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OVERSIGHT OF U.S.-PAKISTAN RELATIONS: FROM

AD HOC AND TRANSACTIONAL TO STRATEGIC

AND ENDURING

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY

AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT

AND GOVERNMENT REFORM

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

SEPTEMBER 24, 2008

Serial No. 110–181

Printed for the use of the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpoaccess.gov/congress/index.html

http://www.oversight.house.gov

(II)

COMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND GOVERNMENT REFORM

HENRY A. WAXMAN, California, Chairman

EDOLPHUS TOWNS, New York

PAUL E. KANJORSKI, Pennsylvania

CAROLYN B. MALONEY, New York

ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland

DENNIS J. KUCINICH, Ohio

DANNY K. DAVIS, Illinois

JOHN F. TIERNEY, Massachusetts

WM. LACY CLAY, Missouri

DIANE E. WATSON, California

STEPHEN F. LYNCH, Massachusetts

BRIAN HIGGINS, New York

JOHN A. YARMUTH, Kentucky

BRUCE L. BRALEY, Iowa

ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of

Columbia

BETTY MCCOLLUM, Minnesota

JIM COOPER, Tennessee

CHRIS VAN HOLLEN, Maryland

PAUL W. HODES, New Hampshire

CHRISTOPHER S. MURPHY, Connecticut

JOHN P. SARBANES, Maryland

PETER WELCH, Vermont

JACKIE SPEIER, California

TOM DAVIS, Virginia

DAN BURTON, Indiana

CHRISTOPHER SHAYS, Connecticut

JOHN M. MCHUGH, New York

JOHN L. MICA, Florida

MARK E. SOUDER, Indiana

TODD RUSSELL PLATTS, Pennsylvania

CHRIS CANNON, Utah

JOHN J. DUNCAN, JR., Tennessee

MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio

DARRELL E. ISSA, California

KENNY MARCHANT, Texas

LYNN A. WESTMORELAND, Georgia

PATRICK T. MCHENRY, North Carolina

VIRGINIA FOXX, North Carolina

BRIAN P. BILBRAY, California

BILL SALI, Idaho

JIM JORDAN, Ohio

PHIL BARNETT, Staff Director

EARLEY GREEN, Chief Clerk

LAWRENCE HALLORAN, Minority Staff Director

SUBCOMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS

JOHN F. TIERNEY, Massachusetts, Chairman

CAROLYN B. MALONEY, New York

STEPHEN F. LYNCH, Massachusetts

BRIAN HIGGINS, New York

JOHN A. YARMUTH, Kentucky

BRUCE L. BRALEY, Iowa

BETTY MCCOLLUM, Minnesota

JIM COOPER, Tennessee

CHRIS VAN HOLLEN, Maryland

PAUL W. HODES, New Hampshire

PETER WELCH, Vermont

JACKIE SPEIER, California

CHRISTOPHER SHAYS, Connecticut

DAN BURTON, Indiana

JOHN M. MCHUGH, New York

TODD RUSSELL PLATTS, Pennsylvania

JOHN J. DUNCAN, JR., Tennessee

MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio

KENNY MARCHANT, Texas

LYNN A. WESTMORELAND, Georgia

PATRICK T. MCHENRY, North Carolina

VIRGINIA FOXX, North Carolina

DAVE TURK, Staff Director

(III)

C O N T E N T S

Page

Hearing held on September 24, 2008 ..................................................................... 1

Statement of:

Curtis, Lisa, senior research fellow, Asian Studies Center, Heritage Foundation; C. Christine Fair, Ph.D., senior political scientist, the Rand

Corp.; Daniel Markey, Ph.D., senior fellow for India, Pakistan, and

South Asia, Council on Foreign Relations; and Brian Katulis, senior

fellow, Center for American Progress .......................................................... 9

Curtis, Lisa ................................................................................................ 9

Fair, C. Christine ...................................................................................... 11

Katulis, Brian ............................................................................................ 23

Markey, Daniel .......................................................................................... 14

Letters, statements, etc., submitted for the record by:

Katulis, Brian, senior fellow, Center for American Progress, prepared

statement of ................................................................................................... 26

Markey, Daniel, Ph.D., senior fellow for India, Pakistan, and South Asia,

Council on Foreign Relations, prepared statement of ................................ 17

Tierney, Hon. John F., a Representative in Congress from the State

of Massachusetts, prepared statement of ................................................... 4

(1)

OVERSIGHT OF U.S.-PAKISTAN RELATIONS:

FROM AD HOC AND TRANSACTIONAL TO

STRATEGIC AND ENDURING

WEDNESDAY, SEPTEMBER 24, 2008

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,

SUBCOMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY AND FOREIGN

AFFAIRS,

COMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND GOVERNMENT REFORM,

Washington, DC.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:10 a.m. in room

2154, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. John F. Tierney, (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

Present: Representatives Tierney, Higgins, McCollum, Van

Hollen, Welch, Shays, and Platts.

Staff present: Dave Turk, staff director; Davis Hake, clerk; Andy

Wright, counsel; MaryAnne McReynolds, graduate intern; Alexandra McKnight, fellow; A. Brooke Bennett, minority counsel; Christopher Bright, minority senior professional staff member; Todd

Greenwood, minority professional staff member; Mark Lavin, minority Army fellow; and Nick Palarino, minority senior investigator

and policy advisor.

Mr. TIERNEY. Good afternoon, everybody.

I guess I can’t apologize for the vote since it is not something I

have any control over, but I have to start the hearing late. I understand in about an hour or so there will be another series of votes,

so I apologize in advance for what might be an interruption at that

time, but we are going to begin our hearing.

I thank all of our witnesses for being here today and for assisting

us by getting their information to us beforehand.

A quorum is present and the Subcommittee on National Security

and Foreign Affairs hearing entitled, ‘‘Oversight of U.S.-Pakistan

Relations: From Ad Hoc and Transactional to Strategic and Enduring,’’ will come to order.

I ask unanimous consent that only the chairman and the acting

ranking member of the subcommittee be allowed to make opening

statements. Without objection, so ordered.

I ask unanimous consent that the hearing record be kept open

for 5 business days so that all members of the subcommittee be allowed to submit a written statement for the record. Without objection, so ordered.

This hearing constitutes a continuation of our sustained oversight of the U.S. national security interests in Pakistan and our

2

strategic interest in the absolutely critical Afghanistan-Pakistan

border region.

Since 2007, this subcommittee has held seven related hearings,

and we have dispatched three separate congressional delegations to

the region.

The purpose of today’s hearing is to step back, to take a look at

the big picture of U.S.-Pakistan relations 7 years since 9/11, and,

most importantly, to explore options and opportunities for going

forward.

The challenges the Pakistani people currently face are multi-faceted and immense. Pakistanis are being hit by skyrocketing food

and fuel prices. There have been runs on their stock market. Their

two main political parties remain in dispute over the reinstatement

of judiciary members. And militancy and extremism is continuing

to hit home, most recently with the brazen bombing of the Marriott

Hotel in Islamabad.

At the same time, the U.S. national security interests in Pakistan are as acute as they have ever been, and the challenges will

be hard to overcome. Many in the United States are understandably frustrated at the lack of progress in pacifying the terrorist safe

havens in western Pakistan, which has led to increasing U.S. crossborder attacks, including reportedly raids by U.S. troops.

Pakistan’s military and civilian leadership have reacted strongly,

stressing the imperative to protect their sovereignty.

Not all, however, is lost. In fact, our two countries stand at an

ideal time to strengthen our relationship in a strategic and enduring manner. For too long our relationship has been characterized

by ad hoc and short-term arrangements. We have too often treated

Pakistan as a means to an end rather than as a partner. Our hope

is that leaders from both of our countries can work together to satisfy the long-term interests of both countries, leading to real security and prosperity for both our peoples.

I am optimistic about the prospect for this sea change for three

primary reasons. First, both countries have, or will soon have in

the United States’ case, new leadership. Earlier this year Pakistan

held very promising elections and the new civilian leadership is

now fully in place, most recently with Asif Ali Zadari being elected

president.

The phenomenon of new leadership for both countries will hopefully lead to an interest and ability to reassess and strategically

update our relationship without the baggage of either side not

being able to admit past wrongs.

Second, there appears a general recognition by both countries on

the need to implement a new, long-term strategic plan. I am heartened in particular about recent statements made by our military

and Defense Department. Admiral Mike Mullen, chairman of the

U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, recently testified in Congress as follows.

He said, ‘‘I intend to commission a new, more intensive strategy for

the region, one that covers both sides of the border. . . . Absent a

broader international and interagency approach to the problems

there, it is my professional opinion that no amount of troops and

no amount of time can ever achieve all the objectives we seek. . . .

We can’t kill our way to victory.’’

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Secretary Gates added, ‘‘We must continue to work with the Pakistani government to extend its authority in the tribal region and

provide badly needed economic, medical, and educational assistance

to Pakistani citizens there.’’

Third, I am hopeful that the recent tragedies inflicted on Pakistanis and the setbacks in Afghanistan will lend a seriousness and

urgency of purpose. The Pakistanis lost one of their most beloved

leaders last year with the assassination of Benazir Bhutto. Just

this weekend they faced a horrific hotel bombing in Islamabad. And

recent setbacks in Afghanistan, including the deaths of many of our

brave troops, have collectively refocused our country’s attention

back to where it needs to be.

Secretary Gates put it this way: ‘‘The war on terror started in

this region. It must end there.’’

My hope is that out of this tragedy and out of these setbacks can

arise the impetus, focus, and urgency to do this right, instead of

just muddling along, as we have been doing for far too long.

The U.S. Coalition Support Funds program is just one example

of the need for a more strategic, effective, and enduring approach

to Pakistan. What began as a temporary, ad hoc program to reimburse Pakistan for certain assistance in the lead up to the invasion

of Afghanistan morphed into a $6.3 million behemoth that suffers

from serious accountability, effectiveness, and diplomatic challenges.

In our year-long investigation of this program, I was struck by

how this program seemed to continue based simply on inertia, as

opposed to satisfying any rigorous or strategic analysis, despite the

fact that Coalition Support Funds have accounted for over half of

the overall U.S. funding to Pakistan since 9/11.

The New York Times ran an editorial earlier this week on the

situation in Pakistan with the header, ‘‘Running Out of Time.’’ My

hope is that years from now the people of Pakistan and the United

States will look back at this time not as a last gasp effort, but rather as when we began to turn the corner to a brighter future for

both of our countries and our peoples.

I am delighted that we have such an esteemed panel of experts

with us today to help chart our way forward. We appreciate all of

the expertise and hard work that you bring to this hearing, and we

are eager to hear your analysis and your ideas.

Our panel has also traveled extensively in Pakistan and consults

regularly with Pakistani leaders and their counterparts, for any

strategic and enduring solutions must surely come from the two

countries and people working together.

In an interview earlier this week Pakistan President Zadari

stressed ‘‘Let’s sit together. Let’s find a solution.’’ I would add let’s

do so with a sense of urgency and seriousness that these times demand.

With that, I defer to Mr. Platts for his opening statement.

[The prepared statement of Hon. John F. Tierney follows:]

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5

6

7

Mr. PLATTS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. On behalf of Ranking

Member Shays and myself, thank you for holding this well-timed

and essential hearing on U.S. relations with Pakistan. Ranking

Member Shays will be in attendance in the near future, and we are

going to play tag team. I apologize to our witnesses. I am going to

get to take in your testimony in writing, but do have to depart

after sharing Ranking Member Shays’ statement, and then hopefully will be able to return for a later part of the hearing before

we complete this important hearing.

When Congressman Marshall and Ranking Member Shays visited Pakistan in August of this year, they found it to be one of the

most unstable and dangerous countries in the world. Its government is weak. It possesses nuclear weapons. And it has not successfully neutralized the Taliban and al Qaeda forces operating

along its border with Afghanistan. In fact, over the last few years

the situation there has continued to worsen.

Congressmen Marshall and Shays also found the government of

Pakistan is not just fighting the Taliban and al Qaeda, coping with

the judicial crisis, or dealing with the fractured coalition government; it is also trying to stabilize its economy during one of the

worst periods in the country’s history.

The bottom line is: Pakistan is in turmoil and is a haven for terrorists.

Most Pakistanis believe they are fighting a war for the United

States, not for themselves, against the Taliban and al Qaeda. An

independent survey of Pakistani citizens by the International Republican Institute concluded only 15 percent of Pakistanis believe

their government should cooperate with the United States in the

war against terrorism.

However, Islamic extremists in Pakistan are using that country

as a safe haven, crossing the border into Afghanistan and attacking

our forces. We cannot allow this to continue.

