GAO 

United States Government Accountability Office

Report to Congressional Committees

MILITARY BASE 

REALIGNMENTS 

AND CLOSURES 

DOD Needs to Update 

Savings Estimates and 

Continue to Address 

Challenges in 

Consolidating SupplyRelated Functions at 

Depot Maintenance 

Locations 

July 2009 

GAO-09-703 
What GAO Found

United States Government Accountability Office

Why GAO Did This Study

Highlights

Accountability Integrity Reliability

July 2009

MILITARY BASE REALIGMENTS AND 

CLOSURES 

DOD Needs to Update Savings Estimates and 

Continue to Address Challenges in Consolidating

Supply-Related Functions at Depot Maintenance 

Locations 

Highlights of GAO-09-703, a report to 

congressional committees 

As a result of a 2005 Defense Base 

Realignment and Closure (BRAC) 

recommendation, the Defense 

Logistics Agency (DLA) is charged 

with consolidating supply, storage, 

and distribution functions at 13 

military service depot maintenance 

locations to streamline operations 

and save money. The BRAC 

Commission data indicate that 

these consolidations would 

generate net savings of nearly 

$1 billion through 2011 and about 

$137 million annually thereafter. 

Because these actions could affect 

depot maintenance operations, the 

conference report accompanying 

the National Defense Authorization 

Act for Fiscal Year 2008 directed 

GAO to assess implementation 

issues associated with the 

consolidations. GAO’s objectives 

were to assess (1) DLA’s progress 

and challenges to implement these 

consolidation actions and (2) the 

extent to which DLA’s most recent 

cost and savings estimates related 

to these consolidations differ from 

those of the BRAC Commission. To 

meet these objectives, GAO visited 

three depot locations where 

consolidation actions had begun, 

interviewed service and DLA 

officials, and analyzed estimated 

cost and savings data. 

What GAO Recommends

GAO recommends that the 

Department of Defense (DOD) 

improve the accuracy of its savings 

estimates by taking a number of 

steps, including updating inventory 

data and removing savings not 

clearly the result of 2005 BRAC 

actions. DOD concurred. 

While DLA has made progress to consolidate supply-related functions at the 

13 depot maintenance locations recommended by BRAC and has taken steps 

to minimize the risk to ongoing operations, some of the most difficult tasks 

are yet to be undertaken and pose implementation challenges for DLA. For 

example, the Army and DLA officials are still negotiating what specific 

functions and personnel will transfer to DLA and the information technology 

interfaces needed to consolidate DLA’s and the services’ supply inventories 

continue to evolve and have experienced delays. Nevertheless, DLA 

anticipates that the consolidation actions will be completed by the mandated 

September 2011 BRAC deadline for completing recommended actions. For the 

actions to be complete, DLA officials told GAO the military services must have 

transferred all related personnel positions to DLA and physically consolidated 

all applicable inventories with DLA. While personnel transfers are under way, 

DLA has not begun physically consolidating inventories. And, although DLA 

has taken several steps to mitigate risk to ongoing depot operations such as 

involving stakeholders in the decision-making process, ensuring high-level 

leadership to drive these transformational actions, and employing time-phased 

transfers, continued collaboration between the services and DLA and periodic 

monitoring by DOD are critical to ensure the timely completion of these BRAC 

actions. 

Compared to the BRAC Commission’s 2005 cost and savings estimates, DOD 

expects to spend more and save significantly less by implementing the supplyrelated consolidation actions. DLA’s current data indicate that the cost to 

implement the recommended consolidation actions has increased by about 

$158 million (378 percent) while estimated savings have decreased by 

$753 million (73 percent). Consequently, estimated net savings of about 

$82 million over the 2006-2011 BRAC implementation period are considerably 

less than the BRAC Commission’s estimate of about $993 million. Further, net 

annual savings beyond 2011 are projected to be $52 million per year, rather 

than the Commission’s $137 million estimate—an annual decrease of about 

$85 million (62 percent). Moreover, GAO found that DLA’s most recent 

savings estimates are unrealistic because they are based on practices that 

count some savings that GAO believes are not attributable to BRAC actions, 

use 4-year-old data, assume an inventory reduction scenario that is unlikely to 

occur, and employ an overall methodology that has not been approved by 

senior-level officials. DOD’s financial management regulation requires BRAC 

savings estimates to be based on the best projection of savings that will 

actually accrue, but GAO’s analysis indicates that DLA could actually incur a 

net cost of $22 million during the implementation period if non-BRAC-related 

savings were removed from the estimate, compared to the $82 million in net 

savings that DLA currently projects. Although the potential exists for DLA to 

eventually realize savings over time as it assumes control over supply-related 

operations, updated savings estimates based on sound estimating practices 

would provide better information for congressional oversight and help 

maintain public confidence in the BRAC process. 

View GAO-09-703 or key components.

For more information, contact Brian J. Lepore 

at (202) 512-4523 or leporeb@gao.gov. 
Page i GAO-09-703 Military Base Realignments and Closures 

Contents 

Letter 1

Results in Brief 4 

Background 7 

DLA Has Taken Steps to Minimize Disruptions to Depot Operations 

and Made Progress Toward Completing SS&D Consolidation but 

the Most Difficult Tasks Lie Ahead, Posing Challenges 9 

DOD Expects to Spend More and Save Less to Transfer SupplyRelated Functions and Associated Inventories, Although Savings 

Estimates Are Unrealistic 17 

Conclusions 25 

Recommendations 25 

Agency Comments 26 

Appendix I Scope and Methodology 30 

Appendix II Status of Full-time Equivalent Positions (Civilian and 

Contractor) Expected to Transfer from the Services 

to DLA 32 

Appendix III Comments from the Department of Defense 33 

Appendix IV GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments 36 

 

Related GAO Products 37 

 

Tables 

Table 1: Full-time Equivalent Civilian Positions Transferred to DLA 

Compared to the Number of Personnel in Those Positions, 

as of May 2009 16 

Table 2: Comparison of DLA's Current Cost and Savings Estimates 

to BRAC Commission’s Estimates for the Consolidated 

Depot-Level SS&D Actions 18 
Table 3: Comparison of DLA's Cost Estimates to BRAC 

Commission’s Estimates for Fiscal Years 2006-2011 for the 

Consolidated Depot-Level SS&D Actions 19 

Table 4: Comparison of DLA's Savings Estimates to the BRAC 

Commission’s Estimates for the Consolidated Depot-Level 

SS&D Actions 20 

Table 5: Number of Full-time Equivalent Positions (Civilian and 

Contractor) Expected to Transfer from the Services to 

DLA at the 13 BRAC-Affected Depot Maintenance 

Locations over Time 32 

Figures 

Figure 1: Locations of the 13 BRAC-Affected Military Depot 

Maintenance Sites 8 

Figure 2: Completion Status of Key Milestones, as of May 2009 12 

Abbreviations 

BRAC Base Realignment and Closure 

COBRA Cost of Base Realignment Actions 

DLA Defense Logistics Agency 

DOD Department of Defense 

OSD Office of the Secretary of Defense 

SS&D supply, storage and distribution 

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Page ii GAO-09-703 Military Base Realignments and Closures 
Page 1 GAO-09-703 Military Base Realignments and Closures 

 

United States Government Accountability Office

Washington, DC 20548 

 

July 9, 2009 

Congressional Committees 

The Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) is the largest combat support agency 

for the Department of Defense (DOD), providing worldwide logistics 

support in both peacetime and wartime to the military services. Under 

existing arrangements with the military services, both DLA and the 

services perform supply, storage, and distribution (SS&D) functions1

 and 

maintain inventories of repair parts at 13 domestic depot maintenance 

locations.2

 As part of a larger 2005 base realignment and closure (BRAC) 

recommendation concerning supply-related functions within DOD, DLA 

was charged with consolidating SS&D functions, along with associated 

inventories, at all 13 locations—and is required to do so by September 15, 

2011, the mandated completion date for implementing all 

recommendations from the 2005 BRAC round. DOD expects that the 

consolidation actions will eliminate unnecessary redundancies and 

duplication, streamline supply-related processes, and save money. The 

BRAC Commission projected that nearly $1 billion in savings would 

accrue through 2011 by implementing the recommended actions and that 

additional savings of over $137 million would occur annually thereafter. 

Although such consolidation actions are historically atypical of BRAC 

recommendations, the Secretary of Defense made it clear at the outset that 

his primary goal for the 2005 BRAC round was military transformation. As 

such, many of the BRAC 2005 recommendations involve complex 

realignments such as reconfiguring the defense supply, storage, and 

distribution network. The BRAC actions related to SS&D are 

transformational in that they focus on complex business process 

1

In this context, supply, storage, and distribution functions refer to various actions to 

provide repair parts to depot maintenance personnel who perform repairs and upgrades on 

equipment that are needed to maintain readiness and support ongoing military operations. 

2

Affected locations include three Air Logistics Centers located in Warner Robins, Georgia; 

Oklahoma City, Oklahoma; and Ogden, Utah; three Fleet Readiness Centers located in 

Cherry Point, North Carolina; Jacksonville, Florida; and San Diego, California; two Naval 

Shipyards located in Norfolk, Virginia; and Puget Sound, Washington; two Marine Corps 

Logistics Bases located in Albany, Georgia; and Barstow, California; and three Army depots 

located in Tobyhanna, Pennsylvania; Corpus Christi, Texas; and Anniston, Alabama. Figure 

1 shows a map of these locations. 
 

reengineering3 efforts involving the transfer of personnel and management 

functions, and the consolidation of inventories in addition to 

synchronizing several existing and evolving information technology 

systems. While these transformational actions are intended to provide 

benefits to DOD over time, their implementation could have an adverse 

impact on depot maintenance operations during a time of high wartime 

demands, if not carefully managed. 

