United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

Chicago, Illinois 60604

Submitted May 23, 2014*

Decided May 27, 2014

Before

 ANN CLAIRE WILLIAMS, Circuit Judge

JOHN DANIEL TINDER, Circuit Judge

 DAVID F. HAMILTON, Circuit Judge 

No. 13-2755

ROBERT CARTER,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

CAROLYN W. COLVIN,

Acting Commissioner of Social Security,

Defendant-Appellee. 

Appeal from the United States District

Court for the Central District of Illinois. 

No. 12-1129

Michael M. Mihm,

Judge.

O R D E R

Robert Carter, a 56 year-old who suffers from depression and abuse of alcohol

and cocaine in remission, appeals the district court’s judgment upholding the denial of

his application for Disability Insurance Benefits and Supplemental Security Income.

Carter argues that the record belies the administrative law judge’s determination that

NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION

To be cited only in accordance with 

Fed. R. App. P. 32.1

After examining the briefs and record, we have concluded that oral argument is *

unnecessary. Thus, the appeal is submitted on the briefs and record. See FED. R. APP. P.

34(a)(2)(C).
No. 13-2755 Page 2

he was “malingering” before his date last insured and that the ALJ improperly 1

discredited his testimony regarding the severity of his impairments. Because substantial

evidence supports the ALJ’s conclusion that Carter was not disabled, we affirm. 

The earliest reports in the administrative record of Carter’s mental health date

back to 1998, when he was transferred from Cook County Jail to Chester Mental Health

Center for an evaluation of his fitness to stand trial on charges of burglary, escape, and

violating probation. He reported to doctors at Chester that he had five prior psychiatric

hospitalizations and that he was hallucinating. But a prison psychiatrist discredited

Carter’s reports of hallucinations and concluded that, although he had a history of

polysubstance dependence and antisocial personality disorder, he was “obviously”

malingering. He was found fit for trial. 

In 2006 Carter, released on parole just days earlier, was hospitalized after

reportedly experiencing a nervous breakdown and a “major relapse” in substance

abuse. He was diagnosed with a mood disorder induced by alcohol and cocaine,

dependence on alcohol and cocaine, and antisocial personality disorder, and prescribed

anticonvulsant and antipsychotic medications.

Back in prison a year and a half later, Carter reported hallucinations and

depression. A prison psychiatrist discounted Carter’s “report of psychotic features” as

“somewhat self serving and strongly suggestive of exaggeration” and speculated that

Carter’s “motivation for partial malingering might be to obtain hypnotic medication” or

Supplemental Security Income. For the next several months until his release from

prison, Carter was prescribed an antidepressant, which he later told medical staff was

“doing me a lot of good.”

Soon after his release, Carter applied for Social Security benefits, alleging that he

had become disabled as of January 1997 because of depression, a nervous breakdown,

and “emotional instability.” He completed and submitted a report in support of his

application describing his difficulty concentrating and following instructions. In

connection with his application, Carter underwent a mental status examination and

 “Malingering” is defined in the DSM-V as the “intentional production of false 1

or grossly exaggerated physical or psychological symptoms, motivated by external

incentives such as avoiding military duty, avoiding work, obtaining financial

compensation, evading criminal prosecution, or obtaining drugs.” American Psychiatric

Association, Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders 726 (5th ed. 2013). 
No. 13-2755 Page 3

reported experiencing “severe depression” and frequent hallucinations (several per

day). The state-examining psychologist concluded that Carter had severe major

depressive disorder, alcohol and cocaine abuse in remission, and antisocial personality

disorder. 

In 2009 Carter’s application for benefits was denied initially and on

reconsideration. 

Later that year a psychologist consulting for the Social Security Administration

assessed Carter’s functional limitations and concluded that there was insufficient

evidence to assess the severity of Carter’s impairments before 2000, his date last

insured. The psychologist described Carter’s impairments after 2000 as severe but noted

that “several sources have questioned the veracity” of Carter’s symptoms and that

Carter had the mental residual functional capacity to perform unskilled tasks on a

sustained basis.

Carter was again incarcerated in 2011, when he had a video hearing before an

ALJ and testified about his mental limitations. He said that he could not function

without his medication, which helped stabilize his mood and control his anger. Because

he was depressed, he told the ALJ, he had a “hard time getting up and moving around

sometimes.” He testified further that he did construction work in 2007 until his

employer discovered his criminal background and fired him. Testimony was also

presented by a vocational expert, who was asked about work available to a hypothetical

claimant of Carter’s age with a high school education and no past relevant work, who

could perform simple tasks, interact superficially with coworkers and supervisors but

not with others, and tolerate minor changes in routine. The vocational expert opined

that such a claimant would be able to work as a machine feeder, marker, or fastener.

However, the vocational expert added that this claimant would not be competitively

employable if he could not concentrate or work persistently throughout a two-hour

period.

The ALJ applied the five–step evaluation process and denied Carter’s application

for Disability Insurance Benefits and Supplemental Security Income. See 20 C.F.R.

