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WESTERN SECURITY ISSUES:

EUROPEAN PERSPECTIVES

H E A R IN G

BEFORE TH E

SUBCOMMITTEES ON INTERNATIONAL 

SECURITY AND SCIENTIF IC AFF AIRS

AND ON

EUROPE AND THE MIDDLE EAST

OF TH E

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

NINETY-SIXTH CONGEESS 

FIRST SESSION

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j SE P T E M B E R 12, 1979

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U.S. GOVERNME NT PR INTING OFFIC E

WASHINGTON : 1979

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COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

CL EM EN T J. ZABLOCKI, Wisconsin, Chairman

L. H. F OU NT AIN, N ort h Carolina

DANTE B. FASCELL, Florid a 

CH AR LE S C. D IGGS , Jr., Michigan 

BE NJAM IN S. RO SE NT HA L, New York 

LE E H. HAM ILT ON, Indi ana 

LES TE R L. WOLFF, New York 

JO NA TH AN B. BIN GHAM , New York 

GUS YA TR ON , Pennsylvania 

CA RD ISS COLLINS , niinois 

STEPH EN J. SOLARZ, N ew York 

DO N BO NK ER , Washington 

GERRY E. STUD DS , Massachusetts 

AN DY IR EL AND, Florida 

DO NA LD J. PEAS E, Ohio 

DA N M ICA, Florid a

MICH AE L D. BA RN ES, Maryland 

WILL IAM H. GR AY I II, Pennsylvania 

TO NY P . HALL, Ohio

HOW ARD W OLPE, Michigan

DAVID R. BOWEN, Mississippi 

FL OY D J. FI TH IA N, Indiana

WILL IAM S. B RO OM FIEL D, Michigan 

EDWA RD J. DE RW IN SK I, Illinois 

PA UL FI N DLE Y, Illinois 

JO HN H . BU CH AN AN , Jr., Alabama 

LA RRY W INN, J r., Kansas 

BE NJAM IN A. GILMAN, New York 

TE NN YS ON GU YE R, Ohio 

RO BER T J. LAG OMARSINO, California 

WILL IAM F. GOODLTNG, Pennsylvania 

JO EL P RIT CH A RD , Washington 

MIL LI CE NT F EN WICK, New Jersey 

DA N QU AY LE, Ind iana

John J. Brady, Jr. , Chief of Staf f

Josephine Web er, St af f Ass istant

Sandra Decker, St aff Assistan t

'. i ...1 I

Subcommittee on I nternational Security and Scien tific Affairs

CL EM EN T J . ZABLOCKI, Wisconsin. Chairman

L. H. FO UN TA IN , N ort h Carolina 

LEE H . HA MILTON , Ind iana 

LEST ER L. WOLFF , New York 

JO NA TH AN B. B INGH AM , N ew York

WILL IAM S. BROOMFIELD,'Michigan 

LA RR Y W INN, J r., Kansas 

DA N QU AY LE, Indiana

Fvo J. Spalatin, Subcommittee Staff Director

William H. Fite, Minority St af f Consultant

F orrest R. F rank, Subcommittee S ta ff Associate

Toni J. Grant, Subcommittee S ta ff Associate

Subcommittee on Europe and th e Middle East

LE E H. HAMILTON , Indiana, Chairman

BE NJAM IN S. RO SE NT HA L, New York 

DO NA LD J. PE AS E, Ohio 

GERRY E. STUD DS , Massachusetts 

MICH AE L D. BA RN ES , M aryland 

L. H. FO UN TA IN , N orth Carolina

PA UL F IN DLE Y, Illinois 

MIL LICE NT FENW ICK , New Jersey 

LARRY WINN , J r., Kansas

Michael H. Van Dusen, Subcommittee S ta ff Director

Alison Brenner, Minority St af f C onsu ltant

R onald L. Soriano, Subcommittee S ta ff Associate

D avid P aul Barton, Subcommittee Staf f Associate

(I I)
CONTEN TS

WITNESS ES

Paul Thyness, Member of the Norwegian Parliament (Conservative P»se 

Party ); and president of the North Atlantic Assembly______________ 2

Patrick Wall, Member of the British Parliament (Conservative Party );

and chairman, Military Committee, No rth Atlan tic Assembly________ 12

Peter Corterier, Member, German Bundesta g (Social Democratic Party ); 

and general rapp orteur, Political Committee of the North Atlan tic 

Assembly_____________________________________________________ 17

Klaas de Vries, Member of the Dutch Parliament (Labour Par ty ); and

general rapporteur, Military Committee of the North Atlantic Assem bly. 20 

AP PE ND IX

Biographies of witnesses:

Paul Thyness (Norway)______________________________________ 47

Patrick Wall (United Kingdom)_______________________________ 47

Peter Corterier (Federal Republic of German y)__________________ 47

Klaas de Vries (Netherland s)__________________________________ 48

(HD

WESTERN SECURITY ISSUES: EUROPEAN

PERSPECTIVES

WEDNESDAY, SEPTEMBER 12, 1979

H ouse of R e pr e se n t a t iv e s,

C om m it te e on F o reig n Affa ir s,

S ubcom m it te es on I n ter n a tio n a l Secu rit y

an d Sc ie n t if ic Affa ir s an d on

E u r o pe an d th e M id d le E ast ,

Washington, D.C.

The joint subcommittees met at 10:30 a.m., in room 2255, Rayburn 

House Office Building, Hon. Clement J. Zablocki (chairman of the 

Committee on Foreign Affairs) presiding.

Chairman Zablocki. The subcommittees will please come to order.

We meet today to examine some of the emerging issues relating to 

the security of Western Europe. We are all aware, I think, of the 

growing military capability of the Warsaw Pact.

What may not be well-known, however, is the ability of the NATO 

alliance to defend its interests using both military and nonmilitary 

means.

Much has been said in recent weeks about the views of our European allies on the pending ratification of the SALT II Trea ty and the 

modernization of United States and other NATO nations’ theater 

nuclear forces. In order tha t we might better understand how our 

NATO allies feel about a number of important factors preserving 

European security, we are privileged to welcome four distinguished 

European parliamentarians.

Largely as a result of the United States-Western European cooperation since World War II, the NATO alliance has made a significant 

contribution toward avoiding another such war and providing for economic progress for both sides of the Atlantic.

As we assess the future here in Congress, we must fully take into 

account the views of our European allies on whom much of the burden 

of preserving peace in the future will fall.

Toda y’s hearing provides the subcommittees with a unique opportunity to hear directly from representatives of our allies’ legislatures 

on these very important issues.

Gentlemen, we look forward to your informed testimony.

I will call on Chairman Hamilton if he has a statement.

Mr. Hamilton. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

I simply want to endorse your comments and add that our four 

distinguished guests this morning are members of the North Atlantic 

Assembly. They constitute the Presidential Working Group of tha t 

assembly, a group which was constituted to undertake the necessary 

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groundwork for the No rth At lan tic Assemb ly to be able to formu late 

positions on SALT II a nd t he at er force m odern ization at its upcoming 

meetin g in Ottaw a, Canad a.

We look forward to havin g a dialog wi th these gentlem en. Th ey 

are Mr. Paul Thyne ss, who is the Presiden t of the Nor th At lan tic 

Assembly and a member of the Norwe gia n Pa rli am en t; Mr. Pa tri ck 

Wall, who is Ch airma n of the M ili tary Co mm itte e of the Nor th 

Atlan tic Assembly and a me mb er of the Br itish Pa rli am en t; Mr. 

Kla as de Vries, Gen eral Ra pp or teur of the M ilitary C om mittee of t he 

Nor th At lan tic Assembly and Ch air man of the Defense Comm itte e 

of the Dut ch P arlia men t; and M r. Pe ter Co rterier, who is t he Gen eral 

Ra pp orteur of the Political Co mm itte e of the Nor th A tla ntic Assem ­

bly and spo kesman for the Social De mo cra tic Par ty pa rli am en tary 

grou p on the Foreig n Affairs Co mm itte e of the Ge rm an B undestag.

I un derst and all of you have pre pared sta temen ts thi s morning. 

Th ey will be entered int o the record in full. We w ould appre cia te it if 

you would begin wi th a summ ary of yo ur sta temen ts for the record 

and t he n we will tu rn to s tatemen ts and c omments by memb ers of the 

panel from the U.S. Congress.

You may proceed. I think, Mr. Thyne ss, you are the leadoff ma n. 

We are del ighted to have all of you here.

STATEMENT OE PAUL THYNESS, MEMBER OP THE NORWEGIAN

PARLIAMEN T (CONSERVATIVE P AR TY ); AND PRESIDENT OE THE

NORTH ATLANTIC ASSEMBLY

Mr. T hynes s. Th an k you, Mr. Chairma n.

Perhaps I migh t be allowed firs t of all to say a few words on the 

composition of this group me eting w ith yo u tod ay. I t is, in fac t, qu ite 

a cross section of Eu ropean political positions.

Two of us are conservatives in th e E urop ea n sense, n ot in the A merican sense, and two of us are Social Demo cra ts, La bo ur P ar ty . One of 

eac h rep res ent s pa rties in power, one of each, parties in opp osition. 

One of each rep res ents a small co un try and a big country . On the 

whole, I think we have manag ed to get a fai r cross section.

Th ere is one thin g t hat I t hink is int ere sting about thi s composition. 

That is th at however differen t we are, small countries, big cou ntries, 

opp osition or gover nm ent position, we are all agreed on one thing ; 

nam elv , the n ece ssity to have the SALT II Tre at y ratified .

As you would know, the Eu rope an perspective here is som ew hat 

different from the Ame rican . Some of yo u who go to the Nor th A tla ntic Asse mblv , as you, Ch air ma n Ha mi lto n, do, will kno w th at the 

Nor th At lan tic Asse mbly pro vides a forum for American legislators 

and Eu ropeans to get tog eth er and assess eac h others’ p erspective on 

cu rre nt issues in a way which I think is mo st valu able.

SO VI ET MI LITA RY PR ESE NCE IN CUB A

Now, since we have been ove r here for a few days, we hav e, of 

cou rse, seen how the SALT II rat ificatio n debate has bee n sud den ly 

cen tered on w ha t is hap penin g in Cu ba and th e Soviet m ilitary presence 

the re. If I may, I would like to say a few words on thi s because as a 

Norweg ian, I have ha d a pa rti cu lar perspe ctive on th at p oin t.
3

You see, whe n No rway entered NA TO in 1949, we decided no t to 

establ ish an y foreign bases or have an y foreign military presence in 

No rway because we thou gh t th at with our proximity to the Sov iet 

Union, th at would no t be help ful for an eventua l de ten te and for a 

dev elo pm ent tow ard a more las ting peace.

And th at , of course, was acc epted by the Un ite d States and by o ur 

other allies.

Now, it is obvious th at the Sov iet Union and its ally h ave a v as tly 

different con cept of wh at co nstitutes a constru ctive peac e policy, if 

th at is w ha t they th ink they are doing, and I hop e i t is. B ut ne ve rth eless, it is clea r th at thi s is no t germane to the ratificatio n process as 

view ed from the Eu ropean side.

We realize it is so from the Am erican side and we r espect th at , b u t 

in our opinion, the SALT II Tre at y and othe r tre ati es we may conclud e wi th the Sov iet Uni on and the Wars aw Pa ct will no t ush er in 

an y kin d of millenium of coo pera tion . I t will no t relieve us of the 

neces sity to me et their challenges in a nu mber of othe r fields which 

are n ot covered b y treati es.

We sim ply h ave to ge t r id of the ra th er u nre alistic perspe ctive th at 

concluding a trea ty on nucle ar aim s lim ita tio ns will somehow alter 

the to tal pictu re and relieve us of the nec essity of me eting Sovie t 

challenges in the Eu rope an theater, in Africa, in Cuba, and in othe r 

pa rts of the world, milita rily , politically , and economically.

So I th in k we wou ld hav e to ge t th at persp ective; and this, I be ­

lieve, is the Eu rope an per spe ctiv e on the ongoing process of deten te.

Perhaps I mi gh t also be excused if I add th at the re has been some 

talk in the Am eric an media lat ely ab ou t so rt of a ti t for ta t, the 

Russians tak ing ou t their comb at force in Cu ba and the Americ ans 

tak ing ou t their troops in Norwa y.

Now, y ou know perfectly well, of course, th at the re are no Am eric an 

troops in Norwa y. But I am sorry to see th at the Am eric an pub lic is 

led to believe th at the re are. As a m at te r of fac t, I go t the message 

toda y t hat the to tal nu mber of Am eric an m ilitary pers onn el is 140-odd, 

mo stly at t he NA TO Comm and at Koloas. There are 10 U.S. ma rin es 

doing du ty in the embassies. We can always p hase those ou t if t hat is 

nec essary to get the Russians ou t of Cuba. [Laughter.]

B ut the re is quite a bi t of difference here .

TH EA TE R NU CL EA R MO DE RN IZAT ION IN EUROPE

Let me conclude my oral statem en t by referring to the bu rning 

quest ion that is on t he agen da coming u p now, which is th ea te r nu cle ar 

mo der niz ation in Eu rop e. Th ere ha s been som e discussion of this issue, 

wh eth er the nucle ar buildup on the Sov iet side wi th the SS-20 and 

the Backfire bomb er really is som eth ing we ought to wo rry about.

A lot of scenarios have been pre sen ted which say, in fac t, th at it is 

no t necessary to tr y to create any kin d of counterfor ce to th at , bu t 

I do believe th at in a sit ua tio n where the Soviet Union has added 

nucle ar cap abi lity in addition to a s ignificant con ven tion al superiority 

in the Eu ropean the ater, the re are good reasons to fea r th at the S oviet 

Union will develo p more asse rtive policies, gra dually eroding Eu ropean 

self-confidence and its confidence in the Am eric an nucle ar umbrella.
4

After all, the Backfire bomber and the SS-20 have, presumably, 

been developed and deployed for a purpose, and tha t purpose cannot 

be anything else but an attempt to establish a military superiority 

on the continent of Europe, which in turn would be a very unhealthy 

state of affairs for Europe, for American interests in Europe, and for 

the alliance as such.

Therefore, it is my firm belief tha t it is necessary for the Alliance 

to make decisions of implementing theater nuclear modernization and, 

at the same time, go ahead with a SALT II I process and further arms 

control negotiations in order to create an environment in which a 

spiraling arms race can be avoided.

I think that, perhaps, will be my oral statement. And my colleagues, 

I am sure, would have their views to offer.

[Mr. Thyness’ prepared statement follows:]

P r e p a r e d St a te m e n t o f P a u l T h y n e s s, M em b er o f t h e N o r w eg ia n P arli a

m en t (C o n ser v a tiv e P arty ); an d P r e s id e n t of t h e N o rth Atla n tic

Ass em bly

The North Atlan tic Assembly is a semi-official organization of parlia men tarians 

th at was started 25 years ago—5 years after the signing of the NATO-treaty—by 

a number of European and Canadian members of Parliament soon joined by a 

number of promine nt Senators and Congressmen from the United States, who felt 

th at parliam enta rians in a m odern democracy have an increasingly im por tant role 

to p lay in questions of foreign policy and defence as intermediaries between governm ents and people. To discharge these duties members of Parliament needed a 

forum to provide a greater activ e involvement in the affairs of t he alliance, independen t sources of information and broad con tact with their colleagues from allied 

nations.

The organization was first known as “ The NATO Parliam enta rians’ Conference” 

and grew from an annu al m eeting to a perm anent body th at assumed the name of 

the North Atlan tic Assembly in 1966. It has a bure au consisting of a President, 

three Vice-Presidents and a Treasurer, one of whom must always be a North 

American. The bureau is supported by a Standing Committee of one representative 

of each nation al delegation, and an internation al secr etariat situ ated in Brusseles.

The Assembly works thro ugh five main committees, Political, Military, Economic, Scientific an d Technical, and Educa tion, Cultural Affairs and Information 

Committee. These committees in turn may establish subcommittees for dealing 

with specific issues.

The group meeting with you tod ay has been called—for wan t of a better 

name— a Presidential Working Group. It has for various reasons not been set up 

as a subcommittee by the ordinary procedure, and it cannot speak for the North 

Atlantic Assembly as such. Its main tas k is to coordinate preparations for the 

discussions on strategic arms limitations and the ater nuclear modernization at the 

Assembly’s annual plenary session in Ottawa in late October this year.

While it ca nnot speak for the Assembly it is, however, a singularly represen tative 

group comprising th e Chairman and General Rappo rteur of the Military Committee, the General Rapporteur of the Political Committee and the President of the 

Assembly. These four people come from two of the greater European allies, United 

Kingdom and the Federal Republic of Germany, and two small allies, the N etherlands and Norway. Two are Conservatives, two are Social Democrats. One Conservative and one Social Dem ocrat belong to parties in government, and one of 

each to parties in opposition. And we are all four of us deeply concerned with 

politico-military affairs in our respective parliaments.

With the comm ittee’s permission I would now like to tur n to my views and 

impressions of the substance of the matt er before us, i.e., European reactions to 

SALT II and theater nuclear modernization.

I thin k it is correct to say tha t broadly speaking bo th detente and arms control 

measures have over the years been more popular issues with European politicians 

and voters tha n with their North American counterparts. There are a number of 

reasons for this. One is that the European nations individually cannot match the 

Soviet Union militarily. The United States can, and NATO collectively can, but
5

dependence on others will never breed th at deep sense of self-reliance th at comes 

from a knowledge of being able to go i t alone if necessary. No European nation 

can do that, and this fact naturally colours Euro pean thinking. Another reason 

is that the European nations are very much aware th at they would be the first 

casualties in any armed conflict between the Warsaw Pac t and NATO. And 

Western Europe, with its small, densely populated territory, has been engulfed 

in devastating wars twice already in th is century.

This a ttitud e must not be confused with appeasem ent or defeatism. For instance 

in Norway—one of your smallest allies and one of the two with a common border 

with the Soviet Union—recent polls have shown 84 percent of the people to support our military defence and 65 percent actively to supp ort our membership in 

NATO. There is no tende ncy to uncritical accomm odation to Soviet wishes. But 

the perspective is somewhat different from the one commonly found on this side 

of the Atlantic. For Europeans a normalization of East-West relatio ns and a 

dialogue between the super-powers is viewed more pragm atically and has e somewhat deeper and more immediate significance tha n is felt by most Americans.

On this background Europeans welcomed the SALT process from the st art, and 

European reactions to the SALT II tre aty as it has emerged have been markedly 

favourable. There are of course critical voices to be heard, but the y are few. For 

the most part European supp ort for SALT II has been overwhelming.

The more generalized criticism th at surfaces from time to time is directed 

against the tre aty for not being what it was never intended to be, viz. a tre aty 

designed to enhance the security of Western Europe specifically and directly. 

The primary impulse behind the SALT process has been to secure limitations on 

the intercontinental nuclear systems, trad itionally term ed “strategic” systems. 

This dividing of nuclear weapons systems into “strate gic” and “ta ctical” is imprecise and generally unsatisfactory, in th at it leaves out nuclear systems aimed 

at Western Europe. For th at reason and with considerable merit it has lately 

become fashionable to speak of “E urostrategic” systems. But this is a fairly 

recent development, and the fact remains th at the negotiations have not, until 

the very last stage, involved systems of direct and specific relevance to the European theater. It will be remembered th at th e United States consistently, and with 

full concurrence of her European allies, has rejected Soviet efforts to include U.S. 

systems based in Europe. It will inevitably dis tort the picture if this historic 

perspective on the SALT II tre aty is forgotten.

This is n ot to say, however, th at the central nuclear balance is n ot a relevant 

European concern. These systems represent th e final and indispensable guarantee 

for the secu rity of Western Europe, and an agreement th at affects this balance 

also affects European security. But apart from the tiny minority th at specializes 

in the somew hat arcane world of strategic theory where the conclusions one 

reaches fairly often are of doubtful relevance to the affairs of living a nd brea thing 

men, m ost Europeans are content to study the tre aty in its broadest term s. These 

appear to indic ate th at SALT II does consolidate a position of “essential equivalence” where advan tages for one side in certain areas are balanced by concessions 

in others. It is extremely difficult to see how, as some critics assert, the United 

States is moving into a position of strategic inferiority, as a result of SALT II. 

