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*********************************************** 
STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. RICARDO SWILLING

(AC 40234)

Alvord, Keller and Beach, Js.

Syllabus

Convicted of the crimes of kidnapping in the first degree, home invasion

and assault in the second degree, and of being a persistent dangerous

felony offender, the defendant appealed. The defendant, who had paid

the victim to stay at her apartment, allegedly had engaged in a violent

physical struggle with the victim in the apartment over the course of

two days, during which he held her hostage in the apartment, attempted

to strangle her, stabbed her with kitchen knives, and punched and kicked

her. When the victim was able to escape, she went to the apartment of

a neighbor, where she called 911. On appeal, the defendant claimed,

inter alia, that the trial court violated his due process right to a fair

trial by questioning two witnesses during the state’s case-in-chief and

improperly permitted the victim to make an in-court identification of

him in the absence of a showing that she previously had made a nonsuggestive out-of-court identification of him. Held:

1. The defendant could not prevail on his unpreserved claim that the trial

court violated his due process right to a fair trial, which was based on

his assertion that the court became an advocate for and suggested that

it favored the state when it questioned the victim and the neighbor

during the state’s case-in-chief: the trial court did not compel the victim

to identify the defendant as the perpetrator, reflect bias in favor of the

state or act unreasonably when it asked her a single question about the

identity of the defendant after she had made an ambiguous in-court

identification of him, and the present case did not present a situation

in which the court advocated in favor of a particular verdict, suggested

that a particular witness was credible, or otherwise suggested that it

believed or disbelieved any particular version of events; moreover, the

court’s questioning of the neighbor reflected a reasonable attempt to

clarify his ability to make an identification of someone in the courtroom,

as well as the nature of the state’s inquiry, the court’s brief inquiry

protected the defendant’s right to ensure that the jury had before it

facts, rather than confusion, and that the facts were presented to the

jury in an understandable manner, and the court’s jury instructions

conveyed to the jury that the court did not have a role in the fact-finding

process and did not have an opinion concerning the outcome of the trial.

2. This court found unavailing the defendant’s unpreserved claim that his

due process rights were violated when the trial court permitted the

victim to make an in-court identification of him in the absence of a

showing that she previously had made a nonsuggestive out-of-court

identification of him: although the state failed to request permission

from the trial court to conduct a first time in-court identification of the

defendant, as required under the newly created rule applicable to first

time in-court identifications set forth in State v. Dickson (322 Conn.

410), that rule applied to the parties in that case and to all pending

cases, the defendant’s appeal was pending at the time Dickson was

decided, which meant that the suggestive in-court identification already

had occurred, and, thus, the defendant was not necessarily entitled to

relief arising from the state’s failure to abide by a procedural rule that

was not in existence at the time of the defendant’s trial, and given that

there were no factual disputes with respect to the victim’s familiarity

with or ability to identify the defendant, or with her ability to observe,

recall and narrate facts concerning the person who allegedly assaulted

her, and, despite the fact that the record was silent with respect to any

out-of-court identification made by the victim, her in-court identification

of the defendant was permissible without adherence to the procedural

safeguards in Dickson where, as here, there was no showing of harm.

3. The defendant could not prevail on his claim that the trial court abused

its discretion in admitting evidence of his prior felony convictions, which

was based on his assertion that the convictions were too remote in time

and were more prejudicial than probative; the defendant’s argument
that the convictions were too remote in time was not persuasive, as the

defendant was released from confinement within ten years of the time

of his trial, he was unable to demonstrate that the trial court’s determination that the felony convictions were relevant in an assessment of his

credibility was improper, and there was no reason to doubt that the

jury followed the limiting instructions given by the court immediately

following the admission of the evidence and during the court’s charge.

4. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting into evidence under

the spontaneous utterance exception to the hearsay rule a recording of

the 911 call made by the victim:

a. The trial court properly determined that the 911 recording fell within

the spontaneous utterance exception to the hearsay rule; that court

properly considered the manner in which the victim spoke in its review

of all of the relevant facts surrounding her statements and properly

determined that the victim’s declarations were made under circumstances that negated the opportunity for deliberation, contrivance and

misrepresentation by the declarant, as the 911 call occurred within

minutes after the victim fled from her apartment while she was under

the influence of a startling event following an ordeal that reasonably

would be expected to have created a high degree of emotional disturbance, and although some of the victim’s statements were made in

response to questions posed to her by the 911 dispatcher, many others

were made spontaneously, the circumstances reflected a lack of forethought by the victim in responding to the questions, and there was

ample evidence to support the court’s finding that the victim’s statements

were spontaneous.

b. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in failing to conclude

that the admission of the 911 recording was unduly prejudicial; the

defendant’s claim that the 911 recording was prejudicial because it was

cumulative was not supported by the record, and the victim’s strong

language in the recording that the defendant had tortured and kidnapped

her was not any more inflammatory than, and was not likely to have

aroused the jury’s emotions any more than, her testimony concerning

the defendant’s actions, which included beating, choking, kicking and

repeatedly stabbing her.

