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i 

65–589 2011

[H.A.S.C. No. 112–22] 

HEARING 

ON

NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT 

FOR FISCAL YEAR 2012 

AND

OVERSIGHT OF PREVIOUSLY AUTHORIZED 

PROGRAMS 

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES HEARING 

ON

BUDGET REQUEST FOR NATIONAL 

SECURITY SPACE ACTIVITIES 

HEARING HELD 

MARCH 15, 2011 
(II) 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES 

MICHAEL TURNER, Ohio, Chairman 

TRENT FRANKS, Arizona 

DOUG LAMBORN, Colorado 

MO BROOKS, Alabama 

MAC THORNBERRY, Texas 

MIKE ROGERS, Alabama 

JOHN C. FLEMING, M.D., Louisiana 

SCOTT RIGELL, Virginia 

AUSTIN SCOTT, Georgia 

LORETTA SANCHEZ, California 

JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island 

RICK LARSEN, Washington 

MARTIN HEINRICH, New Mexico 

JOHN R. GARAMENDI, California 

C.A. DUTCH RUPPERSBERGER, Maryland 

BETTY SUTTON, Ohio 

RYAN CRUMPLER, Professional Staff Member 

KARI BINGEN, Professional Staff Member 

LEONOR TOMERO, Professional Staff Member 

ALEJANDRA VILLARREAL, Staff Assistant 
(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF HEARINGS 

2011 

Page 

HEARING: 

Tuesday, March 15, 2011, Fiscal Year 2012 National Defense Authorization 

Budget Request for National Security Space Activities .................................... 1 

APPENDIX: 

Tuesday, March 15, 2011 ........................................................................................ 23 

TUESDAY, MARCH 15, 2011 

FISCAL YEAR 2012 NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION BUDGET 

REQUEST FOR NATIONAL SECURITY SPACE ACTIVITIES 

STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS 

Langevin, Hon. James R., a Representative from Rhode Island, Subcommittee 

on Strategic Forces ............................................................................................... 3 

Turner, Hon. Michael, a Representative from Ohio, Chairman, Subcommittee 

on Strategic Forces ............................................................................................... 1 

WITNESSES 

Conaton, Hon. Erin C., Under Secretary of the Air Force ................................... 4 

Sapp, Betty J., Principal Deputy Director, National Reconnaissance Office ...... 8 

Schulte, Ambassador Gregory L., Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, 

Space Policy .......................................................................................................... 6 

Shelton, Gen. William L., USAF, Commander, Air Force Space Command ....... 6 

APPENDIX 

PREPARED STATEMENTS: 

Conaton, Hon. Erin C. ...................................................................................... 29 

Sanchez, Hon. Loretta, a Representative from California, Ranking Member, Subcommittee on Strategic Forces ....................................................... 27 

Sapp, Betty J. ................................................................................................... 87 

Schulte, Ambassador Gregory L. ..................................................................... 75 

Shelton, Gen. William L. .................................................................................. 49 

DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD: 

[There were no Documents submitted.] 

WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING THE HEARING: 

[There were no Questions submitted during the hearing.] 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING: 

Mr. Bartlett ....................................................................................................... 111 

Mr. Franks ........................................................................................................ 104 

Mr. Lamborn ..................................................................................................... 106 

Mr. Rogers ......................................................................................................... 107 

Mr. Ruppersberger ........................................................................................... 108 

Ms. Sanchez ...................................................................................................... 101 

Mr. Turner ........................................................................................................ 101 

(1) 

FISCAL YEAR 2012 NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION BUDGET REQUEST FOR NATIONAL SECURITY 

SPACE ACTIVITIES 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES, Washington, DC, Tuesday, March 15, 2011. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 3:47 p.m., in room 

2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Michael Turner (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. MICHAEL TURNER, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM OHIO, CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON 

STRATEGIC FORCES 

Mr. TURNER. Good afternoon. I would like to welcome everyone 

to the Strategic Forces Subcommittee’s hearing on the fiscal year 

2012 budget request for national security space activities. Our witnesses this afternoon are the Honorable Erin Conaton, Under Secretary of the Air Force; General William Shelton, the new Commander of Air Force Space Command; Ambassador Greg Schulte, 

Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Space Policy; and Ms. 

Betty Sapp, Principal Deputy Director of the National Reconnaissance Office. 

Thank you all for appearing before this committee. 

I want to give a special welcome, of course, to Erin Conaton. We 

greatly appreciate her prior service with this committee. People say 

with absolute conviction that this is one of the most bipartisan 

committees that is on Capitol Hill, and it is one of the reasons why 

I enjoy serving on it. And, Erin, you certainly contributed greatly 

to that spirit of bipartisanship and, at the same time, contributed 

to what I think is a highly substantive team here. Thank you for 

your work as Under Secretary of the Air Force. With the WrightPatterson Air Force Base, I am particularly pleased, obviously, that 

the Air Force was able to secure your service; and I get to recognize, I understand, today is your one-year anniversary. Congratulations. We greatly appreciate your work there. 

Secretary CONATON. Thank you, sir. 

Mr. TURNER. I must express, however, the committee’s disappointment that we did not receive General Shelton’s testimony 

until just hours ago. While I understand the General’s testimony 

was completed several days ago, it was not cleared by OMB [Office 

of Management and Budget], and it was not received by this committee until 11:00 a.m. today. 

We take these hearings seriously, and I want to have a substantive discussion on the material presented in testimony. There-
2 

fore, our committee requires witnesses’ testimony 48 hours in advance of a hearing so that members may have sufficient time to review it and can use it to inform their oversight questions, and so 

that the members of our staff can have an ability to digest the context of the testimony that is being provided. 

It is the Air Force’s responsibility to get this testimony to the 

committee timely, even though we are aware of the issues in working with OMB. We certainly hope that that occurs in the future. 

Let me first start by congratulating the Department on an impressive 38 out of 38 successful EELV [Evolved Expendable Launch 

Vehicle] launches and commend our dedicated space professionals 

for placing the first GPS [Global Positioning System] IIF satellite, 

the first AEHF [Advanced Extremely High Frequency] satellite, 

and the SBSS [Space Based Space Surveillance] Block 10 spacecraft on orbit this past year. 

I am pleased that major space acquisition programs such as 

AEHF, WGS [Wideband Global SATCOM], MUOS [Mobile User 

Objective System], GPS, and SBIRS [Space Based Infrared System] 

appear to be sufficiently funded in the budget request despite a 

$178 billion efficiency reduction for the Department over the next 

5 years. Finishing these acquisition programs and getting them on 

orbit is vitally important. Equally important are the investments in 

next-generation science and technology and innovation and ingenuity that can lead to new, and sometimes revolutionary, capabilities. 

There has been significant turbulence in space acquisition over 

the past decade. This has resulted in significant cost growth and 

schedule delays, leading to greater fragility in our space architectures and greater instability in the industrial base. Therefore, I 

was pleased to see that the Air Force proposed its space acquisition 

efficiency initiative, or EASE [Evolutionary Acquisition for Space 

Efficiency], in this year’s budget request. However, the Department 

is requesting legislative authority this year to implement EASE 

that is different than in past years. It is important for our committee to understand why this legislation is needed. We also need 

to understand the longer-term strategy for EASE, because this is 

a different approach to space acquisition, and we want to have confidence that this isn’t just a one-year activity. 

I am concerned about the industrial base for solid- and liquidfuel rockets. Costs for the Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle, 

EELV, have skyrocketed with the termination of NASA’s [National 

Aeronautics and Space Administration] Constellation program, and 

infrastructure costs currently shared by the Department and NASA 

are being passed on to DOD [Department of Defense]. I am also 

concerned that the EELV block buy approach does not fully meet 

the national security launch needs of the Department, despite cost 

increases of $3.5 billion in the outyear budget request. 

I would also like to highlight a few other concerns that I hope 

our witnesses can address today. 

First, the National Security Space Strategy recognized that space 

is becoming increasingly, ‘‘congested, contested, and competitive.’’ 

Orbital debris, such as that created in the 2007 Chinese antisatellite test and the 2009 Iridium-Russian Cosmos satellite collision, increasingly threaten our space assets. However, our current 
3 

Space Situational Awareness, SSA, toolset rests largely on 1980s 

computer and network technology. The Air Force plans to replace 

this with the Joint Space Operations Center Mission System, but 

this information system program has experienced several challenges and setbacks. This is an important capability. I would appreciate our witnesses’ thoughts on how we can get this set for success. 

Second, I would like to further understand the Department’s concerns about a new commercial communications capability that 

could potentially interfere with the GPS, as highlighted in a recent 

letter from the Deputy Secretary of Defense to the FCC [Federal 

Communications Commission]. Such interference could have severe 

consequences not only for the military but also first responders, the 

FAA [Federal Aviation Administration], and other civil and commercial users who are highly dependent on GPS. Third, the Department’s $100 billion efficiencies initiative and $78 billion deficit reduction initiative appear to take significant 

tolls on our space workforce. These cuts appear to be in areas that 

were scheduled for growth to accommodate rapid mission growth. 

What is the magnitude of this issue and how is the Department approaching it? 

Fourth, the discussion in the National Security Space Strategy 

on ‘‘norms’’ has led to questions about whether the United States 

intends to sign up to the European Union’s Code of Conduct for 

space. Some believe the Code could be a first step towards space 

arms control and limit U.S. freedom of action in space. What are 

the impacts of such an agreement? I would hope that the Department would carefully consult this committee before taking any further steps that could limit our future operations in space. 

Lastly, a year ago, I expressed my concern that the National Air 

and Space Intelligence Center, NASIC, was being restricted from 

doing original analysis in certain counterspace areas despite their 

long history of technical expertise. Some of this has been resolved, 

but I am still uneasy with the current allocation of space intelligence analytical responsibilities. Like our committee, I understand that many of your organizations are routinely briefed by 

NASIC. Limiting their ability to continue to provide such important support cannot be in our best interest, especially with the Department’s increased emphasis on space situational awareness and 

space protection. 

I want to thank you all for being with us today. You each possess 

a tremendous amount of expertise and insight on our Nation’s 

space policy and capabilities, and our Nation is better off as a result of your service. I look forward to your testimony. 

With that, I would like to turn to Mr. Langevin, who will be our 

ranking member, for an opening statement. 

STATEMENT OF HON. JAMES R. LANGEVIN, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM RHODE ISLAND, SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC 

FORCES 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Welcome to our witnesses. 

Before I begin, I just wanted to welcome Secretary Conaton back 

to the committee. It is wonderful to have you back here once again; 
4 

and, like the chairman, I would like to congratulate you on your 

one-year anniversary of being sworn in as Under Secretary to the 

Air Force. 

With that, Ranking Member Sanchez, who is out sick today, has 

a statement that I would like to submit on her behalf for the 

record. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Sanchez can be found in the Appendix on page 27.] 

Mr. LANGEVIN. With that, I look forward to the witnesses’ testimony. 

I would just say I would like to associate myself with many of 

the comments and statements that the chairman made, and I will 

get into some of those questions during my time for questioning. 

With that, Mr. Chairman, I yield back and look forward to our 

witnesses’ testimony. 

Mr. TURNER. Thank you, Mr. Langevin. 

Under Secretary Conaton. 

STATEMENT OF HON. ERIN C. CONATON, UNDER SECRETARY 

OF THE AIR FORCE 

Secretary CONATON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Mr. Langevin, 

Mr. Lamborn, Mr. Thornberry. It’s wonderful to be back and wonderful to be part of this subcommittee and this committee again. 

I want to thank you for everything that you do for our 690,000 

active Guard, Reserve, and civilian airmen. This committee in particular does so much in overseeing some of our most critical national security programs, whether it be nuclear weapons, missile 

defense, or the subject of today’s hearing, space programs. 

Being back in this room brings back many memories and all of 

them good. So I am thrilled to be back and, particularly, to be here 

with my great colleagues in national security space. If you don’t 

know already, you will find out in the course of the hearing just 

how much tremendous expertise is up here, and I am thrilled you 

will have the opportunity to engage in a dialogue with these wonderful colleagues. 

I want to just very briefly highlight some of the changes we have 

seen over the past year when it comes to Air Force space programs, 

particularly in the areas of governance, acquisition reform, and investment. The changes we have made in those areas are consistent 

with and designed to support the tenets of the National Space Policy and the National Security Space Strategy. 

