JULY 2009

Options for

Combining the

Navy’s and the

Coast Guard’s Small 

Combatant Programs

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PAPER

CBO

Options for Combining the 

Navy’s and the Coast Guard’s 

Small Combatant Programs

July 2009
Notes

Unless otherwise specified, all dollar amounts in the text, tables, and figures are expressed 

in 2009 dollars, and all years are federal fiscal years.

Cover images (clockwise from top): The Seas Ahead, an oil painting by Robert Selby, depicts 

the Reliance, the first in the Coast Guard’s fleet of 210-foot medium-endurance cutters. Commissioned in November 2008, the Freedom is the first of the Navy’s new littoral combat ships; 

designated the LCS-1, it features a semiplaning monohull. Commissioned in August 2008, 

the Bertholf is the first of the Coast Guard’s Legend class of high-endurance cutters.
Preface

As part of their long-term procurement strategies, the Navy and the Coast Guard are 

each in the process of developing and building two types of small combatants. The Navy 

is building two versions of its new littoral combat ship, and the Coast Guard is building 

replacements for its existing classes of high-endurance cutters and medium-endurance cutters. 

Although all four types of ship are about the same size, they are designed to perform different 

missions. If the Navy’s and Coast Guard’s plans for their small combatant programs are fully 

implemented, the two services combined will spend over $47 billion over the next 20 years 

purchasing 83 of those ships. 

In light of the many pressures on the budgets of the Navy and the Coast Guard, some policymakers and analysts have questioned whether the services could combine their small combatant programs in ways that still meet their requirements but save money. This Congressional 

Budget Office (CBO) paper, prepared at the request of the Ranking Member of the Senate 

Budget Committee, examines three alternatives that might allow the Navy and the Coast 

Guard to consolidate their small combatant programs. In keeping with CBO’s mandate to 

provide impartial analysis, the paper makes no recommendations.

Eric J. Labs of CBO’s National Security Division wrote the paper under the general supervision of J. Michael Gilmore and Matthew Goldberg. Raymond Hall of CBO’s Budget Analysis 

Division and Derek Trunkey of CBO’s National Security Division prepared the cost estimates 

under the general supervision of Sarah Jennings and Matthew Goldberg. Paul Cullinan, Sarah 

Jennings, and David Moore provided thoughtful comments on a preliminary draft. Heidi 

Golding, Dawn Sauter Regan, and Jason Wheelock of CBO contributed to developing the 

life-cycle cost estimates used in the paper. Robert Work, formerly of the Center for Strategic 

and Budgetary Assessments, reviewed the manuscript before publication. (The assistance of 

external reviewers implies no responsibility for the final product, which rests solely with 

CBO.)

Loretta Lettner edited the paper, and Christine Bogusz proofread it. Maureen Costantino 

designed the cover and prepared the document for publication. Lenny Skutnik printed the 

initial copies, Linda Schimmel handled the print distribution, and Simone Thomas prepared 

the electronic version for CBO’s Web site (www.cbo.gov).

Douglas W. Elmendorf

Director

July 2009

Contents

CBO

Summary and Introduction 1

Types of Missions Performed by Small Combatants 4

Coast Guard Missions 4

Navy Missions 4

The Navy’s and the Coast Guard’s Current Small Combatants 5

Oliver Hazard Perry Class Guided-Missile Frigate 5

Avenger MCM-1 Mine-Countermeasures Ship 6

Hamilton Class High-Endurance Cutter 6

Bear Class Medium-Endurance Cutter 7

Reliance Class Medium-Endurance Cutter 7

The Navy’s and the Coast Guard’s Future Small Combatants 7

Freedom Class Littoral Combat Ship 7

Legend Class High-Endurance Cutter 9

Notional Medium-Endurance Cutter 9

Key Characteristics of the Services’ Future Small Combatants 10

Projected Costs of the Services’ Small Combatant Programs Under 

Current Acquisition Plans 11

Alternatives to the Services’ Current Acquisition Plans 13

Option 1: Base the Coast Guard’s Medium-Endurance Cutter on a 

Variant of the Navy’s LCS Monohull 14

Option 2: Support the Navy’s Maritime Strategy by Reducing the 

Number of LCSs Purchased and Buying NSCs Instead 18

Option 3: Equip the Coast Guard’s Deepwater Force with More 

National Security Cutters and Cancel the Offshore Patrol Cutter Program 20
VI OPTIONS FOR COMBINING THE NAVY’S AND THE COAST GUARD’S SMALL COMBATANT PROGRAMS

CBO

Tables

1. Acquisition Costs and Total Life-Cycle Costs of New Surface Combatants 

Under the Services’ Plans and Three Alternative Plans 3

2. Characteristics and Capabilities of the Navy’s and the Coast Guard’s 

Existing Small Combatants 8

3. Characteristics and Capabilities of the Coast Guard’s New and Notional 

Small Combatants 15

Figures

1. Average Age of the Navy’s and the Coast Guard’s Existing Small Combatants 6

2. Line Drawing of the Navy’s Freedom Class Littoral Combat Ship 9

3. Line Drawing of the Coast Guard’s Legend Class High-Endurance Cutter 10

4. The Navy’s and the Coast Guard’s Purchases and Inventory of Small 

Combatants 12

5. Acquisition Costs of the Services’ Small Combatant Programs Under 

Existing Plans, 2009 to 2025 13

6. Total Acquisition Costs of the Services’ Small Combatant Programs 

Under Three Alternative Plans, 2009 to 2025 14

7. Number of Mission Days Provided Annually by the Coast Guard’s 

Total Inventory of Cutters 16

8. Minimum Number of Refueling and Resupply Visits During a 180-Day 

Deployment, Selected Navy Ships 19

9. Number of Days Required to Deploy from San Diego to the Western Pacific, 

Selected Navy Ships 20

10. Number of Days at Sea Provided Per Year by the Coast Guard’s Current and 

Prospective Inventory of Cutters 21

Boxes

1. Calculating the Total Life-Cycle Costs of Small Combatants Under the 

Services’ Plans and CBO’s Options 17

2. Increasing the Antiship Missile Defenses of a Patrol Frigate 

Derived from the National Security Cutter 18
CBO

Options for Combining the 

Navy’s and the Coast Guard’s 

Small Combatant Programs

Summary and Introduction

As articulated in their respective long-term shipbuilding 

plans, the Navy and the Coast Guard intend to spend 

more than $47 billion combined over the next 20 years to 

purchase a total of 83 small combatants. Of that number, 

the Navy plans to purchase 53 littoral combat ships 

(LCSs), in addition to the two that were purchased in 

2005 and 2006. The LCSs will be built using two different hull designs—one, a semiplaning monohull; the 

other, an aluminum trimaran—although the exact mix of 

hulls has not yet been determined.1

 The ships will carry 

one of three sets of equipment, or mission packages, 

depending on which mission they are expected to perform (antiship, antisubmarine, or countermine warfare). 

The Coast Guard plans to buy five new high-endurance 

cutters, commonly referred to as national security cutters 

(NSCs), and 25 new medium-endurance cutters, often 

called offshore patrol cutters (OPCs).2

 Three other NSCs 

ordered prior to 2009 have been built or are currently 

under construction. Although the Coast Guard plans to 

begin buying the offshore patrol cutter in 2015, it is not 

yet certain what the OPC will look like or if it will be 

confined to one class of ship. Together, the NSCs and 

OPCs, which are designed to operate 50 nautical miles 

beyond the U.S. coastline, are part of the resources and 

force structure that make up the Coast Guard’s “Deepwater assets.”3

As the designation “small combatant” implies, the Navy’s 

LCSs and the Coast Guard’s NSCs and OPCs are 

designed to be significantly shorter in length, lighter in 

weight, and shallower in draft than most Navy surface 

warships (carriers, amphibious ships, cruisers, and 

destroyers). For instance, the Navy’s LCSs have a full-load 

displacement—the weight of the ship plus its crew, weapons, fuel, and cargo—of about 3,300 tons. The national 

security cutter displaces about 4,300 tons of seawater, 

and the most recent notional design of the offshore patrol 

cutter would have the ship displace 3,700 tons.4

 By contrast, the most modern Arleigh Burke class destroyers, the 

backbone of the Navy’s surface combatant force, displace 

about 9,500 tons; amphibious ships displace from 16,000 

to 45,000 tons; and aircraft carriers displace about 

100,000 tons.

Despite a superficial similarity in size, the small combatants being developed by the Navy and the Coast Guard 1. A team led by Lockheed Martin is building a steel, semiplaning 

monohull. A team led by General Dynamics is building an aluminum trimaran.

2. The Coast Guard’s official designations for the ships are Maritime 

Security Cutter, Large (WMSL-750) and Maritime Security 

Cutter, Medium (WMSM). In this analysis, the term “national 

security cutter” will often be used to describe the Coast Guard’s 

new high-endurance cutter and the term “offshore patrol cutter” 

will often be used to describe the Coast Guard’s new mediumendurance cutter. The term “cutter” describes any Coast Guard 

vessel that is 65 feet or greater in length and can accommodate 

a crew for extended periods of time.

3. Other Deepwater assets include aircraft and sensors. The Coast 

Guard’s Deepwater program is a 30-year plan to recapitalize 

virtually all of the service’s ships, aircraft, and sensors that perform 

missions more than 50 nautical miles from U.S. shores.

4. All displacements are measured in long tons, which is typical for 

most Navy and Coast Guard ships. Displacements for the LCS, 

however, are usually expressed by the Navy in metric tons. To 

convert metric to long tons, multiply metric tons by 0.984. A 

standard short ton is 2,000 pounds; a long ton is 2,240 pounds; 

and a metric ton is 2,204.62 pounds.
2 OPTIONS FOR COMBINING THE NAVY’S AND THE COAST GUARD’S SMALL COMBATANT PROGRAMS

CBO

have different characteristics and capabilities, which are 

designed to fulfill different missions. In general, the 

Coast Guard ships are meant to operate independently at 

sea for long periods of time and at some distance from the 

shore (that is, to have a large, unrefueled range of operation) and not to engage in major combat operations. The 

Navy’s LCSs, by contrast, are designed to have less range 

than Coast Guard cutters but to operate at much greater 

speeds and serve during wartime as part of a naval battle 

network in close-in littoral waters in other parts of the 

world. Those differences in mission requirements have 

led the two services to reject a common ship platform for 

their small combatant needs and to adhere to their previously articulated procurement plans. 

