GAO 

United States Government Accountability Office

Report to Congressional Requesters

BALLISTIC MISSILE 

DEFENSE 

Actions Needed to 

Improve Planning and 

Information on 

Construction and 

Support Costs for 

Proposed European 

Sites 

August 2009 

GAO-09-771 
What GAO Found

United States Government Accountability Office

Why GAO Did This Study

Highlights

Accountability Integrity Reliability

August 2009

BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE 

Actions Needed to Improve Planning and Information 

on Construction and Support Costs for Proposed 

Highlights of GAO-09-771, a report to European Sites congressional requesters 

The Missile Defense Agency (MDA) 

estimated in 2008 that the potential 

costs of fielding ballistic missile 

defenses in Europe would be more 

than $4 billion through 2015. 

Planned ballistic missile defenses 

in Europe are intended to defend 

the United States, its deployed 

forces, and its allies against 

ballistic missile attacks from the 

Middle East. They are expected to 

include a missile interceptor site in 

Poland, a radar site in the Czech 

Republic, and a mobile radar 

system in a still-to-be-determined 

European location. 

GAO was asked to evaluate the 

Department of Defense’s (DOD) 

plans for missile defense sites in 

Europe and address to what extent 

DOD has (1) planned for the sites’ 

implementation and (2) estimated 

military construction and long-term 

operations and support costs. 

Accordingly, GAO reviewed key 

legislation; examined policy and 

guidance from MDA, the Army, the 

Air Force, and the Army Corps of 

Engineers; analyzed budget 

documents and cost estimates; and 

visited sites in Poland and the 

Czech Republic. 

What GAO Recommends

GAO is recommending that DOD 

clarify roles and responsibilities, 

refine military construction cost 

estimates, and define who is 

responsible for operations and 

support costs for the European 

sites. DOD generally agreed, stating 

that steps are being taken to 

address these issues, but that 

operations and support cost 

estimates will not be completed in 

time for the 2011 budget. 

DOD has begun planning for the construction and implementation of the 

European missile defense sites, including coordinating with international 

partners and U.S. stakeholders; however, several challenges affecting DOD’s 

implementation of ballistic missile defenses in Europe remain. First, neither 

Poland nor the Czech Republic has ratified key bilateral agreements with the 

United States, limiting DOD’s ability to finalize key details of the sites, such as 

how security will be provided. Second, DOD’s efforts to establish the roles 

and responsibilities of key U.S. stakeholders for the European sites remain 

incomplete because MDA and the services have not yet made important 

determinations, such as establishing the criteria that must be met before the 

transfer of the European missile defense sites from MDA to the Army and Air 

Force. Since 2002, MDA has been directed by DOD to begin planning for the 

transfer of missile defense elements, including the direction to coordinate 

with the services on resources and personnel needed to provide an effective 

transition of responsibility. Without clear definitions of the roles that MDA 

and the services will be responsible for and agreement on criteria for transfer, 

DOD will continue to face uncertainties in determining how the European 

Interceptor Site and the European Midcourse Radar Site will be sustained 

over the long term. 

DOD’s cost estimates for military construction and operations and support 

have limitations and do not provide Congress complete information on the 

true costs of ballistic missile defenses in Europe. Key principles for cost 

estimating state that complete cost estimates are important in preparing 

budget submissions and for assessing the long-term affordability of a 

program. Further, according to DOD military construction regulations, the 

Army Corps of Engineers typically certifies that key construction design 

milestones have been met and verifies military construction cost estimates 

before the estimates are submitted as budget requests. However, DOD’s 

original military construction estimates in the fiscal year 2009 budget did 

not include all costs, primarily because MDA submitted the estimates 

before accomplishing key design milestones and without a review by the 

Army Corps of Engineers. Consequently, DOD’s projected military 

construction costs for the interceptor and radar sites could potentially 

increase from DOD’s original $837 million estimate to over $1 billion. DOD 

operations and support cost estimates are also incomplete because they 

do not include projected costs for base operations that will be managed by 

the Army and Air Force. Key cost factors that will affect these estimates, 

such as how security will be provided at the sites, remain undefined. In 

addition, MDA and the services have not yet agreed on how the operations 

and support costs for the interceptor and radar sites will be funded over 

the long term. As a result, Congress does not have accurate information on 

the full investment required for ballistic missile defenses in Europe. 

View GAO-09-771 or key components.

For more information, contact John Pendleton 

at 404-679-1816 or pendletonj@gao.gov. 
Page i GAO-09-771 

Contents 

Letter 1

Results in Brief 4 

Background 8 

DOD Has Made Progress in Planning for Ballistic Missile Defenses 

in Europe with International Partners and Key U.S. 

Stakeholders, but Challenges Remain 9 

DOD’s Military Construction and Operations and Support Cost 

Estimates for Ballistic Missile Defenses in Europe Have 

Limitations and Do Not Provide Congress Complete Information 16 

Conclusions 23 

Recommendations for Executive Action 24 

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 25 

Appendix I Scope and Methodology 29 

Appendix II Comments from the Department of Defense 32 

Appendix III GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments 36 

Related GAO Products 37 

Tables 

Table 1: Status of Key Bilateral Agreements 13 

Table 2: Status of Overarching Memorandums of Agreement and 

Annexes 16 

Figure 

Figure 1: Proposed Site for Interceptor Field at Redzikowo Air 

Base in Poland 10 

 Ballistic Missile Defense 
Abbreviations 

BMDS Ballistic Missile Defense System 

DOD Department of Defense 

MDA Missile Defense Agency 

NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization 

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Page ii GAO-09-771 Ballistic Missile Defense
Page 1 GAO-09-771 

United States Government Accountability Office

Washington, DC 20548 

 

August 6, 2009 

The Honorable Daniel K. Inouye 

Chairman 

Committee on Appropriations 

United States Senate 

The Honorable Tim Johnson 

Chairman 

Subcommittee on Military Construction, Veterans Affairs, 

 and Related Agencies 

Committee on Appropriations 

United States Senate 

The Honorable Robert C. Byrd 

United States Senate 

The Missile Defense Agency (MDA) was created in 2002 in order to 

develop ballistic missile defenses comprising land-, air-, and sea-based 

elements—such as missiles and radars—working together as an integrated 

system and intended to intercept ballistic missiles in all phases of flight. 

MDA has spent almost $56 billion since 2002 on developing and fielding an 

initial ballistic missile defense capability and is on course to spend about 

$50 billion more over the next 5 years. As part of this system, MDA plans 

to field a missile interceptor site in Poland designed to intercept incoming 

ballistic missiles launched from the Middle East, a radar site in the Czech 

Republic capable of tracking incoming missiles and guiding interceptors to 

their targets, and a mobile radar system to be strategically placed in a stillto-be-determined European location to provide additional warning of 

potential ballistic missile threats. While MDA has taken the lead in 

developing the sites thus far, the Army has been designated the lead 

military service to operate and support the European Interceptor Site in 

Poland and the mobile radar system, and the Air Force has been 

designated lead military service for the European Midcourse Radar Site in 

the Czech Republic. MDA estimated in 2008 that the potential costs of the 

planned ballistic missile defenses in Europe through 2013 would be more 

than $4 billion—approximately $837 million for military construction; 

$612 million for operations and support at the sites; and $2.6 billion for 

development, testing, and procurement costs. 

Although the Department of Defense (DOD) is moving forward with 

planning and site analysis for the ballistic missile defense sites in Europe, 

the new administration indicated in 2009 that it is reviewing U.S. national 

 Ballistic Missile Defense 
 

policy on missile defense and has not yet stated its plans for the future of 

ballistic missile defenses in Europe. Some critics of the proposed ballistic 

missile defenses in Europe argue that testing of the system to date has 

been insufficient to verify that it will function as intended. In light of those 

concerns, Congress has placed limitations on the use of funds for the 

acquisition or deployment of missiles at a European site until the 

Secretary of Defense certifies that the proposed interceptors have 

demonstrated a high probability of working in an operationally effective 

manner and the ability to accomplish the mission.1

 Further, the 

deployment of the ballistic missile defense sites in Europe has been the 

subject of debate in the parliaments of both Poland and the Czech 

Republic, and the Russian government has adamantly protested U.S. plans 

in those countries. However, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization 

(NATO) has indicated its support for ballistic missile defenses in Europe 

and is pursuing ways to link its own missile defense efforts with those of 

the United States. 

We have previously reported on a number of challenges facing DOD as it 

develops and fields ballistic missile defenses. For instance, we recently 

testified that to meet President Bush’s goal of putting in place an initial set 

of ballistic missile defense capabilities beginning in 2004, the Secretary of 

Defense granted MDA a significant amount of funding and decisionmaking flexibility, exempting the agency from many traditional DOD 

requirements for weapon system development, acquisition, and oversight. 

Although this exemption allowed MDA to quickly develop an initial 

ballistic missile defense capability, this approach has also resulted in 

several management challenges.2

 For example, MDA has not yet provided 

baselines necessary to measure its progress on cost, schedule, and testing. 

Further, some of MDA’s production and fielding decisions have gotten 

ahead of its testing schedule, raising concerns about system efficacy.3

Finally, DOD’s plans for long-term operations and support are incomplete, 

 

1

 National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-181, § 226 (2008), 

and Duncan Hunter National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2009, Pub. L. No. 

110-417, § 233 (2008). 

2

 GAO, Defense Management: Key Challenges Should be Addressed When Considering 

Changes to Missile Defense Agency’s Roles and Missions, GAO-09-466T (Washington, D.C.: 

Mar. 26, 2009).

