UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

)

WYE OAK TECHNOLOGY, INC., )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) Civil No. 10-1182 (RCL)

)

REPUBLIC OF IRAQ, )

)

Defendant. )

)

MEMORANDUM OPINION

This is a breach of contract action brought by an American defense contractor, Wye Oak 

Technology, against the Republic of Iraq. Defendant Iraq moves for partial reconsideration of 

an opinion issued by Judge Trenga of the Eastern District of Virginia concerning the adequacy of

service of process. Def.’s Mot. for Reconsideration, ECF No. 64. Iraq also moves to dismiss 

the action on grounds of forum non conveniens, naming Iraq as the proper forum. Def.’s Mot. to 

Dismiss, ECF No. 66. The Court denies both motions.

I. BACKGROUND1

A. Factual Background

In 2004, Wye Oak, an American defense contractor, entered into agreements with the 

Iraqi Ministry of Defense to buy and sell arms. Wye Oak Tech., Inc. v. Republic of Iraq, 2010 

WL 2613323, at *1–2 (E.D. Va. June 29, 2010), aff’d, 666 F.3d 205 (4th Cir. 2011). Wye Oak 

undertook a variety of actions in Iraq and the United States to perform its obligations under the 

 1 The Court summarizes only those facts essential to this opinion. For additional background, see Wye Oak Tech., 

Inc. v. Republic of Iraq, 2010 WL 2613323, at *1–2 (E.D. Va. June 29, 2010), aff’d, 666 F.3d 205 (4th Cir. 2011).
2

contract,

2 and sought payment of roughly $24 million. Id. at *2. In December 2004, while 

traveling by car to Baghdad to collect payment on this contract, two Wye Oak personnel 

including the president of the company, Dale Stoffel, were killed by unidentified gunmen. Id. 

Both parties agree that the murders remain unsolved. Pl.’s Opp’n 4, ECF No. 70; Def.’s Reply 8, 

ECF No. 71. Wye Oak refers to the killings as “assassination[s],” and suggests that they were 

linked to Wye Oak’s work as a defense contractor. Pl.’s Opp’n 4. Iraq notes that the FBI has not 

“linked [Dale Stoffel’s] death to a known terrorist group or to this contract dispute with the Iraqi 

government.” Def.’s Reply 8. The current president of the company is Dale Stoffel’s brother, 

David Stoffel. He claims to have received death threats following his brother’s murder in 2005. 

Decl. of David J. Stoffel ¶¶ 5–8 & Exs. 1–3.

Wye Oak continued to perform under the agreements after the murders but claims that it

never received payment. Wye Oak Tech, 2010 WL 2613323, at *1–2.

B. Procedural Background

Wye Oak filed this action in 2009 in the Eastern District of Virginia. Id. at *1. On 

October 8, 2009, Wye Oak attempted mail service on Iraq pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1608(a)(3) by 

 2 Judge Trenga described Wye Oak’s performance under the agreements as follows:

Between August 16, 2004 and January 2005, Wye Oak performed under the [agreements] in 

connection with the repair and refurbishing of several armored battalions and by identifying and 

arranging for the sale of scrap metal from military equipment. Beginning in mid-August 2004, 

Wye Oak, through offices in the United States and employees and subcontractors in the field in 

Iraq, inventoried depots in Iraq for scrap, evaluated whether the equipment was worth 

refurbishing, estimated scrap tonnage, and identified potential foreign buyers. All potential buyer 

nations were approved by a United States military office.

Wye Oak performed multiple tasks in the United States related to its work in Iraq 

including accounting, running computer programs for tracking military equipment, meeting with 

Department of Defense officials regarding coordination of the refurbishment program in light of 

the reconstruction activities in Iraq, monitoring employees, contacting potential foreign buyers, 

ensuring that all necessary licenses were up to date, creating spreadsheet systems to ensure that 

pricing of scrap equipment and salvageable equipment could be compared, creating and making 

maintenance preparations for an [Iraqi Military Equipment Recovery Project] website, and 

maintaining and monitoring Wye Oak’s United States-based bank accounts.