In the early stages of implementing those plans, however, 

the Navy and the Coast Guard have encountered various 

challenges. Cost overruns and construction problems 

have plagued both versions of the Navy’s littoral combat 

ship—designated LCS-1 (the semiplaning monohull) 

and LCS-2 (the aluminum trimaran)—as well as the 

Coast Guard’s national security cutter. Because of the difficulties associated with constructing the NSC, development of the Coast Guard’s notional offshore patrol cutter 

has been delayed by five years. All three ship programs 

have experienced substantial cost growth above the original estimates the services provided to the Congress as well 

as delays in construction of more than a year for each 

ship.

As a result of those delays and cost overruns, some members of Congress and independent analysts have questioned whether the Navy and the Coast Guard need to 

purchase four different types of small combatants and 

whether—in spite of the services’ well-documented reservations about using similar hull designs—the same type 

of hull could be employed for certain missions. To 

explore that possibility, the Congressional Budget Office 

(CBO) examined three alternatives to the Navy’s and the 

Coast Guard’s current plans for acquiring littoral combat 

ships and deepwater cutters. 

B Option 1 explores the feasibility of having the Coast 

Guard buy a variant of the Navy’s LCS—specifically, 

the semiplaning monohull—to use as its offshore 

patrol cutter. 

B Option 2 examines the effects of reducing the number 

of LCSs the Navy would buy and substituting instead 

a naval version of the Coast Guard’s national security 

cutter. (The rationale for this option is that, according 

to some analysts, the NSC’s longer mission range and 

higher endurance might make it better suited than the 

LCS to act as a “patrol frigate,” which would allow 

the Navy to carry out certain activities—maritime 

security, engagement, and humanitarian operations—

outlined in the sea services’ new maritime strategy.)5

B Option 3 examines the advantages and disadvantages 

of having the Coast Guard buy more national security 

cutters rather than incur the costs of designing and 

building a new ship to perform the missions of an 

offshore patrol cutter.

According to CBO’s estimates, all three alternatives and 

the services’ plans would have similar costs, regardless of 

whether they are calculated in terms of acquisition costs 

or total life-cycle costs (see Table 1).6 CBO’s analysis also 

indicates that the three alternative plans would not necessarily be more cost-effective or provide more capability 

than the services’ existing plans. Specifically, even if the 

options addressed individual problems that the Navy and 

Coast Guard might confront with their small combatants, it would be at the cost of creating new challenges. 

For instance, Option 1—which calls for using the LCS 

monohull for the Coast Guard’s OPC—would provide 

less capability for the Coast Guard from that service’s perspective and at a potentially higher cost. Option 2 could 

provide the Navy with capability that, in some respects, 

would be superior for executing the peacetime elements 

of its maritime strategy; but that enhanced peacetime 

capability would sacrifice wartime capability and survivability. Option 3 would allow the Coast Guard to replace 

its aging cutters more quickly at a slightly higher cost but 

without the technical risk that is associated with designing and constructing a new class of ships, which the service’s existing plan entails. It would, however, provide 

fewer mission days at sea and require the Coast Guard to 

find new home ports for its much larger force of national 

security cutters.

5. U.S. Marine Corps, U.S. Navy, and U.S. Coast Guard, A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower (October 2007).

6. Acquisition costs are expenses related to developing and buying 

ships. Total life-cycle costs include acquisition costs as well as costs 

for operating and replacing the ship over the course of its service 

life.
OPTIONS FOR COMBINING THE NAVY’S AND THE COAST GUARD’S SMALL COMBATANT PROGRAMS 3

CBO

Table 1.

Acquisition Costs and Total Life-Cycle Costs of New Surface Combatants 

Under the Services’ Plans and Three Alternative Plans

Source: Congressional Budget Office.

Notes: LCS = littoral combat ship; NSC = national security cutter; OPC = offshore patrol cutter; n.a. = not applicable.

Two littoral combat ships and three national security cutters were purchased prior to 2009. 

Total acquisition costs include the costs of developing and buying the ships and the costs of associated LCS mission packages.

Total life-cycle costs include the following: acquisition costs; the costs of replacing each ship one time; and the costs of operating the 

ships (purchasing fuel, maintaining ship structures and systems, and compensating personnel) between 2009 and 2055. 

 The Coast Guard’s variant of the LCS would be the semiplaning monohull.

a. Includes $3.4 billion for 62 LCS mission packages.

b. Includes $1.8 billion for 33 LCS mission packages.

c. Includes improved antiship missile systems. No LCS mission packages would be purchased for the NSC-derived patrol frigate. 

d. In the calculations of total life-cycle costs presented here, the acquisition costs of the first three NSCs and the first two LCSs are not 

included because the period that CBO is analyzing begins in 2009. Annual operating costs for all ships are included.

LCS 53 33.1 a 53 33.2 a 28 17.1 b 53 33.1 a

LCS (Coast Guard variant) 0 0 25 12.1 0 0 0 0

NSC 5 2.9 5 2.9 5 2.6 25 12.5

NSC-Derived Patrol Frigate 

(Naval variant) 0 0 0 0 20 10.7 c 0 0

OPC 25 11.1 0 0 25 11.1 0 0 ___ ____ ___ ____ ___ ____ ___ ____

Total 83 47.1 83 48.2 78 41.5 78 45.6

Memorandum:

Average Cost Per Hull 

(Millions of dollars)a n.a. 570 n.a. 580 n.a. 530 n.a. 580

LCS 108 65.9 108 65.1 58 35.3 108 65.9

LCS (Coast Guard variant) 0 0 50 23.3 0 0 0 0

NSC 13 10.4 13 10.4 13 9.9 53 31.2

NSC-Derived Patrol Frigate 0 0 0 0 40 25 0 0

(Naval variant)

OPC 50 21.6 0 0 50 21.6 0 0 ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____

Total 171 97.9 171 98.8 161 91.8 161 97.1

Acquisition Costs, 2009 to 2025

(Billions of 2009 dollars)

Ships

Option 1 Option 2 Option 3

Costs

Total Life-Cycle Costs, 2009 to 2055d

(Discounted to net present value)

Number of 

Ships Costs

Number of

Ships Costs

Number of

Services' Plans

Number of

Ships Costs
4 OPTIONS FOR COMBINING THE NAVY’S AND THE COAST GUARD’S SMALL COMBATANT PROGRAMS

CBO

Types of Missions Performed by 

Small Combatants

The Navy’s and the Coast Guard’s existing shipbuilding 

plans reflect the fact that the services have traditionally 

engaged in distinctly different missions that are performed in different environments. Whereas the Navy’s 

missions have historically been oriented toward combat, 

the Coast Guard’s missions have focused on ensuring 

maritime security, enforcing maritime law, protecting 

natural resources, and responding to humanitarian crises 

in the nation’s inland waterways, at its ports, in coastal 

areas, and on the high seas. What the services’ existing 

plans do not reflect, however, is that the services’ new 

maritime strategy has created some overlap in those mission profiles. Generally speaking, however, even as the 

services’ mission profiles continue to evolve, their respective responsibilities can be characterized as follows:

Coast Guard Missions

The principal missions of the Coast Guard’s deepwater 

cutters require the ships to operate independently with 

minimal logistical support hundreds, if not thousands, 

of miles beyond U.S. shores. Traditionally, those missions 

have centered on activities that are humanitarian in 

nature or that relate to law enforcement and maritime 

security. The Coast Guard’s mission profile includes the 

following:

B Search-and-rescue operations;

B Environmental disaster response;

B Fisheries enforcement;

B Immigration enforcement;

B Homeland security operations; and

B Overseas operations in support of deployed military 

forces.

Those missions often require Coast Guard cutters to 

engage in solitary at-sea patrols for long periods of time. 

For example, during particular fishing seasons, the Coast 

Guard will typically maintain a cutter on-station at the 

fishing grounds, which may be hundreds of miles from 

the U.S. coast, to enforce fishing regulations as well as to 

provide search-and-rescue capability. 

Navy Missions

While the Coast Guard’s missions for small combatants 

largely center on peacetime activities, the Navy has 

designed the LCS-1 and the LCS-2 to perform a variety 

of wartime and peacetime missions. However, the LCS is 

above all a warship, the Navy argues, and therefore must 

be designed and built for combat operations. Specifically, 

the LCS is designed modularly so that it can be reconfigured fairly quickly to perform one of three distinct missions: finding and sinking quiet diesel-electric submarines 

operating in crowded, noisy, and shallow coastal waters; 

finding and neutralizing mines; and countering swarm 

attacks by small, high-speed boats armed with missiles. 

The ships displace about 3,300 tons fully loaded and can 

cruise at speeds in excess of 40 knots. 

At the same time, the sea services’ new maritime strategy 

places about equal emphasis on peacetime presence and 

engagement missions: maritime security, building naval 

partnerships with the navies of other countries, and 

humanitarian operations.7

 These are peacetime missions 

that resemble certain Coast Guard missions, but the Navy 

would generally conduct its peacetime missions overseas.

While almost any Navy ship could be called on to participate in missions requiring “low-end” capability—

maritime security operations, for instance, which range 

from antipiracy and counterdrug operations to enforcing 

economic sanctions—small surface combatants are especially useful in that capacity because they have sufficient 

capability to perform such missions but are small enough 

to operate in shallower waters, where those activities 

often take place. The Navy would prefer not to use its 

large surface combatants for those operations, for several 

reasons: The vessels were designed and built for missions 

requiring “high-end” capability, such as fleet air defense 

and land attack; they are not designed to operate quickly 

and efficiently in shallower waters; and small surface 

combatants are capable of carrying out low-end missions 

but at a fraction of the cost of a large surface combatant. 

