GAO 

United States Government Accountability Office

Report to Congressional Committees

DEMOCRACY 

ASSISTANCE 

U.S. Agencies Take 

Steps to Coordinate 

International 

Programs but Lack 

Information on Some 

U.S.-funded Activities 

September 2009 

GAO-09-993 
What GAO Found

United States Government Accountability Office

Why GAO Did This Study

Highlights

Accountability Integrity Reliability

September 2009

DEMOCRACY ASSISTANCE 

U.S. Agencies Take Steps to Coordinate International 

Programs but Lack Information on Some U.S.-funded 

Highlights of GAO-09-993, a report to Activities

congressional committees 

In fiscal years 2006- 2008, the U.S. 

Agency for International 

Development (USAID), which has 

primary responsibility for 

promoting democracy abroad, 

implemented democracy assistance 

projects in about 90 countries. The 

Department of State’s Bureau of 

Democracy, Human Rights and 

Labor (State DRL) and the private, 

nonprofit National Endowment for 

Democracy (NED) also fund 

democracy programs in many of 

these countries. 

Partly to lessen the risk of 

duplicative programs, State 

recently initiated efforts to reform 

and consolidate State and USAID 

foreign assistance processes. GAO 

reviewed (1) democracy assistance 

funding provided by USAID, State 

DRL, and NED in fiscal year 2008; 

(2) USAID, State DRL, and NED 

efforts to coordinate their 

democracy assistance; and (3) 

USAID efforts to assess results and 

evaluate the impact of its 

democracy assistance. GAO 

analyzed U.S. funding and 

evaluation documents, interviewed 

USAID, State, and NED officials in 

the United States and abroad, and 

reviewed specific democracy 

projects in 10 countries. 

What GAO Recommends

GAO recommends that, to enhance 

coordination of U.S.-funded 

democracy assistance, the 

Secretary of State and the USAID 

Administrator work jointly with 

NED to establish a mechanism to 

routinely collect information about 

NED’s current projects in countries 

where NED and State or USAID 

provide democracy assistance. 

These entities concurred with our 

recommendation. 

Data available from State show total democracy assistance allocations of 

about $2.25 billion for fiscal year 2008. More than $1.95 billion, or about 85 

percent of the total allocation, was provided to field-based operating units, 

primarily country missions. Although complete data on USAID funding per 

country were not available, USAID mission data, compiled by State and 

USAID at GAO’s request, show that in a sample of 10 countries, most 

democracy funds are programmed by USAID. In the 10 countries, annual 

funding per project averaged more than $2 million for USAID, $350,000 for 

State DRL, and $100,000 for NED. In fiscal year 2008, more than half of State 

funding for democracy assistance went to Iraq, followed by China, Cuba, Iran, 

and North Korea, and NED funding for democracy programs was highest for 

China, Iraq, Russia, Burma, and Pakistan. 

USAID and State DRL coordinate to help ensure complementary assistance 

but are often not aware of NED grants. To prevent duplicative programs, State 

DRL obtains feedback from USAID missions and embassies on project 

proposals before awarding democracy assistance grants. State DRL officials 

generally do not participate in USAID missions’ planning efforts; some State 

and USAID officials told GAO that geographic distances between State DRL’s 

centrally managed program and USAID’s country mission-based programs 

would make such participation difficult. Several USAID and State DRL 

officials responsible for planning and managing democracy assistance told 

GAO that they lacked information on NED’s current projects, which they 

believed would help inform their own programming decisions. Although NED 

is not required to report on all of its democracy assistance efforts to State and 

there currently is no mechanism for regular information sharing, NED told 

GAO that it has shared information with State and USAID and would routinely 

provide them with information on current projects if asked. 

USAID uses standard and custom indicators to assess and report on 

immediate program results; USAID also conducts some, but relatively 

infrequent, independent evaluations of longer-term programs. The standard 

indicators, developed by State, generally focus on numbers of activities or 

immediate results of a program, while custom indicators measure additional 

program results. USAID commissions a limited number of independent 

evaluations of program impact. USAID mission officials told GAO that they 

did not conduct many independent evaluations of democracy assistance 

because of the resources involved in the undertaking and the difficulty of 

measuring impact in the area of democracy assistance. In response to a 2008 

National Research Council report on USAID’s democracy evaluation capacity, 

USAID has reported initiating several steps—for example, designing impact 

evaluations for six missions as part of a pilot program. 

View GAO-09-993 or key components.

For more information, contact David Gootnick 

at (202) 512-3149 or goodnickd@gao.gov. 
Page i GAO-09-993 

Contents 

Letter 1

Results in Brief 4 

Background 7 

Data Show Largest Allocations for USAID Democracy Assistance 14 

USAID and State DRL Coordinate to Help Ensure Complementary 

Programs but Often Are Not Aware of NED Projects 26 

USAID Uses Standard and Custom Indicators to Assess and Report 

Democracy Assistance Results and Provides Some Independent 

Evaluations of Impacts 31 

Conclusion 38 

Recommendation for Executive Action 38 

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 39 

Appendix I Objective, Scope, and Methodology 41 

Appendix II Country Funding Levels and Freedom House 

Ratings 46 

Appendix III Democracy Assistance Provided by MEPI, State 

INL, and MCC 51 

Appendix IV Listing of Field-Based and Washington, D.C.-Based 

Operating Units 54 

Appendix V Comments from the U.S. Agency for International 

Development 57 

Appendix VI Comments from the Department of State 61 

 Democracy Assistance 
Appendix VII Comments from the National Endowment for 

Democracy 63 

Appendix VIII GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments 65 

Tables 

Table 1: GJD Program Areas and Program Elements 9 

Table 2: Total GJD Funding and Freedom House Rating for Top 20 

Countries, Fiscal Years 2006-2008 11 

Table 3: Global USAID Democracy Funding and Projects by 

Implementing Mechanism, Fiscal Year 2008 22 

Table 4: Example of GJD Element-Level Standard Indicators 32 

Table 5: National Research Council Recommendations and USAID 

Reported Actions 37 

Table 6: USAID, State DRL, and NED Funding by Country for Fiscal 

Years 2006-2008 46 

Table 7: Ten Highest GJD-funded Countries not including Iraq and 

Afghanistan, Fiscal Years 2006-2008 50 

Table 8: MCC Democracy-Related Threshold Grants to Date 53 

Table 9: Operating Units Receiving GJD Funds between FY 2006 

and FY 2008, and Status as Field-Based or Washington, 

D.C.-Based Operating Unit 54 

Figures 

Figure 1: Distribution of GJD Funding, Fiscal Years 2006-2008 10 

Figure 2: GJD Funding by Operating Unit, Fiscal Year 2008 15 

Figure 3: GJD Funding by Program Area, Fiscal Year 2008 16 

Figure 4: Average Annual Funding, Number and Duration of 

USAID, State DRL, and NED Democracy Projects in 10 

Sample Countries 18 

Figure 5: Annualized Funding, Number and Duration of USAID, 

State DRL, and NED Democracy Projects in 10 Sample 

Countries 19 

Figure 6: Countries with the Largest Percentage of Funding from 

State DRL and NED, Fiscal Year 2008 25 

Page ii GAO-09-993 Democracy Assistance
Abbreviations 

CAS country assistance strategies 

EUR/ACE Office of the Coordinator of U.S. Assistance to Europe and 

 Eurasia 

FACTS Foreign Assistance Coordination and Tracking System 

GJD Governing Justly and Democratically 

MCC Millennium Challenge Corporation 

MEPI Middle East Partnership Initiative 

NED National Endowment for Democracy 

State Department of State 

State DRL Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor 

State/F Office of the Director of Foreign Assistance 

State INL Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement 

Affairs 

USAID U.S. Agency for International Development 

This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in the 

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necessary if you wish to reproduce this material separately. 

Page iii GAO-09-993 Democracy Assistance
Page 1 GAO-09-993 

 

United States Government Accountability Office

Washington, DC 20548 

 

September 28, 2009 

The Honorable Patrick J. Leahy 

Chairman 

The Honorable Judd Gregg 

Ranking Member 

Subcommittee on State, Foreign Operations, 

 and Related Programs 

Committee on Appropriations 

United States Senate 

The Honorable Nita M. Lowey 

Chairwoman 

The Honorable Kay Granger 

Ranking Member 

Subcommittee on State, Foreign Operations, 

 and Related Programs 

Committee on Appropriations 

House of Representatives 

The U.S. government supports democracy promotion activities in every 

geographic region of the world, including many countries where political 

and civil rights are limited. In fiscal years 2006 through 2008, the U.S. 

Agency for International Development (USAID), the agency primarily 

responsible for providing democracy assistance abroad, implemented 

democracy activities in about 90 countries. The Department of State’s 

Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor (State DRL) and the 

National Endowment for Democracy (NED), a nongovernmental, 

nonprofit organization funded through a congressional appropriation, also 

supported U.S.-funded democracy assistance programs in many of these 

countries.1

1

USAID, State DRL, and NED—referred to in this report as implementing entities—provide 

U.S. funding for democracy assistance programs implemented by partners such as 

nongovernmental organizations. Other implementing entities, including the Millennium 

Challenge Corporation (MCC) as well as State’s Middle East Peace Initiative (MEPI) and 

Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (State INL), also provide 

U.S.-funded democracy assistance in some of these countries (see app. III for more 

information about these other implementing entities’ democracy assistance efforts in fiscal 

years 2006-2008). Various other State offices, such as regional bureaus and the Bureau of 

International Organization Affairs, also receive small amounts of funding for democracy 

assistance efforts. 

 Democracy Assistance 
 

In 2006, citing the risk of conflicting or redundant efforts and wasted 

resources among U.S. foreign assistance programs,2

 State initiated efforts 

to reform and consolidate State and USAID foreign assistance processes.3

These efforts included establishing the Office of the Director of Foreign 

Assistance (State/F) to, among other duties, coordinate State’s, USAID’s, 

and other U.S. foreign assistance efforts. To help target U.S. 

government resources more efficiently and effectively, State/F developed 

the Foreign Assistance Framework with five strategic objectives, one of 

which—”Governing Justly and Democratically” (GJD)—encompasses 

democracy assistance.4

 In 2008, acknowledging a need to improve the 

effectiveness of its democracy assistance programs, USAID’s Office of 

Democracy and Governance commissioned a study by the National 

Research Council to improve methods for evaluating the effectiveness and 

impact of these programs.5

 In July 2009, the Secretary of State announced 

plans for a Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review—a 

comprehensive assessment of current approaches to diplomacy and 

development intended to, among other things, strengthen coordination 

between State and USAID and provide recommendations on better 

evaluating impacts of U.S. foreign assistance. 

As directed by the House and Senate Appropriations Committees, this 

report provides an overview of U.S.-funded international democracy 

 

2

Foreign policy observers have written of the potential for fragmented and duplicative U.S. 

democracy promotion activities, which are often provided by multiple entities. For 

example, see Thomas O. Melia, “The Democracy Bureaucracy: The Infrastructure of 

American Democracy Promotion” (discussion paper prepared for the Princeton Project on 

National Security, September 2005); and Susan B. Epstein, Nina M. Serafino, and Francis T. 

Miko, Democracy Promotion: Cornerstone of U.S. Foreign Policy?, RL34296 (Washington, 

D.C.: Congressional Research Service, 2008). 

3

We previously reported on State’s foreign aid reform efforts. See GAO, Foreign Aid 

Reform: Comprehensive Strategy, Interagency Coordination, and Operational 

Improvements Would Bolster Current Efforts, GAO-09-192 (Washington, D.C.: Apr.17, 

2009). 

4

State and USAID define GJD as encompassing activities aiming to promote and strengthen 

effective democracies in recipient states and move them along a continuum toward 

democratic consolidation. GJD and the other four strategic objectives—Peace and 

Security, Investing in People, Economic Growth, and Humanitarian Assistance—are part of 

the Foreign Assistance Framework. 

5

The Office of Democracy and Governance, within the Bureau for Democracy, Conflict, and 

Humanitarian Assistance, is responsible for supporting and advancing USAID’s democracy 

and governance programming worldwide. Its primary objective is to work with USAID 

missions, regional and pillar bureaus, and other U.S. government partners to incorporate 

democracy and governance as a key element in foreign assistance programming. 

Page 2 GAO-09-993 Democracy Assistance
 

assistance efforts. Specifically, this report (1) describes democracy 

assistance funding provided by USAID, State DRL, and NED in fiscal year 

2008; (2) examines USAID, State DRL, and NED efforts to coordinate their 

democracy assistance activities to ensure complementary programming; 

and (3) describes USAID efforts to assess results and evaluate the impact 

of its democracy assistance activities.6

In conducting our work, we analyzed funding, planning, and programmatic 

documents and data describing U.S. democracy assistance activities 

provided by USAID, State DRL, and NED in fiscal years 2006 through 

2008.7

 We conducted audit work in Washington, D.C., and in three 

countries—Indonesia, Jordan, and Russia—with large democracy funding 

levels and assistance from several U.S. entities; in these three countries, 

we met with USAID and State officials responsible for democracy 

assistance programs, officials from nongovernmental organizations that 

implement these programs, and country government officials in two of the 

three countries we visited. We also collected information on democracy 

programs in seven additional countries—China, Democratic Republic of 

Congo, Haiti, Kosovo, Lebanon, Nicaragua, and Pakistan; as a result, we 

collected detailed information on U.S. democracy programs in a total of 10 

geographically diverse countries with large GJD funding levels and where 

multiple U.S. agencies or organizations provide democracy assistance.8

 We 

excluded Iraq and Afghanistan from our sample, despite the large 

democracy assistance funding levels there, because of the unique 

circumstances in those countries. To obtain the views of USAID mission 

officials in our 10 sample countries regarding interagency coordination 

 

6

We did not review State DRL and NED practices for assessing results and evaluating 

impact, because their programs are small and short term relative to USAID’s. According to 

State DRL officials, State DRL recommends that grantees conduct independent external 

evaluations as part of individual grant awards but has not undertaken standard 

independent evaluations of democracy assistance at the country or thematic level. NED 

commissions periodic independent evaluations of clusters of programs but does not 

evaluate every grant. See appendix I for more information about our scope and 

methodology. 

7

We focused our work on these three entities because each conducts democracy assistance 

projects in most recipient countries around the world. In contrast, other entities providing 

U.S.-funded democracy assistance, such as MEPI and State INL, conduct projects in a much 

smaller number of countries. 

8

In 9 of the 10 countries, USAID manages its democracy assistance projects from countrybased missions. The one exception is in China, where USAID does not have a mission. 

