United States Court of Appeals

For the First Circuit

No. 20-1903

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Appellee,

v.

WILLIE RICHARD MINOR,

Defendant, Appellant.

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF MAINE

[Hon. D. Brock Hornby, U.S. District Judge] 

Before

Barron, Chief Judge,

Lynch, Thompson, Kayatta, Gelpí, and Montecalvo, Circuit Judges.

Karen A. Pickett for appellant.

Joshua K. Handell, Attorney, Criminal Division, U.S. 

Department of Justice, with whom Darcie N. McElwee, United States 

Attorney, Benjamin M. Block, Assistant United States Attorney, 

Kenneth A. Polite, Jr., Assistant Attorney General, and Lisa H. 

Miller, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, were on brief, for 

appellee.

Laura A. Foggan, Preetha Chakrabarti, and Crowell & Moring 

LLP on brief for amici curiae Battered Women's Justice Project, 

Illinois Coalition Against Domestic Violence, Indiana Coalition to 

End Domestic Violence, Kentucky Coalition Against Domestic 

Violence, Maine Coalition to End Domestic Violence, Maryland 

Network Against Domestic Violence, National Coalition Against 

Domestic Violence, and Standpoint. 

Iman K. Kholdebarin, Alan E. Schoenfeld, Emily Barnet, Joe D. 
Zabel, and Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale and Dorr LLP on brief for 

amicus curiae Everytown for Gun Safety. 

Opinion En Banc

March 24, 2023
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KAYATTA, Circuit Judge. A jury convicted Willie Richard

Minor under 18 U.S.C. § 924(a)(2) of knowingly violating 18 U.S.C. 

§ 922(g), which prohibits nine categories of persons from 

possessing a firearm. On appeal, Minor asserts that the 

proceedings below were tainted by a series of errors relating to 

the mens rea required to establish a knowing violation of 

section 922(g). 

In a divided opinion, a panel of this court vacated 

Minor's conviction on grounds of instructional error. United 

States v. Minor, 31 F.4th 9 (1st Cir. 2022), vacated, 49 F.4th 22. 

The panel focused its decision on Rehaif v. United States, 139 

S. Ct. 2191 (2019), in which the Supreme Court held that 

convictions under section 924(a)(2) for knowingly violating 

section 922(g) require "the Government [to] prove both that the 

defendant knew he possessed a firearm and that he knew he belonged 

to the relevant category of persons barred from possessing a 

firearm." Id. at 2200. The "relevant category" in this instance 

is the category of persons who have been convicted of a 

"misdemeanor crime of domestic violence." 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9). 

The government charged Minor with belonging to this category based 

on his 2010 no-contest plea to a simple assault charge under Maine 

law, which he entered after refusing to plead guilty to a charge 

of domestic violence assault. The panel vacated Minor's conviction 

because "the jury was allowed to convict [him] of knowingly 
- 4 -

violating section 922(g)(9) without finding that he knew that his 

assault conviction placed him in the category of persons convicted 

of a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence." Minor, 31 F.4th at

11.

We granted the government's petition for rehearing en 

banc in order to reconsider the mens rea required for a conviction 

under sections 924(a)(2) and 922(g)(9), as well as whether the 

jury instructions here properly described the elements of that 

offense. United States v. Minor, 49 F.4th 22 (1st Cir. 2022). We 

once again vacate Minor's conviction and remand for a new trial 

due to instructional error, but we modify and clarify what type of 

knowledge equates to knowing -- for purposes of a conviction under 

sections 924(a)(2) and 922(g)(9) -- that he was in the category of 

persons convicted of a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence.

I.

We first discuss the procedural path leading to Minor's 

trial and the largely undisputed facts presented to the jury. We

then describe the parties' debate concerning how best to apply 

Rehaif's holding to adjudicating a charge that a person knowingly 

violated section 922(g)(9), which effectively sets the stage for 

the issues raised in this appeal. 
- 5 -

A.

Minor's federal case began with a November 2016 

interview with members of the Auburn, Maine Police Department,1 in 

which Minor told the officers that he owned a Lorcin firearm, which 

the officers later seized. In February 2017, a federal grand jury 

charged Minor under sections 924(a)(2) and 922(g)(9) with 

possession of a firearm by a person who had previously been 

convicted of a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence. The 

predicate offense supporting this status was a June 2010 Maine 

conviction for Assault, Class D, committed against Minor's thenspouse. Minor was convicted on the federal gun possession charge 

after a trial in December 2017.

While his appeal from that conviction was pending, the 

Supreme Court issued its decision in Rehaif construing 

sections 924(a)(2) and 922(g) to require the prosecution to show 

that the defendant knew he belonged to the relevant category of 

persons prohibited from possessing a gun (thus articulating what 

we have called the "scienter-of-status" requirement, see United 

States v. Burghardt, 939 F.3d 397, 400 (1st Cir. 2019)). In light 

of that ruling, the parties agreed that Minor's conviction should 

be vacated and the case remanded for a new trial. The government 

then filed a superseding indictment that included the allegation 

1 The reason for this interview was not elicited at Minor's 

trial and does not appear to bear on the instant appeal.
- 6 -

that Minor "knew that he had been previously convicted of th[e] 

misdemeanor crime of domestic violence."

