U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE

WASHINGTON : 

i 

26–739 2018

[H.A.S.C. No. 115–54] 

HEARING 

ON

NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT 

FOR FISCAL YEAR 2018 

AND

OVERSIGHT OF PREVIOUSLY AUTHORIZED 

PROGRAMS 

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED FIFTEENTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

FULL COMMITTEE HEARING 

ON

THE FISCAL YEAR 2018 

NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION 

BUDGET REQUEST FROM THE 

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE 

HEARING HELD 

JUNE 12, 2017 
(II) 

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

ONE HUNDRED FIFTEENTH CONGRESS

WILLIAM M. ‘‘MAC’’ THORNBERRY, Texas, Chairman 

WALTER B. JONES, North Carolina 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

FRANK A. LOBIONDO, New Jersey 

ROB BISHOP, Utah 

MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio 

MIKE ROGERS, Alabama 

TRENT FRANKS, Arizona 

BILL SHUSTER, Pennsylvania 

K. MICHAEL CONAWAY, Texas 

DOUG LAMBORN, Colorado 

ROBERT J. WITTMAN, Virginia 

DUNCAN HUNTER, California 

MIKE COFFMAN, Colorado 

VICKY HARTZLER, Missouri 

AUSTIN SCOTT, Georgia 

MO BROOKS, Alabama 

PAUL COOK, California 

JIM BRIDENSTINE, Oklahoma 

BRAD R. WENSTRUP, Ohio 

BRADLEY BYRNE, Alabama 

SAM GRAVES, Missouri 

ELISE M. STEFANIK, New York 

MARTHA MCSALLY, Arizona 

STEPHEN KNIGHT, California 

STEVE RUSSELL, Oklahoma 

SCOTT DESJARLAIS, Tennessee 

RALPH LEE ABRAHAM, Louisiana 

TRENT KELLY, Mississippi 

MIKE GALLAGHER, Wisconsin 

MATT GAETZ, Florida 

DON BACON, Nebraska 

JIM BANKS, Indiana 

LIZ CHENEY, Wyoming 

ADAM SMITH, Washington 

ROBERT A. BRADY, Pennsylvania 

SUSAN A. DAVIS, California 

JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island 

RICK LARSEN, Washington 

JIM COOPER, Tennessee 

MADELEINE Z. BORDALLO, Guam 

JOE COURTNEY, Connecticut 

NIKI TSONGAS, Massachusetts 

JOHN GARAMENDI, California 

JACKIE SPEIER, California 

MARC A. VEASEY, Texas 

TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii 

BETO O’ROURKE, Texas 

DONALD NORCROSS, New Jersey 

RUBEN GALLEGO, Arizona 

SETH MOULTON, Massachusetts 

COLLEEN HANABUSA, Hawaii 

CAROL SHEA–PORTER, New Hampshire 

JACKY ROSEN, Nevada 

A. DONALD MCEACHIN, Virginia 

SALUD O. CARBAJAL, California 

ANTHONY G. BROWN, Maryland 

STEPHANIE N. MURPHY, Florida 

RO KHANNA, California 

TOM O’HALLERAN, Arizona 

THOMAS R. SUOZZI, New York 

(Vacancy) 

JENNESS SIMLER, Staff Director 

TIM MORRISON, Counsel 

WILLIAM S. JOHNSON, Counsel 

BRITTON BURKETT, Clerk 
(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

Page 

STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS 

Smith, Hon. Adam, a Representative from Washington, Ranking Member, 

Committee on Armed Services ............................................................................ 2 

Thornberry, Hon. William M. ‘‘Mac,’’ a Representative from Texas, Chairman, 

Committee on Armed Services ............................................................................ 1 

WITNESSES 

Dunford, Gen Joseph F., Jr., USMC, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff ............... 7 

Mattis, Hon. James N., Secretary of Defense, U.S. Department of Defense ...... 4 

APPENDIX 

PREPARED STATEMENTS: 

Dunford, Gen Joseph F., Jr. ............................................................................ 100 

Mattis, Hon. James N. ..................................................................................... 86 

Smith, Hon. Adam ............................................................................................ 83 

Thornberry, Hon. William M. ‘‘Mac’’ ............................................................... 81 

DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD: 

Senate Testimony of Under Secretary of State for Arms Control Rose 

Gottemoeller, July 13, 2016 ......................................................................... 121 

Study by Dr. Colin Gray .................................................................................. 115 

WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING THE HEARING: 

Dr. Abraham ..................................................................................................... 128 

Mr. Byrne .......................................................................................................... 128 

Mr. Carbajal ...................................................................................................... 128 

Mr. Langevin ..................................................................................................... 127 

Mr. Moulton ...................................................................................................... 128 

Ms. Speier ......................................................................................................... 127 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING: 

Mr. Bridenstine ................................................................................................. 145 

Mr. Hunter ........................................................................................................ 139 

Mr. Langevin ..................................................................................................... 135 

Mr. O’Rourke .................................................................................................... 144 

Ms. Rosen .......................................................................................................... 146 

Mr. Scott ............................................................................................................ 136 

Mr. Smith .......................................................................................................... 133 

Ms. Speier ......................................................................................................... 139 

Ms. Tsongas ...................................................................................................... 136 

(1) 

THE FISCAL YEAR 2018 NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION BUDGET REQUEST FROM THE DEPARTMENT 

OF DEFENSE 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, Washington, DC, Wednesday, Monday, June 12, 2017. 

The committee met, pursuant to call, at 7:04 p.m., in room 2118, 

Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. William M. ‘‘Mac’’ Thornberry 

(chairman of the committee) presiding. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. WILLIAM M. ‘‘MAC’’ THORNBERRY, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM TEXAS, CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order. 

The committee meets to receive the testimony of the Secretary of 

Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the administration’s fiscal year 2018 budget request. We welcome Secretary Mattis for the first time before our committee, and we welcome Chairman Dunford back. 

The question today, as it is each year for this hearing, is how 

well the administration’s proposal meets the security needs of the 

Nation, factoring in both the external threats and the current state 

of our military. 

This committee has repeatedly heard testimony over the past 2 

years that our country faces more serious, complex security challenges now than we have ever faced before. And the hearings and 

briefings we have held on the current state of our military have 

been disturbing. The administration’s budget request of $603 billion for base requirements is 6 percent above the 2017 enacted level and 3 percent 

above the last Obama administration budget proposal. It is also 

$37 billion below what this committee assessed last fall was needed 

and about $58 billion below the fiscal year 2012 Gates budget, 

which was independently validated by the bipartisan National Defense Panel. 

But, of course, the issue is not about numbers. The issue is about 

what those numbers provide for the men and women who serve 

and what security the budget provides to the Nation. It is about 

whether we can defend the United States and our allies against 

North Korean missiles, for example. It is about whether we have 

the number of ships and planes and other military capability to 

deter aggression and maintain peace. 

It is about doing right by our most valuable asset: our people. 

The men and women who serve deserve the best weapons and 
2 

equipment our country can provide, and I am afraid today they are 

not getting it. 

It is always tempting to divert this discussion into a broader 

budget debate about taxes and other spending issues. Those issues 

are not within the jurisdiction of this committee or of these witnesses. But, regardless of our views on those other issues, we cannot wait until we solve our budget problems to adequately fund our 

military. We cannot wait until we perfect our acquisition system to 

have planes that fly and ships that sail. The world is not stopping 

and waiting on us to get our act together. It moves on, and it is 

moving on in a dangerous direction. 

2018 is a key decision point. We have spent 6 years just getting 

by, asking more and more of those who serve, and putting off the 

choices that have to be made. We cannot keep piling missions on 

our service members without ensuring they have all they need to 

succeed. 

Does the administration’s budget proposal accomplish that goal? 

That is the question we intend to examine tonight. 

I yield to the ranking member, Mr. Smith, for any comments he 

would like to make. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Thornberry can be found in the 

Appendix on page 81.] 

STATEMENT OF HON. ADAM SMITH, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM 

WASHINGTON, RANKING MEMBER, COMMITTEE ON ARMED 

SERVICES 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And I agree with much of what you said, and I think the best 

way to sum it up is what you said about putting off choices. That 

is what we have done for quite a while, and not just on the defense 

budget but on our tax reform, on all aspects of the budget as well. 

And I think the impact on the military is as the chairman describes. And the real problem we have right now is a major disconnect between what we would like to do and the amount of 

money that we are prepared to do it. 

As the chairman mentioned, even the President’s budget at $603 

billion does not match what our committee assessed was needed. 

I think even more tellingly, it does not match what the President 

has said he is going to do. In fact, it is very, very distant from that. 

If you talk about a 350-ship Navy and, I think, 570,000-person 

Army, you talk about all the planes, all the nuclear modernization 

that they want to do, I do not even begin to know what the yearly 

number would be to get to that. I am suspecting it is well north 

of $700 billion, $800 billion. 

So we have all these grand ideas of what we want. We do not 

have the money to get there. And who is left in the lurch? The people that you serve. The men and women of the military are left 

with missions that they do not have the resources to fulfill. 

And I think we have to start making choices. And I have got a 

bit of a preview with your opening remarks, and I agree with you. 

Certainly, the House of Representatives is in no position to lecture 

you about making choices. We do not have a budget. It is the middle of June. I have been here 20 years; we have never gone this 
3 

long without providing numbers for the basic appropriations bills, 

defense being chief among them. 

So we continue to stall, I think, in hopes that the money will 

magically appear or we will figure out some way to spend money 

that does not count, something. But we have got to make choices. 

We have got to decide what we are going to fund. 

And I will disagree with the chairman on one issue, and that is 

the notion that somehow as the Armed Services Committee, everything else that goes on in the budget really does not have anything 

to do with us and we should not worry about it. One thing most 

certainly does, and that is revenue. Because how much money you 

have, in my experience anyway, has a profound impact on how 

much money you are able to spend. 

You know, I will skip for the moment the argument about the 

Department of Homeland Security and how important the State 

Department is—well, I lied. I did not skip it. But I think all of 

those things are important. 

But if you just want to get right down to the basics, even if you 

just want to say forget about all that, all we are concerned about 

is the Armed Services Committee and providing for the men and 

women in our military the resources that they need, the planes, the 

ships, the equipment, the training, the readiness, all of that, it is 

nonsensical to say that the amount of revenue we have available 

does not impact that. It absolutely does. 

And if we are talking about putting together—and I use ‘‘we’’ 

loosely here—a tax reform proposal that is going to further cut 

taxes by $2 trillion to $3 trillion, and if there are members of this 

committee who want to support that and then want to keep coming 

back to this committee and talking about how terrible it is that we 

do not fund our military, I think that is a huge inconsistency that 

we need to reconcile. 

We have clear needs in the Defense Department. Let us make 

sure we provide the money for them. If we are not prepared to provide the money for them, then we need to come up with a different 

set of strategies, which I agree with the chairman: It will be very 

difficult. We have a very complex threat environment, from North 

Korea to Iran to Russia to a rising China to—not to mention the 

terrorist groups that are still out there and active. So it would be 

difficult to redo that strategy. But we would be better off doing that 

than to have a strategy that we have no intention of funding, and 

right now, that is kind of what the executive branch looks like they 

are doing. They have a strategy that they have no intention of 

funding. We have to fix that. 

Just two quick things, and I will ask questions about this when 

we get the chance. I think countering what Russia is doing is an 

enormously important step for us. They are in a very comprehensive effort to undermine the very values that our country has 

fought for in the post-World War II environment. They have an incredibly complicated cyber effort, propaganda effort. They are doing 

all of this stuff to basically foster authoritarian regimes at the expense of democracies and to undermine alliances that the United 

States has relied on in that post-World War II world to maintain 

peace and security and to protect our interests. I think we need a 

strategy on that. 
4 

And I will be very curious to get your take on exactly what we 

are doing in Qatar. We hear what the Secretary of State says about 

it, and mere hours later, the President says something diametrically opposed to that. It is a very destabilizing situation right now 

in the Middle East. 

I agree with the Secretary of State. We should be finding ways 

to solve that problem, not ways to throw gasoline on the fire. But 

I am just not clear what the administration’s strategy is. 

And considering the fact that CENTCOM [U.S. Central Command] is located in Qatar, I would think that, Mr. Secretary, you 

would have some opinions on what we ought to do to try to resolve 

that situation. And I would look forward to that comment. 

And, with that, I yield back and look forward to your testimony. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Smith can be found in the Appendix on page 83.] 

The CHAIRMAN. The committee is pleased to welcome the Honorable James Mattis, Secretary of Defense; General Joseph F. 

Dunford, Jr., Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; and Mr. David 

Norquist, the Under Secretary and Comptroller, who has been on 

the job, I think, about a week. 

So, welcome, all of you, to the committee. 

Without objection, any written comments you would like to make 

will be included in the record. 

Mr. Secretary, the floor is yours. 

STATEMENT OF HON. JAMES N. MATTIS, SECRETARY OF 

DEFENSE, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE 

Secretary MATTIS. Well, Chairman Thornberry, Ranking Member 

Smith, and members of the committee, I appreciate the opportunity 

to testify in support of the President’s budget request for fiscal year 

2018. And I appreciate the committee accepting my written statement for the record. 

I am joined by Chairman Dunford and the Department’s new 

Comptroller, Under Secretary of Defense David Norquist. As noted 

by the chairman, he is new, but he will be vital to gaining your 

confidence that we know where our money is going once you give 

it to us through a good audit. 

This budget request holds me accountable to the men and women 

of the Department of Defense. Every day, more than 2 million service members and nearly 1 million civilians do their duty honoring 

previous generations of veterans and civil servants who have sacrificed for our country, and it is a privilege to serve alongside them. 

We in the Department of Defense are keenly aware of the sacrifices made by the American people to fund our military. Many 

times in the past, we have looked reality in the eye, met challenges 

with the help of congressional leadership, and built the most capable warfighting force in the world. 

There is no room for complacency, however, and we have no Godgiven right to victory on the battlefield. Each generation of Americans, from the halls of Congress to the battlefields, earns victory 

through commitment and sacrifice. And, yet, for 4 years, the Department of Defense has been subject to or threatened by automatic across-the-board cuts as a result of sequester, a mechanism 

meant to be so injurious to the military it would never go into ef-
5 

fect. But it did go into effect, and as forecast by then-Secretary of 

Defense Panetta, the damage has been severe. 

In addition, during 9 of the past 10 years, Congress has enacted 

30 separate continuing resolutions to fund the Department of Defense, thus inhibiting our readiness and adaptation to new challenges. We need bipartisan support for this budget request. 

In the past, by failing to pass the budget on time or eliminate 

the threat of sequestration, Congress sidelined itself from its active 

constitutional oversight role. Continuing resolutions coupled with 

sequestration blocked new programs, prevented service growth, 

stalled industry initiative, and placed troops at greater risk. 

Despite the tremendous efforts of this committee, Congress as a 

whole has met the present challenge with lassitude not leadership. 

I retired from military service 3 months after sequestration took effect. Four years later, I have returned to the Department, and I 

have been shocked by what I have seen about our readiness to 

fight. 

While nothing can compare to the heartache caused by the loss 

of our troops during these wars, no enemy in the field has done 

more to harm the combat readiness of our military than sequestration. We have only sustained our ability to meet America’s commitments abroad because our troops have stoically shouldered a much 

greater burden. But our troops’ stoic commitment cannot reduce 

the growing risk. It took us years to get into this situation. It will 

require years of stable budgets and increased funding to get out of 

it. 

I urge members of this committee and Congress to achieve three 

goals: first, fully fund our request, which required an increase to 

the defense budget caps; second, pass a fiscal year 2018 budget in 

a timely manner to avoid yet another harmful continuing resolution; and, third, eliminate the threat of future sequestration cuts 

so we can provide a stable budgetary planning horizon. 

Stable budgets and increased funding are necessary because of 

four external forces acting on the Department at the same time. 

The first force that we must recognize is 16 years of war. When 

Congress approved the All-Volunteer Force in 1973, our country 

never envisioned sending our military to war for more than a decade without pause or conscription. America’s long war has placed 

a heavy burden on men and women in uniform and their families. 

A second concurrent force acting on the Department is the worsening global security situation. We must look reality in the eye. 

Russia and China are seeking veto power over the economic, diplomatic, and security decisions on their periphery. North Korea’s 

reckless rhetoric and provocative actions continue despite United 

Nations’ censure and sanctions, while Iran remains the largest 

long-term challenge to Mideast stability. All the while, terrorist 

groups murder the innocent and threaten peace in many regions 

and target us. 

A third force acting on the Department is adversaries actively 

contesting America’s capabilities. For decades the United States 

enjoyed uncontested or dominant superiority in every operating domain or realm. We could generally deploy our forces when we 

wanted, assemble them where we wanted, and operate how we 
6 

wanted. Today, every operating domain, including outer space, air, 

sea, undersea, land, and cyberspace, is contested. 

A fourth concurrent force is rapid technological change. Among 

the other forces noted thus far, technological change is one that necessitates new investment, innovative approaches, and new program starts that have been denied us by law when we have been 

forced to operate under continuing resolution. 

Each of these four forces—16 years of war, the worsening security environment, contested operations in multiple domains, and 

the rapid pace of technological change—requires stable budgets and 

increased funding to provide for the protection of our citizens and 

for the survival of our freedoms. 

I reiterate that security and solvency are my watchwords as Secretary of Defense. The fundamental responsibility of our government is to defend the American people, providing for our security, 

and we cannot defend America and help others if our Nation is not 

both strong and solvent. 

So we in the Department of Defense owe it to the American public and to the Congress to ensure we spend every dollar wisely. 

President Trump has nominated for Senate approval specific individuals who will bring proven skills to discipline our Department’s 

fiscal processes to ensure we do so. 

This first step to restoring readiness is underway, thanks to Congress’ willingness to support the administration’s request for an additional $21 billion in resources for fiscal year 2017 to address vital 

warfighting readiness shortfalls. Your support put more aircraft in 

the air, more ships to sea, and more troops in the field to train. 

However, we all recognize that it will take a number of years of 

higher funding delivered on time to restore readiness. To strengthen the military, President Trump requested a $639 

billion top line for the 2018 defense budget. This budget reflects 

five priorities: 

The first priority is continuing to improve warfighter readiness 

begun in fiscal year 2017, filling in the holes from tradeoffs made 

during 16 years of war, 9 years of continuing resolutions, and 

Budget Control Act caps. 

The second priority is increasing capacity and lethality while preparing for future investment, driven by results from the National 

Defense Strategy. Our 2018 budget request ensures the Nation’s 

current nuclear deterrent will be sustained and supports continuation of its much-needed modernization process. 

The third priority is reforming how the Department does business. I am devoted to gaining full value from every taxpayer dollar 

spent on defense, thereby earning the trust of Congress and the 

American people. We have begun implementation of a range of reform initiatives directed by the 2017 National Defense Authorization Act and are on track to enter into a full agency-wide financial 

statement audit as required by statute. I urge Congress to support 

the Department’s request for authority to conduct the 2021 Base 

Realignment and Closure, or BRAC, round. I recognize the careful 

deliberation that members must exercise in considering it. But 

BRAC is one of the most successful and significant efficiency programs. We forecast that a properly focused base closure effort will 

generate $2 billion or more annually over a 5-year period, enough 
7 

to buy 300 Apache attack helicopters, 120 F–18s, or 4 Virginiaclass submarines. 

The fourth priority in the fiscal year 2018 budget request is 

keeping faith with service members and the families. Talented people are the Department’s most valuable asset, but we must continually balance these requirements against other investments critical 

to readiness, equipment, and modernization to ensure the military 

is the most capable warfighting force in the world. Investment in 

military compensation, blended retirement, the military health system, and family programs are essential to fielding the talent we 

need to sustain our competitive advantage on the battlefield. 

The fifth priority is support for overseas contingency operations. 

The fiscal year 2018 President’s budget requests $64.6 billion, focusing on operations in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria, increasing efforts to sustain NATO’s [North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s] defenses to deter aggression and global counterterrorism operations. 

ISIS [Islamic State of Iraq and Syria] and other terrorist organizations represent a clear and present danger, and I am encouraged 

by the willingness of our allies and partners to share the burden 

of this campaign. 

Moving forward, the fiscal year 2019 budget informed by the new 

National Defense Strategy will have to make hard choices as we 

shape the fiscal year 2019 to 2023 defense program. The Department will work with President Trump, Congress, and this committee to ensure future budget requests are sustainable and provide the Commander in Chief with viable military options that support America’s security. 

I am keenly aware that each of you understand the responsibility 

we share to ensure our military is ready to fight today and in the 

future. I need your help to inform your fellow Members of Congress 

about the reality facing our military and the need for Congress as 

a whole to pass the budget on time. 

Thank you for your strong support over many years and for ensuring our troops have the resources and equipment they need to 

fight and win on the battlefield. I pledge to collaborate closely with 

you for the defense of our Nation and our joint effort to keep our 

Armed Forces second to none. 

Chairman Dunford is prepared to discuss the military dimensions of the budget request. 

[The prepared statement of Secretary Mattis can be found in the 

Appendix on page 86.] 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Chairman. 

STATEMENT OF GEN JOSEPH F. DUNFORD, JR., USMC, 

CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF 

General DUNFORD. Chairman Thornberry, Ranking Member 

Smith, distinguished members of the committee, it is an honor to 

join Secretary Mattis and Under Secretary Norquist here tonight. 

I am honored to represent your men and women in uniform, and 

it is because of them I can begin by saying with confidence that 

your Armed Forces today are the most capable in the world. However, the competitive advantage that the United States military 

has long enjoyed is eroding. 
8 

A number of factors have contributed to that erosion. Since 9/11, 

an extraordinarily high operational tempo has accelerated the wear 

and tear of our weapons and equipment. Meanwhile, budget instability and the Budget Control Act have forced the Department to 

operate with far fewer resources than required for the strategy of 

record. As a consequence, we prioritize near-term readiness at the 

expense of replacing aging equipment and capability development. 

We have also maintained a force that consumes readiness as fast 

as we build it. We lack sufficient capacity to meet current operational requirements while rebuilding and maintaining full-spectrum readiness. 

You know, the Secretary and the service chiefs have addressed 

that dynamic in their testimonies, and I fully concur with their assessments, but beyond the current readiness, we are confronted 

with another significant challenge that I assess to be near term. 

While we have been primarily focused on the threat of violent extremism, our adversaries and potential adversaries have developed 

advanced capabilities and operational approaches, and these are 

specifically designed to limit our ability to project power. They recognize that our ability to project power is the critical capability 

necessary to defend the homeland, advance our interests, and meet 

our alliance commitments. 

Secretary Mattis alluded to it today: Russia, China, and Iran 

field a wide range of cyber, space, aviation, maritime, and land capabilities. And these are specifically designed to limit our ability to 

deploy, employ, and sustain our forces. 

Russia and China have also modernized their nuclear arsenal 

while North Korea has been on a relentless path to field a nuclear 

ICBM [intercontinental ballistic missile] that can reach the United 

States. In just a few years, if we do not change the trajectory, we 

will lose our qualitative and quantitative competitive advantage. 

The consequences will be profound. It will adversely affect our nuclear deterrence, our conventional deterrence, and our ability to respond if deterrence fails. 

Alternatively, we can maintain our competitive advantage with 

sustained, sufficient, and predictable funding. To that end, the fiscal year 2018 budget is an essential step. However, this request 

alone will not fully restore readiness or arrest the erosion of our 

competitive advantage. Doing this will require a sustained investment beyond fiscal year 2018. 

Specific recommendations for fiscal year 2019 and beyond will be 

informed by the forthcoming strategy development. However, we 

know now that continued growth in the base budget for at least 3 

percent above inflation is the floor necessary to preserve today’s 

relative competitive advantage. 

We ask for your support, and while we do that, we recognize the 

responsibility to maintain the trust of the American taxpayer. We 

take that seriously and will continue to eliminate redundancies and 

achieve efficiencies where possible. 

Thank you again for the opportunity to appear before you. And, 

more importantly, thanks for ensuring that America’s sons and 

daughters are never in a fair fight. With that, I am ready for your 

questions. 
9 

[The prepared statement of General Dunford can be found in the 

Appendix on page 100.] 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, sir. 

Mr. Norquist, do you have a statement you would like to make? 

Secretary NORQUIST. I agree with the Secretary, Mr. Chairman. 

I have no statement to make. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Let me just alert members that under the circumstances, I think 

it is important to hold members to the 5-minute rule, and, therefore, short, direct questions will—I have no doubt with these witnesses—evoke short, direct answers. They are known for that. And 

put me on the clock, please. 

Mr. Secretary, when the budget came to Congress on May 23, I 

think, other than the past week, you were the only Senate-confirmed person in the Department of Defense of the Trump administration. And if you look at that budget request, it has basically the 

same number of ships and planes, no change in end strength for 

the Army and Marines that had already been planned. 

So is it fair to say that essentially what has been sent to us for 

fiscal year 2018 is what was already in the works with some minor 

adjustments? 

Secretary MATTIS. Chairman, what we attempted to do with the 

fiscal year 2017 supplemental was to fill in as many of the holes 

in our readiness as possible. With $21 billion, we were unable to 

fill them all. So part of what we are doing, admittedly, right now, 

is continuing to fill in holes. 

But the growth that we are developing right now this year is into 

areas where we balance the force. In other words, we have got to 

bring in more cyber troops. We need to do some things to expand 

where we have already got gaps that we cannot simply repair our 

way out of. 

We have got to actually buy some new equipment, this sort of 

thing. So we are still in getting the force back on its feet, a force 

that you have paid a lot of money for, but it was not maintained 

at full readiness, sir. 

The CHAIRMAN. Well, and just following up on Mr. Smith’s point, 

the President has said specifically he would like to have a Navy of 

350 ships. He has talked about 12 aircraft carriers. He talked 

about Army end strength of 540,000. He has talked about increasing the number of fighter aircraft and so forth. 

So, for this budget in 2018 that we have gotten so far, it does 

not really advance any of those goals, does it? 

Secretary MATTIS. Sir, it gets us in the right direction. As the 

Chairman and I said, it is going to take 3 to 5 percent in the future 

to actually grow the force along the lines of what you are talking 

about. 

But I would also point out that this is $52 billion above the BCA 

[Budget Control Act] cap, and that is not something that we can 

simply walk in and ignore knowing it is a reality that you have to 

deal with. 

The CHAIRMAN. Yeah. I would just editorially comment: I do not 

think anybody thinks that BCA cap is anywhere appropriate to 

what we need for our military. And that is what we are trying to 

focus on. 
10 

Let me just ask you one other question about this. Again, the 

White House talks about developing state-of-the-art missile defense 

systems. And I think the biggest surprise to me was to look at the 

budget for the Missile Defense Agency and see that go down in 

2018 from what it is in 2017. Can you explain that to me? 

Secretary MATTIS. Sir, it is a worsening situation. We have a 

Ballistic Missile Defense Review underway. But right now, I am 

confident that we have what it takes to secure us against the 

North Korean threat and buy us some time until we can get the 

review done and come to you with a defensible, sustainable ballistic 

missile defense buildup. 

The CHAIRMAN. Chairman Dunford, you talked about that the 

2018 budget does not fill all the readiness holes. Secretary just testified that he was shocked when he came back into the Department 

and saw the state of our readiness. I looked through all of the services’ unfunded requirements, which they are required to give by 

statute, and there is a lot of readiness in those unfunded requirements. 

So it is true, is it not, that, if there is additional funds above the 

President’s request, especially on readiness, that those funds can 

be well used? Would you agree with that? 

General DUNFORD. Chairman, I would. And I think it is important at this point to realize that, you know, where traditional readiness has been considered just operations and maintenance money, 

when you have a squadron that has only six of the primary aircraft 

authorized that it rates, you can only have those aircraft so ready 

and it is still not going to make a difference. The squadron is still 

50 percent ready. 

So I would just argue that there is really maybe, this year now, 

as a result of the last several years, in many cases there is a distinction without a difference between readiness and procurement. 

In many cases, procurement is necessary in order to get units 

ready. 

The CHAIRMAN. I think that is what is—a point that we have 

learned over the past year as well. Thank you. 

I would yield to Mr. Smith. 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you. 

I am just wondering, has anyone added up all of the President’s 

promises in terms of defense, as the chairman and I have outlined 

some of them, and is there any notion of what it would cost to meet 

those goals in a 5-year plan? 

If I am not mistaken, there actually was not a FYDP [Future 

Years Defense Program] offered by the President’s budget, which is 

unusual. And I cannot help but think that it is because—and you 

can start the clock on me—I cannot help but think that that is because you did not want to look at it and see just how outlandish 

those numbers would be versus the money we have. 

So do you have a number, I mean, if you have 5-year numbers, 

to begin to get to what we are—what the President has talked 

about? 

Secretary MATTIS. I do not, sir. We have been digging down into 

what we can do right now to get the force ready in its current situation that we confront. I think there is pretty common understanding here that the force is going to have to be improved. That is the 
11 

common ground we have. And we are going to have to move out 

smartly and in concert with the Congress as we sort out what can 

be done and what the targets are. 

Mr. SMITH. Well, I would suggest, as I said in my opening remarks, that we get more realistic about that. I do not think it 

serves any particular purpose to make promises that nobody has 

any intention of keeping. So if we could down that to something 

that is reasonable. 

And, with that, let me just say, one of the things I hope that the 

NDAA [National Defense Authorization Act] is able to do is, when 

we are on the floor, we have an amendment to repeal the BCA and 

the budget caps. And I would urge in a bipartisan way that we try 

to get that out there on the floor and let Members take that vote, 

because the Budget Control Act was 6 years ago. It was passed 

with the goal of reaching a grand bargain. That did not happen. 

It is irrelevant. Now, that is not to say that a $20 trillion debt and 

a $700 billion deficit is not a problem. It is just that it is obvious 

that the Budget Control Act is a terrible way to go about trying to 

address it. 

Can you help me out on the Qatar question that I raised earlier? 

Now, I certainly do understand that Qatar has a mixed record. But, 

you know, we are doing this primarily at the behest of Saudi Arabia, and if you want to talk about a mixed record, they have a pretty mixed record too: 15 of the 19 hijackers; Wahhabism is one of 

the more extreme forms of Islam; they funded madrasas all across 

the Middle East and South Asia and North Africa. Now, I have met 

with the Foreign Minister. I have been assured that they are trying 

to reform and move in a more positive direction. But it just seems 

odd that we are working with Saudi Arabia to go after Qatar because Qatar is doing too much to support groups that are radical 

extremists. 

So what is going on over there, and what should our policy be? 

Secretary MATTIS. Sir, it is a very complex situation. You know, 

each of those countries manifest its own trajectory of forward progress. I would tell you that there is common ground, and that is 

something President Trump was attempting to generate and reinforce with the trip that we recently witnessed. 

In that regard, you see Qatar itself, for example, houses the largest single airbase that we have and the forward headquarters for 

our Air Force, our Central Command, and our special operations. 

I would simply point out that we have interoperability capability 

with Qatar. And I believe that Prince Thani inherited a difficult, 

very tough situation, and he is trying to turn the society in the 

right direction. 

But we all agree that funding of any kind of terrorist group is 

inimical to all of our interests, and I believe that it is moving in 

the right direction. We have got to try and help sort this out with 

them all. 

Mr. SMITH. Well, why the disconnect between what Secretary of 

State Tillerson has said about the situation and what the President 

has said about it? 

Secretary MATTIS. Sir, I believe that the President coming back 

from the Middle East was extremely focused on what they had 

done in order to try to get everyone to agree on how we would stop 
12 

the funding of the enemy groups, to include at times gray funding. 

In other words, it is not black and white. It goes into some kind 

of nebulous area and shows up there. 

So what you are seeing is a continued focus on that. At the same 

time, we have obviously got shared interests with Qatar that, 

again, holds the biggest base that we have there. So it is one of 

those areas where we have got to find the common ground, make 

common ground, and move out together, and it has been a challenge. It is not tidy, I will admit it is not tidy, but it is something 

that we have got to work together on. 

Mr. SMITH. And just a couple of quick comments before my time 

runs out. One, that Saudi Arabia is a country that we also have 

to work on that issue, because while—I mean, they have cut this 

deal. They will support the Wahhabism version of the religion as 

long as they do not get violent. The Wahhabism version of the religion pushes you right up to the edge of that violence and some 

would argue is the logical conclusion of it. So I think we need to 

put pressure on Qatar. Certainly, we really need to put pressure 

on Saudi Arabia to stop the spread of that ideology. 

And I will assume that one of my other colleagues will ask the 

question about Russia. We lack a comprehensive strategy to 

counter what they are doing. I would like an update on, are we 

going to develop one? Do you see that as a critical need? Am I 

being, you know, alarmist about what Russia is attempting to do 

in so many parts of the world? 

So I would be curious about your comments on that, but I will 

leave that to my colleagues to follow up on, and yield back my 

time. 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. LoBiondo. 

Mr. LOBIONDO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Secretary Mattis, General Dunford, thank you for being here and 

for your service. 

Funding for cyber warfare command and U.S. Cyber Command 

has been protected in the budget since 2013. This has been a very 

high priority for me given responsibilities on both this committee 

and House Intelligence Committee. 

Admiral Rogers testified recently that, and I am quoting: To execute our missions, I requested a budget of approximately $647 million for fiscal year 2018, which is nearly 16 percent increase from 

fiscal year 2017. However, cuts to the services impact our cyber 

warfare capabilities. Cyber operations to counter ISIS are funded 

via OCO [overseas contingency operations], which could represent 

a hollow forces structure, and cyber capability and readiness gaps 

still exist for European Command against Russia and U.S. Pacific 

Command against China and North Korea. 

General Dunford, for you, could you describe the readiness of our 

cyber forces to carry out the variety of missions they need to conduct around the world? 

General DUNFORD. I can, Congressman. Thank you. 

We identified a requirement for 133 cyber mission teams, and 

that was done in conjunction with U.S. Cyber Command. Right 

now, 70 percent of those teams are what we call fully operational 

capable. So they have had all the manning, they have all the training, and they are fully operational capable. 
13 

The balance at 133 teams are in initial operational capability, 

and they will be in the coming months fully operational capable. 

So we are moving towards those 133 teams being there. 

But I think none of us are complacent with where we are in 

cyberspace, given the number of threats we face every day. We 

need it to defend the network, develop effective offensive tools, and 

be in a position to grow the force. 

And, Congressman, I think, in fiscal year 2018 and in 2017, for 

that matter, we began to reverse a trend that, for over the past 5 

years, in areas like space, cyberspace, electronic warfare, we have 

been underfunded. This year is the second year in a row where we 

have increased our resources to Cyber Command. 

Mr. LOBIONDO. And as a follow-up, General, right now we are 

conducting operations against ISIS. But do we have the capacity to 

ramp up for additional operations against a different adversary simultaneously if required? 

General DUNFORD. We do, Congressman. Without going through 

details, we are actually simultaneously conducting cyber operations 

now against multiple adversaries. 

Mr. LOBIONDO. And can we handle the current level of aggressive cyber activity to counter Russia, North Korea, China, Iran, 

and others that we are seeing today? 

General DUNFORD. We need to continue to grow the force to be 

able to deal with those emerging threats, Congressman. 

Mr. LOBIONDO. Can you talk to us about what we are doing to 

track people and support cyber as a career field—to attract people 

and support cyber as a career field? 

General DUNFORD. Congressman, I know Admiral Rogers has 

worked very hard on that, as have the services. And I think there 

is a combination of incentives as well as going out there and recruiting high-quality people and then setting good conditions for 

them to be retained. But that is something that we are working on 

very hard as well. 

Mr. LOBIONDO. So we are looking at things such as incentive 

pay, or bonuses to attract and keep key cyber professionals? 

General DUNFORD. We are actually using those tools now, Congressman, and always monitoring the force to make sure to what 

extent we need to increase use of those tools. 

Mr. LOBIONDO. Okay. Thank you. I yield back, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Mrs. Davis. 

Mrs. DAVIS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you all for 

being here as well. 

Secretary Mattis, I know in your testimony you spoke about the 

3 million service members and civilians that make up the Department of Defense. And I certainly agree with you and agree with my 

colleagues that this committee cannot be expected to deal with all 

the issues that we face today, but the reality is that the people who 

come into our service, the men and women, they came from somewhere. You know, they were educated. Perhaps their families were 

on food stamps at one time. They got Federal student loans. 

How do we reconcile—and in your position, where I think you 

have such a strong voice in this—how do you work with those 

issues while we are struggling here to fund defense appropriately 

and looking at all of our readiness issues and, at the same time, 
14 

we see that the President is cutting many of the programs that 

service the people who actually are in the military? We know that 

over a third of kids are obese today, and they cannot serve. They 

are not able to serve because they have—they had drug addictions. 

There are so many issues that we kind of put them over there 

and say, ‘‘Well, those do not really relate to our military and certainly not to our national security.’’ I know you have thought about 

this issue. And what is the role that you see yourself playing even 

within the Cabinet to try and have people focus on these issues? 

Secretary MATTIS. Well, Congresswoman, as you know, I am not 

shy about speaking up. I would tell you that we are meeting our 

own quality demands right now. We have not had to lower our 

standards at all. 

But you are absolutely accurate that we have a shrinking percentage of our 18-year-old, 20-year-old—that population we do a lot 

of recruiting from—we have a shrinking percentage that can qualify to enlist in the Army, for example, as a private. So I would take 

no issue with it. I think it is all of our responsibilities, whether we 

are in the executive branch, the legislative, or we are a local school 

district member. 

But it is not one that I can speak about with authority. I have 

been rather consumed, as you will understand, with the portfolio 

I have. But I do not take any issue with what you are saying. 

So far, I will tell you, it has not inhibited our quest for high-quality young men and women who are rallying to the flag. 

Mrs. DAVIS. Do you hear other voices speaking up on this in this 

room? 

Secretary MATTIS. Absolutely. 

Mrs. DAVIS. Okay. Well, I hope so. And I appreciate your doing 

that as well. 

I wonder if you could just turn for a second and, certainly, General, as well, and just speak to us about your current thinking on 

Afghanistan. As I think that the public is aware, it is becoming— 

feels much more chaotic and violent, and there are very few options 

for us. 

What do you see as the status, and where can we go with this? 

Secretary MATTIS. Congresswoman, we are taking a regional approach to this. We are looking at everything from the situation between India and Pakistan, Pakistan and Afghanistan, obviously 

Iran, that whole South Asia area, because if we look at it in isolation, you will probably have something that is lacking in some 

area. 

We are going to have to recognize that problems that come out 

of ungoverned spaces like that, as we experienced on 9/11, those 

problems do not stay there. They can come home to roost here. So 

there will be no turning a blind eye to it. 

We have got to determine what level of support is necessary and 

how we orchestrate the international community, not just the 

American but the international community, to deal with this. We 

will take that forward to the President for a decision very soon. 

Mrs. DAVIS. And, General Dunford, I know that you serve very 

actively there as well. Do the numbers that are being talked about 

and—are those in isolation from other tools in our toolbox essentially? Do we need to be doing something else with civilians? 
15 

General DUNFORD. Sure. We have listened very carefully to General Nicholson’s assessment of the situation. I think we are all concerned about the security trends over the last 2 years, not the least 

of which is the significant number of casualties the Afghan forces 

have suffered. 

So we have gone to Secretary Mattis and the President with 

some options that might be considered in order to reverse those 

trends. But as the Secretary said, we will consider Afghanistan in 

the broader context of a regional strategy as well. 

But we do have some things that we are considering to turn 

around the trends and better enable the Afghan security forces, 

who, as you know, have been in the lead for the last 2 years providing security for their country. So this is not about us being in 

the fight. It is about us doing things for the Afghans to be more 

successful than they have been over the last two summers. 

Mrs. DAVIS. Do you have the resources that you need, both in the 

military and on the civilian side? 

General DUNFORD. As you suggested, Congresswoman, the options will include not just—it is not just about numbers of troops. 

It is about authorities. It is about other things we can do, diplomatic and economically as well. 

Mrs. DAVIS. Thank you. 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Turner. 

Mr. TURNER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Secretary Mattis, thank you for being here. You referenced that 

President Trump has talked about rebuilding the military and has 

called for an end to sequestration. You have called on us to help 

you rebuild the military and to end sequestration. And on all that, 

we agree. 

As we look to 2018, though, we are very concerned that this 

budget falls short of our ability to help you do that. There are important needs that you know that we see that are not met, and one 

of those is the concerns that we have for the end strength and what 

numbers are needed. 

So, in the discussion of what do we need, we can look to your 

statements, that we currently have an Army that is doing more 

than it has ever done. And if we look backwards to a time when 

the Army had less to do, when we thought the world was more 

safe, it certainly is pre-9/11. Pre-9/11, we had 482,000 troops in Active Force. Today, we have 476 in current Active Force. 

Now, we know where we were going. President Obama had proposed drawing down the Army even further. He was going to be 

460 for fiscal year 2017, 450 for fiscal year 2018. Chris Gibson and 

I working with the chairman drafted the POSTURE Act [Protecting 

Our Security through Utilizing Right-Sized End-Strength Act of 

2016], and the Republican Congress prevented that drawdown, 

which keeps us at 476 today, still below the peacetime 482 of pre9/11. 