3

 GAO, Defense Acquisitions: Production and Fielding of Missile Defense Components 

Continue with Less Testing and Validation Than Planned, GAO-09-338 (Washington, 

D.C.: Mar. 13, 2009). 

Page 2 GAO-09-771 Ballistic Missile Defense
 

making the transition and transfer of the ballistic missile defense elements 

from MDA to the services difficult.4

In requesting this review, you expressed interest in the completeness of 

DOD’s plans for the ballistic missile defense sites in Europe, including 

questions about whether MDA’s initial $4 billion estimate for the planned 

European capabilities includes the full costs associated with construction 

and operations and support of the sites. In this context, you asked GAO to 

evaluate DOD’s plans for the ballistic missile defense sites in Europe and 

address to what extent DOD has (1) planned for the initial implementation 

of ballistic missile defenses in Europe, to include coordination with key 

international partners and U.S. stakeholders, and (2) estimated total 

military construction and long-term operations and support costs for 

ballistic missile defenses in Europe. 

For both objectives, we reviewed key legislation related to ballistic missile 

defenses in Europe, DOD policy and guidance on military construction and 

estimating costs, and DOD’s overall approach for preparing to support 

ballistic missile defense. To determine to what extent DOD has planned 

for the initial implementation of ballistic missile defenses in Europe, we 

conducted site visits in Poland and the Czech Republic; met with DOD, 

State Department, and host nation officials to discuss the efforts under 

way to plan for the sites; and examined key documents, including 

agreements with the host nations, memorandums of agreement between 

key U.S. stakeholders, and MDA, Army, Air Force, and Army Corps of 

Engineers documents for planning and site preparation. We evaluated the 

collaboration efforts among the agencies to determine whether DOD, 

Army, Air Force, and State Department officials followed key practices 

that can help agencies enhance and sustain their collaborative efforts.5

 To 

determine the extent to which DOD has estimated total costs for ballistic 

missile defenses in Europe, we examined budget documents, including 

DOD’s fiscal year 2009 Future Years Defense Program (including budget 

data for fiscal years 2008-2013), MDA’s fiscal year 2009 military 

construction cost estimates, MDA’s fiscal year 2010 budget submission, 

and the Army’s projected military construction cost estimates, and 

 

4

 GAO, Missile Defense: Actions Needed to Improve Planning and Cost Estimates for 

Long-Term Support of Ballistic Missile Defense, GAO-08-1068 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 25, 

2008). 

5

 GAO, Results-Oriented Government: Practices That Can Help Enhance and Sustain 

Collaboration among Federal Agencies, GAO-06-15 (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 21, 2005). 

Page 3 GAO-09-771 Ballistic Missile Defense
 

reviewed key principles for developing accurate and reliable cost 

estimates.6

 We also discussed the cost estimates with MDA, the Army, the 

Air Force, and the Army Corps of Engineers-Headquarters and Europe 

District to determine the completeness of the military construction and 

operations and support costs. We discussed the results of our analyses on 

these objectives with DOD and State Department officials. Our scope and 

methodology is discussed in more detail in appendix I. 

We conducted this performance audit from October 2008 to August 2009 in 

accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those 

standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, 

appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and 

conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence 

obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions 

based on our audit objectives. 

DOD has begun planning for the construction, implementation, and 

operations and support for the European missile defense sites, including 

coordinating with international partners and U.S. stakeholders; however, 

several challenges remain that are affecting DOD’s plans for ballistic 

missile defenses in Europe. First, neither Poland nor the Czech Republic 

has ratified the bilateral Ballistic Missile Defense Agreements and bilateral 

supplementary agreements to the NATO Status of Forces Agreement. The 

ratification votes remain delayed, in part, because of a desire on the part 

of both the Polish and Czech parliaments to wait for an indication from the 

new U.S. administration on its policy toward ballistic missile defenses in 

Europe. As long as these agreements remain unratified, DOD’s ability to 

finalize key details about how the sites will operate, such as whether 

security will be provided by the host nation, will be limited. Second, DOD’s 

efforts to establish the roles and responsibilities of key U.S. stakeholders 

for the European sites remain incomplete because MDA and the services 

have not yet made important determinations, such as establishing the 

criteria that must be met before the transfer of specific European missile 

defense sites to the services. MDA has been directed by DOD since 2002 to 

Results in Brief 

 

6

 Key principles for developing accurate and reliable cost estimates are drawn from DOD 

guidance and our Cost Estimating and Assessment Guide. Department of Defense, Office 

of the Secretary of Defense, Cost Analysis Improvement Group, Operating and Support 

Cost-Estimating Guide (Washington, D.C., May 1992 and October 2007), and GAO, GAO 

Cost Estimating and Assessment Guide: Best Practices for Developing and Managing 

Capital Program Costs, GAO-09-3SP (Washington, D.C.: March 2009). 

Page 4 GAO-09-771 Ballistic Missile Defense
 

begin planning for the transfer of missile defense elements, including the 

direction to coordinate with the services on resources and personnel 

needed in order to deliver an effective transition of responsibility. In 

addition, our prior work assessing interagency collaboration has shown 

that agreed-upon roles and responsibilities that clarify who will do what, 

organize joint and individual efforts, and facilitate decision making are 

important to agencies’ capability to enhance and sustain their 

collaborative efforts. While the Army has been designated lead service for 

the European Interceptor Site and the Air Force has been designated lead 

service for the European Midcourse Radar Site, the specific 

responsibilities related to these roles remain undefined. Roles and 

responsibilities for these missile defense elements are to be established in 

Overarching Memorandums of Agreement between the services and MDA 

and annexes to those agreements specific to each missile defense element, 

but these important agreements remain incomplete because MDA and the 

services have not yet made important determinations, such as establishing 

the criteria that must be met before the transfer of specific European 

missile defense sites to the services. Without establishing specific roles 

and responsibilities for the sites and defining key criteria that will guide 

the transfer of the elements from MDA to the Army and Air Force, 

uncertainty will persist about how the European Interceptor Site and the 

European Midcourse Radar Site will be sustained over the long term. The 

delay in ratification creates an opportunity for DOD and MDA to address 

some of the planning challenges DOD faces for the European sites. We are 

therefore recommending that MDA, the Army, and the Air Force use this 

time to finalize the Overarching Memorandums of Agreement that detail 

the specific roles and responsibilities for the European sites and clearly 

define the criteria that must be met before the transfer of those sites from 

MDA to the Army and Air Force. 

Although DOD has provided congressional decision makers with some 

information on the military construction and operations and support costs 

for the European Interceptor Site and European Midcourse Radar Site, 

DOD’s estimates have limitations and do not provide Congress complete 

information on those costs. Key principles for cost estimating state that 

complete cost estimates are important in preparing budget submissions 

and for assessing the long-term affordability of a program. MDA’s initial 

cost estimates for total military construction and operations and support 

costs for ballistic missile defenses in Europe have significant limitations. 

• DOD’s original estimate to construct both sites did not include all 

costs. The $837 million estimate did not fully account for the cost of 

power and utilities at the sites, among other things. This was primarily 

Page 5 GAO-09-771 Ballistic Missile Defense
 

because MDA submitted the estimates for its 2009 budget before 

accomplishing key design milestones and without a review by the 

Army Corps of Engineers. According to DOD military construction 

regulations, the Army Corps of Engineers, as construction agent, 

typically certifies that key construction design milestones have been 

met and verifies military construction cost estimates before the 

estimates are submitted as budget requests. Additionally, DOD’s initial 

military construction cost estimates did not include any Army or Air 

Force base operating support facilities costs, such as housing, or 

account for possible currency fluctuations. Consequently, DOD’s 

projected military construction costs for the European Interceptor Site 

and the European Midcourse Radar Site are expected to increase 

significantly from DOD’s original $837 million estimate in the fiscal 

year 2009 budget. In May 2009, an Army Corps of Engineers official 

estimated that military construction costs for the sites could 

potentially increase to over $1 billion. Despite the expected increase in 

military construction costs, DOD has not provided Congress updated 

military construction estimates since the initial estimates were 

submitted in February 2008 with the fiscal year 2009 budget request. 

As a result of these limitations in the initial estimates, DOD and 

congressional decision makers do not have accurate information on 

the full military construction investment required for ballistic missile 

defenses in Europe. 

• Total operations and support costs are also uncertain. DOD estimated 

operations and support costs totaling $612 million for the European 

Interceptor Site and European Midcourse Radar Site in its fiscal years 

2008-2013 Future Years Defense Program. However, these estimates 

are incomplete because DOD’s operations and support cost estimates, 

for example, do not include estimates for base operations managed by 

the Army and Air Force. Although MDA and the Army and Air Force 

have initiated the development of total operations and support cost 

estimates, key cost factors that will affect these estimates, such as how 

security will be provided at the sites, remain undefined. Furthermore, 

MDA and the Army and Air Force have not yet agreed on how the 

operations and support costs for the European Interceptor Site and the 

European Midcourse Radar Site will be funded over the elements’ life 

cycles or who will pay for these costs. This has been a persistent issue 

that is important to address as these costs are typically over 70 percent 

of a system’s total lifetime cost. 