Minor's case proceeded to his second trial, at which he 

stipulated to most elements of the offense charged. He agreed 

that the gun was recovered from his home, was operable, and had 

been moved in interstate commerce; he further agreed that he had 

"knowingly possessed" it. Minor also stipulated to several details 

regarding his prior Maine assault conviction, including that the 

victim named in the 2009 assault complaint was his spouse at the 

time. As on appeal, his defense homed in on what he knew about 

his prior conviction, since he had "stipulated to literally every 

other aspect of the crime."

Also focusing on the mens rea issue, the government 

introduced some state-court records of Minor's prior offense. 

These records show that Minor was initially charged with a 

"Domestic Violence Assault" that occurred on August 23, 2009. The 

state-court complaint alleged that Minor "did intentionally, 

knowingly or recklessly cause bodily injury or offensive physical 

contact to Betty Minor." It then stated, "This conduct was 

committed against a family or household member as defined by [Maine 

law]." The judicial advice-of-rights video played at Minor's 

state-court arraignment on the charge of Domestic Violence Assault 

instructed him:
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If you are convicted of certain specific 

crimes, you may lose your right to purchase, 

possess, or own a firearm or any type of 

ammunition. These specific crimes include 

offenses that involve the use of force, or 

even the attempt to use physical force, or 

offensive physical contact, or the use, or 

threat to use, a deadly weapon and . . . and 

the victim was either your spouse [or another 

specified relation]. The judge can tell you 

whether you are charged with such a crime. If 

you are, I would strongly suggest you speak 

with an attorney before entering a plea of 

guilty or no contest. 

In the wake of that admonition, Minor refused to plead 

guilty to the domestic violence charge on which he was arraigned. 

Subsequently, the state prosecutor agreed to amend the complaint 

to reduce the charge to "Assault, Class D" and to strike the 

sentence stating, "This conduct was committed against a family or 

household member . . . ." The docket entries characterized the 

revision as a motion to amend "to delete DV reference." The 

revised charge thus eliminated any express allegation of domestic 

violence, claiming only that Minor "did intentionally, knowingly 

or recklessly cause bodily injury or offensive physical contact to 

Betty Minor." The judgment and commitment form had initially been 

printed with the offense "Domestic Violence Assault," but the words 

"Domestic Violence" had been crossed out by hand. The state-court 

records show that Minor then pleaded no contest to the assault 

charge in June 2010. The record of this case contains no tape or 

transcript of the colloquy at the acceptance of Minor's plea.
- 8 -

In his own trial testimony in 2020 on the federal gunpossession charge, Minor described his understanding of his 2010 

state-court conviction: "I was convicted of a simple assault." 

But, he said, "I wasn't convicted of a domestic. . . . They removed 

any language . . . that it was a domestic." Minor then related 

that he had told his prior counsel, "I want to make sure I'm not 

pleading to a domestic," "because it would have meant that I 

couldn't have firearms." Minor testified that he believed he could 

possess a firearm and that this result had been arranged in his 

plea, but the court struck that testimony on the government's 

objection, and it denied on relevance and unfair-prejudice grounds 

Minor's counsel's entreaty for further inquiry into Minor's belief 

that he could own a firearm.

Minor also sought to introduce testimony from George 

Hess, the lawyer who had represented him in the Maine state 

proceedings. As proffered, Hess would purportedly have testified 

about Minor's desire "to possess a firearm" and that Minor was 

"unwilling to plead to a domestic violence offense." Minor further 

proffered that Hess would testify to representations made to him 

by Assistant District Attorney Nicholas Worden, who prosecuted 

Minor's misdemeanor. Specifically, ADA Worden allegedly told Hess 

"that Mr. Minor would still be able to possess a firearm if he 

pled guilty to the Class D simple assault." The district court 

excluded this evidence on relevance grounds.
- 9 -

B.

Before trial, Minor sought jury instructions on the 

knowledge requirement imposed by Rehaif. He requested the jury be 

instructed that: "In order to find the Defendant guilty of the 

charged offense you must find beyond a reasonable doubt that he 

acted knowingly in possessing the firearm and that he knew he 

belonged to the relevant category of persons barred from possessing 

a firearm." Later, Minor revised the latter portion of the request 

so that he sought instructions requiring the jury to find, for a 

guilty verdict, "that at the time [Minor] possessed the firearm, 

he knew that he had been previously convicted of a misdemeanor 

crime of domestic violence" and "that he knew that he belonged to 

the status of individuals convicted of a crime of domestic violence 

as defined by federal law." Minor later supplemented the "as 

defined by federal law" portion of that request by asking that the 

court read out the statutory definition of "misdemeanor crime of 

domestic violence," which states:

[T]he term "misdemeanor crime of domestic 

violence" means an offense that --

(i) is a misdemeanor under Federal, 

State, or Tribal law; and

(ii) has, as an element, the use or 

attempted use of physical force, or the 

threatened use of a deadly weapon, 

committed by a current or former spouse, 

parent, or guardian of the victim, by a 

person with whom the victim shares a 

child in common, by a person who is 
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cohabiting with or has cohabited with the 

victim as a spouse, parent, or guardian, 

or by a person similarly situated to a 

spouse, parent, or guardian of the 

victim.