Further, unlike prior BRAC rounds, BRAC 2005 included a number of joint 

recommendations involving more than one military component, thus 

creating challenges in achieving unity of effort among the services and 

defense agencies. We have previously reported that BRAC 

recommendations such as the consolidation of SS&D functions, which 

involve a significant amount of joint cooperation and complex 

organizational transformation, place DOD at risk of not implementing 

recommendations on time and in some cases risk mission disruption. In 

our most recent report focusing specifically on the SS&D-recommended 

actions at the depot level in October 2007, we reported4

 that the military 

services had expressed concerns about disruptions that could result from 

the SS&D consolidation process, and we concluded that periodic 

monitoring by the Office of the Secretary of Defense was critical to ensure 

that DLA implementation actions were on track. 

In addition to furthering transformation and fostering jointness, 

anticipated savings resulting from BRAC implementation remained an 

important consideration and was a factor in justifying the need for the 

2005 BRAC round. To realize savings5

 from BRAC 2005, DOD typically 

must first invest billions of dollars in facility construction, renovation, and 

other up-front expenses, and we have previously reported that DOD 

planned to spend more and save less than the BRAC Commission 

 

3

Business process reengineering can be generally defined as an approach for redesigning 

the way work is done to better support an organization’s mission and reduce costs. 

4

GAO, Military Base Realignments and Closures: Transfer of Supply, Storage and 

Distribution Functions from Military Services to Defense Logistics Agency, GAO-08-121R

(Washington, D.C.: Oct. 26, 2007). 

5

Savings are typically in the form of cost avoidances—avoiding costs that DOD would have 

incurred if BRAC actions had not taken place. While savings may begin to accrue over the 

implementation period, additional savings typically occur annually on a longer term basis 

beyond the implementation period. One-time savings may include reduced costs associated 

with inventory reduction, for example; whereas recurring savings may include reduced 

annual sustainment costs associated with maintaining less warehouse space. 

Page 2 GAO-09-703 Military Base Realignments and Closures 
 

originally estimated. In October 2007, for example, we reported that 

implementation cost estimates for the transfer of SS&D functions at the 

depot level had increased and that savings estimates had decreased, and 

we reported that it is critical for DOD to continue to monitor and adjust 

projected savings attributable to BRAC as necessary. In a March 2008 

report,6

 we noted higher costs and lower savings projected for two DLAmanaged BRAC recommendations, including the consolidation actions 

discussed in this report. In addition, in January 2009, we reported7

 that the 

services and other DOD components were not consistently updating BRAC 

savings estimates, and we recommended that the Office of the Secretary of 

Defense take steps to ensure that BRAC savings estimates are based on 

the best projection of savings that will actually accrue from approved 

realignments and closures. DOD subsequently concurred with that 

recommendation and stated that regularly updating savings is essential. 

Due to continued concerns about the implementation of the recommended 

supply-related consolidation actions at the depot level and their potential 

impact on depot maintenance operations, the conference report8

accompanying the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 

20089

 directed us to assess issues associated with the implementation of 

the consolidation actions at the depot level as required by BRAC. 

Accordingly, our objectives were to assess (1) DLA’s progress and 

challenges in implementing these BRAC supply-related consolidation 

actions with minimum disruption to depot operations and (2) the extent to 

which DLA’s most recent cost and savings estimates for implementing 

these consolidations differ from those of the 2005 BRAC Commission. 

 

6

GAO, Military Base Realignments and Closures: Higher Costs and Lower Savings 

Projected for Implementing Two Key Supply-Related BRAC Recommendations, 

GAO-08-315 (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 5, 2008). 

7

GAO, Military Base Realignments and Closures: DOD Faces Challenges in 

Implementing Recommendations on Time and Is Not Consistently Updating Savings 

Estimates, GAO-09-217 (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 30, 2009). 

8

H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 110-477, at 893-894 (2007). 

9

Pub. L. No. 110-181 (2008). 

Page 3 GAO-09-703 Military Base Realignments and Closures 
 

To address our objectives, we initially reviewed a June 2008 DOD report10

on matters associated with implementing the recommended supply-related 

consolidations as well as our prior work germane to our objectives. To 

determine DLA’s progress and challenges, we analyzed DLA 

implementation planning documentation, including its business plans and 

supporting data, and interviewed officials at various levels within DOD, 

DLA, selected services’ maintenance depots, and military customers 

aligned with these depots. We visited three of the seven depot 

maintenance locations where some portions of the consolidation actions 

have taken place. To evaluate the extent to which DLA’s most recent cost 

and savings estimates varied from those of the BRAC Commission, we 

compared DLA’s estimates as presented in supporting documentation to 

its February 2009 business plan with those of the BRAC Commission and 

discussed the rationale for variances with DLA officials. We further 

analyzed the overall methodology and associated assumptions used by 

DLA in deriving its estimates. We conducted this performance audit from 

June 2008 through July 2009 in accordance with generally accepted 

government auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and 

perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a 

reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit 

objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable 

basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. More 

detailed information on our scope and methodology appears in appendix I. 

While DLA has taken steps to minimize potential disruptions to depot 

operations as a result of its planned consolidation efforts and has made 

progress in implementing the SS&D consolidation actions, the most 

difficult tasks still lie ahead, posing challenges for DLA in completing 

those actions. DLA has taken steps in its plans to mitigate risks to the 

depots’ mission by implementing a number of key actions—several of 

which are considered best practices for organizational transformation—

such as ensuring that leadership drives the transformation and involving 

military stakeholders in decision making. Senior DLA officials we spoke 

to told us that they will consider consolidation actions complete when the 

agreed-upon SS&D functions, personnel positions, and associated 

personnel have been transferred from the military service to DLA and 

Results in Brief 

 

10Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology & Logistics), 

Department of Defense Report to Congress on the Implementation of the Consolidation of 

Depot Supply, Storage, and Distribution Functions with the DLA as Required by the 

2005 BRAC (June 2008). 

Page 4 GAO-09-703 Military Base Realignments and Closures 
 

when related applicable military and DLA inventories have been physically 

consolidated. As of May 2009, the Air Force had completed the transfer of 

all positions and associated personnel at all 3 of its affected depots; the 

Navy had completed transfers at 4 of its 5 locations, and the Marine Corps 

and the Army had not yet begun to transfer positions. In addition, as of 

May 2009, DLA had not physically consolidated any inventories and the 

first is not scheduled to occur until August 2009, which represents a 

3-month slippage from the milestones set forth at the beginning of our 

review. DLA does not currently plan to consolidate any inventories at 5 of 

the 13 locations—3 Army and 2 Marine Corps locations—because, 

according to DLA and military service officials, neither of these services 

have any applicable inventories to consolidate. Although DLA expects to 

complete the recommended actions by the statutory BRAC deadline of 

September 15, 2011, we identified several challenges, including finalizing 

strategic agreements—for which the schedule for completion has slipped 

several times—and addressing information technology issues, which may 

impede DOD’s efforts to achieve efficiencies envisioned by the BRAC 

Commission. As we have previously reported, continued collaboration 

between the services and DLA and periodic monitoring by DOD are critical 

to ensure that implementation actions are on track and that any issues that 

could adversely affect depot operations are resolved as implementation 

proceeds. 

In comparison to the BRAC Commission’s estimates, DOD expects to 

spend more and save less to implement the recommended SS&D

consolidation actions, and our analysis indicates that DLA’s current

savings estimates are unrealistic. 11 According to DLA’s latest estimates, 

the net savings to transfer the supply-related functions and associat

inventories will be reduced by $911 million over the 6-year BRAC 

implementation period compared to the BRAC Commission’s estimated 

net savings. DLA now projects about $82 million in net savings over this 

time period, which is a decrease of $911 million (92 percent) from the 

BRAC Commission’s net savings estimate of about $993 million. The 

$911 million reduction consists of a combination of an increase of about 

$158 million (378 percent) in expected one-time implementation costs and 

a $753 million (73 percent) decrease in expected savings. Additionally, the 

ed 

 

11The figures presented in this report are in then-year dollars. While the BRAC Commission 

reported its figures in fiscal year 2005 constant dollars (i.e., excludes projected inflation), 

DLA subsequently converted the Commission’s estimates to then-year dollars in its 

business plans and also expressed its estimates in then-year dollars (i.e., includes projected 

inflation). 

Page 5 GAO-09-703 Military Base Realignments and Closures 
 

estimated net annual recurring savings that DLA expects to achieve after 

the SS&D actions have been completed have decreased from the BRAC 

Commission’s estimate of nearly $137 million per year to $52 million per 

year. This represents an annual decrease of about $85 million (62 percent).

Our analysis indicates that these decreases in estimated net savings are 

attributable primarily to increased costs for information technology 

integration efforts and a large reduction in estimated savings to be 

achieved by reducing inventory levels. Furthermore, DLA’s most recent 

savings estimates are unrealistic because they count some savings that we 

believe are not attributable to BRAC actions, use 4-year-old inventory data 

that are not likely to reflect current inventory levels, assume an inventory 

reduction scenario that is unlikely to occur as planned, and employ a 

methodology that is still in draft form and has not been approved by 

senior-level DLA officials. DOD’s Financial Management Regulation12

requires BRAC savings estimates to be based on the best projection of 

what savings will actually accrue. Our analysis indicates that, as a result of 

updating just one of these factors—excluding savings resulting from 

service inventory reduction efforts not attributable to BRAC—DLA could 

actually incur net costs of $22 million during the implementation period, 

compared to the $82 million in net savings DLA currently projects.13 Once 

the services’ and DLA’s SS&D consolidations are completed and DLA 

assumes control over supply-related operations, DLA could achieve some 

efficiencies, but the magnitude of those savings is unknown. As we have 

previously reported, imprecise savings estimates could diminish public 

trust in the BRAC process by producing an unrealistic sense of the savings 

that this BRAC round may actually produce. Updated savings estimates, 

based on sound estimating practices and more recent data, would provide 

sound information to congressional decision makers while maintaining 

public confidence in the BRAC process. Therefore, we are making four 

recommendations intended to improve the accuracy of DLA’s current 

savings estimates. 

