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i 

44–898 2009

[H.A.S.C. No. 110–34] 

HEARING 

ON

NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT 

FOR FISCAL YEAR 2008 

AND

OVERSIGHT OF PREVIOUSLY AUTHORIZED 

PROGRAMS 

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

TERRORISM, UNCONVENTIONAL THREATS AND 

CAPABILITIES SUBCOMMITTEE HEARING 

ON

BUDGET REQUEST ON HARNESSING 

TECHNOLOGICAL INNOVATION: CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES 

HEARING HELD 

MARCH 14, 2007 
(II) 

TERRORISM, UNCONVENTIONAL THREATS AND CAPABILITIES 

SUBCOMMITTEE 

ADAM SMITH, Washington, Chairman 

MIKE MCINTYRE, North Carolina 

ROBERT ANDREWS, New Jersey 

JIM COOPER, Tennessee 

JIM MARSHALL, Georgia 

MARK E. UDALL, Colorado 

BRAD ELLSWORTH, Indiana 

KIRSTEN E. GILLIBRAND, New York 

KATHY CASTOR, Florida 

MAC THORNBERRY, Texas 

ROBIN HAYES, North Carolina 

KEN CALVERT, California 

JOHN KLINE, Minnesota 

THELMA DRAKE, Virginia 

K. MICHAEL CONAWAY, Texas 

JIM SAXTON, New Jersey 

KEVIN GATES, Professional Staff Member 

ALEX KUGAJEVSKY, Professional Staff Member 

ANDREW TABLER, Staff Assistant 
(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF HEARINGS 

2007 

Page 

HEARING: 

Wednesday, March 14, 2007, Fiscal Year 2008 National Defense Authorization Act—Budget Request on Harnessing Technological Innovation: Challenges and Opportunities ..................................................................................... 1 

APPENDIX: 

Wednesday, March 14, 2007 ................................................................................... 35 

WEDNESDAY, MARCH 14, 2007 

FISCAL YEAR 2008 NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT—BUDGET REQUEST ON HARNESSING TECHNOLOGICAL INNOVATION: 

CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES 

STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS 

Smith, Hon. Adam, a Representative from Washington, Chairman, Terrorism, 

Unconventional Threats and Capabilities Subcommittee ................................. 1 

Thornberry, Hon. Mac, a Representative from Texas, Ranking Member, Terrorism, Unconventional Threats and Capabilities Subcommittee .................... 2 

WITNESSES 

Cohen, Dr. Brian S., Institute for Defense Analyses ............................................ 9 

Lehman, David H., Senior Vice President and General Manager, Command 

and Control Center, The MITRE Corporation ................................................... 2 

Lewis, James Andrew, Director and Senior Fellow, Technology and Public 

Policy Programs, Center for Strategic and International Studies ................... 6 

Starr, Dr. Stuart H., Center for Technology and National Security Policy, 

National Defense University ............................................................................... 10 

APPENDIX 

PREPARED STATEMENTS: 

Cohen, Dr. Brian S. .......................................................................................... 51 

Lehman, David H. ............................................................................................ 39 

Lewis, James Andrew ...................................................................................... 45 

Starr, Dr. Stuart H. .......................................................................................... 58 

DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD: 

‘‘I-Power: The Information Revolution and Stability Operations,’’ Defense 

Horizons, February 2007, by Franklin D. Kramer, Larry Wentz, and 

Stuart Starr. Submitted by Dr. Stuart Starr ............................................. 71 

WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING THE HEARING: 

[There were no Questions submitted during the hearing.] 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING: 

Mr. Smith .......................................................................................................... 81 

(1) 

FISCAL YEAR 2008 NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT—BUDGET REQUEST ON HARNESSING TECHNOLOGICAL INNOVATION: CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, TERRORISM, UNCONVENTIONAL THREATS AND

CAPABILITIES SUBCOMMITTEE, Washington, DC, Wednesday, March 14, 2007. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 3:00 p.m., in room 

2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Adam Smith (chairman 

of the subcommittee) presiding. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. ADAM SMITH, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM WASHINGTON, CHAIRMAN, TERRORISM, UNCONVENTIONAL THREATS AND CAPABILITIES SUBCOMMITTEE 

Mr. SMITH. I think we will go ahead and get started and call the 

meeting formally to order. 

I want to thank our witnesses and members. 

We have probably an hour-and-a-half, somewhere in that neighborhood, before they are going to call votes over on the floor. It is 

hard to say precisely. And when they do call votes, it is going to 

be about an hour’s worth, because there is a motion to recommit 

in there. 

The importance of all of that is, we are going to try to get done— 

when the bells go off, hopefully we will be done with our witnesses 

and questions, and try to work on that timeframe. 

With that, I want to welcome everybody to the Subcommittee on 

Terrorism, Unconventional Threats and Capabilities. We are hearing today about technological innovations, specifically focusing on 

the Science and Technology (S&T) programs within the military, 

and how we can do a better job of making sure we get the absolute 

best technology to our military and to the warfighter as quickly 

and efficiently as possible. 

I think there is a lot of potential here. Certainly, the military is 

doing a lot of things right, but we have got some more things that 

I think we can do better. 

We have a good panel with us here today. 

I assume Mr. Lewis is joining us shortly? Nobody seems to know. 

Mr. Lewis is not here yet? All right. 

He will go last. But we will have him here shortly. 

We have James Andrew Lewis, who is director and senior fellow 

for technology and public policy programs—let us get the titles here 

right; David Lehman, senior vice president and general manager, 

Command and Control Center at The MITRE Corporation; Dr. 
2 

Brian Cohen, Institute of Defense Analysis; and Dr. Stuart Starr, 

the Center for Technology and National Security Policy at the National Defense University (NDU). 

And I want to thank you very much. NDU has been enormously 

helpful in my efforts over the last few years. 

And with that, I will turn it over to the ranking member on the 

committee, Mr. Thornberry, for any opening comments he may 

have. 

STATEMENT OF HON. MAC THORNBERRY, A REPRESENTATIVE 

FROM TEXAS, RANKING MEMBER, TERRORISM, UNCONVENTIONAL THREATS AND CAPABILITIES SUBCOMMITTEE 

Mr. THORNBERRY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I want to join 

you in welcoming our witnesses on this important topic. 

The globalization of the world’s market presents a lot of opportunities, but also challenges for us. And how the United States can 

be innovative enough to protect our national security is something 

we all struggle with, given some of those globalization challenges. 

We have a terrific group of witnesses, and I look forward to hearing from them, as I know you do. And I yield back. 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you, Mac. 

We will start with Mr. Lehman. 

STATEMENT OF DAVID H. LEHMAN, SENIOR VICE PRESIDENT 

AND GENERAL MANAGER, COMMAND AND CONTROL CENTER, THE MITRE CORPORATION 

Mr. LEHMAN. Mr. Chairman and honorable members, thank you 

for the opportunity to appear before your committee. 

My name is David Lehman. I am a senior vice president at The 

MITRE Corporation. I am also general manager of MITRE’s Command and Control Center, which is a part of the Department of Defense’s command and control, communications, intelligence, federally funded research and development center. Also, I was MITRE’s 

chief technology officer for nine years, managing our internal research program. 

I would ask that my prepared statement be included in the 

record. 

Steve Jobs of Apple said, ‘‘An innovation is an idea that ships.’’ 

The idea may start as a technical curiosity, a result of scientific research. If someone connects that curiosity to a solution to a realworld problem, an invention is created. If people or organizations 

adopt that invention, an innovation is created. 

Too often, the research community lacks an understanding of 

real-world problems, and the potential users do not know that the 

enabling technologies exist. The result is too few inventions and 

even less innovation. 

To combat this, we must create an environment and process that 

carry research results through invention to widespread adoption. 

This will result in innovation. 

In my testimony today, I will present three recommendations to 

improve the processes and the environment to increase the yield of 

innovation from our science and technology community. I will focus 

less on research—the creation of technical ideas—and more on the 
3 

management process necessary to increase invention and innovation. 

These recommendations are: align S&T investment with warrior 

needs and improve the funding mechanism to carry research inventions through to innovations; adopt open systems architectures for 

program of record, so that these programs can more easily accept 

and adapt innovations; and, three, change the business model used 

in programs of record to increase incentives for contractors. 

The key to a good research program is to align investments with 

the goals of the organization or the needs of the end user. When 

an organization fails to achieve such alignment, the researchers tell 

the developers, ‘‘You do not use anything we invent,’’ and the developers retort, ‘‘You do not produce anything we can use.’’ 

This standoff occurs, because the two departments have not 

worked closely together to understand the needs of the customers 

or the organization, the research problems, the research risks and 

the funding profile that links the research schedule and budget to 

the production schedule and budget. 

When an organization can solve these problems, it can put a plan 

in place that includes continuous dialogue and adjust the plan as 

necessary over time. Optimally, this process bridges the chasm between research and production. 

I should caution that the linkage among the customer, the researcher and the developer should not be too tight. This only 

achieves incremental improvements, not disruptive, quantum leaps. 

A good research program balances this tension. 

Government organizations have proven that they can achieve optimal alignment between research and development. The National 

Reconnaissance Office (NRO), in the 1970’s and early 1980’s, tightly linked its research investments in increased sensor sensitivity 

and satellite technology to production projects. This resulted in continuously improved intelligence collection capability. 

The NRO could achieve this alignment of budgets and schedules 

partly because the users, the programs, the developers and the research organization all reported to the same manager, creating 

unanimity of purpose and control. 

Then NRO also had exceptionally strong and technically competent program officers. They were essentially the technical peers 

of their contractors. 

Beyond organizational structure and technically strong program 

officers, there are four additional reasons why most organizations 

do not achieve this alignment. Currently, neither the research community nor the acquisition community fully understands the needs 

of the end user. And here we are talking about the warrior. 

The well-intentioned but overly bureaucratic documentation review process isolates the warriors from those who will design and 

build the system. The formal research and acquisition process, as 

practiced, offers too few opportunities for rich dialogue between the 

engineers, who know what technology can do, but do not understand the warrior’s problems, and the warriors who have the experience, but not the technological insight. 

This dialogue, which links the technical curiosity or idea to the 

real-world need, leads to problem discovery, invention and innovation. 
4 

To achieve this kind of interaction in the research and development cycle, we need to create a development environment in which 

the warriors and the technologists interact continuously, experimenting with new inventions and applications and rapidly incorporating those that prove themselves into the programs of record. 

Such a system would combine with what the acquisition process 

does best—training and sustainment—with what develop-in-thefield does best—satisfy the users’ requirements. 

Second, the S&T community’s research portfolio is not well 

aligned with both the needs of the warriors and the program of 

records that exist to satisfy those needs. Tighter alignment must 

come from joint management of the investment through continuous 

dialogue among warriors, research and developers. Otherwise, we 

will continue the pattern of research results that are never used, 

and programs that are less technically advanced than they could 

be. 

Please note, only part of the S&T budget should be tied to users’ 

needs in existing programs of record. The S&T budget is a portfolio, some of which must be invested in disruptive advances. 

Third, research schedules are not aligned with acquisition schedules. Achieving such alignment is understandably difficult, because 

research does not follow a schedule. Government programs must 

learn to manage the inevitable uncertainty. 

Service laboratories regularly present inventions to acquisition 

programs, but the acquisition program usually has little latitude to 

make changes. The acquisition process can manage the uncertainty 

with advanced, collaborative planning between the program and research communities and continued communication throughout the 

research and development cycle. 

The fourth failure in alignment relates to funding. The research 

and acquisition communities must plan for success from the moment they embark on a research project. The funding profile in the 

program objective memorandum must bridge from research funding 

through acquisition funding. 

Too often, research programs, advanced concept technology demonstrations, joint expeditionary force experiments, and the like, 

validate operational needs, but the budget lacks funding for followon development, acquisition and fielding. 

To deal with this uncertainty, the acquisition community needs 

to have a set of funds available that allow it to harvest the best 

ideas that have achieved practicable results. In economics, this approach is called ‘‘real options.’’ 

Having a line in the Program Objective Memorandum (POM) 

that gives program managers the flexibility to apply funds to research investments, as they mature, and carry them into programs 

of record will increase the innovation yield from the S&T community. 

This line item should be large enough to harvest some, but not 

all, successes, forcing services and programs to prioritize user 

needs and control budgets. 

As a corollary to this observation, we must improve our ability 

to manage failure. If we recognize and deal with failure early, we 

can afford more new starts. That is my second recommendation. 
5 

Once programs have achieved alignment, they must ensure that 

the systems they field are designed with open architectures. They 

must have defined interfaces and use well-known and accessible 

commercial standards. 

A good architecture allows a system to be modified easily, and 

thus accept with relative ease some—though, unfortunately, not 

all—future innovations and improvements. Google, eBay and Amazon do this very well. 

The Department of Defense (DOD) acquisition community is 

striving to build systems with open architectures. To meet this 

goal, the DOD must find a new business model for its contractors. 

And that is my third recommendation. 

Under the standard model, the DOD lets a contract for an entire 

system, usually for its entire lifecycle. This gives the contractor little incentive to design an open system. 

The DOD should let a contract for a base infrastructure with as 

open a design as possible, then let separate, smaller contracts for 

the applications that will ride on the infrastructure, and bar the infrastructure contract from bidding on these applications. 

The contracting community will undoubtedly find it difficult to 

adapt to this change; however, such a structure is vital. It will 

allow the DOD to become a faster adopter and beneficiary of innovations. 

In summary, to increase the yield from our S&T investment, I 

recommend that the DOD strongly encourage the S&T community, 

the acquisition community and the warriors to manage the process 

as a team. They must be in constant dialogue to determine needs, 

create investment and align budget schedules, architectures and 

acquisition strategy. 

All this will maximize the impact of S&T procurement dollars for 

the warrior. 

The DOD already possesses the authority to act upon most of 

these recommendations. What is needed is some flexibility in the 

POM line. 

Finally, I would like to mention the possible contribution of Federally Funded Research and Development Centers (FFRDCs) in the 

context of these recommendations. FFRDCs could play key roles, 

because of their combination of technical expertise and their inherent, government-mandated impartiality. They are honest brokers. 

This impartiality is especially important, because commercial organizations can freely share their latest proprietary findings with 

FFRDC staff. And, because FFRDCs have no commitment to a particular vendor or system, FFRDCs can augment expertise of government program offices, to scan all sources of innovation and objectively evaluate technical innovations against measurable criteria. 

I believe that implementing the recommendations outlined above 

will keep the United States at the forefront of applied technological 

innovation and contribute to the success and safety of our warriors. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would be happy to answer questions. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Lehman can be found in the Appendix on page 39.] 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you. 
6 

Mr. Lewis. 

STATEMENT OF JAMES ANDREW LEWIS, DIRECTOR AND SENIOR FELLOW, TECHNOLOGY AND PUBLIC POLICY PROGRAMS, CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND INTERNATIONAL 

STUDIES 

Mr. LEWIS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and let me apologize for 

being a moment or two late. 

I would like to thank the committee for this opportunity to testify. I am going to make four points in my testimony that I will 

summarize for you now. 

First, as you know, technological leadership has contributed to 

U.S. military superiority and economic strength for almost 70 

years. 

Second, globalization and other changes means that the U.S. 

share of innovation and its technological leadership will decline. 