Now, General Milley has recently come out and said: I need 

100,000 more. In this article here, he is proposing that we have Active Forces of 550,000, higher than the pre-9/11. 

If we look at the unfunded requirements for fiscal year 2018, we 

know that the Army has asked for an additional 10,000 Active, an 

additional 7,000 National Guard. Those are troops that they said 
16 

that they needed but did not get. And it is very unusual in unfunded requirements to actually have force requests. Usually, they 

have like planes and tanks, not people. 

So, Secretary Mattis, we do not want to give you a hollow force. 

But if we are going to do more, do you need more soldiers? 

Secretary MATTIS. I believe we do. I do not take any issue with 

the unfunded priorities list as far as a requirement. I think the 

base budget has the right priorities. If there is more money available, then I think that is a pretty good list: Army, Navy, Air Force, 

Marines. 

I would add, however, that we have got to have a stable budget 

horizon in the future. If we bring those troops in and we do not 

have a good budget by next year, then it is going to come out of 

our operation and maintenance and our modernization as we pay 

their salaries because, if we go under a CR [continuing resolution]—again, 9 out of the last 10 years, we have had some form of 

this—then we end up with an Army that actually, with the best of 

intentions, starts hollowing out. 

So it has got to be a balanced approach, sir. And right now, I 

think this is the way to set the conditions with fiscal year 2018. 

Excuse me, go ahead, sir. 

Mr. TURNER. No, that is okay. As you know, we have been in 

those CRs because we have not had agreement between the House 

and the Senate and the outgoing administration on what to do. 

And so I am going to ask you about your conversations with OMB 

[Office of Management and Budget] because that currently is 

where one of our problems are as we are looking at the House trying to increase spending to give you what it is that you need. 

Could you give us some ideas? What do they say? Do they know 

that you have planes that cannot fly, that you have pilots that do 

not get flying time, that you have soldiers that are not ready, and 

that you have shortfalls in ammunition, training, and spare parts? 

Because the budget that they gave us does not fix that. And what 

is OMB saying? Because we would like to fix it now. We do not 

want to wait. 

Secretary MATTIS. Well, sir, as you know, that is why we came to you for $21 billion just a few months ago to start reversing this. 

Fiscal year 2018 is how we are going to try to stabilize the problem 

and fill it in in a way that allows us to balance the force. 

This is where we will get the additional cyber troops and start 

building out like this. But the real growth comes in 2019 to 2023 

with a program that OMB is keenly aware we need and President 

Trump has highlighted to OMB. So we have his support on this. 

Mr. TURNER. Secretary Mattis, I have got a question and I think 

I know the answer and that you are going to want to answer, and 

that is on sequestration: 142 of us sent the Speaker of the House 

a letter asking him to put on the House floor a bill repealing sequestration. Every member of the Armed Services Committee 

signed it on the Republican side. We certainly believe that the 

President’s call for ending sequestration is important. 

I recall—and I am not sharing classified information here—when 

you called us in for a classified meeting on North Korea, we were 

all waiting to hear what you were going to say, and the first thing 

you said is repeal sequestration. That was more important than 
17 

what you were going to tell us about what the threat was from 

North Korea. 

So I have got a question for you: Secretary Mattis, should we 

vote to repeal sequestration? 

Secretary MATTIS. Yes, sir. 

Mr. TURNER. Thank you. I yield back. 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Langevin. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Secretary, Mr. Chairman, thank you very much for your service 

to the Nation and for your testimony today. 

Secretary Mattis, in the past, you have acknowledged the impacts of climate change on our National Security Strategy, stating, 

and I quote: ‘‘Climate change is impacting stability in areas of the 

world where our troops are operating today,’’ end quote. 

We are certainly aware of these coming dangers, first here in 

Rhode Island, being a coastal State. As such, I think it is critical 

to address how the Department of Defense quantifies the cost of 

climate change. 

I also assume that there is a cost in adapting our National Security Strategy to defend new sea-lanes in the Arctic or respond to 

regional instability abroad as a result of desertification, famine, 

and climate-related economic challenges. 

As someone who has thought deeply about this in the past, how 

are you guiding DOD [Department of Defense] to address these 

strategic and tactical challenges? 

Secretary MATTIS. Yes, sir. I cannot quantify the cost. I will tell 

you, it is part of the physical environment, the warming. And for 

us, it comes down to, for example, we have a new sea that is navigable more year round, where the winter ice no longer extends as 

far south. So that is a national security consideration. 

We look at these as they develop, sir, from the warming climate. 

And we take it into account. But it is hard to quantify the cost. It 

is simply part of the broadening appreciation of the situation that 

we confront. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Can you talk about the steps that at least you are 

taking to identify those costs? 

Secretary MATTIS. Sir, let me get back—I want to give you a good 

answer. Let me get back to you on that one. 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on 

page 127.] 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Fair enough. 

Secretary MATTIS. Because there is, as you know, almost a 

Rubik’s Cube of ways that you address one thing because it impacts another, and how you contain the analysis is actually quite 

challenging. 

But the bottom line is we have to address whatever the physical 

environment brings, whether it is storms in an area where we are 

responding with humanitarian or whatever else. I mean, this is all 

part of the physical environment. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. I take you at your word, and I look forward to 

your more thorough answer then, Secretary. 

Secretary and Chairman Dunford, I believe that the value of our 

American power projection lies in our diverse and flexible abilities 

beyond traditional warfighting domains. Today, these strengths are 
18 

jeopardized by the administration’s shortsighted budget proposal, 

which fails to recognize the overlapping impacts of these varied interests. 

For example, underfunding the State Department will strain 

U.S. efforts to maintain our present level of diplomatic and military 

influence across the globe, and underfunding the Department of 

Education and Health and Human Services will undermine the 

military’s ability to recruit the best and the brightest should we fail 

to invest in science, innovation, and programs that ensure Americans can meet the educational and fitness criteria of the Armed 

Forces. 

This is especially important in areas where technological change 

is outpacing our ability to match our adversaries and especially 

where focusing heavily on the third offset strategy. Would you 

agree with this assessment? What other specific challenges do you 

face when national interests are underfunded? 

General DUNFORD. Congressman, I will start with that. Look, I 

would agree with the point that you make. In every challenge that 

we are dealing with right now, there is a military dimension to the 

challenge, but also we require assistance from the State Department, Justice Department, other elements of the government, what 

we call whole-of-government solutions are required. 

And all of the challenges that you recited all require whole-ofgovernment challenge. What we have done in the fiscal year 2018 

budget, of course, is address the resources necessary for the military dimension of those challenges you referred to. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Mr. Secretary. 

Secretary MATTIS. Sir, the State Department, the Defense Department are tied very tightly as we go into these situations. I will 

give you an example of ISIS. We just had a conference here. State 

Department hosted it. Sixty-six nations plus INTERPOL [International Criminal Police Organization], Arab League, NATO, European Union, and they all sat down together, not to talk about just 

the combat part, which we were able to address in about 15 percent 

of the conference, but 85 percent was spent talking about the postcombat and how do we make certain, when we defeat them, how 

do we keep the next group from rising? 

My point is that these take the whole-of-government effort. And 

right now, the Defense Department and State Department work 

very closely. Not a week goes by where Secretary Tillerson and I 

are not personally sitting down together for hours. And we talk 

probably five, six, seven times a week as we try to make this a real 

tight team to address this sort of situation. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Rogers. 

Mr. ROGERS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

General Dunford and Secretary Mattis, the last administration 

was not very aggressive or, in my opinion, serious in confronting 

Russia about its INF [Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces] violations. We have not had a senior military or DOD official testify before this committee that they believe that Russia is going to come 

back into compliance with the INF Treaty. 

So my question is, is this administration going to seriously confront Russia about their INF violations? And are you prepared or 
19 

will you be prepared anytime in the near future to give us a set 

of military options for their violation—continued violation? 

Secretary MATTIS. Sir, we are meeting on the apparent violations, alleged violations, what looks like violations to us. We are 

meeting on it interagency-wide as we speak. And probably in closed 

hearing, at least initially, because we will also be consulting with 

NATO allies, for example, on this. 

As we build the international understanding of what has happened, we can brief you, I would say, soon. I cannot give you a specific date, but we are engaged on the effort right now. 

Mr. ROGERS. Okay. Thank you. 

General Dunford, in March, your Vice Chairman, General Selva, 

testified before us and said, quote: ‘‘There is no higher priority for 

the Joint Force than fielding all of the components of an effective 

nuclear deterrent, and we are emphasizing the nuclear mission 

over all other modernization programs when faced with that choice. 

Nuclear modernization can no longer be deferred as a result of previous delays in deferrals, all well considered. We are currently depending on just-in-time modernization and replacement of many of 

the components for our nuclear triad,’’ closed quote. 

General, do you share this priority and emphasis on ensuring our 

nuclear modernization programs remain on schedule? 

General DUNFORD. Congressman, I do. And that priority has 

been reflected in both the 2017 and the 2018 budget. 

Mr. ROGERS. Thank you. 

Secretary Mattis, do you believe that we should fully fund your 

fiscal year 2018 budget request for these programs or decrease the 

funding until we see the results of the NPR [Nuclear Posture Review]? 

Secretary MATTIS. Sir, I am confident right now that maintaining 

a safe and secure nuclear deterrent is supported by the current 

budget, and we do not have to wait. What that review will do is 

tell us where we are going in the longer term, but right now, we 

know what we can do right now to keep the deterrent safe. 

Mr. ROGERS. Great. 

Secretary Mattis, I would like to commend you a study by Dr. 

Colin Gray, which I request be entered into the record, Mr. Chairman. 

[The study referred to can be found in the Appendix on page 

115.] 

Mr. ROGERS. In it, Dr. Gray states, quote: ‘‘The American triad 

now begs for modernization to remain operational in coming years 

and deserves the attention and support of the U.S. leadership. In 

particular, the LRSO [Long Range Standoff] cruise missile will be 

a weapon with a performance character that must be highly desirable, even essential, to meet the kind of challenges of most concerned,’’ closed quote. 

Dr. Gray also points out the long history of the use of dual-capable cruise missiles by both Russia and the United States, and said 

concerns about the LRSO as being destabilizing are overwrought, 

overstated, and unpersuasive. 

Secretary Mattis, I am going to save my question for the record, 

but I know you are a reader. And I would commend this study to 

you as you review the NPR. 
20 

Thank you. And I yield back, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Larsen. 

Mr. LARSEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Welcome, everyone. 

Mr. Norquist, I have got a question for you, just very quick. Do 

you anticipate, as Comptroller, that you will be able to keep the 

timelines this committee would like to see the Pentagon keep in 

conducting the audit of Pentagon programs? 

Secretary NORQUIST. Yes. We will have the Department, all the 

major elements of the Department under audit in 2021—in 2018, 

as required. That will include stand-alone audits for many of the 

organizations and an overarching audit of the entire Department 

overseen by the DOD IG [Department of Defense Inspector General]. 

Most of those contracts are already awarded. There is one or two 

that are waiting to be finalized and awarded. But we have every 

expectation to be fully compliant and fully under audit. 

Mr. LARSEN. Okay. And I anticipate other folks will have questions for you on that, but I wanted to be sure you were listening. 

No, I am sure you are. 

General Mattis, I want to return to Mr. Rogers’ questions in 

theme only when it comes to the Nuclear Posture Review. Do you 

anticipate the NPR will decide on a triad versus dyad debate, or 

do you anticipate it will focus on specific programs within the nuclear enterprise? How are you approaching it? 

Secretary MATTIS. Sir, we are going to have to address both. I 

think that whether it is a triad or a dyad will be resolved very, 

very early because of the strength of the triad right now, frankly. 

And then we will continue with the rest of the review. 

Mr. LARSEN. At that—okay. All right. Do you anticipate that it 

will come out in stages like that, or do you anticipate one report 

at one time? 

Secretary MATTIS. Right now, I anticipate one report, but, you 

know, if it looks like it can come out in stages, I would be willing 

to look at it. Right now, it is going to come out as one report. 

Mr. LARSEN. Yeah. Thank you. 

Perhaps for General Dunford: So some of this debate in the recent past is that the NSC [National Security Council] has been 

more of an operational—too operational. It needs to return to being 

more strategic. And part of that discussion has resulted in this conversation about giving operators and combatant commanders and 

those below them in the hierarchy more authorities, additional authorities, especially when it comes to anti-ISIS and other counterterrorism operations. 

I do not have a big heartburn with that myself, but I do believe 

that there is still the oversight question is important, that it is 

still—whether it is policies set at NSC, whether it is policies set 

at NSC and DOD together, or if it is a set of actions taken by operators that then evolves into a policy, it is still policy, and it should 

be coming back to us for oversight. 

Now, that is a statement. And I kind of want to get your feel on, 

one, do you think the changes on authorizations have been either 

that noticeable or that great in the last 4 months, first? And, second, what is your thought on the oversight question from this committee? 
21 

General DUNFORD. Congressman, I think the issue really is speed 

of decision making. And that more than the level at which decisions are made has been the point that Secretary Mattis has emphasized since he came in. 

I will tell you, having been in both administrations, the fundamental issues of force levels, authorities, and those kinds of things 

have rested either with the Secretary of Defense or the President 

in accordance with established policy. So there has not been a 

change in that regard. What the Secretary has emphasized is speed 

at the speed of relevance, meaning to support the commander. So 

we have emphasized that. 

And the other thing I would just say is that, in my experience, 

the national security decision-making process reflects the decisionmaking style of the President. And I am not sure there is a good 

or bad. It is the process reflects the degree of detail that the President wants to maintain oversight on. 

So what we have seen is that the President has delegated to the 

Secretary certain authorities in order to make him more responsive 

to commanders on the ground. But I can assure you that, on some 

of the major issues, there has been no change in the oversight nor 

will there be a change in what Congress is able to provide oversight for. 

Mr. LARSEN. Thanks. Just in my last 30 seconds, it is really not 

a question, but I do want to put a plug in for the Electronic Warfare EXCOM [Executive Committee]. It has been a long road to get 

to an EXCOM, and I urge you to make EW [electronic warfare] a 

priority both in terms of leadership and investment and training 

and in R&D [research and development]. We have lost it in the 

past, and I think we finally got the Pentagon where it needs to be 

on EW overall, not just sort of service-to-service, so I would like to 

make sure you note that. 

Thank you. I yield back. 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Franks. 

Mr. FRANKS. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And thank you, Secretary Mattis and General Dunford, for your 

lifetime commitment to human freedom. 

Thank you, Secretary Mattis, that you keep our enemies awake 

at night. 

Secretary Mattis, defense officials in South Korea and the U.S. 

as well have confirmed claims by North Korea that their ballistic 

missile launch of a liquid-fuel Hwasong-12 on May 14 successfully 

survived reentry. I consider that to be a very significant and dangerous development. And then, a few days ago, the Director of the 

Missile Defense Agency Vice Admiral Syring, testified in open committee before the Strategic Forces Subcommittee that, quote: We 

must assume that North Korea today can range the United States 

with an ICBM carrying a nuclear warhead. 

Mr. Secretary, this new and alarming judgment suggests that the 

North Koreans are making significant progress as a result of their 

ballistic missile tests, yet the President’s budget request for the 

Missile Defense Agency is $7.9 billion, which is the average MDA 

budget throughout the Obama administration. So my question is, 

in your best military opinion, is the threat posed by ballistic missiles greater now than it was under the Obama administration, and 
22 

is that threat growing, shrinking, or staying the same? And if the 

threat is increasing, why would we wait for the Ballistic Missile 

Defense Review to at least fund the $1 billion unfunded request recently submitted by the Missile Defense Agency? 

Secretary MATTIS. Congressman, right now, I would say that the 

threat is growing. However, what we have in Fort Greely now and 

in California I believe is sufficient to buy us time so that, when we 

come to you with a program, I can defend it and I will not come 

back and say we had it misjudged or targeted in the wrong direction. 

As you know, this is something that takes a high-tech, very focused effort, and I want to make certain that what I am asking for 

can sustain the way ahead in terms of giving us a real capability. 

And I also assume that every time they fire one of these, they are 

learning something more. So it is a worsening situation. But we 

can buy the time right now, Congressman. 

Mr. FRANKS. Well, let me, if I could, just leverage off of that and 

say that, under your budget requests, in Fort Greely and Vandenberg, once we deploy those 44 ground-based interceptors this year, 

we will not be able to continue to test and improve their reliability 

of the system without having to pull interceptors out of the ground, 

which means we will fall below 44 operational deployed interceptors to protect the United States homeland. And I guess I would 

just ask, are you aware of that, and do you believe that is an acceptable risk in this threat environment? 

Secretary MATTIS. I am aware of it, and based on what we think 

North Korea has and could have in the near future, I am still confident that we can defend the country, and we will take steps to 

expand and distribute this capability, ballistic missile defense capability, further. 

In fact, right now, should we need another site, for example, on 

the East Coast to defend the East Coast, we are doing the environmental impact statement, so, in the event we have got to come to 

you and say we need to do more, we are not starting at that point 

with something that would take some time. 

So we are not at all blind to this, Congressman, and I accept 

your concern 100 percent. 

Mr. FRANKS. Thank you, Secretary. And General Dunford, would 

you have anything to add to either one of those points? 

General DUNFORD. The only thing I would say, Congressman, is 

that, when we look at the North Korean threat, you correctly point 

out ballistic missile defense as being critical, but when we balance 

it and you look at our investments in cyber capabilities in the intelligence community, maritime capabilities, all of those also are designed for North Korean threats. When we look at the North Korean challenge, we have got to balance capability development 

across multiple areas and not just the missile defense capability 

area. 

Mr. FRANKS. Well, thank you both, and keep them awake if you 

can. Thank you. 

The CHAIRMAN. Ms. Bordallo. 

Ms. BORDALLO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you to our 

witnesses, Secretary Mattis, Chairman Dunford, and Under Secretary Norquist. 
23 

Secretary Mattis, it was a pleasure to meet you during the 

CODEL [congressional delegation] that our chairman led to the 

Shangri-La Dialogue. With two visits to the Indo-Asia-Pacific, I 

have particularly appreciated your commitment to positive engagement within the region. While we, our allies, and partners have 

been subjected to mixed messages, at best, from the administration, it is my hope that the rhetoric and the actions of the Department of Defense will signal consistency. 

So, Secretary Mattis and General Dunford, if you could speak 

about the value of forward-deployed forces in the Indo-Asia-Pacific 

region in augmenting your toolbox, given political and financial 

considerations, what additional value is gained by having forces 

stationed on a United States territory? And what flexibility does it 

provide and what limitations does it remove to allow you and your 

force providers to be ready and ready to engage, when necessary? 

Secretary MATTIS. Congresswoman, the Asia-Pacific theater is a 

priority theater for the United States for the United States Department of Defense. The value of the forward-deployed forces in themselves is that they are a stabilizing element. If we did not have 

them out there and we had to flow them in the event of a crisis, 

it could actually be a destabilizing element, as people were adjusting to a force that was not there before, whereas if they are out 

there in position, then they are present and any adversary would 

have to consider that if they were up to mischief. 

I would also say that having these forces on United States territory, whether it be Guam or Hawaii, obviously our sovereignty allows us certain freedoms of action and sustainment out there that 

we would not otherwise have the confidence in. 

Ms. BORDALLO. General Dunford. 

General DUNFORD. Congresswoman, the Secretary kind of outlined it. From our perspective, I would just tell you, having been 

in the Pacific with you last week let me look at it through the lens 

of our allies and our adversaries. I would tell you us being forward 

certainly is great assurance to our allies that we can meet our alliance commitments, and it also serves as a deterrent to our potential adversaries in a region, as well. 

Ms. BORDALLO. Well, I thank you both for your comments. I have 

another question for you, Secretary Mattis. Reflecting on your visits and discussions with senior military and political officials in the 

region, what role do our alliances, particularly the United StatesJapan relationship, play in strengthening our posture and furthering our national interests? 

Additionally, how is the DOD strengthening partnerships 

through incorporating inter-organizational cooperation into planning and operations in the Indo-Asia-Pacific region? 

Secretary MATTIS. Well, ma’am, I came into the Department with 

the priorities of strengthening our military, strengthening our alliances, and reforming our business practices so we get the best use 

of every dollar that we get. 

In terms of strengthening alliances, the United States-Japan alliance has stood the test of time. They pay an enormous amount of 

the costs of our forces that are there in the Japanese islands, and 

we also have a technological relationship with them. They are a 

very capable force. Their navy, as you know, uses our systems, our 
24 

ballistic missile defense systems, for example. So this is a two-way 

street in terms of benefit for the defense of our own homeland as 

well as for the defense of Japan. 

But I do not think that right now we can find—they are in that 

top tier of allies, frankly, that we have around the world. I do not 

think we can find a better one. 

Ms. BORDALLO. So you feel then that Japan and the United 

States in its partnership for the buildup in the United States territory is solid? 

Secretary MATTIS. I absolutely am certain. I have met with 

Prime Minister Abe, and he is committed to it, to include helping 

to fund the move of the Marines from Okinawa and the other Japanese islands down to Guam, and we will continue working it along 

those lines of a partnership with Japan and get the Marines in 

place. 

Ms. BORDALLO. Well, I thank you both for your support. And I 

yield back, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Conaway. 

Mr. CONAWAY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Gentlemen, thank you. 

General Mattis or Secretary Mattis, thank you for your clear 

statement on supporting the audit of the books and records of the 

financial statements of the Department of Defense. Thank you for 

that continued leadership and supportive, obviously, leadership 

from the top. 

General Dunford, I took a quick look at your statement, did not 

necessarily see something there, but I hope we can count on your 

leadership among the uniformed folks, because they are the ones 

at the pointy end of the sword on most of those transactions, and 

making sure that you have added your leadership to making sure 

that happens, and so I assume that is the case. 

General DUNFORD. That is the case, Congressman. 

Mr. CONAWAY. Thank you. And, Mr. Norquist, welcome to a terrific team. You and I were having a brief conversation at the start 

of the hearing that your experience—was it DHS [Department of 

Homeland Security]? 

Secretary NORQUIST. Yes, sir. 

Mr. CONAWAY. They have now finished 4 years of audited financial statements? 

Secretary NORQUIST. Correct. They did not have a clean opinion 

when I was brought there as the CFO [chief financial officer], but 

they already had an audit, and we implemented a process to turn 

that around with corrective action plans. DHS now has had four 

clean opinions. 

Mr. CONAWAY. Well, that is fantastic. Obviously, the Department 

of Defense spends a few more dollars than DHS, but thank you for 

bringing your talent and leadership to that task as well. 

General Dunford mentioned something about a 3 percent above 

the base rate of inflation would be necessary just to simply keep 

pace with where we are going. Mr. Norquist, could you give us a 

dollar amount what that might look like, assuming just a flat 3 

percent, a zero-based inflation, what the dollar amount would be? 

I know the math, but would you put that in record what that math 

would look like? 
25 

Secretary NORQUIST. I would be happy to. You want it for the 

record, sir? 

Mr. CONAWAY. I would rather have you just state it right out, something in the order of $20 billion. 

Secretary NORQUIST. $639 billion at 3 percent would be about $18 billion to $20 billion a year, sir. 

Mr. CONAWAY. All right. Thank you very much. I appreciate that. 

I did not mean to put you on the spot. General Mattis, you mentioned BRAC in 2021. Obviously, it takes a lot of money to implement a BRAC—obviously a BRAC process to go through will spend 

that money, but actually those recommendations then result in a— 

construction and decommissioning, all kinds of expenses that go 

into that. Saving those dollars on the back end are clearly important, but could you talk to us somewhat about, are there operational reasons why we would go through a BRAC, given that today’s force looks dramatically different in terms of training needs— 

I am maybe trying to answer your question for you, but I want 

folks to know that, while it takes a long time to recoup those dollars, there may very well be things that, other than the dollars and 

cents, that would lead us to make some of those hard decisions. 

Secretary MATTIS. Well, exactly, sir. The money that we free up 

from closing an unneeded base continues to accrue to us. It takes 

a couple years to start taking the profits, of course, because we 

have to close the base down, but once those reduced costs for that 

unnecessary base go away, then every year you are gaining that 

money for training, for buying new equipment, for modernization. 

I am not comfortable right now that we have a full 20-some percent excess. I need to go back through and look through this again 

because I do not want to, you know, get rid of something or come 

to you with something that we cannot sustain and we try and say 

we have got to buy some land here in 10 years. So we will take 

a look at it, sir, but it is a great way to free up money. 

Mr. CONAWAY. Clearly, we try to do that, and the 2005 BRAC 

may today be saving us money, but I guess what I was looking for, 

are there reasons, operational reasons, training, better locating 

folks together that have been in separate bases across, are there 

reasons why we would do that separate and apart from the savings 

and where those savings would accrue to the future? 

Secretary MATTIS. I am sure we would find some of that, sir. I 

would have to look at each individual case to state that firmly. 

Mr. CONAWAY. I think as we start down that path of doing a 

BRAC, the checkered history of the 2005 BRAC, we are going to 

need reasons other than just a straight savings in terms of making 

that happen, and if there are operational reasons why we would 

close some bases, open other bases, build new places and certain 

other spots in order to train better, more efficiently, be able to deploy quicker and more efficiently, all those things would be helpful 

as well. 

So, again, thank all three of you for your service. And I yield 

back, Mr. Chair. 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Courtney. 

Mr. COURTNEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you to the witnesses for your testimony today. I would 

like to go back to where the chairman and ranking member started 
26 

off talking about this budget in the context of a lot of the expectations that have built up before it was submitted, in particular in 

terms of the Navy. 

Over the last 3 years, we have had strategic reviews including 

a Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower—actually, General Dunford participated in that review again—which talked about 

the need to grow the fleet larger than 308 ships. We had the Force 

Structure Assessment that Secretary Mabus submitted last December, which, again, put an exact number saying that we should build 

a fleet of 355 ships. We had, in early 2017, an accelerated shipbuilding plan, which Assistant Secretary Stackley sent over, which 

actually showed a roadmap in terms of how we can jump-start that 

process and called for a minimum of 12 ships in the 2018 budget 

to again get us moving in that direction. Three force structure and 

architectural studies that Navy—architectural studies that this 

committee commissioned—which actually talked about even bigger 

numbers in terms of the fleet. 

And now we get a budget which, on the 23rd, it actually had only 

eight ships on it; on the 24th of May, it grew a ship. But, you 

know, there is just no debate really about the fact that, you know, 

what is going on out there, and we hear from Admiral Harris, and 

we hear from General Scaparrotti in terms of the demands out 

there, and we are living off a legacy fleet in terms of the ships that 

we have out there. 

I do not understand the hesitation in this budget in terms of taking advantage of all the work that has been done over the last 3 

years to have, again, a more robust shipbuilding plan than what 

was sent over. 

Secretary MATTIS. Yes, sir. I think, once we get our strategy review done, so we can give you a compelling logic, not just for number of Navy ships but number of Air Force fighter squadrons, 

bomber squadrons, the number of Army brigades—we have got to 

weave this whole fabric together to make certain we have a joint 

force that is ready to fight. I would love to have more ships. You 

are right. There are nine ships in this one, in this 2018 budget, and 

we know that we need more, but we have got to get our plan together. As you know, we have been in place here only about 5 

months, and we need to get our analysis basically harvested from 

all those that you just mentioned and then come up with a planned 

way ahead. 

But as you know, ships are expensive, and we have got to make 

certain that we have the budget to support it. And, right now, I 

cannot ignore the reality of the U.S. Army situation or the Air 

Force fighter squadrons, the Navy aircraft, all the other things we 

are having to spend money on. 

Mr. COURTNEY. Well, again, I mentioned all those prior studies, 

which really were built around a strategic foundation. Again, it 

was not just a wish list that was put out there. 

And I would also just know, having been on the subcommittee for 

10 years now, is that shipbuilding is a long game. You have got to 

send a demand signal out, not just the big shipyards but also the 

supply chain, which frankly went through a shipbuilding holiday in 

the early 2000s and which really destroyed, you know, a really 

healthy industrial base and supply chain. And I, frankly, think this 
27 

budget, you know, undercuts that demand signal that people really, 

I think, were really starting to believe in, in terms of what we have 

seen over the last 3 years. 

So I would just say that I think our subcommittee is not going 

to wait. I mean, I think you are going to see, frankly, some work 

being done on this side to really take advantage of the great work 

that all these studies have accumulated over the last 3 or 4 years 

and, again, which we hear in person from combatant commanders 

about the fact that they are playing zone defense out there against 

the Chinese navy and the Russian navy. And that is really just not 

an acceptable state of affairs, particularly given the fact that we 

are going to see legacy ships coming offline in greater numbers 

than the replacement volume that a nine-ship budget calls for. 

That is a 308-ship Navy budget that was sent over here, not a 350- 

ship budget. 

And, again, I have the highest respect for all of you, and I think 

you understand, you know, what is going on out there and the need 

to grow the fleet, but we have got to do better than what was sent 

over. 

And I yield back, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Wittman. 

Mr. WITTMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman Dunford, Secretary Mattis, Mr. Norquist, again, thank 

you so much for your commitment and service to our Nation. I do 

want to continue along the lines of questions about shipbuilding. 

Secretary Mattis, you stated, which I think is extraordinarily important, the need for us to understand that we have been marking 

time, at best, here in the last several years and that our adversaries are advancing. That is problematic. You also talked about 

the capabilities that they have, the ones they continue to develop, 

and if we are going to have the ability to make sure that we influence the course of events, United States presence is critical around 

the world. The Navy-Marine Corps team is a critical part of that, 

and I know I am speaking to the choir here. 

But I do want to build on the question asked before, and that is, 

across the spectrum, I have not heard anybody that has disagreed 

with saying 355 is not a number that we should direct our efforts 

toward. And this year’s budget has us on track to get to the number that is in the outdated 30-year shipbuilding plan of 308 ships. 

So the question being is, if there is this near universal agreement that 355 is where we need to be, we cannot mark time; we 

need to catch up. Our adversaries are doing everything they can in 

building additional capacity, whether it is under the seas, across 

the spectrum with aircraft carriers, surface navy. The question is, 

is it does seem counterintuitive to say we are just going to do eight 

ships this year or nine ships. I understand wanting to maintain 

those and making sure we are doing those things. But another 

thing that is additionally troubling, not with just the number of 

ships, but this year’s budget request actually cuts a billion dollars 

out of shipbuilding accounts. 

So, in that realm, my question is, why only nine ships this year, 

but more fundamentally, with cutting a billion dollars out of the 

shipbuilding accounts, how do we see our Navy getting to 355 

ships, and when will we be able to get there? You know, the CBO 
28 

[Congressional Budget Office] has done an assessment about when 

we believe we can get there. We think we have the industrial capacity to get there. The question is strategically for our Nation the 

urgency of getting there. 

Give me your perspective, both Secretary Mattis and Chairman 

Dunford, about those two elements, the numbers and the dollars 

reflected in this year’s budget. 

Secretary MATTIS. Well, I share your sense of urgency, sir. As I 

mentioned in my opening remarks, we did not get into this situation in one year, and we are not going to get out of it in one year. 

And I recognize that Congress has responsibility to raise armies 

and sustain navies, but we cannot do in one year or put a marker 

down in one year. It is unrealistic. And I mentioned that we are 

going to have to have sustained growth fiscal year 2019 to 2023, 

and this is where you will see the biggest growth Army, Air Force, 

and Navy showing up, as we are still digging ourselves out of a 

readiness, operation, and maintenance hole. Furthermore, we are 

engaged in operations where we have to come to you and ask for 

OCO funding, overseas contingency operations funding. When you 

get done, there is a carrying capacity that we can carry as part of 

the present budget, and we just have to recognize that. 

But I take no issue with what you are saying or the sense of urgency as we try to deal with what amounts to years of falling behind. 

Mr. WITTMAN. Chairman Dunford. 

General DUNFORD. Congressman, I think that this highlights the 

debate we had internal inside the Department as a result of not 

modernizing in so many areas at the same time. What I can tell 

you is I am confident we have the right priorities within the budget, but I am also, as the Congressman mentioned earlier, I was 

part of at least one of these studies that articulated the need for 

more ships, and so I understand that also as Secretary Mattis’ 

global force manager trying to meet on a day-to-day basis the combatant commanders’ demands. 

This really does reflect the challenge outlined in my opening remarks, is that this year and last year it started, we are confronted 

with literally what has been described as a bow wave of modernization in the nuclear enterprise, in the cyber capabilities, our electronic warfare capabilities, space resilience, maritime capabilities, 

land forces. And so what we try to do is just get the right balance 

within the top line that we have been given. 

It is also why I highlighted that minimum of 3 percent just to 

maintain the competitive advantage that we have today. And that 

actually is a marker for saying that if we do want to get to 355 

ships, if we do want to get to the number of the brigade combat 

teams that have been identified, if we do want to get to the numbers of squadrons that are required, it is going to take sustained 

growth over time. And that is why 2019, 2020, 2021, and 2022 are 

so important because we just could not get there in 2018. 

Mr. WITTMAN. Very good. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield 

back. 

The CHAIRMAN. Ms. Tsongas. 

Ms. TSONGAS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and welcome to you 

both this evening. It is good to see you before us. It seems to me, 
29 

as we have been talking here today and you have both given voice 

to the variety of threats we face, whether it is from those who wish 

us ill but also from the changing dynamics of how we have to respond to, for example, cyber and making sure we are making all 

the appropriate investments, it is sort of a dual-track challenge we 

have. 

It is clear to me that the military services, you all need to recruit 

from a talent pool that is as broad as possible. General Dunford, 

you represented, you said how important it is to secure our competitive advantage, and, Secretary Mattis, you talk about having 

the most capable warfighting force in the world, and that does 

come down to people. 

An analysis conducted for the Defense Advisory Committee on 

Women in the Services estimated that only 29 percent of young 

people ages 18 to 23 are eligible to serve after you apply all the 

filters that rule people out. And I think you referenced that number, too. Of that population of eligible individuals, more than 51 

percent happen to be women. However, less than 20 percent of today’s Active Duty Force is comprised of women. In an era where 

the eligible military recruiting population remains on the decline, 

it seems to me it is ever more important that we recruit from the 

entire population and not disregard or discourage half of our Nation’s talent pool. 

So, with that in mind, how do we—how are you all thinking 

about your recruiting efforts around bringing women into the military so that you do have that full array of talents that are needed 

in this very dynamic environment, and in thinking about that, how 

do you make the case for the invaluable contributions they could 

be making to serving their country in the military? 

So I will start with you, Secretary Mattis. 

Secretary MATTIS. Yes, Congresswoman. 

I do not think in any way we disregard or discourage it. In fact, 

we are fortunate for decades now to have had superb women—they 

are not good; they are outstanding—in our ranks. I think the quality standards are being met across the board, men and women, enlisted and officer ranks. So right now I would just tell you that they 

are, without the pressure of conscription or the draft, we are getting volunteers of eye-watering quality of men and women. 

Ms. TSONGAS. Well, I would agree that is the case of those who 

come in, but the reality is, of that larger pool, only 20 percent are 

seeking to serve. So, yes, I think there has to be some thinking on 

better recruitment efforts in order to bring more of that pool in. 

But I also wanted to follow up that I was glad to hear in January 

that, in your confirmation hearings, you were committed to having 

men and women serve alongside each other as long as all parties 

met the standards necessary for the job. Under your predecessors, 

the services launched a review of the physical standards that all 

services have to meet in combat arms—and I have seen some of 

that process at Natick Soldier Systems in Massachusetts—but to 

establish the physiological standards in order to integrate women 

into every occupation specialty. 

My question is, how are you planning on assessing the progress 

of ongoing integration efforts? 
30 

Secretary MATTIS. I would have to see if the services have identified any problems or our various surveys find a problem. If there 

is a problem, we will assess it and solve it, I guarantee you. 

Ms. TSONGAS. So, in your time, as has been a rather brief tenure, 

are you monitoring those efforts? 

Secretary MATTIS. Ma’am, I have met with the Joint Chiefs of 

Staff, the service chiefs, with Chairman Dunford. I did it in my 

quarters to make it a casual evening where this issue was brought 

up, and none of them surfaced any problems right now. 

Ms. TSONGAS. And then one other quick question. In the wake 

of the various social media scandals, what do you think needs to 

be done to improve the culture of respect across the Department as 

a whole? 

Secretary MATTIS. I believe that it is very important, as we recruit from American society, that we make clear not just what the 

military stands for but what it absolutely will not stand for and 

make certain we maintain good order and discipline. 

A unit cannot be effective in combat that does not maintain a 

disciplined lifestyle. I do not care whether it is DUI, driving under 

intoxication, or sexual harassment or anything else, when a unit 

does not maintain discipline standards, it is of less capability on 

the battlefield. So we maintain a mission orientation and make 

very clear what we will not tolerate, and we field the force. 

Ms. TSONGAS. Thank you, Secretary Mattis, and thank you for 

your service. 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Coffman. 

Mr. COFFMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And, Secretary Mattis, General Dunford, thank you so much for 

your service to this country. 

Secretary Mattis, current law requires that military pay is to 

keep pace with government inflation projections. This year, that 

would be a 2.4 percent pay raise. Unfortunately, the administration 

submitted a budget request that would cut our service members’ 

pay raise. Secretary Mattis, were these decisions based on budget 

constraints or your belief that pay for the military should not keep 

pace with government inflation projections? 

Secretary MATTIS. Thank you, Congressman. 

We have a responsibility to take care of our families, take care 

of our troops and make certain they are paid what we need to draw 

very good people and that they do not go off to combat worried 

about whether or not their family is being taken care of. Whether 

it be healthcare or retirement program pay, all those go into making certain we keep faith with them. 

I also have a responsibility to ensure that they can win on the 

battlefield, that we are providing them the best equipment, that we 

are doing the research and development that will keep them at the 

top of their game. It is a balancing act, sir, as we try to balance 

what we need to outfit them with to bring them home alive and 

victorious with what we need to pay them to maintain basically our 

obligation to these people who volunteer to serve. 

Mr. COFFMAN. Thank you, Secretary Mattis. 

Military services are already having trouble recruiting men and 

women to join the services due to competition with an improving 
31 

private sector economy. How do you maintain the All-Volunteer 

Force if you will not pay them competitive wages? 

Secretary MATTIS. Sir, I think our analysis shows that we are 

paying them very competitive wages. When you stack them up 

against high school graduates, for example, for the enlisted ranks, 

we probably have a better benefits package than most places, not 

all of them. I mean, there are some out in Silicon Valley, where I 

lived for 3 years, that could probably beat us hands down. When 

you look across the United States, we are drawing in very highquality people because we are competitive. 

Mr. COFFMAN. Secretary Mattis, one thing that I would like you 

to take a look at in terms of containing costs where we can shift 

those resources around to things like pay raises that keep up with 

inflation is to look at every opportunity to shift capability to the 

Guard and Reserve, and granted those training requirements 

would have to probably be revised accordingly if we are going to 

rely on them more, but I just think that there are cultural impediments within the Active Duty Force that argue against that, and 

I think we need to look beyond that in terms of our force structure 

and how we can maintain capability, how we can certainly maintain capability without compromising national security, but at a 

lower cost. 

Secretary MATTIS. Yes, sir. 

Mr. COFFMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back. 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Garamendi. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. Gentlemen, thank you for your service and leadership. 

I will try to do some quick questions here about choices. We are looking at tax cuts that might create a $3 trillion to $7 trillion deficit in the next 10 years. We are looking at a State Department 

budget immediately that calls for a $30 billion reduction and a 

dyad and a triad. How would you prioritize these? 

Secretary MATTIS. Well, sir, in my role maintaining a safe and 

secure—inside the Department of Defense—maintaining a safe and 

secure nuclear deterrent with a decisive conventional force that can 

also fight, has the capability of fighting irregular warfare, the problem—Dr. Colin Gray was mentioned earlier. The most near-faultless strategist alive today has pointed out the enemy will always 

move against your perceived weakness. So we cannot decide we are 

only going to upgrade the nuclear, we are only going to upgrade the 

Navy, because the enemy will move against our weak area. So it 

is going to be safe and secure nuke capability deterrence so those 

weapons are never used; and a conventional capability that no one 

wants to take us on, or if they do, we change their mind very 

quickly. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. So we do not have to make choices, we can do 

all the above. 

Secretary MATTIS. I believe that we can, that America can afford 

survival, yes, sir. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. Even though it is estimated to be a trillion-plus 

dollars in the next two decades for the nuclear? 

Secretary MATTIS. We have gone through this twice before in our 

history, sir, where we had to hit one of these upgrade times, and 

both times the Congress rose to it, yes, sir. 
32 

Mr. GARAMENDI. Thank you. I will just move on to something 

perhaps a little less important. Current law prohibits military-tomilitary contacts with Russia. Should the new National Defense 

Authorization Act continue that policy? 

Secretary MATTIS. Sir, I think that we are right now carrying on 

deconfliction. We do not do cooperation or collaboration. We do 

deconfliction in the Syria theater, but for right now, I believe that 

there cannot be business as usual military-to-military. There may 

be advantages to us deconflicting and perhaps even having talks 

once they are led, first of all, by our foreign policy and our State 

Department to set the conditions for the military-to-military talks. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. So we should continue the prohibition on military-to-military, other than deconfliction? 

