About the Report

Following a year of economic setbacks, natural disasters, and 

political tumult in Haiti, bilateral and multilateral donors 

convened at a mid-April 2009 conference and pledged $353 

million to reduce poverty and stimulate economic growth 

there. But it is by no means certain that this pledge—and the 

additional hundreds of millions of dollars coming in from earlier 

pledges—will reverse the country’s fortunes. At present, Haiti 

continues to be characterized by turmoil, a lack of sustained 

growth, and extremes of poverty and human suffering, and 

it remains highly vulnerable to external shocks. This report 

surveys poverty and inequality in Haiti and examines obstacles 

to sustained stability and growth as a means of understanding 

why stimulative efforts have not succeeded thus far. It offers 

conclusions and recommendations aimed at providing Haitians 

and their international supporters a way forward for achieving 

sustained stability and growth and for lessening the country’s 

turmoil and vulnerability to external shocks. 

Robert Maguire, a Haiti specialist, is an associate professor of 

international affairs at Trinity Washington University. He was a 

Jennings Randolph Senior Fellow at the United States Institute 

of Peace in 2008–09 and currently serves as the chair of the 

Institute’s Haiti Working Group. 

1200 17th Street NW • Washington, DC 20036 • 202.457.1700 • fax 202.429.6063

Special Report 232 September 2009

© 2009 by the United States Institute of Peace. 

All rights reserved.

Contents

Introduction 2

The Challenge of Poverty and Inequality 3

Obstacles to Sustained Stability and Growth 5

Opportunities for Sustained Stability and Growth 10

Conclusion 17

Robert Maguire

Haiti after the Donors’ 

Conference

A Way Forward

Summary

•	 In April 2009, multilateral and bilateral donors pledged $353 million to support the government of Haiti’s plan to alleviate poverty, mitigate the effects of natural disasters, and 

achieve sustained economic growth. 

•	 Extreme inequalities among Haitians—apparent through severe income disparity and the 

lack of access by most to quality education, health care, and the legal system—have exacerbated the country’s already relentless poverty and stymied the development of human 

resources required for stability and growth. They have also created strong enmity between 

the society’s “haves” and “have-nots.”

•	 A major obstacle to Haiti’s growth has been the lack of attention to its rural economy 

and population. Over time, this neglect, juxtaposed with efforts to develop urban wage 

employment, resulted in the demise of Haitian agriculture, dependence on imported food, 

significant off-the-land migration to crowded urban centers and destinations beyond Haiti, 

unmet expectations, and increased environmental degradation.

•	 The state’s lack of capacity to render public services has resulted in the virtual absence of 

the government as a positive presence in citizen’s lives, thus stoking citizen frustration 

and weakening the democratic process. Donor support of nonstate entities has created an 

environment that lacks coherence, particularly in support of national development plans.

•	 Expanding opportunities that enable people to fulfill legitimate aspirations is sine qua 

non for Haiti’s brighter future. In order to expand opportunities, development programs 

must act in concert to alleviate poverty; lessen inequality in health, education, and rule 

of law; strengthen institutions; build partnerships; address rural neglect and consequent 

vulnerabilities; and alter attitudes that place personal or group interests above those of 

the national good.

United States Institute of Peace www.usip.org

SPECIAL REPORT
2

•	 Conditional cash transfers, expanded microcredit, and the creation of a national civic service corps offer important possibilities for achieving improved equity and inclusion among 

all Haitians and, therefore, for attaining irreversible stability and growth.

Introduction 

Since the 1986 demise of the Duvalier family dictatorship (1957–86), progress toward a more 

democratic and prosperous Haiti and its citizens has been unsteady, if not uncertain. Instability and economic deterioration under a parade of military and civilian governments, exacerbated by episodic conflict, have characterized the country despite—or some would argue 

because of—considerable international attention. Following the election of President Rene 

Preval in 2006, the Haitian government crafted a poverty reduction and economic-growth 

strategy endorsed and supported by international institutions that had, by the beginning of 

2008, reduced gang-related conflict, rampant kidnapping, and politically linked strife and 

their collective catastrophic effects—all highly important achievements in confronting the 

country’s social, economic, and environmental deterioration.1 From all appearances, the 

Caribbean’s most unstable and impoverished country had finally begun to take long-awaited 

steps along a path of progress. However, two developments, both beyond Haiti’s immediate 

control, have since reversed these positive trends. The first was the effect of skyrocketing 

costs worldwide of food and fuel. In a country where 78 percent of the population barely 

survives on less than $2 a day and where more than 55 percent of its food is imported, the 

resultant cost-of-living crisis only deepened the suffering of Haiti’s poor. Fallout from the 

crisis led to the parliamentary ouster of the prime minister in April 2008 and months of 

political gridlock. The second was the devastation wrought on the country by four strong 

storms that struck during August and September 2008. These storms, which collectively 

killed hundreds, uprooted tens of thousands, exacerbated food shortages, submerged a 

major city in mud, and caused $897.4 million in damage—the equivalent of 14.6 percent of 

the country’s GDP—were, in the words of President Préval, “Haiti’s Katrina.”

By April 2009, both the government and its international supporters had taken steps 

aimed at restoring the country to its pre-2008 path of progress and avoiding further turmoil 

and decline. Among these steps was a one-year extension, to mid-October 2009, of the UN 

Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH), with its 9,000 peacekeepers and police trainers 

essential to maintaining security and improving public safety. Additional steps included a 

postdisaster needs assessment, a report on improving economic security, and, subsequently, 

the creation of a revised national development strategy that would work toward a new 

paradigm with three goals: reducing poverty, decreasing vulnerability to natural disasters, 

and paving the way for sustained economic growth.2

These steps culminated in the Conference on the Economic and Social Development of 

Haiti, held in Washington, D.C., in mid-April 2009, which brought together international 

donors and the Haitian government. Emanating from the conference was an agreement 

that the donors and the government would work together to address the poverty reduction, 

disaster mitigation, and economic growth priorities identified by Haitians. That resolve was 

accompanied by donor pledges of $353 million in support of the aforementioned revised 

strategy. These funds will join hundreds of millions more for Haiti already in the combined 

pipelines of various nongovernmental, bilateral, and multilateral donors. 

By no means, however, is it certain that this concerted action will reverse the country’s 

backward tumble for a sustained period. As prior experience in Haiti instructs, the international commitment of human, material, and financial resources alone does not hold the key 

to success, even when coupled with development strategies and plans. To be sure, previously allocated development funding from diverse international sources, including donors’ 

The views expressed in this report do not necessarily 

reflect the views of the United States Institute of Peace, 

which does not advocate specific policy positions.

To request permission to photocopy or reprint materials, 

e-mail: permissions@usip.org

About the Institute

The United States Institute of Peace is an independent, 

nonpartisan institution established and funded by Congress. 

Its goals are to help prevent and resolve violent conflicts, 

promote post-conflict peacebuilding, and increase conflict 

management tools, capacity, and intellectual capital worldwide. The Institute does this by empowering others with 

knowledge, skills, and resources, as well as by its direct 

involvement in conflict zones around the globe.

Board of Directors

J. Robinson West (Chair), Chairman, PFC Energy, Washington, 

D.C. • George E. Moose (Vice Chairman), Adjunct Professor 

of Practice, The George Washington University, Washington, 

D.C. • Anne H. Cahn, Former Scholar in Residence, American 

University, Washington, D.C. • Chester A. Crocker, James R. 

Schlesinger Professor of Strategic Studies, School of Foreign 

Service, Georgetown University, Washington, D.C. • Ikram U. 

Khan, President, Quality Care Consultants, LLC., Las Vegas, 

Nev. • Kerry Kennedy, Human Rights Activist • Stephen D. 