Wye Oak Tech., 2010 WL 2613323, at *2. 
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causing the clerk of the court to issue a summons to the “Head of the Ministry of Foreign 

Affairs” of Iraq, which was delivered, along with a copy of the complaint, to the Iraqi Embassy 

in Washington, D.C., via FedEx. Id. at *4. As no signed receipt was ever returned from this 

mailing, Wye Oak then commenced service via diplomatic channels pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 

1608(a)(4). This service was made on December 27, 2009. See Return of Service, ECF No. 14. 

Iraq moved to dismiss arguing, inter alia, that Wye Oak “did not satisfy the mandatory 

service requirements set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 1608(a).” Id. at *3. Iraq did not dispute that it was 

actually served via diplomatic channels. Id. at *4. Instead, it argued that Wye Oak never 

properly attempted mail service under § 1608(a)(3) because it sent the package to the Iraqi 

embassy in Washington, D.C., rather than to Iraq, and, since the Foreign Sovereign Immunities 

Act (FSIA) authorizes diplomatic service under 1608(a)(4) only where a party has first properly 

attempted mail service under § 1608(a)(3), the diplomatic service was invalid. Id. at *4–5. 

Judge Trenga rejected this argument and found that “attempted service through the 

Embassy [did] not render service ineffective.” Id. at *5. He reasoned that (1) “Wye Oak was not 

serving the Embassy itself or personnel within the Embassy, but rather attempting to use the 

Embassy as a conduit”; (2) Wye Oak reasonably believed that the insecurity in Iraq rendered 

service of a government official there impossible; and (3) § 1608(a)(3) does not prohibit this 

method of delivery. Id.3

II. IRAQ’S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION IS DENIED

“[A]ny order or other decision, however designated, that adjudicates fewer than all the 

claims or the rights and liabilities of fewer than all the parties . . . may be revised at any time 

before the entry of a judgment . . . .” Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b). “Interlocutory orders are not subject 

 3 Judge Trenga also transferred the case to this district. Id. at *10. It was reassigned by consent to the undersigned 

judge from Judge Roberts on April 15, 2013. ECF No. 72.
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to the law of the case doctrine and may always be reconsidered prior to final judgment” even 

when a case is reassigned to a new judge. Langavine v. Dist. of Columbia, 106 F.3d 1018, 1023 

(D.C. Cir. 1997). Courts in this district grant reconsideration “as justice requires.” See Cobell v. 

Norton, 355 F. Supp. 2d 531, 539 (D.D.C. 2005). 

Iraq’s motion to reconsider will be denied. The Court takes no position regarding Judge 

Trenga’s analysis. Even if Judge Trenga’s analysis was incorrect and Wye Oak’s mail service 

attempt was invalid, no injustice would result here since Iraq has received adequate process 

through diplomatic channels. 

III. IRAQ’S MOTION TO DISMISS BASED ON FORUM NON CONVENIENS IS 

ALSO DENIED

While there is a “substantial presumption” in favor of a plaintiff’s chosen forum, a court 

“may nonetheless dismiss a suit for forum non conveniens if the defendant shows there is an 

alternative forum that is both available and adequate and, upon a weighing of public and private 

interests, the strongly preferred location for the litigation.” MBI Grp., Inc. v. Credit Foncier Du 

Cameroun, 616 F.3d 568, 571 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (emphases added). “A court first determines 

whether there is an adequate alternative forum and, if so, then proceeds to balance both private 

interest factors and public interest factors in favor of the respective forums.” Jackson v. Am. 

Univ. in Cairo, 52 F. App’x 518, 518 (D.C. Cir. 2002).

The Supreme Court has explained that, ordinarily, the requirement of an adequate 

alternative forum “will be satisfied when the defendant is ‘amenable to process’ in the other 

jurisdiction.” Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 255 (1981). However, “where the 

remedy offered by the other forum is clearly unsatisfactory,” for example “where the alternative 

forum does not permit litigation of the subject matter of the dispute,” the other forum may not be 
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an adequate alternative. Id. Also, “[a]n alternative forum is inadequate if the plaintiff will be 

‘treated unfairly’ there.” MBI Grp., 616 F.3d at 571 (quoting Piper Aircraft, 454 U.S. at 255). 