Third, some U.S. policies reinforce this decline. These policies include underinvestment in science, a more difficult regulatory regime and the unintended effects of some regulations put in place 

since September 11th. 

Fourth, while the U.S. faces challenges when it comes to technological leadership, it also has an opportunity to respond in ways 

that can advance its security. 

The key to technological leadership is innovation. This is an overused word, but it is the ability to use knowledge to create new 

goods or services. 

The U.S. has been a world leader in innovation. Our political and 

social makeup provide it with an advantage over other nations. The 

question is whether this comparative advantage is enough in an 

era of heightened global competition. 

Now, I should note, Mr. Chairman, that there is an anomaly in 

these concerns. And that anomaly is that the U.S. spends more 

than any other nation on science and on research and development. 

And it is reasonable to ask, if we spend so much, how can there 

be a problem? 

The answer to that, I think, is we are not spending enough to 

maintain our lead, and we are not spending enough on the things 

needed for military technology. Our spending levels are flat. Spending in other nations is increasing. 

If these trends continue, the long-term result will be the U.S. 

will no longer have the lead in important military technologies. 

The issue is complicated, because the results of underinvestment 

can take years to appear. It is also complicated, because the data 

is ambiguous. 

It is hard to measure innovation, so the normal practice is to use 

proxies, like the number of patents awarded, the numbers of Ph.D.s 

and engineers, or the number of scholarly articles published by scientists. 

When we look at this data, it is not clear that the U.S. is losing 

ground. But there are troubling trends. In a few key areas, scientists in other nations are publishing more than their American 

counterparts. 
7 

In our technological workforce, we are coming up to a period 

where many engineers and scientists will be of retirement age, and 

they will not be replaced. 

From an economic standpoint, this may not be bad. We do not 

want to train engineers, only to find there are no jobs for them. 

But from a national security perspective, these are important 

warning signs. We should not ignore these warning signs, because 

they reflect significant changes in the international environment. 

These changes will challenge U.S. leadership. 

One change, as you know, comes from globalization. 

Globalization diffuses technology around the world. It has eroded 

the national character of science, because research is increasingly 

carried out by multinational teams. 

Another challenge comes from the rise of strategic competitors. 

Nations like China or India, or perhaps in the distant future places 

like Brazil or even Europe. 

These challengers have seen how important science has been to 

U.S. military leadership, and they are copying us. 

A related challenge comes from Asia’s economic ascent. The Pacific Rim is the focus of global activity. The U.S. is part of this, but 

the most dynamic growth has been in Japan, Korea, Taiwan and 

now China. 

Asian nations hope to repeat the success they have had in manufacturing in scientific research. If today, Asia is the world’s factory, 

its leaders hope that tomorrow it will also be the world’s laboratory. 

Another challenge, and a broader challenge, comes from the way 

societies create wealth. In the 1800’s, the U.S. transitioned from 

agriculture to manufacturing. That meant that the best way to generate wealth lay in industry, not in farming. 

Now we are transitioning from manufacturing to the creation of 

information and knowledge and services. This transition may be 

good for the U.S. economy, but it has serious implications for military technology. 

The cumulative effect is a new kind of risk for national security. 

The best way to describe this risk is that the vigorous research and 

technological base that has given the U.S. a military advantage for 

decades is in danger of being eroded. 

Congress can play a key role in stemming this erosion. The most 

important step is funding for research. 

While the U.S. continues to lead in many research areas, it is not 

spending enough to sustain this lead. U.S. spending in scientific 

areas that are key to national security is flat or declining, while 

other nations are accelerating their spending. 

These effect of underinvestment is damaging in physics, aeronautics, mathematics, computer sciences and engineering. Research 

in these areas provides the basis for military transformation, and 

in relative terms, these areas have been the most seriously underfunded. 

Underfunding is compounded by changes in the nature of research and development in the Department of Defense and in the 

private sector. Government and industry now have to spend more 

on development, rather than on coming up with new capabilities. 
8 

These changing priorities mean that some key research areas are 

no longer funded. 

U.S. policies on immigration and technology transfer also damage technological leadership. This is an area where the Congress 

could provide assistance. 

U.S. national security and military power was strengthened in 

the 20th century by an influx of foreign scientists. The universities 

and institutions that received these scientists became global leaders. 

But the U.S. is a less attractive destination for scientific talent 

than it once was. Measures imposed since September 11th have the 

unintended consequence of deterring researchers from coming to 

the U.S. 

Other changes prevent researchers from staying here once they 

complete their education. Our universities produce great researches, and then we force them to leave. 

Restrictions on technology transfer also work against U.S. leadership. There are some restrictions that affect how scientists can 

work. There are other restrictions that encourage other nations to 

invest in their own research and technologies. 

The unintended effect of these restrictions, combined with the restrictions on immigration, is to move science outside of the United 

States. The U.S. is essentially creating its own competitors. 

This situation is troubling, Mr. Chairman, but it is not irreparable. And let me tell you two stories to show this. 

In 1957, after the Soviet Union launched Sputnik, President Eisenhower’s science adviser predicted that, because of their lead in 

math and science education, the Soviets would surpass the United 

States in 10 years. He was wrong. 

In the 1980’s, many pundits said that Japan’s rapid growth and 

its trade policies and manufacturing skills would make them the 

leading economic power within a few years. They were also wrong. 

Now we hear similar predictions about China and India. In 

thinking about these predictions, it is useful to ask why the Soviets 

or the Japanese did not succeed. Some of this has to do with weaknesses found in those countries. Every nation has its own strengths 

and weaknesses. And the U.S., as I mentioned earlier, has some 

unique advantages. 

A more important factor lies in the U.S. response. In each case, 

in the 1950’s and the 1960’s and the 1980’s, the U.S. changed its 

policies and practices. The lessons from this is that, if the U.S. 

finds the right set of responses, the problems it faces today are imminently manageable. 

There has already been some progress. There has been a number 

of eminent commissions. There have been reports. The President 

announced his American competitive initiative, the Competitiveness Initiative, and both parties have put forward programs for 

strengthening innovation. 

But these are only initial steps. There is still much to do. 

As the committee contemplates what to do next in harnessing 

technology for national security, I would like to conclude with four 

general recommendations. 
9 

First, make the promotion of innovation a goal for policy law. 

This may require streamlining and simplifying the regulatory burden on innovators. 

Second, identify where government action can be effective. One 

area is funding for basic research in the physical sciences. Without 

government support, the U.S. lead in these sciences will decline. 

Third, look for ways to expand our comparative advantage. We 

have a competitive market economy, and that gives us a superiority 

over some other countries. Policies that reinforce markets and competition will help. 

Additionally, measures that strengthen institutions like the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA), the service 

labs, the National Science Foundation (NSF) or the National Institutes of Health (NIH) and the graduate research programs at our 

universities will be crucial for maintaining American power. 

Fourth, the U.S. should look for ways to expand international cooperation. We have benefited greatly from globalization, and closer 

cooperation with allies will improve national security. 

In conclusion, Mr. Chairman, we face challenges when it comes 

to technology and national security. But I am guardedly optimistic 

that we can overcome them. 

I thank the committee for the opportunity to testify, and ask that 

my full remarks be submitted for the record. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Lewis can be found in the Appendix on page 45.] 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you. We will do that with the full remarks. 

Dr. Cohen. 

STATEMENT OF DR. BRIAN S. COHEN, INSTITUTE FOR 

DEFENSE ANALYSES 

Dr. COHEN. Mr. Chairman and distinguished members of the 

subcommittee, I am pleased to appear before you on behalf of the 

Institute for Defense Analyses, IDA, which is a federally funded research and development (R&D) center, whose sole mission is to 

support the Office of the Secretary of Defense and DOD on matters 

of national security. 

The topic of my discussion is on the globalization trends in the 

integrated circuit industrial base. My recent work has been focused 

on understanding and addressing concerns about the integrated circuit industry, and in particular on the Trusted Foundry Program. 

This program, while not necessarily a general solution, has been 

markedly successful. The Trusted Foundry Program has been well 

utilized from the start, providing secure and affordable, state-ofthe-art, domestic semiconductor manufacturing services for customdesigned integrated circuits for a wide range of defense and national security applications. 

I have submitted a detailed statement for the record. And I 

would be happy at this point to answer any questions the subcommittee may have. 

Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Dr. Cohen can be found in the Appendix on page 51.] 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you very much. 

Dr. Starr. 
10 

STATEMENT OF DR. STUART H. STARR, CENTER FOR TECHNOLOGY AND NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY, NATIONAL DEFENSE UNIVERSITY 

Dr. STARR. Mr. Chairman, distinguished committee members, ladies and gentlemen, I am very pleased to have the opportunity 

today to address this subcommittee on the important topic of actions to enhance the use of commercial information technology in 

DOD systems. 

I have more extensive remarks, and, of course, I would like to 

submit them for the record. 

In my remarks, I try to set the tone, the stage for this activity. 

But most of my colleagues who have been testifying have already 

done that well, so I will go ahead and pass on that. 

What we have been doing at the Center for Technology and National Security Policy (CTNSP) is looking at this issue over the last 

four years. To that end, we have done over 40 different studies. 

We try to take advantage of the best knowledge from government, industry, academia and think tanks. And from that we have 

distilled six key obstacles, and we have tried to suggest a set of recommendations that could be derived to deal with those obstacles. 

What I would like to do is submit for the record a more formal 

characterization of the studies that we performed and our synthesis 

of them into a characterization of the problem and potential activities. 

I would like to briefly summarize what we see as the key six obstacles that prevent the effective use of commercial Information 

Technology (IT) in DOD systems. 

Basically, they fall in the categories of a non-attractive market, 

non-transparency, lack of agility, lack of dominance, an isolating 

market and the challenge associated with primes and lead system 

integrators. 

I would like to very briefly comment on those obstacles so you 

have a sense about what we have synthesized from our various 

pieces. 

With respect to non-attractive market, one of the initial things 

that we did was conducted a survey among people who refuse to 

do work with DOD and people who did work with DOD. 

And to give you an example, in the survey, when people spoke 

of it as a non-attractive market, they said that DOD does not know 

what it wants, it takes too long to acquire key products and there 

are too many barriers to the bid process. 

DOD had a complementary study. And there they noted that 

commercial firms are reluctant to enter, due to the fact of intellectual property rights and the question of cost accounting, auditing 

and oversight responsibilities. 

So, all of those factors combined to create a non-attractive market for the small to medium-sized firms that are the most the creative in commercial IT. 

The second part of our survey dealt with the question about their 

ability to understand how to work with DOD. And there, this issue 

of non-transparency emerged. 

The comment was that the process is too difficult, too slow, too 

confusing and exclusionary. So the net effect is the people we are 
11 

trying to reach out to find us too distant and too difficult to work 

with. 

The third area is perhaps the most difficult one. It is this issue 

of non-agility in dealing with organization the size of the Department of Defense. 

Typically, you are all familiar with the planning, programming, 

budgeting and execution system. And people have observed that it 

takes between 18 and 24 months to transition from S&T into an 

actual acquisition. 

People in the community refer to that as ‘‘the valley of death.’’ 

I mean, a system can be sitting there waiting for transition, but 

is unable to begin to bridge that gap. That is an issue we have to 

begin to attack rapidly and effectively. 

The fourth issue, of course, is one that was alluded to by several 

of the other presenters: the non-dominance of the DOD. 

If we look back to the 1960’s, DOD was calling the shots as the 

dominant player. That is clearly not the case anymore. 

And, in fact, when we have been dealing with many venture capitalists, they threaten to pull their money out of these small and 

medium-sized companies, if they, in fact, deal with DOD. So, this 

is an issue that has to be dealt with. 

The fifth issue is this question of an isolating market. If you go 

to the DOD labs, they will have a mantra which says, ‘‘adopt, adapt 

and develop.’’ 

And the idea of adopt is, take a commercial product and use it 

effectively. Adapt is go ahead and bring in some of the attributes 

one needs. And then finally, if all else fails, develop. 

What we have been finding all too often is that people neither 

adopt or adapt, that they immediately jump to develop. And so, 

they are missing enormous opportunities that they should be exploiting. 

The last barrier that we find is in this issue of the prime and 

the lead system integrator. What we are finding there as we have 

done various case studies is that many of them prefer internal 

technology and may have conflicting objects about commercial, offthe-shelf products. And they are concerned about time limits and 

complexity of external technology. 

So, in many ways, they are not amenable to taking these kinds 

of activities and risks on, even though they offer extraordinary opportunities. 

Now, the question is, in light of these barriers, what are the options that we have to begin to address them? 

Well, a colleague of mine likes to say that, for every complex 

problem there is a simple, eloquent solution that is wrong. And so, 

in our view, one is going to have to go ahead and look at a complex 

set of these activities and balance them off in an intelligent way. 

And we have identified basically six steps, and we think that the 

challenge for the committee is to think about identifying and supporting the right six in a balance that begins to make sense. 

And these six step solutions deal with enhancing communications 

in organizations; increasing resource flexibility; reducing the acquisition barriers that I just alluded to; promoting cultural change; 

creating a system-of-systems engineering and integration organiza-
12 

tion and enhancing testing; and finally, adopting requirements for 

specific missions. 

What I would like to do is very briefly amplify on each of those 

solutions, so you have a sense about where our studies have taken 

us. 

The first one was enhancing communications and organization. 

And one of the things that we have been finding is this barrier between the Department of Defense and these small and mediumsized companies. And we have a number of initiatives that we 

think would begin to bridge that chasm. 

First, we have extraordinary opportunity with Web portals and 

the kind of technology that we use every day to enhance the communication between those communities. And we have looked at 

prototypes we believe that can make a major difference in bridging 

that gap. 

Another key point, you will remember, is that when we dealt 

with these small companies, they found out that the system was 

too complicated, too opaque. And so, what we recommend is the 

creation of tech prospectors and acquisition guides, who can go 

ahead and understand the needs of the DOD, appreciate the technology and communicate effectively with these companies. 

It is too much to ask these small, austere organizations to begin 

to do all those things unto themselves. 

Now, we believe there is an extraordinary initiative that has 

begun at Joint Forces Command (JFCOM), and this is the Office 

of Research and Technology Applications, which would be getting 

to go ahead and systematically deal with those issues. And we believe that they can add a great deal more with adequate resources 

and authorities. 

The second question and second potential solution is increasing 

resource flexibility. And one of the areas that our colleagues have 

worked closely with have been the Defense Security Cooperation 

Agency, the DSCA, as a model. And there is a case where DSCA 

is used a middleman, where it has resources and it ties into organizations that are best equipped to go ahead and do the acquisitions. 

So, we would argue not to create a new acquisition group, but to 

go ahead and take advantage of existing models and exploit them 

effectively. 

One of the thoughts that we have here is that a joint task force 

could be set up, led by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, that would work 

closely with the combatant commands. And our sense is, if they 

had a fund for prompt procurements to deal with the ‘‘valley of 

death’’ that we were alluding to, that it can make an enormous difference in transitioning things from good science and technology 

into products that the warfighter could actually use. 

The next area was this question of removing barriers. As we alluded to, small and medium-sized companies are very concerned 

about intellectual property rights, about the complexity of the acquisition process and the need for other transactional authority. 

We argue that a proper mix of those three can go ahead and 

make them much more effective in responding to the issues that 

we have begun to pose. 

The fourth issue is probably the most challenging. I am sure all 

of you remember the edict from Machiavelli, that nothing is more 
13 

difficult than changing the culture of a complex organization. And 

certainly, we have that problem with the Department of Defense. 

