U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE

32–303PDF WASHINGTON : 2018

CHINA’S REPRESSION AND INTERNMENT OF

UYGHURS: U.S. POLICY RESPONSES

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON ASIA AND THE PACIFIC

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED FIFTEENTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

SEPTEMBER 26, 2018

Serial No. 115–164

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs

(

Available: http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/, http://docs.house.gov,

or http://www.Govinfo.gov 

(II)

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

EDWARD R. ROYCE, California, Chairman 

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey 

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida 

DANA ROHRABACHER, California 

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas 

TED POE, Texas 

DARRELL E. ISSA, California 

TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania 

MO BROOKS, Alabama 

PAUL COOK, California 

SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania 

MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina 

TED S. YOHO, Florida 

ADAM KINZINGER, Illinois 

LEE M. ZELDIN, New York 

DANIEL M. DONOVAN, JR., New York 

F. JAMES SENSENBRENNER, JR., 

Wisconsin 

ANN WAGNER, Missouri 

BRIAN J. MAST, Florida 

FRANCIS ROONEY, Florida 

BRIAN K. FITZPATRICK, Pennsylvania 

THOMAS A. GARRETT, JR., Virginia 

JOHN R. CURTIS, Utah 

VACANT 

ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York 

BRAD SHERMAN, California 

GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York 

ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey 

GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia 

THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida 

KAREN BASS, California 

WILLIAM R. KEATING, Massachusetts 

DAVID N. CICILLINE, Rhode Island 

AMI BERA, California 

LOIS FRANKEL, Florida 

TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii 

JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas 

ROBIN L. KELLY, Illinois 

BRENDAN F. BOYLE, Pennsylvania 

DINA TITUS, Nevada 

NORMA J. TORRES, California 

BRADLEY SCOTT SCHNEIDER, Illinois 

THOMAS R. SUOZZI, New York 

ADRIANO ESPAILLAT, New York 

TED LIEU, California

AMY PORTER, Chief of Staff THOMAS SHEEHY, Staff Director

JASON STEINBAUM, Democratic Staff Director 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON ASIA AND THE PACIFIC

TED S. YOHO, Florida, Chairman 

DANA ROHRABACHER, California 

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio 

TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania 

MO BROOKS, Alabama 

SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania 

ADAM KINZINGER, Illinois 

ANN WAGNER, Missouri 

BRAD SHERMAN, California 

AMI BERA, California 

DINA TITUS, Nevada 

GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia 

THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida 

TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii 

(III)

C O N T E N T S 

Page

WITNESSES 

Adrian Zenz, Ph.D., independent researcher ........................................................ 9

Mr. Nury Turkel, chairman of the board, Uyghur Human Rights Project ......... 21

Justin Jacobs, Ph.D., associate professor, Department of History, American 

University ............................................................................................................. 33

LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING 

The Honorable Ted S. Yoho, a Representative in Congress from the State 

of Florida, and chairman, Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific: Prepared 

statement .............................................................................................................. 3

Adrian Zenz, Ph.D.: Prepared statement ............................................................... 11

Mr. Nury Turkel: Prepared statement ................................................................... 23

Justin Jacobs, Ph.D.: Prepared statement ............................................................. 35

APPENDIX 

Hearing notice .......................................................................................................... 52

Hearing minutes ...................................................................................................... 53

The Honorable Ted S. Yoho: 

Amnesty International report titled, ‘‘China: ‘Where Are They?’ ’’ .................. 54

Letter dated September 26, 2018, from Amnesty International to the Honorable Ted S. Yoho and the Honorable Brad Sherman, a Representative 

in Congress from the State of California ........................................................ 62

Adrian Zenz, Ph.D.: 

Support Document #1 .......................................................................................... 66

Support Document #2 .......................................................................................... 74

The Honorable Gerald E. Connolly, a Representative in Congress from the 

Commonwealth of Virginia: Prepared statement .............................................. 82

(1)

CHINA’S REPRESSION AND INTERNMENT OF 

UYGHURS: U.S. POLICY RESPONSES 

WEDNESDAY, SEPTEMBER 26, 2018

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,

SUBCOMMITTEE ON ASIA AND THE PACIFIC,

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS,

Washington, DC. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:00 p.m., in room 

2172 Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Ted Yoho (chairman of 

the subcommittee) presiding. 

Mr. YOHO. This hearing will come to order. 

Good afternoon, and thank you all for joining us today for a topic 

that does not get the attention it deserves in Congress. 

The word ‘‘dystopia’’ is frequently used to describe the Chinese 

Communist Party’s repression in the northwest of China. There is 

good reason for this. What’s happening there should be confined to 

science fiction but, unfortunately, it’s not. 

The party calls this region Xinjiang, and those who live there 

sometimes refer to it as East Turkestan. The Uyghurs, a Turkic 

Muslim people, have historically been the region’s majority population and remain a plurality. 

Xinjiang falls along the Silk Road. Its capital is closer to Kabul 

than Beijing, and it remains culturally and ethnically distinct from 

China. 

The People’s Liberation Army brought Xinjiang into modern 

day’s People’s Republic of China in 1949 by invasion. Today, the 

party is seeking to eliminate Xinjiang’s uniqueness using methods 

ripped straight from fiction. 

Authorities have turned the region into a high-tech militarized 

police state using cutting-edge technology to subject normal people 

to pervasive surveillance, including AI facial and voice recognition 

and forced genetic sampling. 

Authorities compile vast amounts of data on individuals and assign them arbitrary scores, which can drastically alter their lives. 

In some areas, there are police outposts every few feet. Information, communication, and travel are restricted. 

Astoundingly, about 1 million people are being detained in rapidly expanding networks of concentration camps where they are 

forced to undergo so-called political reeducation that can only be 

described as brainwashing, brutality, torture, and death. 

For those who are targeted, even fleeing will not keep them safe. 

PRC authorities surveil them abroad and punish their families to 

coerce their silence or force their return. 

2

The party has used the specter of terrorism to excuse its abuses 

and scapegoat the victims. But the truth is the victims are men 

and women, young and old, from every walk of life. 

They are not targeted based on extremism. They are targeted 

based on their religion and ethnicity. The party’s so-called strike 

hard campaigns are specifically intended to surveil, profile, punish, 

and round up the Uyghurs, Kazakhs, and any Turkic Muslim 

whose lives are distinct from the party’s vision of what it means 

to be Chinese. 

The CCP’s—the Chinese Communist Party’s—actions are transparently seeking to destroy normal Islamic religious practices, the 

Uyghur culture and language, and even the genetic concentration 

of Uyghur heritage in the Xinjiang. 

Chillingly, the party says their objective is ethnic harmony. Ethnic harmony sounds nice. Based on their action, it seems that ethnic harmony means that no one is allowed to be different from the 

atheist, Mandarin-speaking, ardently socialist Han nation. 

The greatest tragedy of the 20th century occurred when the 

world stood by as cruel nationalist parties targeted an ethnic minority as part of an evil plan to re-engineer society. 

Whether it is the genocide of Rwanda, Sudan, or, as the full committee highlighted today, in Burma, the world has a poor record of 

stopping genocide or ethnic cleansing. 

We did have that hearing this morning and it is just unconscionable that we talk about never again will we allow what happened 

under the Hitler regime, yet here we are, 70 years, roughly, later 

and it’s happening over and over again. 

It is my hope that we can help shine a light on what could be 

the next of these blights on humanity as another totalitarian regime is building crematoriums near its concentration camps. 

We must speak out with the loudest possible voice. Can there be 

a clear warning sign? We have been down this road too many 

times. The sort of human rights violations that the CCP is perpetrating on a massive scale in this district should disqualify the 

PRC from global leadership. 

Such abuses contravene the most fundamental rights and basic 

personal freedoms. Yet, China remains one of the world’s most influential countries, and because of this, few on the international 

stage are willing to speak out about the PRC’s repression and internment of the Uyghurs and others. 

My hope is that today, with the assistance of our expert panel, 

we can begin to address this disparity and work toward options for 

the overdue U.S. policy response to this crisis. 

And with that, members present will be permitted to submit 

written statements to be included in the official hearing record. 

Without objection, the hearing record will remain open for 5 calendar days to allow statements, questions, and extraneous material 

for the record, subject to length limitations and rules, and the witnesses’ written statements will be entered into the hearing. 

I will now turn to the ranking member for any remarks he may 

have. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Yoho follows:]

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China's Repression and Internment of Uyghurs: U.S. Policy Responses 

Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific 

House Committee on Foreign Atlairs 

Wednesday, September 26, 2018, 2 00 p.m. 

Opening Statement of Chairman Ted Yoho 

Good afternoon, and thank you all for joining us today for a topic that does not get the attention 

it deserves in Congress. 

The word "dystopia" is frequently used today to describe the Chinese Communist Party's 

repression in the northwest of China. There's good reason for this-what's happening there 

should be confined to science fiction. 

The Party calls this region Xinjiang, and those who live there sometimes refer to it as East 

Turkestan. The Uyghurs, a Turkic Muslim people, have historically been the region's majority 

population, and remain a plurality. Xinjiang falls along the Silk Road. Its capital city is closer to 

Kabul than Beijing, and it remains culturally and ethnically distinct from China. The People's 

Liberation Army brought Xinjiang into the modern-day People's Republic of China in 1949, by 

invasion. 

Today, the Party is seeking to eliminate Xinjiang's uniqueness, using methods ripped straight 

from fiction. Authorities have turned the region into a high-tech militarized police state, using 

cutting edge technologies to subject normal people to pervasive surveillance, including AI, facial 

and voice recognition, and forced genetic sampling. Authorities compile vast amounts of data on 

individuals and assign them arbitrary scores, which can drastically alter their lives. In some 

areas, there are police outposts every few feet. Information, communications, and travel are 

restricted. 

Astoundingly, about a million people are being detained in a rapidly-expanding network of 

concentration camps, where they are forced to undergo so-called political re-education that can 

only be described as brainwashing. For those who are targeted, even fleeing will not keep them 

safe. PRC authorities surveil them abroad, and punish their families to coerce their silence or 

force their return. 

The Party has used the specter of terrorism to excuse their abuses and scapegoat the victims. But 

the truth is, the victims are men and women, young and old, from every walk oflife They are 

not targeted based on extremism. They are targeted based on their religion and ethnicity. 

The Party's so-called "strike hard campaigns" are specifically intended to surveil, profile, 

punish, and round up Uyghurs, Kazakhs, and any Turkic Muslims whose lives are distinct from 

the Party's vision of what it means to be Chinese. CCP actions are transparently seeking to 
4


32303d-2.eps

destroy normal Islamic religious practices, the Uyghur culture and language, and even the 

genetic concentration of Uyghur heritage in Xinjiang. 

Chillingly, the Party says their objective is "ethnic harmony." Based on their actions, it seems 

that "ethnic harmony" means that no one is allowed to be different from the atheist, Mandarinspeaking, ardently socialist Han nation. 

The greatest tragedy of the 201

h century occurred when the world stood by as a cruel nationalist 

party targeted an ethnic minority as part of an evil plan tore-engineer society. Whether it is the 

genocide in Rwanda, Sudan, or -as the Full Committee highlighted earlier today- in Burma, the 

world has a poor record of stopping genocide or ethnic cleansing. It is my hope that we can help 

shine a light on what could be the next of these blights on humanity. As another totalitarian 

regime is building crematoriums near its concentration camps, we must speak out with the 

loudest possible voice. Can there be a clearer warning sign? 

The sort of human rights violations that the CCP is perpetrating on a massive scale in Xinjiang 

should disqualify the PRC from global leadership. Such abuses contravene the most fundamental 

human rights and basic personal freedoms. Yet China remains one of the world's most influential 

countries, and because of this, few on the international stage are willing to speak out about the 

PRC's repression and internment ofUyghurs and others. 

My hope is that today, with the assistance of our expert panel, we can begin to address this 

disparity, and work towards options for the overdue US. policy response to this crisis. 
5

Mr. SHERMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Today is a day when we focus in this room on China’s war 

against Muslims. This morning in this room we heard how China 

is aiding Myanmar—Burma—and their military in the either genocide or close to genocide of the Rohingya and the ethnic cleansing 

of hundreds of thousands or 1 million individuals who have known 

no other home other than Burma. 

And this afternoon, we focus on China’s domestic policy. China 

is repressing its Uyghur population in the province of Xinjiang on 

a massive scale. 

The Chinese Government has, as noted in a recent U.N. meeting, 

turned Xinjiang into something resembling a massive internment 

camp shrouded in secrecy—a sort of no-rights zone. 

I look forward to learning more from our witnesses. What China 

is doing there is terrible. I don’t know—I’d have to learn more—

before I’d endorse the chairman’s use of the words ‘‘extermination’’ 

or ‘‘crematorium.’’

But, clearly, what we are seeing is hundreds of thousands, perhaps 1 million, being held in so-called reeducation camps. 

The people running the government in Beijing are the sons—not 

so much the sons and daughters, but sons of those who were put 

into reeducation camps during the Cultural Revolution. 

The fact that they would then turn and put 1 million people into 

reeducation camps, concentration camps, detention camps, in this 

case pretty much solely because of their ethnicity and religion, is 

absolutely outrageous. 

An article in ‘‘Foreign Policy’’ noted that the official purpose of 

the internment camps is to ‘‘purify people’s thoughts,’’ eliminate extremism, and to instill support for the Communist Party. 

The idea that you could win friends among a people by interning 

them strikes me as bizarre. Beyond this forced indoctrination, the 

internment camps allow police to physically remove people from society and then say, well, nobody on the streets of Xinjiang opposes 

the Communist Party. 

A report by Human Rights Watch mentions that in 2014 when 

China launched its so-called ‘‘strike hard’’ campaign against ‘‘violent terrorism,’’ the number of people arrested in Xinjiang has increased threefold compared to the previous 5-year period. 

Chinese repression dramatically scaled up in 2016 when the 

Communist Party secretary in Tibet relocated to assume leadership 

in Xinjiang. 

China is going after Uyghurs living abroad. There are accounts 

of Uyghurs being sent back by Middle East countries where they 

worked or lived in violation of international obligations, with these 

Middle Eastern countries knowing that those Uyghurs will be interned when they are sent back to the clutches of the Chinese Government. 

Further, China suppresses the religious and cultural rights of 

Uyghurs, as Amnesty International points out. Its regulations on 

religious affairs ban many religious activities. This allows China to 

suppress basic religious rights. 

The Chinese Government limits the use of the Uyghur language. 

China detains ethnic Uyghur writers and Web sites, editors, et 

6

cetera. All these Chinese efforts to weaken could lead to the elimination of Uyghur cultural identity. 

The ethnic balance in Xinjiang has changed dramatically. In 

1949, that province was only 6 percent ethnic Chinese. Now it’s 40 

percent of the population and 75 percent of the capital. 

It’s time to call out China. In August, I joined the House and 

Senate colleagues in a letter to Secretaries Pompeo and Mnuchin 

regarding this issue. 

We urged the application of the Global Magnitsky Act sanctions 

against senior Chinese officials who oversee mass detention of 

Uyghurs. 

It called for sanctions against businesses assisting the Chinese 

officials in mass detention, and asked the State Department to condemn these abuses. 

We ought to especially call out the Muslim countries that are 

saying nothing. Whether that be Turkey, Pakistan, the Gulf States, 

it is simply outrageous that they do so little to help the Rohingya 

and turn their back completely on the Uyghurs. 

America should be given credit for protecting Muslims as we did 

in Bosnia and Kosovo. Now we are the number-one aid source for 

the Rohingya and we are the leading voice for the protection of 

Uyghurs. 

And I notice that at the United Nations if Israel builds one 

apartment building—huge fireworks, whereas when China moved 

millions of ethnic Chinese into this province—not a peep. And I am 

not saying that every bit of construction done by Israel is consistent with a two-state solution. 

But it is interesting to see how a single apartment building can 

cause Muslim nations to speak in the most extreme terms and then 

be silent on what China is doing, both in its own borders and with 

regard to the Rohingya. 

I yield back. 

Mr. YOHO. I think this meeting is important because we are 

going to bring that out, you know, the questions about whether or 

not there are crematoriums, is correct. 

I think that’ll come out in this. The Uyghurs, we know, prefer 

burial. China prefers cremation, and we will talk more about that. 

But at this time, with no objections I’d like to turn to Ms. Comstock for opening remarks. 

Ms. COMSTOCK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Ranking Member. 

I really appreciate you holding this hearing today. 

As both the chairman and ranking member have noted, this is 

something really important that needs a lot more attention. I am 

sorry that this doesn’t get more attention. But I appreciate you 

making the record here today and exploring this further. 

I certainly associate myself with all the remarks previously made 

and talk about the horrible atrocities occurring in northwest China 

where reports have surfaced that Uyghurs and Kazakhs have been 

detained in reeducation camps, forcing Muslims to renounce Islam 

and embrace the Communist Party. 

Additionally, reports have been made by reporters that have 

made it into the region as well as those who escaped the camps 

and gone abroad—that Uyghurs are subject to torture, medical neVerDate 0ct 09 2002 15:24 Oct 30, 2018 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00010 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\_AP\092618\32303 SHIRL
7

glect, solitary confinement, sleep deprivation, and other deadly 

forms of abuse at these reeducation camps. 

As a member of the Tom Lantos Human Rights Commission and 

as somebody who worked with my predecessor, Congressman 

Frank Wolf, who I know worked with both of you on these important issues, it is extremely important to me that we bring greater 

light to these human rights abuses internationally, and especially 

when they regard suppression of religious freedom. 

One of my constituents is here today. Ferkat Jawdat is in attendance with his sisters and other members of his family. He is a U.S. 

citizen who has his home in Chantilly, Virginia, where he works for 

a government contractor providing support to the Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services, and we thank him for his service and 

we thank him for being here today. He also has a 1-year-old child, 

a daughter. 

Thank you for being here today. However, his life has become a 

living nightmare since February 2018, when his mother was sent 

to one of these reeducation camps. 

He now does not know about her whereabouts, when she will be 

released, or why she was taken. You can imagine that nightmare, 

Mr. Chairman, and that’s why I thank you so much for having this 

hearing and highlighting this. 

This is real to the people in my district and I know throughout 

the country. He worries that she is being tortured, or worse, fears 

that she may already have been killed. 

We are working to bring this to the attention of Secretary 

Pompeo, Ambassador Branstad, and Ambassador Cui asking for 

answers regarding his mother. 

We know he’s not alone in his suffering. At least 1 million people 

have been detained in camps and Uyghurs account for 21 percent 

of the arrests, despite making up only 1.5 percent of the population. Clearly, this is a religious freedom issue and atrocity. 

I am so grateful for this hearing today so that we can shed muchneeded light on this issue and work to find real solutions to this 

problem and the very human and tragic outcomes that we are seeing here, and I thank you again for being here today. 

Mr. YOHO. I thank the gentlelady for her comments, and this is 

something that we want to expose and the best way, you know, 

whenever these atrocities go on, is to expose them—expose them 

through witnesses, expose them through the media, and keep talking about them until we can get enough outrage from people to 

come out, you know, out of reeducation camps. 

I think it’s something that should scare us. I think we have all 

heard of George Orwell’s book, ‘‘1984.’’ He missed the mark by 

about 34 years. You know, he talked about this, and to hear what’s 

going on. I just got back from Mongolia, South Korea, and Japan—

I’m still not sure what country I’m in—but to hear what the Chinese wanted to do in the Asia Pacific region with the 5G network 

is something they can offer to other leaders of other countries and 

say, look, what we can do, we can monitor your systems, we can 

rank your systems to see if they are a good Communist Party member or a bad one, and if they don’t reach a certain level we can send 

them to reeducation camps. 

8

And I think that’s going to come out more in this hearing, and 

so what I’d like to do now is—we are honored to have you guys 

here and we are going to have you guys here and we are going to 

have you—I am going to introduce you and then you’ll have 5 minutes to speak, and I think you all know how to use the system 

there. 

Turn your microphone on. The lights will go green, yellow, and 

red. It’s 5 minutes. 

And we have Dr. Adrian Zenz, a noted expert on China’s policy 

toward minority groups—thank you for being here; Mr. Nury 

Turkel, chairman of the board at the Uyghur Human Rights 

Project; and Dr. Justin Jacobs, an associate professor in the Department of History at American University. 

And before we start, does the gentleman from California have an 

opening statement? 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Yes, I do, and let me apologize. This is one 

of the more frustrating parts about being a Congressman. We have 

got three hearings, all of which are really important, at the same 

time. 

Mr. YOHO. And I’ve got a bill on the floor I am supposed to be 

talking about. Don’t worry about it. [Laughter.] 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Oh, my gosh. But the people—the Uyghurs 

and the people of China should get the message that we are willing. Even though we have really busy days we are not too busy to 

come here to talk about their plight and what’s going on in China 

and the Muslims that are being murdered by the Government of 

Burma. They call it Myanmar now. 

But we have that type of slaughter of Islam. You have the 

slaughter of Islam in China as well. We need to be—make sure 

that the Muslim population of the world knows that we are not 

against their religion and we are not against people who practice 

that religion. 

We are against the radical Islamic terrorists who, basically, attack the United States. But people who live and have lived in their 

societies for a long time throughout the planet, when they are 

under attack, which is what’s happening in China, we are on the 

side of those people, whatever their religion is, and in this case 

they happen to be Muslims. 

And the Uyghurs have played a very important role over the 

years because we have known them. I’ve met them. They are a 

very respectable part of that culture in that part of the world. 

But China, the Government of China today is behind, of course, 

the slaughter of the Muslims down in Burma and the Government 

of China, of course, is doing everything to do to stamp out the 

Uyghur movement in China. 

So with that said, I hope that our friends throughout the world 

get the word and understand what’s happening today. We care 

about Muslim people in China. We care about them in Burma. We 

care about them when they are under attack and it is not—and we 

don’t want just war—this war mentality between Islam and Christianity. 

So, Mr. Chairman, by holding this hearing today, I appreciate 

and I applaud you for sending this positive message toward this big 

9

hunk of the world that we can work together to make it a better 

world and respect each other’s rights. 