Without credible and complete military construction and operations and 

support cost estimates, DOD and congressional decision makers will have 

difficulty making funding decisions and assessing the affordability of 

Page 6 GAO-09-771 Ballistic Missile Defense
 

ballistic missile defense plans over the program’s life cycle. To provide 

military construction costs for ballistic missile defenses in Europe that are 

based on the best available data, we are recommending that MDA, in 

coordination with the Army and Air Force, provide Congress annually, in 

alignment with the budget, updated military construction cost estimates 

for the European Interceptor Site and the European Midcourse Radar Site 

that among other things reflect the data gathered from all site design 

efforts since project initiation and account for all projected military 

construction costs for the sites, including Army and Air Force base 

support facility requirements. To provide for more complete military 

construction estimates for future ballistic missile defense sites, such as the 

still-to-be-determined European site for the mobile radar system, we 

recommend that MDA follow DOD military construction regulations by 

utilizing the Army Corps of Engineers to complete required site design and 

analysis work and verify all military construction cost estimates before 

submitting cost estimates to Congress. We further recommend that MDA 

and the Army and Air Force complete life cycle operations and support 

cost estimates for the European Interceptor Site and the European 

Midcourse Radar Site and clearly define who is responsible for funding 

these operations and support costs over the elements’ life cycles. 

In written comments on a draft of this report, DOD concurred with three 

and partially concurred with two recommendations. DOD concurred with 

our recommendation for MDA and the Army and Air Force to finalize 

Overarching Memorandums of Agreement and element-specific annexes. 

DOD also concurred with both of our recommendations to improve 

military construction cost estimates for ballistic missile defense sites. 

DOD partially concurred with our two recommendations to improve fiscal 

stewardship of DOD’s operations and support resources. In general, DOD 

stated that it is taking steps to address the issues we identified in the 

report, but that life cycle operations and support cost estimates would not 

be complete in time for the fiscal year 2011 budget submission. By 

implementing our recommendations to improve planning and information 

on construction and support costs for the proposed European sites, DOD 

would be better positioned to prepare for the near- and long-term 

sustainment of the sites and congressional decision makers would have 

enhanced ability to evaluate the investment required to implement ballistic 

missile defenses in Europe. The department’s comments are reprinted in 

appendix II. 

Page 7 GAO-09-771 Ballistic Missile Defense
 

When MDA was given the mission to develop a global integrated Ballistic 

Missile Defense System (BMDS), DOD’s intention was for MDA to develop 

missile defense elements, such as the proposed interceptor and radar sites 

in Europe, and then transfer the elements to the lead services designated 

to operate and support them. We have previously reported that the 

transition process may, for some missile defense elements, end at a point 

that DOD calls transfer—which is the reassignment of the MDA program 

office responsibilities to a service.7

 According to MDA and Office of the 

Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics 

officials, not all BMDS elements will ultimately transfer; the decision to 

transfer them will be made on a case-by-case basis and the conditions 

under which this may happen will be identified in agreements between 

MDA and the services for each element. 

Background 

In September 2008, we reported that DOD has taken some initial steps to 

plan for long-term operations and support of ballistic missile defense 

elements, but planning efforts to date are incomplete because of 

difficulties in transitioning and transferring responsibilities from MDA to 

the services and in establishing operations and support cost estimates.8

 We 

noted that DOD has established limited operations and support cost 

estimates for ballistic missile defense elements in its Future Years Defense 

Program, DOD’s 6-year spending plan; however, the estimates do not fully 

reflect the total life cycle cost of the BMDS. As a result, we reported that 

the operations and support costs that had been developed were not 

transparent to DOD senior leadership and congressional decision makers 

and recommended that DOD establish a standard process for long-term 

support planning for the BMDS and a requirement to estimate BMDS 

operations and support costs. 

 

7 GAO-08-1068. 

8 GAO-08-1068. 

Page 8 GAO-09-771 Ballistic Missile Defense
 

DOD has begun planning for the construction and implementation of the 

European missile defense sites; however, challenges affecting DOD’s 

implementation of ballistic missile defenses in Europe remain. First, 

neither Poland nor the Czech Republic has ratified key bilateral 

agreements with the United States, limiting DOD’s ability to finalize key 

details of the sites, such as how security will be provided. Second, DOD’s 

efforts to establish the roles and responsibilities of key U.S. stakeholders 

for the European sites remain incomplete. Without clear definitions of the 

roles that MDA and the services will be responsible for and agreement on 

criteria for transfer, DOD will continue to face uncertainties in 

determining how the European Interceptor Site and the European 

Midcourse Radar Site will be sustained over the long term. 

DOD Has Made 

Progress in Planning 

for Ballistic Missile 

Defenses in Europe 

with International 

Partners and Key U.S. 

Stakeholders, but 

Challenges Remain 

DOD Has Made Progress in 

Planning for European 

Missile Defenses 

DOD has made progress in planning for the construction, implementation, 

and operations and support for the European missile defense sites. In 

2002, the President signed National Security Presidential Directive 23 that 

called for missile defense capabilities to protect the United States, its 

deployed forces, and its allies.9

 As part of that direction, MDA considered 

several European sites where it could base a missile defense capability to 

provide additional U.S. protection and could provide a regional defense for 

its European allies against a missile launch from Iran. DOD approached 

both Poland and the Czech Republic about basing elements of its proposed 

European missile defense system, and MDA briefed the President about 

the potential capability in 2003. Both U.S. and Polish officials told us that 

Poland was a likely host site because many of the trajectories from Iran 

went through Poland. In May 2006, the Czech government sent a formal 

letter to the United States to request that the United States consider 

placing missile defense assets in the Czech Republic. DOD has completed 

site selection and begun site design for the European Interceptor Site in 

Poland and the European Midcourse Radar Site in the Czech Republic. 

The proposed European Interceptor Site is located outside of Slupsk, 

Poland, near the Baltic Sea. The site is planned to consist of 10 two-stage, 

silo-based interceptors—modified versions of the three-stage interceptors 

located at Fort Greely, Alaska, and Vandenberg, California. The site is 

designed to protect the U.S. homeland and U.S. allies from incoming 

ballistic missiles launched from the Middle East. The initial MDA estimate 

European Interceptor Site 

 

9

 The White House, National Security Presidential Directive 23, National Policy on 

Ballistic Missile Defense (Dec. 16, 2002). 

Page 9 GAO-09-771 Ballistic Missile Defense
 

indicated that the site would be operational by 2013, and the Army is the 

lead service that will be tasked with operating and supporting the 

interceptor site once it becomes operational. Site analysis is under way at 

the European Interceptor Site, but no physical site preparation or 

construction has begun. The photograph in figure 1 was taken at the site in 

February 2009 and shows the area where the planned interceptor field will 

be located. 

Figure 1: Proposed Site for Interceptor Field at Redzikowo Air Base in Poland 

Source: GAO.

The proposed European Midcourse Radar Site is located at the Brdy 

military training area, approximately 90 kilometers southwest of Prague, 

Czech Republic. This land-based X-band radar will provide ballistic missile 

tracking data to the European Interceptor Site as well as the greater 

BMDS. The radar proposed for deployment to the Czech Republic is 

currently located at Kwajalein Atoll in the Marshall Islands. The radar will 

undergo an upgrade before its installation in the Czech Republic. The Air 

Force is the lead service that will be tasked with operating and supporting 

the radar site once it becomes operational, which MDA initially estimated 

would occur in 2013. Site analysis is under way at the European Midcourse 

Radar Site, but no physical site preparation or construction has begun. 

European Midcourse Radar Site 

Page 10 GAO-09-771 Ballistic Missile Defense
 

As part of ballistic missile defenses in Europe, DOD is considering the 

placement of an AN/TPY-2 mobile forward-based radar at another site in 

Europe in addition to the European Interceptor Site and the European 

Midcourse Radar Site. The transportable, land-based X-band radar is being 

considered in order to provide additional warning of ballistic missile 

launches from a location that is closer to Iran. The site for this radar has 

not yet been proposed, and at this time, negotiations with potential host 

nations have not been authorized. 

Mobile Forward-Based Radar

DOD Has Begun 

Negotiations and Planning 

with International Partners 

and U.S. Stakeholders 

The State Department and DOD have negotiated the key bilateral Ballistic 

Missile Defense Agreements necessary to move forward on the European 

interceptor and radar sites. In 2008, the United States, Poland, and the 

Czech Republic signed bilateral Ballistic Missile Defense Agreements that 

formally approved the basing of the European Interceptor Site and the 

European Midcourse Radar Site, and both agreements are now waiting for 

ratification by the Polish and Czech parliaments. The Ballistic Missile 

Defense Agreements are the first of several necessary agreements 

expected to govern the fielding of ballistic missile defenses in each 

country. The Ballistic Missile Defense Agreements establish the rights and 

obligations of the United States, Poland, and the Czech Republic specific 

to each site and provide general guidelines on personnel, construction, 

and land use, among other things. 

A second key set of agreements, supplementary arrangements to the 

NATO Status of Forces Agreement, are expected to govern ballistic missile 

defense at both sites. The overall NATO Status of Forces Agreement was 

created soon after the NATO alliance was established in 1949 and sets the 

general status of forces for member nations as they operate in each others’ 

territories. The supplementary Status of Forces Agreement adds missionspecific matters addressed only broadly in the NATO Status of Forces 

Agreement, such as the legal status of U.S. civilian and military personnel 

working at each site. The Czech Republic and the United States have 

negotiated a supplementary Status of Forces Agreement, and it is now 

waiting for ratification by the Czech parliament. However, the 

supplementary Status of Forces Agreement with Poland had not been 

completely negotiated as of June 2009. After the Ballistic Missile Defense 

Agreements and supplementary Status of Forces Agreements are ratified 

by each host nation’s parliament, implementing arrangements will be 

negotiated. The implementing arrangements will serve as the executing 

documents for both of these agreements and address the day-to-day 

working relationship between the countries on a range of issues, including 

security. 

