U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE

30–191 PDF WASHINGTON : 2018

COMBATING TRANSNATIONAL GANGS THROUGH 

INFORMATION SHARING 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON 

COUNTERTERRORISM 

AND INTELLIGENCE 

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED FIFTEENTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

JANUARY 18, 2018 

Serial No. 115–45 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Homeland Security 

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.govinfo.gov 


Congress.#13
(II) 

COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas, Chairman 

LAMAR SMITH, Texas 

PETER T. KING, New York 

MIKE ROGERS, Alabama 

LOU BARLETTA, Pennsylvania 

SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania 

JOHN KATKO, New York 

WILL HURD, Texas 

MARTHA MCSALLY, Arizona 

JOHN RATCLIFFE, Texas 

DANIEL M. DONOVAN, JR., New York 

MIKE GALLAGHER, Wisconsin 

CLAY HIGGINS, Louisiana 

JOHN H. RUTHERFORD, Florida 

THOMAS A. GARRETT, JR., Virginia 

BRIAN K. FITZPATRICK, Pennsylvania 

RON ESTES, Kansas 

DON BACON, Nebraska 

BENNIE G. THOMPSON, Mississippi 

SHEILA JACKSON LEE, Texas 

JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island 

CEDRIC L. RICHMOND, Louisiana 

WILLIAM R. KEATING, Massachusetts 

DONALD M. PAYNE, JR., New Jersey 

FILEMON VELA, Texas 

BONNIE WATSON COLEMAN, New Jersey 

KATHLEEN M. RICE, New York 

J. LUIS CORREA, California 

VAL BUTLER DEMINGS, Florida 

NANETTE DIAZ BARRAGA ́ N, California 

BRENDAN P. SHIELDS, Staff Director 

STEVEN S. GIAIER, General Counsel 

MICHAEL S. TWINCHEK, Chief Clerk 

HOPE GOINS, Minority Staff Director 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON COUNTERTERRORISM AND INTELLIGENCE 

PETER T. KING, New York, Chairman 

LOU BARLETTA, Pennsylvania 

SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania 

WILL HURD, Texas 

MIKE GALLAGHER, Wisconsin 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas (ex officio) 

KATHLEEN M. RICE, New York 

SHEILA JACKSON LEE, Texas 

WILLIAM R. KEATING, Massachusetts 

BENNIE G. THOMPSON, Mississippi (ex officio) 

MANDY BOWERS, Subcommittee Staff Director 

NICOLE TISDALE, Minority Staff Director/Counsel 

(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

Page 

STATEMENTS

The Honorable Scott Perry, a Representative in Congress From the State 

of Pennsylvania .................................................................................................... 1 

The Honorable Kathleen M. Rice, a Representative in Congress From the 

State of New York, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee on Counterterrorism and Intelligence 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 3 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 4 

The Honorable Peter T. King, a Representative in Congress From the State 

of New York, and Chairman, Subcommittee on Counterterrorism and Intelligence: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 11 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 2 

The Honorable Michael T. McCaul, a Representative in Congress From the 

State of Texas, and Chairman, Committee on Homeland Security: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 5 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 6 

The Honorable Bennie G. Thompson, a Representative in Congress From 

the State of Mississippi, and Ranking Member, Committee on Homeland 

Security: 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 7 

WITNESSES

Mr. Stephen E. Richardson, Assistant Director, Criminal Investigation Division, Federal Bureau of Investigation: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 8 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 10 

Mr. Raymond Villanueva, Assistant Director in Charge, International Operations, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 12 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 14 

Mr. Richard H. Glenn, Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary, Bureau of International Narcotic, U.S. Department of State: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 19 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 21 

APPENDIX

Questions From Ranking Member Bennie G. Thompson for Stephen E. Richardson .................................................................................................................... 35 

Questions From Ranking Member Bennie G. Thompson for Raymond 

Villanueva ............................................................................................................. 35 

Questions From Ranking Member Bennie G. Thompson for Richard Glenn ..... 36 

(1) 

COMBATING TRANSNATIONAL GANGS 

THROUGH INFORMATION SHARING 

Thursday, January 18, 2018 

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY, SUBCOMMITTEE ON COUNTERTERRORISM AND INTELLIGENCE, Washington, DC. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:17 a.m., in room 

HVC–210, Capitol Visitor Center, Hon. Scott Perry [Member of the 

subcommittee] presiding. 

Present: Representatives King, Perry, Rice, and Keating. 

Also present: Representative McCaul. 

Mr. PERRY [presiding]. Good morning. The Committee on Homeland Security Subcommittee on Counterterrorism and Intelligence 

will come to order. The subcommittee is meeting today to hear testimony from the FBI, the Department of Homeland Security, and 

the Department of State on Federal coordination and information 

sharing vital to dismantling transnational criminal organizations. 

I would like to welcome the Members of the subcommittee and 

express my appreciation to the witnesses for being here today. 

The Chair now recognizes himself for an opening statement, after 

which I will deliver Mr. King’s opening statement. 

Law enforcement officers use many weapons to fight terrorism 

and crime in our streets. Some of these weapons, such as badges, 

guns, and squad cars are easy to see. They are the hallmarks of 

police work. 

There are other weapons, however, that are harder to identify 

but every bit as vital. Among these less visible weapons the access 

to timely and accurate information is oftentimes the difference between a successful investigation and an unsolved crime. 

In today’s threat environment, much of the information needed 

by law enforcement in the United States is generated overseas. 

This is particularly true when it comes to combating complex 

transnational criminal organizations that threaten our safety here 

at home. 

These sophisticated criminal enterprises do not stop at borders. 

Instead, they extend beyond the limits imposed by nation-states 

and threaten the peace and stability of multiple countries. 

The only way to defeat syndicates that operate across international borders is through partnerships with foreign counterparts. 

It is incumbent on U.S. law enforcement agencies to work with our 

overseas allies to ensure that coordinated enforcement efforts are 

brought to bear against the menace that MS–13 and other TCOs 

pose to our Nation. 

2 

In addition to information sharing, another essential step in 

fighting—in addition to information sharing, another essential step 

in the fight against TCOs is to develop the capacity of our foreign 

partners to defeat these networks before they become a threat to 

the United States. 

Today’s hearing will feature testimony from representatives of 

Federal agencies tasked with combating the spread of TCOs. These 

entities bring various tools and capabilities to the fight, including 

investigating and prosecuting TCOs, as well as working with our 

foreign counterparts to strengthen and support their efforts to disrupt and dismantle TCOs. 

These witnesses include executives from the Federal Bureau of 

Investigation from the Department of Justice and Homeland Security Investigations from the Department of Homeland Security and 

the Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs from the Department of State. All of these agencies participate in protecting the U.S. homeland by working to defeat TCOs 

overseas. 

Each of these agencies is responsible for collecting, vetting, and 

disseminating TCO-related information. Sharing this overseas information with State and local domestic law enforcement agencies 

enhances the ability of our men and women in blue to keep this 

country safe at home from the threat posed by TCOs. 

I look forward to hearing from our witnesses. Their understanding and vast experiences will provide the committee with a 

comprehensive overview of how the cycle of international information-sharing functions. 

This overview will, in turn, afford the committee an opportunity 

to identify enhancements that can be made to better equip U.S. law 

enforcement at all levels to share information in their efforts to disrupt and dismantle TCOs, both home and abroad. 

[The prepared statement of Chairman King follows:] 

STATEMENT OF CHAIRMAN PETER T. KING

JANUARY 18, 2018 

Law enforcement officers use many weapons to fight terrorism and crime on our 

streets. Some of these weapons, such as badges, guns, and squad cars, are easy to 

see. They are the hallmarks of police work. There are other weapons, however, that 

are harder to identify but every bit as vital. Among these less visible weapons, access to timely and accurate information is oftentimes the difference between a successful investigation and an unsolved crime. 

In today’s threat environment, much of the information needed by law enforcement in the United States is generated overseas. This is particularly true when it 

comes to combating complex Transnational Criminal Organizations that threaten 

our safety at home. These sophisticated criminal enterprises do not stop at borders. 

Instead, they extend beyond the limits imposed by nation-states and threaten the 

peace and stability of multiple countries. The only way to defeat syndicates that operate across international borders is through partnerships with foreign counterparts. 

This issue is of particular concern to the people of Long Island. Specifically, the 

violent street gang MS–13, which has been designated as a TCO, has inflicted much 

death and destruction in Nassau and Suffolk Counties. The horrendous criminal actions of MS–13 disproportionately affect the youth of immigrant communities on 

Long Island. In the last 14 months, the murders of 17 people in Suffolk County 

alone have been linked to MS–13 violence. It is incumbent on U.S. law enforcement 

agencies to work with our overseas allies to ensure that coordinated enforcement efforts are brought to bear against the menace that MS–13 and other TCOs pose to 

our Nation. In addition to information sharing, another essential step in the fight 

3 

against TCOs is to develop the capacity of our foreign partners to defeat these networks before they become a threat to the United States. 

Today’s hearing will feature testimony from representatives of Federal agencies 

tasked with combating the spread of TCOs. These entities bring various tools and 

capabilities to the fight, including investigating and prosecuting TCOs as well as 

working with our foreign counterparts to strengthen and support their efforts to disrupt and dismantle TCOs. These witnesses include executives from the Federal Bureau of Investigation from the Department of Justice, Homeland Security Investigations from the Department of Homeland Security, and the Bureau of International 

Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs from the Department of State. All of these 

agencies participate in protecting the U.S. homeland by working to defeat TCOs 

overseas. 

Each of these agencies is responsible for collecting, vetting, and disseminating 

TCO-related information. Sharing this overseas information with State and local domestic law enforcement agencies enhances the ability of our men and women in blue 

to keep this country safe at home from the threat posed by TCOs. 

I look forward to hearing from our witnesses. Their understanding and vast experiences will provide the committee with a comprehensive overview of how the cycle 

of international information-sharing functions. This overview will, in turn, afford 

the committee an opportunity to identify enhancements that can be made to better 

equip U.S. law enforcement at all levels to share information in their efforts to disrupt and dismantle TCOs both at home and abroad. 

Mr. PERRY. I now recognize Ranking Member Rice for her opening statement. 

Miss RICE. Thank you, Chairman Perry for holding today’s hearing and thank you to the witnesses for your testimony today. 

In June 2017 we held a similar hearing on how we can both combat transnational gang violence on Long Island while empowering 

young people with the knowledge, support, and resources that they 

need to reject gangs in our communities. 

As we find ourselves here to discuss a similar topic again, I hope 

that today’s discussion will include a broad look at transnational 

criminal organizations around the world. As we all know, MS–13 

and the 18th Street gang and rival gangs are criminal organizations who commit brutal acts of violence and have taken too many 

lives. 

They, like other transnational gangs, are organizations that revel 

in violence, create fear, and terrorize the communities in which 

they live and operate and recruit their members. 

As the formal Nassau County district attorney, I have seen firsthand how vicious and unrepentant these gangs are. I have seen 

MS–13 and 18th Street gang members laugh at the judge as they 

were sentenced to life in prison or they were deported. 

So I want the record to be clear. I believe all violent criminals 

should be punished to the full extent of the law. I believe that violent criminals who are in this country illegally should be deported 

and prevented from ever coming back. I believe that dismantling 

violent criminal organizations like MS–13 must be a priority for 

law enforcement officials and lawmakers at all levels. 

However, I also know for a fact that the vast majority of immigrants in this country are not criminals. They are usually the victims of crime rather than the perpetrators. 

I know and understand that you cannot destroy a gang like MS– 

13 without the help of immigrant communities. You need members 

of the community to talk to you, provide information, report crimes, 

and for that they need to trust you. They need to know that stepping forward to help will not lead to them being detained and deported and ripped away from their families. 

4 

I will remind the committee and my Republican colleagues that 

many of the members of MS–13 are, in fact, immigrants and children and descendants of immigrants that have become victims of 

gang threats, violence, and recruitment. 

More, it is clear to me that President Trump, Attorney General 

Sessions, and Republicans in Congress have sought and continue to 

use the threat of MS–13 to justify their push to build a wall on the 

Southern Border and round up and deport millions of immigrants, 

including those whose only crime is being in this country without 

paperwork. 

Last week, President Trump and DHS Secretary Nielsen made 

another shameful anti-immigrant decision by ending temporary 

protected status for 31,000 Salvadoran TPS holders in new York, 

which will send families back to a country that is overrun with 

gang violence and drug trafficking. 

This decision came on the heels of the Trump administration’s 

decision to end DACA and temporary protected status for Haitians 

and Nicaraguans. Republicans have made it clear that they are not 

concerned about the destabilizing effects that such U.S. policies 

will have on communities like the one that Peter King and I serve 

on Long Island. 

On average, TPS recipients in our State have lived in the United 

States for an average of 21 years. They are our neighbors, our 

friends, and our co-workers. Now, I recognize that this hearing is 

not about TPS, but I also recognize the Republican-controlled Congress does not want to negotiate so I have to use every platform 

to address this issue. 

I yield back. 

[The statement of Ranking Member Rice follows:] 

STATEMENT OF RANKING MEMBER KATHLEEN RICE

JANUARY 18, 2018 

In June of 2017, we held a similar hearing on how we can both combat 

transnational gang violence on Long Island, while empowering young people with 

the knowledge, support, and resources they need to reject gangs in our communities. 

As we find ourselves here to discuss a similar topic again, I hope that today’s discussion will include a broad look at transnational criminal organizations around the 

world. 

As we all know, MS–13, the 18th Street Gang, and rival gangs are criminal organizations who commit brutal acts of violence and have taken too many lives. They, 

like other transnational gangs are organizations that revel in violence, crave fear, 

and terrorize the communities in which they live and operate and recruit their 

members. 

As the former Nassau County District Attorney, I’ve seen first-hand how vicious 

and unrepentant these gangs are. I’ve seen MS–13 and 18th Street Gang members 

laugh at the judge as they were sentenced to life in prison or deported. 

So I want the record to be clear, I believe all violent criminals should be punished 

to the full extent of the law. I believe that violent criminals who are in this country 

illegally should be deported and prevented from ever coming back. I believe that dismantling violent criminal organizations like MS–13 must be a priority for law enforcement officials and lawmakers at all levels. 

