AIR COMMAND AND STAFF COLLEGE

AIR UNIVERSITY

Ethnic Conflict and US

Central Command Policy for

the Central Asian Republics

WILLIAM M. TART

Major, USAF

Air Command and Staff College

Wright Flyer Paper No. 16

MAXWELL AIR FORCE BASE, ALABAMA

October 2001
Disclaimer

Opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed or implied within 

solely those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of Air 

versity, the United States Air Force, the Department of Defense, or any othe

government agency. Cleared for public release: distribution unlimited.

ii

This Wright Flyer Paper and others in the series ar

available electronically at the Air University Research

Web site http://research.maxwell.af.mil under “Re

search Papers” then “Special Collections.”
Foreword

It is my great pleasure to present another of the Wri

Flyer Papers series. In this series, Air Command and S

College (ACSC) recognizes and publishes the “best of 

best” student research projects from the prior academ

year. The ACSC research program encourages our s

dents to move beyond the school’s core curriculum in th

own professional development and in “advancing ae

space power.” The series title reflects our desire to perp

uate the pioneering spirit embodied in earlier generati

of airmen. Projects selected for publication combine so

research, innovative thought, and lucid presentation in 

ploring war at the operational level. With this broad p

spective, the Wright Flyer Papers engage an eclectic ra

of doctrinal, technological, organizational, and operatio

questions. Some of these studies provide new solutions 

familiar problems. Others encourage us to leave the fam

iar behind in pursuing new possibilities. By making th

research studies available in the Wright Flyer Pape

ACSC hopes to encourage critical examination of the fi

ings and to stimulate further research in these areas.

John T. Sheridan, Brig Gen (Sel), US

Commandant

iii
Preface

I could have selected many topics as a research proj

but I chose one that stretched my academic skills, 

search abilities, and comprehension of a topic about wh

I knew little. Ignorant of the region, I began this proj

hoping to start something that would broaden my horiz

and possibly even help build or explain US military pol

The first aspect is an understatement—the second may 

be in the future.

In either case, I did not make this journey without ma

pillars of support. My total page count would be extrem

unbalanced if I named everyone who contributed to t

work. The majority of my thanks go to a handful of gr

supporters. First, without my wife, Andi, who focused m

showed me reality, and protected me from distracti

when I needed to write, none of this could have happen

Second, thanks to Maj Jeff Hupy for giving me some u

conventional advice on mind-mapping and whose contin

ous flow of information from Air Mobility Command 

only gave me great data but also kept me writing. Th

Maj Vicki Rast deserves my utmost thanks for perfect

the unconventional techniques, for focusing me on 

problem statements, and for providing an academic r

model. Fourth, thanks to Raven buddy—Maj Steven Lat

ford from CENTCOM J-5—who was an indispensable as

and thought that 75 pages of CENTCOM data would b

quick read. Fifth, to Gen Theo Mataxis, US Army (USA), 

tired, and Lt Col Forrest Wentworth, USA, I extend 

thanks for giving me the frameworks that will stick w

me forever on small-scale conflicts (I hope I got it right) a

the ability to pronounce “diaspora” correctly.

v
Abstract

This paper identifies a possible shortfall in United Sta

(US) military planning, the experience of US Central Co

mand (CENTCOM) planners in dealing with the Cen

Asian States. Their emphasis is understandably focu

on Iraq, Iran, and Pakistan. This paper develops for th

planners the most likely threat to stability in CENTCO

area of responsibility—ethnic conflict caused by spillo

from neighboring countries. This paper also attempts 

counter critics in the January–February 2000 Foreign 

fairs who maintained that our obtuse military ties are 

sensible nor sustainable. They described our current act

ties as a manner reminiscent of ill-advised US activities 

Latin America in the 1970s. All of these condemnations fr

authors Amy Myers Jaffe and Robert A. Manning, althou

mostly unfounded, are perceptions that senior econom

and political scientists hold. This paper helps CENTC

“fire for effect” in developing and implementing a dynamic 

gagement strategy in this important region.

This paper develops the theoretical framework of eth

conflict, generated both internally and from spillover. T

framework is then applied to Central Asia, illustrating it 

a complex region of numerous ethnic groups in a b

neighborhood with some powerful bad neighbors. Th

neighbors, as well as the United States, have vital intere

in engaging in this region. These interests—derived fr

the national security strategy—revolve around vital, 

portant, and tertiary interests including humanitarian 

sues. The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction a

transnational drug smuggling are major threats, wh

Central Asian resources and US influence and credibi

are major goals of US and CENTCOM involvement here

This involvement has been seemingly disjointed and e

at odds with other governmental agencies. CENTCOM ac

ities—currently limited to only three of the five republics—

rated on effect and analyzed into general courses of acti

This paper sets the stage for all CENTCOM policies by est

lishing “bounding” questions that can be used to guide p

ductive CENTCOM engagement through the complexities 

Central Asia and its possible ethnic conflict.

vii
Introduction

After the collapse of the former Soviet Union, there w

a mountain of unresolved issues that made the promis

a brighter future not as close as everyone had believ

One of these problems is the United States (US) enga

ment activities in the Newly Independent States (NIS). T

problem is that military planners have little experie

with this issue, particularly in the Central Asian Sta

(CAS) of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenist

and Uzbekistan (see map). In this paper, I took a three-s

approach to solving this problem. First, I familiarized 

reader with ethnic conflict and its proximate and unde

ing causes. Second, I described what is at stake in Cen

Asia in terms of US interests. Third, I evaluated current 

Central Command (CENTCOM) activities in the CAS a

recommended some improvements. 

Background and Methodology

I had to start with a detailed narrative of the theoret

background of ethnic conflict. Theories, supporting exa

ples, and their applications in Central Asia bolstered 

argument that ethnic conflict and spillover remain 

major threats to US interests in the area. Economic a

demographic statistics supported claims by theorists in 

descriptions of bad neighborhoods and dangerous sit

tions. Once the background was complete, I needed to e

phasize that establishing a coherent plan for total US m

itary engagement was important by researching the va

of the region and the threats to our interest in the ar

Defining “US interests,” detailing the threat of weapons 

mass destruction (WMD), and analyzing both the natu

resources and transnational threats in Central Asia s

ported my goals. The few competing views found in my 

search were included in this part of the work on both 

area’s importance and effect of traditional policies on 

region. Finally, CENTCOM planning documents and 

gagement tools allowed me to look at ongoing activities 

a coherent and spelled-out strategy. As a collective I co

rate the events as very effective, effective, or somewhat 

fective, when given the current context. Overall, the 

1
search led me to conclude that CENTCOM must creat

more effective strategy of engagement in Central Asia 

protect vital, important, and humanitarian interests fr

the threat of ethnic conflict.

Ethnic Conflict as the Threat

to Regional Stability

For illustrative purposes, it might be useful to visua

the following situation:

Today Kazakhstan retaliated on Tashkent, Uzbek

istan, with chemical and biological weapons making i

a virtual wasteland. Former Soviet scientists insid

Kazakhstan developed these weapons, under loos

governmental control, in former Soviet laboratories

The attack was in response to Uzbekistan’s expulsion

and slaughter of thousands of ethnic Kazakhs within

its borders and the destruction of 50 miles of th

priceless oil pipeline that has fueled Kazakhstan’

economic expansion. As a member of the Common

Central Asian States
wealth of Independent States (CIS) Security Arrange

ment, Kazakhstan will bring Russian forces into th

region. On the other side, as the seventh largest pro

ducer of uranium and with the world’s 15th larges

energy reserves, Uzbek leaders expect Chinese and

Western backing. Could leaders have foreseen this es

calation from ethnic violence to global involvement?

Although this scenario is not going to occur this ye

this situation and CENTCOM’s preparedness to fulfill 

national military strategy (NMS) roles of “shaping, 

sponding, and preparing now” for this scenario are top

that cry for attention. Ethnic conflict—long misund

stood—has been the root of many crises over the p

decade involving United Nations (UN), North Atlan

Treaty Organization (NATO), and US forces. Today, th

are more than 35 ongoing conflicts, with more than o

half being ethnically driven. These civil wars, as one stu

concluded, have made up 10 of the 13 “most deadly c

flicts” of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.1

Ethnic conflict in this region presents specific polit

and military challenges, which include interrelated dom

tic policies, significant foreign influence, and the newn

of these states. For the US military, challenges include 

mer Soviet training, equipment, doctrine, the nature 

ethnic conflict, and the geographic context of the CAS. B

the stakes are high and CENTCOM must be ready throu

preparation and, more importantly, an enhanced und

standing of the threat posed by ethnic conflict—this u

derstanding should have a starting point. 

Defining Ethnic Conflict Historically

The following definition provides this starting po

“Ethnic conflict is defined in terms of political, social, 

military confrontation, violent and non-violent, in wh

the disputants describe themselves in terms of race, l

guage, religion, culture, or nationality or some combi

tion of ascriptive criteria.”2

From the Mongol invasions of Central Asia to the So

conquests of this region, political change has most often b

implemented through violence. These violent changes w
based on religion, nationality, ethnicity, or just pure c

quest. Clashes between cultures and societies created the 

tremely complicated ethnic groups which exist in Cen

Asia today. For example, the Kazakhs started as a noma

Turkic people but later converted to Sunni Muslims a

Genghis Khan conquered them in the thirteenth century.

the 1700s Cossacks dominated the region, and by 1885 C

Alexander III’s Russian (Orthodox) Empire controlled al

Central Asia.4 By destroying their religious practices, th

assets, and their mobility, the Bolsheviks made the union 

inous for Kazakhs by 1920.5 This is but one example of 

complex history of the current ethnic situation in Cen

Asia. The common thread throughout the region is the 

pect of Soviet dominance and Soviet-style policies throu

most of the twentieth century.