Instead, USAID’s Regional Development Mission for Asia, which is based in Bangkok, 

Thailand, manages USAID’s Democracy and Governance projects in China. 

Page 3 GAO-09-993 Democracy Assistance
 

and project monitoring and evaluation, we conducted an e-mail survey of 

all 35 USAID technical officers with responsibility for managing active 

democracy and governance grants in these countries, receiving 31 

responses, from April to June 2009 (a response rate of 89 percent). We also 

interviewed State DRL policy and program officers responsible for 

managing the bureau’s democracy grants in the 10 countries. In describing 

USAID efforts to assess results and evaluate the impact of its democracy 

assistance activities, we focused our analysis on USAID’s projects because 

they typically represented the majority of U.S.-funded assistance and 

because State DRL and NED generally do not conduct impact evaluations. 

We reviewed USAID performance reports for active projects, USAID 

missions’ strategic assessments of democracy and governance, and project 

evaluations in the 10 countries. We also reviewed findings from the 2008 

National Research Council study of USAID democracy assistance 

evaluation; however, we did not assess the study or USAID actions in 

response to the study.9

 (See app. I for a detailed discussion of our 

objectives, scope, and methodology.) 

We conducted this performance audit from September 2008 to September 

2009 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing 

standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to 

obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for 

our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe 

that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings 

and conclusions based on our audit objectives. 

Data available from State/F show total democracy assistance allocations 

of about $2.25 billion for fiscal year 2008. Approximately $306 million, or 

almost 15 percent of the total allocation, was allocated to operating units 

in Washington, D.C., including USAID and State regional and functional 

bureaus, and to offices such as State DRL; more than $1.95 billion, or 

about 85 percent of the total allocation, went to field-based operating 

Results in Brief 

 

9

National Research Council, Improving Democracy Assistance: Building Knowledge 

through Evaluations and Research (Washington, D.C.: National Academies Press, 2008). 

The report can be accessed at http://www.nap.edu/catalog.php?record_id=12164. 

Page 4 GAO-09-993 Democracy Assistance
 

units, primarily country missions.10 The State/F data systems do not 

include funding information by implementing entity for the years we 

reviewed, and complete data on USAID funding per country were not 

available;11 however, USAID mission data that State/F and USAID provided 

at our request show that in our 10 sample countries, most democracy 

funds are programmed by USAID. The estimated average annual funding 

for democracy assistance projects active in our 10 sample countries as of 

January 2009 was about $18 million for USAID, $3 million for State DRL, 

and $2 million for NED; annual funding per project averaged more than $2 

million for USAID, $350,000 for State DRL, and $100,000 for NED. In fiscal 

year 2008, more than half of State DRL funding for democracy assistance 

went to Iraq, followed by China, Cuba, Iran, and North Korea, and NED 

funding for democracy programs was highest for China, Iraq, Russia, 

Burma, and Pakistan. 

USAID and State DRL coordinate to help ensure complementary 

democracy assistance programs but often are not aware of NED projects. 

In our 10 sample countries, a key mechanism for preventing duplicative 

programming involved State DRL’s efforts to obtain feedback from USAID 

missions and embassies on project solicitations and proposals before 

awarding democracy assistance grants. USAID officials at the 10 missions 

we contacted generally agreed that this mechanism helps to ensure 

complementary programming. Conversely, while each mission’s planning 

efforts may involve other U.S. stakeholders in the country, such as staff 

from the embassy’s political and public affairs sections, these efforts 

generally do not involve State DRL officials managing democracy projects 

from Washington, D.C. State DRL officials responsible for managing 

democracy projects in our 10 sample countries generally indicated that 

their participation in USAID missions’ planning processes would improve 

coordination. However, State and USAID officials noted that geographic 

distances between State DRL’s centrally managed program and USAID’s 

 

10State/F defines an operating unit as the organizational unit responsible for implementing a 

foreign assistance program for one or more elements of the foreign assistance framework. 

For example, all country missions; all regional offices, such as USAID West Africa Regional 

office; and all Washington-based bureaus, such as USAID Democracy Conflict and 

Humanitarian Assistance, are separate operating units. In fiscal year 2008, State/F listed 166 

operating units based in the field, including 155 country missions and 11 USAID regional 

offices, as well as 24 State and USAID regional and functional bureaus based in 

Washington, D.C. 

11We requested USAID funding data for all country missions; however, with our 

concurrence, State/F excluded USAID funding data for Iraq, Afghanistan, and Pakistan 

owing to the unique and complex circumstances in those countries. 

Page 5 GAO-09-993 Democracy Assistance
 

country mission-based programs would make such coordination difficult. 

Although NED is not required to report all of its democracy assistance 

efforts to State, several USAID and State DRL officials said that they 

lacked information about NED’s current projects, which they believed 

would help inform their own programming decisions. No mechanism 

currently exists for the routine sharing of information on NED’s projects. 

NED officials told us that NED has shared information on its activities in 

the past and would be willing to provide project information routinely if 

State or USAID deemed it useful. 

USAID uses standard and custom indicators to assess and report on 

immediate program outputs and outcomes; USAID also conducts some, 

but relatively infrequent, independent evaluations of longer-term program 

impacts and reports taking steps to improve its evaluation capacity.12 The 

standard indicators, developed by State/F with input from subject matter 

experts in State DRL and USAID’s Office of Democracy and Governance, 

generally focus on numbers of activities or immediate results of a 

program, such as the number of justice sector personnel trained by the 

U.S. government. USAID typically develops additional custom indicators 

to better assess particular projects, measuring program results not 

captured by the standard indicators. For example, in Jordan a custom 

indicator for a democracy assistance project measured improvement in 

the capacity of the legislative branch and elected local bodies to undertake 

their stated functions. USAID commissions a limited number of 

independent evaluations of democracy assistance program impact. USAID 

mission officials we met with noted they did not conduct many 

independent evaluations because of the resources involved and the 

difficulty of measuring the impact of democracy assistance. USAID reports 

initiating several steps in response to findings and recommendations in the 

National Research Council’s 2008 report on USAID’s democracy 

evaluation capacity. For example, USAID is designing impact evaluations 

for six missions as part of a pilot program with the goal of better 

identifying the effects of the missions’ democracy assistance programs. 

 

12According to joint State/F-USAID guidance, evaluation is a systematic and objective 

assessment, designed to determine the relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, sustainability, 

or impacts, of an ongoing or completed project, program, strategy, or policy. The purpose 

of an evaluation is to generate credible and useful information that contributes to improved 

performance, accountability, or learning from the experience, to assess the program’s 

effects or impacts, and to inform decisions about future programming. Planning and 

Performance Management Unit, Evaluation Guidelines for Foreign Assistance, Final 

Version (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Director of U.S. Foreign Assistance, 2009). 

Page 6 GAO-09-993 Democracy Assistance
 

To enhance coordination of U.S.-funded democracy assistance efforts, and 

in support of the Department of State’s first Quadrennial Diplomacy and 

Development Review, we recommend that the Secretary of State and the 

USAID Administrator, while recognizing NED’s status as a private, 

nonprofit organization, work jointly with NED to establish a mechanism to 

routinely collect information about NED’s current projects in countries 

where NED and State or USAID provide democracy assistance. 

We provided a draft of this report to State, USAID, and NED for review 

and comment. All three entities concurred with our recommendation. 

Background 

Foreign Assistance Reform In January 2006, to better align foreign assistance programs with U.S. 

foreign policy goals, the Secretary of State appointed a Director of Foreign 

Assistance with authority over all State and USAID foreign assistance 

funding and programs.13 In working to reform foreign assistance, the 

Director’s office, State/F, has taken a number of steps to integrate State 

and USAID foreign assistance processes. These steps have included, 

among others, integrating State and USAID foreign assistance budget 

formulation, planning and reporting processes. As part of the reform, 

State/F, with input from State and USAID subject matter experts, 

developed the Foreign Assistance Framework, with its five strategic 

objectives, as a tool for targeting U.S. foreign assistance resources; 

instituted common program definitions to collect, track, and report on 

data related to foreign assistance program funding and results; and created 

a set of standard output-oriented indicators for assessing foreign 

assistance programs. State/F also instituted annual operational planning 

and reporting processes for all State and USAID operating units. 

Moreover, State/F initiated a pilot program for developing 5-year country 

assistance strategies intended to ensure that foreign assistance provided 

by all U.S. agencies is aligned with top foreign policy objectives in a given 

country. These integrated processes are supported by two data 

 

13See GAO-09-192. 

Page 7 GAO-09-993 Democracy Assistance
 

information systems, known as the Foreign Assistance Coordination and 

Tracking System (FACTS) and FACTS Info.14

In July 2009, the Secretary of State announced plans to conduct a 

Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review, intended in part to 

maximize collaboration between State and USAID. According to State, this 

review will identify overarching foreign policy and development 

objectives, specific policy priorities, and expected results. In addition, the 

review will make recommendations on strategy, organizational and 

management reforms, tools and resources, and performance measures to 

assess outcomes and—where feasible—impacts of U.S. foreign assistance. 

The review will be managed by a senior leadership team under the 

direction of the Secretary of State and led by the Deputy Secretary for 

Management and Resources, with the Administrator of USAID and the 

Director of the Policy Planning serving as co-chairs and with senior 

representation from State and USAID.15 Although State has not announced 

a formal time frame for producing a final report of the review’s results, a 

senior State official indicated that the process would likely produce initial 

results in early 2010. 

Democracy Assistance and 

the Foreign Assistance 

Framework 

Under the Foreign Assistance Framework developed by State/F in 2006, 

the strategic objective GJD has four program areas—”Rule of Law and 

Human Rights,” “Good Governance,” “Political Competition and 

Consensus-Building,” and “Civil Society”—each with a number of program 

elements and subelements. State/F’s information systems, FACTS and 

FACTS Info, track funding allocated for assistance in support of GJD and 

these four program areas. Table 1 shows the four program areas and 

associated program elements. 

 

14FACTS was designed to collect foreign assistance planning, reporting, and funding data; 

FACTS Info was designed to aggregate, analyze, and report data on U.S. foreign assistance 

programs. For more information about these databases, see GAO, Foreign Assistance: 

State Department Foreign Aid Information Systems Have Improved Change 

Management Practices but Do Not Follow Risk Management Best Practices, GAO-09-52R

(Washington, D.C.: Nov. 21, 2008). 

15According to State, the Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review leadership team 

will also include senior representation from the Millennium Challenge Corporation. 

Page 8 GAO-09-993 Democracy Assistance
 

Table 1: GJD Program Areas and Program Elements 

Program area Program elements 

Rule of Law and Human Rights 

To advance and protect human and 

individual rights, and to promote societies 

in which the state and its citizens are 

accountable to laws that are publicly 

promulgated, equally enforced, and 

independently adjudicated, and which are 

consistent with international norms and 

standards 

• Constitutions, laws and human rights 

• Judicial independence 

• Justice system 

• Human rights 

Good Governance 

To promote democratic institutions that are 

effective, responsive, sustainable, and 

accountable to the people 

• Legislative function and processes 

• Public sector executive function 

• Local government and 

decentralization 

• Anticorruption reforms 

• Governance and security sector 

Political Competition and Consensus 

Building 

To encourage the development of 

transparent and inclusive electoral and 

political processes, and democratic, 

responsive, and effective political parties 

• Consensus-building processes 

• Election and political processes 

• Political parties 

Civil Society 

To empower individuals to exercise 

peacefully their rights of expression, 

association, and assembly, including 

through their establishing and participating 

in NGOs, unions, and other civil society 

organizations 

• Civic participation 

• Media freedom and freedom of 

information 

Source: State/USAID Strategic Plan, Fiscal Years 2007–2012 and State’s Handbook of GJD Indicators and Definitions. 

Funding Allocations for 

Democracy Assistance 

In fiscal years 2006 through 2008, funds allocated for the GJD strategic 

objective were provided for democracy assistance programs in 90 

countries around the world. Almost half of all democracy funding over this 

period was spent in Iraq and Afghanistan; the next highest funded 

countries, Sudan, Egypt, Mexico, Colombia, and Russia, accounted for 

more than 25 percent of the remaining GJD funding allocated to individual 

countries other than Iraq and Afghanistan. Of the 20 countries with the 

largest GJD allocations, 8 have been rated by Freedom House, an 

independent nongovernmental organization, as not free; 8 have been rated 

Page 9 GAO-09-993 Democracy Assistance
 

as partly free; and 4 have been rated as free.16 Figure 1 illustrates the 

worldwide distribution of GJD funding, and table 2 shows funding levels 

and Freedom House ratings for the 20 countries with the largest 

allocations. 

 with the largest 

Figure 1: Distribution of GJD Funding, Fiscal Years 2006-2008 

Sources: GAO analysis of State/F data; Map Resources, CIA, and UN (map).

Countries receiving GJD funds

Countries not receiving GJD funds

 

16Freedom House conducts an annual survey of the state of global freedom as experienced 

by individuals. The survey is intended to measure freedom—defined as the opportunity to 

act spontaneously in a variety of fields outside the control of the government and other 

centers of potential domination—according to two broad categories: political rights and 

civil liberties. 

Page 10 GAO-09-993 Democracy Assistance
 

Table 2: Total GJD Funding and Freedom House Rating for Top 20 Countries, Fiscal 

Years 2006-2008 

Dollars in thousands 

Country GJD FY 2006-2008 funding Freedom House rating 

Iraq $1,752,588 Not free 

Afghanistan 935,307 Not free 

Sudan 208,373 Not free 

Egypt 154,800 Not free 

Mexico 119,680 Free 

Colombia 118,928 Partly free 

Russia 117,734 Not free 

Kosovo 92,747 Not free 

Pakistan 91,873 Partly free 

Liberia 81,150 Partly free 

Indonesia 79,663 Free 

West Bank and Gaza 74,493 Not free 

Ukraine 71,567 Free 

Cuba 68,914 Not free 

Haiti 65,880 Partly free 

Georgia 63,464 Partly free 

Serbia 60,754 Free 

Armenia 56,887 Partly free 

Bosnia and 

Herzegovina 53,466 Partly free 

Jordan 53,206 Partly free 

Source: GAO analysis of State/F data and Freedom House’s an annual survey of the state of global freedom for 2009. 

Note: The GJD funding shown for each country does not include amounts that Washington, D.C.-

based operating units, such as State DRL, and regional operating units, such as USAID regional 

offices, may have programmed in the country. The data available from State/F shows allocations to 

country based operating units and do not include amounts of the allocated funds that these regional 

and cross-cutting operating units program in individual countries. 

