www.ndu.edu/inss SF No. 265 1 

Does the “Open Door” Face North?

The “Open Door” policy of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization 

(NATO) has been an article of faith for Allies and aspirants alike for 

more than a decade. Its most recent formulation, approved at the November 2010 Lisbon Summit, states: “The door to NATO membership remains 

fully open to all European democracies which share the values of our Alliance, 

which are willing and able to assume the responsibilities and obligations of membership, and whose inclusion can contribute to common security and stability.”1

In practice, however, near-term prospects for further enlargement toward 

Eastern and Southeastern Europe have stalled for various reasons:

◆ At Lisbon, NATO reiterated its agreement (at the April 2008 Bucharest Summit) to invite the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia 

to join the Alliance “as soon as a mutually acceptable solution to the 

name issue has been reached.”2 Greece continues to object, however, to 

its neighbor’s insistence on using its constitutional name, which is the 

Republic of Macedonia.

◆ Montenegro participates in NATO’s Membership Action Plan (MAP), 

but has yet to fully implement its first annual national program, while 

Bosnia-Herzegovina has yet to fulfill the conditions for full MAP participation set by NATO foreign ministers in April 2010.

◆ Although NATO reaffirmed at Lisbon its agreement (also at the previous Bucharest Summit) that Georgia would become a member of NATO, 

several Allies oppose inviting Georgia to join the MAP, especially given 

Finland, Sweden, and 

NATO: From “Virtual” 

to Formal Allies?

by Leo G. Michel

Strategic Forum

National Defense University

Ce

nter for Strategi

c

ReSEARCH

About the Author

Leo G. Michel is a Distinguished 

Research Fellow in the Center for 

Strategic Research, Institute for 

National Strategic Studies, at the 

National Defense University.

Key Points

◆ The United States has an overarching national security interest in European partners that broadly share 

U.S. values and are willing to help 

foster peace and security both 

regionally and globally. Since the 

early 1990s, Finland and Sweden 

have transformed their security 

policies and defense structures in 

ways that improve their ability to 

work closely with America.

◆ Finland and Sweden plan to maintain capable (albeit smaller) militaries, reflecting lingering doubts regarding Russia and rising concerns 

about other security challenges. 

Both favor close cooperation with 

the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), despite their official 

stance of “military non-alignment.”

◆ While Finland and Sweden have 

not asked to join NATO, the pros 

and cons of possible accession are 

discussed within their political and 

defense establishments. Finland is 

better positioned politically than 

Sweden to make a decision to seek 

NATO membership, although the 

Finnish government is unlikely to 

make such a move before 2012. The 

situation could then evolve quickly, 

depending on internal political 

alignments and factors such as 

NATO performance in Afghanistan 

and Russian attitudes regarding 

further Alliance enlargement.

February 2011
2 SF No. 265 www.ndu.edu/inss

its unresolved conflict with Russia over Abkhazia 

and South Ossetia.

◆ As for Ukraine, following his election in February 2010, President Viktor Yanukovych effectively 

shelved the previous government’s declared aspiration to join the Alliance.

These developments should not be cause for undue alarm. NATO’s successive rounds of enlargement in 

1999, 2004, and 2009 have contributed to the Alliance 

goal of “a just and lasting peaceful order in Europe” based 

on democratic values, human rights, and the rule of law.3

Still, the enlargement process has not been pain free, and 

numerous NATO member state officials and experts privately suggest that Eastern and Southeastern Partners 

must better demonstrate that they will be reliable “security providers” rather than “security consumers.” 

Since the early 1990s, Finland and Sweden have 

transformed their national security policies and defense 

structures in response to major changes in their strategic 

environment. The dramatic collapse of the Soviet Union 

in 1991 removed the most credible, near-term military 

threat to their territory and national independence. Over 

the following decade, the rapid waning of the Cold War 

ideological conflict and growing attractiveness of European integration eroded Finnish and Swedish motivations for pursuing neutralist foreign policies. The two 

countries now broadly accept the need to work closely 

with European and transatlantic partners to respond to 

security challenges in and beyond Europe.

Indeed, since joining the Partnership for Peace (PFP) 

in 1994, Finland and Sweden have developed such close 

ties with NATO, including their participation in NATOled operations in the Balkans and Afghanistan, that they 

are now widely regarded as “virtual Allies.” Neither country has asked to join the Alliance, in contrast with the dozen former Partners in Central, Eastern, and Southeastern 

Europe that have become members since 1999.4

Finnish and/or Swedish accession to NATO would 

depart from the enlargement paradigm set over the past 

11 years. Finland and Sweden are longstanding democFinnish and/or Swedish accession 

to NATO would depart from the 

enlargement paradigm set over 

the past 11 years 

racies and EU member states with advanced, generally 

high-performing economies.5 Their military forces were 

never subordinated to the Soviet-dominated Warsaw 

Pact, and they already have accumulated considerable 

experience in overseas (mainly peacekeeping) missions. 

Moreover, their regional security environment is relatively stable, especially when compared with the Balkans and 

South Caucasus. Thus, even Finns and Swedes who see 

NATO membership as an attractive option are generally 

disinclined to argue (as did their Baltic neighbors) that it 

is an urgent strategic imperative.

Why might Finland or Sweden want to change the 

status quo? How might Russia react to an eventual bid, 

by one or both countries, for NATO membership? What 

would be NATO’s equities? These are important questions 

as NATO considers how best to implement the enhanced 

dialogue and cooperation with Partners promised by the 

new Strategic Concept and Lisbon Summit Declaration.

Views from Helsinki

The Finnish debate over joining NATO has simmered at varying degrees of intensity for nearly a decade. 

At a geostrategic level, it is framed by Finnish relationships with Russia, other European partners, and the 

United States.

Russia. Russia is “the most important factor in 

Finland’s security environment,” according to the Finnish Security and Defence Policy 2009 (hereafter “Government Report”).6

 Finnish preoccupation with Russia is 

understandable, given the legacy of two bloody wars 

with the Soviet Union during 1939–1944 and Finland’s 

susceptibility to, and resentment of, security, political, 

and economic pressures exerted by Moscow over the 
www.ndu.edu/inss SF No. 265 3 

next 45 years. Indeed, Finland’s self-declared neutrality 

during the Cold War was primarily an exercise in realpolitik intended to protect the country from being drawn 

further under Soviet influence rather than to separate the 

country from the West.

In public, Finnish officials typically eschew any explicit suggestion that Russia poses a military threat to 

their country. However, they are adept at signaling their 

concern with Russia’s foreign policy assertiveness and its 

long-term intentions, especially in the wake of that country’s armed conflict with Georgia in August 2008. For 

example, Defense Minister Jyri Häkämies dismissed “any 

actual military threat against Finland” in an April 2010 

speech, but he quickly added: “According to the Russian 

world view, military force is a key element in how it conducts its international relations. . . . If [Russia’s] military 

procurement program [is] financed as expected, it will 

mean a much stronger Russia in military terms by the 

end of the next decade.”7

 Similarly, the Finnish Defense 

Command’s public assertion that “Finland’s defense is 

not built on any specific enemy or threat” seems belied 

by its subsequent clarification that the “focal point in developing Finland’s defense is planning how to prevent 

and repel a surprise strategic strike.”8 While unnamed, 

the hypothetical origin of such a strike is presumably no 

mystery to Finnish readers, especially when an accompanying chart of regional peacetime military forces depicts 

Russian quantitative advantages over Finland by factors 

of 1.25 for troops, 3.6 for surface ships and submarines, 

6.8 for armor, and 7.1 for combat aircraft.9

Finnish security interests regarding Russia are not 

limited to the military sphere. Finnish border guards, 

police (including counterterrorism units), and customs 

authorities focus their resources on securing the 1,200-

kilometer land border with Russia and closely monitoring its maritime activities in the northern Gulf of Finland. Some Finnish analysts cite widespread allegations 

of Russian involvement in the serious disruption of Estonian cyber networks in 2007 as an example of Moscow’s ability to intimidate neighbors while maintaining 

plausible deniability. Others cite ineffectual Russian environmental policies and practices as a major source of 

air and water pollution in and around Finland. Reported 

lapses in Russian safety standards and enforcement related to nuclear energy production and waste management 

are additional sources of Finnish nervousness.

In response to such concerns, Finland has not simply 

retreated into a defensive crouch. Instead, while keeping a 

close watch on Russian military- and security-related developments, it has pursued a broad agenda of cooperation 

with its neighbor. Indeed, Russia was Finland’s leading 

trading partner in terms of exports and imports in 2009, 

and Finland relies entirely on Russia for its natural gas 

supplies.10 In April 2009, the Finnish government’s “Russia Action Plan” emphasized the importance of building 

broader contacts, bilaterally as well as within European 

Union (EU) structures, to increase political dialogue, 

trade, tourism, investment, transportation links, cultural 

exchanges, and “to prevent negative phenomena which 

also impact Finland, such as crime and health hazards.”11

European Partnership. The EU, as a rule, enjoys pride 

of place in Finnish official statements, research papers, and 

press commentary on foreign policy matters. Finland regards its membership in the EU as an “integral element of 

(its) security policy,” according to the Government Report. 