Krasner, Graham H. Stuart Professor of International Relations at Stanford University • Jeremy A. Rabkin, Professor 

of Law, George Mason University, Arlington, Va. • Judy Van 

Rest, Executive Vice President, International Republican 

Institute, Washington, D.C. • Nancy Zirkin, Executive Vice 

President, Leadership Conference on Civil Rights 

Members Ex Officio

Hillary Rodham Clinton, Secretary of State • James N. Miller, 

Principle Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy • Ann E. 

Rondeau, Vice Admiral, U.S. Navy; President, National Defense 

University • Richard H. Solomon, President, United States 

Institute of Peace (nonvoting)
3

conferences in 1994, 2004, and 2006, and the commitment of additional resources, including 

those from UN Missions in Haiti between 1994 and 2000, did not result in a Haiti with less 

poverty, more growth, and greater resilience to shocks, such as the ones of 2008 that sent 

the country tumbling. 

The key to success in Haiti will come not simply from allocating urgently needed 

resources, but by ensuring that they are used effectively to strengthen security and improve 

public safety, relieve poverty, and promote sustained growth, particularly in ways that 

focus on the pressing need for the country to become more resilient to external shocks that 

leave it reeling. Moreover, resources must be applied to create opportunities for equitable 

and inclusive development. Extremes of poverty and inequality among Haitians, and the 

exclusion of most from access to opportunities required both to meet basic needs and to 

participate meaningfully in national life, have been at the root of Haiti’s history of human 

suffering and conflict. Absent significant gains in equality and inclusion the country will 

continue to vacillate between turmoil and deterioration on the one hand, and stability and 

progress on the other.

The Challenge of Poverty and Inequality 

Of all the world’s countries, Haiti has the second largest overall income gap between the 

very rich and the very poor. More than 68 percent of total national income accrues to the 

wealthiest 20 percent of the population, while less than 1.5 percent of national income 

accumulates among the poorest 20 percent. Of the aforementioned 78 percent of its population earning less than $2 a day, 56 percent must make do with less than $1 a day. In rural 

Haiti, where some 60 percent of its 9.7 million people live, extremes of destitution are even 

greater: 86 percent of the population earns less than $2 a day; 69 percent less than $1 a 

day.3 Although life in the countryside is bleak, Haiti’s capital, Port-au-Prince, is no land of 

milk and honey. One prominent businessman estimates that as many as 300,000 of the 2.5 

million to 3 million residing in the metropolitan area wake up every day without a penny 

in their pocket.

Few opportunities exist for impoverished Haitians—in cities or the countryside—to 

increase daily earnings. Unemployment is rampant; estimates run as high as 70 percent 

nationwide and 62 percent among urban youth. Under the prevailing daily minimum wage 

(approx. $1.80 a day), even those roughly 250,000 Haitian workers who find wage employment do not necessarily earn enough to meet basic needs. Most Haitians making $2 a day 

or less earn that by hustling to survive within the informal economy, or by working the land. 

Agriculture, historically undercapitalized and notoriously inefficient, nevertheless provides a 

source of employment for 69 percent of those with work in rural Haiti. 

Cash transfers from Haitians living overseas assist those receiving them to meet basic 

food, clothing, and shelter needs. An estimated 31 percent of Haitian adults receive cash 

from family living abroad. One quarter of all household income is derived from remittances. 

In 2007, Haitians overseas remitted $1.6 billion to family members. Over the past year, 

however, remittances are down by as much as 20 percent as a result of the impact of the 

global economic crisis on the Haitian diaspora.4 This bodes poorly for those who depend on 

international cash transfers to make ends meet. 

Inequality in access to education reinforced by dichotomies of wealth and poverty also 

illustrate Haiti’s stark social and economic disparities. Quality primary and secondary education, available principally at a handful of private schools disproportionately located in Portau-Prince, is a dream for most Haitians, who cannot afford tuition and supplies. Instead, 

they must depend on other, less-costly schools. Typically also privately run (81 percent of 

Haiti’s schools are privately run as a result of scant government spending on education), 
4

these schools—generally speaking—are inadequately resourced and offer nightmarish 

educational environments, including untrained teachers, classrooms averaging 78 pupils 

per teacher, and poorly constructed buildings. The local characterization of these schools 

as lekòl bòlèt (”lottery schools”—bòlèt is Haiti’s numbers game, or lottery) is indicative of 

the fact that they are a gamble where students and their parents seeking education as a 

pathway out of poverty lose more often than win. Haiti’s few public schools offer similar 

conditions. 

Access to quality health care exhibits a similar dichotomy. Those on the upper end of the 

income scale count among their options the best physicians and facilities available either 

in Haiti or beyond. For the vast majority, however, access to quality health care, like education, is elusive. As a rule, the poor gain access only when a low-cost or no-cost service is 

provided by volunteer doctors and nurses either in Haiti on medical missions or in scattered 

clinics operated on shoestring budgets by various nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). 

As with education, prior Haitian governments have typically not paid much attention to 

health service provision. In rare cases when they have, they have had only limited resources 

to invest in public health. 

Despite these known systemic inadequacies, Haiti’s poor commit precious resources 

(including the aforementioned remittances) toward education and health care with the hope 

of putting children on the path of progress and keeping family members healthy. That the 

poor are desperate for quality services is as apparent as is the fact that those services are 

not readily available, especially in rural areas. Twenty-five percent of Haiti’s rural districts 

have no schools whatsoever. Nationally, only three in five Haitian children attend school 

In desperation, rural families seek educational opportunity for their children by sending 

them to cities to live with fictive kin in a potentially abusive arrangement called restavek,

whereby youngsters exchange domestic service for the opportunity to attend school. In 

regard to health care, few of Haiti’s districts have doctors or nurses. The national average of 

physicians and nurses per 10,000 inhabitants is 2.5 and 1, respectively. In the Grand Anse 

Department, the ratio of doctors falls to 0.2.5 As a result, poor Haitians, in search of relief 

for their ailments, seek advice from neighbors with knowledge of traditional medicine or 

others claiming expertise and purchase often worthless, outdated, or even toxic medicines 

from merchants who exploit their desperation. It is no surprise that life expectancy in Haiti 

today stands at 57.5 years, the lowest in the Western Hemisphere.

Inequities among Haitians in rule of law, coupled with a dysfunctional judicial system, also obstruct the country’s path toward poverty reduction, disaster mitigation, and 

economic growth with greater inclusion and equity. Like inequalities in access to quality 

education and health, rule-of-law disparities also play out along socioeconomic lines, with 

those in the upper echelons better served than those who occupy the rungs below them. 

Haiti’s language dichotomy as applied to legal proceedings provides an insightful example. 

The Caribbean nation has two official languages: French and, since 1987, Creole. Only some 

15 percent of Haitians, however—few of whom are among those surviving on less than $2 

a day—speak French whereas all Haitians speak Creole. Yet French remains the predominant 

language used by judges and lawyers in courtroom proceedings, befuddling Creole-speaking 

plaintiffs, defendants, and witnesses. Hence, even when there is access to the legal system 

by the poor, there is not an even playing field. 

Corruption endemic to the system also obstructs equal access to the law and works in 

favor of those with influence through power and resources—usually French speakers. Bribery of judges, attorneys, and law enforcement officials is commonplace in a context where 

justice is literally for sale and expected impunity among those with power is the norm. 

Judicial officials who endeavor to enact equal justice for all are vulnerable to the pressure and intimidation tactics of those who have customary impunity and more power—or 
5

more persuasive tools—than they. This serves not only to exacerbate patterns of exclusion 

and inequality but also to make the poor less likely to invest scarce resources in productive activities. Budding entrepreneurs poised to compete successfully against established 

middlemen or merchants with customary impunity can be ruined by extralegal intimidation tactics. Farmers who improve their land run the risk of corrupt officials issuing bogus 

land titles to a crony or of being forced to turn over a higher portion of their production 

to powerful middlemen who have little or no fear of prosecution. Resultant disincentives 

to improved land use management are particularly detrimental to the compelling need for 

natural disaster mitigation and environmental rehabilitation. 

