### IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE AT JACKSON June 2000 Session STATE OF TENNESSEE v. EUGENE A. TURNER Appeal from the Criminal Court for McNairy County No. 1160 Jon Kerry Blackwood, Judge

No. W1999-01866-CCA-R3-CD - Decided October 2, 2000

Defendant

appeals his jury convictions on two counts of premedi

tated first degree murder for which he received concurrent life sentences. T he followi ng i ssues are presented for our review: (1) whether the evidence was sufficient to support the convictions; (2) whether the trial court erre

d in disallowing impeachment evid ence against a

state witness;

(3) whether

the trial court er

roneously admitted evidence of d efendant bei ng a beneficiary of life insuranc

e policies on one o

f the victims; (4) whether the tria

l court erroneou

sly admitted inflammatory

evidence relating to the crime scene; (5) whether the trial court erred in allowing evidence of alleged threats made by the defendant; (6) whether the trial court erred in allowing evidence of a prior argument between

the defendant and one of the victims; and (7) whether the trial court erred in disallowing evidence of defendant's failure to flee and avoid arrest. We affirm the judgments of the trial court. Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appe al as of Right; Judgme

nt of the Criminal C

ourt Affirmed.
J OE G. R ILEY , J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which J OSEPH M. T IPTON and J OHN E VERETT W ILLI AMS , JJ., joined.
C. Michael Robbins, Memphis, Tennessee (on appeal), and Gary F . Antrican, Distr ict Public Defender, Somerville, Tennessee (at trial), for the appellant, Eugene A. Turne r. P aul G. Summers, Attorney General and Reporter; Kim R. Helper, Assistant Attorne y General ; Elizabeth T. Rice, District Attorney General; James W. Freeland, Jr. and Jerry W. Norwood, Assistant District Attorneys General, for the appellee, State of Tennessee

. OPINION
Defendant

was convicted

by a McNairy County

jury of the premeditated first degree murders of his wife and stepdaughter, for which he received two concurrent life sentences. In this appeal as of right, he pre

sents the following

issues: (1) whether the evid

ence was suffic

ient to support the c

onvictions;-2- (2) whethe r th e trial court erred in disallowing impeachment evidence aga

inst a state witness ; (3) whether

the trial court erroneously admitted evidence of defendant being a beneficiary of life insurance policie s on one of the victims; (4) whe therthe trial court erroneously admitted inflammatory evidence relat

ing to the crime s

cene; (5) whether

the trial court er

red in allowing e

vid en ce of alleged threats made by

the defendant; (6) whether

the trial court erred in allow ing e vidence of a prior argument between the defendant and one of the victims; and (7) whether

the tria l cour t erred in disallowing evidence of defendant's failure to flee and avoid arrest.
After a careful review of the record, we find no reversible error a nd affirm the judgments of the trial court. FACTS
On December

3, 1997, at 12:41 a. m. the defendant p laced a 911 call t

o the McNairy

County Sheriff’s Office. He told the dis patcher someone had broken into his home and shot his wife. Officers later discovered the bodies of defendant’swife and stepdaughter at the residence. Both had been shot in the head with a .9m m handgun. The wife had multiple near gunshot wounds to the head, and the stepdaughter had one near gunshot wound to the head. The family dog had also been sho tand killed. However, there was no evidence of forced entry into the mobi le home and n o evidence of a struggle inside.
Several witnesses testified that they saw t he de fendant with a .9mm handgun a few weeks pr ior to the murder. Dewayne Scott testified that he loaned the defendant a .9mm Ruge r approximately

six months prior to th

e m urder, and the defendant never returned the weapon. Analysis of the clothing defendant

was wearing on the night of the murders revealed the presence of gunpowder residue.
Add iti ona lly, two different ind ividuals heard the

defendant threa

ten to kill his wife pr

ior to the murders. One witness testified that thecouple fought over the family do

g on several oc

casions. Approximately

one week before the murder, the defendant stated that “if the dog ge ts put to sleep, the whole damn family will get put to sleep.” Another witness testified that the defendant warned his wife on two separ

ate occasions tha

t if she tried to leave him, he would kill her. Furthermore, the couple’s babysitter stated that she witnessed a drunken altercation between the couple. She stated the two were “fussing,” and the defendant placed an unloaded gun to his wife’ s headand pulled the trigger several times.-3-