So, we believe that the essence of cultural change is education, 

that organizations like the Defense Acquisition University and organizations like Industrial College of the Armed Forces (ICAF), 

over at the National Defense University, are the place to turn to, 

to begin to get some of the necessary educational change to promote the cultural modifications that people need. 

Typically, you have got to work with the program managers and 

the Lead Systems Integrators (LSIs) to go ahead and give them incentives to use commercial technology and adopt Government Accountability Office (GAO)-recommended best practices to go ahead 

and implement them. 

The fifth recommendation we had dealt with the creation of a 

systems-to-systems engineering and integration organization. And 

this is one of the issues that one faces, because when one develops 

these activities, they are not deployed in isolation. They are part 

of a complex system of systems. 

And one needs an architectural vision. As David indicated, ones 

needs an open system architecture to begin to integrate those capabilities in. What we would like to see is an organization created, 

so we could begin to test things at a systems level, so one would 

have an appreciation of whether people’s promises are actually realized. 

In addition, we would like to see another comment that David 

made about looking at things in a mission context to understand 

the contribution that new systems would make to overall mission 

effectiveness. So, we believe an organization that dealt with that 

would begin to deal with that problem. 

Our last solution was really dealing with particular mission requirements. And one of the areas that we are very sensitive to and 

have been looking at very carefully over at CTNSP, is the question 

of using commercial IT to support stability operations. 

And what I would like to do is enter into the record a recent 

study that we did called ‘‘I-Power: The Information Revolution and 

Stability Operations.’’ And we argue that, if commercial IT is used 

there effectively, it could have tremendous leverage in going ahead 

and dealing with all the other problems that one faces in stability 

and reconstruction, to provide a basis for dealing with medical 

needs, education needs—all of the infrastructures that people require. 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on 

page 71.] 

Dr. STARR. So, commercial IT is the key point of leverage that 

one would begin to use. 

Let me complete my remarks by just observing one or two other 

things that we are doing at NDU that are germane. 

We are embarking on a theory of cyber power. And one of the 

things we are trying to do is to establish a framework to see how 

the cyber infrastructure, if enhanced effectively, can enhance the 

levers of power for the United States and go ahead and empower 

us against adversaries like transnational criminals, terrorists, potential peer individuals. 
14 

We believe that one needs this macro framework to begin to look 

at issues of policy, legal issues, et cetera, to go ahead and make intelligent decisions. 

One of the most important issues is the question of the Internet. 

We have been using that to great advantage, but we are deeply 

concerned about its security deficiencies. 

And so, one of the things that we emphasize strongly is to pursue 

the activities at the National Science Foundation and DARPA, to 

go ahead and re-imagine the Internet, in a way, that would begin 

to fundamentally deal with those security issues, so we would have 

a firm foundation to build on. 

Currently, we see it as a foundation of sand. And we need to go 

ahead and to buttress that capability. 

The last comment I would like to make deals with a recent study 

that was done at NDU on ‘‘The Science and Technology Innovation 

Conundrum,’’ and I would like to enter this into the record, as well. 

[The information referred to is retained in the committee files 

and can be viewed upon request.] 

Dr. STARR. My colleague, Tim Coffey, who is the former head of 

Naval Research Laboratory (NRL), has observed that there are two 

key aspects of S&T. One is prospecting, and the other is mining. 

In prospecting, one can go ahead and do basic research, and 

there are issues about the long-term payback. In mining, one gets 

immediate gratification. 

Tim’s argument is that we have a major void in governance in 

the prospecting phase. And that is a major challenge for the government to go ahead and take a strong role there to provide that 

particular foundation. 

I hope these recommendations are of value to you, and I truly 

look forward to answering any questions you might pose. 

[The prepared statement of Dr. Starr can be found in the Appendix on page 58.] 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you all very much. 

We have just a few members here, so I think we will be a little 

flexible on the five-minute rule. We will try to keep it close to five 

or six minutes, but if members have questions beyond that, we will 

not be too much of a stickler for details on that. 

If I could start—actually, Mr. Lewis, your comments about our 

inability—just lack of funding, certainly, for innovation. I am curious exactly where we need to spend more money, and definitely 

agree with you. 

But then also, the second piece of it, which is, in a post-9/11 

world, we are not doing as well at attracting the technologists and 

innovators to come. 

I mean, an enormous advantage that this country had, that I 

think people underestimate is, throughout the 1960’s, 1970’s, 

1980’s and into the 1990’s, the smartest people in the world, almost 

universally wanted to come here. And we, by and large, let them, 

and benefited greatly from that. 

Now, we are a little bit more concerned about the process of letting people into this country. And I understand that, but I definitely think there is a downside we need to highlight more. 
15 

So, a second question for you is, how can we change that process 

a little bit, keeping in mind the security needs? I think we can all 

agree we have gone too far in the other direction. 

The final point, you mentioned some of the controls on exports. 

And this is really just an observation to put into the record for me. 

I battled the export control issue on this committee for a long time. 

The first time it came up—and this, I believe, was dealing with 

the encryption piece—I was, you know, I lost the vote in the 

amendment 46 to 1 in the committee, because the mindset is, we 

have to protect all of the technology and innovation we have developed here. We cannot let it slip out into the rest of the world, lest 

they figure out something and it falls into the hands of our enemies. 

So, they viewed it as sort of defense versus business. And I have 

always disagreed with. And you made the point very well. 

If the U.S. companies are the leaders in technology in the world, 

then they are going to put us in a better position to defend ourselves. If we lose that leadership, if it drifts overseas, then we have 

totally lost any control we have. 

So, you know, it is sort of the more we tighten our grip, the more 

it slips through our fingers kind of thing. And I just wish we could 

grasp that point. 

And as we are making it more and more difficult for domestic 

U.S. technology companies to export what they do, they ship the innovation overseas and we lose it, and our national security drifts 

backwards, not forwards—a debate we will have further on this 

committee, I am sure. 

You can comment on that, if you like. But I am curious about the 

first two parts of the question. 

Where can we spend more money? And how can we make some 

adjustments to get the best and the brightest to start coming here 

again? 

Mr. LEWIS. Great questions, Mr. Chairman. Let me try and answer them. 

And let me mention that the points you made on export controls 

reinforce some of the issues we have on research and on immigration, because American companies will say we are in a worldwide 

competition for brains. 

There are brains, and we would rather have them than our competitors. And if that means we have to go to China or to India or 

to Europe to set up our research centers to get those brains, that 

is what we will do. Because if they do not, their competitors will. 

So you have put your finger on it. 

The place I would look for a change in the future is in our aerospace industry, which might be suffering some erosion, because of 

export controls. So, a serious problem for defense. 

On the post-September 11 restrictions, one of the things that has 

happened is that other countries have gone out of their way. They 

have looked at what the U.S. did. They love it. They want to copy 

it. And they are competing with us. 

And so, you see, for example, the British had big signs in a Middle Eastern country on the way to the airport. 

‘‘Can’t get a visa to study in the U.S.? Call the British consulate.’’ 
16 

The Chinese have awards now they call the ‘‘sea turtles’’—which 

I guess is some Chinese pun for sea turtles—returning Chinese scientists, who come from Silicon Valley, bring not only their technical skills, but their management skills. And they get funding, 

they get housing allowances. They get government recognition. 

Singapore is famous for this, Australia—the list goes on and on. 

To compensate for this, we have to remember that the most important factor is, our universities are still strong. And this relates 

to the basic research question. If we have strong universities, people will come here to study. 

An easy change would be to say, once they study, once they get 

their doctorate, once they are at the peak of their educational 

skills, we should let them stay. Our current policy is to make them 

leave. 

Mr. SMITH. And that is something that we, you know, on the immigration debate, that is a piece that a number of us are talking 

about putting in; if you get that degree, you get an automatic work 

visa, basically, if you have those skills, you know. 

We spend all the money in our university system to educate 

them, and then we tell them to leave. 

Mr. LEWIS. It is interesting to me that other countries are considering a similar approach. If you come in with an advanced degree, 

they will accelerate your residency permit, or they will give you 

automatic residency status. 

So, we may not have recognized that we are in this competition 

for brains as a country, but other countries have recognized it. And 

there are some things we could do. 

This is just a tiny slice of the immigration debate. We are not 

talking about millions of people. We are talking about a high end 

of students who are getting very advanced degrees, and how do we 

get them to stay here. 

We have innate advantages. They came here for a reason. How 

do we get them to stay? And changing our rules to accommodate 

that would help. 

Related to that is the question, I think, of basic research. 

Funding for basic research is not something that companies will 

do. They cannot afford it, because basic research does not result in 

a product that you can sell, right. Or if it does result in something, 

it is usually open to your competitors. 

So, this is an area where the government plays an absolutely 

crucial role. And it has been an area of strength for the U.S. in the 

past, because of DARPA, NSF, some of the other activities. 

We have made two fundamental problems. We have made two 

fundamental errors. 

The first is, we have kind of rested on our laurels. And so, if you 

look at the spending—and I know it is a tight budget environment. 

It is very difficult to argue for more money. And I usually tell the 

scientists, do not go in and ask for money right away, because, you 

know, no one is going to be happy. 

But our spending has been flat; other countries are ramping up. 

Particularly flat in areas that I think relate to military technologies, whether that is aeronautics, IT, physics, chemistry, engineering. 
17 

You know that about a decade ago, the Congress decided to double investment at NIH, and that has had very powerful results for 

the American economy. 

But the speaker at the time has even said that perhaps it was 

an oversight not to, at the same time, double funding for NSF, because we have weakened the base of basic research on which so 

many of these other activities rest. So, I would look for ways to increase the funding there. 

I did look at the numbers, Mr. Chairman, since I thought someone might ask that. And there has been a small increase in the last 

year. It is a little less than two percent. 

When you think about it, that is nice, two percent. But gross domestic product (GDP) increased about 3.2 percent, and inflation increased a little more than 3 percent. So, in effect, a two percent increase is really a cut. 

So, my argument would be, in the areas of military significance, 

increase the funding for basic research. 

Mr. SMITH. Thanks. 

Mr. Thornberry. 

Mr. THORNBERRY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I guess I want to step back for just a second. It seems to me 

there are two broad categories of issues. One is spending, how 

much and on what. And the other is processes, how it is to deal 

with the Federal Government. 

And I think nearly all of you, if not all of you, have dealt with 

that in some way or another, Dr. Cohen by way of a positive example in his written testimony. 

I guess I would just like just to go down the line briefly and ask 

each of you: How much more could we get out of the money we 

spend, if we improve our processes, if we make it easier to deal 

with the Federal Government and harvest some of that small, middle-sized companies who are the innovative leaders in IT? But I 

suspect it is true across the board, too. 

So, Dr. Starr, let me just start with you. And if you do not mind, 

let us just go down the row on it. 

Mr. SMITH. If I could just place an emphasis on the ‘‘briefly.’’ If 

we get a five-minute answer from each of you, that is going to leave 

some folks behind here, so let us shoot for a minute, minute-anda-half, thereabouts. 

Go ahead. 

Dr. STARR. Okay. That is really a brilliant question. And I think 

process is vital. 

As one example, I have worked with the Defense Venture Catalyst Initiative—DeVenCI—that OSD did. And it went ahead and 

used venture capitalists as a way of identifying where there were 

interesting capabilities and leading these people through so they 

could be more effective. 

The challenge of those efforts is that they are too little too late. 

And so what we need is to begin to expand those on a large enough 

scale to reach out commensurate with the nature of the problem. 

So, I agree with you completely, that we need new processes. We 

need these tech prospectors, we need acquisition guides, but we 

need enough of them to make a difference in the problem. 
18 

Mr. THORNBERRY. And my question is, how much is that going 

to help? I mean, a lot? Could we get a whole lot more bang for our 

buck, if it were easier to deal with the Department of Defense? 

Dr. STARR. Yes. I believe there is an extraordinary payoff, not 

only in terms of intellectual tie-in, but in addition, if one had 

brought technology to bear in terms of Web portals and made it 

much more transparent for people to understand what is going on. 

I mean, the barriers that I spoke about were the questions of 

opacity, complexity and things of that nature. It could make a big 

difference. 

Mr. SMITH. If I could interrupt, just as we go down the line. I 

think that the big thing to focus on here, when you talk about the 

process—you know, why is it so cumbersome, why is it such a problem—there is kind of an implicit assumption that it is just, ‘‘Eh, 

bureaucracies, that is the way they are.’’ And that is not really 

true. 

To my mind, the biggest reason that all of this is in place is, we 

are talking about a lot of money. And everybody wants to make 

sure that, when that money is spent, and if anything goes haywire, 

they can say, well, you know, we did the 55 forms, and we bid this 

through the 6 different companies, we crossed all the T’s and dotted all the I’s about 5 different times. And even though everything 

went haywire, hey, we did what we could. 

And so, if we are going to do this and fix this, we have to be willing to take a little bit of a risk, which I personally am willing to 

take, to say we are going to empower decision-makers at every step 

along this process to say, you know, assistant whatever for procurement, you get to decide. 

Is this the right thing? Buy it. We are not going to make you fill 

out forms and go up four levels of command. 

As you answer this question, if you could touch on that tradeoff 

between protecting against that and the way it bogs us down, I 

think that would be helpful. If we can go down the line, is fine. 

Dr. COHEN. Let me offer my personal opinion. The idea that once 

defense dominated industries, have now become commercially 

dominated, yet we could still use the same processes that we had 

in the past, really has to come under close examination. 

I think, my work with the Trusted Foundry has made clear to 

me that, actually, new approaches, whether they be business structures, ways of partnering with commercial industry, offer significant opportunities for innovation. 

As Dr. Starr had noted, while the Department has traditionally 

developed things very well, they have not always adopted them. 

And our ability to use commercial technologies and get them quickly into practice is really hindered by the processes that we have in 

place. 

So, I would speculate that there would be significant advantages 

in innovating in those sorts of business practices and processes to 

allow you to take commercial technologies, partner with these commercial industries, protect the intellectual property that is at the 

heart of the profit-making in commercial industries, but at the 

same time accelerate getting those technologies into place for the 

Department at much lower cost. 

Thanks. 
19 

Mr. LEHMAN. I would agree that I think we can get a lot more 

out of some new processes here. I think one of the examples is, InQ-Tel has done a very good job of—and they have gotten the users 

together with the venture capitalists very early on in this process 

and said, you know, if you do this to the product, there is a market 

for it, and we will supply that market. 

And it has ended up that they have had to invest much less in 

these companies than they originally thought they would have, because the venture capitalists like the fact that they are bringing a 

market, and they do not really want the government to have equity 

stake in the company, because that is less for them. But they are 

willing to put more money in it themselves, because the government has said that there is a market here. 

So, I thought that was a very innovative approach and is showing the kinds of results that you can get if you do that. 

In my prepared statement, I had an anecdote in there from 

iRobot, which is a small company. You may have seen the Roomba 

vacuum cleaner. But they also make a PackBot, a robot, which the 

DOD uses for exploring caves, and the like, in Afghanistan. 

They had to hire a retired admiral to help them through the acquisition process and the mire of regulations. And so, if we can lift 

those regulations, it will make it a lot easier for other companies 

to do, as iRobot did, bridge that gap from small business innovative 

research (SBIR)s into real products. 

