1

RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION

Pursuant to Sixth Circuit Rule 206

ELECTRONIC CITATION: 2003 FED App. 0307P (6th Cir.)

File Name: 03a0307p.06

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

_________________

SHARON MAY ROCKWELL,

Petitioner-Appellee,

v.

JOAN YUKINS,

Respondent-Appellant.

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No. 00-1992

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Michigan at Detroit.

No. 97-71072—Avern Cohn, Senior District Judge.

Argued: December 11, 2002

Decided and Filed: August 27, 2003 

Before: MARTIN, Chief Circuit Judge; NELSON,

BOGGS, BATCHELDER, DAUGHTREY, MOORE,

COLE, CLAY, GILMAN, GIBBONS, and ROGERS,

Circuit Judges.

_________________

COUNSEL

ARGUED: Laura Graves Moody, OFFICE OF THE

ATTORNEY GENERAL, Lansing, Michigan, for Appellant.

Craig A. Daly, Detroit, Michigan, for Appellee. ON BRIEF:

Laura Graves Moody, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY

2 Rockwell v. Yukins No. 00-1992

GENERAL, Lansing, Michigan, for Appellant. Craig A.

Daly, Detroit, Michigan, for Appellee.

NELSON, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which

MARTIN, C. J., BOGGS, BATCHELDER, GILMAN,

GIBBONS, and ROGERS, JJ., joined. CLAY, J. (pp. 12-29),

delivered a separate dissenting opinion, in which

DAUGHTREY, MOORE, and COLE, JJ., joined.

_________________

OPINION

_________________

DAVID A. NELSON, Circuit Judge. The petitioner in this

habeas corpus action, Sharon Rockwell, was convicted at trial

in a state court of conspiring with her sons to murder the

boys’ father, her husband. A federal writ of habeas corpus

was subsequently granted on the ground that her Sixth

Amendment right to present a complete defense precluded

the state trial court from barring evidence that Mr. Rockwell

had abused his sons sexually. Under the legal standard

prescribed by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty

Act of 1996, the writ should not have been issued unless

exclusion of the evidence in question involved an

“unreasonable” application of, or was contrary to, federal law

clearly established by the United States Supreme Court.

Concluding that the result reached in the state court passes

muster under the statutory test, we shall reverse the grant of

habeas relief.

I

As we noted in an earlier appeal in this case, Rockwell v.

Yukins, 217 F.3d 421, 422-23 (6th Cir. 2000), Sharon and

Edward Rockwell had three sons. One of the sons, acting

with two friends, attempted to kill Mr. Rockwell by cutting

the brake lines on his car. The attempt failed. Then, in a

second unsuccessful attempt on Mr. Rockwell’s life, the two
No. 00-1992 Rockwell v. Yukins 3

1

Although the prosecution had cited Rule 404 in argument, its

relevance is not readily apparent. Rule 404 provides that evidence of a

person’s character is generally inadmissible for the purpose of proving

that the person acted in conformity therewith on a particular occasion.

friends hit him on the head with a baseball bat. Although

Mrs. Rockwell was not present on either occasion, she had

engaged in discussions with one or more of her sons about

killing Mr. Rockwell. On the strength of these discussions,

the State of Michigan charged Mrs. Rockwell with conspiracy

to commit murder.

Mrs. Rockwell’s defense, as her lawyer described it at a

pretrial hearing, was that her participation in the talk of

killing Mr. Rockwell was not intended to further an actual

murder; rather, according to counsel, Mrs. Rockwell’s

purpose had been to let the boys vent the extreme and abiding

hatred they harbored against their father for having abused

them, sexually and otherwise, when they were younger.

“[Mrs. Rockwell] felt in her heart that the only way she could

keep the situation under control,” defense counsel explained,

“was to allow the boys to talk and fantasize about [killing the

hated Mr. Rockwell.]” Far from agreeing to a murder, the

theory went, Mrs. Rockwell hoped to forestall a murder

through what her lawyer seems to have viewed as some sort

of talk therapy.

In connection with this “therapy defense,” as we

characterized it in our earlier opinion, Mrs. Rockwell wanted

to show at trial that Mr. Rockwell had sexually abused his

sons. The prosecution wanted to exclude evidence of the

alleged abuse. The state trial court ordered briefing and heard

argument on the admissibility of the evidence of abuse, after

which it ordered the evidence excluded as not “material”

under Mich. Rule of Evid. 404.1

When the case went to trial, Mrs. Rockwell elected not to

take the stand. The jury returned a verdict of guilty, and Mrs.

4 Rockwell v. Yukins No. 00-1992

2

Rule 403 – which had also been cited in argument before the state

trial court – provides that relevant evidence may be excluded if its

probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair

prejudice.

Rockwell was sentenced to imprisonment for life. An appeal

to the Michigan Court of Appeals followed.

The Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, succinctly

explaining its rationale as follows:

“We find no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s

exclusion of evidence of the victim’s alleged prior acts of

abuse against defendant’s and the victim’s children.

People v. Watkins, 176 Mich. App. 428; 440 NW2d 36

(1989). Defendant was merely limited in the method

with which to present her defense and not deprived [of]

the opportunity to present the same. Although

marginally relevant, the evidence was properly excluded

under MRE 403.”2

Mrs. Rockwell applied to the Michigan Supreme Court for

leave to appeal the affirmance of her conviction, but further

review was denied.

Mrs. Rockwell then filed her habeas action in the United

States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan.

The initial pleading raised two issues, insufficiency of the

evidence and improper exclusion of the evidence of sexual

abuse, both of which had been exhausted in the state courts.

The district court eventually granted Mrs. Rockwell leave to

amend her petition to include an unexhausted claim as well.

