United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

Chicago, Illinois  60604

Argued October 16, 2008

Decided November 12, 2008

Before

KENNETH F. RIPPLE, Circuit Judge

    TERENCE T. EVANS, Circuit Judge

    JOHN DANIEL TINDER, Circuit Judge

No. 08‐1086

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff‐Appellee,

v.

EDWARD SEARCY,

Defendant‐Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District

Court for the Northern District of Illinois,

Eastern Division.

No. 06‐CR‐727‐1

Samuel Der‐Yeghiayan, Judge.

O R D E R

Edward Searcy pleaded guilty to two counts of bank robbery and the district

court sentenced him to concurrent, 169‐month terms of imprisonment.  On appeal

Searcy argues that his sentence is unreasonable.

In August 2006 Searcy robbed a branch of the Charter One Bank in Chicago.  He

gave the teller a note with the words “stick up” and said, “Don’t make me show you my

gun.”  The robbery netted $2,385.  Two weeks later, demonstrating a complete lack of

imagination, Searcy robbed the same bank, using the same general note and words.

This time the take was only $792.  In October 2006, while being held in jail because of an

NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION

To be cited only in accordance with

Fed. R. App. P. 32.1
No. 08‐1086 Page 2

unrelated domestic incident, Searcy approached a guard and confessed to the bank

robberies.  Searcy was indicted a month later on two counts of bank robbery, and he

subsequently pleaded guilty to both without a written plea agreement.  The probation

officer who prepared the presentence investigation report recommended that Searcy be

sentenced as a career offender because he already had two prior convictions for armed

robbery, see U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1, which yielded a guidelines imprisonment range of 151 to

188 months.  Searcy did not object to the guideline calculations in the PSR.

At sentencing, Searcy’s lawyer made several arguments concerning the factors

listed in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).  First, he argued that, “[a]s bank robberies go,” Searcy’s two

robberies were “not the worst” because he was unarmed.  Second, counsel asserted that

Searcy’s designation as a career offender was “a bit of an overrepresentation” because

the prior convictions were for nonviolent property offenses characteristic of a drug

addict.  This, of course, is an odd argument because the two prior convictions were for

armed robbery, not necessarily a crime that’s only committed by drug addicts.  Also,

counsel said it was an “accident of geography” that led to Searcy’s career‐offender

status because the prior armed robberies‐‐the “two big ones” in terms of violence‐‐

occurred three days apart with no intervening arrest and were charged separately only

because they occurred on different sides of a county line.  Counsel argued for a sentence

within the imprisonment range (i.e., 92 to 115 months) that would have applied if not

for Searcy’s career‐offender status.  Third, counsel contended that Searcy’s acceptance

of responsibility, which was shown by his unprompted confession to authorities,

lessened the need for punishment, rehabilitation, and deterrence.  Finally, counsel

argued that Searcy deserved a lower sentence because during his pretrial detention he

worked as a cook and made an effort to rehabilitate himself.  For these reasons, counsel

urged the district court to select a prison sentence “as lenient as possible.”

Before imposing an overall prison sentence within the guidelines range, the

district court discussed the § 3553(a) factors, summarizing Searcy’s arguments for

leniency.  Specifically, the court stated that although Searcy did not actually wield a gun

during the robberies, they were serious offenses that caused emotional distress and

involved risk to those present.  The court evaluated Searcy’s criminal history and

concluded that some of his prior crimes were violent and only a few of them‐‐contrary

to what Searcy said‐‐stemmed from drug addiction.  The court stated:  “The public

needs to be protected from individuals who are risking the public’s life.  The

defendant’s prior convictions show that the defendant does not respect the law and that

the safety of others are placed at risk by defendant’s actions.  The defendant has been
No. 08‐1086 Page 3

convicted before for burglary and armed robbery, both of which could have resulted in

harm to others.”

The court considered Searcy’s acceptance of responsibility and rehabilitation

efforts but concluded that the sentence it imposed was “necessary to instill a respect for

the law and to the defendant and others that contemplate such conduct.”  The court also

considered the need to avoid sentence disparities among similarly situated defendants.

