TRANSPORTATION 

AND 

LOGISTICS 

ONE MAN'S STORY 

Transportation and Logistics 

One Man's Story 

by 

Jack C. Fuson 

Lieutenant Genera l 

U.S. Army, Retired 

Center of Military History 

United States Army 

Washington, D.C., 1994 
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data 

Fuson, Jack C., 1920-

Transportation and logistics : one man's story I by Jack C. Fuson. 

p. em. 

Includes bibliographical references and index. 

I. United States. Army- Supplies and stores. 2. United States. 

Army-Transportation. 1. Title. 

UC263.F88 1994 

355.4' II '090730904-dc20 94- 36166 

CMII Pub 70-62 

First Printing 

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents. U.S. Govcnuncnt Printing Office 

\Vnshington. D.C. 20402 

C!P 
Foreword 

This volume, which depicts the fortunes of a U.S. Army logistician in a time of upheaval and deals with problems of moving troops 

and supplies to fa r theaters of war, may be read as a personal tract for 

the times as well as history. For thirty-five years of service, in a career 

of firsthand experience fighting in the Pacific and Asia and high staff 

responsibility in Europe and Washington, Jack C. Fuson grappled 

with fundamenta l issues of transportation and logistics and amassed a 

lifetime of knowledge in managing the arteries of war. Some of those 

issues have been prefigured in the two companion studies in the spec ial logistics series of which this volume is a part: General Carter B. 

Magruder's incisive account of logistic support planning for an overseas theater of operations, Recurring Logistical Problems As f Have 

Observed Them, and Lt. Gen. Joseph M. Heiser's intimate story of the 

complex challenges facing a communications zone in peace and war, 

A Soldier Supporting Soldiers. 

In this work the focus shifts to transportation, to the practical art 

of moving armies, in particul a r to those ope rations which have 

recurred in the wars of this century, when great magnitude and 

urgency have tested the military's resources. For there is a maxim in 

strategy and logistics- no less true today than in New Guinea, Korea, 

and Vietnam when General Fuson learned his craft- that success usually goes to the side with the capabili ty to feed in the troops a nd 

goods at the superior rate. All through the pages that follow, General 

Fuson presents vivid examples of the impact of military transportation 

on the prosecution ofwar. 

Anyone at all concerned with logistic effectiveness and the 

requirements for mobility in an era of contingency missions will find 

much in this book to contemplate. Equally important is General 

Fuson's stark reminder that logistics is the true limitation on strategy 

and tactics. 

Ill 

JEFFREY J. CLARKE 

Chief Historian 

Acting Chief of Military History 
About the Author 

Jack C. Fuson served as a logistics consultant to the General 

Accounting Office, having retired from the Army with the rank of 

lieutenant general in 1977. His Army career of over thirty years, during which he served in three major wars, concentrated in the areas of 

transportation and logistics. His major assignments included international logistics project officer for the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, 

Director of Transportation for the U.S. Army, and Assistant Deputy 

Chief of Staff for Logistics (Personnel, Doctrine, and Systems). He 

was also the Senior Logistician for the U.S. Army, Pac ific, and the 

Military Assistance Command, Vietnam. After he served as commander, Fort Eustis, Virginia, General Fuson's career culminated in his 

assignment as Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics, U.S. Army. 

General Fuson received a bachelor of science degree in military 

studies from the University of Maryland. He also graduated from the 

Industrial College of the Armed Forces, the Armed Forces Staff 

College, and the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College. He 

has lectured at the Command and General Staff College, the National 

War College, the Armed Forces Staff College, and Association of the 

U.S. Army symposiums. He has also written various articles for Army 

Logistician. 
Preface 

My purpose in writing th is book has been to highlight several 

logistic problems which kept recurring during my thirty-five years of 

service in the United States Army. 

The first problem stems from the Army's organization for logistics. Since World War II, no one commander has been in charge of the 

total system. This creates problems at the operating level. The postwar 

dissolution of the Army Service Forces only made the system more 

unwieldy. 

The second problem is the lack of in-transit asset visibility: transportation personnel do not know the contents of supply containers nor 

can they track containers in transit. As a result they cannot deliver 

s hipments to the intended customer with the documentation he 

requires to validate the transaction. During the Vietnam War, shipments of repair parts and components that lost their identity in transit 

were returned to the supply depot in Okinawa. There, highly paid specialists opened the boxes and identified the contents. They then closed 

the boxes and sent them back to the theater accompanied by new manifests. The concept of inventOIJl in motion, which Lt. Gen. Joseph 

Heiser, Jr., ably described in A Soldier Supporting Soldiers, requires 

I 00 percent in transit asset visibi I ity to provide the kinds of benefits 

inherent to it. 

The third problem is the fail ure to understand the concepts of 

transportation management, traffic management, and movement control. Their accurate use is vital during time of war and essential to the 

cooperation necessary between the military and the civilian economy 

in both peace and war. 

The fourth problem is the lack of any Army organization and doctrine for amphibious support operations. Such operations were very 

successfully developed during World War II and should be considered. 

The fifth problem concerns the lack of emphasis on retrograde 

planning. Such planning is always overshadowed by operational and 

logistical planning for forward movement. 

An additional and very critical problem is the lack of adequate 

support personnel, especially for transportation and supply, during the 

initial stages of an operation. These personnel must accompany the 

early echelons, so that supplies and equipment arriving in the objective area can be properly handled. Unforhmately, these personnel are 

usually brought forward only after major support problems occur. 

v 
This happened even during Operations DESeRT SIIIELD and DESERT 

STORM! 

In addition to these recurring logistics problems- some that have 

also been emphasized by Generals Magruder and Heiser, authors of 

the first two books in this series- J wish to weave into my account 

some emphasis on leadership. 1 have included a n11cmorable 1918 article on the subject by Maj. C. A. Bach. Important principles like this 

are imperishable. 

f would like to thank Col. Thomas W. Sweeney, director of the 

U.S. Army Military History In stitute at Carlisle Barracks, 

Pennsylvania; Dr. Jeffrey J. Clarke, chief historian of the U.S. Army 

Center of Military History; and my editor, Theodore F. Watts, and Ms. 

Karen Moyes at the Logistics Management Institute. J would also like 

to thank Ms. Diane Donovan, editor, and Ms. Beth MacKenzie, visual 

information specialist, both from the Center of M i I itary History. 

In addition, I would like to acknowledge the help that Lt. Gen. 

Joseph Heiser, Maj. Gen. John Murray, and Maj. Gen. Raymond C. 

Conroy provided by reading the final manuscript as well as the valuable reviews my son John Warren and my daughter Jennie made of the 

early drafts. 

Despite the magnificent work of these individuals, all interpretations and conclusions remain my own as well as any errors or omissions 

that may be discovered. 

JACK C. FUSON 

VI 
Contents 

Chapter Page 

Prologue 

I. The New Amphibious Army . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 

2. From New Guinea to the Philippines. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 

3. Postwar Korea . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39 

4. A Career in the Army. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45 

5. War in Korea . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55 

6. The Transportation Corps . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79 

7. Duty in the United States Army, Europe . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85 

8. The Army Reorganizes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93 

9. War in Vietnam . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . I 09 

10. Logistics in Washington . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 133 

I I. Logistics in the Pacific . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 141 

12. Running Fort Eustis... ........ ..... ..... .. . . . . . . . . . 149 

13. Army Deputy ChiefofStafffor Logistics............... 173 

14. Retirement and the General Accounting Office . . . . . . . . . . 183 

15. Persistent Transportation Logistics Problems . . . . . . . . . . . . 193 

Appendix: Leadership. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 205 

Bibliography . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 213 

Illustrations 

Figures 

l. Army Organization Before 1962 and Project 80 . . . . . . . . . . 185 

2. Technical Services Maintenance Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . 187 

3. Department of the Army Organization After 

Project 80 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 188 

4. Organization for Department of the Army After 

Project Steadfast . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 190 

Maps 

I. Northern Australia and New Guinea Coast . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 

2. Pusan Port . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56 

3. Saigon Port . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . I 12 

vii 
Photographs 

The following illustrations appear between pages 69 and 78: 

Lieutenant Fuson, Camp Edwards, Massachusetts, J 942. 

Combined training along eastern U.S. coastline, 1941. 

Beach training exercises, Monterey Beach, Ca lifornia, 1943. 

Captain Fuson with a colleague, New Guinea, 1943. 

Coast Guardmen trying to free an LCVP in New Guinea, 1942. 

Amphibian truck, 2112-ton 6x6, standardized in 1942. 

Supply operations on a beach near .Hollandia. 

Unloading at a beach on Leyte, 1944. 

Open storage of supplies at Inchon port, 1948. 

U.S. Army Transportation Center, Fort Eustis, Virginia, circa 1948. 

Stores of supplies in the open near the docks at Pusan. 

Crane unloading a boxcar at Pusan port. 

LST loaded with boxcars moving into Pusan Harbor, 1951. 

All hands join to fight a raging fire, Pusan, 1953. 

Lieutenant Colonel Fuson meets with Brigadier General Lastago. 

The .following illustrations appear between pages 162 and 171: 

DeLong pier with overhead tramway. 

Colonel Fuson at 50 I st Transportation Company. 

Sunday night meeting of Transportation Corps colonels. 

Gate I , Headquarters, 4th Transportation Command, Saigon. 

Colonel Fuson surveys operations at Saigon port. 

Aerial view of Saigon port. 

Operation LEXINGTON, LCU unloading, 1966. 

1099th Transportation Company LCM in Saigon port, 1966. 

Colonel Fuson escorts General Beach. 

Sec. of Def. McNamara, Ellsworth Bunker, and General Westmoreland. 

Colonel Fuson briefs General Westmoreland. 

Brig. Gen. Fuson visits U.S. Army Transportation Command, Japan. 

USARPAC retrograde operations: M-48s await loading, circa 1971. 

Da Nang port and PDO lot, circa 1971. 

Genera l Fuson promoting boating safety as Comrnander, Fort Eustis. 

Mrs. Fuson landscaping at Fort Eustis, circa 1975. 

Gen. Fuson at American Logistics Association meeting. 

Illustrations courtesy of Lt. Gen. Jack C. Fuson (USA, Retired), the 

U.S. Army Transportation Museum, or from the files of the 

Department of Defense. 

VIII 
Transportation and Logistics 

One Man's Story 

Prologue 

As I review the course of my life, from my earliest memories 

through each of the various stages that I have gone through to arrive 

at where I am today, I find some logical progressions between stages 

but also much that resulted from luck and circumstances beyond my 

control. Unlike those who say how they would like to relive their 

lives so they could change events and improve their pasts, I have no 

such feelings. 1 would not like the risk in trying it again. I would be 

afraid of not doing as well as I have. 

T was born on 23 November 1920 in St. Joseph, Missouri, to parents who had been raised in the sma ll south ern Illinois town of 

Wakefield. My father was a medical doctor, an internist who spec ialized in heart disease. My mother was a housewife and remained one 

throughout her life. My father, one of ten children- five boys and five 

girls- had been raised on a small, ninety-acre farm in Wakefield. 

All the children worked on the farm until they were old enough to 

secure an additional job teaching in grade school. As soon as the boys 

could acquire enough money to enter college, they did. They would 

work one year, then attend summer school or attend school part time 

until they had completed their coursework. As was common practice in 

those days, the girls would work at home until they were old enough to 

marry and start their own families. Of five sons, my father and one 

other became medical doctors, another was an outstanding organic 

chemist, author, and medical school professor at Illinois University, 

while two brothers remained school teachers and farmers. 

My mother, also born and raised in Wakefie ld, had one older 

brother. Her father, Peter Warren, started a country store and mill in 

Wakefield and became a part-time local banker to fi ll the need for 

such services in Wakefield. He extended credit to farmers so they 

could buy the feed and equipment to farm. After the fall harvest, the 

loans would be repaid with interest. It was just this simple in the late 

nineteenth century. Eventually my grandfather moved to nearby 

Newton, I1linois, a larger town of 10,000, to start a regular bank. This 

Newton bank still exists and 1 have considerable interest in it. 

My father gradu ated from the medical schoo l at Washington 

University in St. Louis, Missouri, in 1915. He interned at Barnes 

Hospita l, part of the Washington University Medical School. When the 

United States entered World War l in 1917, Barnes Hospital organized 

one of the first field hospital un its and my father joined it. The hospital 
2 TRANSPORTATION AND LOGISTICS: ONE MAN'S STORY 

unit and my father went to France that year to provide medical support 

to the British and French armies for the rest of the war; they returned 

to St. Louis in 1919. My mother remained in Wakefield during the war 

with my older brother, born just before my father went to France in 

1917. When my father returned from France, he accepted an offer to 

join a physician practicing in St. Joseph, Missouri, thus beginning a 

medical career that lasted for fifty years. 

My older brother John Warren and I grew up and attended school 

in St. Joseph, a town of about 50,000. For his senior year, my folks 

sent John to the Missouri Military Academy (MMA) in Mexico, 

Missomi, a fad at the time. They sent me there the very next year and 

I remained for all four years of high school. The MMA spanned the 

eight years of grade school as well as high school. The first superintendents and part owners, Col. Charles Stribbling and his son, Charles 

Jr., established the MMA as one of the outstanding military schools in 

the country. As I look back on my career in the Army, I must credit a 

lot of my success to my training at this academy. Although I didn't 

realize it at the time, I learned many lessons there, which I carried 

with me throughout my life, such as leadership, discipline, integrity, 

patriotism, and the importance of training. 

Before I graduated from the academy in 1939, I had considered 

applying to West Point because I had been told that I could obtain an 

appointment. My father would have no part of it; he wanted me to follow in his footsteps and become a doctor. He had wanted my brother 

to attend medical school as well, but John had decided to become a 

lawyer. (My brother died after an operation for a stomach ulcer in 

1944 while I was overseas during World War II. He was only twentysix.) 

After my brother rejected medicine for law, my father insisted 

that I study medicine rather than attend West Point. I enrolled in premedicine at Washington University in St. Louis, in the fa ll of 1939, 

after military school; I remained there until shortly after Pearl 

Harbor. At Washington University I also joined the ROTC program 

and soon found myself being used as a basic military instructor for 

the other freshmen. I was better prepared than many of the cadet and 

noncommissioned officers at the university. 

My four years at MMA, plus an ROTC summer camp, qualified 

me to receive a commission as a second lieutenant of infantry upon 

reaching the age of twenty-one. I turned twenty-one on 23 November 

1941 and, shortly after Pearl Harbor, received a letter from the War 

Department requesting my intentions about accepting the commission. Like most young men at the time, I wanted to enter the Army as 

soon as possible, so I replied immediately and soon received orders to 

report to Jefferson Barracks in St. Louis, Missouri, to be sworn in as a 
PROLOGUE 3 

second lieutenant of infantry. The War Department also informed me 

that I would receive orders to proceed to Fort Benning, Georgia, to 

attend the Officers' Basic Course. 

In addition to enthusiasm for my patriotic duty, I had other concerns 

on my mind. In the summer of 1939 l met Miss Georgia Bahnsen, a 

young lady from Americus, Georgia, who was attending the St. Louis 

Institute of Music that summer on the Washington University campus. 

We became very good friends that summer. In the fall she returned to 

Georgia Southwestern College in Americus. We corresponded during 

the winter and when Georgia returned to Washington University the following summer, we resumed our relationship. 

Late in the summer of 1940, I visited her in Americus. Although 

her family was very cordial, her friends would hardly speak to me. It 

is hard to realize now that strong southern feelings against northerners 

persisted in 1940. (Latent distrust of northerners could have been 

rekindled in Georgia by the opening of Gone with the Wind that year.) 

Despite such hardships, we continued to correspond regularly during 

the fa ll semester. 

We were not considering marriage until after graduation. But the 

sudden attack at Pearl Harbor and my orders to enter the Army caused 

us to change our minds and marry at once. During the Christmas 

recess of 1941, my folks accompanied me to Americus, Georgia, for 

our wedding on 27 December 1941. We both came back to St. Louis 

and moved into a small apartment while I finished the semester. 

Shortly after I returned to school, my orders were changed to 

report to a newly organized Engineer Amphibious Command at Camp 

Edwards, Massachusetts, instead of Fort Benning. This was quite a 

shock because we were looking fo rward to being stationed at 

Columbus, Georgia, only a few miles from my wife's home. She had 

planned to live at her parents' home while I was in school. [ also wondered why an infantry officer with only ROTC training and no engineering training was being assigned to an engineer command. It was 

also unsettling not to find anyone who had ever heard of the Engineer 

Amphibious Command. Only later did l learn that the entire basic 

infantry class to which 1 was assigned had been shifted to the 

Engineer Amphibious Command because of the desperate need for 

personnel. 

CHAPTER 1 

The New Amphibious Army 

I reported to the brand new Engineer Amphibious Command 

(EAC) at Camp Edwards on 16 May 1942. The camp was still in a 

state of confusion. Assigned bachelor officer's quarters accommodations and told where 1 could eat and where I should report daily for 

further instructions, I soon met other young officers in the same state. 

We wondered where we were and what was expected of us. I vividly 

recall that on the second or third day, several of us scanned the bulletin board and discovered a notice to meet in formation at 0900 the 

next day in front of the orderly room. Several hundred officers and 

enlisted men lined up as directed. 

The senior officer and commander of the newly formed EAC, 

accompanied by his small staff, arrived to take charge. The commanding officer was Col. (later Lt. Gen.) Daniel C. Noce. Almost 

immediately, I recognized him as the commander of the ROTC camp 

that I attended at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, during the summer 

between my junior and senior years at Missouri Military Academy. 

He did not recognize me and l made no attempt to identify myself. 

Colonel Noce announced that the group would divide into two 

engineer amphibious regiments- the 591 st and the 592d. The 59 1st 

would probably go to Europe and the 592d to the Pacific. He told us 

to choose a regiment and to line up in the one we preferred. My group 

of friends lined up with the 592d bound for the Pacific. The next bulletin board notice divided the two regiments into a regimental headquarters company and three battalions of four companies each. 

Initially, the regiment seemed very disorganized, but this condition 

existed everywhere as the services expanded during those months 

after Pearl Harbor. 

For our amphibious group, the Army was creating an organization and structure where nothing had existed before. The fact that 

we were at war with both Germany and Japan, one who used 

Blitzkrieg warfare and the other capable of sneak attacks, challenged 

our military planners. One of the major problems confronting the 

high command was how to reach the enemy most effectively. We 

could have the best trained and equipped Army in the world, but 

unless it could be transported into the enemy's stronghold, it would 
6 TRANSPORTATION AND LOGISTICS: ONE MAN'S STORY 

not be effective. Developing the Army's own amphibious capability 

was one solution. 

The Army planners wanted to be able to move troops and supplies 

over short distances between a friendly "near shore" and an enemyheld "far shore" in their own landing craft. After the combat forces 

landed, the Army amphibious boats would continue to move additional units, supplies, and equipment from the near shore to the far shore 

as long as needed. When it became possible for deep-draft ships to 

resupply the far shore area, the Army amphibious ·units would remain 

in the combat area to discharge supplies into their own landing craft 

and then move ashore and discharge the suppli es over the beach. 

These supplies would then be moved into beach supply dumps, established and operated by the Army amphibious units, or would be sent 

directly to the combat unit service support areas. This resupply 

process would continue until Army service support units relieved the 

amphibious units. The Army's amphibious shore units had to be capable of establishing all the necessa ry shore facilities such as landing 

beaches, exit roads, supply dumps, and antiaircraft and beach defense 

positions. 

The Marine Corps and the Navy had an amphibious capability 

just as they do today, but their supply of landing forces and landing 

craft was limited. At the peak of World War II, the marines had only 

six amphibious divisions. The Army required an amphibious capability for approximately ninety divisions. Also, the Marine Corps 

amphibious mission differed from that of the Army. The marines were 

trained and equipped to land, establish a beachhead, stay there for 

some tnirty to forly days, then reboard Navy ships and move on. The 

Navy remained in the combat area to support the marines on their 

beachhead. 

The A1·my needed units to perform the same amphibious operations provided by the Marine Corps, but it needed the troops to operate for much longer periods of time. After landing at the target area, 

the Army then had to move in and establish a line of communication 

to sustain combat operations as far inland as necessary. The Army's 

mission included large-scale installations such as airfie lds, hospitals, 

and supply depots. 

The Army also accomplished amphibious landings by moving 

combat troops and combat support units over long distances on Navy 

attack ships. The Army amphibious units with their engineer shore 

parties and landing craft wou ld remain to operate the fo llow-on 

beach and supply operations. Follow-on shipping wou ld arrive without discharge capability. The amphibious units wou ld unload the 

ships, move cargo ashore in their landing craft and move the cargo 

over the beach to shore dumps for pick-up by the combat support 
THE NEW AMPHIBIOUS ARMY 7 

units. The operations in New Guinea in the Southwest Pacific in 

1943 and 1944 were classic examples of this situation. 

Within several months after the attack upon Pearl Harbor, the 

War Department had formed the Engineer Amphibious Command to 

organize and train Army personnel to operate landing craft and establish beachheads. Although security restrictions prohibited widespread news that such new units existed, civilian boating groups and 

military personnel with marine experience soon learned about it. In 

fact, the Army recruiting service advertised in the newspapers and 

distributed pamphlets in the coastal areas to attract men into this new 

Army organization. 

While classed as an engineering unit, the EAC drew personnel 

from all branches of the Army, as well as officers from the Navy, the 

Coast Guard, the Marine Corps, and the Coast and Geodetic Survey. 

Personnel from the Coast and Geodetic Survey were assigned as 

instructors in their specialties. Seamen from the Merchant Marine, 

masters from vessels, and amateur yachtsmen from up and down the 

East Coast became members of the landing craft units. 

Many of the officers who ended up in the boat battalions, 

a lthough college graduates and members of power boat squadrons, 

had no military experience or training. It was to have some members 

of these units with military experience that those of us from the 

infantry had been assigned to the EAC. That is how this midwesterner 

far from either great ocean became part of this seagoing organization. 

I was initially assigned as a battalion adjutant while the command was 

being organized and records were being accumulated. 

I will never forget my first payday. After almost six weeks at 

Camp Edwards, we were fina lly told we would get paid. As one of the 

four adj utants from our regiment, 1 reported to the finance office 

where we picked up rosters for each company and our bags of money. 

We then spent an entire twenty-four hours going from company to 

company, lining up the men in alphabetical order, and paying each one 

in cash. 

The two regiments were reorganized into the I st and 2d Engineer 

Amphibious Brigades (EABs). The I st EAB consisted of the 59 1 st, the 

541 st, and the 531 st Engineer Amphibious Regiments; and the 2d EAB 

comprised the 532d, 542d, and 592d regiments. There were also some 

separate brigade troops. Later, two additional brigades of comparable 

size were formed. 

As quickly as possible, officers and enlisted men were assigned to 

these units according to their skills. I was assigned to the first regiment of the second brigade, the 532d Engineer Amphibious 

Regiment, commanded by a Regular Army engineer officer, Lt. Col. 

Donald C. Hawkins. We moved immediately to a wooded area and 
8 TRANSPORTATION AND LOGISTICS: ONE MAN'S STORY 

established our campsite on the banks of Cape Cod in Cotuit, 

Massachusetts. Small recreational piers in the area were expanded as 

fast as possible to berth our boats. Our first boats were mostly small 

pleasure craft donated by patriotic citizens. Boat construction varied 

and they were powered by many different engines, mainly gasoline 

with a few diesel. The Navy had provided one small 36-foot landing 

craft. 

The initial training plan was misdirected-landing craft and shore 

support units were organized and trained separately. The EAC went 

through several reorganizations before it arrived at what was considered the best approach. After some experimentation it was decided 

that dividing the landing craft and shore party units into separate regiments was an error and that a better mix was a regiment consisting of 

landing craft and shore party engineers capable of supporting one 

Army division. Each regiment was soon reorganized into one boat 

battalion and one shore battalion. 

As soon as these units had been assembled and basic training had 

been completed, we began mission training. At first it was a case of 

the blind leading the blind. Most of the landing craft available to the 

boat battalions for moving personnel were landing craft personnel 

(LCP) and landing craft, personnel ramp (LCP[R]). We also had a few 

landing craft vehicles (LCV) with larger ramps for moving small vehicles. Some used gasoline and some used diesel. We had very few larger crafts, like the landing craft mechanized (LCM) that would later 

become our standard landing craft. The LCM was fifty feet long with 

a much wider bow ramp and was much more seaworthy than the 

smaller, 36-foot LCP. The two 670-horsepower Gray marine diesel 

engines that powered them are still the standard landing craft engines. 

We trained with both the 45th and the 36th Divisions. In the early 

evening, just after dark, we would pick up the infantry units on one 

beach and move them several miles to land them on another beach. 

After some maneuvering, we would retri eve the infantry units and 

return them to their home beach. We repeated this all-night operation 

almost every night throughout the summer and the fall of 1942. Initially 

we moved squads, then platoons, then companies, then battalions, and 

finally one entire regimental combat team. 

The shore battalions were first divided into ncar shore and far 

shore companies. In these practice landings, they would load and 

unload the boats and set up shore installations on the presumed enemy 

beaches. An advance party would land and place lighted markers to 

direct the follow-on main landings. We developed and improved this 

technique as we trained. 

In the original concept, a near shore company was trained in the 

proper methods of loading boats; it remained on the near shore and 
THE NEW AMPHIBIOUS ARMY 9 

continued to reload the follow-on craft. The far shore company would 

establish the beachhead in enemy territory, then build landing ramps 

for vehicles, clear the beach of obstacles and mines, construct exits 

from the beach proper, locate and build initial supply and vehicle 

dump areas, mark the beach, and assist the landing force with many 

similar jobs. In addition to unloading boats and ships, the far shore 

company established defensive positions. 

We soon realized that both the near shore and the far shore missions should be accomplished by the same shore COJTlpany. Thus the 

same shore company would load out the combat units and then land in 

the objective area ahead of the combat units to accomplish the far 

shore missions. During actual combat operations later, the shore companies, as well as the boat companies, demonstrated their ability to 

fight as infantry in order to protect and hold their beachheads. 

For several months the EAC had searched for a more suitable 

year-round training base in the Gulf of Mexico because winter training was not possible on Cape Cod. In the fa ll of 1942, the command 

departed the Cape. The I st EAB moved south to train with combat 

units preparing for landing operations in North Africa. The regiments 

of the I st Brigade each contained three boat battalions but no shore 

units. 

The fo llow-on EABs, the 2d, the 3d, and the 4th, were to be 

deployed to the Pacific with both organic boat and shore units as well 

as several support units. The 2d EAB was supported by the following 

units: the 262d Medical Battalion, the 287th Signal Company, the 

162d Ordnance Maintenance Company, a quartermaster headquarters 

and headquarters company, the 3498th Ordnance Med ium 

Maintenance Company, the !89th Quartermaster Gas Supply 

Company, a support battery, a medical detachment, the 2d Engineer 

Amphibious Brigade Band, and later the 5204th Amphibious Truck 

Company. 

Our shore battalions consisted of a headquarters, headquarters 

company, and Companies D, E, and F. They were well organized and 

had been fa irly well trained as engineers before they arrived at Camp 

Edwards, Massachusetts. As a combat engineer battalion, they were 

equipped with the normal construction equipment, but th ey were 

issued some additional bulldozers and cranes to be used on the beach. 

They required training in the other shore party functions. 

The boat battalion was not as well prepared. Because we didn't 

know what type landing craft and command and control craft we 

would have, we did not know how best to organize for operations. 

First, we were told that each standard boat company, A, B, and C, 

would be assigned fifty 36-foot landing craft. One landing craft 

mechanized, the 50-foot landing craft, would be assigned to the boat 
lO TRANSPORTATION AND LOGISTICS: ONE MAN'S STORY 

battalion headquarters and headquarters company. Each boat company would have an organizational maintenance and supply capability. 

The level of maintenance to be performed at company or battalion 

level had not yet been determined. 

After our last large training maneuver with the 36th Division at 

Martha's Vineyard, we were told that our brigade, the 2d, would move 

to a year-round training base some sixty miles south of Tallahassee, 

Florida, close to Carrabelle on the northern Gulf Coast. Everyone 

imagined our new home would be a paradise whh palm trees and 

white sandy beaches. What a surprise awaited us. 

Most of us traveled all the way down by train on crowded day 

coaches. The entire move took some three days. Some of the landing 

craft made the trip under their own power using the inland waterways, 

which provided excellent training, but most of the craft moved by rail, 

as did most of our other equipment. 

Carrabelle did have a few palm trees, but it was mostly a swamp 

with the biggest flies and mosquitos we would see until New Guinea. 

The cantomnent-type camp we had been told was there had not been 

built. For the following few weeks, we repeated the rough, hard work 

of building another campsite. 

As soon as the camp became livable, we started training on the 

shallow beaches and the sandy reefs of the Gulf of Mexico. The first 

training directive issued by the Engineer Command called for the 2d 

EAB to remain at Carrabelle until April J 943 to train infantry units 

for amphibious operations. The Army ground forces had established 

an amphibious training center next to the brigade's area, so everyone 

settled down for a great winter in Florida. 

Back at camp, the boat maintenance company set up shop and 

prepared our few boats for training. At the same time, a tentative 

training program was being prepared for the combined amphibious 

operations. 

Then came the next big surprise- all plans were canceled. The 

brigade received orders to move immediately to Fort Ord, California, 

and to stage for shipment on the first available transport to the Pacific 

theater for actual landing operations. We turned our boats over to an 

advance detachment of the 3d Brigade which would replace us at Camp 

Carrabelle. We began packing up for our next train ride. It was distressing to the few families who had arrived there to be immediately shipped 

back home. Although we had no idea how long we would be at Fort 

Ord, it didn't look as though it would be long enough to justify moving 

our families to the West Coast. It is difficult today to realize the differences in cross-country h·avel between the 1940s and the I 990s. 

We began the move from Camp Carrabelle to Fort Ord during the 

first few days of November J 942. We required nine troop trains plus 
THE NEW AMPHIBIOUS ARMY II 

additional freight trains for our equipment. Each troop train included 

a mess car in which the troops ate on a scheduled basis. Every day the 

trains would stop so that the troops could unload and exercise on the 

platforms. The trains had pullman cars with berths for sleeping. 

Although not up to peacetime standards, the cars were comfortable. 

Most of the men found the trip enjoyable. We all saw countryside that 

we had never seen before. (We didn't really appreciate the comfort of 

these trains until a few months later when we were moving north from 

Townsville to Cairns in Australia.) 

Fort Ord is located in one of the most picturesque parts of 

California. It was a great place compared with Camp Cotuit or Camp 

Carrabelle. We were housed in steam-heated barracks, along paved 

roads, with surfaced drill fields and excellent bivouac areas. Nearby 

were movie theaters, a post exchange, a laundry service, and excellent 

rifle ranges. 

We conducted a little landing craft training using old Navy landing boats in Monterey Bay, a perfect place for surf training. As you 

move from north to south in the bay, the intensity of surf increases, 

which enabled us to experience landing in calm water in the north to 

absolutely impossible surf in the south. We had not had this kind of 

training either on Cape Cod or in Carrabelle. 

We also accomplished a great deal of field training-extended 

order drills and the like- because Fort Ord has so many excellent 

training facilities. We devoted most of our time to obtaining new 

equipment and supplies and preparing for overseas movement. This 

was a new experience for everyone. 

We also had to take overseas physicals and update our personnel 

records. After the physicals, we lost several hundred men and required 

replacements. My most serious loss from the physicals was my company's first sergeant, a veteran of World War I. He had been my most 

able, competent, and trusted assistant in addition to being a very excellent teacher. He was considered too old to go overseas. Having to leave 

the company just before it went overseas broke the old fellow's heart. 

By this time, I was the company commander of the combined 

Regimental and Battalion Headquarters and Headquarters Company. 

Because the larger craft had been assigned to one headquarters company, it was decided to consolidate the two headquarters and headquarters companies. 1 commanded nine officers, a ll of whom had 

recently been commissioned directly from civilian life because of 

their boat experience. Although they didn't know much about the military, they were skilled with boats and navigation. lt didn't seem to 

matter that all nine were older than 1. 

ln addition to the field training, most of our.boat personnel attended a five-week course in antiaircraft gunnery. This was very important 
12 TRANSPORTATION AND LOGISTICS: ONE MAN'S STORY 

because our craft would all have .50-caliber antiaircraft machine guns 

mounted on board. This was our live fire training. We also received 

extensive aircraft identification training to learn the difference between 

American and Japanese aircraft. 

In late December, we received orders to ship our equipment to the 

port of embarkation (POE) in San Francisco. In late January I943, we 

received final orders to move our units to the POE, where the entire 

532d Regiment boarded the SS Noordam and set sail. 

As I shuttled from Massachusetts to Florida and from Florida to 

California, my wife Georgia also began her long association with the 

U.S. Army. Like all Army wives, her support was vital then and would 

continue to be in the years ahead. Army wives, in fact, constitute a 

special breed whose contributions to service life are far more vitaland often far more onerous- than outsiders could ever know. 

We had initially decided that Georgia would not accompany me to 

Camp Edwards because there were just too many unknowns. Before 

my departure, we met Ruth Kelley whose husband, Dr. Jules Kelley, 

was the superintendent of the Barnstable County Hospital on Cape 

Cod, near Camp Edwards. When Ruth learned about our problem, she 

insisted that Georgia accompany me to Edwards and stay with her and 

her husband until we could find a place of our own. They practically 

adopted Georgia, and she remained their guest until, with Ruth's help, 

she located a small house we could afford. 1 saw very little of the 

Kelleys or Georgia after that. Only later did I become acquainted with 

the difficulties of finding a house that we could afford on my $30-amonth second lieutenant's salary. 

Florida turned out to be more convenient for both of us since my 

wife's hometown, Americus, was relatively close to Carrabelle. She 

had returned home by the time we moved there and drove the family 

car down to the nearest town, Sopchoppy, Florida. In that very small 

village, she found a small house to rent that consisted of an undersized living room, one bedroom separated from it by an old sheet, and 

a tiny kitchen with a small kerosene stove. The water pump was on the 

back porch. There was no inside plumbing, but we had a privy. We 

moved in and were much better off than anyone else in our regiment. 

A few days later my battalion commander, Maj. Oscar W. Traber, 

from Nackadish, Louisiana, moved his wife and her maid in with us 

until they could find a place to li ve. It was close living, to say the 

least. 

As we moved from Carrabelle to Fort Ord, our family situation 

became better. After realizing that my unit was to remain there for 

several months of additional training, I decided Georgia could join 

me. It turned out to have been a sound decision. Soon after Georgia 

arrived, she and two other wives whom we had knovvn on Cape Cod 
THE NEW AMPHIBIOUS ARMY 13 

found an excellent three-bedroom house which we could afford in 

Carmel, California. The three couples moved in and had a wonderful 

final months in scenic Carmel. We spent many nights at homesomething that had not been possible on Cape Cod or at Camp 

Carrabelle. We both cherished this time as we prepared ourselves for 

the inevitable separation and our unknown future. 

CHAPTER2 

From New Guinea to the Philippines 

Our loading out on the SS No01·dam!was rapid and uneventful, 

except for one mystery. The last night before sailing, we saw a barge 

tie up alongside the outboard side of the Noordam, from which three 

vehicles were craned aboard. Because they were well covered, we had 

no idea of what they were. We later discovered that these were the 

first amphibious trucks to be deployed, which accounted for the 

secrecy. We also learned that soon after we were underway, all the 

regiments had been outfitted with an amphibious truck company. 

The development of these amphibious vehicles, called DUKWs, 

was unusual- they were developed, tested, and procured in ninety 

days. They had been conceived by Rod Steves, a boat designer, and 

Dick Kerr, the transportation specialist for the Arabian-American Oil 

Company. Several years later, I had the pleasure of meeting and working with these very talented men. In fact, Dick Kerr was my principal 

adviser when 1 was project officer for the development of the plastic 

DUK.Ws, a product that was never completed. 

Dick Kerr and Rod Steves were among that handful of experts 

that Genera l Frank S. Besson ca lled upon to develop new equipment 

and new technology during his career. General Besson was probably 

the most innovative person I have ever known. He was responsible for 

much of my success in the Army along with Maj. Gen. Rush B. 

Lincoln and Lt. Gen. Joseph M. Heiser, Jr., both of whom I will speak 

about later. 

Our trip to Australia was long and monotonous. A Japanese submarine threat persisted in the aftermath of the Japanese defeat in the 

Battle of the Coral Sea, fought in May 1942. This caused us as a single ship not in convoy to travel a zig-zag course very far to the south. 

It took us thirty days to reach Australia. Because we were a crowded 

troop ship, conditions were cramped. 

While cnroute, we made one stop for two nights in Wellington, 

New Zealand. We were allowed shore leave, which improved morale. 

A few days later we landed in Townsville, Australia, and learned 

that because of the stevedore strike, we would have to unload our own 

ship. We could not imagine that a country in danger of Japanese invasion would permit such an important segment of the work force to 
16 TRANSPORTATION AND LOGISTICS: ONE MAN'S STORY 

strike. We found out later that dock strikes occurred frequently. With the 

help of the ship's crew, we discharged the troops and the accompanying 

gear onto trains and started our movement north to Cairns, Australia- a 

trip which tmned out to be an amazing experience. 

The narrow-gauge Aussie train seemed more like our stage coaches of the West fifty years earlier. It was old, slow, dusty, and terribly 

uncomfortable. It trave lled so slowly that the troops frequently 

jumped off and walked alongside for exercise. In fact, as train commander I encouraged this under supervision. My company of about 

250 strong occupied the entire train. 

Our route north followed most of the seacoast part of the province 

of Queensland and we saw lots and lots of sugarcane and felt lots of 

hot and sticky weather. About half way up the coast, one of the heaviest rainstorms I had ever experienced stopped the train at a small town 

named Babinda. The train conductor informed me that both the bridge 

ahead of us and the one behind us had been washed out. There was no 

way to proceed or return and he didn 't know how many days it would 

take to rebuild the bridges. Because there was no kitchen car on our 

train, we had been issued only enough combat rations to last us on the 

trip to Cairns. 

J now faced the problem of feeding my company once the combat 

rations ran out. After a conference with my company officers and 

senior noncommissioned officers, I left the train and visited the mayor 

of Babinda. He was extremely cooperative and helped arrange meals at 

the four restaurants in town. The willing and friendly Australians and 

their mayor helped me develop a plan to feed the troops. I would sign 

for all the meals and forward the chits to the proper Army authorities 

for payment. I never found out if the payments had been made. 

l explained the arrangement to the troops at a company meeting. I 

also told them they were free to go to town if they wished. I spcci fied 

the restaurant to which each squad and platoon had been assigned and 

how reimbursement was to be made. I also explained to them how 

nice the city fathers had been and called upon each man to act courteously. I told the troops that 1 expected each man to return for company 

formation each day. The ringing of the train bell would signal the formation. I also assigned shore patrols to each area in Babinda. I told 

them that when the bridge had been repaired and the train was ready 

to resume its trip north, I would again ring the bell and I expected 

each man to report back to the train immediately. Because J had a 

well-disciplined company, I expected no trouble. The bridge ahead 

was repaired after two days, so we reassembled for our trip north. 

I called a company formation to tell the troops how proud I was of 

their conduct in Babinda. No trouble occurred and they returned for 

formation on time. Some were helped by others; no one was injured 
FROM NEW GUINEA TO THE PIIJLlPPINES 17 

but some were very drunk. 1 received no complaints from the village. 

I have always wanted to return to Babinda but have never been able, 

even though I have visited Australia in recent years. Babinda is 

remote and very difficult to reach. The trains have not improved much 

and the roads are even worse now than in 1943. 

As soon as we arrived in Cairns, we moved to our next home, 

Trinity Beach. It is sixteen miles north of Cairns and thirty-five to 

forty miles south of Port Douglas. This area was excellent for an 

amphibious unit. Trinity Beach is typical of the northern coast of 

Queensland with a wide, white sandy beach that shelves gradually. lt 

is great for landing water craft and is an excellent training site for 

amphibious operations. The Great Barrier Reef was a challenge 

because we had no navigational charts. The beach itself is backed up 

by good soil running some two miles inland before hitting a very 

steep mountainous slope covered with all types of jungle. This mountain jungle area rises several thousand feet before arriving at the tableland, a very ferti le area, relatively fl at and clear for several miles until 

it turns into the Australian back country desert. 

The tableland became the permanent home for three Australian 

Imperial Forces (AIF) divisions after their return from North Africa. 

We built our campsite at the foot of the mountain at the edge of the 

jungle. While waiting to receive our boats, we used the jungle as a 

training area to prepare for New Guinea. 

We expected to be issued boats as soon as we arrived at Trinity 

Beach. The 41 I th Base Shop, part of our 2d EA 8, had arrived in 

Australia in early December, accompanied by our new boats in knockdown form. Unfortunately, when the base shop arrived in Cairns to 

take over the promised assembly plant, they found only an old saw 

mill that had not been converted. Its owners were still holding out for 

more money. In early February 1943, when this problem had been settled, the 411 th, assisted by our engineers, immediately began to build 

an assembly plant 

Finally, in early April, the first new landing craft came off the 

line. It was a 36-foot landing c raft vehicle personnel (LCYP), 

designed and built by the Higgins Boat Company of New Orleans, 

Louisiana. It had a wide bow ramp and was powered by the standard 

670-horsepower Gray marine diesel engine. Very soon the 4 I 1 th was 

assembling seven of these landing craft every day. As they came off 

the line, they were slowly issued to our boat companies until each had 

the fifty landing craft it had been authorized. 

Our 532d regiment was the only regiment of the brigade in the 

area. The other two were located at Rock Hampton, Australia, several 

miles south near Townsville. We were to be stationed on the northern 

coast of Austra lia just below New Guinea because the beaches 
18 TRANSPORTATION AND LOGISTICS: ONE MAN'S STORY 

offered excellent amphibious training conditions and the terrain 

directly behind us was excellent for jungle training. We were scheduled to train with the 9th Australian Division, one of the units returning from North Africa and stationed on the high tableland beyond the 

jungle. In North Africa, they had been known as the "Rats of 

Tobruk" because they stopped Rommel at Tobruk. The 9th had been 

in constant combat in North Africa for nearly three years and were 

legendary combat soldiers. We learned from their experience. 

The upcoming campaign would rely on amphibious landings. The 

initial battles to be fought in New Guinea to stop the Japanese had to 

be fought on land from Port Moresby, over the Owen Stanley 

Mountain Range, to the eastern and northern coasts of New Guinea. 

The Japanese navy still posed a threat in the Coral Sea and along the 

northern coast of New Guinea. In early 1943, the Allies lacked an 

amphibious capability in the southwest Pacific theater. 

Soon after the Australian 9th Division had moved into their campsite on the tableland, our two staffs began planning for combined 

amphibious training. As we introduced the 9th to amphibious operations, they trained us in combat skills. Our troop amphibious experience had been very limited- mostly that which we had received many, 

many months earlier off Cape Cod. The few months we worked off 

Trinity Beach with the 9th Division provided invaluable training. In 

addition to having had combat experience, the Australians were great 

to work with. The men were all originally from the Sidney area but, 

after three years in North Africa, had been given only seven days 

leave in Sidney before being moved north to the tableland. We heard 

much about this il"\iustice as the months progressed, but such was the 

urgency everywhere. Large numbers of Japanese were still in the area 

and were capable of invading Austra lia. 

Early in July, the War Department renamed the 2d Brigade the 2d 

Engineer Special Brigade and named the regiments engineer boat and 

shore regiments. The word amphibian was dropped without explanation. 

When I look back on the Army's frightening lack of preparedness at 

the beginning of World War II, I hope this condition will not occur 

again. In 1941 we had not planned on an island-hopping campaign 

ranging across the Pacific Ocean. Most units like ours had no organization, no doctrine, no equipment, and certainly no experience in the field 

to which they had been assigned. Our training on Cape Cod had been 

limited to picking up units of the 36th Division, moving them by boat to 

another beach and then back to home beach, all on the same evening. 

The shore party knew it would assist the combat unit to load and 

unload, develop the far shore beach, and build roads and supply 

dumps, but never had the opportunity to actually practice this. Many 
FROM NEW GUINEA TO THE PHILIPPINES 19 

questions remained unanswered: Which supplies would accompany 

the troops? Which would follow on? What, if any, documents were 

needed? And how could we ever maintain asset visibility for the vast 

amount of supplies passing through our hands? 

Moving troops on and off the 36-foot landing craft was simple, 

but how to load and discharge a deep draft follow-on ship was much 

more difficult. Unfortunately, this lesson had to be learned much later 

during actua l combat. During most of our training off Trinity Beach, 

we used the small 36-foot LCVP. We did not see any LCMs or larger 

navy landing craft such as the landing ship tank (LST) and the landing 

ships dock (LSD) until just before we left for New Guinea. We still 

had no navigation or control boats and were still very short of landing 

craft and lacked much of the equipment for the boat and shore battalions. Nevertheless, in early August 1943 we were ordered to New 

Guinea along with the 9th Division. 

The new regimental commander, Col. J. J. F. Stiner, made me 

responsible for loading our regiment aboard a ship scheduled to arrive 

at Cairns Harbor. J contacted the port authority and learned that it was 

a C I MAY I, a small, four-hatched, deep-draft ship that had just 

docked. I went aboard and discussed our plans with the captain and 

the first mate, warning them that I had never loaded a ship. As soon as 

I returned to camp, we started moving to the port. Without the help of 

the ship's first mate, r would never have been able to load the ship. 

After loading we moved north to Morobe, New Guinea, a small village a few miles south of Nassau Bay and north of Buna. (See Map 1.) 

Buna had just been taken by combined elements of the 41st U.S. 

Infantry Division and the 7th Australian Division. 

We unloaded our ship (moored in the river near Morobe) onto 

local barges as well as a few of our landing craft. Our regiment then 

established a campsite alongside this river, with part of the 9th 

Division nearby. Loading and unloading this ship provided more onthe-job learning. 

As soon as we were ashore and had established our camp, we 

began moving elements of the 9th Division up the coast to join the 

Nassau Bay Salamaua operation. In cooperation with the 9th 

Division's support troops, we moved the troops and then their equipment and supplies. We did not have enough boats to make the move in 

one trip. All our movement had to be made at night because of 

Japanese aircraft and shore detachments along the way. Our only 

escorts were a couple of Navy PT boats from a squadron located on 

the Morobe River. Unknown to us, one of the officers assigned to this 

PT squadron was Lt. John F. Kennedy. 

The Salamaua operation expanded day by day as we encountered 

and drove back more Japanese. Every night our boats carried up more 
20 TRANSPORTATION AND LOGISTICS: ONE MAN'S STORY 

troops, artillery, ammunition, tractors, jeeps, and supplies. The shore 

party established and conducted loading operations nea r the 9th 

Division around Morobe and on the far shore. Every return trip 

brought back wounded and sick troops, returning troops, and mail. 

Our boats would often have to cut back their motors to land quietly in the dark within fifty yards of Japanese machine gunners. If the 

firing became too intense, our boats would pull off and quietly anchor 

oiTshorc until the firing could be stopped. They would then return to 

the beach and finish unloading. They made several trips each night if 

time permitted. Gradually, over one hundred boats were obtained to 

support the Salamaua campaign. Salamaua finally fell on 12 

September 1943. 

Lack of navigational charts made operating our boats along the 

New Guinea coast very difficult. These waters had never been charted. 

Because of our proximity to the equator, we could predict neither the 

time of a tide nor its depth. As we moved north, however, we slowly 

charted the area. 

As soon as we moved to New Guinea, the 2d Brigade was able to 

attach useful brigade support units to the regiment. Company B of the 

562d Engineer Boat Maintenance Battalion was attached to our boat 

battalion for direct maintenance support for our boats as we operated 

north. This company did an amazing job for the next year or so. 

Although we encountered extensive action while supporting the 

Australian 9th Division during its assault on Salamaua, our first large 

operation was the Lae landing. (It was from Lac, New Guinea, that 

Amelia Earhart began her tragic fl ight toward Howland Island on 2 

July 1937.) Our headquarters was located at Morobe but, to support 

the 9th Division operations, we scattered sma II boat and shore 

detachments up and down the coast from Milne Bay to Salamaua. 

After receiving orders to make the Lae landing, the regiment 

reassembled at Morobe as fast as possible. We would have a rehearsal 

with the 9th Division and the Navy in the Milne Bay area. Our units 

moved down to participate. At the time, we had only a few 50-foot 

LCMs and relied mostly on the 36-foot LCYPs. Therefore, we could 

move only one regiment of the 9th Division at a time. The landing plan 

called for the Navy to move the remainder of the 9th in their larger 

LST and landing craft tank (LCT). 

After the rehearsal in Milne Bay, we reassembled at Morobc and 

prepared for the landing at Lae. After loading one regiment of the 9th 

Division at Morobe on 3 September, we moved out to join the Navy 

convoy for the 75-mile move up the coast. We landed the next morning at daybreak. Just before the troops hit the beach, the Japanese 

began firing heavily, but the escort ships that the Navy had placed on 

both flanks soon silenced them. 
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22 TRANSPORTATION AND LOGISTICS: ONE MAN'S STORY 

The Lae operation comprised two beach landings some eighteen 

miles east of Lae and an airborne drop of the 503d Parachute 

Regiment into the Markham Valley at Nadzab, an old airstrip. The 

three forces were to converge on Lae. 

Our shore party landed rapidly on Red Beach and began its work. 

As we were followed by the 20th Brigade, 9th Australian Division, 

with all of their equipment and supplies, the beachhead began to grow. 

Although we did not see the Japanese air force during the day, they 

did attack the beach area and its newly established installations every 

night. During these attacks, our boats would disperse offshore to present small isolated targets. As a result, the Japanese generally ignored 

them. After lmloading, most of the boats would return immediately to 

Morobe to pick up another load, but around twenty boats remained in 

the beach area to support the troops as they moved down the coast to 

Lac. 

The terrible jungle terrain, heavy rain and mud made the shore 

roads impassabl e. We used the landing craft to supply the 9th 

Division's advance by water. We moved troops, guns, ammunition, 

supplies, and equipment down the coast from Red Beach where we 

had landed the Australians. As the operation expanded, we brought 

more boats up to assist in this coastal support operation. Lae was 

captured on 15 September 1943. 

General Douglas MacArthur, figuring that a quick landing at 

Finschhafen, New Guinea, wou ld catch the enemy by surprise, 

ordered an attack there for 22 September. Having only four days to 

prepare for this next operation, we moved out with our Australian 

brigade, the 20th of the 9th, and successfully landed north of 

Finschhafen on Scarlet Beach. During this landing, we moved our 

boat and shore elements with our own landing craft while the Navy 

moved the 9th Division on LSTs and LCTs. We made the initial landing, established the beachhead. and installed beach markers to guide 

the Navy ships to the proper beaches. 

For the first time, the Navy launched a very heavy bombardment 

before the landing, which silenced some but not all of the Japanese 

positions. Our shore party personnel landed without much resistance, 

but the first two waves of the 9th suffered quite a few casualties until 

the Japanese pillboxes were destroyed. Again, after landing north of 

the village of Finschhafen, the infantry moved south along the coast 

with the support of ow· boats. Because of nightly visits by Japanese 

aircraft, our boats had to anchor offshore in very rough waters. The 

Japanese considered the shore installations more lucrative targets and 

seldom bombed the landing craft. 

The 9th met more and more resistance as it moved on 

Finschhafen, making it necessary to reinforce the 20th Brigade with 
FROM NEW GUINEA TO THE PHILlPPINES 23 

additional troops and artillery. By early October, we had established 

regular supply lines between Lae and Scarlet Beach near Finschhafen, 

bringing up troops, supplies, and equipment and returning personnel 

to Lae. 

After the fall of Finschhafen, we assembled our regiment, including our boats, in the Finschhafen harbor. It was the first time since 

leaving Lae that our boats had been able to reassemble as a unit for 

protection, maintenance, and rest. 

The 9th Division's next mission was to push toward Sio. The coast 

from Finschhafen northwest to Sio was much different from the 

southern coastline from Lae to Finschhafen. The few beaches were 

always small and rocky and the shoreline was just as rough and rocky 

as the coast of Maine, but our boat personnel met the challenge. 

Sio was the last mission for the 9th Division before returning to 

Australia for rest and rehabilitation. They had been in combat for several months and had endured heavy casualties and lost much equipment. We were sorry to see them go, but they had certainly earned a 

rest. 

After Sio most of our LCVPs were replaced by LCMs, which 

greatly expanded our carrying capacity. We also received an LCM 

equipped with four twin .50-caliber machine guns mounted in 

Martin turrets, a 37-mm. gun, two 20-mm. guns, and a rocket 

launcher. This "flack boat" had been designed by our brigade ordnance officer, Lt. Col. Elmer Volgenau, and built by our 162d 

Brigade Ordnance Maintenance Company. The added fire power 

allowed the boat battalion to protect our convoys from enemy aircraft and shore batteries. From then on, this flack boat was used on 

every mission and established quite a reputation for itself. 

Our next operation was plaxmed against Hollandia, New Guinea. 

As the Japanese had evacuated southern New Guinea, they had moved 

to the north coast at Wewak and had apparently decided to make a 

major stand there. General MacArthur therefore decided to bypass 

Wewak (350 miles from Sio) and land at Hollandia, 700 miles away. 

This operation, vastly larger than anything we had previously taken 

part in, covered a much greater distance. The number of troops, landing craft, warships, and carrier-based planes involved exceeded anything we had ever seen before. Because of the great distances, we had 

to take along enough supplies and equipment for thirty days. Once we 

had established the beachheads, there could be no nightly runs back to 

supply bases as we had been doing. 

The Hollandia operation consisted of landings by two divisions: 

the 41st U.S. Infantry Division was to land at Humboldt Bay just south 

of Hollandia and the 24th U.S. Infantry Division just north of 

Hollandia at Tanahmerah Bay. Our regiment, the 532d Engineer Boat 
24 TRANSPORTATION AND LOGISTICS: ONE MAN'S STORY 

and Shore Regiment, would support the 41st, with whom we had previously worked in Nassau Bay. Our sister regiment, the 542cl, was to support the 24th. We had a full scale rehearsal landing over Red Beach, 

where we had landed for the Lac campaign, while the 542d Regiment 

rehearsed with the 24th Division offshore at Goodenough lsland. 