A court will not force plaintiffs to litigate in a forum where they would face a 

particularized and “serious risk to their safety.” Doe v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 393 F. Supp. 2d 20, 

29 (D.D.C. 2005) (rejecting a motion to dismiss for forum non conveniens in a case concerning 

the Indonesia military where plaintiffs showed that they faced “a genuine risk of reprisals” if 

they litigated in Indonesia); see also HSBC USA, Inc. v. Prosegur Paraguay, SA, 2004 WL 

2210283, at *3–4 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 2004) (holding that Paraguay was an inadequate 

alternative forum because the Paraguayan Government was implicated in the alleged wrongdoing 

and individuals investigating the case had been murdered); Cabiri v. Assasie–Gyimah, 921 F. 

Supp. 1189 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (holding that Ghana was an inadequate alternative forum for a 

former Ghanian Trade Counselor suing a Ghanian security official for alleged torture because 

plaintiff would be put in “grave danger” if forced to litigate there); Rasoulzadeh v. Associated 

Press, 574 F. Supp. 854 (S.D.N.Y.1983) (Iran was an inadequate alternative forum for an Iranian 

refugee in part because of risks to his personal safety). However, mere general indications of 

dangerous conditions, such as a State Department travel advisory, might not suffice to 

demonstrate the inadequacy of the forum. See, e.g., Harp v. Airblue Ltd., 879 F. Supp. 2d 1069, 

1075 (C.D. Cal. 2012); Ismail v. Am. Univ. of Beirut, 246 F. Supp. 2d 330, 331 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).

If the alternative forum is adequate, a court should turn to balance the public and private 

interests laid out by the Supreme Court in Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501 (1947). See 

MBI Grp. 616 F.3d at 576. The private interests include “ease of access to sources of proof”; 

“availability of compulsory process for attendance of unwilling” witnesses; “the cost of 

obtaining attendance of willing” witnesses; the “possibility of view of premises” by the court and 
6

jury if needed; and “all other practical problems that make trial of a case easy, expeditious and 

inexpensive.” Gilbert, 330 U.S. at 508; see also MBI Grp. 616 F.3d at 576. “There may also be 

questions as to the enforcibility of a judgment if one is obtained.” Gilbert, 330 U.S. at 508. The 

public interest factors include the “local interest in having localized controversies decided at 

home”; the possibility of holding the trial in a forum “at home with the law that must govern the 

case, rather than having a court in some other forum untangle problems in conflict of laws, and 

in law foreign to itself”; and avoiding the imposition of jury duty on “people of a community 

which has no relation to the litigation” and other “administrative difficulties” that flow from 

foreign litigation congesting local courts. Id.; see also MBI Grp. 616 F.3d at 576. 

A. Iraq is an Inadequate Forum

Wye Oak cites a U.S. Department of State Travel Warning to show that Iraq is unsafe for 

U.S. Citizens generally. Pl.’s Opp’n 3 (citing U.S. Department of State Travel Warning for Iraq, 

Aug. 9, 20124

). Wye Oak also identifies evidence of more particularized risks posed to its 

employees and representatives. It points to the unsolved 2004 murder Dale Stoffel and another 

Wye Oak employee, which occurred while they were traveling to Baghdad on behalf of the 

company to collect on the same contract at issue in this case. Pl.’s Opp’n 4–6. Wye Oak also 

points to death threats current Wye Oak president David Stoffel received following the murder. 

Pl.’s Opp’n 4–6. 

In response, Iraq provides a declaration from an Iraqi lawyer who states that “[t]he Courts 

in Baghdad have been open without disruption from attacks since late 2003”; that he is not aware 

of “any instance in which there has been an attack on any litigants or witnesses”; and that, in the 

court where this case would be filed, “there have been approximately 225–300 hearings a week 

 4 A more recent travel advisory continues to warn U.S. Citizens “against all but essential travel to Iraq given the 

security situation.” See U.S. Department of State Travel Warning for Iraq, Feb. 25, 2013, available at 

http://travel.state.gov/travel/cis_pa_tw/tw/tw_5758.html (last visited Apr. 17, 2013). 
7

during the course of at least the past five years, all without any security incident inside the 

Courts.” See Decl. of Tarik Al Jibori ¶ 6.D, ECF No. 68-2.

Despite this declaration, the Court finds that Wye Oak’s particularized evidence 

regarding the “serious risk to the[] safety” of its employees and representatives in Iraq 

convincing. See Exxon Mobil, 393 F. Supp. 2d at 29. Iraq is not an adequate alternative forum 

for this litigation. 