On the contrary it can be argued th at without SALT II th e prospect of continued 

“essential equivalence” in the 1980s is more, not less, in doubt. Nor have I seen 

it sub stantiated th at the tre aty in any way undermines or diminishes the U.S. 

guarantee to Europe. Th at guarantee has always been a question of tru st, unknowable and improvable, to us and to the Warsaw Pact, and noth ing in the 

tre aty challenges th at basic tru st. I would like to go on record as one who feel3 

this trust, and I know th at my belief is shared by the overwhelming majority of 

my countrymen.

But of course, and here we arrive at the point where the debate on SALT II 

becomes inextricably intertwined with the current debate on theater nuclear 

forces, how far can we le t the Warsaw Pact get ahead of NATO on any one leg 

of the T riad without overloading this trus t among the nations of t he alliance, and 

without losing credibility in th e eyes of the Soviet Union.

I think it must be accepted th at over the las t decade the military balance has 

tilted significantly in favou r of the W arsaw Pact, leading to considerable uneasiness 

in most Western European countries. In Norway our worry is mainly concerned 

with the Soviet naval build-up, in other countries the focus is more on Soviet 

superiority in armour and more recently on supe riority in theater nuclear forces. 

The need to redress the balance has become pressing before the gap creates a 

situation in which Western Europe becomes highly vulnerable to Soviet pressure.

51-435—79------2
6

This means that there is a need for a costly modernization of conventional and 

the ate r nuclea r forces in Europ e, bu t hop efully kept within reasonable bounds by 

substantial arms control measures— M B FR and SALT II I. Bu t the gatew ay to 

SALT II I is obv iously SA LT II, jus t as it is difficult to believe that M B FR 

could contin ue in the wak e of a defe at of SA LT II. Witho ut SA LT II the watch 

will be put bac k several years and the clim ate for nego tiations will ine vita bly 

dete riorate to a poin t where we in fact will onl y be lef t with the one option of 

matching the Soviet build-up at all levels, strategic, the ater nuclear or Eurostr ateg ic and conventio nal.

This in a no -SAL T environment ma y p rove to be a ve ry difficult task , and much 

more than with a SA LT II tre aty in the back grou nd. I seriously question the 

possibility of persuading European public opinion to ba ck n uclear and conventional 

modernization if the United States reje cts the SA LT II tre aty . In my opinion 

th e a cceptance of S A LT II would not create a clima te in Europe tha t would u ndermine mil itary vigilance : rather it would signify, a willingness on the part of the 

Western World to go along with serious arms control measures, and it wou ld 

signify a reluctance to particip ate in an arms race tha t could erode public support 

for main taining an adequate defense posture.

Mee ting the Eurostr ateg ic requirements will also require activ e particip ation 

on the part of the United States. Except for the British and French nuclea r forces 

it is the United S tates that holds the nuclea r umb rella o ver Western Europe. Thi a 

of course is of crucial importance to prevent a total d efeat for our civilization. Bu t 

the strategic nuclear systems are last resort forces, and not forces that dir ect ly 

count er-balance the kind of pressure tha t the Soviet Union can exert on Western 

Europe on the basis of con ventional superiority ba cked by a superior theater nuclear 

cap ability. Th at balance can only be achie ved wit h American particip ation at all 

levels. Withou t SA LT II Europeans ma y have reason to fear that the United 

Sta tes will have to pour so much money and effort into the strategic arms race t ha t 

the contribution to the defense of Western Europe will suffer.

Seen through Europ ean eyes it is o bvi ous ly a much more att racti ve altern ative 

to get some measure of sta bility in the strategic bala nce through SA LT II, and at 

the same time preserve the United States as an act ive par ticipan t in those fields 

which are of more immediat e concern to Western Europe. And I believe that this 

also makes good sense in the context of the American secu rity and global policies.

U.S . particip ation is particu larly importa nt in the field of theater nuclear force 

modernization. This is tru e not only in a technical sense obviously, but als e 

politica lly. Nuclear defense is a su bject th at Europeans have particula r difficulties 

handling, as was graphically illustrate d in the case of the deployment decision 

regarding enhanced radiation warheads. The basic reason for this may be that 

public opinion has been accustomed to draw the line between deterrence forces 

and warfighting forces, deterrence forces bein g the central sy stems which are b y and 

large American, the warfigh ting forces being the conventional forces in Europe, 

by and large Europ ean. Th e the ater nuclea r forces are blurring this line, raising 

the spectre of a limited nuclear war, with a possible decoupling of American defense 

from the defense of Europe. This, added to the emotional problems th at alw ays 

surround nuclear weapons, and the Soviet prop agan da against each and every 

step NAT O takes in response to parallel acts by the Sov iet Union and its allies, 

makes it very difficult for the European nations to act withou t stron g American 

leadership.

And act we must. The Backfire bomber and the SS-20 give the Soviet Unio n a 

cap ability to att ack Western Europe which has no coun terpart on N ATO ’s side. 

There is now a missing step in the escalatory ladder. Argu ments tha t this doesn’t 

ma tter have considerable force, since the scenarios which we are presented with 

appe ar much more to be prod ucts of theo retical analysis than of a forecast of what 

could act ually happen. Bu t in a situation where the Soviet Union has this added 

nuclear cap ability in addition to a significant conv entional superiority in Europe, 

there are reasons to fear that the Soviet Unio n will develop more assertive policies, gradually eroding European self-confidence and its confidence in the Ame rican 

nuclear umbrella. Aft er all, the Back fire and the SS-20 hav e presumably been 

developed and deployed for a purpose, and th at purpose cannot be anyth ing else 

but an attem pt to establish a m ilitary su periority on the continent of Europe which 

in turn would be an unhealthy sta te of affairs for Europe, for U.S. interests, and 

for the a lliance as such.

Arms control hardly offers a via ble solution. Ther e are no reasons to believe 

th at we can nego tiate aw ay the Soviet theater nuclea r superiority. Bu t some kind
7

of arms control agreement will be necessary in order to prevent spiralling theater 

nuclear rearmament. If we do not allow ourselves to fall too far behind in the 

theater nuclear field there are reasonable prospects for a stabilization to emerge 

as a result of a SA LT III process. I hope, although I realize it is not ve ry likely, 

that such negotiations could bear fruit in a timely and comprehensive fashion and 

thus decrease the requirement for some of the modernization of NA TO forces 

that is expected to be decided.

This leads us back to the question of European attitudes toward SA LT II, 

which is obviously the prerequisite for SALT III and in particular with the issues 

of the noncircumvention clause, the duration of the protocol, and the experiences 

of the inter-alliance consultation process.

At the outset of the debate in Europe some anxiety was expressed concerning 

the ambiguity of the noncircumvention clause. If it could involve the American 

assistance to the United Kindgom in the modernization of its strategic force or 

the deployment to Europe of cruise missiles for use in the theater role it would 

indeed have put a different complexion on the treaty, and might very well have 

had a serious negative effect on European attitudes. In fact I believe that before 

clarification on this point was obtained some skepticism W’as created that has 

been completely dissolved. It is a fairly common phenomenon which we politicians have to live with that initial impressions die hard.

However, the Administration has repeatedly stressed, and has indeed formally 

stated in a letter to the NATO Council, that not only has the United States 

consistently rejected the inclusion of a nontransfer provision in the SALT II 

agreement, but it has made it clear that the transfer of weapons and technology 

to the Allies will continue and cannot ipso facto constitute circumvention. In the 

light of these clarifications I believe that any serious question on this point has 

been satisfactorily answered.

Another point of a similar character was the initial debate over the question 

of the duration of the protocol to the treaty, although this was not only a specific 

European concern. In my opinion critics to the tr eaty were quite right in pointing 

out the danger of the protocol being extended beyond 1981. We all know how 

easily such provisions become an integral part of an established order. The Administration might very well find itself in the position either having to prolong 

the protocol, and thereby further postponing the possible deployment of ground 

and sea-launched cruise missiles, or refusing to prolong the protocol, and thereby 

appear to undermine ongoing negotiations. But that situation cannot arise when 

the possible extension of the protocol has been extensively debated and decided 

against beforehand as the case is now. Under circumstances created by the 

ratification debate it is the prolongation of the protocol that would constitute 

a major new departure. Thus one of the weaker spots in the whole package has 

been effectively dealt with.

It has been said that the United States did not consult with her European 

allies during the negotiation process, that what was called consultations was more 

like briefings on a take it or leave it basis.

To my mind this is largely a question of semantics. Consultations is a point 

on a scale that ranges from the European allies dictating to the United States on 

the one side, to the Europeans being told flatly what the United States has decided 

at the other extreme.

The facts as I have understood them are that the Administration deserves high 

praise for the frequency with which it has informed the allies of developments 

throughout the negotiation process. In matters that have been of particular 

concern to the Europeans, for instance the non-circumvention question and the 

questions relating to the protocol issue, the allies have been given every opportunity to express their views fully before the United States committed herself 

vis-a-vis the Soviet Union. Undoubtedly there have been situations during seven 

years of negotiation when the consultation process did not function at its optimum. Progress in such negotiations is not always orderly and evenly spaced; 

sometimes there has been little time for real consultations, sometimes the sensitiv ity of the issues have worked against the ideal form of consultations.

On the other hand, the European allies have not always earned full marks for 

active participation. I believe it can be argued that a consistently greater response 

from the allies would have triggered improvements in the consultations generally.

What is of particular importance is two things. First, that it is very rare to meet 

anyone who really feels that European interests have been neglected during the 

negotiations. Secondly, when we hopefully start on the SA LT III negotiations,
8

direct European interests will be much more con cretely affected. Here the con ­

sulta tions m ust be broadened compared to what was natural and necessary during 

SA LT II. If the criticism aimed at the SALT II cons ultations hav e serve d to 

sharpen the awaren ess in this respect it will have been of real servic e to th e allian ce 

as such.

I would like to end my statem ent on the poin t which I belie ve is perha ps the 

single most importa nt one, nam ely the resu lts to be expe cted in Europe if the 

trea ty should not meet with the app rov al of the Senate.

We all know that the role of the legis latur e is much smaller in foreign affairs 

than in domestic affairs. For a var iety of reasons foreign affairs has always and in 

all countries been the particular prov ince of the executive power. The coro llary 

is that when it comes to other countries all of us tend to look to a President, a 

Prime Minister or a Foreign Secreta ry to speak leg itim ately and respo nsibly for 

a coun try ’s interests. Foreigners will alw ays hav e difficulties in unde rstan ding 

major differences of opinion between Gov ernm ent and Parliament.

We have witnessed the tot al incomprehension on the part of the Soviet Union 

of the role of the Senate in shaping American foreign policy . Here we were faced 

with a combination of the general problem and a specific problem th at has its 

roots in the va stl y different Soviet syste m. Bu t the Europeans are not immune 

either to this compound problem. In Europe t he parliam entary s ystem of government is prevalent, and since this implies that the government will hav e to resign 

if it is voted down in Parliament on a major issue, the system has evolved in a 

wa y that has imposed great restraints on the individual member of Parliam ent. 

Euro pean members of Parliament ve ry rar ely hav e th at freedom to exercise an 

independent and personal judg men t which is a matter of course in the United 

States Senate.

I am very much afraid t ha t rejection of SA LT I I will never r eally be understood 

in Europe. And when people do not unde rstan d something the y become suspicious, 

and the explanations they make up are usu ally rath er ungenerous if not outright 

hostile and accusatory.

If I had no other reason to support the tre aty , this would have been enough. 

It has been alleged that European expressions of support for the trea ty hav e 

been influenced among other things by domestic pressures. This I believe is true. 

But it would be wrong to ascribe this pressure to the fear of losing th e next election. 

Few elections are lost on questions of foreign policy, and SA LT II is not an 

issue of that kind. The pressure felt by polit ical leaders stems from a recognition 

of th e vit al necessity of ensuring public support a t all times for the NAT O alliance 

and the nation al defense posture, and of the dev ast ating effect non-ratification is 

like ly to have on th e credibility of both the United State s’ leadership and the aims 

and purposes of the alliance. We in Europe will be faced with a public opinion 

problem of stagg ering proportions, and no dou bt the Soviet Union will work that 

for all it is worth.

I quite realize tha t this is only one of the ma ny points American leaders will 

have to consider, and perhaps not a major one seen from this side of the Atlan tic. 

Th ey must have the security of the United States, not of Europe, as their first 

priority. Bu t in presenting the European interest I base myself on my firm conviction that in the long term there is no conflict of interest between us, that 

nothing which harms the one can serve the other, and that no dividin g influence 

can serve either.

Mr. H amilton. Tha nk you ve ry m uch , Mr. Thyne ss.

Mr. Wall.

STATEMENT OE PATRICK WALL, MEMBER OF THE BRITISH PARLIAMENT (CONSERVATIVE PARTY); AND CHAIRMAN, MILITARY

COMMITTEE, NORTH ATLANTIC ASSEMBLY

Mr. Wall. Mr. Chairma n, ma y I also say wh at a privilege it is to 

be able to tes tify before your com mittee.

To repe at wh at M r. Thyness has said, we hav e fo ur p arl iam entar ian s 

from Eu rope frc m different political parti es and wi th differen t views, 

bu t we have reached agreem ent on the SALT II Tre at y and we hop e 

th at it will be ratifie d. You have our full thou gh ts on th at .
9

If I may enter into a slight detail over tha t treaty, I suggest it is 

not for us to question any views that Members of the Senate or Congress may have regarding the nuclear balance. That is a problem which 

must be settled between the two superpowers.

TH RE AT OF SO VIET W EA PO NS IN EU ROPE

But, as a European, there are two particular issues which concern 

me. The first one is the fact tha t today there are powerful Soviet 

weapons which threaten Europe bu t not the United States of America. 

And though it is almost inconceivable, should at a later date an 

American administration come into office which, unlike all previous 

administrations, was deterred from using its strategic force to retaliate 

after a limited theater nuclear attack on Europe, this factor clearly 

could be of major importance.

And I refer, as Mr. Thyness has done, to the SS-20 and the Backfire.

Now, at the moment, Europe’s main protection against the SS-20 

is the American strategic nuclear deterrent. In the future, the arms 

counter to this weapon may lie in the cruise missile. Therefore, I am 

particularly interested to hear the view which has been expressed tha t 

there is no question of extending the protocol of that treaty beyond 

the date of December 31, 1981, when presumably the limit to the 

range of the cruise missile would then be removed.

NO NC IRCU MVE NT IO N CLAU SE

The second issue in which we in Britain are particularly interested 

is the noncircumvention clause. The new British Government has 

said quite clearly it believes in the continuance and modernization of 

the British nuclear deterrent. And, as you know, Mr. Chairman, the 

Nassau agreement allowed us to purchase your A-3’s and fit them 

with our nuclear warheads.

In the future, it is conceivable that arrangements might be made 

between the two governments to purchase an eventual Trident I or 

cruise missiles or mix the two. Of course, we in Britain could manufacture our own missiles. We already, as you know, make our nuclear 

warheads, but of course this wouid be more expensive and it would 

mean less money available for mutual defense.

Therefore, we would like to see it quite clearly stated, if possible, 

and I made this point to the Senate with respect to the Senate resolution, tha t the noncircumvention clause will not prevent any transfer 

of technology to your allies in Europe.

MO DE RN IZAT ION OF TH EA TE R NU CL EA R WEA PO NS

An associated issue with SALT II , but nothing directly to do with 

it, is, of course, the modernization of our theater nuclear weapons. 

I have referred to the Backfire and I have referred to the SS-20. 

Quite clearly, this is a grave weakness in NATO at the present time.

This, I know, is very much a thing on the mind of your administration, and may I say that we hope very much that a final decision will 

be reached in December a t the next NATO Council meeting on this 

very important issue. I hope t hat any possible delay on the ratifica-
10

tion of the SALT Trea ty through other untoward instances like the 

Cuban issue will not delay in any way this important decision in 

December.

E A ST -W E ST BA LA N CE

Finally, Mr. Chairman, there is the whole question of the EastWest balance. The U.S.S.R. has, I think, quite clearly been outbuilding 

NATO for many years in all fields, and the balance is tilting dangerously against us. My own country has, in the period 1964 to 1970, 

and 1974 to 1977, cut its military forces to the bone.

But the new British Government has made it quite clear it intends 

to give defense a high priority and is doing its best to repair tha t 

damage.

Now, President Carter took a very important initiative in 1977 in 

NATO which caused NATO to wake up, and I would submit tha t it 

is very important tha t this initiative be maintained by our leader, 

the United States, and by all allies.

If I may conclude, Mr. Chairman, with a few remarks on the area 

ontside NATO. As you know, Mr. Chairman, both SACLANT and 

SACEUR have expressed their anxieties as to what is happening 

outside NATO. In fact, one has said it is more important than what is 

happening inside NATO.

I refer particularly to two areas. The Middle East, because of its 

oil, and the situation in Iran must give anxiety to all of us. I think in 

the context of the Middle East, Turkey is particularly important and 

our ally in NATO deserves the maximum support we can give them.

The second area of concern is southern Africa, particularly as Europe 

is concerned, because of the vital minerals that come from tha t part 

of the world. And I do believe we should do everything possible to see 

that the Soviet-backed political organizations in Zimbabwe-Rhodesia 

and Namibia would not achieve success, particularly after both of 

those countries have held forms of elections which certainly, to me, 

anyhow, indicate the trend of public opinion in those two countries.

So if I can sum up, Mr. Chairman, by saying tha t I believe all of 

my colleagues and your committee, sir, will agree it is vital to maintain 

the cohesion of the Alliance inside the NATO area but it is also vital 

for us to cooperate outside that area, particularly, I would suggest, 

in the South Atlantic and the Indian Ocean.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[Mr. W all’s prepared statement follows:]

P r e p a r e d Sta te m e n t o f P a tric k W a l l, M em b e r o f t h e B r it is h P a r lia ­

m en t (C o n ser v a tiv e P ar ty ), an d C h air m a n of t h e M il it a r y C o m m it tee

o f t h e N o rth Atlan tic Ass em bly

In this prepared statem ent I propose to amplify certain specific issues, namely 

the strategic nuclear balance, domestic political controversy, and the Eurostrategic and t heatr e nuclear balance made in my verbal presentation as well as 

dealing with some points on the East-West balan ce th at we may have to face in 

the next few years.

THE NUC LEA R BALANCE

The balance since S A LT I

The SALT I Agreement in 1972 was justified by some as an Agreement th at 

codified strategic parity. It has also been sta ted that, in fact, it allowed the 

U.S.S.R. some 50 percent more ICB M Launchers and 45 percent more SLBM
Launche rs t han the U.S.A. The throw-weight of the deployed Soviet ICBM ’s was 

also considerably more th an th at of the US I CB M’s. However, it was claimed t hat 

because of superior MIR V technology, and its lead in heavy bombers, the U.S. 

could afford the Soviet adv anta ge in the numb er of I CBM Launchers. In fact, the U.S.S.R. caught up with MIR V technology within two years. In 

1974 the Vladivostock understanding prolonged SALT I and was based on essential equivalence in launchers; 2,400 each including 1,320 MIR V Launchers; freedom to determ ine the mix of weapons and no restriction on the num ber of warheads in each MIR V, bu t there was no reference to advanced technology 

weapons such as the Cruise Missile. It formed th e framework of SALT II. The net result of the failure of SALT I to restrict modernization and replacement has been an unprecedented buildup of the Soviet strategic nuclear capability , 

with no corresponding American increase. In fact, since 1975 the U.S.S.R. has deployed the SS—17, 18, 19 and 20. The SS— 

IS having a throw-weight exceeding twice th at of any U.S. missile. By 1980 the t otal Soviet throw-weight will be almost double th at of the U.S.A. 

and the nu mber of warheads multiplied by 4 or 5. But the U.S.A. will still have a 

lead in the tota l number of warheads. In contrast the U.S.A. has deployed no new ICB M since 1972 and has only 

modernised existing Minutemen I l l ’s roughly doubling the present 170 kiloton 

yield compared to the 2 megaton yield of the SS—18. The United States missiles 

are still more accurate but the Soviet Union is ca tching up. Much the same story can be told about SLBMs in which the SSN8 has now been 

deployed in some 29 Delta class submarines, thu s permittin g them to hit the U.S.A. from the Barents Sea. Whereas th e first USN equivalent, “USS Ohio” , armed with 

the Trident I, will not be operational un til at least 1980, and the 6,000 mile range 

Triden t II is not expected to be available until the mid-1980s when only i0 

“Ohios” will be deployed. However the MIRVed SSNX18 is now becoming 

operational in t he Delta II I submarines. In 1972, the U.S. had some 400 heavy bombers compared to 140 in the Soviet 

Air Force. The ratio is now nearer to 350 to 135, but the U.S. bombers are m ainly B52s, the BI having been cancelled. On the other hand the U.S.S.R. has so far 

built some 100 Backfire medium bombers an d is expected to have some 300 by 1985.

