1

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY APPELLATE PANEL

OF THE NINTH CIRCUIT

In re:

ANTONIO ALEJANDRO GUTIERREZ,

Debtor.

BAP No. ID-21-1156-SGB

Bk. No. 19-00416-JMM

Adv. No. 20-06023-JMM

MEMORANDUM*

ANTONIO ALEJANDRO GUTIERREZ,

Appellant,

v.

STATE OF OREGON, DEPARTMENT

OF CORRECTIONS,

Appellee.

Appeal from the United States Bankruptcy Court

for the District of Idaho

Joseph M. Meier, Chief Bankruptcy Judge, Presiding

Before: SPRAKER, GAN, and BRAND, Bankruptcy Judges.

INTRODUCTION

Antonio Alejandro Gutierrez is a former chapter 71 debtor and is an 

inmate at the Snake River Correctional Institution, run by the Oregon

Department of Corrections (“ODOC”). After he received his discharge and 

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication. Although it may be cited for 

whatever persuasive value it may have, see Fed. R. App. P. 32.1, it has no precedential 

value, see 9th Cir. BAP Rule 8024-1.

1 Unless specified otherwise, all chapter and section references are to the 

Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. §§ 101–1532.

FILED

MAR 2 2022

SUSAN M. SPRAUL, CLERK

U.S. BKCY. APP. PANEL

OF THE NINTH CIRCUIT
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his case was fully administered, Gutierrez filed a complaint stating two 

claims for relief. One claim challenged the method used by the ODOC to 

collect court filing fees he owed under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b). The other claim 

concerned the dischargeability of those debts under § 523(a)(17).

The bankruptcy court first dismissed the dischargeability claim on 

the merits. The court then dismissed the sole surviving claim challenging 

ODOC’s collection methods for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

Gutierrez has not appealed the dismissal of his dischargeability claim. He 

only has appealed the dismissal of his remaining claim.

Gutierrez insists that the bankruptcy court had “related to”

jurisdiction over the claim regarding ODOC’s collection methods.

Alternately, he contends that the bankruptcy court should have exercised 

its discretion to “retain” jurisdiction over that claim. But the bankruptcy

court never had any jurisdiction over this claim to retain.

Neither of Gutierrez’s arguments on appeal have any merit. 

Accordingly, we AFFIRM.

FACTS

In April 2019, Gutierrez commenced his bankruptcy case by filing a 

voluntary chapter 7 petition. In August 2019, the bankruptcy court entered 

orders discharging debtor and closing Gutierrez’s no-asset case. 2

2 We exercise our discretion to take judicial notice of documents electronically 

filed in Gutierrez’s bankruptcy case and the related adversary proceeding. See Atwood v. 

Chase Manhattan Mortg. Co. (In re Atwood), 293 B.R. 227, 233 n.9 (9th Cir. BAP 2003).
3

In October 2019, the bankruptcy court reopened the case at 

Gutierrez’s request. The purpose of reopening the case was to permit the 

debtor to commence an adversary proceeding challenging the 

dischargeability of debts he owed for federal court filing fees he incurred 

under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b). Under the statute, such fees are owed to the 

federal courts but typically are collected from an inmate’s prisoner trust 

account by the applicable correctional institution. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2).

In this case, that institution was ODOC.

Gutierrez filed his adversary complaint seeking two forms of relief.

First, he challenged the dischargeability of the federal court filing fees. He 

admitted in his complaint that his court fees were the type of debt that fell 

within the scope of § 523(a)(17), but he asserted that the statute should not 

be applied to his fees because none of the cases he filed were frivolous. 

Second, Gutierrez challenged ODOC’s method of collecting the fees. 

Gutierrez alleged that pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2), ODOC

historically capped its collections at “20 percent of the preceding month’s 

income credited to the prisoner’s account” regardless of the number of 

cases for which the inmate owed filing fees. However, Gutierrez claimed

that after he received his bankruptcy discharge, ODOC notified him for the 

first time that it would collect from his prisoner trust account 20% of his 

income per lawsuit filed, instead of 20% total regardless of the number of 

cases filed. According to Gutierrez, the changes in the ODOC’s collection 

methods were both contractually and constitutionally prohibited.
4

The bankruptcy court partially granted ODOC’s motion to dismiss 

the complaint. It dismissed Gutierrez’s dischargeability claim but declined 

to dismiss the collection method claim, holding that this claim was not yet 

ripe for consideration.