So I will be running back and forth now between these two and 

three hearings that I am involved in. But I will be watching on the 

monitor when I am not here and reading your testimony otherwise. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. YOHO. Thank you, Mr. Rohrabacher, and if you get a chance, 

talk on my bill on the House floor. [Laughter.] 

Dr. Adrian Zenz, please go ahead. 

STATEMENT OF ADRIAN ZENZ, PH.D., INDEPENDENT 

RESEARCHER 

Mr. ZENZ. First, I would like to thank the chairman, the ranking 

member, and the other members of the subcommittee for inviting 

me to testify about the situation—what China refers to as the 

Xinjiang Uyghur autonomous region. 

The research performed by myself and others conclusively shows 

the existence of a large-scale extrajudicial detention network for 

the purpose of subjecting Xinjiang’s Muslim minorities, but also 

some ethnic minority Christians, to intensive political reeducation 

and indoctrination procedures. 

The evidence I gathered largely comes from the Chinese Government itself—reports, budgets, bids, recruitment notices, along with 

corroborating evidence from satellite images. 

These are the account of my research findings including largescale police recruitments and the installation of extensive surveillance networks, provided in the written statement. 

All the information we have consistently points toward the fact 

that Xinjiang’s unprecedented securitization and reeducation campaign was inaugurated by the region’s party secretary, Chen 

Quanguo, in spring 2017. 

In this campaign, up to 11 to 12 percent of Xinjiang’s Muslim minority adult population has been detained in reeducation camps, at 

times referred to as ‘‘vocational skills training,’’ or simply, ‘‘training 

institutions.’’

Public bid documents state that some of these so-called training 

facilities are heavily secured with high walls, fences, barbed wire, 

security cameras, reinforced doors and windows, and other security 

features typically found in detention centers or in prisons. 

Recruitment notices likewise starting in spring 2017 indicate an 

unusually large intake of teachers for what is simply referred to as 

training facilities that only mandate a junior or senior secondary 

education, along with Chinese language skills. 

Typically, vocational skills teachers in China as well as in 

Xinjiang are required to possess a tertiary degree in the relevant 

subject. 

Overall, it is reasonable to assume that Xinjiang’s current reeducation campaign exceeds the scale of the entire former national reeducation through labor system, a system that was abolished in 

2013 because the government itself considered it to be no longer 

appropriate for a modern society governed by the rule of law. 

It should be made clear that China has faced a credible terrorist 

threat from Uyghur resistance groups and that measures against 

10

actual religious extremism are certainly in order for any nation facing such challenges. 

However, China’s extra-legal internment of large shares of 

Xinjiang’s Muslim minority population is tearing apart the lives of 

hundreds of thousands of innocent people who have no splittist or 

extremist intentions and pursue harmless and appropriate cultural 

and religious practices. 

Chen Quanguo’s reeducation campaign is destroying the very 

fabric of Xinjiang’s minority societies: Separating families, leaving 

children orphaned, instilling fear and resentment, and sowing the 

seeds of hate. 

In the name of combating terrorism, this campaign constitutes a 

monstrous crime against humanity on a scale and level of sophistication that has only rarely been witnessed in modern history. 

Seasoned scholars who have studied the region for decades are 

appalled at what they perceive to be an unprecedented repression 

with unforeseeable long-term consequences. 

My recommendations are as follows: Firstly, that the United 

States Government investigates whether American companies are 

involved in supplying technologies and products used in Chinese 

surveillance or other security-related systems that may also be deployed in Xinjiang. If so, the export of such products to China 

should be stopped. 

Secondly, to sanction the responsible Chinese officials, for example, through the Global Magnitsky Act. The main effect of such 

sanctions may not necessarily be the sanctions themselves but the 

symbolic force they exert and the resulting increase in public 

awareness. 

Thirdly, that the government would regularly and consistently 

speak up in regards to this issue in all relevant contexts. 

Being aware of the fact that the suppression of core aspects of 

minority identities in Xinjiang is reflective of a wider campaign to 

systematically curtail social and religious freedoms among both minorities and the Han majority throughout China. 

Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Zenz follows:]

11


32303a-1.eps

FIRST PAGE FOR ALL WRITTEN TESTIMONY MATERIALS 

Adrian Zenz 

Expert and researcher on China's ethnic minorities. (The institutional affiliation is withheld as 

the institution has requested not to be mentioned in public in relation to this research.) 

House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific: "China's 

Repression and Internment of Uyghurs- U.S. Policy Responses" September 26, 2018 

Below is are excerpts from an academic paper co-authored by Adrian Zenz and 

James Leibold, submitted for publication, titled "Securitizing Xinjiang: Police 

Recruitment, Informal Policing and Ethnic Minority Co-optation". 

The Scaffolding of Xinjiang's Police State 

In this section, we combine our analysis of advertised security-related recruitment with a 

discussion of the wider securitization infrastructure in Xinjiang. Over the last decade there has 

been a steady and strategic growth of the police force in Xinjiang that is in our view best 

understood through live distinct stages of development: a) before the 2009 riots (2003-2008); 

b) response to the 2009 riots (2009-2011); c) expanded policing in the rural south (2012-

2013); d) grid-style community policing and big data surveillance (2014-2015); and e) the 

massive expansion of surveillance manpower in tandem with the establishment of a dense 

convenience police station system nuder the XU AR's new Party Secretary Chen Quanguo 

(2016-2017). 

Estimating the Base Level (2003-2008) 

Despite claims that Wang Lequan mled Xinjiang with an iron-fist during his fifteen-year 

tenure as Xinjiang l'arty Secretary (1994-2010), I advertised police recruitment was relatively 

small prior to 2009. This reflected China's overall security strategy, which at the time was 

more focused on large coastal cities. 2 

Xinjiang does not publish past or present numbers of active police officers. In order to 

establish a base level estimate we need to take recomse of total national staffing figures from 

the Ministly of Public Security, which rose from 1.6 million in2002 to 2 million in 2011.3 If 

we estimate MPS staffing levels in 2007 at 1.75 million, an equivalent per capita count would 

yield a stock level of 28,600 police for Xinjiang. However, following Shichor's assessment, it 

I Shan and Weng, 20!1, 61. 2 Greitens 2017. 3 Chen, 2015, 62. 
12


32303a-2.eps

is more likely that Xinjiang's per capita police count amounted to perhaps only 60-80 percent 

of the national average4 

Table 1 shows XUAR advertised police ofticer positions prior to 2009. The very low annual 

figures between 2003 and 2005 support a below-average stock level estimate compared to the 

rest of the country. Advertised positions increased rapidly in 2006 and 2007, even prior to the 

2008 Tibetan uprising. The advertised 2008 intake nearly doubled compared to 2007, 

evidently a clear response to the emerging situation in the Tibetan regions and increased 

securitization across China in the lead up to the Beijing Olympic games. 

Table I: XUAR Police Officer (renminjin>;cha) Recruitment (civil service system) 

Year .: : 2oo3 to 2oos 2006 20Q7 2008 

Advertised 1,354 (451 police officer annually) 1,099 1,547 2,919 

positions 

Increase over . 

previous year(s) - 143.7 40.8 88.7 

{IJercent} -· 

Responding to the 2009 Riots (2009-201 1) 

The 5 July 2009 riots in Ununqi surprised the nation. Top Party officials were shocked by the 

scale of the violence and their inability to quickly quell the unrest with the locally available 

security forces. The situation only stabilized after Beijing airlifted nearly 30,000 PAP and 

SPU units with a range of heavy equipment to Xinjiang fwm31 cities across China.5 

In response, Zhou Yongkang, the head of the CCP's Political and Legal Committee and a 

Politburo Standing Committee Member at the time, was dispatched to the region to coordinate 

the government's rcsponse,6 which included the first-ever local recruitment ofSPU officers in 

Xinjiang. While SPUs existed in Xinjiang prior to 2009, thdr numbers were insufficient to 

deal with large-scale security threats. SPU forces are a highly effective but also relatively 

expensive strike force. Party officials also sought to expand the region's undermanned police 

force after Zhang Chunxian succeeded Wang Lcquan as Pmiy Secretary in April2010. As a 

result, total security-related recruitment doubled from 8,647 advertised positions in 2006-

2008 to 17,3 52 positions in 2009·20 II, with most of these posts designated for major urban 

centers like Urumqi. 

Expanded Policing and Sun,eillance in the Rural South (201 2-1 3) 

In January 2012, the region allllounced the recmitment of8,000 new police officers in order 

to bee±:up security ahead of the 18th CPC National Congrcss.7 The 2012 intake marked a 

4 Shichor, 2004. 5 No author, 'Map of People's Armed Police Troops Dispatched to Xinjiang', China Digital Times, (2017), 

available at: https://chinadigitaltimes.nei/2009/07/map-of-peoples-armed-police-troops-dispatched-to-xinjiang 

i•ccessed 15 December 2017); Dennis Blasko, The Chinese Army Today. New York: Routledge, 2012, p. I 11. 

No author, 'Protecting etlmic unity requires that action begins with every household weihu minzu tuanjie yao 

cong meige jiating zuoqi ', People's Daily Overseas Edition, (2009), available at: 

http://paper.people.eom.cn/rmrbhwblhtml/2009-07/llicontent_293148.htm (accessed 18 December 20 17). 7 No author, 'In201 2, Xinjiang plans to recruit over 8,000 new police officers, laying a solid grassroots police 

force foundation, 2012nian Xinjiangjihua xinzhao 8000 duoming minjing hangs hi jicengjing/i', Tianshanwang 

ucws, (2012), available at: http://news.ts.cn/content/20 12-02/0J/content_6533128.htm (accessed 18 December 

2017). 
13


32303a-3.eps

significant turn in Xinjiang's policing strategy. It advertised a total of 12,030 security-related 

positions, a 56 percent increase in adverts compared to 2009. About 7,700 of the 9,800 

advertised police force positions were for so-called "police sub-station workers" (jingwushi 

jingwurenyuan), who were to man small, community-based police sub-stations (jingwushi) 

across the region. XUAR officials committed themselves to fully implementing the "one 

village, one policeman" (yicun yijing) scheme, which had been rolled out in various Eastern 

provinces during the early 2000s 8 Under this policy, a single sub-station police officer leads 

up to three assistant police sta;ff in each rural vi!lage.9 The 2012 intake therefore initiated the 

establishment of a multi-tiered police force. Police sub-station officers are part of the formal 

police force, except that their employment occurs through the public instead of the civil 

service. Additionally, this intake marked the first time that Xinjiang advertised informallyemployed assistant police officers, albeit at a fairly low number (955 positions). 

Overall, 71 percent of the XUAR's 2012 police sub-station rccmitment targeted regions with 

a Uyghur population share of 40 percent or higher; far more than in 2009, when only 40 

percent of all security-related recruitment was aimed at such regions. 

Grid-Style Community Policing and Big Data Surveillance (2014-201 5) 

In the wake ofhigh-profilc terror attacks in Xinjiang and elsewhere across China, which 

triggered Zhang Chunxian's "war on terror" declaration, the 2014 intake marked a decisive 

shift in Xinjiang's security strategy that is not reflected in numbers alone. On the one hand, it 

reinforced the trend toward large-scale, flexible police force expansion by advertising nearly 

6,000 lower-tier assistant police positions. On the other, it introduced numerous new securityrelated recruitment categories in line with massive investments in high-tech surveillance and 

community-based policing. 

One impottant aim of the 2014 intake was consequently an expansion of so-called "grid-style 

social management" (~hehui wanggehua guanli). Gtid management harnesses new 

surveillance technologies and big data analytics to comprehensively monitor activities within 

a discrete geometric zone. 10 It was first trailed in Beijing and Shanghai during the early 2000s 

and gradually rolled out in frontier regions like Xinjiang and Tihct after the 2008-2009 

unrest." In Urumqi, for example, the city's S75 communities have been divided into 6,281 

grids, each patrolled by a range of security personal, including uniform police officers, 

assistant police and red-armband volunteers, with an estimated 86,000 staff involved in grid 

management work. 12 

In order to provide the necessary manpower, XUAR officials began advertising for "patrol 

and prevention" (xunluo fangkang) and "grid patrol and prevention" (wanggehua xunkang) 

8 Zi Yang, 'Rural China's Public Security Vacuum', China Brief, (2015), available at: 

https://jamcstown.org/program/rural-chinas-public-security-vacuum (accessed 18 December 2017). 9 No author, 'ln 2012, Xinjiang plans to rccmit over 8,000 new police officers, laying a solid grassroots police 

force foundation, 20 12nian Xinjiangjihua xinzhao 8000 duoming minjing hangs hi jicengjing/i', Tianshanwang 

news, (2012), available at: http://news.ts.cn/contcnt/2012-02/01/content_6533128.htm (accessed 18 December 

2017). 

10 Xie Yue, "The political1ogic of weiwen in contemporary China," Issues & Sttldies, 48.3 (2012), p. 3. 11 No author, 'Xizang shixian wanggehua guanli quan fugai', China Tibet News, (2014), available at: 

http://www.chinatibetnews.com/2014/1103/1364780.shtml (accessed 8 February 2018); Ya_J(iQ~!!]lg, January 24, 

2013 

12 No author, 'Hangye sbendu baogao: changzhijiu'an wei zbong, xinjiang anfang shichang zheng baofa', Sohu 

Stocks, (2017), available at: http:/lq.stock.sohu.com/ncwsicn/098/300098/4930919.shtml (accessed 18 

December 2017). Wang Yajuan, "Weirao zongmubiao, wanshan wulumuqishi litihua shehui zbi'an 

fangkong tixi de sixiang," Zhonggong wulumuqi shiwei dangxiao xuebao, 2 (June 2017): 21. 
14


32303a-4.eps

staff. Most of these positions were poorly paid and hired on an informal (contract) basis, 

much like the category of assistant police, with clear overlaps in employment terms. At the 

same time, the XUAR also began to employ dedicated police technicians in an effort to beet: 

up smart surveillance capabilities. In 2014, security recruitment included, for the first time, 

video surveillance (shipinjiankan) staff, employed on a "public-service-like" basis as 

explained above. The evolution toward new surveillance-oriented, technology-focused 

security jobs continued in 2015 with the introduction of internet surveillance and prevention 

(wangluojiankan) positions on top of the existing internet security (wangluo anquan)job 

categmy first introduced in 2009. In Urumqi alone, over 160,000 security cameras were 

installed by 2016, with 1,000 video surveillance staff to monitor them on a 24-hour basis. 13 

The massive financial investments associated with these new fmms of digital surveillance are 

reflected in the region's fixed asset investment in "information transmission, software and 

information technology," 14 which doubled from 5.1 to I 0.1 billion RMB between 2013 and 

2014. 15 In2016, the figure reached 13.6 billion RMB and is scheduled (according to 

government plans) to reach a stunning 24 billion RMB in2017. If achieved, this would 

represent 2.4 times the national average (on a per capita basis), more than double that of 

Guangdong province and 1.4 times that ofFujian province (2015 figures), catapulting 

Xinjiang to the very forefront of infonnation technology development in China. 

"Convenience Police Stations" and the Massive Expansion of Surveillance Manpower (2016-

2017) 

Aller Chen Quanguo became regional Pmiy Secretary in August 2016, police recmitment 

increased exponentially, reaching levels that have never been seen before, either in Xinjiang 

or in China as a whole. In outlining his policy agenda in September 2016, Chen stressed the 

importance of "placing stability above all else,"16 and called on ·security officials to adopt a 

more proactive, systematic, and fine-grained approach in combatting the "three evil forces" of 

terrorism, extremism, and splittism. 

During Chen's first 12 months in office, the XUAR advm1ised I 00,680 security-related 

positions, representing a 13-fold increase over the average advert number of the years 2009 to 

2015. Nearly all of these positions (97,629) were advertised for formal as well as assistant 

police forces. This compares to only 64,505 adverts (45,056 for police forces) during the 

decade butween 2006 and the summer of 2016. Chen's unprecedented recmitment drive seeks 

to boost the Party-state's surveillance capabilities across all parts of Xinjiang, without a 

particular focus on potentially restive Uyghur regions. Between2016 and 2017, only 35.5 

percent of advertised positions were designated for regions with a Uyghur population of 40 

percent or higher- below the XUAR's overall Uyghur population share of 47.9 percent 

(2015). 

Notably, R6 percent of the new hires were assistant police positions, and most ofthem were 

directly associated with the construction of so-called "convenience police stations" (bianrnin 

jingwuzhan) across the XUAR. ln dense urban centers like Kashgar and Ummqi, these 

13 Sutt Yongge, 'Qianxi Wulumuqi shi shequ "sihua" guanli moshi', Journal of the CPC Urumqi committee, 2016, 

9(3):15-18. 

14 I.e. any investment in communication and communication technology. 

"Xinjiang Statistical Yearbook, 2016 table 4-12 and 2014, table 4-5, entry "1!'l.lj}1'1i~iilL l:r:!\Lt/LRIJ!%1o~f4!1k 

I§IJE'i!fi"'Jil:Ji"f". And http://www.chyxx.com/industry/20l708/546056.html (accessed 18 December 2017). 16 No author, 'We must fu1nly carry out the governance strategy for Xinjiang of comrade Xi Jinping, the Parly's 

general secretary Jinjue guanche yi Xi Jinping tongzhi wei zong sht{ii de dang zhongyang zhijiangfanglue\ 

(20 16), available at: http://news.Is.cn/content/2016-09/17/content_l2285188.htm (accessed 18 December 2017). 
15


32303a-5.eps

stations can now be fow1d every 300-500 meters, with Chen first pioneering this approach in 

the Tibetan Autonomous Region in 2011. As a key part of grid management infrastructure, 

each station is responsible for monitoring a dedicated zone. '

7 From job advert texts, it is clear 

that the primary duties of assistant police forces are extensive patrols (often 24-hour shifts) 

and manning the numerous new checkpoints that have been established across the region. An 

academic who visited Xilyiang in Apri/2018 noted that "in Uyghur neighbourhoods in 

Urumqi, Turpan and Kashgar there was an exponential increase in the presence of Uyghur 

police officers (without firearms) patrolling the streets, working at convenience police stations 

and checking phones and IDs of Uyghur pedestrians and drivers."" 

While precise numbers are unclear, some have estimated that the XUAR govemment has built 

or renovated an estimated 7,300 of these stations across Xinjiang by March 2017, with 

hundreds more being commissioned in the subsequent months. 19 Depending on their size, 

convenience police stations have a staffing quota of six to thirty security personnel, while 

current advertised recruitments stand at around 12-13 assistant police per station.20 This 

suggests that Xinjiang's police recruitment drive will probably continue. 

Figme 1: Total police recruitruent by type of police force XUAR wide, 2006-2017 

75.000 ,---,,--

70.000 

XUAR security-related public job adverts 

65.000 '------·------------------

60.000 +------------------------ 55.000 +---------------------- 50.000 +-----------,, ________________ __J 

45.000 +---------------~,·---~~····----·--·~---

40.000 +----------------------

35.000 +----------------------

30.000 +---------------------;: 25.000 +----,--" 

20.000 +--------------·-"- 15.000 +----------------------' 

1~:~~~ +--------,-----,Iii!---.,, . IIIIi .· • -

..... • _Ill 1.1 ~ ..... .,.... 1..1 -=- 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 

._,Asslstant police 

(t!IJ.il!' I 411l'i!'IJ 

lii:S,Jb~statlon pollee 

(Wf*li!:J& 

surveillance staff 

~tot Formal pollee (A 

tieil!'~/1#~) 

This latest wave of security-related recruitment completes what we can tentatively call a 

three-tier policing strategy in Xinjiang (Figure 1 ). The top tier consists of regular (PSB) 

17 Wang, 2016, 68. 

"Email exchange with Darren Byler in September 2018. 19 No author, '7300ge Xinjiang bia11min fuwuzhanjizhong caigou nuan tong shebei Xinjiang, Energy News, 

(2017), available at: http•l/www.encrgyncws.eom.cn/show-55-6480-Lhtml (accessed 18 December 2017). 20 Fu Qiang, 'Hetian 119 yituo bianminjingwuzhanjianli 1130ge gudingshi xuanchuanzhan', Zhongguo xiaofang 

zaixian, (2017), available at: http://119.ehina.eom.cn/shyxf/txt/2017-01/16/content_9290098.htm (accessed 18 

December 20 17). No author, 'Akcsu diqu ge xian (shi) zip in renyuan zhaopin modi biao', Zhonggongjiaoyu, 

(2017), available at: httpJ/xj.offcn.com/html/2017/05/33305.html (accessed 18 December 2017). The second 

source cited lists convenience police station staffing quotas in Aksu Prefecture as 20-30 staff, depending on 

whether the station has one, two or three floors. The first source reports six officers in each of the 1,130 

convenience police stations in Hotan Prefecture. 
16


32303a-6.eps

police officers and the SPU police force. The middle tier is composed of sub-station police 

officers who fmm localized hubs of policing, often in rural and remote regions with low 

levels of previous securitization. Finally, the third and lowest tier consists of various types of 

assistant police staff, who provide a large amount of additional manpower at the local 

community level. 

Measuring the Scale of Xinjiang's Police Farce 

To get an impression of the significance of these recruitment volumes, we attempt to compare 

police force figures for China as a whole and the XUAR on a per capita basis. As noted 

above, China's unifonn police numbers were estimated at 2 million in 2011. Our estimate for 

a national stock figure in 2017 assumes that growth rates in recent years have been faster tl1an 

during the period of2002 to 2011, as regions other than the XUAR also recruited assistant 

police positions, although not nearly as many as tile latter. We conservatively estimate tile 

national 2017 stock figure at 2.625 million, or 212 per 100,000 ofthe population.21 

For tile XUAR, the total per capita figure is based on an estimated 2007 stock level of21,480 

or 75 percent of the national per capita average at that time. The XUAR 2017 stock level is 

assessed based on a conservative 75 percent recruitment rate estimate for all policing-related 

adverts between 2008 and August 2017, as well as an annual atttition rate of 3 percent due to 

retirement, death and other causes. This yields a total police stock figure of 112,886.22 The 

resulting per capita count is 478, 2.3 times that of the estimated national per capita figure (see 

Figure 2).1n 2017, Xinjiang's per capita police figure is an estimated 17 percent higher than 

tilat of Hong Kong. 23 In addition, Xinjiang has very likely exceeded the per capita police 

count of the former German Democratic Republic (GDR), which stood at about 453 in1989.Z4 

Since police officers only represent one component of the security state, such comparisons 

cannot be used to compare eitiler the surveillance capabilities or tile overall coercive capacity 

of each region's security state. They simply show the magnitude of Xinjiang's most recent 

police intakes. 25 

Figure 2: All types of police forces except the People's Armed Police. 