These figures are taken from various U.S. and British sources and may not be 

100 percent accurate but they do clearly show the tren d since 1972, which has 

been wholly in favou r of the Soviet Union. The same overall trend can be found in conventional forces, a trend, which, if 

continued, will p ut t he U.S.S .R. in a commanding position to impose its will on 

most of the continents of the e arth.

TH E STRA TEGIC BALANCE TODAY AND IN 1985

The ratification of the SALT II Agreement would limit the U.S.A. and the 

U.S.S.R. to a total of 2,250 ICBM s, SLBMs and heavy bombers, of which 1,320 can be MIRV ed, ICBMs and SLBMs and heavy bombers carrying ALCMs of 

intermediate range. Within the limits of 1,320 MIRVed launchers a sublimit of 1,200 is placed on MIRVed ICBMs and SLBMs and a further sublimit of 820 

is placed on MIRVed ICBM s. It is estimated th at these limits will have the 

following results b y 1985: (a) MIRVed ICBMs— The Minutem an II I productio n line is now closed down 

and the new MX delayed and cannot now be operational by 1985. The 550 

Minutem an I l l ’s can be upgraded in accuracy bu t the aggregate useful payload 

or throw-weight of the U.S. MIRVed ICBM force in 1985 will not exceed 1% 

million pounds and 1,650 RVs (1,650). The U.S.S .R. can deploy 300 plus SS-18s (308) and some 500 (512) SS-17s and 

19s, giving an estimated aggregate throw-weight for the Soviet Union ICBM 

Force of 8 to 9 million pounds, and 6,000 (5,662) RVs. It has thu s been estimated th at in a first strike the U.S.S.R. could eliminate 

from 70 to 90 percent of U.S. silos whereas the U.S.A. would have th e capa bility 

of destroying 65 percent of the Soviet ICBM silos. (b) Un-MIRVed ICB Ms—The U.S. 450 Minutem an II and 54 Titan has an 

estimated 1 million pounds (1.5 million) throw-weight and 1,000 megaton (936) 

of yield. The Soviet may s ubstitute 360 S ils by a new ICBM as permitte d under the Agreement which could produce an estimated throw-weight of 2% million 

pounds and some 6,000 megatons yield.
12

(c) MIRVed SLBMs—The U.S. are expected to have 21 Poseidon submarines, 

10 Trident I baekfitted submarines, and 7 (10) new Trident I submarines by 1985, 

giving a total of 38 (41) nuclear propelled MIRVed SLBM submarines with some 

664 (650) MIRVed tubes with some 5,300 (5,700) RVs.

The Soviet Union could, under the Agreem ent, deploy some 400 MIR V missile 

launchers. It is expected that the new Soviet Typhoon submarine will carry 20 

to 24 missiles with up to 14 RVs. The SSN-18 is expected to have some 7 MIRVs. 

The U.S. therefore, will continue to lead in SLBM MIRV ed tubes and RVs.

(d) Un-MIRVed SLBMs—The U.S. is expected to reta in only some 80 SLBMs 

and the Soviet some 600.

(e) ALCM Bombers—The U.S. plans a possible deployment of 120 such aircra ft 

with cruise missiles of over 600 kilometres range.

If these figures are approximately correct it will be seen that the U.S. inferiority 

in all categories of strateg ic power except accuracy, SLBMs and heavy bombers 

has been frozen for the duration of the Agreement. The argument, therefore, rests 

on whether the U.S. strategic nuclear deterrent will remain credible during the 

duration of the Tre aty. This question, together with th at of verification, has been 

debated during the hearings and must remain an American decision bu t already 

the balance is tilting against the U.S.A.

In addition the virtu al deadlock of the M BF R negotiations for so long does not 

appe ar to indicate a Soviet desire for a balance bu t rather a drive for further 

superiority.

D OM ES TI C PO L IT IC A L CONTROV ER SY

It has always been a m att er for concern when th e international strategic balance 

or, for t ha t matter, natio nal defence, becomes a domestic political issue.

To the outsider th e U.S. Administration has fallen over backwards to commend 

this Agreement. There are m any arguments in its favour bu t the briefing of foreign 

Members of Parlia ment by U.S. Embassy staff, the knowledge t ha t the Administratio n is in trouble over other National issues and badly needs successful ra tification, makes an experienced politician wonder about the political as opposed 

to the m ilitary need for an Agreement.

This, I fear, is n ot unusual as opposing P arty lines on Defense issues are current 

both in my own country and in Europe as a whole.

T H E EU R O ST R A T EG IC AN D T H E A T R E N U C L EA R W A R BALA NCE

As currently constituted the SALT II Treaty affects only missiles and heavy 

bombers of in tercontinen tal range. This has meant the exclusion of a number of 

systems whose characteristics make them difficult to define bu t which are of great 

relevance to Europe. There can be no question tha t the U.S. authorities have kept 

their Allies fully informed during all the SALT discussions. However, Europe is 

menaced by two major new weapons systems t ha t are not included in SALT II— 

the Backfire Bomber and the SS-20. On the other hand, restrictions on the deploym ent of cruise missiles are included in the Treaty.

It has already been stated t ha t the strategic balance has tilted against the U.S.A. 

As far as Europe is concerned th e shift in theatre nuclear capabilities in favour of 

the Warsaw Pact has been even more dramatic.

In Januar y 1978 the U.S.S.R. had ab out 700 I/MRBM s, 430 medium bombers and 

20 plus SLBMs targ eted on high prio rity European targets. By 1985 it has been 

estim ated th at there will be some 275 SS-20 missiles and 250 Backfire Bombers 

deployed against European targ ets, plus 700 I/MR BM s (some ta rgeted on China) 

430 medium bombers and 20 SLBMs.

NATO Europe can produce 150 British and French IRBM s and SLBMs and 

some 200 nuclear capable aircraft, which is a d eterren t bu t no real answer to the 

scale of the Warsaw Pact threat, even when backed by the USAF ’s F - llls and 

other aircra ft and the USN’s SLBM’s allocated to SACEITR.

Anti-Backfire defences can be improved with the adv ent of the British Air 

Defence Tornado and new types of U.S. aircraft based on Britain. But, the SS-20, 

which is mobile ami has a range of some 3,000 miles can, therefore, be ta rgeted on 

European ports and airfields from inside Russia, it can, therefore only be attacke d 

by aircraft which would inevitably suffer appalling losses.

The counter to the SS-20 may be a new long-range the atre nuclear ballistic 

missile, an extended-range Pershing or a Cruise Missile, or a mix of all three. The 

new thea tre ballistic missile cannot be operational by 1985. A stre tched Pershing

Note.—The figures In the text are drawn from U.S. sources and the figures in parentheses 

from non-Government British sources.
13

is unlikely to have a range of more tha n 1,000 miles, and aircraft equipped with 

intermediate range Cruise Missiles are counted as heavy bombers and included in 

the SALT numerical aggregates.

They are also limited to an average of 28 missiles, with not more than 20 

carried in each existing B52 Bomber. Even more important, ground and sealaunc h Cruise Missiles are restricted to a range of 600 kilometers (350 miles) by 

the Protocol to th e Agreement, which expires on the 31st of December, 1981.

If Cruise Missiles are to have a limited range for the next few years why are 

not certain specific restrictions on range applied to the Backfire a nd the SS-20?

However there is nothing in the Agreement to prevent new the atr e ballistic 

missiles being developed by the Allies a nd the U.S. will not be read y to deploy 

longer-range ground a nd sea-launched Cruise Missiles u ntil after 1981.

Two factors of primary importance to Europe therefore emerge—

i. th e Protocol MUS T NOT BE extended beyond its expiry date whatever 

the Soviet Union may demand, and

ii. it must be made plain th at Article XII the “noncircumvention” clause 

will n ot only perm it the transference of Cruise Missile technology from the 

U.S. A. to her Allies but will also permit the sale, for example of Tomahawk and 

Triden t I, should this be desired.

Administration assurances have been given during the Senate hearings bu t it is 

hoped th at t he Senate will insist on these two clarifications being written into its 

resolution in such a way as there can late r be no misunderstanding.

The Soviet aim may well be the de-coupling of the U.S. strategic nuclear 

deterre nt from the defence of Western Europe toge ther with the creation of an 

overwhelming nuclear and conventional advantage against NATO Forces in 

Europe.

The problem of th e theatre nuclear weapons is s eparate from the Euro-strategic 

balance, bu t is related to it. The overall balance in the atre nuclear capability, 

between NATO and the Warsaw P act is roughly equal to the num ber of warheads 

in their respective nuclear stockpiles, bu t in delivery systems the Warsaw Pac t 

has a considerable advanta ge and the balance is tilting further in their favour.

It is to be hoped th at should th e Senate n ot complete its discussion on SALT I I 

this year tha t this will not delay a NATO decision on TNW which is due to tak e 

place in December. Indeed, it migh t be an adv anta ge th at the the atr e nuclear 

decision be ta ken before the SALT ratification so as to make it clear th at such a 

decision is in fact within the terms of th e Tre aty.

It must be borne in mind th at the balance of conventional forces in Europe is 

continuing to shift against NATO and is now approximately 2.8:1 in armour, 2.2:1 

in tactic al aircraft, 2.7:1 in artillery, and 1.2:1 in men. Also tha t the Soviet Forces 

have been reorganised in recent years for offensive rathe r than defensive operations and are fully capable of repeatin g Hitler’s Blitzkrieg.

EA ST-W E ST BA LA NCE

It is now obvious that the balance is tilting aga inst the West both in th e nuclear 

and in the conventional fields.

It must, however, be borne in mind th at th e leaders of t he U.S.S .R. may hope 

to tak e over Asia, Africa and South Africa and South America, followed by 

Europe, without running the risk of a nuclear or even a conventional war.

The key to the industrialised West lies in supplies of energy and raw materials. 

Should the U.S.S.R . secure the dominating influence ovei-

 the Gulf or over Southern 

Africa she will control directly, or indirectly, the West’s major supplies of oil and 

key minerals (platinum, chrome, managanese, gold, vanadium, fluospar, asbestos, 

uranium, titanium, indu strial diamonds etc).

Her growing influence in the Third World and in the countries of the Middle 

East and Africa could enable her to cut off Western supplies at the source or on 

passage, or, in the case of S outhern Africa, to create so much chaos t ha t minerals 

could not be exported. Industrial Europe, starve d of raw materials or energy 

could then be faced with capitulation or resorting to nuclear war.

The w riting is on the wall—in the 1930s the Rhineland, Austria, Czechoslovakia, 

Poland, the U.S.S.R. In the 1970s Afghanistan, Iran , th e Horn of Africa, Aden—and 

the n who knows, Kuwait? Saudi Arabia? Turkey? In south ern Africa, Angola, 

Mozam bique, followed by Zimbabwe/Rhodesia, Namibia, Zaire, Zambia and 

finally South Africa. Thus, the USA could become isolated in a hostile world.

This is, of course, an extrem e concept bu t the fact remains th at countries 

friendly to the West are being rapidly reduced in numbers and the West takes 

no action. Western influence, quite recently supreme in the Pacific, the Indian 

Ocean and the South Atlan tic, is disappearing and with it the freedom for which 

we fought two World Wars.

51-435— 79--------- 3
14

Surely d etente means something q uite different in the West than in the U.S.S.R. 

Does SALT also have different connotations? If so, ther e is little hope for SALT 

II I or, from our concept, of detente.

Mr. Hamilton. Thank you, Mr. Wall.

Mr. Corterier, would you like to proceed next, please?

STATEM ENT OP PE TE R COR TER IER, MEMBER OP TH E GERM AN

BUNDESTAG (SOCIAL DEMOCRATIC PA R T Y ); AND GEN ERA L RA PPOR TEU R, POLIT ICA L COMM ITTEE OF TH E NOR TH ATL ANTIC

ASSEMBLY

Mr. Corterier. Yes, than k you, Mr. Chairman.

I too want to say, Mr. Chairman, how satisfied we all are th at your 

committee as well as the Committee on Foreign Relations in the 

Senate take so much of an interest in the impact that SALT II is 

having in Europe and what it means for the allies and that you also 

are prepared to look into what should be the next steps after SALT I I ; 

namely, the problem of what should be done to overcome the gap th at 

seems to have been formed over the past few years by the Soviet 

buildup in long-range the ater nuclear systems.

GE RM AN PO SITI ON ON TN F

One of the reasons why there is such strong support for ratification 

of the SALT II Treaty not only in Germany, but all over Western 

Europe, too, is tha t we see SALT II as a necessary stepping stone as 

a prerequisite to get into SALT III, where, of course, we hope t ha t 

some of the problems tha t are of particular interest to us in Europe 

can be dealt with.

I have already dealt with this problem of TNF modernization or of 

the gap tha t we have right now in this TN F area, and I would like to 

explain a little bit what the German position on that matter is.

We have had quite a bit of debate on this question in Germany 

this year, but I think that more and more of a consensus is going to 

emerge on this issue. I think there is general agreement tha t we have a 

gap in this area and tha t we cannot live with that gap indefinitely. 

And tha t has been stated again by the Federal Government in its 

white paper on defense th at came out last week.

The question is, of course, what should be done to overcome this 

gap? And we believe in a parallel approach, as has already been stated 

by our chairman, Mr. Thyness. We feel th at there should be a position 

on how to modernize our weapons in that area and on the necessary 

deployment of these weapons, but that at the same time we should 

have an arms control offer to the Soviet Union to negotiate on these 

systems.

I would like to add a little bit on the question of Germany not being 

prepared to deploy these weapons alone on the continent because I 

think it is important that our American friends understand our 

attitude on this point, which I think is very important.

We have, several reasons why we ask that other allies should 

participate in deployment. One of the reasons is that Germany is, of 

course, the country tha t I think is most exposed in Europe with all of
15

the problems that it has with Berlin, with the division of Germany, 

with the problem of the ethnic Germans t ha t we want to bring out of 

Eastern Europe and so on and so forth.

We have a high stake in detente. Therefore, we believe it would be 

unfair to single out Germany among the European allies for deployment 

and to let Germany bear the brunt of a wild campaign th at is certainly 

going to be started by the Soviet Union when NATO comes to a position on deployment and to deployment itself.

We already see the beginning of tha t if we read the Soviet press and 

if we hear some of the things tha t they have to say on this matter. In 

addition to that, we believe it would be extremely dangerous for the 

cohesion of the alliance if such an important decision—and I think 

it is one of the most important decisions NATO has had to make in 

many years—would be made by jus t a few countries and others would 

not participate in it.

I think we would run the risk, in doing so, of getting a split in 

NATO, of creating almost a second-class status for some of the NATO 

members in Europe. And I think this would be an extremely dangerous 

development.

Another argument I would like to put before you, and t ha t may not 

be as well understood in the United States, perhaps, as it is in Europe, 

is that we still have to reckon with the fact th at many of our neighbors, 

not only in the East but also in the West, cannot forget about the 

German role in history, cannot forget about the Second and the 

First World Wars.

And there is concern in some of these countries tha t Germany should 

become too strong, tha t it should emerge almost as a leader of Europe, 

and tha t it should have a role t ha t would be much more important 

than that of any other country in Western Europe. Of course, this 

fear would be compounded, I think, if the impression would be created 

tha t we would be the only ones who, in conjunction with the United 

States, would have these new nuclear weapons.

EU RO PEAN PAR TICIPATIO N IN TN F

I think if we take all these arguments together, we have a strong 

case for having a common decision on this question of TN F modernization and of not letting any European NATO countries not participate in that decision. And I think there is also a strong case for having 

deployment not in all Western European countries—there are some 

countries like Norway, of course, t ha t have always had a very special 

policy on nuclear weapons—but I think in most Western European 

countries we should have deployment.

We hope tha t it will be possible to make this decision soon, if not in 

December, which probably would be the best, then early the next 

year, mainly because we want to get to the arms control negotiations 

with the Soviet Union as quickly as possible and right after the ratification of SALT II .

But we feel it is important to have the T NF modernization decision 

at the same time as the arms control offer to the Soviet Union because 

that is the only way to make this arms control offer credible. If the 

Soviets don’t realize that the Alliance is prepared to do what is necess-
16

ary to redress the balance, if the Soviets don’t realize tha t the Alliance 

is united on this issue, I don’t think they would be prepared to seriously 

negotiate with us.

So, in concluding, Mr. Chairman, we hope that it will be possible 

to ratify SALT II speedily, despite the problems tha t have emerged 

lately, and that after tha t we will move into these positions inside 

NATO and, after th at, into a next phase of negotiations with the other 

side in SALT I II.

Thank you very much.

[Mr. Corterier’s prepared statement follows:]

P r epa r ed Sta te m e n t o p P e t e r C o r t e r ie r, M em b e r o f t h e G er m a n B undes ta g (S ocia l D em ocrati c P art y); an d G e n e r a l R a pp o r t e u r of th e

P oli tic a l Co m m it tee o f t h e N orth Atlan tic Ass em bly

N o doubt the West is entering a period in which new’ defense concerns will 

arise even after ratification of the SALT II Treaty, but the difficulties and problems of Western defense w’ould be immeasureably greater without a SALT II 

agreement. Without a SALT II agreem ent the Soviet Union could deploy numerous strategic systems which would constitute a far greater threat to the West. 

The SALT II Treaty provides greater predictability and transparency of str ategic developments and accordingly facilitates arms planning.

The successful conclusion of SALT II will help to:

Safeguard the West’s capab ility to preserve a stable balance;

Provide a sound basis in term s of armaments and arms control policy for 

a stra tegy of military balance;

Create the prerequisites for progress at the MB FR talk s and the CSCE 

follow-up conference in Madrid;

Make it possible to limit nuclear weapons in Europe, especially mediumrange w’eapons systems;

Create the prerequisites for further arms control and disarmam ent negotiatio ns, for example with regard to a complete ban on nuclear weapon 

tests or a ban on killer satellites, radiation weapons and chemical weapons;

Insure the continuation and the successful conclusion of talks on the 

limitatio n of conventional arms exports.

The successful conclusion of SALT II, then, opens up hopeful new prospects 

for the future of detente in all its aspects. At the same time, it also carries great 

implications for the security of E urope and the security of the Alliance, particularly in the way it points to SALT HI .

Considering the rapid Soviet arms build-up during the last 10 years, it will 

not be easy during the SALT II I negotiations to incorporate into a tre aty the 

principles contained in the Joint Statem ent of Principles for subsequent negotiations. From the European viewpoint, the main problems will be those resulting 

from the existing situation in the field of nuclear medium-range w’eapons. They 

will certainly n ot be th e sole subject of the negotiations, but the disparities existing in this field, made especially acute by the deployment of the SS-20 and the 

Backfire bomber, will make this subject particularly imp orta nt in the SALT II I 

negotiations. The aim of these talks m ust be to ensure an overall strategic balance 

and to preserve the strategic unity within the Alliance. But parity at all levels 

cannot be our objective, because th at would not be conducive to the strategic 

unity of the Alliance, b ut would, in fact, be counterproductive.