In sum, severe, widespread poverty and inequities in access to education, health care, 

and rule of law—along with the inability of the poor to mitigate these inequities—preclude 

prospects for most Haitians to pursue the kind of personal growth and self-improvement 

required for their country’s sustained stability and growth. Further, Haiti’s disparities, 

coupled with the penury and pain of the millions at the bottom of the socioeconomic ladder, has created enmity between the country’s “haves” and “have-nots.” Among those at the 

top, there is widespread fear. Among those at the bottom, there is considerable loathing. 

Haiti’s poverty and inequality, combined with such feelings and perceptions, fundamentally 

contribute to the episodic violence, obdurate instability, and grave human suffering that 

keep the country on edge. 

Obstacles to Sustained Stability and Growth

Rural neglect

A major obstacle to Haiti’s sustained stability and growth has been the lack of attention and 

investment in the country’s rural economy and population, particularly as linked to agriculture. Traditionally, Haiti has been a nation of small-scale farmers. A majority still lives close to 

the land despite urbanization trends that have shifted the population from 80 percent rural 

in the 1970s to 55 to 60 percent rural today. Investments for economic growth and development have not served this majority. According to OECD data, between 1995 and 2006, for 

example, only 7 percent of donor allocations went toward agriculture. In 2007, this dropped 

to 2 percent, representing only $12 million out of $624 million of donor support.6

Neglect of rural Haiti is at the root of the country’s vulnerability to the external costof-living and deadly storm shocks that brought Haiti to its knees in 2008. As recently as 

1980, Haitian farmers provided from 80 to 90 percent of national food needs, but today 

they produce only about 45 percent of what Haiti eats. The country’s diminished capacity to 

feed itself came about as a result of several interrelated developments. Decisions in the late 

1970s by banks and donor governments to promote Haiti as the “Taiwan of the Caribbean,” 

supported by the pliant regime of dictator Jean-Claude Duvalier, contributed significantly 

to Haiti’s food-production demise. Why invest in rural Haiti and its primitive agriculture, 

the thinking went, when the country could become—given its abundant cheap labor and 

its proximity to the United States market—a locus for investment in low-wage assembly 

plant jobs that would alleviate unemployment and stimulate economic growth? Wage earners would be better off buying cheaper imported food than more costly Haitian foodstuffs. 

Farmers would be better off earning wages than scratching a living from the land. At its 

height in the early 1980s, this push to situate Haiti as an assembly zone in the Caribbean 

saw modest success. Apparel, electronics, and sporting goods assembly plants located exclusively in Port-au-Prince created somewhere between 60,000 and 100,000 jobs, employing 

about 10 percent of the city’s population.

Neglect of rural Haiti is at 

the root of the country’s 

vulnerability to the external 

cost-of-living and deadly storm 

shocks that brought Haiti to its 

knees in 2008. 
6

Unfortunately, those who envisaged Haiti’s emulation of Taiwan’s fast-growing economy 

did not pay attention to how Taiwan became Taiwan in the first place. As political economist 

Francis Fukuyama has noted, “In Asia, fast-developing countries such as South Korea and 

Taiwan began their high-growth periods with land-reform policies and then invested heavily 

in universal education. Latin American countries, by contrast, have undertaken relatively 

little redistribution and have failed to provide equal access to public services such as education and health.”7 In Haiti, where the failures of Latin America were played out in the 1970s 

and 1980s, concern about strengthening the country’s rural productivity were trumped by 

the prospect of greater access to cheap imports, particularly flour and rice. Universal education was simply not important to Haiti’s urban-based political and economic elites, who 

were content maintaining their positions of privilege and power in a society highly polarized 

along lines of race and class. 

The impact of the lack of investment in rural Haiti and its people has been disastrous. 

Increased importation of basic food commodities fueled the demise of the country’s ability 

to feed itself and changed consumption patterns. Haitian-produced rice—labor intensive, 

undercapitalized, low yielding, and grown on relatively small parcels—simply could not 

compete with its highly capitalized and high-yield U.S. counterpart, produced on large farms 

that took advantage of economies of scale, favorable government policies, and inexpensive 

inputs derived from fossil fuels to plant, fertilize, control pests, harvest, dry, and ship the 

product to such far-flung markets as Haiti. By the early 1980s, low-cost rice was flooding 

Haitian markets as a relatively inexpensive staple for the country’s poor. The grain, previously consumed by most families only several times a week, became a daily necessity as it 

undercut the price of not just Haitian rice but also locally grown tubers and starches, such 

as cassava, yams, plantains, and corn. 

The country’s competitive disadvantage in supplying food to its people was exacerbated 

after 1986, when tariffs on imported agricultural commodities were removed or reduced, 

a Haitian decision driven by international pressure. Haitian rice producers tried to resist 

when, in 1987, they barricaded roads leading from the port of Gonaives to markets in Portau-Prince, in what became known as Haiti’s “Rice War.” Their efforts were futile. In 1980 

domestic rice production was 210,000 metric tons, satisfying virtually all of Haiti’s needs. 

By 2007, when it had fallen to 90,000 metric tons, Haiti’s total consumption had risen to 

450,000 metric tons. The 360,000 metric ton deficit was made up entirely by imports from 

the United States.8

As local rice production collapsed and demand for other crops declined, Haitian farmers 

and farm workers, already undercapitalized and struggling, felt the pinch. Multitudes reacted 

by seeking opportunities elsewhere, with families in tow. Declining prosperity in the countryside juxtaposed with the prospects of factory jobs in Port-au-Prince sparked a considerable movement from the land to the capital in the early 1980s. As the exodus continued, 

the population of the metropolitan area exploded, growing from an estimated 763,000 in 

1982 to more than 2.5 million today, with 75,000 new migrants arriving each year. New 

arrivals have joined those already crammed into burgeoning slums built on seaside mudflats, 

precipitous slopes, or alluvial flood plains: all locations that leave them highly vulnerable to 

the effect of rainwater and mud cascading down deforested mountainsides.

As a rule, new migrants have also joined those who preceded them in not succeeding in 

their quest for greater opportunity. Following the 1986 ouster of the Duvalier dictatorship 

and the corresponding freedom of expression that fed a cacophony of voices calling for 

improved wages and worker treatment, jobs in the assembly sector began to disappear as 

factories closed—their owners shifting production to less vocal, more predictable environments. By 2008, in a much larger Port-au-Prince, about 1 percent of the population (25,000 

workers) was employed in the assembly sector, 18,000 of them in apparel factories.9
7

The rural exodus also turned toward destinations beyond Haiti. Laborers without work, 

farmers without viable livelihoods, craftspeople with shrinking enterprises, and, subsequently, former rural dwellers now in cities and filled with dashed dreams sought opportunity across the border in the Dominican Republic and across the sea in the United States. 

Today thousands of people who used to live in rural Haiti work in farm fields or at construction sites in the Dominican Republic, or at low-wage jobs throughout South Florida. Their 

greatest contribution to Haiti is the cash they transfer to those left behind.

Haiti’s vulnerability to the devastating effects of storms has also been exacerbated by 

a convergence of the deficit in rural investment and the surfeit in rural desperation that 

resulted in increased removal of vegetative land cover. Deforestation had begun during the 

French period with the indiscriminate harvesting by colonists of precious tropical hardwoods and continued ever since, particularly after 1920, when 60 percent of Haiti’s surface 

remained forested. After 1980 the assault on Haiti’s forests and trees ramped up considerably when laborers and farmers still in depressed rural areas harvested more wood—Haiti’s 

principal source of energy—and produced more charcoal to meet increased demand from 

a growing urban population. In 1980, an estimated 5 percent of Haiti was covered with 

forests. Today, less than 2 percent of the country’s surface remains forested and 25 of its 

30 watersheds are completely deforested. This near absence of vegetative cover has left 

Haiti virtually defenseless to tropical storms and hurricanes that inevitably—and seemingly 

now in greater frequency and with greater force—move across the landscape. Just as the 

country’s dependence on imported food left Haitians unprotected from global trends, the 

neglect of investment in rural Haiti and its people left the countryside unguarded against 

the vagaries of Mother Nature. 

