Filed 12/28/20 P. v. Quiles CA6

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for 

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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

BRENDON RENE QUILES,

Defendant and Appellant.

 H045800

 (Santa Clara County

 Super. Ct. No. C1501990)

Defendant Brendon Rene Quiles was convicted by a jury of murder (Pen. Code, 

§ 187)1and misdemeanor resisting a peace officer (§ 148, subd. (a)(1)). The jury also 

found true the special circumstance allegation that the murder occurred during the course 

of a robbery (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(17)). On appeal, Quiles argues that the trial court made 

erroneous evidentiary rulings, the prosecutor committed misconduct in his argument, the 

trial court should have granted his motion for a new trial on the ground of judicial 

misconduct, the jury was improperly instructed on the elements of the robbery-murder 

special circumstance, and the robbery-murder special circumstance is unconstitutional

due to the enactment of Senate Bill No. 1437. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm 

the judgment.

1 Unspecified statutory references are to the Penal Code.
2

BACKGROUND

1. The Information

On August 4, 2016, Quiles was charged by information with a count of murder 

(§ 187, count 1).2 It was further alleged that Quiles personally used a firearm during the 

commission of the offense (§ 12022.53, subd. (d)) and he committed the murder during

the course of a robbery (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(17)). Quiles was also charged with a 

misdemeanor for resisting, delaying, or obstructing a peace officer (§ 148, subd. (a)(1)). 

2. The Trial Evidence

a. The Robbery and Murder

On January 9, 2015, Christopher Azure and Quiles participated in a robbery that 

led to the murder of Sean Wofford. At the time, Azure worked as a dishwasher and sold 

drugs, including marijuana, ecstasy, and MDMA. He also personally used marijuana and 

other recreational drugs. According to Azure, he and Quiles came up with a plan to “call 

somebody up [to buy marijuana] and rip him off.” Azure’s role in the robbery was to 

make sure that the intended victim brought the requested drugs. On the day of the 

robbery, Azure sent an instant message on his computer to his girlfriend that said, “Baby, 

we’re going to be eating big soon.” 

Azure arranged for a drug dealer to come by. He asked his older brother for the 

phone number for a person named “Little C.” Azure called Little C. and asked him how 

much it cost for half a pound or a pound of marijuana. Little C. told Azure that half a 

pound of marijuana was $600, and Azure asked to buy half a pound. Little C. told Azure 

that he would have a friend drop off the marijuana. Little C. did not tell Azure the name 

of the friend who was going to bring the drugs. Azure arranged for the drugs to be 

delivered to the apartment complex across the street from where he lived in San Jose. 

2 Christopher Azure was initially charged as a codefendant in the same 

information. 
3

After Azure called Little C., Quiles told Azure that he needed to make a call 

because he wanted to get a gun for the robbery. Quiles, who was at Azure’s house, 

stepped outside of Azure’s room to make the call. After Quiles made the call, he came 

back inside Azure’s room. The two played video games while waiting for the marijuana 

to be delivered. At some point, Quiles left Azure’s room to retrieve the gun.3

The person who was going to deliver the marijuana, later identified as Wofford, 

called Azure and told him that he would soon be arriving at the apartment complex across 

the street. Wofford called Azure again when he arrived. By that time, Quiles had 

returned from getting the gun. Azure went outside and got into Wofford’s car, which was 

parked at the apartment complex. Azure saw that Wofford had the drugs in a Ziploc bag

in his car’s “middle console.” Shortly after Azure examined the marijuana, Quiles 

approached Wofford’s car on the driver’s side, where Wofford was seated. Quiles 

opened Wofford’s door and started yelling while holding a gun in the air. At that point, 

Azure got out of the car and went back inside his house because he was afraid. 

b. Aftermath of the Robbery

i. Azure’s Recollection

Azure went inside his house and sent an instant message on his computer to his 

girlfriend, telling her that something bad had happened. At approximately 9:31 p.m., she 

responded with the message, “What happened.” Azure replied at 9:33 p.m. with, “Hot 

shit.” At 9:36 p.m., Azure sent another instant message to his girlfriend that said, “Just 

jacked someone.” Azure’s girlfriend asked, “What did you jack?” Azure responded, “I’ll 

tell you later.” 

After the robbery, Quiles called Azure at 9:29 p.m. and 9:34 p.m. Quiles asked 

Azure if he was okay and if everything was “good” with him. An hour later, Azure saw 

3 On cross-examination, Azure said that Quiles told him that he was going to get 

“something” but did not specifically say that he was going to go get a gun. 
4

Quiles at the end of his driveway. Quiles had called Azure and had told him that he was 

going to come back to Azure’s house. Quiles told Azure that he had shot Wofford. 

Quiles asked Azure if he could come inside, and Azure said no because he was scared. 

Quiles showed Azure a black handgun that he had at his waist. Quiles then told Azure to 

stay quiet or else he would come back for Azure and Azure’s brother. From his 

driveway, Azure could see that Wofford’s car was still parked at the apartment complex 

across the street. 

Azure’s brother had returned to the house around the same time that the robbery 

occurred. Quiles told Azure that he did not have anywhere else to go, so Azure, Azure’s 

brother, and Azure’s brother’s girlfriend, M.M., drove Quiles to somewhere in downtown 

San Jose. When Azure, his brother, and M.M. returned to Azure’s house, Azure could 

see that Wofford’s car was still parked across the street. 

At approximately 4:00 a.m. that same night, Quiles called Azure and asked if he 

could stay over at Azure’s house. Because he was tired, Azure agreed. Azure left his 

house several hours later at approximately 8:00 a.m. and came back around 10:30 or 

11:00 a.m. By the time he returned, police officers had arrived at the scene of the crime 

across the street, and the street where he lived was blocked off. 

Azure was afraid that he would be caught. He spoke to his brother and M.M. 

Azure told his brother that he had participated in the robbery the night before. His

brother told him to stay in his room, but M.M. advised him to go to the police. Azure 

knew that Wofford had called him, and he was concerned that his phone number would 

show up on Wofford’s call history. 

Azure went outside and spoke to an officer. He lied and said that he had planned 

on going across the street to meet with Wofford the previous night, but somebody else

ran out from the other side of the apartment complex and interfered with his plans. The 

officer took Azure’s statement and asked if he would go to the witness center at the 

police department, and Azure voluntarily complied. 
5

At the police department, Azure retold his lie about meeting Wofford.4 After 

officers told Azure that they did not believe his story, Azure confessed to participating in 

robbing Wofford. Azure also provided officers with information about Quiles’s 

Instagram and Facebook accounts. 

Azure was not promised any deals before he spoke with the police. However, he 

entered into an agreement that if did not receive a deal from the prosecution, the 

statements that he made during his police interviews could not be used against him during 

the prosecution’s case in chief should criminal charges be pursued against him in the 

future. Later, Azure pleaded guilty to manslaughter, marijuana, and conspiracy to sell 

marijuana with the understanding that he would be sentenced to 14 years in state prison. 

Before entering his plea, Azure faced a maximum sentence of life in prison. 

ii. Quiles’s Call to Azure’s Brother

M.M. recalled that Quiles called Azure’s brother multiple times after Wofford’s

murder. M.M. told Azure’s brother to pick up the phone, and someone—either M.M. or 

Azure’s brother—recorded a conversation between Azure’s brother and Quiles. In the 

recorded conversation, Quiles can be heard saying, “[Azure] didn’t even do nothing, 

niggar.” 

iii. Quiles’s Movements After Leaving Azure’s House and His 

Subsequent Arrest

At the time of the robbery, Quiles had been dating D.V. for about three months. A 

little after 11:00 p.m. on January 9, 2015, D.V. received a phone call from Quiles. Quiles 

asked D.V. to pick him up. D.V. thought that Quiles sounded like he was in a rush 

because he was talking quickly. D.V. later told the police that she thought Quiles 

sounded scared. 

4 Prior to giving his statement to the police, Azure had taken ecstasy, MDMA, and 

marijuana, and had been “up for three days prior” to the murder. 
6

When Quiles called D.V., she was out with some friends. Two hours after Quiles 

called her, D.V.’s friends took her back to her car, and D.V. went to get Quiles. D.V.

picked Quiles up somewhere in downtown San Jose. Quiles told D.V. that he had hurt 

someone. Quiles and D.V. headed to a Walgreen’s near D.V.’s house in south San Jose. 

A surveillance video from inside the Walgreen’s showed Quiles and D.V. inside the store 

at 1:52 a.m. Quiles told D.V. that what he had done would be on the news. D.V. then 

took Quiles back to her house. D.V., however, was not permitted to have anyone stay 

overnight, so Quiles left around 4 or 5 in the morning. 

Later, D.V. read a newspaper article about someone being shot and killed in a car. 

D.V. confronted Quiles about what she had read, and he said that he did not mean to do 

it. D.V. told Quiles that he might be caught. Quiles responded that he hoped he would 

not be caught, and he was scared. 

On January 11, 2015, officers arrested Quiles while he was sitting in a parked car 

with D.V. Officers surrounded Quiles’s car and ordered him to come out. Quiles did not 

initially comply with the officers’ orders during his arrest. He also asked D.V. to hide his 

phone in her bra. After he was arrested, officers found cash on Quiles’s person, including 

18 $100 bills and some $20 bills. 

D.V. initially lied to police and said that she picked Quiles up at around 9:30 p.m. 

the night that Wofford was murdered. D.V. lied to the police because she was concerned 

about getting Quiles in trouble. During D.V.’s interview with officers, officers told her

that Quiles said that she was a stripper. D.V. was offended by the comment and said that 

her feelings were hurt.

Quiles was dating another woman, J.R., at the same time he was dating D.V. On 

the night of Wofford’s murder, Quiles called J.R. multiple times at 9:41 p.m., 9:43 p.m., 

and 9:45 p.m. Quiles called J.R. another time at 9:56 p.m., and the call lasted 227 

seconds. At trial, J.R. testified that she could not recall what Quiles called her about. 

J.R. remembered that Quiles stayed with her one night in January 2015, but she was 
7

unsure of the exact date. J.R. talked with Quiles multiple times on January 9, 10, and 11, 

but she could not remember what they talked about during those calls. 

After Quiles was arrested, he asked J.R. to help him track down D.V. J.R. 

