NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

 v. 

ANTHONY PRETTY ON TOP, 

Defendant-Appellant.

No. 20-30202 

D.C. No. 1:19-cr-00135-DLC-1 

MEMORANDUM*

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Montana

Dana L. Christensen, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted August 17, 2021**

Before: SILVERMAN, CHRISTEN, and LEE, Circuit Judges. 

Anthony Pretty On Top appeals his bench-trial conviction for failure to 

register as a sexual offender under the Sex Offender Registration and Notification 

Act (“SORNA”), in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2250(a), arguing that the district court 

should have granted his motion for a judgment of acquittal because SORNA is 

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent 

except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision 

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

FILED

AUG 27 2021

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
2 20-30202 

constitutionally infirm as applied to juvenile offenders. We have jurisdiction under 

28 U.S.C. § 1291. Reviewing de novo, see United States v. Juvenile Male, 670 

F.3d 999, 1009 (9th Cir. 2012), we affirm. 

Pretty On Top contends that, because he was a juvenile when he committed 

the underlying sex offense, the application of SORNA to him violates the Ex Post 

Facto Clause and the Eighth Amendment, as well his rights to due process and 

equal protection. Pretty On Top’s arguments are foreclosed. See United States v. 

Elkins, 683 F.3d 1039, 1041 (9th Cir. 2012) (holding that, because SORNA’s 

requirements are not punitive, it is not a violation of the Ex Post Facto Clause to 

apply SORNA to a defendant based on his conviction as a juvenile sex offender); 

Juvenile Male, 670 F.3d. at 1008-14 (rejecting due process, equal protection, and 

Eighth Amendment challenges to SORNA’s registration requirements as applied to 

juvenile offenders). While Pretty On Top argues that this court “should readdress 

the issue of whether SORNA as it pertains to juvenile delinquents is 

constitutionally infirm,” he does not point to any authority that is “clearly 

irreconcilable” with our previous decisions. See Miller v. Gammie, 335 F.3d 889, 

900 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc) (three-judge panel is bound by prior precedent unless 

that precedent is “clearly irreconcilable” with an intervening decision of a higher 

court). 

To the extent Pretty On Top contends that SORNA’s registration 
3 20-30202 

requirements violate the Ex Post Facto Clause because he could potentially obtain

relief from his registration requirements under Montana law while still being 

required to register under SORNA, we agree with the district court that this claim 

is not ripe. See Texas v. United States, 523 U.S. 296, 300 (1998) (claim is not ripe 

if it rests upon future events that may not occur). In any event, this court has 

consistently held that SORNA’s registration requirements are nonpunitive, even 

where there are differences between the applicable state and federal reporting 

requirements. See United States v. Elk Shoulder, 738 F.3d 948, 953-54 (9th Cir. 

2013); Elkins, 683 F.3d at 1048-49. 

AFFIRMED.