We Europeans have an inte rest in the nuclear weapons systems threaten ing 

Europe also being limited in the SALT II I negotiations. The arms race must 

not be shifted to Europe. All the issues of middle range nuclear weapons w’hich 

are a subject of t he SALT II I negotiations are currently being discussed within 

the Alliance, both from the aspect of defense policy (in the High-Level-Group) 

and from t he aspect of arms control policy (in th e Special Group). The intention 

is to elabo rate within the Alliance a concept for SALT II I aiming at a stable 

nuclear balance of power and at closing any gaps in our deterre nt capab ility in 

Europe.

Where this can be achieved with arms control arrangements, this should take 

priority over the introduction of new weapons systems. This depends on whether 

or not the Soviet Union is prepared to effect corresponding limitations or reductions of its own medium-range nucle ar w’eapons. This issue must be discussed 

with the Soviet Union.
17

On 4 July of this year Federal Chancellor Schmidt said before the German 

Bundestag: That the Western Alliance must undertake all measures necessary to preserve its security. The extent to which we can restrict the scale of concrete 

measures aimed at adjusting to the continuous armament effort within the 

Warsaw Pact will depend on the degree of success in achieving an effective 

limitation of continental strategic systems in the East and West through arms 

control negotiations, for instance in S AL T III. This quote makes it very clear that we in Europe must also attempt to make 

progress in arms control negotiations. In other words, when the Atlantic Alliance takes a decision on the deployment of American medium-range weapons in Europe, it must remain clear that this decision in its implementation will also depend on progress or non-progress in the arms control negotiations with the Soviet Union. 

The Federal Republic of Germany is not a nuclear weapons State. Therefore, it must not create the impression of striving to participate in deciding on the produc­ tion of nuclear weapons. Such a decision must remain the responsibility of the United States. We continue to set store by not being forced into any special role within the Alliance. The forthcoming decisions must be taken by the Alliance as a whole. The coherence of the Alliance is also a decisive factor determining the 

success of arms control negotiations. On the basis of the Harmel Report a broad consensus on detente policy has developed within the Alliance over the last ten years. This consensus must now be extended with intensified efforts to all fields of arms control policy and be brought to bear at the SALT III negotiations. Our joint objective must be to curb the increase of Soviet systems in the field of nuclear medium-range missiles and reduce the disparities in the Euro-strategic field. In this connection, a limitation of the existing modern Soviet systems— 

SS-20 and Backfire— could be useful as an initial concrete objective. However, we should not attempt to deploy an equal capability in Europe specifically against 

the SS-20 because in the final analysis we can counter the resultant threat only with the entire range of systems available for deterrence, including American 

strategic arms. Technological developments on the substrategic level have rendered 

the differentiation between strategic weapons of intercontinental and of con­ tinental range useless, and even politically dangerous. Security within the Alliance 

is indivisible. It should not be measured on the issue whether a weapons system has a range of more than 5000 kilometers or not. There is only one security in the 

Alliance and this covers the territory of all alliance states. There should not be any zones of a different security. For the same reason, there can be no isolated TN F 

arms control in Europe. Rather, when adopting a joint strategy to curb the escalation of arms and when reaching arms control agreements, the link with the 

overall strategic balance of power must be preserved. The chairman of the SPD parliamentary group, Herr Herbert Wehner, formulated the objective of our 

efforts as follows: Of course we must not simply trivialize or accept any gap in the system 

of deterrence which might lead to a miscalculation by the other side. The 

deterrent must continue to make it impossible to wage war. That involves 

our reacting to challenges and taking the necessary decisions jointly . At the 

same time, we must ensure tha t all— I repeat: all— possible forms of arms 

control are used to prevent armament and counterarmament resulting in a 

new arms race. After all we are already in the midst of such an arms race, 

and we should tr y to do everything within our power to stop it from assuming immeasurable dimensions. In other words, we must render unto the Alliance all that it requires to 

remain capable of defence, which is our defence too; that is perhaps the 

soundest basis for peace and for our objective of consolidating peace through 

detente. For us, for our policies, and for the existence of our people there can 

be nothing more important than to undertake all efforts to preserve and safeguard peace, which again means that together with our Allies we should take 

advantage of every opportunity for further agreements on detente.

We must therefore undertake a two-fold interactive effort, that of harmonizing 

our defence efforts with the requirements of arms control. The SA LT III negotiations on nuclear medium-range weapons represent a ve ry complex problem. The y will doubtless require closer consultations than has been 

the case until now with SA LT II. In the case of SA LT II, the Allies were consulted adequately and comprehensively, but for SA LT III two parallel efforts 

are nevertheless necessary in order to— (a) make possible further reductions of the strategic intercontinental 

capability of the United States and the Soviet Union, and
18

(b) reduce disparities in the field of con tinen tal nuclear weapons in Europe.

It is to be welcomed th at in the future there will be no more unilateral U.S. 

arms limitations in the TN F field, as there are in the present Protocol. The sta tement which was delivered on behalf of the U.S. Government at th e session of the 

NATO Council on 29 June in connection with the statem ent of intent of the 

SALT II Treaty and which Secretary of Sta te Vance quoted at the hearing of 

the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations on 10 July, represents a step in this 

direction and guara ntees strict reciprocity in the future limitation of noncentral 

systems.

The Alliance will also have to adapt organizatio nally and technically to the 

political and military requirements arising in this context. The experience gained 

so far with the High-Level Group and the Special Group is most positive. The 

importance of the political, m ilita ry and stra tegic issues arising in connection with 

SALT II I justifies new organizational and technical efforts. SALT II I negotiations 

will affect matters relating to European secu rity to a far grea ter extent than 

SALT II did. They will continue to be basically bilateral negotiations between 

the United States and the Soviet Union, bu t the consultations will natura lly 

have to be much more intensive than has been necessary until now. The consultati ons will have to include the elabo ration of negotiatin g positions. We need 

suitable arran gements for the Allies to be able to have a say in the negotiations, 

which is not the same as participating in them . A new institu tion along the lines 

of the Special Group might be a solution t o this problem.

Mr. H amilton. Tha nk yo u, sir.

Mr. de Vries.

STATEMENT OF KLAAS DE VRIES, MEMBER OF THE DUTCH PARLIAMENT (LABOUR PA RT Y); AND GENERAL RAPPORTEUR, MI LITARY COMMITTEE OF THE NORTH ATLANTIC ASSEMBLY

Mr. de Vri es . Tha nk you ve ry much , Mr. Chairma n.

I t is a grea t honor for me to be here toda y to offer some views on 

issues of centr al importa nce to Eu rop e, the Alliance and yo ur own 

country .

EUROPE AN PO SITI ON ON SAL T

In my pre pared stat em en t you will find extensive reason ing on the 

attit ud es of the Allies tow ard SAL T. I will be very brief comm ent ing 

on th at at thi s ve ry m om ent . I th in k Mr. Thyness h as describ ed ade ­

qu ate ly w ha t the position of the Eu ropeans is.

Eu rope favors SALT and fav ors ratificatio n of SALT. I hop e th at 

yo ur colleagues in the Senate will be able to rea ch a decision on ra ti ­

fication pre tty soon. I would like to com me nt in thi s conte xt on the 

issue of linkage, which is, of course, at the mo me nt ve ry mu ch in 

eve ryo ne’s m ind.

I think th at if one think s ab ou t link age, app lying linkage, three 

things should be ke pt in mind. One thi ng is th at the Alliance, and 

especially the lead ing power in the Alliance has to clearly distinguish 

between wh at its v ita l inte res ts are a nd w ha t its nonv ita l i nte res ts are.

There are differen t levels and different means to cope wi th issues 

risin g at those diff eren t levels. Th e othe r thing th at we have to keep 

in mind is th at if we apply link age gen erally in our policies, we will 

prob ably ad d more com plexity to decision mak ing i n our ow n countries.

We will overb urd en our dem ocracies and ove rbu rde n our burea ucracies wi th the com plexity th at is alm ost impossible to han dle, and I 

think th at might provide a ve ry effective blockage for decisionmaking 

th at we are all in need of.
19

SOVIET TROOPS IN CUB A

Third, I would think tha t if we apply linkage, especially in connection with Soviet troops in Cuba, that we would have to look at what 

the results of that linkage would be for things th at are linked to SALT 

II ratification. I think tha t nonratification of SALT or the prolongation of the discussions in the Senate, the postponement of decisionmaking on this issue will have an effect on a great many issues.

It will have an effect on the security discussions in Europe, and it 

will probably have an influence also on one issue tha t is very dominant 

in the m in ds of European governments and the American Government as well, which is theater nuclear modernization.

TN F AND ARMS CONTROL

I think th at Mr. Corterier was absolutely correct in describing that 

most European countries are very much interested in developing a 

parallel track in the course of TNF modernization to make decisions 

on the arms component of the issue, at least parallel with serious 

arms control.

As I mentioned, I think it would be very difficult to define what the 

arms control position would look like if you don’t know what the 

status of SALT I I will be.

Mr. Thyness suggested that a question people have to ask themselves on TNF is, do we have, really, to worry about the Soviet buildup 

in this area? I don’t really think tha t tha t is the question we are 

dealing with. What we want to deal with is, how do we prevent a new 

arms race in this area? How do we constrain specifically the Soviets 

from just continuing their buildup? And what are the means we have 

to talk reason into this process also, which is not very simple because 

the whole problem of theater nuclear modernization is a very complex problem.

RO LE OF TH EA TE R NU CL EA R FO RC ES IN EUROPE

Chairman Zablocki was at the seminar in Brussels and we all appreciated that. He has seen what difficult discussion this causes, one of 

the most difficult being what has the role of theater nuclear forces 

been so far in Europe.

Henry Kissinger, in his much-discussed speech during tha t conference, has pointed out tha t there has been no concept, really, no clear 

concept. No one was really clear on the doctrinal aspects of theater 

nuclear forces in Europe. And tha t has led to a conglomerate of 

arsenal which has proved to be impractical and probably almost 

suicidal.

So there is a problem. And, of course, we are trying in the intellectual communities and defense establishment to determine what we 

need for the future. But tha t is really the kind of complexity tha t I 

don’t think public opinion, a t least in my country—and I would like 

to say a few words about tha t if you allow me—is prepared to tackle 

at the moment.

I think tha t the position of public opinion, the attitude of public 

opinion, in my country is most adequately described by saying tha t
20

the gap th at people perceive or think th at the Russians might per ­

ceive is n ot the gap th at pub lic opin ion in my co un try perceives.

W ha t my people are mo stly concern ed ab ou t is the nu mb er of 

nuclear weapons th at we hav e alread y, the stoc kpile of 7,000 to 

9,000 weapons. And the que stio n th at is very m uch on their min ds is, 

do we really need to add w eapo ns to th at in order to come to a be tte r 

force posture in Eu rop e and to tak e aw ay possibilities of nuclear 

blackm ail or tak e away risk s of failing det errenc e?

So I think th at a lot of discussions have to be de alt with in the 

con tex t of this issue which do no t rea lly tr y to add ress only the SS - 

20 th re at and the Backfire th reat, whi ch are very real, which pose 

very real worries, but we will have to add ress this issue in a larger 

conte xt and clarify the concepts of the role of t he at er nu cle ar weapons 

in general.

The position of my Governm ent has bee n so far th at it is awaiti ng 

the results of the groups esta blis hed in the NA TO con text, the Hig h 

Level Group and the Special Gro up, an d the Go vernm ent is no t 

pre pared to tak e a stan d on th at . I think for a parliam en tar ian who 

has to judge wh at his governm ent’s decisions will be, it would be very 

ha rd for me to be specific on wh at m y idea s are.

Cou ld I ju st foo tno te one rem ark ma de by Pa tri ck Wall? Pa tric k 

and I hav e had a lon gstandin g dispute on the eng agement of NATO 

in areas bey ond NA TO ’s form al boundaries. My feeling has always 

been th at talkin g ab ou t south ern Africa in ter ms of vit al min erals 

and talkin g abou t the Middle Eas t in terms of oil and tal kin g ab ou t 

Tu rkey in terms of Tu rkey as a means of pre venti ng the Rus sians 

from going to the Persian Gulf, is no t going to be very effective in 

our policymakin g.

NATO: A DEFENSIVE ALLIANCE

Th e ma in pro blem th at NA TO poses, and Ch air ma n Zablocki 

witnessed the discussio n we ha d in th e gro up we had in Brussels, is 

th at NATO is a defensive alliance which, for t hat rea son , h as prob ably 

chosen the lowest common denomi nator of common interest of the 

cou ntries as a whole. And I think if we go below th at level and st art 

tal kin g ab ou t coord ina ting our foreign policies, we will ru n int o tr emendo us prob lems.

And, of course, the views of ve ry m an y cou ntries on southe rn Africa 

and o n th e Middle Eas t h ave differen t angles and peo ple hav e d ifferent 

perspe ctives on tha t, b ut I th ink it would be v ery difficult to get NATO 

involved in the Persian Gulf, in so uth ern Africa, and I don’t th in k 

any one should rea lly hop e th at would happen. I t would ju st cre ate 

treme ndous difficulties.

W ha t I think should happen is th at we in the alliance should try 

to come tog eth er mu ch more often and mu ch closer on the discussio ns 

of foreign policies which we h ave to p urs ue. I th in k if we can find f ora 

for th at , we m igh t be able to coo rdinate policies in ord er no t be cou nter prod uctiv e in other area s th at are of mutua l concern to all of us.
21

May I ju st offer this for yo ur con sideration .

[Mr. de Vrie s’ pre pared sta temen t follows:]

P r epa r ed St a t e m e n t o f K la as d e Vr ie s , M em b er of t h e D utc h P a r lia ­

m en t (L a bou r P a rty ) ; an d G e n e r a l R a pp o r t e u r of t h e M il it a r y C om ­

m it t e e o r t h e N orth Atla n tic A ss em bly

Mr. Chairman, in the course of the L’.S. debate on the proposed SALT II

Treaty, the question of European attitudes toward the Treaty has emerged as a 

pivotal issue. While Administration officials have forcefully characterised Allied 

support of ratification as unequivocal and broad-based, other witnesses have advanced a number of rationales which, if true, would significantly depreciate the 

value of official endorsements of SA LT II by European governments. In brief, the 

Congress has been warned that it can draw little comfort from public expressions of European support; indeed th at these declarations may even have been 

proffered under duress.

Let me begin by observing that there can be no disputing the fact that Europe 

has overwhelmingly declared its clear support for the Treaty. To be sure a few 

isolated, and not entirely unpredictable, objections have been heard. But they 

have been drowned in the flood tide of public European support for the Treaty. 

The North Atlantic Council, individual national governments, prestigious centres 

of security and foreign policy research, and leading newspapers have all gone on 

record endorsing T reaty ratification.

Thus, it seems astonishing to have to respond to the suggestion that, at worst, 

we do not really mean what we say, or, at best, that what we have said should be discounted.

To suggest the European governments w’ould knowingly and deliberately 

prevaricate on an issue of such signal importance as strategic arms limitation is 

tantamount to declaring that there is no basis for trust in relations between the 

proud nations of the Atlantic Alliance. SA LT is not a partisan issue in Europe. 

Indeed, support for SA LT may be one of the few issues in 1979 on which 

European leaders— Conservative, Social Democratic, Christian Democratic and 

others— find themselves in basic agreement.

The theory that there is a disparity between official and private European views 

usually relies on one or the other of two lines of argument:

One, that the Administration has “arm-twisted” European governments into 

expressing support in order to save the prestige of the Presidency; and

Two, that public sentiment in favour of detente and arms control runs so strongly 

in Europe that no public figure can prudently speak out in favour of vigilance anil 

defence.

Lest these theories gain credence through unrefuted repetition, I feel that I must 

challenge each of them in turn. First, I cannot accept the suggestion that the 

Administration has pressured European governments into endorsing SA LT II 

against their will. Of course Europe recognises the importance to Alliance cohesion 

of a strong American Presidency. But this should not suggest that Europe would 

support SA LT II against its better judgement for the sake of helping a particular 

President’s standing in public opinion polls. Europe is vita lly interested in 

American leadership. It is not interested in helping to create the illusion of American leadership.

Second, the claim that pro-disarmament euphoria is so rampant on the European 

continent that no one can prudently speak out for military preparedness simply 

cannot be reconciled with the facts. The NATO Allies have agreed to a 3 percent 

increase in defence spending and committed themselves to the Long Term Defence 

Programme. The French Government has just announced a 15 percent increase 

in its defence budget. The United Kingdom Government has declared that it 

intends to undertake greater defence expenditures. NAT O has held to a firm position in the M BF R talks and has just bought the expensive AAA'ACS programme. 

NA TO countries are re-equiping their forces with F-16s, Tornado aircraft, and 

Leopard tanks.

51-435— 79
22

Why did NATO insist on preserving technology transfer and cruise missile 

deployment options under SALT II? Some SALT critics would have us believe it 

both ways: that Europe publicly sup ports the Trea ty out of a lack of will to stand 

up to the Soviets, yet priv ately opposes the agreement because it allegedly denies 

them the hardware needed to stand up to the Soviets. You cannot have it both 

ways.

Let me tur n now to the line of argument th at approval of the terms of the 

Treaty themselves is not a prim ary factor accounting for European support, in 

other words, that European disappointment with th e terms of the Tre aty yielded 

to a higher priority: European interest in preserving progress toward deten te.

I wonder if anyone— European or American or Soviet—can actually declare 

himself tota lly satisfied with the terms of the Treaty? Even the Administration 

acknowledges th at it is disappointed with the height of the ceilings and the 

degree of strategic force modernisation permitted both Parties under the accord. 

By definition this negotiation required some compromises to be made on both sides 

or else there would have been no agreement. Disappo intment over certain negotiatin g outcomes cannot s tand in isolation from other considerations and be allowed 

to constitute a basis for rejecting the Treaty.

The question is not whether Europe approves 100 percent with the provisions 

of the agreement. The question is whether these provisions on balance are acceptable and whether this Treaty, now laid on the table for rejection or acceptance, is 

better tha n no Tre aty or a reopened negotiation. And in making th at assessment 

obviously judgements about the provisions of SALT II must be weighed along 

with other considerations, including the value of SALT I I as one step in th e longterm process of SALT and within the overall framew ork of detente.

Of course European support of SALT II reflects a desire to promote a lessening 

of East-West tensions and a certain anxiety th at rejection of the Treaty might 

occasion a new Cold War. No one denies this. But what is n ot to be accepted is th e 

view t ha t Euro pe’s interest in deten te is so pre-em inent th at we are blinded from 

the recognition that arms, vigilance, and the will to defend ourselves are still 

required in this, the 30th year of the Alliance. Maintaining military security while 

simultaneously pursuing detente have long been the twin pillars of Alliance 

stra tegy. They have not suddenly become m utually exclusive in 1979.

This leads me to a second point. Europeans are intimately familiar with the 

term s of the Treaty. The degree of co-ordination and consultation has been 

extraordinary and unpreceden ted. SALT II is not something th at has suddenly 

been thrust upon the Europeans for approval or disapproval. It is an agreem ent 

th at was methodically worked out under thr ee American administration s in concert 

with the European Allies. Europe had every opp ortuni ty to express reservations 

abo ut provisions considered during the course of formulating negotiating positions, 

and in those cases where Europe did insist on measures to prote ct certain interests 

more stringently —for example, on technology transfer—the United States accommodated European recommendations. Ambassador Earle’s testimony to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee underscores the unprecedented degree of 

consultation and co-ordination w ithin the Alliance on SALT I I. The much app reciated and publicly applauded effort of three successive Administrations to inform 

and consult its Allies has found its deserved reward in th at all European Allies 

became intim ately familiar with the Tre aty and were able to support its final 

version.

Turning now from the subject of European att itu des generally, I would like 

to put forward some personal views on the merits of this Tre aty. In explaining 

the basis for my strong s upport of SALT II, I w ant to touch on four main themes: 

(1) SALT II and the credibility of the U.S. strategic deterrent, (2) SALT II and 

European defence options, (3) European interests in SALT II I, and (4) SALT as an element in a broader framework of East-West relations.