As Ambassador Schulte will discuss at more length, these two 

documents emphasize the need for us to strengthen our capabilities, as the chairman said, in an increasingly congested, contested, 

and competitive space environment. Both call for increased information sharing and cooperation through interagency collaboration 

and international partnerships, and both emphasize energizing our 

space industrial base. They recognize space as a vital national interest that must be defended, and stress that our space assets and 

infrastructure must be resilient. 

In support of the policy guidance in the fiscal year 2012 budget 

request, we are focusing on international partnerships and our 

Wideband Global Satellite Communications and Space Fence programs, working with other agencies and our industry partners to 
5 

stabilize the market for space launch and investing in critical upgrades to our secure communications capability and our GPS constellation, to name just a few examples. 

To ensure we can effectively execute these strategies, we know 

we must have a sound management structure. To that end, we 

have made a number of changes in space governance over the past 

year, both within the Air Force and throughout the broader Department of Defense. 

Within the Air Force, I was designated as the focal point for 

space. We created a Space Board to do management of Air Force 

space activities; and our space acquisition efforts were consolidated 

under our Service Acquisition Executive, Mr. Dave Van Buren. 

At the DOD level, Secretary Mike Donley was revalidated as the 

Department of Defense’s Executive Agent for Space. The Department created the Defense Space Council to do collaborative work 

across the Department, and our National Security Space Office was 

dissolved in favor of a new joint Executive Agent support office, 

which will be stood up in the coming months. 

These are significant developments that will help us reshape how 

we acquire and manage space capabilities. In this budget, the Air Force is dedicating $8.8 billion, fully 21 

percent of the Air Force’s total investment accounts, to national security space programs. We take our space responsibilities very seriously, but to be good stewards of the space mission in the increasingly constrained fiscal environment, we have to make our programs more cost-effective. 

As part of Secretary Gates’ efficiencies initiative, we found savings throughout the Air Force and plan to reinvest these funds into 

readiness and warfighter programs, including our space programs 

such as the Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle program, or 

EELV. 

As another part of our push for more cost-effective programs, the 

Air Force is developing a new acquisition strategy for this EELV 

program, and doing so in great partnership with the National Reconnaissance Office and with NASA. It is based on a strong commitment to sustaining our decade-long perfect record of launches. 

And thank you, Mr. Chairman, for highlighting that. The folks who 

work for General Shelton and for Ms. Sapp do tremendous work to 

ensure that we keep that record perfect, stabilizing a fragile industrial base and lowering the increasing costs of space launch. 

In addition, as the chairman noted in his opening statement, we 

have also proposed a new approach to buying satellites called Evolutionary Acquisition for Space Efficiency, or EASE. EASE is based 

on four key tenets: block buys, fixed-price contracts, stable research 

and development investments, and full funding over multiple years 

through advance appropriations. We are confident this approach 

will result in a better price to the taxpayer and provide greater stability and predictability for our country’s space industrial base. We 

appreciate the dialogue we have already had with your staffs on 

this issue and look forward to working with you further as you get 

closer to your markup. 

In conclusion, the Air Force remains committed to excellence in 

the space enterprise, both as a core function of our service and on 

behalf of the broader national security community. Our fiscal year 
6 

2012 budget reflects this commitment and maintains critical space 

capabilities for our Nation and our warfighters. 

Thank you, as always, for your constant support for the Department of Defense and the Department of the Air Force. I look forward to engaging in your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Secretary Conaton can be found in 

the Appendix on page 29.] 

Mr. TURNER. Thank you. 

General Shelton. 

STATEMENT OF GEN. WILLIAM L. SHELTON, USAF, 

COMMANDER, AIR FORCE SPACE COMMAND 

General SHELTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Representative 

Langevin, and distinguished members of the subcommittee. It is an 

honor to appear before you today as the Commander of Air Force 

Space Command. I am also honored to be with these leaders of the 

national security space enterprise, Under Secretary Conaton, Ambassador Schulte, and Principal Deputy Director Sapp. 

In Air Force Space Command, I am privileged to lead over 46,000 

Active Duty, Guard, and Reserve airmen, government civilians, and 

contractors who deliver space and cyberspace capabilities around 

the world for our Nation. Air Force Space Command space and 

cyberspace capabilities are integral to the joint fight, and our professionals work extremely hard to continually ensure excellence 

and mission success. 

Based on the unique responsibilities of the Command, I have established three priorities: First, Air Force Space Command must 

continue to support the joint fight; second, we must get control of 

the costs of space systems; and, finally, we must operationalize and 

normalize cyberspace for 21st century military operations. 

The fiscal year 2012 budget advances the Command’s progress 

toward these priorities. It modernizes GPS, the world’s gold standard for positioning, navigation, and timing information. It advances 

satellite communications to meet ever-increasing demand. It enhances Overhead Persistent Infrared capability, essential for missile warning and missile defense. It improves our Space Situational 

Awareness, which is foundational to our ability to monitor both our 

spacecraft and the congested and contested space environment in 

which they operate. It addresses acquisition improvements in procuring satellites and launch vehicles. And, finally, it builds upon 

our cyberspace foundation for improved capability. 

I thank the committee for your continued and steadfast support 

of Air Force Space Command and the capabilities we provide for 

this Nation. I look forward to your questions. Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of General Shelton can be found in the 

Appendix on page 49.] 

Mr. TURNER. Ambassador Schulte. 

STATEMENT OF AMBASSADOR GREGORY L. SCHULTE, DEPUTY 

ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, SPACE POLICY 

Ambassador SCHULTE. Chairman Turner, Representative Langevin, subcommittee members, thank you for the opportunity to testify this afternoon. 
7 

Last year at this hearing, Chairman Turner urged the administration to provide, ‘‘a forward-looking posture that will guide nearterm and future investments in space.’’ Last month, Secretary 

Gates and DNI [Director of National Intelligence] Clapper submitted to Congress the first ever National Security Space Strategy 

with exactly that intent. 

This new strategy starts with the dramatic changes in the space 

domain, a domain that remains vital to our national security, but 

as you, Mr. Chairman, noted, is increasingly congested, contested, 

and competitive. In face of these challenges, the strategy seeks to 

protect the strategic advantages we derive from space, while also 

protecting the domain itself and the industrial base that is so important to our capabilities there. 

My prepared statement summarizes the strategy in detail, and 

Secretary Conaton and General Shelton described in their prepared 

statements how the strategy is already being reflected in DOD programs. 

I would like to briefly touch on three important aspects of the 

new strategy: first, promoting the responsible use of space; second, 

partnering with other countries; and, third, deterring attack on our 

space systems. 

Promoting the responsible, peaceful, and safe use of space is one 

of the strategy’s key approaches. A more cooperative, predictable 

environment enhances our national security and discourages destabilizing behavior. The United States is leading by example. We 

have recently begun to provide pre-launch notification of our space 

launches, just as we have notified ballistic missile launches in the 

past. STRATCOM [United States Strategic Command], once a command designed solely to deliver nuclear weapons, is now delivering 

warnings of potential collisions in space. 

The United States is also looking to promote international transparency and confidence-building measures for space. With that in 

mind, we are currently evaluating the European Union’s proposed 

international Code of Conduct for Outer Space Activities. While the 

administration has not made a final determination on the Code, 

our preliminary assessment finds it a positive approach to promoting responsible behavior in the domain, enhancing our national 

security in the process. 

At your request, Mr. Chairman, we remain ready to stay in close 

touch with your committee as work on the Code progresses; and let 

me assure you the Department of Defense, together with the Intelligence Community, will ensure that our national security equities 

are well protected. 

Partnering with other countries is another key approach of the 

new strategy. Partnerships allow us to benefit from growing space 

capabilities of allies in other countries, to make our space capabilities more diverse and resilient, and to improve our ability to operate in coalition. Improved space situational awareness, a 

foundational element of the new strategy, is one of several mission 

areas that can benefit from international cooperation. Secretary 

Gates recently signed statements of principles on SSA sharing with 

his counterparts from Australia, Canada, and France, countries 

whose capabilities and geography can contribute importantly to 

tracking and characterizing the many objects in space. 
8 

Another good example of partnership is the Wideband Global 

SATCOM, WGS, system. Australia has bought into the constellation, and the Air Force is negotiating with other allies to buy in 

as well. This expands the number of satellites, adds coverage and 

resiliency, and shares the cost—a welcome benefit at a time of 

budget constraints. 

The new strategy also reflects a new multi-layered approach to 

deterring attacks on our space systems, an approach that builds on 

aspects of the strategy that I have already described. 

In brief, the first layer of deterrence is the establishment of 

norms of responsible behavior, separating responsible space-faring 

countries from those who choose to act otherwise. 

The second layer of deterrence is the establishment of international coalitions, forcing a potential adversary to contemplate attacking the capabilities of a coalition of countries, not just one. 

The third layer of deterrence is mission assurance, ensuring that 

we can conduct key missions in a degraded environment, thus reducing the incentive to attack our space capabilities. 

The fourth layer of deterrence is a readiness and capability to respond in self defense, and not necessarily in space. 

The goal is simple: to complicate the decisionmaking of a potential adversary in peacetime, crisis, and conflict in order to encourage restraint while protecting key missions should deterrence fail 

us. 

In conclusion, the Department has adopted a new space strategy 

to protect the national security advantages that we derive from a 

domain that is increasingly congested, contested, and competitive. 

We look forward to working with Congress in implementing this 

strategy. Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Ambassador Schulte can be found in 

the Appendix on page 75.] 

Mr. TURNER. Ms. Sapp. 

STATEMENT OF BETTY J. SAPP, PRINCIPAL DEPUTY 

DIRECTOR, NATIONAL RECONNAISSANCE OFFICE 

Ms. SAPP. Chairman Turner, Ranking Member Langevin, thank 

you for letting me be here today. It is a pleasure to appear before 

you with my colleagues and partners from the DOD. 

I want to make a very brief summary of my statement that we 

turned in for the record and just start with the state of the NRO 

[National Reconnaissance Office]. 

From building and launching the most technically capable overhead systems to our successful financial management practices, the 

NRO remains the premiere overhead reconnaissance organization 

in the world. We are nearly through the most aggressive launch 

campaign that we have had in over 25 years, successfully launching five satellites into orbit in the last 7 months. We have one more 

to go next month. 

Our ability to sustain this tempo is due to the diligent efforts of 

our program teams, who successfully acquire and deliver these 

complex systems, and to our NRO launch team, who, with our partners in General Shelton’s organization, have gotten them successfully into space. We are especially proud of this accomplishment because it demonstrates our ability to deliver against our commit-
9 

ments and because of the new overhead reconnaissance system capabilities we are able to provide to the President, senior policymakers, and to our Nation’s warfighters. 

We are also very proud of our data fusion and ground processing 

systems. They are also making a difference to the warfighter. For 

example, several months ago, in the U.S. Central Command area 

of operations, analysts were made aware of an impending ambush 

on coalition troops, but they were unable to pinpoint the location 

of the attack. A newly developed system by the NRO provided the 

analysts precise geolocation of where the attack would come from. 

It was actionable intelligence for our troops. They got—in time— 

both close air support and reinforcements. The net result was that 

they killed 20 insurgents and with no casualties on the coalition 

side. So this is the kind of support and dedication the men and 

women of the NRO strive to provide to our warfighters, and it is 

very important to us. 

Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today. On behalf of General Carlson, 

I thank you for your continued support of the NRO, and I stand 

ready to answer your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Sapp can be found in the Appendix on page 87.] 

Mr. TURNER. Great. Thank you. 

I know that members have a number of questions. So what I am 

going to suggest we do two rounds of 5 minutes each, and maybe 

we will have some overlap of items that members are interested in. 

My first question to the panel goes to the request of EASE, the 

Evolutionary Acquisition for Space Efficiency. If you could please 

give us an idea as to what the expected project cost savings of the 

AEHF block buy that is proposed in the new EASE acquisition 

strategy, what that might be ultimately. If the Air Force had not 

proposed this block buy approach, what would have been the estimated cost for the AEHF procurement, and how would that have 

affected the overall space procurement budget? 

And then, on the legislative side, what is the legislative authority 

that the Air Force is requesting to implement EASE? Why, specifically, is it necessary? And if the Congress were to provide such authority for advance spending, what measures will the Air Force 

take to ensure accountability for and transparency into these 

funds? 