Lastly, before imposing the sentence of 169 months’ imprisonment, the court observed

that Searcy did not require special‐ized medical treatment and that he would receive

treatment in prison for his drug addiction.

Searcy does not challenge the district court’s guidelines calculations, and because

the record shows that the calculations are correct, Searcy’s prison sentence is

presumptively reasonable.  See Rita v. United States, 127 S. Ct. 2456, 2462 (2007); United

States v. Mykytiuk, 415 F.3d 606, 608 (7th Cir. 2005).  On appeal, Searcy makes two

arguments against the reasonableness of his sentence.  First, he argues that the district

court imposed its sentence in a procedurally incorrect manner, and then he argues that

the resulting sentence is unreasonable given his arguments for leniency.  Really though,

these two contentions are just different ways of expressing a single argument:  that his

sentence is unreasonable in light of the factors listed in § 3553(a).

Whether a district court followed the proper procedure for imposing sentence

after United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005), is a question of law we review de novo.

United States v. Mendoza, 510 F.3d 749, 754 (7th Cir. 2007).  The sentencing court is not

required to discuss each of the statutory sentencing factors; it is enough if the record

confirms meaningful consideration of the types of factors set forth in § 3553(a). United

States v. Laufle, 433 F.3d 981, 987 (7th Cir. 2006).  Moreover, the court is not required to

go through every factor raised by the defendant and articulate the weight given in

determining a sentence.  United States v. Rodriguez‐Alvarez, 425 F.3d 1041, 1047 (7th Cir.

2005).  All that is necessary is that the sentencing court respond to nonfrivolous

arguments for leniency.  See United States v. Acosta, 474 F.3d 999, 1003 (7th Cir. 2007);

United States v. Cunningham, 429 F.3d 673, 678 (7th Cir. 2005).  Sentencing courts are free

to reject without discussion stock arguments for leniency, such as family ties, over‐

representation of the seriousness of prior convictions, acceptance of responsibility, and

rehabilitative efforts.  See United States v. Tahzib, 513 F.3d 692, 695 (7th Cir. 2008);

Cunningham, 429 F.3d at 678.
No. 08‐1086 Page 4

According to Searcy, the district court listened to his arguments for leniency but

then imposed a sentence in the middle of the guideline range without specifically

addressing those arguments or explaining why that point was appropriate.  Searcy

contends that the court did not demonstrate that it actually evaluated his arguments

because all the judge did was acknowledge each of his contentions, seriatim, and

announce that the particular argument had been “considered.”  Searcy insists that, if the

court really had considered his arguments for a lower sentence, he would not have been

sentenced to 169 months.

The record of Searcy’s sentencing shows that the district court evaluated Searcy’s

arguments for a below‐range term of imprisonment and gave meaningful consideration

to the § 3553(a) factors.  The court did not have to state explicitly that Searcy’s

circumstances did not warrant a lower sentence because the judge’s statements made

clear that he considered all of Searcy’s arguments.  See United States v. Bustamante, 493

F.3d 879, 891‐92 (7th Cir. 2007); United States v. Ramirez‐Gutierrez, 503 F.3d 643, 646 (7th

Cir. 2007).  Unlike the sentencing court in Cunningham where the defendant’s principal

argument for leniency was ignored, the court here addressed each of Searcy’s

arguments for a lower sentence.  The court’s choice of sentence is not unreasonable

simply because it rejected Searcy’s pleas for leniency.  See United States v. Trice, 484 F.3d

470, 475 (7th Cir. 2007); United States v. Gipson, 425 F.3d 335, 337 (7th Cir. 2005).  The

reasons given by the court for imposing a term of 169 months’ imprison‐ment are

legally sufficient.  See Rita, 127 S. Ct. at 2469; Bustamante, 493 F.3d at 892.  Thus,

the length of the term is reasonable. See United States v. Johnson, 534 F.3d 690, 696 (7th

Cir. 2008); Mykytiuk, 415 F.3d at 608.  And to that we add a final thought:  a prison

sentence of 169 months for a defendant convicted of two bank robberies with two prior

armed robberies on his record could hardly be viewed, as Searcy suggests, as “unduly

harsh.”

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the district court.