Both the United States and the international community need to

provide additional funds and personnel to train Pakistan’s Frontier

Corps. We must also provide the Pakistani military additional

equipment such as helicopters, night sites, and night vision goggles.

Of Pakistanis, 84 percent believe inflation and unemployment

are the most important issues facing their country. A falling rupee,

soaring inflation, and dwindling currency reserves are among their

mounting economic problems. The International Monetary Fund

recommends Pakistan receive a substantial injection of international funds to improve its economic situation.

While it is important for Pakistan to take action correcting the

economic situation themselves, the United States and the international community must consider stepping up and providing Pakistan additional financial assistance during its economic crisis. Our

assistance will obviously depend on how they respond to this help.

The politics of Pakistan remain closely linked to the military. Although Pakistan was founded as a democracy, the Army is the

most powerful political force, but a powerful military is not the

only problem with Pakistan’s political system. Some believe the

guiding principle in Pakistani politics is that there are no principles. The people of Pakistan believe the country is heading in the

8

wrong direction, and their politicians are the problem. Additionally,

only 41 percent of Pakistanis believe the government is working to

resolve the country’s problems.

Pakistan’s problems affect not only their country, but their

neighbors and, in fact, the entire world. Consequently, we and the

rest of the international community must come to grips with how

we interact with Pakistan. Understanding the complexities of these

events and taking the appropriate action requires an informed

judgment. This is why we are here today: to learn from experts

who understand Pakistan’s problems and have the background and

intelligence to make wise recommendations.

On behalf of Ranking Member Shays, I thank each of you for

your testimony and participation in the hearing. I do look forward

to returning and having a chance to participate in the hearing a

little later on this afternoon.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. TIERNEY. Thank you, Mr. Platts.

The subcommittee will now receive testimony from the witnesses

that are before us today. Let me just briefly introduce each of them

before we start.

Ms. Lisa Curtis is a senior research fellow with the Heritage

Foundation. Her areas of expertise include Afghanistan, India, and

Pakistan. Formerly, Ms. Curtis was a professional staff member on

the Senate Foreign Relations Committee under Chairman Luger

and a senior advisor in the State Department’s South Asia Bureau.

She has also formerly served as a member of the U.S. Foreign

Service, in part based in Pakistan.

Ms. Curtis, we thank you for testifying before the subcommittee

today. I read with great interest the report entitled, ‘‘The Next

Chapter: The United States and Pakistan.’’ And you and Dr. Fair

and many other renowned Pakistan experts have worked so diligently to put it together. Dr. Markey, I think you were involved in

that, as well. I think it will be valuable as an aid, and we look forward to what we are going to do strategically on this situation.

Dr. C. Christine Fair is a senior political scientist with the

RAND Corp. She focuses on the security competition between Pakistan and India, Pakistan’s internal security, the causes of terrorism

in South Asia, and the U.S.’ strategic relations with India and

Pakistan. Dr. Fair also served with the United Nations assistance

mission to Afghanistan and Kabul and for the U.S. Institute for

Peace and Center for Conflict Analysis and Prevention. She is the

author of several books, including The Madrassas Challenge: Militancy and Religious Education in Pakistan, and holds a Ph.D. in

South Asian languages and civilizations, all from the University of

Chicago.

Dr. Daniel S. Markey is a senior fellow for India, Pakistan, and

South Asia with the Council on Foreign Relations. From 2003 to

2007 he held the South Asia portfolio on the policy planning staff

with the Department of State. In addition, Dr. Markey formerly

served as the executive director of the research program International Security at Princeton University, where he also received

his Ph.D.

Mr. Brian Katulis is a senior fellow at the Center for American

Progress specializing in U.S. national security policy in, among

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other places, Pakistan. He is the author of The Prosperity Agenda

and has served as a consultant to various U.S. Government agencies, private corporations, and non-governmental organizations on

projects in two dozen countries. Mr. Katulis previously served on

the State Department’s Policy Planning staff and as a fellow at the

National Security Council’s Near East and South Asian Affairs Directorate.

The subcommittee thanks all of you for being here with us today.

As you know, we have held several hearings on the relationship between these two countries, and we think that now is a critical time

for the relationship of those two nations. We look forward to hearing your testimony.

Ms. Curtis, we will start with you, please, but first I want to do

a little bit of housekeeping. We usually swear our witnesses in, so

if you would all be kind enough to stand and raise your right

hands. And if there is anybody who is going to be testifying with

you, they should also stand, please.

[Witnesses sworn.]

Mr. TIERNEY. The record will please indicate that all witnesses

have answered in the affirmative. We thank you. Your full written

statements will be put into the hearing record, so we have 5 minutes of testimony. We don’t have a clock or a light to go on and

off, so Mr. Hake is going to give an indication as to when you

might start winding down your comments, if you would, so we will

have some time for questions and answers. Thank you.

Ms. Curtis.

STATEMENTS OF LISA CURTIS, SENIOR RESEARCH FELLOW,

ASIAN STUDIES CENTER, HERITAGE FOUNDATION; C. CHRISTINE FAIR, PH.D., SENIOR POLITICAL SCIENTIST, THE RAND

CORP.; DANIEL MARKEY, PH.D., SENIOR FELLOW FOR INDIA,

PAKISTAN, AND SOUTH ASIA, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS; AND BRIAN KATULIS, SENIOR FELLOW, CENTER FOR

AMERICAN PROGRESS

STATEMENT OF LISA CURTIS

Ms. CURTIS. Thank you. Mr. Chairman, distinguished members

of the subcommittee, thank you for inviting me here today. I will

speak on behalf of the Pakistan Policy Working Group, which is an

independent, bipartisan group of U.S.-Pakistan experts. I want to

point out that the co-chair of this group, Ms. Kara Bue, is here in

the audience. Ms. Bue is a partner at Armitage International and

a former Deputy Assistant Secretary of State in the Political Military Affairs Bureau. This group has held regular meetings over the

last 8 months to discuss various aspects of U.S.-Pakistan relations.

We have drafted a report of recommendations on managing this

critical partnership, the findings of which both myself and Dr. Fair

will be discussing.

This report was reviewed and endorsed by former U.S. Deputy

Secretary of State Richard Armitage and former U.S. Representative and Co-Chair of the 9/11 Commission Lee Hamilton.

The situation in Pakistan is grave and deteriorating, as evidenced by the horrific truck bombing last Friday night at the Marriott Hotel that killed over 50 and injured hundreds. The bombing

10

demonstrates we have little time to waste in developing effective

policies that help stabilize Pakistan and contain the terrorist

threat emanating from the region. Pakistan may be the single

greatest challenge facing the next American President.

The United States has achieved far too little in its relations with

Pakistan, despite having provided $11 billion in military and economic assistance over the last 6 years.

Washington needs to rethink its approach to Pakistan. If we

genuinely believe that a stable, prosperous Pakistan is in our interest, we must be much smarter about how we work with Pakistan

and what sort of assistance we provide. Fortunately, political developments in both countries make this an opportune moment for recalibrating U.S. policy.

Earlier this year an elected Pakistani government took office following a largely successful election, and the upcoming U.S. Presidential election will bring a new administration and the potential

to consider fresh approaches to managing U.S.-Pakistan relations.

I will now summarize briefly our working group’s findings related to Pakistani domestic politics and Pakistan’s regional relationships, while Dr. Fair will discuss counter-terrorism and U.S. assistance programs.

Our group’s first recommendation is that Washington be patient

with Pakistan’s democratic leadership and work to help stabilize

the government through economic aid and diplomacy. With the

myriad problems facing Pakistan on the economic and terrorism

front, some in the United States may feel nostalgia for the days

when President Musharraf wore his uniform and commanded a

docile parliament. But, just as the United States was too slow in

gauging public disaffection with President Musharraf before the

2008 elections, it must not too quickly lose patience with Pakistan’s

elected leaders. We must demonstrate that our backing of democratic institutions is unwavering and, most importantly, that we

support civilian over military rule.

The United States needs to overcome the widely held perception

in Pakistan that it meddles in the country’s political affairs. We

should maintain neutrality toward Pakistan’s internal political situation, focusing on democratic institutions and reforms rather than

on the day-to-day tumults of Pakistani politics.

To succeed with Pakistan, U.S. diplomacy must do a better job

of distinguishing between what we believe we are doing and how

Pakistanis perceive our actions. We must be more convincing that

American objectives in Pakistan and the region are long-term. This

will require investing in a far-reaching public diplomacy program

that emphasizes common United States and Pakistani interests in

combatting terrorism, creating prosperity, and improving regional

relationships instead of highlighting the struggle as part of the

global war on terrorism.

We need to expand the U.S. Embassy and the USAID mission in

terms of both physical structure and personnel, and invest more in

training our diplomats and other Government officials who will

dedicate their careers to the region.

The United States also must step up its regional diplomacy in

order to assist Afghanistan and Pakistan in transforming their border from a hostile frontier into an economic gateway.

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Pakistan and Afghanistan are inextricably linked through shared

borders, history, culture, and commerce. This inter-dependence creates an opportunity for collaboration in the interest of greater stability and prosperity; therefore, our group believes that the new

U.S. administration should assign primary responsibility for coordinating and implementing Pakistan-Afghanistan policy to a senior

U.S. official with sufficient authority, accountability, and institutional capacity to promote better ties between these two key nations.

A transformation of Pakistan-Afghanistan ties can only take

place in an overall context of improved Indo-Pakistani relations

that enhances Pakistan’s confidence in its own regional position.

Afghanistan constitutes a new battleground of Indo-Pakistani hostility. Continued Pakistani ambivalence toward the Taliban stems

in part from its concern that India is trying to encircle it by gaining influence in Afghanistan. The United States must, therefore,

find ways to give Pakistan a vested interest in Afghanistan’s stability so that it adopts a tougher position toward the Taliban and no

longer sees the value of allowing them to operate.

A policy goal of the United States should be to encourage a serious, consistent India-Pakistan security dialog that permits the

Pakistan army to redefine itself to better tackle the raging insurgency within its own borders.

Last, the United States should work more closely with U.S. allies

and regional countries to encourage Pakistan to stiffen its resolve

against terrorism and to promote stability in the country. This

means we have to raise Pakistan as an issue to a higher level in

U.S. bilateral diplomacy, particularly with countries that have good

relations with Islamabad, such as China, Japan, Saudi Arabia, and

other Gulf States.

That concludes my oral presentation. Thank you.

Mr. TIERNEY. Thank you, Ms. Curtis.

Dr. Fair.

STATEMENT OF C. CHRISTINE FAIR

Ms. FAIR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and esteemed colleagues, for

the opportunity to discuss this report.

As Ms. Curtis explained, these are not my personal views but

those of the Pakistan Policy Working Group. And, as she also explained, my remarks are going to focus upon counter-terrorism and

internal security, as well as our suggestions for re-optimizing the

way in which the United States provides assistance to Pakistan.

Mr. TIERNEY. Could I be rude enough to just interrupt for a second? I will give you whatever extra time you need for that.

Ms. FAIR. Sure.

Mr. TIERNEY. Both of you went out of your way to say that these

are not your personal views, they are the views of that report. Are

there substantial ways that the report deviates from each of your

personal views?

Ms. CURTIS. Not substantially. No. There might be one or two

small points, but not substantially. I agree with the thrust of the

arguments and recommendations.

Ms. FAIR. I think I do, too. I think if you were to arrange all of

the folks on the optimism/pessimism side, over the last several

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years a number of questions for me personally have arisen about

whether or not we actually have partners for change in the various

institutions that we are trying to engage, and without significant

partners for change I am very skeptical. But I think that we have

to try, because the opportunity costs of not making an effort are

really quite large.

But I do believe very strongly—and I think many people in the

working group would agree—we need to have contingencies. Pakistan may be the preferable partner for a number of reasons, but

if it chooses to be unsuitable, as the report says, for U.S. assistance, then we really do need to find contingency arrangements.

Mr. TIERNEY. Thank you. I apologize again for interrupting, but

I think it is helpful for us to know on that.

Ms. CURTIS. I think the group shares that opinion that she expressed.

Ms. FAIR. Yes. Exactly. Good. We are on the same page.

With respect to counter-terrorism and internal security, Pakistan’s militant groups present daunting challenges for the United

States and the international community, and also for Pakistan,

itself. Despite having received some $11 billion in overt assistance,

Pakistan is more, not less, insecure, and sanctuaries have expanded, not contracted. Worse, the state’s passive and active assistance to a raft of militant groups persists, despite the obvious threat

they pose.

