JIPAThe Journal of

Indo-Pacific Affairs

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Gen Charles Q. Brown, Jr., USAF

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Journal of Indo-Pacific Affairs (JIPA)

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Published by the Air University Press, The Journal of Indo–Pacific Affairs ( JIPA) is a professional journal of the Department 

of the Air Force and a forum for worldwide dialogue regarding the Indo–Pacific region, spanning from the west coasts of 

the Americas to the eastern shores of Africa and covering much of Asia and all of Oceania. The journal fosters intellectual 

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Reviewers

Air Cdre Nasim Abbas, PAF

Instructor

Air War College (Pakistan)

Dr. Sascha-Dominik “Dov” 

Bachmann 

Professor of Law and Justice

University of Canberra (Australia) 

Dr. Lewis Bernstein 

Historian, retired 

US Army 

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US Air Force Academy 

CDR John F. Bradford, US 

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Yokosuka Council on Asia–Pacific 

Studies

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Security Studies

US Air War College

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Security College

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Development Academy of the 

Philippines 

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Philippine Coast Guard 

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Air Force Culture and Language 

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USAF

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University of New South Wales–

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Dr. Achala GunasekaraRockwell 

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University of Alabama at Birmingham 

Dr. Amit Gupta

Professor, International Security 

Studies

US Air War College

Dr. Akhlaque Haque 

Professor, Political Science & 

Public Admin.

University of Alabama at Birmingham 

Dr. Jessica Jordan 

Assistant Professor

Air Force Culture and Language 

Center

Dr. Isaac Kardon

Assistant Professor, China Maritime Studies Institute

US Naval War College

Maj Gen Brian Killough, 

USAF, ret.

Former Deputy Commander, 

Headquarters Pacific Air Forces

Mr. Chris Kolakowski 

Director

Wisconsin Veterans Museum

Dr. Carlo Kopp 

Lecturer 

Monash University 

Dr. Amit Kumar 

President 

AAA International Security 

Consultants 

Dr. Suzanne Levi-Sanchez

Assistant Professor, National 

Security Affairs

US Naval War College

Lt Col Scott D. McDonald

United States Marine Corps, 

retired

Dr. Montgomery McFate

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US Naval War College

Dr. Sandeep "Frag" Mulgund

Senior Advisor (HQE)

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(AF/A3)

Headquarters United States Air 

Force

Dr. Brendan S. Mulvaney 

Director

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Dr. Satoru Nagao 

Visiting Fellow 

Hudson Institute 

Dr. Dayne Nix

Professor, Joint Maritime Operations

US Naval War College

Dr. Frank O’Donnell

Postdoctoral Fellow, National 

Security Affairs

US Naval War College

Dr. Jagannath P. Panda

Research Fellow & Centre

Coordinator, East Asia

Manohar Parrikar Institute for

Defense Studies & Analyses

Dr. James E. Platte 

Assistant Professor

Center for Unconventional 

Weapons Studies 

Dr. Terence Roehrig

Professor, National Security 

Affairs

US Naval War College

Dr. Jim Rolfe 

Senior Fellow, Centre for Strategic Studies 

Victoria University of Wellington 

Mr. Richard M. Rossow 

Senior Adviser and Wadhwani 

Chair in US–India Policy Studies 

Center for Strategic and International Studies 

Maj Gary J. Sampson, USMC

Speechwriter/Special Assistant to 

the CJCS

Dr. Yoichiro Sato

Professor

Ritsumeikan Asia Pacific 

University

Cmdre Abhay Kumar Singh, 

retired 

Research Fellow 

Institute for Defence Studies and 

Analyses 

Mr. Daniel K. Taylor 

Defense Intelligence Officer for 

East Asia

Defense Intelligence Agency

Dr. Lavanya Vemsani 

Professor, History and Religious 

Studies 

Shawnee State University 

Dr. Michael E. Weaver 

Associate Professor

Air Command and Staff College 

Mr. Keith Webster 

Senior Vice President for Defense 

and Aerospace 

US–India Strategic Partnership 

Forum 

Brig Gen Craig D. Wills, 

USAF

Director of Strategy, Plans, and 

Programs 

Pacific Air Forces

Dr. Roland B. Wilson 

Program Coordinator & Professor 

of Conflict Analysis & Resolution 

George Mason University, Korea 

Campus 

Dr. Austin Wyatt

Research Associate

University of New South Wales–

Canberra @ ADFA
VOL. 3 NO. 5 SPECIAL ISSUE 2020

INTRODUCTION

 3 Quad Plus 

 Form versus Substance

 Jagannath Panda

BEIJING, QUAD, AND THE QUAD PLUS

 14 “Sea Foam in the Ocean” or an “Asian NATO”? 

 Chinese Views of the Quad

 Jeffrey Becker

 28 US–China Strategic Competition and Washington’s Conception 

 of Quad Plus

 Akriti Vasudeva

 44 India and the Quad Plus

Between Pointed-Alignment and Conjectural Alliance

 Jagannath P. Panda

 73 Japan and the Quad Plus

A Japanese View for the Development and Expansion of the Quad 

 in the Age of War on the Novel Coronavirus

 Hideshi Tokuchi

 87 A Quad Plus?

 The Prospects for Australia and New Zealand

 Miguel A. Hijar-Chiapa

THE PLUS PERSPECTIVES

106 Whose Centrality? 

 ASEAN and the Quad in the Indo-Pacific

 Evan A. Laksmana

118 Britain and the Quadrilateral

 John Hemmings and James Rogers

131 South Korea’s Perspective on Quad Plus and Evolving Indo-Pacific

 Security Architecture

 Kuyoun Chung
146 Israel and Quad Plus

 A Pivot to Asia and through the Indian Ocean

 Giuseppe Dentice

165 France’s Indo-Pacific Strategy and the Quad Plus

Celine Pajon

179 Quad-Plus?

Carving out Canada’s Middle Power Role

Stephen R. Nagy

196 Brazil in the Quad Plus

Incongruous or Extended Drawbridge of the Indo-Pacific?

 Dattesh Parulekar

A VIEW FROM THE OTHERS

210 Russia and Quad Plus

 Is There a Way Forward?

Anna Kireeva and Alexei Kupriyanov

229 Indian Ocean Island States and the Quad Plus

Nilanthi Samaranayake

240 Connectivity and the Quad Powers: 

 Revisiting History and Thought

Lavanya Vemsani

257 Realistic Expectations

The China Factor in the Australia–US Perspective on the Indo-Pacific

Amit Gupta

269 The Middle East and the Quad Plus

Brendon Cannon

285 Pakistan-Afghanistan-Iran Triangularity and the Quad Plus

Countering China’s Growing Influence

 Kenta Aoki
JOURNAL OF INDO-PACIFIC AFFAIRS  SPECIAL ISSUE 2020 3

INTRODUCTION

Quad Plus

Form versus Substance

Dr. Jagannath Panda

Guest Editor

The Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (hereon, Quad 2.0) has become increasingly institutionalized and a normalized part of diplomacy for the four member 

countries—Australia, India, Japan, and the United States. After a 10-year gap 

from when the mechanism was first introduced in 2007, Quad 2.0 resumed in 

2017 with biannual meetings between the four major Indo-Pacific democratic 

powers. At present, the Quad process has secured official traction among these 

states and is considered a vital part of their Indo-Pacific strategies. 

By comparison, the concept of “Quad Plus” is currently an abstract one, seen as 

an extended version of the Quad framework—whether it will materialize into a 

more concrete grouping remains unknown. The idea of Quad Plus refers to a 

minilateral engagement in the Indo-Pacific that expands the core Quad 2.0 to 

include other crucial emerging economies. At the same time, the framework offers a multipolar lens through which observers can view, analyze, and assess the 

strategic multilateral growth of the nations involved. 

The Arrival of Quad Plus

The Quad Plus idea is rather new: it originated from a unique Quad 2.0 meeting initiated by outgoing US Deputy Secretary of State Stephen Biegun on 20 

March 2020 at the foreign secretary level. The consultation—instituted as a 

weekly meeting—was meant to enable an exchange of assessments of members’ 

COVID-19 pandemic situations and synergize participant nations’ responses to 

contain the virus’ spread.1 The forum continued with discussions surrounding 

issues like vaccine development studies; strategies for alleviating the pandemic’s 

devastating impact on the global, national and domestic economies; navigating 

the challenge of citizens stranded in foreign nations; and coordinating assistance 

packages to smaller states in the region. It significantly extended the Quad 2.0 

forum to South Korea, Vietnam, and New Zealand, raising critical questions 

about whether such a broadened platform could be sustained and whether it 

could feasibly translate into a mechanism for security cooperation. Yet, despite 

the many questions surrounding the viability, and indeed the existence, of a Quad 

Plus framework, a foreign ministers–level meeting in May 2020 with the addition of South Korea, Brazil and Israel imbibed it with a global characteristic.2
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Additionally, on a nongovernmental or think-tank level involving the strategic 

communities, the Heritage Foundation in the United States has been organizing 

Track 1.5 roundtable consultations under a Quad Plus label since 2013, which 

have involved Philippines, Indonesia, Singapore, Taiwan, France, and Sri Lanka 

on a rotating basis.3 Hence, a thematic idea of a Quad Plus structure has been 

around for a long time, which is now being witnessed in its practical implementation, usage, and value on an international platform.

Although merely a virtual assembly of agreeable nations that engage and meet 

to address or counter a shared challenge at present, the Quad Plus format holds 

much promise amid all the current uncertainty. It represents, potentially, the 

amalgamation of the Eastern and Western “like-minded” countries. Even in its 

current status, it includes a wide array of states—developing and developed economies and middle and major powers. This indicates that the grouping could possibly be regarded as an amalgamation of countries committed to maintaining a 

rules-based, liberal institutional order. Whether the Quad Plus will be based 

simply on democratic values or international rules and norms remains to be seen. 

However, rather than being a reflection of a broader democratic coalition, which 

is very much abstract at present, a Quad Plus framework is likely to be based more 

on a shared commitment to the existing international order rather than “democratic values” that are harder to define and more exclusive in nature. Instead, what 

states must envision is a broad, all-embracing, and comprehensive framework that 

can stand as a pillar for regional security and stability, multilateralism, and defense 

of global institutionalism and the status quo.

In this context, perhaps the most salient feature of a Quad Plus mechanism is 

its plural, inclusive nature. While the conceptual Quad Plus is led and organized 

by the United States, the distribution of power within its framework allows participating countries to also deepen engagement with counterparts under the strategic ambit of the Quad 2.0 grouping.4

 By building on their own national interests, while being active participants to the fulfillment of national interest goals of 

other nations, the Quad Plus dialogue is poised to take up greater salience as a 

potential extension of the Quad 2.0 mechanism. The Quad Plus emerged with the 

aim to discuss an international response to the coronavirus pandemic by coordinating an efficient crisis response and humanitarian aid.5

 However, in a postCOVID period, the scope for cooperation and convergence among the Quad Plus 

nations has the potential to, and must, emerge as a geopolitical reality. 

Indeed, even in the absence of a shared, urgent challenge that the pandemic 

presents, the increasingly multipolar vis-à-vis multiplex regional order implies 

that there are plenty of foreign policy choices and challenges for rising powers, 

including the Quad 2.0 and Plus nations. The arrival of new institutions; emergence 
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JOURNAL OF INDO-PACIFIC AFFAIRS  SPECIAL ISSUE 2020 5

and re-institutionalization of trilateral, minilateral, and multilateral groupings; as 

well as growing bilateral synergy among like-minded nations are key contours of 

this regional order.6 These contours are increasingly shaping and conditioning the 

strategic choices and challenges of Indo-Pacific nations. China, as a regional and a 

global power, figures greatly in the multipolar choices that actors like India, Japan, 

South Korea, and others are making in Asia and beyond. 

Furthering the Quad Plus Process

It is important to note the larger implications that the emergence of a Quad 

Plus dialogue can have for regional security in the post-pandemic period that, by 

all signs, will be marked by notable differences. For instance, the Quad Plus could 

potentially play a central role in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR). The economies of the IOR are demonstrating growth at a remarkable pace as the region, 

along with the Indo-Pacific as a whole, is becoming one of the most crucial geopolitical and economic areas of the world. Concurrently, a rise in security concerns 

related to vital sea routes and lines of communication, aggressive maritime militarization, and the scramble for natural resources have threatened the transformation 

of the IOR.7 In this context, the “Blue Economy” has emerged as an arena for 

nations to reframe their approach in managing the oceans for a sustainable maritime environment. Here, Blue Economy refers to the sustainable use of precious 

ocean resources for “economic growth, improved livelihoods and jobs, and ocean 

ecosystem health.”8 While the economic aspects of the Blue Economy are widely 

accepted, the political and security importance it holds as a geopolitical instrument 

have received less international focus. To this effect, the Quad 2.0 nations could 

create a viable and comprehensive strategy to reach the geopolitical, security, and 

economic potential of the Blue Economy. In fact, the Quad Plus mechanism would 

offer an ideal platform to further this paramount factor, with countries like Australia, South Korea, Japan, Vietnam, and India attributing increasing focus to their 

maritime economy.9

At the same time, in light of the realistic national security threats prevalent in 

contemporary times, the Quad Plus would allow participating nations to create a 

strategic alignment that has otherwise proved difficult to materialize. The potential 

grouping could, therefore, reinforce the liberal international order in the IndoPacific and, by extension, the world. Due to its composition of like-minded states, 

the Quad Plus could indicate a growing, or at least temporary, embrace of a US-led 

order in the Indo-Pacific region while still not becoming part of a set “alliance 

framework.” An expansion of its scope, or a shift in its priorities from pandemicinduced disaster relief to China, remains an unlikely scenario for many of the potential partners in the forum. 
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Therefore, the emergence of the Quad Plus dialogue as China-centric is not a 

goal that most of the participating nations would like to openly espouse, with almost all participating nations having elaborate economic ties with Beijing even if 

they are wary of China’s coercive, unilateral, and destabilizing actions.10 Even 

though economic and trade ties with China are witnessing redaction in a postCOVID order, with nations aiming to create newer, more sustainable, and broader 

supply chains, the embedded nature of China in the world economy is unlikely to 

be upended, with globalization here to stay.11 Under such circumstances, the 

Quad Plus will, at least for the foreseeable future, shy away from being a Chinafocused grouping owing to fraught tensions that are likely to hinder a convergence of national outlooks toward the major power. Nevertheless, a Quad Plus 

framework could be a multilateral pillar for securing international norms and 

laws and ensuring a secure and prosperous region. Today, despite a misalignment of approaches of individual states, their regional outlooks and metanarratives are becoming increasingly securitized. While a militarization of the Quad 

2.0, let alone the Quad Plus, remains highly improbable, the fact that the Quad 

Plus dialogue will focus on securing and underpinning a rules-based order is 

highly probable.

In this context, it should be noted that the Indo-Pacific has emerged as the next 

global theater of power politics and competition. The rise of the region has multiple facets attached to it: it is geographically hard to define which results in 

greater disagreements among the countries; such politicization of its geography 

only further attests to its importance.12 The region is crucial to the United States 

and China, with the US Department of Defense characterizing it as “the single 

most consequential region for America’s future.”13 Despite a large number of potential flashpoints, it remains one of the most important economic and energy 

trade hubs of the present world order.14 The Indo-Pacific incorporates the world’s 

most populated state (China) and the most populated vote-based political system 

(India). Seven of the ten biggest standing armed forces on the planet can be found 

in the Indo-Pacific,15 and around one-third of worldwide trade goes through the 

South China Sea alone.16

Interestingly, the Chinese leadership and strategic circles have persistently argued that the singular motivation behind US focus in the Indo-Pacific and Washington’s Free and Open Indo-Pacific17 strategy is to contain China’s ascent to 

power.18 To a limited (but certain) degree, the Indo-Pacific has become a point of 

convergence of the US–China competition in present times and will continue to 

be a theater for their contestation in the coming decade. The US–China rivalry is 

set to reshape key geopolitical, geo-economic, and geostrategic elements in the 

regional and global order. In many ways, this rivalry is set to unfold a new era 
Quad Plus: Form versus Substance

JOURNAL OF INDO-PACIFIC AFFAIRS  SPECIAL ISSUE 2020 7

“cold war” dimension that will pressure smaller states in the region and beyond—

such as the Quad 2.0 and Quad Plus nations—to choose between the security 

assurance offered by the United States and their economic dependence on China. 

Many Indo-Pacific states are already altering their foreign policy strategies to 

account for such emerging geopolitical uncertainties. Japan’s Free and Open 

Indo-Pacific policy, India’s Act East Policy, South Korea’s New Southern Policy, 

and Australia’s Pacific Step-up policy have been ideated to encourage deeper and 

dedicated bilateral synergy among nations in an attempt to ensure security vis-àvis an increasingly belligerent China and the United States. This bilateral synergy 

could eventually be carried forward within a Quad Plus framework that is more 

multilateral than US-centric.

In fact, bilateral synergy between the Quad 2.0 nations has been growing exponentially, leading to deeper quadrilateral synergy and the creation of the Quad 

Plus. Cited until now as the weakest bilateral link19 in the Quad 2.0 framework, 

India–Australia ties have recently been upgraded to a Comprehensive Strategic 

Partnership, with both nations signing a mutual logistics support arrangement.20

Meanwhile, the fourth foundational pact between India and the United States—

the Basic Exchange and Cooperation Agreement (BECA)—has been signed.21

Similarly, the  Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement (ACSA)22 between 

India and Japan has been signed amid rising tensions with China for both nations and domestic changes in Japan, signaling a boost in strategic defense ties 

between New Delhi and Tokyo at a time of turmoil.23 These agreements will set 

the stage for the future of security cooperation between India and the Quad; 

Japan already shares ACSAs with the United States and Australia, further 

strengthening the scope of cooperation. 

Factoring the New Undercurrents

In a major boost to trilateralism, India, Japan, and Australia have proposed to 

establish a Supply Chain Resilience Network (SCRI),24 which can gain notable 

success by engaging economically with the Quad Plus nations of South Korea, 

New Zealand, Brazil, Israel, and Vietnam. The emergence of alternative global 

supply chains is a reality of the post–COVID-19 era. In the coming times, the 

global economies will perhaps be divided into two separate value chains: one that 

is China-centric, and one for the rest of the world. As this shift occurs, South and 

Southeast Asia, alongside other developing economies, will seek to benefit by integrating themselves in the new nexus. States like India and Vietnam will also 

seek to establish themselves as technological competitors or search for new technologies to offer a viable alternative for value-added advanced technology manufacturing. Here, the Quad Plus can prove to be a vital tool for the states to further 
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their economic and technological goals by providing an additional avenue for 

building bridges and opportunities for growth and development. The US–Japan–

Australia-led Blue Dot Network,25 aimed at improving infrastructure-related activities in the Indo-Pacific, has also emerged as an initiative with much potential. 

Meanwhile, the India–France–Australia trilateral ideated in 2019 aims at creating 

an inclusive Indo-Pacific by rebalancing China’s assertiveness in the region and is 

a further testament to growing focus being attributed to the Indo-Pacific by nations beyond the region.26 The Australia–Japan–India trilateral, established in 

2015, advances Westphalian ideals of democracy, sovereignty, and the rule of law 

while billing itself as an anti-China, yet not China-containment, model.

To consider the potential outcomes that a post-pandemic-era Quad Plus 

platform might take, it is also important to consider whether any such coalition 

could feasibly stand the test against China’s ire and potential retaliation. In recent times, Beijing has proved to be a coercive trade partner, willing to pressurize states to bend to China’s will by applying its considerable economic prowess. 

As one of the world’s largest economies, still growing steadily despite a brief 

downturn during the pandemic, China is a veritable global economic heavyweight. For many of the states in the region and beyond, Beijing is still their 

largest trading partner, meaning that these states are considerably dependent on 

China for their own economic growth. However, instead of being a responsible 

trade partner, Beijing has openly and frequently used its might to extend China’s 

influence and achieve its diplomatic goals through economic coercion over 

states and businesses. 

In other words, Beijing has expanded its foreign policy tools to include realist 

notions of hard and soft power.27 It has harshly punished countries that undermine its national interests and foreign policy goals through high tariffs, import 

bans, popular boycotts, and limiting tourism. For example, in response to South 

Korea agreeing to host the US’ Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) 

antimissile systems on its territory, Beijing unleashed an economic retaliation 

campaign that left the middle-power economy severely damaged. China not 

only targeted major companies like Hyundai and Lotte with boycotts but also 

stopped Chinese tourism to the country, banned K-pop and other cultural 

products, and held up licenses of Korean agencies in China. Although the cumulative impact of China’s retribution is difficult to calculate, South Korean 

companies are still feeling its impact.28 More recently, in response to Australia’s 

calls for an independent investigation into the origins of COVID-19 and subsequent perceived anti-China statements, Beijing levied sanctions on imports 

from Australia—the world’s most China-reliant economy.29 Yet, China is so 

deeply integrated into the global economy that, despite the push for alternative 
Quad Plus: Form versus Substance

JOURNAL OF INDO-PACIFIC AFFAIRS  SPECIAL ISSUE 2020 9

supply chains, a complete decoupling is a highly unlikely scenario for most 

states.30 Such circumstances will be critical in determining the outcome and the 

scope of a Quad Plus framework—and will very likely be the major reason that 

the potential mechanism is limited in its China approach.

As such, there are multiple outcomes that the COVID-era Quad Plus dialogue 

can reach. By performing exceedingly well, the group may just establish a place for 

itself as a continued exercise between the nations that have been invited until now 

or a rolling observer membership order with the Quad 2.0 nations leading the 

charge. In other words, it can transcend from a mere expansion of the Quad 2.0 

forum to become a systematized form of a coalition. Alternatively, the Quad Plus 

mechanism can overtake the Quad 2.0 altogether, reverting its focus to disaster 

management, coupled with national and strategic security discussion focus areas 

of Quad 2.0, that led to the creation of the “core” group of four in 2004, then 

known as the Regional Core Group, serving a joint response to the Indian Ocean 

tsunami.31 This, however, is an unlikely scenario: despite its overtly broad agenda, 

the rebirthed Quad 2.0 dialogue is largely focused on unifying efforts to counter 

China’s aggressive rise, and any expansion into humanitarian aid will divert attention from this primary focus. On the other hand, the Quad Plus format is likely 

to focus more explicitly on areas like crisis response that are generally easier to 

coordinate and receive more robust support within a broadened forum of liberal, 

like-minded states. Additionally, the possibility of both the Quad 2.0 and the 

Quad Plus mechanism coexisting in the post-COVID order is also likely. The 

symbiotic existence of both dialogues, with a rotational membership beyond the 

Quad 2.0, can lead to the establishment of a new-era framework that seeks to 

provide aid to Indo-Pacific and Asian nations while strengthening bilateral and 

multilateral modes of interaction. 

Critical Questions

At present, the Quad 2.0 and Quad Plus mechanisms are US-led in practice, 

even though Japan has shown strong support for such mechanisms. A stronger 

view from other participating nations, decisive leadership, and focus on regional 

interests that promote national priorities must be envisaged. The Quad 2.0 has 

immense potential to shape the future of the Indo-Pacific, especially in the postCOVID order, and the Quad Plus mechanism might just prove to be the boost it 

needs to reach set goals.32 The rebirth of the Quad and its steady institutionalization have proven that further expansion in the future can be a possibility; the Quad 

Plus is one such gateway to bolster a combined response to China’s assertive rise. 

As Chinese president Xi Jinping’s envisioned China goes under more prominent 

international critique33 in the post–COVID-19 period—the Belt and Road Initia-
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tive specifically has pulled much focus as a result of “debt-trap” set-ups—the United 

States, Japan, India, and Australia must use this chance to reinforce the Quad 2.0 

grouping. By expanding solicitation efforts vis-à-vis the new Quad Plus nations 

into newer economic and security structures such as SCRI and more, the post–COVID-19 order is being shaped rapidly. The Quad Plus is an expansion of the Quad 

2.0, permitting the creation of a “continental connect”34 and “corridor of communication.”

Therefore, taking into account these changing realities in the post-pandemic 

world, there are crucial questions that must be addressed to better understand the 

future trajectory of international relations in the Indo-Pacific and beyond. First, 

what is the significance of the Quad Plus dialogue, and what are its implications 

for the post–COVID-19 Indo-Pacific and Asian order? Second, who are the major 

stakeholders in the Quad Plus mechanism, including and beyond the Quad 2.0 

nations? Last and more importantly, how can the Quad Plus mechanism grow 

beyond its current abstract existence to find synergy with national and multilateral Indo-Pacific initiatives? In reference to these questions, this special issue 

seeks to assess the prospects of the Quad Plus proposition and to test its feasibility as well as its future.

To do so, this special issue brings together different national and scholarly perspectives to analyze the potential of the Quad Plus from varied national and regional connotations. The volume considers whether the Quad Plus framework 

can emerge as a central focus of the emerging Indo-Pacific synergies or approaches 

of various regions and nation states. Accordingly, the special issue is divided into 

three parts. The first, “Beijing, Quad, and the Quad Plus,” discusses the grouping 

from the viewpoints of the core Quad 2.0 states—the United States, India, Japan, 

and Australia, beginning with a special article on the Chinese perspective on the 

Quad process. The second part, titled “The ‘Plus’ Perspectives,” seeks to consider 

the prospects that the grouping holds for middle powers and previously included 

parties such as the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, United Kingdom, 

South Korea, Israel, France, Canada, and Brazil. The third and last section expands 

the scope to discuss perspectives of countries like Russia, the Indian Ocean island 

states, the Middle East, Pakistan–Afghanistan–Iran, and of course, with a focus 

on history and politics that the region delves upon pertaining to connectivity and 

infrastructure. Together, these articles aim to discuss not only the present approaches of the nations/regions in question toward the Quad Plus but also assess 

how their policies may evolve in the future amid a more hotly contested IndoPacific region and an intensifying US–China rivalry.
Quad Plus: Form versus Substance

JOURNAL OF INDO-PACIFIC AFFAIRS  SPECIAL ISSUE 2020 11

Dr. Jagannath Panda

Dr. Panda is a research fellow and center coordinator for East Asia at the Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence 

Studies and Analyses (MP-IDSA), New Delhi, India. He is the series editor for Routledge Studies on Think Asia. 

Dr. Panda is an expert on China and Indo-Pacific security with a primary focus on East Asia: China, Japan, and the 

Korean Peninsula. He is the author of India-China Relations: Politics of Resources, Identity and Authority in a Multipolar 

World Order (Routledge, 2017) and China’s Path to Power: Party, Military and the Politics of State Transition (Pentagon 

Press, 2010). Most recently, he has published the edited volumes Scaling India-Japan Cooperation in Indo-Pacific and 

Beyond 2025: Connectivity, Corridors and Contours (KW Publishing Ltd., 2019) and The Korean Peninsula and Indo-Pacific 

Power Politics: Status Security at Stake (Routledge: 2020). Dr. Panda is also the co-editor/co-author of the newly published book, Chinese Politics and Foreign Policy under Xi Jinping: The Future Political Trajectory (Routledge: 2020).

Notes

1. Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, “Foreign Secretary’s Conference Call 

with counterparts from Indo-Pacific Countries,” 20 March 2020, https://mea.gov.in/.

2. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, “Meeting on the Novel Coronavirus Disease among 

Foreign Ministers of Interested Countries, Hosted by the United States,” 11 May 2020, https://

www.mofa.go.jp/.

3. “The Quad-Plus,” Heritage Foundation, https://www.heritage.org/; and “The Quad Plus 

Additional Resources,” Heritage Foundation, https://www.heritage.org/.

4. Jeff M. Smith, “How America Is Leading the ‘Quad Plus’ Group of 7 Countries in Fighting 

the Coronavirus,” Heritage Foundation, 1 April 2020, https://www.heritage.org/.

5. Vijay Gokhale, “On the Quad, define the idea, chart a path,” The Hindu, 1 October 2020, 

https://www.thehindu.com/.

6. A. J. Dolman, “The Like-Minded Countries and the New International Order: Past, Present and Future Prospects,” Cooperation and Conflict 14, no. 2 (1979): 57–85, https://doi.org/.

7. “Drivers of Blue Economy in Asia and Pacific Island Countries: An Empirical Investigation of Tourism and Fisheries Sectors,” Asian Development Bank, July 2020, https://

www.adb.org/.

8. “What is the Blue Economy?,” World Bank, 6 June 2017, https://www.worldbank.org/.

9. “Blue Economy,” PEMSEA, http://pemsea.org/ .

10. Derek Grossman, “Don’t Get Too Excited, ‘Quad Plus’ Meetings Won’t Cover China,” The 

Diplomat, 9 April 2020, https://thediplomat.com/.

11. Jonathan Woetzel, Diaan-Yi Lin, Jeongmin Seong, Anu Madgavkar, and Susan Lund, 

“China’s role in the next phase of globalization,” McKinsey and Company, 17 April 2017, https://

www.mckinsey.com/.

12. Kai He and Li Mingjiang, “Four reasons why the Indo-Pacific matters in 2020,” OUPblog, 

7 February 2020, https://blog.oup.com/.

13. US Department of Defense, Indo-Pacif ic Strategy Report, 1 June 2019, https://media 

.defense.gov/.

14. “Indo-Pacific: Strategic Significance and Emerging Challenges,” International Political 

Science Association, https://www.ipsa.org/.

15. US Indo-Pacific Command, “Area of Responsibility,” 2020, https://www.pacom.mil/.
12 JOURNAL OF INDO-PACIFIC AFFAIRS  SPECIAL ISSUE 2020

Panda

16. “How Much Trade Transits the South China Sea?,” China Power, 2020, https://

chinapower.csis.org/.

17. US Department of Defense, “A Free and Open Indo-Pacific,” 4 November 2019, https://

www.state.gov/.

18. “World voices condemn US’ containment mind-set of new cold war,” Global Times, 5 

August 2020, https://www.globaltimes.cn/. For a governmental outlook, read: Foreign Ministry of 

the People’s Republic of China, “Interview on Current China-US Relations Given by State 

Councilor and Foreign Minister Wang Yi to Xinhua News Agency,” 6 August 2020, https://www.

fmprc.gov.cn/; read also, Yamazaki Amane, “The PRC’s Cautious Stance on the U.S. Indo-Pacific 

Strategy,” Jamestown Foundation, 28 February 2020, https://jamestown.org/.

19. Dhruva Jaishankar, “The Australia–India Strategic Partnership: Accelerating Security 

Cooperation In The Indo–Pacific,” Lowy Institute, 17 September 2020, https://www.lowyinstitute.org/. Chinese circles too have expressed the view that India–Australia ties are most “distant” 

and “weak” compared to bilateral ties among Quad 2.0 nations, which is why growing synergy 

between the two is alarming for Beijing; see: Qian Feng, “India-Australia closeness draws attention,” Global Times, 21 July 2020, https://www.globaltimes.cn/.

20. Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, “Joint Statement on a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership between Republic of India and Australia,” 4 June 2020, https://www 

.mea.gov.in/.

21. Rajat Pandit, “India, US agree to expedite work on BECA, strengthen defence ties,” Times 

of India, 26 February 2020, https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/.

22. “Japan and India sign military supply-sharing pact,” Japan Times, 10 September 2020, 

https://www.japantimes.co.jp/.

23. For a more enhanced perspective on Japan’s expectations of Quad Plus, read: Jagannath 

Panda, “The Abe doctrine on ‘Quad plus’,” Japan Times, 17 July 2020, https://www.japantimes.co.jp/.

24. Jagannath Panda, “Opinion: What supply chain resilience means for Australia-India-Japan ties?,” Kyodo News, 3 September 2020, https://english.kyodonews.net/.

25. US Department of State, “Blue Dot Network,” 2020, https://www.state.gov/.

26. “India, Australia & France to jointly create inclusive Indo-Pacific,” Economic Times, 28 

August 2019, https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/; and, Ministère de l’Europe et des Affaires 

étrangères, “The Indo-Pacific region: a priority for France,” https://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/.

27. Minxin Pei, “China in Xi’s “New Era”: A Play for Global Leadership,” Journal of Democracy

29, no. 2 (2018): 37–51, https://www.journalofdemocracy.org/.

28. Andrew Salmon, “Korea still taking Chinese economic hits over US missile,” Asia Times, 

6 December 2019, https://asiatimes.com/.

29. See: James Laurenceson, Michael Zhou, and Tom Pantle, “PRC Economic Coercion: The 

Recent Australian Experience,” Australia-China Relations Institute, 14 September 2020, https://

www.australiachinarelations.org/.

30. “Is it possible to end China’s control of the global supply chain?,” Economic Times, 10 June 

2020, https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/; and Yasmeen Serhan and Kathy Gilsinan, “Can 

the West Actually Ditch China?,” The Atlantic, 24 April 2020, https://www.theatlantic.com/.

31. “Tsunami ‘core group’ of relief nations disbanded,” Relief Web, 6 January 2005, https://

reliefweb.int/.

32. While the Quad Plus is admittedly emerging as a crucial doctrine for the future, 

there are still many challenges awaiting the same. Read: Pankaj Jha, “Quad, Quad Plus, and 
Quad Plus: Form versus Substance

JOURNAL OF INDO-PACIFIC AFFAIRS  SPECIAL ISSUE 2020 13

the Indo-Pacific: The Core and Periphery,” Modern Diplomacy, 29 October 2020, https://

moderndiplomacy.eu/.

33. Jagannath Panda, “Xi’s Lost Chance in Asia,” Japan Times, 16 October 2020, https://www.

japantimes.co.jp/.

34. Jagannath Panda, “India’s Continental Connect On Indo-Pacific And Quad 2.0,” EastWest Center, 26 September 2018, https://www.eastwestcenter.org/.

Disclaimer

The views and opinions expressed or implied in JIPA are those of the authors and should not be construed as carrying the 

official sanction of the Department of Defense, Department of the Air Force, Air Education and Training Command, 

Air University, or other agencies or departments of the US government or their international equivalents.
14 JOURNAL OF INDO-PACIFIC AFFAIRS  SPECIAL ISSUE 2020

BEIJING, QUAD, AND THE QUAD PLUS

“Sea Foam in the Ocean” or 

an “Asian NATO”?

 Chinese Views of the Quad

Dr. Jeffrey Becker

Abstract

Since the early 2000s, the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue among Australia, 

India, Japan, and the United States (aka the Quad) has been a subject of signift, 

incorporating participation from New Zealand, South Korea, and Vietnam. These 

changes have led to an exchange of ideas on how to advance shared interests, including ways to address the rise of China as an economic and security presence in 

the Indo-Pacific. 

How does China perceive this cooperation among “Quad” countries, and what 

effects do Chinese scholars and policy makers anticipate it having on China’s 

interests in the Indo-Pacific? This article examines how the Quad is being viewed 

from Beijing, how Chinese academics and government-affiliated analysts understand its potential impacts on Chinese interests, and what they view as possible 

policy responses.

Introduction

In 2018, when asked whether the “‘Indo-Pacific strategy pursued by the US, 

Japan, India and Australia” (better known as the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, 

or “the Quad”) was an attempt to “contain China,” People’s Republic of China 

(PRC) foreign minister Wang Yi was dismissive.1 Likening the strategy to “sea 

foam in the Indian or Pacific Ocean,” Wang argued that the Quad was a “headline 

grabbing idea” that “would soon dissipate.”2 Others, such as Luo Zhaohui, China’s 

deputy foreign minister for Asian affairs, have been less sanguine. Speaking at a 

Foreign Ministry seminar in September 2020, Luo described the Quad as an 

“anti-China front line.” He also referred to the Quad as “the ‘mini-NATO’,” thus 

connecting the rise of the Quad to one of Beijing’s older, longstanding concerns.3

Since its reemergence in 2017, the Quad has been a subject of both debate and 

speculation. How does China perceive cooperation among Quad countries, or 

even among the Quad and an additional grouping some have labeled as a “QuadPlus” arrangement? How does it foresee the Quad evolving, and what effects do 

Chinese scholars and policymakers anticipate it having on Chinese interests in 
“Sea Foam in the Ocean” or an “Asian NATO”?

JOURNAL OF INDO-PACIFIC AFFAIRS  SPECIAL ISSUE 2020 15

the Indo-Pacific? This article examines how the Quad is being viewed from China, 

and how Chinese academics and government- and military-affiliated analysts 

view its potential impacts on Chinese interests in the region. 

The Quad has its origins in the response to the December 2004 Sumatra–

Andaman earthquake and subsequent tsunami, which devastated Indonesia’s 

Aceh province and much of South and Southeast Asia. Following the disaster, 

the United States, Australia, Japan, and India moved to form the Tsunami Core 

Group, allowing the four countries to coordinate their relief activities.4 

Following 2004, Quad members continued to explore opportunities for cooperation. In 2006, the United States, Australia, and Japan upgraded their trilateral 

security dialogue to the foreign and defense ministerial level.5 While visiting 

Japan at the end of 2006, Indian prime minister Manmohan Singh signed a joint 

statement noting “the usefulness of having dialogue among India, Japan and 

other like-minded countries in the Asia-Pacific region on themes of mutual interest,” while US vice president Dick Cheney reportedly endorsed Japanese 

prime minister Shinzō Abe’s idea of expanding the trilateral security arrangement to include India.6 In May 2007, Quad country representatives met on the 

sidelines of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) in Manila for the first time,7

while that September, the second phase of the Malabar naval exercise took place 

roughly 350 km southwest of the Andaman Islands and involved naval forces 

from the United States, Australia, Japan, India, and Singapore.8

This increased cooperation did not go unnoticed in Beijing. Following the 

Manila meetings, China issued formal diplomatic protests to each of the Quad 

countries.9 When asked about the 2007 five-nation Malabar exercise, Foreign 

Ministry spokeswoman Jiang Yu noted that China calls upon “all countries to 

establish a new security concept and carry out dialogue and cooperation on the 

basis of mutual trust and mutual benefit.”10 Meanwhile, Beijing sought to convince Canberra and New Delhi that an assertive Quad arrangement could jeopardize their economic relations with the PRC. 

While Beijing was successful in slowing Quad cooperation, in 2007–2008, 

China’s reevaluation of the balance of power in Asia following the 2008 financial 

crisis helped bring the Quad back into play.11 Following the crisis, Chinese leaders 

saw an opportunity to modify Deng Xiaoping’s traditional axiom of “keeping a low 

profile and biding one’s time” and instead pursue the country’s overseas interests 

more aggressively.12 Indeed, in the decade since, one can see this assertive posture 

in a range of activities, including the establishment of an air defense identification 

zone (ADIZ) in the East China Sea, island building in the South China Sea, and 

continued border disputes with India.
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Economically, Chinese domestic growth slowed during this time, as GDP 

growth declined from more than 14 percent in 2007 to less than 7 percent in 2017, 

while demands for imported energy grew as the economy matured.13 This demand 

for new sources of growth in part helped spur China’s outward economic expansion in the form of overseas investment projects, culminating in China’s massive 

Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), Pres. Xi Jinping’s flagship policy designed to leverage Chinese lending, investment, and technical expertise to more closely integrate 

China to the rest of the world, primarily through infrastructure development.14 As 

China’s reliance on overseas energy imports and overseas investments continued to 

grow, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), particularly the PLA Navy (PLAN), 

was given responsibility for protecting these interests. This subsequently expanded 

the PLAN’s presence in the Indian Ocean beyond its traditional counterpiracy 

operations, including submarine patrols and the establishment of the PLA’s first 

overseas base in Djibouti.15

This reassessment of the international situation post-financial crisis, and corresponding shift toward a more assertive PRC foreign policy, served to rekindle 

interest in the Quad. This reemerging interest was made evident in the Trump 

administration’s 2017 National Security Strategy, which noted the administration’s 

desire to “seek to increase quadrilateral cooperation with Japan, Australia, and 

India.”16 While not naming the Quad specifically, Australia’s 2017 Foreign Policy 

White Paper notes that “Australia is open to working with our Indo–Pacific partners in other plurilateral arrangements” and that Australia pledges to “build on 

the growing strategic collaboration between Australia, India and Japan.”17

While decades of collaboration had already drawn the United States, Japan, 

and Australia closely together; 2010–2017 saw cooperation between the three 

allies and India expand as well. In 2015, the Indian and Australian navies began 

conducting the biannual naval exercise AUSINDEX. By spring 2017, the two 

countries had announced a whole series of exercises involving both the armies and 

special forces of the two countries as well. By the end of 2017, India and Australia 

had also established a 2+2 bilateral dialogue between foreign and defense secretaries, giving India three 2+2 dialogues—one with each of three Quad countries.18

Rumors about the reemergence of the Quad culminated in November, as senior 

officials from all four countries met again in Manila ahead of that year’s ASEAN 

summit.19 Between 2017 and 2019, Quad member representatives met in Singapore in June and November 2018, and New York and Bangkok in September and 

November 2019. In March, the four countries met in an expanded “Quad-plus” 

virtual session at the vice-ministerial level, involving South Korea, New Zealand, 

and Vietnam.20 By summer 2020, it was rumored that Australia would once again 

join the Malabar naval exercise after a 13-year hiatus.21
“Sea Foam in the Ocean” or an “Asian NATO”?

JOURNAL OF INDO-PACIFIC AFFAIRS  SPECIAL ISSUE 2020 17

Publicly, official PRC government statements were not as strident following 

the Quad’s “revival” in 2017 as they were in 2007 (China did not, for example, 

demarche all four countries as they did in 2007). However, Beijing certainly took 

notice, often seeking to link India and other Quad members’ activities directly to 

US policies. When asked about the Quad meetings in Manila, PRC Foreign 

Ministry spokesperson Geng Shuang stated that “these visions and proposals [in 

the Indo-Pacific] should be open and inclusive and conducive to enhancing winwin cooperation. Politicized and exclusionary ones [i.e., the Quad] should be 

avoided.”22 When asked about Malabar 2017, Geng provided similar comments, 

noting, “We hope such relations and cooperation are not targeted at a third party 

and are conducive to regional peace and stability.”23 When asked about the Quad 

at the March press conference for the first session of the 2018 National People’s 

Congress, Wang Yi noted, 

It seems there is never a shortage of headline-grabbing ideas. They are like the 

sea foam in the Pacific or Indian Ocean: they may get some attention, but soon 

will dissipate. Contrary to the claim made by some academics and media outlets 

that the “Indo-Pacific strategy” aims to contain China, the four countries’ official 

position is that it targets no one. I hope they mean what they say and their action 

will match their rhetoric.24 

Chinese media coverage, however, was more strident. Writing in the Global 

Times immediately following the 2017 Manila meetings, Ling Shengli of the 

China Foreign Affairs University argued that “interference [in the South China 

Sea] by the US, Japan, Australia and other nations . . . cannot be left unnoticed” 

and was adding tensions to an otherwise peaceful environment in the South 

China Sea.25 The overseas edition of the People’s Daily, the official newspaper of 

the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) Central Committee, raised the question 

“Should the United States, Australia, Japan and India Join Forces to Counter 

China?”26 When discussing the possibility of Australia participating in Malabar 

2020, PRC news outlets such as the Global Times again argued that the exercise 

was “directed at China,” connecting India’s acquiescence to Australia’s participation in the exercise to recent escalations in tensions between China and India.27

Stepping back from immediate coverage of events, how do Chinese scholars 

and analysts view the Quad’s evolution and resurgence? First, it should be noted 

that some of the writings examined here see the resurgence of the Quad of 

secondary concern and not yet a critical foreign policy issue akin to Taiwan or 

the South China Sea. Ye Hailin at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences 

(CASS), for example, points out that, to date, Quad activities have been focused 

within the Indian Ocean, which constitutes China’s “secondary strategic direc-
18 JOURNAL OF INDO-PACIFIC AFFAIRS  SPECIAL ISSUE 2020

Becker

tion” (Zhongguo de Eryao Zhanlue Fangxiang; 中国的次要战略方向) compared 

to more critical issues such as Taiwan or the Korean Peninsula.28 That being 

said, many Chinese analysts writing about the Quad often discuss it within the 

context of an evolving regional and international structure that continues to 

move from the unipolar world of the post–Cold War world toward the bipolarity of a post-9/11 environment. According to this analysis, the Quad is often 

viewed as part of the United States’ attempts to prevent this shift and reverse its 

decline in the Indo-Pacific.29

This viewpoint is evident in statements by PRC officials as well. As noted by 

President Xi at the June 2018 Foreign Affairs Work Conference, “it is necessary to 

grasp the general trend of accelerating multi-polarization of the world and to attach importance to the in-depth adjustment of relations between major powers.”30

When speaking at the September 2020 ASEAN Foreign Ministers’ Meeting, 

Wang Yi argued that differences in US–China relations are fundamentally about 

the United States’ refusal to embrace the historical trend toward multipolarity.31 

It is within this context that Chinese analysts often see the Quad as a mechanism by which Washington can prevent this power shift and undermine China’s 

growing influence in the region. When discussing the reemergence of the Quad, 

Zhang Li at Sichuan University argues explicitly that China, particularly China’s 

expanding maritime activities and overseas investment activities in the form of 

the BRI, are the Quad countries’ main target.32 Zhang Jie at CASS points to 

Japanese foreign minister Tarō Kōno’s October 2017 interview, during which 

Kōno expressed a desire to work with the Quad countries to counteract China’s 

expansion under BRI, as evidence that the Quad is explicitly designed to “compete with China’s Belt and Road Initiative and [also] its [China’s] strategy to 

become a maritime power.”33

It is not surprising, therefore, that many Chinese analysts see the Quad as an 

extension of the US Indo-Pacific Strategy, which, although vague, under the Trump 

administration has helped to generate increased focus on the region, a process that 

began under the second Obama administration.34 As part of this strategy, the 

United States has moved away from its traditional view of two distinct regions 

(the East Asian and Indian Ocean Regions), and adopted the view, which had 

come to prominence in the region years earlier, of an interconnected Indo-Pacific 

extending from the Horn of Africa to the Western Pacific.35 With this view, the 

current administration has described, at least on paper, an approach characterized 

by free trade, the rule of law, and an upholding of the existing regional order by 

US allies, partners, and regional institutions.36

Examining the Quad’s resurgence in the context of the US Indo-Pacific Strategy, 

many Chinese authors argue that the Quad is merely an extension of that strategy, 
“Sea Foam in the Ocean” or an “Asian NATO”?

JOURNAL OF INDO-PACIFIC AFFAIRS  SPECIAL ISSUE 2020 19

designed to maintain the US position in the region and curb China’s rising power. 

Xia Liping at the Shanghai Institute for International Strategic Studies (SIISS) 

for example, argues that the United States sees the Quad as a means of bolstering 

America’s network of alliances in Asia, which has eroded in recent years to the 

point where it was insufficient to contain China’s rise. Xia specifically ties the 

Quad’s resurgence to the White House’s 2017 National Security Strategy, which 

calls for increasing security ties with Quad countries.37 Editorials in the PRC’s 

official English newspaper, China Daily, connect the Quad and the Indo-Pacific 

strategy explicitly, stating, “China-haters in Washington have been celebrating 

the administration’s Indo-Pacific strategy, especially the so-called Quad alliance” 

(emphasis added).38

A subset of authors, however, do see Australia and Japan as having a larger 

hand in the Quad’s resurgence,39 viewing this as a consequence of the US retreat 

from the region, rather than its recommitment, which has motivated Australia 

and Japan to try and keep Washington engaged “and bring India in to jointly cope 

with the rise of China.”40 According to Zhang Jie at CASS, “as the first step, Japan 

and Australia have attempted to work together to fill the ‘power vacuum’ left by 

the US and curb the rapid expansion of China’s influence.”41 Moreover, Zhang 

believes that because the Quad is being promoted by Japan and Australia, it is 

quite separate from the US Indo-Pacific Strategy, and, as a result, may also develop 

faster in both the economic and security fields. 

Regardless of whether the Quad is a US construct or a product of the power 

vacuum created by the US absence, most scholars examined here view the Quad as 

a means to contain China’s rise. This concern has no doubt been intensified by a 

series of policy speeches by Trump cabinet members during the summer of 2020, 

which outlined China’s hostile behavior and presented policy options designed to 

counter that behavior.42 To be sure, concerns that US policy in the region is designed to contain China are nothing new, and the Quad is certainly seen as an 

extension of that objective. Reporting on a July 2018 speech by US secretary of 

state Mike Pompeo, during which he discussed the US Free and Open Indo-Pacific 

Strategy, the China Daily noted that “Pompeo and other State Department officials 

have tried to depict the Indo-Pacific strategy as inclusive and not meant to contain 

China, but such words are not credible.”43 A June 2020 Global Times article argues 

just as explicitly that “to contain China, the U.S. proposed to build a ‘Quad Alliance’ of the U.S., Japan, India, and Australia.”44 Analysis by Chinese academicians 

is more nuanced but draws similar conclusions. Xia Liping argues that the Trump 

administration views the current security architecture in the region to be inadequate, 

implying that the Quad is designed to resolve those shortcomings.45 Others are 
20 JOURNAL OF INDO-PACIFIC AFFAIRS  SPECIAL ISSUE 2020

Becker

more direct, stating, “For the United States, the Quad provides a way to restrict 

China in the Indo-Pacific region.”46

It is not lost on the Chinese research community that the Quad has economic 

dimensions as well. Many see the Quad as a mechanism through which the four 

countries can respond to China’s BRI. Scholars such as Zhang Jie go as far as to 

argue the potential threat of economic cooperation between the four Quad countries poses an even greater threat to China than does the security cooperation.47

To be sure, economic cooperation between the four Quad nations has grown; 

the United States for example recently surpassed China as India’s largest trading 

partner, and Japan and United States have been within the top five-largest sources 

of foreign direct investment to India since 2017.48 The four countries are also reportedly discussing a “supply chain resilience initiative” to lessen reliance on Chinese factories, as well as a mechanism for improving the quality and transparency 

of infrastructure investment, known as the Blue Dot Network.49

However, in their current forms, none of these initiatives appear ready to rival 

the breadth and scope of China’s BRI. Currently, the Blue Dot Network lacks the 

types of dedicated financing similar to that provided by Chinese policy banks 

such as the China Development Bank or the Export-Import Bank of China. 

China’s Response to the Quad

Some Chinese authors see the Quad as a work in progress and caution against 

conducting what they refer to as “undermining work” (fenhua waijiegongzuo; 分化

瓦解工作).50 Others, however, point to economic diplomacy as perhaps the PRC’s 

most useful tool, arguing that economic pressure successfully undermined the 

Quad in the past. Zhang Li notes that as a result of Chinese economic pressure in 

2007, Australia refocused on economic and trade relations with China at the 

Quad’s expense.51

Such economic pressure can be directed at either Quad members or against 

others in the region. Chinese analysts initially focused on India, for example, as a 

possible target for its economic diplomacy to hinder Quad development.52 In 

2018, Xia Liping and Zhong Qi suggested that India could be severed from the 

Quad though Chinese diplomatic overtures.53 As recent as 2019, Ye Hailin posited that “China should focus on India when formulating a strategy to respond to 

the US-Japan-India-Australia security mechanism.”54 Mu Xiaoming at China’s 

National Defense University believed that India’s desire to maintain its “strategic 

autonomy”(zhanlue zizhuxing; 战略自主性)will hinder the development of 

US–India relations.55

Yet this view appears to be changing. Over the past five years, a host of tensions 

in the Sino–Indian relationship have only served to make India a less attractive 
“Sea Foam in the Ocean” or an “Asian NATO”?

JOURNAL OF INDO-PACIFIC AFFAIRS  SPECIAL ISSUE 2020 21

target for Chinese economic outreach. These include China’s sale of submarines to 

India’s archrival Pakistan and China’s growing presence in the port of Gwadar, 

which Chinese analysts often consider as a possible location for a future Chinese 

military facility.56 Moreover, in June 2020, the worst fighting between the two sides 

in 40 years broke out in the disputed Galwan River Valley region, resulting in the 

death of at least 20 Indian soldiers and helping to spur nation-wide anti-China 

protests.57 Interestingly enough, some Chinese analysts have argued that if Indian 

prime minister Narendra Modi faces strong anti-China, nationalist sentiments at 

home, this would certainly limit China’s ability to use economic outreach to India 

to undermine the Quad.58 To date, this appears quite prescient, as growing antiChina sentiment within India makes neither China–India rapprochement nor 

India backing away from the Quad appear likely to occur in the near term. 

Others contend that should the four Quad countries continue to align their 

regional policies, this new, united group would undermine “ASEAN Centrality,” 

the idea that, as the region’s most important multilateral institution, ASEAN has 

a key role to play in the region’s diplomatic architecture. Ge Hongliang and Wang 

Nana of Guanxi University argue that “the Quad will pressure ASEAN to pick a 

side while also undermining ASEAN centrality.”59 Writing in the Global Times, 

Zhao Minghao argues that 

Southeast Asian countries . . . worry that the quadrilateral cooperation mechanism of the US, Japan, India and Australia would pose challenges to ASEAN’s 

centrality in the regional architecture. Having realized that the Indo-Pacific 

strategy is likely to trigger confrontation between China and the US and drag 

Southeast Asia into a dilemma over which side to lean, ASEAN countries are 

working on a common position to deal with the strategy.60 

ASEAN centrality remains core to the organization’s perceptions of itself. One 

need look no further than the 2019 ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific, which “envisages ASEAN Centrality as the underlying principle for . . . maintain[ing] its 

central role in the evolving regional architecture in Southeast Asia and its surrounding regions.”61 This focus on ASEAN Centrality is echoed in member states’ official 

government documents, such as Malaysia’s first-ever Defense White Paper, which 

notes that “a strong and unified ASEAN is at the core of Malaysia’s security and 

defense reliance.”62 In May 2018, Singapore foreign minister Vivian Balakrishnan 

noted that the Quad concept did not adequately address whether ASEAN would 

remain central to the region’s architecture.63

Political elites in ASEAN member states are also not universally opposed to a 

larger role for the Quad, and although Singapore and Malaysia voice concern, 

others, such as Vietnam, appear supportive.64 According to a survey of Southeast 
22 JOURNAL OF INDO-PACIFIC AFFAIRS  SPECIAL ISSUE 2020

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Asian elite opinions, roughly 57 percent of those surveyed are generally in support 

of the Quad, while only 10 percent outright oppose. Moreover, 46 percent believe 

the Quad is complimentary to the role of ASEAN in the region.65

To address these concerns, officials from Quad member states have expanded 

their outreach to ASEAN member states. In a formal statement following the 

26 September 2019 ministerial meetings, the group went on record to officially 

reaffirm their support for ASEAN Centrality in the Indo-Pacific, noting that 

“we [the Quad] want to compliment ASEAN’s critical role in the region.”66

This position was reaffirmed in November of that year in Bangkok, as Quad 

officials again formally “reaffirmed their countries’ strong support for ASEAN 

centrality, ASEAN-led regional architecture, and ASEAN’s adoption of its 

Indo-Pacific outlook.”67

A Quad-Plus Arrangement?

Some ASEAN member states, such as Vietnam, have begun to cooperate with 

the Quad in what has been referred to as a “Quad-Plus” arrangement. In March, 

Quad member states were joined by Vietnam, South Korea, and New Zealand in 

a “Quad-Plus video-conference” to discuss ways to coordinate their COVID-19 

response.68 Within China, while these initial steps toward broader Quad-Plus 

cooperation are welcome in their ability to better coordinate and manage the 

region’s pandemic response, to the extent they are related to larger Quad activities, they are viewed with suspicion. For example, when discussing the aforementioned March 2020 “Quad-Plus” videoconference, Liu Zongyi at the Shanghai 

Institute for International Studies argued that “although they [Quad Plus] 

claimed to be mainly aimed at dealing with COVID-19 issues, the efforts to 

institutionalize the Quad and the intention to expand it to Wellington, Seoul 

and Hanoi cannot be underestimated,” suggesting a high degree of mistrust of 

anything associated with the Quad.69

Overall, however, perceptions of any Quad-Plus expansion appear to be a mixture of concern and ambivalence. Some have sought to downplay concerns over 

the Quad’s expansion. Following Vietnamese foreign minister Nguyễn Xuân 

Phúc’s trip to Australia in 2018, a Global Times editorial with the headline Is 

Vietnam Moving to Join the Quad, went to great pains to downplay the chances of 

this occurring, arguing “we don’t need to read too much into Phúc’s visit and what 

came of it.”70 Others however, see any Quad-Plus activities as further evidence of 

the Quad’s threat to ASEAN. Wang Jingchao, for example, argues that the Quad’s 

outreach efforts to Vietnam has the potential to split ASEAN and the latter’s 

“central position will fall, and its risk of marginalization will increase.”71 One issue 
“Sea Foam in the Ocean” or an “Asian NATO”?

JOURNAL OF INDO-PACIFIC AFFAIRS  SPECIAL ISSUE 2020 23

to watch, therefore, will be the extent to which these Chinese writings on the 

Quad-Plus begin to coalesce around either of these viewpoints. 

The Quad and China: A Contentious Future?

Since its inception, the ability of the Quad to retain cohesion has to a large 

extent been driven by Beijing’s assessment of the balance of power in the region 

and China’s corresponding behavior. A key reason for the Quad’s lost momentum in the mid-2000s was China’s continued adoption of Deng’s low-profile 

diplomacy, undermining the impetus for Quad cooperation at the time. As Beijing reassessed the international situation and pursued overseas interests more 

aggressively, Quad members again found common cause. Given this interplay 

between Chinese foreign policy behavior and Quad cooperation, it is no surprise 

that the vast majority of the Chinese literature examined suggest that the Quad 

is something to be confronted rather than engaged. 

When considering confrontation, early Chinese writings considered a multipronged approach, employing economic diplomacy directed at both India and 

ASEAN. Yet as a means to undermining the Quad, India appears unlikely to be a 

path to success in the near term. If anything, India’s commitment to the Quad 

seems to have grown, as indicated by its willingness to host Quad ministerial meetings in late 2020.72 ASEAN, however, may be more fruitful ground. The organization appears split over the Quad, with some members, such as Singapore and 

Malaysia, concerned about ASEAN Centrality, and others, like Vietnam, engaging 

with the Quad in what may be the early stages of a Quad-Plus arrangement. 

This would be far from the first issue to divide ASEAN member states. For 

years, the organization has been unable to develop a unified approach to the South 

China Sea, and while multiple factors have contributed to this stalemate, China’s 

growing relationship with Cambodia has certainly played a role. In this sense, 

ASEAN’s Quad policy may end up becoming another issue that divides the Quad, 

widening existing cracks in the unity of Southeast Asian foreign policy.

Dr. Jeffrey Becker

Dr. Becker (PhD, political science, George Washington University) directs the Center for Naval Analyses’ Indo-Pacific Security Affairs Program. He is an expert in Chinese politics and Chinese foreign policy and security issues. 

Becker’s recent work has focused on China’s military as a global force, including China’s military diplomacy, US–

China military engagement, and the security implications of China’s expanding global presence.

Becker has published work on Chinese politics and labor unrest in China, and his writings have appeared in the 

journals Comparative Political Studies, the Journal of Chinese Political Science, and the Naval War College Review. 

His book publications and peer-reviewed journal articles include From Peasants to Protesters: Social Ties, Resources, and Migrant Labor Contention in Contemporary China (Lexington Books, 2014), “Who’s at the Helm: 

Leadership in China’s Navy” (Naval War College Review, 2016), and “The Knowledge to Act: Chinese Migrant 

Labor Protests in Comparative Perspective” (Comparative Political Studies, 2012).
24 JOURNAL OF INDO-PACIFIC AFFAIRS  SPECIAL ISSUE 2020

Becker

Notes

1. The author wishes to thank Dr. Satu Limaye and Dr. Jagannath Panda for their comments 

on previous drafts. The views and opinions expressed here are solely those of the author and do not 

necessarily reflect the views of the Center for Naval Analyses or the US Navy. 

2. PRC Foreign Ministry, “Foreign Minister Wang Yi Meets the Press,” 9 March 2018, 

https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/.

3. Shi Jiangtao, “South China Sea: Beijing Warns ASEAN Members Against Backing ‘Troublemaker’ US in Region,” South China Morning Post, 3 September 2020, https://www.scmp.com/. 

On Beijing’s long-standing concern of an “Asian NATO,” see for example Jagannath Panda, “Beijing’s ‘Asian NATO’ Maxim on Quad Is Structural,” PACNET Forum 61 (22 November 2019), 

https://idsa.in/.

4. Marc Grossman, “The Tsunami Core Group,” Security Challenges 1, no. 1 (2005): 11–14, 

http://www.jstor.org/; and Nilanthi Samaranayake, Catherine Lea, and Dmitry Gorenburg, Improving U.S.-India HA/DR Coordination in the Indian Ocean (Arlington, VA: Center for Naval 

Analyses, July 2014), https://www.cna.org/.

5. David Brewster, “The Australia–India Security Declaration: The Quadrilateral Redux?,” 

Security Challenges 6, no. 1 (Autumn 2010), 2.

6. Tanvi Madan, “The Rise, Fall, and Rebirth of the ‘Quad,’” War on the Rocks, 16 November 

2017, https://warontherocks.com/; and Dennis Shanahan, “Pacific Allies Aim For India Upgrade,” 

NewsComAu, 14 March 2007, https://www.news.com.au/.

7. Brahma Chellaney, “‘Quad Initiative’: An Inharmonious Concert of Democracies,” Japan 

Times, 19 July 2007, https://www.japantimes.co.jp/.

8. Phase One of Malabar 2007 took place in April that year and was held in the Western 

Pacific. See Gurpreet S Khurana, “Joint Naval Exercises: A Post-Malabar-2007 Appraisal for India,” Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies 52 (September 2007).

9. Brendan Nicholson, “China Warns Canberra on Security Pact,” The Age, 15 June 2007, 

https://www.theage.com.au/.

10. Xinhua, “Foreign Ministry Spokeswoman: China Advocates for All Countries to Establish A New Security Concept (Waijoabu Fayanren: Zhongfang Zhuzhang Geguo Shuli Xin 

Anquanguan; 外交部发言人:中方主张各国树立新安全观),” Sina News, 6 September 2007, 

http://news.sina.com.cn/.

11. Scott W. Harold, Tanvi Madan, and Natalie Sambhi, U.S.-Japan Alliance Conference (Santa 

Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2020), https://www.rand.org/.

12. Bonnie S. Glaser and Benjamin Dooley, “China’s 11th Ambassadorial Conference Signals 

Continuity and Change in Foreign Policy,” Jamestown China Brief 9, no. 12, https://jamestown.org/.

13. Wayne M. Morrison, “China’s Economic Rise: History, Trends, Challenges, and Implications for the United States,” Congressional Research Report, 25 June 2019, 6, https://fas.org/.

14. See for example, Jeffrey Becker, Erica Downs, and Ben DeThomas, China’s Presence in the 

Middle East and Western Indian Ocean: Beyond Belt and Road (Arlington, VA: Center for Naval 

Analyses, 2019), https://www.cna.org/.

15. Becker, Downs, and DeThomas, China’s Presence in the Middle East and Western Indian 

Ocean; and Erica Downs, Jeffrey Becker, and Patrick de Gategno, China’s Military Support Facility 
“Sea Foam in the Ocean” or an “Asian NATO”?

JOURNAL OF INDO-PACIFIC AFFAIRS  SPECIAL ISSUE 2020 25

in Djibouti: The Economic and Security Dimensions of China’s First Overseas Base (Arlington, VA: 

Center for Naval Analyses, 2017), https://www.cna.org/.

16. National Security Strategy of the United States of America (Washington, DC: White House, 

2017), https://www.whitehouse.gov/.

17. Government of Australia, 2017 Foreign Policy White Paper (Canberra: Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 2017), 40, 42.

18. Tanvi Madan, “The Rise, Fall, and Rebirth of the ‘Quad’”; and Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, “India-Australia Joint Statement During the State Visit of Prime 

Minister of Australia to India,” 10 April 2017, https://www.mea.gov.in/.

19. Kallol Bhattacherjee, “India, Japan, U.S., Australia Hold First ‘Quad’ Talks at Manila Ahead 

of ASEAN Summit,” The Hindu, 12 November 2017, sec. National, https://www.thehindu.com/.

20. US Mission India, “Readout of U.S.-Australia-India-Japan Ministerial (‘The Quad’)” (U.S. 

Embassy & Consulates in India), 3 October 2019, https://in.usembassy.gov/; Derek Grossman, 

“Don’t Get Too Excited, ‘Quad Plus’ Meetings Won’t Cover China,” The Diplomat, 9 April 2020, 

https://thediplomat.com/; and Bhagyashree Garekar, “Quad Leaders Stress Asean’s Centrality in 

Their Indo-Pacific Visions,” Straits Times, 17 November 2018, https://www.straitstimes.com/.

21. Harsh V. Pant and Premesha Saha, “India’s Pivot to Australia,” Foreign Policy, 21 July 2020, 

https://foreignpolicy.com/.

22. PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Geng Shuang’s Regular Press Conference on November 13, 2017,” 14 November 2017, https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/.

23. PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Geng Shuang’s Regular Press Conference on July 7, 2017,” 7 July 2017, 7, https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/.

24. PRC Foreign Ministry, “Foreign Minister Wang Yi Meets the Press.”

25. Ling Shengli, “A Regional Solution Needed for South China Sea,” Global Times, 23 November 2017, http://www.globaltimes.cn/.

26. “Should the United States, Australia, Japan and India Join Forces to Counter China? 

(MeiAoRiYin Yao Lianshou Kangzheng Zhongguo; 美澳日印要联手抗衡中国?),” People’s Daily 

Online, 24 February 2018, http://world.people.com.cn/.

27. Xu Guangyu, “Strategic Intent Behind New Delhi’s Plan to Invite Australia to Join 

Malabar Drill,” Global Times, 11 July 2020, https://www.globaltimes.cn/.

28. Ye Hailin, “Strategic Thoughts on China’s Addressing of the US’s New Version of the ‘IndoPacific’ Concept (Zhongguo Yindui Meiguo Zaibian ‘Yintai’ Gainian de Celuexing Sikao; 中国应对美

国再版‘印太’概念的策略性思考),” Indian Ocean Economic and Political Review 5 (2019), 7.

29. See Panda, “Beijing’s ‘Asian NATO’ Maxim on Quad Is Structural.”

30. “Xi Jinping: Work Hard to Create a New Situation in Major Country Diplomacy with 

Chinese Characteristics (Xi Jinping: Nuli Kaichuang Zhongguo Tese Daguo Waijiao Xinjumian; 习

近平:努力开创中国特色大国外交新局面),” Xinhua, 23 June 2018, http://www.xinhuanet.

com/.

31. “China Urges U.S. to Follow Historical Trend Toward Multi-Polar World,” Xinhua, 10 

September 2020, http://www.xinhuanet.com/.

32. Zhang Li, “Exploring the Quad: An ‘Indo-Pacific’ Perspective (‘Yintai’ Shiyuzhong de 

MeiYinRiAo Sibian Jizhi Chutan; ‘印太’视域中的美印日澳四边机制初探 ),” South Asian Studies Quarterly 4 (2018).

33. Zhang Jie, “The Quadrilateral Security Dialogue and Reconstruction of Asia-Pacific Order,” (MeiRiYinAo ‘Sibian Duihua’ yu Yatai Dichu Zhixu de Zhonggou; 美日印澳“四边对话”与
26 JOURNAL OF INDO-PACIFIC AFFAIRS  SPECIAL ISSUE 2020

Becker

亚太地区秩序的重构 ), China International Studies 5 (2018), 11. On FM Kōno’s statement, see

“Japan to Propose Strategic Dialogue with U.S., India and Australia: Nikkei,” Reuters, 26 October 

2017, https://www.reuters.com/.

34. David Brunnstrom and Michael Martina, “Xi Denies China Turning Artificial Islands 

into Military Bases,” Reuters, September 2015, https://www.reuters.com/.

35. Rex Tillerson, “Defining Our Relationship with India for the Next Century” (speech, 

CSIS Headquarters, 18 October 2017), https://www.csis.org/.

36. US Department of State, A Free and Open Indo-Pacific: Advancing a Shared Vision, 4 November 2019, https://www.state.gov/; US Department of Defense, Indo-Pacific Strategy Report: 

Preparedness, Partnerships, and Promoting a Networked Region, 1 June 2019, https://media.defense.

gov/; and National Security Strategy of the United States of America.

37. Xia Liping and Zhong Qi, “Analysis on Indo-Pacific Strategy of Trump Administration 

(Telangpu Zhengfu Yintai Zhanlue Gouxiang Pingxu; 特朗普政府‘印太战略构想’评析),” Contemporary International Relations, no. 1 (2018), 24.

38. Chen Weihua, “‘America First’ Policy Dooms US’ Indo-Pacific Strategy to Failure,” China 

Daily, 3 August 2018, https://www.chinadaily.com.cn/.

39. Wang Jingchao, “The Evolution of U.S. Indo-Pacific Strategy and Its Influence on Regional 

Situation (Meiguo Yintai Zhanlue de Yanjin Jidui Diqu Jushi de Yingxiang; 美国印太战略的演进及

对地区局势的影响),” Journal of East China University of Science and Technology 3 (2019), 65.

40. Zhang, “Quadrilateral Security Dialogue and Reconstruction of Asia-Pacific Order.”

41. Zhang, “Quadrilateral Security Dialogue and Reconstruction of Asia-Pacific Order.”

42. See David Shambaugh, “Parsing the Trump Administration’s Broadside Against China,” 

China-US Focus, 31 July 2020, https://www.chinausfocus.com/.

43. Chen, “‘America First’ Policy Dooms US’ Indo-Pacific Strategy to Failure.”

44. Long Xingchun, “India’s Betting with Washington and Canberra Is a Poor Move,” Global 

Times, 22 June 2020, https://www.globaltimes.cn/.

45. Xia and Zhong, “Analysis on Indo-Pacific Strategy of Trump Administration.”

46. Zhang, “Exploring the Quad: An ‘Indo-Pacific’ Perspective.”

47. Zhang, “Quadrilateral Security Dialogue and Reconstruction of Asia-Pacific Order.”

48. Department for Promotion of Industry and Trade, Government of India, “Fact Sheet on 

Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) From April 2000 to March 2020,” March 2000, https://dipp 

.gov.in/; and Ministry of Commerce and Industry, Department of Commerce, Government of 

India, “Export Import Data Bank,” 2019–2020, https://commerce-app.gov.in/.

49. Shruti Srivastava and Isabel Reynolds, “Japan, India and Australia Eye ‘Supply Chain Pact’ 

to Counter China,” Japan Times, 23 August 2020, https://www.japantimes.co.jp/; and Jagannath 

P. Panda, “India, the Blue Dot Network, and the ‘Quad Plus’ Calculus,” Journal of Indo-Pacific Affairs 3, no. 3 (Fall 2020), 3–21, https://media.defense.gov/; and US Department of State, “Blue 

Dot Network,” https://www.state.gov/.

50. Ye Hailin, “Strategic Thoughts on China’s Addressing of the US’s New Version of the ‘IndoPacific’ Concept,” 2.

51. Zhang Li, “Exploring the Quad: An ‘Indo-Pacific’ Perspective.” 

52. Zhang, “Quadrilateral Security Dialogue and Reconstruction of Asia-Pacific Order.”

53. Xia and Zhong, “Analysis on Indo-Pacific Strategy of Trump Administration,” 22.

54. Ye, “Strategic Thoughts on China’s Addressing of the US’s New Version,” 1.
“Sea Foam in the Ocean” or an “Asian NATO”?

JOURNAL OF INDO-PACIFIC AFFAIRS  SPECIAL ISSUE 2020 27

55. Mu Xiaoming, “New Tricks Keep Coming: U.S. Wants to ‘Solidify’ Its ‘Indo-Pacific 

Strategy? (Buduanchu XinZhao: Mei “Yintai Zhanlue” Yao “Shixinhua?” 不断出新招:美“印太战

略”要“实心化’?),” People’s Daily, 6 August 2018, http://military.people.com.cn/.

56. For a useful overview of the growing list of issues in the China-Indian relationship, see: 

Jeff Smith, “Democracy’s Squad: India’s Change of Heart and the Future of the Quad,” War on the 

Rocks, 13 August 2020, https://warontherocks.com/.

57. Jeffrey Gettleman, Hari Kumar, and Sameer Yasir, “Worst Clash in Decades on Disputed 

India-China Border Kills 20 Indian Troops,” New York Times, 16 June 2020, https://www.nytimes 

.com/; and Rajesh Roy, “Indians Rage at China After Bloody Border Clash,” Wall Street Journal, 

18 June 2020, https://www.wsj.com/.

58. Ye, “Strategic Thoughts on China’s Addressing of the US’s New Version,” 13–14.

59. Ge Hongliang and Wang Nana, “An Analysis on ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific 

(Dongmen de Yinduyang Yitaipingyang Zhangwang Pingxu; 东盟的印度洋—太平洋展望评析),” 

Crossroads: Southeast Asian Studies 6 (2019), 25.

60. Zhao Minghao, “Southeast Asia Not a Stage for Washington’s Game,” Global Times, 21 

August 2018, http://www.globaltimes.cn/.

61. Association of Southeast Asia Nations, “ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific,” 23 June 

2019, 1, https://asean.org/.

62. Malaysian Ministry of Defence, Defence White Paper (Percetakan Nasional Malaysia Berhad, 2020), 70, http://www.mod.gov.my/. For other discussions of the importance of ASEAN 

Centrality in the white paper, see pages 17, 20, 23, 28, 31, and 64. 

63. Charissa Yong, “Singapore Not Joining US, Japan-Led Free and Open Indo-Pacific for 

Now: Vivian Balakrishnan,” Straits Times, 14 May 2018, https://www.straitstimes.com/.

64. Nguyen Quang Dy, “Vietnam May Turn Threats into Opportunity,” YaleGlobal Online, 2 

June 2020, https://yaleglobal.yale.edu/.

65. Le Thu Huong, “Southeast Asian Perceptions of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue: 

Survey Findings” ASPI Special Report, 2018, https://s3-ap-southeast-2.amazonaws.com/.

66. US Department of State, “Readout of U.S.-Australia-India-Japan Ministerial (‘The 

Quad’),” 26 September 2019, https://www.state.gov/.

67. Office of the Spokesperson, US Department of State, “U.S.-Australia-India-Japan Consultations (‘The Quad’),” 4 November 2019, https://www.state.gov/.

68. Jeffrey Becker, “COVID-19 Offers a Golden Opportunity to Reengage with the IndoPacific,” Defense One, 27 April 2020, https://www.defenseone.com/.

69. Yu Jincai, “India Plays with Fire Spicing up G7 Expansion,” Global Times, 5 June 2020, 

https://www.globaltimes.cn/.

70. “Is Vietnam Moving to Join the Quad?,” Global Times, 20 March 2018, https://www 

.globaltimes.cn/.

71. Wang, “Evolution of U.S. Indo-Pacific Strategy,” 68–69.

72. Archana Chaudhary, “India to Host Quad, U.S. Ministerial Meetings Later This Year,” 

Bloomberg, 3 September 2020, https://www.bloomberg.com/.

Disclaimer

The views and opinions expressed or implied in JIPA are those of the authors and should not be construed as carrying 

the official sanction of the Department of Defense, Department of the Air Force, Air Education and Training Command, 

Air University, or other agencies or departments of the US government or their international equivalents
28 JOURNAL OF INDO-PACIFIC AFFAIRS  SPECIAL ISSUE 2020

BEIJING, QUAD, AND THE QUAD PLUS

US–China Strategic Competition and 

Washington’s Conception of Quad Plus

Akriti Vasudeva

Abstract*

To demonstrate leadership in the Indo-Pacific and build on global concerns 

about dependence on Beijing in the aftermath of the coronavirus pandemic, the 

United States has sought to engage in regular meetings with a grouping of “likeminded” countries to collectively fight COVID-19 and its aftereffects. Discussion has ranged from vaccine development to ensuring supply-chain resilience to 

upholding international norms. What does this coalition imply about the evolution of Sino–US great-power competition over the past two decades and what 

does it mean for the Indo-Pacific going forward? This article considers what 

factors motivated the development of the Quad Plus coalition and why it is 

consequential, how it fits into the US relationship with China and the Trump 

administration’s Indo-Pacific Strategy, and what its future may look like under the 

Biden administration.

Introduction

Over the past 15 years, China has emerged as a serious contender to dethrone 

the United States as the preeminent global superpower. Its gross domestic product 

in purchasing power parity terms has tripled between 2005 and 2019, surpassing 

that of the United States,1 and by the US Department of Defense’s own admission, 

China’s defense modernization over the past 20 years has put its military capabilities 

“ahead of the United States” in areas such as integrated air defense systems and 

land-based conventional and ballistic missiles.2 China has also made tremendous 

investments in antiaccess/area-denial (A2/AD) capabilities aimed specifically at 

frustrating US efforts to defend allies and partners in Asia in the event of a conflict,3

to say nothing of its innovation in emerging technologies such as cyber and artificial 

intelligence,4 forcing the United States to play catch up.

* Sections of this paper are based on and draw from a piece written by the author and Dr. Jagannath 

Panda for The National Interest in September 2020. See: Jagannath Panda and Akriti Vasudeva, “U.S.-

China Competition and Washington’s Case for ‘Quad Plus’,” National Interest, 28 September 2020, https://

nationalinterest.org/.
US–China Strategic Competition and Washington’s Conception of Quad Plus

JOURNAL OF INDO-PACIFIC AFFAIRS  SPECIAL ISSUE 2020 29

Nor is this competition only in terms of economic and military prowess. Beijing 

has also sought to compete with the United States for diplomatic, geopolitical, and 

strategic influence globally, by investing huge sums of money into countries in Asia 

and Africa to provide public goods such as infrastructure and connectivity.5 However, due to the lack of much of a pushback from Washington, this Chinese jostling 

for influence has turned into aggression. For years, by unilaterally advancing its 

land and maritime claims through salami-slicing tactics against neighbors such as 

Japan, India, Philippines, Vietnam, and others; economically coercing countries, 

such as by forcing them into debt-for-equity swaps as in Sri Lanka6 or through 

antidumping tariffs such as with Australia;7 and refusing to adhere to international 

law such as the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea,8 China has 

been chipping away at the US-led liberal international order without a credible 

challenge from Washington.

Although the United States in the past recognized and acknowledged the 

challenge China posed to the rules-based order9 and made some efforts to address it through the Pivot/Rebalance to Asia,10 Washington has now begun to 

articulate a comprehensive response spanning the economic, military, diplomatic, 

and strategic domains through the Indo-Pacific Strategy.

11 The goals of this 

strategy are to ensure that the Indo-Pacific region, which imagines the Indian 

Ocean and Pacific Ocean as one strategic system,12 remains free and open for 

navigation, overflight, and commerce for all countries; is anchored in respect for 

international law;13 and is not dominated by a “revisionist power”: China.14 And 

in this endeavor to defend the US-led global order, the Trump administration 

has sought to develop and strengthen coalitions with like-minded nations such 

as the Quadrilateral, or Quad, grouping with Japan, India, and Australia. However, more recently, in response to the outbreak of the coronavirus, which began 

in Wuhan, China, the United States has initiated a new framework for IndoPacific cooperation, dubbed “Quad Plus” by the media.15

This article considers what factors motivated the development of the Quad 

Plus coalition and why it is consequential, how it fits into the US relationship 

with China and the Trump administration’s Indo-Pacific Strategy, and what its 

future may look like under the Biden administration.

US–China Great-power Competition and Quad/Quad Plus

The genesis of the Quad Plus lies in the United States’ strategic competition 

with China, particularly over the past 20 years. To understand the drivers of and 

motivations behind the development of this coalition, we need to examine the 

evolution of the US approach toward China since the 2000s.
30 JOURNAL OF INDO-PACIFIC AFFAIRS  SPECIAL ISSUE 2020

Vasudeva

The Trump administration’s policy toward China can be described as adversarial, 

with the 2018 National Defense Strategy naming Beijing as a “strategic competitor” 

that aims to achieve “Indo-Pacific regional hegemony in the near-term and displacement of the United States to achieve global preeminence in the future.”16

Analysts have warned that “a new type of Cold War” is now afoot,17 with Washington taking an increasingly confrontational stance toward Beijing on areas such as 

trade, technology, and human rights, particularly in the aftermath of the coronavirus pandemic that Pres. Donald Trump has repeatedly called “the Chinese virus.”18

However, 20 years ago too, Condoleezza Rice, then a foreign policy advisor to 

George W. Bush’s campaign and eventually National Security Advisor and Secretary of State, had identified China as a “strategic competitor” that “would like to 

alter Asia’s balance of power in its own favor,” and had proposed that the United 

States “should never be afraid to confront Beijing when our interests collide.”19

Thus, it becomes pertinent to ask: (1) why did it take two decades for the United 

States to decisively address the challenge from China and what factors explain 

how US policy toward China has come full circle in this time?; and (2) in what 

ways has this evolution impacted the conception of the Quad, the Indo-Pacific 

Strategy, and the Quad Plus? These questions are considered below, analyzing 

each US administration in turn.

The George W. Bush administration came into office at a time when the world 

was starting to come to grips with the rise of China. This administration had a 

hard-nosed view of China militarily, ideologically, and geopolitically. During the 

campaign, candidate Bush asserted that the United States “must deal with China 

without ill-will—but without illusions.”20 He criticized the Clinton administration for being soft on Beijing, particularly with regard to threats China made to 

Taiwan,21 and pledged to strengthen relations with allies in Asia, particularly Japan. The mid 2000s was also when Sino–US economic and trade issues became 

acute, due to concerns in Washington about Chinese currency manipulation to 

keep export rates low, Beijing offering state-owned enterprises land sops and 

other subsidies to compete with foreign firms, and American companies being 

asked to surrender technology to continue accessing Chinese markets.22 Thus, the 

Bush administration was aware of the risks that China posed, as articulated by 

Deputy Secretary of State Robert Zoellick in a speech in September 2005 registering alarm about Chinese military modernization, lack of transparency, and intellectual property theft, among others concerns.23

However, the Bush government had little policy space to address some of these 

challenges, dealing as it was with more pressing threats such as terrorism, two 

wars, and a domestic financial crisis. In addition, the United States and China 

were already fairly economically intertwined by then, and China’s more assertive 
US–China Strategic Competition and Washington’s Conception of Quad Plus

JOURNAL OF INDO-PACIFIC AFFAIRS  SPECIAL ISSUE 2020 31

foreign policy stance, such as confrontation with US naval vessels24 and threatening of freedom of navigation in the Indo-Pacific commons or coercion of neighbors through “salami-slicing” tactics,25 was still a few years away. Thus, overall, the 

Bush administration believed it could constructively engage China on economic 

issues and that being a “responsible stakeholder” and playing by the international 

rules and norms was fundamentally in Beijing’s interest.26

However, the administration did take steps to hedge against China’s rise. It was 

under President Bush that the idea of the shared values of democracies as a balancing force against China came about. Former Bush administration officials 

Michael J. Green and Daniel Twining wrote shortly after leaving office that “a 

network of Asia-Pacific great and regional powers, united by a shared democratic 

identity and the desire to hedge against Chinese domination, could work to preserve a multi-polar regional order as American preponderance eventually wanes.”27

This vision called for strengthening relations with countries such as Japan, India, 

and Australia and became the underlying rationale for the Quad, which was 

imagined as “the hub of a new alignment of like-minded democracies prepared to 

provide greater public goods to the region”28 after it proved successful as an ad hoc 

grouping to coordinate responses to the Indian Ocean tsunami in December 

2004.29 In fact, although the Quad disbanded after a single meeting and a military 

exercise in 2007, in the 2008 campaign for the US presidential elections, candidates Barack Obama and John McCain both spoke of the idea of a concert or 

league of democracies to deal with global challenges.30

Although President Obama did have concerns about the US trade deficit with 

China and what he viewed as unfair practices on Beijing’s part,31 his administration came into office with a desire to maintain stability in the Sino–US relationship so that they could elicit cooperation from Beijing on issues such as combating 

climate change and denuclearization of North Korea and Iran while “managing 

differences.”32 However, while the Obama administration was focused on reviving 

the economy after the 2008 financial crisis and dealing with an uptick in violence 

in Afghanistan, China become emboldened by a distracted United States and 

began asserting itself regionally and globally,33 illustrated by Beijing’s expansion 

of China’s maritime claims in the South China Sea.34

As the nature of the challenge from China became clearer, the Obama administration shifted focus and attention from the Middle East to Asia through its 

Pivot/Rebalance to Asia strategy, initiated in 2011.35 This aimed to build a web of 

relationships and partnerships,36 both bilaterally and multilaterally, to maintain a 

balance of power in the region vis-à-vis China. This included Washington ramping up engagement with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), 

for example, by officially joining the East Asia Summit;37 initiating a trilateral 
32 JOURNAL OF INDO-PACIFIC AFFAIRS  SPECIAL ISSUE 2020

Vasudeva

dialogue with Japan and India;38 and expanding US military presence in Australia 

and Singapore.39 In fact, it was Secretary of State Hillary Clinton who first indicated that the United States was seriously considering the “Indo-Pacific” construct in a 2011 piece for Foreign Policy.

40

However, when Beijing challenged the status quo and it came time for the 

United States to enforce some of the red lines it had set, the Obama administration did not have the resolve to act decisively and instead privileged maintaining 

cooperation and stability in its relationship with China. For instance, President 

Obama had warned China of a negative impact on Sino–US relations if Beijing 

reclaimed land in the Scarborough Shoal,41 and said that China must abide by 

the ruling of the international tribunal against Chinese maritime rights in the 

South China Sea.42 However, the consensus among analysts is that the Obama 

administration did not follow through on those warnings, and the Chinese 

maintained and, in fact, expanded their aggressive presence in the maritime seas 

of the region.43

Thus, the Bush and Obama administrations were either not entirely certain 

about the nature and extent of the threat from China or did not have the resolve 

to act. However, by the time the Trump administration came into office, Beijing’s 

increasing dominance in all domains, whether military, economics, technology, 

or geopolitics, had begun to blunt American advantage, and the challenges it 

posed to US primacy and global leadership as well as the liberal international 

order were clear. For instance, Pres. Xi Jinping had begun implementing largescale modernization reforms to turn the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) into a 

modern military capable of taking on the most advanced of nations, chiefly the 

United States, and the PLA Air Force was already cutting into US technical 

advantage.44 Beijing’s advancements with regard to A2/AD capabilities were 

posing increasing threats to US ability to operate freely in maritime Asia, and the 

Chinese military had made heavy investments in artificial intelligence, cyber, and 

space capabilities, which led the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Gen Joe 

Dunford, to remark that “in the last 10 or 15 years, [US] competitive advantage 

has eroded, and it’s no longer as decisive as it was some years ago.”45 China had 

begun to assert its economic influence from Asia to Europe by floating an alternative to US-led financial institutions, i.e., the Asian Infrastructure Investment 

Bank,46 as well as through the Belt and Road Initiative.47 China had expanded its 

power projection capabilities, with its navy becoming the largest in the world,48

the development of its first overseas military base in Djibouti, and its buildup of 

strategic ports in the Indian Ocean region such as in Pakistan and Sri Lanka—

moves that had the potential to constrain US choices in the region.49 Additionally, Beijing had ramped abrasive tactics toward US allies and partners by milita-
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JOURNAL OF INDO-PACIFIC AFFAIRS  SPECIAL ISSUE 2020 33

rizing islands in the South China Sea50 as well as attempting to change the status 

quo by trying to construct a road in disputed territory claimed by Bhutan.51

In addition, around this time, bipartisan consensus was starting to emerge in the 

policy community in the United States that Washington’s decades-long policy of 

engaging China economically and efforts to make it part of the international system in hopes of shaping its political and military behavior was not working.52 For 

instance, former Obama administration officials Kurt Campbell and Ely Ratner 

wrote in March 2018 that “nearly half a century since Nixon’s first steps toward 

rapprochement, the record is increasingly clear that Washington once again put 

too much faith in its power to shape China’s trajectory.”53 This was essentially the 

same position that the Trump administration put forth in its National Security 

Strategy in December 2017, which said: “These competitions require the United 

States to rethink the policies of the past two decades—policies based on the assumption that engagement with rivals and their inclusion in international institutions and global commerce would turn them into benign actors and trustworthy 

partners. For the most part, this premise turned out to be false.”54

These developments forced a rethink on the US approach to and policy toward 

China. The Trump administration not only labeled China as a strategic competitor, 

recognizing the dangers Beijing posed to a rules-based order, but it also developed 

a strategy with both military and economic dimensions to “preserve a free and 

open Indo-Pacific where sovereignty, independence, and territorial integrity are 

safeguarded.”55 Among the key elements of this strategy is developing stronger 

security relationships with partners in the region that share US concerns about 

Chinese adventurism and have a mutual interest in ensuring a safe, secure, and 

transparent region that is open for all to conduct commerce and navigation. This 

has meant not only upgrading trilateral consultations such as among the United 

States, Japan, and India to the leader level56 or expanding the scope of cooperation 

such as initiating an infrastructure investment partnership with Australia and 

Japan,57 but also revitalizing the Quad and elevating it to the ministerial level.58

The administration believes that linking these relationships in the region would 

develop a “networked security architecture” that can share the burden of responsibilities in the region, is “capable of deterring aggression,” and can support “regional 

peace and stability.”59

In this way, Chinese military and economic ascendance over the past two decades and US recognition (albeit delayed) of the threat it poses have resulted in 

a hardening of American views of Beijing in recent years as well as the nurturing 

of a coalition like the Quad as a coordinating and consultative mechanism to 

address China’s rise. And these two factors have played a key role in determining 
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Vasudeva

the US response to the coronavirus pandemic, including the development of the 

Quad Plus grouping.

Origin of and Strategic Rationale for Quad Plus

The tide had already begun turning in the United States against China in the 

first three years of the Trump administration, which were punctuated by a trade 

war between the two countries60 as well as US and Chinese ships facing off in the 

South China Sea.61 However, the coronavirus pandemic brought bilateral tensions to a low not seen in several decades. Although President Trump was initially 

complimentary of President Xi’s efforts to contain the virus,62 his administration 

soon reversed its stance, perhaps partially to deflect blame for their own handling 

of the pandemic, as reports emerged that China had initially not been transparent 

about the spread and lethality of the virus.63 Tensions escalated when senior administration officials, including Secretary of State Mike Pompeo, traded barbs 

with Chinese officials over where the virus originated and both sides blamed the 

other.64 This nosedive in Sino–US relations in the aftermath of the coronavirus 

pandemic and in the backdrop of an already escalating rivalry between the two 

countries over the past few years laid the foundation for the Quad Plus grouping.

On 20 March, US Deputy Secretary of State Stephen Beigun initiated a weekly 

coordination call with his counterparts in the Quad countries i.e., India, Japan, 

and Australia, as well as Vietnam, South Korea, and New Zealand to discuss best 

practices for and coordinating responses to the coronavirus pandemic.65 In a 

similar call on May 11 but at a higher level and with a slightly different group, 

Secretary Pompeo spoke with the foreign ministers of the Quad member countries along with Brazil, Israel, and South Korea to deliberate “the importance of 

international cooperation, transparency, and accountability in combating the COVID-19 pandemic and in addressing its causes.”66 Multiple such calls have happened since then, which the United States has labeled “Indo-Pacific cooperation 

on COVID-19”67 but the media has termed “Quad Plus,” since it includes the 

members of the Quad plus a few rotating others. 68

Although Washington’s initiative to convene the Quad Plus calls may be seen as 

driven by global health security concerns, it is perhaps better explained as a strategic move intended to reemphasize US leadership of the Indo-Pacific region and is 

best viewed through the prism of US competition with China.69 A key indication 

of this is the United States’ utilization of the Quad mechanism as the basis for facilitating this conversation. The Quad is widely known to be a response to China’s 

rise and is meant to be a balancing coalition of democracies aimed at deterring 

Beijing’s bid to threaten the stability of the Indo-Pacific. Until recently, the Quad 

had done this primarily through increasing military interoperability among its 
US–China Strategic Competition and Washington’s Conception of Quad Plus

JOURNAL OF INDO-PACIFIC AFFAIRS  SPECIAL ISSUE 2020 35

members and exchanging views on regional and global challenges. That the 

Quad, led by the United States, has now brought together other democratic 

partners to provide and share solutions to a problem Washington views as created by China, such as through developing a COVID-19 vaccine or making 

global supply chains resilient, indicates the strategic and geopolitical significance 

of this grouping.

To challenge the narrative about American decline and compete with China in 

the Indo-Pacific, the Trump administration had already begun to paint Beijing as 

a norm violator through various speeches and other public messaging long before 

the pandemic. For example, former Secretary of State Rex Tillerson’s remarks at 

the Center for Strategic and International Studies in October 2017 called China 

out for its predatory economics in the Indo-Pacific and positioned the United 

States as a country that would work to ensure that small states in the region retain 

their sovereignty.70 This rhetoric only accelerated after the coronavirus pandemic, 

with US officials asserting that “Beijing’s actions threaten our people and our 

prosperity” and calling for a “new grouping of like-minded nations, a new alliance 

of democracies” to deal with the challenge from China.71 Quad Plus is likely a 

part of that vision,72 considering the Trump administration has sought to utilize 

the grouping to marshal support for an investigation into the origins of the coronavirus, develop ways to support countries that may be vulnerable economically as 

a result of COVID-19, and fight disinformation,73 all measures directed at China. 