''The XUAR population figure is from 2015 (source: Xinjiang Statistic~! Yearbook). 22 Calculated as 21,480 plus 105,029. 23 Hong Kong police force ("disciplined officers") figure from August 31, 2017, resulting in a per capita police 

force figure of 409 (based on 2015 population data). Source: no author, 'Organisation structure', (2018), available 

at: http://www.police.gov.llk/ppp __ en/Ol_about_ us/os _ chart.html (accessed 18 December 20 17). 24 Based on a count of73,000 for the regular police force (Volkspolizei). Source: G!aessncr, 1989, 158. When 

taking into account domestic security troops besides regular police forces, the GDR boasted an additional 22,500 

personnel, or 140 per capita. Approx. 18,000 domestic police units (Volkspolizei-Bereitschaften) and 4,500 

troops of the interior ministry (Glaessner, ibid.). Unfortunately, there is no reliable PAP troop size figure for 

Xinjiang. A BBC article put the figure at 70,000 in 2013, which would be 297 per capita, although anecdotal 

accounts cite troop figures of200,000. Source: No author, ' Zhongguo junfang yaoqiu Xinjiang junren wujing 

jiagiang jiebei', BBC Chinese, (20 I 3), available at: 

http://www.bbc.com/zhongwenlsimp/china/2013/07/130707 _xinjiang_military (accessed 9 Febmary 2018). It is 

likely that the actual current PAP head count in Xinjiang is higher, but in either case, Xinjiang's per capita police 

count would considerably exceed that of the GDR. 

"Much of the surveillance of the GDR population was done through the Stasi, the GDR's secret service. A 

comparison to Xinjiang is not possible given that Chinese MSS head count figures ate kept secret. In addition, 

state surveillance levels or capabJlities comparisons cannot be adequately done across time. Today's China 

possesses advanced surveillance technologies that did not exist in 1989. 
17


32303a-7.eps

600 

500 

400 

300 

200 

100 

0 

Estimated police force figures per 100,000 of the 

population 

212 

China XUAR 

Even though assistant police recruitment has become a new trend throughout China, 

Xinjiang's recent recruitment drive is unprecedented in scale. Assistant police recruitment 

figures are difficult to assess with high accuracy due to highly scattered nature of these 

adverts. Even so, our compilation of assistant policing related adverts for January to 

September 2017 shows that on a per capita basis, Xinjiang advertised 40 times more positions 

than Fujian or Guangdong provinces, and nearly 90 times more than Zhejiang province (Table 

2). 

~~c Regional Comparison oflnformal Police Recruitment 

Region Advertised assistant Advertised positions per I 00,000 of 

policing positions (Jan. the population26 

-Sept. 2017) 

Xinjiang 69,667 300.8 

Guangdong 8,005 7.4 

Fuji an 2,705 7.5 

Zhejiang 1,732 3.5 

The combination of low-skilled foot-soldiers stationed in and around convenience police 

stations together with high-tech surveillance equipment connected to an expanding 

inf01mation processing system has created "complete coverage," according to the XUAR 

2018 work report, "without any chinks, blind spots, or blank spaces."27 Over the past decade, 

the focus of Xi1yiang 's security apparatus has shifted.from responding to outbreaks of 

violence to preventing and even predicting where unrest might occur. During a 2017 

inspection tour of Xinjiang, the Party's top security o./Jiciaf Meng Jianzhu praised the rapid 

advancement of digital policing, calling for the "organic merger of modern technologies with 

counter-terrorism work, in order to push forward and deepen the use of big-data, AI and other 

technologies ... [in] weiwen work."2 

26 Population data !rom the 2015 Xinjiang Statistical Yearbook. 27 No author, 'Zhengfu gongzuo baogao,' Xinhua, (20 18), available at 

http://news.ifeng.coru/a/20 180128/55540816_0.shtml (accessed 16 February 2018) 

"No author, ' Meng Jianzhu: With full strength creating a new direction ir1 social stability and lasting rule Meng 

.Tianzhu: quanli kaichuang shehui wending he changzhi jiu'an xinjumian', Xinhua, (20 17), available at: 

http://news.xinhuanct.com/po1itics/2017-08/28/c_.11215579l2.htm (accessed 19 December 2017). 
18


32303a-8.eps

Yet these official assessments overstate the capabilities of digital policing in Xinjiang at 

present. Despite massive investments in new technologies, surveillance work is still in many 

ways reliant on large-scale human resource recruitment. As visitors to the region have noted, 

the Party-state currently relys on a large numbers of unarmed informal police staff (not to 

mention private and volunteer security officials) to perform daily security tasks, such as 

monitoring CCTV feeds, conducting patrols, ID checks and scanning mobile phones for 

suspicious contents.29 

Minority Police Employment and Self-Policing 

Average infom1al police wages in Uyghur majority regions are similar to those across the 

XUAR (Table 5). This is remarkable in light of the fact that there is a large disposable income 

gap between the Han-dominated, industrial north and the rural south. In2016, for example, 

Kashgar prefecture's annual per capita disposable income amounted to 11,273 RMB ,

30 39 

percent below the XUAR average. By comparison, the oil city of Karamay in the north had an 

annual per capita disposable income of35,770 RMB.31 

High-wage informal police positions that do not require a tetiiary education represent a new 

career option for lesser-privileged minority populations. While outcome documents that list 

recmitees by ethnicity are relatively rare, a non-representative sample of three assistant police 

recmitment drives in Kashgarprefecture in2015 and 2016 shows that 83.2 percent of those 

hired were Uyghurs. Informant and visitor32 reports confirm that many new police positions in 

the South are being filled by ethnic minorities, many of whom appear to originate from the 

countryside. 

According to several sources, many Uyghurs and other disenfranchised minorities have been 

entering the security forces since at least 2015!16 due to a lack of viable employment 

alternatives, but also because they thought it would protect from future persecutions. 33 Under 

Chen Quanguo, Uyghurs living in southern villages are facing far more stringent residential 

restrictions. For example, they cannot easily get a permit to live or work in urban centers. 

Accepting a police position is one way to escape this confinement, while securing stable, yet 

not unproblematic, employment. 

Consequently, massive informal police recruitment kills two birds with a single stone for the 

Party-state: Not only does it flexibly enlarge the state's surveillance apparatus; it also provides 

29 Personal communication with Ben Dooley (AFP reporter) and other visitors to the region during 2017 and 

early 2018, along with corroborating statements from local informants. 3

° Computed as a weighted average of urban and rural disposable per capita incomes based on respective 

population shares. 1 No author, 'Kelamayishi 2016nian guominjingji he shchui fazhan tongji gongbao', Karamay City Statistics 

Bureau, (2017), available at: http://www.kelamayi.eom.cn/tzgg/contcnt_l266024.htm (accessed 9 February 

2018). 

:!?: Visitors include visiting researchers, journalists and others on informal visits. Informants are Chinese citizens 

who reside in Xinjiang or who are in close contact with local residents from Xinjiang. 33 Personal conversations with Darren Byler and Rune Steenberg Ryhc, who were citing examples from their 

local informant networks. Further confinnation comes from other sources, including other Western visitors. 
19


32303a-9.eps

well-paying jobs for impoverished minority populations, while getting ethnic groups to police 

their own people. Ethnic minorities have long served the CCP in China. However, the number 

of Uyghurs and other minorities recmited into the police force in Xinjiang far exceeds 

previous recruitment, and forms a key part of the current regime's security strategy. Moreover, 

Uyghur recruitment into the police force represents a large-scale employment creation 

strategy in a context where extreme securitization measures have negatively impacted other 

employment sectors and prompted those with better skills and educational levels to leave the 

region. 

However, Uyghurs and other minorities who join the police forces have reportedly had to put 

up with an extremely demanding and stressful environment. Informants and visitors have 

noted that the police in Xinjiang suffer from health and social problems due to high pressure 

and frequent overtime. A substantial share of assistant police wages consists ofperfOimancedependent bonuses, which are cut if performance goals are not met. Even worse, however, is 

the fact that minorities are reportedly unable to freely resign from police positions. According 

to several sources, those who seek to do so are threatened with detainment in re-education 

camps.34 An assistant policeman from Kizilsu, a Kyrgyz minority region with a significant 

Uyghur population share, posted on a legal advice website that he wants to resign, but that his 

superior is threatening him with being sent to a re-education camp should he do so?5 

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Asian Policy (2011), p. 61. 

Tanner, Murray Scot, "China's Response to Terrorism," U.S.-China Economic and Security 

Review Commission, 2016, p.42. 

Trevaskes, Susan. 2008. "The private/public security nexus in China," Social Justice 34.3-4: 

38-55. 

Wang, Yajuan, 'Bianmin jin;,;rwuzhan', Zhonggong wulumuqi shiwei dangxiao xuebao, 4.12 

(2016). 

Wang Yuhua. 2014. "Empowering the police," The China Quarterly 219: 625-48. 

Wong, Kam, 2009. Chinese Policing: History and Reform. New York Peter Lang. 

Yan Xiaojun. 2016. "Patrolling harmony," Journal ofContempormy China 25:99: 406-421. 

Yue Xie. 2012. "The political logic ofweiwen in Contemporary China," Issues & Studies 

48.3: 1-41. 

____ . 2013. "Rising central spending on public security and the dilemma facing 

grassroots officials in China," Journal of Current Chinese Aff'airs 42.2: 79-109. 

Zhong, Lena. 2009. "Community policing in China," Police Practice and Research, 10.2: 

157-69. 

Zenz, Adrian. 2018a. "China's domestic security spending," China Brief18.4, 

https://jamestown.org/program/chinas-domestic-security-spending-analysis-availabledata/ 

----..,.-· 2018b. "Corralling the People's Armed policy," China Brief 18.7, 

https://jamestown.org/program/corralling-thc-pcoples-armed-police-centralizingcontrol-to-reflect-centralized-budgets/ 

____ .. 2018c. '"Thoroughly reforming them towards a healthy heart attitude': China's 

political re-education campaign in Xinjiang," Central Asian Survey 

http~:f/doiQt:giJQ,LOSOjQJ634.2E6Ql8J2Q2221. 

Zenz, Adrian, and James Leibold. 2017. "Chen Quanguo: the strongman behind Beijing's 

securitization strategy in Tibet and Xinjiang." China Brief 17(12), 

https://jamestown.org/program/chen- quanguo-the-strougman-behind-beijings-securitizationstrategy-in-tibet-and-xinjiang. 
21

Mr. YOHO. Thank you for your testimony. 

Next, we will go to Mr. Turkel. 

STATEMENT OF MR. NURY TURKEL, CHAIRMAN OF THE 

BOARD, UYGHUR HUMAN RIGHTS PROJECT 

Mr. TURKEL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member, and 

members of the subcommittee, for inviting me to attend this year. 

It’s an honor to be here before you. 

The Uyghur Human Rights Project commends the subcommittee 

for convening this hearing on the U.S. policy response. 

We would also like to express our appreciation to the subcommittee members who have co-signed bipartisan letters calling 

for sanctions and urging pressure for the release of the relatives of 

Uyghur American citizens. 

The human rights emergency facing Uyghur people in China requires an urgent response. For decades, the Chinese Government 

implemented policies of racial discrimination, and criminalization 

of Uyghurs’ distinct ethnic and religious identity. 

In the 2 years since the new party secretary took office, we have 

seen how these policies paved the way for the dehumanization of 

the Uyghur people. This should raise an urgent alarm about what 

is next for the Uyghur people in China. 

It is also important to be clear about the Chinese Government’s 

claim to be carrying out a counterterrorism campaign, which is 

nonsense. 

Prior to 9/11, China’s Government justified repressive policies by 

claiming to be fighting separatism. Hundreds of political prisoners 

were locked away for expressing their identity or peacefully protesting government abuse and corruption. 

After 9/11, the same policies were suddenly recast as counterterrorism. Today, it’s very clear that these policies have nothing to do 

with security concerns. 

The most obvious evidence is the large-scale facilities being built 

to keep Uyghur children under state control from preschool age. As 

we speak, millions of Uyghurs don’t know if they will ever see their 

parents, sons, daughters, their young nieces or nephews, ever 

again. 

Finally, United States Government must respond vigorously to 

threats and retaliation against the American citizens of Uyghur origin on U.S. soil. 

It is time to act. My recommendations for Congress are as follows. 

One, to guide policy through the government we urge the subcommittee to introduce an abiding resolution endorsing an urgent 

U.S. policy response to the Uyghur crisis. The long overdue Uyghur 

Policy Act is needed to definitely state U.S. support for Uyghurs’ 

civil and political rights and to mandate adequate measures to reverse the current crisis. 

The Congress should also press for an immediate congressional 

fact-finding visit to the Uyghur region. Ambassador Branstad 

should personally lead efforts for the release of the Uyghur American citizens’ relatives in China. 

22

We also endorse the enforcement of the Magnitsky Act and going 

after the companies’ individuals assisting with China’s state security agencies. 

Congress should also review U.S.-China law enforcement cooperation. American officials need to use this channel to vigorously 

raise the shocking treatment of Uyghurs by China’s security forces. 

Law enforcement agencies should also investigate threats and retaliations carried out against Uyghur Americans and other 

Uyghurs living in the United States. 

The United States should publicly affirm its policy not to extradite or deport Uyghurs living in the U.S. and urge other governments to join Germany and Sweden by publicly announcing a halt 

to all deportation of Uyghurs to China. 

Congress should appropriate funds to support Uyghur human 

rights and civil society groups working to advance human rights 

and environmental protection in their homeland. 

The U.S. delegation at the United Nations should have strong 

congressional backing for vigorous action. China has been in the 

hot seat for its crimes against humanity in the Uyghur region exactly once in the last 19 months, which was August 10th at the 

CERD review panel in Geneva. 

Going forward, the United States must field a strong delegation 

at China’s UPR on November 6th. 

Finally, we know of Uyghur students who cannot pay their tuition at American universities because their parents are detained in 

China. In this humanitarian urgency, Members of Congress should 

support these students’ request for tuition waivers and scholarships. 

In conclusion, I would like to reiterate my gratitude to the U.S. 

Congress for the bipartisan support and its effort to hold human 

rights abusers in China to account. 

Thank you again for the opportunity to shine more light on the 

tragic situation facing the Uyghur people in China. 

Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Turkel follows:]

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HEARING 

CHINA'S REPRESSION AND INTERNMENT OF UYGHURS: 

U.S. POLICY RESPONSES 

Written Testimony ofNury Turkel 

Chairman ofthe Board, Uyghur Human Rights Project 

House Committee on Foreign Atiairs 

Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific 

September 26, 2018 

The human rights emergency facing Uyghurs in China requires an urgent response. 

The mass internment of Uyghurs in camps across East Turkestan (officially named by the 

Chinese government as the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region) is occurring as the 

Chinese government promotes itself globally as a model of governance and trade through 

the Belt and Road Initiative. 

Over a million, and possibly more, Uyghurs have been interned out of a population of 

11 million. 1 Credible reports of deaths in custody, torture, and systemic political 

indoctrination must propel the United States into action on behalf of the Uyghurs. In the 

words of scholar Rian Thum, "mass murder and genocide do not look like impossible 

outcomes."2 

The scale of the rights violations against the Uyghur people have been covered by 

brave reporters from a number of agencies, including Radio Free Asia, the Wall Street 

Journal, and the New York Times, among others. Academics, such as Adrian Zenz, have 

painstakingly uncovered the scale of the internment camp system. Extensive reports 

issued by Human Rights Watch and the Uyghur Human Rights Project document 

terrifying firsthand accounts of the camps and of the trauma inflicted on the Uyghur 

community. 3 

This testimony examines three analytical points emerging 11-mn these accounts. The 

first is an exploration of the motives behind China's internment campaign, including the 

threat it poses to democratic values. The second discusses the violation of Uyghur human 

rights in the context of China's counterterror policies and how Beijing has manipulated 

legitimate concerns over global security to justify its repression. The third point details 

China's export of repression targeting Uyghurs in the United Stales in a clear violation of 

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sovereignty. Tn closing, I offer recommendations to the committee regarding U.S. policy 

responses. 

Mass Internment of Uyghurs- Chinese Government Motivations 

Racial Discrimination: In a May 17, 2018 article, Georgetown University professor 

James Millward told Associated Press rep01ters: "Cultural cleansing is Beijing's attempt 

to find a final solution to the Xinjiang problcm."4 The Chinese government has portrayed 

Uyghur ethnic distinctiveness as a threat to ordinary Chinese and the Uyghurs' Islamic 

faith as a contagious disease. 5 Sinification through Chinese language and culture sessions 

and compulsory denunciations of Uyghur culture and belief in Islam in the internment 

camps are justified as necessary measures in reducing this threat and in finding Beijing's 

final solution. 

State-led racial discrimination and criminalization of Islam and any expression of 

Uyghur identity and culture have affected all Uyghurs in the Uyghur homeland and 

China, as well as Uyghur Americans and hundreds of thousands of Uyghurs who live 

outside their home region. Uyghurs are routinely denied rooms in hotels or subjected to 

extra security checks when in transit. In addition, Han Chinese who have rented out 

rooms to Uyghurs have been punished by the Chinese authorities. Although the Chinese 

state has played an enabling role in normalizing discrimination against Uyghurs in 

Chinese society, it has also exploited a sense of racial superiority amongst Han Chinese 

to encourage racial bias. As University of Washington Anthropologist Stevan Harrell 

notes: "As long as such an innate, almost visceral Han sense of superiority remains, the 

actual program of the Communist project will be based on the unconscious assumption 

that Han ways are better, more modern ways."6 

Uyghurs outside the camps are forced to publicly demonstrate their adoption of 

majority-Han culture, as defined by the state. They have been required to perfonn 

contemporary Chinese dances, sing Communist "Red Songs," wear pseudo-traditional 

Chinese robes, and celebrate Chinese New Year. They must attend mass rallies 

denouncing the "Three Evil Forces" and declaring loyalty to the Communist Party. They 

arc required to attend. 

Territorial Consolidation: Consolidation of borders has been an on-going project for 

the Chinese Communist Party since the establishment of the People's Republic of China. 

In fi.Ill knowledge that its claim over the lands of Tibetans, Mongols, and Uyghurs is 

based on the empire building of previous Chinese administrations, Chinese officials have 

moved to assimilate non-Han regions through a rewrite of indigenous histories and the 

exercise of diplomatic pressure to accept China's current borders as having been fixed for 

centuries. As Robert D. Kaplan wrote in a September 16, 2018 commentary for the Wall 

Street Journal: "The repression of the Turkic Uighur Muslim community in western 

China-including the reported internment of up to a million people in secret camps-is a 

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key part of Beijing's new imperial policy. Only by understanding the dynamics of 

Chinese empire can one grasp this brutal campaign."7 

The People's Republic of China's policies of territorial consolidation have for 

decades included the encouragement of Han settlers into historically and ethnically 

distinct regions such as Tibet and the Uyghur homeland. China has successfully managed 

this demographic transformation and "March West' through the instigation of political 

and economic initiatives. These include Open up the Northwest (1992), Western 

Development (2000). the Xinjiang Work Forums of2010 and 2014, the establishment of 

the Shanghai Five (1996) and later the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (2001). The 

build up of infrastructure, investment and settlers encouraged by these initiatives have 

done little to significantly alter economic opportunities for Uyghurs, as they remain 

outside the planning, implementation and monitoring processes while their region 

undergoes transformation. 

In a 2004 monograph, demographer Stanley Toops outlined the state-directed 

campaign to encourage Han Chinese to move to the Uyghur Autonomous Region, which 

relied creating a perception of frontier regions of China as having available resources and 

development opportunities. ln addition, state "inducements and incentives" figured 

heavily in the migration policy. 8 From 1990 to 2000, the number ofl-lan Chinese grew· to 

7.5 million and by the 2010 census the figure had reached 8.8 million. From 1990 

through 2012 (22 years in total), the number of Han Chinese increased by 4.3 million, 

while in the 37 years between 1953-90 the rise was 5.4 million. Since the beginning of 

Chinese Communist rule, the proportion of Uyghurs in the region has shrunk from 75 

percent to 45 percent. 

The redevelopment of Uyghur neighborhoods in the early 20 I Os, patiicularly in 

Kashgar, \Vas a further physical manifestation of the state-managed alteration of Uyghur 

society. The demolition of traditional Uyghur architecture and replacement with 

buildings indistinguishable from eastern China represented not only a tlnn reminder to 

Uyghurs of Chinese colonization, but also eased the transition for settlers arriving from 

outside of the region. The mass intenunent campaign has taken this logic one step further. 

The disappearance of Uyghur homes has been followed by the disappearance of the 

people who once inhabited them. 

Global Influence: Maintaining a firm grip on territories such as the U yghur homclat1d 

is not only a state building enterprise, but also part of a bid to extend influence beyond 

borders. In a speech delivered at Nazarbayev University in Kazald1stan in September 

2013, Chinese president Xi Jinping advanced the Silk Road Economic Belt (SREB), a 

trade proposal encompassing South Asia, Central Asia, Eurasia, Europe and the Middle 

East that would augment the role of the Uyghur homeland as China's primary land 

gateway to Eurasia. According to a state policy document, the region would serve "as a 

core area on the Silk Road Economic Belt."" The SREB and the Maritime Silk Road 

(MSR) form an ambitious Chinese goal to place China at the center of global trade routes. 