The era of Soviet domination provided this multieth

region with three essential elements: political stability, 

curity for all ethnic groups, and—most importantly—a 

atively predictable future. The Soviets used immigrat

and ethnic resettlement as tools to maintain the balanc

power within the region in much the same way as ma

dictators, which limited the power of any one ethnic gro

while dampening ethnic tensions within the now inter

pendent groups. But as in the former Yugoslavia, the d

solution of the Soviet Union erased this interdepende

and eliminated the three elements that Soviet communi

had brought. Thus, today’s ethnic problems are caused 

the removal of hard-line communism, which has unlock

“ancient hatreds”—or has it? 

According to David A. Lake and Donald Rothchild, t

common deduction is false:

Ethnic conflict is not caused by inter-group differences, “ancien

hatreds,” or the stresses of modern life within a global economy

Nor did the end of the Cold War simply uncork ethnic passion

long-bottled up by repressive communist regimes. Rather, ethni

conflict is caused by collective fears for the future. Instead ethni

conflict often takes root as groups begin to fear for their physica

safety, and a series of dangerous and difficult to resolve strategi

dilemmas arise that contain within them the potential for tremen

dous violence.6

Revisiting the three concepts brought by Soviet contro

political stability, security, and predictable futures—a 

uation “ripe” for ethnic conflict has developed. What f
tors serve as the triggers or proximate causes for th

conflicts? Michael E. Brown—an expert on the nature 

war—suggests that there are four possible causes: b

leaders, bad domestic problems, bad neighbors, and b

neighborhoods.7

Bad Leaders

Most internal conflict is rooted in bad leaders. Of the 

going conflicts, more than 20 were elite-triggered ver

seven mass-triggered struggles.8 These struggles can be c

egorized as ideological, criminal, or pure power struggles. 

instance, the current conflict in Tajikistan is a power rat

than an ideological struggle. In this case unorganized eth

minorities are vulnerable to scapegoating, ethnic-bashi

and discrimination solely to court the power inherent in 

majority. Brown says, “power struggles are most likely to l

to widespread violence when political elites are vulnera

group histories are antagonistic, and domestic econo

problems are mounting.”9 In Tajikistan and throughout 

CAS, leaders are suspect in the wisdom of their policies gi

their ethnic situations. Questionable are the Uzbek a

Kazakh presidents who have both mandated single offi

languages. This may be acceptable in the case of Uzb

istan’s 74 percent ethnic Uzbek population, but is it effec

for Kazakhs who only make up roughly 45 percent of th

country? In each case, the presidents appear to be woo

the single biggest ethnic groups—those in power within 

government. One more complicating factor is that Russi

and other minorities provide the scientific and business 

pertise in these countries. To alienate them through p

leadership will be to drive them out of the country, ther

losing essential natural resources.10 Unfortunately, bad le

ers usually do not operate in a vacuum. Their influence c

ates bad domestic problems.

Bad Domestic Problems

Domestic problems, specifically economic growth and d

tribution of wealth, are crucial elements in analyzing inter

conflict. Examples such as Finland have proven that for 

litical stability, ethnically homogeneous populations 

withstand significant economic downturns without resort
to domestic or internal violence. Conversely, Indonesia a

the Ukraine illustrate how multiethnic populations—such 

those in the CAS—will tend to remain at peace only as l

as there are continued economic benefits in doing so. S

cinctly put by Lt Col Forrest Wentworth, Air Command a

Staff College instructor: “People focus on how many GI J

and Barbie dolls they can buy their kids for Christmas, b

this year and next, rather than historical hatred.”

These GI Joes and Barbie dolls have been increasin

tough to come by in Central Asia. Loss of subsidies fr

Moscow, government inefficiencies, and a reluctance 

the part of foreigners to invest here has made econom

growth elusive. So why has there not been large-scale v

lence? Combining the ideas of Lake and Rothchild’s w

Wentworth’s, the tremendous potential for econom

growth, particularly energy-based progress, keeps mos

the states in balance.

Other domestic issues contributing to the ripeness 

conflict in the region include changing demographic p

terns, exclusionary national policies, and failure to m

ernize institutions and industry. Domestic issues sh

ethnic group perceptions and expectations for the futu

In the CAS these expectations are regional since polic

and expectations in any of the individual CAS affect grou

throughout the neighborhood. This neighborhood po

unique and dangerous challenges for each of the CAS.

Bad Neighbors and Neighborhoods

There are few more difficult situations than being an N

situated in the middle of religious, ethnic, and power p

areas. Formative governments, exploitable natural 

sources, low levels of security, and newly acquired fr

doms make this entire area attractive for forces both ins

the Central Asian neighborhood and bordering it.

Starting from the north, the Russians have exerted pr

sure to maintain the CIS Security Arrangement and h

managed to keep all but Uzbekistan within its framewo

Russian influence or lack of decisive intervention has

most opinions, kept the civil war in Tajikistan goin

Kazakh concern that its Russian minority was suscepti

to breakaway tendencies was so strong that they mo
their capital hundreds of miles north from Almaty to 

tana, in a “flag-planting” maneuver.

Moving east, Turkish influence of their ethnically rela

brothers has been moderated by a weak Turkish econom

their own ethnic problems with Kurds and Bulgars, a

their preoccupation with the European Union. Grah

Fuller, a political scientist at RAND, states

A strengthening in nationalist forces within Central Asia will bene

fit Turkey. Over the long run, Turkish influence will probably in

crease rather than decrease. For this reason it is expected tha

Turkey can be expected to play a stronger role in democratizatio

in the region in the expectation that it will lead to greater Turkish

influence as nationalists have a chance to gain power.12

This relationship has been significantly enhanced by 

recent agreements on oil pipelines.

Continuing to the south, Iranian influence, stronges

Turkmenistan and Tajikistan, has had limited success. 

important concept often overlooked is the fact that I

and Pakistan are mainly Shia Muslim—a sect that p

motes fundamentalism—whereas, Saudi Arabia, Turk

and the majority of NIS are Sunni Muslim—a sect t

tends toward secularism in government. These for

counterbalance each other. Iranian interests here inclu

the division of the Caspian Sea and oil pipeline proje

With Iran distracted by current government unrest 

tween its supreme leader and president, Mujahadeen

Khalk attacks, and its immediate concerns in Afghanist

it has had little time to devote in exporting fundamen

ism to the CAS.13 Some believe that once Iran’s curr

regime is stabilized, its influence will be tied to that of Ir

In the scenario where Iraq is dismembered or crippled 

American efforts, Iran will concentrate on expanding its 

fluence in the north, thus prompting possible Russian 

taliation.14 With that said, Russian voting patterns rega

ing UN sanctions on Iraq can be better understood 

CENTCOM as voting for their interests rather than vot

against ours. This sustains political room for maneu

and military cooperation in the region.

Afghan and Pakistani borders bound the southeast C

Although the self-proclaimed Taliban supported by 

Pakistanis remains a source of fundamentalism in Taj

istan, the legitimate Afghan government group—lodged 
the Ferghana Valley—is their dominant concern.15 Sign

cant issues in this part of the neighborhood include poro

borders allowing sanctuary, insurgent infiltration rout

arms trade, and drug routes. A glaring example of this 

in the Uzbek foreign minister’s recent revelation that 4

Uzbek and Tajik guerrillas were trained in Afghan a

Pakistani training camps and then infiltrated into Uzb

istan via Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan.16

Moving eastward, China—particularly the Xinjia

province—shores up the last boundary of the neighborho

This province shapes Kazakh opinion on China, as it o

was a Turkic Mongol independent culture and is ethnic

similar to other CAS with its Uighers.17 Although the Chin

province presents economic opportunities, it also resurre

Kazakh fears of Chinese expansionism and religious oppr

sion. Contention for Chinese influence here is undoubte

based in economics but may be rooted in their desire 

maintain a western lever against the underbelly of Russia

The neighbors have been cooperative with each ot

thus far, especially those rooted in the ancient Fergha

Valley.18 Treaties of eternal friendship between Uzbekist

Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, the Shanghai Five (Russ

China–Kazakhstan–Kyrgyzstan–Tajikistan), CIS, a

NATO’s Partnership for Peace (PFP) operations illustr

varying degrees of CAS interdependence. These bon

however, are showing signs of weakness. The Humani

ian Times reports “For the Ferghana valley’s highly in

grated regional economy, the policies implemented by 

three governments have had a detrimental impact. C

toms controls, establishment of separate currencies a

differences in rates and means of economic liberalizat

tear at the fabric which has woven the Valley together o

centuries.”19 Essentially, the neighborhood has remain

porous yet respectful of diasporas located within ea

other’s sovereign borders. What happens when t

changes?

Ethnic Composition and Diasporas

Diasporas––or ethnic groups trapped or dispersed ins

another country––have historically been the scapegoats 
violence like Hitler’s Anschluss (the union with Nazi Germa

imposed on Austria by Hitler, with considerable assista

from the Austrians) policy, Soviet action in Poland, and e

French involvement in Algeria. This region—ethnically co

posed by the Soviets—is incredibly susceptible to nationa

leaders who would try to rescue their trapped countrymen 

a neighboring state (see appendix A). Stephen Van Eve

from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology’s Secu

Studies Program, notes that “Minority oppressing nation

ism can cause war in two ways: by provoking secessions 

its captive nations, or spurring the homelands of th

captive nations to move forcefully to free their oppressed 

nationals. [This] is most dangerous if the oppressed min

ties have nearby friends who have the capacity to protect 

oppressed nation by force.”20 From the discussions earl

every nation in the CAS seems to have a friend to back th

up. The weight of these friends and the likelihood of their 

volvement in an ever-expanding conflict makes CENTCO

success here crucial.