“hacked” Quiles’s Facebook page to get access to his account because she wanted to see 

who he was talking to. In a recorded jail conversation, Quiles and J.R. talked about J.R. 

deleting something off Quiles’s Facebook page. At trial, J.R. admitted that she may have 

deleted items off Quiles’s Facebook page. Quiles also asked J.R. to set up a “three-way 

call” with D.V. 

iv. Neighbors’ Recollection

On January 9, 2015, neighbor1 lived in the apartment complex across the street 

from Azure’s house. Neighbor1 arrived at the complex’s parking lot at approximately 

9:15 or 9:20 that evening. When he arrived, he noticed that there was a car parked in one 

of his apartment’s assigned parking spots. Neighbor1 parked next to the parked car. He 

did not recognize the car, and it did not appear to be one of his family’s cars. Neighbor1

saw someone inside the car, and he made eye contact with the individual. At the time, 

the person was alive. 

Neighbor1 did not hear any gunshots that evening. The next morning at around 7 

or 7:30, neighbor1 went out to his car to drive to work. Neighbor1 saw that the same car 

was still parked in the spot next to his car. Neighbor1 briefly glanced at the car and 

drove to work. 

At around 11:00 a.m., neighbor1’s mother went inside neighbor1’s apartment and 

told neighbor1’s brother that she thought that someone was hurt outside. Neighbor1’s 

brother went outside and looked inside the parked car. He thought that the person inside 

in the car, later identified to be Wofford, appeared dead. He called the police shortly 

thereafter.
8

c. The Police Investigation

i. The Crime Scene

San Jose Police Department Sergeant Michael Trudeau responded to the call about 

a possible dead body in a car. When he arrived, he opened the car’s driver’s side door 

and found Wofford deceased. “Miscellaneous loose papers” were found on top of 

Wofford’s body, strewn on his abdomen. Trudeau saw a shell casing approximately 10 

feet away from the car in the parking lot. Photographs were taken of the car and of 

Wofford’s body. A photograph of the car’s glove box showed that it was empty. 

After Wofford’s body was taken away, officers found blood transferred onto the 

driver’s seat and pooled dried blood. Two cell phones were found inside the car, but only 

one of them was active and associated with a phone number. 

Wofford’s body had one entrance and one exit gunshot wound. The medical 

examiner believed that the bullet went through Wofford left arm and exited from his right 

chest. The trajectory of the bullet was “left to right and downward.” Given his wounds, 

Wofford would have died within minutes. 

ii. Neighbor2’s Security Camera Footage

San Jose Police Department Officer Christopher Jolliff assisted the investigation 

and canvassed the area of the crime scene. During his canvass, he located a small 

security camera mounted on the front window of neighbor2’s apartment. Jolliff asked 

neighbor2 if the camera was functional and if he could provide footage from 5:00 p.m. on 

January 9 to 12 p.m. on January 10. The camera used a “cloud-based” system and the 

footage had to be downloaded from a third-party server. 

Neighbor2 installed the camera so he could see his front yard and the exterior of 

his front door, but the camera could also view “half of the right carport,” where the 

murder occurred. Neighbor2 used a paid service for his security camera, and the 

camera’s footage was saved for seven days using the company’s outside server. 
9

At Officer Jolliff’s request, neighbor2 downloaded the security camera footage from the 

night of the murder. 

San Jose Police Department Officer Jorge Santiago reviewed the video 

downloaded by neighbor2. When the timestamp for the security camera showed that it 

was 9:22:52 p.m., Santiago saw a set of headlights enter the apartment complex’s parking

area. When the timestamp showed it was 9:26:15 p.m., Santiago heard a car horn honk. 

When the timestamp showed it was 9:27:02 p.m., Santiago heard the sound of an 

argument. Finally, when the timestamp showed it was 9:28:11 p.m., Santiago heard the 

sound of a gunshot. 

iii. The Cell Phone Data

Officer Santiago obtained Wofford’s active cell phone and downloaded his call 

log. The last outgoing text message from Wofford’s cell phone was sent at 9:25:02 p.m. 

After this last outgoing message, Wofford received a number of incoming messages, and 

he did not respond to any of them. Wofford’s call log showed that he made an outgoing 

call to a number associated with Azure at approximately 8:00 p.m. 

Quiles’s phone and Azure’s phone contacted each other several times the evening 

of the robbery including one connection at 9:25:50 p.m. that used a cell phone tower near 

Azure’s house. The next call Quiles made at 9:29:30 p.m. used a different cell phone 

tower north of Azure’s house. Quiles’s phone made contact again with Azure’s phone at 

9:31:41 p.m. and 9:34:52 p.m. that same evening. Quiles then made a call to a number 

associated with J.R. at 9:41 p.m. at the Highway 680 corridor, north of the crime scene. 

The phone number associated with Quiles made additional calls as it moved south from 

the Highway 680 corridor toward the west side of downtown San Jose. Quiles’s phone 

remained in that area until around 2:30 a.m., when it moved down toward south San Jose. 

At around 4:50 a.m., the phone moved back to the area of the cell phone tower near

Azure’s house. 
10

iv. Quiles’s Interview with the Police

Quiles was interviewed by officers after his arrest. Initially, he said that the 

money that he was found with when he was arrested belonged to D.V., and D.V. was a 

stripper and had just been paid. Quiles said that he had gone to Azure’s house midday on 

January 9, 2015, and had left sometime after it was dark. Quiles said that D.V. picked 

him up, they went to the Walgreen’s near D.V.’s house, then went to D.V.’s house. 

Quiles said that he stayed at D.V.’s house until 3 or 4:00 a.m., when his sister went to 

pick him up, and he stayed the rest of the night at his sister’s house. Quiles did not 

mention going back to Azure’s house. At first, Quiles denied that he owned a gun. 

Later, he said that he purchased a .22-caliber gun when he was 17 years old. 

3. The Verdict, Motion for a New Trial, and Sentencing

After the trial, a jury found Quiles guilty of murder (§ 187) and misdemeanor 

resisting a peace officer (§ 148, subd. (a)(1)) and found the special circumstance that he 

committed the murder during the course of a robbery (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(17)) to be true. 

The jury, however, found the allegation that Quiles personally discharged a firearm 

(§ 12022.53, subd. (d)) not to be true. 

On July 21, 2017, Quiles moved for a new trial. In his motion, Quiles argued that 

he was entitled to a new trial because of prosecutorial and judicial misconduct. 

On October 13, 2017, Quiles filed a motion seeking to disqualify the trial court on 

the ground of judicial misconduct as described in Code of Civil Procedure section 170.1, 

subdivision (a)(6). The trial court struck the motion on the basis that it was untimely and 

failed to disclose legal grounds for disqualification. 

On January 26, 2018, Quiles filed a supplemental motion for a new trial again 

alleging claims of prosecutorial and judicial misconduct. On March 23, 2018, the trial 

court denied Quiles’s motion for a new trial. That same day, Quiles was sentenced to life 

without the possibility of parole. 
11

DISCUSSION

1. The Time References Predicated on Neighbor2’s Security Camera Footage

Quiles argues the trial court erred when it overruled his objection to the time 

references derived from neighbor2’s security camera footage. Quiles insists that the 

linchpin for establishing when the shooting occurred was the sound of the gunshot heard 

on neighbor2’s security camera, but the prosecutor failed to lay an adequate foundation to 

establish the accuracy of the security camera’s timestamp. 

a. Background

At trial, Officer Santiago testified that the fatal gunshot was fired on the evening 

of January 9, 2015, at 9:28:11 p.m. This time was derived from the audible sound of a 

gunshot heard on the security camera footage provided by neighbor2.

Defense counsel objected to Officer Santiago’s testimony and conducted voir dire 

to determine the accuracy of the security camera’s timestamp. Santiago explained that 

the security camera footage was obtained from a server, and he had asked neighbor2 to 

download the footage. Neighbor2 told Santiago that he needed to download the footage 

from an offsite server, and the footage would be broken down into hourly segments. 

Santiago told neighbor2 to make a separate CD for every hourly segment “to see if [the 

timestamps are] accurate.” Santiago did not take any other steps to verify the accuracy of 

the security camera’s timestamp. 

At the conclusion of Officer Santiago’s voir dire, defense counsel again raised an 

objection to Santiago’s testimony about when the gunshot occurred, which the trial court 

overruled. 

b. General Principles and Standard of Review 

We review the trial court’s ruling on the admissibility of evidence for an abuse of 

discretion. (People v. Goldsmith (2014) 59 Cal.4th 258, 266 (Goldsmith).) “Absent 

fundamental unfairness, state law error in admitting evidence is subject to the traditional 

Watson test: The reviewing court must ask whether it is reasonably probable the verdict 
12

would have been more favorable to the defendant absent the error.” (People v. Partida 

(2005) 37 Cal.4th 428, 439 (Partida), citing People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836

(Watson); People v. Lucas (1995) 12 Cal.4th 415, 468 [applying Watson standard to 

admission of evidence with insufficient foundation].)

c. Admission of the Evidence Was Not Prejudicial

Quiles argues that neighbor2’s security camera footage was not properly 

authenticated because the only evidence before the court was that the footage was stored 

on a “cloud” and was downloaded in hourly segments by neighbor2 at the police’s 

request.5 Assuming the security camera footage was erroneously admitted, Quiles cannot 

demonstrate that he was prejudiced.

There was other evidence establishing when Wofford was murdered. There was 

Azure’s testimony about the murder and the existence of messages that Azure sent to his 

girlfriend after the murder occurred. Azure testified that he sent a message to his 

girlfriend after the shooting, and Azure’s girlfriend replied at 9:31 p.m. with a message, 

“What happened.” There were also phone records showing that Quiles called Azure at 

approximately 9:29 p.m. and 9:34 p.m., and Azure testified that Quiles called him after 

he left Wofford’s car. Neighbor1 testified that he saw Wofford alive in his car at 

approximately 9:15 p.m. or 9:20 p.m., and Wofford’s phone last showed activity at 

around 9:25 p.m. Thus, even without the security camera footage, there was ample 

evidence for the jury to conclude that the shooting occurred within the time frame argued 

by the prosecution, which was consistent with the cell phone data that suggested Quiles

was at the crime scene when Wofford was killed. Thus, the timestamp evidence, though 

probative, was cumulative of other evidence presented by the prosecution.

