Forexample, the 516th Fighter

Squadron at Da Nang had fifteen aircraft but its sortie rate was about six per day.

The 520th Fighter Squadron flew a few missions in December, but construction lagged at Can Tho (later called Binh 'I huy) and the field was insecure at

night. Beginning December 20 the squadron daily deployed a detachment of five

237
HIE A)VISORY YEARS

(Top) B-57 Canberra bomber

(Center) A rocket pod attached to the

wing pylon of an --100 Super Sabre at

Da Nang

(Bottom) Austratian Caribou aircraft at

Tan Son Nhut, on hand to aid in

aircraft support missions, August 10.

1964

K 0

!W!
DIFFUSION OF AIR ASSETS

A-I Ils to Binh Thuy. The pilots were on call for missions until they returned to

Bien Hoa just before nightfall.

The expansion of the Vietnamese Air Force was supported by adequate

aiiciaft deliveiy and aircrew training. It suffered from troubles in training

maintenance men, owing in part to shortages of ground support and handling

equipment. The Vietnamese borrowed a few dollies, loading hoists, and other

equipment from the 34th Tactical Group. Only main bases like Bien Hoa owned

these items, which hardly helped the situation at forward bases.

On August 8, at the height of the Tonkin Gulf crisis, PACAF issued orders

inactivating the 19th Tactical Air Support Squadron as had earlier been

planned. 2 General Westmoreland expressed surprise to Admiral Sharp and

asked to retain the unit. In lieu of giving the 0-I liaison planes to the Vietnamese

116th Liaison Squadron as contemplated. Westmoreland proposed the purchase

of U-17A aircraft to equip that unit. On September 25 Defense Secretary

McNam; ra approved.

The 19th Tactical Air Suppori Squadron was reactivated at Bien Hoa on

October 3 1. MACV recommended thirty more planes for it and each of the four

Vietnamese liaison units as well."

The reversal of the earlier phaseout decision left the squadron in limbo.

Until pipeline support could be restored, the 34th Tactical Group possessed

twenty-four 0-Is and twelve liaison pilots, three of whom were about to complete

their tours. A detachment of 0-1Fs stayed at Bien Hoa to train newly graduated

Vietnamese pilots arriving from Nha Trang. Ten 0-I Fs. with liaison officers and

forward controllers, went under the air support operations centers.

The USAF controller with the 14th Regiment at Tra Vinh was Capt. Lloyd

E. Lewis. When he received an 0-1 and a Vietnamese observer in S:ptember, he

began to fly day-long surveillance missions coordinated with the Vinh Binh

province commander. The iesult was an appreciable decline in Viet Cong

activity. Friendly ground action became more productive as did interdiction

taigeting and air strikes. '

In September William 13. Graham and Aaron It. Katzof RAND studied the

use of USAF liaison officers and forward air contiollers on constant visual

reconnaissance and strike control. The two analysts gathered data for a new

concept they called the "Single Integrated Attack Team." The idea was presented

in Saigon, Hawaii. and Washington in October and next in a RAND report. The

theory favored small and closely coordinated air and ground strike forces as the

best counterinsurgency weapon. 0-1 crews were to carry out continuous and

extensive airborne surveillance and strike control. They would work with Special

I-orces ground teams of about eighty men, who weie to hold the Viet Cong

groups long enough for strike aircraft to sweep in. Unfortunately, the concept

was better-suited to an insurgency in its initia: stages than to the field warfare the

Viet Cong were starting to wage."

Meanwhile, General Khanh had embarked on a general shakeup following

the abortive coup against him in September. His sweeping personnel changes in

the Joint Geneial Staff and among the field commanders produced officers

239
IHE ADVISORN YEARS

unfamiliai with the an iequest system. To explain the system's teatures. a team

from the USA - Aii-Ground Opeiations School completed a countiywide circuit

in October and November. But all attempts to pei suade the Vietnamese to assign

sufficient workers to tile request net, to dispetse 0-I As to forwaid locations, and

to let others besides Vietnamese air obseivers maik targets weie fruitless. The

field commanders refused to be bypassed in requests for air strikes. Neither the

Vietnamese Air F'orce nor ground commanders were willing to assume iesponsibility under civil law for mistakes that the other might make in marking targets.

Strike pilots iefrained from accepting targets unless a Vietnamese air observei

designated them. And deploying 0-IAs to forward and remote airstrips meant

danger from guerrillas, logistic difficulties, and loss of command control. 1

Despite these drawbacks. Secretary McNamara in November approved a

fifth and sixth fighter squadron for the Vietnamese Air Force. He authoiized

building tie Vietnamese liaison squadrons to thirty aircraft each. by delivei ies of

sixty-eight 0-I As and U-17As from Maich through May 1965. He said he would

probably go along with General Westmorela nd's request to give the 19th Tactical

Air Support Squadron thiity 0-IFs. However. he wanted to postpone his

decision until the political climate in Saigon impioved. '

The continuous surveillance concept could not be properly set in motion

during the winter of 1964-65. due to the dearth of USAI- and Vietnamese airciaft

and forward air controllers. Bv December the 19th Tactical Air Suppolt Squadron was down to seven airmen and nine pilots, when it received eight singleengine pilots who needed to be checked out in 0-Is. The Vietnamese liaison

squadrons owned only sixty of 120 authori/ed 0-IAs and U-17As. In the II

Corps there were just four 0-I controllers oi hand. "

In compensation USAF research and development had turned out some

new weapons that TAC's Special Air Warlare Center had tested. A munitions

survey team visiting Vietnam thought that these weapons and new techniques

ought to replace older munitions and methods. '

The haiards of Viet Cong ground fire to low-flying aircraft, particulaily

those on napalm runs. demanded a different approach to hamlet detense.

Fragmentation clusters replaced napahn on night tlare-assisted missions. I ghters delivered the clusters from a dive to shave the time they were silhouetted b\

tla relight.22

The Ist Combat Application Group at Eglin Air I-oice base had devised and

tested a three-gun side-fiiing installation in a C-47. The Air Stall called fol

operational testing of these rapid-fire 7.62-mm Gatling guns (miniguns). eithli

affixed to the racks of an A-I or mounted and fired from the side cargo doors of

an orbiting C-47. In September Mk-44 L.a/y Dog fiec-falling tinned bullets weic

approved for use in Vietnam. The l.azy Dog worked we.l at fiist but not i ter ia

covered with heavy gi owth. The fins of the small pi ojectiles easily bent out oh

shape when loaded into the dispensers from which thev were dropped. Ihis

caused the missiles to tumble and lose theii impact. Moreover. the si/c and shape

of the pattern ol tile falling projectiles weic erratic. Clealy. La/y l)og was no

240
DIFFUSION OF AIR ASSETS

substitute for napalm when enemy and fiicndly troops were fairly close to each

other. 2' Other new weapons also proved not entiiely reliable.24

1 ests by the Ist Combat Application Group vei ified that it was desirable to

modify the C-47 with lateral-firing miniguns. Still PACAI and TAC were

ieluctant to employ the mnigun-equipped plane in combat. They deemed it

obsolete. vulnerable to giound fire. and unable to perfoiin as well as strike

aircraft.

'1 o Gen. John P. McConnel!. Air Foice Vice Chief of Staff (who would

succeed Geneial LeMay as Chief on Februai\ I. 1965) an armed C-47 was a

highly specialized weapon for use solely in areas of light ground fiie. The aircraft

could fly long night aleit nussions and icact swiftly to surprise attacks. Circling

abo\e srmll-arms range, it could pin down the enemy un .il fighters got there. The

armed C-47 would help offset the shortage of strike .,ircraft and the inefficiency

of night fighter airborne aleits.

Following a Novembe 2 briefing on the armed C-47, Gencial L.eMay

ordered a combat evaluation that got under way in early December. A test team

led by Maj. Ronald W. Ten y fitted two C-47s of the 34th Tactical Group with

miniguns. These aiicraft were an instant success against enemy troops in the

open. Using an improvised gunsight and putting the plane's wing down in a

"plyon 8"turn, the pilot could diiect file from the three miniguns mounted in the

leIt-hand cargo dooi. When fired togethei. they spewed 18.000 rounds-perminute into a space about the siue of a football field. An aerial gunner cleared

jams and reloaded the weapons it flight. While the small-caliber bullets were

easily deflected in wooded stietches, the AC-47 gunships were outstanding for

night tort and hamlet defense. Awed by the stream of tracers, the Viet Cong

spoke of the new "lay gun" turned upon them.2

s

Integrated air reconna;,sance fully responsive to uscis' needs did not

dc~elop in 1964. And the absence ot a coordinated icconais,ancc-intelligencetarget system was a set iots defect. The main stumbling block was the splintering

of air reconnaissance in and out of the country. Many elements were involved.

but the stateside USAF Tactica' Air Reconnaissance Center placed most of the

blame on the 'hoitage of keen and influential senior Air Force officeis in

Vietnam 21

By Lai Iv 1964 the reconnaissance assets of 2d Air l):vision had consisted of

six Able Mable RF-101s. two experimental mnfraied RB-57s. two experimental

mntiared F13-26s, and two night photo RB-26Cs, plus the 13th Reconnaissance

lfechnical Squadron (formerly a photo processing cell). All operated under

Detachment I 33d lactical Group, but suppoi ted the 2d Air l)ivmsion diiector of

intelligence.2'

I me and again Col. Ilaivey E. Ilenderson. 2d Ai l)ivision deputy commandei. had suggested that all these iesoumces be brought into a tactical reconnaissance squadion. I o do so. however, would have exceeded the Air I'oce's

authol/ed unit tomce levels. Mirn oiing the talk of philsing out the American

toices tfrom Vietnam, planners progiaimned a decline in U.S. reconnaissance.

hu-thermoie the Vietnamese 716th Composite Reconnaissance Squadron

241
I III AI)VISORY YFARS

(Upper right) AIC Leonard A Rowe

boresights a 50.caliber nose gun on a B-26

(Lower right) SSgt Harold Inman inspects

the links on 50.caliber ammunition belt for

a B-26

(Center) An AC-47 aircraft at Tan Son

Nhut

(Bottom) A 7 62 minigun mounted in an

AC-47

4W6

242
DIFFUSION O1" AIR ASSETS

with thice RC-47s and eighteen RT-28s, togethei with photo processing cells in

the coi ps tactical /ones was becoming operational Except tor problems in

camera installation, this squadron was making solid progress. As the 716th

leached its projected goal in early 1964 of 374 soities a month, the Able Mable

RF-10ls were to depait along with six Army Mohawk armed photo-ieconnaissance planes.2 ,

tLnfoieseen events buffeted the projections. The U-2 aircralt fiom Bieni Iloa

flew very high altitude photo missions over Southeast Asia. Film from these

flights swamped the 13th Reconnaisance Technical Squadi on, which had to call

upon other PACA I SAC, and Navy facilities in the Philippines and Japan.

Unfoitunately the tU-2 photography, needed for national strategic planning. had

slight value for tactical users.29 Moreover, the wing-stress weakness ol the B-26

led to the removal of the RB-26s from Vietnam at the close ol Malch 1964.

diminishing night photo coverage. At the same time. the Vietnautee icconnaissance progiam ian into technical snags. The improved RC-47 inflaied photo

systens were operational in April and could locate the enemy by heat-souice

imagei v. But MACV intelligence could not use this infol mation because procedures had not been worked out to exploit the infraicd photogiaphy.10

Two things weie to alter sharply the whole reconnaissance program the

U.S. decision in May to begin air reconnaissance over I.aos. and Secretaiv

McNamaia's ordeis to retrain Vietnamese RT-28 pilots for a fourth A-I H

squadron. Six more USAF RF-101s arrived to augment thre six Able Mable

aircraft. ' All RT-28s weie removed from the Vietnamese 716th Squadmon, and

thiee RC-47s were assigned to the Vietnamese 43d Transport Group. ': After a

few transport missions, the RC-47s were iestored to photo duty in the Ill and IV

Corps."

kit midyear the I, F- 10 Is commenced Ilying out of Tan Son Nhut oer Laos.

Yet authoried occasional night photography and infiared reconnaissance were

out ol the question. The two RC-47s foi this work had no self-contained

navigation systems (chiefly terrain clearance radar), and mountains and uncertain weather made the flights too ha/ardous.The Air Force set up delivery of two

more RC-47s with dopplei navigation and inflight readout infraied sensors.

lhese planes could not be modified and in place until Decembel 1964. "'

General 1larris. PACAF commander, pressed for low-level ieconnaissance

to secure more detailed coverage for tactical air operations. Admiral Sharp had

no hope of obtaining blanket approval for these flights, due to their danger to

low-flying planes. CINCPAC needed to justify each mission to officials in

Washington on a case-by-case basis."

As the photo-reconnaissance workload grew in South Vietnam, PACAF

sent six more RF-101s to Tan Son N!ut. Another six RF-10ls that had been

dispatched to Kadena in the wake of the Tonkin Gulf crisis also assisted. The

Vietnamese RC-47s continued their coverage in the III and IV Corps. two

Vietnamese aircrews being permanently assigned to reconnaissance. Requests

for photography forwarded straight to air support operations centers markedly

increased. '

243
THE \DVISORY YEARS

Since photo reconnaissance could not capture rapidlN shifting guei iilli

opermtions. interest in other air reconnaissance techniques quickened. An borne

radio direction finding held promise, and the Army's 3d Radio Research Unit

operated thiee assorted aircitaft. I hese planes furnished impol tant intelligence of

the Viet Cong order of battle, but they could not make precise-enough fixes of

enemy radio tiansmitters to perimit air taigeting.

In the United States the Air -oice tested a C-47 (later an EC-47) that could

plot the location of a ten-watt radio transmitter within one degree at a range of

twenty-five nautical miles. In Januatv 1964 PACAF requested seven C-47s fitted

with mote sensitive and accurate radio direction finders. I lowe\ er, tile Air -oice

delayed approval until the experimental plane could be tested in Vietnam.

Conducted during February-June 1964. tile tests showed the tactical adlantage

of equipment that gave lines of position to an enemy transmitter iegaidless of the

aircraft's heading. The plane could fly past a transmitter without ieseaing

interest in it, whereas Ain.y gem requited a series of head beai ngs oil the

transmitter. Yet as the testing boie out. the C-47 diiection finder was not

sufficiently sensitive to plot tle very low-power, short-range ladios used by tile

insurgents.

A bettet way to pinpoint enem\ actions seemed to be infhaled tcconnaissance sensors. In mid-1964, while two USAP RB-57s waited for tactical work.

MACV requested two Army infiaied-equipped OV-ICs to help cat r\ out \ istial

ant photographic night su veillance. Gencial Mooie asked wh\ the Mohawks

\\cre needed when the R B-57s were there. MACV was surpi ised that an inftared

ca pability was altcady on hand, but pi oceeded to justily a tequirement for four

OV-I Cs. These were to featute side-looking airborne tadar and infrated sensols

that could be "read out" it flight. The two RB-5 7s had olde infraied sets.

icquiring film to be developed and intet peted on the gi ound after the mission. In

Dccember the Ail Porce provided two extra R B-57s with inflight inhated

ieadout. The older RB-57s weic retiofitted with newer equipment and icturned

to service.

Woid of the Mohawks authori/ed to MACV ieached Genet al l.eMa\, Ile

wanted them pit under the operational control of tile 2d Air Division as palt of a

joint countel insuL geitcy iCCOflnnissalcc task force. Geneal Moote hoped to iet

atthority to coordinate all iniated icconnaissance lot MACV. but Gencial

Westnoteland favoied :quitte diffeient control at iangement. "

In mid-1964 USAf- air liaison olficers and lorward air contiollets c,t-,,l\

observed Viet Cong activity. Theili haison planes flew oel enemy-held areas

during the day and even mote at night. when the gue: rillas kindled fites to cook

theit food. The infiated sensor aircraft had the mis,,ion of collecting heatialiating intelligence. Experimenttal night flights of the R1B-57s produced

inhaled photos with "hot spots." These, when corielated with ground intelligence. confirmed tile positions of Viet Cong camps in Zones C and 1). I he

ihared section ol the 13th Reconnaissance Iechnical Squadron processed the

results of each nigt's ihared mission. -rom October 1964 on. enem, locations

(usually the coordinates of the cooking-lire sites) were phoned at once to the

244

I.,.
DIFFUSION OF AIR ASSETS

corps tactical operations center. After coliation with other intelligence, infrared

inatei ial was useful for ai tiller v and air strikes. "

While the R B-57s were in test during.July. 29 infrared targets were requested

and 21 were completed. With one more R B-57 in use in December, there wveie

261 icquests for infiared and 228 executed. Most inhialed coverage was in the III

Corps. To exploit both vistial and :ifrared sightings. the 2d Air Division proposed taiget centeis for the other corps.'

I hese centers were to funnel information and needs to the air operations

center, which would coordinate strike aiicraft. On December 20. 1964. however.

MACV formed the Central Target Analysis and Research Center at Tan Son

Nhtit as a unit of MACV .1-2 (Intelligence). Its main mission was to coordinate

Army and Air Force infraied reconnaissance. The center set up units at the corps

headquaiter s. and they were responsive to MACV .I-2. Flights by R1I-57s and

OV- I Cs proved invaluable. By January 1965 the new settip was absorbing the

entire inrared capability in Vietnam. In February there wei e so many iequests

for R F-101 coveiage that the 13th Reconnaissance Technical Squadron was

again unable to handle the processing load. Chieli" through conelation ol

mirared sensor indications with other intelligence, the center identified 250

possible enem. targets in two montls. Icl uded we; e Viet Cong lattalion camps

in Phuoc *Tuv Province that would eventually be struck by 13-57 jet bombers.'

Although the Air Force supported the M ACV program to improve intelligence. the system remoed contiol ol infiared sorties and much of the R F-101

effol t from the aii operations center.'2 MACV enjoyed several intelligence

sources that by lam could not be disclosed to Vietnamese agencies. Consequentl\.

the Vietnamese delayed and in some cases refused to allow strikes against targets

so generated. The Central Target Analysis and Reseaich Center \\orked at

ci oss- purposes with the 2d Air Division's desire to develop close relations with

province chiefs for intelligence and quick air targeting."

lad the MACV system been staffed with more USAl- targeting. intel pletation. and reconnaissance olficer.,, they might have produced moi air stiikes. But

General Westmoreland r ega (led all air operations as support tot gi oun'l troops

and ol necessity iesponsi\e to ground connandeis. lie even included inteidiction. a normal USAF- responsibility. Hence the MACV .1-2 had the principal say

on how air reconnaissance and surveillance resomces were to be used. I his left

the 2d Ar I),vision commander. working through the air opeiations centei. with

oilV nominal operational control over reconnaissance forces. I hese. like the

aircralt Ilying close support and interdiction in South Vietnam. beca me chielly

geared to ground needs."4

So too the airlilt. Although Geneal LeMay preelrred to hax e C-123 assault

tIansports used in tactical operations rather tha n as logistic carriis, tlie insectue

rail and road net imposed great stress on air. At tines U.S. commanders joked

that the Viet namese army refused to travel on the grotid and to keep ioads and

tails open because the Air Force moved ever ytlhig for them. The adding ol air

escort for tiris, aild convoys (lid little to restrain requests or air movements as

245
THE ADVISORY YEARS

The 315th Troop Carrier Group at Tan Soil Nhut operated the Southeast

Asia Airlift System. Its transport contiol office in the air operations center

mian:ged comnton-usc airlift in South Vietnam and Thailand. Assigned to the

315th Air Division at Tachikawa Air Base. Japan. the group came under MACV

operational control exercised by the 2d Air Division.

American and Vietnamese forces projected monthly airlift requircments

and sent them to the Joint Airlift Allocation Board an MACV .1-4 (Logistics).

The board in fact consisted of one officer in the .1-4 movements branch, lie

screened and processed the requests. set priorities, and with the Joint General

Staff levied the requirements on the aii lift units by monthly increments.

The 315th Group commander also served as director of air transportation

for the Southeast Asia Airlift System. In theory he could call upon the forty-eight

USAF C-123s of his three squadrons, three C-47s of the Ist Air Commando

Squadron. two of sixteen U.S. Army CV-2B Caribou transports. several Vietnamese C-47s, and two Bristol Type 170 transports of the Royal New Zealand

Air Force operating in Thailand. Actually. three C-123s and three aircommando

C-47s were kept on station at Nha Trang to support U.S. Army Special Forces at

remote spots. A "Fire Brigade" of three C-123s at Tan Son Nhut and one at Da

Nang stood alert, ready to respond on fifteen-minute notice to the need for a

paratroop drop or equivalent emergency. Besides, two C-123s were regularly

allocated for service in Thailand. And te Vietnamese C.47s were usually flying

other missions. 4

6

Col. David T. Fleming, commander of the 315th Troop Carrier Group.

depicted the airlift system as a hodgepodge of badly tacked-together elements.

saturated with requirements. The sole officer on the Joint Airlift Allocation

Board could not possibly screen requests for validity. Cargo that should have

gone by surface transportation was airlifted, and caigo for airlift was often late or

absent at air terminals. Communications for keeping tiack of transport flights

were unreliable. Aircraft frequently left bases empty ot partially loaded.'

The great demands constantly pushed the C-1 23s above their pi ogrammed

sixty hours of flying time a month per aircraft. They were wearing out, stressed

by landings and takeoffs on rough fields. By May 1964 skin wrinkles appeared on

the top sides of two planes. i-urther inspection at Tan Son Njhut disclosed " isible

damage on all thirty-seven C-123s that had been in Vietnam for nearly three

yea .. EPe\ en required extensive repairs. Those at Da Nang in the theater for a

year had inor damage. Airlift further declined when three C-123s went to

Thailand in July to join the two on station there. That same month, two U.S.

Army Caribous were lost in ciascs.

The debut in August of six CV-2B Caribous of the Royal Australian Air

Force helped red:ess the balance. They contributed six hundred tons of shortrange airlift a month, proving that all the Caribous could be scheduled and used

within a centralized system.4 1

The system did well despite its shortcomings. Over the first half of 1964. the

C-I 23s bore the bulk of the airlift load. They airdropped 1,270 tons of supplies,

moved 1,252 paratroopersand 115 tons of materiel in assault iniss;ons. and flew

246
DIFFUSION OF AIR ASSETS

239 night flare sorties (dispensing flares 119 times). The air commando C-47s

airdropped 405 tons of cargo and flew 1,338 airlanded resupply missions (2.010

passengers and 1,246 tons ot supplies). As a rule the two U.S. Army Caribous

made short hauls. They flew 7,939 airlanded sorties (4,731 passengers and 3,322

tons of cargo).4 9

The three USAF C-123s and the three air commando C-47s at Nha Trang

delivered about 1,500 tons a month throughout 1964 to the scattered fortified

outposts at remote sites held by At my Special Forces. Cargo loads varied from

neatly packed bundles to bulky and unwieldy rolls of concertina wire, sandbags.

and steel stakes -- frequently a mixture of all. Landing strips at the forward

locations were rough and drop zones hard to find, especially in marginal weather.

Enemy ground fiie made low-altitude approaches dangerous. During 1964 more

C-1 23s w\,ere hit by ground fire than any other type of fixed-wing aircraft. Lt. Col.

Victor N. Curtis, USAF air liaison officer at Nha Tiang, spoke of the C-47 and

("-123 crews as "some of the most professional and dedicated people" he had ever

known. The Special Forces likewise appreciated the air supply. They lent a hand

in rigging AN, PRC-10 radios aboard the transports for communications with

the camps. But the aircraft commanders commonly relied on smoke signals to

direct landir.gs and drops. The crews manhandled their airdrop cargo in a

manner reminiscent of World War I1.50

Through the autumn of 1964, the C-123s and C-47s supporting the Special

Forces ran serious risks. A C-123 on October 24 tried to resupply an outpost in

western Quang Due Province but could not make radio contact. The plane

wandered over the Cambodian border and was shot down with the loss of all

eight crewmen. In December half of the 310th Troop Carrier Squadron and

seven of its C-I 23s went to Nha Trang to "eplace the C-47s, which were withdrawn. The seven C-123s. an Australian CV-2. and three Army CV-2s supported

the Special Forces." l

The 4.200 new U.S. field advisors that General Westmoreland had asked for

in June and July would need an average of 1,200 tons of airlift each month.

Colonel Fleming therefore requested a C-123 squadron to bring his total to four.

Until that unit arrived. PACAF committed eleven C-130s from the 315th Air

Division to the airlift in South Vietnam. These planes worked off the backlog of

air cargo at tne major terminals. The Gulf of Tonkin crisis in August had

triggered a hurried deployment of USAF units into South Vietnam and Thailand. The 315th Division. aided by three TAC C- 130 squadrons of the Composite

Air Strike Force, handled these movements. The division's Detachment 3 at

Clark Air Base functioned as the movement control center.5 2

In 19"2 Ranch Hand C-123s had flown a series of defoliation missions in

South Vietnam. (See Chapter X.) The results led the Joint Chiefs to c -aclude in

April 1963 that aerial spraying of herbicides had military value to kill the Ioliage

concealing the enemy and to destroy his crops. I he Kennedy administration

granted :oint authorityto tie U.S. Am assadorand M ACVto order defoliation

spraying. But it cleared no U.S. crews and aircraft for spray missions against Viet

Cong crops. Specific approval for each crop-dstruction target had to come from

247
TIlE ADVISORY YEARS

\Washington. The chemicals worked best inl the wet season when the vegetation

\\as actlel\ gio\\ ing. Ranch Iland therefore waited until June and July 1963

beloie clearing growth from the Saigon to )a Lat powerline and canals in the Ca

Mat, Peninsula. I his and other spraying o\.er tie year impro\ ed tie '\iew and

ieduced co\er tor hostile ambush operations. There ;,ete eighty-sexen square

kilometei defoliated thioughout 1963. compa icd to t\\enty in 1962.1

In January 1964 the U.S. Army division ad\isois were allowed to make

widei use ol aerial spray around depots. airfields, and outposts. The\ could also

approve hand-spray operations against enemy ci ops. Warnings had to go out to

the cil\ihan population betore spraving. In consequence the Ranch Hand C-123s.

flying at 150 feet. were exposed to enemy ground fire. In 1962 and 1963 the

axeiage numbei of hits on each spra% plane per mission was four small-arms

bullets. The risk rose in 1964 as spray flights treated areas totally dominated by

the Viet Cong. On April 30 a Ranch Hand aircraft ran into .50-caliber fire that

wounded the copilot and tore forty holes in the plane. Fighters regularly escorted

spray missions and struck the areas from which the C-123s took ground fire.

The Ranch Hand C-1 23s staged to )a Nang in May and June 1964. They

set about spra\ing the elephant giass and othei vegetation that shelteied tile

enemy along the ioads in the A Shau-A Luoi valle\ and other 'lieas near tile

Laotian border. Completed quickly before the Vit Cong could fully react, these

flights sustained just four lits in the course of twenty-six sorties. On five spray

missions in III Corps during May. C-123s were struck fifteen times by ground

fire. Oil two occasions MACV suspended operations where hea\y firing

pei sisted.14

Ranch Hand functioned on temporary duty until July 1964. supported by

the 1 actical Air Command. Then the three spray C-123 s and their specialized

crews became l)etachment I of the 315th Troop Carrier Group. permanently

assigned to PACAF. Though Vietnamese helicopters and ground troops had

sprayed ciops in 1962 and 1963. no American aircraft or personnel had been

nermitted to take part in crop desti uction prior to 1964.

On fiull 29, 1964, Ambassador 1aylor received the authority to approve

crop-desti uction opei ations without first relet ring them to Washington. In May

VNAF helicopters had resumed ciop destruction but weie unable to spray crops

in certain areas. laylor therelore directed Ranch Hand to spray some crop

tamgets, beginning ol October 30. The Ranch land planes had to operate under

the Farm Gate concept when spraying crops. '1 hat is. they can ied temporay\

South Vietnamese markings and were under the ostensible control of a South

Vietnamese "aircraft commander" who was also on board. To cut exposuie to

ground fire. the three Ranch I land aircraft in August were given modified spray

systems. Now they c(.uld dispense herbicides at the rate of three gallons per acie

(double the old late), and finish a mission in a single pass. Their first nineteen

ciop-spraying sorties lasted ten days in October. directed against rice, corn.

mpanioc. bananas, and pineapples near War Zone 1). While fightei s escorted all

flights, enemy ground fire scomed forty hits oil the C-I 23s.

248
DIFFUSION OF AIR ASSF'IS

(Top) Loudspeakors installed in a

(Bottom) Leaflets dropped from a C-47 Skytrain

Broadcasts and leaflet drops Over Viet

249
THE ADVISORY YEARS

In Novembei and December Ranch hand sprayed enemx rice near War

Zone 1). An intelligence source quoted the Viet Cong Phuoc Thanh provincial

committee as ieporting that the destroyed rice would have fed their troops in the

area for two yeai s. I)uring these flights ground fire shot out an engine on a C- 123,

an(d tile plane baiely made it back to Bien Hoa. A fourth C-123 was added in

December. By the end of the year the detachment had flown seventy-two survey

flights and 363 spray sorties. defoliated 353 square kilometers of vegetation. and

destroyed 7.620 acies of Viet Cong crops. This contrasted with the 750 acres of

crops spiayed by the Vietnamese in 1962 and the 197 acres in 1963.

Concern of Washington officials over strengthening the Khanh government

focused fiesh attention on psychological operations during the spring of 1964.

Psychological warfare had been conducted since 1961 but with uneven results. In

November 1961 Farm Gate had first used four SC-47s for leaflet drops and

loudspeaker broadcasts. The SC-47, however, was not well-suited to remote-area

work. Farm Gate wanted a plane that could land at a forward site, pick up local

officials or Viet Cong defectors, and let them speak from the air to people who

would recognize their voices. 'I o do this the L-28 Ielio Super Courier (later

designated U-10) seemed ideal. The aircraft, specially configued for the CIA.

featured short-takeoff-and-landing and other adiniable characteristics. Fai in

Gate requested eight 1.-28s and authoiity to cieate a psychological warfare

branch of three qualified officers and two technicians, to forge "a sophisticated

psychological warfare effort. .'

These efforts wer abruptly dampened. On Februar\ II. 1962. a low-flying

SC-47 dropping leaflets near Da Lat crashed and killed eight Americans and one

Vietnamese. Embarrassed by the loss of so many Americans on a flight that was

supposed to train Vietnamese. Secretary McNamaia ordered leallet and speakei

missions turned over to the Vietnamese. The Joint Chiefs directed that U.S.

aircraft refrain from such operations "except in unusual circumstances."'" In

.June 1962 the Vietnamese equipped a C-47 with speakers for airboine

broadcasts."

The Air Staff and PACAF wanted Farm Gate to tiam Vietnamese Air

Force personnel I or psychological warfalre. But by April 1963 tihe 2d Air lDivision

director of operations. Col. Winston P. Anderson. judged tile Vietnamese to

have little recognition of its importance. From June 1962 through January 1963.

the Vietnamese speaker-equipped C-47 had made a total of twenty-two flights

fourteen loudspeaker and eight psychological warfare. Now and then the standard C47s dispensed leaflets, and the L-19s of the liaison squadrons participated

in a small program of civic action, troop information, and enemy leaflet

dissemination.59

In September 1962 Farm Gate received two of four authori/ed U-10 llelio

Super Couriers, one being rigged with speakers. Between December 14, 1962.

and May 13, 1963. Fari Gate made a number of flights in the U-10 to evaluate it

as a psychological watfare aircraft.,0 And in May, Mr. McNamara approved the

use of American planes to supplement Vietnamese psychological opeations.

provided minimum U.S. personnel were aboard."'1

250
DIFFUSION OF AIR ASSETS

The mission was then divided between the Vietnamese Air Force and the 2d

Air Division, with neither of them given authority to coordinate the overall

psychological warfare program.6 2 The 2d Air Division favored the Helio Super

Courier. While the C-47 carried a navigator and was better for night flights, the

U-10 was more maneuverable. not as r.oisy. and less susceptible to ground fire

since it was smaller. The weight of the U- 10's laminated fiberglass arnior diminished airciaft performance. but protected the crew against light-caliber fire.

After speakers and other equipment were installed in two more U-10s, the

2d Air Division had three planes for speaker and leaflet missions. Their flights

stepped up after May 1963. By October 22, 2d Air Division aircraft had flown

386 n,;ychological warfare sorties.6'

In the spring of 1964, aerial psychological operations were often the sole

swift means of communication between the government and renlote rural

peoples. Since part of President Khanh's weakness stemmed from loss of contact

with the hinterland, it was proposed to expand the training of Vietnamese in

psychological operations. While visiting Saigon, Carl 1. Rowan. director of the

U.S. Information Agency, was impressed with the potential of these activities. He

supported the proposal to enlarge them, which President Johnson approved on

April 28.0'

To support the Vietnames, armed forces in "political warfae," the Vietnamese Air Force set tip a general political warfare directorate with headquarteis at Tan Son Nhut and officers at each wing. Ten single-engine utility aircraft (six

U-6As and four U- 17As) were delivered to the Vietnamese Air Force for modification to psychologic :l warfare duty.

Also over the summer of 1964, the ?d Air Division worked with the United

States Army Support Command, Saigon, to test a public address system. It

consisted of eight 125-watt speakers installed in a Vietnamese 11-34 helicoptet.

Messages could be heard or, the ground as the chopper flew at a fairly safe

altitude of three thousand feet, but the rotor blades distorted the sound. The 2d

Air Division abandoned the project. while the Army continued to maintain seven

U H-I B copters fitted with the public address system. 65

American and Vietnamese aircraft in August 1964 reached a new high of

132 psychological warfaic sorties. The Vietnamese were nevertheless more concerncd with internal "personnel service,," to the soldiers and airmen. Caught up in

the conversion to fighter aircraft, the Vietnamese paid scant attention to psychological warfare. Four U-17s were used in and around Saigon, yet only one U-6

was modified due to the complications in installing speakers.(,(,

The U-10 section of the Ist Air Commando Squadron was authori'ed four

aircraft and six pilots. An accident claimed one plane in September. and the

alsence of a planned flow of replacement pilots proved even more serious. In

November the U-10 section was down to two pilots, each averagi:ng more than

one hundred flying hours during the month.

Psychological warfare sorties by USAF and Vietnamese aircraft totaled 106

in September, 109 in October, 69 in November, and 102 in December 1964.

Although four USAF replacement pilots finally joined the U-10 section, the

251
THE ADVISORY YEARS

impression was current that "we aie piddling with" psychological operations

"and not getting anywhere." '

7

That impression applied also to the broader canvas of events in Vietnam.

252
XXI. End of

The Advisory Phase

Viet Cong night autpost and hamlet attacks doubled in intensity during the

last half of 1964. They were especially severe in the III and IV Col ps Tactical

Zones. In October the enemy scored marked successes in the II Corps, which had

been almost pacified a few months carlier.'

General Moore thought it just a matter of time before the Viet Cong ti ied to

spring a psychologically damaging surprise laid or a mot tar bombardment on a

major air base. Although the Vietnamese were responsible for interior security

and perimeter defense, the 2d Air Division had its own force of one officei and

280 airmen as additional guards.

Proper aircraft dispersal was virtually impossible at the overloaded airfields,

thus inviting sabotage or attack. This prompted PACAF to ask CI NCIIAC in

Atigust 1964 to allow one of the two B-57 squadrons to move from Bien Hoa to

Takhli. Action was put off until October, when General Harris spoke personally

with Admiial Sharp. The latter then permitted half of each squad on te ieturn tW

Clark Air Base for training. This trimmed the numbei of B-57s on alert at Bien

Hoa to eighteen. but the field remained overcrowded and poorly deflended.

HIow insectire Bien Hoa was became clear on the night of Noverber I, when

a Viet Cong mortar squadron penetrated the Vietnamese perimeter defen:'.s. The

ensuing thirty-mintite bariage killed foul and wounded seventy-two. destroyed

five B-57s and one H-43 helicopter, and damaged thirteen B-57s ard three 11-43s.

Vietnamese losses totaled two killed, five wounded. three A-I [s destl oyed. and

three A-I Hs and two C-47s damaged. Some houses, a mess hF.ll. vehicles, and

fuel tanks were also destroyed or damaged.2

The attack provoked discussions on countermeasures at the highest levels of

government in Washington. The .Joint Chle;is of Staff had prmvtously agreed on

positive action against North Vietnam. bit diffeied on the s,vcrity, tining, and

location of that action. The major point of indecision stemined from the stand of

Ambassador Taylor. He held that the United States could -,tar! no strong mos e

against North Vietnam until a stable goveinment existud in Saigon. Consequently, planning for an air campaign had continued on a contingenc, basis. At

the end of his first year in office, President .Johnson remarked that his principal

advisers had made no unanimous iecommendation for lir tivity agastll Norlh

Vietnam.

As noted earlier. Secretary of i)efense McNamaia put haid questions to the

,Joint ('hiefs regarding the effects of bombing the ninety-four strategic an target,

identified in North Vietnam. In their ieply the chiefs accepted CINC PAC

assurances. 'I he targets could be attacked withou! depletung fuel and od(nance

needed to meet a Chinese intervention. CINCPA(" had alread\ prepaled a plan

to attack all the talgets in twent days. Since there was no doubt that I Hanoi was

251
THE ADVISORY YEARS

administering and sustaining tile war. General LeMay pushed for Air Force and

Navy aii strikes on North Vietnam's source of supply. He felt that interdiction

would be far more expensive and much less efficient than closing North Vietnam's ports and destroying the supplies by strategic bombing before they staited

south.

General Greene. the Marine Corps Commandant, had backed LeMay but

the other chiefs supported Ambassador Taylor's view. LeMay counteed that

there could be no sound Saigon government without morale-building offensive

operations. The Vietnamese military establishment was the sole stabili7ing force.

If that collapsed, the United States might well have to fight to get its militaiy

advisors and their dependents out of the country.

Now, the Bien Hoa attack spuried the Joint Chiefs toward a strong reprisal.

On November I they verbally recommended to Secretary McNamara immediate

U.S. air strikes against infiltration targets in the l.aotian panhandle: airlifting

U.S. Army and Marine Corps units to defend Da Nang, Tan Son Nhut. and Bien

Hoa. and assembling USAF units within sixty to seventy-two hours for air

operations against North Vietnam. The air campaign would consist of an initial

13-52 night strike flown from Guam against Phuc Yen airfield, first-light naval ail

strikes on other airfields and the Hanoi-Haiphong oil storage areas, and rapidly

progressing attacks against the entire ninety-four targets listed.

Angered by the Bien Hoa affair, Ambassador Taylor favored limited

ietahation against selected North Vietnamese targets by American and Vietnamese aircraft, coupled with a policy statement warning of a similar U.S.

response to future incidents. President Johnson's civilian advisers, chiefly Secretaries Rusk and McNamara. counseled pati"nce. The President listened. H4e was

concerned about the upcoming election and about possible Viet Cong action

against American dependents in Saigon.

Ruling out an instant response. the President ordered quick replacement of

the destioyed and seriously damaged 13-57s at Bien Hoa He further directed a

National Security Council working group, chaired by William P. Bundy. to

outline political and military options available against North Vietnam. In its

early deliberations the Bundy group leaned toward restrained action. In contrast.

the Joint Chief , on December 18 recommended, first, a haid-hitting. fa ,.

"full-squeeze" air campaign against Noith Vietnam completed in twenty days.

Secondly. as a fall-back position, they proposed tightly controlled and gi, adtally

increasing air pressure over a two-month period.'

Meanwhile on the night of November 6. Air Vice Marshal Nguyen Cao Ky

led thirty-two Vietnamese A-I [is against a Viet Cong canp in Zone ). The

mission was a widely announced reprisal for the Bien Hoa incident. According to

South Vietnamese intelligence reports. the attack caused live hundred enemy

casualties.

On the 16th the Viet Cong troops in Zone 1) oraycd out and battled

Vietnamese forces for six hours near Ben Cat. Geneial Khanh personall\

directed a massive operation in response. One hundred fifteen U.S. Army and

254
END OF'THE ADVISORY PHASE

Vietnamese helicopters lifted twelve battalions of ground troops to the fringe of

Zone D near Ben Suc. They killed 163 guerrillas (83 by air) and captuied 68. 4

These and other sizable Vietnamese assaults did not deter the insurgents

surrounding Saigon. Severe floods from typhoos in November. together with

lesurgent communist activity, vitually collapsed governmental authority in the

ten centr'al provinces. As the floods receded, the Viet Cong moved in to take

almost complete control of the countryside in the populous Quang Ngai and

Binh Dinh Provinces. The enemy confined the government's presence to district

towns and provincial capital cities.

Vietnamese ground forces could open a road briefly by committing four to

six battalions of troops. But as soon as they withdrew, the guerrillas moved it'.

Censtant Viet Cong actions kept the army units off-balance and cost them dearly

in men, equipment. and morale. The enemy seemed to easily recruit replacements

for his losses. And the National Liberation Front stood ready as a shadow

government to seize power when the Saigon regime ciumbled. s

During a press interview in Saigon on November 21. Ambassador Taylor

depicted the principal problem in Vietnam as the dual inability to fot m a solid

national government and to stop Viet Cong reinforcement. The Ambassador

realized the military value of air strikes against Laotian infiltration routes and

North Vietnamese infiltrator-training areas. lie suggested a few selective bombing';, but clung to the belief that a sound government in Saigon was the first

priority On ,he other hand, the Joint Chiefs more and more accepted the USAF

position. Stopping Hanoi's suppoit of the insuigency was a prerequisite for a

stable Saigon iegume.6

William Bundy's National Security Council working group outlined thiee

possible courses of action for the United States. One envisioned reprisal att icks.

intensified covert operations, iesumption of offshore naval patrols. and steppedup Laotian T-28 attacks. Another called for the "fast full squeeze" bombing of

Notth Vietnam favoted by the Joint Chiefs, which Bundy termed "almost

iecklcss," an invitation to Chinese intervention. The last specified a "slow

squee/c" of aii attacks on infiltration targets in North Vietnam. All three would

give an impression of ;teady and deliberate piessure-building while permitting

the United States to nalt at any time. Bundy and Assistiit Secrctar of Defense

John '1 McNaughton liked the last option.,

Ambassador' aylor ai ived in Washington on November 26 to join conlerences on strategy. lie advocated U.S. actions to restore adequate government in

Saigon, iefine the counterinsurgency campaign, and convince or compel Ilanoi

to cease helping the Viet Cong. Taylor set out a three-phase pi ogram. The first

phae was to consist of heightened covert actions, anti-infiltiation attacks in

l.aos, and reprisal bombing all to stiffen South Vietnamese moiale. The second

wooild affotd mote air attacks on infiltration objectives in North Vietnam. 1 he

third was to ultimately destioy a!l impoi tant fixed targets in North Vietnam. I Ie

thought (mOch like Bundy) that the first phase should start at on,.e.

The Ambassador believed that U.S. aircraft ought to take patt in the aii

operations oei Laos (tile initial phase of the stepped-up action). This would

255
THE ADVISORY YEARS

deionmtrate American willingness to shale in tile risks of acting agaist North

Vietnam. Armed reconnaissance strikes on infiltration routes in the L.aotian

panhandle would signal a deeper U.S. invol\ement in the conllict and a resolve to

back the governments of' both South Vietnam and Laos.

Briefed on December I. Plesident Johnson accepted the premise that a

stable South Vietnamese government was the first essential to end the insurgency. On the 2d he approved the first-phase military actions. lie said that

subsequent ones would project progressive air bombardment to the north lather

than by functional target systems. At first the heavier Laotian '1-28 and USAIstrikes along Laotian infiltration routes, as well as special covert maritime

operations, would be psychological warnings to Hanoi. Aftei an unspecified

transitional period, air attacks on North Vietnam would begin against infiltiation objectives jtist beyond tile demilitaried ;one. Then moving northward to

the 19th parallel, the strikes were to eventually hit the Hanoi airfields and POL.

stoage, while naval foices mined and blockaded Noith Vietnam's ports.?

Upon his ieturn to Saigon on December 7, Ambassador Taylor stressed to

Victnamese leaders that Washington wanted political stability above all."

In line with the P'resident's decision, a joint State-Defense message on

D:'ccmber 8 instructed the U.S. Ambassador in Vientiane to seek approval fot

American air strikes on hostile communications in Laos. The go-ahead was given

on the 10th and Secretary of Defense McNamara authori/ed two missions a

week. each consisting of four aiicraft. This very icstiicted bombing was nicknamed Bai iel Roll.

Weekly. a National Security Council committee was to designate two

segments of the line of communications for armed reconnaissance as well as a

fixed taiget for ordnance remaining at the end of the route sweep. Both I ISA Iand USN planes weie to play a part. with M ACV acting as tile local coordinating

authority. Publicity was forbidden as were attacks oil the Laotian people.

Tagets of opportunity had to be "unmistakingly military activity ofa transient

or mobile nature." Fixed installations could be hit only during attacks on cleai ly

identified militaiy convoys and personnel. oi as secondary targets. No mission

could be launched from Thai bases or earny napalm. Secietarv McNamam's

explicit and detailed ordeii left little room for combat commanders to specify

tactics, ordnance, routing, and like matteis. I°

Admiral Shap. CINCPAC. was impressed with the high-level national

inteest ill the armed recolnaissance progi lam. lie gave the maiden mission to tile

F-105 Thunderchiefs of PACAFs 80th Tactical Squadron at Korat, I harland.

Sharp selected a section of Route 8 for the aimmed swcep and the Nape ioad

bridge as the target for unused ordnance. The fifteen-plane foicc took off from

Da Nang oi l)ecember 14. Three Rh--101s served as patlhfindeis and damageasse,,ment craft. Eight I--100s flew combat air patrol to guard against MIG

inteilercnce. Four F-105s carried 750-pound bombs. 2.75-inch rockets. and

20-ram ammunition. [he mission achieved slim results because tile hca\y ordnance load led to miscalculation of timle ard distance. Short of fuel. the I--105s

made a hurried attack oi tile bridge and missed it

256
END OF'THE AI)SORY P1ASE

Navy planes flew oil December 17. Four A-I IIs escorted by eight F-4Bs

conducted armed reconnaissance of Routes 121 and 12, with the Ban Boung Bau

road bridge as the fixed alternative. Thc aircraft failed to damage the bridge but

destroyed eight buildings at one end.

[he next mission sent four F-100s of the 428th Tactical Fighter Squadron

along Route 8 on December 21. Lightly aimed with CBU-2As and 2.75-inch

rockets, the fighters became disoriented after teceiving heavy flak, ran low on

fuel, and found no secondary target.

Report,,, on the fist two USAF missions disturbed General Le May. lie sent

word to General Moore that he expected higher professionalism, even though he

recogni/ed that the light curbs complicated air operations.

'1 o prepare for the fourth mission, PACAF's 44th Tactical Fighter Squadion deployed six F-105s from Okinawa to [)a Nang. Four of them reconnoitered

Route 23 on December 25, with a strike against the military barracks at

Tchepone. The oper ation went well, though the dive-bombing at "1 chepone was

inaccurate. During the fifth mission on lDecember 30, four Navy A-I Hs Struck

the military camp.''

Planners for a mission on ,Ianuar y 13 chose the Ban Ken bridge, the most

important potential checkpoint on Routc 7. Aerial photos showed thirty-four

antiaircraft guns (37-mn and 57-mm) in place, with up to seventy more filing

positions built but not occupied. The planners scheduled ain RF-101 as pathfinder and another for bomb damage assessment, eight F-100s carrying CBJ2As for flak suppression. and sixteen 1,-105s from the 44th and 67th Tactical

Fighter Squadrons as strike aircraft. The two flights of F-100s were to fly

low-level and abreast across the gunsrtes to knock them out with cluster bombs.

Ilmmediately thereafter the F- 105s would attack the bridge. Each of the fust eight

F-10'"s were to drop eight 750-pound bombs. This would be followed by eight

F- 105s loaded with six bombs and two AG M- 1213 Bullpup air-to-gr ound missiles. An Air America C-123 wias to serve as airborne control for rescue

helicopters.

'1 he F-100s pummeled the gun positions but some firing continued. The first

wave of F-105s cut the biidgc with their srxty-f'our bombs. The 1--100s and the

second wave of I-- 105s made multiple runs on the gunsites. the mixed ordnance

of the F-105s requiring at least three passes to expend. Moreover, the 'I hunderchiefs had to descend into flak range to control their missiles, and one plane was

downed. An l-- 100 on its fifth pass was also shot down. Four other aircraft werc

maged.

General Moore said that poor judgment was displayed in the attack. To

escape the losses, the planes should lime broken off the engagement after

knocking out the bridge.12

While it seemed impossible for ground transportation to bypass the Ban

Ken br idge, the communists within threc days converted the top of a dain just

upriver into a traffic route. Press epomts of the two lost aircralt prompted

Senator Wayne I . Morse to charge that the air operation violated the 1962

Geneva ageements on I.aos."

257
THE ADVISORY YEARS

HANOIS

HAIPHONG K

/ N. VIETNAM

/BAN KEN

LAOS

VIENTIAN E *NAPE

I.BAN

THALAN BOUNG BAU *DONG HOI

OMZ

\* TCHEPONE S, VIETNAM

BARREL ROLL

CAMPAIGN IN LAOS

DEC 1964 - JAN 1965

258
END OF THE ADVISORY PHASE

Armed reconnaissance sweeps by Seventh Fleet aircraft or January 2 and

10, 1965, detected no enemy. On the 15th. as six A-I Hs reconnoiteied Route 23

at night, the flight leader became separated from the flare plane and wandered

west of the road. He sighted ani attacked moving trucks and also adjacent

buildings that turned out to be the friendly village of Ban Tang Vai. No further

secondary targets were assigned for night missions.14

Admiral Sharp near the end of January took a close look at this relatively

small interdiction campaign, conducted at least risk and under tight control from

Washington. He concluded that the program could be better managed from

Laos. He insisted that militarily effective interdiction had to be constantly and

completely responsive to the tactical situation. General Harris, the IPACAF

commander, agreed that the missions were too few to sway Hanoi. Still, they may

have imparted political strength to the Laotian government at a critical juncture.

In late January and early February, an armed coup was defeated.ii

Meanwhile in South Vietnam, General Khanh and several associates had

seized power from the provisional civil government on December 20, 1964.

Ambassador Taylor strongly protested and after that the ielations between him

and Khanh were strained. Taylor was apparently concerned that the feeble

Saigon government might yield to elements clamoring for a cease-fire and

coalition with the National Liberation Front. He may therefore have hinted that

U.S. advisors v-ere about to take command of the Vietnamese armed forces. In

any event, the unstable conditions in the countiy encouraged the Viet Cong.

They increasingly turned from hit-and-run guerrilla tactics to more conventional

mobile warfare by regular units. This pushed the United States into stronger

support of the counterinsurgency.6

Secretary of Defense McNamara had already made clear that the conllict

was chiefly a ground war in which aviation could make only secondary conti ibutions. While this strategy precluded the full use of tactical air poweri" the rathei

small Vietnamese and U.S. air opeiations were central to saving the Vietnamese

ground forces from piecemeal defeat. On December 9. for example. A-I Hs from

the Vietnamese 516th Fighter Squadron struck a Viet Cong foice and left

thirty-three enemy dead. The force on December 7 had attacked the An Lao

district headquarters in Binh Dinh Province and ambushed government relief

troops. In the three-day battle the foe inflicted battle losses of twenty-eight killed.

fifty wounded, and twenty-two missing.

Also on December 9 a Viet Cong battalion assaulted and overran a government battalion command post and 105-mam howitzer platoon near "1 am Ky in

Quang Tin Province. A USAF captainjoined the eighteen strike sorties flown by

the 516th Fighter Squadron against the hill position. All the strikes were directed

by an 0-IA pilot and Vietnamese observer who were in the air (or- ten hours.

Direct hits on the artillery site exploded ammunition and killed enemy gunners.

The last flight of four A-1 I Is landed at Da Nang after sunset when the ceiling was

under five hundred feet and visibility less than a mile. Government troop, retook

the ground and confirmed 162 Viet Cong killed (85 by air). Friendly losses

totaled 26 killed and thirty-three wounded."

259
THlE ADVISORY YEARS

IDuringt thit, night ofl'Decembcr 10.,,%o \'let Cnbatlostucotposts

'it Long 'My ill ChutongiThienl Pi ovince and ambushed relict Ioi ces. A U.S. Arin\

L- 19 and ai I.SA F -lII- located lte a mbush and pilt fouircoxering A-1 Es on lte

camouflaged foxholes. U.S. Army helicoptei s Iiom Soc' 1 lng held the enem\

uintil Vietna mese in A-I lls airixed and( delivered oi dnance inl the f'ace ot intense

ground litec. One A-Ill1 was downed, tin cc A- l Is and live hielicopters damnaged.

Bvx finec teamwoi k the A-I lis and armed helicoptci s killed about tour hundi ed of

thle fifteen hunildied clenmy troops, and probably sax d at government battalion

and at regional force coinpanv fromt being ovem whelmned

Viet Cong night attacks onl hamlets and outposts soaietl to at new high. A

total of rtinetv-,ix incidents took p~lace ovci the last tenl days of December.

di awingfi e and strike aircraft. The planes forced the foeto bi cak oft the assault

in ninety-tour of the cases. Still under test, AC-47 gunships joined the aii alerts

and per-formed well. Onl thle night of Dcnmber 24. for example. an AC-47 used

its ininiguns to blast gucri ilas off the wall of a foi t uinder siee.:1"

At night onl December 27, two North VietnamesNe iegimcnts raided thle

hamlet of Birth Gia. The next morning ai i cinforced ranger battalion, aided b\

threarmed helicopters. tried without success to relieve lte hamlet. Thalt evening

the Viet Cong hit lte ranigers a; the neai by toxvn of'Ngai Giao butl were d rix n ott.

Onl the 29th, twenty-tour U.S. Army UII-l Bs. p~rotectedl by fifteen armed

U II - I 13s. li fted two other ra ngei coimpa nies to at landing a ia neaw inh iiI ia.

Srnall-ai s and machinegun fiile claimed thie of the hielicoptei s. One ranger

company fought its way ott the second wa oen un.

The defeat seemied to have stemmed fronm tile absence of lpieplartitd

cooid(ination of tactica! air support foi tle heliborne operation. Another tactoi

was lite late icquest lor figltters. made only after tlte loss of lthe three htelicopters.

Eightt A-I E sor-ties covered tlte downed U Il-I Bs. Four Vietnamese H1-34 hielicopters carriedaimuition into tte area and cx acuiated wvounded. A C-47 flatieslip

lighted thle scerte through the night!.

Escorted by lifteen armed U 11 - I 13s. twentty-six U Il-I lls flfed lte 2(1anld 4tlt

Mariite B~attalionts into the zone. Eight helicoptei 5 wei e hit aind one exploded.

killing tle crew, Finally on tte af ternooit of D~eceimber 30, foul A-1IEs and fixe

A-I lis -espoiided to requests. The strike aiicaf't blasted two spots in the rubbei

forests,r .

1

d Biinh Glia that ieportcdly sheltered two V'ic, Cong battalions At

the sar*te time. 11l-34s evacuated tltirty-f'our killed and forty-nine wounded men.

A C-47, four A-I Es. and one AC-47 furnishted night illuminationrt and tire

suipport1.2i

iThe 4t11 Marine Battalion battled its way into tite rubber forest oil

D~ecember 3 1. and was soon surrounded by thle enctemy (identified from captumed

documents as the 48th Main Force Viet Cong Regiment). 'I lie Marinte comnmamtder radioed tlte UJSAF forwa,,rdair conitroller overheacd for air support, Foul

A- I Es responded and hit enemy positions witht napalm and geneial- purpose

bornbs. lit tte aftci noon. eight A-I Es xveic scrambled aitd sent to lite scene. But

the senior gi ourid commander ordered tltem returned to Mien Illoa. becauise an

support had not beii requested tiiough Vietnamese army channels.

260)
END 0I 1 1 ADVISORY 1P11ASE

Armed helicoptets tied to launch stiikes later that da\. Ho\\e\er, tile'

learned I i omn U.S. Mal tile Corps ad\ isol s with tie surrounded battalion that the

thick bianches ol tile tubbei tices absorbed the rocket, and machinegun "ie

from the ain. Attacking at dusk and using massed automatic weapons. the Viet

Cong overpoweted the 4th Marine Battalion. All through the night of the 3 Ist,

thiee C-47N. two C-1 23s. one AC-47. and loul A-I lIs supplied flare tle support. l-\en so. just 232 ol the 532 men ol the 4th Marine Battalion managed to

stiaggle back to Binh Gta.:

General Khanh took peronal charge of a large opetation set afoot in Phuoc

Tu\ Province on .lanuary I. 1965. C-I 23s Ilew the [st and 3d Airborne Battalions

ftom 'fian Son Nhut to Vung Tau, then hcheoptets whisked them to the battle

area. On Januat y 2 helicoptet s transported the 7th Airbotne Battalion directly

from Bien H1oa. Tactical fighters supported continuing operations with cover

and escort. landing-/one rieparations. and strikes on enemy positions.

On the 5th of.lanuary, eight A-I Es were each loaded with one [ay Dog

XM-44 cannister and normal high-explose ordnance. The aircraft employed

the l.a,v Dog missiles against Viet Cong troops firing at U.3. At my helicopter

obsei vet s. Government troops kept clear of the Lazy l),,g ,ones, but U.S. Army

air observers reported that after the drops they no longer received ground fire. An

intelligence report stated that tile Viet Cong carried a\ay from the strike areas

fif'teen oxcatt loads of dead and wounded .

2

At General Khanh's order, government battalions with tanks and armored

vehicles continued to swing through tile safer areas of Phuoc 'uv Province.

t'rom January I0 through February 15. a small air support operations centet

managed the flights aiding the massive sweeps. The operations achieved little, for

the Viet Cong evaded ground contact.24

Analysis of the Binh Gia defeat revealed a failure to use available fixed-wing

ait support properly. Armed helicoptets were unable to provide the needed

lirepowet. As the M ACV .1-3 tepoi ted, "the armed U Il-I B did not possess heavy

enough otdnance to destroy the VC in piep,.red positions or deter their assault.

since they \,were concealed under a dense canopy of tiees."2'

Meanwhile, an incident in downtown Svigon brought the United States to

the verge of direct all-out action. On Christmas Eve 1964 a 300-pound charge

exploded in the Brink Hotel (bachelo; ottiers'quartcrs fot U.S. adxisors). killing

two Americans while injuring sixty-four Americans and forty-three Vietnamese.

Admiral Sharp and the Joint Chiefs tecommended an immediate reprisal. On

December 29 Piesident .lohnson ruled against it.

The Brink Ho:el explosion, a direct attack against and an open challenge to

tile United States, wa. ominous. but the battle at Binh Gia was potentially

disastrous. To U.S. officials in Saigon it was a "highly visible" defeat of serious

proportions. Oil December 31 Ainbassadot 1 avlor tevet sed his thinking. Bolstered by Deputy Amnbas.,ador U. Alexis .lohnson and Geneial Westnioreland.

he sent a joint message to Washington. It advocated American air action against

Notth Vietnam despite tile persistent weakness of the Saigon go\ernment.- ,

261
I III AMI) ISORN I *\RS

~t (Top) Remains of a B-57 destroyed by Viet Cong

mortar attack on Bien Hoa on Nov 1, 1964

. (Center and bottom) Brink 800 area, following the

terrorist attrck on December 24, 1964

Courtesy U S Army

202
END OF THE ADVISORY PHtASE

Attention then turned to the air strike aircraft on hand. Attack planes in

Vietnam numbered forty-eight USAF A-IEs and ninety-two A-I Hs of tile

Vietnamese Air Force. This combined force could fly about sixty combat and

thirty training sorties a day. Air Vice Marshal K.', *s need to have an elite "Palace

Guard" flight of standby A-I Hs at Tan Son Nhut constrained Vietnamese

combat sorties. These planes were piloted by highly trained. scieened, and

politically dependable personnel who routinely flew strike missions in the IlI and

IV Corps areas. H owever, assignments to thwart coups and to control dissidence

often diverted them from action against the Viet Cong.

Although individual Vietnamese strike clews performed valiantly, the growing independence of unit commanders diluted the control of the air operations

centers. Typically. fifty percent of the aircraft were held on five-hour ground

alert. A squadron deciding to fly would call for a target about an hour before the

end of its ground alert and receive a set of coordinates for attack, usually in a

"free-strike" vone. Hence it was difficult to scramble or to redirect aircraft to meet

emergencies.

Early in January 1965 tile Vietnamese 62d Tactical Wing and a detachment

of the 516th Fighter Squadron's A-I Hs deployed from Pl!ekiki to Nha Trang,

where work was to star t on a new runway ill February. The move stationed these

strike aircraft too far away to properly support the critical highland provinces.

including Pleiku and Kontum. 2

'

Ambassador Taylor now wanted to use the USAF 13-57s at Bien Hoa in

combat. He also wished to put off indefinitely the plan to form a fifth and sixth

Vietnamese fighter squadron, so that the Vietnamese could focus on operations

in lieu of training.2 PACAF on January 12. 1965, suggested that heavier air

demands argued for greater air assets. It asked for thirteen tactical strike squadrons in Vietnam (seven to be USA Fjet units). extra USAFair liaison officers and

tactical air control parties to extend direct air support nets to province and sector

levels, and at least 175 USAF and Vietnamese 0-Is -- more if continuous air

reconnaissance was authorived. 29

Defending the role of U.S. Army helicopter gunships. Gcneral Westmoreland said that they had "performed magnificently" at Binh Gia. At a briefing on

January 13, he asked ifstepping up air firepower made sense in Vietnam. In other

words, were there significant and vulnerable targets in Viet Cong sanctuary areas

and how could they be brought under attack? General DePuy, the MACV J-3.

addressed the question in a paper that was largely the work of USAF Col. Alan

C. Edmunds. Deputy Assistant Chief of Staff J-3 for Air.

Targets were available, tie study said. and lifting the curbs on using USAF

aircraft in the country would expand air power. This could best be done by

drawing on Guam-based 13-52 bombers as well as USN carrier aircraft on South

Vietnamese offshore stations, for air facilities in Vietnam were scarce and

overcrowded. The Vietnamese ground forces were apparently unable to give a

high degree of security against Viet Cong attack of air bases. And it was hard to

haul ordnance and aviation fuel to Vietnamese airfields.30

263

Vc
THE ADVISORY YEARS

Air Stat Canalysts agreed with part ot the study. Calling on airc att outside

the country would indeed alleviate the airfield security problem. As carl\ as

December 9. 1964. General l.eMay had suggested sending U.S gl ound combat

units into Vietnam Ior air base defense. lhe Na\y and Marine Corps had

demur red. saving that it was contrarN to national policy. I lie Ar ll\ had objiected

on the gi ound that four divisions would be needed to detend eighteen opeatirg

sites. As lor the supply system. there was no doubt that conieyrng PO and

ordnance was cumbersome, slow, and risky. 1 is was especially true when (lone

by barges. ligiiers. and trucks requiring security guards.

On the other side of the coin. using aircraft located outside the cotntr\

could hamper atteimpts to improve air base scrurty' and Vietnamesean facilities.

Both were long overdue. Althougn Ihc 13-52 bombers were unmatched in allweather, heavy sattir ation attacks, the long flights from Gtam would be expensive. Furthermore. using these strategic bombers would reduce SAC's woIldwide

deter rent posture. While the interest of General Westrmotcrlarid ii tactical air was

encouraging, lie tailed to understand 2d Air Diision and PACAI- hopes tor

building a well-rounded air command, coordination, and control struettue in

Viet nain.)'

On Jariuary 24. 1965. General Moore advrsed Geneat Westmoreland that

the fiastest way to bolster air power was to make full use of the liSAF resouices

now in the country. Moore believed that the most compelling needs were to let

USAF jets tly missions in South Vietnam. do away with the reqtrerent to car

a Vietnamese obser\e| or trainee oti operational missions. and remoxe helrcoptens from air bases to allow an expansion of facilities. 2

Some optimistic signs emerged from the lingering debate on aitr demands. A

ti measure of political stability in Saigon seemed to give the Vietnamese armed

forces confidence and initiative. A MACV press release told ot air attacks killing

about twenty-five hundred Viet Cong in November and December 1964. G(ieni

these indications, were more strike planes realy requited?"

Vietnamese and USAI- A-Is flew 2.339 combat sorties in Janiary 1965.

filling every request for close air support. The combined air forces flew a total of

4.550 sorties, yet could not meet fifty percent of the requests for all types of ar

activity. Estimates showed that all of them could have been met, had there been

no opelational restrictions) 4

In a saturation test during .Iantary 19-21. Vietnamese and ISAIF A-Is

dropped eight hundred tons of bombs on preplanned targets in the Boi I.oi

woods of Zone D. Ranch Hand C-123s then began a massr~e defoliation

program in Boi Loi to cover forty-eight square mites ot dense torest lidinga key

Viet Cong base. The operation tied up many of the combined strike aucraft. On

.lanrary 26 in a sepalate act ion, t .jo govern ment battalions surrounded an

enemy battalion near Ap I3ac. Helicopter gunship and A-I strikes accounted for

half of the estimated four hundred fifty insurgents killed that da\."

Late in January the .Joint Chiefs secured approval for using USAF jet

aircraft in a strike role within South Vietrinm if Ambassado, Faylor agreed in

advance to each mission, and if these strikes could not be carried out by

264

L
tEND) OlF HE ADVISORY PHASE

Vietnamese A-Is. According to this lorniula. lavlor could atithoriie jet air

strikes solely to save American lives 01 to spoil huge Viet Cong attacks like the

one at Binhl (,ia. lie couild do this only if the irl suippol t Opel ations center

cerified that conxenit ionalIa ircra It wei e tinava iIa ble. and if a COI ps tactical /one

Commna ndei . the Vietnamese Joint General Staff, and MACV all thought the

action necessary. ;

As f or air strikes onl Noi th Vietnam. Pi esident Jlohnson i cJectcd them inl

.lanuary 1905 despite his growi ng convict ion t hat thle feeble Sa igon gov'ern meiit

Buddhist opposition, prompted CIA Director McCone to expect Khanhl to fall

f rom power andl a sei ions political crisis to I o!low.lh

Onl January 23. in a speech interpieted by some obserseis as a bid for

niegoti[at ionls. William in . Bundy suggested a diplomatic meeting similar to thle

1954 Oeneva accords as "thle answver" for a secice and independent South

Vietnam. Five days later, Presidential Assistant McGeorge Biundy informed

Piesident .ohnson that he and Secrctar-y McNamara were *'pretty well convinced

that our curient policy canl lead only to d isast rotis Jcfea:,." The preferred

alter-natives were to "use our milltai v power in the Far East and to force a change

of' Communist policy'." oi to "deploy all our resotirces" along "a track of

negotiation, aimed at salvaging what little can be preserved wvith no major

additioni to our present miilitarv risks." Sccietaiy of State Rusk opposed both

options. "The consequences of both escalation and withdrawal ale so bad." lie

said. "that we simiply ust find a way of ma kiiig our presenit policy woik.

Not sure whether to sup)port Saigon nmoie vigorotusly oi to disengage from a

losing proposition. thle Piesident onl Febi niary 4 se nt a fact-finding pai ty headed

by' McGeorge Btundy to Saigon. Thie partyvs arrisal coincided with a visit to

Hanoi by Soviet Premier Aleksei N. Kosy'gin. Siiice Khrushchev's departuic

Iroti power in October 1964. Kos\ygin had tried to restore closer Russian ties with

H anoi. lie aiid a si/able Moscow delegation that included top Soviet air force

of ficials leached I laiioi onl February 6,

Accordingw to the ('hi nee, K osygi n hoped lo pei ',uade H anoi to hadt

militai vaid to thle Viet Cong as a precondition to negotiat ionls (as William Bundy

seemed to have suggested). Btut in McConic's opinion. Kosygin sensed an iimnent Viet Cong victory and wanted thle Soviet Union to shale in it. Kosygin

would pi obably offei more economnic and inilitary'aid and encoturage stepped-tip

svai fare in Sotith Vietnam. Consequntly. McCone picoposecl that tile United

States start air attacks onl targets in North Vietniam. 'I hese would commence at

the I 7th parallel aind wvork progi essively northward. 9

Coniflicting signals stopped onl Stiiday morning. February 7. 1965. Viet

Cong mortar squtadls and demnolitioii teamns attacked the small U.S. advisory'

detachment in 11 Corps. four and one-hialf miles north of Pleiku. In addition thley

strtick Camp IHolloway, headquarters of the U.S. Armiy 52d Aviation Battalion.

also numr Plciku. TIhe joint assaults killed eight Americans and] wotinded 104,

destr-oyed fi e Ariiiy U Il-I 11 lielicopteis and two CV-2 transports. thice USAIF

265
THE ADVISORY YEARS

0-I1Fs. and one Vietnamese O-I F. Moreover the teams damaged tile main

building of the advisory detachment.4

Bundy, Westmoreland. and Taylor jointly sent from Saigon their recommendation for a reprisal strike and President Jlohnson ordeied an instant air

response. That afternoon USN aircraft, and on the 8th Vietnamese and USA F

planes. hit enemy military barracks near l)ong Hoi in an opelation called

Flaming Dart. At the same time. PACA F air transports commenced to lift U.S.