18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(33)(A).2

The district court denied all of Minor's requested 

versions of the Rehaif instruction and ultimately instructed the 

jury that to find Minor guilty, it must find:

that Willie Richard Minor knew that he had 

been convicted of [the specified Maine assault 

Class D offense], that he knew the conviction 

subjected him to incarceration of up to 

364 days, that he knew the conviction was for 

causing bodily injury or offensive physical 

contact to another person, and that he knew 

the victim of the crime was his spouse at the 

time.3 

2 All references and citations to section 921(a)(33)(A) in 

this opinion are to the provision as it existed at the time of 

Minor's charged conduct. The Bipartisan Safer Communities Act, 

Pub. L. No. 117-159, § 12005, 136 Stat. 1313, 1332 (2022), has 

since added "a person who has a current or recent former dating 

relationship with the victim" to the list of relevant domestic 

relations. Additionally, the Violence Against Women Act 

Reauthorization Act of 2022, Pub. L. No. 117-103, § 1104, 136 

Stat. 840, 921–22, added misdemeanors under local law to the 

definition. 

3 The complete instruction for the elements of the charged 

section 922(g)(9) offense explained that, to find Minor guilty, 

the jury must find:

First, that Willie Richard Minor had been 

convicted as charged in the superseding 

indictment of assault Class D in the Maine 

Superior Court on June 14, 2010.

Second, that the victim of that crime was 

Willie Richard Minor's spouse at the time. 
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At the government's request, in light of Minor's 

testimony, the district court also charged the jury that Minor's 

"belief that he could possess a firearm is not itself a defense." 

The jury returned a guilty verdict, and the district court 

subsequently sentenced Minor to time served with three years' 

supervised release. Minor timely appealed, and a divided panel of 

Minor has stipulated that he and Betty[] Minor

were married from June 8, 2008, until 

October 4, 2016, and that the victim listed in 

the complaint filed on October 14, 2009, Betty 

Minor, was his spouse at the time.

Third, that Willie Richard Minor knew that he 

had been convicted of that crime, that he knew 

the conviction subjected him to incarceration 

of up to 364 days, that he knew the conviction 

was for causing bodily injury or offensive 

physical contact to another person, and that 

he knew the victim of the crime was his spouse 

at the time.

Fourth, that on about November 27, 2016, 

Willie Richard Minor knowingly possessed the 

firearm described in the superseding 

indictment. Minor has stipulated that is so.

Fifth, that the firearm satisfied the federal 

definition of firearm and was connected with 

interstate commerce. Minor has stipulated 

that that is so.

The word knowingly means that the act was done 

voluntarily and intentionally, not because of 

mistake or accident. The Government does not 

have to prove that Willie Richard Minor knew 

that his conduct in possessing a firearm was 

illegal or that he knew that he was prohibited 

from possessing a firearm, and his belief that 

he could possess a firearm is not itself a 

defense.
- 12 -

this court vacated his conviction on grounds of instructional 

error. Minor, 31 F.4th at 21. The government then petitioned for 

rehearing en banc. In granting the government's petition, we 

requested supplemental briefing focusing on Rehaif's application 

to section 922(g)(9) and the jury instructions here. 

II.

Minor argues that the district court misapprehended 

Rehaif's requirement throughout the proceedings below, leading to 

his being convicted on improper jury instructions and insufficient 

evidence. We review this preserved contention of legal error de 

novo. See United States v. Norris, 21 F.4th 188, 193–95 (1st Cir. 

2021) (applying de novo standard of review to preserved challenges 

to sufficiency of the evidence and jury instructions). To conduct 

this review, we first address the application of Rehaif to 

section 922(g)(9) and the jury instructions, and then discuss 

where that analysis leaves Minor's sufficiency challenge. 

A.

We confront the often daunting task of trying to apply 

Congress's use of categorical descriptions to define certain 

crimes, convictions for which serve as elements of separate federal 

crimes. See De Lima v. Sessions, 867 F.3d 260, 268 (1st Cir. 2017) 

("Even a single such categorical analysis is an arduous task, 

requiring a close analysis of the specific statutory language put 

at issue [and] of the case law interpreting that language . . . .
- 13 -

The ensuing categorical evaluation is often difficult and time 

consuming." (citations omitted)). Our task here is doubly 

difficult because in this instance Congress has expressly required 

that proof of a gun possession crime under section 924(a)(2) turns, 

in part, on whether the defendant knows that a particular prior 

crime of conviction fits Congress's categorical description of 

that which is required to render the possession unlawful. See

Rehaif, 139 S. Ct. at 2197. 

Minor was convicted in Maine state court on a Class D 

assault charge in 2010. Section 922(g)(9) provides that if that 

crime was a "misdemeanor crime of domestic violence," he could not 

lawfully buy or possess a gun. Whether a simple assault offense 

like Maine's Class D offense satisfies Congress's categorical 

description of misdemeanor crimes of domestic violence split the 

federal courts for many years until a divided Supreme Court settled 

the question in Voisine v. United States, 579 U.S. 686 (2016), by 

finding that Maine's statute did so qualify. Id. at 689–90, 698–

99. 