Key Entities Involved in 

Providing U.S.-funded 

Democracy Assistance 

USAID, State DRL, and NED fund democracy assistance programs in 

countries throughout the world. USAID’s and State DRL’s foreign 

assistance programs are funded under the Foreign Operations 

appropriation and tracked by State as part of GJD funding, while NED’s 

core budget is funded under the State Operations appropriation and is not 

tracked as part of GJD foreign assistance funding. 

Page 11 GAO-09-993 Democracy Assistance
 

• U.S. Agency for International Development. In fiscal years 2006 

through 2008, USAID democracy programs operated in 88 countries 

worldwide. USAID’s Office of Democracy and Governance, based in 

Washington, D.C., supports USAID’s democracy programs worldwide, but 

these programs are primarily designed and managed by USAID missions in 

the field. USAID democracy programs cover a large variety of issues 

including media, labor, judicial reforms, local governance, legislative 

strengthening, and elections. USAID programs are managed by technical 

officers, typically based in missions in the field, who develop strategies 

and assessments, design programs, and monitor the performance of 

projects by collecting and reviewing performance reports from 

implementing partners and conducting site visits, typically at least 

monthly. 

• Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor. State DRL 

implements the Human Rights Democracy Fund, established in fiscal year 

1998, providing grants primarily to U.S. nonprofit organizations to 

strengthen democratic institutions, promote human rights, and build civil 

society mainly in fragile democracies and authoritarian states. In 2006 

through 2008, State DRL’s programs operated in 66 countries worldwide. 

According to State, State DRL strives to fund innovative programs focused 

on providing immediate short term assistance in response to emerging 

events. In addition, State DRL can also fill gaps in USAID democracy 

funding (see app. II). Unlike USAID, State DRL manages its democracy 

grant program centrally. State DRL’s Washington-based staff monitor these 

grants by collecting and reviewing quarterly reports from grantees and 

conducting site visits, typically through annual visits to participating 

countries.17

• National Endowment for Democracy. In 1983, Congress authorized 

initial funding for NED, a private, nonprofit, nongovernmental 

 

17State DRL typically does not have dedicated staff in U.S. embassies to manage its 

democracy grants; instead, the bureau works with foreign service officers covering the 

human rights and labor portfolios in the embassy, according to State DRL officials. State 

DRL has one full-time contractor at the U.S. embassy in China and two full-time foreign 

service officers at the U.S. embassy in Iraq; in both countries, State DRL is operating 

significantly larger democracy programs than it does elsewhere. 

Page 12 GAO-09-993 Democracy Assistance
 

organization.18 NED’s core budget is funded primarily through an annual 

congressional appropriation and NED receives additional funding from 

State to support congressionally directed or discretionary programs.19 The 

legislation recognizing the creation of NED and authorizing its funding, 

known as the NED Act, requires NED to report annually to Congress on its 

operations, activities, and accomplishments as well as on the results of an 

independent financial audit.20 The act does not require NED to report to 

State on the use of its core appropriation; however, State requires NED to 

provide quarterly financial reporting and annual programmatic reporting 

on the use of the congressionally directed and discretionary grants it 

receives from State.21 NED funds indigenous partners with grants that 

typically last for about a year. NED monitors program activities through 

quarterly program and financial reports from grantees and site visits, 

performed on average about once per year, to verify program and 

budgetary information. About half of NED’s total annual core grant 

funding is awarded to four affiliated organizations, known as core 

institutes.22 The remaining funds are used to provide hundreds of grants to 

 

18The legislation authorizing funding for NED, National Endowment for Democracy Act, 

spells out six purposes for the endowment: encouraging democratic institutions through 

private sector initiatives; facilitating exchanges between U.S. private sector groups and 

democratic groups abroad; promoting U.S. nongovernmental participation in democratic 

training programs; strengthening democratic electoral processes abroad in cooperation 

with indigenous democratic forces; supporting the participation of U.S. private sector 

groups in fostering cooperation with those abroad "dedicated to the cultural values, 

institutions, and organizations of democratic pluralism;" and encouraging democratic 

development consistent with the interests of both the United States and the democratic 

groups in other countries receiving assistance from programs funded by the Endowment. 

See Pub. L. No. 98-164, Title V, 97 Stat. 1017 (1983). 

19Although NED’s programs support democracy promotion, State does not include NED’s 

core appropriation in its calculation of foreign assistance because NED’s annual core 

appropriation is usually requested and appropriated in the Diplomatic and Consular 

account, not in the Foreign Operations appropriation. In fiscal year 2008 only, NED’s core 

budget was appropriated under Foreign Operations and, therefore, part of total funding for 

GJD foreign assistance funds. 

20See Pub. L. No. 98-164. Section 504 requires NED to provide an annual report to Congress 

of its activities and accomplishments and makes NED subject to audits by GAO. 

21Unlike NED’s core appropriation, these directed or discretionary grants are counted as 

GJD funding. 

22NED’s core institutes—the American Center for International Labor Solidarity (also 

known as the Solidarity Center), the Center for International Private Enterprise, the 

International Republican Institute, and the National Democratic Institute—represent, 

respectively, organized labor, business, and the two major U.S. political parties. Projects 

implemented by the core institutes are subject to approval by the NED Board of Directors 

and oversight by NED staff. The institutes also participate in NED’s planning process. 

Page 13 GAO-09-993 Democracy Assistance
 

NGOs in more than 90 countries to promote human rights, independent 

media, rule of law, civic education, and the development of civil society in 

general. 

State/F information systems show allocations of approximately $2.25 

billion in GJD funding to operating units in fiscal year 2008, with about 85 

percent of this amount allocated for State and USAID field-based 

operating units, primarily country missions. The estimated average 

annualized funding for democracy assistance projects active in our 10 

sample countries as of January 2009 was $18 million for USAID, $3 million 

for State DRL, and $2 million for NED. In fiscal year 2008, more than half 

of State DRL funding for democracy assistance went to Iraq, followed by 

China, Cuba, Iran, and North Korea, and most NED funding for democracy 

programs went to China, Iraq, Russia, Burma, and Pakistan. 

Data Show Largest 

Allocations for USAID 

Democracy 

Assistance 

Most Democracy Funding 

Allocated to Field-Based 

Operating Units 

Data from State/ F information systems, which report GJD allocations by 

operating unit, indicate that most GJD funding allocated in fiscal year 2008 

went to country programs. The State/F systems show that, of more than 

$2.25 billion allocated for GJD in fiscal year 2008, approximately $306 

million, or almost 15 percent, went to operating units in Washington, D.C., 

including USAID and State regional and functional bureaus and offices 

such as State DRL. More than $1.95 billion, or about 85 percent of the total 

allocation, was allocated to field-based operating units, primarily country 

missions. (See fig. 2 for the allocation of GJD funding by type of operating 

unit, for fiscal year 2008. See app. IV for a list of Washington, D.C.-based 

and field-based operating units that received GJD funds in fiscal years 

2006-2008.) 

Page 14 GAO-09-993 Democracy Assistance
 

Figure 2: GJD Funding by Operating Unit, Fiscal Year 2008 

7%

6%

87%

State DRL,a $168

Other, $138

Field-based operating units, $1,953

(Dollars in millions)

Washington-based 

operating units

Source: GAO analysis of State/F data.

a

The amount shown for the State DRL allocation for fiscal year 2008 reflects State DRL-managed 

funding for that year for all countries except Iraq and also reflects NED’s core appropriation. State/F 

categorizes State DRL-managed funds for Iraq as part of the Iraq operating unit; therefore, our 

analysis includes State DRL-managed funds for Iraq as part of the field-based operating units rather 

than the State DRL operating unit. In addition, because NED core funding was appropriated through 

the Foreign Operations account in fiscal year 2008, NED core funding for that year is included in the 

amount allocated for the State DRL operating unit. (In previous years other than fiscal year 2008, 

NED’s core appropriation was not appropriated under the Foreign Operations account and therefore 

is not included in the GJD foreign assistance totals for all other years.) 

Figure 3 shows the distribution of democracy assistance funding for the 

four GJD program areas. 

Page 15 GAO-09-993 Democracy Assistance
 

Figure 3: GJD Funding by Program Area, Fiscal Year 2008 

26%

13%

34%

27%

Political Competition and 

Consensus Building, $295

Good Governance, $762

Civil Society, $593

Rule of Law and Human Rights, 

$608

(Dollars in millions)

Source: GAO analysis of State/F data.

Although State/F information systems enable reporting of democracy 

assistance allocations to operating units and by program area, these 

systems do not include funding information by implementing entity for the 

years we reviewed—fiscal years 2006 through 2008.23 Consequently, 

State/F data on GJD funding allocations to implementing entities—

including the portion of allocations to field-based operating units that is 

programmed by each implementing entity—are not centrally located.24

However, in response to our request for information on USAID democracy 

 

23Each operating unit enters information into the databases from its annual operational 

plan, showing how it intends to use the current year’s funding allocation, including the 

amounts to be programmed by implementing entities. After funding is allocated to a fieldbased operating unit, such as a country mission, that operating unit determines the amount 

of funding to be implemented by USAID and other entities that implement funds at the 

mission. State officials noted that because these databases and reporting tools were 

developed in 2006 and refined in 2008, the databases were not completely populated with 

information for every operating unit by fiscal year 2008. However, State officials noted that 

aggregated funding information broken out by implementing entity may become available 

in the future as the databases become more complete. For more information about the 

development of State/F’s databases, see GAO-09-192. 

24Although State DRL is an implementing entity, the State/F information systems show GJD 

funds allocated to State DRL because it is also considered to be a Washington, D.C.-based 

operating unit. 

Page 16 GAO-09-993 Democracy Assistance
 

assistance funding, State/F and USAID compiled data provided by USAID 

missions on GJD funding allocated to USAID for most country-based 

operating units for fiscal years 2006 through 2008.25 According to these 

data, USAID implements the majority of the democracy funding provided 

in most countries. In addition, State/F data show that the largest portion of 

GJD funding in fiscal year 2008 was allocated for the Good Governance 

program area (see fig. 3). (App. II shows amounts of USAID, State DRL, 

and NED funding distributed to all countries in fiscal years 2006-2008 as 

well as each country’s Freedom House rating.) 

USAID Funded Most 

Democracy Assistance in 

10 Sample Countries 

Estimated average annualized funding for all active democracy assistance 

projects in the 10 sample countries was about $18 million per year for 

USAID (78 percent of the total estimated average annual funding for all 

three entities), $3 million for State DRL, and $2 million for NED. 

Annualized funding per project averaged more than $2 million for USAID; 

more than $350,000 for State DRL; and more than $100,000 for NED. 

Project length averaged 3 years for USAID, 2 years for State DRL, and 1 

year for NED (see fig. 4). 

 

25We requested USAID funding data for all country missions; however, with our 

concurrence, State/F excluded USAID funding data for Iraq, Afghanistan, and Pakistan 

owing to the unique and complex circumstances in those countries. 

Page 17 GAO-09-993 Democracy Assistance
 

Figure 4: Average Annual Funding, Number and Duration of USAID, State DRL, and NED Democracy Projects in 10 Sample 

Countries 

Average length

of project

(in years)

Average number of

active projects

Sources: GAO analysis of USAID, State/DRL, and NED data.

2,262 10

356

112 

8

19

3.2

2.0

1.1

USAID

State/DRL

Total for all

countries

China

Democratic Republic 

of Congo

Haiti

Indonesia

Jordan

Kosovo

Lebanon

Nicaragua

Pakistan

Russia

Average annual funding

per project

(dollars in thousands)

Annual funding of 

portfolio

(percentage)

NED

8%

78%

13%

Note: This analysis is based on the set of USAID, State DRL, and NED democracy projects that were 

active in each of the 10 countries during January 2009. To compare the projects with varying duration 

and funding levels, we (1) annualized funding of active projects by averaging the monthly cost of each 

project (total project funding divided by the length of the project in months) and multiplying by 12; (2) 

annualized the funding for each portfolio by summing the annualized funding for each project in the 

portfolio; and (3) determined the average length of projects in years by multiplying by 12 the planned 

length of active projects in months. 

According to award data for USAID, State DRL, and NED, USAID provided 

the majority of funding for democracy assistance projects that were active 

as of January 2009 in 9 of the 10 sample countries (see fig. 5).26 USAID 

funding ranged from 10 to 94 percent, with a median of 89 percent, of the 

three entities’ total democracy assistance funding in each country. 

 

26The 10 countries in our sample are China, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Haiti, 

Indonesia, Jordan, Kosovo, Lebanon, Nicaragua, Pakistan, and Russia. 

Page 18 GAO-09-993 Democracy Assistance
 

Figure 5: Annualized Funding, Number and Duration of USAID, State DRL, and NED Democracy Projects in 10 Sample 

Countries 

Average length 

of project

(in years)

Number of 

active 

projects

USAID funding

by program area

(percentage)

Rule of Law

Civil Society

Political Competition

Good Governance

660 4

404

115

42

52

2,711

347

45

5

3

38

2,074

323

68

9

1

14

9

4

6

8

1

8

3.0

2.5

1.0

2.3

2.3

1.0

3.0

2.0

1.0

3.2

2.3

1.7

3.5

2.0

1.0

3,152

281

261

2,274

224

136

USAID

State/DRL

Country

China

Democratic 

Republic of Congo

Haiti

Indonesia

Jordan

Average annual funding

per project

(dollars in thousands)

Annual funding

of portfolio

(percentage)

NED

10%

6%

10%

5%

2%

5%

4%

9%

10%

3%

6%

6%

1%

66%

83%

94%

91%

93%

23%

70%

23%

19%

20%

38%

100%

70%

26%

27%

21%

25%

33%

Sources: GAO analysis of USAID, State/DRL, and NED data; Map Resources (maps).

Page 19 GAO-09-993 Democracy Assistance
 

Democracy Assistance

 

Page 20 GAO-09-993 

Average length 

of project

(in years)

Number of 

active 

projects

USAID funding

by program area

(percentage)

Rule of Law

Civil Society

Political Competition

Good Governance

2,282 7

216

63 5

3,041

444

112

1,945

373

62

5

1

10

3,649

398

166

5

7

19

834

550

87

36

6

32

USAID

State/DRL

Kosovo

Lebanon

Nicaragua

Pakistan

Russia

Average annual funding

per project

(dollars in thousands)

Annual funding

of portfolio

(percentage)

NED

6%

2%

3%

11%

92%

86%

6%

3%

13%

12%

91%

75%

83%

79%

52%

9%

2%

8%

10%

42%

50%

16%

16%

31%

3%

65%

25%

31%

21%

13%

27%

Country

9%

8%

8

7

7

5

2.7

1.0

3.0

0.7

1.0

2.4

2.3

1.3

5.0

1.8

1.0

4.0

1.9

1.0

1.9

Page 20 GAO-09-993 
 

Note: This analysis is based on the set of USAID, State DRL, and NED democracy projects that were 

active in each of the 10 countries during January 2009. To compare the projects with varying duration 

and funding levels, we (1) annualized funding of active projects by averaging the monthly cost of each 

project (total project funding divided by the length of the project in months) and multiplying by 12; (2) 

annualized the funding for each portfolio by summing the annualized funding for each project in the 

portfolio; and (3) determined the average length of projects in years by multiplying by 12 the planned 

length of active projects in months. 

