alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
EXHIBIT 32.1

           CERTIFICATIONS PURSUANT TO SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934
                         RULE 13a-14(b) OR 15d-14(b) AND
                             18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
                             AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002


In connection  with the transition  report of Petrogen Corp.  (the "Company") on
Form 10-KSB for the period ended December 31, 2003, as filed with the Securities
and Exchange  Commission on the date hereof (the  "Report"),  Sacha H. Spindler,
Chief Executive Officer and acting Chief Financial  Officer of the Company,  and
Leo William  Kerrigan,  Executive Vice President of the Company,  each certifies
for the  purpose of  complying  with Rule  13a-14(b)  or Rule  15d-14(b)  of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the "Exchange Act") and Section 1350 of Chapter
63 of Title 18 of the United States Code, that:

     1.  the Report fully  complies  with the  requirements  of Section 13(a) or
         15(d) of the Exchange Act; and
     2.  the  information  contained  in  the  Report  fairly  presents,  in all
         material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of
         the Company.


Dated: April 14, 2005                       By:  /s/ SACHA SPINDLER
                                            ----------------------------------
                                            Sacha H. Spindler, Chief Executive
                                            Officer and Acting Chief Financial
                                            Officer

Dated: April 14, 2005                       By: /s/ L. William Kerrigan
                                            -----------------------------------
                                            L. William Kerrigan, executive Vice
                                            President
Searched for **http://www.cdc.gov/cdctv/healthyliving/healthyeating/plate-full-of-color.html**

 

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Look Up URL in general Internet Archive web collection.
II 

112TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION S. 1829 

To amend the Truth in Lending Act to empower the States to set the 

maximum annual percentage rates applicable to consumer credit transactions, and for other purposes. 

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES 

NOVEMBER 8, 2011 

Mr. WHITEHOUSE (for himself, Mr. LEVIN, Mr. BEGICH, Mr. FRANKEN, Mr. 

REED, Mr. DURBIN, Mr. SANDERS, and Mr. MERKLEY) introduced the 

following bill; which was read twice and referred to the Committee on 

Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs 

A BILL 

To amend the Truth in Lending Act to empower the States 

to set the maximum annual percentage rates applicable 

to consumer credit transactions, and for other purposes. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 

4 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Empowering States’ 

5 Rights To Protect Consumers Act’’. 


smartinez on DSK6TPTVN1PROD with BILLS
2 

•S 1829 IS

1 SEC. 2. LIMITS ON ANNUAL PERCENTAGE RATES. 

2 Chapter 2 of the Truth In Lending Act (15 U.S.C. 

3 1631 et seq.) is amended by adding at the end the fol4 lowing: 

5 ‘‘SEC. 141. LIMITS ON ANNUAL PERCENTAGE RATES. 

6 ‘‘Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the an7 nual percentage rate applicable to any consumer credit 

8 transaction (other than a residential mortgage trans9 action), including any fees associated with such a trans10 action, may not exceed the maximum rate permitted by 

11 the laws of the State in which the consumer resides.’’. 

Æ 


smartinez on DSK6TPTVN1PROD with BILLS
June 9, 2015 

Mr. David D. Speace 

President 

DZP Video/Multimedia, Inc. 

200 Bethlehem Dr. Suite 108 

Morgantown, PA 19543 

Dear Mr. Speace: 

This letter is to inform you that we are unable to process your request for an exemption from 

§§ 21 subpart H; 45.23(b); 61.113(a) and (b); 91.7(a); 91.9(b)(2); 91.103; 91.109; 

91.119(c); 91.121; 91.151(a); 91.203 (a) and (b); 91.405 (a); 91.407 (a) (1); 91.409 (a)(1) and 

(2); 91.417(a) and (b) of Title 14, Code of Federal Regulations (14 CFR). It explains why we 

can not process your request and what you should do in the next 30 days. 

Why We Can Not Process Your Request 

We entered your February 20, 2015, exemption request on behalf of DZP Video/Multimedia, 

Inc. into the public docket (No. FAA-2015-0432), but we are unable to process your request 

any further. The information you sent does not comply with the requirements of § 11.81 

(copy enclosed). For us to consider the request any further, you must send us all of the 

following: 

 The reasons why granting the request would be in the public interest; that is, how it would 

benefit the public as a whole. 

