IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

No. 18-1638

Filed February 5, 2020

STATE OF IOWA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.

CHRISTOPHER WEIGERT,

Defendant-Appellant.

________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Howard County, Richard D. Stochl, 

Judge. 

The defendant challenges the sentence imposed by the district court. 

AFFIRMED.

John J. Sullivan of Sullivan Law Office, P.C., Oelwein, for appellant.

Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Tyler J. Buller, Assistant Attorney 

General, for appellee.

Considered by Bower, C.J., and May and Greer, JJ.
2

GREER, Judge.

Christopher Weigert challenges the sentence imposed by the district court 

following his guilty plea for possession of a controlled substance with intent to 

deliver (methamphetamine).1 See Iowa Code § 124.401(1)(c)(6) (2017). Weigert 

maintains the court impermissibly applied a fixed sentencing policy rather than 

engaging in the meaningful exercise of discretion mandated by Iowa Code section 

901.5. 

When reviewing a district court’s sentencing decisions, we will not reverse 

the court’s decision absent either an abuse of discretion or a defect in the 

sentencing procedure such as considering inappropriate matters. See State v. 

Formaro, 638 N.W.2d 720, 724 (Iowa 2002).

Here, Weigert was first charged with possessing more than five grams of 

methamphetamine with the intent to deliver—a class “B” felony. See Iowa Code 

§ 124.401(1)(b)(7). He reached an agreement with the State, by which he would 

plead guilty to the lesser-included class “C” felony, involving five grams or less of 

methamphetamine, and the State would join Weigert’s request for a deferred 

judgment. 

Before he pled guilty, the court advised Weigert it would not be bound by 

the plea agreement. The court clarified:

 

1 This crime is a class “C” felony. Because the judgment and sentence were 

entered before July 1, 2019, the amended Iowa Code section 814.6(1)(a)(3) (2019) 

does not apply here. See State v. Macke, 933 N.W.2d 226, 228 (Iowa 2019) (“On 

our review, we hold Iowa Code sections 814.6 and 814.7, as amended, do not 

apply to a direct appeal from a judgment and sentence entered before July 1, 

2019.”); see also Iowa Code § 814.6(1)(a)(3) (limiting appeals from guilty pleas for 

crimes other than class “A” felonies).
3

Okay. I’m just saying I won’t be bound by it, so I would have to hear 

some evidence on sentencing. I can take the plea today but I can’t 

guarantee I’ll follow the recommendation. I guess I’d want another

[presentence investigation (PSI)]. This is a pre-plea PSI based on a 

plea to a class “B” felony which was going to be a 25-year term. I 

don’t know if the department [of correctional services] would have a 

different position if it were a plea to the “C” felony after the plea’s 

been taken.[2] Or I can reset it the next calendar when I’m not here. 

I’ll just note that I wouldn’t agree to be bound by the agreement.

After defense counsel conveyed he needed to speak to Weigert privately to decide 

how to proceed, the court continued:

Why don’t you. I mean, to be honest, normally when I’m looking at 

a “B” that [is] plead[ed] down, it’s whether I’m sending the defendant 

to the residential facility or to prison or suspending the prison term; 

it’s never whether I’m giving a deferred. So I’m going to have to have 

some serious evidence as to why I should defer, especially when 

there’s been a prior deferral on a prior drug conviction. So talk to 

your client and let me know.

When they came back on the record, Weigert informed the court he wanted to 

proceed with entering a guilty plea. To confirm the decision, the court asked 

Weigert directly if he understood that the court was not bound by the plea 

agreement, was free to decide what sentence to impose, and that the sentence 

could include time in prison. Weigert said he understood. At that point, the court 

accepted Weigert’s plea and ordered completion of a new PSI report.

Sentencing took place on August 27, 2018. The updated PSI report 

revealed Weigert had twice tested positive for methamphetamine and 

amphetamines in April 2018. The department of correctional services 

recommended a ten-year suspended sentence with two to five years of probation. 

Weigert suggested he had “changes and additions” to make to the PSI report and 

 

2 The pre-plea PSI contained a recommendation that Weigert be given a twentyfive-year suspended sentence with two to five years of probation. 
4

was called to testify. While he did not dispute his positive drug tests, he contended 

he had not knowingly or intentionally used methamphetamine.

