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National Transportation Safety Board

Washington, DC 20594

Highway Accident Brief

Fatal Pedestrian Collision with Transit Bus

New York City, New York, October 4, 2016

Accident Number: HWY17SH003

Accident Type: Fatal pedestrian collision with transit bus

Location: Avenue D and East Houston Street, New York City, New York

Date and Time: October 4, 2016, about 9:50 a.m. eastern daylight time

Vehicle: 2012 Nova Bus 

Driver: 57-year-old male

Pedestrian: 73-year-old female

Fatalities: 1

Crash Description

About 9:50 a.m. on Tuesday, October 4, 2016, a 2012 Nova Bus articulated transit bus 

operated by the New York City Metropolitan Transportation Authority (MTA) was traveling south 

on Avenue D on the Lower East Side of New York City. As the 57-year-old male driver 

approached the intersection of Avenue D and East Houston Street, the traffic signal for southbound 

vehicles was red. The bus stopped in the left-turn lane, the second vehicle in line. According to 

interviews, while the bus was stopped, a passenger walked to the front and, standing forward of 

the white standee line, began to talk to the driver. 

When the traffic signal turned green, the driver pulled the bus into the intersection, then

stopped to yield to oncoming traffic. On a WALK signal, a 73-year-old female pedestrian stepped

into the crosswalk from the curb on the northeast corner and began walking south across East 

Houston Street. The bus driver and the passenger continued to talk. The pedestrian crossed the 

westbound traffic lanes and stepped onto the concrete median. When she stepped off the median 

to cross the eastbound lanes, the driver executed a left turn onto East Houston Street (figure 1). By 

that time, the pedestrian signal was flashing DON’T WALK. The right front bumper of the bus struck 

the pedestrian in the eastbound lane, 77.5 feet from the northeast curb.1 The pedestrian was 

dragged beneath the bus a short way before it stopped. The pedestrian was pronounced dead at the 

 

1 The total distance across East Houston Street was 89.5 feet.
Fatal Pedestrian Collision with Transit Bus, New York City, New York, October 4, 2016

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scene and her body transported to the Manhattan Office of the Chief Medical Examiner of New 

York City for an autopsy. 

Figure 1. Diagram of crash scene showing path of transit bus through intersection, path of 

pedestrian in crosswalk, and position of pedestrian at final rest.

The temperature at the time of the crash was 61°F, the wind was from the east-northeast at 

9 mph, and the sky was overcast. The sun had risen at 6:57 a.m.2

Crash Location

The crash occurred on a busy thoroughfare in a neighborhood of housing complexes, 

commercial businesses, churches, and schools (figure 2). Avenue D is a minor collector roadway 

that runs northeast to southwest. On the north side of the intersection with East Houston Street, 

Avenue D has two lanes, one a dedicated parking lane and the other a travel lane. South of the 

intersection Avenue D becomes Columbia Street, which has two travel lanes and one parking lane 

in each direction. The speed limit for Avenue D north of the intersection is 20 mph. South of the 

intersection it is 25 mph. 

Houston Street is a major arterial roadway that runs east and west, transecting lower 

Manhattan and connecting Franklin Delano Roosevelt Drive on the east (at the East River) to the 

 

2 Weather data from https://www.wunderground.com/history/.
Fatal Pedestrian Collision with Transit Bus, New York City, New York, October 4, 2016

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Hudson River on the west. (East Houston and West Houston streets separate at Broadway.) East 

Houston Street has two travel lanes and one dedicated parking lane in each direction. A raised 

concrete median separates the eastbound and westbound lanes. The speed limit on East Houston 

Street is 25 mph.

