About the Report

The recent resumption of attacks against the oil industry in 

the Niger Delta and the resultant increase in oil prices have 

reminded the world that the unrest there is not a problem 

for Nigeria alone. Indeed, the business of bunkering illegal 

oil, or blood oil, involves players far beyond the shores of 

Nigeria and will require an international effort to control it. 

Additionally, the broader issues of underdevelopment and 

overmilitarization of the Niger Delta, as well as the region’s 

lack of participation in the oil and gas industry, must be 

addressed before any lasting peace can be found. 

This report is based on the author’s extensive experience in the 

Niger Delta, where she has worked with Nigerian governments 

at the federal, state, and local levels; the oil and gas 

companies; the local communities; and members of the armed 

groups of the Niger Delta. It is also based on interviews with 

U.S., British, Dutch, and UN officials.

Judith Burdin Asuni is the founder and executive director of 

Academic Associates PeaceWorks. She is currently a visiting 

scholar at the Johns Hopkins University’s School of Advanced 

International Studies and will be a 2009–10 Jennings 

Randolph fellow at the United States Institute of Peace. 

1200 17th Street NW • Washington, DC 20036 • 202.457.1700 • fax 202.429.6063

Special Report 229 August 2009

© 2009 by the United States Institute of Peace. 

All rights reserved.

Contents

Introduction 2

An Enabling Environment 3

The Blood Oil Business 4

Nigerian Attempts to Tackle Blood Oil 6

International Attempts to Tackle Blood Oil 8

Recommendations for Tackling Blood Oil 10

Conclusions 16

Judith Burdin Asuni 

Blood Oil in the 

Niger Delta

Summary

•	 The trade in stolen oil, or “blood oil,” poses an immense challenge to the Nigerian state, 

harming its economy and fueling a long-running insurgency in the Niger Delta. It also 

undermines security in the Gulf of Guinea and adds to instability on world energy markets.

•	 The exact amount of oil stolen per day in the Niger Delta is unknown, but it is somewhere 

between 30,000 and 300,000 barrels. The loss to the Nigerian economy from illegal oil 

bunkering between 2003 and 2008 totals approximately US$100 billion. 

•	 It is time for the international community to become more proactive in helping Nigeria 

address this complex issue. Efforts to control blood oil must be accompanied by actions 

against corruption, illegal arms importation, and money laundering. 

•	 The enabling environment for illegal oil bunkering includes high levels of unemployed 

youth, armed ethnic militias, ineffective and corrupt law enforcement officials, protective 

government officials and politicians, corrupt oil company staff, established international 

markets for stolen oil, and the overall context of endemic corruption. 

•	 The three types of illegal oil bunkering include small-scale pilfering for the local market, 

large-scale tapping of pipelines to fill large tankers for export, and excess lifting of crude 

oil beyond the licensed amount.

•	 The complexity of players in the illegal oil bunkering business, including local youth, members of the Nigerian military and political class, and foreign ship owners, makes it difficult 

to tackle the problem unilaterally.

•	 Previous attempts by the Nigerian government and international community to address 

illegal oil bunkering have had limited success in reducing the flow of blood oil.

•	 The problem of blood oil needs to be addressed multilaterally. Within the international 

community, the United States is uniquely positioned to take a leadership role in helping to 

dry up blood oil and address other issues in the Niger Delta.

United States Institute of Peace www.usip.org

SPECIAL REPORT
2

Introduction

The trade in stolen oil, or “blood oil,” poses an immense challenge to the Nigerian state, 

harming its economy and fueling a long-running insurgency in the Niger Delta. So when the 

country’s president, Umaru Yar’Adua, asked the Group of Eight (G8) nations in July 2008 for 

help in tackling this hydra-headed problem, the international community was encouraged 

that perhaps Nigeria was finally ready to take the determined action it had put off for so 

long. Nigeria repeated its call at the United Nations in September and again in Washington 

in December 2008 and March 2009. Yet to date, no concrete action has been taken. It is time 

for the international community to become more proactive in helping Nigeria address this 

complex issue. It is in its own interests to do so. The negative effects of blood oil spread 

beyond the borders of Nigeria itself, undermining security in the Gulf of Guinea and adding 

to instability on world energy markets.

The term “blood oil” owes its origins to the “blood diamond” campaign, which raised 

awareness of the problem of diamond smuggling from African war zones and its role in 

funding conflict. The sale of stolen oil from the Niger Delta has had the same pernicious 

influence on that region’s conflict as diamonds did in the wars in Angola and Sierra Leone. 

The proceeds from oil theft are used to buy weapons and ammunition, helping to sustain the 

armed groups that are fighting the federal government. The armed groups are also invested 

in criminal enterprises such as drug trafficking. The act of stealing oil is known as “bunkering,” a term originally used to describe the process of filling a tanker with oil. 

The bunkering business is widespread and very profitable. One analyst, close to former 

President Olusegun Obasanjo, told the BBC that it “makes £30 million [then $60 million] a 

day; they’d kill you, me, anyone, in order to protect it.”1 Its tentacles spread beyond borders. 

One of the governors in the Niger Delta, the governor of Delta State, Emmanuel Uduaghan, 

has claimed that “anything happening in the Niger Delta today is linked to oil, and sustained 

by it, therefore something like illegal bunkering has a large international dimension to it. 

. . . All are needed to assist us to reduce the funding of the crisis which is through the 

illegal oil trade.”2 However, blood oil cannot be dealt with alone: efforts against it must be 

accompanied by actions against the other evils that go hand-in-hand with it—corruption, 

illegal arms importation, and money laundering. To mitigate the dangers to Nigerians and 

the Nigerian government in trying to tackle this issue, it is absolutely essential for them to 

have proper external support.

As an important source of high-quality oil, the twelfth largest producer in the world, 

there are important reasons why it is in the interests of the international community—

and the United States in particular—to take action. The United States, seeking to wean 

itself off oil imports from the Middle East, has increasingly turned to Africa as a means of 

enhancing its energy security. Until recently Nigeria was its fourth largest supplier, providing approximately one million barrels a day. But due in large part to supply problems caused 

by the Niger Delta insurgency and the wholesale theft of oil, U.S. imports from Nigeria 

have fallen of late.3 Insecurity in the Niger Delta is therefore not just a problem for the 

Nigerian government; it is also a problem for the United States and the wider world. At the 

moment, Nigeria’s oil industry is producing well under capacity. Nigeria’s maximum producing capacity is about 3.2 million barrels per day; however, current production is often half 

of that, even without OPEC quota limitations. Much of the country’s production is disrupted 

or shut-in—the oil stays in the ground because of security threats to oil facilities and their 

staff. Of the oil that is produced, a significant proportion is lost through pipeline vandalism, 

acts of sabotage, and theft. A well-known energy security analyst, David Goldwyn, told the 

Senate Foreign Relations Committee’s Subcommittee on African Affairs in September 2008 

The views expressed in this report do not necessarily 

reflect the views of the United States Institute of Peace, 

which does not advocate specific policy positions.

To request permission to photocopy or reprint materials, 

e-mail: permissions@usip.org

About the Institute

The United States Institute of Peace is an independent, 

nonpartisan institution established and funded by Congress. 

Its goals are to help prevent and resolve violent conflicts, 

promote post-conflict peacebuilding, and increase conflict 

management tools, capacity, and intellectual capital worldwide. The Institute does this by empowering others with 

knowledge, skills, and resources, as well as by its direct 

involvement in conflict zones around the globe.