Officials have described the Trump administration’s preference for “mission-based 

coalitions” instead of cooperation in large international institutions, and the Quad 

Plus seems to fit the bill.74

What has aided the United States in putting this coalition together has been 

increasing though selective convergences between its views and those of its Quad 

partners on the risks that China poses in the Indo-Pacific region. This is particularly due to the hardening of the stances of Australia and India, the more reluctant 

of the Quad partners, toward China in the past few years. While Australia has a 

high degree of economic dependence on China and was traditionally wary to rock 

the boat in the relationship, Beijing’s increasing influence operations in the country and repeated economic coercion has pushed Canberra to stand up to China.75

Similarly, India, which has had a longstanding border dispute and a large military 

capability gap with China, has long preferred a hedging strategy to deal with 

China. However, the coronavirus pandemic and the 2020 border standoff in eastern Ladakh has forced a rethink in New Delhi, which is now more comfortable in 

indicating resolve to China through concrete balancing actions.76 Apart from the 

Quad countries, other partners involved in the Quad Plus grouping also underline 

its importance as a tool for the United States to expand its influence in countries 
36 JOURNAL OF INDO-PACIFIC AFFAIRS  SPECIAL ISSUE 2020

Vasudeva

where it has not been as present in the last few years. For instance, the inclusion 

of South Korea, whose relations with China were increasingly close in the early to 

middle years of this decade (at the expense of relations with Washington) but 

have since soured,77 lends credence to this argument.

The motivation behind the Quad Plus grouping is arguably not just strategic 

but also economic in rationale. As discussed in the previous section, the US 

government and private industry have long been frustrated with the growing 

barriers and challenges that American firms face in doing business in China. 

For example, estimates suggest that since 2013, the United States has incurred 

over 1.2 trillion USD in economic damages due to intellectual property theft 

from Chinese companies.78 With the addition of the recent trade tensions between the two countries and the economic fallout generated by the coronavirus 

pandemic, the Trump administration has pushed American companies to end 

their dependence on Chinese manufacturing and move production out of China.79 While some of these jobs would move back to the United States, due to 

Trump’s insistence on domestic manufacturing, American companies may be 

looking to move their supply chains to countries with inexpensive labor.80 Such 

cooperation could be facilitated and prioritized by the Quad Plus at the highest 

levels, particularly since grouping members Vietnam and India could be such 

destinations for US firms.81 The Quad Plus’ focus on “reenergizing global growth 

and economic prosperity” in the aftermath of the coronavirus pandemic with special 

attention being paid to smaller countries82 is also in line with US efforts as part of 

the Indo-Pacific strategy to shield vulnerable countries from “unsustainable debt” 

and China’s potential to “[take] possession of sovereign assets as collateral.”83 This is 

also why the United States has invested in economic instruments such as the Asia 

Reassurance Initiative Act, the BUILD Act, and the Blue Dot Network to provide 

fair and sustainable financing options to countries facing Chinese economic coercion and looking for alternatives for their economic development.

Overall, the Trump administration has utilized the Quad Plus as a signal to 

Beijing that China is increasingly isolated in the world as a result of its own actions, whether with regard to the coronavirus pandemic or its territorial and 

economic coercion. However, whether this mechanism survives when the new 

US administration takes office in 2021 is still an open question, which will be 

discussed in the final section.

Biden–Harris and the Quad Plus Test

Since the election of Joe Biden and Kamala Harris as president and vice 

president of the United States, there has been significant debate in policy circles 

on how the administration should or would deal with China.84 Will the Biden 
US–China Strategic Competition and Washington’s Conception of Quad Plus

JOURNAL OF INDO-PACIFIC AFFAIRS  SPECIAL ISSUE 2020 37

administration’s policies signal a return to Obama-era engagement of China to 

secure tactical cooperation while avoiding conflict, will they resemble Trump’s 

more confrontational approach, or will they be somewhere in the middle? Biden 

has suggested that he would “build a united front of U.S. allies and partners to 

confront China’s abusive behaviors and human rights violations, even as we seek 

to cooperate with Beijing on issues where our interests converge,”85 which indicates a bifurcated strategy of competition and cooperation. However, it is too 

early to predict with accuracy and conviction which of those two elements will 

dominate. What appears at present is that Biden would like to restore American 

leadership in the world, return to a focus on strengthening allies and partners in 

Asia and Europe, and link foreign policy much more with domestic policy.86

What does this mean for his approach to the Indo-Pacific, the Quad, and the 

Quad Plus? There has been some apprehension over whether Biden would adopt 

the term Indo-Pacific or further the vision and strategy articulated by the Trump 

administration. Early indications suggest that the focus on the Indo-Pacific may 

stay intact, but the policy details remain to be seen. Biden has made reference to 

the importance of maintaining a “secure and prosperous Indo-Pacific” in various 

calls with foreign leaders, most interestingly with those of Australia, Japan, and 

India, i.e., the Quad.87 Additionally, his Secretary of State nominee, Antony 

Blinken, has highlighted the need to work with like-minded partners “to 

strengthen and uphold a rules-based order in the Indo-Pacific.” Finally, with key 

US allies and partners such as France88 and Germany89 now adopting their own 

versions of an Indo-Pacific vision or road map, it would be increasingly difficult 

for a US president with an internationalist viewpoint not to do the same.

Arguably, it is fairly certain that the Biden administration would continue 

cooperation with Japan, Australia, and India through the Quad mechanism, including on jointly responding to COVID-19. First, Biden’s likely pick for Secretary of Defense, Michèle Flournoy, wrote in June 2020 about the need to deepen 

Quad engagement to deal with Chinese assertiveness. “The incident at Galwan 

should serve as a clarion call to these major democracies, and other countries 

who are anxious about Chinese intentions and capabilities, to strengthen their 

bilateral and multilateral security cooperation. In a principle, it is a moment that 

demands US leadership to convene and mobilize the region’s democracies,” she 

said.90 Second, Biden has spoken about the importance of coalition-building and 

has specifically mentioned democracies as key stakeholders he would like to engage in cooperating on global challenges. Thus, even if such a grouping does not 

have the same members as the Quad Plus, the objective of working together with 

like-minded nations that share values and interests and a common vision for the 

international order would be achieved.
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Vasudeva

However, if the Biden administration makes investments in continuing the 

Quad Plus collaboration, it could be a useful way of testing the utility of issuebased coalitions led by the Quad. Can the Quad be an effective multilateral institution to check China’s revisionist tendencies? Can it build a complementarity 

of interests with other regional groupings to respond to future global challenges 

like the coronavirus pandemic?91 Exploring this through regular Quad Plus dialogues, even when there is not a global emergency and perhaps with different 

rotating members based on the issue area, could help countries prepare for an 

unforeseen calamity and work together to ensure global stability. Whether the 

Biden administration continues the Quad Plus or not, their policies toward the 

Quad and the Indo-Pacific will be watched closely and are likely to be seen as a 

test of US resolve against China.

Akriti Vasudeva

Ms. Vasudeva is a Research Analyst with the South Asia Program at the Stimson Center. Her research focuses on 

US–India defense and strategic cooperation, geopolitics of South Asia and the Indo-Pacific, and Indian foreign 

policy. She is also Editor-at-Large at South Asian Voices, an online magazine featuring strategic analysis and commentary on the security, politics, and economics of the subcontinent. Her analysis has appeared in publications such 

as Foreign Policy, The National Interest, and The Diplomat. Previously, she worked as a print journalist in India, reporting on environmental issues for The Indian Express in Mumbai, and on education policy for Hindustan Times, New 

Delhi. She has also held research positions at the Embassy of India in Washington, DC, and the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses in New Delhi, among others. She holds an MA in Asian studies from the Elliott School 

of International Affairs, George Washington University, and a bachelor’s degree in information technology engineering from the University of Mumbai.

Notes

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May 2020, https://warontherocks.com/.
US–China Strategic Competition and Washington’s Conception of Quad Plus

JOURNAL OF INDO-PACIFIC AFFAIRS  SPECIAL ISSUE 2020 39

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40 JOURNAL OF INDO-PACIFIC AFFAIRS  SPECIAL ISSUE 2020

Vasudeva

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US–China Strategic Competition and Washington’s Conception of Quad Plus

JOURNAL OF INDO-PACIFIC AFFAIRS  SPECIAL ISSUE 2020 41

44. Graham Allison, “What Xi Jinping Wants,” The Atlantic, 31 May 2017, https://www.theatlantic.com/; and Department of Defense, Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2017, (Washington DC: Office of the Secretary of 

Defense, May 2017), https://dod.defense.gov/.

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64. Zachary Cohen, Alex Marquardt, and Kylie Atwood, “Blame game escalates between US 

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67. Department of State, “Indo-Pacific Cooperation on COVID-19.”

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70. Rex Tillerson, “Defining Our Relationship with India for the Next Century: An Address 

by U.S. Secretary of State Rex Tillerson” (remarks at the Center for Strategic and International 

Studies in Washington, DC, 18 October 2017), https://www.csis.org/.

71. Michael Pompeo, “Communist China and the Free World’s Future” (remarks at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library and Museum, Yorba Linda, California, 23 July, 2020), https://

www.state.gov/.

72. Panda and Vasudeva, “U.S.-China Competition and Washington’s Case for ‘Quad Plus’.”

73. Department of State, “Indo-Pacific Cooperation on COVID-19.”

74. Schadlow, “The End of American Illusion.”

75. Natasha Kassam, “Great expectations: The unraveling of the Australia-China relationship,” 

Brookings Institution, 20 July 2020, https://www.brookings.edu/.

76. Akriti Vasudeva, “Shedding the Dogmas in India’s China Policy,” South Asian Voices, 27 

June 2020, https://southasianvoices.org/.

77. Jung H. Pak, “Trying to Loosen the Linchpin: China’s Approach to South Korea,” Brookings Institution, July 2020, 2–4, https://www.brookings.edu/.

78. Schadlow, “The End of American Illusion.”

79. “Trump dangles cash for US firms moving from China,” BBC, 18 August 2020, https://

www.bbc.com/.

80. Ana Swanson and Jim Tankersley, “Companies may move supply chains out of China, but 

not necessarily to the U.S.,” New York Times, 22 July 2020, https://www.nytimes.com/.

81. Panda and Vasudeva, “U.S.-China Competition and Washington’s Case for ‘Quad Plus’.”

82. Department of State, “Indo-Pacific Cooperation on COVID-19.”

83. Department of Defense, Indo-Pacific Strategy Report, 9.

84. See: Thomas Wright, “Between restoration and change,” Order from Chaos (blog), 1 October 2020, https://www.brookings.edu/; Aaron Friedberg, “Beware the China Reset,” Foreign Policy, 

1 October 2020, https://foreignpolicy.com/; and Bonnie Glaser and Jude Blanchette, “Neither 

China nor the US wants a hot war. Dialogue can help separate fact from fiction,” South China 

Morning Post, 19 November 2020, https://www.scmp.com/.

85. Joseph R. Biden, Jr., “Why America Must Lead Again,” Foreign Affairs, March/April 2020, 

https://www.foreignaffairs.com/.

86. Biden, “Why America Must Lead Again.”

87. Biden–Harris Transition, Readout of the President-elect’s Foreign Leader Calls, 11 November 

2020, https://buildbackbetter.gov/; and Biden–Harris Transition, Readout of the President-elect’s 

Foreign Leader Calls, 17 November 2020, https://buildbackbetter.gov/.

88. French Minister of Europe and Foreign Affairs, The Indo-Pacific region: A Priority for 

France, August 2019, https://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/.
US–China Strategic Competition and Washington’s Conception of Quad Plus

JOURNAL OF INDO-PACIFIC AFFAIRS  SPECIAL ISSUE 2020 43

89. Sebastian Strangio, “Germany Joins the ‘Indo-Pacific’ Club,” The Diplomat, 3 September 

2020, https://thediplomat.com/.

90. Michèle Flournoy and Josh Hochman, “Treat China’s border clash with India as a clarion 

call,” Financial Times, 19 June 2020, https://www.ft.com/.

91. Panda and Vasudeva, “U.S.-China Competition and Washington’s Case for ‘Quad Plus’”; 

and Arzan Tarapore, “The Geopolitics of the Quad,” National Bureau of Asian Research, November 

16, 2018, https://www.nbr.org/.

Disclaimer

The views and opinions expressed or implied in JIPA are those of the authors and should not be construed as carrying 

the official sanction of the Department of Defense, Department of the Air Force, Air Education and Training Command, 

Air University, or other agencies or departments of the US government or their international equivalents.
44 JOURNAL OF INDO-PACIFIC AFFAIRS  SPECIAL ISSUE 2020

 BEIJING, QUAD, AND THE QUAD PLUS

India and the Quad Plus

Between Pointed-Alignment and Conjectural Alliance

Dr. Jagannath Panda

Abstract

The conjectural alliance of “Quad Plus,” which is yet to find formal acknowledgment in the official discourse among the Indo-Pacific partners, is witnessing 

increasing traction, as the member countries fend to ensure regional stability, 

devoid of unilateralism and aggressive posturing. For India, the Quad Plus narrative holds immense strategic significance, since such an open framework exemplifies New Delhi’s evolution as a power in an emerging international order. 

With a focus on Indo-Pacific, India’s adherence to the Quad Plus framework 

comes as a symbolic gesture to New Delhi’s growing global outlook, where the 

strategic intent of having a pointed alignment with a more concentrated power 

structure and indistinct embracing of alliance politics, which is seeking to sustain 

India’s foreign policy posture within the framework of “multialignment” rather 

than “nonalignment,” is becoming aptly clear.

Introduction

Alliances or alignments are the means through which states effectively secure 

their foreign policy advantages, and India is no different. However, as one of the 

few major powers that does not overtly endorse an “alliance framework”—which 

brings the United States, Australia, and Japan together—India has been an active 

partner in the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (hereafter, Quad 2.0) process. 

More importantly, New Delhi has signaled its perception of the Quad framework 

more as a “conjectural alliance”1 of “like-minded” countries in the Indo-Pacific. 

With conversations on the COVID-19 pandemic occurring both at the foreign 

secretary-level as well as the foreign ministers-level, there is a general acceptance 

of mutual commitment, building a consultative channel of understanding, and 

more importantly, trying to expand the compass of Quad 2.0 to a “Quad Plus,” 

among partner states.

While the term Quad Plus is yet to find an official mention in any formal statement or briefing, including those of India, the grouping has lately been gaining 

strategic traction. The inclusion of New Zealand, South Korea, and Vietnam in the 

weekly Quad 2.0 meeting of foreign ministry officials, initiated by the outgoing 

US Deputy Secretary of State Stephen Biegun in March 2020, marked the onset 
India and the Quad Plus

JOURNAL OF INDO-PACIFIC AFFAIRS  SPECIAL ISSUE 2020 45

of the Quad Plus mechanism.2 This was followed by a higher-level meeting organized by the outgoing US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo in May 2020,3

 which 

saw the further addition of Brazil and Israel, indicating a grander global strategic 

intent. At the recently concluded Quad 2.0 second ministerial meeting in Tokyo 

under the new leadership of Japanese prime minister Yoshihide Suga, the foreign 

ministers “affirmed the importance of broadening cooperation with more countries for the realization of a ‘Free and Open Indo-Pacific’,”4

 albeit through separate press statements. These measures have implied, though not explicitly stated, 

the importance attached to the Quad Plus narrative as a significant development 

for the Indo-Pacific region, especially for India.

This article examines the Indian perspective on the emerging Quad Plus 

framework, arguing that New Delhi’s adherence to the narrative is indicative of 

its changing foreign policy outlook, the strategic intent of aligning with a more 

concentrated power structure, and subtle embrace toward alliance politics, even 

though India would maintain a steadfast foreign policy posture within the framework of “multialignment” rather than “nonalignment.” India’s official stance is aptly 

illustrated in Foreign Minister Dr. S. Jaishankar’s statement that “India will never 

be part of an alliance structure.” Still, the subtle nuances shaping India’s postGalwan outreach are being driven along the lines of alignment building with focused and pointed aims of building national security strengths vis-à-vis China in 

the Indo-Pacific—hence, a renewed emphasis on the Quad structures within and 

outside the region. Having a democratic disposition attached to it, a conjectural 

alliance like Quad Plus, which furthers India’s “pointed-alignment” ambitions of 

strengthening security, political, and economic partnerships within and outside the 

Quad framework, allows New Delhi to pursue India’s strategic interests in the 

complex regional order.

Thus, to comprehend this, the article will seek to understand the nuances 

attached to India’s active participation and promotion of the Quad Plus mechanism/narrative. The first part will build on the multipolarity-driven “pointed 

engagement” juxtaposition with pointed-alignment outlook, while analyzing 

the dynamics within India’s recent foreign policy overtures especially toward 

Quad partners and the overarching Quad Plus narrative. The next section will 

seek to explain New Delhi’s build-up of a conjectural alliance with the Quad 

Plus countries. The final section will highlight the rapidly changing India–China 

power-partner contention, with a primary focus on how China’s vision of Asia 

undermines that of India. Here, the Quad Plus framework emerges as India’s 

response in an attempt to protect India’s identity as an Asian power while building on the Indo-Pacific security alignments. The article concludes with an 
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analysis of the new normal emerging in India–China ties within the framework 

of the Quad and Quad Plus narratives in a post-COVID order.

Framing the Quad Plus Narrative

A country’s national policy is often strongly linked to its foreign policy. Yet, 

foreign policies, unlike national policies, are mostly “static and dynamic,” not 

prone to radical or revolutionary changes.5 While the static notion in a foreign 

policy implies the sustenance of the status quo, thereby reducing risks, the foreign 

policy dynamism leading to activism is heavily nuanced and has stronger linkages 

with the external environment, implying revolutionary pathways or orientations 

that are both inbound (domestic) and outbound (external). Indian foreign policy 

follows a similar route, just like many other foreign policies in the world. However, what is unique is that New Delhi's foreign policy exhibits a mixture of both 

domestic and external characteristics that are close to India’s aims and aspirations 

in a rapidly changing world order that complements the construct of national 

interests intertwined with India’s international interests. The adherence to the 

Quad Plus framework is a part of this construct, which exhibits a universal, multilateral driven outlook of India without diverting much from its national interests 

to connect with a concentrated power structure.

New Delhi’s adherence to a Quad Plus framework is a self-oriented pointedalignment strategy that strengthens India’s defense, security, and economic partnerships with the Quad (Australia, Japan, and the United States), while enhancing 

India’s understanding with other associated partners such as Vietnam and South 

Korea in particular. Such an adherence builds a type of conjectural alliance without 

really engaging in formal alliance exercises that the United States shares with Japan 

and Australia in particular. Additionally, a framework of this nature imbibes the 

national character of universalism, endorsing the “rule of law,” democratic ideals, 

and free and open maritime domains that India advocates strongly in the IndoPacific. On the other hand, adhering to such a framework favors India’s national 

security strategy, explicating its pointed alignment with a set of countries (mainly 

Quad countries), clarifying New Delhi’s national security–focused character of 

building military strength or power in foreign policy, primarily to secure foreign 

policy strengths vis-à-vis adversary powers such as China.

Notably, adhering to the Quad Plus framework is part and parcel of India’s 

competing space of being an emerging power vis-à-vis China. Emerging powers 

tend to go for an evolutionary yet dynamic foreign policy guideline. For instance, 

Beijing’s political and diplomatic clout, as well as its international footprint, is a 

direct result of China’s monumental economic growth and prowess; in 2019, 
India and the Quad Plus

JOURNAL OF INDO-PACIFIC AFFAIRS  SPECIAL ISSUE 2020 47

China’s gross domestic product (PPP) was the largest in the world, totaling 22.5 

trillion USD.6 Hence, Chinese foreign policy has been deriving its direction and 

power from economic diplomacy and policies, especially post the global financial 

crisis.7 On the contrary, Indian economic growth has not been in tandem with 

that of China in the past few quarters. Indian foreign policy has always revolved 

around New Delhi’s goal to secure India’s national interests,8 driven by a need to 

protect itself in a largely rival or unfriendly neighborhood with countries like 

Pakistan and China threatening India’s territorial integrity and sovereignty. In the 

post-COVID order, this gap is only expected to widen.

India’s synergy with the Quad partners has grown fundamentally more vital in 

the economic, security, and defense sectors. With respect to the Indo-Pacific, all 

four countries are increasingly finding consonance in advancing a “free, open, and 

rules-based” maritime order, with a focused effort to balance, if not limit or counter China’s aggressiveness in the region. In fact, China’s coercive posture in the 

South China Sea (SCS) and East China Sea (ECS) regions, Taiwan Straits, across 

the Line of Actual Control, and in Hong Kong, through the recently implemented 

National Security Law, undermine the freedoms in the region and is laying the 

foundation to the strengthening of strategic partnerships between the Quad 

member countries.

Further, the ideation of national initiatives by Quad partners has found synergy 

with India’s own Act East Policy (AEP), Security and Growth for All (SAGAR) 

doctrine, Neighborhood Policy, and Indo-Pacific initiatives such as Sagarmala, 

which aims at rejuvenating 7,500 km of India’s coastline in a major boost to its 

maritime sector;9 Project Mausam, which focuses on better connecting Indian 

Ocean littorals by complementing the monsoon patterns;10 and Cotton Route 

initiative, which emerged as a low-end balancing initiative to China’s Belt and 

Road Initiative (BRI) by aiming to improve India’s ties with countries around 

Asia, Eurasia, or the Indo-Pacific at large.11

Meanwhile, under Japan’s Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP) outlook, the Expanded Partnership for Quality Infrastructure (EPQI)12 and its synergy with India’s 

AEP have resulted in extensive India–Japan collaboration, especially in India’s 

Northeast, and specific cooperation in third countries. A collaboration between 

Asia and Africa is also being envisioned where India and Japan can take a leadership 

position to enhance an intercontinental level cooperation through public-private 

partnerships. Such collaborative efforts, coupled with an Asian geopolitical narrative, geographical closeness, and a mutual and historically cautious approach toward 
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China bring a natural political complementarity between India and Japan. These 

ventures, if anything, are crucial to forming a “continental connect” that India and 

Japan have long envisioned, both officially and unofficially.

With Australia, while India’s regional and bilateral synergy have only just started 

to develop, Canberra’s action-oriented Pacific Step-up policy, highlighted in its 

2017 foreign policy white paper,13 has arrived as a welcome addition for promoting 

greater collaborative synergy in the economic, political, and defense domains, 

wherein India and Australia are looking to indigenize as well as diversify. In the 

United States, the outgoing Trump administration revealed a foreign policy signifying deeper and active focus on the Indo-Pacific, more than the policy “pivot” of 

Pres. Barack Obama, with the establishment of multiple initiatives that are more 

likely to sustain as key projects with bipartisan support as Joe Biden takes office. 

Further, initiatives like Digital Connectivity and Cybersecurity Partnership 

(DCCP), Infrastructure Transaction and Assistant Network (ITAN), Asia Enhancing Development and Growth through Energy (Asia EDGE), and the Better 

Utilization of Investments Leading to Development (BUILD) Act of 2018 present a conjoined effort by Washington to focus on rebuilding and strengthening the 

US presence in the Indo-Pacific.14 These initiatives are focused on not only challenging Chinese adventurism but also improving America’s strategic outreach to 

Asia, wherein India has emerged as a crucial partner. Among these national initiatives that have transformed into bilateral synergy, it is important also to note two 

key trilateral ventures: the India–Japan–Australia-led Supply Chain Resilience 

Initiative (SCRI)15 and the US–Japan–Australia-led Blue Dot Network (BDN).16

The implementation of such initiatives by Quad partners has enhanced the 

sphere of influence the grouping wields in the Indo-Pacific. By way of the Quad 

Plus narrative, much like how the synergy grew among the Quad partners themselves, an expansion of the outreach of such ventures with nations like Vietnam, 

New Zealand, Brazil, Israel, and South Korea can be promoted. By advocating for 

a truly global outlook via multilateral support for such ventures, they can together 

shape the post-COVID economic future of Asia and the Indo-Pacific sustainably.

For India, the Quad Plus conjectural alliance has received a more proactive 

thrust, particularly post the Galwan Valley clash with China. Even though the 

Quad Plus narrative does not imbibe to any military or security nexus, it allows 

India to stay in touch with a range of countries via the Quad, exemplifying India’s 

stature as an Indo-Pacific power. In other words, its national security calculus is 

encouraging India to take a more proactive foreign policy approach: protection of 
India and the Quad Plus

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Indian territorial resources, the maritime domain, and enhancing economic diplomacy are strong variables shaping New Delhi’s changing China policy as well as 

India’s increasing focus on the Quad framework. The nature of the conjectural 

alliance of Quad 2.0 is that of a strategic alignment that does not conform entirely 

to an alliance framework, unlike that of the United States and its partners. Here, 

it is essential to note that the COVID-19 pandemic has ushered in a new era of 

regional flux and power balancing in Asia. India’s post-Galwan foreign policy 

directive is shaping into a unique pointed-alignment outlook embracing a focus 

on stronger military, economic, and security ties with Quad 2.0 partners.17 Significantly, this allows New Delhi to move away from China economically to an 

extent while securing India’s national interests strategically. Hence, the promotion 

of economic synergy coupled with security understanding  in frameworks like 

Quad Plus is vital for India.

New Delhi’s Pointed-alignment and China

Essentially, India’s partaking in Quad Plus framework explicates a pointed 

alignment (as seen with Quad partners) and pointed engagement (as seen with 

Quad Plus partners) evolving strategy. A more robust defense, security, and economic engagement with Australia, Japan, and the United States illustrates New 

Delhi’s pointed-alignment strategy, while India’s association with Vietnam, 

South Korea, Israel and other countries such as France and the United Kingdom 

point to India’s pointed-engagement strategy—even if some of these countries 

are not involved in fixed foreign-secretary and foreign-ministry level meetings. 

Such engagement complements New Delhi’s pointed-alignment strategy, helping to build India’s foreign policy strength in the Indo-Pacific vis-à-vis China in 

a post–COVID-19 period. While pointed engagement is vaster in dimensions 

and geographical landscape, pointed alignment remains a more specific and focused strategy or outlook.

Over the past two decades—and even more in the months following Galwan—

Indian foreign policy has undertaken an active outreach driven by concretization of 

bilateral partnerships, especially with Quad partners. While the advancement of 

such bilateral ties (or partnerships) has taken place across a wide spectrum of sectors, defense and military-strategic collaborations indicate how national security 

has shaped the Indian foreign policy landscape (table 1). In a quick recap, it can be 

noted that India–Australia ties have been upgraded to a Comprehensive Strategic 

Partnership with both nations signing a mutual logistics support arrangement.18
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Further, India, which was elevated as a Major Defense Partner (MDP) by the 

United States in 2018,19 has now signed the fourth and final foundational military pact with the United States: the Basic Exchange and Cooperation Agreement 

(BECA).20 Similarly, the  signing of the much-awaited  Acquisition and CrossServicing Agreement (ACSA) between India and Japan, concluded amid India’s 

rising tensions with China and domestic changes in Japan, signals the importance 

of strategic defense ties between the two nations at a time of regional and global 

uncertainty.21 These agreements will set the stage for the future of security cooperation between India and the Quad; Japan already shares ACSAs with the United 

States and Australia, further strengthening the scope of regional, bilateral, trilateral, 

and quadrilateral modes of cooperation.

Table 1. India’s key defence/military agreements with Quad countries

Table 1. India’s key defence/military agreements with Quad countries

S. No. Name of Agreement Year Signatories/

Discussants Key Features/Remarks

AUSTRALIA

1. Comprehensive Strategic Partnership* JUN 2020

Indian PM Narendra 

Modi and Australian 

PM Scott Morrison

a. Shared values of democracy and rule of law

b. Shared vision of a free, 

open, inclusive, and rulesbased Indo-Pacific region

c. Shared Vision for Maritime 

Cooperation in the IndoPacific

d. Commitment to a new 

phase of Australia-India 

Strategic Research Fund to 

promote innovative solutions 

for responding to and treating COVID-19

e. Commitment towards work 

in areas of digital economy, 

cyber security, and critical 

and emerging technologies 

under Framework Arrangement on Cyber and CyberEnabled Critical Technology 

Cooperation

2.

Mutual Logistics 

Support Arrangement (MLSA)*

JUN 2020

Indian PM Narendra 

Modi and Australian 

PM Scott Morrison

Provides a framework for 

growing collaboration between the defence science 

and technology research 

organizations of both countries.
India and the Quad Plus

JOURNAL OF INDO-PACIFIC AFFAIRS  SPECIAL ISSUE 2020 51

Table 1. India’s key defence/military agreements with Quad countries

3. Framework on Security Cooperation† NOV 2014

Indian PM Narendra 

Modi and Australian 

PM Tony Abbott

The action plan incorporated:

a. Annual Summit on Foreign 

Policy Exchanges and Coordination

b. Defence Policy Planning 

and Coordination

c. Counterterrorism and 

transnational crimes

d. Border Protection, Coast 

Guard, and Customs

e. Disarmament, nonproliferation, civil nuclear energy, 

and maritime security

f. Disaster management and 

peacekeeping

g. Cooperation in Regional 

and Multilateral Fora

4. Joint Declaration on 

Security Cooperation‡ NOV 2009

Indian PM Manmohan Singh and Australian PM Kevin 

Rudd

a. Bilateral cooperation 

through East Asia Summit 

and ASEAN Regional Forum 

and other multilateral frameworks

b. Defence Policy Talks (Senior Officials level)

c. Consultations between 

National Security Advisers of 

India and Australia

UNITED STATES

1.

Basic Exchange and 

Cooperation Agreement (BECA)§OCT 2020

Ministry of Defence 

(GoI) and National 

Geospatial Intelligence Agency 

(NGA), US Department of Defense

BECA pertains to geospatial 

intelligence, sharing information on maps and satellite 

images for defence.

This will allow India to use 

the US’ advanced geospatial 

intelligence and enhance the 

accuracy of automated systems and weapons.

2.

Communications, 

Compatibility, Security 

Agreement (COMCASA)¤

SEPT 

2018

Indian Defence Minister Nirmala Sitharaman, Indian 

EAM (late) Sushma 

Swaraj and US Secretary of State Mike 

Pompeo and Secretary of Defense 

James Mattis

Sharing of high-end encrypted communication and 

satellite data

3.

Master Information 

Exchange Agreement 

(MIEA) ̈́

2018

Indian Ministry of 

Defence and US 

Department of Defense

Exchange of Research & 

Development information 

extended for another term of 

15 years, i.e. up to Feb 2034
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Table 1. India’s key defence/military agreements with Quad countries

4. Memorandum of 

IntentΘ 2018

US Defense Innovations Unit (DIU) and 

Indian Defence Innovation Organisation - Innovations for 

Defence Excellence 

(DIO-iDEX)

Coproduction and codevelopment projects through the 

Defense Technology and 

Trade Initiative (DTTI), and 

to pursue other avenues of 

defense innovation cooperation.

5.

Logistics Exchange 

Memorandum of 

Agreement (LEMOA)

2016

Indian Ministry of 

Defence and US 

Department of Defense

LEMOA gives access to designated military facilities on 

either side for the purpose of 

refueling and replenishment. 

Primarily, LEMOA covers 

port calls, joint exercises, 

training and HADR.

6.

India-US General Security of Military Information Agreement 

(GSOMIA)

MAY 2002

Indian Defence Minister Rajnath Singh, 

Indian EAM S. Jaishankar and US Secretary of State Mike 

Pompeo and Secretary of Defense 

Mark Esper

Framework for exchange and 

protection of classified military information between 

India and US defense industries

JAPAN

1.

Acquisition and CrossServicing Agreement 

(ACSA)◊

SEPT 

2020

Indian Defence Secretary Ajay Kumar 

and Japanese Ambassador Suzuki 

Satoshi

Allows reciprocal provision of 

supplies and services between the Armed Forces of 

India and the Self-Defense 

Forces of Japan

2.

Implementing Arrangement for Deeper 

Cooperation between 

Japan Maritime SelfDefense Force 

(JMSDF) and Indian 

Navy□

2018

Indian Defence Minister Nirmala Sitharaman and Japanese Defence 

Minister Itsunori 

Onodera

Maritime domain awareness 

(MDA) - greater cooperation 

and exchange of information

3.

Agreement concerning 

Transfer of Defence 

Equipment and Technology Cooperation^

DEC 2015

Indian Foreign Secretary Dr S Jaishankar and Ambassador of Japan to 

India Kenji Hiramatsu

Enhance defence and security cooperation by making 

available to each other, defense equipment and technology necessary to implement joint research/

development and/or production projects

4.

Agreement concerning 

Security Measures for 

the Protection of Classified Military Information#DEC 2015

Indian Defence Secretary G Mohan 

Kumar and Ambassador of Japan to 

India Kenji Hiramatsu

Ensures the reciprocal protection of classified military 

information transmitted to 

each other

* Ministry of External Affairs, India, “Joint Statement on a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership between Republic of India and Australia,” 4 June 2020, https://www.mea.gov.in/.
India and the Quad Plus

JOURNAL OF INDO-PACIFIC AFFAIRS  SPECIAL ISSUE 2020 53

† Ministry of External Affairs, India, “Framework for Security Cooperation between India and Australia,” 18 November 2014, at https://

mea.gov.in/.

‡ Australian Hugh Commission, New Delhi, “India-Australia Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation,” 12 November 2009, https://

india.embassy.gov.au/.

§ Ministry of External Affairs, India, “Joint Statement on the third India-U.S. 2+2 Ministerial Dialogue,” 27 October 2020, https://www.

mea.gov.in/.

¤ Ministry of External Affairs, India, “Joint Statement on the Inaugural India-U.S. 2+2 Ministerial Dialogue,” 6 September 2018, https://

mea.gov.in/.

 ̈́ Ministry of External Affairs, India, “Ministry of External Affairs: Annual Report 2018-19,” 6 August 2020, https://www.mea.gov.in/.

 Θ Press Information Bureau, India, “Indo-US 2+2 Dialogue,” 31 December 2018, https://pib.gov.in/.

 US Department of Defense, “U.S.-India Joint Statement on the visit of Minister of Defence Manohar Parrikar to the United States,” 29 

August 2016, https://www.defense.gov/.

 Ministry of External Affairs, India, “Joint Statement of India-U.S. Defense Policy Group,” 23 May 2002, https://mea.gov.in/.

◊ Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan, “Agreement Between The Government of Japan and The Government of the Republic of India Concerning Reciprocal Provision of Supplies and Services Between the Self-Defense Forces of Japan and the Indian Armed Forces,” 9 September 2020, https://www.mofa.go.jp/.

□ Press Information Bureau, India, “Joint Press Statement on the India-Japan annual Defence Ministerial Dialogue,” 20 August 2018, 

https://pib.gov.in/.

^ Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan, “Agreement between the Government of Japan and the Government of the Republic of India concerning the Transfer of Defence Equipment and Technology,” https://www.mofa.go.jp/.

# Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan, “Agreement between the Government of Japan and the Government of the Republic of India concerning Security Measures for the Protection of Classified Military Information,” https://www.mofa.go.jp/.

Beyond bilateral synergy, such a pointed alignment by New Delhi is taking 

shape in multilateral and trilateral forums as well. In this context, India’s active 

support of and participation in the Quad Plus mechanism in itself is a defining 

factor of its emerging pointed-alignment strategies. Furthermore, Quad Plus has 

the potential to deepen other new and emerging initiatives in which India is involved. To export military hardware worth 5 billion USD by 2025, India has begun 

to move beyond its extensive defense procurement and import sector and to focus 

on exports by building on its initiatives like “Make in India.”22 Here, the United 

Kingdom’s Democratic Ten (D-10) framework and the potential inclusion of India 

in the same sets a new reference for deeper tech-security collaboration in a multilateral framework driven by like-minded democratic countries.23 Similarly, 

the SCRI can seek to gain much broader implementation and success by closer 

economic integration among the Quad Plus partners.

Furthermore, India’s bilateral ties with all-weather partner France have taken on 

greater proportions in the post-Galwan environment. France was the first country 

that offered India support of its troops in the immediate aftermath of the India–

China Galway Valley clash. Furthermore, the accelerated delivery of Rafale jets to 

India showed the ever-growing alignment between the two nations. The trilateral 
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of India–France–Australia, which aims at creating an inclusive Indo-Pacific by 

rebalancing China’s assertiveness in the region, is a further testament to India’s 

pointed alignment.24

Factoring China in New Delhi’s foreign policy formulation or managing its 

relationship with Beijing is not a strategic choice for India; rather, it is a strategic 

necessity. A complex bilateral and neighborhood environment, competitive foreign policy discourse between the two sides, and China’s rise as an influential 

economic and political actor in the global decision-making process make these 

strategic necessities quite critical for India. Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s 

Shangri-La Dialogue speech in June 2018 reflected this when he stated, “No 

other relationship of India has as many layers as our relations with China, and 

both the countries need to work together for a better Asia and the world, being 

‘sensitive to each other’s interests.’”25 A similar reference was equally discernible 

when former Indian prime minister (late) Atal Bihari Vajpayee accorded the 

Declaration on Principles for Relations and Comprehensive Cooperation between the two nations during his state visit to China in 2003.26 To this effect, 

India’s choices of interest in Asia and beyond vis-à-vis China is complex and 

raises complementarities as well as contradictions that are partly structural and 

partly systemic.

Additionally, India envisions a multipolar Asia, advocating a regional cooperative framework that is much more exclusive, contradicting the Chinese conception 

of Asia and regional order. In the Indian formulation, a multipolar Asia is more of 

a universal proposition than a constricted regional proposition. The Indian contention, as reflected in Prime Minister Modi’s inaugural speech at the Second Raisina 

Dialogue on 17 January 2017,27 is that the world has absorbed multipolarity rapidly and a “multipolar Asia is a dominant reality.” India’s choice of a multipolar 

Asia rests on two critical aspects: (1) the diffusion of power making the notion of 

Asian security interlinked with global security, rendering the situation advantageous to New Delhi’s security interest regionally and globally; and (2) inclusivity 

should be the order of Asia, not exclusivity, indicating the possibility of bestowing 

a space for an external power like the United States to become part and parcel of 

the evolving regional security architecture.28

Such an open framework allows India to stay connected firmly with both the 

prime powers in the world, the United States and China. Additionally, in the 

Asian context, it will enable India to promote a regional paradigm of “shared 

leadership” among the three major Asian powers—India, China, and Japan—that 

offers equal opportunities to other emerging or middle powers in Asia to rise and 

be a part of this leadership framework. Australia, with whom India’s regional and 

bilateral synergy was not at par as compared to India’s other Quad partners, is also 
India and the Quad Plus

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quickly emerging as a major Indo-Pacific partner, encouraged by a “China disconnect” both countries are undertaking.

On the contrary, the Chinese conception of Asia entails an overhaul of the security structure, aimed at reducing the US-led security architecture that has been 

prevalent in the region since the Cold War. This assertion was evident in Chinese 

president Xi Jinping’s speech at the fourth Conference on Interaction and Confidence Building Measures (CICA) in Asia in May 2014, where he endorsed the 

rising status of Asia in world affairs but advanced the concept of “Asia for Asians” 

to articulate a Chinese envisioned order with an exclusive regional character.29 To 

China, the “Asia for Asians” proposition provides a context to bestow the security 

undertaking of the region in the hands of the Asian powers.

In this context, the Quad Plus framework has arrived at a crucial juncture with 

much to offer. India’s defense and security collaborations with the Quad Plus 

participating countries such as Israel, South Korea, Vietnam, and, to some extent, 

Brazil have been progressing over the years (table 2). Among these nations, Vietnam and India’s defense ties have seen the most amount of maturation, with Vietnam’s strategic importance as a claimant in the SCS and partnering for India’s oil 

exploration activities in the SCS being a resounding factor behind the dedicated 

focus on bettering ties. Defense ties with New Zealand, however, have seen a very 

minimal, albeit incremental, if not absent, growth. Complementarities in defense 

manufacturing, space, and nanotechnology, as well as defense cooperation, are 

some of the critical issues that India could pursue.

Table 2. India’s key defense/military agreements with Quad Plus countries

Table 2. India’s key defense/military agreements with Quad Plus countries

S. No. Name of Agreement Year Signatories/ Discussants

Key Features/ 

Remarks

ISRAEL

1.

MoU to establish a new 

center for technical and 

maintenance support for 

India’s air defence systems*

FEB 

2020

Israel Aerospace Institute 

and India’s Bharat Electronics Limited

Collaboration on 

establishing a new 

center for providing 

product life cycle 

support including 

repair & maintenance services for 

the air-defence systems in India.

2. Strategic Collaboration 

Memorandum on UAVs†

FEB 

2020

Israel Aerospace Institute 

and India’s Hindustan 

Aeronautics Limited and 

Dynamatic Technologies 

Limited

That UAVs will be 

made in India
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Table 2. India’s key defense/military agreements with Quad Plus countries

3.

Deal for supply of Barak-8 

missile defense system by 

IAI for seven ships of the 

Indian Navy‡

OCT 

2018

Israel Aerospace Institute 

(IAI) and India’s Bharat 

Electronics Limited

This deal was a sign 

of a strong bilateral 

partnership in defense, which crossed 

6 billion USD.

VIETNAM

1. Comprehensive Strategic 

Partnership§

SEPT 

2016

Indian PM Narendra 

Modi and Vietnamese 

PM Nguyễn Xuân Phúc

Included a Line of 

Credit of 100 million 

USD for defense 

industry cooperation

2.

Joint Vision Statement on 

India-Vietnam Defence Relations for the period 2015-

20¤

MAY 

2015

Indian Defence Minister 

(late) Manohar Parrikar 

and Vietnamese Minister 

for National Defence 

Phùng Quang Thanh

This included an 

MoU on cooperation 

between Coast 

Guards of the two 

countries.

This effort was projected as part of India’s Act East Policy, 

aimed at deepening 

strategic and economic relations.

3.

MoU for the Establishment 

of Collaborative Relationship to Combat Transnational Crime and Development Mutual Cooperation¤

MAY 

2015

Indian Coast Guard 

(ICG) and Vietnam Coast 

Guard

Following this agreement, the ICG ship 

ICGS Sarang conducted a four-day 

port call to the city of 

Ho Chi Minh from 27 

to 31 August 2015 

where the coast 

guards of both countries had elaborate 

discussions over 

antismuggling and 

antipoaching patrols.

4.

MoU on USD100 million 

Line of Credit for Defence 

Procurement ̈́

SEPT 

2014

General Manager, EXIM 

Bank of India Geeta 

Poojary and Deputy Minister of Finance of Vietnam,

Trương Chí Trung

This MoU provides a 

concessional line of 

credit for procurement of defense 

equipment from India. This opens new 

opportunities in India–Vietnam defense 

cooperation.
India and the Quad Plus

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Table 2. India’s key defense/military agreements with Quad Plus countries

5. MoU on defense 

cooperationΘ

NOV 

2009

Indian Defence Minister 

A K Antony and Vietnamese Defence Minister 

Phùng Quang Thanh

To help build closer 

interaction between 

the two nations 

through regular defense dialogue, training, exercises, Navy 

and Coast Guard 

ship visits, along 

with capacity building.

6. Joint Declaration on Strategic Partnership

JUL 

2007

Indian PM Manmohan 

Singh and Vietnamese 

PM Nguyễn Tấn Dũng

To intensify cooperation in defense supplies, joint projects, 

training, and intelligence. Also to enhance interaction 

between their respective defense and 

security establishments.

7.

Joint Declaration on the 

Framework of Comprehensive Cooperation

MAY 

2003

Indian EAM Yashwant 

Sinha and Vietnamese 

Minister of Foreign Affairs Nguyễn Dy Niên

To enhance defense 

cooperation. This 

agreement binds 

both nations to conduct periodic highranking visits including the expansion of 

cooperation in defense and security 

spheres.

8.

Defence Cooperation 

Agreement/Defence Protocol◊

MAR 

2000

Indian Defence Minister 

George Fernandes Vietnamese Defence Minister Phạm Văn Trà

Included sale of advanced military light 

helicopters, assistance in repairs and 

overhaul of Vietnam’s MiG-21 aircraft, and training 

assistance for pilots 

and technicians. Also 

included joint military 

exercises, joint campaigns on antipiracy 

in South China Sea 

and counterinsurgency training.
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Table 2. India’s key defense/military agreements with Quad Plus countries

SOUTH KOREA

1.

MoUs on Defence Cooperation□

(military logistics support 

agreement)

SEPT 

2019

Indian Defence Minister 

Rajnath Singh and South 

Korea’s Defence Minister 

Jeong Kyeong-doo

To enhance defense 

educational exchanges and extend 

logistical support to 

each other’s navies

MoU on Defence Industry 

Co-operation in Shipbuilding^

APR 

2017

Indian Defence Secretary Ashok Kumar Gupta 

and South Korean Minister of Defense Acquisition Program Administration Chang Myoung-jin

This was conceived 

under the overall 

umbrella of the Special Strategic Partnership of May 2015

This cooperation was 

part of the Make in 

India policy, under 

which warships will 

be built at domestic 

shipyards with South 

Korea’s help.

2.

MoU for Cooperation between the National Security 

Council Secretariat of Republic of India and Office of 

National Security of Republic of Korea#

MAY 

2015

Indian PM Narendra 

Modi and President of 

ROK Park Geun-hye

The MoU will finalise 

consultations between National Security Council structures in a number of 

areas

3.

Agreement between the 

Government of Republic of 

Korea and The Government 

of the Republic of India on 

the Protection of Classified 

Information+

JAN 

2014

Indian Defence Minister 

A K Anthony and South 

Korea’s Foreign Minister 

Yun Byung-se

To cooperation in the 

field of defense and 

to ensure the protection of classified military information

BRAZIL

1.

Joint Venture Agreement for 

manufacturing an array of 

small arms ̈

JAN 

2020

Jindal Defence (India) 

and Taurus Armas S.A. 

(Brazi)

Toward India–Brazil 

cooperation in the 

strategic defense 

sector. This agreement proposes setting up of a JV company at Hisar 

(Haryana, India) that 

will manufacture 

small arms based on 

the Transfer of Technology from Taurus 

to achieve localization of production in 

accordance with the 

Defence Procurement Procedure.

2. Action Plan to Strengthen 

Strategic Partnershipo

JAN 

2020

Indian PM Narendra 

Modi and Brazilian President Jair Bolsonaro.
India and the Quad Plus

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Table 2. India’s key defense/military agreements with Quad Plus countries

3. Strategic PartnershipΞ 2006

President of the Federative Republic of Brazil 

Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva 

and Indian PM Manmohan Singh

Based on a common 

global vision, shared 

democratic values 

and a commitment to 

foster economic 

growth with social 

inclusion for the welfare of people of 

both countries

4. Defence Cooperation 

Agreementλ

DEC 

2003

Brazilian Defence Minister José Viegas Filho and 

Indian Defence Minister 

(late) George Fernandes

Cooperation in 

defense-related matters, especially in the 

fields of research & 

development, acquisition, and logistic 

support. Under this 

agreement, a Joint 

Defence Committee 

has been set-up that 

meets at regular intervals.

* “IAI and BEL to Establish New Service and Maintenance Center for Air Defense Systems in India,” Israel Aerospace Industries (IAI), 5 

February 2020, https://www.iai.co.il/.

† “HAL, Israel Aerospace Industries and DTL form strategic collaboration for manufacturing drones,” Economic Times, 5 February 2020, 

https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/.

‡ “IAI to Provide $777 Million worth of Barak 8 LRSAM Air & Missile Defense Systems to State-Owned BEL in India,” Israel Aerospace Industries (IAI), 24 October 2018, https://www.iai.co.il/.

§ Ministry of External Affairs, India, “Joint Statement between India and Vietnam during the visit of Prime Minister to Vietnam,” 3 September 2016, https://www.mea.gov.in/.

¤ Ministry of External Affairs, India, “India - Vietnam Relations,” July 2015, http://mea.gov.in/.

 ̈́ Suhasini Haidar, “India to modernize Vietnam’s defence forces,” The Hindu, 29 October 2014, https://www.thehindu.com/.

Θ “Vietnam, India sign MoU on defence cooperation,” Vietnam Plus, 6 November 2009, https://en.vietnamplus.vn/.

 “Viet Nam, India issue joint declaration,” Vietnam News, 7 July 2020, https://vietnamnews.vn/.

 Ministry of External Affairs, India, “Joint Declaration on the Framework of Comprehensive Cooperation between the Republic of India 

and the Socialist Republic of Vietnam as they enter the 21st Century,” 1 May 2003, https://www.mea.gov.in/.

◊ Maj Gen PK Chakravorty, “Intensifying India Vietnam Strategic Partnership,” Indian Defence Review, 6 December 2018, http://www.

indiandefencereview.com/.

□ “India, S Korea ink 2 MoUs to boost defence cooperation,” ANI News, 6 September 2020, https://www.aninews.in/.

^ “India and Republic of Korea sign Inter-Governmental MOU for Defence Industry Co-Operation in Shipbuilding,” Business Standard, 

21 April 2017, https://www.business-standard.com/.

# Ministry of External Affairs, India, “India - Republic of Korea Joint Statement for Special Strategic Partnership,” 18 May 2015, https://

www.mea.gov.in/.

+ Ministry of External Affairs, India, “India- Republic of Korea Joint Statement for Expansion of the Strategic Partnership,” 16 January 

2014, https://www.mea.gov.in/.
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 ̈ “Jindal Defence signs JV pact with Brazil’s Taurus Armas for manufacturing small arms,” Economic Times, 30 January 2020, https://

economictimes.indiatimes.com/.

o Ministry of External Affairs, India, “Action Plan to Strengthen the Strategic Partnership Between India and Brazil,” 25 January 2020, 

https://www.mea.gov.in/.

Ξ Ministry of External Affairs, India, “India-Brazil Joint Communique,”12 September 2006, https://mea.gov.in/.

λ Ministry of External Affairs, India, “India-Brazil Relations,” January 2019, https://mea.gov.in/.

India’s support for the Quad and Quad Plus narrative, considering the postGalwan security atmosphere, is evident and presents a grander strategic intent. 

In a tweet, Foreign Minister S. Jaishankar identified the first Quad Plus consultation as a “broad based virtual meeting” aimed at overcoming the challenges of 

the COVID-19 pandemic.30 Moreover, the Indian External Affairs ministry’s 

press release titled “Cooperation among select countries of the Indo-Pacific in 

fighting COVID-19 pandemic”  reflected more officially India’s intentions to 

actively support the Quad Plus narrative.31 More significantly, the support of a 

Quad Plus mechanism demonstrates India’s developing grasp and embrace of an 

American perspective that aims to safeguard and fortify a liberal international 

order while zeroing in on building an Indo-Pacific narrative that has been undermined by the ascent of a revisionist China.32 This is at a time when New 

Delhi has drawn its relationship with China on a “power-partner” contention.33

To this effect, by seeking a case-by-case module in managing China, India has 

tried to fortify the multilateral method of relationship with Beijing, desiring to 

rejuvenate and improve the Bretton Woods institutions to build an agent and 

result-driven support for developing economies. Such a contention remained in 

place between the two Asian giants regardless of the developing strains with 

China over border conflicts and other international complexities: for example, a 

challenged Indo-Pacific maritime domain. India’s multilateral associations with 

China in the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) and the New Development Bank (NDB) under the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South 

Africa) structure and inclusion in the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation 

(SCO) are instances of such multilateral overtures by New Delhi.34

It is important to note that recognizing the Quad Plus structure does not imply 

that India will detach itself from these multilateral commitments with China. Likewise, India’s endorsement of the Quad and the Quad Plus narrative equally lends to 

the fact that New Delhi might be envisioning a pointed purposive alignment with 

the United States. Yet, this does not necessarily mean that India is completely accepting of a US-led order that would see New Delhi give away its autonomous, 

independent, and nonaligned frame of foreign policy posturing.35 What is rather 

clearly visible is India’s ‘pointed-alignment’ within the rubrics of a multialigned 

foreign policy framework, which New Delhi has advocated more aptly in recent 
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times. Beijing’s aggressive conduct on the India–China boundary, its efforts to promote friction between India and neighbors like Bhutan and Nepal (through Doklam 

and Kalapani, respectively), its gradually growing sea claims in the SCS and the 

ECS, and its forceful policies toward Taiwan and Hong Kong are all further guiding 

or prompting a case for change or reconsideration in India’s China policies. US 

president Donald Trump’s invitation to India, alongside Australia and South Korea, 

to join the Group of 7 (G7) mirrors the developing Indo-Pacific narrative in which 

a Quad Plus course of action fits well.36

Beyond India’s existing and evolving ties with the Quad nations and countries 

like South Korea via the synergy found between New Delhi’s AEP and Seoul’s 

New Southern Policy, extensively covered in strategic circles,37 a Quad Plus 

framework will further a pointed alignment, which is much needed in defense, 

economic, and political realms between New Delhi and Israel, Brazil, New Zealand, and Vietnam. Israel is vital to China’s advancement of Xi’s flagship BRI 

into the Middle East, and US pressure to choose between Washington and Beijing is a strategic problem for Israel.38 India and Israel are already strong bilateral 

strategic partners, especially in the defense sector; historically, defense trade has 

surpassed 1 billion USD annually.39 In 2020, the two nations began deepening 

their defense industry ties, with Israel seeking long-term partnerships via India’s 

“Make in India” ventures. The Israel Aerospace Industries (IAI) and India’s 

Bharat Electronics Limited have signed a memorandum to create a new center 

for Indian air defense systems.40 Similarly, IAI and Hindustan Aeronautics and 

Dynamatic Technologies Limited have finalized a collaboration to build unmanned aerial vehicles in India.41 This synergy must extend into a more profound 

defense alliance framework, possibly with the United States; while an economic 

synergy with China grows for Israel, a defense synergy with India must be encouraged at par. Under the Quad Plus framework, such defense synergy can be 

expanded via closer bilateral ties.

Like India, Vietnam has not shown much interest in alliance structures in the 

past; however, Hanoi is now looking to change its foreign policy rhetoric along 

realistic lines. In 2016, the two sides upgraded their ties to a Comprehensive 

Strategic Partnership after almost a decade of Strategic Partnership.42 As per its 

latest defense white paper, Hanoi has shown a clear indication that it is willing, 

even aiming, to pursue stronger military ties abroad.43 This comes amid increasing Chinese sovereignty claims in the SCS, which Vietnam contests along with 

countries like the Philippines, Taiwan, Brunei, and Malaysia. China’s military 

and technological lead in the SCS, especially maritime control of the Paracel 

Islands, which are claimed by Vietnam, has become a major concern for Hanoi. 

Looking for stronger Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) en-
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gagement, Vietnam and India can indeed create a robust maritime alliance with 

a potential US trilateral base. Furthermore, via Quad Plus engagements, a more 

active thrust on the India–Japan–Vietnam trilateral could be encouraged.44

The inclusion of Brazil and New Zealand was surprising; but the motive behind the move comes from Washington and its alliance partners’ attempts to 

disengage countries from Beijing that are extremely dependent on China. For 

India, Brazil is its most important trading partner in the Latin America and 

Caribbean (LAC) region, with total bilateral trade worth 7.02 billion USD in 

2019.45 Furthermore, the two nations are part of multiple plurilateral frameworks 

such as BRICS, IBSA (a dialogue forum bringing together India, Brazil, and 

South Africa), the International Solar Alliance, UN, BASIC (a bloc of four large 

newly industrialized countries—Brazil, South Africa, India, and China), and 

G-20. Nonetheless, India–Brazil economic ties fall short of those shared between Brazil and China, while Beijing continues to be the leading trading partner for Brazil, with total trade worth 98 billion USD in 2019.46 However, Brazil–China ties took a sour turn during the pandemic, with President Bolsonaro’s 

son Eduardo (who is also a federal legislator and an advisor to the president) 

drawing a rebuke from China for comparing Chinese handling of the virus to 

the erstwhile Soviet Union’s handling of the Chernobyl disaster.47 Further, Brazil’s Education Minister Abraham Weintraub, in a now-deleted tweet, said that 

China is using the pandemic to dominate the world.48 Eduardo Bolsonaro, 

Weintraub, and Foreign Minister Ernesto Araújo are among President Bolsonaro’s high-profile advisors who advocate for less reliance on China and deeper 

convergence with the United States.49 Hence, even though it is a member of 

BRICS and BASIC and a close trading partner of China, Brazil chose to be a 

part of the Quad Plus grouping, signaling a major potential shift in its commercial and political foreign policy in a post-COVID period.

With China being an indispensable trading partner to New Zealand, the inclusion of Wellington in the Quad Plus grouping was one of the more surprising 

ones. New Zealand has maintained a stringent policy of not appearing to target 

Beijing, despite being one of the Five Eyes intelligence-sharing nations. By formally adopting the Indo-Pacific construct in February 2020, New Zealand’s 

gradual pull away from China can be noticed.50 India has been classified as a 

“priority for New Zealand.” Hence, the mutual “interest in the prosperity and 

stability of the Indo-Pacific region” makes ties between the two nations poised for 

greater pointed-alignment.51 New Zealand has highlighted in its Strategic Defence 

Policy Statement of 2018 that its “Indo-Pacific partners”—the Quad 2.0 nations of 

the United States, Australia, Japan, and India—are “reinforcing the rules-based 

order.”52 For India, which is now also actively working on improving ties with 
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Australia, a New Zealand–Australia–India trilateral, focused on the Pacific Ocean 

and maritime economy as well as security, can be a bold yet prudent step forward. 

This will allow India to not only improve economic synergy, especially within the 

Quad Plus framework but also expand its active maritime presence in the Pacific 

Ocean region—not limiting itself to the SCS or the Indian Ocean.

A “Conjectural” Alliance

With New Delhi endeavoring to put preemptive pressure on China to address 

security concerns in the region, Beijing has been simultaneously and steadily 

promoting its establishment of a coercive maritime influence, mainly in the SCS 

and ECS zones. Beijing’s gray-zone strategy, being largely inoffensive, offers it 

an adequate advantage to stake claims of its sovereignty over land, sea, and air.53

However, with the strategy gradually turning coercive, many are now finding it 

difficult to challenge. In fact, no one country can act as a balancer to China’s 

coercive maritime influence.

Contrastingly, India’s vision for the region stands at the significant intersection 

of partnerships and cooperation through shared goals. A multipolar maritime 

Asia facilitates a flexible strategic environment for India to operate with a range 

of countries, including the US, Japan, and other like-minded nations, through 

trilateral (India–Australia–Japan; India–Japan–United States) and quadrilateral 

formats—such as the Quad—stressing freedom of navigation and overflight. A 

multipolar Asia, thus, complements a conjoined and concerted maritime effort 

across the Indo-Pacific to balance out China’s adventurism.54 Nevertheless, India 

realizes the Chinese prowess as well as the concerns in the American Cold Warstyle containment strategy, which is far from effective, and perhaps challenging to 

implement in today’s world.

The Quad Plus narrative is an evolving concept; its potential, limitations, and 

aspirations are at present only conjectural. With India’s pointed alignments and 

engagements emerging over the past decade with Indo-Pacific partners, the creation of Quad Plus and India’s participation in the same create an actively engaged and strategically aligned like-minded framework that does not completely 

conform to an alliance. Such a multilateral and universalist proposition promotes 

India’s active growth on global forums, while not departing from New Delhi’s 

age-old policy of eschewing an alliance framework. Allowing deeper engagement with nations like South Korea, Vietnam, and, potentially, France and the 

United Kingdom in a possible future, the Quad Plus is a crucial platform for the 

emerging international order.

If a multialigned policy strategy with a thrust toward strategic autonomy has 

emerged as the defining feature of Indian foreign policy,55 it is to find a balance 
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or to accommodate China as a strategic partner in the Asian and global frameworks. Strategic autonomy offers the space to better position India’s strategic 

interests in a systemic calculus, whereas the multialigned policy framework provides a multifold engagement structurally covering regional and global institutions, and across major, minor, immediate, and extended neighbors. Interestingly, 

this allows New Delhi to position India’s interests both in China-centered and 

US-centered institutions or envisioned architecture without wholly subscribing 

to their respective regional visions. India’s growing strategic outreach through its 

AEP, Link West Policy, Connect Central Asia Policy, and SAGAR in the Indian 

Ocean Region builds a strategic context in India’s favor to back a multipolar 

Asian proposition where New Delhi can envision a greater role for itself in the 

regional decision-making process.

To this effect, the Quad Plus is instrumental in creating a channel of communication, with the strategic framework of the grouping highlighting the rapid 

creation of alignment structures toward a conjectural alliance. The recently concluded ministerial Quad meeting has been dubbed as an “exclusive clique” by 

China, focused on “harming third party’s interests.”56 The current uncertainties 

in the geopolitical order present the right time for the Quad Plus and Quad 2.0 

to rise as a functioning political collective or conjectural alliance. With India 

regularly being attributed as the most vulnerable connection of Quad 2.0,57 New 

Delhi's post-Galwan international strategy indications have crucially demonstrated a more dynamic turn toward pointed-alignment and a more profound 

commitment with conjectural alliances like the Quad framework.

By supporting the Quad Plus ambit, India is seemingly becoming more accepting of the US perspective, with Washington having reciprocated by suggesting to 

include India in the recently expanded G7 aims. Likely to evolve as one of the 

most unique and vital Indo-Pacific networks of the post-COVID period, it is 

important that the Quad Plus framework focuses on recuperation from COVIDincited financial mishaps while defining ways toward accomplishing monetary 

independence. For instance, participating countries must consider removing barriers to trade and putting resources into vital activities like the SCRI.

In view of the BRI drawing focus for its alleged debt-trap setups, coupled with 

COVID-driven financial strains on small economies, Xi’s China is undergoing a 

thorough worldwide examination in the post-COVID period. The United States, 

Japan, India, and Australia must, therefore, leverage this context to reinforce the 

Quad 2.0 grouping. They should cautiously actuate India to join initiatives like 

the BDN and expand solicitation efforts vis-à-vis the new Quad Plus countries. 

As an expansion of the Quad 2.0, Quad Plus seems to be allowing New Delhi to 

make a continental connect58 and “corridor of communication,” which must fur-
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ther grow toward seeking a commitment from nations not aligned with China 

within the grouping. Prime Minister Modi’s clarion call for self-reliance (Aatmanirbhar Bharat)59 requires India to become less dependent on China-driven 

worldwide supply chain systems. Joining the BDN and using the Quad Plus 

framework to promote SCRI stands as a positive effort toward making stable 

supply chains and ensuring the public interest in the wake of a resurgent and 

hyperantagonistic China.

Quad Plus in the Wake of China’s Assertive Rise

China’s vision for Asia, its planned military and economic rise within the 

region, and the inception of the Community with a Shared Future for Humankind (CSFH)60 implicitly underpinning the goal to attain the “Chinese Dream” 

of national rejuvenation are crucial determinants pushing India toward the 

Quad 2.0. President Xi’s efforts to present a universalist image of China via the 

CSFH framework, especially with its Asia-focused approach, have eroded over 

time, due to Chinese revisionist initiatives. Beijing’s “charm offensive” strategy, 

shadowed by its simultaneous implementation of “wolf warrior” diplomacy, has 

only disenchanted Asia.

Countries like India have long been actively pushing against the BRI narrative 

and highlighting how China’s hypocritical actions do not put its CSFH rhetoric 

to practice. Adding to this argument, Beijing has now sought to create its quadrilateral grouping in the South Asian trans-Himalayan region, which could be 

termed as the “Himalayan Quad,” composed of China, Pakistan, Afghanistan, and 

Nepal, under the premise of combating COVID-19.61 This endeavor envisions 

several connectivity initiatives geared toward the overall objectives of procuring 

economic leverage and consolidating Beijing’s normative power by spreading its 

influence — ultimately to cement Beijing’s bid for global governance leadership. 

Unlike the Quad 2.0 or Quad Plus, the chances of the rapid securitization or institutionalization of a Chinese Quad are plentiful. Hence, these developments 

will continuously act as a backgrounder to remind and encourage India to accord 

increasing seriousness to the Quad process in times to come.

New Delhi, for its part, has implemented a power-partner balancing approach 

toward China in the different approaches India has taken vis-à-vis AIIB and 

BRI.62 While India has welcomed most of the China-led multilateral institutions 

such as the AIIB and NDB, New Delhi has also opposed Chinese unilateral 

schemes such as the BRI. From the beginning, New Delhi has perceived the AIIB 

as a striking multilateral proposition coming from Asia that would benefit the 

country’s resource accession in national and cross-border infrastructure projects. 

As a result, India is its second-largest shareholder in this bank.
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In contrast, New Delhi has had strong reservations about the BRI from the 

very beginning. Its response to the Chinese invitation on the BRI was diplomatically stout and resolute. An explicit Indian stance on the BRI, which is 

rather dismissive, is seen in an official statement released on 13 May 2017.63

The fundamental difference between the AIIB and the BRI, according to India, is the contested norms of universalism and unilateralism, respectively. To 

India, the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), a BRI project, comes 

as a first-scale strategic hindrance since it ignores New Delhi’s sensitivities on 

territorial integrity.

Reciprocity has been an iron principle in foreign policy that India swears by; 

however, this principle is not visible when it comes to India–China relations, especially referring to the One China Policy.64 China has been consistently undermining 

New Delhi’s territorial sovereignty, vital interests in international organizations, 

border conflict, expanded maritime interests in the Indian Ocean, and the SCS,65 all 

while India nurses a huge trade deficit with Beijing. In particular, lack of reciprocity 

in bilateral relations is reaffirmed as India shares China’s sensitivities over Taiwan, 

Tibet, and Xinjiang, but the same is not reciprocated by Beijing with regards to 

India’s sensitivities over Ladakh, Kashmir, and Arunachal Pradesh.

Striking power parity with China in global decision-making bodies, particularly in the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), has always been India’s 

ambition. As reflected in Prime Minister Modi’s speech at the UN Sustainable 

Development Summit in November 2015, more representation at the UNSC will 

only enhance its “credibility” and “legitimacy.”66 In other words, a multipolar Asia 

corroborates India’s structural vision to reform the UNSC, with Asia having a 

better and bigger voice or representation in world affairs. Instead, the Indian 

proposition of a multipolar Asia looks to build India’s strength globally, and support from China at the UNSC is a strategic necessity for India. Keeping such 

examples in mind, India’s ties with China have been driven along a finely balanced 

line dividing competition and cooperation.

Hence, India’s present China strategy is one of pragmatism, especially through 

promoting economic collaboration despite security differences. Amid this pragmatism, Prime Minister Modi planned to achieve equality of power in the bilateral 

and regional realm to situate India as a peer partner, rather than just a partner, of 

China. The signing of their “developmental partnership” in 2014, at the very onset 

of both Modi’s and Xi’s national leadership roles, was a key example of the expectations both held vis-à-vis bilateral ties.67 Modi’s China strategy has hence imbibed 

a particular portrayal of advancing commitment with balance or “engagement with 

equilibrium.”68 Nonetheless, over the years, Chinese revisionist tendencies—

coming to a head at Galwan—have left a lasting impact on China–India ties, 
India and the Quad Plus

JOURNAL OF INDO-PACIFIC AFFAIRS  SPECIAL ISSUE 2020 67

with the same changing along with the realist paradigms in the emerging 

security order.

The Galwan contention has embedded itself as a dark spot within the India–

China ties and signals a developing distrust, regardless of diplomatic and military 

redressals, in the relations between the two countries.69 India now appears to be 

ready to exploit the power distribution, reaching out past the Quad Plus nations. 

Such a cycle permits India to have more military, economic, and diplomatic engagement with nations that are vital to India’s emerging fortune in the Indo-Pacific. 

As such, Quad Plus enhancements provide a corridor of communication for India 

past the Quad nations, particularly with Brazil, Israel, Vietnam, and South Korea, 

and permits New Delhi to speed up a continental connect paradigm that India’s 

comprehensive Indo-Pacific standpoint has been pitching for quite a while.

Quad Plus is still in its nascence; admittedly, it does not have an institutional 

system, nor is it clear how it is going to proceed in the future. It is only natural that 

countries like Brazil, New Zealand, South Korea, and Vietnam are wary of taking 

part in an anti-China discussion, as every one of them shares large-scale economic 

ties with Beijing. Despite such limitations, the Quad Plus serves New Delhi’s enthusiasm for gaining power multilaterally, by reinforcing India’s relations with nations that are key stakeholders of the emerging order. The methodology of dealing 

with China under a power-partner parity is seemingly becoming outdated and is 

poised to undergo a lasting, rather concrete, change: China is now seen as a much 

stronger force that compromises Indian security, sovereignty, and sway.

The “New Normal” in India–China Ties

Conclusively, it is important to note that India’s stake in a multipolar Asia 

comes more as a politico-security statement, visualizing a greater role for itself in 

this diffusion and distribution of power. This is primarily because it provides multiple choices to New Delhi’s rising power status and helps position India’s security 

interests better vis-à-vis China. This complements India’s multialigned foreign 

policy framework. It must be ascertained that pointed engagement refers to the 

broader narrative of India’s engagement with key partners across the world such 

as the United Kingdom, France, and the Quad Plus countries. Meanwhile, pointed 

alignment refers to the systematic economic, political, and military connection 

with Quad nations that have like-minded outlooks toward the security landscape 

of Asia and the Indo-Pacific. By merging these two foreign policy overtures, the 

creation of a conjectural alliance allows India’s foreign policy to gain much more 

adherence to alliance power structure and politics that nations like the United 

States espouse, without having to break away from the uniqueness of its own 

foreign policy commitment to non-alliance. The opportunities for multilateral 
68 JOURNAL OF INDO-PACIFIC AFFAIRS  SPECIAL ISSUE 2020

Panda

and bilateral synergy under such a policy are vast, allowing New Delhi to more 

systematically plan its post-Galwan emerging China Policy.

In this context, the Quad 2.0 and Quad Plus groupings have taken on a grander 

strategic significance for New Delhi, with a move away from strategic autonomy 

and toward defense cooperation emerging steadily. With India having recently 

invited Australia to the India–Japan–US trilateral Malabar naval exercise, the potential of a militarized Quad cannot really be discounted,70 though India will not 

overtly support such a grouping to emerge as a NATO-like body. In fact, India’s 

hesitance to engage in a direct military-centric negotiation aimed against China 

will persist; a commitment to non-alliance remains vital to New Delhi’s foreign 

policy directions. China’s apprehensions of Quad 2.0 emerging as an “Asian 

NATO”71 have held steady since the revitalization of the dialogue, with recent 

comments by the outgoing US Deputy Secretary of State Stephen Biegun at the 

US–India Strategic Partnership Forum discussing an “Indo-Pacific NATO” only 

accentuating such concerns.72

In the post-Galwan and the post-COVID period, anti-China rhetoric in India 

will progressively rise. The current times present an ideal opportunity for an 

administration-wide push to move supply chain reliance away from China, mainly 

under the aegis of Modi’s “Aatmanirbhar Bharat” and “Make in India” initiatives. 

Choosing to accept a more grounded approach to Chinese tech goliath Huawei’s 

incorporation in India’s 5G preliminaries is another area of reevaluation postGalwan. It is currently an ideal opportunity for India to complete reforming and 

modernizing its military, especially in high-tech surveillance and defense technology and indigenization. Post-Galwan, the story of China as a partner will assume 

a lower priority in an official speech. The utopian goals of the India–China partnership will be supplanted by a more realistic view of their ties that puts India’s 

national security above any economic interests. Confrontation will no longer be 

an extreme reaction.

To India, China’s threat is not just military- or land-centric, it is also ideological, confronting normative ethics of the region that like-minded partners 

seek to preserve via a “free and open,” inclusive, and liberal rules-based international order. For India, to that effect, Quad 2.0 and Quad Plus are opportunities 

to create a lasting democratic security alignment, with pointed goals in economic, 

security, and defense terms. In the changing post-COVID order, enhanced synergy with Quad Plus nations, in an attempt to sway their own “China connect” 

policies and gradually break away from Chinese economic dependence, is crucial 

to New Delhi. 
India and the Quad Plus

JOURNAL OF INDO-PACIFIC AFFAIRS  SPECIAL ISSUE 2020 69

Notes

1. This paper is drawn and built upon the author’s published commentary at RUSI. Please see, 

Jagannath Panda, “India and the Quad Plus Dialogue,” RUSI, 12 June 2020, https://rusi.org/.

2. Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, “Foreign Secretary’s Conference Call 

with counterparts from Indo-Pacific Countries,” 20 March 2020, https://mea.gov.in/.

3. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan, “Meeting on the Novel Coronavirus Disease among 

Foreign Ministers of Interested Countries, Hosted by the United States,” 11 May 2020, https://

www.mofa.go.jp/.

4. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan, “The Second Japan-Australia-India-U.S. Foreign Ministers’ Meeting,” 6 October 2020, https://www.mofa.go.jp/.

5. Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, “Changing dynamics of India’s foreign 

policy,” 23 August 2019, https://www.mea.gov.in/.

6. World Bank, “GDP, PPP (constant 2017 international $),” 4 November 2020, https://data 

.worldbank.org/.

7. Timothy R. Heath, “China’s Evolving Approach to Economic Diplomacy,” Asia Policy 22 

( July 2016): 157–92, http://www.jstor.org/.

8. Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, “India’s Foreign Policy: 2014-19: Landmarks, achievements and challenges ahead,” 22 July 2019, https://www.mea.gov.in/.

9. Ministry of Shipping, Government of India, “Concept & Objectives”, 4 November 2019, 

http://sagarmala.gov.in/; read also, Anil Chopra, “Sagarmala or SAGAR: a maritime dilemma,” 

Gateway House, 14 April 2016, https://www.gatewayhouse.in/.

10. Ministry of Culture, Government of India, “Mausam: Maritime Routes and Cultural 

Landscapes,” 7 November 2020, http://www.indiaculture.nic.in/.

11. Iftikar Gilani, “Cotton route to counter China’s Silk route,” DNA, 13 December 2016, 

https://www.dnaindia.com/.

12. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan, “The G7 Ise-Shima Summit ‘Expanded Partnership for 

Quality Infrastructure’,” accessed 7 November 2020, https://www.mofa.go.jp/; read also, “India 

and Japan cement defence ties! Ink landmark ACSA pact, India to get access to Djibouti in Africa,” Financial Express, 10 September 2020, https://www.financialexpress.com/.

13. Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Australian Government, “Stepping up our engagement in the Pacific,” 2017, https://www.dfat.gov.au/.

14. US Department of State, “A Free and Open Indo-Pacific,” 4 November 2019, https://

www.state.gov/.

Dr. Jagannath Panda

Dr. Panda is a research fellow and center coordinator for East Asia at the Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence 

Studies and Analyses (MP-IDSA), New Delhi, India. He is the series editor for Routledge Studies on Think Asia. 

Dr. Panda is an expert on China and Indo-Pacific security with a primary focus on East Asia: China, Japan, and the 

Korean Peninsula. He is the author of India-China Relations: Politics of Resources, Identity and Authority in a Multipolar 

World Order (Routledge, 2017) and China’s Path to Power: Party, Military and the Politics of State Transition (Pentagon 

Press, 2010). Most recently, he has published the edited volumes Scaling India-Japan Cooperation in Indo-Pacific and 

Beyond 2025: Connectivity, Corridors and Contours (KW Publishing Ltd., 2019) and The Korean Peninsula and Indo-Pacific 

Power Politics: Status Security at Stake (Routledge: 2020). Dr. Panda is also the co-editor/co-author of the newly published book, Chinese Politics and Foreign Policy under Xi Jinping: The Future Political Trajectory (Routledge: 2020).
70 JOURNAL OF INDO-PACIFIC AFFAIRS  SPECIAL ISSUE 2020

Panda

15. Jagannath Panda, “Opinion: What supply chain resilience means for Australia-India-Japan 

ties?,” Kyodo News, 3 September 2020, https://english.kyodonews.net/.

16. Jagannath Panda, “India, the Blue Dot Network, and the ‘Quad Plus’ Calculus,” Journal of 

Indo-Pacific Affairs, 3., no. 3 (Fall 2020): 3–21, https://media.defense.gov/.

17. Jagannath Panda, “Modi’s ‘self-reliant India’ has key foreign policy aspects,” Asia Times, 13 

July 2020, https://asiatimes.com/.

18. Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, “Joint Statement on a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership between Republic of India and Australia,” 4 June 2020, https://www.mea.gov.in/.

19. “US recognises India as ‘major defence partner’,” Economic Times, 12 July 2018, https://

economictimes.indiatimes.com/.

20. Rajat Pandit, “India, US agree to expedite work on BECA, strengthen defence ties,” Times 

of India, 26 February 2020, https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/.

21. “Japan and India sign military supply-sharing pact,” Japan Times, 10 September 2020, 

https://www.japantimes.co.jp/.

22. “India now exports defence products to 42 countries,” Mint, 10 February 2020, https://

www.livemint.com/.

23. “UK wants 5G alliance of 10 countries, including India, to avoid reliance on Chinese 

Huawei,” The Print, 29 May 2020, https://theprint.in/.

24. Ministère de l’Europe et des Affaires étrangères, “The Indo-Pacific region: a priority for 

France,” https://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/.

25. Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, “Prime Minister’s Keynote Address at 

Shangri La Dialogue,” 1 June 2018, https://www.mea.gov.in/.

26. Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, “Declaration on Principles for Relations and Comprehensive Cooperation Between the Republic of India and the People’s Republic 

of China,” 23 June 2003, https://www.mea.gov.in/.

27. Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, “Inaugural Address by Prime Minister 

at Second Raisina Dialogue,” 17 January 2017, https://www.mea.gov.in/.

28. For a series of detailed analyses on international debates surrounding China, and the polarization of such arguments, this journal edition is a recommended read. “Chinese realities,” East 

Asia Forum Quarterly 11, no. 2 (2019), https://press-files.anu.edu.au/; read also, Jagannath Panda, 

“India’s ‘multipolar Asia’ approach and China,” East Asia Forum Quarterly 11, no. 2 (2019): 25–29, 

https://press-files.anu.edu.au/.

29. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, People’s Republic of China, “The 4th Conference on Interaction and Confidence Building Measures in Asia (CICA) Summit Held in Shanghai Xi Jinping 

Presides over the Summit and Delivers Important Speech, Advocating Common, Comprehensive, 

Cooperative and Sustainable Security in Asia for New Progress in Security Cooperation of Asia,” 

21 May 2014, https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/.

30. Dr. S. Jaishankar, Twitter post, 10:51 AM, 11 May 2020, https://twitter.com/.

31. Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, “Cooperation among select countries 

of the Indo-Pacific in fighting COVID-19 pandemic,” 14 May 2020, https://www.mea.gov.in/.

32. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan, “Meeting on the Novel Coronavirus Disease among 

Foreign Ministers of Interested Countries.”

33. Jagannath Panda, “China as a Revisionist Power in Indo-Pacific and India’s Perception: A PowerPartner Contention,” Journal of Contemporary China, May 2020, 8–9, https://www.tandfonline.com/.

34. “China’s grand strategy, India’s great dilemma,” Mint, 8 February 2016, https://www 

.livemint.com/.
India and the Quad Plus

JOURNAL OF INDO-PACIFIC AFFAIRS  SPECIAL ISSUE 2020 71

35. Jagannath Panda, “Will India Pivot Towards the Us After Galwan?,” 9Dashline, 19 June 

2020, https://www.9dashline.com/.

36. “Donald Trump’s move to invite India, Russia, Australia, South Korea to attend G-7 summit riles China,” Economic Times, 2 June 2020, https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/.

37. Read, Jagannath Panda, “A View from India,” Asan Forum, 7 January 2020, http://www.

theasanforum.org/; read also, Jagannath Panda, “Framing an Indo-Pacific Narrative in IndiaSouth Korea Ties,” Korea Economic Institute of America, 7 January 2020, https://idsa.in/.

38. Joshua Mitnick, “Why the U.S. Can’t Get Israel to Break Up With China,” Foreign Policy, 

16 June 2020, https://foreignpolicy.com/.

39. Seth J. Frantzman, “New joint ventures hint at ‘burgeoning relationship’ between Israel and 

India,” DefenseNews, 18 February 2020, https://www.defensenews.com/.

40. “IAI and BEL to Establish New Service and Maintenance Center for Air Defense Systems in India,” Defence Aerospace, 5 February 2020, https://www.defense-aerospace.com/.

41. “Media Releases,” Hindustan Aeronautics Limited, 5 February 2020, https://hal-india.co.in/.

42. “A Decade of India-Vietnam Strategic Partnership: Progress and Prospects,” Institute of 

South Asian Studies, 13 March 2018, https://www.isas.nus.edu.sg/.

43. Ministry of National Defence, Vietnam, “2019 Vietnam National Defence,” 12 December 

2019, http://www.mod.gov.vn/; see also, Derek Grossman and Christopher Sharman, “How To 

Read Vietnam’s Latest Defense White Paper: A Message To Great Powers,” War on the Rocks, 13 

December 2019, https://warontherocks.com/.

44. Jagannath Panda, “The India-Japan-Vietnam Trilateral: An “Inclusive” Proposition,” ISPI, 

15 April 2019, https://www.ispionline.it/.

45. Embassy of India in Brazil, “India - Brazil Relations,” January 2020, https://eoibrasilia .gov.in/.

46. “China remained Brazil’s main trading partner in 2019,” Macauhub, 7 January 2020, https://

macauhub.com.mo/.

47. “Bolsonaro’s son enrages Beijing by blaming China for coronavirus crisis,” The Guardian, 19 

March 2020, https://www.theguardian.com/.

48. “China outraged after Brazil minister suggests Covid-19 is part of ‘plan for world domination’,” The Guardian, 7 April 2020, https://www.theguardian.com/.

49. “Brazil-China diplomatic spat escalates over coronavirus supplies,” Reuters, 6 April 2020, 

https://in.reuters.com/.

50. David Scott, “New Zealand Picks Up on the Indo-Pacific,” East West Center, 18 March 

2020, https://www.eastwestcenter.org/.

51. Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, New Zealand, “India,” 13 October 2020, https://

www.mfat.govt.nz/.

52. New Zealand Government, “Reinforcing the rules based order,” 2018, https://www 

.defence.govt.nz/.

53. James Holmes and Toshi Yoshihara, “Five Shades of Chinese Gray-Zone Strategy,” National Interest, 2 May 2017, https://nationalinterest.org/.

54. Jagannath Panda, “India’s ‘multipolar Asia’ and China,” East Asia Forum, 27 August 2019, 

https://www.eastasiaforum.org/.

55. C. Raja Mohan, “Raja Mandala: Two Discourses on Strategic Autonomy,” Carnegie India, 

18 September 2018, https://carnegieindia.org/; see also, C. Raja Mohan, “Today, India’s strategic 

autonomy is about coping with Beijing’s challenge to its territorial integrity, sovereignty,” Indian 

Express, 25 August 2020, https://indianexpress.com/.

56. “China criticises forthcoming Quad Foreign Ministers meet in Japan,” Outlook, 29 September 2020, https://www.outlookindia.com/.
72 JOURNAL OF INDO-PACIFIC AFFAIRS  SPECIAL ISSUE 2020

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57. Derek Grossman, “ India Is the Weakest Link in the Quad,” Foreign Policy, 23 July 2018, 

https://foreignpolicy.com/; read also, Jeff M. Smith, “India and the Quad: weak link or keystone?” 

ASPI, 15 January 2019, https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/.

58. Jagannath Panda, “India’s Continental Connect on Indo-Pacific and Quad 2.0,” East West 

Center, 26 September 2018, https://www.eastwestcenter.org/.

59. “Building Atmanirbhar Bharat & Overcoming COVID-19,” National Portal of India, 13 

October 2020, https://www.india.gov.in/.

60. “Commentary: Why President Xi strongly advocates building community with shared 

future,” Xinhuanet, 22 September 2020, http://www.xinhuanet.com/; read also, “Global academic 

cooperation guided by a community with shared future provides a ‘stabilizer’ for the changing 

world: officials and scholars,” Global Times, 25 October 2020, https://www.globaltimes.cn/.

61. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, People’s Republic of China, “State Councilor and Foreign 

Minister Wang Yi Chairs Quadrilateral Video Conference on COVID-19,” 27 July 2020, https://

www.fmprc.gov.cn/.

62. Read: Jagannath Panda, “Why AIIB, Not BRI? India’s Fine Balance on China,” in Asia 

between Multipolarism and Multipolarity, ed. Sujan R. Chinoy and Jagannath P. Panda (New Delhi: 

MPIDSA, 2020), 109–34, https://idsa.in/.

63. Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, “Official Spokesperson’s response to a 

query on participation of India in OBOR/BRI Forum,” 13 May 2017, https://mea.gov.in/.

64. Jagannath Panda, “India’s China policy signals a shift post-Galwan,” India Inc., 28 June 

2020, https://indiaincgroup.com/.

65. Jagannath Panda, “Will India revisit its stance on the South China Sea?” The Strait Times, 

5 August 2020, https://www.straitstimes.com/.

66. Narendra Modi, “PM’s statement at the United Nations Summit for the adoption of Post2015 Development Agenda,” 25 September 2015, https://www.narendramodi.in/.

67. Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, “Joint Statement between the Republic 

of India and the People’s Republic of China on Building a Closer Developmental Partnership,” 19 

September 2014, https://www.mea.gov.in/.

68. Jagannath Panda, “Narendra Modi’s China policy: between pragmatism and power parity,” 

Journal of Asian Public Policy 9, no. 2, (2016): 185–97, https://www.tandfonline.com/.

69. Ashok Sharma, “Galwan valley clash unmasks China’s geopolitical intent and India’s delusion with China,” Times of India, 3 July 2020, https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/; see also, “Why 

China wants the Galwan Valley,” Rediff, 19 June 2020, https://www.rediff.com/.

70. Bradley Bowman and Mark Montgomery, “China’s Provocations Propel Decision to 

Include Australia in Upcoming Malabar Exercise,” DefenseNews, 21 October 2020, https://

www.defensenews.com/.

71. Patrick Gerard Buchan and Benjamin Rimland, “Defining the Diamond: The Past, Present, 

and Future of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue,” CSIS, 16 March 2020, https://www.csis.org/.

72. US Department of State, “Deputy Secretary Biegun Remarks at the U.S.-India Strategic 

Partnership Forum,” 31 August 2020, https://www.state.gov/.

Disclaimer

The views and opinions expressed or implied in JIPA are those of the authors and should not be construed as carrying the 

official sanction of the Department of Defense, Department of the Air Force, Air Education and Training Command, 

Air University, or other agencies or departments of the US government or their international equivalents.
JOURNAL OF INDO-PACIFIC AFFAIRS  SPECIAL ISSUE 2020 73

BEIJING, QUAD, AND THE QUAD PLUS

Japan and the Quad Plus

A Japanese View for the Development and Expansion of the 

Quad in the Age of War on the Novel Coronavirus

Hideshi Tokuchi

Abstract

The basic common principles and values of the visions for a free and open IndoPacific (FOIP) are universal, and therefore not only closer partnership among the 

Quad members but also expansion of the Quad is necessary, based on the shared 

sense of the universal principles and values. In exploring the possibility of the Quad 

Plus, France, Germany, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), the 

United Kingdom, and Canada would be good candidates to approach.

Despite the change in Japanese leadership from Prime Minister Shinzō Abe to 

Yoshihide Suga, Tokyo’s commitment to FOIP and the Quad will remain unchanged. While Japan will also try to reach out to other partners, in particular 

ASEAN, to bolster FOIP and the Quad, a sophisticated approach toward China 

must be articulated, since the management of Japan–China relations will continue 

to be a major challenge for Japan.

Introduction: The Concept of “Indo-Pacific”

Indian prime minister Narendra Modi said in his remarks at the Shangri-La 

Dialogue in 2018, “The Indo-Pacific is a natural region.”1 The factuality of that 

statement remains contested. The concept seems much more natural than before, 

but it still seems to be an artificial construct, which is inevitable, as there are not 

many countries that geographically face both the Indian and Pacific Oceans.

The Indo-Pacific concept tends to be viewed from the angle of the US–China 

rivalry alone. It is because the Indo-Pacific is not a genuinely geographical concept. It is often used with the two adjectives “free” and “open,” which means that 

it is value- and norm-oriented, particularly in security terms. China’s behaviors 

are antithetical to the fundamental principles of the rules-based international 

order, and liberal democracies have to counter China. The rivalry and competition will be increasingly intense, and the interests of those who buttress the 

rules-based international order—such as the United States, Australia, India, and 

Japan—and the interests of those who do not, such as China and Russia, overlap 

less and less with each other.
74 JOURNAL OF INDO-PACIFIC AFFAIRS  SPECIAL ISSUE 2020

Tokuchi

There is a question as to whether those values and norms originating in Europe 

and the United States have become inherent in the minds of those who live in the 

Indo-Pacific region. Do they truly accept those concepts as their own? If the answer is affirmative, a coalition of like-minded countries—including all the Quad 

members—is highly promising, and even the possibility of a Quad Plus will be 

more likely. However, if the answer is negative, the Quad countries must address 

that repudiation by reconfirming their value and norm basis to promote the rulesbased international order through implementing their respective visions for a free 

and open Indo-Pacific (FOIP).

There is another question. Do the security interests of both sides of the systemic 

competition not overlap with each other? The international community should 

recall the multilateral relief efforts for the Indian Ocean earthquake and tsunami 

disaster of 2004, which eventually led to the creation of the Quad, and the success 

of the counterpiracy operations in the Gulf of Aden and off the coast of Somalia 

in recent years. Although such nontraditional security threats as large-scale natural 

disasters and piracy do not always generate a successful international cooperative 

atmosphere, policy makers would be remiss if they neglected the opportunity to 

broaden the room for cooperation by identifying the convergence of interests. 

Right now, the international community is in the middle of another nontraditional 

security threat: the outbreak and spread of COVID-19 pandemic. As no one 

knows when or how it will end, the situation makes global cooperation in public 

health, medical innovation, and economic recovery more necessary and urgent 

than ever before for the survival and prosperity of humanity. However, the pandemic is exacerbating existing tension between the United States and China, which 

makes the urgently needed international cooperation difficult.

With these points in mind, this article will discuss Japan’s FOIP vision in the 

context of the current international security environment surrounding Japan, the 

prospect of the Quad Plus, and the diplomacy of Japan’s new administration for 

FOIP and the Quad Plus. It will do so based on the understanding that the Quad 

serves as the instrument for coordination and cooperation of the four maritime 

democracies to achieve their FOIP visions.

Japan’s Security Perception and FOIP

In November 1954, Japanese prime minister Shigeru Yoshida delivered a speech 

before the National Press Club in Washington, DC, during his visit to the United 

States, in which he said, “Japan has a vital stake in the progress of the free Asian 

countries. As an island nation, entirely dependent on trade, Japan knows she cannot survive unless there is free trade and friendly cooperation among us.”2

 This 

recognition rings just as true today. He focused on the impact of China on Asia, 
Japan and the Quad Plus

JOURNAL OF INDO-PACIFIC AFFAIRS  SPECIAL ISSUE 2020 75

saying, “We also have a Communist China, a bleak fact of life in Asia that occupies our mind. And we have a number of new underdeveloped nations trying to 

make their way against the gravitational pull of Communist China.”3 The FOIP 

vision that former Prime Minister Abe launched is an effort to address challenges 

caused by China, but it also takes a much wider perspective, including issues related to the Indian Ocean, Middle East, and Africa.

Since Japan, as a maritime trade nation, has a huge stake in the stability in and 

free and unimpeded access to the global maritime space, China’s maritime expansion and assertive actions against the rules-based order at sea have caused major 

concerns in Tokyo. Kuni Miyake, special advisor to Prime Minister Suga’s cabinet 

is right in noting, “The vision of FOIP is not an exclusive international military 

order. Rather, it provides a basis for a more stable and prosperous arena in East, 

Southeast and South Asia as a whole. . . . Unlike the United States, Japan’s efforts 

to enhance the vision of FOIP is more focused on the areas of economic, cultural 

or law enforcement activities,”4 but as the purposes of Japanese efforts to achieve 

FOIP include maintenance of fundamental principles and values of international 

order and commitment for peace and stability of the Indo-Pacific region,5 the 

security policy aspect of the FOIP vision is expected to be larger.

Though Northeast Asia, where Japan is located, has been enjoying a relatively 

peaceful environment, without any significant and prolonged armed conflicts for 

almost half a century, the environment is increasingly volatile. North Korea’s nuclear and missile development and China’s military buildup and maritime expansion are rapidly eroding the regional balance of power. The National Defense Program Guidelines (NDPG) of 2018, Japan’s official defense policy states, “Thanks to 

further growth of national power of such countries as China, changes in the balance of power are accelerating and becoming more complex, thereby increasing 

uncertainty over the existing order.”6 Japan neighbors China, North Korea, and 

Russia. China poses the most serious threat to Japan among these three neighbors. This prioritization of Japan’s threat perception is shown in the order of these 

countries in the assessment of the security environment in the NDPG.