Page 11 GAO-09-771 Ballistic Missile Defense
 

NATO’s overall role in European ballistic missile defense is still under 

consideration. Although NATO has not been party to the bilateral 

negotiations between DOD and the host nations, DOD and NATO have 

worked together to begin addressing interoperability of the U.S. BMDS 

and NATO’s Active Layered Theater Ballistic Missile Defense system. 

NATO has also taken recent steps to show support for the European 

Interceptor Site and European Midcourse Radar Site. For example, 

NATO’s 2008 Bucharest Summit Declaration recognized that ballistic 

missile proliferation poses an increasing threat to NATO, and recognized 

that the European missile defense sites would provide a “substantial 

contribution” to NATO’s protection. NATO stated that it is exploring ways 

to link U.S. missile defense assets with current NATO missile defense 

efforts. 

DOD has also made progress in coordinating with key U.S. stakeholders 

and by establishing the Army Corps of Engineers-Europe District as the 

construction agent for both sites. DOD has established lead services for 

both the interceptors and the radar and the Army and Air Force have 

identified which command will be specifically tasked to lead each ballistic 

missile element. The Army’s Space and Missile Defense Command has 

been assigned as the lead command for the European Interceptor Site and 

the Air Force Space Command is the lead command for the European 

Midcourse Radar Site. As lead services, both the Army and Air Force have 

conducted planning sessions and negotiation of roles and relationships 

with MDA. For example, MDA and the Army and Air Force are establishing 

roles and responsibilities for the long-term operations and support of the 

European sites through negotiation of Overarching Memorandums of 

Agreement and ballistic missile defense element–specific annexes to the 

overarching agreements. However, with the exception of the Overarching 

Memorandum of Agreement between MDA and the Army, completed in 

January 2009, these agreements are not yet complete. 

In addition, the Army Corps of Engineers-Europe District is the 

construction agent for both the European Interceptor Site and the 

European Midcourse Radar Site. As such, the Corps is responsible for 

issuing and commissioning site preparation and construction contracts for 

the sites. The Corps will manage the contracts to ensure that the sites are 

developed and constructed to meet MDA and service facility requirements. 

However, no contracts can be issued or site preparation commissioned 

until the Ballistic Missile Defense Agreements and supplementary Status 

of Forces Agreements with the host nations are signed and ratified. For 

the Czech Republic, construction may begin after ratification of 

agreements between the United States and the Czech Republic; however, 

Page 12 GAO-09-771 Ballistic Missile Defense
 

for Poland, construction may begin only after ratification of the 

agreements by both countries. MDA officials told us that since Poland and 

the Czech Republic did not ratify their respective agreements by spring 

2009, both sites will experience construction delays based on target 

construction completion dates of the first quarter of fiscal year 2013 for 

the radar site and the second quarter of fiscal year 2013 for the interceptor 

site. 

Delayed Ratification of 

Key Agreements with Host 

Nations and Incomplete 

Agreements between MDA 

and the Services Present 

Challenges to DOD’s 

Planning and 

Implementation of Ballistic 

Missile Defenses in Europe 

While DOD has made progress with key international partners and U.S. 

stakeholders on the planning and implementation of missile defenses in 

Europe, several challenges affect DOD’s ability to carry out its plans for 

the ballistic missile defenses in Europe. Neither Poland nor the Czech 

Republic has ratified either its overall Ballistic Missile Defense Agreement 

or a supplementary Status of Forces Agreement. The lack of ratified 

agreements limits DOD’s ability to negotiate specific details, such as 

security, that are expected to be formalized in implementing arrangements 

to each overall agreement. Table 1 shows the status of these key 

documents. 

Table 1: Status of Key Bilateral Agreements 

Key agreements 

European 

Interceptor Site (Poland) 

European Midcourse 

Radar Site (Czech Republic) 

Ballistic Missile Defense Agreement complete? Yes Yes 

Supplementary Status of Forces Agreement complete? Negotiations ongoing Yes 

Agreements ratified? No No 

Implementing arrangements complete? To be negotiated after ratificationaTo be negotiated after ratification 

Source: GAO analysis of DOD data. 

a

The United States and Poland are currently negotiating a land use implementing arrangement before 

ratifying the agreements, per the European Interceptor Site Ballistic Missile Defense Agreement. 

U.S. and Polish officials also told us that the ratification process in Poland 

is on hold until the supplementary Status of Forces Agreement is 

negotiated and the new administration establishes its policy toward 

ballistic missile defenses in Europe. Additionally, U.S. officials indicated 

that the ratification process is also on hold in the Czech Republic pending 

the new administration’s policy. While DOD’s $7.8 billion fiscal year 2010 

budget proposal for missile defense reflects an increased emphasis on 

bolstering near-term capabilities to respond to specific theater threats, as 

opposed to an overall long-term global ballistic missile defense capability, 

Page 13 GAO-09-771 Ballistic Missile Defense
 

DOD officials have stated that the European missile defense capability in 

particular will be reevaluated as part of DOD’s Quadrennial Defense 

Review, which is expected to be completed in early 2010. 

In the interim, the lack of negotiated and ratified agreements affects many 

aspects of DOD’s ability to plan for the sites, ranging from the services’ 

ability to plan for the numbers of personnel that will be required to the 

types of support infrastructure that will be needed for the personnel. For 

example, the exact numbers of security personnel needed at each site will 

not be finalized until the implementing arrangements are complete and 

decisions are made regarding the extent to which the Polish and Czech 

governments will contribute security personnel to the sites. In addition, 

U.S. European Command is leading meetings, working groups, and 

consultations on land use considerations in Poland, but the specific topics 

included in the land use implementing arrangement cannot be finalized 

until Poland and the United States have agreed on the contents of the 

bilateral supplementary Status of Forces Agreement. 

Moreover, Congress has placed restrictions on DOD’s ability to fund 

procurement, site activation, military construction, and deployment of a 

missile defense system at the sites until the agreements have been ratified. 

Both the 2008 and 2009 National Defense Authorization Acts prohibit DOD 

from funding such activities at the radar site until the Czech parliament 

ratifies and the Prime Minister approves the missile defense and 

supplementary status of forces agreements. However, in Poland such 

activities can begin only after ratification and approval of agreements by 

both countries. Once DOD is able to begin, construction of both European 

sites is expected to take approximately 3 years to complete. Completion of 

the sites’ weapon systems installation, integration, and testing will 

continue after completion of construction. 

Finally, DOD’s efforts to finalize roles and responsibilities for the 

European sites remain incomplete because MDA and the services have not 

yet made important determinations, such as establishing the criteria that 

must be met before the transfer of specific European missile defense sites 

to the services. MDA has been directed by DOD since 2002 to begin 

planning for the transfer of missile defense elements, including the 

direction to coordinate with the services on resources and personnel 

needed to deliver an effective transition of responsibility. In addition, our 

prior work assessing interagency collaboration has shown that agreedupon roles and responsibilities that clarify who will do what, organize joint 

and individual efforts, and facilitate decision making are important to 

agencies’ abilities to enhance and sustain their collaborative efforts. While 

Page 14 GAO-09-771 Ballistic Missile Defense
 

the Army was designated lead service for the European Interceptor Site in 

October 2006 and the Air Force was designated lead service for the 

European Midcourse Radar Site in August 2007, the specific 

responsibilities related to these roles remain undefined. MDA and the 

services have begun to establish these roles and responsibilities through 

Overarching Memorandums of Agreement, with the purpose to outline the 

general delineation of responsibilities for the ballistic missile defense 

development and ongoing operations and support, as each element 

transitions and transfers from MDA to the services. While the Army and 

MDA completed their Overarching Memorandum of Agreement in January 

2009, negotiations between the Air Force and MDA on their Overarching 

Memorandum of Agreement are ongoing. 

In addition, the Overarching Memorandums of Agreement are expected to 

include element-specific annexes for each of the ballistic missile defense 

elements, including the European Midcourse Radar Site and the GroundBased Midcourse Defense, which will include details on the European 

Interceptor Site. The annexes are expected to specifically state the criteria 

that must be met by MDA before the elements transfer to the Army and the 

Air Force and detail specific roles and responsibilities for each 

organization. Further, the annexes will indicate the extent to which MDA 

will retain control of a missile defense element’s materiel development and 

the services will assume control of the remaining supporting 

responsibilities, such as doctrine, organization, training, leader 

development, personnel, and facilities. However, MDA and the Army and 

Air Force are still negotiating the annexes for the Ground-Based 

Midcourse Defense and the European Midcourse Radar Site and it is 

unclear when these annexes will be complete. As a result, the roles and 

responsibilities specific to the European sites remain undefined because 

MDA and the services have not yet agreed to the terms of transfer that are 

to be established in these annexes. Table 2 shows the status of the 

Overarching Memorandums of Agreement and element-specific annexes 

being negotiated between MDA and the Army and Air Force. 

Page 15 GAO-09-771 Ballistic Missile Defense
 

Table 2: Status of Overarching Memorandums of Agreement and Annexes 

Key agreement MDA/Army MDA/Air Force 

Overarching Memorandum of Agreement Signed by MDA and Secretary of the Army in 

January 2009 

Negotiations ongoing 

Element-specific annex Negotiations ongoing for Ground-Based 

Midcourse Defense Annex, to include details 

on the European Interceptor Site 

Negotiations ongoing for European 

Midcourse Radar Site Annex 

Source: GAO analysis of DOD data. 

Until specific roles and responsibilities for the sites are established and 

key criteria that will guide the transfer of the elements from MDA to the 

Army and Air Force are defined, uncertainty will persist in how the 

European Interceptor Site and the European Midcourse Radar Site will be 

sustained over the long term. The delay in ratification creates an 

opportunity for DOD and MDA to address some of the planning challenges 

DOD faces for the European sites. 

