[ DO NOT PUBLISH] 

## In the 

# United States Court of Appeals For the Eleventh Circuit

____________________
No. 22

- 14075
Non

- Argument Calendar

____________________
STEPHEN ADDERLEY,
Petitioner

- Appellant,

versus UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Respondent

- Appellee.

____________________ Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida D.C. Docket No. 1:22

- cv

- 23761

- RAR

____________________ USCA11 Case: 22-14075 Document: 37-1 Date Filed: 05/30/2024 Page: 1 of 62 Opinion of the Court 22

- 14075

Before W ILLIAM P RYOR , Chief Judge, and R OSENBAUM and G RANT , Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM: Stephen Adderley, a federal prisoner, appeals pro se the sua sponte dismissal of his motion to vacate . 28 U.S.C. § 2255. We issued a certificate of appealability on the issue whether the district

court abuse d its discretion, under Paez v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of Corr.
, 947 F.3d 649 (11th Cir. 2020), in dismissing Adderley’s motion as untimely without permitting him to respond . We affirm.
In 2019, Adderley pleaded guilty to conspiring to possess with intent to di stribute heroin and fentanyl
, 21 U.S.C. § 846 , and

was sentenced as a career offender, U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1(b), to 262 months of imprisonment. His career

- offender designation was predicated on Florida convictions for conspiring to possess with intent to distri bute cocaine, possessing with intent to distribute five kilograms or more of cocaine and 50 grams or more of cocaine base, and conspiring to possess with intent to distribute 28 grams or more of cocaine base. Adderley did not appeal.
In 2022, o ver three years after his conviction became final, Adderley filed a motion to vacat e, 28 U.S.C. § 2255 , and argued that he no longer qualified as a career offender. Citing our now

- vacated decision in United States v. Jackson , 36 F.4th 1294 (11th Cir.) (“ Ja ckson I ”)
, superseded , 55 F.4th 846 (11th Cir. 2022), aff’d sub nom
, Brown v. United States , No. 22

- 6389 (U.S. May 23, 2024) , he argued that his predicate Florida cocaine convictions no longer qualified because
, USCA11 Case: 22-14075 Document: 37-1 Date Filed: 05/30/2024 Page: 2 of 622

- 14075 Opinion of the Court 3

at the time of his federal conviction, ioflupane had been removed from the federal drug schedules but not the Florida drug schedules

.Adderley also argued that his two predicate convictions for conspiring to distribute cocaine and cocaine base no longer qualified because section 4B1 .2(b) did not include “inchoate drug crimes.” Regarding the timeliness of his motion, Adderley asserted that his motion was timely under 28 U.S.C. § 2255(f )(3) because “ Jacksonannounced a substantive rule that is retroactive to cases on collateral review. ”
The district court sua sponte dismissed Adderley’s motion. It ruled that the motion was untimely under any limitation period, 28 U.S.C. § 2255(f), because the motion was not filed within one year of his conviction becoming final, id. § 2255(f)(1), and Ja ckson was a then

- vacated decision of this Court and did not constitute a right “recognized by the Supreme Court,” id. § 2255(f)(3). It explained that no other limitation period applied because Adderley asserted no “impediment” to his motion, id. § 2255(f)( 2), or anydate on which a new factual predicate “could have been discovered,” id. § 2255(f)(4). And it explained that Adderley alleged no facts supporting any “equitable exceptions to timeliness,” such as equitable tolling or actual innocence.
We review the decision to raise sua sponte the statute of limitations for abuse of discretion. Paez , 947 F.3d at 651 ; see Rhode v. United States , 583 F.3d 1289, 1291 (11th Cir. 2009) (recognizing that the legal principles applicable to section 2254 proceedings genera lly apply to section 2255 proceedings)

. We review the determination USCA11 Case: 22-14075 Document: 37-1 Date Filed: 05/30/2024 Page: 3 of 64 Opinion of the Court 22