5. The defendant could not prevail on his claim that the cumulative effect

of the trial court’s alleged errors deprived him of his right to a fair and

impartial trial; the claim was not adequately briefed, as it consisted of

a legal assertion and was devoid of analysis of facts or law, and even

if the claim was considered on its merits, it lacked merit in light of

this court’s determination that no error existed with respect to the

defendant’s claims on appeal.

Argued November 15, 2017—officially released April 3, 2018

Procedural History

Two part substitute information charging the defendant, in the first part, with the crimes of kidnapping in

the first degree, assault in the first degree and home

invasion, and, in the second part, with three counts of

being a persistent dangerous felony offender, brought to

the Superior Court in the judicial district of Waterbury,

where the first part of the information was tried to the

jury before K. Murphy, J.; verdict of guilty of kidnapping in the first degree, home invasion and the lesser

included offense of assault in the second degree; thereafter, the defendant was presented to the court on conditional pleas of nolo contendere to two counts of being

a persistent dangerous felony offender in the second

part of the information; judgment of guilty in accordance with the verdict and pleas, from which the defendant appealed. Affirmed.

Robert L. O’Brien, assigned counsel, with whom, on

the brief, was William A. Adsit, assigned counsel, for

the appellant (defendant).
Melissa L. Streeto, senior assistant state’s attorney,

with whom, on the brief, were Maureen Platt, state’s

attorney, and Marc G. Ramia, senior assistant state’s

attorney, for the appellee (state).
Opinion

KELLER, J. The defendant, Ricardo Swilling, appeals

from the judgment of conviction, rendered following a

jury trial, of kidnapping in the first degree in violation

of General Statutes § 53a-92 (a) (2) (A), home invasion

in violation of General Statutes § 53a-100aa (a) (2), and

assault in the second degree in violation of General

Statutes § 53a-60 (a) (2).1 Additionally, following the

defendant’s pleas of nolo contendere, the defendant

was convicted of two counts of being a persistent dangerous felony offender in violation of General Statutes

§ 53a-40 (a) (1), as alleged in part B informations that

were related to the kidnapping and home invasion

charges.2 The defendant claims that (1) the trial court

violated his due process right to a fair and impartial

trial by questioning two witnesses during the state’s

case-in-chief, (2) the court improperly permitted the

victim to make an in-court identification of him absent

a showing that she previously had made a nonsuggestive

out-of-court identification of him, (3) the court improperly admitted evidence of his prior felony convictions,

(4) the court improperly admitted a recording of a 911

call made by the victim, and (5) the cumulative effect

of the court’s errors deprived him of his right to a

fair and impartial trial. We affirm the judgment of the

trial court.

The jury reasonably could have found the following

facts. In December, 2014, the victim, Barbara Wilson,

resided in an apartment complex in Waterbury in a unit

that was leased to her and her daughter. The living

room and the kitchen were located on the first floor of

the unit, and three bedrooms and a bathroom were

located on the second floor of the unit. The victim had

a practice of letting others rent space in her apartment,

at a usual rate of $150 per week. The victim first met

the defendant in 2013. In early December, 2014, a mutual

friend of the victim and the defendant, identified in the

record as ‘‘Luis,’’ appeared at the victim’s residence

with the defendant. Luis asked the victim if the defendant could stay at her apartment for a few days. Initially,

the victim did not consent to Luis’ request and the two

men departed. Later that day, however, the defendant

appeared once more at the victim’s apartment to discuss

the matter further. The defendant gave the victim $20

and some brandy.

During this second meeting, the victim agreed to let

the defendant pay her to stay at the apartment. The

defendant explained that he worked overnight and

would come and go from the residence as necessary.

The victim, who was almost always at home, did not

give the defendant a key to the apartment, but simply

let him in whenever he knocked on the door. The victim

had only two keys for the residence, one which she

kept and another that was kept by her parents.
The defendant stayed at the apartment over the

course of two weeks in December, 2014, sometimes

spending the overnight hours there. He frequently came

to the residence to sleep either in an unfurnished bedroom or on a sofa. He paid the victim $70. During the

time that the defendant spent at the apartment, he was

never left alone there and, prior to the events at issue,

when the defendant was present at the apartment, there

was always one or more third parties present along with

the victim. The defendant did not keep any personal

belongings at the apartment, but always carried his

belongings with him in a duffel bag.

On December 24, 2014, at approximately 10 a.m., the

victim was at the apartment with her boyfriend, Eddie

Ortiz, when the defendant arrived at the apartment. The

defendant asked for a ride. Soon thereafter, Ortiz drove

the defendant to a bus stop located near a liquor store.