DOD’s initial cost estimates for total military construction and operations 

and support costs for ballistic missile defenses in Europe had significant 

limitations. First, DOD’s fiscal year 2009 military construction estimates 

did not fully account for all costs at the European Interceptor Site and the 

European Midcourse Radar Site and consequently could increase 

significantly. Second, DOD’s operations and support cost estimates are not 

complete and it is unclear how these costs will be funded over the 

elements’ life cycles. Without full information on total military 

construction and operations and support costs for the European missile 

defense sites, DOD and congressional decision makers do not have a 

sound basis on which to evaluate the investment required to implement 

plans for ballistic missile defenses in Europe. 

DOD’s Military 

Construction and 

Operations and 

Support Cost 

Estimates for Ballistic 

Missile Defenses in 

Europe Have 

Limitations and Do 

Not Provide Congress 

Complete Information 

Page 16 GAO-09-771 Ballistic Missile Defense
 

DOD’s initial military construction cost estimates for ballistic missile 

defenses in Europe have significant limitations and restrict Congress’s 

ability to evaluate the investment required to implement plans for ballistic 

missile defenses in Europe. Key principles for cost estimating state that 

complete cost estimates are important in preparing budget submissions 

and for assessing the long-term affordability of a program.10 However, 

DOD’s fiscal year 2009 estimates, the first military construction estimates 

for ballistic missile defenses in Europe, did not fully account for all costs 

at the sites. MDA initially submitted military construction cost estimates 

for the European Interceptor Site and the European Midcourse Radar Site 

to Congress in February 2008 for inclusion in DOD’s fiscal year 2009 

budget. MDA projected that a total of $837.5 million would be required to 

complete site preparation and construction activities at the sites— 

$661.4 million for the interceptor site in Poland and $176.1 million for the 

radar site in the Czech Republic. However, the initial estimates did not 

include all costs primarily because MDA developed and submitted the 

military construction estimate to Congress before key site design work 

had been completed and without an Army Corps of Engineers review of 

the estimate. MDA stated that its approach was based on initial 

congressional authorization to field ballistic missile defense capabilities 

with research, development, testing, and evaluation funds; however, the 

fiscal year 2008 National Defense Authorization Act required that MDA 

begin using military construction funds for ballistic missile defense site 

construction for the fiscal year 2009 budget. 

DOD’s Fiscal Year 2009 

Military Construction Cost 

Estimates Do Not Include 

All Costs 

Military construction regulations stipulate that a military construction 

program should reach the 35 percent design phase, a key construction 

design milestone, and that the Army Corps of Engineers should review the 

military construction estimates before they are submitted to Congress.11

 

10 Key principles for developing accurate and reliable cost estimates are drawn from DOD 

guidance and our Cost Estimating and Assessment Guide. Department of Defense, Office 

of the Secretary of Defense, Cost Analysis Improvement Group, Operating and Support 

Cost-Estimating Guide, and GAO-09-3SP. 

11 Under DOD military construction regulations, the Army Corps of Engineers serves as the 

Army’s construction agent and is typically required to review military construction 

estimates after a military construction program reaches the 35 percent design phase and 

before the estimates are submitted to Congress. The Army is assigned as the construction 

agent for most of Europe, including Poland and Czech Republic. DOD Directive 4270.5, 

Military Construction, para. 3.2; 4.4.1, enc. 1 (Feb. 12, 2005). Further, the DOD Financial 

Management Regulation requires the design of all construction projects be at least 35 

percent complete, or alternatively that a parametric cost estimate based on a 15 percent 

complete design be completed before submission to Congress. DOD 7000.14-R, Military 

Construction/Family Housing Appropriations, vol. 2B, ch. 6, para. 060301.B.2 (July 2008). 

Page 17 GAO-09-771 Ballistic Missile Defense
 

However, MDA, asserting that it had statutory authority enacted by 

Congress to field initial ballistic missile defense capabilities with research, 

development, testing, and evaluation funds, developed and submitted its 

fiscal year 2009 military construction estimates without following 

traditional military construction requirements. MDA officials told us that 

MDA, in an effort to meet budget and construction timelines, developed 

and submitted its initial military construction estimates to Congress 

without completing key site design work. Army Corps of Engineers 

officials—although not involved in the development of the initial fiscal 

year 2009 military construction estimates—reaffirmed that the initial 

estimates were done without completing key site design work and that 

MDA based its estimates on assumptions and previous design experience 

from Fort Greely and other overseas operations, such as Shariki, Japan, 

rather than design data from the European sites, and did not have 

complete and accurate information about the sites when it submitted its 

estimates to Congress for the 2009 budget. For example, the initial figures 

overestimated the availability of local resources at both sites, such as local 

power supply, water and wastewater treatment facilities, and emergency 

support services. Army Corps of Engineers officials said that the Corps did 

not have the opportunity to provide input to or independently review 

MDA’s initial military construction estimates before they were submitted, 

as would typically be required under DOD military construction 

regulations. MDA’s initial military construction estimates were submitted 

in February 2008, but the Corps did not begin providing input to the design 

for the European Midcourse Radar Site and the European Interceptor Site 

until after it was issued design directives for the sites in September and 

October 2008, respectively. An Army Corps of Engineers official told us 

that the Corps has since made significant input to MDA’s military 

construction estimates and has worked with MDA to refine the cost 

estimates based on updated data. However, an Army Corps of Engineers 

official stated that had the Corps been involved in the early planning and 

development of the military construction cost estimates for the sites, given 

its experience and prior work in Eastern Europe, the Corps may have been 

able to influence the initial military construction estimates. According to 

this official, the Corps would have likely recommended that more studies 

of the sites be performed, and subsequently, more actual data from the site 

studies would have been used to influence the estimates before they were 

submitted to Congress for the fiscal year 2009 budget. 

Additionally, DOD’s initial military construction estimates for the 

interceptor and radar sites do not include Army and Air Force base 

operating support costs, such as military personnel housing. The Army, as 

the lead service designated to operate the European Interceptor Site, has 

Page 18 GAO-09-771 Ballistic Missile Defense
 

begun planning for base operating support facilities and estimates that it 

will need $88 million in military construction funds to build the facilities 

that it requires for the Army personnel who are expected to be at the site. 

However, the Army’s estimated facility and personnel requirements are 

based on assumptions that may change. For example, the estimate 

assumes that Poland, the host nation, will contribute military personnel 

for security at the interceptor site, even though the United States and 

Poland have not yet agreed on Poland’s security personnel contribution. 

The implementing arrangements to be negotiated between the United 

States and Poland will determine the number of security personnel that 

Poland will contribute to the site, and this, in turn, will drive the Army’s 

personnel and facility requirements at the site. Until these implementing 

arrangements are negotiated and Army personnel determinations are 

finalized, Army base support construction estimates for the interceptor 

site will be based on assumed host nation contributions for security and 

the total Army military construction requirements at the European 

Interceptor Site will not be confirmed. 

Conversely, the Air Force, as the lead service for the European Midcourse 

Radar Site, has not yet developed any military construction estimates for 

base support facilities at the site. Air Force officials have acknowledged 

that the Air Force will require, at a minimum, dining facilities; some form 

of military housing; and morale, welfare, and recreation services at the 

radar site to support Air Force personnel, but the Air Force has not yet 

determined its total base support facility requirements because Air Force 

personnel requirements are not finalized. The Air Force is anticipating that 

the Czech Republic will contribute personnel to assist the United States in 

providing security at the site, but it is unclear how many personnel the 

Czech government will provide. The implementing arrangements that will 

be negotiated between the United States and the Czech Republic are 

expected to determine the number of security personnel that the Czech 

Republic will contribute to the site, which will drive the Air Force’s 

personnel and facility requirements at the site. Accordingly, the total Air 

Force military construction requirements at the European Midcourse 

Radar Site will not be confirmed until the implementing arrangements are 

negotiated and the Air Force personnel concept is finalized. Until that 

point, a DOD official stated that any Air Force base support construction 

estimates for the radar site will be based on assumed host nation 

contributions for security. As a result, DOD’s current military construction 

cost estimates for base support facilities at the European missile defense 

sites should be considered preliminary. 

Page 19 GAO-09-771 Ballistic Missile Defense
 

Another military construction cost that has not been included in the initial 

estimates is the cost to protect the European Midcourse Radar Site against 

a possible high-altitude electromagnetic pulse event. The Air Force 

believes that protection of the radar against a high-altitude 

electromagnetic pulse event is important to ensuring survivability of the 

site and has included it as part of its required criteria for transfer. 

However, Air Force officials told us that MDA is not planning to protect 

the site against this type of event and has not accounted for those costs in 

its military construction estimates for the site. MDA and the Air Force 

have not reached agreement on whether the site will include these 

protective measures and, if so, who will pay for them. Air Force officials 

told us that the costs to protect the site could increase the total military 

construction cost for the radar mission facilities by 10 to 20 percent if the 

protective steps are included in the design phase and construction of the 

radar. If the protective action is done after the radar site has been 

constructed, the cost could be much higher. 

Further, MDA did not account for foreign currency fluctuations in its 

estimates. Unfavorable currency exchange rate fluctuations could increase 

the total cost of construction as military construction funds will be 

obligated in U.S. dollars and site preparation and construction contracts 

will be awarded in euros. Although it is possible that currency fluctuations 

could occur in DOD’s favor, an Army Corps of Engineers official estimated 

that an additional 20 percent of the total military construction cost 

estimate should be set aside for possible currency fluctuations. Without 

accounting for possible changes in the exchange rate, DOD risks 

exceeding its budgeted military construction funds if currency rates 

fluctuate unfavorably. 