 

12DOD Financial Management Regulation, 7000.14-R, Base Realignment and Closure 

Appropriations, vol. 2B, ch. 7, para. 070303E (Sept. 2008). 

13We have previously reported and recommended that DLA not include savings from 

initiatives that are not directly the result of BRAC actions and would have occurred 

regardless of BRAC. While DLA disagreed with this recommendation in stating that these 

particular savings are “enabled” by the BRAC process, we continue to believe that 

including savings unrelated to specific BRAC actions distorts and effectively overstates 

projected savings, as will be discussed in more detail later in the report. 

Page 6 GAO-09-703 Military Base Realignments and Closures 
 

In written comments on a draft of this report, DOD concurred with all of 

our recommendations and described actions it intends to take to 

implement them. DOD’s comments are printed in their entirety in 

appendix III. DOD also provided us with technical comments which we 

incorporated as appropriate. 

DOD has undergone four BRAC rounds since 1988 and is currently 

implementing its fifth round. In May 2005, the Secretary of Defense made 

public more than 200 realignment and closure proposals. In making these 

proposals, DOD applied legally mandated selection criteria that included 

not only expected costs and savings but also military value, which 

considers criteria such as an installation’s current and future mission 

capabilities. Additionally, in establishing the goals of the 2005 BRAC 

round, the Secretary of Defense expressed interest in transforming DOD to 

attain greater efficiencies by aligning the infrastructure with the defense 

strategy and by implementing opportunities for greater jointness across 

DOD. The BRAC Commission, which was established by law as an 

independent entity to review DOD’s proposals, ultimately forwarded 182 

recommendations to the President for approval. The President approved 

the recommendations and forwarded the list to Congress. The BRAC 2005 

recommendations became effective on November 9, 2005, with completion 

required by September 15, 2011. 

Background 

For the 2005 BRAC round, DOD’s Basing Directorate, under the Office of 

the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology and Logistics), 

monitors the services’ and defense agencies’ implementation progress, 

analyzes budget justifications for significant differences in cost and 

savings estimates, and facilitates the resolution of any challenges that may 

impair the successful implementation of the BRAC recommendations 

within the 6-year implementation period. To facilitate its oversight role, 

the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) requires the military service 

or agency in charge of implementing a specific BRAC recommendation to 

prepare and submit a detailed business plan and update it every 

6 months, usually in February and August, to support annual budget 

preparation and documentation. These plans are to include such 

information as a list of all actions needed to implement the 

recommendation, schedules for personnel movements, and updated costs 

and savings estimates based on better and updated information. 

One of the most complicated BRAC recommendations in the 2005 round 

with potentially one of the largest amount of savings is commonly referred 

to as the supply, storage, and distribution (SS&D) recommendation, which 

Page 7 GAO-09-703 Military Base Realignments and Closures 
 

has two primary components. One is to reconfigure DLA’s wholesale 

SS&D network into a streamlined hub and spoke network across the 

United States while the other is to consolidate the SS&D functions and 

related inventories at 13 specified military depot maintenance locations 

where the military services have SS&D functions and associated 

inventories co-located with a DLA distribution center. DLA, as the 

business manager for the recommendation, is responsible for 

implementing the overall recommendation. This review focuses only on 

the consolidation portion of the SS&D BRAC recommendation at the 

depot maintenance level. Figure 1 provides a map of the 13 BRAC-affected 

military locations where depot maintenance is performed. 

Figure 1: Locations of the 13 BRAC-Affected Military Depot Maintenance Sites 

Tobyhanna Army Depot

Warner Robins

Air Logistics Center

Marine Corps Logistics Base

Albany 

Fleet Readiness Center

Southeast Jacksonville

Anniston Army Depot

Corpus Christi Army Depot

Oklahoma City

Air Logistics Center

Fleet Readiness Center East 

Cherry Point

Norfolk Naval Shipyard

Source: DLA and Map Resources (map).

Ogden Air

Logistics Center

Marine Corps Logistics Base

Barstow

Puget Sound

Naval Shipyard

Fleet Readiness Center Southwest

San Diego

Page 8 GAO-09-703 Military Base Realignments and Closures 
 

DLA Has Taken Steps 

to Minimize 

Disruptions to Depot 

Operations and Made 

Progress Toward 

Completing SS&D 

Consolidation but the 

Most Difficult Tasks 

Lie Ahead, Posing 

Challenges 

While DLA has taken steps to minimize potential disruptions to depot 

operations as a result of its planned consolidation efforts and has made 

progress in implementing the SS&D consolidation actions, the most 

difficult tasks still lie ahead, posing challenges for DLA in completing 

those actions. According to DLA officials, the SS&D consolidation action 

will be certified as complete when two key actions are completed: 

personnel are transferred to DLA and applicable service inventories are 

consolidated with DLA. As of May 2009, personnel transfers had occurred 

at 7 of the 13 depot locations, but the physical consolidation of inventories 

has yet to begin. While DLA expects to complete recommended 

consolidation actions by the statutory BRAC deadline of September 15, 

2011, we have identified several challenges that, if not properly addressed 

and monitored, could impede progress towards completing the 

recommended actions and achieving the efficiencies envisioned by the 

BRAC Commission. Although DLA has incorporated in its approaches to 

implementation a number of best business practices that have helped to 

facilitate the implementation process, continued monitoring of ongoing 

actions is critical to ensure that challenges are properly addressed and any 

actions that may pose a risk to depot operations are resolved. 

DLA Has Taken Steps to 

Minimize Disruptions to 

Depot Operations 

In planning for BRAC consolidation actions, DOD has taken steps to 

minimize potential disruptions to depot operations that could occur during 

or as a result of its planned consolidation efforts. DLA’s evolving plans 

incorporate several features that we believe, if implemented as intended, 

conform to best practices that we have identified for successful 

organizational transformations. These mitigating actions include providing 

for an organizational structure involving top leadership and key 

stakeholders to drive the implementation process, establishing integrated 

process teams to facilitate planning and communication among 

stakeholders, using a time-phased approach to transferring SS&D 

functions from the services to DLA, and transferring service personnel to 

DLA in a minimally disruptive way. These features, some of which are 

designed to address challenges faced by DLA and the services, include the 

following: 

• Leadership—DLA has provided for high-level leadership, supported by 

an organizational structure that includes stakeholders from the military 

services and DLA, to help ensure that issues arising during the 

implementation process are addressed and the intent of the 

recommended actions are achieved. This organizational structure 

fulfills the best practice of ensuring that top levels of leadership drive 

the transformation process. In addition, both DLA and service 

Page 9 GAO-09-703 Military Base Realignments and Closures 
 

personnel affected by the transfer have noted that the commanders in 

charge of the transformation visited affected sites and conducted town 

hall meetings prior to the actual transfer to answer questions and were 

very helpful in allaying the fears of affected personnel. 

• Integrated process teams—At each transfer site, DLA and the 

services have established integrated process teams14 that include 

representatives from DLA and the services. These teams incorporate 

the best practices of involving stakeholders and establishing a 

communication strategy that helps share expectations and report on 

progress and challenges as implementation continues. Each team is 

responsible for developing a topic- and site-specific comprehensive 

plan that includes detailed tasks and identifies each task’s duration, 

start and completion dates, percentage completed, organization and 

personnel assigned, criticality of task, and milestones. The teams meet 

regularly to discuss implementation issues, work through problems and 

concerns, and identify potential solutions and mitigating actions where 

possible. In addition, each team has the ability to sit in and observe, 

and share lessons-learned, with other teams. 

• Time-phased transfer of SS&D functions from the services to 

DLA—To proceed cautiously and build upon lessons learned, the 

transfer of SS&D functions from the military services to DLA is being 

phased in by service, beginning with personnel transfers in each 

service. According to DLA officials, timed phasing of transfers is 

intended to allow for the focused dedication of resources to one site at 

a time. For example, at some Air Force locations, DLA encountered 

problems issuing a large volume of common access cards—which are a 

necessary form of personnel identification—at one time. Due to the 

time-phased approach, each Air Force location had the opportunity to 

apply lessons learned from the experiences of the previous one and the 

Navy, as they began their transfers, were applying lessons learned from 

the Air Force. Thus, DLA has been able to more readily address issues 

as implementation progresses. 

• “As-is-where-is” transfer of personnel from the services to 

DLA—In addition, the transfer of all affected SS&D personnel 

positions is occurring on an “as-is-where-is” basis. This means that 

employees filling the transferred positions perform the same general 

 

14The seven teams formed are Inventory Management and Stock Positioning, Financial 

Management, Facilities and Equipment, Information Technology, Metrics, Human 

Performance, and Change Management. 

Page 10 GAO-09-703 Military Base Realignments and Closures 
 

duties at the same location as they did prior to the transfer, albeit for 

DLA instead of for one of the services. To the extent that this construct 

is implemented, there is likely to be less risk for disrupting 

maintenance production schedules due to personnel transfers since the 

employees are already experienced in performing these jobs. 