Mr. LEWIS. You know, it is a great question, and I think all the 

points have been useful. 

If you remember CORONA, which was our first spy satellite, CORONA was finally launched after 13 successive failures. So, I wonder if we could ever have a program like that again, where the people would be able to—yet it was a tremendous success. 

And so, the point about accepting more risk is crucial. We are 

more risk-averse and that hurts us. 

Streamlining would be great. I do think there would be some 

bang. I was trying to do some really cheap calculations in my head, 

so I apologize if they are a bit informal, but this would buy us a 

few years, maybe five years. But at the end of the day, we are 

going to have to ante up a bit more. 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you all. 

Mr. Marshall. 

Mr. MARSHALL. Mac, were you finished? 

Mr. THORNBERRY. Yes. 

Mr. MARSHALL. This is territory that is relatively unfamiliar to 

me. And I find myself, as I listen to you and glance at your testimony—I have not had an opportunity to read it thoroughly—finding that you are in agreement with one another that we are too 

cumbersome, too over-regulated, too slow to be as effective as we 

might be. 

And all of you are very familiar with the reasons why we are too 

slow. And each of you says we ought to lessen the regulatory burdens, lessen the—but you know why we do that. The chairman 

here kind of described. 

Is there reform out there that keeps the baby and tosses the 

bathwater that you are aware of? Or are people simply at the level 

of frustration where it is beyond human scale? We really do not un-
20 

derstand how we got into the mess that we are in; we just recognize that it is a mess. 

It is too complicated, and consequently is slowing us down, costing us lots of opportunities and making it very difficult for us to 

accomplish our objective at a reasonable expense. 

Or is there something specific that we ought to be adopting that 

you are aware of? Has somebody come up with this is the way we 

ought to be doing it, it meets the objectives that are served by the 

current system and it also enables us to do this quicker, more efficiently? 

Dr. STARR. Let me take that first. And I think there are some 

real innovations that are going on that we want to take advantage 

of and build on. 

In my testimony, I alluded to ORTA, the Office of Research and 

Technology Application that has been created down at Joint Forces 

Command. And they have gone ahead and signed multiple contracts with various companies to go ahead and share development 

activities, working SBIR activities, holding fora to explain to small 

and mid-sized businesses what their needs are. 

But the thing is, ORTA is a miniscule activity, just a few people, 

limited authorities. And so, one point would be to go ahead and 

build on that activity, to provide them with more prospectors and 

acquisition guides to begin to expand things. 

So, I think that is a useful thing. 

Mr. MARSHALL. Let me interrupt. 

Dr. STARR. Go right ahead. 

Mr. MARSHALL. All right, let us assume that we are not going to 

begin by changing the entire system and using the model that you 

just described as the model for the entire system. 

What work do you funnel to ORTA that would best—if you are 

going to expand, how do you expand? 

Dr. STARR. Well, I think one of the key points about ORTA is 

that, Joint Forces Command tries to speak for the combatant commands, so, the user. And so, it has been a good window for them 

to go ahead and have the combatant commanders explain what 

their immediate needs are, and to reach out to organizations. 

You are right. And again, there is no single, silver bullet that is 

going to solve all these problems. 

Another area that I think is a complementary activity, is just 

about every service in OSD—and David alluded to In-Q-Tel—has 

been trying to take advantage of venture capitalists. 

And they have done very different models. I mean, almost everybody, in fact, has pursued a slightly different path. 

But they are probably underfunded. I think they are doing some 

very useful work, and they should be working much more cohesively together. 

When In-Q-Tel finds something that is not quite useful for them, 

they should be able to pass it off to the Army or the Navy, or whatever organization is appropriate. 

So, I think there is strength in unity there, where the venture 

capital activity has been very fragmented. And more cohesiveness 

there could make that a more potent technique. 
21 

I certainly agree with you that there is no one mechanism that 

will resolve all of these issues. But there are a few that have promise, and one can build on and expand. 

Mr. MARSHALL. I guess, to any of you, who is working on—who 

is it that is trying to reform this process in a way that makes 

sense? And who has come up with some—is anybody doing that? 

I mean, you have got some suggestions, and then you observe that 

the rest of it is just—— 

Mr. SMITH. If I could interrupt just a second. 

We are. Our committee is. And I will say that the report that Dr. 

Starr referenced a few moments ago was as a result of a request 

from this committee, that I and some others worked with Dr. Starr 

on. 

In last session we then tried to implement some aspects of that 

report—unsuccessfully, but I am hoping for a more favorable review this time. 

And we are going to continue working on that and trying to expand upon what is going on at the Joint Command to try to expand 

those opportunities. It is one of the big things in the science and 

technology are that I want to get to. 

I want to get to the point where we are empowering the—you 

know, however the command structure works. If it is the combatant command, you know, the theater, wherever it is, let us empower them to make more decisions so they can cut through the 

acquisition process. 

So, and Dr. Starr. 

Dr. STARR. Let me just amplify one point, as well. 

You asked, is anybody trying to deal with this. We have, in fact, 

briefed the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and key players 

on the Joint Staff. So, they are working it. 

It is just that they have not quite converged on good solutions 

at this point. They have been interested in what we are saying. 

They are absorbing it and they are trying initiatives. It is just a 

question about work in progress. 

Mr. MARSHALL. The process of reforming the process is what we 

are talking about right now. And if the process of reforming the 

process is as ad hoc as was just described by our chairman and 

you, then we are missing the boat. 

There ought to be a more formal, understood way to tackle what 

is recognized by all of you gentlemen and us as a problem than this 

committee trying to drive it with the limited lights we possess. 

Mr. SMITH. No offense intended to our staff, I suppose. I do not 

think we are quite as limited as that, Jim, but I respect what you 

are saying. 

And one of the challenges that we face, and one of the things 

that we are working on, is to get the military on board with this. 

And, you know, they have got a lot to do. 

Number one and number two, they do not want to be dragged too 

far down a road that they are left holding the bag on, which I respect. But we are working with them to try to get to that point. 

Mr. MARSHALL. May I—— 

Mr. SMITH. Sure. 

Mr. MARSHALL [continuing]. Just one more observation about it. 

I cannot remember the name of the professor, but a couple of guys 
22 

wrote a book some time ago about businesses that get beyond 

human scale, and described the challenges those businesses face. 

The Pentagon has been beyond human scale for a long time. And 

we are kidding ourselves if we think this committee and its limited 

staff is going to be able to solve this problem. 

It is processes. You put together a process to attack the process, 

if you are going to be successful, it seems to me. 

And we ought to at least talk a little bit about that, and that is 

why I asked the questions I asked. 

Mr. LEWIS. Can I add something on that, Mr. Chairman? 

Mr. SMITH. Certainly. 

Mr. LEWIS. Thanks. 

I think you are right, because I know that sometimes I have been 

in meetings where we have talked about doing projects on acquisitions reform. And people run screaming from the room. It is an 

overwhelming task, and it will take a very long time to untangle 

this knot. 

In the interim, there are a couple of things you can do. The usual 

approach is to create some new organization outside of the existing 

dinosaur. And say, the new organization—it is small, it is flexible. 

Let them try it. If it does not work, it goes away. In-Q-Tel is a good 

example. 

Another one is to find a way to give an organization the power 

to waive some of the acquisitions requirements, and if it needs to 

be, an emergency or a crisis or mitigating circumstances. 

But those are the two steps that most people use while you confront what is a crucial problem, but a problem that may take 

awhile to solve. 

On a note of consolation, let me say that, when I think about our 

processes, our processes are very complex. You could even describe 

them as ‘‘bad,’’ but they are less bad than the processes you see in 

other countries. So, we are still a little bit ahead there. 

I do not know if I would want to rest on that one very long, but 

in the interim, there are intermediary steps we can take to speed 

things up. 

Mr. SMITH. And I am realistic about the challenge here. I do not 

think you can invent a process that saves you from the problems 

of process. As the sentence would imply, the process itself can 

strangle you. 

And there is only so much—we are spending a lot of money. And 

a lot of people are involved in that process, from the warrior right 

up through the chain of command, to the congressional side of it. 

There is no way to sort of peel all those people back and create 

some seamless, streamlined dictatorship. We have to understand 

that is the way the system works, but we have to—you know, look 

for the places, as all of you have done, where we can make some 

improvements on that. 

Mr. Conaway. 

Mr. CONAWAY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I share your idea about being willing to take greater risks on 

trusting people to make decisions, but until you and I and our colleagues give up the Monday morning quarterbacking and the, you 

know, tour the battlefield, shoot the wounded kind of mentality 

that we live in, where we punish decisions that we do not agree 
23 

with, where we punish decisions that lead to failures that, in hindsight we would have something different—till we get rid of that 

mentality, then no one on the uniform side of those tables—you 

know, they have got a tough job to do. 

Because we get to evaluate what happened, and then Monday 

morning quarterback, say, well, I have would have done it this— 

now that we know the results of those experiments, I would have 

done it a whole lot differently in my infinite wisdom. 

But I think we all recognize our penchant for that, and it goes 

with the territory, just part of the system, unfortunately. Could you gentlemen help me understand? We spend $3 billion at DOD, or $80 billion, I think, somebody’s testimony showed, overall, the government. 

How do we start with or vet? How do we figure out what we 

want to research, what we want to look at? 

I do not understand, really, how we decide collectively where we 

want to go. It seems like we have a zillion little places to get to. 

But is there a board of science and technology research that says 

we need to focus here, here and here? Or is it just ad hoc, whoever 

has come up with today’s best idea goes at the funders? 

How does that system, top-down, look? I mean, how do we apportion our efforts, whether it is dollars or efforts themselves, across 

that huge spectrum of science and technology and research? 

How do we focus? Or do we focus? 

Mr. LEHMAN. Well, there are multiple—it is not a single, topdown activity. The Office Director, Defense Research and Engineering (DDR&E) has some responsibility for that. Each of the service 

labs has some responsibility for that. 

And there is a huge requirements process out there that starts 

out at the combatant commands that rolls up through, and the 

service labs will respond to the requirements in those documents. 

That is a good start. But as I said in my testimony, you miss the 

rich interaction of the service lab people actually getting out in the 

field and seeing what the problems are. 

And they respond to that, but then they are disconnected from 

the acquisition programs that are actually going to build those programs. 

So, the planning process needs to be—— 

Mr. CONAWAY. Is this research focused on just the applied research, as opposed to—— 

Mr. LEHMAN. It is both. 

Mr. CONAWAY [continuing]. We do not know what we do not 

know? 

Mr. LEHMAN. It is both. It is both. 

Mr. CONAWAY. We ought to have folks out there who are just trying to explore for the sake of exploring. 

Mr. LEHMAN. And there are people doing that. 

Mr. CONAWAY. So, if everybody is in charge of that, then nobody 

is in charge of that. 

Does the pyramid not shrink to the top, where at least one small 

group of people says, we need some folks out here thinking about 

the unthinkable, and we need some other folks thinking this 

warfighter needs X, a way to defeat improvised explosive devices 

(IEDs), so you have got it coming from both ways? 
24 

Do we have any system like that anywhere? 

Mr. LEHMAN. I think there are multiple pyramids. There is not 

a single pyramid. 

Mr. CONAWAY. So then if everybody is in charge, nobody is in 

charge. 

Mr. LEHMAN. Well, it is not everybody, but there are multiple 

pyramids. There is a pyramid for each service, and there is an Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) pyramid. 

Mr. CONAWAY. Okay. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Dr. STARR. Let me just amplify on that just a bit, because I believe you are going to have John Young giving a presentation here. 

And over the years, I have been a member of the Technology 

Area Review and Assessment Process, whereby there was project 

reliance and they took the various S&T activities and structured 

them, and began to make some judgments about how they were 

doing and where there were important shortfalls. 

So, there is, in fact, a formal process that is used. There are 

questions about it. I know, as a reviewer, I was unhappy with it, 

because it was incomplete and it did not give us an opportunity to 

really weigh in the way we thought we should. 

But there is a foundation to build on, and you should certainly 

speak to Mr. Young, and I am sure he can amplify it. 

Mr. LEWIS. You also are going to have, I think, Dr. Tether from 

DARPA. DARPA has a relatively interesting system where they 

take young researchers, mid-career researchers, bring them in for 

a few years to manage programs. 

These are people who know what is going on in the research 

community. They have an idea where to spend the money. They 

hear from DOD what some of the bigger problems are. 

And then after four or five years, they leave and go back into the 

scientific community. That process of refreshment is really helpful 

in doing the kind of targeting you are talking about. He may have 

more information on it. 

Mr. SMITH. Ms. Gillibrand. 

Mrs. GILLIBRAND. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you for 

holding this hearing. I think the topics that we are discussing 

today are of vital importance for our national security and for our 

economic growth. 

In my district—I am in upstate New York—we have begun to 

focus a model on bringing universities together with the DOD in 

a very innovative and exciting framework. So we have the State 

University of New York (SUNY) campus that is doing the Center 

for Nanotechnology. And almost half of those contracts are DOD 

contracts. 

We also have the Request Progression Interface (RPI) system, 

and they are doing enormous amounts of innovation. 

And from these two areas of learning and education have spurred 

a number of small business. So I have one small business who has 

created this ball that a soldier can roll into a war zone, and it has 

a 360-degree view of what is happening around that corner, to give 

the soldiers real-time intelligence about what is happening. 

Other producers are making a great new material to make 

stronger vests to protect our soldiers, a material that we are now 
25 

using on the space shuttle to fix the tiles that come loose. It is impervious to heat and is very strong, but very lightweight. 

And so, what I would like to ask you to comment on is, how can 

we as legislators improve the likelihood of the DOD using this 

model to its benefit, to center its research around educational facilities and to have those kinds of contracts where you have the benefit of innovation, but you also have the security of having these 

labs based in the United States, so all this work is not continually 

outsourced? 

I read somewhere that chip manufacturing is continually being 

outsourced to other countries, and that really creates security concerns for us, because we need them manufactured here. We need 

to be on top of the intelligence designed here. 

And what I would like to know from you, I would like to have 

guidance on how you think we, as legislators, can improve the regulations, create funding models, perhaps, where we can have these 

centers of innovation, where they can be surrounded around these 

university systems where you have the best new ideas coming out, 

and have the DOD actually be part of those facilities, so that they 

can build from within and have that technology be in-house? 

I have read through your testimony that you have some ideas 

about public-private partnerships, which I think are strong. But we 

need to maintain ownership of this technology. 

And I do not think just contracting out to the private sector is 

the solution, because then you have the problem of the current 

DOD acquisition timelines, that are very, very long—one year, two 

years, three years out—when you have already come up with a new 

idea. 

So, I really want you to advise our committee on what are some 

ideas for looking at the most innovative frameworks for innovation 

and growth and design and new technologies, which I think is the 

education system hubs that we are doing well in our district, and 

how that could be used with the DOD. 

Dr. STARR. Well, let me make one quick observation. 

We have probably the world’s expert in the audience here, Dr. 

Bill Berry, who recently joined National Defense University. And 

he was deeply involved with overseeing research in the Multidisciplinary University Research Initiative (MURI) program and things 

of that nature. 

So, I am certainly not an expert, but Bill is. And so, perhaps for 

the record, he could go ahead and respond to your comments. 

Mr. SMITH. Yes, that is permitted. And we will just—if you could 

come forward. And he is a member of the same organization as Dr. 

Starr. 