- 14075 that a motion to vacate is untimely de novo

. Beeman v. United States
, 871 F.3d 1215, 1219 (11th Cir. 2017).
The one

- year limitation period to file a motion to vacate runs from the latest o f the following four dates :(1) the date on which the judgment of conviction becomes final; (2) the date on which the impediment to making amotion created by governmental action in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States is removed, if the movant was preventedfrom making a motion by such governmental action; (3) the date on which the right asserted was initially recognized by the Supreme Court, if that right has been newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactively applicabl e to cases on collateral review; or (4) the date on which the facts supporting the claim or claims presented could have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence.
28 U.S.C. § 2255( f). “I f it plainly appears from the motion, any attached exhibits, and the record of prior proceedings that the moving party is not entitled to relief, the judge must dismiss the motion.” Rule 4(b), Rules Governing Section 2255 Proceedings

. In Paez , w e held that untimely habeas petitions are subject

to dismissal at the screening stage under Rule 4, which requires district courts to dismiss petitions that are “legally insufficient on USCA11 Case: 22-14075 Document: 37-1 Date Filed: 05/30/2024 Page: 4 of 622

- 14075 Opinion of the Court 5 [their] face,” if the court provides the petitioner with notice and an opportunity to be heard. Paez , 947 F.3d at 653 (inte rnal quotation marks omitted). We explained that the district court did not abuse its discretion when it dismissed a petition that it had determined tobe untimely without ordering the State to respond because it provided the petitioner with “notice of its decision and an opportunity to be heard in opposition.” Id. In his initial brief, Adderley does not challenge the sua sponte dismiss al of his motion as untimely. Instead, he argues that the district court erred by dismissing his motion as untimely without considering sections 2255(f)(2) and 2255(f)(4). He also argues that the district court failed to address the merits of his career

- offender arguments. See Clisby v. Jones , 960 F.2d 925 (11th Cir. 1992) (en banc). We do not address th is argument because the certificate we issued is limited to the sua sponte dismissal. See Steiner v. United States , 940 F.3d 1282, 1294 (11th Cir. 2019).
T he district court did not abuse its discretion. Adderley’s motion stated that he was sentenced in 2019 and that he filed no direct appeal or motion for post

- conviction relief until he filed the instant motion three years later

. The district court did not venture beyond the record to take notice of dates to which Adderley lacked

access in determining that his motion was untimely under section 2255(f)(1)

. See Bryant v. Ford , 967 F .3d 1272, 1275

– 76 (11th Cir. 2020). Moreover, Adderley ’s motion listed each of the four limitation p rovisions and invoked s ection 2255(f)(3 ) based on an alleged

new constitutional right in Jackson I

. Indeed, the motion form USCA11 Case: 22-14075 Document: 37-1 Date Filed: 05/30/2024 Page: 5 of 66 Opinion of the Court 22

- 14075 instructed Adderley to explain why the one

- year limitation period did not bar his motion, and he argued on that form and in his attached memorandum that Ja ckson I recogniz ed a new constitutional right that made his motion “timely under §[ ]2255(f)(3).” The district court also did not err in determining that section 2255(f)(3) did not apply because Jackson I and the other cases he cited were
not decisions of the Supreme Court. See 28 U.S.C. § 2255(f)(3); Dod d v. United States , 365 F.3d 1273, 1280 (11th Cir. 2004). The district

c ourt also considered whether Adderley’s arguments could satisfy sections 2255(f)(2) and 2255(f)(4) and correctly concluded that they could not. Because Adderley was afforded notice of the limitation periods , had an opportunity to argue that his motion was timely
, and provided the district court with sufficient information to assess the timeliness of his motion , the district court did not abuse its discretion in sua sponte dismissing his motion

. See Turner v. Sec’y, Dep’t of Corr. , 991 F.3d 1208, 1211 (11th Cir. 2021); Paez , 947 F.3d at 651,
653.
We AFFIRM the dismissal of Adderley’s motion to vacate. USCA11 Case: 22-14075 Document: 37-1 Date Filed: 05/30/2024 Page: 6 of 6