### IN THE COURT OF CRIMI NAL AP PEALS OF TENNES SEE AT JAC KSON

RON NIE B RA DF IELD v. TO NY PA RKE R, WAR DEN

Direc t Appeal from the Circ uit Court forLaud erdale County

No. 6254 Joe H. Walker, III, Judge

No. W2008-02231-C CA-R 3-HC - Filed June 10, 2009

The pe titioner, Ronnie Br adfie ld, appea ls the L auder dale County Circuit Court’s summary

dismiss al of his petition for writ of ha beas c orpus. The State ha s filed a motion reque sting that this court aff irm the lower c ourt’s denia l of relief pursuant to R u l e 20 of the Rules of the Court of Criminal Appea ls. Bec ause the petitioner has f ail ed t o es t ab l i s h that his conviction is void or his sentence illega l, we conclude that the S tate’s moti on is well-take n. Acc ording ly
, we affirm the lower cour t’s summary dismiss al of the pe tition.

Te nn. R . A pp. P . 3 App e al a s o f R igh t; Judg me nt of th e Ci r c uit

Co ur t A ff

ir me d Pur sua nt to Rul e 20 , R ule s o f C our t o f C r im ina l A ppe als

A LA N E. G LE NN , J.
, de liv e re d the op ini on of the c ourt , i n wh ich J. C. M C L I N and C AM I LLE R. M C M ULLEN , JJ., joined.

Ronnie Bradfield, W hiteville, Tennesse e, Pro Se.

Rob e rt E. Coo pe r, Jr
., At torne y Ge ne ra l a nd Re po rt e r; a ndLa c y W ilb e r, As sis ta nt A tto rn e y G e ne ra l, for the a ppellee, State of

Tenne ssee.

M EM OR AN DU M OP IN ION

I n M ar c h 1 9 9 3
, th e p e ti ti o n e r w a s c o n v ic te d o f thr e e c o u n ts o f a tt e mp te d s e c ond deg ree

mur de r, Cla ss B fe lon ie s, ste mmi ng fr om his sh oo tin g a t po lic e of fi c e rs wh e n th e of

fi c e rs we nt t o investigate alleg ations that the petitioner had ma de threatening calls to the direc tor of the police and the may or. See State v. Ronnie B radf ield, No. 02C01-9306-CR-00112, 199 5 W L 4 2 2 7 8 7 , at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App. July

19, 1995), per

m. to appeal denied (Tenn. Sept. 3, 1996). Apparently , as he was be ing se ar ch ed i n the detention ar ea upon his c onviction, the petitioner re trieved a pistol t hat had bee n tucked in h is shoe and thre atene d to shoot the deputy . The pe titioner was subdued a fter

a sc uf fl e and , a s a

re su lt o f h is a c tio ns , w a s c on vic te d in Se pte mbe r 1 995 of, amo ng ot her thi ng s, attempted first deg ree murder, a C lass A felony

. See S tate v. B radf ield, 973 S.W .2d 937, 941 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1997).-2-

I n Augus t 20 08 , th e pe tit ion e r f iled a pet it ion f

or ha be a s c or pu s r e lie f i n th e L a

ud e rd a le County Circuit Court, arg ui n g t h at he wa s illega lly sentenc ed to 9 y ear s instead of 7.2 y ear s as an

e sp e c ia lly mit ig a te d o ff

e nd e r fo r e a c h of his thr e e a tte mpt e d se c on d d e g re e mur de r c on vic tio ns in 1993. He a lso arg ued that he w as illeg ally sentenc ed to six ty

y ear s as a pe rsistent offe nder f or the

a tte mpt e d f

ir st d e g re e mur de r c on vic tio n in 19 95 . H e a sse rt e d th a t hi s se nt ences vi olat e d h is constitutional rights as e lucidated in State v. Gomez, 239 S.W.3d 733 (Tenn. 2007) , beca use they

wer e enha

nced ba sed on judicially -dete rmined fa cts. He a lso asserted that his sentences w ere contra ry to the S entenc ing Act and, therefor e, pursua nt to McConnell v. St ate, 12 S.W.3d 795 (Tenn. 2000), must be vac ated beca use the trial court ha d no jurisdiction to sentence him in contravention of the sentenc ing statute. The ha beas c ourt summarily

dismiss ed the pe titioner’s petition, finding that t h e p et i tioner had f

ailed to demonstrate that his convictions or sentenc es we re void. The petitioner appe aled.