Board of Directors

J. Robinson West (Chair), Chairman, PFC Energy, Washington, 

D.C. • George E. Moose (Vice Chairman), Adjunct Professor 

of Practice, The George Washington University, Washington, 

D.C. • Anne H. Cahn, Former Scholar in Residence, American 

University, Washington, D.C. • Chester A. Crocker, James R. 

Schlesinger Professor of Strategic Studies, School of Foreign 

Service, Georgetown University, Washington, D.C. • Ikram U. 

Khan, President, Quality Care Consultants, LLC., Las Vegas, 

Nev. • Kerry Kennedy, Human Rights Activist • Stephen D. 

Krasner, Graham H. Stuart Professor of International Relations at Stanford University • Jeremy A. Rabkin, Professor 

of Law, George Mason University, Arlington, Va. • Judy Van 

Rest, Executive Vice President, International Republican 

Institute, Washington, D.C. • Nancy Zirkin, Executive Vice 

President, Leadership Conference on Civil Rights 

Members Ex Officio

Hillary Rodham Clinton, Secretary of State • Robert M. Gates, 

Department of Defense • Ann E. Rondeau, Vice Admiral, U.S. 

Navy; President, National Defense University •

Richard H. Solomon, President, United States Institute 

of Peace (nonvoting)
3

that if Nigeria was to produce oil at capacity, it would play a major role in helping to lower 

and stabilize world oil prices.4

An Enabling Environment

Oil bunkering thrives in a climate of instability, conflict, and political chaos. Nigeria offers 

the perfect operating environment. A large, densely populated, and highly heterogeneous 

country of approximately 140 million people, Nigeria is a complex mixture of peoples and 

religions, all of whom have competing claims on an inefficient and corrupt government. 

There are approximately 350 ethnic groups and the population is divided evenly between 

Christians and Muslims. Since winning its independence from Britain in 1960, Nigeria has 

spent more time under military than civilian rule. Democracy has theoretically prevailed 

since 1999, under the stewardship of the Peoples Democratic Party (PDP). In reality, informal patronage networks define the political system. Elections have been marred by brazen 

vote rigging, intimidation, and violence. Although overall standards of governance have 

improved, Nigeria’s economic development continues to be held back by corruption and 

political instability. Nigeria has traditionally been ranked among the most corrupt countries 

in the world, according to Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index. 

The period since the restoration of democracy in 1999 has been characterized by unusually high levels of political violence centered on the Niger Delta, the heart of Nigeria’s oil 

industry. The Niger Delta consists of six or nine oil producing states in southern Nigeria, 

depending on one’s geopolitical definition. The core Niger Delta states are, from east to 

west, Rivers, Bayelsa, and Delta.

The Niger Delta is home to about 140 ethnic groups in the nine states included in a 

broader definition of the region. In common with other parts of Nigeria, this ethnic diversity 

has often led to competition for resources in the form of land, economic benefits, or political power. The presence of oil has only heightened these tensions. Perhaps due to the fact 

that 13 percent of the national oil revenue is paid back to oil-producing states, corruption is 

perceived as being more of a problem in the Niger Delta than in other parts of Nigeria.

While ethnic cleavages are intense in the Niger Delta, its inhabitants are united by a 

sense of grievance about the exploitation and neglect of their region. The people of the 

Niger Delta do not feel that the government of Nigeria has a contract with them. The federal 

government virtually ignored the Niger Delta during the 1990s, leaving development in the 

hands of the oil companies. The oil industry exploited and polluted the area, wiping out the 

traditional livelihoods of fishing and farming and providing few jobs or benefits in return. 

Despite its mineral wealth, the Niger Delta is one of the poorest regions in Nigeria. There is 

no infrastructure to speak of and the inhospitable geography of the region has added to the 

region’s remoteness from the rest of the country. Roads in the Delta cost four times more to 

build than those on dry land, leaving the canoe or motor boat as the primary form of transport. The difficulty of moving goods and people means that essential supplies—including 

petroleum products—cost more in the Niger Delta than in other parts of Nigeria. Thus, a 

combination of geography, ethnic tension, economic underdevelopment, and the presence 

of an industry that yields many disadvantages but few direct benefits to the people of the 

region have created a situation ripe for conflict. 

The Niger Delta has a long history of militant activity dating back to and beyond the 

discovery of oil in Bayelsa State in 1956. The Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People 

(MOSOP) led by Ken Saro-Wiwa, which flourished for a short period in the early 1990s, was 

the most celebrated example. In the past ten years, the mantle of resistance against the 

federal government has been taken up by the Ijaw people, the region’s largest ethnic group. 

Organizations such as the Ijaw National Congress and the Ijaw Youth Council sought to 

Oil bunkering thrives in a 

climate of instability, conflict, 

and political chaos. Nigeria 

offers the perfect operating 

environment. 

The oil industry exploited and 

polluted the area, wiping out 

the traditional livelihoods 

of fishing and farming and 

providing few jobs or benefits 

in return. 
4

nurture a sense of Ijaw nationalism and have demanded from the government a fairer share 

of the wealth that their region produces and damages from the oil companies for the pollution done to the Niger Delta by them. They have also sought a greater say in political life. 

The Niger Delta has also spawned a confusing array of armed groups, many of which mix 

ideological aims with criminal enterprises such as drug dealing, the kidnapping of oil workers, and—most lucrative of all—oil bunkering. They often enjoy the protection of senior 

politicians and are armed and paid by their patrons to mete out violence on their opponents 

and deliver the desired results at elections. Once the groups are given weapons, it is virtually 

impossible to demobilize them, even after their patrons no longer require their services.

The most coherent and well-organized armed group is the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND), which emerged at the beginning of 2006. Well trained and 

equipped with a formidable arsenal, it boasts a fluctuating membership of between 5,000 

and 10,000 and has claimed responsibility for a string of kidnappings and increasingly audacious attacks on oil facilities, some of them many miles off shore. It is also heavily involved 

in the oil-bunkering trade, which provides a steady stream of income to buy weapons. The 

direct link between bunkering, militancy, and conflict was demonstrated in the May 12–14, 

2009, attacks on the camp of Tom Polo, a MEND leader and bunkering kingpin in Delta 

State. The militants and the military seemingly had a clash over the protection of Tom Polo’s 

bunkering interests, which was a trigger for massive air and land attacks on the militants’ 

stronghold. Unfortunately innocent women, children, and elderly people, as well as two 

hostages held by Tom Polo (the BBC quoted 1,000 casualties5), were killed in the cross fire. 