Then, Ortiz drove the victim to a store. At approximately

11 a.m., he drove her back to her apartment. The victim

entered the apartment alone and locked the door.

At approximately 11:30 a.m., the victim observed the

defendant standing near the front door inside of her

apartment. The victim asked the defendant how he

gained access to the apartment. What followed was a

violent physical struggle between the victim and the

defendant. The defendant wrapped his hands around

the victim’s throat and began to strangle her. The victim

was experiencing difficulty breathing, and she managed

to pry the defendant’s hands off her. The victim fled the

apartment by means of the front door, but the defendant

pursued her from behind, dragged her back inside the

apartment, and resumed strangling her.

The victim physically struggled with the defendant

and, eventually, the victim and the defendant were on

the floor of the kitchen. The victim was able to twist

her body to break free of the defendant’s grasp, at which

time she got back on her feet and reached a rear door

inside the kitchen. The defendant cornered the victim

between a stove and a sink. At this point in time, the

defendant grabbed two knives that were on top of a

nearby microwave oven and began to stab the victim

repeatedly while she was standing in front of the stove.

While the defendant was stabbing her and yelling at

her, the victim raised her hands to protect her face.

The victim sustained multiple stab wounds and was

bleeding.

There was a knock at the victim’s front door. The

defendant told the victim that if she said anything, he

would kill her. He pushed the victim upstairs to the

bathroom and forced her to stand in a bathtub. He

threatened her with a knife until the knocking ceased.

The defendant led the victim to her bedroom and

continued to yell at her. Among the things that the

defendant stated was that if he was not going to have
a good Christmas, neither was the victim. The victim

partially undressed and began to tend to her wounds

with a T-shirt. She was permitted to go into the bathroom to wash some of the blood off her body and to

put on a clean shirt. While the victim was cleaning

her body, the defendant remained in the bathroom and

threatened her with a knife. The defendant noticed that

a knife blade had broken off during the attack and

remained stuck in the victim’s arm. The defendant told

the victim that he almost felt ‘‘some kind of sympathy’’

for her and he removed the broken blade from her arm.

The defendant, still holding a knife, led the victim

back into her bedroom, where he remained with the

victim for several hours. He yelled at the victim and

repeatedly used his cell phone, but apparently was

unable to reach anyone on his cell phone. Additionally,

the defendant watched a movie and consumed alcohol

during this time.

At approximately 5 or 6 p.m., there was another

knock on the victim’s front door. The victim told the

defendant that it was likely that her daughters were at

the door and that, if he let them in, she would not say

anything about what had occurred and that he could

get a ride somewhere. The defendant refused, and he

warned her to remain quiet. When the knocking

stopped, the victim asked the defendant for a cigarette.

The defendant approached the victim and punched her

in the face. The defendant and the victim shouted at

one another and, after using his cell phone, he

approached the victim, who was sitting on a bed, kicked

her, and pushed her into a wall. The defendant continued to yell things that were incomprehensible to the

victim and continued to threaten the victim. For example, he told the victim that he found more liquor, he

was ready for ‘‘round two,’’ and that she was ‘‘really

going to get it.’’ The victim, under the constant supervision of the defendant, remained in the bedroom with the

defendant until approximately 4 a.m., the following day.

At that point in time, the defendant ordered the victim

to prepare chicken for him to eat. He escorted her to

the kitchen where she complied with his request. The

defendant forced the victim to sit next to him in the

living room while he ate the meal she had prepared,

but he did not permit her to eat or drink anything. The

defendant warned the victim not to ‘‘make a move.’’

At approximately 6 or 7 a.m., the defendant escorted

the victim back upstairs. The victim, who had barely

slept the night before, felt weak and sat on the bed.

The defendant stabbed her in the right arm with a knife.

The defendant repeatedly yelled at the victim. The victim asked the defendant if she could return to the bathroom to tend to her wounds, but he refused this request.

Throughout the day, the defendant continued to consume alcohol and watch television. Although he did not

do so previously during this incident, the defendant
eventually fell into a deep sleep.

At approximately 8 p.m., the victim sensed an opportunity to rush past the sleeping defendant and make

her way out of the apartment. She quickly exited her

apartment and approached the apartment of a neighbor,

Luis Matos. The victim knocked frantically on Matos’

door. Matos let the victim inside of his apartment where

she called 911. Police and emergency medical personnel

arrived at the scene shortly thereafter. The victim was

transported to a nearby hospital where she received

treatment for her many stab wounds.

Waterbury police Officer Brian LaPerriere was one

of several police officers to respond to the scene. When

he encountered the victim, her clothing was covered

in dried blood and several of her stab wounds were

apparent to him. After hearing the victim’s version of

events, the officers entered the victim’s apartment

through a rear window on the second floor. They

observed bloodstains throughout the residence and

bloody knives on the floor of the kitchen and bedroom.