Under Secretary Conaton, if you want to go first. 

Secretary CONATON. Sure. I will take a crack at it. 

So, as I understand, you are looking for the benefits, what the 

downsides would be if we can’t accomplish this goal, and then to 

talk a little bit about the legislative provision. 

So starting with what we think the benefits are, it is twofold: 

benefit to the taxpayer in the form of lower costs, and benefit to 

the industrial base in the form of greater stability. We believe that 

by undertaking a block buy approach—buying two satellites at 

once—that there is an economic benefit to that, not only to the contractor but in the price they are able to offer to the Federal Government and the American taxpayer. 

Now, the work that we have done here started, honestly, with direction that came from this committee and others over the years, 
10 

that you were not happy with the way that we were procuring satellites and that you wanted us to look at a different way of doing 

it. Obviously, we have put together an approach here, and we are 

looking forward to a dialogue with you all about whether this 

meets your intent and where we can go from here. But we have 

gotten direction from the Congress. 

Our CAPE office, Cost Analysis and Program Evaluation, I think 

that is right—Cost Assessment, excuse me—they have been doing 

work for a number of years that shows that when we buy satellites 

one at a time that we are not as effective as if we are buying in 

blocks and reinvesting continuously into research and development. 

So I want to highlight that this concept comes with analysis behind 

it. 

But the real work really happens from here, which is to say that 

it now falls into the acquisition chain to actually turn that analysis 

into real savings for the taxpayer. We are confident that we will 

be able to achieve real savings. But that work, that analytical work 

by the acquisition community, needs to be done on the ‘‘shouldcost’’ for this system; and that is under way under the leadership 

of Dave Van Buren and then, ultimately, in detailed negotiations 

with Lockheed Martin. 

And, Mr. Chairman, I beg a little bit of indulgence. I think you 

can appreciate that we don’t necessarily want to lay out the details 

of our negotiation strategy in a forum like this, but I would like 

to commit to you to keep working with the committee so that you 

have understanding of where we are headed with this. 

In terms of what happens to us if we can’t achieve this approach, 

the challenge that we have had in the past is that—because of the 

significant cost of space systems, where satellites can cost upwards 

of $1 billion, $1.5 billion, when we have to fully fund in a single 

year—what happens is you create a spike in a particular program. 

So in fiscal year 2012 that spike, if we fully fund it, would be in 

AEHF. And the effect of that, particularly in the budget environment that you all know about better than I, is that it forces us to 

push other space and other programs further to the right because 

we can’t afford to do everything the same year, and it forces us 

then to buy other programs less efficiently. 

And what we have found over time is that, for the industrial 

base, when they get breaks in production lines, it drives their costs 

up, it wreaks havoc on their workforce, and it ultimately drives a 

higher price to the taxpayer when we have to buy that next satellite. So, for those reasons, we think that we need to undertake 

a new approach that allows us to avoid those funding spikes and 

that provides greater stability to the industrial base. 

In terms of the legislative proposal we intend to send over, it is 

sitting with OMB right now. But the Air Force’s intent is to put 

forward a request for full funding through advanced appropriations, and we will certainly work with you on the details of that 

proposal. But the idea is to give you greater confidence on what it 

will cost over time by locking in funding over the course of the Future Years Defense Program at the outset. And the benefit for us 

is that it allows us to avoid those spikes and put the funding over 

multiple years. But, again, we would be very happy to work with 

you on that. 
11 

And, General Shelton, I don’t know if there is anything you want 

to add. 

General SHELTON. Just one thing. As the guy that has got to program for this, if you can have stable funding across several years, 

that allows you, in a time where we are basically recapitalizing 

every constellation we have got, it allows you to get the most bang 

for the buck across the board, as opposed to managing these big 

spikes and having to manage where those spikes occur across the 

years. So, exactly as Secretary Conaton said, we are just trying to 

get to a stable funding environment, much more predictable for our 

suppliers as well. 

Mr. TURNER. Thank you. 

Does anyone else wish to comment on the issue? 

General Shelton and Ms. Sapp, part of the EELV block buy approach calls for a shift in cost sharing for launch services, with the 

Air Force then picking up a greater share of the cost. How does the 

75–25 split between Air Force and NRO impact your budgets and 

programs? It is our understanding that it is being reallocated. 

General SHELTON. We have already adjusted to that. It was directed by OMB. There was a direction as well for us to get together 

and, between Air Force and the NRO, come up with a memorandum of agreement of exactly how this is going to occur. Those 

negotiations are in progress right now. I think we will be done with 

this by May. 

Mr. TURNER. Anything you would like to add, Ms. Sapp? 

Ms. SAPP. No, that is exactly right. We are going to put down the 

exact scope we are each covering and just write it down, and we 

will get there next month. 

Secretary CONATON. Mr. Chairman, can I just add one thing on 

that? Which is to put into context the work that the two organizations are doing. And it goes back to where you started, which is 

that record of launch success. I think we are really mindful of ensuring that any adjustments we make in our partnership on EELV 

put that mission assurance as job one, and both these organizations are absolutely committed to that. So we can work through the 

details when we start from a common goal. 

Mr. TURNER. Excellent. 

Mr. Langevin. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Again, welcome to our witnesses. I would like to try and, if I 

could, just go back to parts of the testimony you just touched on 

in terms of access to space. 

Last year, as chairman of the Strategic Forces Subcommittee, I 

was concerned about the increasing challenges of U.S. access to 

space, particularly given our drawdown of our civilian space exploration program and the problems of the solid rocket motor industrial base. As you know, both the Minuteman-III ICBM [intercontinental ballistic missile] and the Trident II D–5 missile carried by 

our Ohio-class submarines are critically reliant on this industrial 

base. This year, the Obama administration has increased its request for space launch by 50 percent, from $1.2 to $1.8 billion. 

My questions are: What is driving these budget increases and 

what options should we be considering to lower costs of access to 

space? What is the Department doing to ensure that our access to 
12 

space and our missile force are not threatened by these rising 

costs? And then, finally, what can be done to stabilize the industrial base? 

Secretary CONATON. I guess I will take a first crack at it and 

then ask General Shelton and Ms. Sapp to jump in. 

These two have a lot more of the historical context than I do. But 

let me give you my understanding, Mr. Langevin, of why we are 

facing increased costs. Some of it goes back to the beginning of the 

EELV program and the market that we assumed that was out 

there for commercial launch. So there were lot buys, there were 

large purchases of items that were made all at once at preferential 

costing. And, over time, we have been drawing those down. That 

has been happening in the procurement of the actual boosters and 

the items that go into that. 

And also, on the Service side, we had basically gained an advantage from previous block buys. And as time has gone on, we have 

burned that down, and we are now seeing the true current cost of 

launch. 

The second piece there is that you have got, as you noted, industrial base issues—second- and third-tier suppliers that have had a 

break in production or have gone out of business—and we are seeing increased costs in that area. Just in the propulsion area alone, 

we are facing costs two to four times what it had been previously. 

So in terms of what we are doing about this, part of it is the block 

buy that General Shelton and Ms. Sapp discussed, where the NRO 

and the Air Force together are committing to eight cores a year to 

provide stability to the industrial base. But it comes back again to 

doing a rigorous ‘‘should-cost’’ review to really look at the drivers 

of costs and to negotiate them down with our industry partner. 

General SHELTON. Mr. Langevin, we just completed a ‘‘shouldcost’’ review. It resulted in over 80 recommendations of things to 

look at to help lower costs, and we are pursuing each one of those 

over 80 items. 

In terms of the solid rocket motor industrial base, in the space 

arena, we have not been a big player in that. And I should clarify 

that for national security space. Most of our rockets are liquids and 

then small strap-on solids, but not the large solids that you talk 

about for Minuteman and Trident class. The Constellation program 

that NASA was running, which has now been canceled, was going 

to be a big user of solid rocket boosters. The shuttle program is certainly a big user of solid rocket boosters. So there is valid concern 

about the industrial base and the industrial capacity to produce 

those boosters for the future, particularly in our strategic platforms. But in the space arena, we are just not a big player in that. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Ms. Sapp, did you have anything to offer? 

Ms. SAPP. No, I would just say we are working hard to partner 

with the Air Force on both the infrastructure costs and on stabilizing the industrial base on the booster side as well with the minimum eight cores per year that we have committed to buy between 

the two of us. That gives the provider what they need to stabilize. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Thank you. 

Let me talk about other entrants to the space area, particularly 

in commercial. We have seen remarkable progress of new entrants 

into the space launch business, such as SpaceX. What is the Air 
13 

Force doing to allow these new entrants the opportunity to compete 

for DOD space launch contracts? 

Secretary CONATON. I guess I will start. 

Mr. Langevin, there is actually a memorandum of understanding 

between the NRO, the Air Force, and NASA that was signed just 

in the last week that, among other things, speaks to launch and 

this commitment to eight cores per year. But part of it talks about 

the need to get a certification process in place for new entrants, 

wherever they may come from. So that work will be completed, we 

hope, by late July. 

I guess what I would say at a macro level is we would very much 

like to see some competition. We think that there are some innovative things out there. But the main thing that will be playing in 

our minds is the commitment to mission assurance and being confident that we can retain this positive track record that is out 

there. But we think that there are some opportunities in the near 

future for other competitors to demonstrate what they can do in 

this area. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Do you have anything to add, General? 

General SHELTON. I am good. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. If I could, just before my time runs out, Operationally Responsive Space [ORS] has been a major priority for the 

Department. You spoke about it in your opening testimony. This 

has happened since 2006. The goal of, obviously, rapidly reconstituting space assets to meet urgent needs without the usual long, 

expensive satellite acquisition process is, I believe, critical to the 

requirements of today’s changing world. So can you elaborate more 

on how we are focusing on the ORS program? Are we doing it appropriately? If not, what else could or should we do to direct resources to this effort? What are some of the lessons learned from 

our ORS program which can be applied to more traditional space 

programs? 

General SHELTON. Congressman, this is a journey that we started not that long ago, stood up in about 2007 time frame. We have 

been at this for just a few years now. We have benefited from the 

TacSat series of satellites, what we have learned from TacSat-2 

and -3. TacSat-4 is going to be ready for launch probably in the 

May time frame. The ORS–1 satellite will be ready in the May time 

frame. So we are making, what I would consider, baby steps along 

the way here in determining what the art of the possible is. 

Can we truly build a plug-and-play satellite? Can we truly build 

a rapidly launchable satellite? Can we have launchers on standby 

that are ready to go and put up a plug-and-play satellite? All those 

questions we are trying to methodically work through. So it is 

going to take some time. 

I would say we have learned lessons along the way thus far, but 

the big lessons will come with, I think, the TacSat-4 and the ORS– 

1 satellites. So we are probably another year or two out before we 

really determine a good way ahead for ORS. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Good. Thank you to our witnesses. 

I yield back. 

Mr. TURNER. Mr. Lamborn. 

Mr. LAMBORN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you all for 

being here. 
14 

And another homecoming of sorts is Major Eric Lingle, sitting 

right behind you, who was my Air Force fellow last year and did 

a wonderful job. So it is good to see him as well. 

And, General Shelton, I am going to have two questions for the 

record—they are too detailed to talk about with everybody here— 

one having to do with an Air Force Satellite Control Network upgrade, as well as another issue. So if you could be looking for two 

questions for the record on those things, I would appreciate it. 

Now, on insourcing—and we had this same conversation with 

General Kehler, your predecessor—of your needing—to the degree 

that insourcing is still either official policy or playing out as previous official policy—and I haven’t even figured out which it is 

yet—you have reductions in your both—well, in civilian personnel 

and contractors to support mission growth. How are you doing in 

terms of meeting your needs with fewer people helping you from 

the outside? 

General SHELTON. Congressman, as we talked in my office, we 

had a target for insourcing in terms of not only a dollar target, but 

in terms of numbers of civilians that we were planning to hire. We 

have, in the fiscal year 2012 budget, reduced that by quite a bit 

because of targets given to us by DOD. 

I should make it clear that we are not letting any civilians go, 

but it is clear that we will not be able to hire as many civilians 

as we had planned to do. 

