UNITED STAT ES COURT OF AP P EALS FOR VETERANS CLAIMS

No. 96-302
D ONAL D S. S WI NEY , A PP EL L ANT ,

V
. H ER SH EL W. G OBER , A C TI NG S EC RE T A RY O F V ET ER A N S A FF A I RS , A PPEL L EE
. On Appellant' s Application for A ttorney Fe es and Expenses
(De cided August 14, 2000 )

Morton Hollander , o f B e the sd a , M ary land , w a s o n th e ple a din g s f or the a pp e lla nt. Leigh A. Bradley , G e ne ra l Co un se l; Ro n G arv in , A s s i s t an tG e n e r a l C o u n s e l ; Thomas A. Mc Lau gh lin ; and Miche le Russell Katina , all of Washington, D.C

. , we re o n the pleading s for the appellee

. Be fore NEB EKER, Chief Judge , and HOL DAWAY and STEI NB ERG, Judges

. STEI NB ERG, Judge , filed the opinion of th e Co u r t i n wh ich NEB EKER, Chief Judge , joined as to the award

. NE BE KER, Chief Judge , f ile d a se pa rate op ini on

c on c ur ri ngin p a rt

. HOL DAWAY, Judge , filed a dissenting opinion.
STEI NB ERG, Judge : Be fore the Co urt is the appellant' s Dec ember 2, 1998, application, pursuant to the Equa l Acce ss to J ustice Ac t, 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d) (EAJA), for at t o rn ey fee s and expenses in the amount of $32,534.44, and his Marc h 26, 1999, supplemental EAJA application for attorney fee s in the amount of $718.75. For the re asons that follow, the Court will g rant the 1998 EA JA a pp lic a tio n in

a re du c e d amou

nt a nd g ra nt the 19 99 su

pp le me nta l E AJA a

pp lic a tio n in

fu ll.

I. Re le va nt Bac kgr ound The a ppellant appe ale d from two decisions of the Boa rd of Ve tera

ns' Appea ls (Boa

rd or B VA ), bo th d a te d M arc h 2 2, 19 96

. I n the f ir st d e c isi on , th e B oa

rd de nie d a sc he du lar r a tin g in2

excess o f 5 0 % for cluster he adac hes, denie d a rating of total disabilit y

based on individual unemploy ability (TDIU), and deter mined that the veter an was not e ntitled to an ex t ra schedula r evaluation under 38 C.F.R. § 3.321(b) (1) (1999). I n the s econd decision, the Board de termined that it did not have jurisdiction to review a denial by a De partment of V eter ans Aff ai rs (V A) reg ional office (RO) of the appellant' s claim for e ligibility for f ee- basis-outpatient ca

re an d dismiss ed that appea l. Se e Swi ne

yv . W est , No. 96-302, 1998 WL637212, at *1 (Ve t. App. Aug . 31, 1998). O n D e c e mb e r 1 3 , 1 9 9 6 , th e Se c r e ta r y f il e d a mo ti o n to r e ma

n d a s to the TDI U and extraschedular -rating c laims, to de em aba ndoned the sc hedular -rating- incre ase c laim, and to stay the proce eding s pending a dec ision in Qu igl e y v . W est , No. 94-1187, 1998 WL 43004 (Ve t. App. J an. 9, 1998), as to B VA jurisdiction to consi d er cl ai m s for f ee- basis car e. On De cembe r 16, 1996, the appellant f

iled a motion to c onsolidate this a ppeal with that in Quigley . On Dec ember 23, 1996, the Court, by single -judg e orde r, denie d the appe llant's motion to consolidate (statingthat the appe llant could see k leave to file an amicus brief in Quigley and/or the similar c ase of W e bb v . W est , No. 96- 50 2, 19 98 WL77 82 88 (V e t. A pp . O c t. 1 5, 19 98 )) , h e ld i n a be y anc e the Se c re tary ' s mo tion to

re ma n d , an d g r an te d th e Se c r e ta r y ' s mo ti o n to s ta

y p r o c e e d in g s
. O n D e c e mb e r 2 7 , 1 996, the appellant f

iled a re sponse, opposing the Secr etar y ' s motion t o rema

nd as to the rating claims. The C o u rt t h en m o d i fi edi t s De ce mb er 2 3 , 1 9 9 6 , o rd er , i n t e r a l i a , t o h o l d i nab ey an ce t h e S ec re t ary 's mot ion to s tay pr oc e e din g s. On J anuar

y 7, 1997, the appellant filed i n the appe al of Quigley , su pra , a motion for leave to file on behalf of himself a nd the appe llant in W

ebb , su pra , an amicus brief

on the issue of B VA jurisdiction to review RO denials of elig ibilit y for f ee- basis car e. Af

ter the Court g rante d that motion in Quigley , th e a

pp e lla nt fi le d in that c a se an amic us br ie f a nd a no tic e of su pp le me nta l a

uth or iti e s. On Marc h 19, 1997, the Court de nied the Secre tary ' s motion to rema nd as to the TDIU and extraschedular -rating c laims and g rante d the Secr etar y ' s motion t o stay

pro ce ed i n gs as to the fe ebasis-ca re issue pe nding a

decision in Quigley

. Br iefing proce eded on the rating issues; the a ppellant filed a br ief a

nd a re ply

brief, a nd t h e S ec reta

ry filed a br ief. On N ovember 19, 1997, the Court dissolved the stay

as to Quigley . The a

ppellant then fil ed a s u p plemental brie f, incorpor ating the

ar gu m en t s made in the Quigley a mi c u s b r ie f , an d a r e p ly b r ie f

, an d th e Se c r e ta

r y f il e d a brief. There afte r, on May

12, 1998, the Court issued an opinion in Me ak in v . W est , which dec ided the fe e-3

basis-ca re issue in favor of

the veter an. Me ak

in , 11 Vet.App. 183 ( 1998). The a ppellant then filed an unopposed motion to r ever se as to that issue. On Aug ust 31, 1998, in a sing le-judg e orde r, the Court deemed a

bandoned the schedula

r-r ating -incre ase c laim; vacate d the B VA dec ision as to the TDIU and e x trasche dular-r ating claims, on the g rounds that the B oard ha d failed to apply and had incorre ctly applied, respe ctively , pertinent regulations; a nd reve rsed the BV A dec ision as to the fee

basis-ca re issue a

nd rema nded those matter s for re adjudication un der the appropr iate law a nd regulation. Swiney , 1998 WL 637212, at *1, *3. On De c e mbe r 2, 199 8, the a

pp e lla nt fi le d a time ly a

pp lic a tio n for EA JA fe e s and e xpe ns e s, in which he state d that he wa s a prevailing party and was elig ible for a n awa rd, and a lleg ed that the Secre tary was not substantially justified. The appellant' s counsel' s itemiz ation of ser vices re ndere d included 259.05 total hour s fo r a t o tal fee reque st of $32,381.00 and expenses of $153.44. The Secre tary argues in r esponse only that the amount of the awa rd should be reduc ed b y

$ 7 , 000.00 beca use the 56 hours spe nt in prepar ing the Quigley amicus brief was unreasona ble and should t hus be denie d. On Marc h 26, 1999, the appe llant filed a re ply , in which he r equests additional attorne y fee s of $718.75 for 5.75 hours require d for the prepa ration of that reply . On Octobe r 25, 1999, the Court ordere d the appe llant to file a supplemental brief as to his status as a pre vailing pa rty and the Secre tary to file a supplementa l brief a s to substantial just ification. B oth parties re sponded to that Court or de r a nd the n r e pli e d to e a c h o the r' s su pp le me nta l br ie fs

.