7

 Tokyo’s 

bottom line assessment of China is expressed in the NDPG: “Chinese military 

and other developments, coupled with the lack of transparency surrounding its 

defense policy and military power, represent a serious security concern for the 

region including Japan and for the international community. Japan needs to continue to pay utmost attention to these developments.” China’s maritime expansion 

in East Asia, particularly in the East and South China Seas, is the major factor in 

this assessment.8

The NDPG also refers to the importance of international partnership, saying, 

“In the international community, there is a broadening and diversifying array of 
76 JOURNAL OF INDO-PACIFIC AFFAIRS  SPECIAL ISSUE 2020

Tokuchi

security challenges that cannot be dealt with by a single country alone.”9 Based 

on this recognition, Japan holds the Japan–US alliance and international security 

cooperation indispensable to achieving Japan’s national defense objectives.10 Although the NDPG is not specific about the relationship between Japan’s efforts 

to strengthen its alliance cooperation with the United States and promotion of 

the FOIP vision, the role of the Japan–US alliance as defined in the NDPG is 

worthy of attention in this context: “The Japan-US Alliance, with the Japan-US 

Security Arrangements as its core, plays a significant role for peace, stability and 

prosperity of not only Japan but also the Indo-Pacific region and the international 

community” (emphasis added).11 It is the first time in the history of Japanese 

defense policy that the role of the Japan–US alliance has been defined using the 

Indo-Pacific nomenclature. Previously, it was labeled Asia-Pacific.12 This change 

is subtle but significant, as, together with another sentence, it suggests the expansion of the scope of the alliance cooperation: “In order to create a desirable 

security environment including maintenance and enhancing free and open maritime order, and with an eye on increasing Japanese and US presence in the IndoPacific region, Japan will conduct bilateral activities such as capacity building 

assistance, humanitarian assistance/disaster relief (HA/DR) and counter-piracy” 

(emphasis added).13

The NDPG is much clearer about the relationship between international security cooperation and promotion of the FOIP vision: “In line with the vision of free 

and open Indo-Pacific, Japan will strategically promote multifaceted and multilayered security cooperation, taking into account characteristics and situation 

specific to each region and country.”14 In this context, the NDPG also says, “In 

implementing these initiatives [on defense cooperation and exchanges], Japan 

will position the Japan-US Alliance as its cornerstone and will work closely with 

the countries that share universal values and security interests, through full coordination with its diplomatic policy.”15 In accordance with this precept, the NDPG

prioritizes Japan’s defense cooperation with Australia and India.16 As the previous 

NDPG of 2013 gave South Korea the first priority and gave Australia and India 

only the second and the sixth priority respectively,17 the upgrading of security ties 

with these two partners is noticeably significant in the present defense policy.

There are three important points with regard to Japan’s approach toward the 

Quad in security terms. First, the FOIP vision has become a pillar of Japan’s security cooperation with its partners, but the national security aspect of the vision 

is not articulated in the NDPG. This disconnect renders the security aspect of the 

FOIP vision vague, though it makes flexible implementation of the FOIP vision 

by the Japanese defense forces possible.
Japan and the Quad Plus

JOURNAL OF INDO-PACIFIC AFFAIRS  SPECIAL ISSUE 2020 77

Second, the quadrilateral security cooperation of Japan, the United States, 

Australia, and India is not mentioned in the NDPG. However, the policy declares Tokyo’s intent to “strengthen cooperative relations under trilateral framework among Japan, Australia and the United States, which share universal values 

and strategic interests” and to “strengthen cooperation among Japan, India and 

the United States,”18 and these two triangles will foster the Quad. However, the 

lack of any mention of the Quad itself in the NDPG of 2018 implies that Japan 

was not ready to fully integrate its military establishment into the Quad framework in 2018.

Third, the NDPG attaches importance to multilateral frameworks such as the 

East Asia Summit (EAS), the ASEAN Defense Ministers’ Meeting-Plus 

(ADMM-Plus), and the ASEAN Regional Forum and declares Tokyo’s intent to 

contribute to strengthening cooperation and mutual trust among the countries in 

the region.19 However, it does not say anything specific about Japan’s prospect on 

the future mode of these existing frameworks. Therefore, the Japanese position was 

open at the time of creation of the NDPG about the possibility of the enlargement 

of the existing frameworks, including the Quad.

The Prospect for the “Quad Plus” to Achieve FOIP

The basic common principles and values of the FOIP visions of the Quad 

members, including the rule of law, freedom of navigation, and free trade are 

universal. While the strong partnership of the four major maritime democracies 

in the Indo-Pacific is indispensable to maintain and promote these principles and 

values in the vast and dynamic region, there is a limit to what these four countries 

can do in this regard. Outreach is inevitable. As a number of regional security 

frameworks and networks already exist, networking the Quad with these other 

endeavors will be more useful and realistic than trying to establish a new overarching framework from scratch. However, such networking is not the only option to promote the function and value of the Quad. Expansion of the Quad 

should be explored, and the basis of such expansion should and will undoubtedly 

focus on a sense of the universality of their shared principles and values.20

Incidentally, some other countries from inside and outside the region began to 

establish their own Indo-Pacific strategies or similar visions. These countries 

would be good candidates for the Quad Plus. For example, French president Emmanuel Macron delivered a speech in Australia in 2018, in which he referred to 

an Indo-Pacific strategy. The French strategy is not viewed as exclusively a military one,21 but it is an expression of Paris’s intention to contribute to regional 

stability through its military and security cooperation and to preserve free and 

open access to maritime lines of communication with its partners.22 As the French 
78 JOURNAL OF INDO-PACIFIC AFFAIRS  SPECIAL ISSUE 2020

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focus on the Indo-Pacific security includes not only the South China Sea and the 

freedom of navigation but also North Korea,23 its scope overlaps with the Japanese FOIP vision more than some other countries’ perspectives do, because North 

Korea has been one of the immediate threats to Japan.24

Likewise, Germany established its policy guidelines for the Indo-Pacific in 

September 2020. Berlin defined its interests as including the peace and security of 

the region, closing ranks with democracies and partners with shared interests in 

the region, and open shipping routes. The principles that guides the German 

policy include the rules-based order, emphasizing the rule of law in contrast to 

“the law of the strong.”25 Similar to the French strategy, the German policy also 

mentions North Korea as a priority.26 Thus, the German policy shares a number 

of commonalities with Japan’s FOIP. However, Peter Schoof, German Ambassador to Indonesia and ASEAN, commented about the policy guidelines: “Other 

countries that have engaged conceptually with the Indo-Pacific include Japan, the 

USA, Australia, India and France, as well as ASEAN as a whole with its ‘ASEAN 

Outlook on the Indo-Pacific.’ Most of the concepts follow a cooperative approach 

towards China, as do the German guidelines, which stress that inclusivity is an 

important principle.”27 The existence of such a cooperative approach toward China 

is debatable. Schoof is right in saying that most of these countries stress inclusivity, but their emphasis on the fundamental principles and values is a sign of their 

competitive or even confrontational approach toward China. Though Japan will 

welcome Germany’s growing attention to the Indo-Pacific and concept of FOIP, 

Japan might view Germany’s emphasis on the cooperative approach toward China 

as rather naïve.

A similar point could be made regarding ASEAN’s approach. In June 2019, the 

ASEAN published the ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific (AOIP), following close 

on the heels the US Department of Defense publishing America’s Indo-Pacific 

Strategy Report. Tomotaka Shoji argues that the AOIP seems like ASEAN’s response to the US report, pointing out three major characteristics of the AOIP. 

First, it is a euphemistic expression of the ASEAN’s refusal to join the encirclement of China. Second, the policy reaffirms the centrality of ASEAN and the 

importance of the multilateral cooperative framework of ASEAN. Third, the 

AOIP focuses not on security but on economy. Shoji also argues that the ASEAN’s 

emphasis on a win-win relationship and economic factors, its expectation of a 

Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership, and its avoidance of reference to 

security issues—including the South China Sea issue—show ASEAN’s affinity 

for China’s Belt and Road Initiative.28 In November 2019, while attending the 

14th EAS, Prime Minister Abe stated, “Japan fully endorses AOIP. Japan will 

cooperate with ASEAN toward materializing AOIP, by achieving synergies with 
Japan and the Quad Plus

JOURNAL OF INDO-PACIFIC AFFAIRS  SPECIAL ISSUE 2020 79

the ‘Free and Open Indo-Pacific’ concept advocated by Japan.”29 This position 

continues to be the Japanese position today. However, the ASEAN is divided in 

some of the fundamental values, such as the freedom of navigation, which reflects 

the difference of the positions of the ASEAN members on the South China Sea 

issue. Thus, it is uncertain if Japan could continue to fully support the AOIP. 

When the ASEAN is chaired by a country, such as Vietnam, that takes a tough 

position on China about the South China Sea issue, Japan’s full support for the 

AOIP will be certain, but when less strident nations hold the chair, such support 

is less likely.30

The United Kingdom is also noteworthy as a potential partner. The country 

possesses territories in the Indo-Pacific and today pays more attention to the 

Indo-Pacific, showing a willingness to be more engaged in the region. Though the 

British National Security Capability Review of 2018 uses both the “Asia-Pacific” 

and “Indo-Pacific” nomenclatures, the Indo-Pacific is regarded as one of “the 

three primary centres of the global economy and political influence,” and it says 

Britain “must maintain and build on our strong relationships across these 

regions.”31 This document also highlights Japan as one of Britain’s “global strategic 

partners” and stresses the two nations’ upgraded security and defense partnership.32 In economy and trade, the United Kingdom has opened discussions with 

all the members of the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for TransPacific Partnership (CPTPP) to discuss potential UK accession,33 and during her 

visit to Tokyo in October 2020, British trade secretary Liz Truss expressed her 

country’s strong interests in joining CPTPP in a meeting with Japanese economy 

minister Yasutoshi Nishimura. The Quad should not miss the opportunity to engage this maritime democracy.

Finally, Canada should be considered as well. Ottawa has become more engaged in Indo-Pacific affairs in recent years, including Canada’s dispatch of aircraft and vessels to thwart ship-to-ship transfers circumventing maritime sanctions against North Korea. When Prime Minister Abe visited Ottawa in April 

2019, he shared Japan’s FOIP vision with Canadian prime minister Justin 

Trudeau, and the two leaders agreed to advance it through a range of initiatives.34

There is a media report that Canada is formulating a fresh Indo-Pacific policy.35

Like the United States, Canada is both a Pacific and Atlantic nation and a 

NATO member. Therefore, Canada is expected to be a bridge between the IndoPacific region and the Atlantic region and to contribute to the enlargement of 

the scope of the FOIP vision. Additionally, Ottawa could assist in exploring 

partnership with like-minded countries in Europe.

Until recently, the Quad Plus was an abstract idea, and it does not seem that 

Japan was ready for its actualization. However, the Quad Plus is now becoming 
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a reality. On 11 May 2020, a video teleconference called “a meeting on the novel 

coronavirus disease (COVID-19) among foreign ministers of interested countries, hosted by the United States” was held, attended by the foreign ministers of 

the Quad’s four members and of South Korea, Israel, and Brazil. Attendees discussed the need for coordination and cooperation among relevant countries in 

relation to COVID-19 as well as measures to prevent the spread of infections.36

It is difficult to find any reference to Tokyo viewing this meeting as part of the 

Quad Plus efforts; however, some observers discuss this conference as such.37

Therefore, Japan’s efforts to share the FOIP vision with as many other countries 

as possible should be accompanied with similar efforts to enlarge the Quad construct. Incidentally, US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo launched an idea of “a 

new grouping of like-minded countries, a new alliance of democracies” in his 

remarks on US policy on China in July 2020.38 While Washington has not 

elaborated this idea yet, it would be consonant with the Quad Plus efforts. In this 

international environment, it is high time for Japan to seriously consider the idea 

of the Quad Plus in specific terms.

Prime Minister Suga’s Diplomacy and the Future of the Quad

On 28 August 2020, Prime Minister Abe declared he would step down due 

to health issues. Yoshihide Suga, who had served in the Abe cabinet as Chief 

Cabinet Secretary, replaced Abe on 16 September.

The Abe administration’s national security policy had three major points: 

(1) passing security legislation to put the reinterpretation of the Constitution 

with regard to use of military force into practice, (2) strengthening the Japan–US alliance, and (3) procuring international cooperation based on Japan’s FOIP vision.39 Upon assuming leadership, Prime Minister Suga pledged 

to “carry on the initiatives implemented under the Abe administration and 

advance them further.”40 This pledge was made mainly in the context of Japan’s 

response to the COVID-19 pandemic, but Suga’s intention to secure continuity 

of the diplomatic and security policy of the previous cabinet is obvious in his 

other statements. For example, he held a summit telephone talk with Australian 

prime minister Scott Morrison on 20 September, in which the two leaders confirmed “the importance of realizing the ‘Free and Open Indo-Pacific,’ deepening their cooperation for the stability and prosperity of the international community as a whole, and collaborating with like-minded countries in the 

region.”41 A few hours later, Suga held his first telephone conversation with 

Pres. Donald Trump, in which the two leaders “shared the view that Japan 

and the United States would work closely together . . . to achieve a free and 

open Indo-Pacific.”42 Then, he addressed to the seventy-fifth session of the 
Japan and the Quad Plus

JOURNAL OF INDO-PACIFIC AFFAIRS  SPECIAL ISSUE 2020 81

General Assembly of the United Nations on 26 September, referring to the 

importance of the principle of the rule of law as the foundation of both domestic and international order: “Japan continues to promote a Free and Open IndoPacific, the foundation of regional peace and prosperity rooted in the global rule 

of law.”43 From these statements, the political vector of the Suga cabinet to 

promote Japan’s diplomacy under the banner of FOIP and strengthening Japan’s 

alliance relationship with the United States is clearly demonstrated.

Then, two remarkable developments followed: the second Quad foreign ministers’ meeting in Tokyo, and Prime Minister Suga’s visit to Southeast Asia. First, 

Tokyo hosted the second Quad ministerial meeting on 6 October. According to 

the press release of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan,

The four Ministers affirmed the importance of broadening cooperation with 

more countries for the realization of a “Free and Open Indo-Pacific” as the vision 

serves for the peace and prosperity of the region and its importance in the postCOVID world is increasing. In this regard, the four Ministers reaffirmed their 

strong support for ASEAN’s unity and centrality as well as the ASEAN-led regional architecture. They also reaffirmed their full support for the AOIP. They 

also welcomed proactive efforts by other countries including those in Europe 

toward a “Free and Open Indo-Pacific.”44

While reference to their support for ASEAN Centrality is found in the statements of the other Quad members as well,45 it is only in Japan’s press release that 

reference to European countries’ proactive efforts toward FOIP is made. This indicates that the four countries have built consensus to achieve closer partnership 

with the ASEAN. If so, the ASEAN will be a strong candidate for the Quad Plus. 

The Japanese press release also indicates Tokyo’s special attention and interest in 

partnering with European countries to realize FOIP, though it remains uncertain 

if the other three Quad members are as interested in a stronger partnership with 

European countries in the Quad context.

Second, the destination of Suga’s first official overseas trip as prime minister 

was Southeast Asia, a focal point of the FOIP vision. He visited Vietnam, this 

year’s ASEAN chair, and Indonesia, the biggest economy and most populous nation in the ASEAN. In his speech at the Vietnam-Japan University, Hanoi, Suga 

emphasized the commonalities between AOIP and FOIP:

What brought about the wide range of cooperation between ASEAN and Japan 

I have outlined so far? I believe the key is that ASEAN and Japan fully share 

fundamental principles such as the rule of law, openness, freedom, transparency 

and inclusiveness. . . . The ASEAN Outlook powerfully sets for the rule of law, 

openness, freedom, transparency and inclusiveness as the ASEAN’s principles 

for behavior. The fact that it shares many fundamental commonalities with the 
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Tokuchi

FOIP Japan is advocating for is tremendously encouraging for me. I strongly 

support AOIP. I firmly believe that we can create a peaceful and prosperous future along with ASEAN with these fundamental values in common.46

Japan’s continuous and increasingly stronger commitment to advance the Quad 

and also to reach out to other partners to promote FOIP has been demonstrated 

in these recent remarks and developments.

However, management of the Japan–China relation will continue to be a major challenge for Japan. In his first press conference as the prime minister on 

September 16, Suga stated, “I will protect the national interests to the end and 

for this purpose would like to strategically promote the Free and Open IndoPacific and to establish stable relations with the neighboring countries including 

China and Russia.”47 It requires delicate efforts to promote the FOIP vision and 

simultaneously establish a stable relationship with China. Though FOIP is not 

exclusive in nature and the Quad ostensibly is not an alliance to counter anyone, 

confrontation with China is inevitable, as Japan is a staunch ally of the United 

States in this age of US–China rivalry. Thus, so long as China continue to raise 

objections to the rules-based international order, from which Japan has benefited 

for decades, unstable relations with the powerful and cumbersome neighbor 

would not be in Japan’s interests. Soon after the Quad ministerial meeting in 

Tokyo, Chinese foreign minister Wang Yi made comments against the Quad 

and FOIP during his visit to Malaysia:

In essence, [the Indo-Pacific strategy] aims to build a so-called Indo-Pacific 

NATO underpinned by the quadrilateral mechanism involving the United 

States, Japan, India and Australia. . . . What it pursues is to trumpet the Cold 

War mentality and to stir up confrontation among different groups and blocs 

and to stoke geopolitical competition. What it maintains is the dominance and 

hegemonic system of the United States. . . . In this sense, this strategy is itself 

a big underlying security risk. If it is forced forward, it will wind back the clock 

of history.48

In the face of Beijing’s stance, Japan must undertake significant efforts to avoid 

unnecessary tension in the relationship with China.

Coincidentally, when asked about the idea of an Asian version of NATO, which 

one of his political opponents had advocated during the presidential election of the 

ruling Liberal Democratic Party, Suga responded, “The idea of an Asian version of 

NATO is wrong in the context of the US-China confrontation because it would 

be encirclement of China.”49 Even though he clearly rejected the idea, China’s 

aversion to the Quad will not disappear, as the Quad will be more operationalized 

and its function will be expanded. For example, the Malabar naval exercise held in 
Japan and the Quad Plus

JOURNAL OF INDO-PACIFIC AFFAIRS  SPECIAL ISSUE 2020 83

November 2020 brought together all four Quad partners, following India’s invitation to Australia.50 This event added a military security aspect to the Quad, and 

thus, China’s criticism against the Quad might be even stronger.

Today’s world has two faces: the international society of sovereign states and 

the global society transcending national borders. China is a competitor in the 

international society and a partner in the global society. The FOIP vision is a tool 

of competition and cooperation with China. A sophisticated approach toward 

China will have to be articulated in the implementation of FOIP and in the 

promotion of the Quad, including the quest for Quad Plus. Finding a balance is 

a common serious challenge for all the four Quad members. Japan, as a maritime 

nation situated on the periphery of the Chinese land mass, serving as a bulwark 

to block China’s maritime expansion, will have to elaborate its own FOIP vision 

in the face of this intricate environment.

Japan’s national security policy review is expected to conclude in December 

2020. Though the primary focus of the review is on missile defense and counterstrike capabilities, the reform should not be limited to these issues. A whole set of 

clear answers about how to promote the FOIP vision to bolster the rules-based 

international order is anticipated. 

Hideshi Tokuchi

Mr. Tokuchi earned a bachelor of laws degree at the University of Tokyo in 1979 and a master of arts in law and 

diplomacy at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy in 1986. He joined the Japan Defense Agency in 1979 as 

a civilian and assumed the position of the first Vice-Minister of Defense for International Affairs in 2014 until retiring from the Ministry of Defense in 2015. He also worked for the US National Defense University in 1995–1996 

as a visiting fellow. Tokuchi has been teaching international security studies at the National Graduate Institute for 

Policy Studies (GRIPS) as a visiting professor.

Notes

1. Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, “Prime Minister’s Key Note Address at 

Shangri La Dialogue ( June 01, 2018),” 1 June, 2018, https://mea.gov.in/.

2. “Yoshida’s Speech Before the National Press Club,” New York Times, 9 November 1954, 4.

3. “Yoshida’s Speech Before the National Press Club,” New York Times.

4. Kuni Miyake, “Why did Suga choose Vietnam and Indonesia for his first official trip as 

prime minister?” Japan Times, 15 October 2020, https://www.japantimes.co.jp/.

5. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, “Toward Free and Open Indo-Pacific,” November 

2019, 2, https://www.mofa.go.jp/.

6. Cabinet Decision of Japan, National Defense Program Guidelines for FY 2019 and beyond 

(Provisional Translation), 18 December 2018, 3, http://www.cas.go.jp/.

7. Cabinet Decision of Japan, National Defense Program Guidelines, 5–6.
84 JOURNAL OF INDO-PACIFIC AFFAIRS  SPECIAL ISSUE 2020

Tokuchi

8. Cabinet Decision of Japan, National Defense Program Guidelines, 5.

9. Cabinet Decision of Japan, National Defense Program Guidelines, 4.

10. Cabinet Decision of Japan, National Defense Program Guidelines, 8.

11. Cabinet Decision of Japan, National Defense Program Guidelines, 13.

12. For example, Cabinet Decision of Japan, National Defense Program Guidelines for FY 2014 

and beyond [Provisional Translation], 17 December 2013, 8, http://japan.kantei.go.jp/.

13. Cabinet Decision of Japan, National Defense Program Guidelines 2019, 14.

14. Cabinet Decision of Japan, National Defense Program Guidelines 2019, 15.

15. Cabinet Decision of Japan, National Defense Program Guidelines 2019, 15.

16. Cabinet Decision of Japan, National Defense Program Guidelines 2019, 16.

17. Cabinet Decision of Japan, National Defense Program Guidelines 2014, 10–11.

18. Cabinet Decision of Japan, National Defense Program Guidelines 2019, 16.

19. Cabinet Decision of Japan, National Defense Program Guidelines 2019, 17.

20. Hideshi Tokuchi, “Achieving a Free and Open Indo-Pacific through the Quad framework,” 

in Asia between Multipolarism and Multipolarity, ed. Sujan R. Chinoy and Jagannath P. Panda 

(New Delhi: KW Publishers, 2020), 254–55.

21. Francoise Nicolas, “France’s Indo-Pacific Strategy: inclusive and principled,” East Asia 

Forum, 12 December 2019, https://www.eastasiaforum.org/.

22. Florence Parly, “18th Asia Security Summit: The IISS Shangri-La Dialogue, Third Plenary 

Session, provisional transcript,” 1 June 2019, 3, https://www.google.com/.

23. Directorate General for International Relations and Strategy, the Ministry of the Armed 

Forces, France, France and Security in the Indo-Pacific, 2018, updated in May 2019, 5, https://www 

.google.com/.

24. Japan’s FOIP vision refers to “non-proliferation” as one of the cooperation items for a pillar 

of the vision “Commitment for Peace and Stability.” It implies that the necessity to address North 

Korean nuclear and missile development. (Government of Japan, “Toward Free and Open IndoPacific,” 2.) After the second Quad foreign ministers’ meeting held in Tokyo on 6 October 2020, 

the Quad members issued their respective readouts, in which the Japanese press release was the 

only one which specifically mentioned North Korea. (See the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, 

The Second Japan-Australia-India-U.S. Foreign Ministers’ Meeting, 6 October 2020, https://www/

mofa.go.jp/.) A similar thing had happened in the readouts of the Quad consultation held in 

Manila on 12 November 2017, in which the Japanese and the American press releases specifically 

mentioned North Korea, but the Australian and the Indian press releases did not. (See the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, Australia-India-Japan-U.S. Consultations on the Indo-Pacific, 12 

November 2017, https://www.mofa.go.jp/; and Heather Nauert, Australia-India-Japan-U.S. Consultations on the Indo-Pacific, 12 November 2017, https://www.state.gov/.)

25. The Federal Government of Germany, Policy guidelines for the Indo-Pacific region: 

Germany-Europe-Asia: sharing the 21st century together, September 2020, 9–11, https://www 

.auswaertiges-amt.de/.

26. It says, “a number of regional security policy-related risks and threats exist. These include 

the North Korean nuclear weapon and missile programme.” The Federal Government of Germany, Policy guidelines for the Indo-Pacific region, 35.

27. Martin Orth, “‘EU and ASEAN are predestined for a close partnership,’ an interview with 

Ambassador Dr Peter Schoof about Germany’s new guidelines for its future Indo-Pacific policy,” 

Deutschland.de, 19 October 2020, https://www.deutschland.de/.
Japan and the Quad Plus

JOURNAL OF INDO-PACIFIC AFFAIRS  SPECIAL ISSUE 2020 85

28. Tomotaka Shoji, “ASEAN-ga kangaeru ‘Indo-Taiheiyou’ – Amerika-senryaku-bunshoeno kaito [‘Indo-Pacific’ as ASEAN conceives – Response to the American strategic document],” 

International Information Network Analysis, Sasakawa Peace Foundation, 12 July 2019, https://

www/spf.org/.

29. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, “The 14th East Asia Summit,” 4 November 2019, 

https://www.mofa.go.jp/.

30. The chair country of ASEAN is Vietnam in 2020, and Brunei Darussalam in 2021. Therefore, ASEAN’s treatment of AOIP and accordingly Japan’s approach to AOIP in 2020 might be 

changed in 2021.

31. Cabinet Office, HM Government, National Security Capability Review, March 2018, 33, 

https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/.

32. Cabinet Office, HM Government, National Security Capability Review, 38.

33. GOV.UK, “UK takes major step towards membership of Trans-Pacific free trade area,” 9 

September 2020, https://www.gov.uk/.

34. Embassy of Japan in Canada, “Speech by Ambassador Yasuhisa Kawamura “The Free and 

Open Indo-Pacific: Charting a Common Approach,” 22 January 2020, https://www.ca.embjapan.go.jp/.

35. Anirudh Bhattacharyya, “Eye on China, Canada formulates new Indo-Pacific policy,” Hindustan Times, 4 October 2020, https://www.hindustantimes.com/.

36. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, “Press Release: Meeting on the Novel Coronavirus 

Disease among Foreign Ministers of Interested Countries, Hosted by the United States,” 11 May 

2020, https://www.mofa.go.jp/.

37. For example, Indrani Bagchi, “Focus on Covid in Quad Plus meet,” Times of India, 13 May 

2020, https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/.

38. Michael Pompeo, “Communist China and the Free World’s Future,” US Department of 

State, 23 July 2020, https://www.state.gov/.

39. Prime Minister of Japan and His Cabinet, “Statement by Prime Minister,” 11 September 

2020, https://japan.kantei.go.jp/.

40. Prime Minister of Japan and His Cabinet, “Statement by the Prime Minister,” Cabinet 

Decision [Provisional Translation], 16 September 2020, https://japan.kantei.go.jp/.

41. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, “Japan-Australia Summit Telephone Talk,” 20 September 2020, https://www.mofa.go.jp/.

42. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, “Japan-US Summit Telephone Talk,” 20 September 

2020, https://www.mofa.go.jp/.

43. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, “Japan and the United Nations: Address by Prime 

Minister Suga at the Seventy-Fifth Session of the United Nations General Assembly,” 26 September 2020, https://www.mofa.go.jp/fp/.

44. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, “The Japan-Australia-India-US Foreign Ministers’ 

Meeting,” 6 October 2020, https://www.mofa.go.jp/.

45. Minister for Foreign Affairs of Australia, “Australia-India-Japan-United States Quad Foreign Ministers’ Meeting,” 6 October 2020, https://www.foreignminister.gov.au/; Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, “2nd India-Australia-Japan- USA Ministerial Meeting,” 6 October 2020, https://mea.gov.in/; and Office of the Spokesperson, US Department of State, 

“Secretary Pompeo’s Quad Meeting with Japanese Foreign Minister Motegi, Indian Foreign Minister Jaishankar, and Australian Foreign Minister Payne,” 6 October 2020, https://www.state.gov/.
86 JOURNAL OF INDO-PACIFIC AFFAIRS  SPECIAL ISSUE 2020

Tokuchi

46. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, “Speech by Prime Minister Suga at the VietnamJapan University: Building together the future of Indo-Pacific,” 19 October 2020, under “ASEAN 

Outlook on the Indo-Pacific and Japan’s Free and Open Indo-Pacific which share fundamental 

principles,” https://www.mofa.go.jp/.

47. Prime Minister’s Office of Japan, “Suga naikaku-souridaijin kisha-kaiken [Press conference of Prime Minister Suga],” 16 September 2020, https://www.kantei.go.jp/.

48. Ananth Krishnan, “China’s Foreign Minister says U.S. using Quad to build ‘Indo-Pacific 

NATO’,” Hindu Times, 13 October 2020, https://www.thehindu.com/.

49. The Yomiuri Shimbun, 13 September 2020, 8.

50. Department of Defence, Australian Government, “Australia to participate in Exercise 

Malabar 2020,” 19 October 2020, https://www.minister.defence.gov.au/.

Disclaimer

The views and opinions expressed or implied in JIPA are those of the authors and should not be construed as carrying the 

official sanction of the Department of Defense, Department of the Air Force, Air Education and Training Command, 

Air University, or other agencies or departments of the US government or their international equivalents.
JOURNAL OF INDO-PACIFIC AFFAIRS  SPECIAL ISSUE 2020 87

 BEIJING, QUAD, AND THE QUAD PLUS

A Quad Plus?

The Prospects for Australia and New Zealand

Miguel A. Híjar-Chiapa

Abstract

Since the first decade of the twenty-first century, a new regional construct has 

emerged, illustrating the increasingly shifting balance of power: the Indo-Pacific. 

As a way to operationalize this idea, Australia, India, Japan, and the United States 

formed the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, informally known as Quad, in 2007. 

But the initiative did not prosper and was disbanded a year later. Nevertheless, after 

being dormant for ten years, the Quad was revived in 2017 with the aim to respond 

to the challenges resulted from the changes in the status quo, especially those associated with the rise of China. In 2020, however, the COVID-19 pandemic became 

the most pressing threat to the stability of the region and, therefore, the four likeminded partners decided to gather to discuss this issue but this time with the involvement of additional states: the Republic of Korea, Vietnam, and New Zealand 

first, and then Brazil and Israel. This conjunctural expansion has led to the belief 

that a Quad Plus might be in the making. Although this enthusiastic view might be 

initially welcomed by Australia, it raises important questions for a country such as 

New Zealand that has been quite cautious about its engagement with the idea of 

the Indo-Pacific. This article aims to explore the potential ramifications of an expanded Quad for Australia and New Zealand, the interests that might come into 

play for both countries in taking part of such a grouping, and the broader implications for the regional order.

Introduction

The Quadrilateral Security Dialogue—informally known as Quad—was 

initiated by Australia, India, Japan, and the United States in 2007 as a way to 

materialize the idea that came to be known as the Indo-Pacific, a vast maritime zone comprising the Indian and Pacific Oceans and the states littoral to 

it. The forum and the military exercises parallel to it were widely seen as a 

response to the challenges resulting from the changes in the status quo since 

the turn of the century, especially those associated with the rise of China. 

This move triggered immediate diplomatic protests from Beijing to the four 

members, something that is thought to have motivated Australia’s withdrawal 
88 JOURNAL OF INDO-PACIFIC AFFAIRS  SPECIAL ISSUE 2020

Híjar-Chiapa

from the forum. This was one—if not the main—of the many causes of a 

long hiatus that finally ended in 2017 with the revival of the group.

In 2020, however, the COVID-19 pandemic became the newest and most 

pressing threat to the stability of the region. Consequently, the Quad partners 

decided to gather to discuss this issue. However, this time, they sought the additional involvement of three more states: the Republic of Korea (ROK), Vietnam, 

and New Zealand. Then, at a later stage, Brazil and Israel were also included. This 

conjunctural expansion has led to the belief that a broader partnership might be 

in the making in the form of a Quad Plus.

For Australia, one of the most ardent promoters of the new construct, the potential incorporation of these actors could be seen as a positive step toward wider 

acceptance of the proposal for an Indo-Pacific order. Nevertheless, such an enthusiastic view raises important questions for a country such as New Zealand, which 

has been quite cautious about its engagement with the new idea of the region 

mainly due to its strong economic ties with China.

Therefore, this article aims to explore the questions that an expanded Quad 

may raise for Australia and New Zealand, how their identities and interests 

might come into play in deciding to take part of such a potential alliance, as well 

as the potential effects on their behaviors and their relations with other actors 

in the region.

The Rise, Fall, and Revival of the Quad

The discussion about the Quad is embedded in a broader debate about the regional—and, to an extent, global—order, that is, the “pattern of activity that sustains the elementary or primary goals of the society of states, or international 

society.”1 This pattern, however, is not the unintended consequence of international anarchy, but rather a social construction,2

 for, as Alexander Wendt claims, 

anarchy is what states make of it.

3

This means that states act toward others on the basis of the meanings they 

give to those others, because “it is collective meanings that constitute the structures which organize our actions. Actors acquire identities—relatively stable, 

role-specific understandings and expectations about self—by participating in 

such collective meanings.”4 The Quad, in this sense, is not the mere result of 

the interaction between sovereign states in an anarchical environment but the 

product of a new collectively built conception of the regional order: the idea of 

the Indo-Pacific.

While it is argued that the Quad has its origins in the Tsunami Core Group, 

which formed to cope with the effects of the Boxing Day Tsunami of 2004, it 

was not until two years later that the stars really aligned.5 In 2006, India and 
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Japan announced their interest in having a dialogue with other like-minded 

countries in the Asia-Pacific region on themes of mutual interest.6 The United 

States and Australia soon joined in,7 and so the stage was set for the inaugural 

meeting of Quad 1.0 on 25 May 2007 on the sidelines of the Association of 

Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Regional Forum, which highlighted the 

democratic nature of the group.8

Moreover, in August 2007, Japanese prime minister Shinzō Abe presented to 

the Indian Parliament the idea of this “broader Asia” taking shape at the “confluence of the two seas” of the Indian and Pacific Ocean, with Japan and India 

coming together and incorporating the United States and Australia. He then 

emphasized how the identities of these four states imprinted this new construct 

with a distinctive seal and a special mission:

Can we not say that faced with this wide, open, broader Asia, it is incumbent 

upon us two democracies, Japan and India, to carry out the pursuit of freedom 

and prosperity in the region? . . . From now on let us together bear this weighty 

responsibility that has been entrusted to us, by joining forces with like-minded 

countries.

9

Finally, in September of that year, the four like-minded countries (plus Singapore) 

held the Quadrilateral Malabar Exercise in the Bay of Bengal, operationalizing 

the security dialogue.

It is no coincidence that these states decided to form the Quad, for it was their 

identities as democracies, the meaning they gave to each other, and their collective 

environment that constituted the basis for action. This shared identity was even 

invoked by Indian prime minister Manmohan Singh when the newly created 

group was met with condemnation from China: “I spoke to President Hu and 

explained that there was no question of ganging up . . . We met to exchange views 

on development from our experiences as democracies.”10

Although the ire of Beijing is thought to have led to the withdrawal of Australia 

in 2008 and, thus, the disappearance of the first iteration of the group, the Quad 

was revived at the foreign ministerial level on 12 November 2017 as a response to 

an increasingly changing regional landscape and as a reconfirmation of its original 

spirit: “The quadrilateral partners committed to deepening cooperation, which 

rests on a foundation of shared democratic values and principles, and to continue 

discussions to further strengthen the rules-based order in the Indo-Pacific region.”11

Since then, the four partners have moved toward closer engagement and cooperation in diverse areas, and that is precisely what lies behind the convening of the ad 

hoc group now being dubbed Quad Plus.
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In the midst of the global pandemic of COVID-19 that started in China in 

late 2019 and rapidly spread throughout the world in early 2020, US Deputy 

Secretary of State Stephen Biegun summoned foreign officials from India, Japan, and Australia, as well as from New Zealand, the ROK, and Vietnam, for 

the first of regular weekly meetings to discuss policy responses to the public 

health emergency.12 Then in May 2020, Secretary of State Mike Pompeo hosted 

a foreign ministers’ meeting on the novel disease—and the post-pandemic state 

of the international order—which also included the representatives of the aforementioned countries—except for New Zealand and Vietnam—plus Brazil and 

Israel.13 Consequently, a Quad Plus narrative was triggered in mass media, academic, and strategic circles, although there has not been any official mention of 

the term. This raises questions about the prospects for such a group to emerge—

not only as a result of the health and economic crises, but also of a sense of 

shared interests and goals.

Official statements from the United States,14 India,15 Japan,16 the ROK,17 and 

Vietnam18 merely highlighted cooperation with partners across the Indo-Pacific 

region to counter the spread of the virus, develop vaccines, address the challenges 

of stranded citizens, and mitigate the impact on the global economy (while Brazil and Israel have not released any statements on the meetings yet). However, 

official statements from Australia and New Zealand went further, calling to 

“build support for an independent review of the COVID-19 outbreak, emphasise the importance of rules-based open markets,”19 and uphold the “fundamental 

Indo-Pacific principles of openness, transparency, respect for sovereignty and 

adherence to international law.”20 Could this be a sign of a strong commitment 

from these two countries to the idea of the Indo-Pacific and a possible first step 

toward closer collaboration in the form of a Quad Plus?

Australia and the Quad

Although now regarded as one of its most ardent advocates, Australia has been 

blamed for abandoning and, therefore, putting an end to the first iteration of the 

grouping to avoid enraging China.21 Reality, however, was much more complex 

than that. As former Prime Minister Kevin Rudd has claimed in an effort to set 

the record straight, it was not only his decision of suspending Canberra’s participation—which was surprisingly announced by then-Foreign Minister Stephen Smith 

while in a joint press conference alongside his Chinese counterpart in Beijing22—

that disbanded the forum, but also New Delhi’s limited enthusiasm, Washington’s 

reticence, and Tokyo’s change of priorities after Abe’s first stint as prime minister 

was suddenly ended in September 2007.23 Yet, Australia had to do damage control 
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and, as Prime Minister Scott Morrison has argued, work “patiently to restore trust 

and confidence.”24

Fast forward to 2017, with trust rebuilt—and a much more assertive China in 

sight—with the governments of Shinzō Abe, Donald Trump, Narendra Modi, 

and Malcolm Turnbull on the same page again, the Quad was reconvened. Since 

then, Australia has continued to actively engage its three partners to deepen their 

security cooperation. And now, with the world facing a grave health emergency, 

the incentives for further collaboration are even stronger, for, as the Australian 

Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade media release on the Quad Plus meetings maintains, “the stability, prosperity and resilience of the region will have a 

direct impact on Australia’s interests.”25

Notwithstanding the lack of recognition of a possible expansion of the original 

group in any of the official statements of the seven of the nine countries that have 

been involved in the meetings (Brazil and Israel have not released any), questions 

about its feasibility are being raised. But, given the many opportunities this scenario could present to advance Australian interests, it would not be too audacious 

to say that Canberra could positively welcome a Quad Plus. The logic behind this 

claim rests on Australia’s enthusiasm in reimagining the regional order.

Australia’s first official embrace of the idea of the Indo-Pacific took place in 

2013 with the release of the Defence White Paper, in which, it was insisted, the 

country was going through an “economic strategic and military shift to the IndoPacific.”26 However, discourse was also accompanied by policy and, therefore, the 

importance “to create and deepen defence partnerships and contribute to regional 

security architecture”27 was highlighted. Then in 2016, a new Defence White Paper

was published, establishing a stable Indo-Pacific region as one of Australia’s three 

key Strategic Defence Interests.28 The document indicated that Australia will 

continue to work with the United States under the Australia, New Zealand, and 

United States (ANZUS) Treaty29 to pursue close collaboration with strategic 

partners.30 Additionally, the 2017 Foreign Policy White Paper asserted Canberra’s 

determination “to realise a secure, open and prosperous Indo-Pacific, while also 

strengthening and diversifying partnerships across the globe.”31 Due to this emblazonment of the new regional construct across its strategies, Australia has 

sought to build and deepen strategic partnerships with India, Japan, the ROK, 

and the countries of Southeast Asia (especially Indonesia and Vietnam), and its 

close friend New Zealand—apart from its alliance with the United States.

Although Australia’s partnerships with Japan and India have continuously 

deepened since the first decade of this century, the Indo-Pacific rationale has 

furthered this process. In 2014, the relationship between Australia and Japan was 

elevated to a Special Strategic Partnership.32 That same year, building on the basis 
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of the 2009 strategic partnership33 and Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation,34

Australia and India extended defense cooperation.35 Then in 2017, the three 

countries welcomed “continued and deepened trilateral cooperation and 

dialogue.”36 And more recently, in the context of the ongoing global pandemic, 

Australia reaffirmed with Japan their commitment to combat the pandemic and 

build “a prosperous, open and stable post-COVID-19 world, with a focus on the 

Indo-Pacific region,”37 and decided with India on a Shared Vision for Maritime 

Cooperation in the Indo-Pacific region38 and elevated the bilateral Strategic Partnership to a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership. Something to note is that the 

joint statement highlighted the consultations on COVID-19 with Japan, New 

Zealand, the ROK, Vietnam, and the United States and “welcomed the inaugural 

Quad ministerial meeting with Japan and the United States in September 2019, 

and reaffirmed their commitment to ongoing Quad consultations” in the same 

paragraph.39 Whether this might be a subtle nod to the idea of expanding the 

Quad or not, deeper multilateral cooperation would be the natural next step for 

Australia, given the diverse range of partnerships and plans that it has agreed with 

New Zealand, the ROK, and Vietnam.

Australia and the ROK share values and a common strategic outlook and also 

enjoy a mature economic relationship, yet cooperation on political, defense, and 

security issues needs to be enhanced.40 In 2009, both countries agreed on a comprehensive Action Plan for Enhanced Global and Security Cooperation, which 

committed to annual foreign ministers’ meetings and cooperation on a wide range 

of issues.41 Then in 2014, a Vision Statement for a Secure, Peaceful and Prosperous Future was issued42 and to that followed a Blueprint for Defence and Security 

Cooperation in 2015, which extended security and defense cooperation.43 And 

while the 2019 Foreign and Defence Ministers’ 2+2 meeting resulted in a commitment to support a peaceful, prosperous, and stable Indo-Pacific region through 

closer engagement and coordination between Australia’s Indo-Pacific strategy 

and the ROK’s New Southern Policy,44 the long due strategic partnership that 

could elevate ties between both like-minded middle powers remains to be agreed.45

The relationship with Hanoi, nevertheless, is rather different to the one with 

Seoul. Although no references are made to shared values between Australia and 

Vietnam—due to the very different nature of their political systems—official 

statements have always alluded to shared interests. Consequently, both countries 

decided to establish a Comprehensive Partnership in 2009; a Plan of Action followed suit.46 Then in 2015, Canberra and Hanoi committed to enhance the Comprehensive Partnership and develop a second Plan of Action.47 Their growing 

mutual interests finally led to the establishment of a Strategic Partnership three 

years later, pledging to work to ensure that the “region remains peaceful, resilient 
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and shaped by the rules and norms that have prevailed for decades”48 through 

wide-range cooperation. This particular case shows that convergent interests can 

also help create a sense of community—of a shared, collectively built idea of the 

region—even between states with different identities and values.

On the other hand, the relationship with New Zealand is indeed one based on 

shared identities and values and a common history that have turned the two 

countries into “natural allies with a strong trans-Tasman sense of family.”49 But, 

this is not like any other partnership with a like-minded state: it is Australia’s 

closest and most comprehensive of all its bilateral relationships. Canberra and 

Wellington’s strong security ties have been formalized through the 1944 Canberra 

Pact, the 1951 ANZUS Treaty, the 1991 Closer Defence Relations agreement 

(updated in 2018), and a framework for closer consultation and engagement on 

defense that has been implemented since 2012 (in accordance with the recommendations of the 2011 Review of the Australia-New Zealand Defence Relationship) and materialized through a long history of joint deployments and operations 

around the globe. Furthermore, their prime ministers hold annual formal talks and 

their foreign, trade, and defense ministers meet regularly to discuss the bilateral 

relationship and their close cooperation in global and regional fora.50 And, although Australia recognizes “that New Zealand will make its own judgements on 

its national interests, and that New Zealand’s military capability choices may not 

always reflect Australia’s,”51 more recently, following the pledge made in the 2017 

Foreign Policy White Paper, Canberra and Wellington have aligned their Pacific 

Step-up and Pacific Reset policies and have committed to deepen further their 

essential partnership in support of the economic growth, stability, and security of 

the region.52

Even though Brazil and Israel have not issued official statements on the Quad 

Plus meetings, it is worth exploring Australia’s relations with these two countries. 

Although there are historical links between Australia and Israel, closer cooperation 

on security issues is of recent advent. Since 2017, both countries have expanded 

cooperation on national security, defense, and cybersecurity. Accordingly, annual 

strategic talks between defense officials started in 2018, while in early 2019, a resident defense attaché to the Australian Embassy in Tel Aviv was appointed and the 

two countries signed a memorandum of understanding (MOU) on cybersecurity 

cooperation.53 Nevertheless, the bilateral relationship is far from being at the same 

level as those with Seoul, Hanoi, or Wellington. In the case of Brazil, a Memorandum of Understanding for the Establishment of an Enhanced Partnership between 

the two countries was signed in 2010 and in 2012 a Strategic Partnership was 

agreed. The joint statement emphasized priority areas of dialogue and cooperation, 

such as the global economy, international security, trade and investment, resources 
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and energy, education, science and technology, development cooperation, environment and sustainable development, and natural disasters. They also agreed to intensify contacts between leaders, ministers, and high-level government officials.54

Nonetheless, the real potential of the strategic partnership has not been exploited, 

for there have not been substantial engagements since then.

The establishment and deepening of these Comprehensive and Strategic 

Partnerships and the strong links that already exist among Australia and New 

Zealand, the ROK, and Vietnam could serve as the basis for welcoming a potential expansion of the Quad (although the same cannot be said of Israel or 

Brazil, notwithstanding the Strategic Partnership with the latter). After all, 

Canberra’s priority of working with its “Indo-Pacific partners in other plurilateral arrangements”55 could be materialized in the form of a Quad Plus.

New Zealand and the Quad

For the past few years, New Zealand has actively tried to follow a pragmatic 

and logical approach to the increasingly changing landscape of the region, by 

focusing on its trade relations with China and other Asian markets while maintaining close cooperation with other like-minded states and traditional partners, 

such as Australia and the United States.56 However, this balancing act between 

Wellington’s economic and geopolitical interests has become a very difficult task.

New Zealand has always tried to espouse an independent foreign policy to 

avoid the fate common to small countries of being used by their more powerful 

allies. Notwithstanding, it has also recognized the need for US security architecture in the region and has accepted and subscribed to it, albeit exerting its sovereignty.57 Although the United States suspended its ANZUS treaty obligations to 

New Zealand in the 1980s following a series of disputes due to Wellington’s 

stance on nuclear weapons, repair efforts started in the mid-1990s that restored 

elements of functionality and resulted in major improvements in the 2000s, laying 

the foundations for the Wellington and Washington Declarations during the 

2010s. Since then, the bilateral relationship has warmed and grown closer, as the 

US role as a guarantor of regional stability and prosperity—and New Zealand’s 

traditional security partner—has been successively acknowledged.58

At the same time, however, Wellington has been dealing with an increasingly 

prosperous China that has become New Zealand’s largest trading partner59—

due to the Free Trade Agreement signed in 2008 and upgraded in 2019—and a 

participant in almost all regional and global international organizations of interest to New Zealand, hence in all dimensions, a country that Wellington needs to 

engage and exchange views with.60 Moreover, while Chinese prosperity has benefited New Zealand and several other countries around the world, it has also 
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turned into a source of distress, for China’s ambition to resume what it sees as its 

rightful place as not only the predominant regional power, but also a major global 

power, is reshaping the security environment.61 And even though it is impossible 

to predict the outcomes of the aforementioned process, there is an ongoing debate about the future of the region: on the one hand, a China-centric vision of 

the Asia-Pacific; on the other, the Indo-Pacific. This situation, evidently, is of 

great concern for New Zealand, which has been walking a fine line in its dealings 

with both sides.

In a speech to the Otago Foreign Policy School in 2018, Deputy Prime Minister 

Winston Peters insisted that an Indo-Pacific configuration makes a lot of sense for 

some countries, but the Asia-Pacific resonates more with New Zealanders because 

of their own geography and the term’s consistency with—and complementarity 

to—Wellington’s partners’ policies.62 Nonetheless, rhetoric and policy started shifting that same year, with the Ministry of Defence using the Indo-Pacific concept in 

its Strategic Defence Policy Statement of 2018, as well as breaking new and forthright 

language in the way New Zealand talked about China and its behavior in the region.63 To that document, followed the Advancing Pacific Partnerships Executive 

Report of 2019, which also engaged with the construct. Moreover, in late 2018, 

Foreign Affairs Deputy Secretary Ben King presented the ministry’s outlook on 

the Indo-Pacific, adding that New Zealand understands and is quite comfortable 

with the concept and how its interests are positioned within that.64 Furthermore, 

in 2019, Winston Peters made a departure from his previous articulations and 

welcomed the engagement with New Zealand’s regional partners on the challenges 

facing the Indo-Pacific in what can be read as the country’s first official adoption 

of the terminology in a foreign policy statement. This embrace, consequently, has 

resulted in a different approach to Wellington’s relations with the Quad partners as 

well as other countries in the region.

Illustrative of this is Minister of Defence Ron Mark’s visit to Washington in 

January 2020 to meet his counterpart to discuss challenges that New Zealand 

and the United States share in the Indo-Pacific region, and his later travel to 

Honolulu for his first visit to the recently renamed US Indo-Pacific Command.65

Another example is Jacinda Ardern’s visit to Sydney that same month to meet 

with Scott Morrison, in which they emphasized the familial relationship between Wellington and Canberra and the benefits they can reap from their mutual 

effort to support an open, inclusive, and prosperous Indo-Pacific region and 

deepen partnerships with other actors.66 Among these partnerships, of course, 

are those with Tokyo and New Delhi.

New Zealand’s relationship with Japan is characterized by common values and 

shared interests, as well as substantial political, trade, economic, tourism, and 
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people-to-people links.67 Security and defense cooperation is mainly underpinned 

by a MOU signed in 2013 as a result of the Strategic Cooperative Partnership 

between both countries.68 Yet, in September 2019, Jacinda Ardern visited Japan to 

meet Shinzō Abe, and both leaders expressed their ambition to further strengthen 

the Strategic Cooperative Partnership and the security and defense relationship. 

In this context, they welcomed commencing a joint study toward negotiating a 

security information-sharing agreement and decided to develop a joint declaration to strengthen coordination and cooperation in the Pacific. At the same time, 

the leaders raised concerns about the situation in the South China Sea and the 

East China Sea and insisted in the need to closely cooperate in the cybersecurity 

and outer space realms. And, as a sign of further alignment, they “reiterated their 

commitment to working proactively together to maintain and promote a free and 

open Indo-Pacific region.”69

India and New Zealand have long-standing, friendly, and growing ties that go 

back to the 1800s. The relationship has become a key priority for New Zealand 

due to India’s strong economy, large population, and international influence and 

the values and interests they share.70 And now, with the emergence of the IndoPacific as a strategic concept, both countries find themselves increasingly linked 

by what they have in common.71 This situation was emphasized during Winston 

Peters’ visit to India in February 2020. In a speech to the Indian Council of World 

Affairs, Peters highlighted the alignment of Wellington’s and New Delhi’s IndoPacific policies and the shared commitment to a stable, peaceful, open, and secure 

region. He also took the chance to call for Indian leadership in regional and global 

governance issues and announce the launching of a refreshed New Zealand–India 

strategy for investing in the relationship.72 This document sets out a framework 

for New Zealand government agencies and partners to grow a more enduring 

strategic relationship with India over the next five years.73

Therefore, while it is generally argued that “New Zealand cannot afford to 

take sides in the US-China rivalry,”74 Wellington’s recent embrace of the IndoPacific concept might be a signal of its willingness to cautiously align with the 

Quad partners, rather than avoiding choosing sides. Adding to this, relations 

with Beijing have come under increasing strain due to several situations. These 

include the postponement of plans for a work plan for the Belt and Road Initiative75 to determine an agenda that really includes New Zealand’s interests76 and 

values;77 Wellington’s ambiguous position on Huawei78 due to the identified 

“significant network security risk;”79 New Zealand’s deep concern due to national 

security legislation relating to Hong Kong; 80 and Winston Peters’ decision to 

publicly endorse the admission of Taiwan to the World Health Organization 

with an observer status.81
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Could this motivate Wellington’s interest in joining an expanded version of 

the Quad? In a visit to India in 2018, New Zealand’s Chief of Defence Force Lt 

Gen Tim Keating queried the objectives of the freshly resurrected group and 

asserted that he would be very interested in engaging his counterparts “to see 

what Quad means to them and put a question—do they see a role for New 

Zealand?”82 The most important question is, however, if New Zealand envisions 

a role for itself within a potential Quad Plus. It is therefore worth asking if its 

links to the other potential new members could serve as solid foundations for an 

extended group too.

Brazil and New Zealand enjoy a friendly relationship, assisted by growing 

people-to-people links and reflected in the growing numbers of Brazilian visitors 

and students in New Zealand. But, while the two countries are members of the 

New Agenda Coalition, focused on nuclear disarmament, security and defense 

cooperation has not been furthered.83 The relationship with Israel has been rather 

complex in recent years. In 2004, two Israeli citizens were jailed for attempting to 

gain New Zealand passports illegally and working with organized criminal gangs. 

Then-Prime Minister Helen Clark insisted that the two men were Mossad agents 

and that such acts were a violation of the country’s sovereignty. New Zealand then 

imposed diplomatic sanctions on Israel and demanded an apology.84 The formal 

apology arrived in 2005 signed by then-Foreign Minister Silvan Shalom, and 

friendly diplomatic relations were resumed.85 Then in 2016, New Zealand cosponsored United Nations Security Council Resolution 2334, which condemned 

the establishment of Israeli settlements in the occupied Palestinian territory. The 

move prompted Israel’s decision to recall its ambassador to New Zealand and ban 

New Zealand’s ambassador from Israel.86 A few months later, Prime Minister 

Benjamin Netanyahu decided to downgrade Israel’s diplomatic ties with New 

Zealand by not returning Israel’s ambassador to Wellington and leaving only a 

chargé d’affaires.87 It was not until June 2017 that diplomatic relations between 

New Zealand and Israel were restored after a letter from then-Prime Minister 

Bill English expressing regret.88 The rapprochement, nevertheless, has not resulted 

in closer engagement since then.

Relations with Seoul and Hanoi, on the other hand, are close and strong. New 

Zealand and the ROK cooperate in regional and global fora and have agreements 

for film, science and technology, education, and Antarctica projects, as well as a 

Free Trade Agreement, which was signed in 2015. Additionally, a defense relationship has developed out of New Zealand’s involvement in the Korean War. 

Since then, New Zealand continues to support efforts to bring peace and security 

to the Korean Peninsula and to contribute a small number of New Zealand Defence Force personnel to the United Nations Command Military Armistice 
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Commission.89 These links have also led to the signing of the Information Sharing Agreement in 2012 and the Defence Materiel Cooperation Arrangement in 

2019. Furthermore, Hyundai Heavy Industries is currently constructing a new 

supply ship for the Royal New Zealand Navy. Seoul has also committed to the 

Christchurch Call to Action to eliminate violent extremist content online, which 

resulted from the attacks of 15 March 2019 against New Zealand’s Muslim 

community. There is also strong regional and multilateral cooperation between 

both countries—especially in the Pacific—born out of common interests and 

shared values.90

In the case of Vietnam, political, trade, defense and security, and people-topeople links have grown closer and stronger since the establishment of diplomatic relations in 1975, and especially since the agreement of the Comprehensive 

Partnership in 2009. In addition, trade ties have been underpropped by the 

ASEAN-Australia-New Zealand Free Trade Area and the Comprehensive and 

Progressive Agreement on Trans-Pacific Partnership, signed in 2009 and 2018, 

respectively.91 Building on that momentum, and driven by their growing shared 

interests, common outlook, and mutual trust, Wellington and Hanoi decided to 

formally elevate their bilateral relationship to a Strategic Partnership in July 

2020. Through this, both countries committed to deepening bilateral political 

cooperation through frequent high-level exchanges—particularly regular meetings between prime ministers and annual meetings between foreign, trade, and 

defense ministers—and closer defense cooperation, including through high-level 

defense visits, port calls, policy consultations, strategic dialogues, education and 

training, United Nations peacekeeping operations, intelligence exchanges, information sharing, maritime security cooperation, and enhanced coordination in 

regional fora.92

New Zealand has insisted it needs “to keep working on deepening political 

partnerships across the region and with other partners” and, above all, to put its 

“principles into action, maintaining the ethos of partnership and respect that has 

underpinned New Zealand’s engagement to date.”93 In this context, Wellington’s 

recent engagements with the United States, Australia, Japan, India, the ROK, and 

Vietnam (unlike those with Brazil and Israel) have the potential to serve as an 

excellent foundation on which to build the Quad Plus.

Conclusions

Imagining a potential expansion of the Quad is just another sign of the times. 

Beijing’s increasingly assertive behavior and China’s rivalry with the United 

States have created a hostile environment in the Indo-Pacific, and this situation 

has raised crucially important questions for actors such as Australia and New 
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Zealand, both of which could immediately feel the consequences of the potential 

conflicts between the two leading powers of the region.

For Australia, an ardent supporter of the Indo-Pacific construct and a founding 

member of the Quad, the inclusion of the ROK, Vietnam, and New Zealand to the 

group would be a logical and very positive step forward. Canberra’s close links to 

Seoul, its Strategic Partnership with Hanoi, and its special relationship “built on 

deep mutual security interests, shared values and long-standing people to people 

linkages”94 with Wellington are naturally an ideal platform for such an expansion.

Wellington’s recent invocation of the Indo-Pacific in its dealings with Canberra, 

New Delhi, Tokyo, and Washington and its recent inquiries about its potential role 

within the security dialogue might be signs of a shift in New Zealand’s strategy of 

avoiding choosing sides in the ongoing strategic competition. Added to the increasingly complicated relationship with Beijing, this new resolve may result in 

“closer New Zealand involvement with the Quad mechanism, which would be 

welcomed by all current Quad members.”95 Additionally, the close relationship 

with the ROK and Vietnam could also help trigger the interest in building a Quad 

Plus with them on board.

Although Brazil and Israel have been part of the Quad Plus narrative, their 

geographical position, outside the boundaries of the Indo-Pacific region; their 

perceived lack of interest in the ad hoc group, as evidenced by the absence of 

official statements; and lack of firmer bases for closer collaboration with these 

partners might result in a Quad Plus of only seven members instead of nine.

Nevertheless, any attempt to expand the Quad could use some lessons from its 

own past. If the four democracies want to include other Indo-Pacific partners, 

they have to think carefully about the seal they want to imprint into the partnership, for, as Rory Medcalf warned back in 2008, “such ventures will be more 

sustainable if based on convergent interests and the ability to contribute rather 

than on shared values.”96 In this sense, softening the discourse about the democratic identity of the group might be wise, for, in that way, non-democracies such 

as Vietnam could be easily integrated.

In that same spirit, the Quad must clearly communicate its purpose as a forum for information sharing and policy coordination97 and its agenda of convergent interests to avoid any misperceptions. While Beijing does not hide its 

displeasure at certain aspects of the existing order and is certainly guilty of not 

always following its rules,98 the debate about the expansion of the Quad Plus is 

not about the world ganging up on China. As Medcalf has also insisted, it is 

about “rather seeking safety in numbers: creating a context where China cannot 

coerce us individually, and has to engage with norms, rules and material realities 

set by a community of interests.”99
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An international society exists when a group of states, conscious of certain common interests, and perhaps some common values, form a society in the sense that 

they conceive themselves to be bound by a common set of rules in their relations 

with one another—such as that they should respect one another’s independence, 

that they should honor agreements into which they enter, that they should be 

subject to certain limitations in exercising force against one another, and that they 

should cooperate in the working of common institutions.100 In this sense, the prospects of a Quad Plus for Australia and New Zealand could be very positive, for if 

they build it—along with the United States, Japan, India, the ROK, and Vietnam—around a convergence of interests, a new international society with clear 

rules that can be followed by all the powers in the Indo-Pacific may emerge, and 

this can lead to an improved regional and, by extension, global order.

Miguel A. Híjar-Chiapa

Professor Híjar-Chiapa is an associate professor of International Relations at the Center for North American Studies 

of the Pacific Studies Department, University of Guadalajara, Mexico, and president of the Australian and New 

Zealand Studies Association of North America (ANZSANA). He has been visiting scholar at the Edward A. Clark 

Center for Australian and New Zealand Studies and the Teresa Lozano Long Institute of Latin American Studies 

and Nettie Lee Benson Latin American Collection at the University of Texas at Austin, United States, and the Centre for Defence and Security Studies at Massey University, New Zealand. His research interests include International 

Relations theory (especially the English School and Constructivism), the international relations of the Indo-Pacific, 

and the foreign and defense policies of Australia, Canada, India, New Zealand, the United Kingdom, and the 

United States.

Notes

1. Hedley Bull, The Anarchical Society. A Study of Order in World Politics (New York: Columbia 

University Press, 2002), 8.

2. Christian Reus-Smit, “Cultural Diversity and International Order,” International Organization 71, no. 4 (2017), 5.

3. Alexander Wendt, “Anarchy is what States Make of it: The Social Construction of Power 

Politics,” International Organization 46, no. 2 (1992), 395.

4. Wendt, “Anarchy is what States Make of it,” 397.

5. Patrick Gerard Buchan and Benjamin Rimland, Defining the Diamond. The Past, Present, 

and Future of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, Center for Strategic and International Studies 

Brief (Washington, DC: CSIS, March 2020), 2.

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www.dfat.gov.au/.

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Ambassador Baeksoon Lee,” Vibe Media, 21 October 2019, https://www.vibemedia.net.au/.

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Australia-Viet Nam Comprehensive Partnership,” 18 March 2015, https://www.dfat.gov.au/.
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JOURNAL OF INDO-PACIFIC AFFAIRS  SPECIAL ISSUE 2020 103

48. Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade of Australia, “Joint Statement on the Establishment of a Strategic Partnership between Australia and Viet Nam,” 15 March 2018, https://www 

.dfat.gov.au/.

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50. Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade of Australia, “New Zealand country brief.”

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52. Commonwealth of Australia, 2017 Foreign Policy White Paper, 100.

53. Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade of Australia, “Israel country brief,” 1 October 

2020, https://www.dfat.gov.au/.

54. Australian Embassy to Brazil, “Brazil-Australia Strategic Partnership,” 21 June 2012, 

https://brazil.embassy.gov.au/.

55. Commonwealth of Australia, 2017 Foreign Policy White Paper, 40.

56. Rouben Azizian, “Security and Strategy in the Asia-Pacific: Challenges and opportunities 

for New Zealand,” in New Zealand National Security: Challenges, Trends and Issues, ed. William 

Hoverd, Nick Nelson, and Carl Bradley (Auckland: Massey University Press, 2017), 67.

57. Simon Murdoch, “Interests, Influence and ‘Relationship Capital’: NZ/US Relations,” in 

New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade. An Eye, an Ear and a Voice: New Zealand in a 

changing world, ed. Brian Lynch (Wellington: New Zealand Institute of International Affairs, 

2019), 221–37.

58. Murdoch, “Interests, Influence and ‘Relationship Capital’,” 221–37.

59. “Goods and services trade by country: Year ended June 2019,” Stats NZ, 2 September 

2019, https://www.stats.govt.nz/.

60. John McKinnon, “New Zealand’s Relations with China,” in New Zealand Ministry of 

Foreign Affairs and Trade. An Eye, an Ear and a Voice: New Zealand in a changing world, ed. 

Brian Lynch (Wellington: New Zealand Institute of International Affairs, 2019), 209–12.

61. Michael Powles, “The Regional Security Environment and Architecture in the Pacific Islands Region,” in Regionalism, Security & Cooperation in Oceania, ed. Rouben Azizian and Carleton 

Cramer (Honolulu: Daniel K. Inouye Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies, 2015), 33.

62. Winston Peters, “Next Steps” (Speech to Otago Foreign Policy School, University of 

Otago, Dunedin, New Zealand, 29 June 2018), https://www.beehive.govt.nz/.

63. Anna Fiefield, “Under Jacinda Ardern, New Zealand pivots on how to deal with China,” 

The Washington Post, 6 July 2020, https://www.washingtonpost.com/.

64. Ben King, “Remarks on the Indo-Pacific,” in New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs and 

Trade. An Eye, an Ear and a Voice: New Zealand in a changing world, ed. Brian Lynch (Wellington: 

New Zealand Institute of International Affairs, 2019), 142–43.

65. Ron Mark, “Minister of Defence concludes successful visit with his US counterpart,” The 

Official Website of the New Zealand Government, 25 January 2020, https://www.beehive.govt.nz/.

66. Jacinda Ardern, “Joint statement: Prime Ministers Jacinda Ardern and Scott Morrison - 

Sydney, 28 February,” The Official Website of the New Zealand Government, 1 March 2020, https://

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67. New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, “Japan,” accessed October 1, 2020, 

https://www.mfat.govt.nz/.
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68. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, “Joint Statement on a Strategic Cooperative Partnership between Japan and New Zealand -Shared Values and Vision-,” 9 June 2013, https://www 

.mofa.go.jp/.

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the New Zealand Government, 19 September 2019, https://www.beehive.govt.nz/.

70. New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, “India,” https://www.mfat.govt.nz/.

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Council of World Affairs, Delhi, India, 26 February 2020), https://www.beehive.govt.nz/.

72. Winston Peters, “The Indo-Pacific.”

73. New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, India-New Zealand 2025: Investing 

in the Relationship (Wellington, 2020), 1–2.

74. Azizian, Security and Strategy in the Asia-Pacific, 67.

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2020, https://www.newsroom.co.nz/.

76. Richard Harman, “What is Winston trying to say about China?” Politik, 5 March 2018, 

https://www.politik.co.nz/.

77. Sachdeva, “NZ still plotting place.”

78. Katie Fitzgerald, “Huawei ‘never were not’ allowed to run 5G network - Jacinda Ardern,” 

Newshub, 19 February 2019, https://www.newshub.co.nz/.

79. Government Communications Security Bureau, “GCSB statement,” GCSB, 28 November 

2018, https://www.gcsb.govt.nz/.

80. Winston Peters, “Deep concern at Hong Kong national security legislation,” 28 May 2020, 

https://www.beehive.govt.nz/.

81. Sam Sachdeva, “Taiwan’s WHO claims a test of Peters’ diplomatic nous,” Newsroom, 12 

May 2020, https://www.newsroom.co.nz/.

82. Dinakar Peri, “New Zealand defence chief raises India’s role in IOR,” The Hindu, 19 

February 2018, https://www.thehindu.com/.

83. New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, “Brazil,” https://www.mfat.govt.nz/.

84. British Broadcasting Company, “New Zealand-Israel row deepens,” BBC News, 16 July 

2004, http://news.bbc.co.uk/.

85. Helen Clark, “NZ receives formal apology from Israel,” The official website of the New 

Zealand Government, 27 June 2005, https://www.beehive.govt.nz/.

86. “Israel bars New Zealand ambassador from the country in further Security Council fallout,” NZ Herald, 27 December 2016, https://www.nzherald.co.nz/.

87. Raphael Ahren, “Israel permanently downgrades its ties to New Zealand, Senegal,” Times 

of Israel, 10 February 2017, https://www.timesofisrael.com/.

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Official Website of the New Zealand Government, 30 October 2019, https://www.beehive.govt.nz/.

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JOURNAL OF INDO-PACIFIC AFFAIRS  SPECIAL ISSUE 2020 105

92. New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, “Joint Statement on the Strategic 

Partnership between the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam and New Zealand,” 23 July 2020, https://

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94. Commonwealth of Australia, 2016 Defence White Paper, 126.

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https://www.abc.net.au/.

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Andrew Carr, The Centre of Gravity Series Discussion Paper (Canberra: ANU, March 2018), 9.

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100. Bull, The Anarchical Society, 13.

Disclaimer

The views and opinions expressed or implied in JIPA are those of the authors and should not be construed as carrying the 

official sanction of the Department of Defense, Department of the Air Force, Air Education and Training Command, Air 

University, or other agencies or departments of the US government or their international equivalents.
106 JOURNAL OF INDO-PACIFIC AFFAIRS  SPECIAL ISSUE 2020

 THE PLUS PERSPECTIVES

Whose Centrality?

ASEAN and the Quad in the Indo-Pacific

Dr. Evan A. Laksmana

Abstract

Why has Southeast Asia been particularly lukewarm to the idea of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (or Quad)? If Japan, India, Australia, and the United 

States collectively work under the Quad to confront China, Southeast Asia’s biggest 

and most difficult strategic challenge, should not the region embrace and support 

the Quad? This article seeks to answer these questions by examining the different 

Southeast Asian views on the Quad. It further examines whether and how the 

Quad leaders could gradually develop mechanisms to induce a strategic buy-in from 

Southeast Asia. I argue in particular that the Quad should not reinvent the wheel 

in terms of regional architecture building and instead seek to become a “strategic 

filler” for and a “strategic amplifier” to existing ASEAN-led mechanisms and institutions. Furthermore, as far as Southeast Asians are concerned, the idea of the 

Quad boosting ASEAN institutions is perhaps more appealing than expanding 

the Quad into a “Quad Plus” by inviting, for example, South Korea, New Zealand, 

Brazil, Israel, and Vietnam. The key to a future Quad–ASEAN relationship therefore lies in finding a calibrated partnership based on shared principles and interests 

as well as practical cooperative engagements. The following sections expand on and 

elaborate these arguments.

Is There an “ASEAN View” of the Quad?

It should be noted from the outset that there is no “ASEAN view” of the 

Quad, whether in its first iteration in 2007 or the latest Quad 2.0 that reconvened in 2017.1 What we have are different “Southeast Asian views” of the Quad. 

This distinction between ASEAN as a regional multilateral organization on the 

one hand and the different Southeast Asian states on the other is not simply a 

matter of semantics. The distinction matters because it tells us there is no single, 

agreed-upon consensus in Southeast Asia about the Quad. There is certainly no 

official ASEAN-related mechanisms or dialogues, as of yet, involving the Quad. 

Different Southeast Asian states have also expressed different views about the 

potential benefits and challenges associated with the Quad. In general, despite 

the different rationales, most Southeast Asian states are not publicly and fully 
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embracing the Quad, nor are they energetically working to challenge or denounce 

the nascent dialogue.

A recent regional elite survey by the Singapore-based Institute of Southeast 

Asian Studies (ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute) shows for example that support for 

the Quad was “soft,” as less than half the respondents consider the grouping as 

having a “positive” or “very positive” impact on regional security (more than half 

view it as having either “negative,’ “very negative,” or “no impact”).2 Somewhat 

paradoxically, however, many (more than 60 percent) expressed that Southeast 

Asian countries should participate in the Quad’s security initiatives and military 

exercises. However, different Southeast Asian countries appear to have different 

degrees of ambivalence. According to the same survey, Indonesia, Malaysia, Laos, 

Thailand, and Cambodia are top skeptics of the Quad; Vietnam and the Philippines, on the other hand, are the biggest supporters.

These recent findings mirror and confirm earlier surveys that show the different 

degrees of ambivalence among Southeast Asian states over the Quad. For example, 

according to the Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI), roughly more than 

half of regional experts were on the fence, disagreed, or strongly disagreed with 

the Quad.3 In fact, the same survey notes that almost 40 percent thought that the 

Quad had more of a “diplomatic and symbolic value,” rather than becoming a 

critical initiative for the Indo-Pacific. It also notes that different Southeast Asian 

countries view the Quad differently. On the one hand, Vietnam, Thailand, and the 

Philippines appear to be among the biggest supporters of the Quad, while Singapore and Indonesia were the skeptics.4

While these two elite surveys differ in some of their specific country-bycountry results, they still demonstrate the absence of a coherent picture. On the 

one hand, the Quad skeptics do not necessarily share identical reasonings for 

their reticence. Indonesia is more concerned about the sidelining of ASEAN—

and by implication, its own regional leadership profile—while Singapore is likely 

to be more concerned about the sharpening of the US–China competition. Indonesia under the current Joko Widodo administration also appears to be less 

concerned about foreign policy issues that are not “popular among its people,” 

including the Quad.5 Laos and Cambodia, meanwhile, are more likely to be 

wary of the impression of the Quad as an “anti-China” coalition—given their 

increasingly close ties with Beijing.

On the other hand, those who are potentially more welcoming of the Quad 

seem to share similar concerns over China’s recent behaviors, especially in the 

South China Sea. Vietnam and the Philippines, for example, are perhaps the two 

South China Sea claimants that have been increasingly at loggerheads with 

China lately.6 This was particularly the case over the landmark 2016 UNCLOS 
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Laksmana

tribunal ruling that favored Manila over Beijing—and practically invalidated 

China’s infamous “nine-dash line” map. It should be noted however that other 

South China Sea claimants like Malaysia and Brunei appear to be more muted 

in their responses to China’s militarization and aggressive behaviors—largely 

due to domestic politics and economic constraints.

In any case, there is no clear, consistent, and coherent picture of Southeast Asian 

views of the Quad other than the fact that some appear to be skeptical of the 

grouping while others may (partially) welcome it. Aside from the country-specific 

concerns above, this general lack of clarity seems to be a function of several factors. 

First, there is a lack of clarity among the Quad states themselves; they have yet to 

fully agree on what the group is and could be (although this might be changing in 

light of the growing tension between India and Australia with China). They also 

define the broader Indo-Pacific region in different ways.7 The group’s 2017 meeting addressed seven broad themes: (1) a rules-based order in Asia, (2) freedom of 

navigation and overflight in the maritime common, (3) respect for international 

law, (4) enhancing connectivity, (5) maritime security, (6) the North Korean threat 

and nonproliferation, and, (7) terrorism.8 However, it remains unclear how exactly 

the Quad will proceed on these major policy areas. The latest Quad meeting in 

October 2020 in Tokyo also did not address practical initiatives on those seven 

issues—focusing instead on future meetings.9

Second, there is a lack of a clarity among Southeast Asian states on whether 

China—the unspoken primary “threat” the Quad is seeking to address—represents 

the biggest challenge for their respective interests. Numerous studies have noted 

that different Southeast Asian states consider China as representing varying degrees 

of opportunities (especially economic) and challenges (especially security).10 For 

that matter, Southeast Asian views of the United States have also been historically 

ambivalent as well.11 Despite the aspirations of many regional analysts, the structural ambivalence between Southeast Asia and the great powers is unlikely to change 

anytime soon. In other words, the more the Quad seeks to engage Southeast Asia 

driven by great-power politics, the more likely the structural ambivalence among 

Southeast Asian states becomes more pronounced.

Finally, there remains a concern among Southeast Asian states about the extent 

to which the Quad may or may not supplant existing ASEAN-related institutional mechanisms such as the East Asia Summit (EAS) or the ASEAN Regional 

Forum (ARF).12 There is also a concern that the Free and Open Indo-Pacific 

outlook inherent in the Quad may simply be another way to “step on China’s 

toes.”13 These concerns persist, even though in reality, Quad meetings have taken 

place on the sidelines of the ARF and EAS meetings and have focused on issues 
Whose Centrality?

JOURNAL OF INDO-PACIFIC AFFAIRS  SPECIAL ISSUE 2020 109

promoted by ASEAN. In short, ASEAN-related mechanisms have “facilitated 

the Quad process rather than the Quad process threatening ASEAN.”14

However, the concerns over the Quad’s supposed challenge to ASEAN is less 

about multilateral institutions and regional groupings coexisting in the same strategic sphere. Instead, such concerns are about: (1) whether the Quad gets to drive 

the broader regional agenda (a distinct possibility given the strategic heft of its 

members), (2) whether different members of ASEAN, ARF, and EAS might 

decide to spend more energy and resources for the Quad rather than ASEANrelated institutions, and (3) whether some ASEAN members like Indonesia could 

afford to surrender regional order management to others at a time when they 

could not develop new strategic alternatives beyond ASEAN.15 In other words, 

for all the talk about ASEAN Centrality, some ASEAN members remain deeply 

insecure about the prospect of an alternative regional order-making institutions 

like the Quad.

It should perhaps be noted that ASEAN Centrality is more of a process than 

an outcome. As defined by the ASEAN Charter, Centrality is the notion that 

ASEAN should be the “primary driving force” in shaping the group’s external 

relations in a regional architecture that is open, transparent, and inclusive. In 

other words, ASEAN Centrality is, at heart, an ongoing process of continuous 

engagements with external partners.16 As such, a significant feature of ASEAN 

Centrality lies in whether regional and great powers are “willing” to surrender 

regional initiatives and agenda-setting to ASEAN.17 This is part of the reasons 

why ASEAN champions like Indonesia are often “sensitive” to the possibility of 

ASEAN no longer driving the regional agenda.

What Should Be the Quad’s Ideal Role?

Given the above structural ambivalence and concerns, what should be the next 

ideal step for the Quad? First, the Quad needs to provide a systematic, coherent, 

and consistent framework to institutionalize and deepen the cooperative mechanisms among its member states. If the Quad members cannot agree on a long-term 

strategic framework for the grouping, there is no reason the rest of the region 

should take it seriously. How do we know, for example, that the Quad will not fade 

away once again as it did when Australia pulled the plug in 2008? If anything, the 

Quad could perhaps learn from ASEAN’s missteps when the latter organization 

tried to expand its mechanisms beyond Southeast Asia in the 1990s and 2000s too 

soon without first solidifying its own community-building and integration projects.18 Overall, the Quad’s prospects will be determined by the extent to which 

national interests and threat perceptions align across all four of its members.19
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Laksmana

Second, if and when the Quad could develop and implement its own long-term 

strategic framework, then perhaps there are ways to consider how the group could 

engage Southeast Asian states as well as ASEAN-related institutions. After all, 

there is no consensus across Southeast Asia rejecting any future role for the Quad. 

Indeed, almost half the respondents in the 2018 ASPI survey thought that the 

Quad complements existing regional security frameworks to varying degrees.20

Again, bearing in mind the concerns above, there is nothing inherently toxic about 

the Quad’s future engagement with ASEAN.

The key, therefore, is to find “the right ladder and the right rung.” The Quad’s 

external engagement with ASEAN would be effective if it meets the strategic 

interests of both groups (the right ladder) and when the specific engagement 

mechanisms are a good match for ASEAN’s pre-existing initiatives and capacity 

with what the Quad could offer (the right rung). In the long run, finding the 

right ladder means figuring out the convergence of strategic interests between 

the Quad as a minilateral grouping and ASEAN as a multilateral one. These 

include, for example, (1) the extent to which regional order depends on multilateral and collective efforts, rather than unilateral power projections; (2) the extent 

to which regional institutions enhance strategic autonomy, rather than becoming 

extensions of great-power politics; and (3) the extent to which prosperity and 

security are not mutually exclusive, just as no regional country should be left out 

of regional institutions.

These normative benchmarks should not be too difficult for leaders of the Quad 

and ASEAN to agree on. The ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific (AOIP), for 

example, is filled with normative principles and norms many regional countries 

have agreed on for years. Surely the Quad members could easily align the group 

with and support the AOIP in principle. After all, since the AOIP commits no 

resources and practical mechanisms, there is virtually no risk for the Quad members to come out and publicly declare their support for AOIP. In other words, 

while the AOIP may have been defective at birth as far as strategic outcomes are 

concerned, it can still provide an initial normative launching pad for closer collaboration with other regional groupings such as the Quad.21 The more difficult 

challenge lies in how the two groups could potentially build on shared normative 

principles to practical engagements.

In this regard, finding the right rung is essential. This means that the Quad 

should avoid reinventing the wheel in terms of regional initiatives, whether about 

maritime security, trade, or military exercises. Instead, the Quad should aim to be 

a strategic filler, supporting and elevating existing ASEAN-led initiatives where 

they exist and suggesting collaborative new ones where they are absent. In the 

defense and security sphere, for example, the Quad could provide an additional 
Whose Centrality?

JOURNAL OF INDO-PACIFIC AFFAIRS  SPECIAL ISSUE 2020 111

layer of cooperative engagement, from joint exercises to training, in areas where 

ASEAN-related institutions (e.g., ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting–Plus 

[ADMM+]) remain underdeveloped.22 The Quad could also support ASEANled initiatives such as the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership or the 

Master Plan on ASEAN Connectivity. After all, ASEAN has traditionally been 

more comfortable with the so-called “ASEAN Plus” mechanisms—dialogues and 

cooperative mechanisms between ASEAN and a single or several strategic partners.23 Indeed, for more than a decade, ASEAN Plus forums like the ARF, EAS, 

and ADMM+ have been among the premier tools of the group in its efforts at 

regional architecture building. In essence, the Quad should find areas where it can 

boost ASEAN institutions rather than seeking to create new ones as alternatives.

Taken together, the Quad should ideally first recognize that as far as its external 

engagement is concerned, it should invest and seriously consider how it could 

persuade and obtain buy-in from Southeast Asian states. Differences regarding 

China aside, almost every Southeast Asian state is unlikely to turn its back on 

initiatives seeking to strengthen existing ASEAN-led mechanisms and institutions. Given the geopolitical and geostrategic centrality of Southeast Asia within 

the Indo-Pacific theater, whether there is regional buy-in could very well determine the long-term strategic viability of the Quad. The Quad leaders should, 

therefore, also formulate a gradual, long-term engagement strategy built around 

(1) a strategic commitment to a set of shared principles and interests and (2) a set 

of institutionalized mechanisms to provide strategic amplification to ASEANled mechanisms and institutions. In other words, rather than waiting for different Southeast Asian states to finally come around on their own volition to engage 

the Quad, leaders of the Quad members should find ways to present how the 

grouping could strengthen and support ASEAN. At the very least, the effort 

made to find the right ladder and the right rung between the Quad and ASEAN 

could create channels of communication and habits of dialogue that were not 

present before.

Quad Plus: Whose Centrality?

The potential for a dialogue or an engagement mechanism between the Quad 

and ASEAN is more strategically productive than seeking to expand the former. 

The expansion of the Quad Core group of Australia, Japan, India, and the United 

States to a Quad Plus format, including possibly Vietnam, New Zealand, South 

Korea, Israel, and/or Brazil has recently gained some traction.24 Japan, for example, 

sees the Quad Plus idea as potentially beneficial to strengthen its “strategic synergy” in the maritime defense domain with the new set of countries, while Tokyo 

seeks to create a sustainable economic post–COVID-19 structure in Asia.25
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Laksmana

There are certainly plenty of reasons to expand the Quad, but to include ASEAN 

member states like Vietnam could strengthen the critiques that the Quad undermines ASEAN Centrality. While joining the Quad and remaining an ASEAN 

member is certainly not mutually exclusive, the Quad would nonetheless miss out 

on gaining the buy-in of a wider set of countries. For one thing, many in Southeast 

Asia do not appear excited for the expansion of the Quad. As the 2018 ASPI 

survey notes, a median of 68 percent across all ASEAN member states think that 

the Quad should not be further expanded.26 For another, if the Quad presents itself 

less of an alternative to ASEAN and more of a strategic complement, it has the 

potential to develop more sustainable partnerships across Southeast Asia, rather 

than with just one or two countries.

Such an argument of course requires a mental switch. If the Quad leaders remain convinced that it needs to compete with or confront China—in whatever 

terminology accepted—than the goal should not be how to “pry away” a few 

Southeast Asian states from China. Instead, they should focus on boosting the 

region’s strategic autonomy as a collective whole. For all its faults and inability to 

deal with immediate strategic crises like the South China Sea, ASEAN remains 

the only regional mechanism that all Southeast Asian states still embrace. Finding 

mechanisms to strengthen ASEAN-related institutions would also complement 

existing bilateral and minilateral engagements each of the Quad members has developed with different Southeast Asian countries over the past decade (including 

maritime capacity building, for example). In other words, for the Quad to remain 

“central” in the minds of Southeast Asian policy makers, the group should find 

practical ways to boost ASEAN Centrality.

The COVID-19 pandemic and China’s growing tension with India and Australia have given new impetus for the Quad. After the latest Quad meeting in 

early October 2020, for example, it is likely that Quad meetings may evolve into 

stand-alone events, rather than relying on the sidelines of ASEAN-related venues.27 On the military side, India has recently extended an invitation for Australia 

to join the trilateral India–Japan–United States Malabar exercises. This would 

mark the first military exercises by all four members of the Quad since the group 

reconvened in November 2017.28 Bilaterally, the signing of the India–US Basic 

Exchange and Cooperation Agreement in late October 2020 could further boost 

the Quad’s increasingly militarized outlook.

As these developments suggest an upward strategic trajectory for the Quad, the 

leaders from all four countries should start engaging Southeast Asia early on—

before the voices of regional insecurities grow louder. Additionally, the Quad 

should consider new diplomatic and economic initiatives when engaging Southeast Asian states. If the Quad only develops institutionalized cooperation built 
Whose Centrality?

JOURNAL OF INDO-PACIFIC AFFAIRS  SPECIAL ISSUE 2020 113

around the defense sector, Beijing could easily present the Quad as nothing more 

than an “anti-China coalition” to Southeast Asian states. If there are concerns that 

the Quad is moving too fast and too furious at challenging China while sidelining 

ASEAN-related mechanisms, it would be harder to gain strategic buy-in from 

Southeast Asia.

Conclusion and Implications

The Indo-Pacific is in a state of strategic flux. The strategic competition between 

the United States and China risks creating a new bipolar structure across the region. 

The frequency and duration of crises among the region’s powerholders—between 

Japan and South Korea, India and China, Australia and China, North and South 

Korea and others—have also grown in recent years. Historical legacies, territorial 

and maritime disputes, as well as broader strategic competition are all creating regional flashpoints.29 While these strategic trends are slowly unfolding, day-to-day 

security challenges, from illegal fishing to transnational crime, continue to strain the 

resources of regional countries. Domestic political populism across the region has 

also led to stronger protectionist and isolationist impulses, leaving cumbersome 

multilateral institutions fiercely competing for attention. The pandemic has also 

likely accelerated and exacerbated these destabilizing trends.

Under these conditions, it would be strategic malpractice for Indo-Pacific states 

to not develop new foreign policy options. For more than two decades, ASEANled regional institutions have tried to develop a region-wide habit of dialogue and 

cooperation, on the one hand. On the other, traditional bilateral alliances and strategic partnerships have also proliferated. However, as the Indo-Pacific increasingly 

becomes a single geostrategic and geopolitical theater, the slow-paced nature of 

multilateralism and the limited scope of bilateral partnerships are no longer seen as 

sufficient. The rise of minilateralism—more than two countries but less than a full 

multilateral grouping—across the Indo-Pacific has increasingly become a “new 

normal.”30 Indeed, the rise of the Quad certainly fits this pattern.

In this regard, the Quad may seem like a strategic inevitability, even though 

many argue it is nothing more than “a forum for discussion and information 

exchange intended to lead to better policy coordination” between the four countries.31 The United States, Japan, India, and Australia certainly cannot hope to 

“compete” with China on their own without each other. While paying regular 

homage to ASEAN Centrality, the fact of the matter is that these countries no 

longer consider ASEAN institutions as sufficiently agile and capable to respond 

to the strategic challenges posed by China. Policy makers in Tokyo, New Delhi, 
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Laksmana

Canberra, and Washington are certainly aware of how divided ASEAN has been 

in recent years and how some member states are now publicly aligning themselves with China. Therefore, Southeast Asian leaders are aware that getting the 

Quad leaders to disband once again may seem like a fool’s errand. After all, 

ASEAN itself has increasingly seen its own miniliteral arrangements. The 

ASEAN Our Eyes information-exchange initiative on violent extremism, radicalization, and terrorism (Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, 

and Thailand) under the purview of the ADMM builds on existing subregional 

cooperation such as the Malacca Strait Patrols (Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore) and the Trilateral Cooperative Arrangement in the Sulu Sea (Indonesia, 

Malaysia, and Philippines).32

This is one of the reasons why Indonesia has pushed for the AOIP. If Southeast 

Asia cannot stop the Quad in its strategic tracks, it can at least articulate an alternative strategic vision—no matter how devoid of resources and practical steps it 

may be. After all, as Indonesian scholar Dewi Fortuna Anwar notes, because 

Southeast Asia is located at the geographic midpoint between the Indian and 

Pacific oceans and all the lands around and within them, ASEAN must, in Jakarta’s view, continue to retain its centrality in the evolving Indo-Pacific construct.33 Southeast Asian states in general, after all, remain committed to strategic 

nonalignment and hedging in the Indo-Pacific—if only to avoid the impression 

that they are taking sides in the face of growing great-power rivalry.34 However, 

that does not mean that they would seek to push back or prevent the Quad from 

moving forward.

As the above analyses have shown, the challenge is figuring out whose centrality 

matters and how to ensure that both the Quad and ASEAN can not only coexist 

but also complement one another in regional architecture building. As a relatively 

new grouping, the ball is in the Quad’s court, so to speak. The Quad leaders should 

be the ones to persuade Southeast Asia of its strategic utility, rather than the other 

way around. As I have suggested above, finding the right ladder and the right rung 

is essential for the future of Quad–ASEAN relations. The Quad becoming a strategic filler to and a strategic amplifier for existing ASEAN initiatives and institutions 

are certainly not the only means forward. However, at this point, such cooperation 

provides perhaps the best chance to get a region-wide buy-in from Southeast Asia. 

By strategically positioning the Quad as a strong supporter of ASEAN, the new 

grouping can certainly challenge the Chinese view that it will be nothing more than 

“a foam in the ocean.” 
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JOURNAL OF INDO-PACIFIC AFFAIRS  SPECIAL ISSUE 2020 115

Dr. Evan A. Laksmana

Dr. Laksmana is a senior researcher with the Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Jakarta, Indonesia where his research focuses on military change, civil-military relations, and international security. He has 

held research and visiting positions with the National Bureau of Asian Research, the University of Sydney’s Southeast Asia Centre, the Lowy Institute for International Policy, the German Marshall Fund of the United States, and 

Nanyang Technological University’s S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies. His scholarly research has 

been published by Journal of Contemporary Asia, Asian Security, Asia Policy, Asian Politics & Policy, Journal of the Indian 

Ocean Region, Contemporary Southeast Asia and others. His policy essays have appeared in The New York Times, Washington Post, Foreign Affairs, Foreign Policy, South China Morning Post, East Asia Forum and others. He earned his MA 

and PhD in political science from Syracuse University’s Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs as a 

Fulbright Presidential Scholar. He also holds a MS in strategic studies from Nanyang Technological University and 

a BA in political science (cum laude) from Parahyangan Catholic University.

Notes

1. On the evolution of the Quad, see Ashok Rai, “Quadrilateral Security Dialogue 2 (Quad 

2.0)–a credible strategic construct or mere ‘foam in the ocean’?,” Maritime Affairs: Journal of the 

National Maritime Foundation of India 14, no. 2 (2018): 138–48.

2. Tang Siew Mun, et al., The State of Southeast Asia 2020 Survey Report (Singapore: ISEAS–

Yusof Ishak Institute, 2020), 33.

3. Huong Le Thu, Southeast Asian Perceptions of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue: Survey 

Findings (Canberra, ACT: Australian Strategic Policy Institute, 2018), 11.

4. Huong, Southeast Asian Perceptions of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, 24.

5. Shafiah Muhibat and M. Habib Abiyan Dzakwan, “Indonesia and the Quad: can’t or won’t 

decide?”, The Strategist, 7 December 2018, https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/.

6. See the discussion in Madhu Sudan Ravindran, “China’s potential for economic coercion in 

the South China Sea disputes: a comparative study of The Philippines and Vietnam.” Journal of 

Current Southeast Asian Affairs 31, no. 3 (2012): 105–132; Carlyle A. Thayer, “Chinese Assertiveness in the South China Sea and Southeast Asian Responses.” Journal of Current Southeast Asian 

Affairs 30, no. 2 (2011): 77–104.

7. See the discussion in Rahul Roy-Chaudhury and Kate Sullivan de Estrada, “India, the 

Indo-Pacific and the Quad,” Survival 60, no. 3 (2018): 181–94; and Sharon Stirling, ed., Mind the 

Gap: National Views of the Free and Open Indo-Pacific (Washington, DC: German Marshall Fund 

of the United States, 2019).

8. See Ankit Panda, “US, Japan, India, and Australia Hold Working-Level Quadrilateral Meeting on Regional Cooperation,” The Diplomat, 13 November 2017, https://thediplomat.com/.

9. Jesse Johnson and Satoshi Sugiyama, “‘Quad’ meeting in Tokyo prizes symbolism over substance,” Japan Times, 7 October 2020.

10. See for example, David Denoon, ed., China, The United States, and the Future of Southeast 

Asia: US-China Relations (New York: NYU Press, 2017); Don Emmerson, ed., The Deer and the 

Dragon: Southeast Asia and China in the 21st Century (Palo Alto CA: Stanford University Press, 

2020); and Sebastian Strangio, In the Dragon’s Shadow: Southeast Asia in the Chinese Century (New 

Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2020).

11. See the discussion in John D. Ciorciari, The Limits of Alignment: Southeast Asia and the 

Great Powers since 1975 (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2010); and Evelyn Goh, 
116 JOURNAL OF INDO-PACIFIC AFFAIRS  SPECIAL ISSUE 2020

Laksmana

“Great Powers and Hierarchical Order in Southeast Asia: Analyzing Regional Security Strategies,” International Security 32, no. 3 (2008): 113–57.

12. See the discussion in Anton Tsetov, “Will the Quad Mean the End of ASEAN Centrality?,” 

The Diplomat, 15 November 2017, https://thediplomat.com/.