While it has moderated the activity of some militants, Pakistan

has yet to strategically abandon militancy as a tool of achieving its

foreign policy objectives. Alarming reports of ISI and Frontier

Corps and even active Army support to the Taliban, despite massive American support to the Pakistan Army, undermine our goals

and imperil American and Allied troops in Afghanistan.

There are very serious conflicts of national interest held by Pakistan in the United States, despite Washington’s largesse. Some, but

not all, of these differences are due to the army’s domination of

that state and its active efforts to suppress developments of democracy and civilian capability.

While the tribal areas and the various peace deals with the militants there concentrate the attention of Washington, many of the

ongoing efforts to secure the federally administered tribal areas

[FATA], have stalled, in part because they misdiagnosed the problem. Pakistan, itself, has yet to decide that FATA should not be a

sanctuary.

Yet, despite the pervasive and sanguinary violence perpetrated

against largely Pakistani victims, Pakistanis believe that they are

under attack, not because they confront an enemy opposed to their

way of life, but because of Pakistan’s alignment with the United

States. Pakistanis are outraged by U.S. actions in FATA; therefore,

the cost/benefit calculus of each strike must be weighed and arguably unilateral action is not sustainable when Washington is completely dependent upon Pakistan for logistical supply for the war

in Afghanistan.

I want to remind you that most of our logistics for the war move

through the port in Karachi, through Pakistan, and up into Afghanistan.

13

The United States has been hesitant to act because of disagreement within the U.S. Government and between its allies on the nature of Pakistan’s support to militant groups and its strategic objectives; therefore, the working group suggests that the U.S. commission a fresh national intelligence estimate to form a common

operating picture within the U.S. Government about Pakistan’s

support to militants and the extent thereof and what the support

suggests about Pakistan’s intentions.

Second, the United States should develop a strategy on the basis

of NIE and adjust cooperation and military assistance in an effort

to influence Pakistan’s cost/benefit analysis of using militants in its

foreign policy, whether in Afchanistan or in India.

Third, the United States should use its military assistance to

turn parts of the Pakistan army and the para-military organization, the Frontier Corps, into an effective counter-insurgency force

subject to the possibilities. We can discuss that in the Q and A.

Increase support for civilian institutions that can provide enhanced civilian rule of law, including oversight of the military and

ISI, and encourage political liberalization in the tribal areas and

elsewhere.

With respect to U.S. assistance, despite the highest level of

American aid to Pakistan, anti-Americanism and distrust of Washington is pervasive in the country. This anti-American populist

rhetoric is dangerous and facilitates the agenda of militants.

Unfortunately, despite these large sums, the average Pakistani

hasn’t benefited from American generosity. The preponderance of

funds has gone directly to the Pakistani treasury through CSF, as

you know, and has not been used to advance the well-being of the

citizenry. The military focus of our aid has fostered the belief that

Washington is ‘‘buying off’’ the Pakistan military and is indifferent

to the democratic aspirations of the people.

The United States should reorder its assistance priorities to more

directly help the citizens and democracy and incentivize Pakistan

to work with Washington to advance our mutual interests.

The working group puts forth a number of suggestions to developing a more broad-based relationship with Pakistan by moving

away from the transactional relationship with the Pakistan military.

First, support the approach or an approach similar to that advanced by the Biden-Luger legislation. The next administration

should commit to $1.5 billion per year in non-military spending.

Establish reconstruction opportunity zones, as proposed in the legislation long before the Congress, and consider increasing the number of product lines included in the legislation.

Focus the majority of U.S. economic aid on projects and basic

education, health care, water, and other resource management, law

enforcement, and justice programs rather than on budgetary support to the Pakistan government.

Fourth, restructure and redirect the focus of U.S. military assistance to providing systems and training that enhance Pakistan’s

counter-terrorism and counter-insurgency abilities.

Since the issue of CSF was discussed, I will note in conclusion

that we will always need some sort of reimbursement mechanism

as long as Pakistan is engaging in activities in support of the globVerDate 11-MAY-2000 12:31 Aug 26, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00017 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 U:\DOCS\51517.TXT KATIE PsN: KATIE
14

al war on terrorism or whatever that activity may be renamed, but

we all know that CSF needs to be more accountable. GAO has put

forth a number of ways to do so.

That being said, I think another approach to dealing with CSF

is to move many activities currently funded under CSF to FMF.

This has two immediate benefits.

Mr. TIERNEY. You might want to spell out FMF for people that

are in the hearing.

Ms. FAIR. I am sorry, Foreign Military Financing. There are two

immediate benefits of this in broad-stroke terms. First, we actually

have more control over those funds and we can actually direct more

effectively where they go. The problem with CSF is that once they

go into the Pakistan treasury they become sovereign funds and

then it becomes an issue to demand accountability for what happens to those moneys.

Secondarily, it would require more cooperation with the Pakistanis in terms of activities and programs to be acquired through

FMF, and it would force the United States and Pakistan to buttress institutions like the Defense Consultative Group, which have

really failed to live up to its name.

We can talk about this perhaps more in Q and A, but this is the

end of my formal remarks. I thank you for the opportunity.

Mr. TIERNEY. Thank you, Doctor. You will find that some of your

comments on the Coalition Support Funds track the staff’s report

to us that will be released tomorrow, so that is good.

Dr. Markey.

STATEMENT OF DANIEL MARKEY

Mr. MARKEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you, members of the subcommittee. I really appreciate this opportunity to

appear before you to enter into your ongoing discussion about Pakistan and U.S.-Pakistan relations. I would like to focus my remarks

on the topic of the tribal areas along the Pakistan-Afghanistan border.

These remarks are based primarily upon this report that should

have been distributed to you, a Council on Foreign Relations Special Report entitled Securing Pakistan’s Tribal Belt.

I want to use my time here today to basically do three things:

first, describe the nature of the national security challenge that I

think we face, and I will do that very briefly; second, assess the

range of relevant alternative strategies that we actually have before us; and, third, offer a few discrete suggestions for U.S. policy

that would follow from this.

First, the challenge. I see the challenge that we face—and I

think some of my colleagues have already sketched this out—as a

series of nested challenges, layers. We begin with the one that everybody is most familiar with, the challenge of the headlines of violence, al Qaeda, Taliban, sectarian violence, tribal militancy, and

so on, within the tribal belt.

If we step back from that, though, we see a second layer, a layer

of development challenges, political development, lacking political

structures within the tribal regions, and economic development,

deep poverty that is persistent throughout this area.

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If we step one step back from that we see all of this nested within the challenge of Pakistan, the nation, the fragility that we have

talked about in terms of its own political institutions, its own economy, its own security that extends well outside this tribal area.

And if we step one step back from that, we look at this from a

U.S. perspective, we see the challenge of working with a partner

in Pakistan, which has been incredibly frustrating over the years,

and so we see this series of challenges.

What are the options that we have? If we were to begin with a

fresh slate, what would we have on the table? I think the first option that we would consider would be containment or deterrents of

this threat that is very immediate to U.S. security. The problem

with detainment or deterrence I think here, of course, is that we

are dealing with sub-national threats, al Qaeda and Taliban. These

are very difficult to contain and deter, as compared to nation

states.

What would be the next alternative? Coercion. Normally we

would seek to coerce countries or states that are doing things we

don’t like. The problem here, although we have tried a certain

amount of coercion with Pakistan, is that it risks alienating this

partner rather than actually getting them to do the kinds of things

we would like.

Third would be unilateral action. Of course, there have been a

lot of headlines about the kinds of unilateral strikes that the

United States has reportedly made over the past year, and especially over the past month. But here, of course, there is a political

cost. There is a cost bilaterally in terms of the U.S.-Pakistan relationship, and of course there is a cost that is imposed upon the region, itself, in terms of local tribes really rejecting this use of U.S.

violence.

So that leaves me with a final alternative, which is the one that

I support, which is inducement. In the report I entitle this the

least-worst option, not because it is an ideal solution, but because

it is the least of all these bad options.

Here the goal, of course, is to try to use assistance protection to

shape the interests and the behavior of our partner in Pakistan

and to do it in a way that builds a lasting partnership.

How to do this? It is going to be incredibly difficult. And for the

most part, I certainly endorse the statements that have been made

by my fellow panelists and the report that they have just released.

I have signed on to that report.

But if we look specifically at the strategy within the tribal belt,

if we narrow it down to that tribal belt area, I make a number of

suggestions in my report and I place them in what I have termed

a phased approach, a time line of sorts. It begins with the most urgent. In the urgent near future I believe that we need to support

the use of targeted military action of the sort that we are seeing.

These are real threats to the United States. They are real threats

to our troops in Afghanistan. They cannot be diminished. And in

many ways the Pakistanis, themselves, are incapable of dealing

with them in the near term, and so therefore in the very near term

we need to do that.

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I think we can calibrate these attacks and I think we can mitigate them with better cooperation with the Pakistanis on the other

side. I would recommend that, as well.

Getting past the urgent, we have the near term. In the near term

I think we need to complement these kinds of strikes and all of the

Pakistani military operations with economic and political overtures. To some degree, this was contained in sort of small scale,

small-bore development programs that are designed to win over allies within the tribal belt.

I would also include here, and I note in the report, a suggestion

that we should be funding a civilian conservation corps of sorts, a

plan to basically soak up young men in the area, provide them with

near-term opportunities in terms of economic opportunities, and

longer-term opportunities that will allow them a career path and

a way out.

If we look to the longer term, what I suggest in the report is that

we really need to be looking to try to transform the Pakistani military. What we need to be doing is trying to turn it into a military

that is capable of doing counter-insurgency. I make a number of

suggestions about how that would be the case, but right now I

would say it is not possible unless we seriously invest in that military.

Then, if we look even further out, I see a generational challenge.

This is the challenge of transforming this tribal region, of developing its economy, of developing its politics, of creating a sustainable

governance system that actually works, unlike the FATA system

that we have seen so far.

Now let me just conclude, because I have really tried to summarize in brief terms, but conclude by saying that obviously I am advocating what looks like a very costly and long-term commitment.

This is a commitment that is likely to test our patience, and it is

also a commitment that may fail ultimately. I recognize that. But

after a review of the alternative basic strategies that I see out

there, I think that the threats warrant this kind of attention. And

I am also convinced that the costs associated with those other

strategies in the near, in some cases, and certainly in the long run

are likely to run higher than even this approach, which is based

on inducement and assistance and working in partnership with the

Pakistanis.

I thank you for your time.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Markey follows:]

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Mr. TIERNEY. Thank you very much.

Mr. Katulis.

STATEMENT OF BRIAN KATULIS

Mr. KATULIS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee. I appreciate the opportunity to testify before you today.

At the Center for American Progress, under the leadership of my

colleague, Caroline Wadhams, and under John Pedester’s leadership at the center, we have also convened a working group of distinguished experts on Pakistan to examine U.S. policy there. We

plan to release a report next month with much detailed analysis

and recommendations, and my testimony today is based on the

work of that group plus three recent trips to Pakistan that I have

made since December. I might add, though I am not a member of

the working group that Lisa was a part of, I largely agree with

many of its recommendations and analyses. There is a lot of good

thinking going around town on Pakistan, and I think it is really

important.

Today I want to focus my remarks on a very specific challenge.

Dan talked about urgent challenges. I want to drill down on one

thing that I think needs immediate attention, a component of security in Pakistan that requires urgent attention, and that is economic security.

The immediate economic challenges that Pakistan faces have potential for further undermining Pakistan’s fragile internal stability.

If Pakistan’s economy experiences further collapse, the government

could lose further support of the people, and this would be tragic.

If you look at the basic economic statistics, they paint a very dire

picture. Two-thirds of the Pakistani population lives on less than

$2 a day. Though the Pakistani economy has been experiencing

growth, 5.8 percent in the last fiscal year, that growth has slowed,

like it has in many countries around the world, and much of that

growth has not reached the vast majority of Pakistanis.

In my most recent visits to Pakistan, when I got outside of that

elite bubble that many of us travel in, and talked to ordinary Pakistanis, it was clear that the focus of ordinary Pakistanis were these

basic needs. This is confirmed in the polling results that others

have mentioned by the International Republican Institute from this

June, where 7 in 10 Pakistanis said that their personal economic

situation had worsened over the last year.

When asked about the most important issues facing Pakistan,

fully 71 percent said that inflation was the most important issue,

followed by unemployment, poverty, and basic services like electricity and water.

These basic needs ranked even higher than law and order or suicide bombings or even democratic reform in the eyes of ordinary

Pakistanis.

The silent tsunami of global food prices, as others have noted,

has hit ordinary Pakistanis. In a separate poll conducted in May

by Terror Free Tomorrow, 86 percent of Pakistanis said that they

had trouble obtaining flour each day. In that same month, food

prices increased nearly 28 percent.