Marine Corps light antiaircraft missile units from Okinawa to Da Nang and to

evacuate U.S. dependents from South Vietnam. 4

'

The Viet Cong struck on the 10th near Qui Nhon. taking twenty-thiee

American and sevet; South Vietnamese lives. On the following day. USAF.

USN. and VNAF aircraft (in Flaming Dart II) pounded tioop barracks in the

North Vietnamese panhandle. The Joint Chiefs quickly oidered the deployment

to South Vietnam and Thailand of four and one-half USAF tactical squadrons

from bases *n Japan, Okinawa. and the Philippines. and the movemeint of thirty

B-52s to Guam. 42

South Vietnamese control deteriorated in all of the coi ps tactical ,ones as

Viet Cong action exploded. On February 8 a maJoi enemy force crossed Route

19 between Pleiku and Qui Nhon. The crossing occuried. even though lour

A-I Es dropped Lazy Dogs and killed about one hundred of the enemy. The

attackers then enveloped and damaged two battalions of the 40th Reginment and

a troop of M-I 15 armoied personnel carriers in Vinh Binh Piovince. lhat night

an AC-47 poured 20,500 7.62-mm rounds into the area, killing around 250 Ltnemy

soldiers.

To shore up the II Corps defense, General Moore ordeied eight A-! Es to

Qui Nhon where conditions were "unsafe in every iespect." Staying close to the

scene of action. each pilot flew at least three strike sorties a day and significantly

helped to blunt the enemy offensive.4

On February 13 President .lohnson gave the green light to measured and

limited air attacks on North Vietnam. Called Rolling Thunder and planned loi

swift execution, the strikes were delayed foi two weeks by political and milita'y

turmoil in Saigon and by bad weathe.

The capital was directly and immediately thieatened by the Viet Cong 9th

)ivision, which had no less than two well-armed regiments unde Ioiest co \.' 1n

Phuoc Tiy Province. The mystery of how these tioops were getting modern

weapons was solved on Febi uary 16. A U.S. Army helicopter pilot discovered.

and Vietnamese A-I Hs sank, a steel-hulled vessel at Vuiing Ro Ba\. An investigation turned up one hundred tons of arms and ammunition in a near ub cove at

Cap Varella. The U.S. Seventh Fleet at once started naval patiols to stop these

dcliveries.

General We;trioreland wanted to send 13-57 light bombei s against the Viet

Cong 9th Division base camps in Phuoc '1 uy Province. which had been pinpointed by infrared reconnaissance. Securing emergency autho i ty on 'ebruary

17. lie phanned to lainch the planes on tile 19th

266
END OF THE ADVISORY PHASE

On that day, dissident military leaders revolted against General Khanh.

Their troops seized Saigon, and took part of '[an Son Nhut to ground Ky's

anticoup air force. But Ky got his planes in the air, as C-47s brought loyal troops

from the I Corps to clear Saigon of the rebels. The Armed Forces Council then

removed Khanh and exiled him.

At the height of the coup crisis in Saigon on the afternoon of February 19,

four 1-57s from Bien Hoa flew the It st open USAF mission in South Vietnam as

they bombed Viet Cong base camps in Pluoc Tuv. The aitcraft struck again

during February 21-24, while Ky kept most of the V NA F A-I Hs on countercoup

alert and out of combat.44

Judging on February 21 that the United Sta:cs was not "fully committed to

winning the war in Vietnam." Genrcial Westmoreland was ready to change the

natuie of the American involvement. He would make more use of jet aircraft

within South Vietnam, restore U.S. markings to American-manned A-I Es, and

abolish the requirement for Vietnamese observers in American planes.

Enemy action on February 24 involved the elite communist battalion that

had appai ently just arrived in the central highlands. The battalion sti rounded a

ranger company and a Civilian Ih regular Defense Group company on Route 19

in the An Khe valley near the Mang Yang pass (where the Viet Minh had wiped

out a Fiench mobile group in 1954). General Westmoieland used his emeigency

authoiity to commit USAFjet aircraft in an all-American relief effort. F-10kN.

B-57s. and A-I Es covered and supported U.S. Army U I1-1Bs that rescued the

surrounding men. The covering attacks by the 613th '1 actical Fightei Squadron

F-100s, 405th Tactical Wing B-57s. and 602d Fightei Commando Squadion

A-I Es cost the enemy 150 men killed. They also allowed the helicopters to land

three times in the atea without a single casualty. 'I he coptets evacuated the 220

of ficers and men who. accoilding to Col. Theodote C. Mataxis. U.S. Army II

Cotps advisor. would otherwise have been lost.4"

The employmnent of 13-57 and F-100 jets marked the end of the long U.S.

combat advisory phase and the beginning of direct and open Anci ican action in

the Vietnam Wai . On Match I the new commander in chiefot the Vietnamese

armed forces. Maj. Gen. 1 ian Van Minh. established the Vietniamese A Fotcc

air request net as the priiaiy means to obtain immediate ait sippoit for all

rcguli and paramilitarN opcrations I Ic fti thel tcmo\ cd the reslliction that on1K

a Vietnamese f1"rwaid air controllet could mark tatgets for ait stri L's. "

After apl al by higher headquarters. the.Ioint Chiefs of Staff on March 9

directed that 1.S. aircraft could be used for combat opetations in South Vietnam. No stiikes were permitted ftona I hai airfields, and Ameicat, ancraft weic

not to accept missions that the Vietnamese At ri- orce could catt , out. But the

planes now boldly displayed U.S. insignia, and a Vietnamese airman was no

longer icquited to be aboard in combat. "

I he United States /Air l-orce advisory elloi t spanned the decade hetecn

1955 and early 1965. from the time the United States foinially took over the

training of the Vietnamese from the I' ench until Aml ican aiiciaf ffrst openly

engaged in combat. )uting this interval the Viet naiicse Alir I'otce expanded

267
THE ADVISORY YEARS

fromn a few hundred to over tenl thousand men). Its five squadrons of obsolete

French and American planes at two air bases swelled to fourteen squadronlsand

almost three hundred more mnodern aircraft at five major air bases. In addition

the Viet na mese Air Force forged at chain of command mirroring that of its

Amei jean advisors. Most ol these changes took place through the final three

yars of the pei iod wvhen thle threat fromt the north grew ever moie seriou.

Thle U.S. Ail Force expel ieiiced parallel growth in Southeast Asia durnng

the decade. In the late I 950sthier-ewere 68 irmiienstationied in Vietnam and 44in

Thailand. From 1961 onl. these numbers giadluaIly rose and onl thle eve ol

Amiericani/ation of thle war stood at 6.604 and 2.943 respectively. By I-ebruai\

1965 the Air I-or cehad 222 planes in South Viet na mand 83 in Thlailand. Sex ent\'

percent of' those in South Vietnamn were clustered wiound the Saigoni ai en.

operating from Tan Son Nhut or B~ien I-ba Air Pase. T[he remainder were up

north, primarily at Da Nang. One-third of all these aircraft were C-I123 transports, operating for the most part out of Tan Son Nhut. Reconnaissance

missions also originated from Tan Son Nhut, flown by RE-l0is and RB-57s onl

temporary assignment. This Saigon base further housed a handful of F-102s for

air defense. The attack fleet of forty-eight A-I Es for in-country stiikes was

positioned at nearby Bien Hoa. also the headquarters for the forward aircontrol

mission performed by twenty-two 0-I1 Fs. From Da Nang the Air Force operated

one transport squadron and one temporary duty squadron of F-IO0s foi missions in Laos. A sprinkling of support aircraft rounded out the total.

The USAF presence in Thailand was still small at thle start of 1965. Ai

defense ol thle count ry w~as pi ovided by lowu 1-1I02s Ii om D~on M uang Au poil

outside Bangkok. I-ni thur up-country. at squad ion of 1-105Os at I doi n Ros al

"I'h i Alir F-orce Bast, 00R A I-B) andl another at a khIhI R'I A- I-Ble%% a ga inst thle

inliltriation routes In thle I aotian panh'-ndle. At LUdoin ii I A Eli. just south of thle

Lannanl capital, twenty 1-28s worked to stemi thle Ilathet I no tide iii noi thei ii

Laos. -1 hese weic supported b\ eight dirl rescue hielrcoptei s Ii om the -,amie base.

N one of these airci alt took part- in oper at i oill Viet nami.

Despite this sizable swelling of personnel and aircraft between 1955 and

1965. the I. S. advisory nissioi lile(] to end I In iois support ol the nsuigcyc in

South Viet nam in( LidIaos. 'I lie decision earl1\ ii 1965 to i eplace ad\ soiN \\x ithI

cofl'tbat !: o~ps eogn.1ied 1to facet,, that had come ceal !11 late 106,1 iril1talaro

I i oni non Ii into South Viet namii was gi owing lather than taper ing oil. anrd thle

gos Ciii me nt o I Soth I Viet nami (still I inSta ble Sinrce tile ssihat11101On o )rll 

coiuld iiot cope si'th thditmuatioii. U .S. policnma kei ssassm lie conlu~enee ol these

two Inctom"sspelling delent t tile South unless a lie\\ aplpioaclihn tnkeii I hus

thle purely ads isory luncmo. was abandoned ini Inso or ol diect (IS alii add

gi ouid par ticipatiori in liccoillict. I lie tiSAl units in placeni l in 1965 ssould

I oi in tile iiucleus Iloi the cominrg bild(1up.

268
Appendices
Appendix 1

Growth of Major United States Air Force and

Vietnamese Air Force Units to February 1965

1. \ I ETNA M

USAF \'NAF

Bien Hoa Air Base

1955 Julie ..... Air Force Depot transferred here

front Hanoi

19.56 June ..... Ist Fighter Squadron organived.

consistinig of ten-Fiv -81.

Blea reats.

1961 Noseitber . .. . Farm Gate arrives IDesignated

Detachment 2A. 4400th Combat Crew 1 raining Squadron.

Made uip of four SC-47s, font

R11-26s, eight 1-28s,. and 155

men onl ternporary d ut\

D~etachmeint 9. 13th Air Fore. stablishied to 'upport USA F tinits here

1962 April .......... Faria Gate renamed D~etachtment

2A. Ist Commando Giroup

( I AC)

May ........... I wo R[3.26, of Project Blaekssateh

join Farm Gate.

Junie..........lDetachiment 93. l3th Air Porce. replaced by 6221 st Air Base

Squadron

1963 January .. .. .... I arm Gate inereased to ineteen 514th Fighter Squadron (A- III%)

B-26,flthrteen I-28s,%i.C IK'- replaces INt l-ighter Sqtiddron

47%. and four U-l0s. pltis 275

mnen Some aircraft deployed

to Pleiku and Soe 1 rang

.1111l ........... 34th IiIaetteal Group orgamnied

6221st Air Base Squadron rettaiied 34th Air Base Squadron and plaeed tinder 34th

I aetieal Group

July ........... 19th lacticalAirStipport Squadroil act iated uinder 34th IiIactical Group B) Atugtust Ilas

t'eiit)-twoO0-Is Six o( these

go to Cani Ilio

271

Pli-ECEDnVG PAGE BJ.ANK-1oT F11hV\
THE ADVISORY YEARS

I'SAI

kiari (ide rentamed WtAir ('otma odo Squad ron arid( a%~-

signed to 34th I ,ctical Group

October ...... 518th I ighter Sqtiadi on (A- I I Is)

'Icti~ ated

1964 MaN -June.... .t I-ru Gate I1-28% and l(-20s icplaced with A-I1'

.littne .. . . .23d I acticlXIWi hg Iorited loIiorporates 5141h. 51 8th. 520th

nefI ot ted) IIighter Squad1011%. ard the 11 2thI I idi%otl

Squad rotn

Augt . .. .. .... I hirty.six 11-57%arriw fromt Clark

Air IIlt%e Fighteen return to

Clark in October

October .. .. ... A second l-ari (latie squad ron 520thli ighter Squad ron actis ated

(0*)2d -ipgjiter (oimituado S(ltLiddron) orgarived antd assigited

to thle 34th I actical Group

Same ti pe of aireral t (A- II s)

arid uim%%ions a% tie I st Air

('ontnindo Squadroit

D~etachmtent 4. P'acific Air Rescue Serscc. established with

tbree li-43Is%

Can Tho Airfield

1962 Jutne..........lDetachmnent 3. 0220thI Air Blase

Sqttadroil. estahhshed

1 963 1lIii>.......... Dctachuent 2, 33d I acticalGroup.

replace% D~etachtmeint 3. 6220tit

Air Blase Squad roil

1964 iitw nur.. .. .... S2 5 millton approw d for ite%%auifield

April. .. .. .. ... Detaehmtent 3.019th I aetical Coi- 74th I actical Wing organi/ed

trol Squjadron (5th I actical

Control Girotup) orgm.il/ed

D~ecemiber .. .. ............... 520th lighter Sqtiadron flies is e

A-11l Ishiout here duiring the

das . anid rettirn to Ilien I ba

aIt inight

Da Nang Air Base

1955 Nmsember . . . . I t I lais011 Sq nid ron nloses

here from fltue

19.57 Noseitber . . . . Air Force Suppoit Baise 4 ,Ieti-

\ated

272
USAI \'NAl1961 (eiohei .... 2d lielicopter Squaidronieitiaited

D ecemnber . . 3..(l1 I ,n Squadroin aelisded.

1962 hanuar . I Air Suport Operaitioius 'etii

formed A C'ombat Rtvporting

Post adar instatlled (DI) ch

ient 3. 5th I ,ctiea: C'ootrol

Squadron)

lDei-iehitent 11. I 3th A'ir loice,

orgaitild.

I wo N lie I ra in C-I 23s detached here fronm Ian Sont

June ........eond~ MIutle 'Ira in squiadlron

(777th) estabhlied here with

simeen C- 123N under 1 artical

Air l-orce I rnmport Squadron

P~ro isiortdl-2 ( (IaiSon Nbut).

I wehec aireraft remain htere.

and four go to D~on Mniung,

I ha ilaid

lDetachtneit 11, I 3th Air l-ore.

rena med 6222d Air Base

Squad roin

December . L... etachment 2, 8th Aerial

Squadron oiganiued,

1963 Ja ntar 21 3thi IHelicopter Squadron re- places 2d Ifelicopter Squtadl

ron

I110th I ia i~oi Squad roll replaces,

1st I lalson Squadroin

I4hI:soSquad roin re.place'

3d I aison Squadronl (nioxes

to IPIeiku latter it this \car).

Air Base 41 replae,~ Air I-ore

Support Baise 4 to support

VNAI units1

July .. .. .. .. .. 0222d Air Base Squadron beconlics the 23d Air Base Group

(2d Air lDiision)

7771h I roop Carrier Squadron redesigntated ats 311t ii Iroop

Carrier Squtadron v'ih penna nenit stitin here

273
THE ADVISORY YEARS

41s't I detical jsing c',rabh%heuJ. Inl1964janury .corptratillgdli \Al squadrolls here

I-eboar)516th 1 ighter Sqluadron mos 

lebruar>here from Nba I rang

April ..... lDetaIchime n 1. 6)19thl Iactical

C'ont rol Squadron. organiied

May 217111 Ihlcopter Sqnudron estahhwhed Mos e, to haill S,111

Nhlut In .l 1964 and to Mll

I tli Inl l)ecember 1965

.little ..... 1-102' on I 0-day depio~nment for

air defense

Jtll ..... II i-I (m oin tentporar> wmsgnntent fronm Clark Air 1lase

Auigit. .. .. .... Six P-i02s here fronm Clark Air

Base for air defense

,\ugut- Deceniber P-1I00% fronm the 27th I actical

l-ighter Wing (Cann~on Air

j-oree lase) aitid the 401st and

405th I actical Fighter Wings

(1-iland Air IForce Base) rotate itn anmd out inl response to

the Gulf of I onkit incident

D~ecember. ... Six 1-IO5s arme from Okiawa

D~etachmenti 2. 18th I actical

lighter Wing. established.

1965 I'ebrmdry........ Nehe F. I00%~ of tihe 3d I aelical l-ighter Wing fly froit here

in attacks oit ('hap I c Bata tid it Flamii Dart

Nha Trang Air Base

1951 Jllte ........ Air i raining (Center establishied

1955 Jluly 2d I mamson Squadron t ransferred

froin I relich to Viet namese

/959 October . d I misot Squadroin ilt)\ to

I all Soil \but

1961 D~ecemnber . .. 2d Fighter Squiddlon (I-28%) acli-

%.tied

1962 cbriuar\ .. .. .. Detacmteitt 12. 13th1 Air I-orce.

orga titid

274
('SAI VA

..n .. .. etachmuent 12. l3th Air Force.

becomes 6-123d A\ir Mase

Squadron

September . .. . 12th Air Blas Squadron orgainn/d

December ..... Detachment 4. 8th Acrial Poit

Squadron. organh/ed

1963 .latuar% . 2d 1 ighter Squad rotn rena med

5 l6th I ighter Squadron

Ju. .t. .. . 37th Air Wase ~Squadroni ( 33d I actieal Group) replaces 6223d

Air Biaw Squadron

1964 Iebruar . .. .. .. I lire C-123s and three ('-47s 516th Fighter Squadron moss

here to support Arm% Special to D~a Natig

Porces

.1111 ti ........ 16th iIiaison Squad roil activated (0-Is).

1965 Jainuar% 62d I aetical Wing noses here

from Plciku.

Pleiku Air Base

1962 March. .. .. .... 11 Air Support Operations Ccinicr fully operational.

June..........Detachment 1. 6220th Air Base

Squadron. fornied,

D~ecember .. etachment 3. 8th Aerial Port Air Base 62 activated

Squadron. activated

1964 March ....... Air Baise 62 becomes 62d I aetical Wing

1965 JanuarN 62d 'lactical Wing motes to Nba

I ra ng

Tan Son Nhut Air

Base

1955 July . st I ransporiation Sqtiadron

(C-47s) orgarived

September . . .. Air Force Communications, Section formed

1956 F-ebruary . .. Air Iraflic and Weather Sectioni

formied

Julne ..... 2d I rarispo rtattori Squad ronl

(('-4 7s) iorgatiied

275
i HIE ADVISORY YEARS

liiirce opeins ltict

1957 ltme . s. . l.lope .si~it .I.-. organived

1959 October ...... 2d1 I a isol Sqtiad ro i (I- 9

s

InowNC here Itwil N ha I rang

19)61 October . I )ct ach mecnt 2, 507th I acticall

Control GSroup. establishes it

ilobile Coitroland Reporting

Post to train 'ictilatiiese ItI the

I aetteal Air Conitrol SN sieni

Pipe Stein recorindiUssa nce operatiolis trt s% ith touIr 1- 10k and

at Photo Processing C'ell

Nos mbe . .. .l)ctaeclinienjts 7 alind S. I .1th Air

Fore, orga itied to support

USAF mint%

1962 Jantiar .... .. .. .N ile I rain airrise' I ssel e

C- 123' and 2431 people oil tell,-

porar dot\ to pros ide aiirlift

I \\o a1irecraft sent to D~a Na nlg

Unit becomes permanent in)

,little as thre 776th 'I roop Car.

tier Squadroni.

Ranch hland airrises I hree

C. 1 21

s foi defoliation.

Joint Operatins Center set uip

Co nsli rg 01tia per maneint

Combat Recportinig Center to

monitor air trafic i anid deplo\

fighters Subordinate Air Support Operationis Ceitters esiabIled It 1)aj Na ng aind Pleilsti

ipe Stem P- lois depart. leasing9

P1hoto I'roces,,ing Cell (1no\%

dtesignatedt as1 Dldaehnie L

15tIcehitical RecolnaIssanice Squad ron)

I-ebruar% Air l-oree Co illnitunica'ti0i, See.

tion reiiametd Air l-oree Coin.-

itin1cititolis Squadroii

NlaIreli. .. .. .... fil( 11,1tie i rises. 1 ('-54 ftted

v. th infrared etii pilient for reCoitl111iassllte Rema ills here

tiil I'cbrua r 19'63

276
1 ou1 - 102, dkrplosed here for

atdelense I ater, F.- 102s alteritit' \%III \a\s A l)*S0s 1it 6-

\seeK tovirs of .;ir defenseditm

()per..ion innsed to ('lrk Air

in %ae ,I\ 1963

April ..... I )etaelier 3. Pacific Air Re~-

cuec (en'ter, established

M.1% . .... Mu 1tle Ir" r 11in Rai'eh Ilatid

C-12l c0 eolda ted unid er I ajili Air I'orce I ransport

Squadron Prosisonal.2

Is Uo IR 11-57.. on teulporars dtsl

f romt Ja pani

litte . . . . . . . ... I)etaehm t 7. 1 3thI Air F'orce. retia itied H eaidqutarters 2(d AdSa iteed I-elizion

SeptemIber . . . . IHeadquarter.. 0492d Combat

C'argo Group I I roop Carrier)

organieo antd attac hed to the

315th Air D)imson (Japran)

October. .. .. ... d Air Dl~ son t eplaces 2oj Adun tee Fehejlon

± leeemoer.... ladquarters 315th1 I roop Car.

ner Group (Assault) replaces

6492d Combat C'argo Group Able Nlable Reconnaissance 293d Hlelicopter Squadrotn acoiI ask I'orce moses its four sated

IRE -101%. here front Don

Mni ang, I hatilantd

1963 ... ..413th Jima\. Air Iransport Squadron re.

196.?~la uary415tih Air I ra import Squadron r'- places is I ratisport Squadron

12th I rtison Squadron (.- 19s)

replaces 2d liaison Squadron

Mowes to Men I 0b1 in .Itinc

19(A

1-ebruar . . . . .... r Itall C-97 replit's C-54 for

ICCOtiliiss'i Ice

March. .. .. .. Iwno I I' lO added to Able

Mable277

I:

'/

+
THE ADVISORY YEARS

US5AF VNAF

A\pril .......... 3thI Reconntaissane I clinical

Squaidroni activat'-d

.1111N...........33d 1 aciicl Giroup orgainied

Detachment I eunsohdates all

reconnaissance units uinder its

control.

309th and 310th (old 776th *1 moop

Carrier Squadron) [moop Carrier Squadrons actisated under the 315th Troop Carrier

Group ' actical Air Force

1 ransport Squadron Provisional-2 disconiiiued

D)ecember ..... 71 Otb Composite Reconnaissance

Squadron formed, 1 -28s and

C4-7s assigned

1964 January ...... 33d'laeical WVingfornmed. Incorporates all of the abowesquadrons

April......... Able Mable eontingent inc~eased

to ten Rl1-l0ls

619th'1 actieal Control Squadron

orgarnied.

June .. .. .. .... Detachment 2. 421st Air Reftiel- 716th Reconnaissance Squadron

ing Squadron. arrives from inactivated. Pi'lots retrain for

Yokota for Yankee 1 cant ne%% 520th Fighter Squadron

operations (Bien lloa) Mission assumed

by 2d An Division

August ........ 2d Air Division Command Post 293d Helicopter Sqtiadron macestablished. tivated

Six F-102s deploy here from

OktnawNa,

Six RF-l01sadded to Able Mable

October ........ 19th Air Commando Squadron

(Troop Carrier) activated under the 315th 'I roop Carrier

Group. Assigned C-123s

L'-,-eniber... FC-47 gunship used in combat

for the first time

278
11. THAILAND

Don Nluang Airport

(Ihlailand)

1961 April ....... onrol and Rportig Center

and at Control aind Reporting P'ost %et up

Bell I one Detachment (four I102s) of the 509th lighter Interceptor Squadron mosed

here for indefinite dur ation.

Noseniber... Anle Mable Reconnaissane

I ask Force formed. consisting

of four M1 -ls and a Photo

Processing Cell.

lDetaieh'nent 10, I 3th Air Force.

established to support USAP

units

Detachment 1. 5th 1I 4wical Control Group. orgaiwed.

1962 June .. .. .. .. ... our C- I23s arrive hiere from Da

Nangs 777th 1 roop Carrier

Squadron

Air Force Component Cornnmand of Joint Itask Force 116

deploys here

July ........... 1Detachment 10. 13th Air Force.

replaced by 6010th 'lactical

Group ( 13th Air Force).

Nowember. ...Able Mable discontinues Laos

flights Continues coverage in

South Vietnam.

D-ccember. ....Jotnt I ask Force I1161nactivaie-d

Detachment 1, 8th Aerial Port

Squadron, organiied.

Able Mable rnoscs to Ian Son

Nhut.

1963 July ........... 6010th taetical Group redesignated 35th 'lactical Group

Bell lone D~etachmtent redesignated D~etachment 4, 405'h

F~ightter Wing

35th Air Base Squadron (35th

tactical Group) organied

279
THE ADVISORY YEARS

1964 fill\ ... .. .. . . .. Detachment of (1091 st ieconn,11-

\ditce Squadron (C-1.10%)

;arr% es

1965 January........ 3511h 1 actical Group relieved of

resporibtlit\ for air defense

It goes, to Udorn Ro\ al I im

Air IForce Base

Korat Royal Thai Air

Force Base

1963 ulv ........... Detachmtent 1, 60 10th 1 actical

G rouip ( Don Mmng) organtied,

1964 August......... 1-105,, from McConnell Air

Porce Baise begin rotational

temporar dut\ here.

October ........ I -100,, deployed here ternporard\

Takhli Royal Thai Air

Force Base

1962 May..........- s from Cannoiand Englan:d

Air Force Bases begin rotational tentporar d ut% here

July. .. .. .. .... 6011 lit Air Base Squadron

organtted

1963 Ju uk...........131st Air Blase Squadron I 35th

I actical Group) replaces

6011 Ith Air Base Squadron

1964 August ......... letacltnit 1. 4 21st Air Reftueltng Squa~dront. orgaied

Iidorn Royal Thai

Air Force Base

1904 April ......... Detachmnttt 6. I si Air Comman~ndo Wing. established s% it four

1 -28s to train the Ro~al I aomin Air Iore

une .. D~etachmtent 2. 35tht I atical

G rotup (DIon MNita g). organitied

.tl..........A Control atnd Reporting Post

andl an \itAi Suppot t Operalionts ( entter ectabhshted

Augutst ... )eptiv, C'omtmntder. 2d Air i\ it280
SIMIa'~te conltrol ol all

1'SAI- operat10iSn III Ihiln

and I alos

October . D )~echment 2. 351h I aicll

Grotup. become, 333d Air

1965 .Ia ulr) . .. l. eplityconmavid.r2d Air I )iforl' hat air defelnse from Dll

2X 1
Appendix 2

)evelopnent of a Viet Cong Antiaircraft Capability

1962-1965*

By Ronahl H. Cole

During the first three years of the war, the Viet Cong grew accustomed to

their reputation for superior mobility ovi Saigon's forces. In the fall of 1962.

however, the Vietnamese Air Force introduced heliborne and close air support

operations that temporarily jarred Viet Cong complacency. The effectiveness of

the South Vietnemese air strikes resulted in the Viet Cong's sagging morale,

rising fear, and suspicion of spies in their midst. Defections occuried and the Viet

Cong had to recruit arduously among the peasants to maintain their forces. Steps

to counter the air threat intensified at once. As a stopgap, the Viet Cong

instructed their soldiers to shoot directly at the fuselage of the enemy aircraft with

any gun at hand or hurl a "flying bomb."t

Among the Viet Cong, only those regroupees and North Vietnamese Army

cadres who had infiltrated south after 1960 had any semblance of antiaircraft

tiainig. Thus, the visceral reaction of Viet Cong officers and noncommissioned

officers to South Vietnamese air operations in September 1962 was to order their

men "to shoot aircraft flying straight"and to fiie "liberally and with all available

means." The training of gunners and the drafting of field manuals took time.

Nonetheless, during the winter of 1962-63 Hanoi worked feverishly to develop

antiaircraft tactics for infantry weapons that could be instantly used by men In

the field. Programs to train inexperienced soldiers in the basics of antiaircraft

warfare were also begun. Still, it was not until the end of 1963 that the Viet Cong

had an effective antiaircraft capability.

In October 1962 Viet Cong provincial committees distributed to district and

village troops the first detailed antiaircraft directive. The document depicted the

vulnerable points on South Vietnamese fighters, reconnaissance aircraft, and

helicopters. It further outlined procedures for organizing antiaircraft personnel

and firing commands, and methods of shooting at aircraft with infantry

weapons.

In a section entitled "Nature of an Objective in the Air," the directive

explained how to gauge the target size of an aircraft by its shape and angle of

approach. For example, "At 150 we only see the aircraft nose. Target size /4. At

300 we can see the wing and the fuselage, equal in siie. Target si/c 11. At 50' the

wings seem longer than the fuselage. Target si/c -. At 90' we see the entire

aircraft, or target size 4/4."The directive described the aveiage fighter plane used

'Roala ld II Cole. "'People's Arm Phase II. manuscript. September 1973, (haper I,

Ofiice of Air I-orce Ihstory files, based prumarl. on t SAl inteltigence ma:Crials

tA "flying bomb" was a modified shell , i a U S. ircraft rocke. filled with napalr iand iturled .ii

ericm, nes bInmcam n ofa slinpb ot utili/inlg is,o bamboo trees

281

iECEDING PAGE BLAK-O40T F-vIL
TIlE ADVISORY YEARS

by the South Vietnaniese in late 1962 as about 13 meters long, and flying at 200

kilometeis-per-hour at an altitude of 150 to 200 meters. Since the aiciaft was

thereloie vulnerable to rifle and niachinegun tile. a formula was devised lot

computing a firing lead.

The Viet Cong taught their trainees both "passive" and "active" antiaircralt

tactics. Passive tactics consisted ol camouflage, spiked landing /ones, and "sentinel chambe s." 1orcamouflage the Viet Cong used dirty brown netting, natural

cover, and concealment. To spike a possible landing ione they planted pointed

bamboo shafts. 2 to 4 inches in diametei and 6 to 15 feet high, very close together

inareasas Iorge as 100 by 800 meters. The Viet Cong dug conical holes 5 feet into

the ground with their walls slanted down at 500 for sentinel chambers. These

echo chambers permitted a sentinel to hear an aircraft appi oaching from a great

distance and to dete. mine its direction of approach.

Active antiaircraft tactics included mortar as-,aults on landing tones, infantry charges against unloading helicopters, and the "three-man cell tecniqucs." In

the latter method riflemen formed thiee 3-man cells arrayed in an L-shap d

configuration with three machinegun teams. The machinegunners positioned

themselves at the two ends and at the junction of the "L." (See Chait.) The

riflemen and machinegunners practiced synchironi/ed filing in this formation.

which was specially designed to down fi'ked wing aircraft. By December 1964

U.S. and South Vietnamese pilcts had not yet assessed the success of this

formidable-looking technique, since the number of Viet Cong antiaircraft

attacks fluctuated monthly from 20 to 100.

DIAGRAM OF "L" OR TRIANGULAR DEFENSE SYSTEM

------------------------------

-. . I,.

3.MAN CELL - ,

W/tiFLiS 15 30 METElS

TEAM LAAOIt*

3.MANCitt - _ --.- $. 11LI ** $.MAll FICIIL

WIMG sed RIILIG

* FIRES ARE COORDINATED ON COMMAND OF TI:AM LEADER.

* ONE CELL MAY BE DESIGNATED AS DECOY TO DRAW AIRCRAFT

FIRE AND ALLOW AA GUN CREW TO DISFNGAGE.

284
THE ADVISORY YEARS

1 he Viet Congconstructed their first antiaircraft weapons trainingcenter in

Quang Ngai Piovince. Aerial reconnaissance ievealed that this site probably

offei ed instruction in aircraft iecognition, techniques of fire, calculation of firng

leads, piepaiation of antiaiicraft sites, drills in the use of these sites, and basic

tactical formations for use against South Vietnamese heliborne operations. One

major difficulty persisted - the scarcity of antrairciaft weaponly.

The Viet Cong began to receive more sophisticated antiaircraft weapons

from Ilanoi in the fall of 1963. Infiltrators brought with them 12.7-mam (Soviet

DSItK) and .50-caliber machineguns. In addition reports reached Military

Assistance Command, Vietnam, of 20-mam cannon and 13.2-mm machineguns in

War Zone D. and of a 35-m antiaircraft gun in Kien Phong Province.

Moreover, in April 1964 MACV J-2 (Intelligence) anticipated the early arrival of

two new antiaircraft weapons from Hanoi, the 37-mm gun weighing 4,600

pounds and the 40-mm gun weighing 10,000. Within months the impact of this

influx in weapons was felt.

Records of antiaircraft attacks commenced in January 1963. Monthly

incidents remained low throughout 1963, rose to about 100 in January 1964, and

tapered off to only 50 in March 1964. The number then climbed to more than 180

for April 1964. and the average over the next six months was at least 180 the

greatest number foi any one month being neai ly 400 in September 1964. After

April 1964 the coiielation of inciea sed antiairciaft attacks and the quantity of

aniaircialt weapons available to Viet Cong gunnels is obvious. (See Giaph.)

40 RVN COUNTRYWIDE TOTALS

400 VC ANTIAIRCRAFT INCIDENTS

50

300

200 

50

u II

100

50

JAN FIB MAR AR MAY JUN JUL AUG SEP OCT NOV DEC JAN FIB MAR APR MAY JUN JUL AUG SEP OCT

1963 1964

28
Notes

Chapter I

Origins of ilz Amewrican Com itmient io Vietnam

I Grateful ackinowledgement Imade of the tc . 190195 (Washington. 1957). pp 2364-65.

help ftirnished b\ Mr Chairles B Macl~onald of 1)01 P'entagon Papers. Bk 1 11. A- 17. A-.15,

the Arniy's (Center of Military istory on thle A-36. see also Dcanl Acheson. Present at t/he

background of the A merican ii n. 0..ernent In Creationi %lt Years In t/he State 1)eparinient

Vietnam Ilhe literature onl the root% of the (New York. 1967). pp 071-78

Arim-riesn commitmnrt to Sotitheast Asia is 9. II Q .S Al'. Air Order of Blattle. Apr 1.

extensise. bitt see espeeially Cordell Ifull. 71w 1950. USA I',lir Inieligence Digest. Apr 52. p 4.

Memoir% of Cordell11 Hull(New York, 1948). 11. 10 Memo. Geni Omnar N. Bradlev to SFiC1596-77. The Po/'lii Papers and Aitiresse.. of D)1:1. Apr 10. 195fl: ng. Achieson to Arnl~nb

Franin 1) Roosevelt l'etorrond die hires/- London. Nlay 31. 1950. D~ept of State hiress

ol of Peaie (New York. 1950). PP 562-63. [fear- Release 485. Aid to Southeast Asia. MaN 11.

ings before the Committee on Armed Services 1950: all in D)OD Pentagon Papers. Blk 8 308-

and the Committee ott l'oretgn Relations. U S1 13. 3 21. aiid 32 7

Senate. Al/Atari, Situiationi In t/ie Far East. 82d 11. Publii Paperv oft/ic Prestdent Harm S

Cotig. Ist sess(Washington. 1951). pt 4. pp 1890- Tioiani, 19501 (Washington. 1965). p 492

92. UIS Dept (if State. 71we Conference at alta 12 Hearings before the Committee on hForandl Yalta (Washington. 1955). p 770. Sec also eign Rkelation.. and the Committee onl Armed

Johii I Gaddis. Me' United States amil the 5cr. ces. U'S Senate. Mutual Seciritr Act of

Originso 0:he ('oII Wlar, 1941-45 (New York. 1951. 82d ('wig. Ist sess(Washington. 1951). pp

1972) 563-64. Eidga r O'Ballanrce. 7he ii'Itoi lua Wlar.

2 Ellen HIanimer. 'Ilic Struggle /tor ido- 1945-1/954 Al Stiidi in Guerrilla If arfarc (I onlchitna (Stanford. 1954), anid Joseph Buttinger don. 1964). p 114. lust. 1 020th USA I Special

Viwtnamt A D)ragon Embattledl (Ness York. Activities Wg. Apr-Jun 52

1967), are especially hielpful onl the es ents in 13 St tid% Submitted by the Subconimittee

Southeiast rsia during World War 11 antd after onl Nationial Securit% Stafiing andi Operations.

3 [lul~l. Meointrs 11, 1598. I erninal Coil( 7hl /i ,i/ts sttitr ani/ice Probleinof (oordhnaPapersand Minutes of Mectinj's. .lly 1945. pp tion. 88t11 Cong. I %t ss (Senate Docuimenii 36)

217-26, 252-53. and 305. Marcel V:gneras. Re- (Watshiiiioti. 1963). pp 12. 14.15. anid 53-58

armiing the Frienc/i U.S. Aroti tit IlorhI llWar 11 14 U S D~ept of State. U S. Ih'atws% tind

(Washintgtoni. 1957). pp 396-99: Supreme AllidI Other Intertiational ,lgrt'iontsI (Washington.

CormanderSoutlicast Asia. Dip ti. pt IV-A. 1952). 111. pt 2. 2

756-9 9

pp 52(0-28: Charles de Gaulle. M1e li'ar Aenioir3 15 USA F~lir hitelligenc c 1igest. Apr 52. pp

of Chtarles ie GaiIc (New York. 19601). Ill. 0-7. Matirer Matirer. Ibstori of USA F ,livo242-43 Iiis tit Sup/port of 1/ it Mtual IDefemis As t4 Sece insg. Deani Achiesotn io eliarg In ante Programi (Wright-Patterson AlPB- AMCI

China. October S. 1947. Ii Dlmprtnre' of Ilis Office. 1951) pt 1. pp 52-53. pt 2. pp 64-65.

Pfcifne 1 11 Pentagon I'apcrs. L'u' tw- 80 8M. an:d pt 3. p- 1 38.301

l'u' "cti Relations, 1945-1967 ( Wash ington. 16 1id . pt 3. p 261, (IS Seniate. Mutual

I , ). Blk 8 49 [ hereafter cited as 1)01 Pen- Sec uriti ,lct of/951I.82d Coiig. 1st sess. pi564

tagoti Papters) 17 Pol'lu Plapers., t/w 'rcsitlents Hatrr S

5 Ihbt1 . pp 144-49. \Vslivin. C llhtt. "I fie Malitn. /9.51 (Waslitwton. 1965). p 267

Saddest WVar."' Life, lDcc ')9, 1947. pp 6s4-69, 18 USAF IAir Intt'lhgcnte 1)igest.ltn 54. pp

Allanm If (Cole. ed. UonmlI t it huilo-Clhout tant 14 17. Presentat ioi oif I t Col R I I dwards.

!nternationial Repert ussuon .1 IDo,uionftar; Chief Materiel Branrch. NI AAG Vietniami. Ii

1lisorr. 194- 1955 (Ithaca. 1956). pp 83-84 Rpri /15tant-AA P1 Logistic Conferenie. lec 58.

6 M ltait Assista nec Comniiamd Vietcinir pp 154.60. Capt Mack 1) Secord. " I lie Viet

II si orical M onographt. Aliliarv A.s 5iva,twi to Narn Air I orce." Alir Ulnivervi Reviesi. No% -

t/r( Repo/.lu of Sot/i Vietiamt. 1960-1963, p 2 D~ee 61. p11 60-61. M,.j Oakahl I Jonies. -ir

7 03 Statutes 714. Oct 6, 1949. Ileca iings Organi:tttion. thiston andf Growt/h tifthe Pietlicid ii I-xecutise Session before the Corninuttee taines Air Force. 1949-68 (1 IQ PACA I . Ileoj

oin h-enict Relations. U S Senate. L~coion CIIEhCO. Oct 8. 19)68). pp 1-3

,1 -.istotte to Chlina anti /orest 1949-50 19 I ir. Brig (icit 1 .1 If I rapnell. Chief.

(Washington. 1974). p 194 M /.AG- Inrdoishtiia. to Ccii .1 1 awstori Colins

8 US D~ept oif State, Aeruart itirigmi PcI- CSA. D~ec 20). 1952. in DOD1 Pentagon Papers.

287

PiiECEDIN'G PPLSE BL-4.NK-14OT FIU''E
T'HE ADVISORY YEARS Notes to Pages 10-18

Blk 9 2-3. hist . 24ith Air Depot Wg. Sep.IDec 52. 21 (;IIQ tiNCand I'lIC. Intel Sum, Not 14,

1) 50. and .Ian-in 53. App 7, USA F Staotmi al 1952

1)igeit. 1 Y 1953. p 311 22 II ai S I runiaii M.temoir% Year% of

20. 11i m,, 24th Air D~epot WVg. Sept-LDce 52. p 1'rwl1 and lip (Gaiden ('it>. 1956),1P 519

50. dud Jan-Jun 53. App 7

Chapter 11

IMen B~ien Phii

I I%ighn I) Fisetihoter. 771t' II 'lute Hlome Albert G~ I Ici\ it. Vice ('onidr lar Fas~t Air

)'ear. Alandate for Change. 1953-19.56 (Garden I ogtlie.. lorce. to SFCIl'I thru ( SAl . Apr6,

City'. 1963). pp 337-38. IT S, Dept of State. 1954

Anteru an I'oreign 1'olu't' 1950-1955. p 2386 10 N atuare, I '-Igonii' dei 1'lndot'hint'. pp

2 Report o1 Senator Mike Mia nfield on a I188-2MX

St ud\ Mm..iot to the A',..ciaitcd State.. of Indo- I I 31 5th Ait IDi. F'rench Inido-Chiina lPlrticchina., Oct 27. 195.3. idochina. 83d Cong. Is.t i pation. 1953-1954, hi..t. I)ir Plan.. t SAl _Iant- xc... (Wa.isintoi. 1943). p 4- ittg. lDulleN to .Iuii 54. pp 93-90

Am in b Paris~. Mar 26. 1953. iii D)OD Pentagon 12 I 1' A- In tel Rotind up. Apr-NMia\ 54

P'aper.. Ilk 9 17-18, 13 11 hi. A.s.t lot Mutu ial Seem ii\. t SAl

3 U SA F ,1r hinefioemue Dige. .tin 53. pp1 .lan-i n 5.1. pp) 25-26. note b\ the I wcuctii.

30-34 Scretatr% to ithe Naitioinal Seelin. Council. .Iani

4 MIR b\ D~ouglas MlacA rithm II . Apr 27. 1 6. 1954. andl meit bt, Brig (eit C I I Ifbtues.

1953, it DOD1 Pentagon Paper%. Blk 9 38. U'S ted. 111. ('ASl-ISA. Jan 29-30. 1954. itt 1)01)

D~ept of State. A owncan foreign Po/icv. 1950- Pentagon I'aperN. Blk 9 21t7-18,inil 240-44. fi rs,

19.5. pp 2369-70; Iti.t. 24tht Air D~epot Wg. Iani- I- FAl to C'omidr SA F. Apr 10. 1954. ('ol Robert

.it 53. pp 56-67.alid App 8 I1i..orvt'fProlei t I I ile.. tt Ilia Ole I I Al OGI-OR. Itil I5.

Sni'eI C'hair ItI re..poim. to a request itade- b\ 1954. I1-I AlF Stail Sectioii MIoit ll IIm ltRprix.

lie I hit A nta..ador to D~ulles it .cter- en I)ir Op... leb 54

gene) aiir xltipmnieti of ammnitiont anid oilher 14 t S Air l'orceN in I urope cxtaihicda.n

tirgenilh needed itemi were rtihed to Baitgkok auccelerated traiing progrm lot I' rcnelt B-26

IU S l~ept ol State. Antenu an F'oreign Poit -, trex.. anid imechaicsu in a ice, and in .1 tie. the

1950-19.55. p 2.370. I' renelt wotuld allouca'en additionial 450O teelui5 I lerm Naxarre. I ',lgont' (te l,1ndocnuc, cian.. to Vietnaim Rprt. Ileait to I'CI) I

1953-.54 OlParix. 1956). pp 62-88 Apr 6. 1954.hiti irl t ir.tSI.Iui.It54

6 I hux. lDir Plans.. ITSAl'. .1 til- 13cc 51. pp PP 93-96 liui. AsI lot NI tial Secutitt. - SAl

117-19; rprt. I tGeit .1(1111 W O'Da itil toi .ICS kainin 154. p 145. Ii r. I . cx to II h Ole 1-1'Al -

(ithru CINCI'AC). Itil 14. 1953. it 1)01) Pen- OGFIR. .lil I5. 1954. IIIQ 64241 Air D~epot

tagon pallet.. Blk 9 69-96. liuxi 31Sith Air Di\ Wg. Stuppot to the I' reitel Air l-oree. l-eb 2-itil

(Cotiti Cargo). Jani-inl 54. pp 6-7 I17. 19S4. Pubhu Paper of the President..

7 IIlxi. Ax.. ftir Mu iitual Seeunut, U SAl' - 1)uight 1) Ei .enhotter. 19.54 1 W~tliutgtoit.

Itil-IDee 53. pp 45-46, IISAI' Statisticaul Siurn- 1960)). p 247

mnar% F'Y 1954 p 187 I5 -. Inlter..c xitti (cit OttolP We'. anud

8 D e pt of Staite. A weit an I oreign I'Su i ( ii Air Power Wit l1itle Wai "". ( S Vets

1950-55. pp 2370-72,. lIcirmig% beftore the ('tin- & If or/l Pepont. itil 21. 1954, lpp 54.6 1. flight litee til I tireigni Affair%.. I louxe of Represelita- ant%%% xxt.ii We'. lau'd b\ Keni I eiht. In tit01

the... '1/it Mutual Seturair Alct of 19.54. 83d 16 Rpnl. ('apt Robert W II ice.. anid

('olg. 2d sc....(Waxliiigtoii. 1954). pp 6-7. Ilcar- Robert NI I'lo~d tt lep Intel. 1I1 Al'. %Iair 9.

i ltg. before the Commilittee oni Apprtipriations'. 1954

US Senatie, Mintal Sitm unt pp~ropriationt for 17 Lu'.eitlox'er. M(anda'e Mrt ('hange. p 3319:

1957. 84tht ('oug. 2d sc%.. (Waxltinlon. 1956). p Narre. I 'A-gonwe de 1'Indoi hi'. pp 214. 2 10.

67. Lisciltox.ir. Mantdate for ('/iang-, p 338. anld 21 7. rprt. 01 )a hi to lC(S. I eb 5. 1954. in

utemno. Bradle'. for SFIC lI:I' Aug 11, 1953, itt 1)0) Pentagoti paper.. Blk 9 248. .S,1 F' Ailr

DOD1 Pentagon Pape-rs. 111, 9 134-17 hineligenit /)igevt M~ar 54. p 11

9 R pri. O'Daitiel to J CS. Juli 14. 1953. liuxi. 18 tlitRouittIea.J/n m.u'1)Ie. Ax..i for Mutual Sectirit'.. I

1

SAI. JtiI.Me 53. p 1888-1959 (Ne\.. Yoirk. 1959). pp 204-06. tU S

158. a lIaiu-.lit 54. pp 149-501. rpri. Brig (en IDept ofl Staite. A nut an I ort-lgn pohti 1. /950-

288
Notes to Pages 18-26

1955. pp 2372-73 Seecalso Khnmihchin Relltell- 36 llust. lDir Opls. LISAI. Jan-Jun 54.

hyer% (Blotonl, 1970). pp) 481-82. for ani assess- pp 44.45

niCent that 110 %%as acting In (desperation early Int 37 1Fall. lid/in a I err Sniall lawu. pp 301-04

1954 hccatise Chin1,1 a too ssca k to ltelp, 11int 38. Eiscnltoss r. Mandate for Change. p 347,

19 Na'. arre. 1. ,gonce le 1I7do June. p) 218-, Iibhit I'aller of ithe l'reocjlengt 1)wzghtl I)

l)Cp Intel. 13th A F, 1 R-29-54. Jul 19, 1954i Air Eisenhower, 19541 Waishingtonl. 1960) pp) 382-83.

Attache Saigon. W 

- 142-54, Jul 9. 1954. H ear- 39 Sit Istud\,. I-1PA F. I o Recoinnend a l'easiings hefot e the Coniniittec onI I oreign Afrii s ble NI lita r\ Course 01 Action to A\chims U S.

IIo~ o fC0 Represinaties. Mhe .hitiltl Sci urit Ohiectis i Inodo-China. Apr 13. 1954

Act of 19.54. 83d Cong. 2(1 sC55 (Washington,. 40 Stttdy. Apr 19. 1954. Ii [list. Dir Plaits.

1954). ppl 9. I5. 18. 20 LISAF-. lait-.ltn 54. pp) 90)-92

20. Ilist. 483d I C \V9, .an-Jun 54.1 p36. see 41 Ridg'.wa. Soldwer. pp 176-277. Cia'.n

also PP Al Intel Rotund up. Jtin 54. p 40 "1 etter to Ed it or%." iarpers Aagavine. Feb 66.

21 Air Attach Saigoin. IR-56-54. M~ar 23. pp 10-21. hlearings before the ('onmmittee onI

1954:, Bernard 1 I-all. Sireed Wi tloul low F-oreign Relaitions. U.S Se.nate. Supl)'oienial

isurgen t- in idoc/i, 1946-1963. 3d re'. ed F'oreign ,I siamiie isca/ Year 19M) 

-- Ilet-

(Ilairrisburg. 1903). p 317 nam. 89th Cong. 2d sess ( Washington, 1960). pt

22. Rprt. I t Col Williamt 13. SanlderN. Com-. 1. pp 226. 234-35

hat Ops Di\, I PA F. to I)ep Ops. FL Al-. fulti 42 [l ist. Asst for NItual~i Seetirit\ Ja n-i on

14. 1954: inig Chiel NI AAG Saigon to Conidr 54. PP1 1424., anid 146, It. I ties for' IHistoriain

I-PAl-. NIG-650-D-l. Mar 18. 1954. ms'g. PEAI.OGFOR., .1111 I5. 1954; Itr. Vice Adt

Comdr FEA F to Chief NI AAG Saigon, iid.: H.i 

. Hlooper. USN I Ret). lDir Nd'.aI I list.

315th Air I\i' (Comibat Cargo). French I ndo- to Btrig Ge~n It S, Gu tnderson, Clh Af II ist. Dc

China P'articipaitiont, pp 17-18 20. 1972. II 1st Sttimar\ 

- Armament IDi' Icp

23. [i st. 31 5th Air D~iv (Combat Cargo). I or Materiel. I-LAFI- Apr 54

Jan-itin 54. pp 26-:7; Iep Intel. 13th Al., itR- 43 Ilist. IDir Rqitis. I-PAl-. Apr 54. lab 

C

29-54. iil 19, 1954 tile ex\penditure o1 para- Standard Operational Procedtires for Use oh

chittes and other drop eqtuipmient nearly de- La,\ IDog

pleted USAF stocks iii Jlapan. and eiaergeitev 44 Msg. h-PAl- to Chief NIAAG Saigon.

sliipinits had to conic fronit thle United States ADO.RQNWi S-355 1, Apr 7. 1954: tnsg. FFAI24. Eisnho'.ser. Alandae for Change. p 341 to Chief MAAG Saigotn. Ah)O-CO& 1-376)8.

25 Ibid.. Jules Roy. T7he Bttle of Dienbien- Apr I5. 1954, rprt. Sander,to IDcp Ops. I' FA F.

p/in (New York. 1965). p 155: lust. lDir plans. Jtin 14. 1954. Sursiors of thle campaign later

USAl 

- .lan un 54. pp 90.92. Gien NI 11 Ridg- reported that their Vict M inh captors had (file%-

a- Solier (New York.- 1956). p 276) tioned tile"' clOselh abotit thle iisiles. attd otie

26 Roy. Battle of IDibienhu. pp 194-95. repatriated 1-rcitel offiter s.tated that thle "cigar

and 198. IPi'.cthoN,'r. Madctte fo~r Change. p345 shtaped pellets" had been \mer effecti'e lDep

27 Roy. Battle of Dienbientp/ni, pp 214-IS: Inttel, I IAI-. I R-29-54. l 19. 19)54

Nava rre. 1.Agonie dh, PiIndochine. p 244: I-all. 45 Caldat a had ax amIable for cotiibat tirt\.-

Il// ini a lerv Somall P'lace 77ie Siege of Dien two 11-29s, of tie 98thl Bonmba rdmntt Wing at

Blown PhJil (Philadelphia. I1967). p 299. I- PA F Yokota Air Base. Japan. and si \ty-e'.n 13-26s.

Intel Rouitdtip. Apr- NI I\ 54. pp 22 and] 24. oftile 307th Bfonibardmeit Wig.at Kadena Air

28 Ms.g. Air IDcp1;IIAI:to CI'.CUSAIF. Base Okitta

RI -1172. Apr 3. 1954: tti'g. ('IN( USAF 1 to 40 I tr. Partridge to Na.ii.Api 19. 1954,

Comtdr 17A xAl cu. , CINC-1610-C. Apr 3. 1954 NI R b\. N~a) GcttJo'.eph 1) Cakidara (I ISAI-Ret).

29 Ilm is. SA I-F.J.an-.ltii54. 111, App V 1111. klar 8. 1966, Cahdara to Geti Ctirui- F I e Na\.

ist. 62d I C Wg. i1a n-. n 54. hist. Asst for A\, 31 antd Ma% 3. 1954, \iarie. I ~loii 

/

NItttal SecuritN. USAP I-..ani-.ln 54. pl 148 lOndoc/iine. p 244

30 I-all. HlI in a I 'i Smzall P/ace. P 30)2. 47 Fisenlho.. .r. Mlandate' for (liatige. pp

Ro .- i/th of Dienlbienp/iu. pp 221-22 349-50: 1 deni. Alentirs p I116. img, Ciette

31 Decpt of State. I "tal Spc'cches of the flat. 10~ile~)t State.,) DII I1-5. Apr 25. 19)54, Ii

Apr I5. 1954, p 387 1)01 Pentagoni Paper%. Blk 9 388-89

F32 Ato Idi.1w lcnrsfInhoi 48 L-irI i May. the American detachment

MAent. Full Cird Ic Ioston. 1960). pp I102-03 of the 483dl I oop Carrer Wing tliat minitainted

33 P-ise lio\%r. 

.Mante iiiforChianige,.p 347. t ite C-I M1%at Cat Ili scetired a Giroiind Conttrol

Bheal. John A( ter D)ulles. pp 2(06-0)8 Approach radar. btitl it %%5a% not inistalled. anmd

34 Fisenlho\%.'. Manidatefor C'hange' p 347 operations Iii tile IHantoi area continued to be

35 II otie of Representatives. The Miuiual ha/ardotis R pri. Santders to IDel, Ops. H-FIAl.

Sec rit Act of 1954.83d Cotig. 2d sess. pp 9. I5. ltii 14. 1954

18. atnd 20). Ro'.. Batleh of Dienlnenphom. p 224 49 Rprt. liewilt to SI CIDl I .Apr 6. 1954.

289
THE ADVISORY YEARS Notes to Pages 26-34

1:1: Al- IntellRounidup. Auig54. p8. 1 5. Waddell. I roop Carrier Wig had flak damage to inte-

"Ilhase Out for Charlie-One-Onc-Nie" Pega- teen C- I 19s while flying 477 sorties to deliver

sots. Oct 55. p4:It r. Maij Ed ward S Ash.Ct al.to supplies to lDien Blien Ph u Ii st. 483d I C Wg.

Comd r 31 5th Air I\s subj. High Altitude Jain-J on 54, pp 41. 54-55

lDcla\ d lParahtindle D~rops, n d C- 119 crews, 50 ibid.. p 55. IPall. Hil/Itit a I erv Smw/i

claimed they could put cargo pallets into a 330- P/use. pp 328.330-37.373-74. Core\ lord. " I hie

yaird square from 10,000 feet. buit on April 27 llying I igers Carr\ On.," Saturdaii Evening

out\ one-third of the dropped supplies could be Po(st. leb 5. 1955. pp 241 ff~and l-eb 12. 1955. pp

retricsed. French and Aimericain cargo-dropping 30 f.

airerews agreed that escorting flak stuppression 5SI. I-all. ll/ tin a I eri Sinull Platc e. pp 374-

flights operated too high to he effective and were 411. 4132. 487

I eqiienil\ absent w lien needed. In April tile 483d

CHAP~TER III

77ze Geneva Agreenenls and Rench Witlidrautal

I Nav\arre. l.Agontie di,// hido(-/nie. pp 268- c-an ioreign Relations. / 954 (New york. 1955).

60- Jean Lacouture and Philippe 1)cvihlers. l.a pp 283-310. Lacoutuie aind l)Lvillcrs. ia ii

Fin d'une Guerre, Iudoclune 1954 (P~aris, 1960), (111ni' Guerre. pp 276-82.

pp 162-63: nsg. Coidr FEAF to Coiadr 10 Fisenhosser. Vandlate for C/age. pp

FEAL.OGFOR. ca. May 13. 1954, quoting nisg 370.71, Curl. Documieniis pp 315-17

from IJSAI RA Saigon. May' 13. 1954 1I 1 I sg. Co ud r F Al' to Coindr

2. Msg CINCPAC to COMSEADEFCOM.A U'IEALOGE-OR . t al. \'-1)0O-238. sa IMai\ 13.

Apr 28. 1954: CINCPIAC O11lan 56-54, Apr 29. 1954

1954 12 1)ir [list Services. FTAF,' iFar East Air

3. Msgs. Conmdr FEAF to CSAF. May 4. 1-orces Support of F-rench Indo-China Opera1954, May 20. 1954. and Jun 7. 1954 itons. Jul 1. 1952-Sep 30. 1954. pp 162-7 1. 294-

4 Memos. Radford for SECDEI-. May 20. 302 Guerrillas oiiJunec 14 captured five enlisted

May 2 1. and May 26. I195)1. in iDOD Pentagon incn who were illicitly bey'ond tle airfield

PaPers. Ilk 10 477-82 and 487-93 perimeter and held themn prisoner uintil

5. Eisenhower. Mandlate for Change, p 361 Augtist 31I

6 Fal Street Without Jor. pp 109-230: 13 ibid. pp 117-19. lust. Assi for Mutual

lEisenhosser. M1andate for Chanige. p 3K8 Eden Security. LISAI-. JtiI-LDe 54. pp 23-24. I-h:Al-

'Ventirs. p 149: Public Pap~ers of the Presth',uts. Staff Section Motmhly [list Rpris. 1)ep Ops.

Divight D. Eisenhower, 1954, pp 599-600 JuIlDcc54.hlust. CurrOps, I\. Augaid Sep 54.

7 iacouture and Devilrs. L a Im dtne list. 315th Air lDiv(Combat Cargo). Jtml-lDcc54.

Guerre. pp 252-68; Ary Vandenboseli and pp 3247

Richard A Ilttwell. Souttheast Al na anionig tie 14 I-atr East 1-orces Support oll- reni I id,-

Wlorli Powers (L~exingioti. 1957). pp 295-97. China Operations. pp 239-48. itr, Hlooper to

Chester L Cooper. ilte Lost Crus~ade: Anterta Gunderson. Deec 20. 1972

tin Vietniam (New York. 19701). pp 90-91 Secalso IS I-ar Last Air IPorces Support oh I-rcrich

Robert P. Ranidle, Geneva 1954 The Settlement Indo-China Operations. pp 248-5I. 27(1-74: US

of the irochniese Waor (Princeton. 1969). pp D)ept of Staie. Ameiiricain Foreigni Polo i. 1950-

371-85 19.55. p 2399

8 Lacotttre and lDcvillers. La Fini tI'1ie 16 Rpri. Hewitt to1 SECDII Apr 6'. 1954,

Guerre. pp Z52-68. Ilearings before thie Stib- 17 FFAI' Iiitel Rotuidtip. Aug 54. pp 5-Il.

comimittee on the I-a r East and the Pacific of the 18 Gen Gi J M4 Cliassin. 'I essomis ol tile

Committeeott Foreignt Affairs. [louse of Repre- Wur in Indochina."hineravit. VII ( 1952). 670-75

sentative,. United States Polo's Thuiarl ,lsia. 19 Eisenhlower. Mandlate for Chiange. pp

89th Cong. 2d sess (Washington. 1906). pt 2. pp 372-71, Pub/is Papers of the PresidettsEisen398-99 In its final form. thle Geneva agreements hie. 1954. p 168

comprised separate naimary accords for Viet- 20 ILacoutre amid lDcs ilers. La /in dU11ie

nam. l.aos. aitd Cambodia. ain unsigned final Giterre. pp 298-99: lISA I' ,Air intellugeni e

declaration of the ntations tepresented at Geneva Digest. I-eb 55. ppi 36-37. lDasid llialberstaiu.

amid several unilateral national declarations The itaAig of a Quagmnire (Ness York. 1965).

9 P'eter kv Ctirl. ed. lDos-unent onl ,lniri- pp 38-39

290
Notes to Pages 35-40

21 lbo. Appe.ilI ~iade.* .1 l22. 1954. sI uoted %l e%% %%ul oh Cij I a%% toil Collins1 What Were

in B~ernad1 I) all. ed. I/o Cht Moth on Revolu- D~oing in I ndo-China." IS Nutt% & W Iorid

itotNs York. 1967), p 272 Repiort. Mar 4. 1955, pp 82-88. 1 SA FAtr iti22. Public Paper% of the~ Presiden.s Liv en- ligenie Digest. I ell 55. p 38.

hoter. 1954. p 108. Dept ol State. Anmernean 32 HIist, Assi I or MIutualI Securit\, USA 1-.

Foreign Policv. 19.50-1955. pip 2401) Jan'-i un 55. pp 1 46-50. NIACV. MIilitary. Assist2',. State ment (il Policy by the National anee. pp 2-5. 1)01) P'entagon I'ap~er Ilk 2

Security Council onl Re% ies of U1 S. Policy in the I V A.4 

. 6.

Far laIi. Aug 20. 1954. in 1)01) Pentagon Pal)- 33 Mtemo. Col EdwardG( I.ansdale for SEA

erm Ilk 10 7.31-41 Suibcommittee of the IDraper Committee. Mar

24 Curl. Docwnents. 1954, pp 3 19-23. Dept 13. 1959. US Air Force Acaiderm Orail History

of State. Am ,erican Foreign I'oli. 1950-1955. Prograim ilmw with Mat Gen Edss ard I ansdale.

pp 2334-37. FEAI- Intel Roundup. Jan 66. pp Apr 25. 1971, Edward G I.ansdale i the Midsvt

12-13. anid Apr 55. p 25: lusts. IDir plan%. of II 'art An: A terwaiA A\ moon to Southeast

USAF-. ul-Dec 54. pp 57-59. and Jul-IDcc 56. pp 4lna (New York. 1972).

138-39. IDep Ops. Pacific AlP. A Pacific Air 34. IR-163-55. Mi,l Saigon. Oct 21. 1955:

Force Staff Study. Sep 55. in lust 

P5A F. utl-Dee (IS D~ept of State. Amterican Foreign Policv.

55. pt 11, D~oe 21. Statemet of Policy by the Current 1)oi unients. 1956 (W\ashitngton. 1959).

National Security Council ott Review of U S. pp 859-63: Hearings before the Committee onl

Policy ia thte 1-ar East. Aug 20. 1954. I-oreign Affair%. Hbouse of Represeittaties.

25 l.trs. [)title% to Charles E Wilson. iutitlSeettrvAct of /955. 84th Cong. Nss

SECI)EI. Aug 18 .ind Oct 11. 1954: memios. (Washington. 1955). pp 190.91

Ilsiing for SIECDEF. Aug 4. 1954. and Rad- 35. [IQ CINCPAC. Record. Second

ford for SECI)EF. Sep 22. 1954. and Oct 19. SECI)FF Conference. Jain IS. 1962. Itemn 5:

1954. in 1) Pe'ntagon Pap~ers. Ilk 10 701.02, DOD Pentagoni Papierv. Ilk 2- IV A.4 

. 22-23

728-30. 756,-58, 768.89. and 771-74. 36 lDep Ops. I'AF. A Paiifli Air Force

26. M ACV. Atlitarv A snnaaice. pp 2-5, lost. Staff Studi' on Mt1DA, P~ir Force Olnectivev for

Dir Plantis.(USA I-. Jul-l)c54. pp 62-65. miemo. Title- I// Countries alIite Pact/i' C'omm~and.

Radford for SECI)EF. Sep 22. 1954. in DOD Se-p 55

Pentagon Papers. Ilk 10. 756-58. 37 1/nd

27 Ltr. Dualles to Wilson. Aug 18. 1954. in 38. Memo. Itwining for SrCDEF. Sep 9.

1)01 P'entagoni Plapers. Ilk 10 728-30. MACV. 1955. in DOD0 Pentagon I'aperv. Blk 10' 100)2-I5

Mi/itari' Asmince to the Republii' of South 39 Der't of State. ,l oeruan F'oreigni Po/ii'i'

V'ietnia, pp 2-5. Hlearings before the Subeoto- I1950-/955. p 2404, Cole. Conflict in Indeo-China.

mittee ott State Department Organi/atinn and pp 226-27

Public Affairs of the Committee onl I oreign 40 Ilist. IDir Plans. USA I-. Jul-lDec 55.

Relatins. US Senate. Situation in itetnamn. pp 81-84.

86th Cong. 1st sess (Washington. 059). pt 1. 41 /nil. DOI) Penttagoni Pap~ers. Ilk 2

p 49: Robert Scigliano. South It'etnamn: Nationi I V A 4.. 20

undter Streis (Ioston. 1964), pp 162-67 42 Ilist Dir Plans. USAF. Jul-lDee 55.

28 [list. Dir Plans. USAF, Jul-IDec 54. pp 81-84: "WhN the UIS is I osing in Vietnam

pp 62-25: memno. Radford for SECDEF O~ct 19. Ani Inside Story, Iiiterview w%-ih Former Chief I 1954. in 1)01 Pentagon Papers. Ilk 10: 768-74. UIS Military Advisor. I.t Gen Sainuel I see also DOD) Pentagon Plapers. Ilk I IV A 4 . Williams (Ret)." t.S. News & World Rep~ort. 3-6 No% 9. 19(A. pip 62-63

29. Publhic Pap)ers of the Preenitv: Dsen- 43 I/nd. hearings betorca ucmiteo

Iioier, 1954. pp 948-49. R Frank Futrell. the Committee on (Joerninentl Operations.

-Chronology of Significant Airpower E'.nts in Hlouse of Represenitaties. Foreign ,l ConlSoutheast Asia. 1 954-I1967." Aerospace Studies stcton~ I'rolects. 85th Cong 2(1 sess (WashingInstitute. Air University. Journal of *,tarv' til. 1958), pp 872-73

,Issivance. /954 44 U S Nes & World Rep~ort. No% 9. 1964.

30 Statement of policy by the NP' onal pp 63.64. mntlo Capt 11 A Robbins.J .I USN.

Secuirity Council onl Ct rent UI S. Polie in the Ma; 10. 1957. in DOD1 Pe-ntagon l'apers. Ilk 10'

Far East. [)ec 22. 1954, in 1)01) entagon 1106-07, UJSA F Journal of Mutual Sc'urt I. 

X

Plapers. IBk 10' 835-52. Public PapIers of the (Jul 1, 1957). 128. and XI (Nov 1. 1957). 117

Preseidets,&senlioiter. 1954. pp 948-49, lDcpt 45 Memno. SECI)FI- for SA. et tl. Jul 16.

of State. Amoericutn Foreign Polict, 1950-1955. 1956. anid Statement of Policy onl U S9 Policy in

p 2403: lusts. FIA F IDep I ntel. Jan 55. w incl. Mlainland Southeast Asia. Sep 5. 1956. in D01)

and Feb 55. w incl. Penitagon. I'apers. BlK 10- 1004. 1082-95

31. Curl. Documients. 1954. pp 237-38: "Inter291
THlE AD)VISORY YEARS Notes to Pages 41-46

C'haplet I 

V

U.S ('omulild Prohh'Ins ill the Pecific: Emphasis ol .Sowheav~ AI 'a

I (,en I S ie.Citt tdad(trl G (en I-red NI D~ean itlook (- ini itd o1 Air I .i4

ilt Asia-Pa.uefic Area." I eclure to Air War Col. I oree I I liealo became Checf. Air Faorce Seelege. 'Mar 6. 1956 tion. I amian IDetenr Command and NIilitar\

2 Ili t, Dir P'la n%. I.1

SAI J ail- l int 54. p 13. AdI tsor\ Group II ~tea~iovIueit~0

and Jul. Iee 53. pp 32-3?: hist. PA I. J uI-IDec te iroceSinade oprational ltne54. pp 1-9. ni~g. CONIPAl- to COM FIEA., tioit% o1 Air I a-k l-orce 13 came under a srigle

N\ 30. 1955.mi Ii..A .II-ee5,p I. Doe amihorit een though sepirate coit ntaid cltanit

101. fir, Kute ito C IN CIT, Jul 11, 1955 nek t\ere preseied I or the tvolutiiio Jacob

31 Ilist. F-FA1-. Jan-.Iun 55. Ill. limt Rprt. Vait Staamereit. Air Opt'raiio in ath i/T'antan

Dir I'laithanid Pohec\. 1-eb 55. tist. PAPI.Jani- (rim~ of 1958. I. 'SA I 1imtorical IDui~isi I atJm 55. aid Niar-Jul 55 %ontOfiee. No\ 2. pp 11.12. ts. A l1I31 I').