13. Joel Ng, “The Quadrilateral Conundrum: Can ASEAN Be Persuaded?,” RSIS Commentary, 17 July 2018.

14. Malcolm Cook and Hoang Thi Ha, “Formal and Flexible: ASEAN and the New Strategic 

Disorder,” ISEAS Perspective, 17 August 2020, 5, https://www.iseas.edu.sg/.

15. On Indonesia’s lack of strategic options, see Evan A. Laksmana, “Buck-passing from 

Behind: Indonesia’s Foreign Policy on the Indo-Pacific,” Order from Chaos (blog), 27 November 

2018, https://www.brookings.edu/.

16. For a longer discussion, see Evan A. Laksmana, “ASEAN Centrality in the South China 

Sea,” in Southeast Asian Perspectives on US-China Competition, ed. Aaron Connelly (Council on 

Foreign Relations and Lowy Institute for International Policy, 2017), 9–13.

17. After all, ASEAN Centrality was historically correlated with the incapacity of great powers to successfully mediate their relations on their own in the post-Cold War world. See Lee Jones, 

“Still in the ‘Drivers’ Seat,’ but for how Long? ASEAN’s Capacity for Leadership in East-Asian 

International Relations,” Journal of Current Southeast Asian Affairs 29, no. 3 (2010): 95–113.

18. After all, achieving ASEAN Centrality in regional architecture building versus maintaining represents a different set of challenges requiring a different set of tools. See the discussion in 

Mely Caballero-Anthony, “Understanding ASEAN’s Centrality: Bases and Prospects in an 

Evolving Regional Architecture,” Pacific Review 27, no. 4 (2014): 563–84.

19. Euan Graham, “The Quad Deserves its Second Chance,” in Debating the Quad, Centre of 

Gravity Series, ed. Andrew Carr (Acton, ACT: Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Australian 

National University, 2018), 4.

20. Huong, Southeast Asian Perceptions, 15.

21. See Evan A. Laksmana, “Flawed Assumptions: Why the ASEAN Outlook on the IndoPacific is Defective,” AsiaGlobal Online, 19 September 2019, https://www.asiaglobalonline.hku.hk/.

22. See for example the discussion in See Seng Tan, “The ADMM-Plus,” Asia Policy 22 (2016): 

70–75, https://muse.jhu.edu/.

23. See the discussion in Chien-peng Chung, “China and Japan in ‘ASEAN Plus’ Multilateral 

Arrangements: Raining on the Other Guy’s Parade,” Asian Survey 53, no. 5 (2013): 801–24, 

https://www.jstor.org/.

24. See for example the discussion in Nguyen Quang Dy, “Vietnam May Turn Threats 

into Opportunity,” Yale Global Online, 2 June 2020, https://yaleglobal.yale.edu/.

25. See Jagannath Panda, “The Abe Doctrine on Quad Plus,” Japan Times, 17 July 2020.

26. Huong, Southeast Asian Perceptions, 18.

27. Sarah Teo, “What the Quad Meeting Means for ASEAN?,” The Diplomat, 9 October 2020, 

https://thediplomat.com/.

28. Ankit Panda, “Australia Returns to the Malabar Exercise,” The Diplomat, 19 October 2020, 

https://thediplomat.com/.

29. See the discussion of these key trends in Brendan Taylor, The Four Flashpoints: How Asia 

Goes to War. (Carlton, VIC: La Trobe University Press, 2018).

30. See Bhubhindar Singh, and Sarah Teo, eds., Minilateralism in the Indo-Pacific: The Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, Lancang-Mekong Cooperation Mechanism, and ASEAN (New York: Routledge, 
Whose Centrality?

JOURNAL OF INDO-PACIFIC AFFAIRS  SPECIAL ISSUE 2020 117

2020); Wooyeal Paik and Jae Jeok Park. “The Quad’s Search for Non-Military Roles and China’s 

Strategic Response: Minilateralism, Infrastructure Investment, and Regional Balancing,” Journal of 

Contemporary China (2020): 1–17; and Troy Lee-Brown, “Asia’s Security Triangles: Maritime 

Minilateralism in the Indo-Pacific,” East Asia 35, no. 2 (2018): 163–76.

31. Ian Hall, “Meeting the Challenge: The Case for the Quad,” in Debating the Quad, 13.

32. Cook and Ha, “Formal and Flexible,” 5.

33. Dewi Fortuna Anwar, “Indonesia and the ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific,” International Affairs 96, no. 1 (2020), 114. See also I Gusti Bagus Dharma Agastia, “Understanding Indonesia’s Role in the ‘ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific’: A Role Theory Approach,” Asia Pacific 

Policy Studies (2020): 1–13, https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/.

34. See the discussion in See Seng Tan, “Consigned to Hedge: South-east Asia and America’s 

‘Free and Open Indo-Pacific’ Strategy,” International Affairs 96, no. 1 (2020), 131.

Disclaimer

The views and opinions expressed or implied in JIPA are those of the authors and should not be construed as carrying the 

official sanction of the Department of Defense, Department of the Air Force, Air Education and Training Command, Air 

University, or other agencies or departments of the US government or their international equivalents.
118 JOURNAL OF INDO-PACIFIC AFFAIRS  SPECIAL ISSUE 2020

THE PLUS PERSPECTIVES

Britain and the Quadrilateral

Dr. John Hemmings

James Rogers

Abstract

The assumptions made about British involvement in the Indo-Pacific and the 

Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (the “Quad”) tend to rely on the constraints of 

geography rather than on interests in a rules-based system. This article argues that 

not only does Britain share interests with the Quad members in a free trading 

order—something that is threatened by Chinese and Russian policies —but it has 

also developed a set of capabilities and facilities across the region that give it 

reach. From the Persian Gulf and Oman, from Diego Garcia to Singapore, Britain’s role in the Five Power Defence Arrangements and strategic relationships 

with regional powers mean that it is already an Indo-Pacific maritime power. 

Questions as to Britain’s inclusion in the still-evolving Quad are therefore entirely 

political in our opinion. Given the openness of Japan and the United States to 

external members, Britain could make for an interesting and useful addition to 

the Quad in the years ahead.

Introduction

The current international order is in flux, and the international security environment has become considerably more unstable and threatening. The Third 

Annual Report of the UK’s National Security Strategy and Strategic Defence Review

cites the “resurgence of state-based threats and intensifying wider state competition and the attack on the rules-based international order, making it harder to 

build consensus and tackle global threats,”1 while the United Kingdom’s 2018 

National Security Capability Review asserts that “as the world has become more 

uncertain and volatile, we [the UK] remain committed to deploying the full 

suite of our security, economic and influence capabilities to protect and promote 

our security, economic and influence interests.”2 A major cause of this deterioration in the strategic environment is the persistent, multifaceted, and incremental 

challenges posed by China and Russia to the global order and their efforts to 

divide and subvert the Western alliance—the United Kingdom, United States, 

and their allies—through influence operations and political warfare.3 As the 

recently published UK Ministry of Defence’s Integrated Operating Concept recognizes, the alliance is confronted by “adversaries [who] don’t recognize the rule 

of law”4 and who employ “an expanding, diverse and largely unregulated set of 
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JOURNAL OF INDO-PACIFIC AFFAIRS  SPECIAL ISSUE 2020 119

information tools to influence target audiences’ attitudes, beliefs and behavior . . . 

above and below the threshold of war.”5

Before we show why the United Kingdom is likely to become more active in 

the Indo-Pacific in the years ahead, it is important—both for context and for the 

sake of our argument—to spend some time describing the nature of Russian and 

Chinese challenges to the maritime trading order (the “mare liberum”), because 

they directly impact states in Europe and in the Indo-Pacific.

Since the 1960s, when British strategists first conceptualized an “Indo-Pacific,”6

and the end of the Cold War, the United Kingdom’s interests and capabilities in the 

region have more waned than waxed, particularly after its decision to focus more on 

the Soviet threat in Western Europe.7 The apparent disconnect between British 

capabilities and interests remains very much at the heart of the current debate as to 

whether Britain can and should become a partner or member of the Quadrilateral 

Security Dialogue (the “Quad”). In the wake of that decision taken in 1968, Britain’s security posture as a Euro-Atlantic power was gradually solidified as forces 

were gradually withdrawn from the Indo-Pacific region. However, since at least 

2013, there have been growing voices in London arguing that the time has come to 

rekindle a posture “east of Suez.” That year, the Royal United Services Institute 

(RUSI)—Britain’s oldest strategic policy think tank—published an essay entitled A 

Return to East of Suez? RUSI’s director, Michael Clarke, asserted in the foreword: “It 

may not yet be declared government policy, but the UK appears to be approaching 

a decision point where a significant strategic reorientation of its defence and security towards the Gulf is both plausible and logical.”8

 The report noted that new 

British facilities in the Gulf would allow the United Kingdom to deploy greater 

power into the region. Since then, the topic has remained an on-and-off again favorite of think tanks but only began to take shape when the United Kingdom started 

to recast its posture in the wake of Brexit. This article joins that pedigree and takes 

the argument into the thorny question of the United Kingdom’s involvement or 

membership to the Quad.

This article focuses on these two aspects—interests and capabilities—and follows 

three lines of argument: first, that as China and Russia challenge the historic mare 

liberum, the United Kingdom—with its historic interest in unfettered maritime 

communication lines—has similar interests to the Quad’s members. Second, that 

many of the assumptions made about the limits to a British role in the Indo-Pacific 

and in relation to the Quad are based on misconceptions or simplifications of interests and capabilities. We explore what some of those assumptions are and why Britain’s interests and its capabilities make it a possible Quad partner, even a future 

member. The question, we assert is one of politics and one of prioritization. Third, 

we explore the capabilities the United Kingdom has in the region and how these 
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Hemmings & Rogers

have expanded in recent years, noting the recent extension of Britain’s geostrategic 

presence and ability to project power in the Indo-Pacific. We attempt to assess 

whether these will plateau, reduce, or continue rising and what this means for 

Britain’s role in relation to the Quad.

The Challenges Posed by Russia and China to Mare Liberum

While each of the Quad members has different motives for being part of it, their 

common concern has been China’s behavior in the maritime space, particularly in 

the South China Sea, where Beijing claims most of the sea’s fisheries, energy resources, and international waters. In a 2019 report “The South China Sea: Why it 

Matters to Global Britain,”9 we argued that China’s unlawful and excessive claims 

in the South China Sea were both a threat to an open maritime order and to the 

UK’s direct national interests—some 12% of British trade transits the waterway.10

However, we would like to focus this first argument on something altogether 

grander, and that is the health of the global maritime system and how it aligns the 

Quad members with the United Kingdom’s historic role as the guarantor of a “free 

and open” system. Indeed, the Royal Navy’s primary role for much of Britain’s 

history was to support the principle of mare liberum, or freedom of the seas, and 

this often forced British warships into conflict with states that sought to control 

or restrict shipping. In the case of China and Russia, this expansion of de facto 

sovereign control over what were once free seas and the jurisdictional claims that 

negate the historic principle of “innocent passage” are a direct threat to the 

maritime system as it has existed for some 300 years.

If we examine what China has done in the South China Sea, it becomes clear 

that China’s Communist Party has sought to effectively extend its political remit 

over the maritime space, a policy the naval historian Andrew Lambert describes 

precisely as “continentalization.”11 China has asserted the right to demand other 

counties’ vessels transiting areas of maritime space that it claims as its own territorial waters and exclusive economic zones gain advance permission.12 This fundamentally threatens countries’ right of innocent passage as guaranteed in Section 3, 

Article 17 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), 

which China has ratified.13 Furthermore, China has steadfast refused to utilize 

international law or the international courts to resolve the issue and has determined to confirm its interpretation through its own means—including through 

the implied use of force.14

Russia has adopted a similar approach. In March 2019, Moscow implemented a 

policy requiring foreign warships to give 45 days’ advance notice to gain “permission” to transit the Northern Sea Route (NSR) in the Arctic, citing Article 234 of 

UNCLOS, which allows for special rules by coastal states in ice-covered regions to 
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JOURNAL OF INDO-PACIFIC AFFAIRS  SPECIAL ISSUE 2020 121

protect the environment. Again, it has in effect threatened the right of innocent 

passage. In addition to this, Russia demands each vessel include its name, purpose, 

route, timetable, and technical specifications, a gross violation of the sovereign immunity enjoyed by warships at sea. This restriction also followed legislation in 2017 

that restricted foreign commercial vessels from loading and unloading at ports along 

the NSR,15 which is counter to Article 234’s “nondiscriminatory” requirement. In 

the case of Chinese claims in the South China Sea and Russian claims in Arctic, it 

is apparent that both states are asserting—using the threat of military coercion16—

massive extensions of sovereignty over international seas and over the rights of 

marine traffic, challenging the historic principle of mare liberum and specific codes 

of the UNCLOS, upon which that is based.

Testing Common Assumptions on the 

Quad’s Membership and Interests

With regards to the Quad, a number of common assumptions are widely held: 

first, that the Quad is a geographically grounded grouping, with an explicit IndoPacific focus and identity. Second, that its four members are primarily interested 

in: the growth of China’s military capabilities and bases; China’s activities in the 

South China Sea; and the Chinese navy’s increasing presence in the Indian Ocean. 

When it comes to assumptions about Britain in relation to the Indo-Pacific and 

Quad, the following are often cited: first, that Britain is far from the Indo-Pacific, 

the central interest point of the Quad, and therefore unlikely to partner with the 

grouping in a meaningful way. Second, that Britain is constrained by budgetary 

factors and lacks the regional footprint and therefore must prioritize closer to 

home in the Euro-Atlantic, and perhaps the Middle East. While we do not contest these assumptions entirely—they have traction—we do think they are open 

to alternative framing. Let us deal with them, one by one.

First, the argument that the Quad is geographically fixed or has a fixed membership is open to debate. If one considers the recent widening of its membership 

to a “Quad Plus” format, to seven countries,17 it is apparent that the body is not 

yet fixed and remains in a highly fluid state, evolving and changing as the four 

nations decide the group’s equities across a range of sectors. Nor is it clear that 

they hold a clear position on the inclusion of external powers, particularly other 

large powers with sovereign interests in the Indo-Pacific. At the most recent 

meeting in Tokyo in October 2020, Japanese Foreign Minister Toshimitsu Motegi and US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo discussed the possibility of adding 

countries like the United Kingdom and France to the grouping. Motegi responded 

that it was “important to cooperate with as many nations as possible that share 
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Hemmings & Rogers

these basic values and common rules.”18 Likewise, in his recent speech in London, 

Harsh Vardhan Shringla, the foreign secretary of India, praised the Netherlands, 

Germany, and France for their Indo-Pacific strategies and expressed hope that 

“the UK too will finalize its Indo-Pacific strategy.”19 Clearly, the participation of 

external powers in the Quad has not been ruled out. Thus, while we cannot argue 

that the United Kingdom has a right to be a Quad member, it is impossible to 

argue that its membership is unlikely or impossible. The decision is, we believe, 

ultimately a political one.

Second, the assumption that the Quad members’ interests are narrowly defined 

by the Indo-Pacific region is worth exploring. To some extent, we agree that this 

is true but respond with two counterpoints. First, the Quad is interested in the 

maintenance of a free and open maritime space and sustainable development, areas where the United Kingdom has commitment and capacity (for example, its 

official development assistance (ODA) budget is one of the largest in the world).20

Second, if one employs the Japanese and Indian geographical definitions of IndoPacific (i.e., to the shores of eastern Africa), then the United Kingdom is very 

much an Indo-Pacific power with interests and capabilities from the Persian 

Gulf, across the Indian Ocean Region, right through to Southeast Asia. It is also 

the leading party of the region’s only multilateral security grouping—the Five 

Power Defence Arrangements, established in 1971 to underline British support 

for the security of the Malay Peninsula after the termination of the AngloMalayan Defence Agreement. When the geography of the Quad is considered in 

relation to this axis and in terms of Britain’s support for the mare liberum, then 

the United Kingdom’s inclusion is not only possible but also desirable. It is only 

when we think of the Quad as geographically focused around the area under the 

US Indo-Pacific Command (“from Hollywood to Bollywood”), that Britain’s 

inclusion in the Indo-Pacific and as a Quad member looks peculiar; alternatively, 

when viewed through the prism of Britain’s growing role in the Persian Gulf and 

broader Middle East, it looks more natural.

As a final argument, there have been at least two other regional organizations 

that have opened their membership to nonregional states. The first is the Asian 

Infrastructure Investment Bank, which Britain joined in 2015—though it was 

originally conceived as a region-only group to finance China’s Belt and Road 

Initiative (BRI) projects.21 The second is the Comprehensive and Progressive 

Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPATPP), another group with an 

ostensibly regional identity. Despite this, in October 2018, Japan signaled its 

willingness to include Britain in the grouping, to which the United Kingdom has 

also expressed interest.22 Again, our point is not to say that Britain’s potential 

membership within the Quad is likely or probable but instead to argue that its 
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involvement will be based on political factors and common interests and capability, not on geography.

Britain’s Footprint in the Indo-Pacific

We will now discuss in greater depth the level of Britain’s footprint in the 

Indo-Pacific to determine what the country could offer the Quad. While it is 

true that the British home islands are located thousands of kilometers away in 

the north Atlantic, the United Kingdom remains, by virtue of its overseas territories—Pitcairn in the Pacific and the British Indian Ocean Territory in the 

Indian Ocean—a “native” or “resident” power in the Indo-Pacific. Despite having 

deliberately “pivoted” away from the Indian and Pacific oceans during the second 

half of the twentieth century to deter the Soviet Union in the Euro-Atlantic 

region (as already discussed), Britain retained the military means to reach into 

the Indo-Pacific in the event of a strategic emergency. This was proven in the 

regional conflicts in the 1990s and 2000s in the Middle East—twice in Iraq and 

once in Afghanistan—where Britain deployed large numbers of armed forces. 

The Royal Navy also sent a large naval group—Taurus—to Singapore in 2009, to 

demonstrate its continued ability to project power further east and underscore 

Britain’s continued commitment to the Five Power Defence Arrangements.

Britain’s ability to project power has been predicated on a “geostrategic array” 

of military and logistical facilities that stretch from the Middle East to Southeast 

Asia.23 These are linked by the strategically pivotal British Indian Ocean Territory, 

home of the giant UK–US naval, air, and space facility on Diego Garcia. These 

points allow British naval and air forces to access the region from the Mediterranean, not least via Britain’s naval facilities at Gibraltar and the Royal Air Force’s 

Akrotiri air station in the British Sovereign Base Areas on Cyprus. In addition, 

the United Kingdom has long operated military and logistical facilities in Kenya, 

Nepal, Singapore, and Brunei. In Kenya, the British Army has a training unit in 

Nanyuki, supported by smaller offices in Nairobi. In Kathmandu and Pokhara in 

Nepal, Britain operates facilities for the recruitment of the Ghurkas, while at 

Sembawang, in Singapore, it operates a refueling station for British and allied 

warships. And at Sittang Camp and the Medicina Lines, Brunei acts as host for 

the British Army’s Jungle Warfare Training Division.

It is important to note that these British Indo-Pacific military facilities are not

merely the relics of empire; instead, they form part of a dynamic geostrategic 

network that the United Kingdom has continued to modulate in accordance 

with evolving strategic requirements. Indeed, in keeping with the British government’s announcement to refocus east of Suez after 2013, Britain’s geostrategic 

network has grown in the western-most edge of the Indo-Pacific.24 The Royal 
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Hemmings & Rogers

Navy’s shore facilities in Bahrain were upgraded between 2015 and 2018 to 

become a fully-fledged naval base—HMS Jufair—while a “defence hub” was 

established in 2017 in Duqm, Oman, to replenish and service British warships 

operating in the Indian Ocean, including the largest vessels, such as assault 

ships and aircraft carriers.25 New British regional defense staffs—for the Middle 

East and Southeast Asia—were set up in 2016 in the United Arab Emirates and 

Singapore, respectively.26 And in December 2018, Gavin Williamson, the then 

defence secretary, announced that the Ministry of Defence was investigating 

plans to transform Britain’s logistical facility in Singapore to a naval base and/

or open an entirely new one in Brunei.27

Besides acting as points to uphold Britain’s sovereign claims and geostrategic 

presence in the Indo-Pacific, these military and logistical facilities also function to 

support the presence and reach of the British Armed Forces, particularly the 

Royal Navy. Already, in 2011, the Royal Navy had large naval and auxiliary ships 

on the scene after Typhoon Hainan to deliver disaster relief faster than many regional powers, including Australia and Japan.

In keeping with the United Kingdom’s renewed focus east of Suez, this presence has also witnessed a considerable uptick in recent years as several Royal Navy 

vessels have been deployed to the region. In August 2018, HMS Albion—a large 

amphibious assault ship—steamed through the Paracel archipelago en route to 

Hanoi from Tokyo. At that point, the Royal Navy became the only navy, other 

than the US Navy, to directly challenge China’s illegitimate maritime claims—in 

this case Beijing’s imposition of so-called “straight baselines” around the Paracel 

Islands—in the South China Sea.28 Defence Secretary Gavin Williamson promised that the increased presence would not be “a flash in the pan but actually a 

commitment to the region that goes forward over the coming years.”29 He was not 

joking. In 2020, the Royal Navy deployed six warships—supported by logistics 

vessels from the Royal Fleet Auxiliary—to the Middle East alone, building on a 

plethora of vessels fanning out across the Indo-Pacific the year before, some of 

which took part in naval drills with Japan and the United States.30

This rise in UK strategic activity is part of a wider—but often overlooked—

British “tilt” toward the wider Indo-Pacific region, a policy that has been underway since at least 2012. That year, Britain signed a new defense treaty with Japan, 

followed a year later by one with Australia.31 In 2014, the UK National Strategy 

of Maritime Security noted the importance of the South China Sea and linked 

Britain’s maritime strategy with protecting “the rule of law and freedom of navigation and trade.”32 London followed through on this by signing a naval trilateral 

agreement between the Royal Navy, the US Navy, and the Japanese Maritime Self 

Defense Forces in 2016.33 This resulted in trilateral antisubmarine exercises in 
Britain and the Quadrilateral

JOURNAL OF INDO-PACIFIC AFFAIRS  SPECIAL ISSUE 2020 125

December 201834 and January 2019, followed by a US–UK exercise in the South 

China Sea shortly after.35 Initially, much of this activity was an attempt to provide 

balance in relation to the government of David Cameron’s geo-economically 

driven attempts to court China, a policy that has fallen flat given China’s increasingly revisionist tone in recent years.

It has also been animated by Brexit, particularly as the government has sought 

to flesh out the concept of “Global Britain”—the slogan that was adopted after 

the referendum to account for the country’s new post-EU international approach. 

Serving as foreign secretary in 2016, Boris Johnson explained at the Manama 

Dialogue that Britain’s “policy of disengagement East of Suez” during the Cold 

War “was a mistake” and that “in so far as we are now capable, and we are capable 

of a lot, we want to reverse that policy.” He went on to outline that the renewed 

British effort east of Suez would drum up sales for British manufacturers and 

service providers, contribute to regional peace, and ensure the United Kingdom 

remained “active in and deeply committed to the region.”36

Since then, Britain has not only stepped up its diplomatic engagement east of 

Suez but has also begun to appraise its conceptual understanding of the region. In 

2018, the Foreign and Commonwealth Office—now the Foreign, Commonwealth 

and Development Office (FCDO)—amplified its diplomatic presence in the 

South Pacific, a point British diplomats have been keen to trumpet.37 Equally, 

joining Japan, India, Australia, the United States, the Association of Southeast 

Asian Nations (ASEAN), and France, UK officials and political leaders have also 

begun to adopt the term “Indo-Pacific;” in 2020, for example, the FCDO established a new Indo-Pacific section, replacing the older section dealing with the 

“Asia-Pacific.” In 2020, the United Kingdom has sought to deepen its relations 

with ASEAN, even applying for “Dialogue Partner” status, and Japan, through the 

signing of a Free Trade Agreement, which both countries are reported to see as the 

stepping-stone for Britain to join the CPA-TPP.38

Most importantly of all, just before winning the general election in December 

2019, Boris Johnson, pledged to undertake a wide-ranging and integrated strategic review, which he promised would be “the deepest review of Britain’s security, 

defence and foreign policy since the end of the Cold War.”39 He also stated that 

the review would look carefully at the significance of “shifts of power and wealth 

to Asia,”40 a region, accordingly, the review is likely to place additional strategic 

emphasis on, to the extent that Britain may be about to tilt further into the IndoPacific. Indeed, Anne Marie Trevelyan, the former Secretary of State for International Development, who has worked on the review, explained at a side event at the 

Conservative Party’s annual conference in September 2020 that the review would 

probably be maritime-centric and would involve the redistribution of British ODA 
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Hemmings & Rogers

efforts to counter China’s debt diplomacy and provide an alternative to the BRI, 

particularly in light of Beijing’s response to COVID-19.41

At the time of writing, however, this national strategy will likely be delayed 

because of the COVID-19 pandemic. It is reported that the prime minister and 

the chancellor are unable to agree on the financial settlement for the new strategy, 

which is thought to demand an extra £15 billion in UK defense and foreign policy 

spending out to 2025.42 In any case, in 2021, the British government has confirmed that the Royal Navy’s new supercarrier—HMS Queen Elizabeth—will be 

deployed on its maiden operational tour with a full strike group to the Indian and 

Pacific oceans.43

Conclusion

It is almost certain that Britain’s presence in the Indo-Pacific will increase in 

the coming years. This was never dependent on the United Kingdom’s membership of the EU; as we have shown, the British tilt toward the Indo-Pacific began 

long before the referendum of 2016 and has occurred across several planes. That 

said, the decision to leave the EU has amplified the United Kingdom’s desire to 

branch out and consolidate its initial gains; the election of Boris Johnson as prime 

minister has only compounded that desire.

There are several forces drawing Britain further into the region:

1.Economic interests, particularly as the Indo-Pacific continues to grow in its position as the economic core of the world; in October 2020, it showed that by signing 

its first post-Brexit agreement—the Comprehensive Economic Partnership 

Agreement—with Quad member, Japan. It is currently negotiating FTAs with 

Australia and the United States;

2.Geostrategic interests, in upholding British sovereignty over the British Overseas Territories and dissuading China’s attempts to control the South China 

Sea and the maritime space, but also in terms of providing an alternative to 

Chinese economic coercion through the BRI;

3.Diplomatic interests, in providing support to close British allies, such as the 

United States, Australia, Canada, and New Zealand, but also to increasingly 

close partners such as Japan, the ASEAN countries, and India; and

4.Humanitarian interests, in supporting democratic forces, reducing extreme poverty, and implementing policies designed to counter environmental degradation, 

whether in terms of greenhouse gas emissions or oceanic contamination.

It is hard to imagine that these forces will not continue to pull Britain into the 

Indo-Pacific in the years ahead.
Britain and the Quadrilateral

JOURNAL OF INDO-PACIFIC AFFAIRS  SPECIAL ISSUE 2020 127

However, due to the geographic location of the British home islands, the United 

Kingdom will always look at the Indo-Pacific as something of an outsider, despite 

its equitable claim—through its overseas territories—to be a native or resident 

power in the region. But this does not necessarily matter, not least because the 

Indo-Pacific is becoming increasingly woven into, and bound up, with other areas of the world. As countries in Europe, and then the Euro-Atlantic region, 

grew in organizational and economic power in the nineteenth and twentieth 

centuries, they reached out and bound other regions into their internal affairs. In 

the twenty-first century, countries in the Indo-Pacific are doing the same: Japan, 

China, India, and the rest, are reaching out—albeit in different, often competing, 

ways—connecting themselves, and the region they inhabit, to the world beyond 

their shores. Consequently, Europe, Africa, and Asia are all bound increasingly 

together, giving fresh animation to Nicholas Spykman’s “rimland” concept—the 

vast littoral space stretching around the southern underbelly of Eurasia, from the 

British Isles in Europe to Japan in the Pacific.44

Thus, insofar as Europe and Africa are now as much part of this broader strategic theater as the Indo-Pacific, Britain’s presence, posture, and role in the IndoPacific cannot be seen in zero-sum terms. Its role in the Euro-Atlantic should not 

be seen in opposition to its role in the Indo-Pacific. Already, in their 2017 Joint 

Statement on Security Cooperation, Britain and Japan recognized this fact when 

they declared one another “to be the closest security partners respectively in Asia 

and Europe.”45 Consequently, British support for a free and open Indo-Pacific may 

come directly: through new military facilities, diplomatic posts, ODA, and the 

persistent, even permanent, deployment of Royal Navy warships—even integrated 

carrier strike groups, acting as the centerpieces for multinational naval cooperation. 

The Quad should welcome this input, even actively encourage it.

But the Quad should also recognize that British support for a free and open 

Indo-Pacific may also come indirectly, through the United Kingdom’s role in the 

defense of the wider Euro-Atlantic region. Through so doing, Britain would free 

up US resources for deployment elsewhere, not least to the Pacific. Moreover, by 

dissuading potential, and deterring active, revisionists closer to home, the United 

Kingdom could assist with constraining China’s westward geostrategic push, 

manifested today through the BRI, but likely tomorrow via a growing Chinese 

military presence. Indeed, if primarily Euro-Atlantic powers like the United 

Kingdom (and France) have to adjust and tilt to new realities in the Indo-Pacific, 

Indo-Pacific powers—Japan, India, and Australia chief among them—will have 

to do the same in reverse.

But what of British cooperation with the Quad? Until recently, the Quad has 

been in its infancy. To fully mature, it will need to grasp, firstly, that it will need to 
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Hemmings & Rogers

expand and/or build partnerships with other countries, even those “external” to 

the region; and, secondly, that it cannot work in geographic isolation. Britain may 

never become a full member, rendering the Quad a Quint, but the country could 

become—based on its already-established relations with the United States, Japan, 

Australia and India—a key partner, insofar as it has much to offer in terms of 

capability, knowledge, and expertise.

Dr. John Hemmings

Dr. Hemmings is an associate professor at the Daniel K. Inouye Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies (DKIAPCSS), a Department of Defense regional center. He is also an adjunct fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). His writing reflects his own views and are not those of the US Government or Department of Defense.

James Rogers

Mr. Rogers works in the field of British strategic policy and was the former director of the Global Britain program 

at the Henry Jackson Society (2017–2020). Previously, he was acting dean and director of the Department of Political and Strategic Studies at the Baltic Defence College (2012–2017). He was educated at the universities of Cambridge and Aberystwyth.

Notes

1. Cabinet Office, National Security Strategy and Strategic Defence Review 2015: Third Annual 

Report (London: Cabinet Office, July 2019), https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/.

2. HM Government, National Security Capability Review (London: HM Government, March 

2018), https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/.

3. See for example, US Senate, Russia’s Active Measures Campaign and Interference in the 2016 

Election, Report to US Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, 116th Cong., 1st sess., https://www 

.intelligence.senate.gov/.

4. UK Ministry of Defence, “The Integrated Operating Concept: 2025,” 30 September 2020, 

https://www.gov.uk/.

5. UK Ministry of Defence, “Integrated Operating Concept: 2025.”

6. UK National Archives, Defence and Oversea Policy (Official) Committee, “Defence Review 

Studies: Indo-Pacific Strategy,” CAB 148/44, 06 October 1965, 9; and “Defence Review Studies: 

Indo-Pacific Strategy,” CAB 148/44, 20 October 1965, 10.

7. For more on Britain’s series of decisions that resulted in its key role in the defense of Europe, 

see: James Rogers, “Defending Europe: ‘Global Britain’ and the Future of European Geopolitics,” 

Henry Jackson Society, 2018, http://henryjacksonsociety.org/.

8. Gareth Stansfield and Saul Kelly, “A Return to East of Suez? UK Military Deployment to 

the Gulf,” RUSI Briefing Paper, 26 April, 2013, https://rusi.org/.

9. John Hemmings and James Rogers, “The South China Sea: Why it Matters to “Global 

Britain,” Henry Jackson Society, January 2019, found at: https://henryjacksonsociety.org/.

10. “How Much Trade Transits the South China Sea?,” CSIS Chinapower, https://chinapower.csis.org/.

11. Andrew Lambert, Seapower States: Maritime Culture, Continental Empires and the Conflict 

That Made the Modern World (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2018), 318–19.
Britain and the Quadrilateral

JOURNAL OF INDO-PACIFIC AFFAIRS  SPECIAL ISSUE 2020 129

12. Zou Keyuan, “Innocent Passage for Warships: Chinese Doctrine and Practice,” Ocean Development and International Law 29, no. 3 (1997): 195–223.

13. See Section 3, Article 19, of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, United 

Nations, https://www.un.org/.

14. Fu Ying, “Why China Says No to the Arbitration on the South China Sea,” Foreign Policy, 

10 July 2016, https://foreignpolicy.com/.

15. “Russia Tightens Control over Northern Sea Route,” Maritime Executive, 8 March 2019, 

https://www.maritime-executive.com/.

16. The argument that China and Russia are attempting to base their new legal interpretations 

on military coercion is based on the military bases and substantive military forces that both have 

placed in the respective seas. For further information on China’s military bases in the South China 

Sea, see “Chinese Power Projection Capabilities in the South China Sea,” AMTI CSIS, https://

amti.csis.org/. For further information on Russia’s new military bases in the NSR, please see Matthew Malino and Heather A. Conley, “The Ice Curtain: Russia’s Arctic Military Presence,” CSIS 

Report, https://www.csis.org/.

17. Jeff M. Smith, “How America Is Leading the ‘Quad Plus’ Group of 7 Countries in Fighting the Coronavirus,” Heritage Foundation, 1 April, 2020, https://www.heritage.org/.

18. Satoshi Sugiyama and Jesse Johnson, “Suga Clears First Diplomatic Hurdle in Meeting 

with Pompeo,” Japan Times, 6 October 2020, https://www.japantimes.co.jp/.

19. Harsh Vardhan Shringla, “Speech: India’s Vision of the Indo-Pacific,” Policy Exchange, 2 

November, 2020, https://policyexchange.org.uk/.

20. “Net ODA provided, total (current US$)—United Kingdom, United States, Japan, Germany, France (2016),” World Bank, https://data.worldbank.org/.

21. Martin A. Weis, Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 3 February 2017), https://fas.org/.

22. “Brexit: Japan ‘Would Welcome’ Britain to TPP Says Abe,” BBC News, 8 October 2018, 

https://www.bbc.com/ .

23. James Rogers, “European (British and French) Geostrategy in the Indo-Pacific,” Journal of 

the Indian Ocean Region 9, no. 1 (2013): 69–89.

24. See: Gareth Stansfield and Saul Kelly, “A Return to East of Suez?: UK Military Deployment to the Gulf,” RUSI Briefing Paper, 26 April 2013, https://rusi.org/.

25. “UK Opens Permanent Military Base in Bahrain,” Reuters, 5 April 2018, https://uk.reuters 

.com/; and “Defence Secretary Strengthens Ties between UK and Oman,” HM Government, 28 

August 2017, https://www.gov.uk/.

26. “Britain Extends Global Defence Reach,” HM Government, 12 December 2016, https://

www.gov.uk/.

27. Christopher Hope, “Britain to Become “True Global Player” Post-Brexit with Military 

Bases in South East Asia and Caribbean, Says Defence Secretary,” Daily Telegraph, 30 December 

2018, https://www.telegraph.co.uk/.

28. Collin Koh, Twitter post, 12 October 2020, https://twitter.com/.

29. Severin Carrell, “South China Sea: UK Could Send Aircraft Carrier to Back Australian 

Vessels,” Guardian, 21 July 2018, https://www.theguardian.com/.

30. See: “What Military Capability Does Britain Have Deployed In The Gulf?,” Forces Net, 

12 January 2020, https://www.forces.net/ and “HMS Montrose joined trilateral exercises with 
130 JOURNAL OF INDO-PACIFIC AFFAIRS  SPECIAL ISSUE 2020

Hemmings & Rogers

Japan and US,” British Embassy Tokyo, 18 March 2019, https://www.gov.uk/government/news/

hms-montrose-joined-trilateral-exercises-with-japan-and-us.

31. See: Philip Shetler-Jones, “Searching for the ‘Strategic’ in the UK-Japan ‘New Type of 

Alliance’,” Asia-Pacific Bulletin, No. 306, 31 March 2015, https://www.eastwestcenter.org/ and 

Andrew Davies, Benjamin Schreer and Peter Jennings, “Australia–UK defence arrangements,” The 

Strategist, 22 January 2013, https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/australia-uk-defence-arrangements/.

32. “The UK national strategy for maritime security,” HM Government, May 2014, https://

assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/.

33. “Document: Statement on Trilateral Maritime Agreement Between U.S., U.K. and 

Japan,”US Naval Institute News, 20 October 2016, https://news.usni.org/.

34. Jacob Dirr, “Maritime forces from Japan, UK, US practice submarine hunting in Philippine 

Sea,” Commander, US Pacific Fleet, 16 December 2018, https://www.cpf.navy.mil/.

35. Jesse Johnson, “US and British Navies conduct first joint military exercises in disputed 

South China Sea,” Japan Times, 21 January 2019, https://www.japantimes.co.jp/.

36. Boris Johnson, “Foreign Secretary Speech: ‘Britain Is Back East of Suez’,” HM Government, 9 December 2016, https://www.gov.uk/.

37. See: Mackenzie Smith, “UK ‘Stepped Back Too Much’ from Pacific—High Commissioner,” RNZ, 4 July 2019, found at: https://www.rnz.co.nz/; and Cleo Paskal, “Britain’s New Pacific Presence,” Interpreter, 24 April 2018, https://www.lowyinstitute.org/.

38. See: “UK and Japan sign free trade agreement,” British Embassy Tokyo, 23 October 2020, 

https://www.gov.uk/.

39. “Boris Johnson Pledges Security, Defence and Foreign Policy Review,” Forces Net, 1 December 2019, https://www.forces.net/.

40. “Boris Johnson Pledges Security, Defence and Foreign Policy Review,” Forces Net.

41. William Worley, “UK Aid Helps Countries Stand Up to Chinese ‘Bullying,’ Says Former 

DFID Chief,” DEVEX, 6 October 2020, https://www.devex.com/.

42. Steven Swinford and Lucy Fisher, “Rishi Sunak and Boris Johnson Clash over Defence 

Cash,” The Times, 31 October 2020, https://www.thetimes.co.uk/.

43. See: James Rogers, “Is It Time for a Royal Navy “Great Grey Fleet” to Show the World 

Britain Means Business?,” Warships—International Fleet Review, 16 December 2019, https://

www.warshipsifr.com/; and Lucy Fisher, “Britain Set to Confront China with New Aircraft Carrier,” The Times, 14 July 2020, https://www.thetimes.co.uk/.

44. Nicholas John Spykman, The Geography of the Peace (New York: Harcourt, Brace, and Co., 

1944), 38.

45. “Japan-UK Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation,” HM Government, August 2017, 

https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/.

Disclaimer

The views and opinions expressed or implied in JIPA are those of the authors and should not be construed as carrying the 

official sanction of the Department of Defense, Department of the Air Force, Air Education and Training Command, Air 

University, or other agencies or departments of the US government or their international equivalents.
JOURNAL OF INDO-PACIFIC AFFAIRS  SPECIAL ISSUE 2020 131

 THE PLUS PERSPECTIVES

South Korea’s Perspective on Quad 

Plus and Evolving Indo-Pacific Security 

Architecture

Dr. Kuyoun Chung

Abstract

As South Korea prioritizes maintaining its foreign policy autonomy during 

US–China great-power rivalry, Seoul’s priority is not fully compatible with US 

grander strategic motivation of building a networked security network that includes Quad Plus. Joining Quad Plus could present a geopolitical challenge to 

Seoul as it signals a resolve among Indo-Pacific democracies in countering China. 

For now, South Korea prefer to foster a more inclusive international order that 

accommodates every country in the region to hedge the risk of great-power decoupling and disengagement. Meanwhile, South Korea is willing to deepen the 

US–ROK alliance cooperation and support the Free and Open Indo-Pacific 

Strategy to be channeled through its implementation of the New Southern Policy.

Introduction

As the great-power competition has become heightened, the United States has reiterated its resolve to tighten its defense ties with allies and strategic partners in the 

Indo-Pacific into a networked security architecture. Initially introduced in the US Department of Defense’s Indo-Pacific Strategy Report in 2019, the concept of a networked 

security architecture is defined as “a network of interwoven bilateral, minilateral and 

multilateral defense arrangement between the US and regional allies and partners, and 

that also partly include China.”1 US officials’ recent remarks on this point are more 

instructive. During the US-India Strategic Partnership Forum on 31 August 2020, the 

US Deputy Secretary of State, Stephen Biegun, mentioned that four countries in the 

region—the United States, Japan, Australia, and India—would work together as “a 

bulwark against a challenge from China” and would invite more countries to align in a 

more structured manner.2 Secretary of Defense Mark Esper also stated that “we are 

encouraging Indo-Pacific nations to expand their own intra-regional security relationship and networks of like-minded partners,”3

 which reaffirms the US strategic interest 

to multilateralize the US-led hub-and-spoke bilateral alliance system into a networked 

security architecture.4 This networked security architecture does not imply that all the 

security relationships in the Indo-Pacific theater should be unified as an Asian NATO 
132 JOURNAL OF INDO-PACIFIC AFFAIRS  SPECIAL ISSUE 2020

Chung

under US stewardship. Instead, minilateral and multilateral institutions complement 

the existing hub-and-spoke bilateral alliance system.

That said, such remarks rather suggest that Washington sees building this architecture as an opportunity of reemphasizing US leadership challenged by revisionist 

China and attempts to slow down the pace of geopolitical flux with a more extensive web of like-minded Indo-Pacific democracies. Indeed, the regional balance of 

power is shifting adversely for the United States, as allies are declining relative to 

regional competitors such as China and Russia.5 Meanwhile, China’s selective revisionism of the US-led order has met mixed responses from regional countries, 

ranging from resistance to accommodation.6 Such allied decline has not only made 

it more difficult for the United States to provide regional security and stability but 

also weakened the hard power that sustains the US-led liberal order. Hence the US 

message is clear: Washington is now probing the willingness of allies and strategic 

partners to join a like-minded democratic coalition preparing for a post-pandemic 

geopolitical confrontation with China.

Allies and partners in the Indo-Pacific, however, are reluctant to join the 

United States in confrontation with China. While the US–China competition 

now seems to have become a new organizing principle of US foreign policy, the 

prospect of complete decoupling and disengagement between two great powers 

seems remote so far. Even within the United States it is still debated whether the 

rivalry with China should be conceptualized as an existential struggle that must 

be universally fought in every corner of the world.7 As there is little consensus on 

the ultimate end state of the current competition, allies and partners in the IndoPacific, albeit concerned over Chinese revisionism, are hesitant to join the United 

States in allied confrontation.

Additionally, forging a networked security architecture would strengthen Chinese fear of encirclement, which is likely to lead to Beijing undertaking strategic 

or economic countermoves toward US allies and partners participating in the 

architecture, as evidenced by Chinese economic coercion during the Terminal 

High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) deployment dispute in South Korea in 

2016. However, Washington’s response against Chinese coercion has not reassured allies and partners enough during the dispute. What is worse, the much 

narrower unilateralism of the Trump administration has spread perceptions of 

further US decline and attenuated an otherwise favorable balance of power.8

Meanwhile, under the Moon Jae-in administration, South Korea prioritizes 

foreign policy goals aimed at improving inter-Korean relationship as a means of 

denuclearizing North Korea. As North Korea remains the core driver of South 

Korea’s foreign policy, Seoul attempts to maintain a good relationship with 

China, which is the biggest trade partner and main benefactor of North Korea, 
South Korea’s Perspective on Quad Plus and Evolving Indo-Pacific Security Architecture

JOURNAL OF INDO-PACIFIC AFFAIRS  SPECIAL ISSUE 2020 133

enabling sustainment of the momentum of inter-Korean dialogue. To this end, 

South Korea strives to achieve foreign policy autonomy amid the great-power 

rivalry in the region.

Against this backdrop, this article argues that South Korea’s priority of maintaining foreign policy autonomy during great-power rivalry and paving the way 

to build a non-nuclear peace regime on the Korean peninsula has been less 

compatible with the US grander strategic intent of building a networked security architecture under the “Free and Open Indo-Pacific” (FOIP) strategy. That 

said, this article addresses South Korea’s perspective on the current US–China 

competition and changing regional security landscape in the Indo-Pacific. Next, 

it discusses how the strategy of multilateralizing bilateral alliance, as exemplified 

by the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue Plus (Quad Plus), generates strategic 

dilemmas for South Korea. In particular, such dilemmas will be discussed in the 

context of South Korea’s pursuit of its own foreign policy priorities and how 

South Korea’s alternative regional initiative—the New Southern Policy—can be 

synergized with the FOIP.

South Korea’s Perspective on US–China Competition

As Beijing started to reassert China’s influence regionally and globally, the 

United States is increasingly being challenged in the security, economic, technology, and even governance domains. Such confrontation posed by China raises 

questions about America’s status as the preeminent power. Since the end of the 

Cold War, Washington was able to enjoy the unipolar moment with its own 

unparalleled strength, and the fact that the most of countries next to it in overall 

geopolitical strength were its closest allies bolstered US primacy.9 The United 

States has used that primacy to shape the international system in a fashion highly 

conducive to American interests and ideals—employing its power-projection 

capabilities, forwarded presence, and expeditionary intervention to uphold stability in key regions, to promote the spread of democracy, to anchor a liberal 

economic system, and to roll back or contain the influence of adversaries that 

might disrupt the US-led liberal order.10 However, distribution of global military 

and economic power has shifted significantly since the mid-1990s. While the 

decline of the United States and its allies is not universal, allied decline relative 

to the rise of adversaries has eroded the broader influence that US allies can 

bring to maintain the liberal order.

However, China, as a main competitor to the United States, can be better conceptualized as a selective revisionist.11 Specifically, Chinese strategic behavior is 

better captured by the phrase regional restructuring than simply revisionism. Beijing 

would certainly prefer to alter the status quo of the current international order, but 
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Chung

China only aims to revise certain aspect of the regional order to better promote its 

own interests. As China primarily intends to shape international order to be more 

amenable to the exercise of Chinese power, regional restructuring mainly requires 

weakening the US alliance system as an obstacle to those goals, while leaving other 

elements of order intact.

This US hub-and-spoke bilateral alliance system poses a threefold threat to 

China.12 First, the persistence of volatile sovereignty disputes between China and 

neighboring countries—such as Taiwan, Philippines, and Japan, which are mostly 

allied with the United States—carries the risk that a localized clash could escalate 

into a devastating full-scaled war between China and the United States. Second, 

from Beijing’s perspective, US provision of extended deterrence encourages and 

enables US allies to act more assertively. Third, a robust US alliance system grants 

Washington the option of assembling an anti-China coalition to contest leadership in East Asia should relations turn sour. Therefore, finding ways to weaken US 

alliances offers Chinese leaders the benefit of reducing the risk of all-out war with 

the America, while advancing the objectives that the US opposes the most, such 

as ending or reducing US access to allied bases, which would make military intervention in a regional conflict infeasible. Without the ability to project forces from 

forward bases in allied countries, conducting any intervention would be highly 

costly for the United States.

To this end, China has long upheld the realization of “national rejuvenation” since 

the 1980s; Pres. Xi Jinping refined this vision into the “China Dream,” the goal of 

which is to build “a community of common destiny” where China leads neighboring 

countries in managing their own security affairs.13 In Xi’s words, “it is for the people 

of Asia to uphold the security of Asia,”14 which would inevitably reduce the US 

presence in the region. To promote this vision, Beijing has promoted new initiatives 

that aim at building a parallel security order featuring dialogue and multilateral 

cooperation to address shared security threats without any role for alliances. Such 

structures include the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, the Conference on Interaction and Confidence Building Measures, and the ASEAN Regional Forum 

(ARF). Furthermore, China has conducted multilateral and bilateral exercises to 

develop its capacity to conduct multinational humanitarian assistance and disaster 

relief (HA/DR) operations, engage regional US allies, and ease anxieties among 

China’s neighbors concerning the People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA) growing capabilities and expanding missions; for instance, recent joint exercises between China 

and regional countries including Cobra Gold, the ASEAN Regional Forum Disaster Relief Exercises, Khaan Quest, Kowari exercise, Tropic Twilight, and Falcon 

Strike. These exercises have intended to support Xi’s foreign policy by seeking to 
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ease regional concerns while attempting to shape the international system and 

improve the security environment along China’s periphery.15

In addition to the aforementioned engagement measures toward the regional 

countries, the growing influence of China provides both positive and negative 

measures through a combination of coercion and alliance splitting.16 Regarding 

coercion, Beijing uses both coercion and coercive diplomacy to shape the behavior of countries on its periphery. For instance, Beijing has employed punitive 

economic sanctions against Japan and the Philippines following confrontations 

in 2010 between the Japanese Coast Guard and a Chinese fishing vessel in the 

East China Sea and in 2012 between the Philippine Coast Guard and Chinese 

maritime law enforcement ships at Scarborough Reef in the South China Sea, 

both over illegal Chinese fishing activities. China temporarily banned the export 

of rare-earth elements to Japan and unofficially imposed import restrictions on 

Philippine bananas.17

In alliance splitting, some notable examples include the case of South Korea’s 

THAAD deployment dispute, which found Seoul in a strategic dilemma between 

its economic engagement with China and its security relationship with the United 

States. Furthermore, Beijing seeks to exploit seams in relationships and has attempted to drive wedges between Japan and South Korea, whose alignment is 

critical to the US security strategy in Northeast Asia.18

Meanwhile, US foreign policy under the Trump administration has been a combination of retrenchment and realignment as Washington focuses on engaging 

great-power competition rather than restoring liberal order. Retrenchment has 

been pursued to concentrate the limited assets of the United States to the greatpower competition in the Indo-Pacific theater, while the realignment indicates 

that Washington is willing to cooperate with any actors in addition to traditional 

allies and partners to sustain its primacy, which raised concerns.19 In this context, 

US calls for a networked security architecture have been initially regarded less 

credible, as numerous commitments to the multilateral institutions have been 

abandoned during the Trump administration, such as US withdrawal from TransPacific Partnership (TPP) and Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA).

While the idea of great-power competition between the United States and 

China has been lingering among US foreign policy makers, the devastating effects 

of the COVID-19 pandemic catalyzed US resolve to disengage from China beyond great-power competition. This pandemic has clearly revealed US economic 

interdependence with its geopolitical rival, ranging from lifesaving medical equipment to supply chains of technology in national security–related infrastructure. 

Many believe such dependence renders the United States more vulnerable to 

China’s coercive economic statecraft.20
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It should be noted that peacetime nationalist urges of both great powers are 

also driving this decoupling, which leads to the question of how far the decoupling will be escalated.21 At the moment, the Trump administration is framing the 

US–China interdependence as “economic surrender,” threatening that to “cut off 

the whole relationship.”22

Joe Biden, the 2020 Democratic presidential candidate, shares this conviction 

for US disengagement from China. Although he has been labeled as a foreign 

policy centrist, Biden has been pressured to move left by Democratic voters, especially by supporters of Senator Bernie Sanders (I-VT). As clearly stated in the 

2020 Democratic Party Platform, Democrats also share the hostility against Chinese economic practice in the global market, especially for manipulating currencies 

and stealing intellectual property.23 Hence, this bipartisan urge for decoupling is 

likely to outlast the current Trump administration, whoever wins the 2020 US 

presidential election.

It is certain that this decoupling from China will not only incur an unbearable 

cost to the US economy for sure but also collateral economic impacts on allies and 

partners. Furthermore, disengaging from China would make the US post-COVID 

recovery even more difficult and the opportunity to hold accountable China in 

domains of human rights, environment, development cooperation, and global 

health issues will be lost.24 Additionally, it is undeniable that China is the secondlargest economy, with the world’s largest population, and a permanent member of 

UN Security Council, which could undermine US interests across the board. 

Global issues such as climate change, Iran, or North Korea cannot be effectively 

managed without a working relationship with China. However, for now, Washington is determined to ensure that the economic activities of US firms do not 

serve the interests of an authoritarian competitor.25 Regional countries in the 

Indo-Pacific, however, do not universally share the same level of threats and interests out of Chinese selective revisionism, which leads them take different types of 

alignment vis-à-vis US efforts to build a networked security architecture.

Multilateralizing and Institutionalizing a Networked 

Security Architecture

The idea of multilateralizing the bilateral hub-and-spoke system is nothing 

new. In fact, the hub-and-spoke alliance network in East Asia has already been 

transformed into a “less hierarchical and more pliable basis” for security cooperation.26 Originally, the hub-and-spoke system was anchored in East Asia to 

allow the United States to exert control over potentially unruly leaders such as 

Taiwan’s Chiang Kai-Shek.27 Therefore, US allies had very little ties between 
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one another. However, China’s growing assertiveness and the deficiency of US 

strategic commitments in East Asia since the George W. Bush administration 

necessitated a number of regional alignments. This has led to the forging of 

minilateral and multilateral arrangements—a more fluid regional security architecture that reflects the diversity of emerging regional architects.28 Particularly 

military and diplomatic ties among China’s rival claimants in the South China 

Sea are proliferating, with countries such as Vietnam, Thailand, and the Philippines building bilateral partnerships. The Quad countries, India, Australia, and 

Japan, are deepening security cooperation, as demonstrated by the Quad itself, 

and actively participating in other multilateral such as the East Asia Summit 

(EAS), ARF, and ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting–Plus (ADMM+). Regional countries that are not treaty-based allies of the United States, such as 

Singapore, Vietnam, and Indonesia, also participated in building partnerships 

to preserve normative and material base of the rule-based order in the region. In 

other words, while the hub-and-spoke system remains, the region as a whole 

starts to become far more interconnected in the face of the changing security 

landscape. Such a web of political and military ties that pool capacities enables 

states to resist China’s selective revisionism.

However, institutionalizing a sustainable networked security architecture 

would require the United States to consider whether this architecture can find 

the equilibrium between two potentially countervailing perspectives in mobilizing regional democracies: “balance of threat” and “balance of interests.” Realist 

theories suggest that common threats drive states to form a military alliance as 

an institution for hard balancing.29 China, as a selective revisionist, however, is far 

from being a common enemy that poses the same level of threats across regional 

countries. For instance, South Korea feels less threatened by China than does 

Japan. Indeed some have argued that South Korea accommodates rather than 

balances against China’s rise.30 Even regional countries in the Indo-Pacific intentionally accommodate China to develop a vested interest in the stability of 

the existing order, as evidenced by the China-South Korea-Japan Trilateral 

Cooperation Secretariat, EAS, ARF, and ADMM+.

Uneven distribution of threat perception on China’s rise may hinder US efforts 

to institutionalize a networked security architecture in a sustainable manner. In 

other words, balance of threat among democratic allies and partners may not be 

universally perceived. In this context, portraying the US–China rivalry as a “geopolitical competition between free and repressive vision of the world order,”31 which 

is more value-oriented, can mobilize more regional democracies by legitimizing 

the necessity of current competition with their existential threats.
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Meanwhile, different levels of economic interdependence with China might 

create different incentive structures for regional countries to calculate whether to 

join US-led economic minilaterals in the region, as evidenced by the Economic 

Prosperity Network. A wedging strategy conducted by China,32 which uses the 

Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) to dissuade regional countries from engaging in 

anti-China institution building in the Indo-Pacific, is noteworthy. Furthermore, 

such strategy might offset threat perceptions among regional states. For instance, 

the failure of Quad 1.0. is a clear example in which a “democratic diamond” confronted sudden demise after Australia’s withdrawal.33

In addition, given that national security agendas of US allies and partners in the 

Indo-Pacific have already become diverse and often contradictory, forging a networked security architecture would require a measure to overcome the issue of 

compartmentalization among minilaterals. Compartmentalization has been a 

major issue in the relationship between the West and Russia. While Western 

leaders emphasize shared common interests with Russia in the areas of the war on 

terrorism, the Iranian nuclear program, and stabilization operations in Afghanistan, Russia sought to exploit Western efforts to compartmentalize as a way to 

undermine Western interests, as represented in the cases of hybrid war in the 

Caucasus, Central Asia, and the Syrian Civil War.34 These examples demonstrate 

that expanding areas of cooperation among countries do not necessarily make 

their interests converge with one another. Their interests in specific domains may 

collide with others in different domains, which will destabilize the overall security 

architecture the United States intends to forge.

Altogether, institutionalizing the multilateral security architecture is still uncertain, forging a networked security architecture indeed rests on regional democracies’ 

willingness and capabilities that reflect their interests and threat perception vis-à-vis 

China’s selective revisionism and the US intent to decouple from the relationship 

with China. Regional countries will not easily make a choice of bandwagoning with 

one of those great powers but may instead opt to diversify the scope of alignment 

with great powers and with regional countries, as they collectively hedge the risk of 

great-power rivalry.

Quad Plus and South Korea’s Dilemma

Some argue that South Korea holds the key to the success of the US FOIP 

strategy.35 As two great powers compete with each other, both need regional architecture through which they can project their geopolitical strategies and garner 
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support from regional countries. However, the Quad, which serves FOIP strategy 

to balance China’s BRI, does not have participants that can enhance their own 

strategic leverage vis-à-vis China. Japan is a predictable actor as a treaty-based 

ally of the United States; India is now more willing to balance against China after 

the recent Sino–India border dispute in the Galwan Valley; Australia suffers from 

trade wars with China for years. Therefore, inviting South Korea, New Zealand, 

and Vietnam—each of which still hedges against US–China great-power rivalry—

to the Quad Plus demonstrates the Quad’s effort to expand its own influence.36

Indeed, South Korea under the Moon Jae-in administration prioritizes 

maintaining foreign policy autonomy amid great-power competition, which 

makes Seoul reluctant to embrace the FOIP. As much as endorsing the idea of 

a “Free and Open Indo-Pacific” is regarded as an attempt to contain China, 

Quad Plus is considered as another driver that globally supports Washington’s 

anti-China narrative.37

This relatively accommodating attitude toward China has been observed for 

decades. As South Korea’s foreign policy is mainly preoccupied with North Korea, 

Seoul attempts to forge multilateral initiatives connected with Pyongyang. For 

instance, South Korea strived to link its Eurasian Initiative during the Park Geunhye administration with China’s One Belt, One Road initiative to facilitate infrastructure building that could reconnect South Korea and North Korea and even 

to the European continent in the long run. Moon Jae-in’s New Northern Policy 

also has the same strategic purpose. Additionally, South Korea’s middle-power 

diplomacy, which envisions Seoul’s bridging role that builds inclusive like-minded 

groups, seeks positional advantage in the global hierarchy as well as geographical 

location—between the global North and South, great powers and small powers, 

the West and East, and continental powers and maritime powers.38 As a result, 

South Korea has taken a more accommodating attitude toward China and more 

inclusive approach toward other regional countries as a whole.

Meanwhile, as seen in table 1, South Korea’s endeavor to join a networked security architecture remains fairly nascent so far. Most of Seoul’s efforts are bilateral, 

and even minilateral and multilateral cooperations have been limited to engage 

neighboring countries in Northeast Asia. This is mainly due to the ROK’s foreign 

policy focus on North Korea and subsequent accommodating attitude toward 

China, which do not necessarily support US efforts to build a networked security 

architecture to resist China’s revisionism.
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Table 1. South Korea’s major experiences in networked security architecture

South Korea’s major experiences in networked security architecture

Types Initiative Year Since Partners

Bilateral

Joint Vision for the Alliance 2009 United States

Korea-US Integrated Defense Dialogues (KIDD) 2011 United States

General Security of Military Information Agreement 

(GSOMIA) 2015 Japan

Defense Cooperation 2015 Singapore

Defense Cooperation 2017 Indonesia

Memorandum of Understanding 2015 Vietnam

Intelligence Sharing 2015 Australia

Defense and Security Cooperation Blueprint 2015 Australia

Protection of Military Cooperation 2018 Philippines

Minilateral

Trilateral Coordination and Oversight Group 

(TCOG) 1998–2003 United States, Japan

China-Korea-Japan Trilateral Summits and Secretariat 2011 Japan, China

Multilateral

Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) 2003 Global

Northeast Asia Cooperation Initiative 2003

Japan, China, Russia, North Korea, 

US

Northeast Asia Peace and Cooperation Initiative 

(NAPCI) 2013

Japan, China, Russia, North Korea, 

Mongolia, United 

States

Northeast Asia Plus Community of Responsibility 

(NAPCOR) 2018

Japan, China, Russia, North Korea, 

Mongolia, United 

States, India, 

ASEAN

Seoul Defense Dialogue 2015 Global

Source: Matteo Dian, “Japan, South Korea and the Rise of a Networked Security Architecture in East Asia,” International Politics 57, no. 

2 (2020): 185–207.

However, South Korea would rather attempt to hedge great-power rivalry by 

forging an alternative network among middle powers such as Australia, ASEAN, 

and India, which are economically and strategically trapped in the US–China 

competition. This is contrasted with Japan’s attempt to compensate for the declining US commitment in supporting the regional order in the Indo-Pacific. 

More specifically, South Korea attempts to share the concern over collapse of the 

international order out of great-power decoupling with those middle powers by 

forging a buffer through which two great-power’s rivalry can be attenuated.

In fact, early in 2019, South Korea clarified its position over the escalating 

great-power rivalry. When President Trump visited the Demilitarized Zone 
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JOURNAL OF INDO-PACIFIC AFFAIRS  SPECIAL ISSUE 2020 141

(DMZ) on 30 June 2019 to hold a meeting with Kim Jung-un of North Korea, 

he also discussed the US–South Korea bilateral relationship with Pres. Moon. 

During this meeting, both countries agreed that they would put forth a harmonious cooperation between South Korea’s New Southern Policy and the US 

FOIP strategy. Indeed, South Korea maintained its participation in the broader 

US regional effort in domains such as energy, infrastructure, digital economy, and 

good governance.39 The New Southern Policy was introduced as an attempt to 

better posture South Korea to strengthen economic ties with Southeast Asia and 

to expand the diplomatic horizon beyond Northeast Asia amid great-power 

competition. At the same time, while South Korea would attempt to synergize 

its New Southern Policy and the US Indo-Pacific Strategy, the former should be 

understood as a hedge to reduce economic reliance on China.40 Seoul’s bitter 

experience suffering from China’s economic sanctions in response to South Korea’s deployment of the US THAAD system in 2016 is reflected in this endeavor.

Meanwhile, the Quad, which was initially inaugurated in 2007 on the basis of 

the US, Japan, India, and Australia’s success in HA/DR cooperation in the aftermath of the 2004 Indian Ocean Tsunami disaster, has been less vitalized after the 

withdrawal of Australia and India until the arrival of the Trump administration in 

2017 and the rejuvenation of the initiative. While many doubted the feasibility of 

the Quad’s strategic cooperation in the region, the spread of COVID-19 provides 

ample opportunity for the Quad countries to engage major middle powers in the 

region, including Vietnam, New Zealand, and South Korea, through the auspices 

of the Quad Plus. Vietnam, which is the current chair of ASEAN; New Zealand, 

which is one of the Five Eyes partners; and South Korea, which is one of the 

treaty-based bilateral allies of the United States, are all capable contributors in 

not only fighting the COVID-19 pandemic but also strengthening the soft 

power of the Quad by further addressing the issues of HA/DR in the IndoPacific.41 Also, these countries are expected to serve as trusted partners for the 

Economic Prosperity Network.

Joining Quad Plus could provide South Korea a number of strategic and economic advantages, although the initiative is still in its early stages of development. Quad countries already have been conducting spoke-to-spoke strategic 

cooperations. To name a few, India and Australia’s Mutual Logistics Support 

Agreement in June 2020, India and Japan’s Acquisition and Cross-serving 

Agreement in September 2020, and the US and India’s Communication Compatibility and Security Agreement (COMCASA) in September 2018, all represent 

deepening strategic cooperation among Quad countries.

However, Quad Plus also presents a geopolitical challenge to South Korea, as 

it signals a unified resolve among Indo-Pacific countries in countering China. 
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Chung

Likewise, none of the “Plus” countries are sign on to the Quad Plus easily. New 

Zealand, for instance, maintains deep economic ties with China, and Vietnam, with 

its “three nos” principle of defense policy—no military alliance, no foreign troops 

stationed on its soil, and no partnering with a foreign power to combat another—is 

seemingly constrained from taking part in Quad Plus and countering China.42

South Korea prefers an interpretation of the FOIP that does not exclude any 

country in the region. Thus, South Korea does not want the Quad Plus to serve as 

an instrument for the development of regional blocs or for great-power competition that might further accelerate the pace of decoupling. South Korea, within the 

US–ROK alliance framework, is willing to cooperate on a number of issues, 

building on previous bilateral efforts. South Korea would also cooperate on a 

working level with members of the Quad Plus both in economic and security 

domains, but the umbrella of Quad Plus might send a wrong signal to other 

countries that South Korea takes a side in the great-power rivalry.

Way Toward an Inclusive International Order

For South Korea, the Quad Plus is a geopolitical minilateral that serves a 

networked security architecture. South Korea recently confronted a number of 

occasions in which it has to choose, including Quad Plus, D-10, Five Eyes Plus, 

G-11, and so forth. South Korea welcomes any discussions on economic cooperation for empowerment, investment for infrastructure in developing countries, 

or nontraditional security issues from which it can elevate its position as a 

middle power in the Indo-Pacific as well as foster a better strategic environment 

to build an inclusive international order. Likewise South Korea’s support for the 

FOIP is channeled through its implementation of the New Southern Policy in 

the Indo-Pacific region as taking a more conflict-avoidance approach in regard 

to China, by mostly participating in economic, social, nontraditional security 

issue projects. Instead, South Korea further focuses on expanding the areas of 

cooperation with the United States so that US–ROK alliance cooperation can 

be deepened to contribute to the peace and prosperity of the Korean Peninsula 

and regional stability. In the long term, South Korea might be more aligned 

with the FOIP, if Chinese assertiveness trespasses upon Seoul’s foreign policy 

autonomy. But for now, South Korea prefers to foster a more inclusive international order that accommodates every country in the region in its attempt to 

resist great-power decoupling.
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Dr. Kuyoun Chung

Dr. Chung is an assistant professor of political science at Kangwon National University, South Korea. She currently 

serves as a member of the Policy Advisory Committee of the ROK Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of 

Unification, the Unification Education Commission, and the Korea Council for Reconciliation and Cooperation. 

Previously, she was a lecturer in the Department of Political Science at the University of California–Los Angeles 

(UCLA) (2011–12); visiting professor at the Korea National Diplomatic Academy (2014–15); and a research fellow 

at the Korea Institute for National Unification (2015–18). She received her PhD in political science from UCLA in 

2011. Dr. Chung’s research focuses on American foreign policy and Indo-Pacific security issues. Her Englishmedium publications include “Geopolitics and a Realist Turn of US Foreign Policy toward North Korea,” Korea 

Observer 48, no. 4 (2017): 765–90; “Wartime Durability of the US-led Coalition of the Willing: The Case of the 2003 

Operation Iraqi Freedom,” Korean Journal of Security Affairs 25, no. 1 (2020): 96–116; and “Korean Peninsula and the 

Evolving Sino-US Strategic Stability in the Indo-Pacific,” in The Korean Peninsula and Indo-Pacific Power Politics: Status 

Security at Stake, ed. Jagannath P. Panda (New York: Routledge, 2020).

Notes

1. Matteo Dian, “Japan, South Korea and the Rise of a Networked Security Architecture in 

East Asia,” International Politics 57, no. 2 (2020): 185–207.

2. Robert Delaney, “US seeks formal allies to NATO with India, Japan and Australia, State 

Department Official says,” South China Morning Post, 1 September 2020.

3. Jim Garamone, “Esper Discusses Importance of Indo-Pacific Strategy,” US Department of 

Defense, 21 July 2020.

4. US Department of Defense, Indo-Pacific Strategy Report: Preparedness, Partnerships, and Promoting a Networked Region (Washington, DC: DOD, 1 June 2019) 44, https://media.defense.gov/.

5. Hal Brands, Dealing with Allies in Decline: Alliance Management and US Strategy in an Era of 

Global Power Shift (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, 2017).

6. Matteo Dian, “Japan, South Korea and the Rise of a Networked Security Architecture in East 

Asia,” International Politics 57, no. 2 (2020): 185–207; and Bonnie Glaser, “China as a Selective 

Revisionist Power in the International Order,” ISEAS Yusof Ishak Institute Perspective 2019, no. 21 

(5 April 2019): 1–9.

7. Jeffrey A. Bader, “Avoiding a new Cold War Between the US and China,” The Brookings 

Institute, 17 August 2020; Aaron Friedberg, “Beware the China Reset,” Foreign Policy, 1 October 

2020; and Anatol Lieven, “Stay Calm about China,” Foreign Policy, 26 August 2020.

8. Mira Rapp-Hooper, “China, America and the Internatinoal Order after the Pandemic” War 

on the Rocks, 24 March 2020.

9. Brands, Dealing with Allies in Decline, 6.

10. Hal Brands, “The Era of American Primacy is Far from Over,” National Interest, 24 

August 2016.

11. Evan S. Medeiros. “The Changing Fundamentals of US-China Relations,” Washington 

Quarterly 42, no. 3 (2019): 93–119.

12. Kristien Bergerson, “China’s Effort to Counter US Forward Presence in the Asia-Pacific,” 

US-China Economic and Security Review Commission, 15 March 2016.

13. Timothy Heath, “China Overhauls Diplomacy to Consolidate Regional Leadership, 

Outline strategy for Superpower Ascent,” China Brief 14, no. 24 (December 2014).
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Chung

14. “Remarks at the Fourth Summit of the Conference on Interaction and Confidence Building 

Measures (CICA),” Xinhua, 21 May 2014.

15. Michael Green et al., Asia-Pacific Rebalance 2025: Capabilities, Presence, and Partnership

(Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, January 2016), 13, https://

csis-website-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/.

16. Bergerson, “China’s Effort to Counter US Forward Presence,” 5.

17. Phillip C. Saunders, “China’s Coercive Economic Diplomacy – A New and Worrying 

Trend,” Pacific Forum CSIS, 23 July 2012.

18. Robert G. Sutter, Michale E. Brown, and Timothy J.A. Adamson, “Balancing Acts: The US 

Rebalance and Asia-Pacific Strategy,” Elliot School of International Affairs, George Washington 

University, August 2013, 21.

19. Nina Silove, “The Pivot before the Pivot: US Strategy to Preserve the Power Balance in 

Asia,” International Security 40, no. 2 (Spring 2016): 45–88.

20. John Lee, “Decoupling the US Economy from China after COVID-19,” Hudson Institute, 

May 2020.

21. Keith Johnson and Robbie Gramer, “The Great Decoupling,” Foreign Policy, 14 May 2020.

22. Andrew Soergel, “Trump Threatens to ‘Cut Off ’ Relatnioship with China, Claims Coronavirus Proved ‘Trump was Right,’” US News, 14 May 2020; and Brendan Greeley, “Trump raises 

prospect of ‘decoupling’ US economy from China,” Financial Times, 8 September 2020.

23. Democratic National Committee, 2020 US Democratic Party Platform, https://www 

.demconvention.com/.

24. Robin Niblett, “Avoiding a Virus-Induced Cold War with China,” Chatham House, 17 

April 2020.

25. Michael R. Pompeo, “Communist China And The Free World’s Future” (Speech, Richard 

Nixon Presidential Library and Museum, Yorba Linda, CA, 23 July 2020), https://www.state.gov/.

26. William T. Tow, “Minilateral Security’s relevance to US Strategy in the Indo-Pacific: Challenges and Prospects,” Pacific Review 32, no. 2 (2019): 232–44.

27. Victor Cha, “Powerplay: Origins of the US Alliance System in Asia,” International Security

34, no. 3 (2010): 158–96.

28. Elena Atanassova-Cornelis, “Alignment Cooperation and Regional Security Architecture 

in the Indo-Pacific,” International Spector 55, no. 1 (2020): 18–33; and Kei Koga, “Japan’s Diplomatic Strategy toward East Asia: Creation and Evolution of ‘Dual-Track Diplomacy’ in the 

Post-Cold War Era,” Baltic Journal of European Studies 9, no. 2 (2019): 40–60.

29. Stephen Walt, The Origins of Alliance (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1990).

30. David Kang, “The Balance of Power and State Interests in International Relations,” EAI 

Working Paper Series No. 5, 27 January 2007, 1–45.

31. The White House, National Security Strategy of the United States of America (Washington 

DC: The White House, 2017).

32. Timothy W. Crawford, “Preventing Enemy Coalition: How Wedge Strategies Shape 

Power Politics” International Security 35, no. 4 (2011): 155–89.

33. Australia’s withdrawal from Quad 1.0. has been also explained as constructivist’s core explanatory variable, identity, does not work in institutionalizing Indo-Pacific security architecture. 

Kai He and Huiyun Feng, “The Institutionalization of Indo-Pacific” International Affairs 96, no. 1 

(2020): 149–68.
South Korea’s Perspective on Quad Plus and Evolving Indo-Pacific Security Architecture

JOURNAL OF INDO-PACIFIC AFFAIRS  SPECIAL ISSUE 2020 145

34. Svant E. Cornell, “The Fallacy of ‘compartmentalisation’: the West and Russia from 

Ukraine to Syria,” European View 15 (2016): 97–109.

35. Ramon Pancheo Pardo, “South Korea Holds the Key to the Indo-Pacific,“ The Hill, 18 

August 2019.

36. Jagannath Panda and Akriti Vasudeva, “US-China Competition and Washington’s Case 

for ‘Quad Plus’,” National Interest, 28 September 2020.

37. Jagannath Panda, “The Abe Doctrine on ‘Quad Plus’” Japan Times, 17 July 2020.

38. Sohn Yul, “South Korea’s Drive for Middle-Power Influence,” Global Asia 11, no. 1 (2016), 

https://www.globalasia.org/.

39. US Embassy & Consulate in the Republic of Korea, “US & ROK Issue a Joint Factsheet 

on their Regional Cooperation Efforts,” 2 November 2019.

40. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of Korea, 2019 Diplomatic White Paper (Seoul, Ministry 

of Foreign Affairs, 2019).

41. Jeff Smith, “How America is Leading the Quad Plus” Group of Seven Countries in 

Fighting the Coronavirus,” National Interest, 30 March 2020.

42. Derek Grossman, “Don’t Get Too Excited, ‘Quad Plus’ Meetings Won’t cover China” The 

Diplomat, 9 April 2020.

Disclaimer

The views and opinions expressed or implied in JIPA are those of the authors and should not be construed as carrying the 

official sanction of the Department of Defense, Department of the Air Force, Air Education and Training Command, 

Air University, or other agencies or departments of the US government or their international equivalents.
146 JOURNAL OF INDO-PACIFIC AFFAIRS  SPECIAL ISSUE 2020

THE PLUS PERSPECTIVES

Israel and Quad Plus

A Pivot to Asia and through the Indian Ocean

Dr. Giuseppe Dentice

Abstract

Since the mid-1990s, Israel has looked at new trajectories in foreign policy to 

broaden its diplomatic horizons and to elevate its status as an influential middle 

power. Not surprisingly, Jerusalem’s reinforced relationship with India and renewed interest in the Indo-Pacific region respond to multiple needs. Israel must 

contain numerous security and geopolitical threats, especially from Iran. In this 

regard, Israel sees in the Indo-Pacific region as a functional arena to penetrate 

newly enlarged markets, as well as to expand its exports, particularly in the hi-tech 

sphere. A reinforced partnership with India, as well as the opportunity to 

strengthen cooperation with New Delhi within the framework of the Quad Plus 

Dialogue, fits exactly into Israel’s eastward policy. How important is Quad Plus 

for Israel? Can India and Israel move beyond tactical responses to their strategic 

challenges in the Indo-Pacific? What role will Israeli foreign policy play over the 

next few years in this quadrant? And, finally, what prospects are there for regional 

cooperation? In this context, this article first gives a summary of Israel’s developing relations with India. Second, it will try to explain the nature of the developing 

relationship with India, examining the geostrategic context in the current scenario, and third, it will seek to answer what possible challenges the Indo–Israeli 

ties will face in the future.

Introduction: Israel in Asia

Since the twentieth century, classical authors like Karl Haushofer and Halford 

Mackinder have discussed the growing importance of Asia in modern geopolitics. 

According to these authors, control of Asia because of competition between international powers would have produced a competitive advantage over any rival.1

Although Haushofer and Mackinder used the term “Pacific Rim” and “Eurasian 

Rim” to identify the Asian geopolitical space in the early twentieth century, only 

after World War II did these concepts begin to take shape. The extraordinary 

economic progress of Japan in the 1950s and 1960s followed by the remarkable 

advance of the so-called “Asian Tigers” (Hong Kong, Taiwan, South Korea, Singapore, and other Southeast Asian countries) until the end of 1990s represent a 

first turning point in this evolving contest. In fact, the impressive growth of China 
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and India has characterized a watershed, clearly indicated by Chinese leader Deng 

Xiaoping during a 1988 meeting in Beijing with the Indian prime minister Rajiv 

Gandhi. Deng, on that occasion, stated that “the next century will be the century 

of Asia and the Pacific,” meaning the origin of a new age for the Asian region:2

a new era in which China (especially in Deng’s vision), India, and Japan dominated the growing influence of Asian countries in the world, thanks to high rates 

of economic growth, demographic factors, and deepening interconnectedness. 

This approach views the “Asian century” not only as something inevitable or 

predestined but also as an overwhelming geopolitical vision that aims to overcome the Europeanized and Americanized ideas of global order in favor of a new 

Asianized vision of the world. This basically represents a direct derivation of 

what was the British Empire in the nineteenth century and the “American century” in the twentieth. A new concept—more economics oriented—aimed to 

create an Asia-led, or, more likely China-led, international order, in which Asia 

is positioning itself as a multipolar system that goes from Saudi Arabia to Japan 

and from Russia to Australia, extending far beyond its geographical and political 

boundaries.3 In other words, a theory that considers the Asian powers (China 

and India in particular) as the next world’s dominant forces in the twenty-first 

century, supplanting the United States. This Asianization of the world has gained 

greater attention in the contemporary geopolitical discourse over the past decade. In fact, this assumption was revitalized by different analysts and scholars 

(such as Gurpreet S. Khurana, Fazal Rizvi, Jagannath P. Panda, Parag Khanna, 

John Hemmings, and Michael Auslin) with a reinterpreted concept of the Asian 

area, in which they consider the growing importance of the Asia-Pacific—and in 

particular the Indo-Pacific region—in terms of geopolitics and regional security 

as a reflection of US, Russian, and Chinese global strategies to strengthen their 

respective regional positions. In fact, today, Asian countries have increased their 

global roles in different sectors (trade, capital, people, knowledge, transport, culture, and resources) and the political dimension, becoming in a certain sense the 

center of numerous global trends.4

In this act of rebalancing from West to East, Israel also has been attracted to 

expanding its diplomatic network, engaging in good relations with Asian powers 

such as China, India, and Japan. From the Israeli perspective, this is a choice 

aimed not to replace its strategic alliance with the United States and its important 

trade relations with Europe (63 percent of Israel’s trade is still with Western 

partners),5 but instead an attempt to balance its Western alliances and interests 

with stronger economic and strategic ties in Asia.6 This path has strengthened, 

especially since the disintegration of the Soviet Union (1991) and the establishment of full diplomatic ties with China and India (1992). These developments 
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created new opportunities for Jerusalem to open new links and expand Israel’s 

diplomatic networks with Asian countries in several fields of cooperation: i.e., security, agriculture, medicine, culture, science, and aviation.7

 Together with the 

global trends that have pushed several middle and great powers to “look East,” this 

rebalancing in Israeli foreign policy also permitted Jerusalem to revamp its traditional diplomacy, which had been based on an outdated “security-based approach,” 

and to make its diplomatic posture more effective and influential.8

In this regard, Israeli authorities have launched a new version of the country’s 

traditional “periphery doctrine,” an ambitious multidimensional, foreign policy 

strategy that called for Israel to develop close strategic alliances with non-Arab 

Muslim states in the Middle East. This refashioned contemporary form of the 

periphery doctrine seeks to expand Israeli diplomatic networks—particularly 

toward Asia, Africa, and Latin America—with the energy question and maritime 

dimension as centerpieces.9 Many of these issues found growing weight in Israel’s 

international talks, especially after Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s state 

trip to Singapore in 2017, during which he announced that Israel intended to 

expand relations with Asia in a very targeted way. From this perspective, Israel 

has developed particular bilateral cooperations in several fields—specifically, 

security, defense and cyber matters, technology, innovation, telecoms, agri-tech, 

health, and environment—with some Asian countries, including China, India, 

Japan, Vietnam, Singapore, South Korea, Taiwan, Kazakhstan, and Azerbaijan. 

Among these, China and India represent the powerhouses in Asia and the main 

actors with whom to plan possible comprehensive strategies.10 Basically, Israel’s 

reorientation has staged a diplomatic offensive in foreign policy, which has had 

great success in improving relations with East African, Central and Far East 

Asian, and Gulf countries. In particular with the latter, Israel has pursued a rapprochement based on shared interests and enemies, which has been amplified by 

current regional events that seem to have marginalized the relative importance of 

the Palestinian–Israeli conflict and increased the prospects for creating a tactical 

and strategic Israeli–Arab cooperation amid a containment policy against Iran.11

According to Jacob Abadi, this peculiar Israeli pivot to Asia is aimed at overcoming the international isolation into which hostile neighbors (and dynamics) 

since the early 2000s had forced the country and to search for new partnerships 

outside Israel’s immediate regional sphere.12 As part of this new approach in foreign policy, closer ties with India and the renewed interest in the Indo-Pacific 

quadrant have been a functional breakthrough for Israel’s leverage in Asia. In fact, 

from the Israeli perspective, relations with India serve Israel’s multiple economic, 

political and strategic needs based on (1) containing Iranian pressures, in the 

maritime dimension, the Persian Gulf, and the Indo-Pacific region; (2) achieving 
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a new international and reliable status as an influential middle power in Asia; and 

(3) contributing to forging a strong regional system in the Indo-Pacific as a functional arena for penetrating newly enlarged markets, as well as for expanding Israeli 

exports. Moreover, relations with India are important for Israel to develop other 

means of soft power in terms of identities (such as supporting Jewish communities 

in the country or building ties among emerging leaders in India through nongovernmental organizations like the Israel-Asia Center). At the same time, the Israeli 

invitation to participate in the previous meeting of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue—also known as the Quad Plus Dialogue—responds exactly to Jerusalem’s 

needs, also demonstrating the strategic importance that the Asia-Pacific region 

holds, politically and economically, in Israel’s foreign policy priorities.13

Indo–Israeli Relationship under Netanyahu and Modi

Much of the success in this refreshed relationship is mainly due to the efforts 

of Indian prime minister Narendra Modi. Before becoming prime minister in 

2014, Modi was Gujarat’s chief minister (2001–2014) and in this position flew to 

Israel in 2006 to reinforce his personal interest in the country. That interest continued and strengthened when he became premier in 2014 and especially after 

Modi’s historic visit to Israel in July 2017, which can be considered as mostly 

successful since seven memorandums of understanding (MoU) between the 

countries were signed. Moreover, during the visit, Modi met with the Indian diaspora in Israel and announced Overseas Citizens of India cards for Indian Jews 

and for those who had completed their military service in the Israeli Defense 

Force. This visit was variously proclaimed as “historic” and “special” not only by 

the media of both countries but by Modi and Netanyahu themselves. In this regard, Modi’s visit to Israel was a break from the past, because it confirmed a new 

direction in the bilateral relationship, which was further confirmed by Netanyahu’s 

trip to India in January 2018.14

On this reciprocal visit, Netanyahu received a warm welcome. A large delegation of prominent Israeli business leaders accompanied the prime minister. During the visit, both countries reinforced their fields of cooperation like defense, 

trade, science, and technology, signing nine MoUs. In addition, akin to Modi’s 

tribute to the Indian diaspora in Israel, on his Indian trip Netanyahu paid homage 

to the Indian soldiers killed a century ago in the Battle of Haifa during the last 

months of the Palestine campaign of World War I. As well as leveraging great 

symbolism, both visits highlighted the growing personal appreciation between the 

two leaders and their political interests in basing the bilateral relationship on the 

idea of a vital partnership upheld by a security approach and on a moral foundation of democracy.15 In other words, Modi and Netanyahu used their “excellent” 
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personal relations to deepen the bilateral ties that are moving in an “upward trajectory,” as also stated by India’s Ambassador to Israel, Pavan Kapoor, in an interview released to the Indian newspaper The Hindu in June 2019.16 In fact, during 

the visit, Netanyahu also participated in the annual strategic and military multilateral conference known as the Raisina Dialogue, in which the Israeli and Indian 

delegations discussed their successes and the challenges affecting their bilateral 

relations and Indo-Pacific regional security. In this sense, India reshaped its relations with Israel to promote bilateral ties and to raise this relationship to a new 

dimension of the strategic partnership.17

Compared with the past 25 years, in which the relationship has always been a 

balancing act given India’s sizable Muslim population and the country’s dependence on oil imports from Arab countries and Iran, Netanyahu and Modi have 

inaugurated a new momentum, or, with more emphasis, “the dawn of a new era” 

in the Indo–Israeli relationship, as reported in a recent article on the BBC. 18 This 

new relationship developed simultaneously with the slow eclipse of two traditional leftist parties (India’s Congress Party and Israel’s Mapai/Labor Party) and 

the rise of new rightist alignments in both countries: the Hindu nationalist 

Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) in India and the Jewish conservative Likud in Israel. The improved relationship has produced a strategic alignment not only on 

security matters but also regarding water and agricultural needs.19 From Netanyahu’s perspective, the rapprochement with India has been aimed at breaking 

long-standing anti-Israel stereotypes and providing benefits to the Indian population from Israel’s know-how in innovation and technology. From the Indian 

perspective, Modi’s government aimed to overcome the Nehruvian ideology that 

has prevailed since India’s independence to build a new image and international 

vision of a modern India, with a foreign policy at the center of the changes in the 

global order.20

The Role of the Military Dimension in the Bilateral Relationship

Undoubtedly, the main pillar of the Indo-Israeli relationship is the military/security factor. After the Cold War, India established an informal, largely sceptical 

relationship with Israel focused on low-level cooperation on intelligence and 

handicapped due to the two nations’ relationships with competing superpowers. In 

fact, the purchase of Israeli military equipment—employed in the wars against 

China (1962) and Pakistan (1965, 1971)—was the only exception to this in their 

diplomatic ties.21 Following the conclusion of the Cold War, India boosted its 

military cooperation with Israel. In fact, since the mid-1990s, Israel has become 

one of India’s main arms suppliers, a decisive factor that allowed India to regain 

possession of Kargil during the war against Pakistan (1999).22 According to Sanjay 
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Singh, Israel’s fundamental assistance to India in the conflict transformed the relationship into a de facto strategic partnership.23

Following the establishment of diplomatic relations in 1992, bilateral trade 

between Israel and India increased from 200 million USD in 1992 to 5.84 billion 

USD in 2018. This increase intensified after the BJP came to power in May 2014. 

Since then, trade in the defense and security sectors has witnessed—and will 

likely continue to see—significant growth. In particular, arms sales, technology 

transfers, and licensed production have emerged as important dimensions of the 

Indo–Israeli strategic relationship.24 Today, Israel is second only to Russia among 

India’s largest arms suppliers, with sales worth an average of 1 billion USD each 

year. According to a report by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, India accounted for 45 percent of Israel’s arm exports between 2015–

2019.25 Moreover, the Indian Ministry of Defence signed several offset deals 

with Israeli defense companies. One of these companies is Rafael Advanced 

Defense Systems, which signed a 100 million USD contract with Kalyani Rafael 

Advanced Systems Ltd. India (KRAS) in 2019 to manufacture and supply 1,000 

surface-to-air missile systems for the Indian army and air force. In addition, the 

state-owned Israel Aerospace Industries signed a contract worth almost 2 billion 

USD to supply India’s army and navy with missile defense systems.26

In addition to the undeniable weight and importance of arms sales in the Indo–

Israeli relationship, other security and defense affairs have witnessed tremendous 

growth as well. Counterterrorism and general military ties have been in the forefront of this cooperation. In fact, both leaders consider and perceive militant Islam 

to be one of the main domestic threats to their countries’ security and a common 

source of concern in South Asia. After the Mumbai attack in November 2008,27

both countries exchanged information on the finances, recruitment patterns, and 

training of terrorist groups—exchanges conducted away from the public eye. In 

fact, Israel and India are part of the Joint Working Group on Counterterrorism 

and have signed several deals on cooperation in homeland security, protection of 

classified material, and cybersecurity. Further, among the different cooperation 

activities, Israel’s National Police Academy hosts members of the Indian Police 

Service every year for training, and the Indian Border Security Force uses Israeli 

security technologies (smart fencing systems, radar, and other surveillance technology) in sensitive border areas such as the volatile region of Jammu & Kashmir 

and Ladakh.28 In fact, it is not by chance that another key element in this bilateral 

strategic partnership is the regional variable. The growing border tensions with 

China along the contested Line of Actual Control in the Himalayan region of 

Ladakh has forced India to speed up the purchase of military hardware from the 

United States, Russia, France, and, obviously, Israel. In this race for rearmament, 
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India is looking to buy from Israel the Firefly loitering munition, Spike antitank 

guided missiles, Spice guidance kits that can be mounted on standard bombs to 

convert them into smart weapons, and an operational surface-to-air missile system, 

as a 2017 order worth 2 billion USD for such advanced systems to take down 

hostile aircraft and missiles demonstrates.29 Lastly, with the backdrop of the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic, a joint team including representatives from the Indian 

and Israeli ministries of defense, foreign affairs, and health has collaborated to 

develop a rapid screening test system to track down coronavirus patients. From this 

perspective, the significant improvement in the bilateral relations, especially under 

Modi’s premiership, has favored an important convergence of interests on a range 

of issues aimed to define a new pattern in their cooperation.30

Thus, the growing partnership in this specific domain shows that Israel and 

India has reached a significant level of cooperation, considering that the two 

countries are facing both traditional and nontraditional security threats but are 

not formally bound by a military alliance.31 In fact, according to Alvite Ningthoujam, the increasing “demand for defense items due to these emerging security 

challenges, the quest for technological advancement in defense industries, and 

Israel’s readiness to meet some of the requirements of India—will lead to further 

expansion of defence cooperation.”32 In this sense, the Indo–Israeli security cooperation is a “strategic asset” in which Israel will remain an important source of 

defense equipment and technology for India and a reliable key source to help 

New Delhi in developing a self-reliant national defense industry.

Israel and India: An Evolving Partnership

Considering this, it is evident that both countries have pursued a pragmatic approach in their foreign policy. The geopolitical shift that has seen an improvement 

in ties between Israel and the Gulf States, coupled with the seemingly diminishing 

role played by the Palestinian issue, has similarly influenced on the Indo–Israeli bilateral agenda. This, in turn, has led India, especially under Modi, to strengthen its 

ties with Israel, disengaging the relationship from the Israeli–Palestinian question.33

In this regard, it is interesting how India’s policy toward the Palestinian cause has 

changed, although in New Delhi’s official narrative the Indian government continues to support the Palestinian cause. To support this, the government cited multiple 

examples, such as the Modi’s February 2018 visit to Ramallah and the Palestinian 

territories—becoming the first-ever Indian prime minister to visit these territories. 

And to counter accusations concerning a lack of solidarity with the Palestinian 

cause, India‘s deputy permanent representative to the UN, Ambassador K. Nagaraj 

Naidu, said that the Indian government has increased its annual financial contribution 
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to the core budget of the UN Relief and Works Agency fourfold, from 1.25 million 

USD in 2016 to 5 million USD in 2018, pledging the same contribution also in 2020.34

Nevertheless, the need to pursue independent relationships with Israel and the 

Palestinian Authority has primarily driven Modi’s uncritical support for the Palestinian cause, allowing greater maneuvering space with both.35 For the same 

principle, based on the need to balance state interests with opportunities and 

goals in foreign policy, Modi has never officially made any declarations about the 

Israeli plan to unilaterally annex parts of the West Bank.36 Conversely, Indian 

foreign minister Dr. Subrahmanyam Jaishankar has welcomed the agreement between Israel and the United Arab Emirates on the normalization of relations, 

focusing on the agreements opportunities for peace in the Middle East and for 

boosting regional cooperation with Gulf monarchies and Jerusalem in the IndoPacific region.37 It is crystal clear that the marginalization of the Palestinian question on the Indian foreign policy agenda strongly facilitated engagement with 

Israel.38 In fact, New Delhi considers Jerusalem a strategic partner, as well as the 

Gulf countries in the Middle East–North Africa (MENA) region, with whom 

India has good relations. Since his first term in 2014, Modi has vigorously engaged with Gulf leaders, attempting to preserve huge interests, given the number 

of Indian workers living in those countries—about 7.6 million people, vastly more 

than the 85,000 Indian Jews in Israel—and India’s dependence on them for energy sources.39 At the same time, this approach is aimed to neutralize domestic 

pro-Arab and Palestinian opposition groups (leftist forces, the Congress Party, 

and the Muslim minority) and to safeguard India’s shared regional goals with 

Arab countries and Israel. The main issue in which security and geopolitics create 

common axes of convergence among Israel, the Gulf monarchies, and India is 

related to the growing leverage of Iranian foreign policy in the MENA region and 

in the Western Indian Ocean (WIO)—an instrumental and recalibrated posture 

that not only drives India and Israel relations toward each other but also confirms 

a strong interdependence between the Middle East and India.40

However, this triangulation in the bilateral relationship also has some shadows. 