These charts do not include funding implemented by State INL, MEPI, or MCC at the country level. 

For information on the funding for these agencies, see appendix III. 

USAID’s country-based missions are typically responsible for developing 

democracy assistance activities based on country-specific multiyear 

democracy assistance strategies, which they develop in the field with input 

from embassy officials as well as USAID and State offices in Washington, 

D.C. Once the strategic plan is approved, individual programs are designed 

to fit into the overall priorities and objectives laid out in the strategic plan. 

This program design includes the procedures to select the implementer 

and to monitor and evaluate program performance. USAID missions 

typically collaborate with the USAID Office of Democracy and Governance 

to develop and carry out in-depth democracy and governance assessments 

to help define these strategies.27 These assessments are intended to 

identify core democracy and governance problems and the primary actors 

and institutions in a country. For example, the USAID mission in Indonesia 

conducted a democracy and governance assessment in June 2008, which 

formed the basis for a new 5-year democracy and governance strategy for 

2009 to 2014. The assessment, which was commissioned by the USAID 

Office of Democracy and Governance and conducted by an outside 

contractor, involved consultation with more than 100 Indonesian 

government officials, civil society representatives, local academics, and 

other international donors involved in democracy and governance in 

Indonesia. 

USAID democracy activities vary in each country, according to the 

operating environment, needs and opportunities. For example, as of 

January 2009, USAID’s democracy assistance portfolio in Lebanon 

amounted to $24.3 million on an annual basis. The majority of this 

funding—65 percent—was awarded for Good Governance activities such 

 

27Internal program assessments are commissioned at the mission level. Sectorwide 

program assessments follow a specific framework, USAID: Conducting A DG Assessment: 

A Framework for Strategy Development, November 2000. This framework recommends 

that these assessments can be accomplished with three-person teams, one of whom should 

know the country very well, conducting 3 weeks of field work, plus some preparation and 

follow-up time. 

Page 21 GAO-09-993 Democracy Assistance
 

as assistance to the Lebanese Parliament, and programs to improve 

service delivery through municipal capacity building. In Indonesia, about 

70 percent of USAID funding for projects active in January 2009 was for 

Good Governance–related assistance to help the Indonesian government 

with a major effort to decentralize its government. Conversely, in Russia, 

where USAID does not work closely with the Russian government, over 50 

percent of USAID funding supported Civil Society programs and only 

about 13 percent of funding supported active projects in the area of Good 

Governance. 

USAID implements approximately half of the value of its democracy 

programs using grants and implements the remaining half using contracts. 

Worldwide, USAID democracy contract funding tends to be much higher 

than USAID grant funding; in fiscal year 2008, democracy contract funding 

averaged about $2 million per project and democracy grant funding 

averaged almost $850,000 per project. However, USAID implements more 

than twice as many projects with grants than with contracts; thus, 

although USAID contracts are higher in funding, USAID democracy 

funding is fairly evenly split between contracts and grants. In fiscal year 

2008, about 53 percent of USAID democracy funding was implemented 

through contracts and 47 percent was implemented through grants. Table 

3 shows USAID’s average global funding for democracy contracts and 

grants in fiscal year 2008. 

Table 3: Global USAID Democracy Funding and Projects by Implementing 

Mechanism, Fiscal Year 2008 

Grants Contracts 

Average funding per project $846,526 $2,012,114 

Percentage of total funding 47 percent 53 percent 

Total number of projects 692 326 

Source: GAO analysis of USAID data. 

Note: This analysis is based on USAID data for democracy assistance in all countries, including Iraq 

and Afghanistan, for fiscal year 2008; if funding for democracy projects in Iraq and Afghanistan is 

excluded, the distribution of USAID democracy funds by funding mechanism changes to 52 percent of 

funds distributed for grants and 47 percent for contracts. In 2006 and 2007, USAID democracy 

funding, excluding projects in Iraq and Afghanistan, was likewise more heavily concentrated toward 

grants, with 62 percent of funds distributed for grants and 38 percent for contracts in 2006 and 65 

percent distributed for grants and 35 percent for contracts in 2007. USAID officials noted that 

democracy projects in Iraq and Afghanistan are more reliant on contracts because of the nature of the 

projects involved. This analysis does not cover all USAID democracy projects over this period, as it 

excludes some cross-cutting projects relating to more than one objective. 

Page 22 GAO-09-993 Democracy Assistance
 

State DRL funded democracy programs in more than 30 countries in a 

variety of program areas in fiscal year 2008,28 spending 57 percent of its 

funds in Iraq and 28 percent in China, Cuba, Iran, and North Korea. Funds 

managed by State DRL totaled $157 million in fiscal year 2008, $75 million 

of which was allocated through a supplemental appropriation for 

democracy programs in Iraq. Only a small portion of State DRL-managed 

funding in that year—$13 million of $157 million—was discretionary; most 

of the funding was congressionally directed for specific countries or 

issues.29 In planning resource allocations as well as solicitations for 

statements of interest and requests for proposals from NGOs, State DRL 

staff members consult with USAID and State regional bureaus, and review 

country mission strategic plans and operational plans, according to a State 

DRL official. Proposals are reviewed by a 7-person panel, which includes 

representatives from State DRL, USAID, and State regional bureaus.30

According to a State DRL official, the bureau does not prepare country 

strategies for its democracy grant program because funding levels are 

relatively small for most countries and fluctuate from year to year. 

State DRL and NED 

Funded Democracy 

Assistance Activities in 

Select Countries 

NED funded democracy programs in more than 90 countries in fiscal year 

2008, spending 28 percent of its funds on programs in China, Iraq, Russia, 

Burma, and Pakistan. Unlike USAID and State DRL, NED allocates 

democracy funds relatively evenly across many countries, with average 

per-country funding of almost $1 million in fiscal year 2008.31 In fiscal year 

2008, NED’s funding allocation for democracy programs totaled $118 

million. NED makes programming decisions on specific projects in the 

context of its current 5-year strategic plan, published in 2007, and an 

internal annual planning document. For each region of the world, the 

annual planning document identifies regional priorities and critical 

sectors—such as human rights and freedom of information—in which to 

target assistance. According to a NED official, NED solicits proposals from 

NGOs every quarter. After grant proposals are received, NED conducts an 

 

28State DRL funded democracy programs in 66 countries in fiscal years 2006 through 2008. 

29In fiscal year 2008, State DRL-managed funding for democracy grants included specific 

congressionally directed funding levels for several countries, including Iraq, China, Hong 

Kong, Tibet, Syria, Iran, and North Korea, among others, as well as for internet freedom 

and religious freedom programs. 

30State regional bureaus and USAID each have one of seven votes on these review panels. 

31NED per-country funding ranged from $25,000 to more than $6,000,000 across 94 

countries in fiscal year 2008. 

Page 23 GAO-09-993 Democracy Assistance
 

internal review and the proposals that are selected are presented to the 

NED board of directors for approval.32

Figure 6 shows the countries where State DRL and NED, respectively, 

allocated the largest amounts for democracy programs in fiscal year 2008. 

 

32NED has a board of 28 officers and directors, including foreign policy experts and current 

and former members of Congress. 

Page 24 GAO-09-993 Democracy Assistance
 

Figure 6: Countries with the Largest Percentage of Funding from State DRL and 

NED, Fiscal Year 2008 

11%

15%

(Dollars in millions)

Countries with Highest DRL Funding

Countries with Highest NED Funding

Iraq, $6

57%

6%

4%

5%

6%

6%

7%

9%

72%

Iraq, $75

China, $15

Russia, $6

Burma, $5

Pakistan, $3

China, $6

Cuba, $12

All other countries, $19

All other countries, $66

2% North Korea, $3 

Iran, $8

Source: GAO analysis of State/DRL, and NED data.

Note: This analysis includes all funding directly allocated to programs in individual countries and 

excludes funding allocated to regional or cross-cutting programs that operate in more than one 

country. 

Page 25 GAO-09-993 Democracy Assistance
 

To help ensure complementary programming and avoid duplication in 

their respective democracy assistance programs, State DRL invites USAID 

missions to review State DRL proposals for democracy assistance 

projects. In addition, State DRL officials sometimes participate in USAID 

missions’ planning for democracy assistance projects. However, USAID 

and State DRL officials are often not aware of NED democracy assistance 

projects, and although NED is not required to report on all of its 

democracy assistance projects, State DRL officials and USAID mission 

officials said that information on all NED’s active projects would be useful 

in ensuring coordinated assistance.33 USAID officials participate in 

embassy working groups or committees that review democracy assistance 

projects, among others, to ensure that projects are complementary. 

USAID and State DRL 

Coordinate to Help 

Ensure 

Complementary 

Programs but Often 

Are Not Aware of 

NED Projects 

USAID Missions and State 

DRL Take Steps to 

Coordinate Democracy 

Assistance Programming 

State DRL—which manages its democracy grant program centrally, 

without embassy-based staff—solicits feedback from USAID missions in 

both the development of State DRL’s solicitations for democracy programs 

and the resulting project proposals from NGOs. As part of State DRL’s 

formal process for evaluating democracy assistance project proposals, 

USAID and State regional bureau representatives participate in State 

DRL’s project review panels and vote on proposals, conveying feedback 

from USAID country missions and embassies as to whether project 

proposals complement or duplicate ongoing democracy assistance efforts 

of USAID and other State entities. USAID officials at the 10 missions we 

contacted generally agreed that this process helps to ensure 

complementary programming between State DRL and USAID. In just one 

instance, a USAID mission official remarked that a review panel had 

approved a State DRL proposal for civil society training that could 

duplicate an existing USAID project. According to a State DRL official, the 

review panels take into account the missions’ and embassies’ feedback but 

may vote to approve a project on the basis of other factors. 

In addition, State DRL officials are involved in some aspects of USAID 

missions’ democracy assistance planning. State DRL officials who manage 

the bureau’s democracy grants participate with USAID’s Office of 

Democracy and Governance in providing input on democracy funding 

 

33The NED Act requires NED to report annually to Congress on its operations, activities, 

and accomplishments as well as on the results of an independent financial audit. The act 

does not require NED to report to State on the use of its core appropriation; however, State 

requires NED to provide quarterly financial reporting and annual programmatic reporting 

on the use of the congressionally directed and discretionary grants it receives from State. 

Page 26 GAO-09-993 Democracy Assistance
 

levels as a part of the budget formulation process and have the 

opportunity to review and comment on all country operational plans, 

according to State officials. State officials also noted that State DRL as a 

bureau is involved in many strategic discussions about democracy 

assistance that is provided through bilateral programs; however, State 

DRL officers generally are not involved in USAID missions’ planning for 

democracy assistance projects. According to State DRL officials 

responsible for grants in our 10 sample countries, increased integration 

into USAID’s planning process would better inform State DRL 

programming decisions and ensure better coordination between State and 

USAID. State DRL officials noted that this would also increase the 

opportunity for State DRL to share its expertise as the bureau responsible 

for U.S. human rights and democracy policy. However, State DRL and 

USAID officials commented that increasing the level of coordination 

between State DRL’s staff and USAID missions in USAID’s planning 

process could be challenging, because State DRL staff typically have 

resources to travel to countries only once per year as part of their grant 

oversight duties. According to USAID officials, USAID selects its projects 

based on multiyear democracy assistance strategies developed at countrybased missions; the development of individual USAID democracy 

assistance projects and selection of implementing partners also generally 

takes place at the missions. USAID mission officials also noted that their 

review process for selecting implementing partners, which takes place in 

the field, generally lasts 10 to 15 days. In addition, a State/F official 

observed that for most countries, State DRL’s level of funding for its grant 

program would likely be too small to justify the additional staff time 

necessary for increasing their involvement in USAID’s mission-based 

planning processes.34

Despite the challenges related to State DRL involvement in USAID 

planning, we found that USAID missions included State DRL staff in joint 

planning activities for 2 of our 10 sample countries. For example, the 

USAID mission in Russia invited a State DRL official to participate in an 

interagency visit to the country in 2008 to review current U.S. democracy 

assistance efforts and consider areas for future programming. The State 

DRL official involved in the visit noted that this effort helped her identify 

potential areas where State DRL could target its assistance to complement 

USAID’s larger, longer-term democracy program. In China—the only 

country in our sample where State DRL funds a larger portfolio of 

 

34See appendix II, table 6, for information on State DRL’s democracy assistance funding. 

Page 27 GAO-09-993 Democracy Assistance
 

democracy projects than does USAID—a State DRL official participated in 

vetting proposals for a USAID Rule of Law project in China that began in 

2006. State DRL official did not participate in planning the solicitation for 

the proposals,35 and USAID did not invite State DRL to participate in its 

planning or proposal vetting for subsequent Rule of Law projects in China. 

More recently, State DRL and USAID staff met with embassy staff in 

Beijing to collaborate on their respective democracy assistance programs. 

However, according to a State DRL official, it is not clear what role State 

DRL will have in USAID’s future strategic planning process for assistance 

in China or in reviewing USAID’s future democracy project proposals 

there. 

The development of joint State-USAID country assistance strategies 

(CAS), which State/F is piloting as part of its foreign aid reform efforts, is 

expected to improve coordination of State and USAID foreign assistance, 

according to State/F officials. However, as we reported in April 2009, the 

CAS, unlike USAID’s country strategies, contains only high-level 

information, which could limit its impact on interagency collaboration.36

State piloted this new strategic planning process in 10 countries in fiscal 

year 2008 and was reviewing the results of the pilot as of August 2009.37

Consequently, according to State and USAID officials, it is not yet clear 

what form the new process will take; it also is not clear whether or how 

the process may affect interagency coordination of democracy assistance 

efforts.38

USAID and State DRL Are 

Often Not Aware of NED 

Projects 

USAID and State DRL officials responsible for managing democracy 

assistance in our 10 sample countries have often lacked basic information 

about NED’s democracy projects, which they believe would be useful in 

ensuring coordinated assistance. No mechanism currently exists for the 

routine sharing of information on NED’s core-funded projects outside the 

 

35A USAID representative is part of State DRL’s panels to review State DRL project 

proposals. 