The EU is a key actor in many nonmilitary areas that directly affect Finnish security in the broadest sense of the term, 

including immigration, energy, transportation, environmental change, and infectious diseases. In addition, since 1999, 

the EU has built new structures and taken on increased responsibilities in the areas of crisis management operations 

and development of civilian and military crisis management 

capabilities. Through its EU membership, Finland “aims to 

develop the European Union into an increasingly efficient 

and coherent actor (that) would directly contribute to Finland’s security and international position.”12

Overall, Finland has actively promoted development of the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and Common Security and Defense Policy 

(CSDP) as a means of advancing the common security 

of EU member states and the EU’s global influence.13

For example, during the Finnish Presidency of the EU 
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in 1999, its officials shepherded the launch of the ambitious “Helsinki Headline Goal,” whereby EU member 

states agreed to develop, by 2003, the ability to deploy 

up to 50,000–60,000 military personnel within 60 days 

and sustain them for at least 1 year in missions ranging 

from humanitarian and rescue actions to peacekeeping 

and separation of warring parties. Over the past decade, 

Finnish officials have served in responsible positions in 

the European Union’s defense- and crisis management–

related structures.

In line with its support for CSDP, Finnish personnel have participated in several EU-led military and civilian crisis management missions. Some 300 Finnish 

soldiers participate in the Nordic and German-Dutch 

“battlegroups” within the EU’s rotating system of rapid 

reaction forces; both battlegroups will be on standby status during the first half of 2011. (The EU has yet to deploy a battlegroup formation. Finnish parliamentarians 

recently questioned the cost-effectiveness of their country’s participation, noting that the 29-million-euro cost 

of keeping Finnish units on standby for the EU is nearly 

twice as much as the annual training cost for 26,000 reservists, and Defense Minister Häkämies has agreed to 

review the issue.) In addition, Finland plans to deploy a 

minesweeper with the EU antipiracy operation Atalanta

in early 2011. 

During the negotiations on the Lisbon Treaty, Finland strongly supported provisions aimed at improving 

EU defense capabilities and crisis management mechanisms. However, Finnish officials draw a careful distinction between the EU’s modest capabilities to conduct 

military crisis management tasks outside EU territory 

and the organization’s inability to provide for the collective defense of its member states.14 According to these 

officials, CSDP likely will have some beneficial effect 

on Europe’s ability to defend itself by facilitating intraEuropean cooperation on defense capabilities—notably 

through the European Defense Agency (EDA)—and 

broadening European experience in multinational operations. They also credit the Lisbon Treaty’s “mutual 

assistance” obligation with bolstering the EU’s political 

solidarity, thereby helping to deter external aggression 

against its member states.15

However, many of these same officials pointedly 

note that the EU has no planning or headquarters structures to support a collective defense mission. Moreover, 

many Finnish experts doubt that the EU would be able, 

in the foreseeable future, to muster the military capability and political will necessary to deter or defeat a potential aggressor. Their view remains essentially identical to 

a former Finnish official’s observation in 2005: “A separate European defense would be possible only if we could 

be completely certain that it will not be put to the test in 

a real situation.”16

Finland sees regional cooperation as another element of its national security. Accordingly, it has expanded bilateral and multilateral cooperation with Sweden 

and NATO Allies Norway, Denmark, and Iceland in 

recent years. In late 2009, for example, the five countries 

agreed to consolidate previously separate arrangements 

into a single structure: the Nordic Defense Cooperation 

(NORDEFCO). Today, this structure covers a broad 

spectrum of strategy development (ranging from cooperative studies to research, development, and testing); 

capabilities (including armaments and logistics); human 

resources and education, training, and exercises; and cooperation (including planning and execution) in NATOand EU-led—and, potentially, future UN-led—operations. To cite one noteworthy example, the Norwegian, 

Swedish, and Finnish air forces conduct regular crossborder training exercises of their respective air defense 

and air-to-ground strike capabilities. The three countries 

also have cooperative air transport arrangements for their 

troops and supplies to and from Afghanistan.

The geographical proximity of NORDEFCO 

countries, their many shared foreign and security interests (including overseas peacekeeping missions), 

and their increasing attention to environmental and 

security implications of energy production and transit 

in the Nordic and Arctic regions almost certainly will 

spur expanded cooperation in the future. Thanks to the 

membership of NATO Allies, NORDEFCO may be 
www.ndu.edu/inss SF No. 265 5 

a useful channel for Finnish (and Swedish) access to 

information on NATO’s activities and thinking.

However, Finnish officials do not see NORDEFCO 

as a stepping stone to a mutually binding guarantee of a 

common Nordic response to external attack “or undue 

pressure,” as recommended by former Norwegian foreign 

and defense minister Thorvald Stoltenberg in a 2009 report.17 Among other reasons, these officials do not believe the Nordic countries, acting together but without 

support from NATO, necessarily could deter or defend 

against a serious external attack.

Finland also has developed broad defense-related ties 

with Estonia, which has embraced Finnish mentorship. 

While Finnish analysts assess that the Baltic states’ membership in NATO benefits Finland by promoting regional 

stability, they do not believe it has changed their country’s 

fundamental strategic situation vis-à-vis Russia.

The United States. Keeping the United States actively engaged in European security matters has emerged 

as a primary strategic objective of Finnish policymakers, albeit one that is seldom acknowledged explicitly. 

The Finnish government readily acknowledges the key 

U.S. role in shaping the international security environment. According to the Government Report, “the United States is the only great power with global interests 

and the capability for global power projection. . . . [It] 

continues to play a predominant role in the stability of 

Europe and the Baltic Sea region.”18 In private conversation, leading Finnish experts go even further, suggesting 

that for European security in general—and their region 

in particular—it would be more accurate to describe the 

U.S. role as vital or essential. To that end, Finnish officials have pursued both multilateral and bilateral tracks.

From a Finnish perspective, their Partnership relationship with NATO (see section below) represents the most 

important multilateral track precisely because the United 

States has made it clear that it regards NATO as the key 

forum for security cooperation with Europe. To be sure, 

Finnish officials highly value NATO’s role in promoting 

intra-European cooperation on a wide range of military and 

political-military issues, but they view the Alliance’s transatlantic dimension as its unique, critical, and long-term advantage—especially as an ultimate guarantor of European 

security in the event of a future threat from Russia.

Finnish officials also support close EU bilateral 

relations with the United States. However, they accept 

that insofar as defense- and security-related issues are 

concerned, Washington’s strong preference will remain 

to work with Europe through NATO, where Americans 

have a seat at the table.

Finland has sought to complement its multilateral 

defense tracks with an increasingly close bilateral defense 

relationship with the United States. For example:

◆ Some 60 U.S.-manufactured F–18 Hornets (armed 

with Sidewinder and AMRAAM air-to-air missiles) are the backbone of the Finnish air force’s 

air defense capability, and a mid-life upgrade will 

provide an air-to-ground capability as well.

◆ Finnish ground forces are being equipped with 

U.S.-origin multiple launch rocket systems.

◆ Finland and the United States are cooperating on 

several maritime projects, including the use of aluminum mono-hulls, ice breaker technologies, and 

advanced hovercraft.

◆ The two governments recently updated their 1991 

reciprocal defense procurement memorandum of 

understanding, which will further increase cooperation between their respective defense industries. 

◆ In addition, a small number of Finnish officers 

serve in liaison roles at the headquarters of U.S. 

Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM) in Norfolk, 

keeping the United States actively 

engaged in European security 

matters has emerged as a 

primary strategic objective of 

Finnish policymakers
6 SF No. 265 www.ndu.edu/inss

Virginia, and U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM) in Tampa, Florida, and Finnish officers 

regularly attend U.S. professional military education institutions, including the National Defense 

University in Washington, DC.

Finnish Defense Transformation 

and NATO

Finland’s relationship with NATO has facilitated 

the transformation of its defense forces in ways that influential Finnish defense and military officials believe are 

necessary in their own right. While this transformation 

is still a work in progress, it has made appreciable headway in terms of personnel and capabilities.

Since 2004, the “wartime” force has been reduced 

from nearly 500,000 to approximately 350,000 military 

personnel, comprised of 250,000 personnel designated for the largely static “regional” forces and 100,000 

for the more mobile and capable “operational” forces. 

Currently, there are roughly 8,800 active duty military 

personnel; most serve as cadre forces supported by conscripts (in peacetime) and reservists (in a crisis situation). The Government Report forecasted a long-term 

reduction in the wartime force by cutting a few major 

formations, but did not announce a specific figure for 

lowering the wartime strength, despite some military 

advice to do so.19 Over the past year, however, senior defense officials have suggested that the wartime strength 

should be reduced to 250,000 or lower over the next 

few years, with savings to be used for improved training and equipment.20 These officials have not advocated 

ending conscription, which remains politically popular, 

Finland does not accept any 

direction by NATO in determining 

its force levels, structures, or 

methods of recruitment

but have noted that problems with the conscript pool 

might necessitate changes in its organization.21

Finland began shedding its Cold War legacy equipment in the mid-1990s, gradually introducing more modern platforms, C4

ISR, and logistics systems.22 The current 

focus is on upgrading air defense capabilities. Under current plans, the focus will shift to modernizing the army’s 

regional troops during 2012–2016 and, thereafter, to upgrading the operational troops. Although the Government 

Report tends to stress the relevance of modernization 

programs to territorial defense, Finnish military experts 

emphasize the importance of a “one rail” approach that 

seeks to ensure, to the maximum practical degree, compatibility between capabilities needed for national defense 

and those needed for crisis response operations abroad. 