Following a hearing at which arguments were presented on

the merits, the district court granted the writ on the ground

that the state trial court’s decision to exclude evidence of the

alleged sexual abuse clearly violated Mrs. Rockwell’s

constitutional right to present a defense – and “[n]o

reasonable jurist could conclude otherwise.” 
No. 00-1992 Rockwell v. Yukins 5

The soundness of this proposition was not decided in the

initial appeal to our court. The panel that heard the appeal

vacated the judgment on the ground that the district court

should not have reviewed a “mixed” petition containing an

unexhausted claim in addition to the exhausted claims. The

first panel remanded the case with a suggestion that the

district court could reenter its original decision after allowing

Mrs. Rockwell to dismiss her unexhausted claim. See

Rockwell v. Yukins, 217 F.3d at 425.

On remand, the district court accepted this suggestion.

Mrs. Rockwell moved for dismissal of her unexhausted claim

and reentry of the habeas judgment, and the district court

granted the motion. 

The warden again appealed to our court. Reaching the

merits of the case, a divided three-judge panel reversed the

district court’s judgment. The full court then voted to rehear

the case en banc. Supplemental briefs having been filed, and

the case having been reargued, the appeal is now ready for

decision by the full court.

II

As amended by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death

Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110

Stat. 1214 (1996), subsection (d) of 28 U.S.C. § 2254

provides, in relevant part, as follows:

“(d) An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf

of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State

court shall not be granted with respect to any claim that

was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings

unless the adjudication of the claim – 

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or

involved an unreasonable application of, clearly

established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme

Court of the United States . . . .” 

6 Rockwell v. Yukins No. 00-1992

3

The condition of this “contrary to” clause would be met if “the state

court arrive[d] at a conclusion opposite to that reached by [the U.S.

Supreme] Court on a question of law or if the state court decide[d] a case

differently than [the U.S. Supreme Court has] on a set of materially

indistinguishable facts.” Williams, 529 U.S. at 413.

This version of the statute applies to habeas applications filed,

as Mrs. Rockwell’s was, after April 24, 1996, the effective

date of AEDPA. See Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320 (1997).

The statute means what it says. See Williams v. Taylor,

529 U.S. 362, 402-13 (2000). What the statute says, to

repeat, is that habeas relief may not be granted unless the state

court’s decision was either “contrary to . . . clearly established

federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the

United States,”3 or “involved an unreasonable application of

. . . [such] law.”

Mrs. Rockwell does not contend that the affirmance of her

conviction by the state court of appeals was “contrary to”

clear Supreme Court caselaw. She does contend, however,

that it involved an unreasonable application of such law.

For this contention to be accepted, Mrs. Rockwell must do

more than persuade us that the Michigan judiciary’s

application of federal law was incorrect. As Justice

O’Connor said, speaking for the Court in Williams:

“In § 2254(d)(1), Congress specifically used the word

‘unreasonable,’ and not a term like ‘erroneous’ or

‘incorrect.’ Under § 2254(d)(1)’s ‘unreasonable

application’ clause, then, a federal habeas court may not

issue the writ simply because that court concludes in its

independent judgment that the relevant state-court

decision applied clearly established federal law

erroneously or incorrectly. Rather, that application must

also be unreasonable.” Williams, 529 U.S. at 411

(emphasis supplied).
No. 00-1992 Rockwell v. Yukins 7

“[A]n unreasonable application of federal law is different

from an incorrect or erroneous application of federal law.”

Id. at 412 (emphasis in original). And in making the

“unreasonable application” inquiry, we “should ask whether

the state court’s application of clearly established federal law

was ‘objectively’ unreasonable.” Id. at 409. 

In Mrs. Rockwell’s case, as we have seen, the Michigan

Court of Appeals concluded that the probative value of the

evidence of Edward Rockwell’s alleged abuse of his sons was

substantially outweighed by the danger that unfair prejudice

would ensue were the evidence to be admitted. This

conclusion may or may not have been erroneous, but we

cannot say that it represented an objectively unreasonable

application of clearly established Supreme Court precedent.

A Supreme Court decision that the district court found

“particularly instructive,” Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308

(1974), held that the defendant in a burglary case had a

constitutional right to cross-examine a crucial prosecution

witness about a juvenile burglary adjudication for which the

witness was on probation, notwithstanding a state rule making

evidence of juvenile adjudications inadmissible. The Court

emphasized that “[c]ross-examination is the principal means

by which the believability of a witness and the truth of his

testimony are tested,” adding that the juvenile’s testimony

“provided ‘a crucial link in the proof . . . of [the defendant’s]

act.’” Id. at 316 and 317 (citation omitted). “In this setting,”

the Court concluded, “. . . the [Sixth Amendment] right of

confrontation is paramount to the State’s policy of protecting

a juvenile offender.” Id. at 319.

In the case at bar, by contrast, the evidence of sexual abuse

was not being proffered to attack the believability of a crucial

witness against Mrs. Rockwell. The rule under which the trial

court excluded the evidence, moreover, is not aimed at

protecting juvenile offenders. The interests at stake in this

case are entirely different than those at stake in Davis.

Because Davis is readily distinguishable, and because the

8 Rockwell v. Yukins No. 00-1992

gloss Mrs. Rockwell would have us put on the case flies in

the face of a line of authority (to which we shall turn shortly)

culminating in United States v. Scheffer, 523 U.S. 303 (1998),

we reject the claim that the Michigan court’s decision

represented an unreasonable application of Davis.

Mrs. Rockwell attempts to extract from Davis and other

Supreme Court cases a general rule that a criminal defendant

must be permitted to present any evidence that she deems

critical to her defense. In this connection she cites Crane v.

Kentucky, 476 U.S. 683 (1986), which holds that “the

Constitution guarantees criminal defendants ‘a meaningful

opportunity to present a complete defense.’” Id. at 690

(citations omitted). 