For the first time we would travel to the combat area on Navy 

ships. The LCVPs were carried in the davits aboard the LSTs while 

our LCMs were to be moved by an LSD, a new type of ship we saw 

for the first time. We were really impressed. The three huge LSDs in 

our flotilla could carry LCMs or barges fully loaded with tanks or 

trucks. Because of their bulky loads, the only personnel on the LSD 

were the ship's crew and our boat crews. It was a luxury for the boat 

crews to travel without a ship full of infantry men. From then on, we 

all wanted to travel to the landing area aboard LSDs until we ran into 

Japanese kamikazes in the Philippines. Then we all wanted to ride on 

the smallest possible ship. 

For the first time we observed the thunderous barrage of naval 

gunfire with strafing and bombing from carrier aircraft, an awesome 

show. As soon as the preparatory fire ended, our landing craft began 

landing troops and equipment across four beaches on Humboldt Bay 

in the Hollandia area. The Japanese that had survived our pre-landing 

barrage had apparently taken off for the hills and left everything 

behind. Not only were the beaches covered with personal gear but 

worse, with stacks and stacks of Japanese equipment and supplies. 

Our intelligence had chosen less than satisfactory places to come 

ashore. Although the beaches provided excellent landing areas, they 

were very narrow and led to almost impenetrable mango swamps several hundred yards deep. As a result, hundreds and hundreds of troops 

were pouring ashore followed by thousands of tons of supplies, tanks, 

trucks, and equipment, with no place to go. Our shore engineers had a 

challenging task. I bivouacked my company close to the edge of the 

swamp, just behind the stacks of Japanese supplies, and prepared 

defensive positions. We could hear gunfire everywhere but, as it turned 

out later, it was all from our own troops. There were no Japanese 

around, but friendly fire is never friendly under such conditions. 

As soon as we had established our position, we began to assist the 

shore battalion to clean up the landing area. Despite the terribly congested beach, all the Navy ships were unloaded and left before dark. 

The first day and night were quiet: no Japanese aircraft appeared. The 

Japanese were also quiet on the second day, but we could hear the firing of a lot of small arms of undetermined origin. One always 

assumed that one was the target. Early during the second night, the 

red alert sounded. We could hear a dive bomber and we all went to the 

foxholes. Antiaircraft fire from the shore and from ships offshore 
FROM NEW GUINEA TO THE PHILIPPINES 25 

filled the sky. All at once we heard a whoop, whoop, whoop, when a 

bomb hit a gasoline dump very close to our position on our beach. 

The flames spread quickly to most of the other supply dumps and 

worst of all, they spread to the ammunition dump. 

Because of the piles of abandoned Japanese supplies and equipment and the additional thirty-day supply for the 4 ~ st Division, we 

faced terribly congested conditions on this narrow beach. We couldn't 

disperse our supplies and equipment so we had to stack and concentrate them. This violated good policy and placed everything in danger 

of being destroyed by fire and explosions. 

Our regimental executive officer, Lt. Col. Del Brocket, who had 

been with the regiment under three regimental commanders, organized us on the beach area. We rolled gasoline barrels to the right and 

left to cut a wide, clear strip from the water through the area. 

Bulldozers pushed all types of supplies into the water. We organized 

human chains to pass supplies from one man to the next until they 

reached the safety zone. Everyone worked to save what he could. 

Suddenly the fire reached the main ammunition dump, sending explosions and flames everywhere. The supplies burned all night and continued for several days, destroying nearly all of the 41st Division task 

force's thirty-day stockage. 

Everyone worked through the explosions and the fires and, fortunately, casualties were light. Observers on ships offshore could not 

believe their eyes, they told us later. It was apparently a sight to see. 

With great efficiency, our boats evacuated casualties from the burning 

beach to offshore ships for medical attention. 

lt took several more days to clear the beach. Since it would take 

several weeks to receive resupply, the 41st Division task force had to 

share food and supplies with the other Sixth Aimy troops. This meant 

that supplies for everyone were very thin for some time, but eventually 

the resupply ships arrived from Australia. 

Although the Hollandia landing at Humboldt Bay was a disaster, 

the terrain surrounding Hollandia was a very large valley that was 

mostly free of jungle-not typical of New Guinea. The Sixth Army, 

under Lt. Gen. Walter Krueger, moved its headquarters into the valley 

followed by the Eighth Army, commanded by Lt. Gen. Robe rt 

Eichelberger. After our 2d Brigade moved all of its units into the area, 

we were back together again for the first time since Cape Cod. Base 

section troops were phased in and assumed logistical responsibilities. 

We continued to support Base B, as it was called, and gradually were 

relieved of our boat and shore responsibilities so we could begin reorganizing, re-equipping, and refurbishing all our equipment for the 

next operation. This was the first opportunity the regiment had to 

regroup since landing in Morobe in early August 1943. 
26 TRANSPORTATION AND LOGISTICS: ONE MAN'S STORY 

To recapitulate, Morobc, our first stop in New Guinea, had been 

home for regimental headquarters. Meanwhile, most of the elements 

of the boat battalion and the shore battalion had been scattered up and 

down the coast. While some units had been supporting the 9th 

Australian Division in its new locations and other units were preparing for future training exercises around Milne Bay at the eastern tip of 

New Guinea, still other units were preparing to support the Nassau 

Bay operation north of Morobe. 

After Nassau Bay, the regiment reassembled to make the Lae 

landings on 4 September. During the rest of the month, most of the 

regiment reassembled in the Lae area while boat and shore units supported the 9th Division as it moved down the coast for the final 

assault on Lae itself, north on Huon Gulf. Immediately after Lae had 

been captured, the regiment reassembled to assist the 9th Division in 

preparing for the Finschhafen landings north of Lae on 22 September 

1943. 

Following the successful Finschhafen operation, the regiment had 

continued to support the 9th Division as it moved up the New Guinea 

coast to capture Sio and eliminate the remaining Japanese in that area, 

until the unit returned to Australia in mid-January 1944. For the next 

three months, from January through April, the regiment supported the 

Finschhafen area and then the 4 I st U.S. Division for the Hollandia 

operation. We operated in the Hollandia area until October 1944, 

when we moved out for the Leyte operation in the Philippines. 

Although it has not been included in the official records of the 

Hollandia operation, our 532d Engineer Boat and Shore Regiment 

managed to get into serious trouble at Hollandia. As the first unit to 

land, we took charge of the enormous supply dumps that the Japanese 

had abandoned. Our supply personnel were very surprised and 

pleased to discover a large cache of Japanese beer which they immediately began to issue in daily rations to our regimental units. When the 

Sixth Army headquarters found out, they ordered the beer to be turned 

over to their headquarters and General Krueger severe ly reprimanded 

our regimental commander. It proved too good to be true. 

While the Sixth Army moved up the New Guinea coast, other 

South Pacific forces captured the offshore islands from New Britain 

and Saidor to the Admiralties. After Hollanclia and the Admiralties 

had been seemed, the area command decided that it was not necessary 

to clear the Japanese out of the rest of Dutch New Guinea, rather, it 

was time to return to the Philippines. 

Before starting the Leyte operation, I changed jobs. My executive 

officer, Lt. Ralph Waite, took over command of the headquarters and 

headquarters company, and I was reassigned as the intelligence officer 

(S2) of the regiment and was soon promoted to major. For the Leyte 
FROM NEW GUINEA TO THE PHILIPPINES 27 

landings in the Philippines, we moved under X Corps control in order 

to support the 24th U.S. Infantry Division. The X Corps, with two 

assault divisions, was to land on the northern coast of Leyte in the 

area of Tacloban and Palo. That was about all we knew about the 

landing plan until we loaded aboard ship and departed from 

Hollandia. Security was very tight. 

Although most of the attack force was loaded aboard ships by the 

base at Hollandia, we loaded our own boats and equipment aboard an 

LSD and the LSTs to which we had been assigned. The Sixth Army 

Service Command coordinated the ship loading. The plan called for 

the Sixth Army Service Command to take over from us and from the 

592d about thirty days after D-day in the landing area on Leyte. We 

would thus be free for the next operation. Plans also specified that the 

cargo ships be loaded for selective discharge, based upon the conditions found in the landing area. We also were told that the Leyte operation, under the Sixth Army, would include other landings on Leyte to 

the south. 

The first day out, we learned more about the island of Leyte and 

our landing area. The surprise assault would encounter little or no 

resistance from the Japanese. With the purpose of liberating the 

Filipinos from the Japanese, we were told to avoid shooting Filipinos. 

We were part of an enormous convoy, but didn't really realize its size 

until we arrived off the coast of Leyte on D-day minus three or four. 

Fortunately, we met no resistance emoute. 

As our convoy moved into Leyte Gulf early on D-day, 20 October 

1944, the Navy bombardment began in the dark. I have never in my 

life seen such a display of firepower from battleships, cruisers, and 

destroyers. An entire fleet seemed to have opened up on Leyte. During 

the bombardment, we began unloading our landing craft and launching om gunboats and control boats from the LSDs and LSTs. About 

half the landing craft were ours and half belonged to the Navy. 

We found out that before the operation, the Army and Navy had a 

contest over whose landing craft were to dominate the D-day landings. 

The Navy commanders insisted that all the landing craft be Navy with 

none from the Army. The Army leaders insisted that the Navy provide 

only life boats for the return trip from the beach. The Army leaders 

pointed out that Army boats would have to make the D-day assault 

and remain after the Navy departed. The Army had to have its boats 

there to continue follow-on support. This conflict apparently reached 

the Joint Chiefs of Staff before it was decided that the Army boats 

would participate in the D-day landing. This decision established the 

doctrine for future operations. 

The 24th Division that we supported landed on Red Beach in the 

Palo area. The I st Cavalry, supported by the 592d Engineer Boat and 
28 TRANSPORTATION AND LOGISTICS: ONE MAN'S STORY 

Shore Regiment, landed to the north in the Tacloban area. We heard 

that we could expect excellent landing beaches backed up by excellent 

terrain, but we found just the opposite. I landed with the regimental 

commander and his staff in our control boat, between the second and 

third waves, in the Palo area. The initial landings went unopposed, but 

soon after that all hell broke lose. 

As I walked up the beach to establish our regimental command 

post, I was hit by an artillery or mortar shell. I was not seriously 

injured, but my left side received a lot of shrapnel which covered me 

with blood from head to foot. After my fellow officers evacuated me 

to a Navy hospital ship, they thought they would never see me again. 

When the medics had cleaned me up, they found nothing really 

serious, but a broken left eardrum and lots of shallow wounds up and 

down my left side. The most serious problem was a piece of shrapnel 

embedded at the base of my tongue. Removal ofthis shrapnel required a 

painful, three-hour operation because they were not able to deaden the 

nerves all the way to the base of my tongue. They were afraid that they 

might cut my jugular vein, so they worked very slowly. Fortunately, it 

was successful. After a couple of weeks in a general hospital at 

Hollandia, I returned to my regiment about the middle of November. 

I had witnessed only the beginning of the Leyte landings. After 

my return, I heard the gory details about the landings and their problems. The beach was not a good place to land. They could not use 

LSTs because of the shallow water offshore. The Tacloban area 

beaches were better, but they were so busy and the area was so narrow 

and congested that they could not hand le the LSTs reassigned from 

Palo beach. Portable causeways were brought in to land and unload 

our LSTs on D-day plus two or three. Such ca useways had been 

planned for, and three or four sections were required at each landing 

site. Because the beach at Palo was backed up by swamp and mud, it 

was nearly impossible to build roads to move equipment and men off 

the beach. The landing was made during the ra iny season, which 

meant terrible weather and impassible terrain. 

It appeared that intelligence had made a large error. During planning for the landing, General MacArthur's engineer had raised an 

argument against landing on Leyte during the rainy season. The main 

purpose of these landings was to free Leyte and build airstrips there to 

support the larger invasion of Luzon. MacArthur overruled the engineer and forced the operation during the wrong season. In 1944, the 

rainy season was much worse than usual at Leyte; two typhoons hit 

the island in addition to the rain. The World War 11 Army histories 

cover this argument in detail. 1 

1 Robert Ross Smith, Triumph in the Philippines (Washington, D.C.: 

U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1991). 
FROM NEW GUINEA TO THE PHILIPPINES 29 

Soon after I returned to the regiment, we were told that we would 

move around to the island of Mindoro, on the west side of the 

Philippines group, to build airstrips there to support the Luzon operation. The Mindoro operation had been planned for much later but had 

to be moved forward because of the airstrip problem. 

In addition to the beach and poor terrain on the mainland, unloading our supply ships at Leyte had also been a problem. Although the 

base at Hollandia had been told to load the ships for selective discharge to make all parts of the cargo available, the Sixth Army 

Service Command at Hollandia had not done so. Apparently, the 6th 

Army Group had not observed the loadings performed by the base 

command closely enough. They had not been loaded for selective discharge, they had not been loaded with enough dunnage to brace the 

cargo, and the cargo had not been secured adequately. At Leyte, they 

needed steel matting for beach ramps and the Tacloban airstrip immediately. The matting had been loaded first, at the bottom of the ships, 

and then completely covered by vehicles and break bulk cargo. Had 

they loaded the ships for selective discharge, they could have 

unloaded the matting first. Instead, the entire ship's cargo had to be 

off-loaded to make the matting accessible. The Army learned a very 

important lesson the hard way. 

Our regimental commander, Colonel Stiner, had become sick in 

Hollandia and was replaced by Col. Alexander Murray Nielson, also 

an engineer. 

During the discharge operations, the Navy furnished transport 

beach parties who did an excellent job assisting our shore parties on 

the beach. These Navy transport beach parties provided much the 

same type service to Marine Corps landings as the engineer shore 

parties did for Army landings. 

During this same period, the great sea battle of Leyte Gulf was 

underway, but our forces did not hear about the battle for many days 

and did not understand its scope or importance. It was a very important turning point for our operations in the Philippines and in the 

Pacific theater. 

We next moved against the Philippine island of Mindoro, about 

the size of Leyte, but with a much smaller population, located only 

twelve miles south of Luzon. Its inhabitants were scattered along the 

coastal regions. There were no Army divisions available for the 

Mindoro operation, so General Krueger, the Sixth Army commander 

and overall commander of the operation, created a separate task force 

called the Western Visayan Task Force (named after the Visayan Sea). 

He placed the task force under the command of Brig. Gen. William 

C. Dunckel. Its principal combat components were the 19th Infantry 

Regimental Combat Team of the 24th Division and the separate 503d 
30 TRANSPORTATION AND LOGISTICS: ONE MAN'S STORY 

Parachute Regiment with whom we had worked in Australia and again 

at Lae, New Guinea. Also included was the 3d Battalion of the 21st 

Infantry of the 24th Division plus an antiaircraft group and the 532d 

Engineer Boat and Shore Regiment. Initially, they planned to drop the 

503d Parachute Regiment in to Mindoro, but the runways on Leyte 

could not accommodate the troop carrier aircraft req uired to lift the 

50 3d. 

Since the primary mission of landing on Mindoro was to build 

airfields, the task force included a large number of airfie ld engineers: 

four U.S. Army engineer battalions, a Royal Australian work squadron 

and, of course, other service troops to unload the LSTs. General 

Krueger had assigned as service troops I ,200 infantrymen from a 

newly arrived division that had not yet entered combat in the 

Philippines. This billet was very unpopular with the infantrymen, but 

they pitched in and helped our shore party personnel very well. 

As r recall, we assigned a labor detail of seventy-five men to each 

LST. In those days we loaded about 400 tons of break bulk cargo in the 

stern of the LST on the bottom deck and loaded the forward area with 

tanks and vehicles. We unloaded the break bulk cargo by hand because 

we did not have forklifts or pallets. We moved the cargo out to the bow 

of the LST by hand and either loaded it onto trucks for movement to 

dumps or stacked it on the beach until trucks were available. 

The total force included about 12,000 combat troops, 6,000 service troops, and approximately 9,500 Allied airmen. The a ircraft were 

scheduled to arrive by D-day plus five, when the first airstrip was to 

have been completed. 

The task force departed from the east coast of Leyte on 12 

December 1944 and headed south for the Surigao Strait, between 

Leyte and Mindanao, and through the Sulu Sea to Mindoro. A good 

sized Navy escort fleet accompanied us. This was the first time our 

naval forces had entered the South China Sea which, until recently, the 

Japanese fleet had completely controlled. 

We sailed unmolested until the afternoon of 13 December. That 

day we saw our first Japanese kamikaze. He came up unchallenged, 

flying low over the water, and crashed into our flagship, the cruiser 

USS Nashville. We all saw the explosion in which over 130 men were 

killed outright, including several key commanders and staff officers. 

The task force commander, General Dunckel, and the convoy commander, Rear Adm. Arthur Struble, were wounded and badly burned. 

However, they quickly transferred to another ship to continue. At meetings J noticed that General Dunckel was covered with bandages for 

some time. I am sure his burns were serious. 

The Nashville was able to return to Leyte. Later in the day, another kamikaze hit a destroyer which also had to return to Leyte. We saw 
FROM NEW GUINEA TO THE PHILIPPINES 31 

Japanese aircraft frequently from the time we reached MiJ1doro. Often 

we saw kamikazes that were impossible to defend against and caused 

a tremendous amount of damage. 

We landed near the southern tip of Mindoro opposite the small 

sugar plantation village of San Jose, following the usual naval bombardment, on 15 December. We landed on Blue Beach to the north 

and White Beach to the south, separated by about a half a mile of Jess 

favorable terrain. Both were excellent, with gradual shelving and good 

water, and both backed up to excellent terrain. The shore party immediately began organizing the beaches and supervising unloading of the 

LSTs and landing ships medium (LSMs). The 1,200 infantrymen provided very valuable manual labor. We established beach dumps and 

immediately reconnoitered the entire area. 

Because there were no trained service troops, the 532d operated 

the base which included a small, narrow-gauge railroad. We found 

some experienced railroaders in our shore battalion and this detachment moved into the rail yard and found four old locomotives and 

some 300 freight cars. They were also met by Filipinos delighted to see 

Americans. They had operated the railroad before the Japanese arrived 

and they told us they had sabotaged the engines so that the Japanese 

could never use the railroad. Our crews and the Filipinos together got 

the line operating in a few days. From then on, our railroad became a 

very effective form of land transportation. 

During the landings, we encountered no enemy opposition. The 

few Japanese troops on the island left for the mountains which covered Mindoro. The 19th and the 503d were able to move out and 

secure all their objectives by the end of D-day. 

Airfield construction units had priority discharge over the beaches 

to move their equipment and supplies. By the end of D-day, the engineers were ready to begin construction of a landing strip. The engineers found the old San Jose airstrip impossible to improve; they 

located a suitable area and, by D-day plus one, were fast at work. 

ln addition to building and repairing new roads to clear the beaches and to establish a line of communication, our engineers had to 

direct the repair and operation of all the utilities in San Jose. They 

received enthusiastic assistance from the Filipino residents. 

For the first time, we also had to take over a complete operation 

of a port. Our commander served as the cargo control officer and was 

responsible to chart the waters, direct incoming ships to anchorage, 

schedule ship departures, unload and transfer cargo, :and perform all 

other functions of a port. Responsible for the defense of the entire 

beach area, we established defensive positions on both flanks, to the 

rear and to the front. This was in addition to our main job of discharging the initial ships and unloading the follow-on resupply ships. 
32 TRANSPORTATION AND LOGISTICS: ONE MAN'S STORY 

By the end of D-day, most of the Navy escort vessels had dispersed or returned to Leyte because the Japanese still controlled the 

South China Sea. This left us very much exposed. Eight of the first 

ten Liberty ships bringing resupply had been hit by kamikazes and 

were lost or put out of commission. The kamikaze problem was so 

serious that we began bringing ship crews ashore at night and 

bivouacking them in our area. 

The initial resupply convoy, containing two ammunition ships, 

arrived about D-day plus ten. One had been destroyed em·oute. The second arrived offshore and was ordered to anchor about ten miles out. J 

went aboard to direct the anm1o ship to its anchorage and told the ship's 

captain that the current procedure was to take crews ashore at night. 

This delighted the captain, who said he could not wait to get ashore. J 

said I would return at 1700 hours to take hjm and his crew ashore. 

As I returned to the beach I saw a kamjkaze come in low and hit 

the ammo ship amidships. There followed the greatest explosion I had 

ever seen: it looked like an atomic bomb. As the mushroom cloud rose 

up to the sky, the tremendous wave created by the explosion picked up 

our LCM and moved us about 150 yards up onto the beach. It also 

swept all of the equipment and supplies off the beach and deposited 

them inland. Although many people consider me too conservative in 

handling ammunition, that experience taught me to be very cautious 

about berthing and working ammo ships. 

During this period, our boat crews accomplished many extremely 

dangerous rescue operations. They located and rescued crews of 

downed aircraft, they attempted to find survivors from ships hit by 

kamikaze pilots, they landed and resupplied U.S. patrols on Mindoro 

and neighboring islands, and they refloated several PT boats damaged 

during fights with the Japanese. 

Because of inadequate water transportation during the initia l 

move from Leyte to Mindoro, our LCMs and control boats had to be 

towed by LSTs, LCMs, Liberty ships or other ships. The crews on our 

control boats and LCMs lived aboard their boats most of the time. 

Several crews lived aboard their boats for over two years, showing 

how adaptable soldiers can be. Most built elaborate quarters on the 

sterns of the LCMs. 

Homemade wine was available on every boat. Each boat had been 

issued two 5-gallon wooden casks for storing water which, when augmented with the dried fruit from jungle rations, became fermentation 

vats. Soon the natural chemical process produced wine. Every visitor 

to a boat was expected to sample this homemade wine. Most of it was 

awful. 

From 15 December 1944 until January 1945, when the landings 

on Luzon were made, San Jose took continuous poundings from 
FROM NEW GUINEA TO THE PHILIPPINES 33 

Japanese aircraft. Their main targets were ships in the stream during 

the day and the airfield construction at night. Enemy air was not our 

only problem. At about 1800 hours on 26 December, we were alerted 

that a Japanese naval force, consisting of two cruisers and several 

destroyers, was on its way to Mindoro and would arrive about 2000 

hours. 

When they first sighted the force, the Air Corps immediately reinforced the aircraft at Mindoro, bringing in as many as the airstrip 

could hold. The U.S. Navy had only a few PT boats in the area. 

Immediately, all the aircraft and the PT boats moved out to engage the 

enemy. We increased our defensive positions on shore and prepared 

for a possible beach landing. We were alerted to the fact that some 

Japanese troop ships had also been observed behind the combat ships. 

By 2330, the Japanese task force had moved to a position right off 

our beach and began shelling the two airfields. A few she lls hit the 

beach but ca used no great damage. All available aircraft began to 

attack the Japanese task force . .It was like an extra-[arge 4th of July 

spectacle with white and red tracer streams everywhere. 

When all the shelling began, we noticed a lack of activity at the 

battery of 90-mm. antiaircraft guns located on our beach. Since I was 

responsible for the beach defense, Colonel Nielson sent me to the 

battery to find out what was wrong. The battery commander told me 

that they could not fire at a surface ship; they could only fire up at an 

airplane. They lacked a horizontal aiming capability and could not 

lower the gun tubes enough to fire horizontally. I asked him to lay the 

guns down as fa r as possible, sight over the barrels, and fire them 

toward the ships like rifles. Even if it didn 't do any damage, it would 

probably distract the Japanese from the punishment they were giving 

our a ircraft. The captain and r did just that. In no time, the 90-mm. 

guns were firing toward the Japanese task force, which apparently 

did distract them and raised the morale of our gun crews. 

The attacks by our aircraft were very successful, but at a high cost 

in aircraft and pilots. Just after midnight the Japanese task force 

retreated, without attempting a beach landing. It was later reported 

that three destroyers and a heavy cruiser had been badly damaged. 

Each time I observed our Army and Navy aircraft a nd the Navy PT 

boats engaged in combat, I became more respectful of their courage 

and effectiveness. 

Soon after the departure of the Japanese task force, we secured 

most of our troops for the night. There were lots of stories and discussions the following day, but it was mainly back to work. During the 

next month, our boat battalion engaged in several tactical operations 

up and down the coast of Mindoro and to other islands. Our regiment 

also conducted several offshore reconnaissance missions. In March, I 
34 TRANSPORTATION AND LOGISTICS: ONE MAN'S STORY 

took four of my men to reconnoiter the beaches and enemy strength 

on Lubang Island because the high command was considering a landing there. Lubang is off the north coast of Mindoro toward the island 

of Luzon. 

About midnight, two PT boats dropped us off near Lubang, about a 

mile off its southern coast. We arranged with the boat commanders to 

pick us up again two nights later at the same time and place. We went 

ashore in two often-used rubber rafts. On the beach, we deflated our 

rafts and hid them in the brush. After daybreak, we moved out to a predesignated location to meet a Filipino scout. He was apparently a soldier who had remained on Lubang after the Japanese arrived and had 

stayed in touch with Allied intelligence. He had lookouts stationed all 

over the islands and was very helpful. 

The scout became our guide. He told us that there was a unit of 

Japanese soldiers camped at the far end of the island. They were 

thought to be fearful of their position and seldom left their camp. He 

said he had them under constant observation and knew all their movements. He took us into his village and we met the village chiefs, who 

treated us like real heroes. They fed us and assisted us in all of our 

missions. 

l had assigned each of my men a certain area to reconnoiter and 

map. I returned to the beach, pumped up one of the rubber rafts, and 

spent most of the two days there making a complete survey of the 

beach area and the area behind the beach. I reconnoitered and mapped 

the shoreline during the day and charted the water in the evenings to 

determine the best areas for ships to anchor and discharge the landing 

parties and their equipment and supplies. I a lso wanted to discover the 

best beaches for landing craft to land the troops and their equipment 

and to find useful exit paths from the beach to the island targets. We 

selected a perfect area for the landing force to use. 

At the designated time, we returned to our rafts, moved out to our 

rendezvous, boarded the PT boats, and returned to our base at 

Mindoro. [thad been a very simple and uneventful mission highlighted by our unexpected meeting with the Filipinos. r always wanted to 

return to Lubang after the war, but was never able. 

We did not encounter any enemy fire, but another of our task 

forces, landing troops on Lubang a short time later to clear the island, 

encountered very heavy resistance. I was not present. 

In March 1945, Colonel Nielson, our regimental commander, was 

reassigned to an engineering job on Luzon. Lt. Col. Robett Casper, 

who had been the 2d Brigade executive officer, replaced him. Initially, 

Colonel Casper had been our shore battalion commander and had 

trained on Cape Cod. Casper had remained with the brigade for the 

entire period. 
FROM NEW GUINEA TO THE PHILIPPINES 35 

Mindoro remained our regimental home for a lmost a yearlonger than any other place we stayed during the war. During this period many of us were given forty-five days leave back to the States, 

which was certainly welcome. Because my mother was very ill, I was 

one of those granted leave. 

While on Mindoro, we had placed detachments on nearly all the 

other islands. This required running daily resupply missions as part 

of a clean-up operation within the larger Operation VICTOR. When 

the Sixth Army had been assigned the Luzon invasion, the Eighth 

Army, under the command of General Eiche lberger, had been 

assigned Operation VICTOR with the mission to clear the Japanese 

from all the southern Philippine Islands, the Visayan group, which 

consisted of Palawan, Cebu, Panay, and many smaller islands. The 

542d participated in the landing on Palawan Island. 

Our regiment remained on Mindoro tmtil June or July 1945, when 

we were told to reassemble our units from all over the Visayan Islands 

and move to Panay to be attached to the 40th U.S. Infantry Division. 

We would assist the 40th Division in amphibious training and plan our 

next operation. As our unit with full gear boarded the LST for Panay, 

Maj. Robert Butch, one of our regimental staff officers, was followed 

up the ramp by his pet chicken Mildred on the way to her first landing. 

Unfortunately, no one photographed the event. 

We moved to Panay, established a campsite near the 40th, and 

began to help them prepare their equipment and supplies for loading 

aboard Navy combat transports. Having come ashore on Panay after 

the island had been cleared, the 40th Division had never participated 

in a combat landing. 

Our regiment was very careful to tell them how to load for selective unloading, having learned that lesson a couple times before. We 

told them of the importance of overseeing the base command when 

base personnel loaded their initial resupply shipping, even though it 

was not their official responsibility. 

On the first day or so in August, we learned of om· next operation. 

The 40th Division would become part of the XXIV Corps then located on Okinawa. The corps would make landings on the southern coast 

of Japan for Operation OLYMPIC. Our regiment was to land and support the 40th Division. The 592d, the 542d, and one regiment from the 

4th Engineer Special Brigade would take part in D-day landings as 

part of a four-division landing operation under the Sixth Army. 

We were also assigned a second mission. Before we landed on 

Japan on D-day, we were to land some Marine Corps radar vans on 

five small islands just off Kyushu, on D-day minus five and D-day 

minus four, in time to rejoin the 40th for the main invasion. The radar 

vans wou ld establish a radar screen for the landing forces. During 
36 TRANSPORTATfON AND LOGISTICS: ONE MAN'S STORY 

operations on Okinawa, Navy destroyers had been used for the radar 

screen, but this proved disastrous because kamikazes had been able to 

sink several destroyers, which eliminated the radar. 

Because 1 was the S3 (operations and training officer), the S2 

(intelligence) of the regiment and I were heavily involved in planning 

the landings. A study of the available maps and charts showed that 

these little islands were uninhabited but very mountainous, with sheer 

cliffs coming down to the sea. We could find no suitable beaches on 

the islands. We could not figure out how to land these heavy, sma llwhee led radar vans to accomplis h the mission. Nevertheless we 

loaded the vans and their Marine Corps personnel on the assault ships, 

along with the 40th Division, and prepared to join the big OLYMPIC 

operation. 

Just before we sailed, we heard that bombs had been dropped on 

Hiroshima and Nagasaki. We did not Lmderstand what had happened, 

but we soon learned of the Japanese surrender. There would be no 

combat landings on Japan! 

By 1945 our LCM crews had lived, eaten, and worked aboard 

their own vessels for almost three years. They had performed excellently under very serious and dangerous conditions, including absorbing many battle casualties. Although many had been recognized with 

decorations, I' m sure many had been overlooked. 

Our shore battalion personnel had a lso done an impressive job 

loading and unloading ships and boats and supervising the stevedore 

companies and service units with whom they worked. Many times they 

had been called upon to defend beach areas, and they had performed 

extensive construction and utility work for the whole period. 

As I assess our war experience, I realize that we did not devote 

enough time and effort to proper documentation and labeling of cargo 

units. We moved the cargo from ship to shore and into a dump area. It 

was then up to the supply personnel to sort it out, to segregate the 

items by class, and to separate items within each class. This is a very 

difTicult job when the cargo is coming in faster than you can check it 

and accurate documentation does not come with it. Aga in, rations, 

POL, construction materiel- basic supplies- are not a problem. The 

kind of cargo that causes problems is repair parts. Such items are 

requested by part number or serial number. Parts identification, or 

asset visibility, which had not been a problem during our landings in 

New Guinea or the Philippines, became difficult whe n we got to 

Mindoro. 

During the early combat landing with the combat divisions, the 

division's support personnel maintained the ir own asset visibility 

throughout the process. They turned the boxes or equipment over to us 

and we loaded them. At the destination, we discharged the items and 
FROM NEW GUINEA TO THE PHILIPPINES 37 

returned them to the same division support personnel. Since they had 

marked their boxes, they knew the contents of each. When resupply in 

quantities began arriving at Mindoro, for example, we had been 

relieved by the base personnel. 

Then the problem of asset visibility increased dramatically. l cannot say what kind of job base personnel performed because records 

are difficult to find. The Army did not have one starudard system for 

marking like the defense system has today. Each technical service followed its own system religiously. 

CHAPTER3 

Postwar Korea 

I soon learned that I was to join the 40th Division G3 (assistant 

chief of staff, operations) and fly to Okinawa to meet with the XXIV 

Corps conunander and staff to receive further orders. 

The division G3 and I spent one day on Okinawa being briefed 

and preparing plans. We learned that we would not return to the 

United States as we first had heard. The point system to be used for 

discharging troops had been announced and most of our regiment had 

many, many more points than needed to return to the States. We had 

been overseas in combat for almost three years. The troops were not 

happy about not going home, but were glad that we did not have to 

land in Japan. We all knew that the invasion would have been a very 

bloody operation. 

We were told the XXIV Corps, with the 6th, 7th, and 40th 

Divisions, was heading for occupation duty in Korea. The landings 

were to take place through Inchon, Korea. The 532d would land the 

three divisions at Inchon, take over the port, establish a corps supply 

and storage area behind the port, and support the operation until a 

base section could be brought in and established. 

We returned to Panay, where our units remained on board ships, 

and sailed immediately for Korea. We briefed our staffs, prepared 

detailed plans, and began briefing all the units aboard. 

I accompanied the regimental staff, along with both battalion 

commanders, their staff and a part of the boat battalion, as we moved 

by LSD from Panay to Inchon. During the trip, we reviewed the situation based on the limited information available. The sudden end to the 

war and our shift to Korea for occupation duty had not been included 

in anyone's plmming book. In Okinawa we had not been able to obtain 

maps or charts of Inchon or even of the channel leading up to the port. 

It was another case of the blind leading the blind, but at least this time 

we were not planning to be shot at. 

After we arrived off Inchon, several of us went ashore to find out 

how to enter the harbor. We could not believe what we found: the tide 

variation at Inchon was thirty feet, second only to the Bay of Fundy. 

Few navigators had ever experienced anything like a 30-foot tide. The 

tide went out at between six or seven knots, faster than the speed of 
40 TRANSPORTATION AND LOGISTICS: ONE MAN'S STORY 

our landing craft. We also discovered that there was no tidal basin we 

could use. A sma ll tidal basin had existed many years before, but it 

had not been maintained and didn't have gates or a mechanism to 

operate them. 

We did use the basin for unloading landing craft and barges, however. The shore end of the basin was adequate for landing and discharging both the Navy LSTs and our LCMs. The sides were adequate 

for discharging barges. We loaded the landing craft and barges from 

ships off shore and brought them into the basin at high tide. Our 

LCMs could be discharged rapidly, so they could move back out to the 

deep water as the tide receded, to be loaded again for the next tide. 

The LSTs and barges, however, would land in the basin at high tide 

and remain on the mud to be unloaded during low tide. Some six 

hours later at the next high tide, they would move back out to deep 

water. We also had a few additional landing areas available for landing 

craft and barges to discharge their cargos in the same fashion as in the 

basin. 

Today, the port of Inchon is enclosed by a sea wall with gates, 

through which ships enter and leave the port. The port at Inchon has 

become as modern a facil ity as you will find anywhere in the world1 saw it just before the J 988 Olympic games. 

In 1945, however, most of the facilities in Korea were inadequate. 

The Japanese, during their fifty years of occupation, had done little or 

nothing to maintain transportation or utilities anywhere in Korea . The 

Japanese had treated the Korean people terribly. No Koreans had been 

permitted to hold any type of supervisory job; all were relegated to day 

labor jobs. They had not even been permitted to teach their own language at the few schools that remained. They were truly demoralized. 

Operating in New Guinea and the Philippines had prepared us for 

the primitive port facilities in Korea. The steep and rocky terrain 

immediately behind the pott was not suitable for use as a supply dump. 

We established our supply dumps at an old storage depot area between 

Inchon and Seoul. This later became Ascom City, a major supply 

installation in Korea. Although the Japanese had left a lot of supplies 

and equipment there, we emptied the depot without any trouble. 

We found a couple of treasures housed in these warehouses. The 

Japanese had filled one warehouse with British Parker double-barreled shotguns. A Parker shotgun is stm one of the f inest in the world. 

We immediately took these over and later issued them to each company and battalion in the task force for recreational shooting. We also 

uncovered many cases of Japanese s hotgun shells which we also 

issued to the troops. Unfortunately, more than half were no good. It 

was irritating to pull the trigger at the plentiful quail and duck, only to 

hear a click. 
POSTWAR KOREA 41 

We faced serious cargo problems. Many ships arbitrarily sent to 

Inchon laid off the coast waiting to be unloaded. Like all of the ships 

in the Pacific, they had been loaded for some other mission, not for 

Inchon, and certainly not to support occupation troops. We couldn't 

unload the ships because we couldn't handle this many vessels and we 

didn't have any place to put the cargo. The corps support group that 

worked with us would study the cargo manifests. If they found usable 

cargo, they would pass the word to us and we wou ld find it on the ship 

and bring it to our offshore anchorage. 

Assigned as port commander from the first day in Inchon, I had 

to organize the personnel and equipment to support the three divisions of the XXIV Corps task force with three classes of supply: 

Class I, food; Class III, petroleum, oils, and lubricants; and Class IV, 

construction materiel. Meeting this requirement posed little or no 

problem. I discharged all of this as we found it. Disposition of other 

supplies, especially repair parts and components, was more difficult. 

When we found out that someone needed certain spare parts, we 

checked the manifest to see what ship contained them. We then boarded the ship and started digging. Even if the ship's manifest was fairly 

accurate and specified in which hold and at which level the box was 

stored, it was a terrible waste of time. But the ships were just anchored 

there waiting because the war was over. 

Very soon after we left, a transportation medium port tmit took 

over and was ordered to discharge all the ships completely or to 

reroute them to some other destination. Piecemeal unloading was 

stopped. 

My port command had many other problems moving supplies and 

equipment to the tlu-ee divisions. For example, because the ships had 

all been loaded for operations in the hot Pacific, there weren't any 

winter clothing or stoves aboard. We occupied Korea in the fall and 

the weather soon turned cold. In those days, we couldn't fly in highpriority items, such as winter clothing, as we would today. We had to 

wait for winter clothing, stoves, and firewood to arrive by ship from 

the States. 

At one time, there had been lots of wood in mountainous Korea, 

but during the fifty-year Japanese occupation, the Koreans had pretty 

well stripped their mountains of trees. We all suffered pretty severely 

for the several months of the Korean winter until clothing arrived. The 

troops lined their khakis and fatigues with newspapers or straw mats 

to keep warm. 

I had several other problems. Because we did not have enough 

stevedore companies or quartermaster companies to handle all the 

cargo, I was forced to use whatever personnel and equipment I could 

find. Some Korean and Japanese stevedores were available, but their 
42 TRANSPORTATION AND LOGISTICS: ONE MAN'S STORY 

mutual hostility required that they form separate work groups. 

Because the few Army quartermaster port units I commanded also 

disliked the Japanese, we worked the gangs separately. I therefore 

organized the stevedores into tl1ree ethnic groups: Koreans, Japanese, 

and Americans. 

We also had a shortage of trucks to clear the port. We found some 

Korean trucks that we put to work with our quartermaster truck companies. Learning that a Japanese truck company was available, I told 

the Japanese company commander to bring his vehicles to the port the 

next morning. I then noticed that about half the trucks were towing 

the other half. I had told the Japanese commander to bring all his 

trucks, and he did. I had forgotten to tell him to bring only the ones 

that were operable. I had to learn to be more precise when dealing 

with Asians. 

We established a separate ammunition operation just south of the 

port proper. Our DUKW company moved the ammo from ship to 

shore and then inland to an ammo storage area. l'he DUKWs could 

operate around the seashore across the reefs without concern for the 

swift tides. This technique was used later during the Korean War, and 

it is still used in Inchon today. The DUKWs, the barges, and the Navy 

LSTs and LSMs were most helpful, but our LCMs performed the 

heaviest ship-to-shore work in Inchon as they had in New Guinea and 

in the Philippines. 

Although we had problems with the primitive Inchon port, the 

corps commander and his staff had many more. The corps commander, Lt. Gen. John R. Hodge, and a small staff had landed at Tempo 

Airfield on 4 September, just four days before we landed with the 

three divisions at Inchon. The staff had little preparation for Inchon. 

As soon as the troops arrived and established camp·s, the job of receiving the surrendering Japanese began. Although J did not observe this, 

I understand it was difficult. 

Taking over all of the functions and jobs previously held by the 

Japanese and running Korea was a bigger problem. General Hodge 

knew that the Japanese had prevented the Koreans from getting any 

management experience for fifty years, so he decided he had to keep 

key Japanese persotmel to run the country. When he could bring in 

U.S. troops or civilians to assume leadership responsibilities, he would 

drop the Japanese. At the same time he planned to train the Koreans to 

take over these jobs, but this plan was not acceptable to the Koreans. 

Although they lacked training, the Koreans insisted on taking over 

their country directly from the Japanese. 

At the time no Korean party or group was ready to take over and 

run the government. Industry and commerce had ceased; public utilities and services hardly existed. The Korean economy was in a 
POSTWAR KOREA 43 

shambles. The turbulent and tense political atmosphere complicated 

all of these problems. More than seventy political parties had been 

formed since the Japanese defeat and the arrival of the American 

troops. The Korean situation was becoming more complicated 

because the Russians and the Chinese were also applying political 

pressure. 

To placate the Koreans, General Hodge relieved and replaced all 

the Japanese. Soon, thousands of Koreans held key jobs. Hodge also 

brought in as many advisers in these fields as our government could 

provide at the time. Compared to his problems, we were in pretty 

good shape at the port because we took over all functions when we 

came in and continued to operate the port as if it had been another 

landing. 

We left the port this way when we turned it over to a transportation corps port command early in February 1946. Our command 

rotated back to the States as a unit, just as we had shipped out as a 

unit some three years before. Although we had many replacements, 

many of us had been together throughout the war and continued this 

relationship after the war. 

CHAPTER4 

A Career in the Army 

Although the entire regiment moved back to the United States as a 

unit on board the same ship, when we arrived at the Seattle port of 

embarkation in March 1946, we were handled as individuals. It's difficult to imagine the number of servicemen returning from overseas 

ready to be processed out of the service all at the same time. The 

Army was being dismantled as quickly as possible. 

After our records had been turned over to the processing center in 

Tacoma , Washington, we were assigned to barracks a nd mess fac ilities and told to do what we pleased until our orders had been prepared 

and transportation provided to send us home. We had to report to 

headquarters every day to check on our orders. 

After we hit port, we ca lled home and tried to answer the questions about when we would be home. We then went into Tacoma to 

start celebrating. After a while we received change of station orders 

and thirty days leave, following which we were to report to the processing station closest to home, in my case Fort Leonard Wood, 

Missouri. After spending part of my leave at my parents' home in St. 

Joseph, Missouri, and part of the time at my wife's home in 

Americus, Georgia, my wife and I returned to Fort Leonard Wood. 1 

was told to report to the processing point daily for further instructions. 

In the meantime, we found a sma ll room to rent in Joplin, 

Missouri, and began living once again. Several of my midwestern 

friends from the regiment reported to Leonard Wood t·he same time as 

I did. We got together daily with our wives, most of whom had met 

each other at Cape Cod or Fort Ord before we went overseas. 

Needless to say, this was a wonderful way to kill time. Very soon, we 

were told to report to camp. 

After arriving at Leonard Wood, we had been warned that we 

would each have to decide whether to remain in the service or be 

separated. Everyone had discussed this decision a lot during those 

first few days. Most of us from the regiment decided to remain in 

the Army for at least the immediate future. Those staying in soon 

received orders to return to the 2d Engineer Special Brigade, now 

stationed at Camp San Luis Obispo, California. This was c lose to 
46 TRANSPORTATION AND LOGISTICS: ONE MAN'S STORY 

Morro Bay, where we had been stationed for a short time before 

shipping out in 1942. 

At my request, 1 was once again assigned to the 532d Engineer 

Boat and Shore Regiment. While I was reporting in, my wife was 

busy finding a place to live. She rented a small house on Morro Bay, 

Californi a, very close to Camp San Luis Obispo. r was still a major 

and was assigned to the 532d Boat Battalion as the executive officer. 

I would soon see many familiar faces. We were to be stationed at 

San Luis Obispo; however, our boat-operating and maintenance 

facilities were to be located at a site still to be built on Morro Bay. 

In the summer of 1946 it was sti II an unspoiled bay. 

Soon after settling at our new camp, the battalion conm1andcr, the 

area engineer, and [ looked around Morro Bay to find a training site. 

(The battalion commander, Lt. Col. Albert Gasper, had also led our 

unit at Inchon.) Neither the boat battalion nor the shore battalion had 

equipment of any kind. Apparently, the chief of engineers had submitted requisitions for all the necessary TO&E gear, but we could not 

trace them. It probably had something to do with the drastic postwar 

reduction in the Army's size. 

I was soon told to report to Brig. Gen. David A. D. Ogden, the 

brigade commander. Only our 2d Brigade was to remain on active 

duty. The 3d and 4th Brigades were being deactivated. Brig. Gen. 

William F. Heavey, who had commanded our brigade throughout the 

war, was retiring. General Ogden, who had commanded the 3d 

Brigade throughout the war, became the 2d Brigade commander. I 

didn 't know Ogden except by reputation, but I soon learned to respect 

him. He later became the Inspector General of the Army and retired as 

a lieutenant general. 

When I reported to General Ogden, he outlined the problems he 

was having finding out the status of our equipment requisitions. He 

asked me to go to Washington as brigade liaison officer to expedite 

acquisition of the equipment. I was to report to the Office of the Chief 

of Engineers and remain there unti I we got the equipment. His office 

would be in touch. 

On 4 March 1946, my wife and I drove back to Washington, stopping for one night in St. Joseph, Missouri. Fortunately, my mother had 

given us a car. In 1946, it was almost impossible to find an automobile-new or used- since automobiles had been out of production for 

four years. We rented a room in Chevy Chase, Maryland. 

I reported to the Office of the Chief of Engineers, located in the 

New War Building, now part of the State Department building. 

Although most of the War Department headquarters was in the newly 

constructed Pentagon, the chief of engineers had remained in the New 

War Building even though the space could not house his entire staff. 
A CAREER IN THE ARMY 47 

The Supply Division was located in temporary building T - 5 at Fort 

McNair, the present site of the Industrial College. 

J reported to T-5, was assigned office space, and met the people 

with whom I would work. This began several difficult weeks. The 

Supply Division was very helpful, but was having problems with all 

engineer units stationed in the States. As it turned out, General Ogden 

was very wise to place a liaison officer in Washington. He needed 

someone to personally contact the sources of equipment. I dealt with 

the Engineer Supply Division, the Army Service Forces supply staff, 

and most of the equipment manufacturers. 

After a few weeks, I got our equipment and supplies moving to 

San Luis Obispo and was ordered back to our home station. 

Washington was a difficult assignment, but a very important one in 

which l learned a great deal about supply procedures. In the meantime, the brigade moved back to Fort Ord, California, because San 

Luis Obispo was to be closed. We did not have adequate training or 

living faci lities at San Luis Obispo and nothing at Morro Bay. The 

construction of an amphibious base there would have been very 

expensive. 

Georgia and I returned to California and rejoined the brigade at 

Fort Ord. We were fortunate to have been assigned excellent quarters 

at the Presidio of Monterey. This was the first time we had occupied 

government quarters. 

Soon after J rejoined my boat battalion of the 532d, General 

Ogden called me for another special assignment. The War Department 

had given the Sixth Army, to which we were assigned, the job of locating a permanent amphibious training base for the Army on the West 

Coast. As the brigade's representative, I reported to Sixth Army headquarters at the Presidio and joined a small group of five other officers 

headed up by the Sixth Army engineer, Brig. Gen. Garrison H. 

Davidson, a former All-American football player at West Point. 

We spent several weeks surveying the entire West Coast, from 

Alaska to San Diego, to locate areas adequate for amphibious training. 

We attempted to find the ideal location for beach and surf training, 

backing up on enough land for shore training of combat troops. The 

most interesting and beautiful part of the trip was a reconnaissance up 

the inland waterway from Vancouver to Prince Rupert, Alaska, and 

back. Toward the end of our survey, General Davidson was replaced by 

the Sixth Army chief of staff, Maj. Gen. Frank D. Merrill of the 

famous "Merrill's Marauders." He lived up to his reputation and we 

enjoyed his company for the trip. 

We found several adequate areas and reported all this information at the conclusion of our survey. The War Department approved 

our recommendation to locate the main headquarters and base at 
48 TRANSPORTATION AND LOGISTICS: ONE MAN'S STORY 

Fort Warden, a small Army post on the northwest coast of the 

Olympic Peninsula. This old historical post, close to Port Townsend, 

was about to be closed again. We also located several islands in the 

sound that could be used for landing and training areas. Several 

months later, the 2d Engineer Brigade moved from Fort Ord to Fort 

Warden. 

After completing the reconnaissance, I was again assigned a special job as combat liaison officer. The 532d Engineer Boat and Shore 

Regiment was to participate in joint amphibious training exercises 

with the Navy, the Marine Corps, and the 2d U.S. Infantry Division 

stationed at Fort Lewis, Washington. General Ogden asked the regimental commander to assign me as combat liaison officer between 

the 2d Engineer Special Brigade and the other forces. I was put on 

temporary duty at Fort Lewis for sixty days to assist the 2d Division 

in planning for the joint exercises at Camp Pendleton. 

Before leaving for the operation, key people from the regiment 

also joined me at Fort Lewis. We all loaded aboard ship with the 2d 

Division and moved out for San Diego. The remainder of our regiment, including our boats, was picked up off Fort Ord as the convoy 

sailed to San Diego. The landings were to be conducted over the 

Marine Corps facilities at Camp Pendleton, California. 

About the time I returned to the brigade, the Army began the first 

postwar Regular Army integration program designed to increase the 

number of Regular Army officers, since the Army had very few at the 

time. Many of us applied for Regular Army commissions and were 

told to choose three branches in order of priority. My first choice was 

engineers, but one of the requirements for Regular Army commission 

in the Corps of Engineers was a college degree in engineering which, 

of course, I did not have. In fact, I had no degree whatsoever, having 

left college in the middle of my junior year. 

The brigade executive officer, Col. Draper F. Henry, suggested 

that [ make the Transportation Corps my first choice because this 

newly developed corps was to petform work very similar to that performed by the engineer special brigades during World War II. I followed his advice and received a Regular Army commission in the 

Quartermaster Corps/Transportation Corps during the first integration 

program in July 1946. Before Congress authorized a permanent, separate Transportation Corps, all personnel were assigned to the 

Quartermaster Corps and then detailed to the Transp01tation Corps. 

As soon as the brigade learned about my selection, General 

Ogden reassigned me as the post transportation officer at Fort Ord, 

with temporary duty to the brigade until completion of the joint training exercise. Ogden then told the War Department what he had done 

and requested that I be left at Fort Ord. This was not approved and I 
A CAREER IN THE ARMY 49 

soon received orders to report back to the Transportation Center at 

Fort Eustis, Virginia, as soon as the exercise was completed. 

At the time, the Army and the other services were demobilizing. 

Personnel of all ranks were being released from the Army or, in some 

cases, being retained at a reduced rank. We knew of many colonels, 

lieutenant colonels, and majors who were reduced to enlisted ranks if 

they chose to remain until retirement age. Obviously difficult for the 

officer, this was especially difficult for the wives. Many insta llations 

were being closed, equipment being declared surplus, and of course, 

budgets being slashed drastically. It was a trying period. 

In early January 194 7, we packed up and moved back to the 

Transportation Training Center at Fort Eustis to attend the First 

Officers' Advanced Course. My wife and I packed up the car and 

started back across the country with our two-week-old baby for our 

third trip within nine months. In those days, traveling across the country in an automobile was not easy. There were very few motels then, 

so the traveler had to rely on rather run-down city hotels, difficult to 

get in and out of, or the more primitive tourist cabins. The age of the 

interstate highway was still several years in the future. We decided 

that my wife and our new baby would remain in St. Joseph with my 

parents while I went on to Fort Eustis. 

In 1947, Fort Eustis was as unattractive as any place I had ever 

seen. It had been an Italian prisoner of war camp during the war. Most 

of the wooden barracks were rebuilt World War I and II units that had 

been painted black and surrounded with a high barbed wire fence. 

There was not a single tree on the main post. 

I reported in and was assigned a bachelor officers' quarters. Since 

the First Officers' Advanced Course would not start until fall, r was 

assigned to the First Officers' Basic Course. Most of the students 

were not the first and second lieutenants for which the course had 

been designed, but were captains and majors who had been in World 

War II for several years. Most of us had never been in the 

Transportation Corps. After l completed the three-month course, the 

Transportation School assigned me as an instructor and I ended up 

teaching the First Officers' Advanced Course rather than enrolling in 

it as a student. 

When I arrived at Fort Eustis in January 194 7, the school was just 

getting organized after having moved from Mississippi where it had 

been during the war. Very few members of the staff and faculty had 

been assigned yet. It was the school commandant, Lt. Col. (later Maj. 

Gen.) Rush B. Lincoln, who decided that I should attend the short 

course and then join the school faculty to teach the advanced course. 

Lincoln, who had attained the rank of full colonel by the end of the 

war, had been downgraded like so many other young colonels. A very 
50 TRANSPORTATION AND LOGISTICS: ONE MAN'S STORY 

good friend and adviser, he is one of the three officers to whom 1 

credit the success of my career. 

Soon after arriving at Fort Eustis, I began looking for a place to 

live. I rented a small, one-bedroom apartment in the only decent 

apartment building complex in the Newport News area. T was told I 

could work my way up to a larger unit. As soon as a larger apartment 

became available, my wife and baby joined me by train. In those days, 

trains provided the only efficient cross-country transportation. Having 

little or no furniture, we borrowed some temporary items from the 

post until we could buy our own. The Army takes care of its own and 

does so very well. 

I was initially assigned to the Marine Branch of the 

Transportation School and taught Marine Port and Amphibious 

Operations. We had to design our own courses and write our own 

classroom material with very little help. Our supervisors had been 

newly assigned as well and were just getting their own feet on the 

ground. It is difficult now to recall conditions in the Army in those 

early days just after World War II. 

The Transportation Corps had been organized during the war and 

had no approved TO&Es yet. No written doctrine had been prepared. [ 

spent about half of my three years at the school in the Marine Branch 

and the other half in the Movements Branch. At that time, the school 

had two teaching departments: a Transportation Department (consisting of a Movements Branch, a Highway Branch, a Marine Branch, 

and a Rail Branch) and a Military Arts Department which taught general military subjects such as operations, intelligence, logistics, and 

personnel. 