Overall defense spending is expected to remain at about 

1.3 percent of gross domestic product (GDP).

Assessing NATO’s influence on specific Finnish 

decisions on personnel and capabilities is not a straightforward proposition, since senior Finnish officials acknowledge that their pre-2004 structures were simply 

unsustainable for financial and demographic reasons. 

Still, the cumulative impact of the Finnish-NATO relationship is substantial. 

For example, Finland participates in the Planning 

and Review Process (PARP), which is the Partnership 

for Peace counterpart to NATO’s process of identifying 

the military capabilities necessary to meet the level of 

ambition agreed to by the Alliance political leadership 

and of periodically reviewing each Ally’s performance 

in meeting its agreed-upon force goals. Since the PARP 

force goals must be mutually agreed upon by NATO and 

the individual Partner countries, Finland does not in fact 

accept any direction by NATO in determining its force 

levels, structures, method of recruitment (professional 

vs. conscription), or capabilities development programs. 

Rather, participation in the PARP is a window into 

NATO that provides the Finnish defense establishment 

with an in-depth understanding of NATO requirements, 

force structures, standards, and planning disciplines. The 

PARP, in turn, improves Finland’s defense planning skills 
www.ndu.edu/inss SF No. 265 7 

and helps it to frame national decisions in ways that favor a high degree of interoperability with NATO forces.

Beyond the PARP, Finland’s relationship with 

NATO opens opportunities to join collective approaches 

that save on operating, maintenance, and other costs, providing capabilities that many individual countries could 

not afford on their own. For example, Finland participates along with 10 Allies (plus Sweden) in the Strategic 

Airlift Capability Initiative, which operates three C–17 

strategic air transporters.23 In addition, through military 

liaison arrangements with Allied Command Transformation (ACT) and the participation of both military and 

civilian officials in various NATO education and training courses, Finnish authorities can keep abreast of and 

contribute to NATO’s ongoing transformation efforts.24

Finland also participates in an array of NATO-led field 

and table-top exercises, which improve its ability to perform in actual operations. In October 2010, the Finnish government approved the contribution of a deployable chemical-biological-radiological-nuclear laboratory 

(including some 60 personnel) to the NATO Response 

Force reserve forces pool during 2012.

Finland’s role in NATO-led operations is among 

the most striking demonstrations of the country’s post–

Cold War transformation. In 1996, Finland dispatched 

several hundred soldiers to NATO’s Stabilization Force 

in Bosnia-Herzegovina; the contingent stayed, although 

in smaller numbers, until 2003. Finland has been a troop 

contributor to NATO’s Kosovo Force (KFOR) since 

1999, deploying some 900 soldiers during peak years of 

the operation. Moreover, in 2008, Finland became the 

first Partner to serve as a “framework nation” for one of 

KFOR’s three regional multinational task forces. Finland 

officially discontinued its KFOR contingent in December 2010 and will withdraw all but 20 of its remaining 

soldiers during 2011.

Afghanistan has been Finland’s most demanding 

overseas commitment. Finland joined the International 

Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in 2002. Around 180 

Finnish troops serve in a Swedish-led Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) in northern Afghanistan, where 

they increasingly focus on training Afghan security forces.25 Faced with growing public questioning about the conflict, Finnish political leaders take pains to stress that these 

troops serve under a UN mandate and are not at war.26

From a Finnish military perspective, the lessons 

learned from Afghanistan have been significant. For example, according to press reports, Finnish troops complained 

in 2007 that equipment shortages—notably in armored vehicles, weapons, and night vision devices—impaired their 

operational capabilities and security. According to Finnish security experts, this forced a reexamination of national 

procurement and logistics procedures, but it also demonstrated the practical benefits of pursuing greater NATO 

interoperability. In addition, some Finnish officers who 

previously served with ISAF credit that experience with 

having strengthened a warrior ethos in their ranks.

Political Debate 

Advances—But Slowly

At first glance, the decade-long Finnish debate 

on whether to seek NATO membership appears stuck 

among three deep-seated but irreconcilable lines of argument, raising the prospect that it will remain unresolved 

for many years to come. On closer examination, the debate is less clear-cut than frequently portrayed:

◆ Outright opponents of membership exist at both 

ends of the political spectrum. Some in this group 

argue that history proves that Finland cannot rely 

on others for its defense. In their view, joining 

NATO might actually weaken Finland by discouraging its national defense programs and/or 

diverting its limited forces and resources to fighting “the wars of others”; for many in this camp, 

“others” means the United States. Some opponents 

are motivated more by neutralist and/or pacifist 

beliefs. They tend to emphasize that as Finland 

becomes more integrated into a globalized world, 

any entanglement in broad security cooperation, 

whether through NATO or the EU, risks unnecessary involvement in international crises that 
8 SF No. 265 www.ndu.edu/inss

might escalate into military conflict. For many 

membership opponents, fear of provoking Russia 

apparently adds to their concerns. 

◆ A second school of thought favors, in effect, an 

indefinite deferral of any decision to apply for 

membership. Its adherents generally avoid the 

nationalist strains evident among some outright 

opponents, although many share an underlying 

worry about Russian reactions. They emphasize, 

instead, that Finland already has excellent relations with NATO, and they hold that the country 

would gain little additional advantage—and, indeed, would incur substantial new obligations—as 

a result of membership. Some within this group 

also believe that NATO membership would detract from their goal of advancing intra-European 

defense cooperation through the EU. Still others 

believe that Finland could rapidly apply for and 

gain NATO membership if the security environment were to deteriorate. 

◆ Like the other two groups, proponents of nearterm NATO membership are not a monolithic 

bloc. Many are deeply skeptical of Finland’s ability 

to go it alone in the face of potential future security 

threats emanating from Russia. Doubting the EU’s 

ability to develop a reliable common defense, they 

see NATO’s Article 5 (the collective defense provision of the 1949 Washington Treaty) as a strong 

guarantee of transatlantic—and especially U.S.—

protection. Others are less preoccupied with Russia, 

but see NATO as a vital instrument for multinational cooperation to deal with security challenges 

beyond territorial defense that affect important 

Finnish interests. In their view, Finland’s Partner 

status, while beneficial, is too constrained.

Over the past several years, the debate has shifted in 

subtle but important ways, and it is now dominated by the 

latter two groups. One reason for this is the spate of published reports—by government ministries, governmentand parliament-appointed commissions, and respected 

nongovernment think tanks—that have examined NATO’s 

roles, missions, and organization and their relationship to 

Finnish security and defense policy.

For example, a February 2004 report prepared by an 

expert working group of the Defense Ministry and Defense 

Staff provided the first comprehensive look at the effects 

of possible NATO membership on five functional areas: 

political and economic; defense and military; resources; 

security (of information); and legal questions.27 The watershed report, which included detailed cost estimates, did not 

contain a recommendation on whether Finland should join 

a military alliance or continue its “militarily non-aligned” 

policy.28 However, its thoroughness and objectivity set a 

high standard for the treatment of NATO-related issues in 

subsequent reports by the Foreign Ministry, Prime Minister’s Office, and the independent Finnish Institute of International Affairs—all of which have received extensive 

media attention. Their cumulative effect has been to better 

inform the Finnish political class and broader electorate on 

these issues and to explode some of the pervasive myths regarding NATO; these include misperceptions that NATO 

could force Finland to participate in operations against its 

will, acquire capabilities “dictated” by NATO authorities, or 

abandon conscription.

A second reason for the shifting debate is the “dual 

enlargement” of NATO and EU membership.29 Today, 21 

of 27 EU member states are also NATO Allies. As Finnish observers point out, this means that roughly 95 percent 

of the EU’s population now lives in states that belong to 

both organizations. Moreover, two developments likely 

have strengthened the argument of proponents of NATO 

membership that Finland’s position is out of step with 

most fellow Europeans: the marked shift since 2005 toward closer practical cooperation between NATO and the 

EU—a process strongly supported by the Finnish government; and the 2009 decision by France (a leading proponent of autonomous EU defense capabilities) to return to 

full participation in NATO’s military structure.

Opinion polling over the past decade reflects 

somewhat contradictory attitudes regarding NATO. 
www.ndu.edu/inss SF No. 265 9 

According to one respected survey conducted in late 

2010, 80 percent of respondents believe that Finnish 

defense policy has been conducted “extremely well” 

or “fairly well” during recent years, when Finland has 

steadily increased cooperation with NATO as well as 

the EU.30 The survey also indicates that the population, 

while divided roughly in half over whether Finland 

could defend itself in a conventional war, prefers by a 

substantial majority to remain “militarily non-aligned.” 

Asked specifically about NATO, 68 percent of respondents opposed membership, with 25 percent in favor; in 

2007, a similar poll showed 69 percent against and 26 

percent in favor. The most important single reason given for opposition to membership (50 percent of respondents) was that Finnish soldiers “would be sent abroad 

to take part in foreign wars,” with a much smaller number (29 percent) citing concern that membership would 

“increase the threat from Russia.”

