[DO NOT PUBLISH]

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Eleventh Circuit

____________________

No. 22-14075

Non-Argument Calendar

____________________

STEPHEN ADDERLEY, 

Petitioner-Appellant,

versus

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Respondent-Appellee.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Florida

D.C. Docket No. 1:22-cv-23761-RAR

____________________

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2 Opinion of the Court 22-14075

Before WILLIAM PRYOR, Chief Judge, and ROSENBAUM and GRANT, 

Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

Stephen Adderley, a federal prisoner, appeals pro se the sua 

sponte dismissal of his motion to vacate. 28 U.S.C. § 2255. We issued a certificate of appealability on the issue whether the district 

court abused its discretion, under Paez v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 

947 F.3d 649 (11th Cir. 2020), in dismissing Adderley’s motion as 

untimely without permitting him to respond. We affirm.

In 2019, Adderley pleaded guilty to conspiring to possess 

with intent to distribute heroin and fentanyl, 21 U.S.C. § 846, and 

was sentenced as a career offender, U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1(b), to 262 

months of imprisonment. His career-offender designation was 

predicated on Florida convictions for conspiring to possess with intent to distribute cocaine, possessing with intent to distribute five 

kilograms or more of cocaine and 50 grams or more of cocaine 

base, and conspiring to possess with intent to distribute 28 grams 

or more of cocaine base. Adderley did not appeal.

In 2022, over three years after his conviction became final, 

Adderley filed a motion to vacate, 28 U.S.C. § 2255, and argued that 

he no longer qualified as a career offender. Citing our now-vacated 

decision in United States v. Jackson, 36 F.4th 1294 (11th Cir.) (“Jackson I”), superseded, 55 F.4th 846 (11th Cir. 2022), aff’d sub nom, Brown 

v. United States, No. 22-6389 (U.S. May 23, 2024), he argued that his 

predicate Florida cocaine convictions no longer qualified because, 

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22-14075 Opinion of the Court 3 

at the time of his federal conviction, ioflupane had been removed 

from the federal drug schedules but not the Florida drug schedules. 

Adderley also argued that his two predicate convictions for conspiring to distribute cocaine and cocaine base no longer qualified because section 4B1.2(b) did not include “inchoate drug crimes.” Regarding the timeliness of his motion, Adderley asserted that his 

motion was timely under 28 U.S.C. § 2255(f )(3) because “Jackson 

announced a substantive rule that is retroactive to cases on collateral review.” 

The district court sua sponte dismissed Adderley’s motion. It 

ruled that the motion was untimely under any limitation period, 

28 U.S.C. § 2255(f), because the motion was not filed within one 

year of his conviction becoming final, id. § 2255(f)(1), and Jackson

was a then-vacated decision of this Court and did not constitute a 

right “recognized by the Supreme Court,” id. § 2255(f)(3). It explained that no other limitation period applied because Adderley 

asserted no “impediment” to his motion, id. § 2255(f)(2), or any 

date on which a new factual predicate “could have been discovered,” id. § 2255(f)(4). And it explained that Adderley alleged no 

facts supporting any “equitable exceptions to timeliness,” such as 

equitable tolling or actual innocence.

We review the decision to raise sua sponte the statute of limitations for abuse of discretion. Paez, 947 F.3d at 651; see Rhode v. 

United States, 583 F.3d 1289, 1291 (11th Cir. 2009) (recognizing that 

the legal principles applicable to section 2254 proceedings generally 

apply to section 2255 proceedings). We review the determination 

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4 Opinion of the Court 22-14075

that a motion to vacate is untimely de novo. Beeman v. United States, 

871 F.3d 1215, 1219 (11th Cir. 2017).

The one-year limitation period to file a motion to vacate 

runs from the latest of the following four dates:

(1) the date on which the judgment of conviction becomes final;

(2) the date on which the impediment to making a 

motion created by governmental action in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United 

States is removed, if the movant was prevented 

from making a motion by such governmental action;

(3) the date on which the right asserted was initially 

recognized by the Supreme Court, if that right has 

been newly recognized by the Supreme Court and 

made retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review; or 

(4) the date on which the facts supporting the claim 

or claims presented could have been discovered 

through the exercise of due diligence.

28 U.S.C. § 2255(f). “If it plainly appears from the motion, any attached exhibits, and the record of prior proceedings that the moving party is not entitled to relief, the judge must dismiss the motion.” Rule 4(b), Rules Governing Section 2255 Proceedings.

In Paez, we held that untimely habeas petitions are subject 

to dismissal at the screening stage under Rule 4, which requires district courts to dismiss petitions that are “legally insufficient on 

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22-14075 Opinion of the Court 5

[their] face,” if the court provides the petitioner with notice and an 

opportunity to be heard. Paez, 947 F.3d at 653 (internal quotation 

marks omitted). We explained that the district court did not abuse 

its discretion when it dismissed a petition that it had determined to 

be untimely without ordering the State to respond because it provided the petitioner with “notice of its decision and an opportunity 

to be heard in opposition.” Id.

In his initial brief, Adderley does not challenge the sua sponte

dismissal of his motion as untimely. Instead, he argues that the district court erred by dismissing his motion as untimely without considering sections 2255(f)(2) and 2255(f)(4). He also argues that the 

district court failed to address the merits of his career-offender arguments. See Clisby v. Jones, 960 F.2d 925 (11th Cir. 1992) (en banc).

We do not address this argument because the certificate we issued 

is limited to the sua sponte dismissal. See Steiner v. United States, 940 

F.3d 1282, 1294 (11th Cir. 2019).

The district court did not abuse its discretion. Adderley’s 

motion stated that he was sentenced in 2019 and that he filed no 

direct appeal or motion for post-conviction relief until he filed the

instant motion three years later. The district court did not venture 

beyond the record to take notice of dates to which Adderley lacked 

access in determining that his motion was untimely under section 

2255(f)(1). See Bryant v. Ford, 967 F.3d 1272, 1275–76 (11th Cir. 

2020). Moreover, Adderley’s motion listed each of the four limitation provisions and invoked section 2255(f)(3) based on an alleged 

new constitutional right in Jackson I. Indeed, the motion form 

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6 Opinion of the Court 22-14075

instructed Adderley to explain why the one-year limitation period 

did not bar his motion, and he argued on that form and in his attached memorandum that Jackson I recognized a new constitutional right that made his motion “timely under §[ ]2255(f)(3).” The

district court also did not err in determining that section 2255(f)(3) 

did not apply because Jackson I and the other cases he cited were 

not decisions of the Supreme Court. See 28 U.S.C. § 2255(f)(3); Dodd 

v. United States, 365 F.3d 1273, 1280 (11th Cir. 2004). The district 

court also considered whether Adderley’s arguments could satisfy

sections 2255(f)(2) and 2255(f)(4) and correctly concluded that they 

could not. Because Adderley was afforded notice of the limitation 

periods, had an opportunity to argue that his motion was timely,

and provided the district court with sufficient information to assess 

the timeliness of his motion, the district court did not abuse its discretion in sua sponte dismissing his motion. See Turner v. Sec’y, Dep’t 

of Corr., 991 F.3d 1208, 1211 (11th Cir. 2021); Paez, 947 F.3d at 651, 

653.

We AFFIRM the dismissal of Adderley’s motion to vacate.

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