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Collectively known as the Belt and Road, the initiative will project external intluence in 

an attempt to establish China as a bona fide super power by 2050. 

However, the Chinese government's maintenance of power in the Uyghur homeland 

to ensure Belt and Road conidors remain open is founded on fear and a level of state 

intrusion that would not he tolerated in democratic societies. For example, the 

government has sent Communist Party officials to live in Uyghur homes as part of the socalled "Becoming Family" campaign, which appears to be a pretext for gathering 

information on Uyghur families. Furthermore, the pervasive technological surveillance in 

general society, such as DNA collection, iris scans, and ubiquitous CCTV cameras, has 

created an open-air prison for Uyghurs outside the internment facilities. The relevance of 

this invasion into the privacy of Uyghurs' lives and homes is that this is the ideal of 

governance China is attempting to export facilitated through the Belt and Road Initiative. 

The open challenge to democratic values the 'China model' presents should nol be 

underestimated. 

China's Misleading 'Counterterrorism' Campaign 

The 9/11 attacks on the United States marked a strategic shift in how China framed 

Uyghur dissent. Prior to September 11, 2001, Chinese authorities treated expressions of 

Uyghur opposition to repressive government policies as criminal acts of 'separatism' 

regardless of whether these were expressed peacefully or not. After 9/11, the same events 

were recast as 'teiTorism,' The introduction of the term 'terrorism' into the Chinese 

government's discourse on Uyghurs was interpreted as a move to legitimize its repression 

of the Uyghur people. In regard to the support Chinese authorities' offered on the new 

'terror' allegations scholar James Millward concludes, "careful scrutiny reveals problems 

with the evidence presented in both media and official sources. " 10 

China has amended its legal framework to reflect this new discourse. Most recently, 

this has included the Countertenorism Law on December 27,2015 and the 2016 Xinjiang 

Uyghur Autonomous Region Implementing Measures of the Countertenorism Law of the 

Peoples Republic of China. Although one of China's motivations in introducing 

countertenor legislation was lo gamer international support for repressive measures, 

"Western countries (and particularly the U.S.) are reluctant to cooperate with China on 

anti-terrorism because China's definition of tcnorism is shockingly broad." 11 In addition, 

China's search for legitimacy for its counterterror measures within the international 

community was hampered by a lack of transparency and cooperation as noted by the U.S. 

State Department. 12 

Chinese officials have claimed the intemment of Uyghurs is about combatting 

'te1Torism' or 'extremism' and bringing stability to a volatile region. These claims cannot 

be sustained given an examination of scale of the campaign and the types of individuals 

interned. For example, the confinement of Uyghur children already separated from their 

interned parents into 're-education centers' stretches any credible definition of 

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counterterrorism. As one former instructor at one of these facilities for children told the 

Financial Times: "If both parents are in jail, the child will be sent to a re-education centre 

tor 'special children.' The child is forbidden to go to school with the normal [author's 

italics] children because the parents have a political problem." 13 

The Financial Times article also described how the Chinese authorities were 

administering forcible separations of Uyghur children from their extended families. ln 

one case, two children aged seven and nine were sent to a re-education center even 

though their grandparents wanted to take care of them. The report also described how one 

county in Kashgar Prefecture had built 18 new 'orphanages' in 2017 alonc. 14 In its recent 

report, Human Rights Watch detailed how Chinese authorities have forcibly taken 

children between the ages of five and 15 and placed them in 'orphanages,' while 

extended families were permitted to look after children under five years old. 15 

Exporting Repression Against Uyghurs Overseas 

The Chinese govemment has long sought to control the narrative of Chinese politics 

\Vithin Chinese communities overseas though tools including the education departments 

of their embassies and consulates, using them to disrupt events held by activists on 

college campuses and elsew·here. For dissident groups, monitoring and control can take 

more direct fonns. The targets of this harassment include Uyghur and Tibetan rights 

activists, Chinese democrats, Taiwanese independence advocates and Falun Gong 

practitioners. Together the Chinese authorities refer to these targeted groups as the "Five 

Poisons." 

The Chinese govemment has also tried to influence and put pressure on foreign 

governments to label Uyghurs as 'terrorists' and to prevent their free movement, even 

after they have become citizens of other countries. As China builds closer security 

relationships with countries around the world, including in Central and South Asia and 

the Middle East, these countries have used their own security forces to attempt to shut 

down political activities among Uyghurs in their nations, or even detain and deport 

Uyghurs living legally in their tenitory. 

The goal of the Chinese government's harassment is to discourage and disrupt 

political activism among Uyghurs living abroad, replicating the system of control that 

exists in their homeland. Threatening retaliation against family members who remain 

within the borders of China is one of the Chinese government's primary tools. This 

retaliation can include everything from their family members being prevented from 

leaving China by being denied passports, to putting their jobs and educations at risk, to 

being subjected to imprisonment or intemment in a camp. These tactics undennine 

Uyghurs' ability to enjoy their legal rights even after they leave China. 

The families of U.S. citizens and Radio Free Asia (RFA) joumalists, Gulchehra Hoja, 

Shohret Hoshur, Mamatjan Juma, Jilil Kashgary, Kurban Niyaz, and Eset Sulaiman, who 

have been at the forefront of exposing the extent and conditions of the intemment camps, 

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have been targeted by the Chinese government in a bid to silence independent reporting. 

The journalists went public to describe how Chinese authorities have arbitrarily detained 

family members in internment camps. 

ln total, 24 of Gulchehra Hoja's relatives in Ummchi and Ghulja have been detained 

in internment camps, including her brother Kaisar Abduqeyum who was detained in 

October 2017 and has since disappeared. At least nine of Shohret Hoshur's relatives are 

in one of four camps located in Qorghas county. China has previously attempted to 

intimidate RFA journalist Shohret Hoshur. Three of Hoshur's brothers in Ununchi were 

detained in 2014 and 2015. The arrests came after Hoshur published a series of articles on 

the unrest in East Turkestan that exposed vulnerabilities in state narratives. Two of 

Mamatjan Juma's brothers arc in internment camps, one in Kashgar and the other in 

Urumchi. Seven of .Tilil Kashgary's family members are in internment camps. His 

nephew Nurmemet, who had studied in Egypt for two years, was detained in Ghulja. 

Both Kurban Niyaz, and Eset Sulaiman have lost touch with their families. 

This kind of harassment and punishment had touched the lives of many U yghurAmerican families. The family of human rights activist Rebiya Kadeer has frequently 

been harassed by the Chinese government since her arrest in East Turkestan in 1999. 

Amnesty International issued an Urgent Action in November 2017 describing how up to 

30 of her relatives have been detained in internment camps. Amnesty wrote her relatives 

arc at "high risk of torture and other ill-trcatmcnt." 16 Furthermore, the wife and daughterin-law of Mr. Juret Nizamuddin have been in detention since their return to China from 

the U.S. His wife simply disappeared while his daughter-in-law was sentenced to eight 

years of imprisonment. 

Recommendations 

It is time to act. UHRP urges the Congress to take these steps: 

Po/i(y and Congressional initiatives 

I. Pass a binding resolution endorsing an urgent U.S. policy response on the Uyghur 

crisis, including the steps below. 

2. Press for an urgent Congressional fact-finding visit to the Uyghur region, and other 

cities where Uyghur detainees are being transported. Announce the request publicly. 

Urge every Member who visits China to request access to the Uyghur region, and 

specifically the detention centers. 

3. Join the Senate in urging U.S. Ambassador to China Terry Branstad to personally 

lead efforts tor the release of the relatives of Radio free Asia reporters and all those 

hdd in extra-judicial detention. He should be asked to uphold the pledge made in his 

confirmation hearing "to represent American values to the leadership of China and 

the Chinese people at large; values that include upholding human rights for all." 

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4. Press for sanctions on Chinese officials responsible for severe human rights 

violations, including visa bans, freezing assets, and exclusion from intemational 

banking, under the provisions of the Global Magnitsky Act and other sanctions 

authority. Deterring an escalation of rights abuses requires that abusers pay a price for 

their crimes. Those most responsible should be held accountable, particularly 

Regional Party Secretary Chen Quanguo and United Front official Hu Lianhe, as well 

as Regional Deputy Patiy Secretaries Shohrct Zakir, XPCC 1 Patiy Committee 

Secretary Sun Jinlong, XPCC Commander Peng Jiami, XPCC Regional United Front 

Department head Shawkct Tmin, and Xinjiang Politics and Law Commission head 

Zhu Hailun. 

5. Adopt a Uyghur Policy Act that defines the United States govemment's suppmi for 

the Uyghurs' civil and political rights, including their right to maintain their distinct 

cultural identity. U.S. policy on Tibet, Taiwan, and Hong Kong is guided by specific, 

fonnal policies. 17 Given the current crisis, it is past time for the United Stales to 

follow a similar approach for the Uyghurs. 

6. Press for expedited enforcement of the International Traffic in Arms Regulations and 

Export Administration Regulations to prevent private U.S. individuals and companies 

from providing security training, materiel, and surveillance equipment and 

technology to Chinese state security agencies and affiliated entities, particularly those 

that have a role in repressing ethnic and religious minorities in China.t 8 

7. Request law-enforcement agencies to investigate threats and retaliation carried out 

against Uyghur U.S. citizens and against all Uyghurs on U.S. soil. 

8. Publicly affirm U.S. policy not to extradite or deport Uyghurs living in the U.S. Urge 

other governments to join Germany and Sweden in publicly announcing a halt to all 

deportations of Uyghurs to China. 

9. ln line with recommendations in the CECC 2017 Annual Report, ensure that U.S. 

government-suppmied digital security training and capacity-building etTorts include 

Uyghur human rights advocates in the U.S., Europe, Turkey, and Asia. 

10. Increase funding to support Uyghur, Tibetan, and Mongol civil society groups 

working to advance human rights and environmental protection in their homelands, 

through U.S. foreign assistance funding and by encouraging additional support from 

both UN and non-governmental sources. 

11. Appropriate fi.mds for documentation and casework to address the plight of Uyghur 

refugees and asylum seekers in the region and throughout the world. 

12. Tn the context of the U.S.-China Joint Liaison Group on Law Enforcement 

Cooperation, led on the China side by State Councilor and Minister of Public Security 

Guo Shcngkun, ensure that U.S. officials arc fully briefed on the Uyghur situation and 

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empowered to vigorously pursue U.S. policy objectives regarding the treatment of 

Uyghurs, refoulement across international borders, and Chinese police entities' 

responsibility for violations of international law and China's Constitution and laws. 

13. Tn the context of U.S.-China technical and legal collaboration on environmental 

protection, ensure that U.S. officials are fully briefed on the detentions of 

environmental rights defenders in the Uyghur Region, and empowered to vigorously 

pursue their release. 

14. Investigate the relationship ofU.S.-invested development projects with Chinese state 

entities implementing extra-legal "de-extremification" measures. U.S. companies with 

operations in the Uyghur region include Peabody International, Halliburton 19 and the 

NBA20 Urge other countries to pursue similar investigations. 

15. Support Ambassador Nikki Haley and the U.S. United Nations delegation to: 

a. Field a strong U.S. delegation at China's Universal Periodic Review in 

Geneva on November 6. 

b. Organize a joint statement by liked-minded countries on the severe violations 

of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in the Uyghur Region of China. 

c. Raise the issue in the context of UN Security Council Resolution 2150 (2014), 

particularly the statement of Deputy Pcnnancnt Representative of China to the 

United Nations Wang Min, who noted that "Preventing genocide also required 

that Governments protected their civilians and that all parties abided by 

humanitarian law. For its part, the international community should acquire a 

deep understanding of the situation on the ground, as well as strengthen 

coordination efforts tor protecting civilians.'' 

d. Create a contact group of like-minded countries to coordinate action on the 

unprecedented scale of secret extra-judicial detentions and wide-scale 

separation of children from their parents within a targeted ethnic group. 

e. Make a formal request for an investigation by H.E. Adama Dieng, Special 

Adviser to the lJN Secretary-General on the Prevention of Genocide. 

16. Members of Congress should commend universities that waive tuition tor Uyghur 

students who are stranded in the U.S., unable to return home, and unable to pay fees 

due to their parents' detention in China. 

1 Lenz, A. (20 I X). New fo'vidence(<>r China's l'olitical Re-Education Campaign in Xinjiang. [online] The 

Jamestown Foundation. Available at: https:/ /jamesiL>wn.org/program/evidence-Jbr-chinas-political-reedueation-campaign-in-xinjiang/ lAccessed 19 Sep. 2018J and Chinese Human Rights Defenders 

(2018). Chino: Mossi1·e Numbers ofUyghurs & Other Ethnic Minorities Forced into Re-education 

Programs. [online] Chinese Human Rights Defenders. Available at: https://www.nchrd.org/2018/08/chinamassi vc-numbcrs-of-uyghurs-othcr-ethnic-minoritics-forced-into-re-education-programs/ [Accessed 1 9 

Sep. 2018]. 

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2 Thum, R. (2018). China's Mass internment Camps Have No Clear End in Sight. [online] Foreign Policy. 

Available at: https://foreignpolicy.com/201 H/08/22/chinas-mass-internment-camps-have-no-clear-end-insighl! [Accessed 19 Sep. 2018J. 3 1-luman Rights Watch (201 X). 'Eradicating Ideological Viruses··: China ·s Campaign of Repression 

Against Xinjiang's Muslims. [online] Human Rights WaLch. Available at: 

hUps:// wwvv .hrw .org/rcporV20 18/09/09/cradicating-idcologi cal-viruscs/chinas-campaign-rcprcssionagainst-xinjiangs [Accessed 19 Scp. 20181 and Uyghur Human Rights Project ( 20 18). The Mass Internment 

l~( L~vghurs: "We -...vw-11 to be respected as humans. Is it too much to ask?" : Llyghur Human Rights Project. 

[online] UHRP. Available at: https://uhrp.org/press-release/mass-internment-uyghurs-%E2%80%9Cwewant-be-respected-humans-it-too-much-ask%E2%80%9D.html [Accessed 19 Sep. 2018]. 4 Shih. G. (2018). Chinac> mass indoctrination camps evoke Cultural Revolwion.[onlinej AP News. 

Available at: https://apncws.com/6cl51296fbl94f85ba69a8babd972c4b [Accessed 19 Scp. 2018]. 5 Levitz. E. (2018). China Declared Islam a Contagious Disease- and Quarantined 1 Million Muslims. 

lonline] l'iew York Magazine. Available at: http://nymag.com/daily/intelligencer/2018/08/china-muslimscamps-uighm-communist-party-islam-mental-illness.html [Accessed 19 Sep. 2018]. 6 (farrell, S. (2011 ). Cullural encounters on Chinas elhnicfi'ontier.,. University of' Washington Press. 7 Kaplan, R. (20 18). Why China Is Brutallv Suppressing Muslims. l online] Wall Street Journal. Available 

at: https://www. wsj .com/anicles/why-china-is-brutally-suppressing-muslims-153 7129695 [Accessed 20 

Scp. 2018]. 8 Toops, S. W. (2004). Demographics and Del'elopment inXiniiang afier 1949. Available at: 

http:/ /www.eastwestcenter.orglpublications/ demographics-and-development-xiqj iang -after -1 949 [Accessed 

20 Sep. 2018]. 9 J'o;ational Development and Reform Commission. (2015). Vision and Actions on .Toint(v Building Silk 

Road Economic Belt and 21st -Cennuy Maritime Silk Road.[online]. Available at: 

https://rcconasiaproduction.s3 .amazonaws.com/mcdia/filcr _public/c0/22/c02280 17-7 463-46fc-9094-

0465a6flca23/vision and actions onjointly building_silk road_ economic belt and 21stcentury_ mariti 

mc_silk_road.pdf[Acccsscd 19 Scp. 20181. 10 Millward, J. (2004). Violent Separatism in Xinjiang: A Critical Assessment. East-West Center 

Washington, Policy Studies, 6. Available at: 

http://www.east;ve,lcenter.org/llleadmin/stored/pdfs/PSOOfi.pdf l Accessed 20 Sep. 201 SJ. 11 Tiezzi, S. (2014).Jlham Tohti and Islamic State: flow China Defines Terrorism. The Diplomat. 

Available at: https://thcuiplomat.com/20 14/09/ilham-tohti-and-islamic-statc-how-china-dclincs-tcrrorism/ 

I Accessed 20 Scp. 20 18f. 12 l...'.S. Department of State (2014). Countt)' Reports on Terrorism 2014. [online] U.S. Depanment of State. 

Available at: https:l/www.state.gov/j/ct!rls/crt/2014/ [Accessed 20 Sep. 201Sj. 13 Feng, E. (201 X). Uighur children fall victim to China unti-l error drive. lonlinej Financial Times. 

Available at: https:/lwww.ll.com/content!!Uu3223a-7f4d-lle8-bc55-50dafl lb720d [Accessed 20 Sep. 

2018]. 

14 Ibid. 15 Human Rights Watch (20 18). "Eradicating Ideological Viruses": China's Campaign o.f Repression 

Against Xinjiang's Muslims. [online] Human Rights Watch. Available at: 

https://www.hrw.orglreport/2018/09/09/eradicating-ideological-viruses/chinas-campaign-repressionagainst-xinjiangs [Accessed 19 Sep. 201XJ. 

"Amnesty International (2017). Urgent Action: 30 Relatives Of Uighur Activist Arbitrarily Detained 

(China: UA 251.17) -Amnesty International USA. [online] Amnesty InLemalional USA. Available at: 

https://www.amncstyusa.orglurgcnt-actions/urgcnt-action-30-rclativcs-of-uighur-activist-arbitrarilydetained-chinaua-251-17 I [Accessed 29 Jun. 2018l 17 flork. E. (July 10, 2009). How the U.S. Can Help the Uighurs in Wes/ern China. Washington Post. 

Available at: http://w\\w. washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/07 /09/ AR2009070902425 .html 

l Accessed 19 Sep. 2018 J. 

'"Fisher, M., Shapira, 1., and Rauhala, F.., (May 4, 2018). Behind Erik Prince's China Venture, The 

Washington Post, Available at: https://www.washingtonpost.com/ncws/world/wp/20 18/05/04/fcaturc/awa!Tior-goes-to-china-did-erik-prince-cross-a-line/?utmterm=.2e8a8e7b69dl [Accessed 19 Sep. 20 18]. 

wvvw.uhrp.org 9 
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19 L:yghur Human Rights Project (2016). Without land, there is no life: Chinese state suppression ofl!yghur 

environmental activism. Available at: https:/luhrp.org/press-release/without-land-there-no-life-chinesestate-suppression-uyghur-environmental-activism [Accessed 19 Sep. 201 X J 

0

° Fish. I. S .. (August 20, 201X). Why Is the ~llA in Xinjiang'? Available at: https://slate.com/news-andpolilics/20 18/08/xinj iang -the-nba-is-running-a-training-camp-in-the-mid<lle-ol~one-oHhe- worlds-worsthumanitarian-alrocitics.html [Accessed 19 Scp. 2018] 

www.uhrp.org 10 
33

Mr. YOHO. Thank you, Mr. Turkel. 

Dr. Jacobs. 

STATEMENT OF JUSTIN JACOBS, PH.D., ASSOCIATE PROFESSOR, DEPARTMENT OF HISTORY, AMERICAN UNIVERSITY 

Mr. JACOBS. Distinguished members of the committee, thank you 

for holding this hearing on China’s policies in Xinjiang and for inviting me to testify. 

From 1949 to 2001, the Chinese Communist Party generally regarded the mostly Muslim population of the Xinjiang Uyghur autonomous region as deserving of some form of cultural autonomy 

within China. 

These longstanding views have come under sustained assault 

over the past 15 years, during which time China has been gradually accelerating its policies of cultural assimilation, intrusive surveillance, and unlawful detention of the Uyghur ethnic group, with 

the devastating intensification of the more coercive aspects of these 

measures in the past 2 to 3 years. 

Since 2009, a series of violent incidents appears to have convinced the Chinese Communist leadership that it must solve its socalled Uyghur problem in Xinjiang once and for all. 

The result is the oppressive security apparatus, arbitrary system 

of indefinite detention, and coercive assimilationist measures now 

on display in Xinjiang, all of which have been institutionalized and 

normalized in the past 2 years. 

Ever since the appointment of Chen Quanguo as party secretary 

of Xinjiang in 2016, surveillance and assimilationist policies previously tested in Chen’s prior posting to Tibet have been greatly expanded and accelerated in Xinjiang. 

With regard to cultural assimilation, the elimination of bilingual 

education in minority languages such as Uyghur, a policy previously applied only at the university level, has now been instituted 

in primary and secondary schools as well. 

The state also provides new financial incentives for Han men to 

marry Uyghur women, and Uyghurs who wish to sell their property 

must apply for government permission to do so. 

Mosques are frequently closed down without explanation and Islamic insignia, such as the crescent moon, have been removed from 

those that remain open. 

The euphemistic political reeducation schools are now believed to 

be responsible for the arbitrary and indefinite incarceration of anywhere from several hundred thousand up to 1 million Uyghurs, or 

between 3 to 10 percent of the entire population. It is clear that 

all members of the Uyghur ethnic group are being considered for 

mass internment in these camps. Leaked documents and press reports reveal the existence of mandatory quotas for internment. 

Chen Quanguo and Beijing appear to be committed to the permanent institutionalization and further expansion of these reeducation camps, with evidence of massive construction projects continuing to leak to the outside world. 

Chinese leaders believe that their approach in Xinjiang is working. As a result, we should not expect to see any voluntary reVerDate 0ct 09 2002 15:24 Oct 30, 2018 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00037 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\_AP\092618\32303 SHIRL
34

trenchment or scaling back of the new measures on the part of Beijing. 

Indeed, this frightening dystopia did not originate in Xinjiang 

and it will not end in Xinjiang. The United States is uniquely positioned to take on a global leadership role concerning this crisis. 

Not only have the major global powers mostly failed to confront 

China on its treatment of the Uyghur people, but even the leaders 

of majority Muslim countries have until recently tended to shy 

away from raising the issue with Beijing. 