But the Supreme Court has made it perfectly clear that the

right to present a “complete” defense is not an unlimited right

to ride roughshod over reasonable evidentiary restrictions. A

defendant “does not have an unfettered right to offer

testimony that is incompetent, privileged, or otherwise

inadmissible under standard rules of evidence.” Taylor v.

Illinois, 484 U.S. 400, 410 (1988). Rather, she “must comply

with established rules of procedure and evidence designed to

assure both fairness and reliability in the ascertainment of

guilt and innocence.” Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284,

302 (1973). 

As the Supreme Court explained in Scheffer:

“state and federal rulemakers have broad latitude under

the Constitution to establish rules excluding evidence

from criminal trials. Such rules do not abridge an

accused’s right to present a defense so long as they are

not ‘arbitrary’ or ‘disproportionate to the purposes they

are designed to serve.’” 523 U.S. at 308 (citations

omitted).

A defendant’s right to present a “complete” defense, in other

words, does not automatically trump state evidentiary rules.
No. 00-1992 Rockwell v. Yukins 9

4

By the same token, the ruling did not bar Mrs. Rockwell from

simply testifying that the boys had an intense hatred of their father. If

such testimony had gone unchallenged, the jury might well have accepted

it. If the prosecution had cross-examined Mrs. Rockwell as to the basis

of the hatred, on the other hand, or if it had presented the husband as a

witness and evoked a denial that he had done anything to cause the boys

to hate him, the door would then have been opened, in all probability, for

The competing interests must be balanced, and “a defendant’s

interest in presenting . . . evidence may [have to] bow to

accommodate other legitimate interests in the criminal trial

process.” Id. (Internal quotation marks and citations

omitted.)

It was not objectively unreasonable, in our view, for the

Michigan court to conclude that “other legitimate interests in

the criminal trial process” outweighed Mrs. Rockwell’s

interest in presenting evidence of her husband’s prior conduct.

The evidence of sexual abuse posed a substantial danger of

unfair prejudice – a risk that the jury would be tempted to

acquit Mrs. Rockwell not because of any sense that she was

innocent of conspiring with her sons to kill Mr. Rockwell but

because of a sense that killing would be too good for such a

man. 

In addition to the danger of unfair prejudice, the sexual

abuse evidence presented a risk of undue delay and confusion

of the issues. The facts that Mrs. Rockwell wished to

introduce into evidence were disputed. Resolution of this

tangential dispute would have complicated the trial and could

have tended to mislead the jury.

It is true that the chances of the jury’s accepting Mrs.

Rockwell’s “therapy defense” may have been diminished by

exclusion of the sexual abuse evidence. But it would not be

correct to say that Mrs. Rockwell was deprived of her

defense. Exclusion of the evidence would not have prevented

her from testifying that her sons hated their father because of

his unspeakable behavior toward them over the years.

4

 It

10 Rockwell v. Yukins No. 00-1992

Mrs. Rockwell to present evidence of the alleged sexual misconduct.

5

Even if the Michigan court acted unreasonably in concluding that

exclusion of the sexual abuse evidence was constitutional, any error was

probably harmless. There was evidence at trial that Mrs. Rockwell herself

had attempted to acquire a bomb, that she had continued to discuss killing

her husband even after she knew there had been an actual attempt on his

life, and that, on the night of the second attempt, she had taken her

younger children out of the house so that they would not be present

during the attack. This evidence severely undercuts the defense theory

that Mrs. Rockwell believed her sons were merely engaging in harmless

talk.

would not have barred her from telling the jury that she

thought such talk had a healthy prophylactic effect; that she

did not think it would lead to overt action; and that she had

never been a party to any mutual understanding or agreement

to commit murder. The court’s ruling barred Mrs. Rockwell

only from testifying that her husband’s abuse of her sons was

sexual in nature.

Explication of the sexual aspect of the abuse, in short, did

not go to the essence of the “talk therapy” defense. Rather, it

was a detail – an important detail, to be sure, but a detail

nonetheless. 

It is far from certain, moreover, that presentation of this

detail to the jury would have increased the likelihood of Mrs.

Rockwell’s acquittal. The more heinous Mr. Rockwell’s

offenses, the jury could reasonably have concluded, the more

likely it was that Mrs. Rockwell understood the talk of

murder to be in earnest. If, on the other hand, testimony that

the abuse was sexual would have made the jury more likely

to acquit Mrs. Rockwell, it might well have done so on the

improper basis mentioned above – a sense that the conspiracy

was justified – rather than on any legitimate basis. In these

circumstances, we believe it was not unreasonable for the

Michigan Court of Appeals to weigh the competing interests

as it did.5
No. 00-1992 Rockwell v. Yukins 11

The decision made by the Michigan court was a judgment call

of the sort that judges make all the time. Some members of

this court, had they been on the state bench, would have made

a different call. We cannot say they would have acted

unreasonably in doing so, particularly in view of the fact that

the danger of undue prejudice could have been minimized by

a cautionary instruction. See Lewis v. Wilkinson, 307 F.3d

413, 422 (6th Cir. 2002). What we can say, however, is that

the call made by the Michigan court was well within that

court’s discretion. The decision to exclude evidence of the

sexual nature of the victim’s mistreatment of his sons did not,

in our opinion, involve an unreasonable application of clearly

established federal law as determined by the Supreme Court

of the United States.

The decision of the district court is REVERSED, and the

case is REMANDED with instructions to dismiss the

petition.

12 Rockwell v. Yukins No. 00-1992

______________

DISSENT

______________

CLAY, Circuit Judge, dissenting. The majority’s

conclusion that the Michigan Court of Appeals did not

unreasonably apply Supreme Court precedent in rejecting

Petitioner’s claim that she was denied her Fifth Amendment

right to present a complete defense rests upon an

interpretation of § 2254(d)(1) that has no basis in the law. As

the term “unreasonable” is commonly known and applied in

the jurisprudence, the state appellate court’s decision

represented an objectively unreasonable application of the

Court’s precedent. 