In particular, although small surface combatants can 

carry helicopters and small boats to perform interception 

and boarding operations, a ship with long range and high 

endurance would provide advantages for executing maritime security operations because those ships might be 

required to patrol large areas over extended periods of 

time. 

7. A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower, p. 11.
OPTIONS FOR COMBINING THE NAVY’S AND THE COAST GUARD’S SMALL COMBATANT PROGRAMS 5

CBO

Similarly, small combatants are effective platforms for 

engaging with the navies and coast guards of other, 

smaller nations. The maritime forces of most countries 

that the U.S. Navy encounters are composed of small 

ships (few are larger than 3,000 to 4,000 tons). Thus, 

when considering engagement or partnership activities 

(including personnel exchanges and joint training exercises), the maritime forces of other countries might find 

it difficult to participate if the U.S. Navy had only large 

surface combatants or even larger amphibious ships with 

which to conduct those activities. The availability of 

small ships could thus enhance the Navy’s ability to 

maintain and expand its engagement and mentoring 

activities with the navies of other nations. 

Along with larger surface combatants, small combatants 

are also useful in conducting humanitarian operations. 

They can sail closer to shore than larger ships, extending 

the reach of the Navy’s task forces both physically and 

with their embarked helicopters. Small combatants 

would contribute to delivering supplies, rescuing the 

stranded and injured, or policing the seas to maintain 

order in the aftermath of a natural disaster or some other 

type of humanitarian crisis.

This mission profile for small combatants raises a question: The Navy determined its key design characteristics 

for the LCS before the sea services formulated, wrote, and 

promulgated the new maritime strategy emphasizing 

maritime security operations, engagement and partnership with the navies of other countries, and humanitarian 

response. To what extent should that emphasis and those 

activities affect the design of the littoral combat ships or 

the composition of the Navy’s and Coast Guard’s overall 

small combatant force? 

The Navy’s and the Coast Guard’s 

Current Small Combatants

The Navy and the Coast Guard today deploy a total of 83 

small combatants and mine-warfare ships. The Navy’s 

current inventory of small combatants includes two 

classes of ships: 

B 30 Oliver Hazard Perry class FFG-7 guided-missile 

frigates; and

B 14 Avenger class MCM-1 mine-countermeasures 

ships. 

The Coast Guard’s current inventory of cutters, by ship 

size and class, are as follows:

B 12 Hamilton class 378-foot high-endurance cutters;

B 13 Bear (also known as Famous) class 270-foot 

medium-endurance cutters; and

B 14 Reliance class 210-foot medium-endurance cutters.

The characteristics and capabilities of the Navy’s and 

Coast Guard’s existing small combatants are described 

below.

Oliver Hazard Perry Class Guided-Missile Frigate

Oliver Hazard Perry class guided-missile frigates, or 

FFG-7s, are the Navy’s smallest surface combatants, 

displacing about 4,100 tons each. Originally designed as 

escorts for resupply convoys that would cross the Atlantic 

in the event of a war with the Soviet Union, the frigates 

have been adapted to post–Cold War uses, including 

maritime security operations (such as sanctions enforcement or counterdrug operations). The ships can carry 

two H-60 type helicopters and, because they are 

equipped with towed array sonar, can conduct antisubmarine warfare operations. According to one source: 

“The soundness of the design has permitted the expansion [of capabilities], and the ships have proven remarkably sturdy.”8 The average cost of the 51 ships purchased 

by the U.S. Navy between 1973 and 1984 was about 

$570 million each (in 2009 dollars), but later ships, 

which featured improved antisubmarine capabilities, 

cost about $650 million each.

At an average age of 25 years, however, ships in this class 

are reaching the end of their projected 30-year service life 

(see Figure 1). In recent years, in an effort to save money, 

the Navy has removed much of the ships’ armament; consequently, FFG-7s no longer have the capability to launch 

antiship or surface-to-air antiaircraft missiles despite their 

designation as guided-missile frigates.9

 (FFG-7s still 

retain certain combat systems, including open-ocean 

8. A.D. Baker III, The Naval Institute Guide to Combat Fleets 

of the World, 2002–2003: Their Ships, Aircraft, and Systems

(Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 2002), p. 965.

9. Prior to the removal of this armament, the FFGs would typically 

carry 36 antiaircraft missiles and 4 Harpoon antiship missiles.
6 OPTIONS FOR COMBINING THE NAVY’S AND THE COAST GUARD’S SMALL COMBATANT PROGRAMS

CBO

Figure 1.

Average Age of the Navy’s and the Coast Guard’s Existing Small Combatants

(Years)

Source: Congressional Budget Office based on data from the U.S. Navy and the U.S. Coast Guard.

Note: The average age of ships in each class is displayed through the projected year of retirement.

antisubmarine capability.) Nor does the Navy consider 

the Perry class suitable for the type of littoral operations 

against mines, diesel-electric submarines, and fast small 

boats for which the LCS is being built. For instance, 

Perry class ships do not have the space to carry and operate the off-board unmanned systems that are at the heart 

of the Navy’s strategy to defeat such threats in the future.

Avenger MCM-1 Mine-Countermeasures Ship

The 14 Avenger class mine-warfare ships in the fleet each 

displace about 1,300 tons and represent the only dedicated antimine craft in the U.S. Navy. The first ship was 

commissioned in 1987, the last in 1994; they are slated to 

retire between 2018 and 2026, with their mission being 

assumed by the LCS’s mine-warfare package. (Earlier 

shipbuilding plans, however, envisioned replacing the 

Avengers with a dedicated mine-clearing ship as 

well as purchasing 55 LCSs with more than the 24 minewarfare packages than are currently programmed.)10

The Avenger class ships were built with a fiberglasssheathed wood hull to keep the vessel’s magnetic signature as low as possible to resist detection by magnetic 

mines. They have less than half the displacement and are 

less than half the length of the LCS and can support a 

crew of 83. The Avenger program also suffered a number 

of design and construction problems that increased the 

cost of ships in that class. In 2009 dollars, the average 

cost of the 14 ships was about $260 million each.

Originally intended to protect U.S. ballistic missile submarines against deep-ocean Soviet mines, ships in the 

Avenger class have been fitted with various equipment 

upgrades to allow them to detect mines in both shallow 

and deep water. During the first Gulf War, the Avenger 

was deployed for operations in the Persian Gulf, and four 

Avenger class minesweepers participated in countermine 

operations during Operation Iraqi Freedom. Today four 

remain home-ported in Bahrain.

Hamilton Class High-Endurance Cutter

The mainstay of the Coast Guard’s existing Deepwater 

assets for the past 40 years, these 378-foot ships displace 

about 3,100 tons and have a range of 14,000 nautical 

miles at 11 knots. Originally, they were built not only to 

perform the long-range missions and patrols sometimes 

required of Coast Guard ships but also with the capability 

to perform some combat-oriented operations in the event 

the Cold War led to overt hostilities. For example, during 

the Cold War, the ships were equipped with antiship missiles and antisubmarine weapons, including torpedo 

2005 2010 2015 2020 2025

0

15

20

25

30

35

40

45

50

55

Reliance Class

Medium-Endurance

Cutter Hamilton Class

High-Endurance

Cutter

Bear Class

Medium-Endurance

Cutter

Oliver Hazard Perry Class

Guided-Missile Frigate

10. Department of the Navy, A Report to Congress on Annual LongRange Plan for the Construction of Naval Vessels (May 2003 and 

May 2004). 
OPTIONS FOR COMBINING THE NAVY’S AND THE COAST GUARD’S SMALL COMBATANT PROGRAMS 7

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tubes, in order to protect U.S. convoys sailing for Europe 

to reinforce NATO forces. Those weapons were ordered 

removed by the Coast Guard commandant in 1992.

At an average age of 40 years, however, the ships are 

reaching the end of their useful service life. A recent 

report from Inside the Navy states that the Coast Guard is 

assessing the readiness of the entire class after the discovery of “immense structural problems” in two of the 

ships.11 Those problems included corrosion in the hull, 

which compromised the structural integrity of the vessels. 

Nevertheless, the Coast Guard expects to continue operating ships in the Hamilton class until the new NSCs are 

available to replace them.

Bear Class Medium-Endurance Cutter

These 270-foot cutters are the Coast Guard’s newest and 

most sophisticated ships. Built mostly in the 1980s, ships 

in this class average 22 years in age. They displace 1,800 

tons, can reach a maximum speed of about 20 knots, and 

have a mission range of 9,900 nautical miles when cruising at 12 knots. They were designed to be able to conduct 

a 14-day patrol at a range of 400 nautical miles. The 

cutters can “embark” (that is, carry, operate, and sustain) 

one search-and-rescue helicopter from the H-60 or H-65 

family. Nevertheless, Bear class cutters have been criticized for their slow speed and for the fact that they do not 

move smoothly in heavy seas, which has made it difficult 

to perform certain Coast Guard missions.12

If the Coast Guard executes its Deepwater plan according 

to its most recent schedule, which calls for purchases 

of OPCs to begin in 2015, the Bear class cutters would 

not serve as long as the 210-foot Reliance or 378-foot 

Hamilton class cutters. However, they would exceed their 

notional retirement age of 28 years when the last of them 

leave the fleet in 2025.

Reliance Class Medium-Endurance Cutter

Although built in the 1960s, these 210-foot cutters were 

extensively modernized in the 1990s. As with all of the 

Coast Guard’s large cutters, the lack of an available 

replacement has kept the ships operational longer than 

the service would prefer. Originally designed to operate 

for 30 years, the average age of ships in the class is currently 42 years. Reliance class cutters displace about 

1,000 tons, can reach a maximum speed of 18 knots, and 

have a range of 6,100 nautical miles when cruising at 

13 knots (see Table 2). Unlike larger Coast Guard cutters, 

these ships cannot embark a helicopter, although they 

do have a landing deck that can temporarily support helicopter operations. The ships were designed primarily for 

the purpose of performing law-enforcement and searchand-rescue operations. 

