alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### Dwayne GRAY, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. CUYAHOGA COUNTY SHERIFF’S DEPARTMENT, et al., Defendants, James FUERST, et al., Defendants-Appellees.

No. 97-1379.

United States Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit.

Oct. 23, 1998.

Before: NELSON, BOGGS, and CLAY, Circuit Judges.

ORDER

The court having received a petition for rehearing en banc, and the petition having been circulated not only to the original panel members but also to all other active judges of this court, and no judge of this court having requested a vote on the suggestion for rehearing en banc, the petition for rehearing has been referred to the original panel.

The panel has further reviewed the petition for rehearing and concludes that the issues raised in the petition were fully considered upon the original submission and decision of the case. Accordingly, the petition is denied.

However, the panel has amended one portion of the opinion. In the paragraph beginning on page 8 and carrying over to page 9 of the opinion, the material following the long dash in line 16 should be deleted and the following text inserted:

“... the trier of fact could find that the failure by Fuerst and Ussery to ascertain that they were holding the wrong person violated Gray’s due-process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. While the cases discussed in the two previous paragraphs at times speak in terms of a variety of constitutional provisions, it appears to us more precise to follow the language of the Supreme Court in *Baker*and inquire whether a detention of this length will deprive the accused of “liberty without due process of law.” *Baker[ v. McCollan],*443 U.S.[ 137], 145[, 99 S.Ct. 2689, 61 L.Ed.2d 433 (1979)]. On remand, therefore, the principal question for the trier of fact will be whether Fuerst and/or Ussery acted with something akin to deliberate indifference in failing to ascertain that the Dwayne Gray they had in custody was not the person wanted by the Michigan authorities on the outstanding parole-violation warrant. See, *e.g., Romero v. Fay,*45 F.3d 1472, 1480-81 (10th Cir.1995); *Cannon v. Macon County,*1 F.3d 1558, 1564 (11th Cir.1993); *Sanders v. English,*950 F.2d 1152, 1162 (5th Cir.1992). This question will require resolution whether the defendants proceed on the merits, or whether they reassert the defense of qualified immunity. See *Jackson v. Hoylman,*933 F.2d 401, 403 (6th Cir.1991)(recognizing that same substantive standard applies for both qualified-immunity and merits purposes).”
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 21-6492

NAPOLEON J. RANKIN-BEY,

Petitioner - Appellant,

v.

STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA,

Respondent - Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina, at 

Greensboro. Thomas D. Schroeder, Chief District Judge. (1:20-cv-01129-TDS-JEP)

Submitted: August 19, 2021 Decided: August 24, 2021

Before GREGORY, Chief Judge, FLOYD, and RUSHING, Circuit Judges.

Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Napoleon J. Rankin Bey, Appellant Pro Se. 

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
2

PER CURIAM:

Napoleon J. Rankin Bey seeks to appeal the district court’s order accepting the 

recommendation of the magistrate judge and dismissing Rankin Bey’s 28 U.S.C. § 2254 

petition. We dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction because the notice of appeal was 

not timely filed. 

In civil cases, parties have 30 days after the entry of the district court’s final 

judgment or order to note an appeal, Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1)(A), unless the district court 

extends the appeal period under Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(5) or reopens the appeal period under 

Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(6). “[T]he timely filing of a notice of appeal in a civil case is a 

jurisdictional requirement.” Bowles v. Russell, 551 U.S. 205, 214 (2007).

The district court entered its order on January 29, 2021. Rankin Bey filed the notice 

of appeal on March 23, 2021.

*

 Because Rankin Bey failed to file a timely notice of appeal 

or to obtain an extension or reopening of the appeal period, we dismiss the appeal. 

We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are 

adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the 

decisional process.

DISMISSED

* For the purpose of this appeal, we assume that the date appearing on the notice of 

appeal is the earliest date Rankin Bey could have delivered the notice to prison officials 

for mailing to the court. Fed. R. App. P. 4(c)(1); Houston v. Lack, 487 U.S. 266, 276

(1988).
Before the First Division,

June 5, 1952

No. 56744.

protest 182103-K *(New*York).

#### Wm. V. Schmidt Co., Inc. *v.*United States,

Opinion by

Oliver, C. J.