As long as imported commodities, particularly rice, remained relatively inexpensive, 

few decision-makers lamented the declining fortunes either of Haitian agriculture or of 

Haitian farm families. And then, after the 2007 to 2008 global commodity price increase, 

with people eating “mud cookies” to survive—not because imported food was scarce, but 

because the poor simply could no longer afford it—investment in rural Haiti and agricultural 

production suddenly became “la mode.” Donors and their NGOs scrambled to rediscover (or 

discover) rural Haiti. The government poured precious resources into rice production, aiming 

to increase annual production to 120,000 metric tons. It invested $30 million in rehabilitating infrastructure in the Artibonite Valley and $13 million in fertilizer sold at a subsidized 

price. Sadly, these efforts went practically for naught when storms sent rainfall, mud, and 

rocks cascading from hillsides, wiping out 25,000 acres of newly planted rice and thousands 

of acres of other crops, washing 706,000 farm animals out to sea, making 3.3 million Haitians vulnerable to moderate or severe malnutrition, and reaffirming that decades of neglect 

of rural Haiti created a severe obstacle to the country’s stability and growth.10

Lack of institutional capacity

A generally recognized obstacle to improved stability and growth in Haiti is a lack of institutional capacity. As implied earlier, this deficit is particularly apparent when it comes to 

the government’s inability to render services to the population. Institutional deficiency 

emanates from several interrelated factors, including brain drain to distant shores and to 

better-paying private sector, NGO, and international organization positions within Haiti. 

Also contributing to this lack of capacity is the fact that Haitian governments have tended 

to be more concerned with maintaining power and extracting rent from the citizenry than 

providing services. For example, the state's presence in towns and villages has been characterized more by tax offices and—before it was disbanded in 1995—Haitian army outposts 

than by health clinics, agricultural extension offices, or schools. In this context, it should 

This near absence of vegetative 

cover has left Haiti virtually 

defenseless to tropical storms 

and hurricanes that inevitably 

move across the landscape.

The state's presence in 

towns and villages has been 

characterized more by tax 

offices and Haitian army 

outposts than by health clinics, 

agricultural extension offices, 

or schools.
8

not be surprising that when resources from international donors were provided to previous 

governments, expected results were not attained. Endemic corruption, inefficiencies, and 

the preferred use of resources by the state to support power maintenance and predation 

were fundamental causes of the lack of hoped-for outcomes of donor support in education, 

health, and improved economic productivity.

Over time, Haiti became a destination for church groups, private voluntary agencies, and 

other organizations engaged in various humanitarian undertakings, filling the void left by 

the state. Haitian regimes accepted NGOs as mechanisms that would offer at least minimal 

services, allowing them to focus on political objectives. In response to the government’s 

poor performance, donors not explicitly mandated to support public agencies ultimately 

chose to direct resources toward NGOs. For example, the United States channels bilateral aid 

to Haiti—usually in the range of $250 million a year—exclusively to private NGOs. Today, 

there are an estimated three thousand NGOs active in Haiti, carrying out a dizzying array 

of projects that receive support from overseas. This profusion of NGOs and their projects 

has led some, particularly in Haiti, to characterize the country derisively as “a republic of 

NGOs.”

One result of this pattern of overseas support of NGOs is that the Haitian state is virtually absent from delivering services to its citizens and not seen as having a positive impact 

on their lives. The limited presence of state-supported schools exemplifies this point. This 

pattern has given rise to an uncharacteristic dilemma today: the Haitian government is 

expressing its desire to serve citizen needs. This shift away from predation, evident in the 

Preval government’s strategic plans of the past three years, has drawn ample praise among 

donors and other “friends of Haiti.” Whereas the government’s intentions have been commended, its ability to fulfill them has been met with skepticism.

This uncertainty is partly a recognition of the very real weakness of state institutions. 

In part it is a legacy issue from the decades of governments enacting power prerogatives 

and predatory preferences that fueled the aforementioned ineffectiveness. Today’s dilemma 

is that if a Haitian state seeking to reform this track record cannot gain access to significant donor funding, it will be unable either to demonstrate its commitment to action or to 

strengthen its capacity to undertake them, and thereby be condemned to remain absent 

from the lives of its citizens. This absence will stoke not only citizen frustration with and 

distrust of the elected government, but disinterest in or alienation from the democratic 

process writ large. This, in turn, will fuel not only demagoguery, recidivism, and the politics 

of division, but also instability and further economic decline.

Weak capacity juxtaposed with significant resource allocation to nonstate actors also 

has contributed to the same lack of strategic planning, program implementation, and oversight that major donors typically lament. There is no extant mechanism for coordinating the 

significant body of NGO work in Haiti, either to ensure that it complements poverty reduction, disaster mitigation, and economic growth priorities established by the government, or 

to evaluate it. This deficiency has given rise to an environment where private and nongovernmental development actors enact a kaleidoscope of feel-good projects draped in national 

flags that at best offer short-term fixes to longer-term problems.11 International actors 

must support mechanisms for overcoming deficiencies in effectiveness and challenges in 

coordination. They also must assist the Haitian state to become a positive presence in the 

lives of all Haitian citizens. 

Fear and loathing

Perhaps more than any other factor, the fear and loathing engendered by poverty and 

inequality obstruct prospects for the equitable and inclusive development desperately 

One result of this pattern of 

overseas support of NGOs is that 

the Haitian state is virtually 

absent from delivering services 

to its citizens.
9

required for sustained stability and growth. That addressing this obstacle is a prerequisite for 

progress is doubtless; that allocation of international resources necessarily helps the country 

to achieve that precondition is not. This conclusion is drawn from having seen resources 

either allocated to or appropriated by individuals or interest groups on the upper rungs of 

Haiti’s socioeconomic ladder who subsequently apply them toward their own short-term 

interests and gain, not toward the greater national good.

A proverb popular among poor people laments this tendency: “The mules do the work 

while the horses reap the benefits.” In Haitian society there is no doubt about whom the 

mules and horses are. And when benefits continually accrue at the top—as Haiti’s income 

distribution patterns verify—little is achieved to alter the uneven human social, economic, 

and political relationships that are at the root of Haiti’s poverty, instability, and conflict.

The borderline paranoid fear of poor people among society’s upper echelons may be as 

much perception as reality. The story of Sisyphus—adapted to the Haitian context—illustrates the point. In Greek mythology, Sisyphus is condemned for eternity to roll a boulder 

up a hill only to have it roll down again before it reaches the top. In Haiti, Sisyphus, who 

represents the country’s poor and disadvantaged, pushes the rock up a hill whose crest is 

occupied by those at the top of the pecking order. The closer he gets, the more fearful they 

become, so they push Sisyphus and his boulder back to the bottom. Like the Greek mythological figure, Haiti’s Sisyphus renews his climb, only to be pushed back down again and 

again. From the perspective of the Haitian poor, this scenario has been enacted repeatedly 

since 1986, when the ouster of the Duvalier dictatorship brought the thus far unfulfilled 

promise of improved lives with greater opportunity for equity and inclusion. 

Continuing with the metaphor, when those at the top are asked why they are afraid, 

they respond assuredly that if Sisyphus reaches the crest, he will heave his boulder at them. 

But, is it Sisyphus’s intention to hurl his stone? What if, instead of reacting to the poor 

with fear and hostility, those at the top reach out a helping hand, rewarding Sisyphus’s 

determination? Experience demonstrates that Haiti’s poor are gracious to those who reach 

out to them, even though initially they may also be suspicious. Strangers who find themselves in remote villages are welcomed to share an already meager meal, to overnight in the 

nicest—and perhaps only—bed, and to accept as a farewell gift the nicest fruit from the 

garden. Humanitarian workers and others who visit Haiti’s most desperate neighborhoods to 

offer help are warmly welcomed. Have these deep-rooted tendencies among the poor been 

irrevocably transformed into an angry loathing after so many years of being pushed down 

the hill? Is Haiti’s aforementioned rise in crime and rash of kidnappings a manifestation of 

this anger and frustration? Is it too late for reaching out? 