In the wake of Voisine, both parties agree that Minor's 

possession of a firearm following his state conviction violated 

section 922(g)(9). The charge in this case, however, is brought 

under section 924(a)(2), which makes it a serious crime to 

"knowingly violate[]," among other things, section 922(g). 18 
- 14 -

U.S.C. § 924(a)(2).4 Minor, in turn, has contended from the outset 

of this criminal prosecution that he did not knowingly violate 

section 922(g)(9) because he did not know what he would have known 

had he read Voisine -- i.e., that Maine's Class D assault offense 

can be a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence. The government, 

in turn, argues that it need only prove that Minor knew those 

"features" of his prior conviction that qualify it as a misdemeanor 

crime of domestic violence, by which the government means "every 

aspect of his prior conviction necessary to render it a 

'misdemeanor crime of domestic violence' under 18 U.S.C. 

§ 921(a)(33)(A)," which defines the term "misdemeanor crime of 

domestic violence." That knowledge, asserts the government, 

"includes (1) that the defendant's prior offense was 'a 

misdemeanor under Federal[,] State[,] or Tribal law,' (2) that it 

'ha[d], as an element, the use or attempted use of physical force, 

or the threatened use of a deadly weapon,' and (3) that it was 

committed against a person of domestic relation to the 

perpetrator." 

4 All references and citations to section 924(a)(2) in this 

opinion are to the provision as it existed at the time of Minor's 

charged conduct. The Bipartisan Safer Communities Act, Pub. L. 

No. 117-159, § 12004, 136 Stat. 1313, 1329 (2022), has since moved

the penalty provision for section 922(g) from section 924(a)(2) to 

924(a)(8), which provides for a longer maximum period of 

imprisonment. 
- 15 -

The panel opinion in this case held that Minor's 

conviction need be set aside because "the jury was allowed to 

convict Minor of knowingly violating section 922(g)(9) without 

finding that he knew that his assault conviction placed him in the 

category of persons convicted of a misdemeanor crime of domestic 

violence." Minor, 31 F.4th at 11. In particular, the panel held 

that "the government here need prove that Minor knew that he had 

been convicted of a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence." Id.

at 17. We now reaffirm those holdings. In so doing, however, we 

modify and clarify what it means to prove that Minor knew that he 

had been convicted of a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence. 

We hold that if Minor's knowledge about his prior conviction 

included everything necessary to satisfy the definition of 

"misdemeanor crime of domestic violence," see 18 U.S.C. 

§ 921(a)(33)(A), then, for all purposes relevant here, he knew 

that he had been convicted of a misdemeanor crime of domestic 

violence. And that remains true even if he did not know that such 

an offense had been labeled in sections 922(g)(9) and 

921(a)(33)(A) as a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence.

1.

Our reasoning begins with section 922(g). That section 

deems unlawful the possession of a firearm by any person who falls 

into any one or more of nine specified categories. For example, 
- 16 -

it is unlawful for an alien who is "illegally or unlawfully in the 

United States" to possess a firearm. 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(5)(A). 

We then turn to section 924(a)(2), the section under 

which Minor was convicted. That section provides for criminal 

penalties, of up to ten years in prison, for "[w]hoever knowingly 

violates [section 922(g)]." 18 U.S.C. § 924(a)(2). Focusing on 

the word "knowingly," the Supreme Court held in Rehaif that an 

alien who is "unlawfully" in the United States cannot be convicted 

under section 924(a)(2) for possessing a gun unless the government 

proves "both that the defendant knew he possessed a firearm and 

that he knew he belonged to the relevant category of persons barred 

from possessing a firearm." 139 S. Ct. at 2199–2200. More 

generally, the Court pronounced that "by specifying that a 

defendant may be convicted only if he 'knowingly violates' 

§ 922(g), Congress intended to require the Government to establish 

that the defendant knew he violated the material elements of 

§ 922(g)." Id. at 2196.

Of particular relevance to the Court was the fact that 

the conduct at issue -- possessing a firearm -- "can be entirely 

innocent." Id. at 2197. So it is the defendant's "status" as 

belonging to one of the categories listed in section 922(g) which 

serves as the "'crucial element' separating innocent from wrongful 

conduct." Id. (quoting United States v. X-Citement Video, Inc., 

513 U.S. 64, 73 (1994)). Additionally, even though the Court 
- 17 -

recognized that "whether an alien is 'illegally or unlawfully in 

the United States' is a question of law," it rejected the 

government's "appeal[] to the well-known maxim that 'ignorance of 

the law' (or a 'mistake of law') is no excuse." Id. at 2198. The 

Court explained that that "maxim does not normally apply where a 

defendant has a mistaken impression concerning the legal effect of 

some collateral matter and that mistake results in his 

misunderstanding the full significance of his conduct, thereby 

negating an element of the offense." Id. (quotation marks 

omitted); see also id. ("[A] mistake of law is a defense if the 

mistake negates the 'knowledge . . . required to establish a 

material element of the offense.'" (alteration in original) 

(quoting Model Penal Code § 2.04)). Accordingly, although "[t]he 

defendant's status as an alien 'illegally or unlawfully in the 

United States' refers to a legal matter," "[a] defendant who does 

not know that he is an alien 'illegally or unlawfully in the United 

States' does not have the guilty state of mind that the statute's 

language and purposes require." Id.