5

It is unclear how downloading the footage in hourly segments ensures the 

accuracy of the timestamp. For example, if the timestamp is based off the time obtained 

from neighbor2’s computer, the timestamp would be inaccurate if neighbor2’s computer 

had the wrong time, even if the footage was downloaded in hourly increments.
13

There was also strong evidence of Quiles’s guilt. Azure testified that Quiles went 

to get a gun before the robbery, and Quiles later told him that he had shot Wofford. 

M.M. recorded a conversation between Quiles and Azure’s brother, and Quiles is heard 

on the recording saying that Azure, the only other participant in the robbery, did not do 

anything. D.V. testified that Quiles told her that he did something that would be on the 

news, and when she later asked him about the newspaper article that she had read about 

somebody being shot and killed in a car, Quiles said that he did not mean to do it. When 

D.V. told Quiles that he might be caught, Quiles answered that he hoped he would not be 

caught, and he was scared. 

For these reasons, we conclude that even if the security camera footage was

admitted in error, it is not reasonably probable that Quiles would have received a more 

favorable verdict had it been excluded. (Watson, supra, 46 Cal.2d at p. 836.)

d. Violation of Due Process

In his supplemental opening brief, Quiles claims that the trial court’s erroneous 

admission of the timestamp evidence violated his right to due process and a fair trial 

under the federal and state Constitutions. 

Typically, failure to object to the admission of evidence on constitutional grounds 

forfeits the argument on appeal. (See People v. Benson (1990) 52 Cal.3d 754, 786, fn. 7 

[failure to object to admission of evidence as violative of Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth 

Amendment forfeits issue on appeal].) There are certain limited exceptions to this 

general rule. For example, in Partida, supra, 37 Cal.4th 428, the California Supreme 

Court held that a defendant may raise for the first time on appeal an argument that the 

admission of evidence in violation of state law rendered the trial fundamentally unfair in 

violation of due process. (Id. at p. 435.)

Here, Quiles did not object below to the admission of evidence on the 

constitutional grounds that he now raises. However, like in Partida, his failure to raise 

his objection below does not forfeit the argument on appeal. Quiles essentially claims 
14

that the admission of the evidence was a violation of state law that had the additional

consequence of violating his due process rights. (Partida, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 435.) 

Nonetheless, “admission of relevant evidence will not offend due process unless the 

evidence is so prejudicial as to render the defendant’s trial fundamentally unfair.” 

(People v. Falsetta (1999) 21 Cal.4th 903, 913.) This is a high standard, and “ ‘[o]nly if 

there are no permissible inferences the jury may draw from the evidence can its 

admission violate due process. Even then, the evidence must “be of such quality as 

necessarily prevents a fair trial.” ’ ” (People v. Albarran (2007) 149 Cal.App.4th 214, 

229.)

As indicated, the security camera footage was largely duplicative of other 

evidence that was admitted into the record. As a result, we do not believe that its 

admission, even if considered erroneous, was so prejudicial that it rendered Quiles’s trial 

fundamentally unfair.

2. Exclusion of Azure’s Sales of Cocaine

Next, Quiles argues that the trial court erred when it excluded evidence that Azure 

sold cocaine in the past. Quiles argues the evidence should have been admitted because it 

directly contradicted Azure’s trial testimony and impinged on his credibility. 

a. Background

During trial, Azure testified that he sold marijuana, ecstasy, and MDMA. When 

asked, Azure denied that he sold cocaine. During cross-examination, defense counsel 

sought to question Azure about his cocaine sales based on posts that he made on his 

Facebook page. The prosecutor objected to the questions on the ground of relevancy, 

which the trial court sustained.

Later, defense counsel explained that she wanted to introduce the Facebook posts 

to show that Azure had not been truthful when he testified at trial and to demonstrate that 

he needed money on the day of the murder. The prosecutor argued that he believed that 

the evidence had no “logical connection” to Azure’s motive. Furthermore, the prosecutor 
15

argued that he believed the evidence should be excluded under Evidence Code section 

352 because it would consume undue time and would only be marginally probative to the 

issue of Azure’s credibility. 

The trial court agreed with the prosecutor that the evidence was irrelevant. The 

trial court stated, “[a]nd even if there was some margin of argument about motive to get 

money, which I also don’t see the logical connection, I would exclude it under 352 

primarily because I think what’s relevant in this case is . . . marijuana, not . . . cocaine.” 

Defense counsel reiterated that she believed that the evidence could be used to impeach 

Azure. In response, the trial court said that he believed the evidence would be 

“collateral” to this case. 

b. General Principles and Standard of Review

Evidence is admissible under Evidence Code section 352 if its probative value is 

not “substantially outweighed by the probability that its admission will (a) necessitate 

undue consumption of time or (b) create substantial danger of undue prejudice, of 

confusing the issues, or of misleading the jury.” (Evid. Code, § 352.) The “undue 

prejudice” referred to in Evidence Code section 352 “is not synonymous with 

‘damaging,’ but refers instead to evidence that ‘ “uniquely tends to evoke an emotional 

bias against defendant” ’ without regard to its relevance on material issues.” (People v.

Kipp (2001) 26 Cal.4th 1100, 1121.)

We review the trial court’s ruling on the admissibility of evidence for an abuse of 

discretion. (Goldsmith, supra, 59 Cal.4th at p. 266.) The erroneous admission or 

exclusion of evidence is subject to the Watson test—whether it is reasonably probable the 

verdict would have been more favorable to the defendant absent the error. (See Partida, 

supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 439.)

c. Trial Court’s Exclusion of Azure’s Impeachment Evidence

Applying these principles to Quiles’s case, we conclude that the trial court did not 

abuse its discretion by excluding the evidence about Azure’s cocaine sales. 
16

Preliminarily, we agree with Quiles that evidence that Azure engaged in cocaine 

sales was relevant because it impeached Azure’s credibility. At trial, Azure specifically 

testified that he did not sell cocaine. Thus, evidence that he sold cocaine would 

demonstrate that he lied during his testimony. Moreover, the sales of cocaine were

marginally probative of Azure’s motive to commit robbery because it tended to show that 

he needed money to erase some of his debts.

The trial court, however, reasonably concluded that the evidence was more 

prejudicial than probative because it would have consumed an undue amount of time and 

was largely cumulative of other evidence that impinged Azure’s credibility. Azure 

already testified that he sold drugs, including marijuana, MDMA, and ecstasy. Azure 

also testified that he personally used drugs. Azure further admitted that he initially lied to 

officers about what happened after the murder, and he wanted to escape liability for what 

happened. On cross-examination, Azure testified about his marijuana sales and his need 

for money to facilitate some of his sales. He also received a plea deal in exchange for his 

testimony. Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it excluded the 

evidence.

6

 

3. Prosecutorial Misconduct

Quiles argues that reversal is required because the prosecutor committed 

prejudicial misconduct during argument to the jury.

a. General Principles and Standard of Review

“ ‘The applicable federal and state standards regarding prosecutorial misconduct 

are well established. “ ‘A prosecutor’s . . . intemperate behavior violates the federal 

Constitution when it comprises a pattern of conduct “so egregious that it infects the trial 

6 Since we conclude that the evidence was not erroneously excluded, we do not 

need to consider Quiles’s claim that excluding the evidence also violated his due process 

rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. 
17

with such unfairness as to make the conviction a denial of due process.” ’ ” [Citations.] 

Conduct by a prosecutor that does not render a criminal trial fundamentally unfair is 

prosecutorial misconduct under state law only if it involves “ ‘ “the use of deceptive or 

reprehensible methods to attempt to persuade either the court or the jury.” ’ ” ’ ” (People 

v. Hill (1998) 17 Cal.4th 800, 819.)

It is well-settled that there must be a timely and specific objection at trial and a 

request that the jury be admonished to preserve a claim of prosecutorial misconduct for 

appeal. (People v. Seumanu (2015) 61 Cal.4th 1293, 1328 (Seumanu).) “A defendant’s 

conviction will not be reversed for prosecutorial misconduct . . . unless it is reasonably 

probable that a result more favorable to the defendant would have been reached without 

the misconduct.” (People v. Crew (2003) 31 Cal.4th 822, 839.)

b. Prosecutor’s Assertion that Defense Counsel Committed Misconduct

i. Background

Defense counsel sought to introduce expert testimony on how the audio from 

neighbor2’s security camera footage was enhanced. She also sought to introduce a 

transcript based on the enhanced audio. The prosecutor argued that the transcript was not 

the proper subject of an expert opinion. The trial court agreed, stating that it did not 

believe that “it’s a subject of expert opinion [for the defense expert] to give an opinion to 

the jury as to what the video says or what the audio on the video says. That’s for the jury 

to determine.” 

During closing argument, defense counsel played the enhanced audio from the 

security camera footage for the jury. While the audio played, defense counsel displayed a 

transcript for the jury to view. The prosecutor objected to the transcript, and the trial 

court sustained the objection. The trial court then gave the following admonition: 

“There is no transcript of any statement made by the decedent [Wofford] in this matter, 

so the suggestion that there is a transcript is erroneous and it’s misconduct.” 
18

Afterwards, defense counsel argued that Wofford could be heard on the security 

camera footage saying, “Fuck it.” The prosecutor objected, arguing that there was no 

evidence of what Wofford’s voice sounded like. The trial court sustained the objection, 

stating, “[t]here’s no evidence of whose voice is heard on that video.” 

During rebuttal, the prosecutor argued, “One of the worst things [defense] counsel 

did in that, she’s never heard Sean Wofford’s voice. Nobody has, not in this case. 

Nobody. She stood up there and testified to you she knows Sean Wofford’s voice and 

what he said. Not only that, there’s no evidence of that whatsoever. It’s misconduct for 

counsel to do that.” Defense counsel made a generic objection to the prosecutor’s 

statement, which the trial court overruled.

The prosecutor then continued, “[Defense counsel] has not a clue what Sean 

Wofford was like, what his life was like, and she stands up and tells you not only that’s 

his voice on there but she tells you she can hear things about a cellphone? Are you 

kidding me? I mean, they got their speakers, they got a guy who did what he could with 

that thing, stuck those speakers up there. Could you hear a thing? [¶] You know why we 

don’t have a transcript for that and we have transcripts for other things? Other things are 

audible. We can reasonably give you something that we think is a reflection of what’s 

said there. Maybe you can pick out one or two words, the MF word. Okay? You can’t 

pick out anything else on that, and that’s why you don’t have a transcript.” Defense 

counsel objected to the prosecutor’s statements on the basis that he misstated the 

evidence, and the trial court overruled the objection.