While New Delhi is helping Iran to develop its port in Chabahar, maintaining 

close energy ties, Gulf monarchies boost relations with Islamabad to isolate and 

counter Tehran’s growing influence in the Middle East. It is evident how peculiar 

the Indian role is in this triangulation, because it is in New Delhi’s interest to 

counter possible Iranian support for Pakistan’s positions on Kashmir but also to 

impede a strong relationship between Islamabad and Gulf monarchies aimed to 

diminish and isolate Indian leverage in South Asia. On the contrary, in this path 

Israel may be exposed to Iranian pressure, particularly if Indian and Gulf interests 

do not symbiotically collimate against Tehran but work indirectly in its favor. 
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According to Yiftah Shapir, “India is attempting to walk a fine line: to maintain 

its ties and essential interests with Iran, which is an energy supplier and an important land bridge to Central Asia and has cultural and historical importance to 

India, and at the same time, to preserve its important strategic ties with the United 

States and with Israel.”41 In other words, full Indo–Israeli relations are still dependent on multiple changes in the status of Arab–Israeli ties and India’s relations 

with the MENA countries, including Iran and Turkey, which are hostile to Israel, 

as well as on the marginalization of the Palestinian cause from regional and international agendas that could impact different regional dynamics of cooperation 

between Western Asian countries and nations of the Indo-Pacific region.42 At the 

same time, the Indo–Israeli nexus has various implications related to China’s 

growing presence in the WIO, where India is an important actor and Israel is 

trying to stimulate greater interest.43 For this reason, from an Israeli perspective, 

it is evident that the growing relationship with India reflects the awareness of the 

structural changes in the international system that place Asia and the Indo-Pacific 

region in particular at the center of multiple dynamics.

Israel amid US–China Global Competition

Also fitting into this process of transregional realignments is Israel’s attempt 

to reinforce its diplomatic ties with China. Today, China is a reliable partner of 

Israel (second only to the United States), with bilateral trade of around 15 billion 

USD in 2018 and some 22 percent of all Israeli exports now destined for China.44 This new step in the Sino–Israeli relationship began in 1992, but their bilateral ties have expanded significantly in the past 10 years. At the same time, 

Jerusalem and Beijing had begun extensive military cooperation as early as in the 

1980s—exactly as in the case between Israel and India—even though no formal 

diplomatic relations had been forged. This evolution in their relationship has 

forged a comprehensive strategic partnership. In fact, in 2017, during a state visit 

to China, Netanyahu said that the bilateral partnership between Israel and China 

“was a marriage made in heaven.”45

While Jerusalem is a fundamental key partner for Beijing and a gateway to the 

Mediterranean in China’s global strategy also known as the One Belt, One Road 

Initiative (OBOR), for Israel, its relationship with China represents an opportunity to shift its foreign policy approach from a close Western (and in particular a 

pro-United States) alliance to a new Eastern geopolitical approach. From this perspective, Jerusalem became a member of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, 

and Israel’s geostrategic proximity to the Red Sea and Suez Canal places the country at the center of Chinese interests. Furthermore, Israel has shown great support 

for China’s Belt and Road Initiative, hoping that the entry of Chinese companies 
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into Israel will lead to better infrastructure and collaboration with Israeli companies, especially in hi-tech fields. For these reasons, Beijing has invested massively 

in upgrades to the ports in Haifa and Ashdod, as well as in the Med-Red railway 

between Eilat and Ashdod.46 The Shanghai International Port Group, one of the 

most important assets in China’s foreign strategy, has already invested over 2 

billion USD in the Haifa port, which some US officials believe could be used to 

conduct surveillance on the US 6th Fleet operating in the Mediterranean. In 

addition, the China Railway Tunnel Group has a contract worth 1.4 billion USD 

to dig tunnels and operate electronic systems for a new Tel Aviv commuter line. 

Undoubtedly, the Sino–Israeli convergence of interests created enough concerns 

in the United States and India to be highly criticized by both powers. In fact, 

both the US and Indian strategic positions fit into the Indo-Pacific region as 

geopolitical crossroads among the Gulf Peninsula, East Africa, and South Asia. 

This allows for a commercial and military projection in the Indo-Pacific region 

as a whole but also the chance to secure oil trade and freedom of navigation 

through the straits of Hormuz and Bab el-Mandeb. A strong partnership between China and Israel, and Beijing’s growing leverage in the Middle East and 

Iran, is a vital concern both for Washington and New Delhi.47 In other words, in 

this global competition between the United States and China, Israel must choose 

a side to solve this strategic dilemma.48

In fact, after years of blooming bilateral relation, the Trump administration 

expressed its displeasure with increased Chinese investment in Israel. The White 

House is even more concerned about the depth of Chinese investment in Israel, 

particularly in the technological, commercial, strategic, and security sectors. For 

this reason, Washington remonstrated Jerusalem, pressuring Israel to downsize its 

ties with Beijing and to support the US global response strategy against China.49

In January 2019, US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo said that unless Jerusalem 

reduced its ties with China, Washington might reduce intelligence sharing and 

security facilities with Israel. Then in May 2020, Pompeo further insisted that 

Israel sever ties with China in security matters. Not surprisingly, indeed, US policy 

makers pressured the Netanyahu cabinet to choose a local company (IDE Technologies), rejecting the Hong Kong conglomerate CK Hutchison’s project to 

build Israel’s largest water desalination plant in the Dead Sea for 1.5 billion 

USD.50 Although Israel has substantially reduced its ties with Beijing, Jerusalem 

has come to depend on China to upgrade its infrastructure. Conversely, the country is less dependent on American influence, and this has caused great displeasure 

in the Trump administration.

Beyond discussing the role of US grand strategy in the Middle East and Asia, 

this situation poses a security dilemma in terms of alliances with traditional 
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partners.51 Another clear example of the US–China competition involves the 

Persian Gulf and the historical alliance between Arab Gulf monarchies and the 

United States. Although Chinese influence in the Arabian peninsula has grown 

immensely in the last decade, the Gulf monarchies will not risk turning away 

from Washington’s leverage to preserve China’s interests in those areas. In this 

geopolitical pattern aimed to deter China from the Middle East, the Israeli–

Gulf normalization also becomes a key part of a much bigger game in which 

Asian powers (primarily China and India) are also trying to decodify the shifting geopolitics in the Middle East.52 It is clear that Israel is part of the US–

China strategic competition and obvious that this pattern could be replicated in 

several other geostrategic issues related to the rising and assertive role of Beijing 

in Asia, which endangers American hegemony in the Indo-Pacific region.53

Finally, and no less important, is the domestic factor caused by the COVID-19 

pandemic. The second wave of coronavirus has imposed a new nationwide lockdown that could have important implications in terms of economic impact in Israel. The United States has used China’s lack of transparency in managing this 

crisis to criticize Beijing and to convince Netanyahu to cut ties with China. In this 

sense, Washington is trying to use the COVID-19 situation as a test not only to 

strengthen its relations with Israel but also to influence—and possibly to sever—

cooperation between Jerusalem and Beijing.54 At the same time, if US leadership 

aims to maintain a strategic primacy in those areas to contrast Beijing rising 

power, Washington should consolidate its highly complex project of establishing 

a global militarized anti-Chinese bloc among its European, Middle Eastern, and 

Asian allies—a scenario in which Israel could play a crucial role in the US pivot 

to the Indo-Pacific.55

Israel and the Quad Plus: Between the Indian Ocean (geopolitical) 

Implications and the Washington Dimension

This geopolitical dilemma in the Israel–China–US triangle also affects the 

Indo–Israeli nexus that is not directly dependent on the US factor but is of great 

importance in Washington’s efforts to secure US assets in those areas. Indeed, the 

Indo–Israeli relationship reflects several emerging geopolitical and geo-economic 

needs affecting many international players involved in the Indo-Pacific region 

(such as China, the Gulf countries, and Iran).56 An explanation for this evolution 

is what Ashok Sharma and Dov Bing underlined about the role of United States 

in the Indo-Pacific: Washington feared that strong Israeli cooperation with 

China—particularly in the military sector—could directly endanger US strategic 

interests, while this was not perceived in Indo–Israeli security ties. In other words, 
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the United States confirms itself as a strategic power in the region, trying to guide 

or influence several dynamics, such as the reinforced Indo–Israel relationship, into 

the US sphere of geostrategic interests.57 From this perspective, the Trump administration has tried to redefine and shift, coherently with the Obama administration’s 

Pivot to Asia, US strategic priorities from the MENA region to the Indo-Pacific 

region, at the same time building a parallel security system that connects Western 

Asia with South Asia. However, to achieve this ambitious goal, it is necessary to 

build the Middle East Strategic Alliance (MESA, also known as the “Arab NATO”) 

in the MENA region and to transform the Quad Plus into an articulate military 

and security architecture that protects both US and Asian interests against China’s 

growing leverage in those areas.58

All these developments are further encouraging Jerusalem to revisit its current 

approach toward Beijing to preserve Israel’s broader strategic interests. In fact, the 

opportunity to expand the original Quad Plus59 to other countries (such as South 

Korea, New Zealand, Vietnam, Brazil, and Israel) in a “2.0 version” responds to 

the different needs and convergent geopolitical alignments, strongly supported 

and shared by the United States and its Asian allies. In this scenario, it could be 

useful for Jerusalem to reinforce strategic partnerships with Washington and its 

Asian allies.60 In fact, Quad Plus can help Israel elevate its status and capabilities 

in the international system, as a maritime power and a fundamental player involved in freedom of navigation in the WIO region. In addition, growing Israeli 

involvement in the Indo-Pacific dynamics under the banner of Quad Plus can 

help Jerusalem weaken Chinese influence in the country, diversify Israel’s supply 

chains, and encourage alternative infrastructural outlets, for example, under the 

Blue Dot Network Initiative.61 Further, from the Israeli perspective, this strategic 

reengagement with India fits into a fluid geostrategic scenario aimed to protect 

and expand Israeli commercial and security routes that connect the MENA countries’ interests in East Africa and the Red Sea, creating a new potential bloc with 

other coastal states (Gulf countries in particular), with whom Israel shares a common vision and aspirations in Indian Ocean dynamics.62

In fact, the Israeli outlet on the Gulf of Eilat (more commonly known as Gulf 

of Aqaba), ensured by the homonymous port of Eilat, allows a certain penetration 

in the oil and commercial routes to and from the Eastern Mediterranean and the 

Indian Ocean, as do the Suez Canal and the strait of Bab al-Mandeb. The geographical contiguity between these two subregions once again clarifies the strategic importance of the WIO quadrant and its surrounding littorals. This renewed 

Israeli interest in Asia focuses on the opportunity to expand its know-how and 

skills in terms of technologies, innovation, and security matters and to develop 

economic ties and penetrate new giant markets in the wider area. At the same 
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time, this new approach shows a constant growth in status and leverage of Israeli 

diplomacy in Asia, also favored by convergences of interests with those countries 

of the WIO region (especially with Egypt, East African countries, Gulf monarchies, and South Asian states as a whole) in the military and security fields to fight 

terrorism, illegal trafficking, and piracy between the Red Sea and the Arabian Sea, 

as well as to manage several crises (such as in Somalia, Yemen,63 and the Nile dam 

issue) or tensions (in the Persian Gulf and in the Pakistan–Iranian corridor) in 

that quadrant. This growing cooperation between Israel and Afro-Asian countries 

could represent an extremely important factor of change in the Israeli attempt to 

define a new and coherent focus in its own pivot to Asia.64 Thus, strategic trends 

seem to dictate a strong alignment between Israel, India, the United States, and 

the latter’s key allies in the Indo-Pacific (such as Japan and Australia), particularly 

in the maritime domain. At the same time, this new development also reinforces 

the foreign policy status of India, which has developed excellent diplomatic relations with many Arab states, who see in New Delhi an important alternative to 

their economic dependence on China. Finally, this new era in the regional context 

demonstrates how fundamental the US factor still is in Indo-Pacific dynamics 

(especially in the security dimension) and how stridently US policy makers are 

working to forge a coherent and strong security architecture between the Near 

East and the Indian Ocean to counterbalance China’s multilayered presence in 

those areas.65

Conclusions and Perspectives

The new start in the Indo–Israeli relationship is a diplomatic success of Israel’s 

eastward pivot. Beyond the bilateral interests within the relationship, Indo–Israeli 

ties depend on multiple factors that have surfaced in the Indo-Pacific region in 

the past two decades. In fact, these numerous geopolitical and geostrategic issues 

continue to deeply influence the development of bilateral and multilateral alignments as well as Israel’s capability to coherently evolve its foreign policy.66

Basically, Israel and India share a convergence of interests with numerous implications on multilayered dimensions and dynamics due to favoring a balance of 

power through cooperation and partnerships. In fact, both countries discovered 

a higher affinity in some common geopolitical goals, sharing strategic interests 

and targets in a wider range of fields that converged with the strategies and 

projections of some Arab countries. All these elements also show the strong 

connection between the burgeoning Indo–Israeli relationship and the different 

regional dynamics in West Asia and in the Indo-Pacific, as part of the United 

States’ multidecade political and strategic shift and priorities.67 Nevertheless, differing security priorities between New Delhi and Jerusalem have emerged in this 
Israel and Quad Plus

JOURNAL OF INDO-PACIFIC AFFAIRS  SPECIAL ISSUE 2020 159

axis. India is more concerned about China, while Israel is wary of Iran. In this 

sense, India and Israel should try to align their respective “Look East” and “Look 

West” policies and expand their cooperation beyond defense and military matters. 

At the same time, the triangular interaction among the United States, Israel, and 

China could create distrust and more competition not only in the Middle East but 

also in the troubled Indo-Pacific region, putting India at a strategic disadvantage.68

In conclusion, for Jerusalem it will be important to strengthen relations with 

India and other Indo-Pacific US allies (India, South Korea, Japan, and Australia) 

to enhance Israel’s role in the structural changes in the international system that 

see the Indo-Pacific as a new pole of global dynamics. Such a strategy will also 

require Israel’s utmost attention to avoid being caught in the crossfires of greatpower competition while simultaneously preserving Israel’s independence and 

freedom of action.

Dr. Giuseppe Dentice

Dr. Dentice is an associate research fellow at the Middle East and North Africa Centre at the Italian Institute for 

International Political Studies (ISPI), where he is researching geopolitical and security issues in the Middle East–

North Africa (MENA) region. He obtained his doctorate in politics and institutions at the Catholic University of the 

Sacred Heart in Milan, where he serves as a teaching assistant. His academic research focuses on the evolution of 

US relations with Egypt and on US foreign policy in the Middle East, as well as international relations of the Middle 

East. Dentice has published extensively—in Italy and abroad—on a wide range of issues regarding the MENA region and international politics. He contributed also to several reports for the Italian Parliament and Ministry of 

Foreign Affairs, and he contributes to the annual editions of ISPI/Treccani’s Geopolitical Atlas since 2013. He is 

also regularly interviewed on MENA affairs by Italian and international media outlets.

Notes

1. For more information on the geostrategic importance of the Asian-Pacific space, see: Halford J. Mackinder, “The Geographical Pivot of History”, Geographical Journal 23 (1904): 421–37; 

and K.E. Haushofer, L.A. Tambs, and E.J. Brehm, An English translation and analysis of Major 

General Karl Ernst Haushofer’s Geopolitics of the Pacific Ocean: Studies on the relationship between 

Geography and History (Lewiston, NY: Edwin Mellen Press, 2002).

2. Lee Hsien Loong, “The Endangered Asian Century: America, China, and the Perils of 

Confrontation,” Foreign Affairs, July/August 2020, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/.

3. See: David Dollar, “Asian Century or Multi-polar Century?,” Policy Research Working Paper 4174 (working paper, World Bank, Washington, DC, 2007), https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/; Keita Kawakita, “Are We Entering an “Asian Century?”: The Possibility of a New International Order,” E-International Relations, 4 July 2020, https://www.e-ir.info/. For more details 

on great-power competition, see: Graham T. Allison, Destined for War: Can America and China 

Escape Thucydides’s Trap? (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2017).

4. According to the 2011 report of the Asian Development Bank (ADB), titled “Asia 2050: 

Realising the Asian Century,” Asia would nearly double its share of global GDP to 52 percent by 

2050. On this topic, see: Harinder Kohli, Ashok Sharma, and Anil Sood, Asia 2050: Realizing the 
160 JOURNAL OF INDO-PACIFIC AFFAIRS  SPECIAL ISSUE 2020

Dentice

Asian Century (Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE Publications, 2011); Gurpreet S. Khurana, “What is 

the Indo-Pacific?: The New Geopolitics of the Asia-Centred Rim Land,” in Geopolitics by Other 

Means: The Indo-Pacific Reality, ed. Axel Berkofsky and Sergio Miracola (Milan: Italian Institute 

for International Political Studies, 2019), 13–32, https://www.ispionline.it/; Robert D. Kaplan, 

Monsoon: The Indian Ocean and the Future of American Power (New York: Random House, 2010); 

P. Khanna, The Future Is Asian: Global Order in the Twenty-first Century (London: Weidenfeld & 

Nicolson, 2019); Gideon Rachman, Easternisation: War and Peace in the Asian Century (London: 

Bodley Head, 2016); and Jagannath Panda, “India in East Asia: Reviewing the Role of a Security 

Provider,” in Asian Strategic Review 2015: India as a Security Provider, ed. S.D. Muni and V. Chadha 

(New Delhi: Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (IDSA) and Pentagon Press, 2015), 

213–29.

5. Observatory of Economic Complexity (OEC), “Israel,” https://oec.world/.

6. A. Murat Agdemir, “Israel ‘Looks East:’ Besides India and China, Israel’s Relations with 

Japan Seem to Flourish,” Japanese Journal of Political Science 18, no. 2 (2017): 262–85.

7. Anshel Pfeffer, “The View from Israel,” in Looking West. The Rise of Asia in the Middle East, 

ed. Valeria Talbot and Ugo Tramballi (Milan: Italian Institute for International Political Studies 

(ISPI), 2020), 116–17, https://www.ispionline.it/.

8. For more details on the evolution of Israeli foreign policy, see: Tore T. Petersen, Israel in a 

Turbulent Region: Security and Foreign Policy (London: Routledge, 2019).

9. Jean-Loup Samaan, Israel’s foreign policy beyond the Arab World: Engaging the periphery (London: Routledge, 2018).

10. Amotz Asa-El, “Jerusalem’s Orient Express: Israel looks East for new opportunities”, Jerusalem Post, 25 March 2017, https://www.jpost.com/.

11. Giuseppe Dentice, “Israel’s Foreign Policy: No Change in Sight,” in Israel’s Elections: A 

Turning Point?, Dossier, ed. Giuseppe Dentice (Milan: Italian Institute for International Political 

Studies (ISPI), 8 April 2019, https://www.ispionline.it/.

12. For more details, see: Jacob Abadi, Israel’s Quest for Recognition and Acceptance in Asia: Garrison State Diplomacy (London: Routledge, 2004).

13. For more details, see: Joseph Millis, “Israel and India: The Ties that Bind,” Royal United 

Services Institute, 23 January 2018, https://rusi.org/; and Pfeffer, “The View from Israel,” 117–22. 

On Israeli participation in the Quad Plus meeting, see: Indrani Bagchi, “Focus on Covid in Quad 

Plus meet,” Times of India, 13 May 2020, https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/.

14. See: Jacob Abadi, “India’s National Security Imperatives and Indo-Israeli Strategic Cooperation,” Middle East Institute, 18 September 2014, https://www.mei.edu/; and Neelu Khosla 

“Shaping New Dimensions: India’s Relations with Israel and Russia,” International Journal of 

Multidisciplinary Educational Research 8, no. 8(6) (August 2019): 129–42.

15. Vinay Kaura, “Indo-Israeli relations in the Modi era: a transformative shift,” Israel Affairs

25, no. 2 (2019): 1–17; and Aniruddha Saha, “The India-Israeli Security Relationship: Nature, 

Scope and Challenges,” Strategic Analysis, 2020, 1–12.

16. Press Trust of India, “India-Israel ties in upward trajectory courtesy Modi-Netanyahu 

equation: Indian envoy,” The Hindu, 16 June 2019, https://www.thehindu.com/.

17. P.R. Kumaraswamy, “India’s New Israel Policy,” German Institute for International and 

Security Affairs (SWP), 2019/C 11, March 2019, https://www.swp-berlin.org/; and Kaura, “IndoIsraeli relations in the Modi era,” 3–4.
Israel and Quad Plus

JOURNAL OF INDO-PACIFIC AFFAIRS  SPECIAL ISSUE 2020 161

18. “Netanyahu and Modi praise ‘new era’ in India-Israel ties,” BBC, 15 January 2018, https://

www.bbc.com/.

19. S. Samuel C. Rajiv, “India and Israel: Strategic Partners on the Move,” BESA Center 

Perspectives Paper, Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies, 728, 30 January 2018, https://

besacenter.org/.

20. Pradipta Roy, “Benjamin Netanyahu’s state visit to India,” Israel Affairs 25, no. 5 (2019), 

789; and Kaura, “Indo-Israeli relations in the Modi era,” 4.

21. P.R. Kumaraswamy, “Redefining ‘Strategic’ Cooperation,” Strategic Analysis 41, no. 4 

(2017): 359–61.

22. Michal Ben-Josef Hirsch and Manjari Chatterjee Miller, “Otherness and resilience in bilateral relations: the cases of Israel‒Germany, India‒Russia, and India‒Israel,” Journal of International Relations and Development, 2020, 17.

23. Sanjay Singh, “India-Israel: The View from West Asia,” Strategic Analysis 41, no. 4 

(2017), 353.

24. Saha, “The India-Israeli Security Relationship,” 4–7.

25. Pieter D. Wezeman et al., “Trends in International Arms Transfers, 2019” (fact sheet, 

Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, March 2020), https://www.sipri.org/.

26. For more information on Israel-India security ties, see: G. Wermenbol, “A passage to India: 

Israel’s pivot East,” MENA Source (blog), 24 July 2019, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/; and Seth 

J. Frantzman, “New joint ventures hint at ‘burgeoning relationship’ between Israel and India”, 

Defense News, 18 February 2018, https://www.defensenews.com/.

27. During the 2008 Mumbai attacks, in which approximately 166 people died, one of the 

targets singled out by an Islamist extremist cell based in Pakistan was a Jewish religious center. 

Jihadists killed six Israeli citizens. This event created a special bond between Israelis and Indians, 

also reinforcing their cooperation in terms of security and counterterrorism. For more information, see: Prem Mahadevan, “A Decade on from the 2008 Mumbai Attack: Reviewing the question of state-sponsorship,” International Centre for Counter-Terrorism – The Hague, 27 June 

2019, https://icct.nl/. For more details on security and defence cooperation, see: Amit Cowshish, 

“India-Israel Defence Trade: Issues and Challenges,” Strategic Analysis 41, no. 4 (2017): 401–12; 

and N.A.K. Browne, “A Perspective on India-Israel Defence and Security Ties,” Strategic Analysis

41, no. 4 (2017): 325–35.

28. Ashok Sharma and Dov Bing, “India–Israel relations: the evolving partnership,” Israel Affairs 21, no. 4 (2015), 623–25.

29. “India to Sign Defence Deal with Israel Amid Rising Tensions With China,” Eurasian 

Times, 24 July 2020, https://eurasiantimes.com/.

30. Somdeep Sen, “India’s Alliance with Israel Is a Model for the World’s Illiberal Leaders,” 

Foreign Policy, 10 September 2020, https://foreignpolicy.com/.

31. Browne, “A Perspective on India-Israel Defence and Security Ties,” 333.

32. Alvite Ningthoujam, “The Future of India-Israel Arms Trade,” Jerusalem Institute for 

Strategy and Security, 21 July 2020, https://jiss.org.il/.

33. Kaura, “Indo-Israeli relations in the Modi era,” 6–7.

34. “India pledges to contribute $5 million in 2020 to UN Palestine refugee agency,” Economic 

Times, 13 November 2019, https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/.

35. Shaul Shay, “Israel and India celebrating ‘silver jubilee’,” Diplomatist, June 2017, http://

diplomatist.com/.
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36. Ashis Roy, “Israel plans to annex west bank: India’s deafening silence,” National Herald 

India, 21 June 2020, https://www.nationalheraldindia.com/.

37. “UAE-Israel deal has opened ‘lots of opportunities’: S Jaishankar,” Hindustan Times, 26 

August 2020, https://www.hindustantimes.com/.

38. Kumaraswamy, “India’s New Israel Policy.”

39. While 42 percent of India’s oil imports come from the GCC countries, 52 percent comes 

from Iran. Bilal Abdi, “India’s crude oil imports from Iran jumped 52 per cent in June,” Economic 

Times, 24 July 2020, https://energy.economictimes.indiatimes.com/.

40. Chinmaya R. Gharekhan, “India-Israel: Retrospective and Prospective,” Strategic Analysis

41, no. 4 (2017), 321.

41. Yiftah Shapir, “Walking a Fine Line: Israel, India, and Iran,” Strategic Assessment 16, no. 1 

(2013): 75–85, http://www.inss.org.il/.

42. Kaura, “Indo-Israeli relations in the Modi era,” 3-4.

43. Sanjaya Baru, “Indian Ocean Perspectives: From Sea Power to Ocean Prosperity,” Strategic 

Analysis 43, no. 5 (2019): 435–40.

44. Observatory of Economic Complexity (OEC), “Israel,” https://oec.world/.

45. Shannon Tiezzi, “Israel and China a ‘Marriage Made in Heaven,’ Says Netanyahu,” The 

Diplomat, 22 March 2017, https://thediplomat.com/.

46. For more details, see: Rorie Yellinek, “The Israel-China-U.S. Triangle and the Haifa Port 

Project,” Middle East Institute, 2018, https://www.mei.edu/; S. Samuel C. Rajiv, “Israel-China 

Ties at 25: The Limited Partnership,” Strategic Analysis 41, no. 4 (2017): 413–31.

47. For more details on the US and Indian strategy in the Indo-Pacific region, see: B. Glosserman, “An Administration at War with Itself: The New US Strategy for the Indo-Pacific,” in Geopolitics by Other Means. The Indo-Pacific Reality, ed. Axel Berkofsky and Sergio Miracola (Milan: 

Italian Institute for International Political Studies, 2019), 55–70; Jagannath Panda, “India and the 

Pacific Ocean: The ‘Act East’ between Trade, Infrastructure and Security,” in Geopolitics by Other 

Means. The Indo-Pacific Reality, ed. Axel Berkofsky and Sergio Miracola (Milan: Italian Institute 

for International Political Studies, 2019), 71–96.

48. Joshua Mitnick, “Why the U.S. Can’t Get Israel to Break Up with China,” Foreign Policy, 

16 June 2020, https://foreignpolicy.com/.

49. Assaf Orion, “Illusion, Awakening, Rage, and Response: The United States Strategic Approach to China,” INSS Insight 1338, 21 June 2020, https://www.inss.org.il/.

50. Mitnick, “Why the U.S. Can’t Get Israel.”

51. Natan Sachs and Kevin Huggard, “Israel and the Middle East amid U.S.-China competition,” Brookings Institution, 20 July 2020, https://www.brookings.edu/.

52. After the signing of the Israel–UAE–Bahrain normalization agreement (15 September 

2020), Dubai’s state-owned DP World, which operates ports from Hong Kong to Buenos Aires, 

signed a series of agreements with Israel’s DoverTower, including a joint bid in the privatization 

of Haifa Port on the Mediterranean, one of Israel’s two main sea terminals. This move was strongly 

supported by the United States to downgrade the Chinese presence in a strategic project such as 

Haifa port. For more details, see: “Dubai’s DP World to partner with Israeli firm in bid for Haifa 

Port,” Reuters, 16 September 2020, https://www.reuters.com/.

53. For more details, see: Eyal Tsir Cohen, “Israel’s annexation puzzle in the age of great power 

competition,” Order from Chaos (blog), 10 June 2020, https://www.brookings.edu/; and Shira 
Israel and Quad Plus

JOURNAL OF INDO-PACIFIC AFFAIRS  SPECIAL ISSUE 2020 163

Efron et al., The Evolving Israel-China Relationship (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 

2019), https://www.rand.org/.

54. For more details, see: Tara Kavaler, “Pandemic Tests Israel-China Ties,” Medialine, 11 June 

2020, https://themedialine.org/.

55. Sean Yom, “US Foreign Policy in the Middle East: The Logic of Hegemonic Retreat,” 

Global Policy 11, no. 1 (2020), 75–83.

56. Efraim Inbar, “The Background to the First Ever Visit to Israel by an Indian Prime Minister,” Asia Pacific Bulletin 383, 7 June 2017, https://www.eastwestcenter.org/; and Kaura, “IndoIsraeli relations in the Modi era,” 7–8.

57. Sharma and Dov Bing, “India–Israel relations,” 630.

58. For more details, see: J. Mehra, “The Australia-India-Japan-US Quadrilateral: Dissecting 

the China Factor,” ORF Occasional Paper, Observer Research Foundation, 264, August 2020;and 

Alyssa Ayres, “The U.S. Indo-Pacific Strategy Needs More Indian Ocean,” Council on Foreign 

Relations, 22 January 2019, https://www.cfr.org/.

59. The Quad Plus Dialogue is a high-level forum focused on regional security and nonproliferation in the Indo-Pacific, guided by the United States and strongly supported by India, Japan, 

and Australia. During the group’s 11 May 2020 meeting, the four members discussed the opportunity to increase participation in Quad meetings by new players like Israel, Brazil, and South 

Korea, as well as to take into account the prospective of the United Kingdom’s membership in 

Quad Plus. For more information, see: Jagannath Panda, “India and the ‘Quad Plus’ Dialogue,” 

Royal United Services Institute, 12 June 2020, https://rusi.org/.

60. For more information on the Indian geostrategic view in the region see: Jagannath Panda, 

“India, the Blue Dot Network, and the “Quad Plus” Calculus,” Journal of Indo-Pacific Affairs 3, no. 

3 (Fall 2020): 3–21, https://media.defense.gov/.

61. The Blue Dot Network (BDN) initiative, led by the United States, Japan, and Australia, 

was launched in November 2019 at the 35th ASEAN summit in Thailand, with the aim to foster 

infrastructural connectivity in the Indo-Pacific region. This initiative is clearly aimed at containing 

Chinese Belt and Road Initiative projects around the world, proposing itself as an alternative to 

Beijing’s infrastructure project. In February 2020, India agreed with the United States to join the 

BDN. For more details, see: Matthew P. Goodman, Daniel F. Runde, and Jonathan F. Hillman, 

“Connecting the Blue Dots,” Commentary, 6 February 2020, https://www.csis.org/; and Mercy A. 

Kuo, “Blue Dot Network: The Belt and Road Alternative,” The Diplomat, 7 April 2020, https://

thediplomat.com/.

62. Efraim Inbar, “Israel and India: Looking Back and Ahead,” Strategic Analysis 41, no. 4 

(2017), 377.

63. According to Jforum, the official site of the French-Jewish community, after the normalised 

relationship, the UAE and Israel are setting up “spy bases” on Socotra Island, which is about 350 

kilometres from the Yemeni mainland, to collect information throughout the region, particularly 

from Bab al-Mandeb to the Horn of Africa, and to monitor the strategies of Iran, China, and 

Pakistan in those areas. See: “Israël/EAU: grande base de renseignements sur Socotra,” Jforum, 30 

August 2020, https://www.jforum.fr/.

64. For more information, see: Harry Halem, “Strategic Convergence and Prospects for IndoIsraeli-U.S. Maritime Cooperation,” Center for International Maritime Security (CIMSEC), 16 

April 2018, http://cimsec.org/; and Eleonora Ardemagni, “Gulf Powers: Maritime Rivalry in the 

Western Indian Ocean,” Analysis 321, April 2018, https://www.ispionline.it/.
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65. See: Nicolas Blarel, “Assessing US Influence over India-Israel Relations: A Difficult Equation to Balance?,” Strategic Analysis 41, no. 4 (2017): 384–400; Kaura, “Indo-Israeli relations in the 

Modi era,” 8; Inbar, “Israel and India,” 378–79; and Sankalp Gurjar, “Geopolitics of Western Indian Ocean: Unravelling China’s Multi-dimensional Presence,” Strategic Analysis 43, no. 5 (2019): 

1–17.

66. Kumaraswamy, “Redefining ‘Strategic’ Cooperation,” 366.

67. Kaura, “Indo-Israeli relations in the Modi era,” 3–4.

68. Khosla, “Shaping New Dimensions,” 141.

Disclaimer

The views and opinions expressed or implied in JIPA are those of the authors and should not be construed as carrying the 

official sanction of the Department of Defense, Department of the Air Force, Air Education and Training Command, 

Air University, or other agencies or departments of the US government or their international equivalents.
JOURNAL OF INDO-PACIFIC AFFAIRS  SPECIAL ISSUE 2020 165

 THE PLUS PERSPECTIVES

France’s Indo-Pacific Strategy

and the Quad Plus

Céline Pajon

Abstract

In France, the launch of the Quad Plus raised little attention. The emergence 

of yet another minilateral framework in the Indo-Pacific attracted some interest 

but also raised many doubts about the sustainability of this initiative. The general impression was that this new grouping was quite heterogeneous and maybe 

not the most relevant to tackle the challenge it ambitioned to address: the 

COVID-19 crisis. So, while it might be too soon to tell if Paris would be 

ready to join such a scheme, the examination of France’s various engagements in the Indo-Pacific can provide some clues regarding the synergies or 

divergences with the Quad Plus initiative.

 In 2018, Paris unveiled its own Indo-Pacific strategy. It reflects a strategic 

reassessment of the region for French interests: the area is now widely acknowledged as the world economic powerhouse, and major trade partners are located 

there. The Indo-Pacific is also a key region when it comes to the governance of 

the commons and multilateralism. At the same time, there is now a recognition 

that China’s rise is increasingly challenging French interests in the region. 

Maritime security is a core interest and objective in developing an Indo-Pacific 

approach. The Indo-Pacific terminology serves to highlight the strategic dimension of France’s comprehensive approach to the region, by providing it with a 

powerful narrative. This narrative also strengthens Paris’s legitimacy to act in the 

area and is useful to develop and expand cooperation with like-minded partners. 

Through its Indo-Pacific strategy, France can thus more adequately protect its 

sovereign interests while promoting and advancing its very own vision for a 

balanced, multipolar, inclusive Indo-Pacific regional order, upheld by key liberal 

principles and multilateral schemes.

 The French Indo-Pacific vision relies on key strategic partnerships with all the 

members of the Quad. However, a concern to keep its strategic autonomy in the 

context of a worsening US–China rivalry and the strong interest to coordinate 

with European partners in the Indo-Pacific explain why Paris would be reluctant 

to join the Quad Plus in its current form. Paris would certainly favor minilateral 

or multilateral initiatives in which France would find more aligned interests and 

retain greater autonomy, as well as a deepening of the bilateral relations with the 

members of the Quad Plus and ad hoc coordination on specific issues.
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Introduction

In France, the launch of the Quad Plus raised little attention. The emergence of 

yet another minilateral framework in the Indo-Pacific attracted some interest but 

also raised many doubts about the sustainability of this initiative. The general impression was that this new grouping: the Quad (the United States, Japan, India, 

and Australia) plus New Zealand, South Korea, Vietnam, Brazil and Israel was 

quite heterogeneous and maybe not the most relevant to tackle the challenge it 

ambitioned to address: the COVID-19 crisis. Indeed, Washington initiated the 

so-called Quad Plus in March 2020, in the midst of the pandemic, to exchange 

best practices and coordinate consular policies and strategic supplies between likeminded countries. From mid-March to mid-May, officials from the foreign affairs 

services held weekly discussions on practical issues pertaining to the management 

of the COVID crisis (visa exemptions, repatriation of nationals, maintenance of 

critical medical supplies, and so on).1 It is unclear if this group has continued to 

meet since then. The Quad Plus, nevertheless, prompted a flurry of comments and 

discussions about the opportunity for the Quad to expand its membership and 

develop cooperation in domains other than maritime security, counterterrorism, 

humanitarian assistance/disaster relief (HA/DR), or connectivity.

Because the Quad Plus is still a very nascent and debated initiative, it is difficult 

to discuss how Paris sees it and how France could formally associate or cooperate 

with the grouping. That said, the examination of France’s various engagements in 

the Indo-Pacific can provide some clues regarding the synergies or divergences 

with the Quad Plus initiative.

In 2018, Paris unveiled its own Indo-Pacific strategy, which reflects a strategic 

reassessment of the region for French interests: the area is now widely acknowledged as the world economic powerhouse, and major trade partners are located 

there. The Indo-Pacific is also a key region when it comes to the governance of the 

commons and multilateralism. At the same time, there is now a recognition that 

Chin’s rise is increasingly challenging French interests in the area. The Indo-Pacific 

terminology serves to highlight the strategic dimension of France’s comprehensive 

approach to the region, by providing a powerful narrative. This narrative also 

strengthens Paris’s legitimacy to act in the area and is useful to develop and expand 

cooperation with like-minded partners. Through its Indo-Pacific strategy, France 

can thus more adequately protect its sovereign interests while promoting and advancing its very own vision for a balanced, multipolar, inclusive Indo-Pacific regional 

order, upheld by key liberal principles and multilateral schemes.

This paper will offer perspectives on the development of the French IndoPacific strategy over the past two years. France’s vision for the regional order will 
France’s Indo-Pacific Strategy and the Quad Plus

JOURNAL OF INDO-PACIFIC AFFAIRS  SPECIAL ISSUE 2020 167

be highlighted. It appears that maritime security is a core interest and objective 

in developing an Indo-Pacific approach. The French Indo-Pacific vision also relies on key strategic partnerships with all the members of the Quad. However, a 

concern to keep its strategic autonomy in the context of a worsening US–China 

rivalry and the strong interest to coordinate with European partners in the IndoPacific explain why Paris would be reluctant to join the Quad Plus in its current 

form. Paris would certainly favor minilateral or multilateral initiatives in which 

France would find more aligned interests and keep greater autonomy.

France’s Indo-Pacific Strategy Vision

The Indo-Pacific concept has recently entered the French narrative. Pres. Emmanuel Macron referred to an “Indo-Pacific axis”2

 when he visited Australia in 

May 2018, and subsequently, both the Ministry of the Armed Forces (MAF) and 

the Ministry of the European and Foreign Affairs (MEFA) issued key documents 

to present the French vision of the region.3

France has interest to act sovereignly in the Indo-Pacific area, having territories both in the Indian Ocean (La Réunion and the Scattered Islands) and the 

Pacific (New Caledonia and French Polynesia). Among these territories, 1.5 million citizens are living—along with approximately 200,000 French living in other 

countries throughout the region—and more than 90 percent of France’s large (9 

million km2) exclusive economic zone (EEZ) is located in the Indo-Pacific. 

France maintains a modest military presence of 7,000 personnel to protect this 

vast area. There is now a wide recognition that the deterioration of the security 

environment in Asia puts these interests at risk. The 2017 Defense and National 

Security Strategic Review notes that French overseas territories as well as freedom 

of supply and navigation are at risk.4 President Macron repeatedly underlined 

the risks of a Chinese hegemony and the need for France to develop its own 

approach of the Indo-Pacific region.5

Beyond this, the Indo-Pacific is now recognized as a central stage where major 

transformations are ongoing that have global consequences, with direct implications for French interests. The Indo-Pacific is the economic epicenter of world 

trade and production and hosts vital sea lines of communications (SLOC). It forms 

a security continuum where freedom of navigation (FON) should not be challenged, in which issues such as terrorism, environmental issues, and great-power 

politics trigger tensions and where different models of development, cooperation, 

and regional integration compete. The region is also a central stage for key issues 

regarding the governance of the commons (oceans, cyber) and of transnational 

challenges such as climate change and biodiversity and a crucial milieu for the 

shaping of international norms. President Macron made clear that he wanted to 
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restore France’s global influence by upholding its values and principles and for 

Paris to be a central player for global governance and multilateralism.6 The IndoPacific is at the core of challenges to the world order, and therefore, France should 

be engaged as a responsible stakeholder there.

France seeks to develop a principled approach to the Indo-Pacific and aims to 

maintain a multipolar and law-based order in the Indo-Pacific and to encourage 

multilateral regional cooperation to tackle the challenges in the security, political, 

and economic spheres. France supports a multipolar, inclusive, and balanced region, 

“where hegemonic tendencies along with temptations of division or confrontation 

[should be] discouraged.”7 In particular, “The rise of an increasingly assertive China” 

is mentioned as a challenge, both for the diversity of the region and the maintenance of multilateralism. The focus on multipolarity and multilateralism is certainly 

different from the Trump administration’s more confrontational vision of an IndoPacific strategy aimed at building anti-China coalitions. France is not supporting 

Washington’s attempt to decouple economically from China. Also, Paris insists 

that its Indo-Pacific strategy is not military-driven, which again is a significant 

difference from the American one (for example, the renaming of the US Pacific 

Command to the Indo-Pacific Command [INDOPACOM]). France’s vision encompasses broader issues such as the blue economy and environmental questions.

Taking into account the coexistence of several models—for example, the Belt and 

Road Initiative, Free and Open Indo-Pacific, and Association of Southeast Asian 

Nations (ASEAN)-led multilateralism—France’s aim is to “propose an alternative 

aimed at promoting a stable, law-based and multipolar order,” in an inclusive and 

balanced way.8 The stability should be fostered through “an international order based 

on dialogue and multilaterally set rules” to deal with transnational risks and governance of the commons (maritime security, nuclear proliferation, terrorism, climate 

change and biodiversity, cyber, and space).9 Three major pillars have been identified: 

maritime security, connectivity and infrastructure, and environmental issues (climate and biodiversity). All three priorities relate to the ocean, the good order at sea, 

the sustained management of the marine resources, and safety of the sea lanes.

The Prevalence of Maritime Security

In its approach to the region, Paris is placing the priority on the broadly defined 

maritime security. At the 2019 Raisina Dialogue, French admiral Christophe Prazuck, Chief of Naval Staff, presented a holistic approach regarding protecting the 

commons at sea: France is interested in keeping the safety of “dots” (chokepoints 

like Hormuz, Malacca, and Bab el-Mandeb Straits), SLOCs, and stocks (fish, 

hydrocarbons, and rare earths present in respective EEZ).10
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Accordingly, France supports the strict application of the United Nations Convention for the Law of the Sea, contributes to actions against crime at sea, and is 

keen on actively demonstrating its commitment to the FON. In 2016, the statement of the then Minister of Defense Jean-Yves Le Drian at the Shangri-La 

Dialogue emphasized the need to discourage unilateral coups de force in the China 

seas, for fear that such actions might expand in other strategic areas like the 

Mediterranean Sea.11 Thus, while not taking sides on sovereignty matters, Paris 

has consistently sent its ships to the South and East China Seas in recent years, 

through the passing of the Jeanne d’Arc mission or the surveillance frigates based 

in New Caledonia. Last June, the aircraft carrier Charles de Gaulle was dispatched 

to Singapore during the Shangri-La Dialogue. The French Minister of the Armed 

Forces, Florence Parly, then promised that French vessels would sail at least twice 

a year in the South China Sea and will continue upholding international law in a 

“steady, non-confrontational but obstinate way.”12

Thus, maritime security prevails in today’s French Indo-Pacific approach. It 

has been so far embodied mostly by naval diplomacy though the dispatches of 

frigates or aircraft carrier groups to the region. But beyond the military dimension, other issues, such as the blue economy, are of interest for France.13 The 

management of the large French EEZ in the region requires proper protection 

of the marine resources and a sustainable development of these resources. In 

addition, President Macron has identified the blue economy as an important 

engine for growth in the context of the COVID-19–induced economic crisis.14

The security implications of environmental issues such as the depletion of resources (fisheries) and climate change are also core issues of concern. These kinds 

of risks, along with natural disasters, actually represent the primary threat to 

human lives in the Indo-Pacific area.

Therefore, France aims to develop its maritime surveillance capability in the 

region, through capacity-building, networking of partners, and information 

sharing. Maritime security and surveillance may indeed be the least common 

denominator that gathers the majority of the Indo-Pacific countries, from great 

powers to small islands states. Maritime domain awareness (MDA) is a requirement for better managing one’s own sovereign territory and EEZ but also to 

ensure the safety of international waters, SLOCs, and FON. It is also instrumental to prevent crises resulting from environmental issues such as natural disaster 

or fishery depletion. Thus, it is possible to foster international cooperation on a 

crucial capacity (a shared MDA) but in a consensual, or nonconfrontational, 

manner (environmental crisis prevention). To concretize this project, France is 

building up on its strategic partnerships in the region.
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A Partnership-based Approach

To increase its leverage and compensate for limited capacities, France is putting 

a priority on strengthening relations with its partners and building up a network 

of strategic partnerships with India, Australia, and Japan, as well as Malaysia, 

Singapore, New Zealand, Indonesia, and Vietnam. Therefore, Paris has already 

initiated a dynamic cooperation with all members of the Quad and many of those 

envisioned as members of the Quad Plus.

During his visit to Australia in May 2018, President Macron referred to a 

“Paris-Delhi-Canberra axis,” bound to expand. The two key partnerships, with 

Australia and India, are founded upon common values and similar interests and 

are supported by defense equipment sales and concrete security cooperation (facilitated by acquisition and cross-servicing agreement [ACSA] deals) with a 

strong focus on maritime security.

In January 2017, India and France signed a white shipping agreement to enable 

information sharing on maritime traffic and MDA in the Indian Ocean Region. In 

March 2018, a logistics exchange memorandum of agreement, granting reciprocal 

access to each other’s bases.15 Since then, the French frigate Cassard made a port 

call in the Mumbai harbor (January 2019) and in March 2020, despite the pandemic, an Indian Navy P-8 aircraft visited La Réunion to conduct a coordinated 

maritime patrol with French forces.16 In Spring 2019, France and India held their 

biggest naval exercises, with a total of 12 warships and submarines, including the 

aircraft carrier Charles de Gaulle, patrolling off the coast of Goa for the annual 

Varuna exercises.

The two countries have signed a common strategic vision for their cooperation in the Indian Ocean, including maritime intelligence and protection and 

exchange of sensitive information. India and France are co-developing a constellation of satellites to monitor the Indian Ocean, in an effort to strengthen 

the MDA.17 France was also the first country to send a liaison officer to the 

Information Fusion Centre for the Indian Ocean Region (IFC-IOR), created 

in Delhi in 2018. Finally, the two countries are deepening their coordination in 

multilateral settings, with New Delhi supporting Paris’s application to join the 

Indian Ocean Rim Association.

While maritime security in the Indian Ocean lies at the core of the Franco–

Indian partnership, the cooperation extends beyond that, in the realm of climate 

change and global commons for example. France and India jointly launched the 

International Solar Alliance (ISA) at the 2015 United Nations Climate Change 

Conference (COP 21) in Paris, and the first ISA summit, dedicated to the promotion of solar energy, was held in March 2018—the ISA is the first international 
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organization headquartered in India. The ISA is now gathering 121 member 

countries. However, Quad Plus countries such as the United States, Vietnam, 

and Israel are still not part of this grouping. Promoting and enlarging the ISA to 

these countries and implementing projects under the ISA umbrella would be a 

way to feed the cooperation among these countries. India, as well as Australia, 

was among the few nonmember countries invited by President Macron to the 

G7 Summit in Biarritz last year, demonstrating that Paris considers New Delhi 

and Canberra as key players for global governance.

The strategic partnership with Australia has been concentrating more on the 

South Pacific region. The two countries, plus New Zealand, are part of the 1992 

FRANZ arrangement, signed to coordinate their assistance for Pacific island 

nations during natural disasters. Paris and Canberra also coordinate with Washington and Wellington within the Pacific Quadrilateral Defense Coordination 

Group, which coordinates maritime security efforts in the Pacific. The partnership is also developing along the lines of an important industrial cooperation, 

after the French company Naval Group (formerly known as Direction des Constructions Navales or DCNS) won the bid in 2016 to provide 12 submarines to 

be phased into the Australian navy until 2050. This long-term deal implies that 

France will stay engaged in the region for the coming decades, and in 2017, the 

two countries signed a joint statement to set their cooperation in the years to 

come. France was the first partner of the 2018-founded Australian Space Agency, 

and the two partners cooperate on monitoring of climate change and sustainable 

development issues (biodiversity and fisheries) in the South Pacific.18

The French ambition is to develop regular trilateral discussions out of these 

two parallel partnerships. This has been done at the Track 1.5 level in 2019, and 

the first trilateral dialogue at the official level was held in September 2020. The 

talks focused on enhancing cooperation in the maritime sector, promoting global 

commons (climate, environment and biodiversity, health) and multilateralism in 

the Indo-Pacific.19 The Joint Strategic Vision of India-France Cooperation in 

the Indian Ocean Region,20 issued in March 2018, and the Vision Statement on 

the Australia-France Relationship,21 released in May 2018, also mentioned the 

possibility to coordinate with third partners through trilateral dialogues and 

joint exercises. From this perspective, Japan appears as a key partner for France, 

as it has the capacity to help monitor the SLOCs and shares France’s concern 

about keeping multipolarity in the region and avoiding Chinese hegemony. The 

bilateral security cooperation has expanded in recent years and has been gradually institutionalized. Beyond the annual 2+2 meeting (between the defense and 

foreign affairs ministers), an agreement on the transfer of defense equipment and 

technology, in force since December 2016, has opened way to a joint research 
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and development of new-generation underwater minesweeping technology. In 

July 2018, an ACSA was signed to allow the sharing of defense supplies and 

services, an important step to expand cooperation in peacekeeping and HA/DR 

operations and facilitate more ambitious joint exercises. So far, the bulk of bilateral cooperation has been focused on maritime security, mostly in Asia, where 

Japan is taking part in HA/DR joint training held by France in the South Pacific, 

for example, but also in the Gulf of Aden with participation in multinational 

antipiracy operations. A maritime dialogue has been launched with Tokyo in 

2019, and a joint reflection to identify concrete areas of cooperation in the IndoPacific is ongoing.

Other identified partners to expand the network are Malaysia, Singapore 

(where a French liaison officer is dispatched at the Intelligence Fusion Center), 

New Zealand, Indonesia, and Vietnam. A deepening of the relations with the 

ASEAN countries is set as a priority. ASEAN Centrality is seen as a stabilizing 

factor, given that Southeast Asia is again a milieu for the Great Game between 

China and the United States. Therefore, the aim is to achieve a convergence of 

views on a number of issues and to help build up these countries’ resilience vis à 

vis China, through maritime capacity-building assistance. This kind of activity can 

also be coordinated with local partners such as Japan, India, or Australia. The ultimate aim is to build up an open, inclusive, and transparent cooperation architecture that will allow a shared MDA to prevent or manage crises resulting from 

environmental issues, natural disaster, crimes at sea, or so forth.

While France does not share the confrontational and militarized approach that 

the Trump administration developed in the Indo-Pacific vis à vis China, the 

United States is also a powerful partner in the region. A French liaison officer is 

hosted in the US INDOPACOM, and naval exercises have provided opportunities to strengthen ties. Quadrilateral drills on amphibious operations held in 

Spring 2017 among Japanese, French, US, and British ships as part of France’s 

Jeanne d’Arc mission near Guam. In May 2019, France led the La Pérouse exercises with the Japanese, US, and Australian navies, conducting their first joint 

exercises in the Bay of Bengal.22 The progress in the Indo–Australia relations and 

the conclusion of a defense agreement could facilitate the organization of a joint 

trilateral exercises in the years to come.

Therefore, France maintains close and dynamic strategic partnerships with the 

four members of the Quad countries. However, France has so far refused to formally be associated with the Quad. This has to do with Paris trying to walk a fine 

line on China; while it is clear that France’s Indo-Pacific strategy is motivated by 

China’s rise and has elements of a hedging approach vis à vis Beijing, by sending 

signals and seeking to gain leverage through its partners, France seeks to avoid 
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antagonizing China. Paris indeed highlights the importance of engaging China, 

keeping a robust dialogue and partnership, and encouraging Beijing to play the 

role of a responsible stakeholder on issues such as climate change or the reform of 

the World Trade Organization.23 This ambiguous approach generates frustrations 

internationally as well as domestically and so far has prevented France from joining initiatives that may have anti-China connotations. This position is also about 

maintaining France’s strategic autonomy amid the growing rivalry between China 

and the United States.

Strategic Autonomy, EU Backing, and the Quad Plus

Keeping its strategic autonomy will indeed be key to determine how France will 

navigate in the Indo-Pacific. An inclusive, multilateral approach is preferred, even 

if the reality of cooperation points toward more limited groups of like-minded 

countries to advance an agenda in an efficient way. Paris will promote flexible tools 

such as ad hoc, minilateral groups to tackle a specific issue and uphold common 

understanding and norms as a regime. France will also take advantage of its overseas territories to play as a local actor, nurture cooperation with regional partners, 

and maximize its military presence in the area. The focus will be on upholding 

principles, multilateralism, maritime security, and environmental matters.

In this perspective, the formation of the Quad Plus appears as a positive development. It encourages greater coordination between interested countries to work 

on a specific topic (the management of the COVID-19 crisis) rather than to cooperate “against” an actor. It encourages a minilateral initiative (the Quad) to expand 

into a more multilateral setting, without being institutionalized. However, seen 

from Paris, the Quad Plus also has some drawbacks—the more important one 

being that it came at the initiative of a Trump administration that was eager to 

shape the narrative on the initiative to make it a joint reaction to global crisis created by a China-originated virus. The United States also reportedly planned to use 

this format to launch its Economic Prosperity Network, aimed at accelerating the 

restructuring and relocation of supply chains out of China.24 This American, or 

more precisely Trumpian, print on this initiative would make France very cautious 

to join if it were invited, especially as this Quad Plus was launched during the last 

months of the current US administration. Another concern is about the relevance 

of the group of countries that were gathered in the Quad Plus. In particular, when 

Secretary of State Mike Pompeo upgraded the session at the political level in May, 

he invited his counterparts from Brazil and Israel to join.25 This grouping makes 

little sense in terms of Indo-Pacific strategy or COVID-19 crisis management 

but points again to a US-led initiative that may not be attractive to France. It is 
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worth noting that even the terminology Quad Plus stemmed from the media 

and analysts, not the participants’ public diplomacy.

France will more likely go on with its own initiatives, emphasizing their inclusive nature (as long as partner countries share a basic understanding and principles). 

Paris will favor multilateral settings and, more importantly, is emphasizing the 

importance of a coordinated European approach in the region.

In the maritime security domain, coordinating with European partners is indeed also a way to enhance the visibility and the significance of the French deployments and activities. Back in 2016, Jean-Yves Le Drian called for a greater 

European presence in the region, through a better coordination, especially in the 

South China Sea.26 Accordingly, 52 British troops and their helicopters, as well 

as 12 officers from European countries and one EU official joined the French 

naval mission Jeanne d’Arc in 2017, and British ships sailed alongside the French 

naval group in 2018. In August 2019 at an informal meeting at Helsinki, EU 

defense ministers agreed to the concept of an EU Coordinated Maritime Presence. The aim is to ensure a coordinated presence at sea, based on a voluntary 

forces contribution by the EU member states, under national control. The first 

test is set up in the Strait of Hormuz with the European Maritime Awareness 

mission in the Strait of Hormuz (EMASOH) mission that started in February 

2020. It provides a new flexibility for the EU to show the flag and set up a multinational naval presence outside of the Common Security and Defence Policy 

(CSDP) framework—thus, evading the necessity to reach consensus of all member states to act.27 It also affirms European strategic autonomy vis à vis the 

United States. In the future, such a European Task Group could sail the South 

China Sea for political signaling, naval diplomacy, and information gathering. As 

for now, France can take advantage of the EU’s already extensive experience in 

contributing to maritime security by combating piracy in the Horn of Africa and 

building MDA capabilities in the Western Indian Ocean over the past 12 years. 

The EU is expanding its cooperation to the Eastern Indian Ocean and Southeast 

Asia through the Critical Maritime Routes in the Indian Ocean (CRIMARIO) 

II program (2020–2023).28

While France was the first EU country to present an Indo-Pacific strategy and 

although views among EU member states on an Asia policy are still diverse, the 

Indo-Pacific narrative is gaining momentum in Europe. Distrust toward China 

has been growing in recent months, following the COVID-19 crisis, the fiasco of 

the mask diplomacy, the harsh rhetoric of several top Chinese diplomats in Europe, the realization of an excessive economic dependence vis à vis Beijing, and 

the shocking imposition of the Hong Kong security law. This growing consensus 

of an increasing caution regarding China came with a realization that Europe 
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should step up to better defend its interests in Asia too. Indeed, the COVID-19 

crisis exemplifies the vulnerabilities of the supply chains as well as the importance 

of Asia for Europe’s security. As a result, we have seen several declarations from 

the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, 

Josep Borrell, calling for the EU to diversify its supply chains and build up cooperation with Asian democracies.29 Germany, once very cautious about not antagonizing China, published its own Indo-Pacific strategy on 1 September 2020.30

Berlin also announced that it will send a frigate to the Indo-Pacific region soon. 

The Netherlands is also reportedly discussing cooperation in the region with other 

EU member states.31 France has been instrumental in encouraging EU countries 

to step up their presence and commitments to the region.32

Diversification of partners and supply chains will be a key objective of this 

European approach to the region. A stronger strategic autonomy with regard to 

industrial and economic policy is indeed a core objective of the post-COVID 

recovery plan proposed by France and Germany and adopted at the EU level.33

While Paris is likely to prioritize cooperation with the EU and European partners, this agenda regarding the diversification of value chains is similar to the 

Resilient Supply Chain Initiative that Japan pushes together with India and 

Australia and could provide a basis for expanded cooperation among the partners.34 Another way to find synergies is on health cooperation. France wants to 

make a vaccine against COVID an international common good. The Coronavirus Global Response event back in May 2020 helped raise funding to achieve 

this goal. Japan was a co-convenor, along with France and other partners.35 This 

kind of initiative could certainly be useful in developing the cooperation with 

other Quad Plus countries, providing that the next US administration is ready to 

commit again to multilateralism.

Conclusion

The French approach to the Indo-Pacific is in an ascending phase. The overall 

objective is to increase France’s contribution to build up a stable Indo-Pacific 

governed by the rule of law and to mitigate the risks of great-power competition 

in a key area for French interests. Thus, multipolarity and multilateral cooperation 

should be fostered. To achieve this vision, France relies on its strategic partnerships in the region and strives to build up a network to mutualize capacity and 

have a greater impact. Minilateral, ad hoc groupings should be privileged to discuss and adopt a shared understanding and common principles to tackle issues, 

from climate change to governance of the commons (oceans, Internet). Paris will 

also empower its overseas territories to play as regional actors, as it is still unclear 

to what extent France will be able to mobilize additional assets to deploy in the 
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broad area. For now, Paris puts priority on keeping its flexibility and implements 

concrete initiatives to flesh out its vision.

So far, France has been insisting on maintaining its strategic autonomy in the 

region, hence pushing back against propositions to associate with the Quad, for 

example. This said, Paris has also been working to build up a network of partners 

in the region. Hence, multilateralism and minilateralism are both present in the 

French approach. The extent to which France can be associated or interested in 

working with the newly minted Quad Plus will certainly depend on the possibility of maintaining its strategic autonomy and walk a fine line between the United 

States and China, especially as the Sino–US rivalry worsens. This would not prevent a deepening of the bilateral relations with the members of the Quad Plus and 

ad hoc coordination on specific issues.

Céline Pajon

Ms. Pajon is head of Japan research at the Center for Asian Studies of the French Institute of International Relations (IFRI), Paris. She analyses Japan’s foreign and defense policy, as well as geostrategic dynamics of the IndoPacific area. Additionally, she is a senior fellow with the Japan Program of the Vrije Universiteit Brussel and an international research fellow with the Canon Institute for Global Studies in Tokyo, where she stayed to conduct 

research field work. In 2016, she was an invited fellow with the Japan Institute for International Affairs, the think 

tank of the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Ms. Pajon has published extensively, including “Japan’s Coast 

Guard and Maritime Self Defense Forces in the East China Sea: Can a Black and White System Adapt to a Gray 

Zone Strategy?,” Asia Policy (January 2017); “Japan and France: Slowly but Surely Moving Forward on Security 

Cooperation,” The Diplomat, 6 February 2017; and “What Role for Japan in Africa’s Security after Withdrawal from 

South Sudan?,” The Diplomat, 24 May 2017.

Notes

1. Indrani Bagchi, “New alliances, grouping being created in response to Covid-19,” Times of 

India, 14 May 2020, http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com.

2. Ben Doherty, “France and Australia can be heart of new Indo-Pacific axis, Macron says,” The 

Guardian, 2 May 2018.

3. The title of the Ministry of Defense’s brochure on the French security approach to Asia 

evolved from “France and Security in the Asia Pacific” in 2016 to “France and Security in the 

Indo-Pacific” in 2018. The brochure was updated in 2019. See the Ministry of the Armed Forces’ 

website: www.defense.gouv.fr. Only an excerpt of the strategy is made public. The document is 

available in French and English: 2030 French Strategy in Asia-Oceania. Towards an inclusive Asian 

Indo-Pacific Region (Paris: French Ministry of European and Foreign Affairs, August 2018), www.

diplomatie.gouv.fr. The document has been updated in 2019: “Stratégie française dans l’Indopacifique: “Pour un espace indo-pacifique inclusif,” August 2019, https://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/.

4. “Defense and National Security Strategic Review,” 2017, 26.

5. “China, while actively participating in the classic multilateral game, promotes its own vision 

of the world, its own vision of a reinvented, more hegemonic multilateralism. [...] And so I hope 

France to promote a balanced vision and to protect both our interests and our worldview in this 
France’s Indo-Pacific Strategy and the Quad Plus

JOURNAL OF INDO-PACIFIC AFFAIRS  SPECIAL ISSUE 2020 177

constructive, demanding and confident dialogue with China. . . . So, in March and May of this 

year, I proposed in New Delhi and Sydney to work on a new strategic Indo-Pacific axis, which 

should not be directed against anyone and can be an essential contribution to international stability.” [Author’s translation] Discours du Président de la République à la conférence des Ambassadeurs, Paris, 27 August 2018, available at: www.elysee.fr. See also Emmanuel Macron, Speech at 

Garden Island Naval Base, Sydney, 2 May 2018; Emmanuel Macron, Joint media briefing: Statement by the French President, New Delhi, 10 March 2018, https://in.ambafrance.org/; and Discours du Président de la République Emmanuel Macron sur la Nouvelle-Calédonie à Nouméa, 5 

May 2018, https://www.elysee.fr/.

6. Discours du Président de la République à la conférence des Ambassadeurs, Paris, 29 August 

2017, https://www.elysee.fr/.

7. MEFA brochure, 3.

8. MEFA brochure, 4.

9. MEFA brochure.

10. Admiral Christophe Prazuck, Chief of Naval Staff, France, “Raisina 2019 | IndoPacific: Ancient Waters and Emerging Geometries,” ORF, YouTube, 9 January 2019, https://

www.youtube.com/.

11. Jean-Yves Le Drian, Minister of Defense, France – Statement for the fourth plenary session: The challenges of conflict resolution, 15th Asia Security Summit, The IISS Shangri-La Dialogue, Singapore, 5 June 2016, https://www.iiss.org/.

12. Discours de Florence Parly, ministre des Armées, Allocution au Shangri-La Dialogue, 1st 

June 2019, https://www.defense.gouv.fr/.

13. Discours du Président Emmanuel Macron à l’occasion des Assises de l’Economie Maritime à Montpellier, 3 December 2019, https://www.elysee.fr/.

14. « L’accélération » de la « stratégie maritime » annoncée par Emmanuel Macron : « Extrêmement important pour notre filière », Outremers360°, 16 June 2020.

15. The Indian Navy will be able to benefit from logistical support and bunkering within the 

French military facilities of Reunion, Mayotte, and Djibouti, and, potentially, the bases of the 

Emirates and the Pacific Ocean.

16. Xavier Vavasseur, “Indian Navy P-8I MPA in Reunion Island for Combined Training with 

French Forces,” Naval News, 5 March 2020, https://www.navalnews.com/.

17. Chethan Kumar, “India, France to develop a constellation of satellites,” Times of India, 23 

August 2019.

18. “France and Australia sign landmark space cooperation agreements,” Spacewatch Asia Pacific, 1 March 2019, https://spacewatch.global/.

19. The Indo-Pacific: 1st Trilateral Dialogue between France, India and Australia, French Embassy in New Delhi, 11 September 2020, https://in.ambafrance.org/.

20. Joint Strategic Vision of India-France Cooperation in the Indian Ocean Region (New Delhi, 

Ministry of External Affairs of India, 10 March 2018), http://www.mea.gov.in/.

21. “Vision Statement on the Australia-France Relationship by The Honourable Malcolm 

Turnbull, Prime Minister of the Commonwealth of Australia and His Excellency Emmanuel 

Macron, President of the French Republic”, 2 May 2018, https://www.pm.gov.au/.

22. “US, France, Japan and Australia hold first combined naval drill in Asia,” Reuters, 16 May 

2019, https://uk.reuters.com/.
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23. Discours du Président de la République à la conférence des Ambassadeurs, Paris, 27 

August 2018.

24. Humeyra Pamuk, Andrea Shalal, “Trump administration pushing to rip global supply 

chains from China: officials,” Reuters, 4 May 2020.

25. Indrani Bagchi, “Focus on Covid in Quad Plus meet,” Times of India, 13 May 2020, https://

timesofindia.indiatimes.com/.

26. Jean-Yves Le Drian, Minister of Defense, France – Statement for the fourth plenary session: The challenges of conflict resolution, 15th Asia Security Summit, The IISS Shangri-La Dialogue, Singapore, 5 June 2016.

27. Jessica Larsen, op. cit., 40–41.

28. “Europeans and Maritime Security in the Indo-Pacific: Demonstrating a More Proactive 

Commitment”, Céline Pajon and Masashi Nishihara, eds., “East Asia Security in Flux. What 

Regional Order Ahead?”, Études de l’Ifri, May 2020, https://www.ifri.org/.

29. Josep Borrell, High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, 

“We need a more robust strategy for China, which also requires better relations with the rest of 

democratic Asia,” (speech, 18th Conference of the Heads of German Missions, 25 May 2020).

30. “Germany – Europe – Asia: shaping the 21st century together”: The German Government adopts policy guidelines on the Indo-Pacific region, 1 September 2020, https://www 

.auswaertiges-amt.de/.

31. See the tweet from Petra Sigmund, Director General for Asia and the Pacific, German 

Federal Foreign Office, 8 September 2020, 3:50 PM https://twitter.com/.

32. Noah Barkin, “Watching China in Europe - September 2020,” GMF, 1 September 2020, 

https://www.gmfus.org/.

33. French-German initiative for the European recovery from the coronavirus crisis, Paris, 

French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 18 May 2020, https://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/.

34. Dipanjan Roy Chaudhury, “India-Japan-Australia decide to launch resilient supply chain 

initiative in the Indo-Pacific region,” Economic Times, 2 September 2020. https://economictimes 

.indiatimes.com/.

35. European Commission, “Coronavirus Global Response: €7.4 billion raised for universal 

access to vaccines,” (press release, 4 May 2020), https://ec.europa.eu/.

Disclaimer

The views and opinions expressed or implied in JIPA are those of the authors and should not be construed as carrying the 

official sanction of the Department of Defense, Department of the Air Force, Air Education and Training Command, 

Air University, or other agencies or departments of the US government or their international equivalents.
JOURNAL OF INDO-PACIFIC AFFAIRS  SPECIAL ISSUE 2020 179

 THE PLUS PERSPECTIVES

Quad Plus?

Carving Out Canada’s Middle-Power Role

Dr. Stephen Nagy

Abstract

The debate on the role and possible expansion of the Quadrilateral Security 

Dialogue (Quad) is growing. Is there a role for middle powers such as Canada in 

the Quad? This article examines possible Canadian participation in the Quad 

from the perspective of middle-power diplomacy. Key lines of enquiry include 

identifying Canadian middle-power interests in  the Quad, capabilities that 

Canada can bring to the Quad, and how to formulate participation. Findings 

suggest that Canada’s potential Quad participation is limited by its capacities and 

that its middle-power contributions would be capability-focused, including enhancing maritime awareness and consensus building of the consultative process 

through proactive diplomacy.

Introduction

The Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (hereafter, the Quad) has its roots in the 

nontraditional security cooperation that transpired following the joint humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HA/DR) efforts among Australia, Japan, India, 

and the United States in the wake of the 2004 Indian Ocean Tsunami, which killed 

over 250,000 people throughout the region.1 This joint operation laid bare the 

potential opportunities of participating states as to the possibilities that their quadrilateral cooperation could achieve. In May 2007, senior officials from Australia, 

India, Japan, and the United States arranged an inaugural Quad meeting on the 

sidelines of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) meeting in Manila, Philippines, 

to discuss ways to take the four-power relationship forward.2

Ryosuke Hanada argues that while

Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe gave birth to the idea of the Quadrilateral 

Security Dialogue in 2007, that was based on incrementally expanded regional 

cooperation mechanisms, especially the East Asia Summit (EAS), and the development of triangular relations, especially Australia-Japan-US trilateral security 

cooperation. Both were, in different ways, stimulated by increasing threat perceptions of China based on uncertainties about China’s rise. In that sense, the revival 

of the Quad in 2017 cannot simply be attributed to Shinzo Abe’s leadership but 

also to the fact that four governments carefully and steadily shifted their foreign 
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policy priorities in broader East Asia or the Asia-Pacific and developed bilateral 

and trilateral security cooperation mechanism since 2007 in the face of a rising 

and assertive China. Abe recognized these developments and skillfully helped 

revive the Quad in 2017 with his conceptualization of the Indo-Pacific regional 

concept as a pillar of Japanese foreign policy.3

The debate on the role and possible expansion of the Quad is growing. Notwithstanding, while much has been written about the Quad, little has been written about the role of middle powers, like Canada, within this evolving institution. 

Is there a role for middle powers such as Canada in the Quad? If so, what are the 

parameters by which they should contribute to a Quad Plus arrangement?

This article examines Canadian participation in the Quad from the perspective of middle-power diplomacy. Key lines of enquiry include identifying 

Canadian middle-power interests in the Quad, capabilities that Canada can 

bring to the Quad, and how to formulate participation. Findings suggest that 

Canada’s potential Quad participation is limited by its capacities and that its 

middle-power contributions would be capability-focused, including enhancing maritime awareness and consensus building of the consultative process 

through proactive diplomacy.

For clarity, this article borrows from my previous work on middle-power 

cooperation in the maritime domain of the Indo-Pacific to define neomiddle-power diplomacy in the following manner:

[N]eo-middle power diplomacy is understood as proactive foreign policy by 

middle powers that actively aims to shape regional order through aligning 

collective capabilities and capacities. What distinguishes neo-middle power 

diplomacy from so-called traditional middle power diplomacy is that neo-middle 

power diplomacy moves beyond the focus of buttressing existing international 

institutions and focusing on normative or issue-based advocacy such as human 

security, human rights or the abolition of land mines, to contributing to regional/

global public goods through cooperation, and at times in opposition to, the 

middle powers’ traditional partner, the US. Areas of cooperation [may include]... 

maritime security, surveillance, HADR, joint transits, amongst others.4

This article will be organized into four sections. Section one briefly examines 

the current Quad members, their characteristics, defense budgets, identities, and 

the deployment of their military and defense assets. This section serves to highlight the diversity of states that form the Quad as a basis for thinking about which 

states would be suitable candidates for future inclusion if the Quad evolves toward 

a Quad Plus. The second section then examines the converging and diverging 

interests of the current members of the Quad to pinpoint where and how additional members, in this case Canada, could contribute to the Quad. The third 
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section then looks at Southeast Asia’s views of the Quad as a criterion to understand how the region that forms the central locus of the Quad’s activities views 

the Quad and what trajectory they would like to see the Quad evolve toward. The 

fourth section will then discuss Canada’s role in a Quad Plus arrangement based 

on the analysis in the previous three sections.

The Quad’s Nuts and Bolts

By examining the current make-up of the Quad, we can make several observations that contribute to answering the research questions laid out at the onset of 

this article. First, the Quad currently consists of the United States and three 

middle powers: Australia, India, and Japan. Among them, Australia is a selfprofessed middle power that belongs to middle-power groups such as MIKTA, 

an informal foreign ministry-led partnership between Mexico, Indonesia, South 

Korea, Turkey, and Australia.5 India is considered a future great power, while 

Japan, arguably a great power in terms of potential, behaves as a middle power by 

“maintaining of the international order through coalition-building, by serving as 

mediators and “go-betweens,” and through international conflict management 

and resolution activities.”6

As outlined in the Lowy Institute’s Asian Power Indices between 2018 and 

2020,7 the fluidity of the power, capacities, and capabilities that each of the current Quad members possesses suggests that any institution based on contemporary metrics of each state’s capacities may be outdated as the balance of power in 

the region continues to shift toward China. The fluidity of power and the shift 

toward China are even more salient in the wake of the COVID-19 pandemic, as 

China has enhanced its assertive behavior in its periphery, evidenced by the 

Sino–Indian border violence in May,8 hyperbole toward Taiwan,9 enhanced grayzone and blue-hull naval operations in the South China Sea (SCS) and East 

China Sea (ECS),10 and the adoption of the new National Security Law in Hong 

Kong in June 2020.

Second, in terms of defense spending, the current Quad members bring significant resources to the Indo-Pacific table. In order of defense budgets, the United 

States brings approximately 750 billion USD, India 61 billion USD, Japan around 

49 billion USD, and Australia 26 billion USD to the collective military resources 

of the Quad.11 Despite the pandemic-induced global recession, each of the current Quad members continues to increase their defense budgets to reflect the realization that more and more resources will need to be directed at the Indo-Pacific 

to ensure the region is not shaped by China unilaterally. For instance, the July 

2020 Australian Strategic Defence Update envisions a region that will demand 
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more robust maritime, submarine, and strike capabilities to defend itself in the 

coming decades.12 In its 2021 defense budget request, Japan plans a record 5.49 

trillion Yen, focusing on space, cyber, and the electromagnetic spectrum.13 These 

are meant to deal with immediate challenges, such as North Korea’s weapons of 

mass destruction and missile development and the long-term challenge of China’s 

reemergence as the dominant organizing state in the region and determination to 

reorganize the region to protect Beijing’s core interests.14

The United States and India have increased their military budgets as well. In 

the case of the United States, its Indo-Pacific Strategy15 and defense budget proposal16 demand increased resources be developed and deployed in the region to 

counter China’s revisionist behavior. India continues to increase its military 

spending to push back against a growing Chinese maritime presence in the Indian Ocean,17 a military presence along the Indo–China border,18 and China’s 

support for India’s archrival, Pakistan.19

Third, if we compared where most of the defense and military assets are deployed, we find that Japan, Australia, and India have deployed most of their 

assets in their near abroad. For Japan, that means throughout the Japanese archipelago, the ECS, the SCS, and parts of the Indian Ocean.20 Australia, in 

contrast, has deployed the majority of its military assets in the Pacific Islands 

area, SCS, and parts of the Indian Ocean.21 India deploys most of its assets in 

the Indian Ocean and along its northern borders with China and Pakistan.22

Even though the United States has a global deployment of its assets, it started 

titling its resources to the Asian region, first under the Obama administration’s 

Rebalancing Strategy23 and accelerated under the Trump administration through 

its Indo-Pacific Strategy.

24

Converging and Diverging Interests of Quad Members

Another important area to examine when thinking about the Quad and attempting to carve out a role for middle powers is to examine the converging and 

diverging interests of its current members to identify synergies and opportunities 

to establish a Canadian middle-power role.

For existing Quad members, there are many areas of convergence. The most 

imminent concerns for them are growing economic interdependence with China 

and China’s track record of using economic coercion as leverage for strategic 

gains.25 China’s surrogates in Northeast Asia and South Asia, in particular nuclear 

weapons development in North Korea and Pakistan, also create worries in Japan 
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and India.26 China’s objection to expanded representation in the United Nations 

Security Council, despite attempts by Japan and India, represents another shared 

concern for Quad members.27 China’s expanding maritime claims in ESC, SCS, 

and Indian Ocean have the potential to disrupt sea lines of communication 

(SLOC).28 Furthermore, Quad members are united in their continued frustration 

with China’s role in fracturing Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) 

unity.29 Finally, there is also growing interest among Quad members to use arrangements such as the Quad to enhance partnerships through specific initiatives 

such as strengthening and diversifying global supply chains.30

India sees the Quad as a as a coalition of states to sustain the US presence in 

the region. The subtext here is to ensure the Indo-Pacific region and the Indian 

Ocean are not dominated by China as Beijing seeks to elevate its global reach 

through the construction of ports and infrastructure through the Belt and Road 

Initiative (BRI) and other arrangements in India’s neighboring states of Sri Lanka, 

Bangladesh, Nepal, and Pakistan. For India, Chinese infrastructure projects are 

strategically located in what India deems its historical sphere of influence and are 

often called China’s string of pearl around India’s neck—albeit viewed more as a 

garrote than a necklace.31 New Delhi’s views of the Quad partially overlap with 

those of Tokyo and Canberra in this regard, as all three states want to ensure that 

the United States remains engaged in the region through active institutional arrangements such as the Quad.

While convergences are many, there are important divergences that continue 

to make deeper institutionalization of the Quad a challenge. For India and Japan, 

issue linkage over North Korea and Pakistan’s nuclear capabilities continues to 

foster disagreement.32 Tokyo would like to get India’s support for North Korea, 

and New Delhi seeks Tokyo’s support for Pakistan—but neither side is willing to 

seriously support the other’s concerns. Another area of divergences is Tokyo, 

Washington, and Canberra’s comfort with alliances, alignment, and minilaterals, 

whereas New Delhi continues to wed itself to the Non-aligned Movement. More 

critically perhaps is the gap between New Delhi and its Quad counterparts in 

terms of the geographic understanding of the Quad and the Free and Open 

Indo-Pacific (FOIP). Here, India sees the Indian Ocean as the geographic scope 

of the Quad’s activities, whereas the other members of the Quad have much 

more expansive understandings.33 Last but not least, each member of the Quad 

has different degrees of concern regarding the securitization of the Quad or 
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FOIP. For India, Japan, and Australia, their largest trading partner is China, and 

that relationship cannot be easily changed.

Table 1.0 Japan–Australia–India–US and Canada’s converging and diverging interests

Japan–Australia–India–US and Canada’s converging and diverging interests

Japan–Australia–India–US and Canada Concern

Converging 

Interests

1. Growing economic interdependence with 

China (Glaser, 2017)

2. Chinese surrogates in Northeast Asia and 

South Asia

3. UNSC permanent member status (Mohan, 

2013, 283)

4. China’s expanding maritime claims in ESC, 

SCS, and Indian Ocean (Abe, 2015)

5. China’s role in fracturing ASEAN unity

6. Resilience of Global Supply China (Basu, 

2020)

7. Infrastructure, connectivity

1. Economic coercion

2. DPRK, Pakistan (missile and nuclear 

tech)

3. Monopolization of representation

4. Sea lines of communication

5. ASEAN Centrality

6. Global supply chain disruption

7. Development, integration

Diverging 

Interests

1. Issue linkage (Panda, 2011, p.8)

2. Alliance/alignment/minilaterals

3. Competing visions (Roy-Chaudhury and Sullivan de Estrada, 2018)

4. Over-securitization of Quad or FOIP

1. North Korea vs Pakistan

2. Legacy of Non-aligned Movement, 

US–Japan Alliance, Transpolar Sea 

Route

3. Indian Ocean vs Indo-Pacific

4. Exclusion of China and conflict

Source: Author’s own compilation.

The Quad and Southeast Asia

From the vantage point of Southeast Asia, the Quad in its current form is unlikely to get regional buy-in from ASEAN or Southeast Asian states. First, there 

is no dominant view within the region as to how to engage the Quad.34 Even 

Vietnam and the Philippines, the two countries with strong anti-Chinese sentiment, would not like to see the Quad evolve into a hard security-focused regional 

institution, as it would place them in a position in which they need to choose 

between their security and their economic prosperity.35 Both would welcome the 

Quad as a new actor in the region, depending on what the Quad intends to do. 

For them, the right formulation of the Quad would be another tool to hedge 

against China.36
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Other Southeast Asian states do not view the Quad in such utilitarian manner. For many, if the US–China rivalry is the basis for the Quad, it becomes an 

initiative that ASEAN will be unable to support. That said, for most, the Quad 

is another tool in the hedging box and a useful means to keep the United States 

engaged and to bring in other stakeholders to maximize the strategic autonomy 

that ASEAN carefully guards.37 If the evolution of the Quad focuses on maritime security, there is more potential to get support from ASEAN.

In the COVID-19 pandemic era, other areas have emerged as potential pillars 

of cooperation that could be implemented by the Quad countries in their present 

form or an enlarged Quad Plus format. For instance, COVID-19 demonstrated 

the vulnerabilities that Southeast Asian states face in terms of supply chains and 

in particular the vulnerability of their medical supply chains.38 States like Vietnam and Cambodia, which are deeply dependent on China’s supply chains, are 

increasingly in need of finding ways to diversify their trade and supply-chain 

portfolio to preserve their strategic autonomy as the US–China strategic 

competition intensifies.

The Quad represents one of many tools the region can use to meet its needs. To 

capitalize on this, the Quad needs to be reinvented to focus on the needs of 

Southeast Asian countries rather than some kind of Indo-Pacific NATO arrangement to contain China. Here, Japan’s FOIP and its overlap with aspects of the 

Quad in terms of membership and several policy agendas may be a template to 

get support from Southeast Asian countries for not only a more proactive role for 

the Quad in the Indo-Pacific but importantly, expanded membership to bring in 

more resources to the region.

Critical to garnering support will be the inclusion of a clear statement supporting ASEAN Centrality, an overt shift toward infrastructure and connectivity, 

development, and trade as the key pillars of a reinvented Quad. An example the 

Quad can follow is FOIP’s shift away from a more security-focused FOIP 1.0 to 

what Hosoya Yuichi of Keio University calls FOIP 2.0, a revamped FOIP that is 

more in line with the needs of the littoral states in the Indo-Pacific.39

Quad Plus?: Carving Out Canada’s Middle-Power Role

Shifting to the central research puzzle of this article regarding a possible role 

for middle powers such as Canada in a Quad Plus arrangement, it is useful to first 

provide a brief overview as to Canada’s engagement in the region, followed by a 

systematic examination of where Canada fits compared to existing Quad members and in an expanded organization.

Canada’s hitherto engagement in the region has been through an Asia-Pacific, 

not an Indo-Pacific framework, focusing on multilateral architecture such as the 
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Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) on the trade side. Canada was a 

founding member of APEC in 1990 and has been a dialogue partner in the ARF 

since the forum’s formation in 1994. Canada’s activities in the region also include 

international development in the form of support, cooperation, and membership in 

the Asian Development Bank (ADB), and more recently joined—while not before 

considerable internal debate—the Chinese-led Asian Infrastructure Investment 

Bank (AIIB) in 2017.

On the political-security side, Canada’s engagement has been through the 

ARF.40 Traditionally, this is primarily meant to strengthen cooperation among 

member states within the Asia-Pacific context, and now this is falling increasingly 

under the umbrella of the Indo-Pacific framing.

Canada has yet to find a way to contribute to the region’s security architecture 

through institutional participation. Nevertheless, Canada actively participates in 

multilateral defense fora such as the Shangri-la Dialogue, the Tokyo Defense 

Forum, the United States Pacific Command Chiefs of Defense Conference, the 

Jakarta International Defense Dialogue, the Multinational Planning and Augmentation Team Program, and the Seoul Defense Dialogue, which bring together 

senior defense officials at the deputy minister/vice minister level. Canada continues to express its interest in becoming a member of both the ASEAN Defence 

Ministers’ Meeting–Plus and the EAS.41

Currently, Canada’s regular military activities in the Indo-Pacific area include 

the biennial Rim of the Pacific Exercises (RIMPAC). In 2014, Canada deployed 

more than 1,000 Canadian Armed Forces personnel; ships, such as the HMCS 

Calgary, HMCS Nanaimo and HMCS Whitehorse; submarines, such as the 

HMCS Victoria; and several aircraft (eight CF-188 Hornets, one CC-130 Hercules, one CC-150 Polaris, and three CP-140 Auroras).42 In addition to these 

multilateral exercises, Canada also participants in the Cobra Gold,43 one of the 

largest exercises in the region next to RIMPAC; ARF’s disaster relief exercise 

(DiREx), which is a training opportunity through which ASEAN countries can 

exercise coordination of civil-military international assistance to strengthen cooperation in HA/DR cooperation; and Ulchi-Freedom Guardian Exercise,44 which 

tests the operational control of the combined forces in defense of the Korean 

Peninsula. Canada’s participation has consisted of personnel from the 1st Canadian Division, acting as a Division Headquarters under the the 1st US Corps, 

among other military training exercises in the region.

Reflecting on Canada’s participation in multinational defense fora and its interests in the Quad, there is a convergence on many issues in the Indo-Pacific 

region—but less so as to the nature of the Quad. In fact, little is written about 

Canada’s perception of the Quad, with some mischaracterizations such as “the 
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Quad is nowadays contextualized first of all by issues around the militarization of 

Chinese international behaviour,” an impression of the Quad which resonates 

with Southeast Asian states and other states as well.45

Comparing to the other middle powers within the Quad, Canada spends 

around 22.5 billion USD per year, a number that is comparable to Australia but 

well below the other Quad members’ budgets.46 Ottawa deploys most of its resources toward NATO-related activities and peacekeeping operations. It was only 

in 2012 when Canada began its “mini-pivot” to the Asia-Pacific in which we saw 

regularized Canadian ships visits to the region.47 These activities have continued 

to expand, with the Canadian navy seeing greater engagement in Asia.48 Still, a 

common refrain when advocating for enhanced security-related engagement in 

the Indo-Pacific is that Canada already is significantly overstretched to manage 

its security in the Pacific, Atlantic, and now the Arctic Oceans and that it is simply impossible to divert more resources to the Indo-Pacific in any meaningful 

manner outside the regularized joint exercises listed above.

If that is the case, Canada’s ability to contribute to the Quad’s capacities significantly is limited by the realities of finite resources. Nonetheless, that does not 

mean that Canada cannot contribute to the Quad in other areas, such as enhancing maritime domain awareness activities, HA/DR operations, international 

development, infrastructure, and connectivity. As Robert M. Cutler writes, 

Canada can even assume the role of a stable “producer and exporter of Canadian 

oil and gas to Canadian allies in the Indo-Pacific region.”49

In this sense, Canada’s potential role within the Quad will depend less on who

is part of the Quad or Quad Plus formulation but rather on what activities the 

Quad members agree to be the core agenda of the nascent institution. If the Quad 

evolves toward a security grouping aimed at curbing China’s assertive behavior in 

the Indo-Pacific, the contributions that Ottawa could practically provide would 

be limited to enhancing the capacities of the other members through leveraging 

Canada’s experience and expertise in particular maritime-based activities such as 

maritime domain awareness. In discussions with Canadian naval personnel, the 

core competences that Canada could provide in maritime domain awareness is 

leveraging their intelligence-gathering experience and expertise to bolster the collective capabilities of Quad members. This targeted form of collaboration suggests 

that there might be scope for other forms of targeted cooperation within the 

Quad framework as well. These may include multilateral sanctions enforcement in 

the case of North Korea, capacity building, search-and-rescue operations, and 

HA/DR activities.

If the Quad evolves in a direction that inculcates the needs of Southeast 

Asian states such as development, the diversification of global supply chains, 
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infrastructure and connectivity, and nontraditional security cooperation such as 

antipiracy, antipoaching, illegal immigration, and food security,50 Canada will have 

more latitude in terms of the meaningful contributions it could provide to a revamped Quad. Here, Canada’s existing track record in international development 

could be leveraged alongside Quad members such as Japan, which already has an 

established, longstanding track record of providing official development assistance 

(ODA) for regional development. This could be through the ADB, the AIIB, or 

both, depending on the project and target of developmental aid. In the area of 

nontraditional security cooperation as well, there is extensive overlap between the 

maritime domain awareness operations to monitor blue- and white-hull ships of 

sanction evaders and states attempting to dominate the ECS and SCS and the 

monitoring of pirates, illegal fishing, and human trafficking.

Contributing to capacity building of states on the frontline of Chinese assertive 

behavior will be critical. This means providing training and tools such as coast 

guard vessels, maritime domain awareness technologies, and intelligence so that 

states in the region can manage their bilateral challenges with China on more 

even ground. It also means more joint training exercises focusing on HA/DR and 

search-and-rescue to develop interoperability and experience.

Building on Canada’s preexisting bilateral relations with each of the current 

Quad members, established multilateral cooperation in institutions such as the 

Five Eyes, and joint training exercises with Australia, Japan, and the United 

States, Canada is well positioned to contribute directly to current Quad members directly within or outside the Quad framework. Canada has activity courted 

India to expand cooperation in many areas, including the Foreign Investment 

Promotion and Protection Agreement (FIPPA) and the Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (CEPA) under former Prime Minister Stephen 

Harper. Harper further expanded cooperation to include foreign direct investment, technology transfers, and trade agreements and leveraged diaspora links 

toward expanding ties with India.51

Prime Minister Justin Trudeau further deepened this engagement with India 

with the recognition of “the rapid emergence of the global South and Asia and 

the need to integrate these countries into the world’s economic and political 

system.”52 Ottawa’s courting of New Delhi was aimed at inculcating stability into 

the Asia-Pacific with the rise of China and its assertive behavior in the region. 

While not explicitly supporting freedom of navigation operations (FONOPS) in 

the Indo-Pacific and not linking Canada’s activities in the Indo-Pacific to Chinese maritime behavior, Ottawa has aimed to both support and enhance Canada’s 

relationships with states like India in the region at the same time it engages with 

China. Infrastructure, connectivity, and energy remain areas of synergy between 
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Canada and India. Working through the Blue Dot Network, Ottawa could leverage Canada’s preexisting capacities and cooperate with Australia, Japan, and the 

United States to undertake infrastructure and connectivity projects to help New 

Delhi develop India’s smart cities, diversify global supply chains, and make India 

and the region more resilient to shocks to supply chains and economic coercion.

Energy is another area that Canada could lend weight to relieve pressure on 

states with concerns over SLOCs in the SCS being disrupted by intentional or 

accidental conflicts in the region. By providing a steady flow of energy resources 

to the region, Canada could assist Quad members and Southeast Asian states to 

be less dependent on energy flows in the SCS. For Southeast Asian states, this 

gives them more strategic autonomy by decreasing their reliance on SCS-based 

SLOCs. For Quad members, guarantees of stable supplies of energy strengthens 

their resilience against disruptions, allowing their economies to be less affected by 

conflict, coercion, and endogenous and exogenous shocks.

On the energy front, Canada is already reaching out to India. For instance, at 

the second India–Canada Ministerial Energy Dialogue, Minister of State for Petroleum and Natural Gas Dharmendra Pradhan said, “India and Canada share 

common values and ideals and believe in long term sustained partnerships. Our 

energy cooperation is steadily growing, but the potential is much higher.”53 Ketan 

Metha highlights that

In times of growing pressure from the US to cut oil imports from Iran, Canada 

could be an alternative energy source for India. Canada can also be a significant 

source of Liquified Natural Gas (LNG) for India; it is estimated that the latter 

will import 44 billion cubic metres of LNG by 2025.54

Aside from India, Canada has also reached out to the other existing Quad 

members to provide support for cooperation and a growing alignment of the 

FOIP vision. For instance, on the occasion of Canadian defense minister Harjit 

Sajjan’s visit to Japan in June 2019, both countries agreed to continue to “advance 

the FOIP.”55 This declaration came in the wake of the previous years’ Acquisition 

and Cross-Servicing Agreement (ACSA) to strengthen cooperation between the 

Canadian Armed Forces and the Japanese Self-Defense Forces.56 The agreement 

“advances cooperation between the two countries in response to humanitarian 

and disaster crises, peacekeeping initiatives, and allow greater collaboration with 

third-partners, including the US.”57

Cooperation between Canada and Japan is not limited to the bilateral level as 

highlighted above. Since 2018, Canada has also participated in the Keen Sword 

trilateral exercises with the United States and Japan. The latest rendition of Keen 

Sword included one Canadian Destroyer and is meant to provide participants “a 
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comprehensive scenario designed to exercise the critical capabilities required to 

support the defense of Japan and respond to a crisis or contingency in the IndoPacific region.”58 While participation is modest, the regular presence of the Royal 

Canadian Navy working alongside Japan and the United States sends a strong 

signal that Canada is committed to working with like-minded countries in the 

Indo-Pacific on issues Ottawa deems critical to a rules-based order. This participation outside the Quad framework and without signing on to FONOPS, the 

latter of which is squarely aimed at deterring Chinese maritime activities, does 

not speak to Canada’s lack of support for these activities; rather, it illustrates that 

Ottawa wishes to maximize Canada’s strategic flexibility toward China while 

demonstrating Canadian support for and ability to contribute to multilateral 

cooperation in the region.