While he was in the process of searching the apartment,

LaPerriere discovered the defendant hiding in a closet

on the first floor. The defendant complied with LaPerriere’s commands, and provided the officers with his

name and his street name, Apollo. The defendant stated

to the police that he ‘‘was in some shit.’’ Additional

facts will be set forth as necessary in our analysis of

the defendant’s claims.

I

First, the defendant claims that the court violated

his due process right to a fair and impartial trial by

questioning the victim and Matos during the state’s casein-chief. We disagree.

The following two events that occurred during the

trial are the subject of the present claim. The first

occurred during the state’s direct examination of the

victim. By way of relevant background, the victim testified that she was familiar with the defendant prior to

the events at issue. She identified the person that she

allowed to stay in her apartment as ‘‘Ricardo Swilling,’’

who had a street name of ‘‘Apollo,’’ and described his

arrangement with her regarding the use of the apartment. Absent objection, the following colloquy

occurred:

‘‘[The Prosecutor]: . . . And is [the defendant] present in court today?

‘‘[The Victim]: Yes.

‘‘[The Prosecutor]: Can you please point to him and

describe what he’s wearing?

‘‘[The Victim]: He’s right over here. He [has] a gray

suit on.

‘‘The Court: With the tie or without the tie?
‘‘[The Victim]: I can’t see over the screen. No tie.

‘‘The Court: All right. The record can reflect identification of the defendant.’’

Absent objection, at the conclusion of the state’s

examination of the victim, during which she described

the defendant’s conduct during December 24 and

December 25, 2014, the following colloquy occurred:

‘‘[The Prosecutor]: And the individual who stabbed

you on [December 24 and December 25] of 2014, is he

present in court today?

‘‘[The Victim]: Yes, he is.

‘‘[The Prosecutor]: The person that did not allow you

to leave your apartment?

‘‘[The Victim]: Yes, he is present.’’

Following an additional brief inquiry of the victim by

the state, the prosecutor stated that he did not have

any further questions for the victim. The following colloquy followed:

‘‘The Court: Before we take the recess . . . you said

that person is in the courtroom and it may seem obvious,

but is that the person you’ve identified before as [the

defendant]?

‘‘[The Victim]: Yes.’’

Second, during the state’s direct examination of

Matos during its case-in-chief, Matos testified in relevant part that, on December 25, 2014, the victim

appeared at his door, he provided assistance to her,

and police and emergency medical personnel were summoned to the scene. Matos testified that the victim

explained to him what had happened to her. There is

no indication in Matos’ testimony that he knew the

defendant prior to the events at issue or had any interaction with him following the events at issue. He testified

that, following the victim’s arrival at his apartment on

December 25, 2014, he went outside to see ‘‘where was

the guy at.’’ The following colloquy then occurred:

‘‘[The Prosecutor]: And when you were outside . . .

did you see anything?

‘‘[The Witness]: No. The only time I seen him was

when the officer ran behind her house; that’s when he

locked the door on the house.

‘‘[The Prosecutor]: Okay. When you say, ‘he,’ who do

you mean?

‘‘[The Witness]: The guy. When the officer went to

the house to see if he was still there, the guy ran back

to the house, he locked the door.

‘‘[The Prosecutor]: So . . . you saw an individual

outside of [the victim’s] apartment?

‘‘[The Witness]: No. I didn’t get to see him, but the
officer ran and he seen him locking the door.

‘‘[The Prosecutor]: Okay. And which door did you

see him lock or go into?

‘‘[The Witness]: The back door of [the victim’s] house.

‘‘[The Prosecutor]: Okay. And were you able to see

that individual?

‘‘[The Witness]: No. I didn’t get to see him. I seen

him after he got arrested and everything, then I seen

him. But I never seen that guy before.

‘‘[The Prosecutor]: Now, the person that you saw go

back into the house, was that the same person you saw

in police custody later?

‘‘[The Witness]: Yup.

‘‘[The Prosecutor]: Okay. And is that person in court

here today?

‘‘[The Witness]: I don’t know. I have no idea.

‘‘[The Prosecutor]: If you take a look in the courtroom, can you let us know if you recognize anybody?

‘‘[The Witness]: That guy.

‘‘[The Prosecutor]: Can you describe what he’s

wearing?

‘‘[The Witness]: He’s got a gray sweater.

‘‘The Court: What color shirt is he wearing?

‘‘[The Witness]: He’s wearing a white shirt with

like blue—

‘‘The Court: No, I’m talking about right now.

‘‘[The Witness]: Right now, he’s got a blue on, with

dreads.

‘‘The Court: Okay.

‘‘[The Prosecutor]: I’ll ask [that] the record reflect he

did point in that direction.