According to some Finnish political observers, opposition to NATO membership is soft, and a majority 

of Finns would switch relatively quickly to supporting 

membership if their top political leaders were to advocate 

it openly. While that has not happened, increased public 

discussion of NATO membership is making it more difficult for the politicians to completely sidestep the issue, 

even if their declarations are artfully ambiguous.

For example, the official view of the four party 

center-right coalition government (National Coalition 

Party, Center Party, Swedish People’s Party, and Green 

League), as reflected in the 2009 Government Report, 

is that “strong grounds exist for considering Finland’s 

membership in NATO. As regards a decision on possible 

membership, broad political consensus is essential, and it 

is important to take public opinion into account.”31 Since 

her appointment in June 2010, Prime Minister Mari Kiviniemi (Center Party) has not commented extensively 

on NATO. Other Center Party figures hold that the issue cannot be seriously addressed until after the April 

2011 parliamentary election.

The National Coalition Party is the only centerright party where the level of support for NATO membership (48 percent, according to the 2010 poll) runs 

significantly higher than that of the population as a 

whole.32 Its key leaders, including Foreign Minister Alexander Stubb and Defense Minister Häkämies, openly 

champion deeper cooperation with NATO, which they 

describe as an essential part of European security and 

the bedrock of transatlantic cooperation. While generally avoiding references to the virtues of “military nonalignment,” they are careful not to deviate publicly from 

the coalition government’s agreed-on language.

Among the center-left parties, President Tarja Halonen (of the Social Democratic Party) is a longstanding 

advocate of “non-participation in military alliances.” She 

favors close cooperation between Finland and NATO, but 

not membership.33 Her personal popularity and constitutional authority to direct foreign policy in cooperation with 

the government ensure that Finland will not make any decision to seek NATO membership before her term ends 

in early 2012. Social Democratic leader Jutta Urpilainen 

supports “keeping the option open” to join NATO, while 

insisting that there is no threat that would justify seeking 

membership anytime soon—in any event, not before the 

next parliamentary term ends in 2015.

While polls indicate that among Social Democrats 

opponents of NATO membership outnumber supporters by approximately three to one, some prominent former Social Democrat politicians have distanced themselves from the current party leadership on this issue. 

For example, in a December 2010 television interview, 

the widely-respected former Finnish president (and 

Nobel Peace Prize winner) Martti Ahtisaari regretted 

that the domestic debate on NATO was not “moving forward.”34 Emphasizing that NATO is a “central 

increased public discussion of 

NATO membership is making it 

more difficult for the politicians to 

completely sidestep the issue
10 SF No. 265 www.ndu.edu/inss

peacekeeping operation” and poses “no threat to Russia,” he asked rhetorically: “We have to look and see 

what group we belong to. Are we ending up in the same 

group as Ukraine and Belarus?”

According to Finnish political analysts, the 

NATO membership issue is unlikely to play a major 

role in the April 2011 parliamentary elections. However, a victory by the incumbent four-party coalition, 

especially if led by the National Coalition Party, might 

raise the profile of the membership issue in the January 2012 presidential contest. If the next president 

were to favor NATO membership—and incumbent 

President Halonen, who won by a 3.6 percent vote 

margin over her National Coalition Party opponent 

in 2006, cannot run for a third term—the government 

would have several options.

For example, according to one scenario, Finland 

would enjoy a window of opportunity in early 2012 to 

apply for membership in time to receive a formal invitation to join at that year’s NATO summit, which will be 

held in the United States. (Such a meeting likely would 

take place during the first half of 2012, before the U.S. 

presidential campaign enters its most intensive phase.) 

Under a less ambitious scenario, the Finnish government might use the planned revision of its Report on 

Security and Defense Policy in 2013 as a launching 

point to build a consensus for a membership bid in the 

2014–2015 timeframe.35 Alternatively, Finland might 

opt for the “status quo plus,” consisting of continued 

Partnership with an increased level of involvement in 

selected NATO activities.

View from Stockholm

Despite their geographical proximity, historical ties, and increasingly close cooperation in many 

areas of government and economic activity, Sweden 

and Finland possess distinctive strategic cultures. 

This is not surprising; Sweden, unlike its neighbor, 

has been at peace for nearly 200 years. In particular, 

Sweden’s brand of neutralism during the Cold War, 

while progressively diluted and eventually sidelined 

in the 1990s, still colors its security policy debates in 

important ways.

First among these is the contradiction between 

Sweden’s longstanding declaratory policy of “military 

non-alignment” and the reality that during much of the 

Cold War, its leaders believed “the West would provide 

military help in case neutrality failed and Sweden was 

attacked by the Soviet Union.”36 Indeed, as documented 

by one Swedish defense expert, successive governments 

undertook multiple and detailed measures during the 

1950s to “facilitate wartime military cooperation” with 

several NATO Allies—notably the United States, United Kingdom, Norway, and Denmark—and, albeit to a 

lesser degree, with NATO itself.37 A significant number 

of the political and military elite reportedly were aware 

of these arrangements despite their public denials. The 

arrangements were allowed to lapse following the Social 

Democrats’ return to government in 1982.

A second important factor was the shift in Swedish government circles and public attitudes—beginning 

in the late 1950s and accelerating in the 1960s, as U.S. 

involvement in Vietnam expanded—from a “pragmatic 

neutralism” aimed mainly at avoiding entanglement in 

East-West conflicts to a “more puritan declaratory doctrine” with “overtones of moral rectitude.”38 By the 1970s, 

prominent Swedish political and public figures had become outspoken advocates of nuclear disarmament, with 

many engaging in one-sided criticism of Western reliance 

on nuclear deterrence. At the same time, this moralistic 

strain in foreign policy both encouraged and facilitated 

greater Swedish activism in peacekeeping and observation missions under UN auspices. Hence, while the current debate in Sweden over joining NATO is framed, as 

it is in Finland, primarily by the country’s relationships 

with Russia, other European partners, and the United 

States, the context and implications of those relationships are viewed somewhat differently by Stockholm.

Russia. Overall, Russia figures less prominently in 

Swedish discussions of defense and security policy than 

in Finland. Swedish officials acknowledge that they cannot “rule out the risk of military conflicts” in the Baltic 
www.ndu.edu/inss SF No. 265 11 

Sea region, although they believe Sweden is unlikely to be 

singled out for armed attack for the foreseeable future.39

However, with few exceptions, Swedish government officials and security experts are even more circumspect than 

their Finnish counterparts when addressing potential security challenges emanating from Russia.

For example, although Foreign Minister Carl Bildt 

publicly criticized Russia’s “aggression” and “authoritarian direction” in the immediate aftermath of its armed 

conflict with Georgia, such rhetoric largely disappeared 

from Swedish official declarations by late 2009. The 

“Statement of Government Policy,” delivered by Foreign Minister Bildt to the parliament in February 2010, 

contains only passing references to Russia that welcome 

“the Russian President’s statements on the importance 

of a functioning rule of law and an extensive modernization of Russian society” and the conclusion of a new 

U.S.-Russian strategic nuclear arms reductions treaty.40

For their part, defense ministry officials carefully 

avoid explicit mention of Russia as a potential threat, 

emphasizing that its military as a whole is relatively 

weak (compared with its Soviet antecedents) and suffers from a poorly performing economy (except for 

the energy sector) and depressing demographic trends. 

However, as Defense Minister Sten Tolgfors stated in a 

July 2009 speech, the “old, large-scale invasion” scenario 

is not Sweden’s greatest concern. Russia, he observed, is 

concentrating on developing “rapidly mobile operational 

units . . . intended for operations in Russia or very near 

Russia.” “If anyone were to act against a Baltic State the 

way Russia acted against Georgia,” he added, “that would 

have fundamental security policy implications.”41

Like Finland, Sweden is concerned about a variety of 

nonmilitary security and environmental challenges involving Russia, especially those associated with energy flows and 

maritime security in the Baltic Sea. Stockholm has sought 

to engage Moscow in cooperative efforts to address these 

challenges, but with an emphasis on coordination through 

the EU. This is explained, in part, by the relatively modest 

bilateral leverage available to Sweden. For example, according to 2008 figures, Russia did not figure among Sweden’s 

top five trading partners, and crude oil accounted for nearly 

70 percent of Swedish imports from Russia.

European Partnership. In the mid-1990s, some 

Swedish officials and nongovernment opinion leaders 

were reluctant to see the EU gravitate toward greater 

involvement in security and defense matters, apparently 

fearing that it might generate momentum for a European army that would be fundamentally incompatible with 

Swedish policy. Today, however, the EU’s CSDP normally enjoys top billing in Swedish official statements 

and think-tank analysis. In his February 2010 statement, 

for example, Foreign Minister Bildt argued that Swedish 

membership in the EU means it “is part of a political alliance and takes its share of responsibility, in the spirit of 

solidarity, for Europe’s security.”