Secretary MATTIS. I think at least the Congress should give a 

sense of its direction. If it is not a requirement, if it leaves some 

flexibility to the executive branch and the Secretary of State and 

the President, it would be best. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. You mentioned that we have a new ocean or a 

sea opening up. I assume you are referring to the Arctic. Is the 

U.S. Coast Guard an important and integral part of the U.S. defense, and if so, is a heavy icebreaker necessary? 

Secretary MATTIS. I believe the Coast Guard is essential—an integral—distinct but integral—part of our Nation’s defense, and that 

is not an area I am an expert in, I assure you, sir, but I would 

imagine getting through the ice is probably a pretty good idea up 

there when it starts moving in to keep us relevant. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. An icebreaker is about a billion dollars a copy, a heavy icebreaker. Should we allow $1 billion of the $638 billion 

budget to be used to build an icebreaker? 

Secretary MATTIS. Sir, this is really beyond my area of expertise. 

I am not trying to get out of the question, but it is not one I have 

studied. I would prefer to study it before answering it. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. I thank you. And I yield back my remaining 

time. 

The CHAIRMAN. Ms. Hartzler. 

Mrs. HARTZLER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you, gentlemen, for your service. 

I have a few questions I would like to ask on the LRS [Long 

Range Standoff] program. 

Secretary Mattis, last July, then Under Secretary of State for 

Arms Control Rose Gottemoeller testified before Congress regarding the Long Range Standoff cruise missile program, and I would 

like to introduce her written testimony for the record. 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on 

page 121.] 

Mrs. HARTZLER. Here are a few quotes from Secretary 

Gottemoeller’s testimony, which she said were focused on three key 

points: ‘‘First, the LRSO is consistent with our arms control commitments and the President’s Prague agenda. Second, the LRSO 

supports strategic stability and does not undermine it. Third, it is 

important in the eyes of our allies.’’ She elaborated: ‘‘There is no 

evidence that the LRSO or our nuclear modernization program are 

prompting an action-reaction cycle or catalyzing arms race. . . . The 

LRSO is valuable at maintaining strategic stability. . . . Indeed, it 
33 

is the absence of a nuclear armed cruise missile that might leave 

us more vulnerable to unintended escalation during a crisis. Without a standoff cruise missile option, future Presidents may find 

themselves facing the unpalatable choice of responding to nuclear 

coercion or attack with SLBMs [submarine-launched ballistic missiles] or ICBMs.’’ 

So, Mr. Secretary, as the Nuclear Posture Review continues, and 

you examine the LRSO program, how will you and your team consider the input of the Nation’s senior diplomats like Ms. Gottemoeller, and do you agree with her position that the LRSO enhances strategic stability and is important for assuring our allies? 

Secretary MATTIS. Ms. Gottemoeller’s reputation stands on its 

own merit. I have had private discussions with her as recently as 

this last month in Brussels, and she is a trusted adviser. 

As far as whether or not I would stand on the LRSO right now, 

I am going to wait until we have the study done, and then I can 

let you know, but I have no reservations about taking Ms. Gottemoeller’s ideas on board, no reservations at all. 

Mrs. HARTZLER. Great. And I hope you will read her comments 

and her testimony on that because I think it was very good insight 

there. 

I want to shift gears just a little bit here to another topic. So, 

General Dunford, in 2012, the Obama administration ended the 

U.S. military strategy that required a force structure and readiness 

levels capable of fighting two large-scale wars simultaneously. At 

the time, the Pentagon stated that times have changed, and the 

United States no longer faced a peer military on par with the Soviet Union. This worldview was quickly disrupted by a resurgent 

Russia and expanding China and continued instability of North 

Korea and Iran. 

So my question is, what do you see as the force structure requirement in order to guarantee American security of our allies across 

the globe? Do we need to be able to fight a conventional war with 

China and Russia simultaneously? And are we currently able to 

fight two conventional wars at once, and if not, what do you see 

as the greatest capability gap that must be addressed? 

General DUNFORD. Congresswoman, we do confront today Russia, 

China, Iran, North Korea, and violent extremism. And we are going 

to go through the Defense Security Review. We are going to have 

a closed hearing on Thursday night, and I would like to talk to our 

force size and construct and the challenges we face in a closed 

hearing if we can do that. 

Mrs. HARTZLER. Yes, but you agree it is important to be able to 

address all of these at the same time? 

General DUNFORD. Certainly one or more. 

Mrs. HARTZLER. Right. Okay. I look forward to that. 

The last question, back to Mr. Secretary. I remain deeply concerned about our strike fighter shortfall. According to the Vice 

Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Bill Moran, two-thirds, more 

than 60 percent, of our Navy’s strike fighters, the planes that are 

launching the entirety of the Navy’s attacks against ISIS, cannot 

fly. I am pleased to see the fiscal year 2018 budget request including 14 F/A–18 Super Hornets as well as another 10 Super Hornets 

as a top priority of the Navy’s unfunded priority list. So can you 
34 

talk about how important it is for us to address the Navy’s strike 

fighter shortfall and how important new procurement is in that effort? 

Secretary MATTIS. Yes, ma’am. The bottom line is we cannot simply repair enough fighters to bring them back up to full strength, 

so we actually are going to have to buy more fighters. Furthermore, when you look at the $21 billion that Congress 

gave us as fiscal year 2017 supplemental, much of that went into 

buying spare parts for fighters for the very reason you are highlighting here and Admiral Moran highlighted. So we are on to the 

problem. We have got to keep the modernization going, but we are 

going to need some gap fillers. Before we get the F–35, we are 

going to have to have more Hornets, for example, for the Navy to 

address this problem. 

So we share your appreciation of the problem, and we are addressing it, but at the same time, it is going to take a little while 

before you hear better testimony in here. 

Mrs. HARTZLER. Thank you. 

The CHAIRMAN. Ms. Speier. 

Ms. SPEIER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

To all three of you, I want to just say that, on behalf of the 

American people, I think they are all breathing a sigh of relief tonight because you exhibit the kind of confidence and steady leadership that I think we desperately need in the military right now. I 

am going to ask you three questions for the record that I will just 

ask them, and then I will move on to a question that you can answer orally. 

The Annual Report on Sexual Harassment and Violence at the 

Military Service Academies was just released a couple months ago, 

and it is stunningly bereft of answers to some of the most jarring 

statistics. Forty-eight percent of the service academy cadets and 

midshipmen indicate that they are sexually harassed. And of those 

that actually report sexual assaults, they suggest that there is a retaliation rate of 47 percent. So, for the record, I would like for you 

to provide to me and to the committee what you are going to do 

to address what I think is a staggering statistic. 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on 

page 127.] 

Ms. SPEIER. Along with retaliation, James LaPorta was the reporter that broke the Marines United case. I think all of us here 

were shocked by the revelations. It is not just in the Marines; it 

is in all of the services. But he just recently was told that he is 

debarred from coming onto the Lejeune Base by the deputy commander. And I would like for you to explain to us why, after he 

did a great service I think to all service members by outing this 

conduct, that he would be debarred. 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on 

page 127.] 

Ms. SPEIER. And, thirdly, there have been, to our knowledge, a 

number of government meetings, including meetings with foreign 

counterparts, that have been held at properties owned by the President. I would like to ask each of you if you or your staff have participated in official government events at properties owned by the 

President, and if so, did the Department of Defense expend tax-
35 

payer money to pay for costs associated with that event, including 

room and board, meals, or other incidental costs? 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on 

page 127.] 

Ms. SPEIER. Those are the three questions. 

Now, the one I would like for you to answer publicly. Secretary 

Mattis, you have been blunt in your assessment of Russia as a 

principal threat to the United States. Russia has been seemingly 

relentless in its provocations: buzzing our ships in an irresponsible 

and dangerous manner, flying long-range strategic bombers to 

Alaska, and violating the INF [Treaty]. The President has been silent about these hostile actions. There is much speculation as to 

why. But I guess my question to you, Mr. Secretary, is, do you believe that Vladimir Putin has any real interest in a mutually beneficial good-faith partnership with the United States? 

And, General Dunford, how do you plan to respond to these Russian military provocations? 

Secretary MATTIS. At this time, Congresswoman, I do not see any 

indication that Mr. Putin would want a positive relationship with 

us. That is not to say we cannot get there as we look for common 

ground, but at this point, he has chosen to be competitive—a strategic competitor with us, and we will have to deal with that as we 

see it. 

Ms. SPEIER. General. 

General DUNFORD. Congresswoman, last year, in fiscal year 

2017, we requested $3.7 billion for what is called the European Reassurance Initiative. This year, we have requested $4.8 billion. 

That money is designed to increase our forward presence in Europe. It will increase the three brigade combat teams as well as additional preposition equipment. It increases the exercises that we 

conduct in Europe, all of which is designed to deter Russia and assure our partners that we can meet our NATO alliance commitments. 

So we have significantly changed our force posture in Europe 

and, again, our exercises and capability development with our partners in response to growing Russian capability and aggression. 

Ms. SPEIER. Do you believe that Russia is our adversary? 

General DUNFORD. I think we have an adversarial relationship 

with Russia, a competitive adversarial relationship, yes, Congresswoman. 

Ms. SPEIER. Secretary Mattis. 

Secretary MATTIS. Mr. Putin has chosen to be a strategic competitor, yes. 

Ms. SPEIER. Thank you. I yield back. 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Scott. 

Mr. SCOTT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Gentlemen, thank you for 

your service. 

Just to refresh people’s memory on the Budget Control Act, the 

reason the Budget Control Act was put in place was to effectively 

create so much pain on the discretionary side of the spending that 

it would force formula changes to the mandatory side of the budget. 

Those mandatory changes never came about. One of the challenges 

that we have is that we are just living longer, and that has created 
36 

challenges with the funding of Medicare and Social Security. Probably better than the alternative, though. 

But as it is, we live under the Budget Control Act. We as a Congress have been reactive to trying to resolve this problem, and it 

has created a very serious challenge for the three of you at that 

table. We have talked about the military budget on an annual basis 

for the last several years, but, General Dunford, if the BCA is not 

repealed, what does our military look like 4 years from now if we 

are working under the Budget Control Act numbers? 

General DUNFORD. Congressman, we will have some tough 

choices to make, and it is either going to be a significantly smaller 

military incapable of meeting the strategy, or we will try to maintain capacity, in which case it will be the hollow force that I joined 

in the late 1970s. In either case, it is not what the United States 

of America needs to defend itself. 

Mr. SCOTT. I would just suggest that the sooner we deal with the 

BCA, the better off we will be. It makes no sense to start building 

a ship today that cannot be completed because the Budget Control 

Act forces the termination of the contract early. 

As we talk about those tough choices, a lot of countries were 

mentioned. Some countries that were not mentioned in your testimony were Venezuela, Honduras, El Salvador, Colombia, Guatemala, Mexico. 

I had time to visit with Admiral Tidd in Miami a few months 

ago. We talked about the narcotics flow into the United States from 

those countries. Approximately 50,000 Americans died from drug 

overdoses last year. At a minimum, half of that, half of those drugs 

originated from the SOUTHCOM [U.S. Southern Command] area 

of responsibility. A lot of other countries down there with chaos 

that are going on outside of the transnational criminal organizations. 

What additional resources do we need to combat the transnational criminal organizations within the SOUTHCOM region? 

Given the threat that they pose to Americans, why is this not a 

higher U.S. national security priority? 

General DUNFORD. Congressman, the two major capability areas 

that Admiral Tidd probably shared with you when you were down 

there is intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance, so he can 

support the interagency effort to stop drug flow, as well as maritime capability to interdict that drug flow. Those are the two main 

capability areas that he would want to have and that we have not 

been able to routinely meet the requirements that he has identified. 

Mr. SCOTT. General, they are so short-funded that, when they 

have the intel that there is a load of cocaine coming into the 

United States, in many cases, they have to sit there and watch it 

go by. 

I know, as we talk about all of these other concerns, you have 

got a lot to balance, but I just wonder if maybe, just as we do for 

OCO, maybe there should be a direct funding line for SOUTHCOM 

with regard to the drug interdiction mission. I know that, without 

training dollars, they simply would not be able to function at this 

stage. And so I would just encourage you as you go forward to just 

keep in mind that over 50,000 Americans died from drug overdoses 
37 

last year, significantly more than have died from acts of terrorism 

in the last decade, and that war is on our border. It is right here. 

It is on top of us. 

With that said, I appreciate your service to the country, your 

commitment to the country. 

And, Mr. Norquist, I look forward to getting to know you better, 

but thank you for your service as well. 

With that, I yield the remainder of my time. 

The CHAIRMAN. Ms. Gabbard. 

Ms. GABBARD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, gentlemen, 

for your service and for joining us here this evening. 

Secretary Mattis, after the attacks on 9/11, the leaders of our 

country made a commitment to the American people that they 

would go after and defeat Al Qaeda, yet we have not carried out 

a serious campaign to do so to defeat Al Qaeda in Syria specifically 

where, as a result of that, Al Qaeda has been able to gain strength 

and territory. In your budget request this year, your request of $500 million to 

counter ISIS in Syria does not include any mention or dollars to 

go after Al Qaeda. So my question is, is this for military reasons 

or political reasons, namely that Al Qaeda is allied with and so 

deeply intertwined with the so-called moderate rebels that the 

United States, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and other Gulf states have 

been financing and supporting in their fight to overthrow the Syrian Government? 

Secretary MATTIS. Congresswoman, we have had a serious campaign, as you know, against Al Qaeda. Al Qaeda in the FATA [Federally Administered Tribal Areas] area has been shredded as a capable outfit. They have been unable to attack America for many, 

many years. 

Now, they have franchised out is the point you are making and 

from Yemen to Somalia, from the Sahel to certainly Syria, and all 

this is a franchised Al Qaeda metastasizing threat. 

Ms. GABBARD. And, respectfully, sir, I agree and understand that 

Al Qaeda has spread, but specifically with Syria, Al Qaeda’s presence in Syria is far greater today than it ever was before, which 

speaks to my question about our lack of taking them on in a serious way, specifically in Syria. 

Secretary MATTIS. The location of where they are at in Syria 

makes them very difficult for us to reach, frankly, and we would 

have to deconflict even more vis-a-vis the Russians. Let me ask 

General Dunford if he has anything to add to this. But you are 

right. They are embedded pretty deeply, and they are hard to get 

to. 

General DUNFORD. Congresswoman, I know you visited and you 

probably know—well, you can argue whether we have had sufficient resources. We do have a dedicated campaign against Al 

Qaeda in Syria. We do have specific resources dedicated just for the 

fight against Al Qaeda, but it is fair to say our priority in Syria 

has been ISIS because we are operating largely in the east, and 

that is where ISIS has been. 

Ms. GABBARD. To both of you gentlemen, when your budget is for 

a counter-ISIS program, your commander’s mission on the ground 

for Inherent Resolve is to defeat Daesh or ISIS, and there is no 
38 

mention of Al Qaeda and the fact that Al Qaeda has become so difficult to target specifically because our country has not been taking 

them on in a serious way and they have become so deeply intertwined with these armed militants that have been and continue to 

be working alongside and oftentimes under the command of Al 

Qaeda with our support through the CIA [Central Intelligence 

Agency] and Saudi Arabia and Qatar and these other countries. 

So, given the fact that this is the group that has been targeting 

us since that attack on 9/11, what can we do in Congress and the 

administration to stop that support of these armed militants that 

are strengthening Al Qaeda and actually go after them? 

Secretary MATTIS. I think, Congresswoman, we can start, if this 

is Congress’ intent, with an authorization for the use of military 

force in Syria against Al Qaeda with the funding and resourcing. 

The statement by Congress would show the spirit of Congress, 

frankly. 

Ms. GABBARD. Yes, sir, but the authorization that you are currently operating under in Syria was the one passed by Congress in 

2001 to go after Al Qaeda and its affiliates. Is that not right? 

Secretary MATTIS. We used that authority, yes, ma’am. The challenge is that, right now, we have a greater clear and present danger with ISIS, and you saw why in 2014, and we went after what 

we thought was the priority danger through two different—well, 

through one administration and now with this administration. 

Ms. GABBARD. Sir, I think the reason why ISIS you are saying 

is now a greater danger is because it was not taken seriously—one 

reason among many—it was not taken seriously from the beginning. And that is the concern here with Al Qaeda, is that because 

it has been largely ignored, it has grown to a point where it has 

now become difficult to take on and now presents a greater threat 

to the United States, and this must be addressed. 

Secretary MATTIS. I think that is fair, and we are addressing it 

from Yemen to Somalia and other areas, but we are certainly—we 

will look at what you are talking about here. It is not that we are 

not addressing it there. It is just that we do not have the reach 

right now, and we will take a look at it, but there are plenty of 

enemies in Syria, and I would agree with you on that. 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Cook. 

Mr. COOK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I want to thank everybody for being here tonight. I know we 

have had a long session here, but Mr. Scott asked some of these 

issues, and it is something I am very concerned about. Quite frankly, I came to Congress to be on this committee, and maybe I might 

not be as empathetic to some of the other issues that are going on. 

Everyone’s got their own area that they are really interested in. 

But I am sorry; with what is going on in the world and everything 

else, that your testimony is so important, and we have had testimony about being C3, C4, which translates—and, quite frankly, I 

do not think the rest of the Congress or the Senate know exactly 

the implications of being not combat ready. And that means, basically, if the balloon goes up, we are going to have to commit troops 

to a conflict where they are going to die or at least be wounded. 

And so that is a big priority with me. 
39 

So, you know, we are going to have this debate whether we are 

going to have a continuing resolution. I think it will be so stupid 

if we send that message again and even worse if we do not end 

that sequester. 

Now, my question, you know where I stand, but I will be damned 

if I am going bury anymore Marines on my watch. If we continue 

with that, as I described, and we have units that are C3 and C4, 

and we have all these commitments in Europe all over the world, 

what kind of message will it send to our allies and, in this case 

particularly, our NATO allies that we have been after them to meet 

their 2 percent commitment, yet we ourselves cannot have our 

units combat ready? 

And in light of the RAND [Corporation] study, Mr. Secretary and 

General Dunford, if you could address that in terms of, you know, 

those 28 countries—actually, it is 29 now with Montenegro in there 

right under the gun of the Russians. And what kind of message 

would we be sending them? 

Secretary MATTIS. Well, Congressman, we share your priority 

you place on this. That is the reason why we came for the fiscal 

year 2017 supplemental. It is why this budget grows significantly. 

I share the concern that it does not grow enough, but, again, we 

are trying to balance a lot of things along with a debt. And I just 

have to recognize that this is going to take some time to get out 

of. 

What is the message we send, sir? I would say the message to 

our allies would be worrisome. It will not be reassuring. But more 

importantly, it is the message to our adversaries that would concern me that this is a time to test us. 

General DUNFORD. Congressman, I think you raised two issues, 

and the Secretary spoke about one of them. The first is that I think 

history tells us that the perception of strength has a lot to do with 

the probability of conflict. And so if our adversaries look at us and 

we are strong and the perception is that we are strong, that drives 

down the probability that we will have to fight. 

But then the second thing you raise is, if deterrence fails and we 

do have to respond to a conflict, it will be come as you are. And 

the cost of not being ready will be in time to accomplish our objectives and in casualties, which is what you spoke about. 

So I could not agree with you more. And when our allies in 

NATO or elsewhere look to the United States, what they see is 

what gives them confidence that we can meet our commitments 

and that we will be strong. And so I think it is fair to say they 

have concerns about that. 

Mr. COOK. I yield back. Thank you. 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. O’Rourke. 

Mr. O’ROURKE. Mr. Secretary, I wanted to begin by extending my 

sympathies to you and those who are serving currently in Afghanistan and to the families of those who lost their lives, U.S. service 

members who lost their lives in Afghanistan this weekend. 

And I think so much of what we are talking about and the support that you are asking us to provide is to ensure, as you mentioned, that we are ensuring the readiness and the ability of those 

brave service members to do the jobs that we have asked them to 

do. 
40 

And you have also mentioned, and I think accurately so, that 

Congress has sidelined itself from some of its key responsibilities, 

and the effects of those are very serious. And I would add that I— 

I would say Congress has sidelined itself from its oversight and 

ownership of the wars that we have been fighting. And I want to 

make sure that we work more effectively together to ensure that 

we are doing our part. 

In this budget, in our projections for this coming year, what 

should we expect to see in Afghanistan? How many service members do we have there now? How many do we project to see over 

the course of the year that we have a budget for, or a proposed 

budget for? 

Secretary MATTIS. Yes, sir. We have got, as you know, a little 

under 10,000 U.S. service members there at this time. The commander on the ground, in light of the situation, has asked for more. 

Those discussions are ongoing right now with the President and 

myself and the Chairman advising him. 

And I think the decision will be taken soon. We have got to come 

up with a more regional strategy. So what we are doing is connected to the geographic reality of where this enemy is fighting 

from. As you know, it is not just from Afghanistan. 

And so we are engaged in this. However, the bulk of the fighting 

will continue to be carried by the Afghan forces, as we have seen 

over the last several years. 

Mr. O’ROURKE. Are the proposals in those ongoing conversations 

reflected in the overseas contingency operations numbers that you 

presented earlier? 

Secretary MATTIS. They are not right now, Congressman. 

Mr. O’ROURKE. There may be a supplemental request depending 

on the outcome of that conversation? 

Secretary MATTIS. There would be, yes, sir, which we would have 

to have a discussion with you to explain it. 

Mr. O’ROURKE. Something that you told us when we first had a 

chance to meet with you that has stuck with me since is that the 

United States has two principal powers, the power of intimidation 

and the power of inspiration. 

And I guess, to bring it back to the subject of the hearing and 

what the cost is of those two powers, do you feel that we have the 

appropriate balance of the two? Are we trying to do too much 

around the world through our powers of intimidation? And to use 

Afghanistan again. 

And you mentioned doing more with regional powers. How could 

we complement the extraordinary service of those who are deployed 

and whose lives are on the line with the resources necessary to provide the inspiration side of the equation? 

Secretary MATTIS. Well, sir, the inspiration side is more than 

just what we deploy with. However, in the deployed category, 

where we are out there with USAID [U.S. Agency for International 

Development], U.S. diplomatic service, that sort of thing, our education efforts, where we fund students to come back to the United 

States on exchange tours, there is a host of things we do in terms 

of building the broader power of America’s inspiration so that it is 

actually a player in this competitive—against competitive ideologies right now. 
41 

So are we doing enough? Well, I mean, you can always do more, 

but you can always do more in the military realm. We try to get 

the right blend. And I think that we are at least going in the right 

direction on that. 

Mr. O’ROURKE. Do you think we need to do anything fundamentally different in Afghanistan to achieve a different result as we approach almost 16 years in? Or, by and large, will it be more of the 

same for the foreseeable future? 

Secretary MATTIS. I think we have got to do things differently, 

sir, and it has got to be looked at as across the board, whole-of-government, not just military efforts, plus allied efforts and internationals. 

Along the same lines of what Secretary Tillerson is orchestrating 

against, for example, ISIS, right now, what NATO is orchestrating 

in Afghanistan, but even broader than we are doing it up until 

now. 

Mr. O’ROURKE. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Lamborn. 

Mr. LAMBORN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And, Mr. Secretary and General Dunford, thank you both for 

your wonderful dedication and service to our country. We all appreciate that. 

Secretary Mattis, I want to ask you about research and development for space and then research and development for missile defense. And I know you see the need for both of those important 

areas. 

In your testimony on page 5, you said, ‘‘Outer space, long considered a sanctuary, is now contested. This creates the need to develop capabilities and capacities for more resilient satellites designed to withstand persistent kinetic and nonkinetic attack.’’ 

So in your written testimony, you certainly point out the need for 

more capacity and more capability for space. And also in missile 

defense, I know you are a proponent of exploring boost phase missile defense, when the adversaries’ missiles are at their most vulnerable state. 

But I am just concerned, and the chairman asked you this at the 

very beginning of the hearing, we are cutting the budget for missile 

defense research and development. And in the space R&D budget, 

it is at a 30-year low. So in both cases, we are really not putting 

our money where our mouth is. 

And I know President Trump wants to have a state-of-the-art 

missile defense system. So how do we square the needs out there 

with the fact that we are cutting and not necessarily—and, Mr. 

Norquist, I am going to ask you to jump in on this also—why are 

we not putting our money where our mouth is? 

Secretary MATTIS. Sir, it is a prioritization. As you know, right 

now, we have the ballistic missile defense capability at Fort Greely 

and down in California, Vandenberg. And I think that right now 

we can first do the study to make certain we know what is the— 

what are we lacking, define the problem well enough that we are 

targeted like a laser beam on exactly what we need. 

Boost phase, as you know, is geographically dependent, for example, and that just may not be something that we want to put a lot 

of money into because, you know, it just may not be as relevant as 
42 

increased naval capability that we can move around. It would be 

one example up and down our coast to help defend. 

I want to get this right. Before we come to you and spend a lot 

of money, you are going to count on us that we did our homework, 

and I have not yet done it. And that is probably the best answer 

I can give you. 

As far as space, we are taking advantage of some things that the 

intelligence services are telling us, but I would prefer to, again, 

study this a little more. I am not disagreeing that we do not need 

the R&D in these two areas at all, however. 

Mr. LAMBORN. Okay. Thank you. 

Mr. Norquist, you are probably itching to answer a lot of questions here tonight, so could you jump in on it. 

Mr. NORQUIST. Thank you, Congressman. 

I would just point out two things. I do not know how the R&D 

breaks out among the individual programs, but overall the science 

and technology piece of RDT&E [research, development, test, and 

evaluation] that the research adds. That is $13.2 billion, which is 

up $600 million from the 2017 budget. So there has been an investment in research and technology in the S&T [science and technology] area. 

And on the space—— 

Mr. LAMBORN. That is DOD-wide, right? 

Mr. NORQUIST. That is DOD-wide, correct. So I do not know the 

individual piece of that, but DOD-wide, there has been an increase 

in investment in that area. 

Mr. LAMBORN. Okay. Well, I am glad to hear that. But you would 

agree with the need for space and missile defense research and development in particular. Would you not? 

Mr. NORQUIST. Correct. 

Mr. LAMBORN. And, General, do you have anything to add to this 

conversation? 

General DUNFORD. I do not, Congressman. 

Mr. LAMBORN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back. 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Moulton. 

Mr. MOULTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Secretary, when I was a young second lieutenant standing 

in the Kuwaiti desert, you gave me a lot of confidence as my division commander. And I have to say that you give me a lot of confidence today as our Secretary of Defense. So thank you for continuing to serve the country. 

Mr. Chairman, I will withhold my praise for you, lest I be unduly 

accused of favoring the Marine Corps. But suffice it to say, we are 

lucky to have you as well. 

Speaking of that confidence, Mr. Secretary, do you have confidence in our post-Mosul, our day-after plan in Iraq? It would be— 

I would never have believed standing in that Kuwaiti desert 14 

years ago that we would still be there today. 

With the plan as it is resourced today, are you confident that we 

will be able to win Iraq once and for all and bring the substantial 

number of our troops home? 

Secretary MATTIS. Congressman, it is going to be a long fight. 

Even in Iraq, as we throw ISIS out, we are going to have to deal 

with the aftermath. I would tell you that we are working this by, 
43 

with, and through allies, and so I do not have the same control 

over the day-to-day activities of what is going to happen, for example, in west Mosul in the post-combat phase. 

But I think that we are going to have to work with the Government of Iraq in the—what I would call post-combat pre-reconciliation phase so we do not end up in this same situation again. And 

we are committed to working with the Government of Iraq and 

Prime Minister Abadi, who, as you know, visited here in Washington 2 months ago, month and a half ago. 

Mr. MOULTON. Mr. Secretary, from your view, does the State Department have the resources it needs to support the Iraqi Government as you describe? 

Secretary MATTIS. I believe they do. I would defer to the State 

Department evaluation of that, however. 

Mr. MOULTON. Okay. Mr. Secretary, in order to do your job, you 

need to have a workforce. You need to have personnel in the Department of Defense. And there has been a lot of concern about just 

filling positions. How many positions at the Pentagon do you have 

unfilled today? 

Secretary MATTIS. Congressman, I need to take that for the 

record. Day by day, we are getting more people through the process. As you know, the Senate Armed Services Committee has very 

high ethical standards, higher than any other department for the 

people that come to work, so it takes a while for some to disentangle their finances. It is challenging. But—— 

Mr. MOULTON. Have there been any nominations or any names 

that have been rejected by the administration, names not requiring 

Senate confirmation? 

Secretary MATTIS. I am not aware of any rejected at the White 

House. There were some that we were told would not make it 

through Capitol Hill. But I had no one that I can think of rejected 

there. 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on 

page 128.] 

Mr. MOULTON. Is there anyone that you have brought on to the 

Department of Defense who has subsequently been pulled out for 

political reasons by the White House? 

Secretary MATTIS. I cannot think—I have only had a few, as you 

know, brought on and—Secretary of the Air Force, Comptroller. I 

do not have very many—I have not had any pulled out by the 

White House. 

Mr. MOULTON. Okay. Mr. Secretary, I would like to move on to 

the role of Congress in all of this. And you have outlined, as has 

the Chairman, the responsibilities that we have to ensure a proper 

budget, proper resources to come to grips with the financial situation of the country, which people in your position have cited as one 

of the greatest threats to our national defense. 

What are, if you could name the top five programs or projects, 

that you do not want at the Department of Defense but we here 

in Congress force upon you, thereby taking away resources from requirements that you need to fund? I think that would be helpful 

as we go through the NDAA process. 

Secretary MATTIS. Congressman, I better do a little homework 

and get back to you on that. I have mentioned that BRAC is one 
44 

that I do want that Congress may not want, but I think I can make 

a persuasive argument on that. But I cannot think of something 

that Congress is forcing right now, but I will look into this and get 

back to you. 

Mr. MOULTON. Mr. Secretary, would you be able to get back to 

us before the NDAA markup with that list? 

Secretary MATTIS. I should be able to get back to you this week, 

I would imagine. If there is something out there, I will find it 

quick. 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on 

page 128.] 

Mr. MOULTON. Okay. Thank you both again very much for your 

service. We are proud to have you. 

Mr. Chairman, I yield back. 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Bridenstine. 

Mr. BRIDENSTINE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Secretary, I think you will find broad bipartisan support for 

the budget request that we have received, which, of course, increases defense spending a little bit. I think you will also find some 

bipartisan support for even more. 

As a former Navy pilot currently serving the Oklahoma Air National Guard, I used to fly counterdrug missions. I would like to 

piggyback for a second on what Mr. Scott from Georgia was talking 

about. I used to fly the E–2 Hawkeye, VAW–77, the Nightwolves. 

In 2013, my squadron under the sequester was eliminated. My squadron was responsible for busting about $2 billion worth of cocaine every year on the high seas, $2 billion. That cocaine now 

comes into the United States, and, of course, Mr. Scott mentioned, 

I think you said 50,000 Americans die in drug overdoses every 

year, which is more than all the Americans we lost in Vietnam, if 

not—maybe close to if not more. 

So this is a big concern. As far as the capability gap, I understand when you mentioned that the concern is if we spend too 

much too fast, it could end up putting us in a position where it is 

not sustainable and we could end up with a, as you mentioned, a 

hollow force, which is a concern, I think, for pretty much everybody 

on this panel. 

I would also say that there are a lot of unfunded requirements 

that ultimately we could be working on today. And I would just ask 

General Dunford, when we deploy an Aegis cruiser or a THAAD 

[Terminal High Altitude Area Defense] missile battery, are we deploying those with the full complement of interceptors? 

General DUNFORD. We have some precision munition challenges 

that bleed over into our Navy weapons systems. 

Mr. BRIDENSTINE. And are you aware that when we deploy one 

Aegis, many times there is an underway switching of missiles from 

one Aegis to another Aegis? 

General DUNFORD. I am aware of that, Congressman. 

Mr. BRIDENSTINE. So these are examples of unfunded requirements that ultimately we could meet today if the resources were 

there that ultimately would not put us into a position to have a 

hollow force in the future? 

General DUNFORD. Congressman, I would like to just address 

that precision munitions challenge. We today have requested re-
45 

sources that get to the maximum amount that industry can 

produce. But there is a caveat to that: Industry can produce at the 

level of prediction that they have right now; in other words, they 

can only produce so much today based on what we are able to tell 

them about tomorrow. 

So one of the areas that the Secretary has highlighted is the 

need for predictability and stability in the future as well. And the 

only way we are going to get around the challenge is—that is a 

great example of why we need stable, predictable budgets because 

we actually cannot buy the precision munitions we need until we 

do have stable, predictable budgets at adequate levels. 

So, again, industry is telling us today we are producing at the 

maximum rate we can. But if we were able to tell them what resources would be available 2, 3, 4, 5 years down the road, they 

would be able to increase the industrial capacity and actually address that particular issue. 

So that is just one of the second-order effects of the challenge we 

have been in living year to year with a number of CRs that we 

have had is we are not able to give industry the predictability they 

need to actually meet our requirements. And that is actually the 

story of precision munitions. 

Mr. BRIDENSTINE. So if we are doing a defense appropriation annually, how do we address that? 

General DUNFORD. We would have to, with a program, be able 

to provide our industry partners with some degree of accuracy the 

rough order of magnitude of resources that would be available in 

the out-years. And because of the budget situation right now, we 

are simply not able to do that. 

Mr. BRIDENSTINE. Okay. I would encourage, Mr. Chairman, Mr. 

Secretary, as you look at the budget and as we work as a body 

here, know that we fully support increasing the defense spending, 

that we have capabilities that we are leaving on the table. And if 

we can support you in that effort, whether it is long term or next 

year, we want to do it. And I would encourage you to look at unfunded liability or unfunded requirements specifically. 

I yield back, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Ms. Hanabusa. 

Ms. HANABUSA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Gentlemen, thank you for being here this evening. 

Secretary Mattis, your testimony you have five priorities. The 

fifth, of course, is the support of what we call the OCO funding. 

OCO has been something that I never quite understood for the 

time that I have been here. It is sort of—it was originally not even 

on budget so to speak, then we kind of report it, but it is still a 

question as to whether it counts, it does not count. 

So in your mind, when you say your fifth priority is in support 

of the OCO budget, what do you anticipate the $64 billion to be 

used for? 

Secretary MATTIS. This is for operations, Congresswoman, 

against ISIS in Iraq and Syria. It has to do with any place that 

we have active areas of hostilities, Afghanistan, for example. And 

this is over and above the standard budget to maintain our military. These are for the operations we actually conduct there. 
46 

Unfortunately, we have seen at times things that belonged in the 

base budget put into the OCO. And I share Congress’ frustration, 

the base budget should have the base budget and it should only be 

for those things that grow based on overseas contingency operations. 

Ms. HANABUSA. So your overseas contingency operation definition 

is the battle against ISIS, and it is Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria. 

Would that be a correct statement? 

General DUNFORD. Congresswoman, it also pays for units that 

are at home station preparing to go to those particular fights. And 

we also have some OCO outside of that with the Al Qaeda fight in 

Africa, as an example. 

Ms. HANABUSA. In Africa as well? But it is also tied to ISIS? 

General DUNFORD. It is tied to violent extremists. 

Ms. HANABUSA. Some terrorist organization? 

General DUNFORD. That is right. 

Ms. HANABUSA. Mr. Secretary, I do know from your history that 

you are a very interesting person in the sense that, your time at 

Hoover, you have written a lot, you have thought a lot. 

One of my favorite reading materials that you did was ‘‘Warriors 

and Citizens’’ that you put together at Hoover Institute. 

So given that philosophy that I call it, your philosophical bet on 

a lot of this, how do you want to put together or come to grips with 

the fact that we have a QDR [Quadrennial Defense Review] in 

2018, you have authorized an NPR in 2017, and I believe somewhere in there there is going to be a review of the ballistic missile 

defense. 

So do you feel that it is premature, or do you feel that any of 

these studies could somehow affect what you are coming here and 

asking us for today? 

Secretary MATTIS. Certainly, it will affect it via there will be implications downstream. But right now we know the situation, the 

threats we face today. We know the force we have today. We know 

the readiness shortfalls we have today. 

And I am confident right now that we can justify the dollars that 

we are asking for. Certainly, we will define the problems, strategic 

and operational problems for the future that need further addressal. But right now, I am confident that what we are asking for we 

can defend. 

Ms. HANABUSA. Mr. Secretary, you cannot come to Congress and 

on page 11 of your testimony talk about BRAC and not expect any 

of us to just have a free pass at that. So can you tell me when you 

talk about BRAC and you want the ability—you want Congress to 

give you the authority to consider BRACing, can you tell me what 

your criteria is? 

You must have some idea by requesting it as to what kind of, 

quote, establishments, facilities, whatever you may want to call it, 

you want to BRAC, because you must feel that somehow it is excess, that we do not need it? 

Secretary MATTIS. Right. It would be facilities that we no longer 

need nor can we foresee using them in the future even if we have 

to mobilize, for example, significant parts of our Reserves. It would 

be the ones that we do not—the facilities that do not perhaps any 

longer have training capability because of urban spread around 
47 

them where we can no longer safely do what we used to do there. 

It would be that sort of a situation. 

Ms. HANABUSA. Mr. Secretary, is a list or some kind of a, you 

know, potential BRAC list exist? Does it exist today? 

Secretary MATTIS. I have been told we have 20 percent excess capacity, but as I said earlier, I am not confident in that figure. And 

I would want to look at it again and make certain that we validate 

the criteria that was used to get there and then go back through 

it. 

Ms. HANABUSA. Before my time runs out, can you provide us a 

list, whatever you have? 

Secretary MATTIS. I cannot right now, ma’am, because I am not 

willing to put my name to it. I want to study it first. 

Ms. HANABUSA. Thank you. And I yield back, Mr. Chair. 

The CHAIRMAN. Dr. Wenstrup. 

Dr. WENSTRUP. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I want to thank you for your service, especially in an extremely 

challenging time for our Nation and for the world. And neither of 

you have to be here, and you are choosing to do it. And it is a tremendous challenge. As I said, our threats are so many. It is so 

multifocal, it is so multifaceted that it is even hard to list. And the 

chessboard is more than three-dimensional, in my opinion. 

You know, with that in mind, one of the things that you mentioned, Mr. Secretary, was that it is going to be a long slog. A lot 

of these things are going to be long, drawn out. You know, as a soldier in the field, when you know that is the situation, then you 

look for your short gains, right, because you want to have that motivation there. 

So I guess my first question is, how do you see the morale of our 

military today? 

Secretary MATTIS. Sir, I would like the Chairman also to respond 

to that. In my discussions, in the e-mails I receive, the young people are quite—they show a lot of initiative in helping me to run the 

Department. I would just tell you that so far I think we have got— 

the morale is holding. The affection of the American people is 

understood, and that has a lot to do with why the morale is held. 

That said, I believe the families in many cases have become riddled with repeated deployments of their husbands, wives, mothers, 

fathers, whatever. And I think that there is some question about 

the level of commitment when people cannot fly the airplane that 

they know they have got to be good at flying. 

They cannot put their vehicles in the field. The ships are not 

going to sea on schedule or they are deployed longer overseas because they are waiting for the ship that had to go through more 

extensive repairs to get out. 

But let me ask the Chairman to give a few words on that, sir. 

He is a little closer. 

General DUNFORD. Congressman, you know, one of the privileges 

is having the chance to go around and meet with members and 

families from all the services. And I think, by and large, morale is 

very high. 

But the Secretary spoke about families, and I think I do see some 

challenges with our families. And also, if you look at some of these 

readiness challenges, they cannot help but affect morale. If you are 
48 

a pilot that is flying 10 or 11 hours a month and you are in a 

squadron that should have 12 aircraft and only has 6 aircraft, it 

cannot help but affect you. 

Now, I will tell you, we are recruiting and retaining high-quality 

people. I think morale is better than any of us should expect that 

it would be after 16 years at war. As the Secretary said, the AllVolunteer Force was never envisioned to be at war for this enduring period of time. 

So I think there is a lot of reasons for us to be proud of the morale and proud of the quality of people that we are recruiting and 

retaining. But I do not take it for granted. And I do think some 

of the challenges we have with our families and some of the challenges we have with people who are in units most affected by these 

readiness challenges, those are going to have an impact over time 

and we should be attentive to that. 

Dr. WENSTRUP. Yeah, I think that sometimes the country does 

not always understand the sacrifices that are being made by the 

troops and their family and then the challenges that they face 

when we really do not have them at full readiness the way that we 

would like to. And so I think that is in part on us here to make 

sure that the country is aware of that. 

And as you look ahead, you know, our current readiness state, 

as you just mentioned, it has us doing less things than we would 

like. And so to me, it is very difficult and challenging for you to 

make a list of what we are going to do next, you know, how do we 

have a step-by-step plan, you know. 

I think traditionally in wars, you know, we take this land, we go 

to the next step and we keep moving on. This is very challenging, 

a different environment than we have ever seen, and you are talking about terrorism as well as near-peer adversaries. 

