SPECIAL STUDIES

Air Warfare

and

Air Base Air Defense

1914-1973

John F. Kreis

Office of Air Force History

United States Air Force

Whqhinmtnn. D. C. 1988
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Kreis, John F., 1940-

Air warfare and air base defense 1914-1973 / John F. Kreis.

407 p. cm. - (Special studies)

Bibliography: p. 387

Includes index.

ISBN 0-912799-55-2

1. Air defenses, Military. 2. Air bases-Defense measures.

3. Air warfare. I. Title. II. Series: Special studies (United

States. Air Force. Office of Air Force History)

UG730.K7 1988 88-19692

358.4'17-dc19 CIP

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office

Washington, D.C. 20402
Foreword

While the projection of air power in contemporary warfare is among

the most complex endeavors facing a military commander, few of the activities required to support and sustain air forces in battle have been explored in

depth in historical literature. Even less studied has been the defense of air

bases.

Since the introduction of airplanes to warfare, it was obvious that bases

must be kept functioning at peak efficiency to sieze and maintain air superiority over an enemy as well as to carry out close air support and interdiction

operations. A number of factors have been critical in actions involving air

bases: advancing technology in aircraft and in defensive weapons, command

and control systems, detection capabilities, evolving air power doctrine that

predisposes air forces to specific courses of action, human endurance and

morale, camouflage or concealment, dispersion, the ability to foresee and

counter the strategy of a potential enemy, and in many cases pure chance

that favors one side over the other.

In response to a request by the Air Force Director of Plans, the Office

of Air Force History undertook to condense into one volume the experiences

of various nations' air forces in defending air bases against attacks from the

air. Maj. John Kreis, an experienced air security officer who spent much of

his career providing protection for U. S. Air Force bases, accomplished this

task by adopting a case study approach that highlights the interplay of the

factors affecting air base defense over half a century. In these pages he has

presented examples of the earliest attempts to defend airfields and troops in

World War I from aerial assault. He chronicles the development of radar

and command organizations that influenced so heavily the Royal Air Force's

performance in the Battle of Britain, the ability to marshal defenses and

repair crews on the island of Malta, and evolving command arrangements in

North Africa that made for success against a capable enemy whose own

command arrangements were deficient. Cases were also chosen to investigate failures from which sound lessons could be drawn. Limited conflict in

the cold war world has imposed its own logic on base defense and attacks on

installations, and the examples of base destruction in the Middle East wars

between 1948 and 1973 are also instructive.

This volume has wide application in staff planning for developing base

structures, establishing command and security arrangements, positioning of

iii
defensive emplacements, providing repair and support services, and training

base personnel to react in a host of contingencies. For the Air Force generally, it offers new insights into matters not usually treated in doctrinal

literature. The cases elaborated upon here will also have an appeal to a wider

public audience interested in military aviation in all of its aspects.

DR. RICHARD H. KOHN

Chief, Office of Air Force History

iv
United States Air Force

Historical Advisory Committee

(As of July 1, 1987)

Anne Foreman Norman A. Graebner

The General Counsel, USAF University of Virginia

Dominick Graham Ira Gruber

Royal Military College of Canada Rice University

Charles R. Hamm Haskell Monroe

Lieutenant General, USAF University of Missouri-Columbia

Superintendent, USAF Academy (Committee Chairman)

John H. Morrow, Jr. Thomas M. Ryan, Jr.

The University of Tennessee General, USAF

at Knoxville Retired

Truman Spangrud Gerhard L. Weinberg

Lieutenant General, USAF The University of North Carolina

Commander, Air University at Chapel Hill
The Author

Maj. John F. Kreis completed the research and writing of this volume

while serving as a historian in the Special Histories Branch, Office of Air

Force History, Bolling Air Force Base, Washington, D.C. He has served in

the U.S. Air Force for twenty years as a specialist in air base security and

defense. He holds a BA in economics (1962) from Willamette University and

an MA in history (1975) from the University of Delaware. Major Kreis is

also a graduate of the FBI National Academy, Quantico, Virginia. He is

currently preparing a companion volume on the ground defense of airfields.

vi
Acknowledgments

This book originated in a request from the Directorate of Plans,

Deputy Chief of Staff, Plans and Operations, Headquarters, U.S. Air

Force, for an analysis of past air base air defense actions to assist in current

planning. Once work on the project began, however, it became apparent that

its scope had to be widened to include more than the isolated defense of

airfields.

Many of the ideas leading to development of this volume came from

discussions with Mr. Bernard Nalty and Mr. Jack Neufeld, two of my colleagues in the Special Histories Branch. Both Mr. Neufeld and Mr. Nalty

were generous with their time and knowledge of air warfare and both spent

many hours reading draft manuscripts and discussing various campaigns in

detail.

Dr. Richard H. Kohn, Chief of the Office of Air Force History, read

and commented on the manuscript, but I am most indebted to him for

encouraging and giving me the freedom to inquire into areas not automatically associated with air base air defense. The present volume owes much to

his willingness to explore new areas. He was an enthusiastic supporter of the

project from its beginning.

Lt. Col. Vance Mitchell, Dr. Eduard Mark, Lt. Kenneth Schaffel, Dr.

Wayne Thompson, Dr. Daniel Mortensen, Dr. George Watson, Dr. Walton

Moody, Mr. Warren Trest, Mr. Herman Wolk, and Col. John Shiner of the

Office of Air Force History all read and commented on the drafts and

offered thoughtful comments during several seminars. Dr. Fred Beck and

Ms. Joyce Truett, who so ably edited the volume, are due much appreciation. Mr. William Heimdahl and MSgt. Roger Jernigan of the Reference

Services Branch always responded to my requests for help in research, frequently abandoning temporarily other pressing duties. Sgt. Glenn Reynolds,

Ms. Kim East, Ms. Jewell Newman, Ms. Elaine Estrada-Aherne, and Sgt.

Rosalyn Culbertson provided much help with typing manuscripts; their willing assistance shortened considerably the process of manuscript preparation. Special thanks are due to my friend and editor, Mr. Eugene P.

Sagstetter, who sadly did not live to see the work's conclusion, and to Mr.

Louis C. Mattison for the time given to interviews and the kind permission

to use his diary and other papers from Guadalcanal during late 1942 and

early 1943.

vii
Above all, special thanks go to my wife, Thea, who spent many hours helping with research in the National Archives and the Library of Congress. She proofread most of the manuscript, offering many suggestions to bring clarity to these pages.

viii
Contents

Page

Foreword .................................................... iii

The A uthor .................................................. vi

Acknowledgments ............................................. vii

Introduction .................................................. xv

Part One

The Early Development of Air Base Air Defense

I Air Base Defense in World War I ......................... 3

Protecting the Flying Birdcages ......................... 5

The Americans Arrive ................................ 13

II Interwar Doctrine and Technology Changes ................ 23

American Defense Development ........................ 24

Germany Prepares .................................... 32

Japanese Defense .................................... 36

The Soviet Union .................................... 39

Great Britain and the Commonwealth ................... 42

Part Two

World War II

III Blitzkrieg and the Battle of Britain ........................ 53

The Attack on Poland ................................ 54

Fighting in the West .................................. 62

The Battle of Britain .................................. 76

Sum m ary ........................................... 91

IV Malaya and Malta: 1941-1942 ............................ 93

Malaya and Singapore: A Study in Failure ............... 94

The Siege of Malta, 1941-1942 ......................... 111

Comparison of the Campaigns ......................... 133

V Campaigns in Africa .................................... 137

War of Movement in the Western Desert ................. 138

ix
The Desert Luftwaffe ................................. 153

TORCH and the Drive to Tunis .......................... 159

The Axis Defense of Tunisia ........................... 169

Sum m ary ........................................... 173

VI The Eastern Front: 1941-1944 ............................ 177

Operation BARBAROSSA ................................ 177

The Russians Regroup ................................ 184

German Air Base Defense ............................. 189

The Struggle on the Steppe: 1942-1943 .................. 193

The Battle for Kursk .................................. 199

The Attack on Poltava Air Base, June 21, 1944 ........... 204

Sum m ary ........................................... 212

VII The Solomons and New Guinea: 1942-1944 ................ 217

Guadalcanal and Munda .............................. 219

The Fifth Air Force: Port Moresby to Hollandia .......... 236

The Japanese Respond ................................ 248

Sum m ary ........................................... 257

Part Three

Postwar Changes

VIII TWo Limited Wars: Korea and Southeast Asia .............. 265

Dominating the Air in Korea ........................... 266

Success and Frustration in Vietnam ..................... 278

Comparison of the Campaigns ......................... 296

IX The Middle East: 1948-1973 ............................. 299

The Six Day War: 1967 ................................ 306

War of Attrition: 1967-1970 ........................... 319

The October War: 1973 ............................... 325

Mid-East Air Warfare in Perspective .................... 338

X Conclusion ............................................. 343

A ppendices .................................................. 354

G lossary ..................................................... 359

N otes ....................................................... 363

Bibliographic Note ............................................ 387

Index ........................................................ 395

Maps

1. World War I, The Western Front ............................. 14

2. Radar and Observer Network; Great Britain, 1940 ............. 46

3. Poland, 1939 .............................................. 58

4. Dutch Air Bases, 1940 ..................................... 68

5. German Attack in the West, 1940; Airfields in France ........... 73

x
6. British Fighter Force Deployment, 1940 ....................... 87

7. R.A.F. in Malaya, December 1941 ........................... 98

8. British Defenses in Singapore ............................... 99

9. Malta: Mediterranean Bastion ............................... 114

10. Airfields on M alta ......................................... 116

11. Luqa - Hal Far Airfields, Malta, May 1942 ................... 126

12. Takali Airfield, Malta, 1942 ................................. 127

13. North African Operations, 1941 ............................. 139

14. North African Operations, 1942 ............................. 152

15. German Invasion of Russia; Operation BARBAROSSA ............. 178

16. Eastern Front, 1943; Operation CITADEL ...................... 200

17. Pacific Operations, 1942 .................................... 218

18. Solomon Islands, 1942 (Inset: Henderson Field) ............... 224

19. Port Moresby - New Guinea ................................ 237

20. Port Moresby Airfields ..................................... 238

21. Buna - Dobodura Airfields ................................. 246

22. Western New Guinea ....................................... 250

23. East A sia ................................................. 266

24. Korean Airfields .......................................... 276

25. Air War in North Vietnam .................................. 282

26. The M iddle East . ......................................... 303

27. Israeli and Egyptian Airfields, October 1956 ................... 310

28. Syrian Airfields, 1967 ...................................... 312

29. Egyptian Airfields, 1967 .................................... 314

30. Israeli and Jordanian Airfields, 1967 ......................... 318

31. Egyptian Airfields, 1973 .................................... 328

32. Israeli Airfields, 1973 ...................................... 329

33. Syrian Airfields, 1973 . .................................... 331

Tables

1. Luftwaffe Order of Battle, September 1939 .................... 60

2. Strengths and Losses, Polish Air Force, 1939 .................. 61

3. French Air Force, May 1940 ................................. 64

4. British Air Forces in France, 1940 ............................ 72

5. The Luftwaffe in the West, 1940 ............................. 74

6. Comparative Strengths, Battle of Britain ...................... 79

7. RAF Strength, Dispositions in Malaya, 1941 .................. 102

8. Antiaircraft Artillery Forces, Malaya ......................... 103

9. Malayan Air Defenses, December 1941 ....................... 104

10. Japanese 3d Army Air Corps ................................ 105

11. Japanese Navy 22d Air Flotilla .............................. 106

12. RAF Order of Battle, Malta ................................ 120

xi
13. Malta Antiaircraft Defenses ................................. 121

14. Luftwaffe Order of Battle, Sicily 1942 ........................ 122

15. Axis Air Forces, Africa, December 1941 ...................... 145

16. RAF in Africa, November 1941 .............................. 146

17. Axis Air Forces, Africa, May 1942 ........................... 157

18. RAF in Africa, May 1942 ................................... 158

19. Axis Air Strength, North Africa, April 1943 ................... 171

20. Luftwaffe Strength, Eastern Front, June 1941 ................. 186

21. Soviet Antiaircraft, June 1941 ............................... 187

22. Luftwaffe Air Strength, Eastern Front, June 1941 .............. 190

23. Soviet Air Strength, June 1941 .............................. 191

24. U. S. Air Defense Units, Guadalcanal ....................... 226

25. Japanese Navy Air Units, Pacific, 1942 ....................... 227

26. Allied Air Units Used Against Wewak ........................ 253

27. Estimate of Japanese Air Strength, February 1944 .............. 254

28. North Vietnamese Antiaircraft Artillery ...................... 286

29. North Vietnamese Air Threat ............................... 292

30. Egyptian Air Force, 1956 ................................... 304

31. RAF - French Air Force, Middle East, 1956 ................... 305

32. Israeli Air Force, 1967 ...................................... 308

33. Israeli Air Force, 1973 ...................................... 332

34. Israeli Air Defense Systems, 1973 ............................ 333

35. Syrian Air Defense Systems, 1973 ............................ 335

36. Probable Aircraft Losses, October 1973 ....................... 336

37. Daily Loss Summary, Israeli Air Force, October 1973 ........... 338

Photographs

1. Royal Flying Corps Field at Beauval .......................... 4

2. Flanders Aerodrome, Richthofen Squadron ................... 5

3. Aerial View of Souilly Aerodrome ........................... 6

4. Improvised Antiaircraft Emplacements ....................... 8

5. Allied Barrage Balloon under German Attack ................. 10

6. 94th Aero Squadron Pilots on Alert .......................... 18

7. Lt. Douglas Campbell Attacks a Pfalz DIII ................... 19

8. Bomb Loading ............................................ 20

9. Lt. W illiam C. Sherman .................................... 26

10. Fort Bragg Maneuvers, 1938 ................................ 28

11. SCR-268 Radar and Searchlight ............................. 29

12. U. S. Army Antiaircraft Guns during World War II ............. 30

13. German Antiaircraft Guns of World War II ................... 35

14. Japanese Antiaircraft of World War II ........................ 37

15. German Wiirzburg D Radar ................................. 47

xii
16. Polish Aircraft Destroyed at Deblin .......................... 56

17. Okechie Airfield after German Attack ........................ 57

18. British Guns in France, 1940 ................................ 65

19. Wrecked German Ju-52s at Waalhaven ....................... 69

20. British RAF Filter Center and Radar in Operation,

Winston Churchill Inspecting Rocket Device ............... 80

21. German Aerial Photos of RAF Station Eastchurch ............. 86

22. RAF Leadership, Battle of Britain ........................... 91

23. Grand Harbor, M alta ...................................... 115

24. Scenes from the Siege ...................................... 118

25. Bofors Gun Crew near Valetta ............................... 124

26. British Serviceman with Siege Rations ........................ 128

27. Maltese Airfield under Attack, 1942 .......................... 129

28. M altese Terrain ............................................ 132

29. German Aerials of British Desert Landing Grounds ............ 142

30. American Bomber in Egyptian Sandstorm .................... 148

31. British Air Strike at Tamet, Libya ............................ 151

32. Wrecked American B-17s at Maison Blanche, Algeria ........... 161

33. Algerian Laborers Stack Supply ............................. 162

34. Allied Commanders at Casablanca, 1943 ...................... 164

35. American Bulldozer Fills Crater ............................. 166

36. British Bofors Crew on Tripoli Beach ......................... 168

37. Allied Bombs over Axis Airfield, Tripoli ...................... 172

38. Abandoned Russian Aircraft during German Attack ............ 179

39. Camouflaged German Radio Vans ........................... 182

40. Field Marshal Albert Kesselring ............................. 183

41. Luftwaffe 88-mm Gun Crew in Russia ....................... 192

42. German Airfield Construction in Russia ...................... 194

43. German Aerial of Russian Field at Kirovsk .................... 195

44. German Light Flak Crew in Action .......................... 196

45. German Field at Demyansk ................................. 197

46. German Crew Manning a Predictor .......................... 203

47. American Engineers Lay Out Pierced Steel Plank

Runways at Poltava .................................... 205

48. German Aerial of American Bombers at Poltava ............... 207

49. German Attack on Poltava .................................. 209

50. Yak-9s Defending the Poltava Base .......................... 210

51. Poltava Base Commander General Alexander R. Perminov ...... 210

52. Ju-52s Blaze in Russian Field ............................... 213

53. U. S. Marine 90-mm Guns on Guadalcanal ................... 222

54. F4F Wildcats in Open Revetments, Guadalcanal ............... 223

55. Crew with 20-mm Guns on Henderson Field .................. 225

56. Control Panel of Japanese Radar ............................ 228

xiii
57. American SCR-270 Radar Used on Guadalcanal ............... 229

58. Maj. Gen. Roy S. Geiger, USMC ............................ 230

59. Japanese Hit on American Hangar, Henderson Field ........... 232

60. American Aviation Facilities on New Guinea .................. 249

61. Concealed Japanese Guns with Telltale Gardens ................ 251

62. Low Level Operations in New Guinea ........................ 258

63. American 40-mm Gun in Korea, 1950 ........................ 268

64. Stripped Yak-9 at Wonsan, Korea, 1950 ...................... 270

65. American Bombers Reduce Sunan Airfield, Korea .............. 274

66. American Aerial Outlining Dummy Airfield, North Korea ....... 277

67. American Fighters in Prefabricated Revetments,

South Vietnam, 1966 ................................... 280

68. North Vietnamese Surface to Air Missile Battery, 1966 .......... 283

69. Drone Mission Over North Vietnam, 1969 .................... 284

70. American Bomb Damage at Hoa Loc Airfield, North Vietnam .. 287

71. Phuc Yen Airfield Bomb Damage ............................ 289

72. Israeli Gun Crew in the Sinai, 1973 ........................... 326

73. Israeli Strike on Egyptian Airfield, 1973 ...................... 340

74. Israeli Bombs over Syrian Field, 1973 ........................ 341

xiv
The experience which I gained during this advance

through Cyrenaica formed the main foundation

for my later operations. I had made heavy demands throughout the action, far more than precedent permitted, and had thus to relearn the fact

that standards set by precedent are based on

something less than average performance, and,

for that reason, one should not submit to them.

- Erwin Rommel, Field Marshal

I have sometimes reflected that it was an advantage to the Royal Air Force that we had no long

Service tradition behind us, no set ways of tackling our job. Improvisation, which saved us in the

Middle East, came the more easily to us, I think,

than to our contemporaries in the Army and the

Royal Navy.

-Arthur William Lord Tedder,

Air Marshal
Introduction

Some medieval European cartographers, preparing maps based in part

on travelers' tales or superstition, occasionally labeled otherwise unknown

areas of far continents with the phrase "Here be Dragons,' seeking to warn

the unwary of dangers in venturing beyond the clearly defined regions of the

world. None of these men had ever seen a dragon, and although they had

vivid ideas of flying, fire-breathing monsters based on mythological or biblical accounts, no dragon was found on journeys across unknown lands. In

the twentieth century, however, a war weapon with some of the dragons'

attributes, yet far more lethal, appeared. The new weapon was the airplane,

and as airplanes grew in size, complexity, and destructive capability, their

need for bases and support systems grew. In the ancient stories, Hercules,

Perseus, Jason, and St. George ventured to the dragons' lairs to outwit or

destroy the creatures. As with the ancient heroes, modern warriors trying to

destroy warplanes often went to airfields to obliterate modern dragons. In

the process, they showed that combat aircraft, like the mythical dragon,

might be hard to destroy, but they were not invincible.

From virtually the first appearance of aircraft in warfare, their bases

have been the targets of enemy attack and the concern of defending friendly

forces. Between 1914 and 1973, the concept of air base air defense grew with

the technological changes of the 20th Century. In 1914, antiaircraft guns

could barely contend with early warplanes. Until World War II an attacker

could do little permanent damage to the grass or dirt fields that sustained

the light military aircraft and service equipment of the time. Starting on a

small scale early in World War II, assaults on air bases grew in intensity as

opposing sides realized the impact of airpower. These attacks involved paratroops, glider forces, air raids, and ground assaults. Since that era, faster

planes, technologically improved ordnance of increased destructiveness,

permanent concrete runways, and the presence of fixed, complex service and

support establishments made airfields ever more vulnerable to destruction.

By 1973, tactical air base defense used some of the most sophisticated

weapon systems and advanced electronic command and control systems yet

known. Radar-controlled guns and missiles guided toward an attacker still

xv
AIR BASE AIR DEFENSE

miles from his target gave new options to defenders. Air base air defense was

continually redefined as much by doctrinal prescription as by context: time,

place, the technological evolution of control mechanisms, munitions and

aircraft, and the interplay of other elements of airpower all contributed to

the nature of the individual cases chosen for study here.

Technology had similar, but not simultaneous, effects on both attack

and defense. Over time, technological change caused the advantage to swing

back and forth. In 1940, during the Battle of Britain, the RAF's radar

system greatly assisted the defenders. Subsequently, air commanders in

other battles and other theaters learned to overcome, or at least control, air

defense systems, thus prompting new air base defense measures in turn.

Changes to attack and defense technology over the years necessarily altered

the methods whereby commanders sought air superiority or attempted to

protect their bases. It was air superiority which weighed heavily in the

success or failure of counterair operations, and by the peak of fighting in

World War II, air superiority became the crux of air base air defense.

Air superiority normally gives one side such a degree of dominance as

to permit it to operate its land, sea, and air forces without prohibitive

interference by the opposing air force. In practice, however, air superiority

was not permanently attained. Often it was contested anew each day, and it

was not based on numerical advantage. Concentration of force, ingenuity of

command, and effective use of defense weapons were important aspects of

air superiority and air base air defense efforts. During World War I, tactical

air superiority was achieved by air-to-air combat. Between the wars, aircraft,

especially bombers, became faster and able to carry a much more destructive bomb load. The changes opened the way to new applications of air

power so that by 1939 many air commanders viewed air warfare much

differently than they had twenty years before. At the beginning of World

War II, German Air Force doctrine advocated destruction of enemy aircraft

on the ground by surprise strikes. Other nations' air forces saw air warfare

and base defense differently depending on the conditions prevailing in their

respective combat theaters. The air combat of World War II made clear,

however, that air base air defense and air superiority were closely interwoven; one could not exist without the other.

Adequate protection of air bases has been complex and difficult; at

times it was greatly underrated or misunderstood, frequently to the detriment of one side or the other. In general, there were four facets of base

defense. The first, but not necessarily the most important, was active defense (sometimes called point defense*), and involved the use of antiaircraft

* Point air defense is the protection of a specific site, such as an airfield, factory complex,

rail yard, or the like. It can be contrasted with the concept of area defense, which is the

protection of a region or an entire country.

xvi
INTRODUCTION

guns, surface-to-air missiles, or fighter aircraft operating under varying

levels of ground or airborne control. Second was passive defense, such as

camouflage, the use of revetments, hardening facilities with concrete and

steel construction, or the use of decoys and deception, such as dummy

airfields. A third, dispersal, involves scattering the aircraft and other vulnerable resources, such as fuel and spare parts, over a wide area of a single base

or over many bases to increase an enemy's targeting problems. The fourth

aspect was too often unrecognized, but highly important: the ability of an

air installation's units to effect repairs and recover from an attack as quickly

as possible. To the extent these factors were neglected, bases suffered from

the depredations of the opposing air force.

Traditional formulae predicting that ground troops in prepared defenses should be able to defeat a force three times their number do not hold

for aerial operations. Air forces cannot make use of terrain features to aid

the defense, but air defense systems using all of the advantages at their

disposal have in the past held their own against greater than three-to-one

odds. The portion of the Battle of Britain fought between August 10 and

September 15, 1940, was a struggle for air superiority over England and for

control of RAF Fighter Command's main bases in East Anglia, Kent, and

Sussex. On August 10, the Luftwaffe's fighters outnumbered those of

Fighter Command. Not only were the British short of fighters, their pilotto-plane ratio was well below 2:1, which meant fliers had to endure long,

stressful duty shifts day after day, often engaging in combat several times a

day. British pilot training rates at that time were less than those of the

Germans, and bomber and transport pilots could not be quickly retrained to

fly the new, high-performance Spitfires or Hurricanes. But in 1940, the

British had an advantage: a radar directed defense system tailored to the

needs of its guns and fighters. The result was Fighter Command's ability to

detect enemy bomber groups forming over France. British interceptor pilots

and antiaircraft guns were thus able to attack the German aircraft, taking a

heavy toll.

The Battle of Britain was a seminal air defense experience, influencing

tactical air defense doctrine in such diverse theaters as the Mediterranean

and North Africa, the Southwest Pacific and the Solomon Islands, as well as

the air defense of North America and North Vietnam. Almost two years

after the Battle of Britain, the RAF applied the same techniques to defend

Malta, at times against odds of ten to one. During April 1942, the weight of

bombs dropped on Malta's airfields was thirty-six times the amount that hit

Coventry, England, on the night of November 14-15, 1940, and more than

fell on London during August, September, and October of 1940. Air operations at Malta, although reduced, did not halt because of enemy action.1

The style of defensive air combat employed by the British over Malaya,

by the Allies in North Africa and the South and Southwest Pacific all

xvii
AIR BASE AIR DEFENSE

reflected the command and control system first used over England. After

World War II, the defenses favored by the Americans during the Korean War

and by both sides in Southeast Asia and the Arab-Israeli fighting in the

Middle East were based upon the same system. In contrast Germany, Japan,

and the Soviet Union did not trace the origins of their doctrine on air

defense to the Royal Air Force. The differences in German, Japanese, and

Soviet air base protection in World War II become clear in the chapters

covering the Eastern Front, the Mediterranean, and the Pacific; all three air

forces developed methods of safeguarding their airfields that varied in effectivenss. The influence of these campaigns has been felt to the present day,

and the experiences form the basis of much of today's tactical air warfare

planning.

Military history has paid little attention to air base defense, though the

topic is vital. Most accounts of air campaigns concern planning for and

carrying out the flying aspect of the fighting. While flying is the most

important aspect of a campaign, the costs of building modern air bases and

sophisticated attack aircraft require that we carefully consider ground assets

as well. The World War II experience taught the Unites States Army and

Army Air Forces many lessons by the end of 1944, and brought them into a

close working arrangement that overcame their parochial prewar views. One

year later, however, the two services disagreed with each other over the

subject of air base air defense more heatedly than they had in 1941. Since

that time, the arguments have continued.

The cases selected for study in this volume reflect a wide variety of

geographic and operational differences in the sixty years from the beginning

of World War I through the Arab-Israeli War of 1973. The Second World

War was the first to involve large air forces fighting over long periods of

time. All of the cases involve the application of tactical, as opposed to

strategic air power. Some campaigns that might interest a reader were excluded. The Japanese attacks on Pearl Harbor and Clark Field have been so

frequently analyzed that little would be gained by a repetition here; the

United States Army Air Forces' raids on Germany's airfields in 1943 and

1944 were part of a strategic effort, and therefore were purposely omitted.

Finally, the Allied operations on the European continent after D-day, June

6, 1944, pitted the British and Americans against a Luftwaffe which had

been so badly debilitated on the Russian Front, in the Mediterranean Theater, and in its efforts to protect the German homeland from Allied strategic

bombers that it was no longer a viable fighting force capable of any sustained operations, let alone air base air defense. Assaults on air bases by

paratroops or ground forces will not be discussed except where directly

affected by the air operation in question. The forms of attack associated

with ground forces require the insertion, supply, reinforcement, and possibly

xviii
INTRODUCTION

the removal of military units not normally common to an air force; their

complexities call for a separate volume to afford them adequate review.

The episodes discussed here depict actions that involved air defense

planning and operations in several countries over a long (for aviation history) span of time. Selections of cases do not necessarily imply approval of

the tactics or the weapons involved, but were made in the hope that today's

air commanders and planners could benefit from the experience of others.

xix
Part 1

The Early Development of Air Base Air Defense
Chapter I

Air Base Defense in World War I

When the British Expeditionary Force (BEF) moved to France in the

late summer of 1914 virtually all of the Royal Flying Corps' aircraft went

along as an integral, if small, part of the BEF. On the Continent, they joined

the equally small French air service, the Aeronautique Militaire, but neither

the Allies nor the Germans had a chance to build substantial aerodromes for

some time. In the maneuvering of the first months of the war, airplanes on

both sides often flew from a different location each day as ground forces

advanced or retreated. Aerodromes were sometimes prepared fields, but

usually no more than hastily chosen flat ground where aircraft could land

safely. Antiaircraft fire, both small arms and exploding artillery shells, appeared during the first month of fighting, and pilots and mechanics found

great sport in shooting at an enemy overhead. As the war progressed, both

sides resorted to antiaircraft fire.I The Allies and Germany scored significant

technical gains in aircraft design and construction, gunnery, and communications during the four years of fighting.

By war's end elaborate air defenses sited near the front for the protection of armies were common. Extensive detection and warning systems appeared everywhere along the trenches. In addition, airfields near the battle

lines benefited from their proximity to army antiaircraft (AA) gun positions.

Often it was impossible to tell if an army intended its air defenses for the

protection of ground or flying units.

Most aerodromes of early World War I were level, open fields. Cows

often grazed while aircraft landed and took off. Maintenance shops,

hangars, and living quarters were temporary canvas-covered wood-frame

structures that could be knocked down and moved on short notice. As the

war slowed to a stalemate, these facilities became semipermanent and some

airfield improvements, such as grading and crushed rock or cinder surfaces,

3
AIR BASE AIR DEFENSE

Royal Flying Corps field at Beauval. Tents house flying personnel and ground

crews. U.S. Army Air Defense Museum.

were made. Usually, the aircraft and shops were the only inviting targets.

Cratering runways was not worthwhile, as their construction often needed

no more than several groups of men walking over a field to compress the

soil. The light bombs then in use could not substantially damage the surface. 2

Shelters of some sort were necessary from the first. The people stationed at the field had to be quartered and supplied; aircraft and equipment

needed protection. World War I airplanes deteriorated rapidly in the rain

and dampness of Europe. Without a cover to keep the weather at bay, an

airplane's wood warped and its canvas loosened, making the craft unflyable

in as little as eight days. As the war progressed, many of the bases became a

good deal more permanent, even acquiring some basic comforts. Supply

and air depot installations, such as those at Orly, Romorantin, and Colombey-les-Belles, became rather elaborate.3

By November 1918, the Americans had brought over and set up some

148 steel hangars and had another 266 ready for the builders. The American

Expeditionary Force's production center located at Romorantin was projected to have 600,000 square feet of covered hangars for aircraft assembly

4
WORLD WAR I

Flanders aerodrome housing the Richthofen squadron. Tents provide shelter

on a provisional air field. When conditions required, the entire field could

move to a new location within hours. U.S. Army Air Defense Museum.

and storage. By Armistice Day 371,000 square feet were in use. The changes

taking place at the rather informal locations of early air bases could be seen

not only in the relatively safe rear area, but also at forward sites. By November 11, the Air Depot at Colombey-les-Belles, near Toul, had 357,363 square

feet of building space." These aircraft shelters became obvious targets; opposing airmen's attacks caused the ground crews to install a variety of light

defensive weapons.

Protecting the Flying Birdcages

On the 24th of August 1914 Capt. H. C. Jackson and Lt. E. L. Conran

of the Royal Flying Corps were on an observation patrol near Tournai, in

Flanders. About noon, they spotted three parked German aircraft on an

airfield outside the town of Lessines. Lieutenant Conran banked the plane

for a closer look, and as they passed one of them threw a bomb overboard.

The attack caused no damage and was notable only because it was one of the

first air attacks on an enemy air base.' Neither bombardment nor attack was

5
AIR BASE AIR DEFENSE

Aerial view of Souilly Aerodrome in the last two years of the war. Structures

and flying field have become more permanent, but are still relatively impervious to damage by air attack. U.S. Army Air Defense Museum.

the mission of fliers early in World War I. They were observers, sent to

report on troop movements, supply and artillery positions, and the like. The

most important function of aircraft units during the early years of fighting

was to spot for and adjust gun fire. If these early aviators used bombs, they

were often nothing more than hand grenades or containers of gasoline

thrown from the cockpit. The pilot or observer usually released the first

externally mounted bombs by cutting the retaining strings, and their destructive power was quite limited. Not to be outdone by the British, the

Germans attacked an airfield near Compiegne on August 29th. Again, there

was no damage."

As the war continued into the autumn, it grew in scope. Germany

introduced zeppelins to the conflict and with their use gained the ability for

both long range reconnaissance and bombardment. In September 1914, the

British Admiralty concluded that German zeppelins posed a threat to the

British fleet as well as to targets in England. The Royal Naval Air Service's

(RNAS) squadron at Dunkirk received orders to attack the zeppelin bases.

All the airships within 100 miles were to be destroyed. On September 22,

1914, the RNAS launched the first raid on the zeppelin hangars at Duesseldorf; it failed when the bombs fell short of the target or did not explode. On

October 8, two attacks by single aircraft at Cologne were more successful.

They destroyed a zeppelin, a zeppelin shed, and a machine shop. The pilots

met heavy ground fire from rifles and antiaircraft guns. One airplane was

badly damaged, but both pilots returned safely. The destruction at Cologne

6
WORLD WAR I

pleased one man ever on the lookout for new ideas: Winston Churchill, then

First Lord of the Admiralty, encouraged more attacks and was, in fact, an

early believer in destroying an enemy's air force on the ground at his bases.7

These flights of about 200 miles to attack the zeppelins were remarkable

not only for their endurance; misty weather introduced much guesswork

into the navigation for the mission. More important, the imaginative raids

clearly illustrated that the British realized from the start of the war the need

for counterair attacks on the enemy's flying fields. At the same time, Germany's antiaircraft defenses demonstrated that they, too, had given the problem considerable thought. The airplane's great potential as a weapon of war

was now becoming clear, and the need for counterweapons was recognized.

Antiaircraft (AA) weaponry was not new. An AA gun was first used in

the Franco-Prussian War of 1870-1871 and was specifically designed to

shoot at balloons leaving the surrounded city of Paris. The original Ballongeschi~tz was a 37-mm wheeled cannon which came from the Krupp Steel

Company's Essen works. Although testimony on its accuracy was not recorded, it fired a shell up almost 2,000 feet and seems to have shot down one

balloon, damaged others, and discouraged the French from further daylight

flights. The first commercially available antiaircraft gun was exhibited in

1906 by the German Rheinmetall firm at the Berlin Auto Exhibition. Rheinmetall's weapon was a vehicle mounted 50-mm gun in two designs, one with

an armor shield protecting the gunner and having a 60-degree traverse, and

one with no armor and a 360-degree traverse. The barrel could be elevated to

70 degrees. 8

In the complex armament race of the pre-World War I period, companies actively competed for customers and nationality was no bar to purchasing. When Count Zeppelin began to build airships for the Kaiser's

government in 1906, commercial possibilities of a counterweapon did not

escape notice. The tactic of creating a threat and then a weapon or armor to

defend against it was common in the rush to sell. In 1909, Krupp introduced

a 65-mm antizeppelin gun based on its 1870 model. It was available for

purchase by Britain, France, and Russia, so that by 1914 all of the major

powers had access to the design. Nevertheless, sales for AA guns were not

especially brisk at first and by July 1914, two Rhine River bridges and the

zeppelin hangars at Metz and Friedrichshafen were the only protected locations in Germany. The German Army planned, however, the purchase of

movable AA guns for each field army headquarters and infantry division.

The basic requirement was to stop reconnaissance and observation craft

more than to protect against attack.9

By the early summer of 1914, several types of AA guns were being

manufactured in small quantities in England. The most popular were the 3-

inch gun and the 37-mm pom-pom, a fast firing cannon which the Royal

Navy intended placing aboard ships. These weapons were quickly adapted

7
Improvised antiaircraft machine gun emplacements. (Left) American troops

use log as pedestal for Lewis gun. Gunner of the French 65th Antiaircraft

Autocannon Section aims skyward. (Below) German tub emplacement rotated to allow a 360 degree arc of fire. U.S. Army Air Defense Museum.

WNi

.1" W
WORLD WAR I

for air defense. The first shells had impact fuzes that required a direct hit on

a target, but ground commanders worried that their men would be hurt

when the shells fired at aircraft returned to earth. Moreover, pilots were

unaware they were being fired upon and hence AA guns had no deterrent

effect upon them. Subsequently engineers developed more responsive fuzes

to detonate the projectiles after a few seconds' flight, but their large scale

manufacture was intially slow. These crude affairs used a burning powder

train that could be set to activate at a chosen altitude, but a true proximity

fuze, which would explode upon encountering even a maneuvering airplane,

was three decades in the future. Early AA shells were not intended to destroy

aircraft by force of a nearby explosion. Rather, gunners attempted to score

direct hits with smaller automatic weapons or small arms. Heavier weapons

such as the 3-inch or 75-mm relied on the nearly chance effects of shell

splinters to damage aircraft parts or hurt the pilot.'0

The antiaircraft gun, which came into use on both sides in 1914, was

not produced in large numbers for some time. As the armies expanded,

factories could not meet the need for artillery. The first effective British

antiaircraft gun sent to the front was the 3-inch thirteen pounder. Able to

fire high explosive or shrapnel shells, the 3-inch gun reached an altitude of

17,000 feet. Faulty ammunition, however, limited the weapon until April

1916 to the use of shrapnel only, which had a greatly reduced killing range.

The British intended assigning a 2-gun antiaircraft artillery section to each

front-line division in Flanders and northern France, providing a line of AA

fire through which intruding enemies were forced to fly. Another 30 heavy

guns were to be used for AA protection in rear areas, including airfields. Of

the 112 guns needed for this scheme, only 80 were in place by April 1916. By

July of that year, 113 guns were distributed among the field armies with

another 18 along lines of communication. Eight more were assigned to the

BEF's General Headquarters."

The German munitions industry suffered similar production problems,

and resorted to two expedient measures. The first campaigns in Russia

yielded a great many captured Putilov M1903 field guns with a high angle of

fire. Mounted on a pedestal and supplied with captured shrapnel ammunition, they became the first widely used German Fliegerabwehrkanone, or

flak weapons. In the west, the Germans employed French 75-mm guns

captured during their drive to the Marne. Since there was little captured

ammunition, German factories in the Ruhr bored out the French guns to

accept German 77-mm shells.' 2

Probably the most widely used antiaircraft gun early in the war was the

high velocity French 75-mm adapted to high angle fire and mounted on a De

Dion Bouton motor chassis. French defenders employed these mobile weapons for area air defense with field armies and for the defense of Paris. Later

they were deployed around aerodromes by the U.S. Army. The 75-mm had a

9
AIR BASE AIR DEFENSE

Allied barrage balloon under German antiaircraft fire. Enemy shells are wide

of the mark. Hitting even a stationary target in the sky was a feat at this

time.

high rate of fire and a vertical range of 21,000 feet, the maximum operating

altitude of most aircraft. The French depended upon it heavily to make up

shortages of fighter aircraft. With the entry of the United States into the

war, American antiaircraft gun carriages were fitted with French 75-mm gun

barrels. The U.S. Army also purchased 75-mm truck-mounted guns from

France to complete the antiaircraft protection for its field armies. '

All of the belligerent powers used antiaircraft guns as area defense

weapons during the war. In an area defense, guns protected regions such as

corps areas rather than small points like transportation junctions or air

bases. Area defense use was a rather general application of the new artillery

pieces, but reflected the fact that for some time few people knew how to

employ an AA gun effectively. Since the weapons were new to combat, there

were a number of technical problems that frustrated the gunners."

Firing at targets moving through three dimensions was unique in the

history of war to that time. Gun crews needed training and experience; range

finding problems seemed almost insurmountable. Until 1916, there was no

practical method of predicting an airplane's future position in the sky. The

gunners could not see where their fire was going in relation to the small and

rapidly moving target and could not easily adjust for range and speed.

Estimates of speed and altitude were mostly guesswork; observers directed

changes in aim after watching shell bursts, but at best their new targeting

information lagged by several seconds by the time it reached the gun crew.

British and French designers devised electrical and gear driven deflection

meters which reduced the time needed to aim an AA gun. In 1916 the

10
WORLD WAR I

invention of position finders greatly facilitated accurate aiming, and aircraft

were forced to fly higher to avoid damage. Even after a method of accurately

predicting an aerial target's line of flight was in use, however, gunners had to

assume it would continue at the same speed, altitude, and direction when

they adjusted sights and fuzes. No sooner had the designers solved the

problems of aiming and firing, however, than another difficulty arose.

Above 15,000 feet powder train fuzes in the early AA shells did not function

well. Lack of oxygen and the projectile's spin made detonation erratic.

Changing fuze design and powder composition rectified the newest difficulty, and by war's end, 20,000 feet was the highest altitude at which an

antiaircraft shell could be expected to be effective. That, however, was adequate for the aircraft then in use."5

The ballistic and aiming limitations of antiaircraft guns and their rather

restricted availability often made them unsuitable for point air defense of

sites such as aerodromes. As a result, defense of World War I air bases

devolved largely upon machine guns and small arms fire plus camouflage,

dispersal, deception, as well as fighter interception. By late 1915, the Royal

Flying Corps (RFC) aggressively attacked aerodromes in German-held territory. Maj.-Gen. Hugh M. Trenchard, its commander, believed in repeated

attacks to curb the German Air Service's growing power. Large raids by the

RFC were loosed upon a variety of targets, including airfields. Bombers met

strong AA fire, forcing an abandonment of the small unit formation. The

RFC found that large groups reaching the objective together reduced the

ability of AA guns to score a hit. The Allied policy of attacking repeatedly

brought them air superiority by forcing the Germans onto the defensive. By

early 1916, on the other hand, the threat to Allied bases was not yet of

serious proportions. The Germans preferred to operate over their own territory where they could concentrate force, recover a downed pilot easily, and

better contend with the superior numbers of Allied aircraft."6

The Germans countered Allied superiority by organizing units called

Jagdstaffeln, fighter squadrons, that attacked Allied aircraft. Led by experienced combat pilots and equipped with new, fast flying Halberstadt and

Albatros D aircraft, the squadrons quickly outmatched the Allies. The German aircraft were fitted with two machine guns firing forward through the

propeller arc. The first of the new squadrons went into action in September

1916 and found success against British Martinsyde bombers. The new

fighter tactics broke up several Allied raids against German airfields. The

new fighter squadrons and superior aircraft employed by the Germans now

gave them air superiority in areas where they operated. Neither side, however, could control the air entirely. The Germans massed aircraft in areas

they felt were important; the French did the same, but to support specific

attack missions. Defensive patrols to counter these thrusts were found inef11
AIR BASE AIR DEFENSE

fectual. A stronger air arm now made possible increased German attacks on

Allied areas."

Late in 1916, seeking to control German aerial activity, the British

incorporated their army wireless observation stations into the aircraft reporting net. Direction finding stations reported bearings of German airborne radio transmissions to the area army's wing headquarters. Cloth

panels laid out on the ground were then used to relay coded information to

pilots in the air who attempted interception. Fighters were launched if exceptionally large formations were detected. 8 By 1917, the system included interception stations able to listen in on German air-to-ground radio

transmissions. Information was passed quickly by telephone to antiaircraft

gun units and, with coded ground panels, to pilots aloft. Various technical

problems kept radio reception sets out of the fighters of the time, but the

system added greatly to warning capability. The British were not alone in

this improvement. Germany adopted a similar system in the summer of

1916, just at the time German air forces also began to use the new aircraft

and squadron formations. German aircraft losses in combat with the RFC

during the battle of the Somme from July to November were about half

those of the British. The new detection, warning, and tactical improvements

doubtless contributed to the drop in casualties. ,9

The RFC also used its airplanes to alleviate fear of air attack among

Allied ground troops who especially connected the accuracy of enemy artillery with the presence of an enemy observer overhead and were often terrified by strafing. During 1917 the ground war intensified, and the aggressive

German Air Service struck supply depots, transport parks, and infantry

positions. Ground commanders wanted to see their own aircraft above to

protect their men. At the Battle of Ypres, the RFC tried a new tactic intended to keep German aircraft tied up away from the front during the early

stages of assault. Ninth Wing, consisting of No. 19, 27, 55, 56, 66, and 70

Squadrons, attacked a number of rear area objectives, including the German

airfields at Ingelmunster, Huele, and Marcke. This approach was successful

in spite of bad weather, which may have hampered the German detection

and warning service. In this instance, the high level Martinsyde bombers

were accompanied by RFC fighters each carrying four 25-pound bombs on

specially fitted racks. The nearly simultaneous high and low level attacks

complicated the task of the defenders who had to divide their attenti %n to

engage both."

Expecting retaliation in kind, the British prepared area defenses consisting of 3-inch AA artillery supported by machine guns and searchlights to

protect their airfields. They readied dual mount Lewis guns, each with a one

man crew, and positioned at least twelve of these weapons on each base. In

addition, they located 3-inch or 75-mm guns on some of the more important

aerodromes near the front. On their side, the Germans, seeking to prevent

12
WORLD WAR I

further losses of aircraft on the ground, built numerous standbyairfields

with hangars and support buildings ready for use on short notice. Multiplying the possible number of airfields they could use was a wise tactic as the

British and French were forced to keep all of them under continuous observation. The concentrations of German aircraft near important locations

meant that Allied reconnaissance and attack pilots faced a heavy AA fusillade as well as fighter opposition as they approached the target bases."

The Germans also exploited camouflage and deception to protect

planes and bases. They painted the upper surfaces of many of their Gotha

bombers with a pentagonal pattern of brown, black, green and purple. The

color arrangement helped hide the planes on the ground and made them less

conspicuous targets from above in the air. After an Allied attack in August

1918 at Boulay aerodrome destroyed five aircraft and damaged ten, they

built a dummy field nearby. Most of the next British raid went to the decoy

location and subsequent attacks seem not to have destroyed any aircraft.22

The Americans Arrive

In April 1917, a new combatant, the United States, entered the war and

began enlarging its military services to build an expeditionary force to be

sent to France. The American planners were full of good intentions, but

most lacked knowledge of how to conduct war on a large scale. Moreover,

American industry was not yet ready to supply the numbers of guns and

aircraft needed by the armed forces. The American Expeditionary Force

naturally looked to its new Allies for advice and experience that would

reduce both the time and the tribulations of mobilization.

British and French tactics and policies were often adopted by the United

States' air and antiair* services when they entered the war. Most American

units acquired French and British equipment and used all or parts of existing

air fields. (Map 1) Often the Americans depended on Allied defenses for

base protection. What they found on arrival in the way of facilities was

indicative of the past defense effort. For example, the 17th Aero Squadron,

located at Petit Synth, France, near Dunkirk, with two RFC squadrons, No.

210 and 213, occupied existing wooden buildings revetted with sandbags.

The squadron dugout alone was protected by almost 30,000 sandbags,

stacked like a stepped pyramid as protection against the frequent attacks by

German night bombers. Accuracy by the early bombardiers was poor in the

darkness and little damage was inflicted on the field. People soon ceased

taking the raids seriously and found an evening's adventure by climbing onto

* Because of its experience in firing at rapidly moving surface targets (ships), the U.S.

Army's Coast Artillery Corps became responsible for AA defense of the AEF's troops and

bases.

13
AIR BASE AIR DEFENSE

WORLD WAR I THE WESTERN FRONT

K1.

/

• ....... J*E ... .. 0 -hff F h

Lb.I, d. IFnifr

LST *lflomfly \S1⁄2

ScafZue *Fr.isdkhdhf~

ORomotsotin

Map 1

rooftops to peer up into the dark during the attacks. The 17th Squadron's

reports noted that there was heavy but inaccurate British fire. The squadron

history recorded neither daytime attacks on the base nor any attackers being

shot down or deterred by ground fire. The darkness that protected bombers

had been partly overcome by the British use of searchlights, but even so, AA

accuracy was not good. 23

Concerted American planning for air defense on the Western Front

began with a report in October 1917 by Brig. Gen. James A. Shipton, Chief

14
WORLD WAR I

of Anti-Aircraft Services, First U.S. Army, AEF. Shipton had formed an

American antiaircraft school in France, but lacked weapons and trained

people. The American AA school acomplished little until February 1918,

when Shipton proposed a plan for organizing the whole of the AEF's AntiAircraft Service. On March 5th, an American Army board of officers recommended AA protection for the rear areas, where many air bases were

located. The board's report favored a U.S. air defense system closely tied to

that of the British and French. It specified places which required immediate

protection and noted the need for more dispersal to reduce the vulnerability

of the AEF's sites to air attack. Aerodromes, however, were not included in

the list of places to be defended. The recommendations were not unanimous, however, and a strong minority report was filed by the Air Service's

member, Lt. Col. Carleton V. Chapman.2 4

Colonel Chapman, the only aviator on the board,* recognized the need

for air base defense, and objected to giving the preponderance of AA protection to ground units. Chapman bluntly argued that the board's work was

inadequate, and that the AEF's previous air defense studies, like that of

General Shipton, had little result. Chapman prepared his own recommendations that Air Service officers like Lt. Col. Edgar S. Gorrell and Maj.

Harold Fowler, experienced in aerial bombardment, be consulted on questions of air defense. He also wanted more explicit planning for AA weapons

deployment, ammunition consumption, and camouflage. Chapman insisted

on revisions to the list of American aerodromes needing protection. Issoudon, Tours, and Aulnat headed his list, but little was done.25

On June 1, General Shipman requested that the AEF's Headquarters

approve air defense artillery for Ourches, Colombey-les-Belles, and Orly

airfields, all of which were exposed to aerial bombardment. The AEF's

Chief of Staff approved the request on June 8. Shipman's antiaircraft

schemes, however, continued to be hampered by shortages of guns, inexperienced staff personnel, and slow training of gunners. As a result, antiaircraft

artillery protection could not be organized for locations farther behind the

front than Is-sur-Tille, about thirty miles north of Dijon and some eighty

miles from the lines. Commanders farther to the rear were advised to use

passive defensive measures like camouflage, sandbags, and dispersal. Machine guns could also be used where available but only if improvised mounts

could be made.'

Base defense was too often hit or miss. Before their own air defense

units were available, American airdromes were ordinarily protected from air

* The remaining board members were Lt. Col. J. W. Wright, Infantry, and Capt. W. J.

Pearmain, Ordnance. The group visited thirteen major locations, only one of which, Colombey-les-Belles, was an air base. Chapman was a pilot who had previously served with Gorrell

and Capt. Benjamin D. Foulois as part of the 1st Aero Squadron in Texas and Mexico in 1916.

15
AIR BASE AIR DEFENSE

attack by Allied organizations, other U.S. forces in the area, or by base

support troops who had received some machine gun instruction. In the

absence of trained AA crews, base commanders resorted to whatever expedient they could devise. Of all the Air Service units in France, only the Balloon

Wing and subordinate balloon groups and companies were authorized antiaircraft machine guns; none was specified for pursuit, bombardment, or

observation squadrons or groups. The balloonists had first priority because

they had to protect their vulnerable, stationary locations. The flying squadrons already drew on armament stocks for their aircraft, and supply officers

chaffed at the thought of giving more. Demands for machine guns were so

heavy that on May 14 Brig. Gen. C. B. Wheeler, the AEF's Chief Ordnance

Officer, prohibited assignment of more than two per air base. Any additional weapons, he said, must be taken from airplanes or other local resources. Many contemporary photographs show a variety of machine gun

types mounted on wooden posts and wagon wheels, capable of firing up at

various angles. 7

Shortly after entering the war, the U.S. Army organized 5 antiaircraft

machine gun battalions along British lines, only 2 of which arrived in France

in time to see service at the front. The 2nd Antiaircraft Machinegun Battalion, commanded by Maj. Orville L. Whitney, had about 600 officers and

men divided into 4 companies. The main weapons used by this battalion

were 64 Hotchkiss machine guns. The Americans intended to use their

antiaircraft units to protect the front line infantry from low-level German

attacks and they motorized them so that they could move their weapons to

areas where they were most needed. Upon arrival in France, the battalions

received AEF antiaircraft training before their assignments to specific sectors. Company B of the 2nd Battalion moved to the large American aerodrome at Colombey-les-Belles. There it joined the 5th, 6th, 7th, and 8th

Antiaircraft Batteries, constituting the 10th AA Sector, commanded by

Capt. C. C. Robertson.Y

Problems plagued the American base defenders, however. Machine gun

and AA units arrived slowly at Colombey-les-Belles; artillery pieces were not

delivered until late July or early August. Allied plans called for a major

attack on the St. Mihiel salient, near Verdun, starting on September 12.

American forces were to play a prominent part. By August 27, AA guns

were not yet unpacked at Colombey, leaving the installation exposed to

German raiders. In a fit of frustration, Brig. Gen. Benjamin D. Foulois, the

AEF's Assistant Chief of Air Service, pointedly telegraphed General Shipton his insistence that gunners go into action "without delay." Shipton

assured Foulois the next day that four batteries of men would be sent to

Colombey-les-Belles as soon as they completed training. Another four batteries would go to Ourches shortly afterward. Unfortunately, even Shipton's

16
WORLD WAR I

intervention availed him nothing. The AA artillery units did not arrive until

the end of September.2 9

Colombey-les-Belles lay 25 miles from the front lines and was the home

of the 1st Air Depot, through which the American Air Service supplied all

its units in the Toul sector. Normally, the airfield was a repair site for

damaged aircraft and worn engines, but late in August 1918, the Americans

began assembling there aircraft for the St. Mihiel offensive. The first recorded attack on the American operation at Colombey on September 2

inflicted no damage or injuries. Intent on protecting their aircraft, the

Americans hid them and enforced blackout rules at night. The Germans

were unable to bomb the field accurately throughout the five days of fighting at St. Mihiel.3 ° By October 28th, the Germans regrouped, and a night

raid on Colombey damaged about fifty planes. Most of the loss was superficial, but about six aircraft were destroyed. The Americans reacted hastily.

Zigzag trenches were dug for protection of the workers and antiaircraft

defenses were strengthened. By October 30 the Americans had sixteen 75-

mm guns of the 10th AA Sector and thirty machine guns deployed about the

base along with six 60-inch searchlights. That night the Germans returned

and a "fierce barrage" of antiaircraft fire was put up. No planes were shot

down, but the installation commander attributed the lack of bomb hits to

the defenses.

The base defense measures used at Ourches by the 1st Observation

Group were also typical of growing American defense practices. There, they

camouflaged hangars with nets and hid airplanes among trees along the

field. Dugouts ran to thirty or forty feet underground, overbuilt with heavy

log roofs, dirt, and sandbags for protection; all windows were curtained to

block light at night. Antiaircraft machine guns located at several places

around the base defended against low-level attacks."

A rather complex but effective warning and protection system also grew

up in the Toul area. The stability of the front lines through most of the war

permitted permanent ground observation posts, telephone lines, and a radio

net to report on incoming air raids. The warning system's organization long

preceded the American arrival, but the U.S. Signal Corps added its own

radios. Four of the American stations intercepted enemy radio traffic, all

reported air activity to a net command post at Vaucouleurs. Originally of

French design, the network protected against German aerial threats to front

line troops, and allowed AA gunners to find and fire on photoreconnaissance and artillery spotting aircraft. When the Americans arrived, they used

the talents of the forward AA gunners; their own men became as skilled as

the French. The ground and radio observers directed their reports to the 1st

Pursuit Group at Toul. Information on aircraft type, number, direction of

flight, and altitude would all be at the airfield in less than the five minutes

necessary to warn personnel and prepare the guns. On April 14, 1918, two

17
AIR BASE AIR DEFENSE

94th Aero Squadron pilots wait on air defense duty in alert tent at Toul in June

1918.

American aircraft of the 94th Squadron took off at the first report of

intruders and shot down two German planes, which crashed on the Toul

aerodrome. Many Americans in the 94th were veterans of French or British

flying units who made optimum use of early warning information.32

Through the course of the war, attacks on air bases became progressively better organized, more sophisticated, and relatively more destructive.

Even so, they were not of major importance during the war because aircraft

carried limited bomb loads, bombs lacked destructive power, and bombing

accuracy, especially at night, was poor. All the belligerents constantly

worked at improving defenses, but at the armistice the art of air base air

defense was far from efficient. The Americans tried to absorb all they could

from Allied experience, but the confusion inherent in organizing and moving a huge army overseas prevented the efficient use of many AA units.

After the war many Air Service commanders discussed the need for better

base defense in official reports.

Maj. Maxwell Kirby, commander of the 5th Pursuit Group, favored

combining the American air and antiair arms for better coordination. Kirby

believed that pursuit aircraft should not be wasted in individual combat, but

should protect army corps and bombers while antiaircraft complemented

the effort by protecting operational air forces over friendly territory. Al18
WORLD WAR I

Lt. Douglas Campbell of the 94th attacks a German Pfalz DIII, which crashed

on the Toul aerodrome moments later. British aviation artist Frank Wooton

commemorated the event in this painting. Courtesy of T. Hamady.

though the suggestion to combine service arms was not adopted by the U.S.

Army, the German Luftwaffe and the French Air Force applied the basic

idea in their doctrine before World War II.33

Maj. Harold E. Hartney, wartime commander of the 1st Pursuit

Group, reached conclusions similar to Kirby's. Hartney believed that attacking airfields could force enemy air operations so far to the rear that the

tactical situation could be significantly changed by putting aircraft out of

reach of the front line. In addition, he speculated on the eventual need for

underground hangars and base shops, an idea used by the Germans in World

War II, later by the North Koreans, Swiss, and Swedes, and to some extent

explored by American planners during the 1930s. While looking at the

offensive power of aviation, Hartney did not disregard the need for defense.

He realized that his desired attack units had to have secure bases. He believed a generous distribution of antiaircraft guns to be vital. Hartney made

the preparation of dummy airdromes and auxiliary fields for intermittent

operational support part of his plan for future air defense.34

19
AIR BASE AIR DEFENSE

Loading bombs into early racks. Narrow gauge track running beneath aircraft

was laid on the larger aerodromes to service dispersed areas by the end of the

war.

Maj. William C. Sherman, writing several years after the war, noted

that bombing methods and bombing equipment had been crude and undeveloped. Most bombing efforts were directed against targets other than

airfields. 5 Air doctrine was young and air commanders were under great

pressure to protect the ground combat arms. The psychological effect of air

attacks upon ground troops served to increase the clamor for cover on all

sides. At the same time, there was no significant collection of air experience

that could adequately support or deny most arguments and the opposing

claims greatly taxed air resources during the war. The shifting balance of air

superiority was often the factor which governed frequency and effectiveness

of attacks.2 Airdrome defenses varied from base to base but, in general,

benefited from both technical and practical improvements by war's end.

Antiaircraft guns became much more accurate and could reach higher elevations. Expanded production allowed increasing gun defenses everywhere on

the Western Front. When the American Expeditionary Force arrived in

20
WORLD WAR I

France, antiaircraft officers trained with the French and, in turn, imparted

years of experience to the newly enlarged United States' military. As a result,

American gunners achieved an effectiveness per round fired that equalled or

surpassed that of the other Allied armies."

Base defenders on both sides met the growing threat from air attack by

a variety of means and in conjunction with regional antiaircraft artillery.

Machine guns were located about the bases to protect people and equipment; camouflage was used for deception and concealment and dummy

installations drew attacks away. The year 1918 saw increasingly heavy attacks

on air bases in support of the major campaigns that led to the war's conclusion. During that year, General Hugh M. Trenchard directed more than one

third of his Independent Air Force's attacks at German aerodromes in order

to suppress German aircraft that might retaliate against Allied columns.3

"

The AEF's First Corps observation base at Ourches, in the Toul sector,

developed an extensive defense that used antiaircraft machine guns, camouflage, dispersal of buildings, underground dugouts and nighttime blackouts.

The newly assigned Americans adopted the lessons of years of war and

advancing technology painfully learned by the other combatants. Nevertheless, many air defense techniques remained crude. The problem of truly long

range detection and warning was never adequately solved. Front line observers were limited by the range of sight and hearing. Even binoculars or sound

ranging equipment was not effective beyond five miles. Radio intercept and

observation stations became common, but the short reception ranges limited

their utility too. Frequently, commanders were unsure of the value of defenses. In his report in July 1917, Col. Chauncey B. Baker of the U.S.

Army's Quartermaster Corps, who went to France to survey and report on

war needs and priorities, was not impressed with French antiaircraft prowess. Noting that gunners scored only 1 hit per 10,000 rounds fired since 1916

he stated that the only practical effect of ground fire was to make the planes

fly higher. By 1918 many commanders seemed to share Baker's sentiment.

His judgment was, perhaps too harsh. He gauged only artillery and used

incomplete statistics, and he failed to understand that forcing planes higher

was in itself a success, as it reduced bombing accuracy or reconnaissance

ability. Still, he had grounds for skepticism. During 1918 the French Antiaircraft Service shot down 220 airplanes, expending an average of only 7,500

rounds per victory.3 9

By the end of the war, many questions remained about air base air

defense, but, at the hands of Trenchard's airmen, the Germans especially

had learned many lessons in fending off attacking Allied airplanes. Although they held air superiority in certain areas, often they took aircraft

from lesser priority needs to achieve it. The German Army and air arm thus

were forced to balance numerical inferiority with a well organized warning

and reporting system supported by many guns. German long range air raids

21
AIR BASE AIR DEFENSE

on England, though strategic in nature, gave the future RAF a major lesson

for fighting tactical air battles: warning and fighter control were essential to

the defeat or deflection of an attacker. During the next twenty years of

peace, these lessons took root.

22
Chapter II

Interwar Doctrine and Technology Changes

After the 1918 Armistice, the air forces of both the Allied and the

Central Powers were rapidly dismantled. The Treaty of Versailles forced a

subdued Germany to give up all of her airplanes and most of her antiaircraft

weapons, which were seized or destroyed by the Army of Occupation. At the

same time, the Allies reduced their air forces to skeleton strength for economic reasons and for several years experimentation and development came

to a virtual standstill. Not all of the lessons learned by the airmen were

forgotten, however. In Germany the Weimar Republic's small German Army

established an air technical office responsible for collecting and studying

aeronautical information. British, French, and American air leaders returned to peacetime duties that often involved teaching or developing air

doctrine. Japan began adding powerful air arms to its army and navy. Until

the early 1920s, Russian fliers contended first with revolution and civil war

at home, then war with Poland, but would soon begin to design and build

excellent aircraft.

In England and America, smaller budgets and strong pacifist or isolationist political forces after World War I helped prohibit the development of

modern air forces able to employ new technical knowledge. During the

1920s, Russia suffered a shortage of skilled designers, but obtained information from Germany in return for supporting secret German design and

testing on Russian territory.' Japan's insular outlook seems to have retarded

her development of radar, defense systems, and antiaircraft weapons. The

failure of the League of Nations in 1931 to force Japan to alter her designs

on Manchuria did nothing to change her view that she was not very vulnerable to direct air attack from overseas. 2 Finally, the financial turbulence that

accompanied the worldwide depression of the 1930s affected development

23
AIR BASE AIR DEFENSE

and production of both weapons and technology in all of the major countries.

During the interwar years, the British, Germans, French, Americans,

Italians, Japanese, and Soviets designed several types of fighters that would

be instrumental in tactical air warfare in World War II. Many of these

fighters appeared in several models; some were used for both air base attack

and air base defense, others were suited for only a single role. The table in

Appendix 1 shows the relative capabilities of each country's aircraft, and the

general development of combat aircraft of the various nations. In addition

to the design and performance of fighters, other factors such as imaginative

leadership, differences in air force organization, and technological improvements of nonflying areas of military and naval services gave certain countries advantages not possessed by others.

American Defense Development

Many participants in the Great War recorded their experiences and

ideas in books published in the 1920s. William Sherman's Air Warfare,

published in 1926, was a compilation of the subject matter being taught at

the Air Corps Tactical School (ACTS). It was a comprehensive restatement

of his "Tentative Manual for the Employment of Air Service,' written in

1919 for the Final Report of the AEF Air Service rather than a new treatment of the subject. Sherman was a supporter of the air power advocate

William Mitchell, and his book became influential among American air

force thinkers in the 1920s; it included sections on principles of warfare,

characteristics of aircraft, individual aircraft combat and defense, observation, pursuit, attack, bombardment, antiaircraft defense, logistics, and naval aviation. Although it seemed all-encompassing, Sherman's book failed

to assess advancing technology or analyze the possible changes in post war

aerial fighting based on new equipment. The sections covering antiaircraft

defense were very short and reflected both the technical problems of shooting at moving objects in the air and Sherman's fervent belief that military

airplanes, especially bombers, would prevail over national defenses if another war began.'

A more concise view of the need for and value of defense was prepared

several years later by an Air Corps officer, Claire L. Chennault. His short

monograph, The Role of Defensive Pursuit, was written after the 1932 Joint

Antiaircraft-Air Corps Exercises.* Although discussing defense against

long-range bombardment, and contemplating area defense (as opposed to

base or point air defense) Chennault's ideas had application in the narrower

* The exercises, held near Ft. Knox, Kentucky, tested the U.S. Army's antiaircraft and

fighter interception tactics against bombers and explored new air defense techniques.

24
INTERWAR CHANGES

sense of base defense against both high and low altitude attack.' He emphatically rejected the thesis of Giulio Douhet and others that an air force, using

massive offensive aerial bombardment, could achieve victory in war. He

believed strongly that active fighter interception could deflect a bomber

formation, and he insisted that an air unit that kept its planes on the ground

and awaited assault was sure to be destroyed, as it could not react quickly

enough to meet the threat.' Chennault sought to build an aggressive air

defense, but faced a great many problems because of the practical inability

to detect and report approaching aircraft. He proposed adopting the British

visual observation system (ground observer posts spaced about seven miles

apart) with telephone and telegraph to transmit information to a central

authority which would dispatch fighter forces. Citing the successful British

experience of World War I, he made central command of warning and

interception a key to his system.'

Chennault's proposals were not entirely welcome in the Air Corps. He

was an irascible, difficult person with many enemies among senior Air

Corps leaders who had other ideas on how to defend against an enemy air

force. These ideas were bound up with the desire to build an air arm able to

carry out an offensive war should the need arise. In September 1933, the Air

Corps' Chief, Maj. Gen. Benjamin D. Foulois, told the Army War College

that "the real effective air defense will consist of our ability to attack and

destroy the hostile aviation on the ground before it takes to the air." Foulois

voiced the official position of the Army Air Corps, which was reflected at

the Air Corps Tactical School. Chennault's opinions were eclipsed within the

service, and he retired late in the 1930s to serve as air adviser to China's

leader, Chiang Kai-shek. Nevertheless, the attack-defense dispute continued. During the 1935 Air Corps maneuvers in Florida, 1st Lt. Gordon R.

Saville demonstrated central control of fighters to American military officers and established what the British knew and Chennault had argued previously.,

While this debate went on in Air Corps circles, the practical application

of radar brought the promise of far reaching changes to base attack and

defense. Conceived in the early thirties both in England and at the U.S.

Naval Research Laboratory, the military use of radio detection was forced by

Britain's vulnerable position. By mid-1939, radar stations on England's east

coast observed aircraft approaching from the Continent. Small radar units

for field application were built in both Britain and the United States by

1940, allowing defenders of tactical air bases a measure of warning. Experimentation was also under way in Germany, the Soviet Union, and to a lesser

extent, Japan.'

Few countries, however, exploited radar consistently. Despite the advances in its laboratory deployment, its incorporation into military use and

doctrine was slow and uneven. The acceptance of radar in the U.S. Army

25
AIR BASE AIR DEFENSE

Lt. Col. William C. Sherman's

post-World War I book, Air

Warfare, influenced American

aviation doctrine in the 1920s.

was impeded by secrecy, a shortage of money for more extensive experimentation and purchase, and an apparent unwillingness to fully approve and

assimilate the new equipment. A few field sets were in experimental use by

the Signal Corps and Coast Artillery in 1940. The Army Air Corps' Tactical

School, however, did not mention radar or countermeasures in its attack or

light bombardment courses until 1940. The antiaircraft defense course at the

Air Corps Tactical School in March 1940 made only an oblique reference to

radar in England and none to developments in the United States. In fact, the

course taught that ground observers were the main source of information for

a defense commander. This was in part due to the secret nature of radar

experiments, but also because radar did not belong to the Air Corps. Unlike

the Royal Air Force, which was at that time busy teaching its fighter controllers how to use radar, the new medium was little known to American Army

air officers. In 1940, with war raging in Europe, the Commander of the New

York Air Defense Sector, Brig. Gen. Earle E. Partridge,* found that radar

stations on Long Island reported to him. General Partridge later remembered that at the time he "couldn't technically evaluate what they were

doing" because he had not been told what radar was, how it worked, and

how he should use it to direct his forces. Radar found an easier acceptance

in the Navy and Marine Corps, which faced the need to defend forces put

ashore in isolated parts of the world. Thus from 1940 plans were made to set

up and defend airfields on hostile shores.9

* Among later assignments Partridge commanded the U.S. Fifth Air Force during the

Korean conflict and, later, the Air Defense Command.

26
INTERWAR CHANGES

Unlike the U.S. Army's prewar preparations, the Navy Department's

base defense planning between 1937 and 1941 was less fragmented. In May

1938, faced with a growing threat from Japan, Congress directed the Secretary of the Navy to study the need for new and enlarged naval bases in

America and overseas. The resulting Hepburn Board, named for its chairman, Rear Adm. A. J. Hepburn, selected sites for new bases in the United

States, the Carribean, and the Atlantic, and in the Pacific as far as Guam.

The Hepburn Board's report was the basis for a rapidly accelerating naval

air base construction program. In May 1939, Congress overcame strong

isolationist opposition and appropriated $63 million for naval base construction. With the money in hand, the Navy formed an Air Base Construction Board, charged with developing and overseeing the various projects. At

about the same time, the Navy Antiaircraft Defense Board studied the best

ways to protect the new advanced installations and any other bases that

might be needed in war. The upshot of the planning was a clear Navy policy

that gave the U.S. Marine Corps responsibility for defending advanced installations "not defended by the Army' presumably the bulk of the new

airfields. Shortly thereafter, the Marines organized four Base Defense Battalions for AA and shore defense work. Each battalion varied in composition according to its task, but included AA guns similar to those in the

Army, 5-inch coast defense guns, infantry, sound detectors, and searchlights. The overall naval defense posture improved when the Navy took an

added interest in the RAF's use of radar in the Battle of Britain and formed

a fighter director school in Hawaii that taught the latest fighter radar interception techniques. By 1941, SCR-268 and SCR-270 radar sets were added

to the battalions' makeup. The senior Navy officers responsible for this

preparation had the support of the President, and were driven by the specter

of a fleet at war in the far Pacific or the Atlantic with few bases available for

their ships and aircraft. Although the Navy and Marine Corps were not

ready to defend all their offshore installations, their approach to the problem was distinctly different from that of the Army, charged mostly with

responsibility for continental and Western Hemisphere defense.' 0

Through the interwar period, the emphasis in the antiaircraft course at

the Army Air Corps Tactical School was on area, or strategic, defense of the

United States, especially the industrial northeast and various territorial possessions such as Hawaii. In March 1940, the school added a section on

antiaircraft defense of an air base." Thereafter, the ACTS somewhat hesitantly acknowledged the need to protect an air base in a hostile area with the

weapons then in Army service. Heavy machine guns, 37-mm cannon, and

artillery were mentioned, but with the qualifier that there were not enough

available in the army to protect existing continental United States installations. Weapons were so few that one instructor suggested using machine

guns taken from B-17 bombers to augment low level protection if necessary.

27
AIR BASE AIR DEFENSE

Fort Bragg maneuvers in October 1938. Searchlights blaze in the North Carolina night during joint Army-Air Corps exercises.

Camouflage and target hardening were discussed, and protection from

chemical attack received a lengthy treatment by a chemical warfare officer.

It was, however, a beginner's inquiry into base defense, prompted by the

collapse of Poland six months before, and it pointed out the many shortcomings in the American ability to defend an air base. Because the United

States was neutral and still focused on defending the western hemisphere,

there was no discussion of overseas base operation or defense coordination

with allied forces. After considering all these matters, the instructor soberly

concluded that no United States base had adequate protection.'2

The air defense command structure taught by the Tactical School was

based upon an area protection concept, with an Army ground officer as

commander. Subordinate to the area commander were to have been antiaircraft, barrage balloon, bombardment, pursuit units, and the various support agencies such as signal, quartermaster, and medical. The area air

defense commander would not necessarily have had expertise in any of the

major defense specialities in his organization and, surprisingly enough,

there was some question as to whether or not an air officer would be present

on his staff. Considerable groping would have been needed to create a

functioning command and, with only limited experience being gained in

28
INTERWAR CHANGES

SCR-268 radar used to direct accompanying searchlight. Though still an imprecise instrument, the radar was quickly employed as a gun laying mechanism.

such exercises as the 1935-36 maneuvers in Florida, few people were qualified for the various jobs that would be created."3

Improvements were at hand, however. First Army maneuvers during

August and September 1940 in New York state pitted a Red and a Blue Army

against each other in a series of tactical problems that included air defense.

Formed in June to develop air defense doctrine and training, a new Air

Defense Command (ADC) had its first chance to organize and test a regional aircraft warning service. The ADC used Signal Corps SCR-270 radar

sets with a 50-mile range under optimum conditions. The radar sets augmented a network of civilian American Legion spotters.* The radar worked

satisfactorily, but the overall aircraft warning service had too few volunteers

for round-the-clock operation. The exercise included practice in area airdefense protection for a field army, but the final report did not discuss the

need for point defense of the Blue Army's air bases. There was such a

serious shortage of air defense weapons that all vulnerable points of the

* The American Legion was a society organized in 1919 and made up of American veterans

of World War I. In 1940, the Legionnaires were patriotic volunteers used as ground observers.

29
Water cooled 50-cal. machine gun

on alert during 1st Division maneuvers in North Carolina,

1941. (Below) A gun crew trains

on the 40-mm Bofors in the

i same area in 1943.

S11
INTERWAR CHANGES

Blue Army's limited forces could not have been protected. Despite its shortcomings, the maneuvers were an advance for the growing Army of the

United States."4

With the increasing possibility of American participation in the war,

Congress authorized President Franklin D. Roosevelt in August 1940 to

order several National Guard units into federal service in mid-September.

Fifteen divisions, nine antiaircraft battalions, and twenty-two antiaircraft

regiments were called up, many in varying states of readiness. Late in the

1920s, the U.S. Army had prepared tables of organization for several types

of antiaircraft units under the Coast Artillery Corps, which became responsible for all antiaircraft gun and searchlight operations and for AA protection for expeditionary forces (including the Air Corps) sent overseas. In

1940, some National Guard units, like the 200th Coast Artillery (AA) Regiment from New Mexico, had only recently converted from other branches,

such as cavalry, and were anything but fully qualified or equipped. The

newly converted units were to be equipped with either medium (between 20-

to 57-mm bore) or heavy (larger than 57-mm) AA guns. Some of the new

units could theoretically be used for air base defense. When fully equipped

and trained they would have been the only source of such protection, as the

Air Corps had no AA guns of its own. Although the call up of the National

Guard improved the operational defensive fire and warning capability of the

United States, the size and training of the AA arm was not yet adequate for

a global conflict. The total weaponry available equipped sixty-two understrength AA batteries, usually of three 3-inch guns plus 37-mm and .50

caliber support.'5 In November 1941, a final prewar change came from a

board of officers studying the need for a mobile Aircraft Warning Service

that noted that each of the Army Air Forces'* pursuit groups needed a

warning regiment, but none was available. Each warning regiment had to

have signal and support services, and be ready to deploy to areas where

pursuit aircraft would operate. The AAF's growing force of fast, durable

fighters could have been a superb air base defense tool, but in late 1941,

there were still too few fighters, and the warning and command structure

was fragmented between the Air Forces, the Coast Artillery Corps, and the

Signal Corps. The Pearl Harbor attack intervened before a new warning and

control structure was organized, but the groundwork for expansion had

been laid. 6

* The term Army Air Forces (AAF) was used beginning in June 1941. The AAF included

the Air Corps, which continued through the war, at first supervising technical, logistic, and

support services. After the Army reorganization in March 1942, the Air Corps continued as the

statutory body of the AAF, but most of its functions were absorbed by new commands and

staff offices of the AAF.

31
AIR BASE AIR DEFENSE

In the late thirties the United States Army Coast Artillery Corps had

three types of weapons for use against aircraft. The largest was the 3-inch

gun with a maximum effective range of 28,000 feet. The intermediate range

weapon was the 37-mm cannon, capable of firing 80 rounds per minute,

with a maximum effective vertical range of 10,500 feet. The shorter range

.50 caliber machine gun could fire short bursts at 500 to 650 rounds per

minute to 5,400 feet depending upon the model in use. The prewar .50

caliber machine gun used a cumbersome 500-pound mount which made it

difficult to transport and set up. A lighter mount did not appear until 1942.

Just before the war the United States began to manufacture 40-mm guns and

rushed the design of a 90-mm high velocity antiaircraft gun, which did not

appear in significant numbers until 1941. The three main weapons, .50

caliber, 37-mm, and 3-inch guns, were used in conjunction with sound

locators, searchlights, and the very early gun laying radar, the SCR-268, for

direction finding and aiming."

In general, the type of defensive fire available to the United States was

adequate for use against prewar planes, although the speed of potential

attacking aircraft imposed distinct limitations in addition to the general

shortage of weapons. The widely used sound locator was completely inadequate. Bad weather or ambient noise reduced its detection range to as little

as 5,000 yards. As it took time to set a gun for firing, advance warning was

crucial. With a 5,000-yard detection capability, antiaircraft crews would

have an attacker within range for only seconds. Pursuit fighters and a first

rate warning system were the answer to the base defenders' dilemma, but

there were too few of them and the command systems were too poorly

developed to make them the mainstay of air base air defense. To maintain

even limited fighter patrols aloft was costly because of the short fuel capacity of the aircraft. Keeping a full squadron on aerial defense patrol was

practically impossible because the Air Corps had not enough planes to

guard even a single base in such a fashion."8

In 1940, much remained to be done in the area of defense against low

level air attack. At that time, only the new 37-mm gun was seen as a possible

defense, and very little was known of its combat characteristics. Once production was able to meet demand, there was still no standard fire control

system for the gun and only a small pool of trained gunners who could

deploy to a threatened area with that weapon."9

Germany Prepares

In 1935, Hitler reorganized his armed forces, creating an independent

air force, the Luftwaffe. Over the next few years, both offensive and defensive air weapon systems and employment doctrine appeared. Luftwaffe Directive 16, first issued in 1936, and revised slightly in 1940, was the basis for

32
INTERWAR CHANGES

air operations and air force cooperation with other services. German air

doctrine called for aggressive attack to seize air superiority. Directive 16

viewed "attack, defense, and protection [as] interchangable." In general,

German air doctrine called for first strikes on enemy air forces to forestall

attacks on the Luftwaffe. The German air leaders reasoned that "surprise

makes [our] attack less difficult and increases the efficiency of one's own

defenses." The Luftwaffe's rules stressed avoiding air to air combat with an

enemy air force except in self defense. If strong enemy fighter formations

were present, they would be controlled by strikes at their home bases. In

Europe, the Germans had the first clear cut strategy calling for air superiority over an enemy's territory as the first step to victory in an air campaign.20

The Luftwaffe was unique among the aerial combatants of World War

II. In many respects it was a separate military department within the Wehrmacht, containing not only flying units, but also the nation's antiaircraft

defenses, the aircraft warning service, paratroop divisions, an armored division, and in 1942 and 1943, twenty field infantry divisions. As much as

anything else the inclusion of the Flakartillerie in the service made for a

close relationship between attack and defense elements, and promoted useful, coordinated weapon development. Under Directive 16 as revised in

1940, fighters and flak operating in combat zones were part of a unified

command. Separate flak units were assigned to the army for protection of its

troops. Aerial reconnaissance was divided among the Air Force, the Army,

and the Navy, with the Luftwaffe responsible for long range operations.

Each of the other services used its own reconnaissance squadrons for short

range surveillance. For the Army, this was done by Luftwaffe air cooperation squadrons assigned to Army field forces.2

" The relatively young German

Air Force, although it had an adequate doctrinal base, faced serious but

unassayed problems in organizing tactical air defenses as well as joint airground operations. Early German victories masked these problems, which

became more stark by the war's second year. In 1939, the Luftwaffe had less

than five years of organizational experience, and most of its officers transferred from the Army. Few air officers had seen service in ranks between

captain and colonel, when one normally commanded flying groups and

attended various staff schools. Many of the Army transfers lacked extensive

knowledge of flying, air strategy, and technology. The Luftwaffe's rapid

growth also returned to the colors men who had served in German aviation

in World War I, but who had been inactive for years. Nazi ideology also

militated against a wholesale immersion in modern technology, reinforcing

vague tendencies among rising German bourgeois classes to aspire to the

patterns of wealth of the old land owning Junker class. The result was an air

officer corps unprepared to integrate fully the demands of technology into

tactical air warfare decisionmaking. Because of their inexperience and the

tendency of such senior commanders as General Hans Jeschonnek, Chief of

33
AIR BASE AIR DEFENSE

the Luftwaffe's General Staff, toward abject acceptance of Hitler, the leadership made several serious errors of lasting consequence. They neglected to

train an adequate reserve of aircrews, overestimated the value of dive

bombers, slighted the development of air transport, failed to develop a long

range heavy bomber, and did not insure production of adequate numbers of

combat planes in the first three years of war.22 One postwar U.S. Air Force

study remarked that the service "lacked completely the decades of formative

experience which had created a certain type of [well trained] individual for

the Army."23 Organizationally independent, the Luftwaffe nonetheless remained in a real sense a creature of the Army; its main function was, by

doctrine, equipment, and Hitler's wishes, army support. Service doctrine

stated that until air superiority was established, units intended for protection of specific targets remained in that role. Protection of Army units was

usually considered subordinate to airfield defense missions for the AA

force, but antiaircraft assigned to the Army was under its operational control and was not withdrawn for air base defense.

The rearmament program of the 1930s saw a rapid increase in the

Luftwaffe's air defense artillery. The German government placed high priority on weapon design and built a variety of antiaircraft weapons. The most

favored was the 88-mm gun, the early models of which could fire effectively

to between 22,960 and 26,240 feet. The "88", or Flak 18, was the best

weapon of its type in the world when it was introduced in 1933. By 1939,

there were more than 1,000 in the Flakartillerie, with better models in production. Lighter weapons such as the 20-mm and 37-mm cannon came into

service, and all could be found in stationary or motorized configurations.

The light flak guns were prominent in tactical air-defense plans. They could

be easily moved as air units advanced from base to base. By the start of war

there were almost 1,000,000 active duty and reserve men assigned to this

function which increased to 1,250,000 by 1944. A large proportion of these

manned the heavy AA as the mainstay of home air defense. In the field, AA

units protected the air force's ground installations with a variety of light and

medium caliber weapons. German designed 20-mm and 37-mm cannon were

the most used low level defense weapons. The 20-mm had a rather short

effective range of 1,100 yards, the 37-mm 1,600 yards, so that it was important to bring fire on a target as soon as possible. Both weapons lacked a

predictor,* severely restricting use against any but aircraft moving directly

towards or away from the gun's position. The Germans also used 7.92-mm

machine guns in both single and dual mounts for defense of bases against

low level attack. Prior to the war, spotters assigned to AA units provided

* A predictor or director was an early mechanical computer which, using information

about speed, direction of flight, and altitude permitted a gunner to lead a target and fire into its

path.

34
German antiaircraft pieces used in World War II. The track mounted 20-mm

flak gun gave mobile protection against aerial and ground attackers around

Luftwaffe installations. The 88-mm piece, (below), designed as an antiaircraft weapon, was extensively used as artillery against armor and infantry.
AIR BASE AIR DEFENSE

almost all air raid warning. The spotters were usually among the most able

people in the unit, and information they developed was entered into a reporting net that ran throughout an operational area.24

As the Germans expanded their Air Force during the middle and late

1930s, so too did they increase the number of military airfields in Germany.

Some were permanent installations, many were dirt or grass strips on open

land in the country or were laid out on sections of highways selected for this

purpose. Travelers reported that these tactical airfields and their runways

and buildings were well camouflaged. Windows were angled downward so

they would not reflect the sun, and hangars and other structures were set

among trees or so constructed as to minimize detection from the air. The

object was to conceal the true size and operational nature of Germany's Air

Force and to protect the airfields from enemy bombardment in wartime.

Thus Germany's tactical commanders were well versed in the techniques of

camouflage and dispersal."

Radar experiments began in Germany in 1934 but did not progress very

rapidly. The German Navy experimented with a gun laying unit and an air

and sea search system. The Luftwaffe began looking into radar in 1936, but

its continually changing specifications and lack of coordination among the

three services slowed experimental progress. German radar was more accurate than that of other countries, but the Germans failed to establish a single

office to direct the research and development and to prepare a coherent plan

for radar use until after the war had begun. Thus, they dissipated their early

lead in the field. The Luftwaffe finally ordered 1,000 sets in 1939. Failure to

understand fully the operational requirements and benefits of radar was to

have significant consequences early in the fighting.2 6

Japanese Defense

By 1939, while many countries were making technological progress in

antiaircraft protection, the Japanese lagged badly. An insular nation, protected from air assault by vast oceans and control of Korea and portions of

China, Japan did not realize the full importance of modern tactical air

defense systems. Most Japanese AA weapons were designed and introduced

to service in the 1920s and early 1930s. The newest weapons were a 7.7-mm

machine gun, first used in 1939, and two types of 40-mm guns captured

from the Dutch and British in 1941 and 1942. There was a variety of 6.5-mm

and 7.7-mm machine guns usable only against low level attacks. The machine guns all had maximum ranges of 5,000 to 6,000 feet with effective

ranges of 2,000 to 2,400 feet. Their basic heavy weapon was a 75-mm low

velocity gun supported by 20-mm and 25-mm cannon. The Japanese also

had some mobile 88-mm guns, but both their equipment and control sys36
Japanese 20-mm antiaircraft on

traverse mount. The 25-mm triple barrel mount (below) was

common in the Japanese defense of airfields during the

war.

S• •*• • j • , . . . ... ....
AIR BASE AIR DEFENSE

tems were poor. The Japanese fire control system was manually operated,

based upon sound detection, and comparable to an American system that

became obsolete in 1930. In the field, the Japanese assigned these weapons

to armies and corps and deployed them where the situation demanded.

Despite the shortcomings of the equipment, the 20-mm and 25-mm weapons

and machine guns and small arms threw up a heavy curtain of fire through

which low level attackers had to pass to reach a target. For the lightly

armored aircraft of the 1930s, this was a formidable obstacle. Allied use of

large numbers of aircraft built to protect the crews and vital airplane parts

and tactics suited to high speed, heavily armored aircraft created serious

problems for Japanese defense planners.2 7

In 1939 Japan was far behind the British, Americans, and Germans in

the development of practical radar units. Early warning and fire control

radar sets were built in Japan, but the advent of war in 1941 actually retarded continued development. The first Japanese tactical radars were not

seen until 1942, and were bulky semipermanent units. Portable radar sets

were not in the field until 1943, and were copies made from British and

American sets captured in Malaya and the Philippines. Gun laying radar sets

appeared in 1943; they too were patterned on captured British sets. Identification Friend or Foe (IFF) experimentation did not yield good results, thus

ground control intercept (GCI) development was retarded until well into the

war and never attained the levels reached by the British or Americans. 8

The AA defense of Japanese tactical air bases was well organized and

effectively handled under an assigned garrison company of an airfield battalion. Normally, one platoon of the garrison company specialized in air

defense and consisted of about 70 men armed with automatic cannon (20-

mm and 25-mm), 6.5-mm and 7.7-mm AA machine guns plus other light

machine guns. As necessary, the area Army commander could add heavier

weapons such as 75-mm guns and move defense forces around to meet the

needs of changing situations, adding to or subtracting from existing bases

and creating defenses for new bases.'

Japan's air strength was divided between the Navy and the Army, with

the Navy having both land and carrier based air units. In the years before

World War II, both services apparently resisted a single shore based air

force, as neither was willing to give up its air service. Japanese pilots,

especially those in the Navy, were excellent. Prewar military pilots were an

elite class, graduates of a rigorous training program that continued after the

men were assigned to operational units. Air combat against China and the

Soviet Union in the late 1930s sharpened the skills of these men, so that in

1941, when Japan went to war with Britain and the United States, some

Allied observers in the Far East had difficulty believing the previously underrated Japanese were not Germans. The elite status of Japan's pilots,

however, threatened to undo Japan's war effort. Prewar naval aviator train38
INTERWAR CHANGES

ing programs had such strict standards that as few as 25 men of an original

class of 100 completed a year's flying instruction. Relatively few pilots

meant that combat losses could not be readily replaced."

The Japanese Army Air Force's (JAAF) flying units were subordinate to

Army ground commanders. During fighting in China after 1937, the JAAF

was used largely for ground support. With air superiority in China easily

attained, the Japanese did not engage in heavy counterair operations until

the 1939 border war with the Soviet Union. The JAAF was not then fully

prepared to carry out large scale air attack and defense in a concerted bid to

seek air superiority. In Siberia and Manchuria, the Japanese were roughly

handled by the Red Air Force, in large measure because their aircraft were

not armored and were vulnerable in combat. Studies of Russian armor

plating led the Japanese to experiment on their own planes, but neither

armor nor self sealing fuel tanks were in common use until 1943. When the

Zero, or Zeke, fighter appeared in the summer of 1940, the Japanese recognized it for the excellent weapon it was. They came to rely on it too much

and failed to pursue aircraft design vigorously. They did not build either an

advanced fighter or a long range heavy bomber until late in the war. Consequently, the Japanese were committed to fighting the war with medium

bombers lacking armor and self sealing tanks that could not withstand

Allied gunfire."

Japanese equipment was not standard among the services, and development proceeded independently in the Army and the Navy. Originally, this

was done to foster and gain the benefits of competition. Unfortunately, the

divided effort produced a vast array of weapons. Machine guns for fighters

in both services were .50 caliber, but had different size chambers. The

ammunition was not interchangable, nor were parts for the weapons. The

ground forces had yet other designs. The lack of standardization created

severe logistics problems. Sometimes, aircraft of one service lacked ammunition, but could not use that of the other service's neighboring unit because it

would not fit the guns.3 2

The Soviet Union

Shortly after Russia's revolutionary leaders established themselves early

in the 1920s, they began to look abroad for help in technical areas including

military hardware. They found a ready partner in the post-World War I

German Republic's military. The German-Russian cooperation on aircraft

design and testing in the 1920s was beneficial for both countries. The secret

effort allowed Germany to skirt the Versailles Treaty's prohibition on designing and testing of weapons, while Russia too gained vital information.

Controlled by the Bolsheviks after the revolution and civil war, the basic

doctrine of Russian air elements after 1920 emphasized tactical support of

39
AIR BASE AIR DEFENSE

the Red Army. Early in its history, the Red Air Force faced severe shortages

of fuel, parts, and aircraft. Expedient measures to keep the air force flying

were often used, and, as a result, the service quickly formed a pragmatic

tradition of flying regardless of the problems faced. After 1930, when his

political control of the Soviet Union was secure, Joseph Stalin paid much

attention to aviation; enormous improvements in flight technology brought

Russia many aviation records in the decade before World War II. Long

distance aviation received special attention, but the efforts detracted from

the design of tactical combat aircraft and impeded development of fighters

that could be used in air superiority campaigns. By 1939, Russia's first line

fighters were outclassed by those of the other major powers. In addition,

Stalin's political purges of the late 1930s severely affected the growth of air

doctrine and the development both of aircraft and support equipment.3

Joseph Stalin had an enormous impact on the Soviet Union's military

doctrine and operation. Throughout his career, he constantly stressed the

offensive. Stalin's insistence on offensive actions can be traced to at least

1918, when, as Commissar of Food Supply in Tsaritsyn (later Stalingrad),

he severely criticized the area's military leader, A. E. Snesarev, for being

"defensist,' rather than aggressive. Stalin, at the same time, also had other

military leaders removed from office and some shot for displaying similar

"defensist" views while fighting the counter-revolutionary White Army.,

In the mid-1930s, Stalin began the systematic expulsion from the Communist Party and the government of whomever he believed disloyal. He

extended the purge in the late 1930's by large scale removal of military

leaders. In 1938, he ordered the Red Air Force's Chief of Staff, Yakov I.

Alksnis, shot; Alksnis was soon followed by his deputy and successor, Vasili

V. Khripin. Khripin's successor, General Alexandr Loktionov, was shot, too,

in a general bloodletting that took some twenty-five percent of the service's

senior officers. Many more were sent to labor camps. The replacements for

the executed and imprisoned men were young, inexperienced officers, chosen mostly because they would be obligated to Stalin for their careers. The

loss of these experienced air commanders retarded training and operational

readiness of the Red Air Force and contributed heavily to the collapse of the

Soviets in the face of Germany's attack in 1941.1

At the end of the political purges in 1940, a new generation of fighter

and ground attack aircraft began to appear in the field. Designs were based

on lessons the Russians learned in Spain while helping the Republican government in 1938, in the fighting against Japan in Siberia in the following year,

and in the Winter War of 1939-1940 with Finland. Excellent new aircraft

would put the Soviet Air Force on an even footing in many areas with

Germany and the Allies, but not until 1943. In 1940, Stalin appointed a new

head of the Aviation Industry Commissariat, A. I. Shakurin. Universal

military service began, and the length of service was extended from two to

40
INTERWAR CHANGES

five years. The Air Force received a talented Chief of Staff, General Pavel

Rychagov, and the long process of modernization began.3 6

The Soviet Air Force (Voyenno- Vozdushnyye Sily or VVS) was a highly

decentralized flying branch of the Red Army, designed to support the

ground forces in areas as divergent as Western Europe and China. The VVS

was not a unified service; its units were subordinate to Army commands

mobilized for war, its staff a division of the Red Army Staff. Decentralizing

the air force was done to insure cooperation between the forces. Before the

war, air regiments were assigned to the various Military Districts, subordinate to the District Commanders. When the war began, the VVS's units

became part of corps, armies, and fronts, commands roughly equal to army

groups. The regiments that made up Russia's tactical air force were commonly referred to as the Red Air Force or VVS and were required to secure

air supremacy, support army ground forces, and perform air reconnaissance. In addition to the VVS, there was a national air defense force, the

Protivozodushnaya Oborona Strany (PVO Strany), with fighters, observation units, and AA guns. It was charged with protecting strategic targets

such as cities and vulnerable industrial sites. In addition, PVO units were

assigned to army fronts. The Soviet High Command controlled the Long

Range Bomber Force (the Dahinaya Bombardirovshchik Aviatsiya or DBA),

and the Navy had an aviation section with aircraft assigned to each fleet. As

part of the 1940 Soviet military reform, air base districts were created. Each

district supported the air units within an army front by building, operating,

and protecting air bases. Initially, the VVS sought to have three airfields for

each of its flying regiments: a main field, an alternate or standby, and a field

facility or dispersal field. The large number of landing grounds made dispersal easier, but also complicated problems of AA gun allocation and command and control of fighter aircraft. Very few of the forward airfields, built

in former Polish territory seized in late 1939, were ready by June 1941, and

many of the VVS's aircraft were grouped on a few operational bases.,7

While aviation underwent changes, so too did air defense artillery. One

of the main Russian derivations from the secret partnership with Germany

was a 76-mm gun. Later, German success with the 88-mm gun in the Spanish

Civil War prompted the Russians to devise an 85-mm gun, first produced in

1939 with an effective range of 27,500 feet. Medium range weapons were

primarily 37-mm guns of Swedish, German, or British design; mass production began in Russia in 1939. Prewar Russian training and doctrine placed

heavy stress on the use of machine guns such as the 7.62-mm, with an

effective range of 2,400 feet, for low-level air defense of the Red Army's

forces. The Russian manufactured 12.7-mm machine gun was also employed

for air defense in a similar fashion. 8

The Red Army's AA target plotting and fire control methods before the

war were not good. The systems were almost always manual and seem not to

41
AIR BASE AIR DEFENSE

have been refined, even with the outbreak of fighting. Soviet technicians

began work on electronic aircraft detection early in the 1930's. By the middle of the decade they were developing rudimentary radar sets and making

significant strides in solving problems of frequencies to be used. The Russian attempts to create a viable radar capability were hampered by a divided

research and development effort, made more difficult because of disputes

between research agencies over the value of long and short microwaves and

the use of thermal (infrared) detection. In addition, Stalin's aggressive removal of people he deemed unreliable affected technical institutions and

resulted in the loss of many skilled scientists to labor camps during 1937.

Research continued, however, under the direction of the PVO and took two

lines: early warning, and short range gun laying. Soviet leaders, like some in

Germany, seem not to have grasped the importance of radar to effective air

force command and control. As a result, the Red Army and PVO probably

had no more than fifteen RUS-2 early warning sets, of very limited capability, on June 22, 1941. The German invasion stopped research and production in its tracks until 1942. The first production models probably were not

put into use until the end of 1943. Problems associated with manufacture

and the training of operators limited Russian use of electronic early warning

throughout the war. The lack of radar integrated into a warning and command network was to have serious consequences when the Luftwaffe attacked Russian air bases. 9

Russian antiaircraft defenses for units deployed in the field were the

responsibility of the Red Army's artillery branch. The Red Army assigned

AA elements to units of division size, and lower if needed. Searchlights,

listening posts, and observation stations all came under a single organization in each army region. While this provided some efficiency of operation,

the obsolete and varied types of equipment increased supply and maintenance problems, and reduced the ability of the warning network to aid in

defense against air base attack. The need to spread AA weapons thinly over

the vast Russian land mass left minimal or nonexistent protection in some

places. In some ways, however, the Soviets were exceptionally fine performers. In addition to their skill at using heavy small arms and light

machine gun fire against low flying enemy aircraft, the Russians had an

unsurpassed ability to use camouflage in the open heartland of the country.