A medium-endurance cutter is one that can engage in a 

three-week patrol without the need for replenishment 

of stores. The normal patrol for one of these ships is 

about six to seven weeks, during which the vessel returns 

to port for refueling and replenishment once. A mediumendurance cutter would typically spend about half the 

year at sea and the other half in home port to allow the 

ship to undergo mechanical and structural maintenance 

and the crew to rest and receive additional training.

The Navy’s and the Coast Guard’s 

Future Small Combatants

Both services are pursuing programs to replace their existing small combatants as those ships reach the end of their 

service life. The Navy plans to replace its Oliver Hazard 

Perry class guided-missile frigates and Avenger class minecountermeasures ships with 55 Freedom class littoral 

combat ships (although the exact mix of the two variants 

has not been decided upon).13 The Coast Guard will 

replace its aging Hamilton, Bear, and Reliance class cutters with 8 Legend class national security cutters and 

25 offshore patrol cutters.14 The status of those new programs is discussed below.

Freedom Class Littoral Combat Ship

The Navy’s 2009 shipbuilding plan details the service’s 

intention to build 53 littoral combat ships between 2009 

and 2019. The Navy ordered the first two Freedom class

11. Rebekah Gordon, “Coast Guard to Assess Readiness of All HighEndurance Cutters,” Inside the Navy (December 8, 2008).

12. Norman Polmar, The Naval Institute Guide to Ships and Aircraft 

of the U.S. Fleet, 18th ed. (Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 

2005), p. 581.

13. When the Navy initiated the LCS program in November 2001, it 

also operated 12 Osprey class MHC-56 coastal minehunters. In 

essence, the Navy is replacing 56 small combatants (30 FFG-7s, 

14 MCMs, and 12 MHCs) with 55 LCSs.

14. The Coast Guard is replacing 39 ships with 33 NSCs and OPCs. 

It is currently reviewing its requirements for the national security 

and offshore patrol cutters. At the time this report was written, the 

Coast Guard had not announced a change in the number of ships 

it plans to purchase but that still had to be determined.
8 OPTIONS FOR COMBINING THE NAVY’S AND THE COAST GUARD’S SMALL COMBATANT PROGRAMS

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Table 2.

Characteristics and Capabilities of the Navy’s and the Coast Guard’s 

Existing Small Combatants

Source: Norman Polmar, The Naval Institute Guide to Ships and Aircraft of the U.S. Fleet, 18th ed. (Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 

2005).

Notes: n.a. = not applicable.

Beam indicates the width of the ship. Draft indicates the depth to which the ship is immersed. Full-load displacement includes the 

weight of the ship plus its crew, cargo, weapons, and fuel.

a. The Navy does not consider endurance to be a meaningful measure of capability because of the availability of logistics ships that operate 

with Navy combat ships to provide replenishment of stores and refueling at sea.

b. At 18 knots.

c. At 11 knots.

d. At 12 knots.

e. At 13 knots. 

LCSs in 2005 and 2006, respectively. Thus, the Navy 

plans to purchase a total of 55 of those ships. Currently 

the Navy is building two different designs, one a semiplaning monohull (the ship ordered in 2005; see 

Figure 2) and the other a trimaran (the ship ordered in 

2006). The Navy has not yet determined when or if it 

will eventually select one hull or whether it will divide the 

entire class between the two types of ship. 

The LCS differs from the Navy’s existing and previous 

warships in that the program is divided into two components: the sea frame (the ship itself) and mission packages 

(combat systems). The sea frame will be built with the 

ability to switch mission packages, depending on which 

mission the ship is intended to carry out at a given time: 

antiship warfare, antisubmarine warfare, and countermine warfare. The Navy expects to buy 64 of these mission packages for the 55-ship program—24 for antiship 

warfare, 16 for antisubmarine warfare, and 24 for antimine warfare. Once it has more familiarity with the ship, 

the Navy may develop and then procure other mission 

packages for other types of missions.

Bringing the LCS program to fruition has been difficult. 

The Navy originally hoped that each sea frame would 

Navy

(Oliver Hazard Perry (Hamilton Class (Bear Class (Reliance Class

Class Guided-Missile High-Endurance Medium-Endurance Medium-Endurance

Frigate) Cutter) Cutter) Cutter)

Length (Feet) 455 378 270 210

Beam (Feet) 45 43 38 34

Draft (Feet) 22 20 14 11

Full-Load Displacement (Long tons) 4,100 3,100 1,800 1,000

Maximum Speed (Knots) 29 29 20 18

Endurance (Days) n.a.a 45 21 21

Range (Nautical miles) 5,000b 14,000c 9,900d 6,100e

Number of Helicopters 2 1 1 0

Design Service Life (Years) 30 30 28 30

Current Average Age (Years) 25 40 22 42

Crew 239 178 116 75

Coast Guard
OPTIONS FOR COMBINING THE NAVY’S AND THE COAST GUARD’S SMALL COMBATANT PROGRAMS 9

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Figure 2.

Line Drawing of the Navy’s Freedom Class Littoral Combat Ship

Source: Lockheed Martin Corporation.

Note: This illustration depicts the semiplaning monohull variant of the littoral combat ship.

cost about $260 million in 2009 dollars and take two 

years to build. The first two ships, however, are now 

expected to cost about $700 million each; CBO estimates 

that the average cost of subsequent ships will be about 

$550 million and that they will take about three years to 

build. The average cost of each mission package would 

add about $60 million to that figure.

Legend Class High-Endurance Cutter

The Coast Guard’s new high-endurance cutter—also 

known as the national security cutter—is designed to 

replace the 378-foot Hamilton class cutters. Ships in this 

class displace about 4,300 tons and can accommodate 

a crew of 120, with the capacity to berth as many as 

150 people. The ship, which is about the same size as 

the Navy’s Oliver Hazard Perry class frigate, has a range 

of about 12,000 nautical miles when steaming at 8 to 9 

knots. It is designed to perform the Coast Guard’s most 

challenging missions, such as patrols far from U.S. shore, 

and can operate with U.S. Navy fleet units on missions in 

other parts of the world. 

The first ship of the class, the Bertholf (see Figure 3), has 

been delivered to the Coast Guard, but the program has 

experienced significant cost increases and schedule delays. 

When construction of the ship began in 2004, the Coast 

Guard expected it would join its fleet in 2006, but the 

ship was not delivered until 2008. Originally projected to 

cost $475 million, the ship’s costs have increased to about 

$750 million. Those cost increases have affected production of subsequent ships of the class by increasing the 

overall cost of the program by about 40 percent.15

Notional Medium-Endurance Cutter 

Under the Coast Guard’s original Deepwater plan, the 

service’s new medium-endurance cutter, often referred to 

as the offshore patrol cutter, would likely have been a 

scaled-down version of the national security cutter. In 

fact, senior officials in the Coast Guard and industry 

officials both argued that the government would get the 

best price for the OPC by maximizing the commonality 

between the larger and smaller cutters. However, in the 

wake of the troubles with the national security cutter and, 

in particular, the cost increases the program has experienced, the Coast Guard has taken over direct management of the Deepwater program and has opened up 

construction of the offshore patrol cutter to general 

competition. Under the original plan, the first OPC was 

to be bought in 2010; the Coast Guard now expects to 

award the first OPC contract in 2014 or 2015.

The service recently released a request for information 

(RFI) outlining its design criteria for the OPC. Those

15. For an extensive discussion of these and other problems, see 

Ronald O’Rourke, Coast Guard Deepwater Acquisition Programs: 

Background, Oversight Issues, and Options for Congress, CRS Report 

for Congress RL33753 (October 9, 2008).
10 OPTIONS FOR COMBINING THE NAVY’S AND THE COAST GUARD’S SMALL COMBATANT PROGRAMS

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Figure 3.

Line Drawing of the Coast Guard’s Legend Class High-Endurance Cutter

Source: Northrop Grumman Corporation.

Note: The high-endurance cutter is also referred to as the national security cutter.

requirements include the ability to a achieve a sustained 

speed of 25 knots; the capacity to berth 120 crew members; the capability to reach a range of 7,500 nautical 

miles at 12 to 14 knots with a fuel reserve of 30 percent 

(the NSC’s 12,000 mile range does not include a reserve); 

and the ability to launch and recover small boats in sea 

state five (characterized as rough seas with wind speeds 

of 21 to 25 knots and waves 8 to 12 feet high), conduct 

more than one small boat operation at the same time, and 

embark one helicopter. A critical requirement in the RFI 

is that the proposed OPC should have a parent craft (an 

existing ship on which the new ship’s design is based) that 

is constructed to the American Bureau of Shipping’s 

Naval Vessel Rules (NVR).16 It is not clear how many 

viable candidates there are that can meet this particular 

requirement because many such parent craft are foreignbuilt and, thus, not subject to the NVR.

The Coast Guard also stated, however, that it will consider ship candidates that do not meet these requirements 

exactly, implying that the service will weigh the advantages of various capabilities and costs against one another. 

In particular, the RFI stated that an OPC proposed by 

industry could have a range of between 5,500 and 9,000 

nautical miles, endurance of 30 to 50 days, and accommodations for 90 to 130 people. With respect to the 

NVR requirement, the Navy has waived areas of noncompliance with the NVR in the past when it felt the 

need to do so; the Coast Guard could as well.

For the purpose of this analysis, CBO assumed the Coast 

Guard would acquire an OPC that conforms to the criteria outlined in the RFI and that the ship would displace 

about 3,700 tons when fully loaded. That displacement 

was based on the notional displacement of the OPC 

under the original Deepwater plan but including post–

September 11 Homeland Security requirements. 

