United States Government Accountability Office

GAO Report to Congressional Requesters

BORDER PATROL

Checkpoints 

Contribute to Border 

Patrol’s Mission, but 

More Consistent Data 

Collection and 

Performance 

Measurement Could 

Improve Effectiveness

August 2009 

GAO-09-824 
What GAO Found

United States Government Accountability Office

Why GAO Did This Study

Highlights

Accountability Integrity Reliability

August 2009

BORDER PATROL

Checkpoints Contribute to Border Patrol's Mission, 

but More Consistent Data Collection and Performance 

Highlights of GAO-09-824, a report to Measurement Could Improve Effectiveness

congressional requesters 

The U.S. Border Patrol, part of the 

Department of Homeland 

Security’s Customs and Border 

Protection (CBP), operates 

checkpoints on U.S. roads, mainly 

in the southwest border states 

where most illegal entries occur. As 

part of a three-tiered strategy to 

maximize detection and 

apprehension of illegal aliens, 

Border Patrol agents at 

checkpoints screen vehicles for 

illegal aliens and contraband. GAO 

was asked to assess (1) checkpoint 

performance and factors affecting 

performance, (2) checkpoint 

performance measures, (3) 

community impacts considered in 

checkpoint placement and design, 

and (4) the impact of checkpoint 

operations on nearby communities. 

GAO work included a review of 

Border Patrol data and guidance; 

visits to checkpoints and 

communities in five Border Patrol 

sectors across four southwest 

border states, selected on the basis 

of size, type, and volume, among 

other factors; and discussions with 

community members and Border 

Patrol officials in headquarters and 

field locations. 

What GAO Recommends

GAO recommends that CBP take 

several actions to strengthen 

checkpoint design and staffing, and 

improve the measurement and 

reporting of checkpoint 

effectiveness, including community 

impact. CBP agreed with our 

recommendations, and identified 

actions planned or underway to 

implement the recommendations. 

Checkpoints have contributed to the Border Patrol’s ability to seize illegal 

drugs, apprehend illegal aliens, and screen potential terrorists; however, 

several factors have impeded higher levels of performance. Checkpoint 

contributions included over one-third of the Border Patrol’s total drug 

seizures, according to Border Patrol data. Despite these and other 

contributions, Border Patrol officials said that additional staff, canine teams, 

and inspection technology were needed to increase checkpoint effectiveness. 

Border Patrol officials said they plan to increase these resources. 

The Border Patrol established three performance measures to report the 

results of checkpoint operations, and while they provide some insight into 

checkpoint activity, they do not indicate if checkpoints are operating 

efficiently and effectively. In addition, GAO found that a lack of management 

oversight and unclear checkpoint data collection guidance resulted in the 

overstatement of checkpoint performance results in fiscal year 2007 and 2008 

agency performance reports, as well as inconsistent data collection practices 

at checkpoints. These factors hindered management’s ability to monitor the 

need for program improvement. Internal control standards require that 

agencies accurately record and report data necessary to demonstrate agency 

performance, and that they provide proper oversight of these activities. 

The Border Patrol generally followed its guidelines for considering 

community safety and convenience in four recent checkpoint placement and 

design decisions, including the proposed permanent checkpoint on Interstate 

19 in Arizona. Current and projected traffic volume was a key factor in the 

design of the proposed Interstate 19 checkpoint, but was not considered when 

determining the number of inspection lanes for three recently completed 

checkpoints in Texas due to a lack of guidance. Having explicit guidance on 

using current and projected traffic volumes could help ensure that future 

checkpoints are appropriately sized. 

Individuals GAO contacted who live near checkpoints generally supported 

their operations but expressed concerns regarding property damage that 

occurs when illegal aliens and smugglers circumvent checkpoints to avoid 

apprehension. The Border Patrol is not yet using performance measures it has 

developed to examine the extent that checkpoint operations affect quality of 

life in surrounding communities. The Border Patrol uses patrols and 

technology to detect and respond to circumventions, but officials said that 

other priorities sometimes precluded positioning more than a minimum 

number of agents on checkpoint circumvention routes. The Border Patrol has 

not documented the number of agents needed to address circumventions at 

the proposed I-19 checkpoint. Given the concerns of nearby residents 

regarding circumventions, conducting a workforce planning needs assessment 

at the checkpoint design stage could help ensure that resources needed for 

addressing such activity are planned for and deployed. View GAO-09-824 or key components. 

For more information, contact Richard Stana 

at (202) 512-8777 or stanar@gao.gov. 
 Border Patrol

Contents 

Letter 1

Background 5

Checkpoint Contributions Support the Border Patrol’s Mission, But 

Several Factors Affect Higher Levels of Performance 14 

Checkpoint Performance Measures Have Been Established, but 

Data Limitations Hinder their Usefulness 28 

Border Patrol Considered Community Impact in Checkpoint 

Placement and Design 40 

Community Members Cited Some Adverse Impacts of Checkpoint 

Operations, and Border Patrol Reported Having Limited 

Resources to Minimize Them 58 

Conclusions 76 

Recommendations for Executive Action 77 

Agency Comments 78 

Appendix I Objectives, Scope, and Methodology 81 

Appendix II Proposed Border Patrol Checkpoint Performance 

Measures 98 

Appendix III Photographs of Potential Checkpoint Locations on 

I-19, in Arizona 102 

Appendix IV Additional Property Value Data for the State of 

Arizona, Santa Cruz County, Pima County, and Tubac 108 

Appendix V Additional Economic Data for the State of Arizona, 

Santa Cruz County, Pima County, and Tubac 112 

Appendix VI Additional Tourism Data for the State of Arizona, 

Santa Cruz County, and Pima County 121 

Page i GAO-09-824 
 Border Patrol

Appendix VII Additional Crime Data for the State of Arizona, 

Santa Cruz County, Pima County, and Tubac 123 

Appendix VIII Comments from the Department of Homeland 

Security 134 

Appendix IX GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments 138 

 

Tables 

Table 1: Results of Border Patrol Checkpoint Performance 

Measures as Reported in Annual Performance and 

Accountability Reports and GAO Analysis 32 

Table 2: Selected Border Patrol Checkpoint Locations Compared 

with Surrounding Population Densities and Distances to 

Nearest Hospitals and Schools 41 

Table 3: I-19 Proposed Checkpoint Locations Compared with 

Surrounding Population Densities and Distances to 

Nearest Hospitals and Schools 44 

Table 4: Border Patrol Reasons for Not Selecting Certain Locations 

for the I-19 Permanent Checkpoint 46 

Table 5: Checkpoint Inspection Lanes Compared to Traffic Volume 

for the Three Checkpoints Constructed Since 2006 49 

Table 6: Facilities and Resources Recommended in Border Patrol 

Checkpoint Design Guidance Compared to Recently 

Constructed Permanent Checkpoints 50 

Table 7: Border Patrol Response to Community Recommendations 

Expressed on the Draft Design of the I-19 Checkpoint 54 

Table 8: Comparison of Proposed I-19 Permanent Checkpoint with 

I-35 Checkpoint 54 

Table 9: Number of Apprehensions and Seizures at the I-19 

Checkpoint and Area Surrounding I-19 Checkpoint 60 

Table 10: Checkpoints Visited by GAO, by Border Patrol Sector 82 

Table 11: Total Net Assessed Values and Percentage Change from 

Previous Year (in parenthesis) for Select Areas in Arizona, 

2000 through 2008 110 

Page ii GAO-09-824 
 Border Patrol

Table 12: Total Number of Establishments in Tubac, by NAICS 

Industry, 2000 through 2006 114 

Table 13: Number of Other Offenses or Incidents Reported to Santa 

Cruz County Sheriff’s Department, District 2, Quarterly 

from January 1, 2004, through December 31, 2008 132 

Figures 

Figure 1: Total Apprehensions of Illegal Aliens Across the 

Southwest Border for Fiscal Years 2006 through 2008 6 

Figure 2: Permanent Checkpoint on I-35, North of Laredo, Texas 8 

Figure 3: Border Patrol Sectors and Permanent Checkpoints along 

the Southwest Border 9 

Figure 4: Tactical Checkpoint at Arivaca Road, South of Tucson, 

Arizona 10 

Figure 5: Checkpoint on I-19, South of Tucson, Arizona 13 

Figure 6: Drug Seizures at Checkpoints in the Southwest Border 

Sectors for Fiscal Years 2007 and 2008 15 

Figure 7: Apprehensions of Illegal Aliens at Checkpoints in the 

Southwest Border Sectors for Fiscal Years 2007 and 2008 17 

Figure 8: I-5 and I-15 checkpoints Near San Diego, California 22 

Figure 9: Canine Working Checkpoint Inspections 24 

Figure 10: Van with Backscatter X-ray Scanning a Truck (left 

photograph) and VACIS Unit (right photograph) Used at 

Checkpoints to Detect Concealed Persons or Contraband 26 

Figure 11: Map of I-19 Corridor with Proposed Checkpoint 

Locations and Distances From Schools 45 

Figure 12: I-35 Checkpoint, North of Laredo, Texas 52 

Figure 13: Border Patrol Site Plan of the Proposed I-19 Permanent 

Checkpoint 58 

Figure 14: Quarterly Number of Pima County Sheriff’s Department 

Referrals to the Border Patrol and Santa Cruz County 

Assists to Other Agencies, January 1, 2004 through 

December 31, 2008 67 

Figure 15: Map of all Arizona Counties, Santa Cruz and Pima 

Counties, and the I-19 Corridor 70 

Figure 16: Median Real Estate Property Value for Residential 

Properties in the Arizona Communities of Tubac and 

Green Valley and Counties of Santa Cruz and Pima, 2002 

through 2008 71 

Figure 17: Percentage Annual Change in Number of Visitors to 

Arizona State Parks, 2002 through 2008 73 

Page iii GAO-09-824 
 Border Patrol

Figure 18: Number of Violent Crime Offenses and Annual 

Percentage Change for Selected Arizona Locations, 2004 

through 2008 75 

Figure 19: Number of Property Crime Offenses and Percentage 

Annual Change for Selected Arizona Locations, 2004 

through 2008 76 

Figure 20: KP 41, Looking North, Aerial View, Location Marked 102 

Figure 21: KP 25, Looking South, Aerial View, Location Marked 103 

Figure 22: KP 42, Looking North, Aerial View, Location Marked 104 

Figure 23: KP 42, Looking South, Aerial View, Location Marked 105 

Figure 24: KP 50, Looking South, Aerial View, Location Marked 106 

Figure 25: KP 50, Looking North, Aerial View, Location Marked 107 

Figure 26: Median Residential Sales Prices and Number of Sales in 

Tubac, July 2006 through March 2009 109 

Figure 27: Percentage Change from Previous Year, Net Assessed 

Values for Select Areas in Arizona, 2001 through 2008 111 

Figure 28: Trends for Top Six Industries in Tubac, by Number of 

Establishments, 2000 through 2006 113 

Figure 29: Number of Establishments in Tubac and Percentage 

Change from Previous Year, Total Number of 

Establishments for Arizona, Pima County and Santa Cruz 

County, 2001 through 2006 115 

Figure 30: Number of Real Estate, Rental, and Leasing 

Establishments in Tubac and Santa Cruz County and 

Percentage Change from Previous Year for Arizona and 

Pima County, 2001 through 2006 116 

Figure 31: Number of Arts, Entertainment, and Recreation 

Establishments in Tubac and Santa Cruz County and 

Percentage Change from Previous Year for Arizona and 

Pima County, 2001 through 2006 117 

Figure 32: Number of Accommodation and Food Service 

Establishments in Tubac and Santa Cruz County and 

Percentage Change from Previous Year for Arizona and 

Pima County, 2001 through 2006 118 

Figure 33: Percentage Change from Previous Year, Number of 

Employees for Tubac, Santa Cruz County, Pima County, 

and Arizona, 2001 through 2006 119 

Figure 34: Percentage Change from Previous Year, Total Annual 

Payroll, 2002 through 2006 120 

Figure 35: Percentage Change from Previous Year, Lodging 

Occupancy Rates, 2001 through 2008 121 

Page iv GAO-09-824 
 Border Patrol

Figure 36: Percentage Change from Previous Year, Revenue Per 

Available Room, 2001 through 2008 122 

Figure 37: Percentage Change from Previous Year for Violent 

Crimes and Property Crimes in Arizona, 2005 through 

2007 124 

Figure 38: Santa Cruz County Total Offenses, 2004 through 2008 125 

Figure 39: Santa Cruz County Number of Violent Crime Offenses by 

District, 2004 through 2008 126 

Figure 40: Santa Cruz County Number of Property Crime Offenses 

by District, 2004 through 2008 127 

Figure 41: Cross-District Comparison of Violent Crime Offenses, 

Quarterly from January 1, 2005, through December 31, 

2008 128 

Figure 42: Cross-District Comparison of Property Crime Offenses, 

Quarterly from January 1, 2005 through December 31, 

2008 129 

Figure 43: Cross-District Comparison of Criminal Damage 

Offenses, Quarterly from January 1, 2005, through 

December 31, 2008 130 

Figure 44: Number of Narcotics and Drug Related Offenses in 

Santa Cruz County Sheriff’s Department, District 2, 

Quarterly from January 1, 2004, through December 31, 

2008 131 

Page v GAO-09-824 
 Border Patrol

Abbreviations 

ADOT Arizona Department of Transportation 

CAR Checkpoint Activity Report 

CBP U.S. Customs and Border Protection 

CCD Department of Education Common Core Data 

COMPEX Compliance Examination 

DEA Drug Enforcement Administration 

DHS Department of Homeland Security 

DOJ Department of Justice 

EIS Environmental Impact Statement 

FBI Federal Bureau of Investigation 

GPRA Government Performance and Results Act 

ICE U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement 

KP kilometer post 

MLS Multiple Listing Service 

NAICS North American Industry Classification System 

NEPA National Environmental Policy Act 

PAR Performance and Accountability Report 

SBI Secure Border Initiative 

UCR Uniform Crime Reporting 

VACIS Vehicle and Cargo Inspection System 

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Page vi GAO-09-824 
United States Government Accountability Office

Washington, DC 20548 

 

August 31, 2009 

Congressional Requesters 

Several hundred thousand individuals enter the country illegally and 

undetected each year, and the impact of this illegal activity affects 

communities within the southwest border states. Some of these illegal 

aliens,1

 on more than one occasion, have evaded detection at the border 

ports of entry2

 by hiding themselves, drugs, or other contraband in 

vehicles. Others trekked through the Arizona desert, waded across the Rio 

Grande, or otherwise eluded capture by roving law enforcement patrols 

somewhere along the nearly 2,000-mile expanse of the southwest border. 

U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), a component within the 

Department of Homeland Security (DHS), is responsible for managing, 

controlling, and securing our nation’s borders, at and between the ports of 

entry. Between the ports of entry, the U.S. Border Patrol, a component of 

CBP, is responsible for detecting and preventing the illegal entry of 

persons and contraband, including terrorists and weapons of mass 

destruction. To achieve these goals on the southwest border, the Border 

Patrol has implemented a multilayered enforcement strategy. This strategy 

includes the use of traffic checkpoints generally located from 25 to 100 

miles of the border, where Border Patrol agents screen vehicles for any 

illegal aliens or contraband that were able to cross the border undetected.3

Some of these checkpoints have a permanent structure with off-highway 

inspection lanes and technology to facilitate inspection and convenience, 

while other checkpoints have temporary infrastructure in the form of 

trailers and generators that are generally used on secondary roads with 

low traffic volume. 

 Border Patrol

 

1

 In addition to persons who enter the United States illegally, the term “illegal alien” may 

also encompass persons who entered legally but are subject to removal under 8 U.S.C. § 

1229a. For example, an alien who entered the country legally may nevertheless be removed 

once his or her lawful immigration status expires, or if the alien commits certain crimes or 

engages in activities that endanger public safety or national security. See 8 U.S.C. § 1227 for 

the various classes of deportable aliens and 8 U.S.C. § 1182 for the various classes of 

inadmissible aliens. 

2

 At a port of entry location, CBP officers are to secure the flow of people and cargo into 

and out of the country, while facilitating legitimate travel and trade. 

3

 The Border Patrol also operates checkpoints on the northern border, but these 

checkpoints were outside the scope of this review. 

Page 1 GAO-09-824 
 

 Border Patrol

Communities within the border enforcement area may be positively or 

negatively impacted by the placement, design, and operation of 

checkpoints and other Border Patrol resources, depending on sufficient, 

efficient, and strategic use of these resources to address the volume and 

type of illegal activity. In regard to checkpoint placement, for example, the 

Border Patrol needs to balance identifying locations that provide the best 

tactical advantage to detect and apprehend illegal activity against the 

impact that such a location would have on public safety issues that may 

result from traffic delays and inadvertent channeling of illegal activity into 

surrounding communities. In regard to checkpoint operation, the Border 

Patrol must balance resources needed to detect and apprehend illegal 

activity at the checkpoints against the need to deter and prevent illegal 

travel through local neighborhoods by placing resources along community 

perimeters. Historically, the Border Patrol has been unable to address the 

volume of cross-border illegal activity, putting greater reliance on the 

efficient and strategic use of resources, including checkpoints. 

To help federal agencies operate more efficiently and effectively, the 

Government Performance and Results Act of 1993 (GPRA) requires the 

establishment of performance goals that define the level of performance to 

be achieved, and measures by which to track progress toward these goals 

and identify areas that need improvement.4

 We previously reported in 2005 

that checkpoints serve an important role in U.S. border security strategy 

and that community support for checkpoints was generally positive; 

however, we recommended that the Border Patrol develop measures and 

collect data to report on, and potentially improve, checkpoint productivity 

and effectiveness.5

 Our report also discussed community concerns in the 

state of Arizona in regard to checkpoint placement, design, and operation. 

You asked us to determine the progress the Border Patrol has made in 

implementing these prior recommendations and resolving community 

concerns, including concerns about the planned permanent checkpoint on 

Interstate 19 (I-19) in Arizona. This report addresses the following 

objectives: 

 

4

 Pub. L. No. 103-62, 107 Stat. 285 (1993). Under GPRA, federal agencies are required to 

develop strategic plans, performance plans, and performance reports that set long term and 

annual goals along with the means for accomplishing the goals and report on achieving 

them. 

5

 GAO, Border Patrol: Available Data on Interior Checkpoints Suggest Differences in 

Sector Performance, GAO-05-435 (Washington, D.C.: Jul. 22, 2005). 

Page 2 GAO-09-824 
 

 Border Patrol

• How has checkpoint performance contributed to meeting Border 

Patrol goals for securing the southwest border, and what factors, if 

any, have affected checkpoint performance? 

• To what extent has the Border Patrol established measures of 

performance for checkpoints? 

• To what extent has the Border Patrol considered community impacts 

in the placement and design of checkpoints since 2006, including the 

planned I-19 permanent checkpoint? 

• How do checkpoint operations impact nearby communities, 

particularly those near the I-19 checkpoint, and to what extent does 

the Border Patrol address those impacts? 

To address these objectives, we reviewed Border Patrol checkpoint policy 

documents, reports, manuals, and guidance, and held discussions with 

relevant headquarters and field officials concerning border strategy, 

checkpoint operations, and the design and placement of checkpoints. We 

conducted site visits and observed checkpoint operations at 15 

checkpoints, located in five of the nine Border Patrol sectors: San Diego 

sector, California; Tucson sector, Arizona; El Paso sector, Texas and New 

Mexico; and Laredo and Rio Grande Valley sectors in Texas. The sectors 

we visited were selected to provide diversity in the size and types of 

checkpoint operations; estimated volume of illegal aliens; and topography 

and density of road networks. While our site visit results are not 

representative of observations that may have been made at other times or 

locations, they provided us with an overall understanding of checkpoint 

operations. 

To assess the reliability of checkpoint performance data collected by the 

Border Patrol, we spoke with agency officials at Border Patrol’s 

Washington, D.C. headquarters and at the five sectors we visited in the 

field about data integrity procedures, including methods by which data are 

checked and reviewed internally for accuracy. We also provided a data 

collection instrument to the Border Patrol seeking information on how 

checkpoint agents collect checkpoint performance data. We determined 

that despite limitations in overall data collection and oversight processes, 

the data recorded on certain data fields—specifically apprehensions and 

drug seizures at checkpoints—are sufficiently reliable for the purposes of 

this report, with limitations noted as appropriate. 

Page 3 GAO-09-824 
 

 Border Patrol

To assess the extent to which the Border Patrol considered community 

impacts in the design and placement of checkpoints, our scope included 

checkpoints that were either (a) new permanent checkpoints constructed 

since 2006, or (b) new permanent checkpoints currently under 

construction. We did not include older checkpoints in our analysis 

because the guidelines and standards for checkpoint placement and design 

were different and limited documentation is available for them, according 

to Border Patrol and CBP officials. We did not include checkpoints that 

were or are being renovated or expanded, because they would not be 

subject to the Border Patrol’s checkpoint placement guidelines. We also 

did not include tactical checkpoints in our analysis, because these lack 

permanent infrastructure. We also included in our analysis the planned I19 permanent checkpoint, rather than all planned checkpoints, because of 

the extent of the controversy regarding that particular checkpoint. 

To assess the extent that operations from Border Patrol checkpoints 

impact surrounding areas, we interviewed officials from 14 state and local 

law enforcement agencies, and various business groups, community 

leaders, and other members of communities located near checkpoints we 

visited to obtain their views on the impacts of checkpoint operations. 

Because this selection of places was a nonprobability sample, the results 

from our site visits cannot be generalized to other locations and 

checkpoints; however, what we learned from our site visits provided a 

useful perspective on the issues addressed in this report. We also 

interviewed Border Patrol field officials at the 15 checkpoints we visited 

regarding the impacts of checkpoint operations. In addition, we gathered 

and compared available crime, tourism, economic, and real estate data for 

the state of Arizona and communities near the current checkpoint on I-19 

to examine the extent to which checkpoint operations impact surrounding 

communities. We determined that these data used within the report and 

appendixes were sufficiently reliable for providing historical trends and 

general descriptions. 

We conducted this performance audit from July 2008 to August 2009 in 

accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those 

standards require that we plan and perform our audit to obtain sufficient, 

appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and 

conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe the evidence 

obtained provides this reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions 

based on our audit objectives. Appendix I provides additional details about 

our scope and methodology. 

Page 4 GAO-09-824 
 

CBP’s U.S. Border Patrol is the uniformed enforcement division 

responsible for border security between designated official ports of entry 

into the country. The Border Patrol reports that its priority mission is to 

prevent terrorists and terrorist weapons, including weapons of mass 

destruction, from entering the United States. In addition, the Border Patrol 

has a traditional mission of preventing illegal aliens, smugglers, narcotics, 

and other contraband from crossing the border between the ports of entry. 

To carry out its missions, the Border Patrol had a budget of $3.5 billion in 

fiscal year 2009 to establish and maintain operational control of the U.S. 

border.6

 As of June 2009, the Border Patrol had 19,354 agents nationwide, 

an increase of 57 percent since September 2006. Of these agents, about 88 

percent (17,011) were located in the nine Border Patrol sectors along the 

southwest border.7

 About 4 percent of the Border Patrol’s agents in these 

sectors were assigned to traffic checkpoints, according to the Border 

Patrol. 

Background 

Despite efforts to enhance border security in recent years, DHS reports 

show that significant illegal activity continues to cross the border 

undetected. At the ports of entry, CBP has both increased training for 

agents and enhanced technology. However, the DHS Annual Performance 

Report for fiscal years 2008-2010 sets a goal for detecting and 

apprehending about 30 percent of major illegal activity at ports of entry in 

2009, indicating that 70 percent of criminals and contraband may pass 

through the ports and continue on interstates and major roads to the 

interior of the United States. Between the ports of entry, CBP is 

implementing the Secure Border Initiative (SBI), a multiyear, multibilliondollar program aimed at securing U.S. borders and reducing illegal 

immigration through a comprehensive border protection system.8

 

6

 The Border Patrol defines operational control as the ability to detect, respond, and 

interdict border penetrations in areas deemed as high priority for threat potential or other 

national security objectives. 

7

 Border Patrol sectors, led by a Chief Patrol Agent, are further divided into stations, led by 

a Patrol Agent in Charge, where each station is responsible for operations within a specific 

area of the sector. 

8

 This system has two main components: SBI tactical infrastructure, which consists of 

fencing, roads, and lighting between the ports of entry; and SBInet, which employs radars, 

sensors, and cameras to detect, identify, and classify the threat level associated with an 

illegal entry. As of May 2009, CBP had completed 629 miles of the planned 661 miles of 

vehicle or pedestrian fencing along the southwest border, and was field testing SBInet 

technology. See GAO, Secure Border Initiative Fence Construction Costs, GAO-09-244R 

(Washington, D.C.: Jan. 29, 2009). 

Page 5 GAO-09-824 Border Patrol
 

 Border Patrol

Along the southwest border, overall Border Patrol apprehensions of illegal 

aliens have declined over the past 3 years, from nearly 1.1 million in fiscal 

year 2006, to 705,000 in fiscal year 2008. This decreasing pattern was 

reflected in all sectors except San Diego, which showed a steady increase 

across these years, as shown in figure 1. 

Figure 1: Total Apprehensions of Illegal Aliens Across the Southwest Border for Fiscal Years 2006 through 2008 

0

50,000

100,000

150,000

200,000

250,000

300,000

350,000

400,000

450,000

Rio Grande

Valley

San Diego El Centro Yuma Tucson El Paso Marfa Del Rio Laredo

Number of apprehensions

Border Patrol sector

Source: GAO analysis of Border Patrol data.

Fiscal year 2006

Fiscal year 2007

Fiscal year 2008

The Tucson sector continues to have the largest number of apprehensions 

compared to other sectors along the southwest border, as shown in figure 

1. Border Patrol officials stated that targeted enforcement efforts in other 

Border Patrol sectors in previous years caused a shift in illegal crossborder activity to the Tucson sector. 

Checkpoint Role and 

Characteristics 

Checkpoints are the third layer in the Border Patrol’s three-tiered border 

enforcement strategy. The other two layers are located at or near the 

border, and consist of line watch and roving patrol. According to the 

Border Patrol, the majority of Border Patrol agents are assigned to line 

watch operations at the border, where they maintain a high profile and are 

Page 6 GAO-09-824 
 

 Border Patrol

responsible for deterring, turning back, or arresting anyone they encounter 

attempting to illegally cross the border into the United States. Roving 

patrol operations consist of smaller contingents of agents deployed behind 

the line watch to detect and arrest those making it past the first layer of 

defense in areas away from the immediate border. Traffic checkpoints are 

located on major U.S. highways and secondary roads, usually 25 to 100 

miles inland from the border. This permits them to be far enough inland to 

detect and apprehend illegal aliens, smugglers, and potential terrorists 

attempting to travel farther into the interior of the United States after 

evading detection at the border, but are close enough to the border to 

potentially control access to major population centers. 

The Border Patrol operates two types of checkpoints—permanent and 

tactical—that differ in terms of size, infrastructure, and location. While 

both types of checkpoints are generally operated at fixed locations, 

permanent checkpoints—as their name suggests—are characterized by 

their bricks and mortar structure, that may include off-highway covered 

lanes for vehicle inspection, and several buildings including those for 

administration, detention of persons suspected of smuggling or other 

illegal activity, and kennels for canines used in the inspection process (see 

fig. 2). 

Page 7 GAO-09-824 
 

 Border Patrol

Figure 2: Permanent Checkpoint on I-35, North of Laredo, Texas 

Source: Border Patrol.

Canine

facility

Covered

primary 

inspection

lanes

Main checkpoint 

building and 

detention facility

Permanent checkpoints are equipped with technology and computers 

connected to national law enforcement databases to enhance the ability of 

agents to identify suspects, research criminal histories, and cross-check 

terrorist watch lists. Permanent checkpoints generally have electricity, 

communication towers, and permanent lighting to enhance operations at 

night and in poor weather conditions. These facilities also offer greater 

physical safety to agents and the public—particularly when they are 

located off-highway—by virtue of protective concrete barriers separating 

agents from vehicle traffic, and better signage and lighting. Permanent 

checkpoints also have assets to help lessen the chance that illegal aliens 

and smugglers will be able to successfully bypass the checkpoint to avoid 

detection. These assets include remote video surveillance, electronic 

sensors, and agent patrols in the vicinity of the checkpoints, which may 

also include horse patrols and all-terrain vehicles. There are 32 permanent 

checkpoints along the southwest border, in eight of the nine Border Patrol 

sectors, as shown in figure 3. Of the nine sectors, only the Tucson sector 

does not have permanent checkpoints, instead operating tactical 

checkpoints. 

Page 8 GAO-09-824 
 

 Border Patrol

Figure 3: Border Patrol Sectors and Permanent Checkpoints along the Southwest Border 

Sources:: GAO (analysis), Mapinfo (map), Border Patrol (data).

$

$

$

Nevada

San Diego Tucson

Oklahoma

Del Rio

El Paso

Corpus 

Christi

Brownsville

TUCSON

EL CENTRO

SAN DIEGO

EL PASO

California Arizona New Mexico

Texas

RIO GRANDE 

VALLEY

LAREDO

DEL RIO

MARFA

Permanent checkpoint

City or town

Border Patrol sector

State line

Rio Grande City

Laredo

Del Rio

Fort Hancock

Eagle Pass

Marfa Alpine

Van Horn

Kingsville

Las Cruces

Nogales

Yuma

Oceanside

YUMA

Tactical checkpoints are also operated at a fixed location but do not have 

permanent buildings or facilities, as shown in figure 4.9

 One of the intents 

of tactical checkpoints is to support permanent checkpoints by monitoring 

and inspecting traffic on secondary roads that the Border Patrol 

determined are likely to be used by illegal aliens or smugglers to evade 

apprehension at permanent checkpoints. Tactical checkpoint 

 

9

 According to the Border Patrol, in the case of both permanent and tactical checkpoints, 

the Border Patrol must obtain operating permits from the relevant state Department of 

Transportation. Because it can be time consuming to obtain the necessary permits from a 

state Department of Transportation, tactical checkpoints, like their permanent 

counterparts, operate from fixed locations. 