SA LT II AN D T H E C R E D IB IL IT Y O F T H E U .S . STR A TEG IC D E T E R R E N T

The question of whether SALT II entails negative implications for the credibility of the U.S. strategic deterr ent has centered on the fa ct th at the Soviet Union, 

is allowed to maintain 308 heavy missiles (SS9s now being replaced by SS18s) 

while the United States is permitted none. It is argued th at this perm anent 

advanta ge in throw-weight when married to the inevitable improvem ents in 

accuracy will give the Soviet Union a convincing first strike capab ility, th at is, 

Soviet leaders will have a high confidence possibility of taking out 90 p ercent of 

United States land-based missiles with only a small proportion of their own la nd-
23

based systems. With only the bomber and subm arine proportion of the United 

States deterre nt force remaining, a United States President would allegedly be 

deterred from retalia tory action. The critics do not actually believe th at such a 

scenario will tak e place bu t rathe r th at the perception of supe riority th at this 

situatio n will create will be man ipulate d b y Soviet leaders to obtain th eir political 

objectives. This superiority will, it is alleged, be used for nuclear blackmail. The 

critics argue tha t under this situation nuclear weapons re tain considerable political 

utility.

It is my belief th at this strategic supe riority argument is based on a highly 

selective and inadequa te inte rpretation of weapons criteria. The current asym ­

metry in United States and Soviet force levels is the result of differences in force 

stru cture and military planning. The United States has developed smaller, more 

accu rate missiles, while the Soviet Union has, largely because of technological 

restrain ts, developed larger missiles with heavier throw-weights. It m ust be noted 

th at throw-weight is only one of a number of crite ria t ha t can be used to measure 

strategic power. Accuracy is far more important in terms of destructive capability 

since very large warheads ten d to be less efficient tha n smaller warheads. In terms 

of accuracy and the numbers of w arheads, the United States has a decided lead 

over the Soviet Union.

It is therefore unreasonable and distortive to single out one element of the 

strategic picture in order to prove a picture of United States inferiority. Asymmetries in one area should be m easured against advantages in others. In fact, the 

composition of the two strategic arsenals is very different. The Soviet Union has 

placed a very heavy emphasis on its land-based forces. It has relatively small 

bomber forces (none on permanent alert as with Strategic Air Command) and while 

it has a large num ber of submarines, only 15 percent of these are on station at any 

one time. The United States on the other hand has fewer than 25 p ercent of its 

warheads in Minutem an silos, and by the 1980s with the deployment of Triden t 

and the cruise missile this proportion will be even lower. It has a formidable 

bomber force a proportion of which will shortly be equipped with air-launched 

cruise missiles and a sub stan tial force of Poseidon/Polaris submarines, 60 percent 

of which are perm anently on station. It is estim ated, for example, th at owing 

to higher alert rates and multiple warhead advantages, approxim ately 2,446 

United States as against 140 Soviet SLBM warheads are a t sea. As these characteristics indicate, a direct comparison of the effectiveness of either strategic force 

is to say the least complex. It is for this reason th at the term “essential equivalence” has come to describe the current balance.

With regard to the specific disparity in heavy missiles it is necessary to ask 

whether given the opp ortunity the United States would seek to construct an 

equivale nt number of heavy missiles. The answer would be certa inly negative 

because it has no need of them.

Finally, th e question of Minuteman vulnerability: the suggestion that the Soviet 

Union will in the 1980s have the capacity to destroy United States land-based 

forces may be mathem atically provable but such action would depend on so many 

unce rtain variables as to be beyond rational comprehension. Such variables include 

hum an error, equipment failures, the effect of atmospheric turbulen ce caused by 

the first explosion on incoming warheads, and also th e “fratricidal” effect on these 

warheads. In addition to these uncerta inties, a Soviet leader would have to gamble 

th at a United States President would not launch his ICBMs as soon as he knew 

Soviet missiles had been dispatched, and th at he would not reta liat e with his 

remaining force of submarines and bombers. Such risks may seem reasonable in 

the artificial vacuum of theoretical strategic planning and force exchange calculations but they have little to do with the choices t ha t face political leaders in 

the real world. If the vulnerability argument is with out military logic then the 

political advanta ge th at is said to accrue from it is likewise with out foundation.

It is therefore unfo rtun ate th at when based on so m any questionable assum ptions the concept of Minuteman vulnerability has been allowed to become an 

established tru th, almost an article of faith on which critics of th e SALT process 

base the ir arguments. The effect of t heir criticisms could be to weaken our selfconfidence, create doubts in the minds of friends and neutrals, and suggest to 

Soviet leaders possibilities th at do not actually exist. Thus, the final result of 

their arguments is to undermine deterrence. The eve ntual theoretical vulnerability 

of fixed land-based systems was inevitable once MIRVd warheads entered the 

strategic arsenals, and had no thing to do with the SALT process. In the words of 

Secretary of Defence Brown, “Minutem an vulnerab ility was not a problem created by SALT, nor is it a problem we can solve with a SALT agreement * * *
24

we would have th e same problem withou t such an agreement, only in that case we 

would have other problems as well”. It is not a question of establishing that a 

number of fixed points can in theory be hit by a certain number of missiles, but 

of deciding whether in the realm of practical politics this paper certain ty would 

tran slate into a tangible political advantage.

If the United States Administration is concerned that this is a weakness that 

should be fixed th en it has the MX mobile missile under development. Currently , 

the Adm inistration is study ing the basing problem in order to establish a mode 

th at will give the necessary mobility and yet be verifiable under a future arms 

control agreem ent. However, it should be noted th at in discussing the vulnerability of land-based systems th e Soviet Union has far more to fear t han the United 

States. She places a far greater reliance on her land-based missiles tha n the 

United States and does no t possess an equivalent Triad of forces.

SA LT II AN D EU R O PE A N D E F E N C E O PTIO N S

It has been argued th at while the Treaty places no limits on Soviet the atre 

systems such as the SS20 and Backfire bomber, thus allowing th e Soviet Union a 

subs tantial advantage in the theatre field, i t imposes limitations on the development of ground and sea launched cruise missiles which could be used to offset 

this advantage. Thus, some analysts have worried that, over time, many Europeans might conclude th at the United States— in order to reach an agreement— 

has mortgaged systems that are most likely to serve Western, rather than American, interests.

While acknowledging that the restrictions on GLCMs and SLCMs are for the 

duration of the protocol and therefore officially temporary, nevertheless critics 

assert th at under a SALT II I climate these limitations will be extended. Some 

have suggested th at it is hopelessly naive to believe the West will be able to 

turn back the clock on ‘tem porary’ arms limitations and plunge ahead with new 

and previously banned weapons as though they had never been prohibited.

The Allies’ access to cruise missile technology is also linked to the provision in 

the Tre aty which bars circumvention of the Treaty provisions throug h third 

countries. Critics believe that the wording of this provision is so vague th at the 

Soviet Union will be able to use it to prev ent the United States sharing certain 

crucial military technologies with its Allies.

The a rgument that SALT excludes Soviet medium range systems represents a 

curious approach since it was t he firm position of the United State s, with complete 

Alliance support and approval, to keep forward based systems a nd medium range 

theatre systems out of the negotiations. Thus having successfully resisted Soviet 

pressure to include these systems it is slightly distortive to complain th at SALT 

II will fail to constrain them. Moreover, it should be noted th at the Alliance has 

exactly the same freedom as t he Soviets to augment its the atre systems if it sees 

the need.

On the question of the restrictions on cruise missiles contained in the Protocol, 

the Administration has made it clear th at the availability of options for theatre 

nuclear forces is unaffected by the Protocol. Specifically, testing of ground and 

sea launched missiles can go forward to unlim ited ranges. The prohibition against 

deployment of ground and sea launchers of cruise missiles with a range in excess 

of 600 km will expire well before such systems could in fact be deployed. Thus 

the decision on the utilisatio n of cruise missiles within NATO will be decided 

through consultation within the Alliance, most likely at the Ministerial meetings 

in December. Administration officials stress th at the Protocol was a compromise 

to settle a bargaining impasse and to leave time for more definitive negotiation 

while not imposing, in the meantime, any prac tical limits on the United States 

or NATO. They stress th at the Soviets have indicated th at the y recognise that 

the Protocol will expire according to its terms.

Concerning the issue of non-circumvention, it is evident t ha t the Soviet Union 

pressed hard for a very restrictive ban on transfers of technology and equipm ent 

covered in any way by the agreement. The United States however did not agree 

to such a clause. The non-circumvention clause is therefore very general and does 

no more tha n sta te an obligation which the United States would be under in any 

event. In testimony before th e Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Administration officials have affirmed in the most explicit language tha t the non-circumvention clause will not affect existing patterns of collaboration and co-operation with 

America’s allies, nor will it preclude co-operation in modernisation or continued 

nuclear or conventional co-operation with the Allies.
25

I will n ot comment at length here on the relationship between strategic and 

the atre forces except to emphasise th at while the Protocol has ensured th at a 

number of options remain open to th e Alliance, close consultation will be necessary 

to decide whether these options are actually needed, under what circum stances 

and how the y will fit into futu re arms control negotiations. In particu lar, it will 

be necessary to consider w hether a decision to deploy these new options in Europe 

and thus provide Europe with a more sub stantial regional capa bility could be 

inte rpreted as a serious step to loosening th e United States strategic com mitmen t 

EUROPEAN INTERESTS IN SALT III

It is already accepted th at once SALT II is signed the United States and the 

Soviet Union will proceed with negotiations on further limitations on strategic 

arms. SALT II includes a statem ent of principles and guidelines concerning a 

SALT? I ll negotiation. While t he United States originally wanted the statem ent 

of principles to set fairly explicit and ambitious targets regarding further redu ctions and modernisation restrain ts, it accepted the Soviet position of a fairly 

generalised statem ent. The Soviet Union is expected in SALT II I to argue again 

th at United States and Allied t heatre nuclear weapons capable of reaching the 

Soviet Union must be ta ken into accou nt in arriv ing a t new ceilings.

It has always been difficult t o restrict th e negotiations to strictly b ilateral issues 

since from the earliest days the Soviet Union raised the issue of th e French and 

British nuclear forces and of American nuclear-cap able aircraft stationed in 

Europe and capable of striking Soviet territo ry. Now, with the development of 

the strategic cruise missile, the controversy over the Backfire bomber and the 

emergence of the SS20, attention has been focused on a number of systems whose 

characteristics defy precise definition and which will complicate any furthe r 

negotiations.

Since these “grey area” or the atre systems have particu lar significance for 

Europe, it is evident th at European interests must in some way be represented. 

However, several complex issues remain to be settled : namely, what sor t of 

negotiatin g forum would be set for what particular weapons and for which particu lar participa nts?

The most realistic formula of th e various proposals th at have been circulated 

would be a continuation of th e bilateral dialogue between the United States and 

the Soviet Union with consideration of those theatre systems under U nite d States 

or Soviet control. It is difficult to see any multila teral negotiation making much 

progress and several countries are opposed to dealing with the atre systems in 

isolation from strategic systems. Furthermore, the French have refused to participate in any negotiatio ns on their nuclear forces and while the United Kingdom 

has not made its position clear its willingness to see restrai nts placed on its strate gic 

force is doubtful. This would inevitably mean t hat the Soviet Union will ask t o be 

given compensation for the French an d British nuclea r forces. It will also mean continu ing th e present system of Alliance consultation as a means of securing European involvement. However, it may be possible to secure more perm anent involvement thro ugh a new institu tional mechanism. Wha teve r the mechanism, it must 

be m ade clear th at Alliance participation means all members or at least those who 

par ticipate in the basing or ownership of nuclear weapons.

As long as a satisfactory consultation mechanism could be established a continuation of the bila teral approach would certa inly be the most likely to achieve 

progress. This approach would have the advanta ge of maintaining the essential 

continuity of nuclear system s and counteractin g the tendency to t ry to separate 

the the atre and strategic levels. It would also facilitate matc hing constraints as, 

for example, United States constraint on the ground launched cruise missile in 

return for Soviet restraint on the SS-20.

SALT II AND EAS T-W EST RELATIONS

Some critics have suggested th at United States conduct in the SALT negotiations should have been linked to Soviet behaviour in other areas, in other words, 

a SALT agreem ent would have been conditional upon Soviet actions in areas such 

as developing countries, human rights, etc.

It is clear th at SALT is one component of many th at constitute the East-W est 

relationship, and as an effort to establish un derstanding and a mutually acceptable 

framework in nuclear armame nts it is clearly an important component. SALT 

therefore forms pa rt of overall United States defence and foreign policy and j us t
26

as it is influenced b y developments in other areas so it will itself contribute to the 

general climate of East-West relations. Thus while SALT cann ot be separated by 

developments in other areas it cannot be m ade responsible for them and cannot be 

used as a mechanism to influence them. It would have been wrong for the United 

States to have made concessions in SALT II in order to influence Soviet actions 

and it would have been wrong to have suspended SALT II in order to punish th e 

Soviet Union. Above all, it must be stressed th at SALT II is of sub stan tial interest to both sides a nd must be judged on the basis of its own merits.

CONCLUSION

While re-emphasising my sup port for the Trea ty, I wish to endorse the criticism 

voiced by several observers th at not only are the levels too high bu t th at the 

Treaty does too little in checking the momentum of armame nts development. As 

has been pointed out by opponents and sup porters of the T rea ty alike, the T rea ty 

does nothing to constrain the development of planned United States strategic 

systems, including the MX, Triden t and subm arine missile, and cruise missiles, 

as well as new generations of Soviet strategic systems. I join those who urge th at 

the next round of negotiations seriously tackle the unnecessarily high levels and 

potentially destabilising qualitative developments.

Despite this criticism, I support the current Treaty because it is an essential 

element of th e East-We st relationship and because it establishes a framework of 

mutual understanding and confidence which will pe rmit the eventual acceptance 

of lower levels of forces. T he Tre aty provides a number of impor tant steps in this 

direction:

It reinforces the perception and reality of balance by establishing equal levels 

of interco ntinenta l nuclear delivery systems.

Foi- the first time it requires actu al reductions of abo ut 250 Soviet (and no 

United States) strategic delivery systems.

It will lim it Soviet MIR Vd ICBM s, the most thre aten ing part of their force, 

to 820.

It will prevent increases in the maximum number of warheads deployed in 

ICBM s, tnus limiting Soviet ability to exploit their throw-weight advan tages.

It will channel Soviet activity into certain areas and thu s simplify United 

States planning, and it will constrain the deployment of Soviet strategic nuclear 

forces well below the levels which could be deployed in the absence of an agreement.

I believe th at the SALT II Treaty will make a positive contribution to the 

future security of the Alliance. Failure to ratify this agreem ent would represent 

a reversal in the efforts to secure a more stab le relationship between Eas t and 

West. The SALT process has provided an imp ortant fram ework for t he communication and exchange of inform ation necessary for the building of mutual confidence. Such confidence is a prerequ isite if stability is to be assured.

One great American once said th at your country would never negotiate out of 

fear and never fear to negotiate. Successive administrations have conducted the 

SALT negotiations in this spirit. I sincerely believe th at the Treaty th at is now 

before the United States Senate serves the security inte rest of the nations and 

peoples of our Alliance. At the same time, this Treaty is a true expression of 

of Western determination to contribute to restraining weapons systems, th at, if 

used, could destroy civilisation itself.

Ch air ma n Zablock i. Again, I wan t to th an k you gen tlem en for 

coming.

Mr. de Vries has referred to the NA TO conference. NATO in the 

1980’s was discussed in Brussels in the las t week of Augus t. It was, I 

thi nk , very productive. How ever, we d id no t come to any conclusions. 

We nor ma lly do no t at those type of conferences, bu t I do believe 

it did give us an op po rtu nity to air our views and tr y to resolve our 

differences and try to coo rdinate our f uture efforts.

ROLE OF NATO COUNTRIES IN SALT

This brin gs me to the underlying thou gh t I belie ve all four of you 

have touched upo n, and th at is the role th at Eu ropean countries, 

pa rti cu larly NA TO alliance countri es, have pla yed or should pla y in
27

future negotiations on SALT, particularly SALT I II, which is of the 

greatest concern to European nations.

True, not everyone is satisfied, certainly I am not, with SALT II 

to the point tha t we could say there are no problems and tha t it is 

the most perfectly negotiated treaty. Nevertheless, it does set ceilings 

and it has demonstrated progress, and we hope tha t SALT II I will 

follow, the negotiations and preparations for which are already under 

way.

Some have questioned whether there was consultation. Mr. de 

Vries in his prepared statement says “Europeans are intimately 

familiar with the terms of the treaty .” I might say probably more so 

than some of the Americans.

Mr. de Vries. I didn’t suggest tha t at all, sir. [Laughter.}

Chairman Zablocki. No, you didn’t say that. That is my aside 

that I am adding. You also said: “And the degree of coordination and 

consultation has been extraordinary and unprecedented.”

U .S . CO NSU LT ATIO N W IT H NATO ON SA LT

On the other hand, Mr. Corterier has said that in the future, 

consultation should have to include the elaboration of negotiating 

positions. By tha t do you imply, perhaps, tha t there has not been a 

sufficient amount of consultation during the process of negotiation?

Could you advise us, and the others as well, as to how this can be 

corrected? You do mention the special group. Have you any other 

ideas to what extent—since I might say we as Members of Congress 

are not always consulted by our executive branch as to the process 

of the negotiations.

I do hope tha t our European allies will be fully informed as the 

process continues. I am sure you will all agree that the two major 

powers cannot resolve the problems tha t European nations will face 

or the world will face in disarmament.

Mr. C orterier. Mr. Chairman, I didn’t want to suggest that there 

wasn’t adequate consultation during SALT II. Maybe at the beginning 

it wasn’t as good as i t could have been, but I think both sides had to 

learn. When SALT II started, I think there was a great lack of information on the part of the Europeans. They hadn’t had a chance to 

study the issue enough. So I think in the consultations at the beginning 

they didn’t come up with very much in terms of views and suggestions 

for the negotiations.

But as 1 see it, this improved during the negotiations. And later on, 

of course, the Europeans were able to influence the Americans to a 

considerable extent, namely in what concerns the protocol and article 

XII of the treaty, where, of course, the interests of the Europeans 

were strongly concerned.

But now in SALT I II I think we have a different situation. I think 

you will have two major areas of negotiations there. One is the task to 

get more cuts in central strategic systems. And I think we all hope, of 

course, tha t they will be very deep.

Second, you have a second area where you will, hopefully, deal with 

the long-range theater systems in Europe. Now, as far as th at second 

area is concerned, it is obvious tha t the European interests are concerned very, very strongly indeed, much more than they ever 

were in SALT II.
28

So I think in order to be able to negotiate in th at area, the Americans will need very, very close consultation and cooperation with the Euro­ peans, and something, I think, tha t goes beyond what we have had in SALT II. There, I think, it is really necessary to work out negotiating 

positions in common. And I am only talking about the second area. I am not talking about the central system. I am talking about the second area where really European interests are a t stake. I think we have to think of new ma­ chinery, and this special group, I think, may be a good example of what we should do if we could maintain that special group. So far it is only the task to write up a report, and then it will be phased out again after the December NATO meeting. If we could maintain tha t and even expand it, I think it would be a good idea. I was pleasantly surprised yesterday in our talks in the State Department that they seemed to think along the same lines.

Chairman Zablocki. I am sure tha t it is the intent of our government to work as closely as possible with our European allies.

SENATE RATIFICATIO N OF SALT

While my Codel was in Europe last month we attended the UNCSTD meeting in Vienna and visited Spain, Portugal, and Yugo­ slavia and then ended up in Brussels in the NATO conference. The prime question of our European counterparts was what will be the outcome of SALT II in the Senate insofar as ratification? And that, of course, was prior to the revealing of the Soviet combat troops 

in Cuba. It is definitely our Government’s position that there is no linkage between SALT II and th at situation in Cuba. They are separate issues. On the other hand, there will be indirect consequences because some of the Senators who were not sure how they were going to vote are taking this particular issue in Cuba as an excuse for not voting for 

SALT. And those who are opposed to SALT II and have already so an­ nounced will be further fortified in their position in opposition. And yet we should remember as far as the Cuban military force is concerned that it has been there since 1962. Admittedly, however maybe the mission of their presence has changed, and that is our concern. If they are trainees, we didn’t raise the issue in the missile crisis. We didn’t raise the issue then and subsequently there was no agreement on 

personnel, just on equipment. It may have been a shortcoming of the United States at tha t time that we did not include personnel. But I am confident, after this issue is resolved and I am sure both sides are going to try to find a way to 

do it, tha t SALT II will be ratified. But I would have to amend my prognostication as to when it would be. It will not happen at the end of this year; or rather more likely 

early next year. But again I want to reassure you gentlemen t ha t there is no intentional linkage.