‘‘The Court: He did. The record can reflect he pointed

in the direction of the defendant, but—Mr. Matos, let

me just make it a little easier here. You pointed over

in that direction. Do you see the person that the police

took into custody that night here in the courtroom?

‘‘[The Witness]: Well, it looks, the only one that look

familiar is him.

‘‘The Court: Okay. And what color shirt is he wearing,

that’s all I’m asking you.

‘‘[The Witness]: Blue.

‘‘The Court: Blue. Okay. There is really no one over

there with a blue shirt that I could see.

‘‘[The Witness]: I’m not a color, you know—

‘‘The Court: Okay. All right. That’s enough. That’s
fine. Go ahead. Continue your questioning.’’

At the time of trial, the defendant did not raise any

objection to the court’s questioning of the victim or

Matos. On appeal, the defendant claims that the court

violated his due process right to a fair trial3 by questioning the victim and Matos directly, thereby interfering with and aiding the state’s direct examinations of

the victim and Matos. The defendant argues that, by

questioning these witnesses as it did, the court abandoned an impartial posture, became an advocate for

the state, intruded on the role of counsel, and suggested

to the jury that it favored the state’s case. The defendant

argues that the court asked the victim a leading question

that effectively compelled her to identify the defendant

as the perpetrator of the violence she described in her

testimony. The defendant argues that, during its colloquy with Matos, the court ‘‘essentially pressed Matos

to identify [the] defendant’’ as the man he observed

outside of his apartment. According to the defendant,

‘‘Matos’ failure to identify [the] defendant made [the

court’s] interference even more improper. It worked to

disadvantage [the] defendant’s case in that it tended to

convey to the jury . . . [the court’s belief that the]

defendant was the perpetrator, or at least strongly suggest[ed] that the jury should infer this, even though

there was nothing in evidence prior to [the victim’s]

compelled identification in response to the court’s leading question that suggested [the] defendant was [the

person who the victim knew to be] ‘Apollo.’ ’’ The defendant argues that absent the court’s interference with

the presentation of evidence, the record is devoid of

sufficient evidence from which the jury reasonably

could have found that the state had satisfied its burden

of demonstrating the essential element of identity, that

is, that he was the perpetrator of the crimes at issue.

The defendant requests review under the doctrine

set forth in State v. Golding, 213 Conn. 233, 239–40,

567 A.2d 823 (1989).4 As modified by In re Yasiel R.,

317 Conn. 773, 781, 120 A.3d 1188 (2015), the Golding

doctrine provides that ‘‘a defendant can prevail on a

claim of constitutional error not preserved at trial only

if all of the following conditions are met: (1) the record

is adequate to review the alleged claim of error; (2)

the claim is of constitutional magnitude alleging the

violation of a fundamental right; (3) the alleged constitutional violation . . . exists and . . . deprived the

defendant of a fair trial; and (4) if subject to harmless

error analysis, the state has failed to demonstrate harmlessness of the alleged constitutional violation beyond

a reasonable doubt. In the absence of any one of these

conditions, the defendant’s claim will fail. The appellate

tribunal is free, therefore, to respond to the defendant’s

claim by focusing on whichever condition is most relevant in the particular circumstances.’’ (Emphasis in

original; footnote omitted.) State v. Golding, supra, 239–

40. ‘‘The defendant bears the responsibility for provid-
ing a record that is adequate for review of his claim of

constitutional error. . . . The defendant also bears the

responsibility of demonstrating that his claim is indeed

a violation of a fundamental constitutional right. . . .

Finally, if we are persuaded that the merits of the defendant’s claim should be addressed, we will review it

and arrive at a conclusion as to whether the alleged

constitutional violation . . . exists and whether it . . .

deprived the defendant of a fair trial.’’ (Citations omitted.) Id., 240–41.

We conclude that the claim is reviewable under Golding because the record is adequate to review the claim

presented and the claim is of constitutional magnitude.

We conclude, however, that the defendant cannot prevail under Golding because he is unable to demonstrate

that a constitutional violation exists and that it deprived

him of a fair trial.

‘‘Due process requires that a criminal defendant be

given a fair trial before an impartial judge and an unprejudiced jury in an atmosphere of judicial calm. . . . In

a criminal trial, the judge is more than a mere moderator

of the proceedings. It is [the trial judge’s] responsibility

to have the trial conducted in a manner which

approaches an atmosphere of perfect impartiality which

is so much to be desired in a judicial proceeding. . . .

Consistent with his [or her] neutral role, the trial judge

is free to question witnesses or otherwise intervene in

a case in an effort to clarify testimony and assist the

jury in understanding the evidence so long as [the trial

judge] does not appear partisan in doing so. . . . Thus,

when it clearly appears to the judge that for one reason

or another the case is not being presented intelligibly

to the jury, the judge is not required to remain silent.