The prosecutor then argued, “Counsel knows full well why we don’t have a 

transcript for that, and she also understands why there should be no reference trying to 

identify a person who said something. She knows that.” Defense counsel objected again, 

arguing that the prosecutor’s statement constituted misconduct. The trial court overruled 

the objection.
19

ii. Analysis 

Quiles argues that the prosecutor committed misconduct when he said that defense 

counsel committed misconduct by describing what she heard on the audio from the 

security camera footage. Quiles insists that defense counsel’s argument that the voice 

heard on the audio was Wofford’s was a reasonable inference based on the other evidence 

presented in the case. Furthermore, he claims that even if defense counsel had committed 

misconduct when making her argument, the prosecutor’s argument itself was misconduct 

because the issue of defense counsel’s misconduct was something that should have been 

brought to the trial court’s attention and not to the jury’s. 

We agree that even assuming defense counsel’s argument about Wofford’s voice 

was improper, the prosecutor was not permitted to disparage defense counsel in front of 

the jury. (People v. Young (2005) 34 Cal.4th 1149, 1193 [misconduct to accuse counsel 

of lying to jury].) The prosecutor, however, was permitted to give his opinion on the 

evidence, vigorously attack the defense’s case, and focus on deficiencies in defense 

counsel’s tactics. (People v. Redd (2010) 48 Cal.4th 691, 735 (Redd).) For example, it 

would not be misconduct for the prosecutor to assert that statements made by defense 

counsel concerning the factual events that occurred were speculative and that defense 

counsel’s speculation was intended to aid Quiles. (Id. at pp. 734-735.)

In Quiles’s case, the prosecutor’s statements were forceful, but they did not 

constitute misconduct under these standards. The prosecutor’s argument properly 

focused on the deficiencies in defense counsel’s factual account and her tactics. (Redd, 

supra, 48 Cal.4th at pp. 734-735.) The prosecutor did not personally demean defense 

counsel or disparage her in front of jurors. He merely reiterated that defense counsel had 

no evidentiary basis for her claim that Wofford’s voice could be heard on the audio 

recording.

Moreover, even if the remarks can be construed as disparaging to defense counsel, 

we find them harmless. The jury was instructed by the court not to let bias, empathy, 
20

prejudice, or public opinion influence its decision. The jury was also instructed that 

nothing said by the attorneys is considered evidence. Given these instructions, the 

prosecutor’s brief remark “resulted in ‘no miscarriage of justice within the meaning of 

the Constitution.’ ” (People v. Stewart (2004) 33 Cal.4th 425, 499.) 

c. Argument Over the “660” Phone Number

i. Background

At trial, Azure testified that he told officers that he ordered marijuana the night 

before from “a connect from a friend.” During cross-examination, defense counsel asked 

Azure if “the connect’s number start[ed] with 660,” and Azure answered yes. Azure also 

confirmed that he told officers that this “connect from a friend” was going to call him 

when he arrived. Defense counsel then asked Azure if he told officers that Wofford was 

going to call him when he arrived, and if Wofford called him “from the 660 number.” 

Azure answered yes. 

Later, Officer Santiago testified that two cell phones that were connected to 

Wofford were recovered from the crime scene. One of the cell phones started with the 

number “500,” and the other cell phone did not have a number attached to it. Officers did 

not find a cell phone that was associated with a “660” number. 

During her closing argument, defense counsel summarized some of the phone calls 

made between Quiles, Azure, and Wofford. Defense counsel referenced Azure’s phone 

records, including calls that Wofford made to Azure from the number beginning with 

“500.” Defense counsel then argued that Azure was also in contact with a number 

starting with “660” that was “associated with Mr. Wofford.” The prosecutor objected to 

this argument on the ground that defense counsel misstated the evidence, which the trial 

court sustained. Defense counsel informed the court that Azure had previously testified 

“that was Mr. Wofford’s number,” and offered to show the trial court Azure’s testimony. 

The trial court declined defense counsel’s offer and told her to “go on” with her 

argument. Defense counsel continued with her argument, commenting to the jury that it 
21

could “ask for [a] read back [on] whether or not that [(‘660’)] number is associated with 

Mr. Wofford.” 

Defense counsel then argued that “there’s a phone missing” that was associated 

with Wofford. Defense counsel theorized that it was likely that the shooter grabbed 

whatever was in Wofford’s lap, which must have included drugs and a cell phone, 

because one of the neighbors recalled seeing Wofford look down at a cell phone while he 

was parked in the apartment complex parking lot. Defense counsel then argued that 

Azure may not have realized that he received phone calls from two phone numbers 

associated with Wofford, the number starting with “660” and the number starting with 

“500.” 

In his rebuttal argument, the prosecutor argued, “[Defense counsel] is playing fast 

and loose, too, with phones. What evidence is there that Sean Wofford had three 

phones?” The prosecutor then argued that the “500” phone number had been recovered 

from Wofford’s car, and “[t]he other phone that was there, you heard the evidence, not 

this argument, evidence that that phone had videos, pictures on it. That’s what it was 

used for. All right? There’s only evidence of two phones.” Defense counsel objected to 

the prosecutor’s argument on the ground that it misstated the evidence, which the trial 

court overruled. 

Later, the prosecutor made the following argument: “Counsel stated, just 

throwing it out there, seeing what would stick, there were several calls from Wofford. 

What evidence is there of that? We have his outgoing phone call log. There’s one. Only 

one. She was wanting you to believe he has a third phone he’s calling from. That phone 

has not been identified as belonging to him.”

ii. Analysis

Quiles argues that the prosecutor committed misconduct when he accused defense 

counsel of being deceptive when she argued that the “660” number was attributed to 

Wofford. 
22

First, the prosecutor did not misstate the evidence to the extent that it can be 

construed that he argued that the “660” number did not belong to Wofford. Azure 

testified that Wofford called him from the “660” number, but there was no evidence that 

the phone number was identified as owned by Wofford or registered to him in some way.

Second, even if the prosecutor erroneously asserted that the “660” number was not 

associated with Wofford, the error was harmless and it is not reasonably probable that 

Quiles would have received a more favorable verdict absent the mischaracterization. 

Any possible prejudice was ameliorated by the trial court’s instruction that the attorneys’ 

arguments were not evidence, and by defense counsel’s argument in rebuttal, which 

advised the jury that it could ask for a read back as to whether the “660” number was 

associated with Wofford. Moreover, the evidence against Quiles was strong—as we have 

described, Azure testified that Quiles said that he shot Wofford, D.V. testified that Quiles 

told her that he did not mean to do it when she asked him about the shooting, and Quiles 

was recorded saying that Azure, the only other person involved in the robbery, did not do 

anything. No prejudicial prosecutorial misconduct occurred.

d. Assertion that Defense Counsel Objected to Evidence to Prevent Jury 

From Seeing It

i. Background

During trial, the prosecutor introduced evidence of a report prepared by the 

Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms (ATF) for a gun that was seen in a photograph 

on D.V.’s phone. Defense counsel objected to the report on the grounds that it was 

hearsay and lacked foundation, which the trial court overruled. The report indicated that 

the gun was initially sold by the manufacturer to the New Hampshire State Police in 

August 2007. 

During his closing argument, the prosecutor commented, “Exhibit 22 [(the ATF 

report)]. This was an exhibit counsel objected to. She didn’t want it into evidence.” 
23

Defense counsel objected to this statement on the ground of prosecutorial misconduct, 

which the trial court overruled. 

ii. Analysis

Quiles argues the prosecutor committed misconduct when he asserted that defense 

counsel did not want the jury to see the ATF report. Quiles insists that defense counsel’s 

evidentiary objections should not be weighed against him. 

Even if we construed the prosecutor’s comment to be misconduct, it did not 

amount to reversible error. The comment by the prosecutor was relatively brief in the 

face of strong evidence of Quiles’s guilt, and the trial court had already admonished the 

jury that nothing that the attorneys said was considered evidence. Additionally, the ATF 

report was not particularly probative of Quiles’s guilt, so the prosecutor’s assertion that 

defense counsel did not want the jury to see the report had little prejudicial effect. Given 

the context of the statements, we do not believe it is reasonably probable that Quiles 

would have received a more favorable verdict in the absence of error. (People v. Stewart, 

supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 499.) 

e. Reference to Witness’s Immunity Agreement

i. Background

M.M. testified under an immunity agreement. The prosecutor’s petition 

requesting the immunity agreement did not expressly state the reason why immunity was 

sought, only that M.M. had exculpatory evidence about Azure that corroborated Azure’s 

statement to the police. Before M.M. testified, the prosecutor explained outside the 

presence of the jury that he sought the immunity agreement because “there’s potentiality 

for Fifth Amendment rights at issue here to the extent [M.M.’s] asked about her 

recollection whether she recorded [the conversation] or not.” Thereafter, the trial court 

signed the immunity agreement. 

During closing argument, the prosecutor argued that M.M. had an immunity 

agreement with the prosecution because she recorded the conversation between Quiles 
24

and Azure’s brother. The prosecutor stated, “[Defense c]ounsel says you don’t know 

who recorded [the conversation] and when it happened. Yes, you do. There’s only two 

people who could have recorded that. And she was asked this over and over again, and 

she stuck to her guns. I was there and [Azure’s brother] was there. She didn’t remember 

anybody else. She wasn’t going to say or didn’t say I recorded it. That’s why she has 

immunity, not because there’s some nefarious, sinister thing she’s done in this case.” 

Defense counsel objected to the argument as misconduct, arguing that the 

prosecutor was not permitted to say “why a witness has immunity.” The trial court 

overruled the objection. The prosecutor then said, “The petition was submitted to this 

Court explaining why immunity was required. Counsel has a copy of it. [¶] It’s illegal to 

record a conversation with certain exceptions. That’s why she has immunity. Okay? 