Why This Spells Bad News

The first report, “New World Coming,” of the US Co

mission on National Security/21st Century (also known 

the Hart–Rudman Commission) foresees “An increase 

the rise of suppressed nationalism, ethnic or religious v

lence, humanitarian disasters, major catalytic regio

crises, and the spread of dangerous weapons. Most v

lence will erupt due to internal conflicts in existing stat

As more and more people learn about the state of life in 

rest of the world they will be less tolerant of their own 

pressive or incompetent leaders.”21 The Hart–Rudm

Commission’s documented projections for conflict in 

ensuing 25 years reflect problems related to Central A

as well as the possibility of US intervention in that regi

As a matter of fact, more than one-half of the 14 basic c

clusions apply to the US view of Central Asia:

• Rapid advances in information/biotechnology will c

ate new vulnerabilities for US security.
• New technologies will divide the world as well as dr

it together.

• Energy will continue to have major strategic sign

cance.

• All borders will be more porous; some will bend a

others will break.

• The sovereignty of states will come under press

but will endure.

• Fragmentation/failure of states will occur, with des

bilizing effects on neighboring states.

• Foreign crises will be replete with atrocities and 

terrorizing of civilian populations.

• The essence of war will not change.

• Intelligence will face more challenging adversar

and excellent intelligence will not prevent surprise

• The United States will be called upon frequently to 

tervene militarily in a time of uncertain alliances a

with the prospect of fewer forward-deployed forces

• The emerging security environment in the next qu

ter century will require different military and ot

national capabilities.22

So what is the most likely direction conflict will take 

Central Asia? The primary source of conflict will be eth

conflict generated from spillover from neighboring C

The porous bending and breaking described by the Ha

Rudman Commission allows tremendous political, r

gious, and military influence to transcend borders. T

Afghan and Tajik refugee problems present examp

where pressure and demographic balances in cert

pockets are changing, leading to the majority’s widen

fears as to the security of their future.

Spillover from neighboring countries here is inevita

unless all these states can effectively seal their borde

Although a daunting task, the cost of failure to do so m

be national survival itself. Brown uses a 1970 example 

illustrate. Here, King Hussein I expelled radical Palestinia
from Jordan, with most resettling in Lebanon where Ch

tian–Muslim tensions were already mounting. These fig

ers, mixed with refugees, may have been the sparks t

triggered the start of the Lebanese civil war.23 More 

cently, US concern for the allocation of Albanian Koso

refugees proves that they are using lessons learned. Eff

tive border control is a tool to diffuse potential eth

spillover and can become a means to prevent violence.

In “Hypotheses on Nationalism and War,” Van Ev

notes that the potential for nationalistic conflict betw

states can be checked partly by looking at the defensibi

of one’s borders, their international legitimacy, and the 

gree of correspondence between political and eth

boundaries.24 These three characteristics immediat

sound the warning horn in Central Asia. First, as seen 

the number of conquerors in this region, the borders 

any of these five countries can be defined as indefensib

This fact tends to lead to the conclusion that all of 

countries should feel insecure. But taking Van Ever

comments one step further, it may lead all of them to 

more secure since they all have vulnerabilities similar 

nature. These security dilemmas could raise tensions 

the region if one of the states develops an unmatched m

itary capability. Second, international legitimacy can be 

lustrated in the Rand–McNally map denoting “Border 

Dispute with China” throughout the area. Significant st

have been taken to eliminate this problem, and there 

currently no boundary disputes between the five natio

Third, corresponding ethnic and political boundaries h

historically caused ethnic conflict. Specifically, African 

colonializing this century has seen widespread ethnic v

lence caused by the European created border demar

tions. Unmatched tribal and geographic boundar

triggered internal ethnic conflict and spillover from th

diasporas in the neighboring countries. Theorist Samue

Huntington describes these lines as cultural “fault lin

around which the world is built. He states that fault li

that run through countries rather than along their po

cal borders create torn countries that have tradition

been ripe for conflict. Due to the nomadic nature of 

Central Asian peoples, the fault line has to be based on 

boundary of Orthodox and Muslim influence.25 But as e
nic Russians and Germans repatriate, this fault line sh

northward even though political borders are not changi

Unlike the results of poor line correlation in west Afr

Van Evera observes that “the peaceful dissolution of 

former Soviet Union was thus a mixed blessing: its s

cessor states emerged without violence, but with bord

that captured unhappy diasporas behind them.”26 In a 

cases, especially in Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan, small 

claves or autonomous regions have been developed 

these “captured” diasporas. Unsettling, though, is the f

that there are no Russian enclaves. This may reinfo

Russian minority fears for their future.

In summary, this region has all the elements that h

historically caused ethnic conflict. Indeed some auth

say that the “complex problems of the Caspian Reg

could, if left to fester, make the Balkans look like a p

game warm-up.”27 CENTCOM decision makers must u

derstand this context to be able to analyze and operate 

this complex but valuable region. 

Framing the Context:

Identifying US Interests

Our nation’s central challenge—and our responsibility—is to

sustain the role of the world’s most powerful force for peace,

prosperity, and the universal values of democracy and freedom by seizing opportunities of this new global era for the benefit of our own people and people around the world.

—A National Security Strategy for a New Century

To analyze the importance of Central Asia with regard 

US interests, the starting point must be national polic

This section discusses stated interests in the CAS focus

on WMD, natural resources, drug smuggling, US influe

and credibility, and humanitarian issues. 

Current National Security Strategy

The national security strategy (NSS) stratifies US int

ests into three broad categories: vital, important, and h

manitarian and other interests. A quick review of these 

help frame the CAS.
Vital Interests

Vital interests are defined as broad, overriding imp

tance to the survival, safety, and vitality of our nation

They include the following:

• physical security of our territory and that of our all

• the safety of our citizens,

• the economic well-being of our society, and

• the protection of critical infrastructures from para

ing attack.

The vital interests in this region include WMD, terroris

and the immense strategic resources of the CAS (e.g., 

natural gas, uranium, etc.). 

Important Interests

These interests do not affect our national survival, 

rather our national well-being and the character of 

world in which we live.29 Defined in this manner, import

interests include

• regions in which we have a sizable economic stake 

commitments to allies,

• protecting the global environment from severe ha

and

• crises with a potential to generate substantial a

highly destabilizing refugee flows.

Important US interests in the CAS are drug trafficki

civil wars in Afghanistan and Tajikistan, and Iranian 

fluence.30

Humanitarian and Other Interests

Acting because our values demand it, these tertiary 

terests may be framed as:

• response to natural and man-made disasters,

• promoting human rights and seeking halts to gross 

olations of those rights,

• supporting democratization,
• adherence to the rule of law and civilian control of 

military,

• assistance in humanitarian demining, and

• promoting sustainable development and environm

tal protection.31

US interests that fall into this category include disas

preparedness, democratic reform, legal reform, the inclus

of the NIS into the World Trade Organization (WTO) a

US/foreign investment.32

Weapons of Mass Destruction

According to the NSS, WMD poses “the greatest pot

tial threat to global stability and security.”33 Althou

1995 marked the establishment of the Central Asian N

clear Weapons Free Zone, security at previous nuclear, 

ological, and chemical laboratories and the whereabout

their resident experts have come into question. Eth

conflict, the resulting government destabilization, and 

security could mean a fire sale of deadly weapons and m

terials for any entity hostile to the United States and its 

lies. Once in possession of WMD, groups mired in a fi

for their sheer existence may use the materials in num

ous ways to:

• direct use on the opposing ethnic groups or rul

government,

• threaten WMD use as a deterrent for international 

tervention,

• use or threaten use of WMD internationally as a 

for intervention,

• sell the material to finance their struggle because t

have no means of application, and

• serve as a transit route (safer than Europe) for sm

gled Russian WMD material.

From the CAS government side of the equation, there i

potential win-win situation for the regimes. Getting rid 

the WMD and the capability to produce such materials 
unquestionably in the CAS’s best interest. Since the pr

CAS governments would pay for using these weapons 

prohibitively high, they might as well get the most ou

discarding them. 

Use or threatened use of these weapons by legitim

governments would promote international alienat

much like it did with Iraqi chemical attacks in the 198

In these developing states, positive international attent

replete with economic and diplomatic benefits remain

necessity. Any form of sanctions would crush econom

growth, thus exacerbating hopes for a brighter futu

Currently, sanctions and US policy on Tajikistan have l

ited US military engagement there, thus reducing shap

options.

WMD use by government forces on any specific eth

group, regardless of insurgent identity, would tend to 

calate neighboring countries’ concerns for their diaspor

These types of atrocities and their tremendous killing 

pability would demand quick military responses from th

protectorate nations before their entire diaspora was 

terminated.