4 A NI I- PA Area I I I MAl 11 ogtmtte Cont. Jani-Jtn 58. pp 3-14. itd .1 tl-DIec 58. p 17. antd

No\ 14-M9 1950. pp 44-48 I~tht Al-. JuI-IDee pp 55-56

5 Ilist. A MC. .l-Iee 55S. 1. chap 1. 1qt. 17 Ilist, PACAI I AlI (Rear), Jat-Jutt

AMP I-PA. Oct 1. 1956-Juit 30. 1957. pp 1 3-2S 57, 1. 1. Killer "llhe I'acidi Air F ores- Ai~r

0 Nisia. CONI PAlI- to 'ONI FTA I 

. N o\ 30. 1 orce (Oct 57). p) 61. Ity.ir P'lans. I'SAI.

1955 Jai-.unt5g.p I(X):It.r. KutertoClNClFE.JuI II.

7 [list. PA I'. .lul-lDee 55. 11. 72-99 1955. tist. PIAI-..Iait-.un 56. Ill. 522-27. Iti,-

8 Ibid. .Idn-.lun 56. 1. D~oc 25: Iiitt rprt. Sotiitlt to CINCPIAC. Not 27. 1956 IhcIteSA 10

Dit lIttel. Dote 6. 1-eb 17. 1956 Air I iitk F\ereise hteld at Bantigkok in NMa\ 1957

9. II -t 

. P AI*. Jani-Jtn 56. 1. 35. Itist 

. ditttlredfite 1>tit 0iteteqi.

PAC(Al' I- FAl- Rear. J1ul-Dlec 56. Ill. D~oc 10. ntents. an itle exerene %eit poorly Memto. Lt

AMN F PA I tile MI DA P) 1 ogistie Cott lali- Col 1) \ Clark. R pri at Stall \'t~it. I )c 6. 1957

kawi. l1tt 7-Mva\ 10. 19.56. attdi laguto. p.1 

. itll it. 5tht Al , .lant..un 58. Ili. App 99. imt.

No\ 14-19. I1956 ~ 31S~th Air D~i\ (Cottbat Cargot), .IanttJut 57, 10 Killer. "Cottuanid anid Cointrol itt Asia- N A NIAl. Asiani-MA P I ogistie Cait lOee 58.

Pacilte Area p 45S

I Ifid, . ho. PACA I- -E Al' Rea r. ill- 18 Coman ad ReIa tionit Caonept% of

D,:e 56. 11. 96-97. Itist. IDir P'lans. USAl'.h .l~. C'INCPACAFI- Aug. 21. 1957. itt I hit. IACAl 

. Jun 56. ppl 2(0-21 Jtil-Dlec 57. 11. PAl' Ftrttl Rprt Atr Attachte12 II ott. Dir Pliant. U.SA I-. Jutl-Dee 56. %I AAG Cotti. No% 4-8. 1957. Iittrodtuction

pp 90.91. antd 141-42. and .IattJtin 57. p I1 

. 19 loit. lDir Pliat%. IOSAI-. JuI-lDec 56.

bitt. I-AC Al- I-hl- Rear. JtiI-Iee 56 I p - 1383

106-07 p0 PAA- I8-391-t 5 15 13 Kutter. "Commitanid antd Cotitrol in tle 21PCA'It -. Jil5.95

Astt.Pateific Area". htr. Kitler to CI N ClH'. Juld 21 Robert IF Ftitrell. Idiots. Comnepi..u boH.- 1955. ilt IIitt I-Al- hi i-J tn 55. I, pt 11, irait A iitiori' of &u( 1hinking ini the I it~ed

Chtap 3. Doce% 3 anid 4: Itst. lDir Platt. USA I-. Staiti Ail Iw 

. 19,17 1964 ( Air I nier-il

Jati-Jtiit 56. pp 54 aitd 56:Iiit. PA'A I- lEA 1' Aerospace .Stutite imttlt. 1971). I, 406-08

(Rear). Jai-Jtii 57. 1, 1 22 [lit. l-iftlt AI-. .lai-Jti 58. I. 901-100:

14 I' P Al- Sttid It aAug 6. 1956) in PAPl Rettt~irk ,of lt (ii Fredleric II Sititt.Jr 

- Na%

I- le. Iliteater R corga ittatuott. C oitponit 8 98 i bd-IV p l e.Aoii

p Cotttntommttders Rzxoittitndatioiv J u I Iee 58. 1. 140-51.- I- ift 1. Al 

. Atomtic

I 5. Ili ts. I'ACA 1I-I H-I- IReairItl. De-1.c Wcapoat itt I ittied Wars ilt Sotihatt Asta.

56. 11, 10)2-03. antd l)ir Plats. I SAl. JuI-lDee flill 22, 1958, Sithl. "Ntuclear Weapott anid

56. pp 87-89 I intttttd War." .1 Univerni t Quarierli Ret',t'tt

10 CINCPAC Inttr 1030201.2. Juit 20. 1957; XI I (Sprittg 1960). 3.27

PAI I -inal R prt (Air -Attache D~i\). Air Attachte- 23 lI Iertitgsbefttcie eStibeontutiittee ofIlte

MAA(; Cotif. No\ 4-8. 1957. pp I-C-6 aitd C'oitttttitieoit Appropriatioto. llttoe ttf RepreIl-lISlighttly differeitt front the othter% attd s.eitatt\es. Mutual Set uitt AIlpporuzoi for

later intrtoduced itto Vietntamt \%as te itodel itt 1961 (andl ReliedI genut le). 86tht Cattg. 2d se%%,

Iaa Ovdi i Marcht IS. 1958. tile hecadqtarter- of I Watltigtot 19t60). pt 2. p 2486

tilie L iman itDefense Comtitantd aitd otf tile 24 DO(D IAnntual Report of die Secretary ttf

NI on-ltdttd A I ele -a td tO ~ iiI Ma Defetse. J1ul I1. 1958, to Itti 30, I1959 kw hiltS292
Notes to Pages 46-53

ton. 1960). pp 35-46. in%. IIACAF-. tJu-[)ec 58. 31 NAMAI). rprr of5rh Asrani-MIAl). .ogis1. pt 1. 172-75 tic Coot. Nov 59. p 353: lust. AssI for Murtial

25 CINCPAC ist. 19W4. pp I and 3 Seturt,t~ USAF. Jan-Jun 60. ni.p .and .lan-Jurn

26 Misg. PAC'Alto CSAI-. PF-CCS-61-7-3. 62. pp 35-36

Jul 12. 1961. hist. 315th Air IN (Combat 32. flust. A I FP:A.. Jul . 1959-NIar 31.1960l.

Cairgo). Jan-Jun 62. PP 53-54: George F. II. App 18.[Dec9. 1959: hist. I'ACAIF.Jatri-Jun

Lermer. 77w Laos Crisis of 1959 (Office of Air 60. 111. PFMIlI las.s Apr 60. w aicli. Apr 17.

Force History. 1961). pp 39-49 1900. and May 60. w arch: Iit Col Willrim G.

27. 115Senaite. If moialt Secoriti ,liof 1959. Beno. "How to Iniprose the USAF Portion of

86th Cong. Ist sess. pt 1. pp 5. 10-11. and 19-20. the Military Assistance Program in Southeast

28 NANIAI. Asian-MAPI .ogisrics Conf. Asia.-( I hesis. LISA WC. Apr 60).

Dece 58. pp 45 1-53. 33. PACAF Ref 1Bk for Jan 62 SECDEF

29 N '\MAP. 5thr Asian-MII l.ogisties Conf. lab I5F. Counr Force Imabalance:

Conf. No\ 59. pp 67-71 NAMAI'. rprr of 5th Asian-MAI' l.ogistic

30. Ibid.. pp 69.71: NAMIAI Asian-MAP Conf. Nov 59. pp 53-58 and 61-62.

l~ogisticConf. D~ec 58. pp 456-58: l.enmmcr. The 34 I'ACAF Ref B3k for Jan 62 SEiCDEF

Laos Crisis of 1959. pp 39-49: rprt . Air Vice Conf. 1ab 15F: Country Force Imbalance.

Marshal Kamol 'I liqatuinga. R*I A F. and Mar NAMAI'. rprt of 5th Asian-MAPI l.ogisric

Gen Thomas S Moorman. UiSAF. to Clh Conf. Nov 59. p 353.

SEA 10 Mil PlIng Ofe. %far 23. 1959. p 2

CHAPTER V

Strained Cis'il-A'Iilitar)- Relations in South Vietnam, 195 7-1960

1. DI) Pentagon Papere 13k 2 IV A.4.. 24- Smith. Comndr P'At, to CINCI'AC. Nov 27.

31: U'S. News & Wortl Rep~ori. Nov 9. 1964, 1956: Robbins mecmo. M~ay 15. 1957; hist.

p 63: OAS).ISA. MAP. FY 1962-66. Sep 1, PACAP FEAF Rear. Jan-Jun 57. II: [list Sun.

1960. lDir Plans arid Policy. Apr 57. hist Asst for

2. NAIMAP. Asian-MIAP I.ogistic Con. lDec Muntial Securty. US AP. Jan-Jun 57. App:

58. pp 154-60 t SA F Journal of Ahtual Securitr. X (Jult 1.

3. Himt. Dir plans. U~SAF. Jul-IDec 55. 1957). 106. and (Aug 1. 1957). 131

pp 62-65: hist. Asst for Mtual Securrs. LISAP. 7 Background Paper on Viernan. prepared

Jan-Jun 55. pp 146-SO.,\MACV. Mfilttari-,13sist- by Maj Will'arm I.. Nicholson. III. IIQ I'ACA.

once. pp 2-5. rprr. Collins for SECS'lIA IT. Jan (a Jan 62. Robbins mrrrio. May I5. 1957.

20. 1955. in DOI) Pentagon P1prs. Bk 10-865- 8 USA F Jornat of iMutual Securai. Xl

84. U.S Neiia & lWorkl Rep~ort. Mlar 4. 1955. (\o\ 1. 1957). 131. NAMAP. Asian-MAP)

pp 82-88. I.ogsitic Conf. lDec 58. pp 154.60: :iist. Asst for

4 lust%. Asst for Mutual Securit). USAF. Mutual Security. USAF. Jul 'cc 58. n.p.:

Jan-Jun 55. p 146. Jul-lDec 55. pp 33-34. Jan- IIACAP Curr Intel Surm. Oct 21 05~9. p 9

Juni 58. rip. 1)01) Pentagon Pap~ers. Bk 3: 9 LISAPSurmary of MDAP and Progres.

IV.B..125: A NITA. Itie Ill MI)AP I.ogistic No 42. Dec 31. 1955. p 99: IACAF Base DevelConf. May 7-10. 1956. p 303: lust. I'At-. Jan- opnicnt Plan.Jul I5.1l90.App2.'labG:rprl of

Jun 50. Ili. 527. Dep Ops P&R 'lean to Comdr I'AF. Jan 2.

5 IR-223-54. AIRA Saigon. D~ec I5. 1954. 1956: USA FJournial of iMutual Secuirif i. VII I

lIR.149-55. AIRA Saigon. Sep IS 1955: VNAP. (Sep 1. 1956). 137. and IX (Dec 1, 1956). IO4and

Welcome to Vietnam'. 'pp5.5: Secord. "Hie 126.

Viet-Nani Air Poice. pp 60-61: FEAP Intel 10. .See Dept of State. Amiericanr F-oreign PotRoundup. Apr 55. pp 21-24: AMF'A Area Ill or. Current Documents, 1958. pp1 120-121

MAI) I~ogisteConf May 7-10.1I956. p 303.and I I Cong Rer. May 9. 1968. pp 12615.16

Nov 14.19. 1956, p 314. rprt of Dep1Ops R&R 12. FutrellChron" rd. CNCPACto DIA.

leant to Conrdr PA-.J.ar 3. 1956: hist. Assi for Mar 63: DOD) Pentagon Papyerr Bk 2: 24,43

Mutail Security. USAP, Jan-Jun 58. ri~p I). Ibid. pp 68-70

6 AMI:PA. Area Ill MAP'. logistic Conf. 14 Lerirer. 77we Iaov Crisis of 1959. p 40.

Nov 14-19. 1956. p 312. NAMAP. Asian-MAI) tro. JCS for Dep Asst SECI)EF for NSC

I ogit Coirf. lec 58. p 154, htr. Maj Gen Sory Affairs arid P'lans. Jul 14. 1959. in DOD

293
THE ADVISORY YEARS Notes to Pages 53-59

Pentagon Papers%. Blk 10 1215. Hearing% before AI)VO\ to PACA F. Jan 13. 1962. telephotne

the Comit tfee onl Appropriationts, US Senate. consersation. Itrell an id Col Iliars e% Bross n.

Mutual Set urit Appropriations for 1960 (and tUSAF (Ret). Sep 28. 1972

RelatedAgencies). 86th Cong. 1st sess(Washtng- 29 US Senate. Mtlual Set urni Appropniatoil. 1959). p SlI tions for 1960. 86th Cong. I st scss. p 510. see

15 [IQ MI ACV. "Inflilt ration Stud% .- I-older also Operations C'oordinating Board. R prt onl

Vietnian. No% 1-30. 1965. 69A-3853. box 34 Southeast Asia. Aug 12. 1959. and SNIF 68-2-

16 Ha Ibersta in. Mlakinug of a Quagmire. 59. 1 lie Situation tin I aom, Sep 18. I 95X tin 1)0D

pp 63-64: misg. Anifirb Saigon to D)A. 278. Pentagon 11apirv. Ilk 10 1238-39. 1242-47

Mar 7. 1960. tin D)01 Pentagon Plaperv. 13k It) 30 ~Declaration onl Gratiing Indepeindence

1260: Cong Rec. May' 9. 1968. p 12616 to Colonial Cottntriesaitd Pecoples." Khruvhchev

17. Ibid tin Neii Y'ork (New York. 1961). p 90. Hearing

I8 HQ MACV. Stun of Highlights. Febl 8. before ithe Subcomnittee to Insestgate tlte

1962-Feb 7. 1963. p 21. Administration of the Itnternail Secsirit Act andt(

19 Memo. Lansdale for IDrapei Committee. Internal Scitrits Laws of the Comittee onl the

Ma-r 13. 1959: Robert Scigliano. South J'n'iin. J udietary.- US Senate. .Anat ti of itie

Nation Under Stress (Boston. 1964). p 179. Khrus/w/wv Speech of Janiuari 6, 1961. 87th

Williams "Interview". CINCPAC Rerd. Secotnd Cong. Ws sess (Washington. 1961). pp 64-65.

SECDEF Coztf. Jain I5. 1962. itemn 5A 77.78

20. M AC% Itist monograph. Militarr Asosi- 31 Cotig Rec.MNa% 9. 1968. p 12617. NIACV

anic to the Republic of South Vitetniam. pp 6-7. lhst monogra ph. lltari A svistant e to the

9-Il. NIACV. Stin of Highlights. F-eb 8. 1962- Republi of South Vitetnian. pp 9-Il. hDotglas

Feb 7. 1963. pp 46-49. DOD1 Pentagon Paper%. Pike. IViet (tng 7he Orgainiaton antI Tet /-

Blk 3- I V. 113 125. itiqites of National iberaion 11ront of South

21 Msg. herucmtr ~o JCS. May F. 1961: l'ietman (Cambridge. Mass . 1966). p 79

Jountpal of Mtutal,1 snsi:ance. Ju tn 61 32 US1 A l .Iournuil ol Mtual Amnitite.

22 IPACAF Ref Ilk for Jan 62 SECI)EF X I II (hDee 63)). 149. Buttinger. 'izetiam. 11. 990.

Conf. Tab 6A\: CINC'"AC Colli Ilist. 1961. 33 Arthur I- Schlesinger. Jr. A 7housandI

pp 172 and 174-75: Scigino. South Vi~etniam,. 1)as (Bostotn. 1965). p 450. Robert Shaplen.

pp 164-65. UISA F Journal of Mutual Securiti'. Men Lost Revolustion (New York. 1965). p 149.

XII I (Dec 60). 149. See also insg. Anmintrb Sai- Maj WVilliam 1. Nicholson. Ill. Background

gon to SlECSTA'IE. 276. Jan 4. 1961. in 1)OD paper onl Vietnam. (-a. Jan 62. Schneider rprt.

Pentagon Papers. Blk 10 1357-59 p~resentation by (Git Mooriman before Congres.

23. M aj Gen iiilicod ore R Miton. "Atir siotial Commiiittee.I. I-Il: lust.1I3iIi A F-.J til- 3c

Power. hiqualiir in Sotteast Asia." Aitr Unt- 61.1. 107-0K Intelligence Estimate. SVN. (a Oct

v'erstil Review. Nov-IDee 63. p 4. 1. 1961. in luist. 2d AI)VON. Nov 61-Oct 62. 1.

24. USAIF Journal of Muhtual Set unritr. X II D~oe IS

(Sep 59). 164-55 34 Cong Re(,. May' 9. 19M, pp 12617-IS.

25 IPACAF Ctmrr Intel Sumn. Oct 23. 1959. Pike. V'iet Cong. paiioi IDosgla% Pike. War.

pp 9-10, lust. Asst for Mtitual Sectirity. USAF. P'ete. and the Pitet Cong (Camnbridge. Mas

Jan-Jum 60. imp., lust. IIACAF. JtiI-Dcc 60. 111; 1969). pp 1-18

Wkly Activities Rprts. PFMI.P., May 22-26amd 35 Presentation by Gen Moormian before

Oct 10-14. 1960: isg, Cl NCIAC to h)IA. Mar Conig Commiuttee. I. I -11, Maj William11 I

13, 1963; PACAF Referetice Book for Oct 8. Nicholson. 111. uaekgrouid P'aper on Vietnam.

1962. SECDEF Conf. Vietriam Sc. Tab 4 ca Jan 02, Schneider -pr

26 I[list. Asst for Mutual Security. USAF. 36 Arthur I IDommren. ('onltit it Laos.

Jul-Dec 60. np.. [list. I'ACAFI. Jan-Jtin 61. Ill. The Polities of Aeutrali:atit~ (New York. 19(A).

Wkly Activities Rprt. PFMI.P. Feb 27-Mar 3. p 175. Fifth AlF Wkly Intel Brief. Jan 11. 1961.

1961 37 lDsstglt I) Finoser. The WIhtite Ilinie

27. Rprt of UJSAF Asian MAP Logistices Years Wlagtng Peate. 19-56-1961 (Garden Cit\.

Confs. No% 1-3. 1960. pp 254-55. ist. PACA F. 1965). p 60?. L~yndon B3. Johnson. 7The lVatage

Jul-Dec6I. Ill: WkIyActivities Rprts. PF1MlIlP. Point (New York. 1971). p 5I. Schlesinger.

Jul 24.28 and Sep 18-22. 1961. rprt. Col E'dwin lhtuand flavs. pp 163-(A.

A Schneider. Asst for MAP. PACAF. to 38 Memo. Clark Clifford for thme Presidett

CINCPIACAF. Oct 25. 1961 subJ- Conf ottJan 19. 1961. dated Sep 29. 1967.

UAWbi.: intvw w Capt D~onald V MacKellar tin DOD1 Pentagon Papers. Blk 10 1369-4.

by J1 W Grainger. Aug 29. 1903: insg. 2d

294
Notes to Pages 63-67

Chapter VI

Initial Challenges and Actions

1, Special Message to the Congress on the Coi.'mttee on Appropriations. US Senate. I-orD~efense Budget. Mar 28.1I96I. in Pubic Papers eign Is',istance and Related Agenciev Appi

of the Presidents: John F. Kennedy, 1961. priat mn% for 1962. 87th Cong. 1st sess (Wash-

(Washington. 1962), pp 229-40. ington,. ,I). Pli 112-13 and 135-37z Henry F-.

2. AF-XOPJ Book of Actions it, SEA. 1961- Graff, " leach-In on Vietnam." New Y'ork Thnes

64, No. 6.4995-52-. Charles II. Ilildreth. USA F itaga:ine. Mar 20. 1966. pp 130-3 1: CQ BackCoupierinsurgenwt Donctineu.% and Capabilities, ground. China and U.S. lbar East Police. 1945-

1961-1 962 (USAF [list D)iv Liaison Ofc. Feb 67. p 104: Stebbins. Docinents. pp 311-18:

64). pp 1-3*, Presenitation to the USAF Scientific Domimen. Conflict in L~ao.%, p 188. lust, I

5

ACAF.

Advisory Board on the Subject of Counterin- Jtil-lDee 61. 1. pt 2. 13-18: lust. IDir Plans.

%urgency by Brig Gen Adriel N. Williams. Apr USAF. Jul-Dee 61, pp 184-88: 5th AF Intel

24. 1962: US Dept of State Bulletin 57. 280-8l1. Brief. Apr 5, 196h: Hearings beforethe Commit3. Maxwell 1). Taylor. Swvordv and Plow- tee on F-oreign Relations. US Senate. Foreign

shareA (News York. 1972). p~p 197 and 220: Assotatwi Act of 1962. 87th Cong. 2d sess

Ftitrell. "Chron -(Washington. 1962). pp 349-50 and 370

4. Richard M. Nixon. "Cuba. Castro and I I I-list. Dir Plans. U)SAF. Jul-Dec 61. pp

John F'. Kennedy'." Readert's Digest. Nov 64. pp 184-88: Belden Intvw with LceMay. Jul 1972.

290-92. 12. Publn Paper.% of the Presidents;: Ken5. lDommen. Conflict in Laos%. pp 192-95: twile. 1961.pp533. 580.and 656: Annual Report

lust. Dir Plans. USAF. Jan-Jun 61. pp 78-81. of the D~ept of D~efense. Fiscal Year 1962. p 56.

Hearings before the Committee on Foreign 1 3. Jacob Van Staaveren. LUSA F Plain andi

Relations. US Senate. international Develop- Policii's in South V'ietnamt. 1961-1963 ( USAF

inent and Securit v,87th Cong. l st scss (Washing- Hlist ivt Liaison Ofe. Jtin 65). p 6: CINCI'AC

ton. 1961). pt 2. p 682: 5th AF Intel Brief, May Comd Ilist. 1961. pp 174-74,, memo. Pres

16 and 23. 19%61. Kennedy for SECSTAI U3 and SECDI)E. Jan

6. Ilist. 1'ACAF-. Jan-Jun 61. 111 Hist Rprt 30. 1961.and msg State- Defe nse-I SA toSaigon.

A-2. Apr 61. hist. 315th Air Div (Combat 1054. Feb 3.1901. in DOI) Pentagoni Papers. Bk

Cargo). Jan-Jtin 61. App 0: CINCPAC Comd 11 13-l6:rad.CINCPIACtol)iA. Feb 5. 1961.

ist. 1961. pt 2. pp 89-90: Schlesinger. Thou- 14. Ilderal Register. No% 10. l960. pp 10731-

sand l)ais. p336:, Richard P). Stebbinsed. D~oc- 3: Dept of State Bulletin 45. 993-94.

uinent% on Aminecan F'oreign Relations. 1961 I5 USAl F Journal of Mtutual Secura t. Mar

(New York. 1962). pp 306-10: lDommen. Con- 61 If Vietnamese pilots were sometimes less

ffint in Laos. pp 192-95. than enthusiastic about flying or fighting, it ssas

7. US Senate. lnterntional Developmient because they lacked the protection of insurance.

antI Security. 87th Cong. 1st ses. pt 2. p 649: death benefits, and disability pcinsions. I hey

Schlesinger, Thouvand Dais%. pp 337-39: might hope that their families or clans would

CINCPAC Comd Hist. 1961. pt 2. p 93: hist. protect their survivors if they %%ere killed or

lDir Plans. USAF. Jan-Jun 61. pp 78-8 1. injured. btit even so. a loss of life or a crippling

8 D~ept of State. Memo of Conversation on itjuryliad conseqtience,, beyond thoscan AmerLaos. Apr 29. 1961. in DOI) Pentagon Papers. jean might iagine on the basis ofhis own situaBk 11.62-00. Hecarings before the Subcommittee tion. Vietnamese pilots and aiicrews flying in

of the Committee on Appropriations. [louse of combai exposed their families to haiards of a

Representatises. D~epartment of Defetnse Appro- most sobering variety. Kenneth Sams. llisiorr

priatiotzs for 1963. 87th Cong. 2d sess. (Wash- of the Second Ahir Dis'iion. Jul-lDec 64. 111.42

ington. 1962). pt 2. pp 354-56. 16. LISAFJouirtial olf utual. Secuzrity. Mar

9. Dept of State, Memo of Conversation on 61

Laos. cited above: ltr. O'Donnell to LceMay. 17 DOD) Pentagon Papers. Bk 2.30: NationMay 22. 1961,.in hist. PACAF..lan-Jun 61. 1, pt al Intelligence Estimate. May 59. Researeh

2. 13-I5 Analysis Corp.. "U.S. Army Special Forces

10. 1 heodore C. Sorenson. Kentiedv (New Operationsutnder the Ciian Irregular Defense

York. 1965). pp 644.45: Schlesinger. Thousand Grotips Program in Vietnam. 1961-64"

IDavs. pp 337-39: DOD) Pentagon Papers. Blk 2: (Mcl.ean. Va . 1966). p 26: JCS History. pp

IV.B. I., 6-7. Taylor, pp 197, 220: Futrell. 201-03. '1 lie police consisted of approximately

"Chron"; Public Papers of the Presidents: sesenty-fise hundred Bureau of Insestigation

Kennedy, 1961, pp 438,444. Hearings before the and ten thousand five hundred municipal police295
I HE ADVISORY YE:ARS Notes to Pages 67-73

men who %%~ere in the cities anwid not as ailablc to (is e. Niento I or thle Record. Ma% 22. 196 1. mel to

deal with insurrection in rural areas A CIA JICS 1992 994-. ntsg. A I-XOI) to PACAF. May

%ursey in December 1961 feported that the secutr- 19. 1961

ity forces in the fourteen province.,,needed train.- 321 CINCI1

AC Coind Ilist. 1961, pp 172-74

Ing in professiona~l fundamental-,.'] hie f ollow~ing 33 1)01) Pentagon P'aper%, I11k 2 16

January. the Bureaui of Ins estigation ail' lte 34 Grafll. "I each-lin onl Vietna in." r) 131

police \\ere combined. JCS Hitstory. 1954-59, p Rusk had recom mentded onl May' 5. 1961, that

96; DOD Pentagon Papers, Bk 2: 23: R V~ the United States refrain from Placing combat

Komer. "'ile Malaya n Emnergency in Rtetro- fo.-ces Mn South Vietnam See I esy Menmo for

spect." The RAND Corp. 1972. p 38: Status Recoid. May 5. 1961.111 101)1Pentagon Paper%,

R~prt onl Cosert Actions in Vietnam, lDec 28, Ilk 11 67-68

1961: Status I prt oil I nstrution,, to Nolting. 35. Status, R prt onl Cosert Actiotns in VietJan 11,- 1962. nlai.Jtin 01. p I5h

18. M1 ACV lust monograph. Atilitart- %t vvn 36 Ilite Kennedy Comitments atnd Pro.

ate -to the Relic ltof Sot/a I 'inaui. pp 9-Il graini. 1961. pp 58.061

Fifth Al- Wklv Intel Brief. Mar 22. 1961: Pubhu 37, Ilist. lDir Plan'. USA I-. Jan-.Itn 61. lp

lazpwr. olfthe iPremtulint: Kennied. 1961. ppl 31. 44. 169-70

340). 3$ Jo'int Action Prograimi by the V'iet \,kil19. A Pi ogra ni of Action. Apr 26. 1961. U Inited Staites Special Finantcial Girotip, in 1)01)

20. CINCPAC Comd Ilist. 1961. pp 169-70: Pentagon Pape,-%, Blk 11 182-226

5th Al: Wklv IBrief. May 11. 196 1; PACA I- Ref 39 Note b\ Secys to JCS on Presidentiail

Bk for Dec 61 SECDEF Conf, Tab B. /-B: rad. l'rograin. " ' 43 i2, Aug IS, 1961.1p 42. [-older

U K 70272. May 8. 1961: USAFiournala ofMill- " Policy -Viet nami. " See 3 04A2430. 425 Cosert

tar), Security, Jun 61. acet ionls are "smakll milita ry t\ pe actions tak-n in

21. Schlesingecr. Tlioiand IDarv. p 541, lte na~tionial interest that. if detected by frieiidly

CINCI'AC Conid lust. 1961. p 175: lust. Asst or unfriendI\ po%%ers.ean be plausibly denied by

for M uttial Security. USA F. Ja n-.l tn 61. n.p.: tile U S Gos emninn Fqtiipment anid or perVan Stasercn. LSAF IPl'ain and I'ow -it n onitel used in these operationsa.re selected and

Southi Itia, 1961-1963. p 7 prepa red so is to oiler the tigliest probabilit\

22. I aIling Pa per onl Programn of Action for that they cannot legall\ be traced to lte It S

Vietnam, Folder "Policy-Vietnam." RL (61) (htscrnment "- Clanidestine operaitions. oin eon.

38-9. (Jan I-May 31, 1961), Sec 1. 64-A-2436: trast .rc those in, which ciuphisis is pidied onl

memo. AFXOD-PY to CSAF. May 10. 1961. concea ie dic th act ol thie operaitioin. I t.I t Ger,

ibid. i ohn K Gerhiard. USA I- I )CS I

t

la itsand Pro23 See rad. UK 7(0272. May 8. 1961 gramns. to the Asst to SFCI')1EI-. Ma~r 28. 1962

24. Sciglia no. South I tetnain. p 1 (4). Puishh 40 I[(older. -- l'ctl%-\'it tn." RI (6i) 18-9

Papers of the Presidents: Kennedy, 1961, .p356; (.1 ill I -Aug 196 1). Van i Staiaiscreit. I SAlI Planii

AFXOPJ Book of Actions in SEA, 1961-64. andti Plic let in South I tetnain. pp X-9. itisg

Iteim IV-A. ( NCPAC Coind Ilis. 196. pp CI \(i'AC to lDl,. Ma~r I11. 19613. itttiui

184-75. htr. O'Donnell to Felt. May 17. 1961. SI CI)1F- ito Sersice Nce'.s. (1(N \1,1I l\

Johitson. lIantag- Poit, p 53 Aug 18. 1961

25. 1)01 Penitagoni Paper%.,1Bk 2: 19-45. 41 Jouritalol. thhu ,, r Is ~.~I I, 1

26. Keitiedy Prograii and Commnitments. pp I 5?-it

1961. pp 44-1. RtAC-l-477. p 20 42 M~ \ 1 .1 lhttit.o,N~~tuidy. Folder

27 I-older, "l'olics-Vicitarn RI 161) 1, 1) Vivit~n.n 1 '-t No t,4. RANID Corp Study.

(Jait I-May 31. 1961). Sec I - hadiraotr of I'craionnel fron North Vietnam.

28. 1)0! Pe'ntagon I'aj'er' Ilk ?" 1 i ti-/.Oct 68.

.1-3 2434 41 to lte JCS \i~v , t1110 ocivp,- 4.3. [list. Sth AF. Jul-Dec 61. I. 107-09.

Anilmni Saigon I 14 t \!.%t t-' vto~ PACAF Ref Book for Dec 61 SECDEF Conf.

2i) t h1 Is. ,., ,it t ..n..ilii tl and Pro. Tab B-2: 7the Pentagon Papers as Priblisied by

1.1"'*Ini s;t the New York ines. ed N. Slteehan, et al(New

%.ii 1qj% [ell.sic. ( SA 1. Hatn% antd I'oli e' York. 1971). pp 95-96.

in voi~ti I i-tnain. 1961-19 63 p 8: Dept of State 44. CINCPAC Comd lfist. 1

961. pp 182-83:

huilli'titi 45. 956-57: Schlesinger. Thousand MACV. Sum of Highlights, Feb 8. 1962-Feb 7.

D~i v. p 54.3. I'ubbi Papers of the' I'rewdiins: 1963. p 41; AFXOPJ Book on Acttons in SEA.

1.tnedot 11. Jo/anon. 1965 (Vashiungtott. 1966). 1961.64. Item IV-C. bitt. Dir/ Plans. USAF. Jul.

1.404: NSAM 52. Mlay 11. 1961.rprt. Lyndont B. Dec 61. pp 44-45: CINCPAC Rerd of 2d SECJohnsott to t0w Presadei. May 23. 1961. in 9)EF Conf. Jan 15. 1962, Item 13.

101) I'ntagon Paperi. Ilk If. 136-37. 159-66 45. CINCPAC Comd Hist. 1961, p 183: hist.

3 1. Col R. M. Levy. USAF, JCS rcprsenta. Asst for Mutual Security. USAF. Jan-Jun 61.

296
Notes to Pages 74-82

nup .Rprt ol CSAI- Visit to SVN. Apr 62. Ivontlh I list Rprt, Oct 61, hist. PACA I. Julinist.51 5hac Coiitr Op.uI-Dc 61,A App XXV Det. Oct 18-21. 1961

47 Nlciao. Phillip P. II ilbert for IDir lanis. 49. Jourtal of Atllitari' ,bqam e. Sep 61. p

Jun 8. 1961. CINCPAC ('mmd lhust. 1961, pp 1 53. Schlesinger. Thousand D~ar,\, p 450.

33-34: hist. PACA I. J1ul-DIec 61. 111. II ist Rkprt 51wplen. I ows Revolution. p 149, Maj William

of C-E Opns,. Ekec System D~i\. Aug 01. hist. 1, Nicholson. Ill. Background Paper on VictP 1-OCO. D~ec 61, Ir. Brig Gen~ R MI Anthtis to iiiam. a. Jan 62. Schnecidert-rprt. IPresenitation by

13th Al , nt d .Schricider rpnt: Josepht W. Grain- (len M ormani before Congressional Commitger and I Sgt George P) Da . I list of the 2d tee. . 1 -11. lust I 3tl AF. Iul-lDec 61.1I. 107.09.

Al)VON. Nos I5. 1961-Oct 8. 1962Z hir. Lt (kit Intel Pst. ia Oct 1, 1961, tin hist. 2d AI)VON.

I trle E Wheeler. Dir Jt Sit. to CJCS. No\ 14. Nov 6 1-Oct 62. 1. D~oe IS

1961 50 lust. Asst, for lNittital Seccuit\. USAIU.

48. Kentedy Program aitd Comitmnts. .lan-j un 01. n.p , aind J uI-Icc 61. pp 28-29

1961. Futrell, "Chron". lust. I 3th AF. JIti-lDee 51 .ICSNI-700-01. Jet Aircraft for MIN. Oci

61. pp69.70.tist. 2d AI)VON\. Nov6I-Oct 62. p 7. 1901: hist. lDir Plans. USAI-. JtiI-lc 'I M 1

5, ist. IPACAF. .Iti-Dc 61, 1, pi 2. 18-32. Ill. 262: AFXOPJ Blook of Action% in 1A N Ithtl

A-2 NI ontll II ist R prt. Oct 61, msg. CI NC- 64. Item V Il-A: CI NCIIACC '.m~tl II'. id 1.

PAC to .16'. Nov 11. 1961; Rprt on Able 186. [ IQ U SA I \le-i itl- M i .H) '-t ').

ia ble. en. l-eb I1. 1962. ilist. 2d ADIVON. No% 1961. hi. \,,v to.,u i.i .11 1 i Dec 61.

I5. 1961-Oct 8. 1962. D~oc 72. 1)OD Pentagon it p Iisi VU 1.t hl it (4 ~. Ill. Wkl-. AelisiPapers. BkI -, IV B3 I .91. lust. 19th I IA. loii I 'u ii VIt '01. lie I1-IS. 1961

I)e 61. p 62: ist. i'ACAIU.Jtil-INt-'e Ill NI

Chapter V1I

Opening Farm: Gate

I I tr. Col Robert I Gleason to Col Rau\ is \%,tit I t Col Charles E. I rumbo. Jr .- b

Boners. Ofe AF Ilist. IDec 30. 1971. Book of .1, W. Grimnger. Jul 13. 1963. Lec~ayeoinments.

A\ctions tin SEA. p 6. SO G-4. 1 AC. Langley it \s b\ I homias G Belden. Mar 29. 1972. see

AFPB. Va , Apr 10. 1961: mtcmo. lDur Ops. also Proj Corona I lars es Oral Ih lit intw \%tilt

UISAF. Apr 27. 1961. incI 7. Vlol 2: 1 Sgt Robert Brig Glen Benjamuin It. King. Sep 4. 1962. pp 1-5

.1. O'Neill. Iliutor, of Special Air Warfare Ccii- M Rcrd. Second SU:CIF Conf. Ian I5.

ter. Apr-lDec62. Air Archises. intv\\ with It Col 1962. ni 111-2. intw J1 (Grainger with Lt Col

M. MI lDo\Ic. Bien I ba. P-eb 16. 1963-. lst. 2d 1NI. NIA Doyle. l-eb 16. 1963. tin App 1). Ilist. 2d

AI)VON. No\ 61-Oct 62. At)VON. Nov 61-Oct 62

2 l.tr. Gleason to Bo\ners. )oyle int\\w. 1-cb II. NIR.Dlir Plans. tSAI-. subj: CINCPAC

16. 1963 Briefing on Junigie Jim. Oct 16. 1961

3. Ilist. 2d AI)VON. Nov 61-Oet-62. p 8. 12 NIsg. [IS Atub Saigon to State. Oct 13.

lust. 2d Air lDivisin Ja n-Jtin 64. p 4: JIohn 196 1, ti M-ws York imte.%, Pentagon Papers. pp

W. R I avlor. ed. Cot~nba, ,I Inraflth :1w I 140-4 1,%cc also I aylor. SivordIsand Plem slares.

tNcew York 1961), pp 491-92. lactical Air Sup- pp 227--8. CINCPAC Cond Him,. 1061, pp 197.

port H andbook. Oct 62. See IX. MIR. tDctails on 91. Prot Corona I laiwsst Oral II 1s intmv. mith

Modification aitd IRAN's Perf otn 1-28 and 11- Col King. pp 15-21

26 Aeft. mid.. Binder COI1N Ops 774-04. box 12. 13 IDetaeciitent I was spending seseral

6SA-4994 sseeks tin Nlali. the Reptublic of West Africa.

4 Al- XOPJ Book of Actions in SEA. 1961- training paratroopers

64. Itemn IV-B. 14 Plrogress, Rpfrt. (0)9th ISG. ca. Me 5.

5. 1/nd.. Item Ill-B. pp 21-22. 1961. in Ilis. 2d AI)VON. No\ 61-Oct 62.and

6. CINCPAC Comnd Ilist. 1961. p 187 D~oc 6. lst. 5tht Al-. J til- D)ee 61. 1. '31-56. nisg.

7 Kennedy P'rogra m and Commitmnents. PACA I- to I 3th A I-. Nov 17. 1961

1961. p 84. I5 Himt, SAWC. Apr-lDec 62. pp 12-13

8. Ilis. lDir Plaits. USAF. Jul l-lDec 31. 16 MsNg. Det 9.2d AI)VON to PACAI-. Nov,

1961. Vol 22. 78 21. 19K1 Intel Rprt. Debriefing of the Coin9 Book of Actionts in SEA. p 2and Itemn II: iander and Intelligence Officer. lDct 2,.4400th

lust. SAWC. Apr 27-Dec 31. 1962. pp 1-10: CCI G(Nov6lU-cb62), Apr 1. 1962, Briefingby

297
IIII ADiVISORY YEARS Notes to Pages 82-88

Cipt MI K. Palmer. Jan 16. 1962. in [list. 5th Asia. /962-67( Research Analysi% Corp. Jun 69).

AlF. Jan-jun 62. 11. 1)oc 144, p 117

17. Ihst.2d ADVON.pp8-9:4400th CCIG 22. Msg. JCS to CINCIPAC. Dec 6. 1961:

Intel Rprt. Apr 1. 1962: mrsg. CSAF to CINC- CINCPAC Comid [list. 1961. pp 190-91.

P~AC, No% 9. 1961. msg. CINCPIAC to JCS. AF-XOI'Jl Book of Actions in SEA. 1961-64.

Nov 15.1961: CINCPAC Rcrd. SECI)EF Conf. ItmVll

lDec 16. 1961. mnsg. Itemn 8A: AE'CIIO Oral [list 23. Msg. IPACAF to CINCPIAC. lDcc 6.

lntvw with LeMay, Jun 8. 1972: telephone con- 1961. P'ACAI- R~ef 13k for lDec 61 SI*CI)1EF

versation. 17 ttrell with Col Rlobert L. Gleason. Conf. Action'lab 11

L~t Col John Pattee. and Lt Col William Ui 24. CI NCIAC Comtd Ilist.1961.p 171. misg.

Dotighterty.JuI 72. Victor 13. Anthony. The Air CINCIIAC to Chicf MAAG VN. IDec 6. 1961.

Force in Soin/zeast /1 o: 7iirtis andl Tech- CINCPIAC 1Rerd. SE:CIEI- ('onf. lDec 16. 1961.

niqucs 01 Night Operations. 1961-1970, (Ofc I tein 4.

AF I-ist. Mar 73) 25 Nlsgs. PIACAF to CINCPAC. lDcc 8.

18. Msg. CINCPIAC to Chief MAAG VN. 1961. 13th AF toi PACAI-. lDcc 10,. 1961:

Nov 16. 1961: rprt. SAF to Pres. Feb 6. 1962. AI-XOIPJ B~ook of Action% in SEA. 1961-64.

B~inder Vietnam 11-62 Itemn 1ll. CI NCIA C Comnd 11st. 1961. p 188.

19. Msg. CINCPAC to l)IA. Mar 13. 1963: 26 CIINCPIAC R1crd. SE-CDI+ Conf. Dcc

Neiv York Dines, Feb 20. 1962. p 3: IIACAF 16, 1961. Iterm 8A, misg. PACAF to CSAI-. 13cc

Ref 13k for Mar 62 sraCI Conf. Item, 5 17. 1961.

20. IPACAF Rcef 13k for Jlan 62 SI:CIDEF 27. Msg. CINCPAC to PACAI-. IDcc 20.

Conf. lab 311. Mar 62 SrCDEF Conf. Itcnm 5: 1961

Futrell's consersation with Gleason. Jutl 72 28. hitvsw withI Anlt Iiis b Gautsclic and

21 Pa.ttI S. Ell. Rfichard P. Joyce. Robert H Graingcr. Aug 30. 1963. misgs. l3th AF to

Williams. and William Woodworth. U.S. Alrmst IPACAF. 13cc28. 1961. CSAI-to PACAI-. Mar

Special Forces ail Similar Ituertial D)efense 23. 1963. JCS to ClNCIPAC. 13cc 26. 1961.

,ldvisorr Opyerationv in Maidnl Soutlu'av PACAI- Ref Ilk for F-eb602 SECI)E IF Cont.

Chapter V11I

The TaYlor Mission

I 'I lc Prcsidcit alsoasked the State Decpart- 6. CINCPAC Coind [-list. 1901. pp l$R7-9I

mncnt to solicit comments on this question front 7 I.tr. laylor tothie Presidenit ('Iavlor Rprt).

allied nations. AFXOPJ Book of Actions, in Nov 3. 1961. Kennedy l'rogram and commitSEA. Itemn Ill-B. Van Staaveren. USIF 1'1ativ 'Itents. pp 98.99

and P1ohiesin Southi Vietnamn. 1961-1963: MI R. 8 I ayior. 5mm ori anai Plowvhare5. pp 241-

Rosswell Gilpatric. Oct 11. 1961. and NSAM 44. New YorA 7anev. Pentagon Papers. pp 14 1-

104. Oct 13. 1961,ini DOD) Pentagon Papers. Bk 48. 1)0!) Pentagon P'apers, 13k 2 IV.13 I . 100-

11 122-38: Public Papers of the' Prewdenzw 08- Vatn Stavs-rct. US l F I'Iami and Puhcwsk in

Kennedh-, 1961. pp 656. 660: 'laylor. Sivordls Sout/i Vietia, 1961-1963. pp 10-1lI. Schlesitiger.

anid Plowshares. pp 225-26. 7housandl 1)am'. pp 546.47. Rtoger lilstritt. To

2. CQ Background. China andc U.S Far East M1ove a N-nion. 7hii Polito tf loreigit Poht r in

Policy. 1945-1967. p 108: sec also Cooper. 1Lost the A1dministration of Jo/in I* Aenniedi

crusade. pp 193-94. (Garden City. 1967). pp 422-23. George WV Bll.

3. MACV hist monograph. Miilitarv ,lsstvt- 7he Dis tphte of'mi er Essentia l a/ti Modernz

alice t) die Republic of Suth Vietnami. 1960- 11'orltl Stru, lure (PIoston. 1968). p 334: D~ept of

1963. p 11: Itr. Diem to K~nnedy. nd.. in Pubhc Staite Builletin 56. 5I14.

P'apers of the Presidents. Kt'nnedvw. 196). pp 9. Coveriig note. sgd Williamil P ltmmdy with

801-02: I'ACAF Recference Blook for 13cc 61 draft memo. SECl)E for president. Nov' 6.

SE'CDEF- Conf. Tab B3-I: Intel Estimate SVN. 1961. Blackgrotund paper on CI NCIPAC O111an ca. Oct 1. 1961. in [list. 2d ADVON. 1, D)oc IS 32-59: Kented lprogramt atid Commitments.

4 PACAF Reference [look for 13cc 61 1961. pp 122-23. SM-1212-61. Reeoniinicd

SECDEF Conf. Change to the proposed Memno for the lire5. 5. Msg. USAmb Saigon o State. Oct 13, Nos6. 1961;ltist.DIir Plans.UtSAI..ltl-IDec6l.

1961. in Newt York Tines, Pentagoni Papers. pp pp 176-78

140-41. 10VaStsrn.UA 'lnadPice

298
Notes to Pages 88-96

it Soulh I wmnam,. 1961-1963. p II. memo. 19. lMI ng Paper on I) trnllt[io 01 EffecMeNamara for the Pres No% 8. 1961, in DOI) tiMe 11 S. Policv to\uard South Veiltm. No\ 13,

Pentagon pape'rs. Bk II. 343-44 1961,

II. Keninedv Program and Commitments, 20 CSAF M 430-61. for the ICS on SVN,

1961. pp 122-23: laylor, Sn ord and Plow- l)cc5.1961:Al:EXO PJllookon Actionin SFhA,

share., pp 245-46. 1961-64, Item IV-I): JCSM 33-62. Jan 13. 1962.

12, Schlesinger. Thouvand lr's p 5 17: lust. In DOI) Pentagon Paperl. Bk 12 448-.54.

PACAI-. Jul-Dec 61. III. Monthlv lIht Rprt 21 lBsickground l.lipcron CINCI'AC OPlan.

A-2. No% 61 22 Incl to CSAFNI 430-61. I)ec 5. 1961.

13. Msgs. CINCPAC to JCS. Oct 20. 1961. draft mnlo for SCI)I'I- I eNta"., thinking

and Nov 15. 1961: DOI) PeItagon Papers. lk 2. '.mas consistent \\ith that of the Army it least. On

lV.B.I .88-90 Nosember 14 the Army had cmbarked a brigade

14. Schemilger. lhounand Dan'. p 547 task force in the Pacific Coinuand, plis some

15. Ibid.. ueno. McNamari for the Pres. thirt.-fiw. thousand combat and logistical supNo'% I i. 1961. in DOI) PI'ntagon I'aper.. 3k I I. port unit% I rom the U nited States. for deploy359-66: I aylor. Sit ord% and I'lowiiare.t pp 246- mwnt Merno with incls. I.t Gen Earl G Wheeler.

47. I)ir .It Sif. to CJCS. No% 14. 1961

16 list. I)ir Plans. USAF. Jul-Dcc 61. pp 23. JCS 2343 65, Dec 7. 1961

45.46. 176-77z Van Staaeren. USA 1.la'tnhand 24 Memo. SECI)EI- to Pre. Jan 27. 1962.

I'ohlws in South I'wevam. 1961-1963. p 12: IcI to JCS 2343 70

DOD Pentagon Papers. Bk 2 V.B.IL.. 125-37. 25. I.elay mis\' '\th Belden. Mar 29. 1972

17 NSAM I I1 1. First Ph,tsc of Viet-Nam 26. See Summary Sheet. Dir Pllans. UISAI-.

Program. No\ 22. 1961 No\ 24. 1961. meno with uIcl. In JI Sif to

18. Memo. Ilurchinal to CSAI- (sgd Col CJCS. No\ 14. 1961

I-rank It. Pancake). n.d 27 Ltr. CINCPAC to .ICS. Dcc 5. 1961.

Chapter IX

L1. S. Cominuld A rrangements: 2d A D 11ON aml MAC i"

I. )DO) Pentagon Papers. Ilk 2 IV B I . 90- PACAI. Ref Ilk lor 1cc61 SCI)EF Conf. lab

108. I'ACAI- Ref ilk for |Dcc 61 SE.CI)EI Conf. 11-4

Fab 11-4. 9 Ibd

2 'i hc Kenned Program i and Commit- 10 AIEXOPI Ilook of Action. u SEA. 1961-

itncils. 1961. Pp 129-30. meno. SEC|)EI- to 64. Iten IllA-I . mg. CINCPAC to PACAF

C.ICS. No'. 13. 1961 and Chief MAAG. Nov 2. 1961.

3 Note to Control Dli.. N.o\ 28, 1961. JCS II 1--IOOsand a control andreportingcenier

2343 61. Note by the Secvs to the.ICS. No'. 30. of the I hirtecrth Air Force had been at Don

1961. ltr. Rear Adm i I Iou in to SECI)EF. Muang. I hailaiid. since April 13. 1961. under a

D3cc 13, 1961 coimmand clement known a% l'lUirtecnth Air

4 Mg. MeNamara to I-ell and McGarr, Iorce AI)\'ON (abbrc\iation for Ad'anccd

No\ 28. 1961 Echelon) I hi \%.,as the first ADVON. tltat in

... 5. I% sg. AillEmb Saigon to SIECS I A I E, Vietnamit became the second.

I3cc 4. 1961 12 Mgs. CINCPACAF to CSAF. No\ II.

6. DO ) Pentagon Paler. Ilk 2, IV II.. 118, 1961. I'ACAF to 2d AI)VON. I cb 20. 1962. to

Hearings before the Committee on I oreign 2d Al). Aig 4. 1962. to 13th Al-. Nov 17. 1961.

Relations. US Senate. IloreignllmA ta,,ie. 1966. SO 0-85. PACAF. No\ 15. 1963: hist. 5th AF.

89th Cong. 2d ses (Washington. 1966). pp 243- Jul-Dee 61. I. 53-56

44, 263: iilsg. AmEmb Nc\\ l)chh to Pres. No\ 13 Nlgs. Nolting to State. No\ 25. 1961.

21. 1961. in DOD Pentagon Papers. Ilk II CINCPACtoJCS. No% 25and 29. 1961: insgs.

410-18 USAIRA Saigon to CSAF. Nov 28. 1961.

7 Msgs.CStoS.CI| No'. 22. 1961.and CINCPAC to Chief MAAG VN. Nov 25. 1961.

to CINCPAC. No'. 23and 28. 1961. Van Staa\- and No'. 29. 1961. htr. O'Donncil to CINCPAC.

cren. USA F Plans and Pohn, In South Iet. Dec 12. 1961 liltv\\ 'lith Anthis b(a uscle amid

nam, 1961-1963. pp 14-15 Grainger. Aug 30. 1963

8 Msg. CINCPAC to .ICS. No% 29. 1961. 14 Nlsg. 13th Al' to PACAI-. Dcc I0. 1961

299
THEi AD)VISORY Y'EARS Notes to Pages 96-102

15 list. 2d AMINO\. \o% 6 1I-Oct 62.,1 46 to I('IN C I'(lI F I aet a4 Nlat\ 22. 1962 1 ch

106 Illis techtiquelC ii dliit ted as ellig less liehiewd that no reqiillietit C \istd lo an.

stjsliiro that coopel ,tu\e (C-47 flreship XI AC ' N' \,% compone p llil~n cit 0lid( Yt onl

strike airc,.tlt JI~ier~tIolis iklcat b use iol thle Al1. uI I962. I Icadquiarte' Suppoi Act mit\

limited nutmber il l a i ht i I 1-28 could load Saigon. a nia lol .lI/til.Citle110beitig to

011 Its '.115l~llg% lSI antd thei coli5C(Illlt tedtie- ptlo' le common adlllllillltlw and l)±l~lic

11011 of 10 oIII;1CC thdt1 It Coitid 1,0I.' NIsg. %utlilt.Itcidt5 ClsIiClli ~l~i'd'

PACAF to 10 SAl. Icse Il. 1961. Proiect chan uge. anid Itouskeeping sets lees to NI A A6

Coronla IIhirest Owl IM amt 1115.' '51 Kinlg. pp anid NMAC unit%

51-56 2 7 NI sg. 1) A(CA I t o I It I A I ,indI 2df

17 See russ. *NA CV to C'INCP)AC. Sepl 1~ AI)NON, leb 20) 19)62

1962 28 Ma~rtin amid ('C'. r. 11, 17-18. Ills W04~i

IN 01t the I ormier. 2.066'N% ere itllocated to the Paper% gil rhi' I'rg'nglg's hlohi2i I heei~il. 1962

ANrm\ . 61 tthe NMatime Corps. 135 to filie ~'i.. ( Washitigion. 1963). p) 137. 111555. I

1

ACA I to

,trd 187 (68' oflicers atnd 119 men) ito the Air I 3tl AI- anid 2dI A INO\v le-620. 1902. ('INC

lolee ( IN CPIACConid II iss 1961 .1) 175. .n1( PAC to NI'NC N. l-eb 25. 1 962. NIA to

1962. 1p I55: Ilsm, I

1

ACA I'. .lI-IDe 61. Ill. 'I NCPlAC'. M~ar 1, 1962. aund 2d 'NIDNON to

IINI[ IP N'kI\ Actwnitie Rprt. IDec 22-29. 1961. I3tt ANI-. Ma~r 9, 1902

PA CAFI Rl Ilk Ifor I )ee 61 SFICI)- I'.(onl. 29 Ifl hem gton R prt. Apr 25. 1972. m'ig.

Actiotn la1b' I-ACA I ito I1th Al'. Mat 24. 1902

19) Nletto. S FCDH-1] to Pties. W~e 22. 1961. 30 D~ept oI State. Ileman 0uiIort'ign Poh/ii

V'ani Staw. ret. I.11' IPlao and l'olgg'u Ini Current /)io ling'nts. /62W tsltt ngtoli. 1906),

Siouth I wiani. 1961-196.?. p) 15 pp 110t3'06

20 NMsg. I'ACANI' to I 3th IAF I' ,ttt 2d 11 N') lhtalgl IrthInn, Apr 28. 1902

AI)NON. I-eb 21). 1962 32 Ibid

21 AN1'Cll( Oral Ilms hit'.'.% 522. '.'.itli (jell ;S I ig (ten I illa% IR Phillips. kISA (Wet).

l'ati 1) 1 la rkiN. I'eb 23. 1972. mug. CI NCPNC in St I gnus llm. i spaii'i.h,t 6a . 1902

ito )I PFCI NC SA V ~ \ C. F'eb 8. 1962 34 I ins'.'. Grattttgel s'. th ItI ('il NI NI

22 Nlses, I('S to 1(I NC 1A(. .Ian 131 anid IDo~ l. I'eh 16, 1963, NlartmatiI 'I Cler. ANpp 2.

Malt 2. 1902. to MA'. \ Apr 7. 1902. CSA I' to C(;IN Iiut\\%.ss lb NI

I'ACAFI. Feb 21. 19'62. Martitn atid ('le'ci. IN\. 15 Wit )ogrA Mliss's. NIlts 1. 1962

38-39: Va S, a'ert.('N.l;I/gigu!Iiii 3 6 C hi ago /0bnil. N~a\ 6 I1962

in Soih I winai. 1961-19631. pp 16-.17 1 dter. 37 A Rosw. ''m )t n tiecitred Nm as1 \ Nset.

B~rig Getn MinI It1i Adam %wsst Assistant (Chief starlt.'' Reiporte'r. Ma\ 10I. 1962

iol Stall .1-5 (Plait'.) 18 NIsg. PAC 'I' til I Ills NAI . NMd% 24. 1962.

23 Nlsg. IACN ft C'IN('IA'. Sepl 17. lJst. 2id ANI)NON. Nso'. 6 1-Oct 62. pp 21-3 1 4.

I19)(2. IVr. Alit is to I tigelle C /titel. SAN F. msgs. ('I N CPA (Cto NI ANC\N .,fill 7a1 mii 28. 1962.

.lani 9. I1903. Brig (Ont I'ran k A Omsuti i. NIAC tN'N 1 (INC(IIAC. lt 9, 192, P A('A

NI iNCV.' W-. R prt on N'tet nam ii Sep 20. 961 ~.pp SO G-857. Sep 24. 1902, lust. I Ith Al'. .I1att.l ill

101-I 63. P) 20

24 Nlsgs. MACN' to ('INC'IAC. NMam 1. 19) list. 2d1 AI)NON. \o%. 6-Oct (i2. p) 42.

106"2. 2d Al) N' tol PACAPI. NMa% 7. 1 962, nlg. P'N(''NI to 13011 Al'. No'. 1). 190)2

CINC'PA(' to NINC'V. MIa\ 12. 1962. 2d 40) \lsgs. 2d ANI)NON to 1301 AF,' ANpt 2.

ADIVNO N o I 1th Al' NI .1(6. (1062. C';A 'Ivo . o 5 1962. N\.Ill Stjtt .it., IS-.N' I'P/gui. gina

Chief M AANO A.Imt 21. I1902. anud C'IN CPIAC toi Puu itsiigngaui I wiain. 1961.1963?. pp-l4(.

CSA F. Oct 31. 1962. IMPNI SO) ANN2 164. No%. 9., A'C'IlO ' Oral I lis itt'.' '.'mtl Ilarkim. l'eb 21~.

1962. ltr. Awuhis to Ztickcrt. .imi 9. 1961 1972

25. Nlsgs. CIhNCI'AC tol NI,N'' leb 25. 41 H ealintgs before filie C'sintlte oil

1962. NIACN' to ('IN'I~iCT . NMar 1, 1962, Apr ANimtued Sersices. Ilotise olf Rersetii'e. il

6I. I1962. A~pr 7. 1962. Nla\ 6. 1962. P

1 NAlA to stgars I'o iur'. 89)th It(omg. 2d Nss ( N.tlingtiit.

I 1th Al' anid 2d A I)NON. ANpr 27, 1962. 2d 1966). pp' 7610It

A D)NON to IACN I-. NJ*' 5. 1962. I

1

ACAN to 42 \'.Ili Staa'eremi. ('5. I'lguam and l'olgii'

C'SAI-. NMa' 12. 1902. 'I NC'IA(' to MACN. In So'uth/ I giiflgu. 1961-1963?. p 47

. rieitio. ('ill

Sep 30). 1961 N'miston I' ANndersot. IDir Ops. 2d ANDI. for

26 Ostiminskt R prt. pp 10-11I. Itr. Athi to Atthis. leb 21,. 19601. msgs. 2d AD to1 il' NCAN

Ztickert. lait 9. 1963: tnsg. ('NO ('SA C'SNI 1ait 27. 1961. anid Sepl 29. 190~

3001
N ote!, it) Pages 103-107

C'hapIItr X

'l'eu'ical .i~r ('ontrol. Mul Tii'Irain, and R~anch Hand

I W\illied (6 BuIchett. I n'iton inside' Book ol Acion\ lin SI A. 1961-64. Item IIl-C.

Slor otliit-Gi', ri/it II or (Ne\\ 'tork. 1965). pp his. 115thI Al). Ia n-Jun 62. pp 44-45. CINC

SS-89. I'ACAPI Rel Ik for Jult 22-24. 1962. Pt

AC Reid, 2d SI ('PUI' ('vii. IhemA

S FCD) C~ (ont. Item 1B. SI ACV lim~ monio- 13 Ihl%t. 2d A I )\" ppI NVII -N\. Chief.

giaph. .),ir,'ia 4\%wanou t o lilt, Rt'pubih o/ A\I See, MIAA. Agenda Blook I or I'eb 62

Small I iilto. 1960.63, ppi I1- 12 SF CI ' Cord,- Item I(.0 A. ipi. Bing Gcin

2 Cng 9 ec.N~a I 68.pp 267-IS. ike Irmi0t, N I letlieringlon. IX S I'li i~t] dOps.

I ui 'on. ali iJIso. I ti. eatt' ani /it Iwi PA C \I'. Apr 25. 1962, rpt t. I t C'ol ('hatile% I)

('wig. pp I-IN S Ia~le\ (it Aug S. 1962. hr. I'asIe\ to 2 OI)C. t at

I Mg. VSA I R A Saigon to ('SAl'. N\o\ 28. All L 19(02. Prol Cot ona 11.11iewttOiaI [lis

1961. PA('AI Referene Book lot Jlan 1962. lit\%\ \% Antim, fil PP 64.8. PIACA Ite RIlk for

SFCI)I' I' Cont. i b 13. 'I NCI'AC Rerd. j.Iti 62 SFC WI' ('ont. lab 3. MIAC\ SumSecond( SU'CI F Cont . Jan IS. 1 962. Item 13. tnai\ ol i ghighits. 1-eb 8. 1962-1 eb 7. 1961 1.

arid IWc 16. I1961,I Itemt 2 135: insit. V SA IRA Saigon to CS A F M~ar 21.

Jan 15. 1962. Iliet .A. I IQ MIAC'\ . Sittninrt 14 Ralph A Ro%\ke. USAF /'"('' Opera-

(titglilghts, leb 8, 1962- Ich 7. 1901 97, Itr. nt'n li Sotni/,t't r 't. 1961-65 (OIe AlI' IIi.

It K G~ I hoinpson to Di em., N o\ 11. 196 1. t Iant 1972). pp I. 1. IX 24-25; htit. 2d1 A IVON. p

0)01) Petatgon Papt'r Blk 11 14.5-58 9)7. Iral t prewetitaiton. Anti, t~ Mo ar 62

i CIN('I t

AC Rerd. I Iitrd SFCI)Il C ori. SFCDI)PI Cotol. lii%t. 2(d ADVIO. rad.

l'eb 19. I1962. Items 2 an td 4 V'SAl RA Bangkok to PACAFI. Jan 131. 1962

6 Nhg. NIACV to ('INCPAC. Apr 14. 1962. 15 PACAl Rl Blk for IDee 61 SI'CIA

CI NCPA(' Rerd. SI CI)EI- CortiIDee 16. 190%- ConI. Actiton il .1I. I or.ta 162 SI' (')1:1 ConI.

Iteim 2. antd 3d SF ('1)1: Conf. l-eb 19. 19(62. Ilab 9. I or l'cb 62 SI C IFI Corti. Itemn 0.

lI tem 3 and 5; nicilo. Noormia to1 PF [)A I and CI NC(I''C Rcrd. SFCDlFI' ('ottl MIe 16. 1961.

Pi1 ( . I'eb 23. 1962. II tlman. lot A/tnt ov hemi 8-I 1 I pri (it CSA l's \ t'.tt tol Sottth Vlct-

\ton. pip 441 -44 nrtia. Item 11. IHethierington rprt. Apr 25. 1962.

7 ('INC AC Rerd. 2d S ECI ) I Cont . Jatnt I a%k'\ I od (i t I ottr It pit. (t aAtig 5, 1962

IS. 1962, ltcrin' S. 5A. and 14. and M( SFC'I 16 1 lie 8ih and 57th I wisport Hlelicopter

Cotil . I'cb It). 1962, lIcen 4, Sir Robert I hip- C'onmpaies atim ted as~ ideniiable uitt at Satt-

%otn. Peit'n~ * ( oylttll intulgit fIt'h gonta.boatrd at uircraltI carrier oii IDecemiber 11.

/ I %%oil tt/ t1tat aI antd I itinan N\e%\ N ork . 1962. ant \le re so i eported lin lte \(tnt Y'ork

I 9f6).pp 129-39 flnn' I lite I nternattonal (Cont rol C'onimitoii

8 I lite miembers \%ere Robert Kciitied\ - I Prontptl)11 recorded tills tolauioti oh tile Genle~ .

Aleci% .Iohmnt. lki~eII Gtlpatt c. (iveratI acLord, I lie coinpamt %e~re baed .t lant Sonl

I emtmllter. J1ohni A NI Cotie MceGeorge Nltu atitl Qti NhIoit untder tile I S Arm\s entor

Bund .Idnhtrd Rk Nlirro\\.anid l'o\%ler Harril- d ~t't h II dIl Corps Oii.lantr\26,

t~ti 1962.1h~e I S Arm'. \ 93 I lielteopicr ('oin)ti n

1,1\()i ~ (I??( H' 1 trse im %ho/are\, pp 201- 1. airm~ed at [),t Nanug and '.'.a plaed( uindrer ilie

NSAMN 124. Jan 1i I. I1962. lin D1)/ i'et'agon I IS Aritt %eitor ad\1 isor to the I C'orps I lie

i'apenr. Blk 12 442-44. Ilea rttig betfore a Sub- conipallc itie% c' ombait Mllpttrl itilsioli% atnd

committtee (if the C'ommittee on Approprita trattinedlie Vieinainesea.rttt t iair inobtlt tacti. II itse of lkeprcenttt'.c%. iVt'partniet'n ol ttc% t S Arm\*% 18th It \d Witig A\'. titott

I)tit'iiiit'.',11propnratoto for 1965. 88111 Cong. 2d Cttipain . %ilt %im\eentt -1I Otter atreral t.

'.e'.' ( Washtngton. 1964). Pit 2. 1)(612 reached Nl ha Iiang ott I ebrilir\ 7. 1962. anid

10 I a~lbr. Sioi~ tatd Piotn %hart'%. lp 2011 - tIe. ti'o ieat(beC rtn.tr I.(hu

03., NSAMN 162. J in 19. 1962. and NSA NI 182. %.and ptttirl' o1 cargo or eight pa\%'engcr'.) %.1111-

Attg 24. 1962. lt 1)1) Pe'ntagoni P'tpt'r. Ilk 12 Ported the I I S Armn\ fteld ad'. ior'. I lie 139tht

481-80. I5 'S er'.ea' Iternal IDefen~e I'olic\. - Irt u'potatitit Compan i i)Naintenva ice) ,trAug I. 1 962. IC(SMN. No\. 20. I1962 rt. e(t n Ichia r\ 11. 1962 ('hief. Al' Sec.

I I AlI XOP.1 Book 01 AetiimutS FA. 1961- NIAAGUV. Agetida Ilk I (r I eb 62. SFI' 1'1

64.1 p 23Coti. Item 303).C(IN('IAC Ikrd. 2d SI ('1)1

12 II u.t'. I 3i A I' .1ul-lc 61.1I. 73.74.-id ('otif. Jan t 161. 1 962 Itemi 3. 'I NCPA(' 'ound

1962. I. 72-74. I 3ili Al 01O1an 226-61. D~ec 30. lhnt. 1961. p 194

1961. him. IACAI'. .hnl-IDc 61. 111, AFXI'.I 17 ('IN(CIPAC' Comad IltI.t. 196 1. p 189. img.

301
THlE ADVISORY YEARS Notes to Pages 108-I116

t.SAI RA Saigon to ('SAl . No% 28. 1961. tour I p. Aug 2.,1902

Cl NPAC erd.SLCIF I on.Dee 9. 161. 31 1 it, Moorma~n to Antis. Sep) 25, 19621

Item 7. Mlartin and Clexer. IV. 31-34 misgs. l3th Al- to PIACAI , Mas 26. 1961.