These questions cannot be answered absent an effort of those in the upper echelons 

to set aside fear; to redefine or sublimate personal or group interests to embrace broader 

national interests; and to acknowledge that it is the inhumane living conditions of some 

80 percent of Haiti’s people that pushes the country—and all residing in it—to its tipping 

point. Viewing the improvement of the social and economic conditions of the less fortunate as a plus—and not as a threat—is a sine qua non for sustained stability and progress 

in Haiti. The country’s present precarious state, matched by the attention, support, and 

endorsement Haiti and its leaders are receiving internationally, makes this a propitious time 

to initiate changes to destructive behavioral paradigms. Change will take courage and will. 

It will take leadership. It will also take time. But it must begin. International actors mobilizing and allocating resources to assist Haiti must insist on—or try to catalyze—changes 

in Haiti’s socioeconomic behavioral paradigm that will improve the country’s chances for a 

salubrious future. 
10

Opportunities for Sustained Stability and Growth

At the April 2009 donors’ conference, U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton remarked in 

reference to Haiti that “talent is universal; opportunity is not.” This statement encapsulates 

Haiti’s great challenge: expanding opportunities for a talented people. That Haiti’s people 

are talented is beyond doubt and when given opportunities, those talents blossom. Consider 

the success of ordinary Haitians when they manage to relocate themselves to environments with greater opportunity in the United States, Canada, the Dominican Republic, and 

elsewhere. In the Eastern Caribbean island of Dominica, for example, the more than one 

thousand Haitians who have migrated there over the past decade have seized opportunities 

as farm workers, seamstresses, tailors, hucksters, and entrepreneurs. One recent immigrant, 

a part-time mechanic in Haiti, established Dominica’s first 24-7 road-service company, a 

thriving business valued throughout the 300-square-mile island. Simply stated, Haiti must 

also become an opportunity-laden environment that gives such energy and entrepreneurship a chance to blossom.

But not all opportunities are equal. Like people everywhere, Haitians seek opportunities 

that enable them to care for themselves and their families, improve their material conditions, and achieve personal growth and fulfillment. For most, existing opportunities do 

not allow them to meet—or even realistically work toward—these legitimate aspirations. 

Earning $2 or less a day keeps individuals and families in survival mode, with little prospect 

for advancement. And, as costs of living rise, minimal income improvements barely allow 

individuals and families to keep their heads above the waters of despair, destitution, and 

frustration. Declining remittances add to already desperate conditions. 

To move beyond survival, resources and investments must respond to the current needs 

of Haiti writ large while concurrently boosting its people beyond poverty and inequality 

by eroding obstacles to sustained stability and growth, and to human fulfillment. If not, 

resources and investments may move Haiti away from turmoil and deterioration, but only 

temporarily. There is no single solution that will achieve resolute movement toward continued stability and growth. Indeed, just as there are multiple interwoven manifestations 

of Haiti’s poverty and disparity, and multiple interwoven obstacles in its path, there are 

multiple intertwined approaches toward expanding opportunity required for achieving—

and sustaining—that strongly desired, but heretofore elusive, steadfast movement forward. 

Intertwined approaches to expanding opportunity must alleviate poverty and lessen 

inequality, strengthen institutions and build partnerships, address rural neglect and its 

consequent vulnerabilities, and alter attitudes.

Alleviating poverty and lessening inequality

To bridge disparities in poverty and inequality, efforts must focus on improving access to 

quality education and health care, channeling financial resources toward the poor, freeing 

up capital for grassroots entrepreneurship, expanding wage-employment opportunity, and 

improving prospects for equitable and inclusive rule of law.

Improving education and health care. An essential condition for a brighter future is the 

diminution of imbalances among Haitians in access to quality education and health care. 

Building more schools and health care centers, upgrading existing facilities, and equipping 

them all are a necessary part of the solution. The same holds true for training teachers, 

health care workers, and administrators, and making sure they have the resources required 

to render quality services. These essential needs can be met, at least in part, through the 

allocation of resources mobilized for Haiti’s development, mutual respect among NGOs and 

the private and public sectors working in education and health, and successful coordinaAn essential condition for a 

brighter future is the diminution 

of imbalances among Haitians 

in access to quality education 

and health care.
11

tion among them. Fortification of the education and health ministries of a government 

that takes rendering services seriously is an indispensible part of the solution. Encouraging 

Haitians living overseas to continue—or expand—their support of education and health 

initiatives (in coordination with national plans) is another key element.

Channeling resources toward the poor. But will the intended beneficiaries of these education and health improvements be able to take advantage of them? In view of Haiti’s crushing 

poverty and slipping remittances, and the need for so many of its children to hustle in the 

informal economy or work in fields as a means of making a family’s ends meet, the answer 

is not an automatic yes. It is for this alone that a “best practices” conditional cash transfer 

(CCT) program, similar to Brazil’s Bolsa Familia, Mexico’s Opportunidades, and New York City’s 

Opportunity NYC be adapted and instituted to Haiti’s circumstances. Such a program will 

not only improve the income of the poorest of the poor through cash transfers conditioned 

on their children’s regular, verifiable, and successful participation at school and health clinics, but will also serve as a catalyst for Haiti’s long-neglected investment in building its 

human capital. Additionally, because CCTs are public-sector programs, they provide national, 

regional, and local governments the opportunity—and responsibility—to be present among 

citizens, without a political litmus test, in a positive regard and, as such, to reinforce the 

benefits of democracy and the democratic process. 

A CCT program in Haiti would fuel the urgency to expand and upgrade all components 

of the education and health infrastructure. Conditioning cash transfers on participation 

in quality educational and health programs and then not having those programs available 

would defeat program objectives and exacerbate dissatisfaction through unmet expectations. As a matter of pace and scale, a CCT program can be phased in to match improvements 

of the education and health (physical, human, and material) infrastructure. In regard to 

needed improvements, the Haitian diaspora can play a critical role, particularly in providing 

material and human resources. One example of how this can be done is the Haitian Volunteer in Education Corps (HVEC), developed by the Florida Agency for Voluntary Action in the 

Caribbean and the Americas (FAVACA), whereby Haitian-American upper-level undergraduate or graduate students, or recent college graduates, volunteer in Haiti’s schools under an 

arrangement roughly similar to Peace Corps Volunteers. If eager volunteers are discouraged 

by the burden of federal college loans, payment on them should be deferred or renegotiated 

to facilitate participation in this international public service initiative.12

One prerequisite for successful administration of a CCT program is that its participants 

have a state-issued identification card. Multitudes of Haitians have no such document. 

Expansion of the ongoing Organization of American States voter identification program into 

a national identification documentation system will address this need. 