40

Great Britain and the Commonwealth

British preparations varied from region to region. Their base defense

capabilities were least developed in the Far East because of decisions by the

home government which essentially discounted the Japanese threat. Few

aircraft were assigned in Asia, those present were obsolete, and war plans

42
INTERWAR CHANGES

there were poor. Competing demands for Middle East and home defense put

a strain on production capacity, first because of the belief during the 1920s

that France was the most serious threat. By the 1930s, a resurgent and

militant Germany kept British defense decisions centered on Europe. British

scientific advances and a well organized air defense system created a very

favorable position in the British Isles, although this would not become clear

until after the summer of 1940. British tactical air defense doctrine based

upon experience in the Battle of Britain would be used initially in Malta and

North Africa. 4

'

When Germany announced in 1935 that the Luftwaffe was on a par

with the Royal Air Force (RAF), the British Chiefs of Staff reevaluated their

meager air defense capability. In 1934, AA defense was 17 gun batteries of 8

guns each, and 42 searchlight companies. In 1936, the British increased their

planned strength to 76 batteries and 108 searchlight companies, but there

was little money to buy the weapons and equipment. Strong antiwar feeling

and continued opposition from the Treasury delayed purchase of guns and

equipment and training of men. In 1937, Air Chief Marshal Sir Hugh

Dowding, Commander-in-Chief, Air Defence of Great Britain, issued a

report describing an ideal scheme for the air defense of the United Kingdom. He proposed that 16 heavy guns be deployed around important points

such as Navy yards and manufacturing plants and groups of 4 for general

defense. That year there were only 146 heavy AA weapons in the entire

country. The use of light AA was not yet well understood, as the threat of

low level bombing raids from the Continent was just beginning to become

apparent. Dowding's report also recommended acquiring 1,200 small guns,

but had no specific justification for such a number. The scheme was approved in principle, but it could not be implemented until November 1937

for lack of money. In 1938, when weapon production began in earnest, most

guns in use were still the 3-inch from World War I. The Munich Crisis of

September 1938, added greater urgency because neither the antiaircraft nor

the fighter interceptor force was adequate to the task of defending the RAF's

bases in Britain. No more than a handful of the all important Bofors guns,

crucial to defense against low-level attacks, was available. Bofors production in Britain and purchases from Sweden slowly increased the number. On

September 1, 1939, when Germany attacked Poland, the numbers of both

heavy and medium AA guns were far from satisfactory for protection in

Britain, much less to send weapons to overseas bases. 42

A Swedish design of 1930, the 40-mm Bofors gun so far surpassed other

midrange weapons that it became the most widely used antiaircraft gun of

the war. Licensing agreements allowed its manufacture in eleven countries

including Poland, Britain, and the United States; all the countries making it

sold the guns on the export market and assigned them to home forces. The

Bofors' accuracy and rapid fire (120 rounds per minute) along with its ease

43
AIR BASE AIR DEFENSE

of handling and barrel replacement made it a deadly weapon around British

and Allied air bases. It had an effective hitting range, allowing for angle of

fire, wind, temperature, and barometric pressure, of between 5,000 and

6,500 feet. High altitude air defense requirements were met by a 3.7-inch

gun, introduced into service in 1938; followed by a 4.5-inch gun also

adopted in 1938. The early model 3.7-inch had an effective range of 23,000

feet, not enough to reach high flying German and Japanese bombers, several

of which could exceed 25,000 feet. An improvement was found in the 4.5-

inch gun which had an effective ceiling of 26,500 feet shooting 8 rounds per

minute. The array of British weapons, then, could theoretically contend

with both low and high level attacks. Initial production delays meant, however, that most targets were only marginally defended from the ground,

sometimes by only 2 or 3 guns, when the attackers arrived in 1940.41

Despite the shortages of AA guns, in many respects the British had the

best prepared air defense of any of the World War II combatants in 1940,

and it was not by accident that this was so. In 1936, coincident with a

reorganization of the RAF that created the Fighter Command, the British

began an intense effort to exploit what they called radio direction finding

(RDF), or radar. The name RDF was chosen deliberately to mislead German

intelligence into believing the development work was related to aerial navigation. Sir Henry Tizard, Chairman of the Committee for the Scientific Survey of Air Defense, and unofficial scientific advisor to the Air Officer

Commanding (AOC) Fighter Command, Air Marshal Dowding, believed

radar's ability to give bearing, distance, and height of aircraft could be used

to guide fighter interceptors to approaching bombers. Tizard thought such a

system would eliminate the need for continuous airborne patrols, conserving both men and machines. Experiments at RAF Station Biggin Hill in

southeastern England during the summer of 1936 proved him correct. That

year the first ground controlled interception guidance techniques were devised. Over the next four years, the techniques were refined and improved,

and men were trained to control fighters launched from various airfields. As

war with Germany became more probable, the RDF system, named Chain

Home, was extended to cover the east coast of the United Kingdom. Tizard's

efforts gave Britain an operationally effective detection, warning, and control system, something no other nation had."

This success created a coherent system that gave the British an inestimable advantage over their potential enemy, Nazi Germany. By 1940, the Chain

Home (CH) and Chain Home Low (CHL) radar stations, which divided the

task of high and low level detection, observed aircraft approaching from the

time they took off from airfields behind Calais. In the north of England the

protection was not as yet complete, but was being pursued strongly by the

Air Ministry. Radar ranges and capabilities were constantly improved as

engineering changes were made, but by the summer of 1940 gaps continued

44
INTERWAR CHANGES

to exist. The low level stations, in particular, were beset with problems

caused by surface reflections of the signal, causing false returns on the radar

screen. To resolve this problem, the British stressed proficiency of radar

scope readers and made wide use of ground observers."'

Each of the Chain Home sites (Map 2) was originally connected to

Fighter Command Headquarters. By June 1940, however, they were so numerous that direct reporting was impractical and reports were made to the

appropriate fighter group operations room. Chain Home Low stations covered low level approaches to which the high-altitude CH stations were blind

and reported to the respective CH location they supported. Information

flowed to group and Fighter Command by direct telephone line. Once the

information reached an operations room, controllers issued instructions to

sectors and airfields by both dedicated telephone lines and the Defence

Teleprinter Network. The sector command post then scrambled and controlled the fighter squadrons. The system was not perfect. The CH stations

did not always detect each flight of aircraft. In addition, the RAF's 1936

reorganization creating Fighter, Bomber, and Coastal Commands, coupled

with the service's slow growth between 1936 and 1938, meant that the new

organization was not fully broken in, and not all the RAF's senior officers

understood it. Nevertheless, the important advance, the fighter control system, was in place. The question now was how effective it would be.'

Supplementing the radar stations was the Observer Corps, originally

used during World War I, abandoned, and then reorganized in 1924. This

group continued to grow, so that by mid-1940, it contained some 30,000

people serving at more than 1,000 posts. The observers were largely civilian

volunteers who put in extra time after work. Observer reports were one of

the keys to defense of Fighter Command's inland airfields. Since the radar

stations pointed seaward, only the observers could spot enemy aircraft over

England's interior. As they became more and more proficient, observers

were able to give accurate reports on height and direction of flight of aircraft. Telephones linked the many posts to Fighter Command, and even the

most remote location could get a message through in less than 40 seconds.

Despite severe problems with report saturation during heavy raids, and difficulty in estimating altitudes by visual observation in poor weather, the observers consistently produced useful information on aircraft formations.47

Capping the structure of Britain's air defense system in 1940 was

Fighter Command's most important weapon-the squadrons of Hurricane

and Spitfire interceptors. Directed by the command and control system,

fighter pilots could take off in good time to pounce on enemy formations

approaching from the Continent. The growth and development of Fighter

Command was not without problems, however. In April 1938, British aircraft production was only 158 machines monthly. Spurred on by the Munich

Crisis of September 1938, production increased rapidly. Nevertheless, by

45
RADAR AND OBSERVER NEWRk GETBRITAIN, 1940

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Map 2
INTERWAR CHANGES

German Wiirzburg D radar in semipermanent emplacement. The unit was also

mounted on a wheeled van.

mid-1940 Fighter Command had but 756 of its best fighters to form 29

squadrons of Hurricanes and 19 of Spitfires, with the usual 16 to a squadron. Four more squadrons of older, less capable Defiants and Blenheims

complemented this force. This was not a large number of aircraft, and the

problem was complicated by an accompanying shortage of pilots: 916 at

midyear, 946 on September 1, 1940. The relatively small number of pilots

and aircraft reflected the inability of the country to respond almost overnight to all of the production and training demands engendered by the

military buildup that increased in tempo after Munich. With the organization of Fighter Command, Dowding controlled not only the fighter squadrons, but also radar stations and AA guns; all served one purpose: the

defense of the United Kingdom. Dowding and his group commanders focused on that one issue. The years of planning and the leaders' abilities were

now to be tested. 4

1

By mid-1939, air defense services of the major powers had undergone

varying technical and doctrinal changes, most of them coming in the few

years before war. Problems associated with high altitude munitions were

largely solved, at least in design. Mechanical time fuzes, for example, gave

the AA gunners a much improved ability to detonate rounds at specific

altitudes. This increased accuracy of AA fire significantly. Production of

such fuzes, however, was slow at first, especially in Britain. Complex prob47
AIR BASE AIR DEFENSE

lems of assembling intricate clockwork mechanisms able to withstand the

shock of propulsion out of a gun barrel were slowly solved. In 1939, mass

production was not yet under way. Both mechanical and electric computers,

used by Japan, Germany, Great Britain, and America, allowed more rapid

range calculation and fuze setting, and a variety of excellent machine guns

and small cannon of the 20-mm to 40-mm caliber were readily available. No

country, however, developed a tracking and gun control system that could

follow a fast moving airplane. None would be designed during World War

II.

In many ways, World War II was to be an air war. Often, base survival

depended on an air force's ability to seize and hold air superiority for a

protracted time, and the most effective weapon against air raids became the

highly trained pilot flying a fast, well armed fighter-interceptor. How well an

air force could function from its flying fields was to be of paramount

importance to both sides. The question was most difficult for the German,

Japanese, and Russian air forces, as all three were essentially tactical, although they used planes for strategic purposes on occasion. All espoused a

doctrine that included attacking enemy airfields as well as logistical and

strategic targets.

Lt. Gen. Elwood R. Quesada, wartime commander of the U.S. Army

Air Forces' IX Fighter Command, believed that in the years before World

War II, none of the the western Allies gave much serious thought to the

importance of air base defense."9 Even by 1939 tactical airfields were still

mostly grass with little construction and few paved areas. Many governments were reluctant to spend large amounts of money on air defense during

peacetime, and therefore yielded to the belief of many air officers that heavy

bombers would defeat an enemy by destroying his homeland and bringing a

quick end to the war. Basic planning and consideration for national defense

were discussed, and major protagonists had adequate air operation doctrine. In general, however, organization for protection of tactical forces in

the field fell by the wayside. One notable exception was in Germany, where

the Luftwaffe developed an air doctrine calling for the early destruction of

an enemy air force in war and an air defense system built on a sophisticated

organization that no longer relied on crude adaptations of machine guns

shooting at aircraft. The specialization of weaponry for this purpose was

not limited to the Germans, although they surpassed all others.

Base defense remained an unfinished and to some extent a still theoretical art at the outbreak of World War II. Virtually every major country had

included high altitude artillery and medium and low altitude guns and automatic weapons in its armament, but antiaircraft weapons alone were not the

only means needed to defend bases. Faster aircraft and more destructive

weapons required efficient warning and control systems for the defenders.

In the event, the British combination of radar, well designed fighters under

48
INTERWAR CHANGES

flexible but firm control, and antiaircraft artillery under one command was

soon put to the test.

49
Part 2

World War II
Chapter III

Blitzkrieg and the Battle of Britain

In the late summer of 1939, the German Wehrmacht* began a series of

decisive offensives. On September 1, 1939, the German campaign in Poland

precipitated a declaration of war on Germany by France and Britain. Following the success in Poland, German forces rested, reequipped, and devised new plans to carry the fight to Western Europe. In France, the Allied

armies watched cautiously, but took no action against Germany in a phase

of the war that came to be known as Sitzkrieg. Bombing was forbidden, and

only reconnaissance aircraft entered German airspace. In April 1940, Hitler

seized Denmark and Norway. The next month he turned on France and the

Low Countries, smashing the allies in six weeks and forcing Britain to

evacuate the Continent. For the Western Allies, this was the bleakest period

of the war, culminating in the Battle of Britain in the summer of 1940. By

the end of the year, however, the Luftwaffe had been dealt a severe blow over

England, losing 1,733 aircraft to fighter and antiaircraft defenses, and various other operational casualties connected with the battle. Although few

immediately recognized the fact, the Luftwaffe's effectiveness, planning,

and doctrine had been called into serious question, and the heavy losses of

skilled pilots drained a resource that would be badly needed in the fighting

to come. Prepared for a short war, Germany now faced a lengthening conflict of attrition.

During 1939 and 1940, the war was to try severely the military doctrine

and planning of all the participants, especially in the new area of tactical

warfare. The First World War had been a crude affair for air forces and base

* This term is often used to refer to the German Army. It actually included all of the

German armed forces, the Army (das Heer), the Navy (die Kriegsmarine), and the Air Force

(die Luftwaffe).

53
AIR BASE AIR DEFENSE

defenders alike. The scale of aerial fighting in World War II dwarfed anything experienced in the earlier conflict by even the most seasoned officers.

Many of the future air generals and marshals who drew up war plans or

doctrine in the 1930s were rudely shocked by the unprecedented events of the

new war. Pre-World War II ideas about the effectiveness and relative ratios

of antiaircraft weapons to the targets to be defended, the value of air attacks

on airfields, and the vulnerability of aircraft conducting them often turned

out to be far from reality. From the first, German air strikes against airfields

were an integral part of blitzkrieg; the German Air Force sought to destroy

enemy air strength on the ground by massive surprise attack. Twice the

Germans achieved air superiority, only to fail in the most critical test during

the Battle of Britain.

The Attack on Poland

Although not preceded by a declaration of war, the Nazi attack did not

catch the Poles unaware, for as early as 1935 Poland began a Six Year Plan

to upgrade its armed forces, including the addition of a modern antiaircraft

defense with some three hundred 40-mm Bofors guns, Browning machine

guns, and other automatics for low-level protection. These weapons would

be manufactured in Poland under license from Swedish and American designers.' Determined to protect its homeland, the Polish government intended to spend one third of each year's tax revenue and a two billion franc

French loan in the defense scheme. By 1939 some thirty-five to forty-five

percent of the original goals had been achieved, despite Poland's sluggish

production. In addition to the weapons of foreign origin, the Poles designed

and built forty-four 75-mm AA guns, a total of eleven batteries. 2

Antiaircraft defense played a part in Polish military maneuvers as early

as 1927. These units increased in each of the 1937, 1938, and 1939 military

exercises. By the summer of 1939, defense plans were well advanced, and

Polish leaders were quite aware of Hitler's intentions. Contrary to belief at

the time in the West, Poland's air force was not destroyed on the ground on

the first day, nor did it lack an ability to protect either itself or the country.'

The original German air attack plan centered on a massive surprise

blow at Polish bases to destroy support facilities and catch planes on the

ground. Germany had clear numerical air superiority in combat aircraft and

a tremendous advantage in the quality and capability of equipment. In the

East, the Luftwaffe deployed two air fleets of some 1,500 planes for the

Polish campaign. The Luftwaffe's task was to prevent the Polish air force

from taking any effective part in air operations, to support the two army

groups, and to destroy military installations and armament factories."

The Poles mustered an air force of about 400 first line operational

aircraft; 154 were bombers and 159 fighters in 43 squadrons. These aircraft

54
BLITZKRIEG AND THE BATTLE OF BRITAIN

were divided into 12 army cooperation squadrons for air support of ground

forces, 7 reconnaissance, 15 fighter, and 9 bomber squadrons.' By 1939 all

operational aircraft were of Polish design and manufacture. The main Polish

air defense weapon was the PZL 11 fighter (P 11), a high wing, open cockpit

monoplane first built in 1931. During the 1930s the P11 underwent many

modifications and was generally regarded as an excellent airplane, but by

1939, it was completely obsolete and due to be replaced. The PlIc then in

use was armed with two 7.7-mm machine guns, and modifications adding 2

additional machine guns were under way. The 7.7-mm rounds, equivalent to

.30 caliber, were not heavy enough to destroy an opponent without concentrated fire for many seconds. The PlIc at 230 miles per hour was much

slower than its principal opponent, the German Mel09, which could exceed

350 miles per hour. However, because of its excellent maneuverability, the

PlIc could easily contend with the Ju87 Stuka, whose maximum speed was

242 miles an hour. Although the PlIc was slow, it was exceptionally well

built and a potentially deadly weapon in the hands of a skilled pilot, even

against an Mel09. 6

The Polish Army had 1 regiment and 8 detachments of antiaircraft

artillery. It could muster 400 heavy weapons both in fixed emplacements and

self-propelled. There were also over 300 light guns and about 170 antiaircraft machine guns. None of the guns had data computing equipment for

aiming at moving targets. The Poles did not have radar, and command and

control proved weak. German intelligence considered Polish AA effectiveness low due to insufficient numbers of weapons and poor aiming capability.7

The Polish air service was part of the Army except for a small naval air

section directly under Navy control. In peacetime, the Army's air arm was

organized in three large air groups, only two of which were fully operational

in August 1939. When mobilizing for war, the Poles planned to break up the

big units and allocate squadrons to field army commanders, except for

bomber and reconnaissance aircraft which belonged to the Army's High

Command. The Polish military command directed conversion to wartime

organization five days before the invasion. By August 31, half of the fighters

were thus parceled out to various field armies, the other half were organized

for defense of major cities, such as Warsaw. (Map 3) Except for the bombers

and some reconnaissance units, the air arm was now under control of the

various ground commanders.

The Polish air arm's ground service units in September 1939 were cumbersome. Although the aircraft were well dispersed, the Germans caught the

Poles in the middle of mobilization, and maintenance and service people

apparently had not adjusted to wartime operation. The most serious deficiency, however, was communications, especially that used by the air defense

forces. There was no Polish communication system dedicated to use by the

55
AIR BASE AIR DEFENSE

"The destruction of the Polish Air Force. Obsolete Polish aircraft abandoned at

Deblin, south of Warsaw.

air and antiaircraft units. The Polish air force depended on Army communicators from local ground units, and there were only ten radio stations to

support air operations. Any disruption of the fragile radio and telegraph

circuits would quickly affect the commanders' ability to function, the delivery of fuel and spare parts, and the transmission of air raid warning orders.'

Despite all of the German planning and effort spent in preparing for

war and its preponderance of force, the Luftwaffe faced serious problems in

trying to destroy the Polish air arm. The weather on September 1 was very

poor: fog, rain, and low ceilings with restricted visibility. Only about onethird of the effective force could take off on schedule. Still, the Germans hit

nine of the twelve main Polish airfields, but only at Warsaw-Okecie did the

they find sizeable numbers of planes. Nineteen secondary airfields were

attacked with little effect, and an additional fifteen airfields were reconnoitered but found empty. Poland had successfully dispersed its air capability to

"a number of secret fields from which it was prepared to operate, although at

"a reduced effectiveness. 1

The Germans had excellent air reconnaissance and accurate maps of

Poland. The Luftwaffe was unable, however, to reconnoiter the whole coun56
BLITZKRIEG AND THE BATTLE OF BRITAIN

$rep

Okechie airfield showing effects of German bombardment in early September

1939. Some Polish squadrons survived on smaller installations and continued to harass the Luftwaffe until late in the campaign.

try. In the flat terrain of East Europe, airfields could be almost anywhere,

and the Germans simply could not find many Polish landing places. The

Poles capitalized on this by the heavy use of camouflage to protect almost all

of their combat aircraft and the first day's damage was to facilities and

runways of abandoned bases and to old, noncombat planes. In fact, Poland

had employed what the British Air Ministry in 1943 considered of "paramount importance [for defense against air attack] adequate dispersal of

aircraft and the use of satellite airfields"."

Despite the successful air force dispersal, Poland's military weaknesses

were evident on the first day of the war. The force of the attack and damage

to the communications system confused the Polish air command, which was

apparently unable to organize its most effective asset-fighters-in an aggressive, coordinated defense. Similarly, because Polish antiaircraft gunners

lacked warning of approaching attacks, their fire was weak and ineffective

until September 2nd. Polish reconnaissance planes were aloft then, radioing

position and direction of enemy bombers. The highly maneuverable Polish

57
AIR BASE AIR DEFENSE

POLAND, 1939

'LITHUANIA

MODLIN

WARSZAWA

LODZ

DEBLIN

LU13LIN

GERMANY

KATOWICE KRAKOW KAO

SOVIET

UNION

SLOVAKIA

S~HUNGARY

Map 3

fighters attacked the Germans. The ground defenses came into action and

the Luftwaffe's 4th Bomber Group faced heavy flak around the three airfields near Deblin, 55 miles south of Warsaw. Unfortunately, the antiaircraft

fire burst 1,000 feet below the planes, the result of poor warning and lack of

adequate height and range finding equipment. The Luftwaffe easily passed

over this potential impediment and carpeted the bases with explosives. Air

58
BLITZKRIEG AND THE BATTLE OF BRITAIN

defense efforts, although remaining unorganized, continued until the Poles

exhausted their resources."2

The initial defense at Katowice and Cracow air bases were examples of

both Polish successes and failures. Attacking suddenly at 900 to 1,500 feet,

German aircraft flew too low for the heavy antiaircraft guns, and machine

guns had to assume the bulk of the effort. At Cracow, machine guns damaged 3 Dol7s, which were forced to land and their crews made captive. By

day's end, however, most of the original machine guns had been silenced by

the attackers. Army heavy machine guns hastily mounted on truck beds and

dangerously exposed to strafing or bomb fragments replaced them. The

Poles then used whatever weapons they had at hand throughout the rest of

the campaign."3

The Polish air force continued to fight, albeit at a diminishing level,

until September 16. A lack of spare parts grounded increasing numbers of

defenders. German air attacks cut the telegraph system, compounding troubles when orders and information could not be transmitted. Since there was

no useful air detection and warning system to begin with, Polish air bases,

once found, were in an exposed and dangerously vulnerable position. During the first two weeks of September, however, the Luftwaffe's combat

losses numbered 285, or 19 percent of their force. Contrary to some past

belief, the Germans had faced significant ground-to-air and air-to-air combat. Several sources give the total number of Polish air-to-air victories as 126

for the 16 days of fighting. In addition to the aircraft lost, another 279

German planes were seriously damaged. Polish bombers made attacks

against German infantry up to the final day, but the Poles could not hold

out. On the 17th, the remaining planes fled south to Rumania."4

Though victorious in Poland, the German military machine did not

perform as well as Nazi propaganda of 1939 led the world to believe, both

because of Polish resistance and its own internal weaknesses. Inadequately

trained German crews missed many of their targets in Poland during the first

five days of combat. In 1944, German Air Historical Branch analysts

pointed out problems with accuracy of bombing and reliability of aircrew

reports during the Polish campaign. Because of the substantial amount of

incorrect information, readers were cautioned that, "if the High Command

is not to be misled, particular importance must be attached [by the

Luftwaffe] to the accuracy of such reports." Luftwaffe Chief of Staff General Jeschonnek gave vacillating and contradictory operational directives.

Early in the campaign, he ordered the sporadic diversion of aircraft from

tactical operations to unnecessary strategic targets, such as factories and

cities. He also frequently overrode the decisions of senior field commanders,

to the point of issuing orders directly to combat units without informing the

two air fleet chiefs. The uncertainties and insecurities of many of the air

59
TABLE 1

Luftwaffe Order of Battle, Losses in the Polish Campaign

Under Direct Command of Goering

Headquarters, Potsdam

8 and 10 Recce Staffeln

Signals Unit 100

Luftflotte I (East)-Kesselring Luftflotte 4 (Southeast)-L6hr,

Hq, Henningsholm/Stettin: Hq, Reichenbach, Silesia:

5 Recce Staffeln 3 Recce Staffeln

13 Bomber Gruppen 8 Bomber Gruppen

41⁄2 Stuka Gruppen 4 Stuka Gruppen

3 Twin engine Fighter Gruppen 2 Twin engine Fighter

(Mell0) Gruppen (Mell0)

3 Single engine Fighter 2 Single engine Fighter

Gruppen (Me 109) Gruppen (Me109)

I Ground Attack Gruppe

Total: 824 Serviceable Aircraft 676 Serviceable Aircraft

Total aircraft deployed: 648 bombers, 219 dive bombers, 30 ground attack planes, 210 single

and twin engine fighters, 474 reconnaissance planes, plus transports. Figures do not include

Army aircraft and home defense fighters.

Luftwaffe Losses in the Polish Campaign

Period September 1 through 28, 1939

Reconnaissance 63

Single engine Fighters 67

TWin engine Fighters 12

Bombers 78

Dive bombers 31

Transports 12

Marine and Miscellaneous 22

Total 285

The Germans counted a further 279 aircraft of all types as temporarily lost to strength, being

over ten per cent damaged, but repairable.

Sources: Air Ministry, German Translation VII/33, The Luftwaffe in Poland

Bekker, The Luftwaffe War Diaries
TABLE 2

Strength and Losses of the Polish Air Force

September 1939

Aircraft Operational Units Training Schools

and Reserves

Fighters:

Plic 129 43

P7 30 75

Light Bombers:

P23 118 85

Bombers:

P37 36 30

Reconnaissance:

R XIII 49 95

RWD 14 "Czapla" 35 20

397 348

Losses

Most of the training and reserve aircraft were used as replacements in the first few days of the

campaign. Aircraft lost on operations numbered 333, including 82 by the Polish Bomber

Brigade. One hundred sixteen serviceable planes were flown over the Carpathians, mainly on

September 17th, and were interned in Rumania.

Sources: Bekker, Luftwaffe War Diaries, quoted from figures issued by the Sikorski Institute in

London, and from Adam Kurowski's Lotnictwo Polskie 1939 Roku, Warsaw.
AIR BASE AIR DEFENSE

commanders remained even as it became evident the Polish air force would

be unable to affect the outcome of the fighting.'"

In spite of the Luftwaffe's earlier limited experience in the Spanish

Civil War, some officers found difficulty in dealing with what they viewed as

unexpected Polish resistance. Although outnumbered and outclassed, the

Poles put up a credible fight. Three MellOs were shot down by Plls in a

dogfight on the afternoon of September 2nd. The Polish AA guns were

technically some of the best at the time, but they were too few and had no

effective aiming mechanisms. A cohesive command organization, the ability

to detect and report an approaching aerial enemy in time to intercept him,

and improvement of interception tactics and AA control were all hobbled by

an overall lack of industrial development in the country. Certainly the skill,

spirit, and valor of Polish pilots and crews played a large part in their

effectiveness, which was proven when the remnants joined the Royal Air

Force in 1940.16

Fighting in the West

When they began the war in Poland, the Germans mobilized their

reserves, including flak artillery. The armament industry had not produced

all of the weapons desired, but the German antiaircraft artillery was much

better than that of any of Germany's potential adversaries. In late 1939 the

Luftwaffe, which controlled flak units, had 6,700 20-mm and 37-mm guns,

and 2,600 88-mm and 105-mm guns; 30,000 20-mm guns, 5,000 37-mm, 8,200

88-mm, and planned 2,000 105-mm guns for the end of 1942. The period

of quiet in the West between September 1939 and May 1940 allowed the

Germans to continue building AA weapons and gave them the training time

to create first line operational units. The French refusal to bomb Germany

before May 10 greatly facilitated this training and organizing task, as the

young German reservists required a good bit of work to make them proficient."7

With the array of weapons they possessed, the Flakartillerie protected

the German homeland, advanced air bases, and the army on the move.

Furthermore, the large numbers and growing size of the antiaircraft establishment clearly showed the importance attached to air defense. The Germans had such strong confidence in defensive guns protecting their heavy

industrial areas that overflights of Allied bombers dropping propaganda

leaflets in the Rhine-Ruhr district brought no great insistence on fighter

protection. Only after May 10, 1940, when the Luftwaffe accidentally

bombed Freiburg-im-Breisgau, did public pressure bring about the relocation of two fighter groups for south Germany's air defense. Both sides had

time to organize and prepare for wartime demands."8

62
BLITZKRIEG AND THE BATTLE OF BRITAIN

In March and April 1939, joint Franco-British staff conversations assessed Allied military needs in facing a German enemy. Discussion included

questions of general strategy, the relative capabilities of the various air

forces, principles of collaboration between the British and French air forces

in attacking German war industries and installations, and the defense of

Allied bases. The proposition of Allied air attacks on the Luftwaffe's bases

received considerable attention, but was dismissed by the air commanders of

both countries, largely because the Allies considered themselves militarily

inferior to Germany. The French Arm~e de l'Air's bomber force, although

being expanded and modernized, was neither large enough nor capable of a

counterair campaign aimed at German airfields. The French did not wish to

provoke German bombing of French territory and so favored general restraint on the question of air attacks on Germany. The Royal Air Force

viewed attacks on Germany's airfields as generally infeasible because of the

large number of such targets, the high cost of such attacks, and the small

potential for successfully destroying or impeding the Luftwaffe's operations. The delegates agreed on tactical areas of operations for their air forces

and that enemy air bases could be struck if the situation warranted. They

split, however, on the question of methods. The French wanted general

attacks on airfields if precise bombing were impossible; the British wished to

leave such questions to the local air commander. The upshot of the meetings

was general recognition that Allied air forces could not decisively hurt the

Luftwaffe's bases.19

In the spring of 1940, French officials waited with apprehension.

French industrial production, especially defense goods, suffered from political infighting in the French government and poor planning and control

during the last half of the 1930s. French air defenses were markedly weaker

than Germany's. The prewar French Air Force was oriented toward heavy

bombardment and deficient in light and medium ground attack planes.

Unlike the Wehrmacht, French Army and Air Force staffs failed to develop

joint doctrine, especially for the air-armour operations. Neither senior air

officers nor Air Ministry planners understood the use of dive bombers and

the defense against them. The French antiaircraft commander realized his

forces lacked almost everything, but there was little he could do. Aircraft

detection relied largely on imperfect sound sensors, supplemented by visual

observation. The French also incorporated their balky civil telephone net

into their aircraft warning system. They had no tactical radar, and only six

British radar sites were located along the Franco-Belgian border from Calais

to Le Cateau, the only ones outside Britain. The radar equipment did not

work as well over land as over water, it was far from British bomber bases,

and there was little networking, especially with the French Air Force, to

allow information to flow from radar sites to defending fighters. Only

French forward observers reported aircraft sightings along most of the bor63
TABLE 3

Strength Summary

French Air Force in Europe,

May 10, 1940

Fighters

Morane-Saulnier 405/406 300

Curtiss P-36 100

Bloch 152 40

Dewoitine 501/510 and Potez 631 (obsolete) 70

510

28 Groups: 12 of Morane-Saulnier, 7 of Bloch, 4 of P-36, 5 miscellaneous. On May 10, the

Dewoitine 520 was just beginning to be delivered to French Air Force operational units.

Bombers

Thirty-one squadrons were organized. Almost all were equipped with obsolete aircraft.

Total strength was 806. Modern bombers were the Loire et Olivier, Martin, and Douglas.

Loire et Olivier 45 10

Martin Marauder, Douglas DB-7 166

Amiot 351, Breguet 693 384

Amiot 143, Bloch 210, Farman 221 246

806

Reconnaissance and Observation (all obsolete)

Reconnaissance 152

Observation 340

Note: On May 10, the Dewoitine 520 was just beginning to be delivered to French Air Force

operational units.

Source: Griffin, "The Battle of France, 1940".
British 3-inch and 40-mm guns in France just prior to the German assault in

May 1940. Imperial War Museum.
AIR BASE AIR DEFENSE

der. This left the area facing the Ardennes Forest and the Maginot Line,

almost the entire frontier, without practical aircraft warning capability. '

In January 1940, Gen. Joseph Doumenc was appointed special troubleshooter to raise the parlous state of the Arm~e de I'Air. He found, among

other things, a service desperate for 2,100 short and medium range guns for

air base defense and almost no production of these weapons. Moreover, the

Army wanted 3,000 25-mm guns for protection from air attack, with few to

be had from French sources. Immediate foreign purchase of 440 guns, and

the use of a few from new domestic production were Doumenc's only solutions. By May of 1940, the British Expeditionary Force deployed to the

Continent brought another 550 light guns, but these were used by the British

themselves. The French allocated the majority of their antiaircraft artillery

to the Army near Belgium or placed it behind the Maginot Line for home

defense. Total French production of AA weapons in 1939 was just 1,200,

compared to the monthly German output of 1,098. Field artillery pieces

were temporarily used as AA guns wherever possible. Unfortunately, they

lacked the aiming mechanisms to be very effective. When fighting began in

mid-May some airfields in France were without any ground protection."

The French Air Force was visibly weak in modern fighters and the

means to control them in combat. Of the 500 fighters in use, few were equal

to the Mel09. The best was the Dewoitine 520 (D.520), so new to the service

that it did not reach the front until May 15. The mainstay was the MoraineSaulnier 406 (M.S.406), a 300-mile-per-hour craft with a single 20-mm cannon and two 7.5 mm machine guns. Sixteen pursuit groups flew the

M.S.406, several of which began conversion to the D.520 in the midst of the

fighting. In the fragmented French deployment scheme, some squadrons

protected field armies, others were under Air Force control for defense of

vital positions. Air raid warning systems were sparse and did not extend

beyond field army boundaries; fighters in the Ninth Army area, for example, could not be advised of enemy aircraft approaching from the First and

Second Armies on either flank. Lacking radar, ground controllers could not

direct fighters to targets. Often the flights dispatched failed to find an enemy

formation which had changed course or altitude, or flown into clouds after

initial observation.12

To the north, Belgian and Dutch air defenses were nowhere near adequate to cope with a German assault. The Netherlands had 355 first rate

antiaircraft batteries, but these had to protect the entire country. The AA

defenses could put up a stiff local resistance, but could not hope to defeat or

even deter an invader. The Germans planned to disable and occupy four

primary airfields: a main base at Waalhaven, near Rotterdam, and three

others near The Hague: Valkenberg, Ypenburg, and Ockenburg. The Germans wanted Waalhaven intact so they could use it to fly in an infantry

66
BLITZKRIEG AND THE BATTLE OF BRITAIN

division to outflank the Dutch defenders. The Dutch had some warning

from their own embassy in Berlin and from the unlikely medium of the

Italian Foreign Minister, who warned the Dutch and Belgian ambassadors in

Rome. Dutch forces were on alert late on the 9th and began blowing bridges

on the German frontier at 0300 on May 10th. At the moment this commenced, Hitler notified the Dutch and Belgian governments of his intent to

cross their borders to thwart an expected French and British invasion of the

Low Countries."

The Luftwaffe attacked Waalhaven at dawn. Trying to approach undetected, German bombers came in from seaward and the direction of England. Dutch defenders saw through the ruse, however, put up a fierce flak

barrage, and brought in fighters. While they were busy with the first German group, a low level bomber attack hit Waalhaven. Unsuspecting Dutch

soldiers asleep in a hangar were killed and the air defenses paralyzed.

Quickly following the bombers, Ju52 transports dropped paratroops of the

Luftwaffe's 7th Air Division on the field. The base fell in a short time,

despite intense ground fighting. Although Dutch pilots and antiaircraft gunners took a sharp toll, air base defense guns were not numerous enough and

intercepts too few to cope with the Luftwaffe. The Dutch air force was

destroyed, largely in air combat, by noon on May 11. Its twenty-six Fokker

GI-As and some old, obsolete fighters were no match for squadrons of

Mel09s3 4

From the outset, the Luftwaffe had control of the air and followed the

Waalhaven attack with assaults on all the main air bases in the Low Countries. (Map 4) The few Dutch aircraft that managed to take off were unable

to prevent the outcome despite their valorous efforts.

For the Germans, the air victories were essential. The Dutch Army's

ground resistance was so effective in places that the threat of disaster hung

over the Wehrmacht's air landing operations for two days. The invaders

flown to the beaches near The Hague were all but destroyed, and a large

number of aircraft were damaged beyond repair. At Ypenburg, the antiaircraft gunners shot down several of the 13 Ju52 troop transports approaching

the base. Others wrecked themselves against the obstacles on the ground.

Only 2 of the transports of the first wave survived. Late on the morning of

May 10 a Dutch bombing raid on Waalhaven destroyed another group of

German transports. Dutch defenses accounted for nearly all the 193 German

transports lost in Holland in May and the Luftwaffe could not mount

adequate airlift for some months to come. Dutch antiaircraft may have shot

down as many as 315 planes, and German aircraft losses during the 4 day

campaign in the Low Countries were very heavy.5

Even with these accomplishments, the Dutch defenders were overwhelmed. Their inability to protect the main operational air base at

Waalhaven was symptomatic of the problems facing base defenders through67
AIR BASE AIR DEFENSE

DUTCH AIR BASES, 1940

de Mok• Tee ed

deKooy

Oldbroek ý

Schellingwou Rissen

Schiussu Twente

S(cii0MilligenO OTeuge

Soesterbergo *Harskamp

Ypenburg Arnhem "

OOstvoorne INW aha en

Haamste e *uh C eere 4 Gilze-Rijen I

Issinge Woensdrecht Eindhoven I WedeVenlo

LEGEND

* Airfields

0 Emergency Airfields

Seaplane port

Map 4

out Holland. The inadequate size of its air force, confusion in command,

and lack of base defense guns concentrated on attacking aircraft gave the

Dutch no hope against a much more numerous enemy. Most important, the

absence of a coordinated Allied defense plan left the Dutch forces isolated

68
BLITZKRIEG AND THE BATTLE OF BRITAIN

In amateur photo taken immediately after the assault, the wrecks of German

Ju-52s litter the field at Waalhaven.

and facing an enemy growing stronger by the day. Most of the Dutch Army

surrendered on May 14.

The situation in Belgium was hardly better. During 1939 and early 1940,

the Belgians could not count on effective British-French aid in the event of

war. Hoping to forestall an eventual German invasion, the country had

declared neutrality in 1936 and refused to coordinate defense plans with the

major Allies. The Belgians went so far as to refuse both Britain and France

any information on airfields in the country. As a result, neither the BEF nor

the French could provide help to defend Belgian bases. Early morning attacks on several air bases on the 10th destroyed the Belgian Air Force. Over

the next several days, the attacks continued and no effective air defense

developed, either on the ground or in the air. By the time the Dutch surrendered, Belgian air operations were also at an end. Some of the force escaped

to France, but the planes that made it out were old and of little use to the

Allies.26

69
AIR BASE AIR DEFENSE

While the Germans attacked all the airfields they could find, the Allies

denied themselves an equal chance when their Commander-in-Chief, Gen.

Maurice G. Gamelin, stuck to the principles of the year old Allied staff

discussions and forbade air attacks across the German border through

nearly all of the first day of the German assault. This obligingly enough

placed the air war initiative squarely in the enemy's hands. When the reclusive commander finally made German bases eligible for attack, he placed

them second in priority to the attacking German armor columns, a prescription that could only divide Allied aviation, since the armor was already in

French countryside. The Germans had almost no need to defend their bases

from Allied attacks, which were sporadic and of little significance. Gen.

Wilhelm Speidel, the 2nd Air Fleet's Chief of Staff during 1940, claimed

that there were no French Air Force attacks upon air bases in Germany at

any time during the campaign in the West. Ineffective RAF raids struck

some German bases, encountering only light flak; the Germans diverted no

aircraft or AA guns from their westward attack .

2

The rapid pace of the German advance created different problems for

the Luftwaffe. To keep constant pressure on their enemies, German air

elements moved forward so quickly that they often outran their own support. At a group of airfields around Guise, the Germans were threatened by

several French Army units still wandering about in confusion after the passage of the Panzer divisions. Most of the area was as yet unoccupied. Ju52s

supplied the squadrons, but spare parts were in such short supply that

fighters and dive bombers could put only half their strength in the air for a

time. German flak could not move over the congested roads to the new

bases, and the gunners operated without an aircraft warning net. A French

night attack on the Guise fields met very little resistance and caused considerable damage to airplanes and uneasiness among crews. Speidel believed

the situation so fluid and precarious that the outcome would have been in

doubt were not the French in the process of moving air units to the rear in an

attempt to regroup.2

The British Air Forces in France, commanded by Air Marshal Sir Arthur Barratt, had two main parts. The tactical arm was the BEF's Air

Component while the bombers made up the Advanced Air Striking Force

(AASF), a bombardment organization independent of the ground force and

operationally controlled by Bomber Command in the United Kingdom. The

AASF included Battle and Blenheim bombers (Table 4) and two squadrons

of Hurricanes to to protect airfields, but the force was without its own radar

warning system. After struggling with the indecision of the 10th, forced by

Gamelin's restriction on bombing, Barratt took matters into his own hands.

He ordered the Blenheims of No 142 squadron to attack the German tanks

leading the advance through Luxemburg. Next morning, the air attacks

continued, and at dawn, aircraft were warming up on the field at Conde

70
BLITZKRIEG AND THE BATTLE OF BRITAIN

Vraux, the crews ready to climb aboard. To the northeast, bombers from the

Luftwaffe's 2nd Kampfgruppe were flying from Aschaffenburg at extremely

low altitude, just above the housetops. They intended to cross the Maginot

Line without warning and bomb Conde Vraux by surprise. There was no

radar in the region. No 142 Squadron received no warnings, and neither the

base's AA gunners nor the Hurricane pilots saw the approaching formation.

Crossing the airfield, twelve Dol7s dropped 100-pound bombs all along the

line of waiting Blenheims, then circled for a strafing run. One of the last

German bombers made a third circuit. The pilot wanted to give his radio

operator, Flight Sergeant Werner Borner, a chance to photograph the scene

with his movie camera. The Germans flew on toward the Aisne River, still at

low altitude. As they departed, a lone Vickers machine gun fired after them.

At one stroke, half of the AASF's medium bombers were put out of business. A total lack of warning paralyzed the base force and allowed the

destruction of every airplane there.29

German air attacks continued without letup through the entire campaign, quite in keeping with the Luftwaffe's initial plan for gaining air

superiority. Target planning centered on British and French airfields in

France. (Map 5) Figures vary, but at least 75 such fields were successfully

attacked. Retaliation by Battle light bombers failed. The aircraft were extremely vulnerable and were shot down in great numbers by German gunners and fighter pilots. By May 12, the AASF's original strength of 135

bombers fell to 72. Gallant attacks on German river crossings and columns

on the 13th and 14th brought more staggering losses: 40 Battles and 7

Blenheims. At the same time, the Luftwaffe closely~supported the German

army. Mechanized columns drove toward Calais and the French coast, intending to split the Allied force and destroy the French and British piecemeal. Facing annihilation, the BEF with its Air Component and elements of

the French Army retreated toward Dunkirk. By the 20th, most BEF aircraft

were forced into a narrow strip between the advancing Germans and the sea.

On May 23, the Air Component's last planes moved to bases at Hawkinge

and Dover across the Channel, from whence they flew to cover the embarkation from Dunkirk's beaches. The airfields in Britain now became targets as

the Germans hit the evacuating army. The bases on the English side, however, could not be hammered as hard as those on the Continent. The investment in air defense during the 1930s paid its first dividends as the RAF

fended off the Luftwaffe and continued operations over the small French

seaport. Because it was out of radar and fighter control range, British

fighter patrols swept the air over Dunkirk continuously. Hurricanes and

Spitfires often forced German bombers and dive bombers away from the

beachhead, and air operations clearly showed that the RAF could gain air

superiority, especially if it had bases secure from destruction by air and

ground forces. 30

71
TABLE 4

Strength Summary, British Air Forces in France

May - June 1940

Air Component, British Expeditionary Force:

Squadron Equipment Role

85 Hurricane Fighter

87 Hurricane Fighter

607 Hurricane Fighter

615 Hurricane Fighter

18 Blenheim IV Bomber

57 Blenheim IV Bomber

53 Blenheim IV Bomber

59 Blenheim IV Bomber

2,4,13,16,26 Lysander Army Cooperation

81 Dragon Rapide Liaison

The Air Component was reinforced by three more Hurricane squadrons, Nos. 3, 79 and 504,

after May 10. RAF squadrons usually had 12 aircraft.

Advanced Air Striking Force (AASF):

Squadron Equipment Role

I Hurricane* Fighter

73 Hurricane* Fighter

12 Battle Bomber

88 Battle Bomber

103 Battle Bomber

105 Battle Bomber

142 Battle Bomber

150 Battle Bomber

218 Battle Bomber

226 Battle Bomber

114 Blenheim IV Bomber

139 Blenheim IV Bomber

212 Photoreconnaissance

* The Hurricanes were to defend the area where the AASF was based. Four Hurricane squadrons reinforced the AASF from 11 May. In addition, the following bomber squadrons based in

UK operated in support of the AASF during the battle:

No 2 Group: Nos. 107, 110, 21 and 82 (Blenheim IV).

No 4 Group: Nos. 77 and 102 (Whitley)

Sources: Ellis, The War in France and Flanders, 1939-1940

Richards and Saunders, Royal Air Force, 1939-1945
.4 i 0 0 

N to2 > r0 

A Nm 04 > r

r 0 z 4 )

.4 > 2 z

> z A

m , m r, r

02

A z >n 10

CO - .

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0 r

0 n 0'

C C

M ~
TABLE 5

The Luftwaffe in the West, 1940

On May 10, 1940, the first-line strength of the Luftwaffe was 5,142 aircraft. Of these, some

3,959 were on the inventories of Luftflotten 2 and 3, which had the task of providing air

support of the German invasion of France. The order of battle was as follows:

Luftflotte 2 (Kesselring), in support of Army Group B:

IV Fliegerkorps (Keller)

Lehrgesch wader I JuS8

Kampfgesch wader 27 He!IIl

Stukagesch wader 3 Ju87

VII Fliegerkorps (von Richthofen)

Slukagesch wader I Ju87

Stukagesch wader 2 Ju87

Stukagesch wader 77 3u87

Jagdgesch wader 27 Me 109

J/Jagdgesch wader 21 Me 109

IJ/Lehrgesch wader 2 He123

IX Luftdivision (Coler)

Kampfgesch wader 4 Helll/Ju88

(minelaying operations in the North Sea)

Jagdfliegerf-uhrer 2 (Doring)

Jagdgesch wader 3 Mel09

Jagdgesch wader 26 Mel09

Jagdgesch wader 51 MellO

11 Flakkorps (Desloch) -Three antiaircraft regiments

Units temporarily attached to Luftflotte 2 for the invasion of Holland and Belgium:

Luff Iandekorps (Student) comprising 4,500 airborne troops of the 7th Fliegerdivision,

12,000 men of the 22nd Infantry Division, I regiment of the 46th Infantry Division.

Special Duty Fiiegerkorps JuS2

Kampfgesch wader 54 He~llI

Luffflotte 3 (Sperrie) in support of Army Group A and part of Army Group C:

I Fliegerkorps (Grauert)

Kampfgesch wader I He~ll!

Kampfgeschwader 76 Dol7/Ju88

Kampfgesch wader 77 Helll/JuS8
BLITZKRIEG AND THE BATTLE OF BRITAIN

TABLE 5 (Continued):

II Fliegerkorps (Loerzer)

Kampfgesch wader 2 Do17

Kampfgesch wader 3 Do17

Kampfgeschwader 53 Helll

II/Stukageschwader 1 Ju87

IV/Stukageschwader LG 1 Ju87

IV Fliegerkorps (von Greim)

Kampfgesch wader 51 Ju88

Kampfgeschwader 55 Helll

JagdfliegerfiThrer 3 (Massow)

Jagdgeschwader 52 Me109

Jagdgesch wader 53 Me 109

Zerstorergesch wader 76 Me110

Source: Jackson: Air War Over France

On June 3rd, seeking to end resistance in France, the Luftwaffe launched

Operation PAULA, a series of air attacks on 13 air bases and aircraft production facilities in the Paris area. Alerted by various intelligence

sources, the French based some 60 fighters around the city, and placed there

the heaviest concentration of French antiaircraft artillery in the country. The

French flak barrage was the most concerted thus far in the war. German

propaganda inflated French losses to an unbelievable 450 airplanes but

government figures show 17 fighters lost with 16 more planes destroyed on

the ground. Twenty-six German planes were shot down. All of the bases

attacked were back in operation within 48 hours. Beginning on June 5th,

with the German drive south into France, French air defense stiffened, and

the Paris bases were the mainstay of operations for the next week. Speidel

noted, "Operation Paula apparently produced no practical results."'"

The French Air Force could not meet the demands placed upon it with

the units then in service, and forces were cobbled together for the defense.

Starting on May 11 a number of Escadrilles Legeres de Defense, or light air

defense flights, were organized from whatever resources were at hand. Test

pilots or instructors were rushed to the front in any aircraft available. Very

few records survived, but at least one flight, based at Chartres, seems to

have acted in an air base air defense capacity and probably damaged three

Dol7s. These scant victories did nothing to change the outcome of the

battle, nor did they give enough protection to air bases. The defense flights

75
AIR BASE AIR DEFENSE

were not provided central direction and were no more than a stopgap to vent

frustration."3

In 1940, Allied tactical air defense was inadequate. The French, British,

Belgian, and Dutch armed forces were not united by a common plan aimed

at stopping Germany. The ill advised prohibition on bombing enemy airfields aborted any effective counterair campaign that might have been

mounted. The dismal air base defense effort in France meant that no base

opposing the Luftwaffe was secure. Most of the AASF's Blenheims were

destroyed on the ground; the Battles were shot from the air by AA and

fighter interceptors. The RAF had too few fighters, deficient AA protection,

and a woefully inadequate warning system. It was not until the end of the

first week of June that air defense effectiveness improved, and then it was

far too late. French aircraft production in May and June reached new highs.

The modern Dewoitine 520 fighter came off assembly lines at the rate of one

an hour and, until the fall of Paris, factories met or exceeded the rate of loss.

This rate should have been achieved in the summer of 1939 if any respectable

defense was to be prepared for 1940. The Armistice of June 25th simply

recognized a fact established weeks before. The only air bases left to face the

Germans were now in Britain."

The German success in France brought about a clear realization in

Britain and the United States that their tactical air defenses were very inadequate. After the fall of France, both countries produced a large variety of

armored, mobile antiaircraft weapons. These vehicles mounted machine

guns and light cannon, and were admirably suited to protect both ground

troops and air installations. They appeared in great numbers, especially in

North Africa, Italy, and Europe after D-Day, where they could readily assist

fighter and bomber squadrons as they changed bases with the flow of war.4

The Battle of Britain

The Battle of Britain, one of the most analyzed engagements in military

history, began as an apparently unequal contest. Just under 1,000 strong,

the pilots of RAF Fighter Command became larger than life heroes in what

Peter Townsend described as "one of the most crucial battles in history.""35

Their victory over a well equipped, courageous, skillful, and numerically

superior foe relied heavily on the ingenuous use of radar and superior

tactics. With electronic warning of an oncoming enemy, RAF ground command centers could plot the direction of the attack and scramble defending

fighters to allow them maximum loiter time aloft. With the fall of France in

June 1940, the drain of British aircraft to that active warfront ceased, but

the flow from factories did not make up the losses easily and could not as yet

fill the needs of the existing squadrons. The British had some advantage in

that they ran their defense over home territory, where damaged aircraft and

76
BLITZKRIEG AND THE BATTLE OF BRITAIN

German reconnaissance photo shows British radar masts on the Dover cliffs in

1940. The Luftwaffe quickly abandoned its ineffective attempts to destroy

these targets.

parachuting pilots could be recovered. On the other hand, the RAF's command structure that had evolved in 1936 into Fighter, Coastal, and Bomber

Commands was still untested. Across the channel, the three German air

fleets pitted against the RAF had a decided advantage of numbers and at

least technical equality in the fighter aircraft deployed. The Mel09 fighter

was a match for or better than the Spitfire or the Hurricane, and the MellO

outperformed the Hurricanes at altitude. But Air Chief Marshal Hugh C. T.

Dowding, commanding Fighter Command and Commander in Chief, Air

Defense of Great Britain, also knew from the outset that his force would not

have to annihilate the enemy; a standoff would prevent an invasion of the

imperiled island. For Dowding, the strategy was to keep his bases and command system fully operational. 6

The Luftwaffe's attack aircraft, and the targets of the RAF's defending

pilots, were the light Ju87 and Ju88, and the medium Dol7, Helll, and

Do215 bombers, all of which required fighter escort. The Mel09, the main

single-engine fighter, was an excellent airplane, but its limited range gave it

only ten to twenty minutes flying time over the United Kingdom, depending

on the target and intensity of combat. The MellO had longer range, but it

was vulnerable and could outperform only the Hurricane, and that at high

77
AIR BASE AIR DEFENSE

altitude. The real test of battle was how well the RAF destroyed the attacking bombers. Escort fighters could often be ignored by well directed interceptors. Thus, a fighter imbalance in Germany's favor was not necessarily a

crucial determinant in the battle.37

The first thrust of the German Air Force was at British ports, shipping,

aircraft production facilities, and the RAF's operating fields. Although

there is considerable dispute about when the battle began and ended, the

most intense activity occurred from August 13 to September 15, 1940. Marshal Goering repeatedly attacked the main fighter bases until mid-September

when he switched to the cities to terrorize the British population into submission. The key to the battle, though, was how well the British protected

their bases.38

The air defense control system centered on Fighter Command headquarters at Bentley Priory, Stanmore, which acted as the filter center, receiving all reports from radar stations and the Observer Corps. Each sighting

was assigned a raid number which it kept until it was found to be friendly or

until it left British skies. Dowding and the brilliant Air Vice Marshal Keith

R. Park had designed a command system that integrated all of the warning

and control forces available so that the fighters of the various groups could

be directed to the best targets. The ability of Dowding's commanders to

allocate squadrons to oppose a raid, depending upon how important each

was thought to be, allowed Fighter Command to conserve forces. Interceptor squadrons could then be pitted against attacks which controllers at

various filter centers judged to be valid and not feints to distract from larger

groups out of radar range.

39

The Fighter Command Filter Center also obtained information from

the Admiralty, RAF Coastal and Bomber Commands, and civil, air, and sea

agencies so that as much intelligence as possible was available to decision

makers. In addition, liaison officers for the antiaircraft, civil defense, and

barrage balloon commands were always present at Stanmore. Both the antiaircraft and barrage balloon commands were operationally subordinate to

Dowding.'

As the air defense system expanded to include Scotland, the Orkney

Islands, and the west of England, the growing amount of information and

instructions made decentralization of filtering and control increasingly necessary. Decentralization was first introduced in the more remote western

areas and then in the eastern and southern areas held by Nos. 11, 12, and 13

Groups, which bore the brunt of the fighting during the summer of 1940.

Without decentralization, Fighter Command headquarters would likely

have been overwhelmed by the flow of information. The original three

fighter groups within Fighter Command were later expanded to five, each

having several sectors. The number of sectors depended upon the types of

targets in the area, proximity to the Continent, and available fighter forces.

78
TABLE 6

Opposing Forces, Battle of Britain

August 8, 1940

Operational RAF Fighters

10 Group 11 Group 12 Group 13 Group Total

10 Sqdns 23 Sqdns 16 Sqdns 14 Sqdns 62 Sqdns

Spitfires 51 81 100 44 276

Hurricanes 69 245 85 150 549

Defiants - - 30 - 30

Blenheims 9 17 21 11 58

Gladiators 5 - - - 5

Totals 134 343 236 205 918

There were about 200 additional fighters in squadron reserves. Fighters in storage ready for

issue were as follows:

Defiant 80

Hurricane 183

Spitfire 143

Luftwaffe Strength

August 13, 1940

Luftflotte (No.) 2 3 5 Total

Single engined Fighters (MelO9) 480 265 35 780

Twin engined Fighters (Mell0) 126 68 20 214

Single engine Bombers (Ju87) 42 234 - 276

Twin engined Bombers (Ju88, Helli, Do17) 469 299 100 868

Four engined Bombers (FW 200) - 7 - -

Long Range Night Fighters (Ju88) 14 - - 14

Reconnaissance Aircraft (Ju88, Helll, Do17, Mell0) 26 26 15 67

Totals 1157 899 170 2226

Sources: Bekker, Luftwaffe War Diaries

Price, The Hardest Day

Dempster and Wood, Narrow Margin
Women auxiliaries surround the plotting table in an RAF filter center during

the Battle of Britain. The flow of information to the center kept them busy

tracking the location of incoming Luftwaffe attacks. (Below) Crew reads

blips representing German raiders on radar scope in late 1940. (Right) Winston Churchill inspects a rocket and cable device at Shoeburyness, Winter

1940. Defenders fired the rocket into the air trailing a cable that entangled

an attacking aircraft.
BLITZKRIEG AND THE BATTLE OF BRITAIN

As information on hostile raids developed, each raid was assigned to a group

which, in turn, assigned it to a subordinate sector. Sector commanders

directly controlled the squadrons, dispatching the units to attack and then

informing group headquarters of squadron status. Status notifications were

made continuously so that the main plotting boards at each group and at

Fighter Command always showed each squadron's position and readiness

condition."

One of the most important tools in use was the Identification Friend or

Foe (IFF) unit installed in the fighter aircraft. Although not always reliable,

this device responded to radar signals from the ground by transmitting a

"beep tone" that showed on the radar screen and allowed ground controllers

to plot the course of friendly aircraft. Thus, controllers directed the interceptors toward incoming enemy formations, and brought individual aircraft

as well as squadrons back to a base after combat."2 The entire system had

some flaws, the most serious being the information load placed on the

operations controllers. Once these men, most of themWorld War I fighter

pilots, learned to absorb large amounts of information, they reacted with

great efficiency in assigning intercept responsibility.

Both radar operators and the people to whom they passed the information also required special attention and training, done under the guidance of

Fighter Command's Operational Research Section.4 3 A very important aspect of Dowding's success was his use of scientists as operational researchers

to solve technical problems and train operations room personnel. In addition to examining operations matters in general, the scientists wrote procedures for radar sets, devised criteria for selecting men and women best suited

to stressful jobs, designed equipment, and often provided on the job training for inexperienced controllers."

A British asset not fully revealed until 1974 was the ability to intercept

and decrypt German radio messages. The German Enigma encryption machine and its associated code keys had been obtained by a combined BritishFrench-Polish operation in the late 1930s. British intelligence analysts

referred to the information derived from this source as ULTRA for the extreme secrecy that surrounded it. It was given only to War Cabinet and select

leaders, Dowding and Park among them. Message traffic to and from

Luftwaffe units attacking Britain usually went by land lines not subject to

eavesdropping, thus during the Battle of Britain, ULTRA did not often provide advance information on specific raids. Signals intelligence was nonetheless important. Previous Enigma decrypts gave the British a good

background on the organization, operation, and order of battle of the German Air Force. Interception of low grade radio transmissions, such as those

on air traffic control frequencies, often allowed the RAF to learn of raids

forming out of radar range. The information then helped radar observers

discriminate between bomber and fighter formations on their screens. On

81
AIR BASE AIR DEFENSE

occasion, ULTRA provided key information. The probability of air base raids

on August 30 and 31 was known in advance, and appropriate alerts passed

to sector commanders. During the same period, Churchill and Dowding

knew that the Luftwaffe's aircraft strength had fallen to half of the normal

total and that replacements were not arriving quickly enough to cover losses.

German production, geared only to a short war, had trouble meeting requirements. Knowledge of German operations and organization gave the

British a clear picture on which to base decisions, and daily operational

intelligence assisted effective tactical deployment of fighter squadrons.45

The RAF's fighter force battled for six weeks and appeared to be nearing at the end of its tether when the Germans shifted emphasis from airfields

to attacks on major cities. The Germans thereby admitted they had not

defeated the RAF. Subsequently, the Germans dropped their plan to launch

a cross channel naval and airborne invasion.

In surviving the British had prevailed. The air defense of Great Britain

functioned so well that a report on October 30, 1940, by a board of officers

convened by the Chief of the U.S. Army Air Corps recommended adopting

much of the system for air defense of the continental United States. The

major change projected by the Americans was a more decentralized control,

made necessary by the expanse of North America. There is no question that

Fighter Command, with its expert leadership, aided by Goering's vacillation, was one of the main reasons for British survival beyond 1940. What is

not often seen, however, is the manner in which the air bases were defended

from the ground while the Spitfires and Hurricanes were in the air. 4

In the summer of 1940 Britain's antiaircraft gun defenses were anything

but first rate. Attached operationally to Dowding as commander of the Air

Defence of Great Britain was the British Army Antiaircraft Command,

which controlled all the heavy and medium AA guns throughout the country. The AA Command, formed shortly before the war, was made up largely

of a dedicated Territorial Army militia, some of whose members had spent

many prewar weekends in training, to the quiet amusement of their countrymen. The antiaircraft units were commanded by a regular officer, General

Sir Frederick Pile, who retained his position throughout the war. His command started as one antiaircraft division, which grew in stages to seven by

early 1940. During 1939 and early 1940, large numbers of personnel from

various, and sometimes dubious, sources were inducted, trained, and organized, all with considerable struggle.4

'

Pile had never enough guns to meet the German onslaught. In January

1940, he had only one-third of the heavy guns (4.5-inch and 3.7-inch) and

one-twentieth of the medium guns (40-mm Bofors) needed to protect the

entire United Kingdom. Production was not increasing rapidly enough, and

there were constant demands from the Army and the Navy to divert weapons

to the British Expeditionary Force in France, for the expedition to Norway,

82
BLITZKRIEG AND THE BATTLE OF BRITAIN

and for shipboard use. Many guns were abandoned when the BEF quit the

Continent. The lack of medium guns was especially worrisome to the RAF,

as the 40-mm was the prime weapon for use against dive bombers and low

level attackers, and was needed to protect fighters during the vulnerable

times when they were landing or just taking off. To make matters worse,

there were only 150 spare barrels for these weapons in mid-1940. The shortage of Bofors guns was made up temporarily by use of Lewis guns, a .30

caliber machine gun from World War I with limited range and rate of fire,

hardly suited to the task of shooting down contemporary airplanes. Searchlights were in short supply and the few gun laying radars were very new and

so unreliable as to be almost valueless. The AA Command, however,

achieved good daytime accuracy using visual observation, which fortuitously coincided with the initial German strategy of daylight raids to achieve

optimum accuracy.

48

As the months of 1940 passed, desperate measures resulted in a slow

increase in guns available for air base defense. By July 11, there were 574

Bofors guns of a projected need in excess of 4,000. On August 21, there were

a total of 694, and 726 on September 11. If all of these were spread evenly

among the 40 stations where fighter squadrons were located, there would

have been 18 per location with just 6 left for other places such as ports,

aircraft factories, arsenals and the like-a not very impressive score and one

kept a closely guarded secret even from the Americans. General Pile even

dissembled with the American military attache in June 1940 in claiming that

the constant movement of guns made strict accounting impossible. During

the battle, Pile settled on 16 Bofors guns and 8 heavy AA guns as the

minimum for the defense of each base. Few RAF installations ever acquired

so many; the 8 Bofors at Hornchurch and 6 at Biggin Hill were the most at

any one location.4 9 Pile had to concentrate the Bofors at Fighter Command

bases in the south and east that were under the heaviest attack and which

formed the linchpin of Dowding's defensive scheme. He supplemented them

with Lewis guns and some 20-mm cannon designed for installation in

fighters. Airfields to the west and north had few, if any, medium AA guns,

and the number of guns in different areas changed as demand shifted among

Army, Navy, and other competing agencies.?

Camouflage, too, was a victim of the interwar frugality and very little

preparation had been accomplished by September 1939. Some practical experiments for aircraft were carried out during the 1935 crisis in Ethiopia,

and the following year the RAF established a pattern for coloring planes to

reduce visibility from above. For European operations, the upper surfaces

were painted in a combination of "dark green" and "dark earth,' which

reduced detection both while on the ground and in the air. This color pattern, in paint designed to reduce reflection, was in common use by 1939. The

increased drag on a dull painted surface slowed the high performance Hurri83
AIR BASE AIR DEFENSE

canes and Spitfires, but, on balance, was an advantage because of the

concealment it offered."

Ground targets, especially air bases, were much more difficult to conceal. Most RAF station buildings were of brick construction at the edge of a

wide grass field and easily discernible from the air. An attempt at systematic

camouflage of vulnerable sites began in 1936 with the formation of a subcommittee devoted to it within the Committee of Imperial Defence. The

subcommittee quickly decided that it would be impossible to make targets

invisible to reconnaissance cameras and, in any event, most major targets

were well known to the Germans or any other potential enemy. With the

object of confusing a bombardier, targets were to be made inconspicuous to

an airborne observer 4 miles away at 5,000 feet and moving at 180 miles per

hour. The distance and altitude criteria matched the average visibility in

English skies and the height of English cloud cover. Results were hardly

uniform or encouraging."

Biggin Hill was disguised in late 1938. False woods and hedges blending

with those of the surrounding Kent countryside were planted and the light

color of the concrete aircraft parking apron and the parade ground were

subdued with asphalt. Hangars were painted in an orange tone to break up

their silhouettes, but a pilot who went up to check from 7,000 feet reported

the base clearly discernible. A number of Lufthansa commercial airliners

passed over, supposedly off course on their approach to the London airport

at Croydon. German airline crews observed and photographed the installation in the summer of 1939, much to the distress of the British, who on at

least one prewar occasion, fired warning flares at the intruders. Other RAF

bases were camouflaged similarly. Their runways were painted a dark color,

and buildings were given a diffuse pattern, but all remained visible from the

air. A much more effective ruse was the creation of dummy airfields with

mock aircraft intended to misdirect bomber pilots. The Luftwaffe would

have been alert to the possibility of dispersed airfields after their experience

in Poland and France and so that tactic lent itself to successful deception.

On several occasions these fields were hit instead of the intended targets."

Virtually every RAF station had a ground defense unit of about 150

men armed with rifles and machine guns. Ground defense weapons could

also be turned against air attackers, with occasional success. Biggin Hill had

74 men from the Queen's Own Royal West Regiment, supplemented by 70

RAF airmen. In addition, some heavy gun batteries of the 90th Anti-Aircraft Regiment were posted around the base. The Station Commander,

Group Capt. Richard Grice, moved them close to the field so that their fire

would have a greater effect on dive bombers. At the time of the fall of

France, both the ground and air defenses were increased by the addition of

half a battalion of the Dorset Regiment and a detachment of the 34th AA

84
BLITZKRIEG AND THE BATTLE OF BRITAIN

Battalion with Bofors guns. On August 18, Biggin Hill's defense was among

the strongest in the country.5

"

The Luftwaffe's main attacks were on the air bases in Kent, Sussex,

Surrey, Hampshire, and Essex, closest to the Continent. The fields were easy

for the Germans to reach, but RAF fighters operating from them had the

greatest combat time after take-off, and German success depended on forcing the British out of their favorable position. In order to defend the bases,

the RAF used a variety of passive and active measures in addition to the

fighters. To prevent blast damage to parked aircraft, the British spread the

planes out behind earth revetments whenever possible. In addition, dispersals were used, and entire squadrons were moved to smaller satellite airfields

to increase targeting problems for the Luftwaffe. Biggin Hill's aircraft used

a small flying club field at Gravesend as an auxiliary airdrome. Kenley,

Croydon, and West Mailing were also under Biggin Hill's control. Biggin

Hill's aircraft operated from them when necessary, supplementing the assigned crews. 5

From the start of the air battle, the Germans were unsure of the function and importance of the Chain Home stations, although they knew the

stations existed and that fighters were directed by radio based upon radar

sightings. On August 12, the Luftwaffe attacked six stations, but destroyed

only the one at Ventnor, on the Isle of Wight. The British kept the remainder

in operation and managed to conceal the single loss. Other attacks followed

the next day, with stations damaged, but none disabled for more than a few

hours. On August 15, Goering dropped radar sites from the target list because, as he said, "not one of those so far attacked has been put out of

action." The Luftwaffe's leaders failed to understand fully the importance

of radar to Fighter Command's operations. Although they employed radar

themselves and knew of the RAF's use of it for at least a year before the

battle, they made no apparent study of the British system's vulnerability or

of ways to neutralize it. For the RAF, this was a godsend, as three days after

Goering's decision, the heaviest blows began to fall on their airfields.56 (Map

6)

Biggin Hill, the fighter control base for the defense sector southeast of

London, was one of the most important Fighter Command installations in

the area, and closest to the Luftwaffe's French airfields. The Germans hit it

repeatedly. The first major raid on August 18, 1940, hit the field and the

stations at Kenley, West Malling, and Croydon. About fifty German planes

approached Biggin Hill from the direction of Tunbridge Wells. Two of the

four RAF squadrons had already taken off to defend Kenley. Only No. 32

Squadron with Hurricanes and No. 610 Squadron with nine Spitfires remained. These the controller held back until he was sure Biggin Hill was the

target. Just in time, he ordered them up and everyone one the base not in

battle stations went into the trenches. The low level attackers were a mixed

85
Two German aerial photos show RAF Station Eastchurch, the first before

August 15; the second, grainy poststrike view bears German indicators

pointing out damage to facilities.

o f 4r

#f *

5~: 41g++
BRITISH FIGHTER FORCE DEPLOYMENT 1940

LEGEND _

Bnaries of Fighte Groups._____

Boundare of Fighter Sectors........

The figures show the number of fighters in

.0 each sector on the basis of a tactical strength

of twelve aircraft to a squadron

Types are shown thus: o Hurricanes and Spitfires ....... 0

Blenheims ...........................

Defiants.............................. A

TU RM4OUSE 12I Q ~No. 13 GROUP

USWORTH

WALLOP -,CA@HFENTONC

Ma0
AIR BASE AIR DEFENSE

force of Dornier 215s, Junkers 88s, Heinkel Ills and Messerschmitt l10s,

accompanied by an escort of Messerschmitt 109s. Bombs began to drop on

the far side of the field away from the buildings while the Bofors guns

opened up. Near the base a group of civilian Local Defence Volunteers, later

redesignated the Home Guard, fired their rifles at a low flying Do215, which

caught fire and crashed just beyond the base-much to everyone's surprise.

The Bofors guns scored no hits, although one of their positions suffered a

near miss from a bomb; one of the crew was killed and several others

injured. Above the base a wild ten-minute fight ensued with none of the

British planes shot down. At the same time, the two RAF squadrons

claimed a total of seventeen Luftwaffe planes including one Dol7 which

Flight Sgt. C. A. Parsons of 610 Squadron, with empty guns, bluffed into

landing intact in Romney Marsh. The aggressive attack by Biggin's defenders broke up the German force. The base suffered very little damage,

losing only the motor vehicle sheds. No aircraft or other buildings were

harmed. Two people were killed. 7

On August 30th and 31st Biggin Hill received a series of determined

Luftwaffe raids, preceded by a warning from radio intercepts. At noon on

the 30th, two squadrons of Spitfires met the first raid and scattered the

Germans, who could not hit the base. Another attack on came at six that

evening without warning. A flight of no more than ten German bombers

flew up the Thames, turned south and came in at low level. Heavy antiaircraft fire and some ineffective Lewis guns engaged them. Only six Spitfires

took off, but failed to stop the Ju88s that cratered the flying field. All

electric, water, and gas lines were cut and the airmen's and Women's Auxiliary Air Force dormitories were destroyed. One hangar was hit by a bomb

and almost all of the motor vehicles and two parked aircraft were destroyed.

The gunners did not account for any aircraft shot down. Even as the Ju88s

flew off, the station commander organized a rapid repair crew to free

wounded trapped in the rubble, find bodies, and restore the utilities and

general operation of the station. Telephone service, crucial to launching

fighters, resumed during the night, but other utilities remained out for some

days. Flying operations continued on the morning of the 31st with two

squadrons, Nos. 32 and 610, going to Acklington for a rest. At noon on the

3 1st, the Germans returned and this time, despite antiaircraft fire, pitted the

runway so badly that the arriving replacement squadron, No. 79, had to

land at Croydon, a few miles away, until frantic repairs put the field back

into operation by late afternoon."

At six in the evening, the Germans returned and this time put the

operations center out of action, destroyed four parked Spitfires and set the

armory on fire. Those who could resumed the clean up while the commander and the chaplain prepared a funeral for those killed. During the

services, held the following day, the fifth attack took place, but the airfield

88
BLITZKRIEG AND THE BATTLE OF BRITAIN

remained operational. Through four more days of heavy bombing, Group

Capt. Grice's command, by dint of aerial combat, ground fire, and almost

constant repair, maintained fully operational status on the display board at

Fighter Command headquarters. Reading radio intercepts, Air Vice Marshal Park was able to select squadrons for intercept duty and time their

return to base for service before the next raid. The RAF's fighters usually

avoided destruction on the ground.

During the long series of attacks on Biggin Hill, antiaircraft defenses

were heavily relied upon, but scored relatively few hits. The value of the guns

lay in disrupting the concentration of attacking pilots. The threat of the

Bofors and machine guns sent pilots to higher altitudes, throwing off their

bombing accuracy and making their airplanes more vulnerable to interception by the Spitfires and Hurricanes. Antiaircraft guns at Biggin Hill, then,

were not a main source of loss for the Luftwaffe, but contributed to the

defense by creating conditions favoring the defending fighter squadrons and

even the repair crews working on runways, communications, and damaged

aircraft. The combined efforts kept the base operational, despite heavy and

repeated damage. 9

Hornchurch lay east of London, and, like Biggin Hill, was one of the

most heavily attacked bases. With the start of the war in East Europe,

camouflage crews worked over the buildings, gunners in the outlying areas

practiced their load and fire drills, and the Hurricanes and Spitfires moved

to dispersal spots around the field. Within Hornchurch's sector was the field

at Manston, right on the coast and a magnet for the Luftwaffe's raids.'

The strength of Hornchurch's station complement in June 1940, exclusive of fighter squadrons rotated in and out, was 34 officers and 650 airmen

and non commissioned officers. Of this number, one officer and 154 enlisted men made up the Station Defence Force, an essentially ground defense

unit armed with rifles and machine guns that fired on low flying aircraft.

The main air defense was provided by antiaircraft guns. West of Hornchurch

lay a detachment of four 4.5-inch heavy AA guns, the newest in use. Low

level protection was the responsibility of eight Bofors guns of the 109th

Canadian Light AA Battery. Supplementing these weapons were twelve machine guns of the ground defense section. The 40-mm and 4.5-inch weapons

were controlled from the station operations room in a small, one story

building out in the open where an AA liaison officer was posted with with

two signal men. The room's location was so vulnerable that the controllers

and communications equipment eventually moved to a Masonic Temple in

the town of Romford, finding larger quarters and the advantage of distance

as a protection from bombs.6 '

On the 31st, at quarter past one, German aircraft came over Hornchurch at 15,000 feet and dropped bombs diagonally across the station.

There was no structural damage, but blast pressure destroyed three Spitfires

89
AIR BASE AIR DEFENSE

just as they left the ground. The planes were thrown about like wood chips in

a wind. With wings torn off, they hit the earth upside down or without

propellers. By a miracle, none of the pilots was killed or even seriously

injured. The bombs badly cratered the landing field, but it remained usable.

The holes were quickly filled.6 2

Heavy attacks on the base continued for several days. Typical was

September 2nd, when all three of the fighter squadrons rose to fend off a

large group of Germans who turned back just short of the base and were

able to bomb only the perimeter. Four Messerschmitts and a Dornier 215

were shot down. All of this came about after the squadrons had, earlier in

the day, fought two battles over France and the Channel. It was not the

antiaircraft fire that stopped the raid, but the aggressive defense of the

fighters.6 3

In the early part of September, the Luftwaffe shifted its attention from

air bases to cities due to a deliberate British stratagem. Churchill knew the

RAF could not continue to accept punishment indefinitely. Using as a pretext a minor, accidental bombing of London on August 24, he directed

retaliatory raids on Berlin. Hitler and Goering were furious and baited into

pursuing a policy of terror bombing; they obligingly defaulted on their best

chance to defeat Britain. The Luftwaffe's real opportunity was destruction

of the RAF's bases in the southeast, which would have forced a withdrawal

to northern and western areas of England, exposing the proposed invasion

beaches near Dover. Churchill recalled the bitter necessity to accept damage

to the civilian population in his account of the Battle of Britain: ". . . we

never thought of the struggle in terms of the defence of London or any other

place, but only who won in the air."' The major urban areas of England,

used as a lure, became a weapon in air base defense. The pressure on the

RAF's airfields eased, the reserve of fighters grew, and new pilots replaced

those lost during the battle.

Despite the continuing arguments over the location of the No. 11 Group

bases (west of London as opposed to the east and southeast) or the size of

the RAF's attacking force (wings as opposed to squadrons), the system

designed, built, and tested over a four year period prevailed. The British

were aided in their victory by an enemy air command that chose not to

concentrate its forces on the most vital targets-the radar system and Fighter

Command's air bases. German target policy shifted first away from radar

stations and then from air bases to cities and less important facilities just at

a crucial time for the Royal Air Force. Even when airfields were prime

targets, the Luftwaffe dissipated its offense instead of focusing on Fighter

Command. Failure to assess correctly the military situation at the highest

German command levels resulted in a loss of the concentration of force

needed to win.65

90
BLITZKRIEG AND THE BATTLE OF BRITAIN

Three of the commanding British figures during the Battle

of Britain at a commemorative service. Left, General Sir

Frederick Pile, Air Chief

Marshal Sir Hugh Dowding,

center, and Air Vice Marshal .

Trafford Leigh-Mallory accept honors.

Summary

Conventional guns, searchlights, and camouflage did not protect bases

in Poland, the Low Countries, or France. In Britain, defenses succeeded,

but for reasons not apparent to many even during the Battle of Britain itself.

Guns brought down very few airplanes, but forced the bombers higher. Had

the RAF relied on them alone to defend bases on British soil, the result

would have been much the same as the Allies experience in the battle for

France. Camouflage, which some held in high regard, provided only limited

protection, and German aircrews found targets by easy reference to known

landmarks. By the Luftwaffe's doctrine, most German bombing was from

15,000 feet and above or from 1,000 feet and below. The British prewar

decision to conceal or disguise installations from a distance of 5,000 feet

thus became moot. The 100 or more dummy airfields with airplane silhouettes were a more effective ruse. Later in the war, the Air Ministry Inspector

of Airfield Camouflage, Mr. Norman Wilkinson, decided that much of this

effort was waste. He found that quick runway repair and other damage

control measures were much more useful during the Battle of Britain.'

During August and September 1940, the RAF lost 1,379 fighters destroyed

or heavily damaged. Less than 70 were caught on the ground by enemy

action. The tactics of Dowding and Park and vigorous base defense, rapid

airfield repair, the production of new planes, and repair of damaged ones

combined to keep Fighter Command operating without letup.67

91
AIR BASE AIR DEFENSE

Clear German aerial victories in the first year of World War II came to

an end by September 15, 1940. In Poland, the Luftwaffe's attrition of a

numerically inferior force followed upon the disruption of its suppy and

communications. In France and the Low Countries German air power faced

a foe with divided command authority, using tactics and organization more

suited to World War I, and, in the case of France, not prepared to fight

offensively. The Germans maintained pressure on the Allies and seized air

superiority except over the evacuation beaches at Dunkirk. With the bases

they gained on the channel coast, Marshal Goering's air fleets could bring

pressure on the United Kingdom over short range and with reasonable hope

of victory."

The German failure over England had multiple causes. The inadequacy

of doctrine, the inability to make correct decisions at senior command

levels, and equipment design problems contributed heavily. The inattention

of the Luftwaffe's leadership to the importance of the Chain Home stations

and their relation to the defense also led to the German failure. Without the

ability to direct the squadrons, Dowding's group commanders could not

have continued their intense defensive battle. The German failings were

almost incomprehensible, but the Battle of Britain was the first in which the

Luftwaffe fought a major air campaign, and inexperience at strategic direction showed. Vulnerable German bombers, carrying inadequate loads and

often left unprotected by the Luftwaffe's short range fighters, could not

defeat Fighter Command. In January 1944, a lecturer at the German Air

Technical Academy at Berlin-Gatow, said, in referring to the RAF during the

Battle of Britain, "the enemy's power of resistance was stronger than the

medium of attack." 6

'9

Clearly, the respite between the fall of France and the large scale attacks

on RAF stations was needed by Dowding to reorganize his fighter squadrons

after the losses on the Continent. During May and June, of the 432 Hurricanes and Spitfires destroyed in France, 219 belonged to Fighter Command.

British factories produced 446 fighters in June, 496 in July, and 476 in

August, which barely covered the losses while providing a minimal reserve.

Pilots remained in short supply, but 1 Canadian squadron arrived and 4

Polish and Czechoslovak units were formed with veteran pilots who escaped

from their now occupied countries.70 The middle of August 1940, then,

found the British in a far better state than might have been supposed, given

the debacle across the Channel three months before. The RAF's experience

from the Battle of Britain left it ready to employ similar tactics in other

theaters as the war progressed. The next tests were to come in the Mediterranean and the Pacific.

92
Chapter IV

Malaya and Malta: 1941-1942

The closing months of 1941 and the first half of 1942 marked the lowest

point in Allied fortunes in World War II. Between June and December 1941,

the Russians suffered stunning losses; in December they were desperately

defending Moscow. The United States had just entered the war as a result of

Japan's attack at Pearl Harbor, but could not as yet exert a commanding

influence. Early in the following year, Maj. Gen. Erwin Rommel, Commander of the Afrika Korps, drove east from Cyrenaica in modern day

Libya and, on June 21, 1942, captured the British stronghold at Tobruk. In

the Far East, the Japanese forged swift campaigns in the Philippines, Malaya, and the Netherlands East Indies, where they established the defensive

outposts of their new Pacific empire and gained the needed raw materials for

their armed forces.' Landing in Thailand and northern Malaya on December

8, 1941, they pursued and often outran British forces, capturing Singapore

on February 15, 1942.

The defenses of Maltese and Malayan airbases present a diverting study

in similarities and contrasts. Both were victims of a parsimonious Exchequer in the quiescent interwar years. Faced with a hostile Fascist Italy

athwart her Mediterranean lifeline running from Gibraltar to Egypt, Britain

organized a hasty defense for Malta, but could not commit large numbers of

troops to a garrison. In the event, the successful defense counted on the

local leadership's skill and determination and the reluctance of the Axis to

accept the costs of overwhelming the exposed island when it had an even

chance to do so. Under attack from the time of the Italian entry into the war

in June 1940, Malta was in the thick of the fight a year and a half before

Malaya met its first onslaught. Yet the Far Eastern bulwark of Empire,

adequately warned and more heavily advertised as impregnable, was no

match for the Japanese forces thrown at it. The British defense was nowhere

93
AIR BASE AIR DEFENSE

concentrated or coordinated on the mainland north of the main fleet anchorage at Singapore. Interservice bickering hobbled prewar planning for

Malaya's defense, and faulty, often arrogant intelligence summaries tended

to demean Japanese competence and military equipment. The crisis in Europe starved the British command of adequate types and numbers of aircraft

for the defense. Malayan bases became easy prey for a greatly underestimated and superior enemy. Lack of British air cover combined with masterful Japanese amphibious strokes employing landing parties of armor and

infantry forced continual British retreat, eventual rout, and the loss of a

prized Imperial possession in the Far East, another signal of the demise of

European colonial dominion in Asia.

Malaya and Singapore: A Study in Failure

The Malay Peninsula extends south from Thailand toward the East

Indies and is connected to Asia at the Kra Isthmus, fifty miles across at its

narrowest point, between the Gulf of Thailand and the Indian Ocean. A

mountain range runs down the north-south axis to form a rugged backbone

for nearly the entire country from the Thai border to Singapore. In 1941,

roads generally paralleled the mountains on the coastal lowlands covered

with swampland and jungle vegetation interspersed with rubber estates and

rice paddies.

A vital part of the British Empire, Malaya was rich in basic goods

needed for the war, particularly rubber, tin, and iron. The British Cabinet

sought the greatest possible production of raw materials and strongly encouraged foreign sales to help finance the fighting in Europe. Begun in the

1920s, the naval base on Singapore Island was the pivot for the defense of

British interests in the Far East. In 1924, when the Curzon Committee*

selected the site of the Far East naval base, the Air Ministry proposed using

aircraft for the main defense of the island. That agency argued that airplanes could hit a land or sea invader at many times the range of even the

largest gun. The aircraft would not have to be stationed permanently in

Malaya, but could fly from England in time of need. Neither the Army nor

the Navy agreed with the Air Force's argument. The Royal Navy pointed out

the obvious advantages of having heavy weapons in place and favored the

type that had historically succeeded in deterring warships and seaborne

attack. The Army intended to defend the naval base, but not Malaya proper;

it believed no enemy force could operate in the rough jungle terrain. The

* Lord Curzon was Lord Privy Sea! in Stanley Baldwin's 1924 Conservative government

and former Foreign Minister. His committee was actually a subcommittee of the Committee of

Imperial Defence charged with making a final decision on the location of the naval base on

Singapore Island.

94
MALAYA AND MALTA

interservice rivalries still simmered in Malaya in 1940, when the colony's

defense amounted to three Indian Army divisions and a collection of obsolete and wholly inadequate aircraft.2

Until 1937, studies of the land defense of Malaya still rejected the

possibility of an overland advance down the peninsula. Maj.-Gen. William

G. S. Dobbie, General Officer Commanding Malaya, prepared his own

assessment at that point, asserting that a seaborne attack and landing on the

northeast coast was possible during the monsoon season from October to

March. Dobbie made landings to test his belief and found that the monsoons often obscured the forces involved. A land assault from the north, he

argued, posed the greatest danger to Singapore; the jungle would not prevent infantry maneuver as had been believed. As a result, an Indian Army

battalion scheduled to leave Malaya remained, and the Committee of Imperial Defence allotted £60,000 to build ground defense fortifications on

Singapore Island and in Johore State, just to the north.3

The improvements to ground defense contributed little. By 1940, the

approved defensive plan for the Far East centered heavily on aviation in

Malaya. In July of that year, the Chiefs of Staff in London authorized 336

modern fighters and bombers for the purpose, and the RAF sited new

airfields throughout the colony to extend reconnaissance and offensive capabilities. At no time, though, did the RAF ask the Army how well the

locations could be defended, an ill advised omission, since the Army theoretically provided all ground and antiaircraft protection. Since the Army had

not been consulted on the question of base defense, it was not prepared to

meet the RAF's expectations. The revised plan in 1941 called for securing all

of the air bases on the peninsula so as to give the RAF the range to strike an

enemy carrier force before it could strike. While this might have been realistic in 1935, the fall of France in 1940 and Japan's subsequent seizure of

French Indo-China in the summer of 1941 gave the potential enemy air and

naval bases within easy reach of Malaya. The British garrison of three

divisions could not mass enough force in any location to defend either side

of the country. In the event of an Asian conflict, the Commander-in-Chief

Far East was to hold Malaya until a fleet could arrive, a period assumed to

be between 70 and 180 days. The Air Officer Commanding Far East, Air

Vice Marshal Conway W. Pulford, realized that his 88 obsolete aircraft in

Malaya were not enough, and that air base construction in north Malaya

had to be accelerated. 4 A Far East Commonwealth defense conference held

in Singapore the October 1940 recommended increasing the combat air

strength to 582. The Chiefs of Staff agreed, but could not even send the

previously authorized aircraft, let alone the higher number of planes, hard

pressed as they were to defend the United Kingdom, Malta, and the Middle

East.'

95
AIR BASE AIR DEFENSE

The British also reorganized their command structure in Malaya in last

minute attempts to meet the coming fury. Late in 1940, the Cabinet created

the position of Commander-in-Chief Far East, and appointed Air Chief

Marshal Sir Robert Brooke-Popham to the post. On November 14, four days

after his arrival in Singapore, General Headquarters Far East began functioning. Subordinate to Brooke-Popham was Pulford as Air Officer Commanding Far East Command. Pulford bore the burden of modernizing and

operating the Air Force. Eight months later on July 10, 1941, Group Captain

E. B. Rice was appointed Fighter Defence Commander of Singapore and

Coordinator of Air Defences of Malaya. Antiaircraft guns remained the

responsibility of the British Army.'

Other Allied defense meetings in Singapore late in 1940 and early in

1941 involved the British, Dutch, Australians, and New Zealanders, with

United States representatives attending as neutral observers. No political

commitments resulted, but several recommendations for mutual air and

naval reinforcement went to the British and American Chiefs of Staff. Japan

was the presumed common enemy. American representatives participated in

the meetings through February and March 1941, but Washington publicly

raised repeated objections to the conference recommendations, pleading a

legally mandated neutrality. The U.S. Chief of Naval Operations refused to

be tied to the defense of Singapore. London, meanwhile, did not want to

divert United States support for Atlantic operations and so did not press for

extensive U.S. involvement in South Asia.7

Air base construction in Malaya after July 1940 centered on seven

existing installations that needed modernizing and sixteen new sites. Fighter

defenses, including the control system, were wholly lacking and had to be

started from scratch. Radar had to be acquired and installed, the rudimentary observer operation expanded, and a central fighter control organized

along with support, communications, and training of the staff. The work

was to have been done by the end of 1941, but this was impossible. Labor

and materials, especially asphalt and concrete, were lacking. Construction

equipment was old and there were not enough contractors in the country to

handle the expansion. The government of New Zealand sent an airfield

construction unit in October 1941, which helped but did not solve the problem.' The farthest north of the RAF's new bases, Alor Star and Kota Bharu,

were small civilian landing fields with tightly grouped buildings close to the

runways. Earth revetments there were not sufficient for blast protection.

With no thought given to camouflage, hard surfaced runways made excellent targets. Grass fields were easily seen and had their own particular

drawbacks: in the monsoon season they became quagmires, difficult to use

under any circumstances and especially hard to repair. As a result of the

February planning meeting, and in anticipation of a wartime alliance with

the United States, four bases, Gong Kedah, Butterworth, Tebrau, and Yong

96
MALAYA AND MALTA

Peng were to be built or enlarged to accommodate American B-17 bombers.

Of the four, only Gong Kedah's runway was complete when Japan invaded.

While construction went forward, defenses for the new bases did not keep

pace.9 (Map 7).

Defensive batteries and warning nets were incomplete in December

1941. Antiaircraft guns were extremely scarce in Malaya and some locations

were totally unprotected. The 3-inch AA guns, about one third of the total

heavy weapons, were World War I designs. There was only one regiment of

Bofors guns for low level defense.'" Defense plans called for a total of 20

radar installations for Malaya, but only at Singapore was coverage adequate

and there only to seaward. (Map 8) Four radar stations on the island provided advance warning of aircraft approaching at 130 miles offshore. Two

additional stations, on the southeast and southwest tip of Johore, were

operational, but great gaps in surveillance existed and were never closed.

Radar was supplemented by an Australian Air Force aerial reconnaissance

unit at Kota Bharu, but the normally heavy cloud cover and limited flying

time reduced its ability to provide information." Although the Army retained control of AA, the RAF controlled a poorly organized volunteer

civilian observer corps on the model of that used in England. The warning

net, lacking trained personnel, equipment, and communications, provided

little in the way of consistently effective reports of aircraft sightings. The

dense, mountainous jungle precluded building observation posts in central

Malaya. There were two observer control rooms, at Singapore and Kuala

Lumpur, and both were connected to the Dutch East Indies observer system.

The general lack of training and observer posts, however, meant that little

could be accomplished by the organization. In all, the defense operation

held promise of functioning well-but only if it could be put into action

with completed warning and communication systems, modern aircraft and

trained people.'2

As it was, the air bases were at risk. In addition to the lack of guns, the

outmoded fighters (See Tables 7-10), and poor siting of bases, little or no

joint planning had been done, and most ground defense units were Indian

States Forces, poorly trained and led."' North of Singapore, antiaircraft guns

were very scarce and height finding and fire control equipment, where it

existed, was all manual. Frequent overcast made spotting from the ground

difficult, and AA gun crew training was not always possible because of

shortages of aircraft to simulate or tow targets. With the shortage of

waapons, no installations other than those on Singapore Island mounted the

eight heavy antiaircraft and sixteen Bofors guns recommended as the minimum defense by General Pile after the Battle of Britain. Brooke-Popham

had to settle for a reduced number for each base: eight heavies and eight

Bofors. None of the bases north of Johore Strait reached even this number,

and many were totally unprotected. The few searchlights available were all in

97
R.A.F. IN MALAYA, DECEMBER 1941

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AIR BASE AIR DEFENSE

Singapore. Gun crews and air defense controllers were so deficient that on

the night of December 8, 1941, when Japanese bombers first raided the city,

fighters were forbidden to take off. Nobody knew how to coordinate gunfire

with airplanes, and there was fear that the wrong aircraft would be hit."

To prepare for combat with the British, the Japanese had Lt. Gen.

Tomoyuki Yamashita's veteran 25th Army, the subordinate 3rd Air Corps,

and the attached 22nd Naval Air Flotilla. Since his forces lacked adequate

maps for the Malayan operation, the Chief of the 25th Army's Operations

Planning Staff, Lt. Col. Masanobu Tsuji, reconnoitered north Malaya in an

unarmed plane. Fine weather on November 22 allowed him to see Singora

and Patani in Thailand, and the east coast airdrome of Kota Bharu. Crossing the mountains and entering rain clouds, Tsuji and his pilot dropped to

6,000 feet and overflew the air bases at Alor Star, Sungei Patani, and Taiping. The size and extensive development of the British installations surprised Tsuji. Knowing the RAF could destroy the few planes his forces could

initially operate from Singora and Patani airfields, he decided to recommend quickly capturing the major British air installations of Alor Star and

Kota Bharu. Tsuji's reasoning was clear; possessing the bases would drive

the RAF from Northern Malaya and allow the Japanese greater operating

freedom. On Tsuji's return to Saigon, the Japanese altered their plans and

reinforced the Army Air Forces' units intended for the Malay campaign.

General Saburo Endo's 3rd Air Group, with 3 regiments of medium bombers

and one of fighters, was added to the 3rd Air Corps on December 2.'"

Both the 3rd Air Corps and the 22nd Naval Air Flotilla possessed

fighter and bomber squadrons. The majority of the naval flotilla's squadrons were land based, operating from Indo-China. Although missions of the

3rd and 22nd differed, both had to collaborate in preventing British attacks

on newly established Japanese airdromes. In addition to fighter protection,

the 3rd Air Corps prepared mobile antiaircraft organizations to protect their

new bases. The Corps' four airfield construction units could repair captured

enemy airfields and rapidly build new establishments."6

In mid-1941, the British plan to thwart a Japanese invasion was Operation MATADOR. MATADOR postulated a British advance to a line across the

Kra Isthmus just north of the Thai ports of Singora and Patani and their

airfields to deny them to the Japanese. The War Cabinet complicated this

simple plan with an insistence that Britain violate no part of Thai territory

until Japan did so, or unless America agreed to provide support to the

British in the Far East.' 7

On December 5, amid reports of Japanese movements, Brooke-Popham was authorized to begin MATADOR if he faced a Japanese landing on

the Kra Isthmus. He agonized while trying to get full reconnaissance surveys

from the Gulf of Siam. Even as the British minister in Thailand was insisting

on continued respect of Thai neutrality, General Yamashita seized Singora

100
MALAYA AND MALTA

and Patani on December 8, 1941. The two airfields, inadequate at first, were

rapidly improved.'s On the same morning, the Japanese launched air attacks

from Singora, Bangkok, and Indo-China designed to neutralize the northern Malay air bases. Japan's air commanders wanted to preserve the fields

for their own use, so they avoided cratering the landing areas. With no

warning system, the British installations were vulnerable to surprise raids,

and scarcity of British and Indian AA guns made retaliation feeble. Group

Captain Rice's fighter control center in Singapore was just becoming operational and could provide little help."9

Nothing seemed to avail the defense. The RAF attacked troops landing

at Patani, but Japanese interceptors were waiting in the air and British losses

were heavy. The RAF was too weak to follow up, and the Japanese retaliated

quickly. Twenty minutes after No. 62 Squadron's Blenheims returned to Alor

Star, Japanese bombers came over at 13,000 feet dropping antipersonnel and

high explosive fragmentation bombs. The only warning came from an airman waving a white handkerchief on the base's far perimeter. There were no

fighters aloft, and the four old 3-inch guns could neither hit nor disperse the

attackers. Four Blenheims were destroyed, five were damaged. No Japanese

planes were shot down and the bombing formation was not disrupted.

Brooke-Popham thought the antiaircraft guns unable to reach the bombers,

but their range was 20,500 feet. Inexperienced crews, the outmoded design,

and the poor aiming capability of the all too few antiaircraft guns led to the

complete failure of the defense. The Japanese hit airfields at Sungei Patani,

Gong Kedah, Machang, and Butterworth repeatedly on the same day. None

had any passive defense except for dispersal parking at Gong Kedah."

Kota Bharu, on the northeast coast, was also in difficulty. The Japanese

wanted the base to support the 25th Army's advance. Air attacks began

early in the morning, avoiding the landing field when possible. The Japanese assault force landed on the beach and began to move inland toward the

base under heavy British fire. By late afternoon of December 8, the ground

offensive pressed so close to the perimeter that the RAF evacuated the

base-prematurely as it turned out. While the British moved their 3-inch

AA guns to the south, the Japanese seized their first functioning airfields in

Malaya. No other British air base or satellite field on the east coast had any

antiaircraft defense. Bypassing the nearby but overly vulnerable Gong Kedah, the retreating British aircraft landed at Kuantan, several hundred miles

down the coast. 2'

On December 9, Pulford tried again to strike at Singora airfield with six

Blenheims from Tengah and Butterworth. The attackers bombed the Japanese aircraft, but found fighters of the 12th Air Group in abundance. With

their sound detectors and searchlights, Japanese antiaircraft units contributed effective AA fire. Three of the six British planes did not return. The

101
TABLE 7

Royal Air Force Strength and Disposition

in Malaya, December 7, 1941

Airfield Squadron No. Type Strength

Alor Star 62 Blenheim I 11

Sungei Patani 21 (RAAF) Buffalo 12

Sungei Patani 27 Blenheim I 12

Kota Bharu I (RAAF) Hudson II 12

Kota Bharu 36 Vildebeeste 6

Gong Kedah 100 Vildebeeste 6

Kuantan 60 Blenheim I 8

Kuantan 8 (RAAF) Hudson II 8

Kuantan 36 Vildebeeste 6

Tengah 34 Blenheim IV 16

Kallang 243 (RNZAF) Buffalo 16

Kallang 488 (RNZAF) Buffalo 16

Sembawang 8 (RAAF) Hudson II 4

Sembawang 453 (RAAF) Buffalo 16

Seletar 100 Vildebeeste 6

Seletar 205 Catalina 3

Total 158

No. 60 Squadron had arrived from Burma for bombing practice, and was retained in Malaya on the start of the war with Japan. About the middle of December

the personnel returned to Burma by sea, the aircraft remaining in Malaya to replace

combat losses in other squadrons.

Hurricane fighters did not arrive until January 1942, because of demands at

home and in the Middle East.

There were two maintenance units, No. 151 at Seletar and No. 153 at Kuala

Lumpur.

Reserve Aircraft in Malaya

Blenheim I and IV 15

Buffalo 52

Hudson 7

Catalina 2

Total 88

Source: Kirby, The War Against Japan, Vol I.
TABLE 8

Antiaircraft Artillery Forces

Singapore Malay Peninsula

1 st HAA Regt (Less 1 Btry) Butterworth - 1 Lt. AA Btry

2nd HAA Regt (Less 1 Btry) Alor Star - 1 Lt. AA Btry

3rd HAA Regiment Sungei - 1 H.A.A. Btry

3rd Lt. A.A. Regt (Less 1 Btry) Gong Kedah - 1. H.A.A. Btry

1st AA Regt (Indian Army) Kota Bharu - 1 H.A.A. Btry

5th Searchlight Regt

Heavy AA regiments normally had guns in 3 batteries of 12 guns each but this varied

by type of gun in use and location of the unit. Both 3-inch and 3.7-inch weapons

were in Malaya.

The light AA regiment was assigned 3 batteries of 18 Bofors guns.

Sources: Kirby, The War Against Japan, Vol I

Percival: Second Supplement to The London Gazette, No. 38215, 26 February 1948

Japanese Monograph No. 68: Report on Installations

and Captured Weapons, Java and Singapore.
TABLE 9

Major Malayan Air Installation Defenses

December 8, 1941

AA Dispersal Runway

Base Guns Capability Surface

Alor Star 4 x 3" guns Complete Hard

Butterworth* None Not complete Hard, being extended

Jabi None None Graded, not surfaced

Lubok Kiap None None Partly surfaced,

partly graded

Penang None None Grass

Sungei Patani 7 x 3.7" guns Almost complete Grass

Gong Kedah 2 x 3" guns Almost complete Hard

Kota Bharu 4 x 3" guns Almost complete Grass

Machang None None Hard

Kuantan None Complete Grass

Ipoh None None Grass and hard

Kuala Lumpur None None Grass

Kluang* None Complete Grass, hard surface

under construction

Kahang None Complete Grass

Singapore Island

Kallang ** Complete Grass

Seletar **

8 x 40-mm Bofors Complete Grass

Sembawang ** Complete Grass

Tengah ** Partly complete Grass and concrete

* Eight Bofors guns arrived at Butterworth on the morning of December 10; a

battery of guns arrived at Kluang on or about December 28.

** AA protection was provided by Singapore and Naval air base air defense

guns.