3

Gutierrez then filed a motion seeking entry of a default judgment 

against ODOC or alternately seeking entry of summary judgment on his 

surviving claim challenging ODOC’s collection method. In support of his 

default judgment motion, Gutierrez asserted that ODOC had not timely

complied with the court’s directions regarding further proceedings in the 

adversary proceeding. As for his summary judgment motion, Gutierrez

contended that he was entitled to judgment as a matter of law on his 

collection method claim.

ODOC opposed Gutierrez’s motions and filed its own motion 

seeking to dismiss the remaining claim for lack of jurisdiction. ODOC in 

relevant part pointed out that Gutierrez’s collection method claim would 

not have any conceivable effect on his no asset chapter 7 case. The 

bankruptcy case had been fully administered back in August 2019, well 

before Gutierrez commenced his adversary proceeding. 

The bankruptcy court held a hearing on the parties’ motions. The 

court determined that it lacked jurisdiction over the surviving claim

3 Gutierrez has not challenged on appeal the dismissal of his dischargeability 

claim. In fact, he later admitted to the bankruptcy court that he “didn’t think [the fees] 

were going to be discharged.” Hr’g Tr. (June 21, 2021) at 4:5-7.
5

because the outcome would not affect Gutierrez’s bankruptcy case or the 

bankruptcy estate. Based on that determination, the bankruptcy court held 

that it lacked jurisdiction to decide the collection method claim, denied 

Gutierrez’s motions, and dismissed the adversary proceeding.

On June 24, 2021, the bankruptcy court entered its order dismissing 

the collection method claim and denying Gutierrez’s motions for default 

judgment or for summary judgment. Gutierrez timely appealed.

JURISDICTION

The bankruptcy court’s jurisdiction is addressed in the discussion 

section, below. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 158.

ISSUES

1. Did the bankruptcy court have jurisdiction over Gutierrez’s collection 

method claim?

2. Did the bankruptcy court abuse its discretion by not retaining

jurisdiction over the collection method claim?

STANDARDS OF REVIEW

We review de novo whether the bankruptcy court had subject matter 

jurisdiction over Gutierrez’s adversary proceeding. Wilshire Courtyard v. 

Cal. Franchise Tax Bd. (In re Wilshire Courtyard), 729 F.3d 1279, 1284 (9th Cir.

2013); Alonso v. Summerville (In re Summerville), 361 B.R. 133, 139 (9th Cir. 

BAP 2007).
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We review for an abuse of discretion bankruptcy court decisions 

concerning retention of jurisdiction after case dismissal. See Linkway Inv. Co. 

v. Olsen (In re Casamont Invs., Ltd.), 196 B.R. 517, 521 (9th Cir. BAP 1996).

The bankruptcy court abuses its discretion when it applies an 

incorrect legal rule or when its factual findings are illogical, implausible, or 

without support in the record. TrafficSchool.com, Inc. v. Edriver Inc., 653 F.3d 

820, 832 (9th Cir. 2011).

DISCUSSION

Gutierrez has asserted two arguments on appeal. First, he argues that 

the bankruptcy court had “related to” jurisdiction over his claim 

challenging ODOC’s debt collection methods. And second, he argues that 

even if the bankruptcy court lacked “related to” jurisdiction over that 

claim, the court should have “retained” jurisdiction to determine whether 

ODOC was properly collecting the nondischargeable court fees. 

Gutierrez acknowledges that the bankruptcy case was fully 

administered long before he filed his adversary proceeding. He also 

concedes that his claim regarding the dischargeability of the underlying 

debt already had been dismissed. Yet he insists the bankruptcy court 

should have exercised its discretion to keep and decide the collection 

method claim because the court was “almost finished” adjudicating the 

claim.

We address each of these arguments in turn.
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A. The bankruptcy court did not have subject matter jurisdiction over 

Gutierrez’s collection method claim.

“Bankruptcy courts have subject matter jurisdiction over proceedings 

‘arising under title 11, or arising in or related to cases under title 11.’” In re 

Wilshire Courtyard, 729 F.3d at 1285 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1334(b)). Gutierrez

has conceded that his collection method claim did not arise under or arise 

in the Bankruptcy Code. However, as he notes, the bankruptcy court also 

has jurisdiction over “those proceedings that are ‘related to’ a bankruptcy 

case.” Montana v. Goldin (In re Pegasus Gold Corp.), 394 F.3d 1189, 1193 (9th 

Cir. 2005). The bankruptcy court typically has “related to” jurisdiction over 

the claims stated in an adversary proceeding when “the outcome could 

alter the debtor’s rights, liabilities, options, or freedom of action (either 

positively or negatively) and which in any way impacts upon the handling 

and administration of the bankrupt estate.” Fietz v. Great W. Sav. (In re 

Fietz), 852 F.2d 455, 457 (9th Cir. 1988) (cleaned up) (quoting Pacor, Inc. v. 