These attacks also endangered an amnesty for all militant groups in the Niger Delta, which 

President Yar’Adua had offered in April 2009. In addition, MEND has carried out its promised 

massive armed strikes against oil facilities. Even this most cursory glance at the recent history of the Niger Delta illustrates that there are many factors that help to create an environment in which oil bunkering can flourish. The Niger Delta Peace and Security Secretariat, a 

group set up by civil society, the government, and the oil companies in 2005 to discuss the 

problems of the region, outlined a series of additional problems that have helped create an 

enabling environment for oil bunkering:

1. the high number of unemployed youths in the Niger Delta

2. the presence of armed ethnic militias who are familiar with the dense network of rivers 

that connect the region and allow easy access to unprotected oil pipelines

3. the ineffective and corrupt law enforcement officials and low conviction rates for those 

suspected oil bunkerers who are prosecuted

4. the protection or patronage offered by senior government officials and politicians who 

often use oil theft as a funding source for political campaigns

5. the relative ease of threatening or corrupting oil industry staff to assist in bunkering

6. the presence of an established international market for stolen oil, which includes West 

African (São Tomé, Liberia, Senegal, Côte d’Ivoire, Gambia), Moroccan, Venezuelan, 

Lebanese, French, and Dutch partners

7. the overall context of endemic corruption—traffickers “settle” or bribe local communities 

where the oil is tapped, “passage” communities through which the bunkered oil travels 

on its way to off-shore tankers,6 and navy officials along the route.7

The Blood Oil Business

It should be made clear from the outset that oil bunkering by its very nature is a murky, 

opaque business. There are many gaps in analysts’ knowledge of how the trade in blood oil 

operates. However, it is possible to make some general points. To begin, there are three 

The Niger Delta has spawned 

a confusing array of armed 

groups, many of which mix 

ideological aims with criminal 

enterprises such as drug dealing, 

the kidnapping of oil workers, 

and oil bunkering.
5

types of illegal bunkering. The first and least significant type involves the small-scale pilfering of condensate and petroleum product destined for the local market. In early 2009, the 

military Joint Task Force (JTF), which was brought into the Niger Delta following interethnic 

violence during the 2003 elections, closed down a number of small local refineries where 

the crude was being processed for local use. This kind of bunkering is minor and conducted 

by local people. 

A second type of illegal bunkering involves stealing crude oil either by hacking into the 

pipeline directly or by tapping the wellhead. This process involves removing the structure at 

the top (called the Christmas tree) and attaching a hose to siphon off the oil. From there, 

the oil is placed on small barges and taken out to sea, where it is loaded onto large ships 

lurking out of sight of the authorities. In return for their oil, the bunkerers receive money 

and weapons. The large tankers (which generally carry between 30,000 and 500,000 barrels 

of crude, but can carry up to two million barrels) take their cargo either to spot markets 

such as in Rotterdam or to refineries in other countries, such as Côte d’Ivoire. This type of 

bunkering is much more significant—not just in terms of the money involved but because 

of what the crude oil is often exchanged for: illegal weapons and drugs. There are large 

international syndicates involved in this operation, which also handle the money laundering 

for the international players.

While Niger Delta youth may handle the local tapping and loading, international players 

from Eastern Europe, Russia, Australia, Lebanon, the Netherlands, and France all play roles 

in financing, transporting, and laundering the money associated with blood oil. One money 

trail followed a path from Senegal and Côte d’Ivoire through French banks and French credit 

agencies to Syria and Lebanon.8 It also now appears that Nigerian Lebanese (those of Lebanese descent, born or naturalized in Nigeria) are heavily involved in the business, especially 

those with good political connections. Similarly, many top Nigerian politicians and military 

officers, both serving and retired, are said by internal sources, such as the army chief of 

staff, to be actively involved in the large-scale bunkering business. 

The third type of illegal bunkering involves the excess lifting of crude oil beyond the 

licensed amount, using forged bills of lading, which are the documents issued by a carrier 

to a shipper, listing and acknowledging receipt of goods for transport and specifying terms 

of delivery. This type of bunkering often involves a number of oil company staff and Nigeria’s state oil company, the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC), as well as top 

government officials who give the oil lifting contracts.

Thus it is possible to identify the main players involved in the oil bunkering business 

at its various levels. At the local level, Niger Delta youth and community leaders play the 

leading role. As one moves up the network to the senior echelons, members of the Nigerian 

military, oil company and NNPC employees, top politicians, and retired military officers 

predominate. At an international level, the countries mentioned previously are all involved. 

The crews of two bunkering ships—one Filipino, another Ghanaian—were recently arrested 

in Nigeria and shed some light on this shadowy network. 

The sheer number of players illustrates the complexity of the blood oil business. It 

should also be noted that while Niger Delta youth often fight over bunkering turf, resulting 

in casualties not only to themselves but to the residents of the region, the real benefactors 

are safely out of harm’s way, enjoying their profits.

The profits are not inconsiderable. The exact amount of oil stolen in Nigeria is unknown 

but it is significant. Estimates range between 30,000 and 300,000 barrels per day.9 Stolen 

crude refers to oil taken from pipelines or flow stations, as well as extra crude added to 

legitimate cargos that is not accounted for. A recent study by the International Centre 

for Reconciliation (ICR) put the total value lost to the Nigerian economy from stolen 

crude and disrupted oil production between 2003 and 2008 at N14 trillion (approximately 

While Niger Delta youth may 

handle the local tapping 

and loading, international 

players play roles in financing, 

transporting, and laundering 

the money associated with 

blood oil. 
6

US $100 billion).10 This is a rough estimate at best because the Nigerian government does 

not keep statistics that distinguish between stolen crude and shut-in production, nor 

between losses through bunkering and losses through forged bills of lading. 

The ICR report shows that although the actual volume of stolen crude went down 

between 2003 and September 2008, the total dollar loss to Nigeria steadily increased due 

to the rapid increase in the price of oil, which peaked at $147 per barrel in the summer of 

2008 (see table 1). Figures on current levels of oil bunkering are also difficult to come by and 

hard to evaluate. The picture appears to vary from company to company. While a security 

adviser with Chevron told this author that theft from its pipelines in the Western Delta has 

practically dropped to zero, a Shell Petroleum Development Corporation staff member confirmed that bunkering was still an issue and involved individuals from its host communities. 

An informant on the ground in Rivers State said that while bunkering by the Niger Delta 

youth had virtually stopped in that state, it was now being controlled by members of the 

Nigerian military. He explained that one of the most notorious bunkerers, Ateke Tom,11 had 

been chased into the creeks from his home in Okrika and reported that an army captain had 

seized control of the pipeline that Ateke had diverted to his own compound for bunkering 

purposes. It appears that oil theft is continuing in Bayelsa State, with the protection of 

the Nigerian military. The involvement of the Nigerian military in criminal networks is supported by a number of sources, including the current chief of defense staff and the chief 

of army staff.12 

Nigerian Attempts to Tackle Blood Oil

The Nigerian government has made some efforts to control bunkering in the past. However, 

these efforts were usually not sustained or were executed in a half-hearted manner. They 

have included the following:

Table 1. Estimated value of Nigeria’s stolen and shut-in oil production, January 

2000–September 2008

Year

Average 

price of 

Bonny Light 

per barrel 

(in USD)

Volume of 

oil stolen 

per day (in 

barrels)

Value of 

oil stolen 

per annum 

(in USD)

Volume of 

oil shut-in 

per day (in 

barrels)

Value of 

oil shut-in

per annum 

(in USD)

Total

value of 

oil stolen 

or shut-in 

per annum 

(in USD)

2000 28.49 140,000 1.5 billion 250,000 2.6 billion 4.1 billion

2001 24.50 724,171 6.5 billion 200,000 1.8 billion 8.3 billion

2002 25.15 699,763 6.5 billion 370,000 3.4 billion 9.9 billion

2003 28.76 300,000 3.2 billion 350,000 3.7 billion 6.9 billion

2004 38.27 300,000 4.2 billion 230,000 3.2 billion 6.4 billion

2005 55.67 250,000 5.1 billion 180,000 3.7 billion 8.8 billion

2006 66.84 100,000 2.4 billion 600,000 14.6 billion 17.0 billion

2007 75.14 100,000 2.7 billion 600,000 16.5 billion 19.2 billion

2008 115.81 150,000 6.3 billion 650,000 27.5 billion 33.8 billion

Sources: Coventry Cathedral, The Potential for Peace and Reconciliation in the Niger Delta (Coventry, UK: 

ICR, February 8, 2009), 159; Peace and Security Secretariat, “Niger Delta Peace and Security Strategy 

Background Papers” (unpublished paper, Port Harcourt, 2006), 25; and author’s estimates based on 

these two reports.
7

Arresting bunkerers and traffickers. The Nigerian government has made several attempts 

to crack down on oil bunkering, dating back more than twenty years. General Buhari, the 

military head of state from 1983 to 1985, jailed several people for contributing to the “economic adversity of Nigeria,” which perhaps was a factor in the overthrow of his government. 