Going forward, I believe that there are four policy options that 

may help to ameliorate a few of the worst abuses of the system and 

encourage Beijing to reevaluate its role in perpetuating the human 

rights crisis on a scale not seen in China since the days of Mao 

Zedong. 

First, in accordance with the Magnitsky Act, the United States 

should consider the adoption of sanctions against key members of 

the Chinese Communist Party associated with the implementation 

of the excessive and indiscriminate policies in Xinjiang. 

Second, the United States should call for the release of the hundreds of thousands of Uyghurs who have been unlawfully and arbitrarily detained in the so-called ‘‘political reeducation schools’’ and 

other extralegal facilities in Xinjiang. 

Third, the United States should urge the Chinese Communist 

leadership to avoid excessive and indiscriminate incarceration and 

surveillance measures that target entire religious and ethnic 

groups within China. 

And fourth, the United States should encourage China to uphold 

the provisions in its own constitution that provide for the cultural, 

linguistic, and religious autonomy of its minority groups. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman and committee members, for your attention and consideration. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Jacobs follows:]

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China's Repression and Internment ofUyghurs: U.S. Policy Responses 

Testimony of Justin M. Jacobs 

Associate Professor of History 

American University 

Before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs 

Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific 

September 26.2018 

Chairman Yoho, Ranking Member Sherman, and distinguished members of the 

committee, thank you for holding this hearing on China's policies in Xinjiang and for 

inviting me to testifY. 

For the past fifteen years, China has been gradually intensifying its policies of coercive 

assimilation, intrusive surveillance, and unlawful detention ofthc Uyghur ethnic group in 

the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region. From 1949 to 2001, the Chinese Communist 

Party generally regarded the mostly Muslim population of Xinjiang as deserving of some 

form of cultural autonomy within China. The Uyghurs were designated as one of the 

largest of China's fifty-six officially recognized ethnic groups, with various social, 

economic, and educational benefits made available to its members in order to help 

reinforce this autonomy. Using multiculturalist policies adapted from the Soviet Union, 

China went to great lengths both to institutionalize and to celebrate the inclusion of a 

distinct Uyghur ethnic group within the modem Chinese state. Tt was widely 

acknowledged that the Uyghurs were a Turkic-speaking Muslim people, and that the 

preservation of their cultural identities constituted evidence of a tolerant and progressive 

Chinese leadership. 

These longstanding views have come under sustained assault over the past fifteen years, 

with a devastating intensification of the more coercive aspects of Beijing's new approach 

in the past two to three years. Since 200 I, Beijing has been able to take advantage of the 

U.S. "global war on terrorism" to conduct its own parallel "war'' on any group of people 

it chooses to associate with terrorism in China. Chief among these groups are the 

Uyghurs, whom Beijing often identities with various "East Turkestan" independence 

movements. Because China's suppression of"East Turkestan" groups has been largely 

focused on Muslim peoples within Xinjiang, it has long escaped close international 

scrutiny. 

This lack of international scrutiny changed in 2009, when an attempt by the Chinese 

police in Ummchi to break up the peaceful demonstrations ofUyghur demonstrators 

prompted riots and bloodshed between Uyghurs and Han. Then, from 2013 to 2015, a 

series of violent insurrections broke out in cities throughout Xinjiang and China, 

including a car attack at Tiananmen Square and a mass knifing incident in Kunming. 

Taken together, these incidents appear to have convinced the Chinese Communist 

leadership that the "Uyghur problem" in Xinjiang must be solved once and for all. 
36


32303c-2.eps

The result is the oppressive security apparatus, arbitrary system of indefinite detention, 

and coercive assimilationist mcasmes now on display in Xinjiang, all of which have been 

institutionalized and nonnalizcd in the past two to three years. Ever since the 

appointment of Chen Quanguo as Party Secretary ofXinjiang in 2016, surveillance and 

assimilationist policies previously tested in Chen's prior posting to Tibet have been 

greatly expanded and intensified in Xinjiang. 

With regard to cultural assimilation, the elimination of" bilingual education in minority 

languages such as Uyghur, a policy previously applied only at the university level, has 

now been instituted in primary and secondary schools as well. The state also provides 

new financial incentives for Han men to many Uyghur women, and Uyghurs who wish to 

sell their property must apply for government permission to do so. (Tfthcy live in a 

complex where Han are fhv, they will be required to sell their property to Han buyers.) 

Mosques arc frequently closed down without explanation, and Islamic insignia, such as 

the crescent moon, have been removed from those that remain open. Muslim restaurants 

have been required to remove references to "halal" food and are not allowed to advertise 

their establishments as "Muslim." 

With regard to intrusive surveillance and unlawful detention, the euphemistic "political 

re-education schools" are now believed to be responsible for the arbitrary and indefinite 

incarceration of anywhere from several hundred thousand up to a million Uyghurs. 

(There are approximately ten million Uyghurs in Xinjiang today, meaning that those who 

have been detained may represent up to 10% of the entire Uyghur population.) Only 

Uyghurs and other Muslim minority groups in Xinjiang are being put into these camps, 

v,;ith the reasons for incarceration ranging trom anything as simple as receiving an 

international phone call to growing a beard. 

Tt is clear that the entire Uyghur population is being considered tor mass internment in 

these camps: leaked documents and press reports reveal the existence of mandatory 

quotas tor internment, and some Han otlicials even go so far as to describe the utility of 

these camps as similar to spraying herbicide indiscriminately over an entire plot of grass 

in order to kill just the weeds. And it is not only the camps that are tasked with this 

mission: major cities in Xinjiang are now saturated with police inspection kiosks every 

several hundred meters, while the regular prison system has also admitted a 

disproportionately large number ofUyghurs. These aggressive and extralegal detentions 

have created deep trauma within Uyghur communities. Nearly every Uyghur knows 

someone who has been sent to one of these camps, a realization that has prompted the 

repetition of a chilling phrase throughout the region: adem yoq ("everybody's gone"). 

Chen Quanguo and Beijing appear to be committed to the permanent institutionalization 

and further expansion of these re-education camps, with evidence of massive constmction 

projects continuing to leak to the outside world. Not only that, but the state has also 

succeeded in integrating large numbers ofUyghurs into the very same security apparatus 

that has detained up to ten percent of the rest of the Uyghur population. In other words, 

many Uyghur families have become perversely dependent upon the existence of the 
37


32303c-3.eps

camps and the security forces associated with the new policy environment. In tandem 

with the cultural assimilationist policies outlined above, the Chinese state has apparently 

managed to "naturalize" the application of its coercive power in Xinjiang, to the extent 

that many Uyghur families now obtain a portion of their household income from the same 

system that deprives them oftheir least pliable members. 

Chinese leaders believe that their approach in Xinjiang is working. Unlike the West, 

which is viewed as stumbling from one Muslim-associated political disaster to the next, 

Chinese policymakcrs have issued statements declaring their belief that by such means 

China has managed to avoid its ovvn "Libya" or "Syria." The official line, which many of 

China's top politicians and scholars seem to have genuinely embraced, is that the 

problems in Xinjiang stem directly from the same "global exportation ofradicallslam" 

that has long afflicted Western states. Beijing's heavy-handed and authoritarian approach 

to the situation in Xinjiang is viewed as a policymaking innovation that has already 

achieved more effective results than anything Western democracies have tried. 

Precisely because Xi Jinping and Chen Quanguo believe that their approach in Xinjiang 

is working, we should not expect any voluntary retrenchment or scaling hack of the new 

measures on the part of Beijing. The coercive security state currently entrenched in 

Xinjiang did not originate in Xinjiang-it was first tested out on a smaller scale in Tibet, 

and then exported and further developed in Xinjiang. Indeed, reliable evidence suggests 

that China has already begun to expand on its "success" in Xinjiang and is currently 

implementing similar policies among Chinese-speaking Muslims in the neighboring 

provinces of Gansu and Ningxia. Beijing has even passed newly restrictive regulations 

that are applicable to the practice of all religions anywhere in China, policies that are 

described as facilitating the "sinification" of religion. 

Outside of China, the same technology used to intrude on the 1 ivcs of Xinjiang's Uyghurs 

has already been exported to Zimbabwe and Ecuador. We can reasonably expect that 

other countries will soon join this list. Few of them, however, will be capable of 

maintaining the same degree of oversight and indoctrination that has allowed China to 

implement these measures so effectively. As a result, it is likely that the exportation of 

the technological and ideological foundation for China's repressive policies in Xinjiang 

elsewhere will lead not to terrified compliance, as seems to he the case in Xinjiang, hut 

rather to increased resistance and political instability among the targeted population in 

other parts of the world. 

The United States is uniquely positioned to take on a global leadership role concerning 

the human rights crisis currently unfolding in Xinjiang. Not only have the major global 

powers mostly failed to confront China on its treatment of the Uyghur people, hut even 

the leaders of majority Muslim countries have until recently tended to shy away from 

raising the issue with Beijing. No Middle Eastern country has taken up the cause of the 

Muslims in China, nor have any of the Central Asian republics situated along Xinjiang's 

western border attempted to lobby publicly on behalf of their Turkic-speaking cousins. 

The reason is simple: most of the world's countries are grossly dependent on maintaining 
38


32303c-4.eps

a positive economic and trade relationship with China, and to speak up on Xinjiang is to 

risk endangering that relationship. 

As such, the United States is one of the few countries capable of calling sustained global 

attention to what is happening in Xinjiang. As China plunges headlong into a cynical 

retrenchment and betrayal of its own ptior policies of multicultural and multiconfessional tolerance, the United States can take the opportunity to champion the 

integrity and importance of these values and position itself as a defender of the rights of 

religious minorities. The conviction of many Chinese leaders that their policies in 

Xinjiang represent an tmmitigated success story may waver if they begin to encounter a 

global backlash. Though growing media attention to the situation in Xinjiang has finally 

forced some of these same leaders to issue defensive statements about the situation in 

Xinjiang, Beijing has yet to be forced to reckon with the consequences of its actions. 

Historians of the future will pass a harsh judgment upon the Communist leadership of 

China for its cutTent policies toward the Uyghurs in Xinjiang. The following policy 

recommendations may help to ameliorate a few of the worst abuses of the system and 

encourage Beijing to re-evaluate its role in perpetuating a human rights crisis of a scale 

not seen in China since the days of Mao Zedong: 

• In accordance with the Magnitsky Act, the United States should consider the 

adoption of sanctions against key members of the Chinese Communist Party 

associated with the implementation of the excessive and indiscriminate policies in 

Xinjiang. 

• The United States should call for the release of the hundreds of thousands of 

Uyghurs who have been unlawfully and arbitrarily detained in the so-called 

"political re-education schools" and other extra-legal facilities in Xinjiang. 

• The United States should urge the Chinese Communist leadership to avoid 

excessive and indiscriminate incarceration and surveillance measures that target 

entire religious and ethnic groups within China. 

• The United States should encourage China to uphold the provisions in its own 

constitution that provide for the cultural, linguistic, and religious autonomy of its 

minority groups. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman and committee members, for your attention and consideration. 
39

Mr. YOHO. I appreciate all of your comments, and I think your 

last statement is how China’s constitution says they should incorporate all this and they should be doing all this, but as we see over 

and over again, China leads by lie, deceit, and coercion. 

They say one thing, they do something else. It’s like when they 

were telling President Obama in the Rose Garden that, we are not 

militarizing the South China Sea on reclaimed lands that we cannot call islands because islands denote ownership—it’s reclaimed 

lands—that we are not militarizing them, and we see over and over 

again they speak deception while they do underhanded things. 

Very dangerous place to be, and, again, I can’t think of anything 

more Orwellian on the planet than what China is doing. 

I think you guys have all seen this Radio Free Asia report—

Xinjiang rapidly building crematoriums to extinguish Uyghur funeral traditions—to extinguish Uyghur funeral traditions. It’s a 

very disturbing report when you read through this about what they 

are doing. 

It says, amid concerns over expansion of the burial management 

centers in XUAR, or Xinjiang, a job posting listed on the official 

government Web site for the region’s capital, Urumqi, last month 

called for 50 security personnel with above average health who are 

physically and mentally fit, exceptionally brave, to work in the crematorium located in the city’s district for a salary of more than 

8,000 yen and that is the U.S. equivalent of $1,215 per month. 

I think it’s kind of interesting—50 security personnel of above 

average health who are physically and mentally fit to work in a 

crematorium. 

I think what we are seeing here is a repeat of what we’ve seen 

too many times in history, and shame on us, shame on the free 

world, to turn a blind eye and not stand up to this. 

And how do you stand up to it? Can one nation stand up to it, 

or does it take the world community realizing this, define it for 

what it is? And, again, we’ve seen this in Syria—400,000-plus people have been slaughtered. 

We see what’s going on with the Rohingya being slaughtered, 

and we see what China is doing, stepping up to create a pure race. 

Hitler wanted the Aryan race, obviously, and then we see Xi 

Jinping, clearly articulated underlying in the Xinjiang region where 

he said the aim of liberating thought is to better standardize 

thought. 

Then he goes on and says in the speech at the nineteenth CCP 

National Congress he addressed the need for ethnic harmony to 

keep China on a path to success—ethnic harmony—we must do 

more to safeguard China’s sovereignty, security, and development 

interests and staunchly oppose all attempts to split China or undermine its ethnic unity and social harmony and stability. 

And I think those are very clear things. They want everybody 

thinking the same way on the same page, and that would be awesome if we could do that in every culture. 

And if you believe in what we stand for in this country with our 

Constitution—that rights come from a Creator, not from government—that we institute government—we, the people, do—to protect our God-given rights, wherein the Chinese party they view the 

role of the citizen to serve the Communist Party. 

40

There is no higher authority in life in China than the Communist 

Party, and those that aren’t following what the Chinese Communist Party says need to be sent to re-thought camps or reeducation camps and, henceforth, it requires to have crematoriums for 

those that don’t and so they can extinguish that. 

What is the PRC’s vision for ethnic harmony? We’ll start with 

you, Dr. Zenz. Am I off on this or are we seeing a repeat of Adolph 

Hitler, in a different language? 

Mr. ZENZ. My personal opinion on this issue, Mr. Chairman, is 

that China considers itself as a multi-ethnic nation or even empire 

in the past and under current CCP leadership. 

It’s a superficially diverse multi-ethnic Chinese nation under the 

leadership of Chinese culture. In this context, China does not have 

any interest to destroy or eliminate an ethnic group but, rather, to 

integrate and to assimilate. 

It’s my belief that we are not looking at an intentional genocide 

in terms of the large-scale killing of an ethnic group. What I perceive is very—what I perceive is very consistent with a Communist 

practice to try to change a people. 

Here we see a Communist attempt to change a people particularly away from religion, which is not only limited to Uyghurs but 

also to other religious groups in other parts of China. 

With the Uyghurs it’s being done with particular intensity due 

to the sensitive location and the fact that violent incidents have occurred. 

And on the second line we also see an attempt to ethnically and 

linguistically assimilate a people into the core culture of the Chinese nation, which is the Han Chinese culture, which permits a 

certain remnant of ethnic culture to remain. 

People can speak their language, to an extent. They can keep 

harmless cultural customs, although the space for that has been 

shrinking under the current Chinese regime. There was much more 

space for this under previous Chinese regimes.I21As a result, I believe we are looking at these camps at political reeducation. These 

camps will naturally have higher mortality rates due to their conditions. 

People who are sick and elderly or suffer from mental conditions 

will, naturally, die quicker. We will have, therefore, higher mortality rates due to the conditions of these camps. 

I do not believe that there is an intent to systematically move 

into mass killing. Of course, I can be proven wrong. But if you ask 

my opinion, that’s what it is. 

I also believe that the crematoria that are being built that you 

refer to, all of China is moving toward cremation by 2020, not just 

Xinjiang. 

Of course, this has some very convenient side effects besides saving room, of course, in a country with a high population density, 

although Xinjiang autonomous region does not have a high population density. 

It does restrict and eliminate religious practice related to funerals. Many religions, of course, including Islam have very important 

funeral rites of spiritual and religious importance. 

So this is another way to encroach upon a territory occupied by 

religion, and another aspect is, of course, if people do die in reeduVerDate 0ct 09 2002 15:24 Oct 30, 2018 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00044 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\_AP\092618\32303 SHIRL
41

cation camps or the detention facilities, it is very convenient to cremate them because you do not have anybody attending the funeral. 

You can then choose to tell and inform the family members at a 

later stage. 

Mr. YOHO. Let me—let me stop you there for the sake of time. 

Mr. ZENZ. Yes. I am done, in any case. 

Mr. YOHO. Okay. Thank you, and I appreciate that and I want 

to come back to that. 

At this time, we’ll go to the ranking member, Mr. Sherman. 

Mr. SHERMAN. Thank you. I am glad that—when I heard crematorium next to concentration or internment camps, one hearkens 

back to the Nazis where they were not cremating those who had 

died, they were using crematoriums in order to kill. 

That being said, Dr. Zenz, are there funerals and burials taking 

place in the province now or are they forcing Uyghurs to use cremation instead? 

Mr. ZENZ. I think there is limited empirical information on the 

matter. But the evidence we have would be consistent with what 

is being sought to be implemented in the rest of the nation to shift 

toward cremation. 

Mr. SHERMAN. Push people in that direction. 

Mr. ZENZ. Yes, which is forced. Which is forced. It’s not voluntary, and particular in Xinjiang. 

Mr. SHERMAN. So I guess someone will be buried today who died 

of natural causes, but another family might be pushed into accepting cremation as opposed to burial or Islamic burial? 

Mr. ZENZ. That is very much the trend, especially in Xinjiang. 

Yes. 

Mr. SHERMAN. Yeah, I’m talking only in Xinjiang. 

Mr. ZENZ. Yes. 

Mr. SHERMAN. I don’t know which witness to ask, but Turkey 

used to be an advocate for what is called East Turkmenistan. Is 

Turkey continuing to advocate for the Uyghurs or have they backed 

off? Does anyone know? 

Mr. Turkel? 

Mr. TURKEL. I would be happy to answer that question. Before 

addressing your important question, I would like to point out the 

unstated goal of the Chinese Government under this claim that 

they’re working to achieve social stability. 

In any—under any wildest imagination you don’t achieve social 

stability by calling somebody’s ethnicity or ethnic cultural appreciation as a tumor, religion as a mental disease. It makes no sense 

in any——

Mr. SHERMAN. Okay. If you could focus on my question. 

Mr. TURKEL. And then in addressing your question, Turkey has 

been historically—was historically supportive of the Uyghur struggle for cultural, linguistic, and historic reasons. 

In 2009, the current Turkish President said that he thinks what 

is happening in East Turkestan is sort of genocide, knowing the 

genocide word is a very sensitive word in Turkey. 

But in the last couple years, the Turkish Government has taken 

a 180 degree turn—has become very close to the Chinese Government. Specifically, they signed an extradition treaty and also the 

42

Turkish foreign minister in Beijing stated that Turkey will not be 

allowed for anti-China activities. 

Having said that, if you flip through any newspapers published 

in Turkey, you will be hard-pressed to find anything on the ongoing 

madness in East Turkestan today. 

Mr. SHERMAN. So they’ve gone from supportive to deliberately influencing their newspapers to not even report what China is doing 

to the—to these Turkic peoples. 

What about Pakistan? Have they been willing to speak out for 

the Uyghurs? 

Mr. TURKEL. Pakistan has also had a horrible history of collaborating with China. 

Mr. SHERMAN. Which Muslim government or——

Mr. TURKEL. Unfortunately——

Mr. SHERMAN [continuing]. A government of a Muslim country 

has been the loudest and most dedicated to protecting the 

Uyghurs? 

Mr. TURKEL. Unfortunately, none, as we speak. Only Malaysian 

leader Anwar Ibrahim recently expressed concern. That’s pretty 

much about it. 

Mr. SHERMAN. Expressed concern. But none of them have sanctioned any Chinese leaders? 

Mr. TURKEL. None, unfortunately. 

Mr. SHERMAN. Or sanctioned Chinese businesses? Which religious customs or rights is China prohibiting? 

Mr. TURKEL. The—China’s Government sanctions pretty much 

everything related to Islam, especially in the last 19 months. 

Mr. SHERMAN. So if you don’t eat during daylight in Ramadan, 

what will they do to you? 

Mr. TURKEL. Foreign Policy magazine listed 48 ways that you’d 

be considered an extremist in the eyes of the Chinese Government 

under this new draconian rule of regulation imposed April 2017 

that sanctioned a normal beard, adherence to Islamic diet——

Mr. SHERMAN. You mean eating halal food makes you an Islamic 

extremist? 

Mr. TURKEL. This is under their new regulation. There are policy 

papers that have been written. Reports have been published on this 

particular issue. Foreign Policy magazine lists 48 behaviors that 

you and I——

Mr. SHERMAN. And the Foreign Policy magazine is translating a 

Chinese regulation——

Mr. TURKEL. That’s correct. 

Mr. SHERMAN [continuing]. That says you can—you are classified 

an Islamic extremist and subject to internment if you eat halal 

food? 

Mr. TURKEL. Even greeting in an Islamic way. Today, Uyghur 

families cannot even say ‘‘salaam alaikum’’ as part of their culture. 

Mr. SHERMAN. So they’re, basically, prohibiting the practice of 

Islam while not allowing perhaps a vague Islamic cultural identity 

and the Muslim nations of the world lift not a finger. 

Mr. TURKEL. That’s the ironic world that we find ourselves today, 

unfortunately. 

Mr. SHERMAN. I yield back. 

Mr. YOHO. Next, we’ll go to Mr. Rohrabacher from California. 

43

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Let me ask the panel, didn’t Mao have a period of time after he 

took over where he—was it ‘‘let a thousand flowers bloom’’ or something like that? Do you remember what I am talking about? 

And, apparently, there was—in order to calm people down about 

this new power structure in China it came off as if the—well, it’s 

not going to be so bad after all, and then when all the flowers 

began to bloom, meaning all the people became—coming out and 

expressing what they really believed about communism and about 

life, he had mass arrests and after that they had, of course, that 

effort that happened in the ’60s where they just—a cultural revolution and just wiped all those people out who had exposed themselves to something other than the Communist ideology. 