Whether the petitioner is e ntitled to habea s corpus relief is a question of law. Summers v. State, 212 S.W .3d 251, 255 (Tenn. 2007); Har t v. State, 21 S.W .3d 901, 903 (Tenn. 2000) . As such,

our r e vie w i s de novo with no presumption of corr ectne ss g iven to the trial court’s findi n gs and conclusions. I d.

I t is we ll- e sta

bli sh e d in Te nn e sse e that th e re me dy pr ov ide d b y

a wr it o f h a

be a s c or pu s is limit ed in scope and may only be invoked whe re the judgme nt is void or the petitioner’s term of imprisonment has expi red. F aulkner v. State, 226 S.W .3d 358, 361 (Tenn. 2007) ; State v. Rit chie, 20 S.W. 3 d 6 2 4
, 6 2 9 ( T e n n

. 2 0 0 0 ) ; St a te v

. D a v e np o rt, 9 8 0 S. W. 2 d 4 0 7
, 4 0 9 ( T e n n

. Cr im. App. 1998). The judg ment of a c ourt of g ener al j urisdiction is conclusive and presumed to be valid, and such a judg ment can only be impeac hed if the r ecor d aff irmatively

shows t h at the re nderingcourt was without persona l or subj ect matter jurisdiction. Arc her v. State, 851 S.W .2d 157, 162 (Tenn. 1993). A void, as oppose d to a voidable, judg ment is “one that is fa cially invalid beca use the c ourt did not have the statutory

authority to rende r such judg ment.” Summers, 212 S.W .3d at 256 (c iting Dy kes v. C o m p t o n , 978 S.W .2d 528, 529 (Tenn. 1998) ). A pe titioner bear s the burden of establishing a

void judgment or illega l confine ment by a pre pondera nce of the evidenc e. Wy att v. State , 2 4 S. W.3 d 3 19 , 3 22 (T e nn . 2 00 0) . F ur the rm or e , w he n “ a

ha be as corp us pet iti on

fa ils to

e sta bli shtha t a jud g me nt i s v oid , a tr ia l c ourt may dis mis s the pe tit ion wi tho ut a he ari ng .” Sum me rs , 212 S.W .3d at 260 (c iting Hog an v. Mills, 168 S.W .3d 753, 755 (Tenn. 2005) ).

The pe titioner argues that his 1993 and 1995 sente nces a re i l leg al bec ause the trial court

e nh a nc e d h i s s e n t e n c e s b a s e d

o nj u d i c i a l l y

- d e t e r

m i n e d f a c t s , w h i c h i s c o n t r ar

y t o t h e U. S. Constit uti o n as interpre ted in Appre ndi, Blake ly , and Cunning ham. These case s require that any fac t, other than that of a

prior convic tion, used to enhanc e a de fenda nt’s sentenc e be pr oven to a jury bey ond a re asonabl e d o ubt. The petitioner c ites State v. Christine H. Osborne, No. M2006-01301-CCA-R3-CD, 2008 WL1822443 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr . 23, 2008), per m. to appeal de n i e d ( T e n n

. S e p t

. 2 9
, 2 0 0 8 )
, f o r t h e p r o p o s i t i o nth a th e i s e n t i t l e d t o r e s e n t e n c i n g b e c a

u s e “ thi s court doe s ‘now’ in fa ct adhe re to the U .S. Supreme Court’s dec isions.”-3-

The pe titioner’s relianc e on Osborne is mispl ace d as the defe ndant in O sborne was sente nced afte r Appre ndi and B lakely , wher eas the petitioner’s c ases became final we ll before either A pprendi

or B lake ly wa s de c ide d. “ Ap pr e nd i/B lake ly ty pe iss ue s re g ard ing a llo c a tin g fa c t- fi nd inga uth or ity to judge s during sentenc ing a re not in the narrow class of procedura l rules that apply retroa ctively .” Uly sses Richardson v. State, No. W2006-01856-CCA-R3-PC, 2007 WL 151 5 1 6 2, at *2 (Te nn. Cr im. Ap p. May

24 , 2 00 7) , p e rm . to a

pp e a l de nie d ( Te nn . Se pt. 17 , 2 00 7)

. Mo re ov e r, e ve n a va lid Blakely claim rende rs a conviction voidable, not void, and is thus non-cog nizable in habeas c orpus revie w. Richardson, 2007 WL1515162, at *3.