Buhari’s successors, Generals Babangida and Abacha, took a more lenient approach toward 

bunkering. With the reintroduction of democracy in 1999, the level of bunkering increased, 

perhaps due to the decreased military presence in the region. Another credible theory is 

that bunkering increases during the run-up to elections, as its profits fund attempts by 

political leaders to manipulate the polls. In President Obasanjo’s second term, beginning in 

2003, his government began to take more serious measures to address the problem, which 

had began to get out of control. A number of ships involved in the trade of blood oil were 

seized. However, these actions seldom led to successful prosecutions. In spite of improved 

equipment for the Nigerian Navy, there was no marked improvement in the patrolling of 

coastal waters. 

Closing markets for illegal oil. The Nigerian government has urged governments known 

to receive stolen oil to stop accepting it. It issued a warning to Côte d’Ivoire in 2003 and 

offered the government in Yamoussoukro contracts for the supply of legal oil to the stateowned refinery. This model might have proved effective had it been continued toward Côte 

d’Ivoire and other destinations for stolen oil. 

Increasing the military presence in the Niger Delta. The introduction of the Joint Task 

Force (JTF) into Warri, Delta State, following the violence surrounding the 2003 elections 

between the Itsekiri and Urhobo and later the Itsekiri and Ijaw ethnic groups, has not had 

the desired effect of controlling the blood oil business. Indeed, it has had the opposite 

effect of not only alienating the people but of also providing military personnel with an 

opportunity to participate in the bunkering business, to extort money from local communities, to commit rapes, and to generally intimidate the local populace. 

Introducing the Nigerian Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative. The Nigerian 

Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (NEITI) was launched by the Obasanjo government and is the Nigerian version of the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative 

(EITI), an international strategy launched by a coalition of nongovernmental organizations 

(NGOs) and supported by scores of governments and international oil companies. It aims to 

strengthen governance by improving transparency and accountability in the extractives sector. The EITI sets a global standard for companies to publish what they pay to governments 

in taxes, commissions, and royalties and for governments to disclose the revenues that they 

receive. The Obasanjo government led the way in implementing the EITI by publishing in 

2006 fully audited accounts of all the payments it received from individual companies in a 

five-year period. Following the inauguration of a new NEITI board in January 2008, board 

members resolved to “cultivate a culture of transparency, accountability, due process and 

zero-tolerance of corruption in Nigeria’s extractive industries for the benefit of Nigerians.”13

Unfortunately, the current Yar’Adua administration has not given NEITI the necessary 

support to move forward. Although NEITI produced recommendations for monitoring the 

amounts of oil stolen, it is not directly related to oil bunkering. However, it does aim to 

improve transparency in the oil industry and government, both of which would be conducive 

for addressing the issue of blood oil.

Another credible theory is that 

bunkering increases during the 

run-up to elections, as its profits 

fund attempts by political 

leaders to manipulate the polls.

The EITI sets a global standard 

for companies to publish what 

they pay to governments 

in taxes, commissions, and 

royalties and for governments 

to disclose the revenues that 

they receive. 
8

International Attempts to Tackle Blood Oil

The various international partners have made several attempts to help Nigeria address the 

issue of oil theft and violence and insecurity in the Niger Delta region. For the most part, 

these attempts have had limited success, perhaps due to the complexity of the problem 

and the actors involved. Although the author found it difficult to find detailed information 

about earlier attempts to assist Nigeria in its efforts, recent international attempts have 

included the following: 

Creating the Gulf of Guinea Energy Security Strategy (GGESS). The GGESS was first 

conceived in a meeting attended by the author in August 2004 when she took Stephen 

Davis, then a consultant to Shell, to meet President Obasanjo at which it was suggested 

that Nigeria should develop its own plan for ensuring security in the Niger Delta and in the 

larger Gulf of Guinea. Obasanjo tasked the Group Managing Director (GMD) of NNPC with 

developing such a concept. After a lag of almost a year, the first meeting of the Gulf of 

Guinea Energy Security strategy was held in Washington in the spring of 2005. GGESS grew 

to include the United Kingdom and the Netherlands, and later Norway, Switzerland, Canada, 

and France. NNPC was the partner organization on the Nigerian side. After regular initial 

meetings, the forum has almost collapsed, with no meeting having been held since early 

2008. The European partners are to reconstitute an international forum under a new minister 

who demonstrates more political will than the previous Nigerian focal point.

Making public offers of military support and training. The British government publicly 

offered military support to Nigeria during President Yar’Adua’s meeting with Prime Minister 

Gordon Brown in July 2008, but it resulted in an uproar against “foreign military presence in 

the Niger Delta.” Based on the author’s research, this reaction appears to have been orchestrated by some Ijaw leaders to maintain their hold over the militants. Similar but less public 

offers by other countries of military training have also been rejected, with the Nigerian 

government requesting military equipment instead. 

Developing oil fingerprinting technology. Oil fingerprinting is an analytical technique 

developed by chemists to identify the unique characteristics and composition of oil. Its proponents claim it is sensitive enough to identify oil emanating not only from Nigeria but also 

from particular fields or even specific wells. The former managing director of SPDC, Ron van 

den Berg, told journalists in 2003 that certification of Nigeria’s crude through fingerprinting would enable the government to block the market for stolen crude, thereby serving as a 

disincentive to smuggling syndicates. NNPC, the oil companies, and the UK-based University 

of Plymouth have been in discussion for some time about using fingerprinting to identify 

and certify Nigeria’s crude oil going into the international market. If the origins of a cargo 

of oil are identified, it is possible to determine if it is legal or stolen.

Among the oil majors, opinion is divided on whether or not fingerprinting at its current 

stage of development is reliable enough to tie a particular cargo, or part of a cargo, of oil to 

a precise location and therefore determine whether it is stolen. Author contacts at Chevron 

and Total were pessimistic; they said that once the oil was mixed in a tanker, it would no longer be possible to identify Nigerian oil from other types, even though the Bonny Light crude 

that comes from the Niger Delta is noted (and prized) for its unusually low sulfur content. 

By contrast, a Nigerian spokesman for ExxonMobil said that his company already possessed 

the technology to identify Nigerian crude, even if it was mixed with other types of oil. He 

said his company used the technology to determine the extent of its responsibility for an oil 

spill as far back as 1998. A senior Shell spokesperson told the Niger Delta Working Group in 

Opinion is divided on whether 

or not fingerprinting is reliable 

enough to tie a particular 

cargo to a precise location and 

therefore determine whether it 

is stolen. 
9

Washington, D.C., in December 2008 that Shell found the Plymouth technology inadequate 

and was developing its own more sophisticated method, which it would give to the Nigerian 

government to use. As of late February 2009, the technology was still being finalized.14 The 

Nigerian government has sought international help in fingerprinting technology since at 

least 2005.15 As soon as the Shell technology is ready, it should be given to the Nigerian 

government, with strong pressure to put it to immediate use.