 Any additional information, views, or arguments available to support your request. 

What You Should Do 

If you want us to process your request any further, you must send the information described 

earlier to reach us within 30 days. Please note that § 11.63(d) requires you to send your 

petition for exemption at least 120 days before the proposed effective date of the exemption. 
2 

If We Do Not Hear From You 

If we do not hear from you within 30 days, we will close the docket without notifying you 

further. If you have any questions or require additional time, you may call (202) 267-9677. 

Sincerely, 

/s/ 

Brenda Robeson 

Program Analyst, Airmen and 

 Airspace Rules Division

Enclosure
No. 54370.

#### Anco Import Corp. et al. *v.*United States,

protests 154536-K, etc. (New York).

Opinion by

Oliver, C. J.

Following the authorities cited in Abstract 15400 the court dismissed the protests.
Fourth Court of Appeals

San Antonio, Texas

MEMORANDUM OPINION

No. 04-15-00733-CV

THE CITY OF HELOTES; Tom Schoolcraft, in his capacity as Mayor of Helotes; Rick 

Schroder, in his capacity as Helotes City Administrator; and Ernest Cruz, in his capacity as Head 

of the Helotes Development Services Department,

Appellants

v.

TEXAS ASSOCIATION OF BUILDERS and The Greater San Antonio Builders Association,

Appellees

From the 407th Judicial District Court, Bexar County, Texas

Trial Court No. 2014-CI-07817

Honorable Karen H. Pozza, Judge Presiding

PER CURIAM

Sitting: Sandee Bryan Marion, Chief Justice

Marialyn Barnard, Justice

Luz Elena D. Chapa, Justice

Delivered and Filed: September 7, 2016

APPEAL DISMISSED

On April 29, 2016, appellants filed a motion to abate this appeal pending a determination 

in Town of Lakewood Village v. Bizios, which was, at the time, pending before the Texas Supreme 

Court in cause number 15-0106. Appellee filed a response opposing the abatement. Because one 

or more of the issues pending in the appeal before this court were similar to the issues pending in 

the Bizios appeal, on May 17, 2016, this court granted the motion to abate, withdrew the appeal

from submission, and for administrative purposes treated this appeal as a closed case. On May 27, 
04-15-00733-CV

- 2 -

2016, the Supreme Court issued its opinion in Bizios; and on July 8, 2016, the court issued its 

mandate.

On August 26, 2016, appellants filed an unopposed Motion to Dismiss Appeal in this court. 

The motion is granted. This appeal is hereby reinstated on this court’s docket and the appeal is 

dismissed.

PER CURIAM
# C_2012165EN.01002301.xml

| 9.6.2012 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 165/23 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

9.6.2012

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 165/23

---

Action brought on 19 March 2012 — ActionSportGames v OHIM

(Case T-122/12)

2012/C 165/39

Language in which the application was lodged: Danish

Parties

Parties

Applicant: ActionSportGames A/S (Humlebæk, Denmark) (represented by: W. Rebernik, lawyer)

Applicant:

Defendant: Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade Marks and Designs) (OHIM)

Defendant:

Other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal: FN Herstal SA (Herstal, Belgium)

Other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal:

Form of order sought

Form of order sought

| — | Annul the defendant’s decision of 12 January 2012 in Case R 2096/2010-1; |
| --- | --- |

—

Annul the defendant’s decision of 12 January 2012 in Case R 2096/2010-1;

| — | Uphold the decision of the Opposition Division of 24 September 2010 (Case No B 1 344 904); |
| --- | --- |

—

Uphold the decision of the Opposition Division of 24 September 2010 (Case No B 1 344 904);

| — | Order the defendant to pay the costs. |
| --- | --- |

—

Order the defendant to pay the costs.

Pleas in law and main arguments

Pleas in law and main arguments

Applicant for a Community trade mark: ActionSportGames A/S

Applicant for a Community trade mark:

Community trade mark concerned: Word mark ‘SCAR’ for goods in Class 28 in Community trade mark application No 5 750 054.