So I think it would be helpful to us to be able to explain how difficult it is if we are not fully ready and equipped to even compile 

a plan that can get us where we want to be someday where there 

may be some peace. 

And so my question is, do you have a list and based on that, does 

it reflect what you need but do not have? 

Secretary MATTIS. Sir, we have an assessment that tells us what 

we need to be ready for and that assessment comes to us from our 

regional commanders based on any treaties that we are in, the protection of the American homeland. There is all sorts of things that 

figure into what national security looks like. 

Based on that, we know a number of forces that we need and 

what level of readiness, how fast they have to be ready to deploy. 

So that is the way we parse it out. And then we look at what each 

of those forces needs, an Air Force, Navy, this sort of thing for 

readiness to deploy. 

So we break it down into something that is manageable by unit 

commanders who know what they are expected to do. An Army brigade commander knows he must be able to move, shoot, and communicate with his brigade of troops, close with and destroy an 

enemy. 

A ship commander knows he must be prepared to deploy on so 

many days’ notice with this much ordinance and his people trained 

to do things. So we do have it. It is broken down. It is very complex 
49 

to make the joint force work. But the commanders know and the 

troops know, the NCOs [noncommissioned officers] know, sir. 

The CHAIRMAN. Ms. Rosen. 

Ms. ROSEN. Thank you. 

I want to thank you for being here into these late hours and your 

willingness to answer all of our questions so candidly. 

And, you know, a question was asked a few minutes ago by Representative O’Rourke that mentioned America’s role and inspiration in being a world leader. And, Secretary Mattis, in 2013, you 

said yourself that if you do not fund the State Department fully, 

then I need to buy more ammunition ultimately. 

So we know that the President’s budget slashes funding for the 

State Department and foreign aid about 32 percent. In a recent oped by a retired Admiral Michael Mullen and retired General James 

Jones, they mentioned that research does suggest that investing in 

prevention is 60 times—I will say that again—60 times less costly 

than war and post-conflict costs. 

So do you support this decrease of foreign diplomatic support by 

the President, and does it not seem to undermine our success and 

our stature around the world if we do this? 

Secretary MATTIS. Congresswoman, that is a tough one for me to 

answer because I have not looked at where those cuts lie, you 

know. I cannot give you an authoritative answer. 

I will tell you that when the President’s budget was released, due 

to the teamwork between Department of Defense and Department 

of State, we immediately—Secretary Tillerson and I met and we 

looked at where is the money that I have for development aid, 

what does he still anticipate receiving, and looking at how do we 

jointly figure out the priorities. 

So we are working on it within a sense of teamwork, a spirit of 

collaboration between DOD and Department of State to try to get 

the best return on the money. But I have not—I honestly have not 

looked at his budget and looked at where the cuts are coming from, 

so I would rather not speak about something I have not studied. 

Ms. ROSEN. Thank you. 

I guess what I want to say about that then is, does that relate— 

how does that relate to what you are going to request? Because if 

we do not put money into prevention, is that going to increase your 

budget request, and where will it do it, especially in regards to 

ISIS, cyberterrorism, some of those issues? If we are not stopping 

and preventing, then what do you have to do on the back end? 

Secretary MATTIS. Well, I mean, the challenges we face in some 

cases, having fought this enemy for a long time, there is probably 

very little we can do to rationally move them out of where they are 

at because they did not rationally gain their perspective. 

That does not mean we should not try to take the next generation and prevent them from going down this path. But I would just 

tell you that in terms of defense of the country, that is what Department of Defense does when it comes to the kinetic side, the lethal side and making the Department the most lethal it can possibly be is where I focus in, although I work very, very closely with 

Secretary Tillerson to support his efforts. 

Ms. ROSEN. Thank you. I will yield back my time. 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Byrne. 
50 

Mr. BYRNE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Gentlemen, thank you for being so patient with us. If you do not 

mind, I would like to go back to the discussion we had earlier about 

the size of our Navy fleet. Now, we know from the Navy’s Force 

Structure Assessment that has been just last year that they recommend 355 ships. 

Our President, our Commander in Chief says he knows we need 

350 ships, pretty close to one another. So we know where we want 

to go. The Congressional Budget Office [CBO] gave us an estimate 

that to build a 355-ship Navy would require an additional $5 billion a year for shipbuilding. 

General Dunford, let me start with you. Do you agree in general 

with CBO’s analysis to what more we need to be spending per year 

on shipbuilding? 

General DUNFORD. Congressman, I have seen that study and it 

looks about right to me based on my experience. 

Mr. BYRNE. Thank you, sir. 

Well, looking at this year’s budget, obviously, after you heard the 

questioning from Chairman Wittman, we know that we are actually not going in that direction with the proposed budget for 2018. 

At what point, in your estimation, General, are we going to get to 

the point where we are spending that extra $5 billion to get to the 

size of fleet we are trying to get to? 

General DUNFORD. No, Chairman, thanks for asking that question. I mean, you know, my characterization of 2018 is that it is 

the second year in a row we begin to turn around a trend that really was 7 or 8 years in the making. And it is going to take several 

years to get us out of the hole that we are in right now, which is 

why I just maybe highlight in my opening remarks that just to 

maintain the relative competitive advantage today would require a 

3 percent above inflation. 

And so in the coming years—and, of course, we do not have a 

long-term program now. We will have that in the future—when we 

think about what is adequate in the future, we need to have it in 

context of those requirements that you have identified and the real 

growth above inflation that will be required to realize that. 

Mr. BYRNE. Mr. Courtney made a very important point. When 

you are building ships, the timeline is very long. And so every year 

that you wait you push that timeline back further. Do you have 

any concerns that we are pushing that timeline back further with 

what is happening with retirement of some of our ships that are 

presently in the fleet? 

General DUNFORD. Congressman, I do. And the other thing I 

have a concern about is, you know, back to the example I used of 

precision munitions, you know, if we told a shipbuilder, you know, 

with predictability we were going to build 10 ships, they would be 

able to buy 10 ships worth of steel, 10 ships worth of copper piping—copper wiring and so forth; it would cost X. 

The fact that we are not able to provide predictability and actually make multiyear contracts for things like shipbuilding means 

we pay much more, which means we cannot get after meeting the 

requirements that you have identified. 

So I am concerned on two fronts: I am concerned that we are late 

to need in getting after these requirements; and I am also con-
51 

cerned that a failure to provide predictability means we will not be 

able to afford getting to this number of ships with the top line envisioned. 

Mr. BYRNE. Mr. Secretary, if I could turn to you for a moment. 

Your boss, the Commander in Chief, wants a 350-ship fleet. You 

just heard what General Dunford said. Where do you see—with the 

pace that we are on right now, where do you see the fleet being 

at the end of President Trump’s Presidency in January of 2025? 

Secretary MATTIS. Congressman, I think that depends on whether or not sequester is repealed, whether or not we start going for 

multiyear—there is a lot of variables here. 

Mr. BYRNE. Assume we do not have sequester. Based upon your 

budget request for 2018 and what you are—I know you are planning for years after that, where do you see the fleet 8 years from 

now? 

Secretary MATTIS. Sir, I need to come back to you with a reply 

that is researched here. 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on 

page 128.] 

Secretary MATTIS. The challenge is, sir, that we are in a position 

right now where we have got to get the fleet back to sea that we 

have now. We are trying to address this—trying to eat this elephant one bite at a time. 

And so we are going to have to increase—I would think it is 

going to take a budget that is probably up around 5 percent 

growth, real growth in order to get towards where we want to go. 

Three percent will not do it. A 3 percent growth will not suffice, 

I will tell you that. It is going to have to be up over 5 percent. 

Mr. BYRNE. Well, both—General, both to you and to the Secretary, I said this to you when we were together in Singapore a 

couple weeks ago, I strongly support what we need to do to give 

you the resources you need to protect the people of America. And 

if that means we need to repeal the Budget Control Act, I am prepared to do that. 

And with that, Mr. Chairman, I yield back. 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Carbajal. 

Mr. CARBAJAL. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. And thank 

you all for being here. 

Secretary Mattis, General Dunford, I cannot tell you how relieved I am that you are in the positions you are in. You actually 

provide great adult supervision to this administration, and I am 

just extremely grateful for your service and for you being where 

you are at. 

Secretary Mattis, I would like to follow up on the question that— 

Mr. Langevin’s question regarding climate change. One of the 

many reasons why I find President Trump’s decision to withdraw 

from the Paris climate accord disturbing is because of all the security risks we will face if we do not address climate change. 

For example, rising sea levels will affect the stability of military 

sites on the coastlines, including but not limited to sites in California, Virginia, South Carolina, North Carolina, Georgia, Florida, 

as they are at higher risk of severe flooding and other extreme 

weather events. 
52 

In 2008, the National Intelligence Council found that over 30 

military sites in the continental United States are already facing 

elevated risks because of sea-level rise. 

Secretary Mattis, what actions is the Department taking to protect against the effects of sea-level rise and climate change in general, especially in terms of protecting critical military infrastructure; and two, how can climate change complicate our strategic objective especially in terms of our Asia-Pacific rebalance strategy? 

Secretary MATTIS. Congressman, first, I would say that withdraw 

from the Paris accord is not—the administration is not going to do 

anything about it. They are going to do it under a different framework, but it is not that they are not going to address climate 

change, a warming climate. 

As far as what we do to address this inside the military, I have 

frankly been a little consumed by the situation in Korea and Europe and some others, so I need to get some specifics on this. But 

I know that we look at protection of our physical infrastructure 

wherever we are at, and along the coast, obviously, it is a significant concern with the effects of water, you know, whether it be a 

hurricane or rising sea levels. 

But I do not have a good answer for you right now, sir. But I 

will get you one. 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on 

page 128.] 

Mr. CARBAJAL. Thank you. 

Secretary Mattis, it is estimated that it will cost $1 trillion to 

sustain and modernize the nuclear deterrent over 30 years. We extensively discuss whether such modernization is necessary or not, 

whether we need more nuclear weapons. However, an area we tend 

to sideline is the threat of nuclear proliferation. 

What actions are you taking to address the threat of nuclear proliferation? How vital are nonproliferation programs? 

Secretary MATTIS. Sir, I think nuclear nonproliferation has not 

received enough attention over quite a few years. I have met with 

former Secretaries of Defense to gain from them their perspective 

when they were in the job I am in now. 

A former Secretary of Defense is coming in to see me tomorrow 

afternoon after I get done testifying in the morning over on the 

Senate side on this very issue. Rose Gottemoeller was mentioned 

earlier by one of your colleagues. I have met with her in Brussels. 

But I think this is going to be critical to what we turn over to 

our children’s generation. We have a responsibility to reenergize 

the nuclear nonproliferation effort. 

Mr. CARBAJAL. Thank you very much. I yield back, Mr. Chair. 

The CHAIRMAN. Ms. McSally. 

Ms. MCSALLY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And thank you, gentlemen. 

I want to talk about North Korea. Kim Jong-un has threatened 

to build the capability to hit the United States with an ICBM and 

a nuclear warhead. He seems to be obsessed towards gaining that 

capability. 

Secretary Mattis, do you believe that is an existential threat to 

our country if he were to gain that capability? 
53 

Secretary MATTIS. I do, Congresswoman. He does not have it yet, 

but we do not have to wait until it is there to start addressing it, 

yes, ma’am. 

Ms. MCSALLY. Exactly, and I agree with you. 

Should diplomacy fail and we need to use conventional capability 

to deal with this threat, can you paint a picture in this environment of what that would entail and what is left of North Korea 

when it is over? 

Secretary MATTIS. It would be a war like nothing we have seen 

since 1953. And it would—we would have to deal with it at whatever level of force was necessary. I am not the most articulate on 

this, ma’am, but it would be a very, very serious war. 

Ms. MCSALLY. General Dunford, do you want to comment on 

that? 

General DUNFORD. You asked about North Korea, Congresswoman McSally. Let me talk about South Korea. Regardless of 

what happens, there is 25 million people in Seoul, 300,000 of those 

are Americans, who are within range of thousands of rockets, missiles, and artillery pieces along the border. 

I do not have any doubt in my mind if we go to war with North 

Korea that we will win the war. We will be successful in accomplishing our objectives. I am equally confident in what Secretary 

Mattis said in that that conflict we will see casualties unlike anything we have seen in 60 or 70 years. 

And many of those casualties will be in the first 3, 5, 7 days of 

that war where all those people in the greater Seoul area are exposed to the North Korean threat that we will not be able to mitigate initially. 

Ms. MCSALLY. Thank you. I just think the American people need 

to understand the gravity of the situation that we are dealing with. 

But also our enemies need to know that ultimately, even as we are 

discussing readiness challenges and other challenges, we will win. 

But this is like something we have never seen in my lifetime anyway, should deterrence fail and should diplomacy fail. 

One of the capabilities you will need in that scenario—I was on 

the hook to deploy over there in the OPLANs [operational plans]— 

is the mighty A–10 Warthog. I was pleased to see in the President’s 

request of fully funding the remaining 283 aircraft, which is 9 operational squadrons. But we do not have the funding in there for rewinging the remaining 110 that need re-winging. They will be 

grounded soon if they are not re-wung. It is on your unfunded request, which is good. 

But nine squadrons is not a lot. Right now they are on the DMZ 

[demilitarized zone]. They are fighting against ISIS. They are deploying periodically to Europe to deal with the threat from Russia. 

And last week, we had Air Force generals testify that they are, you 

know, willing to go down to six squadrons, a cut of 33 percent, 

should the re-winging not happen. 

So you have agreed that you want this capability at least until 

2030, and I appreciate finally getting to that point. And I realize 

the limitations we have had fiscally in the last years. So we want 

the capability to at least to 2030. But if we were to provide that 

funding for the re-winging of the remaining 110, would you appre-
54 

ciate having the capacity of having those nine squadrons given the 

threats we are facing? 

Secretary MATTIS. Absolutely. The priorities are right where they 

are right now, but if we got the money for the additional ones, it 

would increase our warfighting capability. 

Ms. MCSALLY. Great. Thank you. 

General Dunford, anything else to add? 

General DUNFORD. The only thing I would say, Congresswoman, 

I think you understand that dynamic. What I always tell the Chief 

of Staff of the Air Force is, I said, look, to meet our requirements 

right now, I need all out of your legacy capability and a little bit 

more. And I also need you to start taking your legacy capability offline to grow the Air Force that we need tomorrow. 

So they really have—I think they have got it about right in 

terms of prioritization within the top line they have been given. 

But the truth of the matter is that there is more requirement than 

there is capability and capacity at 55 squadrons. 

Ms. MCSALLY. Exactly. Thank you, gentlemen. I appreciate it. 

And I yield back. 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Brown. 

Mr. BROWN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Gentlemen, thank you very much for your service, for your presence here this evening, your stamina, and your patience. I think 

my question is primarily for Secretary Mattis. You are not only 

well read, as I understand, but also well written. One of your 

works has already been referred to this evening. 

I had an opportunity to read an essay that you coauthored entitled, ‘‘Restoring Our National Security,’’ in which you wrote that 

for the past 20 years, across administrations of both political parties, the United States has been operating largely unguided by 

strategy. 

You say that while we have experienced tactical successes, they 

do not add up to strategic victories. And, in fact, they have cost 

lives, both soldiers and diplomats, national treasure, and global 

credibility. 

So I am a little confused as to why and how you can say that 

you are confident today about what is being proposed when we are 

looking at a proposal for a fiscal year 2018 budget without what 

we normally see, which is the Future Years Defense Program. 

I do acknowledge that in your testimony, your written testimony, 

I believe you stated as well that we will make hard choices as we 

develop our new defense strategy for fiscal year 2019 to 2023, and 

that will be informed by national defense strategy. 

But as we sit here today, would you not say that this is a costly 

undertaking that you are asking us to take without a strategy? 

There has been some conflicting comments, sometimes silence on 

issues like what are the decision rules regarding North Korea’s development of nuclear capabilities? What is an acceptable end state 

regarding China’s aggression in the South China Sea? 

And there are just a lot of other components that would go into 

a strategy. So what we are seeing here now seems here like a 

budget designed more for tactical success and not strategic victory. 

Can you just sort of respond or—yeah, respond to that? 
55 

Secretary MATTIS. Right. What we have to do is define very 

clearly what is the threat that we see, and, in fact, a number of 

studies have been mentioned here this evening that have helped in 

that definition. 

So far as the point I was making in the article, the chapter you 

read there from George Shultz’s ‘‘Blueprint for America,’’ what I 

was referring to was why did we go into Korea, Vietnam, Iraq, and 

why did we end up with tactical victories and not a strategic outcome. 

There is a very interesting article by the president emeritus Jim 

Wright, president emeritus of Dartmouth University in the Atlantic, July of 2013, that said, why do we go into these wars when we 

do not know how to end them. And the point he made was if you 

do not define the political end state when you go in, then you cannot figure out how to end the war on a positive note. 

Notice I left out one war, Desert Shield, Desert Storm, where 

very clear political guidance was given. But when you shift from 

those kind of tactical events to more broadly, we can define the 

threats to this country pretty well right now. That is why I am confident, Congressman. 

Mr. BROWN. Are you confident though that we have a strategy 

for the post-ISIL Syria and Iraq, how we ensure security and stability? 

Secretary MATTIS. That is being put together. We have been here 

a couple months. Secretary Tillerson, in his role as Secretary of 

State, I inform him of the military factors, but this foreign policy 

of the United States should largely be drawn up by the—basically 

the State Department. And I believe he is putting that together 

very, very well. His diplomats are literally serving alongside us in 

Syria right now with our officers who are in that fight. 

So I am confident it is being put together. It is not complete yet. 

But I know that we have got to fight this enemy no matter what. 

So that is just part of the current situation we have to address. It 

does not require a fully fleshed out strategy yet, but we are going 

to have to have one pretty darn quick. 

Mr. BROWN. Thank you. 

And, finally, if I can get this in, I do not want you to necessarily—you do not have to comment on what you think about the 

reduction of 29 percent in the State Department’s budget, but is 

that proposed—because you talked about whole-of-government approach. 

The reduction, does that inform the budget that we see in front 

of us? You know, fewer State Department dollars, you acknowledged that that means more Defense Department dollars. Is that 

reflected in the numbers? 

Secretary MATTIS. I do not believe so, sir. This is—I mean, I have 

diplomats from State Department serving alongside us right now, 

so I have not been affected by a reduction in State Department’s 

budget. And, again, I do not feel I am knowledgeable enough to 

give you a detailed understanding of what those cuts are. I would 

have to defer to the Secretary of State. 

Mr. BROWN. Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Russell. 
56 

Mr. RUSSELL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you, each, 

for being here tonight. 

Probably, there is no greater historical example of unpreparedness than what happened in the Philippines in 1942. I would like 

to read just a couple of brief excerpts from one of those soldiers 

that was there. There were 10,000 Americans that surrendered, 

650 died on the Baatan Death March by itself. All of those that 

survived that were weakened and endured horrific suffering, and 

more than two-thirds of them died. 

One of the survivors stated, ‘‘I am one of the few Americans who 

has lost a war and who has seen an American Army overrun and 

defeated by a combination of starvation, sickness, unpreparedness, 

and superior enemy forces. . . . It was a lonesome feeling. I have 

seen a country we were defending occupied by hostile enemy forces 

occupied thoroughly, efficiently, sadistically, and completely. 

‘‘I have seen the American way of life change in one moment and 

have seen the stunned bewildered faces of the erstwhile American 

high command as they tried to comprehend the enormity of the 

blow that had just struck them. I have seen veteran officers 

schooled for 30 years in traditional authority and routine of command, change overnight into tired, dirty, beaten, unshaven old men 

just trying to keep walking. 

‘‘From American soldiers with the heritage of generations of liberty and our blood, we became the chattel. We used to say, if what 

is happening here could happen to everyone in the United States 

for just one week, what a change it would make in their attitude 

about the future insurance of our way of life. 

‘‘Use the prayers of our good people, but remember that prayers 

work better where the guns are bigger and the planes are faster 

and the regiments are more numerous. So in the back of all of 

these plans, I say, let us have what it takes just in case some 

gentleman does not get the word. 

‘‘I do not know if all the peoples in the different nations will 

understand our high ideals and unselfish motives, but I do know 

one thing they will understand: They will know what force we have 

to back up what we say, and if it is big enough, they will act accordingly. 

‘‘The United States is big business. It is bigger than you and bigger than I, and I say there is no cost too great to preserve it.’’ 

Secretary Mattis, you stated in the remarks tonight that the 

enemy will move against our weak areas and that Congress has at 

times risen to the challenge to provide what the military needs. I 

think we are in one of those moments now. 

When we take the President’s budget and what this committee 

is proposing, when the DOE [Department of Energy] and defenserelated dollars are subtracted, this committee is proposing about an 

additional $25 million baseline over the President’s budget of 574. 

Why could the President not want to take Congress’ lead, and 

which budget would best prepare our military? 

Secretary MATTIS. Congressman, thank you for what you read. I 

have read about that campaign, and I share your appreciation that 

either—you do not want to be in second place. And we have no 

right to victory on the battlefield. That takes commitment and that 
57 

takes leadership. And how we got into this situation, I mean, I told 

you I was shocked when I came back and saw this. 

We are going to have to move this forward in a stable way. I will 

just give you an example. We could not afford—we could not recruit 

right now 100,000 more troops for the U.S. military additional 

right now. You heard the acknowledgment earlier about what percent of our young people are even eligible. 

We could not right now have the industrial base to build the 

number of ships, even if you were to somehow repeal the BCA, repeal the Budget Control Act, say you are going to pass budgets on 

time. We literally could not do some of this that would fully address what you rightly bring up in your role to raise armies and 

sustain navies. 

I would just tell you that we are going to have to work together, 

and if this is the will of the Congress that they be willing to spend 

that amount, I am confident that the Commander in Chief would 

be in your corner all the way. 

Mr. RUSSELL. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. 

And thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back. 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. O’Halleran. 

Mr. O’HALLERAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I thank you for 

your service to our country and for those that you lead. Thank you 

for their service and their family’s. 

I want to bring us back to a couple of things, but one of them 

is the cost issue. It is obvious that we need to invest, and it is also 

obvious to me that we need to eliminate the Budget [Control] Act 

issues and all the other issues associated with it. But we still have 

a situation here where as much as you want to know where we are 

going to go with—for you, we need to know where you want to go 

in the future. 

And then we have heard the issue of studies so far. We have 

talked about $19 billion plus a year for inflation at 3 percent. We 

have now talked about $5 billion potentially for additional ships 

puts us up to 24 plus billion dollars not compounded over the 

years, but just at today’s rates. And this is just a statement, but 

I really have a concern with being able to get to next year and 

where we are going to be with the larger scope of budget needs 

that the Congress has before it. 

The second thing is, Secretary, you mentioned that the—for the 

enlisted people that we are competitive with salary with the high 

school diplomas, and we probably are. But we are not asking—and 

I am not saying something you do not know. But I just want to 

make clear that we are not asking these young men and women 

to go and do work here in the United States at one location and 

not move their families around and not put themselves in harm’s 

way. This is something that we need to be better than the competitive atmosphere in our society today. 

And I want to go back to the Secretary of State’s issue. The cut 

is 32 percent to the State Department. That includes the U.S. 

Agency for International Development and a cut of nearly half to 

development assistance. These are programs that obviously, talking 

does one thing, you have to be able to negotiate with a package and 

stop terrorism by getting to the hearts of people. 
58 

These are what a lot of these programs are for. And, Secretary, 

you had made a statement that reducing regional chaos in tandem 

with our interagency partners and international allies to help foster a coherent order requires adequate diplomatic resources. And 

former Chairman Admiral Mullen has stated that cutting the budget in this manner puts the lives of our men and women in uniform 

at risk. 

So instead of getting into the cost issue, can we have agreement 

that it is critical that our State Department be able to function at 

the highest level necessary to work in unison with you, the Defense 

Department and other agencies so that we can stop wars and 

therefore stop the bloodshed that we are trying to prevent through 

both the kinetic energy and the State Department side of the equation. 

Secretary MATTIS. Yes, sir, and I want to always make certain 

our diplomats under Secretary Tillerson are negotiating from a position of strength that the U.S. military, well-funded U.S. military 

can provide. 

Mr. O’HALLERAN. Thank you, Secretary. And I just want to say 

thank you for the great work that you are doing right now and 

bringing Mr. Norquist on, I think you have a job that you are going 

to have a challenge at, and, Mr. Chairman, I yield back. 

The CHAIRMAN. Dr. DesJarlais. 

Dr. DESJARLAIS. The Russians and Chinese are allocating more 

and more resources towards advanced weaponry and technology 

and are making rapid gains in these areas, especially hypersonics. 

As you may be aware, several news outlets have reported that Russia recently conducted tests of its Zircon hypersonic missile nearly 

a year ahead of schedule. 

Defense analysts have described this as a quantum leap in technology. When it comes to hypersonics, do you feel like we are where 

we need to be to meet these threats? 

Secretary MATTIS. No, sir, this is the fourth concurrent force I 

mentioned about rapid technological change. I think we have got 

to increase our hypersonic R&D effort. 

Dr. DESJARLAIS. Do you feel the bureaucracy and compartmentalization of our budget process is putting us in a vulnerable position in areas such as R&D? 

Secretary MATTIS. There are areas, sir, where we need to get acquisition reform, and we need it quickly. I am bringing in people 

from private industry with those specific skill sets in order to identify to you the problems well enough that you can see the solution 

here because some of it requires legislative relief. Much of it requires reform inside the Department. 

Dr. DESJARLAIS. Is part of your reevaluation of the missile defense budget going to be allocated towards hypersonic defense systems? I think right now $75 million has been set aside. 

Secretary MATTIS. I am not sure where the money will be taken 

from or if it will be added on, but I know we are going to have to 

put more money into hypersonic R&D. 

Dr. DESJARLAIS. Okay. Thank you. I yield back. 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Suozzi. 

Mr. SUOZZI. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. You know, whenever I 

am in this hearing room I am always sobered by the important re-
59 

sponsibility we as elected officials have, and I am incredibly sobered by the awesome responsibility that each of you have. And I 

thank you again for your wonderful service. 

Secretary Mattis, you talked about this close collaboration you 

have with Secretary Tillerson trying to work together to have a 

joint strategy. I was fortunate to go to Afghanistan in April and 

was very impressed by the 4-year plan that there was—the by, 

with, and through strategy of building up the Afghan army and air 

force and the special forces and putting pressure on trying to get 

a little bit more out of Pakistan to do their responsibilities—but I 

did not see a similar 4-year plan with the State Department. 

Are you developing plans together that are long-term plans in 

conjunction with each other as a whole-of-government? 

Secretary MATTIS. Secretary Tillerson and I are tied at the hip 

on this, sir. I assure you the planning is ongoing to keep us in step 

with one another and to ensure that we have a tandem approach 

to this, not just a military or even a principally military, it has got 

to be a collaboration. 

Mr. SUOZZI. It would be great if there were documents that 

showed this collaboration between these two branches, this wholeof-government, that showed a long-term plan as to how to address 

or the short-term plan even how to address our situation in Afghanistan. 

In this current budget the request for funds is for the current 

8,448 troops, and when we went to Afghanistan General Nicholson 

and others made a very persuasive case that a few thousand, 3,000, 

5,000 more troops for force protection and to replace some of these 

private contractors really made a lot of sense, it will save money, 

it will build morale, it will be effective in helping out. 

In May a report came out in a Bloomberg article that the intelligence community is pushing for 50,000 more troops, and it looked 

like it was a move away from by, with, and through. So can you 

put us at ease as to what the current thinking is regarding the current force level versus an increase, a modest increase for force protection versus this report of 50,000 more troops? 

Secretary MATTIS. Sir, I give no credibility to any report about 

50,000 more troops. I can assure you neither the commander in the 

field nor the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs have given me any requests like that, not even close. That is somebody’s flight of fantasy, I assure you, sir. 

Mr. SUOZZI. Thank you. And the by, with, and through strategy 

is the strategy that we are going to continue in the foreseeable future? 

Secretary MATTIS. And how we enable them by, with, and 

through, but also perhaps a little more regional approach, sir. 

Mr. SUOZZI. General Scaparrotti was here on March 28th of 2017, 

and he said that ‘‘Additional Russian activity short of war range 

from disinformation to manipulation. Examples include Russia’s 

outright denial of involvement in the lead-up to Russia’s occupation 

and attempted annexation in Crimea, attempts to influence elections in the United States, France, and elsewhere, its aggressive 

propaganda campaigns targeting ethnic Russian populations among 

its neighbors, and cyber activities directed against infrastructure in 

the Baltic nations and the Ukraine. In all of these ways and more 
60 

Russia is attempting to exert its influence, expand its power, and 

discredit the capability and relevance of the West.’’ 

And, you know, we hear this all the time, and a lot of it is caught 

up in the partisanship these days, but Russia is a bad actor, especially in Europe and Eastern Europe. Forget about the United 

States now and everything everybody is in the news this days. 

What is the DOD’s responsibility regarding hybrid warfare to 

combat—you know, we talk heavily about troops and about equipment. What are we doing to combat this hybrid warfare of propaganda disinformation from the DOD’s perspective and what can we 

do and how else can we assist you? 

Secretary MATTIS. I will have the Chairman speak to this for a 

moment, sir. What you defined with General Scaparrotti’s words 

there, Russia has chosen to be a strategic competitor. They want 

a veto authority over the diplomatic, economic, and security interests of their near abroad and actually a little deeper than just near 

abroad. The changing character of war, this deniable gray zone, 

cyber—this is what you are saying. 

Mr. SUOZZI. And beyond that corruption, outright corruption—— 

Secretary MATTIS. Absolutely. 

Mr. SUOZZI [continuing]. They are trying to make money by 

undermining governments in Eastern Europe and Europe. 

Secretary MATTIS. Absolutely, sir. How do we adapt to this so 

that we are not waiting with tank columns for an enemy that never 

can be taken on? It is the changing character of war. 

Let me have the Chairman just give a few groups on this. It is 

a heavily military education issue, as well of our own—— 

General DUNFORD. Congressman, we have spent a lot of time 

over the past year looking at this issue, and if you really break it 

down into political influence, economic coercion, information operations, cyber capabilities, military posture, all put together to advance Russia’s national interest, I think U.S. military presence in 

Europe is a key piece of it, our assurance. Our cyber capabilities 

are an important part of it. Information operations is something we 

can do from a military perspective. 

The one thing that Russia is able to do is very quickly integrate 

their entire government to advance their interests in Europe. And 

one of the things that they are doing, of course, is undermining the 

credibility of our alliance structure in NATO and causing people to 

question whether we can meet our alliance commitments. 

And so I think at least three out of the five major areas or areas 

where there is a military dimension, but the thing I would emphasize is that what you are describing, I call it adversarial competition, it has a military dimension. It falls short of war, but it also 

is the whole-of-government, and I think probably three out of the 

five areas I mentioned are areas where the military can contribute, 

but the entire government needs to be waging in this adversarial 

competition. 

Mr. SUOZZI. I have used up all my time. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I look forward to discussing this further in the future. 

Thank you. 

The CHAIRMAN. Dr. Abraham. 

Dr. ABRAHAM. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for your endurance tonight, gentlemen. I have heard some phraseology used 
61 

tonight: prioritize, challenges with families, do not have the reach, 

balancing act. 

And it all goes back to the Budget Control Act, just we are not 

giving you guys the money that you have to do, and I know, Secretary Mattis, your burden must be very great trying to balance 

this on a daily basis. 

So certainly us on the committee but all of Congress we have got 

to put our money literally where our mouth is and break this 

Budget Control Act, and I know we on the committee with the 

chairman’s leadership certainly would love to do that. 

One of your priorities with your 2018, in your testimony, was 

saying was to keep the faith with the service men and women and 

their families. I saw where in Italy, for example, you have got two 

naval hospitals and one Air Force hospital that are on a closure 

list, and I worry that when and if those do get shut down that 

standard of care for the service members and their families will 

suffer greatly. 

And I guess my question of Secretary Mattis is, What is your 

opinion on that? What is your take on the closure of those three 

hospitals and hospitals like those? Where will these people go? I 

am worried about the standard of care being lowered, and I will let 

you answer. 

Secretary MATTIS. I have got to look at it, sir. I would have to 

look at the specifics of the location, but the bottom line is we cannot deploy troops and families where we do not provide sufficient 

hospital care. So let me look at those three in Italy and come back 

to you with what we have in mind and what we are going to do 

to mitigate any loss of capability, but I cannot give you a good answer right now, sir. 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on 

page 128.] 

Dr. ABRAHAM. That is fine. You can get back to me as soon as 

you can. It has been referenced with the maintenance issue on the 

aircraft, we in this particular hearing room we also have been told 

by others where we are 1,500 to 1,600 pilots short. We are about 

3,400 to 3,500 maintainers short. 

You have got the commercial airlines that are pulling pilots from 

the military daily, and even with the commercial carriers incentivizing with perks and monies they are still not able to meet their 

demands, and they are even talking about reducing routes commercially. 

What is the DOD doing to retain, build a pilot cadre, and is it 

even solvable with money? Where would it go? 

General DUNFORD. Congressman, you have just identified an 

issue that actually is keeping the Chief of Staff of the Air Force 

and the Chief of Naval Operations and the Commandant of the Marine Corps awake at night. And there actually is collaboration right 

now with industry to look at this as a national problem for the aggregate number of pilots both for the commercial sector as well as 

for the Department of Defense. 

And so General Goldfein has been leading an effort to do that, 

to open up that dialogue and look at what will it take to rebuild 

that pilot base to meet both commercial needs and military needs. 

And, of course, in the near term, one thing we use is the incentive 
62 

system to keep our pilots in. A key piece of the incentive system, 

though, is not just base pay and bonuses for flying it’s—we call it 

quality of work, it is the numbers of hours you fly and your confidence in your aircraft and those kinds of things. 

So those are the areas that the Chief of Staff of the Air Force 

is focused on the squadron level, that is where it makes a difference, and in a number of initiatives that he is doing they are 

designed specifically to retain pilots. But as you point out, it is 

going to take a public-private dialogue and solution to get at both 

the commercial requirements and the Department’s requirements. 

Dr. ABRAHAM. Well, like you gentlemen, I have the highest faith 

in the Chief of the Air Force also, Dr. Goldfein. 

So I yield back, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. McEachin. 

Mr. MCEACHIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Secretary Mattis, I am a new Congressman, and I have to tell 

you that I was surprised by the amount of engagements we have 

across the globe. I quickly became a disciple of a 355-ship Navy. 

You have spoken in your testimony today or at least alluded to that 

our future defense strategy might change or evolve. I do not want 

to put words into your mouth, sir. 

My initial question is this, I understand our National Defense 

Strategy to be being capable of fighting two major conflicts simultaneously, perhaps one with a state actor, perhaps one with a nonstate actor. Do you envision—I know your crystal ball may not be 

perfect—but do you envision that aspect of our National Defense 

Strategy changing over time? 

Secretary MATTIS. Sir, if the enemy, our adversary has four 

courses of action that I prepare for, I am pretty confident number 

five will be the one he uses. What I am saying is we have a fundamentally unpredictable phenomenon that this committee deals 

with, and that is called war. That is the auditor that we have to 

be prepared for. Ultimately it audits our recruiting, our equipping, 

our research, our pay, it audits everything about the military. 

So how do we create a military that has got a shock absorber in 

it so that when surprise strikes, we are ready for it? I believe that 

we will have to be ready for more than one adversary at one time 

because we are up against thinking, cunning adversaries, and if 

they see us engaged with one in one arena and they have mischief 

in mind, they certainly will take advantage of our distraction. So 

in creating a military with a shock absorber in it we have to be 

prepared to do more than one thing at a time. 

Mr. MCEACHIN. I would also ask you, I know that maybe it was 

Mr. Wittman, maybe it was Mr. Courtney, but someone asked you 

about the billion dollar reduction in the shipbuilding account, and 

I have to confess to you that I either missed your answer or did 

not understand your answer. Would you mind repeating your answer as to why that is justified at this time? 

Secretary MATTIS. I would not justify reducing the shipbuilding 

account. Right now we are trying to prioritize readiness. In other 

words, we have ships that you have already bought that we already 

have manned that cannot go to sea. So in some cases what we are 

doing is putting money into readiness while trying to save the ship-
63 

building account so we have tomorrow’s readiness being constructed today. 

But this is a matter of prioritization, Congressman, as we deal 

with the reality of too many years of these ships not being maintained in a way that we get full use out of them. So, you know, 

what we cannot do is cease to put in operations and maintenance 

money there because we are putting it all into building new ships. 

As much as I would love to build new ships, it is a balancing act, 

sir. 

Mr. MCEACHIN. So, Mr. Secretary, would you reject the characterization then that the funding for the Navy’s shipbuilding and 

conversion account relative to fiscal year 2017 has been reduced? 

Secretary MATTIS. No, sir. I just ask for your patience that we 

are digging our way out of a readiness hole, and in order to do that 

we cannot always build or put the money where we would want to 

if we did not have to deal with this reality that comes from years 

of living under the Budget Control Act where we have been unable, 

unable to maintain the ships. It is not the option that I would prefer. 

Mr. MCEACHIN. And, again, I apologize if this question has already been asked, but at what point in the future do you see us 

making strides towards that 355-ship Navy, positive strides whether it is getting out of whatever holes you perceive us being in or 

just what? 

Secretary MATTIS. I think even this year with nine ships in the 

budget, sir, at least it starts us in the right direction, but it is only 

a start, and I share your impatience or your concern about it. 

And in 2019 to 2023 obviously we need the kind of growth that 

Chairman Dunford was referring to of 3 to 5 percent a year in 

order to start enlarging the fleet. We need a larger fleet. I do not 

seem to get much argument on that from anybody, so I think it is 

a matter of allocating the resources. 

Mr. MCEACHIN. Sadly my time is used up, but I thank you, sir. 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Kelly. 

Mr. KELLY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank all you gentlemen for being here. 

I still currently serve in the Mississippi Army National Guard, 

served there for almost 32 years, it will be 33, I think, in December. Our readiness level is not where I have seen it in my entire 

career, and I think there are units that are really good. I think 

there is equipment, but we have got to maintain our equipment 

and get back to the level that we can sustain. And I do not think 

that we can do that on the budget that is proposed of $603 billion. 

I think we need to be more in the range of 604. 

We talked about munitions. Those can come out of OCO because 

they are being used in operations or overseas contingency operations, so I do not understand why we cannot have a little certainty in purchasing new munitions through the OCO funding that 

is specifically to buy those munitions that we are shooting at the 

bad guys. 

Equipment. We have got to—right now what I am seeing, and it 

is all underhanded and nobody said this, this is just Trent Kelly’s 

little assumption, but right now what I am seeing is most of the 

Active Component services are eyeballing the equipment of the 
64 

Guard and Reserves and saying we can transfer this to us and give 

them the old stuff and fall in on their stuff to help us get through. 

I do not blame them for doing that. 

That does not help us [with] long-term readiness. We have got 

to be equipped. If you want me to go fight the enemy as a National 

Guardsman, I have got to have an M1A2 SEPv2 tank. I cannot deploy in an M60A3 and achieve the effects that I need to achieve. 

Our communications do not work. We have got to look and smell 

the same, whether it is Active or Reserve and get the force structure to meet that, but when we start trying to take equipment from 

one to shift to the other—in the old Army that I grew up in, you 

did not hot rack tanks, you did not use other people’s equipment. 

You painted your name on yours, and you owned it, and you took 

a lot of pride in it. 

Our soldiers and airmen and Marines, they do not have to do 

that anymore because they do not deploy with their equipment, 

they deploy with somebody else’s. And they leave it over there for 

the next guy to fall in on, and the guys back here cannot train because of readiness. 

What are we doing to get the spare parts and to get the current 

fleet across the board not to transfer readiness from one unit to the 

other, but to actually start building the OR [operational readiness] 

rates of these units? 

Secretary MATTIS. Sir, the first step that was the $21 billion that 

Congress gave us for the fiscal year 2017 supplemental was directly targeted on this. This budget this year is designed to further 

that, but, sir, it took us a long time to get here, and again, I share 

your impatience with this, but I would tell you, too, that OCO will 

not tell industry with any confidence that they should open another 

line, put in the money into their industrial plant because they do 

not know if that is going to be there next year. 

This has got to be part of a budget plan if we want them to make 

the industrial contribution that their stockholders are going to 

have to put money up for because for them to go broke is not part 

of their responsibility. 

So OCO does not help us expand the industrial base. We can get 

max out of the industrial base, but they are not going to build more 

industrial base on OCO. 

Mr. KELLY. So then why do we not ask for 640 instead of 603 

and call it all top-line spending and not OCO? 

Secretary MATTIS. Well, I mean, that is an option, sir. As you 

know, we are already coming in asking you to violate, bust the 

Budget Control Act. I mean, at some point we have to recognize the 

law that you have passed, and I do not have an answer because 

that law was passed with the idea that it would be so injurious 

that it would never go into effect. 

Well, it has been in effect for years now, and frankly, the Department of Defense cannot change that law, only Congress can. 