So, we are going through the analysis right now Air Force-wide— 

not just in Air Force Space Command but Air Force-wide—where 

we are going to put those precious civilians that we are able to 

hire, put them against the appropriate mission areas, probably look 

at some management realignment within the Air Force to accommodate the reductions in the numbers we had thought we were 

going to get. So it is clear that there is a lot of management shuffle 

that we are going to have to do here to accommodate the reduction 

in the growth that we thought we were going to have. 

Mr. LAMBORN. Okay. Now, shifting gears, for any one of you, 

there was a little mention earlier of the proposed space—European 

Union’s Code of Conduct for Space. What are advantages or disadvantages that any of you see with that? 

Ambassador SCHULTE. Well, if I could, Mr. Congressman, we are 

carefully evaluating the EU [European Union] Code of Conduct— 

and when I say ‘‘we,’’ it is the Department of Defense together with 

the State Department—as a possible means to develop transparency and confidence-building measures for space. The President’s space policy says we will consider arms control that meet 

certain criteria, but we will focus on transparency and confidencebuilding measures. And the EU Code is one measure that we are 

looking at very carefully. 

What the EU Code does, in very basic terms, is it requires countries who subscribe to it—it doesn’t even require. It calls upon 

them to refrain from actions that would create debris. And it also 

calls upon them to notify various activities, including ones that 

might create debris. 

Its provisions are all consistent with existing practices of the Department. We consider ourselves to be a responsible space-faring 
15 

country, and we think it is very reflective of the type of practices 

that we take. 

It doesn’t put limits on capabilities. So it doesn’t limit things like 

space-based missile defenses. It is full of references to the inherent 

right of self defense which, for the Department of Defense, is important. And it is a voluntary Code. It is not legally binding. So, 

if necessary, in crisis or worse, it is something that could be put 

to one side. 

What the Code does for you is it starts creating some rules of the 

road for the international community for the increasing number of 

space-faring countries so we can encourage other countries to behave responsibly the way we consider it. So we haven’t made a 

final decision on it yet, Mr. Congressman. We are carefully assessing the operational impact, together with the Intelligence Community. 

I promise you we will make sure our national security equities 

are well protected. But, as Secretary Lynn has said publicly recently, we see it as potentially being a positive step towards promoting the responsible use of space. 

Mr. LAMBORN. Okay, thank you. 

I am going to defer my other questions for the second round, but 

on that I am just concerned—and I think everyone here is, as well 

as everyone sitting on your side of the table—that, as the world 

leader in space, we don’t want to give up more than we gain. 

Please keep us very engaged and please don’t make unilateral decisions that are going to be controversial—or at least questionable— 

without keeping us fully apprised. We would appreciate that. 

Thank you. 

Mr. TURNER. Mr. Thornberry. 

Mr. THORNBERRY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Madam Secretary, you got into this with your answer to the 

chairman’s first question. I think there has been a perception for 

some time that the U.S. could not do anything in space that wasn’t 

over budget, behind schedule, et cetera, et cetera. And we have 

heard lots of excuses over the years, everything from ‘‘the requirements process and the Pentagon leads to cost overruns,’’ to ‘‘the acquisition process is all messed up,’’ to ‘‘space is just hard.’’ 

You described a different approach on this one program, but, 

kind of from a broader level, I would appreciate your view as to our 

ability to implement what we decide to do on-cost, on schedule. Can 

we really do it now? Have we kind of broken the back of this trend 

that everything we tried is late and too expensive? 

Secretary CONATON. Well, Mr. Thornberry, I would certainly not 

tell you that we have cracked the code and that every space program is going to be perfectly on schedule and on-cost going forward, because that wouldn’t be a credible answer. I think, for all 

the reasons you articulated, there are systemic things that make 

this challenging, across the acquisition portfolio for the Department 

of Defense, but sometimes, particularly for space. 

I think the reason that we are trying this with one system this 

time is to put our effort behind this and see if we can achieve this 

and make it work. We have been clear that our intent would be to 

try this approach again next year for the Space Based Infrared 

System, for SBIRS, for the same reasons. But I think we owe you 
16 

a demonstration that we can start moving down this road and show 

better results. I think, for the reasons that we talked about, our 

feeling is that we have a better chance of success with this type 

of approach, but I think we need to demonstrate that to you over 

time. 

General Shelton, I don’t know if—or, Betty, if there is anything 

you want to add. 

General SHELTON. The other thing I would add, sir, is we are focusing on mature technologies. We are not trying to drive the art 

of the possible with our technologies in the future going forward. 

And I would submit that GPS III is the model program. It has met 

every milestone thus far. It has been exactly on schedule, on-cost, 

and we aim to keep it that way. 

Ms. SAPP. If I may, the NRO has used an evolutionary acquisition approach for decades; and when we have gone away from that 

approach, like with FIA [Future Imagery Architecture], we have 

had notable misses. When we have stayed with that approach, like 

we have with our SIGINT [signals intelligence] and our COMM 

[communications] programs and our program in IMINT [imagery 

intelligence] after FIA, we have delivered very well. So we think 

that is a good model for space acquisition programs. It is one that 

we plan to stick with, and certainly we understand why the Air 

Force is moving in that direction. 

Mr. THORNBERRY. Well, particularly in your area, we have little 

margin for error. We have got to perform as planned. And I worry 

in the broader space context about becoming self-deterred because 

of cost and delay overruns that will inhibit us. 

Ambassador Schulte, let me ask you just briefly. I glanced 

through the space study. I heard what you said in your testimony. 

To me, there were hints of what I would maybe describe as ‘‘space 

control.’’ The fact is that any domain value has not only been contested, but has to be defended. And yet, I am still not sure I really 

get the sense from the strategy that our policy is to do whatever 

it takes to defend—I think you said maybe not only the space domain, but the advantages we gain from the space domain. 

Do you feel confident not only that the strategy is there, but then 

the plans and programs to implement that defensive space against 

aggressors that are spending a tremendous amount of effort to 

deny us those advantages, are on track to do that? 

Ambassador SCHULTE. Mr. Congressman, first off, we share your 

concern about countries that are developing a broad range of 

counterspace capabilities. China is foremost amongst those, but 

there are other countries, too. And even as we speak today, or at 

least recently, countries like Iran and Libya were jamming commercial satellites. So there is a broad range of countries developing 

counterspace capabilities, and many of them look at our advantages in space as vulnerabilities. 

Part of our strategy is to reduce those vulnerabilities and protect 

our systems, protect our capabilities, and try to dissuade and deter 

countries from thinking they would benefit from attacking them. 

The strategy, I think, also recommends that space is no longer 

the private reserve of the U.S. and the former Soviet Union. We 

are not up there alone anymore. It is an environment that is very 

challenging. It has changed. There are countries with counterspace 
17 

capabilities. There are a lot more countries in space. There are 

some 60 nations in consortia operating spacecraft. And we need to 

think increasingly about, how do we protect the shared domain? 

And that is part of the reason why, in addition to making sure that 

we protect our systems, we also want to create some norms, some 

rules of the road for space. And, in doing that, we want to be a 

leader. 

I mean, I think increasingly in space—there was a time in space 

where we could kind of lead on our own and, increasingly, I think 

we have to exert that leadership in partnership with others, both 

with our close allies and encouraging other space-faring countries 

to act responsibly. But, in the end, we do have to protect those critical national security functions that we perform through space. 

And the hard part of any strategy isn’t writing it. I have the easy 

part. My colleagues here have the hard part, which is to execute 

that strategy, particularly in a budget-constrained environment, 

and figure out, how do we make our constellations more resilient 

against attack? How do we have, perhaps, cross-domain solutions 

so that if some of our capabilities in space are degraded there are 

other ways to carry out those mission-essential functions and to 

make sure that we sustain those advantages? 

So we share your concern about the changing nature of space, 

and we are going to have to work really hard to implement the 

strategy to protect those advantages, and we will need your support. 

Thank you. 

Mr. TURNER. Going to our second round, the fiscal year 2012 

budget request includes $438 million for space situational awareness systems, a decrease of $165 million from last year. SSA activities include the Joint Space Operation Center, the JSpOC Mission 

System, JMS, which would enable the Air Force to process over 1.5 

million space collisions and plan space operations. 

General Shelton, can you please describe the challenges associated with the JMS acquisition, and how important is this improved 

capability, and what can this subcommittee do to help you? And 

anyone else who would like to comment after you finish would be 

fine. 

General SHELTON. Mr. Chairman, the JMS program is very important as we establish an ability to take data from disparate 

sources, fuse it together, and present what we would call a userdefined operational picture; in other words, what is going on in 

space? Having a good idea of not only what is up there, but what 

the threats are, and be able to understand activity—not just keeping track of what is up there, but activity real-time. So we have 

embarked on a journey to equip the JSpOC with the right equipment, with the right software, with the right processes. 

As we were coming up on Milestone B for JMS, the program underwent what is called an independent program assessment. That 

program assessment found some difficulties in the program which 

resulted in pulling back some Requests for Proposals that were out 

on the street to form kind of the early basis of JMS, and the Department is in the midst of reviewing that independent program 

assessment and determining the way forward for JMS. 
18 

So, at this point in time, I couldn’t tell you what we need for the 

future in JMS. I think the Department is going to take some time 

to study this. 

But I can tell you, on the Space Situational Awareness part of 

this, the reason for the decrease this year was we have deferred 

the Space Based space Surveillance system out probably a year or 

two just to make sure we understood the first satellite’s data usefulness—and it is returning wonderful data—and also to push out 

the second site of the space fence, the unwarned, uncued sensor 

that will tell us what is going on and be able to pick up breakups 

and maneuvers in Low Earth Orbit. 

So the situation in SSA is not maybe as the budget would show 

because we still have a very solid plan on the way forward. 

Secretary CONATON. Mr. Chairman, can I just add one thing to 

agree with everything that General Shelton has said? 

I want to emphasize, you have a budget request in front of you 

which obviously has funds in it for JMS. We are absolutely committed to that capability. The independent assessment that General Shelton mentioned will help us refine the ‘‘how’’ we get to that. 

So I think we owe you more of a conversation before you move to 

markup, but want to reiterate that we support what is in the President’s budget request in terms of resources that should be laid 

against this really critical activity for General Shelton’s command. 

Thank you. 

Mr. TURNER. As my last question, I would like to ask your assessment of intelligence information and original analysis that 

originates from NASIC. Last year, there was a bump in the road 

as NASIC was restricted for a period from doing some original 

analysis in certain counterspace areas. That issue was resolved in 

favor of competitive analysis, with NASIC participating. I wanted 

to ask if anyone on the panel would want to comment with respect 

to the information available from NASIC and its integration, obviously, in overall space intelligence systems. 

Secretary CONATON. I will make just a general statement and 

then maybe ask General Shelton from an operational perspective 

how they use that. 

The effort you described by General Burgess to look at multiple 

capabilities and come down on the side of competitive analysis, we 

have tracked that very closely. The Air Force is enormously proud 

of the work that NASIC does. It supports a number of communities, not only in the Air Force but throughout the Joint Force. So 

I just wanted to start with a general statement of the great work 

that comes out of that organization and turn to General Shelton. 

General SHELTON. This is really easy, Mr. Congressman. They 

are our lifeblood. As a former Commander of 14th Air Force and 

the Joint Functional Component Command for Space, we counted 

on NASIC’s analysis every day, every day. 

Ambassador SCHULTE. Mr. Chairman, I would just say in my 

previous job I worked very closely with the Intelligence Community 

on Iran, as you might imagine, and I moved over to do space. And 

I thought, who is going to provide me my intelligence and assessment on space? And I learned about NASIC, and I have to say I 

have been impressed at the level of intelligence and the level of 
19 

analysis. And in terms of supporting policy and strategy, it has 

been superb. 

Ms. SAPP. I would just add on that we use NASIC extensively 

and wouldn’t know what to do without them. They provide invaluable analysis for us. 

Mr. TURNER. Thank you all for that. 

Mr. Langevin. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

If I could, turning back to space acquisition, could you give us 

more detail on the expected savings from the new approach to 

space acquisition, including increasing block buys and fixed-price 

contracting? How do these changes affect our out-year funding, and 

what new authority will the Air Force need to implement this approach? 

Secretary Conaton. 

Secretary CONATON. Sure. 

Mr. Langevin, I will try to recap a little bit. For the reasons we 

talked about, the block buy approach, we think, is in a position to 

gain the taxpayer a significant amount of savings. What is laid into 

the budget request right now is the analysis done by the CAPE organization inside the Department of Defense that is charged with 

doing independent cost assessments. 