The pe titioner also argues, as we understand, that his sentences violate the SentencingAct be c a us e (1 ) i n 1 99 3 h e sh ou ld have be e n se nte nc e d a s an e sp e c ia lly mit ig ate d o ff

e nd e r, and

(2 ) i n 19 95 he did

no t me e t th e qu a lif

ic a tio ns fo r s e nte nc inga s a pe rs ist e nt o ff

e nd e r. He c ite s Mc Conne ll, 12 S.W .3d at 795, for the proposition that the trial court has no au t h o ri t y to act contr ary to the SentencingAct. With reg ard to his 1993 sentenc es, t he petiti oner’ s contention appears to be that he should have be en sente nced a s an espec ially mitigated of

fende r bec ause he did not have any prior

c o n v i c t i o n s

. T h e a

b s e n c e o f a p r i o r c r i m i n a l h i s t o r

y may make a defe ndant elig ible for se ntencing

as an e specia lly

mitigated of

fende r if the tria l cour t fi n d s , in addition to the lack of prior felony convictions, that mitigating , but no enhanc ement, fa ctors ar e applica ble. Tenn. C ode Ann. § 40 -3 5- 10 9. Ho we ve r, the re c or d d oe s n ot i nd ic a te wh a t mi tig a tin g fa c tor s, if any , w e re a

pp lic a ble in the petitioner’s c ase. The ref ore, e ven if the pe titioner’s alleg atio n that he wa s qualified for
espec ially mitigated of

fende r status wer e true , proof of such status would requir e extrinsic evidence rende ring his j u d g ments of conviction potentially voidable rather than void. See Summers, 212 S.W .3d at 256. Moreove r, it is appare nt that the trial court f ound at least one e nhance ment fac tor g ive n th e pe tit ion e r r e c e ive d nin e -y e ar se nte nc e s ins te a d o f t he min imum in

Rang e Iof

e ig ht y e ars , thus neg ating his eligibility for se ntencingas an e specia lly mitigated of

fende r.
The pe titioner’s argument that he wa s sentence d contra ry to the Sentencing Act on his 1995 conviction bec aus e he did not have the re quisite number of prior convictions to be consider ed a persistent off

ender overlooks that ther e are two alternative subsections that define a per sistent offe nder. Te nnessee Code Annotated section 40-35-107( a)( 2) st ates that a defenda nt is a persistent offe nder if he or she ha s rec eived “ any combination of three (3) Cl ass A or Class B felony convictions if the def

endant’ s conviction offe nse is a Class A or B felony .” He re, the petitioner had thr e e pr ior

Cla ss B fe lony

c on vic tio ns fr om 1 99 3 a

nd his c on vic tio n o ff

e ns e in 1 99 5 w a s a

Cla ss A felony . Thus, he qualifie d for se ntencingas a pe rsistent offe nder, a nd the trial cour

t d i d not act outside its authority

under the SentencingAct.

Be cause the petitioner’s ha beas c orpus petition doe s not state a cog nizable claim for r elief,

we c onclude that the tr ial court did not err in summarily dismiss ing the petition. When an opinion would have no pr ece dential value, the Court of Criminal Appe als may aff irm the judgme nt or

action of the t ri al co u rt by

memorandum opinion when the judgme nt is render ed or the action take n in a
proce edi n g w it

h o u t a ju r y an d s u c h ju d g me n t o r

a c ti o nis n o t a

d e te r mi n a ti o no f

g u il t, an d

the

e vid e nc e do e s n ot p re po nd e rate a g a ins t th e fi nd ing of the tr ia l judg e

. Se e Te nn . Ct . Cr im. Ap p. R. 20. We conclude that this case satisfies the criteria of Rule 20. Acc ording ly
, it is order ed that the-4-

State’s motion is g rante d. The judg ment of the trial c ourt is affir med in acc ordanc e with Rule 20, Rul e s o f t he Court of Cr imi na l App e a ls.

___________________________________ ALAN E. G LENN, JUD GE