3

 After Weigert’s 

testimony, the court pronounced sentence, imposing a ten-year term of 

incarceration, which the court suspended. Weigert was placed on two to five years 

of probation. The court continued:

The reason for the court’s sentence is the circumstances of the 

offense. [Weigert] was previously granted a deferred judgment in 

another matter. Review of the trial information indicates [he] was in

possession of, for purposes of these proceedings, less than five 

grams of methamphetamine packaged for delivery with a scale. 

Based on the prior criminal history, a deferred judgment is not 

appropriate.

The court further notes that since arrest [Weigert] has been 

referred to obtain a substance abuse evaluation. As of the drafting 

of . . . the [PSI] report, no such evaluation has been completed. He 

did meet with a Mr. Albers, was told to complete outpatient treatment.

That treatment was never completed, to my knowledge. I have heard 

no evidence of that. Based on that noncompliance on pretrial 

release, deferred is certainly not merited.

I do note that the department recommends the residential 

facility. I don’t find that necessary; however, [Weigert] will be placed 

in the Corrections Continuum such that if the department feels it is 

necessary for more supervision, he can then be placed at that facility.

On appeal, Weigert relies on the statements of the court before his plea to 

establish the court engaged in a fixed sentencing policy. See State v. Hildebrand, 

280 N.W.2d 393, 396–97 (Iowa 1979) (vacating the sentence imposed because 

“the sentencing court, instead of considering the minimal essential factors we 

consistently have identified, impermissibly selected only one—an attending 

circumstance—which triggered the court’s previously-fixed sentencing policy”). He 

emphasizes the court’s statement, “I mean, to be honest, normally when I’m 

 

3 Weigert offered as a possible explanation that his ex-wife, who had been living 

in the same house as him in April 2018, may have laced his food or drink with the 

drug. 
5

looking at a ”B” that [is] plead[ed] down, it’s whether I’m sending the defendant to 

the residential facility or to prison or suspending the prison term; it’s never whether 

I’m giving a deferred.” (Emphasis added). He pairs this statement with the fact 

that court imposed a suspended sentence rather than granting his request for a 

deferred judgment. 

The court did not engage in the same rigid sentencing practice the court in 

Hildebrand employed. 280 N.W.2d at 396–97. In Hildebrand, the court announced 

that, when sentencing for the crime of operating a motor vehicle while under the 

influence, it “ha[d] the policy that when there is an accident involved, I do not and 

will not grant a deferred sentence.” Id. at 395. In contrast, here the court told 

Weigert it “normally” did not give a deferred judgment where a defendant has 

received a plea agreement reducing a charge from a “B” felony to a “C” felony, but 

the court did not foreclose the possibility. Instead, the court clarified it wanted to 

know the recommendation of the department of correctional services and would 

want to hear evidence at the sentencing hearing in support of Weigert’s request. 

Rather than showing the inflexibility exhibited in Hildebrand, these statements 

show the court’s willingness to consider granting the joint request for a deferred 

judgment. Weigert has not establish the court engaged in a fixed sentencing 

policy. See State v. Lovell, 857 N.W.2d 241, 242–43 (Iowa 2014) (noting the court 

will not vacate a sentence on appeal unless the defendant meets their burden of 

demonstrating an issue with the sentence or the sentencing procedure). 

Additionally, insofar as Weigert claims the court abused its discretion by 

failing to address all the factors outlined in Iowa Code section 907.5 when imposing 

sentence, our case law establishes that a sentencing court need not explicitly 
6

address each factor. Iowa R. Crim. P. 2.23(3)(d) (“The court shall state on the 

record its reason for selecting the particular sentence.”); see State v. Garrow, 480 

N.W.2d 256, 259 (Iowa 1992) (“A sentencing court’s statement of its reasons 

satisfies [rule 2.23(3)(d)] if it recites reasons sufficient to demonstrate the exercise 

of discretion and indicates those concerns which motived the court to select the 

particular sentence which it imposed”); see also State v. Ayers, 590 N.W.2d 25, 28 

(Iowa 1999) (“[A] sentencing court need only explain its reasons for selecting the 

sentence imposed and need not explain its reasons for rejecting a particular 

sentencing option.”). Here the court appropriately explained its reasons for 

selecting the sentence imposed.

We affirm the sentence imposed by the district court.

AFFIRMED.