Where we go from here is with our acquisition community doing 

a very detailed ‘‘should-cost’’ review, which is already under way, 

and then negotiating the best possible contract we can with the 

prime contractors. 

And so, as I mentioned to the chairman, we would like to keep 

you informed of our negotiation strategy as we get ready to undertake that work, and then we will continue to update the savings 

that are laid into the budget request as we get greater fidelity as 

we move through that acquisition process. And the legislative authority, again, is the advance appropriations which allows us to, if 

you all agree to it, to lay in that non-spiky profile a more level set 

of investments year-on-year for the AEHF program. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Thank you. 

To all of our witnesses, the National Security Space Strategy 

calls for exploring private partnerships and hosting government capability on commercial aircraft. Could you detail for us what further—I know you touched on this a bit, but could you further detail 

for us what we are doing to better take advantage of hosted payloads to cut costs while preserving mission assurance? 

General SHELTON. There is a very good example, Congressman, 

of an infrared payload that is set to launch, probably this summer, 

on a commercial communications satellite. That infrared payload 

will help us with the next generation of our missile warning satellites in determining whether or not that is the right technology 

we want to use. So that is a baby step along the way. 

We have got lots of history with hosted payloads. They have just 

been hosted inside the government—hosted payloads with the 

NRO, hosted payloads with NASA, them hosting payloads on our 

platforms. So we know how to do this. It is just whether or not this 

will make it on a commercial model, because the placement of the 

satellite is driven by the commercial business, as opposed to where 

we might need it for national security needs. So it is a thing that 
20 

we are exploring. We will see how this works out with this first 

one, and we will continue to explore opportunities. We think there 

is great potential here. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Very good. Anyone else care to—— 

Ms. SAPP. It is difficult in this environment, but we do use lots 

of partnerships everywhere, so we will continue to explore those opportunities as well. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Thank you. That is it for my questions. 

Before I turn back, though, Mr. Chairman, I would just like to 

recognize Rudy Barnes, who was the staff director for the Subcommittee on Strategic Forces. I just saw him in the audience after 

we had started the hearing and wanted to welcome Rudy back to 

the committee as well. 

Secretary CONATON. I stole him, Mr. Langevin. Sorry about that. 

Mr. TURNER. I, too, want to recognize you. Thank you for your 

work. And you shouldn’t sit so much in the back. It did take us a 

little while to figure out that you were sitting back there. 

Mr. Lamborn. 

Mr. LAMBORN. Thank you. 

For any one of you, recent reports indicate that a commercial 

telecommunications company called LightSquared is developing 

terrestrial broadband communications technology that has the potential to interfere with terrestrial reception of GPS signals. Please 

discuss the magnitude of the impact that this might have on the 

Department of Defense. What is being done to mitigate this potential conflict, and how can we avoid conflicts such as this in the future? And is someone having interaction with the FCC? 

General SHELTON. Let me go back, Congressman, in history a little bit. This was originally designed as largely a space-based effort 

with terrestrial augmentation. It has now shifted in the business 

model to be a terrestrial-based network with space augmentation. 

Probably 40,000—their business plan calls for 40,000 towers 

around the country, many of them concentrated in urban areas. 

Our analysis to date—I shouldn’t say ‘‘our’’ analysis. A large commercial manufacturer of GPS receivers’ analysis has said that signal from GPS will be effectively jammed by these towers, both in 

airborne and terrestrial applications, so much so that there has 

been an industry association that has come up on the net to express concern. The Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense and the 

DOT [Department of Transportation] Secretary have also signed a 

letter back to the FCC expressing concern. 

There is technical analysis under way. I think that analysis is 

due to be completed to the FCC by the June time frame. 

So all the right work is going on. What we are looking for now 

from the company is actual hardware that they plan to use so that 

we can collect empirical data, as opposed to analytical data, and 

determine, kind of once and for all, whether or not this is going to 

jam the signal. We believe from what we have seen thus far that 

virtually every GPS receiver out there would be affected. 

Mr. LAMBORN. And if it does bear out that there is a problem, 

what happens next? 

General SHELTON. That is up to the FCC to determine whether 

or not to grant them a license to operate in that particular spectrum. So, more to come. 
21 

Mr. LAMBORN. Okay. Thank you. 

It was unfortunate, but NASA recently had a satellite that failed 

to reach orbit, and that is going to obviously hurt science and research. Does that affect any of your missions? 

General SHELTON. Congressman, we have three upcoming 

Minotaur launches that we believe have common hardware—may 

have common hardware to what we believe was the failure mode. 

The payload fairing, which is the very tip of the rocket that covers 

the payload, once you get up out of the sensible atmosphere, that 

separates and then exposes the satellite, and then the satellite 

eventually gets deployed. But that is just extra weight carrying uphill, so you want to get rid of that as quickly as you can. 

What happened on the NASA Glory launch is that payload fairing did not separate. The separation system was redesigned 2 years 

ago. We believe the parts that did not function—although the investigation is just starting—but we believe the parts that did not 

function properly from first indications are common to the boosters 

that we have coming up, two in May and one in August. So, more 

work to be done. 

Mr. LAMBORN. Thank you. 

And, finally, Ms. Sapp, NRO does some great work for our national defense. To what extent can you tell us, in an unclassified 

setting, how NRO is working to better integrate intelligence to support the warfighter? Just a general question. 

Ms. SAPP. We take a great deal of pride in that. We are known 

for our space systems, but we do a lot in terms of integrating space 

with other domains and in integrating multiple sources of intelligence on the ground. And in the opening statement I used an example where we did that to support a very detailed geolocation to 

provide actionable intelligence to troops. And that is something we 

take great pride in. 

Mr. LAMBORN. Okay. Thank you all for being here. 

Mr. TURNER. Thank you so much. I appreciate both your leadership in this area and the information you are providing for the 

committee. 

And understanding, of course, that this is an ongoing dialogue as 

we prepare to review the budget and look toward preparing our 

portion of the National Defense Authorization Act, Ambassador 

Schulte, I want to thank you for having participated in what is this 

subcommittee’s ‘‘101’’ sessions. We have begun briefings where we 

have asked agencies that interface with this committee to come forward and give members, prior to the budgetary committees and 

substantive hearings, base-level information. We appreciate you 

participating in those. We think they are very helpful for the subcommittee and the members. 

With that, thank you all, and we will be adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 4:55 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] 

A P P E N D I X 

MARCH 15, 2011 

PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD 

MARCH 15, 2011 

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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING 

MARCH 15, 2011 

(101) 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. TURNER 

Mr. TURNER. Discuss the progress of the Space Protection Program (SPP). What 

have been its accomplishments since its establishment in 2008 and, what space protection areas continue to need the greatest attention? What is your assessment of 

how the defense and intelligence community have worked together to support the 

activities of this office? 

Secretary CONATON and General SHELTON. [The information referred to is classified and is retained in the subcommittee files.] 

Mr. TURNER. Have you identified any gaps in space intelligence? What are you 

doing to address those shortfalls? 

Secretary CONATON and General SHELTON. An early 2010 USAF Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance working group review identified several space intelligence gaps. Since then, we have collaborated with Air Force Materiel Command 

and the primary Air Force intelligence organizations—the National Air and Space 

Intelligence Agency (NASIC) and the Air Force ISR Agency (AFISRA)—as well as 

others, to analyze and identify potential materiel and non-materiel solutions. Together, the materiel and non-materiel solutions will represent a corporate Air Force 

recommendation to integrate AFSPC ISR data into the warfighting Distributed 

Common Ground Systems Architecture. 

Mr. TURNER. Discuss the progress of the Space Protection Program (SPP). What 

have been its accomplishments since its establishment in 2008 and, what space protection areas continue to need the greatest attention? What is your assessment of 

how the defense and intelligence community have worked together to support the 

activities of this office? 

Ambassador SCHULTE. The SPP was established in 2008 as an Air Force Space 

Command (AFSPC) and National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) partnership designed to secure the ‘‘depth and breadth’’ of the nation’s knowledge of how to plan 

proactively for and respond to threats against U.S. space systems. The SPP advises 

senior DoD and intelligence community leaders about threat impacts on space systems and provides informed options and recommendations for protecting against 

those threats. 

Both our view of the space protection areas that continue to need attention and 

our assessment of the cooperation between DoD and the IC are outlined in detail 

in the 2010 update to the SPS, which will be delivered to Congress shortly. 

[A portion of the information referred to is for official use only and is retained 

in the subcommittee files.] 

Mr. TURNER. Have you identified any gaps in space intelligence? What are you 

doing to address those shortfalls? 

Ambassador Schulte. [The information referred to is for official use only and is 

retained in the subcommittee files.] 

Mr. TURNER. Discuss the progress of the Space Protection Program (SPP). What 

have been its accomplishments since its establishment in 2008 and, what space protection areas continue to need the greatest attention? What is your assessment of 

how the defense and intelligence community have worked together to support the 

activities of this office? 

Ms. SAPP. [The information referred to is classified and is retained in the subcommittee files.] 

Mr. TURNER. Have you identified any gaps in space intelligence? What are you 

doing to address those shortfalls? 

Ms. SAPP. [The information referred to is classified and is retained in the subcommittee files.] 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MS. SANCHEZ 

Ms. SANCHEZ. When does the Navy expect to make a decision on MUOS and what 

are the best options for increasing communications capability in addition or until 

MUOS is operational? In addition, the Australian Defense Force recently purchased 

a hosted payload for $350 million, saving about $150 million, to augment their UHF 
102 

capabilities. Have you considered buying a payload as a way to augment our communications capabilities cost-efficiently? 

Secretary CONATON and General SHELTON. The Air Force defers this question because it would be better addressed by the Navy. For more information on the Navy’s 

MUOS program, the Air Force recommends contacting the Deputy CNO for Information Dominance and the SPAWAR Program Exec Officer for Space. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. What is your long-term view on transforming and sustaining an affordable launch capability? 

Secretary CONATON and General SHELTON. A steady launch vehicle production 

rate is crucial for a healthy launch industrial base. Air Force, inter-agency and independent reviews have recommended an annual minimum production rate of booster 

cores plus associated upper stage engines, payload fairings, and solid rockets to sustain our spacelift industrial base. Based on these studies, the Air Force is developing a new EELV acquisition strategy targeted to reduce costs and help sustain 

the industrial base. The strategy includes near-term block buys of Atlas and Delta 

vehicles (and more efficient buying practices that will stabilize production rates. A 

key element of this strategy is an inter-agency commitment to a minimum of eight 

booster cores per year—five by the Department of Defense and three by the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO). 

Additionally, the Air Force recently signed a joint Memorandum of Agreement 

with NRO and NASA designed to ensure a consistent position on opportunities, certification, and requirements for potential new entrants. We expect to release new 

entrant criteria by late this summer, and we expect to allow new entrants to compete for near-term launch missions. 

In addition, in March of this year, the Air Force office of the Assistant Secretary 

for Acquisition established the Program Executive Officer for Space Launch 

(AFPEO/SL). The new AFPEO/SL is charged with executing our new strategy and 

balancing space-lift needs, budgetary constraints, and our efforts to support a 

healthy and competitive US launch industrial base. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. There has been concern about potential interference with our GPS 

signal and about what level of study the FCC will require before deciding on issuing 

a license. Could you give us an update on the next steps to ensure that we avoid 

any disruption to our GPS capability? 

Secretary CONATON and General SHELTON. Per the FCC order of 26 Jan 11, 

LightSquared has formed a Technical Working Group co-chaired by the GPS Industry Council. This working group has strong participation from civil and military 

GPS experts and includes government agency representatives and observers. The 

test results from LightSquared are due back to the FCC by 15 Jun 11. Independent 

of the LightSquared working group, the U.S. Government has established a test 

team, which will test military receivers and a representative sample of civil and 

commercial receivers. The results of the Government tests will be completed prior 

to 15 Jun 11 to keep pace with the LightSquared commercial tests. The FCC will 

evaluate the LightSquared test results to determine an appropriate way forward. 

The Government will submit their independent test results to the FCC for consideration in this determination. The process will be complete once the FCC, after consultation with National Telecommunications and Information Administration, concludes that the harmful interference concerns have been resolved and sends a letter 

to LightSquared stating that the process is complete. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Could you give us your thoughts on the way forward for JMS and 

when this decision will be made? 