Petitioner sought to introduce evidence of Edward

Rockwell’s alleged sexual abuse of his sons for the purpose

of establishing that she engaged in talk of killing Rockwell

with her sons, not for the purpose of forming an agreement to

kill, but for the purpose of allowing the boys to vent their

anger and hatred of Rockwell. Thus, evidence of Rockwell’s

alleged sexual abuse provided the substantive basis of

Petitioner’s defense and, without the evidence, Petitioner was

prevented from establishing any defense at all. The state

appellate court’s finding that omission of this evidence

merely limited Petitioner in the “method” of presenting her

defense thereby constitutes an objectively unreasonable

application of Supreme Court precedent. As a result, the state

appellate court’s conclusion that the evidence was properly

excluded on evidentiary grounds constitutes an objectively

unreasonable application of the Court’s precedent as well. I

would therefore affirm the district court’s order granting the

petition for a writ of habeas corpus filed by Petitioner, Sharon

May Rockwell. 
No. 00-1992 Rockwell v. Yukins 13

I. “Unreasonable Application” Prong of 28 U.S.C.

§ 2254(d)(1)

This Court’s review of the Michigan Court of Appeals’

decision regarding Petitioner’s claim is circumscribed by

§ 2254(d)(1) of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty

Act of 1966 (“AEDPA”), meaning that the state court’s

decision will not be disturbed on habeas review unless the

decision was “contrary to, or involved an unreasonable

application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined

by the Supreme Court of the United States . . . .” In this case,

it is the “unreasonable application” prong of § 2254(d)(1) that

guides our review. Under this prong, “‘a federal habeas court

may grant the writ if the state court identifies the correct

governing legal principle from [the] [Supreme] Court’s

decisions but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts

of the prisoner’s case.’” Lockyer v. Andrade, ___ U.S. ___,

123 S. Ct. 1166, 1174 (2003) (quoting Williams v. Taylor,

529 U.S. 362, 413 (2000)). Said differently, “a federal court

may grant habeas relief [under this prong] based on an

application of a governing legal principle to a set of facts

different from those of the case in which the principle was

announced.” Id. (citing Williams, 529 U.S. at 407).

“‘[A] federal habeas court may not issue the writ simply

because that court concludes in its independent judgment that

the state-court decision applied [a Supreme Court case]

incorrectly.’” Price v. Vincent, ___ U.S. ___, 123 S. Ct.

1848, 1853 (2003) (alteration in Price) (quoting Bell v. Cone,

535 U.S. 685, 699 (2002)). Rather, “[i]n order for a federal

[habeas] court to find a state court’s application

‘unreasonable,’ the state court’s decision must have been

more than incorrect or erroneous[,] [it] must have been

‘objectively unreasonable.’” Wiggins v. Smith, ___ U.S. ___,

123 S. Ct. 2527, 2534 (2003) (citing Lockyer, 123 S. Ct. at

1175; Williams, 529 U.S. at 409); see also Woodford v.

Visciotti, 537 U.S. 19, 24-25 (2002) (per curiam).

14 Rockwell v. Yukins No. 00-1992

We are not without guidance, however, as to when a state

court’s decision rises to the level of being “objectively

unreasonable” for purposes of granting a petitioner habeas

relief under § 2254(d)(1). In Wiggins v. Smith, 123 S. Ct. at

2538-539, a death penalty case, the Supreme Court held that

the Maryland Court of Appeals unreasonably applied the

governing principles of Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S.

668 (1984) in rejecting the petitioner’s claim that he had been

denied his Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of

counsel. The Court found that the state court of appeals’

conclusion that counsel’s performance was within

professional norms was objectively unreasonable under

Strickland inasmuch as counsel had failed to make a

reasonable investigation into the petitioner’s social history.

Id.(noting that under Strickland, “strategic choices made after

a less than complete investigation are reasonable precisely to

the extent that reasonable professional judgments support the

limitations on investigation”) (citation and internal quotation

marks omitted). This, in turn, made the state court’s

deference to counsel’s strategic decision not to present

mitigating evidence of the petitioner’s social history

objectively unreasonable as well. Wiggins, 123 S. Ct. at

2538-539 (“[C]ounsel chose to abandon their investigation at

an unreasonable juncture, making a fully informed decision

with respect to sentencing strategy impossible.”).

The Wiggins majority rejected the dissent’s contention that

“the Court’s hands [were] tied under § 2254(d), by the state

court’s factual determinations that [the petitioner’s] trial

counsel did investigate and were aware of [the petitioner’s]

background.” Id. at 2539 (internal quotation marks and

citation omitted; emphasis in original). The Court reasoned

that the dissent’s position was unfounded because the state

appellate court’s conclusion that “the scope of counsel’s

investigation into petitioner’s background met the legal

standards set in Strickland represented an objectively

unreasonable application of our precedent.” Id. (emphasis in

original). In other words, the state court’s finding that

counsel investigated and knew of the petitioner’s social
No. 00-1992 Rockwell v. Yukins 15

history did not tie the Court’s hands because the scope of

counsel’s investigation was objectively unreasonable under

the principles of Strickland. Id. 

Thus, Wiggins instructs us that while we defer to state court

decisions under § 2254(d)(1), the deference is not absolute

inasmuch as a petitioner may be afforded habeas relief when

the state court’s decision reaches a result not supported by

Supreme Court precedent. See id.

II. Michigan Court of Appeals’ Ruling

The Michigan Court of Appeals issued a divided ruling in

this case. While the two-judge majority found that Petitioner

was not entitled to relief on her claim that the trial court

abused its discretion in excluding evidence of Edward

Rockwell’s prior acts of alleged sexual abuse against

Rockwell’s and Petitioner’s children, a dissenting judge

sharply disagreed. See People v. Rockwell, No. 124359

(Mich. Ct. App. May 23, 1991) (unpublished). 