Well, what it sounds like to me is that what we have now—let 

1,000 flowers bloom—I was right. Okay. What we seem to be having now and what you’re describing is that the Chinese Government is going through another period where it is clamping down 

in order to stamp out those forces in society, especially those containing religion like the Uyghurs have that part of their culture—

they’re trying to stamp that out in order to secure that they—themselves from any opposition based on that cultural difference. 

Does that pretty well sound like we are going through that 

phase? It sounds like to me, especially when we hear your testimony talking about how there are relocation camps and there are—

there is an infrastructure being built to brutally eliminate the 

Uyghur tradition in that part of China—just eliminate it from the 

world. 

And so thank you for being here and giving us those details, and 

I was listening to what you had to say and I would say it’s frightening but it’s consistent with what, frankly, those of us who’ve 

been worrying about China and the Communist Government of 

China, although, I don’t even know if you can call it a Communist 

government. 

It’s just a vicious, one of the most iron-fisted dictatorships in the 

world. And whether or not—how they think about Marx or Lenin 

is irrelevant to that. 

However, when you have a group that might be opposing that 

who has a religious conviction the Uyghurs are finding that out 

now. 

But you have had—the Falun Gong, as you know, have had a 

very peaceful oriented philosophy—a spiritualist type philosophy. 

They’re being brutally repressed, being murdered and their organs 

are sold to Westerners at times, and then, as I say, we got the—

is it Rohingya down in Burma. 

The Chinese are actually the ones who have organized and 

armed the Burmese Government and the military to go down there 

and commit the genocide—the genocide that is taking place with 

the Rohingya. 

So I hope that we get the attention of some of the people and, 

number one, your suggestions, whichever one it was, about activating the Magnitsky Act—it’s a good idea—when you have people 

committing crimes against humanity. 

I disagreed with the title, Magnitsky, but I certainly agreed with 

the substance of what that act was all about and is all about. We 

44

should do that. We should actually—and but most importantly, 

your testimony is as well. 

Mr. Chairman—because we’ve got to make sure American corporations aren’t involved with providing the technology needed for 

this repression—this wave of repression to succeed in China and 

some of our own companies need to be held accountable. 

One last question—we are mentioning countries that have 

stepped forward. Has not Albania stepped forward and taken in a 

group of Uyghurs or am I mistaken about that? 

Mr. TURKEL. Thank you very much. May I address your question? 

Good to see you, Congressman Rohrabacher. We’ve known each 

other quite a long time. 

Albania has not stepped up. Albania took some Uyghurs being 

detained in Guantanamo years ago. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Right. 

Mr. TURKEL. But Kosovo, interestingly enough, after the Ministerial that Secretary Pompeo organized several weeks ago, is one of 

the countries, along with the U.K., Canada, and the United States, 

to sign on the joint statement. That’s the only Muslim country——

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Okay. So Kosovo has but——

Mr. TURKEL. Not Albania. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. But Albania has not? 

Mr. TURKEL. Not yet. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. So—okay, I will check that out. Let me just 

note that I’ve been told a number of times that Albania and the 

Kosovars have been done but Albania was—in particular was mentioned to me. So we’ll look into that. 

Mr. Chairman, that may be something the committee can verify 

and I appreciate that information. 

Mr. TURKEL. Thank you. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for having this 

hearing today. I am going to run to that other hearing and then 

to the vote and then to the other thing. 

So sorry I can’t stay for the whole thing. 

Mr. YOHO. You will be in shape at the end of the day. [Laughter.] 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Okay. 

Mr. YOHO. So where do we go from here? Again, we don’t normally have people comment. If you can give just one comment, and 

this is the only time we are going to do it. So don’t anybody else 

raise your hand, and keep it short, please. 

[Off-microphone comment.] 

Mr. YOHO. Let me address that after Mr. Chabot. Thank you. 

Mr. CHABOT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will be very brief. I am 

trying to do two things at once here. I apologize. I was in the back 

room with a meeting with some folks from Puerto Rico. 

Again, I apologize, Mr. Chairman. Thanks for letting us go next. 

Let me begin by just saying, having served as the chair of this subcommittee for a number of years and having travelled through the 

Asia-Pacific region a number of times, I think many of us are very 

aware of China’s terrible human rights record and the case in 

Xinjiang is truly Orwellian. 

45

Uyghurs are routinely subjected to the most extreme and, really, 

absurd surveillance. They face random checks, restricted freedom 

of movement, and they cannot travel abroad. 

Worse, authorities have made extensive use of video surveillance, 

facial recognition, and artificial intelligence to track every Uyghur’s 

every move. 

Most dystopian of all, authorities also maintain detailed records 

on Uyghurs including DNA samples, eye scans, and blood types. 

Unfortunately, Beijing has spread its repression well beyond 

Xinjiang. Uyghurs around the world, including here in America, 

often face threats to their families at home unless they comply with 

Chinese authorities’ demands and help monitor fellow Uyghurs. 

Beijing claims to be worried about terrorism. But every country 

faces counterterrorism challenges without locking up over 1 million 

people. And the bottom line is Beijing is terrorizing their Uyghur 

population and it’s just unacceptable. 

So just a couple of questions and I would welcome any of the gentlemen here to respond. Over the past couple of years, the situation 

in Xinjiang has worsened considerably and we know that China’s 

economic influence is quite comprehensive and can be pretty 

daunting, and Mr. Sherman got in this to some extent but I would 

like to go a little bit further. 

And I would ask to what extent has this influence caused other 

countries, particularly the—some of the larger Muslim population 

countries to overlook or refrain from public criticism of China’s 

treatment of the Uyghurs? 

And I would offer that to anybody who might—Mr. Turkel, you 

might be the best person because you touched on it before. 

Mr. TURKEL. There are a couple of possible ways to answer that 

question. 

One is to those Muslim countries, it appears that the Uyghurs 

happen to be the wrong type of Muslim to show sympathy. 

Mr. CHABOT. You said the wrong kind of Muslim? 

Mr. TURKEL. Yes, and then the other possibility is that China 

happens to be the wrong type of adversary for them to take on. 

And then finally, this committee holds a hearing about the Chinese coersive influence campaign that have been very effective in 

the Muslim countries. There was a question about Pakistan. Pakistan has been very supportive of Chinese efforts to silence the Pakistani Uyghur citizens even. 

And in the Gulf States, particularly UAE, Egypt, has a horrible 

track record of deporting Uyghur students, which has been also reported by various media outlets, and in Malaysia, in a previous administration, has also deported some Uyghurs. 

In the refugees issues they have been very, very cooperative with 

the Chinese Government. But on the moral issues, they have been 

looking the other way. 

Mr. CHABOT. Thank you, and I think I’ve got time for one more 

question, Mr. Chairman. 

It’s my understanding that some members of the Uyghur diaspora have been targeted by Chinese authorities and I would ask 

how have Chinese authorities sought to co-opt or coerce or punish 

members of the Uyghur diaspora around the world and particularly 

here in the United States? 

46

Mr. TURKEL. They use two different methods. One, they use the 

remaining family members in China as leverage against the free 

Uyghurs who have citizenship in Europe and North America. 

So by using their family members, they silence public criticism. 

And then we had also recently Voice of America did a report on a 

public event here in Washington, DC. It specifically states that 

none of the Uyghurs who spoke with the reporter were comfortable 

disclosing their names. 

I can assure you that many Uyghurs today living and breathing 

in this free country are afraid of coming to this hearing. 

So the Chinese export of its oppression and the psychological 

damage—emotional damage, the crippling anxiety that they have 

caused is immeasurable in various communities, particularly in the 

Western societies. 

Mr. CHABOT. Thank you. 

Mr. Chairman, if I could just conclude. I mean, I think what was 

just said, it’s very disturbing when one considers that people would 

be fearful—people living here in the United States would be fearful 

to come to a hearing before the United States Congress because of 

what might happen across the globe to their relatives back home 

and I think that the administration ought to look into this and we 

ought to do everything possible to make sure that people know that 

in the United States it truly is a place to be free and one ought 

not to have to worry about their relatives being harmed back home 

from the PRC or anybody else. 

I yield back. 

Mr. YOHO. No, I think you’re very spot on. But, you know, you 

look at the long arm—the reach of the Chinese Government now 

with the intelligence they have, with the technology, and then looking to the future, when we get closer to perfecting artificial intelligence and then put in quantum computing, that’ll be light years 

of where we are today. The control they can have on society over 

here for the people back home, as you just said, they’ll be afraid 

to speak up. 

And I find it very disturbing because, again, we’ve seen this 

throughout history. You know, if you don’t fall in line with the government, we want you to report and we want you to report your 

neighbors. 

On these so-called reeducation camps—and the only place I know 

of them in modern time were in Nazi Germany, in North Korea, 

and now we see them in China—have you guys talked to many people that have every come out of the reeducation camp? 

I mean, what is the average time in a reeducation camp and how 

many people come out? 

Mr. Turkel. 

Mr. TURKEL. Not many. Not many. We have only a handful of 

former detainees who have been speaking with Western media. 

There is a Kazakh citizen who has been testifying and told us the 

stories of an 11-month ordeal. 

He’s a Kazakh citizen travelling in China and he came up and 

described his experience in those camps, and his parents had been 

taken away, and he apparently could not continue to live in 

Kazakhstan—recently had been relocated to Turkey, and Radio 

Free Asia recently went to Turkey to interview the actual victims 

47

of those detention facilities and their accounts have been heartwrenching—going through tortuous condemnation, denunciation, 

renunciation of their identity, watching so-called anti-separatist 

videos praising Xi Jinping, singing Red songs, very poor health conditions, diet. 

Even today—last night I read a Radio Free Asia report about a 

31-, 32-year-old young woman who died in one of those detention 

facilities. And earlier, Radio Free Asia also reported an 82-year-old 

Islamic scholar who was apparently tortured to death in prison, 

and, as reported recently, his entire family had been taken away. 

And one thing that we need to point out here—the Chinese Government is attacking Uyghur intellectuals. 

Mr. YOHO. Sure. 

Mr. TURKEL. Elites, business leaders, musicians, athletes. Just 

reported last night again by Radio Free Asia, the vice president of 

Xinjiang University, president—former president of Xinjiang Medical University, and the four top officials at Kashgar University all 

have been taken away. 

And the person who is in charge of educational affairs reportedly, 

by Radio Free Asia, received the death penalty, which is—I literally cannot come up with a better word——

Mr. YOHO. It’s just hard to comprehend. 

Dr. Jacobs, anybody else, have any comments on that? Dr. Zenz? 

Mr. ZENZ. If I may go ahead—I would add to this that the information we have on this is fairly limited. But what we do have is 

very consistent. The information is consistent that people go in. 

More and more people go in. Very few people go out. Numbers are 

increasing. 

I should also point out that in 2014 and 2015, the reeducation 

system for de-extremification grouped Uyghurs into four groups, 

and the most hardened, stubborn, and dangerous received 20 days 

of reeducation. 

These days, it’s unread of that anybody would be detained on no 

crime at all, no suspicion, no charge, no nothing whatsoever, and 

be released in—as quickly as 20 days. It’s unheard of. 

Mr. YOHO. Yes. I just find it extremely frightening. 

Dr. Jacobs, do you have any other comments? 

Mr. JACOBS. The only other evidence that we’ve had are from 

people who have come out and they then toed the party line as well 

and you will get this utopian account of how great the camps are. 

Mr. YOHO. Right. 

Mr. JACOBS. And they’ll come out saying, you know, this is necessary. The only way you’re going to get contrary testimony to that 

is by people who have been able to leave China and are not afraid 

of family members back home suffering repercussions. 

Mr. YOHO. Right. I want to address our audience back there that 

wanted to make a statement. Unfortunately, I can’t do that because 

we didn’t have prior permission from both sides. 

We’ll be happy to get a statement that we can enter into this and 

maybe read it at a future one. Not to slight you or anything, but 

we are—you know, we checked on the rules and I can’t do that. 

You know, again, I just don’t want to sound like a broken record. 

We’ve seen this too many times in history and we see what China 

is trying to do to create a one China, one mind set, one culture. 

48

Yet, they’re going after the people of Tibet, trying to rewrite history, trying to erase that culture. We’ve seen that in other parts 

of China—trying to erase that, and we see that with the Uyghurs. 

We see where they’re going with this new technology to get people to toe the line. If you don’t toe the line, you go to the reeducation camps. The way we understand it there has been over 1 million people put into these. 

We know the party elites that don’t toe the party line are put 

into reeducation camps and we know they have over 1 million of 

those. But very few come out. It’s like that song of the Eagles, 

‘‘Hotel California’’—you can check in but you can’t check out. 

And, you know, the thought that we are repeating those atrocities of the past are very disturbing and with the DNA and the retinal scans and things that they’re tracking people, there’s a U.S. 

company—Thermo Fisher—I understand that’s involved in genetic 

testing equipment used for forced tests. 

Do you guys have any ideas of what Congress should do with any 

company that is involved in having their equipment involved in 

this? Sanction them, being—you know, get the word to them, don’t 

participate? 

Dr. Zenz. 

Mr. ZENZ. I think some companies may not fully realize what is 

going on or what it means to sell equipment to Xinjiang. Maybe 

they should be realizing by now. But I think the first item would 

be a significant awareness raising in the public and amongst, of 

course, companies. 

Elevate the issue, and then issue relevant decisions on it. But I 

think especially the publicity—the awareness—and also the cost involved. 

Mr. YOHO. No, I think that’s a great idea and that’s something 

that we can do on this committee, and if you guys are aware of any 

companies involved in their equipment being used in this, and it’s 

like you said—they may not even know. 

But if we can get that to them and bring an attention to this, 

I would think our companies would say, you’re not using our equipment. 

I find this shocking, you know. This is deeper than I thought—

the control that China is doing—and, you know, some of the reports I read that they talk about there is no higher power than the 

Chinese Government—no deity, nothing else. 

And I am so glad that we are in this country where we realize 

our rights come from a Creator, not from the government, and that 

China wants to turn everybody into a policing state and then they 

have the technology to make sure that they can follow through 

with that. 

What we plan to do on this committee, and it’s happened so 

many times, the information we deem from you will go into resolutions, letters to the different companies—different entities that are 

involved in this, and we’ve got some good results out of this. 

You know, we’ve got the Cambodia Democracy Act that the cronies around Hun Sen said would never go anywhere. Their media 

attacked us. Yet, that bill got passed here in the House and we are 

going to continue to do things like that. 

49

The DPRK Act, the Taiwan Travel Act—those are all things that 

came out of committee hearings like this, that we put pressure on 

those countries and we are going to continue to do that. 

Again, I just find this very disturbing and I hope anybody that’s 

listening to this that’s in this audience, you see George Orwell’s 

‘‘1984.’’ It is here and it is real, and this is the beginning of something that could be really catastrophic for the rest of the world and 

I think this is something that we need to get the message out for 

the family members that are here. 

You’re practicing Uyghurs and you have family members either 

left in China that are going through this process. You know, stay 

strong. Keep the word out there. Keep us—keep us informed. 

It’s shining the light on it through committee hearings like this, 

getting on the news, and I know you put yourself at risk or your 

family at risk. But if we go down the road and we do nothing, we 

will look back and have the regrets, and we just want to make sure 

we don’t make those regrets of the past. 

With that, this meeting is adjourned. I appreciate everybody 

being here and thank you for your input. 

[Whereupon, at 3:26 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] 

(51)

A P P E N D I X 

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SUBCOMMITTEE HEARING NOTICE 

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

W ASHTNGTON, DC 20515-6128 

Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific 

Ted Yoho (R-FL), Chairman 

September 19, 20 18 

TO: MEMBERS OF THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

You are respectfully requested to attend an OPEN hearing of the Committee on Foreign 

Affairs, to be held by the Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific in Room 2172 of the Rayburn 

House Office Building (and available live on the Committee website at 

h!tp I lv>I)"{wl:_ore!gMfi_'airs.llQ~): 

DATE: 

TIME: 

SUBJECT: 

WITNESSES: 

Wednesday, September 26, 2018 

2:00p.m. 

China's Repression and Internment ofUyghurs: U.S. Policy Responses 

Adrian Zenz, PhD. 

fudependent Researcher 

Mr. Nury Turkel 

Chairman of the Board 

Uyghur Human Rights Project 

Justin Jacobs, PhD. 

Associate Professor 

Department of History 

American University 

By Direction of the Chairman 
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COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

MINUTES OF SUBCOMMITTEE ON ________ A_sit_"_"'_il_<l_w_P_ac..::.ifl_rc _______ HEARING 

Starting Time --"2~:1,_,5c.l1"'11"-'II'-_Ending Time .1:30pm 

Recesses r .to .)( .to __ )( __ to __ )( __ to __ )( __ to __ )( __ In __ ) 

Presiding Mcmber(s) 

Rtp. l'nlto 

Cfteclr ttl/ oft!te [ol/owi11g tlwt ttpp(F: 

Open Session 0 EXl~cufi\'c ~sed) St•ssiun D Televised I.Zl 

TITLE OF IIEAIUNG: 

Electronically Reconl~taped) 0 

S(cnogrnphic Record LLJ 

Clti1111~~ Rep1·essiolllllllf Intemment of Uyghurs: U.S. Policy Respon!"es 

SUBCOMMITTEE MEMBERS PRESENT: 

Reps. Yoho, Rolmtbacller, Chabot 

Rep. Shermcm 

NON-SUBCOMMITTEE MEMBERS PRESENT: (Mark with an * if they are not membel's qf jill/ committee.) 

Rep. Comstock* 

HEARING WITNESSES: Same as meeting notice attached? Yes [2'] No0 

(If "no", pleme lis! be! ow and im:lud{! Iitle, ugel/cy, .depurlmenf, or orga11i2niion.) 

STATEMENTS FOR THE RECORD: (List any statements s!tbmittedfor the record.) 

SFR- Yo/10 (On Behllif of Amnesty Inte/'JUttionul) 

SFR" Connolly 

TIME SCHEDULED TO RECONVENE ___ _ 

or 

TIME ADJOURNED __ 3_:_3_0_~ 
54

MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD BY THE HONORABLE TED S. YOHO, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF FLORIDA, AND CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON ASIA AND THE PACIFIC


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Amnesty International is a global movement of more 

than 7 million people who campaign for a world 

where human rights are enjoyed by all. 

Our vision is for every person to enjoy all the rights 

enshrined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 

and other international human rights standards. 

We are independent of any government, political 

ideology, economic interest or religion and are .funded 

mainly by our membership and public donations. 

lndexo ASA 17/9113/2018 

Original language: English 

amnesty.org 

AMNESTY Jt 

INTERNATIONAl (tf 
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CONTENTS 

INTRODUCTION 

FAMILIES FEARING THE WORST 

"NO RIGHTS ZONE" 10 

"TRANSFORMATION THROUGH EDUCATION" 13 

TIME FOR ANSWERS 18 

CHINA:"WHEREARETHEY?" 

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INTRODUCTION 

Located 1n China's far northwest, the XinJiang Uighur Autonomous Region (XUAR) is a huge, sparsely 

populated area encompassing vast semi-desert steppes in the north and severe desert basins ringed by 

histone oas1s towns 1n the south. Roughly three t1mes the s1ze of France, the area covered by the XUAR 

was renowned over centuries for the ancient Silk Road and its flourishing conduit of trade and culture 

between China and the rest of the world. 

That history made the XUAR one of the most ethnically diverse reg1ons 1n China. More than half of the 

region's population of 22 million people belong to mostly Turkic and predominantly Muslim ethnic 

groups, including Uighurs (around 10 million), Kazakhs (around 1.5 million) and other populations 

whose languages, cultures and ways of l1fe vary distinctly from those of the Han who are the majonty 1n 

"intenor" China. 

Rich in coal, natural gas and oil and sharing borders with eight different countries, the XUAR 1s 

Intertwined with many of China's economic, strategic and foreign policy goals. But decades of interethnic tensions have led to cycles of sporadic violence and heavy-handed repression. China's leaders now 

consider stability in the XUAR vital to the success of the "Belt and Road Initiative", a mass1ve global 

Infrastructure development programme aimed at strengthening China's links to Central Asia and beyond. 1 

1 D Tweed, "China's New Silk Road," Bloor>Jbetg, 23 August 2018, www bloomberg.comlqUicktakelchina-s-silk-road 

CHINA:"WHEREARETHEY?" 

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Today, however, the world's attention has focused on the XUAR for other reasons. Over recent months, 

disturbing details have emerged from the region describing intrusive surveillance, arbitrary detention, 

political indoctrination and forced cultural assimilation being carried out there on a massive scale and 

targeting the region's Uighurs, Kazakhs and other predominantly Muslim peoples. In concluding 

observations to 1ts August 2018 rev1ew of China, the UN Committee on the El1m1nat1on of Rac1al 

Discrimination (CERD Committee) expressed alarm about reports of arbitrary, prolonged and 

1ncommun1cado mass detention of U1ghurs and other predominantly Muslim minont1es under the pretext 

of countenng terrorism and religious extremism. 2 

The p1cture of what 1s happening 1n the XUAR 1s gradually com1ng 1nto focus, but as the Chmese 

government has long barred any form of meaningful independent Investigation in the reg1on, much 

remains unknown. In recent months Amnesty International has spoken with more than 100 people 

across four continents who say they have lost touch with relatives and friends inside the XUAR and fear 

that they have been detained. The secret1ve and undocumented way people are gomg m1ssmg there 

makes it nearly 1m possible to trace or confirm the whereabouts of any particular individual. Amnesty 

International has begun to collect accounts from affected individuals, and these accounts corroborate 

many of the details that are being reported by others. 

At this pomt, our concern about recent developments 1n the XUAR demands that we urgently speak out 

and call on the Chmese authorities to begin providing credible answers to questions about the current 

crackdown. 

Among all those questions, perhaps most urgent 1s one all those fam1ly members who've reached out to 

us want answered more than any other. On behalf of the missing inside the XUAR and the people 

worldwide who care about them, it 1s that question we are now asking the Chinese government 1n a 

strong, un1f1ed vo1ce: "Where are They?" 