Sources: Maltby, Third Supplement to The London Gazette, No. 32816, 26 February 1948

RAF Narrative (Draft), The Campaigns in the Far East, Vol I
TABLE 10

Japanese 3rd Army Air Corps

(Lt. Gen. Michiyo Sugawara)

Unit Aircraft Ty1pe* Numbers

3rd Air Group (Brigade)

59th Air Flt (Regt) Model 1 (Oscar) and

Model 97 (Nate) Ftrs 24

27th Air Flt Model 99 Bombers (Lily) 28

75th Air Fit Model 99 Bombers 25

90th Air Fleet Model 99 Bombers 23

7th Air Group

64th Air Fleet Model 1 and Model 97 Ftrs 41

12th Air Fleet Model 97B Bombers (Sally) 27

60th Air Fleet Model 97B Bombers 60

98th Air Fleet Model 99B Bombers 42

* Allied code names for Japanese aircraft appear in parentheses.

12th Air Group

1st Air Fleet Model 97 Fighters 42

llth Air Fleet Model 97 Fighters 39

15th Independent Air Fleet

50th Recon. Sq. Model 97 and 100 Bombers (Helen) 5

51st Recon. Sq. Model 97 and 100 Bombers 5

Other Assigned Units

81st Air Fleet Model 97 and 100 Bombers 26

(Recon)

15th and 7th Air Model 97 Transports 55

Transport Units

83rd Indep. Air 3 Recon

Unit (Recon) Squadrons

Antiaircraft Artillery Forces

20th AA Regt

32nd AA Fld Battalion [4 companies each, armed

36th AA Fld Battalion with 20 and 25-mm automatic

cannon and 75-mm heavy guns.)

Sources: Japanese Monograph No. 55, Record of Southeast Asia Air Operations
AIR BASE AIR DEFENSE

TABLE 11

Japanese Navy 22nd Air Flotilla

Rear Adm. Sadaichi Matsunaga

Malaya Operation Strength

Type 0 Fighters (Zeke or Zero) 36

Light Attack Bombers

Land Based 96

Reconnaissance

Aircraft, Land Based 9

21st Air Flotilla Units

(Attached for the Operation)

Light Attack Bombers,

Land Based 42

According to Lt. Gen. Saburo Endo, Commander of the 3rd Air Group, the total

Army and Navy air strength on December 8, including reserve aircraft, was about

800.

Sources: Japanese Monographs, No. 55, Record of Southeast Asia Air Operations, and No.

107, Malaya Invasion Naval Operations

Kirby, The War Against Japan, Vol I

Endo Interrogation, Interrogation No. 278, USSBS, Pacific

ease with which the Japanese brought AA battalions to their bases indicated

their capacity to move equipment and supplies quickly."

Continued southward pressure by the Japanese on both sides of the

mountains made the RAF's position extremely tenuous. On the ninth, at

noon, the first Japanese bombing raid hit Kuantan air base. After the high

and low level attacks, the Japanese naval pilots reported fierce antiaircraft

fire. Since Kuantan had no protection, the source of the fire is uncertain,

but it may have come from the rifles and machine guns of the 5th Sikhs,

providing the ground defense. Perhaps it was imagination, stimulated by the

106
MALAYA AND MALTA

sense of danger felt by the pilots. Another Japanese attack on Butterworth

at five that afternoon disrupted the imminent departure of another flight of

Blenheims for Singora. The eight Bofors guns sent by the l1th Indian Division were just being set up, and could not influence the fight. At about the

same time, British Air Headquarters decided that an evacuation of all the

northern bases was necessary. Most of the squadrons there no longer existed; the RAF north of Singapore was largely a reconnaissance agency. 3

Japan's Nate and Zero fighters were a complete surprise to British

pilots. The high performance aircraft quickly destroyed the Buffaloes, leaving the Blenheim bombers unescorted and vulnerable. Although most British pilots were unaware of the existence of the Japanese fighters on

December 8, a great deal of information about a Zero shot down in China in

May 1941 reached Air Headquarters Far East in Singapore months before

the Japanese attack. By the end of September, the British knew the aircraft's

range, speed, and armament and oxygen arrangement, yet none of this was

given to the aircrews because there were no intelligence officers in the flying

squadrons. The small intelligence staff at air headquarters was simply unable to make up for the inadequacies caused by poor prewar staff organization and manning.2

Until December 10, the Japanese were wary of the British Far East

Fleet, the battleship Prince of Wales and battle cruiser Repulse and their

supporting destroyers, which could disrupt Japanese naval support and

ground operations in Southeast Asia. That day, the Japanese Naval Air

Force, flying from Indo-China, found the British fleet units off the Malay

coast near Kuantan, and sank both capital ships in two hours. This was a

stunning blow to the British; for Japan it opened new combat options and

allowed them a free hand in advancing on Singapore. 5 At the end of the first

week's fighting, the RAF was forced to fall back to Kuala Lumpur airfield.

Here the retreating Indians, British, and Australians assembled their

fighters and supporting antiaircraft weapons. Gunners manning six 3.7-

inch, four 3-inch, and eight Bofors guns along with the pilots of the Royal

Australian Air Force's No. 453 Squadron, flying Brewster Buffaloes, fought

Japanese fighters and bombers attacking the airfield. By nightfall of the

22nd, only three of the original fifteen fighters were able to fly, and the field

was abandoned the following day to a much superior Japanese air force

operating from nearby captured British fields. The remnants of the RAF

were now centered on the reputedly impregnable Singapore Island.'

Air defense of the four bases at Singapore itself benefited at first from

their distance from the fighting, radar warning, modern airfields, and the

antiaircraft guns protecting the city and the naval base. Of the 172 heavy and

light AA guns in the colony, more than half were in the Singapore area on

107
AIR BASE AIR DEFENSE

December 8.* The forces retreating to the city brought back many of the

weapons that had been deployed up-country, but the most serious problem

continued to be a shortage of fighters. Japanese ability to repair and use

abandoned British air bases added to the difficulties facing Singapore's

defenders. While the retreating RAF was able to remove spare parts and

equipment, large stocks of gasoline and bombs were left behind."

Throughout the remainder of December, combat losses reduced the

Commonwealth squadrons to a total of twenty-five bombers and thirty

Buffalo fighters, all based at Singapore. Acting in support of the prewar

mutual assistance plan, the Dutch East Indies Air Corps sent fifteen Martin

B-10 bombers and a squadron of Buffaloes. The Air Ministry in London

ordered reinforcements from the Middle East: fifty-two Hudson III

bombers, and fifty-one Hurricane fighters. The convoy carrying the crated

Hurricanes arrived on January 13, and they were ready for use by the 20th of

the month.2

While awaiting the reinforcements, British night air strikes at Japanese

occupied bases continued at every opportunity. Because of the heavy losses

of Blenheims, attacks were small and sporadic. Most were made before

dawn, timed to take advantage of darkness and to arrive when the Japanese

planes were on the ground. Some raids were effective. One attack on Sungei

Patani during the night of December 27-28 destroyed seven Japanese

fighters and damaged ten fighters and bombers, but the RAF flew only

eighty sorties between December 20 and January 15. The Japanese did not

take the RAF lightly. General Saburo Endo, commander of the Japanese 3rd

Air Group at Sungei Patani, was very concerned lest his unit's strength be

badly depleted. The RAF pilots, flying over familiar territory, found their

targets fairly easily. Detection and warning, not a strong feature of the

Japanese Army Air Force in 1941, was inadequate or nonexistent at their

newly captured bases. Japanese operational records did not completely reflect their losses on the ground, yet they easily replaced aircraft from depots

in Indochina and Taiwan. The British had no replacement aircraft easily

available to them and had to depend on those that arrived in midmonth. 29

Early in January the Japanese began concerted attacks against airdromes in the Singapore area. By this time, the retreat down the peninsula

put most of the ground observers out of business. The incomplete radar net

could not provide more than thirty minutes warning of bombers at 24,000

feet; it took longer than thirty minutes for the Buffaloes to reach that

height. The heavy guns could engage immediately, yet the 3-inch pieces on

hand could not reach this altitude."

* A Japanese survey in May 1942 reported the capture of 152 antiaircraft guns in Singapore. Seventy-six were Bofors guns, the rest assorted heavy weapons.

108
MALAYA AND MALTA

On January 20th, the new Hurricane squadrons began flying intercept

missions from Seletar, Kallang, and bases in Johore State. Heavy Japanese

attacks on Singapore's air bases did not allow full, effective use of the new

units, however. Bomb damage was severe, and native labor for repair disappeared; British airmen, soldiers, and civilians had to be diverted to the

work. Aircraft shelters were both inadequate in number and protection. To

complicate matters, bomb damage at Kallang, built on reclaimed swamp

land, could not be easily fixed. Water and mud seeped up from bomb

craters, and elaborately reinforced gravel fill was needed to stabilize the

repaired surfaces. All was not yet lost, however. The new Hurricanes improved the RAF's defenses. Many of the pilots who arrived to fly them were

veterans of the Battle of Britain. The skilled fliers and first rate fighters

began to take a sharply higher toll of Japanese aircraft.3

'

Relentless pressure by the Japanese Army forced the British south once

again. Between January 23 and 25, the airfields at Kahang, Kluang, and

Batu Pahat, all equipped to handle Hurricanes, were abandoned. Kluang

and Kahang possessed protected dispersal parking; Seletar, to which the

Hurricanes were now restricted, was not as good. Work had begun late in

December to build six dispersed emergency landing strips on Singapore

Island, but air attacks were so severe that none was completed. Because of

the poorly designed and protected parking at Singapore's four main bases,

Japanese raids destroyed many airplanes on the ground. Singapore's air

bases were protected by the heavy AA guns defending the naval base and

city. Only Seletar had its own Bofors guns. Yet the Army's heavy antiaircraft

weapons were remarkably ineffective. Japanese airplanes crossing the island

rarely broke formation under fire. One battery of the 5th Battalion, 16th

Heavy Anti-Aircraft Regiment, with four new 3.7-inch guns, had no usable

height finding equipment. The height finder pedestals had been sent by

mistake to the Middle East, and there were no replacements.32

During the latter part of January, sixteen to twenty Hurricanes operated each day. Normally, the Japanese aircraft outnumbered the defenders

during a raid by anywhere from six to one to fifteen to one. Congested

aircraft parking made for easy targeting and increased the danger of damage

from secondary explosions and fragmentation during a raid. The scheduled

arrival of carrier borne Hurricanes promised more serious crowding. Air

Marshal Pulford had no choice but to remove some of the flying units to

Sumatra.33

The first squadrons to leave Malaya were the Dutch bombers. Then on

January 27, three RAF squadrons moved to Palembang airfield on the

Dutch East Indian island of Sumatra. The RAAF's reconnaissance units

remained in Malaya, as did a few Hurricanes to serve as an advance fighter

force. The Singapore airfields would now be used primarily as service and

ground alert locations. The withdrawal of the Army to Singapore Island on

109
AIR BASE AIR DEFENSE

January 30 put three of the four main fields there in range of Japanese

artillery in Johore. Although the RAF continued some flying from Kallang

until February 10, for all practical purposes air defense of the remaining

bases was no longer possible.34

Just before the surrender of Singapore, Group Captain Rice, the air

defense commander, estimated that the British destroyed about 180 Japanese aircraft in counterair strikes on Japanese bases. A further 130 were

destroyed in aerial combat, most by the Hurricanes. The effort was not

enough. A modern fighter force did not arrive until the campaign was nearly

over, and it did not have secure bases from which to operate. An adequate,

coordinated air defense was never in place, and the bases became littered

with damaged and unflyable aircraft. Once the Japanese seized the initiative

and ousted the RAF from its northern bases, they did not lose air superiority.35

The improperly sited British air bases could not be protected against

Japanese ground or air attack. Without sound interservice planning in the

thirties, the RAF built such bases as Kota Bharu near invasion points on the

Malay Peninsula instead of inland where terrain and vegetation could favor

ground defense and help disguise the installations from air observation.

When Japanese air superiority forced the RAF out of the northern bases,

the Army further spent itself in vain attempts to deny them to the enemy.

The many long standing problems affecting defense in Malaya and the

tyranny of logistics in a global war acted to British disadvantage. Japanese

planning and execution in the Malay expedition demonstrated a unity of

purpose unmatched in their opponents. Battles over England and Malta and

in North Africa absorbed most of the first-rate Hurricane and Spitfire

fighters. When new airplanes could be spared for Malaya, the Japanese

firmly held air superiority. Antiaircraft artillery reinforcement units arriving

in January 1942, were hardly organized for combat before they were swept

into prisoner-of-war cages.36 The British found themselves at the end of a

very long supply line with obsolete aircraft; they were outnumbered by a

much more modern and determined air force, one which they did not understand. The Japanese were able to fly from airfields and depots adjacent to

the theater of operations. As the Japanese Army advanced south, the British

could not continue flying from fields threatened by air and ground attack.

Japanese squadrons, on the other hand, took over airdromes abandoned by

the RAF and protected their new bases. The most costly prewar British

mistake was the disparagement of Japanese ability and equipment. Air Vice

Marshal Paul Maltby, who took command of the RAF in southeast Asia

when Pulford died while evacuating his headquarters to Java, realized too

late the ability of his enemy. Maltby noted that "the speed and aggression of

his follow-up [to each successive thrust south] came as a surprise." Even so,

had the British applied the air defense lessons taught them during the cam110
MALAYA AND MALTA

paign in France and the Battle of Britain, they could have given a much

better account of themselves."

As in France, the RAF's bases in Malaya were grossly underprotected.

Antiaircraft weapons were not sufficient in either quality or quantity, radar

surveillance was largely nonexistent, and Group Captain Rice's air defense

control center in Singapore, once it began a rudimentary operation, lacked

the information and communications needed to launch and control even the

small fighter force at its disposal. Moreover, it is doubtful the center had

firm command of all the air defense assets. The longstanding interservice

bickering probably insured that it did not. This situation existed more than a

year after the Battle of Britain had demonstrated conclusively that such an

arrangement was essential.

The complicating factor least apparent on the surface was the failure of

the three services to cooperate fully in preparing the defense of Malaya. Air

Marshal Brooke-Popham found that welding the three forces into a cohesive

entity was one of his most pressing jobs in late 1940. Months passed before

he was able to see results in the attempt to unify his organization. Jealousy

and a decided tendency to work within their own spheres of operation

characterized not only the relations between the military services, but also

between the military and civil authorities as well. The result was the fragmented effort at defense clearly visible in the precarious position of the air

bases.3

"

Inadequate early warning, uncoordinated antiaircraft gunfire with

questionable accuracy and rate of fire, poor facilities for protecting ground

assets from blast and bomb fragment damage, and a lack of modern fighters

and AA guns were all symptoms of difficulties which could not be corrected

in the few weeks available before the fall of Singapore. The failure to come

to grips with problems seen emerging years before, when the need of a

Commander-in-Chief Far East was first debated, created a situation fraught

with disaster fully realized in the course of events.

The Siege of Malta, 1940-1942

Even as the drama of Singapore played itself out, Malta was entering a

new phase of its own siege. At five o'clock in the morning of June 11, 1940,

Italian bombers attacked Hal Far airfield and Grand Harbor and continued

a sporadic and intermittent air campaign against the island for six months. 9

In January 1941, Hitler, determined to prop up his Italian ally reeling from

British attacks in North Africa, committed German troops to the desert to

drive the British finally from the Mediterranean and secure Axis predominance there. The Luftwaffe would protect the shipping lanes carrying Rommel's supply to North Africa. In May, having momentarily subdued the

island's defenders, the Germans moved to the conquest of the Balkans, and

111
AIR BASE AIR DEFENSE

Malta quickly resumed its role as a center of the British sea interdiction of

Axis supply.' Unable to ignore this thorn in their logistical side, the Germans turned their attention to the island again in December 1941.

Malta resembled Singapore in few respects other than size. Lying some

sixty miles across the Malta Channel from Sicily, its strategic importance

was in its position as the only Allied operational base and refuel point

between the Atlantic and the Middle East during 1941 and most of 1942.

(Maps 9, 10) It was open to attacks by the Luftwaffe and the Regia Aeronautica based in Sicily, a half hour from their targets and closer than the

Japanese in Indo-China were to Malaya or Singapore.

The island's air defenses were almost nonexistent in 1939. Air force

protection consisted of four old Sea Gladiator biplanes found crated in a

warehouse, assembled, and manned by pilots hastily assigned. One regiment

of Royal Artillery heavy antiaircraft provided gun defenses. A prewar plan

called for 4 fighter squadrons and 112 heavy and 60 light guns. Demands of

the British Expeditionary Force in France and home defense, however, made

deployment of the projected force impossible. In July 1940, the Chiefs of

Staff believed they could provide the necessary antiaircraft guns by April

1941, and hoped to send the 4 fighter units as soon as possible. By December

1940, only 1 squadron of Hurricanes was in place along with a squadron of

12 Martin Maryland reconnaissance bombers. Seventy-two heavy and 34

light AA guns made up the remainder of the air defenses. 4' British naval and

air forces nevertheless invited attack by their effectiveness in sinking 31

enemy ships totaling 101,636 tons through the first five months of 1941.

When the Luftwaffe supplanted the Italians in dealing with Malta,

Fliegerkorps X was based on Sicilian fields with a strength that reached 443

fighters and bombers by the end of March 1941. The fury of their unremitting attack in the first half of the year is clear from the use rates of antiaircraft munitions on Malta. From January through March, British gunners

expended four-and-a-half times the heavy AA ammunition used in the last

six months of 1940. Light AA artillery fire increased thirty-three times, to

18,660 rounds, for the same period."2 A few Hurricanes fitted with fuel tanks

flew from Egypt to Malta, but they could not manage the 1,100 miles from

Gibraltar to the island. RAF bomber and Royal Navy flying boat units

temporarily moved to Egypt in March. Fighter activity continued, but combat losses and operational wear reduced the size of the force. Replacement

fighters sent via the Western Mediterranean had to be shipped most of the

way to Malta on aircraft carriers, which normally launched the planes about

400 miles west of their destination. During April, May, and June 1941, 109

arrived by this route. An attempt in late April to send crated aircraft by ship

failed when the merchantman carrying them hit a mine and sank off Cape

Bon, Algeria. With British offensive capability on Malta eroded and needing aircraft in May 1941 for action on Crete and the projected invasion of

112
MALAYA AND MALTA

Russia, the Germans returned responsibility for the island to the Regia

Aeronautica. The Luftwaffe's first campaign against Malta cost it 60 aircraft; the Italians lost 16. Royal Air Force losses were 42 fighters and 36

bomber, reconnaissance, and other aircraft. The British continued to use

Malta as a stopping point for flights to the Middle East, and as soon as

German pressure abated, the British bombers returned to the island.43

Given Malta's ninety-five square mile area and the relatively short range

of the fighters, defense in depth was not possible. Early warning radar was

available, but in early 1941 did not give complete coverage of the air space

surrounding the island, nor could it give accurate heights of targets. British

ground-to-air radio was so poor that fighters could not be directed to locations far from land. The Hurricane's moderate rate of climb made it necessary to fly south to gain altitude, after which the flight leaders were

responsible for sighting an enemy and controlling the attack. These maneuvers worked well enough for early 1941, but improvements both in the

ground organization and in air tactics were needed to blunt heavier enemy

attacks.'

The Germans made good use of Malta's reduced circumstances. During

February and March 1941, fifteen of their convoys reached Tripoli carrying

the 5th Light Division with large numbers of vehicles and supplies. During

May the 15th Panzer Division was brought over to complete the Afrika

Korps.45

In the summer of 1941, Air Vice Marshal Sir Hugh P. Lloyd became Air

Officer Commanding Malta and opened a new phase of defense operations.

Lloyd began heavy improvements to the three active fields at Hal Far, Luqa,

and Takali. A landing strip lay between Hal Far and Luqa at the village of

Safi. At all of the bases there was dispersed parking for about five squadrons, but it was generally close to the runways. More parking was needed for

transient aircraft passing to and from the Middle East required protection,

as would any additional aircraft assigned to the island. The terrain and

villages near the existing bases made expansion a difficult undertaking.

Begun in June 1941, the first major enlargement was a series of taxiways

linking Luqa and Hal Far via the Safi strip. Construction equipment on

Malta was in even shorter supply than in Malaya. All of the excavation was

done by civilian labor using hand tools and pony carts. The taxiway and

dispersal parking work continued for a year, through the most intense air

bombardment the island experienced. Materials to seal the runway and

taxiway surfaces were almost nonexistent. Rolling equipment was old, too

light for the work required, and in short supply. Nevertheless, the goal was

to build 240 protected parking spots at the three bases by January 1942. All

were to be far enough away from any airdrome so that airplanes were near a

runway only when landing or taking off. In addition, at least two of the

bases, Luqa and Hal Far, required longer runways to accommodate bombers

113
Sr I 

-

uJL

4cI- 

-

cc2I
MALAYA AND MALTA

Grand Harbor, Malta. Damage to dockside structure at left is evident; bomb

throws up spray beyond the harbor breakwater. Imperial War Museum

so that those arriving during a raid would have a choice of landing sites that

might be relatively free of enemy activity.•

Battalions of infantry and those with time free from other duties

swarmed to the repair work. By May 1942, 43 miles of taxiway were in

service connecting 600 revetted or tunneled parking spots. The runways and

taxiways were not the only projects to be undertaken. Takali airfield lay on

the central plateau of the island and was bounded to the south by a limestone bluff. The face of the bluff was ideal for building underground shops

where extensive repair work could be carried out in safety. To exploit this

advantage, the British began to dig a number of caves and connected them

to the airfield by both road and taxiway. A cave cut into the wall of a ravine

at the end of Luqa's runway accommodated a large engine and instrument

repair shop. One of the most important projects was the preparation of

several underground radar operations rooms and space for an air defense

control center. The latter was in a cavern dug out of the hill overlooking

Valetta Harbor. Here all work was done by hand. Workers cleared debris

from narrow air shafts by loading rock in buckets that were hauled by hand

to the surface. In addition to underground shops, the RAF dug into the cliff

face to create protected parking spaces. The rock, however, would not sup115
AIRFIELDS ON MALTA

GOZOSCOM INO

SAERODROMES

0C

Map 10
MALAYA AND MALTA

port the large undercut areas needed, and the excavations were not used for

operational aircraft. The work was not entirely in vain as derelict aircraft

were parked there and often fooled the attacking Germans. 7

Blast shields were also necessary around each parking space and to

protect precious construction equipment. Work had to be done by hand,

with laborers piling rock, earth or, more often, filling 5-gallon gasoline cans

with rubble, then stacking and wiring them into place. A single revetment

for a Wellington bomber required 60,000 such cans and took 200 men

working 9 hours a day 3 weeks to complete. All of the service equipment and

two steam rollers essential to bomb damage repair needed similar protective

revetments. Steady work was not possible as the airfield commander diverted men to repair bomb damage and craters on airfields. In late 1941,

weeks went by with no progress in dispersal construction. Lloyd fretted and

fumed, but there was nothing he could do; day and night bombing attacks

required constant repair work. The civilian labor force quickly fell behind in

the task and men from the infantry brigades on the island were pressed into

service. Workers, military and civilian alike, were additionally hampered by

an inadequate diet, the result of the Axis blockade of Malta. From October

into the new year the three airfields remained open except for a few short

periods .

48

The control of the defense improved amid the continuing expansion of

installations. Late in 1941, the Air Defense Operations Centre moved into

expanded underground quarters that held the fighter operations controller,

antiaircraft artillery control room, and radar filter center. It was not until

February 1942, however, that the fighter operations room was completely

organized and staffed with experienced controllers. After that, the joint

facility greatly increased efficiency. Drawing on experience from the Battle

of Britain, there was now direct liaison between all of the functions and their

administrative and communications support. RAF squadrons, Fleet Air

Arm units, and the antiaircraft artillery all came under Lloyd's control.

Defense of the air bases required an ability to intercept an approaching

enemy with fighters directed by radar. Ground weapons engaged the enemy

that got past the fighters. Damage repair was directed where needed immediately after an attack. All of the functions required constant coordination by

a central authority well versed in the needs of air operation and ground-air

cooperation.4 9

While air base construction continued, the island's bomber and torpedo aircraft and submarines from the naval base kept up steady attacks on

Axis shipping bound for Africa. The British estimated that between July

and December 1941, they sent down another 581,000 tons of shipping with

Rommel's supplies. German leaders began seriously to contemplate invasion

in late 1941, but concluded that the Italians were not equal to the task of

subduing the island's defense."

117
Scenes from the Siege (Clockwise from above) Repairs to taxiways on Malta

used extensive hand labor. (2) Revetments of cut stone, sandbags (3), and later,

rubble filled jerry cans (4) were common. A Hawker Hurricane is fueled by

gravity feed tank in protected emplacement. (5) Bristol Beaufighter in revetted stand at Takali airfield. Imperial War Museum

I.,.

II-
WL

V - 1, AL

Fed"

ip,, irL
TABLE 12

Royal Air Force, Malta

Order of Battle

1941-1942

January 1941

No. 261 Sq. Hurricanes-12

No. 228 Sq. Sunderland Reconnaissance Flying Boats-5

No. 69 Sq. Maryland Reconnaissance Bombers-4

No. 148 Sq. Wellington Bombers-12

No. 830 Sq. Swordfish Torpedo Bombers-10

(Fleet Air Arm)

January 1942

No. 126, 185,

249 Sqs. Hurricanes - 16 planes each

No. 1435 Flight Hurricanes - 4 planes

No. 69 Sq. Maryland and Beauforts Reconnaissance

Bombers-8

No. 21 and Blenheim Bombers - 12

107 Sqs.

No. 37 and 40 Wellington Bombers - 18

Sqs.

No. 828, 830 Sqs. Albacore and Swordfish Torpedo Bombers - 20

(Fleet Air Arm)

Sources: Richards and Saunders, Royal Air Force 1939-1945, Vol II.

Playfair, The Mediterranean and Middle East, Vol II.

Report, RAF Operations in the Western Desert and Eastern Mediterranean.
TABLE 13

Order of Battle

Malta Antiaircraft Defenses

November 1941

10th Heavy Antiaircraft Brigade

2nd Heavy AA Regt.

l1th Heavy AA Regt. J Royal Malta Artillery

4th Heavy AA Regt.

7th Heavy AA Regt. Royal Artillery

10th Heavy AA Regt.J

Each regiment was assigned 24 guns, either 3.7-inch or 4.5-inch. Regiments were

divided into three batteries, each battery consisted of two troops of four guns per

troop.

7th Light Antiaircraft Brigade

3rd Light Antiaircraft Regt., Royal Malta Artillery

Four batteries with 72 Bofors guns assigned

32nd Light AA Regt.

65th Light AA Regt. Royal Artillery

74th Light AA Regt.J

Each Royal Artillery Regiment was assigned three batteries of three troops each, with

six Bofors guns per troop.

225th Light AA Battery, Royal Artillery

14th Heavy AA Battery (Relief), Royal Malta Artillery

Sources: Playfair, The Mediterranean and Middle East, Vols II and III.

Attard, The Battle of Malta
AIR BASE AIR DEFENSE

TABLE 14

Luftwaffe Order of Battle

Sicily

(Fliegerkorps I])

March 1942

Type of Unit Type of Aircraft No. of Aircraft

Long Range Recon.

Staffel Ju88 17

Single Engine Fighter

Geschwader,

Organized in four

Gruppen Mel09f 146

Twin Engine Fighter

Gruppe MellO 19

Night Fighter Gruppe Ju88 14

Bomber Geschwader

Organized in five

Gruppen Ju88 131

Dive Bomber Gruppe Ju87D 25

Total 352

Source: Felmy: "The German Air Force in the Mediterranean Theater of War"

On November 28, Field Marshal Albert Kesselring of the Luftwaffe arrived

from Russia to become Commander-in-Chief South (Oberbefehlshaber

SiMd) with authority over all operations in the Mediterranean area. He also

commanded Fliegerkorps II, transferred from Russia. Fliegerkorps X continued to operate in the eastern Mediterranean. On May 6, 1941, The Germans rescinded a directive from the Luftwaffe's Chief of Staff making

German air units on Sicily subordinate to Italian Air Force headquarters.

Destruction of the RAF's air and ground operation on Malta became first

priority for the Germans." Kesselring planned a three-phase air operation to

122
MALAYA AND MALTA

destroy the British defenses and open the island to invasion. First, he

planned to neutralize the antiaircraft guns. By forcing the gunners to intensify their fire for a period of several days, Kesselring believed, they would

exhaust their ammunition, and the Axis blockade would prevent the arrival

of replenishments. This was sound in theory, but the Germans were unaware

of the large stocks of AA shells on Malta, enough for three months of

defensive operations and 1,000 rounds per gun in an invasion reserve. Then

he intended to eliminate the fighters and the bombers by severe and continued air base bombardment. Finally, a series of attacks would reduce the

naval facilities and ports of the island."

From December 1941 through the following spring, bombardment of

the RAF's bases increased in both tempo and quantity of explosives

dropped, the result of the better organized and larger force directing itself

against what Kesselring referred to as "that hornet's nest."53 Axis fliers gave

special consideration to the destruction of the underground areas at Takali.

Ju88s launched rocket propelled armorpiercing bombs, either from a shallow dive or on low altitude runs toward the cliff face. German tests led them

to believe the bombs could penetrate from thirty-six to forty-nine feet of

rock before detonation and then collapse the caves. In addition, they

dropped oil filled bombs in front of the entrances to the caves. The oil was

ignited by a fuze and was supposed to flow into the caves, burning the

contents. Neither weapon worked. The limestone was too hard for the armorpiercing bombs, and the oil was absorbed by the crushed rock of the the

tunnels and burned without entering the excavated area. March 20, 1942,

marked beginning of the most violent air attacks on the fortress. For six

weeks, until April 28, the bombing was far heavier than anything directed

against the bases in England during the Battle of Britain. In February, 993

tons of bombs fell on Malta; March's figures increased to 2,174 tons, and

April's to 6,728. In April, 1,200 tons of ordnance fell on the three airfields

within few days.14

To oppose the Axis onslaught, Air Vice Marshal Lloyd had an assortment of aircraft. The Hurricanes were Malta's first line defense. They could

turn inside a German Mel09f at moderate altitudes, but could not fly as fast

or handle as well at greater heights. But all the Hurricane's speed was needed

to catch the Ju88 bombers, and the fighter's .303 caliber machine guns could

not penetrate the Junkers' armor. Only the RAF's few fighters with 20-mm

cannon were superior in this regard. Constant combat rapidly wore down

the Hurricanes, the Wellingtons, and the Blenheims. To repair the fighters,

Lloyd ordered a halt to all major maintenance on the bombers and impressed new aircraft transiting the island en route to the Middle East. Old

aircraft in need of major repair, inspection, and service were sent out, the

new ones kept.5

123
AIR BASE AIR DEFENSE

i J! 

One of many Bofors gun crews on Malta stands ready near Valetta. Their

determined defense claimed 1,000 Axis aircraft in two years.

Imperial War Museum

In the midst of all this punishment, the British defenders managed to

strike back. During the winter of 1941-1942, heavy rain made Luqa and Hal

Far (Map 11) unusable for several weeks. All working aircraft were scattered

about Takali airfield (Map 12), immobile targets for the Luftwaffe. Hugh

Lloyd surmised that the Germans might have similar problems with mud

and water at their bases on Sicily. British photoreconnaissance reported the

enemy had shifted many of his planes to Catania, Castel Vetrano, and two

other airdromes. Since the RAF had been concentrating attacks on North

Africa-bound shipping and had neglected attacking their enemy's air bases,

Lloyd also detected in his opponents a false sense of security. On January 4,

1942, flying at no more than one hundred feet, ten Blenheims found the

Germans parked wingtip to wingtip at Castel Vetrano and destroyed thirty

planes while damaging many others. A following attack by Wellingtons set

fire to another fourteen planes and a gasoline storage area. In the confusion

of that night, the RAF set a trap for German bombers returning to Catania.

As German aircraft circled awaiting their turn to land, Hurricanes and two

Fleet Air Arm Fulmar fighters shot down three. As an added benefit to the

British, the German gunners directed antiaircraft fire into the melee, damaging some of their own planes.s6

124
MALAYA AND MALTA

Such success was rare, and the steady offensive by Field Marshal Kesselring continued to reduce Malta's air defense force. On February 15, only

eleven Hurricanes were serviceable, and the main German effort was more

than a month in the future. German raids were so frequent that the RAF's

pilots often did not have enough time between attacks to land, refuel, and

rearm. By default, the Germans had no air opposition on those occasions;

only the antiaircraft guns could carry on the fight. Until more British aircraft reached the island, the overriding problems were fending off German

attacks with ground fire, maintaining airfield operations, and avoiding starvation. Kesselring's campaign had reduced a typical day's rations to four or

five slices of bread with a thin smear of jam, bully beef at all principal

meals, a still adequate supply of sugar, but dwindling stocks of oil and

margarine. Axis shipping losses declined markedly after mid-February until

only seven percent of German supply vessels bound for Africa were sunk in

April and May.

Antiaircraft weapons on the ground were crucial to the defense of

Malta. The British positioned most of the guns to protect the four main

military areas. No more than ten miles separated major targets. Operating in

an area about one-seventh the size of London, the defenders had to exercise

strict gun control. If flak appeared too early, the Germans chose an alternate target. If it began too late, there was not enough time for British guns

to disrupt the formations. Axis fliers had an advantage because their bombing effort aimed at a relatively small area; but within the area almost all the

guns waited for the approaching airplanes. Since the antiaircraft defense was

concentrated on less than half the island, at least two and one-half guns

were available for each square mile. By grouping the four-gun batteries to

take advantage of their effective ranges, as many as eighty heavy guns fired

into the air above the most important points. Furthermore, the small size of

the target areas shortened the distance that repair crews had to move material, thus allowing the work to be completed quickly. The continuing addition of dispersal points greatly complicated the targeting tasks of

Kesselring's staff. 8

Before the arrival of gun laying radar, gunners often fired so called box

barrages, where every available gun fired as fast as it could at its own

predetermined point within a defined cube in the sky. The heavy flak the

attackers had to fly through was daunting to any pilot, yet the Germans and

Italians did so repeatedly. Box barrages appeared ferocious, but in reality

were very inefficient. Most of the fire at fixed, predetermined points in the

sky came nowhere near a moving target. Diving aircraft emerging from the

high level barrage met much more effective fire from Bofors guns. Bombing

remained quite accurate, with most of the explosives falling on or near the

targets.5 9

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AIR BASE AIR DEFENSE

LUQA - HAL FAR AIRFIELDS, MALTA MAY 1942

S~THE LOOPWAY

S• : fSTIRLING VALLEY

AERODROME JISWT

•]DISPERSAL POINTS HAL FAR'I

TAXI TRACKS JON IHSF STRIP

TAXI TRACKS AND DISPERSAL POINTS BUILT

JUNE 1941 TO MAY 1942 .. i

-<t

Map 11

By the beginning of 1942, two MklI gun laying radar sets were on

Malta. This equipment provided the distance, bearing, speed of approach,

and elevation, of a formation, and allowed much more accurate concentrations of fire than the box barrage. Air defense controllers had the guns fire

into designated layered zones in the air. Air Marshal Lloyd reserved other

zones for fighters and bombers to give free passage to friendly aircraft,

especially those involved in night raids.w

Malta's stock of AA ammunition was so great that conservation measures were not needed until March and April 1942, when fear of an invasion

prompted the desire to keep some on hand for that eventuality. The blockade

reduced new ordnance supplies to that which could be carried by submarines

126
MALAYA AND MALTA

TAKALI AIRFIELD, MALTA, 1942

AERODROME

TAXI TRACKS

I' DISPERSAL POINTS

P PENS & UNDERGROUND,

STORAGE IN CLIFF FACE

CLIFF FACE

TAXI TRACKS AND DISPERSAL POINTS BUILT

JUNE 1941 TO MAY 1942

Map 12

and the fast mine layer HMS Welshman. The firing restrictions presented no

serious defense problems. Increased accuracy made possible by the gun

laying radar and firing only by guns in range of the targets compensated for

the reduced volume. During April, antiaircraft gunners claimed 102 victims.

As a result of their mounting losses to AA, the Germans concentrated on

flak suppression. Having calculated that at least 47 guns could reach any

given spot over each sector, the Germans realized they had to reduce the

effectiveness of British gunners. As a result, one-third of all their aircraft in

127
AIR BASE AIR DEFENSE

British serviceman at Malta airfield contemplates spare rations. The garrison

endured a semistarvation diet during the second year of the siege.

Imperial War Museum

the siege of 1942 went for the AA positions. The attackers tried dive bombing to destroy the batteries or prevent accurate aiming. Often, time delay

bombs were dropped amid the batteries. The crews then either evacuated the

area, defused the weapons, or, on some occasions, disregarded them. Losses

were sometimes heavy, and whole AA crews were occasionally killed. The

Royal Malta Artillery organized a gun relief battery to replace losses and

provide rest for crews."'

Well conceived deception schemes forced the enemy to choose among

alternate targets and sometimes bluffed attacking formations into retreat.

An unfinished airdrome at Krendi became a night target and absorbed

frequent attacks. Special teams kept Krendi's runway lighting working, and

a crew in a protected bunker switched it on as radar reported approaching

formations. The size of the island again became an advantage as the German pilots, unable to differentiate quickly, dropped their bombs on what

they mistakenly believed was their target. During the day, Safi strip served as

the decoy when crews shifted irreparably damaged aircraft around the area.

128
MALAYA AND MALTA

im

German bomb leaves smoke column over Maltese airfield, 1942.

Imperial War Museum

These derelicts attracted dive bombers and confused enemy intelligence. An

Italian Air Staff summary stated that the RAF kept the number of fighters

constant at about forty between March 20 and April 10. In fact, many of the

airplanes included in this count were the decoys parked at Safi. Radio

deception played out fictitious fighter unit designations, and radio conversations between ground stations simulated directions to airborne Hurricanes.

On several occasions, Axis bomber crews listening to RAF frequencies jettisoned their bombs and retreated rather than face the imaginary interceptors.62

Among the Axis fliers, the reputation of Malta's defense forces continued to grow with each raid. During the spring siege a commonly believed

story held that the British found a dead Italian pilot with a disciplinary

charge sheet referring to some indiscretion for which he had been sentenced

to participate in air raids on Malta. 63

Five radar stations detected raiders approaching Malta from Italy or

North Africa. Reports of sightings were relayed to the filter room in the Air

Defense Operations Centre at Valetta. The radar net was invaluable in

scrambling Hurricanes and, later, Spitfires, to intercept Axis formations,

but it often broke down. Technicians trickled in to handle the problems and

continue installing new equipment. In May 1942, the British added night

interception to their defense, using heavily armed Beaufighters that were

129
AIR BASE AIR DEFENSE

guided to within three miles of their targets by ground control intercept

radar and then took over for final approach with their own airborne radar.'

During more than two years of conflict, the Axis air forces attacked

none of the radar stations. Occasionally a telephone cable connecting the

stations to Valetta and the bases was cut, but this was sheer happenstance

and service was quickly restored. It is difficult to understand why the Germans left the radar alone. The Luftwaffe had radar in Sicily, used it in their

own base defense, and regularly tracked RAF flights around Malta. On one

occasion in April, they detected a flight of 47 Spitfires ferrying in from the

American carrier USS Wasp and sent Ju87s and Ju88s that destroyed two

RAF planes and damaged six shortly after the fighters landed. Jamming

attempts from Sicily were common and caused some problems for the RAF's

operators. In November 1942, the Germans used radar and flak to protect

their airfields in the Bizerte -Tunis area, so their tactical air forces were by no

means ignorant of its value. Apparently, Kesselring still had not realized

either the full importance of radar to tactical warning and aircraft control,

or the fragility of the equipment as demonstrated during the Battle of

Britain, in which he was one of the Luftwaffe's senior tactical commanders.* On Malta, some radar rooms were under many feet of rock, but

the antennae were on the surface and could not be protected. Without them,

radar could not function, aircraft could not be controlled effectively, and

gun crews would have to remain on alert almost constantly, an extreme strain

that could quickly reduce the undernourished men to uselessness. The Germans may have believed that jamming alone was a sufficient countermeasure, but if so, it was a serious error, as they did not know what

countermeasures the British might use. The most likely explanation was the

German air leaders' inability to absorb technical information and apply it to

* By 1942 the British had discovered widespread use of radar in Germany but were, as yet,

unable to neutralize it. Not having faced bombing efforts against the home radar, the Germans

may not have disseminated either warnings to protect the units or staff opinions on how best to

destroy an enemy radar. See F.H. Hinsley, et al., British Intelligence in World War II, 3 volumes

(New York: Cambridge University Press, 1979-1984), Vol. 1, pp 238-257. Postwar German

discussions of the Malta campaign did not mention radar as a target. See Helmuth Felmy, GAF

in the Mediterranean Theater of War, USAF Historical Study 161 (Maxwell AFB, 1955), and

Albert Kesselring, Kesselring: A Soldier's Record (New York: William Morrow and Company,

1954), Ch 13 and 14. The Italian versions of the plan for capturing the island did not mention

radar as a target. Kesselring's plan directed jamming of radar, but did not discuss British

antijamming measures or prelanding attacks on radar. Generals Paul Deichman and E. A.

Marquard, in their reconstruction of German target selection methods, did not list a specific

target category for radar stations. Other categories, such as communications stations, apparently included radar. Deichman and Marquard listed the type of weapon preferable for attacking radar stations, but did not tell when it was added to the weapons list. See USAF Historical

Studies 186 and 187. Writing after the war, Kesselring spoke of disabling radar by seizing the

stations with paratroops. See A Soldier's Record, pp 68-70.

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MALAYA AND MALTA

tactical situations. The same failing that plagued their efforts during the

Battle of Britain haunted them at Malta. 65

Throughout 1941 and 1942, British intelligence helped keep Malta

fighting, especially by predicting movements of enemy convoys to North

Africa. Lloyd withheld attacks on Italian shipping until an independent

source was found to duplicate the information, thus protecting ULTRA and

other eavesdropping activities. In addition to the Enigma decrypts, the British regularly read the Italian medium and low grade naval codes, and the

RAF's Y-Service teams analyzed radio messages throughout the Mediterranean area. Radio intercept, however, yielded little information of direct help

to Malta's defenders. Most of the message traffic to and among the German

air bases on Sicily went by cable and could not be intercepted. The attacks

on Malta were so frequent and intense that even if specific times and routes

of raiding formations were known, it could have added little to the effort.

Radar warnings were a more significant factor because they gave immediate

information of course and altitude exploited by the Spitfire's high speed,

rate of climb, and its heavier armament.6

Because of the intense pressure on the air bases, fighter wastage was

great. The number of serviceable fighters fluctuated, often declining to as

few as five. The British pilots contended with almost 500 German and

Italian aircraft. Many times when British fighters were too few or the pilots

exhausted, the antiaircraft guns bore the defense burden. During April there

were 248 air raid alerts on the island, during which the Axis hurled 5,715

sorties at the island. Malta's heavy guns fired 72,053 rounds, the Bofors

guns 88,176.67 The intensity of the fire and the accuracy of the Bofors

gunners made the enemy release bombs at altitudes of 5,000 to 6,000 feet,

not the optimum for dive bombing accuracy and one of the reasons why flak

suppression was not as effective as it should have been. Heavy defensive fire

notwithstanding, by early May the Axis had curtailed Malta's offensive

power and much of her air defense. Rommel's drive toward Egypt had

isolated the island yet more, but the air bases did not stop operating except

for short periods of restoration after each attack. Some days flying halted to

allow the mechanics an opportunity to ready more planes and create a more

potent force. Use of the island as an air staging area did not cease. Almost

half the aircraft replacements sent to Egypt and the Middle East in 1941 and

1942 used Malta's bases. 68

On May 9, 1942, Malta's air operation was again reinforced, this time

with 64 Spitfires flown from the carriers USS Wasp and HMS Eagle. Reception preparations were much improved and the arriving Spitfires orbited at

very low altitude under protection of Bofors guns while waiting to land.

This time the Germans attacked Hal Far, not Takali where the new Spitfires

were. The airplanes were serviced and flew 74 interception sorties the same

131
AIR BASE AIR DEFENSE

Maltese terrain, with numerous depressions and stone walls, presented a forbidding aspect to a prospective German glider invasion. Imperial War Museum

day. On May 10, the Welshman arrived at Valetta with a 340-ton cargo of

airplane parts, some AA ammunition and a small amount of food."9

On May 10, Kesselring believed the island's defenses neutralized. Hunger and stress achieved what the air raids could not. Much of Fliegerkorps II

was transferred to Libya and the Luftwaffe once again shared responsibility

for the island with the Italian Air Force. Rommel's advance opened the port

of Benghazi, and when the Germans captured Tobruk on June 21, Axis

supply convoys could sail farther east and avoid attacks from the island's

bomber force. Unfortunately for the Axis powers, their plan for the seizure

of Malta was not carried out. German leaders remembered the high costs of

taking Crete in May 1941, when two German airborne divisions suffered

almost 4,000 casualties and lost a large number of Ju52 transports and

gliders. Goering especially had little desire to lose more of his prized paratroops. Believing that shipping supplies to Tobruk and Benghazi was more

efficient than seizing Malta, he would not authorize the operation. The

British continued to threaten Rommel's supply line and ultimately the shortage of material helped force him out of North Africa. That Malta could

have successfully resisted an invasion in May or June 1942 is difficult to

imagine. The demonstrated excellence of leadership and determination of

the garrison would have exacted a higher price than Kesselring believed, but

132
MALAYA AND MALTA

the defenders were in such serious straits that had he attempted the invasion,

he would probably have succeeded.7

"

Because the Axis hesitated, the British could again reinforce their base

defenses. On May 18, seventeen Spitfires arrived, increasing the number of

fighters on the island to more than a hundred. The bomber squadrons were

restored to full strength and returned to the offensive against Africa bound

shipping. Transfer of the Luftwaffe's forces away from Sicily and the renewed strength of the Royal Air Force returned local air superiority to the

British. The Axis opportunity to seize the island lapsed. Though they hotly

contested the relief of the island by convoys in June and July, the Axis could

no longer support the simultaneous campaigns in North Africa and Russia

and continue the aerial destruction of Malta; the island's worst trial was

over.71

Comparison of the Campaigns

A study of air base air defense during the Malayan and Maltese campaigns shows that neither of these British bases was ready for war when

hostilities began. Malta had the nine months from Germany's invasion of

Poland to Italy's declaration of war to prepare. Singapore had less than a

day after Japan's attack on Pearl Harbor, but British leaders should have

fathomed Japan's intentions long before the bombs began falling. In both

instances, war priorities directed resources to other theaters, primarily home

defense. While planning was done before fighting began, in neither case was

it adequate. In Malaya, defense preparations underway on December 8 were

far from complete. Lack of dispersals, revetments, modern fighters and

antiaircraft weapons, and poor intelligence and command and control planning were the most deficient areas.

At Malta, the planning for AA and fighters to be based on the island

also proved deficient. Large increases in force size and constant resupply

were necessary. Few passive defensive measures, such as underground facilities, were complete. Almost no blast shields and little dispersal parking were

ready in June 1940. Construction began in earnest only after large scale

bombing by the Germans in 1941. The need to repair while constructing new

defenses put a very heavy strain on the engineers.

The garrisons of both islands had several airfields to defend, Singapore

four and Malta three. Both commands placed heavy reliance on antiaircraft

guns for air defense and heavy gun density was roughly equal. Singapore

had three guns per square mile, Malta two and one-half for the critical

eastern part of the island. Half of Singapore's heavy guns were the old 3-

inch type; all of Malta's were modern 3.7-and 4.5-inch. Gun laying radar

was used to assist AA in both locations.7

" The number of Bofors 40-mm

guns available in Malta and Singapore differed significantly. There were 234

133
AIR BASE AIR DEFENSE

protecting the Maltese targets; no more than 76 were in use by the Singapore

garrison. With great accuracy and a high rate of fire, these weapons instilled

fear in German and Italian fliers. Between June 1, 1941, and mid-July 1942,

the defenders shot down 693 aircraft during attacks on Malta. By October

13, 1942, 1,000 were claimed by fighter and gun defenses during 28 months

of war. The antiaircraft score was heaviest in April 1942, when gunners

believed they had accounted for 102 raiders. 7

1

The most striking dissimilarity between these two cases is in the varying

determination among the military forces and civil governments to keep the

air bases functioning. The British never viewed the prewar threat to Singapore as seriously as that to the United Kingdom itself and misjudged Japan's

intent and strength. They allocated fewer resources to the Far East. The

Japanese as a consequence drove the thinly spread British defenders in

Malaya 400 miles down a peninsula thought to be impassable. The defenders of Singapore were exhausted and much of their equipment had been

left behind as they scrambled south. The Japanese used British bombs and

gasoline abandoned at several northern bases in their final bombardment of

the airfields, ports, and Army positions on Singapore Island. Stunned by

the brilliance of the Japanese concept and the enormity of their losses, the

leadership lacked the will to defend Singapore and in any event had lost

much of the means to do so. The senior British leaders failed to organize a

coherent defense of the island and the adjacent part of Johore so vital to its

protection.74

The leadership on Malta was totally different, buoyed by a number of

factors, not the least of which was a psychological one. The island was a

vital link to Egypt, the Middle East, and India, and the British were determined to hold it. Not having seen their forces retreat in disorder while trying

to protect a land mass like Malaya, Malta's commanders did not adopt an

attitude of inevitable failure. Even under the most intense bombing, Royal

Air Force pilots and mechanics and Army artillery gunners resisted fiercely.

Airplanes frequently arrived from England and Egypt, and the island's

garrison never lost communication with other British forces. In Malaya, a

growing feeling of isolation and abandonment eroded morale as the battle

progressed. Even while training to fight an invading force, thousands of

soldiers joined the civilians and airmen in patching Malta's taxiways and

runways. Malta's weapon batteries fought for two years, and there were few

glaring failures such as the lack of critical parts for height finding equipment that prevailed at Singapore. The consistent willingness of Malta's

population to repeat the repair jobs and the proximity of other British and

Allied forces were the keys to success .

7

The disparity in tonnages of bombs dropped was striking. Between

March 12 and May 10, 1942, almost 10,000 tons of bombs fell on Maltese

bases, an average of over 160 tons a day. On some peak days, the three

134
MALAYA AND MALTA

airfields absorbed 600 tons of explosives.7 6 Air base attacks by the Japanese

were never as severe. During the fifteen days of the final attack on Singapore, the Japanese 7th Air Group dropped 773 tons of bombs on all targets,

including those at sea. The amounts expended by the 3rd Air Group and the

22nd Naval Flotilla were probably similar."

German and Japanese bombs used in these two campaigns were quite

adequate for air base attacks, except for the destruction of underground

facilities at Malta. The Luftwaffe used mostly 550-pound fragmentation

and high explosive bombs and incendiaries. The Japanese employed generally lighter weapons and bombs captured from the British. Throughout the

Malta campaign, bombing was consistent; responsibilities for targets were

assigned to specific units, intelligence was good, and the targets were struck

repeatedly in an attempt to prevent recovery of the RAF. Damage caused to

flying fields and parking areas on Malta was quickly repaired. At Singapore,

however, the available work force was too small, and materials were not

readily at hand to accomplish the same results.78

Whereas Malta had a more modern fighter force than did Singapore,

until late April 1942 there were so few planes available, and the odds they

faced were so formidable, that air interception was as difficult there as in

Malaya. Isolation of both Singapore and Malta made reinforcement extremely difficult, although aircraft carriers could bring replacement fighters

to within flying distance of both battles. Those sent to Singapore, via convoy or carrier, were far too few and arrived too late to be a significant factor.

The fighter replacements to Malta served only to sustain an operational

force of ten or fewer planes through March and most of April 1942. While

never without resources, on some days Air Vice Marshal Lloyd chose not to

commit his handful of fighters and entrusted the defense of the island base

to the guns. Even when a small number of fighters did fly, the British still

depended heavily on ground guns. The artillery gunners and the people who

repaired the airfields, then, were the factors that sustained a minimal base

operation through the most intense fighting.

Malta differed most obviously from Malaya in the courage and determination of Air Vice Marshal Lloyd, Maj. Gen. C. T. Beckett, the antiaircraft artillery commander, and their crews who refused to concede the

closing of the air bases. Britain could replace Malta's aircraft losses only in

small increments, but those few planes at a time, a bristling collection of

antiaircraft guns, and a defensive system proven during the Battle of Britain

were enough to keep at bay an enemy whose Cretan venture left him unwilling to rush into a similar attempt in 1942.

135
Chapter V

Campaigns in Africa

For the Western Allies, the two year war in North Africa was the

proving ground for new tactical air warfare ideas and for newly raised units

fresh to combat. By 1942, under the influence of Air Marshal Arthur Tedder, British air commander in the Middle East, the RAF's tactical air operation was closely aligned with that of the Eighth Army. Both air and ground

defenses drew on each service's inherent mobility, intelligence gathering and

processing ability and the firepower of fighters and light and medium AA

guns. The desert conflict also made clear the need for dedicated base defense units, organizations that could repel raiders in the air or on the

ground. In addition to fighter squadrons, the Royal Air Force looked back

to the experience of World War I to organize armored car companies for

mobile defense. Later, in Northwest Africa, squadrons of the Royal Air

Force Regiment protected landing fields. In 1942 and 1943, the Americans,

new to the war, adopted some of the proven techniques to defend their air

bases during the Allied drive from the West across French North Africa.

The Axis powers countered with forces that were so skillfully used that

at times they were nearly overwhelming. Both sides competed fiercely for air

supremacy; losses were heavy, and landing grounds were frequent targets for

air attack. Two problems haunted the German-Italian armies, however. The

continued existence of a British base on Malta whose commanders used the

advantage of ULTRA to attack resupply from Italy and an air support system

that was not meshed closely enough with its ground forces in the Western

Desert. As a result, many excellent opportunities to damage the enemy

slipped by unrealized.

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AIR BASE AIR DEFENSE

War of Movement in the Western Desert

When Mussolini declared war on Great Britain in June 1940, large

Italian armies in Eritrea and Libya threatened the British positions on the

Suez Canal, in Palestine, and in Egypt. The fall of France left the greatly

outnumbered British without an ally. In August, Italian forces under Marshal Rodolpho Graziani advanced cautiously from Libya as far as Sidi Barrani, sixty miles into Egypt, where they paused to build a forward supply

base. For the next three months, the armies watched each other from fixed

emplacements. The British were unsure how the Italian Army, then still well

regarded, would fight, but General Sir Archibald Wavell, Commander-inChief Middle East, moved first. He sent his Western Desert Force, consisting

of an infantry and an armored division and the Royal Air Force, Egypt, on a

five day raid into enemy territory.' Results were immediate.

On December 9, 1940, the British attacked under the command of one

of the most highly respected officers in the Middle East, Lt.-Gen. Sir Richard N. O'Connor. O'Connor revised Wavell's plan and sought to outflank

the Italians by maneuvering in the vast open area between the Nile and

Tunisia which the British called the Western Desert. In rapid succession

O'Connor took the fortress at Tobruk, drove west over the Cyrenaican

desert, and trapped the Italian army near Benghazi. With a numerically

inferior air force, the British won air superiority by staging a series of heavy

attacks on the Regia Aeronautica's bases. In less than a month, the British

captured 200,000 prisoners and nearly all the enemy's war supplies in Libya.

The Italian collapse left the Axis with only a small foothold along the

Tripolitanian coast, centered on the port of Tripoli.2 (Map 13) Before he

could finish the job, O'Connor received orders from Winston Churchill on

February 7, 1941, to hold in place and extend all possible aid to Greece,

which Italian forces had invaded from Albania the previous October. Most

of the British force facing the Italians in Libya returned to Egypt for refitting or was sent to assist the Greeks. Then, on February 12, 1941, Rommel

arrived in Tripoli to command Axis ground forces. His immediate goal was

to rally the Italians and organize two arriving German divisions into a force

that could stop the British and expand the Axis-controlled land area sufficiently to allow the German Air Force, already in Libya, room to operate.'

In the Balkans, the Greek advance into Albania and the presence of a

British expeditionary force on the Hellenic peninsula rapidly brought German intervention; Hitler felt compelled to prevent a second Italian military

disaster at least as great as the recent defeat in Libya. The German columns

pushed south, and by the end of April British forces had retreated to the

island of Crete. On March 31, while attention was riveted upon events in

Greece, Rommel, contrary to orders, seized the opportunity to outflank the

British in the Western Desert. With a small force of tanks and mechanized

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infantry, his fledgling Afrika Korps, supported by the Luftwaffe's X

Fliegerkorps, raced across Cyrenaica, invested Tobruk, and in mid-April

came to a halt at the Egyptian border. By a stroke of good fortune, German

troops captured O'Connor, who was attempting to restore order in the disorganized Eighth Army. The German Air Force now joined with the artillery,

trying to force Tobruk's perimeter. Attempting desperately to salvage something from the disaster, the British decided to hold the Germans where they

were in North Africa and defend Crete, thereby keeping a foothold at the

entrance to the Aegean Sea. Defense of the island centered on 3 airfields and

consisted of some 30,000 men, but less than a squadron of British fighters at

Heraklion and Maleme airdromes. German opposition came from a string

of bases in southern Greece and the Italian Dodecanese islands. The issue of

air defense of the troops on Crete was never in doubt. Combat losses quickly

ended the RAF's air operations on the island, which lay beyond the range of

any British fighters based in Egypt. The meager bombing effort by Wellingtons flying from Egypt could barely dent the German forces."

Although fiercely opposed on the ground, the Luftwaffe's parachute

and glider borne troops, supported by tactical air bombardment, landed at

Maleme. In ten days they overcame all ground opposition on Crete, but with

heavy losses. One of the mildest German assessments said that although

successful, the seizure of Crete "was not easy and involved a great deal of

bloodshed." Tedder, in summing up the British loss, attributed the RAF's

inability to operate in Greece and Crete to "a lack of secure airbases:' which,

in turn, gave the Luftwaffe the initiative. By May 31, the British abandoned

Crete with the Royal Navy evacuating about half the defending force. Bleak

as the British situation appeared, the Germans lacked the naval force needed

to cross from Crete to Alexandria. Furthermore, they were powerless to

advance farther into Egypt from Libya. The Afrika Korps was tired, its

armor reduced by combat losses and its supply lines stretched to the limit.

Tobruk's perimeter could not be penetrated without heavy German reinforcements, and none was available.'

With both sides temporarily exhausted, the situation stabilized. The

German aviation and artillery, however, continued to press the attack on

Tobruk, a small but developed seaport that served as the main logistic and

troop marshaling area in eastern Libya. The British had turned it into a

strongpoint protecting Egypt and lying astride the only road the Axis could

use. Ground and antiaircraft defenses were tenacious and withstood German attempts to seize the position throughout the summer. Antiaircraft

guns were in short supply and several additional batteries were brought in by

the Navy. Radar warning came only from two gun laying sets which could

not search the sky adequately, but did help with aiming and fire control. The

RAF's airfield at Tobruk was too exposed to bomber and artillery attack and

quickly became unusable. Cut off from the Eighth Army and supplied only

140
CAMPAIGNS IN AFRICA

by ships under intense attack, Tobruk's fighter force dwindled rapidly. The

remaining aircraft of the two original squadrons withdrew on April 24. Air

Marshal Sir Arthur Longmore, Air Officer Commanding in Chief Middle

East, and his deputy, Tedder, had 54 Hurricanes left in Egypt to face an

enemy air force capable of deploying some 400 aircraft from bases in Libya

and the eastern Mediterranean area.'

The RAF now faced several serious problems. Pilot morale after the

loss of Greece and Crete and the retreat in the Western Desert was low. The

German aircraft outnumbered and outperformed the Hurricanes. The distance from sources of new aircraft (England or America) was great; delivery

times were lengthy. As a result, the RAF seemed unable to match its opponents in combat and operational support. Tedder began by establishing a

more coherent organization for the job. He got Longmore to decentralize

control of aerial operations and created a tactical force in the Western Desert

responsible to himself. Bombers and the air defense forces of the Nile Delta

remained under command of Headquarters Middle East Air Force in Cairo.

Upon Longmore's recall to London on May 1, Tedder took command of the

RAF in the Middle East and immediately placed Air Vice Marshal G. G.

Dawson in charge of all repair and maintenance in the theater over the Air

Ministry's demurrers. Tedder knew Dawson's unit to be utterly essential, and

it became the key to sustaining the Air Force in isolated areas.'

Of equal importance was the division of each fighter and fighter

bomber squadron into two parts. The ground echelon of each half squadron

was equipped with vehicles, enabling the divided components of the tactical

air forces to leapfrog forward or backward to match the movements of the

armies. The British established desert landing grounds quickly, often within

a few miles of the maneuvering ground units. The landing grounds were dirt

strips with minimum supplies of gasoline, essential parts, and ammunition

which allowed the RAF's mechanics to service aircraft quickly. Tedder added

mobile radar stations to forward bases so the aircraft would not be surprised

by a German or Italian attack. In moving his forces about the country, one

of Tedder's first rules was to locate fighter fields close to bomber airdromes,

to allow fighters to intercept enemy aircraft and escort British bombers.'

The restructuring did not leave the Desert Air Force problem free. By

September 1941, Tedder still judged air base defense to be the RAF's "weakest spot." Moreover, he encountered opposition to his changes from both

the Army and the Navy. The Eighth Army commander feared the outcome

of any battle in which each of his division commanders did not have

bombers and fighters at his disposal. The Navy voiced the same concerns,

having lost half its Mediterranean fleet to Axis air attacks while supporting

the withdrawal from Greece and Crete and supplying Tobruk. Bitter arguments ensued in staff meetings. Neither the Army nor the Navy wanted

Tedder to control tactical air. Tedder, refusing to yield, cited Prime Minister

141
AIR BASE AIR DEFENSE

German aerial reconnaisance photo plots the location of British desert landing

grounds between Tobruk and Bardia.

Churchill's support for his position and finally brought the sister services

around by convincing General Sir Claude Auchinleck, now Commander-inChief Middle East, of the necessity of concentrating the attacking power of

the Desert Air Force at the most effective spot."

Tedder further insisted, in the face of great resistance from the Army,

that the forward tactical air headquarters (Western Desert Air Force, commanded by Air Vice Marshal Sir Arthur Coningham) be adjacent to that of

the army commander. Moreover, he created a command organization that

was highly mobile and could communicate directly with the commander of

subordinate groups, with supply and repair points, radar stations, the AA

gun operations room, or rear headquarters. Within Western Desert Air

Force, No. 211 Group was responsible for fighter defense. The Western

Desert became a fighter sector, another sector was formed to cover rear

areas. Both resembled sectors in England during the Battle of Britain.'0

The division of air defense guns and equipment supported the new

organization. Eighth Army assigned 12th AA Brigade to work with No. 211

Group, and the brigade's operations room quickly came to share quarters

with the fighter controllers. Assigned to the 12th were thirty-two 3.7-inch

142
CAMPAIGNS IN AFRICA

German intelligence outlines the British field at Bir Stama, near Gambut.

and seventy-two 40-mm Bofors guns. Four radar sets, observer units, and

some of the RAF's Radio Field Interception Units (of the Y-Service intelligence organization) also reported to the fighter controllers. Radar filter

rooms were not used; time response was so critical that no delays could be

tolerated. The fighter control that developed was not a true ground controlled intercept system such as used over Britain; the controllers did not

work directly with radar scopes. Rather, they used a variety of data passed to

them to maneuver their airborne fighters. Moreover, a GCI system would

not have worked because most of the RAF's aircraft had high frequency

radios with a range of fifty miles. It was not until 1942 that the RAF began

to change to VHF radios in Africa, giving them an extended range of one

hundred miles or greater. Additional defense against low level attack was

available from the machine gunners of the station defense forces, predecessors of the Royal Air Force Regiment. During 1941 and 1942, station defense

143
AIR BASE AIR DEFENSE

force units in the Middle East served largely as airdrome guards or on

general base details. They were poorly trained and did little AA work. In

1942, however, the Regiment assumed control of 8,000 of the RAF's antiaircraft gunners in the Middle East theater, where, after September, they were

made into AA flights with up to 360 men. A much greater role for the

Regiment came with the Northwest African invasion late in 1942. There, the

Regiment deployed both ground and air defense units."

Tedder defined air superiority as an ability to destroy an enemy air force

or limit its operations against friendly forces. In his view, air superiority was

gained by operating from secure air bases, bases protected by a combination

of early warning, fighter interceptors, and enough AA guns to deflect an

attacker during his final bombing or strafing run. He clearly realized that

superiority could not be held permanently; relative strength could and did

change from day to day. Risks must be taken, especially at the start of a

campaign when there might be no assurance of secure bases. Furthermore,

numerical superiority alone was never a determinant; effective strength,

concentration of force, and adroit leadership were more important. Before

the November 1942, Anglo-American landings in Northwest Africa, the

RAF held clear numerical superiority rarely-and then only if one did not

count total Axis strength in the Mediterranean that could be used as reinforcements."

Late in 1941, the most important British air base in the Western Desert

was extremely vulnerable. Located at Sidi Barrani, just east of the front line,

it was within easy reach of the Luftwaffe and Regia Aeronautica. The

British quickly moved gun defenses from Mersa Matruh airfield and installed numerous machine guns for use against low level attack. Parachute

and cable rockets, first used in the Battle of Britain, were set out, and radar

and Hurricane fighters were placed on alert. Even so, Italian air attacks

during September destroyed many aircraft on the ground, and defending

fighters shot down no intruders. Better protection was needed, for Tedder

feared an attack by pilots of greater skill could destroy his operation."

Churchill, the ever present force in British military planning, added

more urgency by demanding an offensive into Libya. On November 18,

1941, Operation CRUSADER began. As the operation opened up, rains and

mud immobilized the enemy's air force; there was little Axis air reaction and

no direct threat to the British air bases. The RAF's fighter sweeps neutralized enemy airfields. Advancing British forces found 172 damaged or destroyed airplanes on aerodromes near Derna. Ground threats to RAF bases

from Rommel's maneuvering divisions were a far greater menace, and two

advanced landing grounds had to be evacuated under the guns of Afrika

Korps tanks. Throughout CRUSADER, however, the air threat to Tedder's

bases was negligible. By Christmas 1941, the British once again controlled

Benghazi. They then paused to re-equip their forces. During the rapid ad144
TABLE 15

Axis Air Forces in Africa

December 1941

German Air Force

Reconnaissance

Africa Flight, 1st Staffel/121 Gruppe (Ju88) 4

Dive bomber

3d Bomber Geschwader (Ju87, MellO) 72

'IWin Engine Fighter

3rd Gruppe/26 Fighter Geschwader (MellO) 18

Single Engine Fighter

27th Fighter Geschwader (Mel09) 64

Night Fighters

1st Staffel/3 NF Gruppe (Mel0) 10-12

A Staffel in the Mediterranean area usually consisted of nine aircraft, though

special purpose units varied in strength. Support and reinforcements were also available from Luftflotte II in Rome. Normally, half the assigned aircraft were operationally ready at any time. Total German aircraft in the Mediterranean area was 523.

Italian Air Force

Fighters 100

Fighter bombers 90

Italian Air Force operational rates were about fifty percent.

Sources: Felmy, "The GAF in the Mediterranean Theater of War"

Air Ministry, German translation VII/2
TABLE 16

Royal Air Force in Africa

November 1941

Air Headquarters, Western Desert

30 Sq Sidi Haneish, L.G.* 102 Hurricanes

33 Sq Gerawla, L.G. 10 Hurricanes

60 Sq (So. African) Fuka, L.G. 16 Marylands

80 Sq Fuka, L.G. 103 Hurricanes

113 Sq Maaten Bagush, L.G. 115 Blenheim Fighters

223 Sq Fuka North, L.G. 17 Marylands

272 Sq Gerawla, L.G. 10 Beaufighters

805 Sq (Fleet Air Arm) Fayid Martlets

815 Sq (Fleet Air Arm) Dexheila Swordfish/Albacores

826 Sq (Fleet Air Arm) Maaten Bagush Albacores

261 Wing

!1 Sq Maaten Bagush, L.G. 116 Blenheims

12 Sq (So. African) Dara, L.G. 24 Marylands

21 Sq (So. African) Qotafiya, L.G. 21 Marylands

24 Sq (So. African) Fuka Main Bostons

270 Wing

8 Sq Fuka Main Blenheims

14 Sq L.G. 15 Blenheims

45 Sq Fuka, L.G. 16 Blenheims

55 Sq Fuka North, L.G. 17 Blenheims

84 Sq SW Maaten Bagush L.G.116 Blenheims

Lorraine Sq (French) Abu Sueir, L.G. X Blenheims

253 Wing

208 Sq Sidi Barrani, L.G. 75 Hurricanes

237 Sq (Rhodesian) Gerawla, L.G. 11 Hurricanes

451 Sq(RAAF) Sidi Barrani, L.G. 75 Hurricanes

258 Wing

2 Sq (So. African) Sidi Haneish, L.G. 101 Tomahawks

3 Sq(So. African) Sidi Haneish, L.G. 102 Tomahawks

4 Sq(So. African) Sidi Haneish, L.G. 101 Tomahawks

112 Sq Sidi Haneish, L.G. 102 Tomahawks

250 Sq Sidi Haneish, L.G. 13 Tomahawks

Royal Navy Sq. Sidi Haneish, L.G. 13 Tomahawks
CAMPAIGNS IN AFRICA

TABLE 16 (Continued):

262 Wing

1 Sq(So. African) Kenayis Hurricanes

94 Sq(So. African) Maaten Bagush, L.G. 103 Hurricanes

229 Sq Jesaka, L.G. 10 Hurricanes

238 Sq Sidi Haneish, L.G. 12 Hurricanes

260 Sq Maaten Bagush, L.G. 115 Hurricanes

274 Sq Fuka, L.G. 103 Hurricanes

* Landing Ground

In addition, No 205 Group with 6 squadrons of Wellingtons, No. 201 Group (Naval Cooperation) with 5 squadrons of Dorniers [prewar acquisitions by various Balkan and Mediterranean

powers, captured or otherwise pressed into service by British forces at this point], Blenheims,

Ansons, and Sunderlands, and two squadrons of Hurricanes assigned to Air Hq Egypt were

available as reinforcements.

British squadrons normally had twelve to eighteen aircraft, however, this varied by area and

operating conditions.

Source: Rpt., "RAF Operations in the Western Desert and Eastern Mediterranean:' 512.421B

vance both Army and Air Force accommodated themselves to the new methods of close cooperation.' 4

In December, as the British advanced into Cyrenaica, Eighth Army's

engineers rapidly built or repaired landing grounds. Using whatever transport was available, the RAF delivered gasoline and began flying operations.

At Gazala, engineers spent two days under Axis shellfire clearing three

airfields ahead of British lines. Protection was provided by the RAF fighters

flying to and from targets in the near vicinity, but such cover could not be

continuous and the engineers were at great risk. Nevertheless, the construction efforts paid off handsomely by placing planes on fields close enough to

Eighth Army to support it directly. At Msus, a landing ground with some

dispersed parking and fifty thousand gallons of gasoline was ready two days

after the British Army took the area. Eleven fighter squadrons, a close air

support squadron, and Blenheim bombers soon occupied it and an adjacent

airstrip."

Because of the vast area of responsibility, the distance from England,

and the varied locations of landing grounds, the total number of weapons

protecting desert airfields remained inadequate until well into 1942. The

fluid nature of the desert war left some bases with great numbers of guns,

others with few or none. The desert dust was notorious for fouling weapons,

and rough terrain wore the gun mounts, resulting in extra work for the

147
AIR BASE AIR DEFENSE

S.... :l •o• .5

American B-25 weathers Egyptian sandstorm, 1942. Maintenance and flying

operations under these conditions were arduous.

gunners who had to clean and repair the pieces. Gun positions could not be

prepared readily in the hard, rocky soil, and gun crews began blasting instead of digging emplacements. Much of what was learned would prove

invaluable in the summer of 1942, especially when the British faced Rommel's renewed offensive, which was designed to force the British to withdraw

far into Egypt."6

Backing away before CRUSADER, Rommel safely withdrew through Agedabia to Mersa el Brega, where he reorganized and re-equipped. On January

21, he lashed out again, quickly recaptured Agedabia, and turned once more

toward Egypt. Recoiling from the renewed Axis threat, the RAF retreated in

stages across Cyrenaica to airfields at Gazala and Tobruk. Resupplied, Rommel renewed his drive in May, broke Tobruk's defense, captured the port,

and chased Auchinleck into Egypt, behind the El Alamein line. During the

retreat, Axis fliers made 211 attacks of varying size on the RAF's landing

fields, forcing No. 262 Wing to abandon the fighter base at El Adem. The

Axis attacks were, however, almost entirely limited to landing grounds near

the front. The RAF believed this was due largely to their enemies' inability

to move attack squadrons rapidly from airfield to airfield. Cooperation grew

between the gunners of the 12th AA Brigade and 211 Group. Because both

the RAF's operations center and the 12th AA Brigade's gun operations room

were highly mobile, they quickly abandoned any location threatened by

Rommel's advancing army, and rapidly restored operations at a new airfield.

The swiftness with which Royal Air Force squadrons could move from base

to base prevented losses during the retreat. On several occasions the depart148
CAMPAIGNS IN AFRICA

ing aircraft were screened from the enemy only by a few of the RAF's

armored cars."

Several negative aspects of this fluid process emerged, too. The continuous exchange of information between gun and fighter defenses quickly overloaded the 12th Brigade's telephone and radio circuits, and communications

often broke down. Tanks and trucks cut the wires while moving into position

and only the most ingenious solutions and hard work kept a satisfactory

operation going. Fortunately, the communication difficulties were not a

major impediment because of Tedder's insistence on close and continuing

liaison between Desert Air Force and the AA Brigade. Tedder himself often

remained near Eighth Army's headquarters where he and the ground commanders could quickly solve problems. Joint staff meetings were held daily,

and a close understanding arose between the air and ground leaders facilitated by the design of the air force's operations center.'8

American observers were not impressed at first. In June of 1942, after

Maj. Gen. Lewis H. Brereton and his staff arrived in Egypt to organize the

United States' Ninth Air Force, they formed an impression that British air

defenses had been improvised and were somewhat ramshackle. Maj. David

H. Likes reported to Brereton that "the mobile desert units [used only]

rudimentary plotting methods and often only a vehicle for an operations

room." Although the system appeared crude to the Americans, they quickly

came to appreciate that it was a well thought out, battle tested scheme. In

the operations room the information was sorted, assessed, and given to the

controllers who dispatched fighters to contend with large groups of intruding Axis aircraft. Small flights of two or three enemy planes were ordinarily

ignored by fighters and left solely to ground gunners regardless of what their

target might be. In using its fighters, the RAF tried to intercept Axis raiders

before they reached the front lines, thus preventing them from penetrating to

the relatively unprotected rear areas, where radar detection and control was

lacking. Once directed toward an enemy, fighter pilots were under tight

direction until they were near combat. Only while fighting were they on their

own; immediately after they broke off, the fighter controllers sent them to

another target or back to their bases. The result was a very efficient allocation of weapons; the British avoided any ineffective prowling of the skies by

pilots who had no knowledge of an enemy's location. During daylight, the

RAF used AA guns to drive off or deter enemy pilots who avoided the

interceptors. At night, guns were only allowed to fire if the enemy found a

landing ground. Otherwise, they would lie low, depending on camouflage or

blackouts to fool the pilots."9

During the last year of fighting in Africa, British forces probably received more information about the enemy's tactical air operations, especially logistics, than at any other time in the Second World War. How well

ULTRA was used will probably never be known since no commander ever

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AIR BASE AIR DEFENSE

published revelations on how he appreciated or applied the secret intelligence. This was partly for security reasons, but also because commanders at

the time were not always aware of the relative importance of the information, nor was ULTRA the only source of good intelligence. Many were also

reluctant to put on paper accounts of their decisions and deeds that proved

in hindsight to be mistakes. The effects of this special intelligence on every

aspect of Allied military operations in North Africa, including air base air

defense, were nevertheless pronounced. Auchinleck, the Commander-inChief Middle East (after August 15, 1942, General Sir Harold Alexander),

received daily ULTRA reports from London summarizing high level German

messages. Although the nature of ULTRA information often precluded its

immediate tactical exploitation, or even open discussion of the material,

experts at Bletchley Park provided the commanders in Egypt information

against which RAF Y-units could compare their own intercepts. In addition,

the RAF's radio operators at various radar stations picked up radio conversations between enemy pilots and ground stations and various enemy ground

units. Frequently, radio intercepts confirmed compass bearings of radar

sightings (most of the radar sets in the Western Desert were accurate only for

height and distance). The confirmation allowed immediate actions by

fighter controllers at No. 211 Group headquarters who had been alerted

earlier by Tedder. The Luftwaffe's logistics problems and force dispositions

were almost as well known to Tedder and Coningham as to Lt. Gen. Stefan

Froelich and his successors who commanded the Luftwaffe's forces in Africa.'

By the summer of 1942, Rommel had advanced to El Alamein, some

fifty miles from Alexandria, Egypt. The British Middle East Command,

hard-pressed to halt the enemy and, at the same time, provide aircraft to

bolster the Far East against the advancing Japanese, requested American air

units to reinforce the RAF. On June 2 a detachment of B-24s arrived,

followed shortly by Brereton's task force from India. Shortly thereafter, the

Army Air Forces organized the Ninth Air Force with Brereton commanding.

The Americans only provided flying units; they relied on established British

air base defenses throughout their stay in the Western Desert campaign. In

fact, Brereton enthusiastically embraced many of Tedder's ideas, including

placing the 57th Fighter Group operationally under No. 211 Group, dividing

it into two sections to support rapid movements, and sending American

officers to the fighter controller school at Heliopolis, near Cairo." In the

days before the second battle of El Alamein began in late October, combined

RAF-USAAF air strikes repeatedly hit the Axis' airfields as well as other

advanced positions. Allied fighter cover was heavy and Axis reconnaissance

planes could not cover the front. On October 27, the 57th's P-40s took off in

the darkness from Landing Ground 174 using truck headlights to mark the

dirt runway. Flying low to avoid German radar, they surprised an airdrome

150
CAMPAIGNS IN AFRICA

Blenheims of 82 Squadron strike German field at Tamet, Libya, on June 17,

1942. Two aircraft are wreathed in smoke and dust, while a Ju-88 waits

helplessly. Other equipment and structures lay open to the attack.

near Fuka at dawn and heavily damaged parked Italian and German aircraft.22

With the Axis retreating toward El Agheila, Tedder and Coningham

once again tried audacity to disrupt further Axis transport and air bases.

Landing Ground 125, 120 miles west of the Libyan-Egyptian border, and

deep within the Cyrenaican desert, lay abandoned, and served only as a

rendezvous for air transports supporting patrols of the British Long Range

Desert Group and the commando teams of the Special Air Service. Tedder

and Coningham, however, saw the area as the perfect place from which to

operate fighters in the Axis rear. They counted on rapid redeployment and

the remoteness of the desert strip for both air and ground defense. Nevertheless, British Middle East Headquarters objected that the risk to the air

transports supplying the fighters at the field would be too great. Coningham, convinced the plan would work, promised to protect the supply

aircraft with his fighters; he received a reluctant approval. In early November, the RAF's No. 2 Armoured Car Company drove west unobserved over

the forbidding terrain. They would give light AA protection for the fighter

headquarters at the field and a ground detection screen 50 miles out to the

north. On November 12, the RAF flew supplies and ground personnel to the

landing ground. On the 13th, two Hurricane squadrons landed, refueled,

and took off to attack Axis lines of retreat. For three days the British

fighters shot up the crowded roads along the coast. In addition, they made

surprise raids on at least two airfields-Agedabia on November 14 and

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Giala on the 15th. Pilots reported heavy damage to both the road traffic and

the air bases.23 By the 15th, the thoroughly aroused enemy sent ground and

air units to find and destroy the British base, which beat off an approaching

Italian artillery unit, inflicting heavy losses. Coningham abandoned LG 125

by noon on November 16. Two fighter squadrons were not enough to be

decisive, but they disrupted the Axis retreat and hammered the morale of the

defeated army. The 21st Panzer Division's report for the period noted heavy

air attacks on nearby units to the south; many of these attacks were probably made by Hurricanes from the mid-desert landing ground. The British

decision to use the field took agility and daring, for it was almost entirely

lacking conventional warning and air defense equipment. The RAF moved

in stealthily, operated with great success for four days, and deftly withdrew.2

"

Throughout the time they pressed the retreating Axis forces, the Allied

commanders capitalized on ULTRA and their own air superiority. They knew

the extent to which interdiction from Malta sapped the fuel and supply of

their opponents. The result was an effective campaign that denied air support to Rommel's army. During the period October 24-November 2, the

Luftwaffe's daily sorties exceeded 200 only once, on October 31. On the

24th, just 107 sorties were flown. The low numbers indicated not only

gasoline shortages, but also pilot fatigue and the heavy punishment meted

out by the RAF and the Americans. General Sir Bernard L. Montgomery,

the Eighth Army's new commander, drove west in collaboration with the

RAF. He forced Rommel, now extremely short of fuel, into a long retreat to

Tunis.25 (Map 14)

The Desert Luftwaffe

On the German side in North Africa, the relationship between air and

ground commanders diluted German efforts. Rommel described the problem in organizational terms: "One thing that worked very seriously against

us was the fact that the Luftwaffe in Africa was not subordinate to the

Afrika Korps."26 The root cause was the continuing friction between Rommel and senior German air officers and complicated equipment and organizational deficiencies that prevented the formation of a responsive, mutually

supporting headquarters so apparent under Tedder's leadership. Unlike the

British and later the Allies in North Africa, the Germans were unable to

unify the control of air power within their African forces. Rommel's chain

of command ran through the Italian High Command in Africa to the Commando Supremo in Rome. The Luftwaffe's command lines, however, went

from North Africa directly to Kesselring in Rome. Within the German air

elements in Africa, the ground organization, including flak, was separate

from the fliers and responsible not to Germany's African air commander,

but to Luftflotte II in Rome. The Axis alliance did not establish a clear

153
AIR BASE AIR DEFENSE

theater command responsibility for African operations until the final battle

in Tunisia.* Regardless of Kesselring's superior position as Oberbefehlshaber Sid and their usually genial personal relationship, Rommel did not

always take him too seriously. Rommel also distrusted the Italian field commanders. Believing that they leaked his plans to the British, he often acted

without consulting his Italian superiors or subordinates. The Desert Fox

also had a tendency to communicate directly with Berlin, bypassing all

intervening commands. The upshot of the situation in Africa was an early

estrangement between Rommel and his air support-to the detriment of

both.27

In contrast with the British practice, the Axis' ground and air forces did

not have adjacent operations centers. During most of the fighting in 1941,

Froelich kept his headquarters at the major airfield then in use. His successor, Brig. Gen. Otto Hoffman von Waldau, never improved on this. Thus,

while Rommel was operating at Tobruk or in Egypt, the Ffiegerfihrer

Afrika (Air Commander, Africa) was usually at Derna, more than one

hundred miles west of Tobruk. With no air liaison officer on Rommel's

staff, the air commander could not keep up to date on the movement of

friendly forces or easily track enemy units that could threaten his operation."

German military doctrine called for close coordination between Army

and Air Force, but practical considerations overrode the printed manual,

this time with serious consequences. Luftwaffe Directive 16, published in

1940, called emphatically for the Air Force to achieve air superiority at the

start of a campaign. However, Hitler emphasized instead that air units

primarily provide close air support for maneuvering ground forces, and

when Froelich went to Africa, he was told that his main mission was "maximum support of the army units,' not seizure of air superiority. While trying

to resolve coordination problems, the Air Commander, Africa, continued to

receive instructions from Kesselring which placed both convoy protection

and close air support ahead of air superiority in mission priority. 9

Prior to the war, the Luftwaffe had not prepared a ground based fighter

control system. The service tried three different systems between 1939 and

1942; none worked very well. One of the most serious unresolved problems

was the development of an IFF capability that could interface with and

mark friendly aircraft on a radar operator's screen. In 1941, the Germans

used a radar directed system in France. Shortly thereafter, they started using

radar controlled fighters to defend Germany. To a lesser extent this was also

seen on the Eastern Front in Russia, but tactical intercept control systems,

* The Luftwaffe's combat structure, organized in terms of fronts, was unlike that of the

Allies, based on theaters. When several commanding generals worked on a front, their operational responsibilities were divided according to area or duty.

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CAMPAIGNS IN AFRICA

such as those employed by the RAF in the Western Desert, were absent from

the German theater organization. Day fighters were scrambled when German radar picked up approaching intruders, but after receiving directions

on approximate distance and bearing, the pilots were on their own.3 0

Not only was radar's use retarded, but the Germans also had a deficient

aircraft reporting service in North Africa. Air and ground patrols went out,

but, von Waldau noted, "British aircraft approaching over a wide area

cannot be located." Improvements were made over the next year, however,

they remained inadequate by September 1942. At least two radar stations

were in use near El Alamein in 1942, but they seem to have been intended

only to warn the advance forces of aircraft approaching from British bases.

Once the planes passed on a flight to the west, the stations did not track

their courses. In May 1941, a squadron of radar equipped Mell0 night

fighters came to Benghazi to protect the port and airfield. The MellOs were

used, however, for reconnaissance and close air support, and never succeeded in their intended mission.3

"

To correct the problem, and to improve operations and defense in general, the Luftwaffe's fighters in Africa were grouped under the control of a

Jagdfliegerfilhrer (Jaffi, literally, a fighter leader or commander), who provided a specialized staff to plan for and support combat flying. The JafiD's

office coordinated fire of flak batteries near air bases and with its communications net, sent aircraft to attack RAF bases or intercept flights of enemy

aircraft. Analogous to Tedder's mobile operations center, the fighter commander control system worked rather well within its limited framework. It

might have compared favorably with that of the RAF, had it not been for the

lack of liaison between the services and a shortage of almost all varieties of

supplies, parts, fuel, and aircraft because of interdiction of convoys from

the British flanking position on Malta and the demands of the Russian

front.32

Throughout the campaign in Africa the Luftwaffe could not match the

RAF's ability to move quickly. The smallest German fighter unit capable of

shifting operations from base to base was the Gruppe, usually composed of

two or three squadrons totaling some forty aircraft. Station changes were

preceded by an advance party which arrived at the new location a day or two

before the move. After the aircraft flew to the new airfield, the remainder of

the command and support people followed by truck. Only rarely did a single

squadron move, and then under unusual circumstances. The German system

was more cumbersome than the British and could not match it for speed and

efficiency. During February 1942, while Rommel advanced toward Egypt,

the lack of squadron mobility caused the Axis to forfeit air superiority over

Cyrenaica. Lacking motor transport for their service echelons, the air forces

could not keep up with the rapidly maneuvering ground forces. When

Luftwaffe and Italian squadrons arrived at Benghazi, Derna, and then Mar155
AIR BASE AIR DEFENSE

tuba, they were left exposed. Fortunately for the Germans, the RAF was

sending aircraft to the Far East and India to meet the specter of Japanese

seizure of Singapore. The rapid British withdrawal in fact gave the

Luftwaffe an opportunity to destroy Air Vice Marshal Coningham's tactical

air force on the ground at this juncture, but German air elements could not

pull themselves together and strike the vulverable bases.33

Relying heavily on its own ground based weapons for base defense, the

Luftwaffe brought flak units to Libya early. Shortly after Rommel's arrival

and before most German army units were in place, there were five and a half

motorized battalions of AA guns (subsequently organized as the 19th Flak

Division) and a mobile flak gun repair shop in Africa. The German AA

quickly gained a reputation among RAF pilots for accuracy. No less impressed were the Eighth Army's tank men who experienced the fire of the 88-

mm batteries used against them. The German Army frequently

commandeered 88-mm and 37-mm flak guns, as their range, muzzle velocity, and flat trajectory made them ideal for tank killing. When the German

Army did not take AA weapon units for its own use, Axis airfields were well

defended by flak, radar, and searchlights, but their abrupt removal from air

defense left gaps not readily filled. To avoid effective German fire, British

pilots sought to attack the guns either at very low altitude or between the

3,500 foot maximum range of the 37-mm guns and the lowest altitude at

which the 88-mm could be used, about 9,000 feet.* In the latter case,

bombers joined the attacks to keep the gunners pinned down. Finding the

defending gun batteries was not easy, for they were spread out and away

from the flying fields.34

Although Axis air base defenders usually had enough guns, they failed

to use camouflage to their advantage. This too, may have been due to

interdiction of shipping by the RAF's Malta air force, for nets, paint, and

equipment were all in short supply. German motor vehicles and aircraft were

often not repainted from the dark gray-green used in northern Europe. The

dark color gave protection during the short wet season, but with the summer

months light earth tones would have been far more effective. Little attempt

was made to conceal dispersed aircraft and AA guns were not always hidden. Fuel storage, however, was better concealed; it was kept in small caches

scattered over wide areas. The few such sites located by British aerial reconnaissance were well covered by brush and earth. Fuel containers, rather

small in size, were more easily concealed in the terrain; the larger gun pits

and airplanes were not.33

The German guns protecting airfields outnumbered those of the British

in the Western Desert, but antiaircraft artillery was necessarily a reactive

* Minimum effective range was governed by the elevation of the gun barrel, fuze design,

speed of the target, and of ability of the gun crews to traverse the guns.

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TABLE 17

Axis Air Forces in Africa

May 1942

German Air Force

Strength

Reconnaissance

4th Short Range Staffel (Mel09, MellO) 21

1st Long Range Staffel/121st Gruppe (Ju88, Mel09) 13

Dive Bomber

3rd Bomber Geschwader Hq. (MellO, Helll) 2

1st Gruppe/3rd Geschwader (Ju87) 44

Twin Engine Fighter

7th Sq./26th Geschwader (MellO) 12

9th Sq./26th Geschwader (MellO) 11

Single Engine Fighter

1st Gruppe/27th Geschwader (Mel09) 34

2nd Gruppe/27th Geschwader (Mel09) 31

3rd Gruppe/27th Geschwader (Mel09) 30

Fighter-bomber Gruppe/27th Geschwader (Mel09) 10

Night Fighter

2nd Sq./2 NF Gruppe (Ju88) 9

Bombers

12th Sq./lst Luftwaffe Area Command (Ju88) 17

234

Italian Air Force

1 Ground Attack Wing 90

1 Fighter Wing 75

Reconnaissance, misc. 20

185

Support and reinforcements were available from elsewhere in the Mediterranean

area. Normally half the assigned aircraft were operational at any one time.

Source: Felmy, "The GAF in the Mediterranean Theater of War"
TABLE 18

Royal Air Force in Africa

May 1942

Air HQ Western Desert

No. 211 Group (Fighters)-Gambut

233 Wing

2 Sq (So. African) Maaten Bagush, L.G.* 115 Tomahawks

4 Sq (So. African) Maaten Bagush, L.G. 115 Tomahawks

260 Sq Maaten Bagush, L.G. 115 Kittyhawks

239 Wing

3 Sq (RAAF) Sidi Haneish, L.G. 12 Kittyhawks

112 Sq Sidi Haneish, L.G. 12 Kittyhawks

450 Sq (RAAF) Sidi Haneish, L.G. 12 Kittyhawks

243 Wing

33 Sq Sidi Haneish, L.G. 13 Kittyhawks

73 Sq Sidi Haneish, L.G. 13 Hurricanes

80 Sq Sidi Haneish, L.G. 13 Hurricanes

274 Sq Gambut Hurricanes

805 Sq (Fleet Air) Maaten Bagush, L.G. 14 Martlets

889 Sq (Fleet Air) Fuka Satellite Fulmars

3 Wing (So. African)

12 Sq (So. African) Qotafiya Bostons

24 Sq (So. African) Qotafiya Bostons

Detached Squadrons

I Air Ambulance Western Desert

2 Flight (Photo Rec) Western Desert Various

15 Sq (So. African) Amriya, L.G. 98 Blenheim Fighters

21 Sq (So. African) Amriya, L.G. 99 Baltimores

40 Sq (So. African) Sidi Azeiz Hurricanes

60 Sq (So. African) Ahbassia Marylands

208 Sq Sidi Azeiz Hurricanes

250 Sq Sidi Haneish, L.G. 12 Hurricanes

No. 205 Group (Bombers)-Ismailia

231 Wing

37 Sq El Daba Wellingtons

70 Sq El Daba Wellingtons

236 Wing

104 Sq El Daba, L.G. 106 Wellingtons

147 Sq L.G. 224 Wellingtons

148 Sq El Daba, L.G. 106 Wellingtons
CAMPAIGNS IN AFRICA

TABLE 18 (Continued):

238 Wing

38 Sq Shallufa Wellingtons

40 Sq Shallufa Wellingtons

242 Wing

108 Sq Fayid Wellingtons

* Landing Ground

No 201 Group with 11 squadrons of Beauforts, Blenheims, Dorniers, Ansons and Beaufighters

in Alexandria, and 15 assorted squadrons of Spitfires, Hurricanes, Beauforts, and Tomahawks

assigned to Air Hq Egypt. All were available for reinforcement.

Most squadrons had 12 or 18 aircraft assigned, but this varied greatly depending on intensity of

combat and repair or service facilities available.

Source: Rept., "RAF Operations in the Western Desert and Mediterranean,' Hq RAF Middle

East

force, subject to the flow of highly mobile fighting. After October 1942, as

the weight of British forces sent the Axis retreating a thousand miles toward

Tunis, the German air base defenders were rendered temporarily impotent.

During the course of the retreat the Luftwaffe's 19th Flak Division and its

88-mm guns came under control of the Army as an antitank force and was

no longer able to protect bases and ports. With the Allied landings in

Morocco and Algeria in November 1942, the German and Italian Air Forces

began the final battle for North Africa. 6

TORCH and the Drive to Tunis

Late in 1942, a redirection of Anglo-American strategy took the western

allied war effort to North Africa. Early in the year, the American Chiefs of

Staff planned for a contingency invasion of Europe should the Russians

appear on the verge of collapse. The British saw little possibility of success

for such a venture. Prime Minister Churchill sought to win the fight in

Egypt and deny the Vichy French regime its North African possessions. He

proposed instead the seizure of those territories to President Roosevelt. This

thrust would place a force in Rommel's rear and inject Allied influence into

the western end of the Mediterranean.3 7

The Germans controlled Northwest Africa through an Armistice Commission set up in 1940 to enforce the neutrality of Morocco, Algeria, and

Tunisia. The French actually administered the region with the limited miltitary forces allowed them by the imposed 1940 agreement. No Axis forces

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AIR BASE AIR DEFENSE

were in French North Africa, but it was obvious that Germany and Italy

could occupy both it and Vichy France at Hitler's whim. Covert diplomacy

aimed at gaining French acquiescence to the landings on the Moroccan

Atlantic coast and at Oran and Algiers were only partially successful.

Though negotiators presented the enterprise as a primarily American one,

the French were still bitter at the memory of their apparent abandonment by

the British in 1940 and Royal Navy's later attack on the French fleet at Oran.

Amid these uncertainties, Operation TORCH began."

The landings took place on the morning of November 8, 1942. A lack

of shipping reduced the size of the forces originally planned for TORCH, but

the troops got ashore at all three invasion points against enough resistance

to rescue French honor. An American naval task force, with the carrier

Ranger and three escort carriers, provided air cover for the landings in.

Morocco and seizure of airfields at Port Lyautey and Casablanca. The

escort carrier Chenango carried P-40s of the 33rd Fighter Group, a contingent of Brig. Gen. James H. Doolittle's Twelfth Air Force. The 33rd was to

fly from the carrier to fields near Casablanca. The Royal Air Force provided

the newly formed Eastern Air Command, under Air Vice Marshal Sir

William A. M. Welsh. The two Allied air forces were organized as complete

units, capable of performing several missions. Each was to carry out

strategic bombing, counterair, coastal patrol, and similar duties in its

geographical area. 3 9

At the landing sites, French ground and coastal defenses were potentially strong. Air defenses were active at first, but easily overcome. The

Germans had permitted only a few obsolete AA weapons among the French

defenses. Radar was not to be found. American aircraft losses in Morocco

were due largely to inexperienced pilots' landings on fields damaged by

naval shells. The French agreed to an armistice with the Allies, and on

November 11, their units joined the drive against the Axis. The Allies turned

their attention east hoping to capture Tunis by the end of December.'

In support of the offensive, eastern Algeria became the center of air

action. Paved runways there were rare, hard surfaced parking rarer; everywhere a sticky mud quickly trapped any airplane taxiing into it. The resulting congestion presented exceptional targets for enemy bombers. On

November 18, Maison Blanche airfield, near Algiers, received one of the

first air attacks. Eighteen airplanes of the 14th Fighter Group were badly

damaged. Overcrowding prevented some fighters from taking off to engage

the Luftwaffe. British and American engineers began to lay out new airdromes and bring in equipment, but a severe shortage of road and rail

transportation and the Allies' ignorance of terrain and soil conditions impeded construction.4

'

The burden of defending against air attack devolved early on the RAF

and the AA units of the British First Army; theirs was the only radar

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CAMPAIGNS IN AFRICA

Wreckage of American B-17s at Maison Blanche, Algeria, on November 21,

1942. The absence of any protection left these aircraft vulnerable to a German strike.

available until early 1943. Most American radar sets sent to the three Signal

Aircraft Warning battalions were slow in arriving, sometimes several months

late. Moreover, they were too delicate to unload over beaches and too heavy

to be easily transported overland, save over good roads. Unlike the U.S.

Marine Corps, which had brought similar equipment to Guadalcanal a few

months previously, the U.S. Army was not yet accomplished at amphibious

operations. When American radar arrived it was used mostly along the coast

west of Algiers. Mountains and terrain variations caused echoes or gaps in

coverage, and some sets were moved a dozen times until they were satisfactorily placed. For an interim solution to the many air defense warning problems, the Allies turned to British ULTRA and Y-Service intelligence to report

impending German air attacks on bases in Algeria. Intelligence officers

could not predict every raid, and every precaution was taken to avoid tipping

off the Germans that their messages were being read. Nevertheless, the

results were satisfactory and knowledge of the Luftwaffe's order of battle

was extensive. The signals intelligence staff at Allied Force Headquarters

was quickly increased in size and function.42

Radar siting difficulties were overcome as the Allies gained experience,

but the early problems with operating the systems were more serious. No

entirely satisfactory solutions were found during the North African campaign. The Eastern Air Command staff had no officer responsible for coordinating radar, fighter operations, and communications. On November 21,

Group Capt. D.E.W. Atcherly reported to Welsh that, among other problems, the situation created "an air of uncertainty, no one being entirely

certain of his own individual responsibility in setting up of the [defensive]

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AIR BASE AIR DEFENSE

Algerian laborers help stack pierced steel planking for use in airfield construction on the advance to Tunisia.

fighter coverage." More than three weeks were needed to establish radar

detection around Algiers, the stations then being connected to Maison Blanche airfield "somewhat nebulously" by unreliable field telephone. Station

operators were not sure they could reach the air base when necessary.43

As a result of earlier wartime experiences, the British established interservice rules for operational control of air defense in overseas areas. When

an air defense system was created in major operating areas, the air officer

commanding controlled all defense resources including guns, fighters, radar,

and searchlights. At isolated bases the service with the predominant interest

would appoint a defense commander. Apparently this was not clearly understood in Northwest Africa, for the Chiefs of Staff in London found it

necessary to reiterate the policy in a message to their forces. The less experienced Americans had an even vaguer understanding of tactical air defense.