In accordance with stipulation of counsel that the merchandise consists of synthetic stones the same in all material respects as those the subject of *S. Nathan & Co., Inc.*v. *United States*(37 C. C. P. A. 99, C. A. D. 426), the claim at 10 percent under paragraph 1528 was sustained.
# C_2016410EN.01003901.xml

| 7.11.2016 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 410/39 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

7.11.2016

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 410/39

---

Order of the Civil Service Tribunal (3rd Chamber) of 15 June 2016 — Poniskaitis v Commission

(Case F-152/12) (1)

1

((Civil service - Officials - Pensions - Transfer of national pension rights - Proposals concerning additional pensionable years - Act not having an adverse effect - Inadmissibility of the action - Application for a decision not going to the substance of the case - Article 83 of the Rules of Procedure))

(2016/C 410/70)

Language of the case: French

Parties

Parties

Applicant: Jonas Poniskaitis (Brussels, Belgium) (represented by: initially D. de Abreu Caldas, A. Coolen, J.-N. Louis, É. Marchal and S. Orlandi, lawyers, then D. de Abreu Caldas, J.-N. Louis and S. Orlandi, lawyers, subsequently J.-N. Louis and S. Orlandi, lawyers, and, lastly, J.-N. Louis, lawyer)

Applicant:

Defendant: European Commission (represented by: initially D. Martin and G. Gattinara, Agents, then J. Currall and G. Gattinara, Agents, subsequently G. Gattinara, Agent, and, lastly, G. Gattinara and F. Simonetti, Agents)

Defendant:

Re:

Re:

Application for annulment of the decision to calculate on the basis of the new GIP the amounts to be credited of the applicant’s pension rights acquired before he entered the service of the Commission.

Operative part of the order

Operative part of the order

| 1. | The action is dismissed. |
| --- | --- |

1.

The action is dismissed.

| 2. | Mr Jonas Poniskaitis shall bear his own costs and pay the costs incurred by the European Commission. |
| --- | --- |

2.

Mr Jonas Poniskaitis shall bear his own costs and pay the costs incurred by the European Commission.

---

(1)  OJ C 71, 9/3/2013, p. 30.

1

---
EXHIBIT 99.1
------------

                           CERTIFICATION OF PRESIDENT
                         AND PRINCIPAL FINANCIAL OFFICER

I, Harry Chauhan, certify that:

1. I have  reviewed  this  quarterly  report on Form  10-QSB of Global  Wireless
Satellite Networks (USA), Inc.;

2. Based on my  knowledge,  this  quarterly  report  does not contain any untrue
statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact  necessary to make
the statements made, in light of the  circumstances  under which such statements
were made, not  misleading  with respect to the period covered by this quarterly
report;

3.  Based  on my  knowledge,  the  financial  statements,  and  other  financial
information  included in this quarterly  report,  fairly present in all material
respects the financial  condition,  results of operations  and cash flows of the
registrant as of, and for, the periods presented in this quarterly report;

4. I am responsible for  establishing  and maintaining  disclosure  controls and
procedures  (as  defined  in  Exchange  Act Rules  13a-14  and  15d-14)  for the
registrant and have:

      a)  designed  such  disclosure  controls  and  procedures  to ensure  that
      material   information   relating  to  the   registrant,   including   its
      consolidated  subsidiaries,  is made  known to us by others  within  those
      entities, particularly during the period in which this quarterly report is
      being prepared;

      b) evaluated the effectiveness of the registrant's disclosure controls and
      procedures  as of a date  within 90 days prior to the filing  date of this
      quarterly report (the "Evaluation Date"); and

      c)  presented  in  this  quarterly   report  my   conclusions   about  the
      effectiveness  of the  disclosure  controls  and  procedures  based on our
      evaluation as of the Evaluation Date;

5. I have disclosed,  based on our most recent  evaluation,  to the registrant's
auditors and the audit committee of registrant's  board of directors (or persons
performing the equivalent functions):

      a) all  significant  deficiencies  in the design or  operation of internal
      controls which could adversely affect the registrant's  ability to record,
      process,  summarize and report  financial data and have identified for the
      registrant's auditors any material weaknesses in internal controls; and

      b) any fraud,  whether or not material,  that involves management or other
      employees  who  have  a  significant  role  in the  registrant's  internal
      controls; and


<PAGE>


6. I have  indicated  in  this  quarterly  report  whether  or  not  there  were
significant  changes  in  internal  controls  or in  other  factors  that  could
significantly  affect internal controls subsequent to the date of my most recent
evaluation,   including  any  corrective  actions  with  regard  to  significant
deficiencies and material weaknesses.