Pakistanis are also finding it difficult to meet their energy needs

because of the rising cost of oil and gas. The subsidies provided by

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the Pakistani government have put pressure on the government’s

budget. Overall inflation has skyrocketed to a 30-year high, reaching 24 percent in July and, according to some reports, 31 percent

in the first week of September.

In addition to these food and fuel price increases, parts of Pakistan have experienced electricity shortages. In my last visit to the

country, the capital of Islamabad actually experienced rolling

blackouts due to electricity shortages, and Pakistanis have rioted

in recent months in cities such as Multan and Karachi due to these

electricity shortages.

So my first point is that these economic troubles and these challenges in delivering basic services can have a de-stabilizing impact

on a country that is already facing enormous internal stability. In

a sense, these troubles combined with that internal insecurity are

creating a vicious cycle.

Just a few notes on the Pakistani government and its fiscal crisis. The Pakistani government is facing a very severe financial crisis and is actually in danger of defaulting on its debt. This is in

large part, again, due to the fuel subsidies and other economic obligations. Pakistan’s budget deficit of $21 billion is the highest in a

decade, and its current account deficit in July and August, the first

2 months of the fiscal year in Pakistan, is about 1.6 percent of

gross domestic product.

Pakistan’s government debt is considered the riskiest in the

world. Yesterday Moody’s cut the ratings outlook for Pakistani government bonds from stable to negative because of the drop in foreign currency reserves. In June, Standard and Poor’s cut its rating

on Pakistan’s debt, and there may be another downgrade ahead. So

this significant decline in Pakistan’s cash reserves is an immediate

crisis that actually is being addressed this week in New York at

a meeting that President Zadari has tried to pull together I believe

on Friday.

Other economic indicators: the rupee has lost 20 percent of its

value and is near record lows, and the Karachi Stock Exchange has

lost 40 percent since April 2008.

Pakistan has started to look for external assistance. Though it

has rejected an IMF restructuring program, sources in the Pakistani Finance Ministry said that they hope to obtain commitments

between $3 to $5 billion at a Friends of Pakistan Forum to coincide

with the U.N. General Assembly testifying week, and there are

hints that perhaps the Asian Development Bank and the World

Bank may offer anywhere from $1.5 to $2 billion.

Last week the Finance Minister of Pakistan unveiled a four-point

plan to attempt to stabilize the economy, including key steps such

as eliminating subsidies on fuel and power, trying to hold the budget deficit to 4 percent by increasing revenue by taxes, increasing

savings, and a whole host of schemes, including privatization perhaps of the oil, gas, and power sectors.

But there is a real crunch happening, and it is happening right

now, and it is happening in the coming weeks and months, and it

is perhaps one of the most urgent crises that needs to be addressed. I think many of the recommendations that were offered

here and are offered in the task force’s report are essential.

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I would like to conclude by making two immediate points. I think

first the United States needs to work with other countries to assist

the Pakistani government to move through this time of economic

reform and economic trouble. There are key powers—China, Saudi

Arabia, many of the Gulf countries—have a vital role in shaping

Pakistan’s economy, and coordination often is not as strong as it

could be between these international actors.

Second, as Christine noted, the United States should redirect its

economic assistance to those Pakistanis most affected and refocus

its development assistance projects. There are a lot of good ideas

along that front, and I think it is vitally important.

But, in conclusion, I think, two overall points, and in our working group session and I suspect in your working group session, too,

we talked about the need to make a shift in U.S.-Pakistan policy,

and one common thread in all of these discussions was the urgent

need for national security reform on the part of the United States;

that many of the recommendations that you will find, I think, in

the task force’s report, both the one that you heard about today

and the one that we will release later next month, talk about investing more in the civilian capacity of the U.S. Government.

In my trips to Islamabad, I have seen in our U.S. Embassy out

there very dedicated professionals, but I am concerned about the

lack of investment in our capacity to deliver development assistance to do the sorts of things that are necessary, particularly on

the economic development front, and I think we need a closer look

at our capacity to do that. This is something, quite frankly, Defense

Secretary Robert Gates has talked about in a very general and

global context, but I think Pakistan is going to be a test case in

terms of investing in the other structures of U.S. national security

power to be able to address these challenges.

Second, there is going to be a need for stronger oversight. This

committee has done incredible work, I think, over the last few

months in looking at the oversight in terms of the financial assistance provided to Pakistan, but if all of these recommendations we

offer have a price tag on them, I think, given our experience in

Pakistan, we need a closer look on following the money and seeing

where that assistance is being delivered.

That concludes my opening remarks.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Katulis follows:]

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Mr. TIERNEY. Thank you.

I want to thank all of you for your comments and your expertise.

A lot of what you say falls very clearly where the trend has been

at hearings in front of this committee on the idea of needing a new

strategy for the United States in this region, about the need to concentrate on getting our civilian capacity up and maintaining that,

and about focusing on a better economic development aid package

and the way it is delivered out there.

But the dilemma seems to be this: everybody cautions patience.

The United States has to have patience. I suspect there is some of

that in the report that will come out tomorrow on the CSF. But

then you have the military telling us you can’t have patience. You

know, we understand that every time we intercede in Pakistan it

creates a violent reaction by a lot of different people there, but we

have to protect our troops.

So how do we resolve that contradiction in design here? One is

that obviously we don’t want to be creating new enemies and enlarging the recruitment of people in these militant groups, and we

understand how that might even undermine some of the other

things we have recommended in terms of buttressing up the economic efforts of the Pakistani government. How do you reconcile

that with what our military is telling us, that they think they need

to go in there and have some sort of kinetic action in Pakistan if

they are going to be more protective of our troops in Afghanistan.

You can start in any order you want to start. Dr. Fair.

Ms. FAIR. As you noted, I have had the opportunity to serve with

the U.N. in Afghanistan. My concern has really been that there has

been a tendency to externalize major policy failures in Afghanistan

to FATA.

There are a number of realities. FATA is a sanctuary. It has

been a sanctuary. It is going to remain a sanctuary because that

is in Pakistan’s national security interests.

I like to give the example of the Indians. They have been dealing

with the Pakistan base insurgency in Kashmir now for decades.

They know full well, they can even see with their binoculars the

training camps across the LOC, but they don’t bomb the LOC, they

don’t even make hot pursuit incursions across the LOC unless it is

an accident. They have about 300,000 individuals involved in the

counter-insurgency grid in the area of Kashmir. So in some sense

we have real problems with the way we are conducting that war

in Afghanistan. We have inadequate troops. NATO, with the caveats, there are whole issues with NATO there, as well.

What my fear has been is that in great measure we are

externalizing serious policy failures in Afghanistan and Pakistan

and the cost/benefit of these strikes are very dubious to me. Some

of them may have operational advantages. I doubt that they have

strategic advantages on the main.

The problem is, of course, that there is no media that are allowed

to operate in FATA, so as soon as the ordinance lands we have already lost the perception management campaign because they will

always say it killed women and children. There may be not a single

woman and child killed, but there is no way we can prove or disprove that.

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So I think my approach to this is that we really need to rethink

the war fighting strategy in Afghanistan. These so-called rat lines

are not new. These are the same rat lines that militants have been

using to crawl into Afghanistan for decades.

So I think I am a little bit concerned that we are not better at

eliminating these individuals as they cross, and that by relying

solely upon expanded unilateral action we really have put ourselves and our relationship with this pivotal country in peril.

Not only that, Pakistan engages more U.S. equities than Afghanistan ever will, if for no other reason than its population mass, because of its nuclear weapons, because it is the source of insecurity

and therefore the source of possible security should it normalize its

relations with the neighbors.

I think that would be summarizing my views on the subject.

Mr. TIERNEY. Does anybody else feel compelled to respond to

that? Dr. Markey.

Mr. MARKEY. I would just say, Mr. Chairman, I think you put

your finger on a legitimate dilemma. There are some things that

you just can’t reconcile, and this may be one of them. In other

words, I believe firmly that we are facing urgent security threats

that the Pakistanis are unable or unwilling to address and that the

United States may need, in certain cases, to take unilateral action.

Mr. TIERNEY. So you disagree with Dr. Fair, who says that she

doesn’t fail to perceive the threats, but she thinks it is counter-productive to go in and——

Mr. MARKEY. Well, I would agree with her that it may also be

counter-productive, and that is why it is a dilemma. In the broader

sense of the relationship with Pakistan, we are seeing the cost of

this. We are seeing it in terms of the statements out of their leaders, out of their Army chief. We see it on the ground in precisely

the way that Christine has suggested in terms of the cost that we

pay.

So sometimes you can’t have both things that you want, ad I

think this is one of those instances.

If I may just make a couple of suggestions about ways that we

could try to mitigate the cost of taking new strikes—because I do

see the disruption as being potentially useful—would be to coordinate with Pakistanis whenever possible. I am not convinced that

we have the level of coordination with them in terms of these actions that we could. Part of that is a trust deficit that we face and

that they face.

Mr. TIERNEY. So part of it also is that fact that they, at least as

a public posture, have to say they don’t want us doing it.

Mr. MARKEY. Right. That doesn’t mean that necessarily in the

background you wouldn’t.

Mr. TIERNEY. Perhaps.

Mr. MARKEY. And then also I think we need to maybe set the bar

a little bit higher in terms of our target selection. There are targets

in the tribal areas that would be more acceptable to even the locals

than other targets. Arab foreigners, Uzbeks, Chechens, these are

ones that we should really go after, and I think we have more leeway to go after.

Mr. TIERNEY. And that comes down to that issue of intelligence.

Mr. MARKEY. Exactly.

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Mr. TIERNEY. Mr. Katulis, Ms. Curtis, do you want to respond to

that?

Ms. CURTIS. I think it is an issue of short-term versus long-term

interests. As you said, the military feels it needs to take these actions. And what we have said in our report is that until the Pakistanis demonstrate they are willing and capable of getting at some

of these targets, that we will have to continue unilateral actions.

However, we have to do a cost/benefit analysis, probably for each

incursion, realizing that there are long-term costs, that these incursions would strengthen radical forces in the country. That is certainly something we don’t want to do. And obviously it is going to

create distrust when we have not asked for permission ahead of

time with the Pakistani leadership.

So I think we just need to have our eyes wide open as we move

forward, but if there is a threat and it is an immediate threat, then

obviously the United States has to do something about it.

This raises another issue. Dr. Markey talked about inducements

in terms of getting more cooperation from the Pakistanis. I think

we all agree the Pakistanis aren’t doing enough to address the

threat.

Now, we did not come to a firm conclusion on the nature of support that might be going toward groups that are opposing our interests, even killing United States and Coalition forces. That is

why we called for the commissioning of an NIE. But if we do decide

that there is support, then I think we have to assess why the

would Pakistanis be engaging in such risky behavior, and we really

have to think about that hard and we have to deal with that.

I think it is hard to understand if you have an ally that there

may be links to groups that oppose your interests, but you have to

understand they have their interests, as well. We just have to figure out how to deal with that. I would argue it is carrots and

sticks, not just inducements, but it is careful leveraging of smarter

diplomacy, and just being very smart about how we deal with this

and coming to terms with issues that maybe our interagency has

not made a final decision on.

Mr. KATULIS. Just one point. I am deeply concerned about the

lack of information and knowledge that we have about dynamics in

places like FATA and NWFP. I am sure you have seen this, too,

but our intelligence, if we are going to conduct these strikes, I

think needs to be a lot better. In my discussions with U.S. Government officials, expanding our reach—and when I talked about reforming national security structures, I wasn’t just talking about development assistance in upping the level of USAID employees that

are out there to the extent that we can.

It is also, I think, a human intelligence concern. I am deeply concerned about managing the short-term threats. We need to be better informed. I worked in Iraq and other places, and I worry that

our level of knowledge about certain parts of Pakistan are equivalent to our level of knowledge in Iraq in 2002. We don’t, I think,

understand the internal dynamics, not only inside these areas but

also inside the Pakistani government.

Mr. TIERNEY. Mr. Shays, do you want some time to settle in on

that?

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Mr. Shays joins us at the moment. He is having a great day for

complex issues dealing with this one in Pakistan and also in the

Financial Services Committee, so we will give him a little time to

settle in.

Mr. HIGGINS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I just have a couple of

questions.

Dr. Markey, you talked about the trust deficit. Whatever you

read, particularly in western journals, about Pakistan and the

United States’ relationship with Pakistan, it is replete with contradiction. Pakistan is said to be a strategic ally of ours. They are

said to be assisting in repressing Islamic terrorists. But at the

same time there is ample evidence to suggest that they are assisting the militant terrorists.