Crucially, for our purposes, Rehaif does not explain 

exactly what type of knowledge equates to knowing that one 

"belonged to the relevant category of persons barred from 

possessing a firearm." Id. at 2200. The Court did offer some 

guidance. It observed that in a case involving an alleged knowing 

violation of section 922(g)(1) -- which prohibits firearm 
- 18 -

possession after being convicted of "a crime punishable by 

imprisonment for a term exceeding one year"5 -- a defendant who 

was convicted of a crime that was so punishable might nevertheless 

be innocent if, for example, he was "sentenced only to probation"

and did not actually know that the crime was so punishable. Id.

at 2198. In other words, knowing in such a case that one has been 

convicted of Crime X is not sufficient merely because Crime X is 

punishable by more than a year in prison; one must actually know 

that Crime X is punishable by more than a year in prison. 

Here, "the relevant category of persons barred from 

possessing a firearm" is those "convicted in any court of a 

misdemeanor crime of domestic violence." 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9). 

Pointing to Rehaif's treatment of charges under sections 922(g)(1)

(those convicted of a crime punishable by more than one year in 

prison) and 922(g)(5)(A) (aliens illegally or unlawfully present) 

as closely controlling analogies, Minor first argues that the 

government must prove that he knew that the assault crime of which 

he had been convicted was classified as a misdemeanor crime of 

5 In 2021, 79% of all defendants sentenced under U.S.S.G. 

§ 2K2.1 -- which covers offenses involving the unlawful possession 

of firearms, among other firearm-related crimes -- were convicted 

under section 922(g)(1), compared to 1.8% convicted under 

section 922(g)(9). See U.S. Sent'g Comm'n, What Do Federal 

Firearms Offenses Really Look Like? 24 (July 2022), 

https://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/research-andpublications/research-publications/2022/20220714_Firearms.pdf. 
- 19 -

domestic violence, not just that he had been convicted of a crime 

that was, unbeknownst to him, so classified. 

We disagree. To explain why, we point first to Rehaif's 

caution that its holding does not necessarily dictate how best to 

consider convictions under subsections of section 922(g) not at 

issue in Rehaif itself. 139 S. Ct. at 2200. We then consider a 

hypothetical example. Suppose Congress had included as a tenth 

category of section 922(g) something like, "any person . . . who 

has received a lengthy sentence for a crime of which he was 

convicted in any court." A large number of defendants could 

plausibly argue that they could not tell whether they belonged to 

that category. But if Congress added to the end of that 

hypothetical subsection something along the lines of "for purposes 

of this subsection, the term 'lengthy sentence' means any sentence 

in excess of one year," then, in order to have the mens rea required 

to establish a knowing violation of hypothetical 

section 922(g)(10), defendants would only need to know that they 

had received a sentence longer than one year. 

To a large extent, Congress followed a similar approach 

here by providing in section 921 a list of definitions of terms 

"as used in" the U.S. Code chapter in which section 922 appears. 

That list includes the definition of "misdemeanor crime of domestic 

violence." That definition, as noted above, reads as follows: 
- 20 -

[T]he term "misdemeanor crime of domestic 

violence" means an offense that --

(i) is a misdemeanor under Federal, 

State, or Tribal law; and

(ii) has, as an element, the use or 

attempted use of physical force, or the 

threatened use of a deadly weapon, 

committed by a current or former spouse, 

parent, or guardian of the victim, by a 

person with whom the victim shares a 

child in common, by a person who is 

cohabiting with or has cohabited with the 

victim as a spouse, parent, or guardian, 

or by a person similarly situated to a 

spouse, parent, or guardian of the 

victim.

18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(33)(A).

Of course, in our hypothetical we posited that the 

definition of the shorthand description appeared right in the same 

hypothetical subsection of 922(g), whereas here the definition 

appears in a different section of the Code. But we are not engaged 

in an inquiry that presumes the defendant looked at the statute. 

We are asking instead whether Minor knew that he belonged to the 

category of persons convicted of a misdemeanor crime of domestic 

violence. And where Congress provided a definition of that term

"as used in" the relevant chapter of the U.S. Code, we think that

if Minor's knowledge about his prior conviction included 

everything necessary to satisfy that same definition, then -- for 

purposes of a conviction under sections 924(a)(2) and 922(g)(9) -
- 21 -

- he knew that he was in the category of persons convicted of a 

crime so defined.6

2.

That leaves the following question: Did the instruction 

here convey that the jury must find that Minor's knowledge about

his prior offense included everything necessary to satisfy the 

definition of "misdemeanor crime of domestic violence"? Framing 

such an instruction poses a special challenge where, as here, the 

definition is technical and complex, yet a conviction requires 

knowledge by a layperson of all its necessary parts, which we 

discuss below. On the one hand, a trial court might find it 

helpful to further describe the statutory definition so that the 

jury can better understand it. See United States v. Woodward, 149 

F.3d 46, 69 (1st Cir. 1998) ("Clear, accurate, easily understood 

jury instructions are 'vitally important in assuring that jurors 

grasp subtle or highly nuanced legal concepts.'" (quoting United 

States v. DeStefano, 59 F.3d 1, 4 (1st Cir. 1995))). On the other 

hand, one must proceed with caution in crafting a bespoke rewrite 

6 Proof beyond a reasonable doubt of this type of knowledge

is sufficient to prove that a defendant knew that he belonged to 

the relevant category, but it is not always necessary. If, for 

example, the government proved that a defendant knew that a 

previous conviction was classified under federal law as a 

misdemeanor crime of domestic violence -- perhaps in part because 

he had been informed of this classification during previous 

judicial proceedings -- it would not matter if he did not 

understand exactly why his conviction was so classified.
- 22 -

of the statutory definition. The risk is that the effort to 

clarify introduces a misdescription that allows the jury to convict 

without finding that the defendant actually knew he belonged to 

the relevant section 922(g) category. 