§§ 404.1520, 416.920. The ALJ concluded that Carter had not worked since his alleged

onset date (step 1); his major depressive disorder and abuse of alcohol and cocaine in

remission were severe impairments, but he did not show that he had those impairments
No. 13-2755 Page 4

before his date last insured (step 2); his impairments or combination of impairments 2

did not meet or equal a listed impairment (step 3); he did not have any past relevant

work, but had the residual functional capacity to work at all exertional levels with some

limitations (that he perform simple, routine, repetitive tasks; make simple decisions;

interact only superficially with coworkers and supervisors but not with the public; and

experience only minor changes in routine) (step 4); and suitable jobs were available in

the national economy, including work as a machine feeder and fastener (step 5). In

addressing step 4, the ALJ discredited Carter’s allegations of disabling limitations,

pointing out that Carter was able to work for several months as a construction laborer

until being fired for non-medical reasons; he was able to participate in the hearing

closely and fully without being distracted; he had been malingering, in the opinion of

treating psychiatrists; and his symptoms had significantly improved with routine and

conservative treatment.

After the Appeals Council denied review, Carter sought judicial review, 42

U.S.C. §§ 405(g), 1383(c)(3), arguing that the ALJ erred at step 2 by finding him not

disabled before his date last insured. Carter asserted that the record contained nearly

200 pages of medical evidence and that the ALJ failed to consider submissions from

either the state-examining psychologist or a prison counselor corroborating that he was

depressed. 

The district court upheld the ALJ’s decision. The ALJ did not err at step 2, the

court determined, because the only record evidence predating Carter’s date last insured

showed that—despite his history of mental-health issues—he had been found to be

malingering and fit to stand trial. Further, neither the psychologist’s report nor the

counselor ‘s submission (which was not part of the administrative record) suggested

that Carter had disabling limitations or otherwise undermined the ALJ’s conclusion that

Carter was not disabled. 

Carter maintains on appeal that the ALJ erred at step 2 in finding that the

evidence predating his date last insured did not show that he was disabled. In one of his

appellate briefs, he attaches new documents—hospital-discharge summaries and a

psychiatric evaluation—showing that in 1985, 1988, and 1994 he was diagnosed with

 This finding rendered him ineligible for Disability Insurance Benefits but not 2

Supplemental Security Income, which is available to people with disabilities who have

low income and few assets, regardless of their work history or insured status. See 42

U.S.C. § 1382(a).
No. 13-2755 Page 5

bipolar disoder, hallucinosis, schizoaffective disorder, and schizophrenia. But we will

not review evidence that was not before the ALJ. See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Rice v. Barnhart,

384 F.3d 363, 366 n.2 (7th Cir. 2004). As the district court found, the only record

evidence predating Carter’s date last insured was medical reports confirming his fitness

to stand trial. Although those reports also reflect Carter’s diagnoses of substance

dependency and antisocial personality disorder, they do not suggest that those

impairments were disabling. Substantial evidence thus supports the ALJ’s

determination that Carter is not entitled to Disability Insurance Benefits. See 42 U.S.C.

§ 416(I).

Carter next argues, for the first time on appeal, that the ALJ’s credibility

determination was flawed because the ALJ used “boilerplate” that we have repeatedly

criticized: “[T]he claimant’s statements concerning the intensity, persistence and

limiting effects of these symptoms are not credible to the extent they are inconsistent

with the above residual functional capacity assessment.” See, e.g., Bjornson v. Astrue, 671

F.3d 640, 644–46 (7th Cir. 2012); Martinez v. Astrue, 630 F.3d 693, 694 (7th Cir. 2011);

Parker v. Astrue, 597 F.3d 920, 921–22 (7th Cir. 2010). But this boilerplate does not

necessarily undercut the ALJ’s decision; we will uphold the ALJ’s credibility

determination if the ALJ provided specific and legitimate reasons for discrediting the

claimant’s testimony. See Filus v. Astrue, 694 F.3d 863, 868 (7th Cir. 2012). The ALJ here

disbelieved Carter’s testimony for a number of legitimate reasons, including the

repeated opinions of psychiatrists that Carter was malingering; Carter’s demeanor at

the video hearing; and Carter’s request to a doctor—two months after applying for

Social Security benefits—seeking medical verification that he was “mentally cleared to

work.” See Bates v. Colvin, 736 F.3d 1093, 1098 (7th Cir. 2013) (demeanor); Powers v. Apfel,

207 F.3d 431, 435–36 (7th Cir. 2000) (same).

Finally, Carter has filed a motion to supplement the record with a document

from the Cook County Department of Corrections verifying that, contrary to his

testimony that he worked in 2007, he was in fact incarcerated at that time and thus

unable to have worked. But again, we will not review evidence that was not before the

ALJ. See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Rice, 384 F.3d at 366 n.2. Thus, we DENY Carter’s motion to

supplement the record. 

We have reviewed Carter’s remaining contentions, and none has merit.

AFFIRMED.