II. Ana lys is A. Juri sdiction Th is C ourt

ha s juri sdic tio n to awa

rd re a so na ble a tto rn e y

fe e s and e xpe ns e s p ur su a nt t o 28 U. S.C. § 2 41 2( d) (2 )( F ). Th e a pp e lla nt' s D e c e mbe r 2, 199 8, EA JA a pp lic a tio n w a s f

ile d w ith in the 30- d ay E A JA a

p p li c a ti o n p e r io d s e t f

o rth in 2 8 U

. S. C. § 2 4 1 2 ( d ) ( 1 ) ( B ) an d s a ti s f ies any jur isd ic tional con tent

re qu ir e me nts that a

pp ly , b e c a

us e the a pp lic a tio n c on ta ins the fo llo wi ng : A showing that he is a pre vailing pa rty by virtue of the Court's reve rsal and rema nd action and tha

t he is a party elig ible for a

n awa rd under the EAJA because his ne t w orth does not exceed $2,000,000; an alleg ati o n that the position of the Secre tary was not substantially

justified; and an itemized fee statement. See 28 U. S.C. § 24 12 (d )( 1) (A ), (1) (B), (2) (B ); Fr itz v . W est , 13 Vet.App. 190, 1954

(1 99 9) ; Che

sse r v . W est , 11 Vet.App. 497, 499 ( 1998); Ba za lo v . B ro wn , 9 Vet.App. 304, 308 (1996) (en ba nc), re v 'd o n o the r g

ro un ds su b n om . B az alo v. W est , 150 F.3d 1380, 1384 ( Fe d. Cir. 1998) (holding that "statement t hat [appellant] is a pre vailing ' party ' satisfies elig ibilit y require ment for jurisdictional purpose s")

. B. P re v ail ing Pa rty As to the merits of this a

pplication, the Secre tary , in his Fe bruar y 24, 1999, response to the

a p p e l l a n t ' s E A J A a

p p l i c a t i o n , s p e c i f

i c a l l y c o n c e d e s t h a tt h e a p p e l l an tw a s a

p r e v a i l i n g p a rt y. Response (Resp.) at 3. Nonethe less, as noted a bove, the Court o rd er ed the a ppellant to provide

su pp le me nta l br ie fi ngon

thi s is su e , a

nd a llo we d th e Se c re tary to fi le a re sp on se ; the re fo re , w e wi ll

a dd re ss p re va ili ngpa

rt y status

. As a g ener al rule, the "pr evailing party require ment of the EAJA is satisfied when a rema nd is obtained bec ause it re prese nts 'suc ce [ s s ] o n an y signific ant issue in litigation which a chieve [d]

so me of the be ne fi t

. . . so ug ht in br ing ing su it." St il lw ell v. Br own , 6 Vet.App. 291, 300 ( 1994) (citi n g S h a l a la v. Schae

fer , 5 09 U. S. 2 92 (1 99 3) ); se e als o Sim ile s v . W est , 11 Vet.App. 115, 118 (1998) ( holding that a

ppellant satisfied pre vailing pa rty require ment wher e application showed that appea l led to settlement ag ree ment); Nagler v. Derwinski , 1 Vet.App. 297, 307 ( 1991). An outrig ht victory is not alway s a pre requisite. See Sti llwe ll , 6 Ve t.A pp . at 30 1. " I t is e no ug h f or the Court to

make so me ' su

bs tanti ve de te rm inatio n in [the ] ap pe a l, b a se d u

po n th e re c or d, the pa

rt ie s' ple a din g s, andth e C ou rt 's' preced ent , t hat is favo rabl e to th e app ell ant ." Le ma tta v . B ro wn , 8 Vet.App. 504, 50 8 ( 19 96 ); se e als o Sm ith (W ilf re d) v . B ro wn , 8 Vet.App. 327, 328, 330- 31 (1995) ( rec og nizi ng that appellant wa s preva iling par ty under Sh ala la and Sti llwe ll , both su pra , wher e appellant had initiated settlement neg otiations for re m an d , neg otiations had failed, a nd appellant ha d then ar g ued for

reve rsal, but Court had vacated BVA decision and rema nded claim). The Supreme Court has held: The touchstone of

the pre vailing pa

rty inquiry must be the mate ria l al te ra tio n of

the legal relationsh ip of the parties in a mann e r w hic h Con g re ss s ou g ht t o p ro mot e in t h e fe e st atute. Where such a c hang e has oc curr ed, the de g ree of the plainti ff 's overa ll succe ss g oes t o the re asonable ness of the a war d under Hensley [ v . Ec k e rh ar t , 461 U.S. 424 (1983)], not to t he ava ilability of a f ee a war d vel non.5

Te x as Sta te Te ac he rs As s'

n v. Ga rla nd

In de pe nd e nt S c ho ol D ist

. , 489 U.S. 782, 792-93 (1989) (e mph a sis a dd e d) ; see also Farrar v. Hobby , 506 U.S. 103, 109-14 (1992) ( "pr evailing party inquiry does not turn on the mag nitude of the re lief obtained" ). I n the instant case , the appe llant rec eived a reve rsal as to one claim and a vacatur as to the others, ruling s that the Court finds to have be en " favor able to the a ppellant"

