[Cite as State v. Gilmore, 2023-Ohio-1503.]

Atty. Gina DeGenova, Mahoning County Prosecutor and Atty. Edward A. Czopur, 

Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, 21 West Boardman Street, 6th Floor, Youngstown, 

Ohio 44503, for Plaintiff-Appellee and

Atty. Wesley A. Johnston, P.O. Box 6041, Youngstown, Ohio 44503, for DefendantAppellant.

Dated: May 4, 2023

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO 

SEVENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

MAHONING COUNTY

STATE OF OHIO,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

ZION QUINCY HAYNES GILMORE,

Defendant-Appellant.

OPINION AND JUDGMENT ENTRY

Case No. 22 MA 0067

Criminal Appeal from the

Court of Common Pleas of Mahoning County, Ohio

Case No. 21 CR 16

BEFORE:

David A. D’Apolito, Carol Ann Robb, Mark A. Hanni, Judges.

JUDGMENT:

Affirmed.
– 2 –

Case No. 22 MA 0067

D’Apolito, P.J.

{¶1} Appellant, Zion Gilmore, appeals from the May 11, 2021 judgment of the 

Mahoning County Court of Common Pleas convicting and sentencing him to a jointly 

recommended, total indefinite sentence of 11 years (minimum) to 15 years (maximum) 

for involuntary manslaughter and aggravated burglary, both felonies of the first degree, 

following a guilty plea.1 On appeal, Appellant asserts his guilty plea was not made in a 

knowing, intelligent, and voluntary manner because the trial court did not strictly comply 

with Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(c) because it failed to specifically inform him of his right to a trial by 

jury. Finding no reversible error, we affirm. 

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

{¶2} On January 21, 2021, Appellant was indicted by the Mahoning County 

Grand Jury on five counts: count one, murder, an unclassified felony in violation of R.C.

2903.02(B), (D) and 2929.02(B) with a firearm specification; count two, aggravated 

burglary, a felony of the first degree in violation of R.C. 2911.11(A)(2) and (B), with a 

firearm specification; count three, felonious assault, a felony of the second degree in 

violation of R.C. 2903.11(A)(2) and (D)(1)(a) with a firearm specification; count four, 

having weapons while under disability, a felony of the third degree in violation of R.C. 

2923.13(A)(2), (3) and (B); and count five, intimidation of an attorney, victim or witness in 

a criminal case, a felony of the third degree in violation of R.C. 2921.04(B)(1) and (D).

Appellant was appointed counsel, pled not guilty at his arraignment, and waived his right 

to a speedy trial.

{¶3} Appellant subsequently entered into plea negotiations with Appellee, the 

State of Ohio. A change of plea hearing was held on April 28, 2021. Appellant withdrew 

his former not guilty plea and entered a guilty plea to an amended count one, involuntary 

manslaughter, a felony of the first degree in violation of R.C. 2903.04(A), (B), and (C) 

1 Am. Sub. S.B. No. 201, 2018 Ohio Laws 157, known as the “Reagan Tokes Law,” significantly altered the 

sentencing structure for many of Ohio’s most serious felonies by implementing an indefinite sentencing 

system for those non-life felonies of the first and second degree, committed on or after March 22, 2019. 
– 3 –

Case No. 22 MA 0067

with a firearm specification; and count two, aggravated burglary, a felony of the first 

degree in violation of R.C. 2911.11(A)(2) and (B) with a firearm specification.

{¶4} The written plea form, which Appellant went over with his counsel and 

affixed his signature on April 28, 2021, explains his non-constitutional and constitutional 

rights, including his right to a trial by jury. (5/11/2021 Plea of Guilty, p. 1-2). Specifically, 

the plea form states: “I understand that by my plea, I waive certain important and 

substantial constitutional and statutory rights, including my right to a trial by jury[.]” (Id.). 

The plea form further includes the parties’ jointly recommended sentence of eight to 12 

years on each charge, to be served concurrently, and acknowledged that the two threeyear firearm specifications would merge, and be served prior to and consecutively to the 

other charges. (Id. at p. 5).

{¶5} During the plea hearing, the trial court also explained Appellant’s nonconstitutional and constitutional rights. (4/28/2021 Plea Hearing Tr., p. 8-25). At issue 

here is Appellant’s constitutional right to a trial by jury which was addressed orally on the 

record as follows: 

THE COURT: * * * If you don’t plead guilty, then you would go to trial. That’s 

pretty much your options.

