# FILED April 30, 1998 Cecil Crowson, Jr. Appellate C ourt Clerk IN THE COURT OF CRIMINA L APPEALS OF T ENNESSEE AT JACKSON FEBRUARY SESS ION, 1998

STATE OF TE NNE SSE E, ) C.C.A. NO. 02C01-9704-CC-00139 ) Appellee, ) ) McNAIRY COUNTY V. ) ) ) HON. JON KERRY BLACKWOOD, PAM DAVIS, ) JUDGE ) Appe llant. ) (WORTHLESS CHECKS)

FOR THE APPELLANT : FOR THE APPELLEE : GARY F. ANTRI CAN JOHN KNOX WALKUP Distri ct Public

Defender Attorney General& Reporter RICKEY

W. GRI GGS GEORGIA BLYTHE FELNER Assistant Pu blic Defende r Assistant Attorney General 2nd Floor, Cordel l Hull Bui lding JEANNIE KA ESS 425 Fifth Avenue North Assistant Public Defender Nashvill e, TN 37243 P.O. Box 700 Somervill e, TN 38068 ELIZABETH T . RICE District Attorn ey Ge neral ED NEAL McDANIEL Assistant Distri ct Attorney General 300 Industri al Drive Selmer, TN 38375

OPINION FILED ________________________ AFFIRMED THOMAS T. WOODALL, J UDGE-2- 

# OPINION

The Defe ndan t, Pam Davis , appe als as of right fr om the judgment of t he McNairy County Circuit Court. Defendant was convicted of issui ng worthless checks followi ng a jury trialand was sentenced to eleven (11) month s, twenty-nine (29) d ays in the McN airy Cou nty Jail wi th the sentence to be suspended upon pay ment of the
c heck amo unt with in thirty (3 0) day s. On a ppea l, Defe ndan t raises the follo win g issues: 1) Whether there is s ufficien t eviden ce to s uppo rt the D efend ant’s conviction ; 2) Whether the tri al judge abused its discr etion by deny ing Defe ndan t’s motion for a judgm ent of acq uittal base d upon a defective indictme nt. We affirm the ju dgme nt of the trial co urt.

When an accused challenges t he suffi ciency of the convict ing evidence, t he standard is

whether, af

ter revi ewing the evidence in the l ight most favorable to the prosecution , any rat ional trie r of fact c ould have fou nd the e ssential e lemen ts of the cri me beyond a reason able do ubt. Jackson v. Virginia , 443 U.S. 30 7, 319 (1979 ). On appea l, the State is entitled to the strongest legiti mate view of t he evidence and all inference s therefr om. Stat e v. Cabbage , 571 S.W .2d 832, 835 (Tenn. 197 8). Because a verdict

of guil t removes the pr esumption of i nnocence and replaces it with
a presumption of

guilt, the accused has t he burden in thi s court of illustrati ng why the evid ence is insufficient to suppo rt the verdict re turned b y the trier of fac t. State v. Tug gle , 639 S.W.2d 91 3, 9 14 (Te nn. 198 2); State v. Grace , 493 S.W.2d 474, 476 (Tenn. 19 73).-3- Questions concerning the credib ilit y of the wi tnesses, t he weight and value to be given the evidence, as wellas all factualiss ues r aised by the evide nce, are resolved by the t rier of fact, no t this court. State v. Pappas , 754 S.W.2d 620, 623 (Tenn. Crim. A pp.), perm . to app eal denied , id . (Tenn. 198 7). Nor ma y this court reweig h or reevalu ate the ev idence
. Cabbage , 571 S.W .2d at 835. A jury verdic t approved by the trial j udge accredits the State’ s witnesses andresolve s all conflicts in favor of the State. Grace , 493 S.W .2d at 476
.

“A person commits an off ense who, with fr

audulent i ntent or

knowingly: stops payment on a check or si milar si ght order forthe payment of money f or the purpose of paying any fine, fee, tax , license orobligat ion to any gov ernmental entity or for the purpose of obtaining money, servi ces, labor, c redit or a ny article of value; provided, thatsuc h mon ey, cre dit , go ods or s erv ice s wer e asrep res ent ed at

theti me of t he issuance of t he check orsimilar sight orde r.” Tenn. Code A nn. § 39-14-1 21(a)(2). The Defenda nt contends that the above statute do es not ap ply to checks writ ten for the service s of rental a ccom moda tions.

A statute i s construed to ascert ain and give effect to the intent and purpose of legisl ation, consideringthe statu te as a whole and giving words their common and ordinary meaning withou t forced or sub tle con structio n that w ould lim it or extend t he meaning of the lang uage. Carso n Cree k Vaca tion Res orts, Inc. v . Depar tment of Revenue , 865 S.W.2d 1, 2 (Tenn. 1993 ). This cou rt should assume that the legislature used e ach wo rd in the sta tute purposely and that the use of t hose words conveyed some intent and had so me m eaning and pu rpose. As the language in t he statute i s plain, clear a nd un amb iguou s, there is no room for interpretat ion and we apply the words o f the statute as written. Id
.-4- Under the broad definit ion of “servi ces,” accommodations in hotels, restaura nts or else where are inc luded within the statu te. Tenn. CodeAnn. § 39-11- 106(a)(35). While the defi nition d oes not spec ifically refer to “ren t,” this check was written for

theser vi cesof mo nth ly

acc ommod ati ons.The i ndi ctme nt spe cif ically charged that the Defendan t stopped payment of a check for t he purpose of “obtaini ng services.” B y use of the term “or e lsewhe re,” the act is written to encompass serviceswhich are no t spec ifically enumerated withi n the stat ute. In t he light most

favorabl e to the State, a rati onal trier of fact could have fo und that there
was s uffici ent evidence t o find theDefendant guilty under t he provisi ons of Tennessee Code Annota ted sectio n 39-14 -121(a)( 2). The Defen dant ha s failed to meet h er burde n of proo f, and this iss ue is witho ut merit.

The Defendantargues that the indi ctment is i nvalid as it fai led to speci fy the requisite menta l elemen t of “ fraudulen t intent .” The indi ctment charged t he Defendant as follows: Pam Davis . . . did unlaw fully and know ingly stop payment of a check forthe purp ose of ob taining se rvices . . . in violation of T.C.A
. 39-1 4- 121. In order to beconvicted under Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-14 -121(a)(2),
a defendant must act “kno wingly” o r“with f raudulent i ntent.” As the indi ctment charged the Defe ndant w ith acting “kn owingly,” this is suffi cient to meet the requirement

that the indi ctment state the facts constituting the offen se in ordinary and concise languag e, without prolix ity or

repetit ion, in such a manner as to enab le
a person of common understandi ng to know what i s intended. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-13-202. The indi ctment correctly i nformed the Defendant of the charg es, enabled the trial court

to enter judgment and sentence and protected the Defendant against-5-

doub le jeopard y. State v. T rusty , 919 S.W .2d 305, 309 (Tenn. 199 6). This issueis without m erit.

We affirm the ju dgme nt of the trial co urt.

____________________________________ THOMAS T. W OODALL, Judge
CONCUR:

___________________________________ JOSEPH B. JONES, Presiding Judge

___________________________________ JOHN H. PEAY, Judge