GAO 

United States Government Accountability Office

Report to Congressional Requesters

SECURE BORDER 

INITIATIVE 

Technology 

Deployment Delays 

Persist and the Impact 

of Border Fencing Has 

Not Been Assessed 

September 2009 

GAO-09-896 
What GAO Found

United States Government Accountability Office

Why GAO Did This Study

Highlights

Accountability Integrity Reliability

September 2009

SECURE BORDER INITIATIVE 

Technology Deployment Delays Persist and the 

Impact of Border Fencing Has Not Been Assessed 

Highlights of GAO-09-896, a report to 

congressional requesters 

Securing the nation’s borders from 

illegal entry of aliens and 

contraband, including terrorists 

and weapons of mass destruction, 

continues to be a major challenge. 

In November 2005, the Department 

of Homeland Security (DHS) 

announced the launch of the 

Secure Border Initiative (SBI), a 

multiyear, multibillion dollar 

program aimed at securing U.S. 

borders and reducing illegal 

immigration. Within DHS, U.S. 

Custom and Border Protection’s 

(CBP) SBI program is responsible 

for developing a comprehensive 

border protection system using 

technology, known as SBInet, and 

tactical infrastructure—fencing, 

roads, and lighting. GAO was asked 

to provide periodic updates on the 

status of the program. This report 

addresses (1) the extent to which 

CBP has implemented SBInet and 

the impact of delays that have 

occurred, and (2) the extent to 

which CBP has deployed tactical 

infrastructure and assessed its 

results. To do this work, GAO 

reviewed program schedules, 

status reports, and previous GAO 

work; interviewed DHS and CBP 

officials, among others; and visited 

three SBI sites where initial 

technology or fencing had been 

deployed at the time of GAO’s 

review. 

What GAO Recommends

GAO recommends that the 

Commissioner of CBP conduct a 

cost-effective evaluation of the 

impact of the tactical 

infrastructure’s contribution to 

border security. DHS agreed with 

this recommendation. 

SBInet technology capabilities have not yet been deployed and delays require 

Border Patrol, a CBP component, to rely on existing technology for securing 

the border, rather than using newer technology planned to overcome the 

existing technology’s limitations. Flaws found in testing and concerns about 

the impact of placing towers and access roads in environmentally sensitive 

locations caused delays. As of September 2006, SBInet technology deployment 

for the southwest border was planned to be complete by early fiscal year 2009. 

When last reported in February 2009, the completion date had slipped to 2016. 

As a result of such delays, Border Patrol agents continue to use existing 

technology that has limitations, such as performance shortfalls and 

maintenance issues. For example, on the southwest border, Border Patrol 

relies on existing equipment such as cameras mounted on towers that have 

intermittent problems, including signal loss. Border Patrol has procured and 

delivered some new technology to fill gaps or augment existing equipment. 

However, incorporating SBInet technology as soon as it is operationally 

available should better position CBP to identify and implement operational 

changes needed for securing the border. 

Tactical infrastructure deployments are almost complete, but their impact on 

border security has not been measured. As of June 2009, CBP had completed 

633 of the 661 miles of fencing it committed to deploy along the southwest 

border. However, delays continue due mainly to challenges in acquiring the 

necessary property rights from landowners. While fencing costs increased 

over the course of construction, because all construction contracts have been 

awarded, costs are less likely to change. CBP plans to use $110 million in 

fiscal year 2009 funds to build 10 more miles of fencing, and fiscal year 2010 

and 2011 funds for supporting infrastructure. CBP reported that tactical 

infrastructure, coupled with additional trained agents, had increased the miles 

of the southwest border under control, but despite a $2.4 billion investment, it 

cannot account separately for the impact of tactical infrastructure. CBP 

measures miles of tactical infrastructure constructed and has completed 

analyses intended to show where fencing is more appropriate than other 

alternatives, such as more personnel, but these analyses were based primarily 

on the judgment of senior Border Patrol agents. Leading practices suggest that 

a program evaluation would complement those efforts. Until CBP determines 

the contribution of tactical infrastructure to border security, it is not 

positioned to address the impact of this investment. 

Tactical Infrastructure Deployment Progress as of June 26, 2009 

Infrastructure 

type 

Miles in place 

before SBI

Miles

deployed 

through SBI 

as of 6/26/09

Total miles in 

place as of 

6/26/09 Target 

Miles

remaining to 

meet target

Pedestrian 

fencing 67 264 331 358 27

Vehicle 

fencing 76 226 302 303 1

Total fencing 143 490 633 661 28

Source: GAO analysis of SBI data. 

View GAO-09-896 or key components.

For more information, contact Richard Stana 

at (202) 512-8777 or stanar@gao.gov. 
Page i GAO-09-896 

Contents 

Letter 1

Background 3 

SBInet Deployment Delays Require Border Patrol to Rely on 

Existing Technology Which Has Limitations That Newer 

Technology Is Planned to Overcome 11 

Tactical Infrastructure Deployments Are Almost Complete, but 

Their Impact on Border Security Has Not Been Measured 19 

Conclusions 29 

Recommendation for Executive Action 29 

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 30 

Appendix I The Status of SBI Program Office Staffing and the 

Progress the Office Reports in Achieving Its Human 

Capital Goals 33 

Appendix II Task Orders Awarded to Boeing for SBI Projects as 

of July 8, 2009 37 

Appendix III Comments from the Department of Homeland 

Security 38 

Appendix IV GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments 40 

 

Related GAO Products 41 

Tables 

Table 1: SBI Funding, Fiscal Years 2005-2009 (dollars in thousands) 4 

Table 2: Tactical Infrastructure Deployment Progress as of June 26, 

2009 21 

Table 3: Miles under Effective Control and Change in 

Apprehensions in Select Southwest Border Sectors from 

Fiscal Year 2007 through Fiscal Year 2008 26 

 Secure Border Initiative 
Table 4: Human Capital Goals, Planned Activities, and Steps Taken 35 

Figures 

Figure 1: Map of Border Patrol Sectors along the Southwest Border 5 

Figure 2: Project 28 Mobile Sensor Tower Deployed in the Tucson 

Sector 7 

Figure 3: Examples of Fencing Styles along the Southwest Border 10 

Figure 4: Depiction of Changes in the SBInet Deployment Schedule 

from December 2006 through April 2009 14 

Figure 5: Example of an MSS Unit 17 

Figure 6: Examples of Repaired Breaches in Newer Fencing 24 

This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in the 

United States. The published product may be reproduced and distributed in its entirety 

without further permission from GAO. However, because this work may contain 

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necessary if you wish to reproduce this material separately. 

Page ii GAO-09-896 Secure Border Initiative
Page 1 GAO-09-896 

 

United States Government Accountability Office

Washington, DC 20548 

 

September 9, 2009 

Congressional Requesters 

Securing the nation’s borders from illegal entry of aliens and contraband, 

including terrorists and weapons of mass destruction, continues to be a 

major challenge. Much of the United States’ 6,000 miles of international 

borders with Canada and Mexico remains vulnerable to illegal entry. 

Although the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) apprehends 

hundreds of thousands of people entering the country illegally each year, 

several hundreds of thousands of individuals also enter the United States 

illegally and undetected. In November 2005, DHS announced the launch of 

the Secure Border Initiative (SBI), a multiyear, multibillion dollar program 

aimed at securing U.S. borders and reducing illegal immigration. The U.S. 

Customs and Border Protection (CBP) supports the initiative by providing 

agents and officers to patrol the borders, secure the ports of entry,1

 and 

enforce immigration laws. In addition, CBP’s SBI program is responsible 

for developing a comprehensive border protection system using 

technology, known as SBInet, and tactical infrastructure—fencing, roads, 

and lighting. 

Our previous reports on CBP’s SBI program have outlined program 

challenges and delays.2

 Specifically, the initial segment of SBInet

technology, Project 28, encountered performance shortfalls and delays, 

including the following: users were not involved in developing the 

requirements, contractor oversight was limited, and project scope and 

complexity were underestimated. Program uncertainties, such as a lack of 

fully defined program expectations continued to delay planned SBInet

deployments following Project 28. In addition, the deployment of tactical 

1

At a port of entry location, CBP officers secure the flow of people and cargo into and out 

of the country, while facilitating legitimate travel and trade. 

2

GAO, Secure Border Initiative: Observations on Selected Aspects of SBInet Program 

Implementation, GAO-08-131T (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 24, 2007); Secure Border 

Initiative: Observations on the Importance of Applying Lessons Learned to Future 

Projects, GAO-08-508T (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 27, 2008); Secure Border Initiative: 

Observations on Deployment Challenges, GAO-08-1141T (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 10, 

2008); Secure Border Initiative: DHS Needs to Address Significant Risks in Delivering 

Key Technology Investment, GAO-08-1148T (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 10, 2008); and, Secure 

Border Initiative: DHS Needs to Address Significant Risks in Delivering Key 

Technology Investment, GAO-08-1086 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 22, 2008). 

 Secure Border Initiative 
 

infrastructure along the southwest border experienced challenges, such as 

increased costs, unknown life-cycle costs, and land acquisition issues. 

You requested that we monitor CBP’s SBI program and provide periodic 

updates on the status of the program. Accordingly, this report, the fourth 

in a series of reports, addresses the following questions: 

• To what extent has CBP implemented the SBInet technology program and 

what has been the impact of delays that have occurred? 

• To what extent has CBP deployed the SBI tactical infrastructure program 

and assessed its results? 

In addition, we are providing information, in appendix I, on the status of 

SBI program office staffing and the progress the office reports in achieving 

its human capital goals. 

To address these questions, we analyzed DHS documents, including 

program schedules and status reports. We reviewed criteria in the 

Government Performance and Results Act of 1993, 3

 our prior work on 

results-oriented government and federal government best practices in 

human capital management, as well as DHS Office of Inspector General 

reports.4

 We also interviewed DHS and CBP headquarters and field 

officials, including representatives of the SBI program office, the tactical 

infrastructure program office, Border Patrol (a component of CBP); and 

Department of Interior (DOI), including representatives of the Office of 

the Deputy Secretary and Office of Law Enforcement Security and 

Emergency Management. We visited the Border Patrol’s Tucson, Yuma, 

 

3

Pub. L. No. 103-62, 107 Stat. 285 (1993). Among other things, the act requires agencies to 

develop strategic plans that include comprehensive mission statements, a set of goals and 

objectives for the agency’s major functions and operations, and a description of how the 

agency intends to achieve these goals and objectives. 