Like Finland, Sweden has participated actively in a 

range of CSDP-related activities. Sweden has provided 

land forces to EU-led military operations in Africa (in the 

Democratic Republic of the Congo and Chad) and Bosnia Herzegovina, and serves as “lead nation” for the Nordic 

battlegroup. The Swedish navy has participated in the EUled antipiracy operations off the Somali coast. Sweden also 

is an active member of the EDA, reflecting in part its dependence on the European market for arms exports.42

One consequence of Sweden’s involvement in EU 

security and defense matters has been to legitimize the 

government’s moves to distance the country from its official policy of “military non-alignment” without taking 

the politically risky path of explicitly renouncing it. Specifically, the government’s “solidarity declaration,” adopted in 2007 (and expanded in 2008) with the approval 

from all the political parties seated in parliament, states 

inter alia: “Sweden will not remain passive if a disaster 

or an attack would strike another EU member state or a 

Nordic country. We expect these countries to act in the 

same way if Sweden is similarly affected. . . . Sweden, in 

light of this, will have both the ability to receive and provide military support (in crisis and conflict).”43

Swedish officials describe the declaration as a “statement of political will” and note that Sweden will decide 

how to act on a case-by-case basis. Notwithstanding 
12 SF No. 265 www.ndu.edu/inss

such qualifications, the declaration’s open recognition of 

Sweden’s security interdependence with its fellow EU 

members and Nordic neighbor (and NATO Ally) Norway represents a major watershed in Swedish security 

policy. As Defense Minister Tolgfors suggested in July 

2009, the declaration makes clear that Sweden’s defense 

does not begin at its borders; instead, “incidents, conflicts 

and war must be prevented from reaching our borders.”

The declaration also has fueled discussion within 

Swedish defense and foreign policy circles over whether 

the EU might eventually assume a collective defense role 

and become, in effect, an alternative to NATO. Although 

leading government experts are skeptical of the EU’s capability to fulfill such a role, they nevertheless point out 

that within defense ministry ranks, two experts work 

full-time on NATO issues compared with some two 

dozen focused on CSDP. 

Like their Finnish counterparts, leading Swedish officials and security analysts support increased 

regional cooperation, especially on maritime security 

in the Baltic and High North regions. As previously 

noted, Sweden also cooperates on air defenses with 

Finland and Norway. However, Swedish officials, like 

their Finnish counterparts, dismiss the potential of 

regional structures (such as NORDEFCO) to ensure 

Sweden’s territorial defense in the face of a major military contingency.

The United States. Swedish officials and nongovernment experts generally are more reluctant than 

their Finnish counterparts to acknowledge publicly 

the important U.S. role in European security, largely 

for political reasons. According to Swedish political 

observers, public attitudes toward the United States 

have improved since late 2008. They caution, however, that the legacy of widespread criticism of U.S. 

policy during the Cold War, which was rekindled by 

the 2003 invasion of Iraq, makes a rapid turnaround 

unlikely. Indeed, in 2009 a respected Swedish public 

opinion poll found that for many respondents, the 

United States ranked close behind Russia and China 

as a “problem for peace and security globally.”44 Similarly, during the campaign preceding the September 

2010 parliamentary elections, the “Red-Green” alliance (Social Democratic, Environment, and Left parties) called for the closure of all U.S. overseas military 

and “nuclear weapons” bases. Hence, positive mentions 

of specific U.S. contributions to Swedish and European security—for example, Defense Minister Tolgfors’s 

praise for the U.S. role in the Baltic Sea region—are 

often subsumed by broad references to the benefits of 

NATO and a strong transatlantic link.

Most defense and military interactions between 

Sweden and the United States occur within the framework of NATO-led operations or Sweden’s PFP-related activities. These are increasingly complemented, 

however, by a range of bilateral relations. For example:

◆ Sweden operates eight U.S.-built C–130 transport aircraft (upgraded under a 2004 agreement) 

and one C–130 refueling aircraft. In September 

2010, the Defense Security Cooperation Agency 

notified Congress of a possible sale to Sweden of 

15 UH–60 Blackhawk helicopters at an estimated 

cost of $546 million. The sale is intended, in part, 

to meet Sweden’s requirements for combat search 

and rescue and medical evacuation in operations 

such as Afghanistan.

◆ Sweden’s multirole combat aircraft, the Gripen, 

includes U.S.-licensed components, and the two 

countries are involved in joint development and 

production of the Excalibur advanced precisionguided artillery projectile.

◆ A small number of Swedish officers serve in 

liaison positions at USJFCOM and USCENTCOM and attend U.S. professional military 

education institutions. 

Some Swedish experts who are skeptical of their 

government’s willingness to join NATO would favor 

expanded bilateral defense ties with the United States 

as a means of improving Swedish capabilities while enhancing interoperability with the U.S. and other Allied 
www.ndu.edu/inss SF No. 265 13 

militaries. They acknowledge, however, that this would 

be an uphill battle within their government bureaucracy 

and some of the major political parties.

Swedish Defense Transformation 

and NATO

Sweden’s defense reforms over the past several 

years stem from its leadership’s acknowledgment that 

their nation could no longer rely on conscription-based 

structures when, in the event of a serious threat, approximately two-thirds of the armed forces would not 

be operational for at least 1–3 years—manifestly too 

late to protect the country. Nor could Sweden, which 

foresees growing demands to participate in international crisis management under EU, NATO, or UN auspices, continue to sustain two separate force structures, 

one for national operations and one for international 

engagements. Hence, Sweden has shifted its defense 

paradigm to develop smaller, all-volunteer armed forces 

that are more useable and relevant for all operations 

(territorial, regional, and international) and able to cooperate with international partners.

If current plans hold, by 2014 Sweden’s force structure will total approximately 50,000 volunteer military 

personnel, including 28,000 soldiers in “high availability” units (versus about 12,000 today) and 22,000 

in strengthened “Home Guard” units.45 This will enable Sweden to continually deploy some 1,700 military 

personnel on international operations, with an additional 300 available as high readiness reinforcements; 

this represents roughly a doubling of current capacity. 

In parallel with personnel reforms, the military will be 

acquiring new medium-heavy helicopters for increased 

tactical mobility (for both national and international 

use), surface ships, and advanced air-to-air missiles, 

while modernizing its four conventional submarines 

and maintaining some 100 Gripen advanced combat 

aircraft. Overall defense spending is expected to remain 

at about 1.4 percent of GDP.

As with Finland, Sweden’s defense reforms were 

not directly driven by NATO. However, they have been 

shaped, in part, by Swedish participation in the PARP, 

the Strategic Airlift Capability Initiative, liaison arrangements with key NATO commands, and especially 

in NATO-led operations. 

Sweden’s operational experience with NATO began 

with its participation in the NATO-led Stabilization 

Force in Bosnia-Herzegovina, which transitioned to an 

EU-led operation in 2004. In Kosovo, a Swedish contingent—now approximately 250 soldiers—has served in 

KFOR since late 1999.

Sweden joined ISAF in 2002 and currently deploys approximately 500 troops in Afghanistan. Most 

of these serve in Mazar-e-Sharif, where Sweden is the 

only non-NATO European country to lead a PRT. 

Sweden also fields an Operational Mentor and Liaison 

Team embedded with Afghan army forces and plans 

to augment its International Security Assistance Force 

(ISAF) contribution with a helicopter unit and healthcare assets. In December 2010, the Swedish parliament 

renewed, with little opposition, the mandate needed 

by the government for participation in ISAF through 

2011, provided the UN Security Council–approved 

mandate remains in force.

Swedish officials characterize their participation 

in ISAF as an expression of solidarity with, and acceptance of responsibility pursuant to, the UN mandate, 

and intentionally play down the role of NATO. For the 

most part, they express confidence that public support 

for the Afghanistan mission can be maintained over 

the next few years, but their recent public statements 

have warned that security in the area where Swedish 

troops are active is unlikely to improve significantly 

anytime soon. According to press reports, Swedish 

Sweden has shifted its defense 

paradigm to develop smaller, 

all-volunteer forces that are 

more useable and relevant
14 SF No. 265 www.ndu.edu/inss

units engaged in 65 combat incidents during 2010, suffering three killed in action.46

Swedish defense experts observe that the Afghanistan experience has brought home the need for: 

modernized equipment (including armored vehicles) 

better suited to demanding stabilization missions; 

more structured predeployment training and rotations for deployed units; and greater interoperability 

across the board with NATO forces. Sweden’s close 

operational ties with NATO also have helped pave 

the way for greater cooperation on major exercises. 

For example, in June 2009, Sweden hosted Exercise 

Loyal Arrow, where nearly 900 participants from 

NATO’s airborne early warning component, eight 

Allied nations, and Finland tested deployment, reception, and redeployment procedures for elements of 

the NATO Response Force. In keeping with its increased cooperation with NATO, Sweden has been a 

leading advocate within the EU for adopting NATO 

standards in the development, training, and potential 

employment of EU battlegroups. 

Low Profile Political Debate

Despite occasional public mention of the possibility 

of seeking NATO membership, the issue has not been 

the focus of sustained debate between Sweden’s main 

center-right and center-left political coalitions; nor has 

it received extensive critical examination by nongovernment think tanks or the media. Swedish opinion surveys 

help to explain the cautious approach of the major parties. According to a respected 2009 poll, 35 percent of 

respondents favored NATO membership “as soon as 

possible” or “eventually”—twice as many as in 2004–

2005—but 38 percent favored staying “outside” (down 

from 67 percent in 2004–2005) and 27 percent were “on 

the fence.”47

Beyond previously-mentioned factors—especially 

the lingering hold of neutralist sentiments and mixed 

views regarding the United States—Swedish political 

culture puts great stock in achieving a broad consensus 

on major foreign policy issues, as was the case when the 

government sought EU membership. In contrast with 

Finland, however, leading government officials, parliamentarians, and party officials have been reluctant so far 

to undertake the preliminary step of commissioning one 

or more government or think-tank studies to methodically identify and assess the potential implications of 

NATO membership, which would lay the groundwork 

for a more informed public debate on its pros and cons.