36See GAO-09-192. 

37The countries are Armenia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Democratic Republic of the Congo, 

Honduras, Jamaica, Morocco, Mozambique, Nepal, the Philippines, and Tanzania. 

38USAID issued guidance in September 2009 that in countries where a joint country 

assistance strategy is not in place or not under development, USAID Missions may develop 

an interim long-term (3 to 5 years), USAID-only country strategic plan. If a joint country 

assistance strategy is subsequently approved, it will supersede USAID’s strategic plan. 

Page 28 GAO-09-993 Democracy Assistance
 

Europe and Eurasia region. In 4 of our 10 sample countries, USAID 

mission officials told us that they were not aware of NED-supported 

activities in the country, despite the presence of several active NED 

projects. Several USAID mission officials stated that more knowledge of 

NED’s projects would be useful for ensuring that U.S.-supported 

assistance is well coordinated. State DRL officials responsible for planning 

and managing democracy grants in 7 of the 10 sample countries also told 

us that they were not aware of NED’s current projects, and State DRL 

officials responsible for managing projects in 5 of these 7 countries said 

that receiving timely information on NED’s projects would improve 

coordination and help reduce the possibility of duplicative programming. 

In particular, State DRL officials stated that knowledge of NED’s activities 

in a given country would help inform their own planning decisions 

regarding which projects to support. 

State has access to NED’s annual report to Congress on its core grant 

activities. However, State DRL officials noted that they cannot rely on this 

report for complete information about NED’s activities, because the report 

may exclude many projects that go into effect after the report is published. 

Although NED is under no obligation to report to State on the projects it 

funds with its core U.S. appropriation, NED also regularly provides 

information on its core-funded and non-core-funded projects to State in 

some instances. For example, in addition to annually reporting, NED 

provides quarterly updates on both proposed and active projects in former 

Soviet Union and Eastern Europe countries to State’s Office of the 

Coordinator of U.S. Assistance to Europe and Eurasia (EUR/ACE).39

EUR/ACE officials stated that they circulate information on NED’s 

proposed and active projects to the relevant USAID missions and U.S. 

embassies, as well as to Washington counterparts in DRL and regional 

State and USAID bureaus, to keep them informed and that they also solicit 

any feedback that might be useful to NED on an advisory basis only. 

EUR/ACE officials noted that because EUR/ACE exists expressly to 

coordinate all foreign assistance in its geographic regions, staff resources 

are available to collect and disseminate this information; according to 

 

39State’s EUR/ACE oversees the bilateral economic, security, democracy, and humanitarian 

assistance of all U.S. government agencies providing assistance to 18 states of the former 

Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. The office is part of State’s Bureau of European and 

Eurasian Affairs and was established by the Support for East European Democracy Act of 

1989 (Public Law 101-179), as amended, and the FREEDOM Support Act of 1992 (Public 

Law 102-511), as amended. 

Page 29 GAO-09-993 Democracy Assistance
 

these officials, other geographic State bureaus may not have access to 

such resources. 

NED officials told us that, although there is no mechanism for routine 

information sharing on NED projects, NED provides information to State 

and USAID when asked. NED officials also said that the organization does 

not oppose sharing with State or USAID information on projects that the 

NED board has approved.40 The officials stated that NED would be willing 

to provide project information routinely if State or USAID deemed it 

useful. However, NED and State officials also indicated that any attempt to 

increase NED’s sharing of information with State DRL should be designed 

to minimize additional administrative burden and avoid straining State 

DRL’s available staff resources. 

USAID and Embassy 

Officials Collaborate 

Regularly 

USAID mission and embassy officials involved in democracy assistance in 

our 10 sample countries collaborate regularly, typically through working 

groups or committees at posts. For example, in Indonesia, an 

anticorruption working group that includes USAID, Department of Justice, 

and State officials from the embassy’s political and economic sections 

meets monthly at the embassy. According to USAID officials, this group 

has discussed various anticorruption-related programs to ensure that their 

efforts are complementary. The embassy in Indonesia also convenes a 

parliamentary working group, a counterterrorism and law enforcement 

working group, and an ad hoc working group on elections involving many 

of the same representatives. In addition, during our review of 10 sample 

countries, USAID officials in Russia told us of a working group that meets 

at the embassy to coordinate all U.S. foreign assistance, including 

democracy assistance. Also, according to State officials, the embassies in 

Lebanon and Kosovo have each established a staff position devoted to 

coordinating U.S. assistance.41 The State officials noted that these staff 

have facilitated interagency coordination among the various U.S. programs 

involved in democracy assistance in these countries. 

 

40NED officials also indicated that having more access to information on State DRL and 

USAID projects could help inform NED’s programming decisions. 

41According to State officials, U.S. embassies in former Soviet Republics and Eastern 

European countries, including Russia and Kosovo, have a designated coordinator of all U.S. 

assistance programs, usually the Deputy Chief of Mission or a dedicated staff person. 

Page 30 GAO-09-993 Democracy Assistance
 

In addition to participating in embassy-based interagency working groups 

and committees, mission officials also reported regularly collaborating, 

both informally and formally, with State officials at posts such as political 

and public affairs officers. In particular, in our survey of 31 USAID mission 

officials responsible for managing democracy assistance projects, 25 

officials identified collaboration with the embassy political section, 21 

officials identified collaboration with the embassy public affairs section, 

and 10 officials identified collaboration with the embassy law enforcement 

section as being at least somewhat important to their current projects. Our 

survey respondents also showed that State officials often reviewed USAID 

democracy project proposals. Specifically, 13 respondents identified the 

embassy political section as being somewhat, moderately, or very involved 

in reviewing USAID’s democracy project proposals. Six respondents 

identified the embassy public affairs section, and two respondents 

identified the embassy law enforcement section, as being at least 

somewhat involved in reviewing the proposals. 

USAID uses standard indicators to report quantitative information on 

immediate results of its democracy assistance programs and develops 

additional custom indicators to assess specific projects. In addition, 

USAID sometimes commissions longer-term independent evaluations of 

program impact. USAID reported taking several actions to improve its 

evaluation capacity in response to the 2008 National Research Council 

study that the agency commissioned. 

USAID Uses Standard 

and Custom 

Indicators to Assess 

and Report 

Democracy 

Assistance Results 

and Provides Some 

Independent 

Evaluations of 

Impacts 

Page 31 GAO-09-993 Democracy Assistance
 

USAID uses standard indicators to assess and report the outputs—that is, 

numbers of activities and immediate results—of its democracy assistance 

programs.42 State/F developed the standard indicators with input from 

subject matter experts in DRL and USAID’s Office of Democracy and 

Governance. The indicators, which are linked to State/F’s program 

objectives, areas, and elements, are intended to facilitate the aggregating 

and reporting of quantitative information common to foreign assistance 

programs across countries.43 For the GJD program areas, there are 96 

element-level standard indicators (see table 4 for examples). USAID uses 

the standard indicators in performance reports that summarize project 

activities, achievements, and difficulties encountered.44

USAID Uses Standard and 

Custom Indicators to 

Assess Immediate Results 

of Democracy Assistance 

Table 4: Example of GJD Element-Level Standard Indicators 

Program area Program element Indicator 

Rule of Law and Human Rights • Constitutions, Laws and Human Rights • Number of U.S. government-supported public 

sessions held regarding proposed changes to 

the country’s legal framework 

• Judicial Independence • Number of judges trained with U.S. 

government assistance 

Good Governance • Legislative Function and Process • Number of public forums resulting from U.S. 

government assistance in which national 

legislators and members of the public interact 

• Anti-corruption Reforms • Number of government officials receiving U.S. 

government-supported anti-corruption training 

Political Competition and 

Consensus Building 

• Consensus Building Processes • Number of groups trained in conflict 

mediation/resolution skills with U.S. 

government assistance 

 

42The standard indicators we describe are those that State/F refers to as element-level 

indicators. State/F has defined three types of standard indicators: (1) strategic-level 

indicators, intended to capture the impact of foreign and host-government efforts at the 

objective level; (2) program area–level indicators, intended to measure country 

performance within subsectors of the five foreign assistance program objectives and to 

measure results beyond what could be achieved solely by U.S. government-funded 

interventions; and (3) element-level indicators, intended primarily to measure outputs that 

are directly attributable to U.S. government programs, projects, and activities. 

43The standard indicators are tied to State/F’s standardized program structure, which 

provides uniform program categories and associated definitions to describe and account 

for foreign assistance programs. The standardized program structure serves as the 

foundation of the integrated State and USAID foreign assistance budget requests, annual 

operational plans and performance reporting. 

44Beginning in fiscal year 2008, State/F requires USAID and DRL to assess and report the 

results of their democracy assistance activities, providing standard indicators for 

monitoring reports. 

Page 32 GAO-09-993 Democracy Assistance
 

Program area Program element Indicator 

• Elections and Political Processes • Number of election officials trained with U.S. 

government assistance 

Civil Society • Strengthen Democratic Civic 

Participation 

• Number of people who have completed U.S. 

government-assisted civic education programs

• Media Freedom and Freedom of 

Information 

• Number of journalists trained with U.S. 

government assistance 

Source: Department of State, Office of the U.S. Director of Foreign Assistance. 

According to USAID officials, in addition to using these standard 

indicators to measure program outputs, USAID uses custom indicators for 

virtually every project to measure program outputs, outcomes, and 

impacts45 that are not captured by the standard indicators.46 Some USAID 

officials we spoke with informed us that they use project-specific custom 

indicators that are more outcome focused than the standard indicators. 

For example, USAID’s Jordan mission uses customized project indicators 

associated with each GJD program area; for the program area Good 

Governance, one such indicator is “improved capacity of the legislative 

branch and elected local bodies to undertake their stated functions.” Of 

the USAID technical officers we surveyed, more than two-thirds (22 of 31) 

said that custom indicators were very useful for monitoring and evaluating 

projects and assessing impact. USAID management officials also noted the 

importance of custom indicators in assessing the impact of democracy 

assistance projects. 

 

45Outcome and impact indicators measure policy-relevant effects of a program. 

46In its operational plan guidance for fiscal year 2007, State/F acknowledges that the 

standard indicators may not capture all ongoing programs or their outcomes and 

encourages the limited use of additional output, outcome, or impact indicators, called 

custom indicators, to establish targets and monitor the progress and impacts of 

interventions at the implementing mechanism level [Office of the Director of Foreign 

Assistance, U.S. Foreign Assistance Performance Indicators for Use in Developing 

FY2007 Operational Plans (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of State, 2006).] In 

addition, USAID guidance on performance monitoring and evaluation mandates that each 

mission collect performance indicators on every assistance objective (project). The 

guidance defines performance indicators as both quantitative and qualitative indicators 

that include custom project indicators and State/F standard indicators. (USAID, Automated 

Directives System, chap. 203.3.4.) 

Page 33 GAO-09-993 Democracy Assistance
 

To complement the data collected with the standard and custom 

indicators, USAID also commissions some independent evaluations of the 

longer-term impact of its democracy assistance, although such evaluations 

are relatively infrequent.47 State/F’s and USAID’s March 2009 joint 

guidelines for evaluating foreign assistance state that mission staff may 

decide whether and when to commission evaluations, based on 

management needs among other considerations. 

USAID Conducts Some 

Independent Evaluations 

of Longer-Term Democracy 

Assistance Impact 

Evaluations of USAID assistance efforts have decreased in frequency since 

the mid-1990s. In 1995, USAID eliminated a requirement that every major 

foreign assistance project undergo midterm and final evaluations; 

according to USAID officials, the requirement was eliminated because the 

evaluation requirement of every project was seen as too resource intensive 

relative to the value added. As a result of this change in policy, the number 

of evaluations across all areas of development assistance dropped from 

approximately 340 in 1995 to about 130 in 1999, according to a 2001 

review.48 

Our analysis of documentation from the 10 sample countries shows 7 

independent evaluations commissioned in fiscal years 2006 through 2008.49

Some USAID mission officials we met with noted that they conducted few 

independent evaluations of democracy assistance because of the 

resources involved in the undertaking and the difficulty of measuring 

 

47In this report, “independent evaluations” refers to evaluations conducted by third parties, 

versus end-of-project reports completed by implementing entities or implementing 

partners. In joint guidance issued in March 2009, State/F and USAID define evaluation as a 

systematic and objective assessment of an ongoing or completed project, program, strategy 

or policy, designed to determine the relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, sustainability, or 

impacts of an intervention, strategy, or policy. The guidance characterizes evaluations as 

episodic or ad hoc and notes that they are often performed by independent contractors. 

Office of the Director of U.S. Foreign Assistance, Evaluation Guidelines for Foreign 

Assistance (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of State, 2009). 

48The review projects the number of evaluations for 1999; in 2001, when the review was 

published, there were 68 evaluations. Cynthia Clapp-Wincek and Richard Blue, Evaluations 

of USAID’s Recent Evaluation Experience, USAID Working Paper No. 320 (Washington, 

D.C.: USAID, 2001). 

49USAID had 96 active projects in January 2009. In the 10 sample countries, the seven 

evaluations were for projects completed in fiscal years 2006 through 2008: three in 

Indonesia, two in Jordan, and two in Kosovo. USAID recommends, but does not require, 

that missions allocate 7 to 10 percent of their budget for evaluations. 

Page 34 GAO-09-993 Democracy Assistance
 

impact in the area of democracy assistance.50 For example, one technical 

officer responded on our survey that “behavior change is difficult to 

measure and change in democracy is not seen overnight. It is a long 

process difficult to measure.” In addition, senior USAID officials we spoke 

to in the three countries we visited stated that it is difficult to demonstrate 

causality between projects and improvements in a country’s democratic 

status. On the other hand, USAID mission officials in all of our 10 sample 

countries stated that evaluations are useful to monitoring, evaluating, and 

identifying lessons learned. In addition, in our survey six of eight technical 

officers who responded on the usefulness of independent evaluations 

responded that they are either very or moderately useful to monitoring and 

evaluation. 

USAID officials at headquarters as well as at several missions we 

contacted told us that because of the infrequency of independent 

evaluations, USAID missions use, as a proxy for such evaluations, internal 

program assessments of a country’s need for democracy programming 

(called sector and subsector assessments). More than half of the USAID 

technical officers we surveyed said that they found these assessments 

moderately or very useful in monitoring and evaluating their current 

projects.51 The three overall sectorwide assessments that we reviewed—

for Kosovo, Indonesia, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo—follow 

the assessment structure recommended in USAID guidance, which 

emphasizes strategic recommendations rather than program performance 

results. In line with that guidance, these assessments provide general, 

 

50Recent studies have highlighted the difficulties of measuring the impact of democracy 

assistance. For example, in 2006, NED reported that demonstrating causality between a 

democracy project and a country’s progress toward democracy is difficult because many 

other variables come into play. See National Endowment for Democracy, Evaluating 

Democracy Promotion Programs: A Report to Congress from the National Endowment 

for Democracy, submitted to the House and Senate Appropriation Committees in response 

to a request for a report contained in the conference report (H. Rept. 109-272 at 195 (2005)) 

accompanying the Science, State, Justice, Commerce Appropriations Act for FY2006 (H.R. 