Page 9 GAO-09-824 
 

 Border Patrol

infrastructure may consist of a few Border Patrol vehicles, used by agents 

to drive to the location; orange cones to slow down and direct traffic; 

portable water supply; a cage for canines (if deployed at the checkpoint); 

portable rest facilities; and warning signs. In general, tactical checkpoints 

are intended to be set up for short-term or intermittent use, and open and 

close based on intelligence on changing patterns of smuggling and routes 

used by illegal aliens. As a result, the number of tactical checkpoints in 

operation can change on a daily basis. Thirty-nine tactical checkpoints 

were operational at some point in fiscal year 2008 on the southwest 

border. 

Figure 4: Tactical Checkpoint at Arivaca Road, South of Tucson, Arizona 

Source: GAO.

Authority at Border Patrol 

Checkpoints 

Border Patrol agents at checkpoints have legal authority that agents do not 

have when patrolling areas away from the border. The United States 

Supreme Court ruled that Border Patrol agents may stop a vehicle at fixed 

checkpoints for brief questioning of its occupants even if there is no 

reason to believe that the particular vehicle contains illegal aliens.10 The 

Court further held that Border Patrol agents “have wide discretion” to 

 

10 U.S. v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 545 (1976). 

Page 10 GAO-09-824 
 

 Border Patrol

refer motorists selectively to a secondary inspection area for additional 

brief questioning.11 In contrast, the Supreme Court held that Border Patrol 

agents on roving patrol may stop a vehicle only if they have reasonable 

suspicion that the vehicle contains aliens who may be illegally in the 

United States—a higher threshold for stopping and questioning motorists 

than at checkpoints.12 The constitutional threshold for searching a vehicle 

is the same, however, and must be supported by either consent or 

probable cause, whether in the context of a roving patrol or a checkpoint 

search.13

Checkpoints in the Tucson 

Sector 

The Tucson sector is the only sector along the southwest border without 

permanent checkpoints. Although other sectors along the southwest 

border deploy a combination of permanent and tactical checkpoints, the 

Tucson sector has only tactical checkpoints that operate from fixed 

locations. Legislation effectively prohibited the construction of permanent 

checkpoints in the Tucson sector, beginning in fiscal year 1999. 

Specifically, the Omnibus Consolidated and Emergency Supplemental 

Appropriations Act, 1999, stated that “no funds shall be available for the 

site acquisition, design, or construction of any Border Patrol checkpoint in 

the Tucson sector.”14 The effect of this legislative language was that no 

permanent checkpoints could be planned or constructed in this sector, 

which had no permanent checkpoints when the prohibition took effect. 

Subsequent appropriations acts carried this construction prohibition 

 

11 Id., at 563-564. 

12 U.S. v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 881-882 (1975). 

13 U.S. v. Ortiz, 422 U.S. 891, 896-97 (1975). 

14 Pub. L. No. 105-277, 112 Stat. 2681, 2681-59 (1998). 

Page 11 GAO-09-824 
 

 Border Patrol

forward through fiscal year 2006.15 Furthermore, during fiscal years 2003 

through 2006, the Border Patrol was subject to an additional 

appropriations restriction that required it to relocate checkpoints in the 

Tucson sector on a regular basis.16 Beginning in fiscal year 2007, the 

appropriations restrictions that applied to checkpoints in the Tucson 

sector did not appear in DHS’s annual appropriations acts.17 In response, 

the Border Patrol fixed the position of the I-19 checkpoint at kilometer 

post (KP) 42, near Amado, Arizona.18 Although the I-19 checkpoint has 

been operating since November 2006 at this fixed location, the checkpoint 

lacks permanent infrastructure and the associated benefits. For example, 

the Border Patrol does not have the facilities to detain apprehended illegal 

aliens at or near the checkpoint or the access to national databases to 

determine whether apprehended individuals are wanted criminals or 

potential terrorists. The facility also lacks protective concrete barriers 

separating agents from vehicle traffic and a canopy to protect agents and 

 

15 Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-113, 113 Stat. 1501, 1501A-12 

(1999); District of Columbia Appropriations Act, 2001, Pub. L. No. 106-553, 114 Stat. 2762, 

2762A-60 (2000); Departments of Commerce, Justice, and State, the Judiciary, and Related 

Agencies Appropriations Act, 2002, Pub. L. No.. 107-77, 115 Stat. 748, 756-57 (2001); 

Consolidated Appropriations Resolution, 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-7, 117 Stat. 11, 58 (2003); 

Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act, 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-90, 117 Stat. 

1137, 1138-39 (2003); Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act, 2005, Pub. L. 

No. 108-334, 118 Stat. 1298, 1300-01 (2004); and Department of Homeland Security 

Appropriations Act, 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-90, 119 Stat. 2064, 2066-67 (2005). DHS’s fiscal 

year 2005 appropriations act required CBP to submit an expenditure plan to the House and 

Senate appropriations committees that included location, design, costs, and benefits of 

each proposed Tucson sector permanent checkpoint, but the act maintained the 

prohibition against obligating funds for construction of a permanent checkpoint in the 

Tucson sector. 

16 For fiscal years 2003, 2004, and 2006, the Border Patrol was required to relocate 

checkpoints in the Tucson sector at least once every seven days. Consolidated 

Appropriations Resolution, 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-7, 117 Stat. 11, 58 (2003); Department of 

Homeland Security Appropriations Act, 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-90, 117 Stat. 1137, 1138-39 

(2003); and Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act, 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-90, 

119 Stat. 2064, 2066-67 (2005). During fiscal year 2005, the Border Patrol was required to 

relocate checkpoints in the Tucson sector at least an average of once every 14 days. 

Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act, 2005, Pub. L. No. 108-334, 118 Stat. 

1298, 1300-01 (2004). 

17 Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act, 2007, Pub. L. No. 109-295, 120 

Stat. 1355, 1358-59 (2006); Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-161, 121 

Stat. 1844, 2044-45 (2007); and Consolidated Security, Disaster Assistance, and Continuing 

Appropriations Act, 2009, 122 Stat. 3574, 3654-55 (2008). 

18 The kilometer post (KP) designations stem from a time when the metric system was 

being proposed as an alternative to the English system of measurement. 

Page 12 GAO-09-824 
 

 Border Patrol

canines from exposure to the elements while conducting inspections, as 

shown in figure 5. 

Figure 5: Checkpoint on I-19, South of Tucson, Arizona 

Source: GAO.

The Border Patrol has developed plans to construct a permanent 

checkpoint on I-19, but the House Committee on Appropriations 

instructed the Border Patrol to first take some interim steps. Specifically, 

in the House report accompanying DHS’s appropriations bill for fiscal year 

2009, the committee instructed the Border Patrol not to finalize planning 

for the design and location of a permanent checkpoint on I-19 until it first 

establishes and evaluates the effectiveness of an upgraded interim 

checkpoint. According to Border Patrol officials, the upgraded interim 

checkpoint will have a canopy, a third inspection lane, and an expanded 

secondary inspection area, among other improvements. In addition, the 

committee also told the Border Patrol to consider the findings from this 

GAO study in its planning efforts.19 The Border Patrol expects the 

upgraded interim checkpoint to be completed by May 2010. Tucson sector 

 

19 H.R. Rep. No. 110-862, at 32 (2008). 

Page 13 GAO-09-824 
 

 Border Patrol

officials estimate that constructing the upgraded interim checkpoint will 

cost approximately $1.5 million and constructing the permanent I-19 

checkpoint will cost approximately $25 million. 

Checkpoint operations have contributed to furthering the Border Patrol’s 

mission to protect the border, and have also contributed to protection 

efforts of other federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies. 

However, Border Patrol officials have stated that additional canines, nonintrusive inspection technology, and staff are needed to increase 

checkpoint effectiveness. Border Patrol officials stated that they are taking 

steps to increase these resources at checkpoints across the southwest 

border. 

Checkpoints contribute to the Border Patrol’s mission to protect the 

nation from the impact of contraband illegally transported across the 

border, as well as the impact of illegal aliens, some of whom may have ties 

to organized crime or countries at higher risk of having groups that 

sponsor terrorism. 

Border Patrol data show that checkpoints assisted federal efforts to 

disrupt the supply of illegal drugs. In fiscal year 2008, over 3,500 of the 

almost 10,100 drug seizures by the Border Patrol along the southwest 

border occurred at checkpoints. With a relatively small allocation of 

agents—about 4 percent, according to Border Patrol officials—

checkpoints accounted for about 35 percent of Border Patrol drug seizures 

along the southwest border. Checkpoint seizures included various types of 

illegal drugs. For example, the Tucson sector checkpoint on I-19 seized 

3,200 pounds of marijuana, with an estimated street value of $2.6 million, 

in a single event in June 2009. Additionally, the Laredo sector checkpoint 

on I-35 seized almost 240 pounds of cocaine with an estimated street value 

of $7.6 million in a single event in March 2009. 

Checkpoint 

Contributions Support 

the Border Patrol’s 

Mission, But Several 

Factors Affect Higher 

Levels of 

Performance 

Contributions to the 

Border Patrol’s Mission 

Include Seizing Illegal 

Drugs, Apprehending 

Illegal Aliens, and 

Screening for Potential 

Terrorists 

Seizing Illegal Drugs 

Overall, the number of drug seizures at southwest border checkpoints 

increased slightly from 3,460 in fiscal year 2007 to 3,540 in fiscal year 2008 

(an increase of about 2 percent), while total Border Patrol seizures 

decreased slightly, from 10,285 to 10,065 (a decrease of about 4 percent). 

In two sectors, however, seizures at checkpoints increased substantially, 

Page 14 GAO-09-824 
 

 Border Patrol

as shown in figure 6. Specifically, drug seizures at San Diego sector 

checkpoints increased by 93 percent from fiscal year 2007 to 2008, while 

drug seizures at Yuma sector checkpoints increased by 73 percent. Yuma 

sector checkpoints also had more than twice the number of seizures 

compared to other individual sectors. 

Figure 6: Drug Seizures at Checkpoints in the Southwest Border Sectors for Fiscal 

Years 2007 and 2008 

0

200

400

600

800

1,000

1,200

1,400

1,600

1,800

Rio Grande

Valley

Del Rio

Laredo

Marfa

El Paso

Tucson

Yuma

El Centro

San Diego

Number of drug seizures

Source: GAO analysis of Border Patrol data.

Border Patrol sector

Fiscal year 2007 checkpoint seizures

Fiscal year 2008 checkpoint seizures

Note: The Rio Grande Valley sector’s definition of an “at checkpoint” seizure is broader than that used 

by other sectors. Other sectors report counting seizures occurring only at the checkpoints, while the 

Rio Grande Valley sector counts all seizures occurring within 2.5 miles of the checkpoint, as of 

August 2008. 

According to San Diego sector officials, the increase in seizures at San 

Diego sector checkpoints can be attributed to a number of factors, 

including 

• a 78 percent increase in the operational hours of sector checkpoints, 

• a 123 percent increase in sector manpower, 

Page 15 GAO-09-824 
 

 Border Patrol

• utilizing an additional inspection lane during peak traffic times at the 

checkpoint on I-8, rather than allowing traffic to pass without 

inspection, and 

• increased infrastructure (fencing, light poles, remote video 

surveillance system) in the western corridor of the sector may have 

pushed traffic east towards the sector checkpoints. 

Yuma sector officials attributed the increase in Yuma sector checkpoint 

seizures to factors including increases in tactical infrastructure and 

technology at the border, which have allowed the sector to move more 

agents and canines to sector checkpoints. 

Checkpoints have also contributed to apprehensions of illegal aliens. 

Nearly 17,000 illegal aliens were apprehended at checkpoints, or 2 percent 

of the more than 705,000 total Border Patrol apprehensions along the 

southwest border in fiscal year 2008. Checkpoint apprehensions ranged 

from single individuals to large parties of illegal aliens led by “coyotes.”20

For example, we observed the apprehension of an illegal alien at a San 

Diego sector checkpoint who was hidden beneath the trunk floor of a 

passenger vehicle during our visit to the San Diego sector in October 2008. 

More recently, the Laredo sector checkpoint on I-35 found 13 illegal aliens 

concealed in a tractor-trailer trying to traverse the checkpoint in a single 

event in April 2009. The illegal aliens and the driver of the tractor-trailer 

were processed for prosecution. 

Apprehending Illegal Aliens 

Overall, apprehensions at checkpoints decreased from fiscal year 2007 to 

2008, and at a greater rate than for other Border Patrol activities. During 

this time frame, the number of apprehensions at all southwest Border 

Patrol checkpoints decreased by 26 percent (from 22,792 to 16,959), while 

 

20 “Coyotes” refers to professional people smugglers. A prominent border security expert 

reported in 2008 that illegal aliens have adapted to tighter border enforcement by relying 

upon the skills and experience of professional people smugglers (generally known as 

coyotes) to guide them across the border and transport them to their final destination. 

Today, four out of five undocumented migrants are relying on coyotes to evade the Border 

Patrol and reduce the risks of crossing through remote desert and mountainous areas that 

pose life-threatening hazards, according to the report. See Wayne Cornelius, Reforming the 

Management of Migration Flows from Latin America to the United States (Center for 

Comparative Immigration Studies, University of California-San Diego, Dec. 2008). Border 

Patrol officials in the Tucson sector reported that the cost to an illegal alien to be smuggled 

across the border—using a coyote—in the sector has increased from $2,250 in fiscal year 

2007 to $2,750 in fiscal year 2008, although the extent to which these increases are due to 

checkpoint operation or other Border Patrol operations, such as line watch or roving 

patrols, is unknown. 

Page 16 GAO-09-824 
 

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apprehensions for other Border Patrol activities along the southwest 

border decreased by 18 percent (from 858,638 to 705,005). In one sector, 

however, checkpoint apprehensions increased from fiscal year 2007 to 

2008, as shown in figure 7. Tucson sector checkpoint apprehensions 

increased by 28 percent from fiscal year 2007 to 2008, although the total 

number of checkpoint apprehensions remained higher in the San Diego, 

Laredo, and Rio Grande Valley sectors. 

Figure 7: Apprehensions of Illegal Aliens at Checkpoints in the Southwest Border 

Sectors for Fiscal Years 2007 and 2008 

0

1,000

2,000

3,000

4,000

5,000

6,000

7,000

Rio Grande

Valley

Del Rio

Laredo

Marfa

El Paso

Tucson

Yuma

El Centro

San Diego

Number of apprehensions

Source: GAO analysis of Border Patrol data.

Border Patrol sector

Fiscal year 2007 checkpoint apprehensions

Fiscal year 2008 checkpoint apprehensions

Note: Rio Grande Valley sector’s definition of an “at checkpoint” apprehension is broader than that 

used by other sectors. Other sectors report counting apprehensions occurring only at the 

checkpoints, while Rio Grande Valley sector counts all apprehensions occurring within 2.5 miles of 

the checkpoint, as of August 2008. 

Border Patrol officials stated that Tucson sector checkpoint 

apprehensions increased because the sector maintained nearly full-time 

operations at all sector checkpoints during fiscal year 2008. Additionally, 

the Border Patrol increased the number of operational checkpoints in the 

sector from 10 in fiscal year 2007 to 13 in fiscal year 2008. 

Page 17 GAO-09-824 
 

 Border Patrol

Border Patrol officials said that apprehensions decreased in other sectors 

in part due to the deterrent effect of increased Border Patrol presence and 

infrastructure, and initiatives to criminally prosecute illegal aliens. For 

example, Laredo sector officials said that checkpoint apprehensions 

decreased by nearly half from fiscal year 2007 to 2008 due to the following 

contributing factors: 

• Increased staff. The number of Border Patrol agents in the Laredo 

sector increased from approximately 1,200 agents in fiscal year 2007 to 

approximately 1,636 agents in fiscal year 2008. In addition, Operation 

Jump Start, which ended in July 2008, provided 286 National Guard 

soldiers to support Border Patrol operations in the sector, with 

approximately 36 deployed to support checkpoint operations. These 

soldiers were placed in areas highly visible to the checkpoints which, 

along with increased Border Patrol agents, created a deterrent to 

illegal activity. 

• Improved infrastructure and technology. Deterrence and detection 

capabilities increased in the Laredo sector in terms of improved traffic 

checkpoint technology, cameras, license plate readers, and vehicle and 

cargo inspection systems (VACIS). In addition, fiscal year 2007 was the 

first full fiscal year in which the new state-of-the-art checkpoint on I-35 

was operational. Border Patrol officials believe that human and 

narcotics smugglers rerouted their cargo to other locations due to the 

deterrent effect of the new checkpoint. 

• Increased prosecutions. At the beginning of fiscal year 2008, Laredo 

sector implemented a prosecution initiative—known as Operation 

Streamline—to prosecute and remove all violators charged with illegal 

entry in targeted areas in the sector. Although sector checkpoints were 

not in these targeted areas, sector officials reported that this zero 

tolerance policy resulted in a higher prosecution rate in fiscal year 

2008, providing a deterrent to illegal aliens across the sector.21

Checkpoints also help screen for individuals who may have ties to 

terrorism. CBP reported that in fiscal year 2008, there were three 

Screening for Potential 

Terrorists 

 

21 Zero tolerance policies have been established to various extents along the southwest 

border. Studies by the Homeland Security Institute have shown that prosecution of 

apprehended aliens who illegally enter the country provides an effective deterrent against 

repeated illegal re-entry. See Homeland Security Institute, Customs and Border Protection 

(CBP) Operational Assessment, RP06-51-02 (Arlington, Va.: Mar. 30, 2007). 

Page 18 GAO-09-824 
 

 Border Patrol

individuals encountered by the Border Patrol at southwest border 

checkpoints who were identified as persons linked to terrorism. In 

addition, the Border Patrol reported that in fiscal year 2008 checkpoints 

encountered 530 aliens from special interest countries,22 which are 

countries the Department of State has determined to represent a potential 

terrorist threat to the United States.23 While people from these countries 

may not have any ties to illegal or terrorist activities, Border Patrol agents 

detain aliens from special interest countries if they are in the United States 

illegally and Border Patrol agents report these encounters to the local 

Sector Intelligence Agent, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) Joint 

Terrorism Task Force, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) 

Office of Investigations, and the CBP National Targeting Center. For 

example, according to a Border Patrol official in the El Paso sector, a 

checkpoint stopped a vehicle and questioned its three Iranian occupants, 

determining that one of those occupants was in the United States illegally. 

The individual was detained and turned over to U.S. Immigration and 

Customs Enforcement for further questioning. 

Contributions to Other 

Federal, State, and Local 

Law Enforcement Missions 

Include Identifying 

Criminals and Leveraging 

Resources 

Federal, state, and local law enforcement officials from the five sectors we 

visited told us that Border Patrol checkpoints enhance their operations 

and mission achievement. For example, federal Drug Enforcement 

Administration (DEA) officials stated that in addition to individual drug 

seizures, checkpoints supported DEA goals to disrupt and dismantle drug 

smuggling operations by gathering intelligence from captured drug 

smugglers turned over to DEA, helping to identify patterns in smugglers’ 

routes of ingress to the United States, and increasing smuggling costs by 

forcing the use of increasingly sophisticated methods of concealment to 

evade detection. 

 

22 According to Border Patrol officials, aliens from special interest countries that have been 

lawfully admitted into the United States—such as foreign students studying at U.S. 

universities or foreign military personnel undergoing training at U.S. military 

installations—and later encountered by agents, are not detained and their information is 

not reported to intelligence authorities except in certain circumstances. These 

circumstances include probable cause that a violation of U.S. law has occurred or the alien 

does not possess the proper immigration documents to be in or remain in the United States 

legally at the time they are encountered. 

23 We could not report the number of encounters with special interest aliens by each sector, 

or by specific checkpoints, because this information is considered Law Enforcement 

Sensitive. 

Page 19 GAO-09-824 
 

 Border Patrol

Checkpoints provided benefits to state and local law enforcement 

officials, including the identification and detention of criminals who were 

attempting to evade arrest by state highway patrol, city police, or county 

sheriffs, and providing other services in rural areas with sparse law 

enforcement presence. For example, Border Patrol agents at the I-5 

checkpoint in San Clemente, California, referred a vehicle with two men to 

secondary inspection because the men were acting suspiciously. Upon 

inspection, agents found a small quantity of marijuana and 

methamphetamine, a large quantity of cash, and a handwritten demand 

note. The men and evidence were turned over to the local sheriff who 

determined that the men had robbed a local pharmacy and were primary 

suspects in another armed robbery. In terms of other services, several 

state and local law enforcement officials we met with said that checkpoint 

personnel could respond more quickly to highway accidents and provide 

access to detention facilities for transfer of illegal aliens captured by local 

authorities. For example, a sheriff responsible for law enforcement near 

the U.S. Route 77 checkpoint in Border Patrol’s Rio Grande Valley sector 

reported that the Border Patrol regularly provides assistance and backup 

to his office, such as responding to highway accidents or other incidents, 

because he often has only one deputy on duty to cover a large geographic 

area. Additionally, this same sheriff reported that if he apprehends an 

illegal alien, he turns the person over to the Border Patrol agents at the 

nearby checkpoint for processing and detention. 

Factors Affecting 

Checkpoint Performance 

Include Operational and 

Resource Limitations 

Border Patrol guidance and officials from five sectors we visited identified 

operational requirements and resources that are important for effective 

and efficient checkpoint performance, including (1) continuous operation, 

(2) full-time canine inspection capability, (3) non-intrusive inspection 

technology, and (4) number and experience of checkpoint staff. While 

most permanent checkpoints were operational nearly 24 hours per day in 

fiscal year 2008, Border Patrol officials have stated that additional canines, 

non-intrusive inspection technology, and staff are needed to increase 

checkpoint effectiveness. 

According to the Border Patrol, operating checkpoints continuously—that 

is, 24 hours a day, 7 days a week—is key to effective and efficient 

checkpoint performance. Keeping checkpoints operational is important 

because smugglers and illegal aliens closely monitor potential transit 

routes and adjust their plans to ensure the greatest chance of success. For 

example, a 1995 study of checkpoint operations in the San Diego sector by 

the former U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service showed that when 

the checkpoint on I-5 was closed, apprehensions at the nearby and 

Continuous Operation 

Page 20 GAO-09-824 
 

 Border Patrol

operational I-15 checkpoint fell sharply—there was a 50 percent decline in 

1 month.24 According to the study, this decline resulted from illegal aliens 

choosing to travel through the closed checkpoint on I-5 instead of the 

operational checkpoint on I-15.25 Recent testimony before Congress by the 

Arizona Attorney General discussed the sophisticated surveillance and 

communication technology currently used by smugglers.26 Such 

technology could allow for immediate notification of security 

vulnerabilities, such as a checkpoint closure. Tucson sector Border Patrol 

officials and the Assistant Special Agent in Charge from DEA’s Tucson 

District Office explained that smugglers of humans and drugs, often 

sponsored by organized crime, store loads of people or drugs in “stash 

houses” after illegally crossing the border until transit routes are clear. As 

soon as a checkpoint is closed, the people or drugs in the stash houses are 

moved through the checkpoint. 

Border Patrol data showed that in fiscal year 2008 most of the 32 

permanent checkpoints were near continuous operation, with 25 having 

operated 22 hours or more, and 3 having operated between 20 and 22 

hours per day, on average. Those operated most frequently include 

permanent checkpoints located off highway with enhanced weather 

infrastructure in place. For example, the U.S. Route 77 checkpoint in 

Border Patrol’s Rio Grande Valley sector was operational almost 24 hours 

per day on average in fiscal year 2008, closing only for a total of 22 hours 

because of inclement weather related to Hurricane Dolly. 

The remaining four permanent checkpoints were operational less than 7 

hours per day on average in fiscal year 2008. These included two 

checkpoints with on-highway inspection lanes that were located in high 

traffic areas and two checkpoints that were no longer used because they 

were relocated to other locations. For example, the I-5 and I-15 

checkpoints in the San Diego sector have on-highway inspection lanes, as 

shown in figure 8, and the high traffic volume passing through these 

 

24 Prior to the establishment of DHS, which took effect in 2003, the Border Patrol was a 

component of the Immigration and Naturalization Service, U.S. Department of Justice. 

25 Office of Policy and Planning, U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service, U.S. 

Department of Justice, Evaluation of Traffic Checkpoints at San Clemente and Temecula, 

June 1995. 

26 Testimony of the Honorable Terry Goddard, Attorney General for the State of Arizona, in 

a joint hearing before the Senate Judiciary Committee, Subcommittee on Crime and Drugs, 

and Senate Caucus on International Narcotics Control, on March 17, 2009. 

Page 21 GAO-09-824 
 

 Border Patrol

checkpoints overwhelms the capability to perform checkpoint inspections 

more than 2 hours per day, on average, without causing significant traffic 

congestion and safety concerns.27

Figure 8: I-5 and I-15 Checkpoints Near San Diego, California 

Source: Border Patrol.

The I-8 checkpoint in Yuma sector was relocated as a new tactical 

checkpoint 60 miles east of the location where the former permanent 

checkpoint was located, due to encroachment of developers and 

increasing freeway traffic. Finally, the Oak Grove checkpoint in the San 

Diego sector was operational for only 26 hours in fiscal year 2008 because 

checkpoint operations were shifted from the Oak Grove checkpoint to 

other checkpoints farther east, as well as roving patrols, to increase 

enforcement in those targeted areas, according to sector officials. 

Border Patrol data also showed that in general tactical checkpoints are 

operated much less frequently than permanent checkpoints, a median of 

less than 2 hours per day for tactical checkpoints compared to a median of 

over 23 hours per day for permanent checkpoints.28 Border Patrol officials 

said that safety conditions and staff shortages were the primary reasons 

for closure. Tactical checkpoints, which generally consist of trailers and 

generators, are more vulnerable to adverse weather conditions than 

permanent structures, and may be lower in priority for staffing during 

 

27 Border Patrol policy requires that checkpoint operations be suspended if traffic 

congestion could affect the safety of agents or the traveling public. Similarly, Border Patrol 

policy requires that checkpoints shut down if there are slick or icy roads, or extreme 

weather conditions. 

28 In contrast, Tucson sector’s tactical checkpoint on I-19 was operational for 22 hours per 

day, on average, in fiscal year 2008. 

Page 22 GAO-09-824 
 

 Border Patrol

times of low traffic volume. In addition, Border Patrol headquarters 

officials said that differences in operational hours for tactical checkpoints 

across sectors can occur because of the operational decisions of each 

sector’s Chief Patrol Agent based on information on smuggling trends and 

available staffing to address those trends. 

Border Patrol checkpoint policy states that full-time canine presence at 

checkpoints is important for the effective and efficient inspection of 

vehicles and cargo for illegal drugs and persons, but the manager of 

Border Patrol’s canine program noted that in general there is not a 

sufficient level of canines at checkpoints.29 According to Border Patrol 

officials, smugglers have become increasingly sophisticated in the design 

of concealed compartments that agents would find difficult or impossible 

to detect without canine assistance. Often, canines alerting to the presence 

of illegal drugs or hidden persons may provide Border Patrol agents the 

only source of probable cause to search a vehicle or its occupants, 

according to Border Patrol officials.30 (See fig. 9) 

Use of Canines 

 

29 According to officials from the Rio Grande Valley sector, checkpoints in the sector have 

full-time canine coverage. 

30 In United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 706-07 (1983), the Supreme Court determined that 

probable cause was not necessary for detection canines to perform an exterior sniff of 

luggage located in a public place, because such an investigative technique was not a search 

within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. 

Page 23 GAO-09-824 
 

 Border Patrol

Figure 9: Canine Working Checkpoint Inspections 

Source: Border Patrol.

Border Patrol officials said there were not enough canines for full-time 

checkpoint coverage, even in sectors with the most heavily used 

smuggling corridors. In the Tucson sector, for example, sector officials 

said that as of July 15, 2009 they have 99 canine teams, but 120 teams 

would ensure availability when officers are not available for duty due to 

leave, training, or supporting other law enforcement agencies.31 Border 

Patrol’s canine program manager said that the Border Patrol expected to 

train 180 canines in fiscal year 2009 and will send a majority of these 

canines to southwest border sectors to address gaps in canine coverage at 

checkpoints.32 In fiscal year 2010, the Border Patrol plans to expand its 

 

31 In addition, use of canines at Tucson sector checkpoints was limited by the lack of 

infrastructure to provide adequate shelter during times of extreme temperature. Tucson 

sector officials said that multiple canine teams are also needed at checkpoints because 

drug smugglers often use decoy vehicles scented with drugs to divert the canine team to 

secondary inspection, so that vehicles following with larger drug loads can pass through 

the checkpoint undetected. 

32 As of July 15, 2009, there are 631 canines stationed in southwest border sectors, 

according to the Border Patrol. 

Page 24 GAO-09-824 
 

 Border Patrol

canine facility to facilitate training and hopes to train an additional 250-300 

canines. However, the program manager noted that additional trained 

canines will not alleviate the Border Patrol’s immediate need for these 

assets as many of the trained canines will replace older canines that will 

be retiring. The program manager stated that while the Border Patrol does 

not have the resources to address the need for canines in the near term, 

the agency plans to train 1,500 canines by fiscal year 2014 which, including 

canine retirement and replacement, will result in 1,300 deployed canines 

across all Border Patrol activities, including checkpoints. 

The Border Patrol has identified the deployment of non-intrusive 

inspection technologies that allow the inspection of hidden or closed 

compartments—in particular, the ability to find contraband and other 

security threats—as one of its high-priority needs to improve checkpoint 

performance. Non-intrusive inspection technologies, such as a VACIS or 

backscatter X-ray machine, as shown in figure 10, use imaging to help 

trained operators see the contents of closed vehicles and containers, 

which helps them to intercept a broad array of drugs, other contraband, 

illegal aliens, or other items of interest without having to search 

physically.33 Border Patrol officials told us that they have seen smugglers 

using increasingly complex concealment methods at checkpoints, 

emphasizing the importance of deploying new detection technologies to 

counter these threats. For example, Tucson sector officials reported that 

within 1 month of deployment of a backscatter machine at a sector 

checkpoint, they identified 30 hidden compartments in vehicles being used 

to smuggle illegal drugs. Border Patrol officials said that backscatter 

machines have been of great value to checkpoint officials for discovering 

hidden compartments. 