Maritime monitoring and surveillance is another domain in which Canada has 

been engaged since 2018, using aircraft based at Kadena Air Base, Japan, and 

subject to a UN Status of Forces Agreement, to counter illicit maritime activities, 

including the ship-to-ship transfers of North Korean-flagged vessels that are prohibited by United Nations Security Council resolutions.59 Here, leveraging the 

preexisting Five Eyes Network provides a springboard to expand cooperation 

between current Quad members such as Australia and the United States, while at 

the same time basing cooperation on the Five Eyes framework excludes two of 

the current Quad members: Japan and India.

Canada recently held a virtual Five Eyes defense ministers’ meeting on 15–16 

October 2020. Building on the June 2020 Five Eyes meeting, participants expanded their talks to focus on China and the Indo-Pacific. This focus may provide 

a framework where Canada can provide value in the Indo-Pacific. While this 

maybe be welcome to identify where current and potential Quad members could 

cooperate, some see a Five Eye framework for Canada to participate in the region 

a “risk that by diluting an intelligence-sharing and joint collection mechanism 

into something with an expansive agenda, the core missions of the grouping could 

be sidelined. Issues-based coalitions work much better than all-purpose ones.”60

Last but not least, the COVID-19 pandemic and a recent track record of economic coercion clearly illustrated the dangers of global supply chains being overcentralized in one state. In the case of the former, the shutdown of the Chinese 

economy to control the COVID-19 outbreak severely affected the supply and 

distribution of products, including medical equipment and personal protective 

equipment,61 parts, and products to the world.62

In the case of the latter, economic coercion against Australia, Canada, South 

Korea, and Japan in recent years demonstrates the need to diversify and strengthen 

supply chains such that countries can be better positioned to deal with shocks to 
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global supply chains and the weaponization of trade. To do this, Japan’s approach 

has been primarily economic. It is investing in building resilience into the IndoPacific economic integration through infrastructure projects, strengthening 

global supply chains throughout Southeast and South Asia, developmental and 

technological aid that strengthens economic integration, support for a shared 

rules-based understanding of trade, and the use of SLOCs.63 To illustrate, the 

supplementary budget for fiscal 2020 includes subsidies to promote domestic 

investment for support of supply chain (220 billion Yen) and for supporting diversification of global supply chains (23.5 billion Yen). These are examples of this 

investment during the COVID-19 pandemic, but many of the core pillars of the 

FOIP Vision also illustrate this commitment.

Taking a page from Japan’s approach to deal with economic coercion and the 

possibility of another shock to global supply chains, Canada should work with 

other Quad members in investing in the diversification and resilience of supply 

chains. This serves to enhance their collective economic security while providing 

to Southeast Asian and South Asian states critical infrastructure and connectivity 

that enhances their development. At the same time, it enhances these states’ strategic autonomy to deal with assertive behavior without directly confronting China 

or creating a security competition with China.

Conclusion

The viability of a Quad Plus arrangement and carving out Canada’s middlepower role is dependent on how successful current Quad members are at reinventing the security dialogue such that it focuses on the needs of Southeast and 

South Asian nations. Canada’s contributions will be limited if the arrangement 

retains its current formulation and orientation that leans toward an informal 

security partnership chiefly aimed at containing China. In contrast, a reinventing 

of the Quad such that it embodies the needs of littoral states in the Indo-Pacific 

opens up doors for Canadian contributions to the region through the Quad. 

Infrastructure and connectivity, energy cooperation, maritime domain awareness, 

HADR, and search-and-rescue activities are the primary areas in which Canada 

can contribute to the current Quad and Quad Plus formulations. For Canada, 

the question of a middle-power role within the Quad will be informed by how 

well Ottawa can leverage and expand Canada’s existing bilateral and multilateral 

cooperation in the Indo-Pacific to add value to the Quad while being in line with 

Canadian interests in the region.
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Dr. Stephen Nagy

Dr. Nagy is a senior associate professor at the International Christian University in Tokyo, a distinguished fellow 

with the Asia Pacific Foundation of Canada, a fellow at the Canadian Global Affairs Institute (CGAI), and a visiting fellow with the Japan Institute for International Affairs (JIIA).

Acknowledgment

The author would like to express his gratitude to Ms. Hanh Nguyen for her editorial assistance.

Notes

1. Jesse Barker Galle and Andrew Shearer and, “The Quadrilateral Security Dialogue and 

the Maritime Silk Road Initiative,” CSIS Briefs, 4 April 2018, https://csis-website-prod.s3.

amazonaws.com/.

2. Dhruva Jaishankar, “Its’s Time to Resuscitate the Asia-Pacific Quad,” Order from Chaos 

(blog), 9 January 2017, https://www.brookings.edu/.

3. Ryosuke Hanada, “The Role of U.S.-Japan-Australia-India Cooperation, or the ‘Quad’ in 

FOIP: A Policy Coordination Mechanism for a Rules-based Order,” Strategic Japan Working 

Papers (working paper, Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2019), https://csis-websiteprod.s3.amazonaws.com/.

4. Stephen R. Nagy, “Maritime Cooperation between Middle Powers in the Indo-Pacific: 

Aligning Interests with Capability and Capacity,” Issues and Insights 20, no. 1 (working paper, Pacific Forum, March 2020): 1–6, https://www.researchgate.net/.

5. Helen Clark, “Australia, MIKTA and the middle power question,” The Diplomat, 20 April 

2015, https://thediplomat.com/.

6. Laura Neack, “Middle powers once removed: The diminished global role of middle powers 

and American grand strategy” (paper presented at International Studies Association 41st Annual 

Convention in Los Angeles from 14–18 March 2020).

7. Hervé Lemahieu and Bonnie Bley, “Asia Power Index 2019 Pocket Book,” Lowly Institute, 

accessed 28 September 2019, https://power.lowyinstitute.org/.

8. Ashley J. Tellis, “Hustling in the Himalayas: The Sino-Indian border confrontation,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 4 June 2020, https://carnegieendowment.org/.

9. Rik Glauert, “Will Taiwan Strait tensions lead to conflict? Five things to know,” Nikkei Asia, 

25 September 2020, https://asia.nikkei.com/.

10. Stephen Nagy and Hanh Nguyen, “Opportunism and miscalculation by claimants in the 

South China Sea,” PacNet #41, Pacific Forum, accessed 7 October 2020, https://pacforum.org/.

11. Global Fire Power, “Defense Spending by Country (2020), accessed 7 October 2020, 

https://www.globalfirepower.com/

12. Department of Defense of Australia, “2020 Defense Strategic Update,” accessed 7 October 

2020, https://defence.gov.au/.

13. Japan Times, “Japan’s Defense Ministry seeks record ¥5.4 trillion budget,” 1 October 2020, 

https://www.japantimes.co.jp/.

14. In August, Japan’s Self Defense Force proposed a 2.1-percent hike in defense spending to 

¥5.3 trillion (or 48 billion USD), citing threats from North Korea’s nuclear and missile program 

as well as China’s growing air and sea power in the waters around Japan. For an insightful discus-
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JOURNAL OF INDO-PACIFIC AFFAIRS  SPECIAL ISSUE 2020 193

sion on growing security threats to Japan, see: Masashi Murano and Rebeccah L. Heinrichs, 

“Transcript: Pushing back against Chinese and North Korean missile threats: Strengthening U.S.-

Japan deterrence strategy and joint missile defense posture,” Hudson Institute, 3 August 2020, 

https://www.hudson.org/.

15. U.S. Department of State, “A free and open Indo-Pacific: Advancing a shared vision,” 4 

November 2019, https://www.state.gov/.

16. U.S. Department of Defense, “DOD releases Fiscal Year 2021 budget proposal,” 10 February 2020, https://www.defense.gov/.

17. David Brewster, “Silk Road and Strings of Pearls: The strategic geography of China’s new 

pathways in the Indian Ocean,” Geopolitics 22, no. 2 (2017): 269–91.

18. Ashley J. Tellis, “Hustling in the Himalayas: The Sino-Indian border confrontation.”

19. Rai Verma, “China’s new security concept: India, terrorism, China’s geostrategic interests and domestic stability in Pakistan,” The Pacif ic Review, 13 September 2019, DOI: 

10.1080/09512748.2019.1663902.

20. Ministry of Defense of Japan, “2020 Defense of Japan,” accessed 8 October 2020, https://

www.mod.go.jp/.

21. Department of Defense of Australia, “2020 Defense Strategic Update.”

22. Ministry of Defense of India, “Annual Report 2018-2019,” accessed 9 October 2020, 

https://www.mod.gov.in/.

23. Renato Cruz de Castro, “The Obama administration’s strategic rebalancing to Asia: Quo 

vadis in 2017?” Pacific Focus 33, no. 2 (2018): 179–207.

24. U.S. Department of Defense, “Indo-Pacific Strategy Report: Preparedness, Partnerships, 

and Promoting a networked region,” 1 June 2019, https://www.defense.gov/.

25. Bonnie S. Glaser, “China’s Coercive Economic Diplomacy,” The Diplomat, 25 July 2012, 

https://thediplomat.com/.

26. Malik Mohan, India and China: Great Power Rivals (New Delhi: Viva, 2012), 283.

27. J. Mohan Malik, “Security Council Reform: China signals its veto,” World Policy Journal 22, 

no. 1 (2005): 20.

28. Shinzo Abe, “The Bounty of the Open Seas: Five New Principles of Japanese Diplomacy,” 

Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, 18 January 2013, https://www.mofa.go.jp/.

29. Huong Le Thu, “China’s dual strategy of coercion and inducement towards ASEAN,” The 

Pacific Review 32, no. 1: 20–36.

30. Bloomberg, “Japan, Australia and India to launch supply chain initiative,” 1 September 

2020, https://www.bloomberg.com/asia.

31. Surinder Mohan and Josukutty C. Abraham, “Shaping the regional and maritime battlefield? The Sino-Indian strategic competition in South Asia and adjoining waters,” Maritime Affairs: Journal of the National Maritime Foundation of India 16, no. 1 (2020): 82–97.

32. Rajaram Panda, “Changing Dynamics of India-Japan Relation: Future Trend,” in Akihiro 

Iwashita, ed., India-Japan Dialogue: Challenge and Potential (Hokkaido: Slavic-Eurasian Research 

Center, Hokkaido University, 2011), 8.

33. Rahul Roy-Chaudhury & Kate Sullivan de Estrada, “India, the Indo-Pacific and the 

Quad,” Survival 60, no. 3 (2018): 181–94.

34. Huong Le Thu, “Southeast Asian perceptions of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue,” 

Australian Strategic Policy Institute, October 2018, https://www.aspi.org.au/.
194 JOURNAL OF INDO-PACIFIC AFFAIRS  SPECIAL ISSUE 2020

Nagy

35. Vietnam and the Philippines perceive the Quad as an initiative to complement the existing 

regional security framework and hope it will play a role in enforcing rules-based order. To understand Southeast Asia’s diverse view of the Quad, read Huong Le Thu, “How Southeast Asian really perceive the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue,” Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative, Center 

for Strategic and International Studies, 12 November 2018, https://amti.csis.org/.

36. Huong Le Thu, “How Southeast Asian really perceive the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue.”

37. Huong, “How Southeast Asian really perceive the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue.”.

38. Manisha Mirchandani, “Coronavirus exposes dependency of Southeast Asia’s manufacturers on China,” Brink News, 15 March 2020, https://www.brinknews.com/.

39. Yuichi Hosoya, “FOIP 2.0: The evolution of Japan’s Free and Open Indo-Pacific Strategy,” 

Asia-Pacific Review 26, no. 1 (2019): 18–28.

40. David Dewitt, Mary Young, Alex Brouse and Jinelle Piereder, “AWOL: Canada’s defense 

policy and presence in the Asia Pacific,” International Journal 73, no. 1 (2018): 5–32.

41. Association of Southeast Asian Nations, “Canada to further strengthen ties with ASEAN,” 

31 March 2016, https://asean.org/.

42. Government of Canada, “Canada participates in world’s largest maritime exercise – RIMPAC 2014,” accessed 8 October 2020, https://www.canada.ca/en.html.

43. Zachary Williams, “Cobra Gold 2020: America’s strategic shift in Southeast Asia,” The 

Diplomat, 6 March 2020, https://thediplomat.com/.

44. Global Security Force, “Ulchi-Freedom Guardian,” accessed 8 October 2020, https://

www.globalsecurity.org/.

45. Robert M. Cutler, “Canadian Energy Leadership in the Indo-Pacific Region,” in Conference of Defence Associations (CDA) Institute, January 2019, https://cdainstitute.ca/.

46. Global Firepower, “Defense spending by countries (2020),” accessed 8 October 2020, 

https://www.globalfirepower.com/

47. Eric Lerhe, “The Asia-Pacific and the Royal Canadian Navy,” Canadian Global Affairs Institute, June 2015, https://www.cgai.ca/.

48. Gordon Arthur, “Canadian Navy sees greater engagement in Asia,” Shephard Media, 4 May 

2018, https://www.shephardmedia.com/.

49. Robert M. Cutler, “Canadian Energy Leadership in the Indo-Pacific Region.”

50. Prakash Gopal, Maritime Security in the Indo-Pacific: The Role of the US and its Allies,” 

Maritime Affairs: Journal of the National Maritime Foundation of India 13, no.1 (2017): 27–40.

51. Arthur Rubinoff, “Canada’s Re-Engagement with India,” Asian Survey 42, no. 6 (2002): 

838–55.

52. Rajiv Bhatia, “India-Canada Relations-Post Trudeau’s Visit: The Road Ahead,” The Gateway House, 7 May 2018.

53. Press Information Bureau, Government of India, “Canada and India Highlight Growing 

Energy Relationship,” 7 July 2015.

54. Ketan Mehta, “India and Canada Relations: The Long Road to Recovery,” Observer Research Foundation, Occasional Papers (2019).

55. Department of National Defence of Canada, “Joint Statement of the Ministry of Defense 

of Japan and the Department of National Defence of Canada on Defense Cooperation,” June 

2019, https://www.canada.ca/.

56. Global Affairs Canada, “Canada and Japan sign Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement to strengthen military cooperation,” April 2018, https://www.canada.ca/.
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57. Jonathan Berkshire Miller and Thomas Wilkins, “The Role for Middle Powers in the Free 

and Open Indo-Pacific: Looking at Opportunities for Canada and Australia,” Japan Review 3, no. 

1 (2019).

58. “U.S. Military and Japan Self-Defense Forces Kick Off Keen Sword,” Naval News, 26 

October 2020, https://www.navalnews.com/.

59. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan, “Monitoring and surveillance activities by Canada 

against illicit maritime activities including ship-to-ship transfers” (press release, 24 May 2019), 

https://www.mofa.go.jp/.

60. Abhijnan Rej, “Five Eyes Defense Ministers Meet Amid Widening Agenda,” The Diplomat, 17 October 2020, https://thediplomat.com/.

61. Talha Burki, “Global shortage of personal protective equipment,” The Lancet Infectious Diseases 20, no. 7 (2020): 785–86.

62. Sara Hsu, “Effects of coronavirus on China’s supply chains,” China-US Focus, 14 May 2020, 

https://www.chinausfocus.com/.

63. US Indo-Pacific Command Public Affairs, “Japan Self-Defense Forces, U.S. military to 

begin exercise Keen Sword,” 26 October 2020, https://www.cpf.navy.mil/.

Disclaimer

The views and opinions expressed or implied in JIPA are those of the authors and should not be construed as carrying the 

official sanction of the Department of Defense, Department of the Air Force, Air Education and Training Command, 

Air University, or other agencies or departments of the US government or their international equivalents.
196 JOURNAL OF INDO-PACIFIC AFFAIRS  SPECIAL ISSUE 2020

 THE PLUS PERSPECTIVES

Brazil in the Quad Plus

Incongruous or Extended Drawbridge of the Indo-Pacific?

Dr. Dattesh D. Parulekar

Abstract

The Indo-Pacific framework has been characterized as “inclusive and across 

oceans,”1 suggestive of the expansively envisioned traverse and trajectory of the strategic construct. Hence, it is no surprise, but plausibly curious, that the emergent 

phraseological rollout of the Quad Plus, an informal collective-in-the-making of 

very recent vintage, transcends the immediate two-oceans confluence of the Quad 

grouping of the quartet of vibrant democracies, to extend to the third ocean of human habitation, in incorporating the Atlantic seaboard transcontinental powerhouse 

of Brazil into its mix. This article endeavors to intimately examine the intriguing 

case of Brazil’s involvement in the Washington-spurred maiden conference call for 

coordination, which, given Brasilia’s abject lack of appreciation of the Indo-Pacific 

framework in its foreign policy calculus and little if any enthusiasm exuded in orienting Brazil to it in any purported grand strategy, makes it an apparently incongruous participant in the exercise. The article illuminates the sashaying trajectory of 

contemporaneous twenty-first-century Brazilian foreign policy, contextualized to 

interchange with sovereigns within the once proverbial Asia-Pacific but now the 

putatively realigned Indo-Pacific, through the epoch of constructive and responsible 

internationalism under Pres. Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva’s administration (2003–

2010); the subsequent phase of recanting isolationism of Pres. Dilma Rousseff 

(2011–2016); through to the erratic and sometimes reckless fluidity of incumbent 

Pres. Jair Bolsonaro, in pursuance of ascertaining the scoped prospects, or otherwise, 

of Latin America’s largest country and its economic involvement with and within 

the Indo-Pacific going forward. The article further assesses the accosting systemic 

and sovereign actor pressures that come to bear in chaperoning the dilemmas of 

Brazil in its logical and legitimate desires for strategic autonomy in foreign policy 

regarding diversification and pluralization of strategic engagements, which, in the 

Indo-Pacific context, would entail a curated approach on the part of Itamaraty—

one that tactically balances among Brazil’s deep-seated commercialist dependence 

on Beijing, its progressively bonhomous engagement with Washington, and its role 

and contribution within the Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa (BRICS) 

construct, where the other four sovereign constituents are geographical and geopolitical Indo-Pacific stakeholders.
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Introduction

In times where the constructs and processes of regionalism and regionalization 

are undergirded by the axis of functional cartography born of delimited geographies endeavoring to produce transcending continuums, it is only in the nature of 

the terrain, for international statecraft to manifest strange sovereign diplomatic 

bedfellows from time to time—accentuated, of course, by the pandemic-spurred 

new normal. However, even by the greatest stretches of imagination, it strains incredulity to observe the invitation to Brazil to partake in the foreign ministers’ 

teleconference of the clique informally billed as the Quad Plus. If Brasilia was 

tapped only because the brief of the coordinating conference call was ostensibly to 

sing from the same hymn sheet at the then-impending World Health Assembly 

plenary meeting of the World Health Organization, then, given Brazil’s travails 

with tending to the pandemic, it is understandable and could be perceived as a 

one-off invitation to the cause. However, if the invitation is anything but, then, in 

incorporating an-ocean-and-two-continents-apart nation as far removed as one 

could possibly be on account of its geopolitical bliss from the Indo-Pacific construct, the gross oddity of such an invitational exercise straddles the gamut of flippancy and the outlandish. And going beyond being the odd nation out from within 

the BRICS in relation to the Indo-Pacific, Brazil’s outlier status is further credentialed by the dint of it being the only country of even the G4 collective with no 

express or discernible strategic conception or resonation of the Indo-Pacific—this 

made more stark after Germany’s recent formalization of an Indo-Pacific vision,2

all of which befuddles to no end Brazil’s selection to the virtual meeting.

If the solicitation to the virtual schmooze was oozing appreciation for Brazilian congressman Eduardo Bolsonaro joining US president Donald Trump and 

Secretary of State Mike Pompeo’s ranks, in picking cudgels with Beijing through 

typecasting the pandemic strain as the “Chinese virus3” but without the Bolsonaro dispensation following through on punitive measures against China either 

on trade or through technological nix, then, eligibility on considerations of conveniently opportunistic polemics that deflect from Brazil’s own ham-handed 

management of the apocalyptic health crisis construe as facetiously trivial. And 

even if one were to counsel Brazil’s invitation to the Indo-Pacific pertinent confabulation on account of its maritime exertions as part of flagship naval exercise 

IBSAMAR, commissioned since 2008 under the rubric of the long fledgling 

India-Brazil-South Africa (IBSA) Trilateral, then, such an argument would constitute clutching at straws. This since only one of six biennial editions of the trilateral arrangement at maritime interoperability has transpired in Indo-Pacific 

waters, and that too brought on by the logistical convenience of preceding the 
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marquee International Fleet Review assemblage of multinational navies, hosted 

by India off Vishakhapatnam in March 2016.4 From every standpoint, Brazil’s 

presence at the convivial maiden Quad Plus conversation exudes incongruity and 

is replete with jarring incoherence.

Brazil within the Indo-Pacific’s Quad Plus: Much Ado 

about Nothing?

As a country possessed of gargantuan landmass, hemming in the fifth-largest 

demographic concentration worldwide and being reposed of natural endowment 

in terms of strategic natural resources, Brazil has inveterately harbored plausible 

and legitimate aspirations of exerting a greater influence upon the international 

system—most certainly so since the turn of the century. However, such comprehensible ambitions have for good measure stood tempered at the multitudinous 

altar of Brazil’s travails with being recognized and coveted as the dominant regional 

lynchpin by sovereign peers within continental South America and the larger 

transcontinental Latin American space. Brasilia’s penchant to stand strong in support of its national equities and wider regional interests vis-à-vis the United States, 

a posture that has it often touted in metaphorical profile as being the region’s 

France, and the nation’s inability to emerge from the natural conditioning of its 

distinctly Euro-Atlantic and principally Lusophone-Africa conceptualized worldview have accentuated the disconnect between the regional powerhouse’s ambitions to break out of geographical detachment and its underwhelming performance 

in terms of participation in global value and supply chains. Additionally, its primary 

mode of industrialization, which, despite creation of niche capabilities in specific 

sectors, has largely remained commoditized in catering to national demand and 

regional markets, thereby ending-up shortchanged. Furthermore, the dint of this 

predominantly agrarian powerhouse with decent production sectors to boot, having remained aloof of multilateral trade and investment compacts, has, unlike 

Mexico, rendered it short shrift in envisioning a foreign economic policy beyond 

the transactional interests interchange with specific sovereign commercial partners 

globally. Hence, during the course of the past three decades of the post–Cold War 

era, for a once praetorian Brazil now democratizing at home but desirous of diversifying strategic choices overseas, a geopolitically and economically rising Asian 

continent never caught Brasilia’s imagination in a manner any greater than its 

mercantilist attraction for the specific natural resources–devouring dynamic economies of East Asia, i.e., Japan, South Korea, and more so China, not to mention 

India of late. The carving out of an Indo-Pacific strategy, anchored in diversified 

dimensions of trade and investment interchange, could procreate an alternative 
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cognitive thinking on strategic engagement with the dynamic economic sentinels 

within a rising Asia, which would productively serve the recasting and reorientation of the Brazilian economy and behold exponential socioeconomic benefits.

It is hard to envision either the logic of identity or salutary role for Brazil amid 

the intensifying strategic churn of the Indo-Pacific expanse, where primordial 

considerations of ensuring a rules-based international order, preserving the pluralized nature of maritime waterways as global commons, and establishing and 

sustaining a dynamic and effective balance of power that counteracts against 

machinations at singularized hegemony are overriding in the sovereign protagonists’ strategic calculus. In contrast, Brazil, which is perched along the Southern 

Atlantic coast, heralds a coastline of 7,491 kilometers that sits astride virtually 

halcyon and somnolent stretches of maritime expanse5 so pristinely insulated 

from conventional and asymmetrical threats that Brazilian naval and maritime 

capabilities are more utilitarian in benign beneficence of humanitarian assistance 

and disaster relief (HA/DR) activities, most notably across the Caribbean. However, with its outbound trade-based orientation more incandescent than its inbound integration across the continent, Brazil’s prosperity remains inseparably 

forged in safe and secure maritime shipments across the serene stretches of the 

Atlantic and the Eastern and Central Pacific, which in themselves are distant 

from the strategic sea lanes of trade and lines of communications straddling the 

continuum arc of the Indian Ocean through to the Western Pacific. Adding further grist to the mill of argument that Brazil is yet to and seems lackadaisical to 

realign its maritime gaze toward the emerging fulcrum of the Indo-Pacific is 

borne out by the dint of each installment of the Exercise IBSAMAR, which is 

essentially billed as a Southern Oceans initiative, barring the 2016 edition, having 

taken place off South Africa’s coast, a categorical reflection to date of Brazil’s 

maritime prioritization of the Southern Atlantic over the Western Indian Ocean. 

If anything, Brazil’s conception of vulnerability, to the extent perceived in its security calculus, stems from potential continental-based threats—the upshot of 

sharing territorial land frontiers with 10 South American nations.6 Notwithstanding recent endeavors to transform Brazilian naval capabilities from the coastal 

territorial functions of a green-water force to the constabulary of a blue-water 

naval entity, the obsessions of disposing as a Southern Atlantic anchor in terms of 

a security actor, economic agent, and development exponent leaves maritime orientation and strategic conception obscured from the crosshairs of the arterial 

waterways of the Indo-Pacific. Even as Brazil grapples with translating its quotient of raw power across the region into substantive influence and meaningful 

sway, through strengthening its long spearheaded Southern Common Market 

(MERCOSUR) framework, it pursues its intentions to team-up with the Pacific 
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Alliance trade grouping of sovereign constellations along the western rim of the 

Americas. It is imperative that such impulses at trade integration and compulsions for maritime maneuver-in-concert on the Pacific flank go beyond a possible 

Brazilian flip on its two earlier spurns of US invitations in 2016 and 2018 to 

participate in the biennially convened multinational Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC) maritime exercises. The calibrated but marked engagement with navies of 

resident and littoral Pacific countries, with an ensuing naval posture at the modest 

threshold of maritime interoperability, would be very much in consonance with 

Brazil’s potential prospective equities across the Indo-Pacific expanse.

What bridges the breach between grand ambition and veritable action is the 

chiming amalgam of strategic intent and curated content imbued in a nation’s 

higher-order ideational and policy disposition. By this metric, even a fleeting 

glance at the thought of possible Brazilian orientation toward the Indo-Pacific 

leaves more questions than answers. Even though the Indo-Pacific construct is a 

concept of recent currency, the South American giant, famed for its intra-executive 

policy tussles that often place the institutional establishment of the Ministry of 

External Relations, known more famously as Itamaraty, at odds with the prioritizing policies of its presidential occupants, has curiously not exhibited any inclination—let alone mojo—for formulating an ostensible Indo-Pacific outlook, despite 

the fact that Brazil’s trade ties with Asian countries, most notably the East Asian 

triumvirate of China, Japan, and South Korea, but also with the Indian Ocean 

mainstay India, have burgeoned, with the incidence of politico-diplomatic engagements scaled up. Given that there is nothing whatsoever to glean from the 

foreign affairs dispatch box, echelon’s speeches, or defense strategy white papers 

emanating since 2012, it would be safe to conclude that Brasilia simply has not 

bought into the pervasive popular parlance of the Indo-Pacific coinage just yet 

and remains either indifferent, slothful, or merely realistically prudent of the serious limitations and diminishing returns of any politico-diplomatic legwork in 

strategic conception and action.7 Amid key Indo-Pacific and extraregional players 

having undertaken strategic perspectivization and approach formulation with regard to the Indo-Pacific, the conspicuousness of Brazilian blissful ignorance, despite the fact that Brasilia perceives itself as an arch-pillar popular voice of the 

Global South, reflects a cognitive frame and operative vent as being seriously out 

of touch and needing a dose of reality.

Brazil in a China Juxtaposed Quad Plus

In what could not be more disparaging to a proud nation, Brazil’s economic relationship with China, with which it established a Strategic Partnership way back 

in 1993 and subsequently elevated to a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership in 
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JOURNAL OF INDO-PACIFIC AFFAIRS  SPECIAL ISSUE 2020 201

2012,8 construes a double whammy. Mutual equations evoke dimensions of pronounced export-led dependence upon the world’s second-largest economy on the 

one hand and aggravating susceptibility to the pincer-like consequences of import 

overreliance and investment benefaction at the Middle Kingdom’s hands, on the 

other. China has been Brazil’s most commodious trade partner and the latter’s 

predominant export destination since 2009,9 besides being the largest investor 

across the South American nation—a profile that leaves the competitive likes of 

Japan, with its high-value but circumscribed economy,10 and India, with its glacially rising economic trajectory, appreciably important but by no means epochal in 

the current and foreseeable future. As Beijing sources predominant quantum of 

agricultural commodities to meet the considerations of food-chain and foodsecurity mechanics back home, it also seeks significant quantities of naturally 

mined minerals, rendering its stranglehold on Brazilian economic fortunes seemingly insurmountably complete, as witnessed in a secular upswing of commercial 

equations spanning the cognitive regime priorities of four distinct presidencies and 

notwithstanding the populist rhetoric—seemingly immune even to the ideological 

fault lines across the Brazilian political spectrum. Yet, it is not all smooth sailing, as 

the vagaries and vicissitudes within sectors of the Brazilian economy ebb and flow 

with the economic trajectory posted by China, positioning the latter as predator to 

the sunrise manufacturing industry of Brazil but viewed as Good Samaritan by the 

bedrock milieu of Brazilian agro-space stakeholders.

Notwithstanding President Bolsonaro’s acerbic rhetoric on the campaign stump 

back in 2018, when he famously remarked that “China was not buying in Brazil, 

but buying Brazil,”11 his ensuing courtship of Taiwan, an overture that is anathema 

to Beijing, his decrying of communist regimes, and a comparative predilection for 

the likes of Japan and South Korea, Bolsonaro’s subsequent actions vis-à-vis China 

have diverged from the pouting mouthful of polemics, which continue unabated. 

With overweening pressure from the agrarian sector that constitutes the president’s electoral power base in a proposition that almost mirrors the pressures confronting Trump from his Rustbelt states, Brazilian bilateral trade with China has 

stayed resoundingly high, verging on 100 billion USD in 2019, a full third greater 

than Brazil’s current trade value with the United States, and clocking a similar 

rollicking pace during the first eight months of 2020. Notwithstanding, China 

continues to be the prima donna investor on the South American continent, with 

Brazil garnering almost one-half of all Chinese investments in the region,12 the 

trend exemplified in Brazil’s earlier enamor for China to build the expansive 

5,600-km-long, 10 billion USD Trans-Amazonian Railroad Project linking the 

Atlantic and Pacific coasts via the Amazon and the Andes, the endearment for 

which has since faded in Brazil and across the region—including the western 
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terminus of Peru.13 China’s overbearing profile in Brazil is further enhanced and 

leveraged by its burgeoning investments across a slew of sectors, from critical 

transportation avenues such as port infrastructure to petroleum-based energy 

storage depots to higher-value manufacturing spaces such as automobiles. Beijing 

is leveraging this outsized role, through the lever of its financial heft, witnessed in 

commercial loans largesse advanced to agriculture- and mining-sector entities 

and the swift mopping-up of many stressed sector assets.

And if this was not enough, China remains a hot favorite with multiple provincial dispensations across Brazil, which have been unabashed in permissibly circumventing federal authority in localized outreach to Beijing, with such phenomenon 

predating the most notable current case of the Amazonian Consortium collective 

of state governors (a representative body comprising nine Amazon-inhabiting 

states of Brazil), who have been unequivocal in their effusive cooperation and collaboration with Beijing, from concerted sourcing of protective medical gear and 

emancipatory medical equipment during the heat of the pandemic to the sophisticated realm of virus vaccine development.14 Beijing’s recent announcement that its 

soon to be readily available COVID-19 vaccine would be proffered to countries 

currently in collaboration with China over Stage-III clinical trials, the triumvirate 

of which includes Brazil, comes on the back of the Brazilian federal health regulator certifying the ongoing vaccine development partnership between principal 

developer Sinovac Biotech Ltd. of China and more than century-old São Paulobased Butantan Institute, with expectations for a vaccine rollout by the year’s end.15

Despite superficial assessment over the perceived erratic tone and tenor of 

President Bolsonaro’s playbook, closer scrutiny of policy reveals the intent to manage and navigate through the US–China angularities yet stave off any direct juxtaposition with China, which could leave Brazilian interests singed. The Bolsonaro 

cabinet is torn between Sinophiles and Sinophobes, competing for presidential 

attention and influence. Foreign Minister Ernesto Araújo has been spearheading 

the Sinophobes, demanding that the president unequivocally cast Brazil’s lot with 

the United States in calling out China on its dystopian actions—including leaning 

on the president for an early decision to scupper Huawei from the landscape, a 

high-stakes call that Bolsonaro has deftly deferred until 2021.16 The Sinophiles, led 

by the likes of Vice President Hamilton Mourão and Economy Minister Paulo 

Guedes have cautioned against any and all anti-China postures and attendant 

measures, characterizing them as self-destructive myopic populism at a time when 

the Brazilian economy is oscillating between its recession-stricken staple and the 

enveloping conditions of anemic global demand for commoditized resources, 

which is only set to aggravate in a post-pandemic schema, and where sustained 
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Chinese demand on the back of its seemingly V-shaped economic recovery could 

constitute an even more disproportionate lifeline.

The dint of President Bolsonaro dispatching Vice President Mourão to China 

just five months into office17 and himself sojourning there in October 2019, weeks 

before he was set to play host to the BRICS leaders in November, was manifest of 

the deep desire to reset ties, even if for purely pragmatic reasons.18 During his 

Beijing visit, Bolsonaro tempered his shrill rhetoric, inviting Chinese investments 

by stating that “a significant part of Brazil needs China, and China needs Brazil 

too”19—a pointer to the enmeshing hue of transactional economic complementarity across trade, investment, and financing, the scope and scale of which cannot be 

replicated or supplanted by other economies within the Indo-Pacific. All this and 

more constrains Brazil’s latitude for maneuver in shaping any Indo-Pacific strategy, 

given that Beijing principally views such a formulation as a US-instigated mutually 

exclusive containment initiative forged in the Cold War setting of a zero-sum 

paradigm. At a time when the amorphousness of the Quad Plus concept, in terms 

of the contours and scope of its membership; the mandate and terms of reference 

over its portfolio of issues; and a generic consensus on its format, as to whether it 

is simply to be a coordinating forum over shared interests, a tactical platform for 

amplifying a certain expedient set of actions, or consolidate into something more 

crystallized and tangible as a framework, it is perceived as imprudent for Brazil, 

with no substantive stakes in the wider outcomes of the Indo-Pacific but whose 

equities in the present and foreseeable future are weighted and wedded to China, 

to indulge in self-destructive adventurism simply at Washington’s behest. However, an invitation to the Quad Plus deliberation marks a convenient latitude for 

Brazil to breakout of the vice like commercial grip of Beijing and foster a wider 

ambit of strategic economic ties.

Brazil–US Bonhomie and the Quad Plus

The unfolding of the Quad Plus coordinating conversations have had a 

COVID-19 context written large over it, further reinforced by Washington’s 

own admittance that the forum was onsetting with overriding concerns over 

“accountability” and “transparency”20 attributes pertaining to genesis and 

palliative management of the pandemic, an instructive broadside upon China, 

even as issues of urgent common concern, such as the imperative for weaning 

of undue dependence on Beijing through effecting supply-chain relocations, 

marked albeit, an auxiliary presence. Notwithstanding, the leavening of the 

Quad quartet of Indo-Pacific mainstay sovereigns, through incorporation of 

South Korea, a cornerstone security ally of the United States; New Zealand, 

a prominent member of the US-led higher-ordering intelligence-sharing 
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Parulekar

consortium of the Five Eyes Network; and Vietnam, a key geopolitical and 

geo-economic protagonist in the South China Sea, the trinity of additions also 

made it to the expanded assemblage on account of their dexterous handling of 

COVID-19, in the main. Even the inclusion of Israel, as intimate a US ally as 

any can be and a pioneering innovation hub to boot, was understandable, as its 

COVID-19 management was being lauded at the time. While Washington’s 

lead on the issue is counterintuitive in itself, Brazil’s insertion belies logic and 

betrays an element of muddled thinking at the highest levels within the US 

government, as Brazil was a frontline state being ravaged by the pandemic, 

steeped in a dilettante approach that was a mirror image of Washington, and its 

stewardship of the crisis.

There is no gainsaying that the US–Brazil bilateral relationship, which has 

largely been marked by a roller-coaster ride since Brazil’s return to democracy in 

the 1990s and through much of this century, has blossomed since the advent of the 

Bolsonaro administration in January 2019. Presidents Trump and Bolsonaro, 

united in their mercurial, temperamental leadership styles, have portrayed themselves as ideological soul mates, making common cause on a range of issues from 

railing against China to characterizing the phenomenon of climate change as a 

hoax and belittling COVID-19. Yet, despite their mutually expressed affinities, the 

record on accomplishments spanning these 20-odd months has been checkered. 

Brazil’s candidature for membership of the Western-led Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development found earnest US endorsement in early 

202021 but is queued up in a torturous negotiating process at accession, which 

seems set to endure, even as Washington’s designation of Brazil as a Major NonNATO Ally has come to fruition, a move liked by the nostalgic former military 

figure, Bolsonaro.22 Yet, what these coveted designations signify is an accompanying constant within Brazilian foreign policy concerning its Western institutional 

orientation in economic and security terms and the prioritization of incorporation 

into the firmament of the exclusive Western groupings, a temperamental and 

policy accent that has found pronounced prominence under President Bolsonaro, 

in contrast with the tenures of Presidents Rousseff and Lula, in particular. Despite 

hosting the BRICS Summit in late 2019, President Bolsonaro has often expressed 

skepticism about the rationale and logic of the “Emerging Economies” grouping 

and on its potential for deliverables, besides not necessarily being skittish about 

broader issues of sustainable development, multilateralism, and democratization of 

the global order that segue within the developing world framework. Instead he has 

expressed his marked predilections for a US-led order and President Trump’s dealmaking worldview. However, a mutual commitment to double trade by 2025 remains mired in tedious negotiations, even as a mini–trade deal that addresses issues 
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piecemeal, which cherry-picks low-hanging fruits away from the US Congress’s 

spotlight, is touted by the end of the year. The fact remains that even if the doubling of trade fructifies, it would only constitute a sixth of US–Mexico trade, 

brought on by the renegotiated United States–Mexico–Canada Agreement, earlier the North America Free Trade Agreement.23 This serves as a glaring indicator 

of misplaced Brazilian focus on slim-pickings up North, when the economic center of gravity in terms of consumption-driven markets, logistics supply chains, and 

investible surpluses are materializing across the swathe of Asia and the IndoPacific. Of course, Bolsonaro has not lost sight of the fact that Brazil has emerged 

as the accidental benefactor of unintended serendipity brought on by the US–

China trade skirmishes, with Chinese demand for soybean imports, customarily 

from the United States, shifting to Brazil, unleashing an unanticipated bonanza 

at a time of record production in the country.24 Similarly, the cookie could crumble 

favorably for Brazil, if China–Australia trade relations further sour, making the 

South American powerhouse’s verdant coal deposits a collaterally benefiting alternative for China. It would be advisable for a Bolsonaro-led Brazil to harness its 

strong cultivation of ties with Washington to fructify its broader ambitions of 

being a stakeholder in global governance frameworks and witting of a seat at the 

high table, something which can realistically be realized only through insertion 

and greater participation in Indo-Pacific initiative platforms.

Responsible Pragmatic Turn in Brazil’s Foreign Policy: Notional 

Interface with the Indo-Pacific

Since the turn of the century, but more so since the advent of President Lula 

in 2003, a distinct desire to embrace strategic autonomy in appropriating to diversified choices of international engagements has marked Brazilian foreign 

policy. In what has been christened as Lula’s “autonomy through diversification”25

strategy, contrasted with the “autonomy through participation” philosophy espoused by his predecessor, Pres. Fernando Cardozo, Brasilia made no bones 

about its intent to not simply expand the remit of its mercantilist economic 

partners but also to deliver on diversification through disposing as an important 

player on the international stage and emerging as an influential actor in the firmament of global governance. Notwithstanding diplomatic contretemps with 

Washington, through opposition to the US invasion of Iraq in 2003 and torpedoing of the Free Trade Area of the Americas initiative in 2004, the broader 

US–Brazil relationship was constructively driven, as Lula recognized the need to 

work with Bretton Woods institutions of the International Monetary Fund and 

the World Bank to recast Brazil’s debtor status into a creditor nation and US–
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Parulekar

Brazil ethanol cooperation fostered. However, what was unmistakable was Brazil’s alignment of its strategic priorities away from the Western Hemisphere and 

with the wide swathe of developing countries across the Global South, all of 

which crystallized in Brazil’s participation and meaningful contribution to creation of collectives such as the BRIC, later to be the BRICS; the IBSA Trilateral; 

and the G4 quartet (Brazil, Germany, India, and Japan); not to mention Brazil’s 

autonomous stances on negotiations to the Doha Round of the World Trade 

Organization, Climate Change Conferences, and within the post-global and 

economic crisis framework of the G20.26

While the optics were gratifying, including the big moment when Brazil joined 

Turkey in proposing an off-ramp solution to the escalated US–Iran imbroglio 

over the latter’s nuclear program during 2009–2010,27 the fundamentals of Brazilian economic structures weighed foreign policy priorities down—shown most 

noticeably in primary commodities and natural resources production and in continuing low levels of export performance to countries of Africa and the Indian 

Ocean, even as transactional relations with China and to a lesser extent with Japan 

and South Korea deepened, while Brazil’s desire to subsume within the North 

American manufacturing–driven economic zone remained elusive. President 

Lula’s ties with India did take off from the onset of his two-term presidency, underpinned by cogent cooperation in pharmaceuticals and service-sector trade in 

particular; however, given the scale and structures of their respective economies, 

transactional equations were rife but created no more than the occasional splash 

in quantitative and qualitative terms. Despite the increased politico-diplomatic 

socialization with geopolitical theaters, nondescript until then, Brazil under Lula 

had not traversed beyond notional footprint in geometries and geographies identified as the current-day Indo-Pacific. President Rousseff, who succeeded Lula, 

having been his associate in government, was meant to preserve continuity rather 

than opt for change. However, her tenure, albeit interrupted by her second-term 

impeachment in 2016, was marked by the whiff of a distinct turn back to prioritization of relations with the United States, as Brazilian foreign policy relapsed 

back into the dialectic of deepening commercial relations with the world’s twolargest economic spaces, consigning backwater consideration to broadened and 

deepened engagement with Asian regional powers, whose global relevance is 

primed for ascent.

Conclusion

There is little gainsaying that the expansive Asian continent and its sovereign 

constellations are no longer terra incognita for Brazil,28 but has the strategic conception within the latter’s consciousness pivoted enough to construe the continent, 
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JOURNAL OF INDO-PACIFIC AFFAIRS  SPECIAL ISSUE 2020 207

whose maritime expanse conjoining the two arterial oceans and making it the 

principal arena for competitive power transitions and broader power-shifts, as 

cynosure of attention? If Brazilian foreign policy is to address its principal permeating objective of elevating from middle-power status to becoming an acclaimed global power, it cannot rest simply on being a powerhouse for primary 

commodities and agrarian raw materials funneled to Asian states with a view to 

underwriting their economic growth. The Brazilian economy must transform 

domestically, but that transformation shall be induced and subsequently leveraged by the mainstreaming of its strategic engagements, which have to be forged 

across a cavernous canvass. A China-centric mercantilist and economic policy or 

an alternative that endeavors to find equanimity between the duality of deepened 

engagements with Washington and Beijing shall not suffice and would merely 

end up relegating Brazil to the suborn position of a supplicant.

The invitational participation within the Quad Plus conversations must be seen 

as a starting point for Brazil to build on a pan-Asian regional engagement, identifying important sovereign interlocutors within the Indo-Pacific for mutually 

beneficial outcomes. With Canada becoming the latest extraterritorial nation to 

articulate its commitment to an Indo-Pacific strategy, and with the Quad Plus 

possibly incorporating further additions such as the United Kingdom, Germany, 

and France going forward, Brazil would be better advised and suitably placed to 

leverage its curated defense modernization drive with traditional European powers, its budding affinities with Israel after relocation of its embassy to Jerusalem, 

and the potential of diasporic ties with Japan29 to expand the spectrum of trade 

partners and to showcase itself as captive to their technological investments back 

home. Through a strong sense of enlightened bilateralism and plurilateralism, 

which the matrix of the Quad Plus portends to offer, the undue dependence upon 

Beijing can be spread out for comfort and dividends of strategic diversification. 

With almost all current and prospective constituents within the Quad Plus enjoying lucrative economic ties to Beijing, Brazil would hardly be cut from a different 

cloth in pursuing dichotomously concurrent options, which geo-economic strategies allow, over securitized geopolitical gambits. It is highly unlikely that the 

Quad Plus forum would become a security bloc; if anything, it could find traction 

in coalescing around recrafting supply-chain trajectories, curating data-driven 

clean technologies, and even formalizing some form of pan-continental regional 

economic cooperation and trade integration. It is a no-brainer that all these and 

more would mesh well with Brazilian national priorities and external strategic 

calculus, helping Brasilia contribute and leverage the benefits brought on by productive interaction with the constellation of these higher-order economic spaces 

for turbocharging its own socio-economy into qualitatively refined performance. 
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Hence, Brazil, which needs to carve out its industrial base on a broadsheet of 

manufacturing competencies and desires to be integrated within emergent supply 

chains in a post–COVID-19 world order, can hardly afford to sit out this pancontinental initiative and needs to hew integration with industrial and economic 

partners across Asia, which cannot happen without a fulsome incorporation into 

the evolving Quad Plus thicket.

Dr. Dattesh D. Parulekar

Dr. Parulekar is an assistant professor of international relations and strategic studies in the School of International 

and Area Studies, Goa University, Goa, India.

Notes

1. Huma Siddiqui, “India’s concept of the Indo-Pacific is inclusive and across oceans,” Asian 

Voice, 13 August 2019, https://www.asian-voice.com/.

2. Gurjit Singh, “Germany takes view of the Indo-Pacific,” ORF Online, 1 October 2020, 

https://www.orfonline.org/.

3. Tom Phillips, “Bolsonaro’s son enrages Beijing by blaming China for coronavirus crisis,” The 

Guardian, 19 March 2020, https://www.theguardian.com/.

4. IBSAMAR-V was conducted off the West Coast of India, 19–26 February 2016. Indian 

Navy, “Exercise IBSAMAR – V between India, Brazil and South Africa,” 26 February 2019, 

https://www.indiannavy.nic.in/.

5. Balaji Chandramohan, “Brazil’s Strategic Expansion in the Indo-Pacific,” The Diplomat, 8 

October 2019, https://thediplomat.com/.

6. Erico Duarte, “Brazil, the Blue Economy and the Maritime Security of the South Atlantic,” 

Journal of the Indian Ocean Region 12, no. 1 (2016): 97–111, https://www.tandfonline.com/.

7. Dawisson Belem Lopez, “Brazilian Malaise in an ‘Asian Century’: Is Brasilia paying attention to Asia,” The Diplomat, 12 September 2017, https://thediplomat.com/.

8. Daniel Cardoso, “China-Brazil: A Strategic Partnership in an Evolving World Order,” East 

Asia: An International Quarterly, March 2013, 35–51, https://link.springer.com/.

9. Barbara Kotschwar, “China’s Economic Influence in Latin America,” Asian Economic Policy 

Review 9, no. 2 (2014): 202–22, https://doi.org/.

10. Brazil is Japan’s fifth-largest exporter and eighth-largest importer, with outbound trade 

of 4.33 billion USD and inbound sourcing of 4.36 billion USD, as of 2018. See: Brazilian 

Ministry of Economy, Secretary of Development, “Industry and Foreign Trade, 2019,” http://

www.mdic.gov.br/.

11. Richard Lapper, “Bolsonaro took aim at China. Then Reality Struck,” Americas Quarterly, 

23 April 2019, https://www.americasquarterly.org/.

12. “Chinese Money Pours into Brazilian Projects as US Trade War Bites,” South China Morning Post, 24 July 2018, https://www.scmp.com/.
Brazil in the Quad Plus

JOURNAL OF INDO-PACIFIC AFFAIRS  SPECIAL ISSUE 2020 209

13. Adriana Erthal Abdenur, “Navigating the Ripple Effects: Brazil-China Relations in 

Light of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI),” International Relations 12, no. 2 (2019): 153–

68, https://doi.org/.

14. Marina Lang, “Brazil’s State Governors Open their Own Channels with China,” Dialogo 

Chino, 13 August 2020, https://dialogochino.net/.

15. “Chinese Vaccine maker to offer shots first to Countries Running Phase-3 Trials,” Bloomberg News, 24 September 2020, https://theprint.in/.

16. Oliver Stuenkel, “Huawei or Not: Brazil Faces a Key Geopolitical Choice,” Americas Quarterly, 30 June 2020, https://www.americasquarterly.org/.

17. “Brazil’s Vice President Hamilton Mourao heads to China to mend relations,” South China 

Morning Post, 19 May 2019, https://www.scmp.com/.

18. “Bolsonaro Meets China’s Xi in a Bid to Balance ties with the US,” Bloomberg News, 25 

October 2019, https://www.bloomberg.com/.

19. “Brazil’s Bolsonaro invites China to participate in massive oil auction on November 6,” 

Reuters, 25 October 2019, https://www.reuters.com/.

20. Indrani Bagchi, “Focus on COVID in Quad Meet,” Times of India, 13 May 2020, https://

timesofindia.indiatimes.com/.

21. Anthony Boadle, “US backs Brazil for OECD Membership ahead of Argentina,” Reuters, 

14 January 2020, https://www.investing.com/.

22. “US designates Brazil as ‘Major’ Military Ally,” Business Standard, 1 August 2019, https://

www.business-standard.com/.

23. Dan Kopf, “Mexico is finally the US’s number one trade partner,” Quartz Online, 8 August 

2019, https://qz.com/.

24. Daniel Ren, “The US-China trade war has been a boon for Brazil’s soybean farmers. But 

can they keep up with Chinese demand?,” South China Morning Post, 17 May 2019, https://

www.scmp.com/.

25. Alexandre Uehara and Guilherme Casaroes, “Brazil, East Asia and the Shaping of World 

Politics,” Perceptions 18, no. 1, (Spring 2013): 75–100, https://dergipark.org.tr/.

26. Tullo Vigevani and Gabriel Cepaluni, “Lula’s Foreign Policy and the Quest for Autonomy 

through Diversification,” Third World Quarterly 28, no. 7 (2007): 1309–26. https://www.jstor.org/.

27. Carlos Vidigal, “Brazil, a Cordial Power: Brazilian Diplomacy in the 21st Century,” RECIIS 4, no. 1 (2010): 33–41, https://www.reciis.icict.fiocruz.br/.

28. João Paulo Nicolini Gabriel et al., “Bolsonaro, China and the Indo-Pacific,” Mural Internacional 10 (2019), DOI: 10.12957/rmi.2019.40103.

29. Approximately 300,000 Brazilian expats live in Japan, while Brazil is home to the largest 

concentration of Japanese demography beyond the archipelago. The state of São Paulo, for instance, alone accounts for approximately one million Nippon-Brazilian citizens, outnumbering 

other foreign ethnic groups settled in the city.

Disclaimer

The views and opinions expressed or implied in JIPA are those of the authors and should not be construed as carrying the 

official sanction of the Department of Defense, Department of the Air Force, Air Education and Training Command, 

Air University, or other agencies or departments of the US government or their international equivalents.
210 JOURNAL OF INDO-PACIFIC AFFAIRS  SPECIAL ISSUE 2020

A VIEW FROM THE OTHERS

Russia and Quad Plus

Is There a Way Forward?

Dr. Anna Kireeva

Dr. Alexey Kupriyanov

Abstract

Russia’s official stance toward both the Quad and the concept of the IndoPacific has been largely negative. The Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs repeatedly argued against the Quad, accusing the United States of attempts to contain 

China and draw not only allies Japan and Australia but also India to this goal. The 

Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ approach is explained by the fact that the Quad is 

essentially perceived as an echo of the Cold War alliances as well as NATO-style 

arrangement that Russia is well-familiar with in Europe. Russia’s position is explained by the fact that the Quad is seen as running counter to Russia’s interests 

of building a collective security architecture and undermining Association of 

Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Centrality as well as by the character of Russia’s bilateral relations with ASEAN members. A rift in US–Russia relations 

seems to preclude any opportunity for cooperation with the Quad or Quad Plus. 

Moscow deems it impossible to support the Quad due to its anti-Chinese nature, 

as adopting policies against China is not considered to be in Russia’s national 

interests. Russian officials generally overlook cooperation on nontraditional security by either the Quad or Quad Plus. At the same time, Russia enjoys a privileged 

strategic partnership with India and other powers that are at odds with China, 

such as Vietnam, and would rather prefer to remain neutral in the growing US–

China strategic competition and retain as much strategic autonomy as possible. 

Russia has been one of the key players in addressing nontraditional security threats 

in the Indo-Pacific and, although direct cooperation with the Quad or Quad Plus 

is out of the question, bilateral cooperation with the group’s individual members 

or under the auspices of regional multilateral institutions like ASEAN Regional 

Forum or ASEAN Defence Minister’s Meeting–Plus (ADMM+) is a tangible 

prospect, including addressing COVID-19 and the pandemic’s effects.

Introduction

Russia’s official stance toward both the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, better 

known as the Quad—composed of the United States, Japan, Australia, and India—and the concept of the Indo-Pacific has been largely negative. The Russian 
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JOURNAL OF INDO-PACIFIC AFFAIRS  SPECIAL ISSUE 2020 211

Minister of Foreign Affairs, Sergey Lavrov, repeatedly argued against the IndoPacific and the Quad. The first speech where he touched upon the Indo-Pacific in 

a substantial way took place in Vietnam in February 2019. He started by characterizing the contemporary world order as a polycentric and more democratic one 

in the making, with a number of economically and politically rising powers. He 

described the Indo-Pacific as an artificially created region and accused the United 

States of attempts to contain China and draw not only allies Japan and Australia 

but also India to this goal via military cooperation.1 During his speech at the 

Primakov Readings summit in July 2020, Lavrov named the US Indo-Pacific 

Strategy as aimed at creating confrontational blocs in the region.2

One of the prevalent critiques given by Russia’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs has 

been based on questioning the basic principles of the Indo-Pacific—that it is free 

and open—and the necessity for formulating a new region. According to Lavrov, 

the Indo-Pacific seems to be an exclusive rather than an inclusive bloc which 

clearly does not correspond to the principles of openness. Moreover, on the Russian side questions arise about why a new and very vaguely characterized IndoPacific is supplanting an inclusive and multilateral Asia-Pacific structures with 

large participation, clear and agreed-upon rules, and defined geography. The Quad 

has been accused of policies aimed at containing China.3

At the same time, it should be noted that Russia, apart from being a European 

power, at the same time geographically belongs to the northern Pacific Ocean 

and, thus, can also be characterized as a Pacific or an Asia-Pacific power.4 Apart 

from the post-Soviet space, the European and Asian dimension of Russia’s foreign and economic policy can be characterized as strategically important ones, the 

latter being connected to the need for development of the Russian Far East.5 In 

particular, there is an academic tradition among Russians living in the Far East 

that prefers to refer to this part of the country as Northern Pacific, highlighting 

its geographic and historic interaction with Asia and North America.6

Thus, a question arises why Russia, being a northern Pacific power and positioning itself as a part of the Asia-Pacific, is so negatively predisposed toward both the 

Indo-Pacific and Quad? Should such a position be taken for granted, or is there a 

way forward for Russia to cooperate with the Quad or Quad Plus? To answer this 

set of questions this chapter explains Russia’s reaction by analyzing its foreign and 

security policy toward Asia as well as the set of bilateral relations with Quad members and China, both elements deemed critical for understanding Moscow’s official 

approach. The article starts by examining the transformation of Russia’s Asian 

policy and its approach to regional security agendas. These are followed by the 

overview of Russia’s bilateral relations with Quad member states and the People’s 

Republic of China. The final section explains Russia’s approach based on the above 
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Kireeva & Kupriyanov

presented analysis together while shedding light on its position on liberal and 

rules-based international order. The conclusion discusses whether there is a way 

forward for cooperation between Russia and the Quad or Quad Plus.

Russia’s Asian Policy and Approach to Regional Security

Russia’s interest in the Indo-Pacific region has a long history. For centuries, 

Russia traded with Persia, China, and India. Russian pioneers and pathfinders 

fought their way to the East and on to the Pacific Ocean; after the Bolshevik 

revolution, Soviet leaders showed interest in spreading the ideas of socialism and 

communism to the countries of the East. In the second half of the twentieth 

century, Moscow’s policy in the Pacific and Indian Oceans was defined through 

the prism of the Cold War, and both oceans, primarily the Pacific, were viewed as 

battlefields. The difference between them was that in the Pacific Ocean the Soviet 

Union had bases in Primorye and Kamchatka, but there were no strong allies, 

while there were no Soviet bases in the Indian Ocean, but there was a powerful 

friendly partner: India. The end of the Cold War completely changed the situation. In the last years of the Soviet Union, Pres. Mikhail Gorbachev formulated 

an initiative to reorganize the regional Pacific order and said that the Soviet Union 

was ready to participate in this process.7 However, the collapse of the USSR and 

the economic difficulties of the 1990s interrupted this emerging interest in the 

Pacific Ocean. The general collapse of the Russian economy, the desire to break 

with the Soviet legacy, the pro-Western orientation of the new leadership in every 

sense, and a lack of strategic thinking led to the rejection of any attempts to declare Russia as a powerful Pacific power.

However, as Russia overcame its protracted internal crisis, its leadership grew 

aware that Moscow should pay more attention to the East, as the twenty-first 

century would become the “Age of Asia.” One of the pioneers of this idea was the 

head of Russian foreign intelligence, then-Foreign Minister and Prime Minister 

Yevgeny Primakov.8 His line was continued by Vladimir Putin, who, after becoming president of Russia, took decisive steps in this direction. Such policy enhanced 

Russia’s relations with Asian states as a strategic course to diversify Moscow’s 

relations in politics, security, economics, and energy since the early 2000s and has 

been often labeled as a “pivot to Asia” or “turn to the East.”9 At the same time, 

even taking into consideration growing economic interaction with Asia, Russia 

has been often considered as an “external player” or an “absent power” due to it 

small share in regional trade and investment as well as lack of participation in 

production networks. Russia’s involvement in regional institutions is also facing a 

number of limitations.10
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A crisis in Russia’s relations with the West in 2014 prompted Russia to accelerate its pivot to Asia, as it had become apparent that only on the basis of greater 

cooperation with Asian states would it become possible for Moscow to realize its 

key goal of establishing a center of power in Eurasia.11 For a long time, Russia’s 

policy in the region remained multivectored: while strengthening relations with 

China, Moscow at the same time sought to maintain close ties with India, improve economic and political ties with Japan, actively promote the resolution of 

the Korean problem, maintain the central role of ASEAN, and not spoil relations 

with the United States. However, as events have played out over the past several 

years, Russia has seemingly grown closer to China, and pressure from the United 

States is literally pushing Moscow into the arms of Beijing. Attempts by Washington’s regional partners, primarily Japan and India, to avoid such a development 

have proven unsuccessful, with American pressure proving so strong that Tokyo 

and New Delhi’s efforts are in vain.

As far as Russia’s approach to regional security12 has been concerned, since 

2010 it has been consistently advocating for creating an “inclusive, open, transparent and equitable collective security and cooperation architecture in Asia-Pacific,”13

echoing the same approach for establishing a common security architecture from 

Lisbon to Vladivostok. In principle, such a concept does not mean that bilateral 

security alliances that the United States has with Japan, South Korea, Australia, 

and others should be disbanded but rather incorporated into the joint security 

architecture based on multilateral mechanisms and institutions. Russian leadership maintains that the American “hub-and-spokes” system of bilateral militarypolitical alliances with Asian states is obsolete and no longer adequate for the 

contemporary era, as it ensures security of one state at the expense of others. 

ASEAN-centric institutions are believed to be most fit to serve as the basis for 

regional collective security architecture.14

At the same time, Russia’s approach lacks conceptual clarity as to how such 

joint architecture should be established. Moreover, the approach has not been 

substantially updated following rising strategic confrontation and mounting tensions between the United States and China since 2018–2019. As a result, Russian 

officials keep criticizing Indo-Pacific strategies and the concept itself. Moreover, 

the rift in US–Russia relations in the aftermath of the Ukrainian crisis caused 

considerable damage to Russia’s relations with American allies in Asia, especially 

with the ones that imposed sanctions targeting Russia, such as Japan and Australia. In particular, as far as Russia–Japan relations are concerned, it appeared to be 

one of the obstacles to finding an effective solution to a long-standing issue of 

concluding a peace treaty and settling a territorial dispute. To illustrate, Foreign 

Minister Lavrov, after his talks with his Japanese counterpart in November 2019, 
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Kireeva & Kupriyanov

stated that the US–Japan alliance is an obstacle for Russia–Japan relations 

reaching a new quality, something that Russian president Vladimir Putin has 

repeatedly stated is a necessary prerequisite for achieving a compromise on a 

peace treaty. Moscow has many concerns regarding the military build-up of the 

US–Japan alliance, such as the deployment of Aegis Ashore, which was recently 

unexpectedly scrapped by the Japanese government. The core motivation is explained by the fact that the United States publicly announces that Russia and 

China constitute key military threats and all security alliances, including the 

ones with Japan, Australia, and South Korea, will be managed according to 

these challenges. In the eyes of Russia’s leadership, these considerations apparently take precedence over Japan’s statements that the US–Japan alliance is not 

targeted against Russia.15

Russia’s Bilateral Relations with Quad Plus States and China

United States

Relations between the United States and Russia are going through hard times. 

Russia, having gone through economic decline in the 1990s and lost its position in 

the world, seeks to restore its prosperity and prominence. The United States sees 

these moves by Moscow as revisionist and Russia itself as a country trying to disrupt the post–Cold War order in which the United States is the hegemon. As a 

result, from the Russian perspective, the United States is trying to put pressure on 

Russia, attempting to force Moscow to admit defeat, and striving to keep Russia in 

the position of a secondary player—thus, maintaining Washington’s perception of 

the status quo.

Russia views such American pressure as unacceptable. Moscow’s main goal is 

to restore Russia’s position as one of the great powers, with its own interests and 

sphere of influence. Washington’s accusations that Moscow is seeking to destroy 

the liberal world order are perplexing and viewed by the Kremlin as a cynical attempt to maintain American dominance. The pressure from the United States is 

enough to complicate the Russian economic situation but insufficient to bring 

down the Russian economy, due to the relatively small trade between the two 

countries and the lack of critical dependence of Russian industry on American 

technologies. In fact, Washington’s actions serves as a constant annoyance, forcing 

Moscow to develop economic autarky and move closer to any opponents of the 

United States, including Iran and China. The more Washington tries to get Moscow to agree to its demands, the faster Russia drifts toward Beijing.16
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Moreover, America’s radical Indo-Pacific strategy creates new challenges for 

Russia in Asia.17 The very wording “rules-based order,” actively promoted by 

Washington, puzzles Moscow. Russia believes that the existing order is already 

based on rules, primarily on the norms of international law and on the UN 

Charter. Moscow rejects attempts to introduce any other rules, demonstrating 

institutional conservatism.18

Japan

From a strategic perspective, Russia and Japan have increasingly regarded each 

other as strategic regional players of great significance in Northeast Asia, broader 

East Asia, and the Asia-Pacific. On Japan’s side, in particular, Prime Minister 

Shinzō Abe, during his term (2012–2020), undertook great efforts to elevate Russia–Japan strategic, political, and security dialogues, reflecting on the value of engaging Russia as an important global and regional player.19 At least part of Japan’s 

efforts can be attributed to the goal of preventing a unified Sino–Russian front 

against Japan, an issue of outstanding importance due to the challenge that China’s 

strategy, especially in the East China Sea, presents to Tokyo. Russia’s closer alignment with China, following a deep crisis in relations with the United States and 

Europe after 2014, prompted Japanese leadership to put greater emphasis on improving relations with Russia.20 President Putin, on the Russian side, has been an 

advocate of improving relations with Japan, aiming to reach a new stage in bilateral 

relations characterized by comprehensive cooperation in all spheres.21

Russia–Japan relations, however, have historically been far from cordial and 

have been mired in the territorial dispute and the issue of the absence of a peace 

treaty since the end of World War II. These lingering questions have spoiled the 

political relationship between Moscow and Tokyo for more than 70 years. Despite 

a robust political dialogue and significant personal political capital inserted by 

Abe into resolving these issues in 2016–2019, the conditions put forward by the 

Russian side and the obstacles cited by Foreign Minister Lavrov in January 2019 

proved to be too overwhelming to reach this goal. In addition, as demonstrated 

above, Russian foreign policy officials have been critical of US–Japan alliance 

military build-up and generally regard Japan as an actor not fully independent 

from the United States—and thus, vulnerable to Washington’s pressure.22 Despite 

these obstacles, Japan has traditionally been one of Russia’s major economic partners in East Asia, surpassed only by China.
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India

Russian–Indian ties have a long history, and their main feature is that Russia 

and India initially treated each other with friendliness and warmth. Their relationship was sometimes close to being allies and has never been hostile. The Soviet 

Union supported the Non-Aligned Movement and numerous foreign policy initiatives of India, providing New Delhi with military and development assistance. 

However, most importantly, during the Cold War, Moscow and New Delhi were 

interested in curbing China’s ambitions. Since the end of the Cold War, Russia 

has been able to resolve its differences with China, while India has not. As a result, 

Russian and Indian positions on the Chinese issue are now radically different, and 

Moscow is watching with dismay as its two strategic partners are quarreling over 

mutual distrust and unwillingness to make concessions.

At the same time, Russia views India as a strategic partner, and their relations 

do not depend on Russian or Indian relations with China. Russia plans to continue cooperating with India on a wide range of issues, perceiving it as a great 

power and one of the pillars of the future polycentric world.23 Moscow is interested in Eurasia and the surrounding maritime space becoming a zone of peace 

and stability, since any instability in this region will impede the development of 

Russia, deprive Moscow of the possibility of foreign policy maneuver, and force 

Russia to divert its already limited forces and resources to counter a possible 

threat. Therefore, Russia does not enthusiastically accept any steps aimed at rapprochement between India and the United States, since Moscow believes Washington is ready to destabilize the situation in Asia, in the Indian and Pacific 

Oceans, if it helps to stop the growth of China’s power and removes the threat to 

the role of the United States as a world hegemon.24

Australia

Australia is a relatively insignificant partner for Russia due to Moscow’s lack of 

interests in the South Pacific. In addition, certain stereotypes regarding Australia 

prevail in Moscow—it is assumed, in particular, that Canberra is a reliable American ally and will take the side of the United States in any conflict with Moscow 

or Beijing. Russia–Australia relations suffered in the aftermath of the Ukrainian 

crisis, and, furthermore, Australia’s preference for the Indo-Pacific and Quad 

meets little if any apprehension from the Russian side. At the same time, Russia 

sees Australia as a partner it should take into consideration while working in international organizations such as Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation or the East 

Asia Summit (EAS).25
Russia and Quad Plus

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Russia and Quad Plus Powers

As far as the states that joined Quad Plus are concerned, the picture is not 

much different. As a small power, New Zealand plays an absolutely marginal role 

in Russia’s policy toward the Asia-Pacific. Russia has never had much interaction 

with Wellington, and in most cases, relations are no different than those with 

Australia. However, economic relations between the two countries are quite developed (in the 1980s, the Soviet Union was an important trading partner of New 

Zealand, in some years accounting for as much as 5 percent of New Zealand’s 

exports), and Moscow and Wellington cooperate on a number of areas of the international agenda: i.e., environmental protection and conservation of the living 

resources of Antarctica.26 Still, in a political sense, the role of New Zealand in 

Russian regional politics is negligible. Russia has no interests in the South Pacific; 

as a result, Moscow is not interested in New Zealand as a political partner at the 

moment. The possible entry of New Zealand into the Quad or cooperation with 

this format is perceived in Moscow completely indifferently.

Russia regards South Korea (ROK) as a neighbor and an important partner on 

the Korean Peninsula that needs to be a part of any regional solution. Regionally, 

South Korea, together with China and Japan, has been one of Russia’s key economic partners. The political climate in Russia–South Korea relations depends 

greatly on whether the representatives of the progressive or conservative camps 

are in power in Seoul at the moment, with the former enjoying much warmer 

relations with Russia due to their willingness to engage in negotiations with 

North Korea, as illustrated by President Moon Jae-in.27 Moscow and Seoul started 

searching for a new impetus for bilateral and trilateral economic projects after 

President Moon launched his New Northern Policy in 2017 and proposed to 

build nine bridges of economic cooperation.28 However, in practice, cooperation 

is visible only on the bilateral level, as trilateral projects have proved impossible to 

realize under the UN Security Council’s sanctions regime targeting the North 

Korea. A political dialogue between Russia and Seoul is heavily concentrated on 

the situation on the Korean Peninsula because other topics are hardly considered 

as important. South Korea’s willingness to commit to the US Indo-Pacific strategy 

was met with apprehension in Russian policy making circles. At the same time, 

much like Japan, the relationship also suffers from Russia’s criticism of the US–

ROK alliance and its role in exacerbating tensions on the Korean Peninsula, with 

President Putin even directly referring to South Korea as having a sovereignty 

deficiency.29 Hence, the ROK’s participation in Quad Plus is unlikely to lead to 

any changes in Russia’s position.
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Vietnam has been regarded as Russia’s key strategic partner in Southeast Asia, 

and bilateral relations have always been cordial. Apart from being a buyer of 

Russia’s military equipment, Hanoi has historically enjoyed military and economic cooperation with Moscow. Russia and Vietnam have robust security ties 

and exchanges and conduct an annual security dialogue. As a mark of bilateral 

cooperation, since 2014, the Russian navy regularly makes port calls at the naval 

base in Cam Ranh, where a Soviet naval base used to be positioned. This bilateral 

political relationship is characterized by a high level of trust. Moreover, a consensus has been established that development of security cooperation between Moscow and Hanoi fully corresponds to the long-term national interests of the two 

states.30 Russia’s relations with Vietnam have been an important factor in formulating Moscow’s stance on the South China Sea dispute and Russia advocating a 

solution based on international law and the United Nations Convention on the 

Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).31 However, Vietnam’s recent policy of upgrading its 

cooperation with the United States has been a point of concern for Moscow, 

quite similar to concerns of India. Moscow remains wary of Vietnam’s possible 

inclusion in the Quad and views such as a destructive policy by the United States 

threatening Russia’s own strategic partnerships.

Russia has a difficult history of relations with Israel. At one time, the Soviet 

Union supported the formation of a Jewish state in Palestine, but after the start of 

the Cold War, relations between the two countries deteriorated: Israel became an 

ally of the United States, and Moscow supported the Arab countries. Now the 

relationship between Russia and Israel is relatively good, largely thanks to peopleto-people contacts and the large Russian-speaking diaspora in Israel. At the same 

time, Russia and Israel are well aware that it is necessary to separate profitable 

trade projects and sympathy at the level of the population from considerations of 

geopolitics.32 In world politics, Russia and Israel rarely support each other. Moscow is accustomed to the fact that Israel is Washington’s main ally in the Middle 

East, so the possible accession of Israel to the Quad will be perceived in Russia as 

a natural step and will not lead to any changes in the Russian position.

Russian relations with Brazil, on the other hand, appear to be the exact opposite 

of relations between Russia and Israel. Personal contacts and trade are relatively 

few; however, Moscow views Brasilia as a potential major player in the future world 

order. Similar to India, Brazil is considered an important global partner for Russia 

as a participant of the Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa (BRICS) 

grouping. Brazil’s participation in the Quad Plus format will be perceived in Moscow, most likely, with bewilderment and generally negativity, but it will not affect 

Russia’s position. Brazil and Israel can hardly be considered important players in 
Russia and Quad Plus

JOURNAL OF INDO-PACIFIC AFFAIRS  SPECIAL ISSUE 2020 219

the Indo-Pacific by any means, and regional Latin Americans and Middle Eastern 

dynamics have primarily driven Russia’s relations with the other two states.

China

Throughout the four centuries of historical bilateral interactions, Russia–

China relations have seen ups and downs, with such forms as alliances and 

military conflicts being an exception. Maintaining stability on a shared morethan-four-thousand-kilometers border has been one of the key priorities of 

Russian and Chinese leadership, while instability would pose a significant challenge for security to each partner. This border also means that the two countries 

cannot be fully geopolitically encircled and helps create a more solid foundation 

in relations with the West. Final border resolution in 2004 was an important 

milestone in consolidating bilateral cooperation.33 Contemporary Russia–China 

relations, starting with the end of the Cold War era, can be characterized as a 

deep alignment in the form of strategic partnership. Cooperation has been 

based around a number of shared goals and principles, including but not limited 

to the aim of building a multipolar or a polycentric world order, opposition to 

the American hegemony and interventionism, support for the principles of respect for sovereignty and noninterference in domestic affairs, and reformation 

of global governance to better represent non-Western powers.34

Russia–China relations have seen a deeper alignment, starting with a crisis in 

Russia’s relations with the West in 2014, as the Russian government viewed improving relations with China as a major safeguard from the damage dealt by 

Western economic sanctions. A new stage has been characterized by robust political relations underpinned by Putin and Xi’s personal bond, increasing security 

cooperation and new economic deals and projects, mostly large-scale ones implemented by state-owned enterprises. Moreover, amid exacerbating strategic competition between the United States and China and a deep crisis in US–Russia 

relations, Moscow and Beijing took steps in 2018 and 2019 to heighten military 

cooperation, improve interoperability, and broaden cooperation in the strategic 

sphere. American policy has been effectively pushing Moscow deeper into Beijing’s embrace, giving rise to a long-term challenge of Russia’s greater economic 

dependence on China if the current trend persists. Imbalances in the complex 

power of the two partners are also hardly invisible. At the same time, Russia and 

China are not ready to enter a full-fledged alliance with security guarantees, as it 

will hamper their autonomous decision making.35 Russia does not deem it necessary to comply with China’s policies in Asia, retaining strategic neutrality in 

China’s territorial disputes (i.e., in South China Sea) and enjoying partnerships 

with states with which China has disputes, i.e., India, Vietnam, and Japan.36
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Russia–China relations are most accurately described by the formula “not always 

together, but never against each other.”37

Some have suggested that if Pres. Donald Trump invites Russia to rejoin the 

G7, thereby transforming it into the G8, Russia’s position on China may change. 

However, Russia’s potential invitation to the G7 will most likely be rejected. Russia used to be a member of the G8 but was actually expelled from grouping. This 

move demonstrated to Moscow the unreliability of cooperation in such a format. 

If Russia returns to the G7, members could again expel Moscow at any time, as 

soon as Russia tries to pursue its own interests, at odds with the policy of the 

United States and its allies. Moscow will gain nothing by joining this format, but 

it would lose China’s trust, since such a step will be unambiguously perceived in 

Beijing as anti-Chinese. Russia will not trade the real benefits of cooperation with 

China for an ephemeral sense of pride from participating in a club of great powers 

whose might is declining. Participation in the G8 could be acceptable to Russia 

either if the activities of the G8 are institutionalized and the rights of the participants are clearly spelled out or if more developing countries, friendly to Moscow 

and pursuing a policy independent of the United States, enter the grouping. Since 

this is unlikely to happen in the near future, Russia is focusing on cooperation in 

the G20 format, which Moscow believes is better suited to address global challenges, as it includes major emerging non-Western powers.

Russia’s Negative Attitude toward the Indo-Pacific and Quad

So, how can Russia’s official negative stance toward the Indo-Pacific and Quad 

be explained? First, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ approach is explained by the 

fact that the Quad is essentially perceived as an echo of the Cold War alliances as 

well as a NATO-style arrangement that Russia is well-familiar with in the European region.38 Thus, Moscow views as negative the Indo-Pacific strategies of the 

United States and its allies, which are predominantly perceived as a US-centric 

project. Russian officials tend to overstate the significance of the Quad, which has 

not evolved much from multilateral consultations, and generally overlook cooperation on nontraditional security by either the Quad or Quad Plus. There has 

been no indication whatsoever that Russia’s approach to Quad Plus is different by 

any means.

The roots of this attitude lie in a completely different vision for the regional 

architecture. Russia has been supportive of ASEAN-centric regional architecture 

and inclusive regional visions as expressed by ASEAN and India. During his 

February 2019 speech in Vietnam, Foreign Minister Lavrov expressed strong 

support for ASEAN as a solid foundation for security and cooperation architecture with a number of security, diplomatic, and economic mechanisms such as the 
Russia and Quad Plus

JOURNAL OF INDO-PACIFIC AFFAIRS  SPECIAL ISSUE 2020 221

East Asian Summit, ASEAN Defence Minister’s Meeting–Plus (ADMM+), 

and ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) dealing with security issues. The IndoPacific was characterized as competing with ASEAN Centrality,39 moving away 

from consensus-seeking mechanisms based on ASEAN to divisive ones, and 

thus not welcomed by Russia. What is more, as stated by Lavrov at the Raisina 

Dialogue in January 2020 in New Delhi, Russia’s own concept of the Greater 

Eurasian Partnership envisions forming a cooperative Eurasian space with the 

participation of the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU), ASEAN, and Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) member states as well as all states situated 

on the huge Eurasian landmass, including members of the European Union. In 

Lavrov’s view, the concept of the Indo-Pacific, which is divisive in nature, opposes rather than completements Russia’s vision of harmonizing integration 

projects of different countries and uniting a huge continent. The international 

organizations that Russia participates in such as BRICS and SCO are highlighted as an example of unifying institutions that are not directed against third 

parties. Moreover, Lavrov has repeatedly stressed that it is not clear how the 

Indo-Pacific is geographically different from the Asia-Pacific region.40 Russia 

fears that the Quad could supplant ASEAN-centric institutions and lead to a 

further marginalization of Russia’s regional standing.41

Second, Russia has been a proponent of a polycentric and more democratic world 

order, where the voices of not only Western but also of other global and regional 

powers can be heard. A polycentric world order has been regarded as a result of the 

emergence of new centers of power and erosion of the US-dominated unipolar 

world, with the United States no longer being a hegemon capable of imposing its 

will on the global scale.42 Accordingly, Russia supports multilateral institutions that 

could ensure participation of key developing powers in global governance such as 

the G20. In addition, Moscow has been advocating adherence to the international 

law as stipulated in the Charter of the United Nations, including principles of respect for sovereignty, noninterference into internal affairs, peaceful resolution of 

disputes and conflicts through dialogue, and so forth. Consequently, there has been 

a continuous discomfort on the Russian side with the so-called rules-based order 

promoted by the United States, Western states, and some US allies and endorsed by 

the Quad. According to Lavrov, it is unclear what these rules are, who agrees on 

them, what is wrong with the international law, and why it is not the international 

law but some other set of rules that are being promoted.43

In a similar fashion, Russia has been questioning the concept of the liberal world 

order promoted by the United States and other Western states. The key problem is 

what exactly is meant by a liberal world order. If the key to its definition is the 

dominance of Western states and Western models, then Russia is categorically 
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opposed to such a world order, and Moscow argues for a polycentric world in 

which Russia can realize its ambitions without asking permission from Washington. If by liberal world order, we mean a world of open borders, responsible 

development, and mutually beneficial globalization, then Russia is quite ready 

to integrate into it. It is important for Moscow that the global order should be 

dynamic, reflecting changes in the power balance and enabling absolutely all 

states to realize their interests, which implies the reform of global governance 

institutions to enhance the role of non-Western actors. However, the behavior 

of Western countries, which change the rules of the game when the Eastern 

ones have to adapt to them (for example, measures to oust China from Western 

markets based on security considerations), causes Moscow to suspect that the 

liberal world order is aimed at maintaining Western dominance. Moscow, of 

course, opposes this, since Russia is not interested in seeing its position as a 

defeated power in the Cold War be consolidated forever and that it be barred 

from resolving major world issues.

Third, a closer look into Russia’s relations with Quad members and China helps 

to explain Moscow’s official attitude toward this grouping. The Quad is originally 

an anti-Chinese format, and no one disputes this thesis. As a result, under current 

conditions, when Washington is literally pushing Russia into the arms of China, 

Russia cannot approve of either the Quad in its current or in an expanded format 

until the grouping’s anti-Chinese foundation is transformed into something more 

acceptable—for example, until it transforms into an inclusive security format, 

which can include both Russia and China. It can be argued that it is impossible 

for the Russian government to express its support of the Quad, as taking any 

anti-Chinese measures does not correspond to Russia’s national interests.

The problem with the Quad casts a shadow on the perception of the IndoPacific. Since the problem of relations with the United States is acute for Russia, 

the Russian Foreign Ministry perceives the Indo-Pacific through the prism of the 

Quad as an anti-Chinese format—not always making a distinction between the 

Indo-Pacific in the American and Indian interpretations. A number of political 

structures, think tanks, and independent researchers are taking a more nuanced 

approach.44 The Indian embassy in Moscow plays an important role in this, seeking to clarify New Delhi’s policy and the entire range of halftones.45

President Putin’s speech at the Valdai Discussion Club session in October 2019 

exemplified a more nuanced approach. He stated that Russia is against creating 

blocs and bloc divisions in Asia and believes that Asian countries are unwilling to 

make choices and join blocs aimed against other states. Additionally, he claimed 

that containing China is an unrealistic goal in itself and those who are pursuing 

to do so will ultimately fail. At the same time, he supported creating a network of 
Russia and Quad Plus

JOURNAL OF INDO-PACIFIC AFFAIRS  SPECIAL ISSUE 2020 223

institutions that could include different organizations from Asia and ensure cooperative interaction: i.e., it could be based on ASEAN-centric platforms. In addition, he stated that Russia would welcome multilateral economic partnership in 

Asia and Eurasia.46

Finally, it is instructive to note that although Russia speaks against the Quad, 

it does not mean that cooperation with specific member states of the grouping 

becomes impossible. Quite to the contrary, Russia still enjoys a privileged strategic partnership with India and strategic partnership relations other powers, such 

as Vietnam, that are at odds with China. Security dialogue with Tokyo is also 

highly valued as a means to engage in discussions with one of the key regional 

stakeholders and address each other’s security concerns. Similarly, Russia takes no 

interest in a China-dominated Asia and would like the region to be polycentric, 

with Russia as one of the centers of power and one of the key stakeholders in 

settling regional conflicts, such as the one on the Korean Peninsula.47

Although Russia and China are closely aligned, Moscow would rather prefer to 

remain neutral in the growing US–China strategic competition and retain as 

much strategic autonomy as possible, while working to ease regional polarization.48 Prime Minister Abe’s proposal to connect the free and open Indian Ocean 

concept and Asia with the Russian strategy for the development of the Russian 

Far East and the Arctic, with the help of Japan and energy projects, together with 

Indian prime minister Narendra Modi’s idea to make the Russian Far East the 

focal point for linking the Eurasian Economic Union and an open and inclusive 

Indo-Pacific by establishing new routes in trade and logistics, were articulated at 

the Eastern Economic Forum in September 2019.49 If accepted by Russia, such 

proposals could create a foundation for Russia’s cooperation with the states and 

organization that advocate, or at least possess, Indo-Pacific strategies, such as Japan, India, and ASEAN.50 What is more, one of important areas of cooperation 

among Russia and Japan, India, and ASEAN has been nontraditional security—a 

major focus of the Quad Plus.

Conclusion

This article has demonstrated that Russia’s official negative stance toward the 

Indo-Pacific and Quad has been predominantly expressed by the Ministry of 

Foreign Affairs. Moscow seems not to be paying any attention to the Pacific 

part of Russia’s identity and to be reluctant to formulate its own version of the 

Indo-Pacific, sticking to its traditional regional policy regardless of the changes 

in regional dynamics. Russia’s stance stems from its historic negative experience 

with US-led alliances, the contradictions of new formats with Russia’s view of 

the regional security evolution trajectory, and the character of Russia’s bilateral 
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relations with Quad members and China. Russia’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs 

sees the Indo-Pacific and Quad as running counter to Russia’s interests of building a collective security architecture and choses to constantly criticize them 

rather than adapt or search for compromises. Additionally, being a weaker major 

power in East Asia, Russia sees the Quad as a threat potentially capable of undermining ASEAN Centrality and marginalizing Russia’s regional positions.

Another reason for Moscow’s criticism of the Quad lies in the character of 

Russia’s relations with Quad members. The main problem is relations between 

Russia and the United States, which have deteriorated dramatically in recent 

years, and there are no prospects for their improvement in the near future. With 

Japan, Russia has a long-standing territorial problem; Australia is perceived in 

Moscow as a loyal ally of the United States. India remains Russia’s only real friend 

in the Quad, but this is not enough for Russia to seriously think about joining the 

grouping. Russian leadership deems it impossible to support the Quad, due to the 

grouping’s anti-Chinese nature, highlighted by the adoption of policies against 

China that are not considered to be in Russia’s national interests. A rift in US–

Russia relations seems to preclude any opportunity for cooperation with the Quad 

or Quad Plus. Furthermore, Russia does not seem to take any notice of cooperation in the sphere of nontraditional security in the Quad and Quad Plus and in 

general seems not to be paying any attention to the Quad Plus. Russia’s reaction 

to possible drawing of its traditional regional partner Vietnam into cooperation 

with the Quad is unlikely to be positive by any means. New Zealand is a regional 

player of little significance in the eyes of Russian policy makers, and political relations with South Korea are also complicated by the presence of Seoul’s military 

alliance with the United States. Israel is perceived as a staunch ally of the United 

States in the Middle East, while Brazil is an important partner in creating a 

polycentric world order as a member of BRICS. As a consequence, it is highly 

unlikely that Moscow’s position on the Quad Plus will be different from the one 

toward the Quad.

Although Russia’s direct cooperation with the Quad or Quad Plus is out of 

the question, Moscow may be much more enthusiastic to engage in broader regional cooperation. It would also like to sustain existing bilateral ties, taking into 

consideration Russia’s friendly relations with India, ASEAN, and Vietnam, and 

zero interest in supporting a China-dominated Asia. As stated by President Putin in October 2019, Russia would welcome a network of institutions that could 

provide a ground for cooperative engagement. The main potential of Russia’s 

cooperation with the Quad Plus states lies in cooperating on the areas that are 

considered unequivocally aimed at the common public good. In practice Russia 

has been one of the key players in addressing nontraditional security threats in 
Russia and Quad Plus

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the Indo-Pacific through bilateral and multilateral channels. Moreover, Russia 

and Japan have recently stepped up cooperation in combating nontraditional 

security threats, exemplified by their first naval antipiracy exercise in the Arabian 

Sea in January 2020. Additionally, Russia and ASEAN are looking for the ways 

to jointly cooperate in fighting the COVID-19 pandemic and facilitating regional 

capacity building in that area.51 Consequently, Russia’s bilateral cooperation with 

the same countries that constitute the Quad and Quad Plus or under the auspices 

of regional multilateral institutions like ARF, ADMM+, or EAS is a tangible 

prospect, including addressing COVID-19 and its effects.

Dr. Anna Kireeva

Dr. Kireeva holds the positions of Associate Professor at the Department of Asian and African Studies and of Research Fellow at the Center for Comprehensive Chinese Studies and Regional Projects at Moscow State Institute of 

International Relations (MGIMO University), the MFA of Russia. She holds BA (2008), MA (2010) and PhD 

(2013) in international relations and regional studies from MGIMO University. Dr. Kireeva focuses on strategies 

and foreign policy of great/major powers in East Asia and the Indo-Pacific: China, Japan, the United States, and 

Russia as well as India as an emerging power. Her research has recently been centered on Russia’s Asian pivot and 

Russia’s relations with Japan, China, South Korea, North Korea, and East Asia in general. Her works include the 

topics of the transformation of the East Asian regional order and the Indo-Pacific, China’s Asian policy and the Belt 

and Road Initiative, US Asia and Indo-Pacific policies, Japan’s foreign policy and national security policy transformation, Japan’s Indo-Pacific strategy and its relations with regional states, and the territorial disputes in the East 

China and South China Seas.

Dr. Alexey Kupriyanov

Dr. Kupriyanov is a senior research fellow at the Institute of World Economy and International Relations (IMEMO) 

of the Russian Academy of Sciences. He is interested in the history and contemporary development of South Asia 

and the Indian Ocean region. Dr. Kupriyanov is the author of more than two dozen articles on the Indo-Pacific and 

Russian interests there.

Notes

1. “Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov’s remarks and answers to media questions during the 

Russian-Vietnamese conference of the Valdai International Discussion Club, Ho Chi Minh 

City, 25 February,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, 25 February 2019, 

https://www.mid.ru/.

2. “Primakovskie chtenija-2020: vystuplenie Sergeja Lavrova [Primakov Readings-2020: Sergey Lavrov’s Speech],” International Affairs, 11 July 2020, https://interaffairs.ru/.

3. “Primakovskie chtenija: Rossija i postkovidnyj mir. Special’nyj gost’ Sergej Lavrov [Primakov Readings: Russia and post-COVID world. Sergey Lavrov as a Special Guest],” Interfax, 11 

July 2020, https://www.interfax.ru/.

4. An alternative discourse puts emphasis on the Eurasian aspects of Russian identity, representing Russia rather as a continental power belonging to a huge Eurasian landmass.

5. Ekaterina Koldunova, “Russia as a Euro-Pacific power: Dilemmas of Russian foreign policy 

decision-making,” International Organizations 29, no. 3 (2015): 378–94; and Margarete Klein, 
226 JOURNAL OF INDO-PACIFIC AFFAIRS  SPECIAL ISSUE 2020

Kireeva & Kupriyanov

“Russia: A Euro-Pacific Power? Goals, Strategies and Perspectives of Moscow’s East Asia Policy,” 

SWP Research Paper (Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik German Institute for International and Security Affairs, September 2014), 5–10.

6. Victor Larin, ed., Integrating Pacific Russia into the North Pacific region: experience and potential of regional and cross-border cooperation in the beginning of 21st century (Vladivostok: IHAE FEB 

RAS, 2017).

7. Leonid Kutakov, Moskva–Tokio: ocherki diplomaticheskikh otnoshenii, 1956–1986 [Moscow–

Tokyo: Essays on the History of Diplomatic Relations], (Moscow: Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia, 

1988), http://nippon-history.ru/.

8. Kirill Barskii, “Vostochnyi vektor» nachertil Primakov” [Eastern vector was drawn by Primakov]. Mezhdunarodnaia zhizn’, Number 10 (2016): 41–66, https://interaffairs.ru/.

9. Koldunova, “Russia as a Euro-Pacific power,” 5–10.

10. Ekaterina Koldunova, “Russia’s Involvement in Regional Cooperation in East Asia. Opportunities and Limitations of Constructive Engagement,” Asian Survey 56, no. 3 (2016): 552–54.

11. Alexander Lukin, Pivot to Asia. Russia’s Foreign Policy Enters the 21st Century (New Delhi: 

Vij Books India Pvt Ltd, 2017), 1–9.

12. For Russia’s approach to regional security in Asia, see: Dmitry Streltsov, Anna Kireeva, and 

Ilya Dyachkov, “Russia’s View on the International Security in Northeast Asia,” Korean Journal of 

Defense Analysis 30, no. 1 (March 2018): 115–34.

13. “Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation (approved by President of the Russian 

Federation Vladimir Putin on November 30, 2016),” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian 

Federation, 1 December 2016, http://www.mid.ru/.

14. Samuel Charap et al., “The US and Russia in the Asia-Pacific,” International Institute for 

Strategic Studies,, 2016, 8. https://www.iiss.org/.

15. “Lavrov: Japonija dolzhna priznat’ suverenitet RF nad Kurilami dlja zakljuchenija mirnogo 

dogovora” [Lavrov: Japan should acknowledge Russian sovereignty over the Kuril Islands in order 

to conclude a peace treaty], TASS, 23 November 2019, https://tass.ru/.

16. Anatoly Torkunov, Norma C. Noonan, and Tatiana Shakleina, eds., Russia and the United 

States in the evolving world order (Moscow: MGIMO University, 2018); and Viktoria Zhuravleva, 

“Russia and the United States: Reflecting on the Conflict,” Russian Politics & Law 55, no. 6 

(2017): 401–18, DOI: 10.1080/10611940.2017.1574499.

17. I.A. Istomin, “Politika SShA v Indo-Tihookeanskom regione: posledstviya dl’a Rossii” 

[U.S. Policy in the Indo-Pacific: Implications for Russia], Russian International Affairs Council, 

Working Paper #49 (Moscow: NP RSMD, 2019), 38–40, https://russiancouncil.ru/.

18. “Lavrov: kontseptsiia ‘poriadka, osnovannogo na pravilakh’, zatragivaet polnomochiia 

OON” [Lavrov: the concept of “rule-based order” affects UN powers], TASS, 20 September 2019, 

https://tass.ru/.

19. Tsuruoka Michito, “Making Sense of Japan’s Approach to Russia,” The Diplomat, 5 September 2019, https://thediplomat.com/.

