UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 15-4106

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

WAYNE MICHAEL SCUPP,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of 

South Carolina, at Florence. R. Bryan Harwell, District Judge. 

(4:09-cr-00524-RBH-4)

Submitted: July 21, 2015 Decided: July 23, 2015

Before WILKINSON and MOTZ, Circuit Judges, and DAVIS, Senior 

Circuit Judge.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

William F. Nettles, IV, Assistant Federal Public Defender, 

Florence, South Carolina, for Appellant. William E. Day, II, 

Assistant United States Attorney, Florence, South Carolina, for 

Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM: 

Pursuant to a plea of guilty, Wayne Michael Scupp was 

convicted of conspiracy to commit bank fraud and to steal and 

possess stolen mail, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1349 (2012). He 

was sentenced to 18 months’ imprisonment, followed by a 5-year 

term of supervised release. Shortly after his release, Scupp 

engaged in new criminal conduct, leading to a petition for 

revocation of his supervised release. At the revocation hearing, 

Scupp admitted the alleged violations. The district court 

sentenced him to 12 months of imprisonment, followed by a 1-year 

term of supervised release. On appeal, counsel has filed a brief 

pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), asserting 

that there are no meritorious issues for appeal but seeking review 

of the reasonableness of Scupp’s revocation sentence. Scupp was 

informed of his right to file a pro se supplemental brief, but he 

has not done so. The Government elected not to file a brief. 

Finding no error, we affirm. 

“A district court has broad discretion when imposing a 

sentence upon revocation of supervised release.” United States v. 

Webb, 738 F.3d 638, 640 (4th Cir. 2013). A revocation sentence 

that “is within the statutory maximum and is not plainly 

unreasonable” will be affirmed on appeal. Id. (internal quotation 

marks omitted). In so evaluating a sentence, we assess it for 

reasonableness, utilizing “the procedural and substantive 
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considerations” employed in evaluating an original criminal 

sentence. United States v. Crudup, 461 F.3d 433, 438 (4th Cir. 

2006). A revocation sentence is procedurally reasonable if the 

district court has considered the policy statements contained in 

Chapter Seven of the Sentencing Guidelines and the 18 U.S.C. § 

3553(a) (2012) factors enumerated in 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e) (2012). 

Id. at 439. The district court also must provide an explanation 

for its chosen sentence, but the explanation “need not be as 

detailed or specific when imposing a revocation sentence as it 

must be when imposing a post-conviction sentence.” United States 

v. Thompson, 595 F.3d 544, 547 (4th Cir. 2010). A revocation 

sentence is substantively reasonable if the district court states 

a proper basis for concluding that the defendant should receive 

the sentence imposed. Crudup, 461 F.3d at 440. Only if we find 

a sentence to be procedurally or substantively unreasonable will 

we determine whether the sentence is “plainly” so. Id. at 439. 

Here, the district court considered the parties’ arguments, 

Scupp’s allocution, the statements of his friends and family, and 

the relevant statutory factors before sentencing Scupp below the 

policy statement range. The district court provided an explanation 

tailored to Scupp, focusing specifically on the nature of his 

violations of supervised release, his extensive criminal record,

his mental health issues, and his family’s statements to the court. 

We therefore conclude that Scupp’s sentence is neither 
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procedurally nor substantively unreasonable. We have examined the 

entire record in accordance with the requirements of Anders and 

have found no meritorious issues for appeal. Accordingly, we 

affirm the judgment of the district court. 

This court requires that counsel inform Scupp, in writing, of 

the right to petition the Supreme Court of the United States for 

further review. If Scupp requests that a petition be filed, but 

counsel believes that such a petition would be frivolous, then 

counsel may move in this court for leave to withdraw from 

representation. Counsel’s motion must state that a copy thereof 

was served on Scupp. We dispense with oral argument because the 

facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the 

materials before this court and argument would not aid the 

decisional process. 

AFFIRMED