Inspection Technology

 

33 A VACIS uses gamma rays to inspect the contents of a vehicle, while a backscatter X-ray 

machine uses lower dose X-rays to screen vehicles. 

Page 25 GAO-09-824 
 

 Border Patrol

Figure 10: Van with Backscatter X-ray Scanning a Truck (left photograph) and 

VACIS Unit (right photograph) Used at Checkpoints to Detect Concealed Persons or 

Contraband 

Source: Border Patrol.

As of May 2009, the Border Patrol reported that it had eight mobile nonintrusive inspection technologies, such as a VACIS or backscatter 

machine, deployed to support Border Patrol operations in the nine 

southwest border sectors. Of these eight non-intrusive inspection 

technologies, four were dedicated to specific checkpoints and four were 

deployed to sectors and were moved among checkpoints or other 

locations as deemed necessary by the sector’s Chief Patrol Agent. The 

Border Patrol reported that the agency is in the process of acquiring 

additional mobile non-intrusive inspection equipment for southwest 

border checkpoints. Once these units are acquired, the Border Patrol 

intends to develop a plan to prioritize the deployment of these units 

among checkpoints. Border Patrol officials are of the opinion that mobile 

backscatter units are cheaper to obtain and maintain than VACIS units, 

require fewer dedicated staff, produce images that are easier for Border 

Patrol agents to interpret, and do not require an environmental assessment 

to be completed prior to deployment. 

Despite tentative plans to deploy additional non-intrusive inspection 

technologies at checkpoints, resource constraints may preclude or delay 

acquisition and deployment. Both VACIS and backscatter units require a 

large concrete apron and trained operators for effective operation, and 

some checkpoints lack adequate space or available staff. For example, at 

one checkpoint which has a VACIS unit, reportedly only 4 of the 12 agents 

originally trained to operate the VACIS remain because of attrition, 

decreasing the amount of time the VACIS can be used to screen vehicles. 

Border Patrol sector officials said that it can be difficult getting agents to 

volunteer for VACIS training, as other Border Patrol duties are preferable. 

Page 26 GAO-09-824 
 

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Furthermore, officials responsible for the current checkpoint on I-19 south 

of Tucson, Arizona, reported that more space is needed to improve the 

effectiveness of the backscatter unit, as the unit requires an off-road area 

sufficient to permit its safe operation without interfering with traffic flow. 

Checkpoint performance can also be hindered by limited staffing at 

checkpoints. Border Patrol policy recommends the minimum number of 

agents for checkpoint operation, but sector managers may have other 

priorities for staff placement. Despite the rapid increase in overall staffing 

numbers on the southwest border, the number of agents remains 

insufficient to fully staff all areas of need, according to Border Patrol 

officials. As a result, sector chiefs have developed strategies that prioritize 

areas within the sector for achieving operational control. Priority areas 

differ among sectors, but generally include the immediate border area and 

urban centers, rather than checkpoints. For example, in the Tucson sector, 

the Border Patrol deploys about 8 percent of sector operational agents to 

sector checkpoints on an average day, according to sector officials. 

Tucson officials we met with stated that they would like to deploy 

additional staff to the checkpoint, but no additional agents were available, 

as the majority of agents are staffed to border areas, which are sector 

priority areas. According to Border Patrol officials, checkpoint staffing 

numbers should increase as the Border Patrol continues to hire new 

agents. 

Number and Experience of 

Checkpoint Staff 

Checkpoint performance can also be hindered when assigned staff are 

new and do not have experience gained by continuous on-the-job training 

or do not have the desire to work at checkpoints. Border Patrol officials 

stated that nearly half of all agents have less than 2 years of experience, 

and Border Patrol officials in some sectors stated that agents generally do 

not consider checkpoint duty to be a desirable assignment. As such, 

checkpoints may be staffed on a rotational basis. These problems are 

minimized in locations where Border Patrol stations have operational 

responsibilities for checkpoints only.34 For example, agents at five 

checkpoints in the El Paso sector are generally staffed to the checkpoint 

or checkpoint circumvention routes on a fairly continuous basis. In 

 

34 Each Border Patrol station is assigned a certain area of responsibility within a Border 

Patrol sector. In some sectors, checkpoints are operated by stations that are not 

responsible for an area that includes the international border with Mexico, such as the 

Alamogordo and Las Cruces stations in the El Paso sector. In other sectors, such as the 

Tucson sector, stations are responsible for staffing agents to both checkpoints and the 

international border. 

Page 27 GAO-09-824 
 

 Border Patrol

contrast, Tucson sector agents rotate checkpoint duty with roving patrol 

and other enforcement activities, such as line watch, and may serve at the 

checkpoint at least once every 14 days, according to sector officials. 

The Border Patrol established a number of measures for checkpoint 

performance to inform the public on program results and provide 

management oversight; however, information gaps and reporting issues 

have hindered public accountability, and inconsistent data collection and 

entry have hindered management’s ability to monitor the need for program 

improvement. 

The Border Patrol chose 3 of 21 performance measures identified by a 

working group in 2006 to begin reporting the results of checkpoint 

operations under the Government Performance and Results Act of 1993 

(GPRA).35 Under GPRA, agencies are required to hold programs 

accountable to Congress and the public by establishing performance goals, 

identifying performance measures used to indicate progress toward 

meeting the goals, and use the results to improve performance as 

necessary. Agencies report their program goals, measures, results, and 

corrective actions to the public each year in their Performance and 

Accountability Report (PAR). The Border Patrol first reported the 

checkpoint performance results for these three measures in CBP’s fiscal 

year 2007 PAR. 

Checkpoint 

Performance 

Measures Have Been 

Established, but Data 

Limitations Hinder 

their Usefulness 

Performance Measures 

Developed for Public 

Accountability Hindered 

by Information Gaps and 

Reporting Issues 

The three GPRA measures used for public reporting relate to (1) 

checkpoint drug seizures as a percentage of all Border Patrol seizures, (2) 

checkpoint apprehensions as a percentage of all Border Patrol 

apprehensions, and (3) the percentage of checkpoint apprehensions that 

are referred to a U.S. Attorney for criminal prosecution. These measures 

were chosen as contributing directly to the DHS goals to protect the 

nation from dangerous persons and contraband, and were recommended 

 

35 In response to our previous report (GAO-05-435), the Border Patrol formed a working 

group to identify possible performance measures to evaluate checkpoints. In April 2006, 

the working group issued the results of its work, identifying 21 possible performance 

measures to use for checkpoint evaluation. 

Page 28 GAO-09-824 
 

 Border Patrol

as GPRA measures in a 2007 study commissioned by CBP.36 The remaining 

18 measures identified by the working group collectively provide some 

indication of checkpoint performance, but individually provide more 

indirect support of border security goals. For example, the working group 

identified separate measures for comparing the number of apprehensions 

and seizures at checkpoints to those on circumvention routes37 and the 

number of seizures or apprehensions at checkpoints that involved 

methods of concealment to smuggle persons or contraband. 

Information gaps preclude using the performance measures to determine 

the full extent of a checkpoint’s effectiveness relative to other checkpoints 

and Border Patrol strategies for protecting the nation from illegal aliens 

and contraband. According to GPRA guidance, measures should reflect 

program outcomes and provide information to assess accomplishments, 

make decisions, realign processes, and assign accountability. Studies 

commissioned by CBP, however, have documented that measures of the 

number of seizures or apprehensions bear little relationship to 

effectiveness because they do not compare these numbers to the amount 

of illegal activity that passes through undetected.38 In the absence of this 

information, the Border Patrol does not know whether seizure and 

apprehension rates at checkpoints are low or high, and if lower rates are 

due to ineffective performance, effective deterrence, or a low volume of 

illegal drugs or aliens passing through a checkpoint. As a result, the 

Border Patrol is unable to use these measures to determine if one 

checkpoint is performing more effectively or efficiently than another 

checkpoint, or how effective the checkpoint strategy is compared to 

 

36 Homeland Security Institute, Customs and Border Protection (CBP) Operational 

Assessment, RP06-51-02 (Arlington, Va.: Mar. 30, 2007). In general, this report assesses 

various CBP operations and programs, performance measures for checkpoint operations, 

and the feasibility of using third-party indicators as performance measures. The report is 

deemed Law Enforcement Sensitive and is therefore not publicly available. 

37 Checkpoint circumvention routes are identified areas that experience illegal alien or 

smuggler traffic attempting to avoid the checkpoint. 

38 See Homeland Security Institute, Measuring the Effect of the Arizona Border Control 

Initiative, (Arlington, Va.: Oct. 18, 2005); Homeland Security Institute, CBP Apprehensions 

at the Border, RP05-25f-04 (Arlington, Va.: June 21, 2006). 

Page 29 GAO-09-824 
 

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strategies placing agents at the border or other locations.39 Border Patrol 

headquarters officials said that they do not use the measures as 

management indicators of checkpoint performance specifically, although 

officials do use the results along with other information for oversight of 

overall border strategy. 

CBP has not developed models to address these information gaps for 

checkpoints, but has done so for other aspects of its border security 

strategy. Identifying the extent of illegal activity that occurs is a challenge 

faced by law enforcement agencies, but in some cases CBP uses programs 

and models specific to certain operations that estimate illegal activity 

levels based on various factors. For example, CBP uses a program, known 

as Compliance Examination (COMPEX), which estimates the total amount 

of illegal activity passing undetected through official U.S. ports of entry. 

Developed under the former U.S. Customs Service, COMPEX randomly 

selects travelers entering the country for more detailed inspections. On the 

basis of the extent to which violations are found in the in-depth 

inspections, CBP estimates the total number of inadmissible aliens and 

other violators who seek to enter the country. CBP then calculates an 

apprehension rate by comparing the number of violators it actually 

apprehends with the estimated number of violators that attempted entry, 

and reports these results in DHS’s annual performance report to provide 

program accountability. Other efforts included models to estimate the 

probability of apprehension by sector and an estimate of the number of 

illegal border crossings across the southwest border, and estimates of 

undetected illegal activity passing across smaller geographic zones. Border 

Patrol officials reported that they are exploring the feasibility of 

developing a checkpoint performance model to address checkpoint 

operational effectiveness and checkpoint impact on overall border 

security.40 Although standard practices in program management call for 

 

39 Sector and checkpoint officials said that changes in apprehension and seizure numbers 

over time can be useful indicators of individual checkpoint performance. For new 

checkpoints, officials expect to see a surge in apprehensions and seizures followed by 

lower numbers as illegal aliens and drug smugglers seek to use other routes more likely to 

result in successful passage. In the Tucson sector, for example, officials stated that the 

number of apprehensions and seizures increased since the checkpoint became fixed at KP 

42 in November 2006. Tucson sector officials noted that when the permanent checkpoint 

on I-19 begins operations, they expect that apprehensions and seizures will initially 

increase (due to enhanced operational capabilities), but over time apprehensions and 

seizures will likely decrease (as smugglers attempt to relocate their operations). 

40 CBP and Border Patrol officials said there could be a number of factors that could 

influence whether development of a checkpoint performance model was feasible, 

including, for example, consideration of legal issues relating to checkpoint searches. 

Page 30 GAO-09-824 
 

 Border Patrol

documenting milestones to ensure results are achieved, the Border Patrol 

did not identify time lines or milestones for completing this effort.41 Doing 

so could help provide the Border Patrol with reasonable assurance that its 

personnel will determine the feasibility of developing a checkpoint 

performance model within a time frame authorized by management. 

Reporting issues at Border Patrol headquarters also hindered using the 

performance measure results to inform Congress and the public on 

checkpoint performance. The Border Patrol began annual reporting on the 

three GPRA measures of checkpoint performance in the CBP fiscal year 

2007 PAR, but the information reported was inaccurate, resulting in an 

overstatement of checkpoint performance for both fiscal years 2007 and 

2008, as shown in table 1. Annual Performance and Accountability Reports 

are to document the results agencies have achieved compared to the goals 

they established, which, as we have previously reported, is key to 

improving accountability for results as Congress intended under GPRA.42

We used Border Patrol data to calculate results for the three checkpoint 

measures for fiscal years 2007 and 2008 and compared these numbers to 

results the Border Patrol reported in the PARs. Our analysis showed that 

the actual checkpoint performance results were incorrectly reported for 

two of the three measures in fiscal year 2007 and for one measure in fiscal 

year 2008. As a result, the Border Patrol incorrectly reported that it met its 

checkpoint performance targets for these two measures. 

 

41 Project Management Institute, The Standard for Program Management, (Newtown 

Square, Pa.: 2006). 

42 GAO, Results-Oriented Government: GPRA Has Established a Solid Foundation for 

Achieving Results, GAO-04-38 (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 10, 2004). 

Page 31 GAO-09-824 
 

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Table 1: Results of Border Patrol Checkpoint Performance Measures as Reported in Annual Performance and Accountability 

Reports and GAO Analysis 

Apprehensions at checkpoints as a percentage of total Border Patrol apprehensions 

Target

Results reported by Border 

Patrol 

Results based on GAO 

analysis 

Fiscal year 2007 PAR 5-10% 5% 3%

Fiscal year 2008 PAR 3-8 2 2

Percentage of checkpoint cases referred to a U.S. Attorney 

Target Results reported by Border 

Patrol 

Results based on GAO 

analysis

Fiscal year 2007 PAR 3-13% 13% 9%

Fiscal year 2008 PAR 8-15 18 6

Source: GAO analysis of Border Patrol data. 

Note: Agency targets and results are for all checkpoints nationwide. GAO analysis includes data only 

for checkpoints on the southwest border, but including data from the few checkpoints on the northern 

border does not affect the analysis results. 

The results of our analysis differed from those reported in the PARs for 

several reasons. In regard to errors in reporting apprehensions, the Border 

Patrol reported that Tucson sector data were excluded because including 

such data would unfairly reflect on overall checkpoint performance, as the 

Tucson sector has a substantially higher volume of illegal aliens compared 

to other sectors. According to the Border Patrol, disclosure statements 

explaining the exclusion of Tucson sector data were inadvertently omitted 

from the fiscal year 2007 PAR, and that full disclosure would be presented 

in future reports. 

In regard to errors in reporting the number of checkpoint cases referred to 

a U.S. Attorney for criminal prosecution, reported data were overstated 

because they included referrals to all prosecuting authorities—federal, 

state, and local. Including only those referrals to a U.S. Attorney, as 

defined in the PAR, would reduce reported performance results by nearly 

one-third in 2007 and nearly two-thirds in 2008. The Border Patrol 

indicated that including referrals to all prosecuting authorities is more 

representative of checkpoint performance because prosecutions in general 

are a deterrent to crime. Department of Justice (DOJ) officials agreed, 

noting that there are a variety of cases generated at checkpoints which are 

referred to state and local law enforcement agencies and prosecutors. For 

example, due to the volume of cases and limited resources, many U.S. 

Attorneys’ Offices have “intake” or “prosecution thresholds” by which 

narcotics cases below certain quantities are routinely referred to state 

authorities for arrest and prosecution, according to DOJ officials. In 

Page 32 GAO-09-824 
 

 Border Patrol

addition, there are other state offenses, such as individuals arrested on 

outstanding warrants, stolen vehicles or merchandise, or some weapons 

violations, that are also intercepted at Border Patrol checkpoints. DOJ 

officials stated that a measurement that did not include these types of 

cases referred to state authorities would miss a substantial number of 

criminal cases which were generated by the checkpoints and thus neglect 

a valuable indicator of their effectiveness. For these reasons, Border 

Patrol plans to revise the performance measure definition for future PARs 

to include referrals to any prosecuting authority. 

In addition to these reporting issues, data collection issues across Border 

Patrol checkpoints also contributed to inconsistent data reported in the 

Performance and Accountability Report. Standards for Internal Control 

in the Federal Government call for pertinent information to be recorded 

and communicated to management in a form and within a time frame that 

enables them to carry out internal control and other responsibilities. This 

includes the accurate recording and reporting of data necessary to 

demonstrate agency operations.43 To implement this requirement, the 

Border Patrol developed a checkpoint activity report (CAR) in 2006 as a 

means for field agents to report daily summaries of checkpoint 

performance, and provided relevant guidance. Supervisory agents at each 

station and sector had oversight responsibility for ensuring that data entry 

complied with agency guidance, and headquarters officials had 

responsibility for conducting a final review and reliability check. 

Information we collected from stations responsible for checkpoint data 

entry showed that data collection practices were inconsistent and 

incomplete for the apprehension and referral measures included in the 

PAR. We provided a data collection instrument to the Border Patrol 

seeking information on how checkpoint agents input data into the CAR for 

data fields related to apprehensions and seizures at and around 

checkpoints. Border Patrol headquarters officials forwarded this data 

collection instrument to stations responsible for operating checkpoints 

along the southwest border. The responses we received from stations 

 

43 GAO, Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government, GAO/AIMD-00-21.3.1 

(Washington, D.C.: Nov. 1999). 

Page 33 GAO-09-824 
 

 Border Patrol

responsible for 60 checkpoints operating along the southwest border in 

fiscal year 2008 showed inconsistencies in data reporting.44

• Apprehension measure. Officials responsible for data entry at two 

checkpoints in the Rio Grande Valley sector did not follow guidance in 

recording apprehensions at the checkpoint. CAR guidance defines “at 

checkpoint” as an apprehension or seizure that occurs within the preprimary, primary, or secondary inspection area of the checkpoint. 

Instead, officials at these two checkpoints attributed all apprehensions 

within a 2.5-mile radius to the checkpoint, overstating actual 

checkpoint apprehensions. Officials said they instituted this practice in 

August 2008 because it more accurately represented checkpoint 

performance in forcing illegal activity to use longer circumvention 

routes to get around the checkpoint. However, the CAR contains other 

data fields to capture apprehensions on checkpoint circumvention 

routes, and results are reflected in a separate performance measure. 

• Referral measure. Officials responsible for 26 checkpoints reported 

that they did not regularly or accurately enter data for the number of 

checkpoint apprehensions referred to a U.S. Attorney, understating 

checkpoint performance in apprehending criminals who may pose a 

threat to public safety. In some cases, Border Patrol sector officials 

said this occurred because at the end of the day when checkpoint data 

are submitted, supervisors did not know if cases will be referred, and 

the CAR may not have been updated to reflect any subsequent 

referrals. 

Border Patrol headquarters officials said that they were unaware of these 

data inconsistencies, and that headquarters officials had generally 

provided limited oversight of checkpoint performance data, relying instead 

on checkpoint and sector officials to ensure data reliability. According to 

the Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government, activities 

need to be established to monitor performance measures and indicators.45

Such controls should be aimed at validating the propriety and integrity of 

performance measures and indicators. Establishing controls for 

headquarters oversight of checkpoint performance data could provide the 

 

44 The Border Patrol operates a total of 71 permanent and tactical checkpoints on the 

southwest border. We received responses from 60 checkpoints. Based on the response rate, 

we determined that the responses were reliable for the purposes of this report. See 

appendix I for more information on the data collection instrument. 

45 GAO/AIMD-00-21.3.1. 

Page 34 GAO-09-824 
 

 Border Patrol

Border Patrol with additional assurance related to the accuracy, 

consistency, and completeness of its checkpoint performance data used to 

report on the checkpoint performance measures in the annual PAR. 

Border Patrol officials said that they have formed a workgroup to examine 

these data integrity issues with respect to checkpoint activity reporting, 

and would take action to address the identified issues. For example, 

regarding the referral measure, Border Patrol headquarters officials said 

that they plan to modify the CAR so that information, such as a referral to 

a U.S. Attorney, will be extracted from the databases that agents use to 

process the aliens administratively and criminally. Because the data are to 

be extracted from these systems, agents should no longer have to enter the 

information in two places and errors should be eliminated in checkpoint 

reporting. 

Performance Measures 

Established for Program 

Management Hindered by 

Limited System 

Capabilities and 

Inconsistent Data Entry 

Practices 

In addition to the measures used for public reporting in the annual PAR, 

the Border Patrol identified other measures for checkpoints that taken 

together can provide indicators of performance for internal management 

of the program (see appendix II). According to the Senate report 

accompanying GPRA,46 performance indicators should, wherever possible, 

include those that correlate the level of program activity with program 

costs, such as costs per unit of result or output. The Border Patrol 

checkpoint performance working group established 21 performance 

indicators of checkpoint operations that were divided into four main 

groups, including indicators of program costs in terms of operations and 

maintenance and man-hours: 

• At the checkpoint. These eight measures examine the extent that 

checkpoint resources are operational and effective. They include the 

percentage of time checkpoints are operational or closed for various 

reasons; number of seizures or apprehensions due to canine detection, 

sensors, or other technology; number of smuggling events using a 

method of concealment; number of aliens per smuggling load; and cost 

effectiveness of checkpoints considering operations and maintenance 

costs. 

• Immediate impact areas. These six measures compare checkpoint 

apprehensions and seizures to those on checkpoint circumvention 

routes, in geographic areas adjacent to the checkpoint, and at 

 

46 S. Rep. No. 103-58 (1993). 

Page 35 GAO-09-824 
 

 Border Patrol

transportation centers (i.e., bus terminals, train stations) and staging 

areas (such as stash houses). 

• At the border. These three measures compare checkpoint operations 

to other Border Patrol enforcement operations. Two of these three 

measures—a comparison of checkpoint apprehensions and drug 

seizures to all apprehensions and seizures—were used as GPRA 

reporting measures in the annual PAR. The third measure related to 

cost effectiveness in terms of comparing man-hours dedicated to 

checkpoint operations to man-hours dedicated to other enforcement 

activities. 

• Quality of life. These four measures examine how checkpoint 

operations help address major crime across communities and assist 

other federal, state, local and tribal agencies. One of these four 

measures—referral of smugglers for prosecution to a U.S. Attorney—

was included as a GPRA reporting measure in the annual PAR. The 

remaining three measures examined the reduction of major crimes in 

areas affected by checkpoint operations, the number of cases referred 

to other agencies identified by checkpoint operations, and the number 

of apprehensions turned over to the Border Patrol by other agencies 

during times the checkpoint is operational or non-operational. 

Inconsistent data entry practices by field agents preclude using many of 

the measures as indicators of performance or cost effectiveness. 

Responses received from station officials responsible for operating 60 

checkpoints on our data collection instrument showed that data reported 

in the CAR were often incomplete, inconsistent across stations, or missing 

altogether. These officials reported that checkpoint data entry issues were 

caused by unclear definitions in checkpoint performance data guidance, 

differences between data fields and operations, and perceived duplication 

of effort for information available in E-3, which is the primary information 

system used by CBP for tracking all enforcement activities conducted by 

its components.47

• Unclear definitions in guidance. Data entry personnel differed in 

how they interpreted guidance related to checkpoint data fields, 

 

47 Formerly called ENFORCE, E-3 is the system of record used by the Border Patrol that 

tracks an apprehended individual from initial arrest to disposition. An illegal alien or drug 

smuggler is processed into E-3 as soon as the arrest occurs and the individual is 

fingerprinted. 

Page 36 GAO-09-824 
 

 Border Patrol

resulting in inconsistent data reporting across checkpoints and across 

different shifts at individual checkpoints. Attributes of successful 

performance measures include that the measure is clearly stated, the 

name and definition are consistent with the methodology used to 

calculate it, and the measure produces the same result under similar 

conditions.48 In reporting the number of apprehensions or seizures on 

circumvention routes, however, officials at one checkpoint we visited 

considered all activity within the station’s area of responsibility to be 

circumventions, while officials at other checkpoints considered only 

the activity on defined circumvention routes. Border Patrol guidance 

for the CAR defined circumventions as “to avoid, or get around by 

artful maneuvering,” but did not specify how this definition should be 

applied by checkpoint officials. One Border Patrol field official said 

that at one location, supervisors used different definitions for entering 

information in the same data fields because of unclear definitions in 

CAR guidance, resulting in inconsistencies in data entry. Specifically, 

this Border Patrol field official noted that there was confusion among 

agents responsible for inputting data into fields related to concealment 

methods and cases turned over to other agencies, because neither field 

is defined in the CAR guidance. Officials responsible for 16 of 47 

checkpoints responding to an open-ended question reported that 

agents need additional instruction, training, or clearer guidance in 

using the CAR. 

• Differences between data fields and operations. Some data fields 

in the CAR are inconsistent with operations, resulting in an 

understatement of some activities, including indicators for one of the 

cost effectiveness measures. For example, checkpoint officials are 

required to track the number of agents staffed per shift in the CAR, but 

at least 20 permanent checkpoints operate using an overlapping fourshift schedule, while the CAR provides for a three-shift format. As a 

result, agent hours may be understated at the majority of permanent 

checkpoints along the southwest border because checkpoint officials 

could not record all of the hours worked in a four-shift schedule. 

• Duplication with other information systems. Field agents 

considered CAR data entry time consuming and somewhat duplicative 

of other information systems. Manual efforts by field agents to go 

through all arrest reports daily to identify those that are pertinent to 

 

48 For nine key attributes of successful performance measures, see GAO, Tax 

Administration: IRS Needs to Further Refine Its Tax Filing Season Performance 

Measures, GAO-03-143 (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 22, 2002). 

Page 37 GAO-09-824 
 

 Border Patrol

checkpoints for summary in the CAR can be a labor-intensive effort. 

Detailed information on the arrest or activity summarized in the CAR is 

already reported in E-3, which tracks enforcement efforts from the 

initial arrest to final disposition. Officials responsible for 15 of 47 

checkpoints responding to an open-ended question in our data 

collection instrument recommended that reporting requirements 

among information systems should be integrated to reduce duplication 

of effort. 

Overall, Border Patrol officials said that they were unaware of the extent 

of these data entry and reporting issues, and that headquarters officials 

had generally provided limited oversight of checkpoint performance data, 

relying instead on checkpoint and sector officials to ensure data reliability. 

Internal control standards require that agencies monitor their activities, 

through management and supervisory personnel, to assess the quality of 

performance over time.49 Consistent with these standards, we have 

previously reported that an agency’s management should have a strategy 

to ensure that ongoing monitoring is effective and will trigger separate 

evaluations where problems are identified or systems are critical to 

measuring performance.50 Border Patrol headquarters officials stated that 

the workgroup formed to address data integrity issues would take steps to 

address these identified data entry issues, but officials did not identify how 

they would ensure proper oversight of checkpoint data collection. 

Specifically, to address unclear definitions in the CAR, Border Patrol 

officials reported that they plan to provide updated directives to field staff 

regarding definitions, and would provide associated guidance regarding 

data input in the CAR. To address differences between data fields and 

operations, Border Patrol officials said they would update the CAR to 

reflect the current operation of checkpoints. Border Patrol officials noted 

that the time frames for completing these actions are unknown at this 

point because guidance and systems need to be developed and then 

approved by Border Patrol leadership. Until the Border Patrol fully 

addresses these data entry and oversight issues, it will not be able to 

ensure that data inputted into the CAR accurately reflects checkpoint 

operations. Finally, in regard to system duplication, Border Patrol officials 

stated that the recent rollout of E-3 does provide the means to report some 

performance data for checkpoints that are common to all components, 

 

49 GAO/AIMD-00-21.3.1. 

50 GAO, Internal Control Management and Evaluation Tool, GAO-01-1008G (Washington, 

D.C.: Aug. 2001). 

Page 38 GAO-09-824 
 

 Border Patrol

such as seizures and apprehensions, but that the CAR is still necessary to 

track data for some performance indicators that are unique to 

checkpoints, such as hours checkpoints are in operation and staff assigned 

to operate those checkpoints. 

Other data limitations preclude the Border Patrol from implementing a 

measure comparing the cost effectiveness of checkpoint operations with 

other Border Patrol strategies, such as line watch and roving patrol 

operations. We previously recommended that the Border Patrol implement 

such a measure to determine whether it was efficiently utilizing resources 

among checkpoints and among its three-tiered border enforcement 

strategy, and to assist in allocating additional resources within sectors or 

between sectors so that those resources would have the greatest impact.51

While the GPRA measures do compare checkpoint apprehensions and 

seizures to other Border Patrol activities, the Border Patrol indicated that 

data are not available on the number of agents staffed to line watch and 

roving patrol operations.52 Without accurate data on the number of agents 

staffed to line watch and roving patrol operations, it will not be possible to 

compare the cost effectiveness of checkpoints with these other Border 

Patrol activities. According to Border Patrol officials, the agency 

discontinued tracking agent hours by assignment in 2004, when it became 

cost prohibitive to maintain the information system capturing these data,53

and a comparable system to the CAR was not implemented for operations 

other than checkpoints. Officials stated that they plan to address this 

limitation by developing a new data system to track agent hours and 

assignments for border enforcement operations. The Border Patrol plans 

to initially deploy this new data system by the end of fiscal year 2009, and 

add updates as needed to accurately track agent hours by assignment. 

 

51 GAO-05-435. 

52 The Border Patrol has taken steps to identify operations and maintenance costs for 

checkpoints, establishing baseline data for fiscal year 2008, and can determine the number 

of agents staffed at checkpoints using the checkpoint activity report. 

53 Border Patrol agent assignments and hours were captured in the Performance and 

Analysis System when the Border Patrol was under the auspices of the former Immigration 

and Naturalization Service, according to the Border Patrol. 

Page 39 GAO-09-824 
 

 Border Patrol

Among other factors, the Border Patrol considered community safety and 

convenience in recent checkpoint placement and design decisions, in 

accordance with Border Patrol guidelines and requirements of other 

federal, state, and local agencies. The placement and design process was 

completed for three new permanent checkpoints since 2006, and no public 

comments were received about their design or placement in fairly remote 

areas of Texas. Some members of the public have raised concerns about 

the placement and size of a proposed permanent checkpoint for I-19 in 

Arizona, which is to be located closer to nearby communities. Draft plans 

we reviewed for the I-19 checkpoint were consistent with Border Patrol 

guidelines to locate checkpoints in less populated areas away from 

schools and hospitals and also considered current and future traffic 

volumes in accordance with Department of Transportation goals to 

facilitate highway travel and reduce congestion. 