4

 See for example, GAO, Agency Performance Plans: Examples of Practices That Can 

Improve Usefulness to Decisionmakers, GGD/AIMD-99-69 (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 26, 

1999), Executive Guide: Effectively Implementing the Government Performance and 

Results Act, GAO/GGD-96-118 (Washington, D.C.: June 1996), Program Evaluation: 

Studies Helped Agencies Measure or Explain Program Performance, GAO/GGD-00-204 

(Washington, D.C.: Sept. 2000), Human Capital: Key Principles for Effective Strategic 

Workforce Planning, GAO-04-39 (Washington, D.C.: Dec. 11, 2003), and DHS-OIG, Progress 

in Addressing the Secure Border Initiative Operational Requirements and Constructing 

the Southwest Border Fence, OIG-09-56 (Washington, D.C.: Apr.15, 2009). 

Page 2 GAO-09-896 Secure Border Initiative
 

and San Diego sectors5—sites where SBInet technology (Project 28) 

and/or fencing had been deployed at the time of our review. We 

determined that funding, staffing, and fencing mileage data provide

CBP were sufficiently reliable for the purposes of this report. We based 

our decision on an assessment of each respective area by questioning 

cognizant DHS officials about the source of the data and policies and 

procedures used to maintain the integrity of these data. We conducted this 

performance audit from September 2008 through September 2009 in

accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. T

standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, 

appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and 

conclusions based on our objectives. We believe that the evidence 

obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions

based on our audit objectives. 

d by 

hose 

 

Within CBP, the SBI Program Executive Office, referred to in this report as 

the SBI program office, has overall responsibility for overseeing all SBI 

activities for acquisition and implementation, including establishing and 

meeting program goals, objectives, and schedules for overseeing 

contractor performance; and for coordinating among DHS agencies. 

However, the tactical infrastructure portion of the program is managed on 

a day-to-day basis by CBP’s Office of Finance Facilities Management and 

Engineering division.6

 Among other things, CBP’s Border Patrol has 

responsibility for detecting and preventing the illegal entry of aliens into 

the United States between designated ports of entry. 

Background 

DHS began funding the SBI program in fiscal year 2005 at a level of $38 

million, which it increased to $325 million in fiscal year 2006. Starting in 

fiscal year 2007, DHS’s annual appropriations acts have included specific 

SBI appropriations. Since fiscal year 2005, SBI’s funding has amounted to 

over $3.7 billion (see table 1). DHS has requested $779 million in SBI 

funding for fiscal year 2010. 

5

The U.S. Border Patrol has 20 sectors responsible for detecting, interdicting, and 

apprehending those who engage in illegal activity across U.S. borders between official 

ports of entry. In addition to illegal entry, examples of illegal activity include smuggling of 

people, including terrorists, and contraband, including weapons of mass destruction.

6

We refer to the Office of Finance Facilities Management and Engineering division’s 

Tactical Infrastructure program office as the tactical infrastructure program office in this 

report. 

Page 3 GAO-09-896 Secure Border Initiative
 

Table 1: SBI Funding, Fiscal Years 2005-2009 (dollars in thousands) 

Fiscal year SBI funding

2005 $38,480

2006 325,000

2007a 1,187,565

2008 1,302,587 b

2009 875,000 c

Total $3,728,632

Source: CBP budget data and DHS’s annual appropriations acts. 

a

Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act, 2007, Pub. L. No. 109-295, 120 Stat. 1355, 

1359-60 (2006). SBI funds from this appropriation act are no-year dollars, meaning they do not 

expire at the end of a given fiscal year. 

b Includes approximately $77.6 million of reprogrammed funds from other DHS accounts, plus $1,225 

million appropriated through the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-161, 121 

Stat. 1844, 2047-49 (2007). SBI funds from this appropriations act are no-year dollars.

c

Includes $100 million from the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-5, 

123 Stat. 115, 162, 302 (2009), which expires at the end of fiscal year 2010, plus $775 million 

appropriated through the Consolidated Security, Disaster Assistance, and Continuing Appropriations 

Act, 2009, 122 Stat. 3574, 3655-57 (2008), which are no-year dollars. 

The primary focus of the SBI program is on the southwest border areas 

(see fig. 1) between the ports of entry 

that CBP has designated as having 

the greatest need for enhanced border security because of serious 

vulnerabilities. Although some tactical infrastructure exists in all the 

southwest border sectors, most of what has been built through the SBI 

program is located in the San Diego, Yuma, Tucson, El Paso, and Rio 

Grande Valley sectors. SBInet technology is to be initially deployed in the 

Tucson sector. 

Page 4 GAO-09-896 Secure Border Initiative
 

Figure 1: Map of Border Patrol Sectors along the Southwest Border 

State boundary

Border Patrol sector

Source: GAO analysis of CBP data; Map Resources (Map).

San Diego

El Centro

Yuma

Tucson El Paso

Marfa

Del Rio

Laredo

Rio Grande Valley

Calif.

Nev.

Ariz.

N.M.

Utah

Colo.

Kan.

Tex.

Okla.

SBInet is the program for acquiring, developing, integrating, and deploying 

an appropriate mix of surveillance technologies and command, control, 

communications, and intelligence (C3I) technologies. SBInet surveillance 

technologies are to include sensors, cameras, and radars. Additional 

technologies, such as aerial assets (e.g., helicopters and unmanned aerial 

surveillance aircraft) and Mobile Surveillance Systems (MSS) may be 

added in the future, but as of August 2009, whether and to what extent the 

additional technologies would be included in the configuration of the longPage 5 GAO-09-896 Secure Border Initiative
 

term SBInet systems solution had not been determined, according to SBI 

officials.7

The C3I technologies are to include software and hardware to produce a 

Common Operating Picture (COP)—a uniform presentation of activities 

within specific areas along the border. The sensors, radars, and cameras 

are to gather information along the border and the system is to transmit 

this information to the COP terminals located in command centers to 

provide CBP agents with border situational awareness. The COP 

technology is to allow agents to (1) view data from radars and sensors that 

detect and track movement in the border areas, (2) control cameras to 

help identify and classify illegal entries, (3) correlate entries with the 

positions of nearby agents, and (4) enhance tactical decision making 

regarding the appropriate response to apprehend an entry, if necessary. 

In September 2006, CBP awarded a prime contract for SBInet development 

to the Boeing Company for 3 years, with three additional 1-year options. 

As of July 2009, CBP was in the process of completing action to extend its 

contract with Boeing for the first option year. As the prime contractor, 

Boeing is responsible for acquiring, deploying, and sustaining selected SBI 

technology, deploying selected tactical infrastructure projects, and 

providing supply chain management for some tactical infrastructure 

projects.8

 In this way, Boeing has extensive involvement in the SBI 

specifications development, design, production, integration, testing, and 

maintenance and support of SBI projects. Moreover, Boeing is responsible 

for selecting and managing a team of subcontractors that provide 

individual components for Boeing to integrate into the SBInet system. The 

SBInet contract is largely performance-based—that is, CBP has set 

requirements for the project and Boeing and CBP coordinate and 

collaborate to develop solutions to meet these requirements—and is 

designed to maximize the use of commercial off-the-shelf technology. 

CBP’s SBI program office oversees and manages the Boeing-led SBI 

contractor team. CBP is completing its part of its SBI activities through a 

series of task orders to Boeing for individual projects. As of July 8, 2009 

CBP had awarded 13 task orders to Boeing for a total amount of 

 

7

MSSs are truck-mounted systems that use cameras, radar, lasers, and global positioning 

systems. 

8

The objective of the supply and supply chain management support system is to ensure that 

sufficient quantities of construction materials are readily available to meet the fence 

construction needs and schedules along the southwest border. 

Page 6 GAO-09-896 Secure Border Initiative
 

approximately $1.1 billion. See appendix II for a summary of the task 

orders awarded to Boeing for SBI projects. 

The first SBInet deployment task order was for an effort known as Project 

28. The scope of Project 28, as described in an October 2006 task order to 

Boeing, was to provide a system with the capabilities required to control 

28 miles of border in Arizona. Project 28 was accepted by the government 

for deployment in February 2008—8 months behind schedule. This delay 

occurred because the contractor-delivered system did not perform as 

intended. For example, Boeing was unable to integrate components, such 

as towers, cameras, and radars with the COP software. Project 28 is 

currently operating along 28 miles of the southwest border in the Tucson 

sector of Arizona (see fig. 2). 

Figure 2: Project 28 Mobile Sensor Tower Deployed in the Tucson Sector 

Source: GAO.

Future SBInet capabilities are to be deployed in “blocks.” For example, 

Block 1 is described as the first phase of an effort to design, develop, 

integrate, test, and deploy a technology system of hardware, software, and 

communications. Each block is to include a release or version of the COP. 

According to the Fiscal Year 2009 SBI Expenditure Plan, Block 1 is to 

include the Tucson and Yuma sectors and Block 2 is to include the sectors 

of El Paso, Rio Grande Valley, Laredo, Del Rio, San Diego, and El Centro. 

Page 7 GAO-09-896 Secure Border Initiative
 

While the SBI program office is responsible for deploying SBInet

technology, the tactical infrastructure program office, which was realigned 

to the Office of Finance, Facilities Management and Engineering in March 

2009, is responsible for deploying tactical infrastructure—pedestrian and 

vehicular fencing, roads, and lighting—along the southwest border to 

deter smugglers and aliens attempting illegal entry. The Secure Fence Act 

of 2006, as amended, required DHS to construct not less than 700 miles of 

reinforced fencing along the southwest border where fencing would be 

most practical and effective, and to provide for the installation of 

additional physical barriers, roads, lighting, cameras, and sensors to gain 

operational control of the southwest border. 9

 Although the act did not 

impose any statutory deadlines with respect to the deployment of SBInet 

technology, it did require DHS to complete a portion of the required 700 

miles of reinforced fencing by December 31, 2008.10 This interim 

construction deadline applied to 370 of the required 700 miles of 

reinforced fencing, to be located wherever the Secretary determined it 

would be most practical and effective in deterring smugglers and aliens 

attempting illegal entry.11 

The Secure Fence Act of 2006, as amended, provided the Secretary of 

Homeland Security with some discretion regarding its mileage 

requirements. Notwithstanding the total mileage requirement of 700 miles, 

the act stated that the Secretary was not required to install fencing, 

physical barriers, roads, lighting, cameras, and sensors in a particular 

location “if the Secretary determines that the use or placement of such 

resources is not the most appropriate means to achieve and maintain 

operational control over the international border at such location.”12

According to DHS, under this authority, the Secretary determined that 

fencing was the most appropriate means to achieve and maintain 

operational control over 670 miles, rather than 700 miles, of the border. 