When you look at American investment in Pakistan, some $11

billion over a 5-year period, for both economic and military aid,

when you look at proposals to increase that for non-military aid,

it seems as the situation in Pakistan is characterized consistently

as grave and deteriorating, it seems as though there is almost an

incentive to have the situation always grave and deteriorating because it always results in more money. It is typically U.S. money.

The real question I suppose I have is where is the tipping point?

Where is the game change? Where is the sense that we really have

a true partner, because as recently—the articles that are outlined

in our packet today from Time, from the New York Times—there

is a pervasive sense of conflict as to whether Pakistan is really an

ally of ours.

Response?

Ms. CURTIS. I guess I would argue that I don’t think we want to

see the game changer. I would just argue that I think our group

came to the conclusion that we need to find a way to partner with

this country. It is in the U.S. national security interest that Pakistan become a stable, prosperous, moderate Islamic democracy. I

think that this serves U.S. national interests. I think it serves global interests.

We certainly have not had policies that have brought us to that

point up until now, and I think that is why we search for new ways

of dealing with the issue. But I think that is just what I would say.

When you say game changer, my alarm bells go off because I think

of game changer as Pakistan going in a very different direction

than we would like to see it go.

Mr. HIGGINS. Well, I would respond that the status quo is unacceptable, that this duplicity that exists at great expense to American taxpayers, to American military men and women, and our

strategic interests in the area are highly problematical. When there

is a situation that is grave and deteriorating and your report recommends that Washington be patient with this fledgling Pakistani

government, I see some concerns there.

I just want to know what is the ideal. What does this place look

like in 24 months?

Ms. CURTIS. Just to quickly clarify, when we argue for patience

we argue for being patient with the democratically elected government. We do believe that a stable Pakistan rests on democracy succeeding there. That is the point that we are making.

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A wholly separate issue is the issue of whether or not there are

links between the military or the ISI and the Taliban militancy.

There are sort of two separate issues, and we believe by being patient with democracy and the elected civilian leaders we are actually going to help in impacting the overall situation in terms of not

having the public become more radical or seeing increased support

for militancy.

Mr. HIGGINS. In reality who currently controls the federally administered tribal area?

Ms. FAIR. Well, technically the president does, and so there are

debates about how unstructured it really is. Actually, FATA does

have a government structure, it is just not one that we terribly approve of, and it is one that actually worked for the Pakistanis for

many years until you can put the clock ticking variously between

2002 and 2004. Somewhere in that time period the alignment of

the military, the militant, and the mullahs came out of phase and

the structure ceased to work.

But I actually wanted to address the question that you led with,

because I share your skepticism, and I also don’t have a good answer. But I think it is important to think of a couple of important

periods.

In 2001 we did make a number of commitments to the Pakistanis

about what their alignment with us would guarantee. We told them

that we would take their equities in Afghanistan into consideration; yet, if you actually looked at who attended the Bonn conference, it was basically a conference of Pakistan’s defeat. We told

them we wouldn’t let the northern alliance take Kabul, yet they

did. We demonstrated very early on that we were not interested in

nation building. We used Pakistan’s traditional enemy of its proxy,

which was supported by Iran and India, to be the sort of receptacles of our out-sourcing of security.

In point of fact, we were not interested in the Taliban. If you go

through any of the recent records of the last several years, we

didn’t want to lean on Pakistan, on the Taliban, because we

thought it would detract from the fight against al Qaeda. We

thought that the Taliban had been vanquished. We were only very

episodic in our leaning on them to go after the militants operating

in India in Kashmir. I believe Lisa, many of us at this table, were

opposed to this policy of segmenting the militancy, because for

many of them they shared overlapping membership, so you can’t

actually say this militant is not dangerous to us but that one is.

But, in fact, we were complicit in Pakistan’s policy of thinking

that some militants were protected. It wasn’t until 2005, when we

began having the inkling the Taliban were back and that, in fact,

they had sought and received extensive sanctuary in FATA, it

wasn’t really until 2006 and with great intensity 2007 that we

began leaning on the Pakistanis to deal with the Taliban. In the

meantime, Pakistan made a number of conclusions about activities

in Afghanistan.

So we are also complicit. Analysts who have been going to the

region for many years had raised issues about the Frontier Corps

supporting the Taliban, about ISI complicity. But because there

had been so much discord within the U.S. Government, nothing

really happened until this summer.

36

Also I want to go back to the point that Brian made. We have

been shackled by our own ignorance. I am struck at how many

things are actually written about FATA when, in fact, we don’t

have a clue about FATA. Anyone who says they know about FATA

who isn’t actually from FATA in the last 6 months is simply engaging in deception. We have no access there. We rehearse these narratives from 19th century British political agents. The most recent

scholarship, which is recycled, dates back to the 1970’s. So we are

actually forging policy about an area about which we know nothing,

and we are not really taking responsibility for our own complicity

in allowing Pakistan to target our troops while accepting $11 billion from the U.S. taxpayer.

Mr. MARKEY. Could I just make one very quick note on that?

Mr. HIGGINS. Sure.

Mr. MARKEY. On this issue of the game changer question, just as

a basic point I would suggest that we are engaged in the competition to identify allies in Pakistan that we can work with, so it is

not so much a matter of waiting to see which way Pakistan falls;

it is a matter of cultivating ties within Pakistan, both at the local

level and I think at the national level. That is why some of this

assistance programming is actually vital, even if it is frustrating

and expensive from our side, because it helps us try to win that

and make the answer the one that we want to hear rather than

the one that we fear.

Both of them are, in fact, I think, true, and you said hypocritical.

We are seeing a lot of that. You are right. It is because it is a society I think that is rended by these divisions within it, within its

own institutions, and that is why we see these contradictions.

Mr. KATULIS. If I could add, I share your skepticism at your initial question, not only about Pakistan but about many other countries around the world. Egypt, even the leadership of Iraq, where

we are spending far much more money, Saudi Arabia—we don’t deliver development assistance there, but there are a lot of countries

that play seemingly a double game.

Going back to the central point I was trying to make in one of

my responses, we need to have better intelligence about who we

are dealing with, and one of the ways to do that is to not only put

more boots on the ground—I don’t think the military is a strong

solution to the challenges in Pakistan—but having more knowledgeable experts in our Government in our intelligence agencies

knowing who we are dealing with in Pakistan. We need to project

power in that sphere a lot more than we have over the last couple

of decades.

Mr. TIERNEY. By way of editorial comment on that, our intelligence apparatus and personnel are a long way from being of a

type that would allow us to infiltrate human assets into that area.

If you look at what our people look like, what they sound like, languages they use, or whatever, there is a substantial need to buttress all those things, and it is not going as well as it should be

at this point in time.

Ms. McCollum.

Ms. MCCOLLUM. I have to thank you again for holding this hearing, because our relationship is critically important. I debated between asking about the unmanned drone missions and what is

37

going on there and the question that I am going to pose to you

today. Both of them have to do with our military mission over

there, because I have serious concerns about our relations are very

threatened and that they are, in fact, eroding.

Today the Financial Times reported that the Pentagon is developing an alternative supply line for U.S. shipments to Afghanistan

after Pakistan blocked an important supply route to protest U.S.

military action inside their territory. There goes my question, what

I was going to first ask about, the drones.

According to the Financial Times, 80 percent of the cargo and 40

percent of the fuel used by U.S. military in Afghanistan travels

along the Pakistani supply routes. General James Cartwright, Vice

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, told the Senate Armed Services Committee, ‘‘It would be challenging to sustain our presence without

Pakistani logistic support.’’

Our supply lines for Afghanistan are also threatened by a recent

breakdown in our relationship with Russia. Russia is warning that

it might prevent NATO aircraft from using its air space because of

the West’s criticism of Russia’s role in the Georgian conflict.

From a logistics standpoint, is it realistic to maintain our increased U.S. operations in Afghanistan without access to Pakistan’s

supplies or Russia’s air space?

And then I would ask what other options do we have to move

fuel, food, and materials to Afghanistan? When I compare the current list of U.S. allies and the list of Afghan’s neighbors, I don’t see

much overlap. For those of you who don’t have a map handy, Afghanistan borders Pakistan, Iran, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan,

Tajikistan, and China.

Ms. Fair, I kind of tried to look through in the report if there was

anything I saw on this. I did not. You alluded to it just very briefly

in your testimony. If you would, please lend us any insights you

have.

Ms. FAIR. You have identified it. Now, the fact is the Russia situation has only become problematic this summer, but we have had

7 years, and increasingly throughout the course we have known

about this problem of the Janus-faced nature of Pakistan support.

I mean, I have been a very vocal opponent of single sourcing logistics now for some time. But we actually do have options.

The Central Asian Republics do have rail. We do have a memorandum of agreement with the Russians that would provide nonlethal support, i.e., basically petroleum products. I believe that

memorandum was signed in April. There was no subsequent followthrough. Unfortunately, Russia doesn’t share a border.

There is another option, which I hesitate to throw out, but in the

absence of other alternatives, as you noted, I know the Indian-Iranian relationship has attracted a lot of flak, but the fact of the matter is the Indians are building and expanding the deep water port

at Chabahar. They are also working to expand the rail link that

links Chabahar to Delaram and Zarange, and they are also building the ring road in Afghanistan.

There is some merit in thinking about Indian direct sales to

NATO where Iran is merely the transport. We don’t object to India

shipping other relief goods through Iran to Afghanistan.

38

I think that there is absolute merit to begin very vocally hunting

for alternatives, because it signals to the Pakistanis that it is not

just inducement, it is not just a free lunch. For too long Pakistan—

and every time I get onto CENTCOMM I swear I get a new gray

hair, because I hear repeatedly we do need the Pakistanis more

than they need us, and I object to this rigorously. Chinese military

assets? Good luck with that. We may need the Pakistanis for

logistical supply, for support, the global war on terrorism. Pakistan

needs us to be a successful, modern, stable state, and we have to

keep this symbiosis intact.

I think that the value of talking to Russia, of talking to the Indians, to even begin creating the activity of lessening our dependence

on Pakistan could be an important step in shaping their view of

our intent to find alternative options and their intent to undermine

our intentions in Afghanistan.

Mr. TIERNEY. Mr. Van Hollen.

Mr. VAN HOLLEN. Thank you. I thank you, Mr. Chairman, for

holding these hearings and thank you to all of you for your work

in this area.

I have two questions. One relates to the control of the new democratically elected government over control of the military in Pakistan. I think we all welcomed the transition to democracy. In fact,

I think most of us on this subcommittee thought that the administration put too many eggs in the Musharraf basket for too long.

But, given the current situation, you know, we talk about whether

the ISI is a free agent or operating independently. The question I

have is how much control does the current new president of Pakistan have over the military, and, if there is no control there, how

do we get at that relationship in dealing with the Pakistanis, both

through the military side and the governmental side?

And then, given the sort of inevitable tension that is going to

exist that you all talked about when you were asked the question

about how do you choose between, on the one hand, the long term

and the short term, it seems to me that one thing that we have

to do is signal to the Pakistanis that we are not just interested in

them whenever Afghanistan comes into play, whether it was with

the Soviet invasion or whether it is with 9/11, but that we have

long-term interests in engaging there.

You have emphasized a lot the economic component. If you could

just state what you think the urgency is with respect to moving forward on the ROZ—the reconstruction opportunity zone—legislation

which many of us have been pushing for. It has been in the works

for a long time. A lot of us have argued that we need to look at

this more in the national security frame than squabble over some

of the trade issues that come into play in much larger trade agreements. And, second, the Biden-Luger legislation. Just talk about

how important that is politically within Pakistan for us to be sending that signal that we are engaged in the long term.

Ms. CURTIS. Well, to answer your first question, I think the blunt

answer is the civilian leadership doesn’t have control over the military. This is a transition that we are seeing, and I think that we

have to accept that. That is why I think in our report we have argued for supporting democracy, supporting the civilian leadership,

39

but realizing that it is from the military that we need to see the

commitment to reigning in militancy and terrorism in the FATA.

The ROZ legislation I think is enormously important, and I think

it is more important now than ever because of the actions that we

have felt compelled to take, the unilateral military actions, which

unfortunately have resulted in civilian casualties, which has outraged the Pakistani public. We need to show that we are interested

in the people of the region, in the social uplift of the region as part

of a holistic strategy to uprooting terrorism in the region.

I know this ROZ initiative was announced in March 2006, I

think by President Bush, so it has been out there for a very long

time, and I think it is extremely important that we move forward.

I understand there are some political issues there, but in terms

of our own national security this is absolutely the kind of initiative

that we should be pushing right now, and even if we have the tensions with the Pakistan military, this is the kind of legislation that

reaches out to the people, creates jobs, economic opportunity, and

pretty much the same for the Biden-Luger legislation focused on

economic assistance showing the Pakistani people we have a longterm interest in the country.

