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In The

Court of Appeals

Ninth District of Texas at Beaumont

___________________

NO. 09-13-00359-CR 

___________________

LEEJAY EMANUEL CHARGOIS, Appellant 

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

__________________________________________________________________

On Appeal from the 252nd District Court

Jefferson County, Texas

Trial Cause No. 12-14299

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MEMORANDUM OPINION

Appellant Leejay Emanuel Chargois appeals the trial court’s revocation of 

his deferred adjudication community supervision and imposition of sentence for 

assault on a family member. We affirm the trial court’s judgment of conviction.

BACKGROUND

A jury indicted appellant Leejay Emanuel Chargois, a repeat felony 

offender, for aggravated assault, a second-degree felony. Pursuant to a plea bargain 

agreement, Chargois pleaded guilty to the “Lesser Included Offense of: non-
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Aggravated 3rd Fam’ Ass’[.]” [sic] See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 22.01 (West Supp. 

2014). The trial court found the evidence sufficient to find Chargois guilty but 

deferred further proceedings, placed Chargois on community supervision for four 

years, and assessed a fine of $500. The State subsequently filed a motion to revoke 

Chargois’s unadjudicated community supervision.1 Chargois pleaded “true” to two

violations of the terms of his community supervision. The trial court found that 

Chargois violated the conditions of his community supervision, revoked

Chargois’s unadjudicated community supervision, found Chargois guilty of “lesser 

included non-aggravated assault” and assessed punishment at ten years of 

confinement. 

In five appellate issues, Chargois contends the evidence was legally 

insufficient to support his conviction, his sentence was not authorized by law, his 

sentence is “void as a matter of law[,]” his plea was involuntary, and the trial court 

improperly admonished him concerning the applicable punishment range. The 

State concedes that the offense to which Chargois pleaded guilty may be

“problematic” because a third-degree “family assault under 22.01 requires specific 

prior convictions that are elemental to the charge that are not encompassed within 

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The State previously filed a motion to revoke Chargois’s community 

supervision, which was heard and adjudicated by the Court. However, Chargois 

filed a motion for new trial, which the trial court granted. Therefore, the initial 

revocation is not before us on appeal.
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the [a]ggravated [a]ssault with a deadly weapon offense for which [Chargois] was 

indicted.” Nevertheless, the State argues Chargois contractually negotiated with the 

State and agreed to the offense and he only now complains because his deferred 

adjudication was revoked. 

ISSUE ONE

In his first issue, Chargois argues that the evidence was legally insufficient 

to support his conviction. Because that issue, if sustained, would result in acquittal, 

we address it first. See Clewis v. State, 922 S.W.2d 126, 133 (Tex. Crim. App.

1996). A guilty plea must be supported by sufficient evidence. Tex. Code Crim. 

Proc. Ann. art. 1.15 (West 2005); Massey v. State, 777 S.W.2d 739, 740 (Tex. 

App.—Beaumont 1989, no pet.). However, “a defendant placed on deferred 

adjudication community supervision may raise issues relating to the original plea 

proceeding, such as evidentiary sufficiency, only in appeals taken when deferred 

adjudication community supervision is first imposed.” Manuel v. State, 994 

S.W.2d 658, 661-62 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999). Chargois did not challenge his 

original plea or deferred adjudication when it was first imposed.

An exception to the rule set forth in Manuel exists when the judgment is 

void. Nix v. State, 65 S.W.3d 664, 667 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001). “The void 

judgment exception recognizes that there are some rare situations in which a trial 
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court’s judgment is accorded no respect due to a complete lack of power to render 

the judgment in question.” Id. A void judgment is a nullity and can therefore be 

attacked at any time. Id. at 667-68. “If the original judgment imposing probation 

was void, then the trial court would have no authority to revoke probation[], since, 

with no judgment imposing probation (because it is a nullity), there is nothing to 

revoke.” Id. at 668.

We therefore now turn to the question of whether the trial court’s judgment 

was void, thereby allowing Chargois to challenge the sufficiency of the evidence 

after revocation despite Manuel. “[A] judgment is void only in very rare situations

--usually due to a lack of jurisdiction.” Id. 

A judgment of conviction for a crime is void when (1) the document 

purporting to be a charging instrument . . . does not satisfy the 

constitutional requisites of a charging instrument, . . . (2) the trial 

court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the offense charged, . . .

(3) the record reflects that there is no evidence to support the 

conviction, or (4) an indigent defendant is required to face criminal 

trial proceedings without appointed counsel[.]

Id. (emphasis added and footnotes omitted). 

Chargois argues that his judicial confession contained in the written plea 

admonishments encompassed only the offense originally charged (aggravated 

assault) and “all lesser included offenses charged against” him, and he contends 
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that assault on a family member is not a lesser-included offense of aggravated 

assault, and therefore the evidence is legally insufficient. 