However, I also know for a fact that the vast majority of immigrants in this country are not criminals—they are usually the victims of crime rather than the perpetrators. 

I know and understand that you cannot destroy a gang like MS–13 without the 

help of immigrant communities. You need members of the community to talk to you, 

provide information, report crimes—and for that, they need to trust you. 

They need to know that stepping forward to help will not lead to them being detained and deported and ripped away from their families. 

5 

I will remind the committee and my Republican colleagues that many of the members of MS–13 are, in fact, immigrants and children and descendants of immigrants 

that have become victims of gang threats, violence, recruitment. 

More, it is clear to me that President Trump, Attorney General Sessions, and Republicans in Congress have sought and continue to use the threat of MS–13 to justify their push to build a wall on the Southern Border and round up and deport 

millions of immigrants—including those whose only crime is being in this country 

without paperwork. 

Last week, President Trump and DHS Secretary Nielsen, made another shameful, 

anti-immigrant decision by ending temporary protected status for 31,000 Salvadoran 

TPS holders in New York, which will send families back to a country that is overrun 

with gang violence and drug trafficking. 

This decision came on the heels of the Trump administration’s decision to end 

DACA and temporary protected status for Haitians and Nicaraguans. 

Republicans have made it clear that they are not concerned about the destabilizing effects that such U.S. policies will have on communities like the ones Chairman King and I serve on Long Island. 

On average TPS recipients in our State have lived in the United States for an 

average of 21 years. They are our neighbors, our friends, and our coworkers. 

I recognize this hearing isn’t about TPS, but I also recognize a Republican-controlled Congress doesn’t want to negotiate, so I have to use every platform I have 

to address this issue. 

Mr. PERRY. The Chair thanks the gentlelady. 

The Chair now thanks the Chairman of the full committee, the 

gentleman from Texas, Mr. McCaul. 

Mr. MCCAUL. Thank you, Chairman Perry. 

Transnational Criminal Organizations are a serious and growing 

threat to the American people. They disregard the rule of law of 

all nations and use their networks to smuggle drugs and traffic 

human beings for sexual exploitation and slave labor. 

They resort to brutal violence and intimidation tactics to carry 

out their illegal deeds. These networks of vile individuals and 

gangs like MS–13 have been known to kidnap, torture, and behead 

their victims. Top officials at DHS are very alarmed by their actions. 

Before becoming White House Chief of Staff, Secretary of Homeland Security John Kelly explained to a National security forum 

last July, to me personally, that one of his top concerns is a partnership between TCOs and international terror groups. 

If such alliances were formed, terrorists would have an easier 

time sneaking a dirty bomb or other catastrophic weapon and resources into the United States. 

Further, in written testimony before our full committee back in 

November, Acting Secretary Duke stated that TCOs are, ‘‘bringing 

drugs, violence, and dangerous goods across our borders and pose 

a persistent National security threat to the United States’’. 

Unfortunately, some of these partnerships are starting to take 

hold. Recent reports have shown that Hezbollah has been very active in recent years with international drug cartels in Latin America. We cannot allow such dangerous actors to gather in our hemisphere unchallenged. 

The ability of TCOs secreting terrorists and WMD into our country is a grave threat. This committee is going to undertake a thorough review of these possibilities so that we can prevent them from 

happening. Sadly, these TCOs have an easy time infiltrating our 

communities because the security of our Southern Border is just 

not strong enough to stop them. Hopefully, we will soon be able to 

fix that. 

6 

Legislation I introduced to strengthen border security with new 

infrastructure including a wall, more boots on the ground and new 

technology, was passed out of our full committee in October. 

Last week, that important legislation was incorporated into a 

larger bill to fix our broken immigration system. I am hopeful that 

we can pass it through the Congress and get it to the President’s 

desk very soon. 

All three branches of Government working together is essential 

in this fight, but we must also create and foster partnerships with 

governments in Latin America to help eliminate these threats from 

TCOs. 

One of the most important lessons we learned from the 9/11 attacks is that we must effectively communicate vital information 

among Federal departments and law enforcement agencies. Doing 

so will save many innocent lives. 

Today’s witnesses represent the hardworking men and women 

from FBI, ICE, and State Department, who work very hard for the 

protection of their fellow Americans, and I would like to thank each 

of you individuals for being here today. 

Before I yield back I just want to say on a personal note before 

becoming a Member of Congress I was the chief of Counterterrorism and National Security in the Western District of Texas in 

the U.S. Attorney’s Office. I had the Texas and Mexico border in 

my jurisdiction. 

I have been dealing with this issue for quite some time, seven 

terms in Congress and many years as a Federal prosecutor. This 

problem has not stopped. It has gotten worse. It has not gotten better. 

It is now more of a threat. I think it cries out for action from 

Congress and from the administration to finally, once and for all, 

get this job done. 

With that, Mr. Chairman, I yield back. 

[The statement of Chairman McCaul follows:] 

STATEMENT OF CHAIRMAN MICHAEL T. MCCAUL

JANUARY 18, 2018 

Transnational Criminal Organizations (TCOs) are a serious and growing threat 

to the American people. They disregard the rule of law of all nations and use their 

networks to smuggle drugs, and traffic human beings for sexual exploitation and 

slave labor. 

They resort to brutal violence and intimidation tactics to carry out their illegal 

deeds. These networks of vile individuals, and gangs like MS–13, have been known 

to kidnap, torture, and behead their victims. The top officials at DHS are very 

alarmed by their actions. 

Before becoming White House Chief of Staff, Secretary of Homeland Security John 

Kelly explained to a National security forum last July that one of his top concerns 

is a partnership between TCO’s and international terror groups. 

If such alliances were formed, terrorists would have an easier time sneaking a 

dirty bomb or other catastrophic weapons and resources into the United States. 

Further, in written testimony before our full committee back in November, Acting 

Secretary Duke stated that TCO’s are ‘‘bringing drugs, violence, and dangerous 

goods across our borders... they pose a persistent National security threat to the 

United States.’’ 

Unfortunately, some of these partnerships are starting to take hold. Recent reports have shown that Hezbollah has been very active in recent years with international drug cartels in Latin America. 

We cannot allow such dangers to gather in our hemisphere unchallenged. 

7 

The ability of TCO’s secreting terrorists and WMD into our country is a grave 

threat. And this committee is going to undertake a thorough review of these possibilities so that we can prevent them from happening. Sadly, these TCO’s have an 

easy time infiltrating our communities because the security of our Southern Border 

is just not strong enough to stop them. Hopefully, we will soon be able to fix that. 

Legislation I introduced to strengthen border security with new infrastructure including a wall, more boots on the ground, and new technology, was passed out of 

our full committee in October. 

Last week, that important legislation was incorporated into a larger bill to fix our 

broken immigration system. 

I am hoping we can pass it through Congress and get it to the President’s desk 

very soon. All three branches of Government working together is essential in this 

fight, but we must also create and foster partnerships with governments in Latin 

America to help eliminate threats from TCO’s. 

One of the most important lessons we learned from the 9/11 attacks is that we 

must effectively communicate vital information among Federal departments and law 

enforcement agencies. Doing so will save many innocent lives. 

Today’s witnesses represent hardworking men and women from the FBI, ICE, and 

the State Department, who work very hard for the protection of their fellow Americans. I’d like to thank each of you for being here. 

Mr. PERRY. The Chair thanks the gentleman. Other Members of 

the committee are reminded that opening statements may be submitted for the record. 

[The statement of Ranking Member Thompson follows:] 

STATEMENT OF RANKING MEMBER BENNIE G. THOMPSON

JANUARY 18, 2018 

This hearing is focused on Federal information sharing related to combating 

transnational gangs and criminal organizations, but given the recent antics from the 

White House I cannot address this topic in a vacuum. 

President Trump began his campaign with an attack on immigrants and continues to use his administration to advance an agenda that is based on racial and 

ethnic bias. 

One of his first actions as President was a travel ban from majority Muslim countries. 

Last fall, Trump ended the Deferred Action Childhood Arrival program, upending 

the lives of many young immigrants, who have only known the United States as 

their home. 

On January 8, the Trump administration made a decision to cancel the Temporary Protected Status for people from El Salvador, mere months after the same 

decision was made regarding those that have sought shelter and compassion in the 

U.S. from Haiti and Nicaragua. 

This week, the Trump administration released a misleading report, which purports that foreign-born individuals commit terror at very high rates. 

The data in the report perpetuates a myth that all immigrants are a threat and 

a danger to our communities and country. 

The report is yet another propaganda tool by the Trump administration consisting 

of falsehoods and half-truths to support its narrow-minded policies. 

President Trump is becoming more and more comfortable openly stoking xenophobia to garner support for his misguided immigration and border security plans. 

Republicans in Congress seemingly agree with President Trump, as they are silent when his administration spews misinformation, turn a blind eye to his despicable decisions TPS and Dreamers, and refuse to denounce the vile remarks he 

has made about immigrants from Latin American, African, and Middle Eastern 

countries. 

Republican Members of Congress, some of whom serve on this committee, recently 

scrambled to justify a string of heartless actions by the Trump administration all 

of which are in support of his border wall. 

Those who allege rampant exploitation of our borders and immigration system by 

transnational gangs like MS–13 often fail to acknowledge the hundreds of millions 

of immigrants that reside legally and peacefully in our country. 

After 1 year, it has become crystal clear that President Trump does not understand how important immigrant communities are to the history, makeup, and future 

of our country. 

8 

We are left to wonder whether many Republican Members of Congress actually 

agree with Trump or are simply afraid to hold him accountable. 

The committee has examined transnational gangs in the past, including a subcommittee field hearing on MS–13 in Long Island, New York, last summer. 

However, this administration and Republicans have focused solely on the threat 

from MS–13, while Democrats acknowledge that there are a wide range of threats 

posed by transnational gangs and TCOs, not just MS–13. 

I want to be clear, I remain committed to protecting our homeland from 

transnational criminal threats and activities such as murder, assault, human trafficking, money laundering, and cyber crime, as well as drug trafficking. 

However, I am not willing to give President Trump a blank check to carry out 

his dangerous, un-American policy goals. 

Mr. PERRY. We are pleased to have a distinguished panel of witnesses before us today on this important topic. All the witnesses 

are reminded that their written testimony will be submitted for the 

record. 

Our first witness is Mr. Stephen E. Richardson, the assistant director for the Criminal Investigative Division of the Federal Bureau of Investigation. Mr. Richardson joined the FBI as a special 

agent in 1996. He has worked with the bureau in Louisiana, Tennessee, Virginia, and several stints at headquarters. 

Throughout his career, he has specialized in the investigation of 

white-collar crime, public corruption, hate crime, violent crime, 

gang matters, and counterterrorism. Since April 2016 Mr. Richardson has served as assistant director of the Criminal Investigation 

Division with oversight of all FBI criminal matters. 

Thank you for being here today and—does he recognize individually or all? OK. Well, thank you for being here today and we are 

going to recognize you individually. 

So you can begin with your testimony, Mr. Richardson. 

STATEMENT OF STEPHEN E. RICHARDSON, ASSISTANT DIRECTOR, CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION DIVISION, FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION 

Mr. RICHARDSON. Representative Perry, Chairman McCaul, 

Ranking Member Rice, and Members of the committee, I would like 

to thank each of you for inviting me here today to discuss this very 

important issue. My name is Steve Richardson and I am the assistant director for the FBI’s Criminal Investigative Division. 

The issues that we are going to talk about today fall under my 

leadership at the FBI. The FBI is dedicated to defeating those 

transnational organized crime groups referred to as TOC groups, 

which pose the greatest threat to our National and economic security. 

To combat the on-going threat posed by these groups, the FBI 

has a long-established TOC program. The FBI uses the Racketeer 

Influence and Corrupt Organizations Act to expand criminal accountability for a number of predicate offenses and to expand a single offense across multiple members of a criminal enterprise. 

Utilizing a multi-pronged approach to target a variety of criminal 

activities and impact the group’s financial stability, the FBI is able 

to disrupt or dismantle the entire enterprise, not just a few key 

people. 

The FBI leverages trusted relationships both domestically and 

internationally to combat and influence the reach of these 

transnational criminal enterprises. The FBI has long been a proVerDate Mar 15 2010 11:08 Sep 14, 2018 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00012 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 H:\115TH CONGRESS\18CI0118\18CI0118 HEATH
9 

ponent of the task force model, and in 1992 we stood up the first 

Safe Streets Violent Gang Task Force, specifically to address 

transnational gangs. 

The mission of these task forces is to fully integrate our State 

and local partners to address threats posed by violent criminal 

gangs in communities across our great country. This involves working with State and local task force officers, commonly referred to 

as TFOs, who have direct knowledge of the criminal activities occurring within their specific jurisdictions. 

The collaboration of FBI special agents and local law enforcement creates a comprehensive approach utilizing both State and 

Federal statutes to address these violent gangs from top to bottom. 

The FBI currently operates and provides oversight to 169 of 

these particular task forces comprised of nearly 800 special agents, 

1,400 TFOs, and 58 other Federal law enforcement partners in all 

of the FBI’s 56 field offices. 

Collectively these task forces average approximately 5,100 arrests of violent criminal gang members annually and have averaged over 2,000 seizures of firearms in each of the past 2 years. 

Our ultimate goal and the goal of each task force is to have a positive effect on the communities by disrupting and dismantling violent criminal organizations. 

On the international front, the FBI’s Transnational Anti-gang 

Task Forces, we refer to those at TAGs, work with international 

partners to target transnational gangs, both domestically and 

internationally. 

The TAG program was created through cooperation between the 

FBI and the U.S. Department of State in El Salvador, Guatemala, 

and Honduras and is responsible for the investigation of the MS– 

13 gang and other violent transnational gangs such as the 18th 

Street gang. 

The mission of the TAG is to conduct gang enforcement operations and gather actionable strategic intelligence for domestic use 

by our Safe Streets Violent Gang Task Forces and to further disseminate this information to U.S. law enforcement partners. 

Recently, the TAG has conducted a coordinated arrest operation 

in all three countries in the Northern Triangle, targeting both MS– 

13 and 18th Street, resulting in the arrest of 754 violent gang 

members. The arrest also led to the seizure of multiple items of evidence which are currently being exploited for their intelligence 

value. 