There appear to be several reasons for this reluctance. 

The center-right alliance (comprised of the Moderate, 

Liberal, Center, and Christian Democrat parties) is divided on the issue. Only the small Liberal Party has openly 

advocated near-term NATO membership, while some in 

the Center Party strongly oppose such a move.

Within the Moderate Party—by far the largest 

party in the alliance—there reportedly is significant 

support for eventual NATO membership and, as a first 

step, growing interest in a “Finnish style” governmental or independent experts study on the implications 

of membership. In October 2010, two Moderate parliamentarians introduced a motion that stressed the 

advantages of membership, especially the “greater 

opportunity to both influence international operations and ensure Swedish and European security,” and 

called for a “clear presentation of NATO and what 

possible accession would mean for Sweden.”48 The motion will be reviewed in early 2011 by the parliament’s 

foreign affairs committee. However, it is unlikely to be 

approved absent a prior gentleman’s agreement between 

Moderates and the major center-left party, the Social 

Democrats, since leading Moderates hope to avoid politicization of the study from the outset.

So far, the Social Democrats have shown no interest 

in giving a green light to a NATO study. Indeed, some 

Swedish political culture puts great 

stock in achieving a broad consensus 

on major foreign policy issues
www.ndu.edu/inss SF No. 265 15 

influential Social Democrats believe their support for the 

“solidarity declaration” has been intentionally overblown 

by alliance politicians and conservative-leaning defense 

analysts who want to portray the declaration as a watershed in Swedish strategic thinking. According to these 

Social Democrats, NATO remains a military organization with little appeal for most Swedes, especially since 

(in their view) the country is not threatened.

At first glance, the results of Sweden’s September 2010 parliamentary elections appear to have hurt 

prospects for a serious near-term discussion of possible 

NATO accession. The center-right parties emerged 

with a plurality of seats, but the unexpected success 

scored by the populist and—according to many analysts—xenophobic Sweden Democrats party will force 

the alliance coalition to govern without a stable majority. Hence, despite significant interest in accession 

among Liberals and Moderates, the alliance as a whole 

will need to proceed carefully with respect to NATO to 

avoid an open break with the center-left, which could 

force early elections and result in even larger gains by 

the Sweden Democrats. 

Meanwhile, the Social Democrats, while remaining 

the country’s largest single party, emerged with far fewer 

seats in parliament than in the past. As a result, they will 

choose a new party leadership in March 2011 and have 

promised to review key policy issues. Their new leadership is unlikely to abandon the party’s traditional “military 

non-alignment” stance anytime soon, but they might see 

advantages in allowing a review of the pros and cons of 

NATO membership, arguing that it demonstrates a more 

serious and pragmatic approach to foreign affairs than was 

evident during their 2010 campaign. In this way, the Social 

Democrats might hope to attract more centrist supporters 

in the run-up to the next parliamentary election in 2014. 

External Factors

During the run-up to the Lisbon Summit, Finnish 

and Swedish policymakers, parliamentarians, and security experts used a variety of bilateral and multilateral 

channels to explain their priorities and advance suggestions to NATO member governments and its civilian 

and military leadership. These included the March 2010 

seminar in Helsinki that focused on the new Strategic 

Concept—a high-profile event hosted jointly by the 

Finnish and Swedish governments.49

The fact that key Summit themes tracked closely with 

Finnish and Swedish preferences likely has served, at a minimum, to bolster their domestic support for continued close 

cooperation with NATO. For example:

◆ Crisis management and partnership mechanisms. As 

previously noted, crisis management has been a 

key incentive, vehicle, and domestic justification 

for growing Finnish and Swedish cooperation with 

NATO since the mid-1990s. The Strategic Concept and Lisbon Summit Declaration pay tribute 

to the “concrete and valued contribution” of partner 

relationships to NATO. They also promise “operational partners” a “structural role in shaping strategy 

and decisions on NATO-led missions to which they 

contribute.” NATO’s specific mentions of the continuing importance of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership 

Council and the need for flexible formats to discuss 

security challenges and enhance political dialogue respond, in part, to Finnish and Swedish expressions of 

concern that their relations with NATO should not 

be held back by the lackluster performance, capabilities, or political will of other PFP members. 

◆ Comprehensive approach. The Summit’s emphasis 

on applying a comprehensive civilian and military 

approach to crisis prevention and crisis management in and beyond Afghanistan is consistent 

with Finnish and Swedish thinking. NATO’s 

prominent mention of its desire to strengthen the 

strategic partnership with the EU and improve 

cooperation with the UN also reflects longstanding Finnish and Swedish preferences. 

◆ Article 5, Russia, and emerging threats. The Strategic 

Concept, Lisbon Declaration, and NATO–Russia 

Council Joint Statement respond well to Finnish 
16 SF No. 265 www.ndu.edu/inss

and Swedish desires to balance a positive and cooperative stance toward Russia with a reaffirmation of 

collective defense as one of NATO’s essential core 

tasks. NATO’s assessment of other dangers—from 

terrorism to proliferation to cyber attacks—also 

reflects growing Finnish and Swedish concerns regarding the potential impact of 21st-century threats 

on their security and the need for closer cooperation 

with their North Atlantic and European partners. 

However, Lisbon’s long-term effect on Finnish and 

Swedish views regarding membership will depend first 

and foremost on NATO’s performance, beginning with 

Afghanistan. Although their respective commitments to 

ISAF receive stronger public support than is the case in 

many other parts of Europe, this is due in part to the 

Finnish and Swedish governments’ emphasis on ISAF’s 

UN mandate and support for humanitarian actions such 

as promoting education and respect for women’s rights—

areas where Nordic nongovernmental organizations are 

very active. Such support would be eroded by a perceived 

NATO inability to contain the counterinsurgency, significant loss of life among Finnish or Swedish troops, 

or a dramatic unraveling of Allied political and military 

solidarity behind the operation. If such developments 

were to occur, NATO’s credibility as a potential guarantor of Finnish and/or Swedish security would no doubt 

suffer—although the degree and duration of any such 

setback are hard to quantify in advance.

There is no doubt that Russia would react negatively to a Finnish and/or Swedish bid for NATO 

membership. In a February 2010 interview, President 

Dmitry Medvedev stated that “the never-ending enlargement of NATO through absorbing the countries 

that used to be part of the Soviet Union or happen to 

be our closest neighbors” constitutes a “threat,” adding 

that “[o]ur Armed Forces should therefore be ready to 

accomplish their missions in light of the changes we 

have seen.”50 Finnish analysts note that Russian officials have periodically sent more pointed warnings in 

their direction, and a 2007 report by one influential 

Finnish institute concluded that if their country were 

to apply for membership, “political relations (with Russia) would almost inevitably suffer to some degree, and 

some limited military remonstrations in the vicinity of 

the Finnish borders could occur.”51

Moscow’s overall strategy likely would be aimed at 

persuading the Finnish and Swedish publics to reverse 

their respective government’s decision before the NATO 

accession process could be completed. However, Russian 

tactics likely would depend in large part on the wider 

international context at the time.

If the Finnish and/or Swedish decision were taken 

during a generalized spike in tension with the West—as 

occurred, for example, immediately following the 2008 

Russian-Georgian conflict—Moscow might feel emboldened (or compelled by domestic political pressures) 

to take relatively visible actions; these might include a 

limited redeployment of military units toward the St. 

Petersburg region, stepped up naval and military aviation exercises in the Baltic Sea region, and cutbacks on 

energy deliveries.

Even in a relatively benign international context, 

Russia likely would couple diplomatic protests with demands for strict limits on access by other Allied militaries 

to Finnish or Swedish territory and infrastructure. (As Allies, Finland and Sweden would assume the political commitments contained in the NATO-Russia Founding Act 

of 1997, including those related to the nondeployment of 

nuclear weapons or additional permanent stationing of 

substantial combat forces on the territory of new members.52) In addition, Russia might seek to punish Finland 

and Sweden with trade-related measures, including the 

manipulation of tariffs and customs clearances.

However, Russian policymakers would need to balance such measures, which might hurt Finland and Sweden more than Russia in the short term, against their 

declared strategic interest in multifaceted cooperation 

with the EU in particular, and the West in general. There 

is ample precedent for such calculations: Moscow acquiesced, albeit grudgingly, to Lithuanian, Latvian, and 

Estonian membership in the Alliance after a long period 
www.ndu.edu/inss SF No. 265 17 

engineering a coordinated decision 

between Helsinki and Stockholm 

would be difficult in practice 

of declaring it would be a “red line” for Russian security 

policy. Moreover, unlike Latvia and Estonia, Finland and 

Sweden do not have significant Russian-speaking minorities. A concerted effort by NATO, Finland, and/or 

Sweden to be transparent about the accession process, 

while stressing their common desire to broaden cooperation with Russia through the NATO–Russia Council, as 

well as through the EU and regional fora, likely would 

lessen Moscow’s suspicions over time.