Ms. FAIR. I have a couple of comments about this civil military

issue. You know, the United States loves to pick our guy, or sometimes our gal in the case of Benazir Bhutto, but there are some

really significant structural impediments to true civilian control of

the military.

In June there was a lot of hullabaloo and excitement that the

Pakistan army submitted—gasp—a four-page budget to the Senate,

and that for the first time in the Senate’s history it actually debated the budget.

What was, unfortunately, lost in all the enthusiasm for this great

moment of civilian triumph over military budget request was that,

under the Pakistan Constitution, neither the Senate nor the National Assembly is authorized to alter the Army’s budget request.

So this is just one example.

I think Kayani, the chief Army staff, is very clever. He knows

that we want to see a greater civilian face in the military, and it

is these sort of dramatic events that we shouldn’t be fooled by.

That being said, when I have had the opportunity to talk to Pakistani legislators, they are actually flummoxed. They don’t actually

know how to exert control of the military. They will say, for example, well, we don’t really have the right because this all involves

national security issues. You have to remember the average educational level of the average Pakistani legislator.

I actually think that one area of focus, we always talk about an

IMET for the military. What we need is an IMET for the bureaucrats and the civilian political workers. They need to be competent.

Whenever I tell them the U.S. Senate, the U.S. House of Representatives has committees where there are special people who

can hear about complex things that involve issues of national security, many Pakistani legislators are absolutely floored by this. It

really strikes me that we have a tremendous opportunity to try to

impart this kind of competence.

This opportunity—I really want to emphasize it—the Pakistan

Army is down and it is out. Probably never since the 1971 war has

40

this Army been so emasculated. It is loathed. It is despised. Even

in the IRI opinion polls, you see the opinion tacking upward, but

it is still an Army that doesn’t feel comfortable amongst the people.

So there is this window of opportunity to really help the civilians

put into place legislative structures that will, over time. But if we

don’t take advantage of this opportunity, I fear that, as the civilians continue muddling along, the cyclical contempt for the civilians will set in, the Army won’t look so bad, and Kiyani’s term will

end in about 2 years, even if he is the democrat, which I doubt he

is.

Mr. TIERNEY. Thank you. Mr. Katulis, did you want to make a

brief remark?

Mr. KATULIS. Very briefly. I think to do the sorts of things that

Dr. Fair talks about, which I think are extremely important, goes

back to one of the points I made in my opening remarks. We need

to reform how we do business. I am deeply concerned about how

our military-to-military relationship is often stovepiped and away

from all of the other structures of potentially developing the bureaucrats or the civilian capacity. I think in a certain sense we

don’t often present an integrated face out there. I think there may

be an opportunity, given all of the good ideas in these reports, to

restructure how we do business in Pakistan as perhaps the most

urgent case that we face in doing that.

Mr. TIERNEY. Thank you.

Mr. Shays.

Mr. SHAYS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I thank my colleagues for

participating in this hearing.

I had the opportunity to be in Pakistan and Afghanistan in August, and while I have been to Iraq many, many times, this was

my first visit. I was struck by the fact that Pakistan seems to be

obsessed with India and ignores the fact that it is being eaten up

from inside in its northern territory and the FATA region. I am

just interested, is there any possibility that we can get them to

work better with India, not use so many resources to defend themselves against India, and get them to wake up to the fact that

while they worry about India they may be eaten up from within?

Mr. MARKEY. This I think is exactly what we need to do in terms

of a transformation of not only the public, although that is important, but particularly within the military. In order to transform

pieces at least of the military—if not most of it—so that it understands its mission differently and is capable of doing counter-insurgency, they first need to have this change of mindset of the sort

you are describing.

Now, on the plus side, despite the fact that you heard a lot of

obsession about India, the relationship with India is actually better

now than it has been at many other points in their history. There

is something to buildupon and there is reason to believe that on

the civilian side, in terms of their leadership, they are eager to do

that. At least the Pakistan People’s Party leadership recognizes

that they would like to have a better working relationship with

India, that there is money to be made, that there is a relationship

to be improved there.

This has not filtered down through the ranks of the Pakistani

Army, which is indoctrinated with a kind of mentality that you

41

have suggested, and that is one of those kinds of challenges that

requires a real shift in doctrine, a shift in training, a shift in organization. I suggested at points that the only way to do that is to

provide them incentives.

If you look at the way that other militaries have transformed

themselves in various instances, including our own, it is a longterm process that requires a different pathway to success within

the Army, but all of this requires a top-down decision to begin

with, and that is why that relationship with Kiyani, for instance,

is an important one.

Mr. SHAYS. Dr. Fair.

Ms. FAIR. A couple of thoughts on that. I generally agree with

Dan, but, too, insurgents, the infiltration has increased this summer, so there is evidence that the old gain of insurgency in Kashmir is back on. This is actually a situation where India should also

be very much put to test. Though Musharraf had many detriments,

one of the things that you could certainly say about him was that

he was willing to abandon Pakistan’s traditional unworkable position on Kashmir. He was actually very out of the box.

The Indians were actually the ones that were not willing to move

on any of Musharraf’s suggestions. It is actually very unfortunate

that, of all of the things that could have been obtained from the

Indo-U.S. nuclear deal, a commitment from India to work more

proactively to resolve the Kashmir issue really wasn’t one of them.

So India really should be a point of discussion, because it is India

that really has been the one that has been sticking that up.

Second, many of Pakistan’s apprehensions in Afghanistan draw

from its apprehensions of India, so when the Pakistanis talk about

the Indian presence in Afghanistan, I actually take those concerns

very seriously.

The Indians, the activities they are engaging in in Afghanistan

are very disruptive from Pakistan’s point of view. Similarly, the relationship that Pakistan has with Afghanistan on the border that

remains unsettled is another opportunity that we should be

leveraging to try to find some way of ameliorating this. In other

words, if you look at Pakistan on a map, the majority of its borders

are undefined, and that is a serious shaper of the way in which

Pakistan behaves in its region.

Mr. TIERNEY. Let me ask if our witnesses are willing and able

to come back in about a half hour after we finish this round of voting. There are some more questions Mr. Shays would like to ask.

I have a couple that I might. Would that be a serious imposition

to any of you or something you can do?

[No response.]

Mr. TIERNEY. Fine. So we will recess until after the last vote,

which should be approximately 20 minutes to a half hour. Thank

you for your indulgence.

[Recess.]

Mr. TIERNEY. I know it is a little presumptuous of us to rush everybody to their seat after having a half hour more delay, but we

do want to give you an opportunity to respond to some other questions, us given a chance to ask them, and then everybody a chance

to call it a day.

42

Mr. Shays, we interrupted you for the vote, so why don’t we go

back and see if you have some other questions.

Mr. SHAYS. Thank you.

I wrestle with what we failed to do in Iraq, which I think now

we are doing much better, but when I went to Afghanistan I saw

the same mistakes that we made early on in Iraq we are making

in Afghanistan.

I would like you to describe to me, I have a sense, without the

knowledge to really back it up, but the sense that the FATA region

is almost like what Afghanistan was under the Taliban; in other

words, that it really is a pretty lawless area and that the Taliban,

whether they are Afghan Taliban or Pakistani Taliban, are able to

operate fairly freely. I want to know if they have that same freedom in the Northwest Frontier or the northern areas. I would love

you to just talk to me about this part of Pakistan.

Mr. MARKEY. I do think that it is similar, in a certain sense, to

Afghanistan before 9/11 in the sense that you obviously have

groups that are very dangerous that are operating there. There are

very important distinctions, though, that I would make between

the FATA and the NWFP, Balochistan. Parts of Pakistan that are

outside the FATA are technically supposed to come under the governance of the normal state within provincial authority.

Mr. SHAYS. Right.

Mr. MARKEY. That doesn’t mean that there is always a lot of control, but there is a very different institutional arrangement.

Within the FATA, you have these seven agencies which are technically supposed to be essentially run, in terms of their internal affairs, by tribal authorities, so that is very different, even from the

Afghanistan before 9/11, where you had warlords operating but you

had a sense that Afghanistan should be a state. There is a difference. In some ways it is even more difficult.

But the last thing I will say is to get back to a point that Christine made, which is that entry into the FATA is so incredibly difficult for journalists, certainly for scholars, for anybody who is not

well armed and well connected, that our level of ignorance about

precisely what level of control is held at any given point is very

high.

Mr. SHAYS. But I have the sense that even the Pakistani government has a level of ignorance about what is going on there.

Mr. MARKEY. I think you are probably right. I think that the nature of the relationship that Pakistan has had in that area has

been through their political agents, which is a holdover from a colonial system, and through their intelligence services and through

the relations between those groups and the local tribesmen.

I think that they have been at a loss at a number of points to

really understand the dynamic. I can only say this, not because I

know the answer, but because I have had different Pakistanis in

positions of power tell me very different things about what they

thought was going on, so different, night and day different, and

criticizing each other for having no clue how the tribal areas work,

that it leads me to wonder whether any of them really have a deeper sense, even those who have been based there for some period of

time. It is a difficult area to get a handle on.

43

Mr. SHAYS. Before going a second round and taking over, could

you just explain to me, is the Northwest Frontier or the northern

areas similar to the FATA in terms of are they much more governable?

Mr. MARKEY. Well, the Northwest Frontier province is under provincial authority.

Mr. SHAYS. Right, but I am just wondering if the Taliban

have——

Mr. MARKEY. Yes, they have. Parts of that, including Swat,

which is the most well-known, have had trouble in terms of governance, in part because of the way that the provincial authority has

tried to implement judicial reform. That has been one of the key

sticking points.

Mr. SHAYS. Do the northern areas represent a problem for Pakistan?

Mr. MARKEY. Not in the same way.

Mr. SHAYS. So those are the two regions?

Mr. MARKEY. And parts of Balochistan, which includes Quetta,

which is where most people suggest there is a strong Afghanistan

Taliban presence.

Mr. SHAYS. What I want to do on the second round is to talk

about the relationship of Afghanistan and Pakistan. I can’t imagine

that you would be experts about Pakistan without having some

real sense of where we are in Afghanistan. Would that be accurate?

Thank you.

Mr. TIERNEY. Thank you.

There is a group that is getting together that I think we will be

a part of pretty soon to talk about the difference in the different

regions, the different ethnic groups throughout Pakistan, which is,

of course, itself a real dilemma, particularly as it bleeds over into

Afghanistan. So there is so much that is complicated and complex.

I didn’t hear anybody really address it except Brian Katulis at

the end of his remarks as one of his remaining two points, about

the need for us to really have a larger contact group to look at this

as a region and to sort of have a lot of people that are involved in

this determine what is the security role of Pakistan in that region

and what is everybody else’s role in securing that, whether it is the

borders or providing some security in other ways. In such a group

I would think you would need not only China and India and the

Stans that border it and Afghanistan, but also Iran. Is there anybody that disagrees with that? If so, why?

Mr. KATULIS. I don’t disagree with that. I would even expand the

group, if possible. I am struck by how important the oil-rich Gulf

Arab countries are to Pakistan and its economy.

We talk a lot about bilateral development assistance. We talked

somewhat about ROZs and all of these important things, foreign direct investment, but people forget that there are, I think, nearly 3

million Pakistanis that live in Gulf Arab countries that send remittances back home that are terribly important for their economy.

It is also important to note that the Saudis and the leadership

in the UAE play, I think, a very important role as interlocutors in

some of the internal political disputes. You see this and you saw

this particularly over the last year. So I think some sort of comprehensive approach, a strategy that Pakistan shouldn’t solely

44

focus on what we are doing. It will need to actually discuss all of

the countries that neighbor Pakistan, including Iran, as difficult

and as complicated as that is with its nuclear program and its impact on dynamics in the Middle East, but even more extensively we

will need to include countries that aren’t contiguous with Pakistan.

Mr. TIERNEY. It is going to require more than just the friends of

Pakistan in terms of financial investment; it is going to include

identifying where—I mean, the money is coming from somewhere

to arm and train all of these militants in Pakistan. I mean, they

are tremendously sophisticated in their tactics and in their equipment, to a certain degree, on that. So getting people that have been

involved in that to be part of the solution as well as cutting off

some of these borders where people from other countries have

flown back and forth and becoming part of the militant organizations.

I didn’t mean to cut you off, Dr. Fair. You wanted to say something?

Ms. FAIR. Yes, if it is OK.

Mr. TIERNEY. It is always OK. Sure.

Ms. FAIR. A couple of questions about remittances. Actually, I

wanted to make this point earlier about our ignorance of FATA. I

am often dismayed by journal articles often recycling the same

stuff about Pashtunwali, the changeless code of the Pashtunes.