Apart from our task forces, the FBI’s Criminal Investigative Division actively participates in multi-agency intelligence entities, such 

as the National Gang Intelligence Center, Special Operations Division, and Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Force or 

OCDETF Fusion Center. 

Although vetting and possible arrest of individuals at the border 

is primarily a function of the Department of Homeland Security, 

the FBI makes every effort to gather and share intelligence on a 

timely basis related to the movement and recruitment of gang 

members prior to and upon entry into the United States. 

Information sharing is critical to fulfilling this responsibility and 

the FBI is dedicated to improving communication with our partners. Please know we will continue to direct tremendous resources 

10 

and effort to targeting, investigating, prosecuting, and dismantling 

these transnational criminal gangs. 

Chairman McCaul, Chairman King, Representative Perry, Ranking Member Rice, and other Members of the committee, I thank 

you again for having me here today. I am honored to represent the 

FBI and the fine men and women of our organization, and I look 

forward to answering your questions. Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Richardson follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF STEPHEN E. RICHARDSON

JANUARY 18, 2018 

Good morning Chairman McCaul, Chairman King, Ranking Member Rice, and 

Members of the committee. Thank you for this opportunity to discuss the Federal 

Bureau of Investigation’s (FBI) efforts to combat the transnational gang threat and 

the FBI’s use of task forces. 

The FBI is dedicated to eliminating transnational organized crime (TOC) groups 

that pose the greatest threat to the National and economic security of the United 

States. Some TOC groups can be hierarchies, clans, networks, or cells, and may 

evolve into other structures. The depth and financial stability of these organizations 

often allow them to continue long after key members are removed. Therefore, the 

FBI targets entire organizations responsible for a variety of criminal activities. TOC 

groups are independent associations that operate by illegal means across borders, 

and many of these associations encompass both the Eastern and Western hemispheres. With the increase of technology available around the world, TOC groups 

are more commonly incorporating cyber techniques into their illicit activities. 

To combat the on-going threat posed by these groups, the FBI has a long-established transnational organized crime program dedicated to eliminating the criminal 

enterprises that pose the greatest threat to America. The FBI uses the Racketeer 

Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO) Act to target entire criminal organizations and to address the full extent of the criminal conduct by the leaders, members, 

and associates of those organizations. Unlike typical investigations, which target a 

single criminal act, this multi-pronged approach allows the FBI to disrupt or dismantle the entire enterprise. 

The FBI leverages political and law enforcement relationships domestically and 

abroad to combat the influence and reach of these organized crime groups due to 

the transnational nature of these criminal enterprises. 

The FBI also participates in selecting TOC groups to appear on the Department 

of Justice’s Top International Criminal Organizations Target (TICOT) List, and contributes to the Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Asset Control (OFAC) efforts to pursue criminal enterprises. Further, to pool resources and leverage technical and investigative expertise, the FBI participates in many Organized Crime 

Task Forces consisting of State and local law enforcement partners in the United 

States. 

Specific to transnational gangs, the FBI established the first Safe Streets Violent 

Gang Task Force (SSVGTF) in 1992. The mission of our SSVGTFs is to fully integrate our State and local partners to address threats posed by violent criminal 

gangs that have a destructive effect in our communities across the country. A key 

component of this success involves the utilization of Task Force Officers (TFOs) who 

have direct knowledge of the criminal activity occurring in their jurisdictions. This 

collaboration of FBI Special Agents and local law enforcement creates a comprehensive approach to addressing these violent gangs from top to bottom utilizing the Enterprise Theory of Investigation (ETI). ETIs are intelligence-driven investigations 

which seek to identify the hierarchy of a criminal enterprise and the scope of their 

criminal activity. The SSVGTF can then utilize State and Federal statutes to address all elements of the violent criminal organization. The success of the SSVGTFs 

is directly related to the ability to cross-programmatically leverage all resources and 

expertise of the FBI. 

The FBI currently operates and provides oversight to 169 SSVGTFs comprised of 

nearly 800 Special Agents, 1,400 TFOs, and 58 other Federal law enforcement partners in all of the FBI’s 56 field offices. Collectively, these SSVGTFs average approximately 5,100 arrests of violent criminal gang members annually. Additionally, 

SSVGTFs have averaged over 2,000 seizures of firearms in each of the past 2 years. 

Although the numbers are impressive, the ultimate goal of all SSVGTFs is to have 

11 

a positive effect on communities by disrupting and dismantling the violent criminal 

organizations that exist within them. 

In addition to our domestic task forces, the FBI’s Transnational Anti-Gang Task 

Forces (TAGs) continue to work with international partners to eradicate 

transnational gangs domestically and internationally. The TAG program was first 

created in 2007 in El Salvador through the cooperation between the FBI and the 

U.S. Department of State. The TAG expanded to Guatemala and Honduras in 2009 

and 2011, respectively. The TAG is currently comprised of six FBI Special Agents 

and 120 vetted police officers. Each TAG is a fully operational unit responsible for 

the investigation of MS–13 and other violent transnational gangs, such as 18th 

Street. The focus of the TAG is to conduct gang enforcement operations and gather 

actionable, strategic intelligence for domestic use by the SSVGTFs and dissemination to U.S. law enforcement partners. 

Additional valuable intelligence provided by the TAG include: Affiliations with 

other violent criminal gangs; associations with drug cartels; and illicit activity, such 

as human trafficking and firearms trafficking. Recently, the TAG conducted a coordinated transnational gang arrest operation in all three countries. The operation 

targeted members of both MS–13 and 18th Street, resulting in the arrests of 754 

MS–13 and 18th Street gang members. The arrests also led to the seizure of multiple items of evidence, which are being exploited for their intelligence value. 

The FBI utilizes a comprehensive approach combining intelligence with operations 

to more effectively combat gang violence. Apart from our task forces, the FBI has 

numerous analysts and agents dedicated to studying the threats posed by MS–13 

and other transnational criminal gangs via the National Gang Intelligence Center 

(NGIC). NGIC is a multi-agency intelligence entity that supports law enforcement 

agencies through timely and accurate information sharing and strategic/tactical 

analysis of Federal, State, and local law enforcement intelligence. NGIC is co-located at FBIHQ with the Safe Streets Gang Unit to further enhance integration of 

intelligence and operations. Additionally, the FBI’s Criminal Investigative Division 

(CID) participates in the Special Operations Division (SOD) which is a multi-agency 

intelligence center wherein the FBI is one of over 30 partners. The primary focus 

of SOD is to identify and target command-and-control communications of those 

criminal organizations that operate across regional, National, and international 

boundaries and to facilitate de-confliction and coordination of law enforcement investigations. 

In addition to SOD, the FBI participates in the Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Force’s (OCDETF) Fusion Center (OFC); this collaborative integrated 

center is a multi-agency operational intelligence center that provides law enforcement with analytical resources, case de-confliction, and information sharing to develop the most complete intelligence picture of targeted drug trafficking organizations and other complex criminal organizations. The OFC brings together 112 

datasets from 21 separate Federal and international agencies, along with opensource information, to generate intelligence products for FBI investigations. Furthermore, the FBI continues to be a vital participant in scores of OCDETF investigations that are countering TCOs and Transnational Gangs, like MS–13. In October 2017, the Attorney General explicitly directed that MS–13 be a priority of the 

multi-agency OCDETF Program, authorizing and encouraging investigative agencies 

and prosecutors to leverage OCDETF’s funding, infrastructure, and other resources 

to target MS–13. 

Although the vetting and possible arrest of individuals at the border is primarily 

a function of the Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), the FBI makes every effort to gather intelligence related to the movement and recruitment of these gang members prior to and upon entry into the 

United States. Information sharing with our partners is critical to fulfilling this responsibility, and the FBI is continually working to improve the way in which we 

and our partners communicate. Please know we will continue to dedicate tremendous resources and efforts to targeting, investigating, prosecuting, and dismantling 

these transnational criminal gangs. 

Chairman McCaul, Chairman King, Ranking Member Rice, and Members of the 

committee, thank you again for this opportunity to discuss the FBI’s efforts to eradicate the threat posed by transnational gangs. I look forward to answering any questions you may have. 

Mr. KING [presiding]. Thank you, Mr. Richardson. 

First of all, let me express my regret for not being here on time. 

We had a meeting of the Intelligence Committee, which went over 

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time. But I want to thank all the witnesses for their testimony up 

to now. 

I want to thank Mr. Perry for filling in for me. I am sure he did 

a far better job than I would have. Of course thank the Ranking 

Member for her support in putting this hearing together. 

So thank you, Mr. Richardson. 

Our second witness now is Mr. Raymond Villanueva, the assistant director for International Operations with Homeland Security 

Investigations at U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement. He 

began his law enforcement career in 1994 with the Puerto Rico Police Department. 

Since joining Immigration and Customs Enforcement, Mr. 

Villanueva has served in numerous key positions, including group 

supervisor for the Financial Crimes Asset Forfeiture and Removal 

Group from Buffalo, New York, section chief of the Illicit Finance 

and Proceeds Crime Unit in Washington, DC, assistant special 

agent in charge for the HSI San Juan office and most recently as 

a deputy assistant director for HSI international operations. 

Mr. Villanueva has more than 22 years of law enforcement experience. 

Let me just say that with the situation we have in Long Island 

with MS–13, HSI has been invaluable. Through you thank all of 

them for the great job they are doing in conjunction with the FBI. 

It has just been, again, phenomenal cooperation and also working 

with the local police in Suffolk County and Nassau County. It has 

been extraordinary. So I thank you. 

Mr. Villanueva, you are now recognized for your testimony. 

STATEMENT OF RAYMOND VILLANUEVA, ASSISTANT DIRECTOR IN CHARGE, INTERNATIONAL OPERATIONS, U.S. IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT 

Mr. VILLANUEVA. Thank you, Chairman King. Mr. Perry, thank 

you for starting the hearing and Ranking Member Rice, and distinguished Members. Thank you for the opportunity to appear before 

you today to discuss U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement 

Homeland Security Investigations with efforts to investigate, disrupt, and dismantle transnational criminal organizations or TCOs, 

to include violent gangs in the United States and abroad. 

HSI utilizes its broad legal authorities to investigate immigration 

and customs violations across several programmatic areas, including investigating and dismantling TCOs and gangs. 

During the last two decades, transnational organized crime has 

expanded dramatically, which poses a significant threat to National 

security. 

We take this threat very seriously and target TCOs at every critical location in the cycle by utilizing a layered approach that is 

internationally by pushing our borders out in cooperation with foreign counterparts where transnational criminal and terrorist organizations operate at our Nation’s border, in coordination with U.S. 

Customs and Border Protection, CBP, where the transportation 

cells attempt to exploit America’s legitimate trade, travel, and 

transportation systems and in cities throughout the United States 

where criminal organizations earn substantial profits off their illicit activities. 

13 

As of December 28, 2017 we maintain over 100 open investigations targeting MS–13 members and their criminal organization 

throughout all the United States and abroad by working with our 

law enforcement partners, including those in countries such as 

Guatemala, Honduras, and El Salvador. 

Without our information sharing and partnering with our Federal, State, local and foreign law enforcement partners, HSI would 

not be nearly as successful at battling MS–13 and other gangs. 

In response to the gang epidemic in 2005, ICE initiated Operation Community Shield, which combines HSI and Enforcement 

and Removal Operations, ERO, expansive criminal and civil enforcement authorities, as well as our partnerships with law enforcement stakeholders, domestically and abroad. 

Through this platform, HSI executes on the gang initiative, including specialized urban response gang enforcement, known as 

search operations. Since inception, HSI and its partner agencies 

have made over 60,000 criminal and administrative arrests of gang 

leaders, members, and associates, including more than 7,900 MS– 

13s. 

HSI’s most recent search operation, Project New Dawn, the largest gang search to date, resulted in 1,378 arrests. At the same 

time, we pursue domestic criminal investigations. We continue to 

push the borders out by capitalizing on our international partnerships with foreign law enforcement officials. 

This is accomplished by our attache ́ network located in 67 offices 

around the world. Our attache ́s leverage several key international 

partnerships, to include the Transnational Criminal Investigative 

Units, the TCIUs, and Operation CITADEL to identify potential 

bad actors along the illicit pathways while exploiting available information with the goal of identifying a known gang posing a 

threat to the United States. 

HSI also leverages information-sharing capabilities through the 

use of several key initiatives, some of which I would like to highlight briefly. The Visa Security Program, through this program we 

partner with CBP and Department of State by deploying trained 

special agents to high-risk visa-issuing posts to identify and investigate potential terrorist and criminal threats before they reach the 

United States. 

The Trade Transparency Units, the TTUs are designed to aggressively target organizations and individuals involved in trade-based 

money laundering and also those involved in contraband smuggling 

and customs fraud. All TTU foreign partners, 16 today, recognize 

the value of information sharing. 

Last but not least, the Biometric Identification Migrant Alert 

Program, what we call BITMAP. This program helps provide infrastructure and capability for host governments to collect biometric 

data on individuals they encounter. 

We and CBP’s National targeting center then share information 

back with our foreign partners. Through this process we are able 

to track movement toward the United States, take joint action with 

partner nations along the route and deter human smuggling 

through South and Central America. BITMAP is deployed to 14 

countries. 

14 

These operational endeavors would not have been possible without the cooperation of our Federal, State, local, and foreign law enforcement partners, including the support provided by the Department of State through its country team and their Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs. 

Thank you again for the opportunity to appear before you today 

and for your continued support of ICE and our law enforcement 

mission. I am looking forward to answering any questions you may 

have. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Villaneuva follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF RAYMOND VILLANUEVA

JANUARY 18, 2018 

Chairman King, Ranking Member Rice, and distinguished Members: Thank you 

for the opportunity to appear before you today to discuss the mission of U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), its efforts to identify, disrupt, and dismantle transnational criminal organizations (TCOs), to include transnational gangs, 

drug cartels, and smugglers, and its information-sharing initiatives dedicated to 

combatting the aforementioned threats. ICE enforces approximately 400 Federal 

laws governing border control, customs, trade, and immigration to promote homeland security and public safety. With more than 20,000 employees and more than 

400 offices across the United States and in 50 countries, the men and women of ICE 

execute our mission humanely, professionally, and always in accordance with the 

law. ICE has three operational directorates: Homeland Security Investigations 

(HSI), Enforcement and Removal Operations (ERO), and the Office of the Principal 

Legal Advisor. As a senior executive of ICE/HSI, I serve as the assistant director 

of ICE/HSI International Operations. 