The Signal Corps' air warning service contingent assigned to XII Fighter

Command headquarters arrived in Casablanca on November 19. From its

arrival until April 11, 1943, the organization moved from station to station

without apparent purpose, performing routine drill and details, finally taking over duties of the 412th Signal Company, which were not related to air

warning.41

In addition to a questionable warning system, active air defenses for the

Allied bases in Eastern Algeria and Thnisia were poor or nonexistent. Thelepte airfield had no warning net, only four 40-mm Bofors, and four .50

caliber machine guns to ward off attackers, and had to depend on expensive

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CAMPAIGNS IN AFRICA

daylight fighter patrols for protection. By late December 1942, Biskra airfield had just twelve .50 caliber machine guns and an air warning system for

the British and American bases had yet to be organized. Except for a few

RAF Regiment AA flights, Air Marshal Welsh did not command AA defenses at his airfields; operational control of the heavy and medium guns

was retained by the armies. 45

Lacking the battle experience of the Western Desert, the Allies in

Northwest Africa did not work as closely as necessary. During the first two

years of desert fighting, the British learned that concerted air attacks on air

bases made below 4,000 feet could be deflected only by heavy defenses. At

least a dozen 40-mm guns, and another twenty to twenty-six positions armed

with 20-mm cannon and machine guns were needed. Double or quadruple

mounted light guns were best. Many extra firing positions had to be prepared in advance as the guns had to be moved often; once seen by pilots or

reconnaissance cameras they could be successfully attacked. Above all,

training in the proper use of weapons was essential. Although the Air Ministry prepared studies incorporating battle experiences and gun and radar

operating standards, neither Allied army in North Africa drew upon the

knowledge until forced to do so by the weight of German and Italian attacks. Inability to perform well on offense or to protect friendly forces made

the Allies review doctrine on use of tactical aviation.46

In mid-February 1943, the Allies unified their military organization in

North Africa. The air component, under Tedder, was named Mediterranean

Air Command; the ground echelon became the 18th Army Group. Gen.

Dwight D. Eisenhower's reorganization was intended to consolidate the

Allied position in preparation for an invasion of Italy and drew heavily on

British experience and leadership. 47

The Mediterranean Air Command was not a strong, coherent air force,

however. Its primary purpose was to supervise planning and overall air

operations, but its leaders now set about changing the Allied view of the use

of air power. Most of the senior officers of both armies and air forces in

Northwest Africa were relatively inexperienced in combat. Many army commanders believed firmly in almost constant air cover, available on call, to

fend off enemy airplanes. Doolittle and Welsh were unable to influence

those views, and it took the new command structure to bring about a significant change. Tedder and Air Marshal Sir Charles Portal argued the air arm's

first job was to destroy an enemy air force and then concentrate to destroy

the enemy army's ability to reinforce and continue the battle. Success in the

air would protect both ground forces and air bases from air attack. The

contrary practice of using air power to try to defend army positions simply

dissipated scarce resources. The air marshals' achievements in the Western

Desert loomed large in the continuing debate. In mid-February General

Montgomery and Air Vice Marshal Coningham spoke to many of the senior

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AIR BASE AIR DEFENSE

Allied military leaders at Casablanca Conference, January 1943. Front row,

left to right, General Dwight D. Eisenhower, Air Chief Marshal Arthur W.

Tedder, General Air Harold Alexander, Admiral Sir Andrew Cunningham.

Rear, Harold MacMillan, Maj. Gen. Walter B. Smith and two British officers.

officers at a meeting in Tripoli, convincing them, too, of the need to change

the employment of aviation. Coningham characterized close air-ground

cooperation in the Western Desert by citing examples of rapid deployments

to remote landing grounds, sometimes with supporting armor elements."

Subordinate to the Mediterranean Air Command were Middle East Air

Command, RAF Malta Air Command, and the American Northwest African Air Forces (NAAF). Within NAAF, led by Maj. Gen. Carl Spaatz, were

several subcommands, two of which were responsible for air defense: Northwest African Coastal Air Force in all areas up to a line fifty miles from the

front, and Northwest African Tactical Air Force forward of that line. Within

Allied Force Headquarters an Antiaircraft and Coast Defense (AA and CD)

Section was created and charged with coordinating defensive fire zones and

allocating and controlling AA weapons within the theater. Even with the

reorganization, however, the problems caused by inexperience and the formerly fragmented command structure could not be rectified at once.49

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CAMPAIGNS IN AFRICA

Not only had the Allies neglected warning and defense systems, but

training of radar operators was deficient. The U.S. Army usually assigned

less well educated men to operate and repair the Signal Corps' radar sets

than did the British. The Royal Air Force required radar operators to be

college graduates with appropriate civilian experience. On the other hand,

few of the U.S. Army Air Force's operators were high school graduates and

repairmen were of similar caliber. Captain August W. Mysing, a fighter

controller with the American 3rd Air Defense Wing, remarked, "Our radar

units weren't worth a dime, and if it hadn't been for some English units with

us, we would not have been operational. I believe the [U.S.] personnel were

green and didn't know how to maintain the apparatus or read the scope."

Brig. Gen. Lyman L. Lemnitzer, commander of the 34th Coast Artillery

Brigade, described the Signal Corps' radar maintenance as "non-existent

... one of the blackest situations of [the] campaign." The experience

gained by the British in North African fighting gave them the basis of a plan

to correct the problems, although it took months-in fact until after the

conclusion of the campaign-to resolve them all. The command also transferred many skilled people from Egypt to form a core of repair and operations specialists on the NAAF staff."

The rapid Allied advance to the east after the November landings left

behind the airfield defense and warning units set up at the Allies' first

Northwest African bases. On March 31, Northwest African Strategic Air

Forces found its bases near Constantine, Algeria, without a warning service.

The commander appealed to General Spaatz to provide one to avoid a

"successful attack by the enemy upon our airdromes [which] would decimate ... our heaviest air striking forces." In fact, those bases were already

under frequent attack. Spaatz's staff referred the warning problem to Northwest African Coastal Air Force, which was able to offer little immediate aid

other than to change the reporting circuits to increase warning time for

attacks approaching from directly east, that is, from Bizerte and Tunis. The

radar coverage for the Strategic Air Forces' bases continued to have holes,

however, since aircraft attacking from fields in southern Tunisia could not be

detected."

Eventually, British mobile radar units were linked by radio or telephone

to the Coastal Air Force's 3rd Air Defense Wing or 242 Group, which

launched fighter interceptors. Two British AA brigades sent some guns for

base protection and assigned the American 34th Coast Artillery Brigade,

with its 192 40-mm guns, to the task.5 2

Before the war and through 1940, the Royal Air Force depended on the

British Army for both AA and ground airdrome defense. During the summer of 1940, some bases in England augmented their defense with machine

guns manned by RAF airmen. It became more and more apparent, however,

that the Army had neither the men nor the organization to continue in the

165
AIR BASE AIR DEFENSE

-. • ,..;,.. 

D-7 bulldozer fills crater torn into a North African airfield. Rapid repairs

ensured near continuous operations.

base defense role. Realizing that an army commander in combat would

almost always be forced to support his own units before those of another

service, the RAF began to take a more active interest in protecting its bases

from both air and ground attack. Inability to defend air fields in Greece

followed by the loss of Crete in May 1941, gave added impetus to the

movement. The dangers of depending on an ad hoc ground defense, especially when facing an airborne or highly mobile enemy, had been clearly

illustrated on Crete when the Germans seized Maleme airfield and used it to

reinforce their assault units. In February 1942, after extensive study of how

best to solve the problem, the Royal Air Force formed the Royal Air Force

Regiment. It was intended to be a highly mobile organization capable of

protecting airfields from both ground and air attack. The Air Ministry

handled recruiting, equipping, and deploying the new unit, although the

Army provided its first commander and much of its original training. The

Regiment was first used in England, but the clear need for similar units

overseas was readily apparent." Several of the RAF Regiment's well trained

defense squadrons accompanied the Allied force to Algeria. In addition, it

sent five separate light AA flights armed with air transportable 20-mm

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CAMPAIGNS IN AFRICA

cannon. One of the flights was quickly deployed with No. 322 Fighter Wing

to Bone airdrome, where it immediately engaged the attacking Luftwaffe. In

a short time its commander and four gunners were killed. Other AA flights

were assigned to airdromes near Canrobert and Souk el Arba.5 4

The light AA flights were attached to the RAF Regiment's ground

defense squadrons. Early in 1943 the squadrons and AA flights became

responsible for seizing forward landing grounds as the armies advanced.

After clearing mines and mopping up stray enemy forces in the immediate

area, the units set up base defenses. Because the air defense flights were not

heavily armed, usually having only nine 20-mm cannon and three .303-

caliber Browning machine guns, they supplemented rather than replaced

fully the army AA. Often, however, the Regiment's AA flights were the only

defenders at a newly acquired and operating airfield for some time. They

quickly gained a reputation for effective work.55

In January 1943, the British moved two mobile radar stations through

their front lines and then by land to Cap Serrat to control air attacks on the

German airlift of men and supplies into Tunis. One ground defense squadron and an AA flight went along to protect the equipment. Since the stations

were in an area where the Luftwaffe held air superiority, they were often

attacked en route. The AA flight's gunners shot down at least one attacking

FW 190 fighter. Once at Cap Serrat the unit camouflaged its radar sets and

supporting equipment, the AA guns kept silent, and the ground defenders

moved out as a protective screen blocking frequent Axis patrols. The radar

stations functioned unseen until March 3, when a German offensive forced

them to evacuate to the west.56

So successful were the AA flights that by the end of 1942 the British

formed twenty-four more in North Africa. In a reorganization of May 1943,

the twenty-nine flights became eleven light antiaircraft squadrons, three

fully mobile, each with twenty-four 20-mm cannon. The eight remaining

squadrons temporarily used twenty-nine .303-caliber machine guns apiece

and enough vehicles to move one flight at a time. The intent was to use the

partially mobile units at rear bases or areas not susceptible to heavy attack,

whereas the squadrons with cannon helped defend the more heavily used

airfields and would accompany the first Allied forces to Sicily.57

In addition to the RAF Regiment, other base defense improvements

appeared as the Allied Force reorganization took root. Early in February

1943, Allied Force Headquarters (AFHQ) and Eastern Air Command, responding to Portal's reminder about air defense control, established specified air defense areas. By spring 1943, the areas were fully developed, guided

by the new Antiaircraft and Coast Defense Committee, chaired by Maj.

Gen. R. B. Pargiter, Eisenhower's new antiaircraft chief. Inner Artillery

Zones (IAZ) were designated at certain locations that could best be defended only by antiaircraft guns. Any aircraft entering such a zone was to be

167
AIR BASE AIR DEFENSE

-, 4

41

British Bofors gun crew on guard on a beach near 1ipoli. A downed Italian

Macchi fighter rests where its pilot left it in the sand.

U.S. Army Air Defense Museum.

engaged by gunfire unless the local British or American fighter controller

directed otherwise. By the use of code words and improved communications, the Allies closely coordinated AA fire and fighter operations. Gun

Defended Areas (GDA) were less important locations where heavy antiaircraft weapons were in place and where an inner artillery zone was not

normally in use. When necessary, friendly aircraft could enter a GDA after

identifying themselves. Allied Force Headquarters further specified that an

IAZ could exist within a Gun Defended Area, and specific rules of engagement, varying according to the situation, governed defensive fire in such an

area. Special Areas were the designated third category, established to protect

the most important, vulnerable, or unusual sites. Flying discipline was

stressed and became more detailed over the next few months to accommodate AA gunners, who had to determine that a plane was hostile before they

fired. Pilots were enjoined from flying low over troop locations without

previous coordination, from diving toward bases out of the sun (a favored

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CAMPAIGNS IN AFRICA

mode of attack), and from test firing weapons except in specific places. In

addition, aviators were to approach GDAs through specified corridors. 8

Air defense sectors for Northwest Africa were established under the

control of Coastal Air Force. The British and Americans assigned fighter

squadrons to each sector and supporting command structures improved.

Sector commanders were air officers with operational control of AA in their

areas. The USAAF redesignated its Composite Wings in Morocco and Algeria as the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd Air Defense Wings; aircraft warning services

were integrated in their structure. NATAF also operated fighter control

sectors, protecting its bases with AA and aircraft within its fifty mile area

along the front. Most important, the Allied pilots carried the offensive to

the German and Italian airdromes, destroying the enemy air force by high

and low level bombing of its airfields, and in air to air combat. Each week

the attacks increased in intensity. Airfields within the shrinking German

perimeter became pitted with craters and covered by rubble and wrecked

equipment. Axis air strikes at Allied airfields ceased in April, and remaining

enemy air forces were thrown into desperate support of the army. American

fighter groups, accustomed to operating independently, at first chafed at

flying within the rules. This was overcome in time, and by the capture of

Tunis on May 13, the Allied air defense, combined with air superiority,

provided safe operational bases.5 9

The Axis Defense Of Tunisia

In September 1942, in a major change, Kesselring became commander

of all German forces in the Mediterranean, except for Rommel's army, still

under nominal Italian control. Maritime transportation to North Africa

continued under the direction of the Commando Supremo. German success

depended upon a rapid buildup of reinforcements for Rommel and keeping

the new aggregate supplied with food, fuel, equipment, and ammunition.

On November 9, 1942, the Luftwaffe began moving to airfields in northern

Tunisia; army units followed shortly in strength unexpected by the Allies.

Brig. Gen. Martin Harlinghausen, FliegerfiThrer Tunis, led 3 fighter Gruppen, 1 dive bomber Gruppe, and a reconnaissance Staffel to Tu1nis with a

single flak regiment giving AA protection. By December, Axis air strength in

Tunisia grew to 850 planes with strong ground-attack capability. The entire

Kampfgeschwader 76, with 90 airplanes, flew from the Caucasus to Bizerte.

German Army units were brought to Tunisia faster and in much larger

numbers than the Allies anticipated. By the time they were ready to move on

Tunis, the Allies had lost the race. Now they had to fight to take the country;

gone was the chance to scoop Rommel and his men quickly into the bag."

Twenty-two airfields of varying size and construction were available to

the Luftwaffe and Regia Aeronautica throughout Tunisia. The most impor169
AIR BASE AIR DEFENSE

tant, at Tunis, Bizerte, Gabes, Sfax, and Sousse, were heavily defended.

Moreover, major airfields in Sicily and the lower Italian peninsula, no more

than 170 miles away supported and reinforced the bases in Tunisia. The

single AA regiment at Tunis soon grew into the 20th Flak Division, while the

19th Flak Division continued its largely antiarmor role in the south with

Rommel. In addition to the 19th and 20th Divisions, Italian fighters and AA

defended their bases, though the Germans did not consider their comrades

in arms effective. If nothing else, the Italian weapons increased the total

number of guns available. The relatively small area which the Axis attempted to hold provided several advantages. Fighters could be more effectively deployed and radar could survey virtually all approaches used by

enemy attackers.6 '

German radar units, now much more efficiently used than in the Western Desert, established a warning net connected by an excellent communications system. The Germans moved several Freya sets to Tunisia, siting ten of

these installations in such a way that they had a range of up to 160 miles.

The radar did not have GCI ability, but the Germans were able to detect

impending air strikes-some as much as two hours in advance, while the

Allied groups were still assembling after take off.62

German reinforcement could not stave off defeat indefinitely. By December 1942, Hitler had still failed to conquer Malta. RAF and USAAF

squadrons, based ever closer to their targets in the Mediterranean, attacked

air bases in Sicily, Tunis, and Bizerte, disrupting fighter operations and the

airlift of men and equipment. Of nearly 500 airplanes on overcrowded bases

in Sicily, 62 were reported destroyed between April 4 and 6, 1943, alone.63

German military studies on the southern theater returned constantly to

the difficulty of shipping supplies across the Mediterranean. From June

1941 on, Italian shipping could not meet demands in the face of Malta's air

strikes, and supply starved German forces in Africa rarely operated at full

effectiveness. The Allies were aware of their enemy's plight and attacked

ships and ports relentlessly. Intercepted Enigma messages gave virtually

complete information on shipping losses, and by March 1943, Allied air

attacks on the sea supply routes became decisive.6

Axis attempts to hold a constricted base in Africa were further eroded

by Allied heavy bombers. Flying near 30,000 feet, they were above the

effective range of most of the German 88-mm guns, only the newer models

of which could reach that height. As their perimeter contracted in Tunisia,

the Germans used half of the 138 guns available as antiarmor weapons,

severely restricting the base defenders. The constant need to fly fighters to

cover for close air support missions, protect airlift aircraft, or intercept high

flying bombers strained German pilots and planes and rapidly used up fuel

and spare parts.65

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CAMPAIGNS IN AFRICA

TABLE 19

Axis Mediterranean Air Strength

Tunisian Air Corps

April 1943

Strength

53rd Single Engine Fighter Geschwader (Mel09) 90

77th Single Engine Fighter Geschwader (Mel09) 90

3rd Gruppe/lst Close Support Geschwader (Mel09) 25

3rd Gruppe/4th Close Support Geschwader (FW190) 25

2nd and 4th Staffeln/1l4th Recce. Gruppe (Mel09) 16

Desert Rescue Staffel (Fiesler Storch) 21

Mine Detector Staffel (Ju52) 3

270

The Luftwaffe could also draw from forces elsewhere in the Mediterranean totaling

767 aircraft capable of immediate deployment.

German Flak Strength in Tunisia (19th and 20th Divisions):

105-mm guns 4

88-mm guns 138

37-mm guns 12

20-mm guns (single barrel) 208

20-mm guns (four barrel) 59

The 19th Flak Division was engaged mostly in antitank and army force

protection. About half the available 88-mm guns were in that role.

Sources: Felmy, "The GAF in the Mediterranean Theater of War"

Air Ministry, German translation VII/25

The German-Italian air force faced heavy odds. In mid-February, Luftwaffe

intelligence estimated that 2,769 aircraft were closing in from Libya and

Algeria. This was short of the mark as the Americans had 1,855

aircraft added to an RAF total of about the same. On the other hand, many

German and Italian airplanes used to counter the Allies, such as the Stuka,

were obsolete. The demands of the Russian front and home air defense

171
Allied bombs fall on Axis airfield at Tripoli. Indicators point out bombs

failing (1) and aircraft revetments below (2).
CAMPAIGNS IN AFRICA

groups severely limited available German reinforcements. During the fighting for Tunisia, Allied air and naval attacks on Mediterranean supply routes

kept a choke hold on available fuel and parts."

After mid-March 1943, the Luftwaffe in Tunisia was unable to go on

the offensive. Air operations continued and some replacement aircraft arrived from Italy, but parts and fuel shortages restricted flying. Only the most

important missions could be flown as more and more derelicts collected on

the hard pressed bases. The situation worsened in mid-April when the Allies

gained complete air superiority and began Operation FLAX. FLAX was Tedder's plan to cut the Axis aerial supply effort. It was based partly on Enigma

information, but more on the RAF's Y-intercepts. Carefully scrutinizing

message traffic, intelligence specialists gave the Allied air force leaders

times, routes of flight, and types of aircraft heading for Tunis. Three squadrons of South African Air Force P-40s repeatedly attacked the Ju52s and

Me323s, the latter being six engine transports able to lift 40,000 pounds,

while other Allied fighters took on Axis escorts. German and Italian air

transport losses approached or exceeded those at Stalingrad a few months

earlier. In April alone, the Germans lost 125 Ju52s and 23 Me323s; 65 more

aircraft were badly damaged. 67

Fuel and parts now became almost impossible to obtain. As the Allied

armies approached Tunis, the Germans increasingly diverted their flak units

from AA to ground combat. By April 29, the Luftwaffe could no longer

find the daily 35 gallons of fuel needed for each of its radar sets and powergenerator units. The capability of the German air force declined at an

accelerating rate until, on May 8, 1943, surviving air units were withdrawn

to Sicily, leaving behind 600 unflyable aircraft. The army held out a few days

longer, until May 13. By then, control of the air had long since passed to the

Allies who were preparing to invade southern Europe."

Summary

The keys to successful Royal Air Force operations in the Western Desert

were the liaison with Eighth Army and the mobility of the fighter and gun

defenses. The British ability to create a profusion of landing grounds in

barren, rocky desert greatly compounded German efforts to destroy the

RAF. The Germans, on the other hand, lacked both the air organization and

warning services that could have given them an opportunity to challenge

Allied air superiority. After the fighting west of El Alamein in mid-1942,

during which the Eighth Army was badly mauled and pushed back, Rommel

wrote, "[On the night of June 30, while pursuing the Eighth Army]... we

soon heard the guns of British low flyers, which had apparently settled in on

their new airfields."" The ability to move quickly and the large repair and

maintenance facility in Egypt provided the Allies with an air force that could

173
AIR BASE AIR DEFENSE

vacate threatened areas, replace battle losses, and quickly repair airplanes.

In short, it was an air force that could survive a long battle of attrition.

From November 1942 to May 1943, 2,047 Commonwealth aircraft were

destroyed or damaged in the Western Desert. The intense fighting placed a

premium on quick replacement. The RAF was forced to ship new airplanes

from England or America via the Cape of Good Hope, ferry them through

Gibraltar and Malta, or land them from ships at Takoradi, in present day

Ghana, and fly them to Cairo. During the same period, the RAF assessed

Axis losses at 2,587 destroyed and damaged, but new German and Italian

aircraft could fly a short, direct route from Europe or be repaired at Bengazi

and Tripoli.7"

When Air Marshal Coningham spoke to senior Allied officers in February 1943, he characterized the cooperation that enabled the British to seize,

prepare, and defend airfields:

The advanced forces of the spearhead of the 7th Armored

Division took with them a landing ground party and one or

two specialist personnel. They reached the landing area [at

Sedala, 120 miles east of Tripoli] at dusk, and on breaking

camp next morning threw off the aerodrome party, 18 to 20

prized Bofors, M. T. and the Ambulance Holding Unit. By

nine o'clock word was received that a landing strip was ready.

Two squadrons of fighters escorting a transport plane with the

necessary RDF and immediate requirements, landed. They

flew on their auxiliary tanks which were immediately dropped

and they were then at readiness.

By noon the airfield was in full use. By nightfall the AA guns departed,

moving another thirty miles to yet other airfields.7

The smooth operation evident in the Western Desert was not apparent

during the TORCH landings and only rarely during the subsequent campaign

in Tunisia. The Allied armies that sailed from England and America were

inexperienced, their leaders had yet to try maneuvering a sizable force

against a determined enemy. None of the TORCH planners visited Egypt to

observe air operations or air defense there, nor did they absorb much information from reports sent home by the RAE. Only two staff officers doing

TORCH planning in London thought about use of radar. An equally small

section at the USAAF's Fighter Command school in Florida planned deployment of American radar to Northwest Africa. Both British and Americans planning and commanding TORCH operations failed to use the RAF

experiences of the previous two years to insure air base security. The failure

to prepare was clearly seen in the most significant problem the Allies faced

in protecting their bases: poor organization of the air forces and air defense

until late in the campaign. The result was the halting employment of air

warning and air defense forces in Algeria and western Tinisia. Even after the

174
CAMPAIGNS IN AFRICA

reorganization there was continued confusion and needless duplication of

resources. As late as the end of 1943, Maj. Gen. H. R. Oldfield, AA liaison

officer to General Arnold, noted deficiencies in the AA protection of air

bases because of cumbersome organization and poor training."2

Not all of the Allied efforts were so beset with difficulty. Enigma and YService decrypts provided revelations about most of Rommel's secrets. Tedder used ULTRA information and tactical radio interception to formulate

FLAX, which delivered the final blow to Axis supply. After the destruction of

most of the German-Italian airlift by mid-April 1943, Axis planes flew to

Africa only at night, and in greatly reduced numbers. Ironically, Rommel

learned from British officer prisoners, a source he regarded as reliable, that

Montgomery knew of his plan to attack Alamein on August 25, 1942. He

always suspected some disloyal senior Italian officer was passing information to the allies and never dreamed the Allies were reading German message

traffic."3

Rommel himself shares a heavy burden of blame for the Luftwaffe's

setbacks in Africa. He and all of the successive German air commanders in

Africa failed to reach an understanding on the use of air power and on the

command and control of base defense units until the final reorganization in

Tunis in early 1943. Tedder and the British Army commanders, though they

had problems initially understanding one another's views on air support

before CRUSADER, created a far more efficient and cooperative way of operating. The Commonwealth force reaped rewards in the Western Desert fighting. This was not so for the TORCH forces, whose inexperience and

organizational problems caused American air combat losses between November 1942 and April 1943 to mount to unacceptable levels, reaching 666

machines by the end of the campaign. Antiaircraft defenses accounted for

only 14 percent of the total, Axis fighters for 80 percent. During the same

period the Axis lost 1,183 aircraft to American attack, of which 188, or 16

percent, were hit while on the ground. On the day the Germans surrendered

in Tunis, Brig. Gen. Laurence S. Kuter, Deputy Commander of North African Tactical Air Force, sent General Arnold a blistering indictment of the U.

S. Army's doctrine on air employment as it existed in Africa before the

reorganization and continued to exist both in official doctrine and other

theaters .

7 4

Kuter saw as the most serious deficiencies the subordination of air

forces to ground commanders, inadequate organization of flying commands, and shortages of equipment which prevented, among other things,

establishing an air warning system until March 1943. The overall effect, in

Kuter's opinion, was an air force "unsound in battle', that exercised a" . ..

vague ... concept of Air Support."75 The British did not escape his wrath

either when he suggested that "the organizational lessons learned by the

R.A.F. in the Battle of Brittain [sic] have been applied too broadly and are

175
AIR BASE AIR DEFENSE

not appropriate in a mobile situation." In referring to the RAF, though,

Kuter was painting with a broad brush, as he was familiar only with the

RAF's operations in North Africa under Air Vice Marshal Welsh, not the

campaign in the Western Desert. The subsequent changes under Coningham, brought on by the Allied reorganization, had not yet developed fully

into the type of organization that succeeded in the Western Desert.`6

The ability of the Allies to bring enormous resources to bear in ousting

the Axis from Africa, to adapt their air and ground organization to the

needs of the conflict and to exploit the advantage of cryptanalysis led them

to eventual victory. That it took longer than anticipated and cost more than

expected was a testament to the importance of organizing the air-ground

command relationship. In the summer of 1943, the U.S. Army issued new

air-operations guidelines incorporating the experience gained during the

first year of war. This new directive adopted in large measure the lessons

learned in North Africa, and became the bedrock of air doctrine for the next

half century."
Chapter VI

The Eastern Front: 1941-1944

Outnumbered more than two to one in aircraft strength in the east, the

Luftwaffe depended on a heavy, surprise aerial blow to destroy as much as

possible of the Red Air Force on the ground in June 1941. Russian aircraft

losses when Hitler invaded seemed at first incomprehensible-even to the

Germans, who had direct evidence in the form of burned out and wrecked

aircraft. The Russians had not taken seriously the possibility of such a

devastating assault, but the Red Air Force survived. Over the course of the

war, its decimated regiments were re-equipped with new and better aircraft.

Soviet fliers absorbed heavy losses and gave proportionally heavier in return

in a bloody war of attrition. Bereft of many experienced leaders by Stalin's

purges, the Soviet Army Air Force or Voyenno- Vozdushnyye Sily recovered

only slowly at first from the surprise of June 22, 1941. When the recovery

took hold the invaders, especially the German Air Force, found an enemy

more formidable than expected. The Luftwaffe became progressively less

able to control its opponent. German bases grew more vulnerable as Russian

commanders gained ability and experience. German losses rose to the point

where they could not be sustained. In May 1945, the VVS was triumphant in

the sky over Berlin. It had destroyed a foe which a few years before seemed

the certain victor.

Operation BARBAROSSA

Before dawn on June 22, 1941, the Wehrmacht launched Operation

BARBAROSSA against the Soviet Union, achieving nearly complete surprise

along most of the 2,500-kilometer eastern front. (Map 15) Soviet historians

themselves record the destruction of at least 1,200 aircraft, 800 of those on

the ground, in the first German attack. German claims of 1,489 planes

177
GERMAN INVASION OF RUSSIA

Operation BARBAROSSA

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Map 15
THE EASTERN FRONT

Russian 1-16 biplanes sit disabled and abandoned as German forces overran

their fields in June 1941. Soviet forces lost 1,200 aircraft to German air

strikes in first days of the attack.

destroyed on the ground and 322 shot down were so astonishing that

Goering initially refused to believe them.* He ordered a recount, only to

find the total even higher. The published Soviet statistics are still sketchy,

and the true figures will probably never be known, but it was clear that

within a week the Red Air Force was almost completely deprived of first-line

operational combat aircraft. For more than three months, the VVS remained incapable of performing any significant combat missions; indeed,

except for the defense of Moscow during November and December of 1941,

it was not a significant factor in the war again until late in 1942.'

This stunning failure had its roots in Joseph Stalin's purges of the

Communist Party during the late 1930s, which destroyed much of the military leadership and retarded technical advances. Stalin himself contributed

greatly to the military paralysis by refusing, even on the eve of the attack, to

consider seriously the danger presented by Germany. Stalin seems to have

held a firm belief in Hitler's intent to uphold the terms of the Nazi-Soviet

Non-aggression Pact of 1939. He apparently roused himself to confront

reality on the afternoon of June 21, and by then it was too late to take any

* Conflicting claims relative to aircraft losses in Eastern Europe are very difficult to

resolve. Many German records did not survive the war and we cannot determine with accuracy

how many aircraft were in the three air fleets they deployed against Russia. In addition, Soviet

histories cannot always be taken at face value.

179
AIR BASE AIR DEFENSE

effective action. It was evident that the country was unprepared for the

assault. Stalin's despotism may have put him in a position where he had little

other choice. Perhaps he believed that he could arrange as much as two more

years of quiet, during which he could restore the confidence and capability

of the military.' The wish was in vain.

Faced with the German invasion, new VVS air commanders were often

unable or unwilling to exercise initiative in meeting the threat. By and large,

they did not protect their bases or launch effective counterattacks. German

radio intercept services often heard units under attack ask for instructions

from their headquarters. The quandry continued, and as late as July Red

Air Force headquarters still had to instruct commanders to put no more than

nine aircraft on a base. After the debacle of the 22nd, Stalin had General

Pavel Rychagov, the VVS's Chief of Staff, and the air commander in the

Kiev Military District shot. The Western Military District's commander was

either shot or committed suicide when he lost 600 aircraft. During the last

days of June, many other Soviet Air Force officers died by their own hand

or Stalin's order.'

German photoreconnaissance and radio intercept services had been

excellent. Flying from several bases in East Prussia, Poland, and Rumania,

the Luftwaffe pinpointed virtually every major target in the weeks before

the invasion, including some 2,000 airfields. From intercepted radio messages German intelligence identified most of the major units near the border."

The Red Air Force had committed several errors which, coupled with

the lack of effective leadership, created the desperate situation. Combat

units were concentrated on relatively few exposed bases near the border. On

June 22, the Luftwaffe's first wave of bombers, operating in small flights,

struck thirty-one of the most important and found aircraft parked close

together with little or no blast protection. A reporter for the Frankfurter

Zeitung accompanied one of the first flights of bombers to attack an airfield

in Russian occupied Poland. He saw Soviet fighters "lined up as on parade:'

so that German bombs exploding at one point sent fire and detonation to

plane after plane. He reported only desultory flak and some ineffectual

Russian fighter sorties. Gen. Franz Halder, Chief of the German Army

General Staff, noted in his war journal that some units had not even uncovered their aircraft in preparation for the day's flying. The same situation

prevailed everywhere along the front save for the far south, where the area

commander, Maj. Gen. M. V. Zakharov, dispersed some of his planes and

mounted air patrols. Only there were the losses nearly equal on each side.'

Many Soviet air units reequipping with new aircraft like the LaGG-5, MiG3, and Yak-3 remained at forward operational bases. Camouflage was rarely

evident, Russian fighters were unaggressive, and there was no organized air

180
THE EASTERN FRONT

defense.' From the Baltic to the Black Sea the Germans succeeded at every

major attempt, both in the air and on the ground.

German bombing attacks concentrated on Russian airfields with small,

4-pound fragmentation bombs were generally used to disable airplanes.

Three Dol7 or Ju88 bombers hit each base at low level with these munitions

after crossing the frontier at high altitude to avoid detection. Lack of Russian radar insured the surprise. Stukas made follow-up attacks to finish

destroying planes, fuel, ammunition dumps, and support equipment. The

second and succeeding waves of German attackers on June 22 were met by

the alerted fighters and flak, but each took only a small toll.7

From the opening day of BARBAROSSA to the year's end, the VVS's

attacks employed predictable tactics. Soviet bombers raided German bases

in Poland with great determination and courage, but little effect. Capt.

Herbert Pabst of the Luftwaffe reported seeing twenty-one Russians shot

down at his base. The Soviet aircraft flew straight on, with no effort at

evading either the defending fighters or intense AA gunfire. None escaped,

and no serious damage was inflicted on the Germans. Throughout 1941 the

Soviet Air Force sporadically attacked German airfields. German and Russian estimates of the effectiveness of these raids differed, but there was no

question that the Red Air Force threw itself against the German bases whenever it massed enough aircraft to support a substantial blow.

The general pattern of the VVS's attacks allowed the Russians to return

to their lines as quickly as possible after a strike, but remained otherwise

costly to Soviet fliers. They would circle a base in exactly the same way each

time, then make a single pass, dropping light bombs. German flak was

prepared, fighters aloft, and Soviet losses were high. On occasion, all of the

attacking Russian planes were shot down. When the VVS did try something

inventive, it stood a much better chance of success. One such raid at Smolensk-North airfield in September 1941 saw the Russians come in at low

altitude over a wooded area, avoiding both detection and flak positions.

This time the attackers did not flee immediately, but made repeated passes,

firing at defending gunners and successfully blowing up an ammunition

dump. A number of veteran German aviators, including Hans-Ulrich Rudel,

Pabst, and Heinz Joachim Jaehne, commented on these tactics after the war,

invariably praising the Russians for bravery, but condemning the inexperience and inflexibility of the Red Air Force. 9

The poor initial showing of the VVS should not, however, be attributed

solely to the inexperience of Russian commanders. Russian military doctrine and the beliefs of Joseph Stalin precluded defensive preparation and

did not at first accept retreat. Stalin insisted upon repeated attacks, even in

the face of insurmountable opposition. For example, on the night of June

22, 1941, Marshal S. K. Timoshenko, at Stalin's instruction, issued Directive

No. 3 ordering the Red Army to begin a full scale counterattack. Consider181
AIR BASE AIR DEFENSE

Camouflaged German Air Force radio vans park near tree line.

ing the disorder along the front and the overwhelming effect of the German

attack, compliance with Timoshenko's instruction was impossible. Nevertheless, on the 23rd Stalin stuck by it and refused to allow his field commanders to withdraw and regroup. Roy A. Medvedev, a Soviet writer who

has analyzed Stalin's career, attributed the dictator's failure to his poor

understanding of tactical military problems, his harsh, mean temperament,

his intense suspicion of others, and his cruelty." Leadership in the field was

brutish and unimaginative. The secret police often peremptorily shot commanders who did not display a willingness to attack. There were reports that

members of Russian units surrounded by the enemy, even briefly, were killed

upon return to their own lines. Certainly they were often arrested and sent to

unknown fates. Stalin's own daughter reported a statute providing for punishment of families of captured men. Her father, she said, "considered

everyone taken prisoner, even if wounded, to have surrendered voluntarily to

the enemy.""

The Wehrmacht advanced rapidly on all fronts and on June 30 captured

Lvov. By July 13 the Russian railway system supplying the front was largely

destroyed by air bombardment. On August 13, Red Army units began to

withdraw east of the Dnieper River. During September Marshal Semeon

182
THE EASTERN FRONT

Field Marshal Albert Kesselring

boards FW-189 aircraft.

Budenny's five armies were surrounded in the Kiev pocket. With their surrender late in the month, the Russians suffered almost 1,000,000 men killed

or captured. Large amounts of equipment, particularly tanks, fell into German hands. As the German army groups advanced, the Luftwaffe shifted its

focus from counterair operations to attacking ground targets. Air defense of

Army units and air bases became a secondary, although still important

mission."2 The heavy flak units also changed their emphasis from AA defense to ground support, destroying Red Army tanks and bunkers with

armor piercing 88-mm ammunition.'"

Despite the overwhelming victories of the Luftwaffe, there were disturbing signs seen by German commanders. The VVS seemed to have an

almost inexhaustible supply of aircraft. Some German fighter groups

amassed credits for destroying aircraft exceeding 1,000, but Russian planes

continued to appear. Red pilots were plentiful also. The attacks of June 22

destroyed hundreds of planes on the ground, but did not kill or disable the

crews. These men were assigned to reorganized units, and given new, often

modern aircraft. Graduates, both men and women, of the many civilian

flying and gliding clubs (Osoaviakhim) formed in the 1930s provided a

valuable resource since they all had a basic knowledge of flying and could

183
AIR BASE AIR DEFENSE

prepare for combat in less time than raw recruits.* The ready availability of

new planes and crews were factors not incorporated in German intelligence

estimates. Additionally, the Germans were misled by the magnitude of their

tactical victories. They failed to follow up by destroying Soviet war industries.'4

The Soviet Union relied heavily for recovery on its own industry. Western estimates indicate that as early as the Czech crisis of 1938, Russian

aircraft and engine factories in threatened western areas of the country were

moved east into and beyond the Ural mountains. The German attack accelerated the move, and from these plants soon emerged a steady flow of

fighters, fighter bombers, and ground attack airplanes. The Germans had

seriously underestimated Russian industrial capacity. Domestic production

was able to meet the immediate needs of the VVS and was supplemented,

beginning in the autumn of 1941, by aid from Britain and the United States,

thus allowing the Russians eventually to achieve a numerical superiority in

aircraft on the eastern front."'5

One of the most famous products of Russian aviation industry was the

Ilyushin IL-2 Sturmovik, an armored ground attack airplane that was exceedingly difficult to bring down. Light and medium AA fire at ranges of

900 to 1,200 meters had little effect on it unless the gunners scored a hit on

some vulnerable point, such as the tail. This aircraft was to be the principle

weapon used to attack German air bases in Russia.'" Other aircraft also

appeared, especially fighters such as the Yakovlev Yak-I and -3, the Lavochkin LaGG-3 and La-5, and the Mikoyan MiG-I and -3. All the fighters

were high performance craft, well armed, and able to be serviced and maintained on the profusion of Russian airfields.

The Russians Regroup

Six months of harsh treatment by the Wehrmacht taught the Russians

much in the way of protecting their bases from the German blitzkrieg. Their

attempts at reinforcement went hand in glove with revised organization and

operating procedures, all of which slowly brought their air forces to a level

of operating efficiency. Even as the German drive was blunted in early

December 1942, new measures began taking effect.

* At least three combat air regiments within the VVS were composed of women. Their

organization began in 1941, and by 1943 they were involved regularly in major air battles.

t Soviet factories produced some 140,000 aircraft between 1941 and 1945. United States

Lend Lease provided 14,589. The British added another 4,280, mostly fighters. In contrast, the

Germans built 92,666 between 1941 and 1944, and about 2,500 more early in 1945. Between

1941 and 1945, Britain built 108,560 (1941-1945), Japan 67,065 (1941-1945), and the United

States 295,486.

184
THE EASTERN FRONT

Reorganization for the defense changed the structure of Soviet air

units. A Stavka (Red Army General Staff) order of June 29 created the post

of VVS Commander with an Air Staff subordinate to him. The Staff and its

headquarters received central responsibility for planning, training, logistic

support, and aircraft design. In the field, the air units assigned to military

districts now came under the command of Red Army fronts. The army

front, which had its closest equivalent in the army group of the western

allied armies, controlled its own aviation. Within the front, air operations

were unified under VVS sector commanders. The resulting smaller units

were far less vulnerable than the former air divisions and regiments that

started the war and were much easier to maneuver, disperse, and camouflage.17

By mid-October, the Soviet leaders thought the situation so bleak that

the Politburo left Moscow. In November 1941, however, the extreme distances over which the Germans had to operate, mud caused by autumnal

rains, and fresh divisions brought from Siberia to stiffen the defense had

slowed the German advance. On December 5, the Wehrmacht made its

closest approach to the Russian capital. A Russian counteroffensive sent the

Germans, reduced by combat losses and the severe early winter, into near

rout. The resistance of Gen. Walter Model's Ninth Army, after Hitler's "no

retreat" order, finally stabilized the front in January 1942.18

The dispersal of units among one large and several smaller satellite

bases in an area became standard practice. Soviet doctrine did not require

sophisticated fields, and their number proliferated on the Soviet side with

time. Intermediate size airfields had only rough buildings and sometimes

some fuel and spare parts. Runways were usually of rolled dirt, but also

occasionally constructed of octagonal concrete slabs fitted together. Frost

could shift them, and enemy bombs scattered them, but the surfaces were

easily repaired. Airfield engineer battalions of up to 500 men, supplemented

by locally conscripted labor, prepared airfields in as little as three days with

only the most rudimentary tools. Slit trenches and dugouts served as living

space and shelter during attack. Roads were few, and barrels of gasoline

were hand rolled into place, usually by forced civilian labor, sometimes over

distances of ninety miles. Parts, ammunition, bombs, and food were handcarried in by gangs of civilians. The very simplicity of the bases thus created

added to the mobility of the Red Air Force and gave the Germans little to

destroy in their air attacks. The very crude nature of the landing fields, the

hundreds of sites from which to fly, and the emphasis on mobility created an

air base system with built in defenses. Russian forces brought about 1,000

aircraft from Asia and the Caucusus for the defense of Moscow and sustained them on these primitive bases even as the Luftwaffe, without subzero

lubricants or warm clothing for crews, froze in place.' 9

185
AIR BASE AIR DEFENSE

TABLE 20

Luftwaffe Antiaircraft Strength

Eastern Front

June 1941

Fourth Air Fleet (Army Group South)

II Flak Corps (3 Regiments)

13 mixed (light and heavy) AA Battalions

4 light AA Battalions

Second Air Fleet (Army Group Center)

I Flak Corps (3 Regiments)

16 mixed AA Battalions

7 light AA Battalions

First Air Fleet (Army Group North)

3 AA Regiments without corps organization

8 mixed AA Battalions

3 light AA Battalions

Mixed battalions contained 3 to 6 batteries of guns. Each battery normally had 4 to 8

heavy guns (88-mm) and 12 to 15 light or medium guns (37-mm, 20-mm) plus 4 sixty

centimeter searchlights.

Light battalions had 3 batteries of 20-mm guns, often a battery of nine 37-mm guns,

and a searchlight battery.

Sources: Plocher, "The German Air Force vs. Russia, 1941"

War Department, "Air Staff Post Hostility Intelligence Requirements on German Air

Force"

War Department, MI Service, Special Series publication No. 10

Soviet Air Force commanders made increasingly widespread use of

camouflage and decoys. Parked aircraft were hidden by trees, brush, or

snow. Taxi lanes covered by nets and branches ran far into the woods,

sometimes half a mile. Roads and tracks leading to the dispersal fields were

forbidden. Trucks and equipment were not parked in view and repair was

186
THE EASTERN FRONT

TABLE 21

Soviet Antiaircraft

June 1941

Tactical antiaircraft organizations were part of the Red Army and were formed in

divisions assigned to a Front Area.* Fronts were similar to German Army Groups. A

normal division had the following:

3 to 8 regiments with sixteen 76-mm, 85-mm, or 105-mm guns

1 Light regiment with varying numbers of 37-mm guns

1 to 3 regiments of 12.7-mm AA machine guns

2 to 4 searchlight regiments

1 to 3 barrage balloon regiments

1 to 3 independent AA batteries

Russia had almost no radar in use when the fighting began.

* The strength and number of regiments and divisions varied from area to area.

Sources: Liddell Hart, editor, The Red Army

Mackintosh, Juggernaut

Schwabedissen, "The Russian Air Force in the Eyes of German Commanders"

Hq. USAF Air Intelligence Report No. 100-45-34

done at night or in bad flying weather. On the open steppe, aircraft were

hidden in false houses or covered with hay, dirt, or snow piled to simulate

snow drifts. At various places, dummy airfields were constructed, often in

large numbers. Landings and take offs were simulated by passing aircraft,

vehicles were used to indicate activity, and containers of gasoline were

placed in dummy aircraft to ignite when strafed or bombed. German air

commanders described the Russian camouflage and deception accomplishments as masterful. 20

Early in the war, AA guns for defense of Russian bases were hard to

obtain. Satellite fields might sometimes be protected by a battery or two of

light guns supplemented by machine guns taken from damaged aircraft.

Main bases might be defended by medium or heavy guns. In general, the

accuracy of the heavy gunners was not rated highly by the Germans or

187
AIR BASE AIR DEFENSE

British observers, largely because tracking and aiming mechanisms were

crude. Having learned their lesson in June 1941, Russian air commanders

kept frequent fighter patrols in the air above bases. Protection by fighters

was one of the most significant active defense measures of the early war

years. Another type of defense frequently reported by German pilots was

intense small arms fire at low altitudes. Russian soldiers and airmen were

well trained in this so called "everyone shoot" technique. Aircraft attacking

bases often flew into a hail of bullets.2'

Soviet operating doctrine and equipment did not require sophisticated

airfields. Onc tactical air base could function as a main installation supporting numerous smaller and less well developed flying fields. The number of

fields, some of which were no more than dirt runways, proliferated with the

passage of time. Intermediate size airfields sometimes had a few rough

buildings and, occasionally, small amounts of fuel and spare parts. Runways on the intermediate fields were often constructed of octagonal concrete

blocks fitted edge to edge on level ground. The blocks shifted with mud and

frost and retained a relatively even surface. 22

Little effort was expended in airfield preparation. Mobility and rapid

deployment were extremely important, and most fields were completed in

two or three days. Serviced at the support bases, aircraft would deploy in

small numbers to the satellite stations. Airfield engineer battalions of 400 to

500 men, freely supplemented by conscript labor drafts made up of local

peasants and townspeople, prepared a system of fields simultaneously.

Widespread conscription was carried out under an order of June 22 from the

Supreme Soviet, and large numbers of people were put to work building

bases and other military facilities. Only the most primitive equipment was

used. Sometimes no more than clearing an area of brush, trees, and then

rolling the ground was done. The construction procedure and simple needs

of the VVS allowed hundreds of fields to be built in as little as a month.2 3

The targeting problems which the VVS's system of base operation presented to the Luftwaffe were significant. The dispersal basing theme was

adopted for more than defense reasons, however. The VVS, as part of the

army, helped carry out the Soviet doctrine of attacking every enemy element

in an area simultaneously. As such, the VVS was as much an extension of

artillery as anything else. It conducted little long range bombing, nor did it

ordinarily pursue complex interdiction missions. Early in the war, Russian

ground commanders employed the VVS as they thought best and in conjunction with ground maneuver units. This requirement, as much as defense, was responsible for airfield proliferation.2

188
THE EASTERN FRONT

German Air Base Defense

The Luftwaffe's position within the Wehrmacht was markedly different

from that of the Red Air Force within the Soviet military establishment.

While the VVS was a tactical air branch of the Red Army, the German Air

Force was an independent service which worked closely with the German

Army, but had its own responsibilities. Within the Luftwaffe were antiaircraft units charged with home air defense, air defense of army units and

depots, and air base air defense. In the field, the Luftwaffe's senior commander on a base or in a unit higher in the chain of command, such as an air

division or air corps, was responsible for air defense of his organization.

The Luftwaffe lacked a clear strategic bombardment doctrine or capability.

In the Russian campaign it acted as a tactical force which carried out little

strategic bombing until 1943 and was reduced, over several years' time, to a

position similar to that of the VVS: subordinate to Army needs. As the

Army field forces lacked sufficient artillery and antitank weapons, the

Luftwaffe's aircraft and flak units became more and more a substitute for

these and less an organization capable of independent action. As the guns

and crews drained away to stop Soviet counteroffensives, German air base

defense declined. 25

The Luftwaffe believed that defending a battlefield, including air bases, from air attack was a cooperative responsibility of fighters and antiaircraft artillery. The goal was to achieve air superiority, the essential first step

toward battlefield defense. Attacking enemy airfields was part and parcel of

defense. The Germans discouraged direct conflict with a defending enemy

fighter force except for self protection; they much preferred to strike an

enemy when they held the advantages of surprise and maneuver. Such

actions conserved their forces and were in keeping with their preference for

offensive operations. Examples of the German preference for attacking enemy bases were the air actions of July 1942, near Voronezh, about 350 miles

northwest of Stalingrad. Supporting the German Second and Sixth Armies,

two Kampfgruppen and a Jagdgruppe attacked a number of Russian airfields. By German claims, at least 92 Russian planes were shot down and 35

destroyed on the ground. In the same month, the same tactics were repeated

further south with similar success and reportedly light German losses. The

constant pressure kept the Red Air Force off balance and reduced its ability

to reply in kind. 26

German bases in forward battle zones in the USSR did not support the

same flying units indefinitely. Squadrons were often reassigned on short

notice to keep up with the advancing armor and mechanized infantry. During rapid movement, air defense was very fluid, varying according to the

numbers and types of weapons available and the degree of Luftwaffe air

superiority. As a result, bases would not always have AA defense units until

189
TABLE 22

Luftwaffe Air Strength

Eastern Front

June 1941

Strength

(approx.)

Luftflotte 4 (Lohr)

12 Bomber Gruppen (HelIl) 360

7 Fighter Gruppen (Ju88, Mel09e and f) 210

3 Reconnaissance Staffeln (Ju88) 30 Poland and

2 Air Transport Gruppen (Ju52) 60 Rumania

3 Liaison Staffeln (Ju88) 30

690

Luftflotte 2 (Kesselring)

8 Bomber Gruppen (Do17, HellI) 240

81/3 Dive Bomber Gruppen (Ju87) 250

9 Fighter Gruppen (single engine-MeI09f) 270

2 Fighter Gruppen (twin engine-MellO) 60

2 Ground Attack Gruppen (Ju87) 60 Poland

2 Reconnaissance Staffeln (Ju88) 30

2 Air Transport Gruppen (Ju52) 60

970

Luftflotte 1 (Keller)

9 Bomber Gruppen (Ju88) 270

32/3 Fighter Gruppen (Mel09f) 110

5 Reconnaissance Staffeln (Ju88) 50

1 Air Transport Gruppe (Ju52) 30 East Prussia

2 Liaison Staffeln (Do215) 20

480

Total 2140

Luftflotte 5 in Norway was not a significant force. In addition to the above, the

Rumanian Air Force added 504 first-line planes. The Hungarian Air Force of 368

entered the war on Germany's side on June 27. The Finnish Air Force, which supported Germany, had about 550 aircraft, not all modern.

Sources: Wagner, editor, The Soviet Air Force in World War !

Bekker, The Luftwaffe War Diaries

Plocher, "The German Air Force vs. Russia, 1941"

Air Ministry, German translation VII/34
TABLE 23

Soviet Air Force Strength

June 1941

Location Bombers Fighters Total

Leningrad Military

District, Leningrad 570 585 1,155

Baltic Military

District, Riga 315 315 630

Western Military

District, Minsk 660 770 1,430

Kiev Military

District, Kiev 460 625 1,085

Other Districts:

Odessa, Kharkov,

Caucasus 395 445 840

Moscow, Orel 320 240 560

Total* 2,720 2,980 5,700

* Precise information not available; forces were being reorganized during period.

To the above, add 1800 transport and liaison aircraft and 3000 aircraft probably in

Asia.

These tabulations were made by the Luftwaffe from photoreconnaissance. The Germans assumed 50 percent would be serviceable at any given time. The estimates were

too low. Reserves and new types coming into service were not correctly anticipated.

In reality, there were some 12,000 to 15,000 military aircraft in the USSR.

The VVS's units were organized into air regiments of 60 to 64 aircraft. There were 4

or 5 squadrons in each regiment. Air divisions were made up of 4 or 5 regiments and

could operate independently.

Sources: Wagner, editor, The Soviet Air Force in World War H

Greenwood, "The Red Air Force in the Great Patriotic War, 1941-1945"
AIR BASE AIR DEFENSE

! 4'

Luftwaffe 88-mm gun crew sets up in finished, timber lined emplacement at

captured Dugino airfield in Russia.

territorial gains were consolidated. Through 1942 this did not present a

serious problem, as the Russians did not attack frequently. Many German

AA units thus became free to help destroy enemy armor and fortifications."7

As the war on the eastern front became more settled, German air bases

tended to be increasingly well established, with buildings and support services. Defense became more evident, and was the responsibility of the station

commander. Each base was assigned an Aerodrome Command, responsible

for administration, supply support of flying units, and station defense. The

organization was more complex and sophisticated than that used by the

Russians and reflected the different composition and mission of the

Luftwaffe. Major air installations were normally provided with an attached

flak unit of eight to twelve heavy AA guns (one to one-and-a-half 88-mm

batteries) and twelve to thirty 20-mm cannon. Less important bases received

fewer weapons, and bases where only an Aerodrome Command was present,

with no flying units, had only a small number of 20-mm guns. Base personnel supplemented the antiaircraft artillery with rifle and machine gun fire.

Attached construction platoons handled bomb damage repair and construc192
THE EASTERN FRONT

tion of dispersal areas and defense fortifications. Labor Service companies

(German civilians who were not part of the Luftwaffe) were often assigned

to assist with the work. Local civilians, often forced to serve, also worked on

construction projects. 28

After the Russian Winter Offensive of December 1941-January 1942,

the Luftwaffe formed field infantry divisions. Battalions and regiments of

these divisions varied in size and deployment according to the terrain, location of the station, and nature of the enemy threat. Assigned detachments

were under the operational control of the station commander. When at an

airfield, these ground defense units also fired on low flying attackers with

small arms. Late in 1943, all of the divisions were absorbed by the Army.29

As with the Russians, camouflage played an important part in German

air base defense. Aircraft were painted with a color pattern designed to

increase the difficulty of observation from the air, and whenever possible,

they were parked under nets or in the protection of forests. Guns were

similarly hidden, and command posts disguised to resemble natural features

or native houses. Where blast protection was not available, the Germans

quickly dispersed their aircraft and sent damaged or worn planes to rear

stations in Order to reduce congestion. Because German industry could not

produce the numbers of aircraft to match Russian factory output and British and American aid, the Luftwaffe's tactical commanders were more sensitive to the need to protect and repair their assets than were their

opponents .30

The Struggle on the Steppe: 1942-1943

The exact geographic placement of airfields in the vast expanse of

European Russia was not crucial in the first years of the Soviet-German war.

Possession of a particular base or group of bases was rarely a prerequisite

for continued military operations. During the battle of Stalingrad, however,

the need for a more focussed defense became acute. Between November 19,

1942, when the Soviet pincers began to encircle the German Sixth Army, and

January 30, 1943, when the Sixth Army surrendered, the main contact with

and resupply of the trapped Germans was by air,3

" and airfield defense

assumed a greater importance for the German command. Within the Stalingrad pocket were five airfields: Pitomnik, Bassargino, Gumrak, Gorodische,

and Stalingradsky. Because it was in the best condition, Pitomnik took most

of the load. Gorodische was almost useless due to its rough, pock-marked

surface, and the other three were only marginally better. If the trapped army

was to be sustained, a steady flow of some 750 to 900 tons of food, fuel, and

ammunition had to be provided every day. Security of the bases within the

pocket and at the transports' originating locations was absolutely necessary.32

193
ie

German airfield construction in Russia, 1941. Reich Labor Service battalions

pour footings and emplace primitive but durable wood stump taxiways.

44

e'
THE EASTERN FRONT

German aerial shows typical Russian air strip at Kirovsk. The overprinted

figures delineate the field parking areas, open and covered revetments, flak

pits, barracks, several Russian built aircraft and six Hurricane or Tomahawk

fighters supplied by Western Allies.

The Luftwaffe's 9th Flak Division, attached to von Paulus's Sixth

Army, was the Germans' main air defense force at Stalingrad. The 9th had

11 heavy and 19 light artillery batteries (37 88-mm, 162 20-mm, 49 37-mm,

and 3 50-mm guns). It had been well supplied with ammunition and was

able to maintain fire throughout the period. When it ceased fighting at the

end of January 1943, the 9th still had thousands of rounds of 88-mm

ammunition and an unknown amount of ammunition for its lighter weapons. Also within the pocket were various air units, including a squadron of

about twenty Mel09 fighters. The fighters were active for only a short time.

Attrition, caused largely by the poor airfield conditions and lack of service

facilities, rapidly reduced this force. The 9th was commanded by Brig. Gen.

Wolfgang Pickert, a highly experienced and capable AA specialist and the

Luftwaffe's most senior officer in the Stalingrad area. He was placed in

charge of all air operations in the pocket, including fighters and airlift

services, in addition to his artillery command. Pickert was not a flier but

was highly regarded by both Field Marshal von Paulus and his Air Force

contemporaries."

Despite the exposed position of the German bases, both inside and

outside the pocket, the Russian Air Force does not seem to have made an

195
AIR BASE AIR DEFENSE

German light flak crew fires on

Russians overhead during the

approach on Stalingrad, 1942.

effort to destroy them completely. At first, severe logistics problems, shortages of fuel, parts, and spare engines retarded Soviet air operations. In

August, the VVS's commander, Lt. Gen. (later Marshal of the Soviet Air

Force) Alexander A. Novikov, took personal charge at Stalingrad and ordered changes to improve both the logistic and command systems. The

VVS's performance improved, and during December, 28 percent of its sorties were directed at airdromes (apparently on both ends of the supply line).

In January, the figure dropped to 7.8 percent. The VVS's pilots concentrated

on attacking German transports, a more vulnerable and profitable target.

Postwar German studies of the battle insisted that the Russians were unable

to attain air superiority for any lengthy period. This is open to argument,

given the enormous losses of transports by Germany (German records admit

the loss of 488 aircraft from enemy action, accident, wear and tear, and

weather; the Russians claimed double that from combat losses). Whatever

the true losses, they were heavy. Even so, the Luftwaffe was able to continue

operations into airfields until the end of January, finally resorting to air

drops on the last few days because the bases had been overrun on the

ground. Despite the true method of its employment or the extent of its air

superiority, the action at Stalingrad was a singular achievement for the Red

Air Force. Late in 1942, it was not yet equal to the Germans in quality of

aircraft, crews, or command. Novikov's decision to attack heavily took a

great deal of faith, and months of effort. His forces applied intense pressure

on the Luftwaffe's transport traffic around Stalingrad. 4

Advantages continued to favor the Russians as the battle dragged on.

Russian fighters flew from fields less than 20 miles from Stalingrad, their

fighter-bombers from bases 60 to 90 miles away. The VVS increased the

196
THE EASTERN FRONT

German field at Demyansk. The sod field could sustain heavy traffic and

withstand attack. At lower right is a boneyard of wrecked German aircraft.

number of its sorties until the Germans had to operate over much greater

distances from fewer airfields. The Germans, on the other hand, traversed

up to 180 miles of enemy air space with their slow and unmaneuverable

Ju52, Ju86, and Helll transports. Most of the craft were lost or badly

damaged during flight, the victims of Russian fighters or antiaircraft gunfire. To support their increased fighting, the Russians created an extensive

radio-equipped observer and fighter-control net to detect and attack flights

of transports. They never had a fighter direction system at Stalingrad, but

may have used a rudimentary radar system, which probably did little more

than detect aircraft approaching over the Red Army's units west of Stalingrad. Between November 19, 1942, and February 2, 1943, the VVS's pilots

logged 35,920 sorties.3 5

The improvised German airfields in use at both ends of the operation

could not have offered a sustained defense against a systematic Russian air

assault. Long range German fighters were not available and an adequate

number of fighters could not be kept within the pocket. Antiaircraft artillery

positions were rudimentary, although the gunfire was heavy and accurate.

Shelters for people and equipment were often no more than huts or snow

houses. Few could be constructed by the weakened men in the bitter cold.

On January 18, 1943, the VVS attacked the Ju52 staging base at Zverevo.

197
AIR BASE AIR DEFENSE

The base was, in reality, a cornfield, with no facilities save for essential

services. Rumanian and German AA forces protected the field, but the

Rumanians apparently did not fight. Only the platoon of German 20-mm

gunners gave resistance, shooting down a Sturmovik. The Russians destroyed ten Ju52s and badly damaged twenty others. Other German airfields

supplying Stalingrad were also attacked. Sal'sk twice suffered heavy losses,

and was threatened on the ground by the middle of January.36

In addition to interception by Russian aircraft, the Luftwaffe's transports were under constant Russian AA fire on their flights into and out of

Stalingrad. Although the German pilots could vary their altitude and direction, some routes were unsuitable because of lengthy flight time and heavy

fuel requirements. As the most used flight paths became known, the Russians positioned AA to cover them. The Germans flew above the accurate

low level gunfire and risked the sporadic 85-mm fire. As dire for Sixth Army

as the Soviets were the bitter winter weather and the airlift utterly unable to

meet the needs of the trapped men. The highest daily total of deliveries was

289 tons on December 19. Deliveries from December 1 to 11 averaged 97.3

tons, and from December 13 to 21, 137 tons, several hundred below the daily

requirement. On many days, drifting snow, clouds, ice, and wind combined

virtually to close air transport operations. Indeed, the only bright spots of

the effort were the courage of the crews and the evacuation of about 30,000

wounded by return flights. The last German units in the pocket surrendered

on February 2, 1943.11 It is reasonable to suppose that using an effective

aircraft warning service (even without radar) and coordinating the use of

aircraft at their disposal, the Russians could have stopped the entire airlift.

By a combination of fighter interception and constant airfield bombardment the VVS could have isolated the Sixth Army more quickly. In the

fighting for Stalingrad and during the German withdrawal from the transCaucausus, the Red Air Force, it is generally conceded, became a fully

offensive organization, capable of carrying out attacks on targets of its

choosing and executing them with increasing finesse, although not without

some problems. German air defense units were a major part of that fighting

withdrawal. On February 7, 1943, the 9th Flak Division was reorganized

around the remnants of the division's staff that had not been at Stalingrad.

The division was subordinate to the First Flak Corps, in turn a part of the

Fourth Air Fleet. Its commander was again General Pickert, who had been

away from the pocket at the time of surrender, organizing air defenses in the

Kuban-Crimean area. The 9th was initially assigned three regiments totalling fourteen heavy and fifteen light flak batteries with some searchlight

units. Because of the need to protect air and naval bases, the air force added

an additional forty-seven heavy and thirty-one light flak batteries in early

March." The 129th Air Signal Battalion of the 9th Flak Division built a

communications net that enabled Pickert to control his antiaircraft forces

198
THE EASTERN FRONT

throughout this wide area. Warnings of Russian aircraft relayed by radio and

telephone to the local AA commanders allowed intense fire both day and

night.3 9

Heavy air and ground fighting continued through the spring and summer, with consequent heavy aircraft losses on both sides. By early October,

the Germans evacuated the Kuban area, bringing most of their units across

the strait to the Crimean Peninsula. Operating from their air bases on the

peninsula, the German Air Force claimed 1,045 tanks destroyed. Antiaircraft battalions and fighters reportedly shot down or destroyed on the

ground 2,280 Soviet aircraft.' The claims were high and probably excessive,

although the Germans used a variety of defense measures and aggressive air

attack policies. The Kuban struggle proved above all that the Red Air Force

had overcome its organizational and logistical problems. Now it began the

task of grinding down the Luftwaffe in the east.

The Battle for Kursk

The attrition of German forces in the East continued during the year

with another clash that irrevocably wrested the initiative on that entire front

from the hands of the Wehrmacht. Soviet operations through late winter

1943 resulted in a large salient separating Army Groups South and Center in

the German lines just west of the city of Kursk. (Map 16) Perceiving that

Stalin could counter any German move from this position or launch his own

offensive to the west, Hitler ordered a late spring attack on the salient under

the code name Operation CITADEL. Heavy fighting in the Mediterranean and

the German withdrawal from the Crimea in the spring continually drew off

German air strength, and Hitler postponed the operation repeatedly. Both

sides poured resources into the preparations for the battle: 4,000 Soviet

tanks were poised on the Russian side and Hitler arrayed 2,700 tanks and

several hundred of the Ferdinand self propelled guns against the bulge in

hopes of pinching it off around its base."' Facing some 3,000 Russian planes,

the Germans amassed 1,850 aircraft in support of the effort at bases around

Orel, Bryansk, and Kharkov. The Luftwaffe also emplaced the I Flak Corps

under Maj. Gen. Richard Reiman to protect Kharkov; subordinate to the

Sixth Air Fleet, the 12th Flak Division under Maj. Gen. Ernst Buffa moved

in at Orel and Brig. Gen. Paul Pavel's 10th Flak Brigade guarded the bases

and other potential targets around Bryansk. The 18th Flak Division was

charged with air base air defense around Smolensk for the operation. Russian attacks on the German bases around Orel and on rail depots and supply

points were particularly heavy. As early as April 30, the Russians received a

British warning of the buildup based on Enigma intercepts that confirmed

their own information of German intentions garnered from their efficient

199
EASTERN FRONT, 1943

Operation CITADEL

OV "RO~~ 'Y '* a x ! OLGD German Front Feb-Jul

LENINRADVoboy- - German Fronn 2 Feb

NA~tA~f ~ >(M~hf~OV).~ A ~German Fronn 20 Feb

Feb-Jul German Arm Y Group

STAIAYr*' (TIMOH O ** Soviet Army Group

Gro -2 Feb VoOG5K)glga l~ AA

(KU1ECHLER) ALIN(J GORKI

~ / ri \'. Mscow 41

Fanper ArmI (KONIEVI

ORSHA SMOLENSK '~KALUGA

A GopArm n~a Bryansk

MapA 16 (OPV
THE EASTERN FRONT

espionage network in Berlin. They redoubled the construction of defensive

belts that featured some of the densest minefields ever seen. 42

Both sides installed new airfields for the battle. Near Orel the Germans

constructed 12, but the Russians were even busier. For 325 miles in either

direction north and south of Kursk, they built or reconditioned a total of

154 strips. They stocked each main base with 10 to 15 days of supply and

camouflaged everything carefully. Numbers of dummy airfields went in

around the operating bases. A small force at each dummy field simulated

operations by moving planes around and displaying lights at night. If a field

were attacked twice, it was abandoned in favor of another in a continuing

game that deceived German reconnaissance seeking out the real bases. The

quality of Soviet early warning nets at Kursk varied and we are uncertain

how they used radar. The few Russian radar sets that were probably present

had a range of 70 to 90 miles.* The VVS compensated with many ground

observers who quickly reported any aircraft they saw. In addition, the VVS

kept fighters aloft over its fields, but the multiplicity of targets the Soviets

created was the chief reason for the survival of so many usable installations .

43

Russian aerial tactics had improved vastly by 1943, but were still unimaginative by German standards. Large numbers of attacking planes were

lost in head on attacks. Russian official histories offer a highly sanguine but

dubious view of the performance of the VVS, claiming a total of 506 German craft destroyed in a single surprise attack on German fields on May 6,

1943, and another 145 German planes destroyed during an attack on Russian rail facilities behind Kursk in June. The Russian claims were clearly

unrealistic as the Luftwaffe's strength rarely exceeded 2,500 operational

aircraft on the Eastern Front in 1943.41 Russian aircraft were only sparsely

equipped with radios, and many of those in use could only receive messages;

only flight leaders had transceivers and maps. German gunners and pilots

learned to concentrate on the lead plane in an attack. Destroying it would

usually scatter the rest of the flight. Once over their targets, however, the

Russians were tenacious in the attack regardless of their losses. German

military opinion held that while the Russian attacks could be dangerous,

they were so inconsistent as to reduce their overall effectiveness.4

' The Soviet

fliers, however, had become more adept at flak suppression, and used the I1-

2 Sturmovik to good effect. Flying at the rear of an attacking serial, these

robust planes strafed and bombed gun positions at or near German airfields

that revealed themselves by firing at the lead aircraft in the attack.' Night

attacks on German positions were common. To counter them, the Luftwaffe

* In August 1941, Britain sent the USSR a GL-II gun laying radar that was pressed into

service during the defense of Moscow. The American Lend Lease program provided the Russians 135 early warning and gun laying radars, but these arrived after the Kursk operations.

201
AIR BASE AIR DEFENSE

fixed a mobile radar on a rail car, itself protected by flak, and brought in five

night fighter squadrons from the West. Their excellent communications

allowed the Germans to correlate radar and ground observer reports and

alert interceptors .

4

Hitler finally ordered CITADEL to commence on July 5. For the first few

days German qualitative superiority was evident. German bombers of

Fliegerkorps VIII near Kharkov assembled for take-off when Russian planes

on a night mission nearly upset their timetable. Radar and ground observers

spotted the large flight of Russians headed for the corps' five fields, and

fighters scrambled to meet the assault. A swirling melee developed in the

clear morning sky. General Hans Jeschonnek, the Luftwaffe's Chief of

Staff, was at the corps headquarters watching in astonishment as the Russians bored straight in and lost most of their planes. Few bombs fell where

intended.4 In the 1st German Air Division area near Kharkov later in the

day another large air battle drew on with the Germans demonstrating clear

dominance of the air. But the German aircraft could not continue to fly

mission after mission, and German pilots were hard pressed to contain the

VSS. As the ground battle wore on, the Germans stripped their air defenses

to utilize the 88-mm guns in an antitank role for the Army. On July 13,

Hitler declared CITADEL at an end. The Allied invasion of Sicily on July 10

forced him to divert forces to the aid of the collapsing Italian Army. Between

May and early July, the German Air Force's airfield defenses centered on

warning, fighters, and heavy concentrations of antiaircraft fire. The

Luftwaffe seems to have held its own and continued flying from its bases.

The overall German effort, however, fell to bristling Russian defenses, miles

deep and laid by Stalin and his generals in the full knowledge of the Wehrmacht's plans. The battle of Kursk marked the final German attempt to

destroy the Red Army. For the remainder of the war, the Luftwaffe operated

on the defensive in the East.49

The year 1943 marked the end of German aerial domination on the

Russian front. The Kuban-Crimean and Kursk air battles were among the

most savage and prolonged of the war. The Soviet Air Force prevailed because in the long struggle of attrition, Russian industry and training schools

produced more airplanes and pilots than did Germany. German weapons

and aircraft were more sophisticated, and their pilots generally better. Often

they used radar, while the Russians rarely did. The Luftwaffe, operating in

the Soviet Union at the end of a long logistics line, could not replenish flying

squadrons and send sufficient spare parts to service its fleet. The VVS's

ability to counter German attacks by widespread dispersal, excellent use of

camouflage, antiaircraft artillery, and, most of all, replacement of worn or

damaged equipment provided the long term success denied Germany. Only

fragmentary statistics on Russian air losses are available. One reliable Russian report puts the VVS's losses at Kursk between July 5 and 8, 1943, at

202
THE EASTERN FRONT

-.- -7 w. 

German antiaircraft crew mans a predictor to determine height and range of

approaching Russian aircraft at Dugino, 1943.

566. Clearly, had the VVS not been able to disperse forces over a wide area

and quickly replace lost or damaged aircraft, they would have risked destruction by the Luftwaffe. The turnaround in Russian proficiency in the air

war begun in the Kuban was now complete.5

"

The continuing German losses at Kursk and elsewhere on the Eastern

Front could not be replaced because the Luftwaffe was fighting an air war

on three fronts: in Russia, Italy, and over Germany itself. While the Germans increased aircraft output, they could not produce enough fuel, guns,

and other equipment, and the population was too small to replenish the lost

army divisions. Nor could the Luftwaffe's instructors turn out sufficient

numbers of pilots. For the Germans, air base defense in the East became a

succession of actions designed to safeguard their forces on the retreat to

Germany. The German Air Force was able to strike hard, and occasionally it

did so. One such attempt provided a clear picture of Russian base defense.'

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AIR BASE AIR DEFENSE

The Attack on Poltava Air Base, June 21, 1944

On November 28, 1943, at the Tehran Conference, W. Averell Harriman, American ambassador to the Soviet Union, again approached Stalin

about the use of Russian air bases by the U. S. Army Air Forces to bomb

targets in the eastern part of German held territory. The targets were out of

round trip range of B-17 and B-24 bombers stationed in England and Italy

and the Soviet Long Range Bomber Force was too small and ill-equipped to

undertake such a task."2 In Harriman's scheme for shuttle bombing, American bombers would fly from England or Italy, attack targets, land in Russia

to refuel and rearm, and hit new objectives on the return. Though approving

in principle, Stalin only gave permission on February 2, 1944, and on the 5th

the first substantive meeting to discuss the project was held in Foreign

Minister Vyacheslav M. Molotov's office. The Red Air Force was represented by its commander, Novikov, and Col. Gen. A. V. Nikitin, in charge of

the VVS's air operations. Ambassador Harriman, Maj. Gen. John R.

Deane, Chief of the United States Military Mission to the Soviet Union, and

their aides presented the American ideas."

Deane described the purposes of shuttle bombing, the Russian support

desired, and the need for reconnaissance facilities. After some discussion,

Marshal Novikov proposed use of bases in the south, at Poltava and Kiev,

where weather was better and the sites more readily prepared than in the

north. German destruction in the north precluded using fields there, Novikov continued. During a discussion of general support requirements, the

Marshal told the Americans that defense of the bases was a Soviet responsibility and that they would provide it. Both sides agreed that American

personnel would be kept to a minimum consistent with the needs of flying

operations. Gasoline and bombs would be provided by the Russians, who

would notify air defense units of arriving aircraft. Unable to agree on bases,

the group left a decision on the specific airfields to be used for later.'4

In March 1944, Nikitin and Deane discussed the question of a suitable

base in a meeting at the VVS's General Staff headquarters in Moscow.

Poltava, Mirgorod, and Piryatin, in the Ukraine, had been tentatively selected after several survey trips by the planners. Nikitin pointed out the

vulnerability of Poltava. It was well known to the Germans, who occupied it

for more than a year, was within range of German bombers and could not be

camouflaged easily. He suggested another location farther east. The Americans, however, were concerned about distance to and from England and

Italy; they wanted Poltava. In addition, the constant delays encountered in

getting a decision from the highly centralized Russian bureaucracy

prompted them to accept the fields in the Ukraine and go ahead with the

project, code named FRANTIC."

204
THE EASTERN FRONT

American aviation engineers lay out pierced steel plank runways at Poltava in

the spring of 1944.

Soviet preparations seemed overshadowed with the traditional and pronounced Russian xenophobia. Distrust was more evident at the higher government levels than within the VVS, whose members were most willing to

assist and cooperate with the Americans. The selection of bases in the

Ukraine served to heighten official Russian apprehension as that region was

commonly viewed as being less than completely loyal to Moscow. The Soviets harbored a long memory of Allied intervention in North Russia and

Siberia from 1918 to 1920 when the United States had fought the infant Red

Army and generally supported the White faction in the civil war. The experience left the Soviets, and especially Stalin, with a distrust of foreign intentions."

While the Russians were deciding the question of American troops in

the Ukraine, construction of the airfields was not affected. At Poltava, a

mile long steel mat runway and taxiway were rapidly laid. Mirgorod, too,

would handle bombers, but its concrete block runway did not need as much

work. Piryatin was to be a fighter installation, and runway and taxiway

preparation was also not as extensive as at Poltava. Final visa approval and

other problems related to admitting Americans to Russia were resolved in

late May 1944 in time for the first mission, FRANTIC JOE. It was conducted

from Italy by Fifteenth Air Force units led by their commander, Lt. Gen. Ira

C. Eaker. They arrived at Poltava at one in the afternoon, June 2, 1944.11

Americans at the base had questions from the beginning about air

defense. The primary Russian weapons were 85-mm and 37-mm guns, although precise types and numbers were never made known to the Ameri205
AIR BASE AIR DEFENSE

cans. The VVS also had varying numbers of fighters, mostly Yak-9s, at

Poltava. Passive defenses consisted of slit trenches to shelter personnel during attacks and German built revetments around the bomb storage. Located

on the open steppe adjacent to the town of Poltava, the base had no natural

features to afford protection or concealment of aircraft, people, or equipment. No known decoy bases operated in the vicinity of the three locations

and the only concession to camouflage was the tarpaulins covering the

bombs. There were no aircraft blast shields, so ground dispersal offered the

only measure of protection." Maj. Gen. Alexei R. Perminov, the VVS's

commander at Poltava, originally had control of the heavy air defense batteries and the fighter forces at the station. Perminov and Brig. Gen. Alfred

A. Kessler, Commander of Eastern Command, United States Strategic Air

Forces, conferred often and agreed to greater dispersal of fuel and bomb

storage. On April 22, a German reconnaissance plane overflew Poltava,

after which Perminov directed a relocation of the AA guns. The artillery

commander assured him that no other enemy plane would repeat such a

visit. Perminov was extremely cordial to the Americans, and he and the

other Russian fliers gave every indication of providing a viable and effective

defense. No air raid drills were held, however. When American officers

sought information on details of the Soviet defense system, the Russians

became extremely sensitive and upset, insisting they "were well capable of

handling the situation." It required great tact on the part of Maj. Albert

Lepawsky, the AAF's Executive Officer at Piryatin, to smooth the ruffled

feelings that day."

On May 25 General Deane queried General Nikitin about base defense.

Apparently, control of fighters and antiaircraft artillery had been shifted to

Moscow. If this were so, Deane wanted to know how defense would be

affected. The Soviets never clarified the issue, but the American fears were

allayed when Russian fighter crews and planes began ground alert and heavy

guns appeared in greater abundance. At Piryatin, American P-51s, which

escorted the FRANTIC JOE bombers, joined the ground alert force. During

early June, German reconnaissance aircraft were reported near the bases at

least three times, although they were not pursued. After bombing a number

of targets in east Europe, providing a small diversion after the Allied landing

in Normandy on June 6, 1944, the Fifteenth Air Force contingent returned

to Italy on June 11.61

The second FRANTIC mission arrived at Poltava from Eighth Air Force

bases in England at half past three in the afternoon of June 21, 1944. It was

commanded by Col. Archie J. Old, Jr., and had bombed targets near Berlin

en route. East of Warsaw, Old noticed a German fighter following his formation at a distance, retreating only when challenged by American escorts.

A photoreconnaissance plane also showed up to follow the B-17s to their

new base. Old's flight landed at Poltava and Mirgorod, the P-51s at Pi206
THE EASTERN FRONT

Luftwaffe Sergeant Hans Mueller shot this aerial of American B-17s lined up

in the open at Poltava. A few hours later, using this photo as a guide,

German bombers devastated the field.

ryatin. The bombers taxied to dispersal points and began refueling, a long

process given the lack of fuel trucks and the extensive hand labor involved.

American generals and newsmen met the incoming crews, and the senior

elements of the command sat down to a late supper at the base. The German

reconnaissance pilot, Sgt. Hans Mueller of Kampfgeschwader 55 at Minsk,

crossed the field at Poltava and recorded the scene below. His chief, Col.

Wilhelm Antrup, had received orders to send his wing and the three others

into the attack. Shortly after Mueller brought his photographs back to

Minsk, German bombers took off into the night to destroy American air

power in the Soviet Union."

207
AIR BASE AIR DEFENSE

Air raid alarms sent all the diners and the station crews at Poltava into

the slit trenches or behind other protection. Just after midnight on June 22,

AA opened up fifteen minutes before the German pathfinder dropped flares

over the middle of Poltava. For two hours, Antrup's bombers plastered the

parked American planes with what Old reported as heavy demolition and

incendiary bombs along with thousands of small antipersonnel devices. An

investigating board decided that 110 tons of explosives had hit the base,

most of one or two kilogram size. Ninety-eight percent of the load fell

directly on or near the Eighth Air Force's planes.6 2

Fire fighting and rescue began immediately. The Americans assisted in

the living and administration areas, the Russians claimed the right to try and

save the bombers. Only Soviet personnel were allowed to approach the

aircraft. In fact, Colonel Old described the Russian attempts to protect his

people as "rather embarrassing:' because it was so solicitous. Soviet soldiers

did all of the live ordnance disposal work. The American surgeon, Lt. Col.

William M. Jackson, later cited Mechanic Sgt. Tubisin and Mechanic

Georgy Lucknor for heroism. These two men, directed by a Soviet lieutenant, walked ahead of a jeep picking up the small antipersonnel devices

known as butterfly bombs, laying them aside to let the rescue workers reach

wounded men at the north end of the field. Bomb disposal continued for

months in much the same fashion; at least thirty Russians were killed in the

process, and many more wounded. 3

Every American B-17 was hit, and 50 were written off. Twenty-nine

were still usable, but required extensive repair. By June 24, only 9 were

flyable and recovery work was hampered by the thousands of unexploded

butterfly bombs, which littered the ground and would often detonate if

moved, or even in the event of ground tremors and heavy rain. The VVS's

aircraft losses on the other side of the base were 1 C-47 and 25 assorted

fighters and trainers. In addition, the German attack destroyed 200,000

gallons of gasoline and a great deal of machine gun ammunition. In addition to the 30 Russians killed and 45 wounded, two American officers were

killed at Poltava, and six other Americans were injured. Confidence in the

Russians, built up over several months, was severely shaken.'

The Germans failed to carry through their attacks on the bombers at

Mirgorod on the 21st, probably because of a navigational error. At daybreak

on the 22nd, American aircraft dispersed to bases in the east. That night the

Luftwaffe attacked, but did little damage. No aircraft were lost, though

ground facilities at Mirgorod suffered. The attacking force missed Piryatin

altogether, dropping their bombs three miles east of the installation.6 5

The overwhelming German success in the Poltava raid has led to suspicions of Russian duplicity and even of cooperation with the Germans to

discourage the western Allies from continuing to use Russian bases. Some

theories are rather far fetched. There is enough room for other explanations

208
This scene on the ground is the only known photograph taken by the allies

during the German attack on Poltava airfield, June 21, 1944. Ibacers etch

the sky as German flares illuminate the unprotected bombers. (Below) The

morning after. Burned hulks of Eighth Air Force B-17s cover the Poltava

field on June 22. Nearly fifty bombers were completely destroyed.

'1 ... .
K Žp

Soviet Yak-9s were part of the base defense at Poltava. (Below) Soviet General

Alexander R. Perminov listens to citation read at an awards ceremony. As

the Russian commander at the Poltava field, his relations with Americans

were cordial, which may have contributed to his disappearance after the war.
THE EASTERN FRONT

by taking into account Russian capabilities in air defense.' The VVS

lacked doctrine, command structure, and the equipment to defend the base.

The Russians did not have many heavy bombers, and the VVS probably was

not familiar with defense needs for such a force. Soviet unease with the

project seems to to have surfaced momentarily early in the planning when

General Nikitin pointed out the exposed position of Poltava. The Russians

had very little gun control radar, and their airborne intercept radar did not

appear until late in the war. In addition, they lacked a ground controlled

intercept system capable of contending with a large scale German attack.

Lacking adequate gun laying radar, the antiaircraft artillery could not be

accurately aimed at night. Every American present who subsequently made

a report commented on the ineffective AA fire. Soviet gunfire shot down no

aircraft, and none was deterred from bombing or strafing, though medium

calibre guns continued shooting long after the raiders left. General Deane

reported that Russian antiaircraft gunners fired 28,000 rounds into the air.

Such a figure would confirm Old's opinion that there was a preponderance

of 37-mm fire as these guns could fire faster than heavy artillery, but not as

high. Accuracy was terrible. Old said that only one searchlight located a

plane, and ground fire could not bring it down. In fact, only one Ju88 failed

to get away, and it crashed in Russian territory on the return flight. The AA

units were not prepared for night combat, and Colonel Antrup's raiding

force flew high enough to avoid most of the rounds. The premature firing,

fifteen minutes before the Germans were in range, served only to aid the

bombers by pinpointing the target."7

Very few Russian fighters, if any, of the thirty at Poltava took off, and

no German aircraft was intercepted. This would have been the natural result

of an underdeveloped air defense fighter-control system in an air force

oriented toward ground attack rather than air superiority. It is significant

that after the raid, the VVS offered other bases, near Kharkov and Dniepropetrovsk, for dispersal. Spreading their forces thinly had served the Russians

well, and the suggestion was a logical reaction on their part. General Kessler

had asked the Russians to provide more space at Poltava some weeks before

the attack, but no local resolution to the problem was achieved. Both air

forces needed to use the limited space at that location. Blast shields and

revetments were not common on the VVS's airstrips and were not built at

Poltava. Had they been, the damage could have been reduced considerably.68

The Americans were not without blame either. Little thought seems to

have been given to any German initiative. The American bombers were not

painted in subdued, nonreflective colors, and their silver finishes readily

reflected light from the flares, making them starkly visible to German pilots.

Inadequate camouflage preparations meant that no airplanes were hidden

from view.'9

211
AIR BASE AIR DEFENSE

The Soviet military opinion of defense also mitigated against defensive

measures. Except when incidental to consolidating gains made by an aggressive assault, or while preparing for an offensive, defense was not appropriate as a mode of combat operation. What the Soviet histories refer to as an

"active defense:' was, in reality, an attack or series of attacks. The following

quotation from the official Soviet history of the war illustrates:

In the course of such defensive operations the Soviet troops

exhausted the enemy, inflicted heavy losses on him and created

the conditions for a counteroffensive. A characteristic feature

of the organization of a strategic defense was the availability of

large numbers of mobile troops and the use of artillery corps

and divisions for break through purposes.

This strategic defense would "develop . . . into a strategic offensive to be

pursued until the complete defeat of the enemy's assault groupings."'7

Within this line of thought a place for the defensive military post was

singularly lacking. The Red Army and the VVS were tools of attack. The

Red Air Force, as a branch of the Army, received direction from ground

commanders. It had little opportunity to develop comprehensive doctrine

counter to that of the prominent army marshals who, in turn, reflected the

thinking of Joseph Stalin. Stalin considered defense tantamount to "loafing." 7

'

Summary

The tremendous production potential of Russia, so seriously underrated before the war, allowed the VVS to triumph by attrition. Its planes

were well suited to the task of offensive ground attack and air escort of

fighter-bombers. Soviet acceptance of material and human loss did not vary

throughout the war. The Russians could replace lost materiel far more easily

than their enemies could. It was better to attack from a multiplicity of bases,

abandoning those badly damaged, than to flail away from behind a protective wall. 2 When Maj. Gen. Robert L. Walsh, commander of Eastern Command, United States Strategic Air Forces in Europe, asked Perminov where

the Russian fighters were during the Poltava raid, the Russian base commander told him they had been attacking German air bases. True or not, the

reply refelcted Russian practices.73

Aversion to defense was based partly on skepticism of its efficacy. Only

in a few instances between 1941 and 1945 did the Soviet leaders adopt

defense as a matter of policy-Kursk, Moscow, Leningrad, and Stalingrad

were the most prominent examples-and each was tenaciously defended for

special reasons. Moscow, Leningrad, and Stalingrad were very important

symbolically, less so militarily. In planning for Kursk, the Russians knew,

from the British and through their espionage net in Berlin, of the impending

212
THE EASTERN FRONT

German Ju-52 transports ablaze on a field in Soviet Russia during the German

retreat in 1944.

German offensive; they busied themselves building an immense trap. In

general, however, defense being a suspect tactic, largely foreign to the thinking of the Red Army and the VVS, one could not expect an in depth system

of protection for air bases?. 4

To an extent, the VVS was denied an opportunity to learn the techniques of integrated tactical air defense commonly used in the West because

of the separate strategic defense force, the PVO Strany. The PVO Strany's

position and operational control were not clearly understood by Western

observers during and after World War II. The PVO Strany seemed, however,

to have controlled most of the Soviets' AA guns and large numbers of

fighter regiments. Late in 1941, the air defense force engaged in its most

prominent wartime battle, the defense of Moscow. There it joined the VVS

and bomber force in a common, desperate effort to save the city. Even at

Moscow, the PVO Strany's fighters often attacked German ground targets,

including airfields. But the emphasis on ground attack by the PVO Strany

also reflected Stalin's thinking. German strategic bombing was not an important factor in the aerial fighting on the Eastern Front, especially after

1942, thus continued development of the PVO Strany's doctrine, tactics,

213
AIR BASE AIR DEFENSE

and command and control systems was not as extensive as that found in

western Europe and the Pacific. The experience gained by the PVO Strany

did not become part of the VVS's doctrine or thinking on a scale large

enough to influence tactical air defense command and control. The PVO

could have provided a defense screen not only for the American bases, but

also a much more extensive one for the VVS which lacked enough radar

fighter control systems, including enough airborne intercept radar, to contend with heavy night raids such as that mounted by Colonel Antrup. Consequently, Poltava had less than adequate active protection."5

Air base defense employed by the VVS in World War II was quite unlike

the same art in the West. Despite huge losses on the ground to German

attacks, the Russians maintained air base operations even during the darkest

periods of the war. At times it seemed as if will power and determination

carried the Red Air Force through. Disregarding the active base defense

systems in use by the Western powers, the Soviets built a profusion of

airfields, some 8,545 by war's end, and used them with increasing skill.

Defensive schemes incorporating early warning, coordinated gunfire, and

fighter interception under the command of a single authority were not the

mark of the VVS. A constant proclivity to attack carried the fight to the

opponent. The Russians could, in turn, absorb heavy losses to German

counterair strikes because of an enormous industrial and training capacity.

Although the Soviet Union may have lost between 70,000 and 80,000 aircraft during the war, many of them on the ground to the Luftwaffe's best

pilots, the Germans were unable to subdue their stubborn and increasingly

more skillful foe.' 6

In addition to quick replacement of machines and crews, the VVS

depended on using many small, well concealed landing strips. These airfields were often prepared in advance of a battle so carefully that they were

unobserved by German reconnaissance. The Red Air Force kept airplanes at

bases fifty to a hundred miles behind the front lines until the day before an

offensive. They would then disperse the force to forward camouflaged areas

and strike from these, often without being detected and attacked.77

The devastating German attack on the Eighth Air Force's units at Poltava came about more because the Americans assumed too much about

Russian base defense than because of communist treachery. The Soviet

leaders probably wanted to be rid of the American bases as quickly as

possible, but their own doctrine, organization, and practices did much to

hinder an effective defense.

The German Air Force relied to a far greater extent on an organized,

active defense. It created well equipped and well trained flak divisions,

assigning one or more to each air corps. The guns were coordinated by a

commander who also served on the air corps or air fleet staff. Radar detection was often used and fighters were launched to fend off attacking forma214
THE EASTERN FRONT

tions. The air defense of the Luftwaffe's bases in early July 1943 near the

Kursk salient was much more understandable to Western military thinking

than the Red Air Force's practice of dispersal, replacement, and expenditure

of lives and equipment. At Kursk, as elsewhere, the German efforts were

effective, but German defense suffered in the long run from an inability to

replace lost and damaged guns, planes, and most of all, pilots in a manner

that even approached that of the VVS.

215
Chapter VII

The Solomons and New Guinea: 1942-1944

Japanese forces advanced from one success to another after the fall of

Singapore. In a war fought over islands and wide expanses of ocean, aviation became a central element in military operations, and base defense

accordingly took its place in the military concerns of both sides. While the

Japanese Army was driving through Malaya and the Indies, Imperial Japanese Navy forces from the Caroline Islands took the port of Rabaul on New

Britain island in the Territory of New Guinea. After capturing nearby

New Ireland and constructing an air base at Kavieng, the Japanese turned

their attention to New Guinea. In March 1942, they landed at Lae and

Salamaua on the northeast coast and were poised to seize Port Moresby, the

major Australian position in Papua. Capture of this small trading center

would give the Japanese control of all New Guinea, and leave them ready for

a land assault on Australia. To protect this drive to the south, air bases in the

Bismarck and Solomon Islands were crucial as staging areas and guarded

against an Allied flank attack from the sea.'

During the first months of 1942, the American, British, Dutch, and

Australian Allies (ABDA) faced a pincer movement aimed at isolating Australia and New Zealand from North American supply and reinforcement.

Fortunately, the Japanese moved cautiously while exploiting advances in the

Indian Ocean, and did not arrive in the Solomon Islands until March. They

then waited until May 3 to take the administrative center of Tulagi. Reacting

to an attempt to take Port Moresby, the U S. Navy clashed with the Japanese

in the Coral Sea between May 5 and 8,2 blunting Japan's drive south and

forcing its Port Moresby invasion group to return to Rabaul.' (Map 17)

In the Solomons, the Japanese at first evinced little interest in Thlagi's

neighboring island of Guadalcanal until July 6, when they landed to begin

building an airstrip. The new military dispositions were quickly reported to

217
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SOLOMONS AND NEW GUINEA

the Australian Navy by coastwatchers* in the Solomons and thence to the

Joint Chiefs of Staff in Washington." The Americans had planned since

early June to move north from the Fiji and New Hebrides Islands to block

any further Japanese advance. Discussions among General Douglas MacArthur, Commander-in-Chief, Southwest Pacific Area, General George C.

Marshall, Chief of Staff of the U. S. Army, and Admiral Ernest J. King,

Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet, resulted in a directive of July 2 to

drive the Japanese from the New Britain-New Ireland-New Guinea area and

preserve the Australian lifeline. The first objective was to seize or secure the

Santa Cruz Islands, Tulagi, and islands adjacent to Tulagi-Guadalcanal lay

just twenty miles across Sealark Channel.'

Guadalcanal and Munda

The main Allied landing force at Guadalcanal on August 7, 1942, was

the 1st Marine Division, commanded by Maj. Gen. Alexander A. Vandegrift. Vandegrift intended capturing Tulagi and securing a foothold on

Guadalcanal in the Lunga Point area, taking at the same time the nearby

uncompleted airstrip. As soon as the airfield was made ready for flying

operations it would be occupied by an assortment of fighter and fighterbomber squadrons that would be Vandegrift's only consistent air support.6

Immediate Japanese opposition at Lunga Point came from some 2,230

troops and laborers of the Special Naval Landing Force supported by the

Japanese Navy's Twenty-fifth Air Fleet and strong naval surface units. Vandegrift's Marines found little initial opposition on Guadalcanal, but encountered much stronger resistance on Tulagi and the adjacent small island

of Gavutu. 7

To protect the landing, B-17 bombers of Maj. Gen. George C. Kenney's

Allied Air Forces, Southwest Pacific Area (SWPA), attacked airfields near

Rabaul. These raids of August 7 and 8 found Japanese fighters and

bombers, many of which were unprotected on the runways, at Vunakunau,

near Rabaul. Kenney, newly established in his position, estimated that his

fliers destroyed some seventy-five aircraft and believed the losses limited the

Japanese ability to oppose the Marine landing. Intercepted radio messages

confirmed the disruption of Japanese operations and their inability to offer

immediate help to their forces on Guadalcanal. Kenney's attack surprised

and pleased MacArthur, frustrated by the previously disorganized state of

* In the mid-1930s certain members of the Royal Australian Navy saw Japan as a potential

adversary in a Pacific war. Australian naval intelligence officers began looking about for

possible future sources of information and hit upon the idea of using people familiar with the

territory to observe and report. Both Australia and New Zealand had coastwatching stations

during World War II.

219
AIR BASE AIR DEFENSE

his hard pressed air forces. This modest success buoyed American spirits,

but losses among American bombers were heavy and could not be sustained.

The B-17s could not face Japanese interceptors alone, and no Allied fighters

had the range to escort them on long flights. Protection was essential during

the next eighteen months, but at the outset of the island campaigns only

Japanese bombers had aerial protection.

The Allies needed desperately to hold Henderson Field, but faced a

strong Japanese reaction. Without air operations on Guadalcanal, the Solomon Islands position would collapse. The Japanese, on the other hand, had

to destroy the Marine air base to protect their ships landing reinforcements

on the island. A months long battle of attrition determined the outcome. On

August 9, the Japanese Navy sank four Allied cruisers and a destroyer in the

first battle of nearby Savo Island, a direct threat to the first Allied lodgement in the Pacific. Worse yet, the Japanese attack forced the withdrawal of

the Marines' supply ships, leaving them short of much equipment, including

that needed for anitaircraft defense of the island. Fortunately when it came

ashore, the 1st Marine Division captured a variety of Japanese trucks, earth

movers, and rollers. With these unfamiliar vehicles Marine engineers and

Navy Seabees managed to complete and lengthen the runway at Henderson

Field, named after Maj. Lofton Henderson, a Marine squadron commander

killed at the battle of Midway. Nineteen fighters comprising Marine Fighting

Squadron 223 (VMF-223) arrived on August 20. They were quickly joined

by twelve dive bombers of Marine Scout Bomber Squadron 232 (VMSB232). On August 22, fourteen P-39s of the United States Army Air Forces'

67th Fighter Squadron landed.' The Japanese operated from several air

bases at Rabaul, Kavieng, Buka, and Buin, supplied from their home islands

and the East Indies.' 0

In the first assault wave General Vandegrift split the Marine 3rd Defense Battalion between Guadalcanal and Tulagi. This unit, the first of

several of the same type to serve in the Solomons, had the dual function of

beach defense and antiaircraft protection. The 3rd and its sister units were

created late in 1939 as a result of a long recognized need to protect forward

naval bases, but it was not fully proficient on arrival in the Pacific." Unable

to cope adequately with high speed and nighttime targets, the unit had a

great deal to learn in a short time, for Japanese pressure mounted rapidly.'2

The battalion was equipped with 90-mm antiaircraft guns, capable of

firing to a height of 33,800 feet, and 5-inch guns for shore defense. The

antiaircraft group also had 20-mm and 40-mm cannon and .50-caliber machine guns for defense against low altitude attack. Fire control was the

responsibility of the various battery commanders in conjunction with the 1 st

Marine Air Wing's air operations officer. The liaison between the two sections was not always effective, however, and gunners sometimes inadver220
SOLOMONS AND NEW GUINEA

tently fired into the paths of defending fighters, forcing the aircraft away

from Japanese attackers and endangering friendly pilots.13

The 3rd Battalion had two SCR-268 gun control radars and an SCR270B search radar as well as optical tracking devices. The gun control radars

proved unable to locate an airborne target precisely. The SCR-268 was

originally designed for searchlight control, which required aiming only to

within 200 meters of a target but the bursting radius of the 90-mm shells was

less than fifty meters. The SCR-270 was not much better. It was a crude

instrument that could provide speed and bearing of a target, but not altitude. Moreover, local terrain features produced clutter and bad readings."

The battalion lacked heavy weapons. Although the 90-mm was an excellent gun, the unit had only twelve assigned. The first battery of four guns

fired on August 11, but the demands of fighting to secure Tulagi and the

work necessary to complete the airfield runway delayed the arrival of the

remainder until September 19. The battalion commander soon found out

that he had not been given enough small weapons, such as .30-and .50-

caliber machine guns to protect the 90-mm crews from low-level attacks.'5

Battery E, on Guadalcanal, defended Henderson Field. (Map 18) Since there

were so few guns, they fired from near the midpoint of the runway to

concentrate their aim over the airfield. They were dug in so that the crews

were not exposed to blast and shrapnel during Japanese attacks. 6

The main American defense weapon was the Grumman F4F-4 Wildcat

fighter. This well armored aircraft carried six .50-caliber machine guns and

had a top speed of 330 miles per hour at 19,000 feet. It was not as fast or as

agile as its main adversary, the Japanese Mitsubishi A6M Reisen fighter

(known as the Zero and later as the Zeke). The Zeros, however, had no

armor or self sealing fuel tanks. Additionally, the Japanese used a two

engine medium bomber, the Mitsubishi G4M, later designated the Betty by

the Allies. The G4M also lacked armor, and its nonsealing fuel tanks, located between the engines and the fuselage, made them so infamous for

exploding when hit that their crews referred to them as flying cigarette

lighters. The Grumman fighters were joined by the 67th Fighter Squadron

flying Bell P-39 and P-400 Airacobras (an export version of the P-39

intended originally for the RAF). The Airacobras could not operate at the

23,000 to 25,000 feet where the Japanese normally flew and, after August,

served largely for surface attack."7

Marine and Navy engineer battalions were to repair damage to Henderson Field. Once the builders had completed the runway, they piled sand and

gravel nearby. After an air raid or naval shelling, the material was quickly

moved, the holes shaped, filled, and tamped, and the field restored to

operation. Aircraft often began landing shortly after an air raid, which

required rapid repairs. Japanese cruisers, destroyers, and sometimes battleships shelled Henderson Field at night, as did enemy artillery on the island.

221
AIR BASE AIR DEFENSE

Marine 3d Defense Battlion 90-mm guns sited at the midpoint of Henderson

Field's runway.