The most likely step for the current regimes is selling 

material for nation-building funds. Unfortunately, curr

intelligence cannot identify all of the buyers; and the 

pullout and sanctioning of Tajikistan and Kazakhstan c

ated intelligence shortfalls in this subject. Of the two cou

tries, Kazakh WMD capabilities are the most worrisom

The Kazakh regime possesses components of a WMD 

pability: they control former Soviet laboratories, scientis

fissile material, and production facilities (see appendix 

This is not a country that the United States can afford 

disengage. Previous programs administered under the 

partment of State’s (DOS) Cooperative Threat Reduct

(CTR) Program have included highly enriched urani

(HEU) buys, the funding of relocations of scientists to 

United States, and enhanced security protection me

ures. All of these are profitable endeavors for the countr

involved.34

The real possibility of the CAS being a transit route fr

Russia to the Middle East or South Asia can present te

ble consequences for US security. On this issue the pr

lems lie with porous borders and total disengagement 
the entry and two avenues of exit for the materials. In l

1999 the United States suspended relations with Ka

khstan due to the sale of MiG-21s to North Korea. 

though the delivery was turned around and the person

were recently tried and imprisoned, CENTCOM’s ability 

engage here remains on hold.35 This attitude reduces 

shaping options, strains our intelligence capabilities, a

reduces US credibility in this first stop of WMD mate

out of Russia. US isolation of Tajikistan also allows 

trade route to continue unimpeded with possible out

into China, Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Iran. Of those, l

of US engagement in all but China allows little involvem

or interdiction along this WMD smuggling route. Additi

ally, without US economic involvement in these countr

what profession would bring more money than W

smuggling? What is the risk-reward equation in life and 

sources of an Iranian WMD threat versus the cost of 

US normalization of diplomatic ties? Although chang

current US policy is beyond the purview of the milita

DOS and the Department of Defense (DOD) should c

sider two significant factors: MiG-21s that never made i

their destination are far easier to defend against tha

WMD device obtained in Kazakhstan, and the milita

ability to engage in the region depends on on-scene inte

gence and good relationships between US forces and 

host nation. Allowing CENTCOM activities to resume 

Kazakhstan and Tajikistan enables an effective arm 

American influence. That influence is not only focused 

defending the United States and our allies but also on p

moting US prosperity. 

Resources

We are focusing particular attention on investment in Caspian

energy resources and their export from the region to world

markets, thereby expanding and diversifying world energy

supplies and promoting prosperity in the region. Development

of Caspian energy resources will improve our energy security.

—A National Security Strategy for a New Century

Energy resources in this area are staggering. Compa

ble in quantity to US and North Sea oil reserves, Casp
Sea reserves exist mostly offshore and remain unexplor

Even more impressive are the natural gas possibilit

Looking at proven reserves, Kazakhstan, Turkmenist

and Uzbekistan each rank among the world’s 20 larg

natural gas countries and match North America’s trem

dous reserves.36

Two positive effects of these resources exist. First, 

abundant resources—given a stable and beneficial pric

crude oil—contribute to economic development, enhanc

prosperity and stability. Second, there is regional unity 

both sides of the Caspian due to interconnecting prod

tion and transporting mechanisms. However, there 

also two possible negatives associated with these 

sources. First, the imbalance of wealth among the CA

based on petroleum revenues—will tend to alienate K

gyzstan and Tajikistan and will make the vision o

unified economic region difficult. Currently, Kyrgyzs

overcomes the appearance of the laggard by maintain

the fastest pace in economic reforms and the lead in 

dustry, hydroelectric power, and water resources. Kyrgy

tan could be locked into the future of the region with 

investment in refining technology or could become a c

cial route in pipelines taking oil and gas to China. The s

ond negative is the attention of having resources t

everyone wants. Powerful forces from the United Stat

Russia, China, Iran, Turkey, and multinational ene

companies have increased the choices available 

Caspian region governments. The gravity of decisions 

garding what routes to traverse and where to drill for th

resources has implications for US and allied national 

curity. For the United States, these specifics pres

strategic centers of gravity that must be defended.

Oil and Natural Gas

For years Middle Eastern countries have projected th

defense buildups and social programs based on crude 

prices per barrel. Until recently, the Organization of Pet

leum Exporting Countries (OPEC) surpluses, a slow

rate of energy consumption, and other energy mark

have kept the price of oil below the targets that would c

ate the defense budgets of a regional military giant. In fa
even if the recent upsurge of crude prices continues, it 

probably take years to erase the debts accrued during 

1990s. During this time, the United States may contin

to be the dominant source of defense and security for 

region. Aside from the defense issues, another problem 

the stymied growth of these oil-rich states.

But the future looks bright. Since independence 

CAS has moved to achieve economic prosperity built 

energy revenues. Making energy their priority, Uzbekis

and Turkmenistan have increased their oil production s

nificantly.37 One underperformer, Kazakhstan, has see

slump in production and slower than expected exploitat

of its offshore potential.38 Overall, combined 1997 CAS 

production from the Caspian was respectable but s

dwarfed by OPEC leaders like Saudi Arabia and Iran (

table 1). Essential to US national security, extra produc

help stabilize world markets through increased mar

competition and expanded choices.39

Table 1

CAS Oil and Gas Statistics

Producer Total Oil Total Oil Total Gas Total Ga

Reserves Production Reserves Product

Iran* 12 BBL N/A 0 Tcf 0 

Russia 5 BBL 60,000 BL N/A N

Kazakhstan 95–103 BBL 573,300 BL 53–83 Tcf ,215.4 

Turkmenistan 34 BBL 107,300 BL 98–155 Tcf ,610.9 

Uzbekistan 1 BBL 182,400 BL 74–88 Tcf 1,808.1 

BBL = billion barrels

BL = barrels per day

Tcf = trillion cubic feet

Bcf = billion cubic feet per year

*Iranian values only reflect oil and natural gas from the Iranian section of the

Caspian Sea.

Source: On-line, Internet, 5 January 2000, available from http://www.eia.doe.

emeu/ipsr/t12.txt.
CAS natural gas looks similar, again with Uzbekis

the standout in production increases. Crippled with R

sian bureaucratic links, Kazakh natural gas production 

not near its potential. Similarly, Turkmenistan, with 

world’s third largest proven natural gas reserves—until 

cently tied to Russian transport methods—has not e

begun any form of exploration. Uzbekistan, on the ot

hand, has become the world’s eighth largest produ

through active production and exploration.40 These ill

trate some but not all of the problems with getting to 

reserves.

Another major issue confronting the CAS is the tra

portation and refining aspects of the energy market. U

recently, privatized Russian firms like Gazprom and Lu

zoil have monopolized energy through previous refin

agreements and tremendous transport and convers

fees. With increased international attention and signific

investment by the major oil companies, CAS oil produc

have begun to learn the intricacies of international f

markets. Many of the state-run oil, gas, coal, and mine

companies have already privatized or formed joint v

tures with Western or Middle Eastern firms.41 Still, th

are limited facilities, both in number of plants and in p

duction capacities.42 Overall, this region and the stabi

of its economies will take off provided there is guarant

security of the system and improvements in the product

and distribution systems (see appendix C). But oil and 

are not the only assets in Central Asia. 

Strategic Minerals

The last of the resources that bear on the strategic 

ture of the region is uranium. It is found in signific

quantity in Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan. Specifica

Uzbekistan is the seventh largest uranium producer, p

ducing more than 5 percent of world output with plans 

double that by the end of 2000.43 This is a staggering s

tistic, but it is overshadowed by the fact that both nati

possess the ability to make their raw uranium i

weapons grade or HEU.44 Since 1991 DOS purchases 

HEU through CTR funds have been significant. The Uni

States needs to understand that it cannot buy 38,000 m
ric tons and should instead focus on the dismantling of 

HEU process that actually makes the resource milita

relevant.

Implications for Future Conflict

So what could ethnic conflict have to do with natural 

sources? There are three main dynamics or outcomes t

should be considered in regards to a continued stable p

duction of CAS energy resources. 

First, as mentioned earlier, other states in the reg

may feel threatened by a rich neighbor. Unless oil-rich C

find ways to include their poorer neighbors and thus 

ferent ethnic groups through joint ventures or a regio

profit-sharing structure, there is a great possibility of t

resource imbalance creating a security dilemma. Sur

the oil-rich nations will feel the need to protect their b

ders, energy industries, and cultures. Buying arms to 

so may be perceived as the precursor to an arms race t

the others would have to match or counter through stra

gic alliances. Some of the agreements discussed earlie

such as the Uzbek–Kyrg–Kazakh eternal friendship dec

ration and the CIS security arrangement—make gr

strides in limiting this effect. US decisions regarding m

tary aid should consider this effect very seriously.

Second, ethnic conflict caused by spillover would invo

guerrilla forces operating outside one country and strik

targets within another. An oil-dependent CAS would b

tremendous target for guerrillas. The asymmetry of a sm

band destroying or holding hostage a refinery or a key pipe

would be catastrophic for any of the three oil-produc

nations.

Third, with so many outside entities interested in 

energy resources in the region, foreign governments m

be quicker to intervene in unstable situations—bas

their justification on ethnicity rather than their interes

energy. Governments interested in either disrupting or 

stroying oil production in the region may also use eth

conflict as a means to introduce agents or insurgents to 

their “dirty work.” Likely suspects would be the contend

for energy dominance in the region such as Iran and ot

Caspian Sea players. In constructive moves the Uni
States has announced backing for many projects that c

ate interdependent relations—for example, pipelines fr

Turkmenistan to Turkey and Uzbekistan to Azerbaijan t

will dampen animosity between Caspian region produce

Currently, the main issue between the Trans–Caspian 

tions is the actual post–Soviet-era division of the Casp

and ownership of offshore drilling and exploration are

This issue, although divisive, has not resulted in viole

or subversion by any Caspian players. These energy a

minerals are tangible interests in Central Asia. 