As the largest investigative component in the Department of Homeland Security 

(DHS), ICE/HSI protects U.S. borders by conducting multi-faceted, international law 

enforcement operations, and by partnering with foreign and domestic counterparts 

to combat criminal organizations and prevent terrorist activities. 

ICE/HSI International Operations has a network of over 400 personnel, including 

over 180 special agents deployed to 67 attache ́ offices in 50 countries, who conduct 

investigations against TCOs, terrorist, and other criminal organizations that threaten our National security. ICE/HSI leverages its international footprint and partnerships to disrupt and dismantle TCOs that seek to exploit America’s legitimate trade, 

travel, and financial systems, and enforces U.S. customs and immigration laws at 

and beyond our Nation’s borders to prevent threats from entering the United States. 

ICE/HSI manages several strategic/information sharing initiatives, which include: 

• Transnational Criminal Investigative Unit (TCIU) • Biometric Identification Transnational Migration Alert Program (BITMAP) • Visa Security Program (VSP) • Trade Transparency Units (TTUs) 

HSI, domestically and abroad, focuses on critical investigative areas, which include: • National security • Counter-proliferation of arms and controlled technology • Human smuggling and trafficking • Financial crimes • Child exploitation • Commercial fraud and intellectual property • Anti-Gang Enforcement 

• Narcotics 

• Identity and Benefit Fraud 

• Worksite Enforcement 

• Cyber 

• Human Rights Violators and War Crimes. 

ICE/ERO identifies, arrests, and removes aliens who present a danger to National 

security or are a risk to public safety, as well as those who enter the United States 

illegally, or otherwise undermine the integrity of U.S. immigration laws and border 

control efforts. ERO upholds America’s immigration laws at, within, and beyond its 

borders through efficient enforcement and removal operations. ERO also develops 

investigative leads and provides support in locating and arresting foreign nationals 

wanted for crimes committed abroad who are now at-large in the United States. 

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ERO removal operations require complex coordination, management, and facilitation efforts to successfully remove or return aliens from the United States to their 

country of origin. ERO has enforcement officers strategically deployed to 19 locations around the world and leverages resources available through foreign law enforcement partners, including INTERPOL, EUROPOL, and the HSI Attache ́ corps. 

COMBATTING TRANSNATIONAL CRIMINAL ORGANIZATIONS

ICE utilizes its broad legal authorities to investigate immigration and customs 

violations, including those related to export control, human rights abuses, narcotics, 

weapons and contraband smuggling, financial crime, cyber crime, human trafficking 

and smuggling, child exploitation, intellectual property theft, transnational gangs, 

immigration document and benefit fraud, and worksite enforcement. ICE is grateful 

for continued Congressional support that allows ICE to maintain critical operations 

at home and abroad and increase our efforts to target and combat dangerous 

transnational gangs and other criminal organizations. 

During fiscal year 2017, ICE investigations led to the disruption or dismantlement 

of TCOs with more than 32,958 criminal arrests, including arrests of more than 

4,818 transnational gang members. ICE also seized 981,586 pounds of narcotics, 

made 1,205 seizures for violations of U.S. export laws and regulations, and seized 

nearly $307 million in currency and monetary instruments. Additionally, ICE identified and assisted 518 human trafficking victims and more than 904 child exploitation victims. 

During the last two decades, transnational organized crime has expanded dramatically in size, scope, and impact, which poses a significant threat to National security. ICE takes very seriously this threat, and targets TCOs at every critical location in the cycle: Internationally, in cooperation with foreign counterparts, where 

transnational criminal and terrorist organizations operate; at our Nation’s physical 

border and ports of entry, in coordination with U.S. Customs and Border Protection 

(CBP), where the transportation cells attempt to exploit America’s legitimate trade, 

travel, and transportation systems; and in cities throughout the United States, 

where criminal organizations earn substantial profits off their illicit activities. 

As directed by the President’s Executive Order 13773, Enforcing Federal Law 

with Respect to Transnational Criminal Organizations and Preventing International 

Trafficking, ICE will continue to give a high priority and devote sufficient resources 

to dismantling TCOs and subsidiary organizations. ICE will continue to focus on cooperative work with other Federal agencies, as well as with foreign counterparts, 

by sharing intelligence and law enforcement information when appropriate and permitted by law. 

JOINT TASK FORCES

In 2014, the Department announced its new Unity of Effort Initiative and directed 

our Department-wide Southern Border and Approaches Campaign (SBAC) Plan. The 

SBAC is part of a comprehensive security strategy designed to unify efforts across 

DHS components to address threats specifically associated with terrorism, illicit 

market-driven flows, and illegal migration across our Southern Border and Approaches. In furtherance of the SBAC, the Department commissioned three Joint 

Task Forces (JTFs) in November 2014. The three Joint Task Forces, JTF–East 

(JTF–E), JTF–West (JTF–W), and JTF–Investigations (JTF–I), are responsible for 

establishing operational priorities and synchronizing capabilities in order to achieve 

SBAC objectives. 

Two of the JTFs, JTF–E and JTF–W, are geographically focused task forces that 

concentrate on the southern land and maritime borders and approaches to the 

United States all the way to Central and South America. JTF–I is a ‘‘functional’’, 

multi-component task force that employs National Case Management to identify and 

prioritize top TCOs affecting homeland security, manage investigations and operations to dismantle them, and identify weaknesses or gaps in our practices, technology, etc. 

To address these gaps, JTF–I created and implemented HOMECORT (Homeland 

Criminal Organization Target), the DHS-wide process for identifying and 

prioritizing the top criminal networks affecting homeland security. 

In order to manage and unify U.S. Government efforts against these HOMECORT 

criminal networks, JTF–I developed three complementary processes: 

1. National Case Management to manage, integrate and support all the investigations and operations related to the targeted criminal network; 

2. Comprehensive Criminal Network Analysis to provide knowledge of the criminal network; and 

16 

3. Integrated Action Planning to establish the business rules for conducting National Case Management and producing Comprehensive Criminal Network 

Analysis. 

Through the sharing and fusing of each other’s information, these JTF–I processes 

allow DHS components to: 

• Identify and prioritize the top criminal networks impacting homeland security; 

• Tie together and manage all the investigations, operations, arrests, and seizures 

(covering multiple countries, jurisdictions, areas of responsibility and programs) 

related to all the activities (smuggling, money laundering, corruption, etc.) of a 

criminal network (see complementary processes below); 

• Move toward a complex common goal through a formal integrated action planning process. 

Since its inception, JTF–I’s interagency delegates managed and supported the targeting of 21 HOMECORT criminal networks, comprised of more than a thousand 

criminal investigations. To date, 13 of those networks were dismantled to the point 

they no longer threaten homeland security. The networks include money launderers, 

human smugglers, sex traffickers, drug smugglers, bulk cash smugglers, and weapons smugglers. The remaining HOMECORT-designated criminal networks continue 

to be the targets of active criminal investigations. 

Another example of a successful joint task force model is the Border Enforcement 

Security Task Force (BEST) initiative. BEST teams are ICE-led, multiagency task 

forces that target illicit movement of people and contraband through border areas. 

Other DHS entities, particularly CBP and the United States Coast Guard, participate. There are 38 BEST teams on the U.S.-Canada border and U.S.-Mexico border. 

Canadian and Mexican (multiagency) law enforcement partners work directly with 

DHS and other U.S. counterparts on investigative and interdiction missions. Canadian officials are often cross-designated as U.S. law enforcement (U.S. Code: Title 

19) to promote full sharing of law enforcement information. These units are housed 

on the U.S. side of the border. In fiscal year 2017, the BEST teams initiated 4,034 

investigations and effected 4,967 criminal arrests. 

NATIONAL GANG UNIT

The National Gang Unit (NGU) is a critical part of ICE’s mission to bring the 

fight to transnational criminal gangs. The NGU identifies and develops intelligence 

on gang membership, associations, activities, and international movements. It also 

deters and disrupts gang operations by tracing and seizing cash, weapons, and other 

assets derived from illicit activities. 

In 2005, ICE initiated Operation Community Shield, an international law enforcement initiative that combines ICE’s expansive statutory and civil enforcement authorities to combat the growth and proliferation of transnational criminal street 

gangs, prison gangs, and outlaw motorcycle gangs throughout the United States. 

With assistance from State, local, Tribal, and foreign law enforcement partners, the 

initiative helps ICE locate, investigate, prosecute, and where applicable, immediately remove gang members from our neighborhoods and ultimately from the 

United States. 

Operation Community Shield has resulted in the criminal and administrative arrests of nearly 60,000 gang leaders, members, and associates since its inception. 

Among those arrests, Community Shield operations have resulted in the criminal 

and administrative arrests of over 7,800 leaders, members, and associates of Mara 

Salvatrucha–13 (MS–13), the international criminal street gang. 

In 2012, ICE worked with the Treasury Department Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) to designate MS–13 as a TCO, the first criminal street gang so designated. As a result of the designation, any property or property interests in the 

United States, or in the possession or control of U.S. persons in which MS–13 has 

an interest, are blocked. In addition, U.S. persons are prohibited from engaging in 

transactions with MS–13 and are subject to civil monetary penalties up to $250,000 

and imprisonment up to 20 years. 

In 2016, ICE utilized the 2012 OFAC designation to develop and implement a new 

strategy targeting MS–13. ICE recognizes that TCOs need funding to maintain and 

expand their criminal organization and has been successfully identifying, exploiting, 

and disrupting MS–13’s global financial networks. Part of ICE’s new strategy is to 

address the threats posed by MS–13 in the United States and at their commandand-control structure in El Salvador simultaneously. Since January 2016, ICE has 

been deploying special agents to El Salvador to work with our host country law enforcement partners to build their financial investigative capacity to combat MS–13 

and identify MS–13’s financial networks within El Salvador. In addition, the deployVerDate Mar 15 2010 11:08 Sep 14, 2018 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00020 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 H:\115TH CONGRESS\18CI0118\18CI0118 HEATH
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ment allows the free flow of actionable intelligence between ICE and our host country law enforcement partners. 

In 2017, ICE worked with our DHS partners to form a departmental MS–13 

Working Group, to include ICE, CBP, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services 

(USCIS), and the Department of Justice’s Bureau of Prisons (BOP). The DHS MS– 

13 Working Group was formed to share intelligence, bridge intelligence gaps, eliminate redundancies, enhance collaboration, and provide visibility to all DHS entities 

involved in the fight against MS–13. The ultimate goal of the DHS MS–13 Working 

Group is to develop and implement a DHS enterprise enforcement strategy to disrupt and dismantle MS–13’s global criminal networks. 

As of December 28, 2017, ICE maintains 107 open investigations targeting MS– 

13 members and their criminal organizations globally, including Massachusetts, 

New York, New Jersey, Maryland, the District of Columbia, North Carolina, Texas, 

Tennessee, Ohio, California, Washington, and the Northern Triangle countries of 

Guatemala, Honduras, and El Salvador through Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt 

Organizations (RICO), Violent Crimes in Aid of Racketeering (VICAR), and criminal 

conspiracy prosecutions. Without information sharing and partnering with our Federal, State, local, and foreign law enforcement partners, ICE would not be nearly 

as successful at battling MS–13 and other gangs. 

LAW ENFORCEMENT INFORMATION-SHARING EFFORTS

In addition to leveraging domestic assets, ICE uses its strategically deployed personnel around the globe to use established relationships with host country law enforcement officials and mechanisms such as Customs Mutual Assistance Agreements 

(CMAAs) to share information and further its investigations. Mutual Legal Assistance Treaties (MLATs) are also invaluable instruments in obtaining and receiving 

international legal assistance, including evidence, for criminal investigations and 

prosecutions. 

ICE International Operations also partners with TCIUs and international task 

forces in 12 countries around the world. TCIUs are comprised of foreign law enforcement officials, customs officers, immigration officers, and prosecutors who receive 

ICE training and undergo a strict vetting process to ensure that shared information 

and operational activities are not compromised. Partnering with these TCIUs enables ICE to promote direct action via information sharing and investigative leads 

while respecting the sovereignty of the host country and cultivating international 

partnerships. 

Aligned with the President’s Strategy in Combatting Transnational Organized 

Crime, TCIUs identify targets, collect evidence, share intelligence, and facilitate the 

prosecution of TCOs both in-country and in the United States. These efforts, which 

often occur thousands of miles from the U.S. borders, essentially act as an outer 

layer of security for the United States. 

Another ICE program, BITMAP, helps provide infrastructure and capability for 

host governments to collect biometric data on individuals they encounter. This information is shared with U.S. law enforcement and the intelligence community; DHS 

in turn provides information back to these countries about these individuals. 

Through this process, ICE is able to track movement toward the United States, take 

joint action with partner nations along the route, and deter human smuggling 

through South and Central America. Comparisons of biometric data through 

BITMAP serve to identify criminal persons, wanted subjects (including international 

fugitives), and known or suspected terrorists. BITMAP is currently deployed to 14 

countries, with near-term plans to expand to two additional countries. 

ICE also leverages its information-sharing capabilities through the use of the Visa 

Security Program (VSP) and Trade Transparency Units (TTU). VSP deploys trained 

ICE special agents abroad to high-risk visa activity posts to identify and investigate 

potential terrorist and criminal threats before they reach the United States. VSP 

contributes to both counter-flow and counter-network capabilities, as well as providing support for intelligence, interdiction, and engagement. VSP special agents 

work alongside Department of State Consular Officers to provide real-time feedback 

on visa applicants prior to visa adjudication. VSP agents receive referrals based on 

automated screening of U.S. visa applicants conducted by ICE, in cooperation with 

CBP. 

The core mission of the TTU is to aggressively target criminal organizations and 

individuals involved in trade-based money laundering (TBML) but also those perpetrating contraband smuggling and customs fraud. In order to achieve this mission, 

HSI reached out to key foreign trading partners and successfully established (16) 

TTUs abroad. TTU currently has partnerships with Argentina, Australia, Brazil, 

Chile, Colombia, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Mexico, France, Guatemala, PanVerDate Mar 15 2010 11:08 Sep 14, 2018 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00021 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 H:\115TH CONGRESS\18CI0118\18CI0118 HEATH
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ama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, United Kingdom, and Uruguay. These countries 

are highly dependent upon value-added taxes (VAT) on commodities, which served 

as a motivating factor in the establishment of TTUs. These foreign partners recognize the value of information sharing, which permits the comparison of international 

trade and cross-border movement of merchandise. 