Key Characteristics of the Services’ 

Future Small Combatants

While a particular ship design comprises many characteristics, four appear particularly important to the Coast 

Guard: operating environment, endurance, the ability to 

operate in austere ports, and berthing capacity. The Coast 

Guard’s deepwater cutters must be prepared to operate, 

without logistical support, in waters far from U.S. ports 

and in environments where the sea state can be level 5 or 

greater. For example, the Coast Guard routinely operates 

ships in the Bering Sea off Alaska for search-and-rescue 

operations, fisheries enforcement, and environmental 

protection. Coast Guard deepwater cutters thus are 

designed to allow long cruising ranges and high endur16. The next section discusses the Naval Vessel Rules in more detail. ance. Those needs stem from the lack of an extensive 
OPTIONS FOR COMBINING THE NAVY’S AND THE COAST GUARD’S SMALL COMBATANT PROGRAMS 11

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Coast Guard resupply capability, such as that found with 

the Navy’s fleet of combat logistics ships (including oilers 

and multiple-product vessels).

Coast Guard operations along much of the U.S. shoreline 

may involve putting into ports that do not have many 

services or facilities to assist in the docking of ships. Tug 

service, for example, may not be available. To compensate, bow thrusters, which help a ship dock on its own, 

have been a design feature of Coast Guard cutters for 

decades. 

Finally, the Coast Guard’s various law enforcement and 

immigration responsibilities make it desirable to have 

berthing capacity well in excess of that needed to house 

the crew. The service’s various missions require that cutters periodically carry other law enforcement personnel 

(from the Federal Bureau of Investigation or the Drug 

Enforcement Agency, for instance) or have the capability 

to house immigrants who might be picked up at sea when 

attempting to the enter the United States illegally.

In contrast with the Coast Guard’s cutters, the LCS is 

optimized for high-speed, shallow-water combat operations with a minimal crew. The LCS is designed for sprint 

speed of greater than 40 knots compared with 28 knots 

for the NSC and, prospectively, 25 knots for the OPC. 

The LCS’s speed and shallow-water capability are partially a function of the fact that the vessel’s draft is 6 feet 

less than that of the NSC but only slightly less than the 

16 feet desired for the OPC. 

A critical difference between the Coast Guard’s cutters 

and the Navy’s littoral combat ship is the level of survivability for which the Navy’s vessels are designed and constructed. Because the LCS is considered primarily a warship, the Navy has designed it to sustain some degree of 

damage during combat (the exact amount is classified) 

and still remain afloat. Important elements of that survivability include stronger bulkheads, watertight compartmentalization, and extensive damage-control systems. 

Such higher survivability standards add to a ship’s costs, 

which the Coast Guard has been generally unwilling to 

pay for in its cutter programs. The reason is straightforward: Although the service may expect its cutters to be 

called to serve in wartime operations, those vessels are not 

expected to participate in direct combat operations. For 

example, during the initial phases of Operations Desert 

Storm and Iraqi Freedom, Coast Guard cutters were not 

involved with destroying Iraq’s small naval forces or clearing mines from ports. Once those early activities were 

concluded, however, Coast Guard cutters operated (and 

continue to operate) in the Middle East, providing 

patrols and contributing to maritime interception activities. The fact that the Navy’s ships and the Coast Guard’s 

cutters are built to different levels of survivability does 

not mean that the Navy could not adopt a Coast Guard 

cutter as a naval ship platform; if it did so, however, it 

would be taking on more risk than it would prefer if the 

ship was used in combat.

Another issue is that Naval Vessel Rules are being adhered 

to in the construction of the Navy’s LCS but not for the 

construction of the Coast Guard’s NSC. Naval Vessel 

Rules are a set of standards, specifications, and requirements developed by the American Bureau of Shipping in 

conjunction with the Navy to guide the construction of 

naval ships. They are analogous to the building codes 

used to construct commercial or residential buildings. 

The type of ship one plans to build will determine which 

provisions of the NVR are relevant to that particular ship 

program. The national security cutter was not built to 

NVR standards because those guidelines did not yet exist 

when the first NSCs were designed and built. The LCS 

program was also under way when the NVR came into 

existence, but the Navy decided to apply the rules to the 

LCS retroactively—a decision that caused the costs of the 

LCS to go up. (The Navy and the LCS’s shipbuilders disagree about exactly how much of the ship’s cost growth is 

attributable to the adoption of NVR.) The Coast Guard 

has stated that it expects to use NVR in the design and 

construction of its offshore patrol cutter, even though the 

OPC is not a warship. The Coast Guard would employ 

only those parts of NVR that would be relevant to the 

type of cutter the service plans to buy. Thus, both the 

littoral combat ship and the offshore patrol cutter will be 

built according to the Naval Vessel Rules, but the LCS 

will still be constructed as a warship and the OPC will 

not.

Projected Costs of the Services’ 

Small Combatant Programs Under 

Current Acquisition Plans

Over the next 10 years, the Navy plans to build its new 

class of littoral combat ships, and the Coast Guard plans 

to replace its fleet of aging cutters with a new generation 

of high- and medium-endurance cutters. According to 
12 OPTIONS FOR COMBINING THE NAVY’S AND THE COAST GUARD’S SMALL COMBATANT PROGRAMS

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Figure 4.

The Navy’s and the Coast Guard’s Purchases and Inventory of Small Combatants

Source: Congressional Budget Office based on data from the U.S. Navy and the U.S. Coast Guard.

Notes: FFG-7 = Oliver Hazard Perry class guided-missile frigate; LCS = Freedom class littoral combat ship; NSC = Legend class national 

security cutter; OPC= offshore patrol cutter; WHEC = Hamilton class high-endurance cutter; WMEC-210 = Reliance class 210-foot 

medium-endurance cutter; WMEC-270 = Bear class 270-foot medium-endurance cutter.

Purchases of new combatants are based on the latest information from the services, although the procurement schedules are 

subject to change.

the Navy’s 2009 budget submission, the service plans to 

purchase a total of 55 LCSs by 2019, ramping up to a 

construction rate of six ships per year (see the top panel of 

Figure 4). The Navy has not yet determined what portion 

of its fleet will consist of semiplaning monohulls and 

what portion will consist of trimarans. Thus, for the purpose of this analysis, CBO assumed that the Navy would 

purchase 28 monohull and 27 trimaran LCSs and in 

roughly equal annual proportions over the course of the 

program. 

Under its current acquisition schedule, the Coast Guard 

would purchase one national security cutter per year 

between 2011 and 2014, for a total of eight. The first 

four, including one purchased in 2009, have already been 

ordered. Once the last NSC is ordered, the service will 

begin purchasing 25 OPCs. The first ship would likely be 

2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016 2018 2020 2022 2024 2026 2028

0

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

LCS NSC OPC

Purchases

2004 2007 2010 2013 2016 2019 2022 2025 2028

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

90

100

Inventory

NSC

OPC

WHEC

WMEC-270

WMEC-210

FFG-7 LCS
OPTIONS FOR COMBINING THE NAVY’S AND THE COAST GUARD’S SMALL COMBATANT PROGRAMS 13

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Figure 5.

Acquisition Costs of the Services’ 

Small Combatant Programs Under 

Existing Plans, 2009 to 2025

(Billions of 2009 dollars)

Source: Congressional Budget Office.

Notes: LCS = littoral combat ship; NSC = national security cutter; 

OPC = offshore patrol cutter.

Total acquisition costs include the costs of developing and 

buying the ships and the costs of associated mission packages.

The LCS can be equipped with one of three mission packages (combat systems), depending on the type of mission 

the ship is intended to carry out at a given time: antiship 

warfare, antisubmarine warfare, or countermine warfare.

purchased in 2015, followed by one more each in 2016 

and 2017. Production would then ramp up to three per 

year in 2018, with the final ship purchased in 2025.

As new deepwater cutters enter the Coast Guard’s fleet, 

the service will begin retiring its aging high- and 

medium-endurance cutters. Under the notional retirement schedule the Coast Guard is using for planning 

purposes, the last Hamilton class cutters would retire in 

2017, the last Bear class cutters would retire in 2028, and 

the last Reliance class ship would retire in 2018 (see the 

bottom panel of Figure 4). The retirement schedule could 

be adjusted, depending on perceived operational needs as 

well as the expected delivery dates of new cutters.

The relationship between the Navy’s procurement of new 

LCSs and the retirement of its frigates is more tenuous. 

In the late 1990s and early 2000s, the Navy originally 

intended to replace the Perry class frigates and Spruance 

class destroyers with 32 new DD-21 destroyers. That 

plan envisioned no role for frigates in the future Navy. 

In 2001, the service launched the LCS program, which 

would in essence replace 30 FFGs and 26 mine-warfare 

ships with 55 littoral combat ships. Under earlier plans, 

the LCSs would have been completed as the last of the 

frigates were retired from service but before the last 14 

mine-warfare ships were retired. Under the Navy’s current 

retirement schedule, the Perry class frigates will retire by 

2019, having reached the end of their service life, while 

the LCSs will enter the fleet as fast as the program’s progression and budgets will allow. All mine-warfare ships 

would be retired by 2026.

Overall, the Navy and the Coast Guard plan to spend 

about $47 billion purchasing small combatants over the 

2009–2025 period, CBO estimates (see Figure 5). The 

Navy’s LCS program represents the largest share of that 

amount, or about $33 billion for the ships and mission 

packages. CBO estimates that the average cost of an LCS 

would be about $550 million, with another $60 million 

or so on average required for each mission package. The 

Coast Guard will spend about $3 billion buying five 

more NSCs and an additional $11 billion on 25 OPCs. 

The average per-ship cost of the Coast Guard’s NSCs and 

OPCs would be about $580 million and $450 million, 

respectively. CBO estimated the cost of the OPC using 

the cost per ton of the NSC and then adjusting for the 

smaller displacement that the OPC would likely have. 

Over the course of the next 10 years, the Navy and Coast 

Guard combined will spend an average of about $3 billion per year on small combatants. 