U.S. COMMITMENT TO NATO

Mr. Chairman, I have just one further question. At both conferences, whether it involved a discussion of science and technology transfers or the future of NATO the security of Europe was a major issue and
29

there were questions as to the United State s’ commitment to NATO.

We tried to reassure our European friends tha t the credibility of 

Americans to make commitments is real and tha t there should be no 

question about it. Nevertheless, some did argue that there is a need 

for the United States to reassure NATO allies of the credibility of 

America’s NATO commitments.

How do you gentlemen react to that?

Mr. Thyness. Well, Mr. Chairman, if I may be allowed to answer 

that in the first instance, I would say tha t 1 hear of this need for 

reassuring Europeans much more often on this side of the Atlantic 

than I do in Europe. [Laughter.]

Chairman Zablocki. That is typical.

Mr. Thyness. Of course it is a vital question, b ut in my country it 

is very rarely asked. We are perfectly confident that the Americans 

take our alliance deadly seriously and tha t we can trus t t ha t they will 

live up to their commitments to us, as I hope we are going to live up 

to our commitments to the alliance, too.

So sometimes I am a little b it surprised by meeting this question on 

this side of the Atlantic. But as a Norwegian Member of Parliam ent 

who has been dabbling in foreign affairs for a long time, I would like to 

say t ha t this, at least in Norway, is absolutely no question.

Chairman Zablocki. Without identifying the countries, we visited 

nonalined as well as allied countries during this trip, and we did 

receive such concern. I am very happy it is not in your country.

Mr. Thyness. It is such a central question, really, that I accept 

the fact tha t it is necessary from time to time to reiterate and repeat 

the obvious. That is part of the political game and we will never get 

away from that. But in Norway we do n ot feel any doubt about the 

Americans’ intentions.

Mr. Wall. Could I repeat tha t, Mr. Chairman. As far as my country 

is concerned there are no doubts whatsoever and there never have 

been, if I may say so.

As a kind of sideline on this, I think two issues would help this. I 

mentioned them. As long as it is quite clear tha t your allies will receive 

the technology that is needed on new weapons systems and that there 

are weapons in Europe that can hit Russia if Russia hits us with the 

SS-20, 1 think that would be an added reassurance.

I don’t think any reassurance is necessaiy, but if you get my 

meaning, it would help to confirm the reassurance.

Chairman Zablocki. That is a very difficult problem to resolve.

[Mr. Wall nods affirmatively.]

Mr. Corterier. I agree with my colleagues, Mr. Chairman, tha t 

Europeans believe in the American guarantee, although if there should 

be too many Americans traveling to Europe and telling Europeans 

they shouldn’t believe in t hat guarantee any more, I think that might 

hurt us in the long run. [Laughter.]

Therefore, I am not sure if Mr. Kissinger was very well advised to 

raise these doubts at this very moment and at a time when, as I have 

said before, these very important but also difficult decisions tha t 

NATO has got to make in December are being debated and discussed 

in Europe.

So I don’t think we want tha t kind of debate right now. We should 

concentrate on the tasks t hat lie ahead, and I am confident tha t we will 

be able to solve them together.
30

Mr. de Vries . I to tally agre e wi th Dr . Corter ier. W ha t Dr . Kissing er did in Brussels was really not th e message t hat we ne eded a t t hat 

juncture. I have Dr. Kis singer ’s speech here, and wh at he said was 

“A nd th erefore, I would say, whi ch I migh t n ot say in office”—th at is 

qu ite a curious dis tinction—“t hat Eu rope an allies should no t keep 

asking us to multip ly str ate gic assurances th at we cann ot possibly 

me an or, if we do mean, we s hould n ot w an t to exe cute.” I me an th at 

is a message th at is real ly so co ntrary to every thi ng t h at the adm inis ­

tra tio ns hav e be en saying and w ha t we have be en hear ing here t hat it is 

bound to puzzle a lot of p eop le’s mind s as to wha t thi s could possibly 

mean.

I agree w ith my colleag ues; I do no t th in k Eu rope does no t belie ve 

in Am erican guara nte es to com e to i ts defense w ith all the means that 

mi gh t be necessary and mi gh t have to be considered. But I feel th at 

wha t Dr . Kissing er said might no t only be an ina ccura te des cription 

bu t th at it mi gh t undermine the fa ith we have in su ch re assurance s and 

might lead our adv ersaries to th in k th at possibilities exis t whi ch are 

not real.

And I think to create th at kind of possib le mi sunders tan din g could 

be very dangero us.

Ch air ma n Zablock i. W ell, I cann ot speak for Dr. Kissin ger but I 

would sus pec t th at if he ha d an oppo rtu nity t o give th at speech again, 

he would modify it.

Tha nk you, Mr. Chairma n.

Z\lr. H amilton. Tha nk y ou, Mr. Ch air man.

I mus t say th at I am impressed by the fact th at although we ha ve 

a con servative from Norway and a con servative from Gr eat Br ita in, 

a Social Democrat from Germ any and a Labour Pa rt y man fro m Holland, 

th at every thing seems to be sweetness, light, and un ity in the alliance, 

[Lau ghter.]

TNF AND ARMS CONTROL

I am imp ressed by the fact th at you have all ind ica ted you r acc ept ­

ance of SALT II . You have all indicated a rejection of an y linkag e; 

and three of you , at lea st, have sup ported wh at I think you call, Mr. 

Corter ier, a “p arallel ap pro ach” wi th reg ard to the th ea ter nucle ar 

force mo der niz ation an d SAL T III and othe r arm s con trol efforts.

Mr. de Vries, I am no t sure ab ou t yo ur position on th at po int and 

I w ould like to ask yo u specifically: Did I un de rst an d you to in a way 

reject a paralle l appro ach wi th reg ard to those two matters?

Mr. de V ries. Well, sir, as I said, it is impossible for me to make 

up my mind as long as my Go vernm ent has no t made up its mind. 

The position of our co un try has been regard ed as being ra th er importa n t since the Germans chose to involve us, for reason s which we 

appre cia te, and we hope th at they wou ld do th at mo re ofte n. 

[Laughter.]

But I do n’t th in k th at wha t we wan t is, if the re is a con cept of 

nonsing ulari ty on the pa rt of the Ger mans, to have some kind of 

co ncept to replace th at of s ing ula rity of Hollan d.

I think th at wha t our co untry is try ing to do is try ing to solve, in 

consult ati on s wi th other allies, how thi s prob lem has to be tac kle d. 

An d as I in dic ate d, in H olland th is is a ve ry difficult issue to deal with.
31

Bu t I think th at the question th at our Go vernm ent has to face in 

Pa rliam ent, and since our Pa rli am en t is ra th er resp onsive to moo ds 

of the country , is wha t moo ds we will have to respond to in the 

cou ntry. It is going to be very difficult to find a w ay to solve this prob ­

lem in a way th at will be agre eable to all allies.

That is the goal, however. I think we mus t rea ch as mu ch un ity as 

we can get on the app roach, and I think th at the two mod els whi ch 

are under con sideration at the mo me nt, eit he r the paralle l appro ach 

th at Mr. Corterier adv oca ted , and ma ybe an appro ach th at would 

give preference to an arm s control negotia tio n to establish th at it is 

possible or is no t possible to ge t the co ns tra int we all wan t from the 

Russian side.

IMPACT OF SALT REJECT ION BY SENATE

Mr. H amilton. Suppose you do n’t get rat ific ation of SALT II by 

the U.S. Senate this yea r. W ha t im pa ct is th at going to have on the 

decisions on thea ter nuclear force mo dernizatio n?

Mr. de V ries . I think it is going to make it very difficult. All the 

parties at thi s tab le have ind ica ted an interest in havin g thi s parallel 

app roach. There mi gh t be, like I ind ica ted , some minor differences on 

th at sub jec t, even, bu t I think with ou t a credible arm s con trol approach, it would be very difficult. And I don’t see how the alliance 

could possibly pursue a credible arm s control app roa ch in the con tex t 

of SALT III as long as the stat us of SALT I I has no t bee n clarified.

Mr. H amilton. I won der if each of you would com me nt quickl y 

on wh at you think the im pact would be in Eu rope in the event of a 

rejection of SALT II in the U.S. Sen ate.

Mr. T hyn ess. Well, sir, it is no t an easy quest ion to answer 

because I don’t think anyone in Eu rope has seriously en terta ined the 

notion th at the SAL T II Tre at y would be reject ed. But if th at should 

hap pen , I foresee grave con sequ ences for the alliance in many fields, and 

they will probably also reflect on this pa rti cu lar quest ion of th ea te r 

nuc lear mo dernizatio n.

I th ink mo st people in Eu rope a re willing to go along with a rea son ­

able increase in defense exp enditure and o ther measures t h at migh t be 

necessarv, but I do feel very strongly th at they wa nt to see their 

leaders do every thing possible to reduce the nec essity for increasing 

arm am ents and nucle ar arse nals .

GRAVE CONSEQUENCES OF REJEC TIO N

Mr. H amilton. W ha t do you mean, “grav e consequ ences” ? T hat 

sounds like our St ate Dep ar tm en t talkin g, Mr. Thy ness. I don’t 

know w ha t “grav e consequences” mea ns, and ne ith er do the people in 

India na , my S tate. W ha t do you me an b y “g rave conseque nces ” if it 

is r ejected?

Mr. T hynes s. Well, I have g one into thi s in my w rit ten sta temen t 

to a certa in exte nt, and perha ps i t would be a good th ing to refe r ba ck 

to th at and rea d to you a few sen tences here.

I think th at if the SALT II Tre at y which ha s been nego tia ted by 

the American Gover nment , several governments, in fac t, is rej ected
32

by the Sen ate, I think th at is a so rt of position th at fore igners will 

hav e difficulties in under standing .

We are accustomed, all of us, to look upo n the responsible spokesmen of a cou ntry as speaking for that cou ntry. That means Pr esiden ts, 

Prime Ministers, and Secreta ries of State. And the i nte rnal political 

processes of other cou ntri es are always difficult to judge.

So I t hink t hat people will n ot u nd ersta nd w ha t is behind the re jection . Th ey will make up exp lan ations which would p robably be ra th er 

ungenerous, perha ps hostile, perha ps acc usa tory. I see the spe cter of 

the m ilitary in dustrial complex being raised again, and I a m quite sure 

th at our adversarie s will add fuel to th at fire.

I think we will hav e a sit ua tio n in which people are genuine ly in 

do ub t ab ou t the aims and the goals of the alliance, and th at would 

certainl y no t create a clim ate in which people are willing to go along 

with nucle ar or con ven tion al arm am ents.

So I think we will be facing a grave pub lic relations problem in 

Eu rope which will reflect on the concrete, specific que stio ns th at are 

facing the alliance now.

Mr. H amilton. And on U.S. leaders hip.

Mr. T hyn ess. And on U.S. lead ership. Tha t, of course, is a very 

im po rta nt thin g. If I may add from a slig htly differen t angle, I think 

th at it is impo rta nt to realize th at the Un ited State s has always been 

and will always con tinu e to be the rea l cem ent in the NA TO alliance. 

No rway will feel a very mo dest responsibility for wh at is happeni ng 

in Tu rkey, Greece, Po rtu ga l if the Un ited State s is no t the re to bind 

it all tog ether. And I sus pec t th at the same goes for mo st other countrie s in the alliance.

M r. de Vri es . I think th at Am eric an leaders hip is really the thi ng 

th at will dominat e all the discussions. If SAL T is conc erned with our 

vi tal i nterest a nd it w ould t ur n ou t to be impossible t hat th e top levels 

of the Am eric an Go vernm ent could agree on the per spe ctiv e of wh at 

the vital int ere sts of the Un ite d State s are and wh at the allia nce’s 

are. I think t hat would be deva sta tin g to the l eadersh ip p osition of t he 

Un ited Sta tes.

I t might cre ate so man y que stio ns in NATO ab ou t the relation 

between the twin pillars of NATO, d ete nte , and defense; might cre ate 

que stio ns ab ou t the cre dib ility of West ern deter mi natio n to help 

constra in the arm s race in nucle ar weapons; would expose the West 

to all kin ds of prop aganda from all sides; and would undermine all 

possibilities, however lim ited they mi gh t be, for a non pro life ration 

tre aty.

I think it would rais e a grea t man y issues which would be very 

difficult to cope wi th and certainly would almost, to my mind, be 

disastrous.

Mr. Corterie r. I agree wi th eve rythin g th at h as been said by m y 

colleagues so far. I too believe th e imp act would be extrem ely neg ative. 

I believe the re would be a f ear ab ou t Ea st- West relations as a whole. 

I think these relations have focused very m uch in the pa st few yea rs 

on the SAL T negotiations. And if SALT fails, I think people would 

feel th at all the res ult s we have so far ou t of deten te would be in 

jeo pardy .
I think there would be pa rti cu lar conc ern in Germany , as I have 

alr ead y said, with our concern for Berlin, with our concern for our 

people in Ea st Germany , and their fate , of course, has been alleviated 

to a considerable degree as a res ult of deten te.

And there would be concern, I think, also on the par t of man y 

Ea ste rn Eu rop ean s who have had very clear gain s ou t of de tente. In 

addition to th at , as has alwa ys been said, I think the re would be a 

general fear th at no aim s control resu lts could be had any mo re in the 

ne xt few yea rs, no t only in the SALT area bu t also in the othe r areas.

We have alread y touched upo n SALT II I, and I think it is obvious 

you cannot have SALT III if SALT II fails. But the re are othe r 

neg otiatio ns, too, th at should be me ntioned in th at conte xt, ou r 

negotiations in Vien na, and I ca nn ot see the Russians agre eing to 

anyth ing the re aft er SALT II has no t been rati fied .

I think we should also think of the CSC E, the conference in M adrid . 

I think the re is now a very clear pos sibility th at CS CE shou ld move 

more into th e are a of a im s control, ma inly a s fa r as con fidence-building 

measures in Europ e go.

And I think th at , again , this would no t be possible to tac kle after 

a failure of a SALT II tre aty.

Mr. Wall. Of course, Mr. Ch airma n, one mus t give you an off-thecuff reply to a very im po rta nt question. B ut my own im pression is th at 

the effect on B rit ain would be no thi ng like as dire as has been expressed 

by m y colleagues for co ntinen tal Europ e.

Na turally , we would regret it. I t would make SAL T III obviously 

impossible , which we all hoped would follow up, and is, as a m at te r of 

fact, of mo re concern to my own c ou ntr y because we are also a nu cle ar 

power, as is Franc e.

But I do n’t think i t would hav e an yth ing like the im pact on public 

opin ion in Brit ain as it would have in c ontinental Eu rop e.

On the specific issue about which thi s que stio n arose, I would like 

to say again th at we do believe th at the long -range thea ter nuclear, 

or the th re at of th ea te r nuc lear force, prob lem, pa rticularly the longran ge issue in it, is of vital importance , and we believe th at th at 

should be settled as soon as possible.

Unle ss th at is settle d as soon as possible, we do n’t believe NATO 

would hav e the leverage again st the Soviet Union to allow us to 

negotiate SAL T II I on a reas ona ble basis, so we think it should come 

first and the n SAL T II I.

So as I si y, on the bro ad question, if we do n’t get SAL T II , we 

do n’t get SAL T II I.

Mr. H amilton. Mr. Win n.

Mr. Win n. Th an k you , Mr. Chairma n.

I wa nt to tell you, gen telm en, how mu ch I h ave enjoyed y ou r testimo ny here tod ay. And as parliam entarian s, I wan t to congrat ula te 

you on your b riefness in yo ur o pening sta teme nts . We are no t usu ally 

privileged to th at f rom ma ny of our witnesses.

I was going to ask the same general typ es of que stio ns as the two 

cha irm en hav e asked . You are str ong’y in agreem ent th at we o" gh t 

to go along with SAL T II , and you are eagerly looking forw ard to 

SALT I II . And I sort of re ad in between the lines th at yo u th in k th at 

SALT is going to provide all the answ ers.
34

M B FR N E G O TIA T IO N S

As for M BFR and the wa y the negotiations hav e been stalling 

aro und for 7 yea rs, I ju st w ond ered if you were satisfied with the w ay 

the negotiations were proceeding and why do you think th at SAL T 

III is going to be the answ er whe n M BFR is sta nding in concrete?

Mr. T hynes s. Well, I sha re yo ur conc ern, sir, wi th the lack of 

prog ress in the M BFR negotiations. As a m at te r of fact, I think this 

has been one of the real dis appoint me nts in the whole process of 

Ea st- W est dialog th at h as tak en place.

But I would like to rese rve myself again st yo ur statem en t th at we 

think th at SALT III will solve all of the problems.

Mr. Win n. I was readin g between the lines, bu t it sou nde d kind 

of like th at .

Mr. T hyn ess. Well, let me fill ou t wha t should be between the 

lines in my opinion. Tha t is th at SALT III might conceiv ably bring 

us a step forw ard. But neith er you , sir, no r I will live long enough 

to see all of the prob lems between the Eas t and West solved.

That is no t to say th at we should no t proceed. And th at is no t to 

say th at wh at we might achieve in a SALT III process will no t be 

of immense importance to us all. I do believe there is a good chance 

of achieving res ult s in a SALT III process th at would be ve ry mu ch 

worth having.

Mr. Corterie r. I agree SALT III will certainl y no t give us all of 

the answers, bu t I believe it is ve ry im po rtan t to get into it as fast 

as we can because I think the re is a v ery real dan ger t hat after SALT 

IT, the arm s rac e mi gh t mov e int o th at area. As long as we leave it 

wi tho ut an y agree me nt or wi thou t an y neg otia tion s, of course the 

Rus sians are free to do wh ate ver they like and th at gap could widen 

even more.

So I think we have an interest to st art the m as quickl y as possible 

to tr y t o get some answers ou t of them.

As far as M BFR is concerned, I agree with you th at thes e nego ­

tia tio ns have been extrem ely slow. I agree th at the Russia ns should 

have been more forthco min g. B ut I do no t think it would be fair to 

say th at the re has b een no mo vem ent at all and th at the re have b een 

no res ults at all so far.

I think the re have been some conside rable mo vem ents alre ady . Fo r 

instan ce, the Russians at the beginning of these talks insisted th at 

their superio rity in Europ e in con ven tion al weap ons and in soldiers 

was a good thing because thi s ha d preserved peace since the Second 

World War.

In the me ant ime th ey h ave ha d to give up th at position and they 

have agreed to pa rity in M BFR as th ey have in SALT II . So they 

ju st could no t avoid the im pact of th at pa rity arg um ent in M BF R.

In addit ion to th at , I think they have realized in the meant ime 

th at they will no t get natio nal subceilings, as they have always asked 

to, and in th at res pec t get a droit de regard in alliance matters. I 

think they hav e pre tty mu ch come aro und to accepting a comm on 

ceiling, as we wa nt the m to.

Of course, the re are still the im po rta nt da ta questions and oth er 

questio ns th at are still involved. But I have alwa ys felt th at it w ould 

be difficult to see a situatio n where a majo r bre akthr ough in M BFR 

would be possible before a successful conclusion of SALT.
35

I think these two negotiations have really been more or less tied 

together, and I think we will have to wait for ratification of SALT II 

to get a first agreement in M BFR. B ut I think th at agreement is possible and it should be possible quite soon after ratification of SALT.

Mr. Winn. If the Soviets said they were going to wait and there 

would be no agreement before SALT I I, what makes you think tha t 

they will not wait so tha t there will be no agreement before SALT III?