The United States and its foreign TTU partners currently provide trade data 

which that allows HSI investigators and analysts to detect anomalies which may be 

indicative of criminal activity such as TBML, contraband smuggling, and trade/customs fraud. This information sharing allows for the cross-referencing of trade data 

with other pertinent information such as Bank Secrecy Act (BSA) reports. The ultimate goal of most criminal organizations is financial gain either to promote on-going 

illicit activity or as the finality of this activity, hence trade-based money laundering 

is often the primary means by which they launder proceeds for their criminal enterprises. 

ICE’s Law Enforcement Information-Sharing Initiative (LEISI) serves as an active 

advocate in support of law enforcement information sharing both internal and external to DHS. This includes information sharing between Federal, State, local, Tribal, 

territorial, and foreign partners. LEISI coordinates throughout the law enforcement 

community to improve the understanding of information needs, provide leadership 

in resolving policy issues that may inhibit law enforcement information sharing, and 

develop approaches to overcome traditional barriers to information sharing. 

The LEISI program provides program management support and oversight to include administration of the Law Enforcement Information Sharing Strategy. For fiscal year 2018, additional focus is on international information for initiatives such 

as: Preventing and Combatting Serious Crimes (PCSC), the Five Country Ministerial (FCM), the Five Country Conference (FCC), and ERO’s Criminal History Information Sharing (CHIS) program. 

CHIS is a DHS-led initiative between the United States and its international 

partners whose purpose is to provide participating nations with criminal history information in advance of an alien’s removal. In turn, foreign countries share their 

information with the United States. The information shared helps protect law enforcement personnel, regional security, and public safety officers all over the globe. 

The initiative supports efforts in immigration management, law enforcement and 

National security. Countries currently participating in the CHIS initiative are: Mexico, Dominican Republic, Jamaica, the Bahamas, El Salvador, Honduras, and Guatemala, with planned expansion to additional countries in fiscal year 2018. 

CHIS enables ICE to identify wanted felons, including gang members, who fled 

to the United States to avoid prosecution in their home countries. Without this initiative, dangerous criminals might be able to circumvent prosecution. In fiscal year 

2017, CHIS sent 84,067 outbound notices of removal and ICE’s foreign partners returned 21,434 positive responses, including 2,810 foreign criminal history records, 

93 foreign criminal warrants and information related to 199 transnational gang 

members. 

During fiscal year 2017, ICE achieved significant successes in Latin America and 

the Caribbean through the development of programs that bolstered the law enforcement, customs, and immigration enforcement capabilities of international partners. 

These successes included the joint interagency execution of Operation CITADEL, 

which focused efforts on building partner nation capacity in identifying, disrupting 

and dismantling TCOs, including those designated as drug trafficking organizations 

and terrorist support networks. Interagency information sharing and collaboration 

from agencies within DHS, the Department of State, the Department of Justice (including the Federal Bureau of Investigation), and the Department of Defense, as 

well as participating partner nations, has been an essential piece of Operation 

CITADEL’s efforts to build capacity and to address identified threats. Operation 

CITADEL provided resources to enhance foreign partners’ investigative capabilities 

to counter transnational threats and organized crime that, in turn, provided ICE the 

ability to expand domestic and international investigations well beyond the U.S. 

borders and to more effectively target the illicit pathways exploited by TCOs. 

In fiscal year 2017, the Operation CITADEL effected the training of 809 partner 

national personnel, 231 criminal arrests, 54 indictments, 9 convictions, 2,005 

BITMAP enrollments, seizure of $252,235 in currency, 18,224 pounds of narcotics, 

seizure of 27 firearms, and encountered 3,669 aliens of possible National security 

concern. 

CONCLUSION

Thank you again for the opportunity to appear before you today and for your continued support of DHS and ICE and their missions. ICE is committed to continuing 

19 

its successful practice of sharing information with domestic and foreign partners 

and leveraging its resources around the world to stem cross-border criminal organizations. I appreciate your interest in these important issues and the efforts I have 

discussed today. 

I would be pleased to answer any questions you may have. 

Mr. KING. Thank you very much, Mr. Villanueva for your testimony and for your service. 

Our final witness is Mr. Richard H. Glenn, the acting deputy assistant secretary for the Bureau of International Narcotics and Law 

Enforcement Affairs in the State Department. 

Mr. Glenn oversees his department’s air wing and is responsible 

for foreign assistance programs in the Western Hemisphere that 

combat illicit drugs and organized crime and support law enforcement and the rule of law. Mr. Glenn began working with International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs in 2011 in Mexico 

City, implementing the Me ́rida Initiative. 

Since joining the State Department as a foreign service officer in 

1999, Mr. Glenn has served in Ecuador, South Africa, Czech Republic, Argentina, and Mexico. 

Mr. Glenn, you are recognized for your testimony. Thank you 

very much for being here today. 

STATEMENT OF RICHARD H. GLENN, ACTING DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY, BUREAU OF INTERNATIONAL NARCOTIC, 

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE 

Mr. GLENN. Good morning, Chairman King, Ranking Member 

Rice, Members of the subcommittee. Thank you for the opportunity 

to be here this morning to share with you the Department of 

State’s work to combat transnational gangs, primarily through information sharing. 

The Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, INL as we know it, leads the Department’s efforts to combat 

crime overseas. We strengthen the capacity of foreign partners to 

mitigate crime before it reaches our borders. 

Our neighbors, particularly Central America’s Northern Triangle, 

suffer extortion, violence, and instability carried out by gangs like 

MS–13. Gang activity in the region undermines institutions. It 

drives migration and it threatens citizen security. This has a direct 

bearing on our own National security. 

Like other forms of transnational crime, combatting gangs requires well-coordinated and comprehensive solutions. INL approaches this threat abroad on three fronts: First through regional 

coordination and information sharing through vetted and specialized units; No. 2, community anti-gang efforts; and third through 

institutional reform and capacity building of our foreign partners. 

INL support to vetted and specialized units provides U.S. and 

partner National law enforcement with the tools they need to investigate complex and high-threat gang cases. Through our support, foreign law enforcement gains the skills necessary to become 

reliable, trusted partners of U.S. law enforcement, routinely sharing information to disrupt the work of transnational gangs. 

We support 56 specialized units throughout Central America, including FBI’s TAG units and ICE’s TCIUs. In 2016 alone the 

Northern Triangle and the vetted units that we support made 

20 

3,116 arrests and denied more than $200 million in revenue to 

criminal organizations. 

Because gangs are transnational I cannot overstate the importance of strong regional coordination. We must be nimble and INL 

continually evolves its approach. INL and FBI develop the regional 

criminal gang intelligence platform to enable real-time information 

flow between TAG units. 

Last May, INL, with the Department of Homeland Security, created the Border Immigration and Coordination Center, which we 

call GCIF, a Salvadoran multi-agency task force to help U.S., State, 

and local authorities identify, arrest, or deny entry to gang members. 

To date, GCIF has identified 240 MS–13 members not previously 

known to U.S. law enforcement, 46 not previously known to Salvadoran authorities and 37 Salvadoran human smugglers and 

facilitators. 

Just in the last 2 weeks GCIF identified 16 Salvadoran gang 

members, four of which had active arrest warrants in El Salvador 

for crimes, including aggravated homicide. They will be processed 

for deportation and returned to Salvadoran law enforcement authorities. 

INL is working to expand GCIF offices in El Salvador to include 

Guatemala, Honduran, and Mexican authorities. 

We also work closely with our partners in Mexico through the 

Me ́rida Initiative to strengthen our shared border security and to 

combat transnational crime through enhanced information sharing. 

Through INL support, in partnership with DHS, biometric information Mexico collects at their borders and ports is now being shared 

with the United States. 

This capability enhances our countries’ joint efforts to respond to 

migration trends and to conduct cross-border investigations of gang 

members and special interest aliens. 

We recognize, however, improving operational coordination and 

information sharing is not enough. Citizens need to have the trust 

and confidence in police to report crimes and police need that information to successfully crack down on gang activity. 

In Central America, INL is strengthening local law enforcement’s 

capacity to connect with communities and address gang violence by 

implementing violence prevention programs in high-crime areas, 

many of which have seen homicide rates plunge between 40 percent and 73 percent in 2015. 

INL’s third line of effort supports building strong institutions. 

Arresting gang members is only effective if justice institutions can 

prosecute, convict, and incarcerate criminals. INL and our interagency partners enhance the capacity of justice institutions, including attorney generals to introduce legal reforms, mitigate gang violence, and combat corruption. 

Combatting transnational gangs requires comprehensive and 

well-coordinated efforts. Achieving lasting change is not quick or 

easy, but the comprehensive approach we have put in place is 

showing promising results. And a sustained commitment to our 

partners in the region is critical to protecting our homeland. 

21 

Chairman King, Ranking Member Rice, thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today, and I look forward to your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Glenn follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF RICHARD H. GLENN

JANUARY 18, 2018 

Chairman King, Ranking Member Rice, distinguished Members of the subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today to discuss the 

work of the Department of State’s Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL) to combat transnational gangs, including through information sharing. Transnational gangs are key drivers of instability throughout the 

Western Hemisphere, posing significant threats to security and prosperity here in 

the United States and to our partners abroad, particularly in Central America. 

Transnational gangs extort individuals and small businesses and perpetuate high 

levels of violence and crime, causing large numbers of Central Americans, particularly in the Northern Triangle countries of El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras, 

to migrate to the United States. 

Gangs, predominantly Mara Salvatrucha (MS–13) and the 18th Street Gang, 

which originated in Los Angeles in the 1980’s, continue to forcibly recruit vulnerable 

Central American immigrants and expand their influence in the United States. 

With a presence in more than 40 U.S. States, communities across the country are 

forced to grapple with increased levels of homicide, extortion, local drug dealing, 

prostitution, and other violent crimes carried out by gangs. MS–13 is particularly 

prevalent in El Salvador, contributing to its notoriety as one of the most violent 

countries in the world in 2015 and 2016. While El Salvador’s homicide rate for 2017 

decreased by 25 percent from 2016 levels, gang activity still contributes to sustained 

levels of extortion, violence, and insecurity. U.S. law enforcement reports more frequent communication between MS–13 members in El Salvador and the United 

States, further reinforcing the growing transnational nature of MS–13. Both MS– 

13 and Barrio 18 have a significant presence in Honduras, though not on the same 

scale as in El Salvador. In Guatemala, gang activity consists mainly of street gangs 

focused on extortion. However, transnational gang members, especially Barrio 18, 

are increasingly extending operations in Guatemala as El Salvador and Honduras 

intensify efforts to combat gangs in their respective countries. 

As the reach of transnational gangs span borders and communities, successfully 

dismantling them require comprehensive and well-coordinated solutions at the local, 

State, Federal, and international levels. INL leads the Department of State’s efforts 

to combat transnational crime overseas by strengthening the capacity of foreign 

partners to combat and prevent crime at the source before it reaches U.S. borders. 

Our programs complement those of, and are closely coordinated with, the efforts of 

our U.S. interagency colleagues, including the U.S. Department of Justice (DoJ) and 

the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS). 

In Central America, INL leads the Department’s implementation of regional efforts to combat transnational crime under the Central America Regional Security 

Initiative (CARSI) and in support of the U.S. Strategy for Central America, a multiyear interagency initiative to secure U.S. borders and protect U.S. citizens by addressing the security, governance, and economic drivers of migration and illicit trafficking, and to promote private-sector investment in Central America. Established 

in 2008, CARSI brings years of lessons learned and best practices to the current 

fight against transnational gangs, including the knowledge that combatting MS–13 

and other transnational gangs requires a multi-faceted approach that couples law 

enforcement efforts to deny transnational gangs the ability to operate with building 

stronger, more accountable institutions that bring criminals to justice. To this end, 

INL support under CARSI focuses on strengthening the capacity of foreign governments’ law enforcement and criminal justice systems through a three-part approach: 

Regional coordination and information sharing through vetted and specialized units, 

bottom-up community anti-gang efforts, and top-down institutional reform and capacity building. Through this approach, we prevent gang activity and recruitment 

in Central American communities, ensure institutions are capable of bringing gang 

members to justice, and strengthen the ability of partner-nation law enforcement to 

disrupt and dismantle transnational gangs. 

Our Northern Triangle partners are also working to enhance their efforts to disrupt and dismantle transnational crime. In August 2016, the Northern Triangle governments signed the ‘‘Regional Plan Against Transnational Organized Crime’’. The 

22 

agreement includes measures for information sharing on organized crime investigations and increased joint patrolling of border zones by police and military personnel 

to curb arms and drug smuggling, as well as the movement of gang members. As 

part of this plan, high-level officials, including the Attorney Generals, meet to increase collaboration and coordination between the countries. 

REGIONAL COORDINATION AND INFORMATION SHARING

Working closely with our interagency colleagues, including DoJ and DHS, INL 

combats transnational gangs through building the capacity of vetted units and specialized task forces to investigate cases and to serve as reliable, trusted partners 

of U.S. law enforcement. Due to the transnational nature of MS–13 and Barrio 18, 

our efforts increasingly focus on enhancing cross-border intelligence sharing and operations. We currently support 56 partner nation vetted units, task forces, and specialized tactical units throughout Central America. These units, typically comprised 

of elite members of partner nation law enforcement institutions, are capable of investigating complex and high-threat gang cases and other key security issues. In 

Honduras, El Salvador, and Guatemala, INL provides training, equipment, technology, and logistical support to FBI-vetted and advised Transnational Anti-Gang 

Units (TAGs), which lead international efforts to target criminal gangs. Through the 

TAGs, U.S. and Central American law enforcement partners work together to investigate, disrupt, and dismantle transnational gangs, including through the collection 

and dissemination of intelligence to support investigations. The results of these 

units have been remarkable and, importantly, have led to arrests in both the United 

States and Central America, and to lives saved. In 2015 the TAG unit in El Salvador started monitoring Salvadorans with active links to gang members throughout the East Coast of the United States, which contributed to the identification of 

the entire leadership structure for local MS–13 and 18th Street gangs and the arrest of 98 MS–13 gang members in Charlotte, Boston, and Newark, saving four lives 

in the United States and 28 in El Salvador. 

