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Filed 8/29/24 P. v. Allen CA1/1

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified 

for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for 

publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. 

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

PAMELA MARIA ALLEN,

Defendant and Appellant.

 A167971

 (San Mateo County

 Super. Ct. No. SC035484A)

MEMORANDUM OPINION1

In 1994, defendant Pamela Maria Allen stabbed her sister and 

shot two men for no apparent reason. (People v. Allen (Feb. 7, 2005, 

A105804) [nonpub. opn.] (Allen I) at *2.)

2 She was subsequently 

diagnosed with paranoid schizoaffective disorder. (People v. Allen (Jan. 

24, 2022, A162774) [nonpub. opn.] (Allen II) at *2; Allen I, supra,

A105804, at *2.) 

1 This appeal is appropriately resolved by memorandum

opinion in accordance with California Standards of Judicial 

Administration, section 8.1.

2 We take judicial notice on our own motion of our prior opinions 

in defendant’s appeals from orders extending her commitment to the 

Department of State Hospitals. (Evid. Code, §§ 452, subd. (a), 459.)
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The following year, defendant entered into a negotiated 

disposition to resolve the charges against her—two counts of attempted 

first degree murder, two counts of assault with a firearm, and three 

counts of assault with a deadly weapon. She pleaded nolo contendere 

to two counts of assault with a firearm and two counts of assault with a 

deadly weapon. The remaining counts were dismissed. The trial court

then found her not guilty by reason of insanity (NGI) and committed 

her to the Department of State Hospitals for the agreed-upon 

maximum of 13 years 4 months, with 209 days of custody credit. 

Defendant was housed in the most restrictive unit. (Allen II, 

supra, A162774, at *2; Allen I, supra, A105804, at *2.) She verbally 

threatened and physically assaulted staff and patients, behaved in a 

sexually inappropriate manner, refused medication, and violated rules. 

(Allen II, supra, A162774, at *3.) The trial court has five times

extended her commitment, finding her “still a danger” and she “cannot 

be successfully treated in the community.” (Id., at *5.)

In February 2023, 28 years after entering into the negotiated 

disposition that resolved the criminal charges against her, defendant 

filed a motion to withdraw her nolo contendere plea, arguing it was not 

authorized under the plea statute, specifically Penal Code section 1016

as elucidated in People v. John (2019) 36 Cal.App.5th 168 (John). The 

trial court denied the motion. 

DISCUSSION

Making an amalgam of forfeiture and estoppel arguments, the 

Attorney General maintains defendant has waited too long to challenge 

the validity of her plea. We agree, concluding defendant is estopped 
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from seeking to withdraw her plea and overturning the negotiated 

disposition to which she agreed nearly three decades ago. 

Indeed, one of the cases defendant includes in her opening brief—

acknowledging that “[i]n the absence of exceptional circumstances, a 

party has no right to attack a voidable judgment long after it is final” 

(People v. Ramirez (2008) 159 Cal.App.4th 1412 (Ramirez))—illustrates 

why estoppel should bar her belated attack on her plea.

In Ramirez, the defendant entered into a plea agreement to 

resolve numerous pending charges. In accordance therewith, the trial 

court imposed, but suspended execution of, a midterm, four-year 

sentence and placed him on probation. (Ramirez, supra, 

159 Cal.App.4th at p. 1418.) After violating probation a second time, 

the defendant entered into a second negotiated disposition to resolve 

the probation matter. This disposition included increasing the 

suspended sentence to the upper term of five years. (Id. at pp. 1419–

1420.) After a third violation, the trial court revoked probation and 

imposed the upper term sentence. (Id. at p. 1419.) 