. L e ma tta , su

pr a . Severa l fac tors influence d the Court' s decision here

. First, all of the a ppeale d claims wer e re manded, resolutions which mater ially chang ed the " leg al re lation s h i p " b etwee n the Secr etar y and the appellant, Te

x a s S ta teTe a c h e r

s A s s 'n , su pra , from one of claim denial to a continuing adjudicatory proce ss. Second, the appe llant states that he initially attempted to neg otiate a se t t l em en t wi t h the Secre tary , including a

rema nd as t o the rating c laims, and that his attorney "ma de seve n additional attempts to pursue and w ork ou t a compr omise or settlement" , but was unsucc essful ea ch time. J an. 19, 2000, Resp. at 2- 3. The Sec reta ry does not ref

ute this contention. The appe llant subsequently

argued for reve rsal as to a ll of the claims; howeve r, the Court r ever sed only as to the fee -basis-c are claim, vac ated a nd rema nded as to the TD I U and e x trasche dular-r ati n g cl ai ms, and deeme d abandone d the sche dular-r ating -incre ase c laim. Third, the S ecr etar y initially conce ded the appellant' s preva iling-pa

rty s t at u s an d only

afte r the Court orde red suppleme ntal briefingdid the Secre tary raise a question as t o t h at i ssue. Four th, in his March 27, 2000, re sponse, the Secr etar y reque sts that the Court redef ine the ter m "pr eva i l i n g party " in or der to e x clude the a ppellant from preva iling-pa

rty status. I n the alter

native, he a

rg ues that, under

the Court' s cu rr en t case law, the question of the diffe renc e betwe en a r ever sal and a rema nd would not a ffe ct preva iling-pa rty status but would more prope rly be conside red dur ing the deter mination of the rea sonablene ss of the amount of the fe es re quested. The Sec reta

ry ' s last argument alone is suffic ient to prompt t h e C o urt to conclude that the appellant is a pr evailing party . Although it could, of course , seek to c larify

previous ca selaw, a

panel of this Court cannot transf orm the pre vailing- party -status ana ly sis from whether the appe llant ga ined

so me of the be ne fi t soug ht in bring ing the suit, see Similes and Sti llwe ll , both su pra , to whether

the "r emand or dere d by

the Court . . . result[ed] i n the ultimate merits relief re q u es t ed , [or]

. . . establish[ed] any

ty pe of e ntitlement to the benefits soug ht", a s the Secre tary now proposes. Mar . 27, 20 00 , Re sp . at 7. No r is the Court inc lin e d tow ard any su c h tr ans fo rm a tio n th a t w ou ld e xclu de thi s6

appellant f

rom preva iling-pa

rty status. We do not agr ee w ith the Secre tar y , or our dissenting colleague, that the appellant has not a chieve d signific ant succe ss by virtue of the Court' s remand a s to the two issues in question, which on rema nd rema in very

much alive r ather

than beingfore closed as they would have be en had the Court a ffirme d the BV A decision. In the context of adjudication in this C ourt, outrig ht reve rsal on the m erits has be en ver y rar e. See Wil liam F. F ox , J r., An An aly sis of t he J ur isp ru de nc e, O rg

an iza tio n, an d Ope ra tio n of the Ne west Art ic le On e Cou rt 70-77 (2d. e d. 1998). T h at i s b ec ause this Court can r ever se as to fa ctual dete rminations, which ar e the matter s i n v o l v edi nt h e v as tm aj o ri t y o f ap p ea l edca s es , o n l y w h e r e t h e C o u rt fi n d s t h at t h e B o ar d 's fac tfinding is " clea

rly err oneous" under 38 U .S.C. § 7261(a)(4) , see , e.g. , Be aty v . B ro wn , 6 Vet.App. 532, 538-39 (1994) -- that is, whe re it lacks a plausible basis in the rec ord, see Gilbert v. De rwinski , 1 V e t.A pp . 4 9, 53 (1 99 0) ; se e als o H e ns le yv . W est , 212 F.3d 12 5 5 , 1 263-64 (F ed. Cir. 2000) (discussing section 7261(a)(4) ) -- or finds under 38 U.S.C. § 7261(a) (3) that the B oard ha s made a n
e rr or of law that requires the awa rd of a benef it without further exami n ation of the fa cts or

rea djudication afte r the duty to assist is carried out, see , e.g. , Bentley v. De rwinski , 1 Vet.App. 28, 31 (1 99 0) . Wh e re the Court re ma nd s f or re a dju dic a tio n in

or de r f or the Se c re tary

to c omp ly

wi th VA' s 38 U.S.C. § 5107(a) duty to assist, se e Ha y re v . W est , 188 F.3d 1327, 1331- 32 (F ed. Cir. 1999), or the B oard' s 38 U.S.C. § 7104(d)(1) obliga t i o n t o provide a n adequate statement of r easons or bases for its decisions, se e Gi lbe rt , 1 Vet.App. at 56-57, the result on rema nd may often be the awa

rd of a V A bene fit. Acc ording ly , based on this Court' s curr ent pre v ai l i n g -par ty case law, the Court holds, as the Secr etar

y admitted in his most rec ent pleading , that under c urre nt case law the a ppellant i s a p r e v a i l i n g p a

rt y. Fur thermore , as the Supre me Court has held: " Where [a mater ial alteration of the leg al relationship of the parties] has occur red, the deg ree of the plaintiff' s overa ll suc cess goe s t o t he

rea sonablene ss of the aw ard unde r [ Ec k e rh ar t , su pra ], not to the availability of a fee awa rd vel non." Texas State Teache rs Assoc. , 489 U. S. at 7 92 -9 3. He nc e , a s th e Se c re tary ha s a lso a g re e d, be c a

us e the va c a tur

of the B VAde c isi on

ha s mate ri a lly

c ha ng e d the legal re la tio ns hip of the pa rt ie s, it

ma tte rs no t a s to the pr e va ili ng -p art y ana ly sis tha

t th e a pp e lla nt s ou g ht a

re ve rs a l but g a ine d o nly

a vac atur; rather, that mat t er i s to be consider ed as a part of the Court's c onsideration of the

rea sonablene ss of the fe e, if a n awa rd is made.7 C. Su bstant

ial Jus tification Be cause the appe llant has alleg ed that the Secre tary ' s position wa s not substantially justified, Ap pli c a tio n at 3- 5, the Se c re ta ry " ha s th e burd e n o f p ro vin g tha t [hi s] po sit io n w a s su

bs tanti a lly justified in order to defe at the appellant' s EAJ A application". Sti llwe ll , 6 Ve t.A pp . at 30 1. He mus t

car ry this burden as to his actions both in the administrative stag e (B VA adjudication) and in the litigation stag e (be fore this Court). Se e Loc he r v . B ro wn , 9 Ve t.A pp . 5 35 , 5 37 (1 99 6) ; ZP v . B ro wn , 8 Vet.App. 303, 304 (1995). Althoug h the Secr etar y did not even addr ess substantial justification in his original response , the Court or dere d him to addr ess that issue in supplemental brief ing. T he Secre tary n o w ar gu es that his positi ons at both the administrative and litig ation stag es we re
su bs tanti a lly

jus tif ie d, re sp e c tiv e ly , b e c a

us e on the qu e sti on

wh e the r t he B oa rd ha d ju ri sd ic tio n to consider the appellant' s fee -basis-c are claim t he BVA de cision "w as not contra ry to prec edent then standing and it reli ed u p o n historical interpre tations of VA re g ulations" a nd "the Secre tary cooper ated in spee dily

resolving the litigation phase of t h i s case based upon r ece nt chang es and evolutions in the Court's ca selaw." Fe b. 4, 2000, Resp. at 3-4. I n Sti llwe ll , the Court noted t hat "' a posi tion can be j ustified even though it is not corre ct, and [t hat] . . . it can be substantially (i.e., for the m ost part) justi fied if a rea sonable pe rson could think it corr ect , t hat is , if it has a reas on abl e bas is in law andfact .'" Sti llwe ll , 6 Vet.App. at 302 (quoting Piercev. Unde rwood , 4 87 U. S. 552 , 566 n. 2 (19 88 ))