Thomas Kiracofe, thedefendant’s cellmate, testified that the defendant told him

he shot his wife during an argument over the dog. Kiracofe stated defenda nt then told him tha t he sh ot his stepdaughter

because she wa

s a witness to his wife’s murder. Kiracofe further testified that he and the defendant planned to escape from prison.
The defendant did not

testify at tr

ial but his statemen

t to authorities was read t o the j ury. In that statement the def

endant sta

ted that he had been out drinking on the night in question, did not own a gun, and did not kill his wife and stepdaughter. Defendant also endeavored to show through other witnesses that he w

as cooperative w

ith authorities thr

oughout the inves

tigation and volun

tarily surrendered himself for questioning.
The jury convicted

the defendant of two counts of premeditated murder, and he received two concurrent life

sentences. SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE
The defendant alleges the evidence is insufficient to support his convictionfor first degree murder. Specifically, the defendant claims the state failed

to prove he was the perpetrator and further failed to establish premeditation. We disagree. A. Standard of Review
In Tennessee, gr

eat weight is g

iven to the result r

eached by the jury in

a criminal trial. A jury verdict accredits the sta

te's witnesses a

nd resolves all co

nflicts in favor of the state. State v. Bigbee , 885 S.W.2d 797, 803 (Tenn. 1994). On appeal, the state is entitled to the strongest

legitimate view of the evidence and all reasonable inferences which may be drawntherefrom. Id. ; State v. Cabbage , 571 S.W.2d 832, 835 (Tenn. 1978). Moreover, a gui lty verdict removes the presumption of innocence which the appellant enjoyed at trial and raises a

presumption of guilt on appeal. State v. Grace , 493 S.W.2d 474, 476 (Tenn. 1973). The appellant has the burden of overcoming this presumption of guilt. Id.
Where sufficiency of the evidence is challenged,

the relevant que

stion for an appel

latecourt is whether, after viewing

the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found

the essential elements of the crime or crimes beyond a reasonable do

ubt. Tenn. R. App. P. 13(e); Jackson v. Virginia , 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 2789, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979); State v. Abrams , 935 S.W.2d 399, 401 (Tenn. 1996). The weight and credibility of the witnesses' testimony ar

e matters entrust

ed exclusively

to the jury as the tries of fact. State v. Sheffield , 676 S.W.2d 542, 547 (T enn. 1984); State v. Brewer , 932 S.W.2d 1, 19 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1996).-4-

B. Premeditation
The applicable definition of first degree murder is, “[a] premeditated andintentional killing of another.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-202(a)(1). Premeditation necessitates“a previously formed design or intent to kill,” State v. West , 844 S.W.2d 144, 147 (Tenn. 1992)(citations omitted), and “an act done after

the exercise of r

eflection and jud

gment . . . [meaning

] that the intent to

kill must have been formed prior to the act itself.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-202(d). It also require s that the accused be “sufficiently free from excitement and passion as to be c apable of premeditation.” Id. Although the jury may not engag e in speculation, it may infer premeditation from the manner and circumstances of

the killing. State v. Bland , 958 S.W.2d 651, 660 (Tenn. 1997); State v. Bordis , 905 S.W.2d 214, 222 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1995). Our Supr eme Court delineated several circumstances that may be indicative of premeditation, including declarations by the defendant of an intent to

kill, evidence of procurement of a weapon, the use of a deadly w eapon upon an unarmed victim, the fact that the killing was particularly cruel, the making of preparations before the killing for the purpose of concealing the crime, and calmness immediately a fter the killing. See State v. Nichols , ___S.W.3d___, ___ (T enn. 2000); Bland , 958 S.W.2d at 660. C. Analysis Viewing the evidence and the inferences therefrom in a light most favorable

to the state, we conclude the evidence is suf fic ient to sustain the jury’s finding of premeditation. Some of the circumstances enumerated by the Supreme Court in Nichols are present in the instant case.
Several witness

testified the defendant threatened to kill his wife prior to her murder. Ray Lipford, the defendant’s neighbor, testified that on at least two occasions the defendant threatened to kill his wife. He statedthese altercations occurred about one month prior to her murder. Deborah Floyd, a family fr