That’s why she was granted it. There’s no evidence in this case that she was plotting the 

murder of this drug dealer.” 

ii. Analysis

Quiles argues that the prosecutor’s argument constituted misconduct because there 

was no evidence before the jury about why M.M. testified under an immunity agreement, 

and we agree. In general, counsel cannot misstate or mischaracterize the evidence or give 

their personal opinion, nor can they imply the existence of evidence that is not in the 

record. (People v. Avena (1996) 13 Cal.4th 394, 420-421; People v. Lucas, supra, 12 

Cal.4th at pp. 472-473; People v. Kirkes (1952) 39 Cal.2d 719, 724.) During trial, the 

prosecutor explained to the trial court why he sought an immunity agreement for M.M. 

outside the jury’s presence. 

Assuming the prosecutor’s comment constituted misconduct, we find no prejudice. 

The references to M.M.’s immunity agreement were only marginally probative and were 

collateral to the main issues raised at trial. The prosecutor intended to argue that M.M. 

had no ulterior motive for making the recording between Quiles and Azure’s brother. In 

fact, there was little evidence to suggest that M.M. had such an ulterior motive. 
25

Moreover, as we have described, the jury was already advised that the attorneys’ 

arguments were not evidence, and there was strong evidence of Quiles’s guilt. 

Accordingly, any error was harmless.

f. Cumulative Impact of the Misconduct and Violation of Due Process 

Finally, Quiles argues that the cumulative instances of prosecutorial misconduct 

warrant reversal of his convictions. “Under the ‘cumulative error’ doctrine, errors that 

are individually harmless may nevertheless have a cumulative effect that is prejudicial.” 

(In re Avena (1996) 12 Cal.4th 694, 772, fn. 32.) “A claim of cumulative error is in 

essence a due process claim and is often presented as such [citation]. ‘The “litmus test” 

for cumulative error “is whether defendant received due process and a fair trial.” ’ ” 

(People v. Rivas (2013) 214 Cal.App.4th 1410, 1436.) 

We have either found that no misconduct occurred or that each individual case of 

misconduct was not prejudicial. We conclude that even if we cumulate the prejudicial 

impacts of any alleged misconduct, reversal is not required. Quiles “ ‘has merely shown 

that his “ ‘trial was not perfect—few are.’ ” ’ ” (People v. Bradford (1997) 14 Cal.4th 

1005, 1057.) For these same reasons, we also find no merit in Quiles’s claim, raised in 

his supplemental opening brief, that the prosecutorial misconduct violated his due process

rights under the Fourteenth Amendment.

4. Judicial Misconduct

After the jury returned its verdict, Quiles moved for a new trial on the ground of 

judicial bias. The trial court judge refused to permit defense counsel to present live 

testimony and denied the motion based on the declarations attached to defense counsel’s 

new trial motion. 

a. General Principles and Standard of Review

“We review claims of judicial misconduct on the basis of the entire record.” 

(People v. Peoples (2016) 62 Cal.4th 718, 789.) “A trial court should . . . refrain from 

making comments before the jury that might suggest it has allied itself with the 
26

prosecution. [Citation.] For example, ‘[a] trial court commits misconduct if it “persists 

in making discourteous and disparaging remarks to a defendant’s counsel . . . and utters 

frequent comment from which the jury may plainly perceive that the testimony of the 

witnesses is not believed by the judge, and in other ways discredits the cause of the 

defense . . . .” ’ ” (Seumanu, supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 1320.) A trial court “ ‘should be 

exceedingly discreet in what they say and do in the presence of a jury lest they seem to 

lean toward or lend their influence to one side or the other.’ ” (People v. Sturm (2006) 37 

Cal.4th 1218, 1237.)

“ ‘ “ ‘[O]ur role . . . is not to determine whether the trial [court’s] conduct left 

something to be desired, or even whether some comments would have been better left 

unsaid. Rather, we must determine whether the [court’s] behavior was so prejudicial that 

it denied [the defendant] a fair, as opposed to a perfect, trial.’ ” ’ ” (Seumanu, supra, 61 

Cal.4th at p. 1321.) Generally, “a specific and timely objection to judicial misconduct is 

required to preserve the claim for appellate review.” (Id. at p. 1320.) However, “a 

defendant’s failure to object does not preclude review ‘when an objection and an 

admonition could not cure the prejudice caused by’ such misconduct.” (People v.

Perkins (2003) 109 Cal.App.4th 1562, 1567.)

A new trial motion is typically governed by section 1181, which delineates nine 

grounds for a new trial. Section 1181 states that a new trial motion may be granted only 

on the grounds stated in that section, and judicial misconduct is not one of the listed 

grounds. Nonetheless, “new trials are frequently granted on nonstatutory grounds where 

the failure to do so would result in a denial of a fair trial to a defendant in a criminal 

case. . . . [¶] . . . [¶] The power to grant a new trial on such nonstatutory grounds 

obviously is derived from the trial court’s constitutional duty to insure an accused a fair 

trial.” (People v. Davis (1973) 31 Cal.App.3d 106, 109-110.)

“ ‘ “The determination of a motion for a new trial rests so completely within the 

court’s discretion that its action will not be disturbed unless a manifest and unmistakable 
27

abuse of discretion clearly appears.” ’ ” (People v. Delgado (1993) 5 Cal.4th 312, 328.) 

“Such an abuse of discretion arises if the trial court based its decision on impermissible 

factors [citation] or on an incorrect legal standard [citations].” (People v. Knoller (2007) 

41 Cal.4th 139, 156.) “ ‘ “[I]n determining whether there has been a proper exercise of 

discretion on such a motion, each case must be judged from its own factual 

background.” ’ ” (Delgado, supra, at p. 328.) Moreover, when constitutional rights are 

at stake, our standard of review must comport with the “usual practice for review of 

mixed question determinations affecting constitutional rights.” (People v. Cromer (2001) 

24 Cal.4th 889, 901.) When reviewing a mixed question, we defer to the trial court’s 

findings of fact and apply an independent review on questions of law and on mixed 

fact-law questions. (See People v. Alvarez (1996) 14 Cal.4th 155, 182.)

b. Background

i. The New Trial Motion

On July 21, 2017, defense counsel filed a motion for a new trial alleging claims of 

prosecutorial and judicial misconduct. In support of the motion, defense counsel 

submitted a declaration that she prepared. Defense counsel declared that the trial court 

judge’s “manner of speech,” “physical demeanor,” and “rulings” demonstrated a bias 

against the defense. The declaration also outlined several instances where defense 

counsel believed the judge engaged in misconduct.

First, defense counsel alleged that the trial court judge became hostile toward her 

after she requested that her client be present at all proceedings. According to defense 

counsel, the judge rolled his eyes, scowled, and crossed his arms when defense counsel 

addressed the court. Defense counsel characterized the judge’s vocal inflections as 

abrasive and his responses to defense counsel as abrupt. The judge “ignored [defense 

counsel], would not look at [defense counsel] when [she] spoke, and consistently sided 

with the prosecution. The [judge] consistently denied [defense counsel’s] requests to 

approach the bench for discussions but granted the same requests by the prosecutor.” 
28

Second, defense counsel claimed that the trial court judge consistently interrupted 

her during voir dire “in an aggressive manner, belittled [her] in front of jurors, and 

interrupted [her] Opening Statements.” 

Third, the trial court judge attempted to have an off-the-record discussion with 

defense counsel about a juror despite counsel’s earlier request that her client be present 

for all proceedings. When defense counsel informed the judge that she was not going to 

agree to participate in the off-the-record discussion, he “yell[ed] for [defense counsel] to 

return” to chambers in front of the juror in question. 

Next, defense counsel claimed that the prosecutor violated the trial court judge’s 

rulings on his motions in limine multiple times during his opening statement by including 

an unredacted photograph in his PowerPoint presentation. Defense counsel objected to 

the photograph and brought the violation to the judge’s attention. The prosecutor 

explained that he had forgotten to take out the photograph, but the judge did not 

reprimand the prosecutor or give the jury a curative instruction. 

Defense counsel also cited to instances where she believed the trial court judge 

demonstrated bias against her during the presentation of evidence. For example, during 

trial, the prosecutor wanted “to present a video of cooperating witness [D.V.]” Defense 

counsel objected to certain portions of the transcript of the video being admitted into 

evidence. The judge “did not review the transcript and allowed the video [to] be shown 

to the jury.” 

In another example, defense counsel stated during her closing argument that a 

certain phone number was associated with Wofford during her closing argument. The 

prosecutor objected to defense counsel’s statement, and the trial court judge sustained the 

objection and would not permit defense counsel to make her argument. Defense counsel 

informed the judge that she possessed the trial transcript that supported her claim that the 

phone number was associated with Wofford, but the judge indicated that he was not 

going to review the transcript and did not permit defense counsel to make her argument. 
29

Finally, defense counsel was informed that the trial court judge and the prosecutor 

had an ex parte communication about why exhibits were not ready for the jury. The 

prosecutor represented that he had e-mailed defense counsel a list of exhibits, and she did 

not respond. Defense counsel was not aware if any information about the case was 

discussed outside her presence. 

ii. Motion to Disqualify

On October 13, 2017, defense counsel filed a motion seeking to disqualify the trial 

court judge under Code of Civil Procedure section 170.1, subdivision (a)(6) on the 

grounds that the judge was not impartial and had a bias or prejudice against defense 

counsel. On October 19, 2017, the trial court judge filed an order striking the motion 

finding that defense counsel’s motion did not disclose legal grounds for disqualification 

and the motion was not timely filed.7 

iii. Supplemental Statement of the Case and Fact 

On January 26, 2018, defense counsel filed a supplemental statement of the case 

and facts in support of her motion for a new trial. 

Attached to the motion was a declaration prepared by the defense’s private 

investigator. In his declaration, the investigator stated that he was present for the 

majority of Quiles’s trial and observed the testimony of many witnesses, including Azure. 

According to the investigator, the trial court judge’s “distaste” for defense counsel “was 

evident throughout the trial,” and the judge oftentimes sustained objections with crossed 

arms and scowls. In contrast, the judge “spoke respectfully and behaved politely” when 

interacting with the prosecutor. The investigator observed that he did not see any acts 

taken by defense counsel that would warrant the judge’s “disrespectful and demeaning 

behavior.” The investigator further stated that “[p]art of what made this behavior so 

7 Quiles sought writ review of the order striking his motion to disqualify, which 

this court summarily denied in H045196, Quiles v. Superior Court. 
30

disrespectful was the blatant sexism exhibited by [the court].” The investigator, who had 

been licensed since 1999, asserted that he had “never seen a judge behave as 

disrespectfully towards an attorney as [the court] did towards [defense counsel].” 