. Th e Cou rt pr ov ide d f

ur the r a mpl if ic a tio n in Sti llwe ll , a s f

oll ow s: Tw o s pe c ia l c ir c ums tanc e s ma y a lso ha ve a be ari ng up on the re a so na ble ne ss of the litigation posit ion of the VA , and of the action or ina ction by the VA at the administrative level. One is the evolution of VA benef its lawsince the c reation of this Court that has often resulted in new, dif fer ent, or more stringe nt require ments for a dju dic a tio n. Th e se c on d is that so me c a se s b e fo re thi s Co ur t are on es of

fi rs t imp re ssi on

inv ol vi ng g oo d f

a ithargume nts of

the g ov e rnme nt t

hat are e ve ntu a lly re je c te d b y the Court

. Sti llwe ll , 6 Vet.App. at 303. "T o deter mine whether

the Secr etar

y has demonstrated that his position was ' ' rea sonable' during the administrative and litig ation stag es, the Court looks, r espec tively , to the

' rele vant, deter

minative circ umstances' and to the 'circ umstances surrounding the re solution of the di sp ut e'." J

ac k so n v . W est , 12 Vet.App. 422, 426 ( 1999).8

1
. F e e - B a s i s - C a r e C la i m. As to the administrative stag e, the que stion is whether the Se cre tary ' s long- standing interpre tation of the applica ble statutory

and re g ulatory

provisions was

s u b s t antially

justified. The Court rema nded base d on new Court ca selaw, Me ak in , s u p ra , that clar ified an issue of

first impression befor e the Court. See Swiney , su pra . I n Felton v . B ro wn , th is Court held: We emphasize, howeve r, that we are not a dopting a per se rule that a case of first impression will alway s rende r the Gover nment' s position subs tantially justified. On the contr ary , whether

a ca se is one of f

irst impression is only

one fa ctor for

the Court to consider. In Edwards v. Griepentrog , 783 F. Supp. 522 , 5 2 5 (D. Nev. 1991), the United States District Cou rt fo r the District of Ne vada w rote: " [T] he EA JA do e s not sug g e st that an ag e nc y ' s posi tio n is subs ta nti a lly jus tif ie d b e c a us e its policy g oes y ear s without challeng e or c hang e." Felton , 7 Vet.App. 276, 281 ( 1994). The Court in Felton went on to note that EAJA fee s would be

a va ila ble wh e re the a

pp lic a ble statut or

y or reg ulator

y pr ov isi on s p ro vid e d o ne , p la in m e anin g , to which the g overnme nt's inter pretation was clea

rly contra ry
. Id . at 281-82. I n the instant c ase, a s in Felton , there is no statement i n the under ly ing me rits decision that in d ic a te s w h e th e r th e Co u rt f o u n d th e Se c r e ta

r y ' s ar g u me n ts r e a s o n a

ble. S ee Swiney , su

pra . We note, howeve r, that the fe e-ba sis-car e issue that wa s decide d in this case i s the identical issue that was de termined by

this Court i n Me ak

in , su pra , and that the Sec reta ry ' s arguments were also the

same. This Court in Me ak in held t hat t he S ecr etar

y ' s interpre tation of t he applicable statutory and regulatory

provisions were contra

ry to "the pla in meaning " of

those provisions. M

e a k in , 11 Vet.App.

a t 18 6- 87 . In d e te rm ini ngthat th e Se c re tary ' s in ter pr e ta tio n o f h is o wn

re g ulatio n w a s not to be g iven defe renc e, the Court stated that "[s]uch de fer ence in not war rante d unless th e i n t erpr etation 'sens ib ly con for ms to th e pu rpo se an d wo rdi ng of t he re gulat io n[ ] .'" Me ak in , 11 Vet.App. at 187 (q u o t i n g M

a r ti n v
. O c c u

p a ti o n a l S

a fe ty a n d H e a lt h R e v ie w C

o m m 'n , 499 U.S. 144, 151 (1991)). Be cause the Court in M

e a k in h el d that

the Secretary's interpretation was c ontrary to "the plain meaning " of

the applica

ble statutory

a n d regulatory

provisions, Me ak

in , 11 Vet.App. at 186-87,

we c onclude that the Sec reta ry ' s position as to reg ulatory interpre tation at the administrative level did not have " ' a re asonable basis in law and f act' ", S til lwe ll , 6 Ve t

. Ap p
. at 3 0 2 (q u o t i n g Pierce , s up ra ), and hold there fore that the Secr etar y ' s position at the administ rative stag e wa s not substantially

justified as to t h e fee -basis-c are issue. See F elton , su pra ; see also L.G. Lefler, Inc.9

v. United States , 8 01 F .2 d 3 87 , 3 89 -9 0 ( F e d. Cir . 1 98 6) ; Dev ine v. Suterm eister , 733 F.2d 892, 895 (F ed. Cir. 1984). Havingconclude d that the Secr et ar y wa s not substantially justified in his posi tion at the administrative stag e, the Court ne ed not a ddress whether the g overnme nt's litig ation position before this Court was substantially justified. See Loche r

and ZP , both su

pra . 2. Rat ing Cla ims. The Secre tary makes no argument on this iss ue. Ac cording ly , the Court holds that the Secre tary

has not met his burden to show that his position as t o the appe llant's r ating claims was substantially

justified. See W

est ( Bi lly ) v . W est , 13 Vet.App. 25, 27- 28 (1999) (where Se c re tary do e s n ot m a ke argume nt a s to wh e the r h is po sit ion on pa rt ic ula r m a tte r w a s su

bs tanti a lly justified he has not met his burden to show substantial justificatio n as to that position). Alternatively , the Court notes that the Secr etar y conce ded at the m er i t s stag e that as to the r ating claims the B oard ha d er re d i n fa i l i n g "to discuss 38 C.F.R. § 4.16(c ) and that the rec ord of pr oc e e din g s w a s in a de qu a te be c a us e the B oa

rd br e a c he d it s d

uty to a ssi st b y

no t sec ur inga

c omp le te med ica l ex ami nat io n wit h resp ect to th e app ell ant 's le vel of i mp air men t. " Swiney , 1998 WL 637212,

a t * 1

. T h e C o u rtt h u s h o l d s t h a tt h e S e c r e t ar y w a s n o ts u

b s t an t i a l l y

j u s t i f i e d i n , a tt h e l e a s t , h is

a dmi nis tr a tiv e po sit ion

a s to the ratin g c la ims

.