As a result of the above limitations, DOD’s projected military construction 

costs for the European Interceptor Site and the European Midcourse 

Radar Site are expected to increase significantly from DOD’s original 

$837.5 million estimate in the fiscal year 2009 budget. In May 2009, an 

Army Corps of Engineers official told us that after analyzing design data, 

the Corps recommended that MDA increase its military construction 

estimates for the European sites to almost $1.2 billion—$803 million for 

the European Interceptor Site and $369 million for the European 

Midcourse Radar Site. Whether MDA will accept this recommendation and 

the extent to which total military construction cost estimates at the 

European sites will increase remains unclear. Despite the expected 

increase in projected military construction costs, MDA has not provided 

Congress updated military construction estimates since the initial 

estimates were submitted for the fiscal year 2009 budget in February 2008. 

Page 20 GAO-09-771 Ballistic Missile Defense
 

Without complete information on the total military construction costs for 

the European missile defense sites, DOD and congressional decision 

makers do not have a sound basis on which to evaluate the investment 

required to implement plans for ballistic missile defenses in Europe or the 

extent to which those plans could divert resources from other national 

security priorities. 

MDA was appropriated $151.1 million in military construction funds for 

fiscal year 2009—$42.6 million for the European Interceptor Site and 

$108.5 million for the European Midcourse Radar Site. However, MDA will 

likely be unable to obligate any of these appropriated funds in fiscal year 

2009 for site activation or military construction activities at the interceptor 

and radar sites as key bilateral agreements have not been ratified by the 

Polish and Czech parliaments. Moreover, the future of the sites is pending 

the outcome of the ongoing DOD review of plans for ballistic missile 

defense. According to MDA officials, MDA plans to request DOD and 

congressional authority to reprogram $50 million to $80 million of the 

$151 million to use for planning and design efforts at the European missile 

defense sites, but as of June 2009, no formal action had been taken.12

However, MDA plans to retain the residual military construction funds—

an estimated $70 million to $100 million—to preserve DOD’s options for 

potential construction at those sites as the schedule for construction is 

determined. 

 

12 According to officials in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, Comptroller, in order to 

reprogram appropriated military construction funds for planning and design efforts, the 

MDA Executive Director must first send a formal request letter to the Office of the 

Secretary of Defense to reprogram the military construction funds to planning and design 

funds. After the request letter is received, the Office of the Secretary of Defense notifies the 

Office of Management and Budget and the request is reviewed. If the request is approved 

by the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Office of Management and Budget, 

appropriate congressional committees must also approve the request to reprogram the 

military construction funds to planning and design funds. 

Page 21 GAO-09-771 Ballistic Missile Defense
 

DOD’s operations and support cost estimates for ballistic missile defenses 

in Europe are not complete because they do not include operations and 

support costs for base operations managed by the Army and Air Force. 

While MDA has estimated the operations and support costs it will need for 

the interceptors and radar—an estimated $612 million in the 2008-2013 

Future Years Defense Program—this estimate does not include funds that 

the services may require to provide basing and support of the sites, such as 

facilities support, housing costs, and administration. Additionally, MDA 

and the Army and Air Force have not yet determined the full extent of 

these operations and support costs. Although MDA and the Army and Air 

Force have initiated the development of total operations and support cost 

estimates for the interceptor and radar sites, these estimates are not yet 

complete as key cost factors that will affect those estimates remain 

undefined. For example, the total number and distribution of U.S. military 

personnel, civilian contractors, and host nation-contributed military 

personnel that will be required to operate, support, and secure the sites 

will drive total operations and support costs, but has not yet been 

determined. These determinations depend on the number of personnel 

that Poland and the Czech Republic will contribute for security at the 

sites, to be negotiated as part of the implementing arrangements. Without 

complete information on the true costs of operating and supporting the 

European sites, the usefulness of information regarding those sites in 

DOD’s Future Years Defense Program for congressional decision makers 

will be limited. 

DOD’s Operations and 

Support Cost Estimates for 

Ballistic Missile Defenses 

in Europe Are Not 

Complete, and It Is 

Unclear How These Costs 

Will Be Funded over the 

Long Term 

Moreover, MDA and the Army and Air Force have not yet agreed on how 

the operations and support costs for the European Interceptor Site and the 

European Midcourse Radar Site will be funded over the elements’ life 

cycles or who will pay for these costs. As we have previously reported, 

operations and support costs are typically over 70 percent of a system’s 

total lifetime cost.13 Therefore, the future costs to operate and support the 

European sites over their lifetimes could reach billions of dollars. In 

September 2008, we reported that MDA and the services had not yet 

agreed on which organization(s) will be responsible for funding operations 

and support costs for the European Interceptor Site and the European 

Midcourse Radar Site after fiscal year 2013 and over the elements’ life 

cycles.14 Although MDA and the Army have agreed on the overarching 

terms and conditions for the transition and transfer of elements from MDA 

 

13 GAO-08-1068. 

14 GAO-08-1068. 

Page 22 GAO-09-771 Ballistic Missile Defense
 

to the Army, this agreement does not provide specific details on how 

operations and support costs will be funded following transfer of the 

European Interceptor Site. For the European Midcourse Radar Site, the 

Air Force and MDA are drafting an agreement that will establish, among 

other things, which organization(s) will have funding responsibilities for 

the radar, but it is unclear when this agreement will be complete. 

As part of DOD’s ballistic missile defense life cycle management process 

established in September 2008, DOD intends to pay for ballistic missile 

defense costs, including operations and support costs, other than those 

already agreed to be paid by the services, through defensewide accounts. 

In theory, these defensewide accounts would allow all ballistic missile 

defense costs to be clearly identified and would alleviate the pressure on 

the services’ budgets to fund operations and support for ballistic missile 

defense programs. However, MDA and the services have not yet 

determined the amount and duration of funding for the individual ballistic 

missile defense elements, such as the European Interceptor Site and the 

European Midcourse Radar Site, that will come from the defensewide 

accounts and there are disagreements about what costs should be covered 

by these accounts. For example, according to Air Force officials, the Air 

Force position is that the defensewide accounts should cover all costs for 

the radar over its life cycle, whereas MDA officials told us that all Army 

and Air Force base operating support requirements related to the missile 

defense sites in Europe should be paid for by the services. Until MDA and 

the Army and Air Force determine which organization(s) will be 

responsible for funding European missile defense operations over the life 

cycles of those elements, these costs will not be reflected in the Future 

Years Defense Program. As a result, DOD and congressional decision 

makers will have difficulty assessing the affordability of the plans for 

missile defenses in Europe over time and uncertainty will persist regarding 

how these elements will be supported over the long term. 

DOD has made progress in planning for the implementation of the 

proposed ballistic missile defense sites in Europe. However, the future of 

the sites is currently unclear and largely depends on the outcome of DOD’s 

ongoing review of the ballistic missile defense program. This has, in turn, 

limited the willingness of Poland and the Czech Republic to complete and 

ratify necessary agreements with the United States. The delays in 

ratification of key agreements with Poland and the Czech Republic, 

however, create an opportunity to consider how MDA and the Army and 

Air Force should collaborate in the implementation of ballistic missile 

defenses in Europe and the future operations of the European Interceptor 

Conclusions 

Page 23 GAO-09-771 Ballistic Missile Defense
 

Site and the European Midcourse Radar Site. An opportunity now exists to 

more clearly define roles and responsibilities for the sites as well as 

establish key criteria that will guide the transition and transfer of the 

elements from MDA to the Army and Air Force. Planning for transition and 

transfer of the ballistic missile defense elements from MDA to the military 

services has been a persistent challenge that has hindered DOD’s ability to 

plan for the long-term support of the system. Without agreement on how 

the elements will transfer and clear definitions of the roles that MDA and 

the services will be responsible for, DOD will continue to face difficulties 

in determining how the European Interceptor Site and the European 

Midcourse Radar Site will be sustained in the near and long term. 

These sites will require a significant investment, but DOD has not yet 

provided Congress with an updated estimate of the costs for European 

ballistic missile defenses, restricting its ability to prepare for and weigh 

the trade-offs of a proposal that will likely cost billions of dollars over the 

long term. To date, MDA has not assessed the full costs of the sites, to 

include not only mission-related costs incurred by MDA over the long 

term, but also some base operating support costs that may be borne by the 

services. Given the program’s limited information on costs to date, 

potential increases in military construction costs, and other uncertainty 

surrounding future costs, such as the extent of host nation contributions 

to security, as the new administration considers its position on missile 

defenses full information on the true cost of the European missile defense 

sites is increasingly important for decision makers as they evaluate policy 

options. It is therefore critical that congressional decision makers are 

regularly provided complete cost information with which to evaluate 

budget requests in the near term and future to determine whether fielding 

plans are affordable over the long term. Until DOD develops accurate, 

realistic, and complete cost estimates for military construction and 

operations and support for ballistic missile defenses in Europe, the 

credibility of its budget submissions will continue to be a concern. 

Moreover, until MDA and the Army and Air Force reach agreement on how 

missile defense operations and support costs for the European Interceptor 

Site and the European Midcourse Radar Site will be funded over the long 

term, DOD risks that the services may not be financially prepared to 

operate and support these elements. 

We recommend that the Secretary of Defense take the following five 

actions: Recommendations for 

Executive Action 

Page 24 GAO-09-771 Ballistic Missile Defense
 

• To improve planning for the long-term support of the ballistic missile 

defense sites in Europe, direct MDA, the Army, and the Air Force to 

finalize the Overarching Memorandums of Agreement and elementspecific annexes that detail the specific roles and responsibilities for 

the European sites and define the criteria that must be met before the 

transfer of those sites from MDA to the Army and Air Force. 