On the contrary, the judge may, by questions to a witness, elicit relevant and important facts. . . .

‘‘One of the chief roles of the trial judge is to see that

there is no misunderstanding of a [witness’] testimony.

The judge has a duty to comprehend what a witness

says as much as it is [the judge’s] duty to see that the

witness communicates with the jury in an intelligible

manner. A trial judge can do this in a fair and unbiased

way. [The judge’s] attempt to do so should not be a

basis of error. Whe[n] the testimony is confusing or not

altogether clear the alleged jeopardy to one side caused

by the clarification of a [witness’] statement is certainly

outweighed by the desirability of factual understanding.

The trial judge should strive toward verdicts of fact

rather than verdicts of confusion.’’ (Internal quotation

marks omitted.) State v. Gonzalez, 272 Conn. 515, 535–

36, 864 A.2d 847 (2005); see also State v. Bember, 183

Conn. 394, 401, 439 A.2d 387 (1981).

‘‘Whether or not the trial judge shall question a witness is within his sound discretion . . . [and] [i]ts exercise will not be reviewed unless he has acted

unreasonably, or, as it is more often expressed, abused
his discretion. . . . The trial judge can question witnesses both on direct and cross-examination. . . . [I]t

may be necessary to do so to clarify testimony as [the

judge] has a duty to comprehend what a witness says

. . . [and] to see that the witness communicates with

the jury in an intelligible manner. . . . While no precise

theorem can be laid down, we have held that it is proper

for a trial court to question a witness in endeavoring,

without harm to the parties, to bring the facts out more

clearly and to ascertain the truth . . . and [intervene]

where the witness is embarrassed, has a language problem or may not understand a question.’’ (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Iban

C., 275 Conn. 624, 652, 881 A.2d 1005 (2005); see also

State v. Velasco, 253 Conn. 210, 237–38, 751 A.2d 800

(2000); State v. Fernandez, 198 Conn. 1, 12–13, 501

A.2d 1195 (1985). ‘‘The risk of constitutional judicial

misconduct is greatest in cases where the trial court

has interceded in the merits of the trial.’’ State v. Woodson, 227 Conn. 1, 31, 629 A.2d 386 (1993).

Mindful of the foregoing principles, we turn to the

court’s questioning of each of the two witnesses at

issue. As set forth previously in this opinion, the record

reflects that the victim made an in-court identification

of the defendant as the person she knew to be ‘‘Ricardo

Swilling’’ or ‘‘Apollo,’’ the person she permitted to stay

at her apartment. Later, after the victim had testified

with respect to the violent events of December 24 and

December 25, 2014, she testified in response to the

prosecutor’s inquiry that the person who had stabbed

her and who did not permit her to leave her apartment

was ‘‘present’’ in the courtroom. It is abundantly clear

from reviewing the victim’s testimony that the person

she referred to as ‘‘Ricardo Swilling’’ or ‘‘Apollo’’ was

the person she believed to be the perpetrator of the

crimes at issue. After eliciting this testimony with

respect to the perpetrator’s mere presence in the courtroom, however, the prosecutor did not ask the victim

specifically to identify the defendant.

When the prosecutor indicated that he did not have

any further questions for the victim, the court asked a

single question of the victim. The court asked her if

the person she had identified as the perpetrator of the

crimes, and who was present in the courtroom, was

the person she had previously identified as ‘‘Mr. Swilling.’’ The court aptly observed that its inquiry seemed

‘‘obvious’’—the victim already had identified the defendant to be ‘‘Ricardo Swilling,’’ the person who was staying at her apartment, and she testified that this same

person was the perpetrator of the crimes. Nonetheless,

at the time of the court’s inquiry the victim had made

an in-court identification that was ambiguous. She

merely had testified that the perpetrator of the crimes

was present in the courtroom. Thus, although she made

a second in-court identification, her identification was

not clear, but left an ambiguity with respect to a critical
factual issue. In this circumstance, the court did not

appear to be taking sides in the matter. It merely asked

a single question that readily clarified the victim’s testimony for the benefit of the court and the jury. We

disagree that the court compelled the witness in any

way, reflected any degree of bias in favor of the state’s

case, or acted unreasonably.

With respect to the court’s inquiry of Matos, as is set

forth previously in this opinion, it is clear that, with

respect to whether Matos observed the perpetrator or

was able to make an in-court identification of the defendant, the prosecutor did not present an intelligible narrative. Matos testified that he did not see anything when

he went outside. Then, Matos testified that he saw ‘‘him’’

when a police officer ran behind the victim’s house.