And at trial, the State would have to prove beyond a reasonable doubt each 

and every element of each offense against you. So they would try and meet 

that burden by bringing whatever witnesses and evidence they have to 

present to the judge and jury.

(Id. at p. 8). 

{¶6} On April 28, 2021, the trial court accepted Appellant’s guilty plea after 

finding it was made in a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary manner pursuant to Crim.R. 

11 and dismissed the remaining counts. (5/11/2021 Judgment Entry, p. 1). The parties 

waived a PSI and the court deferred sentencing. (Id. at p. 2). 

{¶7} On May 11, 2021, the trial court sentenced Appellant to the jointly 

recommended, indefinite prison term of eight years (minimum) to 12 years (maximum) on 

each charge, to be served concurrently, and merged the two three-year firearm 
– 4 –

Case No. 22 MA 0067

specifications, to be served prior to and consecutively to the other charges, for a total 

indefinite sentence of 11 years (minimum) to 15 years (maximum). (5/11/2021 

Sentencing Entry, p. 2-3). The court also subjected Appellant to five years of mandatory 

post-release control. (Id. at p. 3). 

{¶8} Appellant filed a delayed appeal and raises one assignment of error. 

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR

THE TRIAL COURT FAILED TO STRICTLY COMPLY WITH RULE 11’S 

CONSTITUTIONAL REQUIREMENT WHEN TAKING GILMORE’S PLEA.

{¶9} In his sole assignment of error, Appellant argues his guilty plea was not 

made in a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary manner because the trial court did not strictly 

comply with Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(c) because it failed to specifically inform him of his right to 

a trial by jury. 

{¶10} Guilty pleas are governed by Crim.R. 11(C), which states in part:

(2) In felony cases the court may refuse to accept a plea of guilty or a plea 

of no contest, and shall not accept a plea of guilty or no contest without first 

addressing the defendant personally either in-person or by remote 

contemporaneous video in conformity with Crim.R. 43(A) and doing all of 

the following:

(a) Determining that the defendant is making the plea voluntarily, with 

understanding of the nature of the charges and of the maximum penalty 

involved, and if applicable, that the defendant is not eligible for probation or 

for the imposition of community control sanctions at the sentencing hearing.

(b) Informing the defendant of and determining that the defendant 

understands the effect of the plea of guilty or no contest, and that the court, 

upon acceptance of the plea, may proceed with judgment and sentence.

(c) Informing the defendant and determining that the defendant understands 

that by the plea the defendant is waiving the rights to jury trial, to confront 
– 5 –

Case No. 22 MA 0067

witnesses against him or her, to have compulsory process for obtaining 

witnesses in the defendant’s favor, and to require the state to prove the 

defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt at a trial at which the 

defendant cannot be compelled to testify against himself or herself.

Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(a)-(c).

{¶11} Appellant does not take issue with the notice requirements for any nonconstitutional rights, outlined within Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(a)-(b), which are reviewed for 

substantial compliance. See State v. Bowers, 7th Dist. Mahoning No. 21 MA 0034, 2022-

Ohio-895, ¶ 9. Rather, Appellant only takes issue with his right to a trial by jury, a 

constitutional right. 

{¶12} The notice requirements for constitutional rights, outlined within Crim.R. 

11(C)(2)(c), are reviewed for strict compliance. See State v. Howell, 7th Dist. Monroe No. 

17 MO 0018, 2019-Ohio-1806, ¶ 6; State v. Daviduk, 7th Dist. Mahoning No. 17 MA 0167, 

2019-Ohio-1132, ¶ 14. “When a trial court fails to strictly comply with the notice 

requirements relating to a defendant’s constitutional rights, the plea is invalid without a 

demonstration of prejudice.” State v. Hill, 7th Dist. Belmont No. 18 BE 0037, 2019-Ohio4079, ¶ 9, citing State v. Veney, 120 Ohio St.3d 176, 2008-Ohio-5200, ¶ 30. “[A]n 

appellate court may rely on a written plea agreement where the trial court’s colloquy 

relating to a particular constitutional right is ambiguous, but not where there is no mention 

whatsoever in the colloquy of the constitutional right.” Hill, supra, at ¶ 11, citing State v. 