D. Special Circum stances Be latedly , the S ecr etar

y argues t hat t here are specia l circ umstances here that make an a war d unjust. Feb. 4, 2000, Resp. at 9-11. Pursuant to section 2412(d)( 1 )( A) , a co u rt may not gr ant an EA JA a wa rd if " t h e c o u rtf i n d s
. . . t h a ts p e c i a l c i r c u m s t an c e s m a d e anaw ar d u n j u s t

. " 3 8 U

. S

. C. § 2412(d)( 1)(A) . "' Special cir cumstance s' is an aff irmative def

ense a s to which the g o v e r

nme nt bear s t h e b u r d e no f

r a i s i n g an d d e m o n s t r a t i n g t h a t s u c h s p e c i a l c i r c u m s t an c e s m i l i t a t e a g a i n s tanE A JA award ." Chesser , 11 Vet.App. at 502. This Court will find " specia l circumstanc es" wher e either (1) the Se c re tary

ha s p ro ff e re d " no ve l but c re dib le e xten sio ns and int e rp re ta tio ns of the law" or (2 ) i n "situations 'wh er e equitable considerations dictate an a war d should not be made' ". Ib id (quoting Do ria v . B ro wn , 8 Ve t.A pp . 1 57 , 1 62 (1 99 5) ). Suc h e qu ita ble c on sid e ratio ns rely

pr e do min a te ly upon asser

tions that an appellant ha s "'u n cl ean ha nds' ". Chesser , su

pra (q u o t i n g Pe rry

v . W est , 11 Vet.App. 319, 325 ( 1998)).10

The Sec reta

ry does not contend he re that the appellant has "unc lean hands" but a rg ues that t h i s ca s e i n v o l v eda "n o v el b u tcr ed i b l e" a rgu m en tt h at h adn o tb ee nl i t i g a t e d p ri o r t o t h i s C o u rt 's opinion in Me ak

in , su pra , w hic h h a d b e e n d e c ide d a ft e r t he Se c re tary ' s lit ig a tio n ple a din g s. " Th is

' safe ty valve' helps to insure that the Gover nment is not deterre d from adva ncing in good f

aith the novel but cre dible extensions and interpretations of the la w that often unde rlie vig orous enf orce ment eff orts." H .R. Rep. No. 96-1418, at 11 (1980), re pr int e d in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4984, 4990. Howeve r, we hold that the Secre tary ' s "spe cial cir cums tance s" de fense is unavailing here for the

same re asons that the Secre tary has not de monstrated "substantial justification" for his interpr etation of his ow n regulation. See L.G. Lefler , su pra (h o l d i n g n o s p ec i al ci rc u m s t an ce s wh er e, al t h o u gh issue had n o t p re v i o usly

been de cided, the g overnme nt "should cle arly have r ecog nized that . . . [t ]here wa s . . . no tenable g round for [i ts conduct]"). Be ca u s e the gove rnment has de monstrated

ne ith e r r e a so na

ble jus tif ic a tio n f or its po sit ion

no r s pe c ia l c ir c ums tanc e s ma kin g a fe e awa rd un jus t, the a pp e lla nt i s e nti tle d to re a so na

ble a tto rn e y

fe e s. E. Severability of Rating-Cl aim and Fee-Basis-Care-Claim Issues Th e Se c re tary

ra ise s th e iss ue of the se ve ra bil ity of the ratin g -c la im a

nd fe e -b a sis -c are -c la im issues. Howeve r, as we conclude d in pa rt I I .B., a bove, the Sec reta

ry ' s position as to bot h the rating

c la ims and th e fe e -b a sis -c are iss ue wa s n ot s ub sta nti a lly jus tif ie d. He nc e , th e re is n o r e a so n to consider the question of the seve rability of those matter s. Se e Cal ma v . W est , 12 Vet.App. 66, 69 (1 99 8) ; Elc

y zy n v . B ro wn , 7 Vet.App. 170, 177 ( 1994).

F. Reasonabl

eness of Fee

s The Court will g ener ally g rant the reque sted amount of EAJA fees a nd expenses "w here the hours claime d ar e n o t (1) unr easona ble on their fa ce, ( 2) otherw ise contra indicated by the fa ctors itemiz ed in Hensley , 461 U.S. at 430 n.3, or Us se ry [ v . B ro wn , 10 Vet.App. 51, 54 ( 1997)], for measuring rea sonablene ss, or (3) persua sively opposed by the Secr etar

y ." Chesser , 11 Vet.App. at 50 1- 02 . H e re , th e a tto rn e y c arr ie d ou t ve ry su bs tanti a l re pr e se ntatio n of his c lie nt, fi lin g fo ur br ie fs , two motions, and a response

. The Sec reta

ry contend s that the $7,000 in fee s (56 hours at $125 e ach) that the appe llant reque sted for the prepa

ration and filing of the amicus brie f in the Quigley a pp e a l are no t r e a so na

ble and should not be awa

rded beca use, in essenc e, the Quigley amicus brief

was filed in a

separ ate c ase.11

The a ppellant ar g ues that the Swineyand Q u ig le y ca ses wer e so inextricably intertwined that the hours s pent on Quigley

should be compensa

ble in the Swineyappea l, and that the appe llant's attorney

was c ompelled to file an a micus brief in Quigley

in order to pr ovide prope r re pres en t at i o n for the appellant in thi s case
. The Court not es that the a ppellant has a lso requeste d $3,281.25 in fee s (26.25 hours at $125.00) f

or pre paration of his supplemental brief as to the fe e-ba sis-car e matter that was filed af ter Quigley

was de cided. This presents a

n issue of first impression bef ore the Court. The appe llant filed an amicus brief in Quigley as t o the Board' s jurisdiction to revie w fee-ba sis-car e determinations and, when that

case was not decide d on that issue, he subsequently incorporated t he languag e fr om that amicus brief i n t o h i s s u

p p l em en t al b ri ef

o nt h e f ee - b a s i s - c a r e i s s u e. P age s 6 -1 0 o f t h e ap p el l an t 's 1 9 -p age supplemen ta l b r ie f

in th is c a s e a

p p e ar to b e a v e r b a ti m t r an s c r ip t o f

p a g e s 3

- 8 o f

th e a mi c u s brief filed in Quigley

. The a ppellant her e ar g ues that if the issue ha d been de cided in Quigley , that deter mination would have c ontrolled in Swiney an d that, in order to a dvocate fully for his client, g iven that the Court had denied his motion to consolidate, he wa s ethically require d to be come involved in Quigley