20. James D. Brown, “Japan’s security cooperation with Russia: neutralizing the threat of a 

China–Russia united front,” International Affairs 94, no. 4 (2018): 861–82.

21. “Press statements following talks with Prime Minister of Japan Shinzo Abe,” President of 

Russia, 29 June 2019, http://en.kremlin.ru/.

22. For more on improvement of Russia–Japan relations under Shinzō Abe and Vladimir Putin 

in 2016–2019, see: Anna Kireeva, “A New Stage in Russia-Japan Relations: Rapprochement and its 

Limitations,” Asia-Pacific Review 26, no. 2 (2019): 76–104. DOI: 10.1080/13439006.2019.1692526.
Russia and Quad Plus

JOURNAL OF INDO-PACIFIC AFFAIRS  SPECIAL ISSUE 2020 227

23. “Putin konstatiruet blizost’ Moskvy i N’iu-Deli po ostrym mezhdunarodnym problemam” 

[Putin notes the proximity of Moscow and New Delhi on acute international problems], TASS, 24 

December 2015, https://tass.ru/.

24. “Sergej Lavrov zajavil ob ugroze Indo-Tihookeanskoj strategii SshA” [Sergey Lavrov announced the threat to the Indo-Pacific strategy of the United States], Mezhdunarodnaja zhizn’, 11 

September 2020, https://interaffairs.ru/. For more on Russia–India relations, see: Alexey Kupriianov, “Russian and Indian Cooperation in the Indo-Pacific Region in the Context of Sanctions,” 

International Organisations Research Journal 14, no. 3 (2019): 117–35, DOI: 10.17323/1996-7845-

2019-03-06.

25. Sergej Lavrov, “Rossija i Avstralija: 75 let vzaimodejstvija” [Russia and Australia: 75 years 

of interaction], RIAC, 24 January 2018, https://russiancouncil.ru/.

26. Winston Peters, “Novaia Zelandiia i Rossiia: 75 let diplomaticheskikh otnoshenii” [New 

Zealand and Russia: 75 years of diplomatic relations], The International Affairs, 22 May 2019, 

https://interaffairs.ru/.

27. For more on this topic, see: Anna Kireeva, “South Korea-Russia Relations after the Cold 

War,” in The Korean Paradox: Domestic Political Divide and Foreign Policy in South Korea, ed. Marco 

Milani, Antonio Fiori, and Matteo Dian (New York: Routledge, 2019), 137–56.

28. Jae-Yound Lee, “The New Northern Policy and Korean-Russian Cooperation,” Valdai Discussion Papers 76, October 2017.

29. “News conference following Russian-North Korean talks,” President of Russia, 25 April 

2019, http://en.kremlin.ru/.

30. “Lavrov: dialog Rossii i V’etnama za 70 let priobrel osobyj harakter” [Lavrov: RussiaVietnam dialogue has become special in 70 years], TASS, 29 January 2020, https://tass.ru/.

31. Klein, Russia: A Euro-Pacific Power, 23–24.

32. On the dynamics of Russia–Israel relations, see: Irina Zvyagelskaya, “Israel-Russia: Confronting Modern Challenges,” Valdai Discussion Club, 22 September 2015, https://valdaiclub.com/.

33. Alexei D. Voskressenski, “The Three Structural Changes of Russo-Chinese Cooperation 

after the Collapse of the USSR and Prospects for the Emergence of a Fourth Stage,” Eurasian 

Review 5 (November 2012), 3–4; and Bin Ma and Jian Zhang, “Present and Future SinoRussian Cooperation: Chinese Perspectives,” Sino-Russian Relations: Perspectives from Russia, 

China and Japan, NBR Special Report #79 (Seattle: The National Bureau of Asian Research, 

May 2019), 25–28.

34. Vasily Kashin and Alexander Lukin, “Russian-Chinese Security Cooperation in Asia,” 

Asian Politics & Policy 10, no. 4 (2018), 615–17, DOI: 10.1111/aspp.12423; and Ma and Zhang, 

“Present and Future Sino-Russian Cooperation,” 27–29.

35. Alexander Lukin, China and Russia. The New Rapprochement (Cambridge: Polity Press, 

2018), 189–91; and Vasily Kashin Vasily, “Russia-China Cooperation: A Russian Perspective,” 

Sino-Russian Relations. Perspectives from Russia, China and Japan, NBR Special Report #79 (Seattle: The National Bureau of Asian Research, May 2019), 1–21.

36. Kashin and Lukin, “Russian-Chinese Security Cooperation in Asia,” 621, 624; and Klein, 

“Russia: A Euro-Pacific Power,” 18–19.

37. Tat’iana Panina, “Rossiia-Kitai: Nikogda protiv drug druga i ne vsegda vmeste” [RussiaChina: Never against each other and not always together], Rossiiskaia Gazeta, 4 June 2020, 

https://rg.ru/.

38. Ekaterina Koldunova, “Russia’s Ambivalence about an Indo-Pacific Strategy,” Asia-Pacific 

Bulletin 476 (6 May 2019), 2, https://www.eastwestcenter.org/.
228 JOURNAL OF INDO-PACIFIC AFFAIRS  SPECIAL ISSUE 2020

Kireeva & Kupriyanov

39. “Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov’s remarks and answers to media questions,” Ministry of 

Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation.

40. “Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov’s remarks and answers to questions at a plenary session of 

the Raisina Dialogue international conference, New Delhi, January 15, 2020,” Ministry of Foreign 

Affairs of the Russian Federation, 15 January 2020, https://www.mid.ru/.

41. Anton Tsvetov, “Indo-Tihookeanskiī front: zachem na geopoliticheskoī karte poiavilsia 

novyī region i chto eto sulit Rossii?” [Indo-Pacific Front: Why Did a New Region Appear on the 

Geopolitical Map and What Does It Mean for Russia?], Moscow Carnegie Center, 22 March 2018, 

https://carnegie.ru/.

42. Evgeny Primakov, “Preface”, in Rossija v policentrichnom mire [Russia in a Polycentric World 

Order], ed. A.A. Dynkyn and N.I. Ivanova, (Moscow: Ves’ mir, 2011), 5–6.

43. “Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov’s remarks and answers to questions at a plenary session,” 

Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation.

44. Anna Kireeva, “The Indo-Pacific in the Strategies of the U.S. and Japan. Common and 

Distinctive Features, Implications for Russia,” Russia in Global Affairs 18, no. 3 ( July–September 

2020): 98–127, https://eng.globalaffairs.ru/; Tsvetov, “Indo-Tihookeanskiī front; Aleksey Kupriyanov, “Kitajskij Faktor v Formirovanii Indijskogo Podhoda k Koncepcii Indo-Tihookeanskogo 

Regiona” [Factor of China in Evolution of the Indian Approach to the Indo-Pacific Region], 

Comparative Politics Russia, no. 2, 2020, 68–75; and Aleksey Kupriyanov, “The Indo-Pacific Region 

and Russia,” Valdai Discussion Club, 14 November 2018, https://valdaiclub.com/.

45. Ashwin Ahmad “Russia Should Get Involved in Indo-Pacific to Safeguard Its Own Interests, Says Indian Envoy,” StratNews Global, 18 July 2020, https://stratnewsglobal.com/.

46. “Zasedanie diskussionnogo kluba «Valdaj» [Valdai Discussion Club session]”, President of 

Russia, 3 October 2019, http://en.kremlin.ru/.

47. Klein, Russia: A Euro-Pacific Power, 5–10, 18–19; Rensselaer W. Lee and Artyom Lukin, 

Russia’s Far East: New Dynamics in Asia Pacific & Beyond (Boulder, CO: Lynne Reinner Publishers, 

Inc, 2016), 3–4; Samuel Charap et al., “The US and Russia in the Asia-Pacific,” 8–11; Vasily 

Kashin, Rossiiskii podkhod k problemam regional’noi bezopasnosti v ATR i perspektivy sotrudnichestva 

s Iaponiei [Russia’s Approach to Regional Security in Asia-Pacific and Prospects for Cooperation with 

Japan] (Moscow: Carnegie Moscow Center, June 2016), 13–14, https://carnegie.ru/.

48. Istomin, Politika SShA v Indo-Tihookeanskom regione.

49. “Plenary session of the Eastern Economic Forum,” President of Russia, 5 September 2019, 

http://en.kremlin.ru/.

50. Kireeva, “The Indo-Pacific in the Strategies.”

51. “Strany ASEAN vyrazili podderzhku usilijam RF po bor’be s koronavirusom” [ASEAN 

states expressed support for Russia’s efforts to fight the coronavirus], TASS, 17 June 2020, 

https://tass.ru/.

Disclaimer

The views and opinions expressed or implied in JIPA are those of the authors and should not be construed as carrying 

the official sanction of the Department of Defense, Department of the Air Force, Air Education and Training Command, 

Air University, or other agencies or departments of the US government or their international equivalents
JOURNAL OF INDO-PACIFIC AFFAIRS  SPECIAL ISSUE 2020 229

 A VIEW FROM THE OTHERS

Indian Ocean Island States and the 

Quad Plus

Nilanthi Samaranayake

Abstract

This article examines the potential implications of the Quad Plus concept for 

Indian Ocean island states. Led by the United States, diplomats from India, 

Australia, Japan, South Korea, New Zealand, and Vietnam have coordinated 

responses to the COVID-19 pandemic since March 2020. More recently, the 

dialogue has expanded to include diplomats from countries farther from the 

Indo-Pacific: Brazil and Israel. To date, six of the nine Quad Plus countries have 

Pacific Ocean borders, whereas only India is situated entirely in the Indian 

Ocean. Expanding the geographic aperture, what are the chances for smaller 

Indian Ocean island states to become part of this grouping? This article will 

consider the potential for states from Sri Lanka to Seychelles, Maldives to Mauritius, as well as French and British territories in the Indian Ocean, to play a role 

in the Quad Plus. Conversely, the article will also consider the potential conceptual and operational limitations for the Quad Plus to be a force across the vast 

expanse of the Indian Ocean during a pandemic. This study will identify key issues and drivers among small states in the Indian Ocean that will be relevant to 

the future of the Indo-Pacific concept.

Introduction

This article examines the potential for the Indian Ocean island states to play 

both a supporting and supported role in the Quad Plus. In March 2020, the US 

Deputy Secretary of State Stephen Biegun began an initiative to coordinate with 

diplomats from India, Australia, Japan, South Korea, New Zealand, and Vietnam 

about responses to the COVID-19 pandemic. The US coordination with its close 

Indo-Pacific allies and partners on a crisis recalls the international response to the 

2004 Indian Ocean tsunami. In the Tsunami Core Group (TCG), diplomats from 

the United States, India, Australia, and Japan coordinated with their militaries to 

provide disaster relief to Indian Ocean countries such as Indonesia, Thailand, Sri 

Lanka, and Maldives.

However, the Quad Plus is more expansive than the TCG. It also takes place in 

the context of rising threats and uncertainty posed by China in the Indo-Pacific 

region and as a result, a renewed focus on the Quad. This grouping, comprising 
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Samaranayake

the United States, India, Australia, and Japan, emerged as an informal strategic 

partnership out of the success of their operational coordination after the 2004 

tsunami. After being disbanded a decade earlier, the Quad has gained momentum 

since 2017. In the months since the Quad Plus concept was introduced, it has 

expanded to include diplomats from countries farther from the Indo-Pacific: Brazil and Israel. More importantly, the grouping has been raised from the deputy 

minister to the ministerial level, with the US secretary of state now coordinating 

with counterparts from India, Australia, Brazil, Israel, Japan, and South Korea on 

COVID-19 response.

What are the chances for Indian Ocean island states to become part of the 

Quad Plus? Would these states even want to be part of the grouping? For example, 

Sri Lanka and Maldives were identified as partners in the US Department of 

State’s 2019 report A Free and Open Indo-Pacific: Advancing a Shared Vision.

1

 News 

reporting from Sri Lanka has suggested the possibility of deepening ties following the June 2020 call between Secretary of State Mike Pompeo and Sri Lankan 

minister of foreign relations Dinesh Gunawardane.2 Washington concluded a 

defense framework agreement with Maldives in September 2020 and has discussed a forthcoming bilateral security dialogue. At this point, the Quad Plus is 

only a virtual, operationally focused conference and should not be overstated as a 

forum. Still, given ongoing questions about the direction of the Quad Plus concept and the renewed focus on the future for the Quad, it is worth considering 

both the possibilities and limitations of expanding the Quad Plus to include the 

Indian Ocean island states.

Context of Indian Ocean Island States

Before considering the outlook of the Quad Plus concept for Indian Ocean 

island states, it will be helpful to review their geography and identities. Some of 

the territories in the Indian Ocean are sovereign countries, whereas others are 

colonial possessions. Beginning in South Asia, Sri Lanka and Maldives are sovereign countries. As a near neighbor, India has wielded much influence—cultural, 

ethnic, political, economic, military—throughout their histories. As a result, both 

Maldives and Sri Lanka have a range of interactions—both positive and negative 

from their perspectives—with their dominant neighbor to the north.3

Farther west in the Indian Ocean are colonial-era territories held by the United 

Kingdom and France. The former claims sovereignty over the British Indian Ocean 

Territory. However, Mauritius disputes Britain’s claim to the Chagos Archipelago 

and is increasingly scoring victories in international fora. As of 2020, this archipelago is represented on the 2020 United Nations map as belonging to Mauritius 

and contains the key military base on Diego Garcia, which will be examined later. 
Indian Ocean Island States and the Quad Plus

JOURNAL OF INDO-PACIFIC AFFAIRS  SPECIAL ISSUE 2020 231

Meanwhile, France also has overseas nationals and territories in the Indian Ocean, 

such as Réunion and Mayotte. Both islands contain military facilities as well. Finally, the western Indian Ocean features multiple sovereign island countries off the 

east coast of Africa: Seychelles, Mauritius, Madagascar, and Comoros.

All these Indian Ocean island states have similarities and differences in terms 

of traits. For example, while Maldives and Sri Lanka are part of South Asian 

institutions such as the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation, Seychelles, Mauritius, Madagascar, and Comoros claim an African identity and are 

part of regional institutions such as the African Union. Second, these Indian 

Ocean island states are at varying stages of economic development. Seychelles 

and Mauritius are high-income economies, according to the World Bank, 

whereas Comoros, Sri Lanka, and Maldives are middle income and Madagascar 

is low income.

Despite their geographic, economic, and institutional differences, these states 

share a common region and maritime identity, which has fostered centuries of 

people-to-people ties.4 Given these historical connections and the development 

ambitions of the island states, there is increasing attention on regional institutions 

that can serve to unite Indian Ocean stakeholders. One is the Indian Ocean Rim 

Association (IORA), an international organization whose secretariat is based in 

Mauritius. As of 2020, the aforementioned island countries are members. While 

IORA focuses on economic and sustainable growth, another regional institution 

links Indian Ocean countries: the Indian Ocean Naval Symposium (IONS). 

Founded by India, IONS focuses on maritime security and assembles meetings of 

regional naval and coast guard leaders. Understanding the shared and distinct 

identities and interests of small states in the Indian Ocean will be relevant to the 

future of the Quad Plus.

An emerging field of international relations theory highlights the traditional 

inattention to small states—many of which are found in the Indian Ocean region.5

 The United States and China are clear examples of large powers, while 

countries such as Australia and India—both Indian Ocean stakeholders—are 

often discussed as “middle powers” with their significant, but not global might.6

Yet, attempts to understand small states are often limited to identifying metrics 

such as population size or land area.7

Theorists of small states are moving toward a more relational understanding of 

the drivers of these states’ international decisions. This is in recognition that small 

states around the world have long understood their fundamentally asymmetric 

relationships with large countries due to their smaller size and capabilities.8 Each 

has needed to carefully navigate larger countries—from India to the United States, 

the United Kingdom, or France. Godfrey Baldacchino and Anders Wivel note 
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Samaranayake

that “small states are legally sovereign, but their actual autonomy may vary.”9 As a 

result, small states such as Sri Lanka called for an Indian Ocean Zone of Peace 

during the Cold War, while the Treaty of Pelindaba was signed more recently to 

ensure a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Africa. In the Indian Ocean, Comoros, 

Madagascar, and Mauritius are signatories to the treaty. In addition to understanding their geographic, social, and economic traits, theoretical knowledge 

about small states will be important for policy makers and academicians if they 

wish to develop the Quad Plus as a conceptual and operational force across the 

Indian Ocean and Indo-Pacific.

Unifying Themes in Indian Ocean Island States

The previous section has emphasized the diversity of Sri Lanka, Maldives, 

Seychelles, Mauritius, Comoros, and Madagascar as Asian and African island 

nations, as well as the French and UK territories, despite their shared traits as 

small Indian Ocean islands. Nevertheless, this diverse constellation has three 

broadly unifying aspects that are worth considering when exploring the Quad 

Plus concept. First, they have common needs such as building capacity for their 

maritime security services. Second, island states share common concerns, such as 

over sovereignty when challenged by large powers. Third, despite their smaller 

size, they possess strengths such as their strategic locations.10

First, these countries have common needs for economic development and 

capacity challenges as small states. Recently, India played a critical role in providing relief for populations in these countries, including Comoros, in responding to the COVID-19 pandemic. After the Indian Ocean tsunami, the TCG 

countries provided relief to the small states of Maldives and Sri Lanka. Beyond 

disaster relief, India has played a strong role in building capacity for the maritime security services in Indian Ocean island states. While these small island 

countries are currently facing challenges to their health systems and economies 

from COVID-19, their maritime forces are also facing cutbacks to the maintenance of ships as well as operations.11

Second, Indian Ocean island states also share common threats. They face challenges such as rising sea levels due to climate change. They are also alert to potential oil spills that can damage their ecology and have economic effects, such as on 

tourism. For example, the maritime forces of Maldives and Sri Lanka fear the 

threat of oil spills and must prepare for the possibility of such a disaster. In fact, a 

tanker fire off Sri Lanka’s east coast was contained in September 2020 before it 

resulted in a major environmental disaster. Unfortunately, in the preceding 

months, Mauritius confronted the damage of an oil spill after a Japanese tanker 

ran aground. In addition to Japan providing assistance after Mauritius declared a 
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JOURNAL OF INDO-PACIFIC AFFAIRS  SPECIAL ISSUE 2020 233

state of environmental emergency, India sent a navy ship and a coast guard team 

and France deployed naval aircraft and advisers from nearby Réunion.

Moreover, small island states have had to confront large countries to maintain 

their sovereignty or craft independent foreign policies. For example, India faced 

protests in Seychelles when reports emerged about a potential military base on 

Assumption Island.12 In the past several years, the United States has faced controversy and eventual rejection of proposed status of forces agreements (SOFA) with 

Maldives and Sri Lanka. Meanwhile, as discussed earlier, Mauritius disputes British sovereignty over the Chagos Archipelago and has waged a successful campaign 

against the United Kingdom for several years in the Permanent Court of Arbitration, the International Court of Justice, and the UN General Assembly. The fact 

that Mauritius has relied on international diplomatic and legal institutions should 

be no surprise. Small states need the “shelter” and capability that these institutions 

provide given the limitations of size and capacity faced by small states.13

Third, the Indian Ocean island states have surprising strengths given their 

small size. Small island developing states, which include most of the countries 

examined in this study, are thought leaders on addressing global challenges such 

as climate security due to the threat of rising sea levels. Maldives, for example, 

recently chaired the Alliance of Small Island States and was one of the first countries to ratify the Kyoto Protocol and the Paris Agreement within the United 

Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change.

Meanwhile, the locations of these small states provide them with strategic and 

commercial advantages.14 For example, Sri Lanka operates the busiest container 

port in South Asia at Colombo, and Maldives is a leader among the luxury tourism 

industry. Related to location is the use of islands for military basing in strategic 

positions. Seychelles has permitted the United States to base the MQ-9 Reaper 

unmanned aerial vehicles in support of counterpiracy and counterterrorism missions. The United Kingdom established the British Indian Ocean Territory largely 

due to the desire to host a base, with US air and naval presence, on Diego Garcia. 

This base has been critical to US military operations—including combat—over the 

past 30 years.

Future of the Quad Plus among Indian Ocean Island States

Having analyzed the context in which Indian Ocean island states find themselves and the unifying themes they share as small states, I will consider the Quad 

Plus concept and the potential implications for this group of states. Essentially, 

how can these states be involved in the Quad Plus? This section will consider both 

the possibilities and the limitations of this concept for Indian Ocean island states.
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Samaranayake

Possibilities: Supporting vs. Supported Framework

To consider the prospects of Indian Ocean island states under the Quad Plus, 

it is useful to employ a framework where these states can be considered to play 

supporting vs. supported roles. First, a supporting role for these states in the Quad 

Plus derives from their strengths. Location was discussed as a strength of small 

states. This is certainly the case for the Indian Ocean islands. Close to the main 

East–West sea lanes, Sri Lanka already permits both merchant and military ships 

to refuel at Colombo port. Such visits could play an important role in relief efforts 

as the COVID-19 situation deteriorates in the developing world.

Another geographic strength of these small island states is the access they offer 

for military basing across the vast Indian Ocean. In Mauritius, India has been able 

to proceed with plans for base construction in the Agaléga Islands in the form of 

a jetty and landing strip for use by Mauritius’ coast guard.15 This activity received 

less protest than similar efforts in Seychelles due to India’s close bilateral ties with 

Mauritius. Basing here, as well as in the British and French colonial territories of 

Diego Garcia and Réunion and Mayotte, respectively, presents another opportunity for small Indian Ocean islands to play a supporting role in the Quad Plus 

construct. These island territories and basing access in the Indian Ocean suggest 

logical invitations to France and Britain by current participants.

Alternatively, a supported role for Indian Ocean island states derives from their 

needs. The fact that China has been supporting these countries not only with 

health assistance but also financial relief, provides an additional imperative for 

support from the Quad Plus construct. These states are likely to continue requiring health assistance. Two of these Indian Ocean countries—Sri Lanka and 

Maldives—received relief in operations coordinated by the TCG after the 2004 

natural disaster.16 More recently, India provided significant amounts of relief to 

neighboring countries in response to COVID-19.17 In particular, the Indian 

Navy deployed to small island states in South Asia and Africa. For example, in 

May and June, INS Kesari steamed for roughly 7,500 nautical miles to deliver 

COVID-19 relief to Maldives, Mauritius, Madagascar, Comoros, and Seychelles. 

Meanwhile, French naval forces deployed to Réunion and Mayotte to provide 

relief to these overseas departments.

Beyond health assistance, the COVID-19 era has already harmed Indian Ocean 

island countries’ economies and future development prospects. Maritime traffic 

and trade have been adversely affected. Lockdowns and travel restrictions have 

undermined tourism, which constitutes a significant source of national income. For 

example, roughly two-thirds of Maldives’ economy is fueled by tourism, while onequarter of Seychelles’ economy comes from tourism. Meanwhile, the Indian Ocean 
Indian Ocean Island States and the Quad Plus

JOURNAL OF INDO-PACIFIC AFFAIRS  SPECIAL ISSUE 2020 235

island states have also seen diminished remittances from overseas nationals, which 

is another important source of revenue. The combined effect of decreased export 

revenue, tourism income, and remittances has resulted in fewer foreign exchange 

reserves for these countries—some of which already had deficient reserves before 

the COVID-19 crisis began. As a result, they have relied on international financial 

institutions and multilateral development banks—as well as China—for assistance. 

Maldives and Sri Lanka have also requested currency swaps from India. This clear 

need from Indian Ocean island states suggests an opportunity for Quad Plus 

countries to provide financial support to these developing economies.

Limitations: Diplomatic, Operational, and Conceptual

While the previous section considers the possibilities for Indian Ocean island 

states to participate in the Quad Plus through supporting and supported roles, 

potential obstacles also exist to their participation. Some of these limitations derive 

from the concerns of small states discussed above. First, island states may be wary 

of the potential use of their territory. This diplomatic issue can have operational 

effects. When China’s increasing ties with Sri Lanka or Maldives are mentioned, 

both Colombo18 and Malé repeat a desire to avoid upsetting India’s security interests such as by permitting foreign military bases on their territory. Indian Ocean 

island states would likely refuse to participate in the Quad Plus if it were to assume 

a military appearance, especially one seen as being anti-China. How the Quad Plus 

framework navigates its relationship to the Quad consultations—including the 

forthcoming Malabar naval exercise—will thus be important going forward with 

regard to Indian Ocean island states.

A second limitation is conceptual with regard to the Indian Ocean region and 

US blind spots. Since the origins of the Quad Plus in March 2020, the United 

States has sought to keep the dialogue focused on the Indo-Pacific, with an 

emphasis on countries bordering Pacific waters. Close US allies such as France 

and the United Kingdom are not even involved, despite their possession of territories in the Indian Ocean region. Expanding the Quad Plus’s attention to the 

Indian Ocean may not be a priority now for Washington, beyond press releases 

and photo opportunities. China’s ongoing expansion of its ties with Indian Ocean 

island states could be a catalyst that increases US attention to the region. It is not 

clear, however, that India would welcome greater US defense engagement with 

neighbors such as Maldives. Although India did not object to a loose defense 

framework agreement between the United States and Maldives in 2020, New 

Delhi had previously discouraged Malé from pursuing a more intensive defense 

agreement (i.e., a SOFA) in 2013–2014.
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Samaranayake

Another potential conceptual challenge is that Quad countries prioritize different parts of the Indian Ocean. This raises questions whether all island states 

can participate in the Quad Plus. As discussed earlier, the origins of the Quad 

date back to 2004, when the United States, India, Japan, and Australia coordinated to provide disaster relief through the TCG. While this group disbanded in 

2005, the strategic rationale for these four Quad countries to work together persisted, culminating in the September 2007 Malabar exercise. A decade later, the 

grouping has reemerged, largely due to increased assertiveness by China in the 

South and East China Seas.

Despite the nominal shift in Washington’s previously declared “Asia-Pacific” 

priorities to the new “Indo-Pacific” strategy, the Quad remains focused on the 

Pacific in practice. Much of the “Indo” focus in the US concept of the Indo-Pacific 

is concentrated on India in particular rather than the Indian Ocean more broadly. 

More recently, however, White House officials (while in India) discussed an extension of the Indo-Pacific definition to extend to Africa. Whereas US officials 

had described the Indo-Pacific Command area of responsibility as extending 

“from Hollywood to Bollywood,”19 this area was characterized in January 2020 as 

extending “from California to Kilimanjaro.”20 Nevertheless, this talking point has 

not yet translated into any changes to the Unified Command Plan for this theater. 

Likewise, the Indo-Pacific remains a fundamentally Asian concept for Australia. 

In the recent 2020 Defence Strategic Update, Canberra prioritizes the eastern Indian Ocean through the use of maps and text mentions.21

As a result, islands in the western Indian Ocean do not receive significant attention from the United States or Australia.22 For example, the African countries 

of Mauritius, Seychelles, Madagascar, and Comoros are not mentioned in the US 

A Free and Open Indo-Pacific report.23 Even territories held by close US allies—

Britain and France—are not mentioned.

On the other hand, India is centrally located in the Indian Ocean and policy 

makers are increasingly focused on westward equities for their country—more so 

than the United States and Australia. India’s 2015 Maritime Security Strategy resulted in the extension of the country’s primary area of interest to encompass the 

entire western Indian Ocean, including the islands in the southwestern corner.24

This strategy has been operationalized through the Indian Navy’s mission-based 

deployments across the entire region. Japan shares this expansive vision for the 

Indian Ocean and has partnered with India on the Asia-Africa Growth Corridor, 

although this initiative has not yet produced notable results.25
Indian Ocean Island States and the Quad Plus

JOURNAL OF INDO-PACIFIC AFFAIRS  SPECIAL ISSUE 2020 237

Conclusion

This article has analyzed Indian Ocean island states and their potential to 

participate in the Quad Plus in both supporting and supported roles. An examination of their traits shows that these states are unified by common needs and 

concerns and possess surprising strengths. Basing access for the provision of relief is a clear example of the supporting role the Indian Ocean island states can 

play in the Quad Plus. On the other hand, during the COVID-19 pandemic, 

these states have been supported through health and financial assistance.

Despite these opportunities, the Quad Plus construct may pose some limitations for Indian Ocean island states’ participation. Diplomatic leadership of the 

Quad Plus will need to ensure it does not assume a discourse that is negative to 

China. Such messaging could result in reduced operational access by Indian 

Ocean island states to their territories. The mostly Asian and Pacific focus of the 

Quad Plus is a conceptual limitation of the current format, with less appreciation 

of the entire Indian Ocean region across which island states reside. While the 

Quad Plus can provide health and financial benefit to these states, they are unlikely to engage with US and Quad partners on any strategic cooperation that 

bears an anti-China tone.

Moreover, the absence of US allies France and the United Kingdom from the 

Quad Plus is a missed opportunity.26 Involving these countries, and by extension 

their island territories, would widen the geographic scope of the grouping to include all Indian Ocean islands.

During the past decade, the United States’ thinking about the Indian Ocean 

has evolved significantly and appears likely to continue to do so over the next 

decade. Regardless of which political party is in the White House in 2021, Washington can be expected to emphasize the buildup of capabilities to address rising 

threat perceptions from China. To this end, the United States should continue to 

deepen its alliances and partnerships in the Indo-Pacific, including in the Indian 

Ocean region and its small island states.

Nilanthi Samaranayake

Ms. Samaranayake is Director of the Strategy and Policy Analysis Program at CNA, a nonprofit research organization in Arlington, VA. She has authored numerous publications on Indian Ocean security issues and small states in 

international affairs, including China’s Engagement with Smaller South Asian Countries (U.S. Institute of Peace, 

2019). The views expressed are solely those of the author and not of any organization with which she is affiliated..
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Samaranayake

Notes

1. US Department of State, A Free and Open Indo-Pacific: Advancing a Shared Vision (Washington, DC: Department of State, 4 November 2019), https://www.state.gov/.

2. Sri Lanka Ministry of Foreign Relations, “Minister Dinesh Gunawardena and US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo in Discussions on Matters of Bilateral Interest,” 30 June 2020, 

https://mfa.gov.lk/; US State Department, “Secretary Pompeo’s Call with Sri Lankan Foreign 

Minister Gunawardena,” 29 June 2020, https://www.state.gov/; and Kelum Bandara, “MCC: A 

Matter for the New Parliament to Decide,” Daily Mirror, 2 July 2020, http://www.dailymirror.lk/.

3. Nilanthi Samaranayake, “China’s Engagement with Smaller South Asian Countries,” 

United States Institute of Peace, April 2019, 15–16, https://www.usip.org/.

4. For example, two-thirds of the citizens in Mauritius are thought to be of Indian descent.

5. Matthias Maass, Small States in World Politics: The Story of Small State Survival, 1648-2016

(Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2017).

6. Rory Medcalf and C. Raja Mohan, “Responding to Indo-Pacific Rivalry: Australia, India 

and Middle Power Coalitions,” Lowy Institute, 8 August 2014, https://www.lowyinstitute.org/.

7. Jeanne A. K. Hey, “Introducing Small State Foreign Policy,” in Small States in World Politics: 

Explaining Foreign Policy Behavior, ed. Jeanne A. K. Hey (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 

2003), 2.

8. Anders Wivel, Alyson J.K. Bailes, and Clive Archer, “Setting the Scene: Small States and 

International Security,” in Small States and International Security: Europe and Beyond, ed. Clive 

Archer, Alyson J.K. Bailes, and Anders Wivel (New York: Routledge, 2014), 8–9.

9. Godfrey Baldacchino and Anders Wivel, “Small States: Concepts and Theories,” in Handbook on the Politics of Small States (Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2020), 6.

10. Nilanthi Samaranayake, “Island States in a Region of Great Powers,” in Sea Change: Evolving Maritime Geopolitics in the Indo-Pacific Region, ed. David Michel and Ricky Passarelli (Washington, DC: Stimson Center, December 2014), 61, https://www.stimson.org/.

11. Author’s discussion with a military officer from an Indian Ocean island country, August 2020.

12. Nilanthi Samaranayake, “Asian Basing in Africa: India’s Setback in Seychelles Could Be 

Worse,” India in Transition, 24 September 2018, https://casi.sas.upenn.edu/.

13. Baldacchino and Wivel, “Small States: Concepts and Theories,” 11–12, 14.

14. Naren Prasad, “Small but Smart: Small States in the Global System,” in The Diplomacies of 

Small States: Between Vulnerability and Resilience, ed. Andrew F. Cooper and Timothy M. Shaw 

(New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2013), 43, 51.

15. Mauritius’ Ambassador Jagdish Koonjul’s response to author’s question, “The Future of 

Diego Garcia: Can America Maintain Its ‘Footprint of Freedom?’,” Center for National Interest, 

28 July 2020, https://youtu.be/.

16. Nilanthi Samaranayake, Catherine Lea, Dmitry Gorenburg, Improving U.S.-India HA/DR 

Coordination in the Indian Ocean (Alexandria, VA: CNA, July 2014), https://www.cna.org/.

17. Nilanthi Samaranayake, “Smaller South Asia: Competition for Influence amid COVID-19 

Response,” in The Viral World, ed. Maya Mirchandani, Shoba Suri, Laetitia Bruce Warjri, (New 

Delhi: Observer Research Foundation, June 2020), https://www.orfonline.org/.

18. Kelum Bandara, “Our Independence and Sovereignty: Shouldn’t Be Subjugated by Any 

Major Power - Jayanath Colombage,” Daily Mirror, 28 January 2020, http://www.dailymirror.lk/.

19. Alice G. Wells, “Special Briefing: Alice G. Wells, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary,” 

Department of State, Office of the Spokesperson, 24 January 2020, https://translations.state.gov/.
Indian Ocean Island States and the Quad Plus

JOURNAL OF INDO-PACIFIC AFFAIRS  SPECIAL ISSUE 2020 239

20. Matthew Pottinger, Raisina Dialogue 2020, tweet, New Delhi, 16 January 2020, 

https://twitter.com/.

21. Australian Department of Defence, 2020 Defence Strategic Update, 1 July 2020, 

https://www.defence.gov.au/.

22. Nevertheless, even India did not include Comoros and Madagascar within its Indian 

Ocean Region Division until December 2019, suggesting the evolving attention of this region even for a country that is centrally positioned in the Indian Ocean. Darshana M. Baruah, “India in the Indo-Pacific: New Delhi’s Theater of Opportunity,” Carnegie India, 30 

June 2020, https://carnegieindia.org/.

23. US Department of State, A Free and Open Indo-Pacific.

24. Indian Navy, Ensuring Secure Seas: Indian Maritime Security Strategy - 2015, October 2015, 

https://www.indiannavy.nic.in/.

25. Research and Information System for Developing Countries (RIS), “About AAGC,” 25 

August 2020, https://aagc.ris.org.in/.

26. Nilanthi Samaranayake, “The Coronavirus Crisis Calls for an International Response,” 

National Interest, 14 April 2020, https://nationalinterest.org/.

Disclaimer

The views and opinions expressed or implied in JIPA are those of the authors and should not be construed as carrying the 

official sanction of the Department of Defense, Department of the Air Force, Air Education and Training Command, Air 

University, or other agencies or departments of the US government or their international equivalents.
240 JOURNAL OF INDO-PACIFIC AFFAIRS  SPECIAL ISSUE 2020

 A VIEW FROM THE OTHERS

Connectivity and the Quad Powers

Revisiting History and Thought

Dr. Lavanya Vemsani

Abstract

International relations rest on cooperation in the fields of economy and military, two major aspects of foreign policy. In addition, intellectual policy priorities 

noted in political, social, and cultural spheres form an undercurrent of foreign 

policy that is noted in historical and cultural relations, currently referred to as soft 

power diplomacy. Therefore, states prioritize alliances of like-minded states. Historically international relations took advantage of similarities in cultural, political, 

and economic life in addition to geopolitical strategy. Consequently, this article 

investigates the historical connectivity and maritime relations in the Indian Ocean 

region, extending into the Pacific Ocean, among the Quad countries—India, 

Australia, Japan, and the United States—applying classical Indian theories of 

statecraft. Premodern maritime relations between India to Japan in the Indian 

ocean zone span millennia and are preserved in intangible and tangible heritage, 

including textual and archaeological sources. Civilizational connections spread 

from India to Japan, then on to the United States and Australia, forming a strong 

bond among the Quad nations.

Introduction

The world is approaching an inflection point due to the COVID-19 pandemic, 

resulting in numerous challenges in medical, economic, and political areas that 

currently plague the world. It is possible that the next five years might see tremendous changes in the global economic, political, and social systems. A nation that 

utilizes this transition period prudently to implement a systematic reorganization 

not only in internal affairs but also in external affairs, with focus on the areas of 

economic, social, and political systems, may herald a brighter future in the new 

millennium. This type of opportunity avails itself very infrequently. India’s foreign 

relations contributed to the formation of the Indian Ocean trading system in the 

first millennium, leading to the peace and prosperity of the Indian Ocean zone 

during the first millennium CE until the turn of the second millennium CE.1

However, the second millennium CE brought numerous changes to the world, 

with mercantilist, colonialist, and imperialist phases leading up to the modern 

global world as we know it today.2 The second millennium expanded the world 
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beyond the Pacific rim of the known world. Relations between the Old World 

and the New World led to numerous changes in the world of international policy 

and networks. India seized upon such a global opportunity during the first millennium to emerge as a global leader, and although India faced pushback during 

the second millennium, there seems to be a great opportunity for India to reemerge as a thought leader and economic powerhouse in the new millennium. It 

is for India to prepare and step-up to this challenge.3

As New Delhi is preparing to play a major role in international strategy and 

cooperation in the Indo-Pacific region, it is crucial to take a long and deep look at 

India’s historical relations with its neighbors in the region. This article is divided 

into five sections discussing crucial aspects of the Indo-Pacific relations of India. 

In addition to this introduction and the conclusion, the first section discusses 

classical Indian statecraft based on the principles of the Arthaśāstra, while the 

second section applies classical Indian thought to understand continuing historical and cultural relations between India and other Asian nations, and the third 

and final section discusses the potential for an alliance of like-minded democratic 

nations with strong defense and economic ties among India, the United States, 

Australia, Japan, and many other nations.

Due to India’s strategic location in the Indian Ocean and its geographical, 

political, and cultural ties to several nations in Asia, India brings depth to the 

Quad powers as New Delhi emerges as the strategic partner in this newly 

minted relationship.

The Indian Way: Theoretical Overview from Ancient India

The Indian Way emphasized the value of deeper human relations for internal and 

external happiness of subject peoples rather than focusing on material gains. Internal and external alliances are fostered with a view to increase happiness of the peoples. The major historical relations of India with numerous nations were built on 

human aspirations of the interconnectedness of culture and sharing of knowledge 

established through like-minded cultures finding common ground. In fact, India’s 

earliest historical relations outside of the subcontinent can be traced to the Mauryan era, which relied not only on exchanging gifts and material goods but also on 

sharing thought and culture. Chandragupta, the first Mauryan emperor, negotiated 

a treaty with the Greek general cum emperor Seleucus I Nicator, who founded the 

Seleucid kingdom centered in modern Syria and Iran.4 This treaty involved not only 

clear clauses on defense and economic exchanges but also cultural exchanges and 

the recognition of people-to-people relations between Indians and Greeks.5 These 

international relations based on people-to-people relations and cultural exchanges 

survived longer than the Indian empire that established them and led to peace 
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and prosperity between India and its western neighbors. Therefore, India needs to 

revitalize and nurture relations based on such historical experience rather than 

relying on the present circumstances. Nevertheless, there have been several debacles in the area of international relations in the past two centuries, inherited from 

centuries-long colonial rule. Hence, for New Delhi to reformulate its international relations, it is imperative that India must move beyond colonial constraints 

and past networks. In this effort, a classical understanding of statecraft would 

provide India the necessary direction. While I understand that paradigms laid out 

in ancient classical texts might not be sufficient to formulate state policy in the 

modern era, I definitely believe that the aspects of state in internal and external 

conduct discussed in this article provide the basic frameworks to begin laying a 

stronger outlook for India.

India’s international relations should not rest solely on the present but also should 

draw upon a combination of the nation’s ancient past and changing present circumstances to be effective for a prosperous and peaceful future. Therefore, India must 

adopt a three-pronged strategy for escaping the colonial legacy while simultaneously strengthening internal statehood and bolstering foreign relations. The three 

necessary steps for this are (1) dismantling/withdrawing from colonial organizations to which India is currently a member, (2) fostering people-to-people relations 

with friendly neighbors that share historic ties and cultural relations with India; and 

(3) forming a treaty alliance with like-minded democracies in the Indo-Pacific. The 

first step is long overdue and must be undertaken by the government of India even 

though it might entail a tedious process. The perils and pitfalls of colonial and 

continuing postcolonial membership in some regional organizations is a topic for 

another article, hence I will limit my analysis here to two central points of discussion 

in this article: (1) fostering closer alliances drawing upon historical and cultural relations of India with its neighbors in the Indo-Pacific region, and (2) establishing 

strong international relations with like-minded democracies in the Indo-Pacific, 

while also fostering stronger economic, political, and defense relationships. While 

discussing these two important aspects of international relations from an Indian 

perspective, I will utilize theoretical concepts derived from the Arthaśāstra. In order 

to efficiently perform these three basic steps noted above, India must first develop 

internal and external frameworks to govern its policy of international relations. 

Therefore, this article focuses on examining the classical theoretical frameworks of 

Indian statecraft to analyze India’s external relations.
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Exploring Ancient Indian Texts for a “New” Foundation 

in Foreign Policy

It is only natural that Kauṭilya (also known as Chānakya), the prime minister 

and mentor of Chandragupta Maurya the founder of the first largest Empire of 

India, is the composer of the Arthaśāstra,

6

 the first Indian compendium on statecraft.7

 History places the lives of both Kauṭilya and Chandragupta on an unusual 

path to power and leadership. Chandragupta grew up in the remote forests of the 

Magadha region, where Kauṭilya discovered and mentored him. Kauṭlya was the 

disenfranchised former chief minister and councilor of Mahāpadmānanda, the 

last emperor of the Nanda Empire. Kauṭilya had left his high position with theṭ

Nanda emperor due to differences and began roaming in the forests, eventually 

finding the charming young child, Chandragupta. He nurtured, the boy to be the 

future founder of an empire and an ideal ruler of India, thus laying the foundation 

for the first state based on the ideal combination of the joint efforts of the philosopher and the emperor, extoling the strength of mind and body. It is only natural that the earliest information on state alliances and the proper conduct of states 

comes from the Arthaśāstra. Emperor Priyadarśi, better known as Aśoka the 

Great, grandson of Chandragupta, emulated these strengths and spread the values 

throughout the Mauryan Empire.8 Kauṭilya composed his magnum opus 

Arthaśāstra, derived from received tradition as well as his own experience in statecraft through building a strong and successful empire.

In the Arthaśāstra, Kauṭilya discusses the strengths and weaknesses of enemy 

kingdoms and methods to foster alliances between states with prospective friendly 

states. Books 6 and 7 of the Arthaśāstra discuss sțalient features of kingship and 

international relations.9 Book 6 contains two chapters: “The Elements of Sovereignty” and “Concerning Peace and Exertion.” Book 7 is dedicated to the “Circle 

of Kings” (rājamandala), best rendered in the modern sense as “Circle of States.”10

Another principle framework for the formation of alliances involves the sixfold 

policy (Arthaśāstra, Book 7, Chapter 1, 263, Page 293): peace (sandhi), war (vigraha), neutrality (āsana), marching (yāna), alliance (samsraya), and balancing 

equal powers (dvaidhībhāva, peace with one and waging war against the other). 

Since a state would like to maintain its balance and harmony in relation to its rival 

and friendly nations, it is important to consider features of sixfold policy (peace, 

war, alliance, balancing, marching, and dual policy of war and peace) as important 

features informing the nature of international relations. Books 6 and 7 deserve 

close examination for clear policy purposes on this aspect of interstate relations. 

Even though the Arthaśāstra is an ancient text, it preserves the systematic strategic thought of India’s statecraft. Knowing the basic foundations that guided the 
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Indian state before colonization should serve as guidance for New Delhi to devise 

its own India-centric foreign policy in the light of modern prerequisites.

In Book 6 Chapter 2 (Arthaśāstra, Book 6, Chapter 2, 261, Page 293), Kauṭilya 

defines the strength of the state in three aspects, stressing that “strength is power, 

and happiness is the end.” The three aspects of strength are power of deliberation 

(intellectual strength), prosperous treasury (economic strength), and martial power 

(physical/military strength). When these three are properly cultivated, happiness 

naturally results. New Delhi must focus on developing these three aspects of India’s 

foreign relations to ensure the nation of a strong international position. To do so, 

the Arthaśāstra declares that policy makers’ power of deliberation comes from cultivating relations with nations that are most similar in culture and polity. Next, the 

prosperous treasury comes from favorable trade relations, and Kauṭilya states that 

economics is of the utmost importance among the allied nations. Additionally, 

internal and external security is important for stable relations, and hence alliances 

should also share and execute closer defense ties. Hence, in the modern sense, it is 

important for democratic nations to foster people-to-people relations as a first step 

toward establishing lasting international relations in the areas of economic and 

defense cooperation. Currently referred to as soft power diplomacy, cultural and political similarities and relations are of extreme importance to nurturing strong international relations between nations. Once firm relations are established through 

the power of deliberation between nations of similar polity, the next steps building 

on economic and defense relation will follow with certainty.

In this article I will apply the most important concepts of the Arthaśāstra, namely, 

the sixfold policy and the circle of states, to the formation of alliances with India 

as the locus of activity for the derivative alliances, which may also benefit the Quad 

alliance. While the Circe of States policy is based on location and history and 

culture, the sixfold policy prioritizes alliances based on war and peace.

Alliances of Location and Culture: History and Continuity

Alliances based on geographical closeness and cultural affinity are not new to 

Asia, especially in the Indian Ocean zone. The South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations 

(ASEAN) are the modern equivalents of similar alliances based on geographical 

and cultural closeness. These alliances are fostered to provide fruitful trade relations and provide a certain measure of peace, as many nations sharing borders also 

possess concerns that might sometimes lead to battles. Fostering relations and 

providing normalized opportunities to meet at regular intervals might provide a 

platform to negotiate regional issues between the neighboring nations.
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Over the past decade, India has been closely monitoring and strongly entrenching itself in the Indo-Pacific paradigm, instituting the Look East policy and cultivating relations with nations throughout the region with a view to taking advantage 

of existing historical relations.11 India, like many other democratic nations in the 

Indo-Pacific, continues to cherish its historical culture. Hence, for New Delhi, 

nurturing economic and defense relations with like-minded nations in the IndoPacific would help bolster India’s role in the world, especially in the region. I will 

discuss below the relations between India and other regional nations, beginning by 

applying the Arthaśāstra paradigm on external policy.

Relations on the northwestern borders of India are precarious and increasingly 

volatile. Pakistan, previously part of India, is a border state, but the past 75 years 

have separated India and Pakistan, with the bilateral relationships seemingly 

consistently deteriorating.12 Therefore, on its northwestern borders, India is compelled to consider cultivating relations further afield, with nations such as 

Ukraine, Georgia, and Armenia along with Afghanistan, rather than competing 

for relationships and resources with Pakistan, which has cordial international 

relations with the other major geopolitical power in the region: China. This further complicates New Delhi’s geopolitical concerns along India’s northeastern 

borders. India’s relations with Himalayan states—including Bhutan, Tibet, and 

Nepal—are very close and remain strategically important for India.13 These relations are even more important because Pakistan occupies a strategic portion of 

Kashmir (Gilgit-Baltistan) and China14 occupies another portion (Aksai Chin) 

and seems intent on expanding its territory at India’s expense. To balance these 

northern border concerns, India must develop other strategic relationships in the 

Indo-Pacific. Therefore, India’s Indo-Pacific strategy acquires vital strategic magnitude—not only for India but also for the entire region.

India maintained close relations with Southeast Asian states during the first 

millennium, which brought immense prosperity to the region.15 I will examine 

below relations of India in the Indian Ocean region, applying the Arthaśāstra

policies of the circle of states and sixfold policy as a backdrop for the emerging 

Indo-Pacific alliance, the Quad, and how this may affect the region in the light of 

classical Indian thought on statecraft.

On India’s southeastern borders, New Delhi maintains cordial relations with 

Sri Lanka and Bangladesh. In addition, India should also focus on cultivating 

better relations with Myanmar, Thailand, and Cambodia, extending throughout 

the region of Southeast Asia. International relations with these eastern states are 

closer to the heart for India, given the long-standing historical networks and 

cultural contacts among these nations and India. Beginning with Aśoka, maritime 

trade routes from India’s east coast extended throughout the Indian Ocean and 
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into the Pacific. Malaysia and Indonesia may have changed their culture over the 

past two centuries; however, many cultural and historical connections with India 

remain, and it is in the best interests of New Delhi to cultivate and foster closer 

relations with these states as well as those of the many Pacific Islander nations.

In Chapter 6 of the Arthaśāstra, Kauṭilya declares that a state should divide its 

neighbors into four categories: (1) the conqueror’s circle of states, (2) the enemy’s 

circle of states, (3) the madhyama (median) king’s circle of states, and (4) the 

neutral king’s circle of states, based on the nature of the state and the power of its 

army and economy (Arthaśāstra, Book 6, Chapter 2, Verse 261, Pages 292–93). 

Additionally, one must also take note of the strategic location of the neighboring 

states with regards to shared borders. Kauṭilya declares those sharing borders 

must automatically be considered as enemy states (Book 6, Chapter 2, Verse 260, 

Page 292).16 However, Mauryan India expanded beyond its original borders 

within a few decades of the composition of the Arthaśāstra, with Emperor Aśoka 

sending “Missions of Friendship” to states located much farther from his empire. 

This vision led to India’s lead in maritime trade in the classical world. This shows 

that India understood the strategic importance of cultivating relations with nations further afield. This aspect seems equally important in the modern world, 

particularly given that India finds hostile states along much of its borders.

The Arthaśāstra provides frameworks to classify friendly nations and enemy 

nations into categories. Since, our focus in this article is on the friendly nations, I 

will focus on classifying those. If we were to apply this rule of classifying nations 

based on its relations, it would result in a three-layered compendium of states that 

could lean in favor of India within the Indian Ocean region, which may also help 

establish lasting peace within the region. As such New Delhi’s responsibility to 

maintain peace in the region is oversized, as is the role of its alliances in the region. Thus, this is an important aspect of India’s external relations. To maintain 

peace, any state needs to know its position relative to its neighboring states and to 

be able to classify them into the three categories according to the Arthaśāstra: 

enemy, median state, and neutral (Arthaśāstra, Book 6, Chapter 2, Verse 261). If 

New Delhi were to take note of the circles of states in its near vicinity in the light 

of emerging aggression of China in the Indo-Pacific region, India might also help 

devise future strategies of deterrence to maintain the overall stability of the region.

The first category defined by the Arthaśāstra is a state’s own circle of friendly 

states. The Arthaśāstra (Book 6, Chapter 2, Verse 261) notes further that historical alliance derived from ancestors as well as alliances of a state situated in 

the immediate vicinity of the enemy is a natural friend.17 This immediately 

places Sri Lanka, the Philippines,18 Singapore,19 and Vietnam20 as natural 

friends for India, due to their location close to China and their ongoing disputes 
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with China concerning marine and land borders and resources, in addition to 

India’s historically solid relations with these countries. The Philippines has recently seen South China Sea disputes with China, which pushed Manila away 

from its previous alliances moving ever closer to the United States and Japan. 

Other island nations with similar considerations are Japan21 and Australia,22

which are already members of the Quad. Along with these nations, which are 

allied with the United States,23 the Quad represents an alliance of like-minded 

nations, a close circle of states, which the Arthaśāstra terms as a state’s own 

circle of friends. India’s circle of friends in the Indian Ocean zone with continuing historical ties are undoubtedly the island nations surrounding India, i.e., Sri 

Lanka24 and Indonesia.25 India maintains close cultural, trade, and social ties 

with these nations through trade and travel agreements.

The second category of states noted in the Arthaśāstra is the median state, which 

is defined as having a territory close to the first country and its adversary and is 

thus capable of helping either state in war or peace or resisting either of them individually.26 Although none of the states located between China and India are 

nuclear powers and hence not strong enough to defend against these nations individually, they do participate in alliances with both nations to maintain the balance 

of power. Some of the states that may qualify to be added to this list are Malaysia 

and Laos. Bangladesh could be added to this category for its shifting allegiances in 

recent years. Bangladesh is participating in China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) 

and is moving closer to China in doing so, while India opposes the BRI. India 

maintains cordial relations with Bangladesh as a counterweight to Indo-Pakistan 

relations.27 At this juncture India’s relations with Myanmar may also take a new 

turn, as relations with Bangladesh acquire a new, deeper geopolitical significance.

The third category of state noted in the Arthaśāstra is the neutral state, which is 

defined as a nation situated beyond the territory of the opposing states, is very 

powerful, and is capable of helping either of the opposing states and the median 

states, either together or individually.28 Considering the efforts of these states to 

maintain neutrality as well as their location within the Indo-China region, these 

following Southeast Asian states include Myanmar,29 Thailand,30 and Cambodia.31

At best, each of the states has played a limited role in the region in contemporary 

developments, especially in relation to India.

As discussed above, the three categories of alliances of nations based on location 

and historical relations provide a clear vision to evolve further policy. However, the 

Arthaśāstra also discusses the sixfold policy to precisely know the disposition of 

each state in relation to one’s own state in times of peace and war. Satisfying four 

of the aspects (two positive aspects and two neutral aspects) of the sixfold policy 
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may lead to conditions of peace/harmony, while satisfying four of the aspects including negative aspects of the sixfold policy may lead to war/disturbance.

The sixfold policy, as envisioned by Kauṭilya, involves “the agreement with 

pledges is peace; offensive operation is war, indifference is neutrality; making 

preparations is marching; seeking protection of another is alliance; making peace 

with one and waging war with another is termed dual policy” (emphasis added). 

Application of sixfold policy may slightly change the relationship equations between the nations discussed in the preceding pages. All the nations that have 

agreements of peace and abide by rules of peace are in first relationship bound by 

peace treaties. India’s allies across the world fall into this first category. The second 

is the relationship of offensive or war, which denotes the nations that are in offensive relationships and currently waging wars, which quickly brings Pakistan 

and China to mind—both of which are currently waging wars with India, even 

though not openly. The third is indifference noted by neutrality. This relationship 

is maintained with noninvolvement, and hence any nations that do not have treaties of peace or war fall into this category. Most of the nations in Southeast Asia 

may fall into this category. However, this also indicates that the neutral nations 

can be approached to conclude peace treaties if deemed necessary. The fourth relationship denoted by making preparations, called marching, which means that a 

nation is preparing to go to war. This may only involve provocative alliances with 

enemy nations but with no direct actions. This brings into focus nations that are 

recently conducting joint defense exercises or alliances with nations negatively 

disposed toward India. This brings into focus some nations that are joining forces 

and forming alliances with Pakistan and China. The fifth is seeking protection of 

another, called alliance. The nations that are seeking protection while geographically located in proximity with India are friendly nations of India in the region, 

noted in the first circle of states above. However, India should take note of any 

nations seeking alliances with opposing nations in the region. The last and sixth 

relationship of a nation is maintaining balance, which is waging war with one 

while maintaining peace with another is considered dual policy. Currently, many 

nations sharing borders with India are maintaining balance through dual policy. 

For example, Pakistan wages war with India, while maintaining peace with other 

neighbors. Similarly, Bangladesh maintains peace with India, while dealing with 

its cross-border issues with Myanmar. Other nations—including Vietnam and 

the Philippines— also follow a dual policy in their international relations.

Due to these historical relations and cultural connectivity, India’s solid relations 

with Southeast Asian nations could form the bedrock of any Indo-Pacific alliance. 

India’s established international relations with Southeast Asian nations as well as 

other Central Asian nations places India in an immensely crucial strategic position. 
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Therefore, as New Delhi develops external relations with like-minded democratic 

nations of the modern world—such as the United States, Australia, and Japan—

India brings much to the Quad in terms of soft power and economic relations. 

These are attributes lacking in the other members of the grouping due to colonial 

and wartime legacies associated with their history and relations to Asia.

The goal of this section is to establish the historical connectivity and robust 

activity of India in connection within the Indian Ocean region due to its historical and geographical connectivity. As a nation with such deep connectivity and 

alliances, India is poised to contribute to the Quad immensely as well as influence 

regional policy within the Indian Ocean region.

Once the nature of alliances with other nations is established based on the principles of the Arthaśāstra—namely, the circle of states and sixfold policy—the state 

should exert itself to apply and derive the three aspects of strength (intellectual, 

economic, and military/defense) noted in the Arthaśāstra (Book 6, Chapter 2, Verse 

261),32 which results in the greater good of the subjects and increasing their happiness. First, the state should strive to establish fruitful intellectual relations with 

other nations through clear channels of communication along with people-topeople relations promoting educational and cultural exchanges. Second, the state 

should bolster the economy by fostering strong trade and commercial treaties that 

facilitate brisk trade in goods and products among the allies. Third, the state should 

form strong military alliances with allied nations promoting defense and security 

of all the involved nations. Defense is the most important aspect of strength and 

should include treaties on arms, training, and sharing of security risks. Strengthening of these three aspects should ensure internal and external strength of one’s own 

state as well as those of the allies simultaneously.

International relations can be inconsistent and unpredictable. However, applying frameworks such as the principle of circle of states and sixfold policy could 

help alleviate some of the uncertainty if stronger international relations and human bonds could be nurtured leading to long-lasting relations. Relations derived 

from circle of states and sixfold policy must inform future policy formulations 

guiding like-minded alliances propelled by overarching values shared by all members of an alliance. In the light of the grim prospects for world peace in recent 

years, this policy framework acquires enormous significance in the twenty-first 

century. Consequently, clear policy paradigms need to be laid down for nations 

forming alliances to be impactful in the future.

Alliance of Like-minded Nations

Previously, India has been a member of several regional and international organizations, some of which were plagued by the trappings of colonialism and/or 
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proved inadequate to serve the interests of India.33 Any association dictated by 

geographic proximity and colonial inheritance rather than political, social, and 

economic ideals is bound to fail in the face of crisis. For example, this is aptly 

demonstrated in the recent failure of the SAARC.34 This is to be expected. As 

noted in the Arthaśāstra, nations sharing physical borders are automatically 

deemed enemies (Book 6, Chapter 2, Verse 260, Page 292). Plagued by multiple 

internal and external terror threats and border disputes, SAARC cannot progress 

beyond basic economic cooperation among members. Half the member nations of 

this group are linked solely by geographical proximity and continue to struggle 

with internal terrorist organizations, while some are still struggling to establish 

democratic states in the face of military interference. Under these precarious circumstances, it is imperative that India develop an alternative geopolitical strategic 

alliance. India is the largest democracy in this group of nations, and hence requires 

secure defense and economic ties with other powerful nations that will help stabilize the Indo-Pacific.

As a member of the Quad, India should consider evolving its sphere of influence in the Indian Ocean region to balance the conundrum of the northern borders, with conciliatory alliances on the southern borders. New Delhi, if it plans to 

be a member of an association for economic and defense cooperation, should look 

toward the Indian Ocean and beyond. India should take the lead in developing an 

international treaty alliance that includes East African nations and other states in 

the Indian Ocean economic zone with the nations located closer to India in the 

eastern Indian Ocean, western Pacific Ocean, and Oceania. Asia needs a powerful 

regional association of cooperation, and India is the only large, successful democracy of the region that could spearhead such an effort. This organization of likeminded nations should cooperate not only in trade but also in military and defense 

strategy, jointly developing techniques to counter terrorist and military threats in 

the Indo-Pacific. Outside the region, New Delhi should take advantage of the 

changing international strategic balance of power in foreign relations by building 

more trustworthy relations far beyond India’s physical borders. This would serve 

the dual purpose of balancing regional strategy and establishing India’s position 

in international fora.

According to Kauṭilya, the circle of states is established following consideration of 

several factors such as a state’s political, cultural, economic, and defense capabilities in 

addition to its natural location. If New Delhi can find nations that are analogous to 

India in political, cultural, economic, and defense capabilities, it would be an asset for 

the resulting circle of states (perhaps the Quad) to become a truly influential force in 

world affairs. History has established that the alliances between like-minded states 

remain the most influential in international cooperation. Alliances formed due to 
Connectivity and the Quad Powers

JOURNAL OF INDO-PACIFIC AFFAIRS  SPECIAL ISSUE 2020 251

like-mindedness in economic and political nature have longevity; therefore, India 

should seek support among the democratic nations of Asia and beyond. Hence, the 

current Quad alliance of nations emerging in the Indo-Pacific and encircling the 

globe will have phenomenal influence in shaping the world.

Emerging Quad: Strategic Alliance of Democracies 

in the Indo-Pacific

Japan is an economic, and potentially military, powerhouse in the Pacific. Australia straddles the Indian and Pacific Oceans and possesses significant political, 

military, and economic wealth. The United States—by virtue of its western border, 

its territories in the Pacific Ocean, and its bases throughout the region—is an 

Indo-Pacific nation. These democratic nations possess flourishing economies, robust militaries, and significant diplomatic relations with India and throughout the 

Indo-Pacific. It is in the interest of the four nations to cultivate closer economic 

and defense relations.

The Quad represents the democratic values of free and open societies held by the 

four member nations. The frameworks of alliances outlined and discussed in section 1 of this article—that of the political, cultural similarity, and closer alliance in 

economic and defense affairs to bring world peace—are at the core of the Quad 

initiative. The articles in this issue discuss the role of the Quad alliance with other 

international organizations and nations across the world. My focus in this article 

has been to analyze the strength of each of the participant nations within the 

framework of the circle of states (Arthaśāstra, Book 6, Chapter 2, Verse 261, Paged 

292–293) and the sixfold policy of the Arthaśāstra (Book 7, Chapter 1, Verse 263, 

Page. 295). The sixfold policy, as envisioned by Kauṭilya, involves “the agreement 

with pledges is peace; offensive operation is war, indifference is neutrality; making 

preparations is marching; seeking protection of another is alliance; making peace 

with one and waging war with another is termed dual policy.” These six policies 

form part of any alliance. However, in a large alliance of nations, at least four of the 

six elements must be satisfied. A quick examination of the Quad alliance and other 

major nations reveals that these six elements are satisfied, which provides hope that 

this alliance might help the peaceful prospects of the future world. For the Quad 

nations, peace, neutrality, marching, and alliance are naturally met, as the Quad by 

nature of its alliance is charged with maintaining the four aspects of the sixfold 

policy. However, due to the nature of the geopolitical issues facing Indo-Pacific 

region, the Quad is also faced with war and the dual policy of making peace with 

one and waging war with another as a precursor to maintaining geopolitical balance, so that the conditions might not deteriorate further.
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Vemsani

The Quad Plus posits positive prospects for member nations, meeting the majority of the elements of the sixfold policy, and, hence, the alliance purports a 

strong bond for peace through balance of powers. Other articles in this issue examine the relation of Quad nations with other unallied nations and groupings, 

including, the ASEAN, the United Kingdom, South Korea, Israel, France, Russia, 

Middle Eastern nations, and others, gauging their reactions to the development 

of the Quad and assessing the likelihood of these nations joining and expanded 

Quad Plus construct. It is important that prospective members in the Quad Plus 

be capable of satisfying at least four or five elements of the sixfold policy in their 

relations with at least one of the members of the Quad. Theoretically, this helps 

secure peace and stability in the world according to the classical frameworks of 

Kauṭilya’s circle of states as outlined in this article.

Conclusions and Prospects: From India to the Americas, and 

Everything in Between

This article discussed three important aspects of India’s international relations—

the historical antecedents and theoretical views, classical Indian international relations, and modern international alliances—and the way forward. First, it discussed 

the foundational thought of Indian international relations and national defense 

based on one of the world’s earliest texts on statecraft. Second, the article delved 

into classical Indian relations established since the third century BCE, their current 

status, and their continued influence on regional relations and communication. 

Third, the article addressed the theoretical perspectives from ancient India on the 

necessity of building alliances with like-minded nations in the fields of diplomacy, 

economy, and defense and the impact such a perspective offers in understanding the 

emerging Quad alliance in the Indo-Pacific.

An examination of classical theories, cultural connections, and historical alliances 

helps us analyze the future prospective alliances of the region. Based on the theoretical perspective provided in the Arthaśāstra, which highlights the importance of 

natural location; cultural, economic, and defense perspectives; and the practice of 

international relations as essential elements of successful alliances between nations, 

the goals of such alliances are lasting peace and prosperity—bringing happiness to 

the people of the allied nations. The Quad initiative is extensive, spanning much of 

the globe, embracing constituent nations that are modern democracies, and representing a large percentage of the world’s population. Hence, the success of the Quad 

would bring hope to the region for lasting peace.
Connectivity and the Quad Powers

JOURNAL OF INDO-PACIFIC AFFAIRS  SPECIAL ISSUE 2020 253

Dr. Lavanya Vemsani

Dr. Vemsani is an award-winning scholar and professor of history specializing in Indian history and religions 

in the Department of Social Sciences at Shawnee State University, Portsmouth, Ohio. She holds two doctorates in the subjects of religious studies (McMaster University) and history (University of Hyderabad). She 

was awarded the Distinguished Teaching Award, Research Professor Award, and the South Asia Council of 

the Canadian Asian Studies Association’s (SACA/CASA) Best Thesis Honorable Mention prize for her PhD 

thesis at McMaster University.

Her research and teaching interests are varied, and multifold. She researches and publishes on subjects of ancient history and religions as well as current affairs and history of India. Her books include Modern Hinduism in 

Text and Context; Krishna in History, Thought, and Culture: Encyclopedia of the Hindu Lord of Many Names; and 

Hindu and Jain Mythology of Balarama. She is the editor-in-chief the International Journal of Indic Religions, and a 

member of the review panel of the Journal of Indo-Pacific Affairs and the Canadian Journal of History. She is the 

current vice-president and president-elect of the Ohio Academy of History (2018–2020).

Acknowledgments: I thank Dr. Ernest Gunasekara-Rockwell for his valuable advice on earlier drafts of this article. My deepest gratitude to the editors and reviewers without whose help 

this article might not have been possible. An earlier version of this paper was presented at the 

“Human Rights and Human Dignity Rooted in the Four Dharmic Traditions” at the University of South Florida, Tampa, Florida, 12–14 October 2018.

Notes

1. Referred to as Southernization, the first millennial development and movement of goods and 

population is well-noted in world history. See Lynda Shaffer, “Southernization,” Journal of World 

History 5 , no. 1 (Spring 1994): 1–21.

2. Referred to as Westernization, this heralds the next major change in the world, leading up to 

the global world. See Serge Latouche, Western Civilization: Significance, Scope, and Limits of the 

Drive Towards Uniformity (Paris: Polity, 1996).

3. Indraprasad G. Patel, “The World Economy in 2020: The Rise of India,” Business Strategy 

Review 6, no. 3 (1995): 63–81.

4. William Woodthorpe Tarn, Greeks in Bactria and India (Cambridge: Cambridge University 

Press, 2010).

5. Radha Kumud Mookherjee, Chandragupta Maurya and His Times (reprint 1966, Delhi: 

Motilal Banarsidas, 1988).

6. Patrick Olivelle, King, Governance, and Law in Ancient India: Kauṭilya’s Arthaśāstra (Oxford: 

Oxford University Press, 2013); and Thomas Trautman, Kauṭilya and the Arthaśāstra: A Statistical 

Investigation of the Authorship and Evolution of the Text (Leiden, Netherlands: Brill, 1971).

7. Rosalind Lefeber, “The Minister Chanakya from Parisishtaparvan of Hemachandra,” in The 

Clever Adulteress and Other Stories: A Treasury of Jaina Literature, ed. Phyllis Granoff (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidas, 1993): 201–15

8. Radha Kumud Mookerji, Ashoka (New Delhi: Motilal Banarsidas, 1962); and Romila 

Thapar, Ashoka and the Decline of Mauryas (Oxford: Oxford Univerisity Press, 1961).
254 JOURNAL OF INDO-PACIFIC AFFAIRS  SPECIAL ISSUE 2020

Vemsani

9. R. Shama Shastry, Kauṭilya’s Arthaśāstra, 8th ed. (Mysore: Mysore Printing and Publishing 

House, 1967). Kauṭilya is also known by two other names: Chanakya and Vishnugupta. All references in this article are to this volume of the Arthaśāstra unless otherwise specified.

10. I use the word state in this paper to refer to the nation/king of the Arthaśāstra, since this 

article is primarily concerned with statecraft in the twenty-first century dealing with nation-states 

and not with kings or kingdoms.

11. Atul Sarma and Saswati Choudhury. Mainstreaming the Northeast in India’s Look and Act 

East Policy. (Palgrave Macmillan, 2018).

12. Abhinav Pandya, “The Future of Indo-Pak Relations after the Pulwama Attack,” Perspectives on Terrorism 13. no. 2 (2019): 65–68; and Zahid Yousuf, Haroon Elahi, and Malik Adnan, 

“War and Peace Framing: The Contextual Analysis of Indo-Pak Relations,” Strategic Studies 38, 

no. 1 (2018): 128–44.

13. Lavanya Vemsani, “The Himalayas in the Economic, Social and Military Conflict in Asia,” 

in The Economics of Conflict in South Asia: Causes, Implications & Solutions, ed. Matthew J. Webb 

and Albert Wijeweera (London: Palgrave McMilan, 2014), 171–91.

14. Dalbir Ahlawat and Lindsay Hughes, “India-China Stand-off in Doklam: Aligning Realism with National Characteristics,” Round Table 107, no. 5 (October 2018): 613–25.

15. Nicholas Tarling, Cambridge History of Southeast Asia, vol. 1: From Early Times to 1800

(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999); and George Coedes. Indianized States of Southeast Asia. (Hawaii: University of Hawaii, 1968).

16. The king who is situated anywhere immediately on the circumference of the conqueror’s 

territory is termed as the enemy.

17. “He whose friendship is derived from father and grandfather, and who is situated close to 

the territory of the immediate enemy of the conqueror is a natural friend; while he whose friendship is courted for self-maintenance is an acquired friend.”

18. Satu Limaye, “India-East Asia Relations: Rebalancing Indian Style,” Comparative Connections: A Triannual E-Journal on East Asian Bilateral Relations, 16, no. 1(2014): 155–67; Satu Limaye, 

“India-East Asia Relations: A Full Year of ‘Acting East’,” Comparative Connections 17, no. 3(2016): 

153–65; Sheldon Simon, “US-Southeast Asia Relations: South China Sea Wariness,” Comparative 

Connections 17, no.1 (2015): 45–56; and Sheldon Simon, “US-Southeast Asia Relations: Philippines: An Exemplar of the US Rebalance,” Comparative Connections: A Triannual E-Journal on East 

Asian Bilateral Relations 15, no. 2 (2013): 51–59.

19. Sinderpal Singh and Syeda Rahman, “India-Singapore Relations: Constructing a ‘New’ 

Bilateral Relationship,” Contemporary Southeast Asia 32, no. 1 (2010): 70–97; Yogaananthan S/O 

Theva and Rahul Mukherji, “India-Singapore Bilateral Relations (1965–2012): The Role of GeoPolitics, Ideas, Interests, and Political Will,” India Review 14, no. 4 (2015): 419–39; Gunjan Malhotra and Ratna Vadra, “India Singapore Trade—A Paradigm Shift,” Paradigm 1, no. 17 (2013): 

54–66; David Brewster, “India’s security partnership with Singapore,” Pacific Review  22, no. 5 

(2019): 597–618; and Ajaya Kumar Das, “India’s Defense-Related Agreements with ASEAN 

States: A Timeline,” India Review 12, no. 3 (2013): 130–33.

20. Le Thi Hang Nga, “India-Vietnam relations since September 2016: from the symbolic to 

practical results,” China Report 53, no. 3 (2017): 400–08; Press Trust of India, “India, Vietnam to 

Reinforce Co-Operation in Atomic Energy, Security and Defence,”  FRPT- Energy Snapshot

(2019): 9–11; Pranav Kumar, India-Vietnam Economic Relations. IPCS Special Reports, 57 (2008), 

1–8; Ngo Xuan Binh, “Vietnam–India Economic Ties,” China Report 52, no. 2 (2016): 112–28.
Connectivity and the Quad Powers

JOURNAL OF INDO-PACIFIC AFFAIRS  SPECIAL ISSUE 2020 255

21. Titli Basu. “India-Japan Vision 2025: Deciphering the Indo-Pacific Strategy.” Indian Foreign Affairs Journal 13, no. 3 ( July 2018): 242–55.

22. Priya Chacko and Alexander E. Davis, “The Natural/Neglected Relationship: Liberalism, 

Identity and India–Australia Relations,” Pacific Review 30, no. 1 ( January 2017): 26–50; Anup 

Shekhar Chakraborty, “India-Australia Relations: Evolving Polycentric World Order,” Indian 

Foreign Affairs Journal 12, no. 4 (October 2017): 362–64; Claudia Astarita, “Japan, India and Australia: Is This ‘Anti-China’ Alliance Feasible?,” Strategic Impact 45, no. 4 (December 2012): 31–41; 

and William T. Tow and Kin Wah Chin, ASEAN, India, and Australia : Towards Closer Engagement in a New Asia (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2009).

23. Nish Acharya, The India-US Partnership: $1 Trillion by 2030 (New Delhi: Oxford University 

Press, 2016); Vinay Kaura, “India-US Relations: From Distant Partners to an Alliance,” Parameters 

48, no. 3 (September 2018): 37–46; Stephen F. Burgess, “The Evolution of India-US Relations and 

India’s Grand Strategy,” Revista UNISCI, no. 49 (1 January 2019): 79–102; Satu Limaye, “India-US 

Relations: Seeking to Sustain the New Normal,” Comparative Connections 15, no. 1 (January 2014): 

137–45; Dhruva Jaishankar, “Making Sense of Uncertain India-US Relations,” Indian Foreign Affairs Journal 12, no. 1 ( January 2017): 10–15; and Karen M. Walker. “Narratives of Engagement in 

US - Indian Relations: A Look Back at the US-India 123 Agreement Debate,” Hague Journal of 

Diplomacy 11, no. 1 (2016): 49–77.

24. N.N. Jha, “India-Srilanka Relations,” India Quarterly 50, no. 1/2 (1994): 53–62; Nitin A. 

Gokhale, “India and Sri Lanka need to do ‘Much More’,” Indian Foreign Affairs Journal 14, no. 1 

(2019): 24–29; and P.K. Sudarsan, “Movement of Natural Persons and Free Trade Agreements: 

India’s Prospects,” Journal of International Economics 4, no. 1 (2013), 63–72.

25. Ristian Atriandi Supriyanto, “Indonesia and India: Toward a Convergent Mandala,” India 

Review 12, no. 3 ( July 2013): 207–24; Vibhanshu Shekhar, “India and Indonesia: Reliable Partners in an Uncertain Asia,” Asia-Pacific Review 17, no. 2 (November 2010): 76–98; and Ted Osius, 

“Global Swing States: Deepening Partnerships with India and Indonesia,” Asia Policy 17 ( January 

2014): 67–92.

26. “The king who occupies a territory close to both and the conqueror and his immediate 

enemy in front and who is capable of helping both the kings, weather united or disunited, or of 

resisting either of them individually is termed a Madhyama king.” Arthaśāstra, Book 6, Chapter 2, 

Verse 261.

27. Eajaj Ahmed Chowdhury, “Asymmetry in Indo-Bangladesh Relations,” Asian Affairs 40, 

no. 2 (2013): 83–103; Sahana Ghosh, “‘Everything Must Match’: Detection, Deception, and 

Migrant Illegality in the India‐ Bangladesh Borderlands,” American Anthropologist 121, no. 4 

(2019): 870–83; Md. Abul Kashem and Md. Shariful Islam, “Narendra Modi’s Bangladesh Policy 

and India–Bangladesh Relations: Challenges and Possible Policy Responses,” India Quarterly 72, 

no. 3 (September 2016): 250–67; and “Joint Declaration between Bangladesh and India during 

Visit of Prime Minister of India to Bangladesh, (2015),” Indian Foreign Affairs Journal 10, no. 3 

(2016): 239–54.

28. “He who is situated beyond the territory of any of the above kings, and who is very powerful and capable of the helping the enemy, the conqueror, or the median king, together or individually, or of resisting any of them individually, is a neutral king (udasina)—these are the twelve primary kings.” “The conqueror, his friend, and his friend’s friend are the three primary kings 

constituting a circle of states.” Arthaśāstra, Book 2, Chapter 6, Verse 261. The primary kings are 

explained as (1) conqueror’s circle of states, (2) enemy kings circle of states, (3) median king’s 
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Vemsani

circle of states, and (4) the neutral king’s circle of states, with each circle containing three states/

kings. R. Shama Sastry, Arthaśāstra. Op. cit. footnote, page 293.

29. Priya Chacko and Alexander E. Davis, “Myanmar and India,” European Journal of East 

Asian Studies 14, no. 2 (2015): 124–43; Pierre Gottschlich, “New Developments in India: Myanmar Bilateral Relations?,” Journal of Current Southeast Asian Affairs 34, no. 2 (2015): 139–63; 

Akkas Ahamed, Mohammad Alam Chowdhury, and Sayedur Rahman, “Bangladesh-Myanmar 

Border Relations: A Study of Some Geopolitical and Economic Issues,” European Scientific Journal 16, no. 22 (2020): 320–51; and Mohammad Janesar and Rajesh Sahu, “The Role of Indian 

Diaspora: A Look at India-Myanmar Relations,” IUP Journal of International Relations 13, no. 3 

(2019): 53–67.

30. Lipi Ghosh, India-Thailand Cultural Interactions: Glimpses from the Past to Present. (London: Springer, 2017); “India-Thailand Road Link to Be a Reality Soon, the India-MyanmarThailand Motor Vehicles Aggrement (MVA) Is to Be Signed Soon,” FRPT- Infrastructure Snapshot, 25 July 2016, 29–30; and P. Sundar Raj and B. Ambrose, “Prospects of Emerging 

Comprehensive Economic Cooperation Agreement between India and Thailand,” Language in 

India 14, no. 1 ( January 2014): 678–90.

31. Bradley J. Murg, “Cooling Us-Cambodia Relations: The Incentivization Argument and Its 

Errors,” PacNet Newsletter, no. 58 (21 October 2020): 1–3; Zhao Hong, “India and China: Rivals 

or Partners in Southeast Asia?,” Contemporary Southeast Asia 29, no. 1 (April 2007): 121–42; Harsh 

V. Pant “Rising China in India’s Vicinity: A Rivalry Takes Shape in Asia,” Cambridge Review of 

International Affairs 29, no. 2 ( June 2016): 364–81; Faizal Yahya, “India and Southeast Asia: Revisited,” Contemporary Southeast Asia 25, no. 1 (April 2003): 79–103; and Jürgen Rüland and Arndt 

Michael, “Overlapping Regionalism and Cooperative Hegemony: How China and India Compete in South and Southeast Asia,” Cambridge Review of International Affairs 32, no. 2 (April 

2019): 178–200.

32. “Each of the twelve primary kings shall have their elements of sovereignty, power and end. 

Strength is power and happiness is the end. Strength is of three kinds: power of deliberation is intellectual strength; the possession of a prosperous treasury and a strong army is the strength of sovereignty; and martial power is physical strength.” I use the terms intellectual strength, economic 

strength, and military strength/defense capability to denote these three important aspects determining the strength of the state in modern sense.

33. My thoughts on a number of these issues were previously published on the blog Manthratalk: The First Word, http://manthratalk.blogspot.com/ and Lavanya Vemsani, “India’s Foreign 

Policy Needs to Escape the Legacy of Colonial Entanglements,” New World Order, https://www 

.newworldorder.today/.

34. Jayanth Jacob and Anil Giri, “SAARC Summit Collapses after India and Three Other 

Members Pull Out,” Hindustan Times, 29 September 2016, https://www.hindustantimes.com/; 

and Rajiv Kumar and Omita Goel, Thirty Years of SAARC: Society, Culture, and Development (New 

Delhi: Sage Publications, 2016).

Disclaimer

The views and opinions expressed or implied in JIPA are those of the authors and should not be construed as carrying 

the official sanction of the Department of Defense, Department of the Air Force, Air Education and Training Command, 

Air University, or other agencies or departments of the US government or their international equivalents
JOURNAL OF INDO-PACIFIC AFFAIRS  SPECIAL ISSUE 2020 257

 A VIEW FROM THE OTHERS

Realistic Expectations

The China Factor in the Australia–US Perspective

on the Indo-Pacific

Dr. Amit Gupta

Abstract

Over the past two decades, Australia has developed a strong economic relationship with China which has led to an unprecedented economic growth and 

prosperity in Australia. Australia believed it could balance between its economic 

relationship with China and its political-military relationship with the United 

States but with the escalation of the conflict of interests between the United 

States and China such a strategy of hedging may no longer be possible. Further, 

Australia can ill-afford a reduction in its economic ties with China and, despite 

the rhetoric from Canberra, this will constrain Australian behavior. This article 

discusses how, given the economic constraint, Australia and the United States 

can shape a new perspective on the Indo-Pacific.

Introduction

The United States views Australia as one of its most important allies in the 

Indo-Pacific and Canberra is part of both the Five Eyes intelligence sharing arrangement as well as one of the nations in the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue. 

Australian analysts also point out that Australia has been a staunch ally that has 

regularly gone to war alongside the United States, and, since World War II, Canberra has seen Washington as the principal guarantor of its security. This article 

argues that Australia’s economic dependency on China makes it difficult for Canberra to remain the type of ally it was to the United States during the Cold War. 

Instead, Australian official statements have spoken of China as the country’s primary economic partner and the United States as Australia’s primary strategic 

partner, suggesting that Canberra can navigate successfully between the two relationships. Based on this approach, Australia has sought to join the Regional 

Comprehensive Economic Partnership, in which China is the dominant economic 

partner, even while Canberra, under its current prime minister, Scott Morrison, is 

taking a hard stand on China’s lack of transparency on COVID-19, Beijing’s 

quashing of individual liberties in Hong Kong, and on freedom of navigation in 

the South China Sea. This article argues that this growing economic dependency, 

and an Australian aversion to casualties, are leading to a fundamental change in 
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Gupta

the security relationship. Given this transformation, the article focuses on how the 

US–Australia relationship should be configured to develop a new and coordinated 

approach to deal with China and the Indo-Pacific.

The US–Australia Relationship

Following the Japanese invasion of Singapore in 1942, Australia went through a 

transformation in its security relationship as it was forced to move away from a 

dependency on Britain as its security guarantor to a reliance on the United States. 

With the onset of the Cold War, Australia strengthened its defense relationship 

with the United States through a series of formal agreements ranging from the 

Australia, New Zealand, United States Security Treaty (ANZUS)—a non-binding 

collective security arrangement between Australia and New Zealand and separately Australia and the United States—as well as the Southeast Asia Treaty 

Organization (SEATO). Additionally, Australia was grandfathered into an 

intelligence-sharing agreement, the Five Eyes, along with other Anglo-Saxon 

nations—Britain, Canada, and New Zealand. Australia also sent troops to the 

Vietnam conflict and suffered 521 casualties.1 Most importantly, Australia was 

able to provide the “real estate” for the United States to build space and 

intelligence-gathering assets in the country like the Pine Gap facility.2

In the 2000s, Australia reacted to the attacks of September 2001 by invoking 

ANZUS and sending troops to Afghanistan. Later, Australian forces were part of 

coalition forces in Iraq. Iraq and Afghanistan were popular wars in Australia, 

since the casualty rates were low (two deaths in Iraq and 41 in Afghanistan3) and 

it affirmed that Australia was a loyal ally and, as the then Australian prime minister, John Howard, liked to bill the country, America’s Deputy Sherriff.

Yet, by the early 2000s, there was a happy confluence of events that worked to 

the advantage of the Australian economy—and that was the rise of China and the 

economic boom it brought to Indo-Pacific region. As China’s economy started to 

grow, it developed a hunger for natural resources. Australia became a ready provider and profited from a significant boost to its commodity prices.4

 Since the 

early 2000s, the economic relationship between the two countries has grown dramatically—to the point where the expression now goes that, if China becomes 

poor, Australia is beggared.

Australia’s major exports to China are commodities, education, tourism, agriculture, and services, and four of these revenue earners depend on a continued and 

thriving economic relationship with Beijing. Australia sells large amounts of copper and iron ore to China, and it was this sale of minerals that sparked a boom in 

the Australian economy from around 2010, which continued until this year when 

COVID-19 stalled the global economy and pushed Australia into a recession. 
Realistic Expectations

JOURNAL OF INDO-PACIFIC AFFAIRS  SPECIAL ISSUE 2020 259

China imports 63 billion AUD of iron ore, 16 billion dollars of natural gas, and 14.6 

billion dollars of coal from Australia.5 Many Chinese students study at Australian 

universities, while Chinese tourists are vital to the Australian tourist industry. Australian data reveals that the country hosts 8.5 million visitors annually, and 1.4 million of those are Chinese.6

 Further, Australia makes 43.9 billion AUD from tourism 

and 12 billion of that comes from Chinese tourists—over 25 percent of the revenues 

earned from tourism are from Chinese visitors.7 Australia now sells about 12 billion 

dollars of agricultural products to China, which is about a quarter of Australia’s total 

agricultural exports. Australia has sought to reduce its dependency on the China 

market and to woo India to raise trade between the two countries to 45 billion 

AUD. However, to put things in perspective, such trade with India would be an 

insufficient amount, given that Australia, in 2019, exported 160 billion AUD worth 

of goods to China.8 Not surprisingly, this has led to a debate in Australian policy 

and business circles as to how to deal with the economic fallout if China decides to 

play hardball with Canberra?

The Australian government has, therefore, despite the rhetoric of the current 

prime minister and the expectations of Washington, sought to toe a fine line between being a strong US ally and not killing the Chinese goose that lays the 

economic golden egg. As Australian foreign minister Marise Payne stated in a 

joint press conference with US secretaries of state and defense, Mike Pompeo and 

Mark Esper, “As my Prime Minister put it recently, the relationship that we have 

with China is important, and we have no intention of injuring it, but nor do we 

intend to do things that are contrary to our interests, and that is the premise from 

which we begin.”9

The differences that Foreign Minister Payne talks about range from the freedom of navigation in the South China Seas to a lack of transparency on the part 

of China regarding the COVID-19 pandemic and the draconian security law that 

Beijing has rammed down the throats of the citizens of Hong Kong.10 These have 

been consistent Australian policies and reflect the commonality of values that 

Canberra shares with Washington on the norms and structure of regional order in 

the Indo-Pacific. While the United States and Australia may have shared common values and in the past, when Canberra was a loyal ally that joined American 

military expeditions, the future, particularly when it comes to confronting China, 

may not lead to such a clear response from Australia.

Military Matters and the Quad

Those who want a containment of China in the Indo-Pacific salivate at the idea 

of a fully operational Quadrilateral Alliance among the United States, India, Japan, and Australia. Initial talk to operationalize the Quad did not go beyond 
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military exercises which were geared toward modest goals—especially in the case 

of India—of getting militaries to talk to one another and become familiar with 

each other’s weaponry. The Indians carried out joint naval exercises with the 

United States and Japanese navies but had been recalcitrant regarding Australian participation in the Malabar exercises or accepting invitations to exercise 

with the Australian Navy.11 The Indians kept the Australians out because they 

did not want to further invoke the ire of China, which was unhappy with the 

exercises in general.

The Quad was revived in 2017 as the four participants began to recognize that 

Chinese military and political forays had begun to worry policy makers in Washington, Delhi, Canberra, and Tokyo, and this year, after the clashes between Indian 

and Chinese troops in the Galwan Valley in the Himalayas, the Australians participated in the 2020 version of Malabar.12 Australian analysts point out that so far 

the weak link in the Quad has been India, but it is worth asking what precisely is 

the military role of Australia in an energized Quad?13

Australian Constraints

Australia, as discussed above, has a major interdependence on trade with China, 

but there is talk of diversifying trade and being willing to bear the pain of disengaging with China. In an article in The Guardian, Peter Jennings, the director of 

the Australian Strategic Policy Institute, wrote, “with coal and iron ore we can be 

confident that we have products that China wants. They would find it painful to 

switch long-term suppliers. Chinese consumers also like Australia’s clean green 

produce, notwithstanding party flimflam about hurt feelings. All the same we 

should be working as hard as we can to reduce economic dependence and diversify, diversify, diversify. Business should stop whining about how hard that is and 

understand that protecting the national interest is key to their own long-term 

survival.”14 Lavina Lee makes an even more optimistic argument that, “Australia’s 

resources are largely traded on world markets and are fungible products for which 

there are markets elsewhere. Restricting iron ore imports from Australia is also 

likely to be an act of self-harm for Beijing.”15 Such arguments tend to simplify the 

international trade process, supply chains, and the strength a very large and reliable market like China has to play economic hardball.

The Chinese do not have to start with the nuclear option of cutting Australian 

iron ore exports; Beijing can hit other sectors of the Australian economy that are 

critical to the well-being of the middle class. As mentioned earlier, Chinese tourists account for over a quarter of Australian tourism revenues, and Canberra 

cannot encourage other countries to make up the shortfall caused by a Chinese 

boycott. If Chinese students seek friendlier academic pastures in Europe and 
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North America, then the Australian academic economy takes a huge hit, as 

152,591 students stop paying tuition to Australian universities, especially since 

the Chinese make up 38.3 percent of the international student body.16 Further, 

countries are always willing to take the economic hit to score political points—

after all, Australia has rejected Huawei’s 5G for security concerns, but this means 

buying an alternative network that is more expensive and less capable. This economic dependence, therefore, does limit what can be done in the military sphere.

As one analyst has argued, there are four common interests for the members of 

the Quad, but not all can be met by a military build-up or by military confrontations. Some of these interests cannot be addressed without significant cooperation 

from Beijing—and that is unlikely to happen if the Chinese feel they are being 

coerced by the Quad nations. Lee argues that these four common interests are 

maintaining a balance of power in the Indo-Pacific region; deterring the use of 

force or coercive measures to resolve territorial disputes; ensuring freedom of 

navigation, since maritime trade is based on this principle; and maintaining a 

rules-based economic order in the region.17

To take the last objective first, Australia is a member of Comprehensive and 

Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) and the Chineseinitiated Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP). The CPTPP 

was meant to be a Western counter to Chinese economic dominance in the region, 

but with the United States refusing to join the treaty, the effort lost its teeth as an 

economic counter to China. Therefore, Australia hoped to address concerns over 

Chinese unwillingness to adhere to a rules-based economic order before inking the 

RCEP, and this will have little to do with any form of military measures taken by 

the Quad. Australia signed the RCEP agreement on 15 November 2020.

Similarly, the peaceful resolution of territorial disputes can only come through 

the creation of universal treaties that the Chinese agree with and that will require 

robust diplomatic negotiations that include all the countries in the region. Regarding the South China Sea disputes, for instance, the countries of the region 

have suggested that the Chinese go with the India–Bangladesh maritime settlement as a template for resolving the dispute over the islands in the South China 

Sea. Such measures are likely to lead to more fruitful discussions than expecting a 

military show of force to reshape maritime boundaries.18

Maintaining the balance of power in the region does and will continue to require a military build-up, and while Canberra is willing to add teeth to its military capabilities, what it is willing to do in the military realm will be constrained 

by its economic links with China and its recognition that a US–China military 

confrontation would be disastrous for the economic future of the region. In terms 

of building up its military capabilities, the Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF) 
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will be getting a complement of F-35s, and the Australians have an impressive 

heavy-lift and extraregional capability that can be used to support American 

operations. The RAAF has eight C-17s, which gives it a significant heavy-lift 

capability across long distances, and its Airbus tankers will allow it to support 

American aircraft if called upon. Yet, one needs to ask what is Australia’s strategic perimeter, and does it extend to the South and East China Seas?

The Australian defense perimeter is primarily focused on the immediate region 

of Southeast Asia and the South Pacific and in those subregions the Australians 

would be able to effectively counter threats to their own security. As the recent 

Australian Strategic Update of 2020 suggests, “The Government has decided that 

under this new framework, defence planning will focus on our immediate region: 

ranging from the north-eastern Indian Ocean, through maritime and mainland 

South East Asia to Papua New Guinea and the South West Pacific. This new 

framework will provide a tight focus for defence planning and alignment with 

broader initiatives such as the Pacific Step-up.”19

The Strategic Update paints a realistic picture when it defines the area of responsibility of the Australian armed forces in the near to medium term. The areas 

it covers are on Australia’s immediate periphery and instability in these areas 

could lead to blowback in the Australian continent in terms of refugee flows or 

terrorism. What this discussion of the immediate area does not talk about is 

China or a military confrontation in the South China Sea. Instead, it talks of 

providing support to American forces in North Asia, although it is not clear how 

that support would be defined and what its scope would be in the event of an 

actual US–China conflict.