Alternatives to the Services’ Current 

Acquisition Plans

Because of the budgetary pressures currently facing all of 

the armed services, some members of Congress and independent analysts have questioned whether the Navy and 

the Coast Guard need four types of small combatants—

two versions of the LCS for the Navy; and two cutters, 

the NSC and the OPC, for the Coast Guard—and 

whether the services could employ the same ship or hull 

for certain missions. To explore the implications of combining or otherwise modifying the services’ small combatant programs, the Congressional Budget Office examined 

the potential advantages and disadvantages of three alternatives to the Navy’s and the Coast Guard’s current 

acquisition plans. The first option explores the feasibility 

LCS NSC OPC Total

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

40

45

50

LCS Mission Packages

Navy

Coast Guard
14 OPTIONS FOR COMBINING THE NAVY’S AND THE COAST GUARD’S SMALL COMBATANT PROGRAMS

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Figure 6.

Total Acquisition Costs of the Services’ 

Small Combatant Programs Under 

Three Alternative Plans, 2009 to 2025

(Billions of 2009 dollars)

Source: Congressional Budget Office.

Notes: Total acquisition costs include the costs of developing and 

buying the ships and the costs of associated mission packages.

Under the three alternative plans, the services’ existing plans 

for their small combatant programs would be modified as 

follows:

• Option 1: The Coast Guard would buy a variant of the Navy’s 

littoral combat ship (LCS)—specifically, the semiplaning 

monohull—to use as its offshore patrol cutter (OPC). 

Between 2009 and 2025, the Navy and Coast Guard would 

purchase a total of 78 LCSs.

• Option 2: The Navy would purchase only 30 LCSs—as 

opposed to the 55 currently planned—and buy 20 variants 

of the Coast Guard’s national security cutter (NSC) to use as 

patrol frigates.

• Option 3: The Coast Guard would cancel its OPC program 

and buy an additional 20 NSCs (for a total of 28) instead.

of having the Coast Guard buy a variant of the LCS 

monohull to use as its offshore patrol cutter. The second 

option looks at reducing the number of LCSs the Navy 

would buy and substituting instead a naval version of the 

national security cutter as a patrol frigate, which may be 

better suited than the LCS to carry out nonwarfighting 

elements of the sea services’ maritime strategy. The third 

option examines the pros and cons of having the Coast 

Guard buy more national security cutters rather than 

design and build a new ship to perform the missions of 

the offshore patrol cutter.

Option 1: Base the Coast Guard’s MediumEndurance Cutter on a Variant of the Navy’s 

LCS Monohull

Under this option, the Navy and the Coast Guard would 

use a common hull in their small combatant programs. 

As its new OPC, the Coast Guard would purchase a 

slightly modified version of the LCS that incorporated 

additional fuel tanks and berthing racks and had a 

reduced maximum speed to better meet the Coast 

Guard’s requirements for endurance (see Table 3). The 

Coast Guard would purchase the LCS-OPC at the same 

rate called for under its original Deepwater plan, which 

CBO used as the basis for its analysis of the service’s program. Thus, in 2015, the Coast Guard would purchase 

the first LCS monohull, followed by one each in 2016 

and 2017. In 2018, the Coast Guard would begin purchasing three per year until the total purchase of 25 was 

complete in 2025. The acquisition schedule under this 

option would thus remain the same as that called for 

under the Coast Guard’s current plans. The rate at which 

the Navy acquired LCSs would slow slightly, however. 

Under this option, the two services combined would not 

purchase more than six ships per year, and the Navy 

would not complete the purchase of 55 LCSs until 2022 

(as opposed to 2019 under its 2009 shipbuilding plan. 

CBO chose to slow the purchase of the Navy’s LCSs 

rather than delay the start of the OPC because of the 

advanced aged of the Coast Guard’s existing ships). 

Between 2009 and 2025, the Navy and Coast Guard 

would purchase a total of 78 littoral combat ships, 35 

of which would be built at one yard and 43 of which 

would be built at a second yard. The precise split, if any, 

between the two types of LCS that the Navy would purchase (monohull or trimaran) would be determined later; 

but the Coast Guard would build 25 LCS monohulls that 

were slightly modified for the service’s missions. The 

Coast Guard would also purchase the remaining five 

national security cutters in its program.

The overall cost to the government under this option 

would be somewhat higher than under the services’ plans 

(see Figure 6). The combined cost of the LCS and NSC 

programs for both services would total $48.2 billion 

through 2025 versus $47.1 billion for the services’ plans. 

The average cost for all of the Coast Guard’s and Navy’s 

Services'

Plans

Option 1 Option 2 Option 3

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

40

45

50
OPTIONS FOR COMBINING THE NAVY’S AND THE COAST GUARD’S SMALL COMBATANT PROGRAMS 15

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Table 3.

Characteristics and Capabilities of the Coast Guard’s New and Notional Small 

Combatants

Source: Congressional Budget Office.

Notes: NSC = national security cutter; OPC = offshore patrol cutter; LCS = littoral combat ship; N.A. = not available; SS4 = sea state 4; 

SS5 = sea state 5.

Beam indicates the width of the ship. Draft indicates the depth to which the ship is immersed. Full-load displacement includes the 

weight of the ship plus its crew, cargo, weapons, and fuel.

Sea state refers to the condition of the seas, such as wind speed and wave height. The higher the sea state the rougher the seas. Sea 

state 4 is characterized by winds of 18 to 20 knots and waves of 6 to 7.5 feet. Sea state 5 is characterized by winds of 21 to 25 knots 

and waves of 8 to 12 feet.

a. Specifications for the OPC are based on a request for information that the Coast Guard submitted to the industry in October 2008 when 

soliciting designs for a new ship.

b. This comparison is based on the assumption that the Coast Guard would use the semiplaning monohull variant of the Navy’s LCS.

c. The ship’s displacement is based on notional design specifications proposed for the OPC under the Coast Guard’s Deepwater plan.

d. According to industry officials, endurance could be expanded either by airlifting supplies to the ship or by adding more refrigeration to 

the mission-package spaces on the LCS.

e. Assumes a fuel reserve of 30 percent.

f. Expanding the number of berths from 100 to 120 would require using space in the mission bay.

LCS

NSC (Range of Acceptable (Coast Guard 

(Legend Class) (Requirement)a Submissions) Variant)b

Length (Feet) 418 N.A. 300 to 390 378

Beam (Feet) 54 N.A. N.A. 57

Draft (Feet) 22 N.A. up to 18 14

Full-Load Displacement (Long tons) 4,300 ~3,700c N.A. 3,500

Maximum Speed (Knots) 28 25 30 ~30

Endurance (Days) 60 45 30 to 50 21d

Range (Nautical miles) 12,000 7,500e 5,500 to 9,000 6,300e

Operating Environment SS5 SS5 SS5 SS4

Number of Helicopters 2 1 1 2

Constructed to Naval Vessel Rules No Yes Yes Yes

Bow Thruster Yes Yes N.A. No

Service Life (Years) 30 30 25 to 40 25

Number of Berthing Racks 148 120 90 to 130 120f

OPC
16 OPTIONS FOR COMBINING THE NAVY’S AND THE COAST GUARD’S SMALL COMBATANT PROGRAMS

CBO

Figure 7.

Number of Mission Days Provided 

Annually by the Coast Guard’s Total 

Inventory of Cutters

(Days per year, total inventory)

Source: Congressional Budget Office based on data from the 

U.S. Navy and the U.S. Coast Guard.

small combatants would be about $580 million per ship, 

including the Navy-specific mission-warfare packages for 

the LCSs, compared with $570 million per ship under 

the services’ plan. The total life-cycle costs of Option 1 

would be $99 billion in discounted dollars compared 

with $98 billion under the services’ plans. (See Box 1 for 

an explanation of how CBO calculated total life-cycle 

costs.)

Advantages of Option 1. Pursuing a common hull for 

the Navy’s and the Coast Guard’s small combatants 

would provide a larger force of small combatants that 

could conduct operations in conditions where the ships 

might come under enemy fire. Eighty ships would fall 

within that category—55 Navy LCSs and 25 Coast 

Guard OPCs—compared with only 55 Navy LCSs under 

the services’ plans. In effect, the more survivable LCS 

hull would enable the Coast Guard to serve as a reserve 

force for the Navy. That does not mean, however, that a 

Coast Guard variant of the LCS could carry and operate 

each of the Navy’s combat mission packages; whether 

that was possible would depend on how much of the 

space reserved for mission packages was used to make 

the changes required for the Coast Guard variant of the 

ship. (For example, the equipment needed for the 

countermine-warfare mission package is much greater 

than that required for the surface-warfare package, which 

relies heavily on the LCS’s aviation and hull-mounted 

gun systems and therefore would not be substantially 

affected by using the LCS as a Coast Guard cutter.) But 

this option would allow the Coast Guard’s mediumendurance cutters to operate in the same areas and under 

the same conditions as the Navy’s littoral combat ships. 

Coast Guard cutters supporting Navy operations today 

would operate with more restrictions in the event of war 

because they were not built to a warship’s standard of 

survivability.

A second advantage of this option is that it would eliminate the risk of starting a new ship program. After the 

cost increases incurred with the lead ships of the LCS and 

the NSC, the Coast Guard, under this option, would be 

entering a shipbuilding program that is about to start 

serial production; no new-design OPCs would be purchased. Historically, once the first few ships in a new program are produced, the costs of subsequent ships come 

down and become more predictable, and the program is 

less vulnerable to technical risk. Furthermore, if funding 

were available, this option could enable the Coast Guard 

to start building its OPC force sooner than 2015.