DLA Has Made Progress 

Transferring Personnel, 

but Physical Inventory 

Consolidation Has Not Yet 

Begun 

As shown in figure 2 below, DLA had established integrated process teams 

as of May 2009 at all 13 BRAC-affected locations. In addition, DLA and the 

Air Force had finalized strategic agreements guiding agreed-upon details 

for transferring functions and personnel and consolidating inventory at the 

three Air Force locations. Further, 7 of the 13 affected locations—all three 

Air Force locations and four Navy locations—have completed the transfer 

of personnel through the “as-is-where-is” approach. DLA’s current plans 

call for transferring over 2,100 positions at the 13 specified military service 

depot maintenance locations from the services to DLA by July 2011. (See 

app. II for more detailed information on these positions broken out by 

depot location.) As of May 2009, 1,391 civilian positions had been 

transferred to DLA. Also, DLA and the Air Force have stated that they 

have the ability to integrate their existing information technology 

systems—a critical prerequisite for being able to consolidate inventories 

as recommended by the BRAC Commission. Finally, DLA has established 

preliminary completion dates for physically consolidating inventories, 

which is currently scheduled to begin in August 2009. Figure 2 provides an 

overall picture of the status of key steps that must be implemented in 

order to complete the recommended BRAC actions. 

Page 11 GAO-09-703 Military Base Realignments and Closures 
 

Figure 2: Completion Status of Key Milestones, as of May 2009 

Jan. 07 Jan. 07 Jan. 07 July 07 July 07 July 07 Oct. 07 Oct. 07 Nov. 07 Nov. 07 Jan. 09 Jan. 09 Jan. 09

Aug. 07 Aug. 07 Aug. 07 Apr. 09 Apr. 09 Apr. 09 Apr. 09 Apr. 09 June 09 June 09 July 09 July 09 July 09

Oct. 07 Feb. 08 July 08 Aug. 08 Oct. 08 Feb. 09 May 09 July 09 Sept. 09 Sept. 10 Feb. 10 Feb. 11 July 11

Apr. 09 Apr. 09 Apr. 09 July 10 July 10 July 10 July 10 July 10 Aug. 10 Aug. 10

Aug. 09 Nov. 09 Jan. 10 Feb. 11 Mar. 11 Apr. 11 June 11 July 11

Fleet Readiness Center 

Southwest San Diego, Calif.

Fleet Readiness Center 

Southeast Jacksonville, Fla.

Fleet Readiness Center 

East Cherry Point, N.C.

Ogden Air Logistics

Oklahoma City Air 

Lo

Center, Utah

gistics Center, Okla.

Warner Robins Air

Logistics Center, Ga.

Anniston Army Depot, Ala.

Corpus Christi

Ba

Tobyhanna Army Depot, Pa.

Army Depot, Tex.

se Barstow, Calif. 

Marine Corps Logistics

Base Albany, Ga.

Marine Corps Logistics

Shipyard, Wash.

Norfolk Naval Shipyard, Va. 

Puget Sound Naval

Intergrated 

process teams

formed

Strategic 

agreements

finalized

As-is-where-is

personnel 

transfer 

completed

Information 

technology 

solution 

availablea

Inventory 

consolidation 

completed

Key steps

13 co-located 

sites

Met

Scheduled

Not applicable

Source: GAO analysis of DLA data.

Air Force Navy Marine Corps Army

Note: All dates associated with scheduled actions are subject to change as implementation proceeds, 

if DLA or the services deem it necessary. a

This refers to when the necessary information technology modifications have been made to DLA’s 

business systems to provide functionality needed in order to integrate with the services’ business 

systems. 

 

Page 12 GAO-09-703 Military Base Realignments and Closures 
 

Some of the Most Complex 

Tasks Are Yet to Be 

Undertaken, Posing 

Implementation 

Challenges 

While DLA expects to complete the recommended consolidation actions 

by the statutory BRAC deadline of September 15, 2011, some of the most 

complex tasks required to fully implement the SS&D BRAC actions are yet 

to be undertaken and pose implementation challenges. These tasks 

include finalizing strategic agreements between DLA and some of the 

services on issues such as costs for DLA-provided services as well as the 

number of service personnel to be transferred in the future to DLA, and 

integrating new and legacy information technology systems necessary for 

inventory consolidation efforts. In addition, issues related to human 

capital could ultimately degrade productivity if not properly addressed. 

According to military officials, while strategic agreements do not need to 

be finalized in their entirety in order for transfer activities to commence, 

negotiations are continuing to resolve issues as implementation 

progresses. At the time of our review, agreements had been finalized 

between DLA and the Air Force and the Navy. Although the Navy 

agreements had been signed, there are unresolved issues regarding how 

the Navy will reimburse DLA for DLA’s SS&D service, according to DLA 

officials. The Army and the Marine Corps have not finalized their 

agreements with DLA because, according to DLA officials, the personnel 

functions to be transferred to DLA have not yet been agreed upon. DLA 

officials have stated that as implementation of the consolidation actions 

approaches, they will work with the applicable service to come to 

agreement on any remaining outstanding issues. However, any delays in 

reaching agreement could affect the dates set forth for remaining tasks in 

the implementation schedule presented in figure 2. 

DLA and the Military Services 

Continue to Resolve Issues 

Since the beginning of our review, the scheduled milestones for having 

approved strategic agreements between DLA and the services have slipped 

several times. For example, while the Navy and DLA were initially 

scheduled to sign their strategic agreement (referred to as a concept of 

operations in the Navy) in July 2008, DLA signed the agreement in August 

2008 but the Navy did not sign until April of 2009. Likewise, although the 

Army and DLA were previously scheduled to sign their agreement in 

August 2008, the current schedule now calls for July 2009. The Marine 

Corps has also slipped from its previously scheduled date of August 2008 

to June 2009 to sign its strategic agreement with DLA. 

Page 13 GAO-09-703 Military Base Realignments and Closures 
 

As we have previously reported,15 the services have also been concerned 

about the consolidation actions’ impact on their inventory levels and how 

this could potentially affect readiness and depot functions to serve the 

warfighter. Tied into this concern for the services is what pricing structure 

DLA will use once the recommended actions are implemented. As 

previously reported, service officials have expressed concern about the 

price DLA will charge them for providing the SS&D functions that the 

services previously provided in-house. Service officials have expressed 

concern that DLA will charge them a higher cost than what they could 

provide the same service for, thereby resulting in increased costs for depot 

maintenance operations, which in turn would be passed on to the 

customers of the maintenance depots. However, DLA officials have stated 

that upon assumption of responsibility for the transferred SS&D functions, 

the cost for DLA-provided services will be no greater than the costs 

currently incurred by the services. Costs will differ depending on what 

costs are included in the price DLA charges for its services and there is 

currently a lack of agreement on how these costs should be calculated. 

Another challenge to the completion of SS&D consolidation actions 

involves delays and issues associated with the integration of DLA’s 

information system with those of each military service. As we have 

reported in our High-Risk Series,16 information technology planning and 

development within DOD has been a long-standing area of concern, 

including difficulties associated with creating interfaces among different 

automated systems. DLA’s supply information technology system needs to 

interface with each of the services’ systems before any inventory 

consolidations can take place. This integration requires ongoing 

coordination between DLA and service information technology experts to 

make the necessary modifications to their systems in order to provide for 

the proper connectivity among those systems. However, this coordination 

process has experienced difficulties and has resulted in an adverse effect 

on the systems integration process. For example, DLA’s progress in 

integrating its system with that of the Air Force has been slowed due to 

the limited availability of Air Force technical experts to work with their 

DLA counterparts. Air Force officials told us that the limited availability is 

caused primarily by a general shortage of technology technicians and they 

are often assigned to higher priority service projects. As a result, the 

integration schedule has slipped, which in turn has delayed the timing of 

Information Technology 

Integration Issues 

 

15GAO-08-121R and GAO-08-315. 

16GAO, High-Risk Series: An Update, GAO-09-271 (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 22, 2009). 

Page 14 GAO-09-703 Military Base Realignments and Closures 
 

inventory consolidation with DLA. Another major complicating factor for 

the integration process is that all military services, excluding the Marine 

Corps, are in the process of upgrading and integrating their depot-level 

automated systems with servicewide business system upgrades. The 

timelines for these improvements were in flux at the time of our review, 

thus creating the possibility that DLA may have to integrate with service 

legacy systems at some sites and later integrate with new service 

information technology systems as they become available. As shown in 

figure 2, as of May 2009, DLA had made only the necessary modifications 

to its system in order to integrate with the Air Force’s legacy system at all 

three of the Air Force’s locations. At the time of our review, the need for 

testing the connectivity remained before consolidations of applicable 

inventories could occur. 

The transfer of personnel from the services to DLA has raised some 

challenges for the personnel involved. During our site visits, we spoke 

with some personnel who had recently been transferred from the Air 

Force or Navy to DLA, and many of those personnel expressed concerns 

about several human capital issues, such as employee turnover, a lack of 

administrative support, and low morale following the transfer. For 

example, service officials and employees told us that a number of 

employees at the affected depot locations decided to retire or pursue 

positions elsewhere in anticipation of or in response to their transfer to 

DLA. In addition, some former service personnel we spoke with 

expressed concerns about fewer promotion opportunities and career 

options with DLA compared to their former position with one of the 

services. On the other hand, some personnel we spoke with were generally 

satisfied with their transfer to DLA. 

Human Capital Issues 

DLA officials stated that they are working with the services to address 

human capital issues, pointing to the agreement they reached with the Air 

Force, which allows employees to transfer and maintain eligibility for 

service positions for the first year after being transferred. However, DLA 

has not reached similar agreements with the other services that have yet to 

fully transfer their positions. Table 1 shows the number of civilian 

personnel that the Air Force and Navy have transferred to DLA, compared 

with the number of associated positions. 