The Border Patrol finalized three placement decisions for new permanent 

checkpoints in the last 3 years in accordance with its Design Guide and 

policy documents.54 These checkpoints, all located in Texas, were placed 

on I-35, U.S. Route 83, and U.S. Route 62/180.55 In regard to checkpoint 

location, Border Patrol guidance includes factors intended to maximize 

operational effectiveness and minimize adverse impact on the public and 

surrounding communities. Specifically, the guidance states that to provide 

strategic advantage, checkpoints should be placed in locations that 

provide good visibility of the surrounding area, near the confluence of two 

or more significant roads leading away from the border, and have minimal 

Border Patrol 

Considered 

Community Impact in 

Checkpoint 

Placement and Design 

Checkpoint Placement 

Decisions Considered 

Factors Related to Public 

Safety and Convenience 

 

54 The Border Patrol’s guidelines for checkpoint placement are documented primarily in 

Border Patrol’s facility design guide, which has a section on checkpoint design, and 

checkpoint policy documents. According to the Border Patrol, “The Design Guide contains 

criteria and concepts for the planning and design of Border Patrol facilities...The Guide 

identifies general architectural design issues, defines operations, describes design 

concepts, categorizes space, and provides specific technical criteria on building materials 

and systems...The operational and architectural information contained in the Guide should 

be viewed as DHS Border Patrol policy, applicable to the design of all new facilities.” 

55 The I-35 and U.S. Route 62/180 checkpoints were relocated to adapt to changing 

conditions, according to Border Patrol officials. The I-35 checkpoint was relocated because 

a newly constructed toll road would have allowed vehicles to avoid the old checkpoint. The 

new checkpoint was built north of the interchange of the toll road with I-35, and close to 

the confluence of two or more significant roads leading away from the border, per 

checkpoint placement criteria. The U.S. Route 62/180 checkpoint was relocated 3 miles 

from where it had been previously to allow for a larger, off-highway facility that could 

accommodate heavy traffic volume and increase safety for agents and the traveling public. 

On U.S. Route 83, a new permanent checkpoint is replacing a tactical checkpoint. 

Page 40 GAO-09-824 
 

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routes that could be used by illegal aliens to circumvent the checkpoint. 

The guidelines discuss community impact in terms of public safety issues 

and traffic considerations. Specifically, preferred checkpoint locations are 

at least a half mile from businesses, residences, schools and hospitals, or 

other inhabited locations. In addition, the Border Patrol guidelines suggest 

that checkpoints be located on a stretch of highway providing sufficient 

visibility for traffic compatible with safe operations, for both the traveling 

public, as well as agents working at the checkpoint.56

We mapped the locations of the three permanent checkpoints placed by 

the Border Patrol since 2006 along with relevant population data, schools, 

and hospitals, and the results were consistent with Border Patrol 

guidance. Specifically, the mapping analysis results, shown in table 2, 

indicated that the three checkpoints were located in sparsely populated 

areas and at least 9 miles from the nearest hospital or school.57

Table 2: Selected Border Patrol Checkpoint Locations Compared with Surrounding Population Densities and Distances to 

Nearest Hospitals and Schools 

Checkpoint location 

Estimated number of 

people living within 

1 mile 

Estimated number of 

people living within 

5 miles

Approximate distance from 

nearest hospital (in miles) 

Approximate distance from 

nearest school (in miles)

I-35, Laredo sector 4 114 21 10

U.S. Route 83, 

Laredo sector 

8 206 28 11

U.S. Route 62/180, El 

Paso sector 

3 472 18 9

Sources: Population estimates: GAO analysis of 2000 Census Data; Hospital data: 2008 Medicare Hospital Data; School data: 

Department of Education Common Core Data for school year 2006-07 and MapInfo. 

Border Patrol placement decisions for these checkpoints also passed 

through federal, state, and local government review, as well as public 

review during the environmental assessment process.58 Our review of 

 

56 This is defined as a relatively flat, straight stretch of highway, which provides sufficient 

advance warning to drivers that they are approaching a checkpoint. 

57 Although population density is not identified in the Border Patrol’s checkpoint placement 

guidelines, we used it as a proxy measure for the Border Patrol’s “remote location” 

guideline. 

58 The federal review process was governed by the National Environmental Policy Act of 

1969 (NEPA), Pub. L. No. 91-190, 83 Stat. 852 (1970), which requires agencies to evaluate 

the likely environmental effects of projects they are proposing using an environmental 

assessment or, if the projects likely would significantly affect the environment, a more 

detailed environmental impact statement. 

Page 41 GAO-09-824 
 

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documentation showed that the Border Patrol conducted environmental 

assessments for the three checkpoint locations that included potential 

community impacts due to noise, air quality, and water resources, as well 

as potential socioeconomic impacts on local income, housing or 

businesses, child protection, and increased traffic congestion.59 The results 

of the assessments were documented along with relevant correspondence 

with federal, state, and local agencies showing compliance with relevant 

laws and requirements.60 Results of the environmental assessment 

conducted for the three checkpoints showed no adverse impact on 

communities that would require an environmental impact statement,61 and 

no public comments were received.62

The placement process for a proposed checkpoint on I-19 in Arizona has 

not yet reached the stage of soliciting formal public comment, but some 

citizens living in nearby communities have expressed concerns about its 

proposed location south of Tucson at KP 41. While some citizens 

expressed support for the checkpoint, others noted that the checkpoint 

would negatively impact local communities, and should be located 

elsewhere, or removed altogether. Community members with this latter 

view stated that the Border Patrol should devote checkpoint resources to 

deter illegal entry at the border. 

Tucson sector officials said they chose KP 41 as the best site for a 

permanent checkpoint on I-19 among three other locations: KP 42 (the 

location of the current tactical checkpoint), KP 25, and KP 50. According 

 

59 Other factors include those related to hazardous waste, biological and cultural resources, 

soils, and environmental justice. 

60 The Border Patrol and CBP’s Office of Facilities Management and Engineering are 

responsible for approving an environmental assessment for a checkpoint, which in effect 

certifies that the environmental assessments were complete and accurate. Other agencies, 

such as the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, may be involved in conducting an environmental 

assessment. 

61 If adverse environmental impacts are found during the assessment process, CBP officials 

told us they will work to mitigate the impact. If the impact cannot be mitigated, then CBP 

issues an Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) for public comment. Under NEPA, an 

agency can employ certain mitigation measures that will lower the otherwise significant 

impacts of an activity on the environment to a level of insignificance. In this way, the 

agency can avoid preparing an EIS. For example, see Spiller v. White, 352 F.3d 235, 241 

(5th Cir. 2003). 

62 The draft environmental assessments were made available for public review for 30 days, 

with public notification provided through a prominent local newspaper. A notarized 

statement of the newspaper submission was included in the assessment package. 

Page 42 GAO-09-824 
 

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to Tucson sector officials, while the KP 50 site provided certain strategic 

advantages,63 the KP 41 site was selected because it was furthest from 

populated areas while also providing strategic advantage. Officials also 

noted that when determining the checkpoint’s location, they consulted 

with developers regarding expected population growth and plans for 

development along the I-19 corridor, but officials stated that it is difficult 

to know what development will or will not take place in the future, as 

plans can change. According to officials, these discussions indicated that 

development was expected along I-19, but more densely around the KP 25 

and KP 50 sites than the KP 41 site. In addition, officials from the Arizona 

Department of Transportation said that the KP 41 location would likely 

meet state requirements for highway traffic safety, but could not make a 

final determination until the final plans were submitted for review and 

approval. 

We mapped the four proposed locations for the I-19 checkpoint along with 

relevant population data, schools and hospitals, and the results were 

consistent with Border Patrol guidance, as shown in table 3. For example, 

the data showed that the KP 41 and KP 42 sites were in areas with fewer 

people than the other two locations. We also reviewed county planning 

documents and zoning maps to determine how the proposed checkpoint 

locations compared with plans for future development. These documents 

showed that areas around KP 41 were zoned for lower density population 

than the KP 25 and KP 50 proposed checkpoint locations.64

 

63 According to Tucson sector officials, locating a checkpoint near KP 50 would negate the 

need to operate a separate checkpoint on Arivaca Road. Currently, the Border Patrol 

operates a checkpoint on Arivaca Road, north of the I-19 checkpoint, because that road can 

be used to avoid the I-19 checkpoint. Officials stated that the KP 25 location did not offer 

tactical advantages, but was considered as a possible location because a temporary 

checkpoint had previously been located there when the I-19 checkpoint rotated between 

KP 42 and KP 25 in response to congressional direction not to have a fixed location. 

64 Santa Cruz County zoning maps show that although KP 41 is surrounded by rural zoning, 

there is an area zoned for residential use within one-half mile of the proposed checkpoint 

location. The town of Amado, located near the KP 41 location, is considered a growth area. 

The corridor near KP 25—from Rio Rico to Nogales—is intended to be the core of the 

county’s commerce activities. 

Page 43 GAO-09-824 
 

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Table 3: I-19 Proposed Checkpoint Locations Compared with Surrounding Population Densities and Distances to Nearest 

Hospitals and Schools 

Kilometer post 

Estimated population 

living within 1 mile 

Estimated population 

living within 5 miles

Approximate distance 

from nearest hospital 

(in miles) 

Approximate distance 

from nearest school (in 

miles)

41 (planned location) 10 720 22 3

42 10 578 23 4

25 118 2821 13 2

50 92 1683 28 2

Sources: Population estimates: GAO analysis of 2000 Census Data; Hospital data: 2008 Medicare Hospital Data; School data: 

Department of Education Common Core Data for school year 2006-07 and MapInfo. 

Our mapping analysis also showed that the KP 41 and KP 42 sites were 

farther away from schools than the other locations, as shown in figure 11. 

Proximity to the Rio Rico high school was a reason cited by the Border 

Patrol for not choosing the KP 25 location. 

Page 44 GAO-09-824 
 

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Figure 11: Map of I-19 Corridor with Proposed Checkpoint Locations and Distances 

From Schools 

Sources: GAO (analysis), Mapinfo (map), Border Patrol (data).

FF

Rio Rico 

High School

Sopori 

Elementary

School

Continental 

Elementary 

School

San Cayetano 

Elementary 

School

Montessori de

Santa CruzSaint Ann’s Hall

KP 42

KP 41

West Arivaca Road

KP 25

I-19

10 mile buffer around I-19

KP 50

Calabasas

Middle School

We also traveled to the four proposed locations on I-19 with Border Patrol 

officials who showed us differences among the sites and factors they 

considered in choosing KP 41, including proximity to populated areas, 

tactical advantage, and costs of construction. (See table 4.) Officials noted 

that while the KP 41 site had certain disadvantages, such as the highway 

access road parallel to the interstate (known as a frontage road) and the 

proximity to the community of Tubac, they pointed out that KP 41 was 

furthest from populated areas, and was the only site that did not have 

outlying roads near the interstate that would allow illegal aliens to 

circumvent the checkpoint. We also observed that the terrain around KP 

41 was relatively flat, which Border Patrol officials explained would allow 

for surveillance of the surrounding area. In contrast, the KP 25 location 

Page 45 GAO-09-824 
 

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was near both elevated areas and canyons where Border Patrol officials 

said it would be more difficult to identify and apprehend illegal activity 

around the checkpoint. With respect to the KP 42 site, Border Patrol 

officials stated that substantial amount of earthwork would be needed to 

level the land, which would increase the construction costs. (See appendix 

III for photographs of the various sites.) 

Table 4: Border Patrol Reasons for Not Selecting Certain Locations for the I-19 Permanent Checkpoint 

Kilometer post Reasons location not selected, according to the Border Patrol 

25 • Proximity to Rio Rico population areas and schools 

• Frontage roads and residential streets could allow vehicle circumvention 

• Terrain (mountains, canyons, vegetation) would more easily allow pedestrian 

circumvention 

• Topography would restrict surveillance capability 

42 (site of current tactical checkpoint) • Higher cost due to amount of fill required 

• Frontage roads could allow circumvention 

• Proximity to highway overpass would limit expansion 

50 • Frontage roads could allow vehicle circumvention 

• Proximity to populated Green Valley community 

Source: Border Patrol information and GAO observations. 

We also traveled along I-19 from the U.S. border at Nogales to the city of 

Tucson and Border Patrol officials showed us why other sites would not 

be suitable alternatives for a checkpoint location. Border Patrol officials 

stated that areas south of KP 25 are considered too close to the border to 

provide strategic value, a factor listed in Border Patrol guidance. Areas 

between KP 25 and KP 41, between KP 42 and KP 50, and north of KP 50 

were not considered suitable for a checkpoint for reasons including 

topography, proximity to communities, availability of circumvention 

routes, or highway characteristics—such as curves in the road—that were 

not compatible with safe operations. 

Checkpoint Size and 

Design Generally 

Considered Safety and 

Convenience of Travelers, 

Agents, and Detainees 

The Border Patrol’s three permanent checkpoints constructed since 2006 

were generally designed in accordance with its checkpoint design 

guidelines. Factors of consideration included in the design guidelines 

related to operational effectiveness, the safety and comfort of agents and 

canines working the checkpoint, the safety and convenience of the public 

traveling through the checkpoint as well as detainees held at the 

checkpoint, and aesthetics for blending checkpoint architecture with the 

surrounding community. 

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According to CBP facilities management officials, checkpoint size is 

largely determined by the number of inspection lanes at the checkpoint, 

and primary and secondary inspection areas account for the majority of a 

checkpoint’s size. CBP officials stated that checkpoint buildings, such as 

the main building housing administration and detention, generally account 

for a relatively small percentage of the checkpoint size. 

Regarding inspection lane criteria, checkpoint design guidelines 

recommend sufficient capacity to quickly and safely move traffic through 

the checkpoint. Specifically, the design should consider current and 

projected traffic volume traveling through the checkpoint, as well as the 

preference to locate inspection lanes off-highway, consistent with national 

and state initiatives to reduce traffic congestion and improve highway 

safety.65 The guidelines also recommend a minimum of two primary 

inspection lanes to separate commercial and passenger vehicles, and a 

canopy to cover all inspection areas. 

We reviewed the inspection lanes for the three new permanent 

checkpoints—which were all located in Texas—and results were partially 

consistent with checkpoint design guidance. In accordance with 

checkpoint design guidelines, the design for all three checkpoints included 

off-highway inspection lanes that separated commercial and passenger 

traffic, canopy covers protecting agents and the public, and at least the 

minimum number of primary inspection lanes. However, we could not 

determine if the Border Patrol complied with its checkpoint design 

guidelines to consider current and future traffic volumes when 

determining the number of inspection lanes at each checkpoint, because it 

did not conduct traffic studies when designing the three checkpoints. 

Although not explicitly required, senior CBP and Border Patrol facilities 

officials stated that the number of inspection lanes at a checkpoint should 

be based to a large extent on current and projected traffic volume over the 

next 20 years to ensure that checkpoint capacity will be sufficient in the 

near future, and this should be documented in a traffic study. Traffic 

design engineering principles discuss the importance of considering 

current and expected traffic volumes over a given period when designing a 

project, to ensure sufficient capacity. According to CBP facilities officials, 

however, traffic studies were not conducted for the U.S. Route 62/180 

 

65 The length of the inspection lanes is also determined by criteria related to traffic volume 

and safety. For example, space is needed for the inspection lanes to ensure traffic does not 

back up onto the highway, and that the entry and exit ramps are not too steep for safe 

movement on and off highway. 

Page 47 GAO-09-824 
 

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checkpoint or the U.S. Route 83 checkpoint, and officials said they have no 

record of a traffic study being conducted for the I-35 checkpoint.66 Officials 

stated that traffic studies may not have been conducted because it is not 

an explicit requirement in checkpoint design guidelines, but agreed that 

they should have been done to inform decisions regarding checkpoint 

design and the number of inspection lanes. In the absence of documented 

traffic studies, the Border Patrol cannot determine if the number of 

inspection lanes at each of these checkpoints is consistent with current 

and projected traffic volumes, or if a different number of lanes would have 

been more appropriate. 

To provide some information on traffic volumes for these three 

checkpoints, we obtained available data on 2007 traffic volumes for areas 

near the location of each of the three checkpoints from the Texas 

Department of Transportation.67 As shown in table 5, the relative number 

of inspection lanes at each checkpoint appears consistent with 2007 traffic 

volumes, in that the I-35 checkpoint has a higher traffic volume and more 

inspection lanes than the other two checkpoints. 

 

66 CBP officials stated that a traffic study for the I-35 checkpoint may have been conducted 

under legacy INS—as the checkpoint design project was initiated under INS—but CBP has 

no record of it. Regarding the U.S. Route 83 checkpoint, CBP officials stated that a traffic 

study was not conducted because the checkpoint was replacing the existing facility. CBP 

officials did not explain why a traffic study was not conducted for the U.S. Route 62/180 

checkpoint. 

67 Texas Department of Transportation calculates traffic volumes at specific mile markers. 

We obtained data on traffic volumes at the mile marker closest to the location of the 

checkpoint. Future traffic projections were not available from the Texas Department of 

Transportation. 

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Table 5: Checkpoint Inspection Lanes Compared to Traffic Volume for the Three 

Checkpoints Constructed Since 2006 

Number of inspection lanes 

Checkpoint 

2007 Estimated traffic 

volume

(in vehicles per hour)a Primary Secondary 

I-35, Laredo 

sector 340 6 5

U.S. Route 83, 

Laredo sector 60 3 2

U.S. Route 

62/180, El Paso 

sector 67 2b 1

Source: GAO analysis of Texas Department of Transportation and Border Patrol data. 

a Traffic volume is estimated based on an average of northbound and southbound traffic. It is possible 

that the volume could be higher for northbound traffic than southbound. 

b

 According to the Border Patrol, the U.S. Route 62/180 checkpoint generally uses one primary lane 

because traffic volume has been low and it allows them to expand their secondary area for safer 

operations. When traffic increases they plan to open both primary lanes. 

Regarding criteria for facilities and other resources, Border Patrol design 

guidance lists the buildings and features that are recommended for 

inclusion at new permanent checkpoints. According to Border Patrol 

officials, this listing of facilities and resources was based on existing 

checkpoint design, as well as the professional judgment of Border Patrol 

officials regarding the facilities and resources that enhance checkpoint 

operations, and should be adjusted to the circumstances of each 

checkpoint to maximize checkpoint effectiveness and efficiency and also 

facilitate the safety and convenience of agents, the public, and detainees. 

For example, design guidance provides for detention facilities at 

checkpoints to reduce the amount of time agents have to leave the 

checkpoint to transport illegal aliens to other locations, and also provides 

separate areas for men, women, and children who are detained to facilitate 

their safety. 

We reviewed Border Patrol design documents for the three Texas 

checkpoints and results showed that two of the three checkpoints had all 

but one of the recommended resources; however, one checkpoint did not 

have several resources, as shown in table 6. The one resource not included 

at the new I-35 checkpoint in the Laredo sector and the new U.S. Route 

62/180 checkpoint in the El Paso sector was commercial truck scales, 

which can improve checkpoint operations by giving agents another tool 

for detecting contraband. According to Border Patrol officials, truck scales 

allow agents to compare the weight of cargo on the truck’s manifest to the 

Page 49 GAO-09-824 
 

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current weight of cargo at the checkpoint. A disparity between the two 

measurements could indicate that the amount or type of cargo has 

changed. The U.S. Route 83 checkpoint was also lacking many other 

recommended resources, such as canine facilities, due to space 

constraints at the site, according to sector officials. Officials stated that 

there was limited space to accommodate all of the resources, because the 

land is not owned by the Border Patrol but provided through a multiuse 

agreement between DHS and the Texas Department of Transportation. 

These officials added that additional funding would be needed to expand 

the checkpoint site to accommodate these resources. However, sector 

officials stated that the resources currently available at the checkpoint are 

sufficient for basic operations, considering the relatively low volume of 

traffic at the checkpoint. 

Table 6: Facilities and Resources Recommended in Border Patrol Checkpoint Design Guidance Compared to Recently 

Constructed Permanent Checkpoints 

Recommended resource/facility 

I-35 checkpoint 

(Laredo sector) 

U.S. Route 83

checkpoint 

(Laredo sector) 

U.S. Route 62/180 

checkpoint 

(El Paso sector) 

Safe and adequate detention and processing 

area to include records check capabilities 

Yes Yes Yes 

Control room set up for sensors, dispatch and 

radio communication, and video monitoring 

Yes Yes Yes 

Safe storage space for detainee possessions Yes Yes Yes 

Loading docks, including safe holding area for 

removed cargo 

Yes No—Limited space 

available 

Yes 

Area for vehicle lifts Yes Yes Yes 

Canine facilities Yes No—Limited space 

available 

Yes 

Staff and visitor parking areas Yes Yes Yes 

Area for commercial truck scales Yes, but commercial truck 

scales are not in place 

No—Limited space 

available 

Yes, but commercial truck 

scales are not in place 

Storage area for miscellaneous equipment and 

tools 

Yes Yes Yes 

Storage area for evidence Yes No—Limited space 

available 

Yes 

Source: Border Patrol checkpoint design guidance, Border Patrol data, and GAO analysis. 

Border Patrol guidelines also include criteria to use aesthetics in the 

architecture and design of checkpoints. These criteria state that 

checkpoints should be designed in a manner that complements the 

indigenous architecture of the surrounding area, including building scale 

and proportion. The environmental assessments for the three Texas 

Page 50 GAO-09-824 
 

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checkpoints showed no significant aesthetic impact because of the remote 

locations of the checkpoints and lack of community concern over the 

design of existing checkpoints. No public comments were received during 

the 30-day comment period raising concerns about the lack of aesthetics in 

the three checkpoints’ final designs. 

The design process for the proposed permanent checkpoint on I-19 in 

Arizona has not yet been completed as of July 2009, but some citizens 

living in nearby communities have expressed concerns about its potential 

size and appearance. Border Patrol officials stated that in general, the I-19 

and other new permanent checkpoints are to be larger than existing 

checkpoints because many of the latter are outdated and undersized to 

address current traffic volume and changes in operation. As these older 

checkpoints are replaced, the Border Patrol plans to enlarge and redesign 

them to reflect new technology and to incorporate lessons learned from 

experiences with more recently built checkpoints, according to officials. 

I-19 Permanent Checkpoint 

Design 

CBP and Border Patrol officials stated that plans for the permanent I-19 

checkpoint are based on the recently constructed I-35 checkpoint near 

Laredo, which they identified as a model checkpoint in terms of layout, 

resources, and size. (See figure 12.) Tucson sector officials said that the I19 checkpoint design also incorporated lessons learned from the I-35 

checkpoint design. For example, officials stated that the design of the I-35 

checkpoint was found to be too small and had to be expanded to 

accommodate a VACIS unit, and that operations at the I-35 checkpoint 

showed that more space was needed in the inspection areas for safe truck 

maneuvering. 

Page 51 GAO-09-824 
 

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Figure 12: I-35 Checkpoint, North of Laredo, Texas 

Source: Border Patrol.

Bus

inspection

area

Commercial 

secondary 

inspection area

Main checkpoint 

building and 

detention facility

Covered

primary 

inspection

lanes

Canine

facility

Loading

dock

Non-commercial 

secondary 

inspection

area

VACIS

area

Vehicle

lift

One key difference between the I-19 checkpoint design and that of the 

three new checkpoints in Texas is that the Border Patrol plans to 

incorporate aesthetics into the I-19 checkpoint design, in response to 

community concerns. Some community members who visited the I-35 

checkpoint were concerned that the I-19 checkpoint would disrupt the 

beauty of the local landscape in that it would be too large and visually 

unappealing. Although not reflected in the current draft design, Border 

Patrol officials said the final design issued for public comment would 

reflect input from the community on options for blending the checkpoint 

in with the surrounding community and landscape. 

Page 52 GAO-09-824 
 

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Border Patrol officials from the Tucson sector and the community have 

coordinated on other aspects of the I-19 checkpoint design. Tucson sector 

officials have met with community members at least 45 times from 2006 to 

2009 to address community questions or concerns. In addition, a 

community workgroup was established in April 2007 to allow direct 

community involvement in discussions about the proposed permanent 

checkpoint.68 In June 2007, this workgroup split into two subcommittees. 

One subcommittee issued a report to the Border Patrol with 

recommendations to reduce the impact of the checkpoint on surrounding 

communities and to improve its effectiveness and public convenience. The 

other subcommittee issued a report expressing opposition to a permanent 

checkpoint on I-19, recommending that resources be placed on the border 

instead. 

We met with Border Patrol officials and reviewed documents showing 

how the Border Patrol has modified the design of the checkpoint in 

response to community input. To address concerns about the size of the 

checkpoint, for example, Border Patrol officials said they removed certain 

structures from the design plans, such as a station house, helipad, and 

fueling island. In addition, to ensure checkpoint lighting did not adversely 

impact a local observatory, officials stated that they plan to comply with 

the local dark sky ordinance by covering checkpoint lighting with a 

canopy, among other things.69 Border Patrol officials stated that other 

recommendations made by the workgroup to increase the safety and 

convenience for travelers through the checkpoint—such as clearly posted 

signage—will be included in the checkpoint design, as shown in table 7. 

 

68 The Community Workgroup on Southern Arizona Checkpoints was co-chaired by the 

Border Patrol Chief for the Tucson sector and the cognizant U.S. Congresswoman. 

Members included community representatives from the business community (13), local 

citizens (11), government representatives, including law enforcement (5), and a local 

religious leader. According to the workgroup, more than 500 citizens participated in the 

four workgroup meetings, including citizens from a range of communities such as Nogales, 

Amado, Arivaca. Rio Rico, Tubac, Green Valley, and Tucson. The workgroup split into two 

subcommittees. The Interim/Permanent Checkpoint Subcommittee identified areas where 

the Border Patrol can make operational and nonoperational adjustments to the checkpoint 

facility to improve enforcement and expedite legitimate travelers, based on the footprint 

and resources at the I-35 checkpoint near Laredo. The Options Subcommittee identified 

alternatives to an interim or permanent checkpoint in southern Arizona. 

69 Pima County, Arizona, has a dark night sky ordinance, which imposes requirements on 

outdoor illumination devices in order to protect visibility of the dark night sky. 

Page 53 GAO-09-824 
 

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Table 7: Border Patrol Response to Community Recommendations Expressed on the Draft Design of the I-19 Checkpoint 

Community recommendations Border Patrol response as of June 2009 

Aesthetics 

 Adhere to local dark sky ordinance Checkpoint is to meet or exceed dark sky ordinance requirements 

 Seek to mitigate noise Recommendation to be researched and considered 

Safety/convenience 

 Clearly posted signage Included in draft design 

 Off-highway location Included in draft design 

 Rumble strips Included in draft design 

 Sufficient traffic lanes to preclude congestion Included in draft design 

 Safe inspection area, to include canopies Included in draft design 

 Separate lanes for commercial and noncommercial traffic Included in draft design 

 Separate lanes to expedite those enrolled in 

expedited travel programs 

Not part of current design plans due to limited time savings for those enrolled, 

according to sector officials 

 Refrigerated dock spaces for perishable 

commodity examinations at the secondary 

inspection area 

Included in draft design 

 A VACIS machine as part of the facility Another type of non-intrusive inspection technology—an X-ray backscatter 

machine—is included in draft design 

Source: Community Workgroup on Southern Arizona Checkpoints and Border Patrol. 

Our review of the draft plans for the I-19 permanent checkpoint showed 

that it is planned to surpass the I-35 checkpoint as the largest checkpoint 

on the southwest border in terms of total acreage and acreage used for 

checkpoint operations, including primary and secondary inspection lanes, 

as shown in table 8. Overall, the I-19 checkpoint is about 20 percent larger 

than the I-35 checkpoint in terms of total acreage and about 69 percent 

larger in terms of the acreage to be used for checkpoint operations. 

Draft Planning Documents 

Show Proposed I-19 

Checkpoint Will Be Largest 

Checkpoint 

Table 8: Comparison of Proposed I-19 Permanent Checkpoint with I-35 Checkpoint 

Checkpoint 

Border 

Patrol sector 

Total

site acreage

Acreage used for 

checkpoint operations

Primary 

inspection lanes 

Secondary

inspection lanes

I-19 (proposed) Tucson 18 7.1 8 9

I-35 Laredo 15 4.2 6 5

Source: CBP and Border Patrol data. 

Page 54 GAO-09-824 
 

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Border Patrol officials estimate that 11 of the 18 total acres at the I-19 

checkpoint site are not planned to be dedicated to checkpoint operations, 

but are expected to be used for 

• graded slope area (4.0 acres), 

• storm water retention areas and septic water filtration areas (3.5 

acres), and 

• freeway on and off ramps (3.7 acres), which is a requirement from the 

Arizona Department of Transportation. 

According to the CBP project manager for the I-19 checkpoint, the large 

size of the checkpoint is largely due to the number of inspection lanes that 

are planned to meet current and future traffic volume, per design 

guidelines. The guidelines indicate that a sufficient number of primary and 

secondary inspection lanes are needed to ensure that current traffic 

volume can be processed through the checkpoint with minimal traffic 

backups and vehicle wait times, as longer wait times create safety 

concerns and inconvenience the traveling public. When traffic backups 

reach a certain distance from the checkpoint, sector officials said that they 

allow traffic to pass through the checkpoint uninspected, which decreases 

checkpoint effectiveness.70 Smugglers and illegal aliens use these 

opportunities to pass through the checkpoint undetected, according to 

sector officials. 

Of the eight primary inspection lanes included in the draft design plan for 

the I-19 permanent checkpoint, five lanes are required to address current 

traffic volume, according to sector officials. The lanes for processing the 

current traffic volume include two lanes for commercial traffic and three 

lanes for passenger traffic. The design is consistent with guidance and the 

community workgroup recommendations to include off-highway 

inspection lanes that separate commercial and passenger vehicles, 

dedicated truck and bus lanes, and canopy coverage for all inspection 

areas. 

The remaining three primary inspection lanes in the I-19 checkpoint design 

plan are to ensure sufficient capacity for processing future traffic volume. 

Border Patrol budget documents state that the checkpoint construction 

 

70 According to Tucson sector officials, I-19 checkpoint agents allowed traffic to pass 

through the checkpoint without undergoing inspection on nine occasions in fiscal year 

2008. 