During the basic course, I was introduced for the first time to 

tra nsportation management, movement control, and traffic management. As T taught my marine subjects, 1 became more and more interested in the subjects taught in the Movements Branch and I devoted a 

great deal of time studying them. Also during this period, I heard 

Colonel Lincoln talk about his World War II experience in movement 

control at the very top level of government. 

Colonel Lincoln had been one often engineer officers whom Maj. 

Gen. Charles P. Gross, the first chief of transportation, had taken with 

him when he was assigned the job on the Army staff. Lincoln had 

graduated first in the West Point Class of 1932 and, like most of the 

top graduates, chose the Engineer Branch. During World War II, while 

working for the Transportation Branch of the Army staff's Logistics 

Division, Lincoln became the Army's main movement control man. 

During the war, President Roosevelt met every six months or so 

with Churchill and Stalin, accompanied by their principal military 

advisers and staffs. President Roosevelt took General Marsha ll, 
A CAREER IN THE ARMY 51 

Admiral King, and General Arnold with him. The Combined Military 

Transportation Committee, made up of the transportation chiefs from 

each country, also attended the meetings. 

At the conclusion of each top-level meeting, the plan of action 

for the next few months (for example, to take Europe first and the 

Pacific second and how to do it) was turned over to the Combined 

Military Transportation Committee on the last night so the committee could decide if the plans were feasible. As the U.S. action officer 

on the committee, Colonel Lincoln would work a ll night with the 

other members of the committee to validate the plan and to finalize 

the Joint Military Transportation Movement Plans and Programs. 

This had to be done before approval of the overall plan. This was 

movement control at the top Level. 

Of the four branches in the Transportation Departm~nt of the 

school, the Movement Branch had the most written doctrine and supporting reference material. While preparing for the Normandy invasion, the U.S. Command in Europe had adopted the British Army's Qmovcment system, which was very well established, well documented, 

and very effective. The Q-movement representative, a principal member of the British staff, is always well respected by the British Army. 

Because the managers of our communication zone (COMZ), established in Europe during the invasion, adopted this system to control 

movements throughout the war, it was adopted Army-wide. 

Transportation is one key to effective combat operations. The 

movement of troops into battle and their support and resupply are obviously vital to military victory. ln the British Q-system, all participants 

in the operation must determine their transportation requirements and 

submit them to the transportation manager so that transpot1ation can be 

allocated properly in accordance with command decisions. In peacetime, when transportation is available units can obtain sufficient transportation if they have the money. ln time of emergency or war, transportation is always limited and it must be totally controlled. 

Even in war, however, it is difficult to force users to determine 

their transportation needs quickly. At the national level only the top 

commander has the authority to allocate transportation to all sectors 

of the military and, in the case of total war, to the civilian economy as 

well. This had been true in World War II. Lt. Gen. John C. H. Lee, a 

strict discip.linarian, commanded the COMZ. He believed in the Qsystem and required all U.S. forces in Europe to follow it. If one had 

not submitted his requirements for transportation in advance, he didn't 

get transportation except in an extreme emergency. General 

Eisenhower apparently supported General Lee. 

During my second year at Fort Eustis, Nell Monroe Fuson, our 

second child, was born. l spent my last year at Eustis learning and 
52 TRANSPORTATION AND LOGISTICS: ONE MAN'S STORY 

teaching transportation management and movement control. After 

completing my three years duty on the staff and faculty, 1 got the 

opportunity to attend the Transportation Officers' Advanced Course 4. 

l initially thought that I didn't need it because I had been teaching the 

advanced course for three years. My superiors thought differently and 

credit for attending such a course is more important than teaching it. 

As I progressed through the nine months of the course, I began to 

appreciate why I was emolled. I learned a great deal when we reached 

the various military arts subjects, which were essential to my future 

Army career. The course a lso prepared me for the next and most 

important career course, the Command and General Staff College at 

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. 

After the Korean War broke out in 1950, more and more forces 

went to Korea. Our class at Fort Eustis knew that following graduation 

in the spring of 1951 , most of us would also be assigned there. Our 

class included officers with World War II experience in all fie lds, 

including some transportation at the junior grade level. When Maj. 

Richard Biggs and I, both at the top of our class, were assigned to the 

Office of the Chief of Transportation in Washington, D.C., instead of 

Korea, we were very much surprised. 

Georgia and I again began the predictable chore of looking for a 

place to live near Washington. With two yotmg children and a third on 

the way, we gave up on apartments. Very few were large enough to 

accommodate us. Finally Georgia found a sma ll house which we 

could afford in the Braddock Heights area of Alexandria, Virginia, not 

far from the Pentagon and my office in Tempo Building 7. Tempo 7, a 

huge run-down temporary office building from World War II, located 

on the site of the parking lots for Washington National Airport, 

housed most of the Army's Technical Services. 

Our third child, named Jack Carter Fuson, Jr. , was born on 

23 August 1951 at DeWitt Army Hospital, Fort Belvoir, Virginia. 

I reported to the chief of transportation and was assigned to the 

Terminal Division. This division had staff supervision over all ports 

and water operations and managed the U.S. Army Transport 

Conunand. Since World War II, the chief of transportation had been 

responsible for the management of all troop and cargo transport ships, 

a tremendous job. This function was later turned over to the Navy and 

became the Military Sea Transportation Service. 

I worked as the chief of the Planning Branch of the division for 

the next one and one-half years as a newly promoted lieutenant 

colonel. In addition to plam1ing various marine operations in Korea, 

Maj. James D. ("Dunny'') Dum1 and I developed TO&Es for all the 

marine m1its: port units, harbor craft units, land ing craft units, and so 

forth. We produced the first official Transportation Corps authorized 
A CAREER IN THE ARMY 53 

organizational tables. We used our World War H experience and the 

information I had picked up teaching at Fort Eustis to prepare these 

documents. As I observed units based on these tables operating in 

Korea and Vietnam, their accuracy amazed me. 

We also supported the "distant early warning" (DEW) defense 

line, which the United States and Canada were establishing against 

Russian bombers coming over the North Pole. This job required establishing communications, ports, and antiaircraft stations on a line in 

northern Canada, Alaska, and Greenland. The construction and support of these stations had to be provided mostly by water, which existed only during one or two months of the year when the icc had melted. I made several trips to our major commands and support areas in 

Goose Bay, Newfoundland, and Thule, Greenland. Fortunately, we 

never had to use the DEW line, even though we devoted a tremendous 

effort to build and support it. 

CHAPTER 5 

War in Korea 

Following World War ll, the Army and Navy had been dismantled 

so rapidly and had discharged their trained personnel so fast that by 

June 1950, when the Korean War began, both services lacked experienced personnel. This affected the Army Transportation Corps acutely. The Army leadership has always had the opinion that because 

established commercial transportation existed, plenty of transportation 

experience also existed. They did not think it necessary to maintain 

transportation experts on active duty in the Army. 

The first group demobilized afte r World War II, the 

Transportation Corps was also the first group to experience a shortage 

when the Korean War started. Consequently, it was the first to be 

called back to active duty. The very few experienced transportation 

personnel available at the beginning of the Korean War had been 

moved to their various billets overseas and in the continental United 

States. By 1952 and 1953, most of our experienced transportation personnel had already served their tours in Korea and had returned to the 

States. 

The major port supporting the movement of materiel was Pusan 

on the southern coast of Korea. (See Map 2.) After MacArthur's counteroffensive, the port of Inchon was used to its limited capacity. Most 

of the men, equipment, and materiel entered the country through 

Pusan and the nearby minor ports of Kunsan, Masan, Ulsan, and 

Suyon. From Pusan, supplies to support the Eighth Army were moved 

forward by coastal water transportation, by the country's rather limited 

rail system, and by highway. This rail line had not been operational 

during the occupation in 1946. 

Pusan Port quickly became a bottleneck as usually happens during 

wartime. The chief of transportation assigned Col. Ralph Garretson, 

his executive officer, to go to Korea to assume command of the port 

of Pusan and relieve the traffic jam. I was one of the four officers 

Colonel Garretson selected to accompany him. An opportunity to put 

into practice the principles I had been learning and teaching at Fort 

Eustis was an exciting prospect. 

Soon after receiving orders for Korea, Colonel Garretson and his 

four officers, Lt. Col. Buck Bratcher, Lt. Col. Richard Biggs, Lt. Col. 
PORT OF PUSAN 

August 1951 

D Built-up Area 

7th Transportation 

Port Command Area 

Breakwater 

• Lighthouse 

Miles 

Pusan 

-----· 

Map2 

PUSAN 

HARBOR 

, 

/ 

I 

I 

/ 

• 
WAR IN KOREA 57 

John Youens, and I departed for Pusan. We stopped for briefings at 

the San Francisco port of embarkation and at the Headquarters, U.S. 

Army, Pacific, in Hawaii, then went on to Korea. 

Very soon after we arrived ln Pusan, Garretson made assignments for the four of us. Biggs took over command at the port of 

Kunsan and Bratcher became chief of the Terminal Operations 

Division at Pusan proper. His job was to discharge and backload all 

the arriving ships and to clear the cargo from the dock to its first 

destination. Youens commanded one of the truck battalions supporting the main port at Pusan. 1 commanded the main ammunition port 

at Ulsan, Korea. An accident at Ulsan had just blown away about 

half of the port. 

I first directed the rebuilding of the port and its ammunition discharge facilities. The Army Corps of Engineers performed the work in 

a very satisfactory manner. Even after repair, this port had very limited capabilities. Because it had no piers, we unloaded ships onto 

barges in the stream, then moved the barges ashore using our small 

tugs. From the barges we transferred the an1111w1ition directly to rail, 

when railcars were available. When they were not, we stacked the 

ammunition on the beach. We tried to limit beach storage to dumps 

less than 20,000 tons for safety reasons. This was sometimes difficult 

because our highest priority job, as always, was to discharge deepdraft ships so they could return for another shipment. Eventually, we 

could unload I 5,000 to 20,000 short tons a day. 

The method we used to move the ammunition across the beach 

and onto the railcars, or to the beach dump area, was new to me. 

Korean stick gangs carried handmade sticks, supported across the 

shoulders of two men, from which the ammo was suspended. A load 

of up to 500 pounds could be carried on a stick supported on two 

men's shoulders. For heavier Loads, such as a 1000-pound Air Force 

bomb, two gangs were used. One two-man gang slung the front of 

the load between them, and the other two men supported the rear of 

the load. These stick gangs had been carrying heavy loads this way 

all their working lives. One could recognize a stick gang member by 

the indentation or groove the stick had worn into his back. 

These amazing teams could carry heavy loads from the barge up 

into the railcar or to the beach all day long. They moved with a regular 

and steady cadence as if they were marching to music. As I got to 

know these stick gangs, I would occasionally take over from one of 

the men and help with the unloading. Getting into the right cadence 

was the most difficult part, but I soon learned how to do it. Every time 

I joined in, the gang would get excited and clap in approval. I became 

very familiar with all of the gangs and learned to communicate with 

them without learning the language very well. I enjoyed getting to 
58 TRANSPORTATION AND LOGISTICS: ONE MAN'S STORY 

know them and working with the Koreans during my wartime tour as 1 

had during our occupation after World War II. 

I commanded one port company and supervised the Korean 

stevedores aboard ship and on the beach. The port company made an 

excell ent team. 1 most respected the two NCO ordnance safety 

inspectors from the Ordnance Corps and an enlisted Coast Guard 

Safety Inspector adviser. The Coast Guard inspector monitored ship 

operations and the ordnance inspectors watched the stevedore operation aboard ship and over the beach. They were on the job constantly 

and knew their jobs well. I became completely dependent upon them 

for advice. My experience with ammunition shi ps in the Philippines 

during World War II taught me a lesson I would never forget. 

Once we had a problem in Ulsan that I was afraid might lead to an 

explosion like the one we had in Mindoro. We were receiving fire 

bombs for the Air Force by the shipload. The bombs looked like two 

55-gallon drums fitted together end to end. If the two sections became 

separated the slightest bit, they would start smoking. We found this 

out the hard way. One day the stevedore crew reported that as soon as 

they opened the hatch, they saw smoke coming out. r ordered the 

stevedore crew ashore immediately and the ship's crew followed. 

When I asked for ten volunteers, the Army and Coast Guard ordnance inspectors raised their hands along with many of my port company personnel. We boarded the ship and began unloading the bombs 

very carefully until we found the one smoker and took that rascal out 

as fast, and as carefully, as we could. We put it on one of our control 

boats, took it to sea, and dumped it overboard. It was a relief to have 

solved the problem safely, and it reinforced my respect for ammunition. I obtained decorations for all the volunteers. 

The nearby little town of Ulsan was full of young girls. The usual 

VD and social problems occurred among our soldiers as they always 

do. I made it a point to become friends with the town mayor, the chief 

of police, and the main city doctor. By working with these three leaders, I kept trouble and VD to a minimum. We provided the penicillin 

for the doctor to treat any girls with VD and we had an excellent 

cooperative relationship. 

During 1952 and early 1953, the Allied forces attempted to 

inflict as much damage as possible on the North Korean and Chinese 

forces. General James A. Van Fleet, in command of the Eighth Army 

since April 1951, really believed in artillery fire. He insisted on firing nearly 10,000 rounds of artillery a day, which became known as 

the "Van Fleet Day of Fire." The Ulsan port became the main source 

of ammunition for Van Fleet's artillery. We had to work around the 

clock to move all the necessary ammo through our port onto rai I cars 

where it could be distributed to the various Eighth Army ammunition 
WAR IN KOREA 59 

supply points. The Third Military Railroad Service (MRS), together 

with the Korean National Railroad, operated the South Korean rail in 

a professional manner. 

The Third MRS consisted of a headquarters, two operating battalions, and a shop battalion. These units came to Korea from our training command at Fort Eustis, but now they were Regular Army troops. 

They had originally been reserve rail units from our major railroad 

companies who had been called to active duty during World War II. 

These rail units had been developed and supported by railways and 

came to the Army as experienced men. They had worked for United 

States and Allied forces all over the world. Their accomplishments in 

Europe, Iran, and Japan were well known. 

During the Korean War, personnel could spend twelve months on 

duty in Korea and then rotate back to the States or could extend to 

eighteen months before rotating. Both Colonels Bratcher and Youens 

rotated back after their one-year tour. Colonel Biggs and I chose to 

extend for the eighteen months. When Bratcher rotated, Colonel 

Garretson moved me back to Pusan and gave me the Terminal Service 

Division, a job I had wanted very much. I overlapped with Bratcher 

for about a month and learned a great deal from him. He had worked 

in a similar capacity at the New York port of embarkation for several 

years and was very experienced with commercial stevedoring. My 

only experience had been ship-to-shore over-the-beach during World 

War II. 

When we came to Pusan port, we had a few experienced transportation officers and enlisted men in top jobs and very few experienced men below that level. When I took over the Terminal 

Operations Division, I had a few experienced lieutenant colonels, 

majors, and captains, but I also had many inexperienced second and 

first lieutenants. Instead of being able to assign a lieutenant colonel or 

a major as a pier superintendent to work four or five ships, I had to 

place a young lieutenant in charge. He was assisted by even less experienced second I ieutenants and NCOs. l had no alternative, but I soon 

found out that even without experience, all of my team was doing a 

great job. 

Our stevedores, all Korean nationals, were well trained in technical stevedore operations. If a new type operation was required, one 

which the Korean stevedores had not yet experienced, the ship crew 

would soon filius in. I soon learned that in most cases, if you have the 

courage to give these difficult jobs to young, well-educated, aggressive people, they soon learn the satisfaction that comes from job 

accomplishment. From then on, you won't be able to hold them back. 

In many cases, for the first time in their lives they will have an opportunity to take responsibility and to realize their own capabilities. It 
60 TRANSPORTATION AND LOGISTlCS: ONE MAN'S STORY 

matures them immediately. Years later, many of these young li eutenants and captains told me how much they appreciated the opportunity I gave them to learn of their abilities so early in life. In c ivilian 

life, such opportunities are rare. 

We had three types of personnel: U.S. military (officers, NCOs, 

and enlisted men), Korean nationals, and Japanese subcontractor personnel. The members of our 7th Transportation Port Conu11and provided most of the port supervision. We had a few Transportation 

Terminal Service companies, which provided stevedore supervision 

and acted as cargo checkers. Large numbers of direct-hire Korean 

civilian stevedores and laborers assisted in the warehouse open storage areas and performed all other types of labor. Japanese contractors 

provided most of our harbor craft and inland and coastal ships. These 

included the heavy-lift crane, the flattop barges, the tugs, and hundreds of small, covered cargo lighters on which the operators and their 

families lived. Japanese contractors a lso provided and maintained our 

materie l handling equipment (MI-fE) which, in those days, consisted 

mainly of small warehouse forklifts and tractors. 

U.S. military truck companies of the 48th Transportation Group 

provided most of our port clearance truck transportation. All of the 

port and supporting labor performed very well. We had no major labor 

problems except pilferage. To control pilfering, a Military Police unit 

provided shipboard and shoreside security. This police unit was augmented by combat units in the area when available. The very serious 

pilferage problem required extra troops. 

My boss, the director of port operations, also a very experienced 

man, had entered the Army from commercial port operations during 

World War II and had worked in most of our ports of embarkation 

during and since the war. Familiar with all types of port operations, he 

was a very fine teacher. I learned more about port operations during 

these six months than any other time during my thirty-five years of 

active duty. 

Colonel Bratcher had one major misunderstanding of our responsibilities in Army Transportation: he failed to maintain 100 percent 

item identification all the time an item was in Army transportation's 

hands. He theorized that since the customer ordered the items, we 

should give them to him and let him worry about identifying them. I 

soon learned that we were doing something wrong. 

The major Technical Service depots for Korea , located in the 

Pusan area, received all the incoming Technical Service cargo. They 

processed the cargo for movement to Eighth Army and COMZ units, 

or they stocked it in their depots in Pusan for future use. Although we 

shipped a great deal of cargo directly forward to the combat zone, it 

was mostly Class 1 (food), Class Ill (POL), Class V (ammo), and 
WAR IN KOREA 61 

vehicles of all kinds. We moved most of the difficult to handle items, 

such as components and repair parts, to a Technical Service depot 

first. We handled over a million tons of cargo a month tlu·ough the 

poti and its outposts. We unloaded 18 to 20 ships alongside our piers 

and another 10 to 15 carrying bulk cargo in the stream. Nearly all the 

depots were on the water or close by the port. 

We could move cargo by barge, truck, or rail, but we mostly used 

barge and truck. The largest Teclmical Service depot was Ordnance 

Base Depot (OBD) No. I, located on the water about a mile away from 

the main port. We moved a lot of the extensive ord!nance cargo by 

water. Ordnance items included tanks, all types of vehicles, tires, 

tracks, guns, and many other "end items." The biggest and most difficult cargo were the thousands of boxes of components and repair parts. 

With each shipment, we usually received adequate documentation 

that described all the items in detail, providing the part number, requisition number, and destination. The ship's manifest generally arrived 

before the ship, but not always. Even if the documentation arrived in 

theater, it would not necessarily be forwarded to the port. Each box 

was marked with a color code for each Teclmical Service: red was for 

Ordnance, green for Quartermaster, and so forth. 

No one can imagine the amount of wartime cargo shipped out and 

received in overseas ports, nor the speed in which it arrives unless you 

actually witness it. The port and beach cargo handlers have to rapidly 

move the cargo through the port to its first destination. There is never 

enough storage space to store cargo in the port. It must move on. 

Keeping a port clear of ships and cargo is always the port's biggest 

problem. Generally, it is not the port's capacity to move cargo that 

causes the problem, but the first destination's capacity to receive the 

cargo, to check and inventory it, and to prepare it to move on. 

All the while, the Technical Services depot personnel must 

maintain I 00 percent asset visibility (I 00 percent content identification), especially if transportation could not provide the receiving 

customer with the necessary documentation. Without the documentation, the customer cannot immediately identify the item or send it 

to its alternate destination. 

The receiving supply installation's problems usually increase 

because of a lack of supply personnel. Obtaining adequate logistics 

personnel in the theater has always been a major problem. The combat 

commander understandably wants his combat troops first. 

Consequently, commanders do not add space for support troops in 

their order of battle until support problems get out of hand. They 

notice this phenomenon when a shortage develops and equipment for 

the combat troops does not reach the front. Then the supply support 

personnel problem becomes a crisis. 
62 TRANSPORTATiON AND LOGISTICS: ONE MAN'S STORY 

Only at the crisis level do the commanders worry about support 

troops. This was our problem in Pusan during the Korean War. It 

occurred later in Vietnam during the 1960s. Jt occurred again, I am 

told, during Operation DESERT SIIIELD in the Persian Gulf. 

Since 1951, the United Nations had been negotiating with North 

Korea for a peace treaty. The Allies knew that once a treaty had 

been signed, the United States would no longer be able to support 

the South Korean forces with combat supplies. To beat the deadline, 

we were moving as much equipment and supplies into the theater as 

possible. We were following the in-transit identification system that 

the Technical Services used to identify cargo in addition to its 

accompanying documentation. 

Many transportation operators had the habit of identifying cargo 

for movement to its destination by color coding alone. This was not 

adequate. When the transportation operators picked up the item for 

shipment at its point of origin, they received documentation that identified the item completely. They should have provided the customer at 

its destination with the same detailed information. We were remiss at 

the port of Pusan, also. We tended to move the boxes with red corners 

to OBD- 1 without regard for their contents. We also packed the shipping documentation in boxes just like the cargo, leaving it to the customer to sort. This procedure lost the identity of the item. 

The receiving Ordnance depot had to sort all the boxes and 

attempt to match the parts to the documentation to trace which part 

corresponded with which requisition. At the speed we pushed cargo 

into OBD- 1, it was impossible for them to keep up. The depot could 

not even unload our trucks and barges as fast as we moved them in 

and it certainly could not match the cargo with its documentation. 

The director of operations would order me to unload our trucks 

and barges at the depot so we could unload the endless stream of ships 

and clear the cargo off our docks. I would send cranes and crews to 

the depots to unload our trucks and barges. We ignored identification 

in our rush to move out the incoming cargo. We stacked it al l up until 

the mounds of ordnance parts and equipment got to be so high that the 

depot could no longer operate. Everyone knew that we had enough 

cargo in the depot to support the Allied and Korean forces for at least 

ninety days, but there was no way to sort out items and issue them to 

the customer in an orderly manner. 

The Ordnance Section finally abandoned OBD-1, moved to 

another location, and started over again. I've often worried about the 

terrible waste of money and materiel this represented. I learned my 

lesson about item identification by making all the mistakes myself, 

but I was never able to convince my bosses that the mess was a 

Transportation Corps problem more than a depot problem. The depot 
WAR IN KOREA 63 

was the victim. Ever since, I've preached the need for item identification to both logisticians and transportation experts, but I have generally struck out. 

Soon after Colonel Bratcher left and I took over the terminal 

operations at Pusan, we established a very innovative operation center on the recommendation of the Korean Base Section commander, 

Brig. Gen. Richard F. Whitcomb. General Whitcomb commanded a 

reserve transportation major port and had commanded ports of 

embarkation and debarkation in the United States and Europe during 

World War II. Called to active duty soon after the Korean War began, 

he devoted most of his days to managing the Korean Base Section, a 

very extensive operation. 

At night, he would come to the port and travel its length to 

observe the various port operations. This was apparently his first love 

and he always came unannounced. He would never ask for anyone to 

accompany him on these nightly runs. After I learned he was doing 

this, I would meet him when he arrived. My assistant chief of staff for 

intelligence (G2) would tell me when General Whitcomb was on the 

way to my port. 

I spent two or three hours almost every night observing port operations with Whitcomb. This was routine for me because I had made it 

a practice to tour the port myself every night before I turned in. I started by touring the port the first thing in the morning, before the night 

shift had departed, to see the results of their work. [ would tour the 

piers again during the day and then again at night for the same reasons. Touring with General Whitcomb not only satisfied this evening 

task, but touring the port with a senior man of his experience was 

helpful. Early on, he pointed out much that needed some form of 

attention. 

General Whitcomb told me he had made it a practice to establish 

an operation center with information boards on which were maintained the current status of each hatch aboard each ship. The same 

sort of system kept track of all warehouse open storage areas and all 

other work areas in the port. He equipped an agent at each work site 

with a small two-way radio which kept him in constant touch with the 

operation center. Normally every hour, the work area agent would 

report its status to the operation center. Any time a ship's gear broke 

down, trucks failed to show up or were not handled properly, the operation center knew about it. If it was serious, the agent notified whoever was in charge of the port. The port could then take corrective action 

immediate ly, instead of waiting until the end of the shift. 

After Learning about the operation center from General 

Whitcomb, I briefed Colonel Garretson, the port commander, and his 

director of operations. They went along with the idea and provided me 
64 TRANSPORTATION AND LOGISTICS: ONE MAN'S STORY 

with the equipment necessary to establish an operation center. 

Everyone soon knew of its importance. From then on, I used this procedure every time I had this kind of responsibility, including the port 

of Saigon during the Vietnam War. 

Securing shipments for transport by rail was another of our problems in Pusan. Although we moved a lot of cargo short distances by 

truck and barge, lashing and securing was never a problem. But highways in Korea were practically nonexistent. For long distances we 

used the railroad, which required different preparation for shipment. 

Each long distance rail trip would be made over poorly maintained old 

track that crossed rough and mountainous terrain. Consequently, the 

rail cargo had to be properly blocked, braced, and lashed down; otherwise, it would fall off the cars enroute. When this happened, the 

Military Railway Service would have to stop the train to reload and 

secure the cargo before resuming the trip. The well-trained rail inspectors that supported the railroad operating battalion were very strict 

about releasing loaded rail cars for forward movement. They wou ld 

reject a car if its load was at all questionable. 

At that time, we were loading and forwarding hundreds of rail 

cars to the Eighth Army 24 hours a day. We generally loaded bulk 

cargo, such as vehicles and lumber, on flat cars. Vehicles were not difficult to secure on the flat cars, but lumber was a problem. Lumber 

had to be loaded and lashed down correctly so that it did not shift and 

fall off the cars. If the rugged terrain caused the lumber to slide off 

the train, it usually happened in areas that were difficult to access. If it 

happened near the port, the rail inspectors would ask the port to help 

reload, and we would generally oblige. If it happened in the mountains 

on the way north, we would pass the responsibility on to the MRS 

who had accepted the load. lt became an MRS job to reload and clear 

the tracks. This made them very careful about accepting lumber loads. 

Many times I was awakened in the middle of the night because an 

inspector had rejected a train of 100 or so rail cars loaded with lumber. Because all the rail cars would have to be reloaded, a standoff 

generally resulted between the rail inspectors and my stevedores. I 

would have to get out of bed to resolve the matter, usually in favor of 

the rail operations. They wouldn't move the cars unless they were 

loaded properly and we had to continue to unload the ships. 

We had established major vehicle rebuild facilities at our depot in 

Japan at the end of World War II. We used them to rebuild vehicles for 

reissue to the American troops remaining in the theater, or to rebuild 

vehicles for military aid customers in the Far East and throughout the 

world. ft was more economical to rebuild the old vehicles left behind 

by American forces in Japan than to return them to the States. (Our 

units returning to be demobilized after World War II had taken very 
WAR IN KOREA 65 

little equipment with them.) It was more economica l to ship rebuilt 

vehicles by water directly to overseas destinations from Japan rather 

than through ports in the United States. This policy also assisted the 

Japanese in rebuilding their economy. The overhaul capability in 

Japan created during the Korean War wou ld later support our efforts 

during the Vietnamese conflict. 

We back-loaded two or three ships with wrecked vehicles and 

equipment, 24 hours a day, for shipment to our rebuild depot in Japan. 

This equipment had been moved by rail fi·om the Eighth Army area to 

the port. The only problem was pilferage of the equipment wh ile 

enroute to the port. The wheels would be removed, the axles stolen, 

and the wheels replaced and lashed to the vehicle. Axles seemed to be 

high priority items. The thieves apparently used them for all sorts of 

things. 

ln addition to pilfering from rail cars, the Koreans pilfered the 

ships. Because they lived in extreme poverty, they would steal anyth ing and everything. They had developed these skills during fifty 

years of Japanese occupation. They became very good at getting 

aboard ship, stealing something, and making off witlnout being seen. 

They came by boat or swam out. 

We stationed armed U.S. guards at both ends and on both sides of 

every ship with open hatches, whether or not the ship was being 

worked. It was difficult to keep the guards alert throughout their 

watches. Many Koreans would still come aboard, break into the cargo, 

and escape. If a guard detected a Korean aboard ship, he would order 

the Korean out and attempt to make an arrest; but, because of the language barrier, the thief usually would not respond to the guard. The 

Japanese had taught them that if they were caught, they would be shot 

on the spot, so they never surrendered. The thief generally ran for 

cover and the guard fired. Every night we would have several Korean 

casua lties, usually fatal. 

We also sustained many pilferage losses from our own troops and 

civilian port laborers. Marriage and temporary liaisons between U.S. 

men and local women were more common in Korea than anywhere 

else I have ever been stationed. The soldier or officer moved in with 

his Korean wife or girlfriend and because his Army salary wou ld not 

support them, he had to find other ways to obtain money. ln many 

cases, this would mean th e soldi er bought articles from the post 

exchange to sell on the black market. If this wasn't adequate, the soldier would begin pilfering and many times would become a drug dealer. Usua lly, the soldier was caught and his career was over. This 

sequence occurred more times in Korea than anywhere e lse 1 have 

ever been. To my real amazement, our provost marshall- a Regular 

Army lieutenant colonel in the Military Police Corps- decided to 
66 TRANSPORTATION AND LOGISTICS: ONE MAN'S STORY 

make some easy money. Until we discovered what he was doing, 

many things disappeared from the port. He ended up in the federal 

prison at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. 

At the same time we moved all of this military cargo to support 

the Allied and Korean forces, we also handled cargo to support the 

Korean civilian economy. We had previously sustained almost all of 

the Korean economy after taking over in 1945 and moving the 

Japanese out. During the next five years, the Koreans developed some 

capability for self support but, as the war between the North and the 

South developed, nearly all of this stopped. We found ourselves once 

again supporting South Korea almost entirely, including the offshore 

islands and the large POW camps. 

Lifting very heavy cargo caused another major problem. Among 

the most difficult of the large, heavy items we moved into Korea were 

rail locomotives. We initially brought in steam locomotives because 

they were the standard engine used then. Later, we started improving 

their rail system with diese l locomotives, each weighing over 

I 00 tons. In the port we had only one heavy-lift floating crane, an old 

Japanese 150-ton stiff-leg crane. Because the crane could not rotate 

on the barge, we had to rotate the entire barge to change directions. 

The ships that brought in the heavy loads could not discharge them by 

themselves. Consequently, we had to use our heavy-lift crane to 

unload the ship directly to our shore facilities. We lifted locomotives 

from the ship directly onto our port tracks. This process was very slow 

and difficult using the old stiff-leg Japanese crane. 

A few years later, the Army provided us with standard 30-·and 

1 00-ton floating cranes that could rotate 360 degrees on their floating 

barge platforms. Fa r more efficient, they enabled us to discharge 

heavy loads much faster. Most of the heavy loads like locomotives 

and tanks would later be moved on ships with built-in heavy-lift 

cranes. 

The Pusan fire occurred during the winter of 1953. This fire was 

the most serious and destructive disaster to happen during my tour. 

The port proper was located at the foot of the city of Pusan and the 

Korean peninsula. A mountain ridge divided Pusan into two valleys. 

The mountain came right down the middle of the valley and reached 

almost to the port. Large residential and business areas ran up each 

valley from the port. The buildings were made mostly of paper and 

cardboard with just enough lumber to hold them together. It gave the 

city the look of a shanty town. Early one evening, we heard that a fire 

had started far up on the western side of Pusan. We had no idea of its 

extent or what might happen. 

As the evening progressed, we began to notice bright lights 

appearing from the va lley. The lights became brighter and brighter. 
WAR IN KOREA 67 

Then we noticed that the fire was coming right down the valley, burning everything in its path from the foot of the mountain to the water. 

The wind was moving down the val ley, pushing the fire ahead of it as 

it came. It became obvious that the fire would reach the port and, at 

the rate it was moving, the port would go. We alerted all the ships to 

button up hatches and move out to the anchorage. We moved our own 

floating equipment away from the docks and manned all the firefighting equipment we owned or had borrowed from the ships before they 

departed. 

As the fire kept coming, moving faster and faster, the situation 

did not look good. The fire would reach Pier 1 first. This pier had 

working berths on one side, our main barracks barge on the other side, 

and all of our headquarters and administrative facilities on the pier 

itself. The barracks barge housed all our officer and enlisted headquarters personnel. 

We did everything we could to prepare to fight the fire. Just as the 

fire actually began burning the entrance gate to the pieJ, the wind shifted. It changed from blowing north to south and blew from west to east. 

The fire followed the wind and moved east, sparing the port. It continued right down the street in front of the p011 all the way beyond it and 

then moved up the eastern valley of Pusan. Without the wind behind it, 

it did not move very far up the eastern valley and eventually burned 

itself out. The fire had destroyed the western valley half of Pusan. The 

sudden wind shift that saved the port seemed almost like a miracle. 

The fire burned all night, and the next morning we could see the 

extent of the disaster. Destruction was everywhere, with thousands of 

Koreans left homeless. Needless to say, the remaining civilian community could not handle all the refugees. The U.S. military had to assume 

responsibility to provide shelter, food, and clothing for thousands of 

Korean families. 

To house some of the displaced Koreans, we provided the wellcovered and protected warehouse facilities on Pier 3. The largest in 

the port, Pier 3 had three deep-draft berths on each side and two at the 

end. Warehouses completely covered the center of this enormous area. 

We installed Herman Nelson heaters outside each warehouse door, 

with heat ducts leading into each warehouse, and built outside toilet 

facilities over the water on the side of the pier. Along the pier, we 

installed field kitchens with serving tables. We issued four 5x7-foot 

marine pallets to each family with enough straw matting to cover 

them. Very soon, we had filled the warehouses with some I 0,000 

Koreans, leaving only aisle room between the pallets. It was not like a 

hotel, but it was much better than lying on the ground during the very 

cold Korean winter. We housed and fed these homeless fam ilies for 

many weeks. 

Lieutenant Fuson, Camp 

Edwards, Massachusetts, 

1942. 
Combined amphibious and infantry unit training along eastern U.S. coastline, 

1941 ; belo1v, two LCls and an LST during beach training exercises, Monterey 

Beach, California, 1943. 
Captain Fuson with a 

colleague, New Guinea, 

1943. 
Coast Guardmen trying to free an LCVP in New Guinea, 1942; below, 

amphibian truck, 2112-ton 6x6, nicknamed "the Duck," standardized in 1942. 
Supply operations on a beach near Hollandia; below, unloading at a beach on 

Leyte, 1944. 
U.S. Army Transportation Center, Fort Eustis, 

Virginia, circa J 948. 
Open storage of supplies at Inchon port, 1948. 
Stores of supplies in the 

open near the docks at 

Pusan; right, crane 

unloading a boxcar at 

Pusan port. 
LST loaded with boxcars moving into Pusan Harbor, 1951; below, all hands 

join to fight a raging fire, Pusan, J 953. 
Lieutenant Colonel Fuson meets with Brigadier General Lastago at 

Outpost #2, Ulsan, Korea, 1952. 
CHAPTER6 

The Transportation Corps 

My family remained in Alexandria, Virginia, during my eighteenmonth tour in Korea from late 1952 to early 1954. lt had been a very 

difficult period for my wife and our three children, ages 3, 5, and 7. 

The youngest, our three-year-old son, contracted nephritis and became 

very ill. He stayed in Walter Reed Army Medical Center for many 

weeks and at first had not been expected to live. My wife spent long 

hours at the hospital with him while friends and neighbors cared for 

our two other children. Fortunately, our exceptionally good friends 

provided all kinds of support for my wife. I did not learn about our 

son's problem until! had finished my tour and returned to the United 

States. 

Before I finished my Korean tour, 1 was delighted to receive orders 

to attend the Army Co1mnand and General Staff College. I returned to 

Alexandria, put our house on the market, and packed up our household 

goods for the move to Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. We sold our house 

very quickly, fortunately, stored our household goods, and returned to 

my family's home in St. Joseph, Missouri, very close to Leavenworth. 

The family remained with my parents while I reported to Fort 

Leavenworth in the early spri ng of 1954. Since our class would not 

begin until August, I was given an interim assignment on the academic 

staff in the assistant chief of staff, logistics (G4) section. 

During the summer, I was able to orient myself and my family 

around the school and post. Because the current class was sti 11 in session, regular student quarters were not yet available. We were assigned 

very satisfactory interim quarters, and we left our household goods in 

storage until the permanent quarters became available. My wife and 

children spent a lot of time back in St. Joseph with my family. At the 

end of the class, school quarters became avai table and we settled 

down into a very nice, small house. The fact that Fort Leavenworth 

and the school make a great effort to take care of the student's dependents meant a great deal to my family, who had just been through a 

very difficult ordeal while J was in Korea. 

I knew that my staff school assignment was importan t for my 

Army career. My four years in the Transportation School had convinced me of the importance of the Army's career school system. The 
80 TRANSPORTATION AND LOGISTICS: ONE MAN'S STORY 

experience had also given me a much better preparation for staff college than the average student. In addition to the academic training, the 

staff college provided many other features of value to my career. I had 

a chance to meet and make friends with the fellow officers with whom 

I would work for the rest of my Army career. 

The experience improved my morale and increased my appreciation for the Army. There wasn't a deadbeat in the entire class or on the 

faculty. The student officers and their families were all top-notch people. Often in logistics, out at the end of the supply line, you can 

become discouraged by working with officers who really don 't measure up. All of my classmates worked hard and were very competitive, 

but in a most positive way. I found this to be true of students in all the 

career schools in the system during my later years. 

Before graduation, 1 received orders that sent me back to Fort 

Eustis to be the command's deputy chief of staff. My family and I 

were happy to return to Eustis because we liked it and the surrou nding 

community. We were delighted to know that we would rate quarters on 

post. As deputy chief of staff, I would work directly for the commanding general, Maj. Gen. Rush B. Lincoln, and 1 was certainly pleased 

about this. General Lincoln had been the Transportation School commandant in 1947 when I was first assigned there. I had learned a lot 

about movement planning and control in the Army from this brilliant 

man and had come to respect him very much. As much as any one 

person, he had been responsible for the success of my career. 

During this three-year tour as the deputy chief of staff for operations, J worked for three different top-notch chiefs: Col. (later Maj. 

Gen.) Edward W. Sawyer, Col. Robert A. Cliffe, and Col. (later Brig. 

Gen.) William L. Calhoun. 

During this tour, I was exposed for the first time to the manifold 

functions of a large military post: the operation of the school, training 

of all types of units, the many post administrative functions, and the 

large staff of civilian personnel required to support these units and 

their families. It was an extremely educational eye-opener for me and 

helped me prepare for future assignments on military posts, including 

Fort Eustis. 

During my previous assignment at the Transportation School, I 

had encouraged amphibious training for our transportation units with 

exerc ises on the James River beaches and at our satellite installation at 

Fort Story, Virginia. These had continued during my absence, especially during the tour of Gene ral Frank S. Besson, Jr., General 

Lincoln's predecessor. 

While commander of Fort Eustis, General Besson had initiated 

severa l innovative approaches to amphibious operations. Besson had 

gotten the idea for an innovative overhead aerial tramway from Mr. 
THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS 81 

Dick Kerr, who he lped in the development of the DUKW. In his 

capacity with the Arab-American Oil Company, Kerr had developed 

an aerial tramway to move oil rigs and other equipment ashore for the 

construction of oil wells in Saudi Arabia. The tramway could be used 

for ship-to-shore loading and unloading of cargo and equipment in an 

amphibious operation if adequate beaches were not available. 

The system consisted of an offshore pier with an overhead structure onto which was mounted one e nd of a cable. The cable was 

attached to a similar pier ashore. Cargo and equipment would be 

pulled ashore from supply ships using slings and pulleys that rode on 

this cable. This made over-the-beach operations unnecessary, regardless of the condition of the shoreline. General Besson had developed 

the idea and procured one system at Fort Eustis. 

The offshore pier itself was a new idea developed by retired Col. 

L. B. ("Slim") DeLong. DeLong based his theory for the pier on first 

modifying a barge large enough to berth a deep-draft cargo vessel 

alongside. Several long circular steel studs that would reach the bottom were dropped through openings built into the barge. The openings for the steel shafts were fitted with lifting pumps that could lift 

the barge onto the studs. 

To create the offshore pier, tugs woul.d float the barge into position. The studs were stacked on the deck of the barge which was fitted 

with a crane. When the barge had been moved to its anchorage spot, 

the studs would be lowered through the openings to firmly penetrate 

the bottom of the ocean. Pumps would then raise the barge onto the 

studs; at the same time its weight would drive the ends of the studs 

into the bottom. After the barge had been pushed up to its proper 

height and secured to the studs, the overhead cranes and the cable 

would be installed on the DeLong barge and on the shore. After the 

cables had been secured, the cable cars for moving the cargo would be 

installed. The rig was then ready for a ship to berth a longside and be 

worked. 

Besson was one of the very few in the Army who liked DeLong's 

idea. The Army first used the DeLong pier as part of Besson's overhead tramway. The entire tramway had been installed on our James 

River training area site and we began testing it. 

During this same period, the Army and Navy had been conducting 

annual over-the-beach amphibious exerc ises in France. General 

Besson was next assigned to the Combined Command of the North 

Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the Supreme Headquarters, 

Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE). Still very much interested in im1ovative transportation ideas, he was instrumental in adding testing of the 

overhead tramway to the 1957 amphibious over-the-beach exercise off 

the southern coast of France. The Army procured another tramway 
82 TRANSPORTATION AND LOGISTICS: ONE MAN'S STORY 

and shipped it to Europe with the other equipment to be used in the 

exercise. 

General Lincoln, our major troop unit commander at Fort Eustis, 

CoL Phillip E. Pons, and I went to Europe to observe the exercise. On 

the way, we visited and were briefed by the European Command 

(EUCOM) in Paris and U.S. Army, Europe, in Heidelberg. In Paris, 

General Besson briefed us and gave a cocktail party in our honor. 

At the beginning of the exercise, we observed the installation of 

the DeLong pier from the shore. The water was very rough, with a 

large surf developing. At dusk, the operation was called off until the 

next day. By th is time, the barge had been jacked up on only two 

studs, and it was still floating on the surface of the water. They 

secured it for the night in this condition. Unfortunately, during the 

night a storm came up. Because the barge pumps had not been able to 

jack the barge up and out of the water, the pounding surf knocked it 

off the two studs and washed it ashore. The barge and all of its equipment were wrecked. This ended the test of the aerial tramway during 

the 1957 exercise. It also ended the idea of the aerial tramway. Besson 

remained the only optimistic supporter of the concept in the Army, but 

he did not push the idea any further. The tramway was one of the few 

ideas of his which did not work out.• 

It was about this time that General Besson started thinking about 

containerization. He realized that to use the tramway effectively, we 

would have to move break bulk cargo in containers of some sort. This 

concept would not be fully rea lized until the Vie tnam War, but I am 

convinced that following the aeria l tramway failure, Besson worked 

on this idea with some of his research and development people. Mr. 

Malcolm McLean, who later created the Sea-Land Services, was one 

ofthese researchers. 

After witnessing the failure in France, we returned to Fort Eustis. 

Although we used the tramway in later exercises, we really did not carry 

development of the idea or the equipment any further. We did, however, 

think a lot about the DeLong pier and how we could use it in the future. 

During my tour at Fort Eustis from 1955 to J 958, our fourth child, 

a son, was born at the Fort Eustis Hospital. We named him for 

Georgia's father, Peter Bahnsen. Also during this tour, I realized that I 

should take advantage of the convenient night school to finish my college degree. Although I attended evening classes for the entire three 

years, I did not receive my college degree until several years later. 

The tour at Fort Eustis also made me realize that the officers' 

wives, especially the senior officers' wives, made significant contri1 British engineers had attempted a similar but more primitive system off 

the Normandy beaches in 1944 with nearly identical results. (See World War 

II green book.) 
THE TRANSPORTATfON CORPS 83 

butions to the post community. The variety of daily activities on the 

post require the help of volunteers. Volunteers play important roles in 

activities such as the Red Cross, the post medical facilities, the special 

service center, and child-care and youth centers. 

The post information center is one of the most important operations that requires such individuals. Volunteers help and teach young 

soldiers and their wives about relocating to a new post and a new life. 

Many of these young couples have never made a budget, never comparison-shopped, and never taken advantage of post services. Because 

unit commanders no longer had time fo r this type work, vo lunteer 

training programs became vital. In the old days, young soldiers, mostly single men, required no introduction to family services. Today, it is 

not uncommon to have 18- or 19-year-old soldiers with even younger 

wives and one or two children. Many times young families arrived 

accompanied by letters of indebtedness. Helping these young soldiers 

and their families made the three years from 1955 to 1958 at Fort 

Eustis interesting, educational, and rewarding for both my wife and 

myself. 

I received orders to attend the Armed forces Staff College in 

Norfolk, Virginia, just across the James River from Fort Eustis. 

During this relatively easy permanent change of station, the only di fficult part was moving from very ample quarters at Fort Eustis to the 

much less than adequate quarters at the staff college. Although the 

staff college tour lasts only five months, it is one of the few assignments for less than six months that is considered a permanent change 

of station. Including families in the program was very important. 

Having become a real advocate for the career school system, J was 

delighted with this opportunity. In those days, it was not necessary to 

attend both the Command and Genera l Staff College and tJ1e Armed 

Forces Staff College, but I thought it would be helpful. 

Soon after entering the staff college, I realized its many advantages. For the first time 1 had close contact with officers from the 

Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force. All were dedicated career officers 

with interests and experiences very different from mjne. Exposure to 

officers from the other services and regular classroom dialogues 

proved to be a valuable educational milestone. The college offered me 

the chance to meet many officers from Allied countries and their families as wel l. All of us had been encouraged to bring our families to 

the school to foster this sort of interaction. Ju st as we did at 

Leavenworth, we made many friends in the U.S. services and our 

Allies, whom I continued to see and work with fo r the rest of my 

active duty career. 

The first three weeks of the curriculum were known as service 

orientation weeks. Students from each of the services were given a 
84 TRANSPORTATION AND LOGISTICS: ONE MAN'S STORY 

week to orient the students from the other services about their organization, functions, and missions. These briefings broadened our 

knowledge of the other services and allowed us to get to know our 

college associates quickly. 

The differences between the theories of career education in each 

service became immediate ly apparent. The Army system stressed 

Army career schools and required each officer to attend the basic and 

advanced courses for his branch. The officer was then ordered to the 

Command and General Staff College and others if his career potential 

warranted. The Air Force stressed some of this, but did not require the 

career officer to complete all of his branch courses except for the Air 

Force Command and General Staff College. The Navy stressed onthe-job training and a master's degree program in an area allied to the 

officer's military specialty. The Navy did not have career courses like 

the Army. 

Having been through preparation and presentation of this information before, we in the Army were much better prepared to present 

the first week service orientation program than those in the other two 

services. Most of us had already had tours at other service schools. 

The Army always led off with the first week, followed by the Air 

Force, then the Navy/Marine Corps. We students got together, decided what we should present, and divided up the work. We did not have 

a difficult job presenting our organization to the other services for 

that first week, but we received considerable help from our faculty 

advisers. 

During our week, the other services struggled to prepare their presentations. They told us as much during the "happy hour," an informal 

social gathering at the post officers' club. We finished easily and then 

sat back to watch the other students. It became apparent that they were 

having problems. Many of them had never thought about their total 

service organization, missions, and functions. They also had a hard 

time finding reference material that provided this information. The 

staff and faculty assisted them because they had seen this before. 

The Armed Forces Staff College was very informative and very 

enjoyable. The importance of joint and combined operations became 

more clear to me than before and better prepared me for future joint 

operations assignments. It also prepared me for several future assignments in Europe and the Pacific, where I worked closely with Allied 

forces. The Allied officers who attended our class had been selected 

with the same great care exercised to select officers from the U.S. 

services and they participated in all activities witl1 great enthusiasm, 

contributing much to the success of the class. 
CHAPTER 7 

Duty in the United States Army, Europe 

About halfway through the staff college course, the Office of the 

Chief of Transportation notified me that I was scheduled for an 

assignment in France following graduation. I would be assigned to 

COMZ, headquarters for about two years, then given the command of 

the 53d Truck Battalion in Germany. This was absolutely the best 

news I could have received. My only experience in Europe up to that 

time had been the trip with General Lincoln to observe the over-thebeach mobilization exercise in 1957. All of my previous overseas 

experience had been in the Pacific, but at that time the Army's maiJ1 

mission was supporting NATO. Except for the classroom, most of my 

experience had been in transportation. 1 was glad to be assigned to 

Headquarters, COMZ Europe, which would broaden my experience. 

My family and r would travel to Europe by surface transportation on 

the United States- then the newest and most modern ocean liner in 

the world. 

After graduation in the spring of 1959, we packed up the household goods that we had moved to Leavenworth and prepared for our 

move to France. We were told to leave most of our belongings in storage. In order to reduce transportation costs, most of the main household goods would be issued to us in Europe. In those days, families 

could take overseas only those personal things thought to be absolutely necessary. Our trip on the United States was enjoyable even though 

we sailed through the rough water of the North Atlantic during winter. 

Old friends met us in Orleans, France, the headquarters for 

COMZ. As a lways, we were looked after until we could find a place to 

live and become established. Once again, we witnessed the AJmy taking care of its own. Because of limited government quarters, we moved 

into an adequate privately owned house. We enrolled our children in 

school and l reported to work. 

In 1959, the COMZ still functioned much as it had immediately 

following World War ll. Its headqua11ers was in Orleans, with a base 

section in the western part of France, an intermediate section in the 

Orleans area, and an advanced section in eastern France. I was 

assigned as executive officer in the Office of the Director of Supply 

and Services, the G4 of COMZ. This opportunity permitted me, for 
86 TRANSPORTATION AND LOGISTICS: ONE MAN'S STORY 

the first time in my career, to work in aspects of logistics other than 

transportation. I had studied and taught "Movement Planning and 

Control in COMZ Europe." On a theoretical basis, I was familiar with 

the organization, the COMZ mission, and its command functions. I 

served as the 04 member of the command briefing team and participated in all of the command briefings. This work allowed all of us to 

visit and learn about all parts of the command in great detail. 

The Technical Services still operated the Army's logistics system. 1 

Headquarters COMZ consisted of a general staff and Technical 

Services staffs. The general staff provided overall command and control while a technical service staff operated each separate system. 

Each Technical Service had its own supply and maintenance facil ity 

in each COMZ section, as well as in the Army rear area. They maintained war reserve stocks at the COMZ facilities, while active supply 

and equipment moved directly forward to Seventh Army units or to 

Seventh Army supply and maintenance facilities. 

At the time, approximately 120 days of war reserve stocks were 

maintained in theater, mainly in France. Bulk POL were provided by a 

petroleum distribution system under the chief of the quartermaster 

general. This POL supply line ran from the Biscay Bay on the west 

coast of France to Metz on the east. The COMZ chief oftranspo1tation 

provided POL transportation, which consisted mainly of commercial 

rail and Army trucks. 

Both the French and German railroads had been reestablished, 

having been rebuilt by the U.S. Military Railway Service after World 

War II. By that time, the trains were running as weB as they had 

before the war. Some commercial trucking was available, but the U.S. 

Army's 37th Transportation Command provided most of the highway 

transport. 

The 37th had a truck battalion in the French port area on the Bay 

of Biscay, one in Orleans, one in eastern France, and a fourth in 

Kaiserslautern, Germany. For the most part, the fl eet comprised fiveton tractors, flatbed trailers, and vans. The 37th's trucks moved most 

of the freight from the Biscay Bay ports to supply and maintenance 

facilities in the COMZ and to the Seventh Army. Each battalion had 

truck parks along the line of communications (LOC) and was responsible for the forward movement of trucks and trailers from park to 

park and the retrograde movement of cargo and trucks to the rear. 

The LOC was well-established and adequate to support peacetime 

operations, but could also be expanded rapidly in case of wa r. 

Although the LOC required some contractor help, U.S. military or 

direct hire civilians performed most of the work. 

1 The seven Technical Services were: Medical, Quartermaster, Engineer, 

Ordnance, Signal, Transportation, and Chemical. 
DUTY IN THE UNITED STATES ARMY, EUROPE 87 

All of my previous experience in movement platming and movement control had been academic, and I could now observe and participate in operating the actual systems. The real world varied from the 

text book concept and doctrine from time to time, but not significantly. I found it most interesting to observe that the command required 

that all customers forecast their transportation requirements in 

advance. Then the Movement Branch of the Office of the COMZ 

Chief of Transportation programmed transportation movements to 

meet this forecast. They published program requirements monthly, 

which became the basis for most movements. 

Standard procedures were not always followed precisely. Many 

transportation requirements developed that had not been forecast. 

However, because there were plenty of transportation resources available, as is the case in peacetime, unscheduled transportation could 

always be furnished. Very little attempt was made to discipline the 

system. Such lack of discipline is poor training for wartime movements, when transportation shortages always develop and must be 

planned for and controlled. 

From my vantage point, I could observe the entire operation of 

this theater logistics system in great detail. Although I quickly became 

familiar with general supply and maintenance functions, I soon realized that this knowledge was not enough. An effective supervisor of 

supply and maintenance must first understand, in great detail, the 

commodities being supplied. There is a large difference between 

knowing about and managing field radios, bridge timbers, or truck 

repair parts. 2 In just a few years the Army reorganization of supply 

would render the commodity expert very difficult to find. 

I also realized that the need for expertise applied to transportation 

as well. An effective transportation planner and operator must become 

a specialist in one mode of transportation such as highway, rail, or terminal and water transportation. My field remained ports and shipping. 

When I was made deputy commander of a reserve logistics command under the chief of our Supply and Maintenance Division of 

COMZ, Colonel Scott, my experience again broadened. President 

Eisenhower had sent U.S. troops into Lebanon to stabilize that area. 