Page 15 GAO-09-703 Military Base Realignments and Closures 
 

Table 1: Full-time Equivalent Civilian Positions Transferred to DLA Compared to the Number of Personnel in Those Positions, 

as of May 2009 

Service Depot location 

Number of full-time 

equivalent positions 

transferred

Number of personnel 

filling those positions Vacancies 

Warner Robins Air Logistics Center, Ga. 267 245 22

Oklahoma City Air Logistics Center, Okla. 366 335 31

Air Force 

Ogden Air Logistics Center, Utah 232 181 51

Fleet Readiness Center East Cherry Point, N.C. 158 145 13

Fleet Readiness Center Southeast Jacksonville, 

Fla. 

112 91 21

Fleet Readiness Center Southwest San Diego, 

Calif. 

101 86 15

Navy 

Norfolk Naval Shipyard, Va. 155 146 9

Total 1,391 1,229 162

Source: GAO analysis of DLA data.

Note: Some positions were vacant before the transfers occurred. Therefore, the number of current 

vacancies does not necessarily reflect the total number of personnel who opted to retire or pursue 

other opportunities. 

As shown in table 1, while personnel transfers have occurred at 7 of the 13 

locations affected by the BRAC actions, some locations are experiencing 

more unfilled or vacant positions than others. It is unclear at this point to 

what degree these vacancies may affect depot operations, particularly in 

the administrative areas.17 On our visits to the Ogden Air Logistics Center 

and Cherry Point Fleet Readiness Center, DLA and service officials told us 

that, due to consolidation actions, the administrative workload has 

increased, while support for certain administrative tasks has decreased. At 

the time of our review, DLA did not have the dedicated human capital staff 

at Ogden to advertise and hire personnel to fill the vacant positions. 

However, DLA officials we spoke to were aware of the situation and were 

in the process of taking steps to rectify the issue. In addition, some other 

administrative details, such as organizing van pools and disseminating 

information about on-base activities, which the services customarily 

provided to depot employees, are no longer available to transferred staff. 

As a result, we observed and spoke with some employees who told us that 

they felt overlooked and overworked and their morale was low. 

 

17In commenting on a draft copy of this report, DLA officials noted that administrative 

support was not included as part of the SS&D functional transfer. 

Page 16 GAO-09-703 Military Base Realignments and Closures 
 

In comparison to the BRAC Commission’s estimates, DOD expects to 

spend more and save less to transfer the SS&D functions and associated 

inventories from the services to DLA, although our analysis indicates that 

those savings estimates are unrealistic.18 The combination of projected 

increased costs and decreased savings results in an overall reduction in 

the expected net savings resulting from implementing the recommended 

actions. DLA’s latest estimates indicate that increased information 

technology costs and decreased inventory reduction savings have resulted 

in significantly lower estimated net savings over the 6-year BRAC 

implementation period ending in 2011, as well as lower estimated net 

annual recurring savings thereafter. However, we believe that these 

estimates are unrealistic for a variety of reasons. Nonetheless, the 

potential exists for DLA to realize savings from expected efficiencies over 

time as DLA assumes broader responsibility of supply-related operations 

at the depot level. 

DOD Expects to 

Spend More and Save 

Less to Transfer 

Supply-Related 

Functions and 

Associated 

Inventories, Although 

Savings Estimates Are 

Unrealistic 

Current Estimated Net 

Savings during the BRAC 

Implementation Period 

and Recurring Savings 

Thereafter Are Less Than 

Those Projected by the 

BRAC Commission 

According to DLA’s latest estimates, the net savings to transfer the supplyrelated functions and associated inventories will be reduced by 

$911 million over the 6-year BRAC implementation period compared to the 

BRAC Commission’s estimated net savings. As shown in table 2, DLA now 

projects about $82 million in net savings over this time period, which is a 

decrease of $911 million (92 percent) from the BRAC Commission’s net 

savings estimate of about $993 million. The $911 million reduction consists 

of a combination of about a $158 million (378 percent) increase in 

expected one-time implementation costs and a $753 million (73 percent) 

decrease in expected savings. In addition, the net annual recurring savings 

that DLA expects to achieve after the implementation period have 

decreased by about $85 million per year, dropping from the BRAC 

Commission’s estimate of nearly $137 million annually to $52 million 

annually. 

 

18It should also be noted that the BRAC Commission’s estimates are based on DOD’s use of 

the Cost of Base Realignment Actions (COBRA) model, which is not intended to and does 

not present budget quality estimates. Consequently, the costs and savings estimates 

calculated by the model are likely to be different from the costs and savings that will 

actually materialize. 

Page 17 GAO-09-703 Military Base Realignments and Closures 
 

Table 2: Comparison of DLA's Current Cost and Savings Estimates to BRAC Commission’s Estimates for the Consolidated 

Depot-Level SS&D Actions

(Dollars in millions)

Difference 

Category 

BRAC Commission 

estimatea DLA estimateb

Amountc

Percentage 

change

Fiscal years 2006-2011 

One-time costs $41.8 $199.7 $157.9 378

One-time savings 703.8 121.1 (582.7) (83)

Recurring savings 330.9 160.4 (170.5) (52)

Total net savings $992.9 $81.9 ($911.0) (92)

 

Fiscal year 2012 and beyond 

Net annual recurring savings $136.8 $52.1 ($84.7) (62)

Source: GAO analysis of documents supporting DLA's approved February 2009 business plan and the BRAC Commission’s 2005 

report. 

Note: Totals may not sum because of rounding. 

a

These figures are presented in then-year dollars. While the BRAC Commission reported its estimates 

in fiscal year 2005 constant dollars (i.e., excludes projected inflation), DLA subsequently converted 

them to then-year dollars (i.e., includes projected inflation) in its business plans. 

b

These figures are derived from documents supporting DLA’s February 2009 business plan. 

c

Represents the variance between the DLA estimate and the BRAC Commission estimate. 

Higher Estimated Costs 

Are Largely Due to 

Increased Spending on 

Information Technology 

Integration Efforts 

According to DLA’s latest estimates, the total estimated costs for 

transferring the SS&D functions and associated inventories have increased 

about $158 million over the 6-year BRAC implementation period compared 

to the BRAC Commission’s estimates. As shown in table 3, DLA’s 

estimated costs are nearly $200 million over this period, which is an 

increase of about $158 million (378 percent) over the BRAC Commission’s 

estimate of almost $42 million. Our analysis of DLA data indicates that the 

main driver for projected cost increases is greater spending on 

information technology integration efforts with about $130 million 

(82 percent) of the overall cost increase due to this cause. DLA currently 

reports information technology costs of nearly $166 million, which is 

about $130 million (351 percent) more than the BRAC Commission’s 

estimate of about $37 million. However, the BRAC Commission’s estimate 

was a placeholder amount that was expected to change as information 

technology requirements became known. According to DLA officials, the 

majority of the necessary information technology requirements involve 

modifying DLA’s business systems to provide functionality needed in order 

to integrate with the services’ business systems at the depot level. DLA 

reports that it expects to spend $123 million (74 percent) of information 

Page 18 GAO-09-703 Military Base Realignments and Closures 
 

technology costs on modifying its systems to perform inventory and 

financial transactions previously provided by the services, and another 

$26 million to incorporate newly transferred employees’ computers at the 

13 depot maintenance sites into DLA’s network, to include hardware 

installation, software licensing, and computer desktop support. The 

remaining $16 million in information-technology-related costs is slated for 

the military services in interfacing their business systems with DLA’s 

systems 

Table 3: Comparison of DLA's Cost Estimates to BRAC Commission’s Estimates for Fiscal Years 2006-2011 for the 

Consolidated Depot-Level SS&D Actions 

(Dollars in millions) 

Difference 

Category 

BRAC Commission 

estimatea DLA estimateb

Amountc

Percentage 

change

Information technology $36.8 $165.9 $129.2 351 

Otherd 1.0 17.2 16.2 1636 

Personnele4.0 16.6 12.6 313 

Total costs $41.8 $199.7 $157.9 378 

Source: GAO analysis of documents supporting DLA's approved February 2009 business plan and the BRAC Commission’s 2005 

report. 

Note: Totals may not sum because of rounding. 

a

These figures are presented in then-year dollars. While the BRAC Commission reported its estimates 

in fiscal year 2005 constant dollars (i.e., excludes projected inflation), DLA subsequently converted 

them to then-year dollars (i.e., includes projected inflation) in its business plans. 

b

These figures are derived from documents supporting DLA’s business plan. 

c

Represents the variance between the DLA estimate and the BRAC Commission estimate. 

d

Includes BRAC Transition Office, supplies and other administrative costs. 

e

Includes personnel separation costs. 

Lower Estimated Savings 

Are Primarily Due to 

Reductions in InventoryRelated Savings 

According to DLA’s latest estimates, expected savings from transferring 

the SS&D functions and associated inventories from the services’ depots 

to DLA have decreased by about $753 million over the 6-year BRAC 

implementation period and by about $85 million annually after the 

implementation period, compared to the BRAC Commission’s estimates. 

As shown in section A of table 4, DLA projects combined one-time and 

recurring savings of nearly $282 million during the implementation period, 

which is about $753 million (73 percent) less than the BRAC Commission’s 

estimate of more than $1 billion in savings. As shown in section B of table 

4, DLA also projects $52 million in annual recurring savings beginning in 

fiscal year 2012, which is a decrease of almost $85 million (62 percent) 

Page 19 GAO-09-703 Military Base Realignments and Closures 
 

over the BRAC Commission’s estimate of nearly $137 million annually. 