Community trade mark concerned:

Proprietor of the mark or sign cited in the opposition proceedings: FN Herstal SA

Proprietor of the mark or sign cited in the opposition proceedings:

Mark or sign cited in opposition: The non-registered Belgian word mark ‘SCAR’ for goods in Classes 13 and 28.

Mark or sign cited in opposition:

Decision of the Opposition Division: Opposition dismissed.

Decision of the Opposition Division:

Decision of the Board of Appeal: Decision of the Opposition Division annulled and case referred back to that division.

Decision of the Board of Appeal:

Pleas in law: The applicant claims that there is no likelihood of confusion between the disputed trade marks, since the goods at issue are fundamentally different because FN Herstal’s goods are made up of proper firearms for military use, whereas the applicant’s goods are replica and toy weapons for sport and play.

Pleas in law:

---
Exhibit
32.1
  CERTIFICATION
 PURSUANT
TO SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002
 18
U.S.C. SECTION 1350
  In
connection with The Sheridan Group, Inc. (the “Company”) Annual Report on Form
10-K for the fiscal year ended December 31, 2008 as filed with the Securities
and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the “Report”), we, John A. Saxton,
President and Chief Executive Officer of the Company, and Robert M. Jakobe, Vice
President and Chief Financial Officer of the Company, certify pursuant to 18
U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act of 2002, that, to the best of our knowledge:
  (1)
              The
      Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of
      the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended;
  and
  (2)
              The
      information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material
      respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the
      Company.
  Date: 
      March 31, 2009
                
                By:
                /s/
      John A. SaxtonJohn
      A. SaxtonPresident
      and Chief Executive OfficerDate: 
      March 31, 2009
                
                By:
                /s/
      Robert M. JakobeRobert
      M. JakobeExecutive
      Vice President and Chief Financial
Officer
  A signed
original of this written statement required by Section 906, or other document
authenticating, acknowledging, or otherwise adopting the signature that appears
in typed form within the electronic version of this written statement required
by Section 906, has been provided to the Company and will be retained by the
Company and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff
upon request.
# C_2012151EN.01002903.xml

| 26.5.2012 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 151/29 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

26.5.2012

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 151/29

---

Action brought on 22 February 2012 — Makhlouf v Council

(Case T-97/12)

2012/C 151/49

Language of the case: French

Parties

Parties

Applicant: Rami Makhlouf (Damas, Syria) (represented by: E. Ruchat, lawyer)

Applicant:

Defendant: Council of the European Union

Defendant:

Form of order sought

Form of order sought

| — | Declare the applicant’s action admissible and well founded; |
| --- | --- |

—

Declare the applicant’s action admissible and well founded;

| — | In consequence, annul Decision 2011/782/CFSP of 1 December 2011 and Regulation (EU) No 36/2012 of 18 January 2012 and their subsequent implementing acts, insofar as they concern the applicant; |
| --- | --- |

—

In consequence, annul Decision 2011/782/CFSP of 1 December 2011 and Regulation (EU) No 36/2012 of 18 January 2012 and their subsequent implementing acts, insofar as they concern the applicant;

| — | Order the Council of the European Union to pay the costs. |
| --- | --- |

—

Order the Council of the European Union to pay the costs.

Pleas in law and main arguments

Pleas in law and main arguments

In support of the action, the applicant relies on three pleas in law which are in essence identical or similar to those relied on in Case T-432/11 Makhlouf v Council. (1)

Makhlouf

Council

1

---

(1)  OJ 2011 C 290, p. 13.

1

---
<TABLE>
<CAPTION>

   Schedule of Year-To-Date Principal and Interest Distributions
                           to
                  Certificateholders

                                                                    Ending
Class            Interest             Principal    Losses           Balance
<S>               <C>                  <C>            <C>           <C>
A               24322561.32     124381385.19                0       377321614.81
B                1565643.03                0                0           25322000
M1               2700731.62                0                0           47584000
M2               1479209.86                0                0           25442000
OC                        0                0        119140.64         5250454.85
R1                        0                0                0                  0
R2                        0                0                0                  0
R3                        0                0                0                  0
R4                        0                0                0                  0


</TABLE>
#### Louis Rait, Plaintiff, *v.*Jacobs Brothers, Defendant.

Supreme Court, Nassau County,

March 16, 1966.

*Morris M. Karp*for defendant. *Yavers S Austern*for plantiff.