After their departure, plans were prepared for similar operations in the 

Middle East if conditions warranted. The combat troops to be 

deployed there would be taken from U.S. forces in Eu rope as before. 

However, no support unit was available that could be easily deployed. 

A plan was prepared to use logistics troops already in the theater for 

deployment. A reserve logistics command drawn from our perso1mel in 

2 This subject is described vety well in Joseph M. Heiser, Jr., A Soldier 

Supporting Soldiers (Washington D.C.: U.S. Army Center of Military 

History, 1991 ). 
88 TRANSPORTATION AND LOGISTICS: ONE MAN'S STORY 

COMZ headquarters would manage this support operation. This reserve 

unit was formed on paper and met occasionally to prepare plans and to 

participate in exercises to be ready to move out if needed. Some I 0,000 

tons of reserve stocks were prestocked in the Middle East for immediate 

availability in case of deployment. These supplies were positioned at the 

U.S. air base at Adana, Turkey, which the commander and I took turns 

inspecting. 

While we were stationed in Orleans, our fifth child was born at 

the St. Chapel's Hospital, an old French hospita l building which the 

U.S. Army took over. We named our new daughter Jennie Chestnut 

after my grandmother, a memorable woman. 

While assigned to COMZ in Orleans, I also participated in a study 

to decide whether the Technical Services and their staffs should be 

moved from COMZ to USAREUR headquarters to be consolidated 

with the Technical Service staffs there. Because the chief of staff of 

USAREUR supported such a move, the study recommended consolidation and the move took place. 

My original orders had assigned me to COMZ for two years, to be 

followed by command of the 53d Truck Battalion of the 37th Group in 

Kaiserslautern. These plans changed after I had been in the COMZ 

only nine months. The officer who was to precede me as battalion 

commander, Lt. Col. Arthur Hurow, had just taken command when his 

wife became seriously ill and had to be evacuated back to the States. 

On I December 1959, I was told to take over the battalion at once. I 

hated to leave France and my job at COMZ, but was anxious to 

assume a command. 

The 53d Truck Battalion, the 37th's largest, consisted of six 

truck companies: two light 2 1/2-ton truck companies and four medium truck companies with 5-ton tractors. We a lso had operational 

control of a German labor service battalion which had three companies of 5-ton diesel tractors. This service battalion had been operating in the area for many years with an excellent reputation. Its commander and I became very good friends. On later trips to Europe I 

was able to visit his unit many times to maintain our very friendly 

relationship. 

The 53d and the German labor service batta lion received and distributed supplies and equipment by trailer and van from the LOC, 

through France, into Germany. The group covered a very large area 

and had some 3,000 trailers to perform its mission. Our sister battalion, located in eastern France, had truck terminals in Nancy and Metz, 

France. We would pick up most of the trailers and vans from these terminals, move them to our terminal in Kaiserslautern, and from there 

to their final destinations at the various COMZ supply and maintenance facilities and Seventh Army facilities in Germany. 
DUTY JN THE UNITED STATES ARMY, EUROPE 89 

Because we were having scheduling difficulties in marrying up 

our tractors with the trailers coming up the French LOC to 

Kaiserslautern, 1 obtained permission to establish our own terminal 

downstream in France. After that, I coordinated my tractors and the 

trailers more efficiently. 

We moved the trai lers and vans to their destinations along with 

the documentation of their contents. After unloading the trailers, the 

receiving personnel were supposed to notify us of their status. Often 

they would not unload them, or would back load them or move them 

to other terminal facilities or installations. We, of course, were 

required to pick up the empty trailers wherever they were and return 

them to the LOC for subsequent return to the coastal area. To keep 

track of these trailers, we established a system of daily checks of the 

trailer locations. My operational staff and 1 spent many hours every 

week riding the German autobahns to visit the military transfer 

depots, to check on our tractors and locate ow· trailers. This proved to 

be a very effective system to maintain control. 

We were called upon to perform an interesting political operation. 

After the Berlin blockade and the U.S. airlift, the Allied nations and 

the Soviets had agreed that we would use the main highway into 

Berlin that passed through the Soviet sector of Germany. In order to 

prove that the Allies actually needed to use this highway, we had to 

run frequent convoys of our trucks in and out of Berlin. I had to dedicate most of the 50 1st Light Truck Company to this mission. More 

often than not, these trucks moved in and out of Berlin with their 

empty beds covered by tarps. 

My wife and I set about to establish good relationships with the 

officers and wives in the battalion. My wife was particularly adept at 

organizing the wives for all sorts of battalion activities and activities 

with the community outside. These interpersonal affairs are critical to 

unit cohesion, especially when dependents accompany units overseas. 

We spent a most enjoyable year with the 53d Truck Battalion and 

were reluctant to turn over command after only one year. 

When our first year ended on 1 December 1960, we still had more 

than a year before our return to the States. We then went to 

USAREUR in Heidelberg, where 1 was assigned to the Planning 

Division of the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics. The 

next organ izational step up from COMZ, this further enlarged my 

view. lt was my first experience planning and coordinating logistics 

for a field Army, its many organizations, and the communications 

zone. 

When J arrived at USAREUR, the United States faced a serious 

"gold flow" problem. Our overseas expenditures greatly exceeded 

European purchases of our products, leaving the country with a nega-
90 TRANSPORTATION AND LOGISTICS: ONE MAN'S STORY 

tive balance of payments. The military was under pressure to reduce 

the expenditure of many millions of dollars to support our military 

forces in Europe. While I was assigned to the USAREUR staff, this 

economic constraint influenced nearly all our work. 

During my tour at COMZ, before I took over the 53d Battalion, J 

had participated in a Headquarters COMZ and Headquarters 

USAREUR joint study designed to prove that the Technical Service 

staffs should be consolidated at Headquarters USAREUR to save 

money. Because the results of this directed study proved this point, the 

plan was set in motion. 

When I joined USAREUR, a second joint COMZ-USARETJR 

study was initiated. We were told that we could save even more money 

and help stem the gold flow if we moved the Technical Service staffs 

back to Orleans. Our second staff study precisely proved this conclusion. The second time, the new commanding general of COMZ had 

more influence on the commander in chief than had the previous commander. I witnessed an excellent example of the influence personality 

can play on actions in the field. As a result of this second study, the 

Technical Service chiefs and their staffs moved back to COMZ in 

Orleans. 

While on the planning staff at USAREUR, I had an interesting job 

taking part in the annual updating of USAREUR 's major contingency 

plan. This plan would be followed if NATO went to war with the 

Russians. One of its key annexes was the wartime movement plan and 

program. To prepare this annex, we requested the transportation customers, Seventh Army and COMZ, to submit what they be lieved 

would be their wartime movement requirements. During my entire 

term on the planning staff, I could never obtain these estimates from 

the various customers. In the end, I would repeat the movement 

requirements presented in previous plans. The transportation staff, in 

tmn, would prepare the wartime movement program. 

Years later, when I had a similar job at the DA level, 1 once again 

tried to obtain estimates from transportation customers. J was never 

successful nor was I ever able to arouse enough interest at the commarrd level, in either USAREUR or DA, to force the customers to 

respond. I do not want to minimize the difficulty of making these estimates: many uncertainties exist. But I have always attempted to prove, 

as I've been taught, that a poor estimate is better than none at all. My 

assignments at COMZ and USAREUR were very interesting and eyeopening. I have always been glad that I had this kind of opportunity. 

My chance to command the 53d Truck Battalion, an invaluable 

leadership opportunity, broadened my understanding of highway 

transportation operations. It gave me on-the-job experience with highway transportation in addition to landing craft, harbor craft, inter-
DUTY IN THE UNiTED STATES ARMY, EUROPE 91 

coastal water transportation, harbor terminal operations, and rail operations. My experiences greatly broadened my knowledge of overall 

transportation and logistics management. 

CHAPTER 8 

The Army Reorganizes 

Soon after arriving at USAREUR headquarters and the Office of 

the Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics, I found my name on the list to 

attend the Industrial College of the Armed Forces. Being a logistician, 

I had asked for the Industrial College rather than the Army War 

College. This meant we packed up again to leave Europe in the early 

spring of 1961 to return to Washington. Our family, now grown to five 

children, was lucky to move by ship again. This time it was a regular 

military transport and not a luxury liner. 

As soon as we were settled with our children in scbool, the class of 

1961- 1962 commenced. Once again, the caliber of the faculty and of 

my fellow students impressed me. The Industrial College, a joint service school, had Army, Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps officer students. Senior executives from other government agencies, such as the 

State Department, Treasury Department, Interior Department, Central 

Intelligence Agency, and General Accounting Office (GAO), also 

attended. The college gave me my first opportunity to know and work 

with top-level civilian professionals. As the college moved us from 

office to office to work with people in different fie lds, I appreciated 

my opportunity even more. 

The college curriculum gave us a very valuable understanding of 

this country's industrial base, a whole new field for me. For the 

required master's thesis, I chose control of commercial transportation 

in the United States at the national level. This subject had fascinated 

me since General Lincoln introduced me to it during my first years at 

the Transportation School. I had never before had an opportunity to 

study it in detail to learn how it was managed and how management 

differed during peacetime and wartime. 

During peacetime, transportation is plentiful and the dollar drives 

transportation decisions. The profit motive creates a cooperative and 

cordial customer/carrier relationship. During wartime, the carrier is 

always privately concerned with staying "full and down," that is, the 

carrier wants to move the most cargo he can handle regardless of the 

type of cargo or the needs of the customer. On the other hand, the customer wants his cargo moved immediately whether or not the carrier's 

truck or train is full. 
94 TRANSPORTATION AND LOGISTICS: ONE MAN'S STORY 

When an emergency occurs, transportation always becomes 

scarce. Top-level authority must make allocation decisions. 

Command decisions on allocations of resources can only be made at 

the top, whether for a combat unit in the field competing with other 

units, or whether one must decide to allocate transportation space to 

the military or allow it to remain available for the civilian economy. 

The only time these problems ever really occurred was during World 

War II. The War Shipping Administration, which President Roosevelt 

created, decided on transportation priorities while the War Production 

Board controlled other critical items. The civilian/govenunent joint 

cooperation was most interesting to review. 

Dr. James A. Huston, an eminent historian of logistics, described 

in great detail how the Army Service Forces handled the allocation of 

transportation resources during World War II.' (The Army Service 

Forces were the combat service support units.) History indicated that 

almost daily Maj. Gen. LeRoy Lutes, the operations officer (G3) of 

the Army Service Forces, demanded that Maj. Gen. Charles P. Gross, 

chief of transportation, move goods regardless of efficient utilization 

of transportation. General Gross would insist that transportation be 

used carefully because it was so critical. Lt. Gen. Brehon B. 

Somervell, Army Service Forces commander, would then have to 

decide, exemplifying the need for decisions to be made at the top. 

During World War II in Europe, transportation decisions were frequently pushed up to the COMZ commander, General Lee. As noted 

earlier, Lee believed in the British Q-movement system and demanded 

that this system be followed to the letter. General Lee was apparently a 

real martinet who believed in doing everything in accordance with 

proper orders and regulations. Through the force of his personality, he 

had been instrumental in making sure that the British system for movement planning and control was followed. By the end of the war, this 

system had become, and still is, the basis of our movement system. 

Two field trips made the course even more interesting. We made 

one trip to industries in the United States and another to visit industries and government agencies in t)u·ee European countries. We were 

allowed to choose the itinerary for our trips. For my U.S. trip, I chose 

to visit the Gulf Coast to be briefed by oil companies, especially those 

engaged in offshore oil drilling. During this most valuable experience, 

!learned about a completely new type of offshore operation. 

For my trip to Europe, I selected Great Britain and NATO. A 

member of Pari iament entertained and escorted us through the House 

of Commons during our visit to England. After briefings on the 

economy and its industrial base, we left London to tour industries in 

1 James A. Huston, Sinews of War, Army Logistics 1775-1953 

(Washington D.C.: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1988). 
THE ARMY REORGANIZES 95 

the Liverpool and Birmingham areas. After a week in England, we 

visited Brussels and NATO headquarters and then traveled to Paris 

for briefings at SHAPE and the U.S. European Command. The entire 

trip was well organized and informative. 

While at NATO in Brussels, I was reminded that NATO's logistical problems are very different. Where actual operations arc concerned, commanders have no problem agreeing on combined and joint 

doctrines. Logistics support is a different matter, because each country considers logistics to be its national responsibility, even though 

this could not work during a war.2 It also contradicts NATO policy.3 

My Industrial College year was enjoyable as well as educational. 

My family associated with my fellow students and their families, an 

added benefit we experienced at each career school. My promotion to 

colonel while at the Industrial College increased my satisfaction. 

Following graduation, 1 moved over to the Army staff. J had earlier been assigned to the Office of the Chief of Transportation, but this 

was my first tour with the general staff. As a colonel in logistics, I 

was assigned to the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics 

(DCSLOG) in the European Branch of the Plans Division. I was chosen for this slot because most of my previous staff experience had 

been in logistics planning and my last assignment had been in Europe. 

J thought I knew everything about logistics in Europe but I found out 

soon enough this was not the case. Our principal staff action continued to be the fight against "gold flow" out of the country. This was 

more of the work I had done on the USAREUR staff. 

Before f had a chance to become familiar with the job, I was 

ordered to join an orientation tour of Vietnam. The Vietnam conflict 

was heating up in 1962, and President Kennedy had initiated a Senior 

Officers' Orientation Program for a group of colonels or Navy captains to travel to Vietnam for several weeks to learn about conditions 

in the country. On tltis first trip, twenty-five colonels or Navy captains participated, along with two brigadier generals. First the 

Defense Department and the joint staff in Washington briefed us, followed by the commander in chief, Pacific, and the three service commanders in Hawaii. After these meetings, we flew on to Vietnam in a 

specia l mission plane. 

In Saigon, we spent the fiJ·st week in briefings with the American 

ambassador, the Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV), 

staff, and the three services. We then divided into four groups for travel 

out of Saigon to spend a week thoroughly investigating each of the four 

2 I Ieiser, A Soldier Supporting Soldiers. 3 NATO Long Term Defense Program, NATO Military Committee 

Document 32/2 (NATO Headquarters: Approved by the Heads of State on 

30-31 May 1978). 
96 TRANSPORTATION AND LOGISTICS: ONE MAN'S STORY 

areas of the country. Each weekend we returned to Saigon to discuss 

what we had seen. The four groups visited a different area each week. 

My group first visited the northern area, where both political and 

military personnel briefed us. Next, we went to the Qui Nhon area, 

then Saigon, and finally the Delta. The ambassador and his staff spent 

an entire day with us, discussing the political problems as they saw 

them. General Paul D. Harkins, the MACV commander, also devoted a 

day to reviewing the military situation as he and his staff understood it. 

Although 1 would have two wartime tours in Vietnam and would make 

many trips there, 1 saw and learned more about Vietnam and its people 

during this orientation tour than during any longer stays in the country. 

For the next ten years, as the U.S. position in Vietnam deteriorated, l kept wondering why we did so badly, both politically and militarily. When r left Vietnam in 1962, 1 believed that the United States was 

going to help the Vietnamese people help themselves, rather than treat 

them as inferior colonial people as the French had. 

We seemed to start out being helpful. We sent our best people 

there to advise the Vietnamese both politically and militarily, but as 

the years went by we changed. Instead of helping them to learn and to 

do the job on their own, we started to bring in our forces and to take 

over the job of fighting the Viet Cong and the North Vietnamese. The 

South Vietnamese observed this shift and adopted the attitude that if 

the Americans want to fight our war, we will let them. The finger 

can't be pointed to any one person or group: everyone made mistakes, 

starting with the White House and President Johnson. 

Almost ten years later, during 1970 and 1971, when I was 

assigned as the DCSLOG of U.S. Army, Pacific (USARPAC), l 

worked directly with Lt. Gen. William P. Yarborough, the deputy commander. As one of the original members of the Special Forces, he had 

spent years in and around Vietnam. Yarborough felt strongly that 

when we shifted our strategy from helping to taking over, we made a 

serious mistake. Apparently, his strong views on this subject became 

so well-known that he was not reassigned to Vietnam in a senior position even though he was extremely well qualified. At the time [ served 

with him, 1 did not realize how correct General Yarborough was, but I 

certainly learned it before the war was over. 

In 1961 , great organizational perturbations began to affect the 

Army staff under the new secretary of defense, Robert S. McNamara. 

First, a newly created Defense Supply Agency (DSA) assumed control 

of a ll wholesa le suppl y for common use items fo r the Defense 

Department. Then, by direction of McNamara, the Army began a 

study of its administration to meet the goals of the new Project 80. 

Project 80's most drastic requirement was the elimination of the 

Technical Services and the creation of the Army Materiel Command 
THE ARMY REORGANIZES 97 

(AMC) to assume all the wholesale logistics functions previously 

performed by the Technical Services. Mr. Leonard W. lloelscher, 

deputy comptroller of the Army, had many years of experience in the 

Defense Department. His committee, charged with implementing 

Project 80, concluded that effective management of the Army's logistic system required that the Army staff confine itself to planning and 

policy making and divorce itself from the details of administration 

and operations. 

The Office of the DCSLOG had become so involved in overseeing the administrative operations of the Technical Services that it had 

neglected its planning functions. lt could not function effectively as 

commander of the Technical Services because of the concurrent jurisdiction exercised by other staff agencies over those services. As a 

result, AMC was established to take over the wholesale logistics system. Personnel management was transferred from the Technical 

Services to the Office of Personnel Operations. 

The study a lso created other major comman ds: a Combat 

Developments Command (CDC) and Continental Army Command 

(CONARC). Each would exercise similar consolidated functions in 

their respective areas. CONARC would have no responsibility for 

combat development, but would command the Army school system, 

including the Technical Services school systems. 

Project 80 did not completely abolish the Technical Services. 

Most were initially left at the departmental level, to be administered 

by special staff officers. The surgeon general, who had already lost 

his procurement function to DSA, continued to exercise his former 

functions as the head of the Medical Corps. The chief of engineers 

retained responsibility for mapping, civil works, military construction, 

and real estate. The chief signal officer retained responsibility for 

Army-wide communications and photographic services. The transportation officer retained responsibility for coordinating and planning 

all transportation required by the Army. Those responsibilities of the 

quartermaster general not turned over to DSA were reassigned to a 

chief of support services. The positions of chief of ordnance and the 

chief chemical officer were abolished. Their staff functions were 

transferred to DCSLOG. 

Certainly the central feature of the Project 80 reorganization was 

the loss of the Technical Services' traditional birth-to-death responsibility for the commodities under their control. This led to the loss of 

technical supervision and commodity-related personnel training, commodity-related military occupational specialty, and unit responsibilities 

for commodities. 

A year after the Project 80 reorganization, one management 

expert, a leading participant in the reorganization process, expressed 
98 TRANSPORTATION AND LOGISTICS: ONE MAN'S STORY 

that the old Technical Services were sorely missed. Efforts to decentralize control of them and homogenize their efforts had failed, and 

had also failed to achieve wholehearted cooperation with respect to 

complex weapons systems such as missiles and tanks. The Teclmical 

Services had provided manpower and experts to the general staff for 

surveys, studies, and normal staff actions. The general staff had 

become quite dependent on this support and it no longer existed. The 

chiefs of the Technical Services had been responsible for doctrine 

and for research and development. They also provided service units 

to the field and supervised their operation tlu·oughout the Army. This 

function was now lost. 

Project 80's major intent was to consolidate the seven Technical 

Services into a single coherent system. This was pretty well accomplished at the national wholesale level, but it had the exact opposite 

effect at the operating level. 

To make logistics operations feasible and to continue their operations until CDC could develop doctrine for a retail logistics system, 

each major command, and in some cases their subordinate commands, 

integrated the available literature, regulations, and organizations, and 

prescribed their own systems. As a result, we had a different system in 

each major command. Europe had one system and the Pacific a different one. This made it extremely difficult to train personnel and units 

to deploy to the field and be prepared for the logistics system they 

would find there. 

As a result of Project 80, the wholesale logistics function perhaps 

benefited, but at the expense of training, combat development, and 

other similar activities. Without technical service support, the 

Technica l Service schools suffered. CONARC had already begun to 

emphasize its tactical mission at the expense of its school operations. 

This problem may have been compounded when CONARC was given 

more schools to operate. This trend was further emphasized when the 

CONARC conunanding general received a second role as the Army 

component conunander of the U.S. Strike Command. 

Although the Technical Services had created many problems 

because of the seven separate systems, at least each system was standard from top to bottom. The chief of each Technical Service developed bis own doctrine, created his own organization, and trained his 

own personnel. He received new personnel and trained them, organized them into units, and then deployed them as requested by the theater commander. The service units were under the command of the 

theater, but they continued to follow the standard technical system 

when supporting the theater. If they were not doing their job, the commander did not attempt to correct them but merely told the chief of 

the Technical Service, who would replace the commander or do what-
THE ARMY REORGANIZES 99 

ever was required to satisfy the combat commander and do the job 

that was needed. 

After AMC was created, the wholesale and the retail systems 

began to separate from each other. AMC had no authority over logistics support in the field. Logistics doctrine was to be developed by 

CDC, which would require lead time before the doctrine could reach 

the theater and the CONUS commands. As a result, du ri ng this void, 

each theater developed its own doctrine and managed its own unique 

system. 

We entered the Vietnam War that way. People trained in CONUS 

really couldn't be readied for what they would find when they arrived 

in the theater. The systems in each theater were different. 

Following my I 962 orientation tour in Vietnam, I returned to the 

Pentagon and resumed my assignment as chief of European Plans of 

the Office of Plans and Operations Division, Department of the 

Army/DCSLOG. For the next two years, followed by another two 

years on the joint staff, my eyes were trained toward Europe and the 

problems there. 

By then, McNamara had served as secretary of defense for two 

years and many of his changes were beginning to appear. The gold 

flow was certainly high on his priority list. He wanted to get the United 

States out of France in order to reduce the great expenditures for ma intaining our line of communications across France. He sensed that this 

would not be politically acceptable either in our country or in NATO, 

but he started to reduce the LOC a little at a time. These policies are 

covered very well in a report issued by USAREUR.4 

The report pointed out that in fisca l year I 96 1, the annual fore ign 

exchange cost for maintaining the U.S. military forces in Europe was 

approximately two billion dollars, of which some $275 million was 

spent in France. The government had conducted several studies to 

determine what could be done to reduce this money flow. The 

Headquarters, European Command (EUCOM), was a lso directed to 

study the problem and recommend how to reduce costs without seriously reducing combat capability. Because most of the money spent in 

France went to support the Army, Secretary McNamara directed that 

the Army prepare a plan to reduce its costs. 

The Department of the Army formed the U.S. Army Logistics 

Evaluation Group (USALEG) under Brig. Gen. Ferdinand J. Chesarck, 

the director of supply and maintenance in DCSLOG at the time. This 

USALEG was tasked to reduce expenditures in Europe by $32 million 

while the Army's peacetime support of its combat forces would have to 

4 U.S. Army Lines of Communication in Europe, 1945-1967 

(Headquarters, U.S. Army, Europe, and 7th Army, Office of the Deputy 

Chief of Staff for Logistics [Operations], 1968). 
I 00 TRANSPORTATION AND LOGISTICS: ONE MAN'S STORY 

remain intact. The reduced organization would have to be capable of 

being expanded rapidly in time of emergency. General Chesarek selected four or five of us from the DCSLOG staff to assist him; I became 

his deputy. We were all familiar with Europe, having had tours there 

recently. Chesarek himself had commanded the 4th Logistical 

Command, part of the COMZ, before being assigned to the DCSLOG. 

At the time, our LOC across France was a mammoth operation. 

We visited every fac ility and reviewed all their functions and activities. We spent our final two weeks at Headquarters, USAREUR, 

finalizing the plan which General Chesarek would brief to CJNCUSAREUR and through the chain of command back to the Defense 

Department. Through Chesarek's superior briefing skills this plan 

was briefed all the way up to the secretary of the Army and then to 

the secretary of defense, who approved it. Insignificant changes were 

suggested as the plan went up the line. 

This was not what the CINCUSAREUR wanted. He objected to it 

violently, but he realized he had no other course of action. The Army 

staff principals didn't particularly like it either, but they realized they 

were under pressure to do what General Chesarek had recommended. 

No one else could think of a better way to save $32 million. 

His major recommendations included reducing theater supply levels from 120 to 90 days; closing depots in western France; deactivating the Petroleum Distribution Command or putting it on standby status; moving stocks to be issued from rear depots to forward depots as 

space became available in the forward area; returning the 4th 

Logistical Command a long with the 32d Engineer Group to the 

States; reducing port activities to the single port of Saint Nazaire and 

imposing a ceiling of I 0,000 tons per month; providing for joint 

United States/Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) use of depots in 

eastern France under cooperative logistic agreements; and reducing 

other activities. 

After Secretary of Defense McNamara had approved the plan, the 

secretary of the Army directed its implementation. The secretary of 

the Army commented that this line of communication retrenchment 

would neither achieve a better organization nor improve management. 

He saw it as solely a gold flow measure with the clear understanding 

that these reductions would require the acceptance of a higher degree 

of risk than before. Much to my later regret, this was the last time this 

caveat was heard. It soon became U.S. policy and everyone assumed 

that we just didn't need these extra resources to support our forces in 

case of war. In fact, this was just the beginning of further reduction of 

the LOC, until ultimately it was eliminated entirely. 

Our plan also contained a proviso that the units returned to the 

States would be stationed on the East Coast with the primary mission 
THE ARMY REORGANIZES 101 

to continue to train for Europe. Jn case of an emergency, they would 

return to Europe and to the line of communications. This proviso was 

honored for less than a year. After that the mission was forgotten and 

most of the units disappeared from inventory. This was only the first 

of many such reductions to the logistics support structure in Europe. 

In the 1960s, after a great deal of discussion between the United 

States and France, President Charles DeGaulle announced that he was 

determi11ed to reestablish normal French sovereignty. All French soil, 

air, and sea would be under the conh·ol of the French government. The 

French claim was really not much different than the agreements we 

had with other cotmtries such as Turkey, Spain, and Great Britain. In 

these countries, we operated and controlled our bases. Each country 

had its own commander on base, who flew the host country's flag. 

American commanders in France, however, had retained complete 

control inside the base. We assumed that, because President DeGaulle 

wanted this changed, Secretary McNamara used his demand as an 

excuse to reduce the gold flow to France to zero. In 1966, all U.S. 

troops, their dependents, equipment, and supplies were moved out of 

France to other locations. 

EUCOM then began to draw up a plan, called the Fast Relocation 

(FRELOC). When the joint staff approved this plan on 2 July 1966, 

EUCOM immediately began its implementation. A tremendous task at 

the time, this involved some 70,000 U.S. personnel (including dependents) in France and many thousand tons of supplies, of which 

USAREUR owned over 90 percent. 

The major effort for implementation fell to USAREUR. The 

major objective of the FRELOC Phase I plan was to move sixty days 

of combat support supplies to add to the thirty-day supply in the 

United Kingdom, Belgium, Luxembourg, and Germany. All the supplies remaining in France beyond these requirements would be disposed of, and all U.S. personnel in France would relocate. Most of the 

COMZ depots and supply installations in Germany were in 

Kaiserslautern, Pirmansens, and Nabol.lenbach. Consequently, that is 

where most of the equipment and supplies were sent. Although unprepared to receive this tremendous load, they did their best. Even some 

ten years later, as l revisited these areas as DCSLOG, I could still see 

some of the unfortunate effects of this move. 

Since the French agency Trapil already conh·olled the petroleum 

distribution system from Donges to Metz, it was not necessary to 

make any change. France, however, would only guarantee its use in 

peacetime; its availability to U.S. forces in wartime would be up to 

the French. We could either take our chances on having French petroleum support in wartime or build another very expensive pipeline 

system. A second pipeline had been laid out of the Benelux countries 
102 TRANSPORTATION AND LOGISTICS: ONE MAN'S STORY 

for peacetime use, but its availability in wartime was questionable. 

For a time, we really had no alternative but to depend on the French. 

The final step of the FRELOC plan was to relocate the COMZ 

headquarters and its supply and maintenance agency to Germany. On 

the surface, FRELOC had been a success; it had met its deadline of 

31 March 1967. The military liquidation section, attached to the U.S. 

Embassy in Paris, was charged with disposing of residual matters 

after the relocation had been completed. Germany and England 

required extensive new construction, and it took years to recover 

from the confusion the move caused. 

Secretary McNamara expressed his satisfaction that, although 

FRELOC had been estimated to cost more than a billion dollars, the 

actual cost totaled less than $150 million of which less than a third 

was gold flow or exported U.S. funds. He conceded that the new LOC 

would be more vulnerable than the LOC across France, but considered 

the increased risk insignificant. He believed that the use of long range 

aircraft to transport military equipment would compensate for the 

conditions imposed by the relocation from France. In fact, he felt this 

represented a definite logistics advantage. Few logisticians agreed, 

then or now. 

The withdrawal from France strained USAREUR's capability to 

perform its mission. Twenty-four major installations in an area extending 750 miles, from the French Atlantic coast into the Federal Republic 

of Germany, had been reduced to one storage depot in England and 

seven active depots in Germany. Such a dramatic reduction severely 

diminished our capability to provide effective logistics support. More 

than ninety percent of COMZ supplies were stored within a thirty-mile 

radius of Kaiserslautern. In the same area were also concentrated such 

important assets as the Supply and Maintenance Agency, several truck 

battalions, and many active Seventh Army units. 1 knew this area well, 

having covered it extensively while commanding the 53d Truck 

Battalion out of Kaiserslautern. 

By the end of 1967, USAREUR's capability to extend its logistics 

resources to provide an effective and efficient wartime support posture was questionable. COMZ no longer had a technical signal or 

engineer capability. It had limited potential to provide logistics support across the English Channel to deployed combat units and it could 

not expand its depot system to the west. For several years, all U.S. 

European commands continued studying and plaru1ing to use the LOC 

from England through the Benelux countries into Germany. We also 

secretly planned to reestablish some kind of LOC across France. 

These schemes were always highly classified. 

It soon became evident to the planners that this same LOC 

through channel ports and into the Benelux countries would be used 
THE ARMY REORGANIZES 103 

by all our NATO Allies to support their own forces. All the NATO 

Allies depended on the same railroads, waterways, a nd highways. The 

logical solution was the development of some kind of cooperative 

effort. Our principal LOC to support the Seventh Army was a line 

starting from the Benelux and Bremcrhaven ports to the LOC facilities in western Germany. This line paralleled the USSR's western 

positions only a few miles to the northeast. 

From the late sixties into the early seventies, the logistics support 

structure continued to reduce under the popular motto, reduction of 

the "tooth to tail." During this period, l kept pointing out that the LOC 

was not capable of supporting an all out war. I maintained that we 

should stop rationalizing and admit that this was a risk we were willing to take. As was frequently the case in long-range planning, when 

the problem couldn't be solved, it was assumed that the problem 

didn't exist. 

We began consulting with our representatives from SHAPE and 

through them to our Allied logisticians. We worked particularly closely with the Germans. Next to the U.S. Army, the FRG was our largest 

customer. At that time most of their equipment and supplies still came 

from U.S. sources. The Allies initially secured a g reat deal of this 

equipment from the United States through grant aid, but they later 

obtained the ir suppl ies through ou r military sales program. The 

Germans found no problem with procuring this support in peacetime, 

but they were apprehensive about maintaining a supply line during 

wartime when shortages were bound to occur. 

The U.S. Army DCSLOG had the main responsibility to solve this 

problem. To better cope with the problem, the DCSLOG created a new 

Directorate for International Logistics which included the divisions for 

military grant aid and military sales and added a new division for 

cooperative logistics. My European Plans Branch was transferred 

intact to constitute the new Cooperative Logistics Division. 

As chief of the Cooperative Logistics Division, I began working 

full time with NATO Allies including the FRG. 1 concentrated mainly 

on creating a U.S./FRO combat logistics support plan. The FRG was 

concerned as to whether the United States would continue to support 

them when equipment and supplies became critical for U.S. troops. 

The FRG was especially worried about the continued support with 

repair parts for the trucks and tanks they had purchased from the U.S. 

There was no other source for these parts. 

Our office began a combined effort with the FRG to solve this 

problem. We he ld many planning meetings to work out the details: 

totaling the end items they possessed; estimating additional end items 

they might need; estimating wartime consumption rate of repair patts 

and components; deciding where to store these items; and determining 
104 TRANSPORTATION AND LOGISTICS: ONE MAN'S STORY 

how they would pay for this logistics support. A major problem was to 

integrate FRG needs into the various U.S. storage levels in theater and 

in CONUS. How much of the peacetime stocks should FRG fund? 

What part of wartime reserve stocks? How would their supply system 

fit into our system so they could submit requisitions and receive supplies in peace and war the same as our forces? This became far more 

complicated than it first appeared. 

The politics got very complicated. By this time, each country was 

sensitive about the other country taking advantage of it. For example, 

because of all the emphasis on stemming the gold flow, the United 

States had required the FRG to assume a large percentage of the cost 

of maintaining our forces in Germany. Every time we assessed the 

Germans with another cost, their politicians became involved. During 

my last year in DCSLOG and for the next two years in joint staff 

logistics, I devoted nearly all of my time to this joint planning. 

One historic event is forever associated with our first complete 

U.S./FRG Cooperative Logistics Plan. After our entire staff bad 

reviewed the plan, we turned it over to the FRG for their staff to 

review. A special assistant to the secretary of the Army translated the 

plan from English into German. He was a German national who had 

been employed by the American forces and then worked his way up to 

this high level position on the secretary's staff. As soon as he finished 

the final translation, he and I made an appointment with the senior 

German representative in the United States for FRG planning at the 

German Embassy in Washington. We knew that he would have to take 

it back to Germany for staff review, but we first wanted to answer any 

questions that he might have. 

As soon as we arrived and entered the embassy, our friend met us 

and ushered us into his office. We immediately began talking about 

our plan, but very soon our German friend, who had looked rather surprised as we arrived, asked us what we thought about the latest news. 

We asked what he was talking about. He told us that President John F. 

Kennedy had just been assassinated. We had not heard the awful 

news. We were dumbfounded. It had been announced while we were 

emoute from the Pentagon. We thanked him, gathered up our papers 

and left, telling him we would talk later. 

Shortly after the President's death, we resumed our joint planning. 

Combined staff reviews were extremely time consuming and difficult. 

The plan was not fully agreed upon until many years after my tour of 

duty. Po litics played a tremendous part. 

We embarked on similar planning with the other Allies using the 

same LOC through the Benelux countries into Germany. Many of 

these Allies also had U.S. equipment and required our continued 

support for repair parts, maintenance, and other supplies. 
THE ARMY REORGANIZES 105 

After two years on the Army staff, I transferred to the Logistics 

Directorate (J4) of the joint staff, where I continued in cooperative 

logistics. NATO logistics had developed from just an Army problem 

into a joint staff problem. Our combined joint planning group met at 

least monthly to discuss progress and to lay out our next actions. 

Military solutions were simple compared to the political considerations. One month we would meet in the United States, the next in 

Europe. l spent a lot of time on airplanes. 

By 1964- 1965, Vietnam had become a full-scale Department of 

Defense preoccupation. We were in the process of building up our 

forces in Vietnam to over 500,000 troops. McNamara operated differently from any of his predecessors, or his successors as far as that is 

concerned. 

McNamara soon learned that the bureaucratic process of moving 

actions through the services and joint staff for review was slow and 

tedious. It certainly did not satisfy his needs. Once he decided to do 

something, he wanted to take action immediately. He not only wanted 

to change the staff procedures, but he also had the administrative and 

the legislative authority and support to do it. Many of his actions initially helped to move troops, their equipment, supplies, and construction material to Vietnam or offshore and to reposition additional 

equipment and supplies. He insisted on personaJiy approving each and 

every one of these actions regardless of size. I remember one case of a 

troop list of five men for a well-drilling detachment that had to go up 

as a separate action for approval by Secretary McNamara. 

lie established a procedure of directly teJling the joint staff logistics director, Lt. Gen. Richard D. Meyer, to take an action rather than 

following normal channels. General Meyer, after graduating from 

West Point, had entered the Corps of Engineers. General Gross had 

selected him to move over to the Transportation Corps upon its establislunent during World War II. He was equally as brilliant as the ten 

other original engineer officers who had joined General Gross. 

T had known Meyer at both Fort Eustis and at the chief's office. lie 

was, of course, a good fi·iend of both Generals Besson and Lincoln. He 

had been responsible for my transferring from DCSLOG to his directorate to continue this cooperative logistics effort. Although he initially 

set me to work in cooperative logistics, more and more he shifted me 

into Vietnamese actions and Mr. McNamara's plans. The secretary 

would task General Meyer and apparently tell him not to wait for the 

normal staffing procedure. General Meyer, working with the services, 

would direct implementation of McNamara's requirements. This was 

unheard of at the time and the services objected violently. McNamara 

ignored them. He apparently also told the service secretaries what he 

wanted done, and they cooperated. 
106 TRANSPORTATION AND LOGISTICS: ONE MAN'S STORY 

The service chiefs and their staffs could not do anything about 

this. General Meyer was very effective at accomplishing his tasks. He 

understood the system very well and knew how to work around it if 

necessary. He also understood the system so well that the services 

could not inadvertently interfere with his tasks. 

Secretary McNamara, his assistant secretary for installations and 

logistics, Thomas D. Morris, and General Meyer brought the assistant 

secretaries for logistics in each of the services and their DCSLOGs 

into the net. They developed a new chain of command so that orders 

passed down through these logistics channels and the results flowed 

back up to General Meyer, Tom Morris, and Secretary McNamara. 

These gentlemen established a steering committee that met weekly to 

discuss issues and to assign future actions. This was an extremely efficient and unique organization for logistics actions. It had been set up 

in 1961 and was ready when the war in Vietnam escalated. 

McNamara developed another controversial idea. After having 

established DSA to handle common supplies for all the services, Mr. 

McNamara wanted to do the same thing for the retail logistics systems. He again asked General Meyer to develop his idea. To head up 

the plam1ing group, Meyer chose Maj. Gen. Frank A. Osmanski, the 

first Logistics director on the MACV staff in Vietnam, who understood 

Vietnam and its problems. He had been a field artillery officer with a 

strong supply and maintenance background. He organized a small 

planning group consisting of three members from each of the services. I was the Joint Logistics Directorate member along with 

General Osmanski, who assigned me as his deputy. 

We spent about a year on this combined operations support project that included several trips to the Pacific and Vietnam. Each of the 

services provided excellent specialists to the group. Although loyal to 

their respective services, they all tackled this project with knowledge 

and enthusiasm. As a matter of fact, we developed a system that when 

connected with DSA could probably have done a better job than the 

systems each service followed to provide supplies to the forces in the 

field-certainly better than the Army's system. 

Secretary McNamara's steering committee met periodically to 

evaluate our plan. As we presented each phase to the committee, they 

either approved it or suggested changes. Although committed to producing the plan, we really didn't believe it was something Secretary 

McNamara could force down the throats of the services. As it turned 

out, we were right. This was one time he met with failure. 

I certainly learned an awful lot about supply and maintenance 

working on this project. I did most of the transportation planning, but 

I also became much more familiar with supply and maintenance. This 

work also proved very useful for future assignments. General Meyer 
THE ARMY REORGANIZES 107 

asked me to extend my tour for another year after the normal two 

years on the joint staff, and 1 accepted. 

CHAPTER9 

War in Vietnam 

During the buildup of troops in Vietnam and the ensuing surge of 

weapons and supplies, the port of Saigon became a bottleneck. Most 

of the troops, equipment, and supplies came through the port facilities 

of Saigon, which also served as the major port of entry for all commercial cargo. (See Map 3.) The Saigon port is located on the southern coast, fifty miles up the Saigon River from Vung Tau and Cape St. 

Jacques. Although Saigon was a river port, it had adequate depth for 

deep-draft shipping. The port had several deep-draft berths and quays 

along the Saigon side of the river. The muddy opposite bank was 

almost impassible. 

I had visited the commercial port of Saigon a few times on earlier 

trips to Vietnam, not on official business, but only to satisfy my own 

curiosity. During these earlier visits, when U.S. personnel were there 

only as advisers, the port operation appeared relatively small. We had 

few troops in the country, and the flow of U.S. Agency for 

International Development (AID) cargo had not yet begun. 

Each time I visited the port, one thing impressed me: crews 

unloaded military cargo from the few ships being worked at a speed 

that permitted the crews to identify and document the cargo for movement to its destination. If the first destination backed up, ship discharge would stop until they relieved the backup. I couldn't help but 

recall the old days in Pusan, Korea, when we had to stuff the cargo 

down the customer's throat whether he could handle it or not. The 

process in Saigon, geared to the whole team's capabilities, impressed 

me very much. This was certainly an improvement over my previous 

experiences with overseas port operations during wartime. The key to 

the smooth operation was matched capabilities- both the port and the 

customer. 

During late 1964 and into 1965, as the buildup of U.S. and other 

military assistance forces in South Vietnam went forward, large 

increases in both initial unit tonnage and resupply tonnage flowed 

through Vietnam's ports, especially Saigon. By December 1965, the 

backlog of ships waiting in South Vietnam waters, or in holding areas 

elsewhere, was so large that it created a buildup of cargo in U.S. ports 

that could not be shipped to Vietnam. 
110 TRANSPORTATION AND LOGISTICS: ONE MAN'S STORY 

Although several factors contributed to this shipping backlog, 

the lack of adequate deep water port facilities in Vietnam was the 

major cause. In addition, the number of transportation units at 

Vietnam ports had not kept pace with the shipping increase. The 

construction of port facilities, roads, and hard stands for storage had 

also lagged behind requirements. MACV's lst Logistica l Command, 

under Col. Robert W. Duke and then Maj. Gen. Charles W. Eifler, 

had studied the problems and developed a plan to solve them. The 

steps required to correct the problems would take time. Major engineering projects included expanding Saigon's harbor facilities and 

building a new port at Cam Ranh Bay, half-way between Saigon and 

Da Nang. 

Commercial, mostly AID cargo was being shipped through the 

same port facilities as military goods, which further congested the 

ports of Vietnam. Initially four deep-draft berths had been assigned to 

the U.S. Army for handling military cargo ships, which had reduced 

the capability of the commercial port. Commercial port personnel, 

even with some help from AID representatives, did not have the necessary know-how nor the capacity to do the job. AID cargo was generally of two types: AID-sponsored Center Procurement Agency (CPA) 

cargo, consisting of bulk products such as rice and fertilizer, and other 

materials being shipped to stimulate the Vietnamese economy under 

the commercial import program (CJP). 

CIP cargo included items like bicycles, motorcycles, refrigerators, 

radios, and other consumer goods sent in at the request of the few 

importers. The importers were supposed to bring them into Vietnam 

on U.S. credit, enter them into their normal commercial supply and 

distribution system, and sell them to their customers for profit to generate capital for their economy. This long-range idea was noble, if it 

would work. 

The major flaw in the plan was that little or no supply or distribution system existed in Vietnam to handle these goods. Before the CIP 

program, Vietnamese importers would import such items and store 

them at the port until they could sell them. The customer came to the 

port, paid for an item and its custom duties, and took it away with 

him. The importers lacked the capital to carry on business the way 

the CIP people envisioned. The port soon began to bog down with 

military, CPA, and ClP imports. 

The Army, directed to move in an Army terminal command to 

control the military cargo, chose to send the 4th Transportation 

Command from Fort Eustis. It was a type A command, the smallest. 

Even with support by several terminal service companies and harbor 

craft units, it soon bogged down as well. The port command was soon 

converted to type C, which meant increased size and capability. 
Saigon 

PORT OF SAIGON 

January 1967 

_ .. _-_ .. _-j Port Facilities 

Miles 

0 2 

Map3 
112 TRANSPORTATION AND LOGISTICS: ONE MAN'S STORY 

Lt. Gen. Jean Engler, U.S. Army, Vietnam, commander, along 

with Genera l Eifler, heading the 1st Logistical Command, asked that 

General Besson, AMC commander, provide a Transportation Corps 

colonel to assume command of the port. Besson responded by asking 

that the Department of the Army send me over to assume command. 

Although General Meyer had recently extended my tour with the joint 

staff, he permitted me to leave. I was very pleased and could not have 

asked for a better job. (Nearly every time I had been assigned a new 

job, General Besson had been in the background. He had been responsible for both the Pusan port job and my command of the 53d Truck 

Battalion in Europe.) 

By the time I arrived in Saigon in July 1966, the buildup in 

Vietnam was really underway. We were moving U.S. troops in to take 

over the war and to show the Vietnamese how to do it. Unfortunately, 

the major pott to receive incoming shipments was still Saigon. At that 

time the port areas at Cam Ranh Bay, Qui Nhon, and Da Nang were 

just beginning to be expanded and could not handle the loads they 

would be able to later. 

When I arrived to take command of the 4th Transportation 

Command, I found a very demoralized unit. The 4th had been there 

less than a year but it was already being blamed for all the logistical 

problems that had occurred while supporting the military and the 

entire civilian community. The situation was appalling. I found many 

ships with commercial AID cargo at anchor off Vung Tau, at the 

mouth of the river coming up to Saigon, that had been waiting to be 

unloaded for months. 

The warehouses at the Saigon port were absolutely full of cargo 

and accountability was completely out of control- asset visibility was 

almost nonexistent. With all of the pier space full, nothing could 

move. We quickly found out that the materiel handling equipment 

available to our dock and warehouse crews was inadequate. The port 

command had some 1,500 to 2,000 civilian Vietnamese barges under 

contract and fully loaded. The barges, with families aboard, were just 

floating around while their cargo was pi lfered or rotting. 

Documentation for the cargo on these barges was missing, but we 

thought most of the cargo was AID material, such as rice, fertilizer, 

and some general cargo. 

AID had first attempted to solve the problem by inviting Mr. 

Teddy Gleason, president of the longshoremen's union on the East 

Coast of the U.S., to straighten it out. Before I arrived, he had visited 

the port with twelve of his longshoremen to try to improve the port 

warehousing. All but one man did work in the warehouses, attempting 

to improve the situation, but this alone was not the solution. After a 

short period of time, they returned to the States. One man, Mr. 
WAR IN VIETNAM 113 

Schultz, stayed on and proved invaluable in assisting us to improve the 

port situation. 

Upon my arrival, I first attempted to sort out the problems. J 

found they fell into two areas: military and civilian. Sometimes they 

overlapped. One potentially dangerous problem existed because the 

port crews were working general cargo ships in the Saigon commercial port and military POL and ammunition ships at N ha Be just to the 

south. No one centra l authority was in charge. 

The military and commercial cargo had been mixed throughout 

the port area. To make matters worse, the military and commercial 

customers waiting for this cargo could not receive, identify, or place 

their cargo in proper storage. Facilities were inadequate and trained 

personnel were not available. Although the military port troops were 

being blamed, they could do nothing about it. 

Up to this period in Vietnam, the Transportation Corps' principles 

of movement planning and movement control did not govern shipments to or within the country. Each service requested and shipped its 

own equipment and supplies into Vietnam, as did the AID and other 

agencies. The MACV had established the Traffic Management 

Agency (TMA) to control movement, but it did not become effective 

until early 1967. 

The existing procedures and organizations had four deficiencies 

at the outset.• First, a coordinated movement organization did not exist 

within the combat zone. Second, no agency had responsibility for providing CINCPAC with logistics information, for advising CONUS of 

the immediate requirements of CINCPAC and COMUSMACV and 

the component commanders, or projecting the cargo input to Vietnam, 

to ClNCPAC and MACV headquarters. Third, procedures had not 

been established to coordinate inter- and/or intra-theater shipping with 

its ability to be received in Vietnam. Lastly, considerable cargo was 

moving to Vietnam outside of the Defense Transportation System and 

without the knowledge of any DOD movement control agency. 

Because of the lack of port facil ities, materiel handling equipment, and receiving capability, during the early days COMUSMACV's General William C. Westmoreland made it a practice to open 

and close hatches and unload ships as the cargo was needed. Selective 

off-loading and using ship's holds as warehouses was necessary 

because of the shortage of adequate shore facilities. 

This procedure, which tied up ships indefinitely, caused the ship 

owners and operators to bring strong political pressure to bear on the 

President of the United States. The solution to the problem then 

became political. Before I arrived in Saigon, the civilian port operated 

1 General Frank S. Besson, Jr., Chairman, A Report by the Joint 

Logistics Review Board, Transportation and Movement Control. 
114 TRANSPORTATION AND LOGISTICS: ONE MAN'S STORY 

completely separately from the military port. Although in many cases 

both jurisdictions used some of the same facilities, cooperation and 

coordination were nonexistent. The problem had been tmder discussion at all levels for some time and a decision had finally been 

reached that the 4th Transportation Command would have operational 

control of CPA/ AID cargo. Both the United States and Vietnamese 

governments concurred in this decision. The decision on control of 

CIP cargo and the entire commercial port would be made later. We 

were told that President Johnson sent a message tlu·ough channels to 

Westmoreland, ordering that all ships be unloaded within thirty days. 

When I took charge of the 4th Transportation Command, it 

appeared to me that with few exceptions, the facilities were adequate 

to handle the cargo being unloaded from the ships waiting in the river. 

Trained civilian contract stevedores handled both military and commercial cargo. Army terminal service companies supervised the crews 

moving military cargo. However, although both military and civilian 

cargo checkers were available, their performance was marginal. 

Materiel handling equipment remained inadequate. 

Port clearance was problematic. We had both military and civilian 

contract trucks to clear the port but, as generally happens when operating overseas during wartime, the recipients of the cargo were not 

equipped to handle the volume of cargo being directed to them. It was 

a replay of the port at Pusan during the Korean War. 

I reviewed the situation, realizing I had tlu·ee generals looking over 

my shoulder: General Westmoreland, the MACV conunander; General 

Engler, his deputy; and General Eifler, the lst Logistical Command 

chief. After explaining the problems to them, I told them what I 

thought should be done and om chances of solving the problems. They 

told me to start and to let them know when I needed help. The only 

help I requested was additional port personnel to help supervise the 

AID commercial stevedores under my command. 

From then on, I had a completely cooperative working relationship with my three bosses. I kept them informed with periodic oral 

and written status reports. Any time I needed support from areas over 

which I had no control, I requested help through channels, and it 

arrived without a problem. Generals Engler and Eifler frequently visited and I always kept them aware of what was going on. General 

Westmoreland had too many other problems to be able to keep well 

informed about the port. Most of our problems could be solved without his intervention. 

The one major problem continued to be handling of the AID commercial cargo. AID personnel had been quick to tell top administrative 

officials that all the problems lay with the mi.litary port administration. 

I soon realized that the principal culprit was AID itself. 
WAR fN VIETNAM 115 

Mr. Robert W. Komer, President Johnson's chief adviser from the 

White House, visited Vietnam every month and always told the Army, 

the American ambassador, and General Westmoreland that something 

should be done about the port problem. On one such occasion, while I 

was meeting with Mr. Komer at AID headquarters, I asked him to 

come to the port and let me show him what the problems were and 

what we were doing about them. Komer told me to stop trying to confuse him with facts, but just get the port mess cleaned up. I gave up 

trying to be reasonable with Bob Komer, who later acquired a nickname, "the blow torch." 

On the military cargo side, I immediately began looking for a new 

location for the ammunition ship working area. I asked one of my terminal battalion commanders, Lt. Col. Thomas H. Hoy, to find a new 

location for the ammunition discharge facilities. He reconunended an 

area known as Cat Lai, a point of land that extended out into an adjacent river canal, within working distance of the port proper. 

The water at Cat Lai was deep enough to handle the ammo ships. 

The small landing area would allow construction of a large barge-disc11arge facility so we could unload the ammo ships in the stream. The 

major setback was that the land ashore was a tidal swamp. We decided 

to go with Cat Lai anyway, intending to move in masses of fill material 

and build the barge facilities. 

As soon as I explained the situation to Generals Eifler and Engler, 

they took the necessary actions to meet our needs. Dump trucks began 

to haul in fill and continued to haul it for months afterwards. It was a 

big job, but the swamp was finally reclaimed, the engineers built our 

discharge facility, and Colonel Hoy erected a tent city for his battalion. We immediately moved our entire ammunition discharge operation to Cat Lai and began unloading all the ammo for the Army, Air 

Force, and Vietnamese armed forces. Cat Lai became the transfer 

point for most of the ammunition going to the Delta. 

To alleviate port congestion, we had to move general military 

cargo out to its destination regardless of the customer's ability to 

receive it. One of the principal recipients of this treatment was Col. 

(later Maj. Gen.) Joseph E. Pieklik, the commander of the "Fish 

Market" supply depot. ("Fish Market" was the Vietnamese name for 

this area, which in earlier days had actually been a fish market.) This 

depot was just south of the port proper, a very short haul by truck. 

(See Map 3.) But Pieklik had inadequate space, personnel, facilities, 

and materiel handling equipment to cope with the incoming cargo. 

The recent change from a technical service to a functional supply 

system made the situation worse. Supply organizations had not had 

time to reorganize, to retrain, to change concepts or doctrines, or take 

the steps necessary to competently operate an overseas depot. Even 
116 TRANSPORTATION AND LOGISTICS: ONE MAN'S STORY 

though we had had supply problems in Korea and during World War 

II, at least we knew to move boxes with red corners to the ordnance 

depots. Ordnance personnel, although understaffed, were trained to 

recognize, receive, and identify ordnance cargo. The same was true 

for the other Technical Services. 

We now moved most of the general U.S. military cargo to the fish 

market depot, manned by personnel beset with myriad problems. We 

were about to deliver them much larger quantities than they could 

possibly handle. With General Eifler's approval, I sent crews and 

equipment to the depot to assist in unloading our trucks so we could 

h1rn them around to bring in even more cargo. Not surprisingly, cargo 

stacked up without proper receipt or identification. But we were moving cargo out of the port. The fish market depot, although not our only 

customer, was by far the largest. Because of the inadequate depot 

facilities at the fish market, the 1st Log Command established a much 

larger depot facility at Long Binh, approximately thirty miles north of 

Saigon, close to the Bien Hoa air base. 