I&. Lmt O'Donncll to CI NCPAC. Dee 12. l'ACA I to l3th Al'. M~a\ 29. 1962. and AI-'(C

1901. msg, USAI RA Saigon to CSAIF. No\ 28. JIl 110 to PACAI'. Nla\ 29. 1962

1961. PACAI Ref Blk Ioi IDee 61 SFCII- 32 1 ts. Moornman to CI NCPAC. JIuI 6.

Collf. Ilab It-I 1962. and to Atluhs. Sep 25. 1962. PACAF SOs

19 Ilis. 3Iithi I C Osp (Assault). 1902. p 10. G-8S dud G-92, Sep 19a.nd Oct 19. 1962. msgs.

iitts wissth 1.t C'ol E W Strong b\ Grainger, Cl NCIAC to MACV. itil 18. 1962. MACV to

No\ 7. 1902. AFXOPJI Book of Ations in SFA. 'I NCPAC. Aug 23. 1902

1901-04, p) 25. JAnne A//i . h I1 ord* 'iAmralt. 33 PA CA I S umimnair\ of Act ion\,. Or i

19.5-56, ed I conard Bridgcman (News York, Wltccler's Parts'. Sec ILI. lab C. tits. Antlus to

nd.). p) 259: CINCIPAC Rcrd. 3d SECDEP Moo: mian. (a. Apr 16. 1962, and Ilossers to

Conf. leb 19. 1962. I'ACAPl Ref Blk for I),e 61 Matin. ca. Just 62 and.InI 25. 1962. Reases Frnd

SECI)EF Conf. lab A-5 and Action Ilab A: of I our Rprt. Aug 2. 1962..ICS 2d AI)\ON .It

ntisgs. CINCPAC to 1 3th Al-. lDee 9. 1961. OPI1tn 62-2, Oct 17. 1962. Moormatn presentaPACAI' to 13th AF. D~ec 13. 196L. tion. (a. l-eb 63. 1. 38. mustz 2d Al) to PACAI'.

2(0Iakn ae nIJ~~Osi N tl Apr 5. 1962.

3. I-older Policv-Vietiam.J.an I-31 1964 34 PA CAFl Stirima r\ of Act ion%. Geni

21 Ni norman ;ipresenitation to Congressinal Wbeeler\ P~arty. See II. labi C

Comittee. ca. l-eb 63. 1. 38. It s, Antili to 35 NI sgs. PACAPl to I 3th A '. IDcc9 and 1I

Maj Gen WV Martin. Sep 2. 1963. and Moorman 1961

to Antltis. ca Feb 28. 1962: insgs. MIACV to 36 Dorns Krtudenter. formerly' of the Office o1

CI NCIAC. Mar 12. 1962. antd I13th A I' to 2d Air l-orce I listor\, WWI kidl upplied this loctiAl)VON. Mar 18.,1962. Rprt 01 CSA F\Visit to nientation Mnieos. 1CS for McNamaira. No\ 3,

SVN. Apr 62. Ops See 1961. and Williaim P) lhad\ for Rusk and

22 MIACV Sumiar. of It ighliglits. Feb 8. McNamara. No\ 14 and 30. 1961

1962-Feb 7. 1963. p 69: Itr. Lt Col FIo~d K 317 NSAMJ 115, No\ 30. 1961. Marsn 1:

Sliafnier. Nta\ 12. 1962. I int, II itor\ of the I hirteciuli Air IPorce..lan

23. 2d AI)VON, Agenda and Info Blk for I-June 310. 1963. pp 75-76, insg. CIIMAAGV to

Mar 62 SIEC)E FConf. Item 17: hist. I3tli Al-. Cl NCPIAC. Decc 23. 1961.in ISA files

1962. pp 103-05 38 IS--2I) a .16.mg IC

24. Misgs. 2d Al)VON to 1301 At-. M~ar 9. PAC to CII MAAGVN. lDcc 28. 1961. menmo.

1962. MvACV toCINCPAC. Miar I?. 19.aid26. SEjCII- to the President. I eb 2. 1962. itd see

1962 msIg. CII NI AAG V tol CINCPAC Jlan 17. 1962,

25 Aiilli presentatioin at May' 62 SECI)F F and PACA I' Ref Blk for Jait 62 SI:CDElP Conf.

Conf: misgs. 2d ADIVON to 13th Al'. Mar 27. lab I16A

1962. Cl NCPAC to.ICS, M~ar 30. 1962. and 2d 39 Ntsg. SFCS I A I F to Am~mb Saigon.

Al) to I 3rh AF-. No% 20. 1962 Jan 4. 1962: and img. CIIMNAAGV to CINC26. Nlsgs.. 2d Al)VON to 13th AF. M~ar 27. IPAC. .an 12. 1962

1962. NIACV to CINCI'AC. Apr 9. 1962. and 40. Capt George I Adaim. TAC Aerial

Mlav 22. 1962. PACAF to CSAI-. Mlay 12. 1962. Sprav F/ig/t Operanona in Southatt ,IAla.

and CINCPtAC to MIACV. Aug *13. 1962. 1961-1964 (1 AC SASI'. n dt ). p 8

lIcetiel inlgon iI pi. Apr 25. 1962. his. 3 1 th I C 41 II ist. P AC At. Ian-lInn 62 Ill. Apr Z2.

Oip (Assault). 1962. p 27. rpri. L~t Col Howard P1 IACAF Ref Blk for Jan 62 Sl:CDI- Conf. lab

Reases. Atig 2. 1962 3. I P-Laitd for Mar-62 SECI)E Conf. Itenms 3

27. 1/nd.. Rprt of CSAPF\ Visit to SVN. Apr aitd 4. Chief. Al- Sec. MtAAGPV. Agenda Blk for

62; PACAF Status Rprt. May 2 to 9,1962. misg. Feb 62 SECI)EF Conif. Itern 30l). CINCI 1

AC

CINCPAC to JCS, N~a\ 8. 1962. Rerd. 3d SF:CIFI' Cotil. l-eb 19. 1902. [tell) 3.

28 Msg. NIACV to CINCPAC. Nla\ 22. and 4th SE*CIA Cotif. NMar 21. 1962. Item 1.

1962. ms~g. lACAI' to CSAF. Feb 20. 1962, Moor29. J ITF 116. AAR. lDcc8. 1962: misgs. 2d Al) mrait memno. Feb 23. 1962 Inl April. wshen lactito l3th AF. Jul 28 and No% 26. 1962. CINCI t

AC cal Air Comnmand mined two %pm> planes to

to.JCS. NMay 25. 1962.10o MACV. M~ay 25. 1962. thle %fiddle East to wtork against locust infeitiPACAF Sumr fAtions. Get\hee~ tnadtsae food crop%. it added two standParty. Jan 63 ard C-I 23sto thl. NIule t rain airlift detaiehiment.

30 One pla ne was lost withItoutt crew fatal it ies 42 3d AI)VON Agentda Blk for Sl!CDFini a major accidfent on J tily IS. [l ist. I'ACA I'. May 62 ( onf. Itemn 3. Cl NCPt

AC Rcrd. 4111

Iai- Itin 62. Ill. Ma\vanid .Ittc 62. lust. 315 Si IC SI!C[I'- Conf. Mar 21. 1962. Item 1. lust.

(;p (Assault). 1962. pp 27-28. Reases Eind of PACAI' Jan-Jun 62. 111, Apr602

302
Notes to Pages 116-124

43 MIACV Rcid. 4th SPI*Cot. Ma S I A II., Sep) 26. 1962

11 1902. Itcin 12 47 C N('PAC Stimma~r\ of Act ioil% taken .1

44 See Cl NCPAC Rcrd, Mth SI-CIII 7111 SI CII Coolf. Oct S. 1962. paias 8 and 9.

Cont. hil1 23. 192. Iteim I %I A(A Suiniuar' ofI litghftght1 ppi 59-01. 2 10:

45 Memuo, Col Wtitia to P Il0ook. JI - I or tomg, Ail mb to SF-CS I A I I- Oct 9. 1963

llaikins. Aug 2. 1962 48 ibid. hist. 1)tr Plans.. LSA. It-,Juil

461 NIACV Sumotoilar\ tfit Highlights.. l-eb 8. 63, PP) 27-38. and It iI'mn, ht. Move1ta Vt.oon.1

1962-1-6b7. 96.p5-6.i'g.CNIAto pp 441-44

.,CS. Aug 21. 1962, AmP ~mb Saigon to S PCChapter X1

Air !'oliev: Too Cautious'

I Quotcd in I teni I- (irat . Pie Tuen/a CO IN lat.''.'.I.b IU, tnt.'.. . Grainger m. ill

('a/noet lPeiheraooo'. and Det ,on~ cn /eaw e Do~ c avd I t Cot C'hatrles I- I ruinbo. I1r . fil

and If ar under Li nion BiJ/on( ul'' o 13. 1963. Ii It i'. 2d ADIV\O\. Van Siaa'.cien.

Cliff. 1 970)). p 35 US -I' P/an' and. /'ohi tea in Southi I ieinamn.

2 M'.g. PACAI to CSAP., Dee 17. 1961;, 1961-1963. p 25. ht'.t. SAW'V'. Apr-tDcc 62. p

ClNCPAC Rcrd. SI:Ct)I.I Conf. D~ec 16, 1961. 167

Itewi 8-1 16 MNfs (Chile[ NIAAG to CINCPAC. D~ec

3 I/nd 23. 1961

4 Nlsg'.. 13tht AI- to I'ACA 1. IDec 28. 1961. 17 Ntero. I and'.dale to Col (),t\ id1 C loll\.

CSAI- to PA''CAI-. Mar 23. 1963, and ICS ito ice 27. 1961. Binder 1257-61.66A-3410. ho'. 37

CI NCPAC. IDec 20. 1961. PACAI' Re! 131 tor 18 Mecmo. MIaj Gen C II Chldre. AIX'S

Ichb 62 5 PC(I)[P I- Conf. I-If. I c Ia. lit\\%, b\ Pla ns.& Progi arm. USA I' IDec 28. 1961. Bitnder

Btelden, MIar 29. 1972, tnt'.'.' '. tt Ainhis' bi \iet ato 1257-01, 00A-34 10. bo'. 37

Gavu'.he antd Grainger. Aug 30. 1963 19 \'a n Stum\ erecn, IS IF Pl/ans and I'm,/o w''

5 Memno. Dir Plans.. IISAI . fot CSAI-. ainot/ I aeuaaan. 1961-19V63. p) 26. tus.t, SAWC.

Mar 1, 19o2. JCS 2343 85. 1Uch 23. 1962. Report Apr-IDec 62, p 167, Veit York limes.. I-eb 1 5.

of CSAI-\% Visit to SVN. Apr 62. p 57 1962. DI)A-IR-1521904: mn'g'.. 2d AI)VON to

6 Ro.' e S. .I F P.1 O raloia. p) 19 I'ACA P. .Ian 30 and I-ch 24. 1962. Gleas.on

7 PA CA I-. S PC 1)1 'It) I for I1an NI tg. .Ianm pa per. (a MNar 1 . 1962. CI NC PA C Rcrd. 3d

I5. 1962. l ab 3-It. is'g. ('INCPIAC to PACAI-. S'CIUI- Conl I cb 19. 1962, hcm 3. PACAI

Ichb 4. 1962 Rl It). tot l-cb 62 SIPCI)UI- Cold, lab XC

8 NI'.g. iIACAI. to 2d AI)VON. I eb 12. 21) CINCUIAC Rerd. 3d SI;CDHI- Conf.

1962. I-cl) 19, 1962. pp 3-22. in'g. CINCI'AC to

9 lI an. MNa i'ihotnias. IfiackaiNv wiCa Pt NI ACV. M~ar 2. 1963

Ldm..n.I l en I a o ht.a 1960. 21 MI'g. 2d AI)\' -,o 13th AlI. NMar 13.

Nlartin d Clew.r, App 2. COIN ant' .'', la b G. 1962

rcrd. 3dM C) Cool, I eb 19 1962. pp 4-5. 2 Jima 2(d ADVON,. No'. 61.O0t 02,Jp 184

E nd ot I otir Reports.. I t Col1 NI NI D0\1 c. 23 I t r. MIat Gen W K MIa rttin to S API. Dce

johna P1 ilbert. Ichb 62-Aug (63 It. 1964. Binder Vietnatm 191-04, 68A4l994. ho'.

10 D~raft prcesentation, Atlit for Ma~r 62 8. Jtust. 2d A)V()N. No%. 61-Oct 62. p 3. Gent

S PCI)I- Conkf. ht'.t. 2d AMI ON. No\ 61 -Oct Fratnk S lBevon. .1r. - /ogi'.ti Suppowrt in t/he

62 1 wznao: Era. Vol%.11 -llWtaigtoll. I070)). P

I I i/oL. 265

12 I c'.'oia' I caitwd 4. U' S Ar\rn Sec. 24 lilt\\\.'. Grainger \\'itlh Mal Williaml C

NI AAG. Apr 11.- 1962 jIt'ohnso and Ca.pt P~rinc't C Cutter.h Ir-eb 7.

13 I-ttielI "Chroit . driaft presettatitonit 1963

\nthi%. for M~ar 62 SP:CI I Conkf itt ttin. 2(1 25 NI'.g. Chief NI AAGi to PACA I. No'. 18.

AI)VON. No\. 61-Oct 62 1961. Jiust. 2d AI)VON No\. 61-Oct 62

14 Rcrd. 3(1 SI'CI)I- Coiti. I cb 19. 1962. 26 ltit.2d At)VON'.No'.61-Oct 62. pp 52.

pp 1-6 55. \.otl I uttictiati NIS. CNI II lp \Iltt. 56-57

I5 [it, 2d AI)VON. No\. 61-Oct 62. p 9. 27 Rprt. Mali (Gen I rat'.t' NI Hectheringtaon.

it'''.Nial D~etan S Gati'.ehe and Gramgcr m..tla Staff Vit%t. Apr 25. 1962. htst. 2d AI)VON. No'.

Amaiti'. Aug;31). 1963: Nlartita a Cle'. r. App 2. (.1-Oct 62. imt%'. M....Nal I lmsa' .1 li m in'..itti

303
14E ADVISORY YEARS Notes to P1ages, 124-133

I Sitt I lamrM Nonaimaker. Dec I1. 1962. %%it h .PuI . I .ib I . hist. 2d A IM ON. pp 67.70)

('apt lUdmii J Rhein. Jr . Jan 3. 1963. m~tli 30 Report o1 CSA F, N isi to S% \. Apr 62.

Chaplain Squires. Jan l6. 1963. ind m it IC (\ 0 p I I

Nvilliaul Weakte% Jan 10. 1903: Martin and .11 Mal (Gen Spurgeon Noel. itcdu ii SiopCle~er. App?. COIN Intss. tabsP1. G. and 1t port ottI 4 .S *Irin in, I tamu. 1965-70

28 lilt%%%. Mal hornas. Iliekarn sih Capt (D~ept of thle Arm>%. %% ash1 1) C.1973). pp 5a.nd

(Chadp) D~onal M. Squires. Jai 116. 1963. Martin 9

dnd Cleecr. App 2. COIN lit %s. lab L. hist. 2d 32 lilt% %. Ilickam dnd (mramnger %it all 0

AIA'O\. \o\ 61-0ct62. pp67.70. find o l our A C I ,berator. \o% 21). 1962. Mtartin and

Reports. ILt Col Kenneth MI Ke~tc. Apr 20. Cte~cr. App 2. tab A

1963. atd Capt I-orrest 1) Meek. Apr 9. 1963 33 [list. 2d AI)VO\. pp 152-N3

29 ln's.Ifickam %%itliAuten. F-eb I5. 1963.

Chapter X II

Farin Gate and thietnmes Air F~orce'

I Chief. AF See. \IA(;\'. Agenda Ilk for 12 %lsgs. Anm.'nb Saiigon ito SECS I AllI

I-eb 62 SILCIEF Conf. Itemn 5C. Gleaison paiper, Mar 28. 1962. I'ACAF- to l3th APF. \Ifir 22.

(.Mar 1. 1962. CINCPAC Rcrd. 4th SFCI)IF 1962. JCS tn CI\CPAC. Mar 2-. 1962. lost.

Conf. Itemn 5 13th At-. 1962. 1.81-83. MIR. Mal (,en Jojit \1

2 lPACAIF Ref Ilk for Jan 62 SFC;)F Re~nolds. Mar 22. 1902

Conl. lab 3. I11-I. Prof Coronat liarmst Oral 13 Report of CSAF\ % isit ito S% \. Apr 62.

Ilms lit%%% m~thl King. pp 52-53. Ftutrell. personal Itemn 6

eonmersation% %%ltilt Gleason and Dlougherty 14 IIist. PCA I Jal~n..Join 62. 111, %MonthIl%

3 l)AI-IR-1521904. lust. 2d Al). 1. m%. [list Rprts. l'FO0CO. \fair aind 51.1> 62. [list.

CINCI'AC Rerd. 3d SFClDt:t- Conf. F-eb '9. PACA F. .lutlee 62. 11. lust. l'F(DC. It, 62.

1902. lItem 3. Gleatson papt-r. (a Mtar I1% W6 ilst I 3tti AF. 1962. 1. S 1.83. lust. 509th FISq.

4 Ilist. 2d1 ADIVON. p 144. lIrs. Atihi to .la n..ln 62. pp 166-6-7

Moorman. Mtar 28. 1963. lDet 2A~ to 2d IS Nlsg. \IACV to Amtitab I aos. Aug 22.

At)VON. JIun 5. 1962 1962. Prof Corona larsest Oral Itist lilt%%% %%itb

5 Rprt. Catirne> arid Esans. Ma% 4. 1962. .\nthis. pp 129-31. ltrs. IHarkins to O'Donnell

Gleason Eind of I our Report aind I-cit. Mar 22. 1963

6. IPACAF Ref Ilk for Jan 62 SI CI)F- 16 tg.1t0l ol.C I a O 92

Conf. l abs 2 nd 3. Palimer briefing tn [list. 5th MAC\ to CI \CI', Mar 24. 19o2. 2d

Al-. .lii-.un 62. II. D~oc 144 At)VO\ to I 3th AF-. A\pr 12. 1962. CI \CI'.C

7 C'INCPIAC Rerd. 3d StECt)Et C(onf.1Feb RcrdI. 4th SFCDF 1:- Cotil. Mar 2t.196,2. ItemS

19. 1962. Itemn 2 17 tg.2d AI)VO\ to l3th AFt Apr 21.

8 Anthis briefinig. Mtar 62 (EI)F ouf. 1962. and PA(\ At- to C'I\CI 1 AC. Mtji S 1962.

in tlist. 2d At). 11. D~oe 206. !11g\. t'ACAI- to Report of CSAFs % iit) S\'\. Api 6'2. pairas4

l3th At-. Mar 15.1I962. to CSAI-. Mar 17. 1962. and 7. 2d AI)VON Ilk for NMa% 62 SI CI','.

anid to CSAF. Feb 20). 1962. Report of CSAFs (wit. Itemn I A:. Muteller to 2(. ( R. Jun i. i9(,

Visit to SV.N. Apr 62. pt 2. ttr. Mtoormnan to 18, Ntsg. 2d ADVON to PNC-NI . Jul 17.

Atittis. to t-eb 28. 1962. CINCPAC Rcrdl. 3d 1962

SP:CI)F - Conf. 1-eb 19. 1962 19 i tr. Atittus to P'ritchtardl. Oct 20. 1902

9 Ntsgs. SACV to CINCPAC. I eb 27. 20 I'ACAI Ret Ilk for ftll 62 St CI)I1962. 2d AI)VON to I'ACAI-. Star 17. 1962. Conf. lab I. C'I\C'I'A' R14.d. 6th SItiand to NIACN. Aug 22. 1962. Ainlhttb Saigon Conf.J.ul 23. 1962. lItem 2

to SECS I A 11'. Mar 3. 1962. Mtartin anid 21 Ntsg. l3th AFsI to I'ACAI . Atig 6. 19f62.

Clew r. Ill. 0.63. Mtoormni presentationi. ta It rs. Aniderson to flosers.JIil 19. 1962. Antui to

I eb 62. pt 1. p 30 C"ot Ngu~en Xiian Vitil. Atig 8. 1962. antd

t0 Mt ACV' lust monogra ph. Militari .l io Aini% to t Dg~ inhl I litiai. Autg 11. 1962.

amei to Ite lepulii of Soul/i I tain. /960- lust. Asst for Muttual Seetsrits. I SAt.J.aii. ftll

/963. p 11 62. p 57. C'iuel. -AI See. SIAAGi. Agenida Ilk

I I Nlsg. 2d AI)VON to) PAC AP. Star 21. for I ell 62 SFCI)I.I Coul. Item XC. I'ACNI1962. rnsg. tISAl RA Saigoni to C'SAI-. Mar 21. Stirnmair:. of Actions. Geti Wlielr*\ Pa.rt%. See

1962 1. tab A See altso, I'ACA-N Ref Ilk for Oct 8.

304
Notes to Pages 133-138

1962. Sl:CIF Coid. Ilab A3. hr. Hlarkin~s to 26 Ms~gs. CSAI- to I'ACAI-. Oct 6. 1962.

Moorman. Oct 1. 19(62. CICPAC Suinmiar% of I'ACA to( IN lCp.\C.Oct 7. 1962. CIN CIAC

Dccisions I aken at Seseuth SFICDI)F Cont. Stinmar'. of IDe-isons Iaken at 'it S FCDI)I

Oct S. 1962. Itum 6. mnsg. PIACAIF to I AC. Oct Coid. Oct 8. 1902. Item 6

13. 1962, 1 ong rprt. Oct 18. 1962 27 Nlsgs. PACAI to I AC. Oct 12 and 13.

22 NMsg 13th AI- to PACAF-. Aug 6. 1962. 1962. ltrs. Anthtsto l'ritelid. Oct 20. 1962. and

lIns. I'ACA I .JuI-lDcc 62. 111. Aug 1.1. 1962 M oormain to Ani. Oct 23. 1902

23 Msg.IPACAI to CSAI-.Sep 29. 1962. Itr. 28 Nlsg. ?d Al) to 1'ACAIF and 13th Al-.

Pritchard to Anthis. Oct 1. 1962 Oct 22. 1962

24 1tnddlgltrSudosbcict 29 Nlsgs. MAC\' to CINCIIA(*. \oo\ 7

5 I4tlt .tnid 516h. 1. 2d. anid 3d I iainbecamie 1962. and CINCI'AC to IfS. \'.9. 1962

thc I 10th. 112th a. j 1 14th. 1st aud 2d I leliop. 30 Nlg.2d A D)\ ON to l3th A P. Mfar 9.

ter became the 211th atnd 213th. 1st and 2(1 1962. C'I\CPAC to A)MI NO. CINCI'AC

I ransport became the 413tha ind 41 ith. thle Spe- Oct 22. 1962. 2d Al) to PACAF.,ian 24. 1961.

cial Air MN sson became the 312ith Squadron. Moormatn presentation. (a F-eb 06k 1. Qtuestion

tactical reconnaissanccelcement% formed the 11I. P ACAPI Suin mar\ of Action%. (Gen

7161h Squad ron. the 12th. 23d. 30th. and 4 1st Whiceler' P'art\. See I. 1 a h C. isg. PIACAI- to

Air Itasc Sutudrons operated at \h~t I rang. ('SAl'. I eb 14. 1963

Ilien II oa. I an Son Nhut. and D~a Nang. respec- I1 Ih~i tan. P) V1ow a \ auon. pp 45367

ti'.l Msg. CII MAAGPV to CINCPAC. Sep 32 AlFXOP'J Bookof Actionisin SP-A. 196:.

19. 1962 1964. Item IIIIF. rnsg. CSAI- to PACAFI. Deec

25 Msg. D)A to USARPAC. Aug 16. 1962 12. i 961

Chapter XI1I

A ir Operations, 1962: ierdit ion. Strikes, uinc Reconnaissalee

I Amni presentation at Matr 62 SITDIA)1 Am Fmh lPhnom Penh to OSD J).a n 22. 1 962.

Cont.ini lst. 2d AD). 11, IDocs 200. 203.and 205. SE*CS- I A I E to AmEtab Saigon. Ja~n 24. 1962.

CINCPAC Rerd. SFCI)EF Conf. Mec 16.1961. and AmIn'ib Saigon to CINCIAC. JIan 26.

Item 2, 1962

2 Chiel. AF Sec. NIAAG\'. Agenda Ilk for 7 CINC'I'AC Rerd. 3d SECI')1F- Conif.1Feb

F-eb62 SIE'CIFFCouif. Moortuan ipresenitationi 19. 1962. Item 3. msg. tJSAI RA. Bantgkok, to

to Congressional Committee. (a Feb 63. 1. PACA! I. Jan 31. 1962. PACAI- Rl Ilk for l-eb

pp I-I I. MAC'VStininmar~of liigllighits. eb 8. 62 SFCI:hI Conf. Itemn 5

1962-Feb 7. 1963. pp 14. aind 27.30. PACAI- 8 Msg. CINCPAC to CIIMAAGV, I-cb 4.

Ref Ilk for Dcc 61 SIECI Conf. Action 1962

lab IP. 9 CINCPAC Rcrd. 3d SF:CDF+ Conf. I eb

3PACAF- Ref Blk for Jul 62 SECI)IjI- Conf. 19. 1962. Items% 2.3.4.5. '.loorman menlo. Febh

'latbs IA. IC.and 5: mg. M1AC Vto (INC PAC . 23. 1962. PACAF Ref Ilk for Mar 62 SI:CI)I:

Nla\ 1. 1962. Itrs. A uthis to Brig (ieit II 1) Con.. hem is 3 anid 5. hr. Mvat, Gen Richard Gi

Avsucs\%orth. Oct 28. 1963. and to Gen Jacob F. \\ec F-eb 27. 1962. isgs.J.CS to CINCI'AC.

Smart. No\. 25. 1963. atd Col llairy 0 Patter- Mar 12. 1962. PACAF- to CSAlP, I eb 20. 1962

son to CI NC PAC.J.un 62. rprt. Capt Charles If 10 Antilm briefing. Miar 62 SECI)FI'- Conf,

'I ardiff. Aug 4. 1962 in Ilist. 2d ND., 11, D~oc 20)5

4 Report of CSAF-s Vist to SVN. Apr 62. 11 Msg. !3th Al- to I'ACAI-. Mar 4. 1962,

Intel See. MACV. Rerd. ith SE:CDFI- Coitf. I

1

ACAF Ref Ilk for Mar 62 SI)DI: Conf.

Ma\ II. 1962. Item 8 Item 3 and 5

5 Chief. Al- Sec. MiAAGjV. Ageinda Ilk fc 12. PACAlP Ref Ilk for Mar 62 SF'CIEF

Fecb62 SECOI' Conf. ItcniS: PACAI- Ref IB., Coitf Item 7. CINCI'AC Rer(I. 4th SiCI)EP

for Feb 62 SECI)EF Coilf. 'lab S. I P-I. Conf. Mar 21. 1962. Item 5:1 ihlsian. 'lo Mole

CINCI'AC Rcrd. 3d SECI)EF Cottf. I-eb 19. a Vation. pp 441.44

1962. Item 5 13 F'aslc\ lEnd of I our Report. ta Aug 5,

6 PACAF Ref Ilk for Feb62 SI)IEFrConf 1962

pt I-It and lab C. (.1NCPIAC Rcrd . 3d 14 1 tr. Atittis to Pritchard. IDee 20. 19612

SU"CIl:I* Conf. F-eb 19. 1962. Item 5. nisg'. I5 I lie direction finder had beendesigited b\

3(05
THlE AD)VISORY YEARS Notes to Pages 138-144

General Ie Nlay lin the baisement of his qunarters 1962,

lin Washington. I eNlaN was personally inter- 28 Nlsgs. CINCIIAC to JCS. No% HI. 1962.

ested lin elect ronicsa id hie hoped that% arious air S ECSl 'I to Am 1mb Saigon. D~ec 8, 1962.

ntimigation aids, such as onibetiaring radio antd Am lmb to SEiCS]l A I F. lDec 15. 1902. fir.

range indicators. "tould gise instant antd unam- Anthis to Pritchiard. D~ee 20. 1962

higuouis bearings on radio station% 29 PACAI' Ref Ilk lor Mar 62 S13CIDli

16 l'ACA F Ref Ilks for Jan. Mar.an nil l 62 (onf. Itemn 3: Anthis briefing at the Mar 62

S13CI)1F Confs. Cl NCPIAC Rerd. 4th SI'CDEI- Conf.m inst. 2d AlD. loc203: Fasle%

SECI)EI: Cotif. Mfar 21, 1962, Itemn 4A. lust. Entd of 'l on, Report, ia Aug 5, 1962. l3th Al'

6091 st Recoti Sq. Ja n-Jim 63. p I Final Rprt A\nah~sis lDiretise I'iogra ii No

17. [list. 2d Al). 1. 157. ntsg. NIACV to 63-3. Apr 30. 1963. pp 39-43. misg. l3th Al- to

PACAI-. May 28. 1963: PACAF Ref Ilk for I'ACAI'. Mar 8. 1962. see htr. Moormnan to

May 63 SliClEF Conf. Ageinda Item 3.1ab 3; Anthis. ca I eb 28. 1902

CINCPAC Rerd. 8th SE:CDFF Corif. May 6. 30 Capts I hotitas Is Cairne\ and IDouglas

1963. Ie 3.2C.Air Interdiction and K Evanis rprt. Feb 14, 1962. Gleason paper. (a

Ground Support. (-i Apr 25. 1963. in Martin Mar 1. 1962. misg. 2(1 AIVON to IIACAI'. Jull

and Cleser. V'. lab A. 97 17. 1962

18, PACAF Ref Ilk for May 63 S*CIF 31 Cairrne\ and [-ais% rpri. Ma\ 4, 1962.

Corti. Ageiida littin 3. 'lab 1: isgs. MI ACV io Cl NCPIA(. NMa\ 16. 1962. 2d

19 Berttard B Fall. The Tito I 'teinnms- A ADIVON JOC to I ASOC atid 11 ASOC. Jun 4.

PolinIa anil .1thtarr ialvnro. 2d ed (Ne%% 1962

York. 1963). Pip 355-56. see ntsgs. 2d AI)VON 32 Hletherington rprt. Apr 25. 1962. lt.

to MACV. May 30 and Jun 14. 19(4 Easle\ to 2 Ol)C. tn a.I fi1. 1962. rprt. ('airrne\

20 Report of CSAF\, Visit to SVN. Apr 62. and Esans to lDep lDir. .10C. Nla\ 4. 1962.

Intel See. NI ACV Rerd. 5th SFCDEI1 Corif. Laslc\ lEnd of I our Report. in Aug 5. 1962

M'vav If. 1962. Itemsv I and 8. 2d AI)VON 33 Misgs. l3th AF to PACAI'. Mars8. 1962.

Agenda Blook for MJay 62 SFiCI)FFConf. Item MJACV to ('II MAAGV. Apt 12. 1962. and 2,

I-A: lust. IIACA I'. Ilan-Jun 62. 1. pt 2. eli 3. ADlVON to 1301 API. Apr 21 and 25. 1962.

citinig PACOMI Wkl\ Ittel Digest. May 18. 'A('A I Ref Bk lot Mfar 62 S1lFDI Cont.

1962. 'I NCPA('Rerd. 6t11i SEICl)Ii Coulf. Jill Item 3

23. 1962: Itemn 5, itisgs. ('INCI)AC to MACV. 34 Misgs. MIACV to CINCPAC. Nla\ 16.

Sep 12, 1962. to JCS. Oct 22. 1962 1962. 2d Al)VON to 13th Al-. Mar 9. 1962 . lit.

21 Nlsgs. NIACV to PACAF,. Jun It. 1962. Faslc\ to 2 ODC. (int.t] 1, 1962

Cl N('PAC to MACV. .IuI 9. 1962. and Sep 12. 15 Cairte\ .ind lians rprt. Ma\ 4. 1902.

1902. and to JC'S. Jul 13. 1962 tasgs. IACAI' to ('SAl fll 17, 1962, 2(1

22 Ltrs. Antltis to I lIini Aug If. 1962. ADlV()N to 131 I At- hi'..1 18. 1962. to I'ACA I'.

Moormian to Harkins. Se p 3. 1962. and ntsg. No\ 7. 1962. and C'INC'PAC to MACV. Aug 3.

CINC'PAC to AiG-929. No\ 29. 1962 1962

23 Nlsg CINCPtACtoM ACV, Sep 12. 1962 30 Cairnc\ atid Fuans rprt. Ma\ 4. 1962, lhr.

24 1t1r. H arkinis to Moormniai. Oct 1. 1962: I tCol W11il i l Icessis to 2CCR. Mar 5. 1962.

rprt. Nlia; And re\t J1 Chtapmani to lDcp Dizr. I II Gleason pa per. ia Mar 1. 1962: lJst. 2d Al). 1.

A SOC. No% 16.I1962. msgs. CINCPACtoJCS. 110. Itr. Antis to Mat Carl 6~ Schnteider. Sepl

Oct 22. 1962. CI NCIPAC to AIG-929. No\ 29. 26. 1962

1962. atd 2d Al) to PACAIF. lDee 20. 1962 37 MACV Suntmtar% ol Highlights. I'eb 8.

25 US D~ept of State. Ilmerman Fozreign 1902-1 eb 7. 1963. pp 133-34. lirs. ('ol l1ohit C

P1olwv: Current 1)ocitng',m. 1962. pp 1002-04. I laygood to C S. I3tli A I'. J n 10(. 1962.1 1 (Col

mnsgs. Am13mb Saigoti to S13CS I A1 13. No% 21. NIs MI Doyle to 2 ('CR. Oct 11. 1962. nisgs.

1962. CINCPACtoJCS. Oct 22.,1962. PACAI' PACAI'toCSAI'. Ma\ 9.1962. 2d AM)\t i.. s

Ref Blk for SECDI)Fl C'onf. Oct 8. 1962. lab J. PACAI'. I eli 28. 1962 and 'dl \1 o' V\( \1ata

Report of Visit b IC (S Ilearn to SVN. Jan 63. 'so\ 12. 1962. Gleaison p.i ts . , l 'it.'

Pt IV. para 8 I'ACAIF Ref Ilk ;mo \I,. ;. 'IIul I k out.

26. M~sgs. C'INCI)AC to I('S. Oct 22. 1962. lab 8 ~i'i .ii..' 11 l', f .iii iiiisurgenc\

A tuEmb Saigon to SE1C'S I AlP. No% 21. 1962. 1 v's,mi' I, i~ m( If 1 .% 1962. rprt. ('ol

NI AC\' Sumnia r of Highlights. l'tb 8. 196W \k tis..n I aod 'on..lg i 14. 1903. it. Anttlis

l'eb 7. 1963. p 40. memo. t I(k'n I v \.mi Is Io %tloi tiaii. (it Apr 16. 1961. Of t A\I I'inal

I inititatio'n of Air and Aitillm . 1it pox!is '. Apr 30. 1963. pp 22-23

Vietnamt Republic llordeo ( mi-d- ,,- Is 18 1 trs. Riha to ,Anderson. No\ 10. 1962.

1962. Moormuan to H enderson. JilI 3. 1903. \% it Iincl.

27 \I1. t(1 1 iii m iti Saigon. filI 2. 1963. Report of Visit b Brig Geni Gilbert

Dvi, h. Pit.t Iss 11 I, t AIG.929. I)cc 16. 1 I'ritcluird. .Ini 9-27. 1962. and Aug 3. 1962.

thq
Notes to P~ages 144-149

rprtis. N aI fit a IG 1lo'wrs. Jan 9. 1963. a nd Caipt 52 PACA 1 Ret Ilk for Jul 62 SFCDI)E

Bryant C lRuhiia n, Sep 4, 1962, 2d A IWON ('oil. Ilab s I A. I ('. a nd S. hir. Patterson to

Al' Sec. MIAA%0. NI AAG Symposium. Aug 9. cI NC PAC.Jun 62 Visiting Saigon in *P ill\,

1962 ('.t Waftier C S\\cce\e. Ji , laetical Air

39 MIAC~V A ri Sec. I essons I earnied I Comma nd commander. urged je neral A nthts

and 6. Mar 30 and Apr 11. 1962: isgs. NIAC' ito establish photo cellsa diIlei iand D~a Narig at

to CI NCIIAC. J1un I anil Jul19, 1962. ( I NCIA C once in order to speed the delis cry ot data to I

toJCS. Ju1 9. 1962.and Aug 11. 1962. 2d Al) o dod II (orp, NMsf. 2d ADVON to IiACA1-.J.ul

13ithAP,. l)c 21.1962. 1IACAlI to 13th Al'. Jul 17. 1962

30. 1962. JCS to NIACV, Aug 3. 1962. to 53 CINCI'AC Rerd.6tIt SIE-CI)l-l- Conzf.JuiI

CINCPAC. Jil 27, 19621 CINCI'AC Reid. 6th 23. 1962. Item 1. rnmgs. MACV to CINCI'AC,

SE-CDI[:l* Caof. Jull 23. 1962. Item I [ihe Aug 8. 1962. dnd CINCI'AC to JCS. Aug 8.

Marine helicopters wished to be bastd att D~a 1902. PIACAI- Ref Ilk for Oct 62 SrCDLIP

Nang. but because the U S, Army had a com- Cont. labt 1I

p~itnytltere.tlitv\\cnitothieSoc'I ranigairfield in 54 Msg, CINCPIAC to JCS. Sep 8. 1962.

ithe delta L~ater. they traded stationt\%,ith an rprt. Col1 J I Ashbur,. Jr , '\o\ 22. 19631. hist 2

Army company, because the> \%~ere more effec- ODC. Jai.un 64. in Ilisi. 2d Al). Jan-Jun 64.

thec In itoiintainous terrain. Maj John .1. Cahill I X. D~oc 9. Oakah 1,.Jones, Orgaymatnon. hisand Jack Shiilinison. D~rafi. -II por\ of U. S von and 6row-th of thei I UIlw isiv Alir I'ori I

Nlaine Corp% Operations in Vietnamt Janl-Junl 1949-1968. p 50. lust. I'ACAI-. .lul-lDee 62. II.

05." pp 14-16,. aii 76-8 1 and Jan..Iun 631. 11. lusts. PII) C. Sep 62. Apr

40 Mueller rprt. Aug 4. 1962. isg. 63: ist. 13th At . Jan-Jun 63. 1.xi

CINCIIACito.CS. Atig 11. 1962. 55 Msgs. CINCI'ACtoJCS. Sep 8. 1962.2d

41. Nlsg%. 2d AI)VON to IPACAF. Sep 16. ADto PACAI'. Sep 14. 1962.and No\ 14. 1902.

1962.and CINCIIACto MACV.Jud 28and Aug and to 13th AF. No% 28. 1962. hir. llilmi ito

.3. 1962. MItR, Col S If Nigie. lan, 9. 1963 Moormtan. Oct 1. 1962: I'AC 'l 1uiiii'..Iis

42 Ilisi. 2d Al). pp 149-50, Martin and Actions. Gecn Wlictc;*lem' % 11ii IA- I..

Clever. V. 52-53z I-al., Two Ili- Nans. 56 '1 %%o oiln~i R l' ?I h'iit 1111c tIi;:c

pp 378-79; msg. CINCIIAC to MACV. Sep 12. to fltaimii. I' vt \1 R,: lk, lIm Jain and Mair

1962. 1% I I t ooi- ing. MACV to CINCPIAC.

43 PIACAIP Ref Ilk for Jull 6? SI D[)1I \1.is I PI(O

Conf. 'lab I %1 Msgs. 2d Al) to IIACAF. No\, 14. 1962.

44. Ibid.. 2d Al). 011s \ihts~ 'ij 01 i aiid Jul 10. 1963: PP.l. Sep 12. 1963

I5. 1962: otsg. mM \~ it, (N I \t, .1V lail 31 58 Ur. Felt to MACV. Sep 1, 1962. MACV

and i nr- %. (I N I o .l(S. Aug 28. Sumnmary of llighligltts. pp 189. 213. tnsgs. 2d

I04.'1 Al) to CSAP. No%, 30. 1962. and MAC\' to

1 is g ( IlN(T.lAC to JICS. Aug II. 1962. CINCPAC. Apr 29. 1963. memno. Anderson for

ipi. ,a lugenci R NcCutelian. Aug 24. 1962 Attis. I-eb 23. 1963

46 Ltr. Ilarkins to Moorman. Oct 1. 1962. 59 Msgs. 2d AD) to IIACAI.. Sep 15. 1962.

lust. 2d AI)VON. No%, 15, 1961-Oct 8. 1962. anld .ln 26. 19631. and to 13th AF. Sep 26.,1962.

p 150: Martin a nd Cles Cr. V. 54: lit of lotir itrs. Atithis to Pritchard. Atig 4. 1962. atnd to

Report. Capt Edwin .). Rhein..Jr . D~ee 28. 1962. Nfilton. Aug 9. 1962, .I'ACAlP Summary of

nisg,2d AI~to I'ACAP.Jati6. 1963-.2d AD Ops Action. Gen Wheeler's P'arty. pt 11, 'lab If,

Analysts Paper 3. p 17. memos. Col hlarsey W Brown for Rowlatnd,

I1 Rprt. It Cot Byron R. Kahn. Sep 4,1962. Apr 19 and 22 196

observationls. Capt Biryant C Rtihmait. Sep 4. 00 PIAC AF- Stiiniiii of Acunno. Gen

1962. msgs. 2d Al)VON to PACA1 . Sep 22. WVheeler's part\. Sec I. pt II11. l ab A. iosgs. 2d1

196?. and MACV to CINCPIAC. Sep 14. 1902 Al) to I'ACAP. Decc 231. 1902. MACV to

48 Ruinan ~iiobser\vationis:Capt Kennet ilI CINCI'AC. Apr 29. 1963,

Wells Sep 14. 1962: misg%. CINCUIAC to 61 Memio. Dir P'lns USA1-. for l)CS

NIACV, Sep 5. 1962.and MACVtoCINCPAC. Plans and Ops, USAI-. Deec 17. 1962.

Sep 14. 1962. 62 Litrs Meclroy to Aitis. Ma', 6. 1962.

49 Rprt. MaJ William J. Kunti. Sep 30. and Anthis to McElro). M~ay 22. 2962-.

1962: mnsiz 2d Al) to 1.3111 A F. Dec 21. 1962 63 App C. RAAI- ASU 18 3 Air (28). Jtit

50. Msgs. 2d Al) to PACAF. Oct 31. 1962. K4 1962

and to CSAF. Decc 15. 1962: Burgin rprt. No\, 64 Lir. Anihis to Nguyen Can K\. Aug 11.

15. 1962: Anderson to PACAF, Jan 14. 19ii3: 1962

ist. SAWC. Apr 27-Dec 31. 1962. pp 188. 197 65 Msg. CINCIPAC to l)IA. Mar 13. 1963.

5I MR. Antlus. Oct 29. 1962. ltr. OD~otnnell PIACAP RefI Bfor SECl)[-EPConf, Oct 8,1962.

to Harkinis. Matt 8. 1963 lab K-I. aind for May 03 SECD)El. Conf.

307
illE AD)VISORY YEARS ot o it eg'N I')') 100

'\genda Item3l. lab 1. Bernard l-alt.'IaIk %ih w'i M,' i I~ I.k \ ( 1. \lDM I \ 0.

lb (hi Nlanh.- 171,' \e'n RInipbli( OctP I')(t. I M I' ( .1 2. 1962. dnd to JCS. Oct 22.

aind in Itall, U1o ( hi 11inh wtn M-til. 146 " (/a !nNCI'AC Reid. 8ib SI-CII' ('ont.

pp 320.24 May, 6. 1963. Item I Il

Chapter XIV

Ap IBac and Related A tatters

I CI\CPAC Rero. 8th SE-1CII Conf. 10 Ng%. 2d Al) to PACAI'. Oct 22. 1962.

May~ 6. 1962. pp 2-.a b-3 Jan 27. 1903. and MACV to CINCPAC. Mec 2.

2 I

1

ACAF Ref 1BK for May 63 SFCDLI 1962, MiA''V Staiary of IhIghlight , p 06.

Cont. Itemn I. MIAC V Summary of I Iighlight". PA CAPI Sumimary of Action,. (Gen Whceler\

Ie8.1962-I eb 7. 1903. p)95 Pamt. pt II. lab 1). Air Staff Ob'.eratiom.

3 NIg 1C oSP WI.Ag1.1 .rr. Soth \'ietam. .lai 116-30. 196., pp 9-I

.1-5 to .1' S. Aun 7. 1962 17 Mg.2d1 Al) to PACAI'. Sep 14 aind

4, bi. memo. 1k~co" of USAI' Actions 30. Oct 30 and 3 1. No\ La nd 13cc 23. 1962.J.an

and Progress mnce May 1. Ret Blk or Jlk 62 27. 1963. anidto CSAI-. Sep 30. 962. MIACV to

SI)I'A Mtg CI\CPA('. Oct 25. N\ 17 .and 19. 1962.

5 I tr. O'D~onnell to I e Ma%. hit 28. 1962 PACA 1 Snmn of Action%. Glen Wheter%

6 ('IN CIAC Rterd. 6th SECI)EI Coit. P'art\ . See 11. I abs A and 10; msg. Maj Gein

p 2-2 Jlohn WV Co'rpenter III to Borehinal. Ian 23.

7 lero.JKCS for SFCI)EI'. Mar 7. 1963. 1963

memio and tab%. I t Cv! I- ranklin Row. Jr.. 18 Rprt. Capt I e%ter G I-ramir. nmd .Nagi o

Dit Illa nN. U SA I'. to ('SA 1. lati 28. 1963. memro of Pelt V sit with D~iem, Jain 9. 1963.

MACV Nationalt Catmpaign Plan for SVN. Mec nigs (INCPAC o JCS. Oct 22. 1962.id 2d

I5, 1962 Al) to I13t0. At-, No\ 22. 1962. ltr. Btowei.. to

8 NIg. CINCI 1A('to l)IA. Mar 13. 1963 lDep Dir. .IOC. D~ec 11. 1962

9 I'ACAI Ref Ilk for Ma\ 63 SH-CDIFI- 19 Bowers rpris, D~ee 28. 1962. and Jan 10.

Conf. Item 1. Report of Vi%it b\ JICS learn to 1963. .Mal Etigene Rt NeCtitchan a prt. Jan I5.

S VN ait 60. See Ill. MItR. (Col 1I Nigro. Ian 1963. N igro memo. Jan 9. 1963. nisg. 2d Al) to

9. 196 : i \% with I t Cot Chiarle' L I in tite. I'ACA I'. Mar.5. I190

lr . b\ (Orainiger. Jttl 13, 1963. trig. 2d Al) ito 20 Rprt. Maj Herbert I l'ieost. JIan I0.

PA('Ai . No%~ 5. 1962. 1963. Repoit oIf Stimiuai Briefing Ow~n by I t

10. Nbsg\. i'SA R IA to D)A. No\ 26. 1962. C'ol Jlohn P) Vann. JIan 6. 1963: I lalber~ta.

2d Al) to PAt.AFI. Oct 18. 1962. Itr. (Col MtaA ag of it Quaagmire. p 146, tarchett. IeXWiwt on P) Anderson to 1)ar Mlat. 2d Al..Ian i mn. PP 193.94. .IOC BriefinigSumma ti~r . .tan 3.

I5. 1963 1963. iig,2d AI)to PACAI-.Jan 3anid 7. ApI I R pr-I. B~o\% r,, to lDep Dir. JOC. Jan i 9 6. 1963. anid to 13th Al'. .Im i 4. 1963

and l'eb 1, 1963. antd I t Cot D~onald K Rearm. 21 MIg. 2d Al) to CSA I'. Jlan M8 1963

t-eb S& 1963 ?2 NI It. ('(l S \ Nigro. Jatn 9. 1963. nisgs.

12 Msg. 2d Al) to PA'AI'. Feb 0. 1963. 2d Al) to I13th At-. Jan 10 aitd 11. 1963, aatd

memo. Anderson for Antbi%. I-eb 23. 1963. Itr. ('IN(PA('to MA('V. Jan 4. 19(63

Mlat Jaine' C. Dutnn to I3th AlJ.~an t 21. 1963 231 I t r. Antha'. to NIACV. Jan 16. 1963.

13 I .t r'. Moorman to IHarkins, Sep 3. 1962. Ander'.on tol lir Miat. 2d Al' 'ana 15. 1963:

anad Rowland~ to NIaj Gein Glen W Martin. Mar artm w witht I ranio by (Grainger.. Jul 13. 196.).

14. 19631. 2dAl) to PACAI'. Oct 22. 1962. and 1

1

A'AI' Ref Ilk for May 63 SFCIFI Cotif.

JIan 3. 1963 Agenida Itemj I

14. M'.g'.. 2d Al) to 13th Al'. Oct 22. 1902, 24 Rpfrt'.. I t (Cot Donald K Roam). May 8.

lDce I1). 1962. and Jan If). 1963. ind 1A('AFI to 1963, Maij \\ aliaan .1 Ktant/. l'eb 10. 1963. It

13111 Al'. lc 8. 1962. hanst. I13th Al'. 1962. 1. (Co1 Bill A. Montgomeiry to 2d1 Al). AugO6. Oct

10f7-0)8 63. atnd No\. 6.and ILt Col ('lre' C1(heninatilt

1 IS Meno. Anders.on for Antlti. l-eb 23. to 2d Al1). No\. 13. 1903: F td of I otur Report.

1963: insg'.. 2d Al) to I'ACA I'. Oct 22. 1962. ( of Beaamin S lPre~ton. 1til 64. Itr. C'.t PtB I

JIani 8. 1963. andt to 0 tha Al-. D~ee 1(0. 1962. aid Rthatn tto Chief Al 0 1'AC See. 2dAl). IWtl2.

Jan 10. 1963. aiid ('I N('A(' to JICS. No'. 9. 1963

1962. 25 I tr. Aitha' to Sittuart, No'. 25. 1963

308
Notes to Pages 160-167

26 1 trN. Anthis to Cicii .laeob F~. Smart. No\ ( Washine'toit 1963). pp 549-53: Martin and

25. 1963. and OIDonnell to H arkin%, Mlar 8. Cieser. II. 8-I10

1963-. msg. CINCIPAC to .ICS, F-eb 1(,. 196.3 42 Ilurchett. I winaun. pp 85-99

27 Nlsg. CSAI to PACAI. jan 9. 196: hr1. 43 fid . intm ws wl o I I tCol Chiarle,, I

Anthis to.ICS, nd . Anithis notc% on, matters ito I rum be b\ rai ngea . hi11 13. 1963: ist.

be taken up With Ccii Le~l (a, c Mar603 C'I NCPAC'to I)IA. Mar 13. 1963- and PACAF

28 I s ikIst Y~inl 111Pl.Mr Re Ilk I or, May 63 SIECDFI- Cciii. Agenda

22. 11)(63 ientl I

29 1Itrs, I-elt to I larkins. May 20, 1963. and 44. 'olI 11R Nigi o..Jan 9.1963: ub/u(

to O'D~onnell. May\ 24. 1903 Papers of the Preoeulm John, F~ Kenni. 1963

30 1I trs. H ark in% to I-elt. Am i 21. 1903. Washiington. 1964). p 11. Report of Visit b\

Antlu o Martin. Sep 2. 1963: MIACV li cr:te .ICS I cant to SVN. See IV,. pama 7.

44. Adn 8. 1963: iitsw ssiilt Hlendersoii b\ 45 N~lsg.CI NCI)AC to MiACV.No\v9.1962:

CIII'CO. I)ee20. 1963: nisg. 2d AI)to 13th AP., CINCI'AC Rcrd. 8th SIECDlEl- Coiif. May' 6.

I-eb 6. 1964. 1963. Item l band 4. House of Represeniti,%cs.

31 II ilsniit.7 to.1/te ia ,\aon. pp 453.67 I te:-ANain and .%:a/,eavt Asia. 88th Cong. 1st

312 Nletio. Col \V V. Niefrid.. Iir lIans, sess (WaV~shintgton,. 1963). p) 8. htr. O'D~onnell toi

USAlI. to CSA- I. Jan 5. 1963 H arkin, NMar 8. 1963: and PACA I Ref Ilk f(r

33 Report of Visit bv I CS I Cdiii to SVN \. ia 63 S 1W I E Conf. Agenda he1m 4.

.Ian 63 1 lie USA F conlt ingenit coinsisted (if ILt 46 NJItR. Codf withI Ngo Diinh Nhu otn Apr

;cii. 1)aid A. llrucltial. It. Gent. C 1) I)Iso%\\,i\. 12. 1963. lIntel Rprts 63 and 69A-702. box 1 15.

iat Gein Williamn NV Nloier. Col Robert N IPACAF Ref Ilk for M~ay 63 SIEC1)E Corf.

I e\\. and ItI Col H-arr\ NI Cltipmnia Agenda Iteiii 4: insg, S ECSlI A IT" to Am Emnb

34. Report oif Visit hb .ICS 'eiman to SVN. Saigon. Mma 13. 1963: Hotise of RepresentaJ1an 63. pt III t1 iMes. Foreign Operatomn Ilyrolriationv. 88th

35. Ibid., see also tiisgs. 2d AlD to PACAIF. Cong. 1st sess (Wsashingtotn. 1963). pt 2.

Jun 27. 1963, MACV to CINCPAC. No\ 17. pp 89.91.

1962. CINCPAC to NIACV. No\ 19. 1962. aind 47. Ib~id.. pp 94-95: nisg.CINCPIACtoJCS.

PACAF to CSAF. Apr 10. 1963 Apr 4. 1963. CINCPAC Rerd. 8th SECIE

36 Report oh Visit by KIS I cant. lani 63. See Comif. NI a\ 6.1963. Itenms Iantd M :aiic I'ACA F

IV. nitsgs. .ICS to CINCIPAC. I eb 17. 1963.and Ref Ilk for Mlay 63 SP'Cl)[ElI Cotif. Ageiida

CINCIPAC to NIACV. l-eb 17. 1963: ltr. Mocor- Item L.

mant to Atis. Feb HI. 19631 48 D01) Pentagon Palvr%. Blk 3 IV B 4.

317 Nlsgs. 2d Al) ito PACAF. Jain 24 and 11-12, See IV.I.5 .4. migs. lDir Plaits. IJSAF. to

27. 1963. PACAI- to CSAI-. Feb 14. 1963, PA(CAl-. Apr 30. 1963. anid to I AC. May 20.

SI*CS'I AlI F to Aitihnb Saigoin. l-eb I5. 196.1: 1962: CINCIPAC Rerd. 8th SIiCl)FF Comif.

Report of Visit by.ICS I ea mit-lamt 63. pm IV May 6. I1903. Items, 2 and 4

38, Nlsgs. CINCIPAC to MACV. Mar 2. 49 [list. l'ACAI-. .lan-it.n 63. 11. Junt 63.

196l.and IPACAF to 2d1 Al). Mair 2. 1963. Mlanpow.er Res ew, and Anialysis of I3mh AF

319 Report oif Visit by J('S I eam to SVN. Acti'.ities.,.lun 28. 1963. lii(I (if 'Iouir Report. I.t

.lait 63. See HI. pairas 2 and 2a. anid See V. Co Ja mitesC l)tinii. .InI 22.1I963:luiist. PACA F.

para Ia .lcil-lDee 63. 1. pt 2. Oct 63: 1)01 Pentagon

40 Air Staff Obsers ations. Sotith Vietnatm. Paper. Ilk 3. I V BI 4.. 12-13. 15-16

Jant 16-30. 1963 50 PIAL Al- Ref Blk Ici No\ 631 S[CI

41. Nlsg.,MACVto I)IA.LNir 2. 1963. Ilear- Coi.lb4:it'sttIrmiboy(riigr

iiigs lief(re the Committee on Armed Sers tes. .1 il 13. I1963

U S Senate, Miitaarv Proi uremnt / thoriza- 51 Msg. vI ACV to J CS. ltmi 13. 196..

lion. Fival Year 1964. 88th Cotig. Ist sess,

Chapter XV

Air Operations. 1963

II liree C'- I23s were detached to I Itailand 2 Msgs. USARI'A('to CINCPAC. Apr 19.

lP'\CAI- Ref Ilk for Niay 63 SECI)EF Cooil, 1963. CINCPAC to IJSARI5AC. May 1. 1963.

Agenda Item I. tiisg. CI NCPIAC to M A(V. and to NI ACV .Iait 24 and Atil 21. 1963. and 2d

.1 ii 24. 1963. lust. 315 1 (C (p. .lai-Jtim 63. p I5 Al) to PACAF-. Jtil 9. I1963: ltr. AtIi to

309
THE ADVISORY YEARS Notes to Pages 167-171

Martin. Sep 2. 1963, ims w 'ithI Kenned\ b\ 1963. ist. 0091N sI econ Sq. lul-Dlee 63. pp I I-

(lausehe., leb 4. 1964. 1 5. I'A CA F Counter in suirge nc I esso us

3 I/in!. hr., Anthis. to Stuart. No\ 25, 196i3: 1 eatrned. Sep 12. 1963

isgN. 2d Al) to Bill Al'. l'eb 25. 1963. and 12 CINCPAC Rterd. 8th SFCI)FI- (ConI,

315th Al) to PACAI'. l'eb 25. 1963. Mla\ 6. 1963. Itemn 3: It. Rose to MACV.J-5. Oct

4 Ilist. 315th I C (it) Jan-Jun 63. pp 15, 19. 23. 1963: PACAI- Ref Bk for Mayt 63 SlC(I)I

z35: Itr. Mat Geni R.(. Wc'ede to 2d AL). Apr 18, ConI - Agenda lItem 4. nisg. NI ACV to

1963. hist. IPACAl'. Jan..lun 63 HI. Junl 63 CI NCPAC. Apr 29. 1903. int s s iti Kenned\

SII ist. 315th]I C Gp. Jant-Jun 63. 1) 24: lIrs. III Caruscehe. I eb 4. 1964

Capt L.oius %V Gav'or to USAFS(l')V. Jlun 10. 131 lItr. Anthis to Brig (Gen II 1)

1963. A uthis to Ma~rtin. Sep 2. 1963 and1( toA~ nesworth. Oct 28. 1963. and ito Smuart. No\

3151h Cp. Mm~ It. 1963-. AC I IV. Il'nI Rprt 25 

. 1963. Mellish rprts. Dec 9. 1963, and JIan IS.

p 9 1964: Col I larw\e F. HIenderson End of I otur

6 lut t I.tllc 31 7 n'wsih Report. I'cb S. 1964: PACAF Ref Ilk for NMd\ 63

Kennedv by Causehc. l-eb 4. !964: itr. Auts to SIECI)EI Conf. Agenda Iteit 4. Op% AnaIksis

Smart. No\ 25. 1963 Ofc. 2d A 1), Cotinteriiisorgenc\ I esn 7 Nlsgs. 2d Al) to PACAI-. Mar 22. 1963, I eariied, Jan-.Itn 64. Jtit 4. 1964

Sep 29. 1963, aind Oct 5, 1963. MAC'V to 14 Rtm. Brig Glen Virgil I Zoller to CSAI'.

CI NCIAC, Oct 3. 1963. PACAI' to 2d Al). Oct Jtul 5. 1962. sealso Proj Corona Iharest Oral

30. 1963. Cl NC PAC to CSA F. Mar IS and Mm [list Int\%% 831 with Col Williani NI Martiin. (a

11,- 1963. Hearings before thre Commnittee oil Jan 30. 1971. PACA F Ref Bll lor SF'CI)IE1

Appropriations. U.S Sciiaie Foreign,Ls-1s wnw Conf. May 13. 1964. I'.ict Sheet 6, NIAC\'

amd Ri'Iawe ,-Igei'oie%' Appropriatomn for 1 965. Suionmar\ of HIighilights. p 135

88th Cong. 2d sess ( Washiingtoin. 1964). 15 Nlsg. 2d1 Al) to I'ACAI'. Jill 10 1963

pp 1 (0-01:1 [ist D~ata Rerd. 34th 1GC. Juli-Dlee 16 PA CA I' Stinima r of Act ioins. (Gcen

63. p I tnd atch 3: hist. I 3th A F. Jtil-IDec 63. 1. Wheeler's P'art\ 

. pt 2. lab 20. It Col Miles MI

116, lust. Assi for N1 ttual See tirit\ 

. LISA P,. J1ul- D~oyle IId of I our Report. F-eb 6, 1963: iiit 

s

lDce63. pp 53-54: inemo with atch. Col Roger E,. withI Maj Willi i J J1ohnson and( Captf E~rnet

Phelan.DIir Plans. UtSAF-. to Asst \'CS. tISAF.. C Cutler. JIr 

. b (Grainiger. Feb 7. 1963: Aiitiis

Aug 13. 196.3, htr. Carpenter to MIoorman. Apr file of item to be takeiitip sN itl Geni I e Nia\ 

.a 1. 1963. Mlar 63: ms~gs. 13th Al- to IPACAI'. Atig9. 1963

8 list. PACAI-. Jul-l)ec 62.11. I)ec 62: lust. 17 1 tr. Anderson to Anthis. Apr 12. 1963.

illt Al'. 1962. 1. 107-08. misg. Al- Sec, lust. I'ACAI'. .Ian..un 63. 1I. Mla\ 63: lirs.

MIAAG;V. to PACAI'. Atig 12. 19631: PACAF Antliis to Brig Gei Joseph W Stils~ell atid to

C'ouniterinisturgecty Lesons I earined, Sep 12. Moortni. Nla 28. 1963, nisg. 2d Al) to

1963 PACAF, JIan 10. 1904 59 lust. PACAI'. Jan.iJun 63.1 II.ii 63. Vai I8. Qutoted in uuisg. PACAI' to ('SAl'.. bitii.

Staasereii. p .33. msgs. PACAF to l3th Al'. 1963

Mar 1. 1963. 5th Al' to 41st Al). Mar 27. 1963. 19 I o conceal ll'?6s as strikec aircraft. tirie\

2d Al) to ibt AF. JIan 10. 1963. MACV to ssec referred to ,is It 1-26s. the reconnaissance

('I NCPA('. Mar I5. 1963. lust. 5th Al'-. 1963, 1. eonfiguratin

59. PACAF StimmarN of Actions. Geni 20. Misgs. ('SAF- to JI'S. I eb 8. 1963.

Whieeler's Party. See 1. lab F. lust. PA('AF. PACAF to CSAI-. l'eb 20. 1963. 2d Al) io

.a.1uii 63. 11. Ma r 2. 1963 1)A CA IF. I -eb1 18. 19 63. h istI. SA W('. .Iain-.1tiii 6 3.

10 I list. IPACA I'. .InI-DIee 62. 11. No%. 62. p 1 00

Rteport of Visit by JICS learn to SVN. Ian 63. 21 Nlsg. ('SAl' to PACAI'. Mar 5. 1963.

See II. para 2e( 5)( b). fir. Antlis to NIilton. .ani rprt. Col 1-ra uk It Pancake. M1-ar 20. 1963

11, 1963 22 I tr. Aiidersoii to Ariimii, Apr 12. 1963.

11. tvlsgs. Ist Air Comimiando Gp to AF .C musgs. 31 3th Al) to PACA 1'. Apr 27. 1963. and

InI Ofe. .ltil 1. 1963.21 Al) to I'ACA F. Atig 25 i ll AlF to PACAF. Apr 27. 1963: list.

anid Sep 21. 1963. MACV ito CI NCPAC. Mar PACAI'. .taiiJtin 63. 11. Jun 63: NMaipo%%er I5. 1963. 5th AF to 4l-t Al). Mar 27. 1963. I 3tli Reviess andl Aiiah~sis of I 3tl Al' Actisities.

AF to PACAF. Apr 12. 1903. I 3thi Al- to 2d RVN. fll 28. 1963: Hlenderson End of Ilour

AlD. May 6. 1963. 2(d Al) to 13111 AlI-. Jtin 27. Report. I-6b5. 1964.1hist. 13th Al-.. Jul-l)cc63. 1.

1963. ,iid PACAF to 2d Al).Sep 13. 1963: losts. 10-I1I

l'ACAI'. Jan-Jtin 63. II. l-eb 24-NMar 2. 1963. 23 lis-t ),tta Rer1. 1st ACS. .ltil-l)c63. iiicl

11l. JIttn 63. and .Itl-lecc 63. 111. Jul 63. htr. 4: lisis. SAWC. Jan-.ltii 63. II. Iteim 74. and

IHenderson to Moornian. Jul 25. I1903. Frnd oif Jutl-Dlcc 63. p 119. lust. B illi Al'. .lant-. tn 63.

I our Reports. Capt Hlarry C Rudolph. (a Oct p 72. insgs. CSAI' to PACA I'. unl 17.1963. and

63. and ('apt Joseph 1: Sinianoiiok. Oct IS. PACAI' to CSAI'. Apr 30. 1961

310
7 7 . ,

Notes to Pages 171-177

24. Ilist. 13th AF-. Jan-Jun 63. pp 22-23: 1963: m'.gs. 2d Al) to lPACAl-. Jan 10. 1964.

Futrell. "Chronology." for 1954-67: WVilliam C and Ill ASOC to 2d A I). l-eb 5, 1964, marginal

Greenhaigh. Jr.. ~Reconnaissance in SEA," comments, b% Ross on Melgish rprt. D~ec 9. 1963

p 1-90: End of TFour Report. Col JIohn C 38 lPACAP Ref Blk for Ma'. 63 SECI

Ilaygood. Feb 19. 1963: firs.. Moorman to Conf. Agenda Item 3

Anthis. l'cb II. 1963. and Apr 15. 1963. Anthi'. 39. PACAI- Counterins.urgency I esson'.

to Monorman. Mar 28. 1963: lust. SAWC. Jul- Learned. Sep 12.1963: hist. 2d AD. Jan-JunW6.

Dcee 63. pp 6-8: nisgs. CSAF to PIACAF. Ma'. VI. lDoc 31. mrsg, 2d1 Al) to 13th AlF. No%. 15.

29. 1963. and 2d Al) to PACAF. Jan 10. 1964 1963. Army See. NIAAGV. Less'ons. I cairned 37.

Anderson Find of lour Report. Apr 5. 1963. Feb 10. 1964

I'ACAI Order 0-40. Jtin 13. 1963. lusts. 315th 40 Matrin and iCleser. V.67-6i9. m'.g. 2dAl)

I C Gp (As.sault), Jan-Jun 63. and Jul-Dlec 63. to PACAPI. Jul 10. 1963: Final Rprt. Opetap 1. im.. PACAI-. Jul-lDec 63. 111. 1-5, tional 1 e't and E'alutiton. I ACS in R\'N. App

25. Msg. 2d Al) to 6220th ABSq. Jan 30. M. p 11. Itr. Col I homas MI Ilergert to Ifien.

1963. May 8. 1963: 1'r. Iliento Roularnd. Nlav9. 1963:

26. Report of Visit by JCS 'lean to SVN. PIACAIF Ref Ilk for No\. 63 SliCl)EI Conf.

Jan 63. See IV. para 8: MACV Summary of lab 213

Hi~ghlights. p 41. 41 Ltr. apt B I Ruhnian to 2dAl).J.I2.

27 Nigro Mernnof I-elt-lDaem Meeting, Jan 1963. and I'.t Ind. Capt IFred W Maivberr'. to

9. 1963. intvw with MiacKellar by Grainger. Aug lDep I)ir .AOC. nd.. m'.g. CINCI)AC to JC'S.

29. 1963. ltr. Antltus to Milton. Apr 18. 1963: Jan 15. 1963. Cahill and Shtilim'ou (draft).

rprt. Capt John Sereel. ca. Apr 8. 1963: and ltr. -'llistory of US Marine Corps. Operations. in

Stiluesll to Anthi'.. Sep 9. 19631 Vietnam..Jan-Jun 65."~ pp 16d17. ms.g. I'ACAF

28. Mvsg. Arnnib Saigon to SECS I A'11. 'o CSAIF. Jun 24. 1961: int%'.' '.ith Ingalls b%

Apr 10. 1963. Gausehec. Aug 21. 1963. fitr. Siinon.I(to

29. M'.g. SECS I A'L to AmE'nb Saigon. Gunderson. No%. 30. 1972: hr. Capt D~onald V.

Apr 12. 1963. and AmEnib Saigon to MatcKellar to AI.O FAC Sec. 2d \I.). ia. Jul

SECSTA IT. Apr25 and 30. 1963: PACAF Rc 63. lIr'.. Capt Ronald A Jlohns.on to Al 0 I-AC

Blk for Ma'. 63 SECI)EF Conf. Agenda Item 1. See. 2d Al). Jun 22.25. 1963.and Jul 2. 1963.

and CINCI)AC Rcrd. 8th SECDEF Conf. %Jay 42 ILtr. Anders.on to An%. Apr 12. 1903.