General SHELTON. As we approached JMS Milestone B, the program underwent 

an Independent Program Assessment. That assessment identified program challenges which resulted in suspending High Accuracy Catalog and Integration and 

Sustainment contracts requests for proposal. We are reviewing that Independent 

Program Assessment to determine the appropriate way forward for JMS. We will 

bring that decision through the Department and to the Congress as soon as possible. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. When does the Navy expect to make a decision on MUOS and what 

are the best options for increasing communications capability in addition or until 

MUOS is operational? In addition, the Australian Defense Force recently purchased 

a hosted payload for $350 million, saving about $150 million, to augment their UHF 

capabilities. Have you considered buying a payload as a way to augment our communications capabilities cost-efficiently? 

Ambassador SCHULTE. I defer this question to the Navy. For more information on 

the Navy’s MUOS program, please contact the Deputy CNO for Information Dominance and the SPAWAR Program Executive Officer for Space. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. What is your long-term view on transforming and sustaining an affordable launch capability? 
103 

Ambassador SCHULTE. Assured access to space is foundational to our National Security Space Strategy. Transforming and sustaining affordable launch capability require that we focus on both the availability of affordable launch vehicles and on the 

infrastructure of our launch facilities and ranges. 

As noted in the National Security Space Strategy, the Department seeks to foster 

a U.S. space industrial base, including launch services, that is robust, competitive, 

flexible, and healthy, and that delivers capabilities on time and on budget. We understand that the launch industry works better with a predictable schedule that 

avoids large swings in demand. We think that the Air Force proposal to conduct 

block buys of Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicles will improve the stability of the 

launcher production schedule, which should result in cost savings. 

We are also enthusiastic about the prospects for increased competition in the 

launch market, because healthy competition can foster innovation and efficiencies 

that translate to lower launch costs. It is important that we provide a clear path 

to certification for new companies, allowing them a fair opportunity to compete 

based upon value, capability, and performance. 

Our primary space launch facilities rely on an aging infrastructure employing 

unique equipment that is becoming increasingly difficult to maintain as it ages. 

Launch facilities at Cape Canaveral Air Force Station in Florida and at Vandenberg 

Air Force Base in California each have the capability to support Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicles. In addition, the Department has launched smaller national 

security space missions from the Kodiak Launch Complex in Alaska, from NASA’s 

Wallops Island flight facility in Virginia, and from the Reagan Test Site in the Marshall Islands. These smaller sites offer additional flexibility and resilience for our 

launch enterprise. 

We are looking at the most efficient and effective ways to modernize our launch 

infrastructure. DoD and NASA are co-leading the development of a Launch Infrastructure Modernization plan. We expect that this plan will take a holistic view of 

the U.S. space launch bases and ranges, and will suggest ways to sustain and improve capabilities. We want to move away from a reliance on customized systems 

and adopt a versatile launch infrastructure capable of accommodating a variety of 

boosters and launch profiles with minimal or no reconfiguration. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. There has been concern about potential interference with our GPS 

signal and about what level of study the FCC will require before deciding on issuing 

a license. Could you give us an update on the next steps to ensure that we avoid 

any disruption to our GPS capability? 

Ambassador SCHULTE. DoD is committed to working with the FCC to ensure that 

GPS can continue its critical roles in national security, public safety, and the economy. The FCC has conditionally granted a waiver to LightSquared LLC, a mobile 

satellite services provider, which will allow them to provide terrestrial-based, cellular-type phone communications services on a frequency band immediately adjacent 

to the GPS Link 1 band. As a condition of the grant of this waiver, LightSquared 

is required to establish a working group to study GPS interference concerns and report the group’s results and mitigation measures to the FCC by June 15, 2011. This 

must take place before the FCC permits LightSquared to launch its service commercially. 

DoD determined that military testing was needed to ensure no disruption of GPS 

capability and that classified GPS capabilities or vulnerabilities are not exposed. 

DoD is conducting these tests, independent of the working group process, led by the 

Air Force’s 746th Test Squadron and the Naval Space Warfare System Center. The 

level of interference to GPS posed by LightSquared is still being analyzed by DoD. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Is there any update you can give us on internal Executive Branch 

discussions about discussions related to export control reform, and how you plan to 

balance U.S. and international security without over-constraining opportunities for 

U.S. exports, how these might affect the space industry? 

Ambassador SCHULTE. We are making significant progress toward reforming the 

U.S. export control system in order to make it more effective, efficient, and transparent. Our reform effort is being conducted in three phases and focuses on the 

‘‘four singles’’ of export control reform: a single control list, a single licensing agency, 

a single export enforcement coordination center, and a single U.S. Government-wide 

information technology (IT) system for licensing. In Phase I, we have completed important regulatory changes to encryption and dual-national controls, and Phase II 

activities are well underway. For example, we have been making significant 

progress toward the creation of a single control list. 

The Department of Defense has taken the lead in rewriting the U.S. Munitions 

List (USML), including the category that deals with spacecraft. We will also begin 

revising and ‘‘tiering’’ dual-use controls in the near future so that the USML and 

the dual-use Commerce Control List can be merged into one. On the single IT sys-
104 

tem, the Department has been designated as the Executive Agent for the new U.S. 

Government-wide export licensing system, which will be based on DoD’s 

USXPORTS system. We are working with the Departments of Commerce and State 

to establish connectivity with this system. The Executive Order establishing the Enforcement Coordination Center was signed by the President in November 2010, and 

those implementation efforts are underway. 

We have not completed our rewrite of controls on spacecraft in the USML; therefore, I cannot provide a detailed assessment at this time of the effects on the U.S. 

space industry. However, consistent with our overall approach to export control reform, I expect that we will propose ‘‘higher fences around fewer items,’’ and increase 

transparency and predictability, so that the U.S. space industry will be able to compete globally more efficiently. Current U.S. law limits the flexibility of the President 

in this area. Energizing the space industrial base, including through export control 

reform, is a key objective of the new National Security Space Strategy. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. What are the benefits to the U.S. participating and joining the EUproposed Code of Conduct, and what are the downsides of not participating? 

Ambassador SCHULTE. There are many potential benefits to the Code of Conduct 

for Space (the ‘‘Code’’). The Code calls on subscribing States to refrain from activities that create long-lived debris and to notify others of certain space activities, including those that might risk creating debris. Space debris is a growing concern for 

all space-faring nations. 

The Code is not legally binding and is consistent with U.S. interests in space. The 

provisions in the Code are similar to other space norms that the U.S. Government 

has already endorsed: pre-launch notifications under the Hague Code of Conduct, 

UN Debris Mitigation Standards, and safety of flight practices to share collision 

warning information. 

The Code clearly recognizes a nation’s inherent right of self-defense. This preserves considerable flexibility to implement the National Security Space Strategy, 

signed by the Secretary of Defense and the Director of National Intelligence, to conduct necessary operations in crisis or war. Supporting the Code affords the United 

States an opportunity to lead by example and to shape behaviors in space while simultaneously not affecting the development of national security capabilities. As Secretary Lynn recently said publicly, ‘‘we think [the Code is] a positive. It has a very 

strong potential of being a positive step’’ toward promoting responsible use of space. 

The Department is conducting a detailed assessment of the Code to help inform 

the U.S. position and determine what, if any, modifications would be necessary to 

be able to support the Code. The Department, together with the Intelligence Community, will ensure that our national security interests are fully protected. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. When does the Navy expect to make a decision on MUOS and what 

are the best options for increasing communications capability in addition or until 

MUOS is operational? In addition, the Australian Defense Force recently purchased 

a hosted payload for $350 million, saving about $150 million, to augment their UHF 

capabilities. Have you considered buying a payload as a way to augment our communications capabilities cost-efficiently? 

Ms. SAPP. [The information referred to is classified and is retained in the subcommittee files.] 

Ms. SANCHEZ. What is your long-term view on transforming and sustaining an affordable launch capability? 

Ms. SAPP. [The information referred to is classified and is retained in the subcommittee files.] 

Ms. SANCHEZ. There has been concern about potential interference with our GPS 

signal and about what level of study the FCC will require before deciding on issuing 

a license. Could you give us an update on the next steps to ensure that we avoid 

any disruption to our GPS capability? 

Ms. SAPP. [The information referred to is classified and is retained in the subcommittee files.] 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. FRANKS 

Mr. FRANKS. Does the DSCOVR mission meet the Air Force’s requirements for 

solar weather prediction? 

Secretary CONATON. Yes, the DSCOVR mission will meet the Air Force’s solar 

wind monitoring requirements that are fulfilled by NASA’s Advanced Composition 

Explorer (ACE) satellite today. However, DSCOVR can’t meet the full range of solar 

weather prediction requirements by itself. DSCOVR will be a critical element of a 

family of solar weather collectors that, when used jointly, will provide comprehensive characterization and forecasts of solar weather events. 
105 

Mr. FRANKS. What is the Air Force’s assessment regarding the service life of the 

DSCOVR spacecraft? 

Secretary CONATON. The Air Force has not independently assessed the service life 

of the DSCOVR spacecraft. However, NASA has indicated that DSCOVR has a two 

year design life and is being refurbished to fulfill a planned five year mission. 

Mr. FRANKS. Did the Air Force propose DSCOVR as a solution to their solar 

weather requirements? 

Secretary CONATON. The Air Force was part of an interagency assessment team 

that recommended DSCOVR as the preferred solution to fulfill near term solar wind 

monitoring continuity requirements. The interagency team also considered potential 

commercial, international, and dedicated US Government options. The DSCOVR solution was determined to be the lowest risk solution. 

Mr. FRANKS. Was the Air Force a part of any inter-agency discussions about the 

DSCOVR mission? 

Secretary CONATON. Yes, the Air Force participated in the interagency analysis 

team tasked by the Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP) to recommend 

a way ahead to continue the ACE solar wind monitoring capability. The group was 

known as the Committee for Space Environmental Sensor Mitigation Options 

(CSESMO) and was chartered under the Office of the Federal Coordinator for Meteorology (OFCM). 

Mr. FRANKS. Does the Air Force have concerns about the DSCOVR mission? 

Secretary CONATON. No, the Air Force agrees with the findings and recommendations of the Committee for Space Environmental Sensor Mitigation Options 

(CSESMO) that DSCOVR is the best solution to address the near term solar wind 

data collection continuity requirements. 

Mr. FRANKS. Has the Air Force done a risk assessment of the DSCOVR spacecraft? 

Secretary CONATON. No, the Air Force did not perform a risk assessment of the 

DSCOVR spacecraft. However, NASA performed a risk assessment of the DSCOVR 

spacecraft and documented their findings and recommendations in ‘‘DSCOVR–The 

Serotine Report,’’ dated January 14, 2009. 

Mr. FRANKS. Has the Air Force signed a MOA or MOU with NOAA regarding 

their participation in this mission? 

Secretary CONATON. The Air Force, NOAA, and NASA are currently discussing 

and negotiating a draft MOA to codify the respective agency roles and responsibilities. The Air Force expects that our primary responsibility will relate to the launch 

of the DSCOVR satellite. 

Mr. FRANKS. Has the Air Force signed any contracts for a launch vehicle for 

DSCOVR? 

Secretary CONATON. No, but the DSCOVR launch vehicle will go on contract in 

FY12. DSCOVR is expected to launch in FY14. Non-EELV launch vehicles are typically put on contract 18–24 months prior to launch, therefore, the DSCOVR launch 

vehicle will be put on contract sometime in FY12. There is $135M in the FY12 

President’s Budget to support this activity. 

Mr. FRANKS. Does the Air Force have a follow-on plan after the DSCOVR mission 

to maintain a solar weather capability? 

Secretary CONATON. In accordance with the Committee for Space Environmental 

Sensor Mitigation Options (CSESMO) recommendations, the Air Force and NOAA 

are considering commercial data buy options for a DSCOVR follow-on capability. 

Non-commercial options will also be considered if it is determined that no viable 

commercial alternatives will be available when needed near the end of this decade. 

Mr. FRANKS. I am concerned about the setbacks of the Space-Based Infrared System (SBIRS) program, which is designed to replace the aging Defense Support Program (DSP). I understand that the current total program cost estimate is about 3 

times more than what was originally estimated and has experienced significant 

schedule delays. I would like to know whether this is money well spent or if it’s 

time to consider other options; and, related to this question, are there other feasible 

options, or are we stuck with waiting for SBIRS and the resulting gap in missile 

warning and defense? 