In this instance, Minor asked the trial court to tell 

the jury verbatim how the statute defined "misdemeanor crime of 

domestic violence." The trial court opted instead to paraphrase

what Congress required Minor to know in order to be convicted. In 

the jury instruction, the court listed what the government had 

argued at the time were the relevant features of Minor's underlying 

conviction that made it a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence. 

The court explained that the instruction adopted certain language 

from United States v. Castleman, 572 U.S. 157 (2014). Castleman

held that the term "physical force" as used in the definition of 

"misdemeanor crime of domestic violence" includes "offensive 

touching," and thus crimes that have as an element mere "offensive 

touching" satisfy the "physical force" requirement of that 

definition. Id. at 162–63. The court also noted that the 

instruction incorporated language from Minor's underlying statute 

of conviction, which prohibited "intentionally, knowingly or 

recklessly caus[ing] bodily injury or offensive physical contact 

to another person." Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 17-a, § 207(1)(A). 

But the result was a material misdescription. To show why this is 
- 23 -

so, we set forth the statutory definition followed by the relevant 

part of the court's instruction, with the key phrases underlined.

Statutory Text 

[T]he term "misdemeanor crime of domestic 

violence" means an offense that --

(i) is a misdemeanor under Federal, 

State, or Tribal law; and

(ii) has, as an element, the use or 

attempted use of physical force, or the 

threatened use of a deadly weapon, 

committed by a current or former spouse, 

parent, or guardian of the victim, by a 

person with whom the victim shares a 

child in common, by a person who is 

cohabiting with or has cohabited with the 

victim as a spouse, parent, or guardian, 

or by a person similarly situated to a 

spouse, parent, or guardian of the 

victim.

Jury Instruction As Given

Third, that Willie Richard Minor knew that he 

had been convicted of that crime, that he knew 

the conviction subjected him to incarceration 

of up to 364 days, that he knew the conviction 

was for causing bodily injury or offensive 

physical contact to another person, and that 

he knew the victim of the crime was his spouse 

at the time.

As the government concedes in its supplemental brief, 

the jury needed to find that Minor knew that his prior conviction 

"ha[d], as an element, the use or attempted use of physical force, 

or the threatened use of a deadly weapon" (quoting 

section 921(a)(33)(A)) (emphases added). Comparing this 
- 24 -

requirement to the portion of the instruction block-quoted above

reveals two key omissions, each of which was error.7

First, the definition given to the jury omitted any need 

to find that Minor knew that the Maine offense "ha[d], as an 

element, the use or attempted use of physical force." Nor did the 

instruction otherwise convey the concept of an "element." The

district court could have, for example, told jurors they must find 

that Minor knew that, in order for him to have been convicted of 

the Maine offense at a trial, the government would have had to 

prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he "use[d] or attempted [to] 

use . . . physical force." Instead, the instruction simply 

required that Minor knew what his conviction was "for." 

Second, the jury instruction eliminated the "use" 

requirement in favor of relying on a passive requirement of an 

offensive touching, which a defendant might "cause." While the 

Supreme Court has held that intentionally, knowingly, or 

recklessly causing bodily injury or offensive physical contact 

necessarily involves the "use" of force, the district court failed 

to include any of those key adverbs. See Castleman, 572 U.S. at 

170 ("[T]he knowing or intentional application of force is a 'use' 

7 We do not address the portion of the instruction regarding 

Minor's requisite knowledge that the crime was a misdemeanor, as 

Minor raises no specific challenge to it. On this point, the 

instruction did not use the word "misdemeanor," instead providing 

that the jury must find "that he knew the conviction subjected him 

to incarceration of up to 364 days." 
- 25 -

of force."); Voisine, 579 U.S. at 698–99 (holding that the 

"'use . . . of physical force' . . . encompasses acts of force 

undertaken recklessly"). 

The government nevertheless defends the instruction by 

claiming that the Supreme Court in Castleman defined "use of force" 

under section 921(a)(33)(A) without using the words "use" or 

"force," referring to it in the same way the jury instruction did 

here -- "causing bodily injury or offensive physical contact to 

another person." This is simply wrong. In the pages cited by the 

government, the Supreme Court was describing the requisite force, 

not the requirement that it be used. Castleman, 572 U.S. at 162–

63. Indeed, after having defined force to include mere "offensive 

touching," the Court in Castleman proceeded to discuss the 

requirement that the defendant "use" that force, noting that "the 

word 'use' conveys the idea that the thing used (here, 'physical 

force') has been made the user's instrument," and that "the 'use'

of force must entail 'a higher degree of intent than negligent or 

merely accidental conduct.'" Id. at 170–71 (quoting Leocal v. 