Figure 2. Aerial view of crash location. Pedestrian was crossing from northeast corner to 

southeast corner and had stopped on median before proceeding across intersection. Bus was 

turning left from Avenue D onto East Houston Street. (Base photo from New York state global 

information system)

The intersection of Avenue D and East Houston Street experiences a high volume of 

pedestrian and vehicular traffic at all hours of the day. According to a 5-year history from the New 

York City Department of Transportation, 11 pedestrian-related crashes occurred at the intersection

from 2010 through 2014. Seven of the struck pedestrians were crossing with the signal. More 

pedestrians were struck while crossing with the traffic signal at the crash intersection than at any 

other Manhattan intersection.

Pedestrian

The pedestrian lived in Brooklyn, New York. Her medical history could not be determined. 

The onboard surveillance camera on a passing MTA transit bus captured the pedestrian walking
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unaided down the sidewalk on the east side of Avenue D. Video from the surveillance camera on 

the passing bus showed that the pedestrian was not talking or texting on a cell phone while she 

crossed the intersection.

The pathologist at the Office of the Chief Medical Examiner of New York City who 

performed the pedestrian’s autopsy reported no preexisting medical condition that contributed to 

her death. The pathologist recorded the pedestrian’s height as 5 feet 1 inch and her weight as 

114 pounds. Being run over by the transit bus caused two potentially fatal injuries: a severed brain 

stem and an aortic transection. The autopsy report listed the pedestrian’s cause of death as multiple 

blunt-impact injuries. Toxicological tests of blood samples from the pedestrian were negative for 

alcohol and other drugs.

Driver

The New York City MTA had employed the 57-year-old driver for 27 years. He had a New 

York class B commercial driver’s license with a passenger and cargo tank endorsement and had 

complied with the requirements of Article 19-A of the New York state vehicle and traffic laws.3

The license had one restriction: the driver must wear corrective lenses while driving. He was 

wearing corrective lenses at the time of the crash. 

The Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration exempts MTA transit drivers from its 

medical certificate requirement; however, drivers are required to undergo an annual physical 

examination for the New York City transit system. At the driver’s last physical examination on

December 23, 2015, he was found medically qualified for duty. The physician scheduled the driver 

for a 6-month follow-up because of preexisting medical issues. The follow-up examination, 

conducted on June 22, 2016, medically cleared the driver for duty.

The crash driver worked a regular Monday-through-Friday shift, with Saturday and Sunday 

as his normal days off. The driver’s shift schedule provided by the MTA shows that he normally 

worked from 7:08 a.m. to 7:27 p.m., as he did on the day of the crash. The crash driver’s last 

2-month work history showed that he regularly worked his normal 12-hour day and did not work 

overtime on his scheduled days off. 

The crash driver underwent seven random rides between January 2015 and the crash. 

During random rides, MTA training, operations, and safety personnel ride buses to detect unsafe 

practices and driver deficiencies. The crash driver received four citations for violating regulations 

during that period. Two of the offenses involved violating internal policies. During a ride on 

October 28, 2015, the driver was cited for an improper turn, and on November 18, 2015, he was 

cited for failing to signal when changing lanes. In the 24 months before the crash, the driver was 

not involved in any crashes the MTA deemed preventable. A postcrash toxicological screening of

the driver was negative for alcohol and other drugs.

 

3 Under Article 19-A, employers of bus drivers must obtain from applicants a current physical exam, an 

employment background check, and a current abstract of their driving record. 
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Vehicle

The 2012 Nova Bus Artic model low-floor articulated bus was designed for high ridership 

transit routes. The bus was 62 feet long and had a maximum occupancy of 112 persons, seated and 

standing. The MTA documented regular preventive maintenance on the bus. Records listed no 

recalls for the bus. The MTA’s Technical Service Division, in the presence of a representative 

from the New York State Public Transportation Safety Board, performed a postcrash inspection 

and brake deceleration test on the bus at the MTA maintenance depot. No mechanical defects were 

found. Figure 3 shows an exemplar MTA bus at the crash scene.

Figure 3. Exemplar transit bus at crash location. Articulated bus is turning from Avenue D onto 

East Houston Street, same location and same maneuver crash bus was executing when it struck 

pedestrian. 