These bombardments, frequently very heavy, could cause more damage than

aircraft attacks.' 8

Early in the campaign, the most essential part of the air-warning system

was the network of coastwatchers established in the northern Solomon Islands. On Bougainville and adjacent Buka Island, a group of men worked

for senior coastwatchers Jack Read and Paul Mason. From their posts, these

men reported by radio movements of the Japanese air and naval forces to

Navy headquarters in Australia and to Henderson Field. The route of Japanese bombers from Rabaul and Kavieng past Bougainville, Choiseul, and

New Georgia kept them in view of the coastwatchers for much of this flight.

On Segi Island, 160 miles northwest of Henderson Field, District Officer D.

G. Kennedy confirmed the reports of other coastwatchers. His position

allowed calculation of speed and an approximate arrival time of the Japanese attackers even before they were within radar detection range.1 9

Coastwatcher reports arriving up to one hour and forty minutes before an

attack often gave sufficient time for the Wildcats to take off and climb to an

altitude above that commonly used by Japanese bombers. The American

fighters normally made only one diving pass from either side through the

Japanese formation, avoiding the Zeros. The dive allowed a clear shot at the

Bettys while staying clear of their dangerous 20-mm tail cannon.10

222
SOLOMONS AND NEW GUINEA

F4F Wildcats in open maintenance revetment at Henderson Field,

Guadalcanal, February 1943.

The information radioed by the coastwatchers was collected at Henderson Field by a small team headed by Hugh Mackenzie, an Australian Naval

Intelligence officer, who passed it to fighter operations which then directed

the air interception effort. After a raid, as the returning Japanese passed

Jack Read's coastwatching station on New Georgia, he reported their numbers and confirmed Japanese losses. As they became aware of the coastwatchers, the Japanese often flew farther out to sea or through clouds. The

Marine radar sets then had to provide the missing information, but the 650

miles between the Japanese bases and the targets still limited the ways the

Japanese could avoid the direct route. 2

'

Because the U.S. Navy was forced out of Sealark Channel around Savo

Island on August 9, the Americans could not land their search radar for

some days. On the day of the invasion, the 1st Marine Division had captured

several Japanese radar sets that they tried to use to no avail before shipping

them home to the Naval Research Laboratory. Japanese communications

equipment, however, including a variety of radio and telephone components, was quickly incorporated into the alerting system. Finally, the Defense Battalion's SCR-270B radar was installed just before Henderson

Field's fighters arrived. Another SCR-270B went into service about September 15. It was assigned to the Marine Air Wing's Fighter Direction Center

223
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SOLOMONS AND NEW GUINEA

, OZ

Crew poses with 20-mm antiaircraft guns at the Henderson strip.

under control of Master Tech. Sgt. Dermott H. MacDonnell,* who became

in his own right one of the keys to the air defense system on the island."2

At first the fighter control system was crude. As soon as the radar

operators sighted a target, they sent the bearing and distance to Henderson's

air operations officer, Maj. Joseph N. Renner. Lacking nearly every kind of

reliable radio and signaling equipment and with almost no staff, the major

launched planes as he received radar or coastwatcher reports. Later he supplemented his equipment with a salvaged aircraft radio installed in his truck.

Renner also acted as an observer, identifying aircraft as friendly or enemy

when they were in sight, then sounding the air raid alarm if necessary. The

strain on the one man carrying this burden was heavy."

* MacDonnell was born on August 16, 1921. He received the Silver Star for gallantry

under fire at Henderson. He left Guadalcanal on March 8, 1943, and returned to the United

States where he was commissioned, rising eventually to lieutenant colonel in the Marine Corps

Reserve. He died in April 1976.

225
TABLE 24

United States Air Defense Units

Guadalcanal

Marine Fighting Squadron 223 (F4F-4)* August 20-October 11, 1942

Marine Fighting Squadron 224 (F4F-4) August 30-October 16, 1942

AAF 67th Fighter Squadron (P-39, P-40) August 22-February 8, 1943

Navy Fighting Squadron 5 (F4F-4) September 11-October 16

Marine Fighting Squadron 121 (F4F-4) October 9-December 30

Marine Fighting Squadron 212 (F4F-4) October 16 into 1943

Marine Fighting Squadron 112 (F4F-4) November 2, 1942 into 1943

Marine Fighting Squadron 122 (F4F-4) November 12, 1942, into 1943

Third Defense Battalion 12 90-mm guns

.50 caliber machine guns

20-mm cannon

8 40-mm cannon

Third Barrage Balloon Squadron, USMC

Arrived with balloons and .30 and .50 caliber AA machine guns. The balloons

were not used on Guadalcanal. Anchorages were difficult to find, and there was

fear the balloons would draw attacking aircraft and interfere with the operation

of Henderson Field. Squadron personnel were used to augment various AA

positions on Guadalcanal and Tulagi.

First Marine Aviation Engineer Battalion

Navy Construction Battalion 6 (Seabees)

* The strength of flying squadrons varied almost daily. Replacements arrived frequently and without regularity. Any attempt to list numbers of aircraft assigned is

almost impossible.

Sources: Miller, The Cactus Air Force

USMC Historical Files
TABLE 25

Japanese Navy Air Units

Solomon Islands

25th Air Flotilla

(Rear Adm. Sadayoshi Yamada)

August 1942

Tainan Air Group Model 0 Fighters (Zeke) 24

2nd Air Group Model 0 Fighters, square Wing (Hamp) 15

Model 99 Dive Bombers (Val) 16

Yokohama Air Group Model 97 Flying Boat 9

Model 0 Fighters (float type) (Rufe) 11

4th Air Group Model 1 Medium Bombers (Betty) 32

107

11th Air Fleet

(Vice Adm. Nishizo Tsukahara)

30 September 1942

Rabaul

25th Air Flotilla (Rear Admiral Yamada)

Tainan Air Group Model 0 Fighters (Zeke) 8

2nd Air Group Model 0 Fighters (Hamp) 16

6th Air Group Model 0 Fighters (Zeke) 12

Model 0 Fighters (Hamp) 13

3rd Air Group Model 0 Fighters (Zeke) 20

Kanoya Air Group Model 0 Fighters (Zeke) 8

77

Kavieng

26 Air Flotilla (Vice Adm. Jinichi Kusaka)

Kisarazu Air Group Model 1 Medium Bombers 15

Misawa Air Group Model 1 Medium Bombers 12

Takao Air Group Model 1 Medium Bombers 19

Kanoya Air Group Model 1 Medium Bombers 16

62

Sources: 11S 43-4, Jan 7, 1943

Miller, The Cactus Air Force

USMC Historical Files
AIR BASE AIR DEFENSE

L-j

Control panel of captured Japanese radar installation, Guadalcanal, October

1942. The unit was sent to the Naval Research Laboratory for evaluation.

On October 8, Lt. Lewis C. Mattison and Ens. W. A. Noll, both naval

officers sent from the Navy's fighter director school at Pearl Harbor, arrived

on Guadalcanal. There they found two rudimentary radar air search operations. One was used by the 1st Marine Air Wing's fighter controllers, the

other by the 3rd Defense Battalion. The two search efforts at first were not

integrated and not always mutually supporting, although there was contact

between them. Moreover, the early radar sets were not very reliable and

reported false returns from the surrounding mountains and hills. Sergeant

MacDonnell was often the only man who could interpret the zigzag lines on

the oscilloscopes and tell how many airplanes were in an attacking formation. Lieutenant Mattison gave much of the credit for the radar's success to

MacDonnell, who could tell from the radar set's A-scope not only how many

aircraft were in a formation, but could also frequently identify medium

bombers, dive bombers, fighters, or long range seaplanes.

MacDonnell was a harried commander's dream who specialized in getting around shortcomings in his equipment. For example, radar operators

could get speed and bearings of approaching raids on the SCR-270 but had

228
SOLOMONS AND NEW GUINEA

Sk

The SCR-270 radar had ten degrees of tilt designed into its

frame. Master Tech. Sgt. Dermott H. McDonnell used this

feature to advantage in the defense of Guadalcanal.

to wait for the enemy to come within 25 miles before the SCR-268 gave them

the accurate altitude reading. The sergeant knew that the 270's frame was

tiltable 10 degrees backward, so that the antenna could be adjusted for

terrain contour when installed. MacDonnell used this feature to take two

readings on a target, one with the antenna perpendicular, another with the

antenna slightly reclined. He could then calculate an approximate altitude.

Fighters vectored to the heading waited above that level. More exact determination could be made when the Japanese came within the SCR-268's range,

and the American interceptors closed in.2 4

Defending fighters rarely tried to attack the Japanese before they

reached the target area. Poor ground to air radios limited the intercept zone

to an area ten to fifteen miles from Henderson Field."5 In the sky above the

field, the Wildcat pilots' dive and run tactic was very effective and compensated for the limited interception zone. The resilient airplane in the hands of

capable pilots shot down or damaged a disproportionate number of enemy

229
AIR BASE AIR DEFENSE

Maj. Gen. Roy S. Geiger surveys

the situation on Tblagi in January 1943. Geiger's grit alone

N't was a major factor in the

American air defense of

Guadalcanal.

aircraft. As the Americans did well under the able leadership of Brig. Gen.

Roy S. Geiger, the Marine air commander at Guadalcanal, they became

more confident, but difficulties persisted.2

"

Command and control of the air defense operation was shaky from the

start of the battle. Both Lieutenant Mattison, the chief fighter director, and

Col. Robert H. Pepper, the 3rd Defense Battalion's commander, recommended improving liaison between radar sets and fighter operations. Colonel Pepper also cited an insufficient information exchange between battery

commanders and fighter squadrons as the cause of frequent conflict and

confusion. On some occasions, the gunners fired on friendly planes. At

others, confusion between the two units was so serious it prevented accurate

tracking and interception of enemy aircraft. Neither Pepper nor his gunners

were apparently aware of what was expected of them. In his after action

report, Pepper begged to have the defense battalion commander sit in on the

planning of operations in which his defense battalion was to be involved.

Such a request from the man responsible for antiaircraft and shore defense

operations seems inconceivable, yet neither the Marine commander nor his

230
SOLOMONS AND NEW GUINEA

staff sought Pepper's consistent participation. The situation illustrated

clearly the problems which faced the willing, yet inexperienced, American

amphibious group.27

Other problems also dogged the Americans. At first, dispersal was

poor, revetments and blast shields could not be built, and the aircraft had to

be scattered widely about the open field. Fortunately, the 90-mm guns of the

defense battalion kept the Japanese bombers high, making their bombardiers' aim uncertain. By early October, the engineers had finished a fighter

strip about one mile from the original field. This dirt runway was rolled

when necessary, but was excessively muddy after a rain. Nevertheless, use of

two fields allowed separation of dive bomber and fighter squadrons and

provided further dispersal. Construction continued throughout the campaign, and by the end of the year three adjacent strips were in use with

revetments and blast shields to shelter most of the planes and equipment.2 1

Japanese naval air units bombed the fields heavily. Most of the raids

came during the day, but night bombers harassed the defenders, keeping

pilots awake or making them run for shelter in foxholes or trenches. Exhaustion resulted in accidents and unnecessary combat losses. General Geiger

could do little about the night attacks as he had no radar equipped night

fighters. Inadequate radar aiming meant the AA gunners could help little.

The stress was so great that pilots returning from combat at times climbed

out of their aircraft and collapsed in tears. On occasion, Geiger was hard

pressed to get the men to fly again the same day.29

The attackers were not without their own difficulties. The distance

from Rabaul and Kavieng forced the Japanese to leave early in the day,

usually arriving over Henderson Field between eleven and twelve o'clock in

the morning. The escorting fighters had to use external fuel tanks that could

not be jettisonned, thus reducing their maneuverability. After October 20,

Japanese fighters flew from Buin, but that was still 300 miles from their

targets. Moreover, the flights invariably arrived from the northwest, often

after forewarning from coastwatcher stations and radar. The long distances,

American awareness of impending attacks, and inadequately armored Japanese planes gave the defenders an important advantage, which they used

repeatedly to ambush the Japanese. After slashing through the flights of

bombers, the Wildcats dove to safety at Henderson. Moreover, American

airmen shot down could be rescued. Downed Japanese pilots were normally

lost at sea or captured."

The American ability to recover both pilots and damaged aircraft was

important to the course of battle. Fighter strength, not great to begin with,

often fell to no more than a handful of operational aircraft during August

and September. Lack of spare parts, battle damage, and accidents caused

constant loss. Only replacements flown from carriers and islands to the

231
AIR BASE AIR DEFENSE

White smoke marks direct Japanese hit on American hangar on Henderson

Field, September 1942.

south enabled the squadrons to offer resistance. Working each night, the

mechanics kept the force at a barely effective level. 3

'

By mid-October American fighter strength had improved somewhat,

just as air defense of Henderson Field reached a critical stage. Repeated

bombings, coupled with Japanese naval and land-based artillery fire exerted

severe pressure on the Marines. Japanese attempts at reinforcing their garrison were constant and could be defeated only by air attacks on the transport

ships, campsites, and supply areas.32 Fierce combat continued into November. Lieutenant Mattison and his fighter directors improved the radar warning system by linking all the radar sets on the island to their operation and

tightening the liaison with fighter operations. Sergeant MacDonnell's adept

use of the sets gave more reliable and useful information.33 The 3rd Defense

Battalion recorded eighty-two air attacks on the Marine air base before

heavy Japanese losses caused the number of air raids to decline significantly

after November 15. By November 22 it became apparent that the American

position could be held, though heavy ground fighting on the island continued. 4

Japan's failure to retake Guadalcanal was due largely to air operations

from Henderson Field. Continued destruction of Japanese supply and reinforcement shipping, culminating in the defeat of a large Japanese naval

relief attempt on the night of November 14-15, left the enemy starving. The

Marines, now reinforced by the Army's 164th Infantry Regiment, beat back

several frontal attacks. During December and January the Japanese, weakened by disease and hunger, were forced into a small area on the north end

232
SOLOMONS AND NEW GUINEA

of the island. The Japanese Navy withdrew the few survivors in early February 1943.11

American air defense of Guadalcanal and Henderson Field succeeded

almost in spite of itself. The Marines were inexperienced and ill prepared for

sustained combat after the Navy support ships departed precipitously on

August 9th with much of their equipment. Even if the ships had stayed,

however, the Marines were far from home, at the end of a long supply line,

and in an unfamiliar area. Fortunately for the Americans, the Japanese,

operating at the extreme range of their aircraft, were funneled toward a

small target area. The defenders, fighting desperately and commanded by

strong men like Geiger and others, used their advance warnings to great

advantage. Many people on the isolated Guadalcanal battlefield were driven

by a combination of desperation and a sense of duty. Others found the

challenges well suited to their talents. Sergeant MacDonnell's innovative use

of radar was not the only example of initiative and skill, but his remarkable

accomplishments were more significant than many. Men like him provided

Lieutenant Mattison's fighter direction center as well Geiger's aviators

with the resources they needed to repel the Japanese air assaults. In addition, the Americans benefitted from British success in 1940. Naval officers

who learned the art of fighter direction from the RAF in England taught

men like Mattison and Noll. They in turn used the knowledge to fend off the

Axis Pacific partner.6

The small number of American fighters wrought disproportionately

heavy losses, although an exact comparison cannot be made because of a

lack of adequate records. American pilots may have destroyed as many as

535 Japanese planes by December 28 with a corresponding loss of 78. In

addition, the 3rd Defense Battalion gunners added 49 with another 13 probably shot down.37 A postwar Japanese study estimated that they lost only

136 aircraft during the Guadalcanal campaign (53 bombers and 83 fighters),

but this is almost certainly too low. In all probability, the Japanese lost some

300 fighters and an equal number of bombers and torpedo planes in action

in the Solomons and adjacent waters. Considering American aircraft losses

at the battles of the Coral Sea and Santa Cruz Islands, there was a rough

casualty ratio of four to one in favor of the Americans.3

"

Interception of Japanese radio transmissions played only a small part in

the Allies' victory. A U.S. Navy Strategic Direction Finder station was established on Guadalcanal in November 1942. This station was part of the

Pacific intercept and direction finding (D/F) net responsible for locating

Japanese radio transmissions and reading enemy radio traffic. The

Guadalcanal station did both D/F and intercept work, but little is known of

its operation before June 1944. It is unlikely this station provided significant

information of approaching air attacks until after the main battle, if at all.

The operation's late start and problems caused by loss of some equipment in

233
AIR BASE AIR DEFENSE

an aircraft crash probably limited the station's intelligence output until after

November 22. Intercept work may not have begun on Guadalcanal until

early 1943. At that time, the information gained normally went to the net

control unit at Pearl Harbor, unless it was immediately recognized as pertaining to the island. During the heaviest fighting, occasional warnings came

from the Commander-in-Chief Pacific (CINCPAC) at Pearl Harbor, but

were not always accurate. In any event, the coastwatchers and radar provided a much faster and more reliable warning.39

Although its hold was tenuous at times, the defense at Henderson Field

stopped the Japanese advance and kept open the lines of communication to

Australia. Guadalcanal marked the limit of Japanese expansion in the South

Pacific area. The Americans, at the same time, learned a great deal about

the relationship between air superiority and air base defense. Except for the

debacles at Hickam and Clark Fields in December 1941, Henderson Field

was the first major American attempt at defending an airfield in a combat

theater during World War II. Many of the problems faced in August 1942

were due to inexperience, but were overcome by the end of the year. As the

Americans seized other airfields, they applied the knowledge gained in radar

operation, fighter control, and AA gun cooperation with increasing success.

Having secured themselves on Guadalcanal, the Allies began to take the

offensive. Several Japanese bases in the South Pacific posed a danger to

their position. Throughout October, reports from coastwatchers and search

aircraft indicated considerable Japanese use of airfields at Buka and Kahili.

Allied aircraft attacked Buka during October and November with limited

success. Airplanes and facilities were damaged, but even after a strong

attack on November 18 there were thirty fighters operating. Then, in early

December, a coastwatcher reported a new base being built at Munda, New

Georgia, within 250 miles of Henderson Field.'

The construction being done by the Japanese at Munda was almost

entirely under camouflage. Tree tops were held in place over the new runways by nets and wires while the trunks were removed and construction went

on beneath. On December 5th, pilots of two USAAF P-39s flying over

Munda sighted two airstrips with five trucks, two rollers, and many carts.

Before leaving with this information, the Americans made a strafing pass at

fifty feet, the first of many attacks."'

Through the rest of December the Americans hit Munda frequently,

two and three raids a day being not uncommon. On December 12, B-17s

from Australia began a series of raids on the airfield. The Japanese doggedly continued work, bringing fighters to protect the field late in the

month. The heaviest strikes came on Christmas Eve of 1942, when three

separate raids found more than twenty Japanese planes on the ground. Ten

were shot down as they took off, another ten or twelve were destroyed on the

234
SOLOMONS AND NEW GUINEA

field. The attacks continued into the new year and the Japanese faced an

increasingly difficult situation."2

The Japanese never used radar at Munda. They relied on reports from

Japanese soldiers, some on Guadalcanal, who radioed reports of American

air activity, much as did the coastwatchers. Ground observation by the

Japanese had limited utility because of the vast area, the frequent cloudy

weather, and the deteriorating Japanese situation in the southern Solomons.

As a result, the American raids from Guadalcanal and New Guinea frequently surprised the defenders and inflicted heavy losses.4 3

The heavy fire of numerous Japanese antiaircraft guns failed to prevent

constant cratering of the runways. During the first 6 months of 1943, attacks

by American aircraft killed some 200 Japanese gunners, and the AA crews'

discipline suffered. In early March 1943, Admiral William F. Halsey, commander of all U.S. forces in the South Pacific, had his staff analyze the loss

rates for fighter escorted missions to Munda. The results clearly showed the

difference between Japanese defense against bomber attacks made with and

without fighter participation. During the period from December 1942 to

February 1943, the Americans lost 12 aircraft on 2,183 sorties where only

AA fire was seen. During the same period, there were 607 sorties against

combined AA and fighters, with 56 aircraft lost."

Generally, throughout the Solomon campaign, land based Japanese

antiaircraft guns were not particularly effective. Japanese gunners could not

make range corrections quickly enough to bring attacking aircraft under

fire. It was common for American crews to observe AA bursts behind and

below their formations. In contrast, Japanese naval AA gunners were more

accurate, given their central shipboatd fire control, excellent range finders,

and the much higher quality of their training. Most of the gunfire faced by

Americans attacking Munda's airfield was not from ships, however."5

In aerial combat during this time the results favored the Allies by a ratio

of 3.34 to 1. The heaviest Allied losses were sustained by American torpedo

bombers flying on missions against enemy shipping. Loss rates for missions

directed against the air base at Munda heavily favored the Americans. The

reasons for such aerial success were, as at Guadalcanal, better armed and

armored aircraft, increasing pilot experience, and the Allied ability to bring

firepower to bear on a target. At the same time, veteran Japanese pilots

could not be replaced quickly and the AA defense lacked the warning, the

gun density, and the accuracy needed to deter attacks.'

Despite the defense's lack of success, the Japanese were able to repair

most bomb damage in forty-eight hours. Runway repairs were accomplished

largely by sheer determination on the part of base construction crews, and it

was necessary for the Allies to bomb the field daily to keep it closed. Heavy

cratering prevented Munda's use as a fighter base, and there was little the

Japanese could do to stop the almost daily raids. When B-26s entered the

235
AIR BASE AIR DEFENSE

fray, the pressure on Munda continued, forcing the Japanese to remove their

air operations. After the end of December 1942, the field was used only to

service aircraft. Repeated heavy bombing, however, continued up to the

American seizure of New Georgia in July 1943. Any significant respite

would have allowed the Japanese forces to restore the field fully."7

Beginning on June 30, 1943, the Allied landings on New Georgia Island

developed into 37 days of fighting against intense Japanese resistance. The

air campaign included neutralizing the nearby Japanese air bases. Not only

Munda was attacked, but also airfields at Kahili, Ballale, Vila, Rakata Bay,

Buka, and Rabaul. Five hundred thirty-three Allied aircraft began the effort

against New Georgia's enemy positions. Japanese reaction included air raids

by as many as 120 aircraft directed mostly against supply and equipment

storage areas. Major targets of the Allies included AA sites, storage areas,

runways, and aircraft parking spots on which were dropped 1,900,000

pounds of explosives in 5 weeks. Other bases on neighboring islands were

attacked as heavily as necessary to keep them out of operation. The Japanese lost 348 aircraft, the Allies 121. Most of the American losses were the

result of aerial fighting and attacks on Japanese shipping.48

Although Japanese air power in the Solomons was largely destroyed by

mid-July, the bitter campaign for New Georgia went on until August 4, far

longer than anticipated. The American planners had underestimated Japanese determination to fight to the end, their skill at deploying forces in

fortified positions, and their tenacious leadership. A major factor in the

final American victory was the Allied counterair campaign. Denying the

Japanese the use of their bases eased the job considerably and allowed the

land and naval forces to extract the defenders from their fortifications.4 9

Fifth Air Force: Port Moresby to Hollandia

The American victory on Guadalcanal drove the Japanese north in the

Solomons, but to the west, the collapse of the ABDA command in February

1942, after the fall of Singapore and the destruction of major Allied forces

in Southeast Asia had left a dangerous threat to Australia from the East

Indies. Blocked temporarily at the battle of the Coral Sea, the Japanese did

not give up their designs on Port Moresby. (Map 19) The small town soon

became the key to the defense of Papua and the center of Allied air and land

forces in the area. The Japanese threatened Port Moresby not only by invasion from the sea, but also by an overland attack from northeast. New

Guinea via the Kokoda Trail over the precipitous Owen Stanley Mountains.,

In early 1942, Port Moresby's airfields were small and virtually undefended. (Map 20) Japanese air attacks were such a threat to Allied aircraft

on the ground that few were based there. Bombers used Port Moresby's

Seven Mile airdrome as a staging base on flights from Australia, landing in

236
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PORT MORESBY AIRFIELDS

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Map 20mp 1
SOLOMONS AND NEW GUINEA

the evening, after dark, and departing the following dawn." On June 22,

1942, General MacArthur directed construction of an airfield at Milne Bay,

at the eastern end of New Guinea. The base was occupied by a squadron of

Royal Australian Air Force P-40s late in July. In all, the Allies built three

landing strips at Milne Bay while rushing seven to completion at Port

Moresby. Because of an almost complete lack of road and rail transportation in New Guinea, these air bases, with their associated seaports, and

others to be built during the course of the campaign, became the key to

sustaining the ground force and the ultimate Allied success in defeating the

Japanese in New Guinea.2

A Japanese landing in the Buna-Gona area late on the night of July 21,

1942, blocked an Allied plan to occupy the region. By mid-August, Maj.

Gen. Tomitaro Horii's Army and Special Naval Landing Force units held the

trail junction and small airfield at Kokoda, northeast of the Owen Stanleys.

They then stood poised to cross the mountains and push the Australians out

of New Guinea. To do so, however, Horii's troops had to cross the roughest

terrain found in any theater of World War II. The jungle covered Owen

Stanley mountains were exceptionally steep. Rainfall averaged 200 to 300

inches per year and there were no roads. Where the muddy, slippery Kokoda

trail passed through a mountain gap it was wide enough for only one person

at a time. Much of the passage had to be cleared with machetes or bolo

knives, and supplies could be hauled by either side only with great difficulty.

The tired and undernourished men with inadequate inoculation easily contracted a variety of tropical diseases. 3

The Allies, not initially expecting an overland Japanese thrust, quickly

reinforced Papua's defenses. Two brigades of the 7th Australian Infantry

Division landed at Port Moresby, a third at Milne Bay.5 4 In bitter fighting

between August 25 and September 6 an Allied force cleared a Japanese

landing force from Milne Bay. Defense of the Kokoda trail was, however,

more difficult. Outnumbered by the Japanese, the Australian Army and

militia units fell back repeatedly until, reinforced by an additional brigade,

they stopped the enemy about twenty miles from Port Moresby in midSeptember. To prepare for a flank attack on Japanese positions north of the

mountains, General Kenney organized a successful airlift of the United

States 128th Infantry Regiment from Australia to Port Moresby. This was

the first American attempt at moving a unit of this size by air, and some at

SWPA headquarters doubted it could succeed. Delivering on what many

considered a rash promise, Kenney saw his standing with MacArthur rise

again. At the same time, his Southwest Pacific Air Forces launched an air

campaign against the Japanese logistics system, attacking supply bases,

trails, bridges, and the airfield at Buna.55

During the fighting in 1942, Kenney's main base was at Port Moresby's

several landing strips. Designed to handle fighter planes and transports, the

239
Strip at Durand Airdrome outside Port Moresby offers no protection to

parked Fifth Air Force planes. A P-47 (below) in earth reventment at Ward

Airdrome.

3'
SOLOMONS AND NEW GUINEA

U.S. Army troops of the 128th Infantry arrive at Port Moresby from Australia.

initial strips were rapidly enlarged. At first, there were almost no air warning

or antiaircraft artillery units available, and early warning of attacks came

either from ground observers or fighter patrols. As a result, the early air

defense of the Port Moresby-Milne Bay area rested largely on fighters and

wide dispersal of aircraft and supplies on the ground. The Port Moresby

base area became a sprawling affair, characterized by numerous taxiways

and revetted parking areas similar to those on Malta. American P-38s, P39s, and USAAF and Australian Air Force P-40s stood ground alert, to be

launched at the approach of a Japanese force.16 Fortunately for the Allies,

Japanese air strength in New Guinea was slight during the summer of 1942.

Kenney estimated on August 2 that there were only 35 enemy airplanes on

the island. Most of the air threat came from Rabaul, and that base would be

preoccupied with the Guadalcanal operation for some time. Even so, the

Japanese mustered frequent, if not always heavy, attacks on Kenney's air

bases.5 7

241
AIR BASE AIR DEFENSE

The inexperienced Americans found difficulty organizing air base defenses. In 1942 the United States Army lacked trained manpower enough to

fight both a European and an Asian war. The mobilization begun in 1940

had yet to meet military requirements, and warning, antiaircraft, and fighter

units arrived in the theater in small numbers. Some units arrived without all

of their equipment, others had outdated guns or aircraft that were to be

replaced when industrial production caught up to the Army's needs."

The first of the United States' air warning units to reach New Guinea, a

plotting platoon of the 694th Air Warning Company, came on August 8,

1942. The first American radar set arrived a month later to supplement an

Australian fighter sector radar recently installed near Port Moresby. The

Allies organized their fighter sectors after those developed by the RAF in

Britain, and they became the standard Allied air defense unit in the SWPA.

As more air warning companies arrived in the theater they joined the 565th

Signal Air Warning Battalion and operated within specific fighter sectors,

giving information to the sector commander and the antiaircraft gunners.

Establishing a warning service was, however, a time consuming process with

little progress visible for months. It was not until December 29, 1942, that

the Allies developed a comprehensive radar coverage plan for New Guinea.

Shortly thereafter, another Air Warning Battalion, the 583rd, began operating. The battalions provided detection of enemy aircraft by both ground

spotters and radar. Each had one or more plotting and control centers,

depending upon the size and needs of the fighter sectors. 9

In theory, all air defense functions (warning, AA, and fighters) were

under the operational control of Maj. Gen. Ennis C. Whitehead, Commander of the Advance Echelon, Fifth Air Force, and an exceptionally able

planner and leader. Whitehead exercised control through the V Fighter

Command and subordinate fighter sectors. It was to the sector commanders

that the warning battalions provided their information. There was, however,

another source of similar reports. Each of the USAAF fighter groups that

arrived in New Guinea had an assigned fighter control squadron charged

with the responsibility of dispatching fighters to intercept an approaching

enemy force. Each fighter control squadron had as its center a plotting and

control section analogous to the plotting platoons of the air warning companies and battalions. Although the control squadrons lacked radar, they

were designed to work independently of warning battalions. Information

about approaching enemy formations came from airborne patrols, ground

observers, and the aircraft warning units in the area.° When the warning

battalions and fighter control squadrons were in place, Whitehead found

they duplicated each others' functions to a great extent. Neither type of

organization intended to relinquish its duties to the other and each possessed

elements the other lacked. 6

1 The inexperience, poor planning, and divided

242
SOLOMONS AND NEW GUINEA

responsibilities that plagued cooperation between American ground and air

forces during the summer of 1940 still plagued operations in New Guinea.

The problems of managing a system in which rival units did similar jobs

grew throughout 1942 and 1943. Because the warning battalions possessed

radar stations and plotting and control ability, they gradually became the

primary sources of attack alerts. The fighter control squadrons were relegated to operating the various fighter control centers. Hampered by the

confusion, Allied effectiveness did not improve quickly. Serious problems in

coordination between fighter sectors existed as late as March 1943. Communications were poor, radar plotters were not familiar with procedures,

and IFF responses appearing on one sector's radar screens were not seen on

others'. Emphasis on training and procedural standards helped, and by late

April major Japanese air raids were repulsed by fighters scrambled with

adequate warning. At the same time, the difficult experiences of its units

overseas were not lost on the AAF's headquarters, which improved the

training of fighter control units still forming in the United States.62

The majority of the AA units sent to the Southwest Pacific by the

Americans were former National Guard cavalry hastily redesignated and

brought into federal service in 1940 and 1941. Many were originally issued

.50-caliber machine guns for initial training at Camp Davis, North Carolina. As heavier weapons became available, the units were converted to

automatic weapons battalions (37-mm or 40-mm), or gun battalions (90-

mm). The majority of those organizations sent to the SWPA went first to

Australia, but two automatic weapons battalions (the 101st and 211th) with

thirty-two guns each went directly to Port Moresby. Another, the 104th, the

Americans divided between Merauke, Dutch New Guinea, and Milne Bay.

One 90-mm gun battalion (the 745th), with sixteen guns, defended Port

Moresby. General Kenney had the 709th AAA Machine Gun Battery (Air

Transportable), airlifted to Milne Bay on August 24, 1942.63 A few days later,

the eight machine guns of this unit, used for ground defense, played a major

part in turning back the Japanese attempt to capture the Milne Bay air strip.

Few other such organizations arrived before mid-1943, however. The weapons in place had to suffice for the interim.'

The most obvious aspect of Allied air base defense was Kenney's policy

of aggressive attack of Japanese bases carried out by the V Bomber and V

Fighter Commands, both organized late in 1942. These two commands took

control of the American squadrons which had been operating in Australia

and New Guinea since March of that year on a more or less independent

basis under the control of Allied Air Forces Southwest Pacific Area. It was

the fighter and bomber squadrons, used in a consistent application of air

power, that gave Kenney secure bases.65

General Kenney was an ardent air power advocate and a man who

believed in aggressive low altitude attack. He was a gregarious extrovert who

243
AIR BASE AIR DEFENSE

Men of Battery D, 101st Coast Artillery, watch a C-47 take off at Ward

Airdrome near Port Moresby, February 1943.

always wanted what he referred to as "operators" in charge. By that term he

meant pilots who could "shoot up" any target, preferably with machine

guns, and who embodied to some extent the qualities of scrounger and

pirate. In short, Kenney wanted his subordinate leaders to be self sufficient

men who did not have to be pushed to do a job and did not always adhere to

regulations while doing so. From the day he assumed command of the

Southwest Pacific Air Forces, Kenney was convinced that the best way to

protect his air force was to destroy that of the enemy, either in the air or on

the ground at home bases. He thus began a series of modifications to his A20 and B-25 aircraft that gave them great forward firepower from as many

as eight or ten .50-caliber machine guns. He also acquired from the United

States several thousand small fragmentation bombs fitted with parachutes

(para-frag bombs) that could be dropped on airfields from low altitude, and

he abandoned use of the A-24 attack aircraft (the AAF's version of the

Navy's SBD dive bomber), which he said was worthless because of its low

firepower and high loss rate. Actually, dive bombing did not fit Kenney's

concept of jungle warfare, and he had little use for the plane in New

Guinea.61

244
SOLOMONS AND NEW GUINEA

Kenney combined his fondness of attack with a belief that he could

supply by air the Allied ground forces north of the Owen Stanleys. To do

this, he had to seize or build bases wherever those forces moved. The first

major bases the Allies set up north of the Owen Stanleys were taken by air.

They were actually nothing more than open fields at Wanigela and Dobodura (Map 21), which Kenney's men quickly converted to landing strips that

supported Australian and American infantry assaulting strong Japanese

positions in the Buna-Oro Bay area late in 1942. After the capture of Buna

on December 31, the Allies quickly established bases at Nadzab and the

upper Markham Valley. Each base put Kenney's forces closer to the main

Japanese air installations at Wewak and Hollandia. Kenney's advance bases

were rapidly constructed by RAAF engineers or U.S. Army aviation engineer battalions assigned to the SWPA Engineer, Maj. Gen. Hugh J. Casey.

For special operations, such as those in the Markham Valley, the Army

temporarily attached aviation engineer units to the Fifth Air Force, which

airlifted them to the new work site. In February 1943, Kenney tried to take

control of the aviation engineers, but Casey argued persuasively to MacArthur that central control would allow more effective use of their small

numbers and limited types and amounts of equipment. 67

Despite the fact that there were so few antiaircraft weapons available,

Kenney argued for his forward base concept at every opportunity. It is

doubtful that the lack of Allied AA guns ever impeded Kenney's efforts to

establish forward bases. His wartime diaries contain no second thoughts on

the matter; throughout the New Guinea campaign he remained assured of

the efficacy of attack aviation. Kenney's view of an air campaign was to hit

enemy targets, especially air bases, with a preponderance of machine gun

fire to suppress defenses followed by heavy bombing. He continued attacks

against the same target until it was destroyed, thus eliminating potential

threats to his airfields. 8 Because of his successes at reorganizing the SWPA

air forces, airlifting the American infantry to Port Moresby, the defenders to

Milne Bay, and bombing Rabaul on the morning the Marines landed on

Guadalcanal, Kenney found that General MacArthur readily accepted most

of his ideas. More important, MacArthur fully supported Kenney in his

drive to obtain more fighter and bomber units from Army Air Forces headquarters in Washington. 69

Kenney was not a man to get tied up with organizational wrangling, and

he left the problems of sorting out the confused warning and fighter control

situation almost entirely to General Whitehead. It was not until early 1943,

while the Allies were pushing into the Markham Valley, that Whitehead

began resolving the air defense problem. Some time passed before he saw

success, and all the while the Japanese strengthened their air forces in New

Guinea. A radio net linking the Allied bases at Buna, Goodenough Island,

and Normanby Island was not completed until February, although an Aus245
AIR BASE AIR DEFENSE

BUNA - DOBODURA AIRFIELDS

Liberty Ship Wharf 0. )B BUNA MISSION BUNA' Giropa Point 0

IU Bulk Petroleum Storage strip Point 4'O

S PA

Petroleum

Pipe Lirne" Cape Sds

* -" ' * / / ./ Staging Area

DOBODURA

OORANDA -

Hospital

EMBI 1 EmbiC)e

* ~~Lakes .)

Map 21

tralian radar unit operated at Oro Bay from the first of the year and was

joined by American air warning equipment in February. Except for a battery

of air transportable .50-caliber AA machine guns, Dobodura airdrome did

not receive AA protection until mid-April because the guns could not be

hauled the few miles from Oro Bay, the road being not yet complete. Kenney

and Whitehead had outrun the ability of the ground defenses to keep up. At

the end of May, the frustrated Whitehead described the antiaircraft protection at Dobodura as "a helluva mess." That was an understatement. He

could not find out what guns were available for the job, nor could he make

his ground force contemporaries understand that air defense of air bases and

adjoining areas handled by separate commands was impractical. Less than

ten miles separated Dobodura and Oro Bay, but a corps boundary ran

246
SOLOMONS AND NEW GUINEA

between the two. Each area's AA had a different line of command and their

fire could not be centrally controlled. 70

The problems Whitehead found in New Guinea resulted in part from

the generally inexperienced American military, but were largely caused by

the attempt of General Headquarters, Southwest Pacific Area, in Brisbane,

Australia, to do all of the detailed antiaircraft planning though far removed

from the scene. Whitehead firmly believed that "the fighter sector which

handles the fighter defense of the locality must also control the antiaircraft

[weapons]." Fortunately, Whitehead and the senior American AA officer in

the Southwest Pacific, Maj. Gen. William F. Marquat, were on good terms

personally, and could devise a solution. With General Kenney's assistance,

and the approval of General MacArthur, Marquat, late in October, asked

Washington's permission to organize the 14th Antiaircraft Command."

Marquat's request detailed the seriousness of the problem and approval

was promptly granted. The 14th AA Command was activated November 15,

1943, taking over the functions of several other intermediate organizations

that were simultaneously abolished. The 14th's operations centered on New

Guinea, but also included Australia. It would coordinate, administer, and

control all of the AA units in the area. More important, the AA command's

operations were subordinate to the air commander. By this stroke of cooperation, the underbrush of confusion was cleared away. From then on, tactical

air defense began to improve."2

Placing AA units into one command eliminated many problems and

allowed a much more effective response to air defense needs. It did not,

however, resolve the difficulty of confused and overlapping duties of the

AAF's fighter control squadrons and the Signal Corps' air warning battalions. The most serious problems continued into 1944 and resulted in clashes

between fighter controllers and air warning commanders with a steep decline

in morale in many locations. A conference called in April 1944 to resolve the

issue found that fighter control squadrons had little or no practical function

because they had not been given any guidelines as to what they were to do.

Consequently, the units tended to operate aimlessly. The conferees recommended a system to end the overlapping efforts, and Whitehead quickly

agreed .73

The 583rd Signal Aircraft Warning Battalion was assigned to the newly

arrived 85th Air Defense Wing headquarters. The 85th was shortly joined by

another air defense wing headquarters and the two began controlling all air

warning and fighter defense in northern New Guinea. The air warning units

operated radar stations and ground observer sites, sending information to

their plotters at filter centers supporting the Aitape, Hollandia, and Wakde

Island fighter sectors. At the centers the fighter control squadrons took the

information, plotted it on an area grid, and used it to guide their aircraft

elements. Daylight ground controlled intercepts became common, although

247
AIR BASE AIR DEFENSE

IV J

Lt. Gen. George C. Kenney and Brig. Gen. Paul Wurtsmith share a moment

with newly decorated pilots in New Guinea.

night GCI actions were rare as there were no fighters able to carry heavy

radar equipment to an altitude where Japanese airplanes could be attacked.

Finally, after two years, the problems of coordination and control were

being solved. Ironically, it came about just as the Allies forced the Japanese

out of New Guinea.7"

The Japanese Respond

The Japanese, in their attempt to seize New Guinea, created a string of

air bases on that island's northern coast and on adjacent islands. By mid1943, airfields at Wakde, Hollandia, Wewak, Madang, Alexishafen, Rabaul,

and Kavieng were the main threat to the Allies. (Map 22) The aggressive

Japanese often launched major strikes at Port Moresby or other bases from

these sites. On March 11, 1943, they swept over Buna destroying thirty-eight

248
SOLOMONS AND NEW GUINEA

C-47s land at strip at Nadzab, New Guinea, while engineers are still laying out

the facility. Mobility and surprise were the hallmarks of Kenney's operations.

Allied aircraft on the ground. On April 14, twenty-eight more met the same

fate at Port Moresby when Japanese aircraft crossed the Owen Stanleys and

raided the base, catching the Allied defenses without warning. The Japanese

bases, like the Allied, depended heavily on guns and revetments for defense.

For the Japanese, antiaircraft gunfire became increasingly important as

Allied air power grew. Because the Japanese lacked radar equal to that of the

Allies, their warning system was less effective than that of their opponents.

Also, the Japanese lacked heavy construction equipment and their aircraft

dispersal parking was nowhere as elaborate as at Allied bases. Attacks often

caught the Japanese with planes on the ground, and losses were sometimes

heavy, but they brought replacements rapidly from the Pacific islands, the

Philippines, or the East Indies.75

Early in the New Guinea fighting, Japanese land based AA fire was

inaccurate and ineffectual. Japanese AA troops did not have an active aerial

enemy before 1942 and they, like the Americans, had little experience in

counterair fire. As the Japanese did not, at first, establish major air bases in

New Guinea, having concentrated on Burma and the Bismarck Archipelago,

there was little air base air defense development. Finally, the Japanese gun

aiming mechanisms were obsolete and could not adjust quickly to a target's

changes of altitude, speed, or direction. Japanese AA gunners eventually

249
- S

)- Wf~' (>

E*~,

-. 0

Az ~~/" A, 

(2 ?0 z J >~

0 ItI u

0

z(
SOLOMONS AND NEW GUINEA

Vegetable gardens give away the locations of nearby Japanese gun emplacements at Wewak, New Guinea, February 1944.

became more proficient and their weapons much more numerous, but few

modern guns or fire control systems became available to them." Early in the

war, Japanese weapons remained close to the defended area, often concentrated within a mile of the runways. While this increased the volume of fire

over the area, it reduced the length of time the guns could shoot at a low

level target. Aircraft attacking at low altitude were in range only a short time

and the gunners rarely reacted fast enough to maintain effective fire. After

November 1943 this changed, and the Japanese dispersed their guns to

increase the time an enemy was under fire. During World War II the Japanese usually did not camouflage their antiaircraft guns. New Guinea was an

exception to this practice and there camouflage was excellent. Camouflage

and the new dispersal scheme made gun positions more difficult to find and

attack. Japanese gun crews, however, seemed intent on undoing all the

good. They often planted vegetable gardens near their gun sites, allowing

Allied photointerpreters to identify some locations that otherwise would

have have gone unnoticed.7

"

At the same time that the Japanese began dispersing weapons, they

made other changes in their AA positions. Attacking aircrews noticed the

use of more light and medium guns (20-mm, 25-mm, and 40-mm). This was

both a response and a distinct threat to Kenney's low level tactics. The

Japanese abandoned the practice of dual siting in which they used the same

guns for both AA and ground defense fire. Antiaircraft guns concentrated

251
AIR BASE AIR DEFENSE

on their primary mission and a new type of weapon site with higher, concentric revetments gave the gunners greater protection.7

"

The changes in Japanese antiaircraft weapon deployment and gun revetment construction seem to have stemmed from growing Allied success in

attacking air bases. The Allies crowned their achievements with an especially successful assault on Wewak during August 1943. American radio

intercept intelligence, by then excellent, found indications of a large Japanese increase in air strength."9 Reconnaissance confirmed the information

and General Whitehead launched his forces on successive days between

August 17 and 21. The Japanese lost more than 200 aircraft in 4 days, almost

all of them on the ground. On the 17th the attackers noticed no AA fire and

little fighter interference. Defenses were not much better on the following

days. The combination of surprise and a low altitude approach put the

aircraft over the target and then out of the area so quickly the gunners had

little chance to react.80

Japanese radar was not as plentiful, nor was it as well developed as that

of the Allies. Few Japanese airfields in New Guinea had radar for search and

warning and gun control radar was almost unknown on the island. Compensation for their lack of radar came from natural sources-the weather and

terrain. In order to avoid heavy and frequent thunderstorms, the Allies often

attacked Japanese bases between ten o'clock and noon. For Kenney and

Whitehead this was not desirable, but bad weather was always a severe

handicap to them, and during the campaign in northern New Guinea they

had little choice. Like the Americans on Guadalcanal, the Japanese could

prepare for the daily raid and, where their bases lay near mountains, they

could predict not only the time, but the probable direction of approach.`

As American attacks on their bases became heavier and more frequent,

Japanese airfield battalions and antiaircraft regiments increased in number.

Whereas they had only a single battery of the 47th Field AAA Battalion

defending their base at Buna late in 1942, by early 1944 Japan had heavy AA

concentrations at a number of bases around Wewak, actually a collection of

airfields within a thirty mile area encompassing Boram, Wewak, But, and

Dagua.12 Wewak and Boram were the most heavily defended by far, having

thirty-six 75-mm, twenty-five 37-mm, and forty-eight 20-mm guns along

with warning radar and fighters. American crews found their fire accurate

and intense. 3

By late 1943, the continuous Allied air attacks forced the Japanese to

repair runways and taxiways constantly. They could not be abandoned as the

heavy jungle and mountainous terrain allowed few alternate sites. Damage

repair, especially to the airfield's surfaces, was the responsibility of the

airfield battalions. Labor was drawn from any available source of enlisted

men on the base and natives in the surrounding area. Morale suffered heav252
SOLOMONS AND NEW GUINEA

TABLE 26

Allied Air Units Used Against Wewak

Bombardment*

90th Bomb Group (B-24) 4 Squadrons

43rd Bomb Group (B-24) 3 Squadrons

22nd Bomb Group (B-24) 2 Squadrons

38th Bomb Group (B-25) 4 Squadrons

345th Bomb Group (B-25) 4 Squadrons

3rd Light (Attack) Bomb Group (A-20) 4 Squadrons

312th Light Bomb Group (A-20) 4 Squadrons

Fighter Protection--Normally 15 aircraft per squadron

7th and 8th Sqdns. P-40

9th, 39th, 40th, 340th, and 342nd Sqdns. P-47

431st, 432nd, and 433rd Sqdns. P-38

* Numers of bombardment aircraft used each day varied. Usually the A-20 squadrons provided twelve while the medium and heavy bomb groups sent six to twelve

aircraft daily.

Sources: Air Evaluation Board, Southwest Pacific Area "Neutralization of Wewak',

Letter, A-2, Fifth Air Force Advance Echelon, 29 March 1944

ily, but it was imperative that existing airfield operations continue as Allied

pressure made new construction virtually impossible.8 4

The Allies made their most severe air base attacks on the four Wewak

fields between March 11 and 27, 1944. These attacks destroyed hundreds of

airplanes and forced Japanese airpower into the confines of Hollandia. The

result was to drive the Japanese from the air over northern New Guinea but

in carrying out these attacks, General Kenney's forces encountered the most

dangerous Japanese air defenses thus far in the Southwest Pacific Area.8 5

The Wewak and Boram airfields were separated by about three miles of

coconut plantation, within which the Japanese located great quantities of

supplies as well as living and work areas. Antiaircraft artillery was posi253
TABLE 27

General Kenney's Estimate of Japanese Air Strength

February 1944

Fourth Air Army-Wewak, Hollandia

Fighters 108

Light Bombers 27

Reconnaissance 45

Miscellaneous

(mostly cargo) 100

270

Reinforcements to Wewak and Hollandia from Sumatra:

(mid- to late-February arrival)

Eighth Air Brigade (Army)

Fighters 54

Light Bombers 54

Medium Bombers 27

135

Additional Air Forces in the East Indies:

Seventh Air Brigade (Army)

Fighters 54

Medium Bombers 27

Reconnaissance 18

99

Naval Air Forces:

Various Aircraft 100

Note: Japanese accounts report the 8th Air Brigade with the 33rd, 45th, 60th, 75th,

and 77th Air Regiments were sent to the Wewak-Hollandia area. Kenney's information came from intercepted radio transmissions and was exceptionally accurate.

Sources: Letter, Kenney to Whitehead, February 12, 1944

Japanese Monograph No. 39, Eighteenth Army Operations, Vol II.

Rinsuka Kaneko, Interview No. 440. USSBS, Pacific
SOLOMONS AND NEW GUINEA

tioned at each airfield, on the plantation, and on coastal capes and promontories, allowing crossfire by mutually supporting positions. Fighters could

be launched on radar warnings, and Japanese pilots could hide in the clouds

before diving on the Allied attackers.86

Fifth Air Force reconnaissance and intelligence organizations constructed a very accurate picture of the base area. Kenney and Whitehead

knew that as long as the fields were fully operational, the Japanese would

send reinforcements from other islands. Destruction of the bases was essential to protecting General MacArthur's advance to the Philippine Islands.

Neutralizing the Japanese bases near Wewak would also protect the Allied

airfields of Gusap, Finschhafen, and Nadzab, and curb any Japanese reaction to the planned Allied seizure of Kavieng, Manus Island, and Hansa Bay

in April.87

The first attack on Wewak began at half past ten, March 11. These

assaults were carefully planned to destroy progressively the defenses and

then the Japanese ability to operate in the area. American fighters made the

first thrust. At their approach, the Japanese launched some thirty fighters

from Wewak, beginning an hour and a half of combat with the P-47s. When

they landed to refuel, B-24 bombers appeared. The heavy bombers dropped

eighty 1,000-pound demolition bombs with instantaneous fuzes on the antiaircraft artillery positions. Similar suppressive strikes hit Boram and the two

other fields. Heavy clouds obscured some of the targets, and the effects were

not as great as expected. The third attack, by B-25s and A-20s at low level,

was made shortly after one o'clock and was intended to destroy ground

facilities and impede use of the airfields.88 Japanese gunners fired some of

the most intense AA yet observed by Fifth Air Force crews. The crossfire

from the well placed Japanese guns lacked effectiveness due in part to the

suppression bombing, and in part to the outdated Japanese aiming devices.

The Allies lost only one B-24 and one P-47. Thirteen other aircraft were

damaged, but all returned home.8 9

At 10:30 the next morning the Americans went back. The AA positions

near Boram and the surrounding area were the prime targets. Forty 2,000-

pound bombs, half of them fuzed for aerial burst, and thirty-two 1,000-

pound bombs with instantaneous and .025-second delay fuzes fell on the

gun positions. The purpose of the fusing was to stun the gun crews by

concussion, allowing free rein to the following low level attackers intending

to hit other targets.9 Japanese fighters again intercepted; all other Japanese

planes took off from Wewak and Boram. Two fighters departed as the Allies

approached the base. They remained low and headed out to sea, trying to

lure some unwary Americans to follow. About 30 more Japanese fighters

remained in the clouds waiting to pounce on any that pursued the decoys.

There was no pursuit and no attacking aircraft was shot down. Because of

the heavy fighting under way, the Japanese were forced to land at But and

255
AIR BASE AIR DEFENSE

Dagua to refuel. When they did, a well timed strike hit these bases with

intense strafing and hundreds of para-frag bombs released from tree top

height. Defensive ground fire was unable to deter the approaching formations.9

"

During the second day's raids many bombs burst close to the AA positions, yet ground fire remained heavy from guns which had not been hit.

Japanese defenders damaged eighteen aircraft and 2 A-20s were reported

missing. Postattack interrogations of crews indicated that many AA batteries began to show reduced effectiveness as a result of the bombing. Daily

attacks continued.9 2

On March 16, the Japanese fighters withdrew to Hollandia to protect

approaching convoys. Wewak's air defense was now without an important

component. The raids continued in the same general pattern except for a

pause on March 20 for maintenance and on March 24 when bad weather

precluded an attack. By March 21, the AA fire was so reduced in volume and

accuracy that attacks on these gun positions were made only twice more,

and then half-heartedly, on the 22nd and 26th. After March 27 it was evident

that the damage to the Wewak bases was irreparable. Aircraft no longer

operated from the four airdromes.93

Allied aircraft losses for the 16-day assault totaled 34. Only 6 were

directly attributed to enemy action, 8 failed to return for unknown reasons,

and the remainder fell victim to various operational problems. The Allies

estimated that they shot down 28 Japanese fighters; 170 more aircraft were

destroyed on the ground. Continued reconnaissance and bombing insured

that the bases could not be used again. General Kenney's air forces imposed

an air blockade of ocean areas between the Wewak fields and Hollandia,

isolating the Japanese 18th Army headquarters and its subordinate divisions

and halting further transit of vital Japanese airplane parts. Since overland

travel by more than small groups and stragglers was virtually impossible, a

large number of combat troops and aircraft maintenance specialists were

trapped. The Allies now faced the last major enemy air base in New

Guinea-Hollandia.94

The air assault upon Hollandia was almost anticlimactic. Beginning on

March 29, 1944, air attacks on the airfields near Sentani Lake used essentially the same tactics as at Wewak, except that heavy ordnance was not

dropped on the runways, as the Allies wanted to use the field without

extensive repairs. Hollandia's air defense was without radar, but the Japanese maintained communication with their forces elsewhere on the New

Guinea coast. Warning of the Allied strike came from Wewak, where either

the radar continued to operate or the Fifth Air Force formations passed so

close on their way to Hollandia as to inform the defenders of their intent.59

Antiaircraft fire was heavy but inaccurate. Some forty Japanese fighters sent

out were not aggressive, and several defenders were shot down. Many Japa256
SOLOMONS AND NEW GUINEA

nese aircraft, some grounded for lack of parts, were destroyed. AA positions

and aircraft on the ground took severe damage. The Japanese relieved their

air commander at Hollandia, Lt. Gen. Giichi Itabana, of his command. Lt.

Gen. Kunachi Teramoto, of the Fourth Air Army, moved the remnants of his

command to Manado in the Celebes. Japanese air forces were no longer a

threat in New Guinea, and between April 22 and 29 Hollandia was seized by

U. S. Army ground forces, ending any further Japanese use of the bases.9

Summary

Two years of unremittingly aggressive fighting by both sides ended in

Japanese expulsion from New Guinea. In 1942, when the campaign began,

neither side had extensive air bases on the huge island, and neither was

prepared to defend the bases it had. The Americans were not fully mobilized, their Australian and Dutch allies weak, and the Japanese occupied

elsewhere. The fighting in New Guinea lasted far longer than that at

Guadalcanal, but some of the reasons for Allied victory were the same.

Japanese aircraft could not withstand battle damage as well as Allied

models and Japan lacked an armor protected bomber. As American military

planners directed the flow of new airplanes to the South and Southwest

Pacific, it became evident that the performance of American aircraft exceeded that of the Japanese. Allied attacks on Japanese shipping put an

increasing strain on their supply system; many aircraft could not fly because

they could not be repaired. Long before the devastating two-week campaign

against Wewak, the Allies seized and held air superiority. General MacArthur, in fact, claimed control of the air from late 1942. General Kenney

agreed, and the Japanese conceded the point privately in a document captured by the Allies early in 1944.91

General Kenney's attack on Wewak in August 1943, was a superb counterair campaign designed to protect his bases in the Markham Valley from

destruction by Japanese air forces. He well understood that the Japanese

could overwhelm his forces with a concentrated and focused aerial campaign. Kenney's solution was typical of the man. He destroyed his enemy

before his enemy attacked him.98 Kenney's relentless pursuit of Japanese

bases and shipping kept his opponent short of the supplies and reinforcements he would need for a counterair campaign. The Japanese forces lacked

the broad range of equipment required for a large scale base contruction

program while the Allied air engineers could rapidly carve out an airfield

even when transport squadrons had to fly in the equipment and men to do

the job, as at Kokoda, Wanigela, Dobodura, and the Markham Valley. The

American air-warning system, so faulty and problematic at the start, was far

better than any the Japanese deployed by late 1943. Nevertheless, in the

257
S1W

Low Level Operations in New Guinea. (Clockwise from above) Japanese

emplacements suffer the attention of Fifth Air Force B-25s, (2) American A20 in low level pass over Japanese Betty parked in grass field at Lae, Spring

1943; partially disassembled fighters are beneath trees, (3) B-25s sew para-frag

bombs among Japanese aircraft at Wewak on the northeast coast of New

Guinea in early February 1944. (4) Fuel truck blazes as Fifth Air Force raids a

seaside strip where unfinished camouflage frames reveal aircraft positions. (5)

A-20 works over Japanese planes parked in the open at Hollandia.
44ý

Ik4 41
AIR BASE AIR DEFENSE

process of organizing air defenses in an army unprepared to deploy huge

forces overseas, the Allies suffered heavy losses. American inexperience

could not be overcome by industrial production; the commanders had to

apply themselves to solving problems, training their men, and determining

the best ways to use the firepower at their disposal.

Allied antiaircraft gun battalions, mostly American, began appearing

in large numbers in New Guinea in 1943. Plagued by seemingly endless

organizational problems and an unfamiliarity with aerial warfare, they eventually outclassed the Japanese AA units in number of guns and quality of

equipment. Even so, the amount and effectiveness of antiaircraft guns did

not tilt the balance in favor of one or the other side's air forces.

Japanese use of air power in New Guinea and the Solomons was faulty.

Although in numbers they often held the preponderance of force, especially

in 1942 and 1943, they failed to develop a coherent scheme of operations to

overwhelm their enemy. Japanese air commanders repeatedly brought large

numbers of reinforcements to face the Allies and then expended them in

small attacks on a variety of targets. Their failure to attempt destruction of

Kenney's air forces puzzled him. For many months, Kenney was uncertain he

could stop a concerted counterair campaign. Knowing that his air force was

vulnerable and that if it were destroyed the Allies could not hold New

Guinea, Kenney chose an aggressive course of action that was facilitated by

an enemy who diluted his forces or could not sustain them.99

After 1942 the quality of Japan's pilots deteriorated. As many as 10,000

pilots may have been lost in the Southwest Pacific Area during 1942 and

1943. Both Japanese Army and Navy training schools expanded in 1942, but

pilots entering combat had progressively less flying experience. Advanced

training of Japanese pilots was severely reduced as attempts were made to

speed the flow to front line organizations."° Similar problems beset the U.S.

Army Air Forces early in the war. In 1942, for example, the need for fighter

pilots was so urgent that they were sent overseas with only 40 hours of

training in their combat aircraft. During 1943, combat training was increased, but still rarely exceeded 80 hours. Japanese Army and Navy pilot

production in 1941 was 2,700; in 1942 and 1943 this rose to 5,000 and 5,400

respectively with the Navy's effort peaking at a total of about 1,200 in April

1943. In contrast, the American goal for 1941 was 30,000; for 1942 it was

50,000. The AAF turned out 70,000 in 1943. To these figures must be added

training by the Allies. Even allowing for the needs of fighting in Europe and

Asia simultaneously, this dwarfed the Japanese effort.'0'

As is usual in war, a combination of factors led to Japan's inability to

defend her air bases adequately or to destroy those of the Allies in the

Southwest Pacific. Not only were the Allies able to outproduce the Japanese

in virtually all types of war material, but Allied aircraft and weapons were

superior. Japanese planes normally were not armored, and although they

260
SOLOMONS AND NEW GUINEA

were often faster and more maneuverable than those of their opponents,

they lacked resiliency under fire. Thus the Allies scored a higher ratio of

victories in air to air combat, suffered lower replacement costs, and kept a

higher level of experienced pilots on duty.

The few Japanese radars in the Solomons and New Guinea were technically inferior to American and British sets. Japan's inability to detect approaching formations retarded base defense. At Munda, where Japanese

commanders relied on ground observers, they suffered repeated heavy damage to aircraft and air base facilities. Similar problems existed at Wewak in

1943 and 1944 where exceptionally high losses resulted.

Japanese antiaircraft weapons in the SWPA used obsolete sighting and

aiming mechanisms. The inability to track enemy aircraft was one of the

reasons for inaccurate fire by Wewak's defenders, and the problem was seen

elsewhere in the Southwest Pacific. The Japanese could put up heavy but

wasteful and inaccurate fire.

Both sides excelled at repairing airfield damage. At Guadalcanal, bomb

damage repairs kept the base operating after repeated attacks. Japanese

airfield battalions performed well at Munda and in New Guinea, but the

immense, continuing firepower brought to bear by the Allies in the end

overwhelmed Japan's airmen and air base crews. At the same time, the

Allies demonstrated superiority in air base construction by airlifting aviation engineers to isolated sites, where they built new fields within striking

distance of Japanese bases. From the newly built fields, Allied airpower

struck progressively heavier blows at Japanese Army and Navy air installations, bringing defeat when the flying units could no longer be sustained.

261
Part 3

The Cold War Era
Chapter VIII

Two Limited Wars: Korea and Southeast Asia

Slightly more than a decade separated aerial fighting in Korea and

Vietnam, but the two conflicts had much in common. The United Nations

in Korea from 1950 to 1953 and the Allies in Southeast Asia during the years

1964 to 1973 almost always held air superiority. In both instances, the communist opponents fielded air forces designed for defense. Air base attackers

encountered heavy antiaircraft fire that threatened their attempts to destroy

enemy air operations. At the same time, the communist air forces in Korea

and Vietnam made extensive use of geographic and political sanctuaries as a

means of air base air defense, (Map 23) venturing out to fight at the times

and places they chose. Both conflicts offer examples of limited wars involving air forces of unequal size. Nevertheless, the air base air defense experiences, especially in Southeast Asia, found application not only in the 1973

October War in the Middle East, but also in examining the general conduct

of counterair warfare.

In both conflicts, communist airfields were the target of repeated attacks. In Korea, however, United Nations' bases were rarely struck, and in

Southeast Asia air attacks on Allied bases in South Vietnam and Thailand

were unknown. Both North Korean and North Vietnamese defenders relied

heavily on ground based antiaircraft weapons. Neither communist force had

enough fighter interceptors, and neither could contest the air for extensive

periods of time with their enemies. On the other hand, keeping communist

bases closed required repeated strikes followed by frequent aerial reconnaissance. Often, the effort needed to attack an airfield was better used on other

targets, and bases themselves became secondary considerations in planning

the air war.'

265

L
AIR BASE AIR DEFENSE

EAST ASIA

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South

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Map 23

Dominating the Air in Korea

As a former Japanese possession, Korea was occupied after World War

II by the Americans in the south and the Russians in the north. Hostile

governments were established in each tier of the country, each claiming to

represent the whole. By June 1950, the North Korean People's Army

(NKPA) consisted of about 89,000 well equipped combat soldiers and a

border constabulary of 18,000 men. The North Korean Air Force (NKAF)

266
TWO LIMITED WARS

possessed some 145 World War II Russian Yak fighters, twin engine

bombers, and a variety of trainers. In contrast, the Republic of Korea's

Army (ROKA) numbered 65,000 lightly armed troops intended for internal

and border security use. The ROK Air Force (ROKAF) had just 16 noncombat airplanes. Such a military organization, although useful for maintaining

internal order, lacked the strength, training, and equipment for defense

against a modern army, let alone the protection of air bases. In June 1950, a

small American advisory group working with the ROK forces was the only

other military presence in South Korea.2

During the predawn hours of June 25, 1950, North Korean military

forces invaded the south. Within two days, the United States entered the

fighting under the auspices of the United Nations (UN). Americans flew air

support for the ROK forces from bases in Japan, then shifted to main fields

at Taegu, Pusan, and Pohang in Korea, and smaller satellite fields such as

Taejon. On June 27, Maj. Gen. Earle E. Partridge, Fifth Air Force Commander, and at the moment acting as Far East Air Forces Commander for

Lt. Gen. George E. Stratemeyer, who was returning from Washington, secured permission from Maj. Gen. Doyle 0. Hickey, Deputy Chief of Staff,

U.S. Far East Command, to transfer to Korea U.S. Army AA units attached

to Fifth Air Force wings in Japan. At the direction of the Joint Chiefs of

Staff, General MacArthur, Commander-in-Chief, Far East Command, had

prohibited use of American ground forces in Korea on the day of the attack,

but Hickey readily assented, and AA automatic weapons teams quickly

deployed to Suwon AB, south of Seoul.* There they engaged attacking

NKAF Yaks on the 29th.3

As the US Air Force enlarged its position in Korea, antiaircraft detachments accompanied the combat and support units from other Fifth Air

Force bases. In Japan the AA attached to an air base fell under the operational control of the base commander; this practice continued in Korea.4

There was no American radar in Korea before the conflict. On July 20,

to provide an aircraft warning and tactical air-control system, Fifth Air

Force activated the 6132nd Tactical Air Control Group. The unit was immediately sent to Taegu, arriving on July 23, where it joined Detachment 1,

620th Aircraft Warning and Control Squadron, which had already come

from Johnson AB, Japan. The 620th possessed one AN/TPS-1B radar, the

only such set in Korea. A Tactical Air Control Center (TACC) was set up,

but it lacked other radar equipment and a full set of radios. In addition,

although the TACC was given an air warning mission, its primary job was

* Hickey's decision was contrary to the JCS's instructions. President Harry S RTuman did

not authorize use of ground troops in Korea until June 30, 1950. Hickey no doubt authorized

the move to cover USAF cargo planes using Suwon and to protect MacArthur, who landed there

on the 29th to view the fighting near Seoul first hand.

267
AIR BASE AIR DEFENSE

F-80s roll past 40-mm gun emplacement. Guns and crews were hastily transferred from Japan to Korea in June 1950 to protect American bases.

close air support of ground forces, not air defense. A further impediment

was confusion as to the intended location of the TACC. On July 28 most of

the center moved to K-3 airfield at Pohang. A small TACC and the Tactical

Air Control Party section remained at Taegu with Partridge. On July 30, the

tactical air-control element at Pohang, threatened by the NKPA pushing

south along Korea's east coast, moved to Pusan, where it had a month's

respite to get organized.5 Newly arriving personnel were still found to be

untrained and additional electronics gear arrived without technical instructions. Not only were skilled USAF radar operators and repairmen rare in

1950, but so few were being trained that Fifth Air Force's demands quickly

absorbed all available men. Instruction of new arrivals by the 6132nd began

at Pusan in late August. For some time this was the only source of qualified

technicians.'

As electronic techniques and equipment improved, so too did the success of the aviators. U. S. Air Force fighters and fighter bombers quickly

reduced the NKAF and turned to support the UN's ground forces, which the

North Koreans had pushed into a defensive perimeter around Pusan by late

summer of 1950. The NKAF had not expected serious opposition, appar268
TWO LIMITED WARS

ently assuming that no foreign defense of the South would develop. As a

result, Russian and Chinese advisors had not equipped North Korea with

large quantities of antiaircraft equipment. Most of the AA fire encountered

by UN fliers came from light and medium automatic weapons. In October

1950, after General MacArthur's forces landed at Inchon, the Americans

captured Soviet made 37-mm and 85-mm guns from NKPA units in the

Seoul and Wonju areas. At the same time, Far East Command intelligence

analysts noted an increase in air defenses of the northern capital of Pyongyang. American airmen judged them quite accurate.'

From the start of the war, camouflage and concealment was the hallmark of North Korean air defense. In general, the North Koreans were very

effective at hiding their war materiel from attacking pilots. Fifth Air Force's

Office of Tactical Air Research and Survey noted that "the continued scarcity of targets, which minimizes the effectiveness of our air potential, is a

tribute to the enemy's performance in camouflage." The NKAF, however,

did not disguise its resources to the extent of the NKPA, preferring instead to

rely upon dispersion and deception. Wrecked or destroyed aircraft were

camouflaged, giving the appearance of an attempt to conceal operational

airplanes. Dummy planes appeared in and around airfield parking areas.

These decoys proved successful, repeatedly drawing attacks by Allied pilots.'

At Wonson airfield, the North Koreans sheltered aircraft in underground

structures, hiding them while at the same time protecting them from blast or

splinter damage. On October 29th, after the UN occupied the base, General

Partridge inspected the runways and facilities. He observed two underground hangars of heavily reinforced concrete construction with steel blast

doors, covered with sod and planted with grass and shrubs. Inside one

hangar were eight Ilyushin 11-10 twin engine bombers; seven more were in

the other. None appeared damaged from air attack; instead, they had been

burned by the retreating North Koreans.'

The Manchurian sanctuary for the communist air forces bedeviled the

UN Command from the war's beginning. As early as July 1950, General

Stratemeyer concluded that the North Korean Air Force operated, at least in

part, from Manchuria. He also thought the NKAF was being reequipped

from there, as reconnaissance revealed new reserves of twenty-six airplanes

at Pyongyang and sixty-eight at Yonpo AB, both in North Korea. When he

sent bombers to destroy them, they had disappeared and were not to be

found at any of the NKAF's four serviceable bases. On August 25, aircraft

reconnoitering communist airfields along the Yalu River, separating Korea

and Manchuria, drew heavy caliber AA fire, some of which was believed to

have come from the Chinese side of the border, although this could not be

established conclusively. Stratemeyer continued efforts to destroy enemy air

power, concentrating on bombing the few usable fields.'"

269
AIR BASE AIR DEFENSE

South Korean military policemen inspect stripped Yak-9 discovered at Wonsan

by advancing U.N. forces, October 1950.

The heady success of the American invasion at Inchon in September

1950 tended to offset the possibility of new troubles ahead. Late in November, the UN Command began an offensive from positions in mountainous

North Korea near the Manchurian border in hopes of achieving complete

victory by Christmas. Especially severe weather put an icy surface on the

roads and hindered the amassing of an adequate level of supply for the

advancing army. The Chinese struck with an estimated half million men

infiltrated into Korea since October. General MacArthur faced what he now

called a whole new war. Quickly it became apparent that a retreat to Seoul

would be necessary to avert destruction of the United Nations' army.

The Chinese had organized air support on their side of the Yalu River.

Antung, just across the border and north of the Korean town of Sinuiju,

became a major Chinese air base with new concrete runways, radar, and AA

defenses. UN intelligence services came to the conclusion that MiG-15s

based there were apparently being supplied in large numbers by Russia.

Worse, the Chinese Air Force's MiGs soon demonstrated themselves better

fighters than any of the types used in the UN Command. Although the

communist fliers were inexperienced in combat and gave little close air

support to their ground forces, they challenged the UN's fighters and

bombers. In the hands of skilled and experienced pilots, a large force of

MiGs could have swept the skies clear of opposition. Until better fighters

270
TWO LIMITED WARS

arrived, General Partridge's fliers had to develop defensive tactics to protect

their older, slower aircraft; the superior performance of the MiGs and their

limited use close to sanctuary bases prevented an immediate UN counterair

offensive. Also, Allied bombers, such as the B-26 and B-29, needed protection during daylight operations near the Yalu River, further draining Fifth

Air Force's offensive ability. During this time, Partridge concentrated on

protecting the retreating army. Air superiority, so easily won from the

NKAF, now appeared threatened."

Fortunately for the UN Command, its air bases faced almost no threat

from Red air attacks, and it continued to contest the skies over North Korea.

By the end of January 1951, UN forces were holding a line south of Wonju

and Suwon. Allied air forces moved south to bases at Taegu and Pusan or in

Japan; from there they carried out intensive air-to-ground attacks which

finally helped stop the communist advance.' 2 UN reconnaissance and attack

aircraft flew daily to the Yalu, observing activity, bombing bridges, and

interdicting targets even when MiG defenders outnumbered them ten or

twelve to one. Through the early part of 1951, the Chinese and Korean pilots

lacked confidence enough to raid UN bases. Their aircraft could not strike

the South from Yalu bases, and they never developed airfields closer to the

front lines. Only two small raids on Kimpo AB in October were exceptions

to the rule and indicated a communist intent to strike if they could muster

the force. Neither raid caused much damage. ' 2

Some believed the Chinese may also have made a calculated decision to

avoid attacking air bases to avert possible retaliation on their installations in

Manchuria. General Omar N. Bradley, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of

Staff, referred to what he believed was the UN's "privileged sanctuary',

citing the fact that communist forces "are not bombing our ports and supply

installations, and they are not bombing our troops." With the equipment

available and the state of training of the Chinese and North Korean Air

Forces, such a sanctuary existed only in the fact that the enemy was incapable of launching telling attacks to the south."

American leaders, lacking a full understanding of the relations between

the communist powers and facing a largely unknown military organization,

had to assume a Red counterair capability and a continuing need to suppress

it. They focussed on the far northwest corner of Korea containing the bases

at Sinuiju, Sinanju, Uiju, and Chang-ju, the temporary preserve of communist fliers that took the nickname "MiG Alley." Here, air defense was formidable because of large numbers of fighters and their proximity to bases in

Manchuria. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, however, cautioned that attacks on

air bases had to be confined to Korea."'

Apprehensive of widening the war by provoking the Russians or Chinese, the UN forces avoided air strikes on Manchuria, though they did

271
AIR BASE AIR DEFENSE

occur.* The Russians were known to occupy large parts of Anju airfield in

Manchuria. There were numerous reports of Russian ground units in North

Korea, and Soviet air elements were reported at other bases in Manchuria.

The North Korean port of Rashin (now Chongjin) also was off limits to

bombers because Russian ships often used it as an alternate when Vladivostok was icebound.' 5

A USAF Air Staff assessment of May 1951 discounted the possibility of

a wider war as a result of limited raids on Manchurian airfields, but predicted a propaganda effect, especially among America's western allies. The

report judged that the most likely Soviet reaction would be to augment

Chinese and North Korean air strength to gain air superiority progressively

farther south. Lacking any authorization from Washington for proscriptive

strikes north of the Yalu, Stratemeyer and Partridge believed they had to

attack the increasingly better defended North Korean air bases to prevent the

enemy from infiltrating aircraft southward, extending his fighting range.' 6

During April 195 1, mounting evidence pointed to just such an extension

of communist air forces southward. Early in the month reconnaissance

reported repair activities on at least thirteen airfields. New antiaircraft defenses appeared on reconnaissance reports with greater frequency. Some

areas became heavily protected. Pyongyang City, for example, had 80 heavy

guns and 151 automatic weapons-most were located on or around Pyongyang East airfield. Chinese Air Force MiG activity also increased dramatically early in 1951. As many as seventy-five of the fast communist jets

operated from Antung. Other bases in MiG Alley were repaired with revetments and AA gun emplacements. The communist fighter pilots struck hard

at UN bomber formations, especially the American B-29s. 7

In mid-December 1950, Fifth Air Force received the first of its new F86 Sabrejets, which had the speed and performance needed to defeat the

MiG-15 in aerial combat. The initial gain was short lived as Red Chinese

advances south of Seoul during January 1951 forced the Sabres out of

Kimpo AB and back to Japan. Supported by a heavy air interdiction campaign, General Matthew B. Ridgway, newly appointed Commander of the

U. S. Eighth Army, began an effort to recapture lost territory-and airfields. Early in 1951 the UN retook Suwon, returning the F-86s to a field

from which they could again operate over MiG Alley and protect bomber

formations bent on keeping airfields out of action. In a series of air battles

between April 17 and 23, F-86s of the 4th Fighter-Interceptor Wing fended

* Soviet intentions and their reactions to these attacks remained an enigma. On October 8,

1950, two American pilots mistook a Russian airfield at Vladivostok for a North Korean base

and strafed it, causing an unknown amount of damage. Russia's public reaction was subdued;

Partridge relieved the responsible group commander. Other border violations by UN aircraft,

especially while in combat, apparently caused little problem.

272
TWO LIMITED WARS

off MiG-15s while Japan based B-29s made repeated airfield attacks. The

UN pilots inflicted heavy losses on the Chinese and North Koreans and

forced them to regroup. On May 9, 312 US Air Force and Marine jets

attacked aircraft and defending AA at Sinuiju airfield. There was little

resistance by MiG-15s, and with fighter-bombers on AA supression attacks,

the base was quickly destroyed.'8

Stung by their inability to defeat the American "invaders,' the Chinese

Air Force apparently sought to revise its operating doctrine. The Russian

aircraft the Chinese had were interceptors, lacking in range and principally

useful for air defense. They wanted air power that could attack and carry the

fight to enemy bases, supply lines, and reinforcement marshalling areas.

Recognizing their failings, the Chinese wanted to obtain aircraft similar in

performance and capability to those used by the United States. All of this,

though, would take time and Russian agreement to provide long range

aircraft. The relentless UN attacks gave the Chinese little flexibility. Even

using Russian and Eastern European pilots for training and combat did not

alleviate the problem. These "international volunteers" were not used in an

air superiority campaign against air bases in the south, but their influence

was seen in the slow but steady increase in communist proficiency and in

their participation in air to air fighting over the northern part of Korea. 9

Unable to compete with the United Nations air forces in the air outside

of MiG Alley, the communists continued to increase the number and types

of AA weapons in North Korea. In September 1950, North Korean forces

had an estimated 70 guns and automatic weapons. By June 1951, there were

at least 300 heavy AA guns, 500 lighter automatic weapons, and large

numbers of machine guns, almost all of Russian or Chinese origin. Airfields

of sufficient size (Map 24) to support jet fighter operations were stoutly

defended. On the 34 largest fields (those with a runway length exceeding

3,000 feet) there were 598 revetted aircraft parking spaces. There were,

however, no communist jets stationed in Korea and few conventional aircraft

made use of the sites; UN bombing continued with the object of keeping

them unserviceable. If nothing else, the bases were magnets, drawing

bombers away from other targets.2 0

At the end of October 1951, aerial reconnaissance disclosed twenty-six

MiG-15s on Uiju in MiG Alley. Some were parked on alert at the end of the

runway. This was the first confirmed instance of communist jets operating

from bases south of the Yalu River. During the last week of October eleven

Soviet built Tu-2 twin-engine medium bombers attacked a UN radar station

and airstrip on Cho-do, an island off North Korea's Yellow Sea coast.

Although the raid caused casualties, radar operations continued. These two

incidents were seen as further indications of the enemy's intent to exert his

influence in the air and possibly begin using bases farther to the south. Uiju

AB was promptly attacked and by the end of November the MiGs had

273
AIR BASE AIR DEFENSE

Fifth Air Force reconnaissance photo designates area of extensive repairs to

Sunan airfield in North Korea.

departed. The bombers, on the other hand, probably came from Mukden,

China, and the sanctuary regulations quashed any inclination on the part of

the UN generals to destroy their bases.2 '

During 1952, the Chinese and North Koreans attempted unsuccessfully

to use 3 airfields at Pyongyang, where as many as 2,000 people filled and

repaired bomb craters. The inexperienced communist airmen launched a few

night raids on Kimpo and Suwon using old Po-2 biplanes flying from Sariwon and other sites, but were unable to mount an effective attack. Anticipating air attacks, the United Nations troops placed AA guns at each of

their installations. A radar warning net gave some surveillance, but the

mountainous country prevented effective electronic observation, and the

AA guns were ineffective in the dark. To end the nighttime incursions, night

fighters went on alert and scrambled when a plane was heard. One North

Korean Po-2 met an abrupt end when a U.S. Navy jet flew into the slower

aircraft. A result of the raids was a tendency of the UN's AA gunners to fire

at anything flying at night slower than 100 knots. Throughout the course of

the war, the North Korean, Chinese, and Russian air commanders used the

northern sanctuary to their great advantage, training aircrews and venturing

into or withdrawing from combat when the situation suited them. Meanwhile, the United Nations' forces continued to attack each airfield in North

Korea that showed signs of use."

274
TWO LIMITED WARS

Hits by 307th Bomb Wing put Sunan out of action again.

The numbers of MiG-i5 fighters continued to grow during 1952, reaching a peak of about 7,000 aircraft by midyear. Over 1,100 were at Manchurian bases, the rest in China proper and Siberia, close enough to provide

ready reinforcement. Air defense technology kept pace with the growing

number of planes. Excellent, modern radar came into greater use, although

definite problems existed in employment. Communist defenders lacked

enough sets to provide full coverage; at several air bases in North Korea they

doubled the number of guns controlled by one unit and aiming efficiency

dropped off. In the absence of radar equipped night fighters, searchlight

teams used radar plots to try and pinpoint and illuminate bombers so that

day fighters could attack out of the darkness. Flak continued to be intense.23

By early 1953, Fifth Air Force intelligence counted an alarming total of

823 heavy guns, 31 gun control radar sets, and 902 medium caliber automatic weapons in North Korea. Most were in the western or northwestern

part of the country, protecting supply routes, storage areas, and airfields.

Communist AA regiments moved the weapons frequently. Consequently, it

was difficult to keep close watch over all known firing positions. The number of weapons, while fluctuating, remained high as each successive count

was made. Almost daily airfield and AA suppression attacks continued. At

the same time, the communists again started a major airfield rehabilitation

project that coincided with renewed promise in the Panmunjom truce talks.

A stipulation in the still unsigned armistice document prohibited introduction of forces in excess of those already in Korea when the truce became

275
MAJOR KOREAN AIRFIELDS

CHINA

r ntung . -

K-30 MIG Alley ungnam

-PYONGYANG K-25

'='- Kimpos• eSEOUL Kaen,.,u... Inch onK, K-14 K-'"

op,) OSuwon

K--13

Map 24
TWO LIMITED WARS

a1

Fifth Air Force Intelligence outlined the limits of a dummy field constructed in

North Korea in December 1951.

effective. Neutral observers were to police the peace terms, but Allied commanders feared the enemy would bring in as many airplanes as possible at

the last moment, especially during the final twelve hours of combat between

the signing of the terms and the cease fire. To forestall this, they began an

intense interdiction campaign with very heavy airfield attacks?'

Between March and July 1953, no more than two North Korean airfields were rated as fully operational by Far East Air Forces intelligence. A

small number of bases were partly serviceable from time to time. Constant

pressure was necessary as a MiG-15 could land on a 2,400-foot strip of turf,

easily returned to service after a raid. The North Koreans also resorted to

increasingly clever camouflage and deception. At Namsi airfield, the North

Koreans painted false craters on the runway that may even have fooled one

MiG-15 pilot, who overshot the adjacent sod area, crashed, and burned."

The North Koreans accelerated repairs of the bases. Pyongyang Main

airfield, out of use since December 1950, was ready by the end of June. Bad

weather during the final weeks of the conflict restricted visibility over these

targets, and poststrike photoreconnaissance was even more difficult. Nevertheless, the UN air force pressed home the campaign. On July 27, the last

day of hostilities, only Uiju was operational. 6

During three years of fighting in Korea, air base air defense was not a

major part of the air war on the UN side. No United Nations base ever

suffered significant damage. The combined communist air forces were unable to exert air power adequate to challenge successfully the largely Ameri277
AIR BASE AIR DEFENSE

can UN force. The United Nations pilots, on the other hand, kept most

bases in North Korea closed, forcing their enemies to use the safe Manchurian airfields. While the UN's AA guns remained silent during much of the

three years, communist gun crews shot down 550 aircraft, but most of these

losses occurred over targets other than air bases. Radar directed guns accounted for substantial American losses, especially among B-29s. The

heavy guns could not cope with the low level attacks favored by UN fighter

bomber pilots. Of the various types of AA weapons used in defending North

Korea, the most effective by far were the automatic weapons, especially

when used against targets flying below 3,000 feet. Even so, ground guns

could not influence the outcome of the fighting. To continue operation of

their airfields, the communists resorted to massive efforts at repair, mobilizing large groups of laborers to fill bomb craters and level runway and taxiway surfaces. The most significant defense the communists had was the

freedom to base aircraft in Manchuria. Although UN pilots at times violated

the border in hot pursuit of an aerial enemy, they did not as a rule attack

bases on the other side of it. The desire to avoid a wider war on the Asian

continent led to specific restrictions that allowed air bases to operate largely

unmolested north of the Yalu River."

Success and Frustration in Vietnam: 1964-1973

At the conclusion of World War II, France returned to Indo-China to

restore its prewar control. The communist Viet Minh, however, refused to

accept French colonial rule. Failing to achieve a political settlement, the Viet

Minh began a military revolution lasting several years. Following the French

defeat at Dien Bien Phu and the subsequent departure of French military

forces in 1954, the United States began supporting the interim government

of South Vietnam, pending a national plebiscite called for in the 1954

Geneva agreement. Fearing the large population of North Vietnam would

vote for national reunification under Ho Chi Minh, their leader and a long

established nationalist and communist, the United States supported the new

Republic of Vietnam (RVN), established in the south on October 26, 1955,

and headed by President Ngo Dinh Diem. To counter the strong military

forces of the north, South Vietnam began to expand the small armed force

initially organized by the French. Air bases were built or expanded at Saigon, Da Nang, and other locations formerly used by France or Japan. A

U.S. Military Assistance Advisory Group provided training and materiel

support to the RVN.1

The North Vietnamese, using their Viet Cong subordinates in the'

south, began a campaign of guerrilla warfare designed to destroy the Diem

government. Many Viet Cong were southerners who went north and then

returned. At the same time, the growing aggressiveness of North Vietnam

278
TWO LIMITED WARS

caused the government of Thailand increasing concern. In mid-1961, the U. S.

Air Force established a detachment of F-102 air defense fighters at Bangkok's Don Muang Airport, where it remained almost continuously until

1970. The American presence in Southeast Asia grew as both sides escalated

the struggle for control of the Republic of Vietnam. By midyear 1964, two

American A-IE squadrons operated from Bien Hoa airfield near Saigon,

training South Vietnamese crews. In Thailand, USAF and Royal Australian

Air Force (RAAF) units were found at Don Muang Airport and Korat,

Takhli, and Udorn Royal Thai Air Force bases after 1962. Although the risk

of air attack was small, these aircraft were exposed to serious ground attacks

that on occasion caused heavy damage. 19

As the Americans and South Vietnamese built their air capability, the

North Vietnamese, with Chinese and Russian assistance, did the same. Ho

Chi Minh's government rapidly rebuilt several old French and Japanese

airdromes. Four air bases-Phuc Yen, Kep, Gia Lam (Hanoi), and Kien An

(Haiphong)-became the main fields for jets in North Vietnam. Nine other

airfields were able to handle propeller driven military and civil aircraft.

Because of North Vietnam's growing air threat and the uncertain position of

the Chinese Communists, the Americans and their allies installed an air

defense system covering several bases in Thailand and the RVN within range

of North Vietnamese MiGs. 3°

The rapid American buildup at Da Nang in 1965 quickly outpaced the

field's ability to handle the number of aircraft assigned. This overcrowding

left choice targets for North Vietnamese airmen, had they wanted to strike.

U. S. Air Force interceptors supported by Army and Marine Hawk missile*

battalions formed what Headquarters, Pacific Air Forces (PACAF), described as a "heavy defense system." The PACAF planners postulated the

loss of two-thirds of any force sent against Da Nang, but feared the survivors could do extensive damage to parked aircraft on unrevetted hardstands,

exposed fuel tanks, a large bomb storage area which greatly exceeded its

maximum safe explosive content, and support facilities. Fortunately, no air

attack on Allied bases materialized then or later in the course of the war.

None of the American air defenses was tested in battle."

North Vietnam's air defense system, by contrast, was heavily exercised.

Beginning in 1964 the North Vietnamese government organized and trained

an air force oriented largely to defending its homeland. From almost nothing, the North Vietnamese Air Force grew until, in late 1966, Pacific Air

Forces saw it as having "appreciable success in harassing our aircraft." The

PACAF staff officers also believed they now had to revise an earlier judge-

* A surface to air, radar guided, antiaircraft missile able to hit targets from 100 feet to

about 38,000 feet above ground. Its maximum slant range was 22 miles. The Hawk became

operational in 1960, and was deployed with U.S. forces and allies.

279
AIR BASE AIR DEFENSE

American F-102s shelter behind gravel filled prefabricated steel revetments at

Da Nang, South Vietnam, July 1966.

ment that the MiG activity would be "operationally tolerable.""2 American

and South Vietnamese attacks had been made on North Vietnam's air bases

in the narrow southern panhandle below 19*N latitude and at Dien Bien

Phu in 1965, but these were minor installations where no sizable air force

unit operated. The Allies encountered little defensive fire, and all the bases

were put out of action. The North Vietnamese attempted repairs, but follow

up strikes discouraged them and the bases remained dormant for some time.

The North Vietnamese did not give up, however. They still harassed American tactical fighter bomber pilots attacking targets in North Vietnam, a

danger to continued air interdiction. Although losses to MiGs in aerial

combat were few, the approach of the communist fighters often forced the

heavily laden, less maneuverable American F-105s to jettison their ordnance.3 Between August 15, 1966, and the end of the year, 119 American Air

Force sorties jettisoned bomb loads to evade MiGs, and the PACAF staff

began to pay more attention to the problem.

On the heels of earlier intermittent retaliatory strikes in the north, the

major air campaign against North Vietnam, Operation ROLLING THUNDER,

began in March 1965. It continued until November 1, 1968, when President

Lyndon B. Johnson declared a halt, hoping to achieve peace through negotiations. ROLLING THUNDER, however, was not a single campaign in the fashion of World War II or the Korean conflict. (Map 25) Rather, it was an on

again, off again affair of fifty-seven different phases over a period of three

and a half years. Each portion of the campaign and the targets to be hit were

individually approved by the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Secretary of Defense, or the President. The intent of the incremental attacks was

280
TWO LIMITED WARS

to convince North Vietnam to cease hostilities in the south by threatening

ever increasing damage. Specific areas were excluded from bombing-a 25

to 35 mile wide buffer zone along the Chinese border, an area around the

capital city of Hanoi up to 35 miles wide, and the a smaller zone five miles in

depth around the major port city of Haiphong. The border buffer zone was

established to prevent inadvertent bombing of China, which the Johnson

Administration feared might trigger extensive Chinese intervention in the

fighting. American spokesmen publicly emphasized the restraint implicit in

observing these restricted zones.34

Three of the five largest North Vietnamese airfields-Kien An, Cat Bai,

and Gia Lam-lay within areas where strikes were often prohibited. Air

bases outside the sanctuaries, such as Phuc Yen and Kep, were near population centers and were thus kept off the authorized target list for some time,

providing them immunity from attack. The Americans first attacked Phuc

Yen in October 1967. The American policy of incremental bombing increases

and prohibited targets, while politically attractive, provided the defenders an

inestimable advantage: air defense systems could be acquired and installed

with minimal interference. Hundreds of Russian and Chinese guns, missiles,

and radar units appeared at critical places. At the same time, the North

Vietnamese enlarged the bases so that by the end of 1966, there were 253

revetted parking spaces on the bases and 412 open parking spots. Still, the

growth of the NVNAF was slow, its training held back by the complexity of

aircraft and their support systems. 5

In addition to the advantages conferred on their defense by American

bombing limitations, the enemy in the north also used several Chinese air

bases to shelter scarce aircraft. The Chinese had well developed radar early

warning and ground controlled intercept systems connected to those of

North Vietnam. The GCI operations of each country supplemented the

other; both were modern and staffed by trained, competent people. The

Chinese air bases themselves had formidable and active defensive systems,

and an attack upon them could provoke Red Chinese participation in the

war. 36

North Vietnam's radar systems were located so as to protect the vital

portions of the country and served several purposes. Radar installation,

begun in the early 1960s, accelerated; a variety of Russian or Chinese types

were copied from American designs of the World War II period, and some

were of East bloc origin. By 1965 the North Vietnamese had thirty-three

electronic warfare and ground control intercept sets and nine fire control

sets in use. They installed radar sets to aim and control the Russian built

SA-2 surface to air missiles introduced into Southeast Asia in 1965 and to

aim antiaircraft guns: Russian 100-mm, 85-mm, and sometimes 57-mm

weapons. Warning of impending air attacks also came from Russian ships

which followed U. S. Navy carriers in the Gulf of Tonkin. By the end of 1966

281
AIR WAR IN NORTH VIETNAM

HINA CHINA

eýKep ?Ha

Na San* Hot Lae 7 ~aLm t Tho Khoit • •a.,.€. Bac Mal* Haiphong

Dong Suonge Kien Akn

GULF OF TONKIN

Dong Hoi

Demarcation Line

Map 25
TWO LIMITED WARS

SAM site photographed in North Vietnam, May 1966.

there were thirty electronic warfare sites feeding four filter centers which in

turn supported an air defense headquarters in Hanoi. Radar control operations were dispersed with redundant communications. The North Vietnamese frequently moved radar sites, greatly complicating targeting problems.

Additionally, putting one filter center out of operation, as the U. S. Navy

did in 1966, did not reduce effectiveness; other centers assumed the workload. As in World War II and Korea, attacking pilots had great difficulty in

locating radar sets. Lacking jamming equipment and radiation homing

weapons at first, American fliers were slow in distrupting the fire control

mechanisms for the SA-2s. 7

After their first success in destroying an American fighter in July 1965,

the North Vietnamese used SA-2 antiaircraft missiles widely. The missile

had a range of about 17 miles, and was effective against airplanes flying

between 3,000 and 60,000 feet. The missiles could be used below that altitude, but often aircraft flying so low were not detected rapidly enough for

the crews to fire. Each missile battalion had from 4 to 6 mobile missile

launchers, 8 to 12 missiles, and radar sets operating from prepared sites.

283
CHINA

N TH IETNAM

*Gia Lam

HANOI Sitea99A • aiphog,

1 Kien An

Nam IDinh

LAOS 

Gl

Thanh Hoa/ Of

Tonkin

.1 a.

Vinh* t~,•

LAOS •

TALAND IT
TWO LIMITED WARS

North Vietnamese engineers built more than 190 launch areas between 1965

and 1968, 40 of which were normally occupied. Battalions moved rapidly

from site to site after firing a weapon or suspecting that they had been

observed by reconnaissance flights. The SA-2 was an area defense weapon,

but the North Vietnamese used it for defense of small sites such as air bases

as well. Kep airfield, for example, was the headquarters of a regiment controlling 5 battalions, 1 of which was always within range of the installation.38

Joining radar, MiG fighters, and ground to air missiles in the North

Vietnamese defenses was yet another, and by far the most potent, defense

element: antiaircraft gunfire. To the Americans the intent of the defense

system quickly became clear. MiG fighters harassed the attacking fighterbombers, and SA-2s kept the hostile aircraft flying low into the area where

the gunners could aim potentially devastating fire. Before the Southeast

Asian conflict, the United States Air Force and Navy apparently concluded

that AA was obsolete and not a serious threat to a low flying, quick striking,

tactical nuclear attack force. American pilots were not mentally prepared for

the ferocious barrage which met their low level flights over North Vietnam.

In 1967, the Pacific Air Forces staff estimated that throughout North Vietnam there were 9,000 AA weapons, many of medium caliber (37-mm and

57-mm), some as large as 100-mm.39 Reconnaissance was not adequate to

provide a correct count, especially of light guns which could easily be concealed. As intelligence gathering improved, the estimate declined to a more

realistic 2,000 by the end of 1969. After the bombing ceased in November

1968, large numbers of North Vietnamese weapons were moved to Laos to

protect the supply routes to the south and west; many more guns went to

repair shops and storage areas. Ground gunfire accounted for more than

eighty percent of all American aircraft combat losses in Southeast Asia.'

During its more than seven years of operation, North Vietnam's air

defense system was the most thoroughly tested in the history of aerial warfare. Designed primarily to protect the nation's capital city and main port, it

encompassed airfields near Hanoi, Haiphong, and in the southern panhandle. Five air surveillance sectors covered the country; three were in the most

important northern portion. Reports of intruders went from any of several

air surveillance sites to initial screening at radar reporting stations, then to

the sector filter center which prepared a composite picture and sent it to the

weapons operations center at Bac Mai airfield. The entire process took less

In May 1969 North Vietnamese air defense forces at Site 99

attacked an unmanned USAF reconnaissance drone flying

toward Haiphong and Kien An, a nearby airfield. The

drone's cameras photographed the missile's pass and, seconds later, its detonation.

285
AIR BASE AIR DEFENSE

TABLE 28

North Vietnamese Antiaircraft Artillery

September 1967

Machine Guns* Medium** Heavy§

Number of Guns 692 3,079 1,330

Active Sites 138 t 671 236

Total Sites 706 1,581 537

* 12.7-mm or 14.5-mm machine guns. Optically aimed. Usually 4-6 guns per site.

** Medium antiaircraft, 37-mm or 57-mm automatic weapons. In this category, only

the 57-mm was capable of accepting and using radar fire control data for aimed fire.

Both were capable of optically aimed fire. Usually 4-6 guns per site.

§ Heavy antiaircraft, 85-mm and 100-mm guns. Both capable of optically aimed

fire, although estimates indicated that all batteries in North Vietnam were associated

with a fire control radar. Usually 6-8 guns per site.

t Calculated using an average of 5 guns per site.

Sources: Hq. USAF Combat Target Task Force Report, October, 1967

than three minutes. While reports were made up the chain, SAM and AA

sites were alerted as was an alternate operations center twenty or thirty miles

from Bac Mai. In 1974 the U. S. Air Force's Project Red Baron air to air

combat analysts at Nellis AFB, Nevada, concluded that the North Vietnamese air defense system, was "one of the best defense systems in existence."40

Geography and climate gave North Vietnam other advantages. The

country was small, and important targets were relatively few. As a result, air

commanders bent on attack could not count on surprise as the North Vietnamese knew where, and approximately when, to expect raids. They concentrated AA weapons at significant points. The monsoon rains between

November and March caused severe problems during the early war years.

The Americans lacked an all weather bombing system in Vietnam and could

not reach targets obscured by rain or heavy clouds. Sometimes weeks passed

between raids. During the slack periods, North Vietnam's leaders recruited

the population into massive repair efforts."'

286
TWO LIMITED WARS

Amid destruction on and around the field, the North Vietnamese have accomplished repairs to the runway at Hoa Loc airfield (squares). They have also

painted false craters on the surface to simulate additional damage (circles).

The bristling North Vietnamese defenses protected far more than air

bases. Their major responsibility was shielding supply and transport facilities, industrial operations, and electric power production facilities. Air bases received AA weapons protection, including SAMs, but they often

benefitted from bombing prohibitions and proximity to other heavily defended locations.

Throughout 1966, there was debate within the Pacific Air Forces staff

about the significance the northern bases as targets. Many did not consider

air base attacks of prime importance, although North Vietnam's interceptors forced the Americans to tailor tactics to protect their fighter bombers.

Only 3 percent of the aircraft losses were to enemy interceptors, and this

could be controlled by F-4 fighter escort. Attacking the bases at the same

time implied accepting losses. Phuc Yen and Kep could probably claim five

to six percent of the sixty fighter bombers and seventeen percent of the B52s. Furthermore, any inkling of a pending attack on major air bases would

send the communist aircraft to China or other dispersal areas; and even if

North Vietnamese bases were hit and greatly damaged, they could be repaired quickly. Eliminating the NVNAF entirely was out of the question,

since the source of supply in China and Russia could not be cut off. Finally,

the Americans believed, perhaps unjustifiably, that at the large number of

U. S. airfields and with improved revetments, American air defenses, although untested, would stop any enemy air raid. Concentrating on indus287
AIR BASE AIR DEFENSE

trial and interdiction targets instead of airfields seemed potentially more

profitable since it promised to have a greater impact on the course of the

war.'4

Intelligence estimates also evaluated the more passive measures the

North Vietnamese used to protect their aircraft. Phuc Yen airfield had many

revetted parking spaces away from the base. All of the storage and support

areas were well dispersed, and camouflage was skillfully used to hide guns

and vital equipment. At Phuc Yen and elsewhere, the North Vietnamese

buried or partly buried fuel storage tanks. Runways, taxiways, and parking

ramps could be easily repaired should bombs crater them. U. S. Pacific

Command experts believed the North Vietnamese also used helicopters to

lift fighters and carry them to and from hidden parking areas some distance

from Kien An airfield. Although cumbersome, helicopter movement would

have been quite practical for an air force that did not plan to contest every

attack. For the Americans, locating the aircraft in the surrounding country

was all but impossible."