Specifically, as to Petitioner’s claim on this issue, the twojudge majority opined:

We find no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s

exclusion of evidence of the victim’s alleged prior acts of

abuse against defendant’s and the victim’s children.

People v Watkins, 176 Mich App 428; 440 NW2d 36

(1989). Defendant was merely limited in the method

with which to present her defense and not deprived the

opportunity to present the same. Although marginally

relevant, the evidence was properly excluded under MRE

403.

Id. In sharp contradistinction, the dissenting judge found

Petitioner’s claim on this issue meritorious and would have

reversed Petitioner’s conviction and remanded for a new trial.

That judge persuasively refutes the majority’s argument as

follows:

16 Rockwell v. Yukins No. 00-1992

The majority opinion agrees that the evidence in

question is relevant. If it is relevant it is only so because

it relates to a legally recognized defense. That defense is

that defendant’s participation in the conversations was

not, from her perspective, part of the conspiracy or

agreement to commit murder, but, rather, it was her way

of allowing her sons to ventilate their anger at the sexual

abuse her husband had been perpetrating on the boys

over a period of time. Her defense might not be accepted

by a jury and her belief, if, indeed, she had such a belief,

that the boys should be allowed to express their rage

through such conversations may have been misguided.

Nevertheless, I believe she should have been allowed to

tell her version of the events to the jury and to submit

evidence it support of it.

I come to this conclusion because I believe her version

goes to the very heart of her defense, i.e., that there was

no conspiracy between her and anyone else. The absence

of a conspiracy, i.e., an agreement, depends on whether

she had a factual basis for allowing the boys to express

their anger in this manner and this, in turn, depends on

whether the sexual abuse actually occurred. If it did not

occur, her defense disappears and if it did occur, she has

an explanation, however tenuous it might be, for why she

participated in the conversations and for her theory that

she was not seriously conspiring to murder her husband.

From this perspective, the need to establish the sexual

abuse becomes crucial. I would not want the trial to

deteriorate into a criminal sexual conduct case with each

allegation of sex abuse being proved and then being

disproved by other witnesses but I am satisfied that the

trial judge can place adequate controls and limits on the

flow of testimony given the purpose of such testimony.

It would be sufficient for the trial judge to allow enough

evidence to establish that defendant’s view of the

situation was supported by an adequate factual basis.
No. 00-1992 Rockwell v. Yukins 17

If all she can show is that her behavior was based on

a vague and generalized hatred for her husband by

herself and by the boys, she is deprived of the essence of

her defense. A defendant must be permitted to offer

proofs of each element of a valid defense. See

Washington v Texas, 388 US 14, 19; 87 S Ct 1920; 18 L

Ed 2d 1019 (1967); People v Callington, 123 Mich App

301, 305; 333 NW2d 260 (1983). I wish to emphasize

that I do not take the position that defendant would be

justified in conspiring to kill her husband if he had

perpetrated sexual abuse upon the boys. Rather, my

position is that she must be permitted to argue and

submit proofs that the existence of the sexual abuse

formed a basis for her belief that she was not a knowing

participant in a conspiracy at all.

I would reverse and remand for a new trial.

Id. (Shepherd, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).

III. Analysis

At the outset, it should be noted that although the state

appellate court’s reason for concluding that the evidence was

properly excluded under Rule 403 is significant, what is most

significant is the court’s finding that the exclusion of

Rockwell’s sexual abuse of his sons merely limited the

“method” by which Petitioner could present her defense.

This is so because the state appellate court made an

objectively unreasonable determination under Supreme Court

precedent that Petitioner was only limited in the “method”

and not the substance of her defense through the exclusion of

this evidence, which thereby rendered the court’s conclusion

that the evidence was properly excluded under Rule 403

objectively unreasonable as well. Said differently, although

it is true that Supreme Court precedent indicates that the right

to present a defense is at times limited by reasonable

evidentiary rules, if in deciding to exclude evidence under an

evidentiary rule the court makes an objectively unreasonable

18 Rockwell v. Yukins No. 00-1992

determination as to Petitioner’s ability to present her defense

in the absence of this evidence, the decision to exclude the

evidence under the rule is itself unreasonable. See Wiggins,

123 S. Ct. at 2538-539 (holding that if the court makes an

unreasonable determination as to the basis for counsel’s

strategy, the decision to defer to counsel’s strategic choice is

itself unreasonable). 

A. Petitioner’s Right to Present a Defense 

The state appellate court held that Petitioner was not denied

her constitutional right to present a defense because the

exclusion of evidence regarding Rockwell’s sexual abuse

“merely limited [] the method” by which Petitioner could

present her defense theory. Under clearly established

Supreme Court precedent, the state appellate court’s holding

was objectively unreasonable because evidence ofRockwell’s

alleged sexual abuse provided the substantive basis for

Petitioner’s defense such that without this evidence Petitioner

was left with no defense at all. 

The Court has long held that an accused’s right to

“establish a defense” is a “fundamental element of due

process.” Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 19 (1967). In

Washington, the Court was called upon for the first time “to

decide whether the right of an accused to have compulsory

process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, guaranteed in

federal trials by the Sixth Amendment, is so fundamental and

essential to a fair trial that it is incorporated in the Due

Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.” Id. at 17-18.

Relying on In re Oliver, the Court observed that, among other

things, an accused’s right “‘to offer testimony’” is a basic

component of his right to offer a defense. Id. at 18 (quoting

In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 273 (1948)). The Court therefore

concluded that “[t]he right to offer testimony of witnesses and

to compel their attendance [] is in plain terms the right to

present a defense” because “[j]ust as an accused has the right

to confront the prosecution’s witnesses for the purpose of

challenging their testimony, he has the right to present his
No. 00-1992 Rockwell v. Yukins 19

own witnesses to establish a defense.” Id. at 19. It is then up

to the jury to “decide where the truth lies.” Id.