One problem which must be overcome is that there is currently no standard system 

of analysis for fingerprinting. Therefore, one company may produce fingerprints that are 

consistent within its own system, but another company may come up with different classifications for the same samples. The ideal would be for companies to agree on a version of 

analysis or at least exchange samples to create a national database. 

Offering electronic bills of lading. Paper versions of bills of lading can be easily forged 

by either increasing or decreasing the stated volume of oil carried or changing its place of 

origin. As a cargo moves from place to place, the bills of lading can be altered to disguise 

illegal additions. Currently most cargo companies (except Maersk) use manual bills of lading. 

However, electronic bills of lading are far better because they are virtually impossible to 

forge. Assistance with electronic bills of lading has been repeatedly offered by the U.S. government since 2006, with no concrete response from the Nigerian government. The Liberian 

Shipping Registry is based in the United States and monitors its flagged vessels, which carry 

60–70 percent of crude into U.S. ports. It has been suggested to NNPC and the GGESS that 

the registry could work on behalf of NNPC in producing electronic bills of lading. Registering 

vessels electronically would give real–time information about tankers and their cargo and 

show that the companies are not complicit in oil theft. It would eliminate the triple–dipping 

system, where crude is exported from Nigeria, refined, and reimported, sometimes making 

several trips in and out of Nigeria before final consumption. It would also tackle the problem 

of “creative bookkeeping” by some ship captains. Under electronic bills of lading, a small 

percentage would be paid to the Shipping Registry, which imposes tax on all vessels flying 

the Liberian flag, with most of the profit going to the Nigerian government.

Supplying coastal surveillance equipment. Equipment was supplied and installed by the 

U.S. government in Nigeria in the summer of 2008. The equipment uses radar sonar infrared 

to monitor ships in Nigerian waters, but to date there appears to have been little or no feedback on what has been observed (although the agreement called for real-time information 

sharing between Nigeria and the United States). The United States also offered assistance 

in tracing small arms, stockpile management, and carrying out stop-and-search operations. 

However, these offers have not been accepted. The Nigerian government seldom gives an 

outright rejection or refusal, but rather simply states that it will consider the proposal 

without ever giving a firm answer. 

Discussing maritime safety and security. Admiral Harry Ulrich of the U.S. Navy visited 

Nigeria in 2007 to discuss the issue of maritime security with the military and the minister 

of defense, but Nigerian officials were primarily interested in the provision of new equipment, such as boats and rocket launchers. When the next GGESS meeting was held in London, the Nigerian government presented the same wish list. Nigeria was also invited in 2007 

to participate in the Africa Partnership Stations (APS), which started with Cameroon, Ghana, 

and São Tomé, but it initially declined to take part. About eighteen months later, Nigeria’s 

new chief of naval staff expressed interest in participating. The APS consists of a series of 

exercises in which different nationalities are trained in maritime patrols and search and rescue. Recent exercises were held in 2008 and March 2009 with Nigerian participation. Adm. 
10

Ulrich started an international network, Maritime Safety and Security Information System, 

which includes sixty countries in the Mediterranean, Caribbean, West Africa, and Eastern 

Europe. Countries in the Persian Gulf and Western Pacific will be joining soon. 

Since 2004, international law has required that any ship that weighs more than 300 tons 

must have transponders fitted that constantly transmit its location. Radio receivers pick 

up the signals within a range of 40 miles (80 miles if mounted on a hill). These receivers 

can be put along the coastline to track ships. These transponders can be useful in tracking 

illegal cargo by following the movement of ships and noting any irregularities, and receiving 

transactional information from companies to note if there are any unregistered vessels in 

the area. The radio receivers cost only $1,000 each, and could be put on rigs in the Gulf of 

Guinea to cover naval movements in the entire region. 

Involving the United Nations. The United Nations has repeatedly offered assistance to 

Nigeria in addressing the core problems of the Niger Delta. Four advisers were posted to the 

office of the vice president in early 2008 but left in frustration six months later when they 

were unable to gain access to the people and information they needed to fulfill their stated 

duties. The United Nations has also responded positively to President Yar’Adua’s September 

2008 call for help on blood oil and is only waiting for a written request from the Nigerian 

government, detailing exactly what help Nigeria would like. When questioned in December 

2008 about whether Nigeria had written yet, Foreign Minister Ojo Maduekwe responded that 

the government had been waiting for the report of the Niger Delta Technical Committee, 

which had been established by the Nigerian government in late 2008 to study all of the 

previous reports on the Niger Delta and to detail prioritized recommendations. The technical 

committee submitted its report on December 1, 2008. However, as of July 2009, the committee’s recommendations have not yet been implemented.

Recommendations for Tackling Blood Oil

Putting an end to the trade in stolen oil can only be achieved through concerted, coordinated, and sustained action by Nigeria, the international community, and the United States, 

with technical support from multilateral organizations. 

Recommendations for Nigeria

A solution will not be found unless the Nigerian government faces up to the scale of the 

blood oil problem and proves by its actions that it sincerely wishes to address it. As part of 

this action, Nigeria should take the following steps:

Address the economic, social, and political problems of the Niger Delta. The trade in 

stolen oil is at heart a purely criminal enterprise, but the Nigerian government must recognize that its disastrous neglect of the Niger Delta has helped it to flourish. The people of 

the Niger Delta have received few benefits from the oil that lies beneath them. Indeed, the 

fight for control over this precious resource has led to ethnic rivalry, endemic corruption, 

and a long-running insurgency. The Niger Delta remains pitifully underdeveloped, and its 

people have had to contend with the destruction of their environment and their traditional 

livelihoods. For all these reasons, they are unlikely to voice disapproval when a leading militant, Mujahid Dokubo-Asari, justifies his oil bunkering activities as an attempt to claim for 

the people of the Niger Delta what is rightfully theirs. The Nigerian government must work 

harder to address the socioeconomic grievances of the people of the Niger Delta, and by 

The Niger Delta remains pitifully 

underdeveloped, and its people 

have had to contend with the 

destruction of their environment 

and their traditional livelihoods.
11

doing so, remove any justification they might have for turning a blind eye to the activities 

of the criminals in their midst.

Provide legitimate employment opportunities. The government could go a long way 

toward building confidence and harnessing goodwill in the Niger Delta by improving the 

local infrastructure through a road-building project. This would not only have the benefit of 

improving the transport network in the region but it would also provide jobs for unemployed 

youth whose current options are limited to criminal enterprises such as oil bunkering. A 

homegrown public works project using local youth to build infrastructure using laborintensive techniques would also mean there would be no foreign companies in the region 

to harass. The International Labor Organization office in Abuja could help the Nigerian 

government devise the project. 

Other employment initiatives could involve training young people in sustainable livelihoods suitable to the region, such as advanced welding, gas-to-power projects, and effective maritime transport systems. A limited number of people could be trained to become 

competent contractors to the oil and gas industry. By offering viable work opportunities, 

particularly in the oil industry, the government can help reduce the allure of entering into 

illegal activities. There is a genuine desire among the youth of the Niger Delta to pursue 

legitimate economic opportunities. As one youth leader stated to this author: “I am an 

illegal oil bunkerer. I want to be a legal oil bunkerer.”16 Strategies should be drawn up to 

give partial ownership of oil facilities to the local communities themselves. The government 

should show faith in the people of the Niger Delta by awarding oil contracts and blocs to 

competent local communities and handing out scholarships to those youths who show promise, so that they might one day be able to run oil businesses themselves.