Risks versus Benefits

For Finnish and Swedish policymakers trying to anticipate how these external developments will play out, 

the key questions with respect to NATO membership 

are and will remain very straightforward.

◆ First, since NATO’s policies and actions will profoundly affect Finland’s and Sweden’s security 

environment for the indefinite future, are their 

national interests better served by having a seat at 

the table inside every level of Alliance political and 

military structures where those policies and actions 

are formulated and implemented? 

◆ Second, assuming that the overall (albeit unsteady) 

trend of NATO–EU cooperation continues, are 

Finland and Sweden at a disadvantage in shaping 

that cooperation compared to their 21 fellow EU 

member states that also belong to NATO? 

Indeed, Finnish press stories following the Lisbon 

Summit reflect a growing tendency to couch the debate 

in such terms. According to one Finnish newspaper, for 

example, the renewed emphasis on the NATO–Russia Council as a forum for “hard security” matters is a 

game-changing development that could put opponents 

of NATO membership “on the defensive.”53

Finnish and Swedish political analysts speculate 

that if their respective governments were to opt for 

NATO membership, they would strongly prefer to act 

together—as “tandem riders,” according to one Finnish observer. In their view, a coordinated approach 

would significantly diminish domestic political opposition in both countries, ensure rapid approval by the 

Allies, and facilitate smooth integration into Alliance 

military and political structures. Some also believe 

that if faced with tandem riders, Russia would be more 

cautious in its reactions.

While attractive in principle, engineering a coordinated decision between Helsinki and Stockholm would 

be difficult in practice. In addition to the above-noted 

differences in historical legacies and strategic cultures, 

the Finnish body politic, thanks to the multiple and 

extensive government and nongovernment studies of 

NATO, is arguably much better prepared to debate the 

issue on its merits.

What’s in It for NATO?

With few exceptions, Allied governments apparently have given little serious thought to possible 

Finnish and/or Swedish accession. This likely is due, 

in large part, to their preoccupation with more pressing concerns such as Afghanistan. That said, according 

to a range of Allied diplomats and military officers, 

both countries enjoy positive reputations as capable 

and reliable contributors to NATO operations, mentors and role models in outreach and cooperation programs involving other Partners (including Russia), and 

active promoters of a comprehensive civilian-military 

approach to stabilization missions in which NATO–

EU cooperation should play a prominent role. But as 

Partners, their ability to inform, shape, and implement 

NATO policy at every stage is constrained by many 

organizational and political factors. Put simply, Allies 

rightfully will not extend unfettered access to their inner councils to nations who are not similarly bound to 
18 SF No. 265 www.ndu.edu/inss

NATO Treaty obligations, including participation—if 

necessary—in collective defense.

There is little doubt that the Baltic and Nordic 

neighbors of Finland and Sweden would welcome their 

full integration into the Alliance. In their view, it would 

boost Finnish and Swedish contributions to deepening 

regional security cooperation. For example, remaining 

impediments to full Finnish and/or Swedish participation in NATO’s “air police” operation over the three 

Baltic Allies and the NATO Response Force would be 

quickly removed. Moreover, by virtue of their military 

capabilities, existing infrastructure, and geographic location, Finland and Sweden would strengthen NATO’s 

ability to deter and, if necessary, defend against any external threat to the Nordic-Baltic region.

From an American perspective, and in addition to 

the above considerations, Finnish and/or Swedish accession would be consistent with the Quadrennial Defense Review (February 2010) and U.S. National Security Strategy (May 2010), which together stress the 

importance of strong and capable European partners 

that broadly share U.S. values and are willing to help 

shoulder responsibility for fostering peace and security 

both regionally and globally. By enhancing security in 

the Nordic and Baltic region, Finnish and/or Swedish accession would complement U.S. policies aimed 

at pursuing new opportunities for NATO cooperation 

with Russia. At the same time, U.S. policymakers likely 

are under no illusion that Finland or Sweden would either substantially expand planned defense expenditures 

and operational commitments or shy away from criticizing specific U.S. policies simply as a result of joining 

the Alliance. 

In the event one or both countries were to seek 

membership, they should expect a more detailed examination on several fronts. For example, some European 

Allies likely will be especially attuned to Russian sensitivities regarding further enlargement. While Finnish 

expertise on Russia is widely respected within the Alliance, some Europeans might seek reassurance that, once 

inside NATO, Finland will not alter its longstanding 

emphasis on cooperative relations with its eastern neighbor. In the case of Sweden, its attitude toward nuclear 

weapons and disarmament might be closely scrutinized 

by member states who are especially intent on preventing any erosion of the Alliance consensus, as expressed 

in the Strategic Concept approved at Lisbon, that 

“[a]s long as nuclear weapons exist, NATO will remain 

a nuclear alliance.” (Finnish security analysts generally 

do not perceive a strong or pervasive “nuclear allergy” 

within their public, given the country’s historical experience with the Soviet Union.) Both countries would be 

expected to participate fully in any negotiations involving NATO and Russian conventional forces in Europe. 

In addition, a number of Allied governments and parliaments—including the U.S. Senate, whose advice and 

consent to ratification would be required for any NATO 

accession protocol—would look for evidence that such a 

move enjoys broad public support within Finland and/

or Sweden.

Conclusion

Given the distance that Finland and Sweden already have traveled toward recasting their security policies, transforming their militaries, and establishing close 

ties with the Alliance, membership might seem a logical 

next step. Yet, it is not an inevitable one. Moreover, as 

suggested by the careful wording of NATO’s open door 

policy, a broad consensus exists within the Alliance that 

enlargement cannot be viewed as an end in itself.

Hence, NATO should be patient. If it stays on the 

course charted by the Strategic Concept, implements 

necessary reforms to its military and civilian structures, 

and above all demonstrates solidarity and effectiveness 

in the face of 21st-century threats, it will remain the essential force for Euro-Atlantic stability and security that 

has attracted Finland and Sweden ever closer to its ranks. 

If one or both opt to remain Partners, NATO must make 

clear that their contributions, ideas, and sacrifices are valued. Alternatively, if Finland and/or Sweden eventually 

seek membership, their citizens must be prepared to accept a fair share of the responsibilities and burdens to-
www.ndu.edu/inss SF No. 265 19 

ward an Alliance that will be better prepared, in return, 

to protect them.

Notes

1 Strategic Concept for the Defence and Security of the Members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation adopted by Heads of 

State and Government in Lisbon, November 19, 2010, available at 

<www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_68580.htm>. 

2 Lisbon Summit Declaration issued by the Heads of State and 

Government, November 20, 2010, available at <www.nato.int/cps/en/

SID-61351483-06DCCB49/natolive/official_texts_68828.htm>.

3 Alliance Strategic Concept 1999, available at <www.nato.int/

cps/en/natolive/official_texts_27433.htm>. 

4 The Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland joined NATO in 

1999. Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia, and 

Slovenia joined in 2004. Albania and Croatia joined in 2009. 

5 Finland and Sweden formally acceded to the EU in 1995. 

Finland belongs to the Eurozone; Sweden does not.

6 Finnish Security and Defence Policy 2009 (hereafter “Government Report”), February 2009, available at <www.vnk.fi/julkaisukansio/2009/j11-turvallisuus-j12-sakerhets-j13-finnish/pdf/en.pdf>.

7 Speech to India’s Institute of Defense Studies and Analysis, 

April 27, 2010.

8 Facts about National Defence, Public Information Division of 

Defence Command Finland 2008, available at <www.puolustusvoimat.fi/wcm/58926d804fc07da3914af7fa0e27a8ed/facts_about_national_defence_08.pdf?MOD=AJPERES&CONVERT_TO=url&C

ACHEID=58926d804fc07da3914af7fa0e27a8ed>, 40. 

9 Ibid., 34. It should be noted that Finland does not have any 

submarines.

10 Based on combined value (in euros) of Finnish exports 

to and imports from Russia, according to Statistics Finland, 

available at <www.stat.fi/tup/suoluk/suoluk_kotimaankauppa_en.html>. Overall, Finland relies on Russia for two-thirds of 

its energy imports (by value). See <www.bloomberg.com/apps/

news?pid=newsarchive&sid=aO8i_gg5fDmc>.

11 Russia Action Plan, Government Resolution, Government of 

Finland, April 16, 2009, available at <http://formin.finland.fi/public/

download.aspx?ID=42535&GUID={448538DA-BD92-4814-9B57-

3590FB386721}>, 94. In December 2010, President Halonen, Prime 

Minister Kiviniemi, and Russian Prime Minister Putin inaugurated 

high-speed train service between Helsinki and St. Petersburg.

12 Government Report, 70–71.

13 Under the Lisbon Treaty, EU structures and activities 

previously known as “European Security and Defense Policy” were 

renamed “Common Security and Defense Policy.”

14 The EU does not currently have competency to provide common defense. Article 24 of the EU Treaty (as modified by Lisbon) 

states: “The Union’s competence in matters of common foreign and 

security policy shall cover all areas of foreign policy and all questions 

relating to the Union’s security, including the progressive framing of 

a common defence policy that might lead to a common defence.” 

(Emphasis added.)