Furthermore, the act also gave the Secretary discretion, through 

December 31, 2008, to set an alternative mileage goal for the interim 

 

9

Pub. L. No. 110-161, div. E, § 564(a)(2)(B)(ii), 121 Stat. 1844, 2090-91 (2007) (amending 

section 102(b)(1) of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 

1996, Pub. L. No. 104-208, div. C, 110 Stat. 3009-546, 3009-554, as amended by section 3(2) of 

the Secure Fence Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-367, 120 Stat. 2638, 2639). The provisions, as 

amended, are codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1103 note. 

108 U.S.C. § 1103 note. 

118 U.S.C. § 1103 note. 

128 U.S.C. § 1103 note. 

Page 8 GAO-09-896 Secure Border Initiative
 

construction deadline of 370 miles.13 Pursuant to this authority, the 

Secretary committed to complete all 670 miles of fencing by December 31, 

2008. Of these miles, DHS planned about 370 miles of pedestrian 

fencing—fencing that prevents people on foot from crossing the border, 

and about 300 miles of vehicle fencing—barriers used primarily in remote 

areas to prohibit vehicles engaged in drug trafficking and alien smuggling 

operations from crossing the border. In September 2008, DHS revised its 

goal of completing the full 670 miles of fencing by December 31, 2008. As 

an interim step, DHS committed to have 661 miles either built, under 

construction, or under contract by December 31, 2008, but did not set a 

goal for the number of miles it planned to complete by December 31, 2008. 

As of December 31, 2008, DHS had completed 578 miles of fencing, 

meeting the interim statutory goal to complete 370 miles of fencing by that 

time. (See fig. 3 for examples of fencing.) 

 

138 U.S.C. § 1103 note. 

Page 9 GAO-09-896 Secure Border Initiative
 

Figure 3: Examples of Fencing Styles along the Southwest Border 

Source: CBP.

The Picket Fence (upper left), Bollard Fence (upper right) and Post & Rail with wire mesh (lower left) 

are examples of pedestrian fencing; the Normandy Vehicle Fence (lower right) is an example of 

vehicle fencing.

Page 10 GAO-09-896 Secure Border Initiative
 

SBInet technology deployments continue to experience delays due to 

flaws found in testing and potential environmental impacts. User 

evaluations by Border Patrol agents found that improvements to the new 

technology that would correct inconsistent system performance needed to 

be made. SBI officials believed that some issues raised about the 

technology during user evaluation were a result of the Border Patrol 

agents’ unfamiliarity with the equipment; however, Border Patrol officials 

said that they selected agents who were familiar with existing technology 

and that some training was provided to these agents before testing took 

place. Until SBInet is deployed, Border Patrol agents continue to rely on 

existing technology that has limitations such as performance shortfalls 

and maintenance issues. CBP cannot determine what operational changes 

it will need to make as a result of the new technology, and Border Patrol 

will not be able to realize the potential of this technology until it is 

deployed. 

SBInet Deployment 

Delays Require 

Border Patrol to Rely 

on Existing 

Technology Which 

Has Limitations That 

Newer Technology Is 

Planned to Overcome 

SBInet Deployment Delays 

Continue Due to Flaws 

Found in Testing and 

Environmental 

Considerations 

Our previous work has shown that CBP’s efforts to deploy SBInet 

technology across the southwest border have fallen behind its planned 

schedule.14 For example, according to the Boeing contract signed in 

September 2006, an initial set of operational capabilities was planned to be 

deployed along the entire southwest border in early fiscal year 2009, and a 

full set of operational capabilities along the southern and northern borders 

was planned by later in fiscal year 2009. As of the December 2006, the 

SBInet Expenditure Plan reported that the schedule had changed such that 

all deployments in the Yuma and Tucson sectors were estimated to be 

complete by October and December 2008, respectively and the entire 

southwest border by October 2011. The Expenditure Plan did not provide 

a time frame for deployment to the northern border. By October 2007, SBI 

program officials expected to complete all of the first planned deployment 

of southwest border technology projects in the Tucson, Yuma, and El Paso 

sectors by the end of calendar year 2008, and deployments in Rio Grande 

Valley, Laredo, and Del Rio by the end of calendar year 2009. In February 

2008, the SBI program office again modified its deployment plans, and 

reported that the first deployment of technology projects within Block 1 

were to take place in two geographic areas within the Tucson sector —

designated as Tucson-1 and Ajo-1—by the end of calendar year 2008, with 

the remainder of deployments to the Tucson, Yuma, and El Paso sectors to 

be completed by the end of calendar year 2011. Other than the dates for 

 

14GAO-08-131T, GAO-08-508T, GAO-08-1141T, GAO-08-1148T, and GAO-08-1086. 

Page 11 GAO-09-896 Secure Border Initiative
 

the Tucson, Yuma, and El Paso sectors, no other deployment dates were 

established for the remainder of the southern or northern borders at that 

time. 

We reported in September 2008 on SBInet program uncertainties, 

including that the program remained ambiguous and in a continued state 

of flux making it unclear and uncertain what technology capabilities are to 

be delivered, when and where they are to be delivered, and how they will 

be delivered.15 We recommended, among other things, that the CBP 

Commissioner establish and baseline the specific program commitments, 

including the specific system functional and performance capabilities, 

which are to be deployed to the Tucson, Yuma, and El Paso sectors, and 

establish when these capabilities are to be deployed and are to be 

operational. Partially in response to our recommendations, in September 

2008, the DHS Acquisition Review Board—a departmental executive board 

that reviews certain acquisitions—required a re-plan of the program.16 The 

re-plan was to include, among other things, a revised and detailed program 

schedule with key milestones. 17 In addition, during the re-plan, a portion 

of SBInet technology funds were reallocated to fund cost increases 

associated with the higher priority vehicle and pedestrian fencing. The 

Acquisition Review Board noted that this reallocation of funds and the 

desire to include additional field testing would result in a delay of the 

Tuscon-1 and Ajo-1 deployments. SBI program office officials said that the 

reallocation of funds was made possible because the program was in the 

middle of the re-plan which required additional field testing prior to the 

start of construction in Tucson-1. By December 2008, the SBI program 

office’s revised schedule showed final acceptance of Tuscon-1 in 

September 2009, and final acceptance of Ajo-1 in December 2009.18 By 

February 2009, the schedule had slipped and final acceptance of Tucson-1 

was expected in November 2009 and Ajo-1 in March 2010. Further, our 

 

15GAO-08-1086. We have ongoing work to assess actions taken by DHS to address the 

recommendations made in this report.

16A re-plan refers to an adjustment to SBInet’s initial development, test, and deployment 

plan. 

17 The Acquisition Review Board was formerly known as the Investment Review Board. As 

part of the DHS investment process, the Acquisition Review Board reviews all acquisition 

investments with an annual expenditure level or acquisition cost greater than $100 million. 

18The SBI program office defines final acceptance as the SBI program office taking 

ownership of the SBInet technology system from the contractor and comes before handing 

the technology over to Border Patrol. 

Page 12 GAO-09-896 Secure Border Initiative
 

assimilation of available information from multiple program sources, 

including the Fiscal Year 2009 SBI Expenditure Plan, indicated that 

deployments throughout the rest of the Tucson and Yuma sectors were to 

be completed by 2011; deployments in El Paso, Rio Grande Valley, Laredo, 

Del Rio, San Diego, and El Centro sectors between 2012 and 2015; and 

deployments in the Marfa sector by 2016. Nevertheless, the timing of 

planned SBInet deployments continued to slip. As of April 2009, Tuscon-1 

was scheduled for final acceptance by December 2009 and Ajo-1 had 

slipped to June 2010. Our previous work emphasizes that a key aspect of 

managing large programs like SBInet is having a schedule that defines the 

sequence and timing of key activities. In addition, our research has 

identified best practices associated with effective schedule estimating.19 

We have an ongoing review to report separately on SBInet and whether 

DHS has established a comprehensive, accurate, and realistic schedule 

that reflects the scope, timing, and sequencing of the work needed to 

achieve commitments, and which provides key information to DHS and 

congressional decisionmakers. Figure 4 shows the changes in the planned 

deployment schedule over time. 

 

19 GAO, GAO Cost Estimating and Assessment Guide: Best Practices for Developing and 

Managing Capital Program Costs, GAO-09-3SP (Washington, D.C.: March 2009). 

Page 13 GAO-09-896 Secure Border Initiative
 

Figure 4: Depiction of Changes in the SBInet Deployment Schedule from September 2006 through May 2009 

Source: CBP’s SBI program office and Border Patrol.

Estimated completion date

a

Miles represent the area of responsibility of the sector(s).

2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

(as of

Feb. 2009)

(as of

Feb. 2009)

(as of

Feb. 2009 

complete 

between 2014 

and 2015)

(as of

Feb. 2009 

complete 

between 2013

and 2014)

(as of

Feb. 2008

and

Feb. 2009)

(as of

Oct. 2007)

(as of

Dec. 2008)

(as of

Dec. 2008;

Feb. 2009; and,

Apr. 2009)

(as of

Feb. 2009

and as of

Apr. 2009)

2008 Planned SBInet 

technology deployment

All of southwest border

(1993 miles)

a (as of

Sept. 2006)

El Paso

(268 miles)

(as of

Oct. 2007)

(as of

Feb. 2008 and 

Feb. 2009)

(as of

Dec. 2006)

(as of

Dec. 2006 

and

Oct. 2007)

(as of Feb. 