B. In Any Event, The Public and Private Factors Also Weigh Against Dismissal

Because the Court has determined that Iraq is not an adequate alternative forum, it need 

not proceed to balance the private and public interest factors. See Jackson, 52 F. App’x at 518. 

Nonetheless, it does so here since the Court finds that only one of these factors weighs in Iraq’s 

favor, and is not enough to overcome the “‘substantial presumption’ in favor of a plaintiff's 

chosen forum.” See MBI Grp., 616 F.3d at 571.

1. Private Interests

i. Ease of Access to Sources of Proof; Compulsory Process; Cost of 

Attendance

Iraq states that it intends to call “important trial witnesses who are in Iraq or only subject 

to process in Iraq,” Def.’s Reply 19 (listing witnesses); that “[c]ompelling trial testimony from 

Iraqi witnesses . . . is out of the question in this Court,” Def.’s Mem. 24; that “[t]rying the case . . 

. based on depositions or responses to letters rogatory will be unfair and ineffective at ferreting 

out the truth,” id.; and that “[e]ven assuming all Iraqi fact witnesses stated that they were willing 

to attend and testify, self-evidently, the cost of travel and hotel accommodations would run into 

thousands of dollars for each,” id. at 25. Iraq also states that many documents are in Iraq, 

including official military records which cannot be easily transmitted to the United States. Def.’s 

Reply 20–21. 
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In response, Wye Oak insists that the “vast majority” of witnesses that it intends to call 

are located in the United States or subject to federal courts’ subpoena power. See Pl.’s Opp’n 

13–15 (listing witnesses). It also states that the “records regarding contract formation, contract 

implementation, and payment issues” that it will “principally rely upon in proving its case” are 

already in its possession in the United States. Id. at 15. 

It appears that wherever the litigation occurs, some inconvenience and delay caused will 

be unavoidable. Because neither side has a clear advantage on this argument, these factors do 

not weigh in favor of dismissal.

ii. Possibility of View of the Premises

Iraq speculates that access to “work sites and numerous refurbished vehicles that are in 

Iraq” may be necessary for the case. Def.’s Mem. 25. The Court finds that this claim is too 

speculative to be credited and that this factor does not weigh in favor of dismissal.

iii. Practical Problems

Iraq argues that it may need to implead a party in this case which “cannot be done here 

because personal jurisdiction over [the party] is lacking” but which could be done in Iraqi courts. 

Def.’s Mem. 26, 4; Def.’s Reply 22. The party is the General Investment Group, based in Beirut 

Lebanon. Iraq asserts that the present case really arises out of a “payment dispute between [the 

General Investment Group] and Wye Oak” and thus “[i]mpleading [the Group] is imperative to a 

full and final adjudication of this dispute among all interested parties.” Def.’s Mem. 26. Such 

difficulties are a proper consideration in forum non conveniens motions. See Piper Aircraft, 454 

U.S. at 259. 
9

Wye Oak does not respond to this claim. Therefore, while the Court does not take a 

position as to whether the Group is a necessary party, or is not amenable to process here, it finds 

that this factor weighs somewhat in favor of dismissal.

Iraq also insists that the costs and burdens of translation would be extensive if the case 

proceeded in this Court, as “[c]ountless . . . relevant documents in the possession of Iraq . . . are 

in Arabic,” “[w]itnesses for Iraq are Arabic speakers,” and “the official laws of Iraq also are in 

Arabic.” Def.’s Reply 22. Wye Oak counters by insisting that any translation would be 

“minimal.” Pl.’s Opp’n 17 n.20. 

The Court notes that some amount of translation (in both directions) would also likely be 

necessary if the trial were held in Iraq. Accordingly, this factor does not weigh in favor of 

dismissal.

iv. Enforcement of Judgment

Iraq asserts that if Wye Oak obtains a judgment in the United States against Iraq, it would 

be unable to collect on that judgment by attaching assets belonging to any Iraqi Ministry other 

than the Ministry of Defense, as they are “separate juridical entities.” Def.’s Reply 21. In 

contrast, any judgment issued by an Iraqi court could be enforced “against immediately 

reachable assets in Iraq.” Id.