6. 1963. Item 6. rprt.l.t ColIlenrv C Mcur.to IIASOC. Jan I5.

30 CINCP)AC Rerd. 8th SECI)EF Conf. 1963. and l'tlInd. l.tCol J,imie'. Co%%ce. nd

May 6. 1963. Item L. AFXOPJ Bk of Action'. in 43 Rprt. Maj Magnus. 11 Johns.on. F-eb 4.

SEA. 1961-64. Item'. VI-Fi. F. G. 1963. and I'.t Ind. L~t Col Charles. S. Allen. F-eb

31 leairings before the Committee on -or- 11. 196.3. itr. MacKellar to Al 0 FAC See. (ai

cign Affair'.. House of Represcentati'.c'. Foreign Jul 63

Asl~tanie Alct of 1963. 88th Cong. l'.t '.e'.' 44 Rprt'.. Meier to 11 ASOC. Jan 15. 1963.

(Wa'.hington. 1963). PPi 744-45 and I'.t Ind. Co'.ee to 2d Al). n d ..aud Mar?2.

32. CINCI)AC Rerd. 8th SECI)EF Conf. 1963: rprt. Mat Mlagnus. P Johns.on. to Al (311

May 6. 1963. Item 3: m'.g. CINCPIAC to Corp'.. Feb 4. 1963. and kit Ind. ItI Col Chairles.

ADMINO. CINC)AC. Mar-27. 1963: IPACOMI S Mfen, to 2d Al). l-eb 11. 1960. rprt'.. ItI Col

WVkl% Intel Dige'.t. Jul 20. 1962 Charles. S. Allen. M~ar I5. 1903. and NMa% 17.

3i3. Rprt'.. Capt Les'ter G. Fraiir. Jan 11. 1963. Van Staa'ercn. I'1anm and I'ohi "v lin

Feb 20. and Mar I5. 1963. S~oth I u'gnani. 1961-1963 tOkL AlF [list. 1965)

34 Rprt'.Maj James F Vealcy. Apr?2. 1963. 45. Rprt. Nlaj .ohn G Schmitt. Jun 13. 1963:

antd Capt E'dward NI Robinson. (a. May 63: Meter rprt. Jtin 20. 1963

PACAF Ref IBk for May 63 SECDFI- Conf. 46 Blrtie End of Ilour Report. ca Jtin 64.

Agenda Item 1. Ilearing'. betore a Subcommittee on Appropria35. Rprt'.. Lt Col Chatrles. S. Allen. Jun 4. tion'.. Ilouse of Repre'.entati'.e'. Foreign Opera.

1903. Capt I out'. A. Klenkel. Apr 30-Nlay 8. tozv ,pprolpraaoons for 1964. 89th Cong. l'.t

1963. and Jun 3. 1963: CINCPIAC Rerd of %c%-'. (Wa'.hitgton. 1963). p 230. ia'g. 2d Al) to

Spcial SEC)E F-SECSl AlE Conf. No'. 20. 13th AF. Atug 21. 1963

1963. Item A4: End of 'I our Rprt. Maj Walter S 47 Melli'.h rprt. Oct 16. 1963

Bruce. ta. Jun 64. 48. CINCI)AC Rerd of Special SECII--

36 Ilist. 2d Al). Jan.Jtil 64. IV. 13-14: 2d SECS I A'l FiConf. Nov. 20. 1963. Item A4: rprt.

Al) Regulation 55-5. Jan 22. 1963: imsg. NMaj William I irgin.Jan 10. 1963. and 2d hid.

PACAF to CSAI-. Apr 16.1l963. ltrs. Ilarkin'.to I t Col .Iiac'. 0. Co'.'cc. Feb 16. 1963: Enid of

Anthis. May 13.,1963.1It Col Charles S. Allen to I our R prt. NMaj Robert K Blutler. lun 8. 1904:

2d Al). May IS. 1963 I'ACAI- Ref Blk for NMa% 63 SFCDIEI- Cotif.

37. Melli'.h rprt'.. Oct 16. No'. 6. and D~ec 9. Ag.-nda Itenm I: lDoyle Entd of] our Report. Feb

311
THE ADVISORY YEARS Notes to Pages 177-183

6. 1963: insg. 2d AD) to PACA I-, Feb 15. 1963. Col Bill A Montgonier . (a Aug 63

hi%t. PACAF. Jul-Dec 63. 1. pt 2. No% 63. lust. 62. End of 1 our Report. Col Harold 1:

"A CA F. Jan-Jun 04. 1. pt 2, Jan 64. Walker. Aug 21. 19K4 Decbriefing of Walker.

49 Rprt. Maj Clarence M Van Metcr.jul3. Sep IS. 1964:hist. 13th AF-.Jul-lDce63. Ill. D~oc

1963. rprts. L~t Col Donald K Reami. Feb 28. 79: rprt. Lt Col Giarr% Oskan'p. Oct 1. 1963. ltr.

1963. Mklir 8. 1963. and 1st Ind. L~t Col1 Jatnc% 0 Cot R 1. Gleason to Carl Berger. May 12. 1972

Co%%ee. n d.. rprt. Capt Bob W Quinn. it d ,.and 63 Ntg. 2d Al1) to Ofth AlP. Sep 2. 1963: Itr.

1st I rd. Cou cc. Ap r8. 1963. M Rs. Maj Stephen Anthis to Mal (icti Sarn Maddu\. .li . Oct 11.

J Carrig. Mfar 28. 1963. Apr 1. 1963: rprt. 1963. ttlsg. PAIL Al- to CSAF. Oct 9 1963.

Burgin. Apr 1. 1963. atnd Ist Itid. Covuee. Apr 8. 04. ltst. 34th CAM RON. Jul $-[)cc 31.

1963. 1963: fhenderson Und of I our Report. Feb 5.

50. Rprt. Burgin. Apr 22. 1963. and kt H,1. 1964. Capt Glenn F Frick Etnd of 1 our Report.

Co%%ce. nd.: I'ACAF- Ref IBk for Ma% (3 Jul 20. 1963. r prt. Mellish. Jan 15. 1904: End of

SFCI)EF Conf. Agenda Itemn I l our Reports. Capt Ro% II. Lynn. Jr. Capt

51 Iid. rprt. Burgin. Apr 21. 1963. and 1st I homjis G. Catm. atnd Lt' Well% 'I Jackson. in

Ind.Jun 6. 1963; rprt. L~t 'Ihonas (.,%Icliierne%. lust. SAWVC. JtiI-lec 63. II. D~oe 35

Jttn 22. 19631 65 Mart-.n atnd Cle~er. IV. 62-64: Maj

52. 1st Ind. rprt. Burgin. Apr 25. 1963: rprt. Williatm I Bturgin lEnd of 'I our Report Jutl If.

Mclnerney..Jun 22. 1963. and Co%%ee. 1st Ind 1963. rprts. McItiernei. Jul 22. 1963. antd

nmd . rprt. Burgin. Jttl 1. 196.3. Mellish. ca. Aug 21. 1963. MacKellar int%%% b%

53 Martin and Clexer. V 96-97. rprt. Capt Grainger. Aug 29. 1963. It Cql K !Colhings%

Fred W. %I~ibcrr%. Jul 5-6. 1963. rprt. Sep 15. 1963. Cotmbat Op%. 19t!h l ASS.

54. l)o%!e End of Ilour Report. F-eb 6. 1963, IDee 31. 1962. in Ilist. l3th Al-.JuI-I)ec 63. 111.

hist. 13th AF.Jtil-1ec 63.11f!. Doe 79. Summtar\ D~oc 80. M ellisli rprt. Oct 16. 1963: insg. 2d AD

of Aircraft l~ost atnd D~amaged. 1963. rnsgs. 2d to l'ACAI-. Oct 5. 1963: .tnd I t Col John J

AlD to PIACAF. Jutl 5 .tnd Jtil 10. 1963. lirs. Willtong rnd of1 'Iour Report. Jtin 30. 1964

Martin to Anthis Sep 17. 1963. and Anihis to 66 Rprts. Mellish. Jlan 15. 1904. and Mat

Martin. Oct 9. 1963. John Gi Schnitt.J.r . Sep 2. 1963. and Ist Ind.

55. Anderson lEnd of Four Report. Apr 5. Allen. Sep 12.,1963. tuerno. Ross for Amni. Oct

1963. h~r. Mat Gen Robert R Ro\ latnd to M aj 10. 1963.

Geni Robert N. Ginsbtrgh. Apr 72. 67 \'dn Meter. rprt. Jul 18. 196' atnd 1st Id.

56 II ist. 2d Al). Jan-Jutn 04. VI. D~oe 31. Couc.id .kMatI laroldl J oh nsoti rprt. Sep 6.

I'ACAF Ref Ilk for No% 63 SIECDIEF- CowI. 1963. ind 1st Itid. Allen. Sep 1', 1963. Schmitt

lab 28: fitr. Ilenderon to Moortatn. Attg 1. rpft. Sep) 18. 1963. and 1st Ind, Allen. Sep 28.

1963 1963. Mellish rprt. t a Sep 18. 1963

57 Msg. AmlEmb. Vientiane. to SE*C. 68. [itrs.Co%%ceeto 7th Di\ Al O.Jul 8. 1963.

S'I A'l E. Apr 26. 1963: PACAF Ref Blk for No% and1( Mellish to) lep D~ir. Ill ASOC. Aug 20.

63 SECDEI- Conf. lab 21f: rp- . Mellish. cac 1963. McIhsh rprt. Sep 16.,I963.mtng. MACV to

Aug 21. 1963. tnsg. VSAIRA ,5, gizn. to l)IA. CINCIIAC. Ma\ IS. 1963. PACAF Ref lit for

Jutl 18. 1963 ',o\ 63 SFCI F' P (Cot. lab 21f: ist. 2d1 ADI.

58 Msgs. JCS to CINCI'AC. No 1. 1963. .Iati-Jun 04. \VI. lDoL 31. Quie rprt. Oct 19.

MACV to JICS. Jtun 13. 1964. 2d Al) to l3th 1963

At-. Aug 21. 1961. 69 Ms. 3th Al to l'ACAI'. Aug 12. 1963.

59 Brtuce lEnd of I otir Report. ca. Jlun (A4: PA( Al- Ret Blk for Mw. 64 St ( [)I, I (tili. 11.

Cl \CIAC Rcrd of Special SFC(I)FE I- Ops I aict Sheet 6. l awrence .1 Ilicke\. Vighzi

SFCS I AlI F %ftg. No% 20. 1963. Itenm A4: rprt. (Claw 4tr Supplort ini R V. 196/41966 (IIQ

MIk Robert K. Biutfer. Oct 30. 1963: Butler lEnd [',\('At-. Prot CIIFCO. Mar 15. 1967). lp 5.32.

of I otir Report. .ltn 8. 1964. Burchctt. I winaoi. I' 'A F Ref Blk Ifir \ o\ 63 S FCI+ (" onI. lab

p 89 213. tass. 2d Al)to I'ACAl Jar Jif)1. 1964,utunss

60 Hlearing% before the Coinnittee on silh Kentied% b% (iautehc. I eb 4. 19641 hist.

Appropriations. U~S Senaitc. I'or'ig,, .luivancc img. 2d Al). jan-lul 64. VI. insgs. 2d ADI to

andI Ielaw'ilgent te Appropriaionis for 1964. V' \('A l-. \o% 16.1I963 .and PA CAU l to 5t11 AlF.

88th Cong. I %t se\% (Washtintion. 1963). p 374. Oct 9. 1963

MRI. Ross. Oct 7. 1963: Vati Staameren. USA1 F 70 Msg. 2d AlD to l3th AF~. .\uig 21. 1961.

Mahn v andlu pti in South I ,inam, 1961-1963?. BMitler ront. Oct 3. 1960. misg. 14 I ac (ip to 2d

pp 73-74 Al).Sep I1. 961: Caitn IhotasG (iain. utd of

61 PACAl- Ref Blk for No% 63 SFCDIl+ I our Report. n dl . in Ilist. SAWC .lttl-lDc 63,

Conf. Ilab 28: rprt. Capt lDonitld V MlacKellar. 11. D~oc 35

Oct 9. 196.1 IR. Ilendmron. Oct 7. 1963. rpnts. 71 Butuler rptti. Oct 1. 1963: isg. 14th I ac Gp

Mai lohn G Schnitt.J.r . Sep 17. I 9f3. and I t to 2d AD I. Sep 13. 1961. (Camt F td of I[otr

112
Notes to Pages 184-189

Report. id.. in Ilms. SA WC. Jukl. Dee 63. I .1 tim 64. 111. lust rprt. Ja~n 64

D)oe 35 74 Buffter rprt. No.. 26. 1963. htr.. Pierce ito

72 Coiling% rprt. Sep I5 1903. and 1st Id. lep lDir. AOC. Oct 19. anid 21. 1963; Quanie

I t (CoI Milton It Pierce. Ser 24. 1903. rprt. ('apt Note,.. Oct 19-21. 1903

Don 0 Quarie. Oct 23. 1903. Butler E~nd of I our 75 Nlicnerne\ rprt. No.. 27. 1963

R eport. Junit S. 1 964 70 Nlsgs. NI ACV. to J1CS. lutn 13. 1964. .nd

73 Msgs. PACAI' to 2d Al). No%. 19. 1903. .(S to CI \CPt

AC. No. 1. 1903. Pierce. I ild of

to CI\CP1AC. Dece 1. 1963. aind MIACV to I otut Report, J.ul 24. 1964

CI\CI'AC. Dece 24. 1963. lust. PACAI' .JanCI-1 A PTE R X VI

Cllapse of ihe Ditm Government

I Cl NC PAC Rcr(1. St i S PCI F Cont. tenits Jani es C I homp..oi. I r . I lo.. Could

Ma\ 6. 1903. Iteim NI NI lb % letmiain I hippentAt At \itops, .- .1 tlanit. Apr

2 M~art in and Cle.. r. Ill. 64. D~einim .1 65. ppt 50-51 . Slesuinger. 4 1Ihouand Pats

lDiuencaon. (imteriloeni and~ Rievoliioni tit p 991. II ilsitani. ho 1toue a Vation. pp-453.85.

I itniai ('c Ne. York. 1 90o). lp 327-331. H eair- I a~ br. Sitord. and Pipi .hare.. p 292. riig.

ings before a Subcommittee ol the Committee State to I odge. Aug 24. 1 903. tin 001) Peintagon

otn A'ppropriation,.. I louse ot Representati.es. I'after.. Bk 12 516-37

F'ore-ign 01wrantoin -Ipprpruaiton for 1964. 14 John Nleckliti. Ilii.on fin Iorinei. fit

88th ('ong. I st se.% ( Wa..Iiigtoii. 1903). pt 31. hitnate 1I4 oint of fiI S /?olet tit I gtnao:

pp YA~-65 W~arden ( it%.. 1965). pp 193-9s. Nirtin and1(

3 IDA Pamphlet 550.40. Areci H andbook for Cle.. r. Ill. 81. t'S IDept of Staite. 'lionmno

N let ni ii. Sep 62 Foreign I'oI, ('nrren I)oi toine,,,.. 1963,

4 Foriign Opriion..o ..lPpropirtilron. for lip 802-66,. iig (' 1 \CPAi.'to JCS. Auig 25.

1964. pt 2. pp 14-17. a rd 89-91. Pidliu Aiperol 19613

thei Iireudi,it Aennedi. 1963. P) 421. ntsg. I. lDept of Staite. Blletin. \ ol 56,. 799.

S F S I A I I to Ani\m b Saiieon. Ma. 13. 1 903 Ioh trior. .Su, A pr 4. 1968. p 4

5 MIa rtitt aind Cle.. er. Ill. 65.70. mnsg. if lialsitan. Io IVit.wa N ':ttfn p 412

CIXCPAC to MIAC\ . JIim 5. 1961 17 Nlsg%. I odge ito Rnsk. Aug 29. 1961. in

6 NMsg. 'SA IRA Saiigon ito )1 A, Julii Is. I flow..-. Pentagon Paper. pip 19i' 9S. Stmie

Ii963 to I odge and1( Ilarkmut. ANug 21). 1963. in P)OP

7 Qtioted in tsg. PA.CANI- it) CSAI'. .IuI 23. /'etnk~oni Palper. Ill. 12 518. lecni ( .ihot

191 odg,!. flit Storm li.Han 1. he% i -.IIn..mlt

8 Schliittzer. .1 Ihioiand Plat... p 988. \arranie (Ne.. ) oirk. 191). pp20l3

lDept of State. Bunlletin. Vol 56. 7991 18 NMsg. I'ACNI to (',,Al . Aug 21), 196i3

9 Mart in and (*Cle.cr. 111. 73-75. CQ Bacik- 19) t'S IDept of Staite. 'linll 01? a .riln

grundt. Chitand IS mtr im'.. Polit t . 1945-S -. 1'ohit Current IPiii ninm. 196? lilt69.().

p 125 iiis. i'ACAI It ;C (SAl . ',,I N. !9W

10 Ili[\%% m...il It A .111 Ib.n tisehle aind 20 Phitpi PApier. of thle P~rew.di, &ei'nedi,

(Grainger. Autg 3t0. 1961 1963. pip 651-52

11 VS D~ept o1 State. linertian floreign 21 NI g. ('INC(' 'N to N I) I IN0

Iltohi i C'urrent Do)1,1 ni. 1963) Washington. 'I NC PAC. Oct 22. I19)(2, Ma rtiii aind (I. i

1967), lip X62.66. V)01) Pentagon Papi'r.. 111. 127-28

1\ 1V B . x.iii. mg. SI[CS I A I1: to Aiti Fitli 22 Ibid . p 102. Buttinger. I winain. 11. 186.

Saigoni. Aug 21. 190'3. id see IIilmnan i. lo 24?. NIie,at%. Nlanei. 11 ar ol ghi I anquhi.Ii

%lote ifat,,',. a, p 486 (\CN...' ork. 197 1). lp 132.52

12 Msg%. 2(d Al) to CINCPAC. Auig 21. 23 VS lDept o1 Staite. 'silirii Oi I .lr'l~

1963. a i(I("I NCIA C to .1 CS. Auig 21.I 1. aitd Poh, (utrri'ni Pott1inteti'' 196,?. ip $1.72.

iug 25. I1963 $82.53. 'nithon. I Siinscai en. 1/u' lIm of the

13 According to (General I.,~lot, tire tire%- 11a,,dari,, IDii'n of I egnain Ii Pt stu rglt.

sige %%,I% is ip'itliheul t tut conlcuirrenee b\. tile 1965). p 109

Seerclt.ir of IDelemte (it thteluit Chieflsol Sltil. 24 M.ig. I

1

A('' tot (SAl .Sep N. 1960

a111 ough I eptt Sccreltciar If )lemte GiIltatric 25 Ihid . Meek lil. , 1i tit Icitni.

Iod1 I ;iklot Itmitself "..ere itil trtned (ifits coin- lip 222-2 1. Schiles itge. .1 Ihl'Uomad P~at%.
THE ADVISORY YEARS Notes to Pages 189-198

p 995: Dept of State. Iulletn. Vol 56. 799 5th AF. Aug 27. 1963 mg.JCS to CINCPAC.

Kennedy on Noember 7 ended %ecret report%. Oct 29. 1963. Shapen. Lott Reohtuolitt.

and L.odge restored the countr. team concept. pp 188-212. |talberstam . MaAing ol a

26. Msg. 2d Al) to PACAF. Mar 12. 1964: Quagmire. pp 277-99

Martin and Cl~e~r. III. 80-81. 99-104. 31 Ihul.. pr 288-99. msg%. 2d A I) to

lialberstin. .ttilmgofaQuagnnre. pp 252-53. PACAF. No\ 28 and Dec 2. 1963. Martin .and

27. [lalberstani. p 659. Schlesiner. A 71aott- Clecr. Ill. 110-18

sand Dais. pp 995-9t: memo. McNamara and 32. IA( AF Ref Ilk for No% 63 SCI)EI"

'1 avlor for the IPresident. Oct 2. 1963. in DOI) Conf.1 :.b IA. lt. Dir Plan%. 'SAF. .Iul-I)ec

Pentagoni Papers. Ilk 12 554-89. nmsg%.2d A1)to 63. p 233: US Dcpt of State. 4,inernani I'oreign

PACAF, Sep 29 and 30. 1963. and Oct 2. 1963. Iohci: Current Document%. 1963. pp 879-80

PACAF to 2d AD, Oct 9. 1963. ltrs. Frederick 33 CINCPAC Record of Special SECI)E--

NV. Flott to larbin. Oct 2. 1963. Wade to SECSI AI I Meeting. No% 20. 1963. Item IA.

CHI MAAGV. Sep 30. 1963. PACAF Rf Ilk for No% 63 SECDEF ConI. lab

28 thel'reuhent.s:Ken,:ed,. 4iAt1hhPapersof 4A: mg. 2d AD to PACAF. Dcc 3. 1961:

1963. pp 759.60. Melhh rprt. Dcc 9. 1963

29. CINCIPAC Cored [lst. 1961. p 280. I'S 34. Martin and Cl~e~r. III. 118: PACAF

l)ept of State. American I'oregn Pohe: Cur- Iackground Ilk for SI)E: meeting of Ma%

rent Doeunents. 1963. pp S/5. 877. CQ Back- 13. 1964. II. Op% I-act Sheet 6. his. 2d AD.

ground. Clnnaand *S ,t'ar East Pohei. 1954.67. .ln-Jhn 64. VI. Doc 31. CINCPAC Record of

p 129" [fearing before the Stbcommittee on the Special SIECDIII-SFCSTA*I F Meeling. No%

Far East and Oie Pacific of tle Committee on 20. 1963. Items. A2 and 133.

I:oreign Atairs. tou.e of Represenrtatmes. 35. PIdIhclPalernothelPreuhent h'eiteIl.

Unite.li taies Pohri-toltard (1 va. 89th Cong. 2d 1963. p 846.

se-, (Washington. 1966). pt I. pp 154-55. 157: 36, CINCI'AC Record of Special SICI)FI--

Duncanson. Governnent and Ietvohitioii it SECS I A IF: Meeting. No%. 20. 1963. Iten% 113

Vietnam. pp 286-338. and 14. [fearing, before the Committee on

30. Martin and Cl~e\r. III. 106417. 109-10. Appropriation%. I'S Senate. Foreign, A sitanme

1 hompsotn. Defeating Cornuntimt I nurgenct. and Related. Igeni tea p,llyrolriationti for 1964.

p 42: Mcckhn. Mision in Torment. pp 277-78. h8tli Cong. Il .,c!. (Walnmton. 1963). p 348.

lit. I3th AF. JuIl-Dc63. I. 75. m.sg. PACAI- to lhst. 13th Al-. .luil-Dec 63. I. 16 and 66

CHAPTER XVII

Objectives Confirmed. Methods Expanded

I. l'ACAI" Ref Ilk for SECDFI- Conf of Brad%. Dcc 3. 1963: Hlalberstarn. Making ofa

May 13. 1964. II. Fact Sheet 4: lost. I)ir Plan. Quagmitre. p 307

USA!:.JuI-Dec3.p 6. ,Vew )'orA Tme. Pen- 6 NIcInerne\ rprt. Dcc I1. 1963. Ist Ind..

tagon P1apers. pp 232-33: DO) Pentagon Btiler. Dec 12. 1963. 2d Ind. Coling. nd . 3d

Papers. Ilk 3: IV.C...4. Johnson. Vantage Ind. Pierce. I)ec22.1963:nlg.2d Al)toCSAI-.

Point. p 45. Dcc I. 1963. 2d Al- Op Anal%%i% paper 4. |-cb

2. Msg. .ICS to CINCPAC. Dc 6. 1963: II. 1904.

Johnson. I'antage Point. p 45 7 Capt Richard W Von flake. rprt. Dec 17.

3. M..g%. 2d AD to PACAF. Dcc 20 and 21. 1963

1963: menmo. McNamara for Johnson. Dec 21. 8. Mellish rprt. .lan 15. 1964

1963. 9 PACAF Ref Ilk for No. 63 SFCI)I"

4 PurIhclapers ofthe Pren/h'nl :l.i iton B Conf. Ialking Paper. lab 2I,

Johnson. 1963-64 (Washington. 1965). I. 106: 10 Capt Kent C. Spear% rprt. Jan 8. 1964.

lPACAF Ref Ilk for Mar 64 SECDEF Conf, mg. 2d Al) to PACAI-. lan 4. 1964.

lab 8. for SECDI- Conference of Ma' 13. CINCIPACto MACV,.Jan 18.196 Martinand

1964. pt II. 'lab G. Cong Rec. Ma) 9. 1968. Cle.er, V. 99-102

p 12618; msg. 2d AI)to PACAF. Mar 10. 1964. II. MeIh.h rprt. Jan 15. 1964

5. CINCPAC Record of Special SECt)El'- 12 Ilearing, before Subcolnultee. of the

SECS'I A'I Meeting. Nov 20. 1963. Item 2A. Committee on Appropriation%. Iouse of RepreMelhh rprt. Dec 9. 1963: rprt. Col I-a'.,,rcnce W %entati',e. Sqpplemental Defense llp rora.

314
Notes to Pages 198-204

no l~ or /966. 891h1 Cong. 2d bes%(IWashmfgtonl. 28 A IX Ol'J Book ittActions in SI: A. 196i1966). p 62. msgs. 2d Al) to PACA I-. Dec 20 6.1mI.Ieiig eoe uem nco and 21. 19631. Shaplen. 1.05 Reisoluton. p 232. the Committee oin App. opriations. IHIouse ofl

CI \CPt AC Record of Special SH'I)E 1- Reptrwrcitimes. flireign Operauwns :IppropnawSITS I All I Meeting. Item 133. 'cc also, memio. nomn for /965. 88thl Cong. 2d scss (Washington.

Mc \amiara f or the president. Ma~tr 16.. 964. in 1964). pi 1. p 369: msg. .1CS to SF CI) 11-. Mar

(irasl I'enqa gn P1apers. Ill. 502 2. 19("

13 Marguerite H iggins. Our I tetnan Vig/:i. 29 2d ADI Cllronolog> . la n-Junl 64; Sharpmart, (\c\% York. 1965). pp 151-54. I)IA. Cold West inorcla rd. Report. p 92. hecarings before

War (Cotinterinsurgenex) Analsis. Republic of Suibconiniittee of theComminittee on AppropriaiVictnm. IDcc I. 19(4. Sec 1). pp 10-I11. Hlearing, tions. House of Representatiec. Suplemtental

before the Subconmnittee of the Committee on /)efen'e -1 ppropmrrons for 1966.89th ( ong. 2d

Appropriattions. I, S Senate. Depyt o/ Defensevt scs% (Washiington. 1966). pp 6465mtg. 2d Al)

,Ipproprtatton for /966. 89th Cotig. 1st sess to CS,\I . \fit 12. 19W4

(Wahington. 1965). pt 2. p 704 31) Msgs. id Al) to 13th Al-. Mar 3. 1964.

14 AI-XOPJ~ [look of Aetions in SL:A. 1961- a~nd P.\CAI to 2d1 Al). Mar 13. 1964. Mellish

1964. Item VI-I. Gravel Pentagon /'aper%. Ill. rprt. Apr IS. 1964

3542 31. I axor. Vit oriA and f'lossshares. 1p 310:

I5 Msgs. Anil-nb Saigon to CINCPAC. rnsgs. 2d Al) to CSAF. Mar 11. 1904. and

j1an 30. 19(4. MACV to CINCPIAC. Jdan 'L. PACAI- to CSAI-. Mar 12. 1964

1964. Ifeatrigs on .

t

ltlaart P'osture before 32 Msg%. 2d Al) to PACAlP. Mar 6. 8. antd

tihe Committee on Armed S~rsccs. llotise of 10. 1964: PACAI- Ret Ilk for SECI)EF Confof

Representaties. 88'th Cong. 2d sess (Washing- Ma~r 12. 1904. latb 2. memio. IMcNamnira for

ton. 1964). pp 7120-21. antd 154.56: /ubht Johnson. -Mar 16. 19(4

P1aper% tf the Pre',denu/s Johnvon. /96.-64. 33 Msgs. 2CCR-64-077C and 08413.

pp 256.60. Gravel Penttagon l'aprv. 111. 38.3') 34.Meo eaarbrono.Mr16

16 C.ICS to lDir i Staff. -lb S. 1904 1964

17 \Msg. CSAI to Smart lf-eb 64J 35. AF;XOI'J Ilooko01Actions in SFA. 1961.

IS C.tpt lonald V MacKcllsi rpir'1-eb 10. 64. Itemn I\'-l. PACAlF Ref Ilk for SlFCI)I1964. Hlearing% before the Stibcommittee to (onfof Max 13. 1964. pt 1. Pu/i/i /'apyer% of the

Investigate Problents Connected oith Reftigees Presidents, Jo/mson. /963.64. 1. 387.88.

anrd I:sC.tpcsof the Comminittee on the.ltidiciatrx. Johnisonl. I Wimage Point. pp 66-67. mg. CSAltI S Se na tc. Refugee P'rolfem v in South ternani to .( S. Mar 14. 1964: Grav-el Pentagon Papyers.

andl Lamc. 89th Cong. 1st sess (Washington. Ill. 499-510

1965). pp 294-95. atnd 298. 2d Al) AI1PX 36 Msg, ICS to1 S'CDFi'-. Mfar 17. 1964.

CPSA(CI Rprt. 1-eb 6. 1904: Malt Gems Udard 37 lcarings before the Committee oil

6 1 ansdale. -\ ict Nat Do We t. ildertaild I-oreigil Relationls. V'S Senatte. /ore~gn essist

Re% olttion"" lorekig,-ffinrv. ()ct 64. pp 84-85 ante. 1904. 88th Cong. 2d %ess (Washtingtonl.

19 (CQ lackgrotind. (lunia andI S Fa(r Ea'Ist 1904). pip 541.64: 1115g. MACV to 2d Al). Mar

P1olu 1. 1945-67 (Washinigtonl 1967 ). pp 134.130. 27.1964.11msg.JICStoCINCI'AC. MIa> 12.1904.

2d1 Al) Clronolog. J1i-Iec 64 nsgs. MAC\ to 2d Al). Oct 29. 1964. .tid to 2d 20) Meno. Mc\amrirrs for Ilaxfor. I zh 2 1. Al). No% 20. 1964 1964 sc also tllsg. I'ACAI- to CSAi-. Feb 21. 38 Msg. 2d Al) to CSAI-. Apr 17. 19(4. 19(4. and CA to Smatrt. ild I'ACAI- Ref Ilk for SECIFi Coif ot Mla. 13.

-1 1I 1i,i II. 7o Vote. a Vaton. lilt SZ7-34 1964. I'iai iact Sheet 12. A i XOP.l Book ol

Pui/ic Papers oft/u- Pretdeniv Jo/inson. /963- Actions imSF'A. 19014. Itiln I1\ -N: llg. State

64. I. 304 ill ArnuilbSaigon. Apr 28. 1964. Puh/u Papers

22 See mnsg. I'AC A ito (CS\I-. lecb 24. of ithe Premde,,,' Linc/on B1 Jo/unon. 1966

19(" (WVashtingtonl. 1967). 11. 760-63

23 \Isgs. CI\CPAC to .ICS. lebh 8. 1964. 39, Cong Rec. MIa% 9. 1968. p 12618. CQ

aind MACV to .I5. .ltin 13. 1964: I'ACAI Ref Blackgrouind. (lima and Par Fast loli,

Ilk, for SFIDIA Conif of Ma% 13. 19i4. la 1. 945-67. p 1.39

24 -ditlil S G Sharp. CIXC(PW and 41 I'ACAI- Ref Ilk for S;CIFI- Comlf oif

Gen W I Wcstrnoreland. COML SMACV. Re- NMa% 13. 1964. pt 1. lab C. Iftmlcr to Al 0) I\

1port onpth/e I I ar in I tet pan, (as of PW Jti 1968) Corps rprt. MIa% 27. 19(4: Sha rp- Westillorla isI,

(Watshlingtont. 1969) Report. p 93. tnsgs. 2d Al) to CSAI- Ma\ 12

25 Msg. 2(d Al) to t

A CA I Mar 8. 1964 andlI 11. 1964. 5ctt YorA Timmu. Pentagon

26 G;ravel' Pentagoni Papers. 111. 43.45 Palpers. p 246

27 Msg. I'ACA- to CSAI. l-eb 24. 1964 42 M\ctlio.('.I'StoSl'('l)I.%tibI Alterna315
THEl ADVISORY Y'EARS Notes to Pages 204-211

Me Courses of Action. Apr 14. 1904. Joseph C inents on Amiemhan Foreign Rehiaom. 1964.

Goulden. Mlroi it the Firvi Casuahi 7he Gulf pp 232-29

of Tonk.in Alfair-lilunson and Realmt 48 A E'XOP.! Booikof Actionis in SrA. 1961-

(Chicago. 1969). pp 87-91 (A. Iten 1\V-0: CM-451-4., Jun 5. 1904

43 I ist. PA (AI*. Ja n-.lun 64. 1. pt 2. lust. 49 Netiv York Times. Pentagon Papers.

lDir Plans. t!SAtP. Apr 64 pp 250-51 (Gravel F.:-toni, H 1. 174-77)

44. lodge. Verbatim Rai: of Co it Saigon. 50 leti York Tvnes. Pentagon Papers.

My12. 1964. p 19. PA( At- Ref Ilk for p 256 ( Gravel Fr/mton. Ill. 182). Johnson.

SE-C)EF Corf of May 13. 1964. lit 11. Iab G. IVatage Point. pt 67

Nevv York 71niev. P'enagon Papers. p 246 51I Msg. ICS to CINCIIAC. Jut 2 and 9.

45 Ibidl.pp 245-49. misg. .1C3 to(CINCIPAC. 1964: hist. PACAIt..ItJu-04-Jtun 65. 11. No\ 64:

Mla\ 21. 1964 A EXOP.J Book of Actions In SEA. 1961-64,

46. Ne ii Y'ork lines, l'entagon P1aers. Itemn 1\V.0

pp 249.50 52 Hist. PACAI-.Jan-JunA 14, tpt 2,171-72,

47 Iid.L. p 250). Jules tDsids. ed1. D)om- Neit )'orA hine.. Pentagoni Pap1ers. p 247.

CHAPTER XVIII

The If'ar in Vietnam, 1964

1. Msg. 2d At) to I

t

ACAIF Jan 27. 1963. 13 End of t our Reports. It Cot Bill A

Sia rp- Westnioreta rd Report. p 104 Mlontgomery. Juzn 27. 1964. Cot Robert .

2 Itist. I

t

ACAI.Jtit 04-Jttn 65. 1. pt 2. 46-55. tigtirm JIuI 22. 1964. Piece. Jul 22 itd 24.

lust. 1)r Pltans. t.SAI-. Jt.t-t)ec 63. p 233: ftr. 1964,and Walker. Atug 21, 1964: mnsg. 2d AD) to

Smart to I avtor. Apr 8. 1964 PIACAI-. Ian 28. 1965

3. Msgs. JC S to Cl NCPAC. tPeb I5. 1964. 14 l~tr. Moore to Batnit. Jtan 18, 1965

P'ACAF to 13th Al-. Mar 6. 1964. to CSAF. I5 IDir Plans. U'SA[-. Decbriefing Rprt of

Mar 21. 1964. and CINCPAC to .ICS. Mar. 22. Cot lDastd I Fleing, Aug 9. 1965

1904 16 1 tr. ('ol W 1) Ritchic to 2d AD. Oct 2.

4. IUrs. Smart to laylor. Apr 8. 1964,1 Ia\for 196(A

t o Smart. ni d.. ms~g. C1N C PAC (to J CS. Ma r 22. '7 Msg. I'ACAI to 2d Al).Jan 23. 1965

1964. lust. PACAI.J.an.Jun 64. 1. pt 2. Apr64A 18. 2(1 A 1). Ops Artiai.sis IDi'. tch Memio 4.

5 H eairings before the Committee on Appro- J1ul 1. 1960

priatlon%. PS Senate. F1oreigni ,1 msance and 19, lust. NIACVs. 1965. p 95. NIACV Dir 95-

Relatd ze Appopriaons Agnt r 196.8 I II. ttn 21. 1966. 7th A I Pamrphlet 55-I.1 Nlar 20.

Cong. 2d1 sess (Washtington. 1964). pp 206-07. 1968. pp 25-26

msi:. 2d Al) to CSAI-. Apr 17. 1964 20) lst. PAC"AI-..Itit-I)cc63,. Pt 2. I)ec63.

6 1 atkmng Pa per on I SA F Ops In V N.Ia n nisgs. 2d A I) to PACA I-. Decc 3 and 9 1961. ttr.

1-31. 1 964 Brig Gen MIilton B) Adarin to CII NI AAGV\.

7 ss.2d Al) ito CSAIP. Apr 17. 1964. to Dec 5. 1963. mnsg. PACAI- to MACV. Decc 13.

PACAI1. \i r 24. i964. antd to 5th AI-. Api 29. 1963: ni.g. PACA I- to I 3thI AI* and 2d Al). D)ec

19(A. !I 1963

8 Msg. 2d AD to I

t

ACAI-. Apr 20 and 23. 21 I he 41stI aicticailWinig\\was establishied .it

1904 D a 'sang, the 51 6th I ighter Wing nmsed from

9 Ms~g. 2d AlD i, PACAI-. M~ay 7. 19K4 Nhta I ranig to D~a Nang. aind the 62d I actical

PACA I Ref Blk fo S F CD)FF Cotif of Nla\ 13. W ing wasI orgiiti/ed at Pleikot

19K4 Plans i-act Sheet 8. lust. PACAI-.Jan-Jtin 22 Msgs 2d1 Al) to I'ACAI., Apr 20 anid

64. 1. pt 2. MaN 64 MaM 4 1964. I

1

ACAF to 2d Al). Apr 18. 1904.

t0 find. I'ACA I Ref Blk ior S[ EI)Il Conif to ('SA I. Ju tn 3. 19K4 Prot Cot ota I Iar'.est

of M'ay 13. 19K4 talking P'aper 4 Oral I[list lit(%\% 241 s tti I t Gjen Joseph II

Ilms. PACAIP. Jul 64-Jtit 65. 1. lit 2. Moore. No% 22. 1969. pp 2-3. and 29

4-55 23 It1 C~ol Bill A MIonigonier rprt. M~ar 12.

12 A I-XO;P.1 Book oif Actiotis in SEA. Itemn 1964. Ii r. Mat Gen J1 If NIo(ore to K% . Apr .

VI '-C: ttvsg%. CSAI- to PAf'AI-.Ju iit 7 and 19. 19K4 tnsg. P'AC',\I to CSAI. Jutn 3. 1964

1964. antd NIAC\' to R' S. Ju tn 19. I1904: lust. 24 Mlsg. 2(d Al)to P'ACA I . Apr 21)aind May

PACAF-. Jtil 04-jutn 65. 1. Pit 2. 46-55 2. 1964

316
Notes to Pages 212-219

25 Montgoinery rpri. Apr 16, 19(A 47 Quanec uprt. Apr 14. 1964. 2d Ind

26 1 tr. Amni to Smamrt, No\ 25. 1963, Osbine. Apr 22. 1964i Nlaj Alan (; Nelson

PACAI- Ret UI for No\ 63 SE*CDI)E ('orf. rprt. May 4. 1964

lab 2A. 48 Butler rprt, Mlay 27. 1964. 2d mnd. I t Col

27 I ti. Ross to MIACV .1-5, Oct 23. 1903. Milton It Pierce. Ma\ 30. 1964

PA('Al Ref Ilk lr No\ 63 SFCIE C'out. lab 49 M~sgs. PACAI- to 2d Al). Apr 14. 1964.

2A. misg. PACAI' to CSAI-. No% 9. 1963: imt. 2d Al) to 'A('AF. Api IS. 19W4. MJAC\' to

PACA I-.in-i in 64. L.pt 2. Jani 6 Cl NCPIAC -eb 17, 1964. hist. 2a Al). an-Jun

2$g.28 Al0oPC in1 n e 4.,1, 70-71

21. 1964: 2d Al) Op. AtimlysisPaper 4.1 lb II 50 Mtsgs,2d Al) to 3tliAl-.lMar 3. 1964,to

1964. Jist. 2d Al). ian-itin 64. 11, 28. ASOCs. Mar 21. 1964. to PACAP. Mar 1$,

29 lt.PCI.ai-tn4..P2.in6. 1964. and Apr 20. 196A

nisg. 2d Al) to 13th Al-. ian 23. 1904 SINl1 s 2d Al) to 13th AlF. 1ma 21. 1964.

30 Mtsgs. 2d At) to PACAI-. Uch 1$. 19K4 and Feb 6. 19W4

CINCIPAC to ICS. F-eb 21. 19K4 MIACV to 52, Msg. 2d Al) to 13th Al-. May' IS. 1964

KCS, leb 22. Ii64: AFXOPi Blook of Actionsim 53 Ms~gs. 2d Al) to 13th Al. 14e 6. 1964. to

SEA. 1901-64, Item Ill-K PACAFI- Apr 20. 1904

31 Ms~gs. 2d AI) to PACAI-. Nlar8 and 10. 54 Ms~g. 2d Al) to lPACAF. Apr 12, 1904

1964: lust. lPACAI-. ian-inni 04. 111, Mar 64 55 Nlsgs. 2d At)to 13th Al-. Mar 2. 1964, to

312. Litr. Smart to I avior. Apr 8. 1964: CSAI . Apr 1S. 1964. to PACAI-. Apr 20. 1964.

IPACAI- Ref IBk for SECI)E Col of Mar 12. amnd PACAI- to 13 At;. NM 8. 19(A.

1964. 'lab IIB: AFXOP.i Book of Actions in 56 Msgs,. 2d At) to IPACA. Apr IS. 1964.

SEA. 1961-64. Item Ill-K. and to CSA I-. Apr 17, 1964: Itr. IHarkins to NItij

.3 Msg. 2d At) to PACAF. Mar 1. 1964: (len I iait I himen Klumti Apr 17. 1964. PACAII'lestonl Eitd of I otir Report. Ad 64: Itist. 2d Ref Blk for Mtay 13, 1964. SECI)EI- Conf. Plans

ADI, lan-I un 64. IX. D)oc 12 I-act Sheet 3: and A UXO P1 Book of Actions tin

34. IHist. 2d AD. .Ian-AIin (A, II. 31; nisg. SFA. 1961.(A. Item Ill-N.

PACAF to CINCIPAC. Mar 2$. 19W4 57 1 tr.,NMoore to ILe~1i. Apr 7.19(A4: misgs.

35 2d Al) Chroniology,J in-l)ee 64: Inst. 2d 2d Al) to CSAI-. Apr 12. i964. lPACAI' to 2d1

At). ian-in 64. \1I. IDoc 21, Al). M~ay 6. 1964. and CSAU to PACAZ. Apr

36 Nlsg%. 2dAl) to PACAI-. Mar 1$. 1964. 30. 1964

PACAI- to Cl NCPAC. Mar 2$. 1964, and 58 Miemo Samndhorn for Moore. Mamy 7.

CINCIPAC to .ICS. Apr 1, 1964 1964

37 Preston End of lotir Repoit. .Itil 64. 59. Ms~gs. PACAI- to CINCI'AC. Apr 27.

isgs.2d AI~to CSAI-. Mar25. 1964.,mnd Apr 1. 1964. CSAI- to PACAI-. Apr30, 1964. 13th Al1964: trip rprt,. .1tin Mae lonald an it1 I osrd to PACA I-. May 8. 1964. and 2(d ADI to

Anderson. McClellan AFB. Calif.Apr It). 1964: PACAI-. May* 8, 1964

Itir. Moore to I e'.a\,. Apr?7.1964: Imt. PACAI-. 60 Memio. Rowland for (itsbtrgh. Apr 2.

Ian-hInn~l I4II. Apr 64.nsg. 2d Al)to 13th At-. 1971

Apr 24. 1964 61 PA('AI Ref Blk for SECI)EI Conif of

38 Misg. 2d At) to PACAI-. Apr 12. 1964. M~m r 12. 1964, 'lab 9. It r. Rowland to

Mellish rprt.I~tn I5. 1904: Itr. MIoore to MJACV. (imnsbmirglt. Apr 72

Oct 22. 1964. 62 MJsgs. 2d Al1) to 13th A P, A pr 24. 1964.

319 Capt D~on 0 Quanec rprt. .Ian 29. 19(A and PAC. Al- to ( SAl-. May* 6. 1904.

410. L~t Olin B. Otindiff rprt. Ian 28. 19(A 63 AE-XOlIJIlook of Actionisin SE:A. 1961-

41 1st Ind to Otindiff rprt. ca. Ian 28. 1964: 64. Iter I lnisg%. CSAI- to PACAI'. Apr

and Butler rprt. Ian 16. 1964 31). 1964. PACAI- to 2d Al). NJ,,% 6. 1964. to

42 Mellish rprts. .la 15 and Mar IS. 1964~. CINCPAC. M~ay 4. 1964. and CINCPAC to

2d Al) Chronology. .1tn-lDec 64. and I1an 16. I1CS. May 8. 19(A

1964. L~t Anthony J. Zihtmsky Report of Staff 64 M~sgs. 2d Al) to PACAI-. Mtay 11. 1964.

Visit. Mar 10. 1964 to CSAi-. May* 13. 1904

43. Mellisht rprt. Apr I5. 19W4. 65 Misg. CSAI- to PACAI. Mtay 10. 1964.

44 Qtiane rpit. Ian 30. 1964: Mal [arl I) 1eartigs before the Conmmittee on Appropria.

Ja meson rprt. M~ar 10. 1964. I st I nd. Mellish. tions. US5 Senate. F~oreign 1lsisiance rand ReMar 13. 1904. 2d I nd. I t Col Albert IL. HIolman. Itned A-gente mm Iiropriaiions for 1965. 88th

Mar 19. 19K4 Mellish rprt. Apr 15. 1964: M~ellish Cong. 2d1 sess (Washington. 1964). p 181

ltr, Mar 18. 19W,. 1st Ind. Capt William NJ 66 Msg ICS to CINCPAC. Mlay 20. 1960

[ecminkthler. Apr 1. 1964. andtatehdr menio. in d. 67 II1ms. 2d Al). Ian-It:it 64. 1, 48-52,

45 Mvelhish rprt. Apr IS. 19K4 PACAI- Ref Bk for SECI)EI- Conferenice of

40. Btutler End of I otur Report. .1 tin 8. 1964 May* 13. 1964. Item 6A, Ma) Walter S Brtice

317
THE ADVISORY YEARS Notes to Pages 220-229

End of 'lour Report. ta. Jun 64: Sharp- Carlos 0 Bcasley Report. Maty 5. 1964: Blutler

Westmorckand. Report. p 90. rprt. Jurn 4. 1964.

68 Montgomery Rprt. Jun 8. 19(A: insp. 2d 80 Mellish rprt. Nla 15. 1964: Montgomery

AD) to PACA F. Jun 1. 1964, End ot'Thur Report.Ja1127. 1964: Pierce End o1

69. H-list. 2d AD1. Ja n-J un 64. 1IX. lDoe 12. It r. I our Report. Jul 24. 1964. lust. PACA I. JanMoore to MACV Jun 2. 1964. Jun 64. 1. pt 2 Ilist Rprt. Dir Policy. Jun 64.

70 Msgs. 2d AD) to IPACAF. Jun 64. to 81. Rprt. Moore to MACV. Aug 3. 1964

PA CA F. J uni 4. 1964. 82 1 tr. iocto Brig (jen\W L- Dl~u~.Jt

71 Msgs. 2d Al) to IPACAF. Jun I and 7. 17. 1904: Sha rp- West morelaind. Report. p 93

1964. toCINCPACand CINCPACF-L I.Jun 3. 83 Pierce End of lour Repoit-til 24. 1964.

1964. Ist. 2d Al). Jul-lDee 64. II. 18-00

72 Mvsg. CINCIPAC to JCS. Jtin 17. 1964: 84 Capt F-ranklin 1) Pleschel rpri. Jul 29.

AFXOPJ Book of Acticns it SEA. 1961-(A. 1964. 1st Ind, Mat Earl D Jameson. Aug I.

Itemn \I1 G,. 1964: lust. 2d Al). Jtil-lDee 64. II. 61-04. lIr. L~t

73 Preston End of*lour ReportJul 64: msg. Col John P1. OkRegan to lDep D~ir. IlI ASOC.

2d AD to PACAF. Jun 4. 19(v4:. Itr. Moore to Aug 21. 1904.

MACV. Jun 2. 1964: intsw %%ith Col William E 85 Ops Analysis Ofe. 2d Al). Cotierini~urBethea. Jan 65. in Hist. 2d AD). Jtil-lDec 65. V. geney Lessons [.earned. Jtil 4. 1964

Doe 5: hist. PACAF. Jan-Jtin 64. Ill. ITMSS 86 Msgs. MIACV to CI\CIIAC. Jtil 16.

WVkly Actmtii Rprt. Jun 26-Jul 3. 1964. rprt. 1964. CINCPAC to JCS. Jul 20. 1964. and

Moore to MACV. Aug 3. 1964 MACV to CINCPIAC. Jul 28. 19N4

74. ILtr. Moore to MACV. Oct 22. 1964 87 Mat XA:n G Nelson rprt. Ma\ 4. 196)4,

75 Nlsgs. 2d Al) to CSAF. Apr 17. 1964. to 88 \Msg.,\IACVtoCINCIIA(C.Jul 6.1964

PACAF. Apr 20. 1964. and May' 18. 1964 89 Msg. MACV to QASDI) A. Aug 20t.

76 Ops Analysis Officee. 2d Al). Counters- 1964. 2d Al) Operating Insirtiction% 1. Autg L.

surgeney Lesson% Learned. Jul 4. 1964. I t Col 1904. hr. Col WV D Ritehie to 2d Al). Oct 2.

Albert iI Hlolnman rprt. Jun 8. 1964. and ltr. 1964: MACV l)ireetise 95-4. Sep 7. 19(4

MSgt Clarence NI flalltoAOC.ra. Jul 1.19(4 90 Ritehie rprt. Oct 2.1964. list. I AC. 19(4.

77 Ilist Data. 2d AOC. Jujl-l)c 64. in [list. 1. 294. msg%. PIACAF to CINCPIAC. Sep 5.

2d AD. Jul-Dcee64. V. D~oc 11 lir. Mooreto Col 1964. CSAF to PACAI .Sep 7. 1964. Ops AnailOaikley WV Baron. Jan 18. 1904, ysis D~i\. 2d AD). lech Memo 4. .Itn 1. 1965

78. Mellish rprt. May 15. 19(A 91 Msg. 2d Al) to CSAF. Sep 21. 19W4. ltr.

79 Ibid - ltrs. Rossantl to Kv. Oct 26. 1964. Mloore to Blaron. Jan 18. 1964. and Brooks End

Hall to lDep Dir OAC. (a Jul 11. 1964: M~at of I our Report. Jan 9. 1904

CHAPTER XIX

The Gulf qf Tonkin hicident

1. Hist. PIACAF. Jan-Jun 64. 1. pt 2. Jan- 7 Msgs. M ACV to C INCPAC. Jti 16. 19(4.

Mar: Gotilden. Trtahi. pp 33. 92-95. and CINCPAC to JCS. Jtil 20. 1964. DOD1

2 Ilist. SAC. Jul-Dec 64. Ill. 122-23. Pentagon Papers. Ilk 3- 1V. 13 .43-54

3 Ibid. pp 124-25: 111%. CINCI'ACI.11 to 8. Goulden. Troth. p 32. CQ Baickgrotind.

CINCIAC. Jul 24. 1964: hist. 41st Air Div. China attit U'S. Far Last Polwi. 194.5-1967. p

Jtil-lDcc 64. pp 66-70 142

4 Msg. l3th AF' to A I. Oct 10. 1964: 9. Msvig%. MACV to CI NCPIAC. Jutl 17 and

AFX0lPJ Book of Actions in SEA. Item IV.Q. Aug 16. 1964

5 Msgs. JICS to CINCPAC. Jtal 2. 1964. and 10 [list. PIACAF. Jan-Jun 64. 1. pt 2. Jan2d AD to PACAF. Mar 23. 1964: Itr. Johnson to Mar. Goulden. Truth. pp 92-95

Taylor. Jul 2. 1964. quoted in nmsg. CINCPIAC 11. .eii YorA Thai's. Penttagon lapert. pp

to PACAF. Jul 3. 1964: se lalor. Swords awlI 258. 288-89,

P'loiwshare's. p 316 12 Goulden. Truth. pp 86. 127-28

6 Maxsell laylor. -I lie Case for Continued 13. I lie question of the cosert actmisitesand

B 'mbing of the North.- Washington Star. Oct thle SouthI Viet na mese pat rol-boat ratds as pro% -

22. 1967. see also l'aylor. Sit or/s and PlIow- ocaition for the attacks on the 11a'imo can be

sharev. pp 315-17 follossed in Ihearings before the Senate Cont-
Notes to Pages 229-236

mittee: on l-oreign Relations. 7hi. Gulf of Th~n- 1964 liwidlents. 90th Cong. 2d sess. pastioa.

4 ti. 77w 1964 Icidents. fl'b 20. 1968, a nd pt 11. Goulden. Trutth. pp 76-81. 122-57. lDavids. ed.

Det 16. 1968. 90th Cong. 2d ss (Washington. Docionunts on ltinerican Foreign Relations,

196U) Gotilden. Truth: Joint Galloway.. The 1964. pp 216-17. Johnson. l'atage Point. pp

Gulf o/ 7'onA it Resolutiont C' utlierford, N J , 112-19

1970): Eugene (; Windchy. !Iot;Ain Gulf (New 23. Bundy Memo on Actions Asailablc to thle

York. 1971,1. and Anthony A ustin. 7hw Presi- U S, after I onkin. tin Newt York 77mes. I'en-

(lenits War (New York, 197 1). tagon P1aperv. pp 294-98. AFXOI J Book of

14. Msg. CINCIPAC to JCS. Aug 5. 1964. Aetions in SEA. Item IVA'

15 AFXOI'J Iook of Actions tin SEA. Item 24. Msg. CINCPIAC to JCS. Aug 17. 1964.

111-1). nisg.JCSto CINCIIAC. AugS. 1964: Ilist in NYew York 77ineA. Pentagoni Papers. pp

Dita. P'lansand Rqmts Div. 2(1 A). Jul-Dee 64: 298-300.

hIst. U'AC.Jul-Dee64. IV. IDoe4:himt.4O5th Ftr 25 Mvsg. U S. Mission Saigon to State. Aug

Wg. Jul-Dec: 64. 11. D~ocs, 2. 3,.and 4: lust. 41st 18. 1964. in ibid.. pp 349.52.

Air ')is.JuI-Dee64. PP55-58. hist.4Olst' 1 FWg. 26. [list D~ata. I'lansand Rqrnts Di\.2d AD.

JuI-t')ee64. PP 334. lust. 27th t1tt Wg. .ItiI-l)ee Jul-Dee 64: nisgs. 2d Al) to PACAF. Atig 25.

64. App 1: hist. 313th Air D,%. Jul 64-Jun 65. p 1964. and 2d Al) to 13th AF. Oct 28. 1964

302: lust. SAC. JuI-lDec 64. P) 131 1 lie 'Ihai 27. AFXOPJ Book of Actions in SEA. Item

gosernntent approved the niosement of addi- I V-X.

tional USAF1 forees into I hailand but was reluc- 28 l)IA. Cold War (Counterinsurgency) Atant to hasec combat sorties flown fromt the coun- nal~sis. D~ec 1. 1904. Sharp-Westmoreland. Reity I lie I bass final[% agreed to the litter it thit. port. p 94: 2d AD Chronology. Jan-Dee 64.

ssere absolutely necessary and it their bases sstre 29. JCS Memio for SECDE F. Aug 26. 1964.

not publicly resealed. Msg. l)EI'COMIUSM- in Nen, YorA Times, PAntagon Papers. pp

ACTIIAI. to CINCPAC. Atig 7. 19(A 354-55

16. Telecon 1. 2d Al) to l3th AF., Aug 7. 30 AF'XOI'J Book of Actionisin SEA. Itent

19(A I V-X

17 Msg. MACVtoClNClIAC.Aug6. 1964. 31 Memo. Btundy for reuiJohnson,

18. Netis, York Vines, Pentagon Papers. pp 268- Sep 8. 1964. in Nets York 77,i. r nagon I1a69: nisgs. PACAF to CINCPAC. Aug 8. 1964. pers. pp 357-59

and 2d AD to multiple addressees. Awlg 7. 1964: 32 AFXOPJ Book of Actioiis in SEA. Item

Sltarp.WestmorclarJd. Report. p 13. 1IV-1l. Johnson V'antage Poin'. p 120

19. Msg. PACAF to CINCPAC. Aug 8. 33. NSAM 314. Sep 10. 1964. in New York

-'1964 Thunes. Penitagon Papers. pp 359.60.

20. Msgs. MACV to CINCPAC. Atig 7. 34. DIA. Cold War Analysis. Dec 1. 1964.

1964. and CINCPIAC to MACV. Aug 8. 1964 Sharp-\Vestmorcland. Report. plp 90 94-95: 2d

21 Mvsg. AmEmb Saigon to SECS'1A I E. Al) Chronology. Jati-Dec 64. AFXOVJ Book

Aug 9. 1964. in New York Titmes, Pentagon of Aetions in SEA. Item I V-V.

P1apers. pp 346-48: exeerpts fromt Summary of 35 CINCPAC Comd Hist. 1967. 11. 962:

Tlaylor's Mission Rprt from Saigon. Aug 10. Gouldeti. Truth. pp 159-60. Briefing by Ch.-f.

1964. tin ibid.. pp 291-94. I

5

ACAF Assistaiice learn. Sep 64. in Ifist. 2(1

22. Sltarp-Westmoreland. Report. pp 11-13: Al).Jan-Jun 64. VI. Doe 3. [list Data. Plans &

7Heiarings, before the Coimiiittee ott Foieign Rqits Di%.. 2d AD. Jul-DLes 64. i. 20th P'R to

Relations. (IS Senate. 77ie Gulf of Tonkin, the I

5

ACAF. Jan 1. 1965.

CHAPTER XX

Dffuis ion of Air Assets

1. ILtr. Moore to Ferguson. Mar 16. 1965. 3. Ilist Data. 2d AD Ops Sersices Dis. Jul2. AI:XOP'J Book of Actions in SEA. Item Dec 64: hist. PACAF. Jul 64-Jut. 65. Ill. lust

Ill-C Becime forty air liaison officer and for- Rprt. lD'O. Jul-IDee 64: hist. I AC. 1965.1P 627

ward air controller teams wotild take all of 4 Ms-g%. JCS to CINCI'AC. Aug 11. 1964

S'IRICON1 resources. otl twenty were sent MACV to CINCPAC. Aug 19. 1964. PIACAlI

Memo. SECI)El to ICS. Aug 7. 1964: I)JSM- to CINCPAC. Sep 5. 1964. CSAI- to PACAF.

1349-64 to A DS I SA. A ug 5. 1964 Sep 7. 1964. 2d Al) to CSAI-. Sep 21. 1964:

319
THE ADVISORY YEARS Notes to Pages 236-241I

Brook% End otl Iour Report. Jan 9. 1965 Oct (4

5 lI lst. 2d ADI. .luI-lDcc64. I. 5 18 I ir. Mloore to Baron.1t Ja8I, 1965. I[list

6 Nlsgs. MIACV to CINCPAC. F-eb 21. Ihat. 2d AOC. Jtil-l)cc o4: htr. Ro'.'.and to K%.

1965. and PACAP to 5th AlP. Apr 12. 1905 Oct 27. 1964. neno. Stil.'cll for C S. It'N A[-.

7 CI CC) im withI It Col Garth Re\- nd anid It r. MIoore to Pracha rd. Apr 27, 1965

nolds. Jan 65. rprt. 2 ('CR ito MACV. Sep"-2. 19. AIFXOPJI Book, of Actons, in SI A. Item

1904 1'rom J ul through September 1964..5D Vl I-G. insg. CSA I- to PACA F-. I eb 10. 1965

requtests foi ai1r support were recec. of which 20 Icletca ii '...Ii 65: hist. PACAFI Jtji

2,403 "e'.re hontored: 918 wcre reluscd because of 64-Jun 65. Ill. F-eb 65. rpri. 2 CCR to MIACV

a lack of aircraft. I t r. NIoore to NI AC(V. Oct 22. i1-3. F-eb 5. 1965. (GuthIrie Fnid of I our Replort.

1904 ca. Aug 65. Bailey Enid o0I otur Report. M~ar 20.

F I tr. I A Col Clarentce R Osbourruc. 1r,. to I 1965: Eichclberger Ittilof I otir Rcport. a Nia\

CAl 0. Sep 3. 19(4. 9.1965. 2d AI)OpsAmtlysis l)i'. lech Nemo.

9 1 hit 14th (Grouip then disconti nued the use .1 tn 1. 1965

of 11.1p111 ont night suipport nmisolt Reynolds 21 Ii ist I).wt. 2J A I) Oils 5cr'.i.cs IDi. .Jut.

lit'''.. ait iS: IIiec. Vig/io /ow ir Supp)/ori I)cc 64:It r.Mat c~ nA .1 K ine> to (ore. Sep

tit RI'A. 1961-190,. p34 2. 19(4

10) ISAI' ad'.i'.oi. assigned to Victiianise 22 llicke\. \Vodo ('Io'.i' ir Sopylu. p3..2d

squaidrons had ic'.er bcen prohibited from Ii>. Al) Ops Anal~sis Office. Counteritisurgcnc\

m g siitglc-scater A-Ilin stike formations, bUt I essons% I ea ricd. Ja i18I. 1964 IAC P sist

Ij\Io r first Icaricd a bout thi' practice late in a 11cc I cein See..~~p 04

Octobcr I hinking that high-ratnkaig officials. ini 23 hir. Kenu\ to NIo(ore. Sep 2. 1964: li 1t

Waishintgton %\'ere tiia.'are of this. lie informetd Da.ta. 2d Al) Ops 5cr'.ices I)i'.. lul.IDce 64:

Mc Nama~ra anld Geiieral Whelecr. '.' Io saw no( Caipt Joseph 'a rrisb End ol I our Report. NIa.r

reason to change tlie situation Rprt. 2 ('CR to 1. 1965

NIA CV. Sep 2. 1964, tnsgs. PACA F to ('SA F. 24 An NNI 71) pod( f or la unchiing 40-ii

Scp 4. 1964. to Cl NCPA('. Sep) 5. 1964. CSAFI grenades, from A- Isas ain anttipersoiniel %%'caipon

to PACA I . Sep 0. Oct I .anid Oct 17. 1964. and1( hada letI. I Sy Stetit that I requntlK niall unctionied

'I NC PA (to JCS. Scp 25. 1964. a 11 A FXOP.I I lie old 2 75.inch acriaiI rocket., pres io(ust> little

Bloo k of Acet ion s in S FA . licein used because it bt neil itself ini the groundi~ bef ore

VII l.G e.ploding. recci. d aniotlci %%irieaid anid ani

I I Rtprts. 2 CCR ito NIAC\'. No'. 3. 1964. XNI-427 stiper-qiclk gra.'e..ction It:/e A ties'

.lani 4a.nid Dac 2. I1965. nisg. 34th ItIac Gp to 2d '-Westo" im\ of napalm iiicenii tl pro'.cd stable

ADI. No'. If. 19W4. Bcheia nt'.'.. . .ani 65: in storage, anid stabiliiig fiiisaddcd to niapailim

MIA('V MnI lthil F'.al R prt. M~c 64. Aine\ B3. ptainiks allo.'.ed (lli.cr> in a di'.c-boinb mode

22. Baiie\ 111(1 of I our Report. M~ar 2(0. 1905. 1 t But t(lie fire pattern %%.as small ainmd left ai longC'o1 Wilia in It Ficlictberger Enid of Ilour biirning inecidiai \ ptiddle in the impact crater

Report. ca MIa> 9. 1965: lust,. 2d AI). .ltil. I)cc I lie best na paliii etuplo\ Itient cilatiiitied to be

64. 11.44-45: ltr. Ros'. anid to Gimbtirgh. Apr 72 the o'.-I. Isplash attack Va riaible-tisi radar

12 II ists. PA'A F. .lani-I in 64. 1. pt 2. .1 uii provrim fifed geiierail purpose bomibs tailed

64. .itd . iul 04..l'ii 65. III. .1tji 64: Bie~mll s'.'MM. to ha.e g;oi aiitipersoniiel effect.a.iid lie 2d Asir

J1an 65: ms1g. PA('A l to 2(1 Al). Amii 10). 1964: I. Dision ' fell back oni the "dais> -ettter"~ tech-.

W\illoiig Eind (if I our Report. Jain 31). 1964 mi. e. '.'.hereb% ttose-l ti/ec enders attached to

I NI sgs. NI ACV to Cl NCPlAC. Atig 11. bombs produced ,i '.'aist-igu 0 plosiorn Yal

1964. ai C11(SA F to PA'A I-. Aug 29. 1964. rih hid of l oit Report. Ma r 1 1965. add ies

A I X OI.I Book oif A.. lls In SlitA. Itern lil. R of Gen NIoolre at1 PA(C Al- ( oitnia iiiers ( owt.

14 Ilist PA('AI'. .In 64..limi 65. Ill. Oct 64. I eb 22-25. 1965

I5 Ilihe nt'.'.' . Jan 65. O~btirite to 1 25 Kenneithi Samsi'. Firt le%[ utnel (timbuzi

C'A 1 0. Sep 3. 1964: Miller I itd (if I our Report. Use olA 471 0IQ l'A(A I . P'rof CI I IWO. Dc

F-eb 7. 1965. in il tr. Jlantssemn to Wood> ,rd, Oct 8. 1965). lir. l-erguson ito NIoore. No'. 12. 1964.

29. 1964 itig. NIA(V to CSAF. D~ec 29. 19W4. llcairiiig

16 Ht Cla re C Eaton rprt. nmd before tine.,onumee on ArmedI Scr. ces. IHotise

17. WVilliam in B Grali~iiatid Amiron II. Kat/, of Representat s s. 1)11al Yiar 1966 .Sppli'

.V/, T' Sing/h, hingratee1 A tta A 'flin. A Cont- mental ,l t/,oriwaoo for I Iitatn. 89th Cong.

(,pt for Ol/f ',io 1i lhiarv (Speratiom tit .Soth/ 2(1 sess (W\ashingt on. 196(6). lip' 5125 anid 51(60.

I inant ( I lie R ANI) Corp. I1965). It r. C'ol Wil- USA I Spec Ops I oice. Prof ('or nau IIa isest

hiam Buirke to1 2d Al). Oct 29. 1964. ntsgs. CSAF rprt. JIan 1. 1965-NMar 31. 1968, chap 3. pp 1-3

to 2d1 Al). No'. 21). 196.2d1 At)t 111 3ti Al)and 26Mg.21A)( 'Sl.IirI.I95Ist

I Atli At-. D~ec 3. 1964. NIACV to CINCPIAC. I AC. 1965. 1. 298-99

I eb 21. 1905. lust. PACAI . Jul (4.Iiti 05. 111. 27 Rprm Asbur\ to PFO'() . \o'. 22. 1963:

320)
Notes to Pages 241-248

L(. Col Paul WV Rainowski lEnd of I our Report. 21-22. misg. NI AC\' to 2d ADI. Mar 4. 1965

Sep 23. 19W4 42 Msg. CSAP to PACAI. Mar 19. 1965.

28 hr. Rtoss to NIACV .1-5. Oct 23. 1963. fir, (Col lFd\ it .1 Wit/enhaurger to M ACV .J-3.

insg. 2d Al) to PACAI-. Jan 10. 1964. Quane Feb 8. 1965

rprt. Jan 30. 1904 43 2d Al1). Ops Anal\ sis Dn. Ieclt Meio 4.

29 PACAI- Ref Ilk for SICI)EP Conf of Jlun 1. 1 96. ltr. ('ol Jatmes 11 Ilagerntroin to 2d Mar 12. 1964. l ab 8. lust. PACAP lJan-Jun 64. Al). Sep 26. 1965 Ill. Mar 64: nisg. MIACV to CINCPAC. Jan 4. 44 Nlsgs. CSAI- to PACAI-. Mlar 19. 1965.