Just state your name for the record, so we can get that. 

Mr. BERRY. I am Bill Berry. I am at the Center for Technology 

and National Security Policy at the National Defense University. 

And the issue you raise, I think is an important issue. I think 

there are some models that the Defense Department is already 

using, which establish center-like organizations. 

We have a number of different models that are used. There are 

university-affiliated research centers in various parts of the country. 
26 

Another interesting model, I think, is one that the Army Research Lab is using called Collaborative Technology Alliances, 

where they work directly with the Army Research Laboratory, either at Aberdeen Proving Ground here in Maryland, or in Adelphi, 

in a number of areas where we bring in work done in the universities, but also in the defense laboratory in this case, and working 

closely with industry, so that the new ideas that are generated 

there have a pathway from the university and the laboratory directly to industry. 

There are a number of other models, I think, that are not so 

much regional. But we do have the Multidisciplinary University 

Research Initiative, which is a center-like program, that generally 

involves a number of universities across the United States. 

And a major effort has been done over the past four or five years 

to link those institutes with our defense laboratories more closely, 

so that the products and the ideas that are generated there do feed 

directly into our laboratory systems, like the Naval Research Lab, 

the Army Research Lab and the Air Force Research Laboratory. 

So, I think a lot is being done in that regard to try and set up 

these kinds of opportunities for integration across academia to defense laboratories and industry. And I actually think we have done 

a reasonable job there. 

Some of those are regional, as you suggest, in the case of the 

New York State model you mentioned. But some of them are 

spread across the United States to take advantage of universities 

in any state that can contribute in a given area of research. 

Mrs. GILLIBRAND. Is there something that we can do legislatively, 

in terms of regulatory aspects, or in terms of appropriations, that 

would facilitate that process? 

And second, do you think the work that has been done in those 

kinds of university hub paradigms, is it effective? Is it proving to 

be effective in the design and creation of new technologies that 

benefit our soldiers? 

Mr. BERRY. My answer to that immediately would be ‘‘yes.’’ I 

think it is being very effective. And I think any time when you can 

bring those three communities together—that is, the defense laboratory, which has a lot of unique capabilities that you will not find 

either in academia or industry and has the ability to work across 

the domain of classifications—that is a real benefit. 

But I can give you examples of lots of things that have come out 

of these kinds of unions, like control algorithms for autonomous 

systems that go directly from university ideas for algorithms to 

control these things, tested in the defense laboratories, and industry picking those up and actually developing them into these autonomous air vehicles, for example. That is one that comes to mind immediately. 

I think, things that you have heard here, the need for increases 

in fundamental research, that is really the stimulus and lays the 

foundation for all of the things that the Department of Defense is 

going to use in the future, is an important—— 

And I always applaud the ideas that we have to increase basic 

research, primarily in physical sciences in the United States, and 

people always want to lift up the National Science Foundation and 
27 

National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) and other 

places. 

But a very large part of the engineering research, in particular, 

and physical sciences research in this country is actually done by 

the Department of Defense. And we have not really included increases in basic research in the Department of Defense basic research programs, I think, to the extent that we should. 

Mrs. GILLIBRAND. Thank you. 

Mr. LEWIS. Let me give you another example, if I could, that 

would be quick. 

One of the states that has been very successful in doing this is, 

actually, I think, North Dakota. And what I usually say is, if North 

Dakota can do it, anybody can do it. 

But what they have done is focused on their universities as a 

place where you have got human capital. They have looked for 

ways to bring in the support you need. And if you need lawyers 

who know about intellectual property, you need a way to hook into 

venture capital, these are things the state has to do. 

And, you know, there are ways to help state governments think 

about that. 

One thing that is crucial, in addition to increasing the pot of 

funding that they are going to be competing for, though, is finding 

a way for these state universities to figure out how to deal with 

Washington, because, as you have heard from all of us, it is complex. It can be confusing. 

The states that have figured this out, like the California system 

do very well and they are a powerhouse in science. 

So, that would be one area you could think about. How do I make 

it easier for my state to navigate the various channels and pathways you have to get through here? 

Mr. SMITH. I think that is, you know—if we did not do anything 

about the process, and all we did was invested more in innovation 

and created the atmosphere where the world’s innovators could 

come here and prosper—if that is all we did and did not change 

the process at all, I think we would make an enormous difference 

on that alone. 

Mr. Kline. 

Mr. KLINE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And thank you to the witnesses. 

I am sorry, as is so often the case here, we have to step out for 

a bit to attend other committee business. And so, I understand that 

I missed Mr. Thornberry’s question. I just got a thumbnail catchup on it. So I do not want to recover that ground, but I think it 

will connect to my interest and concerns here. 

I am looking, Dr. Starr, at your testimony and I listened with 

some interest to your recommended actions. You had six of them 

and they are captured here. 

It just kind of makes me want to cry, not because I disagree with 

the recommendations, but with my own personal experience, I 

know for almost 20 years, personally, and I know from stories way 

preceding that, that we have been grappling with almost exactly 

these same problems and, frankly, many of the same recommendations. 
28 

Defense acquisition official, under secretary of defense for acquisition, DDR&E after DDR&E, director of DARPA after director of 

DARPA has grappled with the same issues. 

We have an acquisition system in the Department of Defense 

that is badly, seriously broken. And everywhere you turn in that 

process, it seems to me, it is broken. 

We have a requirements process. We have to verify requirements 

in a process that sometimes takes years instead of, arguably, weeks 

or certainly months. 

And as you pointed out, we have, what was it, a valley of death. 

I forget, one of you pointed out that valley of death. 

And so, I am sort of laboring in despair here as I look at these 

recommendations—‘‘reduce acquisition barriers.’’ That just sort of 

makes me—as I said, my shoulders are sagging here, because that 

is an enormous problem. 

‘‘Promote cultural change.’’ Everyone, I am sure—and I should 

never speak for my colleagues, because we are a fairly diverse 

group here. But I would hazard a guess that we probably would 

certainly agree with that. 

But I do not know that the gentlelady’s question, how legislatively we fix that. We are looking for those ideas. You have some 

expansion here. 

But I am just frustrated like all of us. And I know you are, I can 

tell in your testimony. You are experts in this field and you have 

been working with them for a long time. 

So, let me just focus back to where I think there is a piece here 

that I am really intrigued by. And that is in your number one recommendation, enhance communications organization, where you 

say—and I am reading from your testimony—to enhance communications, technology prospectors should be created to conduct more 

focused searches and facilitate the injection of commercial off-theshelf (COTS) products into DOD systems. 

Absolutely. Web portals should be created to coordinate the use 

of commercial IT, and acquisition guides should be provided to 

smaller companies. 

And I think that was a part of Mr. Thornberry’s question. You 

have got smaller companies who have great ideas. And how do you 

get them in there? 

And then you mention JFCOM. 

But I am sort of open to any of you. If you think in terms of the 

frustrated entrepreneur out there, or university professor or researcher, who really has this great idea, and you really want to get 

it in front of somebody, it looks to me like that is what you are suggesting here, is there a way for that—whatever, the round ball that 

you throw around corners, or speech translators or—there is a lot 

of good—my district, like others, has lots of small companies that 

have fabulous ideas. 

And I can tell you that it is pushing a rope to get those in front 

of somebody who is a decision-maker, and, in fact, then, to determine who the decision-maker is, because of all the rest of this 

stuff—the culture, built-in decades of bureaucracy and process, a 

testing system that is broken, developmental testing and operational testing. When do you start and where do you start over 

again? 
29 

It is an enormously complicated and, frankly, antiquated and bad 

system. 

I am desperate for a way to wave a legislative, which we could 

get bipartisan support on, and fix that. I do not know what that 

is. 

But this idea, where would you go to create such a Web portal? 

From anybody. 

Dr. Starr, it is your testimony, so I should go to you. 

Dr. STARR. Well, that is a great point. I mean, we see that as potentially one of the contributors to a solution. 

In fact, over at CTNSP, one of the initial prototypes we did was 

create something called Early Military Involvement Speed and Accelerated Results (EMISARS), which was designed—our vision 

would be that you would have a mall of capabilities and various 

boutique things that were geared to particular problems of interest. 

And EMISARS is meant to be one of the elements that would fit 

into that mall. 

So, at this stage, we have done a prototype activity and worked 

with JFCOM. It has been stalled, but at least we began to demonstrate—and I note, we share the frustration that you have, obviously. But we think—— 

Mr. KLINE. I did not mean for that to show on my face so clearly, 

but I am sorry. 

Dr. STARR. But, I mean, it is clear that, in the way we do our 

normal business these days, I know if I book a trip or if I buy 

something on eBay or Amazon, et cetera, it is very, very than the 

way I did things 5 or 10 years ago. 

DOD has not kept up. 

Mr. KLINE. Exactly. 

Dr. STARR. And so, it has to exploit that kind of technology to 

begin to use it, to take advantage of prototypes and expand their 

capability to make things more transparent and enhance 

connectivity. 

Mr. KLINE. But one of the things, the ideas that we have been 

exploring a little bit in this committee through the last couple of 

Congresses, at least, is the answer to the question: Where does one 

go with one’s good idea? 

And we have tried—we have had various testimony. The director 

of DARPA on a couple of occasions has sort of offered that, well, 

DARPA is the place that you go. And so, everybody who has a good 

idea should somehow bring the idea to DARPA. 

I do not know if that is the answer, but it does seem to me that 

there ought to be a place. You recommend an acquisition guide. 

I would like it to be—I know about the simple solution to the 

complex. But, nevertheless, it should be as simple as possible, that 

there is one place to go to get started and let somebody else do the 

navigating, rather than, in the case of a small company, a small 

business, a small college or university, it is very difficult to find the 

time and the resources to figure out how to navigate what is a 

minefield of bureaucratic traps. 

Mr. SMITH. But if you could hit that one specific point. You have 

got a good idea out there. And I know this works, because we all 

have examples of companies we know that have technologies that 

have found their way into the field. 
30 

If you could hit on that one point, Mr. Kline. I mean, it is, okay, 

we have got some new way to defeat IEDs, some technology company out there, or some new, better material that is going to 

produce body armor. 

What is the process? In an ideal world—well, forget the ideal 

world. How does it work right now? And how could it work better? 

Mr. LEHMAN. Well, Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization (JIEDDO) itself is sort of overwhelmed. JIEDDO itself 

is overwhelmed with too many ideas right now, and sorting 

through that process has been very difficult. Now, that is a schedule problem, and everybody wants to help with a very, very difficult problem. 

But they have gotten thousands of ideas. And sorting through 

those ideas has proved very, very challenging for them. It is a staffing problem. 

If we talk about the process in a sort of more regular basis, I 

suggest that maybe the DOD should reach out to the technology 

transfer offices in the colleges and universities and say, here are 

the kinds of things that we are looking for and provide them a list, 

so that they are not just looking for commercial applications for the 

technology, but they are looking for DOD applications for the inventions coming out of the universities and colleges. 

Mr. SMITH. And how do those partnerships work? Because I 

know there is a ton of research going on in the university level. 

And it is my impression, by the way—and we have had a lot of 

testimony about what does not work here. But by and large, we 

have generated a fair amount of technological solutions that have 

helped both in the military context and in the commercial context, 

as well. So, there is a process out there. 

How does the coordination work between the military and the 

various research universities that we have in this country? Fairly 

well is my impression. But how could it work better? 

Mr. LEHMAN. Well, I would say that it does work well at the research level and producing results. 

I do not think there is a close enough tie between the research 

investment and the programs that could use it. And that could be 

fixed by some greater planning, you know, the research community 

that is making the investment in the university, working with the 

programs of record at that point and say, three years from now we 

should have some results here. 

Where are you going to be in your program, and how will you be 

able to receive it? And that the money is POM’ed and planned at 

that point to start inserting the technology. 

Mr. SMITH. I had one question, and then I will open it up to 

other members. 

We have got a bill on the floor this week, as a matter of fact, 

dealing with the issues that we are talking about to some degree, 

which has to do with conflicts of interest between the public sector 

and the private sector, and focusing on—I think it might be more 

broad than just the military—but trying to place greater restrictions on the so-called revolving door of people moving from defense 

contractor companies into the Pentagon and the government and 

elsewhere. 
31 

I do not know if any of you are familiar with that. You are not. 

Okay. Well, all right. 

The question I have is, do you have any specific guidance in 

terms of within that bill, because we are trying right now, and we 

have been successful to get some of the stuff out of there that could 

harm specifically DARPA. 

And we mentioned—I think, Mr. Lewis, you mentioned you have 

the mid-career researchers at DARPA who we bring in there, because they have specific experience in the private sector with a 

given technology. They work on it and then go back out. 

That has not being prohibited, but there are some restrictions on 

working on a project within DARPA, specific to a given company, 

then going out and working for that company in less than a year. 

Any thoughts on that? 

Mr. LEWIS. You know, it is a rule that you see across the Federal 

Government and when—the rule being that if you are at least a 

senior manager, that you are not supposed to go back and lobby 

your organization or get contracts for your organization or do work 

for the organization for a year. 

In general, I think people accept that. I think that people are 

comfortable with it. 

You need to be careful that it does not close off some area of research. And that is where science is a little bit different from, say, 

contracting. 

But my own sense is, the places where people have not observed 

this rule—and you may have seen the articles recently about the 

Department of Homeland Security having to adjust its regulations 

to make it clear that senior managers could not come back and 

lobby or search for contracts in less than a year. 

Where they have not followed that rule, there have been problems. So, if there is a way to do that without hurting research, it 

sounds like a good idea. 

Mr. SMITH. And it is possible. I mean, it is not—because we are 

getting concerns about, you know, it will limit DARPA’s ability to 

get the best and the brightest. And I suppose the devil is in the 

details there, but I appreciate that perspective. 

Anybody else? 

Mr. THORNBERRY. Let me just ask. We have touched on it, but 

my question is, when you consider national security, what areas 

should we spend more research S&T money on? 

I think you have said, and maybe you all agree, basic materials 

research. But I guess I am just curious, if you are going to place 

greater emphasis with where you spend your dollars on things that 

are the most important for national security, what are those areas? 

Mr. LEHMAN. I would venture that cyber security is at the top 

of the list today. And we are creating a command and control system that is dependent on information. The net-centric, it is indeed 

the right thing to do to create a very effective command and control 

and lethal force. 

But we are not paying sufficient attention to the security of the 

network and survivability of that network, because we are becoming more and more dependent on that information to conduct operations. 
32 

Dr. STARR. I would like to second that point. That was the thing 

I would emphasize most strongly. It is the type of things that we 

are seeing at DARPA right now, where they are re-changing the 

priorities for the Internet. Rather than connectivity being most important, it is information assurance. 

And again, we have people in the audience here who are really 

expert in that. 

And there is a second dimension also. And it is that the military 

is inherently mobile. And the way our infrastructure is designed, 

it is more for a static kind of situation. 

And so, in reconceiving the network, it is how one would have 

many mobile users who have secure access and would be continually plugged in and available to deal with it. 

So, I think those are the two most important issues that we 

could deal with. 

Mr. LEWIS. I would kind of like to disagree a little bit. I used to 

have a bumper sticker, Mr. Chairman and Mr. Thornberry, that 

said ‘‘the country with the most physicists wins.’’ 

And I do think that physics is an area that we need to spend 

more on—chemistry, materials. We do a good job on nanotechnology, but there are other material areas that we do not do as well— 

direct contributions to the military. 