This is not the first time in this litigation Iraq has asserted this theory—that this suit is 

properly against only the Ministry of Defense, not Iraq as a whole. In its appeal to the Fourth 

Circuit, Iraq argued that the district court actually lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the case

because the plaintiffs had named only Iraq and their only justiciable claim would be against the 

Iraqi Ministry of Defense (“IMOD”), a separate legal entity. See Wye Oak Tech., Inc. v. 

Republic of Iraq, 666 F.3d 205 (4th Cir. 2011). The Fourth Circuit rejected this argument, 
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finding that “it is the FSIA, and not Iraqi law, that provides the framework for determining 

whether Iraq and IMOD are to be treated a[s] separate legal persons” and that, under that statute, 

“a foreign state and its armed forces are not legally separate for jurisdictional purposes.” Id. at 

213–14. 

The issue here involves attachment, not subject matter jurisdiction. Without deciding the 

issue, the Court notes that Iraq has provided no basis for why a different result should be reached

in an attachment proceeding than the one reached by both Judge Trenga and the Fourth Circuit 

regarding subject matter jurisdiction. Finding Iraq’s arguments lacking in this key respect, the 

Court finds that this factor does not weigh in favor of dismissal.

2. Public Interests

i. Local Interest in Resolving Controversy at Home

Iraq asserts that it has a strong national interest in resolving the controversy at home, 

since it concerns a contract for work “to bring security to its people prior to the 2005 election.” 

Def.’s Reply 24. Wye Oak argues that there is a national interest in the work performed under 

the contract, which “continues to be of critical importance to the United States foreign policy.” 

Pl.’s Opp’n 18. The Court finds these interests are evenly matched and that this factor does not 

weigh in favor of dismissal.

ii. Difficulty of Applying Foreign Law

Iraq asserts that the case will require the application of Iraqi law to “numerous and 

complex issues.” Def.’s Reply. 24; see also Def.’s Mem. 29–31 (listing issues). Wye Oak notes 

that foreign law is “routinely applied” in this jurisdiction, and are quite capable of doing so. 

Pl.’s Opp’n 20. The Court agrees with Wye Oak and finds that this factor does not weigh in 

favor of dismissal. 
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iii. Jury Duty

The parties agree that Wye Oak would not be entitled to a jury trial in this Court under 

the FSIA, so this factor does not figure into the forum non conveniens decision. Def.’s Mem. 27; 

Pl.’s Opp’n 18.

iv. Administrative Difficulties

Iraq asserts that “[t]he civil courts of Iraq are no more congested than federal courts in the 

United States.” Def.’s Mem. 27. Moreover, Iraq argues that if the case proceeds here, additional 

delays “can be expected as a result of the slow and inefficient means of taking foreign discovery 

through letters rogatory.” Id. 

Wye Oak counters by arguing that this foreign discovery process would only have to be 

used to recover few, if any, documents in the case. Pl.’s Opp’n 16. 

The Court finds that this factor does not weigh in favor of dismissal.

v. Additional “Policy” Concern

Iraq also alleges that Wye Oak, a Pennsylvania corporation, decided to sue Iraq in the 

Eastern District of Virginia can “only be explained by Wye Oak’s desire to proceed in the 

‘Rocket Docket’”—in other words, the decision had nothing to do with convenience, and 

everything to do with an intention to “‘vex,’ harass,’ or ‘oppress’ the defendant.” Def.’s Mem. 

31 (quoting Gilbert, 330 U.S. at 508.). Wye Oak counters that it sued in that district because the 

Pentagon is located there. Pl.’s Opp’n 12 & n.13. The Court finds that Iraq’s allegations of 

litigation harassment are inadequately supported, and that this factor does not weigh in favor of 

dismissal. 
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3. Analysis

Weighing the public and private interests together, the Court finds that only a single 

factor weighs in favor of dismissal: the potential need to implead a party. However, as Iraq will 

be able to proceed with its defense theory without this party’s presence, the Court finds that this 

factor alone does not outweigh the “substantial presumption” in favor of Wye Oak’s choice of 

forum. MBI Grp., 616 F.3d at 571. Accordingly, the Court will not dismiss the case. 

IV. CONCLUSION

Both of Iraq’s motions are denied. An order shall issue with this opinion.

Signed by Royce C. Lamberth, Chief Judge, on April 23, 2013.