2008)

(as of

Feb. 2008)

(as of

Sept. 2006)

(as of

Sept. 2006)

All of Tucson and Yuma 

(387 miles)

Tucson-1—one of two 

geographic sectors

within Tucson sector

(23.5 miles)

Ajo-1—one of two 

geographic sectors

within Tucson sector

(29.9 miles)

Rio Grande Valley, 

Laredo, and Del Rio 

sectors

(697 miles)

San Diego and El Centro 

sectors

(130 miles)

Marfa sector

(510 miles)

(as of

May. 2009)

According to SBI program office officials, the results of testing activities 

are contributing to the recent delays of Tucson-1 and Ajo-1. For example, 

one of the changes that resulted from the re-plan was a requirement for 

Page 14 GAO-09-896 Secure Border Initiative
 

additional testing of SBInet technology, which SBI addressed through 

additional testing performed at a test facility intended to emulate 

deployment conditions at project sites. SBI program office officials 

emphasized, and we agree, that testing is a necessary step of deployment 

and ensures that the technology capabilities perform as required.20 By 

February 2009, preliminary results of testing revealed problems that would 

limit the usefulness of the system for Border Patrol agents, including the 

instability of the camera under adverse weather conditions, mechanical 

problems with the radar at the tower, and issues with the sensitivity of the 

radar. In March 2009, CBP’s Acting Commissioner testified on the testing 

activity, among other things, stating that although the system did not meet 

all testing objectives during the December testing, CBP did not perceive 

“any show-stopper issues.”21 Based on the testing results, the DHS 

Acquisition Review Board deferred approval of Tucson-1 equipment 

installation and Ajo-1 site preparation and equipment installation until the 

successful resolution of testing objectives which contributed to an Ajo-1 

schedule delay of 30 days from April to May 2009. The SBI program office 

oversaw Boeing’s efforts to re-work and re-test these issues, but as of May 

2009, the SBI program office reported that they were still working to 

address some issues such as difficulties aligning the radar. 

Although DHS received the necessary environmental permit to begin 

construction of towers on Tucson-1 in October 2008, the need to obtain 

environmental permits was another contributing factor in the Ajo-1 delays. 

DOI and DHS are coordinating their efforts to permit tower construction 

sites in Ajo-1, with the two agencies in negotiations over the location of 

towers and discussions on Border Patrol operations.22 As of May 2009, the 

agencies had not reached agreement on the amount of information Border 

Patrol should provide DOI regarding how Border Patrol operations are to 

change after the deployment of SBInet technology. However, according to 

DOI’s National Borderland Coordinator, DOI and Border Patrol have made 

progress in identifying and discussing Border Patrol’s operational 

 

20GAO-08-1086. 

21Statement of the Acting Commissioner of CBP before the House Appropriations 

Committee, Subcommittee on Homeland Security, Secure Border Initiative (SBI), Control 

of the Land Border, and DHS Response to Violence on the Border with Mexico (Mar. 10, 

2009). 

22The Secretary of Homeland Security is required to consult with numerous entities, 

including the Secretary of the Interior, to minimize the impact to the environment, culture, 

commerce, and quality of life resulting from the installation of required fencing and border 

security infrastructure along the southwest border. See 8 U.S.C. § 1103 note. 

Page 15 GAO-09-896 Secure Border Initiative
 

activities as they pertain to the Ajo-1 site. For example, prior to Border 

Patrol’s completion of an environmental assessment,23 Border Patrol and 

DOI engaged in discussions to address DOI questions on how Border 

Patrol activities are affected by the SBInet deployment. Border Patrol 

stated that its expectation is that SBInet technology in Ajo-1 will allow 

focused interdiction, reducing the number of personnel required to locate 

violators. On May 20, 2009, SBI submitted a draft description of proposed 

action in Ajo-1, which was followed by discussions between DHS and DOI 

officials on unresolved issues related to tower placement within the range 

of environmentally sensitive lands. On June 10, 2009, DOI, CBP, and SBI 

senior officials met to discuss these unresolved issues. According to DOI’s 

National Borderland Coordinator, agreement was reached to proceed with 

completion of a final description of proposed action in Ajo-1. DOI officials 

received CBP’s final description of proposed action on July 24, 2009, and 

DOI is now scheduled to issue a biological opinion associated with the 

endangered species in the Ajo-1 project area by September 22, 2009. Once 

DHS receives the biological opinion, it plans to issue a finding as to 

whether there will be any significant impact to the endangered species as a 

result of the project. DOI plans to issue permits for the Ajo-1 project 

within 5 days of receipt of a finding of no significant impact 

Border Patrol Agents Are 

Providing User Feedback 

on Block 1 Development, 

and Have Noted That 

Some Improvements Could 

Be Made 

While involvement was limited for Project 28, SBI program office officials 

recognized the need to involve intended operators—Border Patrol 

agents—in Block 1 development, including testing activities. For example, 

CBP reported using feedback and input from Border Patrol agents to 

complete detailed plans for tower locations and access roads to support 

SBInet deployment to the Tucson, Yuma, and El Paso sectors. In addition, 

from March 27 to April 4, 2009, Border Patrol agents had an opportunity to 

operate Block 1 technology in a test environment and participate in an 

early assessment of the suitability and effectiveness of the SBInet 

technology. The operators’ initial observations included insight comparing 

the performance capabilities of existing technology—Project 28 and 

MSS—and new technology—SBInet Block 1 (see fig. 5).24 For example, 

 

23The National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-190, 83 Stat. 852 (1970), 

requires federal agencies to evaluate the likely environmental effects of projects they are 

proposing using an environmental assessment or, if the projects likely would significantly 

affect the environment, a more detailed environmental impact statement. 

24According to the Fiscal Year 2009 SBI Expenditure Plan, the use of integrated SBInet 

technology allows CBP agents and officers to efficiently detect, identify, classify, track, and 

resolve illegal incursions. The radars detect persons and vehicles moving in the border 

areas. Once detected, operators use cameras to help identify and classify the entry. 

Page 16 GAO-09-896 Secure Border Initiative
 

the operators indicated that on windy days the Block 1 radar had issues 

that resulted in an excessive number of false detections and that the 

capability was not adequate for optimal operational effectiveness. The 

operators also compared the Project 28, MSS, and Block 1 cameras and 

indicated that the features of the Block 1 camera were insufficient in 

comparison to features of the Project 28 and MSS cameras. Overall, the 

feedback from operators indicated “the need for a number of relatively 

small, but critical enhancements” to the COP and overall concerns about 

inconsistent system performance. 

Figure 5: Example of an MSS Unit 

Source: CBP.

SBI program officials explained that this assessment was an initial user 

evaluation. The officials also said that in reviewing the results, they 

determined that some of the issues raised by the Border Patrol operators 

occurred because the operators were not familiar with and had not been 

trained to use the equipment; other issues, such as those with the radar 

were likely due to incorrect settings across all radars in the test 

configuration. The Border Patrol said that it selected agents to participate 

who had experience with the MSSs and/or Project 28 and that the COP 

operators were given a 2-day course provided by agents familiar with the 

Block 1 COP prior to the assessment. However, the Border Patrol agreed 

that the lack of experience with the Block 1 system may have led to some 

of the issues found during the user evaluation. Nonetheless, because of 

Page 17 GAO-09-896 Secure Border Initiative
 

the agents’ experience with the MSS and Project 28 systems, the Border 

Patrol said that the issues and concerns generated should be considered 

operationally relevant. SBI program officials said that operator training is 

to take place before all Block 1 capabilities are deployed and that 

additional emphasis is to be placed on ensuring the operators’ familiarity 

with the equipment. Once all Block 1 capabilities are deployed in Tucson1, the Border Patrol is to perform and complete operational testing. This 

testing is to include insights from the operators’ initial evaluations of the 

system’s capabilities. Provided there are no additional schedule changes, 

this testing of Tucson-1 is scheduled to begin in January 2010. 

Until SBInet Technology Is 

in Place, Border Patrol 

Agents Continue to Use 

Existing Equipment and 

CBP Is Limited in Its 

Ability to Fully Implement 

the Objectives of the 

Border Patrol Strategy 

Until SBInet capabilities are deployed across the southwest border, 

Border Patrol agents are using existing capabilities, including Project 28 

and legacy equipment supplemented by more recently procured MSS, but 

all have limitations. As stated previously, Project 28 encountered 

performance shortfalls and delays. During our site visit to the Tucson 

sector in March 2009, Border Patrol agents told us, as they had during our 

previous visits, that the system had improved their operational 

capabilities, but that they must continue to work around ongoing 

problems, such as finding good signal strength for the wireless network, 

remotely controlling cameras, and modifying radar sensitivity. 

Furthermore, they said, and we observed, that few of the agents were 

currently using the mobile data terminals installed in 50 of the sector’s 

vehicles, instead relying on agents operating the COP to relay information 

about the whereabouts of suspected illegal migrants. One reason agents 

do not use the mobile data terminals is that it can take up to an hour to log 

into the system depending on signal strength and because the signal, once 

gained, is sometimes lost multiple times during a shift. In all southwest 

border sectors, Border Patrol relies on legacy equipment, such as cameras 

mounted on towers. In the Tucson and San Diego sectors, Border Patrol 

agents rely on cameras that have been in place since before calendar year 

2000. Border Patrol officials told us that in the three sectors, the cameras 

have intermittent problems, including signal loss and problems with power 

and weather. In the Tucson sector, officials noted that the legacy cameras 

should be updated to gain compatibility with SBInet. To fill gaps or 

augment the legacy equipment, the SBI program office procured and 

delivered a total of 40 MSSs. These units were delivered to the Border 

Patrol’s Tucson sector (23 units), Yuma sector (7 units), and, El Paso 

sector (8 units) in fiscal year 2008. In addition, a total of 4 units are 

planned for delivery to the San Diego sector (1 unit) and the northern 

border (3 units) in fiscal year 2009. During our visit to the Tucson sector 

in March 2009, we observed a Border Patrol agent using a MSS unit. The 

Page 18 GAO-09-896 Secure Border Initiative
 

agent showed us the radar capabilities including the maximum range, the 

ability to minimize the range and limit the speed of the radar and cameras, 

which have a 360 degree view. According to Border Patrol officials, the 

MSS represents increased operational capabilities for the Border Patrol. 

However, SBI program officials and Border Patrol noted that at any given 

time, a unit may not be operational because of the need for repairs. As of 

April 2009, 15 of the 23 units at the Border Patrol’s Tucson sector were 

operational. At that time, in the Yuma sector, 4 of the 7 units were 

operational, although during our visit to the Yuma sector 1 unit was 

operational. Border Patrol officials explained that in the Yuma sector 

these units have not worked well because of extreme heat issues. Despite 

these performance shortfalls, and maintenance issues, agents continue to 

use existing technology while waiting for the SBInet deployment which 

will supplement the existing technology. 