North Vietnamese bases could not escape indefinitely. In April 1967, as

the United States increased pressure on Ho Chi Minh's government, Pacific

Command and the Joint Chiefs designated air bases for attack. Only Gia

Lam, Hanoi's international airport, remained inviolate. Phuc Yen was finally attacked in October. Experience and new AA suppression weapons

enabled the Americans to cope with the defense. They dealt heavy blows to

their opponent's air force, destroying twenty-four MiGs on the ground in

April and May 1967. Coupled with sixty-one more shot down by U. S. Air

Force and Navy fighters in the same two-month period, these losses forced

the NVNAF to reduce combat flying for some months while reassessing

tactics.'5

American attackers developed a variety of techniques to overcome the

defense. Airborne radar warning equipment and visual observation of missiles in flight allowed American fighter pilots to evade SAMs with radical

maneuvers. Electronic jamming reduced missile accuracy significantly. Flying above 3,000 feet to avoid the heaviest fire from the AA guns, and diving

on targets from a formation protected by jamming reduced aircraft losses.

Missile and AA hunter killer groups, known as Iron Hand or Wild Weasel,

attacked defense sites, especially the radar sets, with a variety of weapons,

including Shrike missiles. The Shrike was designed to lock onto a radar

signal and follow it to its source, but American pilots tended to distrust it

for its erratic performance. Because its detonation could not be seen, they

never knew immediately if it had destroyed enemy radar transmitters. It did

force defenders to use the radars only intermittently to avoid becoming

targets. Radar suppression rather than destruction became the principle

mission for these missiles. In March 1968, the improved the AGM-78 or

Standard ARM (for antiradiation missile), arrived in Southeast Asia. The

288
TWO LIMITED WARS

After October 1967, Phuc Yen airfield in North Vietnam was struck repeatedly

until the bombing halt. The symmetrical clusters below the airstrip are 57-

mm antiaircraft gun emplacements.

Standard ARM, however, was used only seventy times before the President

ordered the 1968 bombing restrictions, and its success could not be accurately judged. Another new type of weapon was the laser guided bomb

which, like the Standard ARM, arrived too late for a full evaluation in

combat during ROLLING THUNDER. How effective the new weapons would

be was not clear, although they gave promise of more destructive attacks on

defenses.46

By trial and error and by carefully studying defenses, the Americans

learned the least dangerous routes to targets. Airfields at Kep, Kien An, Hoa

Lac, Cat Bai, and Phuc Yen were bombed repeatedly. North Vietnamese

crews flew most of the jet aircraft to Chinese bases at Peitun-Yunnani. By

the end of March, 1968, only seven MiG-21s and six MiG-15s or -17s

289
AIR BASE AIR DEFENSE

remained in the country. On March 31st, however, President Johnson restricted bombing to areas south of 190 N latitude in North Vietnam's panhandle. Immediately repairs began on the major bases in the north and by

October all jet airfields were again in service; most were, in fact, being

improved, and two new fields neared completion. After November 1, when

President Johnson extended the bombing prohibition to all of North Vietnam, Vinh and Dong Hoi airfields in the southern panhandle were also

restored to use."'

Between November 1, 1968, and April, 1972, the United States did not

allow bombing of North Vietnam except under certain very restrictive circumstances. During this time reconnaissance flights frequently crossed the

country and adjacent territories and waters. In some instances, the North

Vietnamese tried to destroy the intruding airplanes. When such attempts

occurred, the American command allowed immediate protective reaction

strikes. At times these strikes were directed at air bases, but neither the

strikes nor the AA fire encountered were militarily significant.'"

The North Vietnamese, however, continued to improve their national

defenses. Before the bombing halt they learned that radar discipline-turning on the set just before firing-reduced exposure to American attacks. The

North Vietnamese also fitted optical sights to both SAM launchers and 57-

mm and 85-mm guns, again to reduce the need for radar, at least in clear

weather. The North Vietnamese also learned that they could link electronic

warfare and ground control intercept radar missile sites. By doing so, they

launched SA-2s without the tell tale electronic emissions that the Americans

had learned to associate with the SAM fire direction system, thus catching

pilots by surprise.' 9 To protect his crews from this danger, the Seventh Air

Force Commander, General John D. Lavelle, permitted attacks on four

airfields, associated radar, and missiles in transit, beginning in November

1971. (These attacks, some of which allegedly violated the American rules of

engagement, resulted in Lavelle's relief in early March and subsequent retirement in April 1972.) On March 30, 1972, when North Vietnam launched its

attack across the Cambodian and Laotian borders and the Demilitarized

Zone separating the two Vietnams, the air forces called upon to stem the tide

faced a much more hazardous situation than they did in 1968 when the

bombing campaign against North Vietnam ceased.50

As the response to North Vietnam's 1972 offensive took shape, the rules

of engagement were much different from those in effect during ROLLING

THUNDER. With certain exceptions, such as populated areas, the Chinese

border buffer zone, religious shrines, hospitals, and POW camps, field

commanders had far greater authority to launch air attacks against targets

as the need arose-if the target was on the JCS approved list. The use of

laser or electro-optical guided munitions allowed the U.S. to strike when

necessary, in an air campaign of significantly different character nicknamed

290
TWO LIMITED WARS

LINEBACKER. Military airfields in North Vietnam could be attacked except

when aircraft of a third nation were present. As before, antiradar missiles

could be used against the sites unless the missile could hit Chinese territory.

Like the earlier ROLLING THUNDER effort, LINEBACKER'S targets were primarily North Vietnam's transportation and supply distribution systems."

In the panhandle in 1972, there were 5 airfields and about 15 MiGs, 28

batteries of surface to air missiles, and more than 1,000 AA weapons,

mostly machine guns and light or medium guns. To the north there were 4

main airfields: Phuc Yen, Yen Bai, Kep, and Gia Lam. Each kept 4 to 6 MiGs

on alert. In addition, Phuc Yen had about 30 fighters in caves or covered

revetments; the base's maintenance facilities were in tunnels and caves of

Tam Dao mountain, 3 miles north of the runway. Yen Bai airfield had about

60 aircraft (40 of which the Americans believed to be in storage or reserve)

protected by extensive tunnels and caves in nearby limestone hills. Gia Lam

had facilities for 6 to 10 fighters; Kep's commander dispersed his 20 fighters

in covered parking or underground hangarettes. The additional bases of

Kien An, Dong Suong, Hoa Loc, and Bai Thuong accommodated jets and

at times served as dispersal sites. Between 1968 and 1972 warning and

ground control radar sets throughout North Vietnam increased from 33 to

49.52

North Vietnam's alert fighters remained dispersed and under cover unless an imminent threat arose. Once a warning sounded, the North Vietnamese pilots were on "condition one" alert; they and their aircraft moved to

ready positions on the airfield. If an attack did not materialize within a

short time, the fighters then returned to protected dispersal parking. If

attacking aircraft arrived undetected, reaction times to get fighters airborne

averaged seven to eight minutes, leaving the interceptors vulnerable on the

ground. Apparently the North Vietnamese used the alert system to avoid a

repetition of earlier losses to American and South Vietnamese air raids.

Night fighter defense was limited to a few qualified pilots flying MiG-21s

from Phuc Yen who often refrained from attacking while relaying altitude,

speed, and heading information to SAM batteries."

Between April 14 and 20, 1972, the Allies attacked bases in the panhandle and along the coast heavily. Reconnaissance flights reported extensive

runway and taxiway damage. A MiG-15 was destroyed at Bai Thuong; two

MiG-17s were destroyed at Kien An, and two damaged. Large amounts of

fuel burned at Cat Bai airfield. Defensive fire was light and ineffective, but

several new weapons were noted by American Navy and Air Force pilots.

The MiG-21 J, with improved internal guns and armed with air to air missiles, appeared. In addition, a new radar gun control system, called GUN

DISH, came into use. Both the MiG-21J and GUN DISH used radar frequencies for which the Americans had no jamming equipment. The Americans

countered with a variety of tactics and the new AIM-9J air to air missile,

291
AIR BASE AIR DEFENSE

TABLE 29

North Vietnamese Air Threat

Date MiG-15/17 MiG-21 11-28

August 1964 36

December 1964 53

May 1965 56 8

December 1965 62 7 6

December 1966 50 16 6

December 1967 28 12 8

December 1968 111 34 6

Location May 65 April 66 April 67 Dec 67 Dec 68

Phuc Yen 56 MiG-15/17 53 MiG-15/17 26 MiG-15/17 11 MiG-15/17 27 MiG-21

15 MiG-21 16 MiG-21 6 MiG-21

8 11-28 8 11-28 6 11-28 8 11-28 3 11-28

Cat Bi none none 14 MiG-17 2 MiG-17 none

Kep none 10 MiG-17 4 MiG-17 9 MiG-17 4 MiG-15/17

Gia Lam none none 31 MiG-17 6 MiG-17 18 MiG-15/17

6 MiG-21

PeitunYunnani (China) 7 MiG-21

89 MiG-15/17

311-28

Sources: Seventh Air Force Weekly Intelligence Summary, 14 December 1968

SEAsia Counterair Alternatives; CINCPAC Command History 1964, 1965, 1966

TAC Intelligence Consolidated Order of Battle,

Communist SEA, Jan 1968, Vol 3A, Part I

which brought down several MiGs after its debut in August 1972. The AIM9J, an improved Sidewinder intended for close air to air combat, gave good

results in Southeast Asia.14

The renewed airfield attacks soon demonstrated the utility of laser

guided bombs. On July 26, 1972, a small formation from the 8th Tactical

Fighter Wing, stationed at Ubon Royal Thai Air Force Base, hit Dong Hoi.

292
TWO LIMITED WARS

In less than two minutes the accurate ordnance cratered the runway. Defensive fire dam(Ded none of the attacking aircraft. Dong Hoi and the other

bases were closely watched, and the Navy and the Air Force regularly assailed those south of the 20th parallel to keep them unserviceable. Few MiGs

flew over the panhandle area."

Over the North's heartland, however, the situation was not so clear for

the Americans. The highly refined and compact air defense system detected

raids before they entered North Vietnam's airspace, and launched interceptors or missiles. By July 1972, the MiG pilots had improved so much that for

the first time during the war the North Vietnamese fighters were shooting

down more attackers than they themselves lost. The Americans reacted

quickly, stressing the use of flying tactics best suited to the F-4s, and using

more experienced pilots to teach those newly arrived in Southeast Asia. The

American intercept warning system centered in Thailand was the most significant change. American Air Force and Navy commanders now could

guide their escort fighters toward the MiGs and warn other aircraft of

danger. The situation quickly reverted to the Americans' favor. After August

1972, claims for aircraft kills rose to four to one in favor of the United

States.56

The bombing of the North continued into October 1972. On October

10, believing that North Vietnam was interested in peace, President Richard

M. Nixon prohibited attacks within ten nautical miles of Hanoi. On the 23rd

of the month, the President halted attacks north of the 20th parallel. Yet

despite the heavy bombardment and increased accuracy of guided bombs,

the North Vietnamese were reluctant to reach agreement at the peace table.

They were aware of the approaching elections in America and the limited

United States forces in Southeast Asia. The return of fighters and B-52s to

combat as a result of the spring invasion of the south in 1972 did not restore

the levels of aircraft which existed before the President began to reduce

American military forces in Southeast Asia. Furthermore, the heavy air

defenses of North Vietnam forced the Americans to provide large support

elements for the tactical bomber forays. Fighter escorts, tankers, search and

rescue aircraft, Navy and Air Force Iron Hand hunter killer flights, and

others meant that for every attacking airplane approximately four more were

in the air as auxiliaries. The North Vietnamese seemed convinced they were

making their enemy sacrifice too many aircraft and crews to continue.5 7

Believing they would have to fly into the Hanoi-Haiphong area again in

the near future, American military leaders in the Pacific prepared for that

eventuality. Admiral Noel Gayler, Commander-in-Chief, Pacific, told his

subordinate commanders on October 26 to be ready to resume interdiction

bombing in the north. By October 29 the Navy's Task Force 77 and Seventh

Air Force, in conjunction with the Strategic Air Command, prepared a plan

to use B-52s along with tactical fighters to "destroy as much as possible of

293
AIR BASE AIR DEFENSE

the NVN tactical [air order of battle] within a 48 hour period." The plan

called for a surprise attack by B-52s on the most heavily used North Vietnamese bases at night, when their defenses were weakest. This would be

followed by a fighter bomber strike against dispersal bases soon after daybreak.58

To force the issue in Paris, President Nixon decided to resume bombing

the Hanoi-Haiphong area. The series of new air attacks, designated LINEBACKER II, continued from December 18 to December 29 with a one day

stand down on Christmas. The Americans directed LINEBACKER II against

all major target complexes in the main part of the country. Many had

already been bombed, but repairs were under way. The first three days of

LINEBACKER II saw 314 B-52 sorties directed against 11 target areas, 3 of

them air bases. B-52s from the 307th Strategic Wing at U-Tapao, Thailand,

hit Hoa Loc, Kep, and Phuc Yen airfields on the night of December 18.1

F-ills made additional air base attacks, approaching the targets at

night at altitudes of 200 and 500 feet and flying at nearly 500 miles per hour.

The use of terrain following radar (TFR) allowed the 474th Tactical Fighter

Wing's planes to dart across Southeast Asia from their Thai bases. Although the F-1lls were too few to be decisive, they harassed the enemy

airmen and defenses and occasionally caused severe damage. The F-111's

ability to jam defense electronics and find the precise target as it flew at very

low altitude made its bombing so accurate that it caused operations at Yen

Bai to cease for a day. At Yen Bai, the American bombs hit within fifty feet

of the intended impact point. Elsewhere, the fighter bombers struck Hoa

Lac, Kep, Bac Mai, and Phuc Yen with almost as much success. The F-ills

continued the strikes for several days, often with great accuracy. Despite the

heavy bombing and significant damage at some fields, especially Bac Mai,

the Yen Bai attacks of the 18th were the only instance when the Americans

succeeded in completely closing an airfield. Nonetheless, North Vietnam's

airfield defenses were completely inadequate. No SAMs hit the low flying

attackers, and light to moderate AA fire from small arms, 23-mm, and 57-

mm weapons was very poorly aimed. F-111s suffered no damage by airfield

defenses during LINEBACKER II. On other attacks in North Vietnam during

the same time, two F-Ills were shot down. Four others received slight

damage.6

In contrast to the accuracy achieved by the F-Ills, four F-4s and forty

A7s failed to do much damage at Yen Bai on December 19 and 20. Craters

were scattered as a result of these raids; the damage not as effective as that

of the more accurate F-Ills. Even though each B-52 strike hit its assigned

airfield targets with high explosives and caused severe cratering, none of the

SAC bombardments caused operations to cease for more than a few hours.

Cluster bombs and other fragmentation weapons were not used as often as

necessary to disable airplanes, equipment, and personnel. The accuracy of

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TWO LIMITED WARS

B-52s at high altitude was not equal to what F-Ills had achieved. Aircraft

parking, shops, and areas where people congregated could not be hit with as

much certainty and effect. The slightest wind drift or bomb release inaccuracy at 35,000 feet put the hits off the aiming point.6

"

Coincident attacks on antiaircraft positions (both SAMs and guns)

suppressed fire for short periods, but did not destroy the North Vietnamese

capability. Nevertheless, the AA suppression effort allowed the bombers to

reach their targets. The effectiveness of North Vietnam's airfield defenses

varied greatly. Against low level night attacks they were useless. High altitude bomber and daylight fighter-bomber air raids, however, received a

much hotter and more effective welcome. The geographical area was so

small that overlapping radar and weapons complemented each other. During

the day, the gunner's aim was easier, but not decisive. Air bombardment

caused heavy damage and forced the North Vietnamese once again to remove MiG fighters to China. Unlike the preceding LINEBACKER I, where

communist fighters accounted for twenty-two of thirty-six USAF aircraft

lost over the Hanoi-Haiphong region, MiG interceptors were not the most

prominent threat during LINEBACKER II. Surface to air missiles caused more

damage to the attackers, although they were ineffectual in preventing or

reducing the pressure brought to bear. At the start of LINEBACKER II, B-52s

approached target areas on predictable flight paths, and SAMs shot down

eleven in four days. SAC commanders quickly changed tactics, but the most

dramatic reduction in bomber losses came from electronic suppression of

gun and SAM control radar, the use of deception, such as chaff, and most

important, destruction of the main SAM assembly facility in Hanoi. 62

The loss of eleven B-52s prompted SAC to eliminate SAM production

in North Vietnam. Poor weather and the inability of B-52s to hit a small

target without damage to the surrounding civilian population brought a

denial of the Strategic Air Command's first request to attack the assembly

buildings. The JCS finally approved an attack by sixteen F-4s using a Long

Range Navigation (LORAN) beacon that guided attackers to the target and

allowed great accuracy. American pilots attacked the heavily defended target

from above an overcast at 20,000 feet. Dodging forty-eight SAMs, the single

attack succeeded in destroying the facility. Subsequent SAC bombardment

of SAM storage and distribution areas beginning on December 26 further

restricted the North Vietnamese air defense efforts.63

During LINEBACKER II, surface to air missiles were most effective

against the B-52s, bringing down 15 for 996 missiles known to have been

launched. SAMs were least effective against tactical aircraft, shooting down

2 for 225 missiles fired. MiGs and AA accounted for 7 more American

tactical aircraft. But the inability of the defenders to regroup after their own

heavy losses was most important. The large numbers of SAMs fired during

the first three days and the loss of their missile assembly and distribution

295
AIR BASE AIR DEFENSE

capability left the North Vietnamese with no supply for the launch battalions. Mining ports and road and rail interdiction curtailed import and delivery of the weapons. Subsequent to the large numbers of launches during the

first few days of LINEBACKER II and destruction of the assembly building,

missile firings were so few and so poorly aimed that they lost effectiveness as

a serious threat. Although North Vietnam's air defense commanders removed guns and SAMs from southern North Vietnam to protect Hanoi and

Haiphong, the weapons either arrived too late or were destroyed en route.

The freedom of the American field commanders to vary target strike times

and methods and to attack as soon as a menace was recognized meant the

defenders could no longer count on stereotyped approach patterns. T 6

The LINEBACKER II attacks appear to have achieved their limited goals

and were especially effective in shutting down air bases. They drove the

North Vietnamese Air Force out of the country. By depriving the North

Vietnamese SAM system of missiles, the Americans choked off the enemy's

air defense system. The North Vietnamese resumed peace talks, the campaign ended on December 29, and a cease fire went into effect by mid,

January 1973.

Comparison of the Campaigns: Korea and Vietnam

Combat over North Korea and North Vietnam was similar in many

respects. In both conflicts an enemy air force had varying degrees of sanctuary. In the Korean War, Manchurian bases were inviolate. In Southeast Asia,

Chinese bases remained so even while American attackers continually

shifted their policies toward bases within North Vietnam itself. Communist

air forces made immediate and continuing use of the restrictions to protect

their forces. Sanctuaries in North Vietnam created by the bombing prohibition allowed the enemy to install heavy defenses. Once they had emplaced

guns or missiles in or near a prohibited bombing zone, defenders could

move them quickly, and often fought with minimal risk of destruction.

Aerial fighting over North Korea and North Vietnam took place largely

within compact geographical areas: in Korea's MiG Alley and North Vietnam's Red River delta. Defenders in the two countries had the advantage of

being able to concentrate antiaircraft weapons in small areas. This allowed

effective control and a very intense volume of fire. Large numbers of guns

appeared in both North Korea and North Vietnam. Most effective were the

medium sized automatic weapons, that is, the 23-mm, 37-mm, and 57-mm

guns.

Self imposed rules of engagement were stricter in Southeast Asia than

in Korea. Target lists governed air attacks in North Vietnam, many requiring

almost daily approval from Washington. Except during the LINEBACKER

operations at the end of the Southeast Asia war, American commanders

296
TWO LIMITED WARS

needed specific approval to strike a target in North Vietnam, even if it was

already validated by the JCS. By contrast, only the port of Rashin and the

hydroelectric dams were off limits in Korea. The theater commander attacked targets within that country at his discretion.

North Vietnam's defenders had ample time to shift guns and missiles

among many prepared sites. This mobility made American reconnaissance

and target development much more complex. Attackers faced unexpected

and heavy ground fire, surface to air missiles, and fighter interceptors, often

all three on the same sortie. Support aircraft required to suppress defenses

often outnumbered the attackers trying to destroy a target in the Red River

delta.

The U. S. Navy and the U.S. Air Force did not expect the heavy fire

encountered below 3,000 feet over Vietnam. American aircraft designed in

the 1950s for a short nuclear war relied on speed and penetration during an

intense conflict. Only the American F-111 had the equipment to detect radar

signals and to counter radar directed fire in Vietnam. Thus, until mid-1967,

losses were higher than they might otherwise have been. Imperfect weapons

and political restraints placed on both bombing intensity and targets allowed

the North Vietnamese to develop a proficient defense. The North Vietnamese commanders directed an able corps of MiG interceptor pilots flying from

bases that were only infrequently out of action. When American forces

could freely operate in Vietnam on the basis of intelligence information,

they reduced defenses and forced the enemy into temporarily abandoning

airfields. In both cases, the defenders had the use of abundant civilian and

military manual labor to repair damage and rehabilitate essential services.

As in World War II, keeping a flying field out of action required continuous

and accurate strikes.6 5

Dissimilarities in the experiences gained in operations against North

Korean and North Vietnamese defenses were many and profound. Most

significant was the fact that the North Vietnamese prosecuted the war themselves. In Korea large Chinese formations fought UN forces; Russian pilots

engaged in aerial combat, and Russian gunners manned AA batteries. Between 1950 and 1953, communist fliers used bases in Manchuria, often to

the exclusion of those in Korea. In contrast, foreign regular military units

were absent in Vietnam. North Vietnamese generals conducted the war and

wherever possible operated the North Vietnamese Air Force from bases

within their own country. Radar coverage in North Vietnam was far more

extensive, and the equipment had advanced another generation beyond that

used in Korea up to twenty-five years before. The Soviet Union and the

Chinese supplied enough to support the defender's needs. North Vietnam's

radar controlled a highly sophisticated and numerous array of weapons in

Vietnam, including surface to air missiles that bedeviled American pilots

even after they learned how to avoid or deflect them. The Vietnamese enemy

297
AIR BASE AIR DEFENSE

made much more efficient use of underground structures for command and

control facilities, aircraft parking areas, and maintenance shops.

Both conflicts saw decisions oriented toward keeping the conflicts

strictly local and limited affairs. Yet the sharpest contrast on the American

side of the war was in the increased political restrictions imposed upon

American field commanders in Vietnam. Militarily, the decisions in both

cases greatly benifitted defenders and frustrated those charged with achieving decisive results.
Chapter IX

The Middle East: 1948-1973

During the first thirty years of its existence, Israel fought her neighboring Arab states four times; the 1947-1949 War for Independence, the 1956

Suez Crisis, the Six Day War of June 1967, and the 1973 Yom Kippur War.

One can also include a fifth conflict, the so called War of Attrition of 1967-

1970, a much more limited engagement, consisting mostly of air and artillery duels near the Suez Canal. These clashes were an outgrowth of long

standing mutual distrust dating from the early 20th century when Jewish

Zionists sought a homeland in Palestine. The largely Moslem Arabs, however, viewed the Zionist movement and the growing Jewish population with

great suspicion, fearing loss of lands they had owned for generations, disruption of their cherished family and community ties, and a threat to their

rights within one of the holiest places of Islam, the city of Jerusalem. That

Jerusalem was also holy to Jews and Christians was secondary. The Arabs

believed that Arabic law and Koranic tradition gave them an unbroken right

to the land from before the seventh century Islamic conquest of Jerusalem.

Expelled from the city by the Roman Emperor Hadrian (A.D. 78-138) in the

year 135, after the last Jewish revolt, Jews were allowed by Constantine to

visit Jerusalem but once a year, on the anniversary of the destruction of the

last Temple. Arab researchers insisted that the ban was not further modified,

that it was continued by Islamic authorities, and that the Zionists had no

valid claim to Palestine.'

The post-World War II influx of Jewish settlers fleeing the disaster of

the Holocaust greatly exacerbated hostility evident from 1922 when Great

Britain became the League of Nation's Mandatory Power in Palestine. Arab

riots in 1922, 1929, and 1936 protesting Jewish emigration were fomented by

the Mufti of Jerusalem, Haj Amin el-Husseini. The Mufti, an influential

leader, played upon the popular fear that Jews were arriving in great num299
AIR BASE AIR DEFENSE

bers and supplanting Moslems with the intent of taking control of the holy

shrines. After World War II, immigration increased as displaced persons

from Europe sought a new home. Friction between the peoples grew and on

November 29, 1947, the United Nations voted to partition Palestine between

Arabs and Jews with Jerusalem designated an international territory. The

Palestinians, supported by the neighboring Arab governments, rejected the

proposal, seeing Palestine as part of a Greater Syria. Great Britain, suffering from the cost of World War II, relinquished control in May 1948. It

could no longer afford to keep a 100,000 man army in Palestine. The Jews in

Palestine created the state of Israel on May 8, 1948, and since that time

security of the state has been a prime consideration for Israel's political

leaders.2

The 1948 war pitted a newly formed Israeli Air Force (IAF), or Chel

Ha'Avir, against the Egyptian Air Force (EAF). Both were equipped with

World War II aircraft, but air operations were a small part of the fighting. In

the main, the IAF was able to achieve two things during the War of Independence. First, it stopped Arab pilots from attacking Jewish territory and even

undertook some limited bombing of Arab lands. Second, the IAF organized

an effective air transport operation that supplied settlements and ground

forces in the Negev Desert, which comprises most of southern Israel. The

early difficulties of the Chel Ha'Avir were compounded by arguments between its first commander, Brig. Gen. Aharon Remez, and the Israel Defense Force's Chief of Staff, Yigal Yadin. Remez's RAF background led him

to seek a fully independent air force, something Yadin opposed, believing

the nature of the war and the forces fighting it did not require complete

service autonomy. Yadin won. Remez's legacy, however, was an excellent

training establishment to support the emerging Chel Ha'AvirI

An armed force organized originally from the Haganah, Irgun, and

Lehi underground partisans that fought the Arabs for possession of Palestine in the early 1940s, the Israeli Defense Force of 1948-49 suffered from

lack of manpower, outdated equipment, and the need to fight on several

fronts at one time. The constant demands of battle caused the Israeli military to develop a philosophy of flexibility, surprise, and innovation often

missing in the armies of their Arab foes. Geography gave the Israelis another

great advantage once the State of Israel was established: they were able to

operate along short internal lines of communication, shifting forces when or

where needed to protect various borders.4

After an early flirtation with an air force designed along functional

lines, having both tactical and strategic units, it became apparent to Israel's

leaders that such an organization was too expensive. Brig. Gen. Dan

Tolkovsky, the IAF's commander between 1953 and 1958, promoted the idea

originated by his predecessor, Haim Laskov, of centralized control of air

operations and use of one type of aircraft for many different missions.

300
THE MIDDLE EAST

Laskov, in turn, drew inspiration from the Desert Air Force of World War II.

Tolkovsky believed it necessary to "compensate for our small numbers [of

aircraft] by emphasizing high serviceability and quick turnaround [of planes

being serviced after a sortie]." He knew the Egyptians had serious problems

in centralizing control of their air force, since they had to defend their bases

and major cities along the Nile River while carrying on a war in the Sinai.

The large size of the EAF, however, made it a potentially deadly enemy and

Tolkovsky firmly believed that, as the IAF's major threat, it had to be

destroyed immediately on a resumption of the conflict.'

Egypt's Air Force, part of its military legacy from British colonial days,

began modernizing in 1955. Unable to obtain enough arms from the United

States, Egypt's leader, Gamal Abdul Nasser, turned to the Russians. Striking

a bargain with the Soviet Union's proxy, Czechoslovakia, Nasser obtained

MiG-15 and -17 fighters, Ilyushin 11-28 light bombers and II-14 transports,

which began to arrive late in the year. Russia also provided flying and

maintenance instructors who worked at the large number of formerly British

airfields between the Nile and the Negev. American intelligence estimates

credited the EAF with 442 pilots, however, the Americans believed only 87

to be qualified for combat; of that number, 46 were jet pilots. Furthermore,

the EAF's command and logistic support structures were weak because of

the lack of trained, experienced people. The Israeli Air Force, on the other

hand, had an excellent training, maintenance, and command arrangement

which supported 16 fighter and fighter-bomber squadrons, 3 transport

squadrons, and liaison aircraft. It operated from 8 major airfields and was

generally considered the best air service in the Middle East.6

In 1955, Israel felt itself threatened when Nasser blockaded the Gulf of

Aqaba at Sharm el-Sheikh, commanding the narrow Straits of Tiran at the

southern tip of the Sinai, thus cutting Israel's port of Eilat from its access to

the Red Sea. For several years, attacks by Arab guerrillas (Fedayeen) on

Israeli territory had originated largely in Egypt and were a constant source

of trouble between the countries. By 1956, Israel faced an Egyptian-Jordanian-Syrian military coalition threatening it from all sides save along the

short demarcation line with Lebanon. Israeli political and military leaders

concluded they had to use force to resolve their country's precarious situation. The British and French joined in the action as a result of Nasser's

nationalizing the Suez Canal, formerly controlled by those two countries.

Both Britain and France believed the canal vital not only to their worldwide

mercantile and defense interests, but also to general international trade. In

addition, both European powers had other axes to grind with Nasser:

France because of open and rather shrill Egyptian support for Algerian

rebels seeking independence from France; Britain because of repeated terrorist attacks on her nationals in Egypt and Nasser's violently anti-British

propaganda in the Middle East.7

301
AIR BASE AIR DEFENSE

Although the Israelis realized the importance of a first strike at an

enemy's air bases, the IAF did not attack Egyptian airfields during the Suez

Crisis of 1956. (Map 26) The plan for the Suez operation, drawn up during

October 1956, called for an initial Israeli thrust into the Sinai Peninsula,

engaging Egyptian forces there and ostensibly threatening the canal. Britain

and France would then use the fighting as a pretext to seize the canal under

the guise of enforcing peace and separating the belligerents. The two European allies would assume the task of neutralizing the Egyptian Air Force.

The IAF was only to protect ground forces and transport army units to key

positions in the Sinai. It would not attack airfields in the hope the Egyptians

would not realize immediately what was happening, and then, when they

did, exercise restraint in retaliatory attacks. Just to be on the safe side,

however, French fighters would be stationed at Tel Aviv's Lod airfield. The

recent installation of Israel's first modern radar at Lod made the employment of French fighters possible.8

The Israeli operation began late on October 29. To confuse the Egyptians, four Israeli F-S1 Mustangs (acquired from the surplus of various

countries) flew at low level across the Sinai and cut telegraph and telephone

lines on twelve foot poles with their propellers This daring feat was followed

by an air drop of a parachute battalion, commanded by Col. Ariel Sharon,

that was to seize the Mitla Pass, near the Suez Canal. Egypt quickly found

itself at war.9

True to the plan, France and Britain presented their previously agreed

upon ultimatum, ordering Israel and Egypt to withdraw forces from the

canal. As anticipated, Egypt refused. The British and French then entered

the fighting, bombing the EAF's airfields on the night of October 31. Unlike

the Israelis, Britain and France intended to strike from Malta, Cyprus, and

aircraft carriers to destroy the EAF at the outset of fighting, thus gaining air

superiority immediately and protecting their convoys approaching Port

Said. Using night high altitude bombing tactics developed during World War

II, and bombs no larger than 1,000 pounds to limit civilian casualties, the

bombers struck twelve airfields. Because of the darkness and altitude, accuracy was not good and the bombs caused little damage to aircraft and

installations. Several of the EAF's bombers and fighters escaped to bases in

the south. Egyptian air interception was minimal, the AA gunfire wildly

inaccurate, and aircraft on the ground had no protective revetments. On

November 1, the RAF, Royal Navy Fleet Air Arm, and French Air Force

fighter-bombers began daylight raids on air bases to finish off the Egyptians. Altogether, forty-four British and French squadrons assembled for the

campaign. Most were initially directed against the bases, and by morning of

November 2 the EAF had been largely destroyed on the ground, never

having struck inside Israel."

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TABLE 30

Comparative Strengths

Egyptian and Israeli Air Forces

1956

Egyptian Air Force

Type No. of Aircraft

Light Bombardment 2 Squadrons

11-28 49

Fighter and Fighter-Bomber 6 Squadrons

MiG-15, -17 126

Vampire 78

Meteor 29

Transport 2 Squadrons

11-14 43

In addition, the Egyptians had one light liaison squadron

Israel Air Force

Type No. of Aircraft

Fighter and Fighter-Bomber 16 Squadrons

Ouragon 50-60

Gloster Meteor VIII 24

F-51D 25

Mosquito 50-60

Mystere IVA 50

Transport 3 Squadrons

C-46 & C-47 40-50

B-17G 6

At least one French F-84F squadron operated from Lod Airfield, Tel Aviv

The Israeli Ministry of Defense cites figures slightly lower than those shown here.

Source: Goldberg, "Air Operations in the Sinai Campaign-1956"
TABLE 31

British and French Aircraft Strength, 1956

Royal Air Force/French Air Force

Base Valiant Canberra Hunter Venom Mystere F-84F Recon

Hal Far, Malta - 16 . . . . .

Luqa, Malta 28 16 . . . .

Akrotiri, Cyp. - - - 64 - 18 26

Nicosia, Cyp. - 48 32 - - -

Haifa, Israel - - - 36 - -

Lod, Israel ..- - - - 18 -

Total 28 80 32 64 36 36 26

Royal Navy/French Navy

Carrier Sea Venom Sea Hawk Wyvern Corsair Avenger

HMS Albion 24 24 - -

HMS Bulwark - 16 - - -

HMS Eagle 16 8 16 -

Arromanches - - - 24 -

Lafayette - - - - 12

Total 40 48 16 24 12

Source: BDM Corporation: "Air Superiority and Airfield Attack: Lessons from History"
AIR BASE AIR DEFENSE

Some scattered Egyptian aircraft still had to be dealt with. Twenty

Russian built Ilyushin 11-28 jet bombers remained at Luxor. TWenty more,

along with 10 11-14 transport aircraft, fled to bases in Saudi Arabia where

they were protected by Saudi neutrality. On November 4, American built F84Fs of the French Air Force, each fitted with two 450-gallon external fuel

tanks, flew from Lod airfield to strafe the planes at Luxor. TWo attacks met

no opposition; the bombers were destroyed on the ground. For the remainder of the campaign, Egypt's Air Force was no threat. Estimates of Egyptian

losses ranged up to 260 aircraft destroyed with 7 British and French planes

shot down. The Egyptian Army fought on for a few more days, but, demoralized by air attacks and broken up by the rapid Israeli advance, it could not

continue. On November 6, a United Nations arranged truce went into effect."

The 1956 Sinai Campaign ended in frustration for the British and

French, who were forced by Russian-American opposition to give up their

military gains, withdraw within a few months, and be replaced by a United

Nations Emergency Force (UNEF). Although air base attack and defense

were not an important part of the action, the air campaign foretold future

operations. Lacking protection by a competent air defense and adequately

trained pilots, the EAF fell easy victim to an overwhelming British and

French force even though the attackers carried out an imperfect plan. The

UNEF separated the Israelis and Egyptians, but the warring parties continued to eye each other warily. As part of the supervised truce, Israel regained

shipping rights past Sharm el-Sheikh through the Straits of Tiran; the UNEF's presence ended the Fedayeen raids from Egypt, although the guerrillas

soon moved to Jordan to continue their depredations. The threat of an

Egyptian-Syrian-Jordanian alliance against Israel subsided temporarily with

the UN ceasefire.'2

For the IAF, air defense of Israel remained the top priority. Air defense

to the Israelis, however, did not mean that they would fight only to defend

the airspace over their country. No enemy aircraft could be left with the

potential to attack Israel. The destruction of the EAF by Britain and France

in 1956 seemed to reinforce the IAF's faith in its own operating doctrine.

Although untried, Israel's conception of attacking Egyptian airfields had

been validated by the Franco-British success in destroying the Egyptian

aircraft on the ground. IAF commanders kept their plans for preemptive

first strikes current over the next decade.

The Six Day War: 1967

Subsequent to the UN truce arrangements, both Egypt and Israel began

to rebuild and modernize their forces. Syria, Jordan, and Iraq, which refrained from entering the 1956 war, also improved their armies. Of Israel's

306
THE MIDDLE EAST

potential foes, Egypt's Air Force remained the largest and best. By 1960, the

Soviet Union provided Egypt a billion dollars in equipment and sent a

military mission that taught strategy and tactics, equipment operation, and

maintenance. Egypt rebuilt almost its entire Air Force with Soviet supplied

aircraft and, in 1967, it consisted of about 450 planes flying from some 25

bases. The EAF had an especially well developed airlift capability, able to

transport 3,000 paratroops at one time, and a dangerous bomber force

composed of some 30 Tupolev Tu-16 medium bombers and 40 I1-28s. The

bomber force presented a threat to any of Israel's cities or military installations.'3

Training standards in the EAF were fairly high, although the service

had only about 500 pilots-not enough to allow for everyday flying of all

operational aircraft. For various reasons, the EAF usually had about 20

percent of its aircraft nonoperational, and the Egyptians were unfamiliar

with some of the new types of aircraft and equipment just arrived from

Russia. Beginning in 1962, Nasser committed his military to support of the

revolutionary faction in Yemen's civil war. About 60 fighter-bombers were

thus occupied on the Arabian peninsula attacking Royalist troops in the

mountainous interior of Yemen. Since they did not face a Yemeni air force,

the Egyptians did not have to fear an attack on their bases and therefore

learned nothing about base defense.'4

Other Middle Eastern air forces varied widely in ability. Like its Egyptian counterpart, the Syrian Air Force was Soviet equipped. The Syrians had

about 120 aircraft, mostly MiG-21s, -19s, -17s, but also 6 11-28 bombers.

It, too, was short of pilots. Training and pilot procurement had been hampered by political instability in the country, but Syrian air bases lay within

easy striking range of Israel. The Iraqi Air Force was about twice the size of

Syria's, although it had only one base (designated H-3) near enough to

Israel to pose a threat. Iraq's Air Force was composed of a mixture of British

and Russian airplanes. The Jordanian Air Force, having but 22 Hawker

Hunter fighters and 16 pilots, was of uncertain fighting capability.'5

In 1967, the IAF was made up almost entirely of French built Mystere

and Mirage fighters. It also had some obsolescent Ouragons and Vautours.

To beef up the service, the Israelis fitted Fouga Magisters, trainers built in

Israel under license from France, with rockets and used them for close air

support. Israel faced the same Arab threats as it did in 1956, and it still did

not have transit rights in the Suez Canal. The Syria-Jordan-Egypt military

combination, however, was now more potent and included the support and

participation of Iraq. Additionally, Arab guerrilla raids were more frequent

and lethal and emanated more from Syria, supporter of the Palestine Liberation Army (PLA), than from Egypt. Continuing to tolerate Fedayeen or

PLA attacks was possible, but politically difficult for any Israeli govern307
TABLE 32

Comparative Strengths

Arab and Israeli Air Forces

1967

Israeli Air Force

Type No. of Aircraft

Fighter and Fighter Bomber

Super Mystere* 40

Mystere IV A 40

Mirage III J 64

Ouragon 48

Vautour II A 25

Training

Fouga Magister** 60

Transport

Noratlas and Boeing Stratocruiser 20

Helicopter

(Super Frelon, Sikorsky H-34, H-55, Alouette) 25

Total 322

* TWenty were on loan from France for training and were returned after the fighting. Official Israeli figures vary slightly.

** Fitted with rockets for ground attack.

Arab Air Forces

Type Egypt Syria Iraq Jordan

Fighter and Fighter Bomber

MiG-21 120 20 60

MiG-19 80 20 30

MiG-15,-17 180 60 -

Su-7 20 - --

Hawker Hunter - - 50 22

Bomber

Tu-16 30 - 6 -

11-28 40 6 10

Transport

11-14 60 --

An-12 25 - -

Helicopters 60 - - 26

Mixed types 40

Training and Miscellaneous 120 - 20 -

Total 735 106 176 88

Sources: O'Ballance, Third Arab-Israeli War

Weizman Briefing
THE MIDDLE EAST

ment. A lost war, the Israels were certain, meant annihilation of the country. 16

The Arabs, however, perceived their own position quite differently.

Bitter at the loss of land to Israel in 1948-49 and rankled by the destruction

of Egypt's Air Force in 1956, Syria and Jordan were also aggrieved by a

squabble with Israel over rights to the waters of the Jordan River. In Syria

the Ba'ath regime, installed by a 1966 coup de etat, was convinced Israel

intended to destroy it. This fear grew in part from Israel's large scale military

retaliation for guerrilla raids. Then on April 7, 1967, Israeli aircraft shot

down six Syrian MiGs in a single encounter and overflew Damascus, Syria's

capital, as if to celebrate the victory. Humiliated by the loss of its jets, in

May 1967 Syria's government became increasingly concerned that it was

soon to face a serious attack. (Map 27) These fears were fed by Russian

reports to both Egypt and Syria that Israel had massed some eleven brigades

on Syria's border and planned an invasion. On May 12 an unidentified

senior Israeli official reportedly remarked that Israel planned to carry out

military operations against Syria to overthrow its government. Whether or

not the statement was ever made, its quotation in a speech by Nasser on May

23 increased tensions.' 7

A Syrian appeal to Nasser for help was followed by a rapid deterioration in Israel's already tenuous relations with the Arabs. Although Arabs

and Israelis were hostile to one another, many informal contacts, as well as

those through the UNEF, existed. The United States Ambassador to Egypt

believed the slide toward war was probably neither anticipated nor desired

by any of the countries directly involved. Nevertheless, on May 16, Nasser

put his military on alert and ordered the UNEF out of the country. Two days

later, U Thant, Secretary General of the United Nations, acceded to this,

and, in a controversial act, removed the peacekeeping force. Nasser moved

his army into the Sinai, and on May 19 Israel announced its intent to fight if

he closed the Gulf of Aqaba to Israeli shipping, which Nasser did on May

22. On May 30, fearing his shaky position as Jordan's monarch would

weaken if he did not support his Arab brothers, King Hussein agreed to

participate in a combined military force under Egyptian leadership.'8

Surrounded by numerically superior enemies, Israel saw its position as

extremely perilous. On June 1 Prime Minister Levi Eshkol, who had no

military background, appointed Moshe Dayan Israel's Minister of Defense.

Except for two short periods during 1953 and 1955, the defense portfolio

always had been retained by the Prime Minister. Dayan's appointment was a

clear indication of how seriously Israel now viewed the situation. The new

Defense Minister was an extremely able leader, Chief of Staff during the

1956 war, and a man not disposed to await an attack on his country. The

Israeli Air Force commander was Brig. Gen. Mordechai Hod, who continued the policies of his predecessor, Brig. Gen. Ezer Weizman, in keeping the

309
AIR BASE AIR DEFENSE

AIRFIELDS, EGYPT AND ISRAEL / .

OCTOBER 1956 A

CO

HAIFA*

RAMAT DAVID

MEDITERRANEAN SEA

TEL AVIVO

EQRN IERN*LOD RAMLE

EQRr* JWERUSALEM

GAPZA'• ," /•

ALEXANDRIA GAMIL* PORT SAIDGAA

AIDKHEL BEERSHHEBA

EL ARISH

ISRAEL

ABU swER. "ISMAILIA *SIR HAMMA

.BILBEIS* *DEVER SOIR *GEBEL

*INCHAS *FAYID GEDEIRA

CAIRO WEST* KASFAREET* NMAIN KABRIT 

* CAIRO *ART3,0

ALMAZA* SUEZA /EGYPT ELATH

a> k.SAUDI ARABIA

LEGEND

* TOWNS

* AIRFIELDS

SHARM EL SHEIKH

Map 27

force aggressive and trained to a high degree of fighting skill. Both Weizman

and Hod kept the plan of attack on Egypt's air bases continuously up to

date; the pilots' target folders held the latest reconnaissance photographs of

the objective sites. Dayan now ordered the IAF to ready its pilots for a

preemptive strike on Egyptian air bases. ,

9

Remembering the Anglo-French assault of eleven years earlier, President Nasser may have anticipated the impending strike. That at least was the

310
THE MIDDLE EAST

opinion of Anwar el-Sadat, a long time colleague of Nasser's and, at the

time of the Six Day War, Speaker of the Egyptian National Assembly. In

1977, Sadat, who succeeded Nasser as President of Egypt, related a meeting

of June 2, 1967, during which Nasser supposedly warned General Sidqi

Mahmoud, the EAF's commander, of the threat of a strike by Israel in the

next few days. Mahmoud replied, nervously, that defenses were in place and

only ten percent losses should be expected from such an eventuality. According to Sadat, Nasser expected war to begin not later than Monday, June 5.20

The Egyptian Air Force used about 22 main flying fields (Map 28),

most of them less than 300 nautical miles from Israel. Two bases were 400

nautical miles distant. Four were in the Sinai. A radar system gave warning

of approaching aircraft to the military command center near Cairo. The

command center was, in turn, linked to Egypt's major military installations

including some 25 SA-2 missile sites. Egypt deployed her surface to air

missiles as area defense weapons; each unit was laid out similarly to those

encountered in North Vietnam and protected by AA guns. At the airfields,

Egypt placed varying numbers of 12.5-mm, 14.7-mm, 37-mm, and 57-mm

AA guns. Antiaircraft protection for the bases was deficient, however. A

large proportion of the AA guns sent by the Russians had been assigned to

the Army to protect field units. The Israelis believed there were few radar

controlled guns protecting each base.2 1

MiG fighters were normally on air defense alert. Egypt protected its

parked aircraft with World War II-style open earthen revetments. These

revetted parking places, however, were not hardened with concrete or steel,

making the planes vulnerable to air attack. MiG fighters on airborne patrols

normally stayed aloft for several hours each morning to defend against

Israeli incursions during the postdawn hours. Egypt's military staff believed

this to be the time of greatest danger.22

The Israelis selected ten of the Egyptians' most important bases for the

first attack. General Hod intended to "destroy the air power of Egypt." To

do this he wanted "to catch them on the ground and [keep] them on the

ground." Some of Hod's colleagues believed the planned attack was a tremendous gamble, the odds against its success great. Precision flying was

absolutely necessary. Almost all the IAF's fighter-bombers had to be used;

virtually none could stay behind to guard Israel. The reactions of Syria and

Jordan could only be estimated. If they brought their air forces to bear

before the Israeli attackers returned home they could ambush the planes

when they were short of fuel and out of ammunition.23

To prepare for a future war, the IAF had for years kept training standards high, stressing accurate gunnery and precision bombing. Simulated

airfields in the Negev served as exercise targets several times yearly. Each of

the sites had runways, dispersal areas, and dummy aircraft. After the war,

General Weizman estimated that each attacking IAF pilot had made be311
ALEPPOO ORASIN EL-ABOUD

DEIR EZ ZORO

OBIR KUTNA SOUTH

*HAMAH

GTIYAS (T-4)

*DAMASCUS

*MARJ RUHAYVIL

Map 28
THE MIDDLE EAST

tween fifty and one hundred practice attacks in the five to seven years before

1967. Israel's intelligence estimates were superb. They contained virtually all

their enemies' aircraft dispositions and the flying schedules of the opposition units. Deception, too, played an important part. For some months

before June 5, the IAF's pilots had repeatedly flown training missions out to

sea after taking off, knowing they were being tracked on Egyptian radar.

Some of the attack force would follow the same route part way, and it was

important to lull the Egyptians into a false sense of security and avoid last

minute suspicions.24

General Hod knew the critical importance of his timing. He expected to

accomplish Israel's war aims before the great powers imposed a UN sponsored cease fire. He had to destroy the Egyptian Air Force and then recover

to face Syria and Jordan, if necessary. He calculated that he had about 3

hours: a half hour for Egypt to understand what had happened; a half hour

for Egypt to explain to Syria, one hour for the Syrians to think about it, and

at least a half hour for Syria to react. In effect, he was gambling that Syria

would help "protect" his bases by its confusion and subsequent reticence to

enter battle.

The Israeli government almost shelved Hod's plan for political reasons.

Some key cabinet members participating in the decision for war did not

believe that total air superiority over Egypt could be gained in less than a

day, and they feared the risks of leaving Syria's air force intact for that long

a time. There was no choice but to gamble, however. Israel had only 200

fighter-bombers, and massing that small force was the only way to succeed.

Furthermore, the design of the aircraft severely limited the types and

amount of weapons that could be carried. The attack had to destroy the

main enemy at the first blow. As this became clear to the Ministerial Defense

Committee of Israel's cabinet on June 4, they approved Moshe Dayan's

motion to establish H-hour as 0745 (0845 Cairo time) the next morning. At

H-hour, Israeli pilots would be over their targets, and the morning ground

fog would have cleared. The early Egyptian patrols would have landed-the

EAF habitually did not replace them-and the senior Egyptian officers

would be on their way to work from breakfast.25

Each section of the Israeli first wave took off from its base in time to

allow all to arrive at their targets at 0845. The strikes operated under a set of

simple rules: no overt act that might warn of an impending blow to the

airfields; each airfield to be hit initially by four fighter-bombers; and absolutely no radio transmissions for any reason by the attackers until after they

struck. Some of the sections flew out to sea-as had the previous training

flights; some traveled south across the Sinai. All were at very low altitude,

often no more than thirty feet-so low that they raised spray and steam from

the Mediterranean's smooth surface and dust from the desert floor. Shortly

after take off, those over water turned south and began navigating toward

313
AIR BASE AIR DEFENSE

EGYPTIAN AIRFIELDS, 1967

MEDITERRANEAN SEA

AL ARISHO

*ELMVANSURA

GEBEL LIBNI•

QUWEISNAO ABU SUWEIRA

BILBEIS KAFR DAUDS DEVERSOIR OBIR GIFGAFA

*INCHAS FAYIDO

CAIRO INTERNATIONAL BIR THAMADAS CAIRO WEST 0 CAIRO ARI

*HELWAN

ORAS SUOR

BENI SUEFO c..

Map 29

their targets. (Map 29) Contrary to some commentators' initial opinions, the

IAF's flights that morning did not swing far out to sea and circle to approach the enemy bases from the south; few of their aircraft had the fuel

capacity for a roundabout route to the target. 6

To add to the defenders' confusion, the Israelis broadcast tape recordings of routine radio transmissions. They filled the airwaves with the chatter

of pilots to create the illusion of a day of ordinary flying for their listeners

along the Nile and in Damascus. In another deception, Israel announced on

June 4 the impending release of some reserve troops, hoping to allay fear of

imminent war."

On the approach to the targets, the IAF ignored Egypt's defenses.

Egyptian radar was useless because of the attackers' low altitude, and the

IAF left it intact to avoid warning the Egyptians. These locations, however,

the Israelis attacked on the flight home as targets of opportunity. Because

314
THE MIDDLE EAST

the Israelis did not fully understand the SA-2s, they were somewhat apprehensive of them and avoided the missiles. When the first wave of airplanes

arrived over their targets, the base defense gunners were surprised and rarely

fired. It is possible that some MiGs took off or were airborne when the

Israelis arrived; they may have shot down two attackers. Otherwise, the

interception attempt was ineffectual. Each wave of Israeli fighter-bombers

stayed over their targets for five to seven minutes, the first series of attacks

lasting eighty minutes in all. In a twenty minute break, the first returning

planes were refueled, reloaded, and given new pilots."8 The scenario repeated

itself in another eighty minute period of attacks.

After the first assault, AA gunfire increased and was sometimes heavy,

but the gunners apparently suffered considerable confusion and often failed

to coordinate their fire. Some of Egypt's defenses simply were inadequate.

SA-2 surface to air missiles launched at the Israelis were ineffective at low

altitude. The SAMs failed to score a hit and taught the Israelis not to fear

them. The Israelis lost only nine aircraft with six damaged in the first series

of attacks.

The Egyptians used dummy airplanes at many places. Some estimates

say as many as forty percent of those seen by Israeli pilots were fakes, but

they were often set in unlikely places. Too, the Egyptians failed to simulate

fuel and exhaust stains normally associated with aircraft and made the

dummies yet more recognizable. Few of the false targets drew fire.2 9

Fortuitous circumstances also played a role in the surprise. In the summer of 1966 a Christian Iraqi pilot, believing he suffered religious discrimination at home, defected to Israel flying a MiG-21 fighter. Possession of

this aircraft gave the IAF a chance for mock aerial combat against their

enemy's best equipment, a tremendous advantage in actual air fighting. In a

curious turn of affairs, given Nasser's apparent belief the war would start on

or before June 5, Egypt's Chief of Staff, Field Marshal Abdel Hakim Amer,

and the Air Force's commander, Lt. Gen. Mahmoud, were in a plane bound

for Thamed when the attack began. Because they were in the air, AA gunners were restricted in their freedom to fire at aerial targets. Out of touch

with the situation on the ground, the commanders could give no orders.

Apparently those in charge on the scene were unwilling or unable to act

decisively in their stead. It is possible the absence of Amer and Mahmoud

was critical in the failure of the Egyptian defenses to recover after the first

attack. If so, lack of competent action by subordinates was a disastrous

failure on the part of the entire Egyptian command.3 0

In his autobiography, Anwar Sadat described the scene at military

headquarters as news of the magnitude of Israel's victory became clear to

Egypt's leaders. Sadat seemed to distrust Amer because of the latter's constant desire to encroach on political power by exerting increasing military

control over the country. Sadat found a dazed Field Marshal Amer in his

315
AIR BASE AIR DEFENSE

office at the command center. He seemed not to recognize Sadat and apparently was unable to act decisively. Nasser was stunned, and he too could not

react effectively, even to remove any of his inept his subordinates. As the war

progressed, it became ever more apparent that the military leadership was

faltering badly. Amer was finally removed from office in August 1967 and

died the next month in detention near Cairo."

As the Israelis readied the second wave, they had to adjust their targets

to account for the initial damage-which well exceeded expectations. They

now directed attacks at other bases not yet hit, where some of the EAF's

planes had sought refuge. The Egyptian losses continued and, even though

fields at Luxor, Bilbeis, and Hughada were not bombed until noon or later,

by late morning the ability of Egypt to wage aerial war was gone. Eighteen

air bases were strafed and bombed in Egypt on the first day to destroy

airplanes on the ground; almost 300 aircraft were reduced to wreckage.32

Many Egyptian bases experienced the effects of a new weapon. The

final pass made by the first sections of attackers released what came to be

called the "concrete dibber bomb." Conventional high explosive bombs

delivered by fast moving aircraft at low altitude tended to ricochet, bouncing

like a stone skipping over a pond. The French first experimented with a

device that used retrorockets to slow itself down in flight. The Israelis improved upon the idea further and added a parachute to stabilize the bomb in

its descent at a 70- to 80-degree angle incident to the ground. Launched

about 100 meters over any runway, the ordnance proceeded through this

sequence until rockets in its tail propelled the 365-pound warhead through

the concrete runway surface to explode deep in the ground below it and leave

a crater with badly cracked concrete around it. Delay fuzes could be set to

catch enemy jets landing on the field in the aftermath of a raid and to

complicate long term repair work. 3 Hod believed that only a few craters

would disrupt the take off of Egyptian jet fighters and keep them out of

action.3 4

Brigadier Hod's calculations of Arab reaction times were accurate,

erring only in favor of Israel. Like Sadat's description of Egypt's headquarters scene on June 5, Moshe Dayan's was probably colored too, although it

was a fair account of the IAF commander's reactions. Hod sat tensely in the

IDF command post with the Chief of Staff, Yitzhak Rabin, and Defense

Minister Dayan, the three scanning operational reports and waiting for the

flights to reach their targets. After the first strikes, the pilots broke radio

silence to report amazing successes. As the possibility of failure disappeared, Hod's mood shifted first to relief, and then elation. He changed

targeting for later flights to avoid objectives already destroyed. Just before

noon, Jordan's Air Force attacked the town of Netanya and the IAF's airfield at Kefar Syrkin, ten miles east of Tel Aviv. One Noratlas transport was

destroyed on the ground. The Syrian Air Force joined the fray, bombing

316
THE MIDDLE EAST

without much effect the oil refinery at Haifa and a small airfield in the

Jezreel valley, where Israeli gunners shot down one of the attacking Syrian

aircraft. Hod quickly ordered his staff to prepare instructions for attacks on

Syrian, Jordanian, and Iraqi tactical bases. The results were devastating."

Israel's apparent intent was to ignore the threat of Arab countries other

than Egypt until they opened hostilities. Responding to attacks from the

north and east, a third wave of Israeli fighter-bombers was in the air by

1215. Fifty-one sorties hit Jordan's Mafrak and Amman airdromes (Map

30), destroying all Jordan's Hawker Hunters. Syria lost 53 planes at Damascus and 3 other locations while the Iraqis lost 10 at H-3. Now fully alert, the

Syrians mounted a stiff defense. The Israelis lost 10 aircraft in aerial fighting

with 5 pilots killed and 2 taken prisoner. Nevertheless, the air war was

virtually over with 451 Arab airplanes destroyed in the first 2 days, only 58

of which were shot from the sky in dog fights; almost all of the rest were

caught on the ground on the first day. The seizure of air superiority allowed

Israel to shift its air operations to support of the Army and underwrite the

speed of the drive to the Suez Canal.36 Israel's successful stroke against

Egypt was its most productive air defense. By eliminating two-thirds of its

opponent's aerial combat capability, the IAF secured its own bases.

Even without this initial stroke, Israeli bases had a line of defense.

These bases possessed complex, although not always heavy, ground defenses. Many aircraft parking spots were hardened and partly underground.

Each had fuel and electric power; often they were camouflaged. Antiaircraft

guns and a few American built Hawk missiles, highly regarded by General

Weizman, were in evidence. The commander of the IAF's antiaircraft unit at

each base was also the base commander's assistant for air defense, advising

and acting for him in all AA matters. However highly Israel may have

regarded its ground weapons, it was unable to match those of its enemy in

number and, therefore, relied on seizure of air superiority to protect its air

bases and the country. For instance, Israel had just six batteries of Hawks,

of which five were operational. Israel's defense policy concentrated AA

weapons at air bases and a few other highly sensitive fixed installations.

Ground units received only those considered essential. The hundreds of AA

guns lost by Egypt in the Six Day War were nowhere equalled in the IDF's

ground units. Although important to defense, AA weapons had a secondary

place in Israeli thinking. As General Weizman put it, "if we lose air superiority it won't make a difference [how many guns we had at the bases]." One

other factor governed Israel's deployment of its limited number of weapons,

both guns and Hawks, and reduced their density at air bases: the nuclear

plant at Dimona was a priority resource requiring heavy defense. It was

inconceivable that such a location would have been left with light protection."

317
ISRAELI AND JORDANIAN AIRFIELDS, 1967

• * RAMAT D-I D

OMEGiDDO

MAFRAQ

I*LOD OAMMAN

OHATZOF3

*HATSERIM J

ISRAEL

SAUDI ARABIA

Map 30
THE MIDDLE EAST

In any event, there was almost no call for the IDF's air defense weapons

to be used. The Arabs paid the price of overconfidence and of being surprised. For all of their superior manpower, they lacked the flexibility of

doctrine and the unity of purpose exhibited by the Israelis. On the first day

of fighting, the Arabs lost almost 400 aircraft destroyed at 25 bases. Egyptian ground defenses, described by General Weizman as heavy, but much less

severe than expected, were not overcome; they were ignored. In any event,

suppression of AA defense was not possible as the attacking aircraft were

fully loaded with the fuel and ammunition needed to destroy the force they

hoped to catch on the ground. No aircraft could be spared from attacks on

parked planes and runway cratering to engage defenses. 8

Command and control of the Egyptian defenses failed. Faced by the

surprise attack and with the principal air and ground commanders isolated

from the fight, others who might have assumed responsibility for air base

defense could not or would not do so. Even though the airfields were repairable in a day or two, sometimes within hours, the initial disaster in Egypt

had been too heavy to overcome. During the six days of fighting, Israel lost

ten percent of its pilots and twenty percent of its planes while imposing

aircraft losses of up to two-thirds on the enemy. For the Chel Ha'Avir,

outnumbered on June 4 by three to one, this was a stunning victory.

War of Attrition: 1967-1970

During the 1977 peace talks, an Egyptian general approached Israel's

Defense Minister Ezer Weizman and asked him if he knew "what offended

us most [in 1967]? That newspaper photograph showing your women soldiers standing guard over our soldiers, who lay face downward on the sands

of Sinai."3 9 The remark illustrated the bitter humiliation suffered by the

Egyptians as a result of the swift defeat. That memory made the war of 1973

almost inevitable. One of the Egyptians' prime concerns, a subject of constant thought, was how to achieve air superiority in the next battle. After

Nasser's death in September 1970, his successor, Anwar el-Sadat, found

himself in an increasingly more difficult position. Many expected him, as

the leader of the most important Arab nation, to deal successfully with

Israel, yet Israel occupied a large portion of Egypt's territory, the Sinai, and

there seemed little prospect of voluntary return. Most of the world, including America and Russia, believed Egypt and the other Arab states powerless

to contest Israel's military position. Frustrations continued to mount as time

passed. Egypt, the ostensible leader of the Arab world, seemed unable to

direct itself toward restoring its prestige and territorial integrity.4

At the end of the Six Day War, Israel's land included large new portions

in the north, along the Golan Heights. In the east, Jerusalem and the West

Bank had been seized from Jordan; to the south Israel held the Sinai Penin319
AIR BASE AIR DEFENSE

sula. Many people believed the Jewish state could now achieve peace on

favorable terms; the Arabs, however, did not agree. Within a month the first

clash along the Suez Canal between Egypt and Israel heralded the start of

what was called the "War of Attrition." Between 1967 and August 1970 the

conflict continued with varying intensity. The resulting actions, especially by

Egypt, would change the style of fighting in the area.4 1

The 1967 campaign had hardly ceased before Arab and communist

nations began a massive resupply effort. On June 9 forty MiG-21 fighters

arrived in Egypt from Algeria; sixty more came from Czechoslovakia. Other

east European nations sent additional aircraft, and Egypt withdrew some of

its own from Yemen. On June 10 and 11, forty military cargo flights landed

in Cairo from Russia and a shipload of tanks reached Alexandria. Some of

the equipment was in transit when the 1967 war began, but these and many

other deliveries were accelerated .4

Nasser sacked Egypt's senior Air Force leaders. Over the next two years

several commanders sought to resurrect the service, aided by the fact that

most Egyptian pilots survived the surprise attack and were able to fly. The

EAF's pilots were told by their new commander, " . . . forget about the

disaster of June 5. We are going to build a new Air Force and we are going to

do to Israel what they did to us.""3 Under the influence of Russian advisers,

a major organizational change created the Air Defense Command, responsible to the Chief of Staff, who was also Minister of War. Not a separate

service, ADC comprised Army and Air Force units. It functioned separately

and controlled all surface to air missiles and fighter-interceptors. Antiaircraft guns not specifically assigned to deployed ground units also came

under ADC's control. Early warning and fire control radars, communications, and command functions were centralized under General Mohammed

Ali Fahmi, the ADC commander."

The Russians intended their resupply of the Arabs immediately following the war to replace losses, rebuild capability, and restore confidence in

Arab armed forces. Static defenses received special attention as improved

radar and surface to air missiles arrived. Almost overnight Egypt began an

intensive effort to build reinforced, covered concrete revetments. On July 27

an Israeli reconnaissance flight over Egypt brought back photographs of an

air base being reconstructed. The Egyptians were using the terrain to mask

resources from approaching planes and conceal the new facilities. Aircraft

parking areas were being built into the ground and were enclosed by heavy

concrete covers. At a briefing for senior American officials in September

1967 in the Pentagon, General Weizman expressed concern about Israel's

need to consider the new defenses in planning air attacks if war should start

anew.4 5

The hardened shelter construction discovered by the IAF in July was

the start of an extensive new program. Over the next few years, Egypt built

320
THE MIDDLE EAST

about 1,000 such covered revetments, more than enough for her entire Air

Force. Further, the Egyptians created protected bunkers for SA-2 and SA-3

missile launch sites and regional radar command centers. Israeli opinion was

divided on whether the designs were Russian inspired or domestic, but the

effect was the same: far greater protection for the EAF and associated

defense units.41

The hard shelters were of several basic types. Many were above ground

and large enough to hold one or two fighters. Another sort was completely

underground, covered with sand or dirt, camouflaged, and difficult for an

attacking pilot to see. Most of the shelters had sliding doors made of steel

reinforced concrete. Although the workmanship appeared crude and unsophisticated, the structures could withstand considerable blast pressure. A

direct hit by a heavy, penetrating weapon was needed to damage or destroy

aircraft within. Israel did not have such ordnance. Bunkers protecting equipment and crews at SAM sites, both SA-2 and SA-3, were of steel reinforced

concrete and either partly or wholly below ground. Radar antennas were

placed on the roofs of the structures. The missiles themselves were located

nearby on their launchers. Some new SAM sites took the form of drive

through bunkers so that radar and launch vans could be moved rapidly from

place to place, yet be protected when at the launch sites. The design of the

missile launch sites allowed dispersal and redundancy of equipment. Each

had its own electric generators, further protecting the location from the

effects of air attack elsewhere. However, the missiles themselves were often

in the open and exposed to attack when they were on their launchers.47

The Egyptians took great care in constructing their regional radar command centers. The radar center at Fayid air base, for example, was air

conditioned and fitted with electricity and connections to support a complex

computer system. It had sturdy blast doors, was camouflaged, and revealed

modern design techniques. In October 1973, it had not yet been put into

service. Throughout the country, other air base facilities were protected

equally well. Beginning in 1967 jet fuel storage tanks were buried. The tanks

were connected by pipelines in reinforced, underground ducts. Cut off

valves were underground, and other equipment was secured in reinforced

masonry buildings. 48

In 1967, Syria, Jordan, and Iraq started similar hardening programs.

Aircraft parking, maintenance, arming, and refueling areas received protection. The Egyptians and Syrians widened taxiways to serve as auxiliary

runways. Additional runways were built at some bases, and the Arabs began

research aimed at developing runway destruction bombs. Egyptian construction crews widened and strengthened highways in various places; aircraft shelters built along the roadside gave added dispersal capability.49

As the Arabs proceeded with construction, the War of Attrition became

progressively more severe. Most of the fighting centered on the Suez Canal

321
AIR BASE AIR DEFENSE

and involved artillery and aerial bombardment and raids by each side on

enemy installations. Heavy exchanges of fire were more or less continuous

between March 1969 and August 1970. On occasion, Israel's aircraft and

commandos penetrated far into Egypt, accomplishing such feats as blowing

up electric transmission lines near the Aswan Dam. In December 1969, a

team of Israeli commandos flew by helicopter to Ras-Arab where it captured

and removed a Russian built radar set. Throughout, the Egyptians used

their very considerable artillery superiority to try to exhaust the Israelis, who

replied with ever greater air attacks on a variety of installations and facilities. Newly delivered American built F-4s and A4s made their appearance

with the IAF in 1969. These aircraft quickly became the mainstay of the

Chel Ha'Avir.50

Egypt's dependence upon the Soviet Union for planes and antiaircraft

weapons gave the Soviets a progressively greater stake in Egypt's military

affairs. It was a situation not welcomed by all Arabs, and frictions arose

between the often arrogant Russian teachers and their Egyptian and Syrian

students. Nevertheless, between 1968 and 1973, Russia and her east European allies delivered between $2.4 and $3.5 billion worth of military goods

to the Arabs. This was double or triple the amount supplied to Israel by the

United States, depending on the method of calculating relative values. Israeli combat aircraft increased 82 percent; Egyptian and Syrian 137 percent,

although the Arabs received a diverse mixture not always easily maintained.

As the War of Attrition intensified, public reaction in Egypt to Israeli incursions forced the Egyptian military command to activate its surface-to-air

missile defenses. The IAF promptly attacked the sites causing great damage

to the missile complexes. Between July 1967 and January 1970, the Israelis

shot down forty-eight Egyptian aircraft in air combat. Israel did not admit

losses, but few, if any of its aircraft were lost. Concern grew in Moscow that

some sort of action was needed to reverse the trend and protect the reputation of Russian weapons.'

Early in 1970, faced with an increasingly grave situation along the

canal, President Nasser sought more Soviet help. The Soviet Union replied

by sending 1,500 personnel to man some 40 to 50 SA-3 batteries. The SA-3,

a two stage, mach-2, radio controlled weapon with a slant range of about 12

miles, could reach an altitude of 49,000 feet and was roughly equivalent to

the IAF's American made Hawks. The SA-3s quickly appeared around air

bases near Alexandria and Cairo as well as other locations such as the

Aswan Dam. The Israelis matched base defense efforts by continuing to

build hardened parking shelters at their bases. Guns were either 40-mm

radar directed Bofors or captured Russian built 37-mm and 57-mm cannons.

Camouflage was skillful, and some hangarettes were partially concealed in

palm groves. 2

322
THE MIDDLE EAST

In April 1970, Soviet pilots began to fly air defense missions over the

Nile, freeing Egyptian fighters and improved SA-2s for duty along the

canal. To avoid confrontations with the Russians, Israel ceased its attacks on

targets deep inside Egypt. Israeli security, always good, became tighter.

Pilots' names were not made public; their air bases were not indentified in

information releases, and censors restricted news interviews with aircrews.

The Israelis refused to discuss techniques of air operations. The scene of

fighting shifted to the Suez Canal area where intense air and artillery battles

were common. The EAF's pilots, emboldened by new aircraft and improved

training, made repeated strikes in the Sinai. Air bases were among the

targets, and Israel reported shooting down two Il-28s over occupied Al

Arish airfield. In a surprise move late on the night of June 29, the Russians

moved operational SA-2 and SA-3 missile batteries to positions near the

Suez Canal. The sites had been prepared in secret, at night, in anticipation

of the move. As the SA-2 and SA-3 missiles moved into place, 23-mm guns

were ready to give low level protection. The IAF's pilots responded with

attacks on the new sites. Israeli spokesmen claimed heavy damage was inflicted.5 3

Fearing the outcome of an escalating conflict, the Soviet Union and the

United States arranged a cease fire that became effective on August 8, 1970.

The cease fire terms included a "standstill" line thirty-two miles west of the

canal. Egypt was to refrain from placing additional AA missiles between the

line and the canal. Almost immediately, however, the Israelis claimed RussoEgyptian violations. Late in 1970, General Aharon Yariv, Israel's chief of

intelligence, pointed out that before the cease fire there were fifteen occupied SAM sites in the area. Yariv added that reconnaissance aircraft photographed new ones on August 16 and 19, and that by early November forty to

sixty such sites existed. The interlocking fields of fire of the guns and

missiles made the IAF's penetration attempts very hazardous.14

During the week before the cease fire took effect, the IAF tried American supplied ECM pods, first used in Vietnam, to allow F-4s to avoid the

missiles. Five of the IAF's aircraft were shot down in two days, although

Israel made no public announcement at the time. Well after the fact, Maj.

Gen. Binyamin Peled, the IAF's commander from 1973 to 1977, said he lost

the aircraft because of poor tactics and reliance on ECM pods not suited to

the radar frequencies found in the Middle East. Nevertheless, once the cease

fire was in effect, Israel discontinued its heavy bombing, and large scale

penetrations of Egyptian air space stopped. Consequently, the IAF's harsh

experience in that one week could not be countered by mounting a successful

mission to prove to pilots, politicians, and observers that the newly installed,

heavy belt of missiles was not impenetrable. According to Peled, far too

many myths about the new AA weapons grew between late 1970 and the

beginning of the October War. In Peled's view, the reality of dealing with

323
AIR BASE AIR DEFENSE

surface to air missiles was clouded by what he called needless fears of "an

idiot ... senseless snake." By October 1973, Peled believed, "Ezer Weizman and many others [were] as scared of [SAMs] as my wife is scared of a

cockroach."5"

In Egypt, friction between the Russians and Egyptians, especially President Sadat, continued to grow, in part because of slow delivery of new

weapons. Sadat was determined to renew the war since he could see no other

way to reclaim Egypt's land. Israel showed no inclination to return any of

the occupied Sinai, and Sadat had come to believe that only by breaking the

military deadlock could there be any hope of great power support for finding an answer to the Arab-Israeli bitterness. Renewal of the conflict, even

with limited aims, might precipitate negotiations. In addition, Sadat

thought an attack on Israel's occupation forces would relieve growing political pressure at home. Arab humiliation continued to fester, and in Egypt

Sadat was under increasing pressure to act. As ostensible leader of the Arab

coalition, he was looked to for leadership. To accomplish something significant, however, Sadat needed offensive as well as defensive weapons but the

Soviet Union was perhaps not willing to provide a long term attack capability it could not control directly. Then too, the Soviet Union was unwilling to

jeopardize its developing detente with the United States by appearing to

foment renewed strife. On July 17, 1972, a frustrated Sadat ordered over

4,000 Russian military advisers out of his country within a week. The Israelis, not believing Egypt able to organize a war without outside help, thought

chances of conflict greatly reduced, an end that Sadat had at least partly

contrived. Russia, not wanting to lose the influence and investment it had in

the Arab world, responded by sending some of the war material Sadat

wanted. New Sukhoi Su-20s and SA-6 and SA-7 surface to air missiles

appeared, as did additional batteries of SA-3s and improved SA-2s. Syria

and Iraq also received Russian supplies.16

When Sadat ousted the Russians, he renewed his ties with the Arab

world's leaders and enlarged his plan of strategic deception, relying on

earlier Russo-Egyptian planning. There were many elements to his illusion.

Since Syria and Egypt had large standing armies posted along the cease fire

lines, a reserve mobilization was not necessary to renew the conflict. The

Egyptian Second and Third Armies took extensive training in canal crossing

over several years, often along the Nile in Lower Egypt. Egypt held at least

forty-one military exercises near the canal between 1967 and the October 6

attack. Secrecy was close. Although Sadat and Syrian President Hafez alAssad spurred general war preparations, the Egyptian and Syrian leaders

held information about the intended date of attack to a very few senior

leaders."

Field army commanders knew the attack date just ten days in advance.

Sadat and Assad told the Russian ambassadors to their respective countries

324
THE MIDDLE EAST

of their intentions on October 3 and 4, and battalion commanders learned

of the advance on the morning of October 6. On the political front, the

Arabs disguised or concealed indications of intent. Sadat laid plans to attend an October UN meeting in New York and discreetly passed this information to East European leaders in the belief it would find its way to other

countries, which it did. Most important of all, Israeli leaders misjudged the

information they had. Believing it would take until 1975 for the Egyptian

and Syrian Air Forces to reach peak capability, the Israelis were reluctant to

judge them ready for combat. The departure of Russian advisers left Israel

and others convinced the Egyptians could not install and use the complicated radar and missile equipment they had, some of it still in shipping

crates. In fact, the Egyptians were quite ready to set it up and integrate it

into the command and control structure in a short time-and they did with

the help of about 1,000 Russians who quietly returned. 8

Israeli intelligence assessments failed to take into account several items

of information available to them. The Syrians had reinforced their divisions

facing the Golan Heights, but two of their armored divisions could not be

located by Israeli intelligence analysts. Live ammunition was being widely

issued during an early October "exercise." Egyptian soldiers wore chemical

resistant clothing, usable only once. Egyptian and Syrian forward air bases

were reinforced and other Arab nations strengthened the two countries'

military units. Israel's self imposed restrictions on reconnaissance overflights after the 1970 cease fire and the installation of the SAM belt near the

canal precluded their gaining extensive in depth photography of enemy

troop movements. The result of careful Arab preparations and Israel's errors

gave Sadat and Assad an important advantage.5 9

The October War: 1973*

At two o'clock on the afternoon of October 6 the Arabs struck. The day

was Yom Kippur, the Jewish Day of Atonement, and most Israelis were in

synagogues or at home. The surprise was not total, however. Suspicious of

the Arabs' intentions, Defense Minister Dayan had sent one of Israel's best

armored brigades to reinforce the Golan Heights three days before, but the

Army, while on alert, had not mobilized its reserves and had only about

twenty-five percent of its manpower on duty. The Air Force and the Navy

were on alert and did not need to call up reservists as they were both largely

composed of regulars, even in peacetime. Much has been made of the Israe-

* Israelis refer to the war as the Yom Kippur War as it began on October 6, the Yom Kippur

holy day in 1973. The Arabs, in turn, call it the Ramadan War since it began during the Islamic

religious period of Ramadan. The term October War, used in this study, encompasses both

references.

325
AIR BASE AIR DEFENSE

Israeli Gun Crew with 40-mm Bofors in the Sinai, October 1973.

lis' intelligence failures in the face of Arab moves, but there is little reason to

suppose that they could have predicted events with complete accuracy. Israel

had faced such developments previously, and war did not always come as a

consequence of singular Egyptian activity. Many of the misunderstood indicators later cited by critical analysts were of only partial validity. Since 1967

most Syrian and Egyptian troops were on the front lines, but a short distance from, and always threatening, the IDE Additionally, Israeli political

leaders, headed by Prime Minister Golda Meir, were reluctant to strike a

preemptive blow. For the benefit of world opinion, and especially that of the

United States, they believed it better to be in the position of the injured

party.'

On the afternoon of October 6, Anwar el-Sadat sat in his military

control center, talking to his commanders and awaiting reports from his

pilots. At two o'clock his armies sent the first assault wave across the Suez

Canal in small boats. When they seized positions on the far side, engineers

quickly moved pontoon bridges into place. Tank and truck traffic could now

cross. Fighters and fighter-bombers from half a dozen bases flew low, just

clearing the high sand banks each side built along either side of the canal. At

326
THE MIDDLE EAST

fifteen minutes past two, the radio began revealing results of years of planning. Approaching Ras Nasrani air base, MiG-17s climbed quickly, then

dove toward the runways releasing their bombs, while MiG-21s flew top

cover. Two of the IAF's Phantoms roared down the runway and rose to

intercept, shooting down several intruders. Israeli gunners ran to their Bofors guns and began firing. Captured Russian 37-mm and 57-mm guns, used

by the IAF for base defense, also opened fire, but the Israeli fusillade could

down no Egyptian airplane. At Bir Gifgafa air base Su-7s dropped enough

bombs on the field to dig five craters in the runways; then they turned to

destroy the control tower. Elsewhere, Egyptian jets attacked radar stations,

destroying two early warning sets. At least two other bases suffered moderate damage to runways and some facilities. Israeli fighters landing at Ras

Nasrani after combat had to dodge craters and debris; the landing gear of

one F-4 was damaged. Bir Gifgafa was not operational for four hours as

understrength repair crews worked feverishly to clear the runways. (Map 31)

Sadat was pleased. He believed the EAF had redeemed the failure of 1967.

In fact, the Egyptian fliers helped alter the balance of power in the Middle

East for a time."

Israeli fighters could not retaliate. Earlier that day, General Peled, as a

result of the government decision against a preemptive strike, ordered offensive weapons on the IAF's aircraft replaced with air defense munitions. The

IDF believed the Arabs would strike late that afternoon, too late for Israel to

mount an air assault on the SAM belt. Lacking current photographic coverage of the enemies' bases and missile sites, Peled could only send up air

combat planes and fighter-bombers to help relieve the beleaguered Army

forces near the canal as daylight slipped away. (Map 32) Protecting from air

attack the two Arab armies, one crossing the canal, the other assaulting the

Golan Heights, were about 172 SAM battalions (each the rough equivalent

of an American battery), most of which were along the canal or near the

Syrians' front lines. Ten Egyptian and 15 Syrian battalions had the new SA6 missiles, unfamiliar to the IAF. All the SA-6s were close to the forward

edge of the battle area, not protecting airfields, but this was no help to

Israel's pilots who were forced to learn quickly how to avoid the lethal

weapons. The SA-6 was a mach-2.8, low altitude weapon not susceptible to

jamming by Israel's ECM equipment. Because of its small flame and lack of

smoke, it was very difficult for pilots to see once launched. Lacking enough

daylight and information to carry out a complex defense suppression operation, the Israelis waited until the next day to respond. 62

On the afternoon of the sixth, the IDF quickly found itself in trouble

on the Golan Heights. A strong Syrian armored assault pushed the Israelis

back, and only the fiercest resistance prevented a breakthrough to the Sea of

Galilee. The IAF's fighter-bombers, flying to the aid of the defenders, faced

a SAM belt along the Syrian lines almost as heavy as the Egyptians installed

327
AIR BASE AIR DEFENSE

EGYPTIAN AIRFIELDS, 1973

BahlqO *Jyn1I

QuweMEnITERRAuEAuwSlA

Az Zoqazlz

0Bilbel Northoavt

Tukh H way be 2 Fayd

strip 01 nchag

KabritO

Cairo West 0 *Cairo international

Cairo Sinai SOHefwan

Al Fayyum •0

Sent Suef 0

*Wadl Abu Rilh

Al Miny.

Hurgh.d&O

Map 31

west of the canal. Syrian missiles began taking a heavy toll of the IAF

airplanes, and had to be suppressed. General Peled told his men to entice the

Syrian missilemen to fire repeatedly at their planes, which dodged the salvoes. Aircraft flying behind friendly lines located the SAM sites which were

then bombarded by artillery. This tactic was especially effective against the

mobile SA-6s, the 18-mile range of which was less than that of Syria's

improved SA-2. When Syria's missiles were exhausted temporarily, Peled's

men turned on the airfields (Map 33) and attacking ground forces, blunting

the enemy's armored thrust and stalling a hastily organized Russian aerial

328
ISRAELI AIRFIELDS, 1973

RAMAT DAVID 0

MEDITERRANEAN SEA

RAS NASRANI

AIRFIELDS ATTACKED BY EGYPT, 1973

Map 32
AIR BASE AIR DEFENSE

resupply effort. Syrian bases were attacked throughout the first two weeks

of fighting, but by October 9 the Israelis began a drive toward Damascus.

The outcome of the fight in the north was already clear. 3

After deflecting or eliminating the immediate threat from Syria, the

IDF turned its full attention to a more determined adversary, Egypt. In all,

Israel attacked between seventeen and twenty-four bases during October. On

October 7, the Arabs' forward missile batteries and air bases came under

attack. On that day 44 sorties of F-4s, with Mirages for top cover, hit seven

Egyptian bases, the most concentrated Israeli assault on airfields in a single

day to that point in the war. On the 10th, some 130 sorties delivered bombs

on 5 Syrian and 2 Egyptian installations. The most pressing problem was to

wrest the initiative from the Arabs. Without a mobilized army the burden

fell on the IAF, which responded at the expense of counterair and interdiction operations, its main missions.6 The effort expended was about the

same as that of the Six Day War, but the results were far less dramatic.

Disruption of Arab air operations was not as pronounced as in the earlier

conflict. Because of the pressing need to help the Army, the Chel Ha'Avir

found itself having to battle the attacking ground force and the enemy's

protective AA cover, the latter a target far down on its list of mission

priorities. In attacking the Arabs' air bases, especially those in Egypt, the

IAF found the resistance much different than before. The Arabs abandoned

the idea of forward air cover for the battle area and kept their air defense

planes patrolling the rear area. Although not trained to a degree sufficient to

compete with Israel's pilots, the Arab fighters were a distraction that had to

be faced in order to penetrate to the bases.65

The most important question for Israel became what bases to bomb

and when. Defenses were a consideration, although according to General

Peled not a major one. His prime concern was to obtain current aerial

photographs of targets, then have his pilots briefed as to what was to be

attacked and how to avoid the air defenses. Defended less heavily than the

canal or the Syrian front facing the Golan, many Arab air bases were protected by four to six missile sites and AA guns of varying caliber-hardly

easy targets. Peled maintained, however, that with the degree of accuracy of

the IAF's weapon navigation system, his aircraft could release conventional

general purpose unguided bombs from 7,500 feet altitude and hit any target

10,000 feet away. The important point was to use the advantages accruing to

an attacker by confusing the defenders with drone decoy aircraft, chaff,

electronic countermeasures, varying approach patterns and times, and firing

stand off antiradiation weapons such as the heavily used Shrike. Once the

attack was made, the pilots got their planes out quickly, reducing exposure

to surviving AA weapons. In contradistinction with the American experience in Vietnam, Peled found the Shrike very effective. He noted, however,

that the weapon had to be used in conjunction with deception and in tactics

330
THE MIDDLE EAST

SYRIAN AIRFIELDS, 1973

ALEPPO* 

...... ORASIN EL-A OUD

OJIRAHB

OHOBIR QOTNE DEIR EZ ZOR SOUTH

OHAMAH

AL OUSAYR OTIYAS *PALMYRA

*AN NASIRYAH

OSAYQAL IRAQ ODUMAYR

&DAMASCUS

ODAMASCUS INTERNATIONAL

OMARJ RUHAYYIL

*KHOLHOLE

JORDAN

Map 33

employing far more planes than the U. S. Air Force two aircraft Wild Weasel

team. Peled preferred to use enough antiradiation weapons to force the

enemy to shut down an entire area's SAM radar operation, whereupon he

could deliver telling blows on the exposed SAMs themselves, which he considered "one of the softest targets on the face of the earth." Once the

defenses were overcome or bypassed, the IAF could then deal with the

enemy's air bases or other targets.66

The IAF found that the numerous Arab concrete reinforced hangarettes

gave excellent protection from 500-pound bombs (the normal weapon) and

Maverick air to ground guided rockets. Neither weapon alone could pene- trate the structures and demolish the contents. The Israeli Air Force destroyed only one hangarette during the war. Next, the Israelis tried cratering

runways. An early cratering tactic was to have the bombing planes preceded

by attack aircraft releasing cluster bomb units. The CBUs suppressed AA

331
TABLE 33

Comparative Strengths

Arab and Israeli Air Forces

1973

Israel Air Force

Type No. of Aircraft

Fighter and Fighter-Bomber

F-4 101

A4 162

Mirage 67

Super Mystere (SMB-2) 20

Assault Helicopters 40

309

Arab Air Forces

Type Egypt Syria Total

Fighter and Fighter-Bomber

MiG-21D -- 20 20

MiG-21F 20 16 36

MiG-21J 180 212

MiG-21 -- 34 34

MiG-15 16 -- 16

Su-7 50 39 89

Su-20 15 -- 15

MiG-21C & E 60 4 64

MiG-17 90 84 174

Reconnaissance

Su-7 6 -- 6

MiG-21 6 4 10

Bomber

Tu-16 26 -- 26

Additional Probable

Modified Su-20 30 30 60

Hawker Hunter 37 -- 37

Mirage 27 -- 27

Probable Maximum 563 263 826

Source: Weapon System Evaluation Group, Paper P-1007, "Preliminary Assessment of the

Effectiveness of Weapon Systems Used by the Opposing Forces in the October

1973 Middle East War."
TABLE 34

Comparative Strengths

Arab and Israeli Air Defenses

1973

Israel Air Defense Systems

Type Number

20-mm Mk I Polsten (UK) 180

20-mm HSS-804 (Swiss) 420

37-mm (Italy) 50

37-mm (USSR) M1939 Undetermined

40-mm (W. Ger.) 54

40-mm (UK) 15

40-mm Bofors L/70 (Swiss F/C) 150

57-mm S60 (USSR) Undetermined

3.7 in. (UK) Undetermined

Total 869+

Hawk Missiles 400

Hawk Launchers 72

Egyptian Air Defense Systems

Type Number

12.7-mm Quad. Barrel (Czech) 363-441

14.5-mm ZPU 2/4 (USSR) 306-334

23-mm ZU 23 (USSR) 379-457

20-mm M53-M-57 (Yugoslavia) 400

37-mm M1939 (USSR) 435-513

57-mm S60 (USSR) 225

85-mm KS-12 and M1944 (USSR/Czech) 180

100-mm KS-19 (USSR) 362

23-mm ZSU/23 SP (USSR) 6 or 7 battalions

57-mm ZSU/57 SP (USSR) 263

Total 2886-3148 +

SA-2 Missiles (Estimates) 1700

Launchers 420

SA-3 Missiles 1400

Launchers 200

SA-6 Missiles 300

Launchers 20

SA-7 Missiles (128 Platoons) 15-20,000

Source: US Army Combined Armed Center, "Analysis of Air Combat Data, 1973 Mideast

War" Vol. II.
AIR BASE AIR DEFENSE

fire by making the gunners seek shelter, but the main effect was to warn the

defenders that an attack was coming. After the runway bombardment, very

efficient repair crews went to work filling the holes. At the more important

bases the work took two hours; the average closure was five to six hours,

enough to allow attacking formations to reach other targets, but not enough

to keep the enemy air force on the ground in a continuing conflict. Some

Israeli pilots observed MiG-21s landing on 3,000 foot sections of cratered

runways. 67

The most effective counterair tactic was the one Israeli air commanders

liked least: air to air combat. Believing that the need for dogfighting signified a failure to lay waste an enemy air force's operating bases, the Israelis

now had to shoot their foe from the sky. In the first 2 weeks of fighting, the

Arabs lost 334 airplanes in combat; Israel lost 3. Israel's effort at base

attack yielded just 22 planes destroyed on the ground, while Arab defensive

fire accounted for 7 F-4s, a 3 to I ratio which did not please the IAF's

leaders. The air superiority gained by combat victories, however, allowed the

IAF to attack the heavy flow of tanks and reinforcements headed for both

active fronts. In attacking the reinforcements, the Israelis also struck the air

defense belts west of the canal and along Syria's border. The IAF's fighting

was desperate. By far the greatest number of its losses came during close air

support and SAM suppression missions. 68

While Israel carried the battle far beyond its borders, its airfields suffered little damage in return after the first day. The IAF's air defenses,

centrally controlled either at the air headquarters or one of the three territorial force operating centers (south, covering the Sinai; central, protecting the

West Bank; north, the Golan Heights), prevented air attacks from reaching

targets inside Israel. While the IAF's gunners shot down 101 aircraft attacking Israel's ground forces, they hit none over their own air bases.69

The Arabs' Russian built planes lacked radar warning, night attack

instruments, and ECM self protection devices. Egypt had barely enough

pilots to fly its combat planes, and many Syrian and Egyptian pilots lacked

flying proficiency. For these reasons, the Arabs did not intend to pursue a

sustained campaign of counterair attacks; they tried very little defense suppression. Moreover, many of their bombs were duds. In one air base raid ten

Egyptian bombs fell, but eight failed to explode. Egyptian Tu-16 bombers

launched about twenty-six Kelt air to ground missiles. The Kelts, some with

an antiradiation capability, destroyed one warning and ground controlled

intercept radar and badly damaged another. Five fighter bomber attacks

made with bombs and rockets damaged two Hawk sites. The poor quality of

the Arab pilots and their inadequate aircraft, when matched against the

Israeli's superior force and excellent flying, made a significant difference. In

an attempt to fend off Israel's air attacks, Syria tried another weapon:

Russian built FROG-7 ground to ground battlefield support missiles armed

334
THE MIDDLE EAST

TABLE 35

Syrian Air Defense Systems, 1973

Type Number

(all figures are estimates)

12.7-mm Quad Barrel (Czech) 425

14.5-mm Quad ZPU4 (USSR) 195

20-mm Single and Triple mount (Swiss) 255

30-mm HSS-831 (Swiss) 32

37-mm M1939 (USSR) 290

40-mm Bofors 4/70 (Spain) 30

57-mm S60 (USSR) 225

85-mm M1944 (Czech) 100

85-mm KS-12 (USSR) 40

100-mm KS-19 (USSR) 170

130-mm KS-30 (USSR) 74

23-mm ZPU 23/4 SP (USSR) 80-100

57-mm ZPU 57/2 SP (USSR) Undetermined

Total 1916+

SA-2 Missiles 200

Launchers 70

SA-3 Missiles 100

Launchers 20

SA-6 Missiles Undetermined

Launchers 60

SA-7 Missiles (64 platoons) 10,000

Source: US Army Combined Arms Center, "Analysis of Air Combat Data, 1973 Mideast War"

Vol. II

with high explosive warheads. A few of these single stage rockets (perhaps

three to five) hit in the vicinity of Ramat David airfield in northern Israel.

The projectiles buried themselves in the ground where they exploded, causing the surface to collapse creating a line of small craters, but no substantial

damage.7°

335
TABLE 36

Probable Aircraft Losses, October War

Israel

Cause of Loss F-4 A-4 Mystere Mirage Helicopter Misc

SA-2, -3, -6 9 27 1 2 1 -

AAA 9 12 2 4 3 1

SA-2, -3, -6 and AAA 1 1 1 - - -

SA-7 - 2 1 - - 1

SA-7 and AAA 1 2 - - -

Tech. Failure 4 - 1 3 1 -

Interception 3 - - - -

Unknown 3 6 - 1 - -

Other 2 3 - I - -

Total 32 53 6 11 5 2= 109

Loss on Type of

Mission

SAM Suppression 8 6 - - - -

Interception 3 - - 3 - -

Patrol 2 - - 8 - -

Strategic 2 - - -

Airfield Attack 7 - - -

Close Support 8 47 6 - - -

Other 2 - - - 5 2

Total 32 53 6 11 5 2= 109

Egypt and Syria

Cause of Loss

Air-to-Air Combat 334 (destroyed by IAF fighters)

Airfield Attack 22 (Destroyed on ground)

Army Ground Weapons 36

Hawk SAM 23 (18 aircraft + 5 helos.)

20-mm AA 42

Unknown 59*

Total 516 (480 fixed-wing + 36 helicopters)

* Most thought to have been shot down by friendly AA fire.

Sources: US Army Combined Arms Center, "Analysis of Combat Data-1973 Mideast War"
THE MIDDLE EAST

After destroying much of the enemy air forces in aerial combat, the

IAF turned its attention to SAM and AA suppression and continued close

air support of the Army. The fierce battle raging in the desert brought high

casualties to each side. Egypt, however, failed to capitalize on its advantage

from the first assault. On the 14th, responding to pleas for help from her

now hard pressed ally, Syria, Egypt began a renewed drive which faltered

short of the Gidi and Mitla Passes. Worse, by abandoning their initial

limited aim of seizing land just east of the canal, Egypt's Army left the

protection of the AA umbrella, most of which remained on the west bank of

the canal. Now Israeli air and ground units could counterattack more freely,

and they did so with devastating effect. On October 16, Israeli Maj. Gen.

Ariel Sharon sent part of his division across the Suez Canal north of the

Great Bitter Lake. After two days of intense fighting, Sharon's men placed

an armor-infantry wedge between Egypt's Second and Third Armies. Israeli

heavy artillery crossed the canal and began to shell SAM sites, destroying

several and allowing the capture of others. Free of the SAM threat in this

area, the IAF could support the Army and expand its antimissile campaign.

The first week of fighting taught the Chel Ha'Avir many lessons in how to

deal with the enemy AA. On the canal's west bank, it now added to the

Army's achievements and employed all its deceptive and destructive resources to further neutralize the Egyptian defenses.7

"

The bulk of Israel's aircraft losses came during the first six days of the

conflict. During this time, the IAF's close air support helped repulse the

initial Arab attack. Antiaircraft sites covering the Golan and the east bank

of the canal shot down sixty-seven Israeli planes. Beginning with the seventh

day of fighting, October 12, 1973, the loss rate declined markedly. By then

the Syrians were retreating, and the IAF could turn most of its attention to

the Egyptians. By the ninth day of fighting, Egypt's tanks and infantry were

fully exposed in the Sinai. Strike sorties increased on that day, and remained

high. Only on October 17 and 18, as Sharon's troops, with air support,

pushed between the Second and Third Armies, did the Israeli air losses

increase, and then only slightly. The Israelis had learned how to cope with

the air defense problem; their combined land-air assault on the AA belt

succeeded.

72

Once the breach opened, mutual self protection between the Egyptian

gun and missile sites declined, and Peled's men could exploit the inherently

soft missiles as targets. On October 19, Fayid air base fell to Sharon's men.

Wishing to preserve his armies, Sadat agreed to a United States-Soviet Union sponsored cease fire. After an initial attempt to end the fighting failed

on the 22nd, a cease fire took effect on October 24, thus protecting some of

the Arabs' gains, preventing possible collapse of the Egyptian Army, and

laying the groundwork for a later disengagement of forces. 73

337
AIR BASE AIR DEFENSE

TABLE 37

Israeli Air Force

October 1973 War

Daily Loss Summary

Daily Sorties

Day Date A/C Lost Egypt Syria Remarks

1 Oct 6 6 197 25 Yom Kippur

2 7 22 241 247

3 8 9 434 188

4 9 17 442 168

5 10 3 296. 230

6 11 10 69 353

7 12 5 172 197

8 13 6 96 133

9 14 2 229 48 2d Egyptian Offensive

10 15 3 246 62

11 16 2 283 30 Sharon's Counterattack

12 17 5 213 18

13 18 6 263 0

14 19 0 375 2 Fayid AB Falls

15 20 3 376 4

16 21 3 327 55

17 22 0 532 24

18 23 0 354 42

19 24 0 315 4 Cease Fire

Mideast Air Warfare in Perspective

The four major wars fought by the Arabs and Israelis between 1948 and

1973 saw tactical changes brought about by improved aircraft and a variety

of new offensive and defensive weapons. Attacks on airfields received little

emphasis in 1948; the installations on both sides were too small and too

primitive to warrant much attention. The air forces of 1948 were not important enough to draw attention to themselves. In 1956, during the Suez Crisis,

the British and French realized the need to disable Egypt's Air Force. They

did so using World War II tactics and against a force not prepared to defend

itself. Egypt's pilots lacked training. Their command and control system was

338
THE MIDDLE EAST

ineffective; poor marksmanship and inadequate range made their AA guns

useless.

The wars of 1967 and 1973, however, when viewed together, present

fascinating contrasts. In June 1967, Israel destroyed the large, modern air

forces of the three main Arab contestants, Egypt, Syria, and Jordan in less

than five hours; that of Iraq was badly damaged. The loss of any chance at

contesting air superiority came about because the Arab nations, having

learned little from the aerial attacks in 1956, were completely unprepared to

defend their air bases. The air commanders failed to anticipate both the

probability of a blow directed against their units and the devastation such an

aggressive strike would cause. Protection for parked aircraft was negligible;

antiaircraft gun defenses failed to deter the Israelis from attempting the

attack or to deflect it once it came. An attempt at using SA-2s during the

Six Day War failed completely. The weapon's radar was not able to lock onto

a low flying target, and the missiles were left pointed toward the sky. The

disruption caused by the surprise IAF raid kept most major Egyptian bases

out of operation until the ground battle was decided. While the attacks on

Syria, Iraq, and Jordan were not a surprise, coming as they did several hours

after the destruction of the EAF, they were just as effective.

The contrast in air base defense in 1973 was significant. Immediately

after the 1967 war the Arabs began building steel reinforced concrete

hangarettes, each containing important service facilities such as fuel, compressed air, spare parts, and electric power. Additional runways and taxiways

were built at existing bases and some twenty new installations were constructed. The project also included protected command posts, fuel storage,

and air defense control facilities. Work of such a magnitude had guidance

from Russian advisers, but was possible because of the large Arab populations, making ample labor available for the effort. More intense Soviet

involvement could be seen in the development of an integrated air defense

system that featured numerous interlocking, radar directed surface to air

missiles and AA gun sites. Each site gave a measure of protection to nearby

positions. All were linked by a modern command and control network using

telephone cables to prevent jamming.