The Court spoke again on the constitutional significance of

allowing a defendant to present testimony in connection with

his defense in Crane v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 683 (1986).

Specifically, in Crane, the Court held that the exclusion of

testimony surrounding the circumstances of a defendant’s

confession deprived the defendant of his fundamental

right—whether under the Due Process Clause of the

Fourteenth Amendment or under the Compulsory Process or

Confrontation Clauses of the Sixth Amendment—to present

a defense. Id. at 690-91. The Court reasoned that the

opportunity to be heard “would be an empty one if the State

were permitted to exclude competent, reliable evidence

bearing on the credibility of a confession when such evidence

is central to the defendant’s claim of innocence.” Id. As a

result, the Court concluded that the “exclusion of this kind of

exculpatory evidence deprives a defendant of the basic right

to have the prosecutor’s case encounter and ‘survive the

crucible of meaningful adversarial testing.’” Id. at 690-91

(quoting United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 656 (1984)).

In Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 315-16 (1974), the Court

examined an accused’s right to present a defense in the

context of the cross-examination of witnesses offered against

him. The Court recognized that “[c]ross-examination is the

principal means by which the believability of a witness and

the truth of his testimony are tested[,]” and that several means

of discrediting a witness are essential to effective crossexamination. Id. at 316. The petitioner in Davis sought to

discredit a government witness by showing the existence of

possible bias and prejudice. Id. Specifically, the petitioner

sought to question a key witness for the prosecution regarding

the witness’ adjudication as a juvenile delinquent and his

probation status in order to demonstrate that the witness

identified the petitioner as the perpetrator out of fear of

possible probation revocation. Id. at 310-11. The trial court

refused to allow the petitioner to cross-examine the witness as

20 Rockwell v. Yukins No. 00-1992

to his probationary status as a juvenile offender based on a

state statute protecting the anonymity of juvenile offenders.

Id. at 311. As a result, the petitioner’s counsel “did his best”

to expose the witness’s state of mind at the time, but much of

the witness’ testimony went unchallenged. Id. at 312-14.

The petitioner was convicted, and his appeal made its way to

the Alaska Supreme Court which affirmed the petitioner’s

conviction, concluding that “‘counsel for the defendant was

able adequately to question the youth in considerable detail

concerning the possibility of bias or motive.’” Id. 314-15.

The Supreme Court granted certiorari limited to the

question of whether the petitioner was denied his

constitutional right to adequately cross-examine the witness,

which “turn[ed] on the correctness of the Alaska court’s

evaluation of the ‘adequacy’ of the scope of crossexamination permitted.” Id. The Court reversed, finding that

it could not “accept the Alaska Supreme Court’s conclusion

that the cross-examination that was permitted defense counsel

was adequate to develop the issue of bias properly to the

jury.” Id. at 318. The Court reasoned:

While counsel was permitted to ask [the witness]

whether he was biased, counsel was unable to make a

record from which to argue why [the witness] might have

been biased or otherwise lacked that degree of

impartiality expected of a witness at trial. On the basis

of the limited cross-examination that was permitted, the

jury might well have thought that defense counsel was

engaged in a speculative and baseless line of attack on

the credibility of an apparently blameless witness or, as

the prosecutor’s objection put it, a ‘rehash’ of prior crossexamination. On these facts, it seems clear to us that to

make any such inquiry effective, defense counsel should

have been permitted to expose to the jury the facts from

which jurors, as the sole triers of fact and credibility,

could appropriately draw inferences relating to the

reliability of the witness.
No. 00-1992 Rockwell v. Yukins 21

Id. (emphasis added). 

Against this backdrop, it is clear that the Michigan Court of

Appeals’ ruling—that exclusion of Rockwell’s sexual abuse

of the boys “merely limited [Petitioner] in the method” by

which she could present her defense—was objectively

unreasonable inasmuch as this evidence was at the very

substance of Petitioner’s defense. Through the exclusion of

this evidence, Petitioner was deprived of her right to present

testimony in connection with and in support of her defense

pursuant to Washington and Crane, and she was denied her

right to effectively cross-examine key witnesses and

demonstrate the accuracy and truthfulness of her defense

under Davis, all of which ultimately denied Petitioner her due

process right to present a defense.

Indeed, at the hearing on the motion in limine before the

trial court, Petitioner’s counsel argued the substantive

significance of the sexual abuse evidence as it related to

Petitioner’s defense:

Your Honor, in this case, my client, Sharon Rockwell,

is charged with conspiracy to murder Edward Rockwell,

her husband. The facts will show in this case that there

were several conversations throughout the period of the

conspiracy in which my client and the other conspirators

and the other parties discussed death, ways of

accomplishing death of father.

The prosecution intends to show that my client

engaged in these conversations in an effort to convince

the jury that my client is guilty of conspiring to murder.

* * * 

My client knew of the extreme—and I

underline—extreme hatred her children had for their

father. She knew this because she lived with it every day

she raised the children. Her defense, you Honor, is that

22 Rockwell v. Yukins No. 00-1992

she knew the situation was a volatile, explosive situation

and she felt in her heart that the only way she could keep

this situation under control was to allow the boys to talk

and fantasize about these things that were apparently in

their minds. And, therefore, her attitude was talk will

diffuse the situation rather than silence causing an

explosion. So her defense is that she did not make an

agreement with anyone. She allowed this talk because it

was just talk.

Now, the sex acts involved in this case and father’s

prior conduct in treating his family so shabbily will show

that this hatred was real and will show that why this talk

was engaged in.

(Trial Tr., Vol. I at 12-13.) The following colloquy then

occurred between the trial court and Petitioner’s counsel: 

THE COURT: Assuming everything you say is true, []

assuming that there was hated [sic] based

upon all these activities, what type of a

legal defense is it?