We relentlessly moved all cargo to our customers. We had to do 

this to meet President Johnson's demand that we unload the ships. To 

make matters worse, much of the cargo documentation was missing or 

inadequate to properly identify the items and their final destinations. 

This led to the creation of "gray boxes," a term coined to describe 

boxes with unknown contents or unknown destinations. After these 

unusable gray boxes sat around a depot for a certain period of time, 

we moved them back to Okinawa. Workers there opened the boxes, 

identified their contents, and put them back in operating condition or 

disposed ofthem. lfpossible, they returned them to Vietnam. I'm sure 

some boxes made more than one round trip between Vietnam and 

Okinawa. 

To cope with the boxes in Okinawa, AMC established assemblyline type operations to process the gray boxes. It required well-trained 

experts, able to open a box and identify a part as well as its purpose. 

To recognize an item as a repair part for a 2 'h-ton truck instead of a 

5-ton truck or another vehicle is no easy job. It required that AMC 

send many of its CONUS depot experts to Okinawa to do this and 

train Okinawan labor to help. This was a very costly remedy considering that the Army had not been permitted to adequately man and 

equip the depots in Vietnam to do this same job. We always seem to 

repeat this mistake, as we did in the latest operation in Saudi Arabia. 

A great deal of cargo was destined for the Vietnamese armed 

forces: their port clearance trucks moved it from the port under the 

watchful eye of the U.S. advisers, or we moved it to their depot facilities on U.S. military trucks or contractor-provided trucks. The 

Vietnamese seemed to have an adequate capacity to handle the cargo, 
WAR IN VIETNAM 117 

but proper identification was another matter. Years later, as joint staff 

logistician (J4), MACV, J would learn that identification had been a 

real problem for them as well. 

Much Air Force cargo was moved out of our port to Air Force 

facilities. The Air Force could handle the increased load better than 

the Army. Most of the Air Force cargo moved into the country by aircraft except for bulk cargo, such as rations and POL, which moved on 

land. The Navy received very little cargo. 

About this same time, General Besson paid me a visit to see the 

port situation for himself. He wanted to learn what 1 had found and 

how I planned to solve the problem. 1 walked Besson over the entire 

port area and over to the fish market. As soon as General Besson saw 

the mess, he turned to me and said that he was going to change the 

method of sending supplies to Vietnam. From then on l would receive 

Army cargo in containers, not break bulk. The stevedores would 

unload containers, not individual boxes of parts. At the time, we had 

been receiving very limited quantities of cargo in CONEX containers. 

Once we moved the CONEX container to its destination, we never 

saw it again. The customer used it for storage or some other purpose. 

When General Besson heard this, he said, "Fine. It is well worth the 

cost, and we will continue to buy more CONEX containers." 

He was not sure how he would containerize all general cargo, but 

he knew he would find a way. He adn1itted he should have done more 

on development of a standard container at the time of our test of the 

offshore aerial tramway in France in 1957. He also said something 

about working with a Mr. Malcolm McLean on the container project. 

By the next year, sea-land containerized services became available to 

Vietnam. 

Very soon after General Besson left the counh·y, we began receiving containerized cargo rather than break bulk cargo. It was not in 

actual overseas containers, but the cargo was lashed to standard warehouse or Marine pallets with wire bands or moved by CONEX containers. 

I failed to mention our forklift problem while General Besson was 

there. Our materiel handling equipment was not adequate to handle 

our break bulk cargo and could not move the containerized cargo that 

we anticipated. As soon as I realized the scope of this problem, we 

submitted high priority requests for adequate fo rklifts and other 

materiel handling equipment. For the next six months, crews broke 

down the pallets in order to handle the boxes by hand or the pallets 

were discharged by ships' tackle directly into waiting vehicles. 

Very soon we had the military cargo portion of our port operation 

under control. Our only continuing error was failure to document the 

cargo adequately. Our customers failed to notice this oversight 
118 TRANSPORTATION AND LOGISTICS: ONE MAN'S STORY 

because the cargo was being fed to them so fast they did not have time 

to spot the omission. Transportation Corps doctrine has always 

required that each piece of cargo be identified as it enters the system, 

from its point of origin until it is unloaded at dockside and shipped to 

the user. 

The port must know in advance the amounts, weights, descriptions, sizes, classifications, stock and/or part numbers, stowage locations, and all pertinent details of all the cargo on ships bound for 

Vietnam. This information was supposed to be mailed to the port in 

advance, but this did not always happen. The ship also carried a copy 

of its manifest that detailed the necessary information, which they 

submitted to the port upon arrival. The port Accounting Division then 

translated the mass of information on the manifest into usable data to 

enable the ship to be unloaded, the supplies stored or shipped to the 

correct consignee quickly, and the vessel released for its next trip. 

The port was required to transpose the information on the manifest manuall y into transportation control movement documents 

(TCMD) that would control movement of cargo to customers in 

Vietnam. If these TCMDs did not accompany the cargo, the customer 

would not be able to identify the items or their final destination. 

Incoming supplies generally replenished depot stock or filled a supply 

requisition from a combat unit. This total accountability of shipments, 

called "intransit asset visibility," is absolutely essential for the supply 

system to operate effectively. 

Visibility has always been a problem during the buildup phase of 

every combat support operation, from World War II, Korea, Vietnam, 

up to Operation DESERT SHIELD. Cargo arrives much faster and in 

larger quantities than can ever be imagined; the number of support 

personnel available to handle this avalanche is never enough. Both of 

these conditions existed during the buildup for DESERT SrrrELD. Even 

though the supply operation is now completely automated, it still 

requires individual human intervention to make the automation work. 

At Saigon, in the 4th Transportation Command, we could not 

maintain I 00 percent asset visibility of the cargo moving through the 

port. Because of this inability, the customers receiving the cargo were 

plagued with problems. However, even if we had been able to do our 

job in the port, most U.S. military customers would still not have 

been able to maintain asset visibility. They simply lacked sufficient 

personnel and depot faci lities to handle the large quantities of cargo 

being moved to them. I discussed this problem with General Eifler 

many times, but he knew we had no recourse other than to unload the 

ships. 

We had many other operating problems, but most of them were 

solved as they occurred. One recurring problem was the fact that 
WAR IN VIETNAM l 19 

operational difficulties were not brought to the attention of the operational supervision as they occurred. They were reported at the end of 

the shift, if then. This same problem had occurred in the Pusan port 

during the Korean War before we established our radio-monitored 

operations. 

We established a similar operational center in Saigon with control 

boards showing the status of each work site, whether it was a ship discharging, a truck transfer point, or a warehouse operation. We linked 

each of the work sites with the operations center via a radio net so that 

each work site could report its status each hour. We used this data to 

update our control boards. If, for example, a crane were to break 

down, the problem would be reported immediately to the operations 

center, where it would receive corrective action. This network also 

gave me and my operations people a much better, more timely 

overview of the entire port operation. 

In addition, I walked through the entire port working area at least 

three times a day. I would make my first trip early in the morning, 

before the night shift left, to see how they had done, again sometime 

during the day shift, and the third trip during th e night shift. 

Operations staff members always accompanied me. We were thus constantly aware of the status of port operations. During these tours we 

boarded each working ship, including those AID cargo ships being 

worked on the river. 

It seemed like every VIP from Washington had the port on his itinermy. Visitors would usually make the port operation center their first 

stop. We would brief them on our capabilities and the status of our 

ongoing operations. When we showed them around the port, they 

gained a much better understanding of our organization, operation, and 

problems. We received many compliments for our tours and briefings. 

Before I arrived in Saigon, MACV had approved construction of 

additional port facilities for Saigon and construction began on the port 

addition, named Newport. (See Map 3.) lt was located up the river 

from the existing port, just south of the main bridge that crossed the 

Saigon River, going north from Saigon toward Bien Hoa air base. This 

was the route from the port to our main ammunition depot and the 

Long Binh depot. 

Newport was planned to have four deep-draft berths, one of which 

could handle roll-on and roll-off ships. Other facilities would include 

two ramps for landing LSTs, a wharf capable of handling seven 

barges, and a landing craft ramp. The Newport complex would also 

have both warehouses and open storage spaces behind each pier, plus 

a large parking space for the sea-land containerized shipping operation. Most faci lities were operational in October 1966, but the four 

deep-draft piers were not available until July of the next year. 
120 TRANSPORTATION AND LOGISTICS: ONE MAN'S STORY 

In 1967, when 1 departed Vietnam, Newport became entirely 

operational, which considerably increased our throughput capability. 

Newport also allowed us to direct most of the U.S. military cargo 

trucks directly onto the Saigon/Bien Hoa/Long Binh highway, bypassing the congested city of Saigon with om heavy equipment. Newport 

was completely manned by U.S. military personnel, the 71 st 

Transportation Terminal Service Battalion, which also reduced pilferage. With Newport available and more convenient for military cargo, 

most of the main port of Saigon was used to handle the primarily AID 

commercial cargo. Newport also allowed improvement of the military 

cargo documentation procedures. 

Newport did not receive its first container ship until October 

1967. Small C2 container ships, with their own cranes aboard, shuttled containers between Cam Ranh, Da Nang, and Saigon about every 

two weeks. The C2 ship picked up containers from a container berth 

or from a large container ship being discharged at Cam Ranh Bay, 

then shuttled the cargo to either Newport or Da Nang. A DeLong pier, 

equipped with container cranes, had been installed at Cam Ranh Bay. 

General Besson, Slim DeLong, and Mr. McLean had worked out this 

arrangement. I later learned that this sophisticated installation had not 

been easy to sell and the deal nearly collapsed several times, surviving 

only because of Besson's persistence. 

Although containerization had been used in ocean shipping 

before, this was the first major container operation anywhere in the 

world. McLean and Besson were testing an entirely new concept that 

had always been laughed at by most ocean transport companies and 

most large ports worldwide. The innovative Besson stuck his neck out 

for something he believed in, and was proved right in the long run. 

Almost immediately, all U.S. shipping companies were forced to follow his lead and worldwide shipping companies were not too far 

behind. 

In Vietnam we experienced a tremendous, instant increase in our 

surface transportation capabilities, but containerization completely 

revolutionized the method of handling and moving cargo in surface 

shipping. Most people today don't realize that this major shipping 

innovation occurred little more than twenty-five years ago. Although 

it finally happened in 1967, Besson and McLean had been toying with 

the idea for many years. DeLong had for years been promoting his 

novel ideas for rapid construction of offshore facilities such as deepdraft piers and oil drilling platforms. DeLong went on to oversee construction and installation of his DeLong piers up and down the coast 

of Vietnam and the southern part ofThailand. 

Although Newport relieved the military cargo pressures on 

Saigon port, the handling of AID cargo remained difficult. The ware-
WAR IN VIETNAM 121 

houses were full of commercial AID cargo. When local Vietnamese 

importers learned that items which AID had imported on their behalf 

had arrived, they customarily left them in the port warehouse until 

they could be sold. At the time of sale, the customer and the importer 

would come to the port together to pay the customer's duty to the government and to remove the imports. 

When I became aware of the procedures in Saigon, I realized that 

the AID cargo was being handled in a manner contrary to all standard 

port procedures. A document called the "port tariff" set forth all of 

the rules and regulations governing warehouses, along with the port 

rules and regulations and the schedule of fees to be charged for such 

services as towing, berthing, and line handling. The port tariff is a 

critical commercial document that specifies fees for each operation 

and controls all that goes on in the facility. Like all such transportation operations, no port can operate without a tariff; at least I had 

never heard of one that did until I arrived in Saigon. 

When I asked to see the Port Tariff for Saigon, my transportation 

people didn 't know what I was talking about. Ne ithe r did the 

Vietnamese commercial port commander when I confronted him. A 

Vietnamese army brigadier general with little or no port experience, 

he had apparently just been shuffled off to that job. 

In Saigon the only bonded warehouses were at the port, a condition I had never experienced before. The port has the most expensive 

and the least available warehouse space anywhere. Because of this, 

the customer usually takes his cargo out of the port warehouse within three to f ive days. lf he does not, the government moves the cargo 

out of the port warehouse to a government-operated, bonded warehouse for storage. The longer the importer leaves his items in bonded storage, the more the warehouse a nd custom fees mount up. 

Therefore, importers everywhere but Sa igon move very fast to avoid 

these fees. After a period of time, if an item hasn't been c laimed, it 

is subject to sale or disposal. In no case, though, would cargo be 

permitted to remain in port warehouses, which are not meant to be 

used for storage. 

When I first took over the commercial port operation, I didn't 

realize that the military and AID had no joint operating agreement. I 

was quickly made aware of this fact and I went out of my way to keep 

the AID advisers informed about everything we did and why. Shortly 

thereafter, the State Department, Defense Department, and 

Vietnamese government worked out an agreement. One of my first 

jobs was to prepare a port tariff, to obtain Vietnamese government 

approval for the document, then to put it into effect. J soon found out 

this was not to be done easily. When we confronted the various U.S. 

agents who worked the ships in the port, they laughed. They knew 
122 TRANSPORTATION AND LOGISTICS: ONE MAN'S STORY 

there should be a tariff, but the lack of one saved them money. They 

did not want us to prepare one. 

Fortunately for me, Mr. Schultz, one of the longshoremen sent 

over by Gleason to advise AID, was not just a warehouse man. He had 

a lot of experience with commercial port operations. We immediately 

got along. In contrast, the other port advisers and officia ls were often 

hostile at first, fearing that I was a threat to their jobs. 

Schultz and r immediate ly obtained copies of tariffs from other 

ports in the area, such as Singapore and Hong Kong, to use as samples. We made the tariff as simple as we could possibly make it. 

(Actually, Mr. Schultz did most of the detailed tariff preparation.) We 

did not include many of the complicated legal clauses normally found 

in such documents. We laid out only the most basic rules and fees to 

permit ships to come in, to be worked, and to depart. lt covered the 

rules necessary for commerci a l stevedore companies, importers, 

exporters, transship transportation, warehouse operations and the like. 

After we finished preparing our draft tariff, we were faced with the 

difficult job of finding the proper Vietnamese government authority 

to approve the tariff and then to enforce it. 

I attempted, without success, to get the Vietnamese port commander to take over the job. AID didn't seem to be much help. Finally, I 

got help through General Westmoreland who enlisted the American 

ambassador, Mr. Ellsworth Bunker. The Vietnamese government 

assigned a Vietnamese major as the new port commander. 

Maj. Pho-Quoc Chu, the port director of the Saigon commercial 

port, clearly a favorite of the government authorities, could call upon 

them for help. Although he lacked prior port experience, he was a 

very forceful young man and immediately realized the importance of 

his job and the steps that he had to take. He worked very closely with 

us from then on, which greatly improved our joint operations. 

While the U.S. helped the South Vietnamese defend their country, 

we tried to stabilize Vietnam's economy. Our major scheme, the commercial import program noted earlier, provided credit for Vietnamese 

civilian importers. CIP procedures required documenting specific 

incoming CIP commodities and verifying payment or nonpayment of 

tariffs and other fees. Unfortunately, the Vietnamese government did 

not always agree with our methods. Neither did the large importers, 

who had the money and lots of political clout. We discovered that 

when both the government and the importers wanted to drag their feet, 

they were experts at it. We were beset by a wide range of problems 

including politics, graft, payoffs, Viet Cong activities, and laziness. 

Technical know-how had little to do with our actual accomplishments. 

The CIP had a built-in conflict. The AID program was pushing in 

millions of dollars worth of goods in order to satisfy consumers, to 
WAR IN VIETNAM 123 

lower prices, and stabilize the economy. The large importers wanted to 

keep prices high in order to make more money. It was difficult to dictate the correct solution. Americans took the attitude that, since we 

were fighting their war and supporting their economy, the South 

Vietnamese citizens should not object to us pushing them around. 

This was a fa lse assumption. The Vietnamese government and their 

citizens did object. 

The port became the logical focal point for all of these political 

problems. Finding solutions was extremely frustrating. Also, because 

the port was so pivotal in solving these problems, it developed a high 

profile. Nearly all visitors to Vietnam ended up there. Briefing visitors, discussing the situation with them, and showing them how the 

operation worked was very time consuming, but necessary. In most 

cases, this investment of time worked to our advantage. 

In August 1967, the Army chief of staff, General Harold K. 

Johnson, then my old boss, General Meyer, visited us. The commander in chi ef of the U.S. Army, Pacifi c (CINCUSAR PAC), General 

John K. Waters, visited several times, as did his replacement, General 

Dwight E. Beach. 

In October, Secretary of Defense McNamara, accompanied by the 

chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Earle G. Wheeler, visited Vietnam. I attended the meeting General Westmore land hosted for 

these visitors and discussed the port situation. During my detailed presentation I asked Secretary McNamara to explain our situation to 

Premier Nguyen Cao Ky and emphasize our need for his help and 

assistance. After the meeting, both McNamara and General Wheeler 

wanted to visit the port. At the conclusion of their two-hour visit, both 

were extremely complimentary on the job we were doing. As always, 

many times during the visit General Westmoreland emphasized to the 

secretary of defense his support of our efforts. 

Shortly after the McNama ra visit, Premier Ky vjsited the port 

with several of his ministe rs, including his key rival , Minister of 

Economy and F inance Au Truong Thanh. Minister Thanh was the 

main supporter of the big importers. I thought that either he would 

replace the prime minister or be shot. Minister Thanh was replaced 

instead. 

Premier Ky and his party spent more than two hours with us at the 

port, mostly for briefings and discussions. Ky was smart and extremely conceited, and l realized one should not get in his way. He was very 

friendly with me, but I'm sure General Westmoreland had made sure 

of that. 

While the port remained a hot spot, we attracted many other visitors including the secretary of the Army, Stanley R. Resor, and the 

under secretary of the Navy. The vice chief of staff of the Army, 
124 TRANSPORTATION AND LOGISTICS: ONE MAN'S STORY 

General Creighton W. Abrams, also spent a great deal of time in the 

port during his visit, joining Westmoreland as his deputy and later 

replacing him. 

In October 1966, Generals Eifler and Engler assigned an additional port unit to help supervise the commercial operation, in response to 

our earlier request. A transportation terminal command (type A), 

under the command of Col. Cary A. Kennedy, arrived in Vietnam 

from Fort Eustis, Virginia, in October 1966. Their organization, consisting of thirty-eight officers and l 01 enlisted men, increased our 

port complement to 250 officers, 1,500 to 2,000 enlisted men, around 

2,000 civilian employees, and many hundred contract workers. Our 

annual budget was near $60 million. 

When Colone l Kennedy started working closely with Major Chu 

and the AID representatives, especially Mr. Schultz, commercial 

operations began to improve tremendously. Because of Cary's very 

aggressive nature, many times I would have to smooth out hurt feelings up and down the line. Many times, complaints would come from 

Gene ral Westmoreland or General Eifler, bu t I worked it out. l 

thought it better for Cary to e rr on the aggressive side rather than 

require that I constantly push him into action. 

Although I didn 't often ask for General Westmoreland's help, on 

some occasions I had no other recourse. During the early part of my 

tour, when the port probl ems were at their height, Westmoreland 

would frequently call me on Friday evenings around seven o'clock 

and ask me to come up to MACV headquarters and bring him up to 

speed. 1 couldn't have asked for a better and more helpful commander. 

Any time I had a problem with D. G. MacDonald, the AID chief, I 

would ask Genera l Westmore land to intercede. He always did, going 

directly to Mr. MacDonald or through Ambassador Bunker. Any time 

this happened, I would alert Genera l Eifler, so that he and General 

Engler would not be surprised. They never objected to my reliance on 

General Westmoreland. 

To expedite the flow of commercial goods, we had to clear the 

paperwork with the Vietnamese government officials and commercial 

interests, such as importers and ship's agents. I assigned one of my 

best officers, Maj. Ted Rosenberg, as liaison officer and expediter. In 

addition, he was responsible for berthing incoming ships alongside 

the piers or in the river. 

The perfect liaison officer, Major Rosenbe rg was smart, knew 

how to work smoothly with a ll types of people, a nd did whatever was 

necessary to accomplish the job. l soon learned that J no longer had to 

worry about commercial traffic or many of the other AID jobs. Ted 

took over, kept me infom1cd of his actions and came to me for help 

only if the mission was beyond his or Colonel Kennedy's capability. 
WAR TN VIETNAM 125 

ln spite of all this, we still did not move commercial cargo out of 

the port in the style we wanted. Apparently, an awful lot of the AID 

commercial items had not been ordered by importers and had not 

moved. After getting the okay from my bosses, I informed Mr. 

MacDonald at AID that I had to get the commercial cargo out of the 

port; if they didn't move it, I would. This was not pleasant news to 

AID. 

I located a storage area in an abandoned stadium called Petris 

Key, which could be fairly well secured by AID and the Vietnamese 

government. It was fenced in and the field had a good hard stand. I 

moved all the unclaimed commercial AID items to Petris Key, stationed security guards in the area and reminded all concerned where 

the goods were stored. Unfortunately, those items that were still 

usable when we moved them didn't remain usable long when left out 

in the weather. 

Before the war, rice had been the largest export (not import) item 

for Vietnam. In those days the rice moved from the fields to the warehouses along the canals, then by barge to the Saigon River for loading 

onto deep-draft ships. Rice provided a large portion of the cash flow 

for the Vietnamese economy. The war reversed all that. Vietnam had 

to import rice provided by U.S. grant aid. 

A lot of grant aid cargo, such as rice and fertilizer, now filled at 

least half of the ships lying off Vung Tau. The Army was blamed for 

the failure to move these ships through the port. These bulk materials 

also filled most of the contract barges drifting up and down the river 

canals waiting to be unloaded. Most of this type cargo had been transshipped from deep-draft ships into the barges, which in turn were 

moved up the canals to storage warehouses for unloading and storage 

until the cargo was disposed of. 

The size of the bag used for inbound shipments caused a problem 

for us in the port. Rice had traditionally been moved in twenty-kilogram sacks (about forty pounds). The Vietnamese laborers could 

carry these on their backs into the warehouse, then out of the warehouse onto the barge for movement to ship side. The bags were then 

loaded aboard ship by ship's tackle. Rice and fertilizer were moving in 

the opposite direction, from deep-draft shipping in the Saigon harbor 

into barges, then up the canals to the old rice warehouses. We planned 

to have Vietnamese labor unload the bags on their backs from barge to 

warehouse. 

An energetic purchasing agent in AID found that he could purchase rice and fertilizer in 80-pound bags cheaper than in 40-pound 

bags. These 80-pound bags were much too heavy for the Vietnamese 

laborers to carry on their backs. We had to substitute cranes and forklifts for the Vietnamese laborers. Moving cranes up narrow roadways 
126 TRANSPORTATION AND LOGISTICS: ONE MAN'S STORY 

to these warehouses was a real challenge. If there were no adequate 

roads, we moved the cranes by barge. If wharf space at the warehouse 

was not adequate for the crane to work, we had to work the crane over 

from our barges, which tied up a lot of our equipment. 

In addition to using the contract barges to move the rice and ferti lizer, we also attempted to move it to the warehouses in trucks. Often 

before the truck driver reached the warehouse, his truck would be surrounded by 50 to I 00 little children, who prevented the truck from 

moving. While he was immobilized, Vietnamese men would make off 

with the cargo. U.S. Army guards were not the answer, because we 

could not shoot at little children. We solved this ]problem by persuading AID and the Vietnamese government to find safer destinations to 

which the rice could be delivered. 

The Saigon port operation was clearly different from anything 

else we had confronted. The United States did finally get the operation under control so the commercial port eventually took over the 

operation. This happened some time after I left the Saigon pot1 and 

had returned to the States. 

On the military side, part of our mission was to support 

Vietnamese military forces in the Delta through the small ports of 

My Tho and Can Tho. We accomplished this with the help of our 

U.S. military advisers. The scope of these activities enlarged dramatically when the 9th U.S. Infantry Division and our newly created and 

trained Riverine Forces arrived in Vietnam in late 1966. Since one of 

the brigades and its supporting units was to be stationed in the Delta, 

a new campsite named Dong Tam was built on a river canal. It was 

built along the canal bank on what had previously been tidal land, 

covered by water during high tide and exposed at low tide. This was a 

challenge for our engineers, whom we supported by providing water 

transportation and port operations from Saigon. 

I assigned troops down there on a permanent basis. It was a most 

interesting operation. The brigade commander was Brig. Gen. (later 

Lt. Gen.) William B. Fulton. I would helicopter down at least twice a 

week to check the operation and to coordinate with Bill Fulton. After 

they finally finished the campsite, we continued to provide water and 

port transportation support. I also provided Bill an LCM company, 

his main form of transport up and down the various canals. Bill 

installed artillery pieces and mortars on some of the LCMs, thus creating gunboats to assist him in attacking the enemy. The LCM company commander, Capt. William ("Gus") Pagonis, later became a 

lieutenant general and supervised our logistical operations for 

D ESERT SHIELD. 

One more problem, an internal one, needs to be highlighted again. 

As mentioned earlier, during this period the Army was changing from 
WAR IN VIETNAM 127 

the technical service system to a functional supply system. The Army 

had not really completed a plan to accomplish this. Consequently, we 

still operated the old system within the newly created organizations. It 

did not work well but, with a lot of hard work done by aggressive people, we ultimately got the job done. 

During this time, we had some ten to fifteen transportation 

colonels in various key transportation staff and command jobs 

throughout the Saigon area. They commanded the transportation 

units, held transportation staff jobs on the MACV and U.S. Army, 

Vietnam (USARV), staffs, and had some general staff jobs. As I 

worked with these colonels, all of whom I knew, I became aware of 

one distracting trait. Each often criticized the others and they disagreed with one another about policies and procedures. All of this disagreement took place in plain view of other senior members of the 

various staffs. It put the whole Transportation Corps in a bad light. 

This was not the first time I had observed this trait in the 

Transportation Corps and I knew it was wrong. 

In an attempt to eliminate this public bickering, I invited all the 

Transportation Corps colonels to join me for a dim1er party at one of 

Saigon's local restaurants. They all accepted and it was such a success 

that we had dinner together every Sunday evening. Before long, we 

were all good friends having a great time, sharing all kinds of information and seeking advice. It worked to the advantage of each of us. 

Before these dinner parties, most of the group had not associated with 

the others at all. After, we spoke to the outside world about transportation with the same voice. We accomplished much more as a result. 

At this point, I will present a brief review of the physical Saigon 

port and its operation from 1 June 1966 through our projections for 

June 1968. On 1 June 1966, the mission of the 4th Transportation 

Command was to receive, discharge, and clear to its first destination 

all military cargo that supported the III and IV Corps Tactical Zones. 

Data indicates that we handled 218,000 short tons in May 1966: 

190,000 short tons of general cargo and 28,000 short tons of ammunition, including cargoes unloaded at Vung Tau. The 4th Transportation 

Command used five deep-draft berths in the Saigon port- three in the 

M&M area and two in the commercial end of the port. They occasionally also used river berths. Ammunition was discharged in the river at 

Nha Be and ship-to-shore operations were conducted at Vung Tauseveral kilometers to the south. 

Because of the somewhat confused operations, incoming cargo 

continued to build up. Ten to twelve ships with military cargo waited 

off Vung Tau at Cape St. Jacques for berthing space in Saigon. The 

materiel handling equipment could not cope with the backlog in the 

port and discharge vessels at a reasonably efficient rate. Trucks were 
128 TRANSPORTATION AND LOGISTICS: ONE MAN'S STORY 

barely able to clear the port, but the depots were not geared to handle 

cargo at the rate it was being received. 

On J June 1966, the commercial sector of the port consisted of 

two deep-draft berths, the same ones used by the Army, with three 

berths used to discharge barges. Twenty-two buoy berths were available in the river. The dock area was only long enough to handle five 

U.S. flag-type ships. 

The Saigon port authority's mission, formalized in May 1966, was 

to assign facilities and to coordinate their use by commercial agencies 

and stevedore contractors. No accurate records exist to reveal the port 

tonnage volumes at that time; our best estimate is that they handled 

about 140,000 to 150,000 short tons, including AID cargo. 

Operations in the commercial port were cumbersome, without a 

single agency or individual with the authority to direct and control the 

operations of the port. The docks, warehouses, and cranes were 

decayed and antiquated. The port faced increased commercial imports 

and a completely inadequate wholesale marketing system. Very little 

operational and management information was available. 

By I June 1967, military operations in the Saigon port proper 

were carried out using the tJu·ee deep-draft berths in the M&M area, 

one berth in the commercial poti, and one in the fish market area. 

(See Map 3.) The U.S. had completed building the fish market berth 

in October 1966. The Army also used three buoy berths to discharge 

bulk AlD cargo. Two berths were returned to the commercial port in 

May; the fish market berth was returned on 1 July. 

Newport had seven barge wharves, two LST slots, and three deepdraft berths. A fourth deep-draft berth became available on 10 July. 

Ammunition operations had been shifted from Nha Be to Cat Lai, the 

base camp of the 11th Terminal Service Battalion, which was responsible for ammo operations. Cat Lai was closer to the barge discharge 

sites up the river at Cogido, Buu Long, Thanh Tuy Ha, and Binh 

Trieu. South of the Saigon complex at Vung Tau, operations expanded 

to meet increasiJ1g delta support requirements. The construction of a 

DeLong pier, which could berth two deep-draft vessels, greatly 

improved efficiency. This pier became operational on 1 July 1967. 

Between June and December 1966, the port at Saigon underwent 

many changes in organization, distribution of functions and authority, 

and method of operation. On 5 July 1966, the mission of the 4th 

Transportation Command expanded with AID support requirements. 

Our revised mission statement gave us responsibility for the receipt, 

discharge, and clearance to first destination of all military cargo coming through the port of Saigon, the back-load of retrograde military 

cargo, and harbor security which included security of vessels at all 

discharge areas in Saigon, Newport, Cat Lai, Vung Tau, and the Delta. 
WAR IN VIETNAM 129 

In addition we would receive, discharge, and deliver to first destination all AID-financed commodities consigned to the Vietnamese government and advise and assist the port authority in the operation of 

the commercial port. 

With these enlarged responsibilities and our gradually improving 

capabilities, the 4th Transportation Command steadily expanded its 

volume of operation. In May 1967 we handled approximately 

393,000 short tons: 355,000 short tons of general cargo, of which 

99,000 short tons were AID, and 256,000 short tons were military 

(38,000 short tons were ammunition). This was an increase of 

175,000 short tons over the preceding May. Generally, during 1967 

we had no serious problems with the military operations in Saigon 

port. With experience, more resources and improvements, the military operation had been rendered relatively routine. We were able to 

concentrate on management refinements to improve the efficiency of 

the operation. 

By this time the commercial sector of the port required all deepdraft berths for deep-draft vessels. This included the use of all intransit sheds alongside the deep-draft berths as well. In 1966 the commercial sector had only three barge discharge berths dedicated for its sole 

use. 

The port authority, which had received the assistance and advice 

of the !25th Transportation Command since October 1966, now functioned quite well. It had taken on a broader and more meaningful mission and now regulated all users of the port. Although its operators 

had a long way to go before they became totally efficient, they had set 

definite objectives and made real progress. 

The port authority had become a self-susta ining element of the 

government, responsible for effective port management. It was well 

aware of its vital role in sustaining the economy of Vietnam. In May 

1967, a low tonnage month, the commercial port handled 17 1,500 

short tons of which 164,000 were imports and 7,500 were exports. 

The commercial import program had caused this reduction of tonnage. Although this reduction was to be replaced with Vietnam government-financed imports, AID did not expect imports to reach the 

previous level. 

As a result of the joint efforts of the port authority and the I 25th 

Transportation Command, commercial operations in the Saigon port 

greatly improved. Port inventory, including cargo in transit sheds, 

barges, and ships being worked or at Cape St. Jacques, showed a favorable trend downward. In the past, the Saigon port had been a storage 

area for the retailers. At one time the port had been covered with cargo 

which importers could not afford, did not want, could not find, or preferred to hold back to raise prices. This inventory had fallen from 
130 TRANSPORTATION AND LOGISTICS: ONE MAN'S STORY 

342,000 short tons in December 1966 to 89,000 short tons in May 

1967. The inventory reduction had been accompanied, or perhaps 

caused, by the favorable inverse re lationship of the tonnage discharged 

to the tonnage cleared. A reduction was also apparent in the number of 

barges under load. 

In addition to these desirable trends, several other factors led us to 

believe that the port authority had made good progress. First, its control had become firmly established. Although this may have seemed 

relatively insignificant to some, it was an outstanding accomplishment. The port rehabilitation program was well under way and modern operational and management practices had been implemented. 

Increased cargo clearance and market absorption indicated that the 

port was becoming increasingly capable of favorably influencing the 

Vietnamese economy. Facilities were being used with ever-increasing 

efficiency and effectiveness. The port authority now had established 

controls, standards, penalties, and an administrative system to enforce 

port policy and the port tariff. Finally, the port had developed a management information system that allowed assessment of its performance in meeting objectives and that served as a solid premise for 

planning and control. 

Our plans also called for continued development of the Saigon port 

to work toward the development of a wholesale distribution system. To 

this end, we encouraged the port authority to add comptroller functions 

to its organization and to introduce improved financial management 

systems. We assisted in formulating long-range plans to modify operations to match an improving economy and for improvements to the 

physical plant. 

We also continued to seek implementation of labor reforms to 

improve the lot of the port workers. These included increased pay, better working conditions, safety, health, and overall fairness of employment consistent with good business practices. We developed training 

programs for management personnel, which included visits to U.S. 

ports by Saigon port executives to observe and study modern port 

practices. Finally, we encouraged promotional activities to regenerate 

the export trade which we hoped would rebuild the reputation of the 

Saigon port and produce a healthy volume of shipping traffic. 

During 1968, Newpo rt became the hub of military termina l 

operations in the Saigon port complex. Military operations in the 

M&M area continued in Saigon port to support the current troop 

leve l and AID cargo. Operations and missions at Cat Lai and Vung 

Tau continued. 

The military mission in the Saigon port did not change substantially during 1967. We continued to be responsible for terminal operations in southern Vietnam, which included support of the Mekong 
WAR IN VIETNAM 131 

Delta. The AID mission did change. Now that the commercial port 

was under better control, we returned some operating responsibilities 

for AID-sponsored cargo to the Vietnamese. The 4th Transportation 

Command stopped handling fertilizer and recommended that the 

Vietnamese move bulk foodstuffs like rice, flour, and bulgur wheat. 

These commodities were relatively easy to handle and the import programs for them had been firmly established. The assistance and advisory mission continued, although by I July 1968 there had been a 

reduction in the pier-level portion of this mission. 

Tonnage requirements for AID imports continued at current levels 

although there had been a substantial reduction in the military handling of AID-sponsored cargo. The U.S. Army was expected to handle 

about 275,000 short tons of military cargo and about 25,000 short 

tons of AID cargo per month. Ammunition was expected to total 

about 50,000 short tons per month, based on the current trends. About 

40,000- 50,000 short tons of ammunition were handled during the 

five-month period preceding May 1967. Vung Tau was expected to 

handle an additional 60,000 short tons. The reduction in net tonnage 

handled was obviously caused by the shift of AID bulk tonnages to 

the port authority along with facilities then used in the commercial 

port by the military. 

The progressive trends initiated in the Saigon port continued in 

1968. The general stability achieved in military operations continued 

throughout the commercial sector. Military and commercial terminal 

operations had not achieved perfection, but the situation had 

improved. There was stil l a long way to go to reach maximum efficiency. For example, the high volume of data created by this terminal 

operation was still being processed manually. An automatic data processing system had been plam1ed for the military terminal operation 

by December 1967, and studies were being made to expand it to the 

commercial port. 

As I look back on my years in Saigon, certain things stand out. 

The first is the importance of good organization, a clear doctrine, and 

good people. As we finally put together a good commercial port operation with the 125th Transportation Command, the commercial port 

improved greatly. Major Rosenberg, my main liaison in all of these 

activities, did much of the work. 

An important part of port doctrine was the installation of a workable port tariff for all to follow. This helped make the Saigon port a 

modern, workable port, although by today's standards that technology 

has become obsolete. We moderni zed both the commercial and the 

military ports by using our operation center with its control boards 

and radio communication throughout the working areas. 
132 TRANSPORTATION AND LOGISTICS: ONE MAN'S STORY 

Eventually, we had the most modern materiel handling and container handling equipment available at that time. Our harbor craft, 

landing craft, and cranes, along with the various contractor support, 

brought Sa igon up to modern standards. However, supply personnel 

and depots remained below standard. 

At the conclusion of my tour, as I prepared to leave the 4th 

Transportation Command, my greatest satisfacltion came from the 

noticeable change in the morale of our h·oops. When I arrived, morale 

was at its lowest possible point. Everyone had told the 4th how poorly 

they were performing and what a mess they had made of the port, 

although none of it was their fault. When I left, the mood could not 

have been higher. They were the best, and they knew it. I truly hated 

to leave the 4th, as I had hated to leave the 53d Truck Battalion in 

Europe. But someone else had to be given a chance to learn all the 

extreineJy valuable lessons one can learn only from commanding 

troops in the field. 
CHAPTER 10 

Logistics in Washington 

Upon my return to the Pentagon from Vietnam jn 1967, I was 

assigned to the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics 

(DCSLOG) as director of transportation. Although this position was 

authorized for a brigadier general and 1 was still a colonel, a general 

officers' board was sitting at the time to select officers for the next 

brigadier general list. This assignment appeared to be a good sign for 

me. General Engler, the USARV commander when I arrived in 

Vietnam and for most of my tour at the 4th Transportation Command, 

was the DCSLOG. He and General Eifler had given me a superior 

efficiency report in Vietnam. When the brigadier general list was published a few months later I found out 1 had been selected. I was high 

on the list because of my seniority as a colonel, and was promoted to 

brigadier general on 17 August 1967. 

At the time my family was still living in Falls Church, Virginia. 

As I began my three-year tour in the Pentagon, my three oldest children continued at the same high school, and were even able to graduate from this same high school, a very unusual privilege for a career 

military family. 

As the new director of transportation I had a ready-made list of 

things I wanted to do, based on my fie ld experience in transportation. 

I had learned about the many problems from the bottom up. I not only 

had to know the programs and their problems and to be able to suggest solutions, I also immediately faced the bigger problem of being 

able to sell my solutions to senior people. It's very easy to think you 

know the answers and to blame someone else for not buying your recommendations. Over the years I've noticed that my ability to articulate and to sell has not been my strongest trait. I've often wished that I 

had the ability of such salesmen as General Ferdinand J. Chesarek and 

General William E. DePuy. General DePuy could sell anything to anybody, at the drop of a hat. It is a valuable asset that I fear I have 

always lacked. 

With so many projects on my action list, an agenda for the Office of 

the Director of Transportation developed. I put the movement of household goods at the top of my list. For some time, I had observed this 

process from the outside and carne to the conclusion that the system 
l 34 TRANSPORTATION AND LOGISTICS: ONE MAN'S STORY 

needed lots of improvement. The Department of Defense and the Army 

spend millions of dollars every year to move household goods. It 

seemed to me that the carriers received a great deal of profit they didn't 

deserve. To familiarize myself with the organizations and their procedw·es, I visited several major installations on the East Coast. 

In the Army, household goods are usually a family 's most important possessions and in some cases, their only material possessions. 

When a young soldier and his wife change stations and move their 

household goods, they are at the mercy of the moving company. 

Regulations clearly state who has what responsibi lities. 

Unfortunately, though, in most cases the young soldier does not know 

or understand his or her responsibilities and those of the carrier. Most 

commanders showed interest only when their own personal household 

goods were being moved, but were not concerned about the movement 

of their soldiers' goods. For some reason, this logistics function did 

not engage their attention. 

The local transportation officer at the station has inspectors available to spot check the carriers. Because of the lack of enough inspectors, however, inspections were usually inadequate. This was the case 

during 1967- 1968 when I made my survey. As I traveled from post to 

post and checked with the various post transportation offices and their 

managers, it did not appear to me that movement of household goods 

received sufficient command attention. When I discussed this with the 

post commanders, 1 pointed out that security of household goods had 

much to do with the morale of their soldiers and that the conm1anders 

should be personally interested in this most uninteresting subject. 

I was not the only general officer concerned about movement of 

household goods. The commanders of the Military Traffic 

Management and Terminal Service (MTMTS) had also given high 

priority to movement of household goods, which has improved this 

service a great deal over the years. Installation commanders should 

also give higher priority to the matter. 

I also gave priority to improving Army general staff attention to 

MTMTS. Even though most of the general staff officers knew that 

MTMTS was a major subordinate command, they did not realize the 

importance of its services. This became very apparent to me even when 

1 sat on a promotion board or participated on a school or command 

selection board. 

This lack of understanding resulted from the organizational links 

through which MTMTS operated. Even though MTMTS was directly 

under the command of the Army chief of staff and the vice chief of 

staff of the Army, it was also under the technical supervision of the 

assistant secretary of the Army and the assistant secretary of defense 

for installations and logistics. MTMTS reported many of its actions 
LOGISTICS IN WASHINGTON 135 

through the civilian technical path rather than the command chain. 

The Army staff was inadvertently bypassed and MTMTS missed the 

opportunity to bring many of its achievements to the attention of the 

Army staff. I proposed to the vice chief of staff that the director of 

transportation be introduced into the chain of command, so that 

MTMTS matters could be staffed through the interested staff offices. 

lt did not happen. 

As director of transportation, I also devoted a great deal of 

attention to the U.S. Army Transportation Center at Fort Eustis, 

Virginia. I emphasized the need for additional instruction at the 

Transportation School and regularly encouraged the major units to 

adopt movement planning and movement control and to practice 

intransit asset visibility based on the required transportation documentation. Everyone had to understand the importance of these 

transportation functions. 

I accomplished this through discussions with the commanding general of Fort Eustis and during every speaking engagement in the field. 

The manuals and directives we prepared or reviewed always emphasized these subjects. I also stressed that a good transportation officer 

must have a good understanding of the other logistics functions, such as 

supply and maintenance. 

The Transportation Corps is responsible for items moved out to the 

field as well as retw-ned items, from the time they arc picked up from 

the customer until they arc delivered back to the customer. The principle of inh·ansit asset visibility means maintaining I 00 percent visibility 

for the entire period. The items must be returned to the customer with 

proper documentation so that they can be identified and issued. If this 

accountability is not preserved the entire supply system can break down 

as it did in Korea, in Vietnam, and again in Operations DESERT SIIIELD 

and DESERT STORM. Automation and modern communications can 

improve visibility, but automation must be used properly. All transportation officers must be thoroughly familiar with transportation management, movement planning and control, and traffjc management. 

They must be able to use these skills whenever necessary. 

The cost of transportation has rarely been addressed, probably 

because no mechanism exists to call attention to transportation costs. 

The requisitioner who creates the cost is not responsible for paying 

the transportation bill. He may not realize that, by imposing a strict 

required delivery date, he can increase the transportation costs from 

under $10.00 to over $500.00. If the unit ordering supplies was to be 

billed for transportation, lean stock levels would be easier to achieve 

and inventory in motion might become more feasible. 

To obtain a consensus among all senior transportation officers on 

the importance of these concepts and the meaning of the terms and to 
136 TRANSPORTATION AND LOGISTICS: ONE MAN'S STORY 

solicit their help in stressing them Army-wide, l asked all the transportation generals in and around the Washington area to meet periodically. They all agreed to meet monthly to promote these transportation 

goals. All transportation general officers on active duty, not very 

many at that time, attended the meetings. I resumed this practice later 

when I commanded the Transportation Center at Fort Eustis, Virginia, 

and it has continued annually at Fort Eustis. 

I was not able to use my spot in the DCSLOG office to promote 

these transportation principl es Army-wide for very long. Within a 

few months after I became the director of transportation of the 

Department of the Army, the Department of Defense realized that 

sooner or later American troops would leave Vietnam and that retrograde planning would be required to accomplish this in an orderly 

manner. The Defense Department directed the services to initiate 

retrograde planning, with the Army having th e principal staff 

responsibility. 

General Engler, the DCSLOG, was assigned the principal staff 

responsibility for the Army. He in turn assigned me as the Army project officer for T-day, or termination day. In mid-1968 a peaceful 

agreement seemed imminent. Each general staff office was directed to 

appoint a T-day planning officer to assist me. We soon met to establish our responsibilities and objectives. Next, we drafted a Department 

of the Army directive that outlined future actions by the staff and by 

all of the appropriate Army commands. 

As we reviewed the history of the U.S. Army's record in retrograde planning and movement it became obvious that the Army performed weakly in each of these areas, from battlefield retrograde to 

theater retrograde. The Department of Defense had initiated this staff 

planning to correct past mistakes and to improve this very important 

and costly operation. 

Retrograde planning consumed the rest of my time as director of 

transportation. A separate element of the DCSLOG staff was established to coordinate with the staff as well as with special staff elements in all the CONUS and Pacific commands. They developed 

plans to rapidly remove troops, equipment, and supplies from 

Vietnam. Although in the end American troops left Vietnam in gradual increments over a four-year period, we were at least prepared for a 

more immediate withdrawal to support any peace agreement. 

The operation required many steps beginning with determining 

what should be withdrawn, how to prepare it for retrograde, how to 

package and document it, where to send it, and whether to rebuild, 

repair, or scrap it. We wanted to retrograde the maximum amount of 

reusable equipment and supplies to the A1my's system. On the other 

hand, we would have to leave behind a certain amount of supplies and 
LOGISTrCS fN WASHINGTON 137 

equipment to support the South Vietnamese armed forces. Planning 

required constant trips to storage sites, as well as coordinating and 

cooperating with many units. 

In the final analysis, our retrograde from Vietnam worked better 

than it had ever worked before. At first we thought there were about 

five million tons in Vietnam that we probably ought to retrograde, but 

getting it to its destination in the necessary condition was difficult. 

This project required a lot of time, but it was an interesting job and I 

learned from it. 

In 1968, during one of my trips to Vietnam to coordinate the 

details of the retrograde plan, the major general promotion list was 

published. My name was on it. The list had been published just a few 

months after I had been promoted to brigadier general. As I was well 

down on this list, I did not pin on the second star for over a year. By 

that time, we had pretty well finished preparing the initial retrograde 

plan, which provided broad guidance to all Army commands involved 

in the Vietnam operation. The detailed planning and actual implementation was just about to occur. It would continue for several years and 

would prove to be extremely difficult. I would remain deeply involved 

in retrograde as I moved from one assignment to another. 

As discussed in Chapter 8, the Army logistics system had undergone major organizational changes in the early sixties as the result of 

Secretary of Defense McNamara's Project 80; however, before these 

changes could be completed and before the Army logistics system 

could be changed, we became deeply involved in the Vietnam War. 

The hybrid Army logistics system struggled through this period, from 

1962 to 1967. 

On 26 March 1965, aware of the difficulties and that the Army 's 

logistics system had problems during the Vietnam War, the Army chief 

of staff directed that the DCSLOG, with the assistance of the other 

principal staff officers, develop an outline plan for a comprehensive 

study of the Army's logistics system. The study plan was approved on 

J 6 June 1965. On 27 August, Atmy chief of staff memorandum CSM65-407 established the board of inquiry into the Army logistics system. 

Lt. Gen. Frederick J. Brown served as chairman, reporting directly 

to the Army vice chief of staff. Maj. Gen. Horace F. Bigelow, an assistant DCSLOG at the time, was named vice chairman. The chief of 

staff's memorandum initially authorized sixteen full-time professionals and ten administrative personnel. Consultants both inside and outside of the Army were authorized. General Brown's overall task was to 

analyze the cun·ent Army logistics system to determine what changes 

and modifications would make it more responsive to materiel readiness requirements at company level and to recommend appropriate 

corrective actions. 
138 TRANSPORTATION AND LOGISTICS: ONE MAN'S STORY 

The ensuing Brown Board report reviewed the evolution of the 

Army logistics system si nce World War II. It focused first on the 

re lationship between the Army and the Department of Defense, 

including DOD's philosophy, the various reorganizations within DOD 

and the services, and the effects these changes had on the Army 

logistics system. It then discussed in great detail logistics operations 

and their control, evaluating their effectiveness with the current tools 

of systems analysis and computer models. This resulted in the most 

thorough, comprehensive, and detailed examination of the Army's 

logistics system ever made. 

The Brown Board pointed out that the Army docs not learn by 

reviewing history and the lessons it teaches, but continues to repeat 

the same mistakes. This is especially true in logistics, where the techniques, technology, and methods constantly change, but the basic 

missions remain the same. Another principal gap exists in the area of 

planning a nd doctrine. The study specifically indi cated that the 

Office of the Chief of Military History provides a valuable service in 

compiling and analyzing historical data and that the Army should use 

its services a great deal more. 

The board recommended putting someone in charge of logistics. 

They did not suggest the creation of a conunand, like the Army Service 

Forces of World War II, but proposed giving the DCSLOG the authority to manage the Army's logistics system. The board recommended 

how this could be done and made a strong case for why it should be 

done. Many of the recommendations were designed to return to the 

Army the kinds of centralized direction previously exerc ised by the 

chiefs of the Teci1Jlical Services, but without the problems. 

The report discussed personne l, doctrine, and systems. The board 

recommended that a new office be created in D CSLOG with the 

authority to supervise these areas Army-wide. As a result, the Army 

chief of staff later expanded the Office of the DCSLOG by adding an 

assistant DCSLOG for personnel, doctrine, and systems (PDS) with 

the staff necessary to meet the recommendations of the Brown Board 

study. 

The study also recommended establishing a separate agency outside of the Washington, D.C., area to assist the ADCSLOG (PDS). 

The study further recommended that the personnel currently performing PDS roles in other agencies be transferred with the functions to 

the new agency, to be named the Logistic Doctrine, Systems 

Readiness Agency (LDSRA). 

Coincidental with this organization change, the DCSLOG, Lt. 

Gen. Joseph M. Heiser, Jr., assigned me to be the first ADCSLOG 

(PDS). As soon as we were able to establish both om new office in 

the Pentagon and the new agency at New Cumberland, Pennsylvania, 
LOGISTICS IN WASHINGTON 139 

we developed a program based upon the many Brown Board study 

recommendations. 

We first attacked the development of automated systems for supply, maintenance, transportation, as well as other logistics areas for 

Army units worldwide. The agency would accomplish most of the 

detailed work, with our office in Washington giving assistance in 

staffing and coordinating with the Combat Developments Command 

and the Anny Materiel Command. AMC was responsible for development of automated systems on the wholesale supply side. 

The Brown Board study was very specific in recommending our 

responsibility for coordinating personnel and training with the deputy 

chief of staff for personnel, the assistant chief of staff for force development, the Continental Army Command, and the Combat 

Developments Command. 

The board further recommended that the Army publish a new regulation spelling out in detail the responsibilities and functions of the 

deputy chief of staff for logistics. The implementation instructions 

with the study filled six separate volumes: Volume I, Summ01y and 

Guide to Implementation; Volume 2, Asset Management; Volume 3, 

Acquisition Management; Volume 4, General Management of 

Logistics; Volume 5, Personnel, Training, and Organization; and 

Volume 6, Logistics Systems. 

Although the Brown Board considered its instructions in Volume 

4 to be comprehensive, one shortcoming in its coverage of transportation was discovered too late to correct. The transportation omission related to overall strategic support of the Army and internal 

transportation within and between deployed forces. Thus the Brown 

Board study did not cover the role of transportation, a deficiency 

which frequently occurs, because the Army was unable to articulate 

its requirements for strategic movement. This was especially true in 

the case of fixing the magnitude of, and obtaining commitments for, 

the total requirements for strategic transportation, so that comprehensive, realistic and coherent planning and programming could be 

accomplished. 

In ADCSLOG (PDS) and our agency at New Cumberland, we 

developed a detailed program to address all the study recommendations which the chief of staff had approved. The program specified the 

actions to be performed, as well as by whom and over what time period. We initially briefed the status of these program details to the 

DCSLOG, to the vice chief of staff of the Anny, to the chief of staff 

of the Army, and to the secretary of the Army every week. At first, 

they all showed great interest. They had already approved the bulk of 

the recommended actions, and had informed the general staff and the 

major conm1ands. After a while, we changed our briefings to every 
140 TRANSPORTATION AND LOGISTICS: ONE MAN'S STORY 

month and, after six or eight months, we briefed only the DCSLOG 

and his staff. The Army soon lost interest; as a result, very few of the 

recommended and approved actions were implemented completely. 

The Army would do well to review and update this fine study. 

During this period, General Heiser held periodic meetings with 

the director of the Defense Division of the General Accounting 

Office. I would attend these meetings along with the key defense-oriented personnel in GAO. One month we would visit the GAO offices 

and the next month they would come to the Pentagon. During these 

meetings, we would brief GAO on the major logistics actions underway in the Army, especia lly actions to implement the Brown Board 

recommendations. GAO would in turn brief us on all reviews they 

were conducting that related to Army logistics. 

We were always honest and straightforward in our discussions and 

briefings, as was the GAO. As a result, the GAO would learn where to 

go and who to see to obtain the most accurate, detailed information. 

Likewise, we were never surprised by a GAO review or by their 

reports. We found this exchange to be mutually helpful. This cooperation continued throughout General Heiser's term as the DCSLOG. 

During my short tour as the ADCSLOG (PDS), our office and our 

agency in New Cumberland laid new groundwork by initiating actions 

to automate the Army logistics systems: supply, maintenance, transportation, etcetera. Much of the initial work required that the logistics 

functions be defined in sufficient detail so they could be programmed 

into computer language to produce the necessary automated management tools. 

My year and a half as the ADCSLOG (PDS) completed my threeyear tour on the DA staff, 1968- 1971. When the job of DCSLOG at 

USARPAC became avai !able, General Heiser offered it to me. I 

accepted this new opportunity with enthusiasm. I knew my family 

would enjoy living in Hawaii. 
CHAPTER 11 

Logistics in the Pacific 

Looking back on the job of DCSLOG, USARPAC, I have wondered about the need for and the validity of the command itself. 

Over the years numerous reports have made the case for unified 

commands such as the Pacific Command and the European 

Command. When Genera l Abrams commanded the MACV, he 

developed a great dislike for the unified Pacific Command and its 

three component commands, feeling they contributed little to the 

operation of the separate commands in Japan, Korea, and Vietnam. 