Mr. KELLY. I agree wholeheartedly, Secretary, and we have got 

to break the sequester in the BCA. I do think that we need a higher number, and I think we need the certainty to go with that. If 

we give that to you can you spend that on training soldiers? We 

do not have enough slots to train soldiers. We cannot send soldiers 

to additional training to developing classes, AIT [Advanced Indi-
65 

vidual Training] and NCOES [Non-Commissioned Officer Professional Development System] and OES [Officer Education System]. 

Can you spend that money in new schools and new things to train 

these soldiers and equipment if we get that BCA busted and we 

give you the money on the top line? 

Secretary MATTIS. We can, sir. It would help if it was in multiyear money so that we could have a program that we know we are 

going to implement over a couple of years. It would help if it came 

in a budget on time, not a continuing resolution with the paralysis 

a continuing resolution will apply to us. 

So with fiscal discipline we will do our level best to spend every 

bit of it and address every problem you have got. We share your 

assessment of what the problem is. 

Mr. KELLY. Thank you all for your service, and thank you, Mr. 

Chairman. I yield back. 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Khanna. 

Mr. KHANNA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, gentlemen, 

for your service to our country and for being so patient to take 

questions from some of the junior members. 

Secretary Mattis, Geo Saba on my staff tells me how respected 

you were back home at Stanford. I appreciate your service. I have 

two questions. I want to read from the [Section] 809 Panel interim 

report, which as you are aware, was the commission panel created 

to help streamline the defense acquisition process. 

And they wrote, ‘‘According to DOD, the last major defense 

downturn in the late 1980s and early 1990s resulted in more than 

300 prime contractors, platform providers, and subtier companies 

merging to form [the] five megaprimes of today: Boeing, Lockheed 

Martin, Northrop Grumman, Raytheon, and General Dynamics.’’ 

My question is, do you think there is enough competition in the 

defense industrial base and what steps are you taking to create 

more competition? 

Secretary MATTIS. It is very hard for us to create competition, 

sir. It is based on how much budget we have and how many different companies feel they can compete and stay healthy. We saw 

this coming in the 1990s. What the Defense Department did—I 

happened to be the executive secretary to two Secretaries of Defense, William Perry and William Cohen. They looked at each case 

where they concentrated the industrial base into smaller and fewer 

and fewer companies, a larger actually, but fewer companies, but 

there was no way to maintain the vitality, the financial vitality of 

the companies if we stood in the way of it. 

So it was forced on us. We were worried about it then. We saw 

this coming, whether it would be less competition, but frankly, we 

were unable to sustain an effort to maintain the wider industrial 

base. 

Mr. KHANNA. Well, I hope you will consider things we can do to 

have more competition if it is possible. 

My second question concerns I mean, your testimony was very eloquent where you said our Nation has been at war for 16 years, 

the longest war our country has faced, and that this has been in 

part why our resources have been strained. 

And I think if you were to look objectively at Iraq and Afghanistan and Libya and ask has our country met the objectives we set 
66 

out to meet, you would probably get people on both sides of the 

aisle saying that has not been the case. I mean, as you know much 

better than I, Taliban still controls 40 percent of Afghanistan. And 

so where I come in Silicon Valley, you know, when you have a business and they come for more funding, one of the questions will be, 

well, is the strategic plan working or do we need a change in strategy? 

And my question is, I have great confidence in our troops. I have 

less confidence in the policymakers. Do we need before we talk 

about more funding, a clear sense of what the strategy is going to 

be so that we know that the last 16 years if we have not achieved 

our goals that we will achieve our goals in these regions? 

Secretary MATTIS. Well, I think we do need a change in strategy, 

and I think it has got to be one that starts with a good exchange 

between the Congress and the level of resources they believe is appropriate to the Department of Defense. And I would start there 

by saying that continued BCA, which makes the Congress a spectator to all this, is probably an irresponsible way to go. 

I am much more comfortable coming up here and defending a 

strategy and a good relationship and a good discussion back and 

forth than I am with coming up here as we all watch BCA put us 

into a position that some of the serving members who have been 

in the National Guard and the Armed Forces say is destroying that 

very military readiness. 

So it is a balancing act of getting a good strategic dialogue, determining what level of the government’s treasure we are willing to 

put into defense and make certain that what we have got are welldefined objectives that we can accomplish. I am not going to condemn what someone has done before me. I will leave that to history. I am here to deal with the reality of the threat to the country 

today. 

Mr. KHANNA. Thank you for your answers. I yield back the balance of my time. 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Gallagher. 

Mr. GALLAGHER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. General Dunford, 2 

years ago Lieutenant General Glueck told this committee that the 

COCOM [combatant command] demand for amphibs [amphibious 

assault ships] was closer to 54 than the nominal Navy-Marine 

Corps unconstrained goal of 38. Is that still the case? 

General DUNFORD. That is pretty close to being the case, Congressman. I remember those numbers. I was the Commandant of 

the Marine Corps at the time. 

Mr. GALLAGHER. And, if anything, I would submit that the 

Navy’s 2016 Force Structure Assessment where the formal requirement was raised from 34 to 38 suggests that in a greater threat 

environment the amphibious demands are growing. 

Despite this trend, your budget request does not support another 

amphibious ship until fiscal year 2020. Navy officials have supported the long-term layup of certain amphibious ships, which, 

while it will support certain modernization readiness requirements, 

will also take them out of the fleet and further reduce our amphib 

capacity. 

Your fiscal year 2018 request also reduces the planned procurement of ship-to-shore connectors from six in the fiscal year 2017 
67 

FYDP to three, so I guess my question at the end of the day is in 

light of that does the fiscal year 2018 budget request improve or 

degrade the capacity of the Navy-Marine Corps team to project 

power? 

General DUNFORD. Congressman, I have to go back and check 

the numbers, but it certainly does not enhance the capacity of the 

Navy-Marine Corps to project power. 

Mr. GALLAGHER. I think the answer we have heard sort of in the 

five or so shipbuilding or Navy questions we have asked tonight is 

that you have chosen to prioritize readiness over long-term shipbuilding, and I understand why readiness is so important, I just do 

not understand why we cannot do both at the same time. I mean, you look at Reagan’s first full-year budget he added $3 billion on Navy O&M [operations and maintenance], $10 billion on 

shipbuilding. So why have we chosen this sort of false choice, that 

is my word, right now between readiness and long-term shipbuilding in this budget? 

Secretary MATTIS. Right. It is a good question, Congressman, and 

I do not take any issue with where you are going with it. I would 

just tell you that when we are already busting the BCA cap by $52 

billion this is not a budget that has taken readiness or modernization laying down, but we have got to marry our time. 

Congress has the Budget Control Act in effect. I mean, if we 

walk into here acting as if there is nothing that you have said and 

put into law has any effect, you would understandably or at least 

some Members of the Congress would understandably question our 

judgment. We have got to at least deal with this. And if you come 

out and tell us that you are willing to go right now as a Congress, 

not this committee, this committee has stood by us through thick 

and thin. 

This committee is not the problem, nor are your colleagues in the 

Senate Armed Service Committee. You know where the problem 

lies. It is more broadly. And please guide us. Talk to us. We are 

eager to do what you are talking about. 

Mr. GALLAGHER. I guess my only difference of opinion on that approach is it suggests that the Pentagon and the President are passive spectators in this process and have priced in sort of what the 

congressional market can bear. When we know that sort of leadership from Article I can change the market dynamics themselves. 

Secretary MATTIS. Well, Article I, if I remember right sir—— 

Mr. GALLAGHER. Article II, excuse me. 

Secretary MATTIS. Yes, sir. I think Article I is you. 

Mr. GALLAGHER. If you are indeed urging us to—you both condemned BCA, why does the budget extend the reductions under 

BCA from 2021 when they expire through 2027? Are those just 

placeholders? It grinds it down to roughly 2 percentage of GDP 

[gross domestic product]. 

Secretary MATTIS. Go ahead. 

Mr. NORQUIST. When you are looking at the FYDP, the out-years 

numbers, those are placeholders. Secretary Mattis’s reference, 

when the studies are done next year will include the out-years in 

the implications, but right now they are just placeholders. 

Mr. GALLAGHER. Sure. And then quickly going back to a line of 

questioning that Mr. Conaway and Ms. Hanabusa brought up, you 
68 

said that, you made the claim in your testimony that a round of 

BRAC could allow to us buy something like 120 Super Hornets. 

What is the Department’s assessment of what we have been able 

to buy from the last round of BRAC? 

Secretary MATTIS. We could go in and show the amount of money 

that we have saved, and we just obviously it goes into the defense 

budget. We can give you some examples of what—I was showing 

examples of what that savings would translate to in terms of combat capability, but we could certainly go back, show you what we 

have saved from past BRACs and then tell you what that translates into in terms of number of ships or airplanes or tanks or 

whatever. 

Mr. GALLAGHER. And I think we all appreciate that, and also an 

assessment of what investments and readiness we are prepared to 

forego in order to fund another round of BRAC. 

In other words, sort of reverse the dynamic and say how many 

Hornets would it cost us to fund BRAC? But I think we really 

would appreciate that assessment. 

Secretary MATTIS. You mean for a couple of years until it started 

paying off? 

Mr. GALLAGHER. Yes. All the cost on the front end. 

Secretary MATTIS. Okay. 

[The information referred to was not available at the time of 

printing.] 

Mr. GALLAGHER. Thank you. I yield back. 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Secretary, the last round of BRAC took more 

than 10 years to break even, so just part of the reason there is concern on this committee is—and last time I checked with CBO they 

did not have it breaking even yet. 

Now that has been a year or so, but there is no doubt it took 

more than 10 years to break even—not a couple—and so that has 

left a bitter taste in a lot of folks’ mouth. It did not achieve the 

savings that were promised. So just an editorial comment. I am 

happy to continue to talk, as I know other members are, but the 

last one is not a very good basis to go on. 

Secretary MATTIS. I would try to align—I told you I do not accept 

the current—— 

The CHAIRMAN. And I appreciate that. 

Secretary MATTIS. And what we will do is we will look at what 

can we do to make certain what we get rid of this next time starts 

paying off in 5 years, not 10 or 20. 

The CHAIRMAN. It has got to be a different approach. 

Secretary MATTIS. Yes, sir. 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Bacon. 

Mr. BACON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you for your 

patience in being here and for your leadership. 

A lot of great insightful comments tonight, and I thank you for 

them. One of the ones that stands out is the fact that we have this 

huge bow wave of modernization as the Chairman pointed out, and 

you have had to work within the top line that you have been given 

and that the BCA has had that huge impact, so I think it is just 

a great summary of what you had to contend with here. 

My first question is for the Chairman dealing with intelligence, 

surveillance, and reconnaissance. Today only 30 percent of our 
69 

combat commanders’ airborne intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, or ISR, are being met by the capabilities from the combatant 

commanders, their requirements. 

This means we are choosing between providing ISR support for 

counterterrorism or collection of peer competitors like Russia or 

China. Is 30 percent good enough and does the current budget proposal by you or by the executive branch here, is it helping to narrow that gap? 

General DUNFORD. Congressman, just a little bit of history, we 

actually have grown the ISR enterprise by 1,200 percent since 

2001. We have increased in numbers of platforms by 600 percent 

since 2008, and we are currently meeting 30 percent of the requirements. So this is one of those areas in the Department I actually 

do not think we can buy our way out of, and it is probably number 

one, not probably, it is number one for me in terms of innovation 

initiatives, leveraging big data and finding a different way to feed 

decision-making. 

In other words, we will not be able to buy enough platforms to 

meet the current articulated requirement by the combatant commanders, and yet we still need to get the intelligence necessary to 

feed decision-making. 

So I guess what I am suggesting to you is that we do have—we 

are growing now from 60 caps to 90 caps over the next couple 

years. That is our program growth, and so that is a 50 percent 

growth, and at the end of that period of time I suspect we will be 

somewhere at 34 percent or 35 percent. 

So the areas that we need to burn some intellectual capital on 

this particular problem is at the top of the list. 

Mr. BACON. Secretary Mattis, do you have anything else to add 

to that? 

Secretary MATTIS. Sir, as our military has shrunk in size the 

need for more precise intelligence is one of the ways we mitigate 

the risk that smaller military. So part of this is a growing need for 

a level of what is over the next hill, where is the enemy, what is 

going on as we have gotten a smaller military that we are still 

committing, as you know, around the world. 

We did not pull everybody out as we had anticipated a few years 

ago and reconstituted at a time when we could have put more effort into this, more finances into it. So we are going to have to continue to work this, but what we are doing right now is challenging 

for us, very challenging to shrink this gap. 

Mr. BACON. Another area of concern is electronic warfare. When 

I came in in 1985 we had, I would say, a dominant electronic warfare capability compared to our near peers, we will say, but in the 

1990s and I think the 2000s we let it atrophy, and I would say 

today the Russians and Chinese are producing electronic warfare 

capabilities technology-wise and capacity-wise that exceeds us. 

Does this budget, Chairman, does it help narrow that gap in electronic warfare realm? 

General DUNFORD. Congressman, it does, and we started in 2017, 

and I could not agree with you more that our competitive advantage has eroded over time in electronic warfare, and we talk about 

our ability to project power and we talk about adversaries like 

China and Russia specifically targeting our ability to move into an 
70 

operational area and operate freely within that area. You have 

heard the term anti-access/area denial. Electronic warfare is one of 

the key areas that we need to improve our competitive edge. 

Mr. BACON. Mr. Secretary, anything else to add? 

Secretary MATTIS. No. 

Mr. BACON. Thank you very much. I yield back. 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Banks. 

Mr. BANKS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you to each of 

you, sirs, for joining us late into the evening tonight to talk about 

these important issues. 

Mr. Secretary, General Nicholson suggested and you endorsed efforts to add a, quote, ‘‘few thousand’’ additional troops to prop up 

the Afghan security forces in the face of aggressive Taliban attacks. 

I want to dig more deeply into testimony that you have already 

provided related to the budget related to Afghanistan. Why would 

a new total of approximately 15,000 troops be decisive when just 

a few years ago they were close to 100,000 troops in Afghanistan? 

Have our interest or the mission changed? 

Secretary MATTIS. The Afghan Army, as you know, has been 

fighting hard, and you will just have to look at the casualty figures 

to see that reality. The troops that are being asked for by General 

Nicholson, and I do not want to characterize them all this way, but 

many of them are going to be what we call train, advise, assist. 

These are troops that will go, that are specifically trained by our 

U.S. Army to go out in the field, and you apply them with the brigades, the Afghan brigade. 

Now remember, we have been operating at what we call the 

three-star headquarters, the corps level headquarters. Below them 

is the two-star division headquarters, then you get down to the 

one-star and colonels in the brigades. We are talking now about 

putting people who can call NATO air support down at the brigade 

level, so that when they are in contact the high ground is now 

going to be owned by the Afghans. 

It is a fundamental change to how we bring our, what I would 

call, our real superiority in terms of air support to help them. So, 

in other words, we are not talking about putting our troops in the 

front line and saying somehow a few thousand more troops in the 

front line alongside them are going to help taking the hill by closing with the rifles and machine guns. 

These are going to be people specifically designed, trained, and 

organized and equipped to go in and advise them how to take the 

hill, get them the air support, the artillery support, the rocket support that will enable them. Does that help to address your question? 

Mr. BANKS. Yes. Mr. Secretary, like you, I am supportive of ensuring that Al Qaeda and groups that want to attack the U.S. 

homeland are unable to gain safe haven again in Afghanistan, and 

I support those efforts. But when it comes to corruption and ensuring to the American taxpayers that the investment is a sound one 

in Afghanistan, what do we need to do to ensure that our support 

for the Afghan security forces is used appropriately and effectively. 

Secretary MATTIS. Yes, I think corruption has been probably the 

biggest strategic vulnerability that we faced in terms of the Government of Afghanistan gaining the respect and the trust of their 
71 

own people. The authorities we give and the expectations we give 

to these troops that we are plugging in down at lower levels for one 

thing will help to change that, but furthermore, I went to Afghanistan here a month and a half ago, and I met the officer who has 

now been put in charge of going after corruption. 

I find a fellow who is serious, but as you know this is a society 

that is run by reciprocity. It is a tribal society by and large, and 

we are going to have to deal with the corruption in a way consistent with that society. They recognize the problem there. They recognize that something has got to be done about it, but this is a critical problem. 

I would say this biggest strategic problem we face is corruption, 

and we will be dealing with it, President Ghani has a program to 

deal with it, and we will do our best to address it. We have got to. 

Mr. BANKS. Thank you very much. I yield back. 

The CHAIRMAN. Ms. Cheney. 

Ms. CHENEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you very much, Secretary Mattis and General Dunford. I 

appreciate your time here this evening. 

First of all, I want to say I completely agree. We have got to repeal the Budget Control Act. I believe there is no more important 

obligation we have as Members of Congress than providing resources necessary for the defense of the Nation. It does not matter 

how much healthcare reform we do, how much tax reform we do. 

It does not matter if we balance our budget. If we get this wrong, 

none of that matters, and we cannot get this right without repealing the Budget Control Act. 

Having said that, though, I am very troubled by the budget that 

the administration has put forward. And I think that in both of 

your written testimony to the committee and in testimony here tonight you have done a tremendous job at laying out the gravity of 

the threats that we face, laying out the seriousness of the situation, 

the pace of advancements that our adversaries are making against 

us, including in areas we may not be able to counter or defend 

against. And dominance lost. 

And in particular, General Dunford, in your written testimony 

you talk about within 5 years the potential that we would lose the 

ability to project power. Yet the budget that has been presented to 

us is at best a holding pattern. At best. When we face an existential threat from North Korea and this budget cuts missile defense, 

it cuts directed energy funding, which in your testimony, Secretary 

Mattis, you said is crucial. 

I want to understand, General Dunford, this is a question for 

you, how can we possibly justify, you know, we have heard tonight 

this budget is a holding pattern before we get to real growth? How 

can we possibly justify a year of holding pattern? Why is it not better to begin the real growth today when we should have begun it 

yesterday? 

General DUNFORD. Congresswoman, all I can do is tell you if our 

priorities are correct within the top line that have been given, and 

when I talked about that 5 years, and we will talk more in detail 

on Wednesday night, we came up with that by analyzing our peer 

competitors by functional area and taking a look at where are we 

today, where will we be in 5 years based on projected resources? 
72 

Where are our potential adversaries today, and where will they be 

in 5 years? 

So I am trying to share with you the problem. I cannot solve it. 

I can tell you that we have the right priorities in the top line we 

have been given, but I also emphasize that if we do not turn 

around the trend, if we do not change the trajectory that we are 

on, that is where we will be at a competitive disadvantage within 

5 years. So I am trying to do the best I can with candor to share 

the situation as it exists today and what it will be in 5 years if we 

do not actually take action. 

Ms. CHENEY. I appreciate that. Who gave you the top line? Are 

we talking about OMB? 

Secretary MATTIS. That is correct. It is a growth of about 5 percent, a little over 5 percent over 2017, and it is, as I said it is $52 

billion above the BCA cap. At some point we have got to get some 

freedom, and OMB will need the same freedom. 

Ms. CHENEY. But with all due respect, Mr. Secretary, we are in 

a hole that may be greater than we have, you know, certainly been 

in since the 1970s. We are facing an array of threats, you said in 

your testimony, that is basically more volatile than any time in 

your career. 

And so I am trying to understand how it is that we could possibly have an administration that is saying but it is okay, we can 

wait until next year to begin the serious buildup? 

Secretary MATTIS. I do not think anyone is saying that, ma’am. 

Five percent growth, that is a bit of a change to say the least. 

Ms. CHENEY. Well, it is 3 percent, as I understand it, Mr. Secretary—— 

Secretary MATTIS. Over 2017? 

Ms. CHENEY [continuing]. Over the Obama administration request for 2017. 

Secretary MATTIS. Okay. Well, Congresswoman, we are growing 

the budget, we are dealing with readiness problems that we inherited that the Congress has watched for some time. We are going 

to do our best to create combat capability as swiftly as we can 

using an All-Volunteer Force and trying to get ships back to sea, 

trying to get airplanes back in the air. 

Ms. CHENEY. But I am sorry, Mr. Secretary, but I just do not understand when you say we are doing it as quickly as we can, why, 

you know, tonight we have said we are going to begin real growth 

next year. Why are we all right to wait until next year to begin 

that real growth? 

Secretary MATTIS. Well, for one thing, ma’am, we have got to put 

a lot of money into readiness where we are already in a hole. I 

mean, I have looked at the unfunded priorities list, and after the 

priority we have already set, I agree with every one of the unfunded priorities, as well. And that is 33 billion more dollars, but 

the bottom line is you are asking us to come in with a budget request beyond what we have now that would be even more of a violation of the act that Congress has passed. 

I mean, we need some direction from you, as well. I mean, frankly, as I recall my civics textbook the President does not even have 

to send a budget. 
73 

Ms. CHENEY. Right, but, Mr. Secretary, with all due respect, I 

know my time is up, just to echo what my colleague Mr. Gallagher 

said, the President has got to lead on this, and, you know, in terms 

of the budget proposal that came up, and I know you dealt with 

this issue of the proposed caps, but the President’s budget extends 

the Budget Control Act out 6 years. So we can say it is a placeholder, but table S7 foresees the Budget Control Act and the caps 

going beyond where they are supposed to be today. 

And so I think we can all agree we have got to repeal the Budget 

Control Act. It is crucially important. But we cannot be in a holding pattern in my opinion with all due respect for a year, you 

know, while we face the grave nature of the threats we face. 

Thank you. 

Secretary MATTIS. Okay. 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Wilson. 

Mr. WILSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and General Dunford, 

Secretary Mattis, Mr. Norquist. I am grateful tonight to see the bipartisan appreciation of your service. 

It is clear that we all want you to be successful for American 

families. The Vice Chief of Staff of the Army, General Daniel Allyn, 

testified that quote ‘‘based on current readiness levels, the Army 

can only accomplish defense planning guidance requirements at a 

high military risk,’’ end of quote. 

General Dunford, what is your assessment of the impact on our 

soldiers of being able to accomplish requirements at a high military 

risk? How many casualties does this mean for the Army to incur 

when it is ordered to fight at a high military risk? How many casualties at a low military risk? 

General DUNFORD. Congressman, without talking about a specific 

scenario, I cannot talk about casualties, but when General Allyn 

did testify, and when we all testified to risk, we do look at two 

variables. One is the time it takes to accomplish the objectives and 

then the amount of casualties we would estimate under particular 

circumstances. 

So I think what General Allyn was suggesting is that readiness 

translates into casualties, and I would subscribe to that, as well. 

Mr. WILSON. And I appreciate that Colonel Paul Cook has reflected such concern and wants to work with you obviously. 

And, Mr. Secretary, I want to thank you for your very clear 

warnings about the destructive consequences of sequestration. But 

at the same time, the budget level in your request, how many years 

do you think it would take normally to address high military risk? 

Secretary MATTIS. It is a constantly moving target, sir, because 

the enemy does not stand still. But I would just tell you that between 2019 and 2023 we intend to significantly grow the force, the 

Navy fleet, the Army brigade, and the fighter squadrons to reduce 

that risk. 

Mr. WILSON. And, Mr. Secretary, I am very concerned as Ms. 

Cheney, too, the defense budget request states, quote, ‘‘The condition of mission facilities, airfields, training areas, housing barracks 

directly impacts the readiness of the units and the morale of the 

soldiers, civilians, and families.’’ 

Yet the budget also tells us that the Army has $10.8 billion in 

unmet needs, the Navy at $9.5 billion short, and the Air Force is 
74 

$25 billion short. How long will it take to fix these critical backlogs, 

5 years, 10 years, 20 years? Will we ever be able to fix these facilities for our soldiers, airmen, and Marines to train for war and for 

their families to live? 

Secretary MATTIS. Well, we are increasing the MILCON [military 

construction] budget, sir. You know, as we look more broadly at 

this, as I said earlier, Congressman Wilson, we did not get into this 

overnight, and it is going to take time to get us out of this. We are 

given a top line as the President’s budget had to deal with a lot 

of priorities, and we are doing the best we can with the money that 

we have been given, which is an increase over what past years 

have committed to DOD. Is it enough? 

Can I give you a timeline on this? Probably not right now, but 

it is going in the right direction, and I think we would all agree 

with that even if it is not sufficient in terms of getting us where 

we need to go. But the Congress has the purse strings, and if the 

Congress decides to fund the unfunded priority list, some of these 

issues are listed right there, then that money can be applied to it. 

Mr. WILSON. And specifically, Mr. Secretary, the Navy alone submitted unfunded requirements of more than $690 million for critical repairs to airfields, dry docks, wharfs, and other facilities. The 

Air Force asked for more than $858 million, the Army for $820 million. What is the explanation for the committee and how should we 

accept whether the budget request is adequate when the services 

are asking for so much, and really there has been a great description by Congresswoman Cheney that we are in a holding pattern, 

and so we want to work with you, and so how quickly can we get 

this done? 

Secretary MATTIS. Sir, the budget is growing, so a holding pattern I do not agree with. It is not sufficient to address all the shortfalls that grew over the years. I will be the first to admit that, and 

if the Congress sees fit to give us enough money to do all that then 

we can probably do it a lot faster. But for me to give you an estimate would take a heck of a lot of analysis and a firm, stable budget horizon that we have not enjoyed in a decade. 

Mr. WILSON. Thank you very much again for all of you being 

here tonight. 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Gaetz. Make it good. 

Mr. GAETZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am not sure when the 

Secretary said that he kept others up at night, he quite had this 

in mind. 

Mr. Secretary, please know that the warfighters in my district in 

northwest Florida are as proud of you as I am certain you are of 

them. We have spent now 4 hours in this hearing to essentially answer this question: If we gave you more money than the administration requested with a stable budget horizon, could you use it effectively? 

Secretary MATTIS. Yes, Congressman, we could. 

Mr. GAETZ. And would that effective use of money above and beyond what the administration has requested make our troops safer 

in combat? 

Secretary MATTIS. We would ensure it did. 
75 

Mr. GAETZ. And would the money that we could provide above 

and beyond what the administration has requested do a great deal 

to advance America’s interests throughout the world? 

Secretary MATTIS. I would presume so, yes. 

Mr. GAETZ. And as we sit here today is it accurate that the average airplane in our Air Force is about 27 years old? 

Secretary MATTIS. I would have to confirm that, but it sounds— 

it is in the ballpark. 

Mr. GAETZ. At any other time in the Air Force’s history has the 

average age of an aircraft been higher? 

Secretary MATTIS. I do not believe so, but, again, I would have 

to look at the specific data. 

Mr. GAETZ. And today in the Air Force would we have to say that 

more or less than half of our fighter squadrons are full-spectrum 

ready? 

Secretary MATTIS. Well, Congressman, again, I prefer not to get 

too specific in open hearing, but I think you are about right. 

Mr. GAETZ. And the fact that we have an Air Force where perhaps readiness is less than optimal with aircraft that are older 

than at any other time in the Air Force’s history, could you take 

just a moment and reflect on the impact that has on our ability to 

project power and the safety of those that we send into combat? 

Secretary MATTIS. Well, Congressman, I think you have heard 

from the Chairman tonight. We have pilots who are not flying 

enough to stay current in their aircraft or have their confidence in 

the aircraft. We have readiness problems across the force and these 

for anyone I think who has been on this committee for more than 

a year probably this is not a surprise. 

It was a bit of a shock for me coming back to the Department. 

But what you are outlining appears to be a pretty good definition 

of the problem. 

Mr. GAETZ. Earlier in response to a question you indicated that 

you thought Qatar was moving in the right direction. I appreciated 

that characterization because it is quite binary. In a world that is 

always moving, things are always going in the right direction or in 

the wrong direction. What characterization would you apply to Turkey, are they going in the right direction or the wrong direction? 

Secretary MATTIS. Well, in what regard, sir? 

Mr. GAETZ. In the same regards in which you answered the question as it related to Qatar. 

Secretary MATTIS. Qatar was in regard to whether or not they 

were moving away from funding, and much of it was private funding, not governmental, but funding of any kind of violent extremist, 

and in that regard they are moving in the right direction. I am not 

aware of Turkey funding violent extremists. 

Mr. GAETZ. Then in the broadest sense, Mr. Secretary, of Turkey’s interaction with the world, with our allies, taking into account our utilization of Turkish airspace, military assets, also taking into consideration, you know, the challenges that we have in 

the Aegean with the Greeks and the Turks, is Turkey moving in 

the right direction or the wrong direction? 

Secretary MATTIS. Turkey is a NATO ally, as you know. It has 

got internal political issues that they are dealing with. They provide an air base that has been invaluable in the fight against ISIS. 
76 

It is a mixed bag in that regard, but I think right now we are 

doing the best we can to work with Turkey in areas where we have 

common interests in order to take advantage of the situation that 

they provide being right on the border of being a frontline state 

against terrorists. 

Mr. GAETZ. Thank you so much, Secretary Mattis. 

I yield back, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, both, for responding to all the questions that this committee put to you. 

I think you can tell, there is bipartisan interest in going above 

603. There is also bipartisan interest in working with you to reform 

the Department to be more agile and more efficient, which is also 

a part of the equation. 

So needless to say, we have got lots of work together yet to come. 

Without objection, members have 3 legislative days in which to 

submit extraneous material for inclusion into the record consistent 

with the committee policy limits. 

And with that, the hearing stands adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 11:04 p.m., the committee was adjourned.] 
A P P E N D I X 

JUNE 12, 2017 

PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD 

JUNE 12, 2017 

(81) 

Opening Statement of Hon. William M. "Mac" Thornberry 

Chairman, House Committee on Armed Services 

HEARING ON 

The Fiscal Year 2018 National Defense Authorization Budget Request 

from the Department of Defense 

June 12,2017 

The committee meets to receive the testimony of the Secretary of 

Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the Administration's 

fiscal year 2018 budget request. 

We welcome Secretary Mattis for his first hearing before our 

committee, and we welcome Chairman Dunford back. 

The question today, as it is each year for this hearing, is how well the 

Administration's proposal meets the security needs of our nation- factoring 

in both the external threats and the current state of our military. 

This committee has repeatedly heard testimony over the past two years 

that our country faces more serious, complex security challenges now than we 

have ever faced before. And the hearings and briefings we have held on the 

current state of our military have been disturbing. 

The Administration's budget request of $603 billion for base 

requirements is 6% above the FY 2017 enacted levels and 3% above the last 

Obama Administration budget proposal. It is also $37 billion below what this 

committee assessed last fall was needed and about $58 billion below the FY 

'12 Gates budget, which was validated by the bipartisan National Defense 

Panel. 

But, of course, the issue is not numbers. The issue is what those 

numbers provide for the men and women who serve and what security the 

budget provides to the nation. It is about whether we can defend the U.S. and 

our allies against North Korean missiles, for example. It is about whether we 

have the number of ships and planes and other military capability to deter 

aggression and maintain peace. It is about doing right by our most valuable 

asset- our people. The men and women who serve deserve the best weapons 

and equipment our country can provide, and today they are not getting it. 

It is always tempting to divert this discussion into the broader budget 

debate related to taxes and other spending programs. Those issues are not 

within the jurisdiction ofthis committee or of these witnesses. But regardless 

of our views on those issues, we cannot wait until we solve our budget 

problems to adequately fund our military. We cannot wait until we perfect 

our acquisition system to have planes that fly and ships that sail. The world is 

not stopping and waiting on us to get our act together. It moves on, and it is 

moving in a dangerous direction. 

2018 is a key decision point. We have spent six years just getting by, 

asking more and more of those who serve, and putting off the choices that 
82 

have to be made. We cannot keep piling missions on our service members 

without ensuring they have all they need to succeed. 

Does this Administration's budget proposal accomplish that? That is 

the question before us. 
83 

House Armed Services Committee Ranking Member Adam Smith 

Opening Statement - Prepared 

Full Committee Hearing on 

The Fiscal Year 2018 National Defense Authorization Budget Request 

from the Department of Defense 

June 12,2017 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would like to welcome Secretary Mattis 

and General Dunford and to thank them both for appearing this evening. Their 

testimony is instrumental to our consideration of the National Defense 

Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2018. 

The United States continues to confront an array of national security 

challenges. We know that Russia, China, North Korea, Iran, and numerous 

violent extremist organizations, such as ISIL and a! Qaeda, threaten the 

international rules-based order in a variety of ways. The threats posed by 

Russia are especially concerning. Russian meddling in electoral processes, a 

revanchist Russian posture in Europe, and the Russian military's aggressive 

employment of destabilizing cyber and hybrid warfare methods illustrate 

systematic efforts to undermine liberal democratic institutions in order to 

promote those grounded in authoritarianism and kleptocracy. Through its 

efforts, Russia aims to disrupt our governmental and economic systems and to 

weaken our standing within the international community. As a result, Russia 

presents a clear and present danger to our safety and security, our liberties, 

and our way of life. 

The United States must concentrate its efforts on countering this threat. 

In doing so, it must implement a whole-of-government strategy, which will: 

strengthen our defenses, deter Russian aggression, engage more expansively 

in the international arena and build greater solidarity among our many allies 

and partners around the world, uphold internationally-accepted norms, and 

reinforce our values. Given how interconnected the world is, it has never 

been more important to show collective resolve against common threats. We 

cannot face them alone. Our counter-Russia strategy must also harness 

extensive national capabilities, including military, diplomatic, and 

development assistance capabilities, across all geographic regions, functions, 

and domains. Comprehensive threats demand comprehensive responses. 

A similarly engaging and comprehensive approach must be taken 

regarding violent extremism. A successful counterterrorism strategy will 

require long-term commitment, and military means are only a part of the 

package. Addressing violent extremism with military force may be necessary, 

but it is insufficient. We must also address the political, economic, and social 

conditions that fuel the discontent, upon which violent extremist ideologies 

prey. We must encourage and facilitate reconciliation among political, ethnic, 
84 

and sectarian factions, support productive economic reforms, promote civil 

liberties and respect for human rights, and expose the reprehensible aspects of 

violent extremist ideologies in order to de legitimize their appeaL Again, we 

are not alone in this struggle. The cooperation and assistance that we receive 

from our allies and partners in this endeavor is crucial to success. 

That is why the mixed messages that this Administration is sending to 

Qatar, regarding its dispute with certain other Gulf countries, are 

disconcerting to me. Qatar is a key defense partner of the United States, and it 

hosts a major U.S. military installation. Yet, the President is willing to risk 

alienating Qatar and the strategic relationship that we share by issuing 

hardline rhetoric that implicitly supports those disputants who have imposed 

an economic embargo on Qatar. Why is he exacerbating the issue instead of 

doing everything he can to mediate an agreeable way forward? The United 

States should be exercising constructive leadership. If the United States, 

Qatar, and other partners can make improvements that progress the fight 

against terrorism, then let's work together to realize them. I look forward to 

hearing our witnesses' views on how we might improve our security 

relationships with Qatar and other partners around the globe. I also welcome 

their views on how the new Administration's regional policies are taking 

shape with respect to our significant military involvements in Iraq, Syria, 

Afghanistan, Yemen, and Somalia. 

The security environment in that region and elsewhere will continue to 

evolve in ways that will surely affect our national interests. Therefore, the 

United States will need to maintain a modern, balanced, and ready force that 

can meet significant challenges with a spectrum of effective capabilities. To 

do this, we need fiscal certainty. The President has requested a total of$639.1 

billion for the Department ofDefense for fiscal year 2018. That is a lot of 

money. Indeed, the President's request far exceeds the budgetary caps 

imposed by the Budget Control Act of20ll (the BCA), and it assumes that 

Congress will provide legislative relief. 

I have long held that Congress should eliminate sequestration and lift 

the BCA caps. However, securing defense dollars by raiding the non-defense 

accounts is unacceptable. Investments in diplomatic efforts, foreign assistance 

programs, and emergency preparedness also need to be prioritized, and we 

need to invest heavily in infrastructure, research and innovation, energy 

solutions, education, health care, and many other facets of enduring national 

strength. National security involves much more than defense. I am especially 

disappointed by the Administration's willingness to subsidize increased 

defense spending by making cuts to important State Department and USAID 

programs, which would affect U.S. support to the United Nations (including 

UN peacekeeping organizations), foreign military assistance, and 

development assistance. This inclination is misguided, as it would detract 

from the engaging, whole-of-government approaches needed to address our 

most serious national security concerns. 
85 

We also need to enact reforms that will yield future savings. The 

Department should be given the flexibility to reduce excess infrastructure and 

overhead and to revise and balance force structure as may be appropriate. We 

have a duty to manage our country's resources responsibly in fielding an 

effective military. We must invest wisely when it comes to national security. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I look forward to receiving our witnesses' 

testimony. 
86 

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE JIM MATTIS 

HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE 

WRITTEN STATEMENT FOR THE RECORD 

MONDAY, JUNE 12, 2017 

Chairman Thornberry, Ranking Member Smith, distinguished members of the 

committee, I appreciate the opportunity to testify in support of the President's budget 

request for Fiscal Year 2018. 

I am pleased to be joined by Chairman Dunford and the Department's new Comptroller, 

Under Secretary of Defense David Norquist. 

This budget request holds me accountable to the men and women of the Department of 

Defense. Every day, more than two million Service members and nearly one million 

civilians do their duty, honoring previous generations of veterans and civil servants who 

have sacrificed for our country. I am mindful of the privilege it is to serve alongside 

them. 

We in the Department of Defense are keenly aware of the sacrifices made by the 

American people to fund our military. Many times in the past we have looked reality in 

the eye, met challenges with Congressional leadership, and built the most capable 

warfighting force in the world. There is no room for complacency and we have no Godgiven right to victory on the battlefield. Each generation of Americans, from the halls of 

Congress to the battlefields, earn victory through commitment and sacrifice. 

And yet, for four years our military has been subject to or threatened by automatic, 

across-the-board cuts as a result of sequester- a mechanism meant to be so injurious 

to the military it would never go into effect. In addition, during nine of the past ten years, 

Congress has enacted 30 separate Continuing Resolutions to fund the Department of 

Defense, thus inhibiting our readiness and adaptation to new challenges. 

I need bipartisan support for this budget request. In the past, by failing to pass a budget 

on time or eliminate the threat of sequestration, Congress sidelined itself from its active 

Constitutional oversight role. It has blocked new programs, prevented service growth, 
87 

stalled industry initiative, and placed troops at greater risk. Despite the tremendous 

efforts of this committee, Congress as a whole has met the present challenge with 

lassitude, not leadership. 

For much of the past decade, my predecessors and prior members of the Joint Chiefs of 

Staff testified that sequestration and the continued use of Continuing Resolutions would 

result in a steady erosion of military readiness. In 2013, then-Secretary of Defense Leon 

Panetta, former Chairman of the House Budget Committee and the former Director of 

the Office of Management and Budget, testified sequester was "guaranteed to hollow 

out the force." 

I retired from military service three months after sequestration took effect. Four years 

later, I returned to the Department and I have been shocked by what I've seen with our 

readiness to fight. For all the heartache caused by the loss of our troops during these 

wars, no enemy in the field has done more to harm the readiness of our military than 

sequestration. We have only sustained our ability to meet America's commitments 

abroad because our troops have stoically shouldered a much greater burden. 

It took us years to get into this situation. It will require years of stable budgets and 

increased funding to get out of it. I urge members of this committee and Congress to 

achieve three goals: 

• First, fully fund our request, which requires an increase to the Defense budget 

caps; 

• Second, pass a FY 2018 budget in a timely manner to avoid yet another harmful 

Continuing Resolution; and 

• Third, eliminate the threat of future sequestration cuts to provide a stable 

budgetary planning horizon. 

Stable budgets and increased funding are necessary because of four external forces 

acting on the Department at the same time. 

2 
88 

The first force we must recognize is 16 years of war. This period represents the longest 

continuous stretch of armed conflict in our Nation's history. In more than a quarter 

century since the end of the Cold War, our country has deployed large-scale forces in 

active operations for more months than we have been at peace. 

When Congress approved the All-Volunteer Force in 1973, our country never 

envisioned sending our military to war for more than a decade without pause or 

conscription. America's long war has placed a heavy burden on men and women in 

uniform and their families. 

In recognition of these demands, Congress devoted more resources to recruiting and 

retaining members of the military. As a result, personnel costs as a fraction of the 

defense budget have risen over time. 

Meanwhile, the war has exhausted our equipment faster than planned. Congress and 

the Department could not anticipate the accumulated wear and tear of years of 

continuous combat use. We have had to procure replacement gear and spend more 

money to keep gear serviceable and extend its service life. Due to this extensive use of 

our equipment across the force, operations and maintenance costs have also 

increased, rising faster than the rate of inflation during the past 16 years. 

Worn equipment and constrained supplies have forced our personnel to work overtime 

while deployed or preparing to deploy. That too has placed an added burden on the 

men and women who serve and on their families. This further degrades readiness in a 

negative spiral, for those not in the fight are at a standstill, unable to train as their 

equipment is sent forward to cover shortfalls or returned for extensive rework. 

My predecessor, Secretary Gates, stated annualized real defense budget increases and 

efficiencies of two to three percent above inflation are needed to sustain the AllVolunteer Force in a way that keeps personnel, modernization, and readiness accounts 

in balance. In the six years since the passage of the Budget Control Act, a period of 

declining, flat, or modestly increasing budgets, we have not kept this balance. 