Also attached to the motion was a declaration prepared by a private attorney who 

was present during a portion of Quiles’s trial. In his declaration, the private attorney 

stated that during Azure’s cross-examination, the trial court judge “had his arms crossed 

and scowled at [defense counsel]. [The judge] rolled his eyes at [defense counsel] when 

she was looking away and appeared to harbor extreme dislike for her.” Furthermore, 

when the prosecutor objected to defense counsel’s attempt to lay a foundation for 

evidence concerning a phone number, the judge sustained the prosecutor’s objections 

“with his arms crossed and a pronounced scowl” in defense counsel’s direction. The 

private attorney believed that the judge’s actions toward defense counsel stood in contrast 

to his respectful and polite attitude toward the prosecutor. 

iv. The Hearings

On February 22, 2018, the trial court judge held a hearing and discussed 

scheduling issues for the new trial motion. Defense counsel told the trial court that she 

wanted to present live testimony at the hearing because the People were objecting to 

using the declarations as evidence.8

On March 23, 2018, the trial court judge held a hearing on the new trial motion. 

Defense counsel requested a continuance, explaining that she had two witnesses that 

needed to give testimony on the matter. 

In response, the trial court judge stated, “[w]e’re not going to have an evidentiary 

hearing. I’m not going to call witnesses.” The judge explained that he did not believe it 

was necessary to call witnesses because he did not think that witness testimony would 

8 The prosecutor’s opposition to defense counsel’s motion for a new trial objected 

to the use of declarations as hearsay. 
31

assist in making his determination. The judge stated that the matter would be “decided 

on the papers and on the declarations and exhibits that [defense counsel] filed with [her] 

motion.” 

The trial court judge made his ruling after hearing argument from the parties. 

First, the judge found no instances of prosecutorial misconduct and no showing of 

prejudice to Quiles based on the prosecutor’s actions. 

Second, the trial court judge addressed the claims of judicial misconduct, stating: 

“I think that [the claims are] exaggerated. I don’t think that I committed most of the 

things that you have indicated or any of the things that you’ve indicated in your brief. I 

was not prejudiced against you or your client. There were some discussions that took 

place, some heated discussions that took place between you and I during the trial. There 

were some things that came up that required those discussions. And just because there 

was a heated discussion or I ruled against you does not mean that I was prejudiced 

against you. And I don’t think I was. And I don’t think that the things that you’ve raised 

in your brief or in your declarations or in the declarations you submitted with your brief 

were true. And on that basis—that’s one of the bases. [¶] And the other thing is that, 

even if I were to accept your statements as true, which I don’t, I don’t think it in any way 

affected the jury’s verdict. There’s certainly no prejudice to Mr. Quiles, but I’m not 

admitting that I did any of those things. [¶] And, finally, the assertion of judicial 

misconduct is not even a ground for new trial under Penal Code Section 1181. And if 

you read 1181, it’s very specific that the grounds stated therein are the only grounds for 

which a new trial may be brought.” 

v. Other Instances of Judicial Misconduct Not Raised in New Trial Motion

In his opening brief, Quiles discusses several other instances of alleged judicial 

misconduct that were not raised in his new trial motion. Quiles alleges that on March 14, 

2017, the trial court judge lost his patience with defense counsel when she began to make 
32

certain arguments. Next, Quiles argues that the judge repeatedly inserted himself into 

defense counsel’s examination of prospective jurors during voir dire. 

Quiles also makes general observations about the trial court judge’s demeanor 

during trial. He argues that the record reflects that the prosecutor made speaking 

objections without admonishment or censure from the trial court. Moreover, Quiles 

insists that the prosecutor was routinely permitted to approach the bench, but defense 

counsel was often denied that same opportunity. Quiles asserts that bias against defense 

counsel was further shown by the fact that the judge often accepted representations made 

by the prosecutor without question. 

c. Forfeiture of Claims

Preliminarily, the People argue that Quiles’s claims of judicial misconduct have 

been forfeited because he did not make specific and contemporaneous objections to the 

claimed instances of misconduct during his trial, nor did he request the jury be 

admonished. (See Seumanu, supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 1320; see also People v. Fudge

(1994) 7 Cal.4th 1075, 1108.) Generally, “a specific and timely objection to judicial 

misconduct is required to preserve the claim for appellate review.” (Seumanu, supra, at 

p. 1320.) Quiles belatedly raised some of his claims of judicial misconduct in his motion 

for a new trial after the trial had concluded and failed to raise some of his other claims 

until he filed his appeal. Quiles argues that the claims raised in the new trial motion are 

not forfeited, but we disagree. The filing of the new trial motion was not a substitute for 

a timely, specific objection at trial because it could not give the trial court the opportunity 

to correct any error and mitigate prejudice. (See People v. Williams (1997) 16 Cal.4th 

153, 254 [new trial motion did not properly preserve claims of prosecutorial misconduct]; 

see also People v. Cowan (2010) 50 Cal.4th 401, 506 [new trial motion did not preserve 

claim evidentiary error].)

We acknowledge that “a defendant’s failure to object does not preclude review 

‘when an objection and an admonition could not cure the prejudice caused by’ such 
33

misconduct.” (People v. Perkins, supra, 109 Cal.App.4th at p. 1567.) The declarations 

submitted by defense counsel in support of her new trial motion describe the trial court 

judge as highly antagonistic toward defense counsel. However, we have reviewed the 

entirety of the trial transcript, and although there are instances where the judge rebuked 

defense counsel and overruled defense counsel’s objections, there are also multiple 

instances where the trial court ruled in defense counsel’s favor. The record does not 

demonstrate that an objection to the purported misconduct would have been futile. 

Accordingly, Quiles’s claims have not been preserved on appeal. 

d. Claims of Misconduct Were Meritless

Moreover, even if we assume that the judicial misconduct claims were not 

forfeited, the misconduct does not warrant reversal of Quiles’s convictions.

First, the instances where the trial court judge displayed impatience toward 

defense counsel are not misconduct. (People v. Snow (2003) 30 Cal.4th 43, 78 (Snow) 

[judicial bias not shown where trial judge was sometimes impatient and exchanges with 

defense counsel were occasionally “especially contentious”].) “ ‘[O]ur role . . . is not to 

determine whether the trial judge’s conduct left something to be desired, or even whether 

some comments would have been better left unsaid. Rather, we must determine whether 

the judge’s behavior was so prejudicial that it denied [the defendant] a fair, as opposed to 

a perfect, trial.’ ” (Ibid.) “[M]anifestations of friction between court and counsel, while 

not desirable, are virtually inevitable in a long trial.” (Id. at pp. 78-79.) Bias and 

partiality are not demonstrated by “expressions of impatience, dissatisfaction, annoyance, 

and even anger, that are within the bounds of what imperfect men and women, even after 

having been confirmed as . . . judges, sometimes display.” (Liteky v. United States

(1994) 510 U.S. 540, 555-556.)

Quiles also argues that judicial bias is demonstrated by the trial court judge’s 

preferential treatment of the prosecutor. For example, Quiles claims that the judge did 

not properly consider defense counsel’s objections during trial. Although the judge’s 
34

rulings on some of defense counsel’s objections were brusque, he did not disparage 

defense counsel during his rulings. “Moreover, a trial court’s numerous rulings against a 

party—even when erroneous—do not establish a charge of judicial bias, especially when 

they are subject to review.” (People v. Guerra (2006) 37 Cal.4th 1067, 1112, overruled 

on other grounds as stated in People v. Rundle (2008) 43 Cal.4th 76, 151.) And even if 

some of the trial judge’s rulings were erroneous, the erroneous rulings were not so 

pervasive as to render the trial fundamentally unfair. (Snow, supra, 30 Cal.4th at p. 78.) 

We also find no merit in Quiles’s claim that he was entitled to an evidentiary 

hearing on his new trial motion with the ability to call live witnesses. Quiles does not 

cite to any authority for the proposition that a trial court is required to permit witness 

testimony in connection with a new trial motion alleging claims of judicial misconduct.9 

In the context of a new trial motion based on juror misconduct, our Supreme Court has 

consistently held that an evidentiary hearing is not required, and the trial court’s only 

obligation is to “ ‘ “ ‘make whatever inquiry is reasonably necessary’ ” to resolve the 

matter.’ ” (People v. Mora and Rangel (2018) 5 Cal.5th 442, 517; People v. Williams 

(1997) 16 Cal.4th 635, 686 [trial court can hold evidentiary hearing when defendant 

moves for new trial based on jury misconduct, but hearing should be held only when trial 

court concludes an evidentiary hearing is necessary to resolve material, disputed issues of 

fact].) Our Supreme Court has also found that an evidentiary hearing is not required on a 

9

In his opening brief, Quiles argues that failure to permit live testimony had the 

effect of precluding “intelligent appellate review” of his claims of judicial misconduct, 

citing People v. Cruz (1978) 83 Cal.App.3d 308, 318. In Cruz, the appellate court 

determined that the trial court failed in its duty of inquiry in determining the defendant’s 

reason for requesting substitution of an appointed attorney under People v. Marsden 

(1970) 2 Cal.3d 118. (Cruz, supra, at pp. 317-318.) Quiles’s new trial motion is not a 

Marsden motion, and Cruz is not completely analogous to Quiles’s case. Moreover, 

precluding live witness testimony does not prohibit this court from examining Quiles’s 

claims. The declarations attached to the motion for new trial contain detailed 

descriptions of the trial court judge’s alleged misconduct.
35

new trial motion alleging ineffective assistance of counsel. (People v. Hoyt (2020) 8 

Cal.5th 892, 957.)

Finally, Quiles points to the trial court judge’s refusal to permit live witness 

testimony and argues that a reasonable person would view this decision as raising doubts 

as to the judge’s impartiality. On the surface, the fact that the judge entertained claims 

pertaining to his own misconduct may raise a shadow of impropriety. Quiles, however, 

already challenged the judge’s decision to strike his disqualification motion by way of a 

writ petition, which this court denied. And on this record, we cannot say it was 

unreasonable for the judge to proceed without live witness testimony. The declarations 

submitted by defense counsel contained detailed factual accounts of the claimed instances 

of misconduct, and the judge may have reasonably concluded that an evidentiary hearing 

was not necessary to resolve any factual disputes. 