Ashcroft, 543 U.S. 1, 9 (2004)). Notably, the Court then found 

that the underlying conviction in Castleman -- "intentionally or 

knowingly caus[ing] bodily injury to the mother of his child" --

qualified as a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence in part 

because the indictment "ma[de] clear that the use of physical force 

was an element of his conviction." Id. at 169, 171 (quotation 
- 26 -

marks omitted). That is to say, the conviction sufficed because 

it made clear exactly that which was omitted from the instruction 

in this case. 

The government further argues that "the district court's 

knowledge instruction appropriately 'convert[ed] legal jargon into 

a digestible definition for the jurors' without omitting any 

necessary aspects" (quoting Minor, 31 F.4th at 27 n.11 (Lynch, J., 

dissenting)). But the instruction here did not merely clarify

"legal jargon" with synonyms or definitions; it rather altered 

what the government was required to prove. 

3.

As noted above, Minor preserved his objection to this 

misdescription of the required elements in the instruction. The 

government initially proposed instructions requiring the jury to 

find that Minor knew "the crime involved the use or attempted use 

of physical force." Once the government changed its position and 

the district court settled on instructions requiring only a finding 

that Minor knew "the conviction was for causing bodily injury or 

offensive physical contact to another person," Minor's counsel 

specifically requested that the phrase "use or attempted use of 

physical force" be incorporated into the instruction in order to 

"bring[] in . . . the language of the federal statute." Minor 

additionally requested that the court simply read out the statutory 

definition of "misdemeanor crime of domestic violence," including 
- 27 -

the crucial provision here that the predicate offense must have 

"as an element, the use or attempted use of physical force." 

Minor repeated these arguments in his opening brief in

this appeal: "[T]he [trial] judge found that he did not need to 

instruct the jury that the Government prove that the defendant 

knew that the offense for which he had been convicted 'has [as] an 

element, the use or attempted use of physical force[,]' even though 

that is required in the definition of 'misdemeanor crime of 

domestic violence.'" In response, the government did not challenge 

this argument as unpreserved. To the contrary, in its own 

responsive opening brief, the government expressly agreed with 

Minor that we should review the instructional challenges as 

"preserved claims of instructional error."

Under that standard of review, we could overlook the 

error if the government could show that it was harmless. United 

States v. McLellan, 959 F.3d 442, 466 (1st Cir. 2020). An 

instructional error regarding an element of the offense "is 

harmless if 'it appears beyond a reasonable doubt that the error 

complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained.'" Id.

(quoting United States v. Wright, 937 F.3d 8, 30 (1st Cir. 2019)). 

The government, though, does not even attempt to argue that an 

instructional error here was harmless. 
- 28 -

4.

The government asks that, if we reject the instruction

given at trial, we provide clear guidance for the district court 

on remand. This is a sensible request. Congress's attempt to 

tailor prohibitions on gun possession by providing what laypersons 

might regard as unclear categories while simultaneously requiring 

that violations of the prohibitions must be knowing creates great 

opportunities for confusion, as shown by the history of this case. 

Even the overly simplified instruction fashioned by the district 

court appeared to confuse the jurors.8

We therefore provide the following guidance for the 

district court and parties on remand. 

First, as the district court correctly held, the 

government need not prove that Minor knew that his knowing 

possession of a firearm was a crime. It need only prove that he 

knew he possessed a firearm and, at the time he possessed it, he 

8 During deliberations, the jury submitted a note to the 

district judge asking, "why does it say that he was convicted of 

a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence? Is this a mistake? Does 

this matter?" The judge subsequently explained, "it does not say 

that he was convicted of a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence. 

It's describing the charge against him in this federal court." 

When asked if the jury had remaining questions, the foreperson 

responded, "when we read the top part and it's in large letters 

and it says possession of a firearm by a person previously 

convicted of a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence, . . . we 

were like we thought he was convicted of simple assault, which is 

written as assault, and we weren't sure, is domestic violence and 

assault and simple assault all the same and do they carry the same 

weight." 
- 29 -

knew that he belonged to the category of persons convicted of a 

misdemeanor crime of domestic violence.

Second, to prove that he knew that he belonged to that 

category, the government need not prove that he knew that his prior 

offense bore under federal law the label "misdemeanor crime of 

domestic violence." Instead, borrowing from Congress's definition 

of "misdemeanor crime of domestic violence," the court can instruct 

the jury that the government must prove that Minor knew, at the 

time he possessed a gun, that: (i) he had been previously convicted 

of an offense that "is a misdemeanor under Federal, State, or 

Tribal law"; (ii) in order for him to have been convicted of the 

prior offense at a trial, the government would have had to prove 

beyond a reasonable doubt that he "use[d] or attempted [to]

use . . . physical force"; and (iii) the victim of that offense 

was, at the time of the offense, his "current or former spouse." 

18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(33)(A).9 

Third -- in accordance with Castleman and Voisine -- the 

district court should, if asked by either party, explain that the 

"use . . . of physical force" means intentionally, knowingly, or 

recklessly causing bodily injury or offensive physical contact to 

another person. See Castleman, 572 U.S. at 170; Voisine, 579 U.S. 

at 698–99. This language would align with the definition of 

9 Cf. supra note 2. 
- 30 -

Minor's predicate offense -- "intentionally, knowingly or 

recklessly caus[ing] bodily injury or offensive physical contact 

to another person." Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 17-a, § 207(1)(A).10 

Such an explanation would also be consistent with the Eleventh 

Circuit's decision in United States v. Johnson, 981 F.3d 1171 (11th 

Cir. 2020), which held that, to be convicted under 

sections 924(a)(2) and 922(g)(9), "the evidence must establish 

that [the defendant] knew: . . . to be convicted of [the predicate] 

misdemeanor, he must have knowingly or recklessly engaged in at 

least 'the slightest offensive touching.'" Id. at 1183. 