When he returned as chief of staff of the Army, he eliminated 

USARPAC. 

I am thoroughly convinced, had he not died prematurely and had 

he remained chief of staff of the Army for his full four years, General 

Abrams would have accomplished a great deal more to eliminate 

CINCPAC itself. He felt very strongly that the Hawaiian commands 

were nothing but stumbling blocks to accomplishment in the Pacific. 

Out of necessity, as MACV commander, General Abrams had dealt 

directly with the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Office of the Secretary of 

Defense, and in many cases the president's office its·elf, rather than 

going thJough CINCPAC and the components. 

As I worked into my job as USARPAC DCSLOG, I realized that 

we really had very little responsibility over the logistics system in the 

Pacific. In fact, except for ammunition, our biggest job was to stay out 

of the way and avoid interfering with logistics support to Okinawa, 

Japan, Korea, and Vietnam. Requisitions for TO&E-authorized items 

were the only routine requests routed through USARPAC. Our only 

role was to check that the item had been, in fact, authorized for the 

unit- a very simple process. 

Ammunition shipments, however, were a different matter. Our 

large ammunition office controlled the levels of ammo at all locations 

in the Pacific. We maintained accurate measures of ammunition levels 

and the condition of the ammunition by using our field ammunition 

inspectors and by reviewing the ammunition reports submitted by the 

commands. We also maintained visibility over all ammunition emoute 

from the U.S. to its many destinations. If necessary, we could divert 

ammunition shipments to alternate destinations. 
142 TRANSPORTATION AND LOGISTICS: ONE MAN'S STORY 

After the enemy had destroyed considerable ammunition stockpiles 

in Vietnam, om Army decided to use storage in transit as much as possible rather than storing large quantities of ammunition on the ground. 

Another name for this concept is inventOIJ' in motion. By knowing 

exactly what anununition was enroute, what ship it was on, and its destination, we possessed a flexibility that made the vulnerable ammunition dump passe. General Heiser's books, Logistic Support and A 

Soldier Supporting Soldiers, illustrate our application of this approach. 1 

Mr. Vincent P. Huggard, the deputy assistant secretary of the 

Army for installations and logistics, directed and supervised the entire 

ammunitions control operation. Vince had participated in ammunition 

operations during all of his career and ammunition remained his specialty as he was promoted up the civilian career ladder. Huggard 

became known as "Mr. Ammo." Highly respected throughout the 

Army, DOD, and on Capitol Hill, Vince reviewed all the ammunition 

requirements computations and presented them along with the budget 

to DOD and to Congress. All concerned thought so highly of him that 

they seldom questioned his requirement projections. 

Mr. Huggard held close rein over ammunition operations during the 

entire Vietnam War. An important tool in ammunition control was the 

conduct of biannual planning meetings at USARPAC. At these meetings all requisitions for ammo were reviewed and were either approved 

and forwarded to the appropriate sources in the U.S., or they were 

changed as Vince saw fit. Ammunition shipments under way or being 

prepared for shipment were also reviewed. The Hawaii planning meeting devoted considerable time to reviewing ammunition expenditure 

rates in Vietnam as well as future anuno requirements. 

At the close of each six-month meeting, participants prepared a 

detailed plan for ammunition for the next period. We followed the 

guida nce in these plans as c lose ly as possible. Our Ammunition 

Division in USARPAC supervised their application in the Pacific theater. Mr. Bob Surhiem, a key player in the ammunition operation, 

worked closely with Vince Huggard. As the civilian transportation 

officer at the U.S. Army Munitions Command, Bob had been experienced in ammunition movement for many years. During the semiannual ammunition meetings in Hawaii, he would develop the transportation movement plans for the next six months. Upon Huggard 's 

approval, Surhiem wou ld make sure that they were followed. 

USARPAC also provided considerable grant aid and military sales 

to our allied armies in the Pacific. Although CINCPAC had responsibility for military assistance and sales under DOD, USARPAC 

1 Joseph M. Heiser, Jr., Logistic Support (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Army 

Center of Military History, 1991 ). 

I Ieiser, A Soldier Supporti11g Soldiers. 
LOGISTICS JN THE PACIFIC 143 

reviewed the Army portions of these programs. It became obvious to 

me that we should know a lot more about the armies of our allies in 

the Pacific: we needed to know how they were organized, how they 

provided support, the levels of their normal requirements, and many 

other factors so that we could evaluate their requirements more effectively before submitting them to DOD. 

We began meeting with the equivalents of our DCSLOG in each 

of our allied armies: Korea, Japan, Taiwan, Singapore, and Thailand. 

At first we did this informally in one-on-one meetings, but as interest 

grew we decided to meet together to discuss our mutual problems and 

interests. A different country sponsored each successive meeting, 

which provided us with a rare opportunity to become familiar with 

each country's organization, operation, personnel, and problems. 

These meetings became so successful that soon after I left USARPAC, 

the director of logistics, CINCPAC, took over and continued them. 

USARPAC also had planning and operations responsibility for 

retrograde, the rehtrn of supplies and equipment from a command to 

CONUS. We coordinated the actions required to retrograde major end 

items between the theater's subordinate commands, such as Vietnam, 

Korea, Japan, Okinawa, Taiwan, the Department of the Army, and the 

Army Materiel Command. Our responsibility included the retrograde 

of end items to be rebuilt at our facilities in Japan and Taiwan. The 

cost of rebuilding these items at our offshore facilities was cheaper 

than in CONUS, and we could also avoid large transportation costs. 

AMC's inventory control points directly managed most of the repair 

parts and secondary items. General Heiser covers this process very 

thoroughly iJl A Soldier Supporting Soldiers.

1 

My tour of duty at USARPAC was supposed to last three years. In 

January 1972, after only a year and a half in Hawaii, I went back to 

Vietnam to be the director of logistics, J4, at MACV. Because my 

family enjoyed Hawaii very much, we moved off Fort Shafter and into 

a condominium in Honolulu, where they remained while I was in 

Vietnam. 

Having previously been assigned to the joint staff, I had some 

experience with interservice staff problems and responsibilities. I 

knew that logistics is primarily a service, not a joint, responsibility. I 

had also learned what logistics areas fell in the joint arena. Even if 

one sometimes has to step on toes, it usually pays to tread lightly. 

Cooperation pays off in the long run. 

l truly believe in logistics as a separate responsibility of each service because each service has a different mission, different equipment, and entirely different problems. Usually each service performs 

its mission under entirely different conditions. Although some support 

2 Heiser, A Soldier Supporting Soldiers. 
144 TRANSPORTATION AND LOGISTICS: ONE MAN'S STORY 

may be provided more efTiciently and more economically by a crossservice organization such as the Defense Supply Agency, economics 

should not be the main determinant. There really isn't anything economical about providing defense. The money must be spent to defend 

the country. 

However, some logistics functions are truly cross-service, such as 

transportation. We must jointly share this function because we only 

have one transportation system to support the three services and our 

civilian economy. Each service cannot have its own air, land, or sea 

system. Although the Air Force sometimes thinks it has priority for air 

transport and the Navy feels it owns all sea-going transportation, such 

monopolies cannot be allowed. Transportation must be provided based 

on priority of need. 

Joint control of transportation, although important, is not absolutely 

necessary. It is far more important to jointly allocate and control the 

requirements for movement, particularly when a shortage of transportation exists as during an all-out war like World War II. We never experienced a shortage of transportation during the Vietnam War. Movement 

control could have allowed more efficient and effective use of transportation, but that is never the overriding issue for combat support. 

Although a joint transportation movement control agency existed 

at MACV Lmder the control of J4, we really didn' t control movement. 

Each service had enough transportation so that each had its own 

movement control organization. 

When I returned to Vietnam, the services were implementing retrograde plans at a very fast pace. The USARV devoted a great deal of 

effort to the biggest job, Army retrograde. Between J 969 and 1972, 

USARV retrieved and shipped out some two million short tons of 

reusable Army materiel, valued at approximately $5 billion, which the 

Army would use again somewhere else. 

By this time, the handwriting was on the wall: the days left for 

U.S. forces to remain in Vietnam were numbered. Jn addition to continuously retrograding materiel, USARV was also redeploying forces. 

These monumental tasks became USARV's main missions. As a result 

some equipment was damaged, some asset visibility was lost, some 

careless packing took place, and some dirty parts were shipped. But 

on the whole, USARV did a good job. 

Major item distribution instructions had been issued and were 

controlled by the U.S. Army, Pacific. USARV had also published regulations and procedures for handling this same materiel. The destinations of special project stocks; nonstandard equipment; repair parts; 

communication equipment; post, camp, and station equipment; and 

many other items created a significant problem for USARV It taxed 

USARV's processing and management capabilities to the maximum. 
LOGISTICS IN TilE PACIFIC 145 

Not everything went as planned because of the rapid movement of 

units, the constant turnover of personnel, the need to use an increasing 

number of Vietnamese personnel rather than U.S. military, and the 

rapid reduction in the number of adequately trained U.S. supervisors 

to oversee the Vietnamese. Nevertheless, Army logistics leaders realized at the time the importance of documenting this withdrawal of 

forces with lessons learned because it had never before been done 

properly. Each withdrawing unit prepared detailed after-action reports 

(AARs) for the Army to use in any future withdrawals. 

In Vietnam, the most truly combined mission in which I participated was working with the Vietnamese and other allied forces. At 

least 90 percent of my time as J4 was devoted to working with Lt. 

Gen. Dong Van Khuyen, the director of logistics of the Vietnamese 

armed forces and commander of the Joint Logistjcs Command. 

(Although the term "joint" was used, the Army dominated the group 

because Army troops made up the majority of the armed forces.) I 

regarded General Khuyen as honest, inte lligent, and professional in all 

respects, and spent considerable time working with him and other 

Vietnamese logisticians. AltJ10ugh they were doing a good job, they 

needed to make improvements and changes before they could assume 

complete responsibility for logistics support after all U.S. forces 

departed Vietnam. 

General Khuyen agreed with my assessment. I suggested that we 

bring a small team of U.S. experts to Vietnam to work with a team of 

Vietnamese counterparts, appointed by Khuyen, to determine the 

changes and additions required by the Vietnamese Armed Forces 

Support System. Following my request to the DA for such help, a 

small team headed by Col. Herman W. Sheriff from the Army's 

DCSLOG, Supply and Maintenance Directorate, soon arrived. His 

team consisted of several other experts from the Army DCSLOG staff 

and from AMC, joined by a group of Vietnamese logisticians. The 

team ran Pathfinder I, a complete review of the Vietnamese support 

system. 

Throughout the project, Khuyen and I met weekly- sometimes 

twice a week- for updates on the status of the plans. We would often 

provide guidance as we thought necessary. After Pathfinder l had 

been completed, Pathfinder 2 was established to draw up the detailed 

procedures to implement the recommendations of Pathfinder 1. A 

Vietnamese colonel headed each Pathfinder team with Colonel Sheriff 

as deputy chief. The plans the team developed were, in fact, 

Vietnamese plans which the Vietnamese believed they could carry 

out. Colonel Sheriff and his two teams acted as advisers. 

The Vietnamese and U.S. experts specialized in supply, maintenance, and logistics plans. The team also included an American 
146 TRANSPORTATION AND LOGISTICS: ONE MAN'S STORY 

automated data processing hardware specialist and a strategic communications spec ialist. The team visited over ninety different activities scattered throughout South Vietnam, from combat units and the 

direct and general support units to the Logistics Command headquarters and the Office of the Chief of Technical Services. The final 

plan embraced every aspect of the Vietnamese armed forces logistics system. Although the supply system was in fact being automated at the start of Pathfinder 1, automation later expanded to all levels of the Vietnamese forces. After General Khuyen and 1 approved 

Pathfinder I and 2, implementation began in the middle of 1972. 

The American forces had no depot rebuild facil ities in Vietnam, a 

lack that created a big problem when we pulled out. All American 

rebuild of retrograde units had been performed in e ither Japan or 

Taiwan; in some cases, the hardware had been shipped back to the 

United States. To accommodate the Vietnamese, we established a 

rebuild facility on the outskirts of Saigon. With tremendous help from 

AMC and their experts, we equipped this facility with the necessary 

shop equipment, machine tools, hand tools, and training manuals. 

AMC, with help from contractors, began an extensive program to 

train personnel to operate the facility. This very ambitious project provided General Khuyen and the Vietnamese forces with a necessary 

capability. 

As the time approached for U.S. forces to pull out, we also needed 

to ensure that the Vietnamese forces had the equipment and supplies 

authorized for them. Distracted by the pressures of a demanding war, 

we had not spent much time or effort to check the South Vietnamese 

authorizations against our records in the United States which indicated what supplies we had provided to them. I was shocked when I saw 

the reports submitted by the advisory teams we had assigned to study 

this subject. American logisticians had never reconciled what DOD 

thought it had issued to the Vietnamese armed forces and what these 

forces recorded that they had received. 

When DOD shipped equipment and supplies to the Vietnamese 

army, we assumed without checking that the goods were received. 

Before I could ask DOD to issue the additional supplies and equipment that we owed the Vietnamese army, 1 had to reconcile our 

records with those of the Vietnamese. General Khuyen and I then 

assigned all of our personnel to inventory teams. They began the 

tedious process of inventorying equipment and supplies in the hands 

of all South Vietnamese military units throughout the country. This 

huge effort required a great deal of time and most of our logistics personnel for the rest of 1972. As our teams moved a round the country, 

General Khuyen and l spent a great deal of time on the road visiting 

as many sites and units as we possibly could. 
LOGISTICS IN THE PACIFIC 147 

At the same time, a major logistics problem with the South 

Korean forces came to light. The two Korean divisions in South 

Vietnam were stationed north of the Cam Ranh Bay area and were 

supported out of Cam Ranh Bay. Soon after my arrival in Vietnam, I 

visited the Koreans. To my surprise, l discovered that most of their 

combat equipment was nonoperational. When l inspected the artillery, 

I found that the guns were immaculate and had been maintained in 

excellent condition. The only problem was that they couldn't fire. 

Each was missing a vital component or repair part and, in many cases, 

the barrels had been worn out and required replacement. 

When r asked why they had not replaced the worn parts, they told 

me that USARV had stopped filling their requisitions. 1 returned to 

Saigon via Long Binh and USARV headquarters to discuss this with 

Lt. Gen. William J. McCaffrey, the commander ofUSARV He told me 

that they no longer honored Korean requisitions. For some time the 

Koreans, who knew our system better than our own units did, had 

been obtaining equipment and parts illegally from the Cam Ranh Bay 

depot. As a result, he had ordered Cam Ranh Bay to stop supporting 

the Koreans completely. 

When I informed General Abrams about this condition, he merely 

told me to correct it. I had to send inventory teams to the Korean divisions to determine their shortages and had the Koreans submit emergency requisitions to obtain the parts. We monitored these transactions closely and informed DA, USARPAC, and AMC on a regular 

basis. We wanted to rectify these shortages as quickly as possible 

because we had been told that the Koreans would soon be moved out 

of country. Since they were to turn over all their gear, including 

TO&E equipment, to the Vietnamese forces, we wanted it all to be in 

operable condition. We would use the materiel from the Korean divisions to replace the shortages we had discovered during our joint 

U.S.Nietnamcse inventories. 

This transfer of equipment presented another problem, the poor 

relationship between the Koreans and the Vietnamese. They frequently got into fights and often would not speak to each other. We had to 

send more American inventory teams up to the Korean area along 

with the Vietnamese receiving teams. U.S. logisticians would accept 

the equipment and supplies from the Koreans and prepare receipts for 

it; then they would turn around and issue it to the Vietnamese forces. 

My team was aware of the absurdity of what they were asked to do, 

but they performed this slow and tedious procedure successfully. 

I spent most of my time during the last six months of my tour following up on our joint inventories. We finally developed records for 

the Vietnamese armed forces which we both agreed upon and which 

OSD could use to ensure that the Vietnamese armed forces had the 
148 TRANSPORTATION AND LOGISTICS: ONE MAN'S STORY 

equipment and supplies authorized for them. Unfortunately, J later 

learned from Maj. Gen. John E. Murray, my replacement, that the U.S. 

did not finish the resupply and apparently had not intended to do so, 

even while we were making our inventory. 

We soon learned that a cease-fire agreement between the North 

Vietnamese and the U.S. was imminent. The agreement included specific limits on the size and type of organization that could remain in 

South Vietnam to assist the South Vietnamese. This organization 

would be known as the Defense Attache Office, having only about 

fifty personnel. 

The office, headed up by a U.S. general officer known as the 

Defense Attache, would consist mainly of civilians with a few military members. The Defense Attache and his deputy would be the only 

U.S. general officers left in Vietnam. T was to be the new Defense 

Attache and was told to start immediately to develop the authorized 

organization by filling the spaces as soon as possible. We would very 

soon replace MACV and all other U.S. personnel in South Vietnam. 

We were given precise directions about our mission, our operational 

limits, and with whom we could work. My new group was to take over 

the command after the departure of General Frederick C. Weyand, 

commander ofMACV, and his staff. 

1 requested mostly key civilian personnel and a couple of military 

to man the Defense Attache office. Before I could complete the roster 

I was informed that General Murray, who had been J4, CJNCPAC, 

was rep lacing me and that I was being reassigned to Fort Eustis, 

Virginia, as the commanding general of the Transportation Center. I 

was elated to get out of Vietnam, anticipating the inevitable upcoming 

problems, and 1 was very pleased with my assignment to Fort Eustis. 

General Murray, of whom l thought highly and whom I had 

known and worked with for years, arrived in late December 1972 and 

took over what was to become a very difficult and unhappy experience. I returned to Hawaii, packed the family, and returned to Fort 

Eustis, Virginia. 
CHAPTER12 

Running Fort Eustis 

It was certainly satisfying to be named commanding general of 

the Transportation Center and commandant of the Transportation 

School, which meant returning to Fort Eustis, Virginia, the home of 

the Transportation Corps. My family was excited too. Our oldest 

daughter and our youngest son had both been born at Fort Eustis. This 

was to be our third tour there; the post and the local community were 

home to us. From a practical standpoint many of our friends in the 

area were by then community leaders who could be counted on to 

help with community relations. 

My first assignment to Fort Eustis had occurred after World War 

II, in January 1947, as a result of my transfer from the Engineer 

Amphibious Command and my integration into the Transportation 

Corps of the Regular Army. Our second tour to Fort Eustis followed 

the Korean War, and coincided with another reduction in Army 

strength. 

As we returned for the third time, following another war, major 

changes were again taking place in the Army's organization, doctrine, 

training, and equipment. As the result of my recent experiences in 

Vietnam, I had many ideas about these changes and what they implied 

for the Transportation Corps' relationship with the rest of the Army. I 

had closely observed the misunderstandi ngs that had occurred within 

the Army about the mission and the importance of transportation. I 

had seen confusion on the part of transporters as well. 

Overall , the Army had deteriorated badly during the Vietnam War. 

All of the Army's assets- personnel, equipment, and research- had 

been poured into the war effort for ten years. This diversion had been 

at the expense of the rest of the Army. As I returned to the 

Transportation Center, l knew I would be faced with many of the same 

problems we had experienced in 1947 and 1956. Only this time, 1 

would be responsible to ensure that the necessary changes were made. 

I looked forward to the challenge. My job would no longer 

include being chief of transportation because Project 80 had eliminated all the chiefs of the Technical Services. (This position would not be 

revived for several years.) But even without the title or authority, I 

would have many of the same responsibilities of the chief. 
150 TRANSPORTATION AND LOGISTICS: ONE MAN'S STORY 

1 also recalled the Brown Board study and its recommendation that 

the Army logistics system regain many of the responsibilities and troop 

support roles previously held by the chiefs of the Technical Services, 

without resurrecting the duplication and procrastination that had existed before Project 80. The Transportation Center, particularly the 

Transportation School, was responsible for many of these functions. 

This mission was especially important during the period following 

our Vietnam experiences. We would no longer have responsibility for 

research and development or for managing the appropriated funding 

and, of course, would not have the authority that accompanied these 

responsibilities. This role had been taken away and had not been 

returned. The center controlled most of the transportation TO&E units 

remaining in the active force and was responsible for ensuring their 

state of readiness in case of an emergency. 

Upon my arrival at Fort Eustis, I found out that the Army was 

undergoing another major reorganization. As we had discovered during 

the Vietnam War, the Army organization had not worked well. The 

Combat Developments Command, which was supposed to develop new 

organizations and new doctrines for the Army component commands 

to implement, had not worked. The major component commanders 

could not wait for all this development to occur before changing from 

a technical service system to a functional system. As a result, each 

major component commander had developed his own logistics system. 

Because each system was different, the branch centers and schools 

could not prepare individuals and units properly for assignment to each 

unique command. The variety of systems also created problems when 

dealing with AMC and its wholesale supply system. 

At that time, the Army consisted of three major commands: the 

Combat Developments Command, the Continental Army Command, 

and the Army Materiel Command. As mentioned, CDC was responsible 

for the development of concepts, doctrine, TO&E, and equipment. 

CONARC commanded all the CONUS installations, units, and schools, 

and implemented CDC's output. AMC was responsible for research and 

development in coordination with CDC, and for providing wholesale 

logistics support to the Army. 

Because this organization had not worked well, the Army was reorganizing. Two or three new major Army commands were renamed and 

their responsibilities rearranged. The Training and Doctrine Command 

(TRADOC) and the Forces Command (FORSCOM) replaced CDC 

and CONARC, wltile AMC remained the same. TRADOC was responsible for preparation of organizational TO&Es and for concepts, doctrine, and training. It exercised these responsibilities through the 

branch centers and the schools it commanded. To assist in managing 

these responsibilities, TRADOC established three intermediate centers: 
RUNNING FORT EUSTIS 151 

the Combat Arms Center at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, to oversee the 

combat arms schools; the Logistics Center at Fort Lee, Virginia, to 

oversee the logistics schools; and the Administrative Center at Fort 

Benjamin Harrison, Indiana, to oversee the personnel, finance, and 

administrative schools. The Transportation School worked with the 

other logistics schools under the staff supervision of the Logistics 

Center. 

FORSCOM commanded CONUS installations and the forces not 

under TRADOC. FORSCOM was also responsible for Reserve and 

National Guard training and for individual and unit training throughout CONUS. AMC remained responsible for the wholesale logistics 

system including research, development, and procurement of weapons 

in coordination with TRADOC. 

When I arrived at Fort Eustis, the reorganization was just beginning. As commander of the Transportation School and Center, l coordinated with the commanders of the Logistics, Quartermaster, 

Ordnance, and Missile and Munitions Centers. 

The Communications Center and School and the Engineer Center 

and School were combat support organizations rather than combat service support like transportation. Therefore, they were separate from the 

Logistics Center and the Combat Arms Center. They worked with the 

Logistics Center for logistics, but they also worked with the Combat 

Arms Center on matters of combat suppmt. They were directly under 

the command ofTRADOC. 

For the next two and a half years, we devoted a great deal of our 

time and effort to developing the very vital training and doctrine. As 

new concepts and doctrines were developed and approved by 

TRADOC, we added them to our school and unit training curricula. It 

was necessary to produce a tremendous number of new training manuals and publications. All had to be rewritten and published, a very 

time-consuming process. 

Based upon my previous experiences in h·ansportation and logistics 

during World War II, Korea, and Vietnam, I of course put a great deal of 

emphasis on those areas which J knew were in great need. For example, 

1 concentrated on proper transportation documentation; asset visibility, 

particularly in transit; movement planning; and movement control. 

Although these were all transportation responsibilities, tltot all were well 

understood or appreciated by most transporters. These concepts had all 

been introduced in the Transportation School immediately after World 

War !I and had been taught for some time thereafter. Gradually, they 

had been dropped as other matters brought up by the combat side of the 

Army crowded them out. Our performance in Vietnam had been in part 

reflected in this change in curriculum. I reintroduced them into both the 

school courses and unit training. 
152 TRANSPORTATION AND LOGISTICS: ONE MAN'S STORY 

Upon returning to the Transportation Center, I found an even 

greater challenge- the shift to an all-volunteer Army. We had to 

change from depending upon the draft for our soldiers to a system in 

which enlistees wanted to join the Army or, in our case, wanted to join 

the Transportation Corps. I soon decided that we probably had an 

advantage over most other branches, especia]ly the combat arms 

branches. One asset we enjoyed was active support from the transportation industry, which had supported the Transportation Corps 

since its inception. 

The relationship between the railroads and the Army had been 

long standing. During the period of rail expansion during the 19th 

century, Army engineers not only assisted but also provided major 

guidance to the railroads as they established rail I ines throughout the 

United States. (Protecting engineers scouting for suitable railroad 

roadbeds had Jed General George Custer to his demise.) Our government encow·aged this effort because of the advantages that rail transportation provided. The Transportation Corps has always maintained a 

very close relationship with the railroads and arranged for commercial 

transportation for the Army. 

Starting before World War II, nearly all of the class A railroads 

had affiliated with the Army and had sponsored Army reserve rail 

units. The railroads had organized these units, made up of company 

employees. The railroads contributed much time and funds to support 

them. The units were organized along regular military lines, but as 

specialized railroad companies: operating battalions were made up of 

companies to operate the rail lines and equipment maintenance companies to maintain the rail equipment. Also, shop battalions provided 

heavy maintenance for rolling stock and locomotives, as well as 

senior headquarters units to manage these support units. 

Many of these units had been called to active duty during World 

War II and provided the backbone when we took over, rebuilt, and 

operated the destroyed rail facilities in Iran, France, Germany, and 

elsewhere. These rail units, called Army affiliated units, had operated these foreign rail systems, eventually turning them back to the 

commercial carriers. This worked very well. 

ln Iran, the rail units provided transportation from the Persian 

Gulf up through very difficult terrain into Russia to aid our military 

support of the Russian forces in World War II. The affiliated units 

actually on active duty performed similar chores in Korea during that 

war. 

When President Truman took over the railroads from 1948- 1952, 

he did so by calling to active duty senior members of the military railway affiliation program, the Military Railway Service. These executives took off their president or vice president hats and put on their 
RUNNING FORT EUSTIS 153 

military uniforms to run the railroads through their own companies 

under President Truman. It worked well with few difficulties. 

Unfortunately, as the use of rail transportation declined in this country, the Army lost interest in the affiliation program. The units have 

now disappeared. Still, the railroads and the Transportation Corps 

have a close association as we have with all modes of transportation. 

As we began to develop the all-volunteer program, it occurred to 

me that the Army could offer a very attractive career path for young 

enlisted men interested in working in transportation. They could join 

the Army, be trained in the field of their choice and, after leaving the 

service, enter commercial transportation. Industry supported this idea 

and was delighted to work with the U.S. Army. Once again, we 

attempted to sell the Army on affiliation programs with industry 

before we asked the transportation industry to support it. Om request 

fell on deaf ears- the Army was not interested. 

When J commanded Fort Eustis, the aircraft industry constantly 

sought aircraft mechanics. The Army seemed to provide an excellent 

path for a young person interested in an aviation maintenance career. 

The young man could enlist and, after his basic training, come to Fort 

Eustis for his military occupational specialty (MOS) training and later 

his advanced MOS training in aviation maintenance. He would then 

be assigned to one of our aviation units. 

If be desired to leave the Army after he completed his enlistment, 

he would be prepared to join a commercial airline as an aircraft 

maintenance specialist. If he wanted to obtain a college degree in aircraft engineering, he could join one of the Army's many off-time 

higher education programs at the Army's expense and obtain a 

degree. We arranged such a program with St. Leo College, which 

specializes in aviation. St. Leo's provided this off-time, after-hours 

program to soldiers of Fort Eustis who wanted it. 

We arranged similar programs with industry in other fields of 

transportation. One time, we were invited to participate in the Daytona 

500 stock car race. I was asked to wave the starting and finishing flags. 

The Daytona race committee invited as many of our automotive maintenance repair students as feasible to join race car crews and observe 

the preparation of the car before the race and the other suppott during 

and after the race. Our enlisted mechanic st11dents really enjoyed this 

opportunity. It did much for our student morale. As a result of these 

career incentives, we began to meet our volunteer enlistment quotas. I 

believe it worked very well. I still believe the Army should consider 

affiliation programs for all combat service support units. 

We also began updating the TO&Es of our transportation units. 

The terminal service (port operations) company had the most urgent 

need for restructuring. Its TO&E had not been changed materially 
154 TRANSPORTATION AND LOGISTICS: ONE MAN'S STORY 

since its original preparation before the Korean War. With an associate in the Office of the Chief of Transportation, Maj. "Dunny" Dunn, 

I had prepared many of the first TO&Es for terminal service units 

based mostly on our World War II experience. This standard had not 

substantially changed since then. 

The terminal service unit TO&E required review and update 

because of the development of the container for ocean freight. We 

needed to add some additional skills to the unit and we particularly 

needed to make major changes in the authorized cargo handling 

equipment. The terminal service operation had changed from handling break bulk cargo manually, with some assistance from small, 

commercial forklifts, to unloading and moving mostly containerized 

cargo, using large container handling equipment. 

As containerized freight came into use, we had first used small, 

short-masted forklifts to assist in loading and unloading the containers. Now we required large, rough-terrain forklifts and heavy-lift 

cranes to discharge containers from ship to shore, from barges and 

landing craft, and to move the containers to their destinations. We 

estimated that unloading and moving 20- and 40-foot containers 

across beaches and through undeveloped areas would require large, 

rubber-tired cranes with an outreach of 60 to 80 feet, capable of handling 250 tons. We could reduce the size of the gangs because of the 

additional cargo handling equipment, but we certainly had to upgrade 

the capability of our cargo checkers. 

When my estimate of the size of the crane required was questioned 

and our ability to develop one was doubted, J always said that it's not if 

we can do it, but how can we do it: we are now in the age of containerization. This problem was not solved easily, but today most of our terminal service companies have their own large, rough-terrain forklifts 

and 250-ton, rubber-tired cranes that can operate over beaches and 

tlu-ough undeveloped areas. 

I also attempted to sell the Army leadership on a combat, 

amphibious, over-the-beach capability for the Army like that developed during World War II by the engineer amphibious units. Today 

our transportation boat units and terminal service units provide the 

nearest capability. Current doctrine is premised on operating only 

through friendly areas and over friendly beaches. Such units would, of 

course, lack the combat engineer capability that is organic to engineer 

amphibious units. But this could be handled. 

I knew the Army could not afford active service units with this 

capability, but I did believe we should publish Transportation Corps 

doctrine and literature that could be called upon if and when needed. 

The combat engineer requirement could be added easily whenever it 

was required. The relationship could be much the same as that which 
RUNNING FORT EUSTIS 155 

engineer port construction units now provide to transportation ports. I 

also felt that some peacetime amphibious training would be helpful. 

My idea did not sell. Army leaders did not believe the Army would 

ever again be called upon to perform this mission. Instead, they were 

prepared to rely on the Marine Corps to make the combat over-thebeach landings, after which Army units could come ashore as 

required. 

One look at the size and capability of the Marine Corps today 

would indicate that it could not provide this support. The same conditions existed before World War II. Once the war stat·ted, the Army 

leadership soon learned that they could not rely on the Marine Corps 

alone. At the peak of World War II, the Marine Corps had six divisions with amphibious capability. The Army, meanwhile, was landing 

from 80 to I 00 divisions all over the world. The same doctrine exists 

today: the Army depends upon the Marine Corps for all combat landings. Today, the Marine Corps has only one division with amphibious 

capability. Navy transports can carry only one Army division as well. 

I'm sure the Army would be faced with serious conflicts about 

roles and missions from the other services if it attempted to organize 

and train amphibious units. But, I believe it would be advisable for the 

Transportation Center to locate those doctrine and training manuals 

used in World War II and to maintain updated files in the school at 

Fort Eustis. The Cold War is over for now, but with small problems 

emerging throughout the world, it does not seem far-fetched to think 

that we might need this capability again. 

Upon my return to Fort Eustis, I noticed that our harbor craft, 

landing craft, and coastal shipping vessels were still of World War II 

vintage. The introduction of air-cushion vehicles posed problems. Six 

such craft had been used in Vietnam: the Navy had operated three in 

the Da Nang area, and the 4th Transportation Company operated three 

in the Delta. Army transportation had been deeply involved in aircushion vehicle R&D before Vietnam. At that time we had still been 

using aircraft-type construction for this type of equipment in one of 

the most difficult environments in the world. I was extremely skeptical of trying to use air-cushion vehicles over beaches until the state of 

the art had been greatly improved. To justify this position, one has 

only to review the maintenance records of the air-cushion vehicles 

currently assigned to Fort Story, Virginia, a satellite of Fort Eustis. 

Most of our transportation TO&E units at Fort Eustis did not 

belong to TRADOC, even though they were located at a TRADOC 

installation. They belonged to FORSCOM because of the mission for 

which they had been organized and trained. Most were actually a part 

of the Army's XVIII Airborne Corps' fast depJoyment forces, under 

its operational control in many respects. So we looked to the XVIII 
156 TRANSPORTATION AND LOGISTICS: ONE MAN'S STORY 

Corps for much of the command and control. As members of the fast 

deployment forces, they were required to maintain a very high state of 

readiness and periodically they were put on the alert. During these 

exercises, the entire post helped to check out the units to be sure they 

met the deployment requirements- an excellent training procedure. 

Worki ng with the Logistics Center and the three other logistics 

schools to prepare doctrine and training required a great deal of attention. It required many meetings and some traveling, but the task was 

interesting and helpful for all of us. Occasionally, we would meet with 

the Combat Arms Center to coordinate logistics doctrine with combat 

doctrine at Fort Monroe under the direct supervision of the TRADOC 

commander, General DePuy. 

Working with the local community surrounding Fort Eustis, 

another important task, consumed a great deal of my time and effort. 

I believed then, and still do, in the importance of maintaining a good 

relationship with our civilian community. In the final analysis, we in 

the military work for them. They are our bosses and the ones who 

provide all the assets we so badly need. 

l was on very good terms with our local congressman, Thomas 

Downing of the first district in Virginia. We met frequently, both 

socially and for business. Tom frequently came to me to ask for assistance on community projects. Tom never asked me to do something 1 

did not believe was proper or legal. If Tom had to take a stand that 

was not to our liking, he would always tell m.e beforehand, and I 

would understand. 

We assisted the community in cleaning up the area by moving out 

j unked vehicles. This activity helped the peni nsu la, Gloucester 

County, and the southern part of the Delmarva peninsula. The cleanup provided good equipment training for our terminal service companies and for our transportation truck companies. The units understood 

what they were doing, and they received not only training but a great 

deal of satisfaction supporting the projects. The citizens of the communities where we worked were always friendly and would go out of 

their way to assist, often providing food and soft drinks during our 

work. 

When I assumed command of Fort Eustis in January 1973, my 

wife and I also embarked on a program to improve the appearance of 

the post. When we first saw Fort Eustis in 1947, it was a dreadful 

sight. During the last couple of years of World War II, the fort had 

been used as an Italian POW camp. The barracks and most of the 

buildings, World War I and II temporary structures, had been painted 

black and were enclosed by barbed wire. Although the land is completely flat and will always be, it was also desolate looking without 

shrubs and trees. Although the appearance of the buildings at the fort 
RUNNING FORT EUSTIS 157 

improved some over the years, by the time we returned for our third 

tour the landscape was still very bleak. 

My wife and I initiated several projects to relieve this demoralizing prospect. We obtained funds to accomplish considerable landscaping, including planting a great many small trees. My wife also began a 

memorial tree planting program. The officers and noncommissioned 

officers wives clubs helped her to solicit $25.00 donations for trees 

tagged with the donor's name. Georgia convinced me that we badly 

needed a professionally designed landscape plan before we started to 

plant trees and shrubs. 

With the assistance of the post engineer and his post agronomist, 

Mr. Tony Rizzio, a proposal was prepared and a contractor was hired 

to carry out a basic landscape plan. The results have continued to 

inspire all subsequent base commanders to continue implementing the 

landscaping plan. Not all the trees came from appropriated fundsGeorgia 's memorial tree fund generated many plantings in remote 

areas of the post and, through the efforts of her volunteers, generated a 

great deal of interest by most post personnel. 

In recounting one's life and career, it is natural to concentrate on 

one's official life and official duties, overlooking the contributions 

one's family made. As I look back on my career, I feel 1 should highlight the role a family can play in an officer's career, especially the 

contributions made to the Army by the many Army wives who have 

volunteered their time and services to activities on the post and in the 

civilian community. 

The Army makes unusual demands on wives and mothers. My 

wife raised our five children a lmost entirely on her own. During most 

of my career, the Army became involved in a war every five or six 

years, from World War Il through the Vietnam War. I was overseas in 

World War II, the Korean War, and Vietnam for a total of over seven 

years. Even when stateside and living with the family, 1 would spend 

many overtime hours in the office or away on travel. None of this 

seemed to adversely affect Georgia's excellent job carrying out the 

difficult family responsibilities. 

One frequently hears the comment that Army life, with its constant moving and changing schools, adversely affects the children. It 

is frequently cited as the reason for problems with family or children. 

ln our case, and for many other military families we know, this aspect 

of Army life has added benefits. Our children have been broadened by 

their travels and have made many friends, including some overseas. 

Army families tend to be very close knit and often seem to devote a 

lot of time enjoying each other's company. 

My wife, like many Army wives, has always approached new 

assignments as new opportunities for her and our children to gain 
158 TRANSPORTATION AND LOGISTICS: ONE MAN'S STORY 

knowledge. This was especially true whenever we traveled outside the 

United States. Georgia always looked to the future rather than the 

past. She accepted any hardships she had undergone as part of the 

price for having new opportunities. Our children have absorbed this 

attitude and it is apparent in all their actions. 

Wives of officers have the opportunity to take part in Army community life. Georgia was a real professional at recruiting and supervising volunteers. She enlisted volunteers from officers and enlisted 

wives as well as from civilians both on and off the post. The volunteer 

jobs allowed us to undertake projects for which funds were never 

available to hire help. A commander in today's Army must rely on 

volunteers. 

Military wives volunteered and accomplished many useful programs for which we had no funds. For example, as many as eighty 

wives helped to operate our post information and support center. The 

center supported numerous voluntary projects such as orientation 

classes for newly assigned enlisted men and their wives on the various post facilities and activities. They explained the advantages of 

using the conunissary, post exchange, and local theaters. They helped 

young families find living quarters off post, if necessary, and provided information on where to shop. It was amazing how many young 

soldi ers and their young wives, often with small children, would 

arrive with littl e or no knowledge about how to open a checking 

account or even how to write a check, let alone where to go for health 

care for themselves and their families. 

The wives also provided volunteers for the American Red Cross, 

the post hospital, and many other services on the post. They contribute a great deal to community life on a military installation and, of 

course, all without pay. 

Georgia had become very much involved with this volunteer 

work, starting during our early assignments at Fort Eustis. She 

became very good friends with the wives of the senior officers on the 

post which gave me social access to these officers that I would not 

otherwise have had. 

When I took command of the 53d Truck Battalion in Germany, 

our battalion area, especially the headquarters area, was very unattractive. To remedy this, Georgia and several other volunteer wives 

landscaped and planted the area. Their very noticeable improvements 

led to an amazing number of compliments from officers and enlisted 

personnel in the battalion. 

As my career progressed, Georgia continued her activity in garden 

clubs, both on and off military posts. As a member, Georgia met and 

often became good friends with civilian community leaders. Through 

her contacts, we both developed good friends in the community long 
RUNNING FORT EUSTIS 159 

before T could have through military contacts alone. This had been 

especially true during our various assignments at Fort Eustis. Because 

of her efforts, when we arrived back at Fort Eustis and I took command in 1973, we received an extremely cordial welcome from leaders in Newport News, Will iamsburg, Yorktown, and Gloucester 

County. 

Georgia is very talented at gardening, landscaping, flower arranging, and many other art forms. She augmented her natural talents with 

college courses. One needs only to compare Fort Eustis when we saw 

it in the 1940s devoid of trees and its appearance when we departed in 

1976. Today, mainly due to Georgia and her volunteers, it is a beautiful, tree-covered post. Her contribution is well known by most members of Fort Eustis and the surrounding civi lian communities. 

As our children grew older, they also contributed much to both 

our on- and off-post life. Tlu-ough their friends, we met severa l civilians we would otherwise never have k110wn. Some became our best 

friends in retirement. 

DeLong pier with overhead tramway during training on James River, circa 

1957. 
Colonel Fuson, Conunander, 55th Transportation Battalion, receives a safety 

briefing at 501 st Transportation Company. 
Sunday night meeting of Transportation Corps colonels, Saigon; below, 

Gate 1, Headquarters, 4th Transportation Command, Saigon. 
Colonel Fuson surveys operations at Saigon port; below, aerial view of 

Saigon port. 
Operation L EX INGTON, LCU unloading, 1966; below, l 099th Transportation 

Company LCM in Saigon port, 1966. 

1 
Colonel Fuson escorts General Beach, CTNCUSARPAC, during water tour of 

Saigon port; below, Secretary of Defense McNamara meets with Ellsworth 

Bunker, U.S. Ambassador, and General Westmoreland in Saigon, 1967. 
Colonel Fuson briefs General Westmoreland during tour of port of 

Saigon, 1967. 
Brigadier General Fuson visits U.S. Army Transportation Command, 

Japan, 1968; below, USARPAC retrograde operations: M-48s await 

loading, circa 1971. 
USARPAC retrograde operations: Da Nang port and PDO lot, circa 1971. 
General Fuson promoting boating safety as Conunander, Fort Eustis, 1974; 

below, Mrs. Fuson landscaping at Fort Eustis, circa J 975. 
General Fuson, DCSLOG, speaking to the American Logistics Association 

meeting. 

CHAPTER 13 

Army Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics 

After serving as commanding general of Fort Eustis from 

1973- 1975, I heard that I might be reassigned to Department of the 

Army as the deputy chief of staff for logistics. I really wasn't ready to 

leave Fort Eustis; we hadn't finished all the projects we had undetway. 

But one can never pass up the opportunity for a bigger job and a promotion. The rumors soon proved to be true, and I was interviewed by 

the Army chief of staff, General Weyand, the secretary of the Army, 

the deputy secretary of defense, and the secretary of defense. After 

the interviews, I learned that the Senate had cleared my confirmation 

for promotion to lieutenant general and that I was to report for duty in 

Washington. 

Leaving Eustis in the hands of Maj. Gen. Alton G. Post, my wife 

and 1 moved to Quarters Five at Fort Myer, Virginia. On the top of a 

hill overlooking Washington, D.C., this was the most dramatic setting 

we had ever occupied. 

My several years on the DCSLOG staff gave me an understanding 

of the job and increased my pleasure in the assignment. My experience in logistics at all levels in the field would help me in this new 

assignment. Because I had never been assigned to the Army Materiel 

Command, I was still inexperienced in the wholesale logistics system. 

But I also knew that in the DCSLOG job I would spend a great deal 

more time with the retail system. 

I failed to anticipate the amount of frustration I would encounter 

in the job. During my previous assignments as the d_irector of transportation and then as the assistant DCSLOG for personnel, doctrine, 

and systems, I had been free from frustration. 

During my previous tour, the Office of the DCSLOG consisted of 

over 1,000 personnel, with another 500 in what is now called the 

Logistics Evaluation Agency (LEA). At that time the DCSLOG managed three large jobs: procurement, the Army's worldwide real estate, 

and the Army's operations and maintenance function. For each of 

these, the DCSLOG prepared the budgets, testified before Congress, 

and had a great deal to do with controlling expenditures of money 

throughout the Army. In Washington, if you prepare the budget and 

have some control over how the money is spent, you have clout. With 
174 TRANSPORTATION AND LOGISTICS: ONE MAN'S STORY 

this clout you attract the attention of the major commands as you go 

about your business as DCSLOG. Without this kind of clout, you have 

absolutely no audience. 

While I was in USARPAC, the DCSLOG had lost these major 

responsibilities and the personne l that went with them. When I 

returned to DCSLOG, its strength was around 400. The LEA had also 

been reduced in personnel and responsibilities. 

One of the first things 1 did was to review Volume 1, the summary 

volume, of the Brown Board study. As I had suspected, the Army had 

gone in a direction opposite to that recommended by the study. 

Instead of placing one person in charge of the Army logistics system 

and centralizing management, the Army had decentralized more and 

scattered logistics functions and responsibilities throughout the staff. 

This redirection was the result of another study carried out by 

Undersecretary of the Army Herman R. Staudt. 1 understood at the 

time that the change had occurred because Secretary of Defense 

James R. Schlesinger had a strong dislike for the Army Materiel 

Command. I never learned the basis for his strong feelings, but before 

my interview with Schlesinger for promotion, General Weyand had 

coached me to listen carefully as the secretary berated AMC and to 

keep my mouth shut. Having worked for General Weyand in Vietnam 

in MACV as his J4, I knew him well and had the greatest respect for 

his advice. 

During my interview, Secretary Schlesinger spent about thirty 

minutes elaborating on all the faults of AMC, and he wanted to know 

what I was going to do about it. Fortunately he never gave me an 

opportunity to respond, because at that tiJ11e I didn't have the slightest 

idea about the problems at AMC nor if I could do anything about 

them. As it turned out, I had absolutely no authority over the Axmy 

Materiel Command, nor did it ask for my advice or assistance, or even 

my cooperation. 

The reorganization had occurred during the tour of my predecessor, Lt. Gen. Fred Kornet. Fred had spent his entire time fighting the 

reorganization without success. When I first met with General 

Weyand, he told me about Kornet's struggle, but since the decision 

had been made, he didn't want me to reopen it. I agreed not to. 

When faced with a logistics problem that I could not solve, I 

wou ld go to General Weyand or his vice chief, General Walter T. 

Kerwin, Jr. They were both supportive, but because they were busy 

with other problems I could not spend much time worrying them with 

logistics matters. Also, many of my problems were the result of the 

organizational changes. 

During 1975, the U.S. military had just pulled out of Vietnam 

and was in the process of reorganizing for the future. Because the 
ARMYDCSLOG 175 

services had devoted so much time and so many resources to 

Vietnam for ten years, the rest of the forces had suffered. The imbalance had to be rectified. 

The challenges of the mid-1970s were multiple. First, the Army 

and the other services had to rely on the all-volunteer force for the 

first time. The military could no longer depend on the draft. This new 

system appeared fraught with uncertainties. I had a lready had some 

successes in this area, with the Transportation Corps all-volunteer 

program, while commanding Fort Eustis. 

Second, during the ten years of Vietnam, much of our training had 

been neglected. The Army was now working hard to upgrade and 

update all of its training. The new teclmology required that all curricula 

be updated. 

Third, the importance and the needs of the individual soldier and 

his family had also been neglected. Command and leadership at all 

levels had to be reviewed, upgraded, and improved. 

The Army had to move away from the crisis management attitude 

developed during the Vietnam War. All of these problems and many 

more had to be addressed during this post-Vietnam period when the 

Army was also undergoing severe budget constraints. This was the 

environment l faced as DCSLOG. 

1 had identified many actions that I wanted to initiate to get the 

Army logistics system back together to operate as a single, integrated 

system that would support the soldier in the field. These actions were 

not possible because many senior Army leaders did not want to see 

the Army logistics system centralized as it had been under the 

Technical Services. They still remembered the amount of authority 

each Technical Service chief possessed, as well as his personal congressional support and his friends in the military-industrial complex. 

The Army leaders also remembered the parochialism that existed in 

the old system. 

Yet, as Army equipment becomes more and more complex (as is 

rapidly happening today) logistics expertise becomes even more 

important. Both the Brown Board and the more recent Joint Logistics 

Review Board (the Besson Board) recommended that the Army put 

someone in charge of its logistics system so that the system could perform more effective ly, more efficiently, and more economically. 

During my tour as DCSLOG I briefed everyone, from the secretary of 

the Army on down, on this premise. I lectured the students in all the 

service schools, but without success. Apparently I did not have the 

ability to articulate this concept and its importance to the Army. 

1 did not feel strongly that the DCSLOG should be in charge of 

the logistics system, as the Brown Board had recommended. It could 

very well have been the commanding general of the Army Materiel 
176 TRANSPORTATION AND LOGISTiCS: ONE MAN'S STORY 

Command, if he was given enough help and authority, but some one 

person had to be in charge. In the final analysis, AMC had the real 

expertise in logistics. This had certainly become evident during the 

Vietnam War. AMC provided the expert assistance in Vietnam, 

Taiwan, Japan, and Okinawa, using both their direct hire civilians and 

their contract personnel. 

The Army also faced another particularly disturbing dilemma. We 

were told that we had to reduce the number of support troops in the 

active force and rely on Reserve and National Guard support units 

instead. Several senior Army leaders used the term reduction of "tooth 

to tail," meaning the reduction of service support troops while maintaining the strength of the combat troops. Senator Sam Nunn initiated 

the legislation that created this shift, known as the Nunn Amendment. 

The number of active support troops continued to reduce for some 

time thereafter as more and more active duty support troops were 

replaced with Reserve and National Guard troops. 

Soon after 1 became DCSLOG, we updated our annual program 

and spelled out the various actions the staff and l thought we should 

continue to pursue. We attempted to briefly describe the goal of each 

project and the period of time it should require for completion. At 

monthly program reviews the staff was briefed on the status of each 

project and, if needed, provided additional guidance. These q1eetings 

allowed everyone to know what logistics activities were taking place in 

DCSLOG and in the Army. We used the Logistics Master Plan, which 

General Heiser initiated in 1972, to demonstrate how each program 

contributed to our overall objectives. 

In my opinion, one of the more important projects was formalizing integrated logistics support (ILS) and publishing the Army regulations governing ILS. Many considered that paying attention to eventual logistics support during the development process was unnecessary 

and, in fact, a hindrance to development of combat weapons. 

The objective of ILS programs is to influence the design of 

materiel systems hardware and software to ensure that personnel will 

be able to operate, maintain, and support the system. ILS also promotes advanced training, so that the weapon can be maintained by the 

time it has been produced, and sees that any special tools and the necessary test, measurement, and diagnostic equipment (TMDE) is available when the weapon is operational. It ensures that training manuals 

are prepared in time for personnel training and that packaging, handling, transportability, standardization, interoperability, and other such 

requirements, affecting the logistics supportability and life cycle costs 

of the equipment, are considered. 

ILS requires that all these facets of a weapon be reviewed at every 

stage of its development to improve operational readiness and reduce 
ARMY DCSLOG 177 

operating costs. The goal of ILS is to provide equipment that soldiers 

can effectively and efficiently maintain in the field. Although DOD had 

directed the services to implement ILS sometime earlier, the research 

and development community of the Army had not been enthusiastic. 

The Logistics Evaluation Agency in New Cumberland, 

Pennsylvania, spent a great deal of time and resources maintaining 

close oversight on all R&D projects to ensure that ILS was being considered. They briefed me periodically, along with my staff, on these 

developments so we could voice any concerns as each new system 

was briefed up through the staff for final approval or rejection. The 

only problem was that our comments and objections were usually 

voices in the wilderness. My vote, only one among ten or twelve other 

principal staff members, seldom made any difference. 

The general approach of most of the key personnel, especially 

contractors, was to develop the weapon system first and correct any 

logistics deficiencies later. Write the training publications and worry 

about life-cycle costs later. Because of this attitude, many weapon 

systems were developed, tested, and fielded with major deficiencies 

that should have been corrected during development. 

The promoters of the division air defense (DIVAD) system 

became such strong advocates of the weapon, as frequently occurs, 

that they continued to push DIY AD in the face of all sorts of performance problems. It was a terrible shame that finally it required that 

the secretary of defense step in to stop development in spite of all the 

tests that DlVAD had failed. 

During this period, we also attempted to standardize the TMDE 

for all newly developed weapons systems so that the same test equipment could be used at all echelons of maintenance for more than one 

piece of equipment. A standardized TMDE would simplify the supply 

system and be more cost effective. But here again, contractors for 

weapon systems were permitted to develop or procure unique TMDE 

for each new weapon system, rather than use a standard system 

already available, if it would do the job. Army policies on standardized test equipment had little or no effect on the R&D community and 

they were permitted to proceed. 

This practice was the reason J felt strongly that procurement and 

production should be separated from R&D as they previously had been 

under DCSLOG. This would allow for disinterested experts to overview 

the R&D project and its advocates during the development phase. This 

oversight had been the responsibility of DCSLOG, working with the 

assistant secretary of the Army for installations and logistics, before the 

Staudt Study in 1973 and 1974. 

When General Heiser was the DCSLOG and I was his Assistant 

DCSLOG for Personnel Doctrine and Systems, he initiated periodic 
178 TRANSPORTATION AND LOGISTICS: ONE MAN'S STORY 

meetings of the Logistics System Policy Council. The meetings were 

first held in Washington, but after the Logistics Center was established at Fort Lee, Virginia, the meetings were moved there. As 

DCSLOG I continued to hold the meetings, attended by the director 

of the Logistics Center, the directors of the four logistics center commands, and the DCSLOGs from each major Army command. We 

would hold briefings on current topics in logistics and discuss problems of concern to the council members. The meetings were always 

informative and helpful. 

As DCSLOG, General Heiser had also initiated quarterly meetings with the General Accounting Office. These meetings had 

stopped during my absence from DCSLOG, but I renewed them. The 

key personnel in the GAO concerned with Army logistics were still 

in their jobs, and I was well acquainted with them. We would brief 

GAO on our major logistics concerns and ask for their comments. 

They would, in turn, brief us on all GAO reviews or audits under way 

that concerned Army logistics and update us on the status of such 

projects. 

These meetings prepared us for publication of their formal 

reports, and we knew when they would arrive at the Department of 

Defense and the Army. By the time the report was published, we had 

initiated corrective action. In many cases, our comments while their 

reports and reviews were in progress prevented errors or misconceptions from being published. 

While 1 was DCSLOG, the Army continued to have problems 

with its automated systems. We had a separate Logistics Systems 

Division that worked closely with the LEA and all the major commands to develop and implement some sixteen separate Department 

of the Army Standard Automated Logistics Systems. Our automation 

group tasked various agencies for support, managed policy, and coordinated the interfaces and standardization actions required. The sixteen logistics systems were in various stages of development and 

implementation Army-wide. 