To enhance TAG units’ ability to attack criminal gang activity in the region, INL 

supported the development of the Regional Criminal Gang Intelligence Platform 

(SICAT), which was operationalized in October 2017. INL continues to support 

SICAT, which enables real-time information sharing for TAG units to track gangrelated activities, migration, human smuggling, and the trafficking of drugs, weapons, and illicit goods across the Northern Triangle. The platform facilitates secure 

and immediate exchange of information, directly supporting the Northern Triangle 

Presidents agreement in the 2016 ‘‘Regional Plan Against Transnational Organized 

Crime’’ to exchange information on transnational gang activity. SICAT is a critical 

component for increased cross-border coordination and operations. 

In the Northern Triangle and Panama, INL supports U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE)-vetted Transnational Criminal Investigative Units (TCIUs) 

through the provision of equipment and technology, training, and logistical support. 

TCIUs disrupt and dismantle transnational criminal organizations (TCOs) and investigate a litany of crimes, including human trafficking, smuggling, and money 

laundering, which often have a nexus with transnational gangs. Our support for 

TCIUs includes DHS Operation CITADEL, a multi-year interagency effort to bolster 

partner nation capabilities to identify, disrupt, and dismantle TCOs by targeting the 

networks used to move migrants, illicit funds, and contraband throughout Central 

America. In 2017, CITADEL’s intelligence and information sharing, mentoring, and 

capacity building through cross-border TCIU operations resulted in 231 arrests, including nine MS–13 members in Honduras. CITADEL also led authorities to identify or disrupt a number of human trafficking and financial networks of gangs and 

TCOs in the region. 

Extortion is the main source of revenue for Salvadoran gangs. Wide-spread extortion perpetuated by gangs is often cited as a primary security concern by citizens 

of the Northern Triangle and one of the drivers of migration from the region. As 

a result, INL established several specialized task forces beginning in 2012 comprised of police and prosecutors to address extortion and dismantle transnational 

gangs’ extensive financial networks. Through technical assistance and mentoring by 

INL and DOJ Office of Overseas Prosecutorial Development Assistance and Training (OPDAT) advisors, investigations by these task forces have produced impressive 

results. In 2017, asset forfeiture and financial crimes task forces executed numerous 

large-scale operations with hundreds of arrests and multi-million-dollar asset seizures of gang members and associates, eliminating access to their financial resources. For example, the Salvadoran Business Crimes Task Force (BCTF) successfully dismantled four MS–13 and 18th Street extortion networks, maintaining a 96 

percent conviction rate. In 2016, these units contributed to Operation Jaque, El SalVerDate Mar 15 2010 11:08 Sep 14, 2018 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00026 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 H:\115TH CONGRESS\18CI0118\18CI0118 HEATH
23 

vador’s first effort to dismantle MS–13 financial structures. The Salvadoran Attorney General’s Office expanded the BCTF concept to anti-extortion units located in 

each of El Salvador’s 19 departments. In September 2017, the units executed a second MS–13 financial takedown, Operation Tecana, which involved cross-border coordination with Guatemala and DHS, resulting in 137 arrests, including six police 

officers, for collaborating with MS–13 and other criminal organizations and the seizure of properties and businesses used to launder money from illicit acts. 

In September 2017, INL and interagency efforts to more effectively coordinate the 

network of Northern Triangle task forces and vetted units contributed to the success 

of Operation Regional Shield. INL-supported prosecutors and police in Guatemala, 

Honduras, and El Salvador, working with OPDAT and the FBI, conducted a coordinated regional operation against gang members in their respective countries. The 

operation led to the arrest of 3,800 gang members in the United States and Central 

America. Law enforcement officials seized six firearms and charged 284 gang members in Guatemala; seized 14 businesses and 11 luxury vehicles and arrested 12 

MS–13 money launderers in Honduras; and filed 3,477 criminal charges, resulting 

in more than 1,400 arrests and the dismantling of eight MS–13 and Barrio 18 

cliques in El Salvador. 

In May 2017, INL facilitated the creation of the Border Integration and Coordination Center (GCIF), a Salvadoran multi-agency task force supporting DHS and U.S. 

State and local law enforcement to identify, arrest, or deny entry to gang members. 

GCIF officials, originally deployed to McAllen, Texas, conduct research and report 

information to DHS and relevant law enforcement for further action. The information provided through GCIF was not available to U.S. authorities prior to the implementation of the program. Since its inception, GCIF information has led to the arrest of eight gang members and one human smuggler in the United States, as well 

as the arrest of a gang member in Italy who was on Salvadoran authorities’ topwanted criminal list. GCIF has identified 240 MS–13 members not previously 

known to U.S. law enforcement, 46 not previously known to Salvadoran authorities, 

and 37 Salvadoran human smugglers and facilitators. GCIF queries also identified 

88 Salvadoran nationals with active arrest warrants in El Salvador; information 

U.S. officials utilized when reviewing immigration applications made by these individuals. In December 2017, the last Salvadoran officials deployed to McAllen returned to El Salvador, joining a permanent staff of 10 police officers, five migration 

officials, and two corrections officers—alongside representatives from the U.S. Department of Homeland Security—at a dedicated Salvadoran headquarters where 

they will continue to review these records. 

Due to the initial successes and strengthened coordination between United States 

and Salvadoran authorities, INL is working to expand GCIF to include Guatemalan 

and Honduran officials. In July 2017, the INL-funded United Nations Office on 

Drugs and Crime human trafficking project facilitated the first Interparliamentary 

Forum among legislators, Attorneys General, and Security Ministers of the Northern Triangle countries. The country delegates concluded the meeting with signed 

commitments, including support for GCIF, the first tangible regional commitment 

to the GCIF by the Northern Triangle governments. At the same time, we are working to expand GCIF beyond its current location and are promoting it as a resource 

for U.S. States and local jurisdictions with significant MS–13 presence. In October 

2017, INL and DHS reached out to the Suffolk County, Long Island Police Department (SCPD), which submitted to GCIF a list of 454 individuals suspected of gang 

affiliation. GCIF identified and provided potential residential locations of known 

gang members and individuals wanted in El Salvador. 

Through INL’s International Law Enforcement Academies (ILEAs), we provide 

specialized training to criminal justice sector officials and facilitate collaboration between partner nations’ and U.S. Federal, State, and local law enforcement to address common problems. From 2015 through 2017, 211 law enforcement officials 

from 12 countries, including more than 100 from the Northern Triangle, attended 

anti-gang training courses at ILEAs San Salvador and Roswell. The courses were 

taught either by the FBI or Salvadoran National Police to provide participants with 

tools to investigate gang-related crimes. 

INFORMATION SHARING WITH MEXICO

Through our strong security partnership with Mexico, INL’s efforts under the 

Me ́rida Initiative includes enhancing information sharing with Mexico to disrupt 

transnational crime and TCOs. In 2015, the United States agreed to help Mexico 

develop a nation-wide, interagency biometrics system capable of interfacing with 

U.S. biometrics systems. INL, in coordination with DHS, commenced a pilot project 

in 2017 to enable Mexico’s National Migration Institute to routinely collect and exVerDate Mar 15 2010 11:08 Sep 14, 2018 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00027 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 H:\115TH CONGRESS\18CI0118\18CI0118 HEATH
24 

change biometric information on migrants with the United States. As of 2017, all 

biometric information collected in migration centers and ports of entry along Mexico’s southern border with Guatemala and Belize is shared with United States law 

enforcement. This capability enhances our countries’ joint efforts to identify, track, 

and dismantle TCOs and other violent criminal groups; to identify Known or Suspected Terrorists before they reach U.S. borders; to track migration patterns; to anticipate, plan for, and respond to migration surges; to analyze human trafficking 

networks; and to support cross-border investigations of gang members and other 

criminals. INL partners with ICE and Customs and Border Protection (CBP) to 

train and mentor Mexican migration officials. We will explore expanding this biometric exchange with Mexico to prisons, airports, and other Mexican security agencies. 

The depth of our cooperation with Mexico to strengthen border security, control 

migration, and dismantle transnational criminal networks is unprecedented. Since 

2014, Mexico has significantly increased its presence along its southern border with 

Guatemala and Belize. In 2016, Mexico’s Migration Agency detained 188,595 migrants headed to the United States. Ninety percent of those migrants were Central 

Americans, and 17,889 were unaccompanied children. Mexico’s cooperation to control migration strengthens our own border security and saves the United States billions of dollars in potential deportation costs. 

Mexico continues to increase engagement with the United States and Central 

American partners to combat shared threats from organized crime, and we welcome 

this very positive step in regional collaboration. 

BOTTOM-UP ANTI-GANG EFFORTS

In addition to our bilateral and regional coordination efforts to enhance information sharing, INL also implements proven successful community-level anti-gang 

interventions in Central America, given a significant amount of gang activity in the 

region is localized. These interventions strengthen the capacity of police, make communities more resilient to gang infiltration, and establish trust and relationships 

between communities and the police. Through Model Police Precincts (MPP) and 

Place-Based Strategy (PBS) sites, we strengthen local law enforcement’s ability to 

prevent and respond to gang violence by identifying key high-crime areas and communities at risk, and partnering with implementers to develop strategically balanced and integrated criminal justice-sector projects. As a result of these strong 

partnerships, MPP and PBS sites have seen reductions in homicide rates ranging 

from 40 to 73 percent since 2015. We also tackle gang recruitment, a pervasive issue 

for youth in the Northern Triangle countries, through the Gang Resistance Education and Training (GREAT) and Police Athletic League (PAL) programs. These police-led programs provide anti-gang and life skills training, sports, and other activities to at-risk children. As a result, children develop tools to resist recruitment tactics and citizen trust in law enforcement is strengthened. To date, more than 

300,000 students have graduated from INL-sponsored GREAT programs in Central 

America, and 1,624 police officers achieved certification to teach the GREAT curriculum. 

TOP-DOWN INSTITUTIONAL EFFORTS

Arresting gang members is only effective if justice institutions are capable of prosecuting, convicting, and incarcerating these criminals. Through training, technical 

assistance, and mentoring, INL and our interagency partners enhance the capacity 

of the Northern Triangle justice institutions and ensure the security of prosecutors 

and judges working on high-profile cases. These efforts are essential as corruption 

and impunity remain significant challenges in the region. We work closely with the 

Attorney Generals of the Northern Triangle countries to introduce legal reforms, 

mitigate gang violence, and combat corruption. Many key successes, including Operation Regional Shield executed in September 2017, are coordinated by Northern Triangle Attorney Generals, with U.S. support. Furthermore, by helping Salvadoran 

and Guatemalan prisons improve security and infrastructure, we work to ensure 

that gang leaders are unable to direct criminal activities while incarcerated. 

CONCLUSION

Dismantling transnational gangs and ending the violence and crime they carry 

out requires sustained and well-coordinated efforts between law enforcement while 

also strengthening the institutions that administer justice and investing in local 

communities to increase trust and confidence in the police and provide citizens with 

the tools necessary to resist gang influence. These are smart and necessary investments, whether it is combating transnational gangs here at home or abroad. SecuVerDate Mar 15 2010 11:08 Sep 14, 2018 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00028 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 H:\115TH CONGRESS\18CI0118\18CI0118 HEATH
25 

rity in Central America is vital to the security of the United States. INL’s work to 

strengthen foreign partner capacity in the region provides critical linkages between 

U.S. and foreign law enforcement to make possible greater information sharing. 

Like other forms of transnational crime, however, dismantling gangs does not lend 

itself to simple, short-term solutions. This is a long-term endeavor, but the comprehensive approach we have put in place to tackle the considerable challenges before us is demonstrating measurable results. INL will continue to support programming that enhances information sharing and regional coordination to improve citizen security in Central America and combat the influence of transnational gangs 

and criminal organizations in the United States. 

Mr. KING. Thank you, Mr. Glenn. 

I will direct my first question initially to the FBI but then to be 

answered by anyone who wants to respond. What has changed or 

will change in your ability to target MS–13 since the October 2017 

attorney general direction to make the TCO a priority? OK, that 

will be the first part of the question. 

Mr. RICHARDSON. Thank you, sir. Certainly we at the FBI have 

redirected resources appropriately. We are actively engaged with 

our TAG teams or our TAG task forces down in the Northern Triangle with regard to MS–13 and the 18th Street gang. 

Ultimately our goal is to get ahead of the threat through intelligence sharing and be more proactive as opposed to reactive. We 

rely heavily upon the information that is coming out of the Northern Triangle. 

We have SSAs that are assigned to these vetted teams that are 

trusted advisors providing subject-matter expertise regarding investigative techniques that we utilize. Then the goal is to gain actionable intelligence and share that with our domestic partners, 

with our trusted Safe Streets partners across the United States in 

order to get ahead of the threat. 

Mr. KING. Thank you. Let me, before I go to Mr. Villanueva, I 

would be remiss if I didn’t also commend the FBI for the terrific 

work they are doing in the—and again, this is HSI, FBI and the 

local police are doing a phenomenal job, and so I want to—if you 

can, again, pass on to them my thanks for the terrific job they are 

doing. 

Mr. RICHARDSON. Yes, sir. I will. Thank you. 

Mr. KING. Now to Mr. Villanueva and Mr. Glenn, as a follow-on 

to that question, did this attorney general’s direction add any capabilities to HSI or to the State Department? 

Mr. VILLANUEVA. Sir, what I will say is that the direction will 

actually help us to focus on the problem and to double down our 

efforts into targeting MS–13 and other violent gangs by bringing 

all ICE tools to bear, whether it is the criminal enforcement side 

they have through HSI or the administrative through ERO. 

But also to bring our traditional financial investigations to target 

their finances, their assets, and to go with a holistic approach 

against this violent gang, also by working with CBP, with the 

interagency and working with INL to bring capacity-building efforts to the region very much like the FBI is doing to continue to 

raise that level of awareness and the expertise to tackle those violent gangs. 

So a really important direction. It really helps the interagency 

and the law enforcement community to hone down into a terrific 

problem that is affecting our National security. 

Mr. KING. Mr. Glenn. 

26 

Mr. GLENN. I would just echo what Mr. Villanueva mentioned, as 

well as the success of our programs relies largely on the political 

will of the countries that we work in. Without that political will we 

can do a tremendous amount of work and have very few results. 

