J-S65002-19

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

CHRISTOPHER REED 

Appellant

v.

MARK GARMAN, SUPERINTENDENT 

S.C.I. ROCKVIEW

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 1029 MDA 2019

Appeal from the Order Entered May 1, 2019

In the Court of Common Pleas of Cumberland County 

Civil Division at No(s): 2018-12809

BEFORE: PANELLA, P.J., KUNSELMAN, J., and COLINS, J.

MEMORANDUM BY PANELLA, P.J.: FILED FEBRUARY 10, 2020

Christopher Reed appeals, pro se, from the May 1, 2019 order 

dismissing his petition for writ of habeas corpus as untimely pursuant to the 

Post Conviction Relief Act (PCRA), see 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546. As best 

can be gleaned, Reed, inter alia, purports to challenge the extradition process 

used to bring him before a court in Pennsylvania, claims ineffective assistance 

of counsel, attacks the voluntariness of his guilty plea, contends there has 

been a Brady violation, see Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), and 

contests the sufficiency of the evidence utilized in his case. Because Reed has 

failed to overcome, much less discuss, the PCRA’s time-bar, we are without 

jurisdiction to entertain his appeal. Accordingly, we affirm.

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 Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
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Reed pleaded guilty to second-degree murder and related charges on 

January 9, 2004, and correspondingly received a life sentence. Reed filed no 

direct appeal following sentencing. Some fourteen years later, on December 

10, 2018, Reed filed the present petition for writ of habeas corpus. The trial 

court dismissed Reed’s petition without a hearing as untimely under the PCRA. 

Reed filed this timely appeal.

We note that Reed’s Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement and corresponding 

brief approach incoherency. For example, while his five-page 1925(b) 

statement includes numerous citations in an apparent attempt to illuminate 

the trial court’s purported errors, it is largely unclear what point or points he 

is trying to make. However, to the best of our ability to decipher his claims, 

we observe that the most important element of his appeal is his contention 

that, prior to accepting a plea, he had been illegally extradited to Pennsylvania 

to face criminal charges. Conversely, to the extent Reed attempts to raise any 

issue not addressed here, we conclude such an issue is waived for failure to 

articulately raise it on appeal.1

The purpose of the writ of habeas corpus is used “only to extricate a 

petitioner from illegal confinement or to secure relief from conditions of 

confinement that constitute cruel and unusual punishment.” Commonwealth

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1 A pro se litigant is entitled to no special benefit and must comply with all 

applicable requirements. See Commonwealth v. Lyons, 833 A.2d 245, 251–

52 (Pa. Super. 2003). “When issues are not properly raised and developed in 

briefs, when the briefs are wholly inadequate to present specific issues for 

review[,] a Court will not consider the merits thereof.” Branch Banking and 

Trust v. Gesiorski, 904 A.2d 939, 942-943 (Pa. Super. 2006).
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ex rel. Fortune v. Dragovich, 792 A.2d 1257, 1259 (Pa. Super. 2002)

(emphasis added). Reed seems to suggest that he is being illegally confined, 

although even this supposition is muddled because the gravamen of his brief 

appears to simply challenge pretrial extradition proceedings.

If “a defendant's post-conviction claims are cognizable under the PCRA, 

the common law and statutory remedies now subsumed by the PCRA are not 

separately available to the defendant.” Commonwealth v. Hall, 771 A.2d 

1232, 1235 (Pa. 2001) (citations omitted). The PCRA incorporates the remedy 

of habeas corpus if it offers the petitioner a remedy pursuant to that Act. See 

Commonwealth v. West, 938 A.2d 1034, 1043 (Pa. 2007). Similarly, the 

writ of habeas corpus is not an available remedy if relief could be obtained via 

a post-conviction hearing proceeding. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 6503. Therefore, 

regardless of how the petition is styled, “a defendant cannot escape the PCRA 

time-bar by titling his motion as a writ of habeas corpus.” Commonwealth 

v. Taylor, 65 A.3d 462, 466 (Pa. Super. 2013) (footnote omitted).

A filing pursuant to the PCRA “provides for an action by which ... persons 

serving illegal sentences may obtain collateral relief.” 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9542. 

The PCRA is the sole pathway to obtain collateral relief, which therefore 

subsumes common law and statutory remedies including the right to habeas 

corpus relief. See id.; see also Commonwealth v. Deaner, 779 A.2d 578, 

580 (Pa. Super. 2001) (“It is well settled that any collateral petition raising 

issues with respect to remedies offered under the PCRA will be considered a 

PCRA petition.”).
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Here, the trial court found Reed’s petition to be one seeking relief 

available under the PCRA. See Commonwealth v. Burkett, 5 A.3d 1260, 

1275 (Pa. Super. 2010) (identifying that the PCRA offers a remedy for a valid 

illegal sentencing claim); see also Appellant’s Brief, at 2 (maintaining that his 

proceeding was a nullity and that the trial court was without jurisdiction to 

impose a sentence). Furthermore, as Reed’s main argument invokes the 

legality of his extradition proceeding, “[q]uestions relating to the sufficiency 

or regularly of proceedings prior to indictment may not be raised by a petition 

for a writ of habeas corpus.” Commonwealth ex rel. Whalen v. Banmiller, 

165 A.2d 421, 423 (Pa. Super. 1960).

Reed also suggests that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to sentence 

him, but jurisdictional questions are also squarely within the purview of the 

PCRA. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9543(a)(2)(viii) (“To be eligible for relief ... the 

petitioner must plead and prove ... [t]hat the conviction or sentence resulted 

from ... a proceeding in a tribunal without jurisdiction”). Accordingly, Reed’s 

petition is not germane to habeas relief, and we find that the court properly 

addressed his petition under the PCRA.

“On appeal from the denial of PCRA relief, our standard and scope of 

review is limited to determining whether the PCRA court's findings are 

supported by the record and without legal error.” Commonwealth v. 

Edmiston, 65 A.3d 339, 345 (Pa. 2013) (citation omitted). On questions of 

law, our scope of review is de novo. See id.
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Because the court properly treated Reed’s filing as a PCRA petition, the 

jurisdictional requirements of the PCRA applied, as timeliness of a postconviction petition is jurisdictional. See Commonwealth v. Hernandez, 79 

A.3d 649, 651 (Pa. Super. 2013). Under the PCRA, a petitioner must file any 

PCRA petition within one year of the date that his judgment becomes final. 

See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1). A judgment of sentence becomes final “at the 

conclusion of direct review, including discretionary review in the Supreme 

Court of the United States and the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, or the 

expiration of time for seeking review.” 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(3). Therefore, 

absent an exception, we are without the power to address the merits of the 

underlying issues raised if the PCRA petition was not timely filed. See

Commonwealth v. Albrecht, 994 A.2d 1091, 1093 (Pa. 2010).

Reed’s judgment of sentence became final over a decade ago when he 

did not seek any review following his guilty plea. Consequently, his petition is 

patently untimely. Through a thorough and generous review of his 1925(b) 

statement and brief, Reed has not pleaded nor argued that his petition 

qualifies for any of the recognized exceptions to the PCRA’s time-bar. See 42 

Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1)(i-iii) (outlining the PCRA’s three time-bar exceptions).

As such, the trial court correctly dismissed his petition as untimely, and we 

affirm that order.

Order affirmed.
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Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 02/10/2020