Influence and Credibility

US engagement in Central Asia is a security imperat

Encouraging stability and integration of the CAS into wo

political and economic organizations only strengthens 

security.45 Examples of this are evident in the success

American backing of Kyrgyzstan into the WTO and the 

tegration of all five countries into NATO’s PFP program

All of the CAS are currently members of the Organizat

for Security and Cooperation in Europe and have w

comed their participation in election monitoring.47

The Shanghai Five and the CIS security arrangeme

are organizations that can be interpreted many ways 

terms of US security. First, the Shanghai Five feels t

they dominate the Central Asian landscape; thus, they 

secure against US intervention in the region. They a

stabilize the region since it combines China and Rus

into a single powerful group. Other alliances like the in

mal agreements between Iran and China tend to count

balance possible Russian adventurism in the name 

helping ethnic Russians. The CIS security arrangem

seems to have a stabilizing effect in these developing 

tions by providing time for nation-building. As seen in V

nam, there was no “winning the hearts and minds” of 

populace by the US Operations Mission or US Military 

sistance Programs without the element of security.48 T

last dynamic, Iranian–Russian relations, centers arou

Iranian “direct dialogue with Moscow about their mut

interest in preventing the Turks from making greater 

roads into Central Asia.”49
US influence in the region is hampered by access to 

area and, in some cases, failure to engage. World opin

on US credibility is always at stake in situations fr

which the United States disengages, especially if eth

conflict or the perception of ethnic-based conflict is pr

ent. Abroad, US activities in backing Israeli policies 

southern Lebanon can be perceived as hypocritical wh

measured against US lack of action in the Islamic fun

mentalists versus the secularists in this region. US sa

tions on Kazakhstan for a sale of virtually insignific

MiG-21s to North Korea may contrast sharply with US 

action against Israel in response to Patriot technol

transfers to Iran. Although many in the CAS are Soviet-

thinkers who see the United States as the entity w

forced them to endure the Soviet leadership’s demands 

more production and less freedom, most nations and th

media are reportedly pro-West.50 They strive to gain acc

to Western markets, consumer goods, and freedoms. T

is America’s chance to give it to them. In return, the Uni

States will build credibility and influence while enhanc

US and CAS security against threats like the transnatio

issue of drug smuggling.

Drug Smuggling

Since Afghan “freedom fighters” supposedly finan

their struggle with drug money, it would not be surpris

that CAS insurgents would do the same. Ethnic Uzbek 

surgents, Tajik fighters, and Islamic fundamentalists 

profiting from poor border security, economic conditio

and growing world demand for illegal drugs. This dema

takes Central/South Asian cannabis, opium, and her

and distributes it into Russia/Western Europe.51 Since 

vout Muslims do not use drugs, CAS drugs are similar 

oil resources—they remain totally dependent on success

transport onto world markets. In essence, lax border se

rity and corruption means that a tremendous amount o

legal drugs and dollars enter Russia, destabilizing an ec

omy that the United States and the International Monet

Fund are keeping afloat.
The US Drug Enforcement Agency’s new field office 

Uzbekistan suggests that a significant amount of dru

moves through the region.52 The Afghan lesson tau

Tajiks that through eradication the government could d

opium profits to insurgents in their Khulyabi–Khojand c

war.53 In the long run, failure to aid CAS governments 

this mission and border issues means that all US inst

ments of power will cost more and take longer to achi

the desired effect against movements or ethnic groups t

are well armed and financed. Those well-armed groups c

also turn an illegal drug trade into ethnic conflict an

humanitarian nightmare.

Humanitarian Tragedy/Ethnic Cleansing

Seen in the Balkans and Central Africa, humanitar

tragedies such as ethnic cleansing present the Uni

States with difficult choices. Although US leaders tend 

base their involvement on the Weinberger–Powell prin

ples, the immense public outcry “to do something” crea

a dangerous condition for prolonged military action. Co

ethnic cleansing occur in Central Asia? According to A

drew Bell–Fialkoff, a “cleansing is most likely to occur 

situations of (1) sudden reversals of status; (2) loss of 

cial, economic, or political advantages; and (3) the pr

ence of ethnic allies across new borders. Solutions to 

problems of cleansing must consider (A) the creation 

stable and recognizable borders; (B) a geographic distri

tion of minorities; (C) numerical strength; and (D) the r

of growth of each ethnic population.”54

The issue of stable and secure borders is paramou

as is the geographic distribution of minorities. Throu

out the CAS, minorities have grouped themselves i

tight enclaves that may even speak a different langu

than their surrounding countrymen. Enclaves like th

have been, in some cases, turned into autonomous 

gions attached to a “mother country.” However, the f

that they are numerically strong within a sovere

country makes them vulnerable to majority reprisals l

ethnic cleansing. A probable scenario that meets 

conditions above would be a sudden shift to fundam
talist governments. This would be a “reversal,” definit

a “loss of advantage” to all those outside of the religi

The movement would undoubtedly have “ethnic alli

across their borders. An example “ripe” for an ethnic 

pulsion is where Uzbekistan’s president stated that “ 

do not want an Islamic state as a neighbor.’ Tajikis

has taken its Islamic opposition into a coalition gove

ment, a move which will inevitably shift the politics 

the country and which relieves the Tajik Islamic m

tants to carry their movement into Uzbekistan [and it

percent ethnic Tajik population].”55

Overall, ethnic cleansing presents a real problem 

terms of the speed of decisions required and then 

speed of implementation of any US response. US comm

ment to action and end states must be considered prio

deployment or even the suggestion of deployment 

troops. Unlike Kosovo, the extreme distances, the limi

methods of resupply, and the possibility of intervention 

more international players will make any hesitation to 

a decision in itself. 

So what can CENTCOM do? CENTCOM must first u

derstand the context it is operating in, make smart d

sions regarding engagement that emphasize regio

bonds, and focus on the stated US interests here. The C

is a valuable region both in payoff and protection, a

CENTCOM must take the lead in suggesting options 

both defend and promote US interests.

Applying the National Military Strategy:

Shaping CENTCOM Strategy

What stands out is just how ineffective the international community has been in imposing a modicum of civility on even

those small states one might have thought it was in a position

to coerce. Actually when states themselves have taken the initiative, they have done better—which suggests that these domestic problems are best handled domestically, although they

are rarely handled well at all.

—Timothy D. Sisk

—Power Sharing and International 

—Mediation in Ethnic Conflicts
Derived from the NSS, the NMS outlines the imperati

of military engagement. More clearly, the strategy stres

military roles in terms of shaping the international en

ronment, responding to a full spectrum of crises, a

preparing now for an uncertain future.56 In each case, m

itary engagement requires commitment and persevera

for success. This commitment must be across the en

spectrum of the national instruments of power (IOP). 

diplomatic situations like Tajikistan and Kazakhs

where the DOD is not engaged, the DOS loses the lever

of military funding, manpower, and materiel in shaping 

environment. Regardless of how much preparation a co

mander in chief (CINC) may do, the respond phase—wh

may have been avoidable—may now be more costly 

terms of US lives and resources than if the military w

fully engaged in shaping from the start.

CENTCOM Specifics

Transferred from the Joint Chiefs of Staff to CENTCO

the CAS presents unique challenges. Some of the m

pronounced ethnic tensions—coupled with historical a

mosity, international power plays, and abundant WMD 

cilities situated in a resource rich, underdeveloped 

gion—make it imperative that CENTCOM develop 

successful strategy for Central Asia. Unfortunately, the 

sources have not come along with this need. According 

Maj Steven Latchford, two personnel billets and onl

modest increase in traditional CINC activities funds tra

ferred with this five-nation responsibility. Luckily, Natio

Guard Bureau (NGB) country programs (see table 2) dev

oped in the early 1990s absorbed some of the short

through military-military contact and educational vis

Future CENTCOM operations in the region will have 

make the most out of well-informed planning and inte

gency cooperation, specifically with the US Agency for 

ternational Development (USAID) to be exact. DOS C

funds and USAID’s democracy program—along with N

and CENTCOM dollars—may mean a successful, sta

Central Asia free to develop its own economy and dem

racies.
Table 2

National Guard Partnerships with Central Asian States

National Guard Partner Country

Arizona Kazakhstan

Louisiana Uzbekistan

Montana Kyrgyzstan

Nevada Turkmenistan

Source: “National Guard Bureau International Affairs Central Command Th

Overview,” n.p., on-line, Internet, 30 December 1999, available from http://w

ngb.dtic.mil/bureau/ochief/ia/centcom_ovrview1.html.

Shaping the International Environment

CENTCOM’s role in shaping the CAS includes promot

stability, preventing or reducing conflicts, and peaceti

deterrence. Shaping sets the stage for future operati

and can lay the foundation for whether insurgencies 

occur. As Max Manwaring points out:

The ultimate outcome of any counterinsurgency effort is not pri

marily determined by the skillful manipulation of violence in man

military battles. Rather the outcome will be determined by the le

gitimacy of the government, organization for unity of effort, type an

consistency of support for the targeted government, ability to reduc

outside aid to the insurgents, intelligence (or action against subver

sion), and discipline and capabilities of a government’s arme

forces. The elements of this paradigm are not culturally bound in

terms of Western values and goals. The paradigm can help to ex

plain the dynamics of low intensity conflict not only in traditiona

and modernizing societies but also in industrial states facing th

monumental changes unleashed by the breakdown of the forme

Soviet Empire (emphasis added).57

Taking each one of these presents ideas for CENTCO

role in shaping the environment (see table 3).