1965 and MIACV to 2d Al). Mar 4. 1965: MACV

30 liI st. 2 O)C. .Ian.-Jun 64:It r. Rosland to lDireetm 95-1I.J.un 21. 1966

Ginsbtirgh. Apr 62. misg. 2d Al)to PACA I-.Jun 45 [l ist. 2d Al).J.an-iu (ii 4. 1. 102-3. Mlont1. 1964, gomer' .nd o1 I our Repot t. .1un 27. 1964

31 Filtm processed at Ian Son Nhtit was 46 1 list. 2d Al).J.an-Jun 64.1I. 97-98. 104. 01

qosvn unicdtatelY to Clark Air Blase. where the the remaining thirteen Ca ribotis o1 the U. S

animed Forces Courier Sen% ice picked it up and Arny*s 61st Aviation Coiupan'.. lout \\ere

delis ered tt to Washington. usuaII within thirt\ 

- assigned to thle 145th As iation Battalion tnt IIl

fotir hours after a photo mission. Other copies Corps. three to the I Corp% A'. ation D~etachwent to Wdorn for the U..S. Air Attache in Vicn- itent. three tLo the 52d A% itition Battalion tit the

tiaiic. ssIto receisd themn s\itltin tseit\ -four 11 Corps. three to the D~elta A% iat ion Baittalion

lhour%. In) July. two 11-57s %%ere asigned to the 2d tin IV\ Corps, and one to Baingkok

Air lDiison as photo cotiers Msg. 2d ADl to 47. lDir Plans. USAF. D~ebriefing Rprt of1

PACAP. NIa\ 22. 1964. Ilist Dita. 2 Ol)C. Ilering. Attg 9. 1965: 2d Al). D~ebriefing Rprt

Jul-Dlcc 04: lust. PACA 1K Jan..Iun 64. 111, NM. oSI ('o1 Robert .1 .loncs. (a Apr 10. 1965. ()ps

64:.Itr. Col Alisot C Brooks to MACVJ.. I~ Anaissis Ole. 2d Al). Cotinterinsttrgenc I es25. 1964. si" I earned, Jan 18. 1965

32 1 hree RI .28s %%ere lossn to Udorn. 48 'list. lDir IMateriel. 2d Al). .latiJuin 64:

shere I hai pilots tised t hem to photograph the isg. MIACV to CI NCPlAC. Jul 17. 1964. list.

resltsof .2 sriks n LosSi nethelI. S. air 2(1 Al). .la n. tn (A. 1. 104-05. and 11, 5I. B 

A

attaieh in Vientiane wanted this photogranih' Whiita ker aind I P Patterson. 11 sauhl -Iirlilt

within twl heotirs, PACA P established a Operamtion. Ja

1 /961-Jo,, 1966 (II Q 

I

5

ACAI I

photo processitig cell att Lidorn. I list, PACAI 

. Prot CIIlECO. I-eb 23. 1967). pp 32. 40. rprt. 

2

Jan-.lun 64. 1. pt 2. 186-87 ('CR to MACV. Sep 2. 1964. rprt. 2 ('CR to

33 Ilists. 2 Ol)C. Jan-.lun 64. AI'AG. MACVJ.13. Jan 4. 1965. 2d Al1) loiithl\ Stin.

\VN A 1-. .la it 65 imai% of As iaton Actis ite%. Jlan 10, 1965

34. Mj.V%.JCS to ('INCI'AC. NMx. 25. 1964. 49., 2d Al) Stat Rprt oi C'ombait Stilport

2d Al) to PACA I-. .lt 7.,1964. PACAI- to I 3tli NI ssons. .li i-i Li 64. itn t ist. 2d1 Al).J.ani-Jutn

AP-. Auig 29. 1964. aiid to CSAI'. Oct If. 1964 64. \VI. Docs 11-13

35. Msg. CINCPAC to PA('AI-. M~ar 10. 50) ittss sstlt Keiuted\ b\ (;atiche. 1-6b4.

1965 1964. Ops Aiial\sis Ofe. 2d Al) 'otiiteritsir.

36 I tr. 2d Al)to PA('AI-. .lanI. 1965.isg. genc% I essons I carned. Jul 4. 1964: 1 t ('o)1 Vie2d Al) to ('SAPI. No%' 13. 1964: rpri. 2 C'(R to tor N Curtis. F tud .0 I otir Report. (a. Ian it0.

M A CV .103. .lait 4. 1965 Mat I conard G Ilillcbraindt Find o1 lour

37. Col Allred I- fltrle'. 1Me EC-47 in Report. Mar 31. 1905

Sowlteavi vina. Mat 1966 June 1968 ( IQ 5I H-erittg Decbriefiitg Rprt. Atig 9. 1965:

PACAFI. Proj CIIIECO. Sep 20. 1968). pp 4-5 lust. 315th I C (ip (Assatilt). .ltl-lc 64: Ilist

38. NIsgs. 2d Al~to PACAI Jultn 1. 1964. to Da.ta. 2d1 Al) Ops Sersies lDis .lti-lDcc64: rprt.

('SAP. Sep 10. 19K4 ('SAl- to 2d Al). n d .anid 2 ('CR to MACV. No'. 3. 1964. and Ctirtis id

I'ACA P to CSAI-. Oct 11. 1964 of I[o)Lr rprt. Ia. Jait 25. 1965

39. Ihist. 2 O)C. Jtil-l)'e 64: rpri. 2CCR to 52 Whtitakcr and IPattcrsoit. ,lt aidgrlui

MA('V. No\' 3. 1964. Operations. pp 32. i.. MACV to (CINC40 Ihist. 2 O)('. .lul-l)cc 64: rpri. 2('CR tto PAC. Jl 16 andI 1,. 19(4: Al XOI'. Book of

MACV. Jlan 4. 1964. lust. Dir Ite. 2dl Al) Actions itt SPA. ltiti Ill-C

JIti-lDec 64 53 I lis. lir Plains. U'SAFI. ha it.ltii 63. lp

41. Ops Attahssis Ok. 2(1 Al). (ouitteriiisuir- 237.38. misg. AI taib S~iigoit toSP-('S IAIIF.

geticy lessons I earnedJani 18. I19,6: Ops Atial- Oct 9. 1963 (Charles V ('ooliis. fler/imlie

) ~ysis. 'I AC. d raft. Plantning aind Control oh t he Operatomi ini Southeast As ia. Jult /96/-June

?At r-Grotund Operations itt SothI Victita iMb 1967 (Il Q 

15AC(Al. Prot CILCO. Oct HI.

I hoitas W Wasilewsky. Apr 65: ltr. Col I atiren I1967). pp 1.7. 70

1 Shawv JIr_ to 2d Al). Sep 4. 1965. NIA(". 54 M~sg. Amitt b. Saigon to SrCl) I A I I-.

MonthI% Ps al R pri. lait 65. Anne.' B1. pp 19. ( ct 9 I190,3 rprt. NI oore to NI ACV J' tit)2. 1964:

321
THE ADVISORY YEARS Notes to Pages 250-257

rprt. Montgomery to 2d Al). Jun 8. 1964: nisg. and Ross to MACV. No% 3. 1963

2d Al) to PACAI,.Jun 18. 1964: Collins. Iherb- 61. Msgs. MACV to CINCPAC. Mar II.

cue Operation in SEA. pp 7-9. 1963, CINCIPAC to ADMINO. CINCIIAC.

55. Ilst Data. 2d AD Op. Ser ices I)%.Jul- Oct 22. 1962: CINCPAC Rcrd. 8th SI'CDEI"

Dec 64: rprt. Moore to MACV. Oct 2. 1964: Conf. May 6. 1963. Item I. insgs. CINCPAC to

rprt. 2d Al) to MACV. Nov 3 and Dec 2. 1964. MACV. May II. 1963. and CSAI. to PACAF.

anid Jan 4. 1965: Collins. Ierbicide Operations May 13. 1963

it? SEA, pp 9-15. 62. Lt Col Ray A. Robinson. Jr. End of

56 Msg. 2d Al)VON to PACAF. Jan 30. lour Report. Apr 10. 1965.

1962: Gleason paper. ca. Mar I. 1962: PACAF 63 I.tr. Ross to MACV. No\ 3. 1963

Ref Bk for Mar62 SECI)F Conil. 'lab 8: mi w 64 DOD Pentagon Paperi. Bk 3' IV C I.. p

With Col R.I Gleason. May 12. 1972 39: tusg. SECS'I ATF to Am lEmb Saigon, Apr

57 CIN( PAC Rcrd. 3d SECI)EF Conf, 28. 1964

Feb 19. 1962, Item 3i msg%.,ICS to CINCPAC. 65. I'SA|" Spec Ops Force. Pro. Corona

Mar 12, 1962. and CSAI- to PACAI . Apr 20. Ilar\est. Apr I. 1968-Dec 31, 1969. Sec 2. pp

1963 25-26. iprt, Moore to MACV. Oct 22. 1964.

58 General Moor.-an presentation before Robinson End of Tour Report, Apr 10. 1q65

Congressional Commnitee. Lea. Feb63: MACV 66 LItr. Moore to MACV. Oct 2. 1964:

Summary o Ilhghlihghts. t-eb 8. 1962-1(b 7. USAI. Spec Ops Force. I'roj Corona Harmes!

1963. p 53. Apr I. 1968-Dec 31. 1969. Sec 2. f~p 25-26: and

59 Msg, CSAF to PACAF. Apr 20, 1963: tr. Robinson End of' our Report. Apr 10. 1965

Anderson to Anthis. Apr 12. 1963. MACV 67. Rprts. 2CCRItoNIACV.I-3. )cc2. 1964.

Summary of highlights. Feb 8. 1962-Feb 7. and Jan 4, 1965: Reynolds inmW. JIan 65. and

1963. Bethea intw. Jan 65. both in Ihst. 2d Al).

60 Itr. Anderson to Antlti.. Apr 12. 1963: Jul-l)ec64. V. l)oes 5and 8: Capt Earl i.'lighe

Itr. Doyle to 2(1 AD. Oct II, 1962: Mat .Iohn P End o1 I our Report. Apr 15. 1965.

Anderson to I) AF-I U-Vietnam, Aug 21. 1963.

CHAPTER XXI

End of the Advisory Phase

I Msg. 13th At- to MACV. Oct 7. 1964: Itr. pp 324-25.

Moore to Baron..lan 18. 1965:and Guthrie End 8. AFXOPJ Book of Actions in SEA. 1961-

of 1lour Report. ca. Aug 65 !964. Items IV-Y and IV-Z

2 Kenneth Sam%. h1torical fBack groind to 9 M.sg. MACV to 2d AD. l)ec 19. 1964. Ne

I )eg ong Mortar Attamc on Bi'n Ioa (IIQ York fllwe. Pentagon Paperi. P 335

IPACAF. 1'roiC|II:CO. No% 9. 1964). [it Rprt. 10 Ibmd.. pp 335-36. AFXOPJ Book of

PFOOP. Aug 64: Moore address at PACAF Actions in SEA. 1961-1964. Item IV-2. msg%.

Commander's Conf. i-eb 22-25, 1965. lust. ICS to CINCPAC. Dec 19. 1964. and CINCPACAF. Jul 64-un 65. II. pt 2 PAC to MACV. ,Ian 9, 1965. Brooks End of

3 I/nd. Iist R prt. P F:OOP. Aug 64. III. and '1 our Report. .Ian 9. 1965

Sep 64: AFXOPI Book of Actions ii SEA. II M.gs,2dAl)to23d AI(p.l)cc24.19(6.

1961-1964. Items IV-X. IV-V. and IV-Y. New and to 80th I FS. Dcc 25. 1964. CSAF to

York 7me,5, Pentagon Paperi%. pp 320-22,John- PACA|-. Dec 24. 1964 lusts. 19th 'I FW, Julsoil. IVantage Point. p 119. I eMa, i ntw. Ma\ Dec 64. p 40.Ja n-Jhn 65. p3: Robert I' Ilelianka

29. 1972 and Bewerly Ilale, USA I*Operationmfrom 7hai4 [list. 2d Al). .Iul-l)cc (. II. 94, land. 1964-1965 (IIQ PACAI, Prol CIIECO.

5 Sharp-\Vesnmoreclid. Report. p 95: rprt. \ug 10. 1966). pp 81-82. AFXOPI.C. Analysis

Edwards to 2d Al) lhst Ofc. t.Ian 65: Guthr:e of Southeast Asia Air Operations. 1. See 2

End of 'Iour Report. (a. Aug 65 12, Msgs. l)et 2. 18th I |-W. to 2d AD.JIan

6 " lie I.o\down from the 'lop I' S. Coin- 18. 1965. 2d Al) to PACAI-. Jan 17. 1965. 13th

mand in Saigon." if'. No\ 27. lvtl. pp 46. Al- to PACAI-. Jan 27. 1965. and 2d Al) to

51-53" AFXOPJ Book of Actions n Si-A. 1961- CSAI-. Mar 15. 1965 llelinka aind Ilale. USAF

1964. Itei IV-Y Operationm from 7hailml. pp 61-65. 123

7 finL. New York To'ev. Pentaigon Papem. 13 finL. p 91. Public Papers of the Pre322
Notes to Pages 258-267

dlents Ltndoo Bi Jolinon. 1965 1 Wa'shtington. memno. Edumund.. for MIoore. JIan 18. 1965.

1966).I. 57: New York Time%. Pentagon P'aperA%. IPACA F Actis'ity Input to Irom Corona I ars t

p 339 onl In. Counirr Stike Operatomn in Sout/ieasi

14 M.isp.. AI)M1INO. CINCPIAC. to CINC'- Asioa. I Jan 65 -31 Mar 68. V', pt 1. 1965. 15-18.

PAC. Feb 27. 1965. Am Enib Vientiane to SIEC- and rusgs. PACA F to 13th AtF. Jan 23. 1965.

S I A'l 1. Jan 18. 1965. to CINCPAC. Mtar 1. and 2d Al) to I'ACAF. Jan 28, 1965

1965. and 13,h Al- to CINCI1AC. Jan 30. 1965: 31. AF'XOI'J Book of Actionin itSEA. 1961-

AFXOI'I.C. Anayivs of Southeast Asia Air 1964. Item V-1. nisgs. MACV to CINCPAC.

Operation,,. 1. See 2 Jan 2. 1965. PACAF to 13th A F. Jan 23. 1965.

I5. Msgs. CINCIIAC to.JCS. Jan 21. 1965. CSAF to PACAF.Jan 29. 1965.and 13th AFto

I'ACAF to L3th AF. Jan 23. 1965. Anir-mb 2d Al). Feb I5. 1965.

Vientiane to SE-CS'I AlIE. Mfar 6. 1965. 312 Msg. 2d Al)to PACA-. Jan i28. 1965

LISAIRA V'ientiane to CSAF, Jan 24, 1965. 33. Ltr Col III.. Price to 2d AI.Jan 2,1965;

ICS to CINC")AC. Jani26. 1965. Aiib Viei- MACV Immediate Release. Jan 65.

tianie to CINCI'AC. Jan 27, 1965. QASI) ISA 34. MACV. Monthly E~valuation Rprt. Jan

to Anil-ib Vientiane. Feb 3. 1965. 13th AF to 65. Annie, 13. Air Force. p 19.

PIACAI-. Feb 6. lq%5. AFXOI'I.C. Analysis of 35. Ilist. 2d Al). Jan-Jtii 65.1Il. 16.17, 22

Southcast Asia Air Operations. 1. See 2.1p 8-9. 36. Msgs. JCS to C1NCI 1AC. Jan 27 and Feb

I lelnika and H ale. UISA F Operations from 4. 1964: lust. 2d Al), Jan-Jutn 65,11I. 29: Robin77iailand. 1964-1965. pp 19.71, 84 son End of 'lotir Report. Apr I1). 1965. MR.

16. Mtsj,. NIACV to 2d Al). Dec 28, 1964: Woodyard. Mar 1. 1965.

A'ew V *A 'lues. Pentagon Paper.%. pp 336-37. 37. New York D7ines. Pentagon Paper.s, p

I hompson. Defeating Comnnivs isiirgenci. 337. Ball. 1m)isclie of Power. pp 371.' y

pp 43. 166-67. James C I hotupson. Jr . "Ho%% ;wi. "lle Case for Conoinued Biombing."'

Cow~d Vietnam Ilappcnf'-. p 51, 38 Sharp-Westmoreland. Report. p 107:

17. Sandhorn. [End( of]' otir Report. Dec 8. hist.W2 Al). Jan-Jun 65. 11. 8.

1961. I hornpson. Defeating Comnoninisi Muir- 39. Stebbins, Documenti on /1meritan Forgenvi. pp 106.08 eign Relationv. 1966. p 129: Cooper. L.ost Crii.

18 Ilist. 2d AD. ,Iul-lDec 64. 11. 99: itrs, maie, pp 255.62. D~onald S. Zagoria. Vietnamn

Moore to Ky, D~ec 29. 1964. and Rowland to Thong>' (New York. 1967). p 151: Johnson.

Ginsburgh. Apr 72 Vaintage Point. pp 122-24.

19 Ilist. 2d AlD. JuI-IDec 64. 11. 109-12. rprt. 40. Rtprt of Investigatin.I'lciku inicident~b,

Capt Stanton R. Mtisser. D~ec 14. 1964 Board of Officers to Insestigate Incident at

20. U~r. Moore to Baron.Jan 18. 1965: rprt.2 MAC\' Compound and Camp Ilollowa%.

CCR to MACV .1-3. Jan 4. 1965: Sarns. First Pleikti. RVN. Mat Gen Milton B3 Adams%.

71,st antI Comnbat Liw ofI AC-47, p 5 LISAI-. President. Feb 16. 1965

21 Woodyard iprt. Kenneth Sanies. I lie 41 Sharp-Westiaoreland. Report, pp 14.15.

Battle otf Birnh Gia. 2- lce 64 - I JIan 65 11 Q hist. 2d Al). Jan-.Iun 65. P11 22-26

PACAI:. lroj CumCO Dc 27. 1965). p 2 42 Ilist. I

1

ACAF.Jtil 1, 1964-Jun 30. 1965.

22. fInd.. pip 2-6 1. Pt 2. 96: hit. SAC.Jan-Jun 65. 11. 238-239:

23. Wood% ard rprt: lust. 2d Al1). Ja n..Itn 65. rnus. PACAF to 13th AF and 5th Al-. Feb 65

11, 12 and 15.* 43 Ilmst 2d Al). Jan-Jun 65. II. 26-28.

24. Ibid.. p Is Bethica 1115. ii 6 1 965 Gti e End of I otir

25. Satis. 7hei Battie o/ Bilth Gia. pp 6-8 Report. ta. Aug 65

26. New York Thus, P'entagon Papers. pp 44 lust. 2d Al). Jan-Jun 65. 11. 31-33

337-40. 45 Sliarp-Westnmoreland. Report. pp 107-

2'7 luist.2d Al). Janti-Jtun65. 11.8 anid i:itrs. 108: hi.,t. 2d Al). Jan-Jtin 05, II. 34.35. 1tr.

Everding to Bfiller. Jan 8. 1965. Rowland to Mataxis to 2d Al). Feb 28. 1965: msg. M ACV to

Gisbtirgh., Apr 72: [trig Gen A W Schin7 CI NCPAC. Febl 21. 1965

Debriefing Report. Oct 22. 1966. 46 MACV. Monthly Fsaltijtion Rpri. Mar

28 Msg. PACAF to CSAF. Jan 6. 1965 65. Annex B3. p23.

29 Ilmst I'ACAI-. Jul 64-Itin 65. III.Jan 65. 47 Msgs,. PACAI- to 2d Al). Mar 2. 1965.

tasgs. PACAF to 13th AF.J.an 23. !965. and to CSAI- to PIACAI-. Mar 6. 1965. CS to CINC5th At-, Apr 12. 1965 PAC. Mar9. 1965.and AI)MINO. CINCPAC.

30. Sharp-Westimoreland. Rep~ort. p 107: to MACV. Mar 10. 1965

323
GLOSSARY

A-I IE Skvrutder I'rop-drien, single-engliw, land- or carrier-based multipurpose aircraft.

dcseloped to permit greater versatility as an attack bomnber or utility

aircraft. 'Iwo crew Foriacrl designated A D-5

A- Ill Skyraider Prop-drisen, single-engine, land- or carrier-based mutlt ipurpose aircraft

Carrying heavy stores on its centerline rack, this plane is especially

cquipped for low-lesel attack bombing. A single-seater, like all Skyraiders

other than the AD-5 series I-ormnerly designated AI)-6.

AC-47 I hie C-47 transport conserted into a gunship by adding tile General

Electric SU U-1I IA minigtin.1 lie AC-47 had scecral nicknamo, l'iffthe.

Mvagic lDragon. Dragon Ship, and Spooky.

AD-4 Skyraide Prop-drien. single-engie, land- or carrer-based aircraft used for discbombing, tactical support, and other combat missions One crew

AID-5 aircraft See A- IF Skyraider.

AI)-5Q aircraft See IA-lI F Sk% raider.

AI)-6 aircraft See A- Ill Skyraider

AA antiaircraft

AAGS Army Air-Ground System (US)

AAOS Army Air Operations Section, MACV J-3

AA R air-to-air reftieling

All air base

ABHAl air base advisory team

ABGp air base group

Able Mable United States Air Force photographic reconnaisance dcteclmcnt at Don

M ining Royal]1 hai Air 'orce Base (1961-62) then at 1 an Son Nhut Air

Base

A BSq air base squai~dron

ACIP airlift command post airborne comimand post

ACS air commando squadron

ACS Assistant Chiel of Staff for

AOI IV Army Concept 1I camn in Vietnam (US)

Al) air division

AI)CS Assistant lDcput Chief of Staff foi

AI)MINO admmnistratis office

Al)VON adsaneed echelon

AI)Wg air depot wing

Al- Air 1-orce

325

PRECEDING PAU BLANK-INOT YTU1v)
- 7-.-

THE ADVISORY YEARS

Al AG Air F-ore Advisory' Group

AFI( Air Force Base

AFCC Air Force component commainder

AF-CI-l Office of Air Force hlistory. United States Air Force

AFF Army Fiek6 Forces. South Vietnam

AFL.C Air Force Logistics Command

AF Sec. 'vAAGV Air Force Section. Military Assistance Advisory Group. Vietnam

A F I U-V Air Force I est Unit Vietnami (UIS)

AFXOI) Director of Doctrine. Concepts. and Objeeiise. United States Air Force

AFXOIP Director of Operations. United State% Air F~orce

AFXOPI Special Air Warfare D~ivision, D~eputy for I actical I ransport I orces.

Directorate of Operations. United State% Air F-orce

AFXOIPJ Assistant Director for Joint Matters. D~ircctorate of Operations. United

State~s Air Force

I'XOL Factial Disision. IDepuitv for Iactical I ransport Forces. l)irectoratc of

Operations. United States Air Force

AFXPD D~irector of I'lans. United States Air Force

Agile Remote area counterinsurgencyv research and de~elopment b% Adsanccd

Research Projects Agency

A G t air-to-ground missile

AGOS Air-Ground Operitions School (USAIF)

All) Agency for International D~evelopment (US)

A IG address indicating group

Al RA air attach6

Air link Southeiast Asia I reaty Orga ni/ation air exercise in I liailand (1957)

Air Progress Southeast Asia 'I reaty Orgaiuation air inanetier in I hailand (1959)

A [CC airlift control center

AID air liaison officer

Al -P Atithoriid Low priority Interd icition a rget

Amb Ambassador

AMC Air Materiel Command

Am limb American Embassy

AMFPA Air Materiel Force Pacific Area (UISAI-)

AOC aii operations center

app appendix

A I) F airborne radio direction finding

326
ARNIA Army' attache

ARPA Adsanced Research ProjectsAgenc3. A separately orgaiied resLcrchand

deselopnient agency of the Department ot Defense under the direction

anJ supcrsision of the Director of Defense Research and Engineering

ARIPAC Army' Forces. Pacific (US)

ARVN Army' of the Republic of Vietnam

AS!) ISA Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Sccurity Affairs

AS[ Aerospace Studies Institute (USA F)

ASOC air support operations center

Associated States Vietnam. Laos. and Cambodia

in Indochina

asst assistant

A-Staff Air Staff. Formecrly used in numerical combinations as with J-Staif. wshich

Sec.

ASU aeromedical staging tinit

atch attachment

atchd attached

ATF air task force

NiTF-130)) 13th Air Task Force (l'rosional) (USAF)

A'l Gp air transport group

A'ISq air transport squadron

AVCO asiation company (USA)

B-26 Insader A three-place. midssing. all-metial monoplane, light-bombard ment airc, aft

wsith tricycle landing gear. 'ossercd by tsso prop-drisen engines Thire

crews.

13-47 Stratojet A sssept. high-ssing. multi-engine tet atircraft wsith %sscpt tail surfaces and

tandem landing gear. Four engines% are paired in pod% below and for-

%%.ifd uil tdi ngs. Otlici tssoenginesie in iidisiduaii pods~it wiiig tips.

'I hree cresw.

B-57 Canberra A sside-%hort. midssing. twsin-jet bomber aircraft wsith retractable triec!e

linding gear. Two crew.

13-58 Ihustler I onig-rangc. highi-altituide, high-speed aircraift. Wing i% ftill eantileser midwsing modified delta design. P'owered by four turbojet engine% equipped

wsith afterbtirner%. Engine% mounted in inct

is dual nacelle%. tsso per %%mng.

motinted on pylon% beneath each wing.

Bristol 'I ype 170 Prop-drisen. tssin-cigine. cantilever high-ssing monoplanec designed a% a1

freight or passenger transport. Used in Southeast As.ia by the Royal Ness

Zeala-iid Air Force

llritisli Superrmarine I An amphibiotis aircraft tied h the Blritishi dtiring World War 11 for

Sea Otter reconnaissanice and general nausaI duties. uncltingair sea rescue 'I hue

F-rench Nasv eiaplo~ed this ,urcraft in Indochina

327
THE ADVISORY YEARS

Back P~orch United States troposcatter cormmulnicaltionls S steml in South \'ietrnam.

Bali11Iflat M ovement of F'renich military personnel by air fromt Europe to Vietnlain

(1954).

Barin l)oor lista bhsh[iclit of tactical aI .r cont rol svstcmli in Southi Vietniam (1962). Barn

Door 11 estetided the swsemn to 'Ihaila nd,

Barrel Roll United Staites air interdiction iieas~t.'rn Laos (1964) and latter limited to air

aetis ty in northern I ao%

I)A bomb danvige assessment

Bell I one United States Air Force atirdefense detachment at [)on Mining Roval I hi

Air Force Base.

Benit l30o% Rapid dehsery airdrop system.

Blig Safari Air 1-orce ILogisties, Commuand technical renork of infrared equiipment

(1963)

Built1 1 amn Special Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces special tactical /one inl the pros micesof

Zone Binh I hua it and I a in I)ong (1964).

bks book

Black Watch R B-26 photographic actisity lin I a os that was t ra nslerred to \'ietnlain

(1962).

Booster Shot Pacific Air I-orces air-delisered silage id project lin I aos ( 1958)

Box I101) United States Air Force intcllij lce n operations 05cr the Gulf of 'I onk in

(1I9(A).

Brase Bull Ani especially modified C-97 emplo~ ed for reconnaisance lin Southeast

Asia during 1963.

C45 [Fpeditor Light. low-wing. prop-dimen. twin-igine cargo aircraft of all-metall cul)-

strtictiot. 'I \no crew. fotir passetg.-rs

C-47 Skytram Prop-drisen, twin-enigimie. low-wmng monoplanei with retractable landing

gear. titilied as at argo. amutlance. or troop transport I no erew%.

tsenty-four passengers

C -54 Sk ytiaster I'Iol-d itsni. fow-i - igini. In-s o molloplan' ss iret ractable t rio e

Ia uding gear A long-ranige cargo, troop, or p-.rsrial transport Si \cress

C-I 19 Flying Boxcar A twini-boom. hiighi-wi tig. hiid mionoplanie of all-n'ceal cotit riiction iasi\itig

at conveintional tricycle gear with at steerable nose gear Its tno reciprocating engines lime eonsta nt-speed. four-blade. res ersiblc-pitch propellers. 1Ike cren&. forty-two troops

C- 121 Pros ider Pro p-d risen i. tn'o-enigiic,. Ihigh-n'ing mo itopla ne i sedi tranispo t combat

andc other equipment for airborne assatilt troops. thle rcstipply b\ air of

adsanited cotmbat positons. esactiation ol n ounded. and air t ra nsportation of paratroops to the dlrop /oitc I \% o cress. Si \ troops. or fifty

litters plus four atteiails. Also sers ed as a forssard air control flareship. ( I lie C- 123K feattures iss pod-inmted turbojet, inadd,tion to its

piston eingiines.)

C- 124 (lobemser A Ion'-sitig initioplate pos credb lwfouirreciprocatieiigcengines, I las clauinshell cargo doors lin front fuselage and loading dlesator in (.enter I tislage

328
capable of trn sporting licasgrotind -force anid ord na neequipment iii

the main cabin. Fim e rew. two huind red troop,, or 127 litters, plurs

tssentv-fi c arrihulator% patient%.

C-1I30 I Icules A high-wsing. all-mietal coast et ion. ieditim-range. land-based [Ionloplante. for rapid t ra nsportation of personnel. cargo. or paratroop%

Powsered b\ lour turboprop engines. F-our ere\%. iiinct\-tsso troop% or

51 t -four paratroops, or ses etv litter% pins %i \ attendant,

C 11-21 Workhorse All-metial. ,eiaii-itioiiocoquti-constrticted htelicopter for transport anid

cargo operation, Crew compartment Ii n ose, side-b\ -side scat ittg H as

three-blade.,ail--metal rotorsarranged Ii taitdern and turiting inl opposite

directions I ric~clc-tvlpe landing gear. Iwo crews. SIXteen passenger%

I-ormcrlv designated 11-2 1

Cl 1-34 Choctaw Sikorsky Model S-58 helicopter equipped with a four-blade, main rotor

anmd a tail rotor Ilas two-wheel imain landing gear and small tail whleel

'I wo crew\,. eighteen passentger% I-ormier\ designated If- 14

CV-213 Caribou Prop-driven. twin-emtgine transport with load-carrying capacity conliparable to that of the C-47. Hlas short-takeoff-and-landing eapability Crews

of two and thirty-two passentgers.

C Chairmani or Chief of

CALO eorps air liaison oifficer

CAM NJItON consolidated aircraft maintenante squadron (UJSAF)

Candy Machinec United States Air F-orce F-102 interceptor air defense teams Ii Vietnaml

Stiperseded Water Glass

C'AI) combat air patrol

CAS close air stupport

CASI- composite air strike force

CAlT Civil Air 'I ransport Corporation

CA'l 0 Combat Arms ' raining antd Orga ni/ation Division. United Staites M ilitar

Assistance Advisory Grotup. Saigon

Cat Paw Provisiotal Uniited States Air F-orce C'-119 imainitenane detachmieiit in)

Viettnaiat ( 1954).

CD U cluster bomb uinit

cc' comnbat cargo

CCI1 G combat crew% training group

CC IS combat crew t rainint school: combat crew training squad ron

CI)NI Commaittee for ii IDefense of National Interests, or Lao conservatise

political party.

CD1)I C Combat , u-.elopnwnt and 'Iest Center

C-I' cormtni' ations-electronics

CII ECO Contemporary HIistorical Evalution of Counternirgeticy Operations

(1962): Contemporary HIistorical Evaluation of Combat Opeiations

(1965). Contem~pora ry HIistorical Examitiation of Current Operations

(1970)

329
THE AD)VISORY YEARS

Chien lie ng1wVictorioiis "I Gowerimeni ol Vietnam milita r camipaigni plait otficiali% issued In IFebruar% 1965

('It I10 "oOpen Arms," Gm eminent of V'ietniam cause designed to persuade V'iet

Cong to rals to the go~ei ninent cause

CIINIAAGV Chief. Mijijiar% Assistance Adsisor% Group. Vitetnam

citron chronologs

('I couinterintelligene

CIA Central Intelligence Agenc) (WS)

CI DG Casalan Irregular D~efense Group (RVN)

4 .CINCARPAC Commander In Chief. Arias Forces Pacific

CINCFE Commander Int Chief. Far E'ast

CINCPAC Commander In Chief. Pacific Command

CINCIIACAIF Commander in Chief. Pacific Anr Forces

CI NCPACFI I Comitand~r in Chief. Pacific Fleet

Cl NCI.NC FETC Commanader in Chiuef. I nited \ations Commniaad Un'ited State, F-ar last

Comnmand (1950-1956)

C'INCLTSAFE Commander inI Chief. United State-, Air Forces In Europe

CimI Guard See RIF. Regional F-orces

C.ICS I he Chi'irnian. Jointi Chiefs of Staff

C.IT Commander. Joint Iask Force

CIM M-eniorandum (1 hie Chairman. Jloint Ch-efs of Staff)

CMIII Chief of Militar% listory. United States Arnms

('NO Chief of Nasal Opcrations (WS)

COC combat operatioals enter

COI N ~ iinterisrgeney

('old War A hostile enicotinter hmetsen nationis or group% of atations that stop% short

of actual armed conflict It uses the %%capons of politics. diploaic%.

economics. espioniage. police action.arid propagatida to gain ad~aniage

could cornmnand

comdr commander

COM FLA Al- C'ommanider. Far Last Air F-orces

COMI'Al C'oiander. P'aific. Air I orce

CO MSE AD 1 CO NI Commanider. Southeast Asia IDclfcase Command WI.S)

COMN US NI AC III l onimanader. Un ilted State% NI iiar Assista ne Comma nd, I hanid(

CO)N] USNI ACV C'omnmander. Un inted States M alita r% Assistatue Comimianud. Vici nami

Condor I'rcic anihtar% thrust out of Laos fossard ieni Iluen P11ti (1954)

330
cont conference

Cong Congress of the United State%

Con5' Rei Congressional Record

Corona Ilarsest United States Air Force cvaliation of air operations in Southeast Asia.

COSVN Central Office fin South Vietnam (V'iet Cong Headquarters)

counterinsurgency 'I hose military. paramilitary. political. economic. psychologicil. and civic

actionis taken by a government to defeat sub% ersise insurgency.

CQ Congrssional Quarterly

CRC control and reporting center

CRI' control and reporting post

C S Chief of Staff

CSAF Chief of Staff, United State% Air Force

CSAFNI Chief of Staff Air Force Memorandum

C IZ corps tactical /one (RVNAF)

ctmrr cuirrent

DA Department of the Army (US)

DABEN D~ata Base In~cntorv

l)AF Department of thec Air Force (US)

1) All U-V D~irector of Air l-orce Fecst Unit Vietnam

lDep Doptity for

D(7S lDcput% Chief of Statfl for

I) S S&l leptt Chief of Staff. S~sterns and Logistics. United States Air Force

DP~lCI5NCIIAR PAC Depittv Cotuiander in Cltef.titiited State,. Army. Pacific

D)FICOM L'SMAC- Deputy Commnder. United State% Militar% Assistance Commatnd.

'I IAl 'I hailand

dept department

D)e Soto United States offshore intelligence collection

l)IA lDefcnse Intelligenice Agency WIS)

Dir lDircctoi of

dir director: directorate: dirctise

direction finditng procedure for obtainitng hearing% of radio frequency emiitters with the tise

ofa hlighilydirectiozial aintennai~ and a displa% unit on at intercept recciser

of iticillarN eqtuipnment

lDirt I hirty Unitted States Air l-orce (C-47 tratisport pilots attached to the Vietniamese

Air Force (1962-.13) An unofficial nicknamte

331
THlE ADVISORY YEARS

dix dix ixon

l)lSM DIIirector Joint Staf f Miemora ndum

I I dentilitartied /onec

dtoe docum nent

DOD1 D~epartmnent of D~efensxe (US)

doppler radar A molar xx xtem that dil lerentiatex hetwxeen fixed and inoxing ta rgets b%

detecting the apparent change tin Irequtic% of the reflected xxaxe due to

motion of target or the ohserxer

D~uke's NIixture prox isional United States Air Porce aircraf t maintenance detachment tin

Vietnam ( 1954). 1 orncrI% "Project Rexecre

I)Z drop ,onec

FA-I P Skx raider Similar to A- I F except thtat it is equipped for couitermeasure% P-ourcrex

Porineel% designated AD1-SQ

EC-47 Skx'train A C-47 that ha is Oeletroniice ounter mcaxtires ca pah ilit % or elect ronlic dcx Ices

to permit einp~o~ment as a it carlx warning radar station I hirce crew.,

Eagle IHight A tactic for helicopter employment

ECA leconome Cotoperation Admninistration (US)

F D)C Furopean 1)eferne Coinimunit%

Elda Nickminame foi NI k-44 boimh 1965) P or merh "I lail" and "I v% Dog

El I N I electronic irtzmllice

est estimnate

cu l cx aluation

I--4ti Corsair I'rop-drixcn. xiiigle-engiiie. N~tx y fighter used tin xirious iiitodelx both

du' ing antd since World War Ii

F-5 1 rceown [itr Aa all-metal. midwing. txxii-cnigi e, xiigle-plae. jet fighter H as tricycle

landing gear anid steerable noxe wheel Nose is fitted wxith two 11-39

20-mm cannon Cai ii arr% si.\t\-twvo huind red pounds of ordnance Hlax

a range of four hiuiidred Miles and at speed of about ninw huindred milex

per hour

1--6I- Ihellcat A World War 11. prop-drixen. single-engine. Na\ \ fighter

I -81- Ilearcat A prop-dnixen. xglcnic.Nax\ fighter

1 -03 K ingeohi a I'rop-dnixen. xingle-engie loxx-xi ng fighter lDex loped during World

War 11 chitcll\ for grouiid-attack work Otie ercsx

1--86 Sabre Al-ea.xnl-nie o-xis l-x'te.jtfighter interceptoi wxithi

xxxept-back xiiigxanid tail I a re elnigga n ocrdrOne

ere\\

P.1(X) Super Sable Supersonic. xingle-engiiie. iurbolet-poxered. tactical and aii xtiperiorit%

fighter IHax at lox, thin. swxept wxiiig and nose air intake EmAplo\s air

332
braike and drag ehtite Carl pros ideclose Support for ground I orces antd

be refueled In flight. One ere%% .

P- 101 Voodoo Single-place. Issin-engie ssscpt taidwing jet aircralt designed as an escort

an rd penimation fighter. INlS a sss ept One-piece hioriontal stabili/er set

high onl its fin tric~cle-type landing gear

P-102 D~ella Da.gger Single-engie. suipersoice al- dale.(elta-mritg. lt interceptor used iii

airdefense. Has trre~ccl ia diniggeairspeed brakcs..ind dragehutte One

cress

P105O I hunderchief A Supersonic. singke-engine. tturbc'ct-possercd. ,ilI-sscaitlier. tactical fighter

Capable ofcloM,- support for ground forces. Its rangecain beemteided b%

inflight re~ueling One cress.

PAC forwsard air control: forward air controller

FAG forward air guide

IFAR Forces ArineS dui Royatace or Royal I all Arm%

Pornm (Gate D~etaichment 2. 4400thI Comabat Cress I raintg Squad ron. and suibsequentlv United States Air I-orce air comnma ndo act I t% at Mten II oa Air

IF EAF I- ar Ea-.t Air F-orces (USA F) ( 1944-56)

FEIAl I (1FOR Far East Air I ogistics Force ( SA F)

FEC Far East Commanrd (US)

FlC French Inidochina

heild Goal United States Air I-orce Ri -33 photo jet recennaisatice in [.ao% (1961)

Fire Blrigade United State% Air Force-Vietniamsc Air Force air transport rapid alert

capablity for Army ol the Republic of Vietnam airborne empki\ ienr

Firm I Ink 'Southeast Asia 'I reatl' Orgaivation marneusers in I haiaiid ( 1956)

FlSqI fighter inrterceptor Squadron

I-larning [)art United States-Vietntataec Air Force air reprinsal strikes against North

Vietnam (FI-bruar 1 965)

F NI Ifrequency modulation

fragmetitary *1 lie daily supplement to standard operattin% orders gosering thie conduct

opl'I tioiis oidei of the ii it in Soul hist Asi~i It toiiitied miissioii niunib i a id

function. type of ordnne. tine onl target, and other instructions

FlI I) field training detachment

'r fighter

FY fiscal year

G I lie rucastire or valr:x of the gras itational pull r f the earth or of a iorce

requtiredl to accelerate or decelerate any freely movable bod\ at the rate

of aboutt 32.16 feet -pe r-second lo iuill ~tlhre s" mieans to cbjected

to at 0-force of three Gs

3331
ii. ~-~--;_5

THE ADVISORY \ EARS

G CA ground controlled approach

0 IIQ general headquarters

G1.0 ground liaison officer [Gil general purpose (boro or forces)

9p group

GPO CGo~ernrnent printing Office (US)

Goreen Python United States Air Force reconnaissance operations at Udorn Royal 'I hai

Air Force Base. Thailand.

Green 1 urnip Loan of United States Air Force C-47s to the French (1954).

G-St'ff Army' staff. used in numerical combinations wi'th i-Staff, which see

GVN Gosernment of 'sicinamn

11-19 nelicopter See U 11.19 Ciickasaw

11-21 helicopter See Cl 1-21 Workhorse

11-34 helicopter See CII-34 Choctaw

1H-43 helicopter See I I H-43.

HC-47 Skytrain I lie C-47 transport especially equipped for search and rescute missions. and

with twice the normal fuel load. a stronger landing gear. and jet-assisted

takeoff I bree cress. Formerly designated SC-47

HI 1-43 A twsin rotor. single-engine hielicopter designecd for crash-rescue operations

Semi-mnonocoque-consitucted fuselage. Rotors are intermeshing. coonter-rotating rotors. each with two blades, mounted side-by-side Has

non-retractable, four-wheel type, landing gear 1 wo crew. three passengers Formerly designtated 11-43

IIL3-I helicopter See 1311-IA Iroquois and 1311-I B Iroquois.

H -I A hlicopter See MW1-A Iroquois

II U-Ill hlicopter See Lill-III Iroquois.

I I L- 16 Alban oss I'rop-d~mscn. mm-rigme. hmgh-ssing. arnphbimis aircraft \\ith all-mectal

hull and fi\ed wing floats. For search and rescue missions Four crew.

ten) passengers FHail Initial iiickname for N11,44 bomnb

Hawk uec Experimental airborne radio direction finding C-47 Cater EC-47) activity in Southeast Asia

III: D)F high frequency direction finder

Hilo Ilattic An especially eqIt:.ped lUnied States Air loree C-54 reconnaisance

aircraft employed in Vietnam (1962-63).

lust hisory, historical
I lop I ai Sequential conenltric inilitar% operations to salegua~rd Saigon tunder dic

('lien I Ilanlg Plani

F[IQ headquairters

I CA I oternutonal Cootperat ion Adniist ration W LS)

ICC International Control Commission

idleiiaficatioii. friend A ss stem tising elect ronic tr.- isrmison, to s% hich equipment cairried b% or toe friendly forces autornatiealh respond%. for exanmple, b% emitting

impulse%. tltereh\ distinguishing thernsee front client% forces

Ind inelosure

In- indorNeient

initr inst ructor

itel Intelligence

in trail Aircral t d irceed\ behind one another

intss ititersew

IIIR initial photographie interpretation report

I it intelligenee report: infrared

I RA N inspection and repair as necessars

Iron Age Oserall programi for United State, Air I-oree matierril support of the

French in Inudoehina (1953-54)

ISA Interitatitonal Securit Aflairs WIS)

MIL 52 lProp-drisen. three-enginte. los\ -% tg. transport mionoplane btuilt ill German) ,. .1n iker

.1 \A 1. Joinit Airlift Allocaions Bloird I NIAC\')

JAGOS JIoint Air-(irou 0Operations Sstem (NIACV\

l1A NI IA I Joint NI tItiar NIission for A: I to I Lirke 0IS)

lIAOC joit air operations center

JlA I10 jet-assised tak~ofI

IjCS Jloint Chiefs of Staff

I1CSNI Joint Chiefs of Staff Memorandutm

Kl;S .loint Gjeneral Staff ( R VNAIl)

JOC joint opecrations center

.lOI,(;-v JIoint Operational L~saluation G rotip. Viet na i (MIAC\')

.1 RA I A loint Reseairch an ml lt Actis it (MIAC\')

Zt [~~~~1Staff l1omintStaff slinntereIeo intosa -I(lrsnl..2(Ittligence). .-3 (Operations). .1-4 0I ogisties). .l-5 (PIlanis). .1-6 ( Coinittedtion atnd lleet rotes)

315
HIlE ADVISORY YEARS

.111)Joint table of distribution

.11 I Joint task Iore

Jlingle .11111 1 lie 44(00th Combat Ci;% Iv raiing Squa~dron and subsequent I. -ltea

States Air lorce air commitando actm t% at liglin Air !loree I(.it.

Horida

.1 USIAG Joint I. nied State%. iNilita r% Ad~ i'or% Giroup

i USMANI lJoit tinited States. M ilitar% Ad..i..orN ad P Ilanning Giroup

KB-5O Siipcrfortress I actiectI aerial anker po%%crecl b% four reciprocatintg eligine. ,iand t..o

turbojet eiigitie. Capaible of s.imultanteous. aerial refueling of thlrec

2ghtier-type aircralt b% the rrohe antd dIroguie method Six cre.%

KC- 135 Stratotanker I oiig-raitge. high-performaie tanker pev .red b% tour turbotet engine..

I Ia. a 0> ing hoot" lor aerial refueling. l'erforim high-..pced. highaltitude refueling of bombers. anid fighter.. Call he us.ed a..%.a cargo

and or troop trans.port. carr~lng up to eight% troops I-our ere.%

KBA killed b% air

K IA killed In ac1tioni

kiomneter Rqual.. 3.2810 81 feet. about m'~o-t bird.. (('2) of a mile

1 -1 IXlrop-d r.eli. ..iigle-engine. braced hihnn.light mnonoplanle I nel'..d

cabin sceat%. tno inl tande(1m I (a. dual cottrols.

-19 aircraft See 0-I1 Bird D~og

I -2(0 aircraft See U-6 Bea.er

I -26aircraft See U.-9 Aero Commtander

I -28 aiircraft See I! 11 10 I Ielo Super Courier

la ndline %%%.tem I elephonec or telegra ph commaunicationl b%> V.re 0o er. oil, or utider the

groundi(

I .ii% D~og Nti.knaim n'or NIk-44 bonnb. eh caled llaih iimd tiler Il-fi -

I ea ping I eia U nited State%. anid Republic of Viet nami Ai ed 1-orcs. loitg-rantge reconlitaian tce * nterdietion teaiit.

In liai..ol

I OC line of ColnIti uicatilolls

1 01) hle of po..itionl

I OR AN I otig-ra uge electronic na'.igitiolt %%s.tem thiat u..e. a limec di..ergetice of

pukec-I>pe Irawo.m~siont. from two or more fim.d ..ttion.. Alm. ahleti

I ing-r-rnge na..igation

I IT I aotian it lople'\ Ralf, or neutralis.t political part\

fir letter

336
I tick% D~ragon IIihati ie. eri cC lfliis.,i ne Ioii b%\ 1

it itcgtc Aoi C n11Mi d f -2

aircralt ( 1964)1 ttvr called -111I1 illiiHrse

I /laniding /oiie

Marcel I )%%aiilt Iruccl prop-dmr~en. m~in-cigmle. all-nmetal, light i'uiltar% trail%port and

Ni (-I S Siiigl-eigiii. iiibojet. Rowl~an lighter aiteril t. designea anld dc% Iop,:d

h iko~an.-(,ureci1 One ere\%~

MII(G -ndcegie til olet. Russiani lighter aircraf t that b\ 1 953-54 begaii

replacinig the NI 16(-IS in the Smiclt Air and N\ al Smerle

%I K-IX Spitlire llritishi prop-dro~en. sitl-igte o-~iglighter deIeloped b\ Superma rife Onie ere\% I lie speed. ratte (it climb. superior nlaiieu\erahilit\.

anii great Ilrepo\%cr iol the spitlfire mat~de it one of tie greatest combat

aiircraft eser buili

NMorie-%)X Cricket Prop-t im~en. %ingle-engiiie. liigling, hglaison aireral t Blti b\ NIoranie

Saulmer. it i% lie I renc \~ofl wrel th de Oermni iileseler 1 1-1 56' Storeh

eoitilflhiniecaiios imoinoplanie N ~o ere\\

NIAA(, Nilitar% Assistance Ad~ isor% Group

NIAAGiV Nihir\ Assistalice Ad~ isor% Group. V'ietnam

NIACSOG NI iitar\ Assitaitee Commantd . Studics ant O11i bsei %ai-, ,l,,!

MIAC Il HAl NI ilitar% Aswmnatie Commiand. I liiad

NIAC\' NIilitar\ Assistance Comtmanid. Vietia ii

NIAG Nlilitar'. Ad\ usor\ Giroup

Maid Potuch R 1 -33 phto cotirier ser\ ice I romnt i ninu g Ro~.il I limAir Ir orce Base.

I lialatid 1 1961-62)

NI&( nmipo%%er anid orgailiiationl

NI Al NI litar~ \ss Aw fle Program

Market 1

i oject for the loian oit 111nited States All Force 11-26s to the I renli in

!vlarlket I inue U nited Staies N\\ patrol% oft Sotithi et ~nimese coasts

Mat maiteriel

MIA IS Nllitar\ Air I ralisport Sersi(.e (ISAl

MI D 1) MuNItual I elense Assistarne P'rogrm 

I10110 mtemolurand~lum

Mleter lqtial% 19 37 Iliie

NIG( 1l11illiegt.

MI I , A popular utesigllationlot bcerta in Rtissian tfighter z:rcralt designed andl

(ileloped b% %Ikk5 a'i~ ild (itresich

MIillponid I iiited States eow rt assitanlce actillil in I ams (1961)

317
THE ADVISORY YEARS

NION FVA Iillnihl\ es ,luatoii

MnIOttdgnar[(1 Prinm~e mountain tribesmen I numbering about elgnt hundred thousand) wsho had a ltistor\ o1 a utipat h\ tow~a rd the Viet nanim I hie\ vere tiot

absorbed into the iliNtreaml of Vietnamese life

NI :z memioranmd um for record. militar\ region

NI RC Militatry RcsolIitii(-ar\ Council ((GV\)

I S manuscript

mesg

"VIS I SMilitary S,.a I ransport Ser\ ice

NIule I rain Nickname of initial Unitled State% Air l-orce C-I 123 detachment inI V'iet naill.

N ANIA P Northern Air Mlaterial Area pacific I USA Ii

NAl ( North Atlantic 1Ureat\ Orgaivation

NCOIC noncommiissioned officer-in-charge

NCI, National Campaign P'lani

nt d ito date

N I- I S\'N Naional 1' ront for the ILiberatmon of SouthI Vietnam (\Viet Cong political I arm). Also sometimes abbres ated NFlI or NI]-

10 NIA National Intelligence Agenicy. South Vietnam

NI F national intelligence estimate (US)

Night OwlI Nighitdeli\very of ordnaince by F-4 aircraft unider illtnmnaiit'on of their os it

Miares

NISC National Internal Sccurit\ Council. South Vietnmiai

NI] IS Nco Lao Ilak Sat ( Pathect Lao)

Nornad Ali armiled I1-28A trainer aireraft configured for the NIutual D~efense

Assistanc Program

NOR\NI not operationall\ readN mlaintenanice

NORS not operationall\ read\ suppl\

nI.p to place. no publisher 19NSA NI Naional Securit, Action NIcemora rid urn

NSC National Securit% C'ouncil IlUS)

M'A North Vietnamnese Armny

0-I Blird D~og Siltgleettgiile. two-place tantdem. closed cabin. high-wing aircraft of con- \emttioilal stut-bra-ced. t'.vo-spardcmgn All mtetal and sermi-monocoque

fuselage with a fixed pitch McCauley propeller I wemty-four \ olt electrical system Iwo ere%% IFormierly designated 1, 19

OV-I Mohawk Po-rvn igeegn.srelac d>lnlngt ipaewt s

uial obsersation and photographic capabilities Crew of two

')ASI) ISA O)fficeo(f the AssistantiSecretairy (f l)efcnsc. Internaitionial Scurit> Affalirs,

.338
7 -

OASI) PA Office of the Assistant Secretary oi D~efense, Public Affairs

ofc office

01CC office In charge of construction

O.1I on-the-job training

One Buck United States 'I ,tctical Air Command composite air strike force deployment to Southeast Asia in August 1904 in response to die 'Ionkin Gulf

attack.

Onl Mark Extensise modification o1 B- 26K aircraft perfoi toed by the Onl Mark

Engineering Company.

OPlati Operation plan

ops iperations

order of battle I lie identification. stretngth. command strueture, anid disposition of the

personnel, units, and equipmeni of any\ military forces

OSI) Officz of the. Secretary of D~efense

P1114 [-2Privateer A lotir-engie boiber and reconnaissance motnoplane. de\ eloped by Consolidated Vultee dtiring World Wair 11 for the United States Nas

l1BY-5A Catalinta Prop-drisen. twiti-cngi nc. all-mectal. parasol-wing patrol-bomber flying

boat. H as amphibia n capability, with aI retractable tricycle uindecarriage in the hull

lPACAP Pacifie Ail Forces (USAF)

PACFI: Pacific Fleet (USN)

PACOMN Paeific Commnand W S)

P'AP Pacific Air Foice (1954-1950) (USAF)

P'agoda Call sign of tie control and reporting post atl Pleikui

Pa naimi Call sign of the cotrol and reporting post (latter control and reporing

center) at( Dai Nang Air Ilase

Paper Saek Suspension of IMuLtual lcicnard Assistancte Pr ogrant delis eries to Intd ochina following the Geneva aigreeiments of 1954

Paris Call sign of the conitrol anrd reportitng cetiter at Ian Soit Nhut Air Base

P'arrot's Beak 'I lie tip of the Catmbodian salient \&est of Saigon. Sotth Vietniam.

Patliet Lao Laotian communists

Pathfinder I wo or more aircraft using lead aircraft-, I ORAN for navigation

Patricia Lynn RB-SW1 reconntaissane airciaft eqtiipped with iniprosed day-atid-niglit

cameras and infrared sensors

PB3 I Special lactical Republic of Viettriatan Armed Forces special tactical ,one in the proinces of

Zone 'htijoc Long. linh Loitg. and Phuoc I hanit (1962-63).

P) l). Plairnes des Jars (Phlaint ofJars) Anmilitary strategic arca non hi-northeasit ol

Vientiaite in Laos

PLO0 programts evaluatioit office

Pl. P'opular Forces, or thie forme. Vietnamiese Self D~efeitse Corns. I ocallh

rccrt.ited Sotth Vietnantese volunteers orgaiiid into squads and platoons, anid tised chiefly as security forces in villages, atid hamlets

339~
-'"---'''-~,--.'.. -~ -~~ -~- ~ 7

THE3 ADVISORY YEARS

II-DIOIP Deputy Chief o1 Stall. Plans dud Operations. Pacific Air I-orces

1)1 -I I )C D~irector of Intelligene, P'acific Air I orce%

11 P I Pla ns 1)is sion, I jrectorate of lans. Pacil ic Air Ioies

P I' L.UI Assisant for Logistical Plans. LDirectorate of Materiel. Paific Air I ores

IFMtSS Supply aind Service% lim son. Directorate of Materiel. Pacific Air I-orces

IIIl0C( Combat Operations. Assistait Chief of Staff Operation%. Pacific Air

I- orces

OD)lC AititChfofSaff OperationsN. Pacific Air I ores

I' 100 P Operat ions Plans l31sion. D~irectorate of Operations. Pacific Air Forces

Phyllis Anin IEC-47 airborne radio direction finding aircraft and project Follow~ed

experimental "Hawk lsC'

Picrce Arrow United States Navys retalator% xr st rikes agaitist North V'ietnam. August

5. !9o14

Pi1pe stein United States, Air 1-orce photograpice reconna11SMinCe detaichment ait I all

Son Nint Air Base (196I1-(62)

PM) petroleum, oil,a ml lubricainfts

P'OW prisoner oif war

P111C Photographic processing cell A facility. gencrall\ mobilc. eq iippcd for the

processing. priniting. and interpretaition of reconinaissanice sensor products, and other production tiorinall\ related to the recofnnaissance

intelligence function

pre% president

pro) project

PR I 1 People's Res ol utiotiary Pa rty (southern bra nch ol the North Victrnamcsc

comntlillIst (I ao l)otIlg) party)

Pisp pierced %tcel planking

pt part

Que Bietlce United State', Air I' orce coinuniitic,itiotis reeonnalissa tice nas',ions oser thec

Gullf of I onkiti ( 1964).

R-41I) United States Na\. transport slimilar to lihe Air l-ore (C-47

R 11-20 I m'adcr I hie 11-26 nmodified f or recoilnaisa ne miomlii b% cliaiigcs in nose ar11(

itisalled eqtipment I lire crew%

IZII-47 Stratojet I hie 13-47 modified and equippedl for photographic recontij ssdne is-

',ion', I hirce crew%

01-57 Catnberra I lie B1-57 modified lor photo recontnaissane 'Iwo ere%%'

IZ('47 Ski.ytraiti I lie (C-47 tranusport w%,ill equtipment pcrmarnentl) installed lor photoreconnaissaneand or electronic recolnnaissantce misions I lire crcew'

R .I'-10 Voodoo D~a\ or night photogra phic reconnaisa ne %erson oif the F- 101

10 -28 I rojin lifhe I -28 cotifiguired f)r phiotoreconissa t%, iec I w'o crc'.'

RI -33 Shooting Star Rtecotiitaissa 11cc erstoti of the 1-33 I wo crc'.

RAAI- Royal Australiati Air F-orce

340
rad radio

Ranch Hland Nickname of Unite~d States Air Force C-123 aerial spray dctaLhmnent

deployed to Vietnam in 1961-62 and applied to later defoliation and

herbicide actisity

RANDI Research anid De ci Jprnent (I hie R A ND Corporation. Santa Monica.

California)

IUD) research and desclopment

rcrd record

rccon reconnaissance

ref reference

Rec crc Prto% isiotidl United State, Air l-orce aircraft maintenance detachmnent in

Vietnam ( 1954) L~ater called *Dtikc's Mixture."

Rtf. Regional Force% (the former Vietnani.sc Civil Guard) I liese %sere local

Sotith Vietnamese defense forces recruited and used unihin one of the

adniinistratise region!, Iwos s'hlch the country was dis ided

R KGU Rovil Khmer (Canbodi ni) Goscniment

ItI A F Royal I aotian Air Force

Rolling I hunder Sustained United States iii strikes against North Vietnam (March 1965-

October 1968).

rprt report

rqIIIt requirement

RIl AIF Roval IHim Air IForce

I A I'll Rto~al IHim Air F~orce Batse

ItVN Reptiblic oif Vietnam

ItVNAIP R~piihlic of Vietnam Armed IForces

SC.47 aircraft Sec IIC-47 Sk'.train

SA Sccrciar\ of the Arm\

SAC Strategic Air Conmmanid (ITSAIF)

SACSA Special Assistant to th- IDircctor. .ICS Joint Staff. for Counlterinsurgene)

and Special Actisities

Saddle Soap I oan of 11-26aircraft to the I rciich byltlie United States Air I'oree(1954)

SAI* Sccrctar\ of the Air F-orce

SALMA! Southern Air %lateriel Area Pacific (1USAI-)

SAM 4Sq special air mission squtadlron

SA R search and resetie

SASh- special aerial spra) flight

SAW special air warfare

Sa% Bu htck United State% I actical Air (Commandl composite air strike force deplo> -

micits to Sotithtl ~Asia iin id-1962 a nil afterssaird Aso the nickiiai e

oh the I tIited States, Air I-orce C'-123 detachment decpho% ed toV \ietna III

in ii d-11962

341
THE ADVISORY YEARS

SAWC Special Air Warfare Center (USAIj)

SCAR strike control and reconnaissance

SCA*I selected counterinsurgency air target

scramble I o take off as quickly as possible (itsuallv followed by course and altituide

Iistruct[ins)

Sl)C Self D~efense Corps (R VN)

SEA Southeast Asia

SEAAS Southteast Asia Airlift Systemn

SEACOORI) Southeast Asia Coordinating Committee for US Missions

Sea Dog Project for the loan of United States% Air I-orce C-47s to the lreieli(1953)

Sea Swallow Government of Vietnam clear-and-hold operation tin Phil Yen Pro~ i ne

(1962).

SEA*l 0 Southeast Asia I reaty Orgarniation

see section

SE-C[DEI Secretary of Decfense (UJS)

2 CCR Commander. 2d Advanced Echeclon. Comtmander. 2d Air lDi'ision

2 OIt. Director of Current Operations. 2d Advanced Echelon. D~irector of Cutirent Operation-,. '.d Air D~ivision

SECSTA FE Secretary of State (US)

sccv secretarv

se%% session

SHIAPE Supreme Hleadqtirters Allied l'o%%ers Europe

shoran bombing Bombing d otteafter positioniitg thle aircraft to thle bomib-reclease point b%

radar adapted to the purpose

Short Count Air surs cila ne flights os er Soti ie t na mese coastal v. aters I) om i b\.

l-ariti Gate (1961-62)

Sb tifl Nickname for U nited States Marine Corps licicopter squad roil and (letachment tin Vietnar,.

SIAM single integrated attack ivc

SI.AR Side-lookingairborne radar Views at right angles to the ,ivs ohl the weiele.

which produces a presentation oh terrain or ios ing target%

SI AlI Special I ogisics Action%. I haila nl

SM staff mcmoraindumn

SN IE special national intelligeicz estimate

so special order

Special lorces Military personnel with cross-training ti basic and speciali/ed rnilitar\

skills 'file% usere uirgaiti/ed into small mtiltiple-ptirpose detachmnts11

%%it thle mission to train. orga nie. suppl%. direct, anid coitrol indigenOtis forces in guerrilla \% arfare and cotinterinirigenc\ operations, and to

contduict tnconwentional s\ arfare operations

sq squiadron

SSI( single sideband

sif staff

342
STR ICOM Strike Command (US)

hilbj subject

5'J f suimmary

Sunrise "B)inh Minih." HIighly ptiblicied Goscritmen of Vietnm clear-aitd-hold

operationt it Birth lDuoig Px ovince (1962).

SVN South Vietnam

Ssseet Ste Experittental RB-261, itighit reconnaissance aircraft equipped with early

infrared %eilsors.

Swing Back Spare parts support for F-81- aircraft through cannibaliuation

Swivel Chair Project for the loan of United States Air Force C-1 19s to the French and

associated USAF mainteitance support (1953)

T-6 Tecxait Prop-driven. single-engine. two-seat. low-wiitg. trainer -airplane.

T-28 I rojan Prop-drisen, single-cnigiite. tow-wing, all-mectal mtonoplane with retractable trtcycle landing gear with steerable nose wheel. F-or primary pilot

traiing Iwo crew. *1 hte T-28D %ersion is an attack plane, capable of

carrying a variety of ordnance on counterinsurgency missionts.

T-33 Shtooting Star Single-enigine. all-mectal. full-caittileser lowv wing, two-seat. higlt-performanec jet aircraft Desigited for training of flightt personnel. Itcorporates

laminar-flow wing sectuons. disc flaps, pressuri7ed aitd icated cockpit.

Has htydraulically operated tricycle landing gear I wo crew

T-37 All metal. jet-powered. two-place, full-caittilever. low-wing monoplane

primary trainer employing a retractable tricycle landing gear. Is completely equipped witht flight instruments Feattires side-by-side seating.

Nose gear is equipped wvith power steering. Two crew

*1 F-102 Delta D~agger Similar to F-102 except that it is a two-place. side-by-side trainer version

for comtbat use. Two cecw.

tac tactical

TrAC Ilactical Air Coimmand (USAF)

TACC tactical air control center

TACOIP tactical op~ration

TACIP tactical air control party

TACS tacncal air control system

*IADC tactical air direction center

TAIW~ANIEFCONI Iaiwan Dcens.~ Coimmaitd (US)

TA RC tactical air reco~nnaissantce center (USAFI

TASr tactical air stipport elementt (M ACV)

1 AWC I actical Air Wa. fare Ceitter (USA F)

'IC troop carrier

fl)Y temporary duty

tech technical

TER M lemporary Equipment Recovery Mlissiont

F task force

343
THEir AD)VISORY YEARS

I IS tactical lighter squadron

I1 IW tacticall lighter %%Iing

I MC tra nsport mm efient control

I10&1, table of orga iiiat ion anid equipnient

I OC tactical operations center

I oN I iger Night phiotogra phic modification of R I-101 atircraft

[RAC I argets Research and Attal~sis Center (1MACV)

1na ngle MIilitary operation b% R o~al L ao Army inl north-central Laos (J II 1964)

TlR I tvt I raining Relations aid Iln~truction Mission

~rojan IHorse II igh-ahtitttdeaerial recoitiaisanee flown by SAC 1-2 aircraft. Forlier>

"I tick% Dragon

'IS(; tactical support group

I urnaround I lie lengthI of lttlic betwseen arriming at a poinit and departing from that

point It is used inl this sense for the t urnarounid oif hipping in ports.ai tld

for aircraft refueling aiid rearming

1.1-1 Otter lirop-drimen. sitigle-eniginec. short-range, hligh-wing, light. Mt11it% aircratft

Canl operate onl wheels, wheel-ski,. or floats Ilas throw-oscr control

column. dual rudder conti ohs. tailwhecl powsered steering. aiid dotubleslotted wing flaps 'I wo crew. cight passengers

U.-2 Sinigl-e..siniglc-cniginicet aircraift I las long, wide, straight %%mig% to gis c

it a glider-like characteristic and inicrease its load capacity to accommnodate data-collection instruments,.ss as l the abilt to operate abo e

ss cuct> thousand feet 11%sed for high-a1 utide recotnaisatte anld

%%cather sampling

11-3 lirop-drisen. twin-einie. loss -so ig monoplane so ith a trc> dc landing

gear Used foradminusramis aind light-cargo pt powes, Iwsocress.1three

passcttgcrs

U-0 Iheaser Single-etigine. high-winug. a Il-tietal monoplante I las fi \cd latidi tig gear.

throw-ms r Lotrols. an id o ual rudder controls For general ttili [ issiouts Otic ciew. hoec passetnger% I ornierl% designated I -20)

11-91 Acro Comnit dicer lProp-drusn. twin-engine. light. higli-wiiig. Ca utiles er montopla ne swithi

nc Ld hnding gca u I or aditotal atnse lslosOne- crews. It' e pitssenger Formnerly designated 1 -26

U-10 I lclio Stuper Iirop-drusen. sintdecrinic. light. shiort-taikcoff-a tid-la tidiing aircraft tiscol

Courier fo, general tulit% mussiotu I %%o crew., toso passengers I-oritier> desigtiated I -28

1.1-17 Prop-druscut sutugle-engute. hugh-mriug. all-metal, su\-placc. tihuit% aircraft

so ith coit entuonal fixed Ianid ing gear atid ta il-wo eel Adaptable for

%ariots misin such as lpmsuttiel. cargo. anid ambtilanice operation

(11-1I helicopter See U II -I A Iroquois an i(o111-M I Iroqtiois

IlIIA I roquiois U.sed tor t rantsport itg personntel and stipplecs I la% t oo-blade. helicopter

%hiaft ol isen bl a gas tutrbine eniginie Iorqtie cotunteracted bN a t sooblade, tail rotor inounuted ottl a tail boom I las skid-us pc lanidiiig gear

liro isioiu I or dutal cotrols anitc internal feri tank One cress. - Inc

passeilger I ornierly designated Il I- I A

Il1-Ill I roqtiois Used to trans~port personitel aiid suipplies and as a gtiitshp Suntulla r to

I II WA except for etigitic a it wider rotor blade, copilot eunt rots, pros -

344
st011 lot armaiment nrd capabilit% to carry three litters I ' 0crew. sesen

passengers Pormew designated [W -Il)

U11I-1I9 ChIckasdsu All-mectal. semi-mowncoque luslage heliteopter Ilias one all-inetal, threeblade. main rotor and ain all-mectal tsmo-blade. antitorque. tall rotor

E~ngine mounted In' .ose. quadrie~cck landing ge.sr. %idc-by -side scaling.

ex\ternal cargo sling, dual controls. Used for general uItiht operations

'1 %%0 cress. ten passenger. Formerly designated 11-19.

U 11-34 Seahorse Similar to ('11-34 Choctaw. UItilm %ersion. I wo rev,. issels pasengers.