Implement the key recommendations of the technical committee. The report of the 

Niger Delta Technical Committee contains a number of important recommendations, notably 

an immediate increase in the percentage of oil revenue given back to states by the federal 

government from 13 percent to 25 percent. The committee calls for this percentage to rise 

still further over time, reaching 50 percent within several years. Increasing the amount of 

money oil-producing states receive for their own resource would be a powerful way of easing the sense of neglect felt by the people of the Niger Delta and would help to remove any 

rationalization for the trade in blood oil. 

In addition, the technical committee report has made several specific recommendations 

to tackle blood oil, which the Nigerian government should implement without delay. These 

include clamping down on the illegal supply of small arms and light weapons to the Niger 

Delta, which both fuels the insurgency and gives those involved in oil bunkering formidable 

armories with which to fight their opponents, and identifying the highly placed people 

inside and outside of government who are engaged in sponsoring violence for economic 

and political gain.

Provide financial and political support for the new Niger Delta Ministry. There has long 

been a clamor for a special Ministry of the Niger Delta to address the issues of the region, 

similar to how the Ministry of the Federal Capital Territory focused on the development 

of Abuja. This ministry was finally created in late 2008, with two ministers appointed 

in December. However, the ministry, as part of the civil service, is subject to “federal 

character” regulations—meaning that people from all parts of Nigeria must be employed 

there, not just indigenes of the Niger Delta. This may lead to conflicting priorities. There 

is also a fear by some Niger Deltans that the ministry will not receive adequate funding, 

as evidenced by the low allocation given it in the current budget. Pressure and support 

The government should show 

faith in the people of the Niger 

Delta by awarding oil contracts 

and blocs to competent local 

communities and handing out 

scholarships to those youths 

who show promise.
12

from Nigerian civil society should be kept on the ministers and directors to implement the 

goals of the ministry.

Arrest and prosecute those involved in oil bunkering. This is a vital first step for the 

Nigerian government to take in order to prove its desire to stamp out the blood oil business. 

So far, very few people arrested on suspicion of oil theft have been successfully tried and 

imprisoned. Mounting successful prosecutions is easier said than done, particularly given 

the high level of political and military involvement in the trade. But the government has 

no choice but to act. It must resist the temptation to ignore the main players—the elites 

and the foreign businessmen—in favor of easy targets such as the small-time crooks on the 

ground who make small profits by siphoning off oil and selling it to their communities. Making high-profile arrests of some of the key players and successfully prosecuting them would 

send out a powerful message that the government was serious about ending oil bunkering.

Get serious about monitoring its coastline. The coastal surveillance system that was 

piloted in the summer of 2008 should be expanded and the information it gathers shared 

more effectively with relevant parties. It appears that the system is operational, as President Yar’Adua demonstrated it to representatives of the oil companies in late 2008. However, 

to date, little use is being made of the intelligence it produces. The Nigerian government 

should be strongly encouraged to use the equipment it already possesses to monitor what 

is happening around its shores. In addition, Nigeria should follow through with its stated 

desire to set up a coast guard that can track and intercept unauthorized vessels in its coastal 

waters—something the foreign minister has repeatedly expressed an interest in establishing. Foreign Minister Maduekwe should enlist the help of the international community in 

making this a reality. One of the problems he will face is how to prevent any coast guard 

from being corrupted in the way that the present Nigerian Navy has become.

Make better use of surveillance techniques. Relatively cheap and unsophisticated surveillance equipment can be used to monitor attacks on oil pipelines and track the movements 

of suspicious cargo around the Gulf of Guinea. Remote sensors can be placed on pipelines, 

which are able to detect acts of vandalism. Unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), which are 

small surveillance aircraft remotely controlled, can also be used. The Nigerian government 

should use the intelligence gathered from surveillance equipment to publicly shame vandals, 

thereby exposing them to social stigma. In the same way, the government can publicize 

intelligence it gathers on suspicious cargo ships, and by doing so, shame the countries to 

which they are headed into refusing them entry. For such a surveillance system to work, it 

must be placed in the hands of an organization that can be fully trusted. In addition, after 

the information is gathered, there needs to be an intervention squad to arrest and prosecute 

the vandals and bunkering agents that is free from the interference of those with vested 

interests in the blood oil trade. 

Persuade other countries to crack down on blood oil. Nigeria can adopt the moral high 

ground by taking tough action domestically against oil bunkering, then encouraging other 

countries to do the same. It should make clear to its international partners that accepting 

stolen crude from the Niger Delta is unacceptable and will not be tolerated. The Nigerian 

government is well placed to offer carrots as well as sticks and can set up legitimate oil 

export contracts with countries such as Côte d’Ivoire that have previously benefited from 

the receipt of stolen crude.

Very few people arrested 

on suspicion of oil theft have 

been successfully tried 

and imprisoned.

Nigeria should make clear to 

its international partners that 

accepting stolen crude from the 

Niger Delta is unacceptable and 

will not be tolerated.
13

Mobilize civil society to push for action against blood oil. The reality is that the Nigerian government is ill-equipped to deal with the problems posed by the trade in illegal oil, 

particularly in the light of the frail health of the president, which has created a virtual 

vacuum at the center of government. Civil society will therefore have to take a leading role 

in ensuring that the issues of the Niger Delta are kept on the political agenda. The technical 

committee’s suggestion that a compact should be formed between the government and the 

stakeholders of the Niger Delta is a good one. It is likely that the responsibility for making 

this compact a reality and driving it forward will fall to civil society. This compact should 

place the problem of blood oil at the top of its agenda. 

Moves are afoot among civil society groups to give the issue of blood oil the attention it 

deserves. One proposal is to continue the dialogue initiated on the Web site of the technical 

committee, in which civil society groups share information about oil bunkering and make 

it an advocacy topic. There is also an effort to include the religious institutions in praying 

for people involved in illegal activities, a “naming-and-praying” variation on the “namingand-shaming” approach. Because of the power of religious institutions, it is thought that if 

identified sponsors of blood oil are named and prayed for weekly in churches and mosques 

around Nigeria, those individuals will have an incentive to stop their immoral activities and 

calls for their prosecution will gain popular support.

Although the role of the community in drying up blood oil is very important, the difficulty of their task should not be underestimated, nor should the risks involved. There have 

been several cases of people in the Niger Delta being killed for exposing individuals they 

suspected of being members of armed groups. Those who expose people involved in oil bunkering are likely to face similar risks. It has to be remembered that whole communities are 

often involved in oil bunkering activities, directly or indirectly, and stopping such economic 

activities may negatively impact these communities, particularly in the short term.

Nevertheless, people ultimately need to speak up against bunkering because of the 

devastating effects it has on communities. There is evidence that people are beginning to 

pluck up the courage to do just that. For example, a year ago the governor of Rivers State, 

Rotimi Amaechi, ordered the people of Okrika to give information on Ateke Tom, a leading 

militant and oil bunkerer who is one of their “sons.” No one cooperated at the time. However, the author was told in February 2009 that the community was now thoroughly weary 

of Ateke and wanted him permanently out. This disenchantment, combined with anger from 

two major militant groups—the Bush Boys and the Greenlanders—whose leaders Ateke 

had purportedly recently killed, could be harnessed to arrest or chase out the criminals. 

However, the whole community must back such an approach, not one or two people, who 

could be victimized.

In a similar way, the Delta State government in August 2006 called all of the local 

government chairmen and youth leaders to discuss how to stop hostage taking. The youth 

themselves suggested that anyone who rented a boat to hostage takers, or any chief who 

allowed hostages to be harbored in his community, should be arrested. As a result, hostage 

taking in Delta State was significantly reduced. This latter point demonstrates the important 

role state governors can play in tackling oil theft, if they have the political will to do so.