One obstacle that had existed while I was ADCSLOG (PDS) 

persisted after I became DCSLOG- my inability to convince the 

expert logistics functional staff, both those in my office as well as 

those in the field, that they had to take an active part in the design of 

automated systems. The logistics experts continued to let data processing personnel design systems without their input. As a result, 

the created software products did not provide the type of information and reports that the functional logistics people needed to manage logistics properly. The information system experts designed systems to serve their own purposes and not necessarily to help the 

logistics functional people. 
ARMYDCSLOG 179 

A few years ago, General Heiser and I returned to ODCSLOG as 

consultants to GAO and asked to be updated on their automated supply, maintenance, and transportation systems. The briefing room was 

full of action officers. As the briefing progressed, Heiser and I continually asked functional type questions without receiving any functional 

type answers. Finally, 1 stopped the briefing to ask if any functional 

personnel- people who actually did the work-from supply, maintenance, or transportation divisions were in the room. Not a hand went 

up. All of the action officers were from the information staff. This type 

of costly failure has much to do with the asset visibility inaccuracies 

that exist throughout the Army's supply system. 

Foreign military sales and grant aid were very important at the 

time. Over the years the emphasis has shifted from grant aid to military sales. We were supporting many countries, especially in the 

Middle East, that had the cash to buy the weapons they wanted. Now 

that the Vietnam War was over and we were drastically cutting back 

on our forces and equipment, our industrial base was being reduced. 

The military sa les to foreign countries provided an excellent means of 

maintaining our industrial base, which was to our advantage. 

We also supported our North Atlantic Treaty Organization 

(NATO) allies with military sales. We worked closely with the 

Germans on cooperative logistics and tried to expand cooperative 

logistics to al l NATO countries, an extreme ly difficult task. 

Domestically, none of the services wants to depend on another service 

for logistics support; each feels the other really does not understand 

its special problems. Similarly, each country in NATO feels strongly 

that logistics is a national responsibility. No country wants to depend 

on another country for this support. In addition, each wants to support 

its own industrial base to the maximum. 

Our NATO allies frequently used the term "two-way street." This 

meant that each country should be able and authorized to contribute 

equally. Unfortunately, the U.S. industry, with its political clout, insisted that every weapon system in the U.S. military forces be Americanmade, even though Germany or another NATO country had a similar 

system already available that was just as good. U.S. industry had 

become used to this in the years after World War I I when we were the 

only country capable of developing weapons. Now that our allies 

could also produce equipment, they wanted their share of the market. 

For this reason, they did not see the United States participating fairly; 

they believed it was a one-way street. They were correct. 

Each NATO country with forces deployed in Europe planned to 

independently provide logistics support to its forces. As noted earlier, 

the fact that all had to share the one transportation system presented a 

problem. The commercial rail, highway, and waterway systems of 
180 TRANSPORTATION AND LOGISTICS: ONE MAN'S STORY 

France, Germany, and the Benelux countries wound have to support all 

troop movements. But each NATO country planned to use this one system separately, rather than cooperatively. They all recognized the problem and NATO created many boards, committees, and planning groups 

to work on it. If a war came, someone had to be in charge of movement 

planning and movement control. But such a control management system, including all NATO countries, was never established. 

At one time our staff, working with the transportation community 

in NATO, developed a centrally managed system that was accepted by 

the top military planners in NATO. For the first time, we would have a 

unified NATO transportation movement planning and control system. 

lt looked as though we might be taking the first step in overcoming 

one of the long-term problems of NATO logistics management. 

Our plan was agreed to all the way across Europe until it reached 

the German government, which killed the project. German leaders 

saw the plan as an American ploy to obtain financial support from the 

other countries rather than each country providing its equal share. 

Later, in 1977, General Heiser would recommend a similar transportation movement control plan, described in his chapter on logistics, as 

part of the NATO long-term defense plan.• 

During this period, the NATO procedures for host nation support 

were being developed. Host nation support had been based upon 

bilateral agreements between each NATO country and the nation in 

which its troops were stationed or through which its troops would 

move. The host nation provided transportation and other logistics 

support functions on a reimbursable basis. 

We faced another major problem as a result of the Vietnam War. 

For many years, we had operated bases all over the Pacific to support 

Vietnam. This support created large stocks of supplies and equipment, especially ammunition, in Okinawa, Japan, Korea , and 

Thailand. Our war plans in the Pacific had changed drastically; consequently, we did not have a justification for much of this ammunition. Other ammunition in Japan and Korea had been left over from 

the Korean War, and some was no longer of the type our Army used. 

However, the South Korean and Japanese forces could still use much 

of the ammunition and they were extremely hesitant for us to remove 

it from their countries. 

The Pacific Utilization and Redistribution Agency (PURA) had 

withdrawn a lot of excess supplies and distributed them worldwide, 

but there still remained a large surplus of ammunition. To continue to 

operate these Pacific facilities and to maintain the supplies, equipment, and ammunition was extremely expensive. S ince we were trying 

to draw down and reduce our costs, this overhead had to be reduced. 

1 Sec Heiser, A Soldier Supporting Soldiers, Chapter 12. 
ARMYDCSLOG 181 

Our major problem was that we did not have a firm basis for how 

much needed to be removed or where to store it. This excess included 

operating stocks, war reserve stocks, project stocks, and so forth. 

Our mission in Thailand was changing completely. There we 

experienced major coordination problems with the Air Force and the 

Navy about ammunition. What was our future to be in Thailand? I discussed this with Lt. Gen. Edward C. Meyer, the deputy chief of staff 

for operations and plans (DCSOPS) at the time, who suggested that 

we perform a joint study to determine future missions in the Pacific 

and to redo our overall war plans. This would create a firm basis for 

estimating our personnel, equipment, and supply needs. 

The study, called WESTPAC III, would set the posture for U.S. 

Army forces in the Paci fie during fiscal years 1978- 1982. In October 

1975, the Army chief of staff provided guidance to DCSOPS and 

DCSLOG to initiate this in-depth review of logistics forces and supporting bases in the Pacific, our participation in Northeast Asia, and 

our ability to support the evolving Forward Defense Strategy in South 

Korea. 

On 6 May 1976, the chief of staff approved the actions suggested in WESTPAC III. Realignment of forces occurred in Japan, South 

Korea, and Hawaii, while U.S. forces in Thailand were reduced 

based upon the Thailand government's demands for the complete 

withdrawal of U.S. forces except for the Joint U.S. Military 

Assistance Group. 

After WESTPAC III, we began to relocate our stocks and to 

declare supplies, equipment, and many installations as surplus. The 

South Korean government felt strongly that we should not remove our 

ammunition from their country, even though it exceeded our needs. 

Apprehensive about the intentions of the North Koreans, the South 

Koreans wanted to hold all the ammunition they could. 

After a trip to Korea to discuss this approach, we determined that 

the best and most economical solution to the problem was to have the 

Koreans take over the excess ammunition and operate the facilities 

under a joint ownership arrangement. We would leave only a few U.S. 

personnel to ensure that the Koreans lived up to the agreement. This 

was the most economical approach for us. It would cost a lot more to 

move it out of the country or dispose of it than to leave it. To the best 

of my knowledge, the Koreans still operate and maintain these facilities and the ammunition. We worked out a similar solution in Japan 

and Thailand, where we were in the process of giving up facilities and 

stocks for which we had no requirement. 

I continued the same futi le efforts to focus general staff attention 

on the Military Traffic Management Command (MTMC), formerly 

the Military Traffic Management and Terminal Service, that I had 
182 TRANSPORTATION AND LOGISTICS: ONE MAN'S STORY 

initiated during my earlier tour in the Office of the DCSLOG 

(described in Chapter 10). 

After being DCSLOG for a I ittle over two yea rs, J rapidly 

approached my mandatory retirement date. With 35 years in the U.S. 

Army, I handed in my papers and retired- a very sad day in my life. 

But all good things come to an end. 
CHAPTER14 

Retirement and the General Accounting Office 

I spent the first six months of my retirement resting and traveling. 

My wife and I spent two months in Hawaii and moved our permanent 

home from Falls Church to Gloucester, Virginia. I began to explore 

the possibilities of consulting work. 

I was offered several consulting jobs by the various study groups 

or think tanks in the Washington area, but these did not prove satisfactory. Often the main reason for asking my participation was to 

help them land defense business. I did not approve of this, had 

opposed the practice by retired officers while I was still on active 

duty, and certainly didn't want to follow the same conrse. 

Retired General Heiser, who had been consulting for the U.S. 

General Accounting Office (GAO), asked me to assist the GAO as a 

consultant. Heiser had spent a lot of time doing this and enjoyed it, 

but he had become more and more involved with Defense 

Department/NATO tasks. In early 1978, I began consulting one or two 

days a week at the GAO. This consulting work allowed me to keep in 

touch with some of the same Army projects with which I had been 

involved for many years, working with many of the Army military and 

c ivilian logisticians. By keeping abreast of all the Army logistics 

reviews and audits being conducted in the General Accounting Office, 

I could help the Army by ensuring that the GAO action officers 

understood the Army areas they were reviewing and received accurate 

data. 

I also encouraged the deputy chief of staff for logistics to meet periodically with the senior logistics personnel in GAO, as I had done in the 

past. This cooperation has always worked to our mutua l advantage. 

I continued this consultation with the General Accounting Office 

for eight years, and enjoyed every minute of it. The GAO personnel 

were very professional, honest, and extremely conscientious. But after 

eight years I found that I had lost touch with the Army's logistics 

operations and that someone more recently retired should take my 

place. I gave up my consultant job with GAO in late 1986. 

During these years, I continued to review past and present audits 

and reports on the Army's logistics system made by the GAO, the 

Army Audit Agency, and the Office of the Secretary of Defense. 
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY 

General 

Staff 

Special 

Staff 

Technical 

Services 

Field 

Commands 

Figure 1. Army Organization Before 1962 and Project 80 

These reports continued to reiterate that the Army logistics system 

was neither organized nor managed effectively and efficiently for 

either peace or war. Certainly, the Army was not just ignoring these 

findings and recommendations, but rather, there must have been a 

more basic reason that the trend continued. Budget restraints contributed to the problem in peacetime, but lack of money was not the 

only cause. The same deficiencies had existed during the Vietnam 

War when money was not a factor. 

In my opinion, the Army is not organized properly to solve its 

problems. If the U.S. were suddenly thrown into a major war, the 

Army support system would have to be reorganized as it was for both 

world wars, but next time I don't believe time would be available. 

What is the basis for this statement? To answer this question requires 

a short review of history. 

In 1962 and J 972, two major Army reorganizations occurred 

that have had major effects on this issue: Project 80 in 1962- 1963 

and Project Steadfast in 1972 1973. Before I 962 the Army had 

been organized along technical service lines for logistics as indicated in Figure 1. The seven Technical Services (Ordnance, 

Quartermaster, Signal, Engineer, Chem ical, Medical, and 
RETIREMENT & THE GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE 185 

Transportation) were each responsible for their own commodities 

and services worldwide. 

The chief of Ordnance, for example, had responsibility for the 

major war-making items such as guns, tanks, trucks, and ammunition. 

He went before Congress to obtain the authorizations and appropriations for these commodities and their support. In coordination with 

industry, the chief of Ordnance directed research and development 

and procurement of his commodities. The Ordnance department procured, stocked, stored, and issued the commodities worldwide. The 

chief of Ordnance was responsible for supply and maintenance of 

these commodities worldwide. He was also responsible for the doctrine, manuals, and procedures that governed system operation. He 

managed Ordnance personnel and training worldwide. 

The other chiefs performed the same functions for their commodities and services. Although they displayed their true expertise in their 

domestic base (military, civilians, and the large industrial base) they 

organized, trained, and deployed technical service units worldwide to 

support their systems in the field. They were responsible down to the 

forward edge of the division direct support units and, through this 

organization, coordinated with the combat units to assist them in their 

logistics mission. They operated and were responsible for this worldwide system, and they disciplined it. 

As it did under the Technical Services, the Army's logistics system still consists of four levels of support- organizational, direct, 

general, and depot: 

• At the combat unit level, equipment operators and 

unit mechanics perform organizational supply and 

maintenance. This level consists of mostly preventive 

maintenance and supply support. The companies and 

battalions are equipped for this level and nothing more. 

• Direct support is performed at the division level 

and consists mostly of repairs by replacing components and supply support. The division is authorized 

only the skills, tools, TMDE, and repair parts to perform this level of repair. 

• General support can be performed at corps and the 

higher headquarters for which the authorized skills, 

tools, TMDE, and repair parts are available to actually repair end items and components. 

• Depot level support is performed at the wholesale 

level and is generally located in the United States. 

This level overhauls and rebuilds components and 

weapon systems. For some commodities, general and 
186 TRANSPORTATION AND LOGISTICS: ONE MAN'S STORY 

depot level support have been combined and are performed by wholesale commodity commands either in 

the theater or in CONUS. 

Before 1962, the Technical Services performed direct, general, 

and depot support. (See Figure 2.) The chief of each Technical 

Service was completely in charge. As an administratively independent 

agency, each Tecl1nical Service controlled its own organizations, procedures, pers01mel, intelligence, training, and planning. Each had its 

own budget which, added together, accounted for well over half of the 

Army's appropriations. The Technical Services operated installations 

in many congressional districts, their principal sources of political 

support. Their dissimilarities were as marked as their similarities. 

They differed widely in their often archaic procedures which could 

generate a prodigious amount of red tape and make it difficult for the 

Department of the Army to control their operations and for industry to 

do business with them. 

The system also led to duplication and waste. Because it was 

almost impossible for the Army to manage, to coordinate, or to control their varied functions without a unified service or materiel command such as that set up during both world wars, the Technical 

Services were unpopular and had been for many years. The Army 

wanted to change from a system of seven different supply and maintenance systems to one, single functional system- a standard supply 

and maintenance system. (See Figure 3.) 

In 1962, Secretary McNamara approved implementation of 

Project 80, which caused many changes to the Army logistics system. 

It reorganized Army logistics along functional lines rather than separate technical service disciplines. It removed personnel and training 

responsibilities from the Technical Services and centralized them. It 

created three major commands in the continental United States, as 

indicated in Figure 3: one for training and forces management, one 

for combat development, and one for wholesale logistics management. Project 80 ignored the retail logistics system management and 

the necessary relationship between the producer and the consumer. 

An additional factor could not have been foreseen by McNamara 

or the Army. Immediately following this decision and before the 

Army could adjust to this drastic change and begin to solve the many 

problems it caused, the United States had become deeply involved in 

the Vietnam War. All else was sidetracked. 

Although OSD guidance had been broad, it had asked the Project 

80 study group jf the Technical Services were to be subordinate to a 

service command or were to be replaced by a research and development or materiel command. The study group observed that in the past 
MAINTENANCE UNIT LEVEL ACTIVITY 

COMBAT 1 ORGANIZATION PREVENTIVE 

SUPPORT MAINTENANCE 

ARMY -IN-THE-FIELD TECH 2 DIRECT DEFECTIVE 

SUPPORT UNITS 

TECH 3 GENERAL REPAIR 

SUPPORT 

CONUS TECH 4 DEPOT REBUILD/OVERHAUL 

Figure 2. Technical Services Maintenance Operations 

two world wars, the Army had to make major logistics organization 

changes at the last minute in order to successfully support the war 

efforts. The group further observed that the method used to coordinate 

support in both wars had been to make the Technical Services subordinate to a service-type command with both wholesale and retail 

Logistics responsibility. This was not politically popular with the 

Technical Services and their supporters. It worked with some success 

but was abandoned after both wars. 

The study group, apparently reflecting the strong dislike for the 

Technical Services and their methods of operation that permeated the 

Army and the Office of the Secretary of Defense, recommended 

against creating a service command to supervise the Technical 

Services. In fact, it advised the Army staff to get out of technical support operations because of the inevitable conflict between staff and 

conunand viewpoints. 

The study group believed the Teclmical Service chiefs were too 

isolated. The group especially criticized the Technical Services' personnel policies, recommending broader career opportunities for both 

military and civilian personnel. Referring again to the Technical 

Services, the group pointed out that the increasing complexity of 

weapon systems required greater flexibility in the assignment of peop le with specialized talents. Furthermore, under the Technical 

Services organization, training was fragmented among too many 

agencies. 

I find here a major lack of consistency in the study group's findings. On one hand, they link the need for better utilization of personnel and better training management to the need for more technical 

skills. They apparently hoped to solve this problem by creating generalists rather than specialists. They hoped to manage people better 

by centrali zation regardless of skills required, rather than allowing 

the Technical Services, with their specialized talents, to continue to 

manage and train technical people to perform highly technical jobs. 
Combat 

Developments 

Command( CDC) 

DOCTRINE 

ORGANIZATION 

MATERIEL 

REQUIREMENTS 

OPERATIONAL 

TEST 

Continental Army 

Command 

(CON ARC) 

RESERVE UNITS 

ARMY TRAINING 

CENTERS 

Army Materiel 

Command (AMC) 

R&D 

TESTING 

PROCUREMENT 

DEPOT 

LOGISTICS 

Figure 3. Department of the Army Organization After Project 80 

As a result of Project 80, the U.S. Army reorganized its entire 

structure. With two exceptions the Technical Servkes were abolished. 

Their service support missions, functions, and responsibilities, along 

with similar missions and functions of the combat Army were reassigned to the U.S. Continental Army Command, whose missions and 

responsibilities were broadened. Some were reassigned to the Army 

Materie l Command or the Combat Developments Command, the two 

new commands. Others were assigned to the theater army commands. 

Figure 3 displays the post-organization Army major commands and 

their primary functions. 

CDC was responsibl e for determining materiel req uirements 

based on how the Army was to fight and how it should support itself 

in the field . These support functions previously had been the responsibility of the Technical Services. CON ARC, with its newly acquired 

service schools, was to translate the CDC concepts and doctrine into 

tra ining manuals and procedures for both individuals and units and to 

provide the appropriate school training. Training was another responsibi lity formerly performed by technical service units. Finally, the 

wholesale, or producer, part of the Technical Services was regrouped 

under AMC. AMC was given responsibilities for the CONUS wholesale base only; at the time it had no retail responsibilities overseas or 

for the Army in the field. The theater commanders were responsible 

for operating their own systems, independent from the CONUS 

wholesale base. 
RETIREMENT & THE GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE l 89 

Almost immediately the Army's logistics system switched from 

seven standard, well-disciplined systems worldwide, to functional 

organizations in each theater that were separated from their wholesale 

base. Overnight, a wall was placed between the wholesale CONUS 

base and each army in the field. The CONUS base continued to operate the wholesa le system using its civil-military expertise, but the theater commanders had to maintain the complex equipment in the field 

with soldiers who had comparatively little training and expertise. This 

procedure was in accordance with doctrine and training supposedly 

developed by CDC and CONARC. 

As the Army did away with the Technical Services, they did away 

with a great deal of waste and duplication, but unknowingly also lost 

something very important and essential. The Army in the fie ld lost the 

much needed assistance of the industrial base. There was no one in 

charge of the total system! That's the way we fought the Vietnam War. 

The one exception was aviation, new again to the Army and terribly important and expensive. Army aviation units had been among the 

first deployed to Vieh1am in 1961 and initially had poor logistics support. As a result the aviation system soon reverted to the vertical-type 

support resembling the structure of the old Technical Services. The 

wholesaler, AMC, with its commodity command for aviation, was told 

to go into the field, to get into Vietnam with whatever part of the aviation support community was necessary, including the industrial base, 

and to design a supply, maintenance, and support system for aviation 

based upon requirements at the flight line. 

The resulting vertical weapon support system did not bring with it 

the previously unpopular bureaucratic approach. Support personnel 

consisted of soldiers, a few direct-hire civilians, and much conh·actor 

support. This was necessary because the Army could only train soldiers to a certain proficiency level in order to get them to Vietnam for 

a year, the statutory tour length for the Vietnam War, then return them 

to the United States and discharge them. 

In order to maintain the expensive helicopters, the Army had to use 

large numbers of contractor personnel with the real expertise in maintaining aviation equipment. In order to support aviation equipment in 

Vietnam, certain depot-type functions had to be performed in the theater. To support aviation, the Aviation Command procured a deep-draft 

ship, the C01pus Christi Bay, that carried required maintenance equipment on board. The necessary maintenance personnel, both military and 

civilian, were assigned to the ship and the ship was moved to Vietnam 

waters. The Co1pus Christi Bay moved from the Cam Ranh Bay up the 

coast to whatever area required its support. Damaged aircraft requiring 

maintenance beyond the capability of the C01pus Christi Bay were 

moved offshore or back to the United States for repair. 
Operational Test Concepts & 

& Evaluation I I Analysis 

Agency I DA I Agency 

Training & Forces Army Materiel 

Doctrine Command Command Command 

(TRADOC) (FORSCOM) (AMC) 

I-SCHOOLS I-COMMODITY 

I-TRAINING 

r I COMMANDS 

CENTERS I-PROVING 

f.- DOCTRINE 

r ~ Installations I GROUNDS 

I-ORGANIZATION CONUS I-R&D 

'-MATERIEL Armies I-TESTING 

REQUIREMENTS 

L ACTIVE UNITS 

1-PROCUREMEN 

~ '-WHOLESALE 

LOGISTICS 

T 

RESERVE UNITS 

Figure 4. Organization for Department of the Army After Project Steadfast 

Medical support performed well in Vietnam because the Surgeon 

General had been exempted from Project 80. The Army Medical 

Corps continued to function as a Technical Service; it organized, 

trained, and assigned its medical supply and maintenance personnel. It 

continued to operate a standard, well-disciplined system worldwide. 

The Project 80 reorganization failed in many respects. lt did not 

recognize the importance of managing the producer and consumer 

systems as one. It created not one logistics system worldwide, but 

many uncoordinated and uncontrolled subsystems with no one in 

charge of the total system. It failed to recognize the difficulty of managing and training logistics specialists. In the end, Project 80 created 

larger, more damaging problems that prevented sound logistics organization and management. 

In 1973, Project Steadfast followed Project 80 and created another 

sweeping reorganization that continued to centralize the major Army 

functions. Figure 4 shows the realignment of functions in the three 

major Army commands already reorganized ten years earlier. 

Steadfast renamed the Combat Developments Command the Training 

and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), with combat development and 

training functions. The Continental Army Command became the 

Forces Command (FORSCOM) to manage active and reserve forces 

in CONUS. AMC remained unchanged. Additionally, all medical 

activities in the United States were centralized under the U.S. Army 

Health Services Command; strategic communications were unified 

under the U.S. Army Strategic Communications Command; and all 
RETIREMENT & THE GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE 191 

personnel functions were placed under the U.S. Army Military 

Personnel Center. 

Conspicuously absent from Project Steadfast's consideration was 

the major logistics problem in the Army, which had existed since 

Project 80 and the rigorous surgery it had caused. Throughout the 

Project Steadfast study, it must have been assumed that centralizing 

logistics management was less important than centralizing concepts, 

doctrine, and training for the Army in the field under TRADOC. 

Clearly, concepts, doctrine, and training for logistics at the organizational, direct, and general support levels must be coordinated closely with combat developers rather than with the depot or base level 

logistics developers. Nevertheless, the depot and other wholesale 

components must also be brought into the process. This point must be 

emphasized because it is the major difference in philosophy between 

the Army leadership and the logisticians; that is, whether to combine 

the total logistics system under one command or whether to break up 

the logistics elements between the CONUS-based wholesale and retail 

systems with logistics doctrine and management dispersed to the 

field. 

Project Steadfast established a logistics center at Fort Lee to 

coordinate the technical service schools in the development of logistics doctrine for the Army in the field, but it provided for little coordination between Fort Lee's work and the doctrine that AMC was 

developing for the wholesale system. Retail logistics doctrine was 

then developed independently from the wholesale logistics doctrine. 

Somehow the DCSLOG was supposed to coordinate these requirements; however, being a three-star general, the DCSLOG had littl e or 

no leverage over the TRADOC, AMC, or theater armies commanded 

by four-star generals. The major problems with the current Army 

logistics system stem from this basic difference in philosophy 

between the Army leadership and the logisticians. 

The Army leaders believe that the organizational, direct support, 

and general support levels of the field logistics system should be 

designed, developed, and implemented in the field with little or no 

coordination with the wholesale system. They believe this for two reasons: first, they apparently feel that the field logistic ian will better 

understand the user's problems, requirements, and environments; second, they fea r that the logisticians, if they get together, will design and 

operate a system for their own benefit rather than for the benefit of 

the combat units. This is valid critic ism! 

How can the Army correct this organizational problem? The 

Army must put together a tru ly experienced blue-ribbon study group 

similar to the Brown Board to examine the various support systems by 

function, commodity, and service. The Army should then develop a 
192 TRANSPORTATION AND LOGISTICS: ONE MAN'S STORY 

total logistics system, both centrally managed and responsive to the 

users in the field. Someone must be in charge of every aspect, either 

by function, commodity, or service. 

Personnel management is a more difficult problem to handle. 

Certainly the Army cannot afford or would not want to return to seven 

or eight different systems such as existed with the Technical Services; 

however, logistics managers must be more intimately involved in the 

management and training of logistics personnel. Here again, a study 

group is required to produce a solution. 
CHAPTER 15 

Persistent Transportation Logistics Problems 

Reflecting on my more than thirty-five years experience in Army 

logistics, l find both strengths and weaknesses in the Army support 

system. Although logistics functions at both the strategic and the 

operational levels of war, its effect on tactics, although indirect, is 

also powerful. In many cases, transportation, a subdiscipline of logistics, can be key because it is this function, along with communications, that links the three levels of war together and often produces 

the success which strategy, operations, or tactics, however brilliantly 

conceived and executed, could not achieve alone. 

lntransit Asset Visibility 

Throughout my early years in transportation, at the Transportation 

School, in Pacific transportation units, in Europe, and during support 

of combat operations in Korea and Vietnam, I was taught and 

observed the importance of port and beach clearance of incoming 

supply items as a vital part of the operations of the overseas line of 

communication. This clearance was especially important during 

wartime while supporting combat units. 

However, I do not ever remember being told of the importance of 

asset visibi lity in transit from origin to destination. r was never 

warned about the basic fundamental problem of moving goods in tens 

of thousands of unmarked boxes and transportation's responsibility to 

solve it, or at least to lessen its effects. Through experience alone, I 

learned of the need for paperwork to accompany shipping containers. 

r believe it is still not well understood by many logisticians and our 

Transportation Corps personnel. 

During both Korea and Vietnam, thousands of tons of critical 

cargo representing millions of dollars was lost, destroyed, or misused. 

Jt was misplaced because of inadequate identification during transit or 

at theater reception areas. In each case, the port operator blamed the 

receiving customer for not knowing what he had received. The receiving customer blamed the port operator for delivering it to him without 

enough documentation for him to accurately receive it into his inventory and enter it into his files. As a result, thousands and thousands of 

critical supplies were never used. 
194 TRANSPORTATION AND LOGISTICS: ONE MAN'S STORY 

I 'II always remember listening to the advice of Col. Buck 

Bratcher, my number one teacher in stevedore operations during the 

Korean War. While we were unloading cargo and pushing it to the 

depots, I would ask him, "Shouldn't we do a better job of identifying 

this stuff before we shove it down their throat?" Bratcher would 

always say, "They ordered it. Give it to them. Let them worry about its 

identity." I think that describes the attitude of most transportation port 

operators I've known. 1 tended to agree more with the customer, the 

supply side. I think I did even as early as the Korean War, but I didn't 

really understand the system. 

The transportation system n111st maintain complete, I 00 percent 

accurate, asset visibiLity. When we initially pick up a shipment, we 

have the information. Some way or another, we have to maintain that 

relationship between the container and its contents throughout its 

entire period in transit. We must tell the customer what we are delivering, in enough detail so that he can do his job under terribly crowded 

and difficult combat situations. 

In the early 1960s the Office of the Secretary of Defense established a uniform system for all the services to requisition, move, and 

store supplies and equipment. Supply procedures were covered in the 

Military Standard Requisition and Issue Procedmes (MILSTRIP) and 

transportation procedures were covered in Military Standard 

Transportation and Movement Procedures (MILSTAMP). MILSTRIP 

covered worldwide supply but the original MTLSTAMP covered procedures for movement to and from the theater, not within the theater. Had 

these systems been followed, many problems would have been solved. 

Unfortunately, MILSTRIP and MILSTAMP were too often ignored. 

Again, it is almost impossible for one to visualize the amount of 

cargo that arrives during wartime and the speed at which it arrives. 

The enormous volume complicates the job tremendously, but it does 

not excuse the lack of proper asset visibility. This is especially 

important during the early days of combat operations. 

The current state of the art in transportation, communications, and 

automation make it possible to solve the problem if everyone understands the system and follows the procedures and doctrine. 

Transportation pers01mel must understand their responsibilities and 

must be acutely aware of the customer's need for asset visibility in 

transit. It is being observed in the commercial shipment business 

today. Many examples exist to be followed. 

Not too long ago, the American President Line was doing a great 

job of moving supplies from Japan to New York using ship, rail, and 

trucks. They maintained I 00 percent asset visibility by item throughout the entire shipment cycle. The information available from the 

American President Line was so accurate that Macy's in New York 
PERSISTENT TRANSPORTATION LOGISTICS PROBLEMS 195 

could plan to receive an item on a Friday and put it on sale Saturday 

before it knew precisely what was going to come out of the shipping 

container. It is possible. It is very important that the Army get on with 

performing this kind ofjob. 

Recent articles and reports on Operations DESERT SHIELD and 

DESERT STORM show that we still have an intransit visibility problem. 

The action in the desert demonstrated conclusively that transportation 

documentation and intransit asset visibility systems are not sufficiently responsive to the Army's information needs. Although a great deal 

of automation and communications improvements have been made in 

recent years, cargo documentation remains a difficult and often 

unwieldy procedure. In the attempt to push supplies and equipment to 

the Persian Gulf quickly, cargo descriptions, receiving unit addresses, 

and priorities were often incomplete. In many cases, entire containers 

arrived in theater without any documentation at all. Even after arrival, 

the theater distribution system was unable to maintain effective control. Equally significant, all of these problems occurred in a country 

with the most modern port handling and transportation faci lities in the 

world. 

Another factor which must always be taken into account is the 

time available to accomplish the tremendous transportation operation 

required to deploy a sizable military force. Most war plans call for 

mobilization and initial movements oftroops, equipnnent, and supplies 

to be accomplished in ten days or less. But Iraq's defensive military 

strategy allowed the U.S. military to dictate when the war would commence and to prosecute the war on U.S. terms. The Army was able to 

transport personnel and equipment to Saudi Arabia and distribute 

these assets within the counh·y over several months before hostilities 

began. Had hostilities started earlier, the Army's logistical problems 

would have intensified. 

Basic Supply and Maintenance 

While consulting for the General Accounting Office, T stayed in 

close touch with the key Army transportation officers, both on the 

DA staff and in the major commands. I observed that most transportation officers still do not have a good understanding of the total 

logistics field. Yet, every good transportation officer must know 

how basic supply and maintenance works. Much of this knowledge 

can be acquired while commanding a transportation company if the 

officer involves himself with the supply and maintenance of his own 

equipment. 

As I look back on my assigm11ents at the company and battalion 

levels, I must admit that I failed to become as familiar as 1 should 
196 TRANSPORTATION AND LOGISTICS: ONE MAN'S STORY 

have with the jobs of my supply sergeant and repair parts c lerk, the 

prescribed load list (PLL) clerk. Neither did I get my hands dirty with 

the maintenance sergeant and his mechanics. 1 could have and should 

have done both. As a truck battalion commander in Germany, I had 

religiously observed early morning motor stables while every driver 

performed maintenance on his truck. But I did not really become as 

involved in the detailed procedures as I should have. 

Actua lly, not until I became a major general, commander of the 

Transportation Center and commandant of the Transportation School, 

did I begin preaching this doctrine. At every opportunity, I would tell 

our young Transportation School students that before they could consider themselves to be good transportation officers, they must first 

become good basic supply and maintenance officers. r would attempt 

to explain this in detail, but it was difficult to get the message 

through. Yet before anyone can become an able logistician at any level 

of command or staff, he needs to begin at the bottom and thoroughly 

understand at least one conunodity in complete detail, even if it is 

supply support for his own motor pool. 

Transportation Management and Movement Control 

Transportation officers must understand the meaning of three 

terms: transportation management, traffic management, and movement control. Transportation management, a very broad term, can 

apply to all types of transportation. It can mean the management of 

the overall transportation system, the management of any mode within 

the system, or the management of traffic moving through the system. 

Traffic management, a commercial term, refers to the rules, regulations, rate structures, routing, and service information governing 

movement of personnel and freight by commercial transportation. 

Each group of carriers and terminals has a traffic guide that indicates 

routes, rates, and special instructions. This is the basis upon which 

they charge and collect fees. 

In the military, when we move personnel or cargo by commercial 

transportation, we follow the traffic guides of the carrier and, of 

course, consider both cost and getting the job done. Tn peacetime, cost 

is the main consideration. In wartime, we replace the term traffic 

management with the term movement control, particularly to and 

within the theater of operation. Traffic management and movement 

control both require detailed planning and programming of movement. But movement control must balance competing requirements 

against existing, often scarce, capabilities. 

As mentioned earlier, the term movement control originated with 

the British in World War II and was developed to a very high state of 
PERSISTENT TRANSPORTATION LOGISTICS PROBLEMS 197 

effectiveness durin g the latter stages of the war. General Lee's 

European Communications Zone, the major logistics command in 

Europe, provided logistics support for all of our forces. Lee's staff 

prepared a monthly movement program which consolidated all movement requirements and allocated specific missions to the various 

modes of transportation. If you wanted something moved, you had to 

forecast its need on a monthly basis to ensure its subsequent movement. There were, of course, daily changes created by the tactical situation and other local needs. When changes were required, they had to 

be very specific and justified. 

As I read history, General Lee observed movement control very 

closely. Since the war, the U.S. Army in Europe has tried to practice 

movement control but, because transportation is usually adequate in 

peacetime, the Army cannot really test its abilities in this area. There 

is no need to balance resources iftransportation is plentiful. 

Wartime operational plans require that wartime movement programs be developed. But because of the Jack of understanding and 

appreciation for movement control at all levels, customers are not prepared to submit their detailed requirements for movement. Without 

such detailed requirements there can be no movement plann ing or programming. In time of war, movement control planning and programming would become mandatory whether trained for or not. 

We attempted movement control in Vietnam in 1966. The Traffic 

Management Agency (TMA) was established at MACV. The 507th 

Movement Control Group had trained at Fort Eustis and moved to 

Vietnam to provide this service. It worked for the U.S. Military 

Assistance Command, Vietnam, under the direct supervision of the 

director of logistics, 14. Because adequate transportation was available 

in Vietnam, there was no need to give TMA the necessary authority to 

control transportation. As a result, each of the three services developed its own movement control agency to balance in-country movements. Planning and programming of movements does not apply to 

both traffic management and movement control. lt is only applicable 

to movement control in wartime. 

Some regard peacetime transportation planning for war a waste of 

time, in the hope that these rather tedious procedures can be avoided 

because industry can meet the need, except maybe in the theater of 

operation. That's totally wrong thinking. History indicates that in 

wartime, transportation is always in short supply everywhere. One 

only needs to review the history of this country during total war, as 

during World Wars I and II. Competition between the military and the 

civilian economy for transportation in this country was great and had 

to be controlled at the top. During total wars, the same control was 

needed in the theaters of operation. 
198 TRANSPORTATION AND LOGISTICS: ONE MAN'S STORY 

As I discussed this subject with the General Accounting Office 

auditors, who constantly worked in the area of peacetime traffic management rather than movement control, I would ask them about the 

reactions they got when reviewing this subject with the services. They 

reflected the common belief that there would not be a shortage of 

transportation in wartime, so they should not worry about movement 

control and movement planning. 

Most had little understanding of the vast difference between obtaining transportation in peacetime and wartime. In peacetime, the profit 

motive encourages cooperation in the transportation system. Because 

the customer wants to move his goods at the cheapest rate and carriers 

want the business, they cooperate. In peacetime, transportation is nearly 

always adequate as long as the price is right. In an emergency, all this 

changes. The customer no longer cares about dollars. His only thought 

is getting his supplies to the right place at the right time and in usable 

condition. He does not care about transportation utilization rates. 

The transportation manager, on the other hand, is interested in the 

most effective and efficient way to manage the fixed assets of civilian 

and military carriers. There has never been enough transportation during an emergency and there never will be. Transportation is always the 

first shortage to occur. The transportation manager is judged completely on how well he manages this very scarce item. Consequently, a conflict of interest arises between the customer and the transporter, requiring an arbiter who can make command decisions at the highest level. 

A review of the Army's history underlines this point. Historians 

record the daily conflicts in World War II between the chief of operations, General Lutes, and the chief of transportation, General Gross, in 

the U.S. Army Service Forces, that required them to appeal to the 

commanding general of the AJmy Service Forces, General Somervell, 

to decide movement priority. Within the Army, this was a command 

decision. When competition for transportation occurs in a joint forces 

operation, the problem of balancing requirements against capabilities 

becomes far more difficult and, in fact, much more difficult than it 

was in World War II. During World War II, everything that moved 

overseas was under the Army chief of staff, who delegated to an Army 

Service Forces officer the authority to make these kinds of decisions. 

Nothing like this exists today. 

Before the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense 

Reorganization Act of 1986, strategic transportation decisions could 

only be made by the secretary of defense and the president. 

Goldwater-Nichols gave the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff the 

authority to direct the armed forces, including the commanders of the 

unified and specified (theater-level) commands. The act also gave 

clear responsibilities to these commanders. Thus the commander of 
PERSISTENT TRANSPORTATION LOGISTICS PROBLEMS 199 

the joint United States Transportation Command, working with the 

commander or the Central Command (CENTCOM) during Operation 

DESERT SIIIELD, performed the necessary movement planning and 

control for this transportation-intensive effort. 

In peacetime we usc the commercial carrier system to provide military transportation. Currently, three military transportation operating 

agencies, the Military Airlift Conm1and, the Military Sealift Command, 

and the Military Traffic Management Command, provide or arrange for 

commercial air, land, or sea transpot1ation. All these agencies are tmder 

the operational control of the joint Transportation Command. 

In case of all-out war, transportation would not be adequate even 

for defense, let alone for the needs of the country's economy. Who 

would determine the priorities of movement between the civilian 

economy and the military? If there were more than one theater of 

operation, who would determine who or what was going to move 

within the civilian economy and within the military? We haven't had 

this problem since World War II, when a system was established to 

meet this need. At that time President Roosevelt established several 

high-level organizations, like the War Shipping Administration and 

the Munitions Assignments Board, which worked directly for him. 

They constantly reviewed and balanced requirements against capabilities, not only for transportation, but for all scarce resources. 

The Reagan administration established a wartime planning agency 

as soon as it took over in 198 1. President Reagan signed the letter that 

established the Emergency Mobilization Preparedness Board, manned 

by the heads or the deputy heads of eleven major governmental agencies, including the Department of Transportation. The board was organi zed into twelve working groups, all designed to control wartime 

mobilization planning, including transportation. The secretary of 

defense established a deputy secretary of defense for policy to coordinate DOD mobilization planning, a most difficult job. Initially, the late 

General Richard G. Stilwell was brought in full time to help the OSD 

deputy for policy. Stilwell devoted more than twelve hours a day 

attempting to do this job. lt covered every area in which arguments 

about allocation of resources could occur. 

The problem overwhelmed Stilwell, partly because of the way 

OSD and the joint staff are organized. Although logistics is the 

responsibility of each service, transportation is not. Each service cannot acquire its own transportation system. Our only transportation 

system is the commercial one in the U.S. 

Of all logistics functions, transportation is the only truly joint 

system. Consequently, during mobilization and war preparations, 

someone must decide who gets priority for movement between the 

Army, the Navy, and the Air Force. Someone must decide wh ich 
200 TRANSPORTATION AND LOGISTICS: ONE MAN'S STORY 

units go on Military Airlift Command (MAC) flights to Europe first. 

The system now requires that the Transportation Command decide, 

in coordination with the unified or specified combat commander. If 

more than one command were involved, there might be a problem. 

The JCS chairman during Operation DESERT SHIELD, General Colin 

L. Powell, displayed this kind of authority under the secretary of 

defense and the president. Nevertheless, this does not solve the priority problem between the military and the civilian economy. 

Amphibious Doctrine 

Current joint doctrine and war plans visualize the administrative 

deployment of Army troops in support of contingency plans. That is, 

Army units would be moved by surface and air to the objective area 

and be loaded/unloaded by predeployed support units. The scenario is 

thought of in terms of the way troops are handled during our 

Redeployment of Forces to Germany (REFORGER) exercises in Europe 

today. If a combat landing were required, joint plans call for any landings to be made by Navy/Marine Corps amphibious forces. This mind 

set is similar to existing plans when we began World War II. It was 

visualized then, as now, that if the Army units had to be combat landed, they would follow Marine Corps amphibious landings. 

By 1942 it was evident that this approach would not be satisfactory. The services operated under different conditions with different 

missions, which required different concepts, doctrine, and know-how. 

Soon after Pearl Harbor the Army staff realized that if the Army was 

to carry the war to the Germans, the Japanese, and the Italians, then 

amphibious operations were absolutely essential. 

The Marine Corps is traditionally manned, equipped, and trained 

to go ashore, fight, and occupy a beachhead area for at most thirty to 

forty days. The marines then backload and return to the near shore 

for reequipping and retraining. The mission of the Army, on the other 

hand, in the past and probably into the future, has been to land in an 

objective area, and thereafter build a line of communication on shore 

to support land forces as they move inland until the enemy land 

forces have been defeated. The missions are different and the 

required support is different. 

There have been a few exceptions. One occurred when the 3d 

Marine Amphibious Force was required to land in the Da Nang area in 

South Vietnam, to establish a base, and to remain in support of operations, all of which was normally the job of the Army. In this case, the 

marines were not equipped, trained, or capable of establishing a communications zone to support their combat and suppo1t units. The Navy 

was forced to develop a logistics organization to support the Marine 
PERSISTENTTRANSPORTATION LOGISTICS PROBLEMS 201 

Corps in the Da Nang area, but this was an exception and a departure 

from normal doctrine. 

ln any future war, because of the relative size of the Marine 

Corps, the Army would have to make amphibious landings as it did in 

World War II. The need for landings would also likely occur if we 

became involved in two contingency operations in different parts of 

the world which, as I understand it, is the basis for req uirements in our 

war planning today. 

Currently the Army has no capability, no concept, no doctrine, no 

training, no unit equipment, and no organization to carry out these 

difficult amphibious operations in combat. The organizations nearest 

to having such a capability are the Transportation Corps' logistics 

over-the-shore units, equipped and trained to unload and move cargo. 

But they arc not organized, equipped, or trained to develop lodgment 

(beachhead) areas with all the engineering requirements that go with 

such actions. Plans do not exist to marry them up with combat units 

for assistance in combat unit landings and their subsequent deployment and unloading over unfriendly beaches in combat. Nor do plans 

include the even more difficult task of assisting to develop lodgment 

areas and providing logistics support under combat conditions until 

normal resupply can be established. 

I understand the Army has neither the funds nor the desire to add 

this capability. It has not been approved as joint doctrine. But if war 

were to occur, in all probability the Transportation Corps would be 

called upon to duplicate the actions of the engineer amphibious units 

in World War II. Therefore, it would be wise for the Transportation 

Corps, either in its museum or in its school, to acquire all historical 

information on the Engineer Amphibious Command and its engineer 

boat and shore regiments of World War £1. 

They should build a library of manuals, doctrine, organizational 

information, training literature, and training records. It would certainly 

be wise to update the information to match the current automated Army 

supply, maintenance, and transportation doctrine. I'm sure the Army 

does not believe the need exists; however, filing all the relevant information in the museum and school would make it available should the 

need ever arise. Looking back on my firsthand experience with the difficulties in learning how to accomplish this mission in World War U, I 

know that it wou ld be a slow, costly, and difficult job to reinvent such 

capabilities in the future. 

Retrograde Planning 

This area must receive more attention as part of all Army planning 

and needs much more emphasis in our school system. The Army has 
202 TRANSPORTATION AND LOGISTICS: ONE MAN'S STORY 

always carried out retrograde operations poorly. The only exception 

was in Vietnam. During this war, an economy-minded OSD directed 

that all services perform detailed retrograde planning during the gradual U.S. disengagement from Vietnam. As a result, a great deal of 

equipment and supplies were recovered and placed back into the supply system or used for other authorized purposes. This planning saved 

many millions of dollars. 

Although we recommended early on that the Army initiate retrograde planning and retrograde actions at the beginning of DESL:RT 

SHIELD, at first our recommendations were not followed. 

Early Deployment of Support Personnel 

It is also vital to deploy sufficient support units (especially transportation and supply personnel) early, with the combat force. This 

would enable the support system to immediately begin to organize the 

support operation and provide sufficient support when and where 

needed. 

During my experience, especially in Korea and Vietnam, this was 

not done and the support system had a difficult time playing catch-up 

once the necessary personnel arrived. The Army generally deploys 

support personnel only after support breaks down and force commanders realize a break-down has occurred. Although I was not involved 

in the latest Gulf War, all reports indicate that support personnel were 

again deployed only after the system had bogged down. For any operation, the need for support personnel should be realized from the 

beginning of plans. 

Distribution 

[n today's high-tech world, as the Army relies more and more on 

automation, instant communication, and new forms of transportation, 

the word distribution is beginning to seem more appropriate than logistics to describe support to the Army in the field. We have already discussed various problems in distribution including transportation management, asset visibility, retrograde planning, total system command 

and control, inventory in motion, and funding for second destination 

transportation. 

A change in the funding process could conceivably have more 

effect on correcting the problems than any other approach. If the customer had to justify his budget for transportation, he would have to 

take a personal interest in inventory in motion, i.e., total requirements, assets on hand, future requirements, items requisitioned, items 

in the pipeline, total asset visibility of items in transit, expected time 
PERSISTENT TRANSPORTATION LOGISTICS PROBLEMS 203 

of arriva l, and least cost of transportation. Through inventory in 

motion the customer could manage distribution far more effectively 

and efficiently, and for much less cost. The response of Army leadership to this recommendation wi ll probably be that such a system 

would place too heavy a burden on the already overloaded combat 

commanders. 

But this same workload problem exists for management of the 

total logistics "distribution" system. When the Army decided in 1962 

to eliminate the Technical Services and become functional, it decided 

that the Army chain of command could, and would, manage the logistics system rather than have the Technical Services do it. But proper 

management of the cost of the system is a vital part of the job that 

Army leadership assumed in 1962. Because of this lack of attention 

on system management by the Army leadership, the secreta ry of 

defense has increasingly centralized management of many logistics 

functions at the OSD level, such as the Defense Logistics Agency, the 

Defense Commissary Agency, post exchanges, and medical support. 

Others on the horizon are also slated for centralization. 

Leadership 

Much has been written over the years about leadership. Why? 

Because it is so important to all human relationships, especially in the 

military, and yet it is so difficult to define. Most articles describe 

leadership through example rather than attempting a definition. 

l will always remember a speech on leadership given by Dr. 

Douglas Southhall Freeman shortly after World War II. At the time 

and for many years after, Dr. Freeman had been the editor of a 

Richmond, Virginia, newspaper. He also was an outstanding historian 

who had written Lees Lieutenants, George Washington, and other volumes. After being introduced, Freeman stood alone in the center of 

the stage for an entire hour. He used no training aids and he never 

moved. Nevertheless, he kept us sitting on the edge of our scats for 

the entire hour. 1 do not recall ever hearing a more impressive talk. 

Dr. Freeman discussed leadership, his favorite subject. He did so by 

recounting the actions of various Confederate commanders during Civil 

War battles. As he described the commanders' conversations with each 

other, their problems, their actions, and their orders to their troops, they 

came alive and we listeners felt that we were actually there witnessing 

the scene. Freeman conveyed his ideas on leadership by describing how 

each good commander handled his troops, the enemy, and the battle. We 

left with a deep appreciation of humi I ity, selflessness, character, 

courage, and integrity, but never really understood how these leadership 

qualities had been developed. 
204 TRANSPORTATION AND LOGISTICS: ONE MAN'S STORY 

In 1917, Maj. C. A. Bach wrote one of the best articles on how to 

develop leadership. Bach had enlisted in the 13th Minnesota Infantry 

of the National Guard and served as a sergeant with the regiment in 

the Philippines. Promoted to lieutenant in the 36th U.S. Volunteer 

Infantry, he transferred to the Regular Army as a first lieutenant in the 

7th Cavalry. In an address delivered to the graduating officers of the 

Second Training Camp at Fort Sheridan, Bach analyzed how to be a 

leader. His remarks were printed verbatim in the Waco, Texas, Daily 

Times Herald on 27 January 1918. In November 1942, Senator Henrik 

Shipstead of Minnesota inserted the remarks in the Congressional 

Record and they were printed as Congressional Document 289. 

The speech, which appears as an appendix to this book, continues 

to be regarded as the best composition on leadersh ip ever recorded. In 

essence, Bach urged his charges to "know your men, know your business, [and] know yourself," explained the differences between an 

"officer" and a " leader," and provided the formula by which a young 

lieutenant could transform himself from one to the other. 
APPENDIX 

Leadership 

by 

Major C. A. Bach (1918) 

In a short time each of you will control the lives of a certain number of other men. You will have in your charge loyal but untrained citizens, who look to you for instruction and guidance. Your word will 

be their law. Your most casual remark will be remembered. Your mannerism will be aped. Your clothing, your carriage, your vocabulary, 

your manner of command will be imitated. When you join your organization you will find there a willing body of men who ask from you 

nothing more than the qualities that will command their respect, their 

loyalty, and their obedience. They are perfectly ready and eager to follow you so long as you can convince them that you have those qualities. When the time comes that they are satisfied you do not possess 

them you might as well kiss yourself goodbye. Your usefulness in that 

organization is at an end. 

From the standpoint of society, the world may be divided into leaders and followers. The professions have their leaders, the financial 

world has its leaders. We have religious leaders, and political leaders, 

and soc iety leaders. In all this leadership it is difficult, if not impossible, to separate from the element of pw·e leadership that selfish element of personal gain or advantage to the individual without which 

such leadership would Jose its value. It is in the military service only 

where men freely sacrifice their lives for a faith, where men are willing 

to suffer and die for the right or the prevention of a great wrong, that 

we can hope to realize leadership in its most exalted and disinterested 

sense. Therefore, when I say leadership, I mean military leadership. 

In a few days the great mass of you men will receive commissions 

as officers. These commissions will not make you leaders, they will 

merely make you officers. They will place you in a position where 

you can become leaders if you possess the proper attributes. But you 

must make good- not so much with the men over you as with the 

men under you. Men must and will follow into battle officers who are 

not leaders, but the driving power behind these men is not enthusiasm 

but discipline. They go with doubt and trembling, and with an awful 
206 TRANSPORTATION AND LOGISTICS: ONE MAN'S STORY 

fear tugging at their heartstrings that prompts the unspoken question, 

"What will he do next?" Such men obey the letter of their orders but 

no more. Of devotion to their commander, of exalted enthusiasm 

which scorns personal risk, of their self-sacrifice to ensure his personal safety, they know nothing. Their legs carry them forward because 

their brain and their training tell them they must go. Their spirit does 

not go with them. 

Great results are not achieved by cold, passive, unresponsive soldiers. They don't go very far and they stop as soon as they can. 

Leadership not only demands but receives the willing, unhesitating, 

unfaltering obedience and loyalty of other men; and a devotion that 

will cause them, when the time comes, to follow their uncrowned king 

to hell and back again if necessary. 

You will ask yourselves: "Of just what, then, does leadership consist? What must I do to become a leader? What are the attributes of 

leadership, and how can I cultivate them?" 

Leadership is a composite of a number of qua lities. Among the 

most important I would list self-confidence, moral ascendancy, selfsacrifice, paternalism, fairness, initiative, decision, dignity, courage. 

Let me discuss these with you in detail. 

Self-confidence results, first, from exact knowledge; second, the 

ability to impart that knowledge; and, third, the feel ing of superiority 

over others that naturally follows. All these give the officer poise. To 

lead, you must know- you may bluff all your men some of the time, 

but you can't do it all the time. Men will not have confidence in an 

officer unless he knows his business, and he must know it from the 

ground up. The officer should know more about paper work than his 

first sergeant and company clerk put together; he should know more 

about messing than his mess sergeant; more about diseases of the 

horse than his troop farrier. He should be at least as good a shot as any 

man in his company. If the officer does not know, and demonstrates 

the fact that he does not know, it is entirely human for the soldier to 

say to himself, "To hell with him. He doesn't know as much about this 

as I do," and calmly disregard the instructions received. There is no 

substitute for accurate knowledge. Become so well informed that men 

will hunt you up to ask questions- that your brother officers will say 

to one another, "Ask Smith- he knows." 

And not only should each officer know thoroughly the duties of 

his own grade, but he should study those of the two grades next 

above him. A twofold benefit attaches to this. He prepares himself 

for duties which may fall to his lot at any time during battle; he further gains a broader view point which enables him to appreciate the 

necessity for the issuance of orders and join more intelligently in 

their execution. 
APPENDIX 207 

Not only must the officer know, but he must be able to put what 

he knows into grammatical, interesting, forceful English. He must 

learn to stand on his feet and speak without embarrassment. I am told 

that in British training camps student officers are required to deliver 

ten-minute talks on any subject they may choose. That is excellent 

practice. For to speak clearly one must think clearly, and clear, logical thinking expresses itself in definite, positive orders. 

While self-confidence is the result of knowing more than your 

men, moral ascendancy over them is based upon your belief that you 

are the better man. To ga in and maintain this ascendancy you must 

have self-control, physical vitality and endurance, and moral force. 

You must have yourself so well in hand that, even though in battle you 

be scared stiff, you will never show fear. For if you by so much as a 

hurried movement or a trembling of the hand, or a change of expression, or a hasty order hastily revoked, indicate your mental condition 

it will be reflected in your men in a far greater degree. 