2862). However, a 2006 USAID-funded independent study of the effects of foreign 

assistance on democracy in 165 countries between 1990 and 2005 found that USAID 

democracy assistance at the country (versus project) level had a significant and positive, 

albeit moderate, impact on democracy in the country. (see Steven E. Finkel, Aníbal PérezLiñán, Mitchell A. Seligson, C. Neal Tate, Deepening Our Understanding of the Effects of 

US Foreign Assistance on Democracy Building, Final Report (Washington, D.C.: USAID, 

2008). 

51Specifically, 14 survey respondents indicated that the assessments were moderately or 

very useful, and 4 respondents indicated that the assessments were somewhat useful; the 

remaining 13 respondents did not respond to our question about the assessments. 

Page 35 GAO-09-993 Democracy Assistance
 

high-level comments on program results, rather than evaluative 

information, and do not include either evidence supporting the results 

statements or references to evaluation documents.52 We also examined 10 

subsector assessments (not subject to the sector assessment guidance). 

Three of the 10 included significant information about the results of 

specific programs, while others included no reference or only a brief 

reference to the results or outcomes of specific USAID democracy 

projects. 

USAID Reported 

Preliminary Steps to 

Improve Evaluation 

Capacity 

Recognizing the need for evaluations of its democracy assistance 

programs’ impacts, in 2008 USAID commissioned a review of its program 

evaluation practices and problems by the National Research Council. 

According to the report’s findings:53

• USAID has lost much capacity to assess the impact and effectiveness of its 

programs. 

• The number of evaluations undertaken by USAID has declined. 

• The evaluations undertaken generally focus on implementation and 

management concerns and have not collected the data needed for sound 

“impact” evaluations. 

• Most current evaluations do not provide compelling evidence of the 

impacts of the programs. Most evaluations usually do not collect data that 

are critical to making the most accurate and credible determination of 

project impacts. 

• Most evaluations tend to be informative and serve varied purposes for 

project managers. 

The National Research Council report outlines techniques for improving 

the monitoring and evaluation of projects, developing methodologies for 

 

52According to State DRL officials, State DRL recommends that its grantees conduct 

independent external evaluations as part of individual grant awards but has not undertaken 

standard independent evaluations of democracy assistance at the country or thematic level. 

NED commissions periodic independent evaluations of clusters of programs but does not 

evaluate every grant. 

53National Research Council, Improving Democracy Assistance: Building Knowledge 

through Evaluations and Research. 

Page 36 GAO-09-993 Democracy Assistance
 

retrospective case studies, and other means of collecting and analyzing 

data that will allow USAID to more reliably gauge impact and improve 

strategic planning and programming decisions. Following the release of 

the report, the USAID Office of Democracy and Governance formed an 

internal initiative to formulate how to implement the report’s 

recommendations. According to USAID data provided to GAO, as of June 

2009, the office reports taking several actions in response to these 

recommendations.54 Table 5 shows the National Research Council’s 

recommendations and USAID’s reported actions. 

Table 5: National Research Council Recommendations and USAID Reported Actions 

National Research Council recommendation USAID reported actions 

Undertake a pilot program of impact evaluations designed to 

demonstrate whether such evaluations can help USAID 

determine the effects of its Office of Democracy and Governance 

projects on targeted policy-relevant outcomes. 

Initiated a pilot impact evaluation program to conduct a series of 

multicountry, subsectoral impact evaluations covering the most 

important kinds of democracy programs. Designed and delivered 

new training modules on impact evaluations for experienced 

USAID democracy officers, new Development Leadership Initiative 

recruits, implementing partners, and USAID staff and partners in 

the field. By the end of June 2009, over 200 were trained. Also 

provided in-country assistance to six USAID missions on design of 

potential impact evaluations to include in scope of work of new 

projects. In addition, USAID noted that it now routinely trains 

democracy officers in how to conduct impact evaluations, and has 

hired experts in evaluation methodologies to improve overall 

institutional capacity. 

Develop more transparent, objective, and widely accepted 

indicators of changes in democratic behavior and institutions at 

the sectoral level (i.e., rule of law, civil society, etc.). 

Addressed deficiencies in sector-level indicators of democracy. 

For example, conducted analysis of indicator “gaps” and possible 

means for filling those gaps. Draft report on this analysis 

forthcoming. 

 

54Because of the preliminary nature of USAID’s reported actions in response to the National 

Research Council report, we did not verify or assess these actions. 

Page 37 GAO-09-993 Democracy Assistance
 

National Research Council recommendation USAID reported actions 

Use more diverse and theoretically structured clusters of case 

studies of democratization and democracy assistance to develop 

hypothesis to guide democracy assistance planning in a diverse 

range of settings. 

Launched other types of evaluations (besides impact evaluations) 

and explored ways to better integrate academic research with 

efforts of Office of Democracy and Governance to guide 

democracy assistance planning. For example, in May 2009, 

awarded a grant of $685,000 to the University of Pittsburg to 

improve the USAID strategic framework for political party 

assistance and to update assessment and evaluation 

methodologies for political party assistance. 

Rebuild USAID’s institutional mechanisms for absorbing and 

disseminating the results of its work and evaluations, as well as 

its own research and the research of others, on processes of 

democratization and democracy assistance. 

Took actions to promote institutional and administrative changes 

for the Office of Democracy and Governance and USAID in terms 

of monitoring and evaluation. For example, launched a crosssector office evaluation group to formulate and manage the 

Enhancing Democracy and Governance Evaluations initiative that 

coordinates the implementation of the National Research Council’s 

recommendations. 

Source: National Research Council and USAID. 

Democracy promotion is one of five strategic objectives for U.S. foreign 

assistance. Given the need to maximize available resources to pursue this 

important objective, coordination among the entities providing democracy 

assistance is essential to ensure that these efforts are complementary and 

not duplicative. USAID and State DRL have processes in place to facilitate 

coordination of their programs—for example, State and USAID officials in 

the field review State DRL project proposals to minimize duplication, and 

USAID officials regularly participate in interagency meetings with embassy 

officials to help ensure that their agencies’ democracy-related projects are 

complementary. However, lacking access to current information about 

NED’s activities, State and USAID officials are constrained in their efforts 

to fully coordinate their activities with NED’s in the many countries where 

they and NED each provide democracy assistance. Although NED is not 

required to report to State on all of its activities, NED regularly shares 

useful information with State regarding democracy projects in the former 

Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, and NED indicated its willingness to 

also routinely provide information on its projects in other countries. 

To enhance coordination of U.S.-funded democracy assistance efforts, and 

in support of the Department of State’s first Quadrennial Diplomacy and 

Development Review, we recommend that the Secretary of State and the 

USAID Administrator, while recognizing NED’s status as a private 

nonprofit organization, work jointly with NED to establish a mechanism to 

routinely collect information about NED’s current projects in countries 

where NED and State or USAID provide democracy assistance. 

Conclusion 

Recommendation for 

Executive Action 

Page 38 GAO-09-993 Democracy Assistance
 

USAID, State, and NED provided written comments regarding a draft of 

this report, which are reprinted in appendixes V, VI, and VII, respectively. 

State also provided technical comments separately, which we 

incorporated as appropriate. 

Agency Comments 

and Our Evaluation 

In its written comments, USAID agreed with our recommendation, noting 

that its country missions and Bureau for Democracy, Conflict, and 

Humanitarian Assistance would benefit from information on current NED 

projects. USAID also noted that the current coordination mechanism in 

State’s Europe and Eurasia Bureau appears to be effective and may serve 

as a model for worldwide efforts. In our report, we highlight the important 

role of that bureau’s Office of the Coordinator of U.S. Assistance to 

Europe and Eurasia, which exists expressly to coordinate all foreign 

assistance in its geographic regions, but note that other geographic State 

bureaus may not have access to the resources available to this office. 

USAID’s written comments suggested several additions to our report’s 

description of the agency’s planning and evaluation processes; we 

incorporated these suggestions as appropriate. 

State also concurred with our recommendation. State responded that 

improved coordination with NED could enhance the effectiveness of U.S. 

democracy assistance and agreed to work with USAID and NED to assess 

how to develop a cost-effective and sustainable process for doing so. 

State also noted that coordination and information sharing have improved 

in recent years as a result of foreign assistance reform efforts and that 

State DRL includes relevant U.S. agencies in its planning and program 

solicitation process. 

NED concurred with our recommendation as well, noting that sharing 

information about its programs with other providers of democracy 

assistance helps avoid duplication of effort and also helps providers 

develop their program-related strategies. NED stated that a mechanism for 

collecting information on its current projects should be designed to 

minimize additional administrative burden and avoid straining staff 

resources on all sides. In addition, NED highlighted the monitoring and 

evaluation efforts it undertakes and referred to its March 2006 report to 

Congress, Evaluating Democracy Promotion Programs, which we also 

cite in our report’s discussion of challenges associated with assessing the 

impact of democracy assistance. 

Page 39 GAO-09-993 Democracy Assistance
 

We are sending copies of this report to interested congressional 

committees, the Secretary of State, the Acting Administrator of USAID, 

and other interested parties. In addition, this report is available on GAO’s 

Web site at http://www.gao.gov. If you or your staffs have any questions 

about this report, please contact David Gootnick at (202) 512-3149 or 

gootnickd@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of Congressional 

Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this report. 

Individuals who made key contributions to this report are listed in 

appendix VIII. 

David Gootnick 

Director, International Affairs and Trade 

Page 40 GAO-09-993 Democracy Assistance
Appendix I: Objective, Scope, and 

Methodology 

Page 41 GAO-09-993 

Appendix I: Objective, Scope, and 

Methodology 

Our objectives were to (1) describe democracy assistance funding 

provided by the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), and 

the Department of State’s Bureau of Democracy, Labor and Human Rights 

(State DRL), and the National Endowment for Democracy (NED) in fiscal 

year 2008; (2) examine USAID, State DRL, and NED efforts to coordinate 

their democracy assistance activities to ensure complementary 

programming; and (3) describe USAID efforts to assess results and 

evaluate the impact of its democracy assistance activities. To accomplish 

our objectives, we analyzed funding, planning, and programmatic 

documents describing U.S. democracy assistance activities provided by 

USAID, State DRL, and NED in fiscal years 2006 through 2008. We 

conducted audit work in Washington, D.C., and in three countries: 

Indonesia, Jordan, and Russia. We also collected information on 

democracy programs in the following seven additional countries: China, 

Democratic Republic of the Congo, Haiti, Kosovo, Lebanon, Nicaragua, 

and Pakistan. In total, we collected detailed information on U.S. 

democracy programs in 10 countries. 

We selected these 10 countries to reflect geographic diversity and provide 

examples of countries with significant levels of U.S. funding for the 

strategic objective Governing Justly and Democratically (GJD) and that 

have multiple U.S. or U.S.-funded entities providing democracy assistance, 

such as USAID, State DRL, and NED. However, this sample of 10 countries 

is not intended to be representative of all countries receiving U.S. 

democracy assistance. Moreover, we did not include Iraq and Afghanistan 

in our sample, despite the very large levels of U.S. democracy assistance 

funding provided there, because of the unique circumstances in these two 

countries. 

In the three countries we visited, we met with USAID officials responsible 

for democracy assistance programs, selected non-governmental 

organizations receiving USAID, State, and NED grants or contracts to 

provide democracy assistance, and country government officials in 

Indonesia and Jordan. For all 10 countries in our sample, we interviewed 

the USAID Democracy and Governance directors at the USAID missions 

(either in person or by telephone) and administered a survey to 31 USAID 

technical officers with responsibility for managing active democracy and 

governance grants in these countries. We also interviewed State DRL 

policy and program officers responsible for managing the bureau’s 

democracy grants in the 10 countries. 

To obtain the views of USAID mission officials in our 10 sample countries 

regarding interagency coordination and project monitoring and evaluation, 

 Democracy Assistance 
Appendix I: Objective, Scope, and 

Methodology 

we conducted an e-mail survey of all 35 USAID technical officers with 

responsibility for managing active democracy and governance grants in 

these countries, receiving 31 responses, from April to June 2009 (a 

response rate of 89 percent). Our survey included questions on 

collaboration with other U.S. government agencies, overlap of USAID 

programs with those of other agencies, cooperation with implementing 

partners, site visit activities, and monitoring and evaluation practices. We 

pretested our survey with seven technical officers in Indonesia, Jordan, 

and Russia. In collecting and analyzing the survey data, we took steps to 

minimize errors that might occur during these stages. 

To describe the funding levels for U.S. democracy assistance for each 

entity involved in these activities, we collected funding allocation data. 

From State/F we collected and analyzed data on GJD funding allocations 

to each operating unit from fiscal years 2006 through 2008, which was 

generated using the FACTS Info database. Because State/F data systems 

do not include GJD funding by implementing agency, State/F and USAID 

compiled data at our request on GJD funding allocated to USAID for each 

country operating unit for fiscal years 2006 through 2008.1

 We also 

obtained funding allocation data by country for fiscal years 2006 through 

2008 directly from State DRL and NED. We also collected funding data on 

all democracy-related Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) threshold 

grants directly from MCC and available funding information on 

democracy-related assistance provided by State’s Middle East Partnership 

Initiative (MEPI) and the Bureau of International Narcotics and Law 

Enforcement Affairs (State INL).2

To obtain information on active democracy programs in our 10 sample 

countries, we contacted the USAID mission in each country to obtain a list 

of all projects active during January 2009 and the corresponding funding 

obligations for each project. In addition, we contacted State DRL and NED 

to obtain lists and respective funding levels for all active projects in those 

10 countries. To compare these projects with varying duration and funding 

levels, we annualized the funding of each project and portfolio. 

 

1

We originally requested USAID funding data for all country missions, however with our 

concurrence, State/F excluded USAID funding data for Iraq, Afghanistan, and Pakistan due 

to the unique and complex circumstances in those countries. 

2

MCC has six indicators under the category of Ruling Justly: Civil Liberties, Political Rights, 

Voice and Accountability, Government Effectiveness, Rule of Law, and Control of 

Corruption. USAID, which implements MCC threshold programs, categorizes threshold 

programs related to these six indicators as democracy assistance. 