CHINA:"WHEREARETHEY?" 

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FAMILIES FEARING THE 

WORST 

I "When will the nightmare start again? What can I do? Who is 

going to care about us?" 

Uighur JOurnalist Gulchehra HoJa. on the detentmns her family has faced 1n the XUAR, 13 March 2018 

For months, relatives of the missing kept their anguish largely to themselves. They hoped that loss of 

contact with loved ones back home would be temporary, and they feared making things worse if they 

sought outside attention. Now, with no clear end 1n sight for their worries, more and more are Willing to 

speak up and share what they know. 

They come from the d 1aspora of Uighur em 1grants and refugees who have settled across the world and 

the thousands of Chinese-born Kazakhs who have taken up residence in neighbounng Kazakhstan, 

hav1ng until very recently been able to travel relatively freely back and forth between the two countries. 

BOlA'S ACCOUNT: "I WANT TO SEE MY FATHER AGAIN" 

Bota Kussaiyn, a Kazakh student studying at Moscow State University, last spoke with her father in 

I November 2017. Originally from the XUAR, their family had re-settled in Kazakhstan in 2013. A leg 

ailment led Bota's father, Kussaiyn Sagyambai, to return to the XUAR for medical treatment. 

Bota's father told her that local police had confiscated his passport without giving any reason. Three 

months later, her mother who had stayed behind 1n Kazakhstan learned from relatives back 1n the 

XUAR that her father was 1n a political "re-education" camp in E'min County, across the Kazakhstan 

CHINA:"WHEREARETHEY?" 

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border in the northwestern part of the XUAR, but the family did not know the exact location where he 

was being held. 

Those relatives were so afraid that further contact m1ght put them under susp1c1on that they stopped 

commun1catmg w1th her mother altogether after that. 

"My father 1s an ordinary cit1zen. We were a happy family before he was detained. We laughed 

together. We can't laugh any more, and we can't sleep at night. We live in fear every day. It has done 

great harm to my mother. We don't know where he 1s. We don't even know If he's still a11ve. I want to 

see my father again." 

(Online interview, 29 August 2018 and interview in Kazakhstan, 7 September 2018) 

To avoid arousing such suspicion, Uighurs, Kazakhs and others inside the XUAR have been cutting t1es 

with friends and fam1ly living outside China. They warn acquaintances not to call and delete outside 

contacts from social media applications. 5 The resulting communications vacuum only intensifies the 

1nformat1on black hole that the XUAR has become. When you lose all contact w1th loved ones back 

home, how do you know whether it is because they are intentionally avoiding you for self -protection or 

because they have been taken away by the authorities? Unable to get reliable 1nformat1on from home, 

many Uighurs and Kazakhs liv1ng abroad inevitably fear the worst. 

AKEDA'S ACCOUNT: WORRIES FOR MOTHER, PROMINENT UIGHUR SCHOLAR NOW MISSING 

Akeda (who asked to be identified only by her first name) last spoke with her mother, Rahile Dawut, in 

December 2017. She now fears her mother, a prominent Uighur scholar, has been detained at a "reeducation" camp in the XUAR. 6 When Akeda, who is studying in the USA, contacted relatives and 

her mother's students back in China, no one was able to prov1de her w1th any information. 

"I am scared for my mom. I am really concerned about her health and safety," Akeda told Amnesty 

International by email. "She is an honest and assiduous teacher. She dedicated all her life [to] 

teaching and research. I can't thmk of any reason why she should suffer." 

(Email correspondence with Amnesty International, 3 September 2018) 

CHINA:"WHEREARETHEY?" 

TIMEFORANSWERSABOUTMASSDETENTIONSINTHEXINJIANG UIGHUR AUTONOMOUS REGION 

AmnestJ·Internatlonal 
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Adding to the pressure on those living abroad are aggressive efforts by Chmese security officials to 

recruit sp1es in overseas commun1t1esJ Those targeted are reportedly threatened that if they do not 

cooperate, family members back in the XUAR will be detamed. If they do cooperate, on the other hand, 

they receive promises that family members will be treated leniently. 

Not knowing who among the community living overseas might be reporting back to secunty authorities in 

China plants seeds of suspicion and distrust that take root and further feed the sense of isolation and 

fear. The omnipresence of these feelmgs is contributing to a growmg crisis of despair and depression 

among the d1aspora commun1ty, according to a c11n1cal social worker who has surveyed U1ghurs 11v1ng 

abroad. 8 

0 

~ NURSHAT'S ACCOUNl TEENAGE DAUGHTER, SON BOTH GONE MISSING 

Nurshat Mamish went to Kazakhstan in November 2017 and is now a Kazakhstani citizen. She 

appeared heartbroken when she told Amnesty International that her 13-year-old daughter, Dinara 

Yergali, had gone missing after returning to Zhaosu County, XUAR, in March 2018. A month earlier, 

Dinara had gone to Kazakhstan to stay with her mother, but she returned when relatives back in 

XinJiang warned Nurshat that other family members would be 1n trouble if she and her family did not 

return immediately. 

Dinara did not want to leave her mother, but Nurshat and her family had her return, thinkmg that 

noth1ng would happen to a 13-year-old g1rl and it might reduce pressure on other family members. 

Now, however, Omara's whereabouts are unknown and her fam11y fears she has been detamed. 

Two months before Dinara went missing, Nurshat's 24-year-old son Yerbol Yergaliuli called from the 

XUAR to say that he had been detained. He, too, had been planning to join the family in Kazakhstan, 

1 but now Nurshat has no 1dea where he is. 

Hav1ng lost track of two children, Nurshat now says she can only hope that they Will soon be allowed 

to travel to Kazakhstan to reunite as a fam1ly. 

(Interview with Amnesty International, Almaty, Kazakhstan, 8 September 2018) 

Uighurs overseas also fear what might happen to them if they return to the XUAR. Those with the right to 

reside in other countries at least have the ability to stay where they are. But students on short-term visas 

or people seeking asylum in other countries do not always have that option. In 2017, more than 200 

Uighur students were detained in Egypt, of whom at least 22 were forced to return to China.9 To date, 

there 1s no news of their whereabouts. Even am1d grow1ng reports of the ongo1ng repression 1n the XUAR, 

an Immigration panel in Sweden Initially den1ed asylum to a Uighur family of four who were seeking to 

rebuild their lives in safety there. 10 

States have an obl1gat1on under 1nternat1onal law to w1th the pr1nc1 pie of non-refou!ement by ensunng 

that people are not returned, e1ther directly or Indirectly, a country where there is a real mk of ser1ous 

human nghts v1olat1ons or abuses 

CHINA:"WHEREARETHEY?" 

TIMEFORANSWERSABOUTMASSDETENTIONSINTHEXINJIANG UIGHUR AUTONOMOUS REGION 

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MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD BY THE HONORABLE TED S. YOHO, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF FLORIDA, AND CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON ASIA AND THE PACIFIC


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documents made public by local government organs, and a major intensification of the 

state security apparatus throughout Xinjiang all point to what has been documented in 

many personal anecdotes. Those who have travelled or have family abroad, along with 

those who are religiously observant, have expressed the slightest cntic1sm of the Chinese 

government, or have expressed an interest in preserving the Uyghur language and culture 

have all faced pressure from the authorities, along with their families and associates. 

The Chinese government acknowledges the detention of Uighurs but claims they are in 

technical train1ng institutes; however, their whereabouts are unknown, and any 

information is nearly impossible to gather. 

Mass detention camps began appearing in 2014, spreading at an alarming rate across 

Xinjiang province since then. In its 2018 review of China, the UN Committee on the 

Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CERD Committee) expressed concern over human 

rights violations in XUAR. Lack of information remains a paramount challenge 1n 

investigating the issue, but the CERD Committee estimates that there are "anywhere 

between several hundred thousand and just over one million" people have been 

detained. The legal process regarding these camps is questionable, as there are no tnals, 

lawyers, or opportunities to appeal the decision throughout the entire ordeal. I nd ivid uals 

l1ve in fear of being exposed and cut communication with family members in hopes of 

securing their safety. 

For example, Kairat Samarkan was sent to a detention camp in October 2017 after he 

returned to the XUAR following a short visit to neighboring Kazakhstan. Police told him 

he was detained because he was accused of having dual citizenship and had betrayed 

China. He was detained for over three months. Kairat told Amnesty International that he 

was hooded, forcibly shackled on his arms and legs, and was forced to stand in a fixed 

posit1on for 12 hours. He described that there were nearly 6,000 people held in the 

same camp, where they were forced to sing political songs and study speeches of the 

Chinese Communist Party. They could not talk to each other and were forced to chant 

"Long live Xi J1np1ng" before meals. Kairat told Amnesty International that the detention 

abuses drove him to attempt suicide, shortly before his release. Kairat's story is just one 

of many heartbreaking interviews we conducted to document the human rights abuses 

going on 1n Xinjiang. 

Ethnic tensions in XUAR have long persisted but only recently has such information been 

steadily exposed to the international community, and the situation is nothing less than 

f<.MNESTY IWERNA7"1QN,l,L US:.' 600 p,::NNS'r'LVA'liAAVE'lUE SE, 5TH FLOOR I vVP.SH!NGTON, DC 2C•J03 

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urgent. Veiled by the pretext of countering terrorism and religious extremism, Chinese 

authorities are operating under secrecy and denial of human rights abuses against ethnic 

Musl1m groups. 

Those who resist or fail to show enough progress reportedly face punishments ranging 

from verbal abuse to food deprivation, solitary confinement, beatings and use of 

restraints and stress positions. There have been reports of deaths inside the facilities, 

including suicides of those unable to bear the mistreatment. 

While only p1eces of the deterioration of human rights in Xinjiang are known, they 

demand recognition and truth from the Chinese government. Cultural alienation, 

censorship, and forced disappearances are well documented in the test1 monies of 

witnesses and reliable evidence gathered by Amnesty International in September 2018. 

Intrusively detailed biometric data from XUAR's residents such as fingerprints, DNA and 

voice samples, and 360-degree body imagery permeate the region with each passing day. 

Mosques are no exception, as facial recognition software is said to be Installed. Uyghurs 

have been forced to download a government designed application on their phones that 

tracks all of their activities; failure to do so could get one sent to the internment camps. 

Since 2014, surveillance has spread rapidly and is one of the most sophisticated in the 

world with "national security" as a justification for the government's actions, resulting in 

the "Regulation on De-Extremification" in XUAR. XUAR's party secretary, Chen Quanguo, 

is a leading figure in characterizing it as a "no rights zone," according to CERD CoRapporteur Gay McDougall. In 2016, Chen increased the size of police and security 

personnel and presence of high-tech survei I lance systems to restrict mobi l1ty that aimed 

to specifically target ethnic Muslims. 

The Chinese government is negligent in failing to protect its people according to 

international legal standards. China's Constitution, the International Convention on the 

Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination and the International Covenant on 

Economic, Social, Cultural Rights, to which China is a state party, prohibit discrimination 

based on ethnicity, language, and religion. 

Congress should impress on the Administration and the Chinese government the 

importance of fulfilling its human rights commitments to the International community 

f<.MNESTY IWERNA7"1QN,l,L US:.' 600 p,::NNS'r'LVA'liAAVE'lUE SE, 5TH FLOOR I vVP.SH!NGTON, DC 2C•J03 

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and its own people. In particular, Congress should insist that the government of China 

undertake the following actions: 

• Call on the Chinese government to immediately close all political education 

camps in Xinjiang and release all individuals held, and end the Strike Hard 

Campaign 

• Urge the U.S. Administration to participate in China's 2018 Universal Periodic 

Review, send a high-level delegation, and raise concerns about Xinj1ang. 

• Every Congressional delegation that visits China should request access to the 

Uighur region and specifically to the detention centers. Congressional delegations 

that focus on economic ties should condition their visits on access. 

• Request law enforcement agencies investigate threats and retaliation carried out 

against Uighur U.S. citizens and against all Uighurs on U.S. soil. 

• Affirm U.S. policy that it will cease, in accordance with their obligations under 

international law, all forced transfer, directly or indirectly, to China of Uighurs, 

Kazakhs or other Chinese nationals from XUAR, if they would face a real risk of 

serious human rights violations. 

• Appropriate funds for documentation, casework, evidence collection and 

preservation to address the plight of Uighur refugees and asylum seekers in the 

region and throughout the world. 

• Support assistance for civ1l soc1ety organizations that focus on Uighur human 

rights work in the space of capacity building, culture preservation, legal aid, and 

rehabi I itation. 

For more information, please contact Francisco Bencosme by phone at: (202) 845-5075 

or email at: f_t)_Q.Ilg)Sme@§L~sa.grg. 

Sincerely, 

1 ~ C!.dcu ~c-<04 "'-~·· 

Francisco Bencosme 

Advocacy Manager for Asia 

Advocacy and Government Affairs 

!>MNESIY IWERNA~10N!I.l US.!. I 600 FfNNS~"LVA\iiA AVE\JUE SE, 5TH FLOOR I WASHINGTON, DC 2C<I03 

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By Adrian Zenz- Version of this paper accepted for publication by the journal Central Asian Survey 

Despite increasing media coverage starting in late 2017, the Chinese government has 

denied the very existence of Xinjiang's re-education camps. In February 2018, during an 

interview with the Almaty Tengrinews, Zhang Wei, China's Consul General in 

Kazakhstan, claimed that "we do not have such an idea in China" (AKlPress, 2018). 

Similarly, in a May 2018 response to a press comment request, China's Ministry of 

Foreign Affairs stated that it "had not heard" of such a situation (Shih, 2018). Since then, 

the Global Times, the CCP's English-language mouthpiece, reported that over a million 

residents especially in southern Xinjiang have been subject to "government-organized 

occupational education programs" as a "poverty alleviation" measure (2018a). 

Subsequently, it published an article on the education of imprisoned "religious 

extremists" in order to curb extremism (2018b). Notably, however, neither of these 

pieces acknowledges the existence of a large-scale extra-judicial detention system 

designed to indoctrinate large swaths of the general population. 

There is mounting anecdotal and eyewitness evidence on re-education from Western 

news outlets (Dooley, 2018; Chin, 2017; Shih, 2017, 2018). This article demonstrates 

that one can find also a substantial body of PRC governmental sources, produced for a 

domestic audience, that prove the existence of the camps. Official public tenders indicate 

the construction of such facilities on city, county, township and village levels. Based on 

the available documentary evidence, we can surmise that the region's current reeducation system exceeds the size of China's entire former "education through labour" 

system that was officially abolished in 2013. 
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By Adrian Zenz- Version of this paper accepted for publication by the journal Central Asian Survey 

Government and state media reports show that re-education efforts among especially 

the Uyghur population began in late 2013 and gradually became more institutionalised. 

However, it was not until spring 2017, under the auspices of the XUAR's new Party 

Secretary Chen Quanguo, that the scale of these internments reached unprecedented 

levels. Under Chen, Muslim majority regions are being assigned detention quotas, 

resulting in the internment of large swaths of Muslim populations without due process. 

Rather than representing court-sanctioned criminal punishments, official documents 

portray re-education in terms akin to free medical treatment of a dangerous addiction to 

religious ideology. Re-education reports often cite "transformation success rates" to 

demonstrate this "treatment's" effectiveness. Drawing on Foucault, Sean Roberts argued 

that the state has been framing the Uyghur population almost as a biological threat to 

society that must be contained through physical separation, surveillance and detention 

(Roberts, 2018). This article suggests that Chen Quanguo's re-education drive 

epitomises the "biopolitics" of China's "war on terror". 

Xinjiang is China's largest administrative unit, strategically located along a 5,600 

kilometre border with eight nations. It has long been a strategic zone of intercultural 

contact and conflict. Since the creation of the People's Republic of China (PRC) in 1949, 

the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has spent billions of dollars asserting its 

sovereignty and authority over this remote region. However, the intensification of 

Beijing's integrationist project, notably in the wake of the Great Western Development 

Initiative that was inaugurated in 2000, has also led to increased resistance, especially 

among the native Uyghur population (Bequelin, 2004). After the September ll, 2001 

terror attack on the World Trade Center, China launched its own "war on terror" against 

Uyghur Muslim separatism. In particular, the 2008 Lhasa uprising and the 2009 
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By Adrian Zenz- Version of this paper accepted for publication by the journal Central Asian Survey 

Orumchi riots raised the specter of a Soviet-style ethnic implosion, which further 

emboldened state advocates of an integrationist minority policy approach (Millward, 

2009). Rather than decreasing ethnic tensions, these assimilationist tendencies have 

increased Uyghur feelings of cultural insecurity (see Smith Finley in this Special Issue). 

Xinjiang's ethnic relations are further complicated by the fact that Beijing has to take a 

tough stance against any hint of minority separatism in order to appease the region's 

Han, which in 2015 constituted 37 percent of the population (Cliff, 2016). 

Since the inception of Xi Jinping's ambitious "Belt and Road Initiative" in late 2013, 

stability maintenance (weiwen; i'IU~.) in this volatile region has become an even greater 

priority. Xinjiang became a "core region" (hexin qu; t:ti:•L'i'Z) in the BRI, just at a time 

when deadly acts of resistance there were reaching a peak (Clarke, 2016). After the 

suicide car bombing in Beijing's Tian'anmen square (October 2013), the train station 

stabbing in Kunming (March 2014) and the market bombing in Urumqi (April 2014), 

Chinese President Xi Jinping responded with a call for "walls made of copper and steel" 

and "nets spread from the earth to the sky" to capture these terrorists (China Daily, 

2014). Under Secretary Chen Quanguo, who was drafted into the region in late August 

2016, the XUAR embarked on a massive human and technological securitization drive 

that turned the region into one of the most heavily fortified and policed regions in the 

world (Zenz and Leibold, 2017). 

Firstly, this article briefly charts the context of political re-education in China. Secondly, 

it looks at the evolution of re-education in Xinjiang in the context of "de-extremification" 

work. Then, it evaluates the unprecedented re-education drive initiated by Chen 
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By Adrian Zenz- Version of this paper accepted for publication by the journal Central Asian Survey 

Quanguo. Lastly, the article presents detailed empirical information on current reeducation facilities in their various guises. 

Political Re-Education in China 

The concept of re-education has a long history in Communist China. In the 1950s, the 

state established the so-called "reform through labour" (laodong gaizao; 

commonly referred to as /aogai (Seymour and Anderson, 1998). The /aogai system is 

part of the formal prison system, and inmates are convicted through legal proceedings. 

In contrast, the "re-education through labour" system (laodong jiaoyang; ':lj'f,!]{:fl:~) or in 

short /aojiao was established in 1957 as an administrative penalty and internment 

system. Anyone could be sentenced to /aojiao by the public security agencies without 

trials or legal procedures (Miihlhahn, 2009). Revived in the 1980s, /aojiao was widely 

used for dissidents, petitioners or petty criminals. Even family members or employers 

could recommend persons for re-education (Laogai Research Foundation, 2008, 17). 

Both the leadership under Xi jinping and the population felt that sending people into 

such camps without legal proceedings, merely at the whims of local police authorities, 

was no longer appropriate in a modern society governed by the rule of law. A pertinent 

example is the case of Tang Hui, who was placed into laojiao in 2012 for protesting the 

lenient sentences given to those who had forced her daughter into prostitution, causing 

considerable public outrage (Green, 2014). Since their abolishment, many /aojiao 

facilities have become centres for coercive isolated detoxification treatments given to 

drug addicts (qiangzhi gelijiedu; ~.ffii#U ~li.'iffltt!J:) (Sina News, 2013). 

In the early 2000s, another term for re-education emerged, In order to convert Falun 

Gong followers away from their spiritual pursuits, the state initiated so-called 
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By Adrian Zenz- Version of this paper accepted for publication by the journal Central Asian Survey 

"transformation through education" Uiaoyu zhuanhua; f!(i'f#Nl::) classes (Tong, 2009, 

106). The Chinese term zhuanhua, which effectively turns "education" into (political) reeducation, literally means to "transform" or to "convert". It is also used to describe the 

chemical process of isomerization by which one molecule is transformed into another. A 

state media report from 2001 describes the initiation of Falun Gong-related "reeducation classes" Uiaoyu zhuanhua xuexiban; .l'IJi.84tzf{:'J:;J:FJ±) throughout the country, 

including Xinjiang's Driimchi (Renminwang, 2001). 

Besides combating the Falun Gong, the state also employs "transformation through 

education" in educational contexts. So-called "problem students" are subjected to 

"transformation through education", although this often takes place in regular school 

contexts and only sometimes in closed training contexts or dedicated institutions. 

Finally, "transformation through education" is a common concept in the context of 

China's coercive isolated detoxification. 

Political Re-Education in Contrast to Other Forms oflnternment 

Akin to re-education through labour (laojiao), political re-education in Xinjiang is an 

extrajudicial procedure that does not replace criminal punishment or reform through 

labour (laogai). The region's re-education facility network therefore operates alongside 

the regular prison and detention system. 

For example, an official report on Dunbar Village (Kashgar Prefecture) distinguishes 

between: a) convicts who have been sentenced (panxing; 'f'ljlflJ, i.e. to prison), b) suspects 

who have been detained (shouya; l[j(Ji!l, i.e. in detention centres, awaiting judgment), and 

c) those in political re-education Uiaoyu zhuanhua renyuan; ti'!C~~1l::A.i7\) (Liu, 2017). 
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By Adrian Zenz- Version of this paper accepted for publication by the journal Central Asian Survey 

Similarly, sources with close acquaintances in Xinjiang told the author that detained 

suspects there may be first placed in detention centres (kanshousuo; :tj·"'ffJT) in order to 

evaluate whether they will be sent to political re-education or to prison (see also Shih, 

2018). 

