COURT OF APPEALS

SECOND DISTRICT OF TEXAS

FORT WORTH

NO. 02-11-00426-CR

JASON KENT DAVIS APPELLANT

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS STATE

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FROM CRIMINAL DISTRICT COURT NO. 1 OF TARRANT COUNTY

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MEMORANDUM OPINION1

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Appellant Jason Kent Davis appeals the trial court’s judgment adjudicating 

him guilty of indecency with a child, revoking his community supervision, and 

assessing a sentence of twelve years’ confinement. We affirm.

I. BACKGROUND

On December 30, 2009, Appellant pleaded guilty to indecency with a child 

under a plea-bargain agreement. The trial court deferred adjudication of guilt for

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See Tex. R. App. P. 47.4.
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the offense and placed Appellant on community supervision for seven years. 

The relevant terms of Appellant’s community supervision required him to (1) 

abstain from the consumption of alcohol, (2) complete a sex-offender treatment 

program, (3) have no unsupervised contact with any individual under the age of 

seventeen, and (4) abstain from viewing any sexually explicit material. On July 

19, 2010, the trial court entered a supplement to Appellant’s community 

supervision and ordered him confined in the Tarrant County Jail for thirty days.

On July 6, 2011, the State filed a motion to revoke Appellant’s community 

supervision and adjudicate his guilt. In the motion, the State raised six grounds 

for the revocation: (1) consuming alcohol, (2) failing to complete one-third of his 

treatment program within one year, (3) failing to attend sex-offender counseling 

on multiple occasions, (4) being unsuccessfully discharged from sex-offender 

counseling, (5) having unsupervised contact with minor children, and (6) viewing 

pornographic material.2

 Appellant pleaded not true to the allegations.

The trial court conducted a hearing on the State’s motion to adjudicate. 

Appellant’s community supervision officer, Judith Choate, testified that Appellant

admitted to her that he drank alcohol on July 19 and September 4, 2010. 

Appellant also told his therapist, Sean Braun, that he drank alcohol on July 19, 

2010.

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The State waived a seventh ground—failing to pay his supervision fees.
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Further, Appellant missed eight group-therapy sessions even though 

Choate had explained to Appellant that he could not miss such sessions unless 

he was “sick in the hospital, . . . in jail, or . . . dead.” Appellant had explanations 

for many of the absences: he was at the dentist, he had to bury his horse using 

a tractor, and Braun told him not to go after he failed a polygraph exam. 

Appellant also failed to complete one-third of the requirements of his treatment 

program within a year. Specifically, he only completed six of the ten goals he 

was required to complete by December 2010.

Appellant admitted to Choate that he had unsupervised contact with his 

fifteen-year-old son, but immediately left once he realized there was no 

supervision. He also admitted to Braun and Choate that he had unsupervised 

contact with his thirteen-year-old daughter. These contacts were the cause of 

the trial court’s July 19, 2010 supplemental-confinement order.

Finally, Appellant admitted to Choate that he viewed four pornographic 

videos, but claimed he did so inadvertently. He told Choate that he saw them 

only briefly because they were unlabeled and he was trying to determine what 

the videos were during a move.

After the trial court concluded that Appellant had violated the terms and 

conditions of his community supervision, adjudicated him guilty, and sentenced 

him, Appellant filed a motion for new trial, arguing that the evidence was 

insufficient “to support convictions.” The motion was overruled by operation of 

law. See Tex. R. App. P. 21.8(c). Appellant now contends on appeal that the 
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trial court abused its discretion by finding him guilty, revoking his community 

supervision, and denying his motion for new trial because the evidence was 

insufficient to show he violated the terms and conditions of community 

supervision.

II. STANDARDS OF REVIEW

A trial court’s determination on a motion to adjudicate is reviewable in the 

same manner as the determination on a motion to revoke community 

supervision. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 42.12, § 5(b) (West Supp. 

2012). We review an order revoking community supervision and adjudicating 

guilt under an abuse of discretion standard. See Rickels v. State, 202 S.W.3d 

759, 763–64 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006). To justify revocation, the State must prove 

by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant violated the terms and 

conditions of community supervision. See Hacker v. State, 389 S.W.3d 860, 

864–65 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013). The trial court is the sole judge of the credibility 

of the witnesses and the weight to be given their testimony; thus, we review the 

evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court’s ruling. See id. at 865.

If the State fails to produce a preponderance of the evidence to support 

adjudication and revocation, the trial court abuses its discretion. See Cardona v. 

State, 665 S.W.2d 492, 493–94 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984). However, proof by a 

preponderance of any one alleged violation is sufficient to affirm an order 

revoking community supervision and adjudicating guilt. See Bryant v. State, 391 
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S.W.3d 86, 93 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012); Clay v. State, 361 S.W.3d 762, 765 (Tex. 

App.—Fort Worth 2012, no pet.).

Similarly, we review a trial court’s denial of a motion for new trial under an 

abuse of discretion standard and view the evidence in the light most favorable to 

the trial court’s ruling. See Gonzales v. State, 304 S.W.3d 838, 842 (Tex. Crim. 

App. 2010); Quinn v. State, 958 S.W.2d 395, 402 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997). A trial 

court abuses its discretion in denying a motion for new trial only when no 

reasonable view of the record could support the trial court’s ruling. See Holden 

v. State, 201 S.W.3d 761, 763 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006).

III. DISCUSSION

Appellant does not contest the veracity of the allegations that he missed 

group-therapy sessions, failed to complete one-third of his treatment program, 

and watched the videos; but he asserts that his excuses for the violations should 

render the denial of a new trial and the revocation and adjudication an abuse of 

discretion. Appellant’s stated reasons for these violations were subject to the 

trial court’s ability to make credibility determinations, which it obviously made 

against Appellant’s position. We may not tread on the trial court’s discretion in 

the manner Appellant invites. The evidence of these violations is sufficient to 

support the trial court’s order. Thus, we conclude that the preponderance of the 

evidence shows that Appellant violated at least one condition or term of his 

community supervision and that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by

revoking Appellant’s community supervision and adjudicating his guilt or by 
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denying his motion for new trial. See, e.g., Marcum v. State, 983 S.W.2d 762, 

767 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1998, pet. ref’d) (holding probation officer’s 

testimony that appellant did not meet reporting requirement sufficient to revoke);

Lozano v. State, No. 03-07-00597-CR, 2008 WL 3540080, at *2 (Tex. App.—

Austin Aug. 14, 2008, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) 

(recognizing trial court may disbelieve or not accept appellant’s excuses for 

failing to comply with community-supervision conditions).

IV. CONCLUSION

Having overruled Appellant’s sole issue, we affirm the trial court’s 

judgment. See Tex. R. App. P. 43.2(a).

LEE GABRIEL

JUSTICE

PANEL: LIVINGSTON, C.J.; DAUPHINOT and GABRIEL, JJ.

DO NOT PUBLISH

Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b)

DELIVERED: May 16, 2013