In garrison or camp many instances will arise to try your temper 

and wreck the sweetness of your disposition. If at such times you "fly 

off the handle" you have no business to be in charge of men. For men 

in anger say and do things that they a lmost invariably regret afterward. 

An officer should never apologize to his men; also an officer should 

never be guilty of an act for which his sense of justice tells him he 

should apologize. 

Another element in gaining moral ascendancy lies in the possession of enough physical vitality and endtu·ance to withstand the hardships to which you and your men are subjected and a dauntless spirit 

that enables you not only to accept them cheerfully but to minimize 

their magnitude. Make light of your troubles, belittle your trials, and 

you will help vitally to build up within your organization an esprit 

whose va lue in time of stress cannot be measured. 

Moral force is the third element in gaining moral ascendancy. To 

exert moral force you must Jive clean, you must have sufficient brain 

power to see the right and the will to do right. Be an example to your 

men. An officer can be a power for good or a power for evil. Don't 

preach to them- that will be worse than useless. Live the kind of life 

you would have them lead, and you will be surprised to see the number that will imitate you. A loud-mouthed, profane captain who is 

careless of his personal appearance will have a load-mouthed, profane, dirty company. Remember what I tell you. Your company will be 

the reflection of yourself. If you have a rotten company it will be 

because you are a rotten captain. 

Self-sacrifice is essential to leadership. You will give, give all the 

time. You will give of yourself physically, for the longest hours, the 

hardest work and the greatest responsibility is the lot of the captain. 
208 TRANSPORTATION AND LOGISTICS: ONE MAN'S STORY 

He is the first man up in the morning and the last man in at night. He 

works while others sleep. 

You will give of yourself mentally, in sympathy and appreciation 

for the troubles of men in your charge. This one's mother has died, 

and that one has lost all his savings in a bank failure. They may desire 

help, but more than anything else they desire sympathy. Don't make 

the mistake of turning such men down with the statement that you 

have troubles of your own, for every time that you do you knock a 

stone out of the foundation of your house. Your men are your foundation, and your house leadership will tumble about your ears unless its 

rests securely upon them. 

Finally, you will give of your slender financial resources. You will 

frequently spend your money to conserve the health and well-being of 

your men or to assist them when in trouble. Generally you get your 

money back. Very i11frequently you must charge it to profit and loss. 

When I say that paternalism is essential to leadership I use the 

term in its better sense. I do not now refer to that fom1 of paternalism 

which robs men of initiative, self-reliance, and self-respect. I refer to 

the paternalism that manifests itself in a watchful care for the comfort 

and welfare of those in your charge. 

Soldiers are much like children. You must see that they have shelter, 

food, and clothing, the best that your utmost efforts can provide. You 

must be far more solicitous of their comfort than of your own. You must 

see that they have food to eat before you think of your own; that they 

have each as good a bed as can be provided before you consider where 

you will sleep. You must look after their health. You must conserve their 

strength by not demanding needless exertion or usekss labor. 

And by doing all these things you are breathing life into what 

would be otherwise a mere machine. You are creating a soul in your 

organization that will make the mass respond to you as though it were 

one man. And that is esprit. 

And when your organization has this esprit you will wake up 

some morning and discover that the tables have been turned; that 

instead of your constantly looking out for them they have, without 

even a hint from you, taken up the task of looking out for you. You 

wil l find that a detail is always there to see that your tent, if you have 

one, is promptly pitched; that the most and the cleanest bedding is 

brought to your tent; that from some mysterious source two eggs have 

been added to your supper when no one else has any; that an extra 

man is helping your men give your horse a supergrooming; that your 

wishes are anticipated; that every man is Johnny-on-the-spot. And 

then you have arrived. 

Fairness is another e lement without which leadership can neither be 

built up nor maintained. There must be first that fairness which treats 
APPENDIX 209 

all men justly. I do not say alike, for you cannot treat all men alike--that 

would be assuming that all men arc cut from the same piece: that there 

is no such thing as individuality or a personal equation. 

You cannot treat all men alike: a punishment that would be dismissed by one man with a shrug of the shoulders is mental anguish for 

another. A company commander who for a given offense has a standard punishment that applies to all is either too indolent or too stupid 

to study the personality of his men. In his case justice is certainly 

blind. 

Study your men as carefully as a surgeon studies a difficult case. 

And when you are sure of your diagnosis apply the remedy. And 

remember that you apply the remedy to effect a cure, not merely to 

see the victim squirm. It may be necessary to cut deep, bul when you 

are satisfied as to your diagnosis don't be divided from your purpose 

by any false sympathy for the patient. 

Hand in hand with fairness in awarding punishment walks fairness in giving credit. Everybody hates a human hog. When one of 

your men has accomplished an especially creditable piece of work, 

see that he gets the proper reward. Turn heaven and earth upside down 

to get it for him. Don't try to take it away from him and hog it for 

yourself. You may do this and get away with jt, but you have lost the 

respect and loya lty of your men. Sooner or later your brother officers 

will hear of it and shun you like a leper. In war there is glory enough 

for all. Give the man under you his due. The man who always takes 

and never gives is not a leader. He is a parasite. 

There is another kind of fairness- that which will prevent an officer from abusing the privileges of his rank. When you exact respect 

from soldiers be sure you treat them with equal respect. Build up their 

manhood and self-respect. Don't try to pull it down. 

For an officer to be overbearing and insulting in the treatment of 

enlisted men is the act of a coward. He ties the man to a tree with the 

ropes of discipline and then strikes him in the face, knowing full well 

that the man cannot strike back. Consideration, courtesy, and respect 

from officers toward enlisted men arc not incompatible with discipline. They are parts of our discipline. Without initiative and decision 

no man can expect to lead. 

ln maneuvers you will fi·equently see when an emergency arises, 

certain men calmly give instant orders which later, on analysis, prove 

to be, if not exactly the right thing, very nearly the right thing to have 

done. You will sec other men in emergency become badly rattled: their 

brains refuse to work, or they give a hasty order, revoke it: give another, revoke that: in short, show every indication of being in a blue funk. 

Regarding the first man you may say: "That man is a genius. He 

hasn't had time to reason this thing out. He acts intuitively." Forget it. 
210 TRANSPORTATION AND LOGISTICS: ONE MAN'S STORY 

"Genius is merely the capacity for taking infinite pains." The man 

who is ready is the man who has prepared himself. He has studied 

beforehand the possible situation that might arise, he has made tentative plans covering such situations. When he is confronted by the 

emergency he is ready to meet it. 

He must have sufficient menta l alertness to appreciate the problem that confronts him and the power of quick reasoning to determine 

what changes are necessary in his already formulated plan. He must 

also make the decision to order the execution and stick to his orders. 

Any reasonable order in an emergency is better than no order. 

The situation is there. Meet it. rt is better to do something and to do 

the wrong thing than to hesitate, hunt around for the right thing to 

do and wind up by doing nothing at all. And, having decided on a 

line of action, stick to it. Don't vacillate. Men have no confidence in 

an officer who doesn't know his own mind. 

Occasionally you will be called upon to meet a situation which no 

reasonable human being could anticipate. Tf you have prepared yoursci f to meet other emergencies which you could anticipate the mental 

training you have thereby gained will enable you to act promptly and 

with calmness. 

You must frequently act without orders from a higher authority. 

Time will not permit you to wait for them. Here again enters the 

importance of studying the work of officers above you. If you have a 

comprehensive grasp of the entire situation and can form an idea of 

the general plan of your superiors, that and your previous emergency 

training will enable you to determine that the responsibility is yours 

and to issue the necessary orders without delay. 

The element of personal dignity is important in mi litary leadership. Be the friend of your men, but do not become their intimate. 

Your men should stand in awe of you-not fear. lf your men presume 

to become familiar it is your fault, not theirs. Your actions have 

encouraged them to do so. And, above all things, don't cheapen yourself by courting their friendship or currying their favor. They will 

despise you for it. If you are worthy of their loyalty and respect and 

devotion they will surely give all these without asking. If you are not, 

nothing that you can do will win them. 

And then I would mention courage. Moral courage you need as 

well as physical courage-that kind of moral courage which enables 

you to adhere without faltering to a determined course of action which 

your judgement has indicated as the one best suited to secure the 

desired results. Every time you change your orders without obvious 

reason you weaken your authority and impair the confidence of your 

men. Have the moral courage to stand by your order and see it 

through. 
APPENDIX 211 

Moral courage further demands that you assume the responsibility for your own acts. If your subordinates have loyally carried out 

your orders and the movement you directed is a failure, the failure is 

yours, not theirs. Yours would have been the honor had it been successful. Take the blame if it results in disaster. Don't try to shift to a 

subordinate and make him the goat. That is a cowardly act. 

Furthermore, you will need moral courage to determine the fate of 

those under you. You will frequently be called upon for recommendations for the promotion or demotion of officers and nonconu11issioned 

officers in your immediate conunand. Keep clearly in mind your personal integrity and the duty you owe your country. Do not let yourself 

be deflected from a strict sense of justice by feeling of personal friendship. If your own brother is your second lieutenant, and you find him 

unfit to hold his conunission, eliminate him. If you don't, your lack of 

moral courage may result in the loss of valuable lives. 

If, on the other hand, you are called upon for a recommendation 

concerning a man whom, for personal reasons you thoroughly dislike, do not fail to do him full justice. Remember that your aim is the 

general good, not the satisfaction of an individual grudge. 

I am taking it for granted that you have physical courage. I need 

not tell you how necessary that is. Courage is more than bravery. 

Bravery is fearlessness- the absence of fear. The merest dolt may be 

brave, because he lacks the mentality to appreciate his danger; he 

doesn't know enough to be afraid. 

Courage, however, is a firmness of spirit, that moral backbone, 

which, while fully appreciating the danger involved, nevertheless goes 

on with the undertaking. Bravery is physical; courage is mental and 

moral. You may be cold all over; your hands may h·emble; your legs 

may quake; your knees may be ready to give way- that is fear. If nevertheless, you go forward; if in spite of this physical defection you 

continue to lead your men against the enemy, you have courage. The 

physical manifestations of fear will pass away. You may never experience them but once. They are the "buck fever" of the hunter who tries 

to shoot his first deer. You must not give way to them. 

A number of years ago, while taking a course in demolitions, the 

class of which I was a member was handling dynamite. The instructor 

said regarding its manipulation: "I must caution you gentlemen to be 

careful in the use ofthese explosives. One man has but one accident." 

And so I would caution you. If you give way to the fear that will 

doubtless beset you in your first action, if you show the white feather, 

if you let your men go forward while you hunt a shell crater, you will 

never again have the opportunity of leading those men. 

Use judgement in calling on your men for display of physical 

courage or bravery. Don't ask any man to go where you would not go 
212 TRANSPORTATION AND LOGISTICS: ONE MAN'S STORY 

yourself. If your common sense tells you that the place is too dangerous for you to venture into, then it is too dangero~as for him. You know 

his life is as valuable to him as yours is to you. 

Occasionally some of your men must be exposed to danger which 

you cannot share. A message must be taken across a fire-swept zone. 

You call for volunteers. If your men know you and know that you are 

"right," you will never lack volunteers, for they know your heart is in 

your work, that you are giving your country the best you have, that 

you would willingly carry the message yourse lf if you could. Your 

example and enthusiasm will have inspired them. 

And, lastly, if you aspire to leadership, I would urge you to study 

men. Get under their skins and find out what is inside. Some men are 

quite different from what they appear to be on the stnface. Determine 

the workings of their minds. 

Much of Robert E. Lee's success as a leader may be ascribed to 

his ability as a psychologist. He knew most of his opponents from 

West Point days, knew the workings of their minds, and he believed 

that they would do certain things under certa in circumstances. In nearly every case he was able to anticipate their movements and block the 

execution. 

You do not know your opponent in this war in the same way. But 

you can know your own rnen. You can study each to determine wherein lies his strength and his weakness: which man can be relied upon to 

the last gasp and which cannot. 

Know your men, know your business, know yourself. 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 

Besson, General Frank S., Chairman. A Report by the Joint Logistics 

Review Board, Transportation and Management Control. 

Brown, Lt. Gen. Frederic J. , Chairman. Report by the Department of 

the Army Board of!nquiry on the Army Logistics System. March 

1967. 

Cannon, M. Hamlin. Leyte: The Return to the Philippines. 

Washington, D.C.: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1987. 

Division of Responsibility in Wartime Between National Commanders 

and Major and Subordinate Allied Committees, NATO Military 

Committee Document 36/2. NATO Headquarters: Approved by 

the Heads of State on 30- 31 May 1978. 

Epley, William W. Roles and Missions of the United States Army. 

Washington, D.C.: U.S. Army Center ofMilitary History, 1991. 

Heiser, Lt. Gen. Joseph M., Jr. A Soldier Supporting Soldiers. 

Washington, D.C.: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1992. 

Heiser, Lt. Gen. Joseph M., Jr. Logistic Support. Washington, D.C.: 

U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1991. 

Hewes, James E., Jr. From Root to McNamara: Army 01ganization 

and Administration, 1900- 1963. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Army 

Center of Military History, 1983. 

Huston, James A., The Sinews of War: Army Logistics, 1775- 1953. 

Washington, D.C.: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1988. 

Miller, John, jr. CARTWHEEL: The Reduction ofRabau/. 

Washington, D.C.: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1990. 

Milner, Samuel. ViciOIJl in Papua. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Army 

Center of Military History, 1989. 

Smith, Robert Ross. The Approach to the Philippines. Washington, 
214 TRANSPORTATION AND LOGISTICS: ONE MAN'S STORY 

D.C.: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1984. 

Smith, Robert Ross. Triumph in the Philippines. Washington, D.C.: 

U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1991. 

U.S. Army. Histof)J of the Second Engineer Special Brigade. 

Harrisburg, PA: The Telegraph Press, 1946. 

US. Army Lines of Communication in Europe, 1945- 1967. 

Headquarters, U.S. Army, Europe, and Seventh Army, Office of 

the Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics (Operations), 1968. 
INDEX 

Abrams, General Creighton W.: 

123- 24, 141 , 147 

Adana, Turkey: 88 

Administrative Center: 150-5 1 

Aerial tramways: 80- 82 

Agency for International 

Development (ATD): 109, 110, 

112- 13, 11 4- 15, 119, 120- 23, 

124-26, 128- 29, 130- 31 

Air Force, U.S.: 57, 58, 83- 84, 93, 

115, 117, 144, 181 , 199- 200 

Aircraft indust1y: 153 

Air-cushion vehicles: 155 

Airfields: 6, 22, 28- 33 

Alaska: 53 

All ied armies, aid to: 142-43 

All-volunteer Army: 152, 153, 175 

American President Line: 194- 95 

Ammunition 

dumps: 24-25, 57, 119, 142 

explosions: 32, 42, 58 

handling of: 32, 42, 57, 60- 61 , 

11 3, 129, 131 

left abroad: 180- 81 

shipping of: 32, 57, 58, 115, 127, 

128, 141-42 

storage: 42, 57, 142 

Amphibious landing capability 

Army: 5- 12, 154-55, 200- 20 I 

Marine Corps: 6, 155,200- 201 

Navy: 6, 155, 200- 201 

Amphibious landings 

New Guinea: 19- 20, 22- 26 

training for: 8- 13, 17- 19, 23- 24, 

26, 35, 48-49,80-82 

Amphibious shore units: 6, 80- 81 

Amphibious truck companies: 9, 15 

Amphibious trucks (DUKWs): 15, 

42, 80- 81 

Antiaircraft gunne1y: 11 - 12, 23, 33 

Arab-American Oil Company: 

80- 81 

Armed Forces Staff College: 83- 84 

Armies 

Sixth:25 2~27,29 35 47 

Seventh: 86, 88, 90, 102- 103 

Eighth:25, 35,55, 58,60, 64,65 

Army Air Corps: 33 

Anny Airborne Corps, XVIU: 

155- 56 

Army Audit Agency: 183- 84 

Army aviation units: 189 

Army Group, 6th: 29 

Army Materiel Command (AMC): 

96- 97, 99, 112, 116, 139, 143, 

145, 146, 147, 150- 51, 173, 

174, 175- 76, 188, 189, 190- 91 

Army Medical Corps: 190 

Army reserve rail units: 152 

Army Service Command, 6th: 27, 

29 

Army Service Forces: 47, 94, 198 

Army staff: 50, 95 

Army Technical Services: 52, 86, 

88, 90, 138, 150, 175, 184-92, 

203 

cargo documentation system: 

60-62, 116 

depots in Korea: 60-6 1 

elimination of: 96- 98 

Ascom City, Korea: 40 

Asset visibility: 19, 36- 37, 60- 63, 

112, 118, 135, 141, 144, 151 , 

179, 193- 95 

Australia: I I, 15- 19, 23, 25, 26, 

29- 30 

Austra lian Imperial Forces: 17 

7th Division: 19 

9th Division: 17- 18, 19, 20, 

22- 23, 26 
216 TRANSPORTATION AND LOGISTICS: ONE MAN'S STORY 

Australian Imperial Forces 

Continued 

work squadrons: 30 

Automated systems: 138- 39, 140, 

145-46, 178- 79, 194-95 

Aviation Command: 189 

Babinda, Australia: 16-17 

Bach, Maj. C. A.: 204,205- 12 

Barges: 19, 24, 40, 42, 57, 60, 61, 

62, 64, 66, 81, 112, 115, 119, 

125- 26, 128, 129- 30, 154 

Base Shop, 41 I th: 17 

Bay of Biscay: 86 

Beach, General Dwight E.: 123 

Beach supply dumps: 6, 18- 19, 

24- 25,26,31,57 

Beachhead operations: 8- 9, 18- 20, 

22,24,28,3 1 

Benelux countries: 101- 103, 104, 

179-80 

Berlin, Germany: 89 

Besson, General Frank S.: 15, 

80- 82, 105, I 12, 117, 120 

Besson Board: 175 

Bigelow, Maj. Gen. Horace F.: 137 

Biggs, Lt. Col. Richard: 52, 55, 57, 

59 

Board of inquity into the Army 

logistics system (Brown 

Board): 137-40, 150, 174, 

175-76 

Boat and shore battalions: 19, 20 I 

Boat assembly plants: 17 

Boat Battalion, 532d: 46 

Boat maintenance companies: I 0 

Boats, maintenance suppot1 for: 20 

Bratcher, Lt. Col. Buck: 55, 57, 59, 

60,63 

Brigade Ordnance Maintenance 

Company, 162d: 23 

British Army: 51, 94 

Brocket, Lt. Col. Del: 25 

Brown, Lt. Gen. Frederick J.: 137 

Brown Board: 137-40, 150, 174, 

175- 76 

Bulldozers: 9, 25 

Buna, New Guinea: 19 

Bunker, Ellsworth: 122, 124 

Butch, Maj. Robert: 35 

Cairns, Australia: 16, 17, 19 

Calhoun, Brig. Gen. William L.: 80 

Cam Ranh Bay, Vietnam: 1 1 0, 1 12, 

120, 147, 189 

Camps 

Carrabelle, Florida: 10- 11 , 12- 13 

Cotuit, Massachusetts: 7- 8, I I 

Edwards, Massachusetts: 5, 7, 9, 

10, 12- 13 

Pendleton, California: 48 

San Luis Obispo, Ca lifornia: 

45-46, 47 

Can Tho, Vietnam: 126 

Canada: 53 

Cape Cod: 7- 1 3, 18, 34, 45 

Cape St. Jacques, Vietnam: 127- 28, 

129- 30 

Cargo conh·ol officers: 3 1 

Cargo documentation: 36-37, 

60- 63,89, 109, 11 2, 116- 18, 

120, 135, 151 , 193 95 

Cargo lighters: 60 

Cargo loading: 8- 9,27, 29,35 

Cargo unloading: 8- 9, 31, 41, 

60- 61, 112, 120 

Casper, Lt. Col. Robert: 34 

Cat Lai, Vietnam: 115, 128, 130 

Cavalry, lst: 27- 28 

Central Command (CENTCOM): 

198- 99 

Chesarek, Brig. Gen. Ferdinand J.: 

99- 100, 133 

China, People 's Republic of: 58 

Chu, Maj. Pho-Quoc: 122, 124 

Churchill, Winston: 50- 51 

Cliffe, Col. Rolbcrl A.: 80 

Climate: 22 

Coast and Geodetic Survey, U.S.: 7 

Coast Guard, U.S.: 7, 58 

Combat Am1s Center: 150- 51, 156 

Combat Developments Command 

(CDC): 97, 98, 99, 139, 150, 

188, 189, 190- 9 1 
INDEX 

Combat equipment: 146-47 

Combat landings: 200- 201 

Combat logistics support plan: I 03 

Combat supply units, movement of, 

by Navy ships: 6- 7 

Combined Military Transportation 

Committee: 50- 51 

Command and control craft: 9, 19, 

28,32 

Command and General Staff 

College: 52,79,83,84 

Commander in chief, Pacific 

(CfNCPAC): 113, 141, 

142-43, 148 

Commander in chief, U.S. Army, 

Pacific (CINCUSARPAC): 

123 

Commercial import program (CIP): 

110, 114, 129 

Communication zone (COMZ): 51, 

60- 61,85- 91,94,196-97, 

200-201 

Community relations: 156- 57 

CONEX containers: 11 7 

Construction materiel: 29, 41 

Consulting work: 183 

Containerization: 82, I 17, 120, 154 

Continental Army Command 

(CONARC): 97, 98, 139, 150, 

188- 90 

Contract personnel 

Japanese: 60 

in Korea: 60 

in Vietnam: 114, 124, 128, 146, 

189 

Contractors: 60, 86, 112, I 16, 

125- 26, 128, 132, 146, 177 

Coral Sea: 18 

Corps 

X: 26-27 

XXIV: 35, 39,41 

Corps Tactical Zones 

Ill: 127 

IV: 127 

Corpus Christi Bay (ship): 189 

Cost reductions: 99- 1 00, I 0 1- 1 02, 

180- 81' 202- 203 

Cotuit, Massacht1sctts: 7-8 

Cranes: 9, 62, 125 26, 128, 132 

built-in on ships: 66, 120 

for containers: 120, 154 

noating: 66 

heavy-lift: 60, 66, 154 

Custer, General George: 152 

217 

Da Nang, Vietnam: 11 2, 120, 155, 

200- 201 

Davidson, Brig. Gen. Garrison H.: 

47 

Daytona 500 races: 153 

Defense, Department of: 96- 98, 

105, 121- 22, 138, 141-43, 

146, 177, 178 

Defense, Office of the Secretary of: 

141 , 14 7-48, 183- 84, 186-87' 

194, 199,201- 202,203 

Defense Attache Office: 148 

Defense Logistics Agency: 203 

Defense Supply Agency (DSA): 96, 

97, 106, 143-44 

Defense Transportation System: 

11 3 

DcGaulle, Charles: I 0 I 

DeLong, Col. L. B. ("Slim"): 81, 

120 

DeLong pier: 81 - 82, 120, 128 

Department of the Army Standard 

Automated Logistics Systems: 

178 

DePuy, General William E.: 133, 

156 

"Distant early warning" (DEW) 

line: 53 

Division air defense (DIY AD) system: 177 

Dock strikes: 15- 16 

Doctrine: 98 

amphibious landings: 20 I 

joint: 200- 20 I 

landing craft: 27 

logistics: 99, 138, 149, 150-51 , 

154, 156, 183 92 

movement control: 87, 95 

port: 131 
218 TRANSPORTATION AND LOGISTICS: ONE MAN'S STORY 

Doctrine- Continued 

Transportation Corps: 50, 5 1, 

117- 18, 120, 131 , 149, 

154- 55, 196, 20 l 

Dong Tam, Vietnam: I 26 

Downing, Thomas: 156 

Drug dealers: 65- 66 

Duke, Col. Robe11 W.: 110 

DUK Ws: 15, 42, 80- 81 

Dunckel, Brig. Gen. William C.: 

29- 30 

Dunn, Maj. James D. ("Dunny"): 

52- 53, 153- 54 

Eichelberger, Lt. Gen. Robert: 25, 

35 

Eifler, Maj. Gen. Charles W.: I 10, 

112, 114, 115, 116,118, 124, 

133 

Eisenhower, Dwight D.: 5 1, 87 

Emergency Mobilization 

Preparedness Board: 199 

Engineer Amphibious Brigade 

Band,2d:9 

Engineer Amphibious Brigades 

(EAB) 

I st: 7, 9 

2d:7, 9, 10,17- 18 

3d: 9, 10 

4th: 9 

Engineer Amphibious Command: 5, 

7- 13, 20 1 

Engineer Amphibious Regiments: 

8- 10. See also Engineer 

Special Brigades. 

53 1st: 7 

532d: 7- 8, 12, 17- 18 

541 st: 7 

542d:7 

591st: 5, 7 

592d: 5, 7 

Engineer Boat and Shore Regiments 

532d: 18- 37, 39, 46, 47-48 

542d: 24, 35 

592d:27- 28, 35 

Engineer Boat Maintenance 

Battalion, 562d: 20 

Engineer combat battalions: 9, 

154- 55 

Engineer Special Brigades 

2d: 18, 20, 25, 45-48 

3d:46 

4th: 35, 46 

Engineers, Office of the Chief of: 

46-47 

Engineers, U.S. Army Corps of: 57, 

152 

Engler, Lt. Gen . Jean: 11 2, I 14, 

11 5, 124, 133, 136 

European Command (EUCOM): 82, 

99, 101- 102 

Families of mil itaty personnel: I 0, 

12- 13, 49, 50, 79, 82- 83, 85, 

89, 133- 34, 156- 59, 175 

Fast Relocation (FRELOC) plan: 

101- 102 

Finschhafen, New Guinea: 22- 23, 26 

Flack boats: 23 

Food supplies: 16, 4 1, 60- 61 

Force redeployment: 144-45 

Forces Command (FORSCOM): 

150- 51, 155- 56, 190 

Forts 

Benjamin Harrison, Indiana: 

150- 5 1 

Eustis, Virginia: 48- 53, 55, 59, 

80- 83, I 05, II 0, 124, 135, 

136, 148- 59, 173, 175, 197 

Leavenworth, Kansas: 5, 52, 66, 

79, 150- 51 

Lee, Virginia: 150- 51 , 177- 78, 

19 1 

Leonard Wood, Missouri: 45 

Lewis, Washington: 48 

McNair, D.C.: 46-47 

Monroe, Virginia: 156 

Ord, California: 10- 13,45,47, 

48-49 

Shafter, Hawaii: 143 

St01y, Virginia: 80, 155 

Warden, Washington: 47-48 

Fotward Defense Strategy (South 

Korea): 18 1 
INDEX 

France: 8 1- 82, 85, 86, 88- 89, 99, 

101- 102, 152, 179- 80 

Freeman, Douglas Southhall: 203 

Fulton, Lt. Gen. William B.: 126 

Fuson, Georgia: 12- 13,46,47,49, 

50,52, 79,82,88,89, 156-59, 

183 

Fuson, Jack Carter, Jr.: 52 

Fuson, Jennie Chestnut 88 

Fuson, Nell Monroe: 51 - 52 

Garretson, Col. Ralph: 55, 57, 59, 

63- 64 

Gasper, Lt. Col. Albert: 46 

General Accounting Office (GAO): 

140, 178, 179, 183, 195, 198 

Germany: 86,88- 90, 100, 101, 102, 

103- 104, 152, 179- 80 

Gleason, Teddy: 112- 13, 122 

Gold flow problems: 89- 91, 95, 

99- 102, 104 

Goldwater-Nichols Depmtment of 

Defense Reorganization Act of 

1986: 198 

Goodenough Island: 24 

Grant aid: 125, 142-43, 179 

Great Barrier Reef: 17 

Great Britain: 94-95, 10 1, 102, 

196- 97 

Greenland: 53 

Gross, Maj. Gen. Charles P.: 50, 94, 

105, 198 

Harbor craft: 60- 61, !55 

Harkins, General Paul D.: 96 

Hawaii: 57, 181 

Hawkins, Lt. Col. Donald C.: 7-8 

Health Services Command, U.S. 

Army: 190 

Heavey, Brig. Gen. William F.: 46 

Heidelberg, Germany: 89 

Heiser, Lt. Gen. Joseph M., Jr.: 15, 

138-40, 142, 143, 176, 

177- 78, 179, 180, 183 

Henry, Col. Draper F.: 48 

Higgins Boat Company: I 7 

Hodge, Lt. Gen. John R.: 42-43 

219 

Hoelscher, Leonard W.: 96- 97 

Hol1andia, New Guinea: 23- 25, 26, 

27,29 

Hospitals: 6 

Host nation support: 180 

Household goods, movement of: 

133- 34 

Hoy, Lt. Col. Thomas 1-1 .: 115 

Huggard, Vincent P.: 142 

Humanitarian aid: 67 

Humboldt Bay, New Guinea: 

23- 24,25 

Hurow, Lt. Col. Arthur: 88 

Huston, James A.: 94 

Inchon, Korea: 39-43, 46, 55 

Industrial College of the Armed 

Forces: 93, 95 

Infantry (Regiment), 21st: 29- 30 

Infantry Divisions 

2d:48 

6th: 39 

7th: 39 

9th: 126 

24th: 23- 24,26-27,29- 30 

36th: 8, 10, 18 

40th: 35- 36, 39 

41st: 19,23- 26 

45th: 8 

Infantry Regimental Combat Team, 

19th: 29- 30, 31 

Integrated logistics support (ILS): 

176- 77 

Inventories: 146-48 

Inventory in motion: 142 

Iran: 152 

James River: 80, 81 

Japan: 15, 64-65, 141, 143, 146, 

175- 76, 180- 81. See also 

Japanese forces. 

occupation of Korea: 40, 4 1-42 

planned invasion of: 35- 36, 39 

surrender: 36, 42 

Japanese forces. See also Japan. 

air force: I 9, 22- 24, 30- 32 

aircraft: 19, 24 
220 TRANSPORTATION AND LOGISTICS: ONE MAN'S STORY 

Japanese forces-Continued 

naval: 18, 30, 32- 33 

in New Guinea: 19- 20, 22, 24, 26 

in the Philippines: 27, 31, 33, 34, 

35 

Johnson, General Harold K.: 123 

Johnson, Lyndon B.: 96, 11 4, 115, 

11 6 

JointChiefsofStaff:27, 141 , 

198- 99,200 

Joint Logistics Command: 145 

Joint Logistics Review Board: 175 

Joint Military Transp01tation 

Movement Plans and 

Programs: 51 

Joint U.S. Military Assistance 

Group: 181 

Jungle train ing: 17- 18 

Kaiscrslautern, Germany: 86, 

88- 89, 101 , 102 

Kamikazes: 24, 30-31, 32, 35- 36 

Kelley, Jules: 12 

Kelley, Ruth: 12 

Kennedy, Col. Cary A.: 124 

Kennedy, John F.: 19, 95, I 04 

Kerr, Dick: 15, 80-8 1 

Kerwin, General Walter T., Jr.: 174 

Khuycn, Lt. Gen. Dong Van: 145, 

146 

Komer, Robert W.: 11 5 

Korea: 55- 67,79, 141, 143, 193 

Japanese occupation of: 40, 

41-42,65 

marine operations in: 52- 53 

railroads in: 55, 57,58-59,61, 

64-65, 152 

U.S. occupation of: 39-43, 57 58 

Korean Base Section: 63 

Korean National Railroad: 59 

Korean War: 42, 52, 55- 67, 

11 8- 19, 135, 153- 54, 157, 

180, 193, 194, 202 

Kornet, Lt. Gen. Fred: 174 

Krueger, Lt. Gen. Walter: 25, 26, 

29- 30 

Kunsan, Korea: 55, 57 

Ky, Nguyen Cao: 123 

Kyushu, Japan: 35- 36 

Labor relations: 130 

Labor strikes: 15- 16 

Lac, New Guinea: 20,2 1- 25,26, 

29-30 

Landing craft: 6-10, 19, 22, 155 

doctrine: 27 

majntenance of: 9- 1 0 

mechanized (LCM): 8- 10, 19, 

20,23,24,32,36,40,42, 126 

personnel (LCP): 8 

personnel ramp (LCP[R]): 8 

shortages of: 19 

tank (LCT): 20, 22 

unloading of: 40 

used to supply troops: 22 

vehicle personnel (LCYP): 17, 

19,20,23,24 

vehicles (LCY): 8 

Landing ships dock (LSD): 19, 24, 

27 

Landing ships medium (LSM): 31, 

42 

Landing ships tank (LST): 19, 20, 

22,24,27,28,30,3 1,32,35, 

40, 42, I 19, 128 

Lebanon: 87 

Lee, Lt. Gen. John C. H.: 5 1, 94, 

196-97 

Leyte, Philippine Islands: 26-29, 

30-31,32 

Lcyte Gulf: 27- 28, 29 

Liberty ships: 32 

Light Truck Company, 50 I st: 89 

Lincoln, Maj. Gen. Rush B.: 15, 

49-50, 5 n, 80, 82, 85, 93, 105 

Lines of communication: 6, 3 1, 86, 

88- 89,99, 100- 104, 193 

Logistical Commands 

1st: 110, 11 2, 114, 116 

4th: 100 

Logistic Support, by Lt. Gen. 

Joseph M. Heiser, Jr.: 142 

Logistics, cooperative: 103- 105, 

179- 80 
INDEX 

Logistics, Deputy Chief of Staff for 

(DCSLOG): 95, 96, 97, 

99- 105, 133, 137-40, 173- 82, 

183 

assistant DCSLOG for personnel, 

doctrine, and systems (PDS): 

138-40, 177- 78 

Logistics Evaluation Group, U.S. 

Army: 99- 100 

Logistics Systems Division: 178 

Office of the Director of 

Transportation: 133- 34, 136 

Supply and Maintenance 

Directorate: 145 

Logistics Center: 150- 51 , 156, 178 

Logistics Doctrine, Systems 

Readiness Agency: 138 

Logistics Evaluation Agency: 

173- 74, 177, 178 

Logistics management 

Brown Board inquiry: I 37-40, 

150, 175- 76 

doctrine: 99, 138, 149- 51, 154, 

156, 183- 92 

expertise: 175- 76, 187- 89, 190, 

195- 96 

organization for: I 06, I 13, 

I 15- 16, 137-40, 143-44, 150, 

174-76, 183- 92, 200- 20 1 

retrograde: 144-48 

use of automation: 140 

Logistics Master Plan: 176 

Logistics System Policy Council: 

177- 78 

Long Binh, Vietnam: 116, I 19, 147 

Lubang Island, Philippine Islands: 

33- 34 

Lutes, Maj. Gen. LeRoy: 94, 198 

Luzon, Philippine Islands: 28- 29, 

32- 33, 34, 35 

MacArthur, General Douglas: 22, 

23, 28, 55 

McCaffrey, Lt. Gen. William J.: 

147 

MacDonald, D. G.: 124-25 

McLean, Malcolm: 82, 117, 120 

221 

McNamara, Robe1i S.: 96, 99, I 00, 

10 1, 102, 105, 106, 123, 137, 

186 

Maintenance personnel: 189, 190 

Marine Amphibious Force, 3d: 

200-201 

Marine Corps, U.S.: 6, 7, 29, 35- 36, 

83, 84, 93, 154- 55 

Markham Valley, New Guinea: 22 

Ma1iha's Vineyard, Massachusetts: 

10 

Masan, Korea: 55 

Materiel hand ling equipment: 60, 

112, 113, 114, 115, 11 7, 

125- 26, 127- 28, 132, 154 

Mechanics: 153, 189 

Medical Battalion, 262d: 9 

Medical evacuations: 20, 25 

Medical support: 190 

Mekong Delta: 96, 11 5, 126, 

128- 29, 130- 31 , 155 

Merchant Marine: 7 

Merrill, Maj. Gen. Frank D.: 47 

Meyer, Lt. Gen. Edward C.: 18 1 

Meyer, Lt. Gen. Richard D.: 

105- 107, 112, 123 

Middle East: 87- 88, 195 

Military aid: 64-65, I 03, 142-43, 

179 

Military Airlift Command: 199- 200 

Military Assistance Command, 

Vietnam (MACV): 95- 96, 

106, 110, 113, 11 4, l 16-17, 

119, 124, 127, 141, 143, 144, 

148, 197 

Military career education: 49- 52 

Military career school system: 

79- 80, 83- 84, 93, 97, 98 

Military History, Office of the 

Ch ief of: 138 

Military Personnel Center, U.S. 

Army: 190- 91 

Milita1y Police: 60, 65- 66 

Military Railroad Service, Tbird: 

58- 59, 64, 86, 152- 53 

Military sales program: 103, 

142-43, 179 
222 TRANSPORTATION AND LOGISTICS: ONE MAN'S STORY 

Military Sea Transp01tation 

Service: 52 

Military Sealift Command: 199 

Military Standard Requisition and 

Issue Procedures (MILSTRIP): 

194 

Military Standard Transportation 

and Movement Procedures 

(MILSTAMP): 194 

Military Traffic Management and 

Terminal Service: 134-35, 

181- 82 

Military Traffic Management 

Command (MTMC): 181- 82, 

199,200 

Military transpottation experts: 55 

Milne Bay, New Guinea: 20,26 

Mindoro, Philippine Islands: 29- 35, 

36- 37,58 

Missouri Military Academy: 2, 5 

Monterey Bay: II 

Morale: 112, 132, 134, 153 

Morobe, New Guinea: 19, 20, 22, 

25,26 

Morobe River: 19 

Morris, Thomas D.: 106 

Morro Bay, California: 46, 47 

Movement control: 50- 52, 86, 87, 

94, 113, 135, J 44, 151, 

179-80, 196-200 

Movement Control Group, 507th: 

197 

Movement planning: 87, 94, I 06, 

113, 135, 142, 151 , 179- 80 

Munitions Assignments Board: 

199 

Munitions Command, U.S. Army: 

142 

Murray, Maj. Gen. John E.: 148 

My Tho, Vietnam: 126 

Naclzab airstrip, New Guinea: 22 

Nashville, USS: 30-31 

Nassau Bay, New Guinea: 19- 20, 

23- 24,26 

National Guard 

suppot1 units: 176 

National Guard- Continued 

training: 151 

Navigation: I 1, 20, 22, 39-40 

Navy, U.S.: 7, 8, 52, 55, 83- 84,93, 

II 7, I 19, 181 , 199- 20 I 

bombardment of shore areas: 22, 

24,27 

escort ships: 20, 30, 32 

landing craft: 19, 22, 27, 42 

movement of Army troops: 6, 20, 

24,27,35 

PT boats: 19, 32, 33, 34 

training exercises: 20, 24, 48-49, 

81-82 

transport beach parties: 29 

World War II: 6, 19- 20,22,24, 

27,29,30,32- 36 

New Cumberland, Pennsylvania: 

138-39, 177 

New Guinea: 6-7, I 0, 17- 18, 

19- 20,22- 26,30,36,40,42 

New Zealand: 15 

Nha Be, Vietnam: 113, 127, 128 

Nielson, Col. Alexander Murray: 

29,33,34 

Noce, Lt. Gen. Daniel C.: 5 

No01·dam, SS: 12, 15 

North Africa: 9, 17, 18 

North Atlantic Treaty Organization 

(NATO): 8 1, 85, 90, 94- 95, 

99,102- 105, 179- 80, 183 

North Korea: 58, 62 

North Vietnam: 96, 148 

Nunn, Sam: 176 

Ogden, Brig. Gen. David A. 0.: 46, 

47,48 

Okinawa: 35-36, 39, I 16, 141 , 143, 

175-76, 180- 8 1 

Operation DESERT SIIIELD: 62, I 18, 

126, 135, 195, 198- 99, 200, 

202 

Operation OLYMPIC: 35- 36 

Operation VICTOR: 35 

Ordnance, chief of: 185 

Ordnance Base Depot No. I 

(Korea): 61-62 
INDEX 

Ordnance Corps: 58 

Ordnance Maintenance Company, 

162d: 9 

Ordnance Medium Maintenance 

Company, 3498th: 9 

Orleans, France: 85, 86, 88, 90 

Osmanski, Maj. Gen. Frank A.: 106 

Pacific Command: 141 

Pacific theater of operations: 18 

Pacific Utilization and 

Redistribution Agency 

(PURA): 180- 81 

Pagonis, Capt. William ("Gus"): 

126 

Palo, Leyte: 27- 28 

Panay, Ph ilippine ,Islands: 35, 39 

Parachute Regiment, 503d: 22, 

29- 30,31 

Parker shotguns: 40 

Pathfinder 1 and 2: 145-46 

Personnel management: 97, 98, 138, 

139, 186-87, 190- 91, 192 

Petroleum, oil, and lubricants 

(POL): 41,60- 61,86, 113 

distribution system: 1 0 1- 102 

dumps: 24-25 

transportation for: 86 

Petroleum Distribution Command: 

100 

Philippine Islands: 24, 26-35, 

36- 37,40,42,58 

Pieklik, Maj. Gen. Joseph E.: 115 

Piers, offshore: 8 1, 82 

Pilferage: 60, 65, I 12, 120, 126 

Planning 

with allies: 100-105 

ammunition operations: 142 

combat logistics support: 

103- 105 

for combined amphibious training: 18 

by OCSLOG: 97,99- 104, 176 

by joint staff: I 05, 200 

long-range: I 02- 107 

for movement of supplies: 5- 6, 

87, 106, 136- 37, 196 

Planning-Continued 

for occupation of Korea: 39 

retrograde: 136- 37, 143, 144, 

201-202 

theater logistics: 89- 91, 

102- 104, 106, 126-27, 

195- 97 

223 

transportation: 97, 139, 179- 80 

for troop movements: 5- 6, 

28- 29, 87, I 06, 136- 37, 

179-80, 196 

for wartime movement: 90, 195, 

197, 199,200 

World War II: 5--6, 18,28-29, 

196-97 

Pons, Col. Phillip E.: 82 

Port administration: 114- 15, 

128- 29, 130 

Port authority (Saigon): I 28- 29, 

130, 131 

Port companies: 58 

Port facilities 

construction of: I 15, 119- 20 

Inchon, Korea: 39-43 

Pusan, Korea: 59- 60 

Saigon, Vietnam: 110, 11 2- 14, 

115, 121- 32 

Vietnam: 109- 10, 112, 113 

Port operation centers: 63--64, 119, 

131 

Pot1 operations: 3 1, 39-43, 52, 57, 

60- 6 1, 109, 126, 128, 193- 94, 

195 

Port security: 60, 128 

Port tariffs: 121- 22, 130, 131 

Ports of embarkation: 12, 57, 59, 

60 

Post, Maj. Gen. Alton G.: 173 

Post inf01mation and supp011 centers: 158 

Powell, General Colin L.: 200 

Presidio of Monterey, Califomia: 47 

Prisoner of war camps 

for Italians: 49, 156- 57 

in Korea: 66 

World War II: 49, 156- 57 

Procurement: 173- 74, 177, 179 
224 TRANSPORTATION AND LOGISTICS: ONE MAN'S STORY 

Project 80: 96- 98, 137, 149, 150, 

184, 186 88, 190-91 

Project Steadfast: 184, 190- 91 

Promotion boards: 134 

Pusan, Korea: 55, 56, 57,59- 61, 

62- 67, 109, 112, 114, 118- 19 

Q-movement system: 51, 94 

Quartennaster companies: 41 

Quartermaster Corps: 48 

Quartermaster Gas Supply 

Company, I 89th: 9 

Quartennaster port units: 42 

Quartennastcr truck companies: 42 

Queensland, Australia: 16-17 

Qui Nhon, Vietnam: 96, 112 

Radar screens: 35- 36 

Railroad companies: 59, 152- 53 

Railroads 

in Europe: 86 

in Korea: 55, 57- 59, 61, 64-66 

in the Philippines: 31 

used to transport ammunition: 

58- 59 

used to transport equipment: 

10-1 1 

used to transport troops: I 0-1 I, 

16 

Readiness requirements: 137, 150, 

155- 56, 176- 77 

Reagan, Ronald: 199 

Reconnaissance missions: 33- 34 

Recruitment: 7 

Redeployment of Forces to 

Germany (REFORGER): 200 

Regimental combat teams: 8 

Repair parts: 36- 37,4 1,60-63, 

103, 104, 11 6, 146, 147 

Rescue operations: 32 

Research and development (R&D): 

150-51 , 155, 176-77 

Reserve logistics commands: 

87- 88 

Reserve Officer Training Corps 

(ROTC): 5 

Reserve rail units: 59 

Reserve units: 15 1 

support units: 176 

training: 151 

Resor, Stanley R.: 123-24 

Retail log istics system: 98, 99, 

106, 173 , 185, 186- 87, 188, 

191 

Retrograde planning: 136-37, 143, 

144,20 1- 202 

Riverine Forces: 126 

Rizzio, Tony: 157 

Roads 

constmction of: 31 

Korea: 64 

New Guinea: 22 

Philippine fslands: 3 1 

shore areas: 22 

Vietnam: 110, 120, 125- 26 

Rock Hampto n, Australia: 17 

Roosevelt, Franklin D.: 50-51 , 94, 

199 

Rosenberg, Maj. Ted: 124, 131 

Russia: 53, 152 

Saigon, Vietnam: 63- 64, 95- 96, 

109, 11 2- 14, 118, 119-23, 

126, 127- 32, 146, 147 

St. Leo College: 153 

Salamaua, New Guinea: 19- 20 

San Francisco, California: 12 

San Jose, Mindoro: 3 I, 32- 33 

Sawyer, Maj. Gen. Edward W.: 80 

Schlesinger, James R.: 174 

Sea-land conta inerized services: 

117,119 

Selection boards: 134 

Selective discharge: 27, 29, 35, 

11 3 

Sheriff, Col. Herman W.: 145 

Ships. See also Landing craft; 

Landing s hips dock; Landing 

ships medium; Landing ships 

tank. 

deep-draft: 19, 57, 8 1, 109, 110 

loading of: 19, 20, 27, 30, I 18, 

154 

resupply: 3 1, 32, 35 
INDEX 

Ships- Continued 

un loading of: 15 16, 19, 29, 

30- 3 1, 4 1, 57,60-61,64,66, 

80-8 1, 109, 112- 17, 119, 125, 

127- 29, 154 

used to transport troops: 15- 16, 

19 

Signal Company, 287th: 9 

Singapore: 143 

Sio, New Guinea: 23, 26 

Soldier Supporting Soldiers, A, by 

Lt. Gen. Joseph M. Heiser, Jr.: 

95, 142, 143 

Somervell, Lt. Gen. Brehon B.: 94, 

198 

South China Sea: 30, 32 

South Korea: 58- 59, 62, 66, 147, 

180- 81 

South Vietnam: 95 96, 99, 109- 33, 

141, 143, 146, 148, 175- 76. 

See also Saigon; Vietnam 

War. 

army of: 115- 16, 126, 136- 37, 

144-48 

commercial ports: I 12- 14, 

12 1- 23 

marine operations in: 52- 53, 114 

shipping to: I 09- 10, 113, 116, 

117, 118 

Stalin, Joseph: 50-51 

State, U.S. Department of: 121- 22 

Staudt, Herman R.: 174, 177 

Stevedore companies: 4 1-42, 122 

Stevedores 

Australia: 15 16 

Korea:57- 58, 59,60, 64, 194 

U.S.: 59 

Vietnam: 114,117, 122, 128 

Steves, Rod: 15 

Stick gangs: 57- 58 

Stilwell, General Richard G.: 199 

Stiner, Col. J. J. F.: 19, 29 

Storagefacilitics: 112, 113, 115- 16, 

118, 119, 125, 127- 28, 

129- 30, 132 

Strategic Communications 

Command, U.S. Army: 190- 9 1 

Struble, Rear Adm. Arthur: 30 

Supply depots: 6, 40. See also 

225 

Storage facil itics; Warehouses. 

Supply lines: 22 23 

Supply supp011 personnel: 61-62 

Supreme Headqua11ers, Allied 

Powers Europe (SHAPE): 

81- 82, 94-95,103 

Surgeon General: 190 

Surhiem, Bob: 142 

Suyon, Korea: 55 

Tacloban, Leyte: 26-28 

Taiwan: 143, 146, 175- 76 

Tanahmerah Bay. New Guinea: 

23- 24 

Terrain: 25, 28, 29, 3 1, 34, 40 

jungle: 22 

mountains: 64 

swamps: 24 

Test, measurement, and diagnostic 

equipment (TMDE): 176, 177, 

185 

Thailand: 120, 143, 180- 81 

Thanh, Au Truong: 123 

Theater logistics: 89- 91, I 02- 1 04, 

106, 126- 27, 195- 97 

Townsville, Australia: 15 

Traber, Maj. Oscar W.: 12 

Traffic management: 50, 51- 52, 

135, 196- 200 

Traffic Management Agency: I 13, 

197 

Training: 139, 175- 77 

for amphibious operations: 8- 13, 

17- 19, 35, 46-49, 50, 80-82, 

154-55, 201 

antiaircraft gunnery: 11 - 12 

with Australian forces: 18 

Engineer Ampll ibious Command: 

8- 13 

equipment: 156 

individual: 151 , 195 

jungle: 17- 18 

landing craft: I I, 17-19 

manuals: 151, 155, 176- 77, 188, 

20 1 
226 TRANSPORTATION AND LOGISTICS: ONE MAN'S STORY 

Training- Continued 

mi I itary occupational specialty: 

153 

mission: 8 

reserve units: 151 

responsibility for: 150- 51, 156, 

186- 89, 190-92 

sites: 8- 13, 17- 19, 46, 47-48 

unit: 151 

Training and Doctrine Command 

(TRADOC): 150- 51, 155-56, 

190- 91 

Transport Command, U.S. Army: 

52 

Transportation, Office of the Chief 

of: 52, 95, 154 

Transportation, U.S. Department of: 

199 

Transportation boat units: 154 

Transportation Center, U.S. Army: 

135- 36 

Transportation Command, U.S.: 

198- 99,200 

Transportation Commands, U.S. 

Army 

4th: 110, 112, 114, 118, 127, 

128- 29, 131 , 132, 133, 155 

!25th: 129, 131 

Transportation Command Group, 

37th: 86,88 

Transportation control movement 

documents: 118 

Transportation Corps: 48- 53, 55, 

62- 63, 105, 112, 135, 149, 

152, 153, 154-55, 175, 193, 

201 

organizational labels: 52- 53 

in Vietnam: 112, 127 

Transportation corps port command: 43 

Transportation costs: 135 

Transportation Group, 48th: 60 

Transportation industry: 152- 53 

Transportation management: 50, 

135, 196-200 

Transportation medium port units: 

41 

Transportation Port Commands: 

154-55 

4th: 110 

7th: 60 

Transportation requirements: 5 1, 

87,90, 139, 144,196- 97 

Transportation School: 49 52, 79, 

80, 93, 135, 149, 150-5 1, 155, 

193, 196 

Transportation shortages: 87, 

93- 94, 144, 179- 80, 198 

Transportation terminal command: 

124 

Transportation Tenninal Service 

Battalions 

lith: 128 

71st: 120 

Transportation Terminal Service 

companies: 60, 110, I 14, 

153-54, 156 

Transportation Training Center: 

48-49, 148, 149- 59, 196 

Trapil: 101 

Trinjty Beach, Australia: 17- 19 

Truck Battalions, 53d: 85, 86, 

88- 89,90- 91, 102, I 12, 158, 

196 

Truck companies: 60, 88, 156 

Trucks 

contract: I 14, I 16 

dump: 11 5 

shortages of: 42 

used for port clearance: 60- 62, 

64, 114, J 16 

Truman, !larry S.: 152- 53 

Tugboats: 60, 8 1 

Turkey: 88, I 0 I 

Ulsan, Korea: 55, 57, 58 

U.S.S.R.: 89, 90, 103 

Unit equipment: 46-47 

United Nations: 62 

United States (ship): 85 

U.S. Army, Europe: 82, 99, 

100- 102, 104, 197 

COMZ headquarters: 85- 91, 100, 

101- 102 
INDEX 

U.S. Army, Europe- Continued 

Office of the Deputy Chief of 

Staff for Logistics: 89- 91, 93, 

95 

U.S. Army, Pacific: 57, 96, 136, 

140, 141-48 

U.S. Army, Vietnam: 112, 127, 133, 

144, 147 

U.S./FRO Cooperative Logistics 

Plan: 104 

Van Fleet, General James A.: 58 

Vehicle rebuild facilities: 64-65, 146 

Viet Cong: 96, 122 

Vietnam War: 64-65,95, 105- 106, 

109- 32, 133, 136-37, 142, 

144-48, 149, 150, 155, 157, 

174- 76, 180, 183, 186, 189, 

190, 193, 197,202 

amphibious landings: 200 

logistics problems: 62, 99, I 12, 

135 

port operations: 63- 64, 82 

retrograde operations: 143-48, 

201 - 202 

Vietnamese Armed Forces Support 

System: 145-46 

Visayan Islands: 35 

Volgenau, Lt. Col. Elmer: 23 

Vung Tau, Vietnam: 112, 125, 127, 

128, 130, 131 

Waite, Lt. Ralph: 26- 27 

War Department: 47-49 

War Production Board: 94 

War reserve stocks: 86, 87- 88, I 00, 

103- 104 

War Shipping Administration: 94, 

199 

Warehouses: 11 2, 11 3, 11 9, 

121- 23, 125- 26, 128 

Waters, General John K.: 123 

Weapons systems: 176- 77, 179, 

185- 86, 187, 189 

Weather: 22, 28 

Western Visayan Task Force: 

29- 30 

227 

Westmoreland, General William C.: 

113, 114, 115, 122, 123- 24 

WESTPAC Ill: 181 

Wewak, New Guinea: 23 

Weyand, Genera I Frederick C.: 148, 

173, 174 

Wheeler, General Earle 0.: 123 

Whitcomb, Brig. Gen. Richard F.: 

63- 64 

Wholesale logistics: 96- 97, 98, 99, 

139, 150- 51, 173, 185 89, 191 

World War 11 : 2, 157 

amphibious capability: 5- 13, 

154- 55,200 

lack of preparedness for: 18- 19 

movement control: 51, 94, 

196- 97, 198, 199 

transportation needs: 50- 51, 94, 

152, 153- 54 

Yarborough, Lt. Gen. William P.: 

96 

Youens, Lt. Col. John: 55, 57,59