The initial deployment of SBInet technology in the Tucson-1 and Ajo-1 

project sites is intended to provide CBP agents and officers a greatly 

enhanced ability to detect, identify, and classify illegal cross-border 

activity, as well as facilitate a coordinated response to the activity. These 

goals directly support the broader SBI goal and Border Patrol strategy to 

gain effective control of the nation’s borders. While Border Patrol agents 

have been stakeholders in the development and testing of SBInet

technology, Border Patrol officials said that a full assessment of SBInet

technology’s impact cannot be made until the technology is in use. 

Therefore, until technology is in place, CBP is limited in its ability to fully 

identify and implement operational changes in methods, tactics and 

approaches, and resources needed to address objectives of the Border 

Patrol Strategy, and will not be able to realize the potential of this 

technology in its efforts to secure the border. 

The deployment of 661 miles of tactical infrastructure projects along the 

southwest border is nearing completion, but delays persist, due mainly to 

property acquisition issues. In addition, per mile costs, which had climbed 

substantially, are now less likely to change because contracts for the 661 

miles of fence have been awarded. CBP plans to complete 10 more miles 

of fencing using fiscal year 2009 funds, and fiscal year 2010 and 2011 funds 

are to be used primarily for supporting infrastructure. A life cycle cost 

study has been completed which estimates deployment, operations, and 

future maintenance for the tactical infrastructure will total $6.5 billion. 

Despite the investment in tactical infrastructure, its impact on securing the 

border has not been measured because DHS has not assessed the impact 

Tactical Infrastructure 

Deployments Are 

Almost Complete, but 

Their Impact on 

Border Security Has 

Not Been Measured 

Page 19 GAO-09-896 Secure Border Initiative
 

of the tactical infrastructure on gains or losses in the level of effective 

control. 

CBP Is Close to 

Completing Initially 

Planned Tactical 

Infrastructure, but Delays 

Persist 

CBP is close to accomplishing its goal to build 661 miles of fencing along 

the southwest border. As of June 2009, 633 miles had been completed (see 

table 2). CBP was scheduled to complete the remaining 28 miles by 

November 2009. However, fence deployment continues to face delays due 

to challenges in constructing tactical infrastructure on difficult terrain and 

acquiring the necessary property rights from landowners. For example, in 

the San Diego sector, one 3.6 mile tactical infrastructure project previously 

scheduled to be completed by December 2008 and now due to be 

completed by October 2009, involves construction on rugged mountainous 

terrain that is not easily accessible. According to tactical infrastructure 

officials, they realized before December 2008 that it would not be possible 

to complete this segment until October 2009 because of these factors. In 

addition, as of June 29, 2009, fence projects totaling about 20 miles in the 

Rio Grande Valley sector with originally planned completion dates of 

December 2008 are now scheduled for completion by October 2009, with 

the exception of one segment, because of litigation related to property 

acquisition that was not resolved in time to meet the original dates. The 

segment that will not be complete by October 2009 was delayed due to 

difficulties obtaining materials for the bridge construction associated with 

the segment. As a result, this segment is anticipated to be completed in 

November 2009. As of June 29, 2009, of an estimated 96 cases where the 

government sued to acquire property through condemnation proceedings 

because the landowner would not voluntarily sell to the government, the 

property associated with 39 of those cases had yet to be acquired.25

However, of the 39 cases, 7 are required to be settled to complete fence 

construction. The remaining 32 properties are being sought in anticipation 

of future fencing needs and for other purposes, such as operations and 

maintenance of the fence. Nonetheless, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers 

(USACE) officials said that completion of fencing construction projects 

usually takes 90 to 120 days. Because the properties have yet to be 

acquired, the October 2009 projected completion date is likely to slip. 

 

25In cases where the property owner does not agree to a right of entry for the government 

or does not accept an offer to sell, the Department of Justice files a lawsuit against the 

landowner on behalf of the United States of America at the request of the Secretary of 

Homeland Security for the condemnation and taking of the property. 

Page 20 GAO-09-896 Secure Border Initiative
 

Table 2: Tactical Infrastructure Deployment Progress as of June 26, 2009 

Infrastructure type 

Miles in place 

before SBIa

Miles deployed through 

SBI as of 6/26/09

Total miles in place 

as of 6/26/09 Target 

Miles remaining 

to meet target

Pedestrian fencing 67 264 331 358 27

Vehicle fencing 76 226 302 303 1

Total fencing 143 490 633 661 28

Source: GAO analysis of SBI data. 

a Seventy-eight miles of pedestrian fencing and 57 miles of vehicle fencing were in place before the 

SBI program began. However, since SBI began construction, some miles of fencing have been 

removed, replaced, or retrofitted resulting in mileage totals that are different from those we have 

reported in earlier reports. 

While fencing costs increased over the course of construction, because all 

construction contracts have been awarded, cost estimates are less likely to 

change. Fencing miles completed as of October 31, 2008, cost an average 

of $3.9 million per mile for pedestrian fencing and $1.0 million per mile for 

vehicle fencing.26 However, once contracts were awarded, the average per 

mile costs had increased to $6.5 million per mile for pedestrian fencing 

and $1.8 million per mile for vehicle fencing. Tactical infrastructure 

program officials said the per mile costs increased over time due to 

various factors, such as property acquisition costs incurred for these miles 

that were not a factor for many of the previous miles and costs for labor 

and materials increased.27 Also, as we reported in September 2008, as 

tactical infrastructure officials were in the process of finalizing 

construction contracts, cost estimates for pedestrian fencing in Texas 

began to increase.28 Tactical infrastructure program office officials 

attributed the cost increases to a short supply of labor and materials, as 

well as the compressed timeline. For example, the officials said that as a 

result of a construction boom in Texas, labor was in short supply and 

contractors reported that they needed to provide premium pay and 

overtime to attract workers. In terms of materials, USACE officials stated 

that the price of cement and steel had increased and in some areas within 

 

26GAO-09-244R. 

27The land where this fencing was built has been publicly owned since 1907 when President 

Theodore Roosevelt reserved a 60-foot strip along the international boundary with Mexico 

for the United States to maintain the area free from obstructions as a protection against the 

smuggling of goods between the United States and Mexico. In effect, the Roosevelt 

easement provided the federal government with a 60-foot border right-of-way on which it 

could build the fence. 

28GAO-08-1141T. 

Page 21 GAO-09-896 Secure Border Initiative
 

Texas obtaining cement near the fence construction site was difficult. 

Tactical infrastructure program office officials said that they worked to 

mitigate the cost increases where possible. For example, they said that 

although their decision to purchase steel in bulk was made to ensure its 

availability, the purchase also resulted in savings. Tactical infrastructure 

program office officials said that based on data showing that the price of 

steel products almost doubled from January 2008 through August 2008, 

they estimate that they saved over $72 million with the bulk steel 

purchase. However, due to the construction delays, the tactical 

infrastructure program office has had to extend the contract for storage of 

the steel, and is to soon begin negotiations for a long-term storage 

contract. The need to continue to store the leftover steel will result in 

increased costs. Despite these additional costs, tactical infrastructure 

program office officials said that, according to their estimates, they will 

still realize cost savings on their bulk steel purchase. In addition, the 

officials estimated that there will be approximately 25,000 tons of steel 

remaining after all fencing segments are built. They said it will be used if 

additional fencing is built and will be used to maintain the fencing already 

deployed. 

Few Miles of Fencing Are 

to Be Built with Fiscal Year 

2009 Funds and Fiscal Year 

2010 and 2011 Funds Are 

to Be Used Primarily for 

Supporting Infrastructure 

Ten miles of additional fencing is scheduled to be built with fiscal year 

2009 funds, and fiscal years 2010 and 2011 funds are planned to be used 

primarily for supporting infrastructure. For fiscal years 2009 and 2010, 

$110 million has been allocated to tactical infrastructure. With the fiscal 

year 2009 funding, the tactical infrastructure program office plans to 

construct approximately 3 miles of vehicle fence in the Tucson sector and 

about 7 miles of pedestrian fence in the Marfa, Rio Grande Valley, and El 

Paso sectors. The program office also plans to use the funding for 

enhancements to existing fencing, such as gates and canal crossovers, and 

real estate planning and acquisition for fiscal year 2010 projects. Due to 

the long lead time associated with real estate acquisition, DHS also plans 

to use fiscal year 2009 funds to conduct real estate planning and 

acquisition activities for projects slated for completion in fiscal years 2010 

and 2011. By conducting real estate activities 1 to 2 years in advance, CBP 

seeks to limit construction delays due to lack of real estate. Also, as of 

June 2009, the program office had obligated about $21 million of its fiscal 

year 2009 funds for additional costs caused by construction delays and 

changes on projects under way. With fiscal year 2010 funds, plans as of 

June 2009 include replacing surf fencing and constructing all-weather 

roads and lighting in the San Diego sector; constructing bridges, a third 

layer of fencing and lighting in the El Centro sector; and clearing brush in 

the Yuma sector. For fiscal year 2011, plans as of June 2009 were to, 

Page 22 GAO-09-896 Secure Border Initiative
 

among other things, construct all-weather roads in the El Paso and Del Rio 

sectors; and construct roads, bridges, and low-water crossings and to clear 

brush in the Laredo sector. 

A Tactical Infrastructure 

Life-Cycle Cost Study Has 

Been Completed 

The summary of a life-cycle cost study prepared by a contractor for CBP 

shows that total life-cycle costs for all tactical infrastructure constructed 

to date, including pre-SBI infrastructure as well as that planned for fiscal 

years 2009, 2010, and 2011, are estimated at about $6.5 billion. The lifecycle cost estimates include deployment and operations and future 

maintenance costs for all tactical infrastructure, including the fence, 

roads, and lighting, among other things. Previously, CBP had reported that 

the fence is to have a lifespan of approximately 20 years, and plans to 

obligate $75 million to operations and maintenance of the fence for fiscal 

year 2009, and again requested $75 million for fiscal year 2010. A 

significant use of the operations and maintenance funding is to repair 

breaches in the fence. According to tactical infrastructure program office 

data, as of May 14, 2009, there had been 3,363 breaches in the fence, with 

each breach costing an average of $1,300 to repair. Because of its 

construction, the older pre-SBI fencing is easier to breach and most 

breaches occurred in these types of fencing. Of the newer fencing, the 

fewest breaches occurred in the bollard-style fencing, while more 

occurred in the wire mesh fence. Examples of breaches are shown in 

figure 6. 