Secretary CONATON and General SHELTON. The SBIRS program experienced a 

number of technical and programmatic issues leading to significant cost and schedule overruns earlier in the program. Today, the program has stable requirements 

and we have resolved the early issues that hindered initial development. Previously, 

the SBIRS program delivered two HEO payloads to orbit, providing exceptional, 

high-quality data to the warfighter. Recently, the first GEO satellite (SBIRS GEO– 

1) was delivered to Cape Canaveral in March 2011 and is preparing for launch in 

May 2011. Production of SBIRS GEO–2 is nearly complete and launch is scheduled 

for FY12. Current Air Force plans for SBIRS follow-on include production of two ad-
106 

ditional HEO payloads, as well as SBIRS GEO–3 and GEO–4. Pending Congressional and USD(AT&L) approval, the Air Force also intends to procure SBIRS GEO– 

5 and GEO–6 through an efficient block-buy approach, beginning in FY13. 

Throughout SBIRS program history, alternatives have been considered in light of 

development issues, including the Alternate Infrared Satellite System (AIRSS) and 

Third Generation Infrared Surveillance (3GIRS). Based on SBIRS progress, AIRSS 

was refocused from a competing program to concentrate on technology maturation. 

In light of Congressional marks and competing priorities, the DoD terminated the 

3GIRS program beginning in FY11. The mature Commercially Hosted Infrared Payload (CHIRP) demonstration was transferred from 3GIRS to the SBIRS program for 

completion. CHIRP is expected to launch in late 2011 and will perform risk reduction and evaluation of Wide-Field-of-View sensors. With current on-orbit DSP and 

HEO assets and the upcoming launch of GEO–1, SBIRS is ready to meet the nation’s missile warning, missile defense, battlespace awareness, and technical intelligence needs. 

Mr. FRANKS. I am concerned about the setbacks of the Space-Based Infrared System (SBIRS) program, which is designed to replace the aging Defense Support Program (DSP). I understand that the current total program cost estimate is about 3 

times more than what was originally estimated and has experienced significant 

schedule delays. I would like to know whether this is money well spent or if it’s 

time to consider other options; and, related to this question, are there other feasible 

options, or are we stuck with waiting for SBIRS and the resulting gap in missile 

warning and defense? 

Ambassador SCHULTE. With current on-orbit DSP and highly elliptical orbit 

(HEO) assets and the upcoming launch of the first geosynchronous earth orbit 

(GEO) satellite, SBIRS is ready to meet the nation’s missile warning, missile defense, battlespace awareness, and technical intelligence needs. The SBIRS program 

experienced a number of technical and programmatic difficulties, leading to significant cost and schedule overruns. Today, the program has stable requirements, and 

we have resolved the early issues that hindered initial development. The SBIRS program has delivered two HEO payloads to orbit, providing exceptional quality data 

to the warfighter. Further, GEO–1 was delivered to Cape Canaveral in March 2011 

and is preparing for launch in May 2011. The remainder of the SBIRS constellation 

and replenishment vehicles will be acquired through follow-on production efforts. 

Throughout SBIRS program history, alternatives have been considered in light of 

development issues. A mature demonstration, the Commercially Hosted Infrared 

Payload (CHIRP), is expected to launch in late 2011 and will perform risk reduction 

and evaluation of Wide-Field-of-View sensors. In addition, the Under Secretary of 

Defense for Policy is pursuing Departmental assessments of alternative approaches 

to enhance the resiliency of the SBIRS constellation through low-cost augmentation 

capabilities to meet the objectives of the National Security Space Strategy. 

Mr. FRANKS. I am concerned about the setbacks of the Space-Based Infrared System (SBIRS) program, which is designed to replace the aging Defense Support Program (DSP). I understand that the current total program cost estimate is about 3 

times more than what was originally estimated and has experienced significant 

schedule delays. I would like to know whether this is money well spent or if it’s 

time to consider other options; and, related to this question, are there other feasible 

options, or are we stuck with waiting for SBIRS and the resulting gap in missile 

warning and defense? 

Ms. SAPP. [The information referred to is classified and is retained in the subcommittee files.] 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. LAMBORN 

Mr. LAMBORN. In Fiscal Year 2009, the Air Force received a $28 million reprogramming approval to fund the electronic scheduling and dissemination upgrade 

to the Air Force Satellite Control Network at the 22nd Space Operation Squadron. 

This reprogramming was a bridge to the Fiscal Year 2012 budget where the balance 

of the requirement was to be funded. Unfortunately, this was not included in this 

year’s budget. I sent a letter to the Secretary of the Air Force on June 28, 2010, 

requesting an update on this program. I also visited the 50th Space Wing on July 

12, 2010, to see the great work the Air Force is performing at Schriever Air Force 

Base as well as to learn how important this upgrade is for DoD. What is the current 

funding and program status of this critical upgrade? 

General SHELTON. An FY09 Omnibus reprogramming authorization provided 

$28M. The FY12 President’s Budget Request (PBR) baseline provides for $1.3M in 

FY12. 
107 

The current ESD 3.0 Block 1 effort completed Critical Design Review in June 

2010 and is in the build and test phase. Additionally, the developmental system 

completed, integrated and tested four software builds as well as completed an integrated baseline review in Oct 10. 

Mr. LAMBORN. What are your plans for this program thru FY12? 

General SHELTON. We intend to continue incrementally funding development efforts through a reprogramming action in FY12. 

Mr. LAMBORN. What will be the operational impact to the Air Force Satellite Control Network if this upgrade is not implemented? 

General SHELTON. Our plan is to complete ESD 3.0; however, if unforeseen circumstances prevent that, we would continue to rely on the legacy system until an 

enduring solution was provided. As supportability of the legacy system degrades, the 

work load would necessarily become a manual task. 

Mr. LAMBORN. Since the Rapid Attack, Identification, Detection and Reporting 

System (RAIDRS) is a Program of Record, what are your plans in fielding this system? 

General SHELTON. Rapid Attack Identification Detection and Reporting System 

(RAIDRS) Block 10, is a suite of 5 RAIDRS Transportable Ground Segments (RTGS) 

strategically located around the world which provide USSTRATCOM with global 

electromagnetic interference detection and enables geolocation of the source of that 

interference. The RTGS’s will be located in Florida, Japan, Hawaii, Germany and 

CENTCOM in Southwest Asia. Initial Operating Capability is scheduled for 4th 

quarter, FY12, while Full Operating Capability is scheduled for 4th quarter, FY 13. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. ROGERS 

Mr. ROGERS. I understand that the Launch Capability element of the EELV budget pays for the facility and support costs and launch operations. 

• Can you tell me why the Capability budget increased from $771 M in FY 11 

to $928 M in FY 12? 

• Can you provide a more detailed breakout of the elements and cost underlying 

this large number? 

• Can you provide me with a much more detailed breakout of the FY 12 EELV 

Launch Capability budget? 

Secretary CONATON. EELV launch capability (ELC) costs have indeed increased 

from the FY11 PB to the FY12 PB. Costs for sustaining launch capability (infrastructure, engineering skills) for 8 missions a year is paid by the Air Force and 

NRO, and has historically been shared on a 70–30 basis (70 percent Air Force, 30 

percent NRO). However, starting in FY12, the Air Force share has increased from 

70 to 75 percent, resulting in a 5% increase or a $55M increase over FY11PB. The 

Air Force also received approximately $100M per year between 2006–2011 in 

unbilled launch capability and processing work as a result of the transition from 

earlier fixed price launch service contracts. These so called ‘‘contract credits and 

considerations’’ have now expired, leading to the higher costs for FY12. 

FY12 EELV Launch Capability Budget Estimate (AF-only) 

ELC Elements % $ 

Mission Integration 3% 27.8 

Mission Assurance 1% 9.3 

Mission Unique Development/design 1% 9.3 

Systems Engineering & Program Management (SEPM) 38% 353.0 

Supplier Readiness 14% 130.0 

Transportation 2% 18.7 

Launch Operations 28% 259.2 

Depreciation 13% 120.8 
108 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. RUPPERSBERGER 

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. The Air Force’s Evolutionary Acquisition for Space Efficiency (EASE) initiative seems like a sound way to reduce costs by securing block 

buys of space systems. However the space programs selected for FY12 and FY13 application of EASE—the Space Based Infra-Red System (SBIRS) and the Advanced 

Extremely High Frequency (AEHF) satellite—are both far over budget and well behind schedule. The impression this creates is that poor performance on space programs will be ‘‘rewarded’’ with block buys. Does the Department plan to apply the 

EASE block buy approach to well-performing space programs, and if so, what are 

they and when do you think you will do so? 

Secretary CONATON. I understand your concern with the past performance of the 

AEHF and SBIRS acquisition efforts. Indeed, the Air Force has proposed the Evolutionary Acquisition for Space Efficiency (EASE) approach going forward to address 

specific root causes of some of those difficulties. The EASE concept is designed to 

drive down costs, improve stability in the space industrial base, ensure stable investment in technologies that can lower risk for future programs, and achieve efficiencies through block buys of satellites. In providing industrial base stability, we 

expect the contractor to come in with significantly lower prices. Despite its past 

problems, the AEHF satellite program is a good candidate for implementation of 

EASE, because the high-risk development phase is complete, and the satellite design is mature. In addition, the requirements are solid and an experienced government and contractor team is in place. As for the program itself, one satellite has 

launched, one is in storage awaiting launch, and two more are in various stages of 

production. The block buy of satellites 5 and 6 will comprise a smooth continuation 

of the production line. Once the EASE approach is established, the Air Force will 

examine the application of this acquisition strategy to a wider portfolio of space program. The SBIRS program, which has also experienced cost and schedule difficulties 

during the development phase, is also now on more stable footing. The first geo-stationary satellite (SBIRS GEO–1) is set to launch in May. The Air Force intends to 

pursue acquisition of SBIRS GEO–5 and GEO–6 using the EASE approach, but not 

until FY13. 

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. The Air Force has traditionally been the Executive Agent for 

Space within the Department of Defense. Yet recently we have learned that the Defense Information Systems Agency has been given a significant FY12 budget increase (more than $400M) to start the acquisition of a new Ka band satellite system. 

Can you provide any insight on this DISA initiative, how it might affect the Air 

Force Executive Agent status and also how it will avoid competing with other space 

programs for scarce DoD resources? 

Secretary CONATON. The DISA Advanced Satellite System in a Single Theater 

(ASSIST) project will not affect the Air Force’s EA status. The Secretary of the Air 

Force, as the designated DoD Executive Agent for Space, is responsible for coordinating all DoD space efforts, to include integrating and assessing all space communication activities, whether they are acquired by the Air Force, Navy, or DISA. To 

help manage this portfolio, the DoD Executive Agent for Space chairs the Defense 

Space Council—to address all DoD aspects of space: policy, strategy, operations, logistics, and acquisition. The Defense Space Council will provide guidance to DISA’s 

ASSIST effort in support of the overall DoD planning/architecture strategy. 

As the DoD focal point for commercial SATCOM, DISA procures an Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) SATCOM capability to address surge capability requirements. The DISA procured commercial SATCOM complements MILSATCOM in 

meeting the warfighters’ bandwidth requirements. Leasing short-term commercial 

SATCOM on an annual basis to support OCO surge requirements is costly ($235M 

per year) and inefficient. DISA, via the ASSIST project, will acquire long-term satellite communications services, to include both the space segment and associated 

terminals, in the Ka-band (and potentially also Ku-band), to address CENTCOM demand. This would be accomplished either through buying a commercial SATCOM 

satellite or signing a life-time lease for an entire commercial SATCOM satellite. 

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. The Air Force Space Based Space Surveillance System 

(SBSS) was successfully deployed last year as a potentially revolutionary new capability to improve space situational awareness. How is the system performing, does 

the Air Force plan to continue this program and, if so, why did the Air Force eliminate FY12 and outyear funding for the follow on capability? 