Page 55 GAO-09-824 
 

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process alone is estimated to take 5 years, and design guidelines 

recommend that construction projects consider capacity needs over the 

next 10 years, which can reduce overall construction costs and maintain 

longer periods of operational efficiency. The Arizona Department of 

Transportation projects that traffic on the I-19 corridor will increase by 23 

percent from 2007 to 2017, and 35 percent from 2007 to 2027.71 Using traffic 

projections for the year 2017, the site engineer for the proposed I-19 

checkpoint estimated that the five lanes for passenger vehicles will result 

in wait times averaging less than 2 minutes, except for three one-hour 

periods per day when wait times may increase to 8 to 10 minutes.72

According to the engineer, if the number of passenger lanes is reduced to 

four, for example, then wait times are estimated to exceed 20 minutes 

three times per day during peak traffic periods, which would require 

suspension of inspection activities and which is unacceptable, according 

to the Border Patrol. Border Patrol officials stated that six of the eight 

lanes will be able to convert between screening passenger vehicles and 

commercial traffic, which will give the I-19 checkpoint flexibility during 

operation to adapt to changing traffic patterns. 

In regard to the secondary inspection lanes, the proposed nine lanes were 

found to be insufficient to meet the Border Patrol’s targeted rates of 

inspection, according to reports by an engineering firm commissioned to 

provide an advisory review for the I-19 checkpoint design. The engineer 

reported that to meet target inspection rates during peak periods, the 

Border Patrol would need to increase the number of secondary lanes for 

non-commercial traffic from 7 to 22 lanes. Tucson sector officials said that 

they will not build the additional secondary lanes because they do not 

have the resources and staff to use them at this time.73 As a result, the 

 

71 CBP is also planning to expand the Mariposa port of entry in the next few years, which is 

expected to significantly increase the volume of commercial traffic from Mexico on the I-19 

corridor. According to the Arizona Department of Transportation, the traffic projections 

did not include the port expansion, because when the traffic projections were conducted, 

the port expansion had not been finalized. 

72 Specifically, the engineer estimates that wait times will be less than 2 minutes for 20 

hours per day, on average, and that a wait time of 8 to 10 minutes will occur for three hours 

per day, starting at 8 a.m., 3 p.m., and 6 p.m., and a wait of just over 2 minutes at 8 p.m., due 

to a higher volume of traffic at these times. 

73 According to Tucson sector officials, the current I-19 checkpoint is generally staffed with 

8 agents per shift. Sector officials plan to staff the permanent checkpoint with between 33 

and 39 agents during the peak shift (with all inspection lanes open), and fewer agents 

during off-peak times. 

Page 56 GAO-09-824 
 

 Border Patrol

number of referrals of non-commercial traffic from primary to secondary 

inspection will be decreased as needed to preclude traffic congestion. 

Plans for the size of the I-19 checkpoint facilities are also consistent with 

relevant guidelines. Space allocation guidelines are based on many factors, 

including a functional evaluation of individual space, group consensus of 

Border Patrol staff, comparison to existing structures, and use of standard 

formulae. Border Patrol checkpoint design guidelines include general 

processes for determining the size of these resources or the space 

required—such as how large the main checkpoint building should be—but 

do not impose a one-size-fits-all approach on checkpoints. As a result, the 

sizes of each of these areas may vary at different checkpoints based on the 

unique circumstances and operational needs of each checkpoint. For 

example, the size of the main checkpoint building, which includes 

administration, processing, and detention facilities,74 is larger at the 

planned I-19 checkpoint than the I-35 checkpoint by approximately 3,400 

square feet, reflecting a greater estimated need at the I-19 checkpoint for 

processing and detention of illegal aliens.75 Sector officials stated that 

having sufficient processing and detention capability at the I-19 

checkpoint increases operational efficiency and effectiveness, as agents 

will no longer have to frequently transport apprehended individuals to the 

Tucson or Nogales stations for processing and detention. In comparison, 

the canine kennel building at the I-35 checkpoint is nearly 2,900 square 

feet larger than the planned kennel at the I-19 checkpoint. According to 

CBP data, the canine kennel building at the I-35 checkpoint is 

approximately 3,200 square feet, while the I-19 checkpoint kennel is 

planned for approximately 290 square feet. Laredo sector officials said that 

the I-35 checkpoint kennel was large because the building includes an 

office, storage room, bathing room for the canines, bathroom, mechanical 

room, and a quarantine area. Tucson sector officials stated that the smaller 

size is because the I-19 checkpoint kennel will be only used as a rest area 

for the canines. 

 

74 The administration area allows for the supervision of checkpoint operations and staff, 

and performing of administrative duties, such as scheduling, fiscal management, and 

reporting to the patrol station or sector headquarters. The processing area provides a 

secure area where detainees can be interviewed and processed. Detention facilities provide 

a secure area where detainees can be held until transported offsite. 

75 Tucson sector officials intend for the I-19 checkpoint to serve as an apprehension and 

processing hub for multiple areas of enforcement between Tucson and Nogales. The 

Tucson station and the Nogales station apprehend 200 to 300 aliens per day, according to 

Tucson sector officials. 

Page 57 GAO-09-824 
 

 Border Patrol

Plans for the types of resources to be placed at the I-19 checkpoint for 

conducting effective operations are also consistent with relevant 

guidelines. For example, at the I-19 checkpoint, the Border Patrol plans to 

include canine facilities, non-intrusive inspection technology, vehicle lifts, 

and loading docks, among other resources, as shown in figure 13. 

Figure 13: Border Patrol Site Plan of the Proposed I-19 Permanent Checkpoint 

0 100 200

Scale (feet)

300

Source: Border Patrol.

I-19 Southbound (to Nogales)

I-19 Northbound (to Tucson)

Retention

wall B

Septic system

Dry/wet storage

and contraband

Bus and truck

secondary inspection

Secondary

inspection

Canine and 

service 

parking Non-intrusive

inspection area

Retention

wall A

Staff and visitor parking

Vehicle 

lift

Kennels

Tower

Main

building

Auto

Auto/bus

Truck

Dock

Well storage

Well

Existing frontage road

Well pumps

Primary 

inspection 

lanes

Community members living near checkpoints we visited across the four 

southwest border states told us they generally supported checkpoints 

operating near them because of the law enforcement presence they 

provide, but remained most concerned about the property damage that 

occurs when illegal aliens trespass on private property to avoid the 

checkpoints. Border Patrol policy highlights the need to detect and 

respond to this circumvention activity; however, officials stated that other 

priorities sometimes precluded positioning more than a minimum number 

of agents and resources on checkpoint circumvention routes. Tucson 

sector officials stated that when a permanent checkpoint on I-19 is 

constructed, it will provide additional technological enhancements to 

monitor activity in the surrounding areas, but they have not documented 

the number of agents that would need to be deployed to address this 

activity. Despite concerns regarding property damage type incidents, 

community members we spoke with generally said that checkpoint 

Community Members 

Cited Some Adverse 

Impacts of 

Checkpoint 

Operations, and 

Border Patrol 

Reported Having 

Limited Resources to 

Minimize Them 

Page 58 GAO-09-824 
 

 Border Patrol

operations had not adversely impacted their communities in terms of 

violent crime, business, or property values, except for those around the I19 checkpoint in Arizona. Although the Border Patrol has identified 

performance measures that could be used to monitor the quality of life in 

areas affected by checkpoint operations, these measures have not been 

implemented. Data were not available to determine any causal relationship 

between checkpoint operations and community well-being; however, some 

data were available showing overall trends in real estate values, tourism, 

and crime without controlling for checkpoint operation or other factors. 

Property Damage, Theft, 

and Littering Cited as 

Adverse Impacts of 

Checkpoint Operations 

Members of local governments, state and local law enforcement, business 

groups, ranchers, and residents responding to our request for input 

generally supported the Border Patrol and checkpoint operations because 

of the law enforcement presence they provide, but generally agreed that 

checkpoint operations cause illegal aliens and smugglers to attempt to 

circumvent the checkpoint—resulting in adverse impacts to nearby 

residents and communities, such as private property damage, theft, and 

littering. These concerns were cited most often by ranchers and residents 

in areas around checkpoints. Ranchers in Texas, California, and Arizona 

said that they experienced cut fences that allowed cattle or other livestock 

to escape; drained water tanks or water wastage from irrigation lines that 

were left open; theft of water, food, clothing, or vehicles; and trash 

including plastic water jugs and food containers that are either left on the 

property as trespassers move through the area, or that washed down rivers 

or streams from other areas. Local law enforcement officials near two 

checkpoints in Texas we visited said that they frequently respond to calls 

from ranchers for these reasons, and ranchers said that these impacts have 

increased their ranch security expenses.76 The level of concern was lower 

in areas where checkpoints operated infrequently. For example, the San 

Diego sector’s checkpoints on I-5 and I-15 are rarely operational, resulting 

in little need for circumvention and fewer concerns expressed by 

community members. 

The greatest level of concern about trespassing and property damage was 

expressed in the Tucson sector, which has experienced higher levels of 

illegal alien apprehensions across the southwest border. In fiscal year 

 

76 Ranchers reported that increased security expenses related to hiring additional security 

staff, purchasing night vision goggles and other equipment for ranch staff, time and 

materials to repair property damage, and operational delays in ranch business when 

incidents occur. 

Page 59 GAO-09-824 
 

 Border Patrol

2008, for example, just under half of the 705,000 total Border Patrol 

apprehensions of illegal aliens across the southwest border occurred in 

the Tucson sector, and sector officials cited a high level of interaction with 

the community in responding to citizen concerns. However, these 

apprehensions occurred all across the sector, making it difficult to 

determine the extent that trespassing on private property was due to 

attempts to circumvent the checkpoint or use of other transit routes. 

Our review of Border Patrol data for the Tucson sector showed that 

significantly more illegal aliens were apprehended in the area around the I19 checkpoint than at the checkpoint itself, although the reverse was true 

for drug seizures, as shown in table 9.77 Specifically, data show that in 

fiscal year 2008 about 94 percent of apprehensions occurred in the areas 

surrounding the I-19 checkpoint compared to 27 percent of drug seizures. 

Table 9: Number of Apprehensions and Seizures at the I-19 Checkpoint and Area Surrounding I-19 Checkpoint 

At the I-19 checkpoint Area surrounding the I-19 checkpoint 

Apprehensions Seizures Apprehensions Seizures

Fiscal Year 2008 507 153 7,486 57

Fiscal Year 2007 474 167 4,351 45

Source: Border Patrol, CAR for I-19 checkpoint. 

These data also show that increases in the number of apprehensions and 

drug seizures were greater in the areas surrounding the I-19 checkpoint 

than at the checkpoint itself between 2007 and 2008, suggesting that 

community impact may have also increased. Specifically, from 2007 to 

2008 there was a 72 percent increase in the number of apprehensions in 

the surrounding area, compared to a 7 percent increase at the checkpoint. 

Data show that the number of drug seizures for these areas increased by 

27 percent from 2007 to 2008, while declining by 8 percent at the 

checkpoint. 

Data limitations precluded our determining where illegal aliens and 

smugglers were apprehended in relation to community boundaries, or 

comparing the extent that apprehension patterns on circumvention routes, 

 

77 According to the Border Patrol, an apprehension or seizure made circumventing the I-19 

checkpoint is defined as an arrest made within grid 80, a square of 7.4 miles by 7.4 miles 

with the checkpoint close to the center. This grid contains the communities of Amado and 

Arivaca. 

Page 60 GAO-09-824 
 

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or other transit routes, were similar across sectors. Tucson sector Border 

Patrol officials stated that illegal activity on circumvention routes 

generally occurs in remote locations, but the Tucson sector has not yet 

implemented global positioning technology sector-wide, as used by some 

other sectors, to pinpoint the location of apprehensions and drug seizures. 

Instead, this information is tracked among geographic grids comprising 7.4 

square miles. In addition, while the CAR contains data fields to capture 

activity on apprehensions made of those attempting to circumvent 

checkpoints, definitions for these fields were not used consistently across 

all checkpoints, based on an analysis of checkpoint officials’ responses to 

our data collection instrument. 

Border Patrol officials stated that the checkpoint strategy intends to push 

illegal aliens and smugglers off-highway into rural areas where they can be 

more easily apprehended, and the extent that these persons attempt to 

avoid the checkpoint is an indicator that checkpoints are an effective 

deterrent. Border Patrol officials said that when a new checkpoint is put in 

place, or an enhancement is made at an existing checkpoint, 

apprehensions commonly increase, followed by a decrease as smugglers 

and illegal aliens search for less rigorously defended transit routes that 

provide a greater chance of success. In terms of the I-19 checkpoint, for 

example, Border Patrol officials attributed increasing rates of checkpoint 

circumvention apprehensions to fixing the checkpoint at its permanent 

location at KP 42 in November 2006. Over time, officials said that the fixed 

location for the checkpoint resulted in more continuous operation and 

greater ability to deploy sensors and other resources that enhance 

checkpoint effectiveness. 

Border Patrol officials acknowledged that the checkpoint strategy can 

adversely impact private property owners, and said that sometimes there 

were not enough agents in place to deter illegal activity or apprehend 

trespassers in surrounding areas. According to Tucson sector officials, for 

example, eight agents per shift are assigned to work the checkpoint lanes 

and two to four agents per shift are generally assigned in proximity to the 

I-19 checkpoint to address activity in the surrounding areas, but that 

number varies from shift to shift and depends on the activity levels during 

a given time of year. Border Patrol policy highlights the need to detect and 

respond to checkpoint circumvention, stating that it is just as critical to 

checkpoint effectiveness as the inspection process, and should be 

Page 61 GAO-09-824 
 

 Border Patrol

addressed with appropriate staff.78 However, despite the rapid increase in 

overall staffing numbers on the southwest border, Border Patrol sector 

managers may have other priorities for staff placement and stations may 

only staff checkpoints—and circumvention routes—with the minimum 

required manpower.79 In the Tucson sector, for example, checkpoints and 

other interior locations had lower priority for staffing than border 

locations, especially border towns such as Nogales, which are major 

transit routes for illegal activity and had experienced higher levels of 

violent crime. As the Border Patrol has gained better control of these 

priority areas at the border, planning documents show that emphasis will 

shift to other areas, including the I-19 checkpoint. 

Checkpoint guidance also identifies other resources, such as technology, 

that can assist Border Patrol agents in detecting and responding to 

circumvention activity, but checkpoints do not always have these 

resources available on a continuous basis. This guidance states that a 

combination of resources, including ground sensors and video surveillance 

cameras, should be used by each sector and station as needed to monitor 

and address local circumvention activities. According to Border Patrol 

officials, the placement and use of these resources can depend on the 

proximity of checkpoints to populated areas, the extent of illegal activity 

in the area, and the availability of circumvention routes around the 

checkpoint. However, officials said that checkpoints may have lower 

priority than other Border Patrol activities to receive new technology, and 

older equipment may be less reliable and less available for continuous 

operation, particularly at tactical checkpoints. For example, the four 

cameras being used at the I-19 checkpoint are not connected to 

commercial power and are therefore vulnerable to generator and 

microwave transmitter issues, according to sector officials. We also noted 

during our visit to the Tucson sector that staff were not available to 

monitor the remote surveillance cameras, limiting their effectiveness. A 

sector official stated that these cameras were continuously monitored only 

when there was a sufficient number of staff operating the checkpoint lanes 

and back-up patrols. Having these technology resources available—and 

monitored—on a continuous basis is important because Border Patrol 

 

78 The policy states that for a single lane checkpoint, there is a minimum requirement of 

one agent assigned to back-up or roving patrol, but that staffing may need to be increased 

depending on the circumstances, such as the number of circumvention routes. 

79 I-19 checkpoint officials stated that agents patrol the circumvention routes on horseback 

and on all-terrain vehicles. 

Page 62 GAO-09-824 
 

 Border Patrol

officials said that circumvention routes were more likely to be patrolled in 

response to a sensor alert or camera indicating that a response is needed 

to address activity in these areas. 

Tucson sector officials stated that when a permanent checkpoint on I-19 is 

constructed, it will include a wider range of sensors and technology 

improvements, such as SBInet towers,80 that will provide a better view of 

the surrounding areas than the towers at the current checkpoint site and 

that will enhance agents’ ability to monitor the circumvention areas 

around the checkpoint. However, checkpoint design and planning 

documents do not include an estimate of the number of agents that would 

be deployed to address circumvention activity at the new checkpoint. Our 

prior work on strategic workforce planning stated that staffing decisions, 

including needs assessments and deployment decisions, should be based 

on valid and reliable data.81 Per Border Patrol checkpoint design 

guidelines, sector officials are expected to determine the number of staff 

they will need for checkpoint operations, such as inspections and 

processing, as part of the design process for constructing new 

checkpoints. For example, the anticipated staffing level for the new 

permanent I-19 checkpoint would be 39 agents on the peak shift, 

according to Border Patrol officials. However, the anticipated 

deployments of these agents are not included in official design or 

operational documents, and sector officials are not required to conduct a 

workforce planning needs assessment to determine how to best address 

impacts on surrounding areas from illegal aliens and smugglers attempting 

to avoid the checkpoint. Sector officials stated that technology 

improvements would enable fewer agents to monitor illegal traffic in these 

areas, and that a sufficient number of agents will be deployed as necessary 

in response to the level of illegal activity. However, given the limited 

resources currently deployed to address circumvention activity at the I-19 

checkpoint and community concerns regarding the extent of illegal 

activity in the circumvention areas, conducting a workforce planning 

needs assessment at the checkpoint design stage could help the Border 

Patrol ensure that sufficient resources are planned for and deployed at the 

new checkpoint to address circumvention activity. 

 

80 SBInet towers are equipped with radar, cameras, and communications systems. 

81 GAO, A Model of Strategic Human Capital Management, GAO-02-373SP (Washington, 

D.C.: Mar. 2002). 

Page 63 GAO-09-824 
 

 Border Patrol

Citizen reports are also important sources of information alerting Border 

Patrol agents to illegal aliens and smugglers trespassing on private 

property, and Border Patrol officials told us they also make efforts to 

establish relationships with local ranching and community groups. For 

example, in the Laredo and San Diego sectors, there are a total of 19 

agents whose full-time or collateral duties are to regularly coordinate with 

local ranchers, maintain relationships, and provide the ranchers with a 

direct point of contact. Border Patrol stations within these sectors can 

develop their own community relations strategies. In the Rio Grande 

Valley sector, for example, Falfurrias station officials told us they hold a 

monthly meeting with local ranchers to discuss any issues or information 

that should be shared regarding the level of activity and number of 

incidents on the various circumvention routes. In contrast, the Patrol 

Agent in Charge of the Kingsville station said he prefers to maintain 

personal relationships with local area ranchers. The Tucson sector, where 

officials have cited a high level of community interaction, has a full-time 

Community Relations Director who participated in more than 45 

community meetings from 2006 to 2009 to discuss issues relating to the 

current and planned I-19 checkpoint. Across other sectors, community 

relations strategies can include participating in community events and 

organizations such as fairs, car shows, and reading to children in local 

schools. 

Increased Violent Crime 

and Decreased Business 

and Real Estate Values Not 

Commonly Cited as 

Adverse Impacts of 

Checkpoint Operations 

Despite concerns regarding property damage type incidents, 

representatives of local government, state and local law enforcement, 

business, ranching, and residents responding to our request for input 

generally stated that checkpoints had no adverse effects on their 

communities in terms of violent crime rates, business, and real estate 

values, similar to findings in our 2005 report in which we reported that 

most local community members we contacted saw traffic checkpoints as 

beneficial to their communities.82 In some cases this could be due to the 

fact that many checkpoints are located in remote areas away from large 

population centers, or that some checkpoints are operated infrequently. In 

regard to crime, officials from 12 law enforcement agencies across the 

four southwest border states told us that checkpoint operations did not 

cause an increase in local violent crime rates. Furthermore, officials from 

seven of these law enforcement agencies stated that they believed 

checkpoints, as well as the presence of Border Patrol agents, provided a 

 

82 GAO-05-435. 

Page 64 GAO-09-824 
 

 Border Patrol

deterrent to criminal activity in their communities. For example, officials 

from the Alamogordo, New Mexico, Department of Public Safety stated 

that their 2007 crime rates place them with some of the lowest crime rates 

among similarly sized cities in New Mexico. The Department’s Director 

believed that this was due, in part, to the presence of the Border Patrol 

agents at the checkpoints on U.S. Routes 54 and 70, approximately 25 

miles south and west of the city of Alamogordo, respectively. In regard to 

real estate values, an official from the local Economic Development 

Council in Kingsville, Texas, told us that homes sales and values north of 

the U.S. Route 77 checkpoint had increased over the years, which he 

believed was due to the increase in agents purchasing homes in the area. 

In contrast, some community members living near the I-19 checkpoint in 

the Tucson sector—which is operated for nearly 24 hours per day and is in 

the proximity of small communities—expressed concerns that checkpoint 

operations caused adverse impacts to their communities in terms of 

increased violent crime, loss of tourism, and reduced real estate values. A 

2007 letter from U.S. Representative Gabrielle Giffords to the Border 

Patrol Chief detailed concerns from residents in her district that smugglers 

were invading their communities, threatening their homes, and that they 

had been affected by violence associated with what appeared to be 

disputes among drug smugglers. Residents from the town of Tubac, 

Arizona, which is a community close to the I-19 checkpoint location, 

reported concerns that tourism in their community had declined due to the 

proximity of the checkpoint. In addition, the president of a local civic 

association from Tubac told us that the checkpoint had negatively affected 

home sales and housing values. 

Border Patrol Has 

Identified Measures for 

Assessing Impact of 

Checkpoint Operations on 

Surrounding Areas, but 

Has Not Used Them 

Border Patrol officials said that they are not yet using performance 

measures they had developed to examine how checkpoint operations—

including checkpoint circumvention activity—impact the quality of life in 

surrounding communities. The measures—which are consistent with the 

Border Patrol National Strategy to reduce crime and consequently improve 

the quality of life and economic vitality in border enforcement areas—

examine major crime reduction, smuggler activity in areas affected by 

checkpoint operations, and coordination with other federal, state, and 

local law enforcement agencies. (See appendix II for a description of the 

quality of life measures.) We have previously reported that measuring 

performance allows organizations to track the progress they are making 

Page 65 GAO-09-824 
 

 Border Patrol

toward their goals and gives managers critical information on which to 

base decisions for improving their programs.83 Our previous work has 

shown that when evaluating performance, agencies needed to have 

measures that demonstrated results, covered multiple priorities, provided 

useful information for decision making, and successfully addressed 

important and varied aspects of program performance.84

The Border Patrol has included data fields in the CAR to collect 

information relevant to some of the quality of life measures, but the 

Border Patrol has not developed specific guidance for using the data to 

assess the impact of operations on surrounding areas, and not all sectors 

and stations consistently enter the data necessary to use the measures. 

These limitations in guidance and data collection have hindered the ability 

of the Border Patrol to assess the impact of checkpoints on local 

communities. For example, one quality of life measure examines the 

number of apprehensions and seizures turned over to the checkpoint from 

other agencies, known as agency assists or referrals, when the checkpoint 

is operational or non-operational. These data can provide information on 

the extent to which the Border Patrol is able to address illegal activity 

traveling through communities to circumvent the checkpoint when it is 

operational. While the Border Patrol does not consistently track agency 

assists and referrals from local law enforcement agencies in the CAR, data 

we obtained from two local sheriff’s departments near the I-19 checkpoint 

in the Tucson sector show that analyzing this information over time may 

be informative. As shown in figure 14, Arizona’s Santa Cruz County 

Sheriff’s Department reported a total of 84 assists to other agencies, 

including the Border Patrol, in District 2 (which contains the I-19 

checkpoint85) an increase of approximately 8 percent from 2007.86 North of 

the I-19 checkpoint, Pima County Sheriff’s Department Green Valley 

District87 reported a total of 247 referrals to the Border Patrol in 2008, a 

 

83 GAO, Executive Guide: Effectively Implementing the Government Performance and 

Results Act, GAO/GGD-96-118 (Washington, D.C.: June 1996). 

84 GAO-03-143. 

85 Santa Cruz County Sheriff’s Department District 2 covers the area from Rio Rico to the 

south up to the Pima County line on the north, including the areas of Tubac, Tumacacori, 

Carmen, Amado, and Arivaca. 

86 Santa Cruz County Sheriff’s Department tracks all agency assists in one category. 

According to the Santa Cruz County Sheriff’s Department, approximately 75 percent of all 

agency assists are incidents where the individual is turned over to the Border Patrol. 

87 Pima County Sheriff’s Department Green Valley Patrol District covers the area from the 

Santa Cruz County line on the south to approximately KP 80 on I-19 on the north. 

Page 66 GAO-09-824 
 

 Border Patrol

decrease of approximately 7 percent from 2007. Analysis of these data by 

the Border Patrol may show, for example, the extent to which relative 

fluctuations and differences in agency assists or referrals in and among 

locations are due to checkpoint operations or other factors, such as 

Operation Stonegarden, a program providing funding to state and local law 

enforcement personnel to provide additional coverage on routes of egress 

from border areas. 

Figure 14: Quarterly Number of Pima County Sheriff’s Department Referrals to the Border Patrol and Santa Cruz County 

Assists to Other Agencies, January 1, 2004 through December 31, 2008 

Number of referrals or agency assists

Source: Pima County and Santa Cruz County Sheriff’s Departments.

2005 2006 2007 2008

Santa Cruz County Sheriff’s Department, District 2

Pima County Sheriff’s Department, Green Valley District

0

20

40

60

80

100

120

140

Oct. 1- Dec. 31

July 1- Sept. 30

July 1- 

Oct. 1- Dec. 31

Jan. 1- Mar. 31

Apr. 1- June 30

Sept. 30

July 1- 

Oct. 1- Dec. 31

Jan. 1- Mar. 31

Apr. 1- June 30

Sept. 30

July 1- 

Oct. 1- Dec. 31

Jan. 1- Mar. 31

Apr. 1- June 30

Sept. 30

Jan. 1- Mar. 31

Apr. 1- June 30

Note: Santa Cruz County Sheriff’s Department tracks the number of agency assists, which includes 

Border Patrol and all other agency assists. Pima County Sheriff’s Department tracks the number of 

referrals to the Border Patrol separately from other agencies. 

Page 67 GAO-09-824 
 

Sufficient data were not available for us to determine any causal 

relationship between checkpoint operations and local crime rates, tourism 

trends, or real estate values in nearby communities. With respect to the I19 checkpoint, these data limitations also precluded a comparison of 

community impacts for the time before and after the checkpoint on I-19 

became fixed at the KP 42 location in November 2006. Such a comparison 

would require a complete set of historical data to develop a baseline 

understanding, before interpreting factors that can change the baseline. 

However, there are limited data sets for specific geographic areas around 

the I-19 checkpoint, with county level data the smallest possible 

geographic area, in many cases. We conducted a literature search and 

identified several studies that attempted to link Border Patrol checkpoints 

or other aspects of border enforcement operations to local crime, 

business, or real estate values. These studies were also unable to establish 

a causal link between Border Patrol operations and changes in crime rates 

or real estate values due to unavailable or incomplete data, or the inability 

to separate the impact of border operations from many other contributing 

factors, such as local and national economic factors. 88 In terms of crime 

data, for example, officials from Santa Cruz and Pima County Sheriff’s 

Departments said that data are not available in their information systems 

to identify the number of crimes committed by illegal aliens, or how many 

crimes occurred on checkpoint circumvention routes. A more detailed 

discussion on our methodology and limitations to this analysis can be 

found in appendix I. 

Data Unavailable to Link 

Checkpoint Operations to 

Changes in Community 

Crime Rates, Tourism, or 

Real Estate Values 

Despite the limitations in determining any causal relationship between 

checkpoint operations and crime, tourism, and real estate values in nearby 

communities, some historical data were available from federal, state, and 

local agencies that could be used to show overall trends in real estate 

values, tourism,89 and crime for some communities near the I-19 

checkpoint, relevant counties, and the state, without controlling for 

checkpoint operations or other factors. As shown in figure 15, the I-19 

checkpoint in Arizona is located in the northern part of Santa Cruz County 

and the county immediately to the north is Pima County. Communities 

 

88 Homeland Security Institute, Customs and Border Protection (CBP) Operational 

Assessment, RP06-51-02 (Arlington, Va.: Mar. 30, 2007) and Homeland Security Institute, 

Measuring the Effect of the Arizona Border Control Initiative (Arlington, Va.: Oct. 18, 

2005). 

89 We used data on tourism, rather than business activity, because U.S. Census Bureau data 

on business activity trends for 2007 and 2008 were not available at the time of completing 

this report. Business trend data from the U.S. Census Bureau can be found in appendix V. 

Page 68 GAO-09-824 Border Patrol
 

 Border Patrol

closest to the I-19 checkpoint include Tubac, which is located 

approximately 4 miles south of the checkpoint in Santa Cruz County, and 

Green Valley, which is located about 15 miles north of the checkpoint in 

Pima County. 

Page 69 GAO-09-824 
 

 Border Patrol

Figure 15: Map of all Arizona Counties, Santa Cruz and Pima Counties, and the I-19 Corridor 

Sources: GAO (analysis), MapResources (map).

b. Pima County, Santa Cruz County

Marana

Oro Valley

Patagonia

Sells

Catalina

Tucson Estates

Green Valley

Tucson

Yuma

Apache

Cochise

Coconino

Gila

Graham

Maricopa Greenlee

Mohave

Navajo

Pinal

Santa Cruz

Yavapai

La Paz

Pima

MEXICO

a. Arizona

MEXICO

Amado

Carmen

Nogales

Patagonia

Sonoita

MEXICO

c. I-19 corridor

Rio Rico

Tubac

Border Patrol I-19 checkpoint

PIMA COUNTY

Amado

SANTA CRUZ COUNTY

Nogales

State Hwy 86

Indian Route 15

ETaladro Avenue

I-19

I-10

AZ-77

Sonoita

I-19

SANTA CRUZ COUNTY

State Hwy 83

Page 70 GAO-09-824 
 

 Border Patrol

Real estate property values for locations south and north of the I-19 

checkpoint have generally been increasing in the years from 2002 through 

2008 as measured by the median county tax assessed value, shown in 

figure 16. The Tubac community had the highest real estate values of the 

areas we examined, with property values more than three times as high as 

properties in Santa Cruz County, and more than twice as high as 

properties in the Green Valley community and Pima County.90 Data on the 

median sales price and net assessed value of homes in these areas showed 

similar results, as shown in appendix IV. 