Page 23 GAO-09-896 Secure Border Initiative
 

Figure 6: Examples of Repaired Breaches in Newer Fencing 

Source: GAO.

Steel mesh fence showing repaired fence breaches. 

Source: GAO.

A repaired fence breach in bollard fence with honeycomb design, an environmental feature that

allows debris and water to pass through.

Page 24 GAO-09-896 Secure Border Initiative
 

CBP reported that tactical infrastructure, coupled with additional trained 

Border Patrol agents, had increased the miles of the southwest border 

under effective control,but despite a $2.4 billion investment, it cannot 

account separately for the impact of tactical infrastructure. DHS defines 

effective control of the U.S. borders as the ability to consistently (1) detect 

illegal entries into the United States between the port of entry, (2) identify 

and classify these entries to determine the level of threat involved, (3) 

effectively respond to these entries, and (4) bring events to a satisfactory 

law enforcement resolution. Border Patrol personnel, technology, and 

tactical infrastructure are the contributing elements to effective control. 

CBP measures miles under effective control through Border Patrol’s 

quarterly assessments using information on apprehensions; vehicle drivethrough traffic; and, intelligence, operational reports, and the experience 

and expertise of senior Border Patrol agents, among other things. CBP 

recognizes that its measure of effective control is limited in that its source 

relies partially on subjective information and it does not reflect all CBP 

efforts along the border. CBP officials report that they are working to 

create a CBP-wide border control measure to inform resource decision 

making, but are having difficulty determining appropriate data sources and 

the appropriate measure and, therefore, have not set a date for completion 

of this measure. 

The Number of Southwest 

Border Miles That CBP 

Reports as Being under 

Effective Control Has 

Increased, but the Impact 

of Tactical Infrastructure 

Has Not Been Measured 

According to CBP’s Fiscal Year 2008 Performance and Accountability 

Report, 757 of the 8,607 miles the Border Patrol is responsible for were 

under effective control, increasing the miles under effective control by 158 

over those miles controlled in fiscal year 2007. According to the Fiscal 

Year 2009 SBI Expenditure Plan, between fiscal years 2007 and 2008, an 

additional 36 miles in the Tucson sector were under effective control 

partially as a result of added tactical infrastructure. In the Yuma sector 

where some of the early SBI fencing was constructed, apprehensions were 

down 78 percent in fiscal year 2008 compared with fiscal year 2007. CBP 

reported that apprehensions declined partially because of the fencing and 

also because of non-fencing reasons, such as the increase in Border Patrol 

agents during fiscal year 2008. In addition, CBP reported that as a direct 

result of increased tactical infrastructure, vehicle drive-through traffic 

declined from 213 incursions in fiscal year 2007 to 2 in fiscal year 2008. 

Overall, the Yuma sector’s vehicle drive-through traffic declined by 50 

percent and the number of miles under effective control for the sector 

climbed from 70 in fiscal year 2007 to 118 of the sector’s 125 miles in fiscal 

year 2008. In the San Diego sector, 3 miles of effective control were gained 

between fiscal years 2007 and 2008, and apprehensions were up 7 percent. 

Table 3 shows the changes in effective control for these three sectors from 

fiscal year 2007 to fiscal year 2008. 

Page 25 GAO-09-896 Secure Border Initiative
 

Table 3: Miles under Effective Control and Change in Apprehensions in Select Southwest Border Sectors from Fiscal Year 

2007 through Fiscal Year 2008 

Miles under effective control

Sector Total miles FY2007 FY2008

Change in miles 

under effective 

control 

Change in 

apprehensions 

Tucson 262 67 103 36 mile increase 16% 

Yuma 125 70 118 48 mile increase 78% 

San Diego 60 19 22 3 mile increase 7% 

Source: GAO analysis of CBP data. 

However, Border Patrol data show that apprehensions for all southwest 

border sectors except San Diego also declined between fiscal years 2006 

and 2007, before the majority of the tactical infrastructure was deployed. 

Therefore, the impact of tactical infrastructure on apprehensions is 

unclear as there are other factors that could contribute to the decline. For 

example, in its Fiscal Year 2008 4th Quarter Congressional Status Report 

on Border Security and Resources, CBP stated that the end of “catch and 

release,” increases in Border Patrol agents, more tactical infrastructure on 

the border, expanded use of expedited removal, and support from the 

National Guard during Operation Jump Start have had a significant 

deterrent effect, contributing to the marked decline in apprehensions.29

Other factors, such as the decreasing number of migrants attempting to 

cross the border due to the economy may also have impacted 

apprehensions. 

CBP has not systematically evaluated the impact of tactical infrastructure 

on gains or losses in the level of effective border control, controlling for 

the influences of other potential factors on border control efforts. The 

current performance measure for tactical infrastructure is miles 

constructed. While this measure provides useful information it does not 

demonstrate the program’s discrete contribution to effective control. In 

addition, CBP has, as part of its Fiscal Year 2009 SBI Expenditure Plan, 

completed an analysis of each tactical infrastructure segment to be built 

compared to other, alternative means of achieving effective control such 

 

29“Catch and release” refers to the practice of apprehending removable aliens from 

countries other than Mexico and then releasing them on their own recognizance pending 

removal proceedings. Expedited removal refers to returning non-Mexican removable aliens 

to their country of origin as soon as circumstances will allow, generally without formal 

removal proceedings in an immigration court. Operation Jump Start refers to the 

deployment of United States National Guard troops along the U.S.–Mexico border to 

support enforcement of border security. 

Page 26 GAO-09-896 Secure Border Initiative
 

as investments in technology and enforcement personnel.30 This analysis 

was intended to show where physical fencing was most appropriate given 

cost, level of effective control, possible unintended effects on 

communities, and other critical factors. However, these analyses were 

largely subjective because they were based primarily on the experience 

and expertise of senior border patrol agents. 

Federal agencies are increasingly expected to focus on achieving results 

and to demonstrate, in annual performance reports and budget requests, 

how their activities help achieve agency or governmentwide goals. The 

Government Performance and Results Act of 1993 (GPRA) requires federal 

agencies to report annually on their achievement of performance goals, 

explain why any goals were not met, and summarize the findings of any 

program evaluations conducted during the year.31 For programs that have 

readily observable results or outcomes, performance measurement may 

provide sufficient information to demonstrate program results. In some 

programs, however, outcomes are not quickly achieved or readily 

observed, or their relationship to the program is uncertain. In such cases, 

program evaluations may be needed, in addition to performance 

measurement, to examine the extent to which a program is achieving its 

objectives. Our previous work identified program evaluations as a way for 

agencies to explore the benefits of a program as well as ways to improve 

program performance.32 

An evaluation of the tactical infrastructure already deployed along the 

southwest border would help demonstrate its contribution to effective 

control of the border and help CBP to determine whether more tactical 

infrastructure would be appropriate, given other alternatives and 

constraints. For instance, a statistical analysis could be conducted to 

show the effect of tactical infrastructure within each sector and 

 

30CBP submitted its Fiscal Year 2009 SBI Expenditure Plan pursuant to a requirement in 

the Consolidated Security, Disaster Assistance, and Continuing Appropriations Act, 2009, 

Pub. L. No. 110-329, 122 Stat. 3574, 3655-57 (2008). The act required that the expenditure 

plan be submitted within 90 days after the enactment of the act. Condition 11 of the 

expenditure plan required an analysis by the Secretary for each segment—defined as no 

more than 15 miles, of fencing or tactical infrastructure—of the selected approach 

compared to other, alternative means of achieving operational control, including cost, level 

of operational control, possible unintended effects on communities, and other factors 

critical to the decision-making process.

31 Pub. L. No. 103-62, § 4, 107 Stat. 285, 288-289 (1993). 

32GAO/GGD-00-204. 

Page 27 GAO-09-896 Secure Border Initiative
 

throughout the southwest border, controlling for other potential factors.33

This analysis could include, among other data, apprehension data and data 

on illegal migrants’ and smugglers’ methods, routes, and modes of 

transportation before and after tactical infrastructure deployment. CBP 

could use the information collected during program evaluations to 

complement its performance measurement data and thereby more fully 

assess these often difficult-to-measure activities and to inform its efforts to 

improve its performance measures. Our work has shown that analyses 

such as these further complement performance management initiatives 

and are useful to inform resource decision making and in helping to 

effectively implement performance measures.34 

CBP officials said that they would like to conduct a study, but lack the 

resources. In our previous work, we found that through a number of 

strategies, agencies developed and maintained a capacity to produce and 

use evaluations. First, to leverage their evaluation resources and 

expertise, agencies engaged in collaborations or actively educated and 

solicited the support and involvement of their program partners and 

stakeholders. Second, agency managers sustained a commitment to 

accountability and to improving program performance. Third, they 

improved administrative systems or turned to special data collections to 

obtain better quality data. Finally, they sought out—through external 

sources or development of staff—whatever expertise was needed to 

ensure the credibility of analyses and conclusions.35 Furthermore, in our 

efforts to assist agencies’ program evaluation efforts, we identified 

agencies that initiated evaluation studies resulting in recommendations to 

address program performance and a strategy for the future.36 The 

evaluations conducted by these agencies helped them improve their 

measurement of program performance or understanding of performance 

and how it might be improved, or both. Accordingly, information gained 

through an evaluation may help CBP more effectively allocate its limited 

resources, inform its future decisions about investing in tactical 

infrastructure, and ensure that existing tools are adequately supported and 

 

33In impact evaluation, scientific research methods are used to establish a causal 

connection between program activities and outcomes and to isolate the program’s 

contributions to them. GAO/GGD-00-204

34GAO/AIMD-99-69. 

35GAO-03-454. 

36GAO/GGD-00-204.

Page 28 GAO-09-896 Secure Border Initiative
 

maintained. Such an evaluation would also help CBP determine whether 

the tactical infrastructure it has deployed meets the mandate in the Secure 

Fence Act of 2006, as amended, to use physical infrastructure 

enhancements to help prevent unlawful U.S. entries; facilitate access by 

CBP personnel to enable a rapid and effective response to illegal activities; 

and help DHS and CBP achieve and maintain operational control of U.S. 

borders. 37 Until CBP determines the contribution of tactical infrastructure 

to border security beyond a measure of miles covered by tactical 

infrastructure, it is not positioned to address the impact this costly 

resource has had in each sector or might have if deployed in other 

locations across the southwest border. 