. The appellant is not rea lly claiming fee s for be ing a n amicus in Quigley but r ather seeks fee s for the work that he did the re, on the g round that those hours of rese arc h and writing wer e on the same issue that he eve ntually prese nted t o the C ourt as part of hi s supplemental brief in Swiney . Courts have considere d fee s fo r wo rk outside the immediate a ppeal. See Nat'l Ass'

n of Concerned Ve terans

v . Secre tar

yof D e fe ns e , 675 F.2d 1319, 1335 ( D.C. Cir. 1982). "H oweve r, there must be a cle ar showing that the time was e x pended in pursuit of a succ essful re solution of the case in which fe es are b ein g clai med ." Ibid. ; cf. Lundin v. Mec ham , 980 F.2d 1450, 1463 ( D. C

. C i r. 1 9 9 2 ) (deny ing fe e s for a m i c u s w o r

k i no t h e r c a s e s w h e r e c o u rt" d i d

n o th a v e j u r i s d i c t i o no v e r t h e r e l a t e d

c a se s; th o s e c a s e s w e r e n e it

h e r an e s s e n ti a l s te p in c o n n e c ti o n w it h , n o r in an y w ay c o n tr o lling in the prosec ution of, the suit below") . The a ppellant has made such a showinghere

. The a ppellant claims 56 ho u rs fo r t he amicus br ief in Quigley and 26.25 hours f

or the supplemental brief

in this case. We dec ide not to reduc e the 56 or 26.25 hours, bec ause w e ag ree with the a

p p e ll an t' s ar g u me n t t

h a t i no r d e r

to r e p r e s e n t h is c li e n t p r o p e r ly h e n e e d e d

to f il e the amicus brief

in Quigley (and thus all the wor k was re ally

for Mr. Swiney

(and Mr . Webb, of course ))12

and that the a ctual re sear ch and w riting in Quigley can be transfe rre d to Swineybeca use the attorney used the same text in Swineyand conf ormed it to the fac ts of this case. We stress the nar

row pre cede ntial effe ct of what we dec ide today . That is, the award of fee s for hour s in connec tion with the prepar at i o n of the amicus brief is ver y much a pr oduct of the unusual circ umstances of this case, whe re the appellant had soug ht to consolidate his c ase with the

case in which he eventually filed an a micus brief, w here the Court had denie d such consolidation and

no te d th e a va ila

bil ity of an ami c us fi lin g , an d whe re the Court the n h a d p e rm itt e d th e a

pp e lla nt t o file such a

n amicus brief

. The re sult h er e s h o u l d n o t be re ad as pe rmitting EAJA fees in c ase B based on hours worke d to pr oduce either (1) an amicus brief filed in c ase A wher e t h e attorney

un dert oo k rep res ent ati on in case B after filing the amicus brief or (2) a brie f filed in ca se A whe re the attorne y

was re prese nting the a

ppellant in case A. We a lso no te that " [w]he re a pla int if f h a s o bta ine d e xce lle nt r e su lts , h is atto rn e y sh ou ld

rec over a fully

compensatory

fee ." Ec k e rh ar t , 461 U.S. at 434-35. Althoug h the Court may reduc e fee s if the appe llant has bee n g rante d only limit ed succ ess as to a particula r matter, se e id . at 436; Smith (W ilfred) , 8 Vet.App. at 328, 330-31, the Court ha s held that there is n o i n here nt

u n re as o n ab l en es s i n fe es ch ar ged fo r t i m e sp en t i n p re p ar i n g b ri ef s t h at s u p p o rt re v er s al ev en t h o u gh the Secre tary has, as here , alre ady ag ree d to a re mand, see Sm ith (W ilfred) , su pra (holding that there

was no re ason to reduc e appe llant's a war d wher e Secr etar

y was willing to ag ree to remand but appellant argued for

reve rsal). The Supreme Court empha siz ed in Farrar that " ' the de g re e of

su c c e ss obtained' " is "' the most critical fa ctor' in determining the re asonable ness of a fee awa rd"

. Farrar , 5 0 6 U. S

. at 1 1 4 (qu o t i n g Ec k e rh ar t , 461 U.S. at 436). As we stressed in par t I I .B., a b o ve, the

re mand s w on

by the a pp e lla nt i n th is c a se re pr e se nt a hig h d e g re e of

su c c e ss i n thi s Court

. Th a t is

e ve n mo re so in l ig ht o f t he re c e nt o pin ion

by the U. S. Co ur

t of Ap pe a ls f

or the F e de ra l Cir c uit

in Hensley , su

pra , w hic h mi g ht h a ve the e ff e c t of pla c ingfu

rt he r r e str ic tio ns on thi s Court ' s po we r t o
re ve rs e B VAde c isi on s e ve n w he re the B oa rd ha s ma de " c le arl y

e rr on e ou s" fi nd ing s o f f

a c t. Finally , as to our re view of the amount of the a war d s o u gh t , the Secr etar y argues that the appellant' s counse l "u n d u ly protrac ted" the litigation in this Court by not ag ree ing to the r emand proposed by

the Secr etar

y on the extraschedula

r-r ating and TDI

U claims. Secr etar

y ' s Mar. 27, 2000, Re sp . at 11 -1 3 ( c iti ng28 U. S.C. § 2 41 2( d) (1 )( C) (" court

. . . ma y re du c e
. . . o r d e ny

an a wa rd , to13

the extent that the preva iling party

. . . unduly and unre asonably

protrac ted the fina l resolution of the matter" )). We ha

ve examined the appellant' s arguments on these issues, Appellant' s Dec . 27, 1996, Re sp . at 2- 4; May 16 , 199 7, B ri e f at 11 -2 1; Sep t. 5, 199 7, Re ply B ri e f at 2- 8, and fi nd that be c a us e t h e y w e r e n o tf

r i v o l o u s i ns e e k i n g r e v e r s a l t h e a p p e l l an td i d

n o t dr a g o u t t h e l i t i g a t i o nu n r e a s o n a b l y. Rather, his re prese ntation w a s in th e best tradition of full compliance with his professional oblig ation to repre sent his client "w ith c ommitm ent and dedication to the interests of the client and w ith z eal in advoca cy

upon the client' s behalf" . Americ an B ar A sso ci at i on Model Rules of Professional Conduct, Rule 1.3, Comm en t [ 1 ] , as adopted by this Court i n Rule 1(b) of the Court's Rules of Ad mis sio n a nd Pr a c tic e . H ow e ve r, be c a us e he ob ta ine d le ss t

ha n f ull su c c e ss o n th e se se ve ra ble issues, the Court will reduce the fe e re quest by one-qua rter of the hours claimed ( 176.8 hours) for work on these claims (by