U 111ultra high frequencN

U N Untited Nations

U NC United Nations Comma nd

UIS United States (of America)

LISA United States Army

USAF United States Air Force

UISAI RA United States air .ittache

UISAmb United States Ambassador

UISARNMA United States Arm% attache

UISARI'AC United States Armsy. Pacific

UISAS:( P)V United States, Arm% Special I-orces. \ictitam ( Provisional)

UISA\VC United States Arnn War College

UISNC United States Marine Corps

U SIN United States Nass

IUSOM1 United States Operations Mlission

Vayabut Southeast Asia 'I reat\ Organiuation esercise in I lilatid (1958)

VC Viet Cong

VCS Vice Chief of Staff

Vill, very high frcquenc

Viet Cong Vietrinese eontinmIss. tiall South Vtetna niese comnits

Viet Ninth Initial description of Viet nanmese comituniss W\as laiter used to indicate

ethinic North 'icinmese f orce% who citiied I tos Ii ii to mgui~m Nofth

Vi'nainew Army troop%

Vill very Important person

VN Vietinm

\'NAP Vicirunies Air F-orce

52VOA Votee of America

sol voltime

Vulture Plroposed Ui.tted States Air Force bombing operation in relief of Dien

Mlen Phi: (1954)

Water Glass U.nited States Air Force 1-1(02 riitatiotialair defemise deployments, to I1a ii

Son Nbutt (1962-63) Superseded by "Candy Ma hitme

-545
- t -- V.

THE ADVISORY YEARS

Water P~ump Detachment 6. Ist Aircommando Wing ( USA F). deploed to I'hadllnd in

1964 and applied to subsequent special air %%arfi. activity at Udorn

Royal "1 hat Air Force Base

wg wing

WIA wounded in action

Wounded Warrior United States Air Force acromedicaleacuation of French repatriated sick

and wounded mihtary personnel from Vietnam to Europe (1954).

Wring Out United States Air Force project to reach authoried strength of 137 wings

with existing personnel t 1956).

Yankee 'learn United States tactical air reconnaissance nissions in Iaos

Z Zulu Ttae (Greenwich Mean 'I |me)

346
Bibliographic Note

For the purposes of both history and self-evaluation, the United States Air

Force began in 1962 an extensive effort to identify and collect documents on its

role in the conflict in Southeast Asia. At the same time, the Ail Force expanded

its normal historical program. It also established a new activity named Project

Contemporary Historical Evaluation of Counterinsurgency Operations, later

called Contemporary Historical Evaluation of Combat Operations (CHECO).

During the next several years, USAF commands and agencies involved in the

war searched their records and selected papers pertinent for historical research.

Records of USAF staff agencies in the Washington National Records Centerat

Suitland, Maryland, and of the Commander in Chief, Pacific Command

(CINCPAC) in the Federal Records Center at the Naval Supply Depot, Mechanicsburg, Pennsylvania. were screened for data on the air war.

All these sources, together with others, were indexed into the computerprocessed Data Bas. Inventory (DABIN) System at the Aerospace Studies

Institute, Air University, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama. Maintained by the

Technical Systems Branch of the Albert F. Simpson Historical Research Center

at Maxwell A FF, DABI N identifies source materials ranging from multivolume

studies to singlt-page messages, including title, issuing agency or author, date,

general subject. ind significant key words in titles. It reveals the location of

sources by repos;tory and finding numbers in the collections noted above as well

as those in the Reference Division of tht, Historical Research Center and the Air

University Library. A query to DABIN by an authorized researcher can obtain

the listings of.sources and, more specifically, the locations of the items referenced

in the footnotes of this volume of history.

GOVERNMENTAL SOURCES

Books and Documents

DIIVRIMiENi Oi DE-rNst

The records kept by the United States Air Force and its subordinate

commands and agencies are the major source materials for this volume. At the

Washington level, the holdings of the Deputy Chief of Staff, Plans and Operations, are the most useful collection of high-level Air Force policy and planning

papers. The semiannual histories of the Directorate of Plans anil of the Assistant

for Mutual Security give succinct infoi mation on policy formuiation. The study

cited in this history as AFXOPJ Book o! Actions in Southeast Asia. 1961-64.

July 21, 1967, was prepared in the Directorate of Operations. It summarizes

recommendations of the USAF Chief of Staff with respect to the conflict. Special

studies prepared by the Office of Air Force History also give perspective on

policy matters, and the following are particularly useful:

347
MHE ADVISORY YEARS

I1i0dreth. Charles 11 USI ' (ountecrinsurg'i Doeirnc'v andi aalihites, 1961-1962 I-ebrciarN

U SA F Spec cal A ir Wlarfare' Doctine's, 1963 Auigust 1964

The officially publ ishcd 11nited States- Vietnamn Relations, 1945-1967:

Siudh' Prepared bj' the Departnwent of Defense (Washington: Giovernment

Printing Office, 197 1) and 7The Pentagon P1apers, published in various editions.

also provide essential information on high-level policy decisions. The Historical

Office of 'hle Joint Chiefs of Staff kinldly screened and made available from its

files selected documents pertaining to this volume.

Military command histories and their supporting documents have been

useftul sources. The annual Cl NC1PAC Command Histories are of high quality.

and annual MACV Command Histories are available for 1964 and 1965. A

special historical study prepared by the Directorate of Historical Services. Far

East Air Forces (FEA F). FLA FSupport oft/ic French Indo-('hina Op)erations,

/ Jul 1 1952-30 Septiember 1954. contains details on the beginnings of USAF

activities in Southeast Asia. After 1956, Pacific Air Forces (PACAF) histories

(semiannual, except fora one-year coverage from July 1964 to June 1965) give

information on Southeast Asia, as do reports and diaries of PACAF staff

agencies. Thirteenth Air Force histories offer progressively less detail as the war

progressed. A perfunctory History of the Second Advanced Echelon. Thirteenth

Air Force. July 1. 1961-December 3 1. 1961. contains lile of value for research.

But a History of the 2d A DVON. November 15.,1961 -October 8. 1962 (prepared

by Joseph WV. Grainger and 'l'Sgt George 1). Day and issued onl November 12.

1963) is an excellent narrative with supporting documents. No narrative history

of the 2d Air Division in 1963 exists, but supporting documents forstia histoi Y

afford a good coverage of the period. Excellent semiannual 2d Air Division

histories wvere completed from January 1964 under the direction of Kenneth

Sais. 2d Air Division historian and director of CHIECO in Saigon.

ValIua ble opeidt iOns info illat tion is conIa i ned tint fie followimng stutdies:

cAnthont~. Mai Victor B, tSA I Mecc Air Force' tin Soutiac A %ta Tutu si andc 7i'c hniqcc' of Night

Opc'raions, 196 1-1970 Washington Office of '\ir F'orce I Icstor . March 1973

Iio'.'ers. ('ol Ra I .t SAI - I he Air F-orce in Southeast Asia I aetical Airlift "Washington Office

of Air Force II istor% .draft nianuscript. 1971

Ca lull. Maj John J.. UI. C. anld Sh tltinso n, Jack II isor% of U'S Marine Corp% Operations n)i

V'iet nami. Ja nuarN -. une 1965." Washington. II isorical Mranch. 6i-3 I~i'.n. tUnited States

Maraite Corps, dr aft miantiscript. 1968.

Komner. Robert Wv Th Alc~aa Emerge'ntc tin Ri'irosjnc Organmiaoon of a Stimcccc/o Counteciriniorgi'nci Effort R-957-A RPIA Santa M onica, I lie R ANI) Corporation. Iecbrtijar 1972

L~ewis. *1 Itotnas I -I lice I.S M iliar w of the Vietncamtese War in 1963 Recalistc Optimtistm or

Bucrea ucratie D~istortion.- Master's I hesis. Gieorge Washington I. ni'ersit% S-hool of Go'.rninietitaiid lusiness Administratioti. September 1972

R~owleIy. Maj Ralph A.. USAI' ITS/I FA 'IC Opc'raitoicin SVouitilcia. 1961-1965 Washington

Office of Air Force Ilmior .J.anti,mr 1972

%.on Liiu icha t.. Charles 11 I lie t S Arm'. Role it, te Conflict iet cn-imn Washington Cetier of

MIihitarN II itor% .U oiled States Arms. d raft manitiseript. ni (I

348
77,7-

Project C HECO. establishied in October 1962. was designed to give PACA F

ain immediate reporting capability on airpower operations. In 1968, CH ECO was

additionally charged to microfilm documents foi incorporation in DA 131 IN at the

Air University. A few microfilmned documents trace back to the period of this

history. but the major importance of CH ECO as a source to this history of thle

pre-1965 period lies in the following studies, most of which are often accompanied by voluminous supporting documents:

Anrderson. Capt B Conn. tISAI- '5,1 FSeari It ana' Rest twi Soni/u'assA via, 1961-1966 October

24. 1966

Bear. James I RAA Im SEA 1965-1971) September 30. 1970

Coffin. Lt Col Mlont% 1) . ttSAI-. nd Mierrell. Mat Ronald 1) . USAF 71w Roial 7/wi A1ir flors

September 3. 1971

Collin%. Catpt Charles 'V.. USAF2 Ierhitle 0/wranos tin Sotlasti vina. hilt 1961-Jitne 067

October I I 1967

Ilelinka. MiSgt Robert I . USAI-. aitd Hale. i Sgt Be'.erl'. tUSAF2 USAI FOperaiieni 1r.ni 7lmiIasL. 1964-1965 Auttt',t 10. 1966.

itckey,. I a%%rence J Night Close Ilir Support tin R1',%. 196 1-1965 March 15. 1967

IlIurte... Col Alfred F, U LSA F 71w EC-4' tin Southeast Asiii. Mlai /966-June 196', September 20.

1968

.1 oe'. Oakah Ma .. r..t 'A 1Orgaiti:aittott. ,s s,%tostiatsl Gron thtoftis'I iettatsnes AiIsirs e((,

194941968 October 8. 1968

Macl~onough. Lt Cot Robert A . USAF-. and Porter. Mlelin FI -ir ira/ffl Conttrol tin SEA.

1955-1969 IUebrtiar% 14. 1969

McNaughton. I t Robert 1. . U'SAF Yank~ee iea,. Mat 1964-Juit 1965 March 8. 1966

Martin. I t Col Donaild 1%,. IISAI. and Cle'.er. Carl 0. CIIECO Sout/teaw itas~ Report, Ot toler

196 I-D1::enther 1963 Mla'. 1964

MeI'.an. W\ce% R C Mhe It sir in ietnamt. 1965 Janttar% 25. 1967

Pa ters'.l I F lEs'siiiss of the Rules of Engaigemtett for Souitheast A via. 1960-1965 Septeniber 30.

1966

Porter. Mlet'in is: tmtl Cotitrol Squaslron' Operaiton tit SE-IA. 1962-1969 October I5, 1969

Pratt. Maj .John C . t!SAl- Ro-.il Laotiani Air IForce'. 1954-1970 September I5, 1970)

Saitts. Ketnttth i/ti Battle ofith/ Gist. 27 1)et embenr 1964-I1 Janitart 1965 InI% 1. 1965

Comnud atid Control. 1965 lDecen.bcr I i. 1960

Lsi slaiott oft/t i' trit r Southeast A- im: Jid - Des ember 1964 sa tDeemitber 1965

______Fitnal 7inv at(Ii Comtitt I w of t/is A C-47 Oecember 8. 1965

fistorisal 1/askgroint o I tels wig Mortair AIttsa ott Bien, Hlt \osentbcr 9. 1964

Sarm. KennethIt and Altosn. I t Col Bert 13 . USAF,- 'UAF Stqpport of .Vpes iil I ors e it) S L,

Nos',ibs'r 196/- Febrissrt /969 Ma rch 10. 1969

Smith. ('apt M ark Ei . t SAI* UISA F Re: o~tn ante tit Sousthteast A sia. 1961-1/9665 October 2 .

1966

I tiomp'.on Maj A W U S Al I trsAs (si,,rip snsl I/ss int,:ssis isn %/t'4F- P1-968 Ia attn 22

1969

\'allentinm. Capt tEdu~ard. U'SAF- I NAI F itC Operatisons tit SI %. Septembtler 1961-Jolt 1968

Jantiar% 28. 1969

Vittiig. ('apt Robert I . t'SAI'. Air Operattoti in e 1/i' 'tsi. 1962-1967 D~ecemaber N. 1967

Whtita ker. I t C'ol 1B A . USAF1. anid Plater'.on. I F A1sauitlt Ahirlift Opertona. Ammtsir 196 1-/iat

1966 Februar. 23. 1967

The USAF Southeast Asia Etid of]I our Repoit Progiain was established in

1962 in response to a requirement by thle Joint Chiefs of Staff for all thle armed

services to provide observations from all senior officers completinga tour1 Of dutN

in ant area threatened by insurgency. After the number of officers in Southeast

Asia giew to s,ablc proportions. the Joint Chiefs relaxed the requirement.

However, thle Air Force contintied the End ofl Four Reports as ant internal

programn inittally under PAC '\i- and later the Office of Air Force Hlistoryi. 'I hie

349
- s

THE ADVISORY YEARS

observations in these reports frequently supply insights not captured by formal

reporting systemns.

The Southeast Asia Oral History Program was started in 1967 to plan.

conduct, and] process tape-recol ded interviews with knowledgeable persons and

to record their experiences. observations, and recommnendat ions. These oral

interviews are especially wvorthwvhile in filling informational gaps in written

sources. Trhe Office of Air Force History has continued the oral history program

and has expanded it to encompass USAF activities wvell beyond Southeast Asia.

The Reference Division of the Albert F. Simpson Historical Research

Center maintains guides to End of Tour Repoits and oral histories. Somne of the

latter are privileged and unavailable to researchers until a future timne.

Other Department of Defense studies consulted include:

C/ooatologr of Sot/liwt / Am Ma x%%cli Air F'orce Base. Ala Protect Corona I lat scsi. August

1968.

Commni~st Potitt Totiatids SoutheawtAvio. 0954-1 909 A Chronotogu at Compe'ndium: Prepared

bv Battelle Memorial instituie. Columbus. Ohio. Nlamwiel Air F-orce Base. Ala I'roiectCorona

larsest. October 1. 1970

7/u' tinlor-ttti'oi ofAirpoucrin tit'Gret. Gue(rrilla ll'ar Mas.%%ell Air IorcelBase. Ala Aerospace

Studies Instituite. 1964

P'artner. J.. and Strirms'er. NI J The Evoluition of i/u' Airborne torn tard 'hr Controller Aln

Al s of Morquito O1y'rations in Korea RIM-5430-l't S--nia Monica I hie RAND) Corporation. October 1967.

Futrell. Robert F- 7te Linite(I State% Ai~r lore tin Korea. 19.50-1953 Ncss York lDuelI. Sloar'and

P'earce. 1961

United Stau's l'otu Tou ant Sotaa A sta, 1943-1968 A U/ironologu at Coopentiant

Max%%scll Air Poree Base. Ala. P~roject Corona Ilarsesi. 1968

It ('/rirologi of Sigifticanrpin,,te~~tr Evet to Souitleasiit ,195.i1968 Mam.scll Air

1-orce Base. Ala Aerospace Siudies Insitmute. 1969

luca. Cootepis Doctrine A 1ltsori of Baosu ThtinA tgi the i/u' 'ieState% I Air torte.

1907-1964 2 %ols Nlamsell Amr 1orce Base. Ala Aerospace Stuidies lnNutue. 1971

Goure. I coil Soom' loipresoi of i/u' Effects of ,itttari Operations onl ie't Cotig &'/ba% tor

RM-4517-ISA Santa Monica Ithe RAND) Corporation. March 1965

Grahamn. William 13. and Katit. Ainron II S/A7. .Singlt' tigrateut ,httatl. 7h'at Al Coot v or

Offenvise Atiiari Oju'ratttoitit South I itain It M -44tX- PR ( Part 11) Santa IM otlica I lie

RANk) Corptiraiton. Nosember 17. 19(A

Pi tecat antd Cidttrat Environmniet of Sotatst Al %t Ma xsell Air IPorce Itase. Ala Project

Corona F larsest. Nosetaber 1. 1968

Sha rp. Admn U h 6 U SN. anld Westiorelantd.(tell \(i SA Itilortoth i/it' tit ni w inton(.

tf 30/ June /968) \vasiington Goserimeit Printing Office. 1969

Vignerais. Mvarcel Rearmntg ithe Fre,,c/t [Outtett States lrii ti It orl liaor 1t .Speutat Studi'tl,

Waslungion Office of the Cliel of Mfiliar% I Iislor\. Depart ment oi tile \rill\. 1957

CONGRI'SS

Senate Report of Seniator Mike Mallsfield oila Stud% Mission totie Associated States of Indo.liinai.

October 27. 1953 tndlochioo 83d ('ong. 1st sess Wasllingtoll Goseriunetit P'rinting Office.

1953,

Hotuse Ileairings before tie Committee ott I'oreign Affairs The ,ituta Si'ctir ttiit otf 19.54 83d

('ong. 2d wss Washington Gosertltneni Prititing Office. 1954

Senate Compilation of Studies and Suir\eys prepared tItider the Directioni tf the Special Comittie

to Study the Porcign Aid Program Iar'igntAitI Program Seniate D~ocument 52 85th Cotig. Ws

sess Washintoni Gosernment printing Office. 1957

liouse. Hecarinig% before thie Subconmmittee onl the I-ar East arid the Pacific of the Commiittee on

l'oreign Affairs Mlituat Seciurit Program n to aos 85th Cong. 2d ses Wasllingtoil Gosernnient printing Office. 1958

350
Senite I learings before thle Subcomittieon State Departmentt Orgaiwation and Public Affaiirs of

the Committee on IPoreign Relations Situaton in I ie'maan. 86th Cong. I st ,css Washington:

Go'ernment Printcng Office, 1959

House Seseoth Report b\ the Conmmittee on Goernmient Operation%. .Iune 15 1959 L'S. Aid

OperationsiLao% liouseReport 546. 86th Conig. t sess Washinigtoni:(Gos einenjt Prinitnig

Office. 1959

Senate Hlearings before the Subcommittee to Insestigate the Administration of the Internal Securit%

Act attd Interna! Secimnt I asss of the Committee on the Judciary. Ana/isis ofth K1hA/ros/ic/w

Speet: lofianutart 6. 1961 87th Cong. 1st sess Washington (imeruloent 1'rinting Office 1961

Senate A Study' Submitted by thle Stibeomm ittec on Natic ial Seen rity Staffi ng a nd Ope rat ions,

TeoihtIyiassadlor aniic. Problcni i!Cooriniaton Senate Iocumrent 36 88th Cong. Ist sess

Washington Goweniment Printing Office. 1963

Senite Report of Senator Mike Manisfield .to the Committee on lPoreign Relations l iettrm

andl Southeast Asia 88th Cong. I st sess Washington (joserninent Printing Office. 1963

House. Hearing before the Speciail Subcommittee on 1 actical Air Support of the Committee oii

Armed Services Close Air Sipport 89th Cong. 1st %ss Washington (joerninent Printing

Office. 1966.

Senate, Hearings before the Subcommittee to Insestigate Problems Connected %V11.1 Refugees and

Escapees of the Committee on the Judicial Riefugee P'roblems tin Southi'etnaom awid Laos.

89th Conq. 1st ses Washington. Gosernment Printing Office. 1965.

H otise. I leaItng bet ore the Commit tee on A riied Se rcecs flscal Yeiar /966 Supp~len)ietitalluit/iorizanion for V'ietnami 89th Cong. 2d sess,. Washington Government Printing Office. 1966

Senate Hearings before the Committee on I-oreign Relations .. on S. 2793. Supplemnit~al lor'igti

A snstam e Fiscal Year 1966-~ Vietnamt 89th Cong. 2d sess,. Washington, Gosernment Printing

Office. 1966

H otise H earings before the Subcommittee on the Far E-ast aitd the Pacific of the Committee on

I-oreign Affairs Unted States Polici iardAsta. 89th Cong. 2d sess Washington, Gosern.

mient Printing Office. 1966.

Senate Committee on Foreign Relations Bac-Agrounid iforination Relating to Southeast Asia andI

Vi'etnam,. 90th Cong. 1st sess. 3d resised edition Washin~gtonr Government P'rinting Office.

1967.

Senate Hearings before the Committee on Foreign Relations Suid,isnn oft/u' Vietnami Coolc it)

Iiite UnitedI Natons. 90th Cong. 1st sess Washington Government Printing Offie. 1967

Senate. Hearing before the Comnnittee on Foreign P-i-ions .on Pei'tuarN 20. 1968 The, Gidfof

Tonikin. 77te /964 Ihicidenis Parts I and 2 90mi Cong. 2d sess Washington Govertient

Printing Office. 1968

"~Working Paper on the North Vietitanmese Role in the War in South Vietnam "Congresnonal

Record., Ma'. 9. 1968. pp 12614-12620

Senate. Hearings before the Subcommittee on United States Securn'. Agreemcintsaind Commitments

Abroad o" the Committee on IPoreign Relations booted States Seuminon Agreelyne~it andl

Cominotmnts A/,roacL. Kingtlooi of Laos P~art 2 91Ist Cong. I1st sess Washington Government

P'rinting Office. 1970

P RI SIDENsI Al 13AI'IRS

Thli Pu/c Pape~irs ail ,hdeof Fran/in 1)t Roosevelt. l'ictori and lt/ 7lires/iold of Pece,(

New York Harper and llrotlier. 1950

Public Papers oft/ie Prent/lentsv of t/it Utited States vIlarr i S. '&i,,,a,1951/ Washington Gosernment Printing Office. 1965.

Puidc Papers oft/ic Presidlents oft/ic Unitedl State% Hlarm S 'hoota, /951/ Washington (i~nsr1-

mient Printing Office. 1965

Piub/ic Papers of 1/hc Presidenit5 of t/ie Lmitedl States- D)wig/it 1) Eiseni/wner. /954 Washington

Gosernmient Printing Office. 1960)

Piuln' Papers o~f t/ie Presidents of the ('inaea/ States: D)wig/it 1) Eisen/ioi er. 19.55 Washington

Gosernment Printing Officc. 1959.

l'n/dn Papers of the Presidents of thec Unitedf States Ditig/it 1) Iisi'n/:oser. /9.57 Washington

Gosernnicnt Printing Office. 1958

Pu/b/ic Papers of tie Presidents ofti/i Unitedl States 1)isig/it 1) Eisenmotier. /958 Washington

Governnment Printing Office. 1959

Pu/c/i Papers riftici I'rcents of thti U(iited Stati Dii ig/t 1). Eisen/itner. 1960-6/ Washington

Goserninent Printing Of ice. 1961

351
THE ADVISORY YEARS

Pub/it Papert of thl re'tdent% o/ the United Suates. Johni F Kenni'dr. 1961. Washington (im~emnment Printing Office. 1962

Pu/i/u Papert of thie Presidentiof the L'nnea Statet Johnl F. Kenineth . 1962 Was.hington. Go~ emnient Printing Office. 1963

Puht Papeitrs of the' Pru'ndentv of the Untted State%. John, E Kenneth, 1 963 Was.hington: (jot emjment Prieting Office. 1964

Pub/it Paper. of the 'rewident% of the United State% Li-ndon Bt Johnvon. 1963-64 Wa~Iiington

Gowenirit Printing office. 1965.

Pub/h Papers of the P'residium of the U'nited States: Li-nton 11. .Jo/i~,i. 196.5. Was.hington,

Gomermnnt Printing Office. 1966.

Putb/ti /'aier. of the Prentlet of thei /iUnnet State% Lint/on Bt Johnson. /966 Wa'.Iington

Goserninent Printing Office. 1907

IME-N I OI SEA It

A ntentan Foreign Pa/up. 19.50-1955 Washiingtoni: Goerncriet Printing Office. 1957.

Af nierii'ttt Foreign l'tili C urrenit 1)ommtets. 19.56. Washington Government Printing Office.

1959

,lineriuma Foreign l'o/t v Current Documnent%. 19.57 Washingtoni Gmserizmelt Printing Office.

1961

Ifnieru an /'oreigti Pa/nm Currient Dot umnit. 19.58 Washington Goseninient P

t

rintiiig Office,

1962.

A1 nerutin F1ori'igt Po/ier Current Dtuianientv. 1959. WVashngton Goserment Printing Office.

1963,

A nierita, Iforeign Pa/i i Current Dot unent%. /1962 Washington Go'.ernmemn Printing Office.

1906

A nierwan Foreign Pohti Current lDoctien: s. 1 963 Wauington Governmnent Printing Office.

1967

Mhe Coniferet'nv s t atimt antd Yttlta, 1945 \Vahingtonv Governmeint P'minting Office. 1955

A 'lireat to the' f'ette North J'wt-ASams hEffort ito Conquer South I wt- Vain Washington

Go'.erninent Printing Office. 1961.

A rie

1)nndy. William P "'1 lie Path11 to Viet- Na mu. A Lesson in I mi'oI'emrent " US D~epa rtment of State

B/ulletji 57. September 4. 1967. pp 275-287,

Durbrow. Anmsador lElbridge -Iianoi% Intensified Aggre'ssion 1959 -Air WVar College Supp/)h'nit. No'.emher 1967. pp 7-8.

Kenniedv. Col I homnas B) . MSAI'. "Airlift in Sow beas Asia," Ito, Unis'ervat i ei't 16 (iJanuaryI'eruary 1965). 72-82.

Knox. Ca Pt I honias It , USAPI "Waterpimp. 1964-1965 "A erospace ('omn~tari 2 (Spring.

1970). 5 1-59

Milton. M aj (semi I hecodore R . UiSAF "Air Power Eqtiaiver in .Souitheaist Asiai - Air L0n erni

Revieii 15 (Noveniber-IDecembcer 1963). 2-8

Secord. Mack 1) -I lie Viet Nam Air I-orce "Ai~r Ii'ernitt Review I ( No'.niber-)eceinbcr 1963).

60-67,

Smnith. Gen I-rederic HI Jr . USAF "~Nuclear WVeaponsand I utnited War "Air Universti Quarteri

Review 12 (Spring. 1960). 3-27

Suniderinan. L~t Col .lares F . UISA F -Air Operations in Viet Namn. N ighit Flare Strike "Air

Univerntt' Review 15 (Septeniber-Oetobcr 19(4). 82-91

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Acliesn. lOcan. Present tat the Creatiton. %fi Years at thet State Deipartmnent New York WV W

Noton aind Company. 1969

Atisin. Anthony Meii Prenti'ents \iar. New York 1 11, 1 ippiiiettt. 1971

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Brown and Corvipan . 1968

Bates. Victor Vixetna,ia A 1)xjlonuatu Iragedi flu Origitiv of thxe Ui oted Shotes liuo/renuent.

IDubs Perry . N Y.: Oceitna Plublications. 1965

Beal. John Robinson Jo/ha Poste'r Dutle%. 1888-1959. Ness% York Ilarper and Brother,. 1959

Bousearen. Anthony I rawick. lixe Last oftxe Alatxlxrins. Diem; of i iemttx Pittsixurgli. Duxquxesne

Llnicrsity Press. 1965

Burchett. \Vill red G. V ietnami. liuxde Storr of t/xe Guerrilla Wa 'r New York- Interinational Pubser.1905

Bxttinger, Joseph Vixetnxam, A Dragon Emobattledl 2 sols, New York I-rederick A Praeger. 1967

Chanmpassalk. Sisouk Na Stormx Over Laom. A (omteoxporart histor Ness York E rederick A.

Praeger. 1961

Cole. Allan Bl.. ed Cool lxxtin /,xxo- (hxixex & hxternxationxrl Reperx dximi .A lDox oxenxarv lin tor.

1945-1955. Ithaca. Cornell University Press. 1956

C'ooper. Chester I 7/xx Lowt crustxde.-lnxeru a t it I x('ixxti New York. Dondd. - Nead aid Compan).

1970.

CQ Background. Chixxna axnd U S. Ear E'xst l'oxx v. 1945-1967 Washington Congressional Qtxarterl%

Ser\ xce, 1967

Curl. Peter V -ed. 1)un~enxts on Amuericanx Forexgnx Relationxs. / 054 Ness York Council on I orcen

Relations. 1955

D~a\ ids..J tiles. ed. VxoxxtoxA er txForeignx Relatonxs. 1 964 New York Counixon l-o~eign

Relations, 1964.

de Gaulle. Charles 77xe Watr Menx~oxrs of C/tar/este Gaulle Vol13.a/vautonx. 1944-1946 New Yor.

Simion and Shuster. 1960

lDomnxen. Arthur J1 Conflict inx Laos: 7h., Politxcs of Veuxtrah:auonx. New York Frederick A

Praeger. 1964.

lDunca nson. Dennxis .1 Gorerxmxeix tx levo/untit ix'etxanx. Ness York. Oxford U inscrsit

Press. 1968.

Eden. Anthony. flue Afe'noxrs ofAxt/xom, r Ldx'i Full Circle Boston HIoughton M ifflin Coupaiix).

1960.

l-isenlxower. D~wight 1) flue Whi/te lioxtie Years. Aftuxate for C/xanxge. 19.53-1956, Garden Cxt .

N.Y Douibleday and Coimpanxy. 1963

'/;xx Whxxte Hlome )Y'arv Wagxixg Peace. /19.56-1961 Garden ('iu. N Y lDoiileda\ anud

Company. 1965

l-all. Berinard B IHell in a I err Smxalf l

t e. '1/xe Siege of M~en Bienx Himu Philadelphia .1 1B

1 ippincoti Compaix). 1 967

- (lxx Ch xioh oni Re% o/xxtxot. Ncss York. I rederiek A Praeger, 1967

Street JW'ithoutx Jor- hIsurg'mxx i ox ixlox'/xixt. 1946-1963 3d re\ ised edition I larrisbtirg

I lie Staekpole Conipan . 1963

_ . Ix' 71to ix let- Natou A l'oh lta td A/lti Aiali-vis 2d Iditiox. Neus York E-rederick

A Praeger, 1963.

Gallowa) -.Iohn 7/xe Gulfoxf Toninxi Resolutxin Rutherford.- N J 1-arleigh Dickinson I nixersit\

press. 1970

Gould Adams. Richard PDie Timte of Pxott5 er, A Rx'appraxl of J/oxi Fostxer Mil/es I ondon

Wseidenifeld anid Nicholson. 1962

Goulden. Jxoseph C Malxt is the Fxrst ('aixalit Meu Gxxffof TixAnxi Affair- ///xin aixd Reaxt

Chicago Ranid McNall'.. 1969

G raff, H enry P flue ixeslai Catbinext. 1)x'ibleratxoxn itie uioixot, Petxxx' axlla d tr uxder Li ixlox

/1 J,/xxsox Englewood Cliffs. N.J Iireitice-l lall. 1970

lialberstain. Dav'id The M/ak.ing oft: Qxxtgnixrx' New York Random Homse. 1965

Ilal pern. loel M Goverxnmentx Politxxx. xaxd Sou al Strut txxrx oxt Lams A Syult of 'Iradxton t.,ad

lhxnos'atxon. Yale liniersity Southeast Asia Series. No 4 Ness limen Yale 1'imersxiN l'rcess.

19(4

H enmmer. Ellen. 7Te SYtrugglxe for hxdorh/iixa Stanford. Calif Stanuford 11 ix ersity vPress. 1954

Iliggitis. Marguerite Our l'xenxan Nighttmare Ness York Hlarper anid Ross. 1965

IIilsiua n. Roger 7i) /ore a Natxon. fle 'oxtx sof Foreign Poh/i ~ h llxxtrtoxo oxx F 

Kennxethr Garden (City. N Y D~oubleday and Company. 1967

Hlull, Cordell /lxx Alenzirv of Cortili I/ New York I lie Macmillan ('ompain . 1948

Johnson. I vnd on B1 7/e 'axtxgx Point. Plers/x'xxs xoftxe Previdix s . /963-1969 New York HIolt.

Riniehart anid Winston. 1971

3153
T'HE ADVISORY YEARS

Khrustcliev in New York New York Crosscurrents Press. 11960]

K hruslihes'. Nikita S Khius/c/ev Reuemnbers I ia slated and edited by St robe I albott Boston

Little, Brown and Company. 1970

1 acoutre. Jean. and IDevilers, Philippe. to fin (I'Une Guerre, hidoc/tine 1954 P'aris Editions due

Scudl. 1960

1 avisdale. Edwsard Gears'. In te Ait of Wa~rs , An Amnericant M to non ito Southeast A sw New

York- Harper and Row. 1972

Lederer. Wi JA Nation of Sheep. New York WV W. Noro and Coinpainy. 1961

Lodge. Ihenry Cabot. 7hw Storm Has Altan- hies:A/ Personal Narrative New York W.W Notion

and Company, 1973.

Mecklin, John. Umoion atn Thrment An Itiniate Account ofth/i US Role in Vietnam Garden Cit

N.Y :Doubleday and Company. 1965.

Navarre, Henri. Agote (le L'Indochine. 1953-1954. Plais Iibrairle ['lot. 1956

O'Ilallan % [Edgar 77w Indo.(China WIar. 1945-1954. /1 Studi' of Guerrilla War/are London I-aber

and Faber. 1964 I; ~ ~Pike. D~ouglas V'iet Cong. The Orgaimaton anli 7A'cltues of the National Liberation Fronit of

Southi Vietniam Camrbridge 1 lie Massachusetts Instnume of I chnology Press. 1966

---. ar, Peace, and 1/hc Met' Cong. Cambridge. I lie Massaehusetts Institute of 'Ieclinologp

Press. 1969.

Randle, Robert F Geneva 1954. Thte Settlemtent of the Indot/unev' 11ar Princeton, Princeton

University Press. 1969

Raskin, Marcus G.. and [Fall, Bernard B.. eds 7the Vliet-Nam Readter New York Random hlouse.

1965.

Ridgway. Gien Matthew 1B USA, Solth'r. New York hlarper and Brothecrs, 1956

Roy. Jules. llie Battle of Dienblienp/tu. New York. Ilarper and Row. 1965

Schlesinger. Arthur P., Jr. A 77iousantl Dart5: Johnt F Kennedyv in thte White lI'.~os Boston'

Houighton Mifflin Company, 1965.

Seigliano. Robert. South Vietutam- Nationt (itter Stress. Bosiotv Iloughton Miflini Company. 1964

Shaplen. Robert. Thie Lost Revolution New York. Harper and Row. 1965

Sorenson. T[heodore C Kennedli New York Hfarper and Row. 1965

Stebbins. Richard P.. ed D)ocumiet on /lmertcan Foreign Relatiomt. 1961 New York. C'outncil onl

F'oreign Relations, 1962

.______ ed Documtent ont Antericaat Foreignt Reltions. 1963 New York Council onl Foreign

Relations. 1964

e d )ocumeniv on American Foreign RelIations. 1966 Ness York Council on) Foreign

Relations. 1966.

tfaylor. John WV R.. ed Clomb/at Airt raft of t/' 11'orldI New York G(11 Putnam'ns Son%. 1969

'1 aylor. Maxwell 1), Swords antd P'lowshares New York W W Norton and Compan). 1972

'[ Iiorrpson. Robert Iiefetttutg (tnoiuititistlit rgeiniIi L'sis fAaat udVittn New%

York Frederick A. Praeger, 1966

[aoye. flugh Laot, IBu ffer State or Bategrotiid London- Oxford [Jimiersity P'ress. 1968

1 runian. Harry S. Memnoirs: Years of 7Rial and/lope Garden City. N Y lDoubledzi) and Coiupan .

1956

VandenboscLI) Amry. and Butwel. Richard A. Southeast ,lsa ,lniong thte Wo~rld Plowers I exington. Unitsersity of Kentucky Press. 1957

Warner. IDerms. 77we Lat C'onficiatt. New York: I lie Macmillan Company. 19631

Witidehly. Eugene C. Tonkit Gulf. New York Doubleday and Compan). 1971

Zagoria. Donald S. itetntam,,iTiangle New York- Pegasu'. 1967

Zinner. P'aul E , ed D~ocumients ott Amterican Foreign Relations. 1956. New% York Couniiei onl

Foreign Relations. 1957.

e______ d D~ocumntts ott Amoericant Foreign Relattionts, 1959 New York Counil onl I oi eign

Relations. 1960.

A rticles

Alsop. Stewart. "Kennedy's Grand Strategy " 77t1rSaturdlar Evening Post, March 31. 1962. pp 11-16

Blowers. Ray IL "Ainericatis in the Vietnamese Air F'orce I lie IDirt% 'I biit, ,Ierotjiti i

IHistorian,. September 1972. pp 125-131I

Bulliti. William C "'I lie Saddest War Life. [December 29. 1947. pp (A-69.

354
~-~--~ -7

Chassin. Gen G J.M.. French Air Force. "Lessons of the WVar in Indochina'* Interaia 7 (1952).

670.75.

Collins. Gen J. L~awton. USA. "What We're Doing in Indochina." Interview U.S. Alen's & l'orldI

Report. March 4. 1955. pp 82-88.

Fall. Bernard B. "Talk with Ho Chi Minh.- The New Republic. October 12. 1963. pp 19-22.

Ford. Corey. "The Flying ITigers Carry On." Saturdlar Evening Post. February 5. 1955. pp 24.25ff.

and February 12. 1955, pp 30ff.

Graff. Hemn y F. -1 each-lIn on Vietnam by .. 1 hie Plrcstdent. the Secretary of Statc. the Seceary of

De.fense and the Under Secretary of State " Nen, York ines Mfaga:in1e. March 20. 1966. pp 25.

128-133.

Kutcr. Gen L..S , USAF, CINCPACAF. -I hie Pacific Air Forces " Air Force. October 1957.

pp 63-66, 6Q-70.

L~ansdale, Maj Gen Edward G.. USAF. "~Viet Nam- Do We Understand Rcvolution" Foreign

Affairs. October 1964. pp 75-86.

-I le L.owdown from the Top U S Command in Saigon." life. No~cmber 27. 1964, pp 46. 51-53.

McNamara. Robert S. "The Comamuinist Design for World Conquest. Some Shift in our Military

1l hinking Required." Ilital Speeches of the DaY. March 1. 1962, pp 296-99.

Nixon. Richard M. "Cuba. Castro and John F. Kennedy " Readerv Digest. November 1964.

pp 283-300.

Rose. Jerry A. "~Our Undeclared WVar in Vietnam." Reporter. May 10. 1962. pp 30-32

Taylor. Maxwell. "I lie Case for Continued Bombing of the North -lWashington Star. October 22.

1967, p E2.

1 hompson. James C. Jr. "Hlow Could Viktnamt Happen' An Autopsy." Atlantic. April 1968.

pp 47-53.

Waddell. L.S. "Phase Out for Charlie-One-One-Nie " Pegasits. October 1955. pp 1-6.

WVeyland. Gen Otto P.. USAF. "Can Air Power Win *1.,ttlc Wars!" Interview U.S News & Il'orldI

Report, July 23. 1954. pp 54-61.

Williams. Li Gen Samuel T. USA. Ret. "Why the US is Losing in Vitnam-An Inside Story

Interview, U.S. News & World Report. November 9. 1964, pp 62-72.

355
Index*

A Luoi Valley. 248

A Shan Valley: 175, 248

Able Mable: 147-148. 171, 229. 241-243

Achieson. Dean: I I

Adams. Milton B. 207

Advanced Echelon (ADVON). 2d- 95-102. 108 110-'113. 122. 124. 138

Advanced Research projects Agency: 73. 112. 1 16

Advisors

assessnient ofacconnpliinents, 267-268

civilian 204

in combat role. 1 05, 218-219

French, with MAAG: 39

details I rorn M AAGi: 40. 75

number, expansion and reductcon: 97. 151, 162, 166-107. 171. 192, 195. 216. 2 6 1,

range of operations 151, 162, 2 16

Aerial Port Squadrons

8th. IIH. 167

6493d Ill

Aerial Resupply Unit. 808 1st. 16

Agency for International Development: 144

Air America- 257

Air Asia: 181

Air Base Group. 23d 171

Air Base Squadrons,

33d. 171

W4ih 171

6220th: 101

6221st 101

6222d- 101. 171

6223d- 101

Air bases See Airfields

Air Commando Sqtmad ions

I st 171, 181. 2W0-201, 212-214. 218-220. 238. 246. 251

19th 236

Air lDefensc. RVN Air I-orce- 128, 131

Air lDepo;, Wing. 24th, II. I5

Air Divisions

2d- 101 112. 141. 146. 153. I(A), 171-172. 175. 178, 182. 207-208. 210-211. 216-217. 219. 225.

230. 232. 235, 241. 244-246. 250-253, 2W4

315th 16. 31. 41. 45. 81. 106. 108, 111, 171. 247

322d 22

Air drops See Airborne operations. Airlifts of troops and stipplies

Air Forces

1-ar Fast 10-11I. 15-17. 23. 41-42

Filth 41. 43-45. 74-75. 131

Pacific 41. 43-44. 47-48. 81. 83. 95. 101. 106. 112. 120. 217. 229. 232. 236. 241. 244. 250. 253

263-264. 26

I ir-tccntlv 41-42. 45. 47. 81. 83. 95. 101. 106. 108. 120. 124. 131, Ill3. 147, 212

Air-ground liaison, 1016. 128. 131. 140. 143. 159. log. 178. 182. 196. 215-210. 239. 244

Air-grotind operat ions See I actical air support

Air-Ground Operat ion% School 178. 240

'Nunirls in italic indicate an ililmsration of thle subject mentioned

357

hZGEEDING PAGE BLA1K-NOT FILM)
Air Materiel Commantd- 42

Air Materiel Force Pacific Area: 42

Air National Guard: 65

Air operations

air-ground liaison. 106. 128. 131. 140, 143. 159. 168. 178. 182. 196. 215-216. 239.

244

airstrike missions: 120-122, 128, 136-139. 172-174. 178. 183-184. 191. 196-197. 199.

212. 214-216. 220-221, 224. 245. 254. 257-267

artillery fire direction- 37

bombing missions: 25-26. 120. 139. 156. 158. 172, 264

communications intercept missions 228

communications systems and eqtpment: 55. 81. 106-107. 142-144. 146. 159-160.

172. 175. 177-178. 221. 247

composite strike force in: 46. 247

convoy support nussions: 174. 178

coordination and control: 42-44. 55-56, 74-75. 82-83, 95-96. 105-106. 124. 136. 159.

175.211, 214-215. 217. 225. 227. 260-261

crop-destruction missions: 219. 247-250

damage assessments: 174, 199. 212

defoliation mission%. 73. 112-113. 117. 247-250. 2(4

effect on pacification: 236-238

effectiveness, studies on: 25. 134, 157, 213

electronic intelligence missions: 235

escort missions: 25. 133. 145

for%\ard air controllers in: 106-107, 121. 128 136. 138-140. 142-144. 151. 168.

172-176. 180. 181-182. 184. 197. 199. 214-215. 221. 224.

236. 267

hamlet defense, support of: 174

helicopter missions, escort of: 144. 146, 157-158, 174. 176. 197, 267

identification, friend or foe: 131

infrared reconnaissance nissions: 138. 148. 168-169. 243-245. 266

intelligence collection and transmission :n 138

joint operation, first: 128

joint operations center in: 83. 106. 128. 142. 211

language barrier in: 221

logistics centralization: 42

mixed crews in combat: 220. 267

mobile combat reporting post. 74. 82

napalm strikes: 10, 19, 121, 128. 141. 146, 156. 158. 179. 238. 260

night missiuns. 96. 127-127.. 132. 168. 174-175. 189-173. 214, 224. 244. 247, 259-260

operations center in: 142

photographic reconnaissance missions: 74-75. 127. 135, 138. 147-148. 168. 241-243

psychological warfare missions: 122, 219. 251-152

reconnaissance missions: 25. 37, 82. 128-129. 139. 143. 147-148. 169. 171. 174. 182.

196. 227. 239-241. 243-244. 256-259. 268

restrictions on: 133. 141, 159, 172. 224

results, assessment of: 134

rocket assault missions: 158. 130. 158, 237

roles and missions in: 49

search-and-rescue missions: 50. 170. 183

tactical air support miasions. Set, I actical air support missions

target acquisition and deignation, 5s, 136. 138-139. 140. 143. 146. 156. 196. 245

traffic control in. 131

warning system- 129

358
Air relcing Sqiidion. 42I,, 229

Air Rescue missions See Search-and-rescue missions

\ir Rescue Sei\ ice (Pacdic) 45

Air R cue Squ,idron. 31Ni 45

Al I riing Command 154

Air \larliig ssin 129

Airborne opCrit iO11%

American 120. 167

I-rench 16-18. 20. 26

Republic ol Vietnam i 112. 156-159. 164. /80. 196. 228. 246

Aircralif

armament Ioadv 128, 112. 240. 256-257

casuaIties c\actlation b\ 31. 122. 219. 260. 267

combat rcadiness and fItlt,, 181. 212-214. 218, 20. 238. 243. 246

corps. assignment to, 211

,et-a..sitcd tdkeoll 79

Iosses 116. 146. 158. 178. 181. 183-184, 213. 220. 229-230. 238. 246-247. 25o. 253. 257. 260.

26S-266 See alio Helicopter Iosscs

maintenance and repair 50-52. 55. 125. 181

modilcatli0% in 79-80

obsolete models 54-55

,parc-par% stocks 50

tpe', See Aircralt t\pcs

Aircraft types

A-I 77, 153. 174-176. 179. 181-184. 196-197, 199. 212-214. 222. 224-225. 238-240. 243,

253-254. 257. 259-261 263-264. 266-268

AC-47 241. 242. 260-261. 266

A1)-4- 55

AD-5: 131. 169

AI)-6 55. 67. 75. 82. 84. 121. 127-129. 132. 137. 139. 142-143. 145-146. 156-158. 178

B-26 7.9. 10. 17-18. 24. 31, 77. 79-80, 121. 127-129. 130. 131, 133-134. 136-137, 139, 145-146,

151. 154. 1b6-158. 171. 174-176. 178, 181, 183-184. 196-197. 199. 212-214. 217, 242

13-29 22-23. 25-26. 29

11-52 263

13-57 6,9. 212-213. 217. 229, 237. 238. 245. 253. 262. 263. 267

Bristol lype 170 246

C-45 51). 147

C-47 6n. 8. 10-11. 16-17. 19.24,26.31.49-50.55.67.73 77. 79.82.96. 108. 112. 123. 128.

131-135. 147. 153. i56. 167. 171-172. 174-175. 181-183 196, 214. 220. 224. 240-241. 244.

246-247. 249, 251. 260-261. 267

C-5' 38

C-1 19 8. 15-17. 19. 22. 25-26. 31

C-123 93. 108. 109. 110-113. 114-115, 116. 119-120. 141, 146. 152. 154-156. 167. 180. 182-183

196. 224. 236. 245. 247-250. 257. 261. 264. 268

C-124- 20. 22.31

C-130 58. 81. 228. 230

CII-34- 222

CV-2: 107. 110-112. 146. 154-155. 167. 215. 236. 238. 246-247. 265

)asault IM 1) -315 -lamant 10. 36

I A-I 169-170

I 244

1-4 257

l--4f 24

1.-S 153

359
1-61 7. 24, 26

F-81- 7, 8-9. 10. 19. 24. 49-50. 52. 54

163 6n, 7

1-86 75

'-I00 229-230. 237. 238. 256-257. 267-268

F-101 229

F-102 69. /30. 131. 141. 169-170. 229. 268

--205. 229-230. 256-257. 268

" B-26: 241

11-19 19. 24. 50. 51. 55. 67. 154. 168

11-21. 107. 128. 144-145. 158-159. 178. 184. 196

11-34: 55. 107. 116-117. 120. 145. 175. 219. 251

11-43: 253

1111-1: 157

IL1-52- 6n

KB-5(O 229

KC-135. 230

1 -18 107

1-19 50. 51. 55. 67. 75. 107. 112. 121. 127-128. 132. 135. 138. 140, 143-145. 153. 158. 168.

174. 176-177. 181-182. 196-197. 215. 219. 224. 250. 26(1

1-20 24. 107. 138. 155. 219

1-26 51

1-28 81. 144. 151, 155. 168. 250

MIG-15- 230

MIG-17 230

NIK-IX Spithrc. 6n. 7

Morave-SX) (Cracket 9. 10. 18-19. 36

N-i56: 153

0-I 167-168. 180. 182. 199. 215. 224. 239-240. 259-260. 263. 266. 268

OV I 148. 155. 169-170. 174-175. 215. 243-245

[134Y 19. 24

PBY-5A 6n

R-4 112

RI-26 7. 17. 129. 148. 154. 168-169. 171. 213. 241. 241

RI1-47 235

RII-57 168-169. 241. 244-245. 268

RC-47 147.212.243

RI'-101 74-75. 77. 135. 147-148. 154. 168. 229. 241. 245. 256-257. 268

R1-28. 1,17

. 153. 212. 2.13

RW1-33- 54. 74-75. 147. 153. 168

SC47 79. 96. 121-122. 127. 129. 136. 250

Supermarme-I. 6n

1-6 58

1-28 50.75. 77. 79. 82. 84. 93. 96. 120-121. 127-129. 130. 131-134. 136. 139. 142. 144. 146-147.

153-154. 156-158. 164. 171-172. 174. 176-179. 181. 183-184. 196-197. 199. 212-215. 217.

219-221. 256. 218

1-33- 54

1-37 58

11--102 131

U-I- 110. 154. 167. 215

11-2 195. 227. 243

U1-3' 169

11-6 251

11-10 144. 146. 171. 250-251

11-17 239-240. 251

360
;l-I 107. 144, 147. 155. 157-158. 164. 167. 175. 178, 183. 196-197. 214-215, 236. 260. 265. 267

UII-34- 144

Airlield%

air strike%, ,igant 173

conditions at 55. 123-124. 132. 177. 183. 215. 263

conmtruetion and repir 39, 52. 81. 151. 177. 184. 217. 238. 263

defeme ol. 82, 264

security nieaiurcs at 170. 253. 2(4 s uitabilhty ,,ttnce 110

tenant staitti, of IN"AI 123

Viet C.olng attack,, on', 253

Airhilt,, of troop,, and supplies &, 16. 19, 20-21. 24-27. 33. 50). 55. 58, 73-74, 106. 108, 110-112.

121-122. 128. 130. 14,4-140, 154-156. 1 :. 178. 182-1,',A. 196. 204-205.

214. 219. 245-247. 254-255, 260-261. 266

Airmen. personal hardship% of. 124

Ambush operations by Viet Cong, 53. 112-113, 145, 174. 179 196-197, 224. 259-260

An Khe. 176. 267

An I .o 259

An Xu~en Province 178. 196. 214

Andersen Air F-orce Iase. 230

Anderson, Winston 11 250

Anna in 4-5

Anthi . Rollen II . 99

and air opeiations coordinationand control 06. 136. 142-144. 147-149. 153. 155. 159-161. 171

and airborne operattonv 112

and aircraft omeruse 181, 212

and aircraft strength expansion 133-13J. 154

and airlift operation, I 11-112

appointed special assistant for counter nsurgcnc. 227

on Army concept of aircraft use 160

on combait role for Air Forc." 123

commniitd, AI)VON 95-96

commands NIACV air components 97 48

commands 2d Ai Dis ision I101

and commnicdtion% systems I60, 18

oil ddlerisie measi're% 178

I)xei and Nhu. assessment ol 18"

and escort imissions 145

larkins. relations with 101-10^

itd helicopter rinmssion% escort, 159

oil intensifying OpCIiti,

oI interdictionl millsior .

aind MACV coinniand authort.. v8

atd mixed crew-, in comtbat 131

and pilots training 132, 1 '2

and radio homing 168

aind reconlais i ce operations 171

oI roles and m 1issions 148

and ,elf-sustaining RVN Air ilorce 134

soie bwmi. use of 141

and sorties by RVN Air I-orce 132

and tactical air ,trik,, 120. 136-139. 171-172

and tactical target designations 140-141

itd training programs 127

361
Antiaircraft operations and systenis

Viet Cong: 283-285

Viet Muh. 17-19. 25-26. 212

Ap Bac 157-160. 163. 177. 24

Armed Forces Council. RVN 267

Armor operaions 261

A rmorers See lechnieca ns

,lrromanhe/mes (1-rench carrier). 18.24

Artillery fire support. Viet Minh. 18

Asssmiation. b, Viet Cong 52, 67. 72

Atomic %\capon% See Nuclear weapon%

Atrocities by \et Cong 52, 67. 72

Autrana. 35

Ba 'I hu 136

Ba Xu~en Prowice 103

Bac Lieu 183. 202

Ball. George W.. 100. 187-188

Ban Boung Bau road bridge. 257

Ban Ken bridge 257

Ban Mc 'I buot: 53. 122. 148. 151. 169. 177. 179, 182

Ban Tang Vai: 259

Bao I)ai. 3. 5. 7. 10-11. 34

BARREI. R'C. I Operation: 256

Bartle\. Ji,1 ' 70

Ba Ol il g.,w:dent. 63. 68

Ben Cat 145. 197, 224. 25.1

lBen Cas: 199

Ben Sue 255

Ben 1 uong 182

Berlin blockade. 5

Betlica. William E.. 221, 222

Bidault, Georges- 26

Bien lloa Airfield' 50. 52. 55. 81. 83. 96. 104. 113. 116. 124. 127. 129. 130. 136. 145. 148. 151.

157. 168. 171. 175. 181-182. 184. 195. 197. 211-220. 229. 233. 235. 238-239.

243. 250. 253-254. 260-261. 262. 267-268. 271-272

Bien Iloa Iromince 75. 2(M)

Bush Dinh Iromince 37. 255

Bush Duong Province 104. 200. 224

Biuh (ia. 26). 263

Binh Hung, 109

Binh I ong Province" 156, 197

Bmuh 1 huy (formerly Can I ho), 238-239

Binh Xuycn (religious group): 37

Black Watch. 171

Blanchard. William IL.. 217-218

Boat bases. air strikes againt: 230

Bu Ios wood% 2 

4

Bomb lo,ds and type%. 128. 181. 197. 212. 230. 240. 257

Bombardment Squadrons. 8th and 13th. 229

Bombardment Wing. 3d. 212

Bombing mission% See Air operation%

Bonmn Iland,: 44

Bo\,er%. Charles J : 142

362

5
B~ridges. air strikes against 173

Brink. Franci, G.: 7

Brink Hotel incident- 261. 262

lhrolon, Ra-,ntond' 22

Brooks. Allison, C 225

Buddhists. demonstration, b,. 185.-186. 1910. 233. 265

Buen Enaot. 66

Boind%. MicGeorge 192. 265,266

llund\. William 1P 205. 232. 254-255. 265

Bunker ssterns. V'iet Cong- 173

C 7urner Jot. USS. 229

Ca Man peninsula- 116. 182-183, 196. 204. 248

Cat Ntioc. 183

Cai Nuuc Ri'~er- 196

Caldara. Joseph 1). C. 25

Canibedia

American recognition of- 5

bombing openitions in and near. 120-121, 156-157

border violations charged by- 13o, 141. 199

breaks relations with RVN. 188. 197

breaks relations with United States 198

French patrol of: 3

Japancew occupation of: 3

military assistance to. 16

neutratl statuis sought by 140

as saruar\ 163. 197. 202

relations s'ith MI'N 140

stipplh organi/atton for. 42

Cameron. William W. 164

Camnouflage. use of

b\ V'iet Cong. 127'-128

b% \'tet Mlinh 19

Camp Courtney. 64

Camp 1lollo\%s-:y 265

Can I ho (later Blith I huy) Airfield- 153. 167. 171, 177, 179. 182. 184, 202. 211. 215. 217-218.

220. 238. 272

Cao Dat (religious group). 37

Cap Saint Jacques Airfield See Vung I tj Atiitd

Cap Varella 266

Capital Militar,. District. RVN, 153

('ard., USS- 108. 2(94

Carpenter. John W.. 111 168

C arrier aircraft. steikes by- 22. 173

Castro. Fidel 58

Casualties

front air po%%er.stimates of. 134. 157. 213

American 116. 122. 145. 158. 178-179. 184. 199. 204. 213. 218. 224. 250. 253. 201. 265-26

atittidc toward figures 34

Australiani 224

civilians 120. 139. 158. 183. 2(04

evacrttioit b% airlift 3 1. 122. 219. 260. 267

first in USAF 116

irenelt 301.31
Nam\ . c\ aciiitiola by 31

Republic ol Vietnam. 145. 156-158. 177. 179. 184. 191. 190-197. 199. 213-214. 224. 250. 253.

259. 261. 266

Viet Cong 121-122. :28. 137. 39. 145. 156-158. 172-174. 177-178. 183-184. 191-192. 196. 199.

20.4. 213-214. 254. 259-260. 20. 266-267

Viet Minh 22

Cat Ih Airfield 15-16. 18-19. 26. 31

Centrl HilIghlands. 30, 53. 103. 267

Central Intelligence Agenct 47. 63. 69. 155, 190-191. 198. 250

Central Office for South Vietinam ( VC) 157

Central I arget Anialsi and Research Center 245

Ceylon, 20

Cha I a. 196

C(iasi. 6. .1. NI 34

Chemical agenti.

tests of 73

use charged- 113-114

Chemical plants, air strikes againist- 173

Chiang Kai-sltck. 4. 188

China Nationalis- 5

China. iPeople\ Republic of

on Air Force combat role 1(X)

Indi, imncursionis iliO 53

iimtcreniion. tlhrc,it o1 23. 55. 65-65. 68-69. 141. 203. 253

military ,assisitaice b\ 6. 16, 18. 34. 198-199

i,iO1,l1%. c..ucua ion of, 31

I.i~lor mlism.lol. reaction to 85

China I heater exteided 4

('hou lEn-lat 30. 85

Cluong I luen l'ro\lice 215. 224

Churchill. Winsiton 21. 30

Cisil ,0!fairs 54

Cmil Air Iranport 15. 20. 31

Co 1 Guard. RVN 37. 30. 54. 65-66. 67. 71-73. 184-185. 191

Cm'.ihan Irregular I)cfen'e Group. RVN 69. 82. 155. 172. 267

Ci'ilman..

casualtie.s 120. 139, 158. 183. 204

cvdactLition of 31. 188. 2W. 266

C!.rk Air lsdxe II 16-17. 25. 31. 42. 45. 58. 75. 81, 107-118. III. 113, 124-125. 131. 211.

229-230. 247. 253

Cluiei bombs 230. 241). 257

Cochin China 5

Collins. J ILa\%ton 38

and air support for RVN 49

a id a(med force% %ireigh e.tlimatNc. 37. 39

and armny lo al . iestigaton b\ 37

Combat Application Group. I. 240-241

Combat Cargo Group. (492d: I I I

Conbat Crew I rilning S(qiad roi 44(X)tih 79-84

Commander in Chief. lacific. See I-it. larry 1) . Sharp. Ullyvse, S Grant. Stunp. Beli II

Pacific ('ommndii

(ommandcr. Uniited State%. Iorcc., Vietnam 69

(Commnuicatmiol. intercept mission.s 228

364
Comlmnilnicatlons Systenls. equipncnt and operations 55, 81. 106-107. 121. 142-144. 146. 159-160.

172. 177-178. 221, 247

Composite Air Strike 1-orce 46. 247

Composite Reconnaissane it. 363d. 230

Congress

and Americain commitment' 23

military assistance. ainendment to- 190

and reserse units call-ip: 65

Consolidated Aircraft Maintenance Sqiadron% (CAM RON)

23d. 171

33d. 171, 181

34th 171

41st. 220

Constellation. USS 230

Convo~s. See Motor conos

Core. USNS: 115

Corps Tactical Zone%

I: 106. 140, 142. 145-146. 159, 161. 174. 190. 200. 211-214. 267

II 106. 121. 129. 137. 140. 142. 173. 175. 177. 190. 200, 211. 219. 240. 253. 265-266

III 106. 129. 142. 145. 156-157. 175 1I 7. 179. 182. 190. 197. 199-200. 213-217. 243. 245. 248.

253. 263

IV 153. 157-159. 172. 175. 177. 179. 182-183. 191. 200. 215. 235. 243. 253. 263

Countcrmsurgcnc,

policy of differentiating: 224

RVN concept of 39. 54. 103

Crew c' .f See lechnicmans

Crop-destruction intssion,, 219. 247-250

Cua Ron 229

Cubi Point. Philippines, 131

Curtis. Victor N : 247

C/echos Ioakia. 5

I)a I.at: 96, 122. 248. 250

Da Nang Air Base 4. 7. 17. 22. 24. 31. 49. 52. 68, 74. 83. 101. 106-108. 109. 110-111. 127.

129. 132. 136. 142. 145-147. 159. 167. 169, 171. 174-176. 179. 198.211. 219-220.

228-230. 233. 235. 237. 238. 246. 248. 254. 256-257. 259. 266. 268, 272-274

Dak Kct' 139

I)am I)ol 183

Da:u te,.g I9'

)eckcr. George II. 64. 133

Defense. I)epartment of (%cc also McNamara. Robert S . Wilson. CharIc E:

cold-war defense. rcsponsibility for 63

in command stiucture 65

military alsistanc, programs. role in 7. 47

Rcorgani/ation Act (1958). 46

Defense Intelignce Agency: 186

Defoliation project 73. 112-1 l. 117. 247-250. 265

I)e Gaulle. Charles 58. 188-189

Delmore. Fred 1.. 116

I)iilitaricd /one established. 30

Denoclatic Repuhlc of Vietnain. See Norih Vietnain

I)cmolitons operation% by Viet Cong 181. 204, 261. 265

I)ePuy. William F , 208. 263

Deserters from Viet Cong. 113

365
Diei, Ngo Dinh 38

adsisors critici/ed by: 165

and air operations and units, control of. 94. 106-107. 129

and air units commitment: 73

and American troops commitment. 70. 80. 85

and armed forces e\pansion: 49. 54. 71-72. 75

and armed forces reorgamlation 153

assassinated: 191

and bombing operations 104, 120. 140

on Cambodia as sanctuary: 140. 156

Central Intelligence Organiiation formed by 67-68. 75

charges invasion by North: 56. 103

and Civil Guard improvement 75

and clear-and-hold operations. 104. 119

command structure fixed by: 68

conspiracies against: 36. 75. 186. 190-191

and counterinsurgency operations: 54. 68. 71. 103-104

defense treaty with U.S sought by 73

.nd defoliation project: 112-113. 116-117

on economic assistance. 165

elected President: 34. 67

fiscal reforms. promised by: 67

and government reforms- 36. 67. 103

infiltration, alarm over: 72-73

intelligence activitie control by 53. 71

jets requested b% 54. 129

Kennedy program, reaction to 93-94

and MAAG expansion- 71. 73

and MACV activation- 97

martial law declared by 187

and militar% command formation 67-6;. 70. 103-104

military operations, control b% 50. 53-56. 71. 105. 152

and national campaign plan- 152

and National Internal Secutn Council: 68. 75

and navy. formation of: 67

optimism of 149

plebiscite protested by 39-40

and political disturbances: 185-189

popular support lacking- 71

ranger units actn'ated by 75

relations with United States' 58. 165. 185-187

religious affiliation 185

resettlement project 53. 103

residence attacked: 129. 163. 164. 191. 192

sectrity tgency formed by 68

strategic hamlets plan- 104. 153. 173. 183. 223

and stpply routes, interdiction of 104

on tactical air support- 120, 145

and tactical zones organiation 68

laylor evaluation of. 86

threats to government, complaints about 85

and training programs, 40. 49-50. 65

unification, opposition to 52

Viet Cong elimination. estimates for- 153

366
[)jell Illen Phil 8. 9. 16-19. 22. 25-26. 29. 205

('lln D ouglas 22

1)lrection I inders 1 38. 108

I' oni Airlield 17. 31

I )o Xi \\,it :'one 13%. 173. 176

Don I rain Van 180-I187. 190-191

I)onl Nitiang Aiipori 75. 81. 135. 228. 268., 279-280

IDong Iloi 173. 266

1)ong Nai Riwer 190

I)oajgheri\ -willi i L 128

I)oo,'Ie. Nbiks NI 146

Dualles, JIohn I-o~lcr 33

an:d Americani commitment 23. 25-20

onl Colimumt threat 52

.ind Gen\.it Accord% 18

Inld jialiitar\ asskdnce program I5. N9

aind iniljtajr\ I ore% of ItV N. concern I r 35-30

nlebiseile protested h 39

Di -ng. John A 97

I)tirtro\\. Ijlbridge

Onl Mined forces %lirengith 49. 54

and gooernment iclorms. 67

adintelligence orgam,.iiion% 54

relations v. oh )iemn.

Flen. Anithoii 22. 26

H~im~inds. Alan C 263

Edisards. IISS 235

Eglin Air 1-orce B.se 79. 212, 240

lightlt Arim 44

I-Iseitm~er. Dwiught I) 11. 22 

1

ambassadors role %rengiliened b\ 65

and American ci omitmeni 17. 19. 23-24

anid armed f orces %t rength 49)

ajrjiatie proposaIk b\ 30

a mld Clinee inimrention 29

and dlefense of RVN 43

and Dien Mlen M'tin defense 18

go~ernment ,tabillii, -Concert) I or 36

a ind iindepeindeince nime emeni. Polic\ oil I5. 23

and I aos. liller111ntwn in 58-59

.id odjr iiarsista iwe prograi m% I5. 17-22. 14

mnd rC(lijjite% for I-renebh SnLCOS I5

Nopporl of RVN 35

and training prograims 16

Iieeirieiaih See I echnieihiii

Ileetronic intelligence ini~ioir. 235

1.1%. paoif i 18-19. 21. 22. 29. 36

I' iglaind See k nited K inigdom

I;(pjip~jtln losses See Materiel losses

I seort ruiiiioii 2.5. IM3. 145

367
I ar iFas Air I ogi'tic% I'orce 16-17. 41

I-ar Ita'. coiumand: 41. 43

arm Gate 78-84. 95-96. 100-101. 107, 113. 120-124. 127-134. 136-140. 144-146. 148. 151. 155.

157-159. 168, 170-172 174, 181, 18. 2(X). 212. 214. 219. 248. 250

I-elt, Hamrr' 1) 87

and ad i,,ors in combat role 219

and ad\ isor% force rduction 10

ard ADVON opCration'. 95-96. I0M

and air commando units, 81-82. 96. 95

and ir-ground hai.oni 136-137, 1"70

and air operation,, coordination and control- 83. 95. 155-156. 160-161

iid air operations, restrictions. on 172

and air trike%. agains.t North. 201. 206

aind atir niitl coimiiient 69

aid aircraft armamentiii 162

an rd ,rcraft for Arm.\, 110-Ill

and aircraft [or RVN 54. 75. 86. 131. 213

and aircraft strength cpauion' 134. 138

and airfield% constructioin 86. 184

and airlilt operation.. 108. III

and Ap IBac disaster, 159

iad areid forces e.paiOn 54

and Cambodia. incursions into 204

and Chinese pilots for RVN Air -orce 1 33-114

aid ctear-a nd-hold operations 104

and combat role for U' S Air l-orce 123

in command structure 46

aniJ conladder for U S forces 94

anmd 'olilandders'lack of Ilitit'l e 86

ind coUrintrmsurgenc\ operation% 54. 170

and co cr1 actionis against North 195

and delohation project 116

Diemn reasstrcd on U'S support 149

on firepower of airplane %s helicopter: 197

on Ior\:ard air controllers 170

Ilarkm,c~aluation of 102

,d Ilarkili comm, 98

and Ilarkins' relations \\ith Antis 101-102

heads Pacilic Cotitinalmdand hliv.ltcrrm-Iwt one,tort lor 14.il, !50

and iniatilc against VIct Cong 139-140

and intelligence collection and Ira s lnismon 138

on iiiteitlif- " operaitions againt \orth 192. 204

anii' wiierd, ,,1 IImnuison. 135

.lm'ii let, lor RVN Air I orce 147-148, 108

i .. t ak fotc( concept 4647

and KennedN piograin 71

a;ind I ao,. inCIhSi0lns Into 58. 204

on MAAG rcorgaritiil .i iid e\paiu ion 69. 71

on I IA( orginwi/ation and stalll 97-98. 207-21 8

and %iarihe ('orpc neli 188

amrid iitar) aai il e progralii' 47

and ilhtar% operations. control ol1 56

ald ixed crc\%s and ,:ir cotbit 81. 123

36F
and mobile comnbat reporting post- 74

aind iiaipaim strikes 141

and naitional ca mpaign plain 152, 170

and pilots training programi 82. 220

onl political disturba nes, 180

il p)i o% [iie chief% illeddhitig 86

andi recORiMMMiai e m1iNSion'. 83. 86

[ities 210

oil supplies 1ie-jo'.itioiied, 86

an ii%'uppIN route. air inierdiction o1 83

and tactical air strike. 120. 139. 173

a tid target acqtuisitions. 140.141

and tar-geis in North 171

training programs. 82

and troop uinits. commitment 69. 71. 86. 89

and 11,2 tbght'. III

and unified command lor V'ietna m 94

Weede. es alatmon ol 102

Held I lospitafl. 8th 125

lighter Commando Squadron. 002d 238. 267

I- ighter Interceptor Squadion. 509thi 111, 229 I -ighter Squadron. 10th 229

I muned ammutnition 24-25. 240. 261. 266 FLAMING DART l and 11 Operations- 266

[-fares.. rise of 182-183

lHemmng. Il,sd 1 246

Fir',.m RA 130

I light Seruce ('etnter and Nsetork 1601. 17(0

H~ oods,. ef feet on operations. 74. 255

I 00(1 sersie. deficieincies. ii 12.1-125

F-oreign I egmon 20

I-orrestal. Michael V 134.,101. 187

I- ortif ied haunlet' p ain Sete Strategic hamlet%. pI~i i

1-or\'ard ami eont roller'. 100-107. 121. 128. 1136. 138.140) 142-144. 1 if 1. 18 172-I176. 180. 1 S1- I Q2.