iend, testified th

at the coupl e fought about the dog. She testified that about one week prior to the murde

rs, the defenda

nt stated, “if

the dog gets put to sleep, the whole damn family will be put to sleep.” The evidence revealed that the dog was shot and killed by the defendant along withthe two victims. Thomas Kiracofe, the defendant’s for

mer cellmate, te

stified the defen

dant told him the couple

argued over th

e dog and he shot

his wife. Kiracofe stated that the defendant claimed he then shot his stepdaughter because she had witnessed her mother’s murder.
Testimonial ev ide nce revealed th e defendant poss

essed a .9mm handg

un. Dewayn

e Scott testified that he loaned the defendant his .9mm Ruger h andgu n about six months prior to the murders, and both Smith and Lipford testified that they had seen the defendant in possession of the weapon less than a month before the murders. Additionally, Wanda Cobb testified that she observed the defendant aim an unloaded gun at the victim’s head and pull the trigger. Testimony

from crime scene investigators revealed that neither victim was armed, and there was no sig

n of forced entr

y into the mobile home

or any sign of a struggle on the interior. Furthermore, analy sis of the clothing worn by the defendant revealed the presence of gunpowder residue.1 This i ssue was addressed in the trial court and in t he briefs in this court

under Tenn. R. Evid. 613(b). The parties have not ad dressed the admissibility of thi s evid ence un der Tenn.R. Evid. 404(b) or 616. Lik

ewise,we do not (continued ...) -5- Fin all y, in addition to taking steps todestroy evidence of his crime, the defendant exhibited calmness immediat

ely after the killing. He called his brother and told him that he was leaving for Louisiana to visit another bro

ther, and asked h

im to check on his family the next day. Furthermore , he drove to a local gas station and obtained a receipt for cigarettes in order to establish a purported alibi. He then changed his clothes and called 911. The officers who arrived on the scene stated that once the defendant was placed in the patrol car, he fell asleep.
We conclude there

was ample evid

ence to sup port defendant’ s convictions. This i ssue is without merit. IMPEACHMENT EVIDENCE
The defendant argues the trial court erred in sustaining the state’s object ion to the introduction of extrinsic evidence to impeach Thomas Kiracofe. He claims the proper foundation was laid under Tenn. R. Evid. 613 (b).
On cross-examination of Thomas Kirako fe, d efense counsel asked the witness if he ever askedSteven Barker to “go with him and snitch,” in order to get a “time cut”. Kirakofe re plied that he did not. To rebut Kiracofe’s assertion, the defendant sought to introduce the testimony of Steven Barker. Barker’s proffered testimony involved an alleg ed incide nt in which Kirakofe requested Barker “snitch” on another inmate so that Kirakofe could receive a reduction in his federal sentence

. The state objected to this testimony, arguing Kirakofe had not been give

n ample opportunity

to admit or deny making the statements. Ther efor e, the state argued the defense failed to lay a proper foundation for extrinsic impeachment evidence under Tenn. R. Evid. 613(b). The objection was sustained as to the specific statements reg

arding this incid

ent, but the trial c

ourt stressed tha

t defense counsel was free to inquire into Kiracofe’s reputation for truth and veracity

. The trial court erred in disallowing Barker’s testimony about

Kiracofe’s re

quest that he aid him in obtaining a sentence

reduction by “snitching” on a fellow inmate. The defendant laid a proper foundation for this inquiry, and Kiracofe had an opportunity to admit or deny

the statement. Once Kiracofedenied asking B arker to corroborate his story so that he could receive a sentence reduction, the defendant should have been given an opportunity to introduce Barker ’s testimony to impeach Kiracofe. However, we find that this error is harmless.
Barker was allowed to testify that Kiracofe told him about sentence reductions based on cooperation with the pr osecuting a uthorities . Barker was also allowed to testify about Kiracofe’ s reputation for truthfulness and responded by testifying tha tKiracofe was a “liar” and a "lying snitch." In light of this t

estimony, t

he thorough cross-examination of Kiracofe and the overwhelming evidence of guilt, the error was harmless. See Tenn. R. App. P. 36(b). 11 (...continue d) address the admissib ility of the evidenc e under thes e two rules. H owever, if the trial c ourt erred in refusing to ad mit this evidence under these rules, we con clude the err or would b e harmless fo r the same rea sons stated a bove. -6- LIFE INSURANCE
The defendant conte