Mr. Corterier. Do you mean in MBFR?

Mr. Winn. Right.

Mr. Corterier. Well, I think tha t it is a matter of the results we 

have gotten so far. I think it would be difficult for them, after having 

achieved agreement or at least having come close to agreement in 

some important areas which I have tried to outline, to say tha t we 

now would have to wait another 3 or 4 years, because tha t is the 

minim um you will need for SALT III, in order to have a first agreement. I think that would be very difficult to argue.

So I think it is clear that even if the oustanding issues are still difficult, they could be handled within another half-year or a year and a 

first agreement would be possible.

Mr. Winn. You are more optimistic than I about MBFR.

Mr. Wall.

Mr. Wall. I think the direct answer to your question is a Churchillian phrase tha t jaw-jaw is better than war-war. Personally, I have 

considerable doubts as to the possible success of either detente or 

SALT III or CSCE or MBFR, but th at doesn’t mean we should stop 

trying. . . . , . I believe the Russians use all these organizations for their own 

benefit, trying to twist them their own way, and I believe the only 

possible future success of these negotiations is if we negotiate from 

strength. That means both military strength and political strength.

I believe tha t individually and collectively, we haven’t deployed 

much of th at strength in the past decade, particularly politically, and 

the Russians have been allowed to get away with far too much.

Mr. de Vries. Sir, if I might add a little comment, I don’t think 

that the MBFR process has not provided us with great results so far. 

1 think when it started, the two sides were so far apart in terms of the 

effect of conventional forces, in terms of what their ideas were about 

the other’s forces, th at we really have seen a tremendous convergence 

in thinking on these issues.

And since more or less the principal issues or the issues in principle 

have been solved by the Soviets agreeing to parity on a conventional 

level in Europe also, which for them, having had traditionally large 

conventional superiority, of course is really a big step, I think we are 

approaching a state in which we might expect the remaining issues can 

be resolved.

One of these issues, of course, is the gap between our estimates of 

their forces and their own data, about 150,000 troops. I think tha t 

with some determined bargaining, we should be able to solve that 

problem also.

But I think the Soviets want to be sure that at the central strategic 

level, they know what is going to happen in the coming years in order 

to be able to strike a bargain in an area where they traditionally have 

had quite a preponderance over the Western forces.
36

Mr. T hyness. M ay I be allowed to add one sentence to wh at I said! 

form erly, aft er my colleagues have spoken? I do no t think we should 

construct too ma ny excuses for the lack of prog ress in the M BFR 

neg otia tion s. When the y sta rte d, there was no que stio n of linkage. 

And the n sudden ly, prog ress in M BFR was link ed to progress in the 

CSC E. And when th at was concluded and there was no prog ress in 

M BF R, it was linked to SAL T II . And now we are s tartin g to link it 

to SAL T II I.

I thi nk actua lly we should look at it as a separate piece of negoti ation and conclude th at so far it has not lived up to its exp ectatio ns. 

Hopefully, it will do so in the fut ure. Bu t I do no t think th at SALT 

II I will necessarily mean a breakthrou gh in M BFR .

RELATIONSHIP OF SPAIN AND FRANCE TO NATO

Mr. Win n. I would like to see if we can get some quick answ ers 

on several questio ns because the o ther gen tlem en are waitin g for t heir 

lime. I wonder how do you assess, briefly, the attit ud es and moo ds in 

Spain on join ing NATO, and do you believe th at France will eve r 

rejo in NAT O?

Mr. de Vries . I think th at we ought to leave th at decision up to 

Spain itself. Spain has not mad e up its m ind. It has other pref eren ces 

and I think th at their politica l decisionmakers shou ld be allowed to, 

find out, when it is tim e to eventua lly apply for membership, if they 

wa nt to.

Mr. Win n. H ow abo ut Fra nce?

Mr. de Vries . Fra nce , as far as I can see, is no t inclined to come ­

back into the militar y str uctur e. It wa nts to maintain its own military force outside NA TO, as far as I can see.

Mr. Corterie r. I agree with th at , although it is a sad sta temen t 

to make because it is still a very bad set back for the alliance th at 

France is n ot fully int egrated.

As far as Spain goes, I would suggest th at we should concentrat eourse lves at the pres ent time on Spanish membership in the EC . Th is 

is v ery im po rta nt to them. They are all agreed on th at . All the majo r 

political partie s wan t to get Spain into the EC , and the EC, aft er all, 

is a We stern organization. As soon as they are in there, they can no 

long er say th at the y are neutr al in any way or nonalin ed, as some 

have suggested some time ago.

And 1 thi nk aft er th at , the y should pro bably be pre pared to consider membersh ip in NATO, too. Th e majo r difficulty rig ht now is 

th at in the Socialist Pa rtv , there is still a majority aga inst joining 

NATO.

As a Germa n Social Demo crat, I and some of m y colleagues hav e a 

dialog with our friends in Spain. We inv ite them to come in. But I 

think it will tak e time. We should not press them too much on that.. 

We should give the m time.

Mr. Wall. I thi nk it is vita lly im po rta nt th at Spain does come into 

NATO. As Mr. Corterier has said, the Go vernm ent pa rty wants to or 

app ear s to wa nt to, and the opposition Socialist Pa rty does no t. I 

believe we should enco urage them in every way to. coipe int o NATObu t no t to pressure them .
f

37

As I un derst and from colleagues in Spain, there is a considerable 

Russian propaganda effort in Madrid to pre vent thi s from h app ening. 

Cle arly , it would be very advanta geous as Spain run s across the 

NA TO lines of comm unication. The refo re, I think every effort should 

be made to encourage the m to get i nto NATO.

W ith regard to Fra nce , our NAA Sub com mittee m et rep res entative s 

of the French parties about, wh at, 6 mo nth s ago? And na turally we 

brought this up. And I am sor ry to say th at all the parties , from the 

extreme rig ht to the Comm unists, said not a chance of coming 

into a military org anization, although, of course, the re is increasing 

•cooperation.

As you know, sir, the re is c onsiderable coo peratio n from the F rench 

Na vy and quite reas onable coo peratio n from the oth er two services. 

So I think we m ust accept the m n ot coming back. But one hopes th at 

coo peratio n will increase.

Mr. T hyness. Well, on the que stio n of Spain, I would like to say 

th at I think it is imp ortan t, if and whe n Spain decides to join NATO, 

th at thi s is a decision th at has bro ad political su pp ort in Spain. It 

sho uld no t be a one-p arty, even tho ugh a majority -party, decision.

So I think the bes t course is p robably to let Spain know th at w heneve r they wan t to join NATO, they would be welcome, bu t no t to 

pu t any pressure on the m.

As to Fra nce , I think the French position on NATO is of such long 

sta nd ing now th at i t would be difficult for any governm ent to chan ge 

it. Bu t 1 do believe the re is a m ovem ent w ith in France tow ard g rea ter 

practical coop eration. B ut I think it has been so firmly establis hed t hat 

it would be difficult to change it.

Mr. H amilton. Mr. Pease.

Mr. P ease. Th an k you, Mr. Chairma n.

GAP IN T H E A T E R N U C LE A R AN D CO N V EN TIO N A L W EA PO N S

I, too, would like to welcome o ur dist inguish ed guests and comm end 

th em on excellent prese nta tions this mornin g. Th is has been an extre me ly useful session, from our point of view.

I h ave a numb er of q uestion s a nd, pe rha ps, comments. I was pleased , 

Mr. Corterier, to hear you make reference to the desire to spread the 

deplo ym ent of weapons bey ond the borde rs of West Germany . H av ­

ing ju st spen t 2 weeks in Ea ster n Eu rope durin g Augus t, I can 

assure you th at the east Eu rope ans are concern ed ab ou t Ge rm any 

beco ming too stro ng.

Let me pose a general que stio n. You h ave talked a lo t this mo rning 

ab ou t the gap in th ea ter nucle ar wea pons and con ven tional weapons 

in Europ e. I recall in the last couple of decades t hat the Un ited States 

spe nt a great de al of m one y wh en we were told th at th ere was a bom ber 

gap , and the re was some q uestion ab ou t wh eth er the re was. And then 

we spent a great deal of m one y whe n we were told the re was a missile 

gap, and there is some que stio n ab ou t wh eth er the re was.

Are you tho rou ghly conv inced th at the re really is now a gap th at 

requires an unusu al response from West ern Eu rop e and the Un ited 

Sta tes?
38

Mr. Thyness. Yes, sir; I am firmly convinced and I think there is 

quite solid evidence tha t there is, in fact, a gap. If you compare a 

model of the Backfire bomber to a model of the nearest thing we have 

in the West, the F - l l l , it looks like mother and child.

And the SS-20 is a weapon which we have nothing comparable to. 

So I think in fact there is a gap and it is quite easy to demonstrate 

tha t.

Mr. Wall. Yes. The problem is the SS-20 can fire on Europe from 

inside the Soviet Union, way inside, and we have nothing to counter 

it except aircraft. And if you send aircraft in, they will be shot out of 

the sky. In any case, the missile is mobile and an aircraft isn’t the 

right answer.

I am not saying that NATO should have an equal number of equally 

long-range missiles to counter the SS-20. That is obviously nonsense. 

But I would like to see that NATO had the power to hit the Soviet 

Union with a long-range missile if they started hittin g us with the 

SS-20.

In other words, not as a direct counter. The Pershing a t the moment 

is about the only one, and tha t has what, a range of about 470 miles. 

That is nothing to compare to the SS-20, which is estimated at anything between 2,000 and 3,000 miles.

Therefore I do believe there is this gap, and it could well be filled 

by the stretched Pershing and other cruise missiles.

Mr. Corterier. There has been a gap in the long-range theater 

nuclear weapons for a number of years because even before the SS-20, 

the Russians had the SS-4 and the SS-5 and we had no similar 

systems in Western Europe.

But at the time, we could live with that gap because there was a 

massive superiority of the United States in strategic nuclear weapons 

and warheads and everything. So it was easy to fill the gap in that way*

But now, as we are about to ratify strategic parity in the SALT II 

Treaty, I think we have another situation and we can no longer live 

with tha t gap. Of course, it has been compounded also by the fact 

th at the SS-20 is a much more dangerous system than these older 

systems were.

So I think we really have to do something about it.

Mr. de Vries. Might I, in the event that you think we agree on 

everything, say tha t I have a little difficulty in addressing this gap 

perception problem. In the discussions which people have on these 

subjects, they talk in terms of perceptions and perceptions of what 

the other might perceive t hat we believe that he believes about our 

perceptions. Those discussions become intellectually very difficult.

I think tha t the basic question really is not do we have similar 

systems or can we counter the SS-20, because the SS-20 is a system 

which is almost impossible to counter, b ut can we address the Soviet 

thre at on significant levels of escalation with the nuclear inventory 

that is available on our sides.

Of course, over the years we have been doing th at in NATO with a 

great number of systems. There are about 500 tactical aircraft capable 

of reaching Soviet territory. We had Poseidons integrated into the 

strike plan for theater missions. We have had the F - l l l ’s in Europe 

for a long time, whose presence was amplified a couDle of years ago in 

England, with two more squadrons. So there has been always a means 

to address the threat from th at side.
39

The perception of what is credible and what is not credible to the 

Soviet mind, of course, is one which could puzzle us for a long time. I 

don’t know whether it is really very helpful to argue this case in terms 

of similarity or countering SS-20’s. I think we ought to be sure that 

we can do what we might need to do. I am not sure th at we need new 

systems for that.

I think tha t the Poseidons, especially when they would be equipped 

with new missiles, which your Government is intending to do, might be 

accurate enough and credible enough to the Russians to prevent them 

from thinking tha t they could exploit anything in political terms or 

military terms in Europe.

Mr. P ease. I appreciate th at divergence of opinion within the panel. 

What I have a hard time understanding is the reasoning. Apparently, 

I gather, the reasoning is tha t the Soviets can use the SS-20 from 

Russian territory and wipe out the cities of Europe without the United 

States getting involved with the strategic weapons which would wipe 

out the Russians.

Or conversely, for those who want a modern Western equivalent of 

the SS-20,1 assume the scenario is tha t the Russians wipe out Western 

Europe with the SS-20, and in the meantime Western Europe is 

wiping out Moscow and Leningrad with whatever it has. And in the 

meantime, the United States and the Soviet Union are saying, well, 

that will just be where the fight is, we won’t get involved.

I find both of those scenarios really stretching credibility. Is there a 

different scenario or do you accept and see some credibility to one of 

those?

Mr. Wall. Could I put it this way? The Russians have got a socalled tactical weapon to which we have only a strategic counter, and 

that strategic counter at the moment is your strategic forces. Therefore, you are going to escalate straightaway. If we have a tactical 

counter to their tactical missile, then our defense is much more 

credible and your own strategic forces are not directly involved.

It is not a question of whether we believe you won’t use them; it is 

a question of what the Russians believe.

DI ST IN CT IO N AMONG TACTICA L, TH EA TE R, AND ST RA TE GIC FO RC ES

Mr. Pease. Do you make a distinction among tactical forces, 

theater forces, and strategic forces?

Mr. Wall. Well, certainly SALT II does.

Mr. Pease. Well, if we are talking about battlefield weapons, the 

neutron bomb and things of th at sort, I can understand that. But I 

cannot understand what the difference is between a theater nuclear 

missile which, discharged from the Netherlands, will land in Moscow, 

and a strategic weapon which, discharged from the United States, 

will land in Moscow.

Mr. Corterier. Of course, the risk is shared. If you fire that 

weapon from Western Europe, the American President might feel that 

the Russians would not retaliate against the United States b ut against 

Western Europe. Or else, of course, the Russians wouldn’t do that 

but retaliate against the United States.

But the risk is shared in tha t case. I also think we do not think in 

terms of striking cities so much but in terms of striking military targets 

because the SS-20 is so much more accurate than the older systems 

were. Its real role, I think, is going to be counterforce.
40

I h ave heard, be cause you were talkin g a bo ut scenarios, the follow ing 

sce nario: th at t he y would make a con ventional attack , th at we wou ld 

be able to stop th at attack , and then th ey would be tem pted to use t he 

SS-2 0 and these long-ra nge thea ter sys tem s in ord er to get the at ta ck 

going again, and th at they could hope to get away with this type of 

esc alation because the West w ould n ot be able to rep ly in kind .

The only option open to the W est wo uld be to imme dia tely r etaliate 

with the centr al system s. That is one of the scenarios I hav e heard .

Mr. P ease. If you will pardo n me, I really have a difficult tim e 

following th at . If there is a con ventional war th at goes on for some 

period of time, surely the Un ited State s is going to be figh ting side by 

side with Ge rmany, the Ne the rlands, and all the other NA TO 

mem bers.

How would the Russians conceive th at they could then use th ea te r 

nucle ar weapons in Eu rop e w ith out in volving the U.S. strate gic forces?

Mr. de Vries . Sir, one of t he issues at s tak e is the credib ility of the 

U.S. eng agement in a war like th at . And I totally agree with you, I 

cann ot see how one could no t believe th at would be credible.

The dis tinction between tac tic al or th ea te r and str ate gic central 

sys tem s has always puzzled me v ery mu ch because why, in t erm s of the 

rea l s itu ati on —no t in terms of arms c ontrol—b ut w hy wou ld a nu cle ar 

missile launch ed from a sub ma rine be conside red to be centr al and 

som eth ing very special in com parison with a th ea te r sys tem which 

might have the sam e payload?

If you talk ab ou t the SS-20, sir, the se sys tem s are supposed to be 

very selective in strike . But o ne can wonder wh at is selec tive ab ou t a 

weapon t hat has thr ee w arh ead s w ith a 150-kilotons pay loa d. Th e 150 

kilo tons is seven tim es Hir osh ima, and if they star te d using th at in 

Europ e, I can’t see an yth ing of Eu rop e left .

I think it would be ab ou t tim e for them to realize th at in a contingen cy th at would develop, they wou ld have to reckon with to ta l 

de va sta tio n on their p ar t, too. I think if they wou ld s ta rt usin g SS- 20 ’s 

on Europ e, it is ab ou t tim e to think ab ou t hitti ng the Soviet Union 

very hard, too.

Mr. T hyn ess. I am no t foreign to yo ur wa y of thinking , sir, bu t 

nev erth eless, we mus t guard again st pu tti ng too mu ch stre ss on our 

way of thinking and from th at po stu late how the Sov iet Union is 

thinking . If you put the main stress on t he d eterrent va lue of our milita ry forces, then I think we must also at all times address the capa bilities, no t the perceiv ed intentions, bu t the cap abi lities of the Wa rsaw 

Pa ct.

And aft er all, they ha ve n’t poure d billions int o develop ing Eu rostr ate gic sy stems sim ply for t he fun of it. Th ey must ha ve some genera l 

idea in min d th at these forces ma y be useful. Per son ally , I do no t believe it is a he althy stat e of affairs if there is gen eral str ate gic pa rity 

and a va st superio rity on the Wa rsaw Pa ct side, bo th in the th ea te r 

nucle ar field and in the con ven tional field.
41

Mr. P ease. I appre cia te th at and I am searching fo r a good understa nd ing of yo ur reas oning. Le t me if I can, Mr. Ch air ma n, follow 

up with two specific questions:

NAT O DEFE NSE SP EN DI NG

First , NA TO agre ed to tr y to achieve a 3-p erc ent rea l gro wth ra te 

in defense spe nding in each natio n. The Un ite d State s is one coun try 

which h as fallen b ehind so far, alt hough as the price of ratif ying SALT, 

we may m ake it 5 p erc ent r at he r th an 3 percen t.

But t he W arsaw Pa ct imm edi ately met and agreed to increase th eir 

defense spendin g. Does th at me an th at our 3-p ercent increase no 

longer allows us to catch up, to eliminate thi s gap? Will we have to 

have a no the r 3 perc ent o r 5 percent? A h at is to lead us to believe t hat 

the Wa rsaw Pa ct will n ot follow su it in an esc alation of con ven tional 

arms?

Secondly, and tied in with th at , if we tried to modern ize our t he at er 

nucle ar force in West ern E urope to offset the SS—20 and the Backfire 

bom ber, wha t would lead us to believe th at the Soviet Union will 

stan d still and allow th at to happ en wi thou t tak ing addit ion al ste ps 

which will pres erve wh ate ver gap exis ts now?

Mr. Cor terie r. Well, I think we must realize th at th e Ru ssi ans 

have real difficulties in going on raising their military bu dg ets in the 

sam e way they used to in the pa st. I think the re hav e been ma ny 

stud ies, man y also in thi s country , one by the CIA , ind ica tin g th at 

they are no t going to have the sam e economic gro wth ra te over the 

next few y ears th at t hey had in the past, and th at in t hat re spect t he y 

will find it m ore difficult to get high increases in military spe nding in 

the same way s as in the past.

Th en I would like to point ou t the difficulties they have wi th th eir 

allies rig ht now. Ro ma nia has refused to go along with the se defe nse 

increases, and Polan d has nev er pub licly opposed the Sov iets on this, 

but pri vately, if you talk to Poles, y ou can he ar ofte n th at they do n’t 

wan t to go on spendin g more and more.

So I think the Russians hav e a pro blem on th at score.

As far as the question of will they no t build up even more if we 

mod ernize is concerned, I think one has to have in mind—a nd it h as 

been pointed ou t before, I thi nk , by Pa tri ck Wa ll—th at we do no t 

wan t eq ua lity in th at area.

We need it if we get an arm s control agr eem ent because I think 

there should nev er be an agreeme nt where we would no t have pa rity 

wi th the m, bu t I do n’t think we need it milita rily . We do n’t need to 

have e xac tly the same n um ber of system s they have.

W ha t we wan t is a li mited n um ber of sy stems t o be able t o res pond 

in case th at is necessary in ord er to keep enough flexibility for us as 

far as es cala tion goes and in o rder to mak e ou r deterren ce m ore credible. 

B ut we don’t need the same nu mber of sy stems.

So I don’t see the danger as mu ch as you do.

Mrs. F enw ick. Will the gen tlema n yield ?