Typically, the use of the term "transformation through education" in Xinjiang is 

restricted to: a) political re-education of the general population (especially of Muslim 

minorities), b) political re-education of cadres (especially so-called "two-faced persons" 

/iangmianren; JWJliJA), and c) persons detained for coerced detoxification (XUAR Food 

and Drug Inspection and Management Bureau, 2017). Occasionally, it is also applied to 

those in prison, usually in connection with the concept of "de-extremification" (and 

therefore presumably in regard to sentenced "religious extremists"). However, the more 

common term for the re-education of those sentenced to prison terms is jiaoyu gaizao 

(r£8r':il.@), akin to "reform through labour" (laodong gaizao). 

In terms of the different facility names, reform through labour typically takes place in 

prisons Uianyu; :l:\:%1() while the former re-education through labour system was located 

in re-education "facilities" or "camps" (laojiaosuo; 'ii~JiJr). In contrast, Xinjiang's 

contemporary political re-education drive is conducted through a network of 

"transformation through education" "centres" (zhongxin; rr-t:.•), "bases" Uidi; :l!!iJlli) and 

"schools" (xuexiao; '¥: fSZ) (compare Table 1). Locals often refer to re-education 

internment as "attending/entering class" Uin xuexiban; :itt'¥: ..'j J;/l:), or "getting an 

education" (shoudaojiaoyu; ~¥U-l'!i.8). 
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By Adrian Zenz- Version of this paper accepted for publication by the journal Central Asian Survey 

Despite some exceptions, these distinct uses and terminologies have aided the author's 

task of identifying material related to the political re-education of Muslim populations in 

Xinjiang. 

The Inception of "De-Extremification" through Re-Education in Xinjiang 

It was not until 2014 that the "transformation through education" concept in Xinjiang 

came to be used in wider contexts than the Falun Gong, Party discipline or drug addict 

rehabilitation. Prior to that year, public references to "transformation through 

education" in the context of combating religious extremism and stability maintenance 

are very rare. A district in Turpan City, a majority Uyghur region, reported in August 

2013 that it was undertaking "transformation through education work" Uiaoyu 

zhuanhua gongzuo; .\&:l'l'4Ht T.('F) in order to deal with "four special types of people" 

(sizhong teshu renqun; rnll'rJlt#fiAft). including young men who grow beards (Turpan 

City Party Net, 2013). Transformation through education goals were determined on a 

case-by-case basis and implemented through home visits and vocational training rather 

than internment in dedicated facilities. Back then, re-education efforts concentrated on a 

limited number of "focus persons" (zhongdianren; M.~; A). 

The increasingly widespread application of "transformation through education" to 

Uyghur or Muslim population groups arose in tandem with the "de-extremification" (qu 

jiduanhua; ~1:tHffiHl::) campaign. The phrase "de-extremification" was first mentioned by 

Xinjiang's former Party secretary Zhang Chunxian at a january 2012 meeting in Khotan 

Prefecture and de-extremification measures became local legislation in April 2015 

(Phoenix Information, 2015). On April1, 2017, the region then enacted a comprehensive 

"de-extremification ordinance" (Xinjiang weiwu'er zizhiqu qujiduanhua tiaoli; ;l\fi@i£ili1"f 
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Over the last year, Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR) Party Secretary Chen 

Quanguo (• • • ) has dramatically increased the police presence in Xinjiang by advertising 

over 90,000 new police and security-related positions. [1] This soldier-turned-politician is 

little known outside of China, but within China he has gained a reputation as an ethnic 

policy innovator, pioneering a range of new methods for securing Chinese Communist Party 

(CCP) rule over Uyghurs, Tibetans and other ethnic minorities in western China. 

Born into a poor family in rural Henan province, Chen worked his way up the CCP ladder, 

serving first under Premier Li Keqiang in his native Henan, before becoming Party Secretary 

of neighboring Hebei province. In 2011, he was handed the difficult task of ruling the 

Tibetan Autonomous Region (TAR), which had once again erupted into violence in 2008. 

During his five years in Tibet, he restored stability through the construction a sophisticated 

network of surveillance and control. After being transferred to the XUAR in August 2016, he 

quickly rolled out the same securitization strategy, accomplishing in a single year what took 

him five years in the TAR. 

In Tibet and now Xinjiang, Chen Quanguo lifted a strategy directly from the imperial 

playbook, with past colonial powers like England and Japan enlisting "native" populations 

to watch over their own people. Ethnic minorities have long served the CCP in China. 

However, the numbers of Uyghurs and Tibetans that have been recruited into China's 

security apparatus under Chen far exceed public recruitments during the preceding decade 

and are potentially setting a historic record. 

Chen Quanguo's Policing Strategy in Tibet 

Within two months of assuming power in Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR) in August 2011, 

Chen Quanguo rolled out his first and perhaps most effective security innovation, the socalled convenience police stations ( • • • • • ), street-corner bulwarks for communitybased policing. In October 2011, the TAR advertised 2,500 police positions, with 458 of them 

designated for Lhasa's new convenience police stations (Xueyu jiaoyu 

fhttp://www.chinagwy.org/html/xwsz/zyxw/20111 0/21 32722.htmll. October 21, 2011). By 

August 2012, Lhasa had established 161 of these concrete structures with a distance of no 

more than 500 meters between stations (Ministry of Public Security 

fhttp://www.mps.gov.cn/n2255079/n2255804/n2255808/c3872620/content.htmll, August 

12, 2012). 

This dense network of surveillance is at the heart of what Party officials call "grid-style social 

management" ( • • • • • • • ), a practice that segments urban communities into 

geometric zones so that security staff can systematically observe all activities with the aid of 

new technologies (ChinaChange (https:Uchinachange.org/2013/08/08/the-urban-gridmanagement-and-police-state-in-china-a-brief-overview/), August 8, 2013; China Brief 

August 17 fhttps·fLiamestown.org/program/managing-the-state-social-credit-surveillanceand-the-ccps-plan-for-china/https:/jamestown.org/program/managing-the-state-social-
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credit-surveillance-and-the-ccps-plan-for-china/? 

me cid=7a4a69b76e&mc eid=574bf7e508)). The system relies on big data analytics, 

connecting a network of CCTV cameras with police databases to achieve enhanced, even 

automated surveillance. Grid management was first trialed in Beijing in 2004 (Chinese 

Academy of Social Sciences 

fhttp://www.cssn.cn/sf/bwsf gl/201312/t20131205 895684.shtmll, October 28, 2013). 

Chen's implementation of the convenience police station network in China's West is 

probably the most sophisticated implementation yet. 

By 2016, the TAR had established over 700 of these stations throughout all urban and semiurban centers (News.163.com fhttp://news.163.com/16/0304/17 /BHB2970J00014AED.htmll, 

March 4, 2016). In order to man them, regional authorities dramatically increased security 

recruitment. Between 2007 and the summer of 2011, the TAR advertised 2,830 positions for 

all types of police officers. Between 2008-2009, annual police recruitment averaged 866 

positions, already a steep increase over the 260 positions advertised in 2007 before the 

Lhasa riots. However, after Chen Quanguo assumed office, recruitment skyrocketed. 

Between the autumn of 2011 and 2016, the TAR advertised 12,313 policing-related positions 

-over four times as many positions as the preceding five years. 

Chen Quanguo Applies His Security Strategy to Xinjiang 

During Chen Quanguo's five-year rule in Tibet, this previously restive minority region 

experienced no major incidents of unrest. Only eight of the 150 self-immolation incidents (a 

form of protest) occurred in the TAR, with no self-immolations or other incidents of major 

social unrest reported in the region after 2012 (International Campaign for Tibet 

(https://www.savetibet.org/resources/fact-sheets/self-immolations-by-tibetans!l, [accessed 

August 30]). Chen's performance was praised in the Chinese language media, with one 

report noting that "TAR society maintained stability, with no major reported incidents of 

unrest, whereas [such incidents] did occur in the surrounding Tibetan regions" (Phoenix 

Information fhttp·/(news.ifeng.com/a/20160829/49857646 0 shtmll, August 29, 2016). 

Chen's firm grip on stability in Tibet did not go unnoticed in Beijing. While there was talk of 

replacing former XUAR Party Secretary Zhang Chunxian with a close ally of Xi Jinping, Chen 

Quanguo emerged as a capable and politically reliable candidate in 2016 (Aboluowang 

fhttp://www.aboluowang.com/2014/0418/389372.htmll, April 18, 2014). By proving himself 

with a difficult ethnic portfolio and being one of the first senior Party officials to speak of Xi 

Jinping as "core" of the Party leadership, Chen gained Xi's confidence (Wenxuecheng 

(http://www.wenxuecity.com/news/2016/08/31/5554203.htmll, August 31, 2016). He will 

likely be rewarded with a seat on the Politburo at the 19th Party Congress. 

At the time of Chen's new appointment, Xinjiang represented a far greater security concern 

for Beijing than the TAR. Under his predecessors, Xinjiang had already considerably ramped 

up the recruitment of police and other security officers in response to the 5 July 2009 riots in 
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Urumqi. Between 2003-2008, Xinjiang advertised about 5,800 such positions, yet these 

intakes multiplied to nearly 40,000 between 2009 and July 2016. On average, police adverts 

increased from just below 1,000 to nearly 5,000 positions per year. As described in more 

detail in our previous article, this recruitment drive relied increasingly on contract-based 

positions outside the formal civil service system (China Brief 

fhttps:fOamestown.org/program/xin Hangs-rapidly-evolving-security-state/), March 14). This 

strategy enabled a cost-efficient expansion of the police force. It leveraged the limited 

manpower of formal and better-equipped regular police (• • • • ) and special police units 

( • • ) through the establishment of a new underclass of poorly-trained and (traditionally) 

lower-paid assistant police (• • or • • ). 

Between August 2016 and July 2017, Chen Quanguo pushed this multi-tiered policing 

system to its logical conclusion. Within the space of a single year, Xinjiang advertised 90,866 

security-related positions-nearly twelve times the number advertised in 2009 following the 

Urumqi riots. The vast majority of these jobs (95 percent) were assistant police positions 

associated with the establishment of an estimated 7,500 convenience police stations across 

Xinjiang (Energy News fhttp·//www energynews com cn/show-55-6480-1 htmll, January 12). 

[2] Depending on their size, convenience police stations have a staffing quota of six to thirty 

security personnel, while current advertised recruitments stand at around 12 assistant police 

per station. This suggests that Chen's recruitment drive will likely continue into next year 

(Zhongguo xiaofang Zaixian fhttp://119.china.com.cn/shyxf/txt/2017-

01 /16/content 9290098.html January 16, 2017; Zhonggong jiaoyu 

fhttp·//xi.offcn.com/html/2017 /05/33305.htmll, May 9). [3] 
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XUAR security-related public job adverts 

65.000 

60.000 

55.000 

,50.000 

45.000 c-~-----~ ~--- ----~----~--~---~--~·---~~-- ---- ---~------ ~-~~-----~--

30.000 

25.000 

20.000 

15.000 

10.000 

5.000 

Assistant police {t;1} 

I! Hili!!) 

:at Sub-station police 

(l!!~li!)& 

surveillance staff 

:M Formal pollee(}..,~ 

!!~/~!!.!') 

2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 (Jan-Aug) 

(/wp~content/upload5/2017 /09/Chen~Ouanguo~piece~Zenz~Leibold~figure~ 1.png?x87069l 

Figure 1. Source: XUAR civil service, public service, and other public job announcements. 

"Surveillance" pertains to various positions related to internet and video surveillance systems. 

Formal police positions also include security~related civil service positions in the court, justice and 

prison systems. 

Comparing Chen's Security Buildup in Xinjiang and Tibet 

How do these astonishing figures in Xinjiang compare to the TAR? The larger recruitment 

and police station figures for Xinjiang are not surprising, considering that the XUAR's 

population in 2015 stood at 23.2 million, more than seven times the TAR's 3.2 million. 

Xinjiang is also Beijing's top domestic security concern at present. First, Uyghur resistance 

and fear of "Islamic extremism" are now viewed as a far greater threat to CCP rule than 

Tibetan unrest. Second, stability in Xinjiang is crucial to the success of Xi Jinping's signature 

One Belt, One Road (• • • • ) initiative, with Xinjiang reemerging as a "core region" (• • 

• ) and strategic crossroad for trade and investment opportunities in Central and South Asia, 

as well as Europe and the Middle East (Xinhua (http://news.xinhuanet.com/fortune/2015~ 

06/04/c 1115516846.html. June 4, 2015). 

When comparing figures for the two regions per capita, the available data indicates that the 

XUAR might now have considerably more convenience police stations per capita than the 

TAR: 323 versus the TAR's 216 per 100,000 of the population. On the other hand, the TAR 
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advertised 400 policing-related positions per 100,000 of its population during Chen 

Quanguo's rule there, while Xinjiang advertised 394 such positions. [4] Yet the security 

build-up in Xinjiang is continuing, and likely to surpass the level achieved in the TAR as early 

as September this year. That said, the sheer number of positions advertised in the XUAR 

during such a short period of time is apparently making it increasingly difficult to attract 

new applicants. [5] 

Unrest in Tibetan regions has been much more sporadic since 2008, with most acts being 

limited to self-harm. Uyghur militants, on the other hand, have carried out a string of deadly 

attacks on local police stations and other public settings that have resulted in thousands of 

deaths since 2009. Most notably, a series of high-profile terror attacks outside the XUAR, 

including a suicide car bombing in Beijing (October 2013) and the train station stabbing in 

Kunming (March 2014) seriously unnerved the Chinese populace and prompted the central 

government to take an even tougher stance. 

After the April 2014 Urumqi market bombing, which left 43 dead and over 90 injured, Xi 

Jinping announced a nationwide counter-terrorism campaign. Xinjiang Party Secretary 

Zhang Chunxian called for a "people's war on terror", while Xi spoke of the need to build 

"walls made of copper and steel" (People's Daily 

(http:Upolitics.people.com.cn/n/2014/0526/c1 001-25062091.htmll. May 26, 2014; Xinhua 

(http:!/news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2014-05/29/c 133371780.html, May 29, 2014). 

The concurring rise of Xi's Belt and Road Initiative, whose land route relies on Xinjiang as the 

primary traffic hub, further elevated the importance of the region's security. 

In response, advertised police recruitments in 2014 and 2015 increased rapidly in Xinjiang. 

They significantly exceeded the per capita count of the 2009 intake following the Urumqi 

riots, being three to four times as high as in 2007-08, 2010-11 or 2013. However, as Figure 2 

reveals, this build up for Zhang's 'war on terror' was actually quite minor when compared to 

the massive increase in advertised policing positions under Chen Quanguo (2016/17). 
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275 

250 

225 

200 

175 

150 

125 

100 

75 

50 

25 

0 

Advertised policing-related positions per 100,000 of the population 

Includes all types af formal and informal public police or security forces except the 

People's Armed Police and Ministry of State Security agents 

'"*""TAR 

-XUAR 

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 (Jan-Aug) 

Uwp-content/ up loads/2 01 7/09/C hen-Qua ng uo-p ieee-Zenz -Lei bold -figure-2.p ng ?x87069 l 

Figure 2. Population figures are from 2012 (sources: TARIXUAR Statistical Yearbooks). 

On the surface, Chen Quanguo's strategy seems to be producing results. As in Tibet, there 

have been no major incidents of ethnic unrest or violence since the establishment of the 

convenience police stations, with the last major incident occurring in September 2015 when 

a stabbing at a coal mine in southern Xinjiang left SO dead. Since then, there have only been 

comparatively minor and apparently unpremeditated knife attacks. In fact, the XUAR's new 

network of convenience police stations were praised for the quick response to a stabbing in 

Pishan County in February 2017, despite the fact that five innocent bystanders were killed 

before armed police shot dead three assailants (Sina (http://news.sina.com.cn/c/nd/2017-02-

23/doc-ifyavwcv8527136.shtmll, February 22). While limits on reporting from the region 

preclude any reliable statistical accounts of incidents in Xinjiang, it seems less-than-likely 

that any major incident would go completely unnoticed. 

Securitization as Employment Strategy 

Chen Quanguo's securitization strategy achieves two stability maintenance ( • • ) goals at 

the same time: the construction of a dense network of police surveillance, and a range of 

new employment opportunities in a region where stable, well-remunerated jobs are still 

relatively scarce. Our analyses of recruitment documents indicate that Tibetans have 

benefited significantly from Chen's job bonanza. Based on the available data, we estimate 
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NOTE: The preceding document has not been printed here in full but may be found 

at https://docs.house.gov/Committee/Calendar/ByEvent.aspx?EventID=108718

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that between 2012 and 2016 about 77 percent of applicants who either obtained or were 

close to obtaining a government job were Tibetan. [8] While this share is lower than the 

overall Tibetan population share of 90.5 percent, it exceeds the share of Tibetans among all 

TAR university graduates (only tertiary graduates are eligible to apply for formal government 

jobs). [9] 

Even though Chen has not replicated the full employment promise in Xinjiang, securityrelated work is now the single most important source of new jobs. Growth in "urban nonprivate units," a technical term that refers to stable, well-remunerated posts in a) public 

institutions and b) larger private corporations, slowed down considerably in 2014 and 2015 

compared to previous years. [1 0] Excluding employment in public institutions, Xinjiang's 

private corporate sector by itself virtually stagnated during that period. Key sectors such as 

manufacturing, mining, construction, and transportation actually saw a reduction in 

employment. This is likely a negative side effect of the region's exorbitant new security 

measures. A local businessman told us that Chen's security measures have resulted in 

numerous businesses going bankrupt, even in the wealthier north. As a consequence, 

investors are said to be withdrawing their capital, and qualified employees are leaving the 

region. Official data reflects this trend. In 2016, XUAR fixed-asset investment from private 

investors fell by 22 percent or nearly 100 billion RMB, a sharp reversal compared to several 

years of double-digit growth. After years of double-digit growth that trumped the national 

average, Xinjiang's per capita GOP declined by 1.4 percent in 2015 and only grew by a tiny 1 

percent in 2016, now far below the national figures. [11] 

In this precarious situation, Chen's security recruitment drive is more than compensating for 

the employment trough in other sectors. Between 2014 and 2015, Xinjiang's entire private 

corporate employment sector added only 38,000 jobs. [12] This is less than half the nearly 

91,000 security-related positions advertised during Chen's first year in Xinjiang. While lowertier security jobs typically pay much lower salaries than corporate private sector work, their 

pay levels are increasing significantly in Xinjiang. In 2017, they averaged around 4,700 

RMB/month, only 13 percent below the region's average public institutional and corporate 

private sector wage level of 5,386 RMB/month (2016). These assistant police jobs now pay 

substantially more than the average non-corporate private sector wage of 3,133 RMB/month 

for Xinjiang and 3,300 RMB/month for China (both 2015). [13] Furthermore, they now come 

with a standard set of social benefits, the so-called "five insurances" (• • ) of age, medical, 

unemployment, injury and maternity insurance. And in the current political environment, 

these contract-based positions are likely very secure. In 2017, 27 percent of them even 

offered salaries and benefits commensurate with formal government employment, with 

others permitting recruits to apply for entry into the formal police service after two or three 

years. 

As in the TAR, Xinjiang's ethnic minorities (including Uyghurs) have been able to secure a 

large proportion of these new security positions. Whereas formal government (or corporate 

private sector) employment mandates that applicants must hold a university degree, 
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Statement for the Record 

Congressman Gerry Connolly 

AP Subcommittee Hearing: "China's Repression and Internment of Uyghurs: U.S. Policy Responses" September 

26, 2018 

The Chinese government escalated its suppression ofUyghurs and other ethnic minorities in China's Xinjiang 

Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR) since late 2016. Not only are the human rights of millions of individuals 

being abused, but American journalists and their family members are also in peril. The Trump Administration 

must call on the Chinese government to cease these repressive policies and release those in arbitrary detention 

immediately. 

According to human rights groups, during the past year, the Chinese government has detained more than one 

million residents ofXUAR, including Uyghurs and other ethnic minorities, in "political re-education camps" or 

forced them to attend mandatory re-education sessions in their villages. The 2017 Department of State 

Trafficking in Persons Report on China found that government officials sent men, women, and children to 

forced labor camps and separated them from family members. According to Ambassador Kelley Currie, the 

U.S Representative to the U.N. Economic and Social Council, US. permanent residents and family members of 

U.S. citizens are among those in the detention centers in Xinjiang. 

In addition to "political re-education", the Chinese government has undertaken a dramatic expansion of its 

compulsory biometric collection program and implemented a "Widespread crackdown on free expression. 

According to Human Rights Watch, the Chinese government mandated the collection of millions of DNA 

samples, retina scans, and voice prints in XUAR for all those individuals who ''authorities consider threatening 

to regime stability- and their family members." Officials routinely subject innocent individuals involved in the 

peaceful expression of political and religious views to arbitrary arrest, confinement, harassment, and expedited 

judicial procedures-all in the name of combatting supposed terrorism and extremism. 

China has directly targeted six U.S.-basedjournalists, including several of my own constituents, with Radio 

Free Asia's (RFA) Uyghur Service. RFA is one of five media networks under the United States Agency for 

Global Media. lts Uyghur-language news service provides roughly 12 million of China's mostly Muslim, 

Turkic-speaking Uyghur population with trushvorthy, accurate news on the deteriorating human rights situation 

in China's XUAR. 

RF A's journalists, most of them U.S. citizens and all residents of Virginia, have relatives in China-including 

elderly parents-who have been detained, jailed, or forcibly disappeared in what appears to be an act of direct 

retaliation against these U.S. journalists for their work in exposing the unfolding humanitarian crisis in 

Xinjiang These cases represent a concerted effort to interfere with Radio Free Asia's congressionally mandated 

mission of bringing free press to closed societies 

In light of this ongoing humanitarian crisis, I recently led a letter with my Republican colleague Steve Chabot 

urging Secretary Pompeo to raise this urgent issue with his Chinese counterpart, seek answers as to the 

whereabouts and well-being of the missing, detained, and jailed relatives, and appeal forthese individuals to be 

released at every opportunity. We also requested a briefing from the Department of State by September 30, 

2018 with an update on these cases. Thus far, we have not received a response. I look forvvard to hearing from 

our witnesses how Congress can ensure accountability for these human rights abuses and stop this alanning 

situation in Xinjiang.