Barker, 129 Ohio St.3d 472, 2011-Ohio-4130, ¶ 23-27.2 

{¶13} In this case, as stated, the trial court did reference “jury” during the 

constitutional rights colloquy at the plea hearing as follows:

THE COURT: * * * If you don’t plead guilty, then you would go to trial. That’s 

pretty much your options.

2 We note the case at bar is unlike Hill or State v. Lanier, 7th Dist. Belmont No. 21 BE 0030, 2022-Ohio2024. In Hill, this court held there was no ambiguity and, thus, we could not rely on the appellant’s waiver 

in the written plea agreement to validate the plea because the trial court only referred to “jury” during the 

Alford portion of the colloquy, not during the portion of the colloquy when the trial court both informed the 

appellant and determined that he understood that, by the plea, he was waiving his constitutional rights. Hill, 

supra, at ¶ 16-18. In Lanier, this court found error in the trial court’s only advisement that the appellant was 

waiving his right to a “speedy and public trial.” Lanier, supra, at ¶ 13-18. 
– 6 –

Case No. 22 MA 0067

And at trial, the State would have to prove beyond a reasonable doubt each 

and every element of each offense against you. So they would try and meet 

that burden by bringing whatever witnesses and evidence they have to 

present to the judge and jury.

(4/28/2021 Plea Hearing Tr., p. 8). 

{¶14} The court’s “judge and jury” reference at the plea hearing creates an 

ambiguity as to the explanation of Appellant’s constitutional right to a trial by jury. As 

such, this court is permitted to look to other parts of the record to determine compliance, 

including the written plea agreement which, as stated, provides: “I understand that by my 

plea, I waive certain important and substantial constitutional and statutory rights, including 

my right to a trial by jury[.]” (5/11/2021 Plea of Guilty, p. 1-2). See Hill, supra, at ¶ 11, 

citing Barker, supra, at ¶ 23-27. Appellant went over the plea form with his counsel and 

affixed his signature to it on April 28, 2021. 

{¶15} The record further reveals that at the beginning of the plea hearing, the 

State said this matter was set for a “jury trial” but the parties had reached a Crim.R. 11 

agreement. (4/28/2021 Plea Hearing Tr., p. 2). In fact, the record shows this case was 

set for a trial by jury at least four times prior, and had been continued each time upon 

motions filed by Appellant. The record further reveals defense counsel stated at the plea 

hearing that he went over Appellant’s “complete constitutional rights” with him prior to the 

plea and Appellant fully understood his rights. (Id. at p. 3). 

{¶16} Regarding the constitutional notice provisions, in addition to the right to a 

trial by jury, Appellant was informed at the plea hearing that by entering a guilty plea he 

was waiving the right to confront witnesses against him, the right to subpoena witnesses 

to testify on his behalf, and the right to require the State to prove his guilt beyond a 

reasonable doubt. (Id. at p. 8-9). Appellant was also advised that if he chose to go to trial 

he could not be compelled to testify. (Id.)

{¶17} Accordingly, Appellant’s guilty plea was entered knowingly, intelligently, and 

voluntarily. The trial court strictly complied with the constitutional notice provisions under 

Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(c), including at issue here, Appellant’s right to a trial by jury. Appellant’s 

jointly recommended, total indefinite sentence of 11 years (minimum) to 15 years 
– 7 –

Case No. 22 MA 0067

(maximum) was authorized by law. See R.C. 2953.08(D); R.C. 2929.14(A)(1)(a); R.C. 

2929.144.

CONCLUSION

{¶18} For the foregoing reasons, Appellant’s sole assignment of error is not welltaken. The May 11, 2021 judgment of the Mahoning County Court of Common Pleas 

convicting and sentencing Appellant to a jointly recommended, total indefinite sentence 

of 11 years (minimum) to 15 years (maximum) for involuntary manslaughter and 

aggravated burglary following a guilty plea is affirmed.

Robb, J., concurs.

Hanni, J., concurs.
[Cite as State v. Gilmore, 2023-Ohio-1503.]

For the reasons stated in the Opinion rendered herein, the assignment of error 

is overruled and it is the final judgment and order of this Court that the judgment of the 

Court of Common Pleas of Mahoning County, Ohio, is affirmed. Costs to be waived.

A certified copy of this opinion and judgment entry shall constitute the mandate 

in this case pursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure. It is ordered that 

a certified copy be sent by the clerk to the trial court to carry this judgment into 

execution.

NOTICE TO COUNSEL

This document constitutes a final judgment entry.