15 Article 42 of the EU Treaty reads: “If a Member State is the 

victim of armed aggression on its territory, the other Member States 

shall have towards it an obligation of aid and assistance by all the 

means in their power, in accordance with Article 51 of the United 

Nations Charter. This shall not prejudice the specific character of the 

security and defence policy of certain Member States. Commitments 

and cooperation in this area shall be consistent with commitments 

under the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, which, for those States 

which are members of it, remains the foundation of their collective 

defence and the forum for its implementation.”

16 Commentary by former ambassador Leif Blomqvist in “A 

Dual Pillar NATO Alliance Is Not in Europe’s Interest,” Helsingin 

Sanomat, January 8, 2005. 

17 Thorvald Stoltenberg, “Nordic Cooperation on Foreign and 

Security Policy: Proposals Submitted to the Extraordinary Meeting of 

Nordic Foreign Ministers in Oslo on 9 February 2009,” 34.

18 Government Report, 37.

19 Government Report, 127. For example, the Report previews 

the elimination of the two “Jaeger” brigades and the reorganization of 

six “regional brigades” into five “regional battle groups.”

20 Some Finnish experts believe a force of 100,000, if properly 

trained and equipped, would constitute a credible defense.

21 The initial conscript training periods range from 180 to 362 

days, depending on rank and duties. According to official estimates, 

some 20 percent of conscription-age Finns fail to meet the military’s 

minimum physical and mental standards. According to a 2009 poll, 72 

percent of Finns support a general conscription system for males. Available at <www.defmin.fi/files/1516/The_ABDI_Survey_2009_pictures.

pdf>. The Green Party, however, has proposed phasing out conscription.

22 C4

ISR=command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance.

23 A similar approach has been discussed for helicopters.

24 According to press reports, the Finnish army has used its artillery 

expertise to train allied military personnel from several countries who will 

serve in NATO Operational Mentor and Liaison Teams in Afghanistan.

25 The Finnish government decided in early 2010 to raise this 

total to 195 by February 2011.

26 To date, Finnish forces in ISAF have suffered one fatality and 

several wounded.

27 “Effects of a Possible Membership in a Military Alliance to the Development of the Finnish Defence System and to 

the Defence Administration,” available at <www.defmin.fi/index.

phtml?l=en&s=207>.

28 The 2004 report estimated Finland’s annual contribution to 

NATO’s military and civilian budgets would total 45 million euros, with 

additional procurement costs (for example, to ensure interoperability of 

command and control systems) of 25 million euros annually. The report 

also noted: “In general, it can be estimated that all NATO membership 

costs could be covered by current level defence budgets by refocusing 

annual operation and maintenance costs and procurement plans.”

29 In May 2004, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia, 

Slovenia, Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, Cyprus, and Malta joined the 

EU. Bulgaria and Romania joined the EU in January 2007.

30 See Advisory Board for Defence Information, 2010 report 

overview, available at the Finnish Ministry of Defence Web page at 

<www.defmin.fi/files/1685/MTS_survey_2010.pdf>; detailed results 

are available at <www.defmin.fi/files/1686/MTS_Survey_statistics_2010.pdf>. 

31 Government Report, 81.

32 Advisory Board for Defence Information, 2010 report; 

detailed results are available at <www.defmin.fi/files/1686/MTS_Survey_statistics_2010.pdf>. 

33 See, for example, her February 2000 speech, available at <www.tpk.

fi/public/default.aspx?contentid=173545&contentlan=2&culture=en-US>. 

34 Interview on Finnish Broadcasting Company, December 

18, 2010, reported in Helsingin Sanomat, International Edition (in 
20 SF No. 265 www.ndu.edu/inss

English), December 20, 2010, available at <www.hs.fi/english/article/

Ahtisaari+Staying+outside+NATO+weakens+image+projected+by+Fi

nland/1135262517865>.

35 A referendum on NATO membership is not required by the 

Finnish Constitution, but many Finnish political observers believe the 

government would organize a referendum on the issue to demonstrate 

a national consensus behind the move.

36 Robert Dalsjö, Life-line Lost: The Rise and Fall of “Neutral” 

Sweden’s Secret Reserve Option of Wartime Help from the West (Stockholm: Santerus Academic Press, 2006), xi. Sweden also figured in 

early U.S. thinking about transatlantic arrangements for the defense 

of Europe. For example, according to declassified National Security 

Council staff memoranda, in April 1948—1 month after the United 

Kingdom, France, Belgium, Netherlands, and Luxembourg signed the 

Brussels Treaty, which contains a strong collective defense provision—

President Truman’s top diplomatic advisors recommended that the 

United States encourage Sweden (along with Norway, Italy, Denmark, 

and Iceland) to accede to the Brussels Treaty and begin negotiations 

on a “North Atlantic Collective Defense Agreement” to include those 

parties, the United States, and Canada. 

37 Ibid., 23.

38 Ibid., 29.

39 See “Sweden’s Security Policy,” Government Offices of Sweden, available at <www.sweden.gov.se/sb/d/3103/a/116839>.

40 See <www.regeringen.se/content/1/c6/13/96/94/8a6b32fe.

pdf>.

41 Ibid.

42 The majority of Swedish arms exports (totaling $1.9 billion in 

2009) went to European customers. Defense News, March 2010, available at <www.defensenews.com/story.php?i=4533390>.

43 Speech by Swedish Defense Minister Tolgfors, July 3, 2009, 

available at <www.sweden.gov.se/sb/d/12091/a/129883>. 

44 Opinioner 2009, Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency (MSB), 

Stockholm (December 2009), available at <http://www2.msb.se/

Shopping/pdf//upload/Publikationsservice/MSB/0132_09_Opinion_2009.pdf>.

45 Current troop strength includes approximately 16,000 active 

duty and 47,000 reserves (including Home Guard). The future force 

will be composed of career and “contract” personnel; most “contract” 

military will have their main jobs outside the defense forces but will 

be subject to mobilization for operations within 24 hours. 

46 “Record Number of Battles for Swedes,” SvD Online, December 2, 2010.

47 Opinioner 2009.

48 See <www.riksdagen.se/webbnav/index.aspx?nid=410&dok_

id=GY02U229>. In a separate motion, two other Moderates suggested that ongoing defense reforms focused on improving Sweden’s 

capabilities for overseas operations would increase the need for Allied 

assistance in the event of a direct threat against its territory. They also 

criticized the Social Democrats as “hard-core opponents of (NATO 

accession) for sentimental rather than rational reasons.” 

49 Key speakers at the event included Finnish President Halonen 

and former President Martti Ahtisaari; top Finnish and Swedish foreign 

and defense ministry officials; NATO Secretary General Rasmussen; and 

Supreme Allied Commander Transformation, General Stéphane Abrial. 

50 Interview with Paris-Match, February 25, 2010. The relevant exchange (as published on President Medvedev’s official Web page) reads: 

Question:“Russia’s new military doctrine envisages, among 

other things, military operations outside the country to counter a possible aggression, and views NATO as a major threat to its security. Do 

you think that we are sliding back to the Cold War era?”

Response: “No, I certainly don’t think so. It is not about our 

military doctrine, but about the never-ending enlargement of NATO 

through absorbing the countries that used to be part of the Soviet 

Union or happen to be our closest neighbours, such as Romania and 

Bulgaria. This is the threat. NATO is a military alliance which has expanded itself right to our borders. Our Armed Forces should therefore 

be ready to accomplish their missions in light of the changes we have 

seen. It does not mean that we are sliding back to the Cold War, but 

we must take this new situation into consideration.”

Available at <http://archive.kremlin.ru/eng/speeches/2010/02/25/0900_type82916_224466.shtml>.

51 Some of these warnings have been crude and counterproductive. In 2007, for example, a mid-level Russian diplomat hinted, on 

Finnish television, at a “military” reaction by his country. Recent examples have involved only slightly more nuanced warnings. Thus, the 

Russian Ambassador to NATO stated in early 2008 that “if Finland 

becomes a member of NATO and the balance of power in northern 

Europe changes, it will lead to a very serious discussion in the Russian 

political class.” 

52 Among these are NATO statements regarding: 1) nuclear 

weapons—“The member States of NATO reiterate that they have 

no intention, no plan and no reason to deploy nuclear weapons on 

the territory of new members, nor any need to change any aspect of 

NATO’s nuclear posture or nuclear policy—and do not foresee any 

future need to do so”; and 2) conventional basing—“NATO reiterates 

that in the current and foreseeable security environment, the Alliance 

will carry out its collective defence and other missions by ensuring the 

necessary interoperability, integration, and capability for reinforcement rather than by additional permanent stationing of substantial 

combat forces.” See Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation 

and Security between NATO and the Russian Federation, available at 

<www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_25468.htm>.

53 “Parties Launch NATO Debate Again,” Helsingin Sanomat, 

International Edition (in English), December 20, 2010, available at 

<www.hs.fi/english/print/1135262526689>.

The Center for Strategic Research within the Institute for 

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The Strategic Forum series presents original research 

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contributors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the 

Defense Department or any other agency of the Federal 

Government. Visit NDU Press online at www.ndu.edu/press.

Nicholas Rostow

Director

Center for Strategic Research

Phillip C. Saunders 

Director of Studies

Center for Strategic Research

Institute for National Strategic Studies

Hans Binnendijk

Director

INSS