* * *

PETITIONER’S COUNSEL: Because mother

[Petitioner] says there was not an

agreement to murder. Mother says this

was nothing more than talk.

THE COURT: Then how is your client harmed by not

including the sexual—prior sexual

conduct?

PETITIONER’S COUNSEL: Because then a finder of

fact says, well, if there was—You know,

the finder of fact concludes that this is

just nothing more than a smoke screen

by the Defendants. My client must show
No. 00-1992 Rockwell v. Yukins 23

that, in fact, this is true, her defense is

true, because otherwise, a rational finder

of fact can believe that mother is just

making up a story to get out of

something.

* * *

My client’s argument is that there was

no agreement; this was just talk. And

that’s very critical in this case because

the evidence and the facts will show that

this talk occurred because of this

extreme hatred.

Her entire defense is built around

showing that, in fact, this was nothing

but talk, and to disallow the evidence to

come in makes it—makes her defense

one so weak that it is of dubious nature

at best.

(Id. at 14, 24.) Ruling on the record, the trial court excluded

the evidence, stating as follows: “The Court will not allow

inquiry into the collateral issues with regard to sexual matters.

The Court finds that it is not material under [MRE] 404.”

(Trial Tr., Vol. I at 24.)

Thus, the exclusion of this evidence did not merely limit

Petitioner “in the method” by which she could present her

defense; rather, the exclusion of this evidence prevented

Petitioner from establishing her defense. As argued by her

counsel before the trial court, testimony of Rockwell’s sexual

abuse provided the very basis as to why Petitioner allowed

and participated in conversations with her sons regarding

Rockwell’s death, and why these conversations did not

amount to an agreement to kill. Petitioner could not establish

her defense without such testimony, which she could have

introduced through her own testimony as well as that of other

24 Rockwell v. Yukins No. 00-1992

witnesses, including her co-defendants who testified at trial.

In other words, the trial court’s ruling deprived Petitioner of

“the right to present [her] own witnesses to establish a

defense[,] thus depriving Petitioner of a “fundamental

element of due process of law.” Washington, 388 U.S. at 19.

Accordingly, the state appellate court’s ruling that Petitioner

was merely limited in the method by which she could present

her defense was objectively unreasonable under Washington.

The same may be said of the state appellate court’s ruling

under Crane v. Kentucky, inasmuch as without the evidence

of Rockwell’s abuse, Petitioner’s defense had no foundation

and “deprive[d] [Petitioner] of the basic right to have the

prosecutor’s case encounter and ‘survive the crucible of

meaningful adversarial testing.’” Crane, 476 U.S. at 690-91

(quoting United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 656 (1984)).

Similar to Crane, evidence of why Petitioner participated in

the talk of Rockwell’s death—that it was a means of allowing

the boys to vent their hatred for their father that had resulted

from his sexual abuse—was “central to [Petitioner’s] claim of

innocence” because without the evidence as to why the boys

hated their father, Petitioner’s defense had little chance of

succeeding. See id. at 691. Indeed, without more,

Petitioner’s “talk therapy” defense may very well have

worked against Petitioner inasmuch as the jury may have

believed that Petitioner’s sons hated their father because he

demanded that they excel in school, or because he strictly

prevented them from using drugs or alcohol. In other words,

without more, the jury may have thought the sons hated

Rockwell because he was being a good, albeit perhaps strict,

father, such that Petitioner’s approval of the boys speaking of

killing Rockwell as a form of “talk therapy” may have hurt

her defense as opposed to helping it. Without knowing the

reason behind the boys’ hatred of Rockwell, the jury may also

have believed that they hated him at Petitioner’s behest,

thereby adding credence to the prosecution’s claim that

Petitioner formed an agreement with her sons to kill

Rockwell. Thus, evidence of why the boys hated their father

and why Petitioner allowed or participated in talk of
No. 00-1992 Rockwell v. Yukins 25

Rockwell’s death was “all but indispensable to any chance of

[her defense] succeeding” thereby rendering the state

appellate court’s ruling objectively unreasonable under

Crane. Id. at 691.

Davis v. Alaska provides further support as to why the state

appellate court’s ruling that Petitioner was merely limited in

the “method” by which she could present her defense was

objectively unreasonable. This is so because, as indicated, the

Court in Davis held that “the jurors were entitled to have the

benefit of the defense theory before them so that they could

make an informed judgment as to the weight to place on [the

witness’] testimony which provided a crucial link in the proof

. . . of petitioner’s act.” Id. at 317 (internal quotation marks

and citation omitted; emphasis in original). The Court

reasoned that “[t]he accuracy and truthfulness of [the key

witness’] testimony were key elements in the State’s claim

against the petitioner.” Id.

The accuracy and truthfulness of testimony provided by the

prosecution’s witnesses in connection with Petitioner’s

participation in discussions to kill Rockwell were key

elements in the state’s conspiracy case against Petitioner.

Indeed, without such evidence, the state would have been at

a loss in proving that Petitioner formed an agreement to kill.

For example, prosecution witness Peter Earl Granger, who

identified himself as a family friend, testified at length that he

had been privy to discussions that Petitioner had with her sons

about killing Rockwell. (Trial Tr. Vol. IV. at 96-117.) If

Petitioner had been allowed to cross-examine Granger as to

the context or circumstances under which these discussions to

kill arose—the boys’ hatred of Rockwell due to his alleged

sexual abuse—Granger’s statements may have served to aid

Petitioner and not the state. Similarly, co-defendant Jeffrey

Greene, the young man upon whom Rockwell had allegedly

made a sexual advance on the night in question, testified at

trial; and had Petitioner been allowed to question Greene as

to Rockwell’s history of sexual abuse on the Rockwell

children, Petitioner’s “talk therapy” defense would have

26 Rockwell v. Yukins No. 00-1992

1

The majority’s conclusion that Davis is “readily distinguishable”

flies in the face of habeas review under the unreasonable application

prong of § 2254(d)(1) inasmuch as under this prong, relief may be granted

“based on an application of a governing legal principle to a set of facts

different from those of the case in which the principle was announced.”

