[DO NOT PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

________________________

No. 15-11364

Non-Argument Calendar

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D.C. Docket No. 1:13-cv-03155-WSD

WILLIAM JOHNSON, 

 Plaintiff-Appellant,

 versus

STATE OF GEORGIA,

and Certain Agents for Such,

CITY OF KENNESAW, 

and certain agents for such,

CITY OF HIRAM, 

and certain agents for such, 

CITY OF NEWNAN, 

and certain agents for such, 

 Defendants-Appellees.

________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Georgia

________________________

(September 9, 2016)

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Before MARTIN, ANDERSON, and EDMONDSON, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: 

Plaintiff William Johnson, proceeding pro se, appeals the district court’s 

dismissal of his claims against the City of Kennesaw, the City of Hiram, and the 

City of Newnan, Georgia (collectively, “City Defendants”), in Plaintiff’s civil 

action under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985(3). No reversible error has been shown; 

we affirm.1

Plaintiff filed a 135-page complaint against the State of Georgia and the City 

Defendants, purporting to allege violations of Plaintiff’s civil rights and common 

law tort claims arising from Plaintiff’s three arrests and the resulting revocation of 

Plaintiff’s probation. The district court dismissed Plaintiff’s claims against 

Georgia as barred by the doctrine of sovereign immunity.2

 The district court also 

granted the City Defendants’ motion for a more definite statement -- ordering 

 1 Plaintiff has filed a petition for an initial hearing en banc, pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate 

Procedure 35. No Judge in regular active service on this Court has requested that the Court be 

polled about en banc consideration. Plaintiff’s petition for hearing en banc is DENIED. 

2 On appeal, Plaintiff raises no challenge to the district court’s dismissal of his claims against 

Georgia on sovereign immunity grounds; that claim is abandoned. See Timson v. Sampson, 518 

F.3d 870, 874 (11th Cir. 2008). Moreover, because the district court dismissed properly 

Plaintiff’s claims against Georgia as barred by the Eleventh Amendment, we will not consider 

Plaintiff’s arguments on appeal about Georgia’s alleged due process violations. For background, 

see Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 104 S. Ct. 900 (1984). 

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Plaintiff to file an amended complaint, setting forth “in a short and plain manner, 

the facts showing he is entitled to relief against City Defendants.” 

Although untimely, Plaintiff ultimately filed a 73-page first amended 

complaint; it was similar in form and in content to Plaintiff’s initial complaint. 

The City Defendants moved to dismiss Plaintiff’s first amended complaint as an 

impermissible shotgun pleading. 

By a thorough written opinion, the district court dismissed with prejudice 

Plaintiff’s first amended complaint. The district court described Plaintiff’s first 

amended complaint, which consisted of “long, rambling” paragraphs, as a “classic 

shotgun pleading.” The district court concluded that dismissal was warranted 

because Plaintiff had been given ample opportunity to cure the deficiencies in his 

original complaint and still failed to comply with federal pleading requirements.3

 

The district court also denied Plaintiff’s motion for injunctive relief. The 

court concluded that, to the extent Plaintiff sought release from the Spalding 

County Jail, Plaintiff was required to file a petition for habeas relief. And, to the 

extent Plaintiff sought a writ of mandamus compelling the Spalding County Trial 

Court to hold a bail hearing or to otherwise grant Plaintiff unrestricted access to the 

 3 Although Plaintiff filed a 105-page “More Definitive Statement of Plaintiff’s Complaint,” 

which the district court construed as a second amended complaint, the district court refused to 

consider it because Plaintiff failed to obtain the court’s permission to file a second amended 

complaint. The district court noted also that Plaintiff’s proposed second amended complaint 

constituted another shotgun pleading and, thus -- had Plaintiff sought leave to amend -- the 

district court would have denied Plaintiff’s request as futile. 

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courts and to his legal files, the district court lacked authority to issue a writ of 

mandamus against non-federal actors. 