Real Estate Property Values 

Figure 16: Median Real Estate Property Value for Residential Properties in the Arizona Communities of Tubac and Green 

Valley and Counties of Santa Cruz and Pima, 2002 through 2008 

0

25,000

50,000

75,000

100,000

125,000

150,000

175,000

200,000

225,000

250,000

275,000

300,000

325,000

350,000

375,000

2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008

Median property value (in dollars)

Year

Source: Santa Cruz County Tax Assessor’s Office and Pima County Tax Assessor’s Office.

Tubac

Santa Cruz County

Pima County

Green Valley

 

90 According to the Arizona Department of Revenue, all counties are required to have 18-

month lag data and the sales data are adjusted based off current market trends. 

Page 71 GAO-09-824 
 

 Border Patrol

Tourism data, as reflected by visitor data reported by Arizona state parks, 

showed no consistent pattern between the years 2002 through 2008 for 

parks located near Tubac community (Tubac Presidio State Historic 

Park),91 or in other areas of Santa Cruz County (the Patagonia Lake State 

Park), and Arizona. As shown in figure 17, the number of visitors to these 

parks generally fluctuated within a 15 percent window from year to year, 

except for the year between 2006 and 2007, when visitors to Tubac state 

park decreased by 29 percent, a substantial difference compared to other 

locations. According to an Arizona State Parks representative, this decline 

could have been caused by several factors, including a large number of 

events in 2006 at the Tubac state park to celebrate the park’s 50th 

anniversary that resulted in more park attendees in 2006, an overall 

decline in visitors to other parks in Santa Cruz County, and a statewide 

decline in overall spending and international visitors. All of these parks 

experienced a decline in visitors the following year ending 2008, ranging 

from 7 to 10 percent. Similar declines were seen in other tourism data 

based on lodging statistics for the counties and state of Arizona (see 

appendix VI). 

Tourism 

 

91 We used data on the number of visitors to the state parks because other tourism data 

from the Arizona Office of Tourism were unavailable below the county level. These countylevel tourism data, such as revenue per available room and occupancy rates, are included 

in appendix VI. 

Page 72 GAO-09-824 
 

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Figure 17: Percentage Annual Change in Number of Visitors to Arizona State Parks, 

2002 through 2008 

Patagonia Lake State Park

Tubac Presidio State Historic Park

All Arizona State Parks

-35

-30

-25

-20

-15

-10

-5

0

5

10

15

20

2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008

Percentage change from previous year

Source: GAO analysis using most recent data from the Arizona State Parks.

Year

Page 73 GAO-09-824 
 

 Border Patrol

Violent crime data from county sheriff departments92 showed that the 

number of homicides, sexual and aggravated assaults, and robberies was 

substantially lower in the district containing the I-19 checkpoint and the 

surrounding communities of Tubac,93 Tumacacori, Carmen, Amado, and 

Arivaca than other nearby areas, from 2004 through 2008, but has been 

increasing at a higher rate than nearby areas in the last 2 years as shown in 

figure 18. Specifically, violent crime in District 2 almost doubled from 8 

offenses in 2006 to 15 offenses in 2008. In contrast, violent crime in the 

Green Valley District north of the I-19 checkpoint has been decreasing 

since 2006, although the number of offenses remains almost twice as high. 

Additional information on crime trends for these counties can be found in 

appendix VII. 

Crime 

 

92 Officials from Santa Cruz and Pima County Sheriff’s Departments said that data are not 

available in their information systems to identify if any of these crimes were committed by 

illegal aliens. 

93 The Santa Cruz County Sheriff’s Department does not track crime data for the Tubac 

community specifically. Tubac is not an incorporated city and does not have its own police 

department but is included within the Santa Cruz County Sheriff’s Department District 2. 

Page 74 GAO-09-824 
 

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Figure 18: Number of Violent Crime Offenses and Annual Percentage Change for 

Selected Arizona Locations, 2004 through 2008 

Number of offenses

Percentage change

from previous year

Source: GAO analysis of Pima County and Santa Cruz County Sheriff’s Departments data. 

Year

Santa Cruz County Sheriff’s Department, District 2 number of offenses

Pima County Sheriff’s Department, Green Valley District number of offenses

Santa Cruz County percentage change

Pima County percentage change

-30

-20

-10

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

-30

-20

-10

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

2004 2005 2006 2007 2008

Note: Percentages for data from relatively small populations may convey a level of precision that can 

be misleading because they can change greatly with minor changes in the data, therefore, when this 

occurs, we identify the number. 

Crime patterns were similar for property offenses, which include burglary, 

larceny, auto theft, and arson. As shown in figure 19, District 2 containing 

the I-19 checkpoint experienced a 38 percent increase in property crimes 

compared to Green Valley District from 2007 to 2008, although the total 

number of offenses in 2008 was much lower; 58 versus 534 offenses, 

respectively. County level changes were also higher for Santa Cruz County 

compared to Pima County, which had a slight decline. 

Page 75 GAO-09-824 
 

 Border Patrol

Figure 19: Number of Property Crime Offenses and Percentage Annual Change for 

Selected Arizona Locations, 2004 through 2008 

Number of offenses

Percentage change

from previous year

Source: GAO analysis of Pima County and Santa Cruz County Sheriff’s Departments data. 

Year

Santa Cruz County Sheriff’s Department, District 2 number of offenses

Pima County Sheriff’s Department, Green Valley District number of offenses

Santa Cruz County percentage change

Pima County percentage change

0

100

200

300

400

500

600

-10

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

90

100

2004 2005 2006 2007 2008

Within the past few years, CBP and the Border Patrol have increased staff, 

fencing, and other technology at the border to deter repeated illegal 

border crossings. Despite these investments at the border, however, it 

would appear that checkpoints will continue to serve a purpose as part of 

the Border Patrol’s three-tiered strategy. As long as agency goals indicate 

that the majority of major criminal activity will pass through the ports of 

entry undetected, checkpoints are uniquely positioned to provide 

additional opportunities to apprehend illegal aliens and contraband that 

travel from the ports along U.S. interstates or roads. 

Conclusions 

Since our last report, the Border Patrol has established performance 

measures indicating checkpoint contributions toward apprehending illegal 

aliens and seizing illegal drugs, but the lack of information on those 

passing through checkpoints undetected continues to challenge the 

Border Patrol’s ability to measure checkpoint effectiveness and provide 

Page 76 GAO-09-824 
 

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public accountability. While the Border Patrol has developed other 

measures in response to our 2005 recommendation that collectively may 

provide some indication of checkpoint effectiveness and efficiency, these 

measures cannot be effectively used until field agents accurately and 

consistently collect and enter performance data into the checkpoint 

information system. Field agents are unlikely to do so until guidance is 

improved, and rigorous oversight is implemented at the station, sector, 

and headquarters levels. The Border Patrol states that it will take action to 

address these issues. Until these actions are completed, however, the 

integrity of the CBP performance and accountability system in regard to 

checkpoint operations is uncertain. We reiterate the need for CBP to act 

on our prior recommendation to implement a cost-effectiveness measure 

in order to help encourage action by headquarters and field managers to 

identify best practices for checkpoint operation, and implement these 

practices across locations. Similarly, while the Border Patrol’s national 

strategy cites the importance of assessing the community impact of Border 

Patrol operations, the implementation of such measures is noticeably 

lacking. Implementing such measures in areas of community concern may 

serve to provide greater attention and priority in Border Patrol operational 

and staffing decisions to address any existing issues. 

Although the Border Patrol’s checkpoint design process includes factors 

related to the safety and convenience of travelers, agents, and detainees, 

the absence of explicit requirements in Border Patrol checkpoint design 

guidelines and standards to consider current and expected traffic volumes 

when determining the number of inspection lanes and to conduct traffic 

studies could result in inconsistencies in the checkpoint design process 

and the risk that checkpoints may not be appropriately sized. 

Furthermore, the fact that the checkpoint strategy intends to push illegal 

aliens and smugglers to areas around checkpoints—which could include 

nearby communities—underscores the need for the Border Patrol to 

ensure that it deploys sufficient resources and staff to these areas. 

Conducting a needs assessment when planning for a new or upgraded 

checkpoint could help better ensure that officials consider the potential 

impact of the checkpoint on the community and plan for a sufficient 

number of agents and resources. 

To improve the reliability and accountability of checkpoint performance 

results to the Congress and the public, we recommend that the 

Commissioner of Customs and Border Protection take the following four 

actions: 

Recommendations for 

Executive Action 

Page 77 GAO-09-824 
 

 Border Patrol

• Establish milestones for determining the feasibility of a checkpoint 

performance model that would allow the Border Patrol to compare 

apprehensions and seizures to the level of illegal activity passing 

through the checkpoint undetected. 

• Establish internal controls for management oversight of the accuracy, 

consistency, and completeness of checkpoint performance data. 

• Implement the quality of life measures that have already been 

identified by the Border Patrol to evaluate the impact that checkpoints 

have on local communities. Implementing these measures would 

include identifying appropriate data sources available at the local, 

state, or federal level, and developing guidance for how data should be 

collected and used in support of these measures. 

• Use the information generated from the quality of life measures in 

conjunction with other relevant factors to inform resource allocations 

and address identified impacts. 

To ensure that the checkpoint design process results in checkpoints that 

are sized and resourced to meet operational and community needs, we 

recommend that the Commissioner of Customs and Border Protection 

take the following two actions: 

• Require that current and expected traffic volumes be considered by 

the Border Patrol when determining the number of inspection lanes at 

new permanent checkpoints, that traffic studies be conducted and 

documented, and that these requirements be explicitly documented in 

Border Patrol checkpoint design guidelines and standards. 

• In connection with planning for new or upgraded checkpoints, conduct 

a workforce planning needs assessment for checkpoint staffing 

allocations to determine the resources needed to address anticipated 

levels of illegal activity around the checkpoint. 

We provided a draft of this report to DHS and DOJ for review and 

comment. DHS provided written comments on August 24, 2009, which are 

presented in appendix VIII. In commenting on the draft report, DHS and 

CBP stated that they agreed with our recommendations and identified 

actions planned or underway to implement the recommendations. DOJ did 

not provide formal comments. CBP and DOJ also provided technical 

comments, which we incorporated as appropriate. 

Agency Comments 

Page 78 GAO-09-824 
 

We are sending copies of this report to the Secretary of Homeland 

Security, the Commissioner of U.S. Customs and Border Protection, the 

Attorney General, and other interested parties. In addition, this report will 

be available at no charge on the GAO Web site at http://www.gao.gov. 

If you have any further questions about this report, please contact me at 

(202) 512-8777 or stanar@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of 

Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page 

Richard M. Stana 

of this report. Key contributors to this report are listed in appendix IX. 

Director, Homeland Security and Justice Issues 

Page 79 GAO-09-824 Border Patrol
 

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List of Requesters 

The Honorable Jon Kyl 

Ranking Member 

Subcommittee on Terrorism and Homeland Security 

Committee on the Judiciary 

United States Senate 

The Honorable John Cornyn 

Ranking Member 

Subcommittee on Immigration, Refugees and Border Security 

Committee on the Judiciary 

United States Senate 

The Honorable David E. Price 

Chairman 

Subcommittee on Homeland Security 

Committee on Appropriations 

House of Representatives 

The Honorable John McCain 

United States Senate 

The Honorable Bob Filner 

House of Representatives 

The Honorable Gabrielle Giffords 

House of Representatives 

The Honorable Silvestre Reyes 

House of Representatives 

The Honorable Ciro D. Rodriguez 

House of Representatives 

Page 80 GAO-09-824 
A

Me

ppendix I: Objectives, Scope, and

thodology 

Page 81 GAO-09-824 

Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and 

Methodology 

This report addresses the following four principal questions: 

• How has checkpoint performance contributed to meeting Border 

Patrol goals for securing the southwest border, and what factors, if 

any, have affected checkpoint performance? 

• To what extent has the Border Patrol established measures of 

performance for checkpoints? 

• To what extent has the Border Patrol considered community impacts 

in the placement and design of checkpoints since 2006, including the 

planned I-19 permanent checkpoint? 

• How do checkpoint operations impact nearby communities, 

particularly those near the I-19 checkpoint, and to what extent does 

the Border Patrol address those impacts? 

To address our objectives, we examined and analyzed Border Patrol 

checkpoint policy documents, reports, manuals, and guidance concerning 

border strategy and checkpoint operations. We interviewed cognizant 

Border Patrol officials at Washington, D.C. headquarters, officials in sector 

offices, and personnel at selected permanent and tactical checkpoints. We 

visited five Border Patrol sectors—San Diego, California; Tucson, Arizona; 

Laredo, Texas; Rio Grande Valley, Texas; and El Paso, Texas (which also 

covers all of New Mexico). In total, we visited 12 permanent checkpoints 

and 3 tactical checkpoints, as shown in table 10. 

Objectives 

Scope and 

Methodology 

 Border Patrol
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and 

Methodology 

 Border Patrol

Table 10: Checkpoints Visited by GAO, by Border Patrol Sector 

Sector Checkpoints visited 

San Diego • I-5 (permanent) 

• I-15 (permanent) 

• I-8 West (permanent) 

• State Route 94 (permanent) 

Tucson • I-19 (tactical) 

• Arivaca Road (tactical) 

• State Route 82 (tactical) 

Laredo • I-35 (permanent) 

• U.S. Route 83 North (permanent) 

Rio Grande Valley • U.S. Route 77 (permanent) 

• U.S. Route 281 (permanent) 

El Paso • I-10 (permanent) 

• I-25 (permanent) 

• U.S. Route 54 (permanent) 

• U.S. Route 70 (permanent) 

Source: GAO. 

The five sectors we visited were selected to provide a range in the size and 

types of checkpoint operations; estimated annual volume of illegal aliens; 

volume of vehicular traffic transiting checkpoints; topography and density 

of road networks; presence or absence of large urban areas on or near the 

border, both on the U.S. and Mexican sides; and types of checkpoints 

(permanent and tactical). As we were told by the Border Patrol in deciding 

which sectors and checkpoints to visit, and as we found during our site 

visits, these five sectors contained a wide variety of operating conditions. 

For example, we observed that traffic volumes varied widely at different 

checkpoints. Similarly, there were variations in the estimated numbers of 

illegal aliens entering these sectors over the last several years, and 

differences in topography, with some being comparatively mountainous 

and others being comparatively flat. During the winter months, the Laredo 

and Rio Grande Valley sectors have the Rio Grande as a natural barrier to 

illegal immigration, while the Tucson sector has a flat desert at the border 

that is easily crossed. Some sectors have permanent checkpoints, such as 

at Temecula, California, that must be supplemented with tactical 

checkpoints, because of substantial secondary road networks around the 

permanent checkpoint. Others, such as Rio Grande Valley, have no 

alternative secondary roads available to evade the permanent checkpoints 

on the limited north-south highways. Some sectors, such as San Diego and 

Laredo, have large U.S. and Mexican urban areas on or very near the 

Page 82 GAO-09-824 
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and 

Methodology 

 Border Patrol

international border, while others, such as Tucson, have only a few much 

smaller cities on either side at the border. In choosing these sectors, which 

are located in all four southwest border states (California, Arizona, New 

Mexico, and Texas), we sought and found a wide range of conditions that 

appear to reasonably represent the range of operating conditions faced by 

the Border Patrol across the Southwest. However, we were unable to 

observe all operating conditions at all times and the conditions we 

describe are therefore based on available documentation and observations 

at our site visits only. 

We also interviewed selected officials in communities near some of the 

checkpoints, including state and local law enforcement and community 

officials, selected community leaders, citizens, and owners of local 

businesses. These included the communities of Temecula, California; 

Green Valley, Arizona; Nogales, Arizona; Sahaurita, Arizona; Tubac, 

Arizona; Laredo, Texas; Sarita, Texas; Kingsville, Texas; Falfurrias, Texas; 

Las Cruces, New Mexico; and Alamogordo, New Mexico. Because these 

places and persons was a nonprobability sample, the results from our site 

visits cannot be generalized to other locations, checkpoints, local officials, 

or citizens, but what we learned from our site visits and the persons we 

interviewed provided a useful perspective on the issues addressed in this 

report. 

However, this report does not address some of the larger issues 

surrounding illegal immigration into the United States, such as the 

disparities in average daily wages between Mexico and the United States, 

and the incentives created by these disparities for illegal immigration, as 

well as the difficulties of neutralizing such disparities through work site 

enforcement. We have addressed some of these issues in prior work.1

 In 

addition, although deterring illegal immigration through the likelihood of 

detection and apprehension is a goal of the Border Patrol—and 

checkpoints—we did not attempt to measure the deterrent effect of the 

Border Patrol’s operations, as this would have required, among other 

things, opinion surveys of Mexican citizens and potential contraband 

smugglers. This report also does not address the larger factors related to 

illegal drugs in the United States, such as the demand for illegal drugs in 

the United States and the incentives those create, U.S. and Mexican 

 

1

 See, for example, GAO, Immigration Enforcement: Weaknesses Hinder Employment 

Verification and Worksite Enforcement Efforts, GAO-06-895T (Washington, D.C.: June 19, 

2006). 

Page 83 GAO-09-824 
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and 

Methodology 

 Border Patrol

government efforts to address the smuggling of illegal drugs, and the U.S. 

government anti-drug policies. 

We conducted this performance audit from July 2008 to August 2009 in 

accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those 

standards require that we plan and perform our audit to obtain sufficient, 

appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and 

conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe the evidence 

obtained provides this reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions 

based on our audit objectives. 

Checkpoint Contributions To assess the contributions checkpoints make to the Border Patrol’s 

mission and the factors that affect checkpoint performance, we reviewed 

Border Patrol policy and guidance regarding checkpoint operations and 

interviewed officials at Border Patrol headquarters, including the Chief 

and other senior managers, and officials responsible for operating 

checkpoints in five of the nine Border Patrol sectors on the southwest 

border. We obtained data reported in Border Patrol’s checkpoint activity 

report (CAR) for all checkpoints, permanent and tactical, located in 

southwest border states. We were limited to data from fiscal years 2007 

and 2008 because while the CAR was implemented in July 2006, consistent 

data for all checkpoints were not available until October 2006—the 

beginning of fiscal year 2007. To obtain checkpoint apprehensions and 

seizures by sector, we added apprehensions and seizures that occurred at 

each sector’s checkpoints for each fiscal year. Of the 71 checkpoints 

located in the nine southwest border sectors, only two checkpoints in the 

Rio Grande Valley sector defined apprehensions and seizures at 

checkpoint in a manner inconsistent with Border Patrol guidance. These 

two checkpoints count all apprehensions and seizures occurring within 2.5 

miles of the checkpoint as occurring “at checkpoint,” as of August 2008. 

Prior to August 2008, these two checkpoints used the same definition as 

other checkpoints—that an apprehension or seizure at a checkpoint 

occurs “at the immediate checkpoint.” Nevertheless, we believe these 

checkpoint data to be sufficiently reliable for reporting purposes, with 

limitations noted, based on the steps we describe in the next section. We 

also obtained data from the Border Patrol on total apprehensions and drug 

seizures across each of the nine southwest border sectors to compare the 

relative contributions of each sector’s checkpoints to overall 

apprehensions and drug seizures on the southwest border. In addition, we 

obtained data from the CAR on the number of aliens from special interest 

countries encountered at checkpoints in fiscal years 2007 and 2008, and 

obtained information from U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) and 

Page 84 GAO-09-824 
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Methodology 

 Border Patrol

Border Patrol officials regarding how those encounters are managed and 

documented. We reviewed Border Patrol guidance and interviewed 

officials responsible for checkpoint operations in five Border Patrol 

sectors regarding factors that influence checkpoint performance. We also 

interviewed Drug Enforcement Administration and selected local law 

enforcement officials located near checkpoints in five Border Patrol 

sectors to determine the extent to which Border Patrol checkpoints 

support or impact their respective law enforcement operations. 

Assessment of Checkpoint 

Performance Measures 

To assess Border Patrol’s checkpoint performance measures, we reviewed 

documents from Border Patrol and CBP, including a document identifying 

various checkpoint performance measures developed by Border Patrol, 

CBP’s annual Performance and Accountability Reports (PAR) for fiscal 

years 2006 through 2008, and DHS’s annual performance reports for fiscal 

years 2007 through 2010. We also reviewed our prior report on 

checkpoints, which found that Border Patrol had not established adequate 

performance measures for checkpoints.2

 We met with Border Patrol 

headquarters officials responsible for developing and implementing 

checkpoint performance measures to discuss the measures and how they 

are used by Border Patrol management. We also met with officials at the 

Border Patrol sectors we visited to discuss the checkpoint performance 

measures. In addition, we compared Border Patrol’s performance 

measures and data collection practices with the Government Performance 

and Results Act of 1993 (GPRA)3

 and GAO’s Standards for Internal 

Control in the Federal Government.

4

To assess the reliability of checkpoint performance data and to determine 

how checkpoint supervisors input information into the CAR, we sent a 

data collection instrument to Border Patrol officials, who provided it to all 

Border Patrol stations along the southwest border responsible for 

operating checkpoints. The CAR is the primary data collection system for 

checkpoint performance data. We received responses from 60 

checkpoints. We determined, based on these responses, our own 

observations of checkpoint data entry at some checkpoints, and a review 

of Border Patrol provided data, that data on “at checkpoint” 

 

2 GAO-05-435. 

3

 Pub. L. No. 103-62, 107 Stat. 285 (1993). 

4 GAO/AIMD-00-21.3.1. 

Page 85 GAO-09-824 
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Methodology 

 Border Patrol

apprehensions and seizures were sufficiently reliable for reporting 

purposes, but other data fields were not consistently collected and 

therefore not reliable for our reporting purposes. Based on the results of 

the data collection instrument, we identified various factors that 

contribute to checkpoint data reliability issues. We also interviewed 

Border Patrol headquarters officials and officials at the five sectors we 

visited in the field about data integrity procedures, including methods by 

which data are checked and reviewed for accuracy. We also reviewed 

documents to determine what guidance is provided for collecting and 

reporting checkpoint performance data, and what steps could be taken to 

address identified data problems. 

To assess Border Patrol’s reporting of checkpoint performance measures 

in the annual CBP PAR, we compared the reported results with our own 

calculations of checkpoint performance data. These checkpoint 

performance measures reported in the PAR are (1) apprehensions at 

checkpoints as a percentage of total Border Patrol apprehensions, (2) drug 

seizures at checkpoints as a percentage of total Border Patrol drug 

seizures, and (3) percentage of checkpoint cases referred to a U.S. 

Attorney. For the first two measures, we used data from the CAR to 

calculate the total number of checkpoint apprehensions and checkpoint 

drug seizures, and divided that result by total apprehensions and drug 

seizures in Border Patrol’s nine southwest border sectors. For the referral 

measure, we again used data from the CAR to calculate the total number 

of checkpoint cases that result in a referral to a U.S. Attorney. We then 

divided that number by total apprehensions occurring at southwest border 

checkpoints. We noted discrepancies between Border Patrol’s reported 

performance and our analysis of the results of Border Patrol performance 

measures, and we discussed these discrepancies with Border Patrol 

officials responsible for checkpoint performance measurement. 

We attempted to analyze other aspects of checkpoint performance, such 

as apprehensions at checkpoints compared to apprehensions on 

circumvention routes and apprehension and seizures using methods of 

concealment. However, our ability to report on these measures for all 

checkpoints was limited because we identified inconsistencies through 

our data collection instrument in how those data are reported by 

checkpoints in southwest border sectors. We discussed the issues we 

found with Border Patrol headquarters officials responsible for oversight 

of checkpoint operations. 

We also developed additional measures intended to allow for comparisons 

between checkpoints, but certain data limitations hinder detailed 

Page 86 GAO-09-824 
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Methodology 

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quantitative analysis. As stated earlier, it is not possible to use the 

numbers of apprehensions and seizures made at checkpoints as the sole 

basis for comparison between checkpoints, because there are a number of 

factors and variables that can influence and impact checkpoint 

performance. For example, a checkpoint that accounted for 500 

apprehensions is not necessarily better or more effective than a 

checkpoint that accounted for 50 apprehensions. The differences in 

apprehension totals between the checkpoints could be attributed to a 

number of factors that are outside of the control of the checkpoint, such 

as variations in operational hours and differences in traffic volume. As 

such, we developed measures that were intended to normalize or control 

for these variables. These measures included examining apprehensions 

and seizures on an operational hour basis, apprehensions and seizures per 

agent year, and apprehensions and seizures based upon the average annual 

daily traffic volume at the checkpoint. 

First, in the case of our operational hour analysis, checkpoints that were 

not operational as long as others appeared to perform better than 

checkpoints that were operational nearly 24 hours per day. For example, 

using this measure, the I-5 checkpoint in the San Diego sector is one of the 

best performing checkpoints. However, it is only operational, on average, 

1.5 hours per day. Meanwhile, the checkpoint located on U.S. Route 281 in 

Falfurrias, Texas, seizes more drugs and apprehends more illegal aliens 

than the I-5 checkpoint, and is open 23 hours and 20 minutes every day, on 

average, but does not perform as well as the I-5 checkpoint using an 

operational hour measure. Therefore, while the I-5 checkpoint performs 

well using an operational hour analysis measure, one can assume that 

drugs and illegal aliens pass through that checkpoint in the hours that it is 

not operational. 

Second, we attempted to develop a cost effectiveness measure for 

permanent checkpoints that would examine apprehensions and seizures 

per agent work year. We chose this measure because a question that is 

frequently, if not almost universally, asked about government programs, is, 

“What is known about their cost effectiveness?” One potential measure of 

such cost effectiveness for the Border Patrol would be how much did it 

cost to apprehend a single person or seize illegal drugs in one checkpoint 

compared with other checkpoints or other Border Patrol activities? While 

this measure and others should not be taken in isolation as further guides 

to management decisions, knowledge of the basic costs of an agency’s key 

outcomes (such as apprehensions of illegal aliens) per unit of input (agent 

labor costs) can be part of the basis for improved allocation of resources. 

Page 87 GAO-09-824 
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Methodology 

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While such a performance measure can provide some information on cost 

effectiveness, some apprehensions or seizures may be considered more 

important to the agency than others. For instance, apprehending a drug 

smuggler or a terrorist might be considered more important than 

apprehending an illegal alien job seeker. Additionally, in attempting to 

develop this measure, we learned that at least 20 of the 32 permanent 

checkpoints on the southwest border have migrated to a four overlapping 

shift format, while the CAR is limited to reporting of three shifts. As a 

result, at least 20 permanent checkpoints are unable to accurately report 

the number of agents assigned to the checkpoint, limiting our ability to 

conduct an apprehension and seizure by agent work year analysis. In 

addition, the Border Patrol does not track the number of agents staffed to 

line watch and roving patrol operations, so we could not compare the 

performance of checkpoints (as measured by apprehensions and seizures 

per agent work year) to these other Border Patrol activities. 

Third, we attempted to conduct an analysis of permanent checkpoints’ 

apprehensions and seizures in relation to traffic volume. Because it could 

be assumed that checkpoints with high traffic volumes may also have high 

apprehension and seizure totals, such an analysis was an attempt to 

normalize for differences in traffic volume to determine if certain 

checkpoints have higher apprehension and seizure rates per traffic volume 

than others. Higher rates of apprehensions and seizures could indicate a 

more effective checkpoint—that is, one that is better able to detect illegal 

activity—or it could be due to volume of illegal traffic coming through the 

checkpoint. We attempted to use the traffic volume numbers reported by 

checkpoint in the CAR, but could not determine whether those numbers 

were reliable. Therefore, we accessed the online transportation databases 

for the four southwest border states and obtained average annual daily 

traffic volume for major highways in California, Arizona, New Mexico, and 

Texas. However, we could not conduct a comprehensive analysis for all 

checkpoints using this measure because (1) checkpoints were located at 

various distances from a traffic counter or (2) checkpoints (particularly 

tactical checkpoints) were on a highway that did not have a traffic 

counter. 

Border Patrol’s 

Consideration of 

Community Impacts in the 

Checkpoint Placement and 

Design Process 

Regarding checkpoint placement and design, we met with officials from 

CBP Facilities Management and Engineering, Border Patrol Tactical 

Infrastructures, Border Patrol Southwest Operations Division, and Border 

Patrol sector and station offices to understand the checkpoint placement 

and design process and the roles and responsibilities of each office and 

component. We also reviewed available Border Patrol and CBP 

documentation describing the checkpoint placement and design process, 

Page 88 GAO-09-824 
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Methodology 

 Border Patrol

such as the 2003 Border Patrol Facilities Design Guide and Border Patrol 

checkpoint policy. 

We assessed the extent to which the Border Patrol considered community 

impacts in the design and placement of checkpoints that were either (a) 

new permanent checkpoints constructed in the last 3 years, or (b) new 

permanent checkpoints currently under construction. We did not include 

all checkpoints in our analysis, because the guidelines and standards for 

checkpoint placement and design have changed over time, and it would 

not be appropriate to assess checkpoints that were built decades ago with 

current checkpoint placement and design guidelines. In addition, limited 

documentation is available for checkpoints constructed prior to 2006, 

according to Border Patrol and CBP officials. We did not include 

checkpoints that were or are being renovated or expanded, because they 

would not be subject to Border Patrol’s checkpoint placement guidelines. 

We also did not include tactical checkpoints in our analysis, because these 

lack permanent infrastructure. We also included in our analysis the 

planned I-19 permanent checkpoint, rather than all planned checkpoints, 

because of the extent of the controversy regarding that particular 

checkpoint. 

We obtained information on checkpoints that met our criteria from Border 

Patrol and CBP. Based on this information, and review of available 

documentation, we determined that three checkpoints met our criteria: (1) 

the I-35 checkpoint in the Laredo sector, which was completed in 2006, (2) 

the U.S. Route 62/180 checkpoint in the El Paso sector, which was 

completed in 2009, and (3) the U.S. Route 83 checkpoint in the Laredo 

sector—expected to be completed in October 2009. For each of these 

checkpoints, we reviewed available documentation related to the 

placement and design of these checkpoints, including Border Patrol 

Facilities Design Guide—which has a section for checkpoint design—and 

Border Patrol checkpoint policy. These documents describe Border 

Patrol’s guidelines for placement and design of checkpoint facilities, 

including where they should be located and the types of resources and 

capabilities that checkpoints should include. Border Patrol officials noted 

that these documents provide general guidance on checkpoint placement 

and design, rather than specific requirements. We also reviewed 

environmental assessments, which describe the Border Patrol’s rationale 

for selection of a particular site, information on consideration of 

environmental and community impact, and the Border Patrol’s 

coordination with various federal and state agencies. We also talked with 

CBP and Border Patrol headquarters officials and Border Patrol sector 

Page 89 GAO-09-824 
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and 

Methodology 

 Border Patrol

officials about how placement and design decisions were made for these 

checkpoints. 