While the SBInet program continues to test and evaluate potential 

technology applications, a major part of DHS’s effort to secure the nation’s 

borders from the illegal entry of aliens and contraband has been the 

deployment of tactical infrastructure. Along with technology and 

additional Border Patrol personnel, CBP relies on tactical infrastructure to 

help gain and maintain effective control of the border. Controlling, 

managing, and securing the border were the principal purposes of the 

mandate to construct fencing along the southwest border. Deploying this 

infrastructure has been expensive and costs have risen during its 

construction. However, despite a $2.4 billion investment in this 

infrastructure, its contribution to effective control of the border has not 

been measured because CBP has not evaluated the impact of tactical 

infrastructure on gains or losses in the level of effective control. Given the 

large investment made in tactical infrastructure and to help CBP more 

effectively allocate its limited resources, inform future decisions about 

whether to build more fencing, and ensure that existing tools are 

adequately supported and maintained, it is important that CBP assess the 

impact of tactical infrastructure on effective control as it examines the 

costs and benefits of different methods of deterrence. 

To improve the quality of information available to allocate resources and 

determine tactical infrastructure’s contribution to effective control of the 

border, we recommend that the Commissioner of CBP conduct a costeffective evaluation of the impact of tactical infrastructure on effective 

control of the border. 

Conclusions 

Recommendation for 

Executive Action 

 

37 Pub. L. No. 109-367, § 2, 120 Stat. 2638 (2006)(codified at 8 U.S.C. 1701 note). 

Page 29 GAO-09-896 Secure Border Initiative
 

We provided a draft of this report to the Department of Homeland Security 

for its review and comment. In an August 31, 2009, letter, the Department 

of Homeland Security provided written comments, which are summarized 

below and included in appendix III. The department stated that it agrees 

with our recommendation and generally concurred with our report, but 

said that the report does not acknowledge some of the significant factors 

that have contributed to program volatility and delays. 

Agency Comments 

and Our Evaluation 

With respect to our recommendation, DHS concurred and described 

actions recently completed, underway, and planned that it said will 

address our recommendation to conduct a cost-effective evaluation of the 

impact of tactical infrastructure on effective control of the border. DHS 

commented that its Office of Border Patrol was already committed to 

examining evaluation options, as evidenced by the Office of Border 

Patrol’s completion of analyses of alternatives to guide field personnel 

through the process of considering and determining what and how much 

infrastructure would be most effective. We discuss the analyses of 

alternatives in our report, as well as the fact that they are largely 

subjective because they were based primarily on the experience and 

expertise of senior Border Patrol agents. DHS also commented that it is 

considering using independent researchers to conduct evaluations and 

using modeling and simulation technology to gauge the effects of resource 

deployments. We believe that such efforts would be consistent with our 

recommendation, further complement performance management 

initiatives, and be useful to inform resource decision making. 

In its technical comments, DHS elaborated on some of the significant 

factors that have contributed to program volatility and delays. DHS stated 

that although SBI has experienced performance issues that have delayed 

Block 1 deployment, there have been other significant factors that have 

had an impact on the program schedule, such as their decision to 

reallocate funds to higher priority fencing projects, and external 

pressures—such as the need to obtain environmental clearances for tower 

placement. Our report included the environmental issues as a contributing 

factor to the delays. We have added information to our report to reflect 

the decision to reallocate funds. These reallocations and environmental 

issues notwithstanding, SBI program office officials told us that the 

program was not ready to use the funding that was reallocated in fiscal 

year 2008 due to the additional testing that needed to take place before 

deployment. We were unable to reprint DHS’s technical comments in this 

report because they contain sensitive information; however, we have 

incorporated them into the report, as appropriate. 

Page 30 GAO-09-896 Secure Border Initiative
 

As agreed with your offices, unless you publicly announce its contents 

earlier, we plan no further distribution until 30 days after the date of this 

report. At that time, we will send copies of this report to the Senate and 

House committees and subcommittees that have authorization and 

oversight responsibilities for homeland security. We will also send copies 

of this report to the Secretary of Homeland Security, the Commissioner of 

U.S. Customs and Border Protection, and the Office of Management and 

Budget. In addition, this report will be available at no cost on the GAO 

Web site at http://www.gao.gov. 

Should your offices have any questions on matters discussed in this report, 

please contact me at (202) 512-8777 or at stanar@gao.gov. Contact points 

for our offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found 

on the last page of this report. Key contributors to this report are listed in 

Richard M. St

appendix IV. 

ana, Director 

Homeland Security and Justice Issues 

Page 31 GAO-09-896 Secure Border Initiative
 

List of Requesters 

nie G. Thompson 

Chairman 

epresentatives 

chez 

Chairwoman 

ber 

me and Global Counterterrorism 

eland Security 

s 

anking Member 

 Communications, 

d Response 

r P. Carney 

hairman 

ember 

d Oversight 

eland Security 

. Meek 

House of Representatives 

The Honorable Ben

Committee on Homeland Security 

House of R

The Honorable Loretta Sán

The Honorable Mark E. Souder 

Ranking Mem

Subcommittee on Border, Mariti

Committee on Hom

House of Representatives 

The Honorable Mike Roger

R

Subcommittee on Emergency

 Preparedness, an

Committee on Homeland Security 

House of Representatives 

The Honorable Christophe

C

The Honorable Gus Michael Bilirakis 

Ranking M

Subcommittee on Management, Investigations, an

Committee on Hom

House of Representatives 

The Honorable Kendrick B

Page 32 GAO-09-896 Secure Border Initiative
Appendix I: The Status of SBI Program Office 

Staffing and the Progress the Office Reports Appendix I: The Status of SBI Program Office in Achieving Its Human Capital Goals 

Staffing and the Progress the Office Reports 

in Achieving Its Human Capital Goals 

The SBI program office has been reorganized, developed new staffing 

goals, and completed a new human capital plan for fiscal years 2009 

through 2010; however, meeting the plan’s revised human capital goals 

may be difficult. Under the new organizational structure, the tactical 

infrastructure program office has moved to the CBP Office of Finance’s 

Facilities Management and Engineering division and the SBI program 

office has been restructured. The restructuring of the SBI program office 

involved placing a greater emphasis on contractor oversight and creation 

of offices of operational integration, business management operations, and 

systems engineering, in addition to the SBInet program office. The SBI 

program’s Executive Director’s goal is to have a total of 236 employees—

181 full-time government employees and 55 contractors—in place by 

March 2010.1

 He said that the goal to have 236 employees represents the 

number needed to move forward with the program based on his previous 

experience and the need to have government employees representing key 

procurement competencies, meaning an increase in the ratio of 

government employees to contractors. For example, as of May 31, 2009, 

SBI program office staffing consisted of a total of 167 employees—72 

government and 95 contractors, or a ratio of 1.3 contractors to each 

government employee.2

 The new staffing goal calls for a ratio of 3.3 

government employees to each contractor. The SBI Executive Director 

said that having more government employees is important because he 

wants more in-house expertise to oversee the contractors. According to 

the SBI Executive Director, increasing the ratio of government employees 

to contractors in the SBI program office may be difficult because of a 

shortage of some personnel, such as systems engineers. He said he 

anticipates hiring 8 government employees a month, but acknowledges 

that it may take between 4 and 6 months to bring new hires on board. In 

the meantime, he said the SBI office will continue to supplement its 

workforce with contract support staff. 

In December 2008, the second version of its Strategic Human Capital 

Management Plan was provisionally certified and as of June 2009, the SBI 

program office continued to implement the plan. The new version of the 

human capital plan spans 2 fiscal years, reflecting a longer-term staffing 

vision for SBI. The SBI program office’s plan outlines seven main goals for 

the office and includes planned activities to accomplish those goals, which 

 

1

This goal includes staff in the tactical infrastructure program office. 

2

These totals do not include 18 detailed personnel or 27 staff—10 government employees 

and 17 contractors —who were transferred to the Office of Finance. 

Page 33 GAO-09-896 Secure Border Initiative 
Appendix I: The Status of SBI Program Office 

Staffing and the Progress the Office Reports 

in Achieving Its Human Capital Goals 

align to federal government best practices.3 As of May 2009, the SBI 

program office had taken several steps to implement the plan. For 

example, the SBI program office had completed a training plan which was 

undergoing review and had tentatively selected 43 candidates to fill 70 

vacancies. In addition, the program office had finalized an awards and 

recognition policy and had implemented the policy. However, the SBI 

program office had deferred completion of its succession management 

plan until the final quarter of fiscal year 2009. 

To implement and review the human capital plan, the SBI program office 

is partnering with the DHS Chief Human Capital Officer’s office as well as 

CBP’s Office of Human Resources. In a December 8, 2008, letter that 

accompanied CBP’s Fiscal Year 2009 SBI Expenditure Plan, the Chief 

Human Capital Officer noted that the SBI human capital plan provided 

specific initiatives to address hiring, development, and retention of 

employees, and described metrics to measure progress and results of 

these initiatives. However, the Chief Human Capital Officer also noted 

that human capital management challenges remain. For example, 

according to the letter, competition for qualified employees could present 

staffing challenges for SBI in achieving its goals to hire additional program 

managers, auditors, engineers, and environmental specialists and to shift 

the current ratio of contractors to federal employees and hire more federal 

employees and fewer contractors. Furthermore, still to be determined 

succession management plans and finalization of the training plan reflect 

unfinished human capital planning efforts. This gap in planning could 

present challenges in training employees and preparing for a longer-term 

SBI vision. The letter noted that the DHS Chief Human Capital Officer 

planned to reevaluate SBI’s human capital plan in May 2009 to ensure that 

SBI was on track to achieve its staffing goals. According to the SBI 

Executive Director, this review is ongoing through a series of meetings 

and data exchanges. Table 4 summarizes the seven human capital goals, 

and the SBI program office’s planned activities and steps taken to 

accomplish these activities, as of May 2009. 

 

3

These best practices are contained in the governmentwide Human Capital Assessment 

and Accountability Framework which was developed by the Office of Management and 

Budget, the Office of Personnel Management, and GAO.

Page 34 GAO-09-896 Secure Border Initiative
Appendix I: The Status of SBI Program Office 

Staffing and the Progress the Office Reports 

in Achieving Its Human Capital Goals 

Table 4: Human Capital Goals, Planned Activities, and Steps Taken 

SBI human capital goals Planned activities 

Steps taken as of May 2009, as reported by the 

SBI program office 

1. Develop a coherent 

framework of human capital 

policies, programs, and 

practices to achieve a shared 

vision integrated with SBI’s 

strategic plan. 