The prosecutor asked Matos to explain, to which Matos

testified that he saw ‘‘[t]he guy’’ run to the back of the

victim’s house and lock the door. When the prosecutor

asked for further explanation as to whether Matos saw

an individual outside of the victim’s apartment, Matos

testified ‘‘No. I didn’t get to see him . . . .’’ Then, Matos

testified that an officer saw someone locking a door at

the victim’s house. The prosecutor again asked if Matos

was able to see this individual, to which Matos

answered that he did not see him, but also that he saw

him after he was placed under arrest.

Following this utterly confusing testimony, the prosecutor attempted to elicit an in-court identification of

the defendant by Matos. The prosecutor asked Matos

if the person that he observed reentering the victim’s

house was the same person that he observed later in

police custody. Matos replied, ‘‘Yup.’’ When the prosecutor asked Matos if he observed that same person in

the courtroom, he replied, ‘‘I don’t know. I have no

idea.’’ When the prosecutor asked Matos to look around

the courtroom and ‘‘let us know if you recognize anybody,’’ Matos replied, ‘‘[t]hat guy,’’ and began to

describe someone who was wearing a gray sweater.

The court asked Matos four questions, all of which

sought clarification from Matos with respect to whom

in the courtroom he was attempting to identify and

whether that person was the man that he observed in

police custody on December 25, 2014. The court asked

Matos, three times, to clarify the clothing being worn

by the person he was attempting to identify. The prosecutor had asked Matos to identify someone that he

‘‘recognize[d]’’—an inquiry that was not pertinent to

the issues before the jury and which possibly could

have created confusion in the minds of the jurors. The

court, in an obvious attempt to dispel any ambiguity

with respect to who in the courtroom Matos was

attempting to identify and why, asked Matos, ‘‘[d]o you

see the person that the police took into custody that

night here in the courtroom?’’ When Matos continued

to reflect an inability to provide an intelligible identifica-
tion, the court ended the inquiry by stating, ‘‘[t]hat’s

enough.’’

Having reviewed the record carefully, we are persuaded that the court’s questioning of Matos reflected

a reasonable attempt to clarify both Matos’ ability to

make an identification of someone in the courtroom as

well as the nature of the state’s inquiry. It is clear from

a review of the colloquy between the prosecutor, the

court, and Matos that such clarification was needed.

By making the brief inquiry of the witness that it did,

the court did not do more than protect the defendant’s

right to ensure that the jury had before it facts rather

than confusion. Stated otherwise, the court fulfilled its

role of ensuring that the facts were presented to the

jury in an understandable manner. Contrary to the

defendant’s characterization of the court’s questions,

the court did not reflect any bias in favor of the state’s

case or exert any influence on Matos to identify the

defendant as the person he may or may not have seen

on the night in question.

The present case does not present a situation in which

the court advocated in favor of a particular verdict,

suggested that a particular witness was credible, or

otherwise suggested that it believed or disbelieved any

particular version of events. The court’s brief inquiries

in the present case appear to have been directly tailored

to address ambiguities that obviously existed in the

questioning of the two witnesses at issue. The defendant

argues that the court improperly assisted the state’s

case and infringed upon the role of counsel. Yet, as our

case law reflects, judicial intervention in the form of

questioning witnesses is proper when, as in the present

case, such intervention is limited and is properly tailored to dispelling confusion in the mind of the court

and the jury with respect to the nature of the evidence

being presented by a party. Although it was the jury’s

function to evaluate the evidence, including any in-court

identifications of the defendant, it was the court’s function to clarify whether an in-court identification of the

defendant by Matos, in fact, had occurred.

Additionally, we observe that during its charge, the

court stated in relevant part: ‘‘You should not be influenced by my actions during the trial in ruling on motions

or objections by counsel, or in comments to counsel,

or in questions to witnesses, or in setting forth the law

in these instructions. You are not to take my actions

as any indication of my opinion as to how you should

determine the issues of fact.’’ Also, the court stated: ‘‘If

by any remote chance you think I have an opinion in

this case, I must tell you that you are wrong. I have no

opinion in this case. I am, if you will, like the referee

in a basketball game. I have no opinion as [to] how the

matter should end. My job is to make sure that everybody plays by the rules and to explain the rules when

necessary.’’ These instructions unambiguously con-
veyed to the jury that the court did not have a role in

the fact-finding process and did not have an opinion

with respect to the outcome of the trial, thereby mitigating the danger that the jury might have considered the

conduct at issue in this claim in the harmful manner

suggested by the defendant.

For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that the court

acted well within its discretion. The defendant has

failed to demonstrate that a constitutional violation

exists and deprived him of a fair trial. Accordingly, the

claim fails under Golding’s third prong.

II

Next, the defendant claims that the court improperly

permitted the victim to make an in-court identification

of him in the absence of a showing that she previously

had made a nonsuggestive out-of-court identification

of him. We disagree.