Lockyer v. Andrade, 123 S. Ct. at 1174.

gained credence thus making it less “speculative.” Davis, 415

U.S. at 317-18. Accordingly, Davis is further indication that

excluding evidence of Rockwell’s sexual abuse deprived

Petitioner of the substance of her defense, making the state

appellate court’s determination that Petitioner was merely

limited in the “method” of presenting her defense objectively

unreasonable.1 

B. Excluding the Evidence Under Rule 403

The majority contends that the Michigan Court of Appeals

excluded evidence of Rockwell’s sexual abuse of his sons

because the court found that the probative value of the

evidence was substantially outweighed by the danger that

unfair prejudice would have ensued had the evidence been

admitted. The majority goes on to hold that it was not

objectively unreasonable for the state appellate court to

exclude the evidence on this basis because, “[t]he evidence of

sexual abused posed a substantial danger of unfair

prejudice—a risk that the jury would be tempted to acquit

Mrs. Rockwell not because of any sense that she was innocent

of conspiring with her sons to kill Mr. Rockwell, but because

of a sense that killing would be too good for such a man.”

However, the majority’s conclusion in this regard is based on

pure speculation and what amounts to an inappropriate de

novo review of the case inasmuch as the Michigan Court of

Appeals’ two-judge majority merely stated that “[a]lthough

marginally relevant, the evidence was properly excluded

under MRE 403.” Indeed, the same be said for the majority’s

speculation that the evidence was properly excluded under

Rule 403 because it would have complicated the trial or have

tended to mislead the jury. There is nothing to support this
No. 00-1992 Rockwell v. Yukins 27

2

There is nothing in the trial court’s decision granting the state’s

motion in limine to indicate that the evidence was excluded because its

probative value was substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair

prejudice inasmuch as the state trial court excluded the evidence under

Michigan Rule of Evidence 404. (J.A. at 36.)

conclusion, particularly where the decision whether to admit

the evidence was decided in a motion in limine and the trial

court could easily have limited the parameters of the evidence

while cautioning the jury as to the scope of its consideration.

Michigan’s Rule of Evidence 403 is identical to Federal

Rule of Evidence 403 and provides: “Although relevant,

evidence may be excluded if its probative value is

substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice,

confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by

considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless

presentation of cumulative evidence.” MICH. R. EVID. 403.

Thus, the Michigan Court of Appeals may have excluded the

evidence under Rule 403 for any of the reasons provided

under the rule. Indeed, there is nothing in the state court’s

majority opinion to indicate that it excluded the evidence

because the probative value of the evidence was substantially

outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.2 In fact, when

considering the sentence in the state appellate court’s opinion

immediately proceeding the sentence where it is found that

the evidence was properly excluded under Rule

403—“Defendant was merely limited in the method with

which to present her defense and not deprived the opportunity

to present the same”—it logically follows that evidence was

excluded as being cumulative.

That aside, the state appellate court’s ruling that the

evidence was properly excluded under Rule 403, for whatever

reason,is objectively unreasonable inasmuch as its conclusion

that Petitioner was “merely limited in the method with which

to present her defense and not deprived the opportunity to

present the same” was in itself objectively unreasonable. See

Wiggins, 123 S. Ct. at 2538-539 (concluding that the state

28 Rockwell v. Yukins No. 00-1992

3

Because the denial of her right to present a defense would be

“constitutional error of the first magnitude and no amount of showing of

want of prejudice would cure it,” see Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 318

(1974), the majority’s contention that such error would have been

harmless is unfounded.

court of appeals overall application of Strickland was

objectively unreasonable because 1) the court’s finding that

defense counsel had adequately investigated the petitioner’s

background was objectively unreasonable under Strickland

which 2) thereby made the state court’s subsequent deference

to counsel’s strategic choice objectively unreasonable as

well).

It is true, as the majority contends, that the Supreme Court

has held that a defendant’s right to present relevant evidence

is subject to reasonable restrictions for the purpose of

accommodating “‘other legitimate interests in the criminal

trial process.’” United States v. Scheffer, 523 U.S. 303, 308

(1998) (quoting Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 295

(1973)). To the extent that the Michigan Court of Appeals

excluded the evidence under Rule 403, for whatever reason,

it would appear that under the deferential standard set forth by

AEDPA, this Court would be in a position to conclude that

the state appellate court’s decision was not unreasonable.

However, inasmuch as the state court was objectively

unreasonable in concluding that exclusion of the evidence

merely denied Petitioner the “method” by which she could

present her defense, its conclusion that the evidence was

properly excluded under Rule 403 was objectively

unreasonable as well.3 See Wiggins, 123 S. Ct. at 2538-539;

see also Scheffer, 523 U.S. at 308 (recognizing that it is

unconstitutionally arbitrary or disproportionate to exclude

evidence if, in doing so, an accused’s weighty interest is

infringed).
No. 00-1992 Rockwell v. Yukins 29

IV. Conclusion

The Constitution guarantees criminal defendants “a

meaningful opportunity to present a complete defense.”

California v. Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479, 485 (1984). Because

the exclusion of evidence regarding Rockwell’s sexual abuse

deprived Petitioner of her opportunity to be heard for

purposes of establishing a defense and claiming her

innocence, the Michigan Court of Appeals’ ruling that

Petitioner was merely limited in the “method” of presenting

her defense was objectively unreasonable, thereby making its

ruling that the evidence was properly excluded under Rule

403 objectively unreasonable as well. I therefore would

affirm the district court’s grant of Petitioner’s application for

a writ of habeas corpus, and respectfully dissent.