Disadvantages of Option 1. This option would have two 

distinct disadvantages. First, it would be somewhat more 

expensive to implement than the services’ plans. Second, 

this option would make it harder for the Coast Guard 

to conduct its normal day-to-day activities of search and 

rescue as well as enforcement of immigration, fisheries, 

and environmental laws and regulations. The reduction 

in the desired range and endurance of an OPC that used 

the LCS monohull would be the most important consideration regarding those Coast Guard activities. Under its 

current plans, if the Coast Guard were to build an offshore patrol cutter based on the design of the national 

security cutter, its overall deepwater force of eight NSCs 

and 25 OPCs could provide the same number of mission 

days per year at 500 nautical miles as Option 1. However, 

at 1,500 nautical miles, Option 1 would provide about 

one-third fewer mission days than the Coast Guard’s 

plan—3,800 mission days versus 5,600 (see Figure 7). 

This option presents other potential disadvantages that 

are more difficult to quantify. The LCS cannot operate as

Today's

Fleet

Services'

Plans

Option 1 Option 2 Option 3

0

1,000

2,000

3,000

4,000

5,000

6,000

7,000

8,000

500 nautical miles

1,500 nautical miles
OPTIONS FOR COMBINING THE NAVY’S AND THE COAST GUARD’S SMALL COMBATANT PROGRAMS 17

CBO

Box 1.

Calculating the Total Life-Cycle Costs of Small Combatants Under the 

Services’ Plans and CBO’s Options

Although acquisition costs usually make up half or 

more of a ship’s total life-cycle costs, it is still useful to 

consider the long-term effects that decisions about 

acquiring certain types of ship can have on other elements of the Navy’s and the Coast Guard’s budgets.1

One platform can be more or less expensive to operate, 

or it may have a longer or shorter service life than a different choice. Additionally, such costs are spread over 

many years into the future. To compare the costs of 

platforms with different streams of expenses over many 

years, the future costs are discounted to their present 

value to account for the time value of money.2

To estimate the future life-cycle costs of different combinations of littoral combat ships (LCSs), national security cutters (NSCs), and offshore patrol cutters (OPCs), 

the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) separately projected the annual acquisition, personnel, and operating 

costs for each possible ship from 2009 to 2055. CBO 

assumed that the disposal cost for each ship would be 

zero, as ships of this type are typically given or sold to 

other countries when they are no longer needed by the 

United States. The separate costs for each ship under 

each option were then discounted to 2009 dollars for 

comparison. 

CBO estimates acquisition costs using various historical 

analogies of prior Navy ship programs, adjusted for 

weight. The acquisition costs include research and 

design as well as construction expenses. Learning and 

rate effects, and real (inflation-adjusted) cost growth in 

ship acquisition are also part of CBO’s cost analysis. 

The operating costs are based on CBO’s models of fuel, 

maintenance, and personnel costs. These models use 

historical operating costs and “steaming” hours contained in the Navy’s VAMOSC system.3

 CBO projected 

fuel costs for the LCS, NSC, and OPC using historical 

data for selected Navy surface combatants adjusted for 

displacement. Average maintenance costs were determined by using an average of several types of Navy ships 

as well as by incorporating information from the Coast 

Guard on maintenance costs and fuel usage for Coast 

Guard cutters. However, while there may be variations 

in maintenance costs associated with differences in 

manning levels among the options, CBO has not captured those variations in the estimates. Personnel costs 

are based on the manning assumptions in Title X and 

CBO’s model of the fully burdened cost of personnel.4

Those personnel costs include pay, withholding taxes 

paid by the government, housing benefits, current and 

future health benefits, retirement benefits, tax advantages, and veterans’ benefits. CBO updated each category using 2009 data and projected each category to 

grow at rates consistent with CBO’s long-term economic projections.

For each option, the costs are estimated for each ship 

and each year of the analysis. The costs are then discounted to their present value in 2009 dollars using a 

discount rate of 3 percent. CBO used a discount rate of 

3 percent based upon the long-term average of 30-year 

Treasury bonds. That rate was chosen over the Office of 

Management and Budget’s official rate of 2.8 percent 

because it was thought to better represent the long-run 

time value of money based upon CBO’s economic 

projections.5

1. 10 U.S.C. 2434. See Charles J. Hitch and Roland N. 

McKean, The Economics of Defense in the Nuclear Age

(Cambridge, Mass.: RAND Corporation, March 1960), 

p. 138.

2. Office of Management and Budget, Guidelines and Discount 

Rates for Benefit-Cost Analysis of Federal Programs, Circular 

A-94 (October 29, 1992); Hitch and McKean, The Economics of Defense in the Nuclear Age, p. 207.

3. The Navy’s Visibility and Management of Operating and 

Support Costs (VAMOSC) management information system 

collects and reports historical operating and support costs for 

the U.S. Navy’s and the U.S. Marine Corps’ weapon systems. 

See www.navyvamosc.com. 

4. Congressional Budget Office, Evaluating Military Compensation (June 2007).

5. Office of Management and Budget, Guidelines and Discount 

Rates for Benefit-Cost Analysis of Federal Programs, Appendix 

C; Congressional Budget Office, A Preliminary Analysis of 

the President’s Budget and an Update of CBO's Budget and 

Economic Outlook (March 2009).
18 OPTIONS FOR COMBINING THE NAVY’S AND THE COAST GUARD’S SMALL COMBATANT PROGRAMS

CBO

safely as the Coast Guard’s cutters in sea state five. Thus, 

there could be rescue missions that the Coast Guard 

might not be able to perform in a sea state 5 environment 

if it had to rely on an offshore patrol cutter. In addition, 

Coast Guard cutters are designed to conduct two smallboat operations simultaneously (operations that are necessary for search and rescue missions as well as for drug 

and migrant interdiction). One limitation of the LCS is 

that it can launch and recover only one small boat at a 

time from its stern ramp.

There are no evident disadvantages to the Navy if the 

Coast Guard were to use the LCS hull for its mediumendurance cutter—other than the slightly slower procurement of the Navy LCSs.

Option 2: Support the Navy’s Maritime Strategy by 

Reducing the Number of LCSs Purchased and Buying 

NSCs Instead

Under this option, the Navy would purchase only 30 

LCSs—as opposed to the 55 called for in its existing 

plans—and buy 20 national security cutters to use as 

patrol frigates. The Navy’s version of the NSC would 

carry more extensive antiship missile defenses than the 

Coast Guard’s version (see Box 2). In 2010, the Navy 

would decide which version of the LCS it intends to buy; 

nearly all of the 30 LCSs in its fleet would be the same 

version.17 The service would begin purchasing the NSCderived patrol frigates in 2011 and build them at a rate 

of two per year. The Coast Guard would continue with 

its plan to purchase 25 medium-endurance cutters as a 

scaled-down version of the high-endurance NSC. 

The acquisition costs to the government of implementing 

this option would be less than under the services’ plans. 

The combined costs of the Navy’s LCSs and patrol 

frigates and the Coast Guard’s cutters would be about 

$41.5 billion, about $6 billion less than the $47.1 billion 

projected for the services’ plans (see Figure 6 on page 14). 

Box 2.

Increasing the Antiship Missile Defenses of a Patrol Frigate 

Derived from the National Security Cutter

Constructing the national security cutter (NSC) to 

have the same degree of survivability as the Navy’s 

existing Oliver Hazard Perry class frigates would 

entail a major redesign of the ship—which, in turn, 

would result in substantial additional costs. Nevertheless, adding two additional layers of antiship 

missile defenses to a naval version of the NSC, as is 

described in Option 2, would significantly improve 

the ship’s ability to defend itself. 

For approximately $260 million, the Navy could 

replace the Close-In Weapon System (CIWS) currently used on the national security cutter with the 

SeaRAM Mk-15 CIWS. Unlike the former system, 

which consists of a rapid-firing gun designed to 

engage subsonic antiship missiles at close ranges, the 

SeaRAM CIWS would incorporate a rolling airframe 

missile on the same physical space but provide the 

ship with the ability to engage supersonic antiship 

cruise missiles out to 5 nautical miles. The SeaRAM 

system includes its own sensor suite—a Ku band 

radar and forward-looking infrared imaging system—

to detect, track, and destroy incoming missiles.

An additional layer of antiship missile defense could 

be provided by installing the Mk-56 vertical launch 

system with Evolved Sea Sparrow Missiles (ESSMs) 

along with an Mk-9 Tracker/Illuminator system to 

detect, track, and engage antiship missiles. The 

ESSM can engage supersonic antiship missiles at a 

range of nearly 30 nautical miles. Installing 20 sets 

of a 12-cell launching system (which would carry 

24 ESSMs), buying the missiles, and integrating 

the weapons with the ships would cost about 

$1.1 billion.

17. There would be two exceptions: the lead and second ships of the 

type that are not selected. The lead LCS monohull was authorized 

in 2005, the lead trimaran in 2006, and the second ships of both 

types were authorized in 2009.
OPTIONS FOR COMBINING THE NAVY’S AND THE COAST GUARD’S SMALL COMBATANT PROGRAMS 19

CBO

Figure 8.

Minimum Number of Refueling and 

Resupply Visits During a 180-Day 

Deployment, Selected Navy Ships

Source: Congressional Budget Office.

Notes: FFG-7 = Oliver Hazard Perry class guided-missile frigate; 

LCS = Freedom class littoral combat ship; NSC = Legend 

class national security cutter.

Ships can and will resupply more often, if convenient, 

depending on their operations.

The average price for the 78 small combatants under 

this plan would be about $530 million, compared with 

$570 million for 83 small combatants under the services’ 

plans. Total life-cycle costs would be about 6 percent less 

under Option 2, totaling $92 billion in discounted dollars (in comparison with the $98 billion projected under 

the services’ plans).

Advantages of Option 2. Implementing this option would 

bring several benefits to the Navy that might not be available with its LCS program. First, it would align the service’s purchases of small combatants more closely with 

elements of its maritime strategy. The sea services’ core 

statement of their missions and capabilities places about 

equal emphasis on peacetime operations: building navalpartnerships with as many nations as possible around 

the globe; establishing global fleet stations; performing 

humanitarian operations; and conducting maritime security activities, such as counterpiracy and counterterrorism 

operations.18 Such activities suggest the need for a lowend-capability combatant that, much like the Coast 

Guard’s cutters, has a long unrefueled mission range, high 

endurance, and is capable of many different types of 

independent operations. Those activities would not 

require the various mission packages and high-speed 

capability that are associated with the LCS program. 