Military-to-Military Contacts (Effective)

CENTCOM contacts range from CINC and senior D

country visits to US Military and Naval Academy tours 

CAS armed forces. This approach enhances legitimacy 

the governments while displaying US commitment to 

region. US contact visits should be coordinated with D

activities and across the interagency and joint milit
spectrums. CAS visits should begin to stress “Central A

a regional fighting unit” by grouping low-level visits 

gether. A commander (J-7) described this type of cont

as a “cheap way to enhance learning and provide a for

for sharing perspectives.”58

Theater Engagement Planning Management

and Information System (Very Effective)

TEPMIS is an excellent single source for managing a

maintaining visibility into all of the organizations and 

tivities in CENTCOM’s area of responsibility (AOR). This 

lows all agencies to build on other activities, enhan

unity of effort in the region, and allows CINCCENTCOM 

better visualize engagement strategy. The program’s m

shortfall is the lack of accountability for database entr

that could make this tool outdated or irrelevant. CIN

CENTCOM should assign responsibility for updates a

continue funding and integration of TEPMIS.

Foreign Military Sales/Excess Defense

Articles (Somewhat Effective)

FMS/EDA programs for the CAS appear to be inadequ

totally reactionary, and disjointed. Determining CAS need

especially in border control, protection of high-value facili

Table 3

CENTCOM Program Ratings Overview

Activity Rating*

Military-to-Military Contacts Effective

Theater Engagement Planning

Management Information System (TEPMIS) Very Effective

Foreign Military Sales/Excess Defense Articles

(FMS/EDA) Somewhat Effective

Education Effective

Military Exercises Somewhat Effective

Other Shaping Activities Somewhat Effective

*The rating system is based on both potential—if the fixes are implemented

(e.g., TEPMIS)—and current (e.g., FMS/EDA) which provides minimal aid w

out a strategy.
like oil refineries and pipelines, and maritime self-defens

should be the main focus of FMS/EDA programs. Ana

ing EDA for the type and consistency of support for a t

geted government rather than a reactive response to C

requests is the strategy of shaping. Problems that h

slowed EDA programs—such as CAS defense struct

and funding to get the materiel to the region—should 

solved in standing agreements with DOS rather than re

tive negotiations. Although the temptation in EDA wo

be to provide the bulk to “jewels of Central Asia” Ka

khstan and Uzbekistan, careful consideration should 

given to the effects on the earlier discussed balances 

power. FMS/EDA should focus on the asymmetric nat

of possible ethnic conflict by focusing on border secu

equipment and rapid response capabilities (i.e., tro

transport via helicopters and fast coastal patrol boa

Trends should also steer the CAS towards US–NATO int

operability (i.e., communications, identification friend 

foe equipment, etc.) enhancing both the payoffs at PFP 

ercises and future training opportunities.

Education (Effective)

Prior to full CENTCOM engagement, some CAS stude

who were to attend two-month Professional Military Edu

tion (PME) courses would spend one year in the Uni

States learning English.59 Positive investment in langu

laboratories in each of the CAS is paying off. Continued 

vestment in this area will make all other individual milit

education and training (IMET) programs possible. IM

funding for humanitarian assistance and field medic

courses has been a success for the Arizona National Gua

Members from all CAS are scheduled for their courses, o

again promoting regional as well as US–CAS unity.

Since all CAS nations deploy peacekeepers to Tajikist

a superb idea would be US funding of UN peacekeep

courses for CAS participants.60 Again, legal issues stand 

the way. IMET money must not be used to pay for fore

military attendance at foreign schools. Dialogue with 

sometimes free Nordic UN peacekeeping courses can m

CAS participation a reality. Continued efforts to send le

ers to courses at the Marshall Center, senior and midle
military PME courses, and noncommissioned offi

courses will enhance members’ understanding of 

proper civil-military relations. The desired PME end st

should be a regional course within the CAS. With the u

healthy trend of ethnically centered state militaries in 

CAS, militaries must be unquestionably professional a

respectful of both military and civilian minorities. A pos

ble way to reduce the apprehension of ethnic minorities 

the military is through leadership courses, awards, a

promotion systems based on US models and taught in 

PME. To combat the growing sophistication of trans

tional actors, more technical IMET programs such as 

US Marine Corps’s (USMC) border patrol, military ope

tions in urban terrain (MOUT), and chemical and biolo

cal hazard training is mandatory. US Army helicop

training, Special Forces, and US Coast Guard (USC

courses also are programs that will enhance CAS milit

capabilities to employ effectively our EDA materiel (i

UH-60 Blackhawks and USCG patrol boats).61

Military Exercises (Somewhat Effective)

Although Central Asian States Battalion 2000 invol

most of the CAS, it needs to evolve into a quarterly eve

Effective in rapid reaction, airdrop, and tactical maneu

training, CENTCOM should also use Central Asia to 

hance all US and CAS capabilities in MOUT, mountain 

erations, and WMD handling. The regional approach 

lows a single vision to be broadcast and sends the mess

that the United States intends to support all of them.

Other Shaping Activities (Somewhat Effective)

The US Army’s Corps of Engineers project targeting b

military undertakings (especially improvement of airfie

and transportation infrastructure) and civil undertaki

that can create both capability and credibility for fut

CENTCOM operations. In shaping the WMD realm, CEN

COM must work more closely in conjunction with the 

partments of Energy and State. Enticing more former 

viet scientists and continuing HEU buys with CTR fun

remain vital activities. Possibly as training missions, 

curing, inspecting, and installing monitoring devices at 
major WMD plants (i.e., Vozrozhdenly Island—see app

dix B) and military medical responses to WMD events 

hance US security.

Drug and technology smuggling must be combated 

an active border control strategy. Ongoing work with 

Nonproliferation Division of DOS, the Drug Enforcem

Administration, and Central Intelligence Agency will cre

enhanced border control measures and enforcement te

niques for the region. This not only reduces direct thre

to US and allied security but also limits the possibility 

spillover of ethnic violence on a given country. All of th

are shaping strategies that will be cheaper and more eff

tive in protecting US goals than having to respond milit

ily.

Responding to the Full Spectrum of Crise

The fight in Central Asia will entail the deployment, 

gagement, or containment of warring parties, as well 

conflict termination and resolution. Massive CENTC

resources will be needed to develop—as the end state

stable, prosperous region that bolsters potential US e

nomic prosperity and respects the democratic rights of 

of its inhabitants. Unfortunately, the infrastructure 

quired for such an operation has neither been planned 

nor designed.

Due to geography, CENTCOM operational choices 

limited. Quick-reaction, forced-entry capabilities inher

in the USMC and logistics constrain possible operations 

Central Asia. Inaccessible to maritime forces, US air

would bear the brunt of requirements. From “beans to b

lets” and the fighting airmen and soldiers, US Transpor

tion Command (USTRANSCOM) would have to use only 

airfields in the CAS to perform its mission. The maxim

on the ground (MOG) issues at these airfields remain

limiting factor that CENTCOM planners should addr

even in the shaping phase.62

Additionally, the “air bridge” to get to Central Asia 

be hindered by political constraints. For instance, if CEN

COM planners design routes with Turkish overflight 

quired, then US involvement in the disputed area will h
to mirror Turkish interests as well. Greek and Bulgarian 

Macedonian and Romanian overflights are other rou

that planners may take. Turkish relations with Bulga

have been rapidly improving, thus making this a vulne

ble capability to plan on. Unconventionally, preposition

airlift in Georgia or other Caspian countries prior to h

tilities, shipping men and material through the Bosporo

Strait to that country and then airlifting them to the C

is a workable, but inefficient, method of global reach. 

any case, once in the CAS, individual states may d

overflight in step with their CIS security arrangement. T

bottom line for preparing and conducting a fight in 

CAS is that it will be politically constrained and nearly 

possible to sustain logistically.

Preparing Now for an Uncertain Future

CENTCOM must add to its already heavy task list the fo

training for CENTCOM attached units that may be emplo

in the CAS. These may include courses, exercises, and 

gagement by linguists, Special Operations Forces, Natio

Guard units, and Air and Coast Guard forces.

Training the Force

A shortfall that should be addressed first is lingui

training, which affects our assessment of the intellige

situation and our effective engagement. CENTCOM m

clearly state its increased training requirement for to

force linguists by the Defense Language Institute for 

CAS languages. Other significant shortfalls in training 

clude formal UN peacekeeping education and MOUT op

ations. With ethnic conflict caused by spillover—the m

probable future challenge for the CAS—UN involvem

becomes a question of when, not if. Leadership and c

duct of these unique operations will be necessary sk

that CENTCOM forces must possess.

Enabling the Force: Infrastructure Design

CENTCOM must invest in increasing the MOG acco

ing to operations plan (OPLAN) development. CENTCO
focus on a handful of airfields will enhance force protect

and allow a more rapid timeline for project completion. 

Transportation Infrastructure. In conjunction w

USTRANSCOM, CENTCOM must constantly update 

plans/suitability reports and ensure that flight/navigat

standard evaluations have been concluded as soon as p

sible. Other methods of transport—particularly suita

land routes connecting the airfields to users—should a

be investigated by USTRANSCOM to create logistically f

sible OPLAN options.

Communications Infrastructure. Not only are CEN

COM’s options constrained by logistics but by commu

cations as well. Satellite coverage giving CENTCOM 

reachback capability is limited. J6 contracts for ex

bandwidth, specifically commercial bandwidth, should 

negotiated today as first-right-of-refusal.63 Other CEN

COM activities that would enhance information backbo

in the CAS will increase military possibilities and prom

faster information exchange between regional CAS str

tures. Culturally, increasing information exchange and 

cess to world information systems will increase the sc

and perception of CAS leaders. Integrated air defense, b

der security surveillance tools, and effective military log

tics can even be shared among CAS partners once rob

communications are in place. Public relations, psycholo

cal operations, and other information warfare options a

become available to CENTCOM and CAS militaries throu

the proliferation of communications systems. Close coor

nation with the Joint Spectrum Center, Joint Comma

and Control Warfare Center, and US Information Age

will help CENTCOM build effective communications s

tems in the CAS.