Assuming without deciding that the offense of which Chargois was 

convicted is not a lesser-included offense of the charged offense, it does not 

necessarily follow that “no evidence” supported the judgment. See Nix, 65 S.W.3d 

at 668. The record indicates that the victim and Chargois were in a dating 

relationship and were engaged to be married. Although the record does not contain 

evidence of Chargois’s relationship with the victim as defined by the applicable 

provisions of the Family Code or a qualifying prior conviction as contemplated by 

the third-degree felony punishment range set forth in section 22.01(b) of the Penal 

Code, both the plea bargain agreement and the judicial confession contained in the 

written plea admonishments demonstrate that Chargois pleaded guilty to the 

offense for which he was convicted, and provide some evidence to support his 

conviction for assault of a family member, third-degree. See id.; Ex parte Williams, 

703 S.W.2d 674, 682 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986) (a guilty plea constitutes some 

evidence to support a conviction); Crume v. State, 342 S.W.3d 241, 244 (Tex. 

App.—Beaumont 2011, no pet.).

We conclude the “void judgment exception” does not apply because there is 

some evidence to support Chargois’s conviction. Therefore, Chargois may not 
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challenge the sufficiency of the evidence after revocation of his deferred 

adjudication community supervision. See Manuel, 994 S.W.2d at 661-62; Crume, 

342 S.W.3d at 244. Accordingly, we overrule issue one.

ISSUES FOUR AND FIVE

In his fourth issue, Chargois argues that his plea was involuntary, and in his 

fifth issue, Chargois contends the trial judge improperly admonished him 

concerning the applicable range of punishment. Chargois may not wait until after 

revocation of his deferred adjudication community supervision to challenge the

voluntariness of his plea on appeal. See Clark v. State, 997 S.W.2d 365, 368 (Tex. 

App.—Dallas 1999, no pet.); see also Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 42.12, § 

23(b) (West Supp. 2014). Additionally, we note that the trial court expressly 

admonished Chargois at the plea hearing that the range of punishment is up to ten 

years in prison. Accordingly, we overrule issues four and five.

ISSUES TWO AND THREE

In issue two, Chargois argues he was sentenced to a term of imprisonment 

that is not authorized by law, and in issue three, Chargois contends his sentence is 

“void as a matter of law.” We address these issues together.

We have already determined that the trial court’s judgment is not void. A 

plea bargain agreement is a contract between the State and the defendant. Moore v. 
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State, 295 S.W.3d 329, 331 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009). “As a contract, once both 

parties have entered knowingly and voluntarily into a plea bargain, they are bound 

by the terms of that agreement once it is accepted by the judge.” Id. “[A] party who 

accepts benefits under a contract is estopped from questioning the contract’s 

existence, validity, or effect.” Rhodes v. State, 240 S.W.3d 882, 891 (Tex. Crim. 

App. 2007). 

The record reflects that Chargois pleaded guilty to the third-degree felony 

offense of non-aggravated assault on a family member, and he was properly 

admonished of the range of punishment applicable to third-degree felonies, which 

is two to ten years of imprisonment and a fine of up to $10,000. See Tex. Penal 

Code Ann. § 12.34 (West 2011). The plea bargain agreement provided that 

Chargois would be prosecuted only for non-aggravated third-degree assault on a 

family member, the State would agree to dismiss another pending cause, and 

Chargois would receive deferred adjudication and be placed on community 

supervision for four years. The trial court’s deferred adjudication order indicates 

that the trial court followed the plea bargain agreement. Upon revocation of his 

deferred adjudication community supervision, the trial court assessed punishment 

at ten years of confinement, which is within the range of punishment for a third-
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degree felony.2 See id. Chargois received benefits pursuant to the plea bargain 

agreement, and the trial court’s judgment is not void; therefore, Chargois may not,

after revocation, challenge the validity of the plea bargain agreement. See Rhodes, 

240 S.W.3d at 891; see also Manuel, 994 S.W.2d at 661-62. Accordingly, we 

overrule issues two and three and affirm the trial court’s judgment.

AFFIRMED.

________________________________

 LEANNE JOHNSON 

 Justice

 

Submitted on September 8, 2014

Opinion Delivered November 12, 2014

Do Not Publish

Before McKeithen, C.J., Horton and Johnson, JJ.

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Had Chargois been convicted of aggravated assault, a second-degree felony, 

he would have faced exposure to a punishment range of two to twenty years of 

confinement and a fine not to exceed $10,000. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. §§ 12.33 

(second-degree felony punishment), 22.02(b) (West 2011) (aggravated assault is a 

second-degree felony).