nds the trial cour

t erred in allowin

g the wife's mo

ther totestify about two insurance polies in which the defendant had a financial stake. He argues that there was no evidence presented to demonst rate that he had knowled ge of these policies . Thus, he claims thi s evidence did notrelate to motive a

nd, therefore,

was irrelevant u

nder Tenn. R. Evid. 401. In addition, he claim s the prejudice resulting from the admission of this evidence outweighed any probative value it might have. See Tenn. R. Evid. 403. Betty Smithtestified that the

re was a credit l

ife insurance po

licy on her d

aughter relat

ing to the mobile home she and the defendant co-owned. In addition, she stated h er daughter h ad a life insurance policy of $42

,000 naming the de

fendant as prima

ry benefic

iary. Howe

ver, on crossexamination she admitted she did not know whether or not the defendant was awa re eithe r policy existed, and stated the defendant had made no claim on either policy.
Tenn. R. Evid. 401 states that evidence is relevant if it “tends to make the existence of any fact of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be withoutthe evidence.” The existence of life insurance can certainly be rele vant to prove motive. See State v. Stephenson , 878 S.W.2d 530, 541 (Tenn. 1994). In Stephen son , howev er, there was pr oof t he defendant knew about the policy and offered the a mount of the policy as payment for killing the victim

. Id

. In the instant case the state failed to show the defendant was motivated by financial gain. In fact, this appe ars to be contr ary to the st

ate’s theory

that the defenda

nt simply carried out his previous threats to kill his wife for reasons unrelated to money.
The testimony regarding the life insur ance policies was brief. In light of the extensive evidence introduced against the defendant, we find this error to be harmless. See Tenn. R. App. P. 36(b). CRIME SCENE EVIDENCE
The defendant alleg

es the trial court

abused its dis c retion by al lowing the state’ s forensic pathologist,

Dr. Smith, and T.B.I. Agent Romanek to describe crime scene photographs of the victims. He argues this

evidence was cumulative and prejudicial. Furthermore, the defendant arg ues the trial court erred by allowing the jury to view the video of the crime scene. A. Description of P

hotographs Although t he photographs were not introduced, the defendant argues the descriptions of the photograph s by Dr. Smith and Age nt Romanek were ir

relevant and just

as prejudicial a

s th e-7-

photographs. The defendant a sserts Dr. Smith

was allowed to

give his opinion a

bout cause of dea

th and the type of injuries suffered. Thus, he argues the desc riptions of the blood s platters an d gruesome det ail s of the wou nds were unn eces sar y and high ly infla mmatory. Additionally, the defendant claims Agent Romanek could have described t he position of the bodies without further details about the “gruesome scene.”
The admissibility of pho tographs l ies within the sound d iscretion of the tr

ial court whose ruling will not be overturned on appeal except upon a clear showing of an abuse of discretion. State v. Banks , 564 S.W.2d 947, 949 (Tenn. 1978); State v. Lacy , 983 S.W.2d 686, 694 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1997). We concludetestimony describi ng crime scene ph

otos should be anal

yzed under this

same standard. Never

theless, the testim

ony must be releva

nt to an issue at trial with its probative value outweighing any prejudicial effect that it may have upon the trier of fact. State v. Braden , 867 S.W.2d 750, 758 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1993). Relevant evidence is evidence “having any tendency to make the existenc

e of any fact tha

t is of con sequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence.” Tenn. R. Evid. 401.
The testimony about the photographs was necessary t o corroborate the medical testimony and to give the jury a pro

per description o

f the crime scen

e. The descriptio

n given by Dr. Sm

ith wa s elicited in t he context of

corroboration for his medical conclusions. In addition, Agent Romanek gave only a brief description with regard to the location of the wife'sbody. Thus, we conclude the trial court did not abuse its di scretion in allowing Dr. Smith and Agent Romanek to discuss the content of the photographs. B. Videotape
The defendant argues the videotape of the crime scene depicting the stepdaughter’s body was particularly

gruesome and inflammatory. The video was edited as to the wife, but did not exclude the stepdaughter. Th