Regarding the planned I-19 permanent checkpoint, we used the Border 

Patrol Facilities Design Guide and Border Patrol checkpoint policy as our 

primary basis for evaluating the placement and design of the I-19 

checkpoint. We reviewed available documentation from Border Patrol’s 

Tucson sector regarding the placement factors considered in determining 

the location of the I-19 permanent checkpoint. To observe firsthand the 

possible checkpoint locations, we traveled along the I-19 corridor, from 

Nogales to Tucson, with Border Patrol officials who explained their 

rationale for tentatively choosing the KP 41 location, and why other sites 

were not suitable, in their view. 

We reviewed available documentation related to the design of the 

checkpoint, including a site plan which showed the layout of the proposed 

checkpoint and draft environmental assessments. We also met with Border 

Patrol officials about their rationale for the design for the checkpoint, 

including total size (footprint), resources, and size of various functional 

areas. We talked with officials from the Arizona Department of 

Transportation (ADOT) about their input and requirements for the I-19 

permanent checkpoint location. We obtained and analyzed ADOT traffic 

projection data, which was developed by a contractor working for ADOT, 

and talked with ADOT engineers and the I-19 permanent checkpoint 

project manager about traffic projections. We also talked with officials and 

reviewed planning documents from the Santa Cruz County Department of 

Community Development to obtain information on plans for development 

in the areas near the proposed checkpoint location. In addition, we 

reviewed the recommendations on the design of the permanent I-19 

checkpoint made by the Workgroup on Southern Arizona Checkpoints, 

and the Border Patrol’s responses to the recommendations. 

We also analyzed the Program Advisory for the I-19 permanent checkpoint, 

which was prepared by an engineering firm contractor to the Border 

Patrol. This document identifies space recommendations based on an 

assessment of checkpoint requirements, traffic capacity, apprehension and 

holding assessments, checkpoint operations, and number of staff. We met 

with the project manager for the I-19 checkpoint project to discuss these 

documents and the placement and design of the checkpoint. The project 

manager also provided square footage information for both the proposed I19 permanent checkpoint and the I-35 checkpoint in the Laredo sector, 

which allowed us to compare the sizes of the two checkpoints. We used 

the I-35 checkpoint as a basis for comparison because Border Patrol 

Page 90 GAO-09-824 
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and 

Methodology 

 Border Patrol

officials told us that the I-35 checkpoint was used as a frame of reference 

for the I-19 permanent checkpoint, and the I-35 checkpoint was also a 

large, permanent checkpoint. We also compared plans for the proposed I19 permanent checkpoint with other large checkpoints in terms of number 

of primary and secondary inspection lanes, and total property size 

(acreage). We obtained data on number of inspection lanes and 

checkpoint size from the Border Patrol and CBP, and found the data to be 

sufficiently reliable for reporting purposes. For other potential variables, 

such as number of buildings, total building square footage, and traffic 

volume, we found that data were not consistently available and therefore 

were not sufficiently reliable for reporting purposes. 

To determine if the Border Patrol followed its checkpoint placement 

guidelines regarding locating checkpoints in remote areas for the three 

checkpoints either constructed or under construction since 2006, we 

calculated the distances between each checkpoint and the nearest school 

and hospital, as listed in MapInfo’s institution data. To determine the 

reliability of the institution data for schools, we compared it to the 

Department of Education’s Common Core Data (CCD) for schools in the 

counties surrounding the checkpoints. We determined that the institution 

layer supplemented with data from the CCD was sufficiently reliable for 

our purposes. To determine the reliability of the institution data for 

hospitals, we compared it to a list of Medicare eligible hospitals in the 

counties surrounding the checkpoints. We determined that the institution 

layer supplemented with the Medicare Hospital data was sufficiently 

reliable for our purposes. We also used 2000 Census data to estimate the 

populations within 1 and 5 miles of each location. Population estimates 

were calculated by using MapInfo to draw a circle with a 1- or 5-mile 

radius around the checkpoint locations provided by the Border Patrol. 

These circles were then layered over 2000 Census block group-level 

population data. For each block group, we determined the proportion of 

the area that fell within the 1- or 5-mile radius of the checkpoint. The 

Census population for each block group that fell within the boundary of 

interest was multiplied by the proportion as an estimate of what 

proportion of the population in the block group lived within 1 or 5 miles of 

the checkpoint. The estimates for each block group were then added 

together to estimate the total population living around the checkpoint. For 

the planned I-19 permanent checkpoint, we calculated distances of four 

proposed checkpoint locations from the nearest school and hospital, and 

we used 2000 Census data to estimate the populations within 1 and 5 miles 

of each location. 

Page 91 GAO-09-824 
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and 

Methodology 

To assess the extent that the Border Patrol has considered community 

impacts in the operation of checkpoints, we reviewed Border Patrol 

operational guidance, policy documents, and training materials that 

describe Border Patrol standards and processes for monitoring and 

responding to circumvention activity. We also met with Border Patrol 

officials at the 15 checkpoints we visited to discuss their efforts to monitor 

and respond to circumvention activity and how they coordinate with 

nearby communities. 

Community Impacts of 

Checkpoint Operations 

To understand the extent that operations from Border Patrol checkpoints 

impact surrounding areas, we interviewed state and local law 

enforcement, business groups, community leaders, and other members of 

communities in the areas we visited to obtain their perspectives on 

impacts, if any, experienced by those who live or work within the areas 

surrounding checkpoints. In the five Border Patrol sectors we visited, we 

met with the following 

Fourteen law enforcement agencies in five sectors: 

• Tucson sector: Arizona Department of Public Safety; Pima County 

Sheriff’s Department; Sahuarita Police Department; Santa Cruz County 

Sheriff’s Department; and Tucson Police Department. 

• San Diego sector: California Highway Patrol; Oceanside Police 

Department; San Diego County Sheriff’s Department; and Temecula 

Police Department. 

• Rio Grande Valley sector: Kenedy County Sheriff’s Department 

• Laredo sector: Laredo Police Department and Webb County Sheriff’s 

Department. 

• El Paso sector: Alamogordo Department of Public Safety and Doña 

Ana County Sheriff’s Department. 

Business organizations in three sectors: 

• Temecula Chamber of Commerce (San Diego sector), 

• Kingsville Economic Development Council (Rio Grande Valley sector), 

• Tubac Chamber of Commerce and other Chamber of Commerce 

members who were participants in the Community Workgroup on 

Southern Arizona Checkpoints town hall meeting (Tucson sector). 

And ranchers and residents in three sectors (San Diego, Tucson, and 

Laredo) that we, or the Border Patrol, identified because they were 

Page 92 GAO-09-824 Border Patrol
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and 

Methodology 

 Border Patrol

landowners, residents, or business owners of the areas surrounding 

specific Border Patrol checkpoints. 

For each sector we visited, we attempted to identify local community 

organizations or community members who could provide insight into the 

impacts of checkpoint operations. However, in some cases—such as when 

checkpoints were located in areas that were rural and remote—we were 

unable to identify appropriate local organizations or community members 

that could provide insight on the impacts of checkpoint operations. In 

those cases we relied on the perspectives of local law enforcement 

officials that patrolled the area of jurisdiction around the checkpoint. In 

our meetings with these organizations and community members, we asked 

specific questions regarding the impacts from checkpoint operations and 

Border Patrol’s response to these impacts. Because the checkpoints and 

potential interviewees were a nonprobability sample, the results from our 

site visits cannot be generalized to other locations and checkpoints; 

however, what we learned from our site visits provided a useful 

background into the types of impacts that occur as a result of checkpoint 

operations. 

In the Border Patrol Tucson sector, there was a community group—known 

as the Community Workgroup for Southern Arizona Checkpoints—that 

was organized around issues relating to the I-19 checkpoint. Chaired by 

the Border Patrol sector chief and U.S. Congresswoman Gabrielle 

Giffords, the mission of the workgroup was to build a better 

understanding among southern Arizona communities on checkpoint 

operations and community impacts and to make recommendations on 

issues, concerns, and ideas regarding the current checkpoint and proposed 

permanent checkpoints. We reviewed documents from the workgroup and 

news articles that reported concerns of the community. While in the 

Tucson sector, we held a town hall style meeting for all workgroup 

members and others from the community. The town hall meeting was 

facilitated with a prepared set of questions to ensure that we obtained 

input regarding perceived community impacts from checkpoint 

operations. This was the only Border Patrol sector that had an organized 

and involved community group that had been actively discussing Border 

Patrol checkpoints, as far as we could determine. 

We attempted to determine the extent to which checkpoint operations can 

be linked to third-party indicators such as crime, economic, tourism, and 

property value data. Based on extensive research and analysis, we 

determined there were many limitations to drawing such causal links. 

Third-party indicators, such as these, are complex statistics impacted by 

Page 93 GAO-09-824 
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and 

Methodology 

 Border Patrol

numerous factors, many of which have little to do with border 

enforcement. It is difficult to further separate checkpoint operations from 

overall border enforcement, and data on crime, economic, tourism, and 

property values can fluctuate in ways that have no correlation to 

checkpoint operations, but may be influenced by other factors, such as the 

U.S. and global economies. Additionally, to understand any trends in these 

indicators there needs to be a complete set of historical data to develop a 

baseline understanding before interpreting factors that can change the 

baseline. If checkpoint operations could impact trends, data should be 

tracked for several years before and after a checkpoint is established to 

understand and control for external variables that may also be impacting 

trends. Given the community concerns regarding the checkpoint on the I19 highway in the Tucson sector, we collected some historical data on 

crime, business, and real estate values for communities close to the I-19 

checkpoint, the checkpoint’s surrounding and nearest counties, and the 

state of Arizona. Those data are presented in the report and appendices 

simply to show overall trends, without controlling for checkpoint 

operation or other factors. We are unable to draw any conclusions from 

these data and cannot link checkpoint operations to any of these 

indicators. We also cannot infer that real estate values, tourism, or crime 

trends are better or worse for nearby communities since the checkpoint 

on the I-19 highway became fixed at the KP 42 location in November 2006. 

We determined that the property value, economic, tourism, and crime data 

used within the report and appendices were sufficiently reliable for 

providing historical trends and general descriptions of each of the below 

categories. To determine the reliability of these data, we reviewed existing 

information about the data systems and interviewed knowledgeable 

officials about the data, as available. 

Property value data. We obtained and reviewed data on property values 

from federal, state, and local agencies. At the federal level we reviewed 

available data on property values from several nationwide data sets, such 

as Federal Housing Finance Board, U.S. Department of Housing and Urban 

Development, Case-Shiller, National Association of Realtors, and U.S. 

Census Bureau, and determined that their level of geographic reporting 

was not specific enough to the areas of interest, such as Tubac and Green 

Valley. At the state level we reviewed available data from the Arizona 

Department of Commerce and the Arizona Tax Research Association, 

which provides annual publications on property tax rates and assessed 

values. The publication is completed every 2 years and compiles countyand district-level data on net assessed values for all properties, which is 

based on tax rates and levy sheets that are officially adopted by each of 

the County Board of Supervisors. The values provided to the Board of 

Page 94 GAO-09-824 
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and 

Methodology 

 Border Patrol

Supervisors comes from each of their Tax Assessor’s offices and are all 

calculated in the same way. Within this publication, Tubac is defined by 

the Tubac Fire District boundaries. We used available data from the 

Arizona Tax Research Association from 2000 to 2008, calculated 

percentage changes from year to year, and compiled the data into charts 

for reporting. At the county level, we reviewed median property values as 

provided by the Santa Cruz County and Pima County Tax Assessor’s 

Offices. Santa Cruz County Tax Assessor’s Office provided annual median 

property values for the county and the area of Tubac. Pima County Tax 

Assessor’s Office provided annual median property values for the county 

and the area of Green Valley, as defined by the Green Valley Fire District 

boundaries. Each of the offices use guidelines set by the Arizona 

Department of Revenue to determine median property value, which is 

calculated based on sales for each tax year and have an 18 month lag. For 

example, for tax year 2008, property sales data analyzed was from the time 

frame of January 1 through December 31, 2005, and January 1 through 

June 30, 2006. We used available data, calculated percentage changes from 

year to year, and compiled the data into charts for reporting. We also 

obtained Multiple Listing Service (MLS) data from Brasher Real Estate, 

Inc., a real estate company located in the Tubac area. MLS data is listings 

of sales of land and residential properties within specific geographic areas. 

We obtained data on sales in Tubac, Rio Rico, Amado, Nogales, 

Tumacacori, and Green Valley. We used available data to calculate 

quarterly totals and compiled the data into a chart for reporting. Because 

real estate values can be calculated in different ways we reported data on 

several indicators to provide a complete picture of property values in the 

various geographic areas. With each of these indicators it is important to 

note that there has been a significant housing market downturn 

nationwide that can affect any and all of these available data sets and we 

cannot draw any conclusion between checkpoint operations and the 

health of property values in a specific area. 

Economic data. We obtained and reviewed data from multiple state and 

national agencies, such as Arizona Indicators, Arizona Department of 

Commerce, U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, and U.S. 

Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis and U.S. Census 

Bureau. Each of these data sets track information by the North American 

Industry Classification System (NAICS), which is the system used to 

classify establishments by industry by the United States, Canada, and 

Mexico. Because art and tourism are important to the economy of Tubac, 

and concerns had been expressed regarding the impact of the Border 

Patrol checkpoint on the real estate industry in Tubac, we also collected 

data on the Accommodation and Food Services, Arts, Entertainment, and 

Page 95 GAO-09-824 
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and 

Methodology 

 Border Patrol

Recreation, and Real Estate and Rental and Leasing NAICS industries for 

each of the data sets. One limitation to using any type of economic data is 

that it is important to consider the context of the increases and decreases 

in percentage changes within the significant economic downturn faced 

nationwide. After reviewing available data sets, we compiled data and 

calculated the annual percentage change for each of the indictors: 

• U.S. Department of Commerce, U.S. Census Bureau, County Business 

Pattern annual data on annual payroll, number of employees, and 

number of establishments, broken down by NAICS category, for the 

state of Arizona, Pima County, Santa Cruz County, and the area of 

Tubac, through the end of 2006. Data from 2007 were unavailable at 

the time of our report. One limitation to using these data is that the 

variation in number of establishments over time gives little sense of 

how big the establishments or variations are, for example, whether 

there were consolidations that reduced the number of establishments 

but not the level of economic output. 

• U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis annual 

data on the number of jobs and personal income, broken down by 

NAICS category, for the state of Arizona, Pima County, and Santa Cruz 

County, through the end of 2007. Annual state Gross Domestic Product 

data are also available through the end of 2007. Data for the Tubac 

area were not available. 

• U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Quarterly 

Census of Employment and Wages quarterly and annual data on wages, 

broken down by NAICS category, for the state of Arizona, Pima 

County, and Santa Cruz County, through the end of 2007. Data for the 

Tubac area were not available. 

Although the Bureau of Economic Analysis and Bureau of Labor Statistics 

data were more current than the U.S. Census Bureau County Business 

Pattern data (as data were available for 2007 and 2008), data were not 

available at the ZIP code level—only for the county level. Therefore, we 

decided not to include those data within our report. 

Tourism data. The Arizona Office of Tourism provides data on Arizona’s 

tourism industry, compiling data at the state and county levels. For the 

state of Arizona, Pima County, and Santa Cruz County, we obtained and 

reviewed data from 1998 to 2008 on occupancy rates, average daily rates, 

and revenue per available room and 2005 through 2008 on lodging demand 

and supply. Data for the Tubac area were not available for these 

Page 96 GAO-09-824 
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and 

Methodology 

 Border Patrol

indicators. However, the Arizona State Parks collects data on the total 

number of visitors to all Arizona state parks, including a state park near 

Tubac. We obtained and reviewed data on total annual number of visitors 

from 2001 to 2008 for Tubac Presidio State Historic Park and Patagonia 

Lake State Park, which is also in Santa Cruz County. We used available 

data to calculate percentage changes from year to year, for each of the 

indicators, and compiled the data into various charts for reporting. 

Crime data. We obtained and reviewed 2004 through 2008 crime 

reporting from the Arizona Department of Public Safety, Pima County 

Sheriff’s Department, and Santa Cruz County Sheriff’s Department. We 

also obtained and reviewed 2004 through 2007 annual crime reporting 

from Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) Uniform Crime Reports for 

Pima County and the state of Arizona. Pima County and Santa Cruz County 

Sheriff’s Departments both provided additional district level data for us to 

review crimes that occurred within the areas closest to the I-19 

checkpoint. We calculated the annual percentage change for major crime 

categories and compiled the data into various charts for reporting. We 

present the crime data to show overall trends and number of various types 

of offenses in the communities near the I-19 checkpoint, but cannot link 

any of these crimes to checkpoint operations, due to several important 

limitations. First, local law enforcement agencies we collected data from 

do not track the citizenship status of those arrested for crimes and could 

not identify which crimes were committed by illegal aliens. They also do 

not determine whether a crime was committed by someone attempting to 

circumvent the checkpoint. Accordingly, there is no way to determine if a 

particular criminal act was committed by an illegal alien that was 

attempting to circumvent the checkpoint or if the crime was unrelated to 

the checkpoint. Second, local law enforcement agencies we collected data 

from compile their crime data by county or by districts, not by a specific 

geographic region around checkpoints. As a result, these agencies could 

not provide data that would show the number and types of crimes that 

occurred within a certain radius around a checkpoint. 

Page 97 GAO-09-824 
Appendix II: Proposed Border Patrol Appendix II: Proposed Border Patrol Checkpoint Performance Measures 

Checkpoint Performance Measures 

In 2006, the Border Patrol convened a working group led by Border Patrol 

headquarters officials with participation from field representatives. This 

group identified 21 possible performance measures regarding checkpoint 

operations. These 21 possible performance measures were divided into 

four main groupings: 

• At the checkpoint 

• Immediate impact areas 

• At the border 

• Quality of life 

The 21 performance measures and a description of each measure are listed 

below. 

At the Checkpoints 

1. Ensure the traffic checkpoints are consistently operational in 

accordance with national and sector priorities and threat levels:

This measure is to examine the percentage of time traffic checkpoints 

are operational compared to non-operational. 

2. Maintain compliance with national Border Patrol checkpoint 

policy: This measure is to examine the percentage of time for each 

reason why traffic checkpoints are non-operational. 

3. Determine effectiveness of canines at traffic checkpoints: This 

measure is to examine the number of smuggling events, both human 

and narcotics, at traffic checkpoints detected by canines compared to 

the number of smuggling events detected without canine assists. 

4. Identify types of concealment methods used by smugglers at 

traffic checkpoints: This measure is to examine the number of 

apprehensions made at traffic checkpoints with concealment methods 

used compared to apprehensions without concealment methods. 

5. Identify the number of aliens in smuggling loads: This measure is 

to examine the number of apprehensions in each smuggling load made 

at traffic checkpoints. 

6. Utilize technologies in support of traffic checkpoint operations 

to identify the appropriate technology required for efficient 

checkpoint operations: This measure is to examine the number of 

Page 98 GAO-09-824 Border Patrol
Appendix II: Proposed Border Patrol 

Checkpoint Performance Measures 

 Border Patrol

apprehensions and seizures attributable to technology support for 

traffic checkpoint operations. 

7. Examine the effectiveness of sensors on traffic checkpoint 

operations: This measure is to examine the number of apprehensions 

and seizures attributable to sensor activations when the traffic 

checkpoints are operational or non-operational. 

8. Examine operating and maintenance cost effectiveness of 

checkpoint operations: This measure is to examine the cost 

effectiveness associated with operating and maintaining permanent 

traffic checkpoints compared to tactical traffic checkpoints. This 

measure is to also examine the cost effectiveness associated with the 

operating and maintenance of traffic checkpoint operations compared 

to the overall budget allocated for border enforcement activities. 

Immediate Impact Areas 

9. Evaluate changes in patterns and trends to identify checkpoint 

circumvention routes: This measure is to compare the number of 

apprehensions at the traffic checkpoint to apprehensions on 

circumventing routes. 

10. Compare checkpoint apprehensions to apprehensions from 

circumventing routes when the checkpoint is operational: The 

measure is to compare the number of apprehensions at the traffic 

checkpoint to apprehensions on circumventing routes. 

11. Compare checkpoint narcotics seizures to narcotic seizures on 

circumventing routes when the checkpoint is operational: The 

measure is to compare the number of seizures at the traffic checkpoint 

to seizures on circumventing routes. 

12. Monitor effects of checkpoint operation on other areas: This 

measure is to compare the percentage of apprehensions and seizures 

at traffic checkpoints to the apprehensions and seizures in adjacent 

zones or other zones impacted by checkpoint operations. 

13. Examine the impact the operational checkpoint has on 

transportation check activities, such as aircraft, bus, or train 

checks: This measure is to compare the number of apprehensions 

from transportation checkpoints compared to when traffic 

checkpoints are operational and non-operational. 

Page 99 GAO-09-824 
Appendix II: Proposed Border Patrol 

Checkpoint Performance Measures 

 Border Patrol

14. Examine the impact operational checkpoints have on staging 

areas (i.e., stash houses): This measure is to compare the number of 

apprehensions at staging areas when traffic checkpoints are 

operational or not operational. 

At the Border 

15. Compare traffic checkpoint operation apprehensions to other 

enforcement activities: This measure is to examine the number of 

traffic checkpoint apprehensions compared to all other enforcement 

activities. 

16. Compare traffic checkpoint operation seizures to other 

enforcement activities: This measure is to examine the number of 

traffic checkpoint seizures compared to all other enforcement 

activities. 

17. Compare man-hours dedicated to checkpoint operations to manhours dedicated to other enforcement activities: This measure is 

to compare the percentage of manpower used at traffic checkpoints to 

the manpower used at other enforcement activities. 

Quality of Life 

18. Examine the reduction of major crimes in areas affected by 

checkpoint operations and beyond: This measure is to examine the 

number of apprehensions of major crimes in areas affected by traffic 

checkpoint operations compared to the number of major crimes in 

other border enforcement areas without traffic checkpoint operations. 

19. Refer smugglers for prosecution: This measure is to examine the 

number of border related cases pertaining to traffic checkpoint 

operations referred to the U.S. Attorney (including state, county, and 

local attorneys) or not referred. 

20. Coordinate with federal, state, local, and tribal agencies to 

support and improve border enforcement activities: This 

measure is to compare the number and type of events/cases that were 

referred to or notified for other agencies that are related to traffic 

checkpoint operations. 

21. Examine the number and location of apprehensions turned over 

to the Border Patrol by other agencies when the checkpoint is 

Page 100 GAO-09-824 
Appendix II: Proposed Border Patrol 

Checkpoint Performance Measures 

 Border Patrol

operational to determine effect of operational checkpoint on 

communities: This measure is to compare the number of 

apprehensions turned over to Border Patrol by other agencies 

compared to when the traffic checkpoint is operational and nonoperational. 

Page 101 GAO-09-824 
A

Che

ppendix III: Photographs of Potential

ckpoint Locations on I-19, in Arizona

Page 102 GAO-09-824 

Appendix III: Photographs of Potential 

Checkpoint Locations on I-19, in Arizona 

The following figures represent aerial photographs of the four potential 

checkpoint locations considered by the Border Patrol, on I-19, in southern 

Arizona. These photographs show the interstate, nearby roads, and the 

surrounding areas. 

Figure 20: KP 41, Looking North, Aerial View, Location Marked 

Source: Border Patrol.

Potential I-19 

checkpoint 

location

 Border Patrol
Appendix III: Photographs of Potential 

Checkpoint Locations on I-19, in Arizona 

 Border Patrol

Figure 21: KP 25, Looking South, Aerial View, Location Marked 

Source: Border Patrol.

Potential I-19 

checkpoint 

location

Page 103 GAO-09-824 
Appendix III: Photographs of Potential 

Checkpoint Locations on I-19, in Arizona 

 Border Patrol

Figure 22: KP 42, Looking North, Aerial View, Location Marked 

Source: Border Patrol.

Potential I-19 

checkpoint 

location

Page 104 GAO-09-824 
Appendix III: Photographs of Potential 

Checkpoint Locations on I-19, in Arizona 

 Border Patrol

Figure 23: KP 42, Looking South, Aerial View, Location Marked 

Source: Border Patrol.

Potential I-19 

checkpoint 

location

Page 105 GAO-09-824 
Appendix III: Photographs of Potential 

Checkpoint Locations on I-19, in Arizona 

 Border Patrol

Figure 24: KP 50, Looking South, Aerial View, Location Marked 

Source: Border Patrol.

Potential I-19 

checkpoint 

location

Page 106 GAO-09-824 
Appendix III: Photographs of Potential 

Checkpoint Locations on I-19, in Arizona 

 Border Patrol

Figure 25: KP 50, Looking North, Aerial View, Location Marked 

Source: Border Patrol.

Potential I-19 

checkpoint 

location

Page 107 GAO-09-824 
Appendix IV: Additional Property Value Data 

for the State of Arizona, Santa Cruz County, Appendix IV: Additional Property Value Data Pima County, and Tubac 

for the State of Arizona, Santa Cruz County, 

Pima County, and Tubac 

In addition to the median property values that were included earlier in this 

report, we identified additional indicators for showing local trends in 

property values. We obtained multiple listing service (MLS) data, from a 

real estate agency in Tubac, and net assessed values, as reported by the 

Arizona Tax Research Association. MLS data provides listings for 

residential and land sales at the ZIP code level. The data show all listings 

within a ZIP code area, providing the listing prices, final sale prices, and 

number of transactions in specific geographic areas.1

 The Arizona Tax 

Research Association publishes annual data on the total net assessed 

values for all properties in the state of Arizona. Net assessed value is the 

full cash value, or market value, of all real property in Arizona.2

According to MLS data, the median sales price for a home in Tubac has 

fluctuated from July 2006 to March 2009, as shown in figure 26. In 2008 the 

median sales price was approximately $384,000, and in 2007 it was 

$375,000. 

 

1

 MLS data does not hold constant the mix of properties that sell from one period to the 

next. 

2

 Although the full cash value is synonymous with market value, the value established by 

the tax assessors may be equal to, or less than, the actual market value. These lower values 

are the result of adjusting all sale prices for mass appraisal error, creative financing, 

personal property, and time on the market. 

Page 108 GAO-09-824 Border Patrol
Appendix IV: Additional Property Value Data 

for the State of Arizona, Santa Cruz County, 

Pima County, and Tubac 

 Border Patrol

Figure 26: Median Residential Sales Prices and Number of Sales in Tubac, July 

2006 through March 2009 

Number of sales

Median price

Number of sales Median price (in dollars)

Source: GAO analysis of Multiple Listing Service (MLS) data provided by Brasher Real Estate, Inc.

2006 2007 2008 2009

0

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

0

100,000

200,000

300,000

400,000

500,000

600,000

700,000

800,000

July 1-

Oct. 1-Dec. 31

Jan. 1- Mar. 31

Sept. 30

July 1-

Oct. 1-Dec. 31

Jan. 1- Mar. 31

Apr. 1-June 30

Sept. 30

July 1-

Oct. 1-Dec. 31

Jan. 1- Mar. 31

Apr. 1-June 30

Sept. 30

The net assessed value of properties in Santa Cruz County, Tubac,3

 Pima 

County, and Green Valley4

 have increased each year from 2000 to 2008, as 

shown in table 11 and figure 27. The net assessed value of properties in 

Santa Cruz County increased by 18 percent from 2007 to 2008, from 

approximately $341,684,000 to approximately $404,366,000. 

 

3

 Tubac was defined by the boundaries of the Tubac Fire District. 

4

 Green Valley was defined by the boundaries of the Green Valley Fire District. 

Page 109 GAO-09-824 
Appendix IV: Additional Property Value Data 

for the State of Arizona, Santa Cruz County, 

Pima County, and Tubac 

 Border Patrol

Table 11: Total Net Assessed Values and Percentage Change from Previous Year (in parenthesis) for Select Areas in Arizona, 

2000 through 2008 

Amounts in dollars 

Arizona Pima County Green Valley Santa Cruz County Tubac

2000 31,837,391,782 4,236,070,095 142,771,161 201,651,947 40,443,083

2001 34,473,431,135 

(8.3%) 

4,491,395,307

(6%)

157,035,701

(10%)

224,373,276 

(11.3%) 

43,787,427

(8.3%)

2002 36,805,206,912 

(6.8%) 

4,835,561,219

(7.7%)

168,439,401

(7.3%)

235,055,570 

(4.8%) 

44,889,292

(2.5%)

2003 40,839,898,348

(11%) 

5,221,270,997

(8%)

178,073,695

(5.7%)

246,303,386 

(4.8%) 

47,213,927

(5.2%)

2004 44,461,738,026 

(8.9%) 

5,620,156,274

(7.6%)

189,805,249

(6.6%)

253,681,084 

(3%) 

48,634,083

(3%)

2005 48,931,946,145 

(10.1%) 

6,050,950,040

(7.7%)

206,007,295

(8.5%)

265,933,931 

(4.8%) 

54,121,934

(11.3%)

2006 54,394,761,521 

(11.2%) 

6,869,955,457

(13.5%)

244,514,539

(18.7%)

294,247,098

(10.6%) 

64,489,462

(19.2%)

2007 71,837,099,233 

(32.1%) 

8,220,395,835

(19.7%)

342,015,821

(39.9%)

341,683,683 

(16.1%) 

82,974,970

(28.7%)

2008 86,090,579,647 

(19.8%) 

9,594,861,519

(16.7%)

424,769,584

(24.2%)

404,365,519 

(18.3%) 

113,278,840

(36.5%)

Source: Arizona Tax Research Association. 