Before the Arabs began the October War, Israel's Air Force had prepared a series of plans to deal with renewed fighting. Based upon the experience of 1967, the first thrust by the IDF would have been a preemptive strike

against enemy airfields. Because of the protection given the aircraft at

Egyptian and Syrian bases, and Israel's apparent failure to develop suitable

ordnance, it was questionable how successful such a blow would have been.

In any event, for a variety of political and economic reasons, the plan

miscarried in 1973. Prime Minister Golda Meir's government prohibited

early attack by the IAF and restricted the reserve mobilization. The situation

facing Israel's defenders on October 6 could not have been worse. Immedi339
AIR BASE AIR DEFENSE

.I M _ , .

Israeli bombs strike main runway at Zalakieh Airfield, Egypt, October 1973.

ately, they had to fend off a well planned, two front Arab offensive protected by the heaviest air defense screen yet seen in warfare. Syria's armored

forces and the Egyptian tanks and infantry seized the initiative, forcing the

IAF to act as flying artillery, concentrating on close air support for the

ground units desperately trying to fend off opponents of nearly overwhelming size. Only when the IDF's reserves arrived to block the Syrians' passage

down from the Golan to Galilee and that of the Egyptians further into the

Sinai, could the Chel Ha'Avir turn its full attention to air superiority.

A clear distinction must be drawn between Arab ground based air

defenses along the two front lines and the defenses found around airfields. It

was along the front lines that the Arabs staked their hopes for victory, and

there they ultimately lost. For a few days, until overcome by the Israelis'

combined air ground assaults, the defenses along the Suez Canal and, to a

lesser degree, along the Syrian side of the Golan, stymied the IAE The

situation was not the same at Arab air bases where active defenses were less

evident and where the IAF, between October 7 and 20, regularly sent some

of its fighter-bombers. While expending about the same amount of effort

attacking bases in 1967 and in 1973, Israel lost fewer planes on such missions

340
THE MIDDLE EAST

Syrian airfield at Nassarieh suffers the same fate in the October war.

throughout the latter conflict than on the air base raids of June 5, 1967.

During the October War, the important factor in protecting aircraft and

facilities was the dispersed, hardened structures. The IAF's main problem

was not missiles or gunfire, but the failure either to develop or use weapons

able to penetrate walls and destroy materiel and aircraft.

Because neither Syria nor Egypt had forged air arms competent enough

to cope with the IAF, they had to content themselves with an initial air

attack, after which their air forces acted as defensive patrols or stayed on the

ground in isolated shelters. That their base defenses were greatly improved

and very effective in 1973 can be seen by a comparison of losses. In 1967,

450 Arab aircraft burned at their bases without firing a shot. In 1973,

however, only 22 fell victim to Israeli raiders. The heavy close air support

demands placed on the IAF detracted from its ability to attack bases. Consequently, it is speculative to judge how well the Arabs' base defenses would

have worked had Israel turned its full attention to them at the outset of

fighting on October 6. General Peled was initially hard pressed to overcome

the problems of contesting the AA shield while giving the Army close air

support. Once he found the ground war stabilized, however, he was able to

341
AIR BASE AIR DEFENSE

come to grips with the heavy SAM and AA threat along the Suez Canal.

Israeli Army advances to the west bank of the canal broke the continuity of

the missile belt. That opening allowed the IDF to expand its air and artillery

attacks on the air defenses with both antiradiation missiles and conventional

weapons, and ultimately to defeat them.

It mattered little what Israel knew or predicted of Arab intentions. The

IAF was superior in all respects save size, and firm in its belief that the best

way to defend its air bases was to defeat the enemy air force. For this reason,

Israel's base defenses were never thoroughly tested. Although the Arabs

protected their bases markedly better in 1973 with the hardened structures,

the IAF carried the fight to enemy air space. Had Israel prepared a weapon

capable of destroying an airfield's hardened installations, the outcome in

the air could well have been hastened by several days.

342
Chapter X

Conclusion

A host of factors has intruded upon the art and science of air base air

defense since the earliest aviators attempted to carry out attacks on enemy

airdromes. Only rarely has there been a successful defense in isolation from

the events on the remainder of a battlefront, and the defense can never be

considered outside the context of air superiority. The defense has seldom

prevailed with earthbound weapons alone. This was not clearly understood

during World War I; airplanes were still too fragile and lacked the range to

carry destructive attacks to enemy installations reliably, and the concepts

underpinning such an offensive air doctrine were still developing. The

squabbles between the American antiaircraft service and airfield commanders likewise resulted more from their failure at the time to comprehend

the principles of an integrated air defense than any other factor. Doctrine on

air war was still in its infancy during the 1920s, and air commanders in

different countries continued to argue its application, even as a new conflict

heavily tested Allied and Axis airfield defenses. The need for air superiority

for successful air base air defense became starkly clear during World War II,

however. Between 1939 and 1945 there were many major defensive battles

involving air bases, but few where the winning side did not hold or gain

control of the air.

In one of the most celebrated air base air defense actions, the Battle of

Britain, the RAF faced a Luftwaffe which initially held superiority, sought

to destroy RAF's Fighter Command, but lacked the long range bombers and

fighters needed to do the job. In addition, the Germans had only one

fighter, the Me109, that could protect the attacking force from the Hurricanes and Spitfires. The bombers themselves were very vulnerable. The

German attack plan was flawed and inexperienced leaders failed to make

343
AIR BASE AIR DEFENSE

that up with corrective tactical decisions. Ultimately, Germany's Air Force

lost the struggle for control of Fighter Command's bases.

Admittedly, the fight for Malta was an example of successful air base

defense without defensive air superiority. The struggle for this mid-Mediterranean island was, in fact, one of the only instances where defenders relied

almost exclusively on ground based gunfire, dispersal, and shelter. Closer

examination, however, reveals a far more complicated picture. The Axis

successfully swept the RAF's fighters from the sky several times, but failed

to destroy the air base complex when Hitler declined to seize the island with

an air and seaborne invasion. Failing to capture Malta meant that Great

Britain could reestablish flying operations and resume interdiction of the

supply lines to North Africa. The consequences for Germany were enormous. When the German-Italian Army surrendered at Tunis in 1943, the

heavy losses of men and equipment diminished the ability of the Axis to

defend itself in the West while facing the growing power of the Red Army in

the East. The struggles over Great Britain and Malta pointed out an inherent

disadvantage of air power: an air force can reduce an enemy's ability to fight

and even temporarily neutralize air bases, but the bases can recover quickly

as attention shifts away from them to other targets.

Understanding an air base's vulnerability, and its inherent resilience,

did not come easily for either air or army commanders during the early

years. The end of the First World War left most of the major nations aware

of the potential for airfield attacks in future conflicts. That awareness,

however, was something gained over a period of several years of combat.

Initial measures to protect air bases had been just as haphazard as were

attempts to destroy them from the air. The limited range and ability to carry

only small bomb loads meant that early aircraft were not a serious threat to

ground installations more than a few miles behind the lines. This was fortunate for the defenders, who were equally handicapped, it seems, by the

ineffective early AA guns and their own small aircraft. As airplanes developed in size and sophistication, however, they were used to attack an opponent's landing grounds and other sensitive targets more frequently. By 1916,

responding to the new weapon, antiaircraft gunners learned to fire at high

altitude, moving targets. Fuzes and projectiles were redesigned to accommodate the peculiarities of antiaircraft artillery. As a result, the ratio of aircraft

downed per rounds fired in 1918 was significantly higher than that of two

years earlier. By war's end, base defenses, including camouflage and light

and heavy AA weapons, proliferated. Both sides organized special air defense units, designed to protect army troops and air fields. Most important,

the idea that air superiority was needed for adequate defense emerged in the

plans and operations of the Allies and Germany.

After the Armistice, aircraft development continued, especially during

the late 1920s and the 1930s. Bombers were larger, faster, and better pro344
CONCLUSION

tected. Tactical attack aircraft able to strike at airfields appeared in the air

forces of many nations. Numerous technical and organizational problems

remained through the interwar years, however. The most persistent air defense difficulty was that of detecting approaching aircraft early enough to

mount a counterblow, either in the air or from ground fire. Increasing speed

and lethality of aircraft made acoustic detection devices obsolete, and the

abilities of human observers on the ground remained limited by bad weather

and darkness. Yet, the lack of money for design and production of newer,

more advanced detection systems during the lean budgetary years of the

Great Depression left these outdated listening devices and ground observers

still in wide use in 1940.

Development of fighter or pursuit aircraft, including their integration

into tactical defense systems, received little peacetime priority despite the

World War I accomplishments of such aviation in the RAF and other air

services. Even the persistent arguments of a few visionaries like the U.S.

Army Air Corps' Maj. Claire L. Chennault received little attention. The

difficulty of bringing relatively slow fighters close enough to a bomber to

allow shooting it down helped foster the idea in some countries that armed

bombers would be able to penetrate to the heartland of an enemy nation

relatively unscathed.

Changes during the late 1930s held great promise for air defense, however. The British built a radar screen to protect their islands, then produced

transportable radar sets for tactical use. Outside Great Britain, however,

radar did not find as receptive an audience. The U.S. Army kept its small

radar force a secret confined largely to Signal Corps circles. Army planners

did not integrate it into tactical air defense plans. Similar delays among the

Germans, Russians, and Japanese in adopting radar also negated the potential value of this new electronic medium for the first two years of World War

II.

Wartime events forced a greater investment in radar technology. Warning was absolutely essential to base defense, and radar production contracts

were quickly let. Ground observers supplemented small sets with the information fed to a central control point. Concomitant development of IFF

transponders and better radios increased a defense force's ability to fend off

an attack in a coherent fashion. The improved ability to detect and to

discriminate partially reduced the attackers' advantages of speed, surprise,

and lethality. At the same time, prewar ideas that equated air base defense

only with guns at an airfield gave way to the integrated use of weapons,

camouflage, decoy aircraft, dummy airfields, and damage repair.

The air doctrine and the aircraft technology of the interwar period also

militated against the development of a coherent concept of air base defense.

Air leaders thought more about attack than they did air base defense; thus

defense preparations proved generally inadequate when conflict once more

345
AIR BASE AIR DEFENSE

erupted. At first sight, this seemed an anomaly since one is just the reverse

of the other. Someone planning to raid an opponent's landing fields and

destroy his planes should surely have expected and prepared for the same

treatment to be given his aircraft and ground installations. In the 1930s, the

U. S. Army had only reluctantly accepted air defense participation in major

exercises such as the First Army maneuvers. The reports issued on completion of the exercise did not address serious questions of deficient equipment

and command and control. One reason for the Americans' lack of emphasis

on defense lay in the evolving nature of air bases themselves. Light planes

used between the wars could land and take off on virtually any level field. If

one patch of ground was unusable, another would do just as well. The

airplanes of the time required little in the way of service facilities. Consequently, the term "air base" did not always refer to a single landing field.

Sometimes it meant a general geographic area, often fifty miles or more

across, containing many landing grounds. Protecting such an expanse of

real estate obviously was impractical for a small army concerned with the

safety of the continental United States and its territories and restrained

fiscally by the depression bound economy. It was not until the general use of

heavy or high performance aircraft, such as four engine British and American bombers, that hard runways and taxiways and the need for complex

service facilities concentrated an "air base" within a relatively small area.'

By then, war spending greatly increased the flow of weapons and fostered

improved defense organization.

During World War II, air base air defense became part of the broader

effort to gain air superiority. More than air combat was involved in the

protection of bases, however. After Germany's conquests of continental air

forces in 1939 and 1940 and the retreat of the RAF from France, a greater

array of warning services, antiaircraft gun deployment, and base recovery

efforts appeared. Moreover, close cooperation between several types of units

were common to successful base defense.

Interservice cooperation and the need for joint or combined operations

was vital to air base air defense in most theaters. The greatest success was

probably that of the British in Egypt and Libya in 1942 and 1943. A comparable achievement was seen also in the Southwest Pacific. Service cooperation, however, often flourished as a function of the personal philosophies of

individual commanders rather than as recognized battle doctrine. In the

Western Desert, Tedder, Coningham, and Montgomery forged a superb

working arrangement, but only after some trying times. Conversely, Rommel and several of the Luftwaffe's commanders in North Africa often failed

to agree on cooperation between air and ground elements. The German Air

Force's bases and its ability to support the Axis army in the desert suffered.

Halfway around the world, the natural trust of Douglas MacArthur and

George Kenney contributed to the construction of a string of crucial air

346
CONCLUSION

bases in Australia and New Guinea. From these bases Kenney's raiders

delivered repeated, devastating blows on Japanese installations.

World War II brought rapid changes in the use of antiaircraft guns.

Before the war, planners often viewed employment of AA guns as separate

from the command of flying operations. The number of guns needed for

adequate base protection was generally misunderstood and underestimated,

or procurement was severely constrained by the effects of the world economic depression. A forced parsimony of the Exchequer in the mid-1930s

left the British Expeditionary Force in France in 1939 with just one light AA

regiment for the Air Component's air base air defense. The British Army

alloted about the same number of guns for defense of the independent

Advanced Air Striking Force's airdromes. Allied warning services were completely inadequate, and the two regiments mounted only a token defense. At

most, the warning services made for a false sense of security. The collapse of

the Allies in France in 1940 brought about a reevaluation of the meager gun

allowances and a recognition that more weapons were required. Even so,

production could not approach the needs of global warfare for several years.

Until 1944, AA guns were a scarce commodity in the Allied forces. The

Mediterranean Command's Anti-Aircraft and Coast Defense Committee

spent at least as much time wrestling with questions of gun allocation as it

did with policy and command problems.'

The importance of recovery efforts to operation of an air base and the

base's continued use by a flying force was soon emphasized. After devastating raids during the Battle of Britain, the RAF restored several of its bases to

operation only through the most exemplary efforts of leadership and diligence. Fighters could operate largely because of the repeated efforts of

military and civilian crews who repaired bomb damage. Elsewhere, American and Japanese commanders in the Solomon Islands went to great lengths

to repair bomb damage and keep airfields serviceable. The Americans succeeded at Guadalcanal; the Japanese lost at Munda and had to abandon

their important airfield there.

On the Eastern Front, the Red Air Force viewed base recovery in a

different light. In the Russian forests and on the steppes, there was ample

space for building crude airfields used by a few planes serviced at a main

base some miles away. The easily concealed fields were so simple that bomb

damage was readily repaired or the runway abandoned; operations could

simply move elsewhere. Viewed by some as primitive, the Red Air Force's

system proved as effective in terms of VVS doctrine as that of any other

combatant. After the initial period of retreat and disorganization in 1941,

the Russians began to use the thousands of landing fields and an extensive

observation and warning system to great advantage. The multiplicity of sites

presented incredible targeting problems for Axis commanders and the Red

Air Force's mobility meant that once warned they had an excellent chance to

347
AIR BASE AIR DEFENSE

escape destruction. The ability to move quickly to a base, and to employ

nearby decoy fields was one of the keys to the Red Air Force's survival.

Changes in the nature of bases to meet new and heavier aircraft led to

evolution in their construction. By 1943, Allied forces were able to lay out a

flying field, grade the surface, and cover it with perforated steel planks,

crushed rock, or coral in, a matter of days. This ability did not come easily.

In the Southwest Pacific, for example, a great deal of learning and many

organizational changes were needed before George Kenney could airlift engineers to build a base in remote New Guinea.

Training, too, became an integral part of air base air defense. The

proficiency of radar operators in Britain in 1940 and of Malta's gunners in

1941 and 1942 were prime examples. A more subtle result could be seen later

in the war. A report by the American Army's AA Command on July 6, 1943,

quoted a British Royal Artillery officer, who said that it was "a fallacy [to

believe] that the highest standard of [AA gunnery] training is attained purely

by frequent engagement with the enemy." . . . The "best chance of a hit is

on the opening round and ... the utmost accuracy of these rounds must be

stressed." 3 Shooting of that sort demanded concentrated practice before the

fighting. Such training had to be made as realistic as possible. The use of

live ammunition fired at moving targets was almost axiomatic. These comments, however, carried with them the incisive and painful reminders of the

Royal Artillery's inability to find training targets at Singapore in 1941.

American Brig. Gen. Lyman Lemnitzer* severely criticized poor radar maintenance, and the inability of American radar to work as it should in North

Africa. Many and varied resources had to be molded into one command to

achieve the training and operational coordination needed for successful tactical air defense. Theater air commanders, gun crew chiefs, and the leaders

of teams that located unexploded ordnance or filled bomb craters all had to

be proficient at their jobs. Only in the last two years of the war did the Allies

achieve strong working relationships among the various services. By then,

the German and Japanese air forces were debilitated by several years of

fighting.

Even on the verge of victory, interservice rivalry threatened to undo the

American military's attainments. Worse, the problems which surfaced continued into the postwar years. In World War II, the growth of tactical air

defense differed, as would be expected, in each major theater. The disturbing factor was that the differences stemmed more from the theater commanders' wishes than thoughtful application of air-ground warfighting

* At the time, Lemnitzer commanded the 34th AA Brigade in North Africa. Later, he was

Chief of Staff to the Allied Supreme Commander, Mediterranean. After the war, he was Chief

of Staff of the U.S. Army, 1959-1960, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1960-1962, and

Commander of NATO forces from 1962 to 1969.

348
CONCLUSION

doctrine. Capable commanders such as MacArthur and Kenney did well,

but even in MacArthur's Southwest Pacific, confusion in the Allied air

defense control system continued into early 1944. Less experienced men,

inheriting forces equally inexperienced in battle, fared correspondingly

worse.

By mid-1944, American air-ground coordination problems in air defense appeared solved with the general recognition that air defense warning,

command, and combat elements had to be grouped under a single organization, but this was only a surface gloss. Increasingly, special interests of

Army and Air Force leaders surfaced, jeopardizing much of the cooperation

learned over several years. A report completed in May 1945 by the General

Board, United States Forces, European Theater, was replete with examples

of the services' inability to decide how to integrate AA into theater air

defense operations.4 As a matter of course, such conflict affected air base air

defense practices. The United States Army, and after 1947, the Army and

Air Force together, seemed determined to misjudge the needs of base defense.

The confusion and the conflict was due in part to interservice rivalry

and an argument over the definition of roles and missions. World War II

also left varying views of the relative importance of AA guns. Early in the

war, the Luftwaffe earned a reputation for highly effective and lethal AA

fire against inadequately armed and armored aerial opponents. Because the

Germans had more such weapons, and used them so well, they lent to AA an

inflated reputation in air base defense. Certainly, antiaircraft artillery fire

could be deadly, especially at altitudes below 3,000 feet, and pilots rightly

feared it. On the other hand, AA guns could fire at a low and fast aerial

target for only a short time. In addition, AA suppression measures, like

machine gun fire and bombs, could be very effective. Only a highly disciplined gun crew functioned well under the stress of heavy attack. Even under

ordinary circumstances, AA gun crews reacted differently according to degrees of nervousness, excitement, or training.

After World War II, many nations demobilized their military forces.

Among them were those of the United States. At the same time, deterrence

and retaliation received much more thought because of nuclear weapons.

The United States spent much of the available defense money on the Strategic Air Command. By 1950, the USAF's tactical force had shrunk, and

collateral training of such specialties as radar operators was greatly reduced.

When the Korean War began, Fifth Air Force commanders assumed air

superiority would protect their advanced bases, and subsequent experience

showed Generals Partridge and Stratemeyer to be right. Defense of UN

bases was rarely tested; when attacks came, they were not serious.

A decade after the Korean War, the U.S. military found itself embroiled

in Southeast Asia. Again, the Americans assumed correctly that air super349
AIR BASE AIR DEFENSE

iority would protect their overcrowded bases. The North Vietnamese Air

Force did not venture south of the military demarcation line, and one can

only speculate about the result of an air attack on a base such as Da Nang.

A survey of the results of a sapper attack on July 5, 1965, and subsequent

stand off attacks there and at other installations might cast doubt upon how

much damage the American air defenses would have been able to prevent

had they been tested.' American attacks on the NVNAF's airfields were

sporadic, largely because the Americans did not wish to risk losses while

hitting targets of doubtful value. Only late in the conflict, during LINEBACKER I and LINEBACKER II, were such attacks pursued seriously. Results

were mixed. North Vietnam's air base defense system scattered and sheltered

its flying squadrons, but when U. S. Air Force, Navy, and Marine airpower

attacked in force, defense proved inadequate and the NVNAF withdrew

temporarily to China. Although the bases, with one exception, were not

closed for more than a few hours, North Vietnamese sorties were reduced

drastically for a time, thus reducing the danger from fighter interception.

Throughout the post-World War II period, the American military, while

occasionally losing planes to aerial assault, lived a charmed existence. It has

not faced in combat an enemy determined to destroy it, so there was no

compelling need to resolve differences of opinion as to base defense responsibility. Meanwhile, the Middle East wars of 1967 and 1973 showed new

possibilities for air base attack and defense.

The Arab air forces were a significant threat to their enemy, Israel. The

Israelis clearly recognized this. In World War II, future Israeli air commanders learned well from the RAF. Later, in 1956, they saw again what air

power did to Egypt's Air Force. The 1967 attack on the EAF was a direct

outgrowth of the French-British success at neutralizing the Egyptians during

the Suez Crisis. Geography, which limited the number of Israeli airfields,

combined with a sense of desperation among IAF commanders to promote a

belief in the necessity for a first strike. Lacking the political limitations the

Americans accepted in Southeast Asia, the Israelis were more aggressive in

planning and weapon development. The resulting low level attacks of June

5, 1967, destroyed for a time the Arabs' air capability. The shock to Arab

pride was great, but it did not preclude their devising better ways to protect

airplanes.

In the 1967 conflict, the Israelis' sudden strike, including the use of

special "concrete dibber bombs:' left the EAF paralyzed. Aircraft losses

were heavy, and runway damage repair was slow. Some bases were out of

operation for long periods. This was not the case in October 1973 when

adequate advance preparation of hardened structures protected most aircraft, and expertly trained repair crews restored bases to use in hours. Protected aircraft parking areas and other facilities (such as ammunition

dumps, fuel storage, and power generation units) increased the difficulty of

350
CONCLUSION

destroying an air base. When the Israelis struck at Egyptian and Syrian

bases in 1973 and found they had no weapon to penetrate hardened

hangarettes, they realized what the Luftwaffe learned at Malta in 1942, and

before that over England in 1940: successful attacks on bases require proper

weapons to overcome the passive as well as the active protective measures

encountered. Nevertheless, in 1973, the Arabs lacked the skills to contest air

superiority. The result was that even with inadequate air base attack weapons, Israel was able to dominate her enemies' flying fields.

The experience of the October 1973 war also suggested the use of

modern technology to create an almost impenetrable air defense. A first

look at the results of that war seems to support such a possibility. The

Arabs, with Soviet support, built a heavy belt of missiles and AA guns.

When fighting began, the Israelis were forced to battle the missile belt to

give their Army close air support. In turn, the IAF suffered severe losses in

three weeks of combat. However, the conclusion by some observers that

heavy fields of AA gunfire and surface to air missiles kept the Israelis away

from Arab air bases was false. From October 7, the second day of fighting,

to the end of the conflict, Israeli fighter-bombers struck at will at Egyptian

and Syrian airfields. In doing so, they lost fewer aircraft than during the

series of air base attacks on the single day of June 5, 1967. General Peled's

airmen knew how to do the job. In not wholeheartedly contesting air superiority, the Arabs tacitly recognized this. Why the IAF's leaders were not

better prepared to destroy targets whose characteristics they were fully aware

of is difficult and speculative to answer. Overconfidence growing out of the

1967 war and the subsequent ability to shoot down Arab aircraft in aerial

combat are the most probable answers.

Syrian and Egyptian antiaircraft weapons on the front lines caused

most of the IAF's losses in 1973. Along both the Golan and Canal fronts,

the Israelis defeated the AA systems by combining ingenious air tactics,

guile, aircraft modification (like extending the tailpipes of jets to reduce

damage from small air to ground missiles), and air ground cooperation,

including artillery and armor penetration. Certainly, the ability to provide

an impenetrable air defense was not proved by the Arabs. Israel won because

her forces were better trained, better equipped, and abler than those of her

opponents. However, the short duration of the conflict, the mismatch in

quality of fighting equipment, and Arab inability to contest control of the

air makes tentative any attempt to form general conclusions about the

changed nature of tactical air warfare and vulnerability that might apply to

a longer and more general conflict.

Methods and doctrines employed by various air forces to achieve dominance have differed greatly. Air superiority and the ensuing requirements of

air base air defense had to be defined anew not only for World War II, but

also for the different theaters within that war, and for each conflict since.

351
AIR BASE AIR DEFENSE

Because modern aircraft have become such powerful and flexible fighting

tools, air superiority in a tactical campaign had to be won day by day. Bases

attacked once could not be considered out of action; often they were returned to use overnight. Furthermore, there were campaigns in which air

superiority and air base air defense failed to fit a preconceived notion.

Commanders who could not adapt their thinking to new circumstances

quickly found their units in trouble and often lost the battle.

New weapons developed since 1945 have changed the style of fighting

and of defending landing grounds. Design evolution produced guns and

missiles able to follow a target more rapidly than before, be aimed more

precisely, and fire faster. At the same time, costs for such weapons and their

accompanying control systems have risen, more skillful servicing has become necessary, and crews have to be better trained. Offensive weapons also

improved. Bases have been struck by faster planes with weapons able to be

more effectively aimed and of greater destructive capacity. The practical use

of remotely piloted aircraft and stand off weapons has just begun. Thus far,

remote control has been limited largely to deception and reconnaissance, but

offers the promise of even greater application to truly offensive weaponry.

The mere presence of weapons, however, has proved little. Success emerged

only when a commander had guns, missiles, or fighters in adequate numbers, with well trained crews, and used them according to the needs of

battle.

Paradoxically, since 1940 air bases have been difficult to defend, but

they have also proven to be very hard to destroy. Neither the defense of

Malta nor the Arabs' success in 1973 at protecting aircraft and restoring

their bases set a standard of achievement that allowed the separation of air

base air defense from questions of theater air capability, deftness of command, or interservice cooperation. That so few examples of base defense

without air superiority exist does not mean it has not been achieved. Rather,

the question must be viewed in the light of overall air and air-ground operations. In base defense there has not yet been found a substitute for destruction of the enemy's air force by a strong, well planned counterair campaign.

352
Appendices
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APPENDIX 2

Representative Antiaircraft Weapons, World War II

Weapon Projectile Muzzle Rate of Fire Effective

Weight Velocity (per minute) Range

(pounds) (feet)

United States

37-mm 1.4 lbs 2,600 120 10,500

3-in M3 12.9 lbs 2,800 25 28,000

3-in M4 12.9 lbs 2,800 25 29,000

90-mm 23.4 lbs 2,700 27 33,800

105-mm 32.8 lbs 2,800 15 37,000

120-mm 50.0 lbs 3,100 12 47,400

Great Britain

40-mm 2.0 lbs 2,700 120 5,000

Bofors

3-in 16.5 lbs 2,000 25 25,200

3.7-in 28.0 lbs 2,600 25 32,000

Mk3

3.7-in 28.0 lbs 3,425 19 45,000

Mk6

4.5-in 54.0 lbs 2,400 8 34,500

Japan

7.7-mm .47 oz 2,700 250 2,000*

13.2-mm 1.8 oz 2,722 8,400*

20-mm 4.8 oz 2,720 120 7,500*

25-mm 8.2 oz 2,850 190 7,500

75-mm 14.3 lbs 2,450 15 21,250

*estimated

Germany

20-mm 4.2 oz 2,950 700 3,500

Flak 38

37-mm 1.4 lbs 2,690 80 3,000

Flak 36

40-mm (See under Great Britain)

Bofors

88-mm 20 lbs 2,690 15-20 26,250

Flak 18,

36, 37

88-mm 20.7 lbs 3,280 20 35,000

Flak 41

105-mm 33.2 lbs 2,890 10-15 31,000
Appendix 2 (continued):

Soviet Union

37-mm M39 1.6 lbs 2,700 160 12,000

76-mm M38 14.5 lbs 2,700 20 26,000

85-mm M39 20.2 lbs 2,650 20 25,000

85-mm M14 20.2 lbs 2,950 20 31,000

105-mm M34 33.0 lbs 3,050 12 38,000
Glossary

AA Antiaircraft, antiaircraft guns

ABDA American-British-Dutch-Australian Command, 1942

ACTS Air Corps Tactical School (U.S.)

Aeronautique The French Air Service of World War I

Militaire

Air Army Early in World War II, the major Japanese Army air commands were

(Japanese) known as air forces or air groups. As the air arm gained a greater

measure of independence from the ground force, the Japanese reorganized their forces and groups as air armies. There was one air

general army with six air armies, the latter assigned to specific theaters of operations.

Air Brigade One or two air regiments with intelligence, (Japanese) signal, or recon-

(Japanese) naissance units as required.

Air Division TWo to Four air regiments, two to four airfield battalions, one inde-

(Japanese) pendent air squadron (reconnaissance), plus intelligence and signal

units.

Air Fleet (Japanese) Two or more aircraft carriers with cruiser or destroyer escort.

Air Flotilla Land based naval air unit.

(Japanese)

Air Regiment Twenty-five to forty fighter planes. A bomber regiment had as few as

(Japanese) twelve medium or heavy bombers.

Air Sector Usually about eight airfield battalions, all operating within the same

Command general area.

(Japanese)

Altitude The vertical distance to a point in space from a reference plane, usually

the horizontal plane containing an AA battery or radar station.

A.M.E.S. British. Air Ministry Experimental Station; a cover name for radar, see

also RDF

Area Army Two or more armies or other combat units with necessary line of

(Japanese) communication units. Conducted general field operations.

Army (Japanese) Two or more divisions with added combat units with necessary line of

communication units. Conducted general field operations.

Battery A group of two or more artillery or AA guns. Generally three or four

guns.

Bn Battalion

CAP Combat Air Patrol

CCF Chinese Communist Forces

Chance of Damage The summation of the chances of being hit by AA fire when passing

along a crossing course within range of gun batteries. See also effectiveness.

Chel Ha'Avir Israel Air Force

Continuous A method of director fire control in which the fire control devices are

Following kept on the target and the data vary continuously with the position

of the target.

359
AIR BASE AIR DEFENSE

Crossing Course The horizontal course of an airplane which is within range of an AA

battery, but which does not pass vertically over the battery.

Dead Zone The area directly above a gun position into which the gun cannot fire

because the quadrant elevation mechanism cannot raise the gun

muzzle any higher. This is usually 80 degrees. The diameter of the

zone, in which a directly approaching plane is safe, increases in

prop~ortion to increasing altitude.

Director A predicting instrument used to determine the firing data pertaining to

the future position of the target aircraft.

EAF Egyptian Air Force

Effective Ceiling The maximum vertical range at which an AA gun or missile can accurately engage an approaching aircraft.

Effectiveness The product of the number of shots fired along any crossing course

and the mean probability of the shots.

EW Early Warning

FEAF Far East Air Forces, United States

Flak German acronym derived from the word Fliegerabwehrkanone, antiaircraft gun

GAF German Air Force, Luftwaffe

GCI Ground controlled intercept, a method of guiding fighters toward approaching aircraft. Usually by means of radar.

Geschwader A flying unit of the Luftwaffe made up of 3-4 Gruppen. The approximate equivalent of a USAAF wing.

GL Gun laying

G.O.R. Gun Operations Room

Gruppe A flying unit of the Luftwaffe made up of 2 to 4 Staffeln. About the

equivalent of a USAAF group or an RAF wing. Pl., Gruppen.

Heavy AA Antiaircraft guns of a caliber greater than 50-mm.

Hikojo Daitai World War II Japanese air base battalion

HMSO Her Majesty's Stationary Office

IAF Israel Air Force

IDF Israel Defense Force

IFF Identification Friend or Foe

IIS Informational Intelligence Summary (USAAF)

Jagdgeschwader A fighter Geschwader of the Luftwaffe

JATO Jet assisted take off

JOC Joint Operations Center

JG See Jagdgeschwader

Kampfgeschwader A bomber Geschwader of the Luftwaffe

KG See Kampfgesch wader

Lehrgeschwader A training or demonstration Geschwader of the GAF

LC Library of Congress, Washington, DC

LG See Lehrgeschwader

Limiting Envelope Points in space, representing the maximum gun or missile ranges for

all altitudes, connected by a continuous line. The curved line is

called the limiting envelope. The maximum range for any altitude

for heavy and medium AA guns is limited by the muzzle velocity

and the maximum fuze time. For AA missiles the maximum range is

determined by the engine burn time and thrust generated. Mathematically, the limiting envelope is the locus of all points on trajectories for the time of flight of maximum range.

360
GLOSSARY

Light AA Small caliber antiaircraft guns. In this study, weapons of .50 caliber,

25-mm or less are considered light AA. During World War II, however, the British Army considered 40-mm to be light AA.

Luftflotte German. Air Fleet, a German World War II unit roughly comparable

to an American numbered air force or RAF group.

LORAN Long Range Aid to Navigation

MAAF Mediterranean Allied Air Force

MAG Marine Air Group

MAW Marine Air Wing

Maximum Ceiling The greatest vertical range of a projectile.

Medium AA Antiaircraft guns of 37-mm, 40-mm, or 50-mm.

M.R.U. British. Mobile Radio Unit, mobile radar.

MS Manuscript

M.T. British. motor transport, mechanical transport

NAAF Northwest African Allied Air Force

NATAF Northwest African Allied Tactical Air Force

NK North Korea

NKAF North Korean Air Force

NKPA North Korean Peoples' Army

NVN North Vietnam

NVNAF North Vietnamese Air Force

PRO Public Record Office, London

Probability The chance of a single shot being a hit.

PVO Strany The national air defense forces of the Soviet Union during World War

II. Separate from the tactical air force (see VVS).

RAAF Royal Australian Air Force

Radar American and British acronym for radio detecting and ranging. A

device for determining electronically the distance, speed, or altitude

of an approaching object. The determination is made by measuring

the time of echo of a radio wave.

RAF Royal Air Force

RDF British. Radio direction finding, a cover name for radar.

Regia Aeronautica Italian Air Force, World War II

Regt Regiment

RG Record Group, U.S. National Archives

SCR Signal Corps Radio, used to designate various types of equipment,

such as the SCR-270 long range warning radar.

SG or STG Stukageschwader, a dive bomber Geschwader of the Luftwaffe

Slant Range The distance from a gun or missile site to the position of the target

airplane.

Sortie One aircraft flying one mission

Staffel The Luftwaffe's smallest operational flying unit. Roughly comparable

to, but smaller than, an American or RAF squadron, usually 9

aircraft.

TACP Tactical air control party

USAAF United States Army Air Forces

USSBS United States Strategic Bombing Survey. The survey was conducted

after World War II and is reported in separate sections for Europe

and the Pacific.

361
AIR BASE AIR DEFENSE

VVS Voyenno-Vozdushniye Sily, during World War II, or in Soviet terms

the Great Patriotic War, the tactical air arm of the Red Army.

W.O.U. (British) Wireless Observation Units

Y-Service Tactical radio intercept and decryption units. The term is commonly

applied to the British and American military of World War II, but

all countries had such organizations.

Zerstbrergesch wader Squadron of Mel 10 "Destroyer" fighters of the Luftwaffe.

362
Notes

Introduction

1. Derek Wood and Derek Dempster, The Lloyd, Briefed to Attack, Malta's Part in

Narrow Margin, The Battle of Britain and the African Victory (London, 1949), Chapters

Rise of Air Power 1930-40 (New York, 1961), XII and XIII, passim.

p 229, Appendices 6, 13, and 18; Hugh P.

Chapter I

Air Base Defense in World War I

1. James T. B. McCudden, Flying Fury, Jones and Raleigh, War in the Air, Vol I, p

Five Years in the Royal Flying Corps, edited 327.

by Stanley M. Ulanoff (Garden City, 1968), 7. S. W. Roskill, ed. Documents Relating

pp 21-57. to the Naval Air Service, 1908-1918 (London,

2. H. A. Jones and Walter Raleigh, The 1969), pp 167-171, 181-183; Jones and RaWar in the Air, 6 vols (Oxford, 1922-1934), leigh, War in the Air, pp 375-390; George H.

Vol I, p 327; McCudden, Flying Fury, pp Quester, Deterrence Before Hiroshima, The

54-55. Airpower Background of Modern Strategy

3. Maurer Maurer, ed. The US. Air Ser- (New York, 1966), pp 35 and 52.

vice in World War 1, 4 vols (Washington, DC, 8. William Manchester, The Arms of

1978), Vol II, p 148. Krupp, 1587-1968 (Boston & Toronto, 1968),

4. Table of Engineer Data on Construc- p 126; Otto-Wilhelm von Renz, The Develoption of Production Center No 2, Weekly Rpt, ment of German Antiaircraft Weapons and

11 Nov 1918, Air Service, AEF, in "History of Equipment of all 7Tpes up to 1945, USAF

the Air Service, American Expeditionary Hist Study 194 (Maxwell AFB, 1958), pp 1-4;

Force:' compiled by Col Edgar S. Gorrell. 280 Ian V. Hogg, Anti-aircraft: A History of Air

vols, RG 120, NA. The Gorrell History is also Defence (London, 1978), pp 13-14. Hogg

in National Archives Microfilm Group gives the caliber of the Krupp Balloon Gun as

M-990, 58 rolls. 25-mm, von Renz as 37-mm.

5. Jones and Raleigh, War in the Air, Vol 9. Manchester, Krupp, p 263; Hogg, AntiI, pp 395-400. Aircraft, pp 19-29; von Renz, Development

6. McCudden, Flying Fury, pp 46-47; of German Antiaircraft, Ch 2, p 14. Antiair363
AIR BASE AIR DEFENSE

craft guns were available and produced before 22. Ibid.

the war, however, given their relative scarcity 23. "History of 17th Aero Sq,' in History

in August 1914 Manchester's assertion that of Organization of Aero Squadrons, Vol 1, pp

they were "bought furiously" may not be an 16-17, USAF Collection, 167.401-14.

accurate description. 24. Washington, D.C., National Archives,

10. Jones and Raleigh, War in the Air, Vol Correspondence of the Anti-Aircraft Service,

I, pp 168, 268; Roskill, NavalAir Service, pp AEF, RG 120, entry 741.

139, 148 and 167. 25. Ibid.

11. Jones and Raleigh, War in the Air, Vol 26. Ibid.

II, pp 168-171; Hogg, Anti-Aircraft, pp 39-43. 27. Ltr., Wheeler to GHQ, AEF (G-3),

12. Hogg, Anti-Aircraft, pp 41-42. Issue of Anti-Aircraft Machine Guns, May

13. Ibid, pp 35, 65-67; Extracts from 14, 1918, HQ, AEF Records, RG 120, entry

Conference on Anti-Aircraft Defense, Paris, 741.

December 26, 1923, M.I.D. Report No. 6312, 28. Ibid; Records of the 2nd Antiaircraft

USAF Collection 145.91-534, pp 1-4. Machinegun Battalion, AEF Records, RG

14. Hogg, Anti-Aircraft, pp 44-47. 120, NA.

15. Ibid. 29. Correspondence of the Anti-Aircraft

16. Jones and Raleigh, War in the Air, Vol Service, AEF, RG 120, entry 741.

II, pp 149-150, 183, 283-285, 320-321, Ap- 30. History of the 1st Air Depot at

pendices VI and IX; Malcolm Cooper, "The Colombey-les-Belles, Gorrell History, roll 31;

Development of Air Policy and Doctrine on Maurer, US. Air Service in World War , Vol

the Western Front, 1914-1918:' Aerospace IV, pp 1-10.

Historian 28 (Spring 81), p 43. 31. Maurer, U.S. Air Service, Vol 1, p 175;

17. Jones and Raleigh, War in the Air, Vol Gorrell Hist, roll 31.

II, pp 281-297, 324-326, 442-445; Cooper, 32. Maurer, US. Air Service, Vol 1, pp

"Air Policy and Doctrine:' pp 42-45. 284-308; AEF Memorandum No. 1, Compo18. Jones and Raleigh, War in the Air, Vol sition of Anti-Aircraft Radio Net, in ibid, Vol

III, pp 319-320, Vol IV, pp 115-117. IV, pp 100-102.

19. Ibid, Vol II, Appendix VIII, Vol III, 33. Ibid, Vol IV, p 42.

Appendix XI. 34. Ibid, p 37-38; Air Corps Tactical

20. Jones and Raleigh, War in the Air, Vol School (ACTS) Air Force (Antiaircraft DeVI, p 162-163; U.S. Department of the Army, fense) Course, March 1940, section AF-16-C,

United States Army in World War I RG 18, entry 273.

1917-1919, 17 vols, (Washington: 1948), Vol 1, 35. William C. Sherman, Air Warfare.

Report of Baker Mission, pp 55ff; Washing- (New York, 1926), p 36.

ton, DC, National Archives, Navy and Old 36. Cooper, "Policy and Doctrine,' pp 43,

Army Branch, "Report on Anti-aircraft 45-46.

Defense:' 5 March 1918, Correspondence of 37. Hogg, Anti-Aircraft, p 67; Report of

the Anti-Aircraft Service, RG 120, entry 741. the Baker Mission, pp 64-65.

21. Raymond H. Fredette, Sky on Fire, 38. Jones and Raleigh, War in the Air, Vol

The First Battle of Britain 1917-1918 and the VI, p 158ff.

Birth of the Royal Air Force (New York, 39. Maurer, US. Air Service, Vol I, p 175;

1966), photographs pp 102-103; Jones and Baker Mission Rept, U.S. Army in World War

Raleigh, War in the Air, Vol VI, pp 158-164. I, pp 64-65.

Chapter II

Interwar Doctrine and Technology Changes

1. Richard Suchenwirth, The Develop- 2. Christopher Thorne, The Limits of

ment of the German Air Force, 1919-1939, Foreign Policy; The West, The League and the

USAF Hist Studies 160 (Maxwell AFB, 1968), Far East Crisis of 1931-1933 (New York,

Ch 1, passim. 1973), Ch 1.

364
NOTES

3. Sherman, Air Warfare, p 116; Robert F. Artillery, A Complete Manual of Technique

Finney, History of the Air Corps Tactical and Material (Harrisburg, 1941), pp 441-468;

School, 1920-1940, USAF Hist Study 100 William J. Wuest, History of Heavy AA Fire

(Maxwell AFB, 1955), p 12; Maurer, U S. Air Control and Materiel (Ft. Bliss, 1951), p 126;

Service Vol II, pp 313ff. "History of Air Defense,' Air Defense Mag4. Claire L. Chennault, The Role of De- azine, July-Sept 1979, pp 38-40.

fensive Pursuit, [privately published mono- 16. Report on Development of Aircraft

graph] 1933, passim. Warning Service, Nov 6, 1941, HQ, AF Coin5. Ibid, pp 6-12. bat Cmd, RG 18, entry 270.

6. Ibid. pp 15-17. 17. U.S. War Dept, Training Regulation

7. Intv, author with Lt Gen Devol Brett, 435-30, 16 April 1928, pp 4ff.

USAF, Ret, Washington, D.C., Feb. 15, 1985; 18. U.S. War Dept, The Engineer School,

Thomas A. Sturm, "Henry Conger Pratt: Second Research Course, March 1, 1940, DeFirst Air Corps Permanent General Officee,' fense of Air Bases, USAF Collection,

Aerospace Historian 22 (June 1975), p 72; Air 248.82-75R; The Air Corps Board, Study No

Corps Newsletter, "The GHQ Air Force Con- 5, 8 January 1936, USAF Collection

centration in Florida,' 15 January 1936, pp 169.7032-70.

11-15; Richard H. Kohn and Joseph P. Hara- 19. U. S. War Dept, Coast Artillery

han, eds, Air Superiority in World War II and School, AAA Defense Against Glide and

Korea (Washington, DC, 1983), pp 14-46; Dive Attack, 1940. USAF Collection,

John F. Shiner, Foulois and the Army Air 248.712-8.

Corps, 1931-1935 (Washington, D.C., 1983), 20. Rept, Air Staff, Post-Hostilities Intelpp 45-48; Robert F. Futrell, Ideas, Concepts, ligence Requirements on the German Air

Doctrine: A History of Basic Thought In The Force, HQ, AAF, Nov 22, 1944, Sect IV,

United States Air Force 1907-1964 (Maxwell Tactical Employment, Luftwaffe Directive 16,

AFB, 1971), p 35, 76-77. "The Conduct of Aerial Warfare,' paras.

8. Wood and Dempster, Narrow Margin, 16-19, 26, USAF Collection 519.601B; Wilpp 126ff, 170; Edward L. Safford, Modern liamson Murray, "The Luftwaffe Against PoRadar: Theory, Operation and Maintenance land and the West,' draft study for AF/CHO,

(Blue Ridge Summit, Pa., 1971), pp 19-20. 1985.

9. Wood and Dempster, Narrow Margin, 21. Luftwaffe Directive 16, paras 4, 55.

pp 279-285; Ronald W. Clark, Tizard (Cam- 22. Horst Boog, "The Luftwaffe and

bridge, Mass., 1965), pp 114-116; Air Corps Technology,' Aerospace Historian 30, SepTabctical School (ACTS), Air Force (Antiair- tember, 1983, pp 200-206; An excellent discraft Defense) Course, 1939-1940, Papers of cussion can also be found in Boog's "Higher

Lt Col Fenton G. Epling, RG 18, entry 273; Command and Leadership in the German

Intv, General Earle E. Partridge, Apr 23-25 Luftwaffe, 1935-1945:' Air Power and War1974, USAF Collection K239.0512-729, pp fare (Proceedings of the Eighth Military His272-273. tory Symposium, USAF Academy, 1978),

10. Samuel Eliot Morison, The Rising Sun Washington, D.C., 1979, pp 128-158. Wilin the Pacific, 1931 - April 1942 [History of liamson Murray, Strategy for Defeat The LufUnited States Naval Operations in World War twaffe 1933-1945 (Maxwell AFB, 1983),

II] (Boston, 1968, pp 31-33; David 0. Wood- Chap 1, covers the topic in broader terms.

bury, Builders for Battle, How the Pacific 23. Suchenwirth, "Historical Turning

Naval Air Bases were Constructed (New Points", Ch 1.

York, 1946), pp 39-42; Charles Updegraph, 24. Ibid, p 108; Hogg, Anti-Aircraft, p 81;

Special Marine Corps Units of World War 11 Alfred Price, Luftwaffe Handbook,

(Washington, D.C., 1972), pp 54, 61-63; Fu- 1939-1945 (New York, 1977), p 65; Hogg,

trell, Ideas, Concepts, Doctrine, pp 72, 81. Anti-Aircraft, pp 84, 108ff.

11. ACTS, Antiaircraft Course, section 25. Memorandum, 1939, Brig Gen B. K.

AF-17-C. Yount, Asst Chief of the Air Corps, Spaatz

12. Ibid. Papers, LC, Manuscript Div.

13. Ibid, section AF-16-C. 26. Wood and Dempster, Narrow Margin,

14. Final Rept, Blue Army, 25 August p 57; Clark, Tizard, p 168-169.

1940, Epling Papers, RG 18, entry 273. 27. "History of Air Defense:' Air Defense

15. U.S. War Dept, The New Army of the Magazine, (Jan-Mar 78), pp 18-26, and (JulUnited States, Aug 1, 1941, p 27; Coast Sept 78), pp 17-24; U.S. Navy Photographic

365
AIR BASE AIR DEFENSE

Intelligence Center, "Japanese Antiaircraft War 1941-1945 (Moscow, 1977), translated

and Coastal Defense Weapons,' Washing- and published by the U.S. Air Force, Ch 2,

ton,[nd], pp 2ff, USAF Collection passim.

180.6042A. 38. U.S. War Dept, U. S. Army Air Intel28. U.S. Navy Dept, "Japanese Radar ligence Rept No 100-45-34, An Analysis of

Equipment" US. Navy COM-ONI Technical the Soviet Air Force, 19 June 1946, USAF

Intelligence Bulletin 2, May 1945, USAF Col- Collection 142.048-45; Walter Schwabedislection 180.6023-2; "Japanese Air Weapons sen, The Russian Air Force in the Eyes of

and Tactics,' United States Strategic Bombing German Commanders, USAF Hist Study 175

Survey, Pacific pp 1-7, 65-67. Hereafter (Maxwell AFB, 1960), p 35.

USSBS, Pacific; Interrogation No. 476, 39. John Erickson, "Radio-location and

Kanjo Takiyanagi, Nov. 29, 1945 in Ibid. the Air Defence Problem: The Design and

29. London, Air Ministry, Directorate of Development of Soviet Radar 1934-1940:'

Intelligence, "Airfield Battalions (Hikojo Science Studies (1972), pp 241-263.

Daitai) of the Japanese Army Air Force." 40. Schwabedissen, Russian Air Force, p

June 1944, p 18. USAF Collection 35; Klaus Uebe, Russian Reactions to Ger512.63144-1; Hogg, Anti-Aircraft, pp 174ff. man Airpower in World War II, USAF Hist

30. Saburo Sakai, with Martin Caidin and Study 176 (Maxwell AFB, 1964), p 34ff.

Fred Saito, Samurai (New York, 1957), pp 41. S. Woodburn Kirby, The War Against

25-31; Interrogation No. 602, Yoshimori Te- Japan, 2 vols (London, 1957), Vol I, p 21ff.

rai, November 28, 1945, USSBS, Pacific. 42. Frederick Pile, Ack-Ack, Britain's De30. Interrogation No. 473, Minoru fence Against Air Attack During the Second

Genda, November 27, 1945, "Japanese Air World War (London, 1949), pp 60-92.

Weapons and Thctics, USSBS, Pacific, pp 43. lbid; Hogg, Anti-Aircraft, pp 90-92,

3-4, 64. Appendices 3 & 4.

32. Ibid, pp 3-4, 33-41. 44. Clark, Tizard, pp 149-163.

33. Von Hardesty, Red Phoenix, The Rise 45. Wood and Dempster, Narrow Margin,

of Soviet Air Power, 1941-1945 (Washington, pp 140-181, 205.

DC, 1982), pp 42-50. 46. Ibid, pp 154-155.

34. Roy A. Medvedev, Let History Judge, 47. Rept, Study of Air Defense Problems,

The Origins and Consequences of Stalinism Oct 30, 1940, Office of the Chief of the U.S.

(New York, 1971), pp 12-13. Army Air Corps, RG 18, box 183; Wood and

35. Robert Conquest, The Great Terror, Dempster, Narrow Margin, pp 154-155,

Stalin's Purge of the Thirties (New York, 170-181, 197-214.

1970), pp 484-492; Alexander Boyd, The 48. Denis Richards and Hilary St. George

Soviet Air Force Since 1918 (New York, 1977), Saunders, Royal Air Force 1939-1945, 3 vols

pp 114-115. (London, 1953), Vol. I, pp 17-18; Robin

36. Ibid; Hardesty, Red Phoenix, pp Higham, "The RAF and the Battle of Brit52-58. ain:' draft study prepared for AF/CHO, pp

37. John T. Greenwood, "The Great Pa- 6-8.

triotic War, 1941-1945', Soviet Aviation and 49. Intv, Lt Gen Elwood R. Quesada, May

Air Power, ed by Robin Higham and Jacob 12-13, 1975, Sect VI, p 6, U.S. Air Force Oral

W. Kipp (Boulder, 1978), pp 72-73; M.N. History Collection; Kohn and Harahan, eds,

Kozhevnikov, The Command and Staff of the Air Superiority, pp 14-16.

Soviet Army Air Force in the Great Patriotic

Chapter III

Blitzkrieg and the Battle of Britain

1. Michael Alfred Peszke, "Pre-War Pol- 186-189; Michael A. Peszke, "Poland's Prepish Air Force: Budget, Personnel Policies, and aration for World War TWo," Military Affairs

Doctrine,' Aerospace Historian 27 (Fall 81), 18 (Feb 79), 18-24.

366
NOTES

2. Ibid. Conquered, The French High Command and

3. Peszke, "Pre-War Polish Air Force:' p the Defeat of the West, 1940 (Westport, 1979),

188. pp 46-51, 106-108; Richards and Saunders,

4. Cajus Bekker, The Luftwaffe War Dia- Royal Air Force, Vol I, p 123; Faris R.

ries (Garden City, New York, 1968), p 23; Kirkland, "The French Air Force in 1940:'

Berlin, German Air Historical Branch (8th Air University Review, Sept-Oct 1985, pp

Section), "The Luftwaffe in Poland, Septem- 101-102. Kirkland cites Gunsburg's belief that

ber 1939:' July 11, 1944, translated in Air the French operated the six radar sets. They

Ministry, UK July 12, 1947, as German Trans- did not. The sets were British with some

lation VII/33, USAF Collection 512.621. French officers in training. See RAF Draft

5. Wilhelm Speidel, The German Air Narrative, The Campaign in France and the

Force in the Polish Campaign of 1939, U.S. Low Countries, pp 98-104.

Air Force Hist Study 151 (Maxwell AFB, 20. RAF Draft Narrative, The Campaigns

1965) Part 1, p 36; Jerzy B. Cynk, History of in France and the Low Countries, pp 12-18.

the Polish Air Force, 1918-1968 (Reading, 21. Ibid; Robert Jackson, Air War Over

1972), p 272. France, May-June 1940 (London, 1974), p

6. Cynk, History of the Polish Air Force, 16; Walter Grabman, German Air Force Air

pp 99-155; Jerzy B. Cynk, Polish Aircraft, Defense Operations, USAF Hist Study 164

1893-1939 (London, 1971), pp 158-172; Ger- (Maxwell AFB, 1959), p 278a.

man Translation VII/33. 22. David A. Griffin, "The Role of the

7. Peszke, "Pre-War Polish Air Force:' pp French Air Force, The Battle of France,

186-188; Peszke, "Poland's Preparation for 1940:' Aerospace Historian 21 (Fall 74), pp

World War Two:' p 19-20; Speidel, GAF in 144-146; RAF Draft Narrative, The CamPoland, Part 1, pp 38-39; German Transla- paign in France and the Low Countries, pp

tion VII/33, Luftwaffe in Poland. 95-96.

8. Cynk, History of the Polish Air Force, 23. Jackson, Air War Over France, p 46;

pp 121-122; German Translation VII/33, Wilhelm Speidel, The German Air Force in

Luftwaffe in Poland. France and the Low Countries, 1939-1940,

9. Speidel, GAF in Poland, Part 1, p 38; USAF Hist Study 152 (Maxwell AFB, 1958),

Peszke, "Poland's Preparation for World War (Unpublished) Pt 3: p 103; Alistair Horne, To

"Two:' p 22. Lose A Battle, France 1940 (Boston, 1966), p

10. Speidel, GAF in Poland, Part 1, pp 199.

21-22; German Translation VII/33, Luf- 24. Jacques Benoist-Mechin, Sixty Days

twaffe in Poland. that Shook the West, The Fall of France: 1940

11. Cynk, Polish Air Force, pp 125ff; (New York, 1963), p 67; Gunsburg, Divided

Rept, "Air Attacks of Airfields', Air Ministry, and Conquered, pp 107-108; Home, To Lose

UK, 1943, pp 7, 9, USAF Collection a Battle, pp 210-213; Killen, History of the

512.549-3. Luftwaffe, pp 113-114.

12. Bekker, Luftwaffe, pp 30-38; Cynk, 25. Jackson, Air War Over France, pp

Polish Air Force, pp 126-130. 41-47; Bekker, Luftwaffe, pp 113-114; Fritz

13. Destiny Can Wait, The Polish Air Morzik, German Air Force Airlift OperaForce in the Second World War (London, tions, USAF Hist Study 167, (Maxwell AFB,

1949), pp 8-20. 1961) pp 106-108; Air Ministry, UK, German

14. Ibid; Cynk, Polish Air Force, pp 128, Translation VII/83, German Aircraft Losses

133-135, 152-155; Bekker, Luftwaffe, p 364. September 1939-December 1940 (Except

15. Suchenwirth, "Historical Turning Poland). USAF Collection 512.621.

Points',' Chapter 1, passim; Killen, History of 26. Jackson, Air War Over France, p 47;

the Luftwaffe, p 101; Albert Kesselring, Kes- Benoist-Mechin, Sixty Days, pp 67-93;

seiring, A Soldier's Record (New York, 1954), Horne, To Lose A Battle, pp 127-132.

pp 39-40; Speidel, GAF in Poland, Part 2, pp 27. Jackson, Air War Over France, p 51;

30-31, 128-129; German translation VII/33, Air Ministry, UK, Air Attacks of Airfields, p

Luftwaffe in Poland. 17; Speidel, GAF in France and the Low

16. Ibid. Countries, Part 3, p 355; Richards and Saun17. von Renz, Development of German ders, Royal Air Force, Vol 2, pp 111-115.

Antiaircraft Weapons, pp 229, 278a-282. 28. Speidel, GAF in France and the Low

18. Ibid, p 283a. Countries, Part 3, pp 190ff, 290ff.

19. Jeffrey A. Gunsburg, Divided and 29. Horne: To Lose A Battle, p 229;

367
AIR BASE AIR DEFENSE

Bekker, Luftwaffe, pp 114-115; RAF Narra- 174-175; Townsend, Duel of Eagles, pp

tive, pp 200; Richards and Saunders, Royal 173-174.

Air Force, Vol I, pp 120-123. 43. Air Ministry, Operational Research, p

30. Speidel, GAF in France and the Low 10-20; Wood and Dempster, Narrow Margin,

Countries, Part 3, p 81; Richards and Saun- pp 174-181; Basil Collier, Defence of the

ders, Royal Air Force, Vol 1, pp 120-121, United Kingdom (London, 1957), pp

130-134; Murray, The Luftwaffe Against Po- 168-169.

land and the West, pp 30-33, and Table 1. 44. Air Ministry, Operational Research,

31. Ibid, pp 349ff; Jackson, Air War Over pp 10-20.

France, pp 82-84ff. General Speidel's claim 45. F. W. Winterbotham, The Ultra Secret

of 450 French losses to 9 German is overstated (New York, Evanston, 1974), pp 7-16, 40-55;

and undoubtedly distorted by propaganda. F.H. Hinsley, et al, British Intelligence in the

Few German records of this period survived Second World War, Its Influence on Strategy

the war and, while Jackson's information is and Operations, 3 vols. (New York, 1979), Vol

not totally reliable, it is based on better 1, pp 161-182, Appendices I and 9.

sources. The German claim of 350 aircraft 46. Collier, Defence of the U K., p 245;

destroyed on the ground exceeded the total Rept, Study of Air Defense Problems; Gropground losses of the Armbe de I'Air for all of man, "Battle of Britain,' p 144.

May and June. The German claim of 22 47. Pile, Ack-Ack, pp 113-116.

French aircraft downed by antiaircraft fire is 48. Ibid, pp 111-116; Collier, Defence of

hardly plausible. Paris was too far from the the UK., pp 153-154; Air Ministry, UK, Air

German lines for this to be so and there is no Attack of Airfields, p 13.

evidence of friendly fire being so misdirected. 49. Collier, Defence of the U. K., pp

32. Jackson, Air War Over France, pp 83, 448-449, 479-481; Pile, Ack-Ack, pp 113,

136; Speidel, GAF in France and the Low 131; Hq U.S. Army Air Forces, Information

Countries, Part 3, p 130. Intelligence Summary No. 35, July 6, 1942,

33. Jackson, Air War Over France, pp (Hereafter cited as IIS No-and date); Hugh

93ff, 135. C.T. Dowding, "The Battle of Britain,' Sup

34. Peter Chamberlin and John Milsom, No 37719 (10 September 1946), The London

Self-Propelled Anti-Tank and Anti-Aircraft Gazette, p 4543.

Guns (New York, 1975), pp 34-58. 50. Pile, Ack-Ack, p 136-137; Wood and

35. Peter Townsend, Duel of Eagles (New Dempster, Narrow Margin, p 205.

York, 1970), p 433. 51. Guy Hartcup, Camouflage, A History

36. Wood and Dempster, Narrow Margin, of Concealment and Deception in War (New

pp 25-31, 81-100; Richard Collier, Eagle Day York, 1980), pp 133ff.

(New York, 1966), p 269; Alan L. Gropman, 52. Ibid, pp 99ff.

"The Battle of Britain and the Principles of 53. Graham Wallace, R. A. F Biggin Hill

War' Aerospace Historian 18 (Fall 71), pp (London, 1957), p 101; Hartcup, Camou138-142. flage, p 65; Air Ministry, UK, "A German

37. Leonard Bridgman, comp and ed, Account of the Air War Against Great BritJane's All The World's Aircraft, 1942 (New ain', translation of a lecture by Capt. Otto

York, 1943), pp 93c-97c. Bechtle given at Berlin-Gatow, Feb. 2, 1944,

38. Wood and Dempster, Narrow Margin, USAF Collection 512.62512 TE-53, p 5.

pp 25-31, 81-100; Collier, Eagle Day, p. 269; Hereafter cited as Bechtle Lecture.

Gropman, "The Battle of Britain,' pp 54. Wallace, Biggin Hill, pp 107, 121.

138-142. 55. Gropman, "Battle of Britain,' p 142;

39. Wood and Dempster, Narrow Margin, Wallace, Biggin Hill, p 104.

pp 170-181. 56. Wood and Dempster, Narrow Margin,

40. Pile, Ack-Ack, pp 108-110; Wood and pp 101-107, 282-285; Bechtle Lecture;

Dempster, Narrow Margin, pp 170-181. Bekker, Luftwaffe War Diaries, pp 145-147.

41. Report, Study of Air Defense Prob- 57. Gropman, "Battle of Britain:' p 141;

lems; Wood and Dempster, Narrow Margin, Wallace, Biggin Hill, pp 158ff.

pp 174-178. 58. Wood and Dempster, Narrow Margin,

42. Air Ministry, UK, The Origins and p 312; Wallace, Biggin Hill, pp 171-180;

Development of Operational Research in the Winterbotham, Ultra, pp 5-58; Pile, AckRoyal Air Force (London, 1963), p 20; Wood Ack, pp 136-138; Air Ministry, UK, Air

and Dempster, Narrow Margin, pp 144, Attack on Airfields, p 16.

368
NOTES

59. Ibid. 66. Hartcup, Camouflage, p 69; John

60. Harry T. Sutton, Raiders Approach. Bushby, Air Defence of Great Britain

The Fighting Tradition of Royal Air Force (London, 1973), pp 156-166; Air Ministry,

Station Hornchurch and Sutton's Farm (Al- UK, Air Attack on Airfields, p 16; Bechtle

dershot, 1956), pp 100-101. Lecture.

61. Ibid, pp 102-103, 132-133. 67. Wood and Dempster, Narrow Margin,

62. Ibid, p 115. pp 468, 472-473; Air Ministry, "Air Attacks

63. Ibid, p 120. of Airfields:' pp 15-16.

64. Quester, Deterrence before Hiroshima. 68. Griffin, "French Air Force, 1940,' pp

(New York, London, Sydney, 1966), pp 117- 144-149; Benoist-Mechin, Sixty Days, pp

120; Bullock, Hitler, p 596; Winston S. Chur- 28-42; Horne, To Lose a Battle, pp 182-204.

chill, The Second World War, 6 vols, Vol II, 69. Wood and Dempster, Narrow Margin,

Their Finest Hour (New York, 1962), p 283. pp 215-216; Gropman, "Battle of Britain:' pp

65. Wood and Dempster, Narrow Margin, 139, 143; Bechtle Lecture, pp 7-8.

pp 409-419; Gropman, "Battle of Britain:' p 70. Richards and Saunders, Royal Air

143. Force, Vol I, pp 145-157.

Chapter IV

Malaya and Malta: 1941-1942

1. S. Woodburn Kirby, et al, History of the 10. Ibid, pp 1347, 1351.

Second World War, The War Against Japan, 5 11. Ibid; Air Ministry, UK, The Far East,

vols (London, 1957), Vol I, The Loss of Vol I: pp 41-42.

Singapore, Appendix 3; I.S.O. Playfair, His- 12. Maltby, "Rept on Air Operations in

tory of the Second World War, the Mediter- Malaya,' pp 1348, 1356.

ranean and Middle East 4 vols (London, 13. Ibid, pp 1351, 1359-1360; Kirby, The

1956), Vol I, pp 29, 119. Loss of Singapore, p 183; Air Ministry, UK,

2. Kirby, The Loss of Singapore, pp 6-7; The Far East, Vol I, pp 41-42.

Paul Maltby, "Report of the Air Operations 14. Ibid; Falk, Seventy Days, pp 44-45;

During the Campaigns in Malaya and Nether- Kenneth Attiwill, Fortress, The Story of the

land East Indies from 8th December 1941 to Siege and Fall of Singapore (New York, 1960),

12th March 1942:' Third Supplement to The pp 24-25; U.S. War Dept, HQ Army Air

London Gazette, 20 February 1948, p 1349; Forces, IIS No. 35, 6 July 1942.

Robert Brooke-Popham, "Operations in the 15. Masanobu Tsuji, Singapore, The JapFar East from 17th October 1940 to 27th anese Version, trans by Margaret E. Lake

December 1941:' supplement, The London (Sidney: 1960), pp 44-52; Interrogation No.

Gazette, 22 Jan 1948, p 536. 278, Lt Gen Saburo Endo, 3 and 28 Nov 1945,

3. Kirby, The Loss of Singapore, pp 14-16. USSBS, Pacific.

4. Maltby, "Report on Air Operations in 16. Shin Ishikawa, Katsumi Dozone, and

Malaya:' p 1349; Stanley L. Falk, Seventy Minoro Miyako, "Southeast Asia Air OperaDays to Singapore, (New York, 1975), pp 45, tions Record, Phase I, Nov 1941 to Feb 1942:'

48; Kirby, The Loss of Singapore, pp 153-175, trans and edited by U.S. Army Far East

467; Air Ministry, Draft RAF Narrative, The Command, Japanese Monograph No 55, Aug

Campaigns in the Far East 2 vols, Vol I, p 41, 1946; Shiro Yamaguchi, "Malay Invasion NaAF/CHO. val Operations:' trans and edited by U.S.

5. Maltby, "Report on Air Operations in Army Far East Command, Japanese MonoMalaya,' p 1349. graph No. 107, Oct 1952.

6. Brooke-Popham, "Operations in the 17. Kirby, The Loss of Singapore, pp

Far East', pp 536-538. 76-79, 170-175.

7. Morison, The Rising Sun in the Pacific, 18. Richards and Saunders, Royal Air

pp 51-56. Force, Vol II, pp 14-17; Kirby, The Loss of

8. Maltby, "Report on Air Operations in Singapore, pp 180-181.

Malaya,' pp 1349-1350. 19. Brooke-Popham, "Operations in the

9. Ibid, pp 1350-1351. Far East:' p 556; Maltby, "Report on Air

369
AIR BASE AIR DEFENSE

Operations in Malaya:' pp 1348-1356, Monograph No 55. Total Japanese losses

1359-1360; Air Ministry, The Far East, Vol II, from all causes were not insignificant during

pp 17-20. the Malay Campaign. The report cites several

20. Richards and Saunders, Royal Air instances of Japanese aircraft lost in combat

Force, Vol 11, pp 14-17; Kirby, The Loss of well before the arrival of the Hurricanes.

Singapore, pp 180-181; Maltby, "Report on Neither this report nor Maltby's estimate of

Air Operations in Malaya:' p 1366. losses provide information on specific causes

21. Ltr, Brigadier B.W. Key to Captain of Japanese air casualties. The obscurity of

Wilfrid Miles, 18 February 1948, Public information makes an assessment of antiairRecord Office (PRO), Air 20/209; Ishikawa, craft effectiveness versus fighter interception

Dozone, and Miyako, Japanese Monograph very difficult.

No. 55, p 46. 36. Maltby, "Rept on Air Operations in

22. Maltby, "Report on Air Operations in Malaya:' pp 1379-1380; Both Masanoubu

Malaya"' p 1367; South African Air Ministry, Tsuji's account of the preparation and conTactical and Technical Notes, No 26, Apr 17, duct of the Malay operation and the air

1942, p 4, USAF Collection, 512.5496. operations plan in Japanese Monograph 55

23. Yamaguchi, Japanese Monograph No clearly illustrate the singleness of purpose of

107, p 14; Maltby, "Report on Air Operations the Japanese. Tsuji's observations on the

in Malaya:' pp 1367, 1413. conduct of the fighting should be read to gain

24. Air Ministry, The Far East, Vol II, pp a balanced viewpoint.

62-63. 37. Maltby, "Rept on Air Operations in

25. "Hawaii-Malaya Naval Operations,' Malaya:' p 1374; Brooke-Popham, "OperaEnemy Publications No 6, trans by Allied tions in the Far East', p 563; Air Commodore

Translator and Interpreter Section, South L. E. 0. Charleton, Britain at War, The Royal

West Pacific Area, pp 12-19, RG 407; Maltby, Air Force, 5 vols (London, 1941-1945), Vol.

"Report on Air Operations in Malaya:' p 2, pp 224-250. Charleton's comments on the

1368; Endo Interrogation, USSBS, Pacific. Allied setbacks in the Pacific contain descrip26. Kirby, The Loss of Singapore, pp tions of Japanese abilities typical of the pre238-241. war and wartime attitudes. American and

27, Tadaka Numaguchi and Katsugi Aki- British intelligence reports of World War II

yama, "Report on Installations and Captured sometimes reported the presence of German

Weapons, Java and Singapore:' May 1942, aircraft and pilots in Japanese air formations

translated and edited by U.S. Army Forces Far (See, for example, Ltr, Office of the ComEast, as Japanese Monograph No. 68, 1958, mander, 7th Air Force, 29 Dec 1942,

pp 53-61; Maltby, "Report on Air Operations 730.310B. See also, Tac. and Tech. Notes 57,

in Malaya:' p 1371. 26, and 54, all of which cite "verified" reports

28. Maltby, "Report on Air Operations in of Japanese use of German aircraft). So far as

Malaya:' p 1374; Richard L. Watson, Jr., is known, there was only limited Axis coopArmy Air Action in the Philippines and Neth- eration of this sort in the Pacific. The Japaerlands East Indies, 1941-1942, USAF Hist nese and Germans conducted some exchanges

Study 111, (Maxwell AFB, 1945) pp 101-104. of technical information, but the Japanese

29. Msg, Air Ministry to AOC Far East, did not use German planes, nor did they build

19 Jan 1942, PRO Air 20/209; Maltby, copies of the Ju87, Me1O9, or other aircraft.

"Report on Air Operations in Malaya:' p A single MeIO9 was delivered from Germany

1375; Kirby, The Loss of Singapore, p 241; for tests. See Ren6 J. Francillon, Japanese

Endo Interrogation. Aircraft of the Pacific War, (New York, 1970)

30. Maltby, "Report on Air Operations in p 498.

Malaya:' p 1376; Numaguchi and Akiyama, 38. Brooke-Popham, "Operations in the

Japanese Monograph No. 68, pp 53-61. Far East', pp 536-538.

31. Maltby, "Report on Air Operations in 39. Playfair, The Mediterannean and MidMalaya:' pp 1377-1379. die East, Vol II, pp 43-44; William G. S.

32. Ibid, pp 1374-1378; Attiwill, Fortress, Dobbie, "The Siege of Malta:' 1940-1942:'

p 76; Kirby, The War Against Japan, Map 18. Royal Engineers Journal (Jan-Mar 43), pp

33. Maltby, "Report on Air Operations in 1-8.

Malaya:' pp 1379-1380. 40. Ibid.

34. Ibid, pp 1380-1382. 41. Playfair, Mediterranean and Middle

35. Ibid, pp 1382-1383. See Japanese East, Vol II, pp 44-45; H. E. C. Weldon,

370
NOTES

"The Artillery Defence of Malta,' Journal of Operations in the Western Desert and Eastern

the Royal Artillery, LXXIX (Jan 52), pp Mediterranean, Appendix B, 18 Nov 1941 to

15-27. 19 May 1942, USAF Collection 512.421B.

42. Playfair, Mediterranean and Middle 55. Ibid, pp 132, 142; Tedder, Prejudice, p

East, Vol II: pp 46-58. 245.

43. Ibid, pp 47-48; HQ, Italian Air Force, 56. Lloyd, Briefed to Attack, pp 118-121;

Memorandum, "The Air and Naval Bases of RAF in Western Desert and Eastern MediterMalta,' 31 Oct 42, Translation VII/43, trans ranean, App B.

Air Ministry, UK, 1947; "Agreement reached 57. Ibid; Kesselring, Soldier's Record, p

on the operational activity of the Italian and 124; Playfair, Mediterranean and Middle

German Air Forces in the Central and Eastern East, Vol III, p 189.

Mediterranean and bordering areas,' July 18, 58. Weldon, "Artillery Defence of Malta,'

1941, Air Ministry [UK] translation, Docu- p 24; Playfair, Mediterranean and Middle

ment No G 181132. Both in USAF Collection East, Vol III, p 179; Joseph Attard, The

512.621. Battle of Malta (London, 1968), pp 55, 176.

44. Basil Embry, Mission Completed 59. Weldon, "Artillery Defence of Malta:'

(New York, 1958), pp 228-233. p 24.

45. Playfair, Mediterranean and Middle 60. Ibid, pp 23-25.

East, Vol II, p 53. 61. Lloyd, Briefed to Attack, pp 186-187;

46. Ibid, p 45; Hugh Lloyd, Briefed to Felmy, GAF in the Mediterranean Theater, p

Attack, Malta's Part in African Victory 239; Attard, Battle of Malta, p 165; Playfair,

(London, 1949), pp 33-35. Mediterranean and Middle East, Vol III, p

47. Ibid, pp 62-70; Air Ministry, RAF in 179; Weldon, "Artillery Defence of Malta:' p

the Second War: Works Services (London, 22.

1956), pp 408-419; Lloyd, Briefed to Attack, 62. Lloyd, Briefed to Attack, pp 160-169,

pp 67-70, 136-138, 174-177. 174-177; Italian Air Force, "Air and Naval

48. Ibid. Bases of Malta:' p 3.

49. Ibid, p 70; Embry, Mission Corn- 63. Attard, Battle of Malta, pp 187-188;

pleted, pp 230-231. Kesselring, Soldier's Record, p 140.

50. Lloyd, Briefed to Attack, Ch V-VII; 64. Embry, Mission Completed, pp

Albert Kesselring, Kesselring: A Soldier's 230-232; Felmy, "GAF in the Mediterranean

Record (New York, 1954), pp 117, 123-124; Theater,' p 236; Lloyd, Briefed to Attack, pp

Arthur William, Lord Tedder, With Prejudice 147, 165-166; Tedder, Prejudice, p 245, 426;

(Boston, 1966), p 245. Kesselring, Soldier's Record, p 132.

51. Air Historical Branch, Luftwaffe (8 65. Ibid; Kesselring's Plan for the InvaSection) Study, "German Air Force Activities sion of Malta, German Translation VII/141,

in the Mediteranean, Thctics and Lessons May 1955, Air Ministry, UK, in USAF ColLearned 1941-1943', 30 Oct 1944, Air Minis- lection K512.621-141.

try, UK, Translation VII/2, 1946; "Agreement 66. Hinsley, et al, British Intelligence in

on Operational Activity,' 18 July 1941; Kes- the Second World War, Vol 2, pp 291-323,

selring, Soldier's Record, p 115. 346-348.

52. HQ, Italian Air Force, "Memo- 67. Playfair, Mediterranean and Middle

randum on the Malta Situation,' 10 May East, Vol III, pp 179, 185; RAF, Report on 1942, Air Ministry, UK, Translation VII/57, Operations in the Western Desert and Eastern

December 1947; HQ, Italian Air Force, Mediterranean, App B.

"Italian Air Operations in Anticipation of an 68. German Air Force, "Tactics and LesAttack on the Island of Malta and Plan for sons Learned; Tedder, Prejudice, p 267; Lloyd,

the Occupation of that Island,' [nd, but Briefed to Attack, p 157, Chapter XIV.

1942], Air Ministry, UK, 1946, both in USAF 69. Lloyd, Briefed to Attack, pp 184-188.

Collection, 622.661-5; Weldon, "Artillery 70. Kesselring, Soldier's Record, pp

Defence of Malta,' pp 21-22. 140-141; Felmy, GAF in the Mediterranean

53. Kesselring, Soldier's Record, p 118. Theater, p 231; Tedder, Prejudice, p 106; HQ,

54. Helmuth Felmy, "The German Air Italian Air Force, "Plan for Invasion of

Force in the Mediterranean Theater of Wae,' Malta;' 1942; "German Air Force Policy DurUSAF Hist Study 161 (Maxwell AFB, 1955) p ing the 2nd World War:' German translation

237; Lloyd, Briefed to Attack, pp 161-162, VII/153, Air Ministry, UK, April 1956, p 16,

164-165; Hq RAF Middle East, Rept on RAF USAF Collection, K512.621-153.

371
AIR BASE AIR DEFENSE

71. HQ, Italian Air Force, "Plan for the 76. Lloyd, Briefed to Attack, pp 145, 161;

Invasion of Malta:' 1942; Suchenwirth, His- RAF, Report on Operations in the Western

torical Tirning Points in the German Air Desert and Eastern Mediterranean, App. B.

Force War Effort, pp 93-97. 77. Ishikawa, Dozone, and Miyako,

72. Maltby, "Report on Air Operations in "Southeast Asia Air Operations Record"'

Malaya'' p 1376, 1380-1381; Weldon, "Artillery Japanese Monograph No 55.

Defence of Malta,' p 21-24; Numaguchi and 78. Ibid; Deichman and Marquard, "LufAkiyama, Japanese Monograph No. 68. twaffe Methods in the Selection of Offensive

73. See Orders of Battle for Malaya and Weapons:' part 2; Felmy, GAF in the MediMalta; Lloyd, Briefed to Attack, p 229; Wel- terranean Theater, pp 232-242; Munitions

don, "Artillery Defence of Malta:' pp 25-26. and Supply Charts, in Ishikawa, Dozone, and

74. James Leasor, Singapore, The Battle Miyako, "Southeast Asia Air Operations

That Changed the World (Garden City, 1968), Record:' Japanese Monograph No 55, pp

Ch 7; Attiwill, Fortress, Ch 11-13, passim; 94-97; Joe G. Taylor's "Analysis of

Kirby, The Loss of Singapore, pp 238-241, Pre-Invasion Air Operations, Pacific Area,

457, Ch 24; Norman F. Dixon, On the Psy- November-December 1943:' USAF Hist

chology of Military Incompetence (New York, Study 125 (Maxwell AFB, 1954), contains an

1976), pp 130-144. excellent comparison of the factors governing

75. Lloyd, Briefed to Attack, Chapter bombing effectiveness during some concenXVII; Tedder, Prejudice, pp 264-270. trated efforts of relatively short duration.

Chapter V

Campaigns in Africa

1. Correlli Barnett, The Desert Generals 9. Tedder, Prejudice, pp 170-175; Whitney

(New York, 1960), pp 13-58. Intv.

2. Tedder, Prejudice, pp 52-59; Erwin Rom- 10. Tedder, Prejudice, pp 170-175

mel, The Rommel Papers, edited by B. H. 11. Ibid; Rept, Experiences in Employment

Liddell Hart (New York, 1953), pp 99-101; Air of AA Units, GHQ Middle East, [nd, but 1942]

Ministry, UK, Air Attacks of Airfields, p 29. USAF Collection 248.712-68; RAF Middle

3. Rommel, Papers, pp 99-101. East Review No 4, July-Sept 1943, pp 77-81.

4. Tedder, Prejudice, pp 71, 97-99; Rom- 12. Tedder, Prejudice, pp 105, 121,

mel, Papers, pp 120-129; Felmy, GAF in the 171-178; RAF in the Western Desert and

Mediterranean Theater, Sect III, pp 55-56. Eastern Mediterranean, 18 Nov 1941 to 19

5. Minutes, OKW Conference with the May 1942, p 4.

Italian General Staff June 2, 1941, German 13. Tedder, Prejudice, pp 170-175; WhitTranslation VII/128, Air Ministry, UK, ney Intv.

USAF Collection K512.621; Tedder, Preju- 14. RAF in the Western Desert,

dice, pp 76-77, 100-107; Rommel, Papers, pp 1941-1942, pp 30-31; Tedder, Prejudice, pp

120-129. 198, 210-213.

6. Ibid; War Department, U.S. Military 15. RAF in the Western Desert, p 29.

Attache Cairo Rept No 2361, Apr 2, 1942, 16. Rept, Experiences in the Employment

AA Defense of Tobruch Fortress, USAF Col- of AA Units; RAF Middle East Review No 4,

lection 170.2278-16. July -Sept 43, pp 77-81.

7. Tedder, Prejudice, pp 76-82; Msg, Col 17. Tedder, Prejudice, pp 234-244; WhitBonner Fellers to War Dept, June 2, 1941, ney Intv, pp 4-9; RAF in the Western Desert,

USAF Collection 170.2278-16. 1941-1942, p 45; Air Ministry, UK, RAF

8. Ibid; Intv, Lt Col Cornelius V. Whitney, Draft Narrative, The Middle East CamApr 6, 1943, USAF Collection 616. 101; Rept, paigns, Vol III, pp 39-43.

Royal Air Force Operations in the Western 18. Ibid.

Desert and Eastern Mediterranean, 18 Nov 19. Rept, Controlled Interception (Air

1941 to 19 May 1942, Hq RAF Middle East, Raid Warning) in the Western Desert and

[nd, but 1942] USAF Collection 512.421B. Associated Problems, Maj David H. Likes,

372
NOTES

Dec 29, 1942, pp 14-15, USAF Collection Corps, 20 May 1941, and HQ Fliegerkorps X,

168.605-24; Air Ministry, UK, Middle East Corps Order, USAF Collection 512.621 and

Campaigns, pp 39-42; Rept, Development of K512.621.

the Organization of Fighter Defence in the 28. Air Staff Post Hostility Rept, Sect IV,

Middle East, Oct 1942-10 Jan 1943, Hq. A-3, pp 12-14, 29-30; Felmy, GAF in the

Middle East Air Force, in the Mediterranean Mediterranean Theater, pp 53-56, 84.

Allied Air Forces file, Reel No. 7, USAF 29. Felmy, GAF in the Mediterranean

Collection 622.011. Hereafter cited as Theater, p 53; Air Staff Post Hostility Rept,

"MAAF Reel" with appropriate reel number. Sect IV, A-3,-6 (Tactical Employment) which

20. Hinsley, British Intelligence in the includes Luftwaffe Directive 16 and interSecond World War, Vol 2, pp 375-380; Devel- views of Lt Gen Karl Koller.

opment of Fighter Defence in the Middle 30. Interrogation of Maj Gen Adolf GalEast, p 2; Ralph Bennett, Ultra in the West: land and Field Marshal Erhard Milch, in Air

The Normandy Campaign 1944-45 (New Staff Post Hostility Rept, Sect IV-C; Tactical

York, 1980), Ch 1, passim. and Technical Notes, No 56, pp 8-9.

21. Wesley F. Craven and James L. Cate, 31. Gebhard Aders, History of the Gereditors, Europe: Torch to Pointblank [The man Night Fighter Force, 1917-1945

Army Air Forces in World War II] (Chicago, (London, 1979), pp 42, 52; Ltr, von Waldau

1950), pp 8-12, 28-36; Whitney Intv, pp 9-10; to Luftwaffe Operations Staff, April 28,

Development of Fighter Defence in the Mid- 1941, German Translation VII/128, Air MindIe East, p 3. istry, UK; Hq RAF Middle East, Enemy

22. Hist, 57 Ftr Gp; Tedder, Prejudice, pp R.D.F. in the Mediterranean, Report No 3,

357-360; Rommel, Papers, pp 317-326, 335; Sept 23, 1942, USAF Collection 533.650.

War Diary, Panzer Armee Afrika, 28 July to 32. Felmy, GAF in the Mediterranean

23 Oct 1942, entries for 20-23 Oct 42, Ger- Theater, pp 53-56, 84; Air Staff Post Hostilman Translation VII/105, Air Ministry, UK, ity Rept, Sect IV, pp 14-22, 29-30.

USAF Collection K512.621. 33. Interrogation of Maj Gen Galland and

23. Operations Records, No 2 Armoured Lt Col Bar, Mobility of Fighter Units, Sept 4,

Car Company, RAF, Nov 1942, PRO, Air 1945, Air Staff Post Hostility Rept; Felmy,

29/55; Air Ministry, UK, Middle East Cam- GAF in the Mediterranean Theater, p 224.

paigns, Vol IV, pp 415-417. 34. Felmy, GAF in the Mediterranean

24. Air Ministry, UK, Middle East Cam- Theater, pp 54-55, 83; Air Staff Post Hostilpaigns, Vol IV, pp 415-417; 21st Panzer Divi- ity Rept, Intv of Karl Koller; Tactical and

sion Rept, 23 Oct-20 Nov 1942, German Technical Notes No 27, Enemy Camouflage

Translation VII/112, Air Ministry, UK, p 17, and AA in the Western Desert, June 25, 1942;

USAF Collection K512.621. Air Attacks of Airfields, p 31; IIS No 67,

25. War Diary, Panzer Armee Afrika, Notes on Axis North African Tactics, Oct 21,

entries for 20-23 Oct 42, German Translation 1942; Hogg, Anti-Aircraft, p 94.

VII/105, Air Ministry, UK, USAF Collection 35. Tactical and Technical Notes No 27;

K512.621; Rommel, Papers, pp 317-326,335; IIS No 77, Camouflage of Enemy Aircraft,

Tedder, Prejudice, pp 357-360. Nov 12, 1942; Combined Services Detailed

26. Rommel, Papers, p 134. Interrogation Center (CSDIC), Report No

27. Ibid, pp 218, 266-268; Felmy, GAF in 578, The German Air Force in Italy, July 12,

the Mediterranean Theater, Sect III, pp 1945, USAF Collection 512.619C-7C.

53-56, 84; U.S. War Dept, Air Staff, Post 36. CSDIC Rept No 578.

Hostility Rept, Sect IV, p 22; Albert Kesselr- 37. George F. Howe, Northwest Africa;

ing, "The War in the Mediterranean:' in Seizing the Initiative in the West [United

World War 11 German Military Studies, 24 States Army in World War II] (Washington,

vols, Donald S. Detwiler, Charles B. Burdick, 1957), pp 13-31, 185-191; Winston S. Churand Jiirgen Rohwer, eds (New York, 1979), chill, The Hinge of Fate (Boston, 1950), pp

Vol 14, pp 7-9; A Tactical Appreciation of the 432-451.

War in Tunisia, German Translation VII/6, 38. Howe, Northwest Africa, pp 13-31;

Air Ministry, UK, p 11; Signals and Directives Craven and Cate, Torch to Pointblank, pp

Concerning Axis Problems of Supply and 77-78, 115-120.

Co-operation, Apr-June 1941, German 39. Rept 48295, Rept of Commander, Task

Translation VII/128, Air Ministry, UK; Force 34, Torch Operation Repts; Rept 44607,

Fuehrer HQ Memo, Subj: German Afrika Report of Air Operations Task Group 34.10;

373
AIR BASE AIR DEFENSE

Rept 44041, Ltr, Dwight D. Eisenhower, Re- can RDF Stations-SCR 588, July 24, 1943,

port of Operation Torch. Cited reports are in MAAF reel 10, sec. 120, 121.

U. S. Center for Naval History, Operational 51. Ltr, HQ, Northwest African Strategic

Archives. Air Force to Spaatz, Aircraft Warning Ser40. Ibid; See also: Howe, Northwest Af- vice, Mar 31, 1943, USAF Collection

rica, pp 189-191, and Craven and Cate, Torch 652.661; Ltr, Doolittle to Spaatz, Fighters for

to Pointblank. pp 77-78 Airdrome Defense, Apr 1, 1943, USAF Col41. Hist, 14 Ftr Gp.; Memo, Proposed lection 652.661; Ltr, HQ. Northwest African

New Fighter Airdrome, Feb 11, 1943, MAAF Coastal Air Force to Spaatz, R.D.FE Policy,

Reel 277. Apr 19, 1943, MAAF reel 283.

42. Hist, XII Ftr Cmd, USAF Collection 52. Mysing Intv; Hist XII Bmr Cmd,

654.906; Hq, U.S. Army Antiaircraft Coin- USAF Collection 652.667; Ltr, AA Defence

mand, Intelligence Memorandum No. 138, of Airdromes.

Antiaircraft Artillery Organization, Equip- 53. Air Ministry, UK, Rept of a Commitment and Operations in the North African tee on the Future of the RAF Regiment, 1945,

Campaign, 1942-1943, July 26, 1943; Intv, USAF Collection 5 12.15-1; U.S. Military AtCapt August W. Mysing, [nd, but 19431 tache Rept No 46660, The Royal Air Force

USAF Collection 248.532-4; SRH-037, "Use Regiment, Mar 10, 1942, USAF Collection

of Ultra in the European Theater, World War 142.04-12; RAF Mediterranean Review No

II•' pp 9-10, AF/CHO. 10, Jan to May 1945, pp 142-147.

43. Ltr, Group Capt D.F.W. Atcherly to 54. Air Mininstry, UK, Rept of a CommitWelsh, Special Rept on the Unsatisfactory tee on the Future of the RAF Regiment, 1945.

R.D.E. and Signals Situation, Nov 21, 1942, 55. Ltr, Lt Col H. R. Salmon, RAF

MAAF reel 10, sec. 120; Hist, XII Ftr Cmd, Regiment NAAF to Air Commodore G. R.

Radar Organization, Jan 1943 to Sept 1944; Beamish, Feb 26, 1943, MAAF reel 1.

War Diary, XII Ftr Cmd, Hq and Hq Co, 56. Ibid.

AWS, USAF Collection 654.901. 57. HQ, NAAF Organization Memo No

44. Msg., Operational Control of Air 28, Formation of Light AA Squadron, R.A.F.

Defences Overseas, Jan 29, 1943, MAAF reel Regiment, May I1, 1943, MAAF reel 7.

277; War Diary, XII Fighter Cmd, Hq and Hq 58. Ltr, Allied Force HQ, Establishment

Co, AWS. of "Inner Artillery Zones" (IAZ), "Gun De45. Craven and Cute, Torch to Pointblank, fended Areas" (GDA), and "Special Areas"

p 127; Memo on the Defence of Airfields in the North African Theater, Feb 15, 1943;

Against Attack, Apr 25, 1943, MAAF reel 1; Ltr, HQ, NATAF, Flying Discipline, Mar 31,

Ltr, AA Defence of Aerodromes, Feb 28, 1943; Ltr, HQ NATAF, Aircraft Recognition,

1943, MAAF reel 1. Mar 25, 1943, all in MAAF reel 1.

46. Tedder, Prejudice, pp 400-404; Ltr, 59. Ltr, HQ, Northwest African Coastal

Brig Gen Laurence S. Kuter to General H. H. Air Force to Spaatz, R.D.E. Policy, Apr 19,

Arnold, Organization of American Air 1943, MAAF reel 283; Hist, XII Ftr Cmd,

Forces, May 12, 1943, USAF Collection Radar Organization; Northwest African Stra614.201-1. tegic Air Force, Three Significant Days (April

47. Craven and Cate, Torch to Point blank, 4, 5, 6), USAF Collection 615.308-1.

pp 161-162. 60. Felmy, OAF in the Mediterranean

48. Tedder, Prejudice, pp 396-400; Theater, pp 534-588; CSDIC Report No 579,

Speech, Air Vice Marshal Coningham to se- July 14, 1945, USAF Collection 512.619-C;

nior Torch Officers, Tripoli, Feb 16, 1943, Hinsley, British Intelligence in World War II,

USAF Collection 614.201-1. Vol 2, pp 487-492.

49. HQ Northwest African Air Forces, 61. Northwest African Tactical Air Force,

GO No 1, Feb 18, 1943. Special Intelligence Report No 4, Axis Land50. AAA Cmd Intel Memo No 138; Mys- ing Grounds in N. Tunisia, [nd, but 19431,

ing Intv; Memo, Group Capt. J.A. Tester, USAF Collection 614.323-2; Felmy, OAF in

Maintenance of R.D.FE in Mediterranean Air the Mediterranean Theater, pp 635-640, 725,

Command, June 24, 1943; Ltr, Air Vice Mar- 740; The Luftwaffe in the Battle for Tunis,

shal G.G. Dawson to Air Vice Marshal Hugh October 17, 1944, German Translation VII/5,

P. Lloyd, July 1, 1943; Ltr, Col Davis D. Air Ministry, UK.

Graves, Personnel of 588 Platoons, June 9, 62. Felmy, OAF in the Mediterranean

1943; Memo, Wing Cdr E. Swinney, Ameri- Theater, p 640; Hq, RAF Middle East, En374
NOTES

emy R.D.F., Report No 5, Dec 14, 1942, and 67. Felmy, GAFin the Mediterranean TheEnemy R.D.F., Rept No 11, May 12, 1943, ater, pp 736, 752-753a; German Translations

MAAF reel 286. VII/5, p 4, and VII/25, p 21, Air Ministry,

63. Rept, Northwest African Strategic Air UK.

Forces, Three Significant Days, May 16, 1943; 68. Ibid; Hinsley, British Intelligence in

German translation VII/6, Air Ministry, UK. World War II, Vol 2, p 612.

64. Hinsley, British Intelligence in World 69. Rommel, Papers, pp 241-242.

War II, Vol 2, pp 494-495, 575-576, 605-608, 70. RAF in the Western Desert,

729; The Mediterranean Campaign, with at- 1941-1942, Appendix I; HQ. XII Bmr Cmd,

tached reports of 1941 relating to supply Information About the Enemy, Dec 24, 1942,

deliveries, German Translation VII/63, Air p 1, USAF Collection 533.650.

Ministry, UK; see also German Translation 71. Coningham Speech

VII/128 for signals detailing supply prob- 72. Ibid; Memo, Maj Gen H. R. Oldfield

lems. to General H. H. Arnold, Dec 24, 1943,

65. German Translation VII/5, Air Min- Simpson Collection 248.712-41; Kuter Ltr,

istry, UK, p 3; U.S. Military Attache Rept No Org of the AAF, May 12, 1943, USAF Col2418, German Equipment, July 27, 1943, lection 614.201-1

USAF Collection 142.646-1; Felmy, GAF in 73. Rommel, Papers, p 282; Coningham

the Mediterranean Theater, pp 692-695; Tac- Speech and excerpt of remarks by General

tical and Technical Notes No 56, Aug 17, Bernard L. Montgomery, Feb 1943, USAF

1943, pp 4-8. Collection 614.201-1; AAF Statistical Digest

66. Felmy, GAF in the Mediterranean WW II, p 256, 264.

Theater, p 644, and appendices to this work 74. Kuter Ltr, Org of the AAF, May 12,

found in the German language manuscript; 1943, p 1.

AAF Statistical Digest WWII, Dec 1945, p 75. Ibid, p 5.

160; The Course of the War in the Mediterra- 76. Ibid.

nean Theater of Operations, Jan 1-May 13, 77. War Dept, FM 100-20, Command and

1943, German Translation VII/72, Air Min- Employment of Air Power, July 1943.

istry, UK, July 29, 1944, p 1.

Chapter VI

The Eastern Front: 1941-1944

1. Ray Wagner, ed, The Soviet AirForce in work covering 1941, 1942, and 1943 respecWorld War I, the Official History, Originally tively. They are USAF studies No. 153, 154,

Published by the Ministry of Defense of the and 155 and will hereinafter be cited as

USSR, trans by Leland Fetzer (New York, Plocher, GAF vs Russia, with appropriate

1973), p 35; Bekker, Luftwaffe War Diaries, pp year.

180-181; John Erickson, "The Soviet Re- 5. Karl Heinz Seiss, "The German Attack

sponse to Surprise Attack: Three Directives, Cannot be Stopped', Frankfurter Zeitung,

22 June 1941,' Soviet Studies, 23 (April 1974) June 22, 1941, cited in Masterpieces of War

pp 519-553; Hardesty, Red Phoenix, pp 11-15. Reporting, ed by Louis L. Snyder, (New York,

2. Conquest, The Great Terror, pp 1962), pp 113-114; Franz Halder, Private War

484-492; Erickson, "The Soviet Response to Journal, Vol III, USAF Collection 171.38-3,

Surprise Attack:' pp 534, 544-545. pp 161-166; Boyd, The Soviet Air Force, pp

3. Boyd, The Soviet Air Force, pp 88-107; 113-114; Erickson, "The Soviet Response to

Greenwood, "The Great Patriotic War, Surprise Attack:' passim.

1941-1945:' pp 75-80; Solzhenitsyn, Gulag, 6. Plocher, GAF vs Russia, 1941, pp

Vol I, p 80. 40-41; Halder, Private War Journal, vol VIII,

4. Hermann Plocher, The German Air p 161.

Force versus Russia, 1941, ed by Harry R. 7. Bekker, Luftwaffe War Diaries, pp

Fletcher, USAF Hist Study 153, (New York, 218-219.

1965) p 38. There are three volumes to this 8. Ibid, p 221; Diary of Herbert Pabst,

375
AIR BASE AIR DEFENSE

June 22, 1941, translation in AF/CHO, Ger- Union, 6 vols, trans and reproduced as bound

man text in USAF Collection, K113.407-3. typescript by Office of the Chief of Military

9. Hans-Ulrich Rudel, Stuka Pilot, trans History, U. S. Army, 1965-1970, vol II, p 21.

by Lynton Hudson (Dublin, 1952), p 19; 20. Rept, "Air Staff Post Hostilities IntelWalter Schwabedissen, The Russian Air Force ligence Requirements on German Air Force:'

in the Eyes of German Commanders, pp Sect Ill, Tactical Employment, 519.601 B-4;

116-119; Bekker, Luftwaffe War Diaries, p Col Ye. Simakov, "Camouflage of Air Force

221; Kozhevnikov, Command and Staff of the Operations:' Soviet Military Review, April

Soviet Army Air Force, pp 46-49, 55. 1982, pp 26-27. Simakov's article is an excel10. Medvedev, Let History Judge, pp lent summation of the Soviet Air Force's

12-13; Erickson, "The Soviet Response to camouflage and deception tactics at its World

Surprise Attack:' pp 349-350. War II airfields. It was reprinted by the U. S.

11. Nathan Leites, Soviet Style in War Air Force in AFRP 200-1, Soviet Press, Jul-

(New York, 1982), pp 230-265; William y-August 1982.

Craig, Enemy at the Gates, the Battle for 21. Ibid; Uebe, Russian Reactions to GerStalingrad (New York, 1973), pp 71-78; Med- man Air Power, pp 34-50.

vedev, Let History Judge, pp 12-13, 406; 22. HQ, USAF Air Intelligence Rpt No

Erickson, "The Soviet Response to Surprise 100-45-34, 19 June 1946, USAF Collection

Attack:' pp 550-552; Svetlana Alliluyeva, 142.048-45; IIS No 13, Comments on GerTwenty Letters to a Friend (New York, 1967), man and Soviet Air Forces, Apr 16, 1942;

p 185; Solzhenitsyn, Gulag, pp 25, 81-83. Plocher, GAF vs Russia, 1942, pp 214-217;

12. Bekker, Luftwaffe War Diaries, p 222. Air Intelligence Rept No 100-45-34.

13. Plocher, GAF vs Russia, 1941. Ch 4 23. Ibid.

and 6, passim. 24. Plocher, GAF vs Russia, 1942, pp 14. Bekker, Luftwaffe War Diaries, pp 214-217.