e defendant ar

gues both victims sho

uldhave been excluded. Additionally, he argues the video was needlessly cumulative. He contends the medical testimony and the testimony of crime scene investigators was sufficien t to depict the injuries to the victims, placement of the bodies, and the condition of the crime scene.
At tria l, a color videotape of the crime scene was shown to the jury. Upon defendant’s objection, the cour t ordered all images of the wife be edited out of the video. However, the court found the images of the stepdaughter “were not so gruesome as to substan tially outweigh their relevance.” The video showed the exterior and interior of the mobile home, including images of her body as she was fo

und by investigator

s. The admissibility of

a videotape of the

crime scene is

within the sound discretion of the trial court, an d we will not overturn its ruling on the admissibility of this evidence without a clear showing of abuse of that discretion. State v. Hall , 976 S.W.2d 121, 151 (Tenn. 1998); Statev . Bigbee , 885 S.W.2d 797, 807 (Tenn. 1994).-8-

The defense claime

d someone broke in

to his house

and committed the murders. Therefore, the state argues the video was probati ve because

it showed there wa

s no sign of forced

entry into the dwelling and no sign of a struggle within the dwelling. We agree that the video is relevant to the issues of identification and premeditation. In addition, the video aided the jury in understanding the testimony of medical examiners and crime scene investigators. Furthermore,the portion of the video depi cting the stepdaughter was brief and was merely shown to document the position of the body in relation to the bullet path and the shell casings that were found at the scene. Furthermore, ou r review of the video does not reveal that it was inflammatory. Thus, we conclude the probative value of the video is

not outweighed by it

s prejudicial eff

ect. The trial co

urt did not abuse its

discretion in allowing the edited video to be shown to the jury. THREATS
The defendant contends the testimony of Ray Lipford and Debbie F loyd regarding threa

ts allegedly made prior to the murders was irrelevant and should have been excluded. He argues the threats were conditional, and the state di d not present evidence that the conditions were ever satisfied. Therefore, he claims the testimony was not relevant to prove motive or state of mind.
In State v. Smith , 868 S.W.2d 561 (Tenn. 1993) , the Ten nessee Supreme Court held that evidence of a defendant's prior acts of violence and t hreats against the victim is admissible under Tenn. R. Evid. 404( b) in a murder case because the prior bad acts are relevant to showing the defe ndant's hostility toward the victim, the settled purpose to harm the victim, and the intent an d motive for the killing. Id. at 574. Declarations of an intent to ki ll are part icularly releva nt to establishing premeditation. State v. Pike , 978 S.W.2d 904, 914 (Tenn. 19 98). Furth ermore, evidence of a threat is relev ant and a dmissible even though the threat is conditional in form. 1 Wharton’s Criminal Evidence § 141 (14 th ed. 1985).
It is immaterial whether the condition is in such form that the victim can avoid the threatened

harm by refrain

ing from doing a spe

cified act, or that the victim must do a specified act in

order to avoid the

harm. Thus, a cond

it ional thr eat is admissible withoutregard to whether the victim did or did no t do the act specified in the condition. Id.
Like the analysis required under Tenn. R. Evid. 403, the trial court must we igh, under Rule 404(b)(3), the probative value of the evidence against the danger of unfair prejudice. However, the test for making such a determination is more stringent under Rule 404 than under Rule 403. State v. DuBose , 953 S.W.2d 649, 654 (Tenn. 1997). Nevertheless, a trial court’s determination pursuant to Rule 404(b) will

not be overturned on appeal absent an abuse of discretion. State v. Vann , 976 S.W.2d 93, 102 (Tenn. 1998).

A. Ray Lipford-9-

Ray Lipford, the defendant’s neighbor, testified that on two different occasions he heard the defendant warn the victim that if she ever tried to leave him, he wo uld kill her. H e stated the incidentshappened appro ximately three mo

nths pr ior to the murders. The trial court held the evidence was relevant to motive and the defendant’s state of mind.
The issue of motive and the defendant’s state of mind were critical to proving premeditation, a required element of the

charged offense. We

conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion in allowing this testimony. B. Debbie Floyd
Debbie Floyd, a friend of the wife, testified that the defendant stated that, “if the dog gets put to sleep, the whole damn f am ily gets put to sleep.” Again, the trial court allowed the evidence as proof of motive and to demonstrate the defendant’s state of mind.
The defendant argu

es this is a conditional statement, and there is no evidence the condition was fulfilled. The evidence revealed the dog was killed b

y the defendant a

long with the two vic

tims. Thus, the statement by the defendant that the family would be put to sleep if the dog was put to sleep has direct correlation to the murders. T heref ore, we conclud

e the trial court d

id not abuse its discretion in allowing the jury to hear this testimony.