Increasing capital for grassroots entrepreneurship. Greater access by poor people to 

the capital required for expanding or creating jobs and increasing productive capacity is 

essential to alleviating poverty and lessening inequality from the bottom-up. One vehicle for 

placing resources critical to job creation and increased production at the disposal of Haiti’s 

poor is microcredit. Well-managed microcredit enterprises similar to the vaunted Grameen 

Bank of Bangladesh have begun serving entrepreneurs in Haiti not traditionally served by 

the established credit system and badly served by avaricious money lenders whose interest rate reaches as high as 20 percent per month on unpaid balances. One such program is 

Fonkoze, which in 2007 had 33 branch offices nationwide serving some 159,000 members, 

the vast majority of whom are among—or at least began as being among—the 78 percent 

of Haitians surviving on $2 a day. That year, its loan portfolio was valued at 405 million 

gourdes (approx. $10 million), with an on-time repayment rate of 90–95 percent.
12

Augmented support of such grassroots programs, which serve clients in locales where 

there are no banks, and extended support of microcredit by formal banking institutions 

to both individuals and grassroots civil society groups will provide a significant boost to 

bottom-up entrepreneurship and job creation. While some have argued that microcredit 

may not work the wonders claimed by its most enthusiastic supporters, few doubt that it is 

of great assistance to the entrepreneurial poor.13 Greater access to credit by CCT program 

participants who demonstrate sound management of their cash transfer income also will 

help set loose the talents of heretofore stymied people. Particularly important are loans to 

small farmers or small-farmer organizations. Producers with expanded access to credit at fair 

rates and to agronomic inputs and services and agricultural infrastructure improvements 

(including farm-to-market roads) will considerably expand opportunity in rural areas through 

increased hiring of farm laborers. Concurrently access by small farmers to these resources 

will free up family labor to attend newly established or improved local schools, thus obviating the need to participate in risky restavek arrangements. According to government statistics, an increase of just 10 percent of man-hours on Haiti’s small farms is equivalent to the 

creation of 40,000 jobs nationwide.14

Another vehicle is freeing up what Peruvian economist Hernando De Soto calls “dead 

capital.” De Soto calls it dead because it is located (or hidden) within the informal economy 

and/or tied up by discrimination, prejudice, or red tape, preventing it from being used 

formally to leverage additional capital for investment and growth. In 2000, he identified 

in Haiti $5.2 billion in such capital, shared among 82 percent of the population. Of this 

amount, $3.2 billion was located in rural Haiti. In the late 1990s, this potential resource for 

job creation, production, and economic growth represented four times the total assets of 

Haiti’s 123 largest private formal enterprises, 11 times the total savings and time deposits in 

Haiti’s commercial banks, and 158 times the value of direct foreign investment in Haiti.15

Giving life to dead capital to unleash it for investment in entrepreneurial activities 

throughout Haiti is a large and difficult challenge, and progress will be slow, particularly 

since it must touch upon the sticky areas of resolving ambiguous ownership, including 

land titling, streamlining the incredibly obstacle-laden process for the registration of small 

businesses, and confronting public and private corruption. Nevertheless, in view of the 

infusion of energy and entrepreneurship these unleashed resources would bring to Haiti’s 

long-neglected and resource-starved rural areas and inner-city neighborhoods, and the fresh 

resources that would be attracted from among Haitians living overseas if these sticky issues 

were treated, the trail toward giving dead capital life—tentatively blazed by open-minded 

private-sector leaders in the late 1990s with the support of the first Préval administration—

should be traveled again. The robust and sustained support of all the key actors in Haiti, 

along with the full support of the international community and its resources, will be required 

for a successful journey.

Expanding wage employment. Expanding opportunities for wage employment can also 

help lessen poverty and inequality. One such high-profile initiative for expanding wagedriven jobs comes through the HOPE II Act, a ten-year trade bill for Haiti passed by the 

U.S. Congress in 2006 that provides duty-free access to the U.S. market of Haitian apparel 

products, particularly knit articles, made from fabric of third-country origin. This provision 

makes HOPE II unique, as usually the United States grants duty-free access only when garments are assembled from fabric of U.S. origin. HOPE II has created 11,000 jobs since its 

passage and, according to some supporters, can add up to 100,000 more. 

As with CCTs, however, parallel investments in infrastructure, particularly as they pertain 

to such needs as adequate roads, electricity, and ports, are required to serve the core investment of assembly plants. The speed at which these needs can be met is not clear. Some, such 

Augmented support of such 

grassroots programs, and 

extended support of microcredit 

by formal banking institutions 

will provide a significant boost 

to bottom-up entrepreneurship 

and job creation.
13

as Oxford economist Paul Collier, believe that can happen quickly. Others, including officials 

of multilateral donor agencies, acknowledge the job creating prospects of HOPE II but 

believe there is no quick fix to meeting these needs, particularly when it comes to changing 

customary practices, attaining required new legislation, and mobilizing the resources to put 

all the pieces in place. Regardless of whether wage work in assembly plants is expanded 

sooner or later, it can be a part of the equation of enlarging opportunity in Haiti, but only 

if caution is taken to avoid repeating the mistakes of Haiti’s experience as the “Taiwan of 

the Caribbean” several decades ago. 

One key factor to mitigating mistakes is to ensure that those who find employment in 

factories can move beyond survival mode. This can be achieved through both an increase in 

wages and investment in workers and their families by both the state and private sector.16

Investment by the state can be achieved through the aforementioned expansion of education and health opportunities and the implementation of a CCT program. Private-sector 

investment can be achieved by a sector-wide commitment to, and codification of, a variety 

of socially responsible initiatives that assist employees and their families. Such programs 

include the provision of subsidized midshift meals and transportation, and assistance with 

health care and child care access or costs. Public-private partnerships that provide workers 

and their families with low-cost housing will also help improve their well-being. As a rule, 

factory jobs alone do not go very far toward enabling Haitian workers to meet their triumvirate of legitimate aspirations. Assisting wage workers to move beyond survival mode is 

essential to Haiti’s future well-being. HOPE II may create jobs in Haiti, but it will not alter 

the poverty and inequality that cast Haiti back and forth between turmoil/deterioration and 

stability/progress unless it is complemented by public and private initiatives that improve 

worker well-being.

Improving rule of law. Rule-of-law dysfunctions are well documented as is the fact that 

internationally supported reform initiatives have tended to place a much heavier emphasis—and allocation of resources—on police reform to the detriment of much needed reform 

of and investment in courts and prisons. Less well documented but equally important to 

ensuring an even playing field for improved rule of law is the need to reform Haiti’s antiquated legal codes. Correcting the imbalance in the attention paid to all three legs of the 

rule-of-law stool—police, courts, and prisons—and allocating (or reallocating) resources 

accordingly is achievable, as is reforming archaic codes.17

Ultimate success, however, will depend not as much on where donors allocate resources, 

but on whether or not there is widespread and durable support for reforms from within 

Haiti. Because powerful elements benefit from dysfunction, such support has been dubious. 

Individuals and institutions who are the beneficiaries of dysfunction are not among those 

who will advocate change. On the other hand, those exploited by the failure of the judicial 

system to perform equitably have little power to change the system unless they have forceful and determined allies who want to—and can—lead the charge. It is imperative that 

those who benefit from rule-of-law disparity and dysfunction sublimate their instinctive 

prerogatives to serve and protect their own self and group interests to those that serve 

and protect the greater good. It is equally important that international actors push for and 

insist upon this needed change and steadfastly support allies in Haiti. Otherwise, Haiti will 

continue to wallow in turmoil and human suffering, regardless of any goodwill and resources 

mobilized on its behalf.
14

Strengthening institutions and building partnerships

At the April 2009 donors’ conference, the issues of strengthening weak state institutions 

and providing them with resources required to more robustly render services to citizens were 

key elements both in presentations and in the reference document outlining a new cooperation paradigm for growth and opportunity endorsed by participants. An operational aspect 

of this requirement is greater coordination between donors and the Haitian government. A 

successful state in Haiti would play a dual role as it administers state functions, responsible 

not only for delivering services and contributing to the improvement of citizens’ lives, but 

also for affirming the fruits and advantages of democracy.

Further erosion of talent because of the brain drain beyond and within Haiti’s borders 

will be mitigated through the provision of more resources to state institutions to even the 

salary and benefits playing field, as well as through the potential attraction more robustly 

endowed state institutions may hold for Haitians overseas looking for opportunities to 

return to and work in Haiti. The deficit of human resources in the public sector will not be 

overcome quickly or by any one initiative, particularly as the government expands its programmatic presence nationwide. For that reason, the need for greater coordination between 

nongovernmental and private organizations operating in Haiti and the Haitian government, 

also a key concern of the donors’ conference, is urgently required. 