• To provide for military construction cost estimates for ballistic missile 

defenses in Europe that are based on the best available data, direct 

MDA, in coordination with the Army and Air Force, to provide 

Congress annually, in alignment with the budget, updated military 

construction cost estimates for the European Interceptor Site and the 

European Midcourse Radar Site that reflect the data gathered from all 

site design efforts since project initiation; have been independently 

reviewed and verified by the Army Corps of Engineers; account for all 

military construction costs for the sites, including Army and Air Force 

base support facility requirements, recognizing that certain 

assumptions about host nation contributions will have to be made; and 

include costs for possible currency fluctuations. 

• To provide for more complete military construction estimates for 

future ballistic missile defense sites, such as the still-to-be-determined 

European site for the mobile radar system, direct MDA to follow 

military construction regulations by utilizing the Army Corps of 

Engineers to complete required site design and analysis and verify 

military construction cost estimates before submitting cost estimates 

to Congress. 

• To improve fiscal stewardship of DOD resources for ballistic missile 

defense, direct MDA and the Army and Air Force, in time for the fiscal 

year 2011 budget submission, to 

• complete life cycle operations and support cost estimates 

for the European Interceptor Site and the European 

Midcourse Radar Site and 

• clearly define who is responsible for funding these 

operations and support costs over the elements’ life cycles. 

In written comments on a draft of this report, DOD concurred with three 

and partially concurred with two of our recommended actions. The 

department’s comments are reprinted in appendix II. DOD also provided 

technical comments, which we have incorporated as appropriate. 

Agency Comments 

and Our Evaluation 

DOD concurred with our recommendation that MDA, the Army, and the 

Air Force finalize the Overarching Memorandums of Agreement and 

Page 25 GAO-09-771 Ballistic Missile Defense
 

element-specific annexes that detail the specific roles and responsibilities 

for the European sites and define the criteria that must be met before the 

transfer of those sites from MDA to the Army and Air Force. In its 

comments, DOD stated that the element-specific Army annexes are in 

coordination for estimated completion in calendar year 2009 and the Air 

Force Overarching Memorandum of Agreement is expected to be signed 

by the end of calendar year 2009. We believe these are positive steps. As 

noted in our report, we believe that an opportunity exists for DOD to 

clearly define roles and responsibilities for the sites as well as establish 

key criteria that will guide the transition and transfer of the elements from 

MDA to the Army and Air Force. Since the element-specific annexes are 

expected to specifically state the criteria that must be met by MDA before 

the elements transfer to the Army and the Air Force and detail specific 

roles and responsibilities for each organization, it is important for DOD to 

meet its estimated dates to finalize the Army annexes and complete the 

MDA-Air Force Overarching Memorandum of Agreement, and further, to 

negotiate Air Force element-specific annexes to ensure that the crucial 

details that will guide the long-term support of the European sites are 

clearly defined. Until MDA and the Army and Air Force reach agreement 

on how these elements will transfer, DOD will continue to face difficulties 

in determining how the European Interceptor Site and the European 

Midcourse Radar Site will be sustained in the near and long term. 

DOD concurred with both of our recommendations to improve military 

construction cost estimates for ballistic missile defense sites. DOD 

concurred with our recommendation that MDA provide Congress annually 

updated military construction cost estimates for the European Interceptor 

Site and the European Midcourse Radar Site. DOD stated that the BMDS 

Life Cycle Management Process and the associated BMDS Portfolio 

provide an opportunity for MDA, the Army, and the Air Force to integrate 

military construction cost estimates. DOD noted that the BMDS military 

construction projects and associated estimates will continue to be 

coordinated with the Army Corps of Engineers for certification, 

independent cost estimating, and reviews for scope completeness and 

technical sufficiency. Furthermore, DOD stated that Army and Air Force 

base support facility requirements will be planned, programmed, 

budgeted, and executed by the services and will not be included in MDA’s 

BMDS Portfolio. Rather, DOD stated that the budgets for these sites will 

be collated and provided by the Office of the Secretary of Defense from 

the coordinated requirements submitted by MDA, the Army, and the Air 

Force. However, until the BMDS Life Cycle Management Process and the 

BMDS Portfolio are fully implemented, it is unclear whether they will 

facilitate improved military construction estimates for the European sites. 

Page 26 GAO-09-771 Ballistic Missile Defense
 

Further, DOD did not set a date by which it would annually provide 

Congress updated military construction estimates for the sites. Our report 

explains the importance of providing complete BMDS military 

construction cost information to congressional and DOD decision makers 

on a regular basis, which is the impetus for this recommendation. Also, 

DOD concurred with our recommendation that for future ballistic missile 

defense sites, MDA follow military construction regulations by utilizing the 

Army Corps of Engineers to complete required site design and analysis 

and verify military construction estimates before submitting cost estimates 

to Congress. In its comments, DOD stated that it is MDA’s policy to follow 

appropriate regulations in execution of design and construction of BMDS 

sites and that MDA recognizes the Army Corps of Engineers as the DOD 

military construction agent for these projects, will follow military 

construction policy, and will remain responsive to DOD direction in 

deploying BMDS assets. 

DOD partially concurred with our two recommendations to improve fiscal 

stewardship of DOD’s operations and support resources. DOD partially 

concurred with our recommendation that MDA and the Army and Air 

Force complete life cycle operations and support cost estimates for the 

European Interceptor Site and the European Midcourse Radar Site in time 

for the fiscal year 2011 budget submission. In its comments, DOD stated 

that MDA will not be able to complete these cost estimates before the 

fiscal year 2011 budget submission, but that MDA will include available 

information on life cycle operations and support cost estimates in the 

fiscal year 2012 submission. DOD noted that information needed to 

complete a life cycle cost analysis will not be available until host nation 

ratifications are signed, site design is complete, and administration policy 

is set. While we understand the limitations that DOD faces in developing 

complete operations and support cost estimates before all of the details of 

the sites have been finalized, we continue to believe that it is crucially 

important for congressional decision makers to have the most up-to-date 

information on the long-term costs of the sites in order to assess the 

affordability of the proposed ballistic missile defenses in Europe. We 

continue to believe the recommendation is valid for MDA, the Army, and 

the Air Force to provide estimates of all known operations and support 

costs for the sites in the 2011 budget. DOD also partially concurred with 

our recommendation that MDA and the Army and Air Force clearly define 

who is responsible for funding operations and support costs over the 

elements’ life cycles in time for the fiscal year 2011 budget submission. 

DOD noted that MDA will continue to work with the Army and Air Force 

to define responsibility for future operations and support cost funding, and 

reiterated that the Overarching Memorandums of Agreement between the 

Page 27 GAO-09-771 Ballistic Missile Defense
 

lead services and MDA, which define responsibility for life cycle costs, 

have not yet been finalized. Determining responsibility for the long-term 

operations and support costs of the BMDS elements has been a persistent 

challenge for DOD and until MDA and the Army and Air Force determine 

which organization(s) will be responsible for funding European missile 

defense operations over the life cycles of those elements, these costs will 

not be fully reflected in DOD’s Future Years Defense Program and DOD 

risks that the services may not be financially prepared to operate and 

support these elements. 

We are sending copies of this report to the Secretary of Defense; the 

Director, Missile Defense Agency; the Under Secretary of Defense for 

Acquisition, Technology and Logistics; and other interested parties. The 

report also is available at no charge on the GAO Web site at 

http://www.gao.gov. 

If you or your staff members have any questions about this report, please 

contact me at (404) 679-1816 or pendletonj@gao.gov. Contact points for 

our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on 

the last page of this report. Key contributors to this report are listed in 

John H. Pendl

appendix III. 

eton 

Director, Defense Capabilities and Management 

Page 28 GAO-09-771 Ballistic Missile Defense
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology Appendix I: Scope and Methodology 

To determine the extent to which the Department of Defense (DOD) has 

planned for the initial implementation of ballistic missile defenses in 

Europe, including coordination with key international partners and U.S. 

stakeholders, we conducted site visits, reviewed key documentation, and 

interviewed relevant DOD, State Department, and host nation officials. 

During this review, we focused on the European Interceptor Site in 

Poland, the European Midcourse Radar Site in the Czech Republic, and the 

planned mobile forward-based radar to be fielded in a still-to-bedetermined location. We conducted site visits and toured the base located 

outside of Slupsk, Poland, that is the proposed European Interceptor Site 

and the Brdy military training area, which is the proposed location of the 

European Radar Site. We met with DOD, State Department, and host 

nation officials to discuss the efforts under way to plan for the sites and 

examined key documents, including ballistic missile defense agreements 

with the host nations, memorandums of agreement between key U.S. 

stakeholders, and Missile Defense Agency (MDA), Army, Air Force, and 

Army Corps of Engineers documents for planning and site preparation. 

Using GAO key principles for management, we evaluated the collaboration 

efforts among the agencies to determine whether DOD, Army, Air Force, 

and State Department officials followed key practices that can help 

agencies enhance and sustain their collaborative efforts to determine what 

aspects of planning may be missing that would hinder the implementation 

of ballistic missile defenses in Europe.1

 For both objectives, we reviewed 

key legislation related to ballistic missile defenses in Europe2

 and DOD’s 

overall approach for preparing to support ballistic missile defense. 