Theodore Velsor, J.

This is a motion to vacate service of a summons upon the ground that the court has no personal jurisdiction over the defendant. The application is based upon the dual premise that the defendant is a limited partnership organized and existing under the laws of the State of Now Jersey with principal offices in that State, and does not transact business in this State. Concededly the summons was served in New York upon a general partner of the defendant who resides in New York.

*904This court does not find it necessary to pass upon the sufficiency of the tangential reference contained in paragraph “ 8 ” of the complaint to support the application of the “long-arm statute ” (CPLR 302). The fact that the summons was served upon a general partner of the defendant who resided in New York, in the opinion of this court, is sufficient to- sustain the jurisdiction of the courts of this State over the defendant.

CPLR 503 (subd. [d]) reads in part “A partnership or an individually-owned business shall be deemed a resident of any county in which * * * the partner or individual owner suing or being sued actually resides.”

CPLR 310 provides that “ Personal service upon persons conducting a business as a partnership may be made by personally serving the summons within the state upon any one of them.”

As used above, no particular distinction can be drawn between a limited partnership and a general partnership, and no legislative intent is to be inferred which would accomplish such end. Indeed, the quoted statutes are merely codifications of existing law *(Bulkley*v. *O’Donnell,*148 Misc. 186, affd. 240 App. Div. 929). In *Bulkley (supra)*the court emphatically held that a partnership, notwithstanding that its certificate stated its principal place of business, had no residence distinct from the residences of the partners. This ruling was cited as authority most recently in *New York Cent. R. R. Co.*v. *Lefkowits*(227 N. Y. S. 2d 302).

Nor does it make any difference that the partnership was sued in the partnership name (cf. CPLR 1025; 2 Weinstein-Korn-Miller, N. Y. Civ. Prac., par. 503.11).

Accordingly, in view of the admitted service of the summons in New York, on a general partner of a limited partnership who resides in New York, the motion to vacate service is denied.
No. 50777.

#### Protests 48758-K/89963, etc., of American Machine & Metals, Inc. et al. (Chicago).

Opinion by

Ekwall, J.

In accordance with stipulation of counsel the court found that the facts herein agreed upon were such as to bring the case within the holding in *John Barr*v. *United States*(11 Cust. Ct. 88, C. D. 801), which record was incorporated herein. (See *John Barr*v. *United States,*324 U. S. 83, decided February 5, 1945.) In accordance therewith it was held that the currency of the invoices should be converted at the buying rate in the New York market at noon on the day of exportation (the “free” rate of exchange for pounds sterling), as certified by the Federal Reserve bank and set forth by the collector on each of the entries. The protests were sustained to this extent.
# C_2014112EN.01002902.xml

| 14.4.2014 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 112/29 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

14.4.2014

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 112/29

---

Judgment of the General Court of 5 March 2014 — HP Health Clubs Iberia v OHIM — Shiseido (ZENSATIONS)

(Case T-416/12) (1)

1

((Community trade mark - Opposition proceedings - Application for Community figurative mark ZENSATIONS - Earlier Community word mark ZEN - Relative ground for refusal - Likelihood of confusion - Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation (EC) No 207/2009 - Admissibility of the applicant’s form of order - Article 46 of the Rules of Procedure - Obligation to state reasons - First sentence of Article 75 of Regulation No 207/2009 - Examination of the facts by the Office of its own motion - Article 76(1) of Regulation No 207/2009))

2014/C 112/38

Language of the case: Spanish

Parties

Parties

Applicant: HP Health Clubs Iberia (Barcelona, Spain) (represented by: S. Serrat Viñas, lawyer)

Applicant:

Defendant: Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade Marks and Designs) (represented by: J. Crespo Carillo, Agent)

Defendant:

Intervener in support of the defendant: Shiseido Company Ltd (Tokyo, Japan) (represented by: B. Moreau-Margotin, lawyer)

Re:

Re:

Action brought against the decision of the First Board of Appeal of OHIM of 6 June 2012 (Case R 2212/2010-1) relating to opposition proceedings between Shiseido Company Ltd and HP Health Clubs Iberia S.A.

Operative part of the judgment

Operative part of the judgment

The Court:

| 1. | Dismisses the action. |
| --- | --- |

1.