Nothing could be farther from the truth. That thing has changed

so much.

A couple of notable things to think about. Aside from the last

three decades of warfare and displacement internally and otherwise has actually been the role of remittances. Lisa Curtis and I

are from the same home town in Indiana, and I actually like to

joke that your average Pashtun family living in the tribal areas is

more globalized than my family in the sense that they have relatives living in the Gulf because there are no opportunities in the

tribal areas. The strategy has been since the 1970’s to export labor.

Not only are they living in the Gulf; they are also living throughout

Karachi, so much so——

Mr. TIERNEY. Could be Irish.

Ms. FAIR. Exactly. That is exactly it. And so we often, I think,

fail to remember that not only have remittances transformed Pakistan’s economy, they have also transformed FATA.

If you look at the way in which the Pakistani Constitution governs FATA, the Frontier Crimes Regulation, there is a relationship

that Pakistan the center has with the agencies. They pay the tribes

basically a welfare payment based upon their demographic distribution, last negotiated about 60 years ago or so. So you have this

power structure set between the Center and FATA that has been

completely undermined by these remittances and other social

cleavages that we are largely ignorant of. So I think the remittance

point is actually very important.

The other thing I would like to talk about a little bit, Iran. I

think it is sometimes assumed that Iran has cozy relations with

Pakistan. Actually, I was fortunate enough to do some field work

in Iran in 2001. Iranians are actually fairly chary of Pakistan.

Though they got much of their nuclear technology from Pakistan,

they actually view Pakistan as a reckless nuclear power. They

45

nearly came to fisticuffs in 1998 when their diplomats were killed

in Afghanistan. They blamed the ISI for that.

So when I look at some of Iran’s equities in the region, obviously

leaving aside the enormous differences, they share a lot of interests

with us in Afghanistan, despite the fact that they are presently

tactically supporting the Taliban. In the big picture, they have

similar objectives vis-a-vis Pakistan and Afghanistan, and obviously they have very similar objectives with the Indians because

they are working with them on a number of issues. It does merit

exploring how we can exploit these tactical and operational, even

strategic, similarities with the Iranians in the context of these huge

differences. I think that the cost may not be as high as the benefit

from that engagement.

Mr. TIERNEY. We had a series of hearings that I recommend to

people that might be interested in that. We brought in some former

administration officials that were dealing with the Iranian matters

right after 9/11. We talked about the level of cooperation and the

opportunities that existed then for reaching some accord on some

of these issues. And it means they are probably not foreclosed forever from trying to reach some accord in the future.

Dr. Fair, in your remarks you talked about your skepticism about

Pakistan being the partner for the United States the way things

are going and said that we have to give it a try, you want it to

work out, but if Pakistan turns out that it is not the right partner

for the United States we will have to explore other options. What

are those other options?

Ms. FAIR. Well, all of this is really a game of chicken. It is a

question about are you comfortable with throwing your steering

wheel out the window. In Afghanistan, like I said, we have made

some serious mis-steps. I don’t think we had enough troops. I am

not sure that we still have enough troops. That said, I am not sure

the Afghans will tolerate more troops. We might be at that point

of diminishing margins of return.

That being said, Pakistan is, I think, the most desired ally for

a number of reasons, but if Pakistan can’t or won’t turn its back

on the Taliban, if it can’t or won’t put its ISI under constraint so

that it is not actively targeting our troops and that of our allies,

there are other options.

The Indians have certainly shown to be a combustible presence

in Afghanistan. It may not be very pleasant, but, as I said, the

Indo-Iranian relationship is there. There is a logistical supply

route. It may be politically and diplomatically costly from where we

are standing today, but if you look at the distance between

Chabahar and the Afghan border, it is actually a lot shorter than

Karachi to Torcom. So we actually do have some options.

As has been said repeatedly—and I hesitate to talk about this in

an open forum, because I don’t want to be taken out of context—

so far we have only talked about inducements. I actually think

that, should Pakistan not cease and desist or find some way of approach with us on these core issues, that it actually becomes a

compellance problem. How do we compel Pakistan to cease doing

what is in its national interest? You could imagine working

through the U.N. Security Council Resolution to redefine Taliban

and what assistance to the Taliban means. This has been a very

46

sensitive political issue. It has been defined, the Taliban as well as

assistance, to basically cater to Pakistani equities. One could get a

lot more nasty there.

The unilateral attacks that we are engaging in right now, obviously I am not a fan of them in general unless it Bin Laden and

you know it is him and you can get him. I think the cost/benefit

analysis needs to be evaluated in each case. But why are you basically poking at the bear but not killing the bear? The Courtisure

is not called the Courtisure because it is in Kandahar. So, you

know, there are, in fact, a range of very unpleasant things that

could be done.

I think the United States should actually be thinking about what

are the unpleasant contingencies. What are Pakistani counter-reactions? We actually haven’t done a very good job of that. The threat

of the port hasn’t really galvanized us to come up with very many

alternatives, but I think we really do have to think about the fact

that the carrots may not do it. Pakistan’s interests in Afghanistan

may be more important than what we want it to do on the global

war on terrorism. And to simply pretend that those divergences

don’t exist, I mean, we really do that at our peril. We need to think

about the serious conflicts of interest and what do we do about it.

Mr. TIERNEY. Thank you for that.

The whole issue of aid, when we travel over there and we speak

with President Karazi and others—it happened to be one of the visits we were on where they just issued a report about aid and saying that the K Street Gang takes 40 percent off the top for arranging the aid, it gets to locally and people take 40 percent off of the

remaining 60 percent for their role in distributing and running the

programs, and by the time it gets through where the rubber meets

the road, not much happening on that. And then we insist on not

necessarily letting the locals do it but coming in and paying contractors and others to do it.

I think that your reports and other comments that we have

heard say how much more preferable it would be to get the smaller

projects perhaps going with local people, with good advice and

counsel where it might be necessary, or even some of the larger

projects with local people working on them, whether it is a road or

a well or anything else. How do we get to that point? How do we

get to that point? We don’t have as many Greg Mortensons as we

would like in the world who I think deserves some credit for all

that he has done in terms of the education aspect of that. But,

while there are other agencies out there, are there enough other

local agencies like that? How do we move in the direction of putting

the aid in the way we want to put it in, be accountable, and get

the results that we want?

Ms. FAIR. I think everyone sort of talks about the fact that we

don’t have a big enough footprint in the U.S. Embassy. USAID is

a booking agency. USAID doesn’t have the density of educational

specialists. They don’t have hydrologists or——

Mr. TIERNEY. Used to, right?

Ms. FAIR. Used to.

Mr. TIERNEY. Used to.

47

Ms. FAIR. And it is not just USAID. It is CETA, all of the major

national aid organizations have a very similar business model. It

is simply not working.

I am somewhat concerned about the Biden-Luger legislation, because if it goes forward as planned I don’t know how you are going

to put all of these resources through a relatively tiny pipe.

I have to say I very much share your skepticism, and I think

without reinventing the agencies—and I think this is a point that

Dan has made. I think we are all in agreement. We need to do aid

differently. The average Pakistani just hasn’t seen what we have

tried to do.

I think we also have to think about benchmarks. I am a very

strong proponent that unless we have a partner for change it is absolutely pointless. Building schools and the number of schools built

is not the relevant measure; it is, rather, are we having a better

educational system, are more children being educated, is literacy

increasing.

So not only do we have to re-tool the way we deliver aid; we have

to re-tool how we engage our partner. What I see a lot of in the

United States and in Afghanistan is what I call supply driven aid.

We do what we want to do, irrespective of whether or not there is

a recipient there who is interested in the program, and then the

objective is: has the money been allocated? This is a very disturbing development. It also corrodes governance. It doesn’t foster it,

because there is no accountability as to where these funds actually

go once it is in the Pakistani treasury.

Now, I am very lucky. I speak Urdu, so I get to go wherever I

want to and talk to folk. I have been going to Pakistan since 1991,

and I have never had anyone say this to me, much less just hanging out in Anarkali Bazaar in Lahore. You Americans throw so

much money at our corrupt government, it is as if you want to encourage corruption. I heard this repeatedly. Never before had I

heard it. I really took it to heart that we have to redo the way we

do business.

Mr. TIERNEY. Doesn’t that present you with a dilemma, though?

On the one hand you want to enforce a democracy and a new government to sort of empower them to run their government, which

means that they are going to want to have the money to allocate

out so people understand that they have responsibility for exercising it, and they are a force to be dealt with. On the other hand,

you are saying that they are so corrupt that their own people are

saying don’t give it to them, they are not going to manage it properly, so give it directly to these other organizations. What does that

then do to the strength or the power of the local government?

Ms. FAIR. I actually am a proponent of the former. I actually,

when you do—I think there is a consensus in the aid community

that off-budget aid actually circumvents governments learning to

be responsible in its distribution of resources.

Let’s just focus upon Pakistan. My concern is that right out of

the door—and you said this in your opening remarks—it became

very transactional and it became focused on CSF. The strategic dialog, such as it is, wasn’t even formed until 2006. It is neither a dialog, nor is it strategic. I would like to give the example of the way

in which Indo-U.S. relations have been transformed. We actually

48

did have a strategic dialog. It had multiple bodies convened. We

multiply discussed our objectives and how we were going to proceed

with those objectives.

What the United States does, it claims to have Pakistani buy-in,

but in fact if you look at some of the areas that we are targeting

they are actually the ones that are least resistant outstanding

change. For example, the Ministry of Education. I am a huge fan

of primary education, but it is not just the number of schools, it

is the curriculum. This is a sovereign issue, so when we say we

want to affect their curriculum, nothing turns Pakistanis off more

than discussion of curriculum change. So this is a really good example of how we have to have a strategic dialog with the Pakistanis that is really strategic, and we actually have to invest in

those areas where, A, we have a partner who has the ability to lead

and the ability to execute. And we have to bring into this government structure non-governmental actors so that the relationship

becomes institutionalized and no longer subjected to the vicissitudes of a particular individual or even a particular government.

I think that is our challenge.

Ms. CURTIS. We do need to buildup capacity in Pakistan. It is not

where Afghanistan——

Mr. TIERNEY. In general, unfortunately.

Ms. CURTIS. But in general. So, yes, how you do that, I think you

have to move very carefully. But, just to reiterate again, we need

a bigger aid mission. We need more embassy staff.

Mr. TIERNEY. What we have been struck with is the fact that

even with the diminished structure of people at the State Department and USAID and all that, they didn’t even keep enough people

on with the credentials to manage and oversee the subcontractors.

So once they made the decision to go out and subcontract, they

didn’t keep enough people in house with the expertise to make sure

the subcontractors were actually doing the work and being held accountable for it, and that is a problem.

Brian, I want to get to you in a second, but my next question is

this: how long is it going to take us to buildup that capacity? I

mean, suppose we had all the money in the world and we said, OK,

here is the blank check for that, it is still going to take a lot of time

to rebuild that capacity. Or are there enough people out there with

the expertise that we can entice to come back in and participate

as Government employees in those areas? Brian.

Mr. KATULIS. First, Mr. Chairman, I have an anecdote based on

my experience out there in terms of USAID employees. I think we

have a lot of committed individuals out there; they are just

stretched thin.

I was struck by how the democracy in governance officer that

USAID had in the run-up to these elections in February, they

didn’t have a permanent democracy in governance officer. They

were rotating people in for 6 weeks at a time during a period where

it was a very tumultuous and historic period in their democratic

transition, very important work to be done, election monitoring, all

of the work that NDI does.

I am of the mind—and this is why I highlighted this in my opening remarks and it is in the book that I wrote and gave to you

there—it is going to take a long time globally to restructure our naVerDate 11-MAY-2000 12:31 Aug 26, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00052 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 U:\DOCS\51517.TXT KATIE PsN: KATIE
49

tional security agencies. Pakistan is an important test case, and if

we can commit resources to it—and I would like to hear what the

other experts on the panel have to say—a new administration could

up the level of resources in a matter of weeks or months and

present a new face out there. That will require a political dexterity

that I think has not been exhibited by some of our agencies, a moving quickly that I think, if you will look at the experience of Iraq—

and Mr. Shays talked about this—I think we have learned from

some of our mistakes in Iraq, but some of these institutional cultures inside the U.S. national security agencies require fundamental reform.

I think if you could look at Pakistan as a test case, a pilot

project, an urgent test case for our national security to present a

new face on national security with General Petraeus coming in on

the Central Command leadership, I think he is fairly attuned to

looking at all of these other components of American power and

how do you update and revive that. I don’t think you will cure it

overnight, but I think with urgent action and a high-level Presidential and congressional engagement on this issue you could actually move pretty quickly. I don’t know if people would disagree with

that.