The crash bus was equipped with eight surveillance cameras. Seven cameras monitored the 

passenger compartment, and one forward-facing camera, attached to the upper right of the front 

windshield, monitored the bus exterior. The bus was also equipped with a device from the Clever 

Devices company that performed the functions of an engine control module and used the global 

positioning system to track not only the bus’s location but also its speed. According to the device, 

the bus’s speed was 12.2 mph at the time of the crash.
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Metropolitan Transportation Authority

The MTA employs over 12,700 transit bus operators and has at least 5,600 buses on the 

road at any time. The MTA conducts an intensive 6-week training program for all potential bus 

drivers at its training center in the borough of the Bronx. The course offers classroom instruction, 

hands-on exercises, the use of simulators, and over-the-road training. The crash driver had 

completed the course. The MTA periodically tests its drivers’ knowledge of company policy and 

New York state regulations and also provides them with regularly updated operational bulletins. 

A bulletin dated November 23, 2015, lists a number of rules its drivers “must always adhere to,” 

including the following: “Avoid talking with anyone while the bus is in motion.” A memo inserted 

into the training manual states that company policy requires executing all turns at 5 mph or less.4

Members of the MTA training division respond to each crash and gather information to 

incorporate into the company’s training curriculum. In an internal analysis of crashes involving its 

personnel, the MTA found that operators with 3 to 5 years of service were more likely to be 

involved in crashes than other drivers. That finding led to the institution of TOPS (Transitional 

Operators Program), which brings at-risk drivers (3- to 5-year veterans) back to the training center 

for retraining. The MTA mandates that all operators participate in yearly training that includes 

fatal accident studies and Vision Zero initiatives.5

MTA staff have also initiated a “ghost rider” program in which members of the training 

division and other staff take random bus rides to identify unsafe drivers, unsafe practices, and 

system deficiencies. Between November 2014 and the date of the fatal crash, MTA staff had taken 

over 16,000 random rides. The MTA also initiated a tracking program that alerts MTA divisions 

each time an operator and a transit bus are involved in a reportable event. 

At the time of the subject crash, the MTA had been involved in 62 fatal pedestrian crashes 

since 2004. In 2015, it was involved in eight fatal pedestrian crashes. In 2016, the company had 

four fatal pedestrian crashes before the subject crash.

Vehicle-Based Safety Countermeasures

The bus involved in the collision was not equipped with an S-1 Gard system, a dangerzone deflector that can be installed under a bus, immediately in front of the rear wheels, to deflect 

a fallen body away from them. The system can thus reduce the severity of injuries to a pedestrian 

who falls under a bus and could be run over by the wheels. The MTA had examined the S-1 Gard 

system as a possible countermeasure to fatal pedestrian crashes and decided that the best way to 

improve pedestrian safety was to prevent buses from hitting pedestrians in the first place.

To that end, the MTA is installing and testing two types of pedestrian safety systems on its 

buses. The first is the TurnWarningTM pedestrian warning system from the Clever Devices

company. The system has a built-in turn-recognition component that senses a turn and, based on a 

 

4 The MTA determined after the fatal crash that a contributing factor was the driver’s failure to adhere to this

policy. 

5 Vision Zero is a nationwide movement to eliminate all traffic fatalities and severe injuries.
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preprogrammed turning angle, audibly warns pedestrians that a bus is turning. A system log 

maintains data showing the date, time, and locations at which announcements are made.

The second system, developed by Rosco/Mobileye, alerts a bus driver to the presence of 

pedestrians or bicyclists. Sensors scan the area around a bus and identify potential hazards. The 

system produces audible and visible warning signals to the driver. The MTA plans to expand the 

system to include an automatic deceleration/collision detection system. The system will 

automatically slow a bus and apply low-pressure braking, helping operators avoid collisions or 

reduce their severity. The system will also warn of unintentional lane departures and imminent 

forward collisions. 