We review de novo a district court’s order dismissing a complaint with 

prejudice, “accepting the allegations in the complaint as true and construing them 

in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.” Am. Dental Ass’n v. Cigna Corp., 605 

F.3d 1283, 1288 (11th Cir. 2010). Although we construe liberally pro se

pleadings, pro se litigants must still conform to procedural rules. Albra v. Advan, 

Inc., 490 F.3d 826, 829 (11th Cir. 2007).

To comply with federal pleading standards, Plaintiff is required to, among 

other things, provide “a short and plain statement” of his claims showing that he is 

entitled to relief. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Plaintiff is also required to present 

each of his claims in a separate numbered paragraph, with each paragraph “limited 

as far as practicable to a single set of circumstances.” See Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(b).

A complaint that fails to comply with Rules 8 and 10 may be classified as a 

“shotgun pleading.” See Byrne v. Nezhat, 261 F.3d 1075, 1129-30 (11th Cir. 

2001). When faced with a shotgun pleading, a district court must order a litigant to 

replead for a more definite statement of the claim. Id. at 1133. When the amended 

complaint still fails to cure the deficiency, the complaint may be subject to 

dismissal. See id. 

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As an initial matter, to the extent Plaintiff raises arguments about his federal 

and state habeas proceedings or about his child custody proceedings, those issues 

were not part of the underlying complaint and, thus, are outside the scope of this 

appeal.4

 In addition, because Plaintiff’s complaint was dismissed as a shotgun 

pleading, we consider only whether Plaintiff’s first amended complaint satisfied 

the federal pleading requirements. Thus, we will not consider Plaintiff’s 

substantive arguments about the constitutionality of his arrests, the force used 

during his arrests, his guilty plea, or the revocation of his probation. 

Here, the district court described Plaintiff’s initial complaint as “rambling 

and unfocused” and “composed mainly of conclusory statements.” The district 

court was correct to grant the City Defendants’ unopposed motion for a more 

definite statement and to order Plaintiff to file an amended complaint. See id. 

Despite the court’s instructions, however, Plaintiff’s first amended 

complaint still failed to provide a “short and plain statement” of his claims 

showing that Plaintiff was entitled to relief. 

Instead, Plaintiff’s first amended complaint (like Plaintiff’s original 

complaint) was composed of long, rambling paragraphs and conclusory statements 

unsupported by factual allegations. Given that each count of Plaintiff’s first 

 4 On appeal, Plaintiff raises no challenge to the district court’s denial of Plaintiff’s motions to 

amend his complaint to add new claims against new defendants in connection with Plaintiff’s 

child custody proceedings. 

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amended complaint incorporated by reference the allegations of the proceeding 

counts, the district court characterized it accurately as a “classic shotgun pleading.” 

See Strategic Income Fund, LLC v. Spear, Leeds & Kellogg Corp., 305 F.3d 1293, 

1295 (11th Cir. 2002) (“The typical shotgun complaint contains several counts, 

each one incorporating by reference the allegations of its predecessors, leading to a 

situation where most of the counts (i.e., all but the first) contain irrelevant factual 

allegations and legal conclusions.”). In the light of Plaintiff’s continued failure to 

comply with federal pleading requirements, the district court committed no error in 

dismissing with prejudice Plaintiff’s first amended complaint.

The district court also committed no error in denying Plaintiff’s motion for 

injunctive relief. The district court concluded correctly that it lacked jurisdiction to 

issue a writ of mandamus to direct the Spalding County Trial Court in the 

performance of the state court’s duties. See, e.g., Moye v. Clerk, DeKalb County 

Superior Court, 474 F.2d 1275, 1276 (5th Cir. 1973) (“[A] federal court lacks the 

general power to issue writs of mandamus to direct state courts and their judicial 

officers in the performance of their duties.”). And, to the extent Plaintiff sought 

release from the Spalding County Jail, the district court concluded properly that 

Plaintiff’s “sole federal remedy [was] a writ of habeas corpus.” See Preiser v. 

Rodriguez, 93 S. Ct. 1827, 1841 (1973). 

AFFIRMED.

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