3 
89 

Not long ago we convinced ourselves that when we pulled out of Iraq and ceased 

combat operations in Afghanistan, we would take two or three years to "reset and 

reconstitute" the force. Today's operations dictate the best we can do is "reset and 

reconstitute in stride," a reality that imposes its own stress on the Force. 

A second concurrent force acting on the Department is the worsening global security 

situation. Our challenge is characterized by a decline in the long-standing rules-based 

international order, bringing with it a more volatile security environment than any I have 

experienced during my four decades of military service. 

The most urgent and dangerous threat to peace and security is North Korea. North 

Korea's continued pursuit of nuclear weapons and the means to deliver them has 

increased in pace and scope. The regime's nuclear weapons program is a clear and 

present danger to all, and the regime's provocative actions, manifestly illegal under 

international law, have not abated despite United Nations' censure and sanctions. 

We also look on the prospect of a new era, one governed by today's economic realities 

and returning once again to a balance of powers. A return to Great Power competition, 

marked by a resurgent and more aggressive Russian Federation and a rising, more 

confident, and assertive China, places the international order under assault. Both 

Russia and China object to key aspects of the international order so painstakingly built 

since the end of World War II. Both countries are making their objections known by 

challenging established international norms, such as freedom of the seas and the 

sovereignty of nations on their periphery. 

Moreover, the breakdown of the broader Mideast order has given rise to terrorist 

groups, including AI-Qaeda and the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS). Security 

vacuums have allowed a revolutionary Iranian regime to sow violence, provoke wider 

Sunni-Shia confrontation, and pursue regional hegemony. More broadly, this need to 

preserve our security also requires us to sustain the international presence in 

Afghanistan to help stabilize the South Asia region and deny terrorists a safe haven. 

4 
90 

Instability in the Middle East spills over into other regions. Extremists and extremist 

ideologies have spread to Europe, Africa, and Asia. Numerous countries are dealing 

with forced migration of people seeking to escape violence and despair, reminding us 

that problems originating in ungoverned or combat torn areas don't remain there. The 

United States is engaged in the Middle East to help restore order and give the people 

who live there a more hopeful future, building a better security situation for Americans 

who want a safer and more prosperous world for our future. 

As one observer of the world has noted, we are "faced with two problems: first, how to 

reduce regional chaos; second, how to create a coherent world order based on agreedupon principles that are necessary for the operation of the entire system." That 

observer, Dr. Henry Kissinger, and his fellow members of the Greatest Generation 

witnessed first-hand the costs of military unpreparedness. They learned the paramount 

need to prevent hostile states from gaining dominance. And they understood that while 

there is no way to guarantee peace, the surest way to prevent war is to be prepared to 

win one. 

Under any circumstances, however, reducing regional chaos in tandem with our 

interagency partners and international allies to help foster a coherent order requires 

adequate diplomatic and military resources. 

Adversaries contesting the United States constitute a third force impacting the 

Department. For decades the United States enjoyed uncontested or dominant 

superiority in every operating domain or realm. We could generally deploy our forces 

when we wanted, assemble them where we wanted, and operate how we wanted. 

Today, every operating domain is contested. 

Outer space, long considered a sanctuary, is now contested. This creates the need to 

develop capabilities and capacities for more resilient satellites designed to withstand 

persistent kinetic and non-kinetic attack. 

Our dominance of the air is challenged by the proliferation of advanced integrated air 

defense networks and 51

h-generation aircraft. The F-35 Joint Strike Fighter program, 

5 
91 

longer range weapons, and unmanned systems will help us impose our will on potential 

adversaries while preserving our aircraft and crews in combat. 

Our command of the seas is threatened by long-range, land-based guided munitions 

battle networks designed to attack our ships at increasingly longer ranges. Our 

undersea superiority, unquestioned since the end of the Cold War, and a key 

competitive advantage, is challenged by both Russia and China. 

Our dominance on land in conventional, high-end combined arms maneuver is 

threatened by the introduction of long-range air-to-surface and surface-to-surface 

guided weapons, advanced armored vehicles and anti-tank weapons, and tactical 

electronic warfare systems. 

Cyberspace is now a contested operating realm at the strategic, operational, and 

tactical levels of war. 

Finally, our air, naval, ground and logistics bases are all under threat of accurate, allweather, day-night guided munitions bombardment. This will complicate our operations 

and make passive and active base defenses more necessary and urgent. 

A fourth concurrent force acting on the Department is rapid technological change. 

Among the other forces noted thus far, technological change is one that necessitates 

new investment, innovative approaches, and when necessary, new program starts that 

have been denied us by law when we have been forced to operate under Continuing 

Resolutions. 

Rapid technological change includes developments in advanced computing, big data 

analytics, artificial intelligence, autonomy, robotics, miniaturization, additive 

manufacturing, meta-materials, directed energy, and hypersonics- the very 

technologies that ensure we will be able to fight and win the wars of the future. 

Many of these advances are driven by commercial sector demands and research and 

development. New commercial technologies will change society, and ultimately, they 

6 
92 

will change the character of war. The fact that many of these technological 

developments will come from the commercial sector means that state competitors and 

non-state actors will also have access to them, a fact that will continue to erode the 

conventional overmatch our Nation has grown so accustomed to. 

In this competitive environment, the Department must pay much more attention to future 

readiness, and regaining our Joint Force conventional overmatch over time. We must 

be willing and able to tap into commercial research, recognize its military potential, and 

develop new capabilities and the operational and organizational constructs to employ 

them faster than our competitors. 

We must also be prepared to deal with technological, operational, and tactical surprise, 

which requires changes to the way we train and educate our leaders and our forces, 

and how we organize for improved Departmental agility. 

Improving our future readiness, rapid adoption of off the shelf technologies, and 

preparing to deal with surprise are critical to modernization efforts, but constrained 

budgets and acquisition regulations have limited our ability to keep pace with rapid 

changes and sustain our competitive advantage. 

In response to these realities, the Department must develop new weapons and 

capabilities, adjust concepts of operations, adapt our training, and spend more time 

war-gaming and exercising to improve our ability to fight and win. 

Each of these four forces- 16 years of war, the worsening security environment, 

contested operations in multiple domains, and the rapid pace of technological changerequire stable budgets and increased funding to provide for the protection of our citizens 

and for the survival of our freedoms. Because as expensive as it is for the American 

people to fund the military, it is far less costly in lives and treasure than a conventional 

war that we are unable to deter because we are seen as weak. 

I reiterate that security and solvency are my watchwords as Secretary of Defense. The 

fundamental responsibility of our government is to defend the American people, 

7 
93 

providing for our security-and we cannot defend America and help others if our Nation 

is not both strong and solvent. So we in the Department of Defense owe it to the 

American public to ensure we spend each dollar wisely. President Trump has 

nominated for Senate approval specific individuals who will bring proven skills to 

discipline our Department's fiscal processes to ensure we do so. 

This first step to restoring readiness is underway thanks to Congress' willingness to 

support the Administration's request for additional resources in FY 2017 to rebuild our 

most urgent needs. Your support of $21 billion in additional resources allowed the 

Department to address immediate warfighting readiness shortfalls and to help fund the 

acceleration of the fight against ISIS. 

This additional FY 2017 funding addresses vital warfighting readiness shortfalls, a 

necessary investment to ensure our military is ready to fight today, by putting more 

aircraft in the air, ships to sea, and troops in the field. Additionally, the funding provided 

for more maintenance, spare parts, training time, flying hours, munition stocks, and 

manpower. 

We all recognize that it will take a number of years of higher funding delivered on time 

to restore readiness. To strengthen the military, President Trump requested a $639.1 

billion topline for the FY 2018 defense budget. Of this topline, $57 4.5 billion supports 

Department of Defense base budget requirements - warfighting readiness and critical 

program requirements, including intelligence community requirements. The balance, 

$64.6 billion, supports Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) requirements. 

The Department's FY 2018 base budget with its $52 billion increase above the National 

Defense Budget Control Act cap is the next step to building a larger, more capable, and 

more lethal joint force. The FY 2018 budget reflects five priorities: restoring and 

improving warfighter readiness, increasing capacity and lethality, reforming how the 

Department does business, keeping the faith with Service members and their families, 

and supporting Overseas Contingency Operations. 

8 
94 

The first priority is continuing to improve warfighter readiness begun in FY 2017, filling 

in the holes from trade-offs made during 16 years of war, and six years of continuing 

resolutions and Budget Control Act caps. This budget request, as directed by the 

National Security Presidential Memorandum "Rebuilding the U.S. Armed Forces" issued 

on January 27, 2017, identifies and improves shortfalls in readiness, specifically in 

training, equipment, maintenance, munitions, modernization, and infrastructure. 

The 30-Day Readiness Review, completed as part of the development of the FY 2017 

Request for Additional Appropriations, identified significant challenges to recovering 

readiness, including budget uncertainty, high operational tempo, and the time required 

to rebuild readiness properly. As a result of this review, the Department submitted the 

FY 2018 budget request to enable the Joint Force to counter national security threats, 

fulfill steady-state demand, and implement readiness recovery plans. 

The Army remains globally engaged with more than 180,000 Soldiers committed to 

combatant command deterrence and counterterrorism operations. The FY 2018 budget 

will restore a larger, more capable and lethal modernized force to defeat emerging 

regional and global near-peer adversaries. Combat Training Center rotations and home 

station training will help the Army develop capabilities for full-spectrum warfare. 

Additional Soldiers, training, and equipment will enable the Army to make significant 

progress towards restoring and sustaining readiness longer. 

The Navy will continue implementation of its Optimized Fleet Response Plan, reduce 

the long-term maintenance backlog, and train to ensure the Fleet is ready to fight. 

Requested funding provides stable and predictable maintenance and modernization 

plans, and forces trained to a single full-mission readiness standard. Predictably 

building readiness with continued implementation of the Optimized Fleet Response Plan 

will increase aircraft carrier availability, fund ship operations to the anticipated level of 

required operational days, and improve quality of work and quality of life for Sailors. 

The Air Force will restore funding to its Flying Hour Program, increase aircraft 

sustainment, and grow training resource availability. These steps will enable personnel 

to regain proficiency in critical skill areas. Investments into training ranges will increase 

9 
95 

capacity and modernize the simulated threats our young men and women need to 

overcome to counter adversaries. The Air Force will also invest in home station highend training, reducing the requirement to deploy for training. 

The Marine Corps is committed to remaining capable of responding to crises anywhere 

around the globe. FY 2018 investments emphasize readiness for deployed and next-todeploy forces, maintenance for aging platforms, and funding to maintain critical 

modernization programs. Fully integrated Combined Arms Exercises for all elements of 

the Marine Air Ground Task Forces will help recover full-spectrum readiness. 

The second priority is increasing capacity and lethality while preparing for future 

investment in the FY2019 budget, driven by results from the National Defense Strategy. 

The FY 2018 budget request addresses resource gaps in the capabilities, readiness, 

and capacity needed to project power globally in contested environments, while 

emphasizing preparedness for future high-end security challenges. The budget request 

supports this priority through investment in advanced capabilities to reassert our 

technological edge over potential future adversaries, while having more units ready to 

fight. 

The FY 2018 budget request seeks to fill the holes and achieve program balance before 

beginning to significantly grow capacity in future years. Part of achieving a more 

capable force involves pursuing innovative ways to develop the force and concepts of 

operation to reverse unfavorable cost ratios adversaries would seek to impose on the 

United States in future warfighting environments. The FY 2018 investments include 

power projection capabilities, nuclear modernization, a stronger missile defense, spacebased systems, and cyberspace operations. Several of these options will expand the 

competitive space to our advantage vice allowing an adversary to define a conflict. Our 

budget request also ensures that the nation's current nuclear deterrent will be 

sustained, and supports continuation of its much needed modernization process. 

The third priority is reforming how the department does business. I am devoted to 

gaining full value from every taxpayer dollar spent on defense, thereby earning the trust 

of Congress and the American people. 

10 
96 

The Department is committed to reforming the acquisition enterprise to improve its 

ability to be innovative, responsive, and cost effective. The Department has begun 

implementation of a range of reform initiatives directed by the 2017 NOAA, to include 

disestablishment of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and 

Logistics, and the establishment of the Under Secretaries for Research and 

Engineering, and for Acquisition and Sustainment. Consistent with section 901 of the 

National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017, this change will be in effect by 

February 1, 2018, or sooner if I'm able to set the necessary conditions. 

The FY 2018 budget request includes notable reform efforts. I urge Congress to support 

the Department's request for authority to conduct a 2021 Base Realignment and 

Closure (BRAG) round, a cornerstone of our efficiencies program. The Department 

currently has more infrastructure capacity than required for operations - and foreseeable 

growth scenarios won't appreciably change this. I recognize the severity of BRAG's 

impact on communities and the careful consideration that members must exercise in 

considering it. In order to ensure we do not waste taxpayer dollars I would therefore 

greatly appreciate Congress' willingness to discuss BRAG authorization as an efficiency 

measure. That authorization is essential to improving our readiness by minimizing 

wasted resources and accommodating force adjustments. Waste reduction is 

fundamental to keeping the trust of the American people and is a key element of the 

efficiency/reform efforts that Congress and the Administration expect of us. Of all the 

efficiency measures the Department has undertaken over the years, BRAG is one of the 

most successful and significant- we forecast that a properly focused base closure effort 

will generate $2 billion or more annually- enough to buy 300 Apache attack helicopters, 

120 F/A-18E/F Super Hornets, or four Virginia-class submarines. 

During Fiscal Year 2018 the Department is on track to enter into a full, agency-wide 

financial statement audit as required by statute. As part of this effort, the Department 

has established a Cost Decision Framework that leverages commercial best practices. 

This initiative will give decision makers the information they need to make a fully 

informed, cost-based decision. 

11 
97 

The fourth priority is keeping faith with Service members and families. Military and 

civilian personnel are the foundation of the Department of Defense. The Nation's 

commitment to these patriots willing to serve our country is built into the FY 2018 

budget request and is demonstrated by the number of initiatives and programs to 

support their professional development and their personal and family lives. 

Comprising roughly one-third of the Department of Defense budget, military pay and 

benefits are the single largest expense category for the Department. I believe providing 

competitive pay and benefits is a necessity to attract and retain the highly qualified 

people needed in today's military. The right people are the Department's most valuable 

asset, but we must continually balance these requirements against other investments 

critical to readiness, equipment, and modernization to ensure the military is the most 

capable warfighting force in the world. Balancing resources is particularly important as 

the Department reshapes the force needed to remain effective in an uncertain future. 

Investment in military compensation, Blended Retirement, the Military Health System, 

and family programs are essential to fielding the talent we need to sustain our 

competitive advantage on the battlefield. 

The fifth priority is support for Overseas Contingency Operations. The FY 2018 

President's Budget requests $64.6 billion, focusing on Operations in Afghanistan, Iraq, 

and Syria, increasing efforts to sustain NATO's defenses to deter aggression, and 

global counterterrorism operations. Specifically, ISIS and other terrorist organizations 

represent a clear and present danger. The U.S. remains united and committed with the 

66 nations of the Defeat-ISIS Coalition -plus the European Union, NATO, Arab 

League, and Interpol- to destroy ISIS. We will continue to support partner nations' 

diplomatic and military efforts through a security cooperation approach. I am 

encouraged by the willingness of our allies and partners to share the burden of this 

campaign. 

The FY 2019 budget, informed by the National Defense Strategy, will grow the AllVolunteer Force. The Department will work with President Trump, Congress, and this 

committee to ensure the budget request we present for FY 2019-2023 is sustainable 

12 
98 

and that it provides the Commander-in-Chief with viable military options in support of 

America's security. 

Judicious spending of America's public money is critical to ensuring security while 

maintaining solvency. We already know we face a dilemma between increasing 

personnel end strength and force structure on the one hand, and investing in equipment 

as well as research and development on the other hand. These challenges are 

compounded by the pressing need to recapitalize the nuclear triad and the sealift fleet in 

the 2020s. The President's Nuclear Posture Review will look at all elements of U.S. 

nuclear forces to ensure that our nuclear deterrent, including our command, control, and 

communication systems, are appropriately tailored to deter emerging 21st century 

threats. 

I know we will have to make hard choices as we develop our new defense strategy and 

shape the FY 2019-2023 defense program. With the help of Congress, I am confident 

we can build a force that is necessarily more lethal without placing an undue burden on 

the American economy. 

I am keenly aware members of this committee understand the responsibility each of us 

has to ensuring our military is ready to fight today and in the future. I need your help to 

inform your fellow members of Congress about the reality facing our military - and the 

need for Congress as a whole to pass a budget on time. 

Thank you for your strong support and for ensuring our troops have the resources and 

equipment they need to fight and win on the battlefield. I pledge to collaborate closely 

with you for the defense of our Nation in our joint effort to keep our Armed Forces 

second-to-none. 

Chairman Dunford is prepared to discuss the military dimensions of the budget request. 

### 

13 
99 

James N. Mattis 

Secretary of Defense 

James N. Mattis became the 26th Secretary of Defense on January 20, 2017. 

A native of Richland, Washington, Secretary Mattis enlisted in the U.S. Marine Corps Reserve at 

the age of 18. After graduating from Central Washington University in 1971, he was 

commissioned a second lieutenant in the U.S. Marine Corps. 

During his more than four decades in uniform, Secretary Mattis commanded Marines at all levels, 

from an infantry rifle platoon to a Marine Expeditionary Force. He led an infantry battalion in Iraq 

in 1991, an expeditionary brigade in Afghanistan after the 9/11 terror attack in 2001, a Marine 

Division in the initial attack and subsequent stability operations in Iraq in 2003, and led all U.S. 

Marine Forces in the Middle East as Commander, I Marine Expeditionary Force and U.S. Marine 

Forces Central Command. 

During his non-combat assignments, Secretary Mattis served as Senior Military Assistant to the 

Deputy Secretary of Defense; as Director, Marine Corps Manpower Plans & Policy; as 

Commanding General, Marine Corps Combat Development Command; and as Executive Secretary 

to the Secretary of Defense. 

As a joint force commander, Secretary Mattis commanded U.S. Joint Forces Command, NATO's 

Supreme Allied Command for Transformation, and U.S. Central Command. At U.S. Central 

Command, he directed military operations of more than 200,000 soldiers, sailors, airmen, Coast 

Guardsmen, Marines and allied forces across the Middle East. 

Following his retirement from the U.S. Marine Corps in 2013, Secretary Mattis served as the 

Davies Family Distinguished Visiting Fellow at the Hoover Institution at Stanford University, 

specializing in the study ofleadership, national security, strategy, innovation, and the effective use 

of military force. In 2016, he co-edited the book, Warriors & Citizens: American Views of Our 

Military. 
100 

HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE 

POSTURE STATEMENT OF 

19TH CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF 

BEFORE THE llSTH CONGRESS 

HOUSE ARMED SERVICES 

BUDGET HEARING 

JUNE 12, 2017 
101 

Chairman Thornberry, Ranking Member Smith, distinguished members of this 

committee, thank you for the opportunity to join Secretary Mattis in appearing 

before you today. 

The U.S. military's competitive advantage against potential adversaries is 

eroding. Over the last decade, sustained operational commitments, budgetary 

instability, and advances by our adversaries have threatened our ability to 

project power and we have lost our advantage in key warfighting areas. The 

FY18 Budget Request will allow the Armed Forces to meet operational 

requirements, continue rebuilding warfighting readiness, and place the military 

on a path to balancing the Defense program. However, without sustained, 

sufficient, and predictable funding, I assess that within 5 years we will lose our 

ability to project power; the basis of how we defend the homeland, advance 

U.S. interests, and meet our alliance commitments. 

Strategic Environment 

In today's strategic environment, five key challenges - Russia, China, Iran, 

North Korea, and Violent Extremist Organizations - most clearly represent the 

challenges facing the U.S. military. They serve as a benchmark for our global 

posture, the size of the force, capability development, and risk management. 

Over the past several decades, each of these state actors have developed 

capabilities and operational approaches to counter our strategic and 

operational centers of gravity. The United States' decisive victory in DESERT 

STORM in 1991 was a wake-up call for our adversaries. For Russia and China, 

specifically, the lessons-learned spurred dramatic tactical, operational, and 

strategic adaptations. Observing the power and efficacy of precision guided 

munitions and combined arms maneuver, both countries accelerated 

modernization programs to asymmetrically counter U.S. advantages. They 

adapted operational constructs to incorporate anti-access technology and 

2 
102 

employed new doctrines to leverage high-tech weaponry across all domains. 

These efforts sought to limit U.S. freedom of navigation, deny our ability to gain 

and maintain air-superiority, negate the capability of our precision munitions, 

and limit our ability to employ sophisticated command and control systems. 

Today, Russia continues to invest in a full-range of capabilities designed to 

limit our ability to project power into Europe and meet our alliance 

commitments to NATO. These capabilities include long-range conventional 

strike, cyber, space, electronic warfare, ground force and naval capabilities. 

Russia is also modernizing all elements of its nuclear triad and its nonstrategic nuclear weapons. These capabilities are intended to enable Russia to 

counter U.S. and NATO power projection and undermine the integrity of the 

NATO alliance. 

Similarly, China has embarked on a significant program to modernize and 

expand strategic and conventional military capabilities. They have expanded 

their nuclear enterprise and made investments in power projection, space, 

cyber, hypersonic weapons, cruise missiles, and ballistic missiles- even as 

they continue to build out their physical presence in the South China Sea. 

China is also investing heavily in 5th generation fighters, air-to-air missiles, air 

defense systems, and sea and undersea anti-access technologies to limit our 

ability to project power, operate freely, and meet our alliance commitments in 

the Pacific. 

Russia and China are not alone in these pursuits. North Korea's nuclear 

weapons development, combined with efforts to develop a nuclear-capable 

ballistic missile capability, is specifically intended to threaten the security of 

the homeland and our Allies in the Pacific. Over the past year, North Korea 

conducted an unprecedented number of missile tests. Moreover, North Korea 

has demonstrated a willingness to use malicious cyber tools against 

3 
103 

governments and industry. These actions destabilize the region and pose an 

increasing threat to U.S. and our allies. 

Iran seeks to assert itself as the dominant regional power in the Middle East. 

They continue to support international terrorist organizations like Hezbollah, 

and support proxies in Syria, Iraq, and Yemen to assert influence and counter 

the influence of the U.S. and our Allies. They actively seek to destabilize their 

neighbors, and employ naval capabilities that threaten freedom of navigation. 

At the same time, they are modernizing an array of ballistic missiles, missile 

defense, space, cyber, maritime, and cruise missile capabilities. 

Finally, Violent Extremist Organizations such as ISIS and a! Qaida remain a 

threat to the homeland, our Allies, and our way of life. Violent extremism is 

fundamentally a transregional threat and a generational struggle that requires 

our military to work with interagency and coalition partners to disrupt external 

attacks, and dismantle their capabilities wherever they emerge. Even with the 

success of our continued efforts to defeat the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria, 

the threat of Islamic terrorism will remain. 

A review of these five challenges demonstrates that the U.S. military requires a 

balanced inventory of advanced capabilities and sufficient capacity to act 

decisively across the range of military operations. As a nation that both thinks 

and acts globally, we cannot choose between a force that can address ISIS and 

other Violent Extremist Organizations, and one that can deter and defeat state 

actors with a full range of capabilities. Nor do we have the luxury of choosing 

between meeting our current operational requirements and developing 

capabilities that we will need to meet tomorrow's challenges. 

However, as a result of sustained operational tempo and budget instability, 

today the military is challenged to meet operational requirements and sustain 

4 
104 

investment in capabilities required to preserve - or in some cases restore - our 

competitive advantage. 

Sustained operational tempo and demand have forced the Department to 

prioritize near-term readiness at the expense of modernization. Additionally, a 

conscious choice was made to limit the size of the force in order to preserve 

scarce resources necessary for essential investments in immediate upgrades to 

critical capabilities. As a result, today, demand for high-demand/low-density 

specialties often outpaces supply. Particular stress is felt in specialties such as 

ISR, missile defense systems, naval expeditionary forces, special operations 

forces, global precision strike units, and cyber forces. Additionally, over the 

past two years, munitions expenditures in ongoing operations against Violent 

Extremist Organizations exacerbated existing shortfalls. 

Making matters worse, for the past five years, the Budget Control Act (BCA) 

has forced the Department of Defense (DoD) to operate with about $450 billion 

less than planned and required. These reductions have been aggravated by 

repeated Continuing Resolutions (CR) which hamper long-term investment and 

often result in increased costs. For nine of the last ten years, the Department of 

Defense has operated under some type of CR, delaying critical new starts, 

deferring installation and infrastructure modernization, and canceling major 

training events. A year-long FY18 CR would cut $33 billion from the 

Department's request, further exacerbating these problems. 

Based on these factors, the Army has been forced to prioritize near-term 

readiness and now faces a shortage of critical capabilities and capacities in 

armor, air defense, artillery, and aviation. These deficiencies are made worse by 

manpower shortfalls in critical military specialties and training resource 

constraints. Consequently, the Army is limited in its ability to man, train, and 

equip fully-ready Brigade Combat Teams (BCT) and other critical enablers 

5 
105 

required to deploy, sustain, and protect service members operating around the 

world. 

For similar reasons, the Navy faces readiness challenges in both ships and 

aircraft. Operational requirements and capacity constraints in shipyards and 

aircraft depots have increased the time and cost required to conduct major 

repairs. Maintenance delays, low stocks of spare parts, lack of training 

ordnance, and aging infrastructure impair the Navy's ability to conduct 

integrated training. As a result, the Navy is limited in its ability to meet 

operational demand for maritime capability and power projection, especially in 

contested environments. 

The Air Force is also challenged to balance operational demands and invest for 

the future. Today, the Air Force is short almost 1,500 pilots, including 800 

fighter pilots, and more than 3,400 maintainers across all components. They 

lack sufficient resources to adequately support both 4th and 5th generation 

training. And they have delayed investment in 4th generation aircraft 

modifications while limiting the fielding of 5th generation strike-fighters. The 

result is fewer trained pilots available to deploy, over-tasked and aging aircraft, 

and delays in modernization programs required to defeat near-peer adversaries. 

Over the last several years, the Marine Corps has been forced to delay planned 

investments in infrastructure, Command and Control, and ground systems 

required to build, train, and launch combat ready forces. Today, the Marine 

Corps lacks sufficient Ready Basic Aircraft for training and deployments and 

has delayed procurement of the F-35, CH-53K, MV-22, and KC-130J aircraft. 

These delayed investments limit the Marine Corps' strategic flexibility and 

inhibit its ability to meet operational demands. 

If these trends continue, and the constraints of sequestration are not lifted, the 

Department will have to cut force structure, as the tradeoffs required to 

6 
106 

maintain the capability and capacity of the current force are no longer 

sustainable. Going forward, the Department of Defense requires sustained, 

sufficient, and predictable funding to meet current operational requirements, 

restore readiness shortfalls, and place us on a path toward restoring our 

eroded competitive advantage. 

Impact of FY17 Request for Additional Appropriations (RAA). 

Congress' willingness to support the Administration's request for additional 

resources in FY 2017 was a necessary first step to reverse the impacts of 

under-investment over the last five years. The FY17 appropriation yielded 

improvements in immediate warfighting readiness by providing funding for 

modest increases to end strength that primarily filled holes in existing units, 

funding full spectrum training, beginning to replenish depleted ammunition 

stocks, and continuing the restoration and modernization of critical systems. 

However, the FY17 Appropriations Bill did not fully address the Department's 

modernization and procurement requirements and significant, long-term 

readiness challenges remain. The Services' inability to fully fund procurement 

of key platforms continues to hamper readiness by limiting the number and 

types of platforms available for initial entry training, individual proficiency, and 

collective training. Because of this, the military begins the FY18 budget cycle in 

a less healthy position than if the FY17 RAA was fully funded, making full and 

on-time funding of this budget even more critical. 

Intent of the FY18 Budget: What does it do? 

The FY18 Budget Request builds on the readiness recovery started in FY17, 

starts to fill the holes created by the BCA, and begins to balance the program. 

It enables the Department to meet operational requirements, begin rebuilding 

mid- and long-term readiness, and begin restoring capability and capacity 

7 
107 

necessary to improve lethality. These are essential first steps in arresting the 

erosion of the military's competitive advantage. 

In Afghanistan, FY18 investments will reinforce improvements in the Afghan 

National Defense and Security Forces. In Iraq and Syria, the Budget Request 

funds emerging requirements and provides sufficient funding and authority for 

the defeat-ISIS train and equip fund. In Europe, the Budget Request provides a 

40 percent increase in funding for the European Reassurance Initiative (ERI) 

that sustains ongoing assurance efforts, and improve the capability of the U.S. 

forces and our Allies to deter potential Russian aggression. 

To rebuild warfighting readiness, the Army will fully man its combat formation, 

fund 19 Combat Training Center rotations in FY18, and increase resources for 

home-station training to ensure units maximize full spectrum readiness. The 

Navy will provide flying hours and increase depot maintenance to enable 

integrated air j sea training. The Air Force will invest in training required to 

improve 4th and 5th generation warfighting capability. The Marines will 

increase funding for flying hours, logistics, and engineering units, and focus 

training resources on amphibious and combined arms operations. 

Maintenance resources included in the FY18 Budget Request also improve 

readiness. The Army will prioritize maintenance for equipment coming out of 

theater in order to prepare it for unit training and refill prepositioned stocks in 

Europe and the Pacific. The Navy will add critical workforce capacity that 

reduces ship and aviation depot maintenance backlogs. The Air Force will 

conduct overdue weapons system sustainment, increase maintenance for intertheater airlift, and execute recapitalization of critical systems. The Marines will 

prioritize maintenance for MV-22, rotary wing, and fighter aviation to improve 

its survivability, mobility, and lethality. 

8 
108 

To begin restoring capacity and lethality across the force, the FY18 Budget 

makes critical investments in Tactical Air (TACAIR), ships, space, and 

cyberspace, and begins essential nuclear recapitalization efforts. 

Investments in TACAIR enable the Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps to 

continue procurement of 5th generation fighters and fund upgrades to 4th 

generation fighters that fill shortfalls and begin to grow capacity. The Air Force 

will procure 46 F-35As and begin upgrades to F-16s. The Navy will procure 4 

F-35Cs and 14 F/A-18E/Fs to mitigate its strike fighter shortfall. The Marines 

will procure 20 F-35Bs. These investments, coupled with investments in 

modernization of depot maintenance facilities, allow us to begin reversing the 

impact of delays in TACAIR modernization over the past five years. 

The FY18 Budget Request supports the Navy's growth by supporting the 

procurement of 9 ships and continuing necessary investments to upgrade and 

modernize nuclear aircraft carriers, destroyers, littoral combat ships, 

TICONDEROGA-class cruisers, amphibious assault ships, and submarines. 

These investments are essential to enabling the Navy to project power, ensure 

forward presence and deterrence, ensure access to the global commons, and 

provide ballistic missile defense. 

Continued improvement in space-based systems enables us to better protect 

satellites, improve tracking/discrimination capabilities, and continue domestic 

launch development. Cyberspace investments prioritize hardening information 

networks, defending against cyber-attacks, and continuing to build, train, and 

equip cyber mission forces and maturing cyberspace command and control. 

These advances improve both offensive and defense space and cyberspace 

capabilities and enhance the resiliency of our systems and networks. 

The FY 18 Budget Request also invests in upgrades to the nuclear enterprise, 

including inter-continental ballistic missiles, nuclear submarines, strategic 

9 
109 

bombers, and command and control systems. Continuing to maintain a secure 

and effective nuclear deterrent is essential to defending the homeland. 

However, the FY18 Budget Request alone will not fully restore readiness or 

arrest the military's eroding competitive advantage. Reversing the impact of the 

past five years of sustained operational tempo and budget instability requires 

sustained investment beyond FY18. 

What FY18 Budget Request doesn't do: Areas for continued investment. 

Specific recommendations for FY19, and beyond, will be informed by the 

results of the National Defense Strategy. Today, however, we know that 

continued investment is needed to execute responsible growth in capacity, 

build advanced capabilities, and restore the long-term readiness. These 

investments are essential to ensuring our ability to project power and maintain 

a credible strategic deterrent. 

We continue to consume readiness as fast as we build it and lack sufficient 

capacity to both meet today's operational requirements and rebuild the 

competencies necessary to defeat near peer adversaries. As a result, our units 

are training to meet their assigned missions at the expense of training for their 

designed mission. To break this cycle, we must increase capacity in critical 

areas such as C4ISR, fighter aircraft, armored BCTs, amphibious ships, and 

special operations forces. This additional capacity will allow us to meet today's 

requirements and prepare for tomorrow's. 

We must also invest in advanced capabilities required to defeat near-peer 

adversaries. As we have prioritized readiness for ongoing operations, our 

adversaries have prioritized investment in technologies that exploit our 

vulnerabilities and limit our ability to project power. To ensure our competitive 

advantage, we must accelerate investments in systems that defeat adversary 

anti-access capabilities at sea and under the sea, improve our ISR resiliency, 

10 
110 

guarantee access to space and cyber, and enable us to defeat integrated air 

defenses. These advanced capabilities are vital to maintaining the U.S. 

military's competitive advantage in all environments and across all domains. 

It is also essential that we restore Comprehensive Joint Readiness, the ability 

of the U.S. military to deploy, employ, and sustain itself anywhere in the world, 

while maintaining the flexibility to transition from one crisis to another, across 

the range of military options. This requires sufficient capacity, the necessary 

capabilities, and iterative training. Our Air Force must possess the right mix of 

4th and 5th generation aircraft and have sufficient capacity to conduct 

integrated training. Our Navy must grow and modernize while preserving a 

globally-present fleet, capable of sailing and operating anywhere in the world. 

The Army and Marine Corps must fill unit short-falls and upgrade ground 

tactical vehicles while expanding full spectrum training. These investments are 

essential to projecting power in contested environments against any adversary 

and operating across the spectrum of conflict. 

Additionally, we must invest in maintaining a credible strategic deterrent. Due 

to fiscal constraints, we have delayed modernization of all three legs of the 

nuclear triad and are now approaching decision points with no remaining 

schedule margins. Over the coming decades we must recapitalize our intercontinental ballistic missiles, ballistic missile submarines, strategic bombers, 

and many of our command, control, and communication systems. 

Recapitalization costs will be significant and can no longer be delayed if the 

United States wants to maintain a safe, secure, and effective nuclear deterrent. 

Conclusion 

Today, despite the challenges facing us, our military is the most capable 

military in the world. We need sustained, sufficient, and predictable funding to 

grow sufficient capacity, develop the correct mix of advanced capabilities, and 

ensure a ready force. These investments are necessary to ensure our ability to 

11 
111 

defend the homeland and project power when and where required. With your 

help and commitment, we can preserve our competitive advantage and ensure 

that we never send America's sons and daughters in to a fair fight. 

12 
112 

General Joseph F. Dunford, Jr. 

Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff 

General Joseph F. Dunford, Jr. is the 19th Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the 

nation's highest-ranking military officer, and the principal military advisor to the 

President, Secretary of Defense, and National Security Council. 

Prior to becoming Chairman on October I, 2015, General Dunford served as the 36th 

Commandant of the Marine Corps. He previously served as the Assistant Commandant of 

the Marine Corps from 2010 to 2012 and was Commander, International Security 

Assistance Force and United States Forces-Afghanistan from February 2013 to August 

2014. 

A native of Boston, Massachusetts, General Dunford graduated from Saint Michael's 

College and was commissioned in 1977. He has served as an infantry officer at all levels, 

to include command of 2nd Battalion, 6th Marines, and command of the 5th Marine 

Regiment during Operation IRAQI FREEDOM. 

General Dunford also served as the Assistant Division Commander of the 1st Marine 

Division, Marine Corps Director of Operations, and Marine Corps Deputy Commandant 

for Plans, Policies and Operations. He commanded I Marine Expeditionary Force and 

served as the Commander, Marine Forces U.S. Central Command. 

His Joint assignments include duty as the Executive Assistant to the Vice Chairman of the 

Joint Chiefs of Staff, Chief of the Global and Multilateral Affairs Division (J-5), and Vice 

Director for Operations on the Joint Staff(J-3). 

A graduate of the U.S. Army Ranger School, Marine Corps Amphibious Warfare School, 

and the U.S. Army War College, General Dunford also earned master's degrees in 

Government from Georgetown University and in International Relations from the Fletcher 

School of Law and Diplomacy. 
DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD 

JUNE 12, 2017 

(115) 

NATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR PUBLIC POLICY 

Issue No. 420 June 12, 2017 

Nuclear Security and Strategic Force Modernization 

Colin S. Gray Colin S. Gray is the European Director 

Emeritus q/Strategic Studies. 

of the ;Vational Institute for Public Po/iqi, and Profi?ssor 

There is nothing extraordinary about current Russian-American dislike, distrust, and antagonism. What 

is happening today is not a return to the much unbeloved Cold War of quite recent memory (only 26 

years), but rather to the enduring reality of international politics as usual. This persisting condition has 

always been characterized by competition political, economic, and inevitably military also. If we read 

history as we should, we learn that distrust or more active dislike among great powers, including actual 

warfare, is both normal and to a degree inevitable. The most persisting reason is not hard to fathom. 

When security/threat analysts of national security scan the current and anticipatable international 

horizon, quite properly they look out first and primarily for the larger, indeed existential, threats to the 

wellbeing of their home country. Americans today are almost spoiled for choice a1nong somewhat 

villainous regional and even sub-regional local states, as well as a more serious malevolent one. The 

latter category only has one rnen1ber, Vladimir Putin's recovering Russia. 

The Problem of Russia 

When considered in historical context it is unlikely that Putin would warrant nomination even for the 

'B' list of 'bad guys'. Yes, he lies, cheats, bullies and threatens neighbors, and flexes his growing military 

muscles to change borders, which makes him seriously unsuited for parh1ership in a top state duopoly 

of cooperative powers alongside Uncle Sam. Lest we forget, the sundry crimes and misdemeanors his 

particular Russian regime has committed have been entirely standard practice by Moscow for decades. 

It is necessary to remember always that Russia lives, and has always lived, in a very rough geopolitical 

neighborhood, one bereft of geographical help for defense, save for sheer space with the distances it 

provides and its weather. From the time of T amerlane' s rampaging tv1ongols in the late 14th Century to 

Hitler's storming Teutons in the 20th, Russians have learnt that national history has been one 

characterized by loss of life on a very large scale. They know, really know, that history periodically 

©National Institute Press, 2017 
116 

Issue No. 420 I June 12, 2017 

produces horrific tragedies. Even if or when victory eventually is achievedf not infrequently it has been 

earned at an extremely high price. 

Russia can never be an enduring friend and well trusted ally because inten1ational politics almost 

literally mandates antagonism, if not outright hostility in the relations between near-equals with 

competing interests. There is no inevitability of war behveen the two states, but the danger and risk of 

such an eventuality cannot be totally expunged. There is an apparent pennanence in the mutuality of 

nuclear deterrence that holds in Russo-American relations. Nonetheless, given the danger that lurks in 

the situation it is desirable that son1e anxieties should be present in both countries. This is truly serious 

business and it is necessary that neither party should forget that fact. Given its history, it is perhaps no 

surprise that Russian leaders have not forgotten this point over the past two decades, unlike many in 

Washington. 

The future is not foreordained and therefore reliably predictable, not, at least, so far as we know or can 

ascertain. Nonetheless, there are grounds for considerable optimis1n. While Russia will never be our 

friend, with prudent Western steps there is ample reason to believe that Russia will never be convinced 

she can take advantage of the United States over a matter about which the American public cares 

profoundly. Of course, even confident expectations of expert analysts, occasionally are proven wrong by 

the actual unfolding of history- demonstrating once again the inherent uncertainty of political decisionmaking. The demise of the deeply unlovable USSR in late 1991, for example, generally was neither 

anticipated nor expected. 

Alas, the end of that great socialist experiment did not herald the emergence of a new and benign dawn, 

one shedding light on old problems and illuminating a path forward for the human race. There was no 

tomorrow garlanded with evidence of good intentions for international peace and security. Not only did 

that fail to happen, its occurrence was not possible. The reasons were both all too human and also rather 

abstract. On the human front, when the United States emerged from a condition of Cold YVar warrior as 

the victor (and survivor) its leaders were more than somewhat surprised by the precipitate and nonviolent collapse of its rival of the preceding 46 years. A few people were not surprised, Dr. Andrew 

Marshall and his Office of Net Assessment in the Pentagon, for honorable example. Understandably, it 

took some little time for Americans to absorb fully the definitive fact of Soviet disintegration and 

collapse; but what did it mean for the near term and beyond? Politics, internal, international, and a 1nix 

of the two, were as unpleasant as ever, if not worse, from the 'Horn' of Africa to Cambodia, and 

especially in the Balkans, where the death of Marshal Tito was taken as a 'start' signal seemingly for 

every ambitious politician in states or nascent 'statelets' in the region. The new, currently much 

disordered and seriously demographically and geographically diminished, Russia unsurprisingly 

meddled. However, it did not do so in a way or with a weight that much troubled the White House of 

Bill Clinton in the 1990s, nor did more significant and violent meddling appear to much trouble 

subsequent American administrations. 