Engineering—someone mentioned the large-scale integration 

problem. And that is an area of American strength, but it is an 

area where we could benefit from more research. 

I agree that IT, computing sciences, broader than simple cyber 

security, is an important area. People say it is underfunded. It 

looks like there is a little bit of truth to that. 

And finally, aerospace. So much of our money has gone to programs, that you see problems in things like keeping the wind tunnels open to do aerospace research. 

So, those would be the five areas, I would think: aerospace, IT, 

engineering, chemistry and physics. 

I am not a physicist, by the way. 

Mr. LEHMAN. If I might add, I have here the Defense Science 

Board summer study from 2006, ‘‘21st Century Strategic Technology Vectors,’’ which has done a very good job of laying out three 

or four vectors for technology research. 

Mr. SMITH. A final question I had was, going back all the way 

to the beginning, we were talking a little bit—I think it was Lehman—you were actually talking about connecting the warrior to 

the technologist. 

Now, we have jurisdiction in this committee over special ops, and 

have visited a lot of them. And it seems to be working fairly well 

in that area. They seem to be able to go directly to the people and 

say, this is the kind of gun we want, this is the kind of Intelligence, 

Surveillance, Reconnaissance (ISR) capability we want. 

I can see that that would be unique to the special forces. Is that 

a larger problem for the rest of the military? And what would be 

an idea of how you would want to better connect the warrior with 

the people making the stuff that he needs? 

Mr. LEHMAN. I would agree that special forces does that better 

than anyone else. And I think it is because of their size and their 

Title 10 authority. 
33 

The notion that I have in working in command and control is 

that we need to put these systems together, in peacetime or in garrison, with a cadre of operators and the contractors that are building these systems. 

And we need to run these systems in peacetime, not in a scripted 

exercise where it is sort of scripted for success, but as a real experiment with simulation, and see what works and what does not 

work, as opposed to only putting this together in the field. 

The intelligence community, since they are really working 24 

hours a day, 7 days a week on intelligence problems, many of these 

systems come together that way in the intelligence community. 

They are real analysts working with technologists on day-to-day 

problems. 

And the problem in command and control is that it only comes 

together in these scripted exercises or when we go to war. 

Mr. SMITH. Well, let me just say, if could interrupt, because I 

think that is what is happening. In talking with people, prior to 

2004 we had major problems in this area. In the last three years 

what I hear is we are doing better. And the reason is, we do not 

need the scripted exercises. It is happening out there in the real 

world, which is, of course, not the ideal place to learn—— 

Mr. LEHMAN. Right. 

Mr. SMITH [continuing]. What equipment you need. 

Mr. LEHMAN. And we have been evolving those systems in the 

field very rapidly with the contractors out there to great effect. 

What is missing is the sustainment, because we will lose that capability, that software that has been written, because the training 

manuals were not written along with the software as it was built. 

And so, that kind of capability will be lost, and we will have to 

rebuild it for the next one. 

Mr. SMITH. We have to run across the street and vote. 

Does anybody have anything else? I do not want to cut off—and 

get to the order here. 

If not, we will probably submit more questions for the record to 

you, the ones we have in the book. And look forward to your responses and look forward to working with you on these problems. 

This is very, very helpful. I thank all of you for your testimony. 

And thank you, Mr. Thornberry and the members of the committee. 

And with that, we are adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 4:36 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] 

A P P E N D I X 

MARCH 14, 2007 

PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD 

MARCH 14, 2007 

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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING 

MARCH 14, 2007 

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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. SMITH 

Mr. SMITH. 1) Mr. Lehman, please describe the unique role and capabilities of a 

Federally-Funded Research Development and Center (FFRDC). Why should the federal government maintain this construct as opposed to funding more research and 

development (R&D) internally or contracting it out to the for-profit private sector? 

Mr. LEHMAN. DOD divides its FFRDCs into three categories, which differ in their 

roles and capabilities: (a) research and development laboratories, (b) study and analysis centers, and (c) systems engineering and integration centers. For example, the 

DOD C31 FFRDC, which MITRE operates, is a systems engineering and integration 

center; MITRE also operates FFRDCs for the Federal Aviation Administration and 

the Internal Revenue Service. My response focuses on the unique role and capabilities of systems engineering and integration FFRDCs, especially those supporting the 

DOD, but many of these points apply equally to other FFRDCs. 

FFRDCs help our government sponsors to be smart buyers of systems and capabilities, understanding what technologies, systems, or commercial products will perform the most essential functions in the most reliable and cost-effective way. We are 

able to do this because: 

• A set of limitations imposed by the Federal Acquisition Regulation, the DOD 

Management Plan for FFRDCs, and the Sponsoring Agreements with the 

DOD ensure that FFRDCs can be fully objective, with extremely strong protections against organizational conflict-of-interest. The major limitations are 

our not-for-profit status, a prohibition against manufacturing products, a prohibition against competing for any federal contract except for operation of an 

FFRDC, strict limitations on work for or teaming with any profit-seeking 

company, and a requirement that DOD or one of our other FFRDC sponsors 

approve in advance any work they undertake. 

• FFRDCs are given a unique role with unusual access to government personnel, information, and future plans. Because FFRDCs do not compete with 

for-profit companies and have strong conflict-of-interest policies, for-profit 

companies are willing to share with FFRDCs proprietary information relevant 

to technologies being sought by the government. 

• The status of FFRDCs as private corporations allow them to manage their 

technical workforce in accordance with industry practices, rather than the 

government model. In particular, they can make rapid decisions to hire, fire, 

promote, or transfer technical staff on the basis of the expertise needed for 

the tasks at hand. Additionally, FFRDCs can set compensation levels to reflect the market for each of the needed skill sets, including the possibility of 

rewarding careers for technical experts who have no interest in a management role. 

FFRDCs enable the Defense Department and related elements of the Intelligence 

Community (IC) to integrate systems and technologies that were developed at different times, for different purposes. by different organizations. FFRDCs are able to 

do this because: 

• Integration of disparate systems and capabilities is one of their major functions, whereas for most government program offices it is a secondary issue, 

and for industry it often looks like making a competitor’s product more useful. 

• They support many different DOD and IC organizations, and they are trusted 

to provide an objective, conflict-free account of the technical issues involved 

in making their systems work together effectively. 

• The continuity of FFRDC efforts over many years means that they often have 

insights that government personnel lack into why a particular system was designed in a particular way. 

FFRDCs are uniquely positioned to provide the government with a broad ‘‘architectural’’ view of government systems. In addition to strong government program offices, real progress towards integration requires effective problem definition, evaluation of alternative solutions and an analysis of execution feasibility. This requires 
82 

an in-depth knowledge of the systems involved and how new systems can be integrated with legacy government systems. The long term relationship between 

FFRDCs and their government sponsors provides the basis for the development of 

an overarching plan (or architecture) for the integration of government systems and 

increases the likelihood of successful acquisitions. 

FFRDCs as organizations combine depth of technical knowledge with the distinct 

mission to estimate risks accurately. One of the major difficulties faced by the 

DOD is that the most senior decision-makers, who want an objective assessment of 

the level of risk associated with each of the alternatives they must decide among, 

receive most of their information from organizations that have incentives either to 

be excessively optimistic about the cost, schedule, and technical performance of the 

capabilities they are selling or buying—or to overstate their resource requirements 

in order to achieve organizational growth. An FFRDC has no economic incentives 

to support the funding of one capability over another, and no bureaucratic incentives to see any organization increase its role or size. FFRDCs do, however, have 

incentives to be viewed as technically astute, objective, and trustworthy, and understand very well that the extent to which the DOD will want our support tomorrow 

will depend on their assessment of how good our technical support is today. 

Mr. SMITH. 2) Mr. Lehman, what is the key to aligning R&D investments with 

the goals of an organization or the needs of the end user? How can this be assured? 

How can this situation be created in the DOD? 

Mr. LEHMAN. The key is leadership from the top, measuring the success of organizational units on the basis of an overarching enterprise view, not simply their own 

organizational responsibilities. For instance, the person in charge of logistics can be 

doing an adequate job by fulfilling requirements that came from calculations when 

the prime mission equipment was in development. The warfighter focuses on the 

day-to-day duties using the prime mission equipment. It is the job of leadership to 

create dialogue among these organizations, so they are not simply trying to improve 

metrics that measure their individual success, but focus on metrics that measure 

the success of the entire enterprise. 

Enterprise metrics have to be established and managers have to act to improve 

those metrics, which may entail real stress within an individual organization. For 

example, Hewlitt Packard uses the metric ‘‘percent of sales from new products.’’ 

New products come from R&D, and R&D has to talk to Sales about what customers 

are demanding. Products have to be built efficiently, so Manufacturing is also part 

of the dialogue. 

Results of the dialogue may be painful. An R&D lab may have to shed a whole 

group of employees in a skill area that was important ten years ago but is no longer 

relevant (an action not possible under the current civil service system). It may have 

to kill a favorite project. Logisticians may find when in continuous dialogue with 

warfighters using the equipment they support that they have been producing more 

of one kind of part and not enough of another, thus forcing labor dislocations in the 

private sector. These arc all hard decisions for managers, and it takes leadership 

from the top to act internally for the good of the enterprise. 

This kind of leadership cannot be assured in business, and it cannot be assured 

in the DOD. Large organizations cannot expect behavior changes by simply declaring the expected result. Desired behaviors must be incentivized, rewarded, and held 

up as examples for others. 

Congress could help. The growth of earmarking has made it increasingly difficult 

for DOD leadership to take a strategic view of R&D priorities. It would greatly 

change the atmosphere within DOD if Congress began to send signals that alignment of R&D with the most important needs of the end-user is more important than 

preserving R&D projects in Members’ districts. It would also help if the rules for 

reprogramming funds during the year of execution provided incentives for DOD 

managers to hold costs below the budgeted amount. 

Mr. SMITH. 3) Mr. Lehman, has there been an erosion in management expertise 

within the DOD? If so, what is the current state of this situation? Has it reached 

catastrophic proportions? 

Mr. LEHMAN. I know many very good managers in the DOD. Congress has recognized the erosion in the acquisition force from retirements, lack of funding, and the 

inability to compete with industry salaries for talent. Congress has already taken 

action to correct this situation, but it will take time. Good acquisition managers require experience as well as training. The acquisition field has never been viewed 

as a path of advancement to the highest levels in DOD. Establishing acquisition as 

a career track with positive rewards would increase the incentive to remain and 

gain experience in that area. 

Making civil service salaries more competitive with private industry, while initially costly, could provide substantial savings in the future by providing the DOD 
83 

with an experienced cadre of acquisition managers and reduce the financial incentive for experienced government personnel to move to the private sector. 

Mr. SMITH. 4) Mr. Lehman, you cite DOD’s budgetary documentation and review 

process as having an adverse impact on innovation. Assuming we were to modify 

and perhaps streamline this process to create a more ‘‘positive development environment,’’ how might we guard against the ills of improprieties and conflict-of-interest 

abuses? 

Mr. LEHMAN. The DOD is a very large organization, and you cannot legislate a 

process that will make improprieties impossible. The rules are already in place. 

There will always be those who want, and will try, to cheat the system, regardless 

of the level of regulation. If someone infringes on the rules, prosecute them to the 

full extent of the law. The DOD audits, regulations and reporting requirements 

make it very difficult for small innovative companies to contract with the DOD; they 

do not have the overhead resources and financial structure to handle it. These companies end up subcontracting to the primes, and the government loses the opportunity for direct interaction with the innovation and innovative thinking of these 

companies. 

Streamline the system. Yes, there will be abuses but many of these abusers will 

be caught and prosecuted, and that will deter others. Responding to every abuse 

with a new regulation makes the system cumbersome in ways that cost the taxpayers far more than a few bad people could steal. 

Mr. SMITH. 5) Mr. Lehman, can you be more specific about how research schedules are not aligned with acquisition schedules? Please cite a few examples. 

Mr. LEHMAN. Research projects have uncertainty of outcome and time and may 

fail entirely. But all research programs must have some failure or the program is 

probably not taking enough risk. They may not obtain the hypothesized results on 

the timeline the researcher expected, either for practical reasons like delays in 

equipment delivery, or scientific reasons like encountering unanticipated results. 

This uncertainty means that usable results from a research project cannot be predicted to the accuracy required for an acquisition program to plan program expenditures. Acquisition programs have a contractor, a contract, a schedule, and a budget, 

all of which make it difficult to change course and accept a new result from a lab 

or industry. 

On the other hand, when DOD labs start with 6.1, 6.2, or 6.3 research money, 

and solve a problem which begets an acquisition program built around the solution, 

the process works well. 

Labs build their research program from requirements developed in a systematic 

process. Unfortunately, it usually lacks tight coordination with programs of record 

that might use their results too late in the acquisition process. What is needed is 

a fund at the program offices’ disposal to harvest technologies when they mature 

to enable more effective transitions from labs to programs of record. See answer to 

question 8 below. 

Mr. SMITH. 6) Mr. Lehman, is the for-profit private sector unwilling or unable to 

reform itself to provide the most-capable, most-innovative product? 

Mr. LEHMAN. I do not think the for-profit sector is unable or unwilling to reform 

itself. The for-profit-sector responds to the incentives in the market. Change the incentives and the sector will change. The DOD has asked the for-profit sector for 

large acquisitions that small innovative companies cannot respond to. These acquisitions permit the contractor to develop a proprietary architecture that only that contractor can further develop and innovate. The contractors try to lock themselves in 

as the only contractor that can work on the system so they can make money on the 

long-term evolution and sustainment of the systems. They are doing nothing wrong; 

they are following the incentives in the market to make money for their stockholders. 

The proprietary nature of these systems has been made worse over the years by 

such ‘‘reforms’’ as Total System Performance Responsibility, which required the contractor to have end-to-end accountability for how the system performed when fielded. In theory this is an excellent idea, but in practice the contractors refused to 

make government requested changes to open the architectures. The contractors 

quite rightly reasoned that they should not take accountability for total system performance for a system for which they did not have total design control. Large Scale 

Integration (LSI) contracts have further exacerbated this problem by the government’s outsourcing of responsibility to control the architecture of the system being 

procured. 

If the government controls the architecture and makes it open (i.e. all interfaces 

are well understood and available to all competitors), then the government can hire 

small (or large) innovative contractors to deliver capabilities into that architecture. 

The for-profit contractors will respond. 
84 

Mr. SMITH. 7) Mr. Lehman, precisely how can we encourage the DOD S&T, acquisition and user communities to manage the development process as a team? 

Mr. LEHMAN. This question is similar to question 2, above, and I will elaborate 

on my answer there by emphasizing that the desired behavior can be achieved 

through incentives—recognition, promotion, cash awards, and publication of successes as examples for others to follow. Give the Service Secretaries a significant 

cash budget to award to those who develop cross-organizational or enterprise processes and metrics that lead to real results and cost savings. It does not need to be 

limited to aligning S&T, acquisition, and user communities. There are opportunities 

throughout the DOD, as there are in business, for better managing the enterprise. 

Mr. SMITH. 8) Mr. Lehman, please explain your proposal to have a separate ‘‘innovation program element (PE) line’’ at the disposal of each program manager. How 

might this work in practice? 