These decreases in expected savings are primarily due to a dramatic fall in 

projected inventory-related savings, which account for $739 million (98 

percent) of the decrease in estimated savings during the implementation 

period and nearly $83 million (98 percent) of the decrease in estimated 

annual recurring savings thereafter. 

Table 4: Comparison of DLA's Savings Estimates to the BRAC Commission’s Estimates for the Consolidated Depot-Level 

SS&D Actions 

(Dollars in millions) 

Difference 

Category 

BRAC Commission 

estimateaDLA estimateb

Amountc

Percentage 

change

Section A: One-time and recurring savings 

over fiscal years 2006-2011

Inventory $703.8 $119.1 ($584.7) (83)

Otherd0.0 2.0 2.0 100 

Total one-time savings $703.8 $121.1 ($582.7) (83)

 

Inventory $304.8 $150.3 ($154.6) (51)

Othere 1.6 0.0 (1.6) (100)

Personnelf24.4 10.2 (14.3) (58)

Total recurring savings $330.9 $160.4 ($170.5) (52)

Total savings $1,034.7 $281.6 ($753.1) (73)

 

Section B: Annual recurring savings beginning in fiscal year 2012

Inventory $127.1 $44.2 ($82.8) (65)

Othere0.5 0.0 (0.5) (100)

Personnelf9.2 7.9 (1.3) (14)

Total annual recurring savings $136.8 $52.1 ($84.7) (62)

Source: GAO analysis of documents supporting DLA's approved February 2009 business plan and the BRAC Commission’s 2005 

report. 

Note: Totals may not sum because of rounding. 

a

These figures are presented in then-year dollars. While the BRAC Commission reported its estimates 

in fiscal year 2005 constant dollars (i.e., excludes projected inflation), DLA subsequently converted 

them to then-year dollars (i.e., includes projected inflation) in its business plans. 

b

These figures are derived from documents supporting DLA’s February 2009 business plan. 

c

Represents the variance between the DLA estimate and the BRAC Commission estimate. 

d

Represents procurement savings from Naval shipyard and aviation depots. 

e

Includes information technology and facilities savings. 

f

Represents civilian salary savings.

Page 20 GAO-09-703 Military Base Realignments and Closures 
 

The decrease in savings due to less than expected inventory reductions is 

attributed primarily to a misinterpretation in defining unneeded or 

duplicate inventory that occurred during the BRAC decision-making 

process for formulating recommendations. The BRAC Commission based 

its savings estimate on the belief that the elimination of duplicate 

inventory—inventory stored by both the services and the DLA depots—

would produce one-time and recurring savings.19 However, as we 

previously reported, after further review of the potentially duplicative 

items, DLA and the services found that data generated by DOD during the 

BRAC decision-making process were flawed.20 For example, war reserve 

materiel, materiel held for other customers, and materiel stored at the Red 

River Army Depot were incorrectly included in the BRAC estimation 

model. However, these items were not actually duplicative and thus could 

not be eliminated. As a result, the expected savings associated with these 

items will not occur. In order to offset this loss of savings, DLA 

recalculated inventory reduction savings to include only items supporting 

depot maintenance and also expanded the scope of what could be 

identified as duplicative to include all DLA-owned inventory stored at any 

of its warehouses in the continental United States, as opposed to the 

BRAC Commission’s approach of comparing DLA and service-owned 

inventories stored at co-located depot maintenance sites. In addition, 

while the BRAC Commission based its savings estimate on the assumption 

that 100 percent of the duplicative inventory would be reduced over a 

period of 2 fiscal years, DLA applied a lower inventory reduction factor of 

25 percent over the same period.21 After these recalculations, DLA 

projected inventory reduction savings totaling over $269 million during the 

6-year implementation period and $44 million in annual recurring savings 

after the implementation period. 

 

19One-time savings result from procurement avoidance—consolidating service and DLA 

inventories to create lower overall inventory levels—which allows DLA to sell off inventory 

without need for replenishment. Recurring savings result from the cost avoidance 

associated with storing less amounts of inventory. 

20GAO-08-121R and GAO-08-315. 

21DLA justifies the use of a 25 percent inventory reduction factor based on commercial 

program assessments as well as the results of a December 2001 study conducted for the 

Army by Dynamics Research Corporation. The study examined the potential for savings 

from transferring inventory management of clothing and equipment from the Army to DLA. 

Page 21 GAO-09-703 Military Base Realignments and Closures 
 

Although DLA projects almost $282 million in savings over the 6-year 

implementation period and $52 million in annual recurring savings 

thereafter resulting from the consolidation actions, our analysis shows 

that some aspects of these estimates are unrealistic. DOD’s Financial 

Management Regulation instructs the services and defense agencies to 

update BRAC savings estimates as part of their annual budget process22

based on the best projection of what savings will actually accrue.23

However, DLA’s estimates do not represent the best projections that could 

be made for a number of reasons. 

Although DLA Projects 

Savings, Current Estimates 

Are Unrealistic 

• First, our analysis shows that DLA’s expected net savings of nearly 

$82 million during the implementation period could be a net cost of 

$22 million because DLA includes about $104 million in expected 

savings that we believe should not be counted as BRAC savings. In 

previous reports, we identified three inventory reduction initiatives 

that DLA included in its savings estimates which we believed were not 

the direct result of BRAC actions and therefore should not be counted 

as BRAC savings.24 The savings from these three initiatives resulted 

from pre-BRAC actions and initiatives already planned by the services 

and would have occurred regardless of BRAC. In commenting on our 

March 2008 report, DOD did not concur, stating that while the potential 

savings from these initiatives were not directly the result of BRAC 

actions, they were “enabled” by BRAC actions and therefore should be 

attributable to the recommendation.25 Since that time, DLA revised its 

estimate and removed the expected savings from one of those 

initiatives. However, the two that remain include $104 million in 

savings attributed to service initiatives that identify and eliminate 

dormant or obsolete inventory, even though such actions respond to a 

supply regulation and are part of DOD’s routine materiel management 

 

22DLA’s savings estimates included in DLA’s business plans are used for the annual BRAC 

budget justification process. 

23DOD Financial Management Regulation, 7000.14-R, Base Realignment and Closure 

Appropriations, vol. 2B, ch. 7, para. 070303E (Sept. 2008). 

24The three initiatives were provided by the Army, Air Force, and Marine Corps. They were 

designed to create efficiencies through reducing and phasing out obsolete inventory and 

improving procurement practices. 

25According to DOD, “enabled” savings are those generated from non-BRAC initiatives that 

were enhanced (e.g., increased in scope, more aggressively pursued, or moved in new 

directions) in some way by the implementation of the BRAC recommendations. 

Page 22 GAO-09-703 Military Base Realignments and Closures 
 

practices26 and this inventory would have been eliminated regardless of 

BRAC. We continue to believe that the expected savings resulting from 

the services’ initiatives not connected to BRAC should not be counted 

as BRAC savings. In fact, BRAC implementation officials from the 

Army and DLA acknowledged that the projected savings from the 

services’ obsolete and terminal inventory reductions were not related 

to this BRAC recommendation and would have been eliminated 

regardless of BRAC. We believe that including savings unrelated to 

BRAC actions distorts and effectively overstates projected savings 

from implementing the SS&D recommendation. 

• Second, DLA’s current savings estimates are based on 4-year-old 

inventory data that were collected on March 14, 2005. Given the 

passage of time, it is unlikely that these data represent more recent 

inventory levels—either higher or lower—from which duplicate items 

can be identified given the nature of ongoing operations in Iraq and 

Afghanistan. 

• Third, the inventory reduction scenario currently considered in DLA’s 

savings estimates is unlikely to occur as planned. DLA currently 

projects a 25 percent reduction of duplicative inventory from all the 

services that will occur over a 2-year period, with the first half achieved 

in fiscal year 2009 and the second half in fiscal year 2010. However, in 

our discussions with DLA officials implementing the inventory transfer, 

we learned that expected savings from inventory reductions are not 

expected to appear until the beginning of fiscal year 2010 due to delays 

in integrating DLA’s and the services’ information technology systems. 

Our analysis shows that postponing inventory reduction by 1 year 

eliminates over $19 million in recurring savings during the 

implementation period. Moreover, in prior related work we 

demonstrated that while achieving savings from reducing inventory 

levels at service maintenance depots may be possible, it is a gradual 

process that occurs over many years.27 Therefore, we believe that it is 

unlikely that DLA will achieve its entire inventory reduction within 2 

years as projected, which would further postpone the accrual of 

 

26DOD 4140.1-R, DOD Supply Chain Materiel Management Regulation, para. C.2.9 (May 

23, 2003). 

27GAO, Military Base Closures: Projected Savings from Fleet Readiness Centers Likely 

Overstated and Actions Needed to Track Actual Savings and Overcome Certain 

Challenges, GAO-07-304 (Washington, D.C.: June 29, 2007). 

Page 23 GAO-09-703 Military Base Realignments and Closures 
 

inventory-related recurring savings.28 Also, while DLA includes 

duplicative inventory from all the services in its current estimates, 

Army and Marine Corps officials maintain that they do not have any 

inventory for DLA to consolidate. Our analysis shows that excluding 

these services’ inventories would eliminate an additional $21 million in 

expected one-time and recurring savings during the implementation 

period. 

