Filed 10/2/13 In re Armando G. CA2/2 

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS 

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for 

publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication 

or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. 

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA 

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT 

DIVISION TWO 

In re ARMANDO G., a Person Coming 

Under the Juvenile Court Law. 

 B247605 

 (Los Angeles County 

 Super. Ct. No. VJ39072) 

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF 

CALIFORNIA, 

 Plaintiff and Respondent, 

 v. 

ARMANDO G., 

 Defendant and Appellant. 

 APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Philip K. 

Mautino, Judge. Affirmed. 

 Jeanine G. Strong, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and 

Appellant. 

 Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney 

General, Lance E. Winters, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Lawrence M. Daniels and 

Connie H. Kan, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent. 
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Minor and appellant Armando G. (minor) appeals from a judgment of the juvenile 

court entered after the court found that minor had committed a robbery. He contends that 

evidence of identification, force, and fear was insufficient to support the judgment. We 

reject minor’s contention, find that substantial evidence supports the juvenile court’s 

findings, and affirm the judgment. 

BACKGROUND 

Minor had previously been made a ward of the juvenile court under three 

sustained petitions. On February 8, 2013, a petition was filed to bring minor within the 

jurisdiction of the juvenile court pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 602. 

The current petition alleged one count of second degree robbery in violation of Penal 

Code section 211. At the adjudication and disposition hearing, the juvenile court heard 

testimony, found the allegation true, and sustained the petition. The court ordered minor 

to remain a ward of the court on the same terms and conditions of probation as previously 

imposed, removed him from the custody of his parents or guardian, and committed him to 

the custody and control of the probation officer for placement in a camp community 

program for nine months, with 28 days of predisposition custody credit. Minor filed a 

timely notice of appeal from the judgment. 

At the adjudication hearing, Daniel V. (Daniel) testified that on the afternoon of 

February 6, 2013, he was walking alone home from school holding his cell phone in his 

right hand, when someone came up behind him and asked to borrow the phone. Daniel 

identified the person in court as minor. When Daniel said “No,” and kept walking, minor 

grabbed the top of the phone with his left hand and pulled. Minor was on Daniel’s right 

side and slightly behind him when he initially reached for the phone. Daniel gripped the 

phone tighter, turned and backed away. Minor then used both hands to pull the cell 

phone with greater force. At one point minor placed his hand on top of Daniel’s in an 

attempt to pull the phone away. During the struggle, Daniel’s knee gave out and he fell 

backward while minor “tripped forward,” and gained possession of the phone. Minor 

then ran off with the phone. Daniel testified he was nervous and a “little scared” during 

the struggle, and suffered a small scratch on the finger of his left hand. The whole 
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incident lasted less than five minutes, and took only a few seconds for minor to take 

possession of the phone. Daniel did not see the cell phone again until a police officer 

returned it to him. 

Minor did not testify or present other evidence in his defense. 

DISCUSSION

Minor contends that a finding he committed robbery was not supported by 

substantial evidence. A challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence to support a juvenile 

court judgment sustaining a criminal allegation is reviewed under the same standard of 

review applicable to any criminal appeal. (In re Ryan N. (2001) 92 Cal.App.4th 1359, 

1371 (Ryan N.).) Thus, we review the whole record in the light most favorable to the 

prosecution to determine whether it discloses evidence that is “reasonable, credible, and 

of solid value -- such that a reasonable trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond 

a reasonable doubt.” (People v. Johnson (1980) 26 Cal.3d 557, 578; see also Jackson v. 

Virginia (1979) 443 U.S. 307, 318-319; Ryan N., supra, at p. 1372.) We do not reweigh 

the evidence or resolve conflicts in the evidence. (People v. Young (2005) 34 Cal.4th 

1149, 1181.) 

“We draw all reasonable inferences in support of the judgment. [Citation.]” 