Date: November 18, 2004


/s/ Harry Chauhan
---------------------------
Name: Harry Chauhan
Title: President and Chief Financial Officer
EXHIBIT 32

                             CERTIFICATE PURSUANT TO
                             18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
                             AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection with the amended Quarterly Report of Advanced Technologies Group,
Ltd. (the "Company") on Form 10-QSB/A for the period ended April 30, 2006 as
filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission (the "Report"), each of the
undersigned, in the capacities and on the dates indicated below, hereby
certifies pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906
of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

     1.   the Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or
          15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

     2.   the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all
          material respects, the financial condition and result of operations of
          the Company.


Date: February 12, 2008       By: /s/ Abel Raskas
                                 ---------------------------------
                                 Abel Raskas
                                 President



Date: February 12, 2008       By: /s/ Alex Stelmak
                                 ---------------------------------
                                 Alex Stelmak
                                 Chief Financial Officer
#### CITY OF EDGEWOOD, Appellant, v. MCR DEVELOPMENT COMPANY, Ronald W. Black, and Holden Cove, Inc., Appellees.

No. 99-331.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.

June 18, 1999.

John A. Leklem of John A. Leklem, P.A., Orlando, for Appellant.

Steven G. Mason, P.A., Orlando and H. Franklin Robbins, Jr., P.A., Orlando, for Appellees.

Joel D. Prinsell, Sr. and Alan Lawson, Assistant County Attorneys, Orlando, Ami-cus Curiae for Orange County.

COBB, J.

The appellant, City of Edgewood, appeals the dissolution of a temporary in*589junction it had obtained against MCR Development Company. Edgewood had stopped MCR’s construction activities within the right-of-way of Holden Avenue, which is located within the city limits of Edgewood, until such time as MCR complied with various provisions of the city building code. This injunction was obtained ex parte. Thereafter, pursuant to a noticed evidentiary hearing, the court dissolved the injunction.

MCR is developing a small subdivision in south Orange County known as Holden Cove. The southern boundary of the subdivision lies along the northern edge of Holden Avenue. This particular section of Holden Avenue was annexed by Edgewood on December 7, 1995. This stretch of the avenue also serves as the boundary between unincorporated Orange County and Edgewood.

The trial court’s action in dissolving the temporary injunction was based on its interpretation of section 335.0415, Florida Statutes (1995) which provides in pertinent part:

> The jurisdiction of public roads ... within the state, county, and municipal road system shall be that which exists on July 1,1995.

It is undisputed that as of July 1, 1995 the property in question had not yet been annexed by Edgewood and was clearly subject at that time to the jurisdiction of Orange County. In light of this statute, the trial court concluded that Edgewood had not established a substantial likelihood of success on the merits of its injunctive action. *See Mid-Florida at Eustis, Inc. v. Griffin,*521 So.2d 357 (Fla. 5th DCA 1988). We agree.

AFFIRMED.

HARRIS and THOMPSON, JJ., concur:
34235.

#### REEVES v. ALLEN.

Undercofler, Presiding Justice.

We granted this application to review denial of Reeves’ petition for habeas corpus charging ineffective assistance of counsel at his trial for the murder of his wife, Grace Reeves.

1. After a careful review of the original trial transcript1 and of the evidence presented at the habeas corpus hearing, we hold that there has not been a showing that counsel was ineffective and the denial of the petition for habeas corpus was not error. Appellant contends trial counsel failed to interview any witnesses, failed to view *697the scene of the crime and failed to properly consult with appellant prior to trial. The evidence rebuts these contentions. It shows appointed counsel had at his disposal the entire file of the district attorney, including all of the statements of witnesses given to police as well as photographs of the deceased and the house and kitchen where the shooting occurred. Dr. Craig Boss testified defense counsel interviewed him regarding his findings prior to trial and following his examination of the body of the deceased. The trial transcript showed counsel conducted a professional and informed defense, pursuing a theory of temporary insanity, and sought to establish through state’s witnesses and the applicant that he was not in full possession of his faculties during the events in question. A charge that there was a lack of pre-trial investigation is not substantiated in light of counsel’s performance at trial. Enumeration 1 is without merit.