That coordination should ensure that NGO and private-sector resources are applied in 

conjunction with the Haitian government’s endorsed poverty reduction, disaster mitigation, 

and economic growth plan. In view of current public-sector institutional shortcomings and 

the lingering legacy of past governments’ inabilities or disinterest in applying resources 

toward the greater good of Haiti, a body created along the lines of the Independent Service 

Authority (ISA) proposed by Paul Collier is recommended. An ISA will ensure the coordination, allocation, oversight, regulation, and evaluation of donor resource use as government 

capacity is concurrently strengthened. In turn, as government capacity to undertake programs is strengthened, ISA functions can be transferred to appropriate state entities.

Donors will be challenged to allocate resources to this envisaged entity that will be 

managed, (e.g., the Préval-inspired Presidential Commissions that have emerged as vehicles 

for addressing critical public issues) by capable Haitians from diverse economic, social, 

political, and institutional backgrounds who agree to work together toward a common and 

transparent goal. The proposed independent body would have the authority to reinvest in 

the work of organizations effectively achieving national development goals and to disinvest 

in those unable to meet these goals. This would be an important step toward assuring that 

the most competent organizations have resources required to meet the government’s goals 

and the nation’s needs.

Within a month of the April donors’ conference, former U.S. president Bill Clinton was 

named UN special envoy to Haiti for two years by UN secretary-general Ban Ki-moon. Among 

Clinton’s stated goals are to ensure that donors actually allocate to Haiti the resources 

pledged at the conference; to ensure that resources are used consistent with the government plan; to assist with the coordination among all parties, including NGOs working toward 

Haiti’s well-being; and to engage the Haitian diaspora more effectively in their homeland’s 

development. Robust support of the UN special envoy’s work toward accomplishing these 

goals will be a plus for achieving required outcomes in strengthening institutions and building partnerships.

Addressing rural neglect and consequent vulnerability

Addressing the neglect of rural Haiti and its people will set the stage for the revitalization 

of agriculture, the renaissance of rural communities and their economies, and the rehabiliCoordination should ensure that 

NGO and private-sector resources 

are applied in conjunction 

with the Haitian government’s 

endorsed poverty reduction, 

disaster mitigation, and 

economic growth plan.
15

tation of Haiti’s battered environment. As suggested earlier, decentralized investment that 

improves access to education, health, credit, and government services, and that improves 

the productive infrastructure—roads, irrigation systems, crop storage facilities, seeds, 

tools, fertilizers, technical assistance—will all contribute to this end. These investments 

will pay off through job creation, increased harvests, better yields, and improved natural 

resource management. A revitalized rural Haiti, in turn, will improve the country’s capacity 

to feed itself, thereby lessening its vulnerability to externally driven cost-of-living shocks, 

and its overall security. Enhanced rule of law and equitable access to justice by all will 

provide incentives for improved land management and greater production. If only for all 

of these reasons, resources mobilized internationally must—as a priority—be invested in 

addressing Haiti’s rural challenges. 

But there is an even more compelling reason for investing in rural Haiti, particularly 

at the level of rehabilitating its degraded environment as a key ingredient in moving the 

country beyond vulnerability to external shocks toward irreversible progress. Revitalizing 

the landscape is essential for protecting all investments in poverty alleviation and economic 

growth. Factories and small businesses located on Haiti’s coastlines and alluvial plains, poor 

people crowded into those locations and elsewhere, and investments in infrastructure and 

agriculture are all equally vulnerable to destruction by raging torrents of rain, mud, and 

rocks tumbling down denuded hillsides. Without a focus on environmental rehabilitation, 

resources allocated to Haiti from international sources run the risk of being literally washed 

out to sea.18

Robust support of the postdisaster needs assessment analysis developed by the Haitian 

government in collaboration with donors and integrated into the aforementioned new 

paradigm is essential to address vulnerabilities and risks. One of the study’s central recommendations is to focus investments on the fifteen watersheds most affected by the storms 

of 2008, at a cost of approximately $8.4 million per watershed. Top-down watershed rehabilitation is an integral part of—and will perfectly complement—the bottom-up, disparitylessening poverty alleviation and economic growth initiatives outlined herein.

An essential component of environmental rehabilitation is identifying and applying viable alternatives to wood and charcoal as Haiti’s principal energy sources. This need is obvious; how to go about meeting it is not. Ideas abound, including introducing or expanding 

alternative energy sources and technologies such as bottled gas and solar and wind power; 

using waste materials to make charcoal briquettes; establishing hillside reserves for quick 

growing, harvestable trees; and importing charcoal. Most likely, a combination of initiatives 

will be required. Whatever solutions are found viable, they should incorporate the involvement of the legions of poor people who make a meager living through their participation in 

today’s wood/charcoal industry. In other words, it is important to “do no harm” to the poor 

who have little choice but to eke out a livelihood in the wood/charcoal sector.

The desired endgame is that Haiti’s natural environment be rehabilitated. That compelling endgame will not come about short of an urgent, focused, and sustained unified 

national and international effort. 

Altering attitudes

When individuals or groups among the privileged and powerful band together against real 

or perceived threats from below, or discount the legitimate aspirations of the poor, not only 

do they fail to sublimate self or group interests to those of the greater good, but they also 

demonstrate an apparent fear that improvement at the bottom will erode resources and 

status at the top. In Haiti, this seems particularly true among those with the power to guard 

access to and control over the resources that have propelled them to a higher status than 
16

their neighbors. As a result, any image of a rising tide lifting all boats is rejected in favor of 

a conviction that improvement among the poor comes at the expense of the rich.

A prerequisite for effective resource allocation and improving Haiti’s future is overcoming 

attitudinal obstacles among Haitians toward supporting improvements among poor people, 

as measured by greater inclusion, equity, and opportunities to fulfill personal aspirations. 

Otherwise, “the mules [will continue to] work and the horses [will continue to] reap the benefits” and Haiti will continue along its path of turmoil and unacceptable human suffering, 

regardless of international concern, commitment, and resource mobilization. It is essential 

that international actors recognize this change as imperative for Haiti’s long term stability 

and progress, and use their influence as needed to attain it. 

Expanding opportunities through a national civic service corps

Few initiatives have the potential to create mammoth and diverse opportunities and to 

concurrently address Haiti’s vulnerabilities, both to external shocks or to the frustration and 

demoralization that make so many of its citizens fodder for the “spoiler class” of political 

demagogues, narcotics traffickers, and gang leaders. The potential is offered through an 

article of the Haitian Constitution that has garnered little attention and even less action. 

Article 52-3 of Haiti’s 1987 constitution states: “Compulsory civic service for both sexes is 

established. The terms thereof shall be set by law.” Both Prime Minister Michèle Pierre-Louis 

and her immediate predecessor, Jacques Edouard Alexis, have expressed interest in enacting 

this article of the constitution through the creation of a law to establish a national civic 

service corps. Alexis saw this as a much-needed “bold endeavor,” and Pierre-Louis called for 

the creation of such an entity at her confirmation hearings in August 2008. 

The corps is envisaged as a Haitian variant of the U.S. Depression-era Works Progress 

Administration (WPA), which gave birth to such job-creating entities as the Civilian Conservation Corps. As envisaged, much like WPA programs of the past, it will create a variety of 

“shovel ready” jobs to rehabilitate the country’s severely damaged natural environment; to 

rehabilitate, improve, and build the infrastructure that supports productive investment in 

both rural and urban areas; and to improve Haiti’s tourism infrastructure. Diverse internationally funded programs, principally under the auspices of NGOs and private entities, are 

engaged in a variety of initiatives aimed at creating labor-intensive jobs. Greater coordination with the Haitian government could gather these initiatives into a more unified effort 

and make sure they address priority needs for poverty alleviation, environmental rehabilitation, and economic growth. The envisaged civic service corps would also serve a long-term 

disaster preparedness and response function.

The corps would be composed of urban and rural males and females between the ages of 

seventeen and twenty-five, providing them opportunities for gainful employment while also 

allowing them to learn job skills and work attitudes they can apply beyond their participation in the program. Wages, paid in cash, will further stimulate localized economic activity. 