• Update the SBI Strategic Human 

Capital Management Plan and ensure 

alignment to the SBI Strategic 

Implementation Plan and CBP 

Strategic Plan. 

• Establish a human capital leadership 

team. 

• An appendix to the human capital management 

plan has been created to demonstrate alignment 

with the CBP strategic plan. Further updates to 

the human capital plan are not expected during 

fiscal year 2009. 

• A human capital leadership team has been 

established. 

2. Prepare leaders to lead and 

manage the workforce. 

• Ensure continuity with required 

management certifications. 

• Create a learning culture that 

provides opportunities for continuous 

development. 

• Leverage and utilize the DHS and 

CBP Senior Executive Service (SES) 

candidacy development program. 

• Six employees have received project manager 

certification. 

• SBI is using outside training sources to provide 

training courses and has held several brown bag 

training sessions. 

• SBI has not enrolled any employees in the SES 

candidacy development program 

3. Create and instill within the 

organization a value-driven 

culture. 

• Leaders will maintain high standards 

of honesty and ethics. 

• Leadership will foster an environment 

of open communication and forum to 

share strategic vision. 

• SBI leadership will inspire employee 

commitment and integrity. 

• SBI requires annual mandatory security and 

ethics training. All employees were to have 

completed the security training by June 1, 2009. 

• The SBI Executive Director holds monthly staff 

meetings. 

• Frequent SBI-wide e-mails highlighting 

accomplishments, areas of risk and general 

status updates are sent. 

• An SBI senior staff offsite was held. 

4. Develop and implement a 

succession management plan. 

• Develop a succession strategy for 

mission-critical positions. 

• Systematically provide a shared 

knowledge management system to 

perform work and gather and share 

knowledge. 

• Mission-critical positions have been identified; 

completion of the succession management plan 

deferred until the last quarter of fiscal year 2009. 

• SBI uses a shared knowledge management 

system to disseminate knowledge, share 

documents, and perform work. 

5. Define the performance 

culture (reward excellence). 

• Continue to supplement the current 

CBP Awards and Recognition 

Program with recurring award 

ceremonies. 

• Continue to adhere to DHS and CBP 

polices on performance management.

• Employees to develop and be 

responsible for meeting goals in 

Individual Development Plans. 

• The awards and recognition policy has been 

finalized and approved. Awards are presented 

quarterly. 

• Employees were provided with guidance on 

completing their fiscal year 2009 performance 

goals. 

Page 35 GAO-09-896 Secure Border Initiative
Appendix I: The Status of SBI Program Office 

Staffing and the Progress the Office Reports 

in Achieving Its Human Capital Goals 

SBI human capital goals Planned activities 

Steps taken as of May 2009, as reported by the 

SBI program office 

6) Hire, recruit, develop, and retain 

employees with the skills for 

mission accomplishment. 

• Develop and enhance relationships 

with professional organizations and 

colleges/universities and attend job 

fairs. 

• Create human capital strategies that 

will attract, acquire, promote, and 

retain quality talent. 

• Craft a recruiting approach that builds 

the public’s knowledge of and desire 

to join the public sector. 

• SBI works with CBP human capital resources on 

networking and coordination of recruiting efforts. 

SBI has attended several career and job fairs. 

• SBI updated its Web site with information on 

mission and goals to help attract job applicants 

and has created SBI “branded” paraphernalia to 

hand out at orientation and career fairs. 

• Recruitment efforts are underway to fill 70 open 

SBI positions; 43 candidates have been 

tentatively selected. 

7) Establish leadership 

accountability for human capital 

management. 

• Identify human capital management 

processes and points of contact to 

ensure accountability. 

• Incorporate periodic assessments to 

analyze human capital data, assess 

results, identify risk, and ensure 

controls are in place to address 

problems and modify strategies and 

activities. 

• SBI uses a human capital scorecard to maintain 

accountability for human capital goals. 

• SBI receives workforce profiles from the CBP 

Human Resources Management Office that 

highlight areas of progress and risk. 

• SBI holds reoccurring meetings with 

representatives from the Chief Human Capital 

Office and the CBP Office of Human Resources.

Source: CBP. 

Page 36 GAO-09-896 Secure Border Initiative
Appendix II: Task Orders Awarded to Boeing Appendix II: Task Orders Awarded to Boeing for SBI Projects as of July 8, 2009 

for SBI Projects as of July 8, 2009 

(Dollars in millions) 

Task order description Date 

awarded 

Ceiling of 

funds a

Task order 

obligation

Program Management: The mission engineering, facilities and infrastructure, systems 

engineering, test and evaluation, and program management services to develop and 

deploy the SBInet system. 

09/21/2006 $146.9 $146.9

Project 28: Boeing’s pilot project and initial implementation of SBInet technology for 28 

miles of the border in the Tucson sector. 

10/20/2006 20.7 20.7

Barry M. Goldwater Range: The construction of 32 miles of vehicle and pedestrian 

barriers on the southern border of the Barry M. Goldwater Range in the Yuma Sector. 

01/12/2007 122.2 122.2

Fence Lab: The testing of potential pedestrian and vehicle fence and barrier solutions. 03/14/2007 0.7 0.7

Design: SBInet deployment design solution including design, environmental-clearance 

support, and locations for the SBInet technology solution in the Yuma, Tucson, and El 

Paso sectors. 

08/01/2007 93.1 93.1

Project 28 Contractor Maintenance and Logistics Support: Provides Project 28 

with the required maintenance and logistics support to operate the system. 

12/07/2007 10.6 10.6

Command, Control, Communications and Intelligence (C3I) and Common 

Operating Picture: The development of the next version of the SBInet operating 

software to design, develop, and demonstrate a functional SBInet C3I/COP system. 

12/07/2007 83.0 66.6

SBInet System: A follow-on to the program management task order, this task order 

specifies the program management and system engineering activities required to 

achieve an integrated program across all task orders issued under the SBI contract. 

04/15/2008 221.4 139.5

Supply and Supply Chain Management: The development and implementation of a 

supply and supply chain management system solution to execute tactical infrastructure 

projects. 

01/07/2008 318.6 318.6

Arizona Deployment Task Order: Boeing’s deployment of two projects of the SBInet

system along approximately 53 miles of the southwest border in the Tucson sector. 

06/25/2008 90.6 90.6

Integrated Logistics Support: Provides SBInet with the required maintenance and 

logistics support to operate the system. 

08/16/2008 35.3 26.7

Design for Buffalo Sector: Provides for the design of a remote video surveillance 

system (RVSS) capability—a system of towers with cameras that transmit information 

to video monitors at a sector's headquarters—in the Buffalo sector. 

02/05/2009 0.6 0.6

Northern Border Project Task Order: Provides for the design, installation, and 

deployment of surveillance technology capabilities in the Detroit and Buffalo Border 

Patrol sectors. 

03/31/2009 22.4 20.9

Total $1,166 $1,058

Source: GAO analysis of CBP data. 

a

 This is the maximum value of the task order. For example, the Integrated Logistics Support task 

order has a “ceiling” of $35.3 million; however, at this time, obligations under the task order are only 

$26.7 million because the project is being incrementally funded to complete work in periods.

Page 37 GAO-09-896 Secure Border Initiative 
Appendix III: Comments from the Department Appendix III: Comments from the of Homeland Security 

Department of Homeland Security 

Page 38 GAO-09-896 Secure Border Initiative
Appendix III: Comments from the Department 

of Homeland Security 

Page 39 GAO-09-896 Secure Border Initiative
Appendix IV: 

A

GAO Contact and Staff 

cknowledgments 

Page 40 GAO-09-896 

Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff 

Acknowledgments 

Richard M. Stana (202) 512-8777 or stanar@gao.com GAO Contact 

In addition to the contact named above, Susan Quinlan, Assistant 

Director, and Jeanette Espinola, Assistant Director, managed this 

assignment. Sylvia Bascopé, Claudia Becker, Frances Cook, Christine 

Davis, Katherine Davis, Jeremy Rothgerber, Erin Smith, and Meghan 

Squires made significant contributions to the work. 

Acknowledgments 

 Secure Border Initiative 
Related GAO Products Related GAO Products 

U.S. Customs and Border Protection’s Secure Border Initiative Fiscal 

Year 2009 Expenditure Plan. GAO-09-274R. Washington, D.C.: April 30, 

2009. 

Secure Border Initiative Fence Construction Costs. GAO-09-244R. 

Washington, D.C.: January 29, 2009. 

Secure Border Initiative: DHS Needs to Address Significant Risks in 

Delivering Key Technology Investment. GAO-08-1086. Washington, D.C.: 

September 22, 2008. 

Secure Border Initiative: Observations on Deployment Challenges. 

GAO-08-1141T. Washington, D.C.: September 10, 2008. 

Secure Border Initiative: DHS Needs to Address Significant Risks in 

Delivering Key Technology Investment. GAO-08-1148T. Washington, D.C.: 

September 10, 2008. 

Secure Border Initiative: Fiscal Year 2008 Expenditure Plan Shows 

Improvement, but Deficiencies Limit Congressional Oversight and DHS 

Accountability. GAO-08-739R. Washington, D.C.: June 26, 2008. 

Department of Homeland Security: Better Planning and Oversight 

Needed to Improve Complex Service Acquisition Outcomes. GAO-08-765T. 

Washington, D.C.: May 8, 2008. 

Department of Homeland Security: Better Planning and Assessment 

Needed to Improve Outcomes for Complex Service Acquisitions 

GAO-08-263. Washington, D.C.: April 22, 2008. 

Secure Border Initiative: Observations on the Importance of Applying 

Lessons Learned to Future Projects. GAO-08-508T. Washington, D.C.: 

February 27, 2008. 

Secure Border Initiative: Observations on Selected Aspects of SBInet 

Program Implementation. GAO-08-131T. Washington, D.C.: October 24, 

2007. 

Secure Border Initiative: SBInet Planning and Management 

Improvements Needed to Control Risks. GAO-07-504T. Washington, D.C.: 

February 27, 2007. 

Page 41 GAO-09-896 Secure Border Initiative
Related GAO Products 

Secure Border Initiative: SBInet Expenditure Plan Needs to Better 

Support Oversight and Accountability. GAO-07-309. Washington, D.C.: 

February 15, 2007. 

(440763) Page 42 GAO-09-896 Secure Border Initiative
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