Dismisses the action.

| 2. | Dismisses the heads of claims of Shiseido Company Ltd other than that essentially seeking the dismissal of the action as manifestly inadmissible. |
| --- | --- |

2.

Dismisses the heads of claims of Shiseido Company Ltd other than that essentially seeking the dismissal of the action as manifestly inadmissible.

| 3. | Orders HP Health Clubs Iberia S.A. to bear its own costs and those incurred by the Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade Marks and Designs) (OHIM.) |
| --- | --- |

3.

Orders HP Health Clubs Iberia S.A. to bear its own costs and those incurred by the Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade Marks and Designs) (OHIM.)

| 4. | Orders Shiseido Company Ltd to bear its own costs. |
| --- | --- |

4.

Orders Shiseido Company Ltd to bear its own costs.

---

(1)  OJ C 355, 17.11.2012.

1

---
# C_2012295EN.01003201.xml

| 29.9.2012 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 295/32 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

29.9.2012

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 295/32

---

Order of the General Court of 6 August 2012 — Makhlouf v Council

(Case T-82/12) (1)

1

2012/C 295/56

Language of the case: French

The President of the Sixth Chamber has ordered that the case be removed from the register.

---

(1)  OJ C 109, 14.4.2012.

1

---
Case Wo. 8,704.

#### McCOBB v. LINDSAY et al.

[2 Cranch, C. C. 215.] 1

Circuit Court, District of Columbia.

Nov. Term, 1820.

Factors — Lien—General Balance — Sale by— Secret Principal — Set-Off.

1. A factor may retain for a general balance due from his principal.

2. If a factor sell in his own name, the vendee cannot set off a claim against the factor’s principal, not yet payable.

Assumpsit for salt sold 16th December, ISIS. It was known that the salt belonged to Henop & Co., of Norfolk, it having been consigned by them, to the plaintiff, for sale. The defendants [Lindsay & Hill] paid half in cash, and premised to pay the balance in ten days to the plaintiff. On the 16th of October, ISIS, the defendants, by their factor at Norfolk, had sold flour to Henop & Co. payable on the 22d of February, 1819; and the plaintiff had, on the 2Sth of November, ISIS, drawn a bill on Henop & Co., payable in sixty days, which they had accepted, but failed before it became payable. The defendants now claimed to set off against the plaintiff’s claim for the balance due for the salt, their claim against Henop & Co. for the amount due for the flour.

Mr. Taylor, for plaintiff.

The plaintiff has a right, at law, to maintain this suit in his own name, and has a right to retain the money, when recovered, as against Henop & Co. A factor has a right to retain for a general balance due from his principal. He has a legal right to recover, and has, at least, equal equity with the defendants.

Mr. Mason, contra.

It makes no difference that the debt of Henop & Co. to the defendants was not payable when the money became payable for the salt. The plaintiff acted as consignee of Henop & Co., and the defendants having possession of the money, have a right to retain it

Mr. Taylor, in reply.

The contract was made with the defendants, by the plaintiff, in his own right. When the money became due from the defendants to the plaintiff, the defendants had no right to retain it; and if the forms of law would then have permitted the plaintiff to obtain judgment, the defendants could not have availed themselves of the set-off.

THE COURT

(THRUSTON, Circuit Judge, absent,)

was of opinion that the defendants

could not set off against the plaintiff, in this action, their claim against Henop & Co.
### D ISTRICT 

### C OURT 

### O F 

### A PPEAL 

### O F 

### T HE 

### S TATE 

### O F 

### F LORIDA

F OURTH D ISTRICT

QUAMAYNE J. JONES

, Appellant,

v.

STATE OF FLORIDA

, Appellee

.

No. 4D 18

- 980

[ August 23, 2018 ]

Appeal of order denying rule 3.850 motion from the Circuit Court for

the Nineteenth Judicial Circuit, St. Lucie County ; Dan L. Vaughn , Judge;

L.T. Case No. 562014CF002551B

.

Quamayne J. Jones, Gainesville, pro se.

No appearance required for appellee.

P ER C URIAM

.

Affirmed.

G ERBER

, C.J., F ORST and K UNTZ

, JJ. CONCUR

.

* * *

Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.