(People v. Wader (1993) 5 Cal.4th 610, 640.) “If the circumstances reasonably justify the 

trial court’s findings, reversal is not warranted merely because the circumstances might 

also be reasonably reconciled with a contrary finding. [Citations.] The test on appeal is 

whether there is substantial evidence to support the conclusion of the trier of fact; it is not 

whether guilt is established beyond a reasonable doubt. [Citation.] [¶] Before the 

judgment of the trial court can be set aside for insufficiency of the evidence . . . , it must 

clearly appear that upon no hypothesis whatever is there sufficient substantial evidence to 

support it. [Citation.]” (People v. Redmond (1969) 71 Cal.2d 745, 755; Ryan N., supra, 

92 Cal.App.4th at p. 1372.) 

Identification evidence 

First, minor contends that the identification of minor by Daniel was not reliable or 

trustworthy and was thus insufficient to prove that minor was the perpetrator. 
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The testimony of a single witness is sufficient to establish identity unless the 

testimony is physically impossible or inherently improbable. (See People v. Elliott

(2012) 53 Cal.4th 535, 585.) An in-court identification alone may be sufficient to sustain 

a conviction. (People v. Hughes (1969) 271 Cal.App.2d 288, 291.) There is no 

requirement of corroboration. (People v. Wilson (1968) 266 Cal.App.2d 106, 108; see 

Evid. Code, § 411.) 

Minor contends that because Daniel did not specifically testify he saw defendant 

and did not describe his face or other identifiable features, the identification testimony 

was insufficient. In addition, minor infers from the following that Daniel did not 

sufficiently observe the perpetrator: Daniel was approached from behind; the perpetrator 

was on his right and slightly behind Daniel when he first grabbed the cell phone; the 

perpetrator ran away when Daniel fell backward; and the entire incident lasted only a few 

seconds. Minor concludes that Daniel’s in-court identification was “inherently 

improbable.” 

“The ‘inherently improbable’ standard for rejecting testimony on appeal is not 

merely an enhanced version of implausibility . . . . [It] means that the challenged 

evidence is ‘unbelievable per se . . . ,’ such that ‘the things testified to would not seem 

possible.’ [Citation.]” (People v. Ennis (2010) 190 Cal.App.4th 721, 725.) “‘“To 

warrant the rejection of the statements given by a witness who has been believed by a 

trial court, there must exist either a physical impossibility that they are true, or their 

falsity must be apparent without resorting to inferences or deductions. [Citations.] . . .”’” 

(People v. Mayberry (1975) 15 Cal.3d 143, 150.) As minor has shown no physical 

impossibility and his argument relies on his inference that Daniel did not get a good look 

at the perpetrator, he has not demonstrated inherent improbability. 

“‘[I]t is not a proper appellate function to reassess the credibility of the witnesses.’ 

[Citation.]” (People v. Thompson (2010) 49 Cal.4th 79, 125.) Moreover, we conclude 

that Daniel’s testimony gives rise to the reasonable inference that he was able to observe 

minor well enough to identify him. Daniel testified that he turned, so that minor was on 

his right side, just slightly behind him when minor grabbed the phone with one hand; 
5 

when Daniel resisted, minor reached with his other hand and used both hands to pull on 

the phone while Daniel pulled and backed away from minor. If minor had been wholly 

behind Daniel at that point, as minor’s argument presupposes, Daniel could not have 

backed away from him. Further, as Daniel fell back, minor “tripped forward,” a scenario 

suggesting that the two young men were face to face or nearly so at that point. Because 

the circumstances reasonably support the trier of fact’s findings, conflicting inferences do 

not warrant reversal. (People v. Rodriguez (1999) 20 Cal.4th 1, 11.) 

Further, any “weakness in the witness’s testimony are matters to be explored on 

cross-examination and argued to the trier of fact.” (People v. Robertson (1989) 48 Cal.3d 

18, 44; see also People v. Mendez (2010) 188 Cal.App.4th 47, 59.) In addition, a 

defendant who claims that his identification was unduly suggestive or unreliable should 

object in the trial court. (People v. Ochoa (1998) 19 Cal.4th 353, 411-412 (Ochoa).) 

Here, minor did not move to exclude the identification and he failed to avail himself of 

the opportunity to cross-examine Daniel in order to establish, if possible, that the 

circumstances could not reasonably justify an inference that Daniel observed minor well 

enough to identify him. 

The authorities cited by minor are inapplicable and do not support his contention 

that in-court identifications alone are insufficient evidence of identity, although some 

agree that such identifications can be suggestive and unfair. (See United States v. Wade

(1967) 388 U.S. 218, 228-229, 235-236 [accused must be afforded counsel at pretrial 

identification proceedings]; Ochoa, supra, 19 Cal.4th at pp. 411-412 [defendant bears 

burden to establish unfair identification]; People v. Bolin (1998) 18 Cal.4th 297, 319 

[identity not an issue]; People v. Palmer (1984) 154 Cal.App.3d 79, 88 [error in refusing 

instructions on evaluating identification testimony]; People v. Caruso (1968) 68 Cal.2d 

183, 184, 189-190 [in-court identification tainted by pretrial lineup without counsel]; 

United States v. Burdeau (9th. Cir. 1999) 168 F.3d 352 (Burdeau) [no error in refusing 

in-court lineup].) Indeed, the federal appeals court observed in Burdeau that “‘[a]s long 

as the witness has an independent recollection that is wholly untainted by the police 
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misconduct, an in-court identification is permissible.’ [Citation.]” (Burdeau, supra, at p. 