Mr. P ease. Su rely . I would be ha pp y to yield.
42

MILITARY SPENDING SPIRAL

M rs. F enw ick. Thi s was gone into at len gth in our pan el in Brussels, 

and I think my colleague’s worry is one whi ch concerns every one of 

us: Will we be startin g a spiral in which mili tary spe nding mou nts 

an d mo unts?

B ut the fact is t hat while we were dispiralin g, so to spea k, spending 

prop ortio na tel y less, this caused a m ore rapid acc elerati on in the Ru ssian spen ding. In o ther words, wh at I th in k we are beg inning to lea rn 

is th at bala nce itself is a de terre nt tho ugh we may no t need actua l 

pa rit y.

Dr . Luns was one of the mo st imp ressive speake rs in Brussels. He 

spoke at l ength abou t arm s and money, the disparity in arm s and the 

seriousness of it, because of the per cep tions no t only in Eu rope b ut in 

the Soviet Union. B ut he finally said th at more im po rtan t th an all of 

this, because arms and mo ney can be, in a sense, secondary, are the 

will and courage of the people.

I think wh at Russia real ly wa nts to kno w is w hethe r they are going 

to have a perfec tly easy “pe rce ption vic tory ” throu gh the political effect 

of their m ilitar y mig ht, or wh eth er th ey a re going to m eet the kind of 

resista nce th at says no, enough. I think th at is the de terre nt to war, 

no t acquiescence in w aiting for a nuclea r holoca ust as th e only response.

And this was rea lly one of the g reat ad vanta ges of going to the B russels conference. Dr. Luns was mo st compelling, I tho ug ht, in the final 

speech of the session.

Mr. Wall. I think figures can me an som eth ing or nothing. Af ter 

all, for the last 10 yea rs or so you have been spe nding app rox imately 

5.7 perce nt of yo ur GN P on defense, and the Russians hav e bee n 

spe nding som ething pro bably like 13 or 15, so the re has been an 

imbalanc e over ma ny, man y years.

Insofar as Br ita in is concerned, we are spe nding ab ou t 4.7 of our 

GN P, com pare d, I think , to ab ou t 5 percen t of you rs. We are now 

going to increase th at , so I think the real answer is th at we must 

spe nd as mu ch as we can afford, our economies can afford, and our 

social s ystems can afford. A nd I k now t hat leads to endless arg um ents 

as to how m uch th at should be.

Bu t I think the po int Dr . Corterier made is im po rta nt, and th at is 

th at the Soviet econ omy is on the run down. Th e Soviet ma npo wer 

problems are serious. Th e cohesion of t he U.S.S .R. is n ot w ha t i t was. 

I can p ut it th at way. Th e eight Soviet Muslim re pub lics are going to 

ou tnum be r the Russians in the n ext few yea rs.

All these ind icate to me th at the Soviets will n ot be able to go on a t 

their same am ount of exp end itures on their military unless they are 

prepare d to cu t f ur th er their s tand ard of living, which will raise grea t 

difficulties n ot only in th e satelli tes but i n the U kraine, L ith uania, and 

othe r places.

So I think wh at rea lly m atters is th at it is seen th at the West ern 

allia nce is spendin g enough to no t equ al the Soviets but to cou nte r 

their variou s threa ts, and rea lly as an ind ica tion of our intention to 

stan d up for wh at we b elieve in.

Mr. de Vries . Could I say som ething on th at? I took natio nal 

pri de in your comm ents on D r. L un s’ speech. [Laughter.]

But I do feel th at we should no t confuse ourselves by try ing to 

express the will we have to sta nd u p by thro wing aro und perc entage s.

Mrs. F enw ick. I didn ’t mean to me ntion any.
43

Mr. de Vries. Absolutely. I have compared over the years Russian spending to our spending, rubles to dollars, et cetera, and you are 

really in quite a discussion to figure out where you should be in such 

a discussion. I think tha t basically what we want to do is have a 

defense posture and implement the defense plans that are necessary 

for our own securities. And whether that will express itself finally in 

percentages of our defense expenditure is, of course, something tha t 

remains to be seen.

But I think it is for parliamentarians not very useful to talk about 

percentages being added to a defense budget before they have seen 

what the menu is actually.

Mrs. Fenwick. I agree. . -

Mr. de Vries. It is like entering a restaurant and paying the bill 

before you have seen-----

Mrs. Fenwick. What is on the menu. Exactly.

Mr. Thyness. I would like to add I am very much in agreement 

with both Mrs. Fenwick and my colleagues, but I do think we are 

addressing the problem you are mentioning, also, through many sets 

of negotiations in which we are concerned, b ut all evidence of history 

tends to show th at if you are going into a conference chamber, you 

must do so from a position of reasonable strength and balance and 

not from a position of demonstrable inferiority.

I would also like to say, since percentages have been mentioned, 

that of course we ought to get much more out of our defense expenditure than we actually do.

[Mr. Wall nods affirmatively.]

Mr. Thyness. And this is one of the great weaknesses of the 

alliance, tha t we have not been able to develop more cooperation on 

R. & D. and weapons procurement which could give us much more 

value from our money than we are actually getting today.

Mr. Pease. Mr. Chairman, I won’t ask any more questions. I 

really do appreciate the responses I have received. I think they have 

been veiy helpful to me. It is just tha t I have a difficult time with 

the concept tha t you have to markedly increase your defense spending 

in order to prepare for disarmament or arms control, which seems to 

be one of the premises.

And second, I have difficulty understanding why anyone would 

believe tha t the Soviet Union having achieved whatever measure of 

superiority it has will allow that to erode. They are in a much bette r 

position, being an authoritarian government, to impose spending 

discipline on their people than we are.

Thank you.

Chairman Zablocki. If I may just add a footnote that you can 

more effectively negotiate from a position of strength rather than 

weakness.

Mr. Pease. Well, there is no doubt about that.

Mrs. Fenwick. Could I say one word? It isn’t tha t the whole 

point of spending on arms is to come to arms control. It is to have 

peace, and not to unleash a war.

Chairman Zablocki. Mr. Findley.

Mr. Findley. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

It is an honor to have the chance to address a few words to this 

distinguished group. I do appreciate the fact tha t you have come here 

to exchange ideas with us. I am sorry I did not hear all of the discussion, and I am in the unfortunate position of having to leave in 

just a few minutes.
44

GAP BETW EEN NATO AND WARSAW PACT

There is a g ap th at troubles Dr. Kiss inger. It tro ubles a lo t of people. 

I see qui te ofte n in the headlines pro mi nent Europ ean s as well as 

people in this Congress speakin g of a concern ab ou t the gap of vario us 

sor ts betw een NA TO and the W arsaw Pa ct.

One way to close the gap is to increase our defense spending. An other 

way is to enh ance the cohesion of the allia nce itself. And in rec ent 

yea rs, we seem to hav e spent mo st of our ene rgy and reso urces on 

try ing to neg otiate a peaceful world with wha t migh t be describ ed as 

the enemy: M BFR and in SAL T. In other words, we hav e tri ed to 

work out understandin gs w ith the cente r of po ten tia l hostility .

I believe th at in that process we have sev erely neg lected the prosp ect 

of negotiating w ithin our com mu nity of liber ty-lov ing nati ons a be tte r 

system of cohesion. If we could achieve be tter cohesion, we would 

insta ntly close the gap. And if t he Sov iet Union knew fo r an abs olu te 

fact th at the resou rces of all the NA TO natio ns would be brou gh t to 

bear aga inst an y adv ance it would mak e, the re would be no advan ce.

I thi nk we would all agree on th at point. But the re is do ub t ab ou t 

the actua l response of the Un ited Sta tes , the response of every individ ual memb er of NATO . We hav e an integ rated com mand str uc ture. 

We hav e a p aper alliance. But we really will n ot know unti l a m om ent 

of crisis comes wh at the response will be.

Dr. Kissinger quite eloque ntly raised the que stion as to the credibility —th e diminishing credibility of the U.S. nu cle ar comm itm ent to 

Western Europ e, and it is som ething we ought to consider.

Now, is the answ er everyon e owning a lot more nucle ar weapo ns 

and various sorts of con vention al arm or? T hat is one possibility. 

An oth er way is t o work diligently and rea lly try to think with courage 

and imagi nat ion ab ou t new insti tutio na l str uc tures throug h which 

these great nations could ac t in con cert and be perc eive d as actin g in 

concert, no m at te r wh at challenge would come along.

All of y ou know th at I have held this inter est for all of my public 

career, and I believe it is more needed toda y th an ever before. But 

perha ps it is less likely to hap pen , given the mood of separatism and 

ultran ationali sm , th an in the pa st. But it is one way we could close 

thi s gap.

We could s harpe n the percep tion of the S oviets on wh at they could 

expect in case they indulge d in mischief. And we could accomplish 

thi s witho ut spending an extra dime for defense.

Mr. de Vries. Could I ju st say, Mr. Zabiocki, th at I think this is 

an elem ent which has been neglected to an exten t th at is alm ost 

irresp onsib le in the alliance. I app rec iate Mr. Fin dle y’s com ments. 

I think it is extrem ely im po rta nt th at we tr y to get our act tog eth er 

as an alliance, and, indeed, not only to work on military schemes.

NATO, of course, is an organ ization t hat c reates all k inds of m ilitary 

thinking. Bu t the political dimension of the cohesion of the alliance 

mi gh t be far more im po rta nt in the long run. And I think if we would 

be able to find mec hanisms, insti tutio ns th at could be helpful in enhan cing the inter nal cohesion in the alliance and overcome the dispariti es betw een the regions in the alliance, because, of course, those 

are pro bably at the very basis of a possibility of losing cohesion, the 

problem s we hav e on the south ern flank, for instan ce. If we ca n’t
45

solve tho se in a political way w hich will contr ibu te to whole cou ntries 

feeling th at they are mem bers of the sam e org ani zation sta nd ing for 

th e sam e values, if we can’t solve th at problem , we are in far more a 

mess th an we could possibly be by not spend ing a lit tle more on defense.

Mr. Fin dl ey : Mr. Chairma n, I forgot to mention I ha d no t seen 

Mr. Wall since the general elections, and I have notice d th at his 

smile is mu ch bro ader th an before. [Laughter.]

Mr. Wall. Perhaps I could rep ly to th at , Mr. Ch airma n, by say ing, 

as one who has trie d to work w ith M r. Fin dle y o n t his p artic ular issue, 

we all entirely agree with him th at an yth ing we can do to get be tte r 

cohesion in the alliance mu st be done.

EL EC TE D EU RO PE AN PA RL IA MEN T

Bu t I think i t goes beyond th at and I kn ow he thinks it goes beyond 

th at . I would add a word of hope th at I think the fac t th at we now 

have an elected Eu rop ean parliam ent—a nd th at is anoth er i mpo rta nt 

election we hav e had rec ently------

Mr. Find ley. It is a good star t.

Mr. W all [continuing]. Will g rad ually bring us togeth er. A nd I hope 

we will be speaking more in one voice on po litical and m ilitary matt ers. 

How thi s dov etails in the futur e into NA TO rem ains to be seen, bu t 

it is an im po rtan t m at te r we m ust consider.

The Americans alway s used to hope, I believe, Mr. Chairma n, ma ny 

years ago when I used to vis it this country, for a Un ited State s of 

Europe. I think th at is a long way away, if it ever comes, bu t I do 

believe it is a very im po rta nt ste p th at has been take n in havin g an 

elected parlia me nt.

And I believe th at all of our experiences are th at once one has an 

elected legislature , they want more power them selves and th at therefore th ey will come into the field, wh eth er the trea ty allows it or not, 

of foreign affairs and defense.

One other issue, if 1 may, Mr. Chairma n. Mr. Fin dle y did mentio n 

it. I think we ten d to concentrate too much on the nucle ar issue. 

T hat is obviously because we are discussin g SALT II . But I would 

sug gest th at the flanks, which I did mention earlier on, are very 

im po rta nt.

CO OP ER AT ION BET W EE N MAR ITIM E PO WER S OF AL LIAN CE

M ay I tak e thi s op po rtu nity to correc t wha t may have been a 

mis app rehens ion which my friend Klaas de Vries took up. I am not 

sug gesting for any mo me nt th at the NA TO bou nda ries can be expanded. Th ey c an ’t be. W ha t I am suggesting is there should be much 

be tter coo peratio n betw een the ma riti me powers of the alliance, 

you rselves, B ritain , and F ran ce, p articu lar ly, in trying to get a balance 

of sea power in the great area s of the South Atlan tic.

Mr. T hynes s. I would like to say, Mr. Fin dley, th at I agree with 

most of wh at you said. But I would like to go on record here as believ ing in not one single line of a pproa ch bu t in several. I th ink we need 

to adv ance in para llel bo th in the political cohesion of the alliance 

in working tow ard great er coo pera tion , particular ly on R. & D. and 

me tho ds of pro curement.
46

At the same time, I do think we need to follow a diligen t line in 

negotia tin g with our adv ersa ries, and I think we do need to beef up 

our defenses a bit here and ther e.

Mr. Find ley . I agree with you.

Mr. Corterie r. I agree with most of wh at you h ave said, Congressman Findley. I ju st believe th at you may have made the picture a 

lit tle bi t too somb er. I think the re have been ve ry clear ind ications 

th at the alliance is able to act, like the lon g-term defense imp rov emen t pro gra m which was ado pted. We have ma jor pro cur em ent programs going in Europ e, like AWACS, which has been decided in the 

alliance. We are startin g to get t he To rna do now, which is an importa nt European proje ct, deployed, and things like th at .

So I think we should no t cre ate the impression th at no thi ng is 

being done. I agree with you more need s to be done, and we all certainly hope it will be possible to get new, im po rtan t agreem ent s inside 

the alliance in December.

I agree very mu ch with wh at you say a bo ut the need to set u p new 

ma chine ry and to find way s and mea ns of stre ng the ning th at . I think 

th at is one of the most im po rta nt tasks t hat lies in fron t of the alliance.

Ch air ma n Zablo cki. Mrs. Fin dley. Excuse me, Mrs . Fenwick. 

[Lau ghter.]

Mr s. F enw ick. W ha t a good idea. [Lau ghter.]

Tha nk you, Mr. Chairma n. I have no fu rth er com ments. I th in k it 

is wonderful to see you all here and to know th at we are all in this 

tog eth er. Th an k you .

Ch airma n Zablocki. I t hink this m eeting has been very productive 

and the exchange of views is, as always, mo st welcome.

Personally , I am h eartened by y ou r ra th er optim istic outlook as to 

the future of the alliance, and I hope we hav e left you with an assurance of t he U.S. comm itm ent a s well as o ur i nt en t to see t hat SALT I I 

will be ratified. Ind eed , if we fail to ra tify it, it will pose addit ion al 

problem s in Europ e and th reats to the sec urity of Europ e.

I hope you gen tlem en will n ot m ind if, after havin g the tra ns cript, 

a brief s um ma ry would be prep are d to be inserted in th e Congressional 

Record of your views and our i nte rch ange.1

I wa nt to th an k Mr. Thy ness, Mr. Wa ll, Mr. Corter ier, and Mr. 

de Vries. Hopefully, we aga in will have an op po rtu nity to exchange 

views at a futur e date. Th an k you for yo ur coming.

I un de rst an d you h ave a lu ncheon c om mitment, and we a re l eav ing 

you amp le time to make th at .

Th e subcom mittees are adj ourne d, subject to the call of the Ch air.

[Whereupon, at 12:20 p.m . the joint sub com mittees adjou rned to 

reco nve ne at the call of the Chair.]

1

 See Cong. Rec., Sept. 20,197 9, pp. E4656-8.
A P P E N D I X

Biogr ap hi es of W it nes se s

P au l T hy ne ss (N orw ay)

Mr. Thyness is a Conservative member of the Storting (parliament) for Oslo. 

He was born on 10th April 1930 in Aker. He studied at the University of Oslo and 

at Nuffield College, Oxford. Mr. Thyness started his career as a journalist and was a ctive in the Conservative Par ty, of which he became Director of Research in 1956. From 1961 to 1965, he acte d as Secretary of the Conservative Parliam entary Group. Co-editor of th e 

Conservative Yearbook (1958-61), he wrote the history of the Conservative 

Parliam entary group. He has also published a stud y of the political philosophy of 

Edm und Burke. In 1963, Mr. Thyness held the post of State Secre .ary to the 

Prime Minister. Mr. Thyness was Chairman of the Norwegian Institute of Foreign 

Affairs (1972-77), and Vice-Chairman of the Norwegian Arms Control and 

Disarmament Council until 1979. He is currently President of the Norsemen’s 

Federation. Mr. Thyness, who has been a member of the Storting since 1965, was ViceChairman of the Defense C ommittee from 1966 to 1973. He is curren tly a member 

of the Storting’s Foreign Affairs Committee and has been Dep uty President of 

the Odelsting (Upper House), since 1975. Mr. Thyness has been a member of th e 

No rth Atlan tic Assembly since 1967 and a leader of his delegation since 1973. 

He fulfilled a four-year mandate as Chairman of th e Military Committee (1974- 

77). Vice-President of th e Assembly in 1977, Mr. Thyness was elected Preside nt 

in November 1978.

P at rick Wal l (U ni te d K ing dom)

Mr. Wall is a member of the House of Commons (Haltemprice, Yorkshire), 

first elected in 1954. He is a member of th e Conservative Par ty. Born October 16, 

1916 and educated at Downside, he served with the Royal Marines (1935-50). 

He gained the rank of major in 1949; was Commander 47 Commando RM FV R 

(1951-56). From 1953 to 1963, he was a member of the Westminster City Council. 

In 1955, he was Parliam enta ry Private Secretary to the Minister of Agriculture, 

Fisheries and Food; in 1956-61, President of the Yorkshire Young Conservatives; 

in 1958-59, Parliamenta ry Private Secretary to the Chancellor of the E xche quer; 

in 1963-72, Vice-Chairman of the Conservative Pa rty Defence Committe e; and 

since 1970, has been chairm an of the Conservative Fisheries Subcommittee. He 

was a delegate to the United Nations 17th General Assembly (1962). He is also 

Vice-Chairman of the British Group of the Int er-Parlia mentary Union. He is a 

former member of the Assembly of the Western European Union and of the 

Parliam entary Assembly of the Council of Europe. He is currently Chairma n of 

the Military Committee of the North Atla ntic Assembly.

P eter C orterie r (F ed er al R epu bl ic of Ger ma ny )

Mr. Corterier is a member of the Bundestag (Baden-Wurttem berg), first 

elected in 1969 and of the Social Democratic Pa rty (S.P.D.). H e was born June 19, 

1936; studied law at Heidelberg, Freiburg and Bonn Universities and at the 

Higher School of Adm inistration in Speyer. He holds a Doctor of Law from the 

University of Bonn. He has been a lawyer and a civil servan t at the Ministry 

of Housing and Town-Planning.

(47)
48

He is a member of the B undestag’s Committee on Foreign Affairs and alte rna te 

member of the Committe e on Defense. He is a former member of the European 

Parliament. He is currently a member of the Stan ding Comm ittee of the North 

Atlantic Assembly and General Rapporteur of its Political Committee.

K la as d e V r ie s (N et h e r la n d s)

Mr. de Vries is a member of the Second Chamber of the States-General (parliament) and of the Labour party (P.v.d.A.). He was born April 28, 1943. He was 

educ ated at Hamline University (liberal arts), St. Paul, Minnesota, and studied 

Dutch law at Utrec ht University . From 1968 to 1971, he was a civil s ervant at 

th e Ministry of Justice, and, since 1971, has been a collaborator in public and 

administrative law at the higher school of economics, Erasm us University , 

Rotterda m. In 1970-71, he was a member of the Municipal Council of Delft. 

First elected to parliament in 1973, he is Chairman of the Second Chamber 

Committee on Defense and a member of the committees on the Inte rior and 

Civil Defense, as well as an alte rna te member of the committees on Foreign 

Affairs and Justice. He is currently serving as General Rappo rteur of the M ilitary 

Com mittee of the North Atlantic Assembly.

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