Argued November 20, 1978

Decided December 5, 1978.

*Barkley & Garner, James S. Garner, III, Larry J. Barkley,*for appellant.

*Johnson & Beckham, Sam D. Price, Arthur K. Bolton, Attorney General, William B. Hill, Jr., Staff Assistant Attorney General,*for appellee.

2. From our holding in Division 1, we also hold Reeves received assistance of counsel "reasonably likely to render and rendering reasonably effective assistance.” *Pitts v. Glass,*231 Ga. 638 (203 SE2d 515) (1974). Though the habeas court appears to have applied the older standards for evaluating effective assistance of counsel as set out *in Hart v. State,*227 Ga. 171 (179 SE2d 346) (1971) and similar cases, there was no harm here.

3. It was not error to permit the trial judge to submit evidence in the habeas corpus hearing by affidavit. See Code Ann. § 50-127 (7) (a) (Ga. L. 1975, pp. 1143-1145).

*Judgment affirmed.*

*All the Justices concur.*

1

This case was affirmed on direct appeal. *Reeves v. State,*234 Ga. 896 (218 SE2d 625) (1975).
USGS HomeContact USGSSearch USGS

U.S. Geological Survey Open-File Report 2011�1003

Combined Multibeam and LIDAR Bathymetry Data from Eastern Long Island Sound and Westernmost Block Island Sound � A Regional Perspective

----

## Methods 

AccessibilityFOIAPrivacyPolicies and Notices

U.S. Department of the Interior |		U.S. Geological Survey
Case No. 14,658.

#### UNITED STATES v. BROWN.

[3 Cranch. C. C. 268.] 1

Circuit Court, District of Columbia.

Dec. Term. 1827.

Witness — Forgery—Person Whose Name is Forged — Order.

1. The person, whose paper is forged, is a good witness for the nrosecution.

[Cited in U. S v. Anderson, Case No. 14,452.]

2. The following is “an order for the payment of money, or delivery of goods,” within the see-*1247ond section .of thr> Maryland act of 1799, c. <5, namely: “Mr. E. M. Linthicum will please ,let the bearer, John Brown, have such articles as he may choose on my account, to the value of thirty dollars; also twenty dollars in cash, and oblige his friend. Henry Tayloe. For Gol. John Tayloe. Washington City, 24ÜT December, 1827.”... ..

[Cited in Gnrmi.v? v State. 104 Ind. 445. 4 N. E. 55; Long v. Straus, 107 Ind. 103, 0 N. E. 123, and 7 N. E. 766.]

Indictment for knowingly uttering as true, and with intent to defraud E. M. Linthicum and John Tayloe, the following forged order, namely: “Mr. E. M. Linthicum will please let the bearer, John Brown, have such articles as he may choose, on my account, to the value of thirty dollars; also twenty dollars.in cash, and oblige his friend, Henry Tayloe. For Col. John Tayloe. Washington City, 24th December, 1827.” The said Henry Tayloe ' was offered as a witness, to prove that it was not his signature.'

Mr. Bradley, for the prisoner,

objected that the • party, whose name is forged, is not a competent witness for _. the prosecution. Archb. 'Cr. Pr. 96.

THE COURT

(THRUSTON, Circuit Judge, absent)

overruled the objection, and suffered the witness to be sworn and examined.

CRANCH, Chief Judge,

mentioned the case of U. S. v. Peacock [Case No. 16,019), in this court, at December term, 1804, in which Mr. Sloane, a member of congress, was permitted to testify that the signature James Sloane, upon the forged bill, was not written by him. ’

Mr. Bradley then objected that the forged paper was not such an order for the payment of money, or delivery of goods, as was intended by the' second section of the Maryland act of 1799, c. 75. and cited 1 Leach. 134; Williams’s Case, Id. 114; and note to Lockett’s Case, Id. 95.