358.) 

Here, the trial court found the evidence of identification sufficient to sustain the 

petition. As we have found substantial evidence to support that finding, we may not set it 

aside. (People v. Redmond, supra, 71 Cal.2d at p. 755; Ryan N., supra, 92 Cal.App.4th at 

p. 1372.) 

Evidence of force or fear 

Minor also contends that there was insufficient evidence of a taking by force or 

fear to support a robbery finding. 

“Robbery is the felonious taking of personal property in the possession of another, 

from his person or immediate presence, and against his will, accomplished by means of 

force or fear.” (Pen. Code, § 211.) The quantum of force used must have been “in excess 

of that ‘necessary to accomplish the mere seizing of the property.’ [Citations.]” (People 

v. Anderson (2011) 51 Cal.4th 989, 995.) 

Minor contends that the evidence showed he committed no more than grand theft 

in violation of Penal Code section 487. Minor points to Daniel’s testimony that he let go 

of the phone when his knee gave out, causing him to fall. Because he did not apply direct 

force to Daniel’s knee, such as by kicking him, minor argues that Daniel’s fall was the 

cause of his releasing the phone, not any force applied by minor. Minor concludes that 

his offense was at most akin to a purse snatching. 

“[W]here a person wrests away personal property from another person, who resists 

the effort to do so, the crime is robbery, not merely theft. [¶] There may be some 

generalized impression that a purse snatch -- grabbing a purse (or similar object) from a 

person -- is grand theft and nothing more . . . , although the weight of authority is 

otherwise where the force used is sufficient. [Citation.]” (People v. Burns (2009) 172 

Cal.App.4th 1251, 1257.) “‘“[A]ll the force that is required to make the offense a 

robbery is such force as is actually sufficient to overcome the victim’s resistance . . . .”’ 

[Citations.]” (Id. at p. 1259.) 
7 

The evidence clearly established that minor used that quantum of force exceeding 

what would have been necessary simply to snatch the phone. Minor did not merely grab 

the phone and run as his argument suggests, but struggled against Daniel’s resistance. 

Minor grabbed the phone with one hand, and when Daniel resisted by gripping it more 

and backing up, minor used both hands to pull harder in his direction. At one point in the 

struggle, minor placed his hand on top of Daniel’s hand and tried to pull. We reject as 

unreasonable any inference that Daniel’s fall was a fortuitous event unrelated to his 

attempt to resist minor’s efforts to pull the cell phone out of his hand, as Daniel was in a 

physical struggle with defendant when his knee failed him. 

We conclude that substantial evidence supports a finding that the cell phone was 

taken by force. Minor contends that Daniel’s testimony that he was “nervous” and “a 

little scared” during the struggle was insufficient to prove that fear allowed the offense to 

occur. (See People v. Anderson (2007) 152 Cal.App.4th 919, 946 [robbery requires proof 

that victim’s fear “‘allowed the crime to be accomplished’”].) Robbery is “accomplished 

by means of force or fear.” (Pen. Code, § 211, italics added.) “There is no need to prove 

both force and fear.” (People v. Hays (1983) 147 Cal.App.3d 534, 541.) 

Regardless, fear may be presumed from circumstances that would justify being 

afraid, even where the victim minimizes or denies his fear. (People v. Iniguez (1994) 7 

Cal.4th 847, 857.) And it may be inferred from the circumstances that the victim’s fear 

facilitated the taking. (People v. Mungia (1991) 234 Cal.App.3d 1703, 1709, fn. 2.) 

Here, the circumstances would reasonably cause a victim to be afraid; Daniel was in fact 

afraid, and we have found the evidence of force was sufficient to support a robbery 

conviction. We conclude that such circumstance gives rise to a reasonable inference that 

Daniel’s fear facilitated minor’s theft of the cell phone. 
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DISPOSITION

 The judgment of the juvenile court is affirmed. 

 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS. 

 ___________________________, J. 

 CHAVEZ 

We concur: 

__________________________, P. J. 

BOREN 

__________________________, J. 

ASHMANN-GERST