Higgins, 743 F.2d 984, 994 (3d Cir. 1984)). 

Notwithstanding the broad scope of “related to” jurisdiction, 

“bankruptcy courts have no jurisdiction over proceedings that have no 

effect on the estate of the debtor.” Celotex Corp. v. Edwards, 514 U.S. 300, 308 

& n.6 (1995). Once a chapter 7 bankruptcy estate has been fully 

administered, most new adversary proceedings brought after that point fall 

beyond the scope of “related to” jurisdiction precisely because there is no

bankruptcy estate left for the new adversary proceeding to impact. See, e.g.,
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Holcomb v. Altagen (In re Holcomb), BAP No. CC-17-1268-KuTaS, 2018 WL 

1976526, at *7 (9th Cir. BAP Apr. 25, 2018); In re Ketscher, Case No. 12-17088, 

2014 WL 2615177, at *1-2 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. June 5, 2014); Ng v. Sterling Pac. 

Lending, Inc. (In re Ng), Case No. 10-61392 RLE, 2011 WL 6133183, at *8 

(Bankr. N.D. Cal. Dec. 8, 2011).

4

Gutierrez’s collection method claim had absolutely no impact on his

fully administered and formerly closed bankruptcy case. He merely sought 

to invoke non-bankruptcy law to restrict or prohibit the manner in which 

ODOC collected a nondischargeable debt.

Gutierrez attempts to argue that the bankruptcy court’s “related to”

jurisdiction should be measured at an earlier time — before the full 

administration of his bankruptcy case. But the law is settled that 

jurisdiction is measured at the time the adversary proceeding is 

commenced. See In re Casamont Invs., Ltd., 196 B.R. at 521 (citing In re Fietz, 

852 F.2d at 457 at n.2).

In short, the bankruptcy court correctly determined that it did not 

have “related to” jurisdiction over the surviving collection method claim 

Gutierrez asserted in his adversary proceeding.

4 There are exceptions to this rule. See, e.g., McCowan v. Fraley (In re McCowan), 

296 B.R. 1, 3–4 (9th Cir. BAP 2003); see also § 554(d) (providing that estate assets neither

abandoned nor administered before closure of the case remain property of the estate).

But none of these exceptions apply to Gutierrez’s adversary proceeding.
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B. The bankruptcy court did not abuse its discretion by not retaining

jurisdiction over the collection method claim.

Gutierrez also argues that the bankruptcy court should have 

“retained” jurisdiction over his non-bankruptcy claim. See Aplt’s Opn. Br. 

at 4-5. Citing Rodriguez v. Volpentesta (In re Volpentesta), 187 B.R. 261, 270 

(Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1995), he contends that the bankruptcy court was obligated 

to consider judicial economy, fairness and convenience to the parties, and 

the degree of difficulty of the related legal issue involved. See also In re 

Casamont Invs., Ltd., 196 B.R. at 521.

These decisions consider whether to retain jurisdiction over an 

existing adversary case after the underlying bankruptcy case is dismissed.

But Gutierrez’s bankruptcy case was not dismissed. It was fully 

administered and closed well before he filed the adversary proceeding.

Casamont, and similar cases, do not apply when the bankruptcy case has 

been fully disposed of before the adversary proceeding is commenced. See

Sea Hawk Seafoods, Inc. v. Alaska (In re Valdez Fisheries Dev. Ass’n), 439 F.3d 

545, 547-49 (9th Cir. 2006). Because Gutierrez’s bankruptcy was closed 

when he commenced his adversary proceeding, the bankruptcy court never 

had jurisdiction over the collection method claim. Put bluntly, there never

was any jurisdiction over that claim for the court to retain, so it did not 

abuse its discretion by dismissing the claim.

Gutierrez seems to argue that the bankruptcy court should have 

considered retaining jurisdiction over the collection method claim because 
10

it indisputably had jurisdiction over his dischargeability claim. Assuming 

without deciding that the bankruptcy court had the discretion to retain 

jurisdiction over the collection method claim based on some sort of theory 

of supplemental jurisdiction, Gutierrez has not persuaded us that the 

bankruptcy court abused that discretion. Applying the factors considered 

in Casamont as suggested by Gutierrez, the record abundantly

demonstrates that dismissal was warranted. Litigants cannot manufacture 

bankruptcy jurisdiction over a non-bankruptcy claim by including that 

claim together with a specious bankruptcy claim well after the underlying 

bankruptcy case has been administered.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, we AFFIRM the bankruptcy court’s 

adversary proceeding dismissal order.