Mr. LEHMAN. If the R&D community investments are aligned with the acquisition 

program, we have solved half the problem—the R&D community is working towards 

solutions the acquisition community can use. However, their timing and success are 

unpredictable, as discussed in the answer to question 5 above. It is impossible for 

an acquisition program to budget against this uncertainty. I proposed a program 

element that would be available to acquisition programs upon request, when the 

technology matures, without having to wait two years to insert the request in the 

POM cycle. The programs requesting the funds would have to justify the return on 

investment to the warfighter. The adjudication of these requests could be done within each service’s acquisition organization, with annual reporting to the committees 

of jurisdiction. To force proper prioritization, the fund should be large enough to accommodate some but not all requests. It should not be used to complete existing programs, but to insert innovations into existing programs. 

Mr. SMITH. 1) The work of the Institute for Defense Analyses (IDA) in support 

of DOD’s effort to secure domestic source production capacity for critical technologies is impressive. Might DOD have accomplished the success found in the 

‘‘Trusted Foundry’’ effort without the assistance and guidance of an FFRDC? If not, 

why not? If so, why did this not occur? 

Dr. COHEN. During the process leading up to DOD’s decision to pursue the Trusted Foundry, there were conflicting perspectives offered by various people and organizations within the Defense Department, as well as by representatives of industry 

and Congress. IDA was asked to provide an independent, objective assessment of 

the issues. In doing so, IDA helped ensure that DOD’s decision was based on the 

best available technical information, analyses and insights, provided by knowledgeable researchers and an organization with no financial or other interests in the outcome. This is a common role for FFRDCs like IDA. In recognition of this role, Congress often requests that FFRDCs conduct independent assessments of controversial 

issues, as evidenced by several studies in the FY08 Defense Authorization Act, including ones dealing with the size and mix of airlift forces, the roles and missions 

of the Missile Defense Agency, the civil reserve air fleet, and options for ballistic 

missile defenses in Europe. IDA helps the government make informed decisions. We 

defer to our sponsors to assess what might have happened in the absence of our 

support on any particular issue. 

Mr. SMITH. 2) A 2005 Defense Science Board Study suggested the need for a ‘‘domestic Integrated Circuit competitiveness’’ policy as a national priority. Why is this 

important? In your view, what mechanisms would be necessary to adopt such a policy? 

Dr. COHEN. A healthy domestic integrated circuit infrastructure would be desirable both for assured access and for lowering—though not eliminating—risks that 

adversaries might tamper with or exploit defense-related integrated circuits. The 

challenge has been finding practical solutions. It is important to note that there are 

a range of ways that DOD can manage these risks through its engineering and procurement practices and given support in the future through the use of new technologies such as those being explored by DARPA. In general, we agree with the DSB 

that many of the actions that would be required to address domestic integrated circuit competitiveness ‘‘are beyond the scope and function of the department.’’ 

Global and commercial interests dominate today’s integrated circuit market. As 

cited in the DSB report, defense purchases of integrated circuits are estimated to 

be 1–2% of the global market and even that small share is shrinking. Thus, the 

DOD demand for leading-edge integrated circuits is too small to influence business 

decisions in the largely volume-driven commercial market. DOD’s demand is also too 

small to justify—based on business case analyses—developing and sustaining a captive capability, except perhaps for narrow elements in the supply chain. 

One area where DOD has attempted to sustain domestic fabrication capabilities 

is in the supply of radiation-hardened electronics. Despite significant investments 
85 

1The most advanced IC technologies, now available from companies such as Intel contain 

transistors patterned with 45nm features. Intel processors at this features size became available 

in November 2007, (http://download.intel.com/pressroom/kits/45nm/45nmSummaryFoils.pdf) 2 Costs cast ICs into Darwinian struggle, Mark LaPedus, EE Times, 03/30/2007. 3Winners, losers in 2007 chip ranking, Mark LaPedus, EE Times, 11/28/2007 (The market 

analysis in the article was provided by iSupply). 4 IBM, Toshiba extend semiconductor R&D collaboration to 32nm, EDN Electronic News, Ann 

Steffora Mutschler, 12/18/2007 (IBM is reported to be partnering with Toshiba, AMD, Chartered 

Semiconductor Manufacturing Ltd., Freescale, Infineon and Samsung). 

in two domestic suppliers, the lack of demand has hampered efforts to attain profitability. As a result, the radiation-hardened market sector lags significantly behind 

commercial capabilities in terms of transistor size. Moreover, even these radiationhardened capabilities are not fully domestic, as the prime U.S. suppliers depend on 

a broad network of global secondary suppliers for equipment, materials and technology. 

A major challenge has been addressing the cost of new advanced technologies, 

particularly as the feature sizes shrink down to 45nm 1 and below. A recent assessment 2 of semiconductor costs noted, ‘‘at the 45-nm node, a new 300-mm fab costs 

about $3 billion, process technology R&D runs $2.4 billion and a ‘‘mask set’’ is up 

to $9 million.’’ This assessment further predicted that it would take annual sales 

of $13.3 billion to achieve a Return on Investment (ROI) at the 45nm technology 

level. This makes it challenging to get an acceptable ROI. 

The projected IC ranking 3 of the top 20 suppliers of semiconductors in 2007 is 

shown in Figure 1. Given the high investment required for 45nm technologies, few 

companies are going to be able to justify investing in 45nm capabilities based on 

the current levels of revenue from sales of ICs. Further, only one or two domestic 

companies might be expected to have a business justification on their own to pursue 

these new technologies. The world leader Intel will likely have sales that support 

its pursing the next generation of technology on its own, but it is likely that much 

of the rest of the market will shift toward collaborative global alliances, sharing the 

costs and risks associated with the more advanced technologies.4

Given today’s global commercial market place for integrated circuits and the high 

costs of creating and sustaining the next generations of technology, DOD is collaborating with selected domestic semiconductor suppliers as a way of continuing to 

mitigate security concerns. 
86 

5 USG Integrated Circuit Supply Chain Threat Opportunity Study, FOUO, Donald J. Goldstein 

et al, IDA Document D-3222, January 2006, publication pending. 6SEMI and the SIA Launch SEMI Anti-Counterfeiting Standards Task Force at SEMICON 

West 2007, (http://www.semiconwest.org/Showlnfo/LiveatWest/CTR 011164) 7Stradley, J.; Karraker, D., ‘‘The Electronic Part Supply Chain and Risks of Counterfeit Parts 

in Defense Applications.’’ IEEE Transactions on Components and Packaging Technologies, 

vol.29, no.3, pp. 703–705, Sept. 2006. 8GIDEP (Government-Industry Data Exchange Program) (www.gidep.org) 9 Counterfeit Electronic Parts, Dr. Diganta Das, University of Maryland, DMSMS 2007 

(http://dmsms2007.com/media/proceedings/GenlSessions/Gen4lThu/ 

Gen4lThul1045lDas.pdf) 

Mr. SMITH. 3) Please provide more detail about counterfeit components? How 

widespread and serious is this? 

Dr. COHEN. Counterfeit semiconductor components are a serious concern not only 

for DOD, but also for the broader commercial electronics industry. A 2005 study by 

IDA 5 concluded, ‘‘Counterfeit chips repeatedly have made their way through our supply chain and into deployed systems.’’ The broader commercial concerns also recently 

resulted in the Semiconductor Industry Association (SIA) creating the Anti-Counterfeiting Task Force (ACTF).6 One conservative estimate of the dollar volume of counterfeit integrated circuits entering the DOD supply chain in 2005 was between $15 

and $21 million.7 The counterfeit efforts could involve a range of deceits, including 

remarking or relabeling parts, providing non-working or substandard parts, providing stolen parts, illegal manufacturing, establishing false provenance (from a different manufacturer, newer/older, or different part number or specifications like 

temperature range), overbuilding products, or actually reverse engineering and 

cloning. 

DOD is paying more attention to the counterfeit problem and more significant 

numbers of counterfeits are being detected and reported. The GIDEP8 acts as a 

clearinghouse for disseminating government wide reports of counterfeits. Figure 2 

shows reporting rates throughout the government have increased dramatically. 
87 

10 Extracted by GIDEP records and communicated through personal communication by Stan 

Green, GIDEP to Vashisht Sharma (IDA), 20 July 2005. 11 Bogus military suppliers sentenced, St. Johns County men sold U.S. $4 million in phony 

parts sent to troops in Iraq, Afghanistan, Florida Times-Union (Jacksonville), July 26, 2005, 

(http://www.jacksonville.com/tu-online/stories/072605/metl19333168.shtml). 

Information from GIDEP was obtained as part of the 2005 IDA study 5 on the impact of counterfeiting on DOD systems, and reports on a number of counterfeit cases 

spanning the years 2002–2005 were provided. The results of IDA’s inquiry are 

shown in Table 1. No doubt, a more current inquiry would result in a larger list. 

It is important to note that although programs are listed as being affected, this does 

not imply that there was any impact. In some cases, the parts were caught by existing processes and were not introduced into the operational environment. 

There are other examples of counterfeit parts being sold to DOD. 

In July 2005, two Florida men were sentenced to prison terms of 46 and 36 

months respectively for selling to DOD counterfeit parts valued at between $4 to 

$12 million.11 The counterfeit parts were sent to troops in Iraq and Afghanistan. 

The guilty parties admitted to sending thousands of parts to the Defense Supply 

Center Columbus (DSCC). A quality assurance specialist at DSCC said that while 

no loss of life can be attributed to this fraud, the actions delayed plans, sometimes 

for weeks and interfered with military operations. The two men started this operation when they learned how to bid on supply contracts over the Internet while 
88 

12Man gets two years in defense fraud case, October 13, 2007, St. Petersburg Times, http:// 

www.sptimes.com/2007/10/13/Hillsborough/Manlgetsltwolyearslin.shtml 13 BAE Systems: Counterfeit Electronic Components, Henry Livingston, DMSMS 2007, http:// 

dmsms2007.com/media/proceedings/Gen_Sessions/Gen2lTue/ 

Gen2lTuel1035lLivingston.pdf 14 ‘‘Export Controls and the U.S. Defense Industrial Base, Volume I: Summary Report and Volume 2: Appendices’’, Richard Van Atta, Project Leader. Appendices, Van Atta et al, IDA Document D-3363, January 2007 (http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA465592) 

attending community college in Jacksonville, FL. They would send substandard 

components to DSCC; when the parts were identified as defective, the men would 

simply change the name of their company and continue bidding. DSCC does not perform background checks on procurements of less than $100,000 and therefore was 

unable to track the men when they changed their companies’ names. 

In October 2007, a Florida man pleaded guilty to defrauding the DOD.12 A federal 

judge ordered the man, who ran a St. Petersburg aerospace company, to spend two 

years in prison for selling used parts as new to the DOD. Prosecutors claimed that 

the government paid him $202,510 for 91 fraudulent contracts. The judge in the 

case ordered the defendant to repay that much in restitution. 

Documents indicate that the defendant was president of Triton Aerospace between 

July 2004 and October 2005. Prosecutors said that the defendant fraudulently supplied parts for Navy and Air Force planes, including the B-52 bomber. The prosecutors claimed the defendant would shop around for surplus or overhauled parts, 

which he bought at a discount, and then in turn fraudulently sell them as new to 

the Department of Defense. 

In summary, counterfeit components are entering the defense supply chain, and 

improved processes are detecting them more frequently. For instance, improvements 

by BAE to incoming inspections and testing have improved the detection of counterfeit parts.13 BAE found that employing acquisition practices that monitor the provenance of parts and audit the origins of parts back to their original manufacturers 

reduces the opportunities for counterfeits to enter the supply chain. These types 

screening and authentication processes should mitigate much of the potential impact of the most damaging counterfeits. 

Mr. SMITH. 4) It appears that policy recommendations include a relaxation of export-control measures in some areas and efforts to ensure more secure, domesticproduction capabilities in other areas. When, where and how might we apply these 

two different approaches? 

Dr. COHEN. The DSB report noted two approaches that could be employed to improve DOD’s ability to meet needs for access to secure supplies of advanced integrated circuits: modifying export control and ensuring secure domestic production. 

The DSB report recommended that export controls be strengthened to assure ‘‘that 

potential adversaries do not have access to leading edge design and wafer fabrication 

equipment, technology and cell libraries.’’ This recommendation focused on strengthening export controls by, among other things, getting the U.S. government to persuade Wassenaar members to restrict exports of semiconductor material and equipment to China. As noted in the DSB report, U.S. attempts to do so have been 

rebuffed. 

The DSB report also notes that ‘‘Advanced semiconductor manufacturing and design equipment with roughly comparable performance characteristics is produced in 

a number of Wassenaar signatory countries. As a result, under the Wassenaar regime 

a Chinese buyer who cannot obtain desired equipment items from U.S. makers because the Department of Commerce has not granted an export license can often acquire comparable equipment from competing sellers based in Europe or Asia who are 

able to obtain licenses from their governments.’’ 

It is important to note that some important countries are not members of 

Wassenaar. In particular, Taiwan plays a dominant role in the global market for 

semiconductors and has a leading business position in the development of semiconductor manufacturing in China. This complicates the formulation of export control 

policies in this market area. 

A recent IDA study 14 found that ‘‘Semiconductor device firms and semiconductor 

materials and equipment firms did not report significant lost sales or competitive impacts from application of U.S. export controls.’’ This is likely due to a climate of ongoing favorable licensing decisions by the Department of Commerce. The same report, however, noted, ‘‘where U.S. export controls interfere with foreign partnering 
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15 ‘‘U.S. Semiconductor and Software Industries Increasingly Produce in China and India’’, 

GAO Report, GAO-06-423, September 2006. 16Packaging Materials: Regional Markets, Dan Tracy and Jan Vardaman, Semiconductor 

Equipment and Materials International (SEMI), (http://wps2a.semi.org/wps/portal/lpagr/ 

103/248?docName=P037398) 

in high tech systems development, they encourage advanced technology and manufacturing investment to take place overseas.’’ In summary, IDA found that ‘‘As the 

locus of advanced IC consumption and production moves to Asia, including China 

as well as Taiwan and Korea, the underlying rationale for controlling microelectronics technologies appears to be negated.’’ 

It is not clear whether relaxation of export-control measures would have any impact on DOD’s ability to obtain secure supplies of advanced ICs. In contrast, as I 

noted in my earlier testimony, the efforts to ensure more secure, domestic-production capabilities (primarily through the Trusted Foundry) have been quite successful 

in meeting DOD needs for secure advanced ICs. 

Mr. SMITH. 5) You mention challenges in the field of packaging and circuit assembly. Please explain further. 

Dr. COHEN. The assembly, test and packaging segments of the semiconductor supply chain were the first segments to move offshore. During the 1960s-1980s, much 

of the assembly, test and packaging moved to Taiwan, Hong-Kong and Malaysia, 

primarily for cost reasons.15 Almost all packaging of integrated circuits—regardless 

of where the circuits are produced—is performed overseas, largely in Asia. Many 

companies vertically integrated these activities into their operations. Other companies outsource these elements of the supply chain, and some companies outsource 

the entire packaging, test and assembly portion. 

In the packaging market, a good way to estimate the amount of packaging being 

performed in various parts of the world is to look at the sales of packaging materials. Plastic is the most frequently used material for packaging ICs and as shown 

in Figure 3, almost no large-scale plastic packaging takes place in North America. 

Even American firms will often package products overseas for cost reasons. 

