their maximum term and not to the minimum term. Appellant asserted 

that as applied to him, the 2007 amendments to NRS 209.4465 constitute 

an ex post facto violation because he was convicted in 2003. Appellant's 

claim was without merit. "[T]he ex post facto prohibition . forbids the 

imposition of punishment more severe than the punishment assigned by 

law when the act to be punished occurred." Weaver v. Graham, 450 U.S. 

24, 30 (1981) (italics omitted); see also Stevens v. Warden, Nev. State 

Prison, 114 Nev. 1217, 1222, 969 P.2d 945, 948 (1998) (discussing that 

computation of good-time credits on the basis of a law that became 

effective after the prisoner's offense violates the provision against ex post 

facto laws if the computation is less favorable to the prisoner). 

In 2007, the legislature amended NRS 209.4465 to permit the 

NDOC to apply credits to certain offenders' minimum term for parole 

eligibility. See 2007 Nev. Stat., ch. 525, § 5, at 3176-77. However, the 

legislature did not permit the NDOC to apply credits to the minimum 

terms of offenders convicted of certain crimes, including sexual offenses. 

See id. (NRS 209.4465(8)). In 2003, appellant was convicted of sexual 

assault of a minor under 16 and attempted sexual assault of a minor 

under 16. Therefore, the 2007 amendments to NRS 209.4465 did not 

apply to appellant. In addition, when appellant was convicted in 2003, 

existing statutes did not permit the NDOC to apply credits to appellant's 

minimum terms. See 2003 Nev. Stat., ch. 259, § 13, at 1367-68 (NRS 

209.4465); 1995 Nev. Stat., ch. 443, § 235, at 1259-60 (NRS 213.120). 

Therefore, appellant failed to demonstrate any ex post facto violation in 

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the application of his good-time credits, and the district court did not err 

in denying this claim. 

Second, appellant claimed that NRS 209.4465(8) violated the 

Equal Protection Clause because it permits the NDOC to show 

preferential treatment to certain inmates. This claim was without merit 

as appellant was not a member of a suspect class, and there is a rational 

basis for treating more serious offenders differently from less serious 

offenders when applying credits that accelerate parole eligibility dates. 

See Gaines v. State, 116 Nev. 359, 371, 998 P.2d 166, 173 (2000) 

(recognizing that the first step in an equal protection analysis is to 

determine the level of scrutiny to be applied, that strict scrutiny analysis 

is only applied in cases involving fundamental rights or suspect classes, 

and that under a lesser standard of review, legislation will be upheld "if 

the challenged classification is rationally related to a legitimate 

governmental interest"); see also Graziano v. Pataki, 689 F.3d 110, 117 (2d 

Cir. 2012) (recognizing that prisoners, whether in the aggregate or 

specified by offense, are not a suspect class and rational basis test will 

apply); Glauner v. Miller, 184 F.3d 1053, 1054 (9th Cir. 1999) (recognizing 

that prisoners are not a suspect class and applying rational basis test). 

Therefore, the district court did not err in denying this claim. 

Third, appellant claimed that application of NRS 209.4465 

violates the Contract Clause of the United States Constitution, as he 

asserted that failure to apply credits to his minimum terms violated his 

guilty plea agreement. Appellant failed to demonstrate that his guilty 

plea agreement is encompassed by the Contract Clause. Moreover, 

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appellant failed to demonstrate that application of NRS 209.4465 actually 

impaired his guilty plea agreement because, as discussed previously, 

existing law when appellant was convicted did not permit the NDOC to 

apply credits to appellant's minimum terms. See U.S. Trust Co. of N.Y. v. 

New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 21, 25 (1977) (discussing that analysis of a claim 

involving the Contract Clause requires consideration of whether a law 

actually impairs a contract and whether that impairment is prohibited by 

the Constitution). Therefore, the district court did not err in denying this 

claim. 

Fourth, appellant claimed that the NDOC violated the 

separation-of-powers doctrine by construing NRS 209.4465 to bar 

appellant from earning credits towards his minimum parole eligibility 

date. See Nev. Const. art. 3, § 1 (separating Nevada's government into 

three separate branches). Appellant's claim was without merit. 

Governmental agencies may only perform duties where granted the power 

to do so by the legislature. Clark Cnty. v. State, Equal Rights Comm'n, 

107 Nev. 489, 492, 813 P.2d 1006, 1007 (1991). The legislature directed 

the NDOC to only award certain prisoners credits toward their minimum 

sentences. NRS 209.4465(8). Appellant, due to his convictions for sexual 

offenses, was not of the type of prisoners eligible to earn credits towards 

the minimum parole eligibility date. See id. Accordingly, the NDOC did 

not violate the separation-of-powers doctrine by acting as directed by the 

legislature. Therefore, the district court did not err in denying this claim. 

Finally, appellant claimed that NRS 209.4465 violates cruel 

and unusual punishment principles, his due process rights, the Double 

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J. 

Jeopardy Clause, and unspecified "rights retained by the people." 

Appellant provided these claims in the form of a list and did not provide 

any support. Unsupported claims, such as these, are insufficient to 

demonstrate that a petitioner is entitled to relief. See Hargrove v. State, 

100 Nev. 498, 502-03, 686 P.2d 222, 225 (1984). Therefore, the district 

court did not err in denying these claims. 

Having concluded that appellant is not entitled to relief, we 

ORDER the judgment of the district court AFFIRMED. 

ACI..A pea , 

Hardesty 

J. 

Douglas 

cc: Hon. Nancy L. Allf, District Judge 

David August Kille, Sr. 

Attorney General/Las Vegas 

Eighth District Court Clerk 

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