Secretary CONATON. SBSS Block 10 is performing very well on-orbit, meeting or 

exceeding all performance requirements. The Air Force has completed the 

Initialization and Checkout Phase and System Characterization Phase, and all systems are performing nominally. Satellite Command Authority for SBSS Block 10 

was successfully transitioned from the Space and Missile Systems Center (SMC) to 
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AFSPC 50th Space Wing on 23 Feb 11. SBSS Block 10 is on track for 3QFY11 Operational Acceptance and Initial Operational Capability determination. 

The FY12 President’s Budget does not include SBSS Follow-on primarily due to 

program affordability and a delayed need for the capability based on the timing of 

the SBSS Block 10 launch. However, the Office of the Secretary of Defense has directed a study examining alternative capabilities for Low Earth Orbit-based Space 

Situational Awareness (SSA) of deep space objects, the findings of which will inform 

future decision making. 

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. The health of the Space Industrial Base has been mentioned 

in both the National Space Policy and the recent National Security Space Strategy. 

Overall, how does the Department assess the current health of the space industrial 

base compared to its health a decade ago (prior to statutory requirements dictating 

that all satellites and satellite components necessarily be considered munitions for 

the purposes of exports)? 

Secretary CONATON. The overall health of top tier manufacturers in the space industrial base is sound, but there are significant issues for lower tier vendors. For 

space systems, there are small numbers of suppliers to produce specialized components such as space qualified hardware. Market forces for small numbers of specialized components and inconsistent demand result in production gaps for lower tier 

vendors and tend to drive suppliers out of the market. 

The Air Force is working with the NRO, NASA, and MDA via the Space Industrial Base Council and other inter-agency forums to assess the status of the domestic industrial base and examine potential actions that can enable the long-term 

health of the industrial base. In addition, the Air Force has taken steps in the FY12 

President’s Budget to help address industrial base issues, through more effective 

and predictable acquisition, including the Evolutionary Acquisition for Space Efficiency (EASE) proposal and the proposed Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle acquisition strategy. 

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. What is the Executive Branch doing to reduce the risk of 

further degradation to the space industrial base? How important is a statutory 

change to the current commercial satellite ITAR regime in helping to project and/ 

or grow this industry base? What can be accomplished in this direction absent any 

further Congressional action? 

Secretary CONATON. The Air Force is supporting a periodic report on the health 

and competitiveness of the U.S. space industrial base chaired by the Department 

of Commerce. The report should be delivered to the White House in summer 2011, 

and will recommend actions that can be taken by the government to enhance the 

space industrial base. In addition, the Air Force is partnering with NASA and the 

Department of Commerce to conduct a comprehensive data collection of the entire 

U.S. space industrial base, which includes defense, intelligence community, civil, 

and industrial sectors. This effort will provide needed information on the critical 

lower tiers of the space industrial base. 

There are a number of U.S. Government, industry, and association reports and 

studies that point to export controls and ITAR as a significant barrier to the health 

and competitiveness of the space industrial base. In 2007, the Air Force released 

a defense industrial base assessment on the U.S. space industry. In that report, 

more than 70% of the approximately 200 survey respondents cited U.S. export control, specifically ITAR, as a barrier to entry to global space-related business. 

The FY10 National Defense Authorization Act requires the Department of Defense to complete a report, known as the 1248 Report, to inform Congress on the 

national security ramifications of transferring satellites and related items from 

ITAR to the Commerce Control List. Legislation is required to transfer these items 

to the discretion of the President, who can then delegate control of these items to 

the Department of Commerce. In a March 31, 2011 presentation, the National Security Staff indicated that the 1248 report is nearly complete and should be delivered 

to Congress in the coming weeks. 

Currently, many items generally available on the global market for space commerce are prohibited from being exported by U.S. companies without government 

approval, and the Air Force understands that this system has hurt the U.S. space 

industrial base. To address this significant challenge, the Obama Administration announced last summer it was pursuing comprehensive export control reform. The Air 

Force recognizes that controlling sensitive space exports remains a concern. But we 

need a different approach, and that is just what the Administration, is working toward. As Secretary Gates has said, the goal of this reform is ‘‘a system where higher 

fences are placed around fewer, more critical items.’’ 

The new system of controls will feature a single control list (rather than several), 

and will be executed by a single licensing agency, using IT system for export licensing, operating a single enforcement coordination center. In November of last year, 
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in fact, an Executive Order established the new ‘‘Export Enforcement Coordination 

Center.’’ 

Currently, the Department of Defense is reviewing existing Technology Release 

and Transfer Processes, and working with other agencies to transition to a single 

electronic licensing system based on DoD software. The State Department expects 

to be integrated later this calendar year; the Commerce Department should be integrated by mid-2012. 

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. The National Space Policy and National Security Space 

Strategy encourage greater cooperation between the Department of Defense and the 

commercial satellite industry. How does the Department view the inter-relationship 

between the commercial industry and the national security space sector? 

General SHELTON. The Air Force acknowledges the need for a strong inter-relationship between the commercial industry and national security space sector to ensure industrial base stability and to assess innovative and cost-effective alternatives. Strategic partnerships with commercial firms will continue to enable access 

to a more diverse, robust, and distributed set of space systems. These strong relationships provide additional options for our space architecture to potentially include 

a mix of commercial, international, and government systems to meet our needs. 

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. How confident are you in the capabilities of the Executive 

Branch to maintain control of the most sensitive satellite technologies if other technologies are not ITAR-controlled? In the event of a transfer, do you believe it will 

be more or less difficult to control the most sensitive satellite technologies? 

Ambassador SCHULTE. A report required by Section 1248 of the National Defense 

Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010 is currently in coordination. The report provides the Departments of State and Defense’s assessment of the national security 

risks of removing satellites and related components from the United States Munitions List (USML). The report includes recommendations on which space and spacerelated technologies should remain on—or be candidates for removal from—the 

USML. The report also addresses safeguards and verifications necessary to prevent 

the proliferation and diversion of these space and space-related technologies. We are 

working to complete coordination so that we can provide the report to Congress as 

soon as possible. 

One objective of the Administration’s Export Control Reform initiative is to create 

a single control list. The Department of Defense has taken the lead in rewriting the 

USML, including the category that deals with spacecraft. We will also begin revising 

and ‘‘tiering’’ dual-use controls in the near future so that the USML and the dualuse Commerce Control List can be merged into one. The new control list will be 

based on a three-tiered structure that will better reflect the military and intelligence value of items and technologies controlled by the United States. Tier 1 items 

will represent the highest level of military and intelligence criticality that are available almost exclusively from the United States. Exports of Tier 1 items will always 

require a license and will be reviewed with the greatest scrutiny. Tier 2 items will 

be items that have substantial military and intelligence applications and are available from the United States and multilateral export control regime members and 

adherents. Many Tier 2 items could be available to Allies and close partners without 

licenses. Some Tier 2 items or technologies may need to be more closely safeguarded. Tier 3 items will be those that have significant military and intelligence 

applications but are more widely available outside the United States and multilateral export control regime partners and adherents. Tier 3 items would be available 

to most of the world. Thus, the tiering of controls in a single control list will significantly enhance our ability to control items based on their national security importance and to make better informed decisions on the national security implications 

of export requests. It will focus our attention on items and technologies of concern, 

while allowing us to share more with Allies and close partners. 

We have not completed our rewrite of controls on spacecraft in the USML; therefore, I cannot provide a detailed assessment at this time. However, consistent with 

our overall approach to export control reform, I expect that we will propose ‘‘higher 

fences around fewer items.’’ Current U.S. law limits the flexibility of the President 

in this area. Energizing the space industrial base, including through export control 

reform, is a key objective of the new National Security Space Strategy. 

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. Has your office identified—or are you identifying—specific 

space capabilities within the industrial base that are in danger of disappearing or 

have disappeared because of ITAR restrictions? 

Ambassador SCHULTE. The new National Security Space Strategy aims, as one of 

its three strategic objectives, to energize the space industrial base that supports 

U.S. national security. The strategy identifies export control reform as a key means 

to this end. Over the past several years, a number of studies, based largely on surveys and interviews, have indicated that the U.S. space industry believes that U.S. 
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export controls have had a negative impact, particularly on second- and third-tier 

suppliers. There are certain space technologies that have only one U.S. supplier or 

are being aggressively developed by foreign competitors. ITAR is one among many 

factors that may contribute to this. While we cannot point to a specific technology 

that has disappeared solely due to export controls, the body of work done on the 

subject supports continuing the export control reform effort that is currently underway. With this effort, our goal is to erect ‘‘higher fences around fewer items,’’ and 

increase transparency and predictability, so that the U.S. space industry will be able 

to compete globally more efficiently. 

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. How does the NRO link export control policies to space industrial base concerns? Do you foresee risks to U.S. national security if the current 

ITAR controls on satellites and their components remain in place? 

Ms. SAPP. [The information referred to is classified and is retained in the subcommittee files.] 

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. What is the NRO doing to evaluate the possibilities of revising satellite export controls within your current authority? 

Ms. SAPP. [The information referred to is classified and is retained in the subcommittee files.] 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. BARTLETT 

Mr. BARTLETT. As you know, NOAA currently gets solar wind data from the Advanced Composition Explorer (ACE) satellite, and uses this data to provide critical 

forecasts and warnings of solar and geomagnetic storms, related interruptions of 

GPS and communications, and potentially devastating impacts on satellite and terrestrial infrastructure. In addition to posting this information online, NOAA also 

shares the data directly with the Air Force for its own forecasting, warning, and 

space situational awareness activities. ACE is now over a decade past its original 

design life, and suffers from instrument damage and degradation due to prior solar 

storms. In FY12, NOAA has requested $47.3 million to begin refurbishment of the 

12-year-old, climate monitoring, DSCOVR spacecraft to replace ACE, with launch 

anticipated in FY2014. The Air Force has requested $135 million in FY12 to pay 

for its contribution to the DSCOVR mission that is the launch of the spacecraft via 

a commercial provider. 

As one who is concerned about the impact of electromagnetic pulse (EMP)—both 

natural and human-caused—I am concerned about any new or additional 

vulnerabilities for national space assets. For that reason, I would appreciate your 

answering a series of questions about the Air Force’s current reliance on ACE data, 

and about its anticipated reliance on DSCOVR data in the future. 

How important is the ACE solar wind data to national security? 

General SHELTON. ACE is an important sensing capability because of its location 

between the Earth and Sun. Located at a stationary point approximately 1 million 

miles between the Earth and Sun, it gives us 30–90 minutes warning before the detected solar disturbance reaches the Earth and our space assets. This enables us 

to implement measures to protect our space systems and services. 

Mr. BARTLETT. How is the ACE solar wind data currently used by the Air Force 

and does the data currently provided today meet the Air Force needs for solar and 

geomagnetic storm forecasting and warning at all storm severity levels that can 

occur during a solar cycle? 

General SHELTON. ACE is used by the Air Force to predict conditions affecting the 

near-Earth space environment and related impacts on space systems and services. 

Having knowledge of these conditions enables us to more effectively attribute and 

mitigate impacts on our space capabilities. Currently ACE data meets the Air 

Force’s solar wind monitoring needs. However, ACE has limitations during rare severe radiation conditions. We do have techniques to work around these limitations. 

Mr. BARTLETT. Has the Air Force examined the capability of the solar wind instruments on DSCOVR and are they sufficient to provide the data needed by the 

Air Force for forecasting and warning at all potential storm severity levels once 

ACE meets its demise? 

General SHELTON. Yes, the Air Force has examined the capability of DSCOVR’s 

solar wind instruments and has concluded that these instruments will be sufficient 

to meet our solar wind data needs. 

Mr. BARTLETT. Has the Air Force examined the NOAA plan for solar wind data 

mission assurance and are they confident that the solar wind mission can reliably 

survive failures that are not uncommon to launch and spacecraft operations without 

an interruption in service that could endanger national security? 
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General SHELTON. Yes, the Air Force has examined the NOAA plan for solar wind 

data mission assurance and is confident that we will get the data without an interruption in service. 

Mr. BARTLETT. What solar wind data and mission parameters does the Air Force 

user community need to have mission assurance and be able to confidently forecast 

and warn of communications and GPS degradation due to solar and geomagnetic 

storms as well as protect their space, air, and terrestrial assets from the impacts 

of these storms? 

General SHELTON. The specific solar wind data and mission parameters needed 

by the Air Force user community for continuity of operations include the following: 

solar wind speed, density, pressure, temperature, and 3–D magnetic field. All of 

these parameters are currently measured by ACE. 

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