The outsourced semiconductor assembly and test market is also mainly located in 

Asia as shown in Figure 4. There remain significant operations in the U.S. with 

Amkor, which has headquarters and significant operations located in the U.S. However, nine out of top ten outsourcing firms in this market segment are in Asia. 
90 

17Outsourced Semiconductor Assembly and Test ’05: Boom Cycle Continued, but Profits 

Sagged, ChipScale Review, Subash Khadpe, Contributing Editor, April 2006, (http:// 

www.chipscalereview.com/archives/0406/article.php?type=feature&article=f2) 18Linkages: Manufacturing Trends in Electronics Interconnection Technology, Committee on 

Manufacturing Trends in Printed Circuit Technology, National Research Council (2005) (http:// 

books.nap.edu/catalog.php?recordlid=11515) 19 A wafer is produced by a semiconductor foundry at diameters currently up to 300mm. The 

wafer, composed of many instances of individual chips, is then diced into individual chips, each 

of which is called a die. Each die is then ‘‘assembled’’ into a package and tested, thus producing 

a packaged integrated circuit. 20 IDA has provided some focused technical assistance to DARPA in the formulation and solicitation processes for this program. 

In 2000, there were concerns about the potential overseas migration of semiconductor wafer fabrication plants. The biggest concern was that it would be costly and 

time consuming to reestablish domestic semiconductor fabrication capabilities. 

In the case of packaging, test and assembly, the situation is different, because the 

industry is much less capital and research intensive. There is little concern that 

U.S. would be denied access. Should the capability to perform these processes be 

disrupted, they could be reestablished domestically with less cost and delay. The security concerns are still important, and it is for this reason that DOD is interested 

in maintaining strong domestic packaging test, and assembly suppliers, rather than 

depending on a less expensive overseas-outsourced suppliers. 

There continues to be sufficient domestic core competencies supporting defense 

needs as noted in the Linkages report by the NRC.18 The report noted that ‘‘Some 

very competent capability exists in a variety of places, such as (1) military facilities, 

including laboratories with limited production capabilities at the Warner Robins Air 

Logistics Center in Georgia and the Naval Surface Warfare Center, Crane Division, 

in Indiana; (2) small shops and boutique contractors; and (3) some defense prime 

contractors and their major subcontractors.’’ 

The Department, through the Trusted Foundry manufactures trusted integrated 

circuit dies 19 in the U.S. However, without secure on-shore assembly, test or packaging, these dies would have to be shipped overseas to a supplier for these steps, 

potentially compromising the security of these completed integrated circuits. It is in 

the Department’s interest to address these issues by maintaining a core set of onshore trusted capabilities in assembly, test and packaging. This area has generally 

been manageable given the levels of specialized defense-related IC production that 

continue to reside in the U.S. DOD continues to actively monitor the situation. 

Mr. SMITH. 6) You mention DARPA has pursuing a few promising research efforts 

in the field of circuitry security and access. How are the DARPA efforts encouraging 

and are there are promising efforts within DOD? 

Dr. COHEN. A brief description of the DARPA Program follows.20 Representatives 

of DARPA are the best sources of information on DARPA programs, and we would 
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21 ‘‘DARPA TRUST IN INTEGRATED CIRCUITS PROGRAM’’, DARPA News Release, December 2007, (http://blogs.spectrum.ieee.org/techltalk/trustlfls.pdf) 

urge you to discuss this Program with them directly. DARPA is pursuing a TRUST 

in Integrated Circuits (Trust in IC) program to ‘‘.. develop technologies that will ensure the trust of integrated circuits (IC) that are used in military systems but that 

are designed and fabricated under untrusted conditions.’’ 21 This DARPA effort is by 

far the largest research effort throughout DOD focused on integrated circuit security 

concerns. The goal of the Trust in IC program is to provide assurance that an IC 

is free from maliciously inserted ‘‘Trojan Horses’’ that might disrupt operation, 

thereby affecting the confidentiality, integrity or availability of end systems. Attacks 

on ICs may take place anywhere in the supply chain, but the Trust in IC Program 

is addressing three of the most difficult elements of the supply chain. These elements are design, die fabrication and Field Programmable Gate Arrays. 

This Program is being pursued because there is a belief that progress can be 

made in the elements. The ideal result of this Program would be a process that can 

be applied to achieve a quantified level of assurance that an IC obtained from an 

untrusted supplier is free from malicious tampering and will operate as intended. 

The program will have its initial four-month program review in March 2008. 

Mr. SMITH. 1) You recommend greater resource flexibility and a greater role for 

the military combatant commands in the acquisition of IT systems yet you seem to 

stop short of granting these commands full acquisition authorities. Explain. 

Dr. STARR and Mr. KRAMER. [In response to prior testimony before the HASC, six 

questions have been submitted for more detailed responses. Although specific testimony on the subject was provided by Dr. Starr, the principal investigators for the 

study on DOD use of commercial IT were Dr. Starr and Mr. Franklin D. Kramer. 

Thus the two of us have collaborated in preparing the responses to these questions. 

Note, however, that the answers represent the personal views of Dr. Starr and Mr. 

Kramer and they do not reflect the views of the National Defense University or any 

other U.S. Government entity.] 

Our recommendation had two key parts. First, we recommended greater resource 

flexibility in the acquisition of IT systems. We made this recommendation because 

the current IT acquisition processes are too rigid and not easily adapted to dealing 

with commercial IT products. Second, we recommended that there be a greater role 

for the military combatant commanders (COCOMs) in the acquisition of IT systems. 

There are two key reasons why the military COCOMs should play a greater role 

in the acquisition of IT systems. First, it is vital to get them involved early in the 

process. By doing so, they can articulate their needs (to support their operations 

plans) and can state the unique constraints that are characteristic of their area of 

responsibility (e.g., interoperability with allies and coalition partners). Second, it is 

vital to get them involved continuously in evaluating candidate products and providing feedback. 

However, we have several reasons for not granting COCOMs full acquisition authorities. In order to execute that responsibility, it requires key skills and experiences that are not generally present at COCOMs (e.g., systems engineering and systems-of-systems engineering). Furthermore, the COCOMs tend to focus more intently on near-term issues rather than on the longer-term planning horizon that is 

representative of major IT acquisitions. Thus, we believe that it would be extremely 

inefficient to have each COCOM take on this role. 

However, we believe that Joint Forces Command (JFCOM) could assemble a ‘‘critical mass’’ in the needed intellectual capital and could focus on longer-term issues 

(consistent with its experimentation and testing activities). Thus, it should play the 

leading role for the COCOMs in the acquisition of commercial IT systems. [Note: 

We amplify on this expanded role for JFCOM in our response to Question 3] 

Mr. SMITH. 2) Describe the acquisition model of the Defense Security Cooperation 

Agency (DSCA) and discuss how it might be used more broadly in the acquisition 

of IT systems. 

Dr. STARR and Mr. KRAMER. The responsibilities of the DSCA are spelled out in 

DOD Directive 5105.65. That Directive notes the following: 

‘‘DSCA reports to the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy through the Assistant 

Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs). DSCA serves as the DOD focal 

point and clearinghouse for the development and implementation of security assistance plans and programs, monitoring major weapon sales and technology transfer 

issues, budgetary and financial arrangements, legislative initiatives and activities, 

and policy and other security assistance matters through the analysis, coordination, 

decision, and implementation process. DSCA directs and supervises the organization, functions, training, administrative support, and staffing of DOD elements in 
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foreign countries responsible for managing security assistance programs and supports the development of cooperative programs with industrialized nations.’’ 

One of the Principal Investigators on the CTNSP Study Team had served as the 

Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs) in the Clinton Administration. As such, he has had intimate involvement in the direction and guidance of DSCA. He observes that an analogous organization could be a highly efficient and effective mechanism to direct and guide the acquisition of commercial IT. 

The key point would be to create such an analogous mechanism to leverage the acquisition organizations of the Services to support the needed capability. Thus, one 

would have a lean focal point that would take full advantage of the acquisition organizations in the individual Services and Agencies. 

Mr. SMITH. 3) What resources and authorities do you recommend for the Office 

for Research and Technology Applications (ORTA) at Joint Force Command 

(JFCOM)? 

Dr. STARR and Mr. KRAMER. We would like to respond to this question by decomposing it into two parts. First we would like deal with the authorities issue. We will 

first characterize the authorities that ORTA currently has and contrast that with 

the authorities that we believe that they need to perform their job effectively and 

efficiently. Second, we will discuss the resources that ORTA needs to build upon 

those authorities. 

In the area of Authorities, JFCOM currently has very little flexibility to support 

research or development of new technologies. They have found Cooperative Research 

and Development Agreements (CRDAs) to be useful, but limited. For example, both 

universities and small industries can not justify CRDAs because they need to receive some funding. In addition, JFCOM is currently under the OSD Small Business 

Innovation Research (SBIR) Program. However, we believe that they do not get benefits commensurate with their contribution. 

To address these concerns, we believe that JFCOM should have greater technology transfer authority. These would include Other Transaction Authority and 

small Grant Authority with funds. In addition, we believe that JFCOM should have 

its own SBIR program. 

In the area of resources, note that ORTA has recently expanded its staff size to 

five (i.e., three government personnel, one contractor, and one administrative person). We believe that its new size is probably sufficient for its current mission. 

These resources have enabled ORTA to effectively perform ‘‘needs’’ analyses. Note 

that JFCOM has Limited Acquisition Authority (LAA) for systems that are less than 

$50 million. However, we are aware that continuation of that authority is in question. In addition, JFCOM’s LAA has never been accompanied by funding. 

Looking to the future, we believe that the ORTA staff should be increased significantly to perform additional vital functions. For example, if ORTA is to be effective, 

it should undertake the following additional functions: perform ‘‘tech prospecting’’; 

perform ‘‘gap’’ analyses and explore options to fill gaps; provide support to experimentation and testing; and work with rest of JFCOM to develop concepts of operations (in concert with J9/J7/JFHQ) and training packages (in concert with J7). In 

order to support those additional functions, it would be desirable to more than double the ORTA staff over a three year period. 

Mr. SMITH. 4) A diffusion of system acquisitions has been cited as one cause of 

the DOD inefficiency in the realm of IT and a reason for more conformity and centralized decision-making with DOD. 

Issues 

• What is your view of this characterization? 

• How does your recommendation to create a greater role and influence at the 

COCOMs support or undermine this proposal? 

Dr. STARR and Mr. KRAMER. We believe that multiple processes are required. 

First, a ‘‘normal acquisition’’ process is needed that would address such vital issues 

as long term system-of-system engineering to ensure interoperability. In addition, 

there is a need for an ‘‘expedited acquisition’’ process that can take full advantage 

of commercial IT products to address immediate needs that emerge in key areas of 

operations. 

We believe that the COCOMs have a major role to play in both processes. In the 

‘‘normal acquisition process’’ they must be active participants in the requirements 

process (e.g., through the Integrated Priority List (IPL) process) and in the evolutionary acquisition of IT systems. In the latter case, they should get early versions 

of evolving systems and provide feedback to the acquisition agent (e.g., characterize 

how effectively the system is satisfying requirements; identify key functions that future systems should support). 
93 

In the ‘‘expedited acquisition process’’ the COCOMs should be active participants 

throughout the life cycle. This includes clarifying requirements, absorbing the new 

systems in their architectures, training personnel to use the new systems, and suggesting opportunities to improve evolving systems. 

Mr. SMITH. 5) You recommend an increase in the threshold under which the simplified acquisition process might be applied to IT systems. At what level should this 

threshold be established? 

Dr. STARR and Mr. KRAMER. In the Federal Acquisition Regulations (FAR) (dated 

24 December 2007), the term ‘‘simplified acquisition threshold’’ is defined as follows: ‘‘ ‘Simplified acquisition threshold’ means $100,000, except for acquisitions of supplies or services that, as determined by the head of the agency, are to be used to 

support a contingency operation or to facilitate defense against or recovery from nuclear, biological, chemical, or radiological attack (41 U.S.C. 428a), the term means— 

(1) $250,000 for any contract to be awarded and performed, or purchase to be 

made, inside the United States; and 

(2) $1 million for any contract to be awarded and performed, or purchase to be 

made, outside the United States.’’ 

Note that the threshold was initially established in Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act of 1994, P.L. 103-355, October 13, 1994. 

We are aware that in Fiscal Year 2000, Congress authorized a test program to 

simplify the procedures for the acquisition of commercial supplies and services, allowing government buyers to eliminate certain procedural requirements when purchasing commercial items not exceeding $5 million. Subsequently, in April 2001, the 

GAO assessed that test program in a study entitled ‘‘Benefits of Simplified Acquisition Procedures Not Clearly Demonstrated’’. In that study, GAO cited a survey of 

procurement executives in federal agencies by the Office of Federal Procurement 

Policy that revealed ‘‘a positive impact on (1) time required to award a contract, (2) 

administrative costs, (3) prices, (4) small business participation, and (5) delivery of 

products and services.’’ However, the GAO observed that ‘‘the survey did not collect 

empirical data that would have supported these views.’’ 

The GAO report made the following observations in the section ‘‘Matter for Congressional Consideration’’: 

‘‘Before providing permanent authority for using simplified procedures to acquire 

commercial items costing up to $5 million, Congress should consider extending the 

authority until 2005 and requiring the Administrator of the Office of Federal Procurement Policy to develop a method for demonstrating that the use of the simplified test program is producing the desired results. This demonstration project 

should be done in a fashion that would not deter government buyers from using the 

simplified procedures. This demonstration project should include an assessment of 

the extent to which (1) time required to award contracts was reduced, (2) administrative costs were reduced, (3) prices reflected the best value, (4) small business participation was promoted, and (5) delivery of products and services was improved.’’ 

In general, we agree with these observations by the GAO. We would conduct a 

test program that should run for five years. We would set the simplified acquisition 

threshold at $5 million for Fiscal Year 2009. However, we would index this number 

to the inflation rate to ensure that this threshold does not erode over the five year 

period. In addition, we would require an evaluation process of the five factors cited 

by the GAO. 

Mr. SMITH. 6) You recommend a ‘‘bridge fund’’ for the acquisition of IT systems 

• How large a bridge fund should this be? 

• Would it be a Central Transfer Account? 

• Who should manage and control it? 

Dr. STARR and Mr. KRAMER. It is recommended that, to begin the process, the 

‘‘bridge fund’’ should be on the order of $200 million to $300 million/annum for the 

following reasons. As we noted in our earlier testimony, the community is deeply 

concerned about the ‘‘Valley of Death’’ (i.e., the lack of resources to go from a good 

idea that has emerged from R&D into an acquired capability). To ‘‘bridge’’ this ‘‘Valley of Death’’, this ‘‘bridge fund’’ could used to provide timely resources to support 

key Test & Evaluation functions (particularly to ensure interoperability) and 

Sustainment (e.g., personnel training; upgrading systems as technology evolves). Ultimately, we believe that the precise size of the ‘‘bridge fund’’ should be based on 

successful performance (e.g., if it is used successfully and additional resources are 

needed, the fund should be increased to sustainable levels). Thus, it is vital to put 

in place a process that would continually assess the effectiveness of the ‘‘bridge 

fund’’ and help determine its appropriate size. 
94 

We believe that the ‘‘bridge fund’’ should be a Central Transfer Account. In addition, we believe that it would be appropriate for it to be managed and controlled 

by the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Networks and Information Integration 

(ASD(NII)). 

Æ