During our review of the ballistic missile defenses in Europe, GAO 

contacted agency officials at the Office of the Secretary of Defense; the 

State Department; the Joint Staff; U.S. Strategic Command; U.S. Northern 

Command; U.S. European Command; U.S. Army Europe; U.S. Air Force 

Europe; MDA; the Department of the Army; Army Space and Missile 

Defense Command; the Department of the Air Force; Air Force Space 

Command; U.S. Embassy Warsaw; U.S. Embassy Prague; the U.S. Mission 

 

1

 GAO, Results-Oriented Government: Practices That Can Help Enhance and Sustain 

Collaboration among Federal Agencies, GAO-06-15 (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 21, 2005). 

2

 National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-181, § 226 (2008); 

Duncan Hunter National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2009, Pub. L. No. 110-

417, § 233 (2008); and Consolidated Security, Disaster Assistance, and Continuing 

Appropriations Act, 2009, Pub. L. No. 110-329, Div. E, Title I (2008). 

Page 29 GAO-09-771 Ballistic Missile Defense 
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology 

to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization; the European Interceptor Site in 

Poland; and the European Midcourse Radar Site in the Czech Republic. 

To assess whether DOD has estimated the total costs, including military 

construction and long-term support costs for the ballistic missile defenses 

in Europe, we examined budget documents, including DOD’s fiscal year 

2009 Future Years Defense Program (including budget data for fiscal years 

2008-2013), MDA’s fiscal year 2009 military construction cost estimates, 

and the Army’s military construction cost estimates. We reviewed DOD 

policies related to estimating military construction costs and key 

principles for cost estimating as well as our best practices for developing 

and managing capital program costs.3

 We interviewed DOD officials to 

determine how the cost estimates were developed. We discussed the 

status of military construction cost estimates with officials from MDA, the 

Army, and the Army Corps of Engineers-Europe District. We also 

interviewed Air Force officials to determine whether military construction 

cost estimates had been developed for the radar site. In addition, to 

determine whether DOD has estimated long-term operations and support 

costs for ballistic missile defenses in Europe, we assessed key documents, 

such as the Ballistic Missile Defense Life Cycle Management Process 

memo and the Army’s Ballistic Missile Defense System Overarching 

Memorandum of Agreement with MDA, to determine the extent to which 

MDA and the Army have agreed to fund operations and support costs for 

ballistic missile defenses in Europe and confirmed our understanding with 

MDA and the Army. We interviewed Air Force officials to determine 

whether long-term operations and support cost estimates had been 

developed and the extent to which MDA and the Air Force have agreed to 

fund operations and support costs for ballistic missile defenses in Europe. 

We discussed our findings with officials from the Office of the Under 

Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics; MDA; the 

Army; and the Air Force. 

We conducted this performance audit from October 2008 to August 2009 in 

accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those 

 

3

 DOD Directive 4270.5, Military Construction (Washington, D.C., Feb. 12, 2005); Army 

Regulation 420-1, Facilities Engineering: Army Facilities Management (Washington, 

D.C., Feb. 12, 2008); Unified Facilities Criteria 3-700-01A, Programming Cost Estimates for 

Military Construction (Washington, D.C., Mar. 1, 2005); Unified Facilities Criteria 3-700-

02A, Construction Cost Estimates (Washington, D.C., Mar. 1, 2005); Unified Facilities 

Criteria 3-701-07, DOD Facilities Pricing Guide (Washington, D.C., July 2, 2007); and GAO, 

GAO Cost Estimating and Assessment Guide: Best Practices for Developing and 

Managing Capital Program Costs, GAO-09-3SP (Washington, D.C.: March 2009). 

Page 30 GAO-09-771 Ballistic Missile Defense
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology 

standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, 

appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and 

conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence 

obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions 

based on our audit objectives. 

Page 31 GAO-09-771 Ballistic Missile Defense
Appendix II: Comments from the Department Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense 

of Defense 

 Page 32 GAO-09-771 Ballistic Missile Defense 
Appendix II: Comments from the Department 

of Defense 

 Page 33 GAO-09-771 Ballistic Missile Defense
Appendix II: Comments from the Department 

of Defense 

 Page 34 GAO-09-771 Ballistic Missile Defense
Appendix II: Comments from the Department 

of Defense 

 Page 35 GAO-09-771 Ballistic Missile Defense
Appendix III: GAO

A

 Contact and Staff 

cknowledgments 

Page 36 GAO-09-771 

Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff 

Acknowledgments 

John H. Pendleton, (404) 679-1816 or pendletonj@gao.gov GAO Contact 

In addition to the contact named above, Marie A. Mak, Assistant Director; 

Pat L Bohan; Tara Copp Connolly; Susan C. Ditto; and Kasea L. Hamar 

made key contributions to this report. 

Acknowledgments 

 Ballistic Missile Defense 
Related GAO Products Related GAO Products 

Defense Management: Key Challenges Should be Addressed When 

Considering Changes to Missile Defense Agency’s Roles and Missions. 

GAO-09-466T. Washington, D.C.: March 26, 2009. 

Defense Acquisitions: Production and Fielding of Missile Defense 

Components Continue with Less Testing and Validation Than Planned. 

GAO-09-338. Washington, D.C.: March 13, 2009. 

GAO Cost Estimating and Assessment Guide: Best Practices for 

Developing and Managing Capital Program Costs. GAO-09-3SP. 

Washington, D.C.: March 2009. 

Missile Defense: Actions Needed to Improve Planning and Cost 

Estimates for Long-Term Support of Ballistic Missile Defense. 

GAO-08-1068. Washington, D.C.: September 25, 2008. 

Ballistic Missile Defense: Actions Needed to Improve the Process for 

Identifying and Addressing Combatant Command Priorities. 

GAO-08-740. Washington, D.C.: July 31, 2008. 

Defense Acquisitions: Progress Made in Fielding Missile Defense, but 

Program Is Short of Meeting Goals. GAO-08-448. Washington, D.C.: 

March 14, 2008. 

Defense Acquisitions: Missile Defense Agency’s Flexibility Reduces 

Transparency of Program Cost. GAO-07-799T. Washington, D.C.: April 30, 

2007. 

Missile Defense: Actions Needed to Improve Information for Supporting 

Future Key Decisions for Boost and Ascent Phase Elements. GAO-07-430. 

Washington, D.C.: April 17, 2007. 

Defense Acquisitions: Missile Defense Needs a Better Balance between 

Flexibility and Accountability. GAO-07-727T. Washington, D.C.: April 11, 

2007. 

Defense Acquisitions: Missile Defense Acquisition Strategy Generates 

Results but Delivers Less at a Higher Cost. GAO-07-387. Washington, D.C.: 

March 15, 2007. 

Defense Management: Actions Needed to Improve Operational Planning 

and Visibility of Costs for Ballistic Missile Defense. GAO-06-473. 

Washington, D.C.: May 31, 2006. 

Page 37 GAO-09-771 Ballistic Missile Defense
Related GAO Products 

Defense Acquisitions: Missile Defense Agency Fields Initial Capability 

but Falls Short of Original Goals. GAO-06-327. Washington, D.C.: 

March 15, 2006. 

Defense Acquisitions: Actions Needed to Ensure Adequate Funding for 

Operation and Sustainment of the Ballistic Missile Defense System. 

GAO-05-817. Washington, D.C.: September 6, 2005. 

Military Transformation: Actions Needed by DOD to More Clearly 

Identify New Triad Spending and Develop a Long-term Investment 

Approach. GAO-05-962R. Washington, D.C.: August 4, 2005. 

Military Transformation: Actions Needed by DOD to More Clearly 

Identify New Triad Spending and Develop a Long-term Investment 

Approach. GAO-05-540. Washington, D.C.: June 30, 2005. 

Defense Acquisitions: Status of Ballistic Missile Defense Program in 

2004. GAO-05-243. Washington, D.C.: March 31, 2005. 

Future Years Defense Program: Actions Needed to Improve 

Transparency of DOD’s Projected Resource Needs. GAO-04-514. 

Washington, D.C.: May 7, 2004. 

Missile Defense: Actions Are Needed to Enhance Testing and 

Accountability. GAO-04-409. Washington, D.C.: April 23, 2004. 

Missile Defense: Actions Being Taken to Address Testing 

Recommendations, but Updated Assessment Needed. GAO-04-254. 

Washington, D.C.: February 26, 2004. 

Missile Defense: Additional Knowledge Needed in Developing System 

for Intercepting Long-Range Missiles. GAO-03-600. Washington, D.C.: 

August 21, 2003. 

Missile Defense: Alternate Approaches to Space Tracking and 

Surveillance System Need to Be Considered. GAO-03-597. Washington, 

D.C.: May 23, 2003. 

Missile Defense: Knowledge-Based Practices Are Being Adopted, but 

Risks Remain. GAO-03-441. Washington, D.C.: April 30, 2003. 

Page 38 GAO-09-771 Ballistic Missile Defense
Related GAO Products 

Missile Defense: Knowledge-Based Decision Making Needed to Reduce 

Risks in Developing Airborne Laser. GAO-02-631. Washington, D.C.: 

July 12, 2002. 

Missile Defense: Review of Results and Limitations of an Early National 

Missile Defense Flight Test. GAO-02-124. Washington, D.C.: February 28, 

2002. 

Missile Defense: Cost Increases Call for Analysis of How Many New 

Patriot Missiles to Buy. GAO/NSIAD-00-153. Washington, D.C.: June 29, 

2000. 

Missile Defense: Schedule for Navy Theater Wide Program Should Be 

Revised to Reduce Risk. GAO/NSIAD-00-121. Washington, D.C.: May 31, 

2000. 

(351279) Page 39 GAO-09-771 Ballistic Missile Defense
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