When we get high-level engagement, for example, the attorney 

general’s engagement with the countries that we work in, it sends 

a very clear signal as to the priorities of the United States and 

helps them internally develop the political will that is needed to 

make these programs successful. 

Mr. KING. If I could follow up with you, Mr. Glenn, how is the 

McAllen coordination facilitated by INL? How is that enhancing 

the coordination between, say, the police in El Salvador and in U.S. 

communities such as Nassau and Suffolk Counties where Miss Rice 

and I represent? 

Mr. GLENN. Sure. So it has been a tremendous development and 

a very effective tool, but what it does is it places or has placed in 

El Salvador a law enforcement official who has access to their 

criminal information databases and puts them in physical connection with law enforcement authorities in the United States and 

provides us between the two countries an avenue with which to 

share the information. 

That is why we have been able to get the results that we have 

gotten. As people have come across the border and been apprehended, we can run fingerprints against databases in El Salvador. 

So people who have misrepresented who they are, your fingerprint doesn’t lie, and that is how we have been able to actually 

identify people wanted for murder back in El Salvador and been 

able to deport them and see that they experience justice. 

Mr. KING. Thank you, Mr. Glenn. 

Now I will recognize the Ranking Member. But let me just say 

before I formally recognize her, is that Miss Rice has been a great 

partner in all this. We had a joint hearing back in Central Islip on 

MS–13 back in, I guess, May or June, and I want to thank her for 

her cooperation and bipartisan spirit in this. 

With that, I recognize the Ranking Member. 

Miss RICE. Thank you, Chairman King. 

Mr. Glenn, what are the largest Russian gangs that you have 

come across, and what are the kind of criminal activities that they 

are involved in? How are you trying to combat Russian cyber 

crime? 

Mr. GLENN. So our focus in the Western Hemisphere has been 

on Latin American gangs, MS–13, 18th Street. Russian gangs in 

the Western Hemisphere has not been a focus. 

What I can do is take that question back to those who focus on 

Russian law enforcement matters. 

Miss RICE. But if you are talking about transnational criminal 

organizations, I mean, the Russians, given what they did during 

the elections last year have to be front and center on—I mean, just 

out of curiosity is there any focus on that at all? 

Mr. GLENN. Right. 

Miss RICE. I am not saying take away from MS–13, but if you 

are looking at transnational criminal organizations I would think 

that the Russians are right up there. 

27 

Mr. GLENN. The focus in the Western Hemisphere has been on 

MS–13 and 18th Street. 

Miss RICE. Are you aware of any effort to address Russian—— 

Mr. GLENN. Not in the Western Hemisphere. 

Miss RICE [continuing]. Criminal organizations? No. 

Mr. GLENN. Not in the Western Hemisphere. 

Miss RICE. Well—— 

Mr. GLENN. Not INL programming. 

Miss RICE. OK. 

Mr. Villanueva, there are many undocumented immigrants who 

I am sure you are aware are victims of transnational criminal organizations, including MS–13, certainly where Chairman King and I 

are from. They witness crimes committed by gang members, but as 

you know, many of them don’t want to come forward because they 

are afraid that they are then going to be taken into custody, deported depending on what their status is. 

So my question is: You know, it seems that the administration’s 

rhetoric and policies toward undocumented immigrants have really 

caused that fear to escalate. So how are you as law enforcement 

agencies, needing information from people who are maybe here illegally but are being victimized and have information to help you address the criminal activities of MS–13 and other gangs, how do you 

deal with that issue? 

Mr. VILLANUEVA. Ma’am, thank you very much for the question. 

Your point is extremely valid and it is a concern that we law enforcement deal with every day. As a matter of fact, there are protections for witnesses when they come forward to law enforcement, 

whether they are in the country legally or not. 

Under the Immigration and Nationality Act, the INA, we can 

provide those individuals with continued presence. That authority 

is delegated to the Secretary of Homeland Security, which she then 

delegates that to ICE, which is one of the programs that I have 

overseen of. It is what we call the Parole Branch. 

We can work with that community and we can offer protections, 

continued presence, significant public benefit paroles and there are 

some other tools out there to protect those individuals from being 

deported, to protect those individuals from violence from those 

gangs. 

So there are protections for them when they come forward to law 

enforcement. When I am saying law enforcement, not only ICE, 

HSI. When they come forward to the FBI we will work with our 

FBI partners to grant those protections to any witness that come 

forward regardless of that person’s immigration status. 

Miss RICE. Has that made it easier for you to get information? 

I mean how do you get the word out that it is OK for people to 

come forward? 

Mr. VILLANUEVA. So we do have actually outreach campaigns 

through the victim assistance program and certainly efforts like 

this and where we have the ability to talk to the American people 

about all the programs are paramount to get the word out, so really appreciate your question on this topic. 

Miss RICE. Great, thank you. 

I think that is it. 

28 

Mr. KING. Mr. Perry, let me thank you for—articulately and 

more intelligently than I would ever do. 

Mr. PERRY. My privilege, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. KING. The gentleman is recognized. 

Mr. PERRY. Thank you. 

Mr. Richardson, a couple questions here kind-of in different directions and maybe a little off the topic of collaboration, but somewhat in it. Not only transnational crimes but if a terrorist activity 

or event occurs in the United States that would be something you 

would collaborate with other agencies on as the FBI. Is that correct? I just want to make sure I am not out of bounds here. 

Mr. RICHARDSON. Yes. Yes. 

Mr. PERRY. That is correct, right? So if I could, what compels 

your organization or local law enforcement for that matter to work 

with the National Counterterrorism Center in some type of a criminal or alleged terrorist event? What compels that? What is the 

precedent? What has to happen? 

Mr. RICHARDSON. So counterterrorism is not my expertise. 

Mr. PERRY. I understand. 

Mr. RICHARDSON. However, I can tell you that NCTC is a great 

partner of ours. We work with them each and every day on the 

counterterrorism front and share information on a regular basis, 

both on a Classified level and an Unclassified level. 

Mr. PERRY. If you were working on a case, so to speak though, 

and you determined that you need to bring the NCTC in, what 

makes that determination? Do they offer? Do you see things? How 

does that happen? 

I am trying to figure out what that nexus is, and I have got a 

specific example in mind and I won’t keep you in suspense. 

The mass hooting in Las Vegas, ISIS in June and August, per 

my recollection, warned the United States or warned us, warned 

the public that they were going to attack Las Vegas. Then I think 

up to four times post the incident claimed responsibility. 

Yet at this point I don’t think there is any NCTC involvement, 

but there is FBI involvement. So I am trying to figure out what is 

happening there? Do you know? 

Mr. RICHARDSON. So I couldn’t speak to the Las Vegas shooting 

incident in this particular environment because of classification 

issues. 

Mr. PERRY. Well, what is the normal protocol though? What 

would invoke? What would precipitate involving the NCTC? 

Mr. RICHARDSON. Specifically I would have to get back to you. I 

am happy to do that. 

Mr. PERRY. There is no normal protocol that somebody has to request it? You hear some traffic. You see some traffic. None of that? 

There is not a specific protocol that you know of at this time? 

Mr. RICHARDSON. So my information is dated but I will tell you 

based upon my personal experience working counterterrorism matters the dialog with NCTC happens every day in group meetings 

and then individually with folks that work from each agency. So I 

can tell you that that dialog is on-going. It is seamless. 

Mr. PERRY. OK. 

Mr. RICHARDSON. But specifically if you are asking me for protocols I will have to get back to you on that. 

29 

Mr. PERRY. Yes, if you could, please. 

Mr. RICHARDSON. Sure. 

Mr. PERRY. I would like to be able to understand that a little bit 

better. Moving on with the remaining time I want to explore an 

area where this, again, is maybe out of the particular realm of this 

conversation, but Congress is meant to provide oversight in our 

role, and we provide a check on the Executive branch to ensure the 

balance of power between the two branches. 

I have oftentimes, and you might not have and probably have 

nothing to do with this, but been frustrated by asking for briefings 

on particular issues from the FBI only to be told there is no briefing available. We are not going to brief you. 

I understand the sensitivity of the case and that we don’t want 

to jeopardize any on-going investigation. I will tell you one in particular that I have requested and recently requested again, and I 

am trying to work through whatever the protocols are. 

Imran Awan is a case that I am interested in. We don’t seem to 

have much information. I am just trying to verify and validate 

some things. This is an incident where literally the Congress is involved. 

As I understand it the FBI’s involved, yet we can get no information—zero. We can’t get a briefing. We don’t see any reports from 

the FBI so we don’t know where the investigation stands. 

Is it solely bank fraud? Is there something more to do with the 

links to Pakistan and the shadow, if you want to call it that, or 

whatever you want to call the car sales exercise and money laundering and so on and so forth? These seem to be reasonable questions for Members of Congress. 

Certainly I have got a bona-fide Top Secret clearance and plus 

whatever you characterize the one here in Congress. What must 

Members of Congress do to get a reasonable briefing on events that 

are appropriate? Is there something I am missing? 

Mr. RICHARDSON. No, sir. We make every effort to provide those 

briefings at the request of Congress and others. I would encourage 

you to continue to make that request. We will send it up through 

our channels. 

I will tell you that we are hesitant to comment both publicly or 

privately on on-going investigations. As a matter of fact, we are 

prohibited to do that. However, in certain instances we are able to 

provide those briefings when the request comes in. 

So I am very familiar with—— 

Mr. PERRY. If you would please make a note that I have made 

the request but maybe it will have a little more weight if you send 

it forward. But we will continue to, and I look forward to a continuing conversation on this and other issues. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield. 

Mr. KING. Thank you, Mr. Perry. 

The gentleman from Massachusetts, Mr. Keating. 

Mr. KEATING. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. KING. Former prosecutor himself. 

Mr. KEATING. That is right. That is correct. Thank you, Mr. 

Chairman, and thank all of you for your service to the country. It 

is really appreciated, and it is great to see the interagency cooperation on display here this morning. 

30 

I had a question, I guess Mr. Glenn first. You were describing 

some of the conditions in El Salvador and you were talking about 

how many homicides, gang activity, the violence that is there. It is 

a pretty violent place, isn’t it? 

Mr. GLENN. Yes. 

Mr. KEATING. Young people that are there, is there coercive activities with these gangs and other groups to coerce them into 

criminal activities? 

Mr. GLENN. Yes. 

Mr. KEATING. What would you say, and is it important to have 

cooperation, as you mentioned, with the local people in the country, 

not just the leaders themselves? That is part of what we are trying 

to instill. That is part of the three things you mentioned, correct? 

Mr. GLENN. Correct. 

Mr. KEATING. So what are we to make of sending 200,000 people 

back to El Salvador in huge numbers? What is that going to—what 

message does that send to the people we are trying to create this 

cooperation with in El Salvador when they see family members 

who have fled because of danger, fear, being sent back? 

Is that something that instills or will enhance cooperation locally 

in our activities? What kind of message could that send? 

Mr. GLENN. Sure. Well, I think it is important at least in terms 

of why we do what we do in Central America, specifically in El Salvador. The reason that we offer the assistance that we do is because of the conditions in these countries. 

Mr. KEATING. Right. 

Mr. GLENN. So we have—— 

Mr. KEATING. So I mean is it fair to say that sending these people that fled from those type of coercive activities and dangers we 

could be sending them right back into those dangerous situations—— 

Mr. GLENN. Well, from an INL perspective, our responsibility is 

to—— 

Mr. KEATING. No, no, I am sorry. I am just asking you with your 

knowledge not as an official answer, but—— 

Mr. GLENN. Yes. 

Mr. KEATING [continuing]. You know, with the knowledge which 

obviously you have for that part of the world and what is happening, is that kind-of a possibility? 

Mr. GLENN. Yes, but there are tough conditions and that is why 

we are there trying to help resolve, to help them get the security 

infrastructure that they need. 

Mr. KEATING. So nothing has changed suddenly from the point 

where those people fled from that coercive activity and it is still a 

problem. I am wouldn’t say there’s not improvement, but it’s still 

a problem. 

Mr. GLENN. Oh, yes. I think we have seen some real improvement, especially in some of the most dangerous neighborhoods, the 

neighborhood of Chamelecon in Honduras, for example, outside of 

San Pedro Sula. You know, in partnership with USAID and DOD, 

INL’s place-based strategy has made significant improvements in a 

neighborhood like that that was a primary—— 

Mr. KEATING. So but it is still dangerous? 

Mr. GLENN. Dangerous and getting better. 

31 

Mr. KEATING. The country is—yes, great. 

Mr. GLENN. Yes. 

Mr. KEATING. All right. Thank you. I know those are difficult 

questions to put you on the line for, but it is important to say as 

part of your earlier testimony indicated. 

You know, there are about 100 people, almost 100 people a day 

in the United States dying, and when you look at the gang activity 

and the other activities. 

But when we are looking at transnational criminal organizations, 

the one that is killing the most people in our country, as I said, 

almost 100 a day, are those activities that surround opioids and 

Fentanyl coming into our country, being counterfeited to look like 

Percocet or other commercial drugs, coming in with great potency. 

It has spiked the deaths in my area and most of the country 

enormously. A lot of that is coming from China. Can you comment 

on what we are trying to do where right under the nose of the Chinese government the manufacturing of these that are occurring and 

being shipped through? 

Because clearly that is costing the most American lives every 

day. Anything we are doing to focus on that specifically? Any of 

you, sorry; FBI, too. 

Mr. GLENN. I can just mention briefly some of the things that 

INL has been doing. One of the important things on Fentanyl and 

the analogs of Fentanyl, so there are multiple types of synthetic 

opioids that are being produced in China and brought into the 

United States, is to get those substances on the list of prohibited 

substances. 

That has been successful. We will be going into the meetings in 

April in Vienna to get additional substances put on those lists. 

Engagement with China has been effective, and I think we have 

begun to see China taking a proactive—— 

Mr. KEATING. Quickly because my time is running out, it is important to note that my discussions in private meetings with the 

Customs and Border Patrol, Homeland people, the greatest trend 

now is getting the shipments through UPS, FedEx, the United 

States Postal Service. 

These things are coming and you also have that in coordination 

with use of the internet and maybe some of the dark parts of the 

internet, too. 

I mean, is that creates a great challenge, a lot of those things. 