222-223; Wagner, Soviet Air Force in World 25. U.S. War Dept, Intelligence Bulletin

War II, p 161; Washington, Dept of the Air No 5, January 1, 1942, Employment of GerForce, Air Intelligence Digest, Feb 1953, pp man Antiaircraft Artillery in Russia, USAF

6-9. Collection 170.2252-5; IIS No 24, The Ger15. Robert A. Kilmarx, A History of Soviet man Air Force, Its Mobility, Airdrome ComAirPower(New York, 1962), pp 200-213; Cra- mands, Maintenance and Supply Organizaven and Cate, Men and Planes, pp 350-354; tion, Nov 2, 1942, USAF Collection

For Russian losses see: "The Part Played by 142.034-2.

the GAF on the Eastern Front,' Supreme 26. Air Staff Post Hostilities Report, Sect

Headquarters Intelligence Party Rept No 31, lII, Tactical Employment and Conduct of

USAF Collection 512.62512M-31. Aerial Warfare; IIS No 24; Plocher, GAF vs

16. Klaus Uebe, Russian Reactions to Russia, 1942, pp 216-217.

German Air Power in World War 1I, USAF 27. Air Staff Post Hostilites Rept, ConHist Study 176, (New York, 1964), p 7. duct of Aerial Warfare; Employment of Ger17. Kozhevnikov, Command and Staff of man Antiaircaraft Artillery in Russia; IIS No

the Soviet Army Air Force, pp 43-45. 24; Air Ministry, Notes on Defense of GAF

18. Leon Gour6 and Herbert S. Diner- Airfields, Apr 18, 1944, USAF Collection

stein, "Political Vulnerability of Moscow: A 512.645-1.

Case Study of the October 1941 Attack" 28. Ibid; Pospelov, History of the Great

(Santa Monica, 1952), Ch 3, passim; Paul Patriotic War, Vol III, pp 439-446. Although

Carell, Hitler Moves East 1941-1943 (New it is not possible to substantiate all of the

York, 1966), pp 329-365, 396; CSDIC (Air) Soviet allegations of forced labor, deportaReport No A585, Aug 3, 1945, USAF Collec- tion, and other crimes by German occupation

tion 512.619C-7C. forces, it is clear that civilians were often

19. Carell, Hitler Moves East, pp 329-365; forced to work at military construction

Rudel, Stuka Pilot, p 46; Schwabedissen, Rus- projects.

sian Air Force in the Eyes of German Corn- 29. Plocher, GAF vs Russia, 1942, p

manders, pp 16, 148; Ministry of Defence, 139-142; See also John F. Kreis, Air Base

UK, "Soviet Airfield Policy and Develop- Ground Defense, Draft Manuscript in

ment:' JIB 5/118/1616, Nov 1948, USAF Col- AF/CHO.

lection, 512.6111-I; P. N. Pospelov, et al, His- 30. IIS No 77, Camouflage of Enemy

tory of the Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Aircraft, Nov 12, 1942. Air Force General

376
NOTES

Information Bulletin (Hereafter AFGIB), No 48. Ibid, pp 83-84.

20, Feb 1944, pp 18-22. 49. Ibid, pp 83-86, 100; Manstein, Lost

31. Carrell, Hitler Moves East, pp Victories, p 449.

618-631; Craig, Enemy at the Gates, p 378. 50. Hardesty, Red Phoenix, p 165.

32. Plocher, GAFvs Russia, 1942, pp 272, 51. Albert Speer, Inside the Third Reich

306; Uebe, Russian Reaction to German Air (New York, 1970), pp 278-291, 332-333,

Power, p 21; Morzik, GAF Airlift Opera- 346-350. See also: Charles Webster and Notions, pp 185. ble Frankland, The Strategic Air Offensive

33. Plocher, GAF vs Russia, 1942, pp 259, Against Germany 1939-1945 4 vols, (London,

261-262, 279-308, 351; AFGIB No 20, Feb 1961) II: passim.

1944, pp 18-22 and MID Rept No 5, 13 Dec 52. Churchill, Closing the Ring, pp

1943, NARA. 292-333; Glenn B. Infield, The Poltava Af34. AFGIB No 20, pp 18-22; Plocher, fair, A Russian Warning: An American TragGAF vs Russia, 1942, p 293; Morzik, GAF edy (New York, 1973), pp 1-14.

Airlift Operations, p 195; Von Hardesty, Red 53. John R. Deane, The Strange Alliance

Phoenix, the Rise of Soviet Air Power, (New York, 1947), Ch II, passim.

1941-1945 (Washington, 1982), pp 105-119. 54. Memo, Harriman-Molotov Meeting, 5

35. Plocher, GAF vs Russia, 1942, pp Feb 1944, History of the Eastern Command,

259-262, 279-308, 351; AFGIB No 20, pp United States Strategic Air Forces, Europe,

18-22 and MID Rept No 5, 13 Dec 43. USAF Collection 522.01 to 522.161; Deane,

36. Morzik, GAF Airlift Operations, pp Strange Alliance, pp 108-109.

191-192, 195; Hardesty, Red Phoenix, pp 55. Eastern Command History, Rept of 5

114-118. Mar 1944; FRANTIC Plan, 22 May 1944.

37. Plocher, GAF vs Russia, 1942, pp 56. Repts of Meetings, Red Air Force

292-306, 315, 329. Headquarters, 5 and 17 Mar 1944, in Eastern

38. Erich von Manstein, Lost Victories Command History; Kenneth R. Whiting, ed

(Chicago, 1958), Ch 13, passim; Plocher, and trans, "Bulganin's Summary of Soviet

GAF vs Russia, 1943, pp 26-27, 365. Miiitary Art and Science,' in Readings in

39. Plocher, GAF vs Russia, 1943, pp Soviet Military Theory, (Maxwell AFB,

44-45; AFGIB No 20, p 18. 1952), pp 67-80; George F. Kennan, Soviet40. Plocher, GAF vs Russia, 1943, pp American Relations, 1917-1920, 2 vols, Vol 2,

49-50; AFGIB No 5, Soviet Fighter Tactics, The Decision to Intervene, passim.

Oct 1942, pp 10-13; Y. Veraksa, "Fighters 57. Deane, Strange Alliance, pp 114-120.

Attack an Airfield,' Soviet Military Review, 58. Memo, Harriman-Molotov Meeting, 5

July 1971, pp 39-41. Feb 1944; Rept of Proceedings of Board of

41. Erickson, The Road to Berlin, p. 97; Officers, 2 Aug 1944; Eastern Command

Plocher, GAF vs Russia, 1943, pp 72-74. History, Ch 6, Airdrome Operations.

42. Plocher, GAF vs Russia, 1943, pp 59. Eastern Command History, Ch 6;

78-83; Hinsley, British Intelligence in the Sec- Intv, Brig Gen Alfred A. Kessler, 5 July 1944,

ond World War, Vol 2, pp 615-627, 767-765. in Eastern Command History.

43. Wagner, ed, Soviet Air Force in World 60. Ibid.

War II, pp 166-171; IIS No 43-41, 20 Aug 61. Report on Shuttle Mission to Russia,

1943; Air Intelligence Rept No 100-45-34; Col Archie J. Old, Jr, 6 July 1944, in Eastern

Erickson, "Soviet Rada,' pp 255-263; Sch- Command History; Infield, Poltava Affair,

wabedissen, Russian Air Force, p 256; E. pp 138-139.

Simakov, "Camouflage of Air Force Opera- 62. Old, Rept on Shuttle Mission; Rept of

tions', pp 26-27. Board of Officers.

44. Wagner, ed, Soviet Air Force in World 63. Ltr, Lt Col William M. Jackson, 24

War II, p 167-169; Plocher, GAF vs Russia, June 1944, in Eastern Command History.

1943, pp 57-65. 64. Rept of Board of Officers

45. Plocher, GAF vs Russia, 1943, pp 65. Old, Rept on Shuttle Mission.

60-66. 66. Infield, Poltava Affair, Ch 11, 12, 15,

46. AFGIB No 15, Oct 42, Soviet Fighter passim.

Tactics; Veraksa, "Fighters Attack an 67. Old, Rept on Shuttle Mission; Deane,

Airfield,' pp 39-41. Strange Alliance, p 122; IIS 44-31, 15 Oct

47. Plocher, GAF vs Russia, 1943, pp 1944.

82-83. 68. Kessler Inty.

377
AIR BASE AIR DEFENSE

69. Infield, Poltava Affair, p 145-154. 75. Boyd, Soviet Air Force Since 1918, p

70. Pospelov, History of the Great Patri- 102; Historical Research and Evaluation Orotic War, vol II, p 597. ganization, The Development of Soviet Air

71. Leites, Soviet Style in War, p 243. Defense Doctrine and Practice (Dunn Loring,

72. Ibid, pp 237-252. Va, 1981), pp 2-25 to 2-31.

73. Infield, Poltava Affair, p 171. 76. Greenwood, "The Great Patriotic

74. Leites, Soviet Style in War, pp 237-252; War,' p 131; J.I.B.5/118/1616, Soviet Airfield

Greenwood, "The Great Patriotic Wah' p 98; Policy and Development.

Craig, Enemy at the Gates, pp 71-78. 77. Ibid, p 104.

Chapter VII

The Solomons and New Guinea

1942-1944

1. John Miller, Jr., Guadalcanal: The First A 32-1, U S Marine Historical Archives.

Offensive [United States Army in World War 12. Charles L. Updegraf, U S. Marine

I1] (Washington, 1949), Ch 1; Cdr Masatake Corps Special Units of World War 11 (WashOkumiya, Interrogation No 75, October 12, ington, 1972), pp 61-77; Rept on Fighter

1945, pp 5-6, USSBS, Pacific. Direction at Cactus, 8 October 1942-1 Jan

2. Ibid. 1943, Lt Lewis C. Mattison, Jan 1, 1943,

3. Frank 0. Hough, Verle E. Ludwig, and AF/CHO.

Henry I. Shaw, Jr., Pearl Harbor to Guadal- 13. Rept, Third Defense Bn Operations at

canal [History of U. S. Marine Operations in Guadalcanal, Mar 1943.

World War II (Washington, 1958), pp 14. Ibid; Intv, Ens W. A. Noll, USNR, 25

210-213. Mar 1943, USAF Collection, 730.3101B; Mat4. Miller, First Offensive, Chapter 1. tison, Fighter Direction at Cactus.

5. Ibid; Hough, Ludwig, and Shaw, Pearl 15. Third Defense Bn Operations, pp

Harbor to Guadalcanal, p 243. 13-16.

6. Ibid. 16. Ibid, p 4; Rept on Marine Antiaircraft

7. Hough, Ludwig, and Shaw, Pearl Har- at Guadalcanal, Solomon Islands, Oct 28,

bor to Guadalcanal, pp 247, 259, 264. 1942, Lt Col Robert H. Totten, Box 6, A

8. General George C. Kenney Papers, en- 32-2, U.S. Marine Historical Archives.

tries for August 7-8, 1942, in AF/CHO; Hist, 17. Gordon Swanborough and Peter M.

28th and 93rd Bomb Sqdns. General Kenney's Bowers, United States Navy Aircraft since

papers, actually a diary kept during World War 1911 (Annapolis, 1976), p 210; Hist, 67 Ftr

II, were typed after the war and organized into Sqn, Part 1; Noll Intv; IIS No 43-5, Jan 8,

eleven loose leaf binders. Interspersed through- 1943.

out are letters to and from President Franklin 18. Vandegrift Rept, Phase III, Annex B;

D. Roosevelt, General Douglas MacArthur, Phase IV, p 14.

General H. H. Arnold, and Kenney's subordi- 19. Eric A. Feldt, The Coastwatchers

nate commanders in the SWPA. (New York,1946), pp 83-95.

9. Hough, Ludwig, and Shaw, Pearl Har- 20. Vandegrift Rept, Phase IV, Annex A,

bor to Guadalcanal, pp 259-260; Division Phase V, Annex N; IIS No 43-8, Jan 23, 1943;

Commander's Final Rept on Guadalcanal Totten, Rept on Marine Antiaircraft at GuaOperation, May-July 1943 (Vandegrift Rept), dalcanal, pp 2-5; Noll lntv; Mattison,

Phase III, Annexes B, D, and G, Records of Fighter Direction at Cactus.

the First Marine Division, Box 4, U. S. Ma- 21. Feldt, Coastwatchers, pp 92-96; Rorine Historical Archives. bert Sherrod, History of Marine Corps Avia10. Miller, First Offensive, Ch 1. tion in World War 1H (Washington, 1952), p 86.

11. Rept, Third Defense Battalion Opera- 22. Vandegrift Rept, Phase IV, Annex D,

tions at Guadalcanal, Mar 1943, Col Robert H. Phase III, Annex B; Rept on Radar Operation

Pepper, First Marine Division Records, Box 6, at Cactus, Master Technical Sergeant Der378
NOTES

mott H. MacDonnell, Dec 16, 1942, 40. First Marine Division Records, Daily

AF/CHO. Intelligence Summaries, entries for Oct 5-13,

23. Noll Intv; Mattison, Fighter Direction Nov 8, and Dec 5 and 9, 1942, Box 8, C4-3,

at Cactus; Intv, author with Lewis C. Matti- U. S. Marine Historical Archives; Feldt,

son, Washington, DC, Oct 7, 1983; MacDon- Coastiwatchers, pp 117-118.

nell, Radar at Cactus; Intv, Maj Joseph N. 41. Ibid.

Renner, July 17, 1943, USAF Collection, 42. First Marine Division Records, Intela180.451-7. ries, entries for December 1942, Box 8, C2-1;

24. Ibid. Okumiya, Interrogation No 75, p 6, USSBS,

25. Noll Intv; Hist, 67 Ftr Sqn, part 1. Pacific.

26. Mattison, Fighter Direction at Cactus; 43. Lt Cmdr S. Yunoki, Interrogation No

IIS No 73, Nov 26, 1942; IIS 43-5. 195, October 27, 1945, USSBS, Pacific; Hist,

27. Pepper, Rept of Third Defense Bn; 67 Ftr Sqn, part II, p. 63, 69.

Mattison, Fighter Direction at Cactus, p 7. 44. Rept, Commander South Pacific Area

28. Vandegrift Rept, Phase III, Annex B; (COMSOPAC), Guadalcanal Escorted

Noll Intv; Rept of Maj Thomas F. Riley, 1st Bomber Missions During Month of Dec 1942

Aviation Engineer Bn (USMC), Box 6, A through Febr 24, 1943, Mar 15, 1943; Yunoki

3 1-1, U. S. Marine Corps Historical Archives. Interrogation, USSBS, Pacific.

29. Noll Intv; William F. Halsey, Admiral 45. IIS No 43-15, Feb 13, 1943.

Halsey's Story (New York, 1947), p 116; Mat- 46. Yunoki Interrogation, USSBS, Patison Intv. cific; Hist, 67 Ftr Sqn, part II, pp 63, 69.

30. Noll Intv; IIS No 73; IIS No 43-8. 47. Ibid; Rept, COMSOPAC, Guadalca31. Hist, 67th Ftr Sqn. nal Escorted Bomber Missions, Dec 1942

32. Noll Intv; Hough, Ludwig, and Shaw, through Feb 24, 1943, Mar 15, 1943, USAF

Pearl Harbor to Guadalcanal, pp 308-330. Collection.

33. Mattison, Fighter Direction at Cactus, 48. Rept, Air Aspects of the Munda Campp 5-9. paign, U.S. Pacific Fleet, Intelligence Divi34. Vandegrift Rept, Phase V; Hough, sion, Aug 15, 1943, USAF Collection

Ludwig, and Shaw, Pearl Harbor to Guadal- 180.204A; Memo, Munda Campaign Statisticanal, pp 324, 354-358; Interrogation No. cal Analysis, HQ, Thirteenth Air Force, Oct

475, Masatake Okumiya, Nov 29, 1945. 14, 1943, USAF Collection, 750.308-10.

USSBS, Pacific. 49. Halsey, Admiral Halsey's Story, p 161;

35. Ibid. Louis Morton, Strategy and Command: The

36. Mattison Intv; Ltr, Mattison to au- First iwo Years [The United States Army in

thor, Oct 24, 1983. World War II] (Washington, 1962), pp

37. Pepper, Rept of Third Defense Bn, 505-512.

Encl A; Mattison, Fighter Direction at Cac- 50. Samuel Milner, Victory in Papua, [The

tus, Appendix B. Mattison's report contains a United States Army in World War II] (Washday by day listing of aircraft of both sides ington, 1951), pp 39-44.

shot down. The list is not definitive, but was 51. Wesley F. Craven and James L. Cate,

prepared by Lt. Mattison from the best infor- eds, The Pacific: Guadalcanal to Saipan [The

mation he could find. Although not wholly Army Air Forces in World War II] (Chicago,

authoritative, it tends to confirm Miller's 1950), pp 5-10.

assessment of Japanese losses. 52. Milner, Victory in Papua, pp 39-44.

38. Sherrod, Marine Aviation in World 53. Ibid, pp 65-71.

War 11, p 128; Miller, Cactus Air Force, p 209; 54. Ibid, pp 71-76.

Samuel Eliot Morison, The Struggle for Gua- 55. Ibid, pp 88-96; Kenney Papers, entries

dalcanal, August 1942-February 1943 [His- for Sept 1942.

tory of United States Naval Operations in 56. Hist, V Ftr Cmd, Ch 1, USAF CollecWorld War II] (Boston, 1950), pp 223-224. tion 731.01; Army Air Forces School of Ap39. National Security Agency, Special Re- plied Tactics (AAFSAT), Intelligence Rept No

search Histories 136, "Radio Intelligence in 25, Mar 1944, USAF Collection 248.535-25.

World War II1' 188, "U. S. Navy Strategic 57. Kenney Papers, Aug 2, 30, 1942; Ltr,

Radio Direction Finder Station Guadalcanal:' Whitehead to Kenney, Jan 18, 1943, Kenney

197, "U. S. Navy Communication Intelligence Papers.

Organization, Liaison and Collaboration, 58. Craven and Cate, Guadalcanal to Sai1941-1945." pan, pp 97-108; Milner, Victory in Papua, pp

379
AIR BASE AIR DEFENSE

26-27; Antiaircraft and Air Warning Unit VFtr Cmd, to Commanding General, V Ftr

Files, U.S. Army Center of Military History Cmd, 18 Apr 1944, in Kenney Papers.

Organizational History Files; Ltr, Whitehead 74. Hist, V Ftr Cmd, Ch 1, pp 97-98, and

to Kenney, Oct 24, 1942, Kenney Papers; 8th Ftr Ctl Sqn; Hist, 85th Air Defense Wing,

George C. Kenney, General Kenney Reports Dec 1943-June 1944.

(New York, 1949), pp 210-215. 75. Kenney Papers, Aug 7, 25, and 26, Dec

59. Hist, V Ftr Cmd, p 109; Kenney 10, 1942, and Jan 9, 18, and May 7, 1943;

Papers for 1942, passim; Antiaircraft and Air SWPA Allied Translator and Interpreter SecWarning Unit Files, Org Hist Files, U.S. tion, Information Bulletin No 1, Nov 23,

Army; History of U. S. Aircraft Warning 1943, USAF Collection, 710.625; Col RinSystem in SWPA, USAF Collection, 731.663. suka Kaneko, Interrogation No. 440, Nov, 21,

60. General Headquarters, SWPA, Stand- 1945, USSBS, Pacific.

ing Operating Procedure No 7, June 26, 1943, 76. Hist, V Bomber Command; History

USAF Collection, 710.301A; Hist, V Ftr of Flakintel, SWPA, May 1, 1944, USAF

Cmd, pp 105-117; Ltr, C of S, Fifth Air Collection, 732.646.

Force, to Commanding General, V Ftr Cmd, 77. IIS 43-38, July 30, 1943, "Japanese

28 Sept 1943 and reply dated 24 Oct 1943, Antiaircraft Installations:' pp 10-21.

USAF Collection, 731.152-1. 78. History of Flakintel, "Trends of Jap61. Ltr, Capt Ross C. Baker, V Ftr Cmd, anese Antiaircraft Tactics."

Asst A-3 to Commanding General V Ftr Cmd, 79. IlS 43-43, Sept 10, 1943, "Destruction

18 Apr 1944, in Kenney Papers; Hist, 8th, of Enemy Planes at Wewak:' p 2; David

35th, and 49th Fighter Control Squadrons. Kahn, The Codebreakers, The Story of Secret

62. Ibid; History of Aircraft Warning in Writing (New York, 1967), pp 578-579.

SWPA; AAF Training Standard 30-4-1, May 80. Ltr, Col Harry F. Cunningham,

14, 1943. ACofS A-2, Advance Echelon Fifth Air

63. Antiaircraft and Air Warning Unit Force, to Kenney, 26 Dec 1943, Kenney PaFiles; Ltr, Maj Gen William F. Marquat, Air pers. In November 1945, Col. Kaneko (InterDefense Commands, 30 June 1944, USAF rogation No 440) told a Bombing Survey

Collection, 730.3812; Rept of Activities of interviewer that only about 120 operational

Separate Airborne Coast Artillery Batteries, aircraft were lost. The remainder were dereUSAF Collection, 248.712-91. licts because of lack of parts and maintenance

64. Kenney Papers, Sept 1, 1942. problems.

65. Ibid, passim. 81. History of Flakintel; "Operational

66. Ibid, Aug 3, 1942 and passim. History of Naval Communications:' Japanese

67. Ibid; Ltr, Kenney to MacArthur, Feb 4, Monograph No 118, U.S. Army Forces Far

1943, Kenney Papers; Kenney, Kenney Re- East, 1953, pp 109-113; Capt H. Komoto,

ports, pp 101-103; Douglas MacArthur, Rem- Interrogation No 360, Nov 12, 1945, and Col

iniscences (New York, 1964), p 157; George Rinsuka Kaneko, Interrogation No 440, Nov

A. Meidling, ed, Organizations, Troops, and 21, 1945, USSBS, Pacific.

Training [Engineers of the Southwest Pacific 82. Sigeru Sugiyama and Kengoro Tanaka,

1941-1945], Office of the Chief Engineer, "18th Army Operations:' 3 vols, Japanese

Army Forces Pacific, 1951, pp 95-96, Appen- Monographs No. 37, 38, and 39, Oct 1957,

dix IV. U.S. Army Far East Command, Vol. I, pp

68. Kenney Papers, passim. 29-31; Ltr, Whitehead to Kenney, May 5,

69. Kenney, Kenney Reports, pp 101-103; 1943; Kenney Papers, entry for May 7, 1943;

MacArthur, Reminiscences, p 157; Meidling, Kenney, Kenney Reports, p 233.

Organizations, Troops, and Training, pp 83. History of Flakintel, Japanese AA

95-96. Installations map.

70. Ltrs, Whitehead to Kenney, Feb 10 and 84. SWPA Air Evaluation Board, Rept No

May 29, 1943, Kenney Papers. 21, Airdrome Neutralization, intv with Col

71. Ibid; Ltrs, Whitehead to Kenney, June Rinkai Kaneko, Oct 18, 1945, pp 82-86,

18 and 20, 1943, and Marquat to Whitehead, USAF Collection 138.8-21.

June 15, 1943. 85. SWPA Air Evaluation Board, Rept No

72. Hist, 14th Antiaircraft Command, 23, Neutralization of Wewak, USAF CollecAntiarcraft and Air Warning Unit Files, U.S. tion 138.8-23; Ltr, Wewak Air Blockade,

Army Center of Military History. ACofS, A-2, Fifth Air Force Advance Eche73. Ltr, Capt Ross C. Baker, Asst A-3, Ion, Mar 29, 1944, Kenney Papers.

380
NOTES

86. SWPA Air Evaluation Board, Rept No Kenney Papers, Mar 27, 1944; Craven and

23. Cate, Guadalcanal to 1ýaipan, p 589.

87. Ibid; See also Kenney Papers for Jan. 95. Kenney Papers, Mar 29 and Apr 1,

uary through March 1944; Ltrs, Whitehead to 1944; Msg, COMAFADVON 5 to Kenney,

Brig Gen Paul B. Wurtsmith, Feb 11 and 21, Mar 31, 1944; Sugiyama and Tanaka, "18th

and Mar 6, 1944, and Whitehead to Kenney, Army Operations:' Vol III, Japanese MonoFeb 11, 1944, in Kenney Papers. graph No 39, pp 36-42.

88. SWPA Air Evaluation Board, Rept No 96. Ibid; Craven and Cate, Guadalcanal

21; Airdrome Neutralization; SWPA Air to Saipan, pp 592-598.

Evaluation Board, Rept No 25, Neutraliza- 97. IIS No 44-31, Oct 15, 1944; Kenney

tion of Wewak; Ltr, ACofS, A-2, Fifth Air Papers for 1942, passim; Morton, Strategy

Force Advance Echelon, Mar 29, 1944, We- and Command, p 357; Kenney, Kenney Rewak Air Blockade, Kenney Papers. ports, p 241; Tanaka Intvs, USSBSPacific.

89. Ibid; See especially bomb squadron 98. Kenney, Kenney Reports, pp 251-253,

mission reports in SWPA Rept No 23. 262, 276-277.

90. Neutralization of Wewak, pp 36-50. 99. Ibid, pp 225-226, 241, 245, 259, 303.

91. Ibid; Airdrome Neutralization, pp 100. USSBS, Pacific, Japanese Airpower,

15-22, 53. pp 35-40; Lt Cdr Takeda Shigeki, Interroga92. Ibid; Craven and Cate, Guadalcanal tion No 354, Nov 4, 1945, USSBS, Pacific.

to Saipan, p 590. 101. Natalie Grow, "Procurement of Air93. Ibid; Intvs No 388, 483, and 486, Lt crew Trainees,' USAF Hist Study 15, p9; Jerry

Col Koji Tanaka, Nov-Dec 1945, USSBS, White, "Combat Crews and Unit Training in

Pacific. the AAF, 1939-1945:' USAF Hist Study 61 pp

94. ACofS Ltr, Wewak Air Blockade; 29-36; Shigeki Interrogation, USSBS, Pacific.

Chapter VIII

Two Limited Wars

Korea and Southeast Asia

1. Roy E. Appleman, South to the Nak- 5. Ibid; Partridge Diary, July 1950; Hist,

tong, North to the Yalu, [United States Army 5AF, Jan-June 1953, Vol VI, p 363.

in the Korean War] (Washington, 1961), pp 6. Hist, 5AF, July-Dec 1950, Vol III, pp

8-12, 394; Rept, Principles for the Selection 33-39, 42; Ltr, Ivan J. Getting to John L.

of Targets for Air Attack in Korea, Hq, Far McLucas, 12 Mar 1974, AF/CHO.

East Air Forces, Aug 25, 1953, USAF Collec- 7. Futrell, USAF in Korea, pp 98-101; Far

tion K720.323A. East Air Forces Weekly Intelligence Roundup,

2. James F. Schnabel and Robert J. Wat- 8-14 Oct 1950 (hereafter: FEAF Wkly Intel

son, The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Rdp), USAF Collection K720.600; Partridge

Policy, The Korean War [History of the Joint Diary, Oct 2, 1950.

Chiefs of Staff], Vol III, Part I (hereafter: 8. Rept, Enemy Use of Camouflage in the

JCS, The Korean War), (Washington, 1978), Korean Campaign, HQ, 5AF Office of Tactipp 41-42; Robert F. Futrell, The United States cal Air Research and Survey Special Rept No

Air Force in Korea, 1950-1953, rev ed (Wash- 32, Jan 22, 1951 (hereafter: Enemy Use of

ington, 1983), p 17. Camouflage in Korea), USAF Collection

3. Diary, Maj Gen Earle E. Partridge, K730.01-25.

1950-1951, entries for June 25-29, 1950, 9. Partridge Diary, Oct 11, 1950; FEAF

USAF Collection 168.7014-1; Schnabel and Wkly Intel Rdp 8-14 Oct 1950.

Watson, JCS, The Korean War, pp 115-122; 10. FEAF Wkly Intel Rdp, 8-14 Oct 1950;

P. LeR. Loomis, "Antiaircraft at Suwon,' Partridge Diary, Oct 14, 1950; Diary, Lt Gen

Antiaircraft Journal, Sept-Oct 1950, pp 2-5. George E. Stratemeyer, entries for July 2-19,

4. Hist, 5AF, July-December 1950, Vol 25 Aug 1950, USAF Collection K168.7018.

III, pp 33-39, USAF Collection K730.01. 11. Futrell, USAF in Korea, pp 239-246,

381
AIR BASE AIR DEFENSE

255, 277; Appleman, South to the Naktong, 30. Ibid; Hist 7AF, Jan-June 1970, Status

North to the Yalu, pp 770-776. of Airfields in NVN, USAF Collection

12. Futrell, USAF in Korea, pp 239-246, K740.01-25.

255, 277; FEAF Wkly Intel Rdp, 8-14 Oct 31. Rept, Southeast Asia Counter Air

1950; Partridge Diary, Oct 14, 1950. Alternatives (SEACAAL) HQ, Pacific Air

13. Schnable and Watson, JCS, The Ko- Forces, Dec 31, 1966, USAF Collection

rean War, p. 555. K717.310-1; Penix and Ringenbach, Air De14. Remarks of General Bryce Poe II to fense in SEA.

author; FEAF Wkly Intel Rdp, No 69, 22-28 32. SEACAAL, pp 1-1 - 1-2, Appendix J.

Dec 1951; Futrell, USAF in Korea, p 286; 33. SEACAAL, pp Ill-1 - 111-7.

Intel Production Memo No 8; Rept, Soviet 34. Ibid; Melvin F. Porter, Linebacker:

Activity in North Korea and Nearby Manchu- Overview of the First 120 Days, Project

ria, HQ, 5AF, Nov 21, 1951, USAF Collection CHECO Rept (Hickam AFB, Hawaii, 1973)

K730.600. pp 1 - 11; Melvin F. Porter, Air Tactics Against

15. Schnabel and Watson, JCS, The Ko- NVNAir/Ground Defenses, Project CHECO

rean War, pp 452-455; HQ, USAF, Air Intel- Rept (Hickam AFB, Hawaii, 1967) p 26;

ligence Production Memo No 8, Soviet Reac- Washington Post, May 22, 1967, p 1.

tion to United Nations Air Attack on Chinese 35. lbid; U. S. Grant Sharp, Strategy for

Communist Air Bases in Manchuria, May 2, Defeat, Vietnam in Retrospect (San Rafael,

1951, USAF Collection K142.0303-8; Par- 1978), pp 202, 209.

tridge Diary, Oct 8, 9, 12, 1950; Intv, Lt Gen 36. SEACAAL, Appendix K.

Devol Brett with author, Feb 1985. 37. Ibid, pp IV-A to IV-7; "Expansion of

16. Schnabel and Watson, JCS, The Ko- NVN Radar Systems Continues,' Defense Inrean War, pp 454-455; Rept, Soviet Reaction telligence Digest, Vol 5, No 2, Feb 1967, p 32.

to United Nations Air Attacks. 38. John C. Pratt, Air Tactics Against

17. FEAF Wkly Intel Rdp., 29 April-5 NVN Air Ground Defenses, Dec 66-1 Nov

May 1951; Futrell, USAF in Korea, pp 68, Project CHECO Rept, (Hickam AFB,

293-300. Hawaii, 1969) pp 1-10; Monte D. Wright,

18. Futrell, USAF in Korea, pp 278-279, USAF Tactics Against Air & Ground De293-300, 301-306. fenses in SEA, Nov 68-May 70 Project

19. FEAF Wkly Intel Rdp, 22-28 Dec CHECO Rept, (Hickam AFB, Hawaii, 1970);

1951; Soviet Activities in North Korea and Rept, SA-2 Deployment and Thctics in North

Nearby Manchuria. Vietnam, HQ, 7AF, June 23, 1966; Seventh

20. Hist, 5AF Jan-June 1951, Vol I, Ap- Air Force Weekly Air Intelligence Summary

pendix 3, Air Intelligence Estimate, June 19, (7AF WAIS), Dec 14, 1968, pp 5-8, USAF

1951, pp 366-372. Collection K740.3072.

21. FEAF Wkly Intel Rdp, 4-10 Nov 1951; 39. SEACAAL, passim; Rept, AntiFutrell, USAFin Korea, pp 307-310, 506-507. Aircraft Threat in SEA, Joint Anti-Aircraft

22. Ibid; Remarks of General Bryce Poe. Effectiveness Conference, 1-8 Nov 1966,

23. Ibid. USAF Collection K417.0372-11; Weapons

24. Fifth Air Force Monthly Intelligence System Evaluation Group Rept No 128

Summaries, Mar-July 1953, USAF Collection (WSEG 128), Apr 1968, Analysis of Combat

K720.607A. Aircraft Losses in Southeast Asia, Part I1, Vol

25. Ibid. 1, Enclosure B, USAF Collection

26. FEAF Wkly Intel Rdp, 12-27 July K160.804-116.

1953. 40. WSEG 128, Part II, Vol I, p 61;

27. USAF Statistical Summary for 1953, p Bernard C. Nalty, Tactics and Techniques of

56; HQ, 5AF Operations Analysis Memo No Electronic Warfare, Electronics Countermea64, A Study of Ground Fire Attrition in the sures in the Air War Against North Vietnam,

Korean Theater, June 17, 1953. 1965-1973, [The Air Force in Southeast Asia]

28. Robert F. Futrell, The Advisory Years (Washington, 1977), pp 10-11; Institute for

to 1965 [The United States Air Force in Defense Analyses, Selected Topics in Air DeSoutheast Asia] (Washington, 1981), pp 3-40. fense Suppression, IDA Study No S-369, p

29. Ibid, pp 221-225; Guyman Penix and 19, USAF Collection K160.8041-369.

Paul T. Ringenbach, Air Defense in Southeast 41. Red Baron III, Air-to-Air Encounters

Asia, 1945-1971, Project CHECO Rept in Southeast Asia, Vol III: Analysis, pp 6-12,

(Hickam AFB, Hawaii, 1973) p 31. 94-97.

382
NOTES

42. "Tactical Lessons of Vietnam:' Avia- 55. Calvin R. Johnson, Linebacker Opertion Week and Space Technology, May 21, ations, September-December 1972, Project

1973, p 7; Porter, Linebacker: Overview of CHECO Rept (Hickam AFB, Hawaii, 1978) p

the First 120 Days, pp 57-58. 21; Msg, CINCPACAF to 7AF (Gen Vogt),

43. SEACAAL, Appendix B; SEACAAL, 112151Z Aug 72, subj: Linebacker OperaAppendix L, pp I-1 to 1-16; WSEG 128, Part tions; Msg, 7AF/DO to CINCPACAF/DO,

I: Summary and Conclusions. 060301 Aug 72, subj: Paveway System Deliv44. Ibid; Pacific Command (PACOM) In- ery Techniques, in USAF Collection

telligence Digest, May 1970, pp 31-38. K744.312, and CHECO microfilm.

45. Porter, Air Tactics Against NVN De- 56. Porter, Overview of the First 120 Days,

fenses, 1967, pp 14-24. pp. 45-47, 67-69.

46. Nalty, Tactics and Techniques of Elec- 57. Johnson, Linebacker Operations, pp

tronic Warfare, pp 53-66; Sharp, Strategy for 9-11, 19.

Defeat, pp 177-185, 202; Rept, Rolling 58. Msg, CINCPAC to Adm Clarey, Gens

Thunder-Linebacker, A Preliminary Compar- Clay, Weyand, and Meyer, 260332Z Oct 72,

ative Analysis, July 1972, USAF Collection subj: Air Operations Message Number Two;

K168.06; US Air Force Tactical Fighter Weap- Msg, CINCPACFLT to CINCPAC, 291520Z

ons Center, Interim Rept No 7 (Project Red Oct 72, subj: Taxi Road; Msg, CINCPACFLT

Baron), U. S. and Enemy Air-to-Air Tactics in to CINCPAC, 291852Z Oct 72, in K744.312.

SEA: Part II, July 1972, pp 50-51, USAF 59. Johnson, Linebacker Operations, p

Collection K417.0735-1; IDA Study S-369, 55; McCarthy, James R., and Allison, George

pp 7-11, 65. B. Linebacker II: A View From The Rock,

47. Ibid; 7AF WAIS, Dec 14, 1968. [USAF Southeast Asia Monograph Series, vol

48. Hearings before the Armed Services VI: monograph 8] (Maxwell AFB, 1976), p

Investigating Subcommittee of the Commit- 41; HQ, PACAF, Linebacker II Operations

tee on Armed Services, House of Representa- Rept, July 2, 1973, Lessons Learned Sumtives, Unauthorized Bombing of Military Tar- mary, Airfields, USAF Collection

gets in North Vietnam, 92nd Cong, 2nd sess K186.06-232 and-233.

(Washington, 1972), passim; Hearings before 60. Msg, CINCPACAF/DO, Talbott, to

the Committee on Armed Services, Senate, 7AF/DO, Blesse, 230330Z Dec 72, subj:

Nomination of John D. Lavelle, General F-111 Operations, in K744.312; Msgs, 474

Creighton W. Abrams, and Admiral John S. TFW to NMCC, 190455Z Dec 72, 200640Z

McCain, 92nd Cong, 2nd sess (Washington, Dec 72, 210530Z Dec 72, 220335Z Dec 72,

1972), passim. 240320Z Dec 72, 270347Z Dec 72, and 7/13

49. Ibid. AF to TAC/DO, 100850Z Jan 73, all in

50. Ibid. AFCHO; Oral History Intv, General John W.

51. Rolling Thunder-Linebacker Prelimi- Vogt, Aug 8-9, 1978, USAF Collection

nary Comparative Analysis; Porter, Line- K239.0512-1093, pp 86-99.

backer: Overview of the First 120 Days, pp 61. PACAF, Linebacker II Operations

44-48, 62-63. Rept, p 3-4, and Lessons Learned Summaries

52. lbid; Rolling Thunder-Linebacker, on Airfields and LORAN Strikes.

Preliminary Comparative Analysis. 62. Ibid; PACAF, Air Operations Sum53. Ibid. mary Southeast Asia, Jan 1973, pp 4-B-i to

54. HQ, PACAF, Summary, Air Opera- 4-B-48; Vogt Intv, pp 86-89.

tions Southeast Asia Apr 1972, pp 4-3 to 4-8, 63. Vogt Intv, pp 90-92; McCarthy and

USAF Collection K717.306-1; Rept, Sum- Allison, Linebacker II: A View From The

mary of Air Opertions in SEA, Center for Rock, pp 97-98.

Naval Analyses (Arlington, 1972), pp 4-1 to 64. Linebacker II Operations Rept, pp

4-13, USAF Collection K180.0481-6; John 3-4; Lessons Learned Summaries on Airfields

W. Seemann, Combat Snap (AIM-9J Intro- and LORAN Strikes.

duction to SEA), Project CHECO Rept 65. Project Red Baron III, Vol III, Part I,

(Hickam AFB, Hawaii, 1974) pp 29-31. pp 50-51.

383
AIR BASE AIR DEFENSE

Chapter IX

The Middle East: 1948-1973

I. Paul A. Jureidini, et al, The Middle 20. Anwar el-Sadat, In Search of Identity

East, A Study of Conflict (Washington, (New York, 1977), pp 173-174.

1969), pp 23-36; Chaim Herzog, The Arab- 21. Weizman Briefing, Sec. I, pp 19, 26,

Israeli Wars (New York, 1982), pp 11-21; A. Sect 11, pp 10, 15; USAF Hod Memo; "Mock

L. Tibawi, "Jerusalem, Its Place in Islam and Dogfights Sharpened Israeli Pilots:' Aviation

Arab History' in The Arab-Israeli Confron- Week and Space Technology, July 3, 1967, p

ration of June 1967: An Arab Perspective, ed 24-27.

by Ibrahim Abu-Lughod (Evanston, 1970), 22. Weizman Briefing, Sect 11, p 21.

pp 10-48. 23. lntv, Brereton Greenhous with General

2. Ibid. Mordecai Hod, Jan 16, 1984, pp 1-2; Weiz3. Intv, Brereton Greenhous with General man Briefing, Sect 1, pp 19-24.

Dan Tolkowski, Jan 13, 1984, p 2, AF/CHO. 24. Weizman Briefing, Sect I, pp 27-28;

4. Herzog, Arab-Israeli Wars, pp 106-108. Hod Intv, pp 2-3; Warren C. Wetmore, "Is5. Tolkowski Intv, pp 2-6. rael's Air Punch Major Factor in War!' Avia6. Alfred Goldberg, Air Operations in the tion Week and Space Technology, July 3,

Sinai Campaign (Washington, 1959), pp 5-8. 1967, p 20.

7. Ibrahim Abu-Lughod, "Israel's Arab 25. Hod Intv, pp 1-2; Dayan, My Life, pp

Policy,' The Arab-Israeli Confrontation, pp 410-415.

73-75; Abba Eban, An Autobiography (New 26. Ibid.

York, 1977), pp 204-205; Moshe Dayan, 27. USAF Hod Memo; Dayan, My Life,

Story of My Life (New York, 1976), pp pp 416-420; Weizman Briefing, Sect I pp

184-199. 18-24.

8. Eban, Autobiography, pp 204-205; 28. Wetmore, "Israel's Air Punch:' p 19.

Roy Fullick and Goeffrey Powell, Suez: The 29. Ibid; Weizman Briefing, Sect 1, pp

Double War (North Pomfret, Vt, 1979), pp 20-25, Sect II, p 11; Dayan, My Life, pp

2-3; Tolkowski Intv, p 4; Dayan, My Life, p 416-422; O'Ballance, Third Arab-Israeli War,

272. p 65; Intv, Brereton Greenhous with Col

9. Dayan, My Life, p 195-199. Yoash Tsiddon-Chatto, Jan 14, 1984, p 2.

10. Ibid; Fullick and Powell, Suez, pp 30. Tsiddon-Chatto lntv; Wetmore, "Is109-122. rael's Air Punch."

I1. Ibid; Goldberg, Suez Campaign, pp 31. Ibid.

26-27. 32. O'Ballance, Third Arab-Israeli War,

12. Dayan, My Life, pp 216-217. pp 55, 63-68; Sadat, Identity, p 174.

13. Edgar O'Ballance, The Third Arab- 33. Sadat, Identity, pp 173-180.

Israeli War (Hamden, 1972), pp 56, 90-96. 34. O'Ballance, Third Arab-Israeli War,

14. Ibid. pp 66-68; Weizman Briefing, Sect I, pp

15. Ibid, pp 60-62. 20-25.

16. Ibid, pp 50-52; Charles W. Yost, "The 35. John W. R. Thylor, ed, Jane's All The

Arab-Israeli War, How It Began:' Foreign World's Aircraft, 1968-1969, p 503; Robert

Affairs, Jan 1968, pp 304-320; Hisham Sha- R. Rodwell, "Three Hours-And Six Days:'

rabi, "Prelude to War: The Crisis of May- Air Force, Oct 1967, p 58; Hod Intv, pp 1-2.

June 1967:' The Arab Israeli Confrontation, 36. Dayan, My Life, pp 418-427.

pp 49-65; Ezer Weizman, Arab-Israeli War 37. Ibid; "Mock Dogfights Sharpened IsBriefing [to the U. S. Department of De- raeli Pilots:' Aviation Week, July 3, 1967, pp

fense], Washington, Sept 11-12, 1967, Sec. I, 18-22; Wetmore, "Israeli's Air Punch:' pp

p 4, AF/CHO. 24-27.

17. Weizman Briefing. 38. Weizman Briefing, Sect II, pp 13-22.

18. Ibid; Dayan, My Life, pp 361-368. 39. Ezer Weizman, The Battle for Peace

19. Dayan, My Life, pp 402-417; Memo, (New York, 1981), p 52.

Meeting with Brig Gen Mordecai Hod, HQ 40. Sadat, Identity, pp 205-231; MoUSAF/XO, Jan 12, 1968, USAF Collection hamed Heikal, The Road to Ramadan (New

K239.0512-913. York, 1975), pp 167-168.

384
NOTES

41. Herzog, Arab-Israeli Wars, pp Insight on the Middle East War (London,

195-197. 1974), pp 29-31; Hiam Bar-Lev, "Surprise

42. "Massive Resupply Narrows Israeli and the Yom Kippur War:' Military Aspects of

Margin in Air Powe,' Aviation Week and the Israeli-Arab Conflict, ed by Louis WilSpace Technology, June 19, 1967, pp 16-19. liams (Tel Aviv, 1975), pp 262-263.

43. Weizman Briefing, Sect II, pp 5-6. 57. Sadat, Identity, pp 232-240; Rept,

44. Richard F. Nyrop, et al, Area Hand- Joint Chiefs of Staff, US Military Operabook for Egypt (Washington, U.S. Dept of tional Survey Team Visit to the Israeli Defense

the Army, 1975), pp 362-363; Heikal, Rama- Forces (IDF), Israel, Dec 1973, pp 2-17,

dan, p 238. USAF Collection K178.203-17.

45. Rept, SecDef to Congress, The Effec- 58. Ibid; Janice Gross Stein, "'Inteltiveness of United States Military Aid to ligence' and 'Stupidity' Reconsidered: EstiIsrael, Dec 1974, p 14; Weizman Briefing, mation and Decision in Israel, 1973', Journal

Sect II, p 22. of Strategic Studies, Sept 1980, pp 147-167;

46. Rept, Weapons Systems Evaluation Edgar O'Ballance, No Victor, No VanGroup, Data from the October 1973 Middle quished, The Yom Kippur War (San Rafael,

East War, Vol IV: Structural Engineering 1978), pp 19, 42-44, 284.

(Aircraft Shelters) Report (WSEG Report 59. Rept, US Mil Visit to IDF, pp 20-21.

237), Jan 1975, pp 95-112, 226. 60. Dayan, My Life, pp 572-575; Rept,

47. Ibid; Edward H. Kolcum, "Soviets Ac- US Mil Visit to IDF, pp 1-20; Stein, "'Intelcelerating Mideast Drive,' Aviation Week and ligence' and 'Stupidity' Reconsidered;" Janet

Space Technology, May 18, 1970, pp 14-18. G. Stein, "Military Deception, Strategic Sur48. WSEG Rept 237, Vol IV, pp 111-122. prise, and Conventional Deterrence: A Polit49. DIA Digest, Jan 1970, p 2; "Airfield ical Analysis of Egypt and Israel, 1971-73:'

Attack: Lessons of the Mideast Wars,' Born Journal of Strategic Studies, March 1982. pp

in Battle: Defence Update, Oct 1982, pp 94-118.

38-42. 61. Sadat. Identity, p 249: "Airfield

50. Herzog, Arab-Israeli Wars, pp Attack,' Born in Battle, pp 37-38; Rept, US

205-210, A J. Barker, Arab-Israeli Wars Mil Visit to IDF, p 25

(London, 1980), p 105. 62. Rept, US Army Combined Arms Cen51. Herzog, Arab-Israeli Wars, pp ter, Special Readiness Group, ACN 22216,

212-217; SecDef Rept, Effectiveness of US Analysis of Combat Data-1973 Mideast

Military Aid, pp 8-15. War, Vol. IV, Appendix E, June 1974, p E-6;

52. Edward H. Kolcum, "Soviets Shifting Peled Intv. Speaking ten years after the war,

Mideast Balance"' Aviation Week and Space General Peled gave his views on the inadequaTechnology, May 11, 1970, pp 18-21; Edward cies of Israeli combat intelligence assessments

H. Kolcum, "Vietnam Lessons Helped Israel in 1973 and on the misconceptions he thought

Build Mideast Air Superiority' Aviation his critics and other observers had formed of

Week and Space Technology, May 25, 1970, his policies. He contended that the IAF did

pp 18-21. not have access to air reconnaissance that

53. "Russians Fly Defense Missions for would have made SAM suppression along the

Egypt in Middle East Conflict:' Aviation coast easier. Peled's remarks show signs that

Week and Space Technology, May 25, 1970, he was still exercised and somewhat defensive

May 4, 1970, p 27; "Soviets Deploy New Suez about these subjects in 1984. His remarks

Defenses,' Aviation Week and Space Technol- were clearly colored by his experiences, and

ogy, July 13, 1970, pp 14-16. some of his recollections are erroneous. He is

54. "New Missile Sites Threat to Israeli nevertheless quite revealing of the way the

Air Supremacy' Aviation Week and Space IAF dealt with the Arab threat.

Technology, Aug 24, 1970. p 20; Edward H. 63. Peled Intv, pp 6-7, 14; Rept, US Army

Kolcum, "SAM Changes Force New Strategy CAC, Special Readiness Group, Analysis of

on Israelis,' Aviation Week and Space Tech- Combat Data-1973, Vol IV, p E-6; Matmon

nology, Nov 16, 1970, pp 16-21. Information File, tables 13, 14, and 17, USAF

55. Intv, Brereton Greenhous with General Collection K178.203-18.

Binyamin Peled, Jan 13, 1984, AF/CHO. 64. Ibid.

56. Sadat, Identity, pp 225, 231-238; Sec- 65. Rept, Naval Weapons Center, NWC

Def Rept, Effectiveness of US Military Aid; TP 5885, The Yom Kippur War, Analysis of

Insight team of the London Sunday Times, Weapon Implications, July 1976, pp 33-35.

385
AIR BASE AIR DEFENSE

66. Peled lntv, pp 3, 9-18. 152-153; NWC TP 5885, p 106.

67. NWC TP 5885, pp 91-92; WSEG Rept 72. Peled Intv; Herzog, Arab-Israeli Wars,

237, Vol IV, Ch 3, passim. pp 262-284, passim.

68. U.S. Army, Combined Arms Center, 73. Herzog, Arab-Israeli Wars, pp

ACN 22216, pp E-ll to E-13. 259-261.

69. Ibid, pp E-ll to E-21. 74. Peled Intv; Herzog, Arab-Israeli Wars,

70. Ibid. pp 262-284, passim.

71. Ibid; WSEG Rept 237, Vol IV, pp

Chapter X

Conclusion

1. Air Corps Tactical School, Course mand, Intelligence Memo No 35, July 6,

AF-16-C, Antiaircraft Defense of an Air 1943, USAF Collection 248.712-88.

Base, Mar 8, 1940, Headquarters Air Forces 4. War Dept, Rept, Command, Staff, and

Combat Command, Epling Papers, RG 18; Administration of Antiaircraft Artillery

Ltr, Clarification of the Term "Air Base:' HQ, Units, United States Forces, European TheGHQ AF to Commandant, ACTS, Aug 5, ater, May 1945, USAF Collection 502.101-37.

1939, USAF Collection 248.12615. See also: John T. Correll, "Air Defense from

2. RAF Draft Narrative, The Campaign in the Ground Up:' Air Force, July 1983, pp

France and the Low Countries, pp 105-113; 38-43.

MAAF reel no 31, Records of AA and CD 5. Roger Fox, Air Base Defense in the

Section. Republic of Vietnam, 1961-1973 (Wash3. U.S. Army Antiaircraft Artillery Com- ington, DC, 1979), pp 40-48.

386
Bibliographic Note

Original sources used for these case studies came largely from the U.S.

Air Force Historical Research Center's collection at Maxwell Air Force Base,

Alabama, and the National Archives and Records Service in Washington,

DC, and at the Office of Air Force History in Washington, which retains on

microfilm much of the record collection in the repository at Maxwell AFB.

The specific locations of the files cited are provided in the footnotes by

reference to the major collection titles and their respective repositories. For

files in collections at the U.S. National Archives and Records Administration (NARA), record group and file numbers are supplied; files located at

the USAF Historical Research Center carry the designation "USAF Collection" with appropriate alpha-numerical cataloging data. British Public Record Office files show the designation "PRO." Where they are used the

Inferential Retrieval Index System (IRIS) file designators are also cited.

Of surpassing interest among these materials are the records of the

Mediterranean Allied Air Forces. The original papers of this command are

held in the NARA collections at the Washington National Records Center,

Suitland, Maryland. A microfilm made at the end of World War II is also at

the USAF Historical Research Center, but is of uneven quality. A general

index of subject files exists, but research requires diligent effort. A copy of

the extensive report titled "Air Staff Post-Hostility Intelligence Requirements on the German Air Force:' begun in 1944, is now held by AF/CHO.

Not well indexed, it nevertheless contains many interviews, translations, and

analytical statements not available elsewhere or scattered through other records collections.

Japanese sources derive from the U. S. Army's Japanese Monograph

series, the interrogations conducted after World War II in conjunction with

the United States Strategic Bombing Survey, and the records of the Allied

Interpreter and Translator Section, Southwest Pacific Theater. In addition,

General George C. Kenney kept an extensive and rather frank diary during

the war. After Japan's surrender, he had most of the material typed, although some original handwritten pages remain. These documents, along

with chronologically interspersed letters, reports, and memoranda are col387
AIR BASE AIR DEFENSE

lected at AF/CHO as the Kenney Papers. Kenney used the material as the

basis for his book, General Kenney Reports, which contains extensive comment by one of the leading American air commanders of the Pacific war and

a man who was a close confidant of General of the Army Douglas MacArthur. When the diary was transcribed, Kenney frequently added notes containing postwar information developed by the USSBS teams, discovered in

Japanese records, or gathered in his direct conversations with individual

Japanese soldiers and airmen.

Records of the U.S. Marine Corps are available at the U.S. Marine

Corps Historical Center in the Washington Navy Yard. Certain special studies, particularly those related to the Arab-Israeli Wars of 1967 and 1973 are

from the Technical Library of the U.S. Air Force Assistant Chief of Staff,

Studies and Analysis. Transcriptions of interviews conducted specifically for

these case studies are retained in the author's files in AF/CHO; some restrictions still attach to their use.

The following are the principal secondary sources used in this work.

Books

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Aders, Gebhard. History of the German Night Fighter Force, 1917-1945. London: Jane's, 1979.

Air Ministry, UK. The Origins and Development of Operational Research in the Royal Air

Force. London: HMSO, 1963.

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1973, Dunn Loring, Va.: T.N. Dupuy Associates, 1978.

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Barnett, Corelli. The Desert Generals, New York: Berkley Publishing Co., 1960.

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Scribner's Sons, 1980.

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G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1963.

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of War, 1904-1945, London: George Allen and Unwin, 1982.

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Bushby, John. Air Defence of Great Britain, London: Ian Allen, 1973.

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388
BIBLIOGRAPHY

Chamberlain, Peter, and John Milsom. Self-Propelled Anti-Tank andAnti-Aircraft Guns, New

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• The Role of Defensive Pursuit, privately published, 1933.

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Against Japan, London: HMSO, 1957.

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_ Guadalcanal: The First Offensive [The United States Army in World War II],

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Miller, Thomas G., Jr. The Cactus Air Force, New York: Harper and Row, 1969.

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393
Index

Advanced Air Striking Force, RAF: 70-71, Air Bases immune from attack. See

76, 347 Sanctuaries

Aerodrome Command, Luftwaffe: 192 Air Base Construction Board (USN): 27

Aeronautique Militaire: 3 Airfields, Soviet

African campaigns: 110, 130, 132, 137-76 in World War II: 201, 214

Air base defense. See also Aircraft use in air construction of: 185

base defense; Base Defense dispersal: 185

Battalions Air Component, BEF (RAF): 70-71

air defense areas: 167-69 Air Corps, U.S. Army (AAC): 25, 31, 82

Allied failure to consider before ToRcH: Air Corps Tactical School (ACTS), AAC:

163 24-28

American: 17-19, 221, 231-34, 242-43, Aircraft destroyed on the ground

246-48 Allied, in SWPA: 248-49

American planning for: 15, 19-20, 27, Allied and American, in France: 11-12,

48, 346 17-18

British: 43, 82-83, 85, 88-91, 174 American, in Russia: 208

British in Malaya: 95, 97, 100-1, Belgian: 69, 76

106-10 British, in Britain: 88-90

Chinese-North Korean: 272, 277 British, in Egypt: 144

dedicated units: 89, 137, 143-44, British, in Malaya: 101, 109

165-67 British and French, in France: 71,

Dutch: 67-68 75-76

Egyptian: 315, 330, 339 Egyptian: 302, 306, 316, 319, 334, 341,

German: 34, 156, 159, 169-70, 175 350

German, in Russia: 181, 189, 192-93, German, by the Dutch: 67

195, 198-99, 202, 214-15 German, in France: 11-13, 18

German, in World War I: 6-7, 21 German, in Russia: 198, 201

inherent resilience of bases: 344 German, in Sicily: 124

Israeli: 317, 323, 327 German-Italian, in North Africa: 144,

Japanese: 38, 101, 106, 108, 235, 249, 150-51, 169-70, 175

251-52, 254-56, 260 Israeli: 316

Luftwaffe responsibilities in: 33-34, 36, Japanese: 108, 110, 219, 234-35, 249,

48, 189 252-53, 256-57

at Malta: 123, 125, 127-28, 131, Jordanian and Iraqi: 317, 319, 341

133-35, 344 North Vietnamese: 288, 291

North Vietnamese: 285, 287, 294-95 Polish: 54

Polish: 57-59 Soviet: 177, 179-81, 183, 189

Soviet: 42, 187-88, 205-6, 213-14 Syrian: 317, 319, 334, 341

Syrian: 330, 339 Aircraft types

in World War II: 343-344, 346 A-1 fighter, Douglas Skyraider: 279

395
AIR BASE AIR DEFENSE

A-4 attack bomber (USN), Douglas F-Ill jet fighter-bomber, General

Skyhawvk: 322 Dynamics: 294-95, 297

A-7 jet fighter (USN), Flying boats (RN): 112

Ling-Temco-Vought Corsair 11: 294 Focke-Wulf FW-190 fighter: 167

A-20 fighter, Douglas Havoc: 244, Fokker GI-A fighter: 67

255-56 Fouga Magister trainers: 307

A-24 dive bomber, Douglas Dauntless: Fulmar fighter (RN) (Fairey): 124

244 Halberstadt fighter: I1

A-29 bomber, Lockheed: 108 Heinkel III medium bomber: 77, 88,

Albatros D fighter: I1 197

B-10 bomber, Martin: 108-9 Hudson III bomber (Lockheed): 108

B-17 bomber, Boeing Flying Fortress: Hunter jet fighter (Hawker): 307, 317

97, 204, 206, 208, 219-20, 234 Hurricane fighter (Hawker): 45, 47, 70,

B-24 bomber, Consolidated Liberator: 77, 82-85, 89, 92, 108-10, 112,

150, 204, 255 123-25, 129, 141, 144, 151, 153,

B-25 bomber, North American 343

Mitchell: 244, 255 IL-2 bomber, llyushin Sturmovik: 184,

B-26 bomber, Martin Marauder: 198, 201 235-236, 271 IL-10 bomber: 269 23-2 36bob, 2 n IL-28 jet bomber: 301, 306-7, 323

B-29 bomber, Boeing Superfortress: IL-14 transport: 301, 306

Junkers 52 transport: 67, 70, 132, 173,

B-52 jet bomber, Boeing Stratofortress: 197-98

287, 293-95 Junkers 86 transport: 197

B-339 fighter-bomber, Brewster: 107-8 Junkers 87 Stuka fighter-bomber: 55,

Battle light bomber (Fairey): 70-71, 76 77, 130, 171, 181

Beaufighter fighter (Bristol): 129-30 Junkers 88 bomber: 77, 88, 123, 130,

Betty medium bomber (Mitsubishi 181, 211

G4M): 221-22 La-5 fighter, Lavochkin: 134

Blenheim bomber (Bristol): 70-71, 76, LaGG-3 fighter, Lavochkin101, 107-8, 123-24, 147 Gurbunov-Gudkov: 184

Blenheim fighter (Bristol): 47 LaGG-5 fighter-bomber: 180

Buffalo fighter-bomber (Brewster): Martinsyde GI00/GI02 fighter-bomber: 107-8 11-12

C-47 transport, Douglas Skytrain: 208 Maryland reconnaissance bomber

Defiant fighter (Boulton Paul): 47 (Martin): 112

Dewvoitine 520 fighter: 66, 76 Messerschmitt 109 fighter: 55, 66-67,

Dornier 17 medium bomber: 59, 71, 77, 88, 123, 195, 343

75, 77, 181 Messerschmitt 110 fighter: 62, 77, 88,

Dornier 17Z/215 bomber: 77, 88, 90 155

F2A fighter-bomber, Brewster. See Messerschmitt 323 transport: 173

Buffalo Messerschmitts: 90

F-4 jet fighter-bomber, McDonnell MiG-I fighter (Mikoyan-Gurevich): 184

Phantom I1: 287, 293-95, 322-23, MiG-3 fighter: 180

327, 330, 334 MiG-15 jet fighter: 270-73, 275, 277,

F4F-4 fighter, Grumman Wildcat: 289, 291, 301

221-22, 229, 231 MiG-17 jet fighter: 289, 291, 301, 307,

F-51 fighter-bomber, North American 327

Mustang: 302 MiG-19 jet fighter: 307

F-84F jet fighter-bomber, Republic MiG-21 jet fighter: 289, 291, 307, 315,

Thunderstreak: 306 320, 327, 334

F-86 jet fighter, North American MiGs: 279-80, 285, 288, 291, 293, 295,

Sabre: 272-73 297, 309, 311, 315

F-102 jet fighter, Convair Delta Mirage jet fighter (Dassault): 307, 330

Dagger: 279 Moraine-Saulnier 406 fighter: 66

F-105 jet fighter-bomber, Republic Myst6re B2 jet fighter (Dassault): 307

Thunderchief: 280 Nate fighter (Nakajima Ki27): 107

396
INDEX

Noratlas transport: 316 Air Service, U.S. Army: 15-21, 24

Ouragon fighter: 307 Air Staff, USAF: 272

P-38 fighter-bomber, Lockheed Air Technical Academy (German): 92

Lightning: 241 Alexander, Harold: 150

P-39 fighter-bomber, Bell Airacobra: Air warning deficiencies

220-21, 234, 241 U. S. in New Guinea: 242

P-40 fighter, Curtiss Tomahawk: 150, U. S. in North Africa: 174, 348

160, 173, 239, 241. See also P-400 Algeria: 159-62, 165-67, 169, 174

P-47 fighter, Republic Thunderbolt: Alksnis, Yakov Ivanovich: 40

255 Allied Air Forces, Southwest Pacific Area

P-51 fighter, North American Mustang: (SWPA): 219, 239, 242-43, 245,

206-7

P-400 fighter-bomber, Bell Airacobra: 247, 261 221 Allied Force Headquarters (AFHQ), 221 tNorthwest Africa: 161, 163, P0-2 trainer, Polikarpov: 274 167-68

PZL 11 (P11) fighter: 55, 62

Sea Gladiator fighter (RN) (Gloster): Allied 18th Army Group: 163

112 Amer, Abdel Hakim: 315-16

Spitfire fighter (Supermarine): 45, 47, American Expeditionary Force (AEF): 4,

77, 82, 84-85, 88-89, 92, 110, 13-16

129-33, 343 American Legion: 29

SU-7 jet fighter, Sukhoi: 327 Antiaircraft Command, British Army: 82-83

SU-20 jet fighter: 324 Antiaircraft Command, U.S. Army: 348

rU-2 medium bomber, Tupolev: 273-74 Antiaircraft units. See British Army units;

TU-16 jet bomber: 307, 334 Canadian Army; Japanese units;

Vautour S04050 jet fighter-bomber Luftwaffe units; United States

(Sud Aviation): 307 Army units

Wellington bomber (Vickers- Antiaircraft weapons. See Cannon/guns,

Armstrong): 123-24, 140 antiaircraft; Machine guns;

Yak-I fighter, Yakovlev: 184 Missiles; Rifle fire

Yak-3 fighter: 180 Antiradiation weapons: 288-89, 330-31,

Yak-9 fighter: 206 334. See also Missiles

Yaks: 267 Antrup, Wilhelm: 207-8, 211, 214

Zeppelins: 6-7 Area defense: 10, 12, 24, 345

Zero/Zeke fighter-bomber (Mitsubishi Arnold, Henry Harley: 175

A6M2 Reisen): 39, 107, 221-22 Assad, Hafez al-: 324-325

Aircraft use in air base defense See also Atcherly, D.E.W.: 161

Royal Air Force units Attacks on enemy air bases

Allied commanders' views on: 163-64 See also Air base defense; Aircraft

by Americans: 25, 27, 31-32, 162-63, destroyed on the ground

229-34, 243, 247-48 British-French planning for: 63, 70, 302

by British: 43-44, 48, 144, 147, 163 Churchill an early proponent of: 7

by Egyptians: 311, 313, 315, 330 force enemy aircraft to the rear: 19

by Germans: 155, 202 German planning for: 33-34, 48, 54

by Germans and Italians in North Israeli planning for: 301-2, 306,

Africa: 170 310-11, 313, 339, 350

by Japanese: 256 Japanese planning for: 48

at Malta: 123, 125, 131-32, 135 Soviet planning for: 48

by North Vietnamese: 291

by Soviets: 188, 211 Zeppelin bases: 6-7

Aircraft Warning battalions, U.S. Army Auchinleck, Claude: 142, 148, 150

Signal Corps: 161-62, 242, 247 Australian units

Air Defense Command (ADC), U.S. Army: Air Force aerial reconnaissance units:

29 97, 109

Air Defense Command (EAF/Egyptian Air Force 453 (fighter) Squadron: 107

Army): 320 Air Force P-40 fighter squadron: 239

Air Headquarters Far East (British): 96, 107 Army 7th Infantry Division: 239

397
AIR BASE AIR DEFENSE

Baker, Chauncey B.: 21 Cannon/guns, antiaircraft

Balloon Wing, U.S. Army Air Service: 16 3-inch, American: 31-32

BARBAROSSA: 177, 181 3-inch, British: 7-9, 12, 43, 97, 101,

Barrage balloons: 28 107-8, 133

Barratt, Arthur: 70 3.7-inch, British: 44, 82, 107, 109, 133,

Base Defense Battalions, USMC: 27, 142

220-21, 223, 225, 228-33 4.5-inch, British: 44, 82, 89, 133

Battle of Britain: 53, 71, 76-92, 97, 109-11, 5-inch coast defense, USN: 27, 220

117, 123, 131, 135, 175, 343-44, 6.5 mm, Japanese: 36

347, 351 7.7 mm, Japanese: 36

Beckett, C.T.: 135 12.5 mm, Soviet: 311

Belgium: 66-67, 69 14.7 mm, Soviet: 311

Bomber Command, RAF: 45, 70, 77-78 20 mm, American: 31, 220

Borner, Werner: 71 20 mm, British: 48, 83, 163, 166-67

Bradley, Omar Nelson: 271 20 mm, German: 34, 62, 192, 195, 198

Brereton, Lewis Hyde: 149-50 20 mm, Japanese: 36, 38, 251-52

British Army units 23 mm, Soviet: 294, 296, 303

Dorset Regiment: 84 25 mm, French: 66

Eighth Army: 137, 140, 142, 147-49, 25 mm, Japanese: 36, 38, 251

153, 173 37 mm, American, U.S. Army: 27,

First Army: 160 31-32, 243

Long Range Desert Group: 151 37 mm, British: 41

Queen's Own Royal West Regiment: 84 37 mm, British, pom-pom, Royal Navy:,

Royal Malta Artillery: 128 7-8

Special Air Service (SAS): 151 37 mm, German: 7, 34, 41, 62, 156,

7th Armoured Division: 174 195

12th AA Brigade: 142-43, 148-49 37 mm, Japanese: 252

16th Heavy AA Regiment: 109 37 mm, Soviet: 205, 211, 269, 285, 296,

34th AA Battalion: 84-85 311,322, 327

90th AA Regiment: 84 37 mm, Swedish: 41

British Expeditionary Force (BEF): 3, 9, 66. 40 mm, American (Bofors): 32, 162,

See also Advanced Air Striking 165, 220, 243

Force; Air Component, BEF 40 mm, British (Bofors): 36, 43-44,

British forces fighting the Egyptians: 301-2, 82-83, 85, 88-89, 97, 107, 109,

306, 338, 350 125, 131, 133-34, 143, 163, 174

Brooke-Popham, Robert: 96-97, 100-1, 111 40 mm, Canadian (Bofors): 89

Budenny, Semeon: 182-83 40 mm, Dutch: 36

Buffa, Ernst: 199 40 mm, Israeli (Bofors): 322, 327

40 mm, Japanese: 251

40 mm, Swedish (Bofors): 43-44, 54

50 mm, German: 7, 195

Cable rockets: 144 57 mm, American: 31

Cambodia: 290 57 mm Soviet: 281,285,290, 294, 296,

Camouflage of airfields 311, 322, 327

American: 15, 17, 21, 28 311, 322, 7

British: 84, 89, 91, 149, 167 65 mm, German: 7

Egyptian: 321 75 mm, French: 9-10, 12

German: 156, 193 75 mm, Japanese: 36, 38, 252

Israeli: 317, 322 75 mm, Polish: 54

Japanese: 234, 251 76 mm, Soviet: 41

North Korean: 269, 277 77 mm, German: 9

North Vietnamese: 288 85 mm, Soviet: 41, 198, 205, 269, 281,

Polish: 57, 91 290

Soviet: 42, 180, 185-87, 201-2, 214 88 mm, German (Flak 18): 34, 62, 156,

in the World War: 11, 15, 17, 21, 344 159, 170, 183, 192, 195, 202

Camouflage painting of aircraft bodies: 13, 88 mrm, Japanese, mobile: 36

83-84, 156, 193, 211 90 mm, American: 32, 220, 231, 243

Canadian Army 109th Light AA Battery: 89 100 mm, Soviet: 281, 285

398
INDEX

105 mm, German: 62 British: 85, 89, 101, 109, 113, 117, 133,

Putilov M1903 field guns (Russian): 9 147, 344

Casey, Hugh J.: 245 German: 156, 193

Chain Home (CH): 44-45, 85, 92 Japanese: 249, 251

Chain Home Low (CHL): 44 North Korean: 269

Chapman, Carleton V.: 15 North Vietnamese: 287-88, 291

Chennault, Claire L.: 24-25, 345 Polish: 56

Chiang Kai-shek: 25 Soviet: 180, 185-86, 188, 203, 214-15

Churchill, Winston Spencer in the World War: 15

aware of Lufwaffe losses: 82 Dobbie, William G.S.: 95

endorses attacks on air bases: 7 Doolittle, James H.: 160, 163

halts advance in Libya: 138 Douhet, Giulio: 25

opposes 1942 invasion of Europe: 159 Doumenc, Joseph: 66

orders offensive into Libya: 144 Dowding, Hugh C.T.: 43-44, 47, 77-78,

orders raids on Berlin: 90 81-83, 91-92

supports Tedder's control of tactical air Drone aircraft: 330

forces: 142 Dummy aircraft: 91, 187, 269, 311, 315, 345

CITADEL: 199, 202 Dummy airfields

Coastal Command, RAF: 45, 77, 78 American: 15, 19, 21

Coast Artillery Corps (CAC), U.S. Army: British: 84, 91, 128-29

26, 31-32. See also United States German: 13, 21

Army units Soviet: 187, 201, 348

Coastwatchers: 219, 222-23, 225, 231, in World War II: 345

234-35 Dutch East Indies. See Netherlands East

Commander-in-Chief, Pacific (CINCPAC), Indies

USN: 234, 293

Computers: 48

Concrete dibber bomb: 316, 350

Coningham, Arthur Eaker, Ira C.: 205

as commander of the Western Desert Eastern Air Command, RAF: 160-61, 167

Air Force: 142, 176, 346 Eastern Command, Strategic Air Forces,

loses aircraft transferred to Far East: AAF: 206, 212

156 Eastern Front. See Soviet Union

on seizure and use of air bases: 163-64, Egyptian Armies: 324, 327

174 Egypt in the Middle East wars: 300-34,

uses information from radio intercepts: 337-42

150 Egypt in World War II: 112, 131, 138,

uses Landing Ground 125 in Libya: 140-41, 144, 148-51, 154-55, 159,

151, 153 165, 173-74, 346

Conran, E.L.: 5 Eisenhower, Dwight David: 163

CRUSADER: 144, 148, 175 Electronic countermeasure (ECM) pods:

323, 327, 330, 334

Electronic jamming: 288, 295, 297

Electronic warfare (EW) sites: 281, 283, 290

Dawson, G.G.: 141 Endo, Saburo: 100, 108

Dayan, Moshe: 309-10, 313, 316, 325 Enigma: 81, 131, 170, 173, 175, 199

Deane, John R.: 204, 206, 211 Escadrilles Legeres de Defense: 75

Decoy aircraft and airfields. See Dummy Eshkol, Levi: 309

aircraft; Dummy airfields

Defence Teleprinter Network: 45

Deflection meters: 10

Desert Air Force. See Western Desert Air Fahmi, Mohammed Ali: 320

Force Far East Air Forces, USAF: 267, 277

Diem, Ngo Dinh: 278 Far East Command (British): 96

Direction finding. See Radio direction Far East Command (U.S.): 267, 269

finding Far East Fleet, Royal Navy: 107

Dispersal of aircraft Fighter Command, AAF: 174

American: 207-8, 231, 241 Fighter Command, RAF

399
AIR BASE AIR DEFENSE

airfield defense: 45, 82-85, 88-91 Ground observers. See also Coastwatchers

creation of: 44, 77 in American air defense: 17, 21, 26, 29

fighter squadrons: 45, 47, 76, 343-44 in British AA Command: 83

Filter Center: 78 British visual observation system: 12, ground command centers: 76, 78 25, 45, 78, 96-97

HQ connected to Chain Home Sites: civilian observer corps in Malaya: 97,

45, 85, 92 108

Operational Research Section: 81 Eighth Army observer units: 143

sector commands: 78, 81, 85 in French air defense: 63

Flakartillerie: 33, 34, 62. See also Luftwaffe German observers: 12, 202

units of the Japanese Army: 235, 261 FLAX: 173, 175 in Netherlands India: 97

Fleet Air Arm, Royal Navy: 117, 124, 302. Soviet VVS observation system: 42,

See also Royal Naval Air Service 197, 201 Fliegeiffihrer Afrika: 154 U.S.-Australian in Papua: 241

Foulois, Benjamin D.: 16, 25 in USMC: 225

Fowler, Harold: 15 in V Fighter Command: 242, 247

France in World War I1: 62-63, 66, 70-76, Guadalcanal: 217, 219-23, 225, 228-35,

91-92, 346-47 261, 347

FRANTIC: 204-5 Gun-laying radar

French Armies: 66 British: 38, 83, 125-27, 133, 140, 211 French forces in Egypt and Israel: 301-2, German Navy: 36

306, 338, 350 Gun Dish used by North Vietnam: 291 French forces in North Africa: 159-60 Japanese: 38, 252

Froelich, Stefan: 150, 154 Soviet: 42

Fuze design: 9, 11, 47-48, 344 used by North Korea: 275

Camelin. Maurice G.: 70 Halder, Franz: i8O

Gayler, Noel: 293 Halsey, William F.: 235

Geiger, Roy S.: 230-31, 233 Harlinghausen, Martin: 169

General Headquarters Far East (British): 96 Harriman, W. Averell: 204

German Air Force. See Luftwaffe Hartney, Harold E.: 19

German Air Service: 11-12 Headquarters Middle East (British): 151 German Army units Height and range finding equipment: 58, Ninth Army: 185 97, 109, 134

Second Army: 189 Henderson, Lofton: 220

Sixth Army: 189, 193, 195, 198 Hepburn, A.J.: 27

15th Panzer Division: 113 Hickey, Doyle 0.: 267

21st Panzer Division: 153 High level detection: 44. See also Chain

Goering, Hermann Home

attacks RAF fighter bases: 78 Hitler, Adolf conserves paratroops: 132 attacks in western Europe: 53, 67

disbelief of initial Soviet losses: 179 attacks Poland: 54

drops radar from target list: 85 attacks the USSR: 177

switches targets: 82, 90, 92 creates independent Luftwaffe: 32

Gorrell, Edgar S.: 15 emphasizes close air support: 154 Graziani, Rodolpho: 138 establishes Luftwaffe doctrine: 34

Greece: 132, 135, 138, 140-41, 166 fails to take Malta: 170, 344

Grice, Richard: 84, 89 invades Greece: 138

Ground Control Intercept (GCI) orders offensive against Kursk salient:

British: 44, 130, 143 199, 202

Chinee: 281 preempted from occupying Algeria and

German lack of: 170 Morocco: 160

Israeli: 334 reacts to raids on Berlin: 90

Japanese: 38 sends troops to Libya: Ill

North Vietnamese: 281, 290-91 Hod, Mordechai: 309-311, 313, 316

400
INDEX

Home Guard (British): 88 attacks Wewak: 252-53, 256-57

Horii, Tomitaro: 239 constructs air bases: 346-47

Hussein, King of Jordan: 309 enlarges Port Moresby bases: 239, 241

Husseini el-, Haj Amin: 299 forced by weather to limit attacks: 252

gets needed air defense: 246-47

seizure and air support of bases: 245

strategy of: 243-44, 260, 349 Identification Friend or Foe (IFF): 38, 81, supported by MacArthur: 245, 247, 346 154, 243, 345 Kesselring, Albert

Independent Air Force, RFC: 21 as C-inC, South: 122-23

Indian Army: 95, 106-7 attacks Malta: 125, 132

Indian States Forces: 97 commander of German forces: 169

Infrared (thermal) detection: 42 fails to understand radar: 130

Interwar period: 23-49, 344-47 relations with Rommel: 153-54

Iron Hand: 288, 293 Kessler, Alfred A.: 206, 211

Itabana, Giichi: 257 Khripin, Vasili V.: 40

Italian forces King, Ernest J.: 219

attacking Malta: 93, 111-13, 117, 122, Kirby, Maxwell: 18

125, 129, 132, 134 Korean War: 265-78, 296, 349

in Libya and Egypt: 137-38, 151, Kursk battle: 199, 201-3, 212-13, 215

153-56 Kuter, Laurence S.: 175-76

ship convoys: 131-32, 170, 173

in Tunisia: 169-71, 173-75

Laos: 290

Laser guided bomb: 289-90, 292-93 Jackson, H.C.: 5 Laskov, Haim: 300-1

Jackson, William M.: 208 Lavelle, John D.: 290

Jachne, Heinz Joachim: 181 Lemnitzer, Lyman L.: 165, 348

Japanese Air Forces Lepawsky, Albert: 206

air strength in New Guinea: 241 Libya: 93, 111, 131-32, 138, 140-41, 144, failure of defense at Munda: 235 147-48, 151, 153-56, 174, 217, 346 losses at Guadalcanal: 233 Likes, David H.: 149

Japanese units LINEBACKER: 290-91, 294-96, 350

airfield battalion, defense operations: Lloyd, Hugh P.: 113, 117, 123, 126, 131,

233 135

Fourth Air Army: 257 Local Defence Volunteers: 88

Special Naval Landing Force: 219, 239 Loktionov, Alexandr: 40

Twenty-fifth Air Fleet (Navy): 219 Longmore, Arthur: 141

3rd Air Corps: 100 Long Range Bomber Force (Soviet DBA): 3rd Air Group: 100, 108, 135 41,204 7th Air Group: 135 Long Range Desert Group (British): 151 12th Air Group: 101 Long Range Navigation (LORAN): 245

18th Army: 256 Low Countries: 66-69, 91-92

22nd Naval Air Flotilla: 100, 135 Low level detection: 44-45. See also Chain

47th Field AAA Battalion: 252 Home Low

Jeschonnek, Hans: 33-34, 59, 202 Lucknor, Georgy: 208

Johnson, Lyndon Baines: 280 Luftwaffe

organization: 33

lack of experience among senior

officers: 33 Kennedy, D.G.: 222 doctrine: 33

Kenney, George C. concept of base defense: 189

advocates low level attacks: 243-44 Luftwaffe units

airlifts troops to New Guinea: 239, 243, Fliegerkorps: 11 (2nd Flying Corps):

348 122, 132

attacks Hollandia: 253, 256 Fliegerkorps: VIII: 202

attacks Rabaul: 219 Fliegerkorps X: 112, 122, 140

401
AIR BASE AIR DEFENSE

Kampfgeschwader: 55 (55th Bomber American: 16-17, 21, 27, 31, 162-63

Wing): 207 British: 12, 16, 71, 83-84, 88-89,

Kainpfgeschwader: 76: 169 143-44, 163, 165, 167

Kainpfgruppe 2 (2nd Bomber Group): German: 11, 34, 48, 192

71 Indian: 106

Kampfgruppe 4: 58 North Vietnamese: 291

Luftflotte 11 (2nd Air Fleet): 70, 153 Polish: 59

Luffflotte IV: 198 Soviet: 41, 187

Luftflotte VI: 199 MacKenzie, Hugh: 223

I/First Flak Corps: 198-99 Mahmoud, Sidqi: 311, 315

1st Air Division (Parachute infantry): Malaya: 93-111, 133-35, 217

202 Malta: 93, 110-35, 137, 156, 170, 174, 344,

7th Air Division: 67 348, 351

9th Flak Division (Antiaircraft Malta Air Command, RAF: 163

artillery): 195, 198 Maltby, Paul: 110

10th Flak Brigade: 199 Manchuria: 269-75, 278, 296-97

12th Flak Division: 199 Marine Corps, U.S. (USMC) units

18th Flak Division: 199 Fighting Squadron 223 (VMF-223): 220

19th Flak Division: 156, 159, 170 Scout Bomber Squadron 232

20th Flak Division: 170 (VMSB-232): 220

129th Air Signal Battalion: 198 1st Marine Air Wing: 220, 223,228

1st Marine Division: 219-20, 223

3rd Defense Battalion: 220-21, 223,

MacArthur, Douglas 225, 228-33

approves coordinated air defense: 247, Marquat, William F.: 247

349 Marshall, George Catlett: 219

attacked by Chinese: 270 Mason, Paul: 222

claims control of air in New Guinea: MATADOR: 100

257 Mattison, Lewis C.: 228, 230, 232-33

directs construction of air bases: 239, Mediterranean Air Command (Allied):

346-47 163-64, 347

lands forces at Inchon: 269 Medvedev, Roy A.: 182

plans offensive to relieve Australia: 219, Meir, Golda: 326, 339

255 Middle East Air Command (Allied): 163

prohibits use of ground forces in Korea: Middle East Air Force (British): 141

267 Middle East wars: 299-342

refuses transfer of Engineers to Fifth Military Assistance Advisory Group Air Force: 245 (MAAG), Vietnam: 278

supports Kenney: 219, 245, 247, 346 Minh, Ho Chi: 278-79

MacDonnell, Dermott H.: 225, 228-29, Missiles

232-33

Machine guns, antiaircraft employment by AGM-78 anti-radiation missile (ARM):

troops: 9, 38, 54-55, 192, 269, 278 288-89

Machine guns, antiaircraft types AIM-9J (Sidewinder) air-to-air missile:

Hotchkiss: 16 291-92

Vickers: 71 anti-radar missiles: 291

.30 caliber American: 221 Egyptian surface-to-air missile (SAM)

.30 caliber Lewis: 12, 83, 88 siting and deployment: 311,

.303 caliber Browning: 167 321-25, 327-28, 330-31, 337, 342,

.50 caliber American: 31-32, 162-63, 351

220-21, 243, 246 FROG-7 ground-to-ground missile

6.5 mm Japanese: 36, 38 (Soviet): 334-35

7.62 mm Soviet: 41 Hawk ground-to-air missile: 279, 317,

7.7 mm Japanese: 36, 38 334

7.92 mm German: 34 Kelt air-to-ground missile (Soviet): 334

12.7 mm Soviet: 41 missile hunter-killer groups

Machine guns in air base defense (USAF/USN): 288, 293, 331

402
INDEX

SA-2 SAM in Egypt: 311, 315, 321, Observer Corps (British): 45, 78

323-24, 339 Observers. See Coastwatchers; Ground

SA-2 SAM in North Vietnam: 281, observers

283, 285-88, 290-91, 293-97 O'Connor, Richard N.: 138, 140

SA-2 SAM in Syria: 328, 330-31 October War: 325-37, 339-42, 350-51

SA-3 SAM in Egypt: 321-24 Office of Tactical Air Research and Survey,

SA-6 SAM in Egypt and Syria: 324, Fifth AF, USAF: 269

327-28, 330-31 Old, Archie J.: 206, 208, 211

SA-7 SAM in Egypt: 324 Oldfield, H.R.: 175

SAMs controlled by the Egyptian Air Operational Research Section, Fighter

Defense Command: 320 Command, RAF: 81

Shrike air-to-ground ARM: 288, 330-31

Soviet Army missile units in Egypt:

322-23, 325 Pabst, Herbert: 181

Mitchell, William: 24 Pacific Air Forces (PACAF), USAF: 279-80,

Model, Walter: 185 285, 287

Molotov, Vyacheslav M.: 204 Pacific Command (PACOM), U.S. Army:

Montgomery, Bernard Law: 153, 163, 175, 288

346 Palestine Liberation Army (PLA): 307

Morocco: 159-60, 169 Papua: 217, 236, 239, 241-49, 257

Mueller, Hans: 207 Parachute rockets: 144

Mussolini, Benito: 138 Pargiter, R.B.: 167

Mysing, August W.: 165 Park, Keith R.: 78, 81, 89, 91

Parsons, C.A.: 88

Partridge, Earle E.: 26, 267-69, 271-72, 349

Nasser, Gamal Abdul PAULA: 75

anticipates preemptive Israeli attack: Pavel, Paul: 199

310-11, 315 Peled, Binyamin

blockades Gulf of Aqaba: 301, 309 ability of Israeli pilots under: 351

death of: 319 attacks on Egyptian SAM sites: 337

obtains Soviet aircraft and instructors: difficulty in overcoming Arab air

301, 322 defenses: 341-42

reaction to aircraft losses: 316, 320 effects of overestimation of AA

seizes Suez Canal: 301 weapons: 323

sends Air Force units to Yemen: 307 inability to react to Arab attack: 327 shretends AIrrcel: us tIsraeli Air Force commander: 323

threatens Israel: 309

Naval Research Laboratory, USN: 25, 223 on fear of SAMs: 324

Netherlands: 66-69 tactics against Syrian SAMs: 328

tactics in airfield attack: 330-31 Netherlands East Indies: 97, 108-10, 217, Pepper, Robert H.: 230-31

220. See also Netherlands New Perminov, Alexer R.: 206, 212

Guinea Perm , Alfgang: 195, 12

Netherlands New Guinea: 236, 243, 245, Picket, Wolfgang: 195, 198-99 247-8, 26-57Pile, 23, Frederick: 82-83, 97 247-48, 253, 256-57 Point defense: 24

New Guinea campaign. See SolomonPondens:2

Islands and New Guinea Poland: 54-59, 62, 91-92, 180-82

New Guinea IslandsandNew TerrPoltava 

Territory Guinea Air Base (USSR): 204-8, 211-12, (Australian): 217,21

219-20, 222, 231, 234, 236, 241, 2 1

245, 248-49, 252-53, 255-57, 261 Portal, Charles: 163, 167

New York Air Defense Sector (U.S. Army): Powder composition: 11

26 P o jer RedpBaron: 11

New Zealand forces: 96 Project Red Baron: 286

Nikitin, A.V.: 204, 206, 211 Pulford, Conway W.: 95-96, 109-10

Nixon, Richard Milhous: 293 PVO Strany (Soviet): 213-14

Noll, W.A.: 228, 233

Northwest African Air Forces (NAAF),

AAF: 163, 165, 169, 175 Quartermaster Corps, U.S. Army: 21

Novikov, Alexander A.: 196, 204 Quesada, Elwood R.: 48

403
AIR BASE AIR DEFENSE

Rabin, Yitzhak: 316 warn of German and Italian air

Radar operations: 81-82, 88-89, 143,

airborne: 130, 155, 288, 294 149-50, 161

American: 25-27, 29, 38, 161-62, 165, warn Soviets of Operation CITADIEL.: 199

174, 225, 228-34, 242-43, 246-47, in the World War: 12, 17, 21

267-68, 288, 345, 348 Read, Jack: 222-23

Australian: 242, 245-46 Reiman, Richard: 199

British: 25-27, 38, 44-45, 63, 76, 78, Remcz, Aharon: 300

81, 83, 85, 90, 345 Renner, Joseph N.: 225

British at Malta: 113, 115, 117, 125-31 Rice, E.B.: 96, 101, 110-11

British in Malaya and Singapore: Ridgway, Matthew B.: 272

96-97, 107-8, 111 Rifle fire as AA defense

British in North Africa: 140-44, by British troops: 9, 88, 106

149-50, 160-62, 165, 167 by German troops: 6, 192-93

Chinese and North Korean: 270, 275, by Japanese troops: 38

278, 281 by North Vietnamese troops: 294

by Soviet troops: 188 code names for radar (RDF and Chain in the World War: 6, 9, 11 Home): 44-45, 85, 92, 174 Robertson, C.C.: 16

Egyptian: 311, 314, 320-23, 325, 339 Roil.iNG TmINtnIR: 280, 289-91

experimental: 25-26, 345 Romanian Royal Air Force AA units: 198

German: 25, 36, 85, 130, 154-55, 170, Rommel, Erwin

173, 201-2, 214, 345 arrival in Libya: 138, 156

Israeli: 302, 327, 334 captures Tobruk: 93, 148

Japanese: 25, 223, 249, 252, 255-56, denied air support by fuel shortages:

261, 345 153

Lufiwaffe commanders distrusts Italian commanders: 154, 175

misunderstanding of: 85, 130, 130n under Italian command: 169

mobile: 141, 149, 165, 167, 202, 345 Luftwaffe in Libya not responsible to:

North Vietnamese: 281, 283, 285, 288, 153-55, 175, 346

290-91, 295 message traffic intercepted: 175

Soviet: 25, 42, 201-2, 211, 214, 281, notes mobility of RAF: 173

345 offensives into Egypt: 131-32, 138-39,

United Nations: 273-74 148, 150, 155, 173

Radar operator training recnforced through Tunisia: 169-70

American: 26-27, 165, 233, 243, 268, responsible for Luftiwaffe losses in

348-49 Africa: 175

British: 26, 81, 165, 233, 348 supply ships sunk: 117, 132

Chinese and North Vietnamese: 281 tanks attack British air bases: 144

Radar sets Roosevelt, Franklin Delano: 31 Royal Air Force, Egypt: 138

AN/TPS-IB (American): 267 Royal Air Force (RAF) units

Freya (German): 170 No. 2 Armoured Car Company: 151

RUS-2 (Soviet): 42 Radio Field Interception Units: 143

SCR-268 gun laying (American): 27, Royal Air Force Regiment: 137, 143-44,

32, 221, 229 163, 166-67

SCR-270 search (American): 27, 29, Searchlight Companies: 43

221, 223-25, 228-29, 231 Station Defence Force: 89

Radio, ground to air: 12, 113, 143, 201, 229 Women's Auxiliary Air Force: 88

Radio direction finding (D/F): 12, 233-34 Y-Service Teams: 131, 143, 150, 161,

Radio direction finding (RDF): 44, 174 173, 175

Radio interception stations II Group: 78, 90

provide information about air and sea 12 Group: 78

transport to Tunisia: 131, 137, 170, 13 Group: 78

173, 175 32 Squadron: 85, 88

provide information complementing 62 Squadron: 101

that available from radar: 150 79 Squadron: 88

404
INDEX

211 Group: 142, 148, 150 Israeli use in 1973: 330, 331

242 Group: 165 Signal Corps, U.S. Army

262 Wing: 148 experimental radar: 26, 345

322 Fighter Wing: 167 radar in the warning system: 29, 31,

610 Squadron: 85, 88 161-62, 242, 247

Royal Artillery: 348 radar operators: 165

Royal Flying Corps (RFC): 3, 5, 11-13 radios in the warning system: 17

Royal Naval Air Service (RNAS): 6. See Singapore: 93-97, 100-1, 107-11, 133-35,

also Fleet Air Arm 156, 217, 236, 348

Royal Navy (RN) ships Six-Day War: 306-19, 339, 350

HMS Eagle: 131 Snesarev, A.E.: 40

HMS Prince of Wales: 107 Solomon Islands and New Guinea: 217-61,

HMS Repulse: 107 346-48

HMS Welshman: 127, 132 Sound locators. See Sound ranging

Rudel, Hans-Ulrich: 181 equipment

Rychagov, Pavel: 41, 180 Sound ranging equipment, acoustic

American: 21, 27, 32, 345

French: 63

Japanese: 38, 101

Sadat, Anwar el-: 311, 315-16, 319, 324-27, South African Air Force: 173

337 Soviet forces outside the USSR

Sanctuaries in Egypt: 322-25, 339

air sorties from Chinese territory: in the Korean War: 272-74, 297

270-74, 278 in Syria: 328, 330

buffer zone in Vietnam along Chinese in the Vietnam War: 281

border: 281 Soviet Union: 177-215, 347-48

Chinese AA along the Yalu: 269-70 Spaatz, Carl A.: 164-65

Chinese air bases used by North Speidel, Wilhelm: 70

Vietnam: 281, 287, 289-90, Stalin, Joseph V.

295-96, 350 and aviation: 40

for Communist air forces: 265 and Kursk (battle): 199

Manchuria a base for North Koreans: approves American shuttle bombing:

269, 274, 296-97 204-05

Saudi bases used by Egypt: 306 as military leader: 179-92

USAF and RAAF operating from bases influence on defensive tactics: 212-13

in Thailand: 279, 292-93 purges, effects on Red Air Force: 40

USAF operating from bases in Japan: purges, effect on radar development: 42

267, 272-73 stresses offensive: 40

Saville, Gordon R.: 25 Stalingrad: 193, 195-98, 212

Seabees (Construction Battalions), USN: Strategic Air Command, USAF: 293-95,

200-21 349 Searchlight Companies, RAF: 43 Strategic Air Forces, AAF: 165, 206, 212

Searchlights Strategic Direction Finder Station (USN):

American: 17, 21, 31-32, 221 233

Belgian and Dutch: 91 Stratemeyer, George E.: 267, 269, 272, 349

British: 12, 14, 43, 83, 97, 100, 162

French: 91

German: 156, 198

Japanese: 101 Task Force 77, USN: 293

North Korean: 275 Tedder, Arthur

Polish: 91 attacks German airlift to Tunisia: 173,

Soviet: 42, 211 175

Shakurin, A.I.: 40 becomes commander of Mediterranean

Sharon, Ariel: 302, 337 Air Command: 163

Sherman, William C.: 20, 24 coordinates air and ground operations:

Shipton, James A.: 14-17 137, 141-42, 149, 153, 155, 346

Shrike antiradar missile favors attacks on air bases over ground

U. S. use in Vietnam: 288. support: 163

405
AIR BASE AIR DEFENSE

gains control of tactical air: 141-42 474th Tactical Fighter Wing: 293

influences organization of U.S. Ninth 620th Aircraft Warning and Control

Air Force: 150 Squadron: 267

locates fighter fields near bomber 6132nd Tactical Air Control Group:

bases: 141 267-68

puts repair and maintenance under United States Army Air Forces (AAF) units

single commander: 141 Eighth Air Force: 206-8

stresses need for air base security: Fifteenth Air Force: 205-6

140-41, 144 Fifth Air Force: 242, 245, 255-56, 267,

uses airfield behind German lines: 151 269, 271-72, 275, 349

uses intercepts of Luftwaffe message Ninth Air Force: 149-50

traffic: 150, 175 Twelfth Air Force: 160

Teramoto, Kunachi: 257 V Bomber Command: 243

Terrain following radar (TFR): 294 V Fighter Command: 242-43

Territorial Army (British): 82 IX Fighter Command: 48

Thailand: 93-94, 100-1, 106-7, 265, 279, XII Fighter Command: 162

292-94 Ist Air Defense Wing: 169

Thant, U: 309 2nd Air Defense Wing: 169

Timoshenko, Semeon Kostantinovich: 3rd Air Defense Wing: 165, 169

182-83 14th Fighter Group: 160

Tizard, Henry: 44 33rd Fighter Group: 160

Tolkovsky, Dan: 300-1 57th Fighter Group: 150

ToRcH: 160, 174-75 67th Fighter Squadron: 220-21

Townsend, Peter: 76 85th Air Defense Wing: 247

Tracking and gun control systems: 48 United States Army Air Service units

Trenchard, Hugh M.: 11, 21 Balloon Wing: 16

Tsuji, Masanobu: 100 1st Air Depot: 17

Tubisin, Sgt.: 208 1st Observation Group: 17

Tunisia: 130, 159-60, 162, 165, 167, 169-71, 1st Pursuit Group: 19

173-75, 344 5th Pursuit Group: 18

17th Aero Squadron: 13-14

94th Squadron: 18

United States Army units ULTRA Eighth Army: 272

code name for Enigma decrypts: 81 First Corps: 21

information passed to other Allied 2nd AA Machinegun Battalion: 16

commands: 131, 149-50, 161, 199 10th AA Sector: 16-17

provides strategic and order of battle 14th Antiaircraft Command: 247

intelligence: 81-82, 149-50 34th Coast Artillery Brigade: 165

used in conjunction with other 101st Coast Artillery Battalion (AW):

intelligence: 131 243

used to attack German-Italian sea and 243

air air 11, onvos: 37, 53, 70,104th Coast Artillery Battalion (AW): convoys: 131, 137, 153, 170, 243

173, 175 243

Underground hangers and shops 128th Infantry Regiment: 239

Egyptian: 320-21 164th Infantry Regiment: 232

Israeli: 317 200th Coast Artillery (AA) Regiment:

at Malta: 115, 117, 133, 135 31

North Korean: 19, 269 211th Coast Artillery Battalion (AW):

North Vietnamese: 291, 298 243

planning for and use of: 19 412th Signal Company: 162

United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF): 565th Signal Air Warning Battalion:

306, 309 242

United States Air Force (USAF) units 583rd Signal Air Warning Battalion:

Seventh Air Force: 290, 293 242, 247

4th Fighter-Interceptor Wing: 272-73 694th Signal Air Warning Company:

8th Tactical Fighter Wing: 292 242

307th Strategic Wing: 294 709th AA Machinegun Battery: 243

406
INDEX

745th Coast Artillery Battalion (AA): Japanese: 249, 252, 254, 256, 261

243 at Malta: 117, 126, 129-30

United States Marine Corps. See Marine Polish: 55-57

Corps, U.S. Soviet: 42, 201, 211

United States Navy (USN) ships War of Attrition: 319-25, 339

USS Chenango: 160 Wavell, Archibald: 138

USS Ranger: 160 Weizman, Ezer: 309-11, 317, 319-20, 324

USS Wasp: 130-31 Welsh, William A.M.: 160, 163, 176

Western Desert Air Force (RAF): 141-42,

149, 301

Vandegrift, Alexander A.: 219EgpinWrd Western Desert campaign: arI;Lb; 138-53. See also

Vietnam War: 265, 278-98, 349-50 Rommel, Erwin

von Paulus, Friedrich: 195 Western Desert Force: 138 von Waldau, Otto Hoffman: 154-55 Wheeler, C.B.: 16

Whitehead, Ennis C.: 242, 245-47, 252

Whitney, Orville L.: 16

Walsh, Robert L.: 212 Wild Weasel: 288

Warning systems. See also Ground Wilkinson, Norman: 91

observers, Coastwatchers Wireless. See Radio

American: 17, 21, 25, 31, 161-62, 165, Women's Auxiliary Air Force (RAF): 88

169, 174-75, 349 Woods: 233

American, in Korea: 267-68 World War I: 3-7, 9-22, 343-44

American, in SWPA: 221-23, 225,

228-34, 241-43, 245-48, 257

American, in Thailand: 293 Yadin, Yigal: 300

British: 25, 44-45, 48-49, 76-78, Yamashita, Tomoyuki: 100

81-82, 345, 347 Yariv, Aharon: 323

British, in Malaya: 96-97, 101, 108, Y-Service Teams (RAF): 131, 143, 150, 161, 111 173, 175

British, in North Africa: 140, 142-43,

149-50, 160-61, 165, 174

Chinese-North Vietnamese: 281, 283,

285-86, 290-91, 297 Zakharov, M.V.: 180

Egyptian: 311, 320-21 Zeppelin, Ferdinand: 7

French: 63, 66

German: 34-35, 154-55, 170, 198-99,

201-2

407