In sum, we do not believe the trial court judge abused his discretion when he 

denied Quiles’s motion for a new trial. And since we find that the judge did not abuse his 

discretion when he denied the motion, we also find no merit in Quiles’s claim that the 

denial of the motion violated his due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment.

5. Cumulative Error 

Quiles argues that the cumulative effect of his claimed errors—the evidentiary 

errors, the prosecutorial misconduct, and the judicial misconduct—resulted in a 

miscarriage of justice that requires the reversal of the judgment. As we previously 

explained, errors that are individually harmless may have a cumulative effect that is 

prejudicial. (In re Avena, supra, 12 Cal.4th at p. 772, fn. 32.) To the extent that we have 

found errors, we have individually found them to be harmless. Moreover, we conclude 

that even if we cumulate the alleged errors, it is not reasonably probable that Quiles 

would have received a more favorable outcome in their absence. Therefore, we must 

reject his claim of cumulative prejudice.
36

6. Failure to Instruct with CALCRIM No. 703

Quiles argues that the jury’s determination that he did not personally use a firearm 

during the commission of the offense (§ 12022.53, subd. (d)) supports a finding that he 

was not the actual killer. Thus, he asserts that the jury’s true finding on the 

robbery-murder special circumstance (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(17)) must be reversed because 

the jury was not instructed with CALCRIM No. 703. 

a. Background

At the close of evidence, the trial court discussed the proposed jury instructions 

with counsel. The trial court asked, “Also, the proposed instruction that was submitted, 

CalCrim 703, both parties have agreed that that instruction should not be given. 

Correct?” Defense counsel and the prosecutor both answered, “Correct.” 

Thereafter, the jury was instructed with CALCRIM No. 540A on felony murder, 

which states in part: “The defendant is charged in Count 1 with murder under the theory 

of felony murder. [¶] To prove that the defendant is guilty of first degree murder under 

this theory, the People must prove that, one, the defendant committed or attempted to 

commit the crime of robbery; two, the defendant intended to commit the crime of 

robbery; and three, while committing or attempting to commit the crime of robbery, the 

defendant caused the death of another person. [¶] A person may be guilty of felony 

murder even if the killing was unintentional, accidental, or negligent. To decide whether 

the defendant committed or attempted to commit the crime of robbery, please refer to the 

separate instruction I will give you on that crime. You must apply those instructions 

when you decide whether the People have proved first degree murder under a theory of 

felony murder.” 

The jury was also instructed with CALCRIM No. 3149 on the allegation that 

Quiles personally used a firearm during the commission of the offense, which states in 

part: “If you find the defendant guilty of the crime charged in Count 1, you must then 

decide whether the People have proved the additional allegation that the defendant 
37

personally and intentionally discharged a firearm during that crime causing death. [¶] To 

prove this allegation, the People must prove that, one, the defendant personally 

discharged a firearm during the commission or attempted commission of that crime; two, 

the defendant intended to discharge the firearm; and three, the defendant’s act caused the 

death of a person.” 

Finally, the jury was instructed with CALCRIM No. 730 on the robbery-murder 

special circumstance (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(17)), which states in pertinent part: “The 

defendant is charged with a special circumstance of murder committed while engaged in 

the commission of a robbery in violation of Penal Code Section 190.2(a)(17). To prove 

that this special circumstance is true, the People must prove that, one, defendant 

committed or attempted to commit the crime of robbery; two, the defendant intended to 

commit the crime of robbery; and three, the defendant did an act that caused the death of 

another person. [¶] To decide whether the defendant committed or attempt to commit the 

crime of robbery, please refer to the separate instruction I’ve given you on that crime. 

You must apply those instructions when you decide whether the People have proved this 

special circumstance. The defendant must have intended to commit the crime of robbery 

before or at the time of the act causing death. [¶] In addition, in order for this special 

circumstance to be true, the People must prove that the defendant intended to commit the 

crime of robbery independent of the killing. If you find that the defendant only intended 

to commit murder and the commission of robbery was merely part of or incidental to the 

commission of that murder, then the special circumstance has not been proved.” 

b. General Principles and Standard of Review

Section 190.2, subdivision (a)(17) provides, “The penalty for a defendant who is 

found guilty of murder in the first degree is death or imprisonment in the state prison for 

life without the possibility of parole if one or more of the following special circumstances 

has been found under Section 190.4 to be true: [¶] . . . [¶] (17) The murder was 

committed while the defendant was engaged in, or was an accomplice in, the commission 
38

of, attempted commission of, or the immediate flight after committing, or attempting to 

commit, the following felonies: [¶] (A) Robbery in violation of Section 211 or 212.5.”

Section 190.2, further provides: “(b) Unless an intent to kill is specifically 

required under subdivision (a) for a special circumstance enumerated therein, an actual 

killer, as to whom the special circumstance has been found to be true under 

Section 190.4, need not have had any intent to kill at the time of the commission of the 

offense which is the basis of the special circumstance in order to suffer death or 

confinement in the state prison for life without the possibility of parole. [¶] (c) Every 

person, not the actual killer, who, with the intent to kill, aids, abets, counsels, commands, 

induces, solicits, requests, or assists any actor in the commission of murder in the first 

degree shall be punished by death or imprisonment in the state prison for life without the 

possibility of parole if one or more of the special circumstances enumerated in 

subdivision (a) has been found to be true under Section 190.4. [¶] (d) Notwithstanding 

subdivision (c), every person, not the actual killer, who, with reckless indifference to 

human life and as a major participant, aids, abets, counsels, commands, induces, solicits, 

requests, or assists in the commission of a felony enumerated in paragraph (17) of 

subdivision (a) which results in the death of some person or persons, and who is found 

guilty of murder in the first degree therefor, shall be punished by death or imprisonment 

in the state prison for life without the possibility of parole if a special circumstance 

enumerated in paragraph (17) of subdivision (a) has been found to be true under 

Section 190.4.” (Italics added.)

Based on the language of section 190.2, the robbery-murder special circumstance 

can be found true if any of the following three theories are proven: (1) The defendant is 

the actual killer. If the defendant is the actual killer, the defendant need not have an 

intent to kill. (§ 190.2, subd. (b).) (2) The defendant is not the actual killer, but, with the 

intent to kill, aids or abets “any actor” in the commission of the murder. (§ 190.2, 

subd. (c).) (3) The defendant is not the actual killer and did not have an intent to kill but 
39

aids and abets in the underlying felony, was a major participant in the underlying felony, 

and acted with reckless indifference to human life. (§ 190.2, subd. (d).)

Here, the jury was instructed with CALCRIM No. 730, the robbery-murder special 

circumstance instruction based on the theory that the defendant was the actual killer. The 

jury was not instructed with CALCRIM No. 703, the robbery-murder special 

circumstance instruction based on the two theories where the defendant was not the 

actual killer. 

In part, CALCRIM No. 703 provides as follows: “If you decide that [the] 

defendant is guilty of first degree murder but was not the actual killer, then, when you 

consider the special circumstance[s] of [robbery-murder], you must also decide whether 

the defendant acted either with intent to kill or with reckless indifference to human life. 

[¶] In order to prove [this] special circumstance[] for a defendant who is not the actual 

killer but who is guilty of first degree murder as (an aider and abettor/[or] a member of a 

conspiracy), the People must prove either that the defendant intended to kill, or the 

People must prove all of the following: [¶] 1. The defendant’s participation in the crime 

began before or during the killing; [¶] 2. The defendant was a major participant in the 

crime; [¶] AND [¶] 3. When the defendant participated in the crime, [he] acted with 

reckless indifference to human life.” 

The Bench Notes to CALCRIM No. 730 indicate that the trial court has the duty to 

give CALCRIM No. 703 when “the evidence raises the potential for accomplice 

liability.” Likewise, the Bench Notes to CALCRIM No. 703 state, “[t]he court has a sua 

sponte duty to instruct the jury on the mental state required for accomplice liability when 

a special circumstance is charged and there is sufficient evidence to support the finding 

that the defendant was not the actual killer. [Citation.] If there is sufficient evidence to 

show that the defendant may have been an accomplice and not the actual killer, the court 

has a sua sponte duty to give the accomplice intent instruction, regardless of the 

prosecution’s theory of the case.”
40

c. The Error Was Invited 

On appeal, Quiles argues that the special circumstance finding must be reversed 

because the jury was not instructed with CALCRIM No. 703. He argues that defense 

counsel in part argued that Azure was the actual shooter. Thus, he insists that the trial 

court’s sua sponte failure to instruct on the required elements for the special circumstance 

finding if the jury found that he was not the actual killer was prejudicial.

Quiles acknowledges that defense counsel expressly agreed not to have the jury be 

instructed with CALCRIM No. 703 but insists that the doctrine of invited error is not 

applicable because it “applies [only] when the defense has made a ‘ “ ‘ “conscious and 

deliberate tactical choice” ’ ” ’ in asking for the instruction in question.” (People v.

Merriman (2014) 60 Cal.4th 1, 104.) Quiles relies on People v. Souza (2012) 54 Cal.4th 

90, 114, where the Supreme Court held that the doctrine of invited error applies when 

defense counsel fails to request an instruction or objects to an instruction on lesser 

included offenses “only if counsel expresses a deliberate tactical purpose in resisting or 

acceding to the complained-of instruction.” (Ibid.) 

Here, defense counsel did not state her reasons for deliberately foregoing 

CALCRIM No. 703, but the fact that she did not state her reasons on the record does not 

preclude the application of the invited error doctrine. “[T]he record must show only that 

counsel made a conscious, deliberate tactical choice between having the instruction and 

not having it.” (People v. Cooper (1991) 53 Cal.3d 771, 831.) “In cases involving an 

action affirmatively taken by defense counsel, we have found a clearly implied tactical 

purpose to be sufficient to invoke the invited error rule.” (People v. Coffman and 

Marlow (2004) 34 Cal.4th 1, 49; accord, People v. Seaton (2001) 26 Cal.4th 598, 668 

[defendant invited any conceivable error in giving jury instructions because he asked the 

court to give them].) The record reflects that defense counsel expressly agreed to exclude 

CALCRIM No. 703 and had a clearly implied tactical purpose. As we have stated, 

defense counsel argued that “everything points to Mr. Azure being the shooter.” 
41

Based on defense counsel’s theory and argument, we can surmise that defense counsel 

decided to forego CALCRIM No. 703 because it would have permitted the jury to find 

Quiles guilty of murder based on two additional theories where he was the nonkiller, not 

solely on the theory that Quiles was the actual killer. 