Page 42 GAO-09-993 Democracy Assistance
Appendix I: Objective, Scope, and 

Methodology 

Specifically, we based the annualized funding of active projects on the 

average monthly cost of each project (total project funding divided by the 

length of the project in months), multiplied by 12; and we summed the 

annualized funding for each project to obtain the annual value of the 

USAID, State DRL, and NED portfolios. 

To assess the reliability of the global funding information on U.S. 

government democracy assistance from the F database, we checked that 

the congressionally appropriated amount for GJD in fiscal years 2006 

through 2008 matched the amounts provided to us by State/F. To assess 

the reliability of the country-level data provided by State/F on GJD 

allocations to USAID at country missions in fiscal years 2006-2008, we 

compared these data to the information USAID missions provided to us 

directly for our 10 sample countries. We also discussed with State/F how 

they conducted this data call and data reliability issues. Regarding the 

State DRL data we use in this report, State DRL officials noted that the 

data provided on funding levels for each country are based on individual 

grant awards. Correspondingly, to verify both the country-level and 

project-level data, we compared State DRL’s data to information in copies 

of grant agreements of all active State DRL projects in the three countries 

we visited (Jordan, Russia, and Indonesia). To verify the reliability of the 

USAID data on individual active democracy programs we received from 

USAID missions for our 10 sample countries, we compared the dollar 

totals of projects contained in the lists they provided us against data on a 

set of 47 projects detailed by the 31 technical officers we surveyed. To 

assess the reliability of the NED project-level data for the 10 sample 

countries, we compared them to project-level data contained on the NED 

Web site. We found that all data used in this report are sufficiently reliable 

to present the general levels of democracy funding globally and in 

individual countries and to present the relative size of project portfolios 

between USAID, State DRL, and NED. 

To assess coordination between USAID, State DRL, and NED, we 

interviewed responsible officials from these three entities and selected 

grantees and contractors during our field work in Indonesia, Jordan, and 

Russia to obtain their views on the coordination mechanisms to ensure 

complementary programming and avoid duplication. For the broader 

sample of 10 countries, including the 3 countries we visited, we reviewed 

project descriptions for all active democracy grants and contracts funded 

by USAID, State DRL, and NED. We also included questions on 

interagency coordination and examples of duplication in our survey of 

USAID technical officers as well as interviews of USAID mission and State 

DRL officials. 

Page 43 GAO-09-993 Democracy Assistance
Appendix I: Objective, Scope, and 

Methodology 

In assessing U.S. reporting and evaluation efforts, we focused our analysis 

on USAID efforts and projects since they typically represented the 

majority of U.S.-funded assistance. We interviewed agency and 

organization officials, as well as selected implementing partners during 

our field work in Indonesia, Jordan, and Russia to obtain their views on 

reporting and evaluation efforts. In our survey of technical officers, we 

included questions on reporting and evaluation practices. We reviewed 

selected quarterly and final performance reports of USAID-funded 

democracy projects in the 10 countries, which are required of USAID’s 

implementing partners. We also reviewed democracy and governance 

assessments for the 10 countries, which are conducted as part of USAID 

missions’ strategy development and project planning efforts. We also 

discussed the use of performance indicators with USAID, including 

standard indicators required by State and custom project-specific 

indicators developed by USAID missions and their implementing partners. 

In addition, we reviewed USAID assessments to determine the extent to 

which these assessments provide program results. Moreover, we reviewed 

independent evaluations from our 10 sample countries completed in fiscal 

years 2006 through 2008. We did not review State DRL and NED practices 

for assessing results and evaluating impact, because their programs are 

small and short term relative to USAID’s and because they generally do not 

conduct independent evaluations of their activities’ impact. According to 

State DRL officials, State DRL recommends that its grantees conduct 

independent external evaluations as part of individual grant awards but 

has not undertaken standard independent evaluations of democracy 

assistance at the country or thematic level. NED commissions periodic 

independent evaluations of clusters of programs but does not evaluate 

every grant. In addition, we reviewed recent studies that discuss the 

challenges associated with measuring impact of democracy assistance. In 

particular, we complemented our findings from interviews and document 

reviews with findings from the National Research Council study of USAID 

evaluation capacity.3

 We did not assess the quality or comprehensiveness 

of this study; we also did not assess USAID’s actions since June 2009 in 

implementing recommendations from this study, because these actions are 

preliminary. 

We conducted this performance audit from September 2008 to September 

2009 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing 

 

3

National Research Council, Improving Democracy Assistance: Building Knowledge 

through Evaluations and Research. 

Page 44 GAO-09-993 Democracy Assistance
Appendix I: Objective, Scope, and 

Methodology 

standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to 

obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for 

our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe 

that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings 

and conclusions based on our audit objectives. 

Page 45 GAO-09-993 Democracy Assistance
Appendix II: Country Funding Levels and 

Freedom House Ratings 

Table 6 shows the USAID, State DRL, and NED democracy funding 

allocated to each country from fiscal years 2006 through 2008. This table 

demonstrates that USAID democracy funding is substantially larger than 

State DRL and NED funding in most countries. Not including Iraq, 

Afghanistan, and Pakistan, USAID has the majority of funding in 93 

percent of countries where USAID has an active portfolio. However, State 

DRL or NED provides democracy assistance in over 20 countries where 

USAID funding is not provided. In addition, State DRL democracy funding 

tends to be larger in countries with lower USAID funding, such as in China 

and Iran, or where USAID funding for democracy assistance is not 

provided, such as North Korea or Syria, consistent with State DRL’s focus 

on filling in the gaps in USAID democracy funding. 

Table 6: USAID, State DRL, and NED Funding by Country for Fiscal Years 2006-2008 

Dollars in thousands 

Country USAID State DRL NED

Total (USAID, 

State DRL,

 and NED)

USAID as 

percent of total 

Freedom House 

rating 

Iraq Not available $352,353 $13,179 Not available Not available Not free 

Pakistan Not available 8,011 9,603 Not available Not available Partly free 

Afghanistan Not available 2,200 5,534 Not available Not available Not free 

Sudan $165,617 2,563 3,046 $171,226 97 Not free 

Egypt 152,100 859 3,185 156,144 97 Not free 

Russia 84,174 2,800 13,005 99,979 84 Not free 

Indonesia 75,755 2,262 4,456 82,473 92 Free 

Colombia 72,752 500 3,385 76,637 95 Partly free 

West Bank and Gaza 68,147 1,063 3,898 73,108 93 Not free 

Kosovo 67,414 1,351 1,084 69,848 97 Not free 

Liberia 66,950 908 2,884 70,742 95 Partly free 

Haiti 61,849 1,146 2,150 65,145 95 Partly free 

Ukraine 56,633 0 7,684 64,317 88 Free 

Mexico 52,348 0 2,830 55,178 95 Free 

Georgia 47,043 650 3,180 50,873 92 Partly free 

Cambodia 45,836 1,210 244 47,290 97 Not free 

Jordan 43,700 1,696 3,569 48,965 89 Partly free 

Democratic Republic of 

the Congo 42,406 3,480 4,864 50,750 84 Not free 

Lebanon 39,913 5,300 2,722 47,935 83 Partly free 

Cuba 37,813 23,667 4,351 65,831 57 Not free 

Serbia 37,023 981 2,133 40,137 92 Free 

Appendix II: Country Funding Levels and 

Freedom House Ratings 

Page 46 GAO-09-993 Democracy Assistance 
Appendix II: Country Funding Levels and 

Freedom House Ratings 

Dollars in thousands 

Country USAID State DRL NED

Total (USAID, 

State DRL,

 and NED)

USAID as 

percent of total 

Freedom House 

rating 

Armenia 32,108 0 620 32,728 98 Partly free 

Bosnia and 

Herzegovina 

31,120 379 1,905 33,404 93 Partly free 

Bolivia 30,187 2,200 1,429 33,816 89 Partly free 

Nigeria 30,050 500 4,539 35,089 86 Partly free 

Azerbaijan 26,898 2,660 3,247 32,805 82 Not free 

Macedonia 26,551 0 637 27,188 98 Partly free 

Nicaragua 24,442 2,073 1,850 28,365 86 Partly free 

Philippines 24,371 1,818 1,997 28,186 86 Partly free 

Kyrgyz Republic 22,754 500 2,805 26,059 87 Partly free 

Guatemala 22,385 1,434 1,924 25,743 87 Partly free 

Iran 21,623 15,039 1,273 37,935 57 Not free 

Bangladesh 20,344 1,500 486 22,330 91 Partly free 

Moldova 20,092 0 1,276 21,368 94 Partly free 

Zimbabwe 19,650 2,545 3,275 25,470 77 Not free 

Kenya 18,492 0 2,959 21,451 86 Partly free 

Nepal 18,429 3,020 1,226 22,675 81 Partly free 

Belarus 17,979 1,803 7,770 27,551 65 Not free 

Morocco 17,423 340 3,441 21,204 82 Partly free 

Angola 17,109 1,194 288 18,591 92 Not free 

Timor-Leste 17,059 532 1,338 18,929 90 Partly free 

Kazakhstan 15,396 1,015 1,334 17,745 87 Not free 

Albania 14,822 0 1,539 16,361 91 Partly free 

Ethiopia 13,648 2,723 1,655 18,026 76 Partly free 

Tajikistan 13,607 300 925 14,832 92 Not free 

Bulgaria 12,516 0 270 12,786 98 Free 

Uzbekistan 12,254 0 570 12,824 96 Not free 

Dominican Republic 12,100 0 0 12,100 100 Free 

South Africa 11,035 0 229 11,264 98 Free 

Guinea 10,751 1,130 444 12,325 87 Not free 

El Salvador 10,570 250 781 11,601 91 Free 

Venezuela 10,420 3,050 2,951 16,420 63 Partly free 

Somalia 10,399 2,000 1,586 13,985 74 Not free 

Paraguay 10,132 0 290 10,422 97 Partly free 

Peru 9,691 637 3,163 13,491 72 Free 

Page 47 GAO-09-993 Democracy Assistance
Appendix II: Country Funding Levels and 

Freedom House Ratings 

Dollars in thousands 

Country USAID State DRL NED

Total (USAID, 

State DRL,

 and NED)

USAID as 

percent of total 

Freedom House 

rating 

Honduras 9,267 0 0 9,267 100 Partly free 

Sri Lanka 9,043 995 1,956 11,994 75 Partly free 

Ecuador 8,379 270 2,763 11,412 73 Partly free 

China 8,068 52,601 16,916 77,585 10 Not free 

Burundi 7,587 1,178 213 8,978 85 Partly free 

Sierra Leone 7,388 0 1,099 8,487 87 Partly free 

Uganda 6,897 0 3,015 9,912 70 Partly free 

Croatia 6,672 0 350 7,022 95 Free 

Romania 6,000 0 648 6,648 90 Free 

Montenegro 5,875 0 1,094 6,969 84 Partly free 

Guyana 5,662 0 0 5,662 100 Free 

Turkmenistan 5,192 500 937 6,629 78 Not free 

Vietnam 4,858 1,800 1,077 7,735 63 Not free 

Mongolia 4,570 100 244 4,914 93 Free 

Mali 4,455 178 1,303 5,936 75 Free 

Jamaica 4,190 0 0 4,190 100 Free 

Yemen 4,010 1,706 2,608 8,323 48 Partly free 

Rwanda 3,839 0 94 3,933 98 Not Free 

Tanzania 3,138 450 465 4,053 77 Partly free 

Mozambique 2,893 0 0 2,893 100 Partly free 

Burma 2,544 2,159 11,805 16,508 15 Not free 

Djibouti 2,200 0 736 2,936 75 Partly free 

India 2,043 0 30 2,073 99 Free 

Namibia 2,037 0 0 2,037 100 Free 

Chad 2,000 2,331 463 4,794 42 Not free 

Thailand 1,980 4,930 1,493 8,404 24 Partly free 

Senegal 1,758 600 203 2,561 69 Partly free 

Ghana 1,629 0 820 2,449 67 Free 

Madagascar 1,592 0 0 1,592 100 Partly free 

Panama 1,320 0 0 1,320 100 Free 

Malawi 1,000 0 0 1,000 100 Partly free 

Zambia 750 0 246 996 75 Partly free 

Mauritania 500 0 1,329 1,829 27 Not free 

Syria 0 6,728 749 7,477 0 Not free 

North Korea 0 4,169 4,433 8,601 0 Not free 

Page 48 GAO-09-993 Democracy Assistance
Appendix II: Country Funding Levels and 

Freedom House Ratings 

Dollars in thousands 

Country USAID State DRL NED

Total (USAID, 

State DRL,

 and NED)

USAID as 

percent of total 

Freedom House 

rating 

Malaysia 0 1,676 1,997 3,673 0 Partly free 

Saudi Arabia 0 1,462 820 2,282 0 Not free 

Argentina 0 1,447 1,450 2,897 0 Free 

Cote d’Ivoire 0 1,446 2,655 4,101 0 Not free 

Laos 0 700 0 700 0 Not free 

Algeria 0 560 1,465 2,025 0 Not free 

Bahrain 0 385 214 599 0 Partly free 

Turkey 0 0 5,479 5,479 0 Partly free 

Tunisia 0 0 1,075 1,075 0 Not free 

Tibet 0 0 1,033 1,033 0 Not free 

Belize 0 0 835 835 0 Free 

Somaliland 0 0 833 833 0 Not free 

Libya 0 0 561 561 0 Not free 

Guinea-Bissau 0 0 452 452 0 Partly free 

Niger 0 0 332 332 0 Partly free 

Togo 0 0 282 282 0 Partly free 

Cameroon 0 0 254 254 0 Not free 

Congo 0 0 228 228 0 Not free 

Kuwait 0 0 215 215 0 Partly free 

The Gambia 0 0 84 84 0 Partly free 

Poland 0 0 38 38 0 Free 

Equatorial Guinea 0 0 25 25 0 Not free 

Source: GAO analysis of data obtained by State/F from USAID country missions, State DRL and NED data and Freedom House’s 

annual survey of the state of global freedom for 2009. 

Notes: In response to our request for information on USAID’s share of GJD funding in each country, 

State/F and USAID compiled data from USAID missions. We requested USAID funding data for all 

country missions; however, with our concurrence, State/F excluded USAID funding data for Iraq, 

Afghanistan, and Pakistan owing to the unique and complex circumstances in those countries. 

According to State/F data, GJD funds were allocated to 90 country missions from fiscal year 2006 

through 2008. In addition, data compiled by State/F and USAID from USAID missions shows that 

USAID implements democracy funds in 88 of these 90 countries. However, since State/F data 

systems include GJD data by operating unit, democracy funding allocated to individual countries by 

Washington, D.C.-based operating units, such as State DRL, is not tracked by country. In identifying 

the countries that receive either USAID and/or, State DRL funding, the number of countries increases 

to 97. 