Recommendations for the International Community

Although the Nigerian government has repeatedly requested assistance in addressing the 

problem of blood oil, it has not always accepted such assistance. The international community must take this request literally and hold Nigeria to its stated commitment. Further, 

the international community should take the following specific steps:

There have been several cases of 

people in the Niger Delta being 

killed for exposing individuals 

they suspected of being 

members of armed groups. Those 

who expose people involved in 

oil bunkering are likely to face 

similar risks. 
14

Revamp the Gulf of Guinea Energy Security Strategy. Some of Nigeria’s European partners 

are keen to revamp the inactive GGESS and elevate it from a talking shop to a body with 

political clout that takes concerted action. The Dutch ambassador in Abuja has visited the 

two new ministers most likely to spearhead this process: the minister of petroleum, Rilwan 

Lukman, and the senior minister of the Niger Delta, Obong Ufot Ekaette. The GGESS can 

coordinate energy security initiatives not only in Nigeria but throughout the whole Gulf of 

Guinea region and has the potential to lend important technical support, with countries 

offering specific expertise—for example, the Netherlands on bunkering, Norway on fingerprinting, Canada on small arms, and Switzerland on money laundering. The Netherlands, 

which is particularly concerned about instability in the Niger Delta because of Royal Dutch 

Shell’s involvement in the region, should be prepared to take a greater role in the GGESS. It is 

one of the few Western nations with staff on the ground in the Niger Delta, having recently 

opened a consulate in Port Harcourt, albeit in the Shell compound. 

Prioritize the search for a reliable method of fingerprinting oil. The new minister of 

petroleum, being an old hand in the oil industry, should use his influence to bring the various oil companies together to develop a common national database and initiate a system 

for identifying and tracking Nigerian crude, similar to the one used for blood diamonds. 

This can be done with the help of the United Nations, which is willing to set up an expert 

committee similar to that established on blood diamonds. Although there is a cost to fingerprinting oil, it is insignificant compared to the cost of oil theft.

Follow the money trail from blood oil. Nigeria’s international partners can share information and help trace the money trail from oil bunkering. Interpol or NGOs, such as Global 

Witness, can trace and expose these money trails. If possible, this money should be frozen 

and repatriated to the Nigerian government, as was done with the return by the Swiss government of money stolen by former Nigerian head of state Sani Abacha.

Expand dialogue to include other international players. China, Russia, and India should 

be included in dialogue with and about Nigeria. The more unified the international approach 

is to stopping blood oil, the more effective it will be.

Strengthen the Nigerian military. A solid security sector reform process should be undertaken to restore the competence of the Nigerian military.

Recommendations for the United States

Within the international community, the United States is uniquely positioned to take a 

leadership role in helping to dry up blood oil and address other issues in the Niger Delta. The 

Netherlands has too small a presence in Nigeria, and the United Kingdom is encumbered by 

a somewhat negative colonial history in the Niger Delta, and its government is not presently 

in a position to lead the international community’s efforts—though it would support an 

effort coming from Washington. Also, the reality of an energetic young U.S. president with 

African roots should not be underestimated. The author was in Nigeria in November 2008 

when President Obama’s phone call to President Yar’Adua was a source of great pride and 

excitement. Everyone wants to be Obama’s friend. The United States can capitalize on this, 

with continuous support and encouragement to President Yar’Adua and other key players in 

the Nigerian government to do exactly what they have already said they are going to do: 

(1) make the Niger Delta a priority and (2) reduce blood oil.

Some of Nigeria’s European 

partners are keen to revamp the 

inactive GGESS and elevate it 

from a talking shop to a body 

with political clout that takes 

concerted action. 
15

David Goldwyn, in reviewing U.S. energy security during the Bush administration, notes 

that U.S. engagement with Africa was greatly reduced during those eight years.17 Yet testimonies before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee’s Subcommittee on African Affairs 

in September 2008 emphasized the importance of the Niger Delta. In his submission for the 

record, Subcommittee Chairman Russ Feingold himself stated: “We must think creatively 

about how we can rally our international partners and muster the many resources at our 

disposal to push for a comprehensive solution [in the Niger Delta]. . . . In the months and 

years ahead, I believe there are few more pressing issues in terms of U.S. security and 

interests in Africa.”18

In turn, the United States must take a more proactive approach to Nigeria and the Niger 

Delta and take the following steps:

Restart U.S.-African energy partnerships and binational commissions. Such partnerships and commissions were in place during the 1990s and should be resumed as platforms 

for dialogue.

Develop a strategic energy security policy in Africa. With a central locus of responsibility, 

it should draw in the Departments of State, Energy, Commerce, Defense and Treasury; the 

U.S. Trade and Development Agency; and the U.S. Agency for International Development.19

Get the diplomatic corps into the region. The diplomatic corps should identify the full 

scope of the area’s problems and develop a sound plan for addressing them. Interviews with 

staff members at the U.S. embassy in Abuja demonstrated their frustration at their lack of 

real knowledge about the Niger Delta. This suggestion was emphasized by the three Niger 

Delta governors during the recent Chatham House meeting. Gov. Timipre Sylva of Bayelsa 

State stated, “There is no one who can administer the Niger Delta from the outside. Foreign 

embassies are in Lagos and Abuja, so any information that they give out about the Niger 

Delta can only be rumor.”20 Likewise, Gov. Rotimi Amaechi of Rivers State stated, “I don’t 

attend any function concerning the Niger Delta which takes place in Lagos or Abuja. I do 

not even send my staff or a representative, as a policy. If you want to discuss with me, then 

come to the delta.”21

Offer greater support for work on governance. Transparency and accountability, as well as 

meeting the needs of the people, continue to be problems in Nigeria, especially in the Niger 

Delta. During the Bush administration, there was an increased focus on military efforts, 

AFRICOM being a prime example, as well as a preoccupation with terrorism. However, 

research conducted for a recent conference in London showed that militancy of the type 

found in other parts of the world is not a major concern in Nigeria.22 Rather, poor governance is a major factor in militancy. An earlier conference in Washington also identified the 

long-term needs for good governance, stability, economic development, and more equitable 

sharing in the benefits from oil proceeds.23 Thus, work on good governance should be a top 

priority for the United States in Nigeria in general and the Niger Delta in particular.

Promote a relationship with Nigeria based on mutual respect and partnership. In January 2009, Ojo Maduekwe, the Nigerian foreign minister, told an audience at the Center for 

Strategic and International Studies that Nigeria wanted to be treated with respect and in 

return was ready to fulfill its international responsibilities. The United States should strongly 

encourage and support Nigeria in addressing its internal issues and those that affect other 

countries, such as security in the Gulf of Guinea. There should be a continued flow of highlevel visitors between the United States and Nigeria, reinforcing the idea that Nigeria is 
16

important to the United States and reiterating the messages of good governance, human 

rights protection, and the need for improved development and security. Such efforts might 

include the following:

•	 Appointing a special envoy to the Niger Delta or Gulf of Guinea region similar to the special 

envoy to the Great Lakes during the Clinton administration.

•	 Implementing the antikleptocracy provision of the Consolidated Appropriations Act that 

denies entry to the United States to all foreign government officials about whom the 

secretary of state believes there to be credible evidence that they were involved in corruption relating to natural resources. The head of Global Witness, an NGO which has exposed 

resource-related corruption and money laundering in many African countries, and has 

pointed out that corrupt African leaders do not want to spend their money in Kinshasa; 

they want to enjoy it in the United States.24 The antikleptocracy provision can keep them 

from doing so.