REMOTENESS OF PRIOR CON FRONTATION
The defendant asse

rts the tria

l cou rt erred in allowing Wanda Cobb to testify about an incident she witnessed one year prior to the murder. He argu es the inci dent was so remove d in temporal proximity to the murders as to make any relevance it might have with regard to motive or intent too remote; thus, its prejudicial effect outweighed its probative value.
Wanda Cobb cared for the stepdaughter when the couple was out of t own or at work. At trial, she testified that approximately one year prior to the murders, she witnessed the defendant and victim in a drunken argument. She stated the defendant pointed an unloaded gun at his wife’s head and pulled the trigger several times. The trial court found this evidenc e was relevant and further found the probative value of the evidence was not outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. Although evidence may appear to be relevant, it

may relate to

a time so remote fr

om the date of the alleged

crime that it ceases to have probative value. 1 Wharton’s Criminal Evidence § 92 (14 th ed . 198 5). No rigid rule c an be stated to det

ermine when the ti

me interval is so gr

eat that a given fact has no probativevalue. Id. However, objections to remoteness are ordinarily regarded as affecting the weight and not the admissibility of the evidence. Smith , 868 S.W.2d at 575; see also 41 C.J.S. Homicide

§ 204(d) (1991).
T he incident

occurred appr

oximately one yea

r before the mur

ders. However,

“threats, even though remot e , are competent when it appears that they were repeated from time to time, or the hostility continued, until sho

rtly before the commission of the offense alleged.”41 C.J.S. Homicide-10-

§ 204(d) (1991). Here, two other witnesses testified they heard the defendant threaten to kill his wife shortly before the murder. Lipford testified the defendant thr

eatened the vict

im one month

prior to the murders, and Floyd testified that she heard the defendant threaten the victim the week before the murders. Ther efore, we conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion by allowing Cobb’s testimony. FAILURE TO FLEE
The defendant argu

es he shou ld have been allowed to rebut Thomas Kiracofe’s testimony that he and defendant intended to escape. He claims the state attempted to introduce evidence that he had a “consciousness of guilt,” and he should have been allowed to challenge that assertion.
At trial, the defendant sought to introduce testimony from Agent McLean of the T.B.I. that the defendant was not arrested until approximately two months after the murders, and that he voluntarily

surrendered

. He claimed this testimony negated Kirakofe’s assertion that he intended to escape. The state objected and the trial court held that the defendant could establish that he was cooperative and that he did not flee the jurisdiction. However, the trial court held th

at the length

of time between the event

and arrest was irrelevant and, therefore, disallowed testimony regarding the actual date of defendant’s arrest.
We conclude that the

failure of the de

fendant t o flee for the two months prior

to his arrest was relevant in light of

the state’s evide

nce. However, t

he defendant wa

s given ample oppor

tunity to establish that he was cooperative during the investigation, and that he did not attempt to flee the jurisdiction prior to

his arrest. The fact that

the jury was unaware that the actual time between the crime and defendant’s arrest was two months did not pre judice the defendant. We, therefore, conclude the error was harmless. See Tenn. R. App. P. 36(b). CONCLUSION In summary, we conclude: (1) the evid e nce was sufficient to sustain the defendant’s convictions for pr

emeditated murde

r; (2) the trial court’s error in disallowing the de

fendant to present impeachment

evidence against a state witness was harmless; (3) the trial court’s error in admitting evidence pertaining to life insurance polici

es was harmless; (4) the crime scene evidence was properly admitted; (5) the evidence of alleged threats made by the defendant

against his wife was properly admitted; (6) the evidence of a pr ior violent argume

nt betwee n th e defendant and his wife was properly admitted; and (7) the trial court did not c ommit reversible error by limiting the defendant’s tes

timony regarding t

he date of his arr

est.-11-

Thus, we AFFIRM the defendant’s convictions for premeditated first degree murder.

___________________________________ JOE G. RILEY, JUDGE