Page 110 GAO-09-824 
Appendix IV: Additional Property Value Data 

for the State of Arizona, Santa Cruz County, 

Pima County, and Tubac 

 Border Patrol

Figure 27: Percentage Change from Previous Year, Net Assessed Values for Select 

Areas in Arizona, 2001 through 2008 

Pima County

Green Valley

Santa Cruz County

Tubac

Arizona

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

40

45

2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008

Percentage change from previous year

Source: GAO analysis of Arizona Tax Research Association data.

Year

Page 111 GAO-09-824 
Appendix V: Additional Economic Data for the 

State of Arizona, Santa Cruz County, Pima Appendix V: Additional Economic Data for County, and Tubac 

the State of Arizona, Santa Cruz County, Pima 

County, and Tubac 

We identified indicators for showing local economic trends from the U.S. 

Census Bureau. The U.S. Census Bureau provides an annual series of 

County Business Pattern data available at the national, state, county, and 

ZIP code level and tracks the number of establishments, number of 

employees, and total payroll across industries. The data are derived from 

U.S. Census Bureau business establishment surveys and federal 

administrative records. These data are available through the end of 2006.1

The U.S. Census Bureau County Business Patterns provides subnational 

economic data, which covers most of the country’s economic activity, is 

used for studying the economic activity of small areas and analyzing 

economic changes over time, and is available by North American Industry 

Classification System (NAICS) industry.2

 According to the Arizona 

Department of Commerce, art and tourism are important to the economy 

of Tubac, and concerns had been expressed regarding the impact of the 

Border Patrol checkpoint on the real estate industry in Tubac. 

Accordingly, the NAICS industries included within the following analysis 

are Accommodation and Food Services, Arts, Entertainment, and 

Recreation, and Real Estate and Rental and Leasing.3

 In 2006, over half of 

the total 87 establishments4

 in Tubac5 were retail trade and 

accommodation and food services, with 38 and 10 establishments, 

respectively, as shown in figure 28 and table 12. The four other industries 

with the highest numbers of establishments in Tubac are shown in figure 

 

1

 Data for 2007 were not available at the time of our report. Other economic indicator data 

are publicly available, such as data on employment, wages, and establishments from the 

U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis, and U.S. Department of 

Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics. Although these data are available for 2007, the smallest 

geographic area for reporting is at the county level, rather than for the Tubac area. 

2

 The North American Industry Classification System (NAICS) is the system used to classify 

establishments by industry by the United States, Canada, and Mexico and is the standard 

used by federal statistical agencies in classifying business establishments for the purpose 

of collecting, analyzing, and publishing statistical data related to the U.S. business 

economy. 

3

 The other NAICS sectors available include Agriculture, Forestry, Fishing, and Hunting; 

Mining; Manufacturing; Utilities; Transportation and Warehousing; Wholesale Trade; Retail 

Trade; Finance and Insurance; Information; Professional, Scientific, and Technical 

Services; Administrative and Support, Waste Management and Remediation Services; 

Educational Services; Health Care and Social Assistance; Management of Companies and 

Enterprises; and Other Services (Except Public Administration). 

4

 According to the U.S. Census Bureau, an establishment is defined as a single physical 

location where business is conducted or where services are performed. 

5

 Tubac, Arizona, was searched using ZIP code 85646. 

Page 112 GAO-09-824 Border Patrol
Appendix V: Additional Economic Data for the 

State of Arizona, Santa Cruz County, Pima 

County, and Tubac 

 Border Patrol

28, other services (except public administration) with eight establishments 

and construction, real estate, rental and leasing, and professional, 

scientific and technical services each with seven. 

Figure 28: Trends for Top Six Industries in Tubac, by Number of Establishments, 

2000 through 2006 

Real estate and rental and leasing

Other services (except public administration)

Retail trade

Construction

Accommodation and food services

Professional, scientific, and technical services

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

40

2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

Number of establishments

Source: U.S. Census Bureau.

Page 113 GAO-09-824 
Appendix V: Additional Economic Data for the 

State of Arizona, Santa Cruz County, Pima 

County, and Tubac 

 Border Patrol

Table 12: Total Number of Establishments in Tubac, by NAICS Industry, 2000 through 2006 

Industry 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

Retail trade 24 24 29 26 29 32 38

Accommodation and food services 6 6 8 8 11 10 10

Other services (except public administration) 4 2 2 3 3 3 8

Construction 5 8 7 6 4 5 7

Real estate, rental and leasing 4 3 4 5 7 6 7

Professional, scientific and technical services 3 4 4 5 4 4 7

Administrative, support, waste management, and 

remediation services 0 0 0 0 1 1 2

Arts, entertainment and recreation 3 3 3 2 1 1 2

Unclassified establishments 1 0 1 0 0 2 2

Utilities 3 2 1 1 0 1 1

Manufacturing 2 2 2 3 2 3 1

Educational services 1 1 1 1 1 1 1

Health care and social assistance 0 0 2 2 1 1 1

Forestry, fishing, hunting, and agriculture 0 1 2 2 2 2 0

Wholesale trade 3 5 2 2 0 1 0

Transportation and warehousing 1 0 1 1 1 1 0

Finance and insurance 1 1 1 0 0 1 0

Source: U.S. Census Bureau. 

From 2004 to 2006, the total number of establishments in Tubac increased 

from 67 to 87, as shown in figure 29. In 2006, the 87 establishments was a 

16 percent increase from 2005, compared to a 1.3 percent increase for 

Santa Cruz County. 

Page 114 GAO-09-824 
Appendix V: Additional Economic Data for the 

State of Arizona, Santa Cruz County, Pima 

County, and Tubac 

 Border Patrol

Figure 29: Number of Establishments in Tubac and Percentage Change from 

Previous Year, Total Number of Establishments for Arizona, Pima County and Santa 

Cruz County, 2001 through 2006 

Number of establishments

Percentage change

from previous year

Year

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

90

100

0

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

Tubac number of establishments

Santa Cruz County number of establishments

Pima County percentage change

Arizona percentage change

Source: GAO analysis of U.S. Census Bureau data.

With respect to the number of real estate, rental and leasing 

establishments from 2001 to 2006, Tubac consistently had fewer than 10 

establishments, and Santa Cruz County ranged between 51 and 65 

establishments. However, Pima County followed a similar pattern to the 

state of Arizona, as shown in figure 30. 

Page 115 GAO-09-824 
Appendix V: Additional Economic Data for the 

State of Arizona, Santa Cruz County, Pima 

County, and Tubac 

 Border Patrol

Figure 30: Number of Real Estate, Rental, and Leasing Establishments in Tubac and 

Santa Cruz County and Percentage Change from Previous Year for Arizona and 

Pima County, 2001 through 2006 

Number of establishments

Percentage change

from previous year

Source: GAO analysis of U.S. Census Bureau data.

Year

Tubac number of establishments

Santa Cruz County number of establishments

Pima County percentage change

Arizona percentage change

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

0

2

4

6

8

10

12

14

16

2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

Figure 31 shows that in 2006, Tubac had 2 art, entertainment, and 

recreation establishments, compared to 305 in Pima County and 1,859 in 

the entire state of Arizona. 

Page 116 GAO-09-824 
Appendix V: Additional Economic Data for the 

State of Arizona, Santa Cruz County, Pima 

County, and Tubac 

 Border Patrol

Figure 31: Number of Arts, Entertainment, and Recreation Establishments in Tubac 

and Santa Cruz County and Percentage Change from Previous Year for Arizona and 

Pima County, 2001 through 2006 

Number of establishments

Percentage change

from previous year

Source: GAO analysis of U.S. Census Bureau data.

Year

Tubac number of establishments

Santa Cruz County number of establishments

Pima County percentage change

Arizona percentage change

0

2

4

6

8

10

12

14

16

18

20

0

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

From 2005 to 2006, Santa Cruz County had an increase in the number of 

accommodation and food service establishments, from 89 to 96, and Tubac 

had no change, with 10 establishments each year. Arizona and Pima 

County had percentage increases of 2 and 1 percent respectively, from 

2005 to 2006, as shown in figure 32. 

Page 117 GAO-09-824 
Appendix V: Additional Economic Data for the 

State of Arizona, Santa Cruz County, Pima 

County, and Tubac 

 Border Patrol

Figure 32: Number of Accommodation and Food Service Establishments in Tubac 

and Santa Cruz County and Percentage Change from Previous Year for Arizona and 

005, when compared to Santa Cruz County, Pima County, and the state of 

 

Pima County, 2001 through 2006 

Number of establishments

Percentage change

from previous year

Source: GAO analysis of U.S. Census Bureau data.

Year

Tubac number of establishments

Santa Cruz County number of establishments

Pima County percentage change

Arizona percentage change

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

90

100

0

2

4

6

8

10

12

2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

In terms of number of employees,6

 Tubac saw a decrease from 2004 to 

2

Arizona, as shown in figure 33. From 2005 to 2006, the number of 

employees in Tubac increased by 2 percent, while the number of 

employees in the state increased by 8 percent. 

6

 According to the Census Bureau, the number of employees consists of the number of paid 

full and part-time employees, including salaried officers and executives of corporations, 

who (for all sectors except Construction and Manufacturing) were on the payroll during 

the pay period. Included are employees on paid sick leave, paid holidays, and paid 

vacations; not included are proprietors or partners of unincorporated businesses. 

Page 118 GAO-09-824 
Appendix V: Additional Economic Data for the 

State of Arizona, Santa Cruz County, Pima 

County, and Tubac 

 Border Patrol

Figure 33: Percentage Change from Previous Year, Number of Employees for 

Tubac, Santa Cruz County, Pima County, and Arizona, 2001 through 2006 

Tubac

Santa Cruz County

Pima County

Arizona

-10

-5

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

Percentage change from previous year

Source: GAO analysis of U.S. Census Bureau data.

Year

With respect to total annual payroll,7

 from 2004 to 2005 Tubac had a 1 

percent decrease, while the state and counties had between 6 to 10 

percent increases, as shown in figure 34. However, from 2005 to 2006, 

Tubac saw a larger percentage increase—19 percent, to $10,093,000—than 

the state and counties. 

 

7

 Annual payroll includes the gross earnings of all employees during the calendar year and 

includes all forms of compensation, such as salaries, wages, commissions, dismissal pay, 

bonuses, vacation and sick leave pay, and compensation in kind, prior to such deductions 

as employees’ social security contributions, withholding taxes, group insurance, union 

dues, and savings bonds. U.S. Census Bureau follows the definition of payroll used for 

calculating the federal withholding tax and recommended to all federal statistical agencies 

by the Office of Management and Budget. 

Page 119 GAO-09-824 
Appendix V: Additional Economic Data for the 

State of Arizona, Santa Cruz County, Pima 

County, and Tubac 

 Border Patrol

Figure 34: Percentage Change from Previous Year, Total Annual Payroll, 2002 

through 2006 

-40

-30

-20

-10

0

10

20

30

2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

Percentage change from previous year

Source: GAO analysis of U.S. Census Bureau data.

Year

Tubac

Santa Cruz County

Pima County

Arizona

Page 120 GAO-09-824 
Ap

St

Pim 

pendix VI: Additional Tourism Data for the

ate of Arizona, Santa Cruz County, and

a County

Page 121 GAO-09-824 

Appendix VI: Additional Tourism Data for the 

State of Arizona, Santa Cruz County, and 

Pima County 

The Arizona Office of Tourism provides information on tourism within the 

state and counties. It provides statewide and county data on occupancy 

rates, revenue per available room, and lodging supply and demand, 

through 2008. However, none of these indicators were available for the 

area of Tubac. Overall, occupancy rates for the state of Arizona, Pima 

County, and Santa Cruz County have been in a steady decline since 2006, 

with Santa Cruz County having the largest percentage decrease in 2008 

occupancy rates, when compared to the others, as shown in figure 35. 

According to an Arizona Office of Tourism representative, the state and 

county downward trends in tourism are a part of the downward trends 

seen in the general economic climate in Arizona and that the overall 

demand for tourism has been decreasing, possibly due to a general 

downturn in the nationwide economy. In 2008, Santa Cruz County had a 62 

percent occupancy rate for all lodging in the county. 

Figure 35: Percentage Change from Previous Year, Lodging Occupancy Rates, 2001 

through 2008 

-12

-10

-8

-6

-4

-2

0

2

4

6

8

10

2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008

Percentage change from previous year

Source: GAO analysis of Smith Travel Research data.

Year

Santa Cruz County

Pima County

Arizona

 Border Patrol
Appendix VI: Additional Tourism Data for the 

State of Arizona, Santa Cruz County, and 

Pima County 

 Border Patrol

With respect to revenue per available room, the state of Arizona, Santa 

Cruz County, and Pima County followed similar trends from 2006 to 2008. 

From 2007 to 2008, all areas saw a decline in revenue per available room, 

with Santa Cruz County having the largest percentage decrease, as shown 

in figure 36. In 2008, Santa Cruz County was making $45 revenue per each 

available room, a decline from $50 the previous year. 

Figure 36: Percentage Change from Previous Year, Revenue Per Available Room, 

2001 through 2008 

-15

-10

-5

0

5

10

15

20

2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008

Percentage change from previous year

Source: GAO analysis of Smith Travel Research data.

Year

Santa Cruz County

Pima County

Arizona

Page 122 GAO-09-824 
Appendix VII: Additional Crime Data for the 

State of Arizona, Santa Cruz County, Pima Appendix VII: Additional Crime Data for the County, and Tubac 

State of Arizona, Santa Cruz County, Pima 

County, and Tubac 

Regarding crime indicators, we obtained additional data from the Federal 

Bureau of Investigation (FBI) Uniform Crime Reporting (UCR) program, 

Pima County Sheriff’s Department, and Santa Cruz County Sheriff’s 

Department. Law enforcement agencies throughout the country—at the 

city, county and state levels—participate in the UCR program by providing 

summarized reports on eight major offenses,1

 which include violent 

crimes2

 and property crimes3 known to law enforcement, through the end 

of 2007, at the state and jurisdiction level. In addition to these eight crime 

categories, we obtained data on all other crimes4

 from the Pima County 

and Santa Cruz County Sheriff’s Departments, which provide information 

on the frequency of offenses within the jurisdictions. In our discussions 

with each of these agencies, they told us that they do not attribute any of 

the below trends to checkpoint specific activities. Furthermore, the 

agencies do not track which offenses are committed by illegal aliens. 

According to FBI UCR data, from 2006 to 2007, the state of Arizona has 

seen a decline both in violent and property crimes, as shown in figure 37. 

Data on these crimes within the state of Arizona is presented to allow for 

comparisons to the local jurisdiction crime rates. From 2006 to 2007, 

Arizona’s decline in both violent crimes and property crimes went from 

approximately 316,000 to 310,000. 

 

1

 The committee that created the Uniform Crime Reporting program identified eight 

categories of offenses as the most appropriate measure of the Nation’s criminality, which 

are (1) murder and nonnegligent manslaughter, (2) forcible rape, (3) robbery, (4) 

aggravated assault, (5) burglary, (6) larceny-theft, (7) motor vehicle theft, and (8) arson. 

The committee also formulated standardized offense definitions, for the eight offenses, to 

provide nationwide uniformity in crime reporting. 

2

 Violent crimes are defined in the UCR program as those offenses which involve force or 

threat of force and include murder and nonnegligent manslaughter, forcible rape, robbery, 

and aggravated assault. 

3

 According to the UCR, property crimes include the offenses of burglary, larceny-theft, 

motor vehicle theft, and arson. The object of the theft-type offenses is the taking of money 

or property, but there is no force or threat of force against the victims, according to the 

UCR. 

4

 The UCR program divides offenses into two groups—Part I and Part II. The Part I offenses 

include the eight violent and property crimes. Part II offenses are all crime classifications 

other than those defined as Part I. 

Page 123 GAO-09-824 Border Patrol
Appendix VII: Additional Crime Data for the 

State of Arizona, Santa Cruz County, Pima 

County, and Tubac 

 Border Patrol

Figure 37: Percentage Change from Previous Year for Violent Crimes and Property 

Crimes in Arizona, 2005 through 2007 

Violent crimes

Total violent and property crimes

Property crimes

-8

-6

-4

-2

0

2

4

6

2005 2006 2007

Percentage change from previous year

Source: GAO analysis of FBI Uniform Crime Reporting data.

Year

According to offense data provided by Santa Cruz County Sheriff’s 

Department, total offenses in Santa Cruz County have declined from 2006 

to 2008, as shown in figure 38. The Santa Cruz County Sheriff’s 

Department has three patrol districts: District 1 is the area of Rio Rico, 

which includes the I-19 corridor from Nogales to District 2; District 2 

includes the I-19 checkpoint and Tumacacori, Carmen, Tubac, Amado, and 

Arivaca; and District 3 includes Sonoita, Elgin, Canelo, Lochiel, Mowery, 

and San Rafael Valley. As shown in figure 38, the majority of crimes in 

Santa Cruz County occur within District 1, which is the area of Rio Rico,5

with 2,085 total offenses in 2008, compared to 398 and 219 from Districts 2 

and 3, respectively. From 2007 to 2008, District 1 had a 7 percent decrease 

in total offenses, District 2 had a 3 percent decrease, and District 3 had a 

0.5 percent increase. 

 

5

 Rio Rico (pop 10,413) is a planned community located 57 miles south of Tucson and 12 

miles north of the international border. 

Page 124 GAO-09-824 
Appendix VII: Additional Crime Data for the 

State of Arizona, Santa Cruz County, Pima 

County, and Tubac 

 Border Patrol

Figure 38: Santa Cruz County Total Offenses, 2004 through 2008 

0

500

1,000

1,500

2,000

2,500

3,000

3,500

4,000

4,500

5,000

2004 2005 2006 2007 2008

Number of offenses

Year

District 1

District 2

District 3

Source: Santa Cruz County Sheriff’s Department.

With regards to violent crimes, from 2005 to 2008 District 2 has seen an 

increase each year, while the number of violent crimes within Districts 1 

and 3 have fluctuated, as shown in figure 39. From 2007 to 2008, District 1 

had an increase from 40 to 47 offenses, District 2 had an increase from 10 

to 15, and District 3 had a decrease from 5 to 2 violent crime offenses. 

Page 125 GAO-09-824 
Appendix VII: Additional Crime Data for the 

State of Arizona, Santa Cruz County, Pima 

County, and Tubac 

 Border Patrol

Figure 39: Santa Cruz County Number of Violent Crime Offenses by District, 2004 

through 2008 

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

2004 2005 2006 2007 2008

Number of violent crime offenses

Year

Source: Santa Cruz County Sheriff’s Department.

District 1

District 2

District 3

Property crime offenses increased in Districts 1 and 2 from 2004 to 2008, 

as shown in figure 40. More recently, between 2007 and 2008 District 1 had 

an increase from 281 to 303 offenses, District 2 had an increase from 42 to 

58, and District 3 had an increase from 23 to 26. 

Page 126 GAO-09-824 
Appendix VII: Additional Crime Data for the 

State of Arizona, Santa Cruz County, Pima 

County, and Tubac 

 Border Patrol

Figure 40: Santa Cruz County Number of Property Crime Offenses by District, 2004 

through 2008 

0

50

100

150

200

250

300

350

2004 2005 2006 2007 2008

Number of property crime offenses

Year

Source: Santa Cruz County Sheriff’s Department.

District 1

District 2

District 3

In addition to crime data on districts within Santa Cruz County, we also 

obtained crime data for the Pima County Green Valley District,6

 which is 

adjacent to District 2 of the Santa Cruz County Sheriff’s Department and 

closest to the I-19 checkpoint. Figures 41, 42, and 43 present various crime 

data from Santa Cruz County Sheriff’s Department District 2 and Pima 

County Sheriff’s Department Green Valley District. 

From 2005 to 2008, the number of violent crimes within both districts has 

fluctuated, with no clear pattern emerging, as shown in figure 41. 

 

6

 Pima County Sheriff’s Department is split into several patrol districts. The Green Valley 

District covers the area from the Santa Cruz County line on the south to approximately 

kilometer post 80 on I-19 on the north. 

Page 127 GAO-09-824 
Appendix VII: Additional Crime Data for the 

State of Arizona, Santa Cruz County, Pima 

County, and Tubac 

 Border Patrol

Figure 41: Cross-District Comparison of Violent Crime Offenses, Quarterly from January 1, 2005, through December 31, 2008 

Number of violent crime offenses

Source: Pima County and Santa Cruz County Sheriff’s Departments.

2005 2006 2007 2008

Santa Cruz County Sheriff’s Department, District 2

Pima County Sheriff’s Department, Green Valley District

0

5

10

15

20

25

Oct. 1- Dec. 31

July 1- Sept. 30

July 1- 

Oct. 1- Dec. 31

Jan. 1- Mar. 31

Apr. 1- June 30

Sept. 30

July 1- 

Oct. 1- Dec. 31

Jan. 1- Mar. 31

Apr. 1- June 30

Sept. 30

July 1- 

Oct. 1- Dec. 31

Jan. 1- Mar. 31

Apr. 1- June 30

Sept. 30

Jan. 1- Mar. 31

Apr. 1- June 30

With respect to property crime data, the number of crimes within Green 

Valley District has varied from 2005 to 2008, while property crimes within 

Santa Cruz County District 2 have remained relatively stable over the same 

time period, as shown in figure 42. For the most recent quarter in which 

data are available, there were 147 property crime offenses in the Pima 

County Sheriff’s Department, Green Valley District, compared to 17 in the 

Santa Cruz County Sheriff’s Department, District 2. 

Page 128 GAO-09-824 
Appendix VII: Additional Crime Data for the 

State of Arizona, Santa Cruz County, Pima 

County, and Tubac 

 Border Patrol

Figure 42: Cross-District Comparison of Property Crime Offenses, Quarterly from January 1, 2005 through December 31, 2008 

Number of property crime offenses

Source: Pima County and Santa Cruz County Sheriff's Departments.

2005 2006 2007 2008

Santa Cruz County Sheriff's Department, District 2

Pima County Sheriff's Department, Green Valley District

0

20

40

60

80

100

120

140

160

180

Oct. 1- Dec. 31

July 1- Sept. 30

July 1- 

Oct. 1- Dec. 31

Jan. 1- Mar. 31

Apr. 1- June 30

Sept. 30

July 1- 

Oct. 1- Dec. 31

Jan. 1- Mar. 31

Apr. 1- June 30

Sept. 30

July 1- 

Oct. 1- Dec. 31

Jan. 1- Mar. 31

Apr. 1- June 30

Sept. 30

Jan. 1- Mar. 31

Apr. 1- June 30

We also obtained cross-district data on criminal damage offenses,7

 which 

also shows no clear trends in the number of offenses within each district 

from 2005 to 2008, as shown in figure 43. In the last quarter of 2008, there 

were 37 criminal damage offenses in the Pima County Sheriff’s 

Department, Green Valley District, compared to one in the Santa Cruz 

County Sheriff’s Department, District 2. 

 

7

 In Arizona, criminal damage generally involves crimes that result in damage to or 

defacement of private or public property. Ariz. Rev. Stat. §§ 13-1602, 13-1604. Criminal 

littering or polluting is also a crime in Arizona. Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-1603. 

Page 129 GAO-09-824 
Appendix VII: Additional Crime Data for the 

State of Arizona, Santa Cruz County, Pima 

County, and Tubac 

 Border Patrol

Figure 43: Cross-District Comparison of Criminal Damage Offenses, Quarterly from January 1, 2005, through December 31, 

2008 

Number of offenses

Source: Pima County and Santa Cruz County Sheriff's Departments.

2005 2006 2007 2008

Santa Cruz County Sheriff's Department, District 2

Pima County Sheriff's Department, Green Valley District

0

1

2

15

20

25

30

35

40

Oct. 1- Dec. 31

July 1- Sept. 30

July 1- 

Oct. 1- Dec. 31

Jan. 1- Mar. 31

Apr. 1- June 30

Sept. 30

July 1- 

Oct. 1- Dec. 31

Jan. 1- Mar. 31

Apr. 1- June 30

Sept. 30

July 1- 

Oct. 1- Dec. 31

Jan. 1- Mar. 31

Apr. 1- June 30

Sept. 30

Jan. 1- Mar. 31

Apr. 1- June 30

The number of narcotics and drug related offenses8

 in Santa Cruz County 

Sheriff’s Department, District 2, peaked in 2006, and has declined since 

then, as shown in figure 44. In 2008, there were a total of five narcotics and 

drug related offenses. 

 

8

 The narcotics and drug related offense data we received include the following crime 

categories: Narcotics, Possession/Marijuana for sale, Possession of Drug Paraphernalia, 

Possession of Marijuana, and Possession/Sale/Transportation of Marijuana. 

Page 130 GAO-09-824 
Appendix VII: Additional Crime Data for the 

State of Arizona, Santa Cruz County, Pima 

County, and Tubac 

 Border Patrol

Figure 44: Number of Narcotics and Drug Related Offenses in Santa Cruz County Sheriff’s Department, District 2, Quarterly 

from January 1, 2004, through December 31, 2008 

Number of offenses

Source: Santa Cruz County Sheriff’s Department.

2004 2005 2006 2007 2008

0

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

Oct. 1- Dec. 31

July 1- Sept. 30

July 1- 

Oct. 1- Dec. 31

Jan. 1- Mar. 31

Apr. 1- June 30

Sept. 30

July 1- 

Oct. 1- Dec. 31

Jan. 1- Mar. 31

Apr. 1- June 30

Sept. 30

July 1- 

Oct. 1- Dec. 31

Jan. 1- Mar. 31

Apr. 1- June 30

Sept. 30

July 1- 

Oct. 1- Dec. 31

Jan. 1- Mar. 31

Apr. 1- June 30

Sept. 30

Jan. 1- Mar. 31

Apr. 1- June 30

In addition to data on major crimes, we also obtained data on selected 

other offenses and incidents within Santa Cruz County Sheriff’s 

Department District 2, from 2004 to 2008 (see table 13). 

Page 131 GAO-09-824 
Appendix VII: Additional Crime Data for the 

State of Arizona, Santa Cruz County, Pima 

County, and Tubac 

 Border Patrol

Table 13: Number of Other Offenses or Incidents Reported to Santa Cruz County Sheriff’s Department, District 2, Quarterly 

from January 1, 2004, through December 31, 2008 

Offense/ 

incident 

Abandoned 

vehicle Assault 

Attempted 

theft 

Dead body 

reported

Livestock 

offenses Threats Trespass

Destruct/damage/ 

vandalize property 

Property 

damage 

reported

Weapons 

offense

Jan 1, 2004 - 

Mar 31, 2004 

2 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0

Apr 1, 2004 - 

Jun 30, 2004 

4 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 1 0

Jul 1, 2004 - 

Sep 30, 2004 

4 0 1 4 0 0 0 0 5 0

Oct 1, 2004 - 

Dec 31, 2004 

0 0 0 0 0 2 0 2 2 0

Jan 1, 2005 - 

Mar 31, 2005 

0 1 0 2 0 0 0 1 6 0

Apr 1, 2005 - 

Jun 30, 2005 

6 1 0 2 0 0 0 0 3 1

Jul 1, 2005 - 

Sep 30, 2005 

2 2 0 2 0 1 1 0 2 0

Oct 1, 2005 - 

Dec 31, 2005 

7 1 0 2 0 0 0 0 6 0

Jan 1, 2006 - 

Mar 31, 2006 

2 1 0 3 1 0 1 0 7 0

Apr 1, 2006 - 

Jun 30, 2006 

3 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 7 1

Jul 1, 2006 - 

Sep 30, 2006 

3 2 0 0 1 1 1 0 5 0

Oct 1, 2006 - 

Dec 31, 2006 

1 0 0 3 0 1 0 0 5 0

Jan 1, 2007 - 

Mar 31, 2007 

1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 4 1

Apr 1, 2007 - 

Jun 30, 2007 

3 0 0 3 0 1 0 1 6 0

Jul 1, 2007 - 

Sep 30, 2007 

3 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 2 1

Oct 1, 2007 - 

Dec 31, 2007 

0 1 0 4 0 1 0 1 3 1

Jan 1, 2008 - 

Mar 31, 2008 

2 1 1 1 0 0 0 3 3 0

Apr 1, 2008 - 

Jun 30, 2008 

2 0 0 1 0 1 1 2 3 1

Page 132 GAO-09-824 
Appendix VII: Additional Crime Data for the 

State of Arizona, Santa Cruz County, Pima 

County, and Tubac 

 Border Patrol

Offense/ 

incident 

Abandoned 

vehicle Assault 

Attempted 

theft 

Dead body 

reported

Livestock 

offenses Threats Trespass

Destruct/damage/ 

vandalize property 

Property 

damage 

reported

Weapons 

offense

Jul 1, 2008 - 

Sep 30, 2008

11 0 0 6 0 1 0 3 1 2

Oct 1, 2008 - 

Dec 31, 2008

2 0 0 6 0 0 0 1 3 0

Source: Santa Cruz County Sheriff’s Department. 

Page 133 GAO-09-824 
Appendix VIII: Comments from the Appendix VIII: Comments from the Department of Homeland Security 

Department of Homeland Security 

Page 134 GAO-09-824 Border Patrol
Appendix VIII: Comments from the 

Department of Homeland Security 

Page 135 GAO-09-824 Border Patrol
Appendix VIII: Comments from the 

Department of Homeland Security 

Page 136 GAO-09-824 Border Patrol
Appendix VIII: Comments from the 

Department of Homeland Security 

Page 137 GAO-09-824 Border Patrol
A

Ac

ppendix IX: GAO Contact and Staff 

knowledgments

Page 138 GAO-09-824 

Appendix IX: GAO Contact and Staff 

Acknowledgments 

Richard M. Stana, (202) 512-8777 or stanar@gao.gov 

In addition to the contact named above, Cindy Ayers, Assistant Director, 

and Adam Hoffman, Analyst-in-Charge, managed this assignment. Ryan 

MacMaster, Jim Russell, and Amy Sheller made significant contributions to 

the work. Michele Fejfar and Chuck Bausell assisted with design, 

methodology, and data analysis, and Melinda Cordero assisted with 

mapping analysis. Frances Cook and Christine Davis provided legal 

support. Pille Anvelt and Karen Burke developed the report’s graphics, and 

Katherine Davis assisted with report preparation. 

 Border Patrol

GAO Contact 

Staff 

Acknowledgments 

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