•	 Enforcing visa bans, even for those not directly involved in resource-related corruption. 

The State Department has a standard measure of denying U.S. visas to people, particularly 

politicians. However, it is not common for those persons refused visas to the United States 

to be publicly named. Because most Nigerians would like to come freely to the United 

States and would not want the embarrassment of being publicly shamed with a visa ban, 

these bans should be made public.

•	 Introducing electronic bills of lading. The software for electronic bills of lading is currently 

available, and the U.S.-based Liberian Shipping Registry is willing to work with Nigeria. 

The U.S. government should encourage President Yar’Adua and the minister of petroleum, 

Rilwan Lukman, to make use of it.

•	 Developing a certification scheme to track the theft and sale of blood oil. American oil 

companies can take the lead in tracking illegal oil out of Nigeria and preventing it from 

entering the United States.

•	 Prosecuting companies and individuals found guilty of bribing foreign officials. The United 

States should enforce good ethical practices among its companies and encourage its European partners to do likewise. This will close off some of the opportunities for corruption in 

countries such as Nigeria.

Conclusions

Two years after the incoming Yar’Adua administration declared the Niger Delta to be one of 

its top priorities and ten months after the Nigerian government first publicly asked for help 

in addressing the problem of blood oil, very little has happened. In those two years, much 

money has been lost to bunkering that could have been better used for the development 

of the Niger Delta. Violence has been perpetrated against the people of the region, both by 

the militants-bunkerers and by the government that is meant to protect its nationals, as in 

the May 2009 Delta State attacks. The government’s inactivity demonstrates both a lack of 

political will and a lack of competence.

To date, the United States has been very preoccupied with conflicts on other continents, 

and the problems in Sudan, Somalia, and Zimbabwe have overshadowed the Niger Delta. 

However, the militant attacks and soaring gas prices of summer 2008 show that all countries 

are vulnerable to problems in the Niger Delta. Blood oil, a complex and lucrative business 

with high stakes and high-level involvement of people both within and outside of Nigeria, 

is beyond the capacity of the Nigerian government to address. Therefore, it can only be 

approached in a multilateral way. The United States and its international partners have a 
17

responsibility to follow a foreign policy that addresses not only energy security but also the 

protection of innocent people, such as those who died in Delta State on May 15, 2009. The 

United States will need to take the lead and bring fresh energy to an international effort to 

strongly support the Nigerian government and keep it to its stated promise of addressing the 

problem of blood oil. The solutions will not be easy or quick, but they should be initiated 

before more people die needlessly in the Niger Delta.

19

Notes

1. Andrew Walker, “ ‘Blood Oil’ Dripping from Nigeria,” BBC, July 27, 2008.

2. Gov. Emmanuel Uduaghan, as quoted in “State Government Solutions to the Niger Delta Troubles: 

Key Challenges, Needs and Strategies” (meeting summary, Chatham House, London, UK, 

February 26, 2009), 12, 14.

3. According to the Energy Information Administration, the United States imported 13.9 million barrels of oil from 

Nigeria in February 2009, making Nigeria the seventh largest supplier to the United States. This compared with 

the importation of 29.7 million barrels in February 2008.

4. David L. Goldwyn, testimony before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations’ Subcommittee on African Affairs, 

Washington, D.C., September 24, 2008.

5. “Nigeria fighting ‘killed 1,000,’ ” BBC, May 18, 2009.

6. After a pipeline or facility is tapped and the crude siphoned off, the barge carrying it has to pass through creeks 

and to the coast to meet the tanker that will carry it abroad. The “passage communities” are along this route. 

The community to which oil is taken and those through which it passes on its way out of Nigeria will demand to 

be paid off or “settled.” The Nigerian military is also paid to protect this process.

7. Peace and Security Secretariat, “Niger Delta Peace and Security Strategy Background Papers” (unpublished paper, 

Port Harcourt, 2006), 43. 

8. Coventry Cathedral, The Potential for Peace and Reconciliation in the Niger Delta (Coventry, UK: ICR, February 8, 

2009).

9. Nnamdi Obasi, International Crisis Group, presentation at SAIS, February 25, 2009.

10. Coventry Cathedral, The Potential for Peace and Reconciliation in the Niger Delta.

11. Ateke Tom is the leader of an armed group, the Niger Delta Vigilante, based in Okrika Local Government Area of 

Rivers State. He has been a major player in bunkering and political violence since the late 1990s. More recently, 

he has been a sponsor of piracy and bank robberies.

12. Maj. Gen. Abdurahman Dambazau, quoted in Vanguard (Niger Delta), August 28, 2008. 

13. “New Neiti Board,” Dredging and Exploration no. 1 (2008), URL=www.dredgingandexploration.com/stories.

php?id=122 (accessed July 9, 2009).

14. Shell Nigeria executive, in conversation with the author, February 2009. 

15. Atiku Abubakar, as quoted in Coventry Cathedral, The Potential for Peace and Reconciliation in the Niger Delta

(Coventry, UK: ICR, February 8, 2009), 161.

16. Niger Delta youth leader, in conversation with the author, January 2006. 

17. David Goldwyn, “US Energy Security in Africa,” in US Africa Policy Beyond the Bush Years, eds. Jennifer G. Cooke 

and J. Stephen Morrison (Washington, D.C.: CSIS, April 2009).

18. Sen. Russ Feingold, “Remarks of U.S. Senator Russ Feingold on the ‘Resource Curse’ in Nigeria’s Delta Region,” 

September 29, 2008, URL=feingold.senate.gov/statements/08/09/20080929a.htm (accessed July 9, 2009). 

19. Goldwyn, testimony.

20. Gov. Timipre Sylva, as quoted in “State Government Solutions to the Niger Delta Troubles: Key Challenges, Needs 

and Strategies” (meeting summary, Chatham House, London, February 26, 2009), 12.

21. Gov. Rotimi Amaechi, as quoted in “State Government Solutions to the Niger Delta Troubles: Key Challenges, 

Needs and Strategies” (meeting summary, Chatham House, London, February 26, 2009), 13.

22. “Radicalization and Militancy in West Africa” (conference, King’s College London, April 2009). 

23. “The Politics of Development and Security in Africa’s Oil States” (conference, African Studies 

Program, Johns Hopkins’ School of Advanced International Studies, Washington, D.C., 

April 2009). 

24. Simon Taylor, testimony before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations’ Subcommittee on African Affairs, 

Washington, D.C., September 24, 2008.
Of Related Interest 

•	 Faith and Politics in Nigeria: Nigeria as a Pivotal State in the Muslim World (2008) by 

John N. Paden

•	 Scenarios for Sudan: Avoiding Political Violence through 2011 by Alan Schwartz (Special 

Report, August 2009)

•	 Building Blocks for Citizenship and a Peaceful Transition in Sudan by Linda Bishai, Kelly 

Campbell, and Jacki Wilson (USIPeace Briefing, March 2009)

•	 Would You Fight Again? Understanding Liberian Ex-Combatant Reintegration by Richard Hill, 

Gwendolyn Taylor, and Jonathan Temin (Special Report, September 2008)

•	 Identity, Diversity, and Constitutionalism in Africa (2008) by Francis Deng 

•	 Nigerian Politics and the 2007 Elections by Jibrin Ibrahim (Special Report, January 2007)

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