44.2 to 132.6 hours) and w ill adjust t he aw ard a ccor dingly

. Se e Ec k e rh ar t , 461 U.S. at 437 (noting that Court has wi d e dis cre tion in EAJ A awa rds and that " [w] hen an adjustment is requested on the basis of either the ex ceptional or limi ted nature of the re lief obtained by the plaintiff, the . . . c ourt should make clear that it has consider ed the r elationship betwee n the

a mou nt of the fe e awa

rd e d a nd the re su lts ob ta ine d" ); se e als o U tti e ri v . B ro wn , 7 Vet.App. 415, 419 (1995) ( reduc ing numbe r of hour s, based on rea s o n ab l en ess, including , in part, " time expended [unsuccessfully ] on . . . reversa l of the B VA dec ision as clear ly err oneous" ). G. Supplem ental EA JA Appli cation "T he sole c onsideration in de t er m i n i n g a fe es-f or-f ees suppleme ntal application is one of

reas on abl enes s. " Mc

Ne e ly ( Al lan ) v . W est , 1 2 V e t.A

pp . 1 62 , 1 64 (1 99 9) ; se e als o Coo k v . B ro wn , 6 Vet.App. 226, 240 ( 1994)

. Her e, the appellant has been succe ssful on the EAJ A application, and the Secr etar y h as n o t contested his application for fe es for fee s. Thus, the Court will gra nt the amount reque sted in the supplemental EAJA application.

III. Conclusi on Up on c on sid e ratio n o f th e fore g oin g ana ly sis and the ple a din g s o f t

he pa rt ie s, the Court , having held t hat t he S ecr etar y ' s position was not substantially justified and that there are no specia l

c i r c u m s t an c e s t h a t

w o u l d m a k e anaw ar d

u n j u s t , g r an t s i np artt h e D e c e mb e r 2 , 1 9 9 9 , E A JA application, in t h e re d u ce d amount of $27,009.69 ($26,856.25 f or fe es and the full amount for14

expenses) and g rants in full the Marc h 26, 1999, supplemental EAJA application (in the amount of $718.75). APPL I CATI ON GRANTE D I N PA R T AND SUPPL EMENTAL APPL I CATI ON G RA N T E D IN F U LL.

NEB EKER, Chief Judge , co n cu rr i n g in part: Ba rg aining for more than is offe red is as leg itimate when it comes to reme dies on appea l as i t is any wher e in a give- and-take world. So long

a s t h e b a s i s f

o r t h e g r e a t e r r e m e dy i s n o t f r i v o l o u s , s e e k i n g t h a t r e m e dy i s qu i t e c on sis te nt w ith

c ouns e l' s p ro fe ssi on a l ob lig a tio n. I n th is i ns tanc e , c ouns e l' s perfo rm anc e wa s mo st p ro fe ssi on a l. Th e fa c t th at th e Co urt d id n ot g ra nt t he a pp e lla nt a re ve rs a l is , in

my vie w, ir re le va nt t o h is entitlement to the full EAJ A awa rd. To be sure , courts in some instance s reduc e EAJA awar ds when c erta in issues are r aised but

u l t i m a t e l y p r o v e t o b e u n a v a i l i n g
. H o w e v e r , e n g a g i n g i n s u c h a c a l c u l a t i o n b o r d e r s , o f n e c e s s i t y, on the ar b it r ar y
. I n th is , a s in mo s t a

p p e a ls , I c an f

in d n o r a ti o n a l w ay to tr e a t th e matt e r as other than a unitar

y event. A la

wy er ma y leg itimately

prese nt a difficult " cutting e dg e" issue which the Court may

choose to avoid deciding by ruling for that party on another

less signific ant issue. The attorney should not be left to do so at the client’s peril. As to oral ar g ument, Iquestion whether the Court c ou ld r a tio na lly

c ut t he fe e fo r p re pa

ratio n a nd pr e se ntatio n o f t

he argume nt b y

the tim e devoted to an issue o r i s s u es which the Court chooses not to rea ch while r uling f or that par

ty on
so me oth e r i ssu e . I

su bmi t th a t th e ult imate fa c t th a t an a pp e lla nt p re va ils on

a re la tiv e ly

sim ple iss u e - - th e k in d o f is s u e w h e r e o n e is li k e ly to f in d a la c k o f s u

b s ta n ti a l ju s ti f

ic a tion by

the Se c re tary -- ha

rd ly make s th e selec tio n a

nd br ie fi ng of oth e r i ssu e s a

us e le ss o r n on c omp e ns a ble endea vor. Ac c or din g ly , I

wo uld g ra nt t he fe e a pp lic a tio ns in f

ull

. I n li ght of the dis se nt, my vo te

ne c e ssa ri ly inc lud e s th e pa

rt ia l amou

nt g ra nte d b y the aut ho r of

the op ini on

of the Court

. Reg rettably , in my

view, the a

ppellant will have to settle for the re duced a

war d.

HOL DAWAY, Judge, dissenting: I respe ctfully

dissent with the holding of the majority . I would deny

the appli cation for

EAJA fees for

three rea sons. First, I

would find that the appe llant15

ha s n ot e sta

bli sh e d th a t he is the pr e va ili ngpar ty in t he un de rl y ingdis pu te be fo re thi s Co ur t. S e c o n d , I w o u l d h o l d t h a t s p e c i a l c i r c u m s t an c e s e xi s t w h i c h w o u l d p r o h i b i t t h e p ay m e n t o f E A JA fee s. Third, Ibelieve that the Secre tary ' s liti g ation position was substantially justified. As noted by

the majority , in order to be elig ible for EA J A fe es, the a ppellant must show that he is the prevailing party

. Se e Sti llwe ll v . B ro wn , 6 Vet.App. 291 ( 1994). In the under ly ing dispute, the issue bef

ore the Court was the a

ppropr iate re medy

for the B oard' s proce dural e rror s. The Secre tary conce ded that the Boa

rd err ed and argued that the Court should vacate the B oard' s decision

an d re m an d t h e m a t t e r fo r r ea d

j u d i ca t i o n
. T h e a

p p el l an tex p re s s l y

d i s agr ee d

wi t h t h e S ec re t ary 's

conce ssion of err or and pressed this Court to rever se the B oard' s decision. Afte r re viewing the argument s prese nted by

the par ties, the Court found the Secr etar y ' s remedy

appropr iate and

rema nded the matter

to th e Board. The ref

ore, the appellant is not the pre vailing pa rty for the purp os e s o f E AJA f

e e s b e c a us e the Cou

rt fo un d in fa vo r o f t he Se c re tary . Wh ile the Court did

rema nd the m atter, the appellant sim ply did not preva il as he did not have a ny succe ss in pressing for r ever sal as the e x clusive appr opriate r emedy . As a result, I would find that the g overnme nt, not the a pp e lla nt, pr e va ile d b e fo re thi s Co ur t. Assuming a

rg uendo that the a

ppellant p re v ail ed on the mer its, I would find that specia l circumstances e x ist which would prohibit the pay ment of EAJA fees. See 2 8 U .S. C. § 2412(d)( 1)(A)