B.

Our conclusion that the jury instruction missed the mark 

in a manner that the government does not claim was harmless beyond 

a reasonable doubt requires that we vacate the verdict. Minor, 

though, asks that we go one step further and order the entry of an 

acquittal because, he says, the evidence was insufficient to prove 

that he had the knowledge we have just explained he needed to have 

to establish his guilt. The government concedes that this 

challenge to the conviction is preserved, but contends that its 

10 As discussed above, the district court here described that 

the jury instruction incorporated "the definition of [Maine] 

Section 207 assault"; but the court omitted from the definition 

the crucial phrase under Voisine -- "intentionally, knowingly or 

recklessly."
- 31 -

own proof was at least minimally sufficient. For the following

reasons, we agree with the government. 

We review Minor's challenge to the sufficiency of the 

evidence de novo, evaluating the evidence "in the light most 

favorable to the verdict" to decide "whether 'that evidence, 

including all plausible inferences drawn therefrom, would allow a 

rational factfinder to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the 

defendant committed the charged crime.'" United States v. Torres 

Monje, 989 F.3d 25, 27 (1st Cir. 2021) (quoting United States v. 

Santos-Rivera, 726 F.3d 17, 23 (1st Cir. 2013)). In so doing, "we 

do not view each piece of evidence separately, re-weigh the 

evidence, or second-guess the jury's credibility calls." United 

States v. Acevedo-Hernández, 898 F.3d 150, 161 (1st Cir. 2018). 

Here, Minor stipulated to or conceded most elements of 

the offense, including that he knowingly possessed the gun, that 

it had traveled in interstate commerce, that he had been convicted 

of a misdemeanor assault offense, and that the named victim in his 

assault complaint was his spouse at the time. On appeal, Minor 

disputes only the government's proof that he knew of his prohibited 

status as a domestic violence misdemeanant. 

On that element, the government introduced some of the 

Maine state-court records, which included the initially charged 

offense of "domestic violence assault" against Betty Minor. 

According to the transcript of Minor's arraignment on that initial 
- 32 -

charge, which the government also introduced, Minor testified he 

understood that he had been charged with "domestic violence 

assault," that it was for "intentionally, knowingly or recklessly 

caus[ing] bodily injury or offensive physical contact to 

Betty . . . Minor," and that the assault was alleged to have been

"committed against a family or household member." The judicial 

advice-of-rights video played at that arraignment further informed 

Minor that he could lose the right to possess firearms for certain 

offenses involving force against a spouse. Thereafter, the parties 

agreed to amend the state-court complaint by reducing the charge 

to simple assault, striking the language alleging that "[t]his 

conduct was committed against a family or household member as 

defined by [Maine law]." The amendment did not disturb the 

allegation that Minor "intentionally, knowingly or recklessly 

cause[d] bodily injury or offensive physical contact to Betty 

Minor." 

It is true that a layperson in Minor's position might 

not necessarily understand that every allegation in a criminal 

complaint must be proved to sustain a conviction, especially given 

the possibility that a complaint may contain surplusage. But under 

our standard for reviewing challenges to the sufficiency of the 

evidence, " we evaluate the sum of all the evidence and inferences 

drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the government . . . 

and 'determine whether that sum is enough for any reasonable jury 
- 33 -

to find all the elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable 

doubt, even if the individual pieces of evidence are not enough 

when viewed in isolation.'" Acevedo-Hernández, 898 F.3d at 161 

(quoting United States v. Santos-Soto, 799 F.3d 49, 57 (1st Cir. 

2015)). Especially where Minor negotiated the excision of other 

language from the complaint, jurors could infer that Minor knew 

that the government would have had to prove the unchanged 

allegation that he "intentionally, knowingly or recklessly 

cause[d] bodily injury or offensive physical contact to Betty 

Minor." Accordingly, a reasonable jury could find that Minor had 

the knowledge required for a conviction under sections 924(a)(2) 

and 922(g)(9), and thus we reject Minor's sufficiency challenge. 

III.

Finally, Minor argues that the district court 

erroneously excluded two categories of evidence: first, testimony 

by Minor regarding "what he believed about whether he was allowed 

to possess a gun after the simple assault conviction"; and second, 

testimony from his state-court counsel regarding ADA Worden's 

purported representation that Minor would still be able to possess 

firearms if he pleaded to the reduced simple assault charge.

Without knowing the precise context in which such 

testimony might be proffered in a new trial, we eschew opining 

preemptively on its admissibility beyond observing that -- as we 

have explained above -- a conviction under section 924(a)(2) for 
- 34 -

knowingly violating section 922(g)(9) does not require proof that 

the defendant knew that he could not possess a gun. As to the 

alleged lack of that knowledge, ignorance of the law is no defense. 

IV.

For the foregoing reasons, we vacate Minor's conviction 

under sections 924(a)(2) and 922(g)(9) and remand for further 

proceedings in accordance with this opinion.