Moreover, in our March 2008 report,29 we recommended that the Secretary 

of Defense direct the Director of DLA to implement a methodology with 

clear metrics for measuring the magnitude of actual savings. Although 

DOD concurred with our recommendation, DLA has yet to implement an 

approved methodology for estimating inventory savings from the SS&D 

recommendation. DLA produced a draft version of its savings 

methodology in September 2008, but could not provide us an estimate of 

when it might be approved. While the savings methodology is in draft, DLA 

could not give us an account of how actual savings from inventory 

reduction will be captured. Until the methodology, data, and assumptions 

supporting DLA’s savings estimates are updated and implemented, the 

extent of the savings from the implementation of the recommended 

consolidations remains uncertain, which may deny DOD decision makers 

and Congress the information needed to assess the overall financial 

performance of this BRAC effort. Further, without more precise savings 

estimates, Congress and DOD will lack an important perspective about 

BRAC results that could inform decisions in any future BRAC round. 

Potential for Savings Still 

Exists Beyond the 

Implementation Period 

While DLA’s current savings estimates are not based on the best 

projections of what savings will actually accrue, the potential still exists 

beyond the BRAC implementation period for DLA to realize some savings 

and achieve efficiencies as it assumes control over consolidated supplyrelated operations. The transfer of SS&D functions and associated 

inventories is a complex organizational transformation, yet it is possible 

that over time, DLA could achieve savings through reductions in inventory 

levels, which provide for both one-time and recurring savings on an annual 

basis. However, the magnitude of any future savings is unknown at this 

time. As DLA assumes consolidated management responsibility for supply-

 

28Because we believe there is uncertainty as to how long it will actually take DLA to reduce 

the entire duplicative inventory, we did not attempt to quantify the loss during the 

implementation period from the delay in the accrual of recurring savings. 

29GAO-08-315. 

Page 24 GAO-09-703 Military Base Realignments and Closures 
 

related inventories at the depot maintenance level, DLA expects that it will 

have the ability to take advantage of improved oversight of inventories and 

the opportunity to further reduce excess inventory through a process of 

balancing inventory levels against customer supply requirements to save 

money while also providing quality service to its military service 

customers. 

While DLA’s planning process incorporates several key elements that are 

intended to provide a smooth transition and mitigate the risk of disrupting 

depot operations, DLA still has a long way to go before it completes the 

recommended BRAC actions, and some of the most difficult steps are yet 

to be taken. Therefore, as we have previously reported, continued 

collaboration between the services and DLA and periodic monitoring by 

OSD are critical to ensure that implementation actions are on track and 

that any issues that could adversely affect depot operations are resolved 

as implementation proceeds. Furthermore, it is important that DLA 

present the most accurate information on the costs and savings associated 

with the implementation of this BRAC recommendation in order to 

provide congressional decision makers with credible information to 

perform their oversight duties and maintain public trust in the BRAC 

process—now and in the future. 

Conclusions 

In order to provide more accurate and up-to-date information to 

congressional decision makers and to enhance OSD’s oversight role, we 

recommend that the Secretary of Defense instruct the Director of the 

Defense Logistics Agency to improve the accuracy of its cost and savings 

estimates associated with the consolidation of the SS&D functions and 

inventories at the 13 specified depot locations by 

Recommendations 

• removing savings estimates that are not clearly the direct result of 2005 

BRAC actions (including savings sometimes referred to as “BRAC 

enabled”), 

• updating its 4-year-old data to reflect the most recent estimate of 

inventory levels available for consolidation (especially given the 

wartime demands currently being placed on maintenance depots), 

• applying current information on the timing of inventory consolidations 

(specifically, when they will begin and how long they will take) and 

excluding projected savings for consolidating Army and Marine Corps 

inventories with DLA, and 

Page 25 GAO-09-703 Military Base Realignments and Closures 
 

• revising and finalizing an approved methodology which implements 

these steps and can be consistently followed by all the services and 

DLA over time. 

In written comments on a draft of this report, DOD concurred with all four 

recommendations and described actions it intends to take to implement 

them. DOD’s comments are included in their entirety in appendix III. In 

response to our first recommendation for DOD to remove savings from its 

estimates that are not the direct result of the BRAC 2005 actions 

(sometimes referred to as “BRAC enabled”), DOD concurred, stating that 

they will be removed from the savings estimates reported in the August 

2009 business plan submission. In response to our second 

recommendation for DOD to update the data used in its savings estimates 

to more accurately reflect current inventory levels, DOD concurred, 

stating that it will use the most recent estimate of inventory levels 

available and update the savings calculations for inventory reductions in 

its August 2009 business plan. In response to our third recommendation 

for DOD to improve the accuracy of its savings estimates by applying the 

most current information on the timing of inventory consolidations and 

excluding Army and Marine Corps inventories from the projected savings 

estimates, DOD concurred, stating that savings calculations for projected 

inventory reductions will reflect the current schedule of consolidating 

materiel and will be updated in the August 2009 business plan. Moreover, 

DOD stated that the update will show that no Army or Marine Corps 

inventory is available for consolidation. Finally, in response to our fourth 

recommendation for DOD to finalize an approved methodology that 

implements these steps, DOD concurred, stating that the new calculations 

will be documented in the August 2009 business plan and updates and 

revisions will be incorporated and staffed by the end of calendar year 

2009. In addition to these written comments, DOD separately provided 

technical comments that we have incorporated into the report where 

appropriate. 

Agency Comments 

We are sending copies of this report to other congressional committees 

and members; the Secretary of Defense; the Director of the Defense 

Logistics Agency; Secretaries of the Army, Navy, and Air Force; 

Commandant of the Marine Corps; and the Director, Office of Management 

and Budget. In addition, the report will be available at no charge on GAO’s 

Web site at http://www.gao.gov. 

Page 26 GAO-09-703 Military Base Realignments and Closures 
 

If you or your staff have any questions regarding this report, please 

contact me at (202) 512-4523 or by e-mail at leporeb@gao.gov. Contact 

points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may 

be found on the last page of this report. GAO staff who made key 

Brian J. Lepore, Director 

contributions to this report are listed in appendix IV. 

Defense Capabilities and Management 

Page 27 GAO-09-703 Military Base Realignments and Closures 
 

List of Committees 

The Honorable Carl Levin 

Chairman 

The Honorable John McCain 

Ranking Member 

Committee on Armed Services 

United States Senate 

The Honorable Daniel K. Inouye 

Chairman 

The Honorable Thad Cochran 

Ranking Member 

Subcommittee on Defense 

Committee on Appropriations 

United States Senate 

The Honorable Tim Johnson 

Chairman 

The Honorable Kay Bailey Hutchison 

Ranking Member 

Subcommittee on Military Construction, 

 Veterans Affairs, and Related Agencies 

Committee on Appropriations 

United States Senate 

The Honorable Ike Skelton 

Chairman 

The Honorable Howard P. “Buck” McKeon 

Ranking Member 

Committee on Armed Services 

House of Representatives 

The Honorable John P. Murtha, Jr. 

Chairman 

The Honorable C.W. Bill Young 

Ranking Member 

Subcommittee on Defense 

Committee on Appropriations 

House of Representatives 

Page 28 GAO-09-703 Military Base Realignments and Closures 
 

The Honorable Chet Edwards 

Chairman 

The Honorable Zach Wamp 

Ranking Member 

Subcommittee on Military Construction, 

 Veterans Affairs and Related Agencies 

Committee on Appropriations 

House of Representatives 

Page 29 GAO-09-703 Military Base Realignments and Closures 
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology Appendix I: Scope and Methodology 

We performed our work at and obtained information from DOD’s Basing 

Directorate under the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense 

(Acquisition, Technology and Logistics); Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) 

headquarters, Fort Belvoir, Virginia; DLA’s Defense Supply Center, 

Richmond, Virginia; Warner Robins Air Logistics Center, Warner Robins, 

Georgia; Ogden Air Logistics Center, Ogden, Utah; and Fleet Readiness 

Center East, Cherry Point, North Carolina. We relied on our related BRAC 

work and resulting reports issued in October 2007 and March 2008 on key 

specific actions associated with the implementation of the recommended 

supply-related consolidations of the BRAC SS&D recommendation. 

To determine the progress made in implementing the depot-level supplyrelated consolidation actions as recommended by the 2005 Base Closure 

and Realignment Commission and the challenges DLA faces, we initially 

reviewed a June 2008 DOD report1

 on implementation matters associated 

with the recommended actions. This report was submitted to the 

congressional defense committees in response to direction included in the 

conference report accompanying the National Defense Authorization Act 

for Fiscal Year 2008. We further analyzed DLA planning documentation 

and interviewed officials at various levels within DOD, DLA, selected 

services’ maintenance depots, and military customers aligned with these 

depots. Our document analyses included DLA business plans and 

supporting data, integrated process team charters, memoranda of 

agreement with the services, and action plans which included scheduled 

implementation milestones and timelines. We discussed the progress of 

key implementation actions, implementation challenges, and plans to 

address those challenges with BRAC officials located at DLA headquarters 

and each of the services. We also visited three of the seven maintenance 

depot locations where “as-is-where-is” personnel transfers had taken 

place: Warner Robins Air Logistics Center, Warner Robins, Georgia; Fleet 

Readiness Center East, Cherry Point, North Carolina; and Ogden Air 

Logistics Center, Ogden, Utah. In making these site selection visits, we 

chose one site from each of the services where personnel transfers had 

occurred (Air Force and Navy) and a second Air Force site to see if 

“lessons learned” were being applied. At those locations, we met with 

officials from DLA headquarters as well as with some personnel newly 

transferred to DLA at each depot maintenance location we visited and 

 

1

Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Logistics and Technology), 

Department of Defense Report to Congress on the Implementation of the Consolidation of 

Depot Supply, Storage, and Distribution Functions with the DLA as Required by the 

2005 BRAC (June 2008). 

Page 30 GAO-09-703 Military Base Realignments and Closures 
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology 

their military customers. Although the number of people we spoke with 

did not represent a statistically projectable sample, we reported concerns 

that consistently emerged as an issue. 