THE COURT (THRUSTON, Circuit Judge, absent) overruled the objection, on the authority of U. S. v. Bates [Case No. 14,542], in this court, in June, 1810; but told Sir. Bradley that he might avail himself of it, on motion in arrest of judgment, when the point might be fully considered. Cur. ad. vult.

At May term, 1828. THE COURT overruled the motion in arrest of judgment, and sentenced the prisoner to fine and imprisonment.
**EXHIBIT 23.1**

 

**CONSENT OF DELOITTE & TOUCHE LLP, INDEPENDENT REGISTERED PUBLIC ACCOUNTING FIRM**

 

We consent to the incorporation by reference in Registration Statements No.333-109183, 333-110678, 333-113192, 333-117441, 333-117443, 333-125901, 333-130091, and 333-141719 on Form S-3 and Registration Statements No. 333-119690, 333-109917, 333-99645, 333-74124, 333-55364, 333-34202, and 333-42952 on Form S-8 of (1) ourreport dated September 4, 2007, relating to the consolidated financial statements and financial statement schedule of Avanex Corporation and subsidiaries (the “Company”)(which report expresses an unqualified opinion and includesexplanatory paragraphs regarding the change in the Company’s method of accounting for defined benefit pension and other postretirement plans upon the adoption of Financial Accounting Standards Board (“FASB”) statement No. 158,*Employers’ Accounting for Defined Benefit Pension and Other Postretirement Plans — an amendment of FASB Statements No. 87, 88, 106, and 132(R)* and the change in the Company’s method of accounting for stock compensation upon theadoption of FASB Statement No. 123(R), *Share-Based Payment*, as described in Note 1 to the consolidated financial statements), and (2) our report dated September 4, 2007, relating to internal control over financial reporting (which reportexpresses an adverse opinion on the effectiveness of the Company’s internal control over financial reporting because of a material weakness), appearing in this Annual Report on Form 10-K of Avanex Corporation for the year ended June 30, 2007.

 

/s/    Deloitte & Touche LLP 

 

San Jose, California 

September 4, 2007
# C_2013336EN.01003101.xml

| 16.11.2013 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 336/31 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

16.11.2013

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 336/31

---

Judgment of the Civil Service Tribunal (Third Chamber) of 2 October 2013 — Nardone v Commission

(Case F-111/12) (1)

1

(Civil Service - Former official - Exposure to asbestos and to other substances - Occupational disease - Accident - Article 73 of the Staff Regulations - Medical Committee - Reasons - Action for damages - Length of the proceedings)

2013/C 336/68

Language of the case: French

Parties

Parties

Applicant: Albert Nardone (Piétrain, Belgium) (represented by: L. Levi and A. Blot, lawyers)

Applicant:

Defendant: European Commission (represented by: J. Currall and V. Joris, acting as Agents)

Defendant:

Re:

Re:

Application for annulment of the Commission’s decision to accept the findings of the Medical Committee ruling on the applicant’s level of disability and the occupational origin of his disease.

Operative part of the judgment

Operative part of the judgment

The Tribunal:

| 1. | Orders the European Commission to pay Mr Nardone default interest for the period between 1 March 2006 and 15 July 2010 on the amount of EUR 8 448,51 at the rate fixed by the European Central Bank for main refinancing operations and applicable to the period in question, increased by two points, and the sum of EUR 3 000; |
| --- | --- |

1.

Orders the European Commission to pay Mr Nardone default interest for the period between 1 March 2006 and 15 July 2010 on the amount of EUR 8 448,51 at the rate fixed by the European Central Bank for main refinancing operations and applicable to the period in question, increased by two points, and the sum of EUR 3 000;

| 2. | Dismisses the remainder of the action; |
| --- | --- |

2.

Dismisses the remainder of the action;

| 3. | Orders the European Commission to bear its own costs and to pay one quarter of the costs incurred by Mr Nardone; |
| --- | --- |

3.

Orders the European Commission to bear its own costs and to pay one quarter of the costs incurred by Mr Nardone;

| 4. | Orders Mr Nardone to bear three quarters of his own costs. |
| --- | --- |

4.

Orders Mr Nardone to bear three quarters of his own costs.

---

(1)  OJ C 379, 8.12.2012, p. 35.

1

---