Military–Civilian Airlift Contracts. With the trem

dous demand for logistics being routed by air, CENTC

(via USTRANSCOM) contracts should ensure early acc

to the major US freight carriers and Civil Reserve Air F

assets. Already running freight into all five of the C

DHL International, Federal Express, and United Par

Service can actually outperform Air Mobility Command 

liveries by getting freight there in two to five days.64 Ne

tiations should be expanded to include assets like airli
currently transporting CENTCOM personnel into Sou

west Asia (i.e., Tower Air, American Trans Air, etc.).

Organizing the Force

According to CENTCOM personnel, the delegation 

Central Asia in CENTCOM’s AOR and US European Co

mand’s area of interest only brought two billets with it. 

viewing each functional area needs to be accomplished 

ensure there are adequate billets. Additionally, with 

significant threat of humanitarian tragedy (e.g., eth

conflict), CENTCOM more than any other unified co

mand needs to pioneer a robust civil-military operati

center (CMOC) capability. Then commander of Operat

Restore Hope, Lt Gen Anthony C. Zinni, USMC, noted t

“instead of thinking about warfighting agencies like co

mand and control, you create a political committee, a c

military operations center—CMOC—to interface with v

unteer organizations. These become the heart of your 

erations, as opposed to a combat or fire support operati

center.”65 A list of organizations that are notionally 

gaged is available in Joint Publication 3-08, Interage

Coordination During Joint Operations, volume 2, a

should serve as the basis for the CMOC.66 This CM

should apply the lessons CENTCOM learned in Operat

Restore Hope by investing in the staffing and education 

permanent CMOC personnel. Just as the new concep

the “Aerospace Operations Center as a weapons syste

will ensure properly trained full-time manning, a CENTCO

sponsored “CMOC as a weapons system” can be a revo

tionary way to get the DOD to realize the importance of 

command and control of military operations other th

war (MOOTW).

Coordinating with the Force

CENTCOM’s imperative of global engagement beg

with shaping the environment. CENTCOM–State Depa

ment liaisons remain vital in the national pursuit of un

of effort. Coordinated planning, funding, and execut

strategies must build on each other synergistically to p

mote stability and prevent ethnic violence in the regi

CENTCOM needs to use its liaisons to develop procedu
that allow ease of FMS/EDA and WMD clean-up ch

lenges discussed earlier that will make military enga

ment more successful. These issues need four-star 

dorsement today in CENTCOM’s quest to prepare for 

uncertain tomorrow.

Commitment

“A key ingredient in successful intervention is the cr

ibility of the international commitment. External interv

tions that the warring parties fear will soon fade may 

worse than no intervention at all. Ambiguous policies s

nal weaker parties that they may do better by fight

longer and harder than compromising for what they c

get now. In today’s world there is no practical alterna

to an international community actively engaged over 

long term in containing ethnic conflict.”67 In the past

has required “boots on the ground” to show US resolve

terms of ethnic conflict or spillover, all that may be 

quired is heightened military-military contact or a p

cisely timed air-drop exercise. But in Central Asia, wh

ethnic issues have been around for many years, the US 

fort must also last many years. Applying the military I

must be clearly thought out, applied evenhande

throughout the CAS, and must be sustainable. To do 

will take creative planners and equally creative coaliti

such as the ones built during Operation Desert Sto

Arab, European, Russian, Chinese partners, partners w

other CAS, and partnerships with nongovernmental a

private volunteer organizations will be the only success

strategy to deal with ethnic conflict and spillover wit

this volatile region.

Summary

So what is the biggest threat to CENTCOM in Cen

Asia? I have demonstrated that ethnic violence caused 

spillover from neighboring countries will be the most lik

problem. Conflict in the CAS should cause CENTC

great concern because of the incredibly high stakes. T

region’s WMD, their resources, US regional influence, a

the fact that this geographical crossroad has all of 
most powerful countries in the world watching is the ex

reason why the United States must maintain its global 

gagement in Central Asia focused on promoting stated 

interests.

To attain those national goals, we must engage all IO

as an integrated force. The United States can little aff

to rely on sanctions like those that took seven years 

work in Libya as their primary means of securing the a

as a stable democratic region. The price of standing stil

just too high. CENTCOM must engage now in all five of 

CAS fostering a regional approach to security. This is 

only way to make each of the ethnic groups feel rep

sented and thus less threatened. But that is only one 

lution. 

To achieve stability, promote democracy, and ens

our national security, CENTCOM must consider the nat

of ethnic conflict, the principles of insurgent warfare a

MOOTW, and develop a thoughtful strategy that create

new regional vision for Central Asia. That strategy—b

with the discussions of this paper—should use the foll

ing tenets as a framework:

• Does the plan rely on a regional approach? Dema

integration of each country?

• Does the plan consider reactions by the Shang

Five? Turkish and Iranian reaction?

• Is the plan sustainable with clear goals attainable 

both the near and far term?

• Is there burden sharing with Asia and Europe, 

prime recipients of CAS oil?

• Does the plan build on the US ability to introd

forces into the CAS if necessary?

• Does the plan add to the legitimacy of the current g

ernment?

• Does the plan assign accountability to the gove

ment for its treatment of ethnic groups?

• Is the plan fully integrated or congruent with all ot

IOPs and the NSS/NMS?
In responding to these questions, CENTCOM plann

should be looking for positive answers that will ensur

synergistic approach.

The United States once again has the opportunity 

shape the future of countries much like the Marshall P

did. In their wildest dreams, the authors of that plan pr

ably could not have envisioned that in 50 years the rub

of Europe would be a bustling center for one of the m

powerful economic unions in the world. Hopefully, CEN

COM will have just such a vision for Central Asia.

Notes

1. Ted Robert Gurr, Why Men Rebel (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton 

versity Press, 1970).

2. Timothy D. Sisk, Power Sharing and International Mediation in 

nic Conflicts (New York: Carnegie Corporation, 1996), 119.

3. “History of Central Asia,” n.p., on-line, Internet, 5 December 19

available from http://members.tripod.com/~kz2000/history/centas.ht

4. Stephen and Sandra Batalden, The Newly Independent State

Eurasia: Handbook of Former Soviet Republics (Phoenix, Ariz.: Oryx Pr

1997), 178.

5. Mike Edwards, “A Broken Empire: Kazakhstan,” National 

graphic Magazine, March 1993, 29.

6. David Lake and Donald Rothchild, “Containing Fear: The Ori

and Management of Ethnic Conflict,” in Theories of War and Peace: An 

ternational Security Reader, Michael E. Brown, ed. (Cambridge, Ma

MIT Press, 1998).

7. Michael Brown, “Causes and Regional Dimensions of Internal C

flict,” in The International Dimensions of Internal Conflict, Michael Bro

ed. (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1966), 577.

8. Ibid., 578.

9. Ibid., 574.

10. Library of Congress country studies gave great statistical d

“Table 3. Central Asia: Population Distribution 1989–1992 (in th

sands),” n.p., on-line, Internet, 15 November 1999, available from htt

lcweb2.loc.gov/frd/cs/uzbekistan/uz_appen.html; and “Table 4. Cen

Asia: Ethnic Composition, Selected Years, 1989–94 (in percentag

n.p., on-line, Internet, 15 November 1999, available from http://lcw

loc.gov/frd/cs/uzbekistan/uz_appen.html.

11. Stanley Escudero and Olivier Roy, Special Report on Tajikis

The War in Tajikistan Three Years On (Washington, D.C.: US Institut

Peace Press, 1996).

12. Graham Fuller, “Central Asia: The Quest for Identity,” Current 

tory, April 1994, 148.

13. Iran’s supreme chief of state is the cleric ayatollah Khomeini, 

the president is pro-western Hatami. “Iran,” Central Intelligence Age

World Factbook, n.p., on-line, Internet, 10 December 1999, available f

http://www.odci.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/ir.html; A Nati

Security Strategy for a New Century (Washington, D.C.: Governm

Printing Office [GPO], December 1999), 33; and “Iran: Reformist Majo
Undermines Theocracy,” n.p., on-line, Internet, 9 February 2000, avail

from http://www.stratfor.com/MEAF/commentary/m0002090115.htm

14. “Fundamentalist Threat Rising in Central Asia,” n.p., on-line

ternet, 9 February 2000, available from http://www.stratfor.com/servi

giu/021898.asp.

15. William M. Tart, “Afghanistan: Same as it Ever Was.” Written 

January 2000 to fulfill partial completion of American Military Univer

course LC508. The Jamiat-i-Islami (Society of Islam) led by Burhanid

Rabanni and his defense minister, Ahmad Shah Massoud, are the le

mate recognized government of Afghanistan. 

16. “Fundamentalist Threat Rising in Central Asia.”

17. Fuller, 149.

18. Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan. Nancy Lubin, Keith M

tin, and Barnett R. Rubin, Calming the Ferghana Valley (Washing

D.C.: Brookings Press, 1999).

19. Ibid.

20. Stephen Van Evera, “Hypotheses on Nationalism and War,” in 

ories of War and Peace, Michael E. Brown, ed., 266.

21. Peter Grier, “New World Coming,” Air Force Magazine, Decem

1999, 59–62.

22. Ibid.

23. Brown, “Causes and Regional Dimensions of Internal Confl

465.

24. Van Evera, 273.

25. Samuel P. Huntington, “The Clash of Civilizations?” Foreign Aff

Summer 1993, 17–19. That line, generally speaking, can be drawn e

west through Kazakhstan. 