184. 197. 199, 214-215, 221, 224 210. 26/

I aniice

ads isor'. %rtli %I AA(j 19

air operation'. b\ 21-25. 14

airecraft dIeliserme'. to 6-7. 8-9, 10-11, 15-17. 22-24

aircrafit iosse% 8- 19. 26-127

aircraft recowered fromt 31. 51)

aircraft stiengili 5-6. 25

airfield construction ani mimpair S2

a mmnititiotn deli',rie' to 24-25

Lasma'iltie. 31-31

finned missile'.. use b\ 24-25

flight cre\s'. laick of 21

Foreign L~egion- 20

goweniment. aidI in '.tibiing 35

mI'depeudcdnce. .gicemcent onl I(,

iniposs er st rength 10 1.5,I 17. 14

Inamteimcl losses. 19

Mtmmar-\ ai'stamnice to 5-7. 16'

Mobile (iiiitp IMK 10

169i
\ortles. ritmber o17 7, 19

a tid Soutbeast Amu lDefenme -1 rcit 3

-StIPPly 1equiretoent'1 19

,Ipt)I\ '.\'.tetil a td operat ions~ 10

%upport of wau declIne I I

training progzrams 36. 49-50

dld \'ictrialil pritionting 30

V''taiilese. ainioiio 17. 23-24,. 34

Vietnamiese. dewertioi1' from 29

V. thd rmV.,l to %otlth 29-310

witl ina d fro"' Viet",int 19.40. 50

1-reeman, Flidtuid 1. 7

1- nel supplies 124

1 nlbright. J W1Miai 68

Galbraiitht. .Iohl K 94

G;,itlinlg gull (nhliu1guit), 240-241. 242

(,in.lnsNJ. 19,.24

Gkiewe. Accords 18. 21 26-27. 10-31. 35. 52, 54. 64-05. 74-75. 121. 147. 172. 206. 257

(Gi,% Dinh Pros ice 20M

(ua l am Aitteld- 15. 18

(Wipatric. Ros\%ell 1 68. 70-71

Gleason. Robert L: 128. 136

Oo,c I eon 236

(iatit.Williami 11 239

Gireait Britain See ti.nited Kingdom

Orece.c CIOi war in1 5

Grectne. Wallace MI . Jr 20N. 234. 254

(iround crews See I echicialis

G rolips support See I actical air support

(ii,iV.. - uppl\ oi gait/atiolt lor 42

Gueirrilla operations5

b\ Viuet Cong .53. 56. 103. 116. 120, 14,S, 181. 191. i96-197. 199. 254

h% Viet M11111 3-i. 10, 18

Gulf ol I onkin crisis 221). 234-215. 239. 243. 247

I lai (I ai Dog) missilcs 24. 26

Hamaindt Isand, 24. 230

I Iiphong 4. 8

aiir strik~es againtst 173. 2)4

operations% at 5, 16-I8. 29)

Ilialberstait. I ),s i 163

I 1attlet defense. ..upport of 17

,oir strikecs agaitt't 254. 2%6

airc raft Nt iength tt 25

Viet NI h cotntrol (if 1-4

1inot D~elta 24

I Io (adin 66

I lark ins. Patul 1) 87. 164

tnd Al VON reorgai i/di ioll IMX

and tit operations coordit,itionl .il coni ol 1I1I 144. 155. 160-161. I10i. 169

and dii operations. restriction%15 oe 172. 201

3170
a ad Air 1-orce representtationt at MACV. 101-10,2. 162

a id aircralt I or Arms' 110-1ll. 148. 181

and aiircraft for RVN 172. 213

and aircraft ..trength expansion- 131. 1 33-134. 155

a tid airlift operation% 11 0-112, 155-156

and American pliaw.-out. 132, 151

tad Ap line disas.ter- 159

anrd Arm%~ control of Marine Corps aviation. 161

and authority as MACV commander 97-98

and Cambodia border violations. 203

and clear-a nd-hold operations.. 2(X)

anad comand of R VN forces. 207

commia nds MAC I liala nd I(X)

commands MAC Vietnam, 97

a nd defoliatmon project 116f- 117

anrd IDe-Nhus crisis. 188, 191

anrd hmeliciopter missiowis escort of 142-144. 159

a nd helicopter tinits. control of. 98

oit ini1titie agains.t Viet Cong 140. 163. 166

ott intnsifying operatio%, 192 205

and lets for RVN Air I-orce 147-148

K ha til. asc..nent of 198

and MACV staff strututre 98. 207

military situation, report i 179

anid inapalm strike... 141

antd national camipaign plait 152-153

anid political listirba ime.. 18. -18

nd raidar operation.. 170

retire.. 210

aiid tactical air strikes 137, 139

an 11( tctical ,air Nutpport 145. 1 (4)

Viet Cong eliominaion,. estimate for 151. 153

and~ Vmcttainm/atmon of conflict 151-152

H arriman. W Ascicll 66. 20)9

onl bombing operaitions. 104. 201

onl Dimern .upport, 188

and gosernmetit reforn.. 67

a nd Political (lisitrba lice.. hi

and troop tunts. commitment 83

I larri... Hutitr. Jr

anid air operaitions coordination aindl control 227

anid air strikes against North 230.212

and Laos. iincursions into. 259

anld low-altitude reconniaimee 243

IlIant Nghmit Pro.. ice 2(X0

Haten, 1'SS 31

Heair detecting demsic. 243

IHeathi, IDona~ld It 6-7 101. 24. 16

I lelicopter.

airplane escort of 144. 146. 157-158, 174, 176. 197. 267

in airlifts 144-146. 154-156. 178. 182-184, 196, 214. 254-255. 260-261

arita imeint load..% 146.147

Arrn conceept of risc 146-147

371
10

,'laUillC% ¢cu. llIoil b% 267

control b% At 11% 144

Il gunisllp iol' 157-168. 177, 197, 199. 215. 225

Iosses 158. 184., 196., 214

Miilimo ('-orp opcration 175

tactical strike% b), 121. 144

twlniilcr lo R\' Air Iorce

I Xl)eSee'( Aircraflt ty'pes

Ilcildcrsoll, Ilarms' IF 179. 197 241

I ergcrt. I horna% NI 218

Il¢\%itt. Albeil G 17. 14

HicLain Air 'orce law¢ 41,44. 114. 195. 231)

IIick. Robert W 17

I igh Nitionl ('ouncil, RVN 235

II gh%%a\i I niliunbeed) See Routcs

I hh-nlan. Rogel

on air po%%¢r clihalh\ i¢cslt%, 134

oil bollbing opcrationl I(N, 201l

on border control opcraItiolm 17,

ul itCi% air in nli opCration% 161

anlld political dlturbalicc 187

oil tcIicI air ltriLe 118

Ilo ('hi Mih

)icm praiked b\ 149

anlid I)li hen llPhtl 18. 27

a l(n iilll )cp l l1¢i ¢ lll O \CllC llt 5, -. 31 )

IInlellified opcratllOls. retCllOll to 204, 2310

plebliscite. (Illilld Ilol 19

sipport b\ (hiuhi ,iild So\1e1 5

I al or 1hiIMll. reaCtion to 85

lilhiiclllol. pllns or 35

Ilo ('i Muih Ihall 72

foa Ilio (rligioi% griloip) 37. 2)2

lion Me Ia hlnd 228

lIon \gu lalnd 228

Ilonohlhli conlIicilnce 119. 121. 18. 147. ISI- I 2. 166. 172. 185. 192. 2)2. 20-206. 21, .'

Ilue 3. 151. 185-187, 202

1ingiNhon 137

!!,nr~ n A: . o & Ill, 79, 8,

IInIsChnon I R t)Oih 47

Ildcltificatio1. Iernd or Ioe III

IIl(dochlni (v aw clo eI hlrcil e Iu', 00111e)

llicd cooperition 111 4

American poic\ iomu:rd 3-5

('ille pollhC ill 4

I ivilch coinrol ofl 1.5

geographlicail Icatuirc% I

I nelplelndence 11111' Ii l 3e-4

laipalile.w, oci.'lpalllonl I

Ihlyared (leCice% 18. 148. 168-169, 241- ., 266

Inmln. Harold 42

372
Intclligeace collection and ieport, 18.54. 85. 135. 137-138. 152. 157. 1 61. 169. 179. 199. 22'-228.

235, 243. 245. 250. 2 1

Iter-Miiir\ Commnrit ot S Sritegic lamlets. RV\ 104

Interniationial Contiol ( onil% ior 30, 40. 50. 53. 85. Hill. 162. 189, 230

Intcrna~tional ('ooperation Admn is~traition 52

Iter/one \ 139. 173

.IablonI\. Illar~c\ Ir 1371438

J.Iapan. uplh orga rivaion in 42

Johnson, llaold K 2(M

.lohnson. lAnoon 13 209

and ad.ior%. reduction in Iorce 195. 204

and air strike% again'.t North 229. 253-254. 256. 265-266

,md ,urcraft for RVN 213. 229

becomues Prcident 192

and bilaerial conihiation agreenment 230

C(ongrc support% riilita or, critionN 232

and eo erl actiOis against North 195, 227. 234

Diem. conlerence with 70

alid go'.ernilcnt. stahillil Ior 256

aid (ill ol I onkin incident 229

on inteli'.nm g opra iol 195. 198-199. 201

arid lt% or RVN Air Force 238

Khiril. relationi v.h 198

anrd I aios iIcursions into 195. 214

and NI ACV. of ficrs ,isigllc(. to 195

and iiiar\ as'siiiice programs, 70

and patrol% b% \a%\ 229 234

Iolic% ol Vietn,rm 195

and pro'i.iorral gow.rinn 195

and psychological warfare missions. 251

on support for I S -RV\ nit 203

aid I aihr authorit 227

anrid U-2 Ihghtl 195

on Viet Cong contiol b'. \orth 195

aid Vietri aini/ation of conflict 195

lohnsoi. U Alexi% 261

.!. i~iI \.r All hc.tion o Board- 246

.Ioinit ("hil% If Stall

anrd ad\ isor% in eorbatit rolt 105. 219

and air base deflene 254

anrid air cornniliido unit, 80. 83

arnd Air lore expanisiorn i 1

and air operations coordinition arid control 216

and air strike. against North 205-206. 234-235. 251-254

and aireraft for RV\ Air Irorce 75. III. 1 67-168. 212, 229. 218

"inid aircraft strength expaiion 134. 218. 221), 229. 218 266

arid American aneriaft in combat 267

and ('amilbodia border \iolationl 141. 203

aid Chiia. pre-elripri\. strikes against 29

and cleaar-aid-hold operations 20

cold-\\ar deise. repoi sibili\ for 63

and combat role Ior U' S Air I ocec 1 11

aind colilnriaid strIctire 41, 65

373
ad 1(1 11222Crc,111 C1C 1rm an 12 5.)iet 0

anrd d.'1e2%e ol 10A 41

and2~ dcll 2itio pi (heel 112. 247

o.2il [)tell)C crisi. S%'C122 22' (122lingl I')

gmcnrx CII) IIII rt 221221 e ) %t,21iht% 15-16

an ld heliellier, combat12 role 102

2)21 21121cll Ing1) operaI 1)11 a2gainst% Nor 21 198-199. 2()1 2013-205

.111(1 iets lot MAV Air I or ee 2Ms. 238, 264, 266

a rid1 I .221. 221ctlron into%2221 64. 204-205. 254

.2 ld I 120% 12s infiltration21 route 04

.212(] NI AO \c(11222,2 2(ei aiiormt 97

I rid NI A( stall structu2re 207, 210

and2( 1222122,\ aN%%2212 2CC p20)102222 6. 35-36

irlilttarr' situation)2. repoit 2 2) 179

and2( 2212d ere\%%. -ii comba1t 82-83. 144. 238

an2d national22 cam22pai2gn plan 152

.a22( 11% CI20loi0c.2I \w.,r1,2re nimi%20% 250

ad M", 12r221( fores% stren2gth2 36. 19. 71.72

I it( Special P-2rces mi%%gnmenti2 228

.2nd( %22pl\ route2%. ai2r In2terdictio 2222 - 80)

(o2 %2pporr2 lr V S -MAN 222222 20

anid la22)1e2 222 \21221 172-173. 233-234

1I\' lo12 rel)r t. rection 2 t2o2 88

Mid1( 22.222222) 212.2212%s and(1) piopo%.i 36. 69. 72. 220

an i oo uni011l1ts comm11)tm1enlt 69, 71, 8W 198. 254

o2n unifi1ed command, 2t(1t Vi' etnam221 94

I (i21r [reqklerle\ ( or1222,t22g Board2( 178

Joint21 (lerierl Stall, R\' N

anid air opera2tions c2)02d2112220 1221(1 c2)r22r0 55. 172. 221

.212 (1pC2.22(12%. 2e%2rict2022% o12 141. 159. 1 72. 221

.221( .22[h(1l oI perations 112, 158

an ld ,221c2121 .2%'.g222erts 1(07

an Id .22rlil 2o(perations12 240

Arm\~ donation202 ol 50

homhl,2(l re%intin b\2f% 129

Inlhligence c2111cli101 and112, t1%1222%%2212 138

in2te12',l 2C ope[122222% 1W)

and2( let% til strike role 2(65

an id pliti2cal crise% 56'. 187

recog211/ed b\ 1)2'. %sional I gm'ernlmrent 191

an21( 212ctic12 ,22r strikes, 139)

Joint21 2212122r\ missio,11.I S IS5

Joint21 operation12% centler 8 3, 100. 128. 142. 2 11

Joint21 Opration2% I \altiation0t (iroup. MAv 159

Joint2 S2trategic 5222. e' Counciel 90

Joint22 112%) Force 11(0 4(6.47 58. 64.94

Jllge J121112222222 79.84. IM(K

Kadena2, \it flaw2 229-230). 243. 257

Ka,12 1hr 2122? 14(6

Kau. 1. ,iir If 23W

Kennieth John21 I122li'..1c% M'.AMP I ,20% 64

374
,igie~lot ltte. eliel In163

adl dar tt11 ol11% tit 77, 79. 170

and direrdit deli'.rie'. to R\V'\ 89

a~nd as"I2Itli ite %onlidn'%%ail thi eat 189-1 90

ambassaidor,, role str~'ngllieied b% 65.66

cji\ lod~tiorl progi dtf 68

anid cold-%%ar (jefen' '. I esPiitl'it lj tor 63

oil conmbat dcelleMt a' tId test center 68

cohiiterins(irgene\ pla ns 63. 6.5 -,1 105

dnd Cuba crisiN 64

aod dcl oliaioit prFOlect 112-113. 117. 247

onl Dii-INhiu' replacement: 188-190

eceonitle de~ clopinlet't p2 ogrdii1 68S. 71.72

and go~erllittent relorm% 67. 89

onl guterrilla %%arlare. dalngt r I 101 61

onl I Ia rkiris as NI AC\ eounntd oder 97

onl intellaf\ ittg operations% 192

anid i aos. Itt1er\ c Itioll in 59. 03-65

NIAG c\painstoit 6S. 94

ajjj iidmiltar\ a'.milallce program'% 70. 89. 105

nucelear tests re'titd b\ 615

pollc\ onr V 'dn in 68. 71. 190. 192

a :td radar lacilities (68

reserc nits edll-tip h\ 65

d1id RVN armed lorces e\pnltot1 65. 6)9. 72

R V IN go\Citelt aijd to 77

Special I-orccs eotllgllititewl 69. 73. 80

Speciatl Gr oup) ((onlterlisutrgceii ) formied bh\ 10)5

Imalor miollt to R V N gowerimnceit 77. 84-91

rinillg prograins e\pandcd b% 65

troop tiitit' collitlititleill b\ 68. 89. 9 1. I 0-1 119

,111(1 \ let Co(ng atrocities 67

and \'letnIImI,at1101 ol c"i11ito" 113-1 34. 185

K hatith. Ngli~eil

an ld air strike, agailist North '204. 230

and bilaterial con1~tltatiott aigreernetit 230)

elltec of ste.jc protposal I oi 2;5

ci\iI goeritillteilt owcrthromi b% 259

and clear-dind-lill1d operation% 200

cilia nd s.tructuire reorgai/cd b\ 2M). :35. 239 240

fall ol predicted 265

I (rill gomerli1eui 19i8

go\ctitillieit ol. intatbilit y 212?-23

o21 intet1itlitg operation,~ .lpwist \ortlt 202. 228

leIdI atltie(.s 254-255. 261

a lld l jtcit cficatloi Man 2WX

proclatimecd tctinig prcitter 234

proclaintell Pre~idc itt 213

re'dgiliit cott~idercd b% 228

resigns 213. 267

and Specia 1-orce% e"P~Itllot 204

anid stanodard 01 11\111g. etltal~ieiig 2CA1

support b\ Uitedc~ State-, 2(02

375
anid %%~a r declaration aigainst North 204

K hrtihchcN . Nik ia S

antd I aos. cease-fire in 65. 71

on national liberation %%ars 55-56. 63, 7 1

anid West Becrlin. threat to 58

Kidnappings b\ Viet Cong 52

Kien (hitg Pro~ iice 178

Kicn I ba Pro~ iicc 178. 214

Kien I ong 204. 215

Kien lPhotig Pro iitce 53

Kim. I c \'an- M)0

King. Blentatain HI. 79. 81-82, W6 127-128

Kontuin 53. 56. 122

Kontim Prm~iitce 173. 20i

K orat Air Base. I itailarid. 229-230. 256. 280

Kos~gm. Aleisci N 265

Krulak. Victor HI. 189

Kuier. I ,ittrence S 4.5

and air units. control of 43.44

on comanid structure, 43-44

and local air forces. relations mtth 42. 45

and logistics. control of. 42

and niilta r assistaine programs 47

mnobile strike force concepi 45-46

K%. Ngu~cn Cao 2.2

and ,iir operations coordination anmd control 211-212

cotmnid% air force 211

anid corps. assiginmcnt of amrcia.fi to 211

and intensification of operations 228

leads Zoite 1) assaiult. 254

and paradrops into Northi 228

personal aniti-cotip aircraft 263. 267

tca mwork. appeal for. 110

K'.cs. Roger NI 23

1 acklaitd Air I ore Bamse. 79

1 a nglc\ Air Force Basc 112

ILai'gnage I- rricr. 221

I aitil. li ph 22

Lansdd!e. Edward G.- 122. !99

I ao IDong Party 52. 56. 58 103

Laos

aircraift (lclitieis to- 58

Amecrica n recoginitiont 5

IFreitch control of 3

incursionts itto 58-59. 64

Japaiicsc occupation 3

imiliar assisianice to 16

opcratimu in I5. 17. 53. 58. 63. 148

photographic reconnaissance o~cr 74-75. 243

as sanctuar% aitd infiltration route 56. 58. 67. 72-73. 163. 204. 227

suppI% orgaiition for 42

1 arson Air I-orcc Base: 22

I assia 1-. II. I) 180

376
I attre de 'I assign1y. Jean de 10

1I/xlo ine immii 24-24. 246,201-16

I Calict jrops 17, 122. 196,. 249. 250

i ema\. Curtis 1- 87

a iid Al)VON reorganh/atioii10

ind aIr-ba&c defense. 264

and air commaindo unt.79-84, 100

ati Aii 1 ),,e Ivprexentatioin on MIACV 10 

I

a mlair operations polic% 119.201l

and air strikes 19,111"A North 201, 204-205. 254

anad au- unit',oiitln 90

anid aircraltlIor Arm\ 110, 244

and aircraft tar RVN Air 1-orce 168

and aircrafi UndclrUse 125

and airlift operation,. 245

a rid -armed C-47 cx aluation 241

and combat role for U.S Air Iorcc 132

crIiicu,,ex, air and mfitar operatoh 161

an iaarm (iate dclassification I 7(- i 71

an lelicopteix as glin~1ips 225. 236

oil Iiicnifving operaions aga inst North 203

and joint operations center 142

and Laos. incursions into 64 65, 227. 257

and 'MAC'\ siaff tiructuic 97 98. 210

and mixed creNS in combat 132

aiid options a or action against North 234 i3

aiid RVN Air Force combat ellcctixencxx' 131-2

stratiegiC plans, disagreecitenI xsith 152

and troop umit' commitmcent 90)

on \'1itn polies 91

1 cniii/er. l.% mnan 1 66

anad air commando iliii 83

,nd clcai-a nd-hold opelatiatins

anld command %tructure 44

a nd golxerniment reform-, 67

ott im\cd ere%%% in eionbat 84

on troop unit% commnitment 69

I coal) Nikolai 55

Lloyd, Robert NI 17

I odgc. I'lenr Cibal

a ad air posscr. V N failure to uxe 197

and air %trikex againxt Nirth- 20)6

anad awsitaic xitdasal threat 188-189

becomes amnbaxxador- 186

and conspiracies against lDiemI 186

on Diern-Nhu rep~aceuttent: 188-190

11t 1ite nxif-, ing operations agaiaxt North 202-205

K harinh. assxesleI atOf 198

on 111t1ixatiilg vietnaitese 192

anad poliical d isturba nes 187-188

and political reforms 191

rcxugav 210 Ijj ,.sphoeain n W11

Logixical operatiowx anad 1Aim e'Spl peain n ~tm

I Ong Au l'rox nice 19i8, 2W8

377
I orig Nix 260

Loudspeaker, usC of:. 122, 249. 250-251

Ma Da Rtiser 173

MacArthur. I ougla%. 04

%Maddlo.\. USS 228-229. 232

Maddu\. Sam. Jr. 211. 210-217

Mail %er~icc 125

Mairiteicia [ice cre%%S Seei Icel i mia Its

Maitenance and repair. 10. 50-52. 55. 125. 181

Makins. Roger NI 23

NMang Yang 11.% 267

Manila 3S. 203

Mansftield. NMike 165

Mato I e-tung 4

MIaria na Is~la nds. in command struictlire 44

Mlarscille. airlift fromn 22

NMars.hall. Carl WV 112

Mlata'is. Ilicodore C 267

MAttenid Group. 64 1 0th 41

Materiel losse

b\ I-raine 19

by RVN forces: 192

by Viet Cong 178. 219

Matis~on, Richard A 77

McCarty. C'hester 1" I5

MeClintock,. Robeit. 25

MeCone. John A 192. 203. 265

McConnell. John 11 241

Mc~oiiald. IDasid 1 204

Mcl~lro%. Stephen 1) 149

McGarr. I roncl C

andl air comima ndo r'iion 83

rcraft assignmnent by 107

and bombing operatoi 104

comndiis L' S Forces. Vietnam 95

on crisis in Vietnam 91

heads MIAAG 54

atnd milrta% operatos.s control 0 56

and RVN Arm% e\pansion, 54

anrd tacimil air control stni 107

IvcGosern. Ja mes 13 27

McKee. Willani F 47

McKinney . Claude Gi. Jr 81

M'-Namara. Robert S 66

and adsisors. number of 931. 106. 190

a iid air commaniido traiinig iiiissioni 83. 219

a rid air operaitioiis coordii nat iou a lideotitroI 155-156

arid air strikes against North 1731. 205-20o, 234. 253-254

ait d iirc raft I r ItV N A ir I-orcc 75. 91. 93. 131. 16(7. 202, 2 12-213, 2 19-240

anrd aircraft stre ngtli expa nsion 134. 218. 236. 240

and airlift operatioii% 110. 119

a ril Americani phias"-out- 132-133. 151

on American combat role 162

3178
on Army maission in Vietna at 119

assistance withdrawal thiieat 189-190

and B1-57 for contingcnes use 218

tecntraliics dc~;sion-itnakmng !23

and China. inierwrition b% 234

and Chinese pilots for MIN Air l-orce 133

anid clear-a nd-hold operation,, 104. 119

and Combat Dcsclopmcnts and I est Center 73

on combait role for U S Air I-orce 123

anii] communications systemns and equipment 10)7

comrprehiensise mecasures for MIN aid- 93

conferences '.iah commniders. Set, honolulu coiiference%. Saigon. conference% at

and couintcrinsurgecc forces, expanding- 63. 80

and counterinsurgency plan%, 80. 82

and defoliation project. 112-113. 110-117

on lDicm-Nhu replacement 190

on flares. use in air strikes. 137

ground wart. stress on 259

and Guff of '1 onkin incident 229

and helicopter deliserics to RVN Air F-orce 144

hostilities end. predictions of 122. 151. 190)

on intensif~iag operatioins 192. 20)2

and jet,, or RVN Air l-orce 147

anrd Lios. incursions into. 195. 256

a nd Laos. interwention in 64

atnd MACV orginivation and staff 97. 171. 21)7-208. 210)

and nmateriel transfer to RVIN- 166

anrd military assiance programs Ill5. 151. 192

a nd mining operations 21)2

mission% to Vietnam 190. 195. 202

and mixed crc%%s in combat, 82-83. 131 218. 238

monitors aid program. 93

and negotiation% to secure peace, 265

and nuclear tests, resumption of 05

and options on action against North 20)3. 234

and pilots shift to airlift% 110

on political conditions in It VN 179

and political disorders 185

on) priori'ies for RVN 72

on in £,ioisi! g0 U5Li i111.at 192. 195

and ps~chological warfare missions 123. 251)

a nd radio use in air ssdrni gs 137

on roles a nil missions, 102

and suppl\ rotwts. air interdiction of 81)

on tactical air conitrol ss sems 93. 106(

anrd tactical air control 121. 138. 217

I aylor report. teaitiotl to 88

and training programs 133. 221). 243

a nd troop units commitment 69. 88-89).1

anrd [ -2 flights, 195

a tid unified coimmnd for Vietnam 94

anid Viect Cong c'ittination. estimtate% fi 151

anad Vie) nam/atmon of contlict 131. 137. M5-152. 106. 218. 221)

McNaughton. Jo1) 255

379
Mledical Air Is actution Group. 0481%~t: 31

Miedical services 31. 122, 125. 2 19, 260. 267

Meter. IlknrN C 176

Mekong Delta, operations tin 34. 17, 49. 72, 74. 153. 157, 177, 179. 183. 204, 217, 221

Niellih. lDasid S 174. 215

Miendenhilall. .loseph A 1 89

Niendcs-Praitee. Pict re 30. .33

Mlilitary Air I ransport Serstee 31. 81

NMilitar, assisance advisor% group%

Air I oree ArmN~ represenlation 00 47. 49

local air forces. deseloping 48

rmhtar assisance, role tin 47-48

Mliitar% Asssa ne Program

annuallallotmtsut 151

priorities ti 7

MIilitar Revolutionarv Council. RV\N. 191. 233

Maitiar% Sea 'I ransport Service 31

Mi lion. Ilicodorc It 54. 111

Mlinh. Duiong Van. 180. 190-191. 195. 198, 233.234

MnIhu. 'I ma . Vani 267

Mlinh, I ri Pliant 77

Nlnigunl See Gatling gun

Mirning operations b\ Vic'. Cong 183

M'is4a Air Base 229

Mlissile assauils 230. 257

Mobile combat reporting post 74. 82

Mobile Communication% Group. 1st 107

Mobile Group 100 3(0

M0lotos. V~aeIl N, 30

Mlonroe D~octriine 5F

Montagnards 73. 1 1W- 17. 173. 179

Mood), Air Force ILkas /3()

Moore, JIosephi 11 209

dnd ads stirs grades 216

and air basec defense 253

and air escort missions 225

it ri air-grouind iaison 216

and air operations coordination anrd control 21. 216. 225

anrd aireralt strength expansion 217. 238

commands 2d Air Division: 208

d rid he licopters as gumnships 236

anrd helicopters. reinow dl rorn air bases 264

a 11(1 infraredl reconnaii lce 244

a nd lets. rise of 264

and1( joint air operationis center 221

Joint General Staff, liaison si itli 217

anid I aos. itctirsioii into 257

at rid hahoti anrd strike aircraift shortage 218

and M AC V staff %trutrcure 20)8

a rid1 timed crew, tin combat 218. 264

and R V\ Air l-orce organi/ation 211

a ridl tactical air stippori controls 216-217

and tactical air stiupr i msions 217

1801
MIoorrmni. I Iiornw, 

S

and Al)VON reorgani/ation- 98-1(X)

anid airlift operations. 245

and defoliation project 116

heads mobile strike force 45

anid self-sustaining RV\N A\ir Forme 134

11\1orak status

American 82. 122. 181. 214

RVN Air I-orce. 181. 217

R 'N armied forces 232

Viet Cong: 173

Miorse, Wayne I... 257

Mortar assalults, by Viet Cong- 179. 183. 253. 265

iforton. US.S 235

Motor convoys

support missions for. 174, 178

Viet Cong attacks on, 197

Mountbatten. ILotii 

4

Mueller. Etigeine If 

. Jr 14.;

Mule Irain. 108. 109. 110-112. 116. 152. 156. 170-171

Mtutual Defense Assistance Act (1949): 5-6

Mttual Defense Assistance Agreement ( 1950): 7. 17. 48-49

My I ho. 157

Naha Air Blase 229

Nanm Iong 224

Napalm strikes. 10. 19, 121, 128. 141. 146. 150. 158, 179, 238. 260

Nape road bridges 256

Narr. Willred G 130

Nash. P'rank C 17

National Intelligencee Ageiies. R VN. 68. 85

National I iberation I ront ( Viet Cong). 58. 149. 150. 163. 189. 255

National Sectirt Council

and air %tiikes against North 233. 254-255

and Coinnunist expaion511. threat of. 35

and defense of Vietnam 43

and lDiemn support 188

on i nteiisifying operationts against NorthI 203. 205. 233. 255

and I amo. iietrstoii into 2',3. 2i525ti

anid iiulttar assista ne program 

6

nmhmiir operations, proposal% for 232-233

and nasal 1Patrols resunmptioin. 233. 255

a tud ItV armed I ores e.parnion, 69

antd training program 36. 21

on troop titt commitmett 83. 89

Nasarre. Heri Fugene 15.18. 22-21. 25-26

Navigation stem 243

Nehru. .Iawa ha ll 22

Nleii YorA hm~e% 1(8). 163

New Zeala td 315 .Seei also Rtosal Ns-- Z/ealantd Air Fore

Newman. Ralph A 140)

Ngai Citao 260

Ngo in Dm iemn See Diem, Ngo )i 

h

Ngo Diinh Nhti See Nhiu. Ngo Dinh

381
Nbia I ratig Airlield, 10-11. 15. 30. 50. 96. 101. 107. 125. 127. 132. 142. 148. IS51. 154-155. 168.

171, 176-177. 181. 185. 211. 239, 246-247. 263. 274-275

Nhu. Madamehi Ngo D~inh, 103-186

Mitt, Ngo D~inhi 34. 56. 58. 104. 129. 139. 165. 185-191 See- ao D~iem. Ngo [inh

Night operation1%

b% RVN fore%~ 96. 127-128, 132. :68, 174-175. 182-181. 214, 224. 244. 247. 259-260

b\ \'tet Cong 253. 260

b\ Vict M i 22

Niglit-111i0n dc\ ie% 148

Nix\oi.. Rtichid NI 33

Noiting. F~rederick 1, 87

and ADIV\ON operwtions 95-96. 101

ad dair eonmmandounit% 81-82

and wr operations,. restrictions on. 172

at id aircraft dcline: ic to R \'N air force 75. 131

aI iid Americani combat role 170

antd Ca-mbodia border \iolations 141

and1( delen.. trentm \%u itliInited Staite% 7.3

and1( de4Oli'itioii protect 113, 116-117

IDiemn reassuiredl on IU S suipport 149

on IDiemr ipl\ to Keied\ programi 94

on iin suem~pport 188

aind jets for R\'N Air l-orn 12')

and Kentied\ coniprelcisiw plan 71

and~ na palmn strikes 141

on relations m th R \'N 10,1. 185

and tacetical %ii control 83

an tiactical air strikes 129, 1.37-I 39

North A mericaini A~ ,oton. Inci 2141

North Atlantic I reatt\ (rgani/ation 5

N orthi \,icinami (se ai' ,Io 1'CiiI Minhi

aggresioti b\ aiIfirmned I00

.1it strikes agai ns 2310

aitcraifi stre ngith 230

,iirlifis of troops antd stipplics 128-129)

Comnitist conti ol ol 14

D~ieni m\ertllro\% C\ plited b\ 11

iidceimidctice proclaimed 4

iiisades South 531

;;~totto SothI 31. 34

im)s. assi tlts b\ 229. 212

Nhu coiitaict u itli 189)

nuinbei In Soth 198

peaee iiegoti~titisn rejected b% 206

poptnlatioii 34

recogniioii b\ ( lIiiia ani m ol ti 5

regulmi f orce,. inose to Souithl 20)4, 227

stilpl5 s'.stei n id operation%. 195. 19

I a~ll mt1s10i1i. reictioti to 85

- ~oii ISAI combait itole IM(X. 162

anid \ ict ( uing e 'painsioii 163

No irthierii Air Ma~teriel Arcai Pacific 412

\ticleair spti

cotisideratiotis on mse 29, 64-01

382
ini test c\crcihC 46

ObserN training lmgiinll 10

O'IDanel. JIohn WV

and 1-retich ad'.i'ors 391

antd 1IC unch philN~ 15

anid Dieni Bien Phu delen'.e 18, 25

head, NIAAG 19

aind training prograi nv 36

Oden, D~ell, M 225

O'D~onnell. Finnit 87

a nd Air IForce irC'.Celtation at LNIAC \ 101

and air commnand1o units 82-83

anid air operat ions coordination and control 129. 600

aild air operation%. restrictions on. 172

Onl air operation% polic. 119

alilt,,. Contrl of 1(08

and hoinhing striLcs 1014

commanids Pacific Air I-ormes 47

and def oliatiioni project If13. 116

and Laos, intersnion it: 05

and milita r\ asssta ne progra nis 48

onl RV\ Ali Iorce dfc~ecies 69

straitegic phi nN. disagreemlent %%,it 152

and tactical ,ir control 1016. 16(0

and taocal aur atrkcs 135. 137

Office ol tl'c Special AssNistaint Ioi Counterinsrgene) and Spaial Aumiuetis 227

Offie ol Strategic SuCr\ ICC

Oil-spot oncept See~ (lea r-.l-i (-old operations.

Oil storag. plans. strike agains 1 71 229, 210. 254. 256

Okina \a. suppl\ orga ni/.tion in 42

Olon. Ar'.il 1 10

Onl Mark I rigineering Coinpai . 181L 212

( )\ilI. Ia,i w 1170

Osborne. ( li.Ci1cc It , Ir 215

Os cisas I

1

re..' Club 2"

Pal'ai(i ( omlmand liiiab1 I-ChIt.larr\ I) , harp. tI hsses S (amit 'stumpll. I Cli\ Bt

ill C0111itid 0 (1 tIICI I C 41 47-44. 40. (,S

P'age ( olnlnlications I ngilers. lint 1017

I',isiai IS

I'arainiiitarN mms1 67-68. 152 l17 22S Seeailsu( nl m (oiard ( islian Implai Dfel-x (iroulls.

Nlit nla rd. l'opulai I ortcs. Rcgionlill I0 olX 'selfl Ielns (alp,

P.1, .i IoIptCs Se Au bome ICopcl on'

Paris airlift 111111 22

P'arrots% IlCak I1,6

P'ant idgC. I arkc I

anid Mti opcrat 1111 conduo 2')

and Aincrica ii ilIiimitiIICei 29)

beisI s.iid wh ras'.,
III conmma nd structure 41

logistics, control by 42

,dd ilitairy assistantce progr~imi 24-25, 31

lPassnta ii. Otto E -185

Patliet Lao: 63. 204. :08

Patricia Lynn: 171

Patrols

grounid. 179

itavai!: 227.229. 234-235. 266

Pay service 125

People's Revoltitionary Party ( North Vietniam): 103

Personnel earners 157-158. 260

Petroletimn oil. ltibricanuts (P101.) See Fuel Su~pplies

PThan I Itiet 215

Philippine Air Lines: 31/

inI comanid structture 44

natiotials. ev'aeuation of- 31

anid Southeast Asia Defense I reaty. 35

supply orgiitiiation in 42

linor P~enh- 129, 163

Pho Sinh. 182

Phlotoe-rapie ieconntassainee iaisions: 74-75. 127, 135. 138. 147-148, 168. 241-243

Phu Qtioc Mlanii 141 P1lm Yen P'rovinee 116-Il17, 236

Phuc Yen 230. 235. 254

IPhtioc Lotng liroie 117. 145, 156

Ilitioc I hanli Pros nice 75. 156. 174. 250

Namiie I uy lirmsinee 2(K), 215. 245. 261. 266-267

Phunec Vinh: 72

P~ilot"

cis liani See Cis l Air I ra nsport

f riction with Viet na tese 110

training program See I raining programs

lIaini of .lars 204-205. 233

Plain ol Reeds 53. 157

l'leikti 30. 53. 56. 83. 100-107, 122, 127, 129, 112-133, 136. 142. 147, 151, 109. 1i/l. '74.176.

211. 263. 265-266. 275

Pleiku Proviince 263

IPlesen. Recne' 18

Polandl 25

C l'olei Klemig 122

Polei Kroiig 122

Pope Air I orce Base 108, 111-112

Poptilair loiees. RV\ 177. 215. 225

Porter. lDniel H) .Jlr 158

P'orter. Jlohn NI 220

Poisda in Coitference (1945) 

4

l'oss r plan i n rkes agriins 173

l'ress reports. effect of 163. 174), 185-180. '257

P'reston. IBeiitinin S 

. Jr 2113-214. 220

Piresot. Ilerberi 1 157.158X

I'isoiier of ssdr

ni'',ring'aniid itrocessinv 11

384
Viet Cong 109. 121. i28, 156, 158, 178

Pritchard. Gilbert 1... 133

Propaganda compaigns by Viet Cong 113-114. 117, 137-138

Prouty, Robert V. 24

Psychological wvariare missions 317. 54, 122. 219. 251-252

Qua'ng Duc Province 247

Quang Ngai 109, 145-146. 175-176, 219

Quang Ngai P'rovine 37. 173. 177. 179. 255

Quai:'g i Proxince 173

Qua a I ri: 185

Qiuartermaster Airborne Stippl anid Packaging Coipain . 8081 st 26

Quam ters. conditions in' 124-125

Qui Mhon- 151, 167, 170. 175-176. 266

IRacli Gia: 178

Radar s\sterns and operations, 25. 68. 74. 121. 129. 131. 136. 148. 169-170. 244

Radford. Arthur WV 19.20. 21. 22-23. 26

Radio eommtmicatiin, See (Coinmiunieation% ss sterw-and eqtiipnment

Raio~( direction fiding 138. 157, 168. 243

Raidio Research Unit. 3d: 244

Ranich Hand. 112-117. 247-250. 2(4)

RAND) Corporation. sttidieN b\ 236. 2319

Ranger Unit-,. RVN 53. 55. 73. 145-146. 156-158, 171. 177. 197, 221, 200

Reconninssdine missions. 25. 37. 82. 128-129. 1139. 143. 147-148, 169, 171. 174. 182. 196' 227,

239-241I. 243-244. 256-259. 268

RZeeoiisiice Sqti~idroi. 6091ht 168. 228

R~xcninaisanlce I echiiei Squadroin. I 3thi 147. 241. 243-245

Red Riser aind Delta 19. 29. 31. 34

Reftieling oper-ationN 22. 230

Regoit 5. Viet Cong 174

Regioiial I-orce%. RV\ 67. 228

Religious groups. denions~rat ions bN 17, 185-186, 190. 233. 265

Republic of Korea

stippl% orgaii.iuiioit in 42

ssir in 6. 16. 27

Republic of Viet naimi (R V N) ( Seie a/p I uIn. \go I inhl)

Aituerica im oo~p sirenith ini 151

border delenses 172

Camniodia. relaitions %\ ith 1,10

eCOnoins %. plans for iitpros itg 54

I- leetios, 3L,67

f inia~ til procedutre%. impi os iig 54

gosern in~uit stai lit\ . conucerin w er 15.36

il pedenc proclaiimed 19

intfiltraition h. North 40. 52-54. 56, 58. 72-'13 101

materiel delisried to. samei o1 151

mtigrationi fromt North if. 14

iiti1itdr% stafi Incion~ei~i. efflet% ol 235

political disttirhjiicc in 17, 52. 14, 50. 58. 1X5-01 233

poplaitioni 14

pi Osiiicuia orgaini,.ion 57

pros iotial gosertnmeui recogni/ed 191

terrait feaittires 7,

385
warfare begins in, 53

Republic of Vietnam Air l-orce ( RVNAlF) See also Republic of V'ietnam armed forces

air .resss. conibat effect ive ness- 176-177

air defense by 128. -1

airborne operations. See Airborne operations

and aircraft assignmnent and conitrol- 107-108, 142

aircraft debseries to. 49-50. 52. 54-55. 75. 127. 132-133. 151. 153-154. 179. 238-239. 243. 25 1.

263. 267-268 Ii airlifts of troops. and supplies. Seec Airlifts of troops and supplies,

command positions,, Army, officers in 50

eqtuipmnent shortage%: 179, 239

ground crc%%s cffectiseniess 132

morale staius 181. 217

organization and %trength. 37-39. 49. 75. 153. 207

organizational unit%: 133

pilots, combat effcctisencss of 50. 54. 127. 131-132

relations with U S Air I-oree. 42

resource% paiceling by 211

scramble time. 132. 175. 182. 215

sorties, number flown: 55.67. 131-133. 149. 174-175, M9. 214-217,.219-221.238. 243. 264

squadrons renumbered 133

surpnse applied b% 219

' aylor Report on 86

training programs 10. 36. 50. 79.84. 125. 127-128. 131. 134. 147, 151-152. 154. 168. 179. 219.

221. 239.,243.,251

units actisated- 50

62d Ivetical Wing. 2631

1st Air'1 ransport Group- 50. 55. 108. 131

Is SijLaison Girotip. 10. 36

43d I ransport Group 243

1st Air I ransport Sqtuadron, 50

1st Fighter Squadron, 50, 54-55. 127. 129. 132

Ist Helicopter Squadron 50. 55

1st l iaison Squadron 50. 127

1st Radar Sqtiadron 74

2d Air I ransport Squadron 50

2d Fighter Squadron- 127. 131-132

2d I .aion Sqtiad ron 50. 127

3d I taison Squad ron' 121

1 101hi I iaison Sqtiad ron 170

112th I taison Squad ron 177. 215

116th I iaison Sqtiad ron 239

1 22d 1 iaison Squaidron 1 77

312th Special Mission Sqtiad ron 10

5 14th I igliter SqIt.adron 175. 179. 2113.215

516th l-ighter Squadronm 179. 219-220. 224. 218. 259. 263

518th 1-ighter Squadron 212-213

r- 520th H-ghter Squadron 220. 238

716th Comnposie Reconnaissanice Squad ron 147. 212. 218-2 19. 241-241

Repuic of Victinam ,irmed forces

casualties 145. 156-158, 177. 179. 184. 19 1 190-197, 199. 213-214. 224, 25t0. 253. 259. 261. 26(6

cisil aiffaiur%. neglect of 54

(Osil Ouard 17. 39. 54. 65-66, 67. 71-71. 194-185. 191

386
Civilian Irregular D~efense Groups- 69. 82. 1 55, 172. 267

Combat lDes lopments antd 'l est Center: 73

comnids, discontetit iii: 201

counterinsurgency operaions 319. 54. 103

deserion,, front: 36. 201

discontent oser lDjem policies 58

intelligeitce collection & disemittation 54

joinit operations center 211

NI ontagnards 73. 116-117. 1 73. 179

materiel losses: 192

nitordle statuts 232

offetisise actions. numbei of: 166

organi/ation and strength: 36. 40. 05. 152-153

pararnilitai% units: 67.68. 152. 157. 225

Popular Forces- 177. 215. 22S

psychiological warfare campaigns: 37. 54

Regional Forces, 67. 228

security systems 56. 124

Sell-eemtse Corps 37. 39. 66. 67. 7 1-72, 191

stupply operations and syltem% 50. 52. 124

womlen in, 66

Republic of Vietnam Arm% (wes alvo Republic of V'ietntam armned lorces)

airbarie operations See Airborite operation%

airborne units 261

,niirtld defense by. 82

armor operations 261

airtillery fire support 37, 157, 199. 214

combat effectiveness: 67. 163

command structtire. defect, in 75

commuinication% systems ain(l equipment 121

defoliamtion protect- :17

guierrillas. traininig to fight. 54

operations. ntimber of 179. 196

orga1117411i01 and strength 49. 54. 67.68

ranger tuns 53. 55. 73. 145-146. 156-158. 173. 177. 197. 221. 260

search-and-clear mtssioits 214. 219

search-.i ld-destroy mtissionis 104. 128

security. disersion to 67

Special l-ores units- 145-146. 175. 187. 191. 239

training programs, 36. 39. 53. 67. 73

1st IDission 175

2d IDisiion 175. 183

5th IDi ison 140). 156. 177. 197. 214-215

7th IDisiton 157-158. 177-178. 196. 214-215

9th Division 1 76

21%1. IDmsion 177-178, 183-184. 196. 214-215

23d I~ion 148, 177. 182

25th D~iviston 170

14th Regiment 239

40th Regiment 266

keptiblic of Vietnm Marit Corps 173-174. 183. 2002o1

Republic of Vietnam Nav\

aalis by 141. 228-229

orgamitat ion and1( equtipmntt 68

387
patrols b\ 228

Richaidson. J ohin 11 W6, 18

Rigi.Natthc\\ If K9 24

Road construction and repair b\ Viet Cong 257

Roadblock construction Im V'iet Cong 183

Robelt\. C A 8'

Rocket .i%%auft nhIisons 128. 130. 158. 237

Rokesand misions del'ined- 46

ROI LI1NG, I II1'I)LR Operation 266

Roomn~eli. I-ranklin 1) 1

Ross. D~onald 11 174

Rosto%, Walt \V 85-86, 89. 201

Route 7 257

Route 8 256-257

Route 12 257

Romte 15 113

Route 19 30. 266-267

Romte 23- 257, 259

Roote 121 257

Ro\\an. Carl 1 251

Ro\\c. I conard A 242

Roifland. Robert It 98. 153-154

Ro~aI Australian Air Fore 149, 236. .2J7. 246

Royal Ne\% /eaIa nd Air -o: ce 246

Ruddell. George 1 213

Rung Sat 17

Rusk. Decan 66

and air operations. re~tricti-mns on 172

and air strikes againit North 254

andi aircraft deliwries to RV\ Air I-orce 75

a nid aircraft stre ngth c~pa nsion 134

ont America ns combat role 102. 170

d ld i~~lalie itdr iaI hrat188-190

and Cam ibodia border \.iolations 136. 141. 20)3

onl comtmianider f or t. S f orces 94

and~ dcl olia' ion project 112-Il13. 1 16.l17

on it oritat on ont combat. rclca~ing 162

on intenild Ig operation% 192. 203-204

anid let% lot R V N Air I-ore 147. 168

Khn lh i gin iclt Suppoi ted b% 2'5

anid I ao. inurstirton% into 58. 65. 256

an lvi AC V orga lilation 97

on ititar\ a%%istaolce inereawc 192

andl optiont% fotr action against North 214

andl political distrurbances 187-188

ott RVN nicutraluatinn 71

aid troop unlits commlitmnt 83. 89

Rii,\Ia 'See Sc, Ct UInioni

R\ ulii lslanids. in coninaid %trtuctotre 44

Sagn 10. 31. I/S. 202

a% Capital MIilitar% IDistrict 151

III eoinltiniile1aloi%. SWCn1 1(07

388
conlcieelce at 119 212 See aw I lonolulu conil erence operations in anlid arounid- 49. 56. 103-104, 145. 177, 196, 248. 255. 261. 266

political d~sturbne% in 185-187. 192. 266-267 • it',Special tactcal lonle 68

nioop mtm arrials in 17

Vwt NIilh control of 3-4

Saigon Rixcr 204

Saiuan, USS 24

Salaii. Raoul 10

Saudborn. Richard I 217

Sanders. William II 24-25

Schell, I) F 180

Scobel, 11%%e- I horsten. 199

Sea boi n. Jdnic% I 206

Sillift of troops 154

Search-and-clear msionm: 214, 219

Scarch-and-destio% iuissonm 104. 128

Search-and-resee immions 50. 170. 183

Secri, 1 Icures 17

Self-I)efcnse Corps. RVN, 37, 39. 66. 67. 71-72. I'll

Sercel. John 172

Se\,li Mountains 172. 178

Seenih Fleet 22, 259, 266

Shank. Edwin G . ,h 213. 218

Sharp. 1Ilsses S (irant 209

and air bai%,e <lefeli 233

a ndl ir operations coordination a nd control 232

and air strikes againist North 2?9. 232. 235. 253

and ,iircraft aismgnnieit and replacement 212

appointed CINCPAC 210

and cowri operitlllOn ig,1im North 233

and Laos. incurtitons into 233. 256. 259

and Io%%-,ltilude reconnaissance 2 11

a id NIACV\ stalf structure' 210

.ind nas.il patrols: 233

and troop units commitment 233

a nd troop units strength. e\palnding 228

Si igiiimel%\, John F- .Jr 170

Shim Air Force 13;,,c 74

Sholner. -lo'.d I) 108

Side-firing ,stern 240

Sides. J II 87

Sinanouk. Norodom 140-141, 199

Slamch. Ihan I 164

Smart. Jacob F 209

and advisors in combat role 219

and aircraft asignment aid replacement 213

and 11-57 for Colilingenc. u e 218

Chiang, conferemice with 188

and corps. assignlment of aircraft to 211

and Diem crisis 189

and IIaiiI tinned tisile 208

it IIoiollu conlerenec 192

and \lACV slal structure 207-208. 210

389
oil tacticail air supp)Iort Missions 213

Smith. f-rederic if ,.jr 46

Siutth. Sor 414.3

Smlith. Walter BI 31

Smoke bomnbs ane iuar),crs 128. 174. 224. 247

Soc I ranig Airtield 133. 171. , 17. IS83-184. 2131. 215. 2610

Soti Korca See Re public of Korea

Sot,, \'ett ,ni &(y Republlic of Vietnam

Southeast Asia Airlift S~.sc atl 111-112. 156. 16)7. 236. 246

Southeast Asia Coinni'iitd 4

Southeast Asia leelnsc I real% ( 1954-55) 35

Southeaist Asia 1 mteay Orga ut/ation 35,. 58. 203

Southiern Air %lateriel Area P~acific 42. 51)

Sos et Untiotn

artmistice proposals 30

and Getiesa Accords 31. 20)5

,.tfltr~cetitotI. thireat of 2031

anid La,,os. cease-fire in 64

tutlitar) .issistanice b 17-18. !03. 128. N9)

t,,,clear c\plosionl, b 65

1 avior muission. reactioti to, 85

and Viet Cong cxpanlsion. 163

West Blerlitn. threats, to 0

Spare pautts 50

Spears. Keli C . .lr 197

Special Aerial Sr, a I-ligh1t 112

Special Air Wvarlare Cetnter 240 tAmte

Special Assistant to tile Direcetor for Cotiiueristirgelle) and Sp/ciaAeiite IC

Special l-orces

Amerieall 531. 73. 82. 155-156. 172-173. 179, 2-24. 240-247

Republic of VietnamI 145-146. 175. W8, 191. 239

S tale\. EeIe.- -

State. D~epa rtmntt of.S.5,w Achiesoni, Deati: Rutsk, De~an

Stead Air force Blase 79

Steel plant%, strikes against 171

Sternberg. lici: 20)7

Stil%\ell. Richard G 208

Strategic Air Commniid' 195. 227. 2301. 204

St r~k C'otutu1arl ti10 ). ?29

Stuidents. demotistrationis b.) 233

sturnp. I-elix BI

atd air untits, conitrol Of 44

and. Americana cottimuttacat 29

atid commnand strticttire 41-44

atiddefense oflRVss 43

ata id litary assa nce progratv 414-'2

and tu Iobie forces. redia ne oni 46

Sulllisan. \Villtalto 11 99. 204

Supply opelatioh aiid systemls

Air I orce orgati/atioti for 42. 45. 47-48. 10)8

Air force withd rm al front 11

ai r utii s. cotatuittuletit of 17

aircraft. usec In See Airlifts, of troops a d supplies

Americati 15. 24

390
cciuralation of: 42

1'rench: 10

In I laos 195

losses in See Materiel losse

North Vietnamese' 195, 198

rcser\e stocks. lack of: 124

Republic of Vietnam: 50. 52. 124

surface \essels in. 24. 124

suspension of: 31

Viet Cong: 72. 117. 227, 266

Viet Minh 18

Support Group, 6499th: 138

Sweeney, Walter C.. Jr.: 133

Swet Sue. 171

Taclukawa Air Base: 81, 246

'lactical Air Command: 46. 79. 217. 229, 240-241. 247-248

1 actical Air Reconnaissance Center: 241

lacticalairsupport- 18-19, 26. 82. 120. 141-142. 145. 146-158. 172. 174-178. 182. 184, 196.211-212.

214-216. 221. 224-225, 236. 239-240. 261, 264. 267

I actical Air Support Squadron. 19th: 168. 171. 181-182, 212. 217. 224. 19-240

lactical Control Groups

5th. 106

507th: 74

Tactical Fighter Squadron,,

36th. 229

44th. 257

67th 257

80th: 256

428th: 257

522d: 229

613th. 267

614th. 229

615th' 229

ii&.tisdl Fighter Wing., 405th 129-1R1 229. 267

F'actical Groups

33d: 171. 241

34th, 171. 212-213. 220-221. 2318-239. 241

Tactical Reconnaissance Squadron, 15th: 74

"lactical Support Groups

6009th: 81

6010th. 81. 101

I actical Wing. 41 st 212

"laiwan: 15.42

lakhli Air Base. 'I hailand, 229. 253.268.280

Tarn Ky' 259

Tan Hliep Airfield: 158

Ian Son Nhut Airfield- 10. 50. 51. 52. 69. 74-75. 81. 83. 87. 95. 101, I16. 108. 110. 113. 121. 123.

129. 130.131. 135-136 142. 147-148. 151. 154 158. 160. 167-171. 177. 183.

197. 222,229-230. 233. 236. 237. 242. 245-246. 251. 254. 261. 263.267-268,

275-278

lank losses. RVN Army 224

larget acquiition and designation: 55. 136. 138 139. 140. 143. 146, 1 6. 196. 245

'Ia Ninh: 156. 197

391
lay' Ninh lPro'.icc 317. 157. 174. 177. 214

*laylor. NMaxmelI. D- 87

and ads isors. numhei of 190

and advisors in combat role, 219

and air strikes against North 205-206. 233. 253-255. 261. 266

and aireraft strength expansion: 218. 263

appointed ambassador 210. 227

auithority in militar% aiffairs. 227

anid COS ert actions againist North: 233. 255

and crop-d estructto n project: 248

and 1)iemn-Nhti replacement: 190

and government, stability for: 228. 255-256, 259

and helicopters as guinships 219

hostilities end, prediction oF 190

and infiltration rotutes interdiction: 255

on intensifying operations atgainst North. 192, 199. 20 t, 228

and jets for RVN Air Force 264-265

Kltanh gosernment. assessment of 227. 232

and Laos. incursions into: 233. 255-256

and vMACV staff structure. 208. 210

and mixed crcvs in combat 238

and rimal patrols resumption 233

missions to RVN 77. 84-89. 190. 202

and options for action against North. 233

on political conditions in R VN: 179)

and reonnaisanc missions oser North. 233

Special Group (Counterinsurgency) headed b%. 105

Icliepone. 74. 205. 257

1echinicianis

commitment to Vietnam- 15. 17

French lack of. 34

training programs. 10

I emporary Equipment Recoscry Mission 53

lerrain. effect on operations 26. 157. 169. 177. 221. 261

I crry. Ronald W 241

I liailand

air stie' ioiii 17

aircraift strength in: 268

lDiemn crisis, reaction to 188

mobile strike force test: 46

and Sotitheast Asia Defense 'I rcat\- 35

supply organi/ation for: 42

threats to. IS

I harsuh P~hu District- 214

I at :188-189

'I Itorpson. Robert G. K.. 91. 103-104. 165

I broekmnorton. Jlohn I ., 2 10

I htia I hien Pros nice. 117

iie'uidiroga. LISS: 229-230. 232

Timmes, Charles J.: 97. 137

Tonkin: 4-6. 11. 15-17

1 otira sic, See Da, Na sg

I raffle control- 131

392
I rin sport Squadroiis. 1Pro% P4011,11

ws 110. 112

2d III

I raptiell. I hoias. II 10. lb

I rihal Area Ic loPinent NPrrain.l 69

I roop Carrier GrotuP 171. 230. 246. 248

1 roop Catrrier Squadrons

309th 171

310th 171. 247

31 Ith. 171

346th. IN8

773(1- 58

776thv 108

7771h. Ill. 167

1Iroop C'arrier Wings62d 22

314th 230

461d- 2.30

464th 112

48ld- 16

516th. 230)

I ruehart. Willilm C 186

I rumial. I larr S 

0

I rung I ap 221

1 nian Giao- 25

! uis. airlift from. 22

I11 Hi Iow 151 V I ssitnug.Nathan I 

.

. 38

and1( Air l-orce exposion 41

I reutcli air operationis. es aluialuon h> 34

anid inilitar assistalnec program 231

and organi/ational patern. tV N Air inoree 37-39

I vrell. Robert I F 186

Ohen, '1 Itilanid 107. 169

I dorn Air Base. I Iailand 268. 280-281

United Kinmdomn

an iidntersenioi in Ind ochina 23. 26

and Law,. cease-fire in 64

and Southcast Asia Defense I reatN 35

and Soviet strength 

A

Uniited Natiolis

and Cambodia border ilolatioals 205

aiid Dicin crisis,. 189

Un ited Natios. Comma nd. io comn %tsructuim 41. 44

Unliited P~ress International' 123

United States

aidl 6etieva A~cord%- 31

na~tiontals. cS acimatioi of I1. 188. 2(W. 266

aid N Al 0) formnationi 

S

Pacific cotnmand strmtuire, 41

public dissent agaist war, 190)

anid Southeast Asia IDefense I reatN 35

Southeast Asia security polic% on. 35

393
United States Air Pore

adls Iors See Ads isors

and air units ComumitmeLnt: 70. 74

airborne operation% See Airborne optrations

aircraft iol Arm% neceds. 110

aircraft deli~ertcs to RVN Air lore. 131, 133. 148, 167-108, 171-172, 208. 212-213. 219.

:129-230. 2318. 250. ?68

airlifts, by See Airlift% of troop% and sulpplies

Arm%. ra'alry \\ith 148

combat role sIitation. UX-l0l. 138-1 J9

couintcrinstirgene\ units: 79-84

1 irst units committed'I

expaimon program 42

MIACV staff. representation on: 97. 20)7-208. 210-211

maorale status 82. 122. 181. 214

personnel strength. See Adv\isors,

policy direction, role in: 207

relations with MIN: 42

sorties, number flown- 108. 135, 144. 148. 167. 174, 181. 184, 191. 238. 251. 264

1 aylor report, reaction to- 90

tenant statuis at airfields: 123

Onl troop tunit% conmmittment. 68

turnaround tune rates 181

unlit reorga ni/ation. 171

\%eapons deselopiinent by: 2401-241

on Wheeler aswsssent' 162-163

United States Air Foree Council: 37-38

United States Air Force Pacifie: 43-44

United States Air l-orce Reserve 65. 236

United States Army

and air base defense 264

Air Force. risalrv with: 148

and air operations coordination aad cotitrol 1431

aircraft assignments 215

aircraft losses. 246. 260. 265-266

aircraift strength: 148

comnmtittic11itions s~steias 221

defoliation and erop-lest ruction projects' 248

hielicopters. conept on use- 146-147

itelicopters. control of: 144

heucopters inI giuship role 157-158. 177. 197. 199. 215. 225

and loudspeakertmissions 251

photographic reconnaisance by 148

reconnaissance missions. 182

sorties. ntuimber Dloss i 215

Special Fores uinits: 53. 73. 82. 155-156. 172-173. 179. 224. 246-247

inI tactical air strikes 121

tactical air stupport. concept of. 160. 167

troop strength III Vicuttain1: 151I

and troop tinit% coimmtitmet 70

52d Aviation Battalion- 265

1st Aviation Coitpatt 111. 167

l8th Fimxed Wing Aviation Company 1101

394
61st Aviation Company. 167

73d Aviation Company. 181

93d Helicopter Company 157

23d Special Air Warfare Detachment- 148

Uited State% Army'. Pacific: 4.-44, 95. 98

United States Army Security Agcncy- 138

United States Army Support Command. Saigon: 251

United Siates Army Support Command. Vietnam 225

United States Army Support Group. Vietnam 98

United States Forces. Japan: 44

United Suates Forces. Korea: 44

United States Forces. Vietnamn 94

United States Marine Corps

and air base defense: 264

and air operations coordination and control: 225

helicopter delisrics to RVN Air Force. 144

helicopter operations by 175

fIMM-162 Helicopter Squadron: 175

troop strength in Vietnam'- 151

troop tinits commitment. 266

United States Military Assistance Advisory Group, Indochina (see also Harkins. Paul 1).: McGarr,

L.ionel C.). 38

activation anzd mission- 7

Air Force representation on. 42. 95, 208

air patrols proposed by: 73

and aircraft for RVN Air Force, 55

mind airlifts, control of: 108

arrials 6-7

in onimiaid structure 41-42

ana counter-nsurgency operations: 54

defoliation protect 112-117

ftinctions shifted to MACV- 97-98

inactivated: 208

MACV. relationship with 207

military assistance programis, role in: 47

orgarniation and strength. 16. 36. 40. 53, 68. 71, 93. 06

and photographic jets for RVN Air Force. 147

training programs: 36-37. 39, 54

United States Military Assisitnce Command. Laos. 04

United States Militar\ Assistance Command. Vietnamn (MACV). Seahv Hlarkins. Paul D).;

West mo rela rd. William C.

actisated: 98

Ai-orce repreetto 9.27-208. 210-211

(eptt commander authori/ed: 207

Geneva Accords violation affirmed. IN~)

MAAG. relationship with 207

orga nimation anrd staff structure, 97-102, 208. 210

personiiel strength- 97. 107. 1

I. nited States Navy

and air base defeiise 204

air operations by*'v 22. 173. 230. 257-259

aircraft deliserics to RVN Air F-orce. 75. 131

aircraft losses 230

c Amnphbiotis Grotip One 31

395
escort nusi5oi 25

patrol opieraio- 227.229. 234-2315. 26

personneil strength in Vietnam 151

pilot training pi ogrami 219

V'A-1S2 Squadron' 219-220

fnited~ States NavN, pacific. 43. 48

U,1nited States 'I aiwan1 l)cfeuse command, 44. 97

Vanill. Johnl (1 157-158

Viennia Confecrence (1961): 64. 7 1

Viet Cong

air defense operatiOns% 283-285

airfields. attacks on. 253

ambuI~tsh operation% 53. 112-11.1. 145, 1-14. 179. 1,9(-197, 224, 259260)

issassination, by. 52. 67. 72

bunker systenms: 173

cainoulage use 127-129

casualties: 121-122. 128. 137, 139. 145, 156-158, 172-174, 177-178, 183-184. 191-192. 196. 199.

204. 213-214. 254. 259-20. 264. 266-26)7

coser and concealmuent. use of 135. 266

dcriolitioni h 181. 204.,260.265

descrtions from. 173

getirrilla opcrations%. 53. S(O* 103. 116. 120. 145, 181. 191. 196-,197. 199. 259

Infiltration Into South,. 3

influence and control exti-ded 201-202

intensificationi of attacls 72, 129. 13. 179. W8-184. 191. 224. 2).' 259-200

kidnappings by 52

materiel losses 178. 219

Nhu contix\%,wit 189

mining op, ratiorv5 183

miorale status 173

mortar avqaiults. 179, 183, 293. 265

motor consos, attaeks on. 197

night operation-,. 253. 261)

orgaiitation anid strenigth. estimates ot 51. 04. 07. 72. S5. 1319. 161

paramilitary units 139

piisoners of war lost, 109, 121. 128. 150. 158. 178

propaganda campaigns. 113-114. 117. 137-1389

road construction and rcpaii 257

roadblocks, use bN 183

ruses b . 56. 137

suppl\ operations and systems 72. 117. 2. 6

tactic-, 163. 184

%%ar aimns. identification Al 85

9th IDimtion: 26

48thi Regiment: 26A)

Viei Mulh 3-4

aggression b . threat of 35

,ut defense opcrations and sssiems 17-19. 25-26. 212

artillery fire stipport IS

camoiflage tise 19

castialties 22

guerrilla opt.raiioiis 3-5. 10. 18

night operatioins 22

396
supply operations aid s~stcns 18

sNlthdrawal to North 30

Vietnam. Staite of

air force actisatlon anid strength. 10, 36

aircraft (leliseries to- 10, 10

Amecricain recognition of: 5

aried~ forces effecties% 36

ainiil forces expansion. 10

armistice bupervision- 30-31

denmarcation hrie agreed on. 30

elections scheduled: 30

relugees, csacuation by aiircraft 31, 32

\%itlidrawals by U. S. Air I-oree 31

Vietnamn Coordinating Committee. I Q9. 204

\'rnlr 173, 205. 22F-230

Vinh Binh- 121

Vrnh Binth Pros nice: 239. 266

\'inh. Komin 209

Voice oif America 187

V'on MIike. Richard W .196

Vung Rn 11m: 266

Vung lau Aifield: 50, 5^, I 10. 113. 261

War Zone C- 136. 177. 244

War Zoiie D, 112-113. 128. 139-141, 145, 156, 173. 177. 197. 244. 248-250. 254-255. 264

War Zone X. 1'40

Warning s stcrus 129

Weapon% losses See Maicriel losses

Wathrer. effcti on operations 25-26. 139. 144. 146. 150. 109, 175, 229. 266

Wccd( Richard Gi. 97. 112. 153. 208

Wellk. Joseph BI., 7

Westrmoreland. WVilliami C. 22

ot, adisors in combat role, 219

arid advisor% grades. 216

and air escort missions 225

anid air-ground liaison 216

anid ain opu tons coordination and control 225

and air strikes against North 230. 261, 266

and aircraft strength expannsnon 211-212. 22(0. 236. 238. 240

and aircraft strciigth reducroni 239

a ppoinied NIA C'corumanrder 210

appointed MACV deptt commander, 207.208

Arm\ air doctririe. adherenee to 236. 245. 264

eo1mnrds Army componients 210

anrd licopters on alr 225

and bheopters ats ginoships 236. 263

an iidnfrared recornraissane 244

oni intensifyrig a1t101i%;tgaitist North 2(05. 263

and jets in combhat role 265-267

anid joinit air operations center 221

Joint Gleneral Staff. ads isor to 217

arid ruarkings for U S aircraft 2o7

arid inised crc\%s in comnbat 22(0, 267

and( Moore a% coiirihiied air coinrder 232

397
and pilot training program 220

and Special Forces units 225

and supply operations- 236

and tactical air support: 236. 2(4

on tatrget acquisition. 26.3

and troop units strength, ex.panding: 228

Viet Cong succes, concern oser- 224

Weyland. OttoTl.: 17. 19

WVhecler. Earle G.: 164

and air operations coordination and control: 208

and aircraft strengthi expanion- 218

on intensifying operations against North: 203

and MACV staff structure. 210

and options for actions against North: 234

and tactical air eont rol: 217

Vietnam situation, assessment of 161-163

White. 'I homas D.: 19, 4.5. 47-48

White phosphortis bombs- 212

Wilfong. John J.. 182

Williams. Samnuel T.: 39.40.,49

Wilson. Char, E.: 16-1..l 14

Wilson. 11. R . 130

W~omen in RVN forces: 66

X311.1 Ctit ^24

Yokota Air DJ - eI 213. 221)

York. Robeit Pi 196

Zuckert, Eugene M. 80. W'

ti S GOVERNMENT PRI~NTNG OFFICE 19810O--308-936

398
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