Mr. TIERNEY. I think we can say, from our testimony here, that

Secretary Gates is obviously leaning in that direction and has appreciation for it, and there was money in the President’s budget for

about 1,000 new positions in State. It is now incumbent on Congress to do something about getting it funded and then decide how

we bring it up to scope even beyond that.

Dr. Markey.

Mr. MARKEY. If I could just layer upon that, I agree that these

very big changes may need to be made in terms of the way that

State and aid do business, but I think that it may be useful, just

given how heavy a lift that is going to be, to really start with the

Pakistan-Afghanistan case first. Invest in building these kinds of

physical institutions and also people that we don’t have in place.

Just one quick anecdote. When I was in Showar the last time I

met with a young American working as a contractor for an international organization that has been essentially contracted by

USAID to do business there, and I asked him very directly, would

you be willing to work for the U.S. Government if there was a flexible hiring authority that would bring you in and allow you to do

very similar work, the kind of work you are doing right now, but

report directly to the U.S. Government, and I got a, well, maybe,

but yes, I think I might consider it very seriously.

So I am not saying he is necessarily the kind of expertise that

you are looking for, but there are some people out there who are

right now essentially being contracted through several layers.

One other example within USAID, I met with somebody who is

very senior who is handling global kinds of issues, and I said, You

know, you are quite expert in this particular area. Why are you

handling all these other issues? And she said, well, professionally

I am encouraged not to stay within one area of expertise. I am very

strongly encouraged to bounce all around the world or to handle a

much wider portfolio. That is the structure within the organization

50

that actually needs to be changed. Develop a core group of really

expert people.

If we intend to be in this particular region for a while, we need

less flexibility and more staying power, and that is how you need

to develop it.

So maybe it doesn’t mean changing the entire institution right

away, but building a core of expertise for a problem that we all

agree is real.

Mr. TIERNEY. Mr. Shays, do you have some more questions?

Mr. SHAYS. Yes, I do.

Mr. TIERNEY. Please.

Mr. SHAYS. Thank you.

I would like to bring Afghanistan into the picture here. Briefly,

where is Afghanistan similar to Pakistan? I am not looking for a

long list. Are there similarities, and where are they quite different.

I mean, from a population of Sunnis, you have 80 percent Sunni

in Afghanistan, 77 percent in Pakistan. But are they very different

countries? And where are there some similarities?

Ms. CURTIS. Pakistan is much more economically developed than

Afghanistan. You really can’t compare the economies. I mean, you

have a functioning economy, you have a stock market, you have developed urban areas. But I guess the similarities are what we are

really interested in. The security issue, which is the FATA, where

you do have Pashtuns. You have Pashtuns in Afghanistan and

Pakistan, and particularly that tribal border area where you have

people who move back and forth and don’t really recognize the border. So in that respect, that area is similar to Afghanistan.

Mr. SHAYS. Has Afghanistan ever really had the industrial age?

Has the FATA region ever had the industrial age?

Ms. CURTIS. Not really. No. That is where it is similar.

Mr. SHAYS. OK. Any other comments?

Ms. FAIR. I think a couple of interesting differences. One is the

whole structure of governance. If anything, Pakistan has had a history of a very overly strong central governance. Local governance

structures have rarely functioned and they don’t really have the capacity or legitimacy that the central government does, for better or

for worse.

In Afghanistan it is kind of interesting, I think. Coming out of

the whole Yugoslavia experience in the post-Taliban Afghanistan,

the United States and its allies were insistent upon making Afghanistan a strong central government. Now, there were periods in

Afghanistan’s time where you could say it perhaps had one, but in

reality the central government for most Afghans doesn’t really

exist, and the real center of power actually is local.

Mr. SHAYS. See, this is really what I am getting into. If Afghanistan wasn’t next to Pakistan, I am not sure I would care about Afghanistan.

Ms. FAIR. I would agree with you.

Mr. SHAYS. And we are making decisions like we have trained

about 443,000 national security force, 65,000 army, 78,000 police.

The rule of thumb basically is we need 20 per 1,000 when you are

trying to control insurgencies. That would mean that you would

need about 620,000 security personnel. We have 143,000 and we

are planning to get 200,000, which is one-third of what we need.

51

So even if we take 2 years to get to the one-third, we are still twothirds short.

When we talk about this being the ‘‘good war’’ in Afghanistan, I

am not sure why we mean it. I could make an argument clearly

that we shouldn’t have gone into Iraq, but once we were there and

disbanding the Army I can make a very strong argument, and I

think I do, of why we couldn’t leave. But at least I saw a strategic

interest, and that was we couldn’t allow terrorist organizations to

control a region where two-thirds of the world’s oil, gas, energy is.

But I don’t see that in Afghanistan, and what I see in Afghanistan is a corrupt government, highly corrupt, open trade that at

least Pakistan has made some effort to control but Afghanistan

hasn’t. So this gets to my question. Do we make things worse in

Pakistan by trying to do what we are doing half-heartedly in Afghanistan, and do we make Pakistan a more dangerous place because of that? Nodding of heads doesn’t get recorded.

Ms. FAIR. I will say yes. I mean, I absolutely agree with that. I

don’t think you were here. I argued earlier in this session that the

way we went into Afghanistan in 2002, obviously breaking all the

commitments that we made to Pakistan about how Kabul would

fall by whom and the security arrangements that we set up basically relying upon the Taliban’s foes, which is by proxy Pakistan’s

foes, really conditioned Pakistan’s beliefs about how Afghanistan

would shape. I continue to believe that this is why we are seeing

this sort of Janus-faced participation. In the end they have to live

with Afghanistan, we don’t, and they are very hesitant to let go of

Haggani. They are very hesitant to let go of Haggani because the

time will come they believe when we leave and they have to deal

with that.

From the Afghan side, we have enough troops to deliver insecurity in the form of civilian casualties. We kill as many civilians as

the Taliban do, which is not exactly an encouraging metric.

Mr. SHAYS. Are you saying in Afghanistan?

Ms. FAIR. In Afghanistan we kill just as many civilians as the

Taliban do, so if you look at the death tolls there, we run neck and

neck with the Taliban every single year. We rely upon——

Mr. SHAYS. I don’t think that is accurate.

Ms. FAIR. It is pretty darn close. Depending on the year and depending on what period you are looking at. Now, there has been

some improvement in recent years, but if you go back to the beginning we do run very close. Part of it is these air strikes. Different

data bases say different things. When I worked with UNAMA, our

UNAMA data suggested that they were similar.

But the problem for your average Afghan is that there are

enough troops to provide insecurity but not enough troops to provide security. If you look at the public opinion polling data, there

are issues with polling in Afghanistan, for sure, but if you look at

the trend what you see is that support for Taliban is certainly inching up, support for the government is declining.

Mr. SHAYS. Let me just jump in. That is kind of my concern. My

concern is that we met with students who said, you know, about

Afghanistan, 70 percent of our population can’t read or write. They

believe that the failure to come to grips with the insurgency is

something that we prefer because that allows us to occupy. They

52

think we want to occupy. I am concerned that if we are not going

to train enough of their own troops, we have to bring in more of

our own, and then we become the occupier.

But I am really trying to bring this to Pakistan, since this is our

topic, and understand whether what we are doing in Afghanistan

is helping Pakistan or hurting it and then what the alternative

would be. I guess I would end with that question. I would like to

ask all of you.

Ms. FAIR. There is a chain reaction. What we do in Afghanistan,

and not just what we do but also how it is depicted in the Pakistani media, the vast majority of which is in Urdu, the vast majority of which we have no assets to monitor in a comprehensive way.

Folks in FATA who are co-ethnic with many people in Afghanistan,

this reflects, they look at what we are doing in Afghanistan. It affects a wider radicalization. We are taking heat from the Taliban.

We put pressure on the Pakistanis to act in FATA, which it can’t,

therefore we do unilateral action, which is then reverberated

throughout the entire Pakistani population as also an invasion of

their sovereignty.

So there is this enormous ripple effect, and people do forget that

Pakistanis, like folks elsewhere in the region, watch TV, listen to

radio, thoroughly globalized media.

Mr. SHAYS. I hear what you are saying. Let me hear from some

other folks so we can wind this up.

Ms. CURTIS. Sir, your comments make me nervous. We cannot afford to have Afghanistan fall back to the Taliban and become a terrorist safe haven again, first off.

I was in Pakistan in the mid-1990’s. I served in the Embassy

there. A month after I arrived, the Taliban was rolling into Afghanistan. The situation is much worse now, so in a sense it is similar

to the Iraq situation. We can’t afford——

Mr. SHAYS. The question is can we afford to have the Afghans

believe we are occupiers? Can we afford to do what historically has

happened in Afghanistan, and that is occupiers unite the Nation

against them. You know, those are the questions I am asking can

we afford.

Ms. CURTIS. No, we can’t, and that is why we need to focus on

the training, the ANA. Before I came here we had General Wardak,

the Minister of Defense from Afghanistan. He laid out a very clear

plan of what he is doing to train out the Afghan forces, acknowledging that ultimately it is the Afghan forces, the Afghan institutions that have to take control of security and stability.

Mr. TIERNEY. Can I interject something here? Chairman’s prerogative on this a little if I can. We spent considerable time in both

countries, Afghanistan and Pakistan, talking to a wide range of

people, from the business community to the media folks to educators, government officials, NGO’s. I think staff with me and others, all we heard is, what are you so focused on the military for?

We definitely need security. Here is a quote—Samina Ahmed who

works in the International Crisis Group said this, but I think it is

representative of what we heard from a lot of people. ‘‘Militaries

are blunt instruments. They are not good at counter-insurgency.

The police would be a far more effective instrument.’’

53

If we really trained out the local security forces, the police in Afghanistan and Pakistan, you can’t ignore the military. But aren’t

we missing the boat if we don’t really ramp up the local police that

are right at the level where people want the most interaction with

them, the ones who know people and could probably persuade them

to address this a little bit better than the military marching in and

thumping them around?

Brian. Dan.

Mr. KATULIS. I agree with that. I am sorry to go back to my

Johnny one note point. Do we have the capacity to do that? I mean,

I think we have increased it——

Mr. TIERNEY. There is international capacity to train up.

Mr. KATULIS. Exactly. And are we marshalling that?

Mr. TIERNEY. No.

Mr. KATULIS. Yes, I think we need to do a better job on that

front. I think that the local police, this is a challenge in Iraq as

you well know, too. But we don’t have a structure inside of the U.S.

Government. We have had friends in other think tanks, like John

Nagl at CNAS, say we need a corps of trainers——

Mr. TIERNEY. But other international organizations——

Mr. KATULIS. They could do that.

Mr. TIERNEY [continuing]. Have good trainers, other countries

have good trainers, and we can certainly find a way to do it if that

is a good part of the answer.

Mr. KATULIS. Yes.

Mr. TIERNEY. Which we are hearing from a number of experts

and a number of people here that it is.

Mr. KATULIS. I agree that it is an important part. Going back to

one of the things I was stressing, when people in Pakistan in the

public opinion polls talk about security, they talk about very localized issues in their own community. I think that is essential to reshift our policy levers and work with others to help develop that

capacity. Tremendous challenges in doing that, and I think the rest

of the panel——

Mr. TIERNEY. Unless there is any extraordinary disagreement to

that?

[No response.]

Mr. TIERNEY. I will try to bring this meeting to an end.

Mr. SHAYS. Let me just make a comment if I could.

Mr. TIERNEY. All right.

Mr. SHAYS. And that is that your comment about there never

being a strong central government makes me believe that our game

plan is hugely flawed, and that ultimately what we are going to do

is de-stabilize both regions. I hope whoever is the next President

really comes to grips with this issue, because one of the Pakistani

leaders—I think it may have been the Governor from the northern

region—was saying to us that what Karzai has to do is he has to

bring all the tribes together and make peace, and it is not going

to be the kind of peace that we want as Americans, but that is the

only way there has ever been peace.

Mr. TIERNEY. Well, thank you, Mr. Shays, and thank all of you

for your testimony and your conversation with us here today. I

think it has been extraordinarily helpful to get into some of these

issues a little deeper and have some thoughtful approaches to it.

54

The people that weren’t here, you can trust that they are not disinterested. There is a lot else going on this week, as you know.

They will read your testimony. They will also look at the video,

which will run on our Web site, the subcommittee Web site. I am

sure others will, as well. And I hope many people do, because I

think it has been very insightful and helpful and I thank all of you

for joining us and helping us today.

We are adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 4:40 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]

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