Russia's Revival 

By the end of the Millennium and for a very few years thereafter it was not understood with much clarity 

in the United States that great states may be shaken, but that is unlikely to be the end of the story. As a 

consequence of a fall from greatness they can be stirred into revival in a form that works well enough 

-2-
117 

Issue No. 420 I June 12, 2017 

for a while. In 1917 Russia was stirred by defeats and poor military performances both at home and 

abroad, but following four terrible years of civil war and foreign intervention the country was obliged 

to try something new, whether or not it so desired. The choice of the time was less than glitteringleading to the rise of Josef Stalin without any resemblance of free and fair elections. 

\Vhat we need to appreciate is that l{ussia's history bequeathed a political culture that has expression in 

a strategic culture utterly unlike the American. To back up briefly: it is entirely usual for powerful states 

to be suspicious of each other. What has been, historically unusuat though not unprecedented, has been 

for there to be only two states in a topmost class of superpowers. Russia slipped in the competitive 

ratings seriously in the decade that followed immediately after the official dissolution of the USSR. 

Rather superficially this wounded condition was partially repaired in the 2000s, in the 'guided 

detnocracy' of nee-czarist Vladimir Putin. His Russia is a state back both with a vengeance, and very 

evidently seeking son1e vengeance upon those who disrespected the interest and wishes of a distinctly 

unholy recreation of Holy Russia. 

It is important for us to recognize that our current troubles with Russia reflect not only the disagreements 

of here and now, but also are faithfully reflective of the entire historical narrative. When two powers rise 

far above the rest of the world they are almost condemned by what is common to their natures to be 

rivals. Blan1e for the antagonisn1 always can be located if one Jocks hard enough, but that exercise is 

futile, often misleading at least. The hostility is an inevitable and unavoidable consequence of the 

geometry of power. Each of two superpowers, even only great powers, have no prudent choice in their 

statecraft other than to regard the other through a lens colored by suspicion. It is only prudent for them 

to stress the taking of 1neasures for the practical goal of prevention of possible subsequent regret. This is 

the demonstrated way of international relations and the rather unhappy context within which the United 

States and the West more broadly finds itself today. 

Nuclear Weapons 

We have lived with nuclear weapons for so long now (72 years) that it can prove quite a challenge to try 

to think through just how great their influence has been for both national and global security. Whether 

or not they are widely understood, two facts govern the reality of nuclear arsenals. The first pertains to 

the permanence of these weapons: they are here to stay. J need to cite this certainty since some people 

hold deeply moral and possibly religious objections to nuclear weapons. I do not doubt their sincerity 

or even the sense in some of their arguments. However, f am no less sincerely convinced that nuclear 

weapons have entered human weapons' arsenals on a permanent basis. Indeed, it may be unfortunate 

but still probable that it would prove extraordinarily dangerous to attempt to implement very large scale 

denuclearization, unilaterally, bilaterally, or on a global basis. It is all too easy to forget that although 

these weapons are indeed fearsome tools of state they did not appear, as it were magicaHy fron1nowhere. 

Rather they were and remain the products of political competition between politically organized 

communities. The weapons exist because of the needs driven by human insecurities. History provides 

an1ple evidence of the bad results that tend to flow as a consequence of undeserved optimis1n about the 

amity possible in international relations. Nuclear weapons and their various means of delivery are not 

and cannot be the problem. The problem, rather, is the enduring search for security manifested in the 

struggle to attain influence. Given that this character of our behavior often is judged in moral terms, we 

can appreciate that such fundamental debate over nuclear weapons is not likely to be helpful for policy 

·3. 
118 

Issue No. 420 I June 12, 2017 

and strategy. Nuclear weapons are what they are, and they are what they are because international 

relations are a reflection of us as we are, and by all appearances have always been. 

The second often under-recognized fact about nuclear weapons is that they do not lend themselves at all 

easily to a strategic framework for employment in and by statecraft. The idea of nuclear strategy trips 

readily enough off a lecturer's tongue but fmniliarity should not be pern1itted to pron1ote foolish 

disrespect. It may be helpful to recall the bare basic structure of strategy which is expressed in the 

standard formula comprising these elements: Ends, Ways, Means - and Assumptions. I will admit that 

the tail-end concept here is a personal insistence of mine. The United States has a nuclear strategy as it 

must, as does Russia. However, there is little doubt that an actual war would rapidly find nuclear 

expression that must strain toward and beyond breaking point the resilience of any state's society. It is 

relatively easy to conceive of a very small number of these weapons being employed to make a political 

point, but it is difficult to conceive how the hundreds and more weapons in both superpowers' arsenals 

could be employed for any politically meaningful, sensible purpose. Obviously, one would think, this 

has to mean that the superpowers could not risk causing catastrophe that easily would be far worse than 

any in humanity's bloody history-exceeding by far even the excesses in slaughter effected by 

Ta1nerlane's Mongols. 

What is almost all too obvious is the strong likelihood that the slide from small (even just token) nuclear 

use on or for the battlefield in Europe, to a 'central' (homeland to homeland) war, could be unstoppable. 

Virtually any size of nuclear war would be catastrophic, and possibly nationally terminal for the 

relative]y small states that cmnprise NATO in Europe. It is not self-evident that even the super-size 

superpower states- the United States, Russia, and China -could wage nuclear war for prudent political 

ends. In short, major nuclear war would not only be grossly imprudent, it would be literally beyond the 

bounds of strategy. Nonetheless, it is not a physical impossibility. All too plainly, nuclear employment 

needs to be deterred, and, in the case of some lesser nuclear-armed states, even physically disabled where 

feasible. 

With considerable reluctance this essay is obliged to recognize the inevitability of an enduring nuclear 

policing role for the United States. TI1is is not a matter for choice; it is driven by the realities of 

international politics. In practice, the only prudent question to pose is that of the nuclear capable 

armament required for American weapons today and tomorrow given that our choice is distinctly 

limited by the facts we know about our principal state competitor. The Russia we know well enough by 

now is a ruthless competitor for influence in the search for ever greater security. This is not an immoral 

goal, although it 1nay be carried out in hnmoral ways. Rather it is usual for great states to press their 

influence outwards until it runs into a barrier that can only be overcome by the threat or use of 

countervailing force. All great powers, not excluding the United States, behave similarly. However, this 

time in the lengthy historical narrative, the great power that is striving to expand its domain both of 

actual ownership and influence at least, runs up against an opposing Alliance system in the character of 

a NATO that remains nuclear armed, despite some internal pressures to disann. In order to stand s01ne 

reasonable chance of deterring or frustrating any Russian invasion, the Alliance will need to have some 

resort to nuclear weapons. If such resort would be a NATO initiative sought in military desperation, we 

might assume that the number of weapons used would be few. However, that cannot be a prudent 

assumption because the Russian military incentive to launch a preemptive nuclear attack might well be 

compelling. 

-4-
119 

Issue No. 420 I June 12, 2017 

Prudent Modernization of the Triad 

The sad state of world affairs sketched briefly above leaves us with little prudent choice for national and 

international security. VVhat we can do, however, is ensure is that such prospects as there might be for 

careful control and limitation of nuclear weapon employment, are fully prepared. A survivable and 

flexible nuclear force has long been recognized as key to this deterrence goal. 

It is in that context that we need to address the urgent issue of modernization and, where necessary, 

replacement of elements in America's Triad of strategic forces (ICBMs, SLBMs, and Manned Bombers). 

Not all audiences appreciate just why this Triad needs attention. First and fore1nost is the fact that these 

strategic forces are akin to being the crown jewels of our country in strategic terms. They comprise 

complementary capabilities that could ruin any foe far beyond any possibility of recovery, and as part 

of a proper deterrence strategy, can effectively cmnmunicate this result to a spectrum of bad actors and 

thereby help deter their provocations. As much to the point, the performance of America's non-nuclear 

conventional forces to support our interests and allies abroad is given needed deterrence cover by the 

dreadful menace posed by our strategic forces. As Herman Khan explained more than fifty years ago, a 

process of escalation connects the different kinds, levels, and amounts of force employed. I 

The entire American Triad now begs for modernization to remain operational in coming years, and 

deserves the attention and support of the U.S. leadership. In particular, the Long Range Stand-Off 

(LRSO) cruise missile will be a weapon with a performance character that must be highly desirable, even 

essential, to meet the kind of challenges of most concern here. Replacing the old ALCMs (Air-Launch 

Cruise Missiles) of 1980s viotage, tl1e LRSO will be "stealthy" and have the extensive range to ensure 

that our matmed bomber force is not cmnpelled of necessity to attempt to penetrate the advanced air 

defenses of the late 2020s and beyond. 

Uniquely among strategic forces, rn.anned bombers are relatively slow to complete their missions and 

are recallable on command, which may be of great utility during a crisis. Yet, our bombers could have 

difficulty penetrating opponents' active defenses in future years-hence the clear need for the "stand 

off" capability inherent in the LRSO. The weapons carried primarily could be conventional and precisely 

targetable for counterforce effect or they could be nuclear. Analysis shows that the LRSO option all but 

makes itself as being vital for the long-term health of the U.S. Triad of strategic forces. While the ICBM 

force is needed in order to hold heavily protected and probably defended targets at prompt risk, and the 

SLBM force to provide enduring deterrent effect, the airborne leg of the Triad can offer purposeful delay, 

even recall response in real-time to orders, and high flexibility as to use, tin1ing, and signaling. The B21/LRSO marriage offers an excellent investment prospect for a notably insecure world and wider 

flexibility for deterrence and assurance missions in the future; much more so than the B-21 and nuclear 

gravity bombs alone could credibly accomplish. 

An issue for LRSO critics is an overwrought concern that an adversary, presumably Russia, could 

mistake a con'l'entionally armed U.S. cruise missile for a nuclear-armed LRSO during a crisis, and that this 

misunderstanding could escalate a crisis dramatkal1y.2 Many things are possible, of course,. but recent 

history de1nonstrates that this concern is overstated. The United States has employed dual-capable 

cruise missiles in conflicts around Russia's periphery on 1nultiple occasions in recent decades, for 

example: in Iraq in 1991, in Bosnia in 1995, io Kosovo in 1999, in Afghanistan in 2001, in Iraq io 2003, and 
120 

Issue No. 420 I June 12, 2017 

against Syria in 2017, without any such problems. Indeed, Russia itself seems to have no qualms about 

launching dual-capable cruise tnissiles over and near stationed U.S. forces in the Middle East. In 

addition, if dual-capable cruise missiles are deemed so "destabilizing," then U.S. bombers and dualcapable aircraft must sitnilarly be labelled since they too can carry both conventional and nuclear 

weapons. But any such designation can only be considered far-fetched, and indeed LRSO critics have 

not made this charge against our bmnbers or other dual-capable aircraft. finally, the concern about 

LRSO and dual-use technology, beyond being unpersuasive, is vastly outweighed in a net assessment 

because LRSO will be uniquely valuable for the priority goals of deterrence, assurance, and damage 

liinitation. 

Conclusion 

The international security envirom11ent breeds con1petition and suspicion an1ong great states, and 

contemporary U.S.-Russia relations reflect this harsh reality. Russian national goals are .inimical to U.S. 

and NATO goals and openly hostile to the status quo; and Russia has made the strategic choice of using 

its nuclear arsenal as a coercive tool to advance its hegemonic ends. This decision by Moscow has 

shocked Western audiences that almost universally had very different expectations about the future. 

The United States can and should act to extinguish the apparent Russian notion of profitable nuclear 

first use threats. Prudence now dictates the United States modernize its nuclear Triad to support its 

priority national goals of deterrence, assurance, and damage limitation. The LRSO is very likely to be a 

critical tool in these missions and deserves the full support of U.S. leadership. 

Recomtnended further reading: Willian1son Murray, America and the Future of War: the Past as Prologue 

(Stanford, CA: Hoover Institutions Press, 2017); and, Keith B. Payne and JohnS. Foster, Jr., eta!., A New 

Nuclear Revinvfor a Neiv Age (Fairfax. VA: National Institute Press), 2017. 

1. Herman Khan, On Escalation: Metaphors and Scenarios (New York: Praeger, 1965). 

2. For example see, Dianne Feinstein and Ellen 0. Tauscher," A Nuclear ·weapon TI1at America Doesn't Need/' Tire 

Nnu York Tin1es, June l7, 2016, available at https:/ jwww.nytimes.com/2016/06/18/opinion/ a-nudear-weaponthat-america-doesnt-need.html?_r=O.; Kingston Reif, "Cruise Control: \rVhy The U.S. Should Not Buy A New 

Nuclear Air-Launched Cruise h'lissile," VVar on the Rocks, March 21, 2016, available at 

https:/ I www .nytimes.com/ 2016/06/18 J opinion/ a-nuclear~weapon~that-america-docsnt~need.html? _r=O. 

The views in this Information Series are those of the authors and should not be construed as official U.S. Government policy, the 

official policy of the National In.stitute for Public Policy or any of its sponsors. For additional information about this publication or 

other publications by the National Institute Press, contact: Editor, National Institute Press, 9302 Lee IIigh.,vay, Suite 750 I Fairfax, 

VA 22031 I (703) 293-9181 For access to previous issues of the National Institute Press Information Series, please 

©National Institute Press, 2017 

-6-
121 

UNCLASSIFIED 

Statement of Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and 

International Security Rose Gottemoeller 

Before the Senate Committee on Appropriations 

Subcommittee on Energy and Water Development 

July 13, 2016 

(U) Good afternoon Mr. Chairman and distinguished members of the 

committee. I'm pleased to be here today with my colleagues from DOD and 

DOE to testify about the Long Range Standoff (LRSO) cruise missile. I will 

focus my remarks on three key points. First, the LRSO is consistent with 

our arms control commitments and the President's Prague Agenda. 

Second, the LRSO supports strategic stability and does not undermine it. 

Third, it is important in the eyes of our allies. 

(U) Let me begin by affirming that the LRSO program, along with our 

approach to nuclear modernization, is consistent with our obligations 

under the New START Treaty and the broader Prague Agenda, which called 

for maintenance of a safe, secure, and effective nuclear arsenal as we move 

toward a world without nuclear weapons. There was a recognition that 

nuclear weapons have an important role to play in the defense of the United 

States and our allies, but that we would work to reduce the roles and 

numbers of nuclear weapons and not create new nuclear warheads and new 

missions. The LRSO does not require a new warhead, and it is not being 

developed in support of a new mission. Its mission is the same as that of 

the more than 30-years old Air-Launched Cruise Missile (ALCM), the AGM86B, which the LRSO is replacing. The AGM-86B is deployed on heavy 

bombers, which are subject to the New START Treaty. 

(U) We continue to reduce our deployed strategic weapons in accordance 

with the New START Treaty and the President has been clear in his 

willingness to examine further nuclear reductions. It is equally clear that 

further reductions require a ready and active partner, which we do not have 

in the current Russian administration. Furthermore, Russia is engaged in 

its own nuclear modernization program to replace Cold War era systems, 

and we believe Russia will proceed on this course irrespective of U.S. 

modernization, including the LRSO. 

(U) There is no evidence that the LRSO or our nuclear modernization 

program are prompting an action-reaction cycle or catalyzing arms races. 

UNCLASSIFIED 
122 

UNCLASSIFIED 

The Russians have already developed their next-generation nuclear-armed 

air-launched cruise missile, the KH-102, and have employed its 

conventional variant, the KH-101, in Syria. Any notion that LRSO is 

spurring on Russia's advanced cruise missile development is simply not 

borne out by the facts. 

(U) The LRSO is valuable in maintaining strategic stability. During the 

Cold War, we worried about the destabilizing nature of intermediate- and 

medium-range ground-launched cruise and ballistic missiles due to their 

short times of flight and the fear that they might be used to conduct 

decapitating first strikes on command and control systems. That is why we 

negotiated the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty. 

(U) The LRSO is different. Unlike a ground-launched system, the LRSO 

cannot pose the threat of a short-notice, disarming attack because it will be 

carried as a stand-off weapon by long-range bombers. Arms control has 

generally given a "discount" to bomber weapons because they were seen as 

the least threatening to stability, because they pose the smallest risk of 

surprise attack. The process of alerting these bombers would be observable 

and these relatively slow flying aircraft would take hours to reach the point 

where they would release their weapons to targets. Moreover, the aircraft 

are recallable. These deliberate aspects of bomber weapons provide the 

President with the most signaling flexibility during a crisis. 

(U) Indeed, it is the absence of a nuclear-armed cruise missile that might 

leave us most vulnerable to unintended escalation during a crisis. Without 

a stand-off cruise missile option, future Presidents may find themselves 

facing the unpalatable choice of responding to nuclear coercion or attack 

with SLBMs or ICBMs, or attempting to employ a stealth bomber to 

penetrate the adversary's territory to reach targets. 

(U) I've explained how the LRSO is consistent with the Prague Agenda 

and I've explained what it doesn't do - undermine strategic stability. I also 

want to tell you what it does do. I will leave the technical details of this to 

my DOD colleagues, but I want to acknowledge the contributions of the 

LRSO to our foreign policy objectives - in particular as they pertain to 

assuring U.S. allies against high-end threats. 

UNCLASSIFIED 
123 

UNCLASSIFIED 

(U) The future security environment in both Asia and Europe will be 

characterized by increased anti-access, area-denial (A2AD) capabilities, 

meaning adversaries will have weapons that degrade the U.S. military's 

ability to project power into conflict areas, to include capabilities necessary 

for responding to nuclear attacks. These adversary strategies are designed 

to make the U.S. forward presence highly vulnerable, degrading the 

survivability of our stealth platforms, and hindering our ability to project 

power forward in a crisis by the middle of the next decade. The LRSO' s 

standoff and penetration capability addresses these vulnerabilities. It will 

help deny the enemy the ability to constrain our President's options for 

responding to nuclear attack. It will assure our allies of our ability to meet 

our extended deterrence commitments. 

(U) This is not just our view. We've heard from our allies about the 

value of the LRSO during our extended deterrence discussions. China is 

developing the combination of modernized nuclear forces, intermediaterange ballistic missiles, and supporting strike architecture to deny U.S. 

conventional forces and stealth bombers timely access to the Western 

Pacific in a crisis. Similarly, our NATO Allies have begun to grapple with 

responses to a Russian doctrine that embraces nuclear coercion. 

(U) Without the LRSO, once again, the United States, if the President 

decided to signal with or employ nuclear weapons, would be forced to 

either send a bomber into an environment in which it may not be able to 

penetrate, or to rely on the strategic-range weapon systems in the groundand sea-based legs of our triad to deter nuclear coercion or respond to first 

use. 

(U) While it is up to the President to make final decisions about what 

capabilities are needed and what risks can be managed, our collective view 

is that the LRSO provides us with rational options that would increase 

Presidential decision space in a crisis and uphold our extended deterrence 

commitments to allies. 

(U) Thank you again for the opportunity to testify. I look forward to 

answering your questions. 

UNCLASSIFIED 

WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING 

THE HEARING 

JUNE 12, 2017 

(127) 

RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. LANGEVIN 

Secretary MATTIS. The cost of climate preparedness and resilience is spread across 

much the Department’s portfolio. Areas affected include operational planning, infrastructure, training, weapon systems operations and maintenance, and personnel 

health. At the same time, climate effects are localized and require evaluation on a 

case-by-case basis. The Department approaches climate effects as a risk factor to 

our mission. There is no single bill to pay for climate preparedness and resilience. 

The costs associated with enhancing climate preparedness and resilience address 

long-term mission risks and must be factored into the Department’s overall cost of 

doing business. Climate risks have and will continue to be a factor prevalent in our 

operational, programmatic, and planning processes. [See page 17.] 

RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MS. SPEIER 

Secretary MATTIS. The Military Service Academies continue to make clear and demonstrable progress in supporting those who report sexual assault and harassment. 

However, this year’s survey results underscore the unique challenges the Academies 

face in sustaining long-term decreases in the occurrence of sexual assault. Department research indicates that retaliatory behavior associated with crime reporting 

occurs with less frequency at the Service Academies than in the Active Duty force, 

but remains an important concern. All three Academies took steps aimed at eliminating retaliatory behavior, improved resources for victims perceiving such behavior, 

and provided tools for faculty, staff, and peers to better prevent and respond to it. 

The Department’s Retaliation Prevention and Response Strategy (RPRS) details actions to address retaliatory behavior against victims who report a sexual assault, 

complainants of sexual harassment, witnesses, bystanders who intervene, and first 

responders, such as SARCs and SAPR VAs. Work to implement the strategy across 

the Military Departments began in February 2016 and remains ongoing. The Academies are leveraging the RPRS to drive changes in retaliation. However, in response 

to the issues and statistics addressed in the report, I met with the Superintendents 

in March to discuss ways to decrease prevalence of sexual assault, sexual harassment, retaliation, and increase reporting. As a result, the Secretaries of the Military 

Departments have been directed to address several key areas of concern at the 

Academies, to include reinvigorating prevention efforts and improving sexual assault and harassment reporting by reducing barriers to reporting within the Academies. Their plans to address these issues are due not later than October 30, 2017.

[See page 34.] 

Secretary MATTIS. On 4 March 2017, Mr. Thomas Brennan, not Mr. LaPorta, 

broke the Marines United story. Mr. LaPorta was debarred prior to the release of 

the Marines United story for conduct that occurred on 5 February 2017. The debarment decision was formalized on 10 February 2017. Mr. LaPorta was debarred for 

failing to comply with regulations addressing media conduct aboard Camp Lejeune, 

North Carolina and at naval correctional facilities generally. [Base Order P5720.7G; 

Secretary of the Navy Instruction 1640.9C] On 5 February 2017, Mr. LaPorta, without coordinating with Camp Lejeune public affairs personnel, traveled to the onbase residence of an alleged child sexual assault victim to obtain information from 

the child’s parents for a story he was working on. The alleged victim’s family did 

not invite Mr. LaPorta onto the installation or to their quarters, and were upset by 

his unannounced appearance. Prior coordination with the installation’s public affairs 

office is required before media representatives may enter the installation to gather 

information. On the same day, Mr. LaPorta visited a pretrial detainee at the Camp 

Lejeune Brig, but failed to identify himself as a member of the media. The detainee 

is pending trial on several charges, including the alleged sexual assault of a child. 

Personal interviews between prisoners and media representatives are not permitted 

without prior authorization. [See page 34.] 

Secretary MATTIS. No. [See page 35.] 
128 

RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. BYRNE 

Secretary MATTIS. Under the Fiscal Year 2018 President’s Budget out-year planning profile, the Navy’s fleet will grow from 276 ships today to 308 ships by January 

2025. With additional topline over a number years, the Navy estimates the fleet 

could grow to 315 ships by January 2025. This modest difference highlights the long 

build times and high costs of shipbuilding. Even with significant additional topline 

for multiple years, the Navy’s forecast is that we could not reach 350 ships until 

Fiscal Year 2041. [See page 51.] 

RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. MOULTON 

Secretary MATTIS. There are 243 political positions in the Pentagon. All but 93 

positions have been hired or are in the process of being hired. [See page 43.] 

Secretary MATTIS. Rather than offer five specific programs that place an undue 

burden on the Department, I submit that mandates that adversely affect the Department’s priorities fall into two categories: congressional adds and restrictions. 

The programs and projects included in the Fiscal Year 2018 budget request represent my highest, balanced priorities. Congressional adds are usually aligned with 

the Services’ list of unfunded requirements, though valid and executable, should not 

replace my highest priorities. The Fiscal Year 2018 request represents the best approach to rebuild readiness while repairing damage from five years of unstable 

budgets and budget caps in preparation for future investments. Likewise, congressional restrictions on the Department’s reform initiatives limit investment opportunities. Authorization for a new round of Base Realignment and Closure in 2021 

would reduce excess infrastructure and save at least $2 billion per year. Additionally, the enactment of proposed TRICARE reforms would yield an additional $5.7 

billion over five years. These savings could be invested in more planes, helicopters, 

and ships to improve our warfighting readiness, increasing both capacity and 

lethality. [See page 44.] 

RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. CARBAJAL 

Secretary MATTIS. In my view, the changing climate is a driver of instability that 

requires a broader, whole-of-government response. At a practical level, the Department of Defense incorporates consideration of the effects of a changing climate into 

our infrastructure planning cycle. As we develop new projects, climate effects is one 

of the risks that is factored into planning and programming analysis. Furthermore, 

the Department developed scenarios for sea level rise and extreme water levels on 

our installations and issued specific policy requiring the consideration of risk associated with construction in flood plains. Our methodology to managing the changing 

climate is one component of our overall strategic commitment to the security and 

prosperity of the Asia-Pacific, and the Department will continue to work to secure 

a peaceful, prosperous, and free region. [See page 52.] 

RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY DR. ABRAHAM 

Secretary MATTIS. To clarify, the hospitals you mentioned are to be transitioned 

to outpatient clinics meaning that substantial DOD-provided medical capability will 

remain at each location. The outpatient clinics will continue to address the vast majority of the care given at these facilities. These hospitals have extremely low volumes of inpatient care, have limited capabilities with emergency or complex inpatient care being routinely transferred to larger and more capable local hospitals. We 

would be asking these same local hospitals to take on a marginal inpatient workload 

comprised of less complex patients. As we move forward with the transitions, we 

are committed to ensuring that patient access and standards of care will not be compromised and are working with the local facilities to address access, language, and 

bedside nursing needs. Senior members of my medical staff, with Navy participation, have visited these facilities and spoken with military providers, visited the 

local hospitals and beneficiaries and have not identified any insurmountable barriers to transitioning these hospitals. The Army’s successful transition of its inpatient facility at Vicenza, Italy to outpatient-only status provides lessons learned for 

similar changes at these facilities. 

I think it’s important to mention that, as these facilities transition, military surgical staff can be to be relocated to hospitals with greater inpatient volume, diversity, and acuity that are better able to sustain the lifesaving clinical skills that are 
129 

key to supporting our deployed warfighters. To answer your question directly, I believe that we can transition these hospitals to outpatient clinics without compromising the care that will be given to our service members and their families at these 

locations. Further that these transitions support the Department’s focus on ensuring 

that our medical force maintains the clinical readiness that has been so amply demonstrated over the past 15 years of conflict. [See page 61.] 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING 

JUNE 12, 2017 

(133) 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. SMITH 

Mr. SMITH. 1. There has been widespread concern about the President’s proposed 

cuts to the international affairs budget, as exhibited by the following: 

a. Op-ed from former Secretary of State Colin Powell, https://www.nytimes.com/ 

2017/05/24/opinion/colin-powell-trump-budget-state-department.html 

b. Joint Testimony to SASC on June 13, 2017 by General Philip Breedlove, USAF 

(Ret.); General George Casey, USA (Ret.); General Carter Ham, USA (Ret.); General 

James Jones, USMC (Ret.); General; George Joulwan, USA (Ret.); General Stanley 

McChrystal, USA (Ret.); Admiral William McRaven, USNA (Ret.); Admiral Michael 

Mullen, USN (Ret.); Admiral Eric Olson, USN (Ret.); General John Paxton, USMC 

(Ret.); General David Petraeus, USA (Ret.); General Joe Ralston, USAF (Ret.); Admiral Gary Roughead, USN (Ret.); General Hugh Shelton USA, (Ret.); Admiral 

James Stavridis, USN (Ret.); and Admiral Sandy Winnefeld, USN (Ret.), https:// 

s3.amazonaws.com/one-org/us/wp-content/uploads/2017/06/13115833/2017–06–13- 

joint-testimony-to-SASC.pdf 

c. Op-ed from General James Jones, USMC (Ret.) and Admiral Michael Mullen, 

USN (Ret.), http://www.politico.com/agenda/story/2017/06/12/budget-foreign-aid-cutsnational-security-000456 

d. Letter from 120 retired military officers, http://www.usglc.org/downloads/2017/ 

02/FY18_International_Affairs_Budget_House_Senate.pdf 

Secretary MATTIS [No answer was available at the time of printing.] 

Mr. SMITH. 2. There has been widespread support and a claim that ‘‘Strategic investments in diplomacy and development make America safer and more prosperous.’’—as exhibited by the following: a. Letter from 225 business leaders, http:// 

www.usglc.org/downloads/2017/05/Business-Letter-Tillerson-May-22.pdf 

3. There has been widespread support from the faith-based community to support 

and protect the international affairs budget, claiming that diplomatic and development tools lead to ‘‘peaceful, productive societies that do not turn to violence or terrorism’’, as exhibited by the following: a. Letter from Faith Leaders, http://www. 

usglc.org/downloads/2017/04/Faith-Letter.pdf 

Secretary MATTIS. [No answer was available at the time of printing.] 

Mr. SMITH. In light of paragraphs 1–3 above, please answer questions 4–8. 

4. Would you agree that 32% is a severe cut to the State Department and USAID 

or any department or agency? Would you agree that cuts to the State Department 

and USAID will impact national security and American security? How? How would 

the President’s proposed budget for the State Department and USAID impact American power projection and global leadership? 

Secretary MATTIS. I defer to Secretary Tillerson on how he intends to manage the 

budget cuts across the State Department and US AID to ensure that the United 

States is able to maintain its leadership role in the international order. He will need 

to make some tough decisions about how to manage risk. The foundation of American power rests on our unmatched ability to project influence, both militarily and 

diplomatically. Adequate diplomatic resources are as critical as military resources 

to defeating ISIS as well as to preventing state actors, like Russia or China, from 

challenging established international norms. 

Mr. SMITH. 5. From a defense perspective, how would the President’s proposed 

budget for the State Department and USAID make America safer and advance U.S. 

national security interests? 

Secretary MATTIS. Again, I defer to Secretary Tillerson on how he intends to manage the budget cuts across the State Department and USAID to ensure that the 

United States is able to maintain its leadership role in the international order. With 

regard to funds related to building the capacity of partner security forces, Secretary 

Tillerson and I have directed our staffs to deepen collaboration to ensure that our 

security sector assistance funds address the highest priorities to minimize risks to 

interoperability and our partners’ ability to address shared threats. 

Mr. SMITH. 6. From a defense perspective, how would the President’s proposed 

budget for the State Department and USAID impact stability in the world and/or 

potential conflict? 
134 

Secretary MATTIS. The U.S. Government is most effective when it leverages the 

expertise resident across its departments and agencies to plan and employ all its 

tools of national power in a coherent, synchronized manner. Just as I have to manage risk across the Defense Department’s sequestration budget, Secretary Tillerson 

needs to manage the proposed budget cuts to the State Department and USAID in 

a way that will minimize risk to the stability and security of the international order. 

Mr. SMITH. 7. What is the Department’s planning and what resources are required to address those potential impacts to stability and conflict? 

Secretary MATTIS. As I’ve consistently stated in testimony and public statements, 

my first priority is to restore warfighter readiness, filling in the holes from tradeoffs made during 16 years of war, nine years of continuing resolutions, and Budget 

Control Act caps. Restoring readiness enables the U.S. Armed Forces to defend the 

United States and perform its roles with regard to promoting stability and preventing conflict. Congress has a critical role to play in supporting the Department’s 

planning and resources. Passing a Fiscal Year 2018 budget in a timely manner, 

avoiding yet another continuing resolution, eliminating the threat of future sequestration cuts, and providing a stable budgetary planning horizon will better enable 

the Department to promote stability and deter conflict. 

Mr. SMITH. 8. Would you agree that the adequate resourcing of diplomacy, development, and defense is critical to advancing U.S. national security interests? If 

funding is cut for diplomatic and development avenues, how would this complicate 

the Department’s ability to operate with coalitions or work with our allies, partners, 

and other actors? How could this complicate negotiations with host nations where 

our service members are operating missions from or are stationed in? How could 

this complicate the Department’s ability to work by, with, and through partners and 

other stakeholders? 

Secretary MATTIS. I agree that adequate resourcing of diplomacy and development 

is just as critical to advancing U.S. national security as adequate resourcing of defense. However, I am encouraged by the willingness of our allies and partners to 

share the burden of the campaign to defeat the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria and 

other terrorist organizations that represent a clear threat to international order. I 

believe a willingness to address shared challenges will continue to motivate allies 

and partners to collaborate with the United States. In some cases, the United States 

must provide support to partners to ensure that they have the capability and capacity to operate alongside, or in lieu of, U.S. forces. In these cases, the State and Defense Departments are collaborating closely to ensure that the security sector assistance funds that each Department oversees are directed to the highest priorities. 

Mr. SMITH. 1. There has been widespread concern about the President’s proposed 

cuts to the international affairs budget, as exhibited by the following: 

a. Op-ed from former Secretary of State Colin Powell, https://www.nytimes.com/ 

2017/05/24/opinion/colin-powell-trump-budget-state-department.html 

b. Joint Testimony to SASC on June 13, 2017 by General Philip Breedlove, USAF 

(Ret.); General George Casey, USA (Ret.); General Carter Ham, USA (Ret.); General 

James Jones, USMC (Ret.); General; George Joulwan, USA (Ret.); General Stanley 

McChrystal, USA (Ret.); Admiral William McRaven, USNA (Ret.); Admiral Michael 

Mullen, USN (Ret.); Admiral Eric Olson, USN (Ret.); General John Paxton, USMC 

(Ret.); General David Petraeus, USA (Ret.); General Joe Ralston, USAF (Ret.); Admiral Gary Roughead, USN (Ret.); General Hugh Shelton USA, (Ret.); Admiral 

James Stavridis, USN (Ret.); and Admiral Sandy Winnefeld, USN (Ret.), https:// 

s3.amazonaws.com/one-org/us/wp-content/uploads/2017/06/13115833/2017–06–13- 

joint-testimony-to-SASC.pdf 

c. Op-ed from General James Jones, USMC (Ret.) and Admiral Michael Mullen, 

USN (Ret.), http://www.politico.com/agenda/story/2017/06/12/budget-foreign-aid-cutsnational-security-000456 

d. Letter from 120 retired military officers, http://www.usglc.org/downloads/2017/ 

02/FY18_International_Affairs_Budget_House_Senate.pdf 

General DUNFORD. [No answer was available at the time of printing.] 

Mr. SMITH. 2. There has been widespread support and a claim that ‘‘Strategic investments in diplomacy and development make America safer and more prosperous.’’—as exhibited by the following: a. Letter from 225 business leaders, http:// 

www.usglc.org/downloads/2017/05/Business-Letter-Tillerson-May-22.pdf 

3. There has been widespread support from the faith-based community to support 

and protect the international affairs budget, claiming that diplomatic and development tools lead to ‘‘peaceful, productive societies that do not turn to violence or terrorism’’, as exhibited by the following: a. Letter from Faith Leaders, http://www. 

usglc.org/downloads/2017/04/Faith-Letter.pdf 

General DUNFORD. [No answer was available at the time of printing.] 
135 

Mr. SMITH. In light of paragraphs 1–3 above, please answer questions 4–8. 

4. Would you agree that 32% is a severe cut to the State Department and USAID 

or any department or agency? Would you agree that cuts to the State Department 

and USAID will impact national security and American security? How? How would 

the President’s proposed budget for the State Department and USAID impact American power projection and global leadership? 

General DUNFORD. Both Secretary Mattis and I work closely with Secretary 

Tillerson. DOD and State are one team. The State Department has yet to release 

the details of the proposed budget cuts, so I cannot comment on the impact to security. However, I do not see one security issue or threat we face that can be solved 

by military power alone. Our most pressing national security issues can only be addressed within a foreign policy framework. We will work collaboratively with the 

Department of State and USAID to ensure we fully leverage our collective capabilities and capacities to protect the Homeland and advance our foreign policy interests. 

Mr. SMITH. 5. From a defense perspective, how would the President’s proposed 

budget for the State Department and USAID make America safer and advance U.S. 

national security interests? 

General DUNFORD. The State Department has yet to release the details of the proposed budget cuts, so I cannot speculate on the impact to our national security interests. I cannot name a single security issue that can be solved by military power 

alone. We will work collaboratively with the Department of State and USAID to ensure we fully leverage our collective capabilities and capacities to protect the Homeland and advance our foreign policy interests. 

Mr. SMITH. 6. From a defense perspective, how would the President’s proposed 

budget for the State Department and USAID impact stability in the world and/or 

potential conflict? 

General DUNFORD. The State Department has not revealed the details of the proposed budget cuts, so I cannot speculate on their impact. A cornerstone of our ability 

to project power, and support stability, is our network of allies and partners. Every 

relationship we have with another country has diplomatic, economic, and military 

elements. In order to be successful, any military relationship, or action, must be 

crafted within a foreign policy framework maintaining our national security interests and end states. We will work collaboratively with the Department of State and 

USAID to ensure we fully leverage our collective capabilities and capacities to protect the Homeland and advance our foreign policy interests. 

Mr. SMITH. 7. What is the Department’s planning and what resources are required to address those potential impacts to stability and conflict? 

General DUNFORD. We will not be able to identify or mitigate potential impacts 

until we fully understand the details of the State Department’s budget going forward. 

Mr. SMITH. 8. Would you agree that the adequate resourcing of diplomacy, development, and defense is critical to advancing U.S. national security interests? If 

funding is cut for diplomatic and development avenues, how would this complicate 

the Department’s ability to operate with coalitions or work with our allies, partners, 

and other actors? How could this complicate negotiations with host nations where 

our service members are operating missions from or are stationed in? How could 

this complicate the Department’s ability to work by, with, and through partners and 

other stakeholders? 

General DUNFORD. I would agree that diplomacy, development and defense are all 

critical to advancing U.S. security interests. There is no security threat today that 

can be solved by military power alone. At the core of our alliances and partnerships 

are intertwined military, economic, political, and intelligence sharing relationships 

that allow us to collectively take action against threats. We have not seen the details on the State Department’s proposed budget cuts, so I cannot comment on specific impacts. Our relationship with allies and partners is critical. We will collaborate with the State Department to ensure we can meet our alliance commitments 

and maintain our network of allies and partners. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. LANGEVIN 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Last year’s NDAA established U.S. Cyber Command (CYBERCOM) as its own Unified Combatant Command and formalized the relationship with 

the Principal Cyber Advisor. The steps taken by Congress recognized the importance 

of governing the development of DOD cyberspace policy and strategy. Leveraging 

the successes and lessons learned, the Principal Cyber Advisor will maximize the 

result of each strategic objective and ultimately the success of each strategic goal 

of the Cyber Mission Force. What steps is the Department taking to establish 
136 

CYBERCOM as a Unified Combatant Command and to enable the Principal Cyber 

Advisor to serve as the service-like secretary? How will this elevation serve your 

broader strategic goals for the Department? 

Secretary MATTIS. The Department is preparing for the elevation of U.S. Cyber 

Command (USCYBERCOM) to a Unified Combatant Command, consistent with Section 167b of Title 10, U.S. Code. I have provided recommendations to the President 

on how and when to proceed with elevation and remain in discussions with the 

White House about this matter. Elevation would enhance the Department’s position 

in the cyber domain by streamlining and consolidating responsibility for cyberspace 

operations in a single operational commander. Elevation would empower the Commander to interact as a peer with other Combatant Commanders, increase coordination of cyber forces and their training, and demonstrate commitment to cyberspace 

as a warfighting domain; thereby assuring partners and enhancing deterrence messaging. The additional oversight responsibilities of the Principal Cyber Advisor 

under section 167b are closely aligned with the plan that will be developed for a 

more optimized cyber organizational structure, as prescribed in Section 902 of the 

National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017. The organizational efforts 

will be sequenced to allow the Department to maintain focus on the lethality and 

mission readiness of an elevated USCYBERCOM. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. I have advocated for the transition of mature, game-changing technologies to our warfighters so that we never send them into a fair fight. Last year’s 

NDAA required the installation of a Designated Official for DE technologies, and it 

is critical that this position focus not just on research and engineering, but especially on facilitating technologies’ transitions to the joint battlefield. Can you provide 

an update on where the Department is in installing this official? 

Secretary MATTIS. I am fully committed to furthering the development and transition of directed energy weapons that complement kinetic weapon systems to fulfill 

near- and long-term warfighter needs. We are creating a detailed strategic plan to 

develop, mature, and transition directed energy technologies to acquisition programs 

of record as directed in Section 219 of the Fiscal Year (FY) 2017 National Defense 

Authorization Act (NDAA). This roadmap will be the cornerstone for future studies 

focused on other directed energy technologies, such as high-energy lasers and highpower microwave, which could fulfill warfighter needs. Once the reorganization of 

the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology & Logistics), creating the 

Under Secretary of Defense (Research & Engineering) and Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition & Sustainment), is complete, as directed by section 901 of the FY 

2017 NDAA, the Department will designate a senior defense official for directed energy technologies. 

QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MS. TSONGAS 

Ms. TSONGAS. On May 8, 2017, Deputy Secretary of Defense Work sent a memorandum to the Secretaries of the Military Departments and Chiefs of the Military 

Services directing an assessment of their readiness to access transgender applicants 

into the military services beginning on July 1, 2017. The memorandum stated that 

‘‘[w]e do not intend to reconsider prior decisions unless they cause readiness problems that could lessen our ability to fight, survive and win on the battlefield.’’ Subsequently, the Army and Marine Corps requested a delay of the July 1 deadline for 

implementation of service plans to access transgender applicants. Please describe 

the process OSD intends to follow in assessing the Army and Marine Corps’s requests and the standard that will be used for any reevaluation of the transgender 

policy or implementation timelines based on impacts to readiness. 