. The appellant would be, in e ffe ct, g etting f ees not ba sed on what he did befor e the Court, but on the basis of the work the Secre tary did in urg ing the reme d y t h at wa s g rante d, i.e.,

rema nd. As noted above , the Secr etar y conce ded that a re m an d was necessa ry . Nonethele ss, the appellant a

rg ued that the Court should reve rse the B oard' s decision. The impetus for the litigation befor e the Court wa s the appe llant's r efusa l to acce pt the rema nd offe red by

the Secre tary . Thus, the

a pp e lla nt' s f e e s w e re wh oll y

inc ur re d in purs uin ga

re ve rs a l of

the B oa rd ' s dec isi on and

ob je c tin g to the re medy that was ultimately g rante d. I f the Court w ere to pe rmit EA J A fee s in this instance, the re
wo uld be no inc e nti ve fo r t

he a ppell ant to acce pt t

he Se c re tary ' s c on c e ssi on of e rr or and a vo id needle ss liti g ation. Cf. 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)( C) (" The c ourt, in its dis cre tion, may reduc e the amount to be awa

rded pur suant to this subsection, or to deny an aw ard, to the e x tent that the preva iling par

ty durin g t h e course of the proc eeding s eng ag ed in conduc t which unduly and

unrea sonably

protrac ted the fina l resolution of the m at t er in c ontroversy .") I n eff ect, by g ranting16

E A JA f e e s i n t h i s i n s t an c e , t h e C o u rtw o u l d b e g r an t i n g t h e a

p p e l l an ta f r e e l i c e n s e t o i n c u r

E A JA fee s even if he has no hope of actua lly obtaining the relief

soug ht, i.e., reve rsal of the Boa rd dec ision. The Sec reta

ry would also be disinclined to offe r a c oncession of e rro r and avoid the c osts of li t i gat i o n beca

use he know s that an appe llant will nonetheless attempt to obtain a re versa l. Of

course , if the appe llant pressed f or a r ever sal and wa s succe ssful, he w o u l d b e co n s idere d a preva iling par

ty and be e ntitled to EAJ A. I n this way , there are ap p ro p ri ate ince ntives and disin ce n t i v es for both par ties to procee d and avoid unne cessa ry litigation. I

do not condemn the

a pp e lla nt o r h is atto rn e y fo r pr e ssi ng fo r re ve rs a l. Hi s a tto rn e y c e rt a inl y wa s a dv oc a tin g zea lou sly in the best interests of his client. I simply believe that the appellant should not be re imbursed under EAJA when that advoca cy was not succ essful. I f he was "succ essful," he was only succe ssful in a marg in a l w ay an d th e f

e e s , a t a mi n im

u m, s h o u ld b e r e d

u c e d , I th ink mo r e dr a s ti c a ll y th a n the majority has re duced the m, beca

use of his minimal and partial " succe ss." Finally , I would find that the g overnme nt's position was substantially justified. I n Sti llwe ll , the Court noted that it must t ake into ac count "the evolution of VA benef its law since the c reation of th e Co u rt th a t h a s o f te n r e s u lt e d in n e w , d if f e r e n t, o r mo r e s tr in g e n t r e qu ir e me nts for adjudication." 6 Vet.App. at 303. I f the Boa rd acte d consistently with judicia l prec edent a nd VA policy , the Court must conclude that the Secreta ry ' s position was subst antially justified. See O lney

v . B ro wn , 7 Vet.App. 160, 162 (1994). I n this case, pr ior to the Court' s decision in Me ak in v . W est , 11 Ve t.A pp . 1 83 (1 99 8) , th e B oa

rd ha d co ns ist e ntl y int e rp re te d 38 C.F .R. § 2 0. 10 1( b) to p ro hib it i t from ex er ci sing jurisdiction over the Secr etar

y ' s determination of w hether fee -basis outpatient t re atment was a

ppropriate . Prior to Me ak in , th e Co u rt h a d

n o t p r e v io u s ly

h e ld th a t t h e B o a rd actua lly possessed jurisdiction to make that finding

. Se e W e bb v . B ro wn , 7 Vet.App. 122 ( 1994) (re manding claim for fee -basis outpatient treatment f or inadequate rea sons a

nd bases)

. I n Me ak

in , the C ourt reve rsed and rema nded a Boa

rd dec ision which held that it did not have jurisdiction over that issue. Meak

in, 11 Vet.App. at 186. The Court he ld that w hile the B oard ma y be cor rec t in that it does not have jurisdiction over the Secre tary ' s ultim ate a uthorization of fee- basis outpatient treatment, it nonetheless possessed jurisdi ction to determine w hether the claimant may

initially be

e li g ib le f o r s u c h tr e a tm e nt. Id. I mmediately afte r the Court issued its decision in Me ak in , the Se c re tary con ceded th at a r e mand

wa s w arr ante d in

thi s c a se . B y

ho ldi ngthat it

did no t po sse ss17

jurisdiction, the Board ap p l i ed the interpre tation of the law w hich was in e x istence at that time. Al tho ug h th e Court

la te r h e ld t

hat su c h a

n in te rpr eta ti on

wa s in c on sis te nt w ith38 C.F .R. § 20.101(b), the i nterpre tation was re asonable g iven that the evolvingnature of this are a of V A benef its law. See O lney, 7 Vet.App. at 162 (g overnme nt's po sition prior to Thu rb e r v . B ro wn , 5 Ve t.A pp . 1 19 (1 99 3) , w a s su

bs tanti a lly

jus tif ie d) ; see also W

ebb , 7 Ve t

. Ap p
. at 1 2 5 -2 6 (B o ar d 's interpre tation of 38 C.F.R. § 20.101(b) was rea sonable) (Holdaw ay , J ., dissenting) . Iwould find that the Secr etar

y ' s position was substantially justified in r ely ing on a

rea sonable interpr etation of 38 C.F.R. § 20.101(b). To f

ind it unjustified, the majority appea rs to r equire the Boa

rd to have ha d the g ift of prophe cy

at the time i t rende red its decision. For this reason a nd the re asons desc ribed a bove, Iwould deny

the appe llant's a

pplication for EAJ A fe es. I hope the Sec reta

ry will seriously

consider reque sting a

n en banc hear ing in this eg reg ious case.