26. Van Evera, 274.

27. Amy Myers Jaffe and Robert A. Manning, “The Shocks of a W

of Cheap Oil,” Foreign Affairs, January–February 2000, 16–29.

28. A National Security Strategy for a New Century (Washington, D

GPO, 1999), 1.

29. Ibid., 2.

30. Ibid.

31. Ibid.

32. Ibid., 3.

33. Ibid.

34. As a matter of fact, significant CTR funds have already been sp

just in Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan. With the remaining former Soviet 

clear weapons in storage in Uzbekistan and the growing legacy of e

ronmental issues surrounding Soviet WMD programs in Kazakhs

both countries have requested increases in CTR funding for the fore

able future. Unfortunately, some of the funding is requested for clean

of previous WMD facilities.

35. Chief of Army General Staff Bakhytzhan Ertaev and businessm

Aleksandr Petrenko went on trial and were convicted in January 20

Ertaev implicated the former prime minister, but no charges were f

The complete story of the transaction is on this Web site. “The High P

of Kazakhstan’s MiG Affair,” n.p., on-line, Internet, 5 January 20

available from http://www.stratfor.com/services/giu/111899.asp.

36. Oil reserves: United States (22 billion barrels), North Sea (17 

lion barrels); the entire Caspian Sea region estimates (16–32 billion 

rels). Natural gas proven reserves: North America (300 trillion cubic 

and Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan (236–337 trillion cubic f

Caspian region, n.p., on-line, Internet, 5 January 2000, available f
http://www.eia.doe.org/emeu.cabs/caspian.html and “Caspian Tab

Maps,” n.p., on-line, Internet, 5 January 2000, available from htt

www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/caspgrph.html.

37. Uzbekistan increased its oil production by more than 91,000 

rels per day in only five years while Turkmenistan added 23,000 bar

per day to its output over an eight-year period. “Caspian Sea Reg

(16–32 billion barrels) and “Turkmenistan” (236–337 trillion cubic f

n.p., on-line, Internet, 5 January 2000, available from http://www

doe.gov/emeu/cabs/turkmen.html and “Uzbekistan,” n.p., on-line, In

net, 5 January 2000, available from http://www.eia.doe.gov/em

cabs/uzbek.html.

38. Kazakhstan has seen a slump by 30,000 barrels a day over 

past seven years. “Caspian Tables, Maps” and “Kazakhstan,” n.p., 

line, Internet, 5 January 2000, available from http://www.eia.doe.g

emeu/cabs/kazakh.html. 

39. 1997 CAS oil production from the Caspian was a respect

763,000 barrels a day. 

40. Turkmenistan with the world’s third largest natural gas rese

behind Russia and Qatar. 

41. From Chinese and American joint ventures that have develo

agreements to build the world’s longest pipeline, a natural gas pipelin

a Chinese coastal port to the Japanese, German, US, Korean, and S

refurbishment tenders on CAS refineries, there is widespread evidenc

international interest. 

42. Although critical to the stability of their economies, these refi

ies are not state of the art and have hurt overall CAS production. K

khstan has three refineries undergoing various stages of upgrades. T

have changed hands numerous times due to improprieties and lega

sues. Here, poor performance of oil and the output and transport fee

KazakhOil and KazTransOil (both former Soviet-style firms) hurt pro

Learning their lesson from this dependence, Kazakhstan is buildin

natural gas liquification plant in conjunction with Phillips and a new 

processing plant in order to limit Russian Gazprom influence. For its 

Turkmenistan has only two refineries; and they are engaged with 

French to build a new lubricant blending facility at the port cit

Turkemenbashi. Uzbekistan has two older refineries and one newer 

finery that were built since the breakup. They have a brand new pe

chemical plant and, innovatively, they plan to have 360 compressed 

ural gas filling stations by 2004 to take advantage of their immense 

resource. 

43. Uzbek produced more than 1,700 metric tons in 1997. They 

almost double that in 2000 with a proposed 3,000 metric tons of 38,

tons of reserves. 

44. “Central Asian Nuclear Weapons Free Zone,” n.p., on-line, In

net, 12 March 2000, available from http://www.fas.org/nuke/cont

canwfz.

45. A National Security Strategy for a New Century, 2.

46. Ibid., 33.

47. The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Euro

(OSCE) field office and base of operations in the CAS is in Kyrgyzs

“Kyrgyzstan,” CIA World Factbook 1999, n.p., on-line, Internet, 3 Fe

ary 2000, available from http://www.odci.gov/cia/publications/factbo

kg.html.

48. George Tanham, War without Guns: American Civilians in R

Vietnam (New York: Praeger, 1966), 23–30.
49. Escudero and Roy, available from http://www.usip.org/oc

tajik2.html. French scholar Roy is former head of the OSCE missio

Dushanbe, Tajikistan; and Ambassador Escudero was the United Stat

chief representative in Dushanbe. 

50. This information was extracted from media ratings from CE

COM documents.

51. Drug trafficking route aids in transporting illegal drugs.

52. “DEA Foreign Offices,” n.p., on-line, Internet, 20 December 19

available from http://www.usdog.gov/dea/briefingbook/page8.htm. 

ticular problems are with Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan.

53. Escudero and Roy.

54. Andrew Bell–Fialkoff, Ethnic Cleansing (New York: St. Mar

Press, 1996).

55. “Fundamentalist Threat Rising in Central Asia,” n.p., on-line, In

net, 9 February 2000, available from http://www.stratfor.com/servi

giu/021898.asp. 

56. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), National Mili

Strategy, Shape, Respond, Prepare Now: A Military Strategy for a New 

Washington, D.C., 11.

57. Max G. Manwaring, “The Manwaring Paradigm,” in Low-Inten

Conflict: Old Threats in a New World, Edwin G. Corr and Stephen Sl

eds. (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1992).

58. A USN commander comments during his 20 January 2000 lec

in Wood Auditorium, Air Command and Staff College, Air Univer

Maxwell Air Force Base, Ala.

59. Lieutenant Colonel Hayman, “CCJ4/7 Information Paper. S

ject: Security Assistance Program-Uzbekistan,” 15 November 1999.

60. Escudero and Roy, 3.

61. Coast Guard courses and Special Operations Forces course t

vary based on levels of experience and requirements.

62. Although there are 11 airfields more than 10,000 feet long 

deemed suitable for even C-5 operations, but maximum on the ground 

stricts effective war-time operations at all 11. “Airfield Suitability,” n

on-line, Internet, 17 December 1999, available from http://www.am

mil/do/doa/doas.html and also per conversation 17 December 1999 

Maj Jeff Hupy.

63. First-right-of-refusal includes a contract that allows us to dec

a capability before any other customer.

64. “UPS,” n.p., on-line, Internet, 22 January 2000, available f

http://www.ups.com and “DHL,” n.p., on-line, Internet, 22 January 2

available from http://www.dhl.com and “Federal Express,” n.p., on-

Internet, 22 January 2000, available from http://www.fedex.com.

65. CJCS, Joint Publication (JP) 3-08, Interagency Coordination 

ing Joint Operations, vol. 2, 9 October 1996, III-16-19.

66. Ibid., B-A-36–38. The list in JP 3-08 could also serve as the b

for the on-site operations coordination center in UN operations.

67. Donald Rothchild and David Lake, “Preventing Ethnic Confl

n.p., on-line, Internet, 13 October 1999, available from http://www-i

ucsd.edu/IGCC2/newletterprev/newletter/study.html.
Appendix A

Ethnic Disposition

Source: Tables 3 and 4 available from http://lcweb2.loc.gov/frd/cs/uzbekistan

appen.html.

Note: Disposition in percentage: “n/a” reflects that eit

they are a negligible part of the population or sources 

not break them out further. Most of these groups proba

were grouped into the “Other” category.

Group Kazakhstan Kyrgyzstan Tajikistan Turkmenistan Uzbekis

Kazakh 44.3 0.9 n/a 2 4.1

Kyrgyz n/a 52.4 n/a n/a 0.9

Tajik n/a 0.8 64.9 n/a 4.7

Turkmen n/a n/a n/a 73.3 0.6

Uzbek 2.2 12.9 25.1 9.1 71.4

Russian 35.8 21.5 3.5 9.8 8.3

Ukranian 5.1 2.5 n/a n/a 0.8

German 3.6 2.4 n/a n/a n/a

Uigher n/a 0.9 n/a n/a n/a

Rural 44.1 64.9 71.9 54.9 61.3

Urban 55.9 35.1 28.1 45.1 38.7

41
Appendix B

Defense Industries of Selected CAS

Major Defense Industry Facilities in Kazakhstan

43

Note: The BW/CW facility at Vozrozhdenly Island in 

Aral Sea shared with Uzbekistan is depicted on the m

Sources report the north half (Kazakh) was the living qu

ters for Soviet scientists while the south (Uzbek) was 

laboratory. (Map source available at: http://www.lib.utex

edu/Libs/PCL/Map_collection/commonwealth/DfnsIndu

Kazakhstan.jpg; and http://www.lib.utexas.edu/Libs/PC

Map_collection/commonwealth/DfnsIndust-Uzbekistan.jp
Details including satellite imagery of “Voz” Island 

available at http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/russia/facili

cbw/index.html.

Major Defense Industry Facilities in Uzbekistan

44
Appendix C

Central Asian Oil Infrastructure

Selected Oil Infrastructure in the Caspian Sea Region

45

Note: This map depicts Trans–Caspian issues. The 

lowing is a worldview that illustrates why many inter

tional powers are interested in Central Asia and its ene

flow. Source available from http://www.eia.doe.gov/eme

cabs/caspgrph.html.
Existing and Potential Oil and Gas

Export Routes from the Caspian Basin

46