Secretary MATTIS. There is no modification to the current policy until we receive 

the President’s direction to the Department. In the meantime, we will continue to 

treat all our personnel with respect. As importantly, given the current fight and 

challenges we face, we will all remain focused on accomplishing our assigned missions. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. SCOTT 

Mr. SCOTT. 1. As the battle to liberate Raqqa gets underway, I’d like you to describe your long-term vision for Syria and how you expect the U.S. military mission 

in Syria to change or evolve after the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) has 

been pushed from major city centers. 

a. What is the desired end-state? b. In addition to our obvious counter-terrorism 

objectives in Syria, what other U.S. national security objectives do we have in Syria? 
137 

c. How do you prioritize those and would you advocate for expending U.S. military 

resources to achieve or sustain those objectives? 

2. The President’s budget assumes troop levels will stay constant in Syria. 

a. Is that your expectation? b. If not, where would that extra funding come from? 

c. Do you plan on requesting additional funding through a supplemental? d. Or do 

you intend to take from other areas in an already insufficient budget request? 

3. Do you anticipate a confrontation with regime-aligned forces will in southern 

or eastern Syria? 

4. How do we prevent unintentional escalation with the regime or the state-actors 

supporting the regime? 

Secretary MATTIS. We remain focused on defeating the Islamic State in Iraq and 

Syria’s (ISIS) physical caliphate and plan to surround the enemy to ensure foreign 

fighters are not able to escape and return home. The liberation of Raqqa is a necessary step in defeating ISIS, but it is not the last step. ISIS remains entrenched 

along the Euphrates River Valley, and operations to defeat ISIS and prevent its resurgence will take many more months. The U.S. desired end state is to defeat ISIS’s 

physical caliphate in Iraq and Syria; destroy ISIS’ ability to conduct external operations; protect partner and allied nation borders and preserve the coalition; and create the conditions for a secure environment that prevents the rise of ISIS ‘‘2.0’’ and 

other violent extremist organizations. The United States seeks a unified Syria and 

a political solution that addresses the root causes of terrorism and instability and 

where Syrians decide their own government. The Department of Defense’s (DoD) 

number one priority is to protect the homeland by defeating ISIS in Iraq and Syria 

and destroying its ability to plan and execute external attacks against the United 

States and its partners and allies. 

We are continuously assessing the force management levels in Syria to ensure we 

are able to balance the Defeat-ISIS mission effectively with other regional and global priorities. As the environment on the ground changes, we will adjust manning 

to meet operational needs and will keep Congress informed. In fiscal year (FY) 2017, 

DOD requested (and Congress passed) funding for the Defeat ISIS mission in the 

Overseas Contingency Operations Transfer Fund (OCOTF) to meet operational requirements in support of emerging decisions on contingency operations without disrupting approved program execution or force readiness. Congress provided DOD the 

flexibility to reprioritize operations, identify assets, and employ forces quickly to 

meet the challenges of trans-regional counterterrorism activities, and provided DOD 

the ability to apportion funding to the Military Departments directly impacted to 

enable them to meet urgent operational needs. The funding provided in the DOD 

Appropriations Act, 2017 for the Counter-ISIS OCOTF allows for flexibility and responsiveness to address emergent requirements related to the Defeat-ISIS mission. 

In addition to the $1.6 billion available in the Counter-ISIS OCOTF, DOD will continue to monitor emergent requirements in order to reprioritize resources or request 

additional funding, as necessary. 

The United States and the Coalition do not seek to fight the Syrian Government, 

the Russians, or pro-regime forces and take careful measures to avoid engagements 

with those forces. It is in neither the Coalition’s nor Syria’s best interest to provoke 

a confrontation. The Department will remain focused on our efforts to defeat ISIS, 

and encourage the Syrian Government and Regime-aligned forces to do the same. 

The U.S. Government has established effective multi-level de-confliction channels 

with Russia to prevent incidents between Coalition forces and Syrian Government 

and pro-Regime forces. There are daily communications between our forces in the 

field and Russia to mitigate the risk of unintended escalation or miscommunication 

between air and ground forces. 

Mr. SCOTT. Given the threat the transnational criminal organizations and other 

networks pose, what additional budgetary resources or authorizations does the Department need in order to combat those organizations within the Southern Command region? 

Secretary MATTIS. As this Committee knows, the Department has not been able 

to source U.S. Southern Command’s (USSOUTHCOM) intelligence, surveillance, and 

reconnaissance (ISR) and other force requirements in full due to competing global 

priorities. To support U.S. and partner nation law enforcement entities, intelligence 

capabilities in all forms of collection and analysis are critical to identifying and disrupting the leadership, financial, and communication infrastructure of both criminal 

and extremist networks. Although USSOUTHCOM receives minimal U.S. Navy 

presence to support its statutory detection and monitoring (D&M) mission, the pursuit and use of non-traditional commercial (leased) alternatives does allow USSOUTHCOM to address some of its D&M resourcing shortfalls. Although Department of Defense-enabled law enforcement actions mitigate threats to the homeland, 

Department of Defense-enabled diplomatic and developmental actions (e.g., Defense 
138 

Institution Building, humanitarian and civic assistance, information operations) provide a more long-term sustainable solution and should be resourced in tandem with 

more direct efforts. 

Mr. SCOTT. Given the Presidential Budget Request for Fiscal Year 2018 and the 

Service’s own unfunded priorities list, both have displayed that we cannot fund our 

military to execute what we ask of it today under the current Budget Control Act. 

We have been discussing what happens in the near term with the 2018 budget, but 

my question is; what will the U.S. Military look like in four years if we stay under 

the caps? 

The Air Force has made it clear that it is the smallest, oldest and least ready 

it’s been in its history. Yet in its unfunded requirements list, the Air Force shows 

the need to accelerate the MC–130J recapitalization by procuring 12 additional aircraft ($1.2 billion) and the need to accelerate the HC–130J recapitalization by procuring one additional aircraft ($100 million). 

How does this budget reverse the years of underinvestment that has left us with 

the smallest, oldest and least ready force in history? 

General DUNFORD. The PB18 base budget request is $575B, $52B above Budget 

Control Act (BCA) levels. This plus-up is intended to reverse the negative funding 

trends created by BCA, which has underfunded the Department since 2012. The 

PB18 base budget continues the progress started in FY17 toward restoring and improving warfighting readiness, and achieving program balance by addressing pressing shortfalls. While PB18 is not intended to grow the force, it will set the conditions for growth in FY19 and beyond. This budget includes sufficient funding to support our commitments around the world, however, our competitive advantage is 

eroding and without adequate and stable funding, we will be challenged to maintain 

these commitments. 

Mr. SCOTT. 1. As the battle to liberate Raqqa gets underway, I’d like you to describe your long-term vision for Syria and how you expect the U.S. military mission 

in Syria to change or evolve after the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) has 

been pushed from major city centers. 

a. What is the desired end-state? b. In addition to our obvious counter-terrorism 

objectives in Syria, what other U.S. national security objectives do we have in Syria? 

c. How do you prioritize those and would you advocate for expending U.S. military 

resources to achieve or sustain those objectives? 

2. The President’s budget assumes troop levels will stay constant in Syria. 

a. Is that your expectation? b. If not, where would that extra funding come from? 

c. Do you plan on requesting additional funding through a supplemental? d. Or do 

you intend to take from other areas in an already insufficient budget request? 

3. Do you anticipate a confrontation with regime-aligned forces will in southern 

or eastern Syria? 

4. How do we prevent unintentional escalation with the regime or the state-actors 

supporting the regime? 

General DUNFORD. We remain focused on destroying ISIS’ physical caliphate, with 

an emphasis on surrounding the enemy to ensure foreign fighters are not able to 

escape and return home. The liberation of Raqqa is a necessary step in defeating 

ISIS, but it is not the last step. ISIS remains entrenched along the Euphrates River 

Valley, and operations to defeat them and prevent their resurgence will take many 

more months. The desired end-state is to destroy ISIS’ physical caliphate in Iraq 

and Syria; Defeat ISIS’ ability to conduct external operations; protect partner and 

allied nation borders and preserve the coalition; and create the conditions for a secure environment that prevents the rise of ISIS 2.0 and other violent extremist organizations. In addition to counter-terrorism objectives in Syria, other U.S. national 

security objectives are: a political solution in Syria that addresses the root causes 

of terrorism and instability; local security forces capable of providing security to Syrian citizens; and the return of refugees and internally displaced persons to their 

place of origin. The first and foremost military priority is to protect the Homeland 

by destroying core ISIS in Iraq and Syria and defeating its ability to plan and execute external attacks against the United States and its partners and allies. To do 

this we must preserve the Coalition and prevent the rise of ‘‘ISIS 2.0’’, which is vital 

to ensuring we can achieve our end state. 

2. We are continuously assessing the force management levels in Syria to ensure 

we are able to effectively balance the Defeat ISIS mission with other regional and 

global priorities. As the environment changes, we will adjust manning to meet operational needs and keep Congress informed. In FY 2017, the Department requested 

(and the Congress enacted) funding for the Defeat ISIS mission in the Overseas 

Contingency Operations Transfer Fund (OCOTF), $1.6 billion, to meet operational 

requirements in support of emerging decisions on contingency operations without 

disrupting the approved program execution for force readiness. The Congress pro-
139 

vided the flexibility to quickly reprioritize operations, identify assets, and employ 

forces to meet the transregional nature of counterterrorism activities, with the ability to issue funding to the Military Departments directly impacted to meet urgent 

operational needs. 

3. The United States and the Coalition do not seek to fight the Syrian Regime, 

Russian, or pro-Regime forces and we take great effort to avoid confrontation. It is 

in neither the Coalition’s nor Syria’s best interest to provoke a confrontation. We 

will remain focused on our efforts to Defeat ISIS, and we encourage the Regime and 

Regime-aligned forces to do the same. 

4. We have established effective multi-level deconfliction channels with the Russians to prevent incidents between the Coalition and the Syrian Regime and proRegime forces. There are daily communications between our fielded forces and the 

Russians to mitigate the possibility of unintended escalation or miscommunication 

between air and ground forces. 

QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. HUNTER 

Mr. HUNTER. President Trump signed a Defense Production Act Presidential Determination (Number 2017–09) on June 13, 2017 stating that ‘‘critical technology 

item shortfalls affecting adenovirus vaccine production capability; high strength, inherently fire and ballistic resistant, co-polymer aramid fibers industrial capability; 

secure hybrid composite shipping container industrial capability; and three-dimensional ultra-high density microelectronics for information protection industrial capability are critical to national defense.’’ The Determination goes on to say that ‘‘Without Presidential action under this Act, the United States defense industrial base 

cannot reasonably be expected to adequately provide those capabilities or technology 

items in a timely manner.’’ Given the urgency of these programs as determined by 

the President, what is the Department’s timeline (i.e. funding and initiating the program) to address these industrial base shortfalls? Please provide timelines for each 

of the technologies identified as critical in Presidential Determination No. 2017–09.’’ 

Secretary MATTIS. The Department of Defense is actively working to address the 

four shortfalls within the President’s June determination: 

1. We are expecting the adenovirus vaccine production project contract to be 

awarded in the first quarter of fiscal year 2018 (FY18). We have allocated $15.42M 

for this project. 

2. The effort to address the industrial capability of high-strength, inherently fireand ballistic-resistant, co-polymer aramid fibers is currently in the contracting 

phase, and execution is planned for FY18. We have allocated $35.38M for this 

project. 

3. The secure hybrid composite shipping container project is also in the contracting phase and award(s) are expected in the first quarter of FY18. We have allocated $19.08M for this project. 

4. Our effort to address three-dimensional microelectronics for information protection has resulted in a contract awarded to Draper Labs, effective July 28, 2017. We 

have committed $13.20M to this effort. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MS. SPEIER 

Ms. SPEIER. There have been numerous reports of official government meetings, 

including meetings with foreign counterparts, being held at properties owned by the 

President. Because of the President’s refusal to divest himself of those business interests, there is the prospect of the President and his family making a personal profit off of that official government business. The American people have a right to 

know whether Department of Defense money—taxpayer money—is ending up in the 

President’s personal wallet. 

Mr. Secretary, General Dunford: Have either of you, or any of your staff, participated in official government events at a property owned by the President? If so, did 

the Department of Defense expend appropriated money to pay for costs associated 

with that event—including room and board, meals, or other incidental expenses? 

Secretary MATTIS. No. 

Ms. SPEIER. Last school year, fewer students at the military service academies reported sexual assault and harassment, but the estimated rates of unwanted sexual 

conduct increased. Both of these are trending in the wrong direction. One reason 

could be the ostracism of sexual assault victims. 47% of those who reported their 

unwanted sexual contact experienced social isolation or maltreatment. We must foster an environment at the service academies in which students who have been sexu-
140 

ally assaulted or harassed feel like they can come forward without fear of retaliation. 

Mr. Secretary, General Dunford: Were you aware of these depressing statistics? 

If so, what are you doing about them? 

Secretary MATTIS. The Department must focus its attention on defeating this 

crime and learning how to do that begins at places like the Military Service Academies. Consequently, I met with the three Academy Superintendents and the four 

Service Chiefs in March to discuss ways to better understand the unique environments at the academies. As a result of that meeting, I directed the Under Secretary 

of Defense (Personnel and Readiness) and the Sexual Assault Prevention and Response Office to work with the Academies this summer to help them address issues 

identified in the report, including improving sexual assault prevention efforts, enhancing their climates to reduce sexual harassment and other readiness-impacting 

behaviors like retaliation, encouraging healthier alcohol choices, and increasing reporting of sexual assault. I have every confidence the Superintendents will make the 

kinds of changes that will result in the progress we’re seeking. The Academies’ 

plans to address these issues are due to the Department not later than October 30, 

2017. 

Ms. SPEIER. On June 7, the non-profit group Protect our Defenders issued a report 

on ‘‘Substantial and Persistent Racial Disparities Within the United States Military 

Justice System.’’ POD’s findings show that, for every year reported and across all 

four branches, black service members were substantially more likely than white 

service members to face military justice or disciplinary action. These disparities 

have not improved, and in some cases have increased, in recent years. 

Mr. Secretary, General Dunford: Have you been made aware of these findings? Do 

you agree that this is a concern—and, if so, what will the Department do in response? 

Secretary MATTIS. The Department of Defense is an inclusive organization that 

continually strives to ensure equal opportunity and justice for all its Service members, regardless of race or ethnicity. The Department first became aware of the subject report through a published story by USA Today on June 7, 2017. The subject 

report and subsequent news story were written in part based upon information received from the Military Services through Freedom of Information requests. 

The Department’s initial review of the report findings reveals that the data provided by the Military Services to Protect Our Defenders (POD) is not consistent, primarily because of the disparate ways in which demographic information is tracked 

by the Military Services. As a result, the conclusions reached by POD are somewhat 

limited. 

Specifically, the conclusions drawn by POD, and subsequently reported on by USA 

Today, are based on the assumption that all Military Services define and track demographic data similarly; however, this is not the case. Furthermore, the information provided by the Military Services, specific to military justice and disciplinary 

action, is not standardized; thus, each of the Military Services track and report dissimilar information. 

Nevertheless, the Department agrees that further study of this important topic is 

needed and continues to review and refine how to analyze the data. The Department 

is looking forward to engaging the Military Services in developing standardized 

tracking and reporting systems, specific to the types of information collected and 

published regarding demographic data, military justice involvement, and final adjudication outcomes. 

Ms. SPEIER. On June 6, the Acting Director of Operational Testing and Evaluation 

upgraded the Department’s assessment of the Ground-Based Midcourse missile defense system, now stating that the system is no longer ‘‘limited.’’ The Acting Director judged that the system now has the capability to intercept intercontinental missiles targeting the homeland. This judgment was made shortly following the most 

recent intercept test of the system, which was judged a success. However, that test 

increases the overall test success rate to only 40 percent since 2010. Further, these 

tests are tightly scripted and controlled, with a single target, known flight parameters, and with no countermeasures or decoys. Finally, there are significant questions surrounding the reliability of the interceptors already deployed. I’m concerned 

that the capabilities of the system are being oversold. 

General Dunford, would you sign off on an operation or a contingency plan that 

has a 60 percent probability of failure? 

Mr. Secretary, given all this, how can the Department’s assessment of the system 

be upgraded based on the results of a single test? 

Secretary MATTIS. The Ground-based Midcourse Defense (GMD) program is continuing to improve. A total of 25 Ground-based Interceptors (GBIs) are new or have 

recently been upgraded in the past 3-years. The Missile Defense Agency (MDA) suc-
141 

cessfully intercepted an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) target during the 

Flight Test Ground-based Interceptor-15 (FTG–15) flight test on 30 May 2017. This 

was the first live-fire test event against an ICBM-class target included countermeasures for GMD and the Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS). The test was 

representative of real world timelines and geometries. FTG–15 demonstrated a new 

GBI configuration with a three-stage Configuration 2 (C2) booster vehicle and a CE– 

II Block 1 Exoatmospheric Kill Vehicle (EKV) that contains new alternate divert 

thrusters. The C2 design increases reliability through design and producibility improvements. Sustainment of fielded hardware was enhanced by addressing obsolescence in booster components. The successful intercept of an ICBM-class target supports the decision to emplace nine additional GBIs. These new interceptors provide 

improved reliability, discrimination performance, and safety when compared to previously fielded interceptors. MDA emplaced the first of nine new GBIs in the FTG– 

15 configuration on 28 June 2017 and will complete the deployment of 44 GBIs by 

the end of 2017. 

I have confidence in the Operational Test and Evaluation’s Homeland Defense 

BMDS Director’s assessment that the GMD has demonstrated capability to defend 

the U.S. Homeland from a small number of intermediate-range or intercontinental 

ballistic missile threats with simple countermeasures when the Homeland Defense 

BMDS employs its full sensors/command and control architecture. 

Ms. SPEIER. There are reports that the Army and Marine Corps have requested 

that you delay the deadline of July 1, set by Secretary Carter, for the Services to 

implement policies for recruiting enlisted troops and commissioning officers who are 

transgender. Such a delay would be unwise and detrimental to readiness, as documented in studies by DOD, RAND, and others. The military has been benefiting 

from open transgender service by current service members since October 1, 2016, 

and has had a full year to prepare their accession policies. 

Mr. Secretary, can you affirm that you will hold the Services to the deadline imposed by your predecessor? 

Secretary MATTIS. There is no modification to the current policy until the Department receives the President’s direction. In the meantime, we will continue to treat 

all our personnel with respect. As importantly, given the current fight and challenges the Department faces, we will all remain focused on accomplishing our assigned missions. 

Ms. SPEIER. The Military Accessions Vital to the National Interest program, or 

MAVNI, offers a path to citizenship through military service for noncitizens and certain qualified members of the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) program. MAVNI, which impacts approximately 4,300 future soldiers throughout the 

United States, has had a start-stop history over the past two years, and delays are 

compounded by the lethargic pace of requisite background and counterintelligence 

investigations. These delays are especially concerning, as the future soldiers have 

contractual ‘‘drop dead’’ dates when their eligibility has been mandated to expire if 

the MAVNI accession program does not continue processing applicants in a timely 

manner. Recruiters and regional commanders do not seem to have information regarding what is going on. Applicants have put other educational and professional 

decisions on hold waiting for this program to move. 

Mr. Secretary, what is the current status of the MAVNI program? Is it DOD’s intent that the program will continue? 

Is there an expected timeline when the freeze on counterintelligence interviews 

will be lifted? Will individuals who incurred cancellation of their interviews have 

those interviews rescheduled? 

Is DOD considering an Exception To Policy regarding the current policy to drop 

MAVNI future soldier contracts after 730 days, or an ETP around the current security protocol requirements (NIAC, SSBI, CI interview) before a MAVNI future soldier may depart for basic combat training? 

Some program applicants have been waiting for 1–2 years due to program delays 

at DOD. If their contractual eligibility windows approach their end-dates due to program delays, are there any intentions at DOD to extend the individual eligibility 

windows for those applicants? 

Does DOD have any advice to MAVNI applicants on what to expect or how best 

to proceed at this moment in time and process? 

Secretary MATTIS. Q. Mr. Secretary, what is the current status of the MAVNI program? A: The MAVNI pilot program is currently suspended. Policy was issued on 

September 30, 2016, that included increased vetting requirements for MAVNIs. 

There have been no new MAVNI Accessions since June 2016; however, vetting of 

all MAVNIs in the Delayed Entry Program (DEP) and Delayed Training Program 

(DTP) continues. 
142 

Q. Is it DOD’s intent that the program will continue? A. A determination on the 

future of the program has not been made. 

Q. Is there an expected timeline when the freeze on counterintelligence interviews 

will be lifted? A. There is no freeze on counterintelligence interviews. The intelligence community has prioritized vetting those individuals currently in the force 

before conducting vetting on those in the DEP and DTP. Counterintelligence interviews are ongoing. 

Q. Will individuals who incurred cancellation of their interviews have those interviews rescheduled? A. DOD continues to conduct counterintelligence interviews and 

individuals will receive a notification once their interview has been scheduled. 

Q. Is DOD considering an Exception To Policy regarding the current policy to drop 

MAVNI future soldier contracts after 730 days, or an ETP around the current security protocol requirements (NIAC, SSBI, CI interview) before a MAVNI future soldier 

may depart for basic combat training? A. By law, individuals may remain in the 

DEP for 365 days, with the Secretary concerned authorized to extend that time by 

365 days for a total of 730 days. The Department is examining all available options 

to extend MAVNIs in DEP to complete requisite screening requirements. 

Q. Some program applicants have been waiting for 1–2 years due to program 

delays at DOD. If their contractual eligibility windows approach their end-dates due 

to program delays, are there any intentions at DOD to extend the individual eligibility windows for those applicants? A. Recent changes to the investigative service 

provider background check and vetting program have resulted in long, complex, and 

costly processes, particularly for higher tiered background investigations and vetting. The average wait time for a Tier 5 investigation is approximately 422 days for 

MAVNI applicants. The Department is examining all available options to extend 

MAVNIs in DEP to complete requisite screening requirements. 

Q. Does DOD have any advice to MAVNI applicants on what to expect or how best 

to proceed at this moment in time and process? A. MAVNI applicants were advised 

to maintain their immigration status until such time they shipped to basic training. 

For those who may have fallen out of status, the Department has advised MAVNIs 

to seek a renewed status or deferred action from the Department of Homeland Security based on their enlistment contract. 

Ms. SPEIER. Exposure to blast overpressure is the leading cause of mild traumatic 

brain injury for military personnel. Brain science research points to a clear relationship between Post-traumatic Stress Disorder and even non-concussive blast overpressure events caused by activities such as heavy weapons training. The Army has 

purchased tens of thousands of DARPA-developed gauges to monitor, record, and 

analyze blast overpressure data—however, my understanding is that they may not 

in widespread use in overseas operations or in training environments. 

What actions are you taking to mitigate exposure to your personnel in the field 

and training environments? 

How many of our men and women are using the DARPA gauges in the field or 

in training? Do high-risk units have access to the devices? How many devices have 

been purchased and where are they today? 

Secretary MATTIS. Blast overpressure (BOP) injuries account for 10% of all traumatic brain injuries (TBIs) within the Department of Defense (DOD). The DOD has 

taken actions to improve our understanding while simultaneously implementing 

policies to protect, screen, diagnose, and treat not just TBIs, but potentially concussive events. In parallel to policy efforts, the DOD monitors BOP exposure through 

the Environmental Sensors in Training (ESiT) program. The ESiT effort fields blast 

gauges in training with the goals of 1) optimizing the use of current or next generation sensor technologies, 2) understanding the health effects of BOP, and 3) establishing evidence-based injury thresholds. 

In 2012, the Army procured approximately 108,000 gauges for use in Operation 

Enduring Freedom. The data from this effort did not provide actionable information 

or insights into the impact of single or cumulative BOP. The Army’s effort to understand low-level BOP shifted to a more tailored approach in the training environment. Within the current Army effort (Environmental Sensors in Training (ESiT)), 

there are 1600 gauges in use on select training ranges: artillery, breacher, mortar, 

grenade, engineers, and shoulder fired weapons. These gauges are drawn from both 

existing inventory and purchase of newer designs. The gauges are available to 

‘‘high-risk units’’ as commercial off the shelf (COTS) devices. 

Ms. SPEIER. There have been numerous reports of official government meetings, 

including meetings with foreign counterparts, being held at properties owned by the 

President. Because of the President’s refusal to divest himself of those business interests, there is the prospect of the President and his family making a personal profit off of that official government business. The American people have a right to 
143 

know whether Department of Defense money—taxpayer money—is ending up in the 

President’s personal wallet. 

Mr. Secretary, General Dunford: Have either of you, or any of your staff, participated in official government events at a property owned by the President? If so, did 

the Department of Defense expend appropriated money to pay for costs associated 

with that event—including room and board, meals, or other incidental expenses? 

General DUNFORD. No. Additionally, all travel is conducted in accordance with the 

Joint Federal Travel Regulations. 

Ms. SPEIER. Last school year, fewer students at the military service academies reported sexual assault and harassment, but the estimated rates of unwanted sexual 

conduct increased. Both of these are trending in the wrong direction. One reason 

could be the ostracism of sexual assault victims. 47% of those who reported their 

unwanted sexual contact experienced social isolation or maltreatment. We must foster an environment at the service academies in which students who have been sexually assaulted or harassed feel like they can come forward without fear of retaliation. 

Mr. Secretary, General Dunford: Were you aware of these depressing statistics? 

If so, what are you doing about them? 

General DUNFORD. I am aware of the statistics and the impact that any form of 

retaliation has on a victim’s decision to report incidents of sexual assault and harassment. The Department recently released the DOD Retaliation Prevention and 

Response Strategy as a comprehensive approach address this issue. The strategy 

aligns Departmental efforts in combating retaliation and targets five areas: standardizing definitions, improving data collection and analysis, streamlining investigation and accountability efforts, strengthening reporter protections, and creating a 

culture intolerant of retaliation. It applies to Service member bystanders and witnesses as well as DOD first responders. We are committed to addressing retaliatory 

behavior and have dedicated resources to that end. 

Ms. SPEIER. On June 7, the non-profit group Protect our Defenders issued a report 

on ‘‘Substantial and Persistent Racial Disparities Within the United States Military 

Justice System.’’ POD’s findings show that, for every year reported and across all 

four branches, black service members were substantially more likely than white 

service members to face military justice or disciplinary action. These disparities 

have not improved, and in some cases have increased, in recent years. 

Mr. Secretary, General Dunford: Have you been made aware of these findings? Do 

you agree that this is a concern—and, if so, what will the Department do in response? 

General DUNFORD. I am aware of POD’s findings. The Department of Defense and 

military services are firmly committed to maintaining the highest levels of discipline 

and readiness in the joint force by upholding the integrity of the military justice 

process while ensuring fair treatment and equal opportunity for all Service members. I am confident that the services will appropriately address any issue that 

interferes with the impartial administration of military justice. 

Ms. SPEIER. On June 6, the Acting Director of Operational Testing and Evaluation 

upgraded the Department’s assessment of the Ground-Based Midcourse missile defense system, now stating that the system is no longer ‘‘limited.’’ The Acting Director judged that the system now has the capability to intercept intercontinental missiles targeting the homeland. This judgment was made shortly following the most 

recent intercept test of the system, which was judged a success. However, that test 

increases the overall test success rate to only 40 percent since 2010. Further, these 

tests are tightly scripted and controlled, with a single target, known flight parameters, and with no countermeasures or decoys. Finally, there are significant questions surrounding the reliability of the interceptors already deployed. I’m concerned 

that the capabilities of the system are being oversold. 

General Dunford, would you sign off on an operation or a contingency plan that 

has a 60 percent probability of failure? 

Mr. Secretary, given all this, how can the Department’s assessment of the system 

be upgraded based on the results of a single test? 

General DUNFORD. The Department’s assessment of the Ground-based Midcourse 

Defense system is based on results of all testing to date, warfighter integration and 

system-wide enhancements. A rigorous complement of ground and flight testing allows for the verification of system performance. The Homeland Defense system, including the supporting sensors and communications architecture are continually improved through hardware and software upgrades which increase overall effectiveness in defense of the Homeland. A few of the performance and capability upgrades 

utilized by the Acting Director of the Operational Test and Evaluation to make the 

determination to remove ‘‘limited’’ from the original assessment include: 
144 

—25 Ground-based Interceptors (GBIs) are new, or have been upgraded in the 

past three years. 

—The Missile Defense Agency (MDA) successfully intercepted an intercontinental 

ballistic missile (ICBM) target during the Flight Test Ground-based Interceptor-15 

(FTG–15) test on May 30, 2017. This was the first live-fire test event against an 

ICBM-class target for GMD and the Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS). 

—The successful intercept of an ICBM-class target supports the decision to emplace nine additional GBIs. These new interceptors provide improved reliability, discrimination performance and safety when compared to previously fielded interceptors. MDA emplaced the first of nine new GBIs in the FTG–15 configuration on 

June 28, 2017 and the full the deployment of 44 GBIs will be complete by the end 

of 2017. 

We will continue to work collaboratively within the Defense Department, to ensure we fully leverage our collective capabilities as well as advancing technologies 

to fully protect the Homeland. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. O’ROURKE 

Mr. O’ROURKE. If forces under the control of Bashar al Assad or another country 

engage forces in Syria that the U.S. has trained and/or equipped, does the United 

States have the legal authority to defend against such engagement? If so, please explain the legal authority the U.S. can use. 

Secretary MATTIS. The efforts of the U.S.-led Coalition in Syria are aimed at the 

defeat of the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS), and the United States does not 

seek to fight the Syrian Government or pro-Syrian-Government forces. However, the 

United States will not hesitate to use necessary and proportionate force to defend 

U.S., Coalition, or partner forces engaged in the campaign against ISIS, if necessary. 

As a matter of domestic law, the 2001 Authorization to Use Military Force 

(AUMF) authorizes the use of force in Syria against ISIS and al-Qa’ida. The 2001 

AUMF also provides authority to use force to defend U.S., Coalition, and partner 

forces engaged in the campaign to defeat ISIS to the extent such use of force is a 

necessary and appropriate measure in support of these counter-ISIS operations. 

As a matter of international law, the United States is using force in Syria against 

ISIS and al-Qa’ida and is providing support to Syrian partners fighting ISIS, such 

as the Syrian Democratic Forces, in the collective self-defense of Iraq (and other 

States) and in U.S. national self-defense. Consistent with the inherent right of individual and collective self-defense, the United States initiated necessary and proportionate actions in Syria against ISIS in 2014 and reported those actions to the UN 

Security Council consistent with Article 51 of the United Nations Charter. Those 

necessary and proportionate actions may include the use of force as needed to defend U.S., Coalition, and U.S.-supported partner forces engaged in the campaign to 

defeat ISIS from threats by Syrian Government and pro-Syrian Government forces. 

Mr. O’ROURKE. Under what legal authority did the U.S. act when launching missile strikes on April 7th, 2017, against Syria? Under what legal authority did the 

U.S. act when engaging and shooting down a Syrian Su-22 on June 18th, 2017? 

Secretary MATTIS. The U.S. military action on April 6, 2017, against Syrian military targets directly connected to the chemical weapons attack in Khan Sheikhoun 

on April 4, 2017 was a justified, legitimate, and proportionate measure to deter and 

prevent Syria’s illegal and unconscionable use of chemical weapons. 

The use of force against the Syrian Su-22 on June 18, 2017, was a limited and 

lawful measure to counter immediate threats to U.S. partner forces engaged in the 

campaign to defeat the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS). As a matter of domestic law, the 2001 Authorization to Use Military Force (AUMF) authorizes the use 

of force in Syria against ISIS and al-Qa’ida. It also provides authority to use force 

to defend U.S., Coalition, and partner forces engaged in the campaign to defeat ISIS 

to the extent such use of force is a necessary and appropriate measure in support 

of these counter-ISIS operations. 

As a matter of international law, the United States is using force in Syria against 

ISIS and al-Qa’ida and is providing support to Syrian partners fighting ISIS, such 

as the Syrian Democratic Forces, in the collective self-defense of Iraq (and other 

States) and in U.S. national self-defense. Consistent with the inherent right of individual and collective self-defense, the United States initiated necessary and proportionate actions in Syria against ISIS in 2014 and reported those actions to the 

United Nations (UN) Security Council consistent with Article 51 of the UN Charter. 

Those necessary and proportionate actions may include the use of force as needed 

to defend U.S., Coalition, and U.S.-supported partner forces engaged in the cam-
145 

paign to defeat ISIS from threats by Syrian Government and pro-Syrian Government forces. 

Mr. O’ROURKE. If forces under the control of Bashar al Assad or another country 

engage forces in Syria that the U.S. has trained and/or equipped, does the United 

States have the legal authority to defend against such engagement? If so, please explain the legal authority the U.S. can use. 

General DUNFORD. The United States may use necessary and proportionate force 

to defend U.S., Coalition, or partner forces engaged in the campaign against the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS). The 2001 Authorization to Use Military Force 

(AUMF) authorizes the use of force against ISIS and al-Qa’ida under domestic law. 

To the extent a use of force is necessary and appropriate to defend U.S., Coalition, 

and partner forces engaged in the ISIS campaign, the 2001 AUMF provides such 

authority. Under international law, U.S., Coalition, and partner forces are fighting 

ISIS in the collective self-defense of Iraq, and in U.S. national self-defense, consistent with the U.N. Charter. The U.S. may use necessary and proportionate force 

to defend U.S., Coalition, or partner forces engaged in the campaign to Defeat ISIS 

from threats posed by Syria or another country. 

Mr. O’ROURKE. Under what legal authority did the U.S. act when launching missile strikes on April 7th, 2017, against Syria? Under what legal authority did the 

U.S. act when engaging and shooting down a Syrian Su-22 on June 18th, 2017? 

General DUNFORD. The April 7, 2017 missile strike taken by the United States 

against Syrian military targets was a justified, legitimate, and proportionate response to Syria’s illegal use of chemical weapons on April 4. These military targets 

were directly connected to Syria’s indiscriminate use of chemical weapons in Khan 

Sheikhoun. The June 18, 2017 strike taken by the United States against the Syrian 

Su-22 in the vicinity of Tabqah, Syria, was a limited and lawful measure to respond 

to an immediate threat to partner forces engaged in the campaign against the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS). The efforts of the U.S.-led Coalition are aimed 

at the defeat of ISIS, acting in the collective self-defense of Iraq and in U.S. national 

self-defense, and are consistent with the U.N. Charter. Additionally, the 2001 Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF) authorizes the use of force in Syria 

against ISIS and against al-Qa’ida and associated forces. To the extent the use of 

force is necessary and appropriate to defend U.S., Coalition, and partner forces engaged in the ISIS campaign, the 2001 AUMF provides such authority. 

Mr. O’ROURKE. How does declaring parts of Somalia as areas of active hostilities 

affect the funding necessary to carry out U.S. missions in that country? Did additional authorities to pursue Al Shabaab’s forces in that country result in an increase 

to the President’s Overseas Contingency Operations or any other request? If so, how 

much is that increase? If not, will the Department require additional appropriations 

in the future for Somalia? How much had the U.S. previously spent on operations 

per year on Department of Defense operations in Somalia? 

Mr. NORQUIST. In March 2017, the President approved a Department of Defense 

proposal to conduct precision air strikes against al-Shabaab in Somalia to enable African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) and Somali National Army (SNA) operations to defeat al-Shabaab. Counterterrorism operations in support of our partners 

in the East Africa region are funded within the amounts appropriated in the Department’s Fiscal Year (FY) 2017 budget and FY 2018 budget request. The Department will continue to assess the duration, frequency, and intensity of support to our 

partners in Somalia in order to determine whether additional resources are required. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. BRIDENSTINE 

Mr. BRIDENSTINE. The Air Force and Navy are recapitalizing the aging KC–135 

tanker and P–3 anti-submarine warfare fleets with the new KC–46A and P–8 aircraft. Industry has the capability to more rapidly and cost efficiently produce these 

critical enablers, but PB18 does not provide adequate funds in the base budget as 

seen in the Air Force and Navy unfunded requirements requests. How does this 

budget ensure that our service men and women have the equipment they need to 

execute their missions while getting the most out of every dollar for our taxpayers? 

Secretary MATTIS. The Department annually balances the funding within the national defense enterprise. However, the Department’s ability to fully fund all mission requirement is constrained by the 2011 Budget Control Act. Both President 

Trump and President Obama have repeatedly recommended that the Congress repeal this law. The fact that the law has not been repealed means the Department 

continues to face many difficult resource decisions. 
146 

Mr. BRIDENSTINE. What is the USAF’s plan to phase in the B–21 and phase out 

older bombers? 

Secretary MATTIS. The acquisition of the B–21 Raider and its integration into the 

long range strike force structure are a national security imperative. The Air Force 

and Air Force Global Strike Command have conducted extensive analysis to determine the right mix of B–21 and legacy bombers considering adversary capabilities, 

future defense strategies and our current fiscal constraints. The Bomber Vector provides the roadmap for the future bomber force structure and is being socialized with 

Congress with an anticipated public roll-out in the fall of 2017. 

Mr. BRIDENSTINE. What is the USAF’s plan to phase in the B–21 and phase out 

older bombers? 

General DUNFORD. Our bombers represent a multi-role, long range, intercontinental strategic part of the Air Force arsenal. The U.S. Air Force is best suited to 

provide further details that address your concerns on the plan to phase in the B– 

21 and phase out older bombers. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MS. ROSEN 

Ms. ROSEN. Iran continues to exercise direct and indirect military influence in 

Iraq, Syria, and Yemen. How do Iranian-backed forces and Iranian political influence in Iraq and Syria affect our own strategy and military operations against ISIL 

in both countries? As the Assad regime consolidates power, what are your concerns 

about Iran and Hezbollah strengthening their influence and presence in Syria? 

What are your overall concerns about a broader regional Shia-Sunni sectarian conflict emerging? Will Iran remain the greatest long-term threat to U.S. interests in 

the region, as General Votel has stated? If so, why and how can the United States, 

its allies, and partners best deter and contain that threat? 

Secretary MATTIS. Iran remains a key strategic and enduring challenge for the 

United States and our partners in the Middle East because of its regional destabilizing activities. Iran’s sectarian approach in both Iraq and Syria is destabilizing 

the situation further, which may be a root cause of the Islamic State in Iraq and 

Syria’s appeal among select Sunni Arab populations. In Syria, Iran’s destabilizing 

support to the murderous Asad regime is a key impediment to solving the Syrian 

crisis. Left unchecked, Iran and Hizballah’s continued influence and military presence in Syria would pose a direct threat to U.S. and allied interests. Their activities 

contribute to extremism and instability in the country and hinder any attempt for 

a lasting political settlement. Tehran’s continued unprofessional and unsafe conduct 

on the seas, sponsorship of terrorists and proxies around the region, malicious cyber 

actions, and ballistic missile launches in defiance of United Nations Security Council resolutions remain top issues for me. To deter and contain Iran’s conventional 

capabilities and irregular warfare activities, the Department maintains military 

plans, preparations, and a strong force posture. Our robust partnerships strengthen 

the regional security architecture in a manner that blunts Iran’s ability to coerce 

its neighbors. 

Ms. ROSEN. Iran continues to exercise direct and indirect military influence in 

Iraq, Syria, and Yemen. How do Iranian-backed forces and Iranian political influence in Iraq and Syria affect our own strategy and military operations against ISIL 

in both countries? As the Assad regime consolidates power, what are your concerns 

about Iran and Hezbollah strengthening their influence and presence in Syria? 

What are your overall concerns about a broader regional Shia-Sunni sectarian conflict emerging? Will Iran remain the greatest long-term threat to U.S. interests in 

the region, as General Votel has stated? If so, why and how can the United States, 

its allies, and partners best deter and contain that threat? 

General DUNFORD. Iran is the greatest long term threat to U.S. interests in the 

region. Iran will attempt to generate political influence through Iranian-backed 

forces that backfill areas of Iraq and Syria previously controlled by ISIS. While this 

may not directly impact U.S. Defeat ISIS operations, it does certainly impact our 

longer term interests in the region as Iran seeks to displace U.S. and Western influence with its own. As the Assad regime consolidates power we are concerned about 

the strengthening of Iran and LH’s influence in the region. This expanded level of 

influence could further destabilize Iraq and increase the chance of conflict between 

Israel and LH. The U.S. works to contain the spread of Iran’s influence and deter 

conventional conflict by being ready to respond through a robust network of partners and allies and maintaining a posture in the region that allows the U.S. to an- 
147 

swer Iranian aggression quickly and effectively. While a broader Shia-Sunni sectarian conflict is possible, Islam in the Middle East is more complex than that. Ethnic, tribal, political, economic, and other cultural factors drive identities and actions 

in the Middle East and will factor into any Middle East conflict. 

Æ