Consequently, Quiles cannot now complain that the trial court erred when it failed 

to include this instruction.

d. Any Error Was Harmless

Even if we were to consider Quiles’s arguments on the merits, we would reject 

them. Quiles likens his case to People v. Mil (2012) 53 Cal.4th 400 (Mil). In Mil, the 

jury was instructed on the elements of the felony-murder special circumstance for a 

defendant who was an actual killer but was not fully instructed on the elements of the 

special circumstance for a defendant who was not the actual killer. The Court of Appeal 

determined that the jury must have convicted the defendant as an aider and abettor and 

not as the actual killer in accordance with the prosecution’s argument, and acknowledged 

that the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury on the elements of the special 

circumstance for a nonkiller. (Id. at p. 408.) However, the Court of Appeal subsequently 

determined that the error was not prejudicial in light of the overwhelming evidence of the 

required elements—that the defendant was a major participant in the underlying felony 

and that he acted with reckless indifference to human life. (Ibid.)

Mil, however, is distinguishable from Quiles’s case. Unlike in Mil, the prosecutor 

in this case did not argue that Quiles was guilty as an aider and abettor. (Mil, supra, 53 

Cal.4th at p. 408.) The prosecutor expressly argued that Quiles was the one who shot 

Wofford. 

Furthermore, the jury instructions reflect that the jury convicted Quiles based on 

the theory that he was the actual killer, not an aider and abettor. The jury was instructed 

with CALCRIM Nos. 540A and 730. CALCRIM No. 540A, the instruction on felony 

murder where the defendant allegedly committed the fatal act, requires the jury find that 
42

Quiles “caused the death of another person.” Likewise, CALCRIM No. 730 requires that 

Quiles “did an act that caused the death of another person.” In other words, when it 

reached its verdict, the jury found beyond a reasonable doubt that Quiles was the actual 

killer who committed an act that caused Wofford’s death. 

Accordingly, even if we assume that the trial court erred in failing to give 

CALCRIM No. 703, any error was not prejudicial and was harmless beyond a reasonable 

doubt. “ ‘We have consistently held that when a trial court fails to instruct the jury on an 

element of a special circumstance allegation, the prejudicial effect of the error must be 

measured under the test set forth in Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24.’ ” 

(Mil, supra, 53 Cal.4th at p. 409.) Any failure to instruct on the elements of being a 

major participant and acting with reckless indifference was harmless because those 

elements are required only when a jury finds that a defendant was not the actual killer.

Quiles disagrees and argues that the jury necessarily found that he was not the 

actual killer because it did not find the firearm enhancement under section 12022.53, 

subdivision (d) to be true. To find the section 12022.53, subdivision (d) enhancement to 

be true, the jury must find that the defendant personally and intentionally discharged a 

firearm during the commission or attempted commission of the crime, and the 

defendant’s act caused the victim’s death. 

Quiles, however, fails to acknowledge that “when the defendant is the actual 

killer, neither intent to kill nor reckless indifference to life is a constitutionally required 

element of the felony-murder special circumstance.” (People v. Jackson (2016) 1 Cal.5th 

269, 347.) In fact, CALCRIM No. 540A specifically instructed the jury that a person can 

be guilty of felony murder “even if the killing was unintentional, accidental, or 

negligent.” There is nothing incompatible with the jury’s determination that the People 

proved beyond a reasonable doubt that Quiles fired the fatal shot—and was the actual 

killer—but failed to meet its burden of proof to show that Quiles intentionally discharged 
43

the firearm as required under section 12022.53, subdivision (d). Accordingly, even if 

there was instructional error, it was harmless under any standard.

7. Constitutionality of the Special Circumstance

Lastly, Quiles challenges the constitutionality of robbery-murder special 

circumstance (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(17)). He argues that after the Legislature passed Senate 

Bill No. 1437, the felony murder rule has now eliminated any distinction between the 

robbery-murder special circumstance and the felony murder offense for nonkillers. Thus, 

he argues that the robbery-murder special circumstance no longer sufficiently narrows the 

class of murderers that are eligible for the death penalty or life without parole as required

under the Eighth Amendment. He also argues that the robbery-murder special 

circumstance is unconstitutionally vague in violation of due process.

a. Background

Before the enactment of Senate Bill No. 1437, section 189 defined felony murder 

as “[a]ll murder . . . which is committed in the perpetration of, or attempt to perpetrate” 

certain offenses including robbery. (Stats. 2010, ch. 178, § 51.) Under former section 

189, nonkillers could be liable for felony murder if they “knowingly and purposefully

participate[d] in the underlying felony even if they [took] no part in the actual killing.” 

(People v. Dominguez (2006) 39 Cal.4th 1141, 1159.)

“Senate Bill [No.] 1437 was enacted to ‘amend the felony murder rule and the 

natural and probable consequences doctrine, as it relates to murder, to ensure that murder 

liability is not imposed on a person who is not the actual killer, did not act with the intent 

to kill, or was not a major participant in the underlying felony who acted with reckless 

indifference to human life.’ (Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, § 1, subd. (f).) Substantively, Senate 

Bill [No.] 1437 accomplishes this by amending section 188, which defines malice, and 

section 189, which defines the degrees of murder, and as now amended, addresses felony 

murder liability. Senate Bill [No.] 1437 also adds . . . section 1170.95, which allows 

those ‘convicted of felony murder or murder under a natural and probable consequences 
44

theory . . . [to] file a petition with the court that sentenced the petitioner to have the 

petitioner’s murder conviction vacated and to be resentenced on any remaining 

counts . . . .’ (§ 1170.95, subd. (a).)” (People v. Martinez (2019) 31 Cal.App.5th 719, 

723.)

Following the passage of Senate Bill No. 1437, subdivision (e)(2) was added to 

section 189, and now limits liability for felony murder to actual killers, nonkillers who, 

“with the intent to kill, aided, abetted, counseled, commanded, induced, solicited, 

requested, or assisted the actual killer in the commission of murder in the first degree”; 

and subdivision (e)(3) nonkillers who were “major participant[s] in the underlying 

felon[ies] and acted with reckless indifference to human life . . . .” 

b. Lack of Standing 

Preliminarily, we observe that Quiles lacks standing to challenge the 

robbery-murder special circumstance under the Eighth Amendment with respect to 

nonkillers who were sentenced to death and life without parole. The People did not seek 

the death penalty in this case, and Quiles was not sentenced to death. (Houston v. Roe 

(9th Cir. 1999) 177 F.3d 901, 907.) Moreover, as we have determined, the jury’s verdict 

reflects that it found that Quiles was the actual killer.

c. Waiver of Argument 

Second, Quiles does not adequately develop his claim that the robbery-murder 

special circumstance in non-death penalty cases is unconstitutionally vague in violation 

of due process. Quiles merely cites to the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments and argues 

that failure to satisfy the constitutional narrowing requirement “constitutes a 

void-for-vagueness violation.” He does not provide further legal analysis of the issue; 

thus, we may deem this argument waived. (People v. Stanley (1995) 10 Cal.4th 764, 793 

[“ ‘[e]very brief should contain a legal argument with citation of authorities on the points 

made’ ”].) 
45

d. Duplicative Elements Do Not Render the Special Circumstance 

Unconstitutional

Even if we were to consider the merits of Quiles’s constitutional claims, we would 

reject them. First, a special circumstance that has overlapping elements or duplicates 

elements of the conviction offense does not violate the Eighth Amendment. (Lowenfield 

v. Phelps (1988) 484 U.S. 231 [single aggravating circumstance that duplicated an 

element of the underlying crime of first degree murder was constitutional despite 

duplication]; see People v. Rodriguez (1998) 66 Cal.App.4th 157, 164 [“that section 

190.2[, subdivision] (a)(21) contains a constitutional infirmity simply because it 

duplicates the elements which defined defendant’s murder as . . . first degree murder . . . 

has already been decided to have no merit”].) Thus, even assuming that section 190.2, 

subdivision (a)(17) duplicates the elements of felony murder for nonkillers, it is not 

unconstitutional under the Eighth Amendment. 

Second, Quiles’s claim that the robbery-murder special circumstance is 

unconstitutionally vague because it has the same elements as felony murder for nonkillers 

has no merit. Generally, statutes must be precise enough “to provide standards for its 

application and adjudication to avoid arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.” (People 

v. Andreasen (2013) 214 Cal.App.4th 70, 79-80.) However, the fact that the theory of 

felony murder and the robbery-murder special circumstance have duplicative elements 

does not render the statutes vague. (See id. at p. 80 [rejecting vagueness claim as applied 

to robbery-murder special circumstance for an actual killer].) 

Under section 189, a defendant is guilty of first degree murder if he or she kills 

during the commission of a robbery. Section 190 provides that first degree murder shall 

be punishable by death, imprisonment for life without the possibility of parole, or 

imprisonment for 25 years to life. Section 190.2, subdivision (a) provides that if the 

robbery-murder special circumstance is found true, a defendant is punishable by death or 

imprisonment for life without the possibility of parole.
46

As written, the statutes provided Quiles with notice that he would be subject to a 

sentence of 25 years to life without the possibility of parole, life without parole, or death, 

if he either committed a statutorily-specified felony and killed someone during the felony 

or was a nonkiller who satisfied the elements as described under the relevant statutes. 

“The mere fact that the prosecution has discretion to select which punishment it will seek 

does not render a statute unconstitutionally vague or create an improper risk of arbitrary 

enforcement of a criminal statute.” (People v. Andreasen, supra, 214 Cal.App.4th at 

p. 80.)

For these reasons, Quiles’s claim that the robbery-murder special circumstance is 

unconstitutional under the Eighth and the Fourteenth Amendments must be rejected.

DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed.
Premo, Acting P.J.

WE CONCUR:

Elia, J.

Bamattre-Manoukian, J.

People v. Quiles

H045800