NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

 v. 

LESHAWN LAWSON, 

Defendant-Appellant.

No. 17-10063 

D.C. No. 4:15-cr-00119-PJH-1

MEMORANDUM*

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the Northern District of California

Phyllis J. Hamilton, Chief Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted April 10, 2018

San Francisco, California

Before: WARDLAW and CLIFTON, Circuit Judges, and KATZMANN,** Judge.

LeShawn Lawson was indicted for one count of possession with intent to 

distribute more than five kilograms of cocaine in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) 

and (b)(1)(A). The district court denied Lawson’s motions to suppress evidence 

 

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent 

except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

** The Honorable Gary S. Katzmann, Judge for the United States Court of 

International Trade, sitting by designation.

FILED

MAY 2 2018

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
2 17-10063

collected pursuant to three GPS tracking warrants and a UPS package search 

warrant, the traffic stop of his Bentley, and the subsequent consensual vehicle 

search. After a bench trial, Lawson was found guilty and sentenced to 214 months’ 

imprisonment, to be followed by five years’ supervised release. Lawson now

appeals, challenging the district court’s denial of his motions to suppress. We have 

jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We affirm. 

This Court reviews the district court’s denial of a motion to suppress de novo, 

and its factual determinations for clear error. United States v. Fowlkes, 804 F.3d 

954, 960 (9th Cir. 2015). 

1. Lawson argues that the traffic stop of his Bentley and the subsequent search 

were the fruits of four prior surveillance warrants. Lawson is incorrect. Based upon 

his observations of Lawson’s speeding and missing license plates, the arresting 

officer, Matthew Williams, had valid grounds to perform the traffic stop. The district 

court did not clearly err in finding that Williams reasonably perceived Lawson’s 

traffic infractions, and Lawson does not challenge the district court’s finding that he 

voluntarily consented to the search which yielded the cocaine. See United States v. 

Arreguin, 735 F.3d 1168, 1174 (9th Cir. 2013) (stating that trial court’s credibility 

determinations are due special deference). Reasonable suspicion that a traffic 

violation occurred is sufficient to justify an investigatory stop, “even if the stop 

serves some other purpose” and “the ultimate charge was not related to the traffic 
3 17-10063

stop.” United States v. Willis, 431 F.3d 709, 715 (9th Cir. 2005) (citing Whren v. 

United States, 517 U.S. 806, 808–10, 813 (1996)). 

2. Lawson also argues that even if the traffic stop and consensual search

were not the fruit of invalid warrants, they nevertheless violated the Fourth 

Amendment because they were unreasonably prolonged. This argument fails. 

Rodriguez v. United States provides that a traffic stop “seizure remains lawful only 

‘so long as [unrelated] inquiries do not measurably extend the duration of the stop.’” 

135 S. Ct. 1609, 1615 (2015) (alteration in Rodriguez) (quoting Arizona v. Johnson, 

555 U.S. 323, 333 (2009)). “An officer . . . may conduct certain unrelated checks 

during an otherwise lawful traffic stop. But . . . he may not do so in a way that 

prolongs the stop, absent the reasonable suspicion ordinarily demanded to justify 

detaining an individual.” Id.

Here, Williams’ traffic stop of Lawson’s Bentley was not unreasonably 

prolonged. The district court found that Lawson consented to a search of the vehicle 

within five minutes into the stop, and that the subsequent background check on 

Lawson “came back clean” approximately seven minutes into the stop. The 

remainder of the stop consisted of Williams awaiting cover and conducting the 

consensual search. Altogether the stop lasted about twenty minutes. This timeframe 

is undisputed.
4 17-10063

Beyond Lawson’s explicit consent, Williams’ grounds for the search were 

buttressed by facts providing independent reasonable suspicion that Lawson was 

involved in criminal activity. See United States v. Turvin, 517 F.3d 1097, 1099–

1100 (9th Cir. 2008); United States v. Mendez, 476 F.3d 1077, 1081 (9th Cir. 2007). 

As the district court found, Williams detailed three factors supporting reasonable 

suspicion of criminal activity to investigate further: (1) the absence of luggage 

despite Lawson’s statement that he had spent three weeks in Los Angeles; (2) 

Lawson’s stated employment as an entertainer and iron worker, which would not 

pay enough for Lawson to afford the Bentley he was driving; and (3) Williams’ 

knowledge that Interstate 580 was a well-known drug trafficking route from Los 

Angeles to San Francisco. Further, Rodriguez does not foreclose any and all 

questions not wholly related to perceived traffic infractions. See 135 S. Ct. at 1611. 

Williams’ questioning of Lawson and observations regarding the inconsistency in 

his answers were reasonable. See United States v. Rojas-Millan, 234 F.3d 464, 469–

70 (9th Cir. 2000). 

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the district court’s ruling.1 

AFFIRMED.

 

1

In light of our analysis, we need not review the constitutionality of the prior four 

warrants.