The Court of Appeal rejected the defendant’s argument that the 

trial court lacked “jurisdiction” to extend the sentence and therefore he 

could challenge it at any time. The appellate court explained:

“ ‘[J]urisdictional errors are of two types. “Lack of

jurisdiction in its most fundamental or strict sense means 

an entire absence of power to hear or determine the case, 

an absence of authority over the subject matter or the 

parties.” [Citation.]’ [Citation.] The term ‘lack of 

jurisdiction’ may also be applied when the court possesses 

jurisdiction over the subject matter and parties in the 

fundamental sense but ‘ “has no ‘jurisdiction’ (or power) to 

act except in a particular manner, or to give certain kinds 

of relief, or to act without the occurrence of certain 

procedural prerequisites.” [Citation.]’ [Citation.] ‘When a 
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court lacks jurisdiction in a fundamental sense, an ensuing 

judgment is void, and “thus vulnerable to direct or 

collateral attack at any time.” [Citation.]’ [Citation.] By 

contrast, when a court has fundamental jurisdiction to act 

but acts in excess of jurisdiction, its actions are merely 

voidable, ‘[t]hat is, its act or judgment is valid until it is set 

aside, and a party may be precluded from setting it aside by

“principles of estoppel, disfavor of collateral attack or res 

judicata.” [Citation.]’ [Citation.] Whereas a lack of 

fundamental jurisdiction may be raised at any time, a 

challenge to a ruling in excess of jurisdiction is subject to 

forfeiture if not timely asserted. [Citation.] In the absence 

of exceptional circumstances, a party has no right to attack 

a voidable judgment long after it is final.” (Ramirez, supra, 

159 Cal.App.4th at p. 1422.)

The court went on to conclude that while the trial court lacked 

“authority” to increase the defendant’s sentence (Ramirez, supra, 

159 Cal.App.4th at p. 1425), it did not lack “fundamental jurisdiction” 

to do so. “[B]y failing to heed the statute that precluded it from 

modifying appellant’s sentence ([Pen. Code,] § 1203.2, subd. (c)), the 

court merely exceeded its jurisdiction but did not lack jurisdiction in 

the fundamental sense over appellant or the subject matter.” (Id. at 

p. 1427.)

The appellate court further concluded the defendant not only 

“forfeited” his challenge to the extension of his sentence by failing to 

file a timely appeal, but he also was “estopped” from challenging the 

order because he “agreed to the five-year sentence as part of a plea deal 

in which he admitted the probation violation.” (Ramirez, supra, 

159 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1427–1428.) 

With respect to the latter point, the Ramirez court explained, 

“The rationale justifying application of estoppel is that ‘defendants who 

have received the benefit of their bargain should not be allowed to trifle 
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with the courts by attempting to better the bargain through the 

appellate process.’ (People v. Hester (2000) 22 Cal.4th 290, 295.) In 

exchange for agreeing to increase his suspended sentence by one year, 

appellant received the benefit of being reinstated on probation and 

released from custody. Having accepted the benefits of his plea, he 

should not now be able to better the bargain by scaling back the 

increased sentence that was a fundamental component of the plea deal. 

[¶] Whether a defendant is estopped to complain about an act in excess 

of jurisdiction ‘depends on the importance of the irregularity not only to 

the parties but to the functioning of the courts and in some instances 

on other considerations of public policy.’ [Citation.] We discern no 

public policy that would be served by allowing appellant to challenge 

his sentence after he had already enjoyed the benefits of the plea 

bargain giving rise to his sentence.” (Ramirez, supra, 159 Cal.App.4th 

at p. 1428; see also People v. Miller (2012) 202 Cal.App.4th 1450, 1452–

1453 [the defendant, who entered into negotiated disposition in 2005 

but made no objection to his plea and conviction until April 2010, was 

estopped from seeking to withdraw his plea; “[a]lthough . . . there was 

error in charging and accepting the plea . . . , for reasons of public 

policy,” the defendant was “estopped from vacating his plea and 

modifying his conviction by his consent to the plea agreement”]; People 

v. Couch (1996) 48 Cal.App.4th 1053, 1057 [“that a defendant has 

received a benefit in return for agreeing to accept a specified sentence 

is itself sufficient to estop that defendant from later seeking to unfairly 

supplement this benefit by mounting an appellate attack on the trial 

court’s imposition of the specific sentence which the defendant agreed 

to accept”]; People v. Superior Court (Wagner) (1989) 210 Cal.App.3d 
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1146, 1149 [holding in habeas appeal the “defendant waived the defect 

in his 1983 NGI plea by his unexcused delay in challenging that plea 

until he reaped the full benefit of preferable hospital confinement and 

avoided the possibility of prison and attendant parole period”].)