To evaluate the extent to which DLA’s cost and savings estimates for 

transferring the SS&D functions and consolidating the associated 

inventories varied from those of the BRAC Commission, we reviewed and 

compared DLA’s estimates supporting the approved February 2009 

business plan with those of the 2005 BRAC Commission’s report to the 

President. Because the expected cost and savings data presented in DLA’s 

business plan represent estimates for the larger BRAC recommendation, 

of which the consolidated SS&D actions addressed in this report are a 

subset, we analyzed relevant supporting documentation to that business 

plan that contained data specific to the depot-level supply-related 

consolidation efforts. We discussed the rationale for variances in the 

estimates with DLA, service, and contractor officials. To better understand 

the underlying assumptions used to generate estimates of costs and 

savings, we reviewed pertinent DOD financial management and supply 

chain management regulations, as well as DOD guidance for reporting 

data. We interviewed BRAC implementation officials from DLA 

headquarters and representatives from each of the military services 

knowledgeable about the data and the assumptions underlying estimated 

costs and savings. We also compared DLA’s savings estimates that were 

based on the inventory reduction scenario that supports its business plan 

with those based on DLA’s most current timeline for reducing the services’ 

applicable inventories. While we determined that the data presented in 

DLA’s planning documents were sufficiently reliable for the purposes of 

this report, it should be noted that the business plans are considered 

“living” documents and the data represent a point in time and are subject 

to change as implementation proceeds. 

We conducted this review from June 2008 through July 2009 in accordance 

with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those standards 

require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate 

evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions 

based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained 

provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our 

audit objectives. 

Page 31 GAO-09-703 Military Base Realignments and Closures 
Appendix II: Status of Full-time 

Equivalent Positions (Civilian 

and Contractor) Expected to 

Transfer from the Services to 

DLA 

Appendix II: Status of Full-time Equivalent 

Positions (Civilian and Contractor) Expected 

to Transfer from the Services to DLA 

The number of civilian and contractor positions expected to transfer from 

the services to DLA has changed over time as shown in table 5. The latest 

plans as of May 2009 call for a transfer of over 2,100 personnel positions 

from the services to DLA by July 2011. As of May 2009, DLA had actually 

transferred 1,391 positions at 7 of the 13 affected sites (as shown in table 

5) with transfers at the remaining sites to occur later. 

Table 5: Number of Full-time Equivalent Positions (Civilian and Contractor) Expected to Transfer from the Services to DLA at 

the 13 BRAC-Affected Depot Maintenance Locations over Time 

Service Depot Location 

June 2005 estimated 

number of full-time 

equivalent position 

transfers b, c

September 2007 

estimated number of 

full-time equivalent 

position transfersc

May 2009 estimated 

and actual number of 

full-time equivalent 

position transfersc

Warner Robins Air Logistics 

Center, Ga. 

131 265 267

Oklahoma City Air Logistics 

Center, Okla. 

393 365 366

Air Force 

Ogden Air Logistics Center, Utah 140 231 232

Fleet Readiness Center East 

Cherry Point, N.C. 

114 88 158

Fleet Readiness Center Southeast 

Jacksonville, Fla. 

129 71 188

Fleet Readiness Center Southwest 

San Diego, Calif. 

89 85 221

Norfolk Naval Shipyard, Va. 132 157 223

Navy 

Puget Sound Naval Shipyard, 

Wash.a

62 89 154

Marine Corps Logistics Base, 

Albany, Ga.a

Marine Corps 53 59 59

Marine Corps Logistics Base, 

Barstow, Calif.a

63 64 64

Tobyhanna Army Depot, Pa.a113 68 68

Corpus Christi Army Depot, Tex.a424 56 56

Army 

Anniston Army Depot, Ala.a

521 68 68

Total 2,364 1,665 2,124

Source: DLA's approved February 2009 Business Plan.

Note: The shaded area represents actual position transfers; the totals may not sum due to rounding. 

a

Numbers subject to change as implementation continues. 

b

Numbers derived from June 22, 2005, Office of the Secretary of Defense memorandum (“Wynne 

Memo Baseline Numbers”). 

c

Includes civilian and contractor employees. 

Page 32 GAO-09-703 Military Base Realignments and Closures 
Appendix III: Comments from the Department Appendix III: Comments from the of Defense 

Department of Defense 

Page 33 GAO-09-703 Military Base Realignments and Closures 
Appendix III: Comments from the Department 

of Defense 

Page 34 GAO-09-703 Military Base Realignments and Closures 
Appendix III: Comments from the Department 

of Defense 

Page 35 GAO-09-703 Military Base Realignments and Closures 
Appendix IV: 

A

GAO Contact and Staff 

cknowledgments 

Page 36 GAO-09-703 Military Base Realignments and Closures 

Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff 

Acknowledgments 

Brian J. Lepore (202) 512-4523 or leporeb@gao.gov GAO Contact 

In addition to the individual named above, James R. Reifsnyder, Assistant 

Director; Karen L. Kemper, Analyst-in-Charge; Betsey Ward; Robert 

Heilman; Susan Ditto; Steve Rabinowitz; and Elizabeth Weisman made key 

contributions to this report. 

Acknowledgments 
Related GAO Products Related GAO Products 

High-Level Leadership Needed to Help Guam Address Challenges Caused 

by DOD-Related Growth. GAO-09-500R, Washington, D.C.: April 9, 2009. 

Military Base Realignments and Closures: DOD Faces Challenges in 

Implementing Recommendations on Time and Is Not Consistently 

Updating Savings Estimates. GAO-09-217. Washington, D.C.: Jan. 30, 

2009. 

Military Base Realignments and Closures: Army Is Developing Plans to 

Transfer Functions from Fort Monmouth, New Jersey, to Aberdeen 

Proving Ground, Maryland, but Challenges Remain. GAO-08-1010R. 

Washington, D.C.: August 13, 2008. 

Defense Infrastructure: High-Level Leadership Needed to Help 

Communities Address Challenges Caused by DOD-Related Growth.

GAO-08-665. Washington D.C.: June 17, 2008. 

Defense Infrastructure: DOD Funding for Infrastructure and Road 

Improvements Surrounding Growth Installations. GAO-08-602R. 

Washington, D.C.: April 1, 2008. 

Defense Infrastructure: Army and Marine Corps Grow the Force 

Construction Projects Generally Support the Initiative. GAO-08-375. 

Washington, D.C.: March 6, 2008. 

Military Base Realignments and Closures: Higher Costs and Lower 

Savings Projected for Implementing Two Key Supply-Related BRAC 

Recommendations. GAO-08-315. Washington, D.C.: March 5, 2008. 

Defense Infrastructure: Realignment of Air Force Special Operations 

Command Units to Cannon Air Force Base, New Mexico. GAO-08-244R. 

Washington, D.C.: January 18, 2008. 

Military Base Realignments and Closures: Estimated Costs Have 

Increased and Estimated Savings Have Decreased. GAO-08-341T. 

Washington, D.C.: December 12, 2007. 

Military Base Realignments and Closures: Cost Estimates Have 

Increased and Are Likely to Continue to Evolve. GAO-08-159. Washington, 

D.C.: December 11, 2007. 

Page 37 GAO-09-703 Military Base Realignments and Closures 
Related GAO Products 

Military Base Realignments and Closures: Impact of Terminating, 

Relocating, or Outsourcing the Services of the Armed Forces Institute of 

Pathology. GAO-08-20. Washington, D.C.: November 9, 2007. 

Military Base Realignments and Closures: Transfer of Supply, Storage, 

and Distribution Functions from Military Services to Defense Logistics 

Agency. GAO-08-121R. Washington, D.C.: October 26, 2007. 

Defense Infrastructure: Challenges Increase Risks for Providing Timely 

Infrastructure Support for Army Installations Expecting Substantial 

Personnel Growth. GAO-07-1007. Washington, D.C.: September 13, 2007. 

Military Base Realignments and Closures: Plan Needed to Monitor 

Challenges for Completing More Than 100 Armed Forces Reserve 

Centers. GAO-07-1040. Washington, D.C.: September 13, 2007. 

Military Base Realignments and Closures: Observations Related to the 

2005 Round. GAO-07-1203R. Washington, D.C.: September 6, 2007. 

Military Base Closures: Projected Savings from Fleet Readiness Centers 

Are Likely Overstated and Actions Needed to Track Actual Savings and 

Overcome Certain Challenges. GAO-07-304. Washington, D.C.: June 29, 

2007. 

Military Base Closures: Management Strategy Needed to Mitigate 

Challenges and Improve Communication to Help Ensure Timely 

Implementation of Air National Guard Recommendations. GAO-07-641. 

Washington, D.C.: May 16, 2007. 

Military Base Closures: Opportunities Exist to Improve Environmental 

Cleanup Cost Reporting and to Expedite Transfer of Unneeded Property.

GAO-07-166. Washington, D.C.: January 30, 2007. 

Military Bases: Observations on DOD’s 2005 Base Realignment and 

Closure Selection Process and Recommendations. GAO-05-905. 

Washington, D.C.: July 18, 2005. 

Military Bases: Analysis of DOD’s 2005 Selection Process and 

Recommendations for Base Closures and Realignments. GAO-05-785. 

Washington, D.C.: July 1, 2005. 

(351233) Page 38 GAO-09-703 Military Base Realignments and Closures 
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