Second, with less than half the range and endurance of 

the national security cutter, the LCS requires more logistical support. That could be especially burdensome when 

it is operating in places far from where the Navy’s logistics 

ships normally operate, such as off the coasts of southern 

Africa or South America. Using an NSC-derived patrol 

frigate would ease the strain on the Navy’s own logistical 

support forces or reduce the frequency with which those 

ships would need to put into port to purchase fuel and 

supplies. Over the course of a 180-day deployment, the 

patrol frigate would require about half the number of 

refueling and resupply visits from Navy logistics ships or 

visits to regional port facilities (see Figure 8).

Third, the patrol frigate’s ability to support a larger crew 

would make it easier for the Navy to perform maritime 

security and humanitarian operations. While the Navy 

generally is trying to reduce the number of people on its 

ships in order to save money, ships performing the type 

of operations envisioned here need to launch helicopters 

and accommodate boarding parties, often at the same 

time. With a core crew of only 40 and a total berthing 

capacity of 75, the LCS might not be as suited as the 

NSC-derived patrol frigate to conduct inspections and 

boardings that could become an increasingly routine part 

of the Navy’s operations.

Disadvantages of Option 2. Nevertheless, this option 

would present certain disadvantages. Perhaps the most 

significant drawback is that even though the national 

security cutter comes equipped with some self-defense 

capability, it is not designed for use in combat operations. 

To compensate for that, the Navy could, for about 

$60 million per ship plus additional one-time costs, 

add more self-defense capability to the ships, such as 

the rolling-airframe missile and the Evolved Sea Sparrow 

Missile (which are antiship-missile missiles). CBO estimates that those improvements would cost about 

$1.4 billion. Even with those improvements, however, 

the patrol frigates would have higher acoustic and 

FFG-7 LCS NSC-Derived

Patrol Frigate

0

2

4

6

8

10

12

14

Refuelings Resupply

18. A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower.
20 OPTIONS FOR COMBINING THE NAVY’S AND THE COAST GUARD’S SMALL COMBATANT PROGRAMS

CBO

Figure 9.

Number of Days Required to Deploy 

from San Diego to the Western Pacific, 

Selected Navy Ships

(Days)

Source: Congressional Budget Office.

Note: FFG-7 = Oliver Hazard Perry class guided-missile frigate; 

LCS = Freedom class littoral combat ship; NSC = Legend 

class national security cutter.

magnetic signatures than the LCS (thus making them 

more vulnerable to attack by diesel-electric submarines 

and mines); and the patrol frigate still would not be built 

to the same level of physical survivability as the LCS.

In addition, a patrol frigate cannot carry—at least not in 

their entirety—all the components of the mine-warfare 

and antisubmarine-warfare mission packages that the 

LCS will deploy. The NSC was not designed with 

enough internal space to accommodate those systems. 

(The NSC can carry all of the elements of the surfacewarfare mission package.) Thus, if in a future conflict the 

Navy found that it needed more than the 30 LCSs in its 

fleet for combat operations, the 20 NSC-derived patrol 

frigates would not provide as much combat capability as 

would 25 LCSs. This option would not buy LCS mission 

packages for the NSC-derived patrol frigate. If the Navy 

decided that the patrol frigate should be prepared to carry 

elements of the mission packages, then the service would 

need to purchase those items, and the cost of Option 2 

would be higher.

A third disadvantage is evident in combat scenarios where 

the need to quickly respond to a crisis or conflict is critical. If the Navy decided it needed to deploy more LCSs 

or patrol frigates from the United States to points overseas, the latter would take more time to deploy than the 

former. While the Navy has not yet revealed the LCS’s 

maximum sustained speed, available evidence indicates 

that it is in the range of 40 to 45 knots. By contrast, 

the maximum speed of the national security cutter is 

28 knots and that of a NSC-derived patrol frigate could 

be somewhat less depending on how the Navy decided to 

equip the ship. To illustrate the effect of speed, a patrol 

frigate deploying from San Diego to the western Pacific 

would require about 12 days, whereas an LCS could 

arrive in about seven (see Figure 9).

A fourth disadvantage is that the patrol frigate would be 

less flexible than the LCS. The latter, with its modular 

design and large internal volume, provides more flexibility to put mission packages on the ship that have not 

been conceived of today. 

Option 3: Equip the Coast Guard’s Deepwater Force 

with More National Security Cutters and Cancel the 

Offshore Patrol Cutter Program

This option would have the Coast Guard forgo designing 

and buying a medium-endurance offshore patrol cutter. 

Instead, the Coast Guard would buy 20 additional highendurance NSCs, for a total of 28. The Coast Guard 

would begin purchasing additional NSCs sooner than is 

specified in its current plans, ramping up to two per year 

in 2011 and remaining at that rate of construction 

through 2022. The Coast Guard would purchase its last 

cutter in 2023, three years earlier than is called for under 

the service’s plans. 

The cost to the government to buy the ships under this 

option would be about $45.6 billion, compared with 

$47.1 billion under the services’ plans (see Figure 6 on 

page 14). The average cost of the 78 small combatants 

under this option would be about $580 million per 

ship, compared with $570 million for 83 ships under the 

services’ plans. The total life-cycle costs for the option 

would be $97 billion, compared with $98 billion under 

the services’ plans.

Advantages of Option 3. A principal advantage of this 

option is that it would provide the Coast Guard’s 

Deepwater force with slightly more mission days per 

year at points farther from the shore than is indicated in 

the service’s plan. At 500 nautical miles from shore, this 

option would provide about 6,500 mission days per year 

FFG-7 LCS NSC-Derived

 Patrol Frigate

0

2

4

6

8

10

12

14
OPTIONS FOR COMBINING THE NAVY’S AND THE COAST GUARD’S SMALL COMBATANT PROGRAMS 21

CBO

Figure 10.

Number of Days at Sea Provided Per 

Year by the Coast Guard’s Current and 

Prospective Inventory of Cutters

Source: Congressional Budget Office.

versus 6,900 under the Coast Guard’s plan. However, at 

1,500 nautical miles, this option would provide 5,700 

mission days per year, compared with about 5,600 for the 

Coast Guard’s planned Deepwater force (see Figure 7 on 

page 16).

By accelerating the NSC’s construction and building 

more of them, this option would address the declining 

readiness of the Coast Guard’s existing Hamilton class 

high-endurance cutters.19 The Coast Guard would have 

18 new cutters (including the first three NSCs) by 2020, 

compared with 11 under the service’s current plan.

Another advantage of this option is that it would eliminate the risks associated with designing and building a 

new class of ship—specifically, the offshore patrol cutter. 

Both the Navy’s and Coast Guard’s small combatant programs experienced cost growth and schedule delays that 

significantly increased the amount of time and money 

needed to complete the first ships of those classes. While 

experience suggests that subsequent ships of those classes 

will not have the same problems—lead ships are notoriously difficult to bring to fruition—the Coast Guard 

could see a similar result as it prepares to develop the still 

notional OPC.

Disadvantages of Option 3. A major disadvantage of this 

option is that it would provide fewer overall days at sea 

per year than would the Coast Guard’s plans for its deepwater cutters. Specifically, the 28 national security cutters 

in this option’s Deepwater force would provide a total of 

6,900 days at sea based on the NSC’s notional operating 

profile. The Coast Guard’s plan for a mix of national 

security cutters and offshore patrol cutters—which, 

at 33 ships, would result in a larger overall Deepwater 

force—would provide about 7,600 days at sea, or about 

10 percent more than under Option 3. By comparison, 

today’s Deepwater force of high- and medium-endurance 

cutters provides about 7,200 days at sea per year (see 

Figure 10).

The effect of such a reduction in planned capabilities 

could make it difficult for the Coast Guard to fulfill all 

of its missions. For example, this option explicitly counters the recommendation made in a report issued by the 

RAND Corporation, which states that the Coast Guard 

will need twice the number of Deepwater assets that 

it currently plans to buy to meet both its traditional 

missions and its newly defined mission to protect the 

homeland (which emerged after the terrorist attacks of 

2001).20 That analysis was based on the number of mission hours the Coast Guard could be required to provide 

to perform its traditional and new missions.

A second disadvantage is that this option could compound the difficulties the Coast Guard would face in 

finding home ports for its national security cutters. In 

information provided to CBO, the Coast Guard states 

that many of the home ports that currently take the existing high- and medium-endurance cutters may not be able 

to accommodate the new national security cutter or, 

depending on the final design, the new offshore patrol 

cutter without significant, and potentially costly, modifications to the ports’ facilities. Specifically, the NSC is 

about 10 percent longer and has a 10 percent greater 

draft than the Hamilton class high-endurance cutters. 

Thus, the Coast Guard expects that it may have to 

expand those home ports that can accommodate the 

19. Gordon, “Coast Guard to Assess Readiness of All High-Endurance Cutters.”

Today's

Fleet

Services'

Plans

Option 1 Option 2 Option 3

0

1,000

2,000

3,000

4,000

5,000

6,000

7,000

8,000

20. John Birkler and others, The U.S. Coast Guard’s Deepwater Force 

Modernization Plan (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, 

2004).
22 OPTIONS FOR COMBINING THE NAVY’S AND THE COAST GUARD’S SMALL COMBATANT PROGRAMS

CBO

NSC so that they can take more ships than they have 

previously, or the service may have to improve the port 

facilities in other locations. Those improvements could 

involve lengthening piers, dredging harbors and channels, 

and upgrading the electrical hookups at piers so that the 

cutters do not have to use their own generators when not 

at sea. Depending on the final design of the OPC, there 

could be a similar problem with the home-port facilities 

for medium-endurance cutters. The Coast Guard has 

not yet completed the analysis needed to determine 

where it will home port its new deepwater cutters and 

what upgrades, if any, will be required to all existing port 

facilities.