The Australian strategic defense update talks of using its capabilities to deter 

a power from attacking Australia rather than waging an offensive war in the 

neighborhood of China. The Strategic Update does discuss using Australian 

troops to make contributions in extraregional efforts and names the Middle East 

and North Asia as two such regions of interest. However, the update go on to 

caution that any such contributions to coalition efforts would be based primarily 

on the country’s national interest: “But any such wider contributions must be 

based on specific national interests. Consideration of making wider military contributions should not be an equally-important determinant for force structure 

compared to ensuring we have credible capability to respond to any challenge in 

our immediate region.”20

This discussion would seem to suggest that while Australia would likely participate in an action against China, such support should not be taken for granted, 

since it would have to be weighed against the national interest. Further, the term 

support is vague, since it could mean providing diplomatic support, basing, and 
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perhaps support logistics as opposed to actual combat forces. The latter is quite 

possible if the Australia–China relationship does not deteriorate and, instead, 

thanks to the growth of RCEP, Australia is brought into greater interdependency 

with the Chinese economy.

Secondly, there is the question about how high a number of casualties the Australian public would be willing to take in the event of actual combat operations. 

The perception that Australia is willing to wage long and bloody wars with high 

casualty levels comes from Australian involvement in World War I and World 

War II, in which the country took more 60,000 and 39,000, respectively, which 

was impressive for a country with a small population.21 In the Vietnam War, the 

Australian commitment was much smaller, as the Australian government, in its 

Cold War strategy for the deployment of troops, became more cautious about 

sending troops abroad. At the peak of its involvement in Vietnam, Australia had 

around 7,700 troops in that country, and the ultimate death toll from the war was 

521, a figure much smaller than the sacrifices of the two world wars.22

The logic for offering and deploying troops changed in the Cold War and continues to drive Australian military commitments, as Peter Edwards has written:

. . . the determination of the Menzies government to do all it could to retain 

British and American power in the region didn’t mean that military contributions were easily volunteered. More commonly, they were used as bargaining 

chips—conceded reluctantly, in response to considerable pressure, on the understanding that their military significance was less important than their diplomatic 

value. While the critics of Australian foreign policy for the past hundred years 

have alleged that Australia has been only too willing to commit forces to “other 

people’s wars”, the view from London and Washington, since 1945, has often 

been that Australians “talk a good war”: the strength of the political and diplomatic support for our allies hasn’t always been matched by the number of boots 

on the ground.23

The reluctance to take casualties makes complete sense, since while in any 

country the citizenry is willing to defend the homeland against attack, it is less 

willing to shed blood and treasure for expeditionary operations in countries thousands of miles away. The Iraq War was very popular in Australia, in part because 

the country suffered only two casualties but was able to show its commitment to 

the Western alliance. Yet, this popularity had to be put in context. In an interview 

with this author, the former vice-chief of the Australian Army, General Peter 

Abigail, felt that 8–10 body bags at any one time could have led to a demand from 

the Australian public for a troop withdrawal.24

In Afghanistan, as of 2019, Australia has about 300 troops whose duties range 

from coordinating administration, communications and logistics support for all 
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defense force members deployed to Afghanistan and working as “embeds” to 

fulfill certain specialist missions. Additionally, there are small special forces 

groups that assist NATO troops and the Afghan police special forces. As of 

2019, the Australians had lost 41 troops (10 in one helicopter crash) and had 

261 troops wounded. The cost to the Australian exchequer by 2019 was 10 

billion Australian dollars.25 A much larger commitment with corresponding 

casualty levels would, most likely have met with opposition from Australian 

public opinion.

Thirdly, the composition of Australian forces is likely to create problems in the 

future, for while Australia is an immigrant nation, its forces remain overwhelmingly white. One out of every four Australians is born abroad, and nearly one out 

of two had a parent who was born abroad, making the country a nation with very 

strong immigrant roots. Yet, this demographic diversity is not reflected in the 

composition of the Australian military.

In a visit to the Australian Special Forces group, this author asked the question why, despite being such a multiethnic nation, Australia’s armed forces were 

so overwhelmingly white? The answer given was that while the Australian military had made the effort to recruit from minority groups, they had faced little or 

no success.26 Yet, Australia is a country with both a large Lebanese and Asian 

population, which should give it a large pool of multiethnic talent to draw upon. 

In contrast, New Zealand has been successful in drawing on its indigenous 

Māori population as well as immigrants of color to serve in its armed forces—

particularly the army.

Australia published the Defence, Diversity and Inclusion Strategy 2012-2017, 

which talked of the need to get more women, indigenous people, and cultural and 

linguistic minorities to the join the military. However, the strategy has borne little 

fruit. While indigenous people constitute 2.97 percent of the population, the 

RAAF, for instance, only has 1.2 percent of its force constituting of indigenous 

people, while 5 percent of the force is of Asian heritage.27 The problem is that as 

Australia’s white population ages and shrinks, there will be a reluctance on the 

part of white families to send their children into conflict, as has been the case with 

European nations where the populations are both aging and shrinking. The situation will worsen if people of color do not join the military in significant numbers, 

for then the Australian military will face serious manpower issues.28 Yet, both 

trends are likely to shape Australia’s force structure and willingness to commit 

forces abroad—especially in the medium to long term.

Fourthly, the entire logic of the Quad is flawed, since it is not a classical collective security arrangement as described in the United Nations Charter of 1945. If 

militarized, a country like Australia, which faces no existential threats from China, 
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would have to agree to come to India’s or Japan’s assistance in the event of a 

conflict between either of those nations and China. Indian strategic analysts are 

not engaging in wishful thinking and believing that if their current tensions with 

Beijing flare up into a full-blown border war Canberra, Tokyo, or Washington 

would offer much more than diplomatic support and express a desire that both 

nations cease hostilities. In the case of Japan, Australia’s foremost strategic analyst, Hugh White, warned at the time the Australian Defense Force was considering buying a new submarine, that while Japanese submarines were or high-quality, 

“We must be quite clear about this. Tokyo expects that in return for its help to 

build our submarines, it would receive not just many of billions of dollars, but 

clear understandings that Australia will support Japan politically, strategically and 

even militarily against China.” White argues that such an alliance would fail, since 

Australia is unlikely to sacrifice its national interest to support Japan against China.29 If the basis for the Quad is so flimsy, the expectation that a cohesive military 

alliance will emerge from it is unduly optimistic. Given that these factors will 

complicate the Australian response, what should the United States realistically 

expect from Australia as an ally in the short to medium term?

Realistic Expectations

The first thing Washington needs to do is to start reducing the hype in the 

Australia–United States relationship and understand what the Australians cannot do militarily. Canberra will not get involved in a long drawn-out war that 

leads to high casualty rates. Instead, Australia will continue to be, as Des Ball 

once put it, “a valuable piece of real estate” on which to base American intelligence and surveillance assets. In the Indo-Pacific region, unless India has a 

radical change of heart and commits to a formal alliance with the United 

States,30 Australia will remain the most reliable ally for hosting critical 

intelligence-gathering assets. It will also provide secure basing for troops to be 

used to launch operations into Asia.

Australian forces will also provide very good assets in the support role for the 

United States because of the heavy-lift and aerial-refueling capabilities of the 

RAAF and the Australian build-up of an impressive naval capability with Air 

Warfare Destroyers (AWD) and conventional submarines. Australia intends to 

manufacture 12 conventional submarines, which would give it sufficient deterrent 

capability in the region that it currently views as its area of responsibility. There is 

talk, however, of acquiring a force of up to 12 nuclear submarines so as to have a 

more modern fighting force that can operate far from Australian waters and have 

considerable operational autonomy because the boats will stay submerged for long 

periods of time.31 Such a proposal is both ambitious and likely to set off alarms in 
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the corridors of Australian power, because it would convey a change in strategic 

attitude that would not only alarm nearby neighbors but also make Beijing reevaluate its perception of the lack of a military threat posed by Australia. What is 

more likely, therefore, is to retain a collection of conventional boats that will give 

a deterrent capability, while Australia’s surface vessels can support friendly regional and extraregional powers.

Three AWDs were built in Australia and have integrated the advanced Aegis 

system, allowing the Australian Navy to deal independently with aerial threats 

rather than depending on the US Navy for cover. However, the Australians are 

unlikely to send such expensive assets to the South China Sea unless faced with 

a serious global conflagration. The Australian government turned down a US 

request that the Australian Navy participate in freedom of navigation operations 

in the South China Sea since that was seen as potentially inflaming tensions 

with China.32 On the other hand, Canberra would readily send the AWDs for 

coalition operations in the Middle East or for similar measures in Southeast 

Asia. If Washington is expecting Canberra to provide a support role in the crucial Indo-Pacific region, where do Australia’s strengths lie as a long-term ally in 

a new security environment?

If Washington accepts that the Australians cannot cut the economic umbilical 

cord with China, then that necessarily shapes the nature of cooperation. Australian diplomatic support for a political and economic rules-based international 

order will continue regardless of the ebbs and flows in the Australia–China trade 

relationship—and one should not expect either country to dramatically cut or 

severely reduce these ties. Australian diplomacy has been excellent in the IndoPacific region for creating common platforms on issues that impact the rulesbased order. These issues range from trade and human rights to the broad-based 

agreement for the peaceful resolution of territorial disputes. The latter being especially important given the prevailing tensions in the East and South China Seas.

Further, Australia’s considerable soft power is an asset, as witnessed by the high 

ranking of its universities and the large number of international students in the 

country. Australia, according to the Shanghai ranking of world universities, has 34 

universities in the top 1,000, which is more than those of France.33 Australian 

government data states that in 2018 there were 398,563 international students in 

the country, and the top five countries of origin were China (152,591), India 

(71,857), Nepal (28,333), Vietnam (15,719), and Malaysia (13,988). This inflow 

of students earned the Australian economy 32.4 billion AUD.34

These students are educated in technical and social scientific fields and go back to 

their countries, taking liberal-democratic values as well as connections to the West’s 

globalized scientific and economic networks (although the counter argument is also 
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made that this has allowed Chinese students to gain access to sensitive technologies). In the long run, such knowledge-based networks are of greater importance 

than the Australian ability to put a battalion in a low-threat environment.

Lastly, if one looks at the neighborhood that Canberra sees as critical to Australia’s security—the northeastern Indian Ocean, through Southeast Asia to the 

southwest Pacific—Canberra’s economic and technical assistance has played a 

positive role in stabilizing the economies and polities of these countries. When the 

typhoon devastated Fiji in 2017, it was the Australians who led the relief efforts to 

help the stricken islands—much as they came to the assistance of neighboring 

countries when the tsunamis of 2004 and 2007 struck the region.

When one puts all these elements together, what emerges is an ally who is 

useful in navigating the complexities of a globalized world, where power politics 

is not the sole determinant of the value of partners. It is time that American 

policy makers respected Australia’s constraints and valued the advantages of its 

economic, educational, and military-support capabilities.

Dr. Amit Gupta

Dr. Gupta teaches at the USAF Air War College. The views in this article are his and do not necessarily reflect those 

of the USAF or the DOD.

Notes

1. Australian War Memorial, “Vietnam War 1962–75,” n.d., https://www.awm.gov.au/.

2. Desmond Ball, Bill Robinson, and Richard Tanter, “Australia’s participation in the Pine Gap 

enterprise,” NAPSNet Special Reports, 8 June 2016, https://nautilus.org/.

3. Australian War Museum, “Australians at war,” https://www.awm.gov.au/.

4. Australian Goverment, “Australia in the Asian Century” (white paper, Canberra, October 

2012), 93.

5. Elias Visontay, “After barley, what next? Australian industries exposed if China trade tensions persist,” The Guardian, 20 May 2020.

6. Visontay, “After barley, what next?”

7. “Australian Tourism Statistics 2020,” 8 October 2020, https://camperchamp.com.au/.

8. Frances Mao, “How reliant is Australia on China?,” BBC News, 17 June 2020.

9. “Australia-United States joint ministerial consultations, joint transcript,” 29 July 2020.

10. Natasha Kassam, “For all its Bluster, China know Australia Isn’t merely doing the bidding 

of the US,” Commentary, 31 July 2020, https://www.lowyinstitute.org/.

11. Asha Sundarmurthy, “India keeps Australia out of Malabar Exercise—Again,” The Diplomat, 8 May 2018.

12. “India to invite Australia to Malabar naval exercise, Quad stands up to China,” Hindustan 

Times, 10 July 2020.
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13. For a discussion, see: Jeff M. Smith, “Democracy’s Squad: India’s change of heart and the 

future of the Quad,” War on the Rocks, 13 August 2020, https://warontherocks.com/.

14. Peter Jennings, “We need to reduce our dependence on China and call it out when required,” The Guardian, 1 May 2020.

15. Lavina Lee, “Assessing the Quad: Prospects and Limitations of Quadrilateral Cooperation 

for Advancing Australia’s Interests,” Lowy Institute Report, May 2020, 16.

16. Hazel Ferguson and Henry Sherrell, “Overseas students in Australian higher education: a 

quick guide,” Parliament of Australia, 20 June 2019, https://www.aph.gov.au/.

17. Ferguson and Henry Sherrell, “Overseas students in Australian higher education,” 4–5.

18. US Ambassador Chas Freeman, interview by author, Grand Rapids, MI, 29 July 2018.

19. Defence Strategic Update 2020 (Canberra, Commonwealth of Australia, 2020), 6.

20. Defence Strategic Update 2020, 24.

21. Australian War Museum, “Australians at war.”

22. Australian War Museum, “Australians at war.”

23. Peter Edwards, “Learning from History: Some Strategic Lessons from the ‘Forward Defense’ Era,” Strategy, May 2015, 10, https://s3-ap-southeast-2.amazonaws.com/.

24. Peter Abigail, interview by author, Montgomery, AL, 8 May 2006.

25. Clive Williams, “Do we still need Australian troops in Afghanistan?,” Sydney Morning 

Herald, 29 January 2019.

26. Amit Gupta, “Demographic Changes and US Foreign Policy,” Orbis 60, no. 3 (2016), 386.

27. “Diversity in the Air Force,” Royal Australian Air Force (website) https://web.archive.org/.

28. For a discussion of the consequences of the aging and browning of the Australian population, see: “Census 2016 reveals Australia is becoming much more diverse – but can we trust 

the data?” The Conversation, 26 June 2017.

29. Hugh White, “If we strike a deal with Japan, we’re buying more than submarines,” Sydney 

Morning Herald, 14 March 2016.

30. For a discussion of the advantages of closer US–India military ties, see: Amit Gupta, “4 

Reasons why India couldn’t win a war with China,” National Interest, 17 July 2020.

31. Peter Briggs, “Can Australia Afford Nuclear Submarines? Can we afford not to?,” Strategy, 

October 2018, 4-5.

32. Daniel Hurst, “Australia to step up South China Sea defence cooperation with US – but 

won’t commit to patrols,” The Guardian, 29 July 2020.

33. “Academic Ranking of World Universities,” ShanghaiRanking, 2020, http://www

.shanghairanking.com/.

34. Hazel Ferguson and Henry Sherrell, “Overseas students in Australian higher education: a 

quick guide,” Parliament of Australia, 20 June 2019, https://www.aph.gov.au/.

Disclaimer

The views and opinions expressed or implied in JIPA are those of the authors and should not be construed as carrying the 

official sanction of the Department of Defense, Department of the Air Force, Air Education and Training Command, 

Air University, or other agencies or departments of the US government or their international equivalents.
JOURNAL OF INDO-PACIFIC AFFAIRS  SPECIAL ISSUE 2020 269

 A VIEW FROM THE OTHERS

The Middle East and the Quad Plus

Dr. Brendon J. Cannon

Abstract

This article explores the actions and reactions of Middle East states to the Quad 

Plus, a currently US-led effort to strengthen engagement with counterpart states 

under the strategic ambit of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue grouping. Because 

the Middle East is a large and highly diverse region, the article will focus on three 

important states—the United Arab Emirates, Turkey, and Iran—as illustrative case 

studies. A qualitative methodology is employed comparing interview results, media 

articles, and government statements to test a hypothesis: the Quad Plus is viewed 

with suspicion or disinterest in the Middle East because it is US-led and therefore 

construed as an anti-China proposition. The findings demonstrate that Iran has no 

wish to see the power of its primary economic and security partner, China, curtailed 

by the Quad Plus. For Turkey, the Quad Plus is a US-led initiative directed against 

China and is geographically irrelevant given Ankara’s current capabilities and national security interests. The United Arab Emirates, contrariwise, relies on the 

United States for its security, has good relations with the Quad states as well as Israel, and views Iran and Turkey as security threats. Invitations to join Quad Plus 

initiatives like supply-chain resilience or pandemic response will therefore likely 

meet a warm reception in Abu Dhabi. No such invitations from Quad capitals will 

likely be forthcoming to either Turkey or Iran.

Introduction

The Middle East is too diverse economically, politically, and socially to safely 

make sweeping statements about policy directions or region-wide interests.1 Accordingly, this article will focus on Turkey, Iran, and the United Arab Emirates 

(UAE) to explore the interests, actions, and reactions of three important and highly 

influential Middle Eastern states to Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad) states 

and their overtures via the Quad Plus.2 This exploration of the Middle East–Quad 

Plus nexus will analyze the alignment and enduring national security interests of 

these three states to test the article’s primary hypothesis: the Quad Plus is viewed 

with suspicion or disinterest because it is US-led and is therefore construed as 

an anti-China proposition. Using a qualitative and comparative methodology, 

the article uses interviews and examines media articles and government statements to extrapolate the emerging positions of Middle Eastern states to the 
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increasingly confrontational stances taken by China, on the one hand, and the 

Quad on the other.

Distributions of Power and the Quad Plus

The Quad Plus, led by the United States but supported strongly by Japan, 

Australia, and India, certainly has some resonance in the Middle East in a way 

that the Quad itself does not. The latter, while not officially so, is largely a 

military-security mechanism to stymie China’s pursuance of national security 

interests—many of them alarming to neighboring states such as Japan, Taiwan, 

and Vietnam—in the Pacific and Indian Oceans. The Quad Plus, on the other 

hand, seems to be a more informal and inclusive mechanism that holds out the 

possibility of international cooperation between the Quad and other states and 

includes security but moves far beyond this to cover contingencies such as pandemic responses and supply chains.3

Scholars of international relations (IR) generally subscribe to the theory that 

the world is an anarchical system of states with finite amounts of power on 

hand. At the very least, scholars agree there is no global policeman to enforce 

rules and laws. While much separates realists from liberal institutionalists, the 

control of power and its largely zero-sum nature remain the bedrock of IR 

theories. In this anarchical global system, significant changes to distributions of 

power—shifting from one state to another state or grouping of states—over a 

relatively short period create greater uncertainty; thus, making the global state 

system even more anarchical.

Multiple IR theories have attempted to grapple with these questions of rising 

and falling state power and the uncertainty that accompanies shifts in distributions of power. Power transition theory, for example, predicts that shifts in the 

balance of economic and military power are often a sufficient trigger for a rivalry 

where previously none had existed.4 Today’s rising powers such as China and India, or Germany in the late nineteenth century, compete for power and influence 

to impose their will on the global order. When this rivalry occurs between a hegemon and the rising power, the ensuing competition exhibits a gravitation pull 

that drags other states in—willingly or not.

If power transition theory broadly explains the rise of Germany in Europe 

and the resulting two world wars, it also offers a great deal in relation to the 

even more meteoric rise of China in the late twentieth century. However, key 

differences separate Germany’s rise from that of China. First, while the United 

Kingdom ruled the waves and possessed a global colonial empire, Germany was 

only one of the multiple European states, including the United Kingdom, that 

vied for economic and political dominance on the continent as well as overseas. 
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To the contrary, the rise of China has occurred largely during an age of US 

dominance. While certainly not a unipolar world, the fact remains that the 

United States is currently China’s only strategic competitor in terms of size and 

power capabilities. This is not to say that China’s rise has not spurred other 

would-be major powers such as India or global economic powers such as Japan 

to take actions to safeguard their national security interests. Tokyo’s and New 

Delhi’s shifting stances toward China demonstrate the conundrums faced by 

many states as they attempt to grapple with what is increasingly perceived as a 

“China threat,” on the one hand, and the “peaceful rise of China” on the other.5

That is, China is both a welcome partner offering development, financing, and 

expertise and an unwelcome actor as its increasing share of power, bellicose rhetoric, and military capabilities coincide to fundamentally threaten the foundations 

of a post–World War II US-led world order. Beijing’s demands for disputed territories or its dismissal of international court rulings may rankle states such as 

Japan, the Philippines, and Vietnam, but it is China’s actions such as hostile takeovers of port operations in Sri Lanka to island-building in the disputed South 

China Sea to its massive military build-up, including a powerful blue-water navy, 

that reinforce the dangerous array of threats posed by Beijing.

One of the results of these shifts in global power from West to East and the 

uncertainty accompanying them is the Quad and, subsequently, the Quad Plus: a 

broad coalition of states willing to question not only China’s controversial actions 

but act against it. Like-minded states have proliferated, with Vietnam, Singapore, 

Malaysia, and Indonesia not only voicing their serious concerns about China and 

Chinese actions but drawing closer to the United States and its Quad partners for 

security. This newfound resolve, however, is tempered by the fact that China remains the largest trading power for not only three of the four Quad states but also 

for the Southeast Asian states. The Quad also wishes to avoid being simply an 

anti-China bloc. Its leaders, while criticizing singular Chinese actions such as 

freedom of navigation issues in the Taiwan Strait, continue to soothe China by 

arguing for inclusion rather than exclusion, making it abundantly clear that New 

Delhi, Canberra, and Tokyo would prefer a friendly China in the room rather 

than an aggressive China outside it.

The Quad Plus–Middle East Nexus

The Quad Plus is analyzed and described in greater detail elsewhere in this issue. The author therefore focuses less on what the Quad Plus will or will not do 

and instead explore interests, actions, and reactions of the three Middle East states 

to the Quad states and their overtures via the Quad Plus. In terms of the Middle 

East, the Quad Plus and related efforts such as the Blue Dot Network (BDN) 
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seem to hold relevance for states on the periphery of the Indo-Pacific, like the 

Middle East, rather than the Quad states themselves or China’s Southeast Asian 

neighbors. This means that the Quad Plus may offer substantive alternatives to 

China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) or more localized efforts in alleviating the 

serious infrastructural and developmental deficits that bedevil many parts of the 

Middle East.

It may take some time and convincing to bring Middle East states around to the 

Quad Plus. This is because China’s BRI, whatever else it may be, is certainly clear, 

present, and tactile in nature. It produces railroads, ports, pipelines, and other forms 

of infrastructural, economic, and, naturally, political connectedness to Beijing. To 

its credit, the Quad Plus proposition makes it clear that the Quad states understand this and have begun to actively engage regions like the Middle East using 

some of China’s strategies while eschewing some of Beijing’s more alarming tactics. 

A statement made by India’s External Affairs Minister, S. Jaishankar, perhaps 

summed up the Quad Plus best when he noted it is “for something” rather than 

“against someone.” However, capital investment on a scale at least approaching 

China’s billions invested in its BRI and related Maritime Silk Road not only need 

to be pledged by like-minded states but need to result in finished projects. Nonetheless, the Quad Plus and BDN are perhaps the beginning of an alternative to 

China and its BRI on the developmental and economic fronts. Whether alternatives are being sought or even thought about in the Middle East depends on the 

state’s interests as informed by security burdens and geopolitics.

The Middle East is well-acquainted with China’s BRI, not the novel Quad 

Plus. Iran, the UAE, Saudi Arabia, and Egypt all have extensive and ongoing 

BRI projects, funded by loans from Chinese state-backed or owned banks. Iran 

is integral to both China’s maritime “belt” and terrestrial “road.” The gravitational pull of China felt in the Middle East through its increasing economic 

and political influence via the BRI is, nevertheless, beginning to be resisted, albeit unevenly. The UAE, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia rely on the United States, 

China’s strategic competitor, for their security. This US security architecture, 

particularly in the Persian Gulf, has been perceived as being under threat for 

two primary reasons. First, Washington’s pivot to Asia, begun by Pres. Barrack 

Obama and continued by Pres. Donald Trump, redeployed US military forces in 

increasing numbers toward the western Pacific, albeit not from the Middle East. 

Second, the tone-deaf approach of the Obama administration to the security 

concerns of the Arab Gulf states about Iran encapsulated with the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action ( JCPOA), followed by the Trump administration’s 

haphazard and uneven engagement, resulted in exacerbating the rift within the 

Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). This is a two-way street, however, and 
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Washington has its own highly public misgivings about the deals made by Abu 

Dhabi, Riyadh, and Cairo with China for everything from 5G to nuclear power 

to military hardware such as drones. On the periphery of the Middle East, and 

unlike Iran and the UAE, Turkey has largely remained immune to the BRI’s 

appeal. As its economic health and relations with the United States and Europe 

continue to decline, nonetheless, Ankara has muffled its criticisms of Beijing 

over its treatment of its Muslim Uighur minority in Xinjiang and looked to 

China for much-needed loans.6

Security Burdens and Interests

A state’s extant and enduring security burdens often, but not always, define its 

strategic choices. Security burdens are often divided into two tiers: first-tier security burdens can be understood as those coming from states possessing the extant 

and enduring capability and intent to cause catastrophic harm to the national 

security of the state in question. Second-tier security burdens may be defined as 

those emanating from states possessing the possible capability and intent to cause 

enduring, extant, and serious harm to the national security of a country.7

Middle East states are no different than the states of Southeast Asia or South 

America: the leaders and policy makers of those states define and make strategic 

choices that are necessarily limited depending on the amount, proximity, and 

tiered nature of their security burdens. This includes not just “hard” security matters, such as those involving the military and other security services, but economic 

and social matters as well. States engage in relations with other states to hedge 

and counter these security burdens, which are necessarily impacted by a state’s 

geographic location and history as well as population.

All states can be said to have national security interests that influence the government’s or leadership’s policies vis-à-vis internal and external threats, regardless 

of their genesis. States in the Middle East such as Turkey, Iran, and the UAE are 

therefore primarily interested in propositions and alignments such as the Quad 

Plus or China’s BRI to further these national security interests.

Iran

Iran’s national security interests are tightly bound up in its relationship with the 

United States. Three factors have generated Iran’s national security priorities: the 

1979 revolution, Iranian foreign policy against Israel, and the attacks of 9/11. These 

have led the United States to adopt increasingly intransigent and harsh policies in 

relation to Iran, including sanctions that have significantly curtailed Iran’s economic and military growth. Not only is the United States a seemingly omnipresent 
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adversary with a significant military presence in Turkey, Iraq, Afghanistan, and the 

Persian Gulf, but it also has over-the-horizon missile and nuclear capabilities that 

leave Iran’s leaders even less secure.

Iran also faces a host of regional threats from medium to small states. In a 

nearly 20-year-old testimony that remains highly relevant today, Dr. Nasser Hadian informed the US Senate Foreign Relations Committee:

Iran’s “anarchical” regional environment has all the ingredients of an strategic 

nightmare: Too many neighbors with hostile, unfriendly or at best opportunistic 

attitudes, no great power alliance, a 25 years face-off with [the] greatest superpower in history, living in a war infested region (5 major wars in less than 25 

years), a region ripe with ethno-territorial disputes on its borders (Iran has been 

a major regional refugee hub), and with a dominant Wahabi trans-regional 

movement which theologically and politically despises Iran, and finally a region 

with nuclear powers; Pakistan, Israel, and India. Iran is located at the center of 

the “uncontrollable center” of post-Cold war and post-9/11 world politics.8

Iran has adopted a “self-help” approach to foreign policy and looked for strategic alignments wherever it can get them. This has meant Tehran has actively 

engaged states with adversarial relations with Washington to lessen the enduring 

security burdens heaped upon it by the United States. The “golden ring” axis of 

Turkey, Iran, Pakistan, Russia, and China may be one such proposition. While 

short on details, it could eventually form a significant anti-US bloc across Eurasia and, in the process, strengthen Iran strategically, militarily, politically, and 

economically.9 Iran, however, has longstanding divergent interests with all these 

states except China, but China is by far the most relevant and useful to Tehran, 

not least because China sees Iran as its most important trade partner and hydrocarbons source in the Middle East. For Beijing, Iran represents a way out of what 

China is increasingly convinced is a US policy of containment. Accordingly, 

China relies on Iran to diversify its energy supply. Doing so helps China’s oil 

imports avoid passing through the Strait of Malacca, which is controlled by US 

allies in Southeast Asia. China plans to overcome this strategic predicament by 

ensuring Iran’s gas flow is connected to the pipelines stretching from Gwadar 

Port (part of the BRI-related China–Pakistan Economic Corridor [CPEC]) in 

Pakistan to China. This, in turn, explains China’s readiness to invest in the development of Chabahar, the southeastern Iranian port currently under construction, 

from which Beijing can also access Afghanistan, Central Asia, and Russia. For 

Iran, “the BRI represents an opportunity at a time when Western powers are 

withholding much-needed investment and advanced technology to develop its 

oil and gas infrastructure and transportation capacity.”10
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Beijing may be wary of getting pulled into festering and complicated regional 

conflicts, but its interests do align with Tehran on one level: it sees much utility in 

building stronger relations with Iran to thumb its nose at Washington. Indicative 

of this is the 25-year Strategic Partnership signed between Iran and China in 

mid-2020 that emphasizes security and underscores Beijing’s long-term weapons 

transfer programs with Iran, such as the development of long-range antiship missiles and the reported purchase of Chengdu J-10 fighter jets.

Iran also has a choice of additional partners, including traditionally nonaligned 

states such as India. New Delhi has historically warm relations with Iran and, 

until recently, remained a significant investment partner along with other states 

aligned with the United States such as France, Germany, and Japan. The departure 

of the United States from the JCPOA and the subsequent financial and economic 

sanctions made it clear that the Trump administration considered Iran near the 

top of threats to the United States and its allies. US sanctions coupled with US 

financial clout on a global scale meant that investments by Indian, French, and 

Japanese companies were no longer viable given the threat of US retaliation, and 

Iran became even further isolated.

Turkey

Turkey’s enduring security burdens, like Iran’s, are wrapped up in its history and 

geography. The fall of the Ottoman Empire and its attempted dismemberment by 

secret treaties between European powers and Russia have led to a collective, longrunning and almost paranoid emphasis on Turkey’s territorial integrity. Russia, in 

particular, continues to pose the largest and most powerful threat to Turkey’s existence. This threat drove the newly minted secular republic to seek an alliance 

with the West, particularly the United States, after World War II. However, Turkey was always an uncomfortable partner for the West, and Ankara—while useful 

from a strategic and tactical standpoint to the United States and its NATO partners—never fully trusted its allies. Appearances were kept up because the threat 

of Soviet (Russian) domination during the Cold War was so great. The serious 

differences that did flare up between Turkey and the West—from Cyprus in 1974 

to the military coups d’état that overthrew three civilian Turkish governments—

were papered over.

The decrease in tensions accompanying the end of the Cold War led to an 

opening up of Turkey’s political, economic, and social spaces that witnessed the 

rise of mildly Islamist politicians and their eventual democratic election to power 

in 2002. Led by Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, the Justice and Development Party ( JDP) 

has been reelected to power several times and has ruled Turkey since then. Turkey’s transition to democracy and the rise of Erdoğan, however, resulted in cooler 
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rather than warmer relations with the United States and Europe. The reasons for 

this are legion, but a primary cause was the advent of a more powerful Turkey with 

a more muscular foreign policy, sometimes delivered in coarse, undiplomatic language by Erdoğan. As Turkey failed to gain support from Europe first on EU 

membership and then with issues of migration, market access, and Kurdish separatism, Turkey’s JDP government also became more authoritarian, escalating 

dramatically in the aftermath of the attempted military coup in July 2016.

Turkey’s relations with the United States similarly soured, based on almost 

willful misunderstandings on both sides, vis-à-vis the Syrian crisis, Kurdish separatism, and arms sales/transfers. Fraying relations with the West, however, only 

increase Turkey’s isolation and security burdens. Turkey remains wary of Russia, 

for example, even though relations have warmed considerably. Tacit cooperation 

with Moscow in Syria and Ankara’s purchase of a Russian missile system cannot 

hide the fact that its security interests are incongruent with Russia’s in Libya, the 

Caucasus, and Syria. Indeed, while relations with the West remain abysmal, Ankara’s interests remain more congruent with those of the United States than either 

Europe or Russia.

What of Turkey’s Middle Eastern neighbors? Largely ignored by the republic 

until the early 2000s, Turkey’s Islamists see efficacy in currying favor with the 

Arab Street and strongly support the Palestinian cause and Hamas. However, 

mistrust and bigotry on both sides—dating back to Ottoman times—as well as 

competition for the mantle “leader of the Arab World,” stymie Erdoğan’s efforts. 

Iran, a revolutionary Shi’a state, holds even less appeal as a partner for Turkey’s 

Sunni Islamists. But very much like Iran, Turkey’s security burdens are suffocating. Turkey often feels threatened by states surrounding it, though this is offset 

some by the presence of seas surrounding Turkey and offering a watery buffer. 

Turkey also relies on self-help and follows the adage that “the enemy of my enemy 

is my friend” (in Turkish, düşmanımın düşmanı dostumdur). The problem faced by 

Ankara is that neither Russia nor the United States, adversarial as they may be to 

one another, can be considered Turkey’s strategic partner for long.

The clear choice for some alleviation of Turkey’s security burdens is China: far 

enough away to not be an overt threat, close and powerful enough to be of assistance. However, Turkey’s relations with China remain tepid, largely for reasons of 

politics. Turkey’s current regime sees itself as the defender of Muslims ala the 

Ottoman sultans, and China’s treatment of the Uighur—ethnic Turks, no less—

negatively affects relations. Additionally, Turkey’s historical, strategic and ethnoreligious interests in the states of Central Asia—also largely populated by 

ethnic Turks—are now complicated by China as well as Russia. As such, Turkey 

has been slow to warm to China’s BRI. Instead, Ankara has rolled out its own 
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vision of economic and transport connectivity, the Middle Corridor (in Turkish, 

Orta Koridor). Essentially a rail link stretching between China (Xian) and Turkey 

(İzmit-Köseköy), the idea is to bind Turkey ever closer to the hydrocarbons, minerals, and markets of Central Asia and the Caucasus.11

United Arab Emirates

The security of the UAE and that of its regime are reliant to a large degree on 

its ability to export its significant share of hydrocarbons, mainly oil. Given the 

UAE’s geographic position as well as its reliance on the export of oil, maritime 

shipping lanes in the Persian Gulf and the Arabian Sea must remain open. For the 

UAE, throughout its first four decades of existence, this has meant the Strait of 

Hormuz has been the primary security concern.12 However, with natural changes 

in leadership after the death of the UAE’s founder, Sheikh Zayed bin Sultan alNahyan in 2004, coupled with a steady increase in wealth, the UAE’s leaders have 

placed increasing emphasis on its extraregional and international standing as a 

small-to-medium power.13 Accordingly, the UAE’s leadership has overseen an 

extensive overhaul of the country’s armed forces and intensified its weapons acquisition programs. The UAE joined Saudi Arabia in Yemen, for example, to roll 

back the territorial gains and power of the Houthi, Zaydi Shiites hailing from the 

north and northwest of the country and supported by Iran.

The UAE’s current foreign adventurism is made possible because of the security 

umbrella provided by the United States in the Persian Gulf and Washington’s 

strategic alignment with the UAE that dates back to the Cold War. This close 

relationship has ensured the UAE’s survival in the face of threats from larger 

neighbors such as Saudi Arabia, Iraq, and Iran. In turn, the UAE’s emphasis on 

developing a highly tolerant society, a stable economy, a capable military, and close 

relations with other US allies, including (in mid-2020) Israel, have meant the 

UAE is even more secure as Washington’s partner.

The UAE’s reliance on the United States, however, comes at the price of insecurity should America ever choose to leave the region. Abu Dhabi has recently 

turned to the East, establishing warm relations with China. As a partner in China’s 

BRI, the UAE signed a Strategic Partnership with China in 2018 and 3.4 billion 

USD in deals with Beijing in 2019. However, the UAE’s leadership remains wary 

of China’s ultimate aims in the region.14 Accordingly, Abu Dhabi continues to 

look to the United States for its security, eschewing the vast array of weaponry on 

offer from China except for drones, rockets, and rifles. These were reportedly only 

purchased on account of speed of delivery and cost as well as political roadblocks 

in Washington for US drones.15
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Beyond regime security and stability for the country via the sale of hydrocarbons, the UAE’s leadership worries deeply about the threat of militant Islam. The 

breakdown in the regional order following the 2011 Arab Spring uprisings led the 

UAE to adopt a more assertive and interventionist foreign policy ranging from 

Libya to Egypt to Yemen to counter what it perceived as Islamist threats to its 

security. It culminated in the severance of relations with Qatar, a fellow GCC 

member, by the UAE, Saudi Arabia, and Bahrain in 2017. The UAE accused 

Qatar of supporting Muslim Brotherhood (MB) causes linked to political violence in places ranging from Somalia to Egypt to Palestine. When Turkey, led by 

Islamists with strong MB ties, strengthened its relations with Qatar by stationing 

more troops in the country and expanding its military facility there, the UAE’s 

leadership quickly perceived the threats facing the country to now be doublebarreled, pitting the Arab World led by the UAE and Saudi Arabia against the 

Turks and the Iranians.

Results

The promises of the Quad Plus, and its expansion to like-minded states concerned about China, certainly hold potential for the Middle East. For reasons of 

geopolitics as well as security burdens and national interests, however, the Quad 

Plus may be viewed with disinterest or outright hostility in certain quarters. The 

Quad Plus, for example, is problematic on two fronts for Iran: it is a US-led 

initiative and therefore is automatically construed as an anti-China proposition. 

Likewise, Turkey is currently mistrustful, even antagonistic toward the United 

States and therefore US-led initiatives. Of the three states, the initiative may 

resonate most with the UAE given its potential to deepen its security relations 

not only with the United States and India but also the Plus member states of the 

Quad, like Israel.

 Iran

Iran has little desire to see China’s power curtailed. Because Iran relies on 

China and expects little but confrontation from the United States, the Quad 

Plus—even given its promise of integrating supply chains between non-Quad 

states such as South Korea and Vietnam—holds little interest for Iran. The Quad 

Plus proposition, for example, would likely not result in assistance to Iran for 

COVID-19 or a future pandemic given Washington’s intransigent stance. Iran, 

however, readily accepted assistance from China for test kits and other medical 

equipment.16 Additionally, the Quad Plus would not be used as an informal or-
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ganizational platform by the United States in any future negotiations with Iran, 

with Washington preferring a go-it-alone approach or the P5+1.17

Iranian commentary—not surprisingly—has been dismissive of the Quad, the 

Quad Plus, and the broader Indo-Pacific visions, viewing them as US Trojan 

horses to further bolster US power across the globe and curb those of states such 

as Iran and China. The word “containment,” for example, is used most often in 

Iranian commentary about the Indo-Pacific and the Quad Plus. The concept is 

viewed as American-led, designed, and operated, thus making it antithetical to 

Iran’s strategic goals. According to one Iranian analysis of the emerging geopolitical alignment, “[US President] Trump is working on getting India more involved in regional initiatives by reviving [former US President] George W. Bush’s 

plan for closer cooperation between Japan, Australia and India as a four-member 

Quad. In this way, by bringing India into power equilibrium equations against 

China, it [the US] will work with regional coalitions to contain this emerging 

superpower.”18 Reporting about the Quad Plus by Iran’s official media organization accused it of being an overreaction by the Quad states to China’s actions in 

the South Pacific and of playing copycat to Beijing’s BRI, albeit on a smaller scale 

and without offering anything new.19

Turkey

Turkey’s security situation is as grave as it has ever been since the founding of 

the republic almost 100 year ago. Domestic and international actions taken by 

Turkey not only pit Ankara against its former allies but have added to Turkey’s 

long list of extant and enduring security burdens. The COVID-19 pandemic has 

exacerbated these tensions; it is the second hardest hit Middle Eastern states after 

Iran. Instead of receiving help from its Western allies, however, Turkey received 

over 350,000 rapid detection kits from China.20

What does this mean in relation to Turkey’s potential interest in the Quad 

Plus? First, there is the issue of geopolitics. Turkey, as a G20 member with the 

fifth-largest diplomatic representation, is an international actor. Yet, for all its 

strides on the global stage over the past two decades, Turkey’s interests and capabilities mean it remains focused on its near abroad. In contrast, the Quad Plus, 

indeed the Indo-Pacific Partnership itself, remains a concept that is wedded—by 

nomenclature as much as interests—to the Indian and Pacific worlds. Turkey is 

not yet an active actor in either region. It is simply too far away.

When asked about Turkey’s interest in the Quad Plus, for example, a senior 

Turkish official drily noted, “We are here [in the Mediterranean/Middle East]; 

the Indo-Pacific is way over there. Why would we be interested?”21 Adding to 

this, the official noted that Turkey perceives the Quad as a US-led effort against 
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China, with the Quad Plus simply being more of the same with a new name. 

“Turkey doesn’t want to be part of an anti-China front,” declaimed the official.22

Arguing for robust Turkish sovereignty and freedom of action—domestically 

and internationally—the official opined that the Quad Plus may limit Turkey’s 

sphere of outreach to other states such as China, adding that Ankara did not see 

any use in joining the Quad Plus simply because it makes the United States feel 

“more secure.”23

Searching for other evidence about Ankara’s position or potential role in the 

Quad Plus, the author conducted a search of Turkish media outlets for stories on 

the Quad, the Quad Plus, or the Indo-Pacific (in Turkish, Hint-Pasifik). These 

yielded only descriptive articles and no editorials arguing for or against such a 

proposition. On the contrary, a search of China’s One Belt, One Road/Belt and 

Road Initiative (in Turkish, Bir Kuşak, Bir Yol or Kuşak-Yol Projesi or Kuşak ve Yol 

Sanayi ve Ticaret Birliği) showed it is an intensely well-known and controversial 

topic in the Turkish press. These searches, therefore, seem a good indicator that 

Turkish officials either have yet to take notice of the Quad Plus, have no interest 

in it, or both.

United Arab Emirates

Contrary to the positions of Turkey and Iran, both of which the UAE considers 

as political and strategic adversaries, Abu Dhabi may take a neutral-to-positive 

position vis-à-vis the Quad Plus. While requests for interviews with UAE officials regarding the Quad Plus went unanswered, the author’s searches of UAE 

media outlets seemed to support the somewhat ambiguous-to-positive stance the 

UAE may take vis-à-vis the Quad Plus. Articles revolving around the topics of 

the Quad, Quad Plus, and the Indo-Pacific, for example, contained reporting 

largely reprinted from other news sources of events, such as joint military exercises 

in the Indian Ocean or ministerial meetings in Australia. When editorials did 

surface, they were written by outsiders from one of the Quad states.24 An article 

in the official news agency of the UAE, however, quoted the Washington-based 

Hudson Institute’s report that placed the UAE as an example of state-to-state 

cooperation. It argued that Washington’s Indo-Pacific strategy be patterned on 

the UAE’s recent efforts at cooperation with India.25 These may indicate that the 

UAE’s leadership has either not taken notice or has not made decisions yet regarding a likely invitation to participate in the Quad Plus.

The BDN’s supply chain initiatives as related to manufacturing and military 

security as well as discussions on environmental security in the Indian Ocean basin 

certainly should interest the UAE. Abu Dhabi, for example, is already involved a 3 

billion USD strategic investment fund for emerging markets and technologies es-
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tablished by the UAE, Israel, and the United States.26 In addition, defense-related 

propositions are likely of particular interest to the country’s leaders, and the Quad 

states offer much that is desirable to the UAE in this field. This is because the UAE 

has been diligently attempting to become an arms manufacturer and exporter and 

taken steps similar to Japan and India (as well as its political and ideological adversary, Turkey).27 To do so, it has relied largely on a robust offsets program that has 

funneled money and expertise into the country, building infrastructure for weapons parts and products in the process. The lion’s share of this has been performed 

by US defense companies, and the UAE has consistently been one of the top 

buyers of US defense equipment in the world.

The UAE remains assiduous in courting Beijing’s investments and partnerships 

in everything from education to oil extraction to ports construction and operations. It will also continue selling its oil and participating in Chinese ventures 

ranging from 5G to COVID-19 vaccines.28 This does not mean Abu Dhabi will 

forge stronger security relations with Beijing.29 China’s close relationship with 

Iran naturally complicates matters for Abu Dhabi. Equally important is Beijing’s 

own reticence to take an active security role in the region. This is because, firstly, 

China can continue to act as a freeloader on US security guarantees and, secondly, 

because China does not wish to be dragged into a Middle Eastern conflict where 

it would need to choose sides. In other words, an invitation to the Quad Plus—

and with it the possibility of drawing closer to the United States and Israel without angering China—would likely be received favorably in Abu Dhabi.

Conclusion

The Quad Plus is supposed to be about something more than China and certainly more than the current Quad of the United States, Japan, Australia, and 

India. Washington sees China’s problematic response to the COVID-19 pandemic as something of an opening, a reset. It is therefore meant to address not 

only China’s BRI but also the very serious economic, political, and security threats 

posed by China, particularly to its close neighbors. Additionally, for states further 

afield, such as Brazil and Israel, the Quad Plus opens doors to cooperation on 

projects that address concerns about Chinese products such as Huawei and 5G 

networks but also offers collaborative prospects to develop something even better. 

In the Middle East, however, two large and powerful states, Iran and Turkey, view 

the Indo-Pacific initiative and related initiatives as almost entirely US-led.

Iran has no wish to see the power of its primary economic and security partner, 

China, curtailed by a proposition like the Quad Plus. It is therefore concerned 

about the web of closer relations being spun between the Quad states. Viewing 

Australia as a US lackey, for example, Iranian analysis views Washington’s closer 
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engagement with Japan with unease. However, it is Washington’s steadily growing 

friendship with India that worries Tehran’s clerical, civilian, and military leaders 

the most. Even India’s and Japan’s working—even warm relations with Iran—will 

be unlikely to result in Tehran being engaged vis-à-vis the Quad Plus. This makes 

Tehran’s involvement in the Quad Plus proposition a nonstarter from both the 

Iranian and Quad sides.

For Turkey, the Quad Plus, indeed the Indo-Pacific Partnership itself, remains a 

concept that is wrapped up with the Indian and Pacific Oceans. Turkey is not active in either region; it is also geographically too distant to affect outcomes. These 

contingencies seem to mean that even if Turkey were interested in the Quad Plus, 

a combination of Turkey’s limited capabilities and geopolitical location, coupled 

with its highly adversarial relations with the United States and its increasingly 

warm relations with Pakistan, mean that the Quad Plus will not come calling on 

Ankara anytime soon.

A second potential issue bedeviling the Quad Plus in the Middle East is that 

of corresponding interest from Washington, Tokyo, New Delhi, or Canberra. 

States like Israel and Brazil, for example, have been earmarked as potential Quad 

Plus participants. These states are of interest for highly political reasons that have 

much to do with currently warm relations between the United States and Brazil 

as well as Israel. This is decidedly not the case with either Turkey or Iran. It takes 

two to tango, and it seems both parties—Iran and Turkey on the one hand and the 

Quad states on the other—are not interested in dancing together.

In contrast to Iran and Turkey, the UAE’s importance and good reputation in 

Washington means that Abu Dhabi will likely be on the shortlist of potential 

Quad Plus participants. The UAE occupies a strategic location on both the Persian Gulf and the western Indian Ocean, exports huge amounts of oil to not just 

China but also India and Japan, and maintains good relations with New Delhi, 

Tokyo, and Canberra. Its recent diplomatic recognition of Israel makes it even 

more likely that an invitation to the Quad Plus will be forthcoming. Given these 

contingencies, the UAE will likely chart a course that takes advantage of more 

apolitical offerings from the Quad Plus. There are limits, however, to what the 

UAE’s leadership would be willing to sign up for vis-à-vis the Quad Plus. Any 

policies or partnerships that appear to be anti-China may be a bridge to far for the 

UAE’s leaders.

Dr. Brendon J. Cannon

Dr. Cannon earned a PhD in political science with an emphasis on international relations at the University of Utah. 

He joined Khalifa University in 2016. His research interests include contextualizing domestic, regional, and international relations in eastern Africa; regional security in the Persian Gulf and western Indian Ocean region; the political economy of ports, bases, and airports; the Indo-Pacific strategy of India, Japan, the United States, and Australia; 
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and China’s Belt and Road Initiative as they relate to and are operationalized in eastern Africa. Dr. Cannon is the 

author of multiple articles and books.

Acknowledgments

The author thanks Dr. Eric Lob for his research and comments about Iranian reactions to and statements about the 

Quad Plus and the Indo-Pacific.

Notes

1. For reasons of expedience and in attempt to dodge rather than end the debate, the Middle 

East referenced in this article includes Egypt (the only Middle East state in Africa), the Arabian 

Peninsula states, the Levant, Iran, and Turkey.

2. Iran, Turkey, and the UAE are used, in part, because they can be said to be representative of 

the three primary ethnolinguistic and religious groupings of the Middle East: Turkish (Sunni 

Muslim), Persian (Shi’a Muslim), and Arab (majority Sunni Muslim), thus providing potentially 

rich case studies with which to test this article’s hypotheses and answer its research questions.

3. Jagannath P. Panda, “India, the Blue Dot Network, and the “Quad Plus” Calculus.” Journal 

of Indo-Pacific Affairs 3, no. 3 (Fall 2020): 3–21, https://media.defense.gov/.

4. Ronald L. Tammen, Jacek Kugler, and Douglas Lemke, “Foundations of Power Transition 

Theory,” in  Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Politics, ed. William R. Thomson (Oxford: Oxford 

University Press, 26 October 2017), https://doi.org/.

5. For an encapsulation of the “China threat” and “peaceful rise” theories, see: Ming Xia, “‘China 

Threat’ or a ‘Peaceful Rise of China’?,” New York Times, 2006, https://archive.nytimes.com/; and 

Jianyong Yue, “Peaceful Rise of China: Myth or Reality?,” International Politics 45, no. 4 (2008): 

439–56.

6. Aylem Alemdaroglu and Sultan Tepe, “Erdogan Is Turning Turkey into a Chinese Client 

State,” Foreign Policy, 16 September 2020, https://foreignpolicy.com/.

7. Frederico Donelli and Brendon J. Cannon, “Power Projection of Middle East States in the 

Horn of Africa: Linking Security Burdens with Capabilities,” forthcoming.

8. US Senate, Testimony by Dr. Nasser Hadian Before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee 

Hearing: Iran, Security Threats and U.S. Policy , 28 October 2003, https://www.iranwatch.org/.

9. Alam Saleh and Zakiyeh Yazdanshenas, “Iran’s Pact with China Is Bad News for the West,” 

Foreign Policy, 9 August 2020, https://foreignpolicy.com/.

10. “Iran turns to China & India in the Face of US Sanctions,” Belt and Road News, 27 December 2019, https://www.beltandroad.news/.

11. “Çin’den Orta Koridor Üzerinden gelen en uzun Yük Treni İzmit’e Ulaşti,” TCDD 

Taşımacılık, 8 January 2020, http://www.tcddtasimacilik.gov.tr/; and Selçuk Colakoğlu, “China’s 

Belt and Road Initiative and Turkey’s Middle Corridor: A Question of Compatibility.” Middle 

East Institute, 29 January 2099, https://www.mei.edu/.

12. Subhes C. Bhattacharyya and Andon Blake, “Analysis of oil export dependency of MENA 

countries: Drivers, trends and prospects,” Energy Policy 38, no. 2 (2010): 1098–1107; 1103.

13. Kristian Coates Ulrichsen, The United Arab Emirates: Power, Politics and Policy-Making

(Basingstoke, UK: Taylor & Francis, 2016).
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14. UAE academic and official, interview with author, Abu Dhabi, 2 April 2020; and UAE 

academic, interview with author, 31 March 2020.

15. Mouza Alnuaimi, “Analyzing the current relationship between the UAE and China: Strategic Hedging or Diversification of Partners?” (MA thesis, Abu Dhabi: Khalifa University, 2020), 

83–84.

16. Megha Gupta and Mansheetal Singh, “COVID-19: China’s ‘Health Silk Road’ diplomacy in 

Iran and Turkey,” Observer Research Foundation (ORF), 13 April 2020, https://www.orfonline.org/.

17. China, France, Russia, United Kingdom, and United States, plus Germany and the European Union.

18. “US strategy to contain China in the Indo-Pacific,” Taadol Newspaper, n.d., http://www 

.taadolnewspaper.ir/.

19. Maryam Shafiee, “The United States, Australia, Japan and India have revived the ‘Quad’ 

Strategic Group,” Islamic Republic News Agency, 5 October 2019, https://www.irna.ir/.

20. Gupta and Singh, “COVID-19: China’s ‘Health Silk Road’ diplomacy.”

21. Senior Turkish government official, interview with author, 15 September 2020.

22. Senior Turkish government official interview.

23. Senior Turkish government official interview.

24. Brahma Chellaney, “Beijing quietly presses ahead with its expansionist agenda in the South 

China Sea,” The National, 25 March 2018, https://www.thenationalnews.com/.

25. Krishan Nayar, “Hudson Institute hails UAE-India cooperation as model for US’ IndoPacific strategy,” WAM, 4 March 2020, https://www.wam.ae/.

26. Rory Reynolds and Bryant Harris, “UAE, US and Israel launch $3 billion investment 

fund,” The National, 21 October 2020, https://www.pressreader.com/.

27. For the UAE’s attempt to achieve arms exporting status, see: Zoltan Barany, “Indigenous 

Defense Industries in the Gulf,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, 24 April 2020, 

https://www.csis.org/. For more about India’s efforts, see: Ash Rossiter and Brendon J. Cannon, 

“Making arms in India? Examining New Delhi’s renewed drive for defence-industrial indigenization,” Defence Studies 19, no. 4 (2020): 353–72.

28. The UAE also readily accepted medical assistance and COVID-19 kits from China. Conversely, Emirati offers of free COVID-19 tests for US Embassy officials and US military personnel 

in the UAE using Chinese-made testing kits were rejected by Washington on account of privacy 

concerns. Simeon Kerr, “UAE caught between US and China as powers vie for influence in Gulf,” 

Financial Times, 2 June 2020, https://www.ft.com/.

29. Alnuaimi, “Analyzing the current relationship,” 79–84.

Disclaimer

The views and opinions expressed or implied in JIPA are those of the authors and should not be construed as carrying the 

official sanction of the Department of Defense, Department of the Air Force, Air Education and Training Command, Air 

University, or other agencies or departments of the US government or their international equivalents.
JOURNAL OF INDO-PACIFIC AFFAIRS  SPECIAL ISSUE 2020 285

A VIEW FROM THE OTHERS

Pakistan–Afghanistan–Iran 

Triangularity and the Quad Plus

Countering China’s Growing Influence

Kenta Aoki

Abstract

Little has been discussed about the role of Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Iran in 

the context of the Quad Plus’s possible areas of cooperation in the Indo-Pacific. 

This matters greatly to the Quad Plus because the area holds the Strait of Hormuz, 

which features as one of the world’s most strategic chokepoints. To fill this gap, this 

article discusses impact of the Trump administration’s “America First” on Pakistan, 

Afghanistan, and Iran, and argues that the policy led these nations to look toward 

China and Russia. After closely looking at each case, this article proposes that 

engaging Iran—rejoining Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action ( JCPOA) and 

keeping Chabahar port development open—and supporting the Afghan peace 

process are the way forward to bring greater peace and stability not only in this 

region but also in the whole world in the long term. Uncertainty remains as the 

United States and Iran lost trust in one other. Thus, the United States and Iran 

must use a limited window of opportunity before the next Iranian presidential 

election in June 2021.

Introduction

In recent years, competition for influence within the Indo-Pacific theater has 

been gaining wider attention in strategic circles. This is partly because the basic 

principles of rules-based order have waned, as “unilateral attempts to change the 

status quo by coercion” began to be seen in several parts of the world, as exemplified 

by China’s aggressive behavior in the South China Sea and Russia’s annexation of 

Crimea.1 This trend has become more visible after the COVID-19 pandemic, as 

the United States and Europe realized the perils of China’s “wolf warrior” diplomacy.2

 Under such circumstances, ways to improve connectivity are becoming 

increasingly important political, diplomatic, and economic tools that promote stability and prosperity. Currently, the Quad Plus, originally composed of Australia, 

India, Japan, and the United States and later joined by South Korea, Vietnam, New 

Zealand, Israel, and Brazil,3 works hand-in-hand toward enhancing connectivity, 

expanding its scope from the Asia-Pacific to the Indo-Pacific.
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Previous studies primarily focused on Southeast Asia under the motto of 

“ASEAN’s centrality and unity,” due to China’s expansionism in East China 

and South China Seas.4 Thus, little has been discussed about the role of Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Iran in the context of the Quad Plus’s possible areas of 

cooperation in the Indo-Pacific. This matters greatly to the Quad Plus because 

the area holds the Strait of Hormuz, which features as one of the world’s most 

strategic chokepoints. It hosts oil flow of 17 million barrel/day, representing 30 

percent of all seaborne-traded crude oil during 2015.5 In short, maintaining 

energy security and freedom of navigation in the area are one of the top priorities for the Quad Plus.

To fill this gap, this article argues that the Trump administration’s “America 

First” policy led Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Iran to look toward China and Russia 

for succor, which eventually incurred considerable diplomatic loss to the members 

of the Quad Plus. This article consists of four sections. The first three sections 

examine Iran, Pakistan, and Afghanistan, respectively. Then, section four discusses 

pros and cons of the research thesis. This article proposes that engaging Iran and 

supporting the Afghan peace process are the way forward to bring greater peace 

and stability not only in this region but globally as well. The methodology adopted 

in this article is based on literature review and a field survey in Chabahar, Iran, 

and Karachi, Pakistan, in February 2018 and March 2019, respectively.

Iran: The Point of Contention

The Trump Administration’s Maximum Pressure Campaign

Since the inauguration of US president Donald Trump in January 2017, his 

administration has pursued a hardline stance against Iran, labeling it as the main 

sponsor of global terrorism. The US–Iran standoff has led Iran to approach China, 

which is damaging the interests of members of the Quad Plus. For this reason, this 

section will scrutinize US policy toward Iran during the Trump administration.

Trump’s mistrust of Iran is deeply rooted, as he continuously criticized Iran’s 

destabilizing activities in the Middle East throughout the 2016 election cycle and 

into his term as president.6 On 8 May 2018, Trump eventually announced that the 

United States would unilaterally withdraw from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of 

Action ( JCPOA),7 which had been seen as one of the most important legacies of 

the Obama administration. On 21 May 2018, shortly after Trump’s announcement, Secretary of State Mike Pompeo pledged to commence “the strongest sanctions in history” and outlined 12 conditions required of Iran before any new deal 

would be made with the country.8 These demands encompassed various issues, 
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such as abandoning nuclear programs, including plutonium processing and development of ballistic missiles; suspending support for Shia militias in Lebanon, 

Iraq, Yemen, Syria, Afghanistan, and elsewhere; and the cessation of threats toward Israel, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates. These demands were 

designed to curtail Iran’s strategic intent and ultimately minimize Tehran’s options, which is considered to be a huge blow to the Iranian regime.

Under the maximum pressure campaign, Iran has faced one of the most serious financial crises in history. Washington’s harsh policy toward Iran took a 

phased approach. The biggest step against the Iranian regime was to end sanction waivers for Iranian crude oil imports for eight countries: India, China, 

Turkey, Greece, Italy, Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan. This meant that few 

governments were allowed to import crude oil from Iran, which was the country’s main source of revenue. Despite the fact that Iran needed India’s continued 

support for buying fuel, India had to stop purchasing Iranian crude oil. Hence, 

it was not a coincidence when Iran excluded India from a railway project between Chabahar and Zahedan.9

With a mixture of many other financial sanctions on Iranian companies and 

individuals locked out of the international money transfer network, the country’s 

financial situation got worse daily, which consequently led Tehran to request 5 

billion USD in emergency funding from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) 

in March 2020.10 In addition, the COVID-19 outbreak hit Iran in February 2020, 

exacerbating the financial situation and rendering it more difficult for Iranian 

citizens to lead normal lives. Due to the closure of borders with neighboring 

countries and the decrease of inbound tourists, revenue generation from trade of 

non-oil products and tourism, two potential alternative industries, also became 

limited. In short, Iran is faced with a double issue: US sanctions and COVID-19.

In addition to such economic statecraft, tensions between the United States 

and Iran centered on the Persian Gulf, Iraq, and other places, soared dramatically. 

The turning point was a US drone strike on IRGC Quds Force commander Qasem Soleimani near the Baghdad International Airport on 3 January 2020, which 

further sparked tensions between Washington and Tehran. In response, the IRGC 

launched more than a dozen missiles at al-Asad Air Base in Iraq’s Anbar province, 

which hosts US troops, on 8 January 2020.11 Although many expected the United 

States to exact revenge against Iran, the Trump did not approve further actions, 

expressing the view that Iran avoided causing human casualties and eventually 

stood down. In addition, debates surrounding the arms embargo on Iran and attacks on nuclear facilities in Natanz are still ongoing.

This status, as well as any action for Israel and against Iran, was maintained by 

President Trump, aimed at winning a second term in November 2020. However, 
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as former Vice Pres. Joe Biden won the election, there could be a significant shift 

in American policy, as he has officially expressed his wish to rejoin JCPOA if Iran 

returns to strict compliance with the deal.12 Iran has gradually reduced its commitment under JCPOA by exceeding the threshold (3.67 percent) of uranium 

enrichment since May 2019. As of June 2020, the Institute for Science and International Security (ISIS) estimates that Iran’s stock of low-enriched uranium grew 

to 2,323.9 kilograms, all enriched below 5 percent, and breakout timelines are 3.5 

months.13 It is true that Iran is engaged in destabilizing behavior across the Middle East, crushes internal protesters in brutal fashion, and poses a threat to the 

interests of the Quad Plus. Nevertheless, it is also certain that the JCPOA provided a platform where the UN Security Council’s five permanent members and 

Germany (referred to as the P5+1) were able to have a dialogue with Iran. In this 

sense, it must be said that the United States eventually pushed Iran to reactivate 

its nuclear development programs. Israel, a member of the Quad Plus, would 

surely oppose any cooperation with Iran, so cautious measures must be taken to 

reduce tensions between the United States and Iran.

Chabahar Port Development

Although what the members of the Quad Plus can offer to Iran seems limited, 

or nearly nonexistent, it is notable that the Chabahar port is exempted from US 

sanctions. According to the US Department of State, the United States granted 

an exception to Chabahar because it is vital for the ongoing support of Afghanistan’s growth and humanitarian relief.14 Washington also might have taken its 

friendly diplomatic relations with India into consideration. Hence, Chabahar port 

development, an India-led initiative, is likely to be a future strategic option for the 

Quad Plus members.

The Chabahar port is a deep-sea port located in Sistan and Baluchestan province, in southeastern Iran (see map below). The port faces the Gulf of Oman and 

is a strategically important port connecting the Middle East and South Asia. It 

is just 160 km west of Gwadar port in Pakistan, which is being developed as a 

gateway to the China–Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) (see section two for 

more details). Most of the inhabitants in the Sistan and Baluchestan province are 

Balochis, whose mother tongue is not Persian but Balochi, and the area has been 

underdeveloped compared to other Iranian provinces. In the eighteenth and 

nineteenth centuries, the Chabahar port was in the subterritory of the Omani 

Empire, like the Gwadar and Bandar-e Abbas ports.15 During the Iran–Iraq War 

(1980–1988), the port played an important role in export and import of cargos 

because it is located outside of the Strait of Hormuz,16 but the port’s development itself was not promoted. On 23 May 2016, Afghanistan, India, and Iran 
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signed a tripartite agreement for the development of the Chabahar port. India 

announced its financial assistance to the Chabahar port, as well as its surroundings and relevant facilities, which cost a total of 500 million USD. Furthermore, 

in February 2018, the operational rights of the Shahid Beheshti port, one of two 

seaports at Chabahar, were awarded to India Ports Global Limited.17

(Source: Google map)

Figure 1. Chabahar port and Makran Coast

New Delhi is committed to developing the Chabahar port as a means of containing China and Pakistan in the Indo-Pacific, promoting connectivity with 

Central Asia, and supporting reconstruction efforts in Afghanistan. First, India is 

believed to have begun supporting Chabahar port development to counter China, 

as the two countries have an antagonistic relationship at the regional level. Due to 

the port’s unique geographical location, Chabahar is a conjunction point between 

the “free, open, and inclusive Indo-Pacific” vision proposed by Narendra Modi 

and China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Although India’s Indo-Pacific strategy 

officially represents an inclusive and open vision, not aimed at countering a specific nation’s initiative, China’s increasing influence is certainly unfavorable for 

New Delhi and India’s allies.

Secondly, India focuses on connecting with the Central Asian Republics 

(CAR), which possess vast natural resources and are potential energy suppliers for 

India. India advocates the Connect Central Asia Policy, which aims to deepen 

India’s relations and connectivity with CAR in the areas of politics, security, 

economy, culture, and so forth. India has also been promoting the International 

North-South Transport Corridor initiative, attempting to establish a trade route 
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with Central Asia and the Caucasus region via sea, land, and air routes. When 

India eyes Central Asia, the roles of Iran and Afghanistan naturally become important because India must bypass Pakistan, which does not allow the transit of 

Indian goods. Finally, supporting reconstruction efforts in Afghanistan is thought 

to be one of the main reasons India supports Chabahar. Afghanistan is a landlocked country surrounded by six other nations, and access to the ocean has always 

been a matter of concern. For New Delhi, stabilizing war-torn Afghanistan is in 

India’s own national interest because of issues related to security, counternarcotics, 

and more. Taking geostrategic importance into account, it would be accurate to 

state that Chabahar port may well be a fault line in the Quad Plus infrastructure 

cooperation in the Indo-Pacific.18

Iran’s Look East Policy

The abovementioned argument can be evidenced through China’s increasing 

presence in Iran, as well as Iran’s approach toward China in recent years. To put it 

simply, this represents a potential threat to the Quad Plus and considerable gains 

for China. First proposed by China’s leader Xi Jinping during a visit to Iran in 

2016, Iran is preparing to sign a 25-year Iran–China comprehensive cooperation 

program soon. The program is designed for China to purchase Iranian oil over the 

next 25 years. On the other hand, Iran is supposed to receive China’s support in 

various areas, including military, security, banking, telecommunication, infrastructure development, education, technology, and science.19 Specific details of the 

program have yet to be publicly disclosed, but some believe the deal will give 

China a military foothold in the region. Ironically, this situation was created by 

Washington’s maximum pressure campaign that devasted Iran’s economy and, 

subsequently, led its leadership to look to China. Thus, engagement with Iran is 

inextricably linked with the Quad Plus narrative.

Pakistan: CPEC as the Main BRI Project

China’s Increasing Influence

Likewise, Washington’s harsh policy toward Pakistan has led Islamabad to 

further deepen its strategic, political, and economic relationship with China. 

China’s partnership with Pakistan is nothing new, as China has placed importance on this relationship to counter India’s influence since the 1960s. With 

China’s economic growth in the early twenty-first century, the relationship between both countries has upgraded over time. For instance, in April 2015, President Xi visited Pakistan. In his interactions with Pakistan’s prime minister Nawaz 
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Sharif, Xi agreed to upgrade China–Pakistan relations to an all-weather strategic 

partnership of cooperation.20 The prospect of greater Chinese presence via the 

CPEC and Gwadar project poses greater security concerns for New Delhi and 

other members of the Quad.21

From Islamabad’s perspective, China’s financial support is invaluable for Pakistan, which has been suffering from a financial crisis for quite some time. Pakistan has asked for the IMF’s help several times, as it is faced with a trade deficit, 

a declining foreign currency reserve, and a drop in the value of the Pakistani 

Rupee. Under such circumstances, China’s proposal to develop Pakistan’s infrastructure via CPEC is a meaningful offer. The Trump administration further 

drove Islamabad toward China through Washington’s hardline stance toward 

Pakistan, regarding it as a sponsor of terrorism in Afghanistan and other places.22

The members of the Quad Plus should counter China’s strategic outreach by 

countering Beijing’s efforts in Pakistan.

Gwadar Port Development

Since the Gwadar port plays an important role as a gateway to the CPEC, 

finding a way to diminish Gwadar’s importance is a matter of concern for the 

Quad Plus. Although the development of the Gwadar port by the Pakistani authority can be traced back to the 1950s,23 China’s interest in the port emerged 

only in 2001. A Chinese company drew a masterplan for the development in 

October 2001 and won the contract to construct multipurpose berths.24 Although 

the Port of Singapore Authority took charge of the management and operation of 

Gwadar port in January 2007, the lack of notable progress in development led 

Islamabad to end that contract in February 2013, again awarding stewardship to 

the Chinese Overseas Ports Holding Company.25 President Xi announced that 

China would commence the BRI during the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation 

summit in November 2014 and placed CPEC as one of the key connectivity 

projects in China’s strategic vision.

It would not be easy to precisely specify China and Pakistan’s strategic intent to 

promote Gwadar port development, but it is certain that both countries place 

importance from a strategic perspective.26 First, the Gwadar port is expected to 

function as an alternative transit route to circumvent the Malacca Straits. This 

matters greatly to China. Indeed, it is true that connecting with the Gwadar port 

and opening access to the Arabian Sea through Pakistan might produce economic 

benefits for the Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region, the relatively underdeveloped western part of China. However, the Khunjerab Pass, located on the border 

of China and Pakistan-occupied Kashmir, is usually closed for 3–4 months in the 

winter every year; thus, a land route from Gwadar to Kashgar does not seem to be 
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a stable and reliable path for traders. It is also not cost-efficient for traders, as 

shipping goods by container is much cheaper than transporting by road.27

Second, as Gwadar is located far from the Indian border, it serves as an alternative port to Karachi for Pakistan in case of an emergency. During the IndoPakistan War of 1971, India blockaded Karachi and there was a very significant 

chance of this happening again during the Kargil War of 1999. For this reason, 

focusing on Gwadar enables Pakistan to expand its naval capabilities and to have 

more strategic options.28 In the short term, China does not have to rely much on 

Gwadar port for military and strategic purposes, as China opened the Chinese 

People’s Liberation Army Support Base in Djibouti in 2017. The Chinese navy 

can resupply and refuel at Djibouti. Having said that, as mentioned above, the 

value of the Gwadar port cannot be measured from its accessibility and feasibility 

in normal situations alone. It would be fair to state that China invests in Gwadar 

port with an eye toward its military and strategic potential in the long term.

“Strategic Depth” and Afghanistan Connection

In fact, the members of the Quad Plus should be wary of Pakistan’s irresponsible and aggressive behavior in the region. Under the concept of “strategic depth,” 

Pakistan is believed to covertly support the Taliban in Afghanistan and jihadist 

groups fighting to “liberate” Kashmir in India. As Ahmed Rashid mentions, 

Pakistan started supporting the Taliban in the early 1990s,29 with Pakistan’s military establishment providing the Taliban with sanctuaries and resources even today.30 Pakistan’s influence in Afghanistan is likely to increase in the aftermath of 

the 2020 US-signed Doha peace deal with the Taliban, which paves the way for 

the Taliban to play an active role in Afghanistan’s future political system, where it 

might even emerge as the leading political faction in Afghanistan (see section 

three for more details). In parallel with the Taliban’s political rise, Pakistan’s influence will proportionally grow bigger in the region. This is particularly worrying 

for India, a core member of the Quad Plus, and should bring New Delhi to revisit 

its foreign policy toward Afghanistan.

Afghanistan: Economic Integration after the 

Withdrawal of the US Troops

Chabahar Port Development as a Leverage to Pakistan

The withdrawal of the US troops, as agreed upon in the Doha Agreement, 

could create a power vacuum, which might result in China and/or Russia gaining 

substantial influence in Kabul. Thus, continued engagement by the Quad Plus is 
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crucial to maintaining security and stability in Afghanistan. In this context, the 

members of the Quad Plus should take Afghanistan into consideration when 

shaping their strategy in the Indo-Pacific because Kabul is one of the main stakeholders in the Chabahar port development. Iran signed a memorandum of agreement with Afghanistan to lease 50-hector of land for Afghan businesses in May 

2012.31 In this context, Afghanistan is supposed to play a role as a user of the 

Chabahar port. Ports are only a means to transit goods, so it could be said that 

connecting them with markets is more important than building infrastructure. 

Here, Afghanistan’s significant role can be pointed out.

First, Afghanistan views the Chabahar port as a strategic project primarily 

because Kabul aims to shift Afghanistan from being an aid-dependent to a selfreliant country.32 Since the Bonn Agreement on 5 December 2001, the international community has attempted to democratize and liberalize Afghanistan in 

the political and economic spheres. Nevertheless, it turned out that politicians 

played a political game, distributing vested interests to their own patronage networks, and corruption has remained prevalent. Additionally, revenue from the 

Afghan government heavily relies on the donor countries/agencies—far from the 

self-reliant state envisioned. It is imperative for Afghanistan to sell its own products, such as natural agricultural resources, to foreign countries, gaining foreign 

currency on its own. The Chabahar port can be categorized as one of many projects that provide better connectivity, along with the Lapis Lazuli corridor, which 

opened in 2018 and links Afghanistan to Turkey via Turkmenistan, Azerbaijan, 

and Georgia; the Turkmenistan–Uzbekistan–Tajikistan–Afghanistan–Pakistan 

power interconnecting project, which aims to export power from Turkmenistan to 

Afghanistan and Pakistan; the Central Asia-South Asia (CASA-1000) power project, which will allow for the export of surplus hydroelectricity from Kyrgyzstan and 

Tajikistan to Afghanistan and Pakistan; and others.

Second, Afghanistan commits to Chabahar port development to evade the influence of Pakistan. For a long time, Afghanistan and Pakistan have had diplomatic disputes, including skirmishes over the Durand Line. One example is that 

the diplomatic relations between both countries were terminated in 1961 due to 

heightened tension. In recent years, the relationship has worsened because Afghanistan publicly accuses Pakistan of supporting terrorist organizations operating in Afghanistan. A strategic calculation allows Afghanistan to move toward 

bypassing Pakistan in trading activities. In fact, for a long time, Pakistan had been 

the country that traded with Afghanistan, but starting in 2014, Iran replaced 

Pakistan as Kabul’s primary trading partner.33 The Chabahar port is being used as 

a leverage to Pakistan to counter Islamabad’s influence in Afghanistan.
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Doha Agreement and Aftermath

Regional dynamics should be noted, because the withdrawal of US troops from 

Afghanistan will certainly present a new challenge to members of the Quad Plus. 

On 29 February 2020, Zalmay Khalilzad, US Special Representative for Afghanistan Reconstruction, and Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar, deputy leader of the 

Taliban,34 and chief of the Taliban Afghanistan Political Office in Doha, Qatar, 

signed a peace deal that guarantees the Taliban will not allow its members, other 

individuals, or groups, including al-Qaeda, to use Afghanistan’s soil to threaten 

the security of the United States and its allies, while the United States will reduce 

the number of US forces in Afghanistan to 8,600 within 135 days, ultimately 

completing withdrawal of all remaining forces by May 2021.35 What the international community had been concerned about was that Afghanistan might once 

again become a safe haven for foreign terrorist organizations because of the power 

vacuum created by the withdrawal of foreign troops. This deal partially resolves 

such concerns; however, the Taliban has agreed to neither a reduction in violence 

nor a permanent ceasefire. For this reason, security in Afghanistan is a grave concern for the Quad Plus.

Although violence in any form must be condemned, it is highly likely that, in 

the long term, the Taliban will either be part of the political system or a leading 

governing political faction in Afghanistan after the Doha Agreement, which, in 

a way, guarantees the Taliban’s future political status. In this context, it is imperative to economically integrate Afghanistan into international markets and 

contain Pakistan’s influence. First, as mentioned above, for Afghanistan to cease 

being an aid-dependent country, it is necessary for Kabul to stand on its own feet 

and earn adequate revenue for the country’s economy. The Quad Plus could consider offering business opportunities or investing in Afghanistan to explore its 

vast natural resources, such as oil, gas, iron, copper, and rare earth and utilize its 

abundant agricultural products, such as fruits and vegetables. This will ultimately 

lead to a more stable situation in Afghanistan by providing economic stability 

and prosperity.

Second, as it is inevitable that Pakistan’s influence will increase in parallel with 

the Taliban’s rise, the Quad Plus must maintain a channel with Pakistan’s military 

establishment so that peace negotiations in Doha will move in a positive direction. In this regard, Khalilzad’s meeting with Pakistan’s Chief of Army Staff, Qamar Javed Bajwa, on 14 September 2020 was meaningful,36 illustrating that 

Washington views Pakistan as an influential actor in the Afghan peace process.37

While peace negotiations must be Afghan-owned and Afghan-led, third parties 

can have an influence on the process, as a similar case was evident in the 2014 
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presidential election. These regional relations should be reflected in the regional 

policies of the Quad Plus.

Dilemma between Belt and Road Initiative and the Free and 

Open Indo-Pacific

While Afghanistan tries to diversify its trade routes, it does not necessarily mean 

that it is turning its back on China’s BRI. It may be true that, considering Kabul’s 

relationship with Pakistan, Afghanistan prefers to export and import products 

through Iran via the Chabahar port. However, it only means that Afghanistan is 

fond of possessing more options rather than limiting itself by selecting only one. In 

fact, Afghanistan was among the first countries to sign an agreement with China 

for the joint construction of the BRI.38 At the same time, Afghanistan is considered to be in favor of the Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP) initiative favored by 

the Quad, as the United States, Japan, India, and Australia were major donors in 

reconstructing Afghanistan after the Bonn Agreement. Given Afghanistan’s 

unique geographical location, it is important for members of the Quad Plus to 

make a strategy that engages Afghanistan in connectivity projects so that it does 

not lapse back into isolation and become a safe haven for terrorism again.

Policy Implications for the Quad Plus

Accelerant Factor

Discussions have so far led to an interim conclusion that the Quad Plus should 

be concerned about China’s growing influence in Pakistan, Afghanistan, and 

Iran; thus, rejoining the JCPOA and promoting Chabahar port development is 

likely to produce a positive outcome for stability in the region. However, this 

issue needs to be argued with accelerant and suppression factors in mind. First, 

considering China’s heavy investment in CPEC, the Quad Plus must act to contain China’s growing influence. As mentioned earlier, Gwadar port development 

has been almost unilaterally promoted by China to ensure an alternative route in 

case of the closure of the Strait of Malacca. In recent years, China has strengthened its naval capabilities and constructed alternate sea lanes. This matters to 

Japan, a member of the Quad Plus, as it faces China’s aggressive behavior in the 

East and South China Seas.

Second, allies of the Quad Plus, except the United States and Israel, have had 

favorable relationships with Iran. Thus, engaging Tehran will surely be a diplomatic asset for these countries to ease US–Iran tensions. It is evident that US–Iran 

military confrontation is a threat to the international community; so, third parties, 
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such as Australia, Japan, India, and South Korea, can play a mediation role. In 

particular, Prime Minister Abe’s visit to Tehran in June 2019 and Iranian president Hassan Rouhani’s reciprocal visit to Tokyo in December in the same year 

illustrate the ability of Quad members’ leaders to facilitate productive interaction. 

Likewise, channels for dialogues should be open.

Third, it is important to recognize that Afghanistan is a part of the tripartite 

agreement on Chabahar. Stabilizing Afghanistan is a common benefit for the 

Quad Plus, and developing Chabahar will result in Afghanistan’s self-reliance 

help bypass Pakistan’s increasing influence.

Suppression Factor

On the other hand, it is too early to conclude that the Quad Plus should 

abruptly change its policy toward Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Iran. First, seeing 

the Trump administration’s hardline policy toward Iran, it is not feasible that the 

Quad Plus can become actively engaged with infrastructure development in Iran. 

The United States and Iran terminated diplomatic relationship on 7 April 1980 

after Iranian students seized the US Embassy in Tehran and took its staff hostage 

on 4 November 1979.39 Although Chabahar port is exempted from US sanctions, 

it is not an easy path for the Quad Plus to choose a drastic change in policy making toward Iran, given 40 years of hostility between Washington and Tehran.

Second, the Quad Plus should be cautious regarding Iran’s intent. On 27 December 2019, a joint naval exercise was conducted among Iran, China, and Russia, 

utilizing Chabahar port during the military exercise. This strongly implies that 

Chabahar port is developed not only for commercial purposes but also military 

purposes. In addition, the Rouhani regime aims to open a pipeline project connecting to Jask port, which is also on the Makran Coast.40 Additionally, the Islamic Revolution Guard Corps is expanding its naval capabilities with the opening of a new port at Sirik.41 Taking these developments into account, developing 

Chabahar port could be a double-edged sword for the Quad Plus.

Prospects and Challenges

Based on the pros and cons of this discussion, it turns out that members of the Quad 

Plus might consider Chabahar port as a potential joint cooperation projects because for 

India the port could serve to counter the Gwadar port under CPEC. For other Quad 

Plus members, getting involved is beneficial because it serves as a breakwater toward 

China’s expansion in South Asia and the Middle East. Aside from infrastructure, other 

potential areas of cooperation include research and development, nurturing human 

resources, environment, and investment (heavy industries, tourism, and so forth). 
Pakistan–Afghanistan–Iran Triangularity and the Quad Plus Countering China’s Growing Influence

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However, the Chinese-sponsored CPEC could be a potential risk for the Quad 

Plus because it can be concluded that China and Pakistan view it from a strategic 

rather than economic viewpoint. In an emergency situation, the CPEC and Gwadar port could be utilized to benefit China and Pakistan. At the same time, rejoining 

the JCPOA would greatly reduce the current tension between Washington and 

Tehran. Last but not least, the Afghanistan issue and the repercussions of the Doha 

Agreement should be considered. Stability in Afghanistan is a common goal for 

Quad Plus members; so, supporting the peace negotiations is one of the potential 

areas for Quad Plus cooperation.

Having said that, uncertainty remains as the United States and Iran lost trust 

in one other as a result of the Trump administration’s maximum pressure campaign. It will not be easy for Teheran to return to compliance with the JCPOA 

because the Rouhani regime would face opposition from anti-US political factions and must appease his own base in the lead up to the Iranian elections. Nevertheless, Tehran has expressed its readiness to comply with the JCPOA, if the 

United States apologizes for its past mistakes, compensates financial losses incurred as a result of Washington’s maximum pressure campaign, and returns to 

the JCPOA.42 Interestingly, the Iranian presidential election is to be held in June 

2021, and hardline candidates are expected to run. The United States and Iran 

must use this limited window of opportunity wisely.

Conclusion

This article discussed the Trump administration’s policies toward Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Iran and argued these policies led to diplomatic losses for Washington. In the case of Pakistan, Washington’s South Asia and Afghanistan policies 

have cemented Pakistan’s deepening relationship with China. Likewise, Iran is 

looking east to resolve the worst financial crisis in its history. In Afghanistan, the 

withdrawal of US troops will certainly culminate in a fluid security situation and 

the future presence of China and Russia. Keeping in mind that Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Iran collectively represent a “missing link” in the FOIP vision, this 

article pointed out potential areas of cooperation by members of the Quad Plus 

in Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Iran.

The measures taken to handle the COVID-19 pandemic, particularly in Iran, 

should be discussed among members of the Quad Plus. As of 7 November 2020, 

COVID-19 cases in Iran have reached 673,250, with 37,832 deaths, which ranks 

Iran as the fourteenth-worst stricken country in the world.43 As the Quad Plus 

was originally convened to counter COVID-19,44 this issue could be one of the 

pillars for ongoing discussion.
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The relationship between Afghanistan and Iran is another point of concern, 

because Iran is believed to support pro-Iranian proxy forces in the Middle East.45

It is of concern that Iran might expand its ties with the Taliban to exercise more 

influence in the region and to kick the United States out of the region.

Considering all these discussions, this article proposes that engaging Iran and 

supporting the Afghan peace process is the way forward to bring peace and stability. President Trump’s foreign policy toward Iran, Pakistan, and Afghanistan, 

above all, benefited China, which is seeking a bigger role in the region, in access 

to oil and power.46 It is urgently needed for the Quad Plus, including the next US 

administration, to form a consistent approach, recognizing that apparently separate issues are, in substance, interrelated.

Kenta Aoki

Kenta Aoki is a research fellow at Middle East Institute of Japan (MEIJ), Tokyo, Japan. He taught at Ochanomizu 

University before joining MEIJ in 2019. His research primarily focuses on contemporary politics in Afghanistan and 

Iran. He earned a BA degree in sociology from Sophia University, Japan, and an MA in peace studies from the 

University of Bradford, UK. His recent publications include “Chabahar: The Fault-line in India-Japan Infrastructure Cooperation,” in Scaling India-Japan Cooperation in Indo-Pacific and Beyond 2025: Corridors, Connectivity and Contours, ed. Jagannath P. Panda (KW Publishers: 2019); “Afghan Local Police and Statebuilding,” in Hybrid Statebuilding (Nakanishiya Shuppan: 2019, in Japanese), and others.

Notes

1. Japan Ministry of Defense, Defense of Japan 2020 (Tokyo: Ministry of Defense, 2020), 17.

2. Jagannath Panda, “Xi’s lost chance in Asia,” Japan Times, 17 October 2020.

3. In March 2020, US Deputy Secretary of State Stephen Biegun called a telephonic conference among the Quad countries and three new partners, South Korea, Vietnam, and New Zealand, to tackle the COVID-19 pandemic. Analysts started to call this group “the Quad Plus.” 

Afterward, in May 2020, Israel and Brazil also joined this strategic alignment.

4. Japan Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Basic Concept: Free and Open Indo-Pacific,” May 2020, 

https://www.mofa.go.jp/.

5. “World Oil Transit Chokepoints,” US Energy Information Administration, 25 July 2017, 

https://www.eia.gov/.

6. See: Yeganeh Torbati, “Trump election puts Iran nuclear deal on shaky ground,” Reuters, 9 

November 2016, https://www.reuters.com/; and Eric B. Lorber, “President Trump and the Iran 

Nuclear Deal,” Foreign Policy, 16 November 2016, https://foreignpolicy.com/.

7. White House, “Remarks by President Trump on the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action,” 

8 May 2018, https://www.whitehouse.gov/.

8. US Department of State, “After the Deal: A New Iran Strategy,” 21 May 2018, https://www 

.state.gov/.
Pakistan–Afghanistan–Iran Triangularity and the Quad Plus Countering China’s Growing Influence

JOURNAL OF INDO-PACIFIC AFFAIRS  SPECIAL ISSUE 2020 299

9. Suhasini Haidar, “Iran drops India from Chabahar rail project, cites funding delay,” The 

Hindu, 14 July 2020, https://www.thehindu.com/.

10. Although Tehran asked the IMF to help Iran recover from the financial crisis, Washington 

blocked the IMF from releasing the funds and the request has not been approved at the moment 

of writing. “Iran asks IMF for $5 billion emergency funding to fight coronavirus,” Reuters, 12 

March 2020, https://www.reuters.com/.

11. “Missiles launched by Iran against US airbases in Iraq,” Guardian, 7 January 2020, 

https://www.theguardian.com/.

12. Joseph R. Biden, Jr., “Why America Must Lead Again: Rescuing U.S. Foreign Policy After 

Trump,” Foreign Affairs, 23 January 2020, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/.

13. David Albright, Sarah Burkhard, and Andrea Stricker, “Analysis of the IAEA Iran Verification and Monitoring Report,” ISIS, 8 June 2020, https://isis-online.org/.

14. Jonathan Landay, “Pompeo allows sanctions exception for Iran port development,” Reuters, 

7 November 2018, https://jp.reuters.com/.

15. See: Kenta Aoki, “Chabahar: The Fault-line in India-Japan Infrastructure Cooperation,” in 

Scaling India-Japan Cooperation in Indo-Pacific and Beyond 2025: Corridors, Connectivity and Contours, ed. Jagannath P. Panda (New Delhi: KW Publishers, December 2019), 264–83.

16. Port and Maritime General Directorate of Sistan and Balochistan Province of Iran (PMO), 

Chabahar Port: East Axis Development Stimulus, n.d., 6.

17. Press Information Bureau, Government of India (PIB), “List of MoUs/Agreements signed 

during the visit of President of Iran to India,” 17 February 2018, http://pib.nic.in/.

18. In contrast to India, Iran and Afghanistan do not view Chabahar as a counter to China’s 

influence. Rather, Iran puts importance on the development of the Makran Coast from the perspective of national development and to enhance strategic options. For Afghanistan, Chabahar is 

a means to transport domestic products and to be connected with markets. For details, see: Aoki, 

“Chabahar: The Fault-line in India-Japan Infrastructure Cooperation,” 264–83.

19. “Barnāme Hamkārī-hā Jāme (25 Sāle) Īrān va Chīn,” Iran International, 7 July 2020, 

accessed 4 November 2020, https://issuu.com/; and Farnaz Fassihi and Steven Lee Myers, “Defying U.S., China and Iran Near Trade and Military Partnership,” New York Times, 11 July 2020, 

https://www.nytimes.com/.

20. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, “Xi Jinping Holds 

Talks with Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif of Pakistan, and Both Sides Decide to Upgrade 

China-Pakistan Relations to All-weather Strategic Partnership of Cooperation,” 21 April 

2015, https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/.

21. Gurmeet Kanwal, “Pakistan’s Gwadar Port: A New Naval Base in China’s String of Pearls in 

the Indo-Pacific,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2 April 2019, https://www.csis.org/.

22. White House, “Remarks by President Trump on the Strategy in Afghanistan and South 

Asia,” 21 August 2017, https://www.whitehouse.gov/.

23. Rafaqat Hussain, “Gwadar in Historical Perspective,” Muslim Institute, 2016, https://www 

.muslim-institute.org/.

24. Ryohei Kasai, “China’s Belt and Road Initiative and Gwadar Port Development,” Journal 

of Middle Eastern Studies (Middle East Trend 2019), March 2020, 1023–30.

25. Kasai, “China’s Belt and Road Initiative.”

26. The author, a Japanese national, applied for a No Objection Certificate (NOC) entry into 

Gwadar in early January 2019. However, Pakistanti authorities did not issue the NOC until the 

middle of March 2019 for unknown reasons.
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27. Based on the author’s hearing from an official of the JETRO Karachi office, Karachi, 

Pakistan, 20 March 2019.

28. Andrew Small, The China Pakistan Axis: Asia’s New Geopolitics (Haryana, India: Penguin 

Random House, 2015), 103.

29. Ahmed Rashid, Taliban: Militant Islam, Oil and Fundamentalism in Central Asia (New 

Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2000), 29.

30. Steve Coll, Directorate S: The C.I.A. and America’s Secret Wars in Afghanistan and Pakistan

(New York: Penguin Press, 2018).

31. Afghan Institute for Strategic Studies, Strategic Analysis of The Chabahar Port: AfghanistanIran-India Relations, 2018, 39–64, http://www.aiss.af/.

32. Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, Realizing Self-Reliance: Commitments to Reforms and Renewed Partnership, December 2014, http://mfa.gov.af/.

33. Central Statistics Office (CSO), Afghanistan, Statistical Yearbook 2016-17, 2017, 

http://cso.gov.af/.

34. Taliban is a plural form in Pashtu and Dari of Talib (meaning student in Arabic). Taliban 

do not call themselves Taliban but instead the Islamic Emirates of Afghanistan.

35. US Department of State, Agreement for Bringing Peace to Afghanistan between the Islamic 

Republic of Afghanistan which is not recognized by the United States as a state and is known as the 

Taliban and the United States of America, 29 February 2020, https://www.state.gov/.

36. Inter Services Public Relations Pakistan, “A delegation headed by Ambassador Zalmay 

Khalilzad, US Special Representative for Afghanistan Reconciliation called on COAS at GHQ, 

today,” 14 September 2020, https://www.ispr.gov.pk/.

37. Imran Khan, “Imran Khan: Peace is within reach in Afghanistan. A hasty international withdrawal would be unwise,” Washington Post, 27 September 2020, https://www.washingtonpost.com/.

38. “Afghanistan has benefited from Belt & Road Initiative,” Belt and Road News, 14 August 

2020, https://www.beltandroad.news/.

39. US Virtual Embassy Iran, “Policy & History,” n.d., https://ir.usembassy.gov/.

40. “Iran plans oil exports from the Gulf of Oman to secure crude flow,” Reuters, 25 June 2020, 

https://www.reuters.com/.

41. “IRGC Commander Inaugurates Iran’s New Naval Base East of Strait of Hormuz,” Fars 

News Agency, 24 September 2020, https://www.farsnews.ir/.

42. “Rouhani: Iranians not to succumb to bullying,” Islamic Republic News Agency, 7 September 

2020, https://en.irna.ir/.

43. “COVID-19 Coronavirus Pandemic,” Worldmeter, 2020, https://www.worldometers.info/.

44. Minister of External Affairs of Government of India, “Foreign Secretary’s Conference Call 

with counterparts from Indo-Pacific Countries,” 20 Mach 2020, https://mea.gov.in/.

45. Frank Gardner, “Iran’s network of influence in Mid-East ‘growing’,” BBC, 7 November 

2019, https://www.bbc.com/.

46. Jamil Anderlini, “China’s Middle East strategy comes at a cost to the US,” Financial Times, 

9 September 2020, https://www.ft.com/.

Disclaimer

The views and opinions expressed or implied in JIPA are those of the authors and should not be construed as carrying the 

official sanction of the Department of Defense, Department of the Air Force, Air Education and Training Command, 

Air University, or other agencies or departments of the US government or their international equivalents.
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