The reasoning of these cases is apposite here. There is no 

question the trial court had personal jurisdiction over defendant and 

had subject matter jurisdiction to hear the criminal case against her. 

Accordingly, the court had fundamental jurisdiction to accept her plea 

and impose the commitment order defendant now seeks to collaterally 

challenge, regardless of whether her plea was statutorily authorized. 

(See People v. Hester, supra, 22 Cal.4th at p. 295 (Hester) [where a

defendant has “pleaded guilty in return for a specified sentence, 

appellate courts will not find error even though the trial court acted in 

excess of jurisdiction in reaching that figure, so long as the trial court 

did not lack fundamental jurisdiction”].) 

There is also no question the trial court accepted defendant’s plea 

and ordered her commitment pursuant to a negotiated disposition 

which secured a significant benefit for her—psychiatric treatment,

instead of incarceration in a state prison. (See Wagner, supra,

210 Cal.App.3d at p. 1149.)

To quote Ramirez, “[w]e discern no public policy that would be 

served” by allowing defendant to withdraw her plea and overturn the 

negotiated disposition long after she has “already enjoyed the benefits 

of the plea bargain.” (Ramirez, supra, 159 Cal.App.4th at p. 1428.) 

Defendant urges that People v. Prudholme (2023) 14 Cal.5th 961 

(Prudholme) and John, supra, 36 Cal.App.5th 168, sanction her effort 
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to invalidate the negotiated disposition to which she agreed nearly 30

years ago. Neither case does so. 

In Prudholme, the trial court, pursuant to a negotiated 

disposition, imposed a three-year probationary period. (Prudholme, 

supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 964.) The defendant timely appealed, and while 

his appeal was pending, the Legislature enacted Assembly Bill 

No. 1950 (2019–2020 Reg. Sess.), which reduced most felony probation 

to two years. (Prudholme, at p. 966.) The issue before our Supreme 

Court was whether this ameliorative legislation applied retroactively to 

nonfinal cases. The court held that it did and modified the judgment to 

reduce the probationary period to two years. (Id. at pp. 979–980.) 

Thus, Prudholme involved an entirely different procedural posture—a 

timely, direct appeal from a negotiated disposition. It does not 

remotely call into question the high court’s decision in Hester and other

estoppel cases. 

In John, the defendant moved to withdraw her guilty plea less 

than five months after the trial court, in accordance with a negotiated 

disposition, ordered her committed to a state hospital. (John, supra, 

36 Cal.App.5th at p. 171.) The trial court ruled her motion was 

untimely. On appeal, the Attorney General conceded the trial court 

was in error. (Ibid.) The Court of Appeal not only agreed the 

defendant’s appeal was timely but went on to conclude the plea deal did 

not comport with the statutes governing guilty pleas. (Id. at pp. 174–

175.) It further concluded the appropriate disposition was to reverse 

and remand, allowing the defendant to enter a new plea. (Id. at 

p. 176.) Not surprisingly, given the relatively short period that elapsed 

before the defendant sought to withdraw her guilty plea, the Attorney 
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General did not raise the issue of estoppel, nor did the appellate court 

consider it. 

In sum, given the nearly 30 years that have elapsed since 

defendant’s nolo contendere plea to the serious charges against her, she 

is estopped from seeking to withdraw her plea and overturning the 

negotiated disposition to which she agreed.

DISPOSITION

The order denying defendant’s motion to withdraw her plea is 

AFFIRMED. 

BANKE, J.

WE CONCUR:

HUMES, P. J.

LANGHORNE WILSON, J. 

(People v. Allen; A167971)