IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO 1 STATE OF NEW MEXICO, 2 Plaintiff-Appellee, 3 v. No. 28,844 4 JESSIE PAUL MORA, 5 Defendant-Appellant. 6 APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF BERNALILLO COUNTY 7 Ernesto Romero, District Judge 8 Gary K. King, Attorney General 9 Santa Fe, NM 10 for Appellee 11 Hugh W. Dangler, Chief Public Defender 12 Carlos Ruiz de la Torre, A ssistant Appellate Defender 13 Santa Fe, NM 14 for Appellant 15 MEMORANDUM OPINION 16 SUTIN, Judge. 17 Defendant appeals from his convictions for trafficking cocaine and conspiracy 18 to traffic cocaine. In this Court’s notice of proposed summary disposition, we 19 proposed to affirm. Defendant has f iled an untimely memorandum in opposition, 202 which this Court has agreed to accept as timely. We have c onsidered Defendant’s 1 arguments, and as we are not persuaded by them, we affirm. 2 Issue 1 : Defendant contends that the district court erred by not permitting his 3 attorney sufficient time to conduct an effec tive voir dire. [DS 3; MIO 3-5] District 4 courts “are given broad di scretion in overseeing the voir dire process,” and “[a] 5 criminal conviction will be reversed only wh ere the trial court has clearly abused its 6 discretion in limiting voir dire.” State v. Martinez , 2002-NMCA-036, ¶ 31, 131 N.M. 7 746, 42 P.3d 851. 8 Defendant asserts that prior to trial, the parties agreed on a ten-minute time limit 9 for voir dire, but that the prosecuting attorney and the judge took up some of his 10 allotted time by making objections to his questions, resulting in bench conferences 11 that took up even more time. [DS 1-2; MIO 4] At the end of the time allocated for 12 Defendant’s voir dire, his attorney requestedadditional time, but the district court 13 denied the request. [DS 2] In this Court’s notice of proposed disposition, we 14 proposed to hold there was no abuse of discreti on in the district court’s actions, as this 15 Court has already held that a district c ourt may properly limit th e time each party may 16 use for voir dire, see id. ¶¶ 31-35, and as Defendant had failed to either distinguish 173 this case from Martinezor to explain why the time limitations imposed by the district 1 court deprived him of a fair and impartial jury. 2 In Defendant’s memorandum inopposition, he argues that State v. Isiah , 109 3 N.M. 21, 781 P.2d 293 (1989), overruled on other grounds by State v. Lucero , 116 4 N.M. 450, 863 P.2d 1071 (1993), and Sutherlin v. Fenenga , 111 N.M. 767, 810 P.2d 5 353 (Ct. App. 1991), warrant reversal in this case. [MIO 4] However, both of those 6 cases addressed limitations pl aced on the subject matter of questions a party wanted 7 to ask in order to uncover bias during voir dire. See Isiah , 109 N.M. at 25-28, 781 8 P.2d 297-300 (discussing a district court’s re fusal to permit questions about jurors’ 9 racial attitudes); Sutherlin , 111 N.M. at 775-77, 810 P.2d at 361-63 (discussing the 10 district court’s decision to permit questi ons about potential jurors’ possible biases 11 related to insurance and insurers). Thes e cases are inapplicab le because Defendant 12 has not argued that the district court eith er prevented him from asking questions about 13 a particular subject or that the time limits it imposed effectively prevented him from 14 asking questions relating to a particular subject. Accordingly, as Defendant has 15 neither demonstrated that the time he was permitted was too short to ensure that the 16 jury was impartial or that he was prev ented from engaging in questioning intended to 174 uncover a particular sort of bias, we hold that the district court did not abuse its 1 discretion. 2 Defendant also argues in his memorandum in opposition that the district court’s 3 refusal to permit Defendant to submit suppl emental questionnaires to potential jurors 4 warrants reversal. [M IO 4] However, Defendant did not raise this issue in his 5 docketing statement and does not argue on appeal that it meets this Court’s standards 6 for an amendment to the docketing statement. Furthermore, even if this issue were 7 properly before this Court, Defendant has failed to expl ain what subject matter the 8 questionnaires would have covered, why this information was not sufficiently 9 uncovered in the standard questionnaires and the voir dire conducted by the State and 10 Defendant, and how the fact that the que stionnaires were not submitted deprived 11 Defendant of his right to an impartial jury. Accordingl y, Defendant has not 12 demonstrated that the district court abused its discretion. 13 Issue 2 : Defendant argues, pursuant to State v. Franklin , 78 N.M. 127, 129, 14 428 P.2d 982, 984 (1967), and State v. Boyer , 103 N.M. 655, 658-59, 712 P.2d 1, 4-5 15 (Ct. App. 1985), that there was insufficient evidence to convict him of trafficking 16 cocaine and conspiracy to traffi c cocaine. [DS 3, 4; MIO 5-6] “The standard of 17 review for sufficiency of the evidence is whether substantial evidence of either a direct 185 or circumstantial nature exists to s upport a verdict of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt 1 with respect to every element essential to a conviction.” State v. Rudolfo , 2 2008-NMSC-036, ¶ 29, 144 N.M. 305, 187 P.3d 170 (internal quotation marks and 3 citation omitted). This Court reviews the ev idence “in the light most favorable to the 4 guilty verdict, indulging all reasonable inferences and resolving all conflicts in the 5 evidence in favor of the verdict.” Id . (internal quotation mark s and citation omitted). 6 The question before this Court “is not wh ether we would havehad a reasonable doubt 7 but whether it would have been impermissibly unreasonable for a jury to have 8 concluded otherwise.” Id. 9 We hold that there was sufficient evid ence to support Defendant’s convictions 10 in this case. During Defendant’s trial, a law enforcement officer testified that during 11 an undercover sting operation, drugs were purchased fro m a co-defendant who was 12 speaking with Defendant both prior to and during the transaction. [DS 3] Although 13 the law enforcement officer st ated that he or she was unable to hear what Defendant 14 said to the co-defendant, the officer tes tified that Defendant made incriminating 15 statements to the officer indicating thatthe officer could obtain more drugs from 16 Defendant when the officer needed them. [DS 3; MIO 2-3] The officer further 17 testified that drugs and currency were found on the co-defendant. [DS 3] We 186 proposed to conclude that this evidence wa s sufficient to support a conviction for both 1 trafficking and conspiracy to traffic in acco rdance with the instructions given at trial. 2 [ SeeRP 157-59] Although Defendant points to evidence that supported Defendant’s 3 theory of innocence, this Court does notconsider evidence supporting an acquittal 4 when reviewing the suffici ency of the evidence. See State v. Rojo , 1999-NMSC-001, 5 ¶ 19, 126 N.M. 438, 971 P.2d 829 (“Contraryevidence supporting acquittal does not 6 provide a basis for reversal because the jury is free to reject [the d]efendant’s version 7 of the facts.”). 8 Therefore, for the reasons stated in this opinion and in our notice of proposed 9 summary disposition, we affirm. 10 IT IS SO ORDERED. 11

__________________________________ 12 JONATHAN B. SUTIN, Judge 13

WE CONCUR: 14

_________________________________ 15 MICHAEL E. VIGIL, Judge 16

_________________________________ 17 ROBERT E. ROBLES, Judge 18