Applicable Traffic Laws

Under Article 27, section 1150 of the New York state vehicle and traffic laws, pedestrians 

are subject to traffic-control signals. Article 27, section 1151, gives pedestrians the right-of-way 

in crosswalks where traffic-control signals are not in place or not in operation. Under Article 24, 

section 1112, traffic-control signals that apply to pedestrians are as follows:

(a) Steady WALK or walking person. Pedestrians facing such signal may proceed across 

the roadway in the direction of the signal and shall be given the right of way by other traffic.

(b) Flashing DON’T WALK or upraised hand. No pedestrian shall start to cross the 

roadway in the direction of such signal, but any pedestrians who have partially completed 

their crossing on the WALK or flashing DON’T WALK signal shall proceed to a sidewalk 

or safety island while the flashing DON’T WALK or upraised hand signal is showing.

(c) Steady DON’T WALK or upraised hand. No pedestrians shall start to cross the roadway 

in the direction of such signal, but any pedestrians who have partially completed their 

crossing on the WALK or flashing DON’T WALK signal shall proceed to a sidewalk or 

safety island while the steady DON’T WALK signal is showing. 

Article 26, section 1146 of the New York state vehicle and traffic law requires drivers to 

exercise “due care”:

(a) Notwithstanding the provisions of any other law to the contrary, every driver of a 

vehicle shall exercise due care to avoid colliding with any bicyclist, pedestrian or domestic 

animal upon any roadway and shall give warning by sounding the horn when necessary. 

Subdivisions 1146(b) and 1146(c) of Article 26 lay out fines and other punishments, including 

imprisonment, for injuring a pedestrian of bicyclist while failing to exercise due care under 

1146(a).

New York City administrative code 19-190 (the Right of Way Law) states that it is 

unlawful (a misdemeanor) for a driver to kill or seriously injure a pedestrian or cyclist resulting 

from the driver’s failure to yield right-of-way or the driver’s failure to exercise due care (as 

required by Article 26, section 1146, of the state laws).6

 

6 The Right of Way Law was enacted in August 2014 as part of the mayor’s Vision Zero initiative.
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Roadway Design

Pedestrians crossing East Houston Street have 26 seconds to cross during the WALK phase 

of the pedestrian traffic signal. The next phase, a flashing DON’T WALK, displays for 10 seconds, 

followed by a solid DON’T WALK that illuminates for 5 additional seconds. The traffic light timing 

sequence for the intersection incorporates a 7-second all-red clearance phase for vehicles.

A study in Sweden found that the average (comfortable) walking speed for an elderly 

person is about 2.2 feet per second.7 The total distance across East Houston Street is 89.5 feet, 

which would require at least 40.6 seconds to traverse. The traffic light timing sequence for the 

intersection allows 41 seconds before the start of the all-red (DON’T WALK) phase.

Probable Cause

The National Transportation Safety Board determines that the probable cause of the crash 

in New York City, New York, was the bus driver’s failure to yield the right-of-way to the 

pedestrian in the marked crosswalk. Contributing to the crash was distraction caused by a 

passenger on the bus and the driver’s failure to adhere to the company policy that prohibits drivers

from talking to passengers while a bus is in motion.

BY THE NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD

ROBERT L. SUMWALT, III EARL F. WEENER 

Chairman Member

BRUCE LANDSBERG T. BELLA DINH-ZARR

Vice Chairman Member

JENNIFER HOMENDY

Member

Adopted: September 5, 2018

For more details about this accident, visit the NTSB public docket and search for NTSB 

accident ID HWY17SH003. The accident dockets include such information as police reports, 

photographs, driver and witness statements, data on previous crashes, highway engineering 

reports, and timing of traffic signals. 

 

7 S. Dahlstedt, Walking Speeds and Walking Habits of Elderly People (Stockholm: National Swedish Road and 

Traffic Research Institute, undated).
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