How are you doing on that? That is a pretty tough challenge to do, 

but are we getting more cooperation from the postal service or from 

these other countries at the point that they are being sent from? 

FBI, you know, Mr. Richardson. 

Mr. RICHARDSON. Yes, sir, thank you for the question and certainly realize that opioid addiction and trafficking of opioids in this 

country is a great problem. It will probably be worse tomorrow 

than it is today unfortunately, but we do have resources that are 

targeting the distributors of those illegal opioids to the communities. 

One thing that we are doing that is a little bit unique maybe 

from some of the other agencies is we have stood up a unit that 

looks at the dark net specifically in order to try to identify those 

individuals, those organizations that are on the dark net, the net 

32 

beyond the net, hiding with autonomy that are sending the drugs 

through whether it is FedEx or whether it is the postal service or 

how the narcotics are coming in. 

So we have had some success with that initiative thus far. We 

are going to add additional resources to that going forward, and we 

have been relatively successful, so—— 

Mr. KEATING. Well, thank you. My time is up. I would just comment. I would rather give you and your collective activities on that 

arena more resources, more money, because it is killing more people than having an extended wall would result in saving people’s 

lives. 

I yield back. 

Mr. KING. The gentleman yields. 

We are going to closed session soon, but I have two questions I 

would like to ask if you can answer them on the record. If not, we 

can wait ’til downstairs. I will ask them together and then you can 

respond. 

My staff recently visited El Salvador and they heard from agencies on the ground that the MS–13 leaders are actually frustrated 

that the MS–13 members in this country are not violent enough. 

They are going to be sending more violent members to the United 

States. 

Now, can you confirm that? If so can you say what, you know, 

the implications of that are? Would you be able to adapt to that? 

Mr. RICHARDSON. So I will take a crack at it first. I can tell you 

from the FBI perspective our intelligence streams tell us that what 

you have mentioned is accurate. Because of enforcement actions 

across the country, some of the leadership here at the mid-level 

within the United States of America they have been arrested. They 

are incarcerated. 

That is frustrating to the leadership of the MS–13 gang in El 

Salvador, and they are very much interested in sending younger, 

more violent offenders, gang members up through their channels 

into this country in order to be enforcers for the gang. So that is 

absolutely correct. 

Mr. KING. Mr. Villanueva. 

Mr. VILLANUEVA. Yes, sir. We can actually discuss some of our 

on-going efforts later on today downstairs, but yes. We are looking 

at that problem. We are looking at the information we are getting 

and, once again, I mean, we are doubling down our efforts against 

MS–13. 

As a matter of fact, this year Operation Citadel, which we have 

been doing for a few years, it is just going to have an MS–13 component working with our international partners. We do have some 

other efforts that are going to be paramount to stop the flow of 

those individuals from coming in to the United States that we can 

discuss later today. 

Mr. KING. Mr. Glenn, do you have any—— 

Mr. GLENN. Again, I would just reiterate that our efforts are 

going to be in support of the units that they work with in the 

Northern Triangle region to help mitigate any kind of change in behaviors by the gangs. 

Mr. KING. Yes. I would just say it is hard to imagine them being 

much more violent, so truly a horrifying thought. I know within 1 

33 

mile of my house I am sure close to where Miss Rice lives they are 

actually digging up bodies of young kids who have been butchered 

by MS–13. 

So one other question on that. Are there any signs of MS–13 

member partnering with traditional drug cartels? 

Mr. GLENN. I can—internationally? 

Mr. KING. Internationally, yes. 

Mr. GLENN. Yes. You know, they control neighborhoods just like 

here in the United States. MS–13 and 18th Street gang members 

distribute drugs in their countries so they are an essential part of 

the distribution network of drugs in their countries for local consumption there. 

There are indications, although not in large ways, but there are 

indications that they do cooperate with the drug trafficking organizations that are sending drugs into the United States. 

Mr. RICHARDSON. So I would say our intelligence tells us or informs us that most of the relationships are opportunistic in nature. 

The MS–13 would be subordinate to the larger drug cartels that we 

are familiar with and we have worked for years. 

MS–13 is used as enforcers for particular shipments and/or distribution rings in some of the communities here within the United 

States. So that is the intelligence that we have currently regarding 

the partnership, but MS–13 is subordinate to the drug cartels. 

Mr. VILLANUEVA. Sir, along the same lines our information is 

similar to the FBI. There is connectivity. It is just defining what 

connectivity looks like. So the same connectivity to be at par. 

Maybe not but maybe as a subordinate, the enforcers, distributors. 

There is certainly a connection to that effect. 

Mr. KING. OK. I have no more questions in open session. 

Miss Rice, do you? 

Miss RICE. No. 

Mr. KING. Scott? No? OK. Well, with that, do we actually adjourn 

or go on recess? How do we get downstairs? What do we do? So 

what do we do next, recess? 

OK. Recess and we will move to a secure environment. Thank 

you. Thank you for testifying and we will see you downstairs. 

[Whereupon, at 11:13 a.m., the subcommittee proceeded in closed 

session and subsequently adjourned at 12:28 p.m.] 

(35) 

A P P E N D I X 

QUESTIONS FROM RANKING MEMBER BENNIE G. THOMPSON FOR STEPHEN E. 

RICHARDSON

Question 1. What are the largest Russian transnational gangs and what are their 

main activities and crimes? 

Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication. 

Question 2. How is your agency trying to combat Russian cyber crimes, including 

those perpetrated by Russian and Eurasian transnational gangs, and/or Russialinked actors working with these gangs? 

Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication. 

Question 3. How does your agency prioritize which transnational gangs, and 

which of their illicit activities, to combat? What common metrics are used by your 

agency to communicate across the interagency to measure the threat posed by various gangs? What metrics are most commonly used in information sharing with foreign partners? 

Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication. 

Question 4. What percentage or proportion of the illicit activities of transnational 

gangs and TCOs involve drug trafficking, human trafficking, money laundering, and 

cyber crime? Separately, how much of transnational gangs’ and TCOs’ illicit activities involve human trafficking, money laundering, and cyber crime? Which 

transnational gangs and TCOs committed the most serious crimes in fiscal year 

2016 and fiscal year 2017, for instance, in terms of numbers of homicides, amount 

and value of drugs trafficked, amount of human trafficking conducted, amount of 

weapons trafficked, amount of money laundered, and dollar value of fraud committed? Please list the top ten transnational gangs and TCOs involved by each type 

of illicit activity. 

Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication. 

Question 5. Threat reports state that there are more than 300 active Outlaw Motorcycle Gangs (OMGs) who engage in violent crime, weapons trafficking, and drug 

trafficking in the United States, including along and across both the Northern and 

Southern Borders, as well as in locations throughout the United States. Please provide statistics on the numbers of crimes, cases, and investigations related to OMGs. 

Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication. 

QUESTIONS FROM RANKING MEMBER BENNIE G. THOMPSON FOR RAYMOND

VILLANUEVA

Question 1. What are the largest Russian transnational gangs and what are their 

main activities and crimes? 

Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication. 

Question 2. How is your department trying to combat Russian cyber crimes, including those perpetrated by Russian and Eurasian transnational gangs, and/or 

Russia-linked actors working with these gangs? 

Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication. 

Question 3. How does your department prioritize which transnational gangs, and 

which of their illicit activities, to combat? What common metrics are used by your 

department to communicate across the interagency to measure the threat posed by 

various gangs? What metrics are most commonly used in information sharing with 

foreign partners? 

Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication. 

Question 4. What percentage or proportion of the illicit activities of transnational 

gangs and TCOs involve drug trafficking, human trafficking, money laundering, and 

cyber crime? Separately, how much of transnational gangs’ and TCOs’ illicit activities involve human trafficking, money laundering, and cyber crime? Which 

transnational gangs and TCOs committed the most serious crimes in fiscal year 

36 

2016 and fiscal year 2017, for instance, in terms of numbers of homicides, amount 

and value of drugs trafficked, amount of human trafficking conducted, amount of 

weapons trafficked, amount of money laundered, and dollar value of fraud committed? Please list the top ten transnational gangs and TCOs involved by each type 

of illicit activity. 

Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication. 

Question 5. Threat reports state that there are more than 300 active Outlaw Motorcycle Gangs (OMGs) who engage in violent crime, weapons trafficking, and drug 

trafficking in the United States, including along and across both the Northern and 

Southern Borders, as well as in locations throughout the United States. Please provide statistics on the number and type of indictments, arrests, and investigations 

related to OMGs. Please also provide statistics on the numbers of crimes, cases, and 

investigations related to OMGs, including as relates to information sharing with Canadian and Mexican officials on the illicit activities of OMGs across both our Northern and Southern Borders. 

Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication. 

Question 6. Your testimony described 32,000 criminal arrests, of which more than 

4,800 were gang members. Were there particular TCOs of concern among the other 

arrests, and if so, which groups constituted the greatest number of arrests? Of the 

4,800 gang members, how many were from MS–13, and how many were from other 

groups? 

Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication. 

Question 7. Your testimony mentioned that ICE seized more than 900,000 pounds 

of narcotics. Which five forms of narcotics were most prominent (by dollar value of 

narcotics seized)? What percentage of the seizures occurred along the Southern Border versus along the Northern Border? 

Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication. 

Question 8. What percentage of the human trafficking and child exploitation activity, per your testimony, that ICE identified occurred within the United States, and 

what percentage occurred along our Northern and Southern Borders, respectively? 

Which transnational gangs and TCOs were most heavily involved in human trafficking? Please list the top ten transnational gangs and TCOs involved. 

Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication. 

Question 9. You stated in your testimony that a successful joint task force model 

is the Border Enforcement Security Task Force (BEST), and that in fiscal year 2017, 

BEST teams initiated more than 4,000 investigations and made nearly 5,000 criminal arrests. Which transnational gangs and TCOs accounted for the largest number 

of arrests, and what proportion of the activity you mentioned occurred along our 

Northern and Southern Borders? 

Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication. 

Question 10. Your testimony noted that Operation Community Shield resulted in 

the arrests of nearly 60,000 gang members and associates since 2005. In your testimony, you identified there were 7,800 gang members arrested who were affiliated 

with MS–13. Which other transnational gangs and TCOs accounted for the most arrests? Please list the top ten transnational gangs and TCOs by number of arrests. 

Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication. 

Question 11. Your testimony stated that without information sharing with Federal, State, local, and foreign law enforcement partners, ICE would not be nearly 

as successful at battling MS–13 and other gangs. Other than working with Guatemala, Honduras, and El Salvador, which countries have you been working most 

closely with, and what transnational gangs have you been targeting? Please provide 

a list of the top 20 countries with whom you are working globally, and the nature 

of the information sharing, to include which transnational gangs or TCOs are a particular focus. 

Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication. 

Question 12. You praised the role of Operation CITADEL in disrupting and dismantling TCOs in fiscal year 2017. Of the 54 indictments and nine convictions as 

a result of this program, which transnational gangs and TCOs were the main culprits whose members were indicted and convicted? 

Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication. 

QUESTIONS FROM RANKING MEMBER BENNIE G. THOMPSON FOR RICHARD GLENN

Question 1. What are the largest Russian transnational gangs whose operations 

are affecting the United States globally and what are their main activities and 

crimes? 

Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication. 

37 

Question 2. How is your department trying to combat Russian cyber crimes, including those perpetrated by Russian and Eurasian transnational gangs, and/or 

Russia-linked actors working with those transnational gangs? 

Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication. 

Question 3. How does your department prioritize which transnational gangs, and 

which of their illicit activities, to combat? What common metrics are used by your 

department to communicate across the interagency to measure the threat posed by 

various gangs? What metrics are most commonly used in information sharing with 

foreign partners? 

Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication. 

Question 4. Of your information-sharing programs globally, what percentage are 

focused on transnational gangs’ and TCOs’ involvement in drug trafficking, human 

trafficking, money laundering, and cyber crime? Which transnational gangs and 

TCOs committed the most serious crimes in fiscal year 2016 and fiscal year 2017, 

for instance, in terms of numbers of homicides, amount and value of drugs trafficked, amount of human trafficking conducted, amount of weapons trafficked, 

amount of money laundered, and dollar value of fraud committed? Please list the 

top ten transnational gangs and TCOs active in the United States and along both 

our Northern and Southern Borders. Please note and explain if there are countries 

(for instance, China and Russia) from which we have faced particular difficulty obtaining actionable information as part of our efforts to counter transnational gangs 

and TCOs. 

Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication. 

Question 5. How many FTEs in your department are working on combating 

transnational gangs and TCOs, and how does your department prioritize and track 

its caseload in terms of the most serious threats? Does your department have the 

resources it needs to devote to this threat? If not, what resources are needed, including in terms of budget, personnel, and technological resources? 

Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication. 

Question 6. The National Gang Report stated that gangs continue to expand their 

partnerships with other criminal organizations in order to widen their networks. 

Please describe the degree of overlap that exists between transnational gangs and 

transnational organized crime. Please include Russian, Eurasian, Asian, Middle 

Eastern, and African organized crime activities along both our Northern and Southern Borders, as well as entities such as Hizbollah that may be active in partnership 

with transnational gangs. 

Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication. 

Question 7. In your testimony, you described the importance of the Central America Regional Security Initiative (CARSI). Has State Department funding for this initiative declined, remained constant, or increased? What were the amounts of funding requested for CARSI in fiscal year 2015, 2016, and 2017? 

Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication. 

Question 8. You stated that our strong security partnership with Mexico, including efforts under the Me ́rida Initiative, have included enhancing information sharing to disrupt transnational crime and TCOs. Has State Department funding for 

this initiative declined, remained constant, or increased? What were the amounts 

of funding requested for the Me ́rida Initiative in fiscal year 2015, 2016, and 2017? 

Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication. 

Question 9. Your testimony mentioned the success of asset forfeiture and financial 

task forces in 2017. Which gangs and transnational criminal organizations (TCOs) 

were you able to disrupt with this focus on assets and finances? Please be sure to 

include assets of transnational gangs and TCOs disrupted globally, to include not 

only groups primarily active along the Southern Border, but also TCOs, Outlaw Motorcycle Gangs (OMGs) and Russian, Eurasian, Asian, Middle Eastern, and African 

criminal networks active elsewhere in the United States and across or along one or 

both of our Northern and Southern Borders. 

Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication. 

Æ