If fully funded, the program would also provide a set-aside stipend that participants could 

use for reintegration or investment following the completion of their service. As an incentive to increase Haiti’s agricultural productivity, land, credit, and technical assistance could 

be made available to program participants seeking to remain in the rural locality where their 

service was undertaken. 

This public sector initiative will draw on the participation of a variety of ministries, 

ranging from those focused on the environment, youth and civic action, and agriculture; 

to tourism, public works, and planning. In rural areas, work camps would house corps members, providing shelter and meals, and serve as a venue for educational activities, including 

literacy, math, and civics classes. International volunteers could work alongside Haitians in 

The corps will create a variety 

of “shovel ready” jobs to 

rehabilitate the country’s 

severely damaged natural 

environment; to rehabilitate, 

improve, and build the 

infrastructure that supports 

productive investment in both 

rural and urban areas; and 

to improve Haiti’s tourism 

infrastructure.
17

rebuilding the country. The program would provide young Haitians an opportunity to gain a 

stake in the future of their country, along with a sense of accomplishment and identification 

with a larger whole. Successful entry-level participants in the program could be promoted 

to a position of greater responsibility for a second tour. 

The challenge of addressing the aspirations of Haiti’s young population is essential to 

the country’s ability to move away—and stay away—from turmoil and deterioration. In 

2005, 42.6 percent of all Haitians were younger than fifteen years of age; 71.1 percent were 

twenty-nine or younger. These youngsters have come of age with little or no direct experience with either the Duvalier dictatorship or the exhilaration and hope experienced by most 

when it was overthrown. Rather, they have grown up in a society characterized by deepening poverty, fear and loathing, episodic turmoil and violence, and distrust of government, 

which largely has failed to improve their lives. Increasingly alienated from a society that has 

“robbed us of our right to dream,” as one Haitian youngster told this author, Haiti’s youth 

is a simmering storm of unrest and instability. Providing opportunities for youngsters is 

another of Haiti’s great challenges. A robust and sustained civic service corps will contribute 

enormously to addressing this need. 

The initiative will move along a dual track: one to create the requisite law and seek its 

passage in parliament, the other to draw upon technical assistance to create the program’s 

framework and operational procedures and to prepare key personnel. The envisaged corps 

will be phased in at a pace and scale that matches available resources. Big problems call for 

bold initiatives. In view of the enormous prospects for this initiative to address multiple 

obstacles and challenges and the government’s apparent interest in prioritizing it, it is 

essential that resources mobilized for Haiti provide the required support for it. 

Conclusion

Haiti faces considerable obstacles to attaining irreversible stability and growth. Extreme 

disparities and the exclusion of most Haitians to opportunities required to meet basic needs 

and fulfill legitimate aspirations have been at the root of the country’s history of human 

suffering and conflict. Today, they fuel turmoil and feed deterioration. More than anything, 

Haiti must attend to its unacceptable suffering and cycle of conflict so it can move away—

and stay away—from a disastrous abyss. Greater effort among all Haitians to sublimate their 

short-term self or group interests toward those of the greater national good is an essential 

step in that regard.

The international community can help Haiti take more steps, but not simply by mobilizing and allocating resources. To assist Haiti achieve and sustain progress, international 

actors must support the more effective use of resources to help the country and all of its 

people achieve greater opportunities for equitable and inclusive development. It will be 

helpful if international actors keep in mind the proverb of the mules and the horses. In the 

end, when the mule does the work, he must get his fair share of the benefits. This, after all, 

is the essence not just of stability and development, but also of democracy. 

19

Notes

1. Government of Haiti, “Pour Réussir le Saut Qualitatif: Document de Stratégie Nationale pour la Croissance et la 

Réduction de la Pauvreté (2008–10)” [To Achieve a Qualitative Leap: The National Strategy Document for Growth 

and Poverty Reduction], November 2007. 

2. Government of Haiti, “Rapport d’évaluation des besoins après désastre Cyclones Fay, Gustav, Hanna et Ike” 

[Hurricanes Fay, Gustav, Hanna, and Ike Postdisaster Needs Assessment Report], November 2008; Paul Collier, 

“Haiti: From Natural Catastrophe to Economic Security—A Report for the Secretary-General of the United 

Nations,” December 27, 2008; Government of Haiti, “Vers un Nouveau Paradigme de Cooperation” [Toward a New 

Paradigm of Coopération], April 2009.

3. Maureen Taft-Morales, “Haiti: Current Conditions and Congressional Concerns,” Congressional Research Service 

Report for Congress, May 5, 2009.

4. “Weighed Down by Disasters,” Economist, February 12, 2009. 

5. Government of Haiti, “Pour Résussir le Saut Qualitatif.”

6. Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development data, cited in Sakiko Fukuda-Parr, “Empowering People: 

Human Rights Review of Haiti’s Poverty Reduction and Growth Strategies: An Issues Paper” (unpublished draft, 

The New School, New York, April 2009). 

7. Francis Fukuyama, “Poverty, Inequality and Democracy: The Latin American Experience,” Journal of Democracy 19, 

no. 4 (October 2008).

8. Jacqueline Charles, “Crop Fields Hold Hope in Haiti,” Miami Herald, April 21, 2008.

9. J.F. Hornbeck, “The Haitian Economy and the Hope Act,” Congressional Research Service Report for Congress 

RL34687, October 1, 2008.

10. Frances Robles and Jacqueline Charles, “Hurricane Victims Left Hungry in Caribbean,” Miami Herald,

September 17, 2008; Government of Haiti, “Rapport d’evaluation des besoins.”

11. Robert Zoellick, “Securing Development” (remarks at the United States Institute of Peace conference titled 

“Passing the Baton,” Washington, D.C., January 8, 2009).

12. Jonathan D. Glater, “New Plan Ties Reduced College Loan Payments to Income,” New York Times, June 29, 2009.

13. “Economics Focus: A Partial Marvel,” Economist, July 18, 2009.

14. Government of Haiti, “Toward a New Paradigm of Cooperation,” Conference on the Economic and Social 

Development of Haiti, Washington, D.C., April 14, 2009.

15. Hernando De Soto, The Mystery of Capital (New York: Basic Books, 2000), 253.

16. An increase of Haiti’s daily minimum wage from 70 gourdes (approx. $1.80) to 500 gourdes (approx. $5) is the 

focus of legislative action, intense political jockeying, and street demonstrations as this report is being written.

17. For recommendations, see Hans Joerg Albrecht, Louis Aucoin and Vivienne O’Connor, “Building the Rule of Law 

in Haiti: New Laws for a New Era,” USIPeace Briefing, United States Institute of Peace, August 2009, and two 

reports of the International Crisis Group: “Haiti: Justice Reform and the Security Crisis,” Latin America/Caribbean 

Briefing No. 14, January 31, 2007, and “Haiti: Prison Reform and the Rule of Law,” Latin America/Caribbean 

Briefing No. 15, May 4, 2007. 

18. For an elaboration of this point, see International Crisis Group, “Haiti: Saving the Environment, Preventing 

Instability and Conflict” Latin America and Caribbean Briefing No. 20, April 28, 2009.
Of Related Interest

•	 Building the Rule of Law in Haiti: New Laws for a New Era by Hans Joerg Albrecht, Louis 

Aucoin and Vivienne O’Connor (USIPeace Briefing, August 2009)

•	 Haiti: Is Economic Security Possible if Diplomats and Donors Do Their Part by Robert Perito 

(USIPeace Briefing, May 2009)

•	 Toward the End of Poverty in Haiti by Robert Maguire (USIPeace Briefing, December 2008)

•	 Haiti: Confronting the Gangs of Port-au-Prince by Michael Dziedzic and Robert Perito (Special 

Report, September 2008) 

•	 Haiti, Hope for the Future by Robert Perito (Special Report, June 2007)

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