Some other entities such as State INL, MCC, and MEPI also ultimately program funds in a number of 

countries but these totals are not included in this table. 

Page 49 GAO-09-993 Democracy Assistance
Appendix II: Country Funding Levels and 

Freedom House Ratings 

In fiscal years 2006 through 2008, almost 30 percent of all GJD funds were 

allocated for democracy activities in Iraq, which is the largest portion of 

democracy assistance funds allocated to any country over this period. A 

large and increasing portion of GJD funds are allocated to democracy 

programs in Afghanistan as well. The percentage of GJD funds allocated to 

Afghanistan rose from 6 percent in fiscal year 2006, 14 percent in fiscal 

year 2007, to 24 percent in fiscal year 2008. In fact, in fiscal year 2008, 

there were more GJD funds allocated to democracy programs in 

Afghanistan than any other country. Together, GJD funds allocated to Iraq 

and Afghanistan comprised over 40 percent of all GJD funds in fiscal years 

2006 through 2008. 

In fiscal years 2006 through 2008, total democracy assistance funding 

increased by 29 percent. However, when excluding Iraq and Afghanistan, 

which account for nearly half of all democracy spending, democracy 

funding only rose 20 percent. In addition, not including funding for Iraq 

and Afghanistan, the 10 countries with the highest GJD funding from fiscal 

years 2006 to 2008 comprised almost half of the remainder of GJD funding 

allocated to individual countries over that time period (see table 7). 

Table 7: Ten Highest GJD-funded Countries not including Iraq and Afghanistan, 

Fiscal Years 2006-2008 

Dollars in thousands 

Country 

GJD FY 06-08 

funding 

Funding as a 

percent of total

Sudan $208,373 7.91

Egypt 154,800 5.87

Mexico 119,680 4.54

Colombia 118,928 4.51

Russia 117,734 4.47

Kosovo 92,747 3.52

Pakistan 91,873 3.49

Liberia 81,150 3.08

Indonesia 79,663 3.02

West Bank and Gaza 74,493 2.83

All other countries 1,495,459 56.76

Source: GAO analysis of State/F data. 

Note: The GJD funding to country operating units is not broken out by implementing entity and 

therefore includes funding implemented by USAID as well as by other implementers programming 

GJD funds through country operating units, such as State INL. In addition, these calculations do not 

include GJD funds allocated to regional or functional operating units. 

Page 50 GAO-09-993 Democracy Assistance
Appendix III: D

by ME

emocracy Assistance Provided 

PI, State INL, and MCC 

Page 51 GAO-09-993 

Appendix III: Democracy Assistance 

Provided by MEPI, State INL, and MCC 

The Department of State’s Middle East Partnership Initiative (MEPI) and 

Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (State 

INL) and the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) provide 

democracy assistance in a much narrower set of countries than USAID, 

State DRL or NED programs. 

MEPI MEPI, part of State’s Near Eastern Affairs Bureau, was launched in 

December 2002 as a presidential initiative to promote reform, foster 

democracy in the Middle East and North Africa, and serve as a tool to 

address violent extremism. MEPI programs are focused in 17 countries 

and are managed from MEPI’s office in Washington, D.C., as well as from 

regional offices in Abu Dhabi and Tunis. MEPI programs are organized 

generally into four areas, two of which—political participation and 

women’s empowerment—are characterized as GJD assistance; MEPI 

funding for these areas in fiscal years 2006 through 2008 totaled about 

$110 million. Unlike USAID and State DRL programs, which are generally 

focused on individual countries, MEPI programs are often cross-cutting 

regional programs that cover a number of different countries. 

Consequently, it is not possible to identify MEPI funding by country. In 

addition to providing larger grants in response to specific solicitations, 

MEPI provides a number of local grants each year directly to organizations 

working at the community level. For instance, MEPI’s local grants program 

in Jordan provides funds to less experienced NGOs to increase the NGOs’ 

capacity and help them become eligible for future funding from larger 

donors such as USAID. Grant officers in the MEPI office in Washington, 

D.C., monitor projects through reviews of grantee quarterly reports and 

rely on staff in the regional offices and embassy-based MEPI coordinators 

to conduct site visits and coordinate with related USAID assistance 

programs. 

State INL State INL’s programs within the GJD framework focus on institution 

building in the criminal justice sector. State’s FACTS database does not 

break out State INL’s funding for GJD programs in every country; 

however, according to a State INL official, the bureau managed $290 

million in GJD funding worldwide in fiscal year 2008, directing the 

majority of these funds to Afghanistan, Colombia, and Iraq. State INL’s 

programs support reforms such as reform of criminal procedures codes 

and promotion of adversarial and evidentiary trial principles; training and 

technical assistance for judges, prosecutors, and defense attorneys; and 

anticorruption programs. A wide variety of U.S. law enforcement and 

regulatory agencies, international organizations, NGOs, and international 

 Democracy Assistance 
Appendix III: Democracy Assistance Provided 

by MEPI, State INL, and MCC 

assistance agencies implement State INL’s programs. For example, State 

INL funds training of prosecutors through the Department of Justice’s 

Office of Overseas Prosecutorial Development, Assistance and Training. 

Embassy Law Enforcement Sections oversee State INL programs 

implemented in the field and they coordinate democracy assistance with 

USAID through embassy-based interagency working groups. 

MCC MCC is a U.S. government corporation that provides assistance through 

multiyear compact agreements with countries that demonstrate 

commitment to reducing poverty and stimulating economic growth, in part 

by strengthening their democratic institutions and processes.1

 MCC also 

funds “threshold programs,” intended to help countries that do not qualify 

for compact assistance to achieve eligibility. During 2008, MCC had 

programs providing democracy-related assistance, such as support for 

anti-corruption and local governance, in 16 countries. Although these 

threshold grants fit within State’s definition of GJD, State does not track 

these activities or funding. USAID has primary responsibility for 

overseeing the implementation of MCC’s threshold programs. USAID 

monitors MCC threshold programs similarly to its own democracy and 

governance programs, through quarterly and end-of-project reporting by 

implementing partners and site visits by technical officers based in USAID 

missions in the field. In addition, USAID submits quarterly reports on 

threshold projects to MCC. According to USAID officials we met with in 

Indonesia and Jordan, management of the MCC threshold projects by 

USAID mission-based staff—former or current USAID democracy and 

governance technical officers—facilitated effective coordination with 

USAID’s democracy and governance programs. 

MCC has threshold projects related to democracy in select countries that 

are high in funding (see table 8). For example, in Indonesia, MCC funded a 

2-year, $35 million threshold project, which represents a large amount of 

funding when compared to annual funding of $28 million for the USAID 

democracy and governance portfolio in Indonesia, $1.1 million for State 

 

1

The Millennium Challenge Act of 2003 (Public Law 108-199, Division D, Title VI) authorizes 

MCC to provide assistance to eligible countries that enter into public compacts with the 

United States. Countries’ eligibility is determined in part by their scores against indicators 

divided into three categories: Ruling Justly, Economic Freedom, and Investing in People. 

According to USAID officials, the six Ruling Justly indicators—(1) political rights, (2) civil 

liberties, (3) voice and accountability, (4) government effectiveness, (5) rule of law, and (6) 

control of corruption—relate to democracy assistance. 

Page 52 GAO-09-993 Democracy Assistance
Appendix III: Democracy Assistance Provided 

by MEPI, State INL, and MCC 

DRL’s grant program, and $1.6 million for the National Endowment for 

Democracy. 

Table 8: MCC Democracy-Related Threshold Grants to Date 

Dollars in thousands 

Country 

MCC threshold 

funding (total 

ruling justly) Signing date Completion date

Ukraine $44,970 12/4/2006 12/31/2009 

Indonesia 35,000 11/17/2006 5/31/2010 

Paraguay 28,353 5/8/2006 8/31/2009 

Albania 25,176 4/3/2006 2/28/2011 

Rwanda 24,730 9/24/2008 12/31/2011 

Moldova 24,700 12/14/2006 9/30/2009 

Peru 24,120 6/9/2008 1/31/2011 

Zambia 22,735 5/22/2006 2/28/2009 

Malawi 18,920 9/23/2005 9/30/2008 

Jordan 16,500 10/17/2006 8/29/2009 

Kyrgyz Republic 15,494 3/14/2008 6/30/2010 

Philippines 13,455 7/26/2006 5/29/2009 

Kenya 12,723 3/23/2007 6/30/2010 

Tanzania 11,150 5/3/2006 12/30/2008 

Uganda 10,446 3/29/2007 12/31/2009 

Niger 4,190 3/17/2008 9/30/2011 

Source: GAO analysis of MCC data. 

Note: The signing date is not necessarily the same as the project start date. There have been two 

threshold agreements in Albania; the first was signed on 4/3/2006 and ended 11/15/2008, and a 

second stage threshold agreement was signed on 9/29/2008 and has an expected completion date of 

2/28/2011. The funding and corresponding dates for Albania reflect all ruling justly activities in both of 

these threshold agreements. 

Page 53 GAO-09-993 Democracy Assistance
Appendix IV: Listing of Field-Based and 

Washington, D.C.-Based Operating Units 

Table 9: Operating Units Receiving GJD Funds between FY 2006 and FY 2008, and Status as Field-Based or Washington, D.C.-

Based Operating Unit 

Field-Based Operating Units Washington, D.C.-Based Operating Units 

Afghanistan Democracy, Conflict, and Humanitarian Assistance 

Albania Democracy, Human Rights and Labor (State DRL) 

Angola Economic Growth Agriculture and Trade 

Armenia State Eurasia Regional 

Azerbaijan State Europe Regional 

Bangladesh International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (State INL) 

Belarus International Organizations 

Bolivia Middle East Partnership Initiative (MEPI) 

Bosnia and Herzegovina ODP - Office of Development Partners 

Bulgaria Policy and Program Coordination 

Burma State Africa Regional 

Burundi State East Asia and Pacific Regional 

Cambodia State South and Central Asia Regional 

Chad State Western Hemisphere Regional 

China USAID Africa Regional 

Colombia USAID Asia Middle East Regional 

Croatia 

Cuba 

Democratic Republic of the Congo 

Djibouti 

Dominican Republic 

Ecuador 

Egypt 

El Salvador 

Ethiopia 

Georgia 

Ghana 

Guatemala 

Guinea 

Guyana 

Haiti 

Honduras 

India 

Indonesia 

Iran 

Iraq 

Appendix IV: Listing of Field-Based and 

Washington, D.C.-Based Operating Units 

Page 54 GAO-09-993 Democracy Assistance 
Appendix IV: Listing of Field-Based and 

Washington, D.C.-Based Operating Units 

Field-Based Operating Units Washington, D.C.-Based Operating Units 

Jamaica 

Jordan 

Kazakhstan 

Kenya 

Kosovo 

Kyrgyz Republic 

Laos 

Lebanon 

Liberia 

Macedonia 

Madagascar 

Malawi 

Mali 

Mauritania 

Mexico 

Moldova 

Mongolia 

Montenegro 

Morocco 

Mozambique 

Namibia 

Nepal 

Nicaragua 

Nigeria 

Pakistan 

Panama 

Paraguay 

Peru 

Philippines 

Romania 

Russia 

Rwanda 

Senegal 

Serbia 

Sierra Leone 

Somalia 

South Africa 

Sri Lanka 

Page 55 GAO-09-993 Democracy Assistance
Appendix IV: Listing of Field-Based and 

Washington, D.C.-Based Operating Units 

Field-Based Operating Units Washington, D.C.-Based Operating Units 

Sudan 

Tajikistan 

Tanzania 

Thailand 

Timor-Leste 

Tunisia 

Turkmenistan 

Uganda 

Ukraine 

Uzbekistan 

Venezuela 

Vietnam 

West Bank and Gaza 

Yemen 

Zambia 

Zimbabwe 

Central Asia Regional 

USAID Central America Regional 

USAID East Africa Regional 

USAID Middle East Regional 

USAID Southern Africa Regional 

USAID West Africa Regional 

Source: GAO analysis of State data. 

Page 56 GAO-09-993 Democracy Assistance
Appendix V: Comments from the U.S. Agency Appendix V: Comments from the U.S. Agency for International Development 

for International Development 

Note: GAO comments 

supplementing those in 

the report text appear at 

the end of this appendix. 

Page 57 GAO-09-993 Democracy Assistance 
Appendix V: Comments from the U.S. Agency 

for International Development 

See comment 1. 

Page 58 GAO-09-993 Democracy Assistance
Appendix V: Comments from the U.S. Agency 

for International Development 

See comment 2. 

See comment 3. 

Page 59 GAO-09-993 Democracy Assistance
Appendix V: Comments from the U.S. Agency 

for International Development 

Page 60 GAO-09-993 

The following are GAO’s comments on USAID’s letter dated September 17, 

2009. 

1. We have incorporated information provided in USAID’s letter 

regarding its democracy strategic planning efforts into our report as 

appropriate. 

GAO Comments 

2. As we state in our discussion of scope and methodology, we did not 

review State DRL’s and NED’s evaluation efforts because their 

programs are small and short-term relative to USAID’s and because 

they generally do not conduct independent evaluations of their 

activities’ impact. 

3. We have incorporated evaluation information provided in USAID’s 

letter into our report as appropriate. 

 Democracy Assistance 
Appendix VI: Comments from the Department Appendix VI: Comments from the of State 

Department of State 

Page 61 GAO-09-993 Democracy Assistance
Appendix VI: Comments from the Department 

of State 

Page 62 GAO-09-993 Democracy Assistance
Appendix VII: Comments from the National Endowment for Appendix VII: Comments from the National Democracy 

Endowment for Democracy 

Page 63 GAO-09-993 Democracy Assistance 
Appendix VII: Comments from the National Endowment for 

Democracy 

Page 64 GAO-09-993 Democracy Assistance
Appendix VIII: 

A

GAO Contact and Staff 

cknowledgments 

Page 65 GAO-09-993 

Appendix VIII: GAO Contact and Staff 

Acknowledgments 

David B. Gootnick (202) 512-3149 or gootnickd@gao.gov

In addition to the contact named above, Leslie Holen, Assistant Director; 

Diana Blumenfeld; Howard Cott; David Dornisch; Reid Lowe; Grace Lui; 

and Marisela Perez made key contributions to this report. Etana Finkler 

provided technical support. 

 Democracy Assistance 

GAO Contact 

Staff 

Acknowledgments 

(320619) 
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