In arguing that his due process rights were violated,

the defendant relies solely on State v. Dickson, 322

Conn. 410, 426, 141 A.3d 810 (2016), cert. denied,

U.S. , 137 S. Ct. 2263, 198 L. Ed. 2d 713 (2017), in

which our Supreme Court held that ‘‘first time in-court

identifications, like in-court identifications that are

tainted by an unduly suggestive out-of-court identification, implicate due process protections and must be

prescreened by the trial court.’’ The court explained:

‘‘[A]ny first time in-court identification by a witness

who would have been unable to reliably identify the

defendant in a nonsuggestive out-of-court procedure

constitutes a procedural due process violation. . . .

Although we recognize that, when the witness could

have identified the defendant in a nonsuggestive procedure, a first time in-court identification does not constitute an actual violation of due process principles, this

court has an obligation to adopt procedures that will

eliminate the risk that the defendant will be deprived

of a constitutionally protected right by being identified

in court by a witness who could not have identified

the defendant in a fair proceeding. Indeed, it is well

established that courts have the duty not only to craft

remedies for actual constitutional violations, but also

to craft prophylactic constitutional rules to prevent the

significant risk of a constitutional violation. . . . In the

present case, we conclude that the practice of allowing

first time in-court identifications creates a significant

risk of a due process violation and that the procedures

that we adopt herein are more effective at preventing

such violations, less costly and more in keeping with the

legislative will than any other alternative.’’ (Citations

omitted; emphasis omitted.) Id., 426–27 n.11.

Our Supreme Court went on to explain that certain

in-court identifications were not subject to the prophylactic rules set forth in Dickson. The court stated: ‘‘In

cases in which there has been no pretrial identification,
however, and the state intends to present a first time

in-court identification, the state must first request permission to do so from the trial court. . . . The trial

court may grant such permission only if it determines

that there is no factual dispute as to the identity of the

perpetrator, or the ability of the particular eyewitness

to identify the defendant is not at issue. . . . For example, in cases in which the trial court determines that

the only issue in dispute is whether the acts that the

defendant admittedly performed constituted a crime,

the court should permit a first time in-court identification. In cases in which the defendant concedes that

identity or the ability of a particular witness to identify

the defendant as the perpetrator is not in dispute, the

state may satisfy the prescreening requirement by giving

written or oral notice to that effect on the record.’’

(Citations omitted.) Id., 445–46. The court clarified that,

if a defendant did not dispute a witness’ ability to identify him, but merely disputed such witness’ testimony

on other grounds, the witness would be ‘‘properly permitted to make a first time in-court identification of the

defendant’’ without violating due process. Id., 446 n.28.

The defendant seeks review pursuant to the Golding

doctrine. We previously set forth the parameters of the

Golding doctrine in part I of this opinion. We will review

the claim because the record provides us with an adequate basis to do so, and the claim is of constitutional

magnitude. We conclude, however, that the claim fails

under Golding’s third prong because the defendant is

unable to demonstrate that a constitutional violation

exists and deprived him of a fair trial.

In arguing that the victim’s in-court identification

deprived him of his right to due process,5

the defendant

argues: ‘‘[T]here was no evidence presented that [the

victim] ever identified [the] defendant in a nonsuggestive out-of-court setting of any kind at all. None of the

police officers testified that she identified [the] defendant as ‘Apollo,’ her alleged attacker, in any interview

or constitutionally acceptable [photographic] array or

lineup. There is not a shred of evidence [that the victim]

ever identified [the] defendant at all outside of court.

Moreover, her in-court identification was tainted with

[the trial court’s] leading question, so it cannot be

trusted. . . .

‘‘Since no prior, out-of-court nonsuggestive identifications were made, the state was obligated to seek the

court’s permission to have nonsuggestive . . . identifications made and have a hearing on how that could be

accomplished. . . . Short of that, the in-court identifications are not to be allowed.’’ (Citations omitted.)

The defendant does not challenge the victim’s incourt identification of him as the person who resided

with her over the course of several weeks in December,

2014, and whom she knew to be ‘‘Ricardo Swilling’’ or

‘‘Apollo.’’ The victim testified, and the defendant did
not dispute, that she was familiar with the defendant

prior to the time that the person identified in the record

as Luis accompanied the defendant to her home

because he needed a place to stay. The victim testified

that she first met the defendant in 2013, at which time

she had a lengthy conversation with him. Far from

attempting to demonstrate that the victim was unfamiliar with him prior to the events at issue, the defendant

testified that, prior to December, 2014, he and the victim

were in a sexual relationship. The defendant’s theory

of defense, articulated during closing argument, was

not that the victim was unable to identify him correctly.

Rather, defense counsel suggested that an unnamed

third party who was a tenant of the victim had committed the crimes at issue, the victim was too fearful to

identify this third party, and, because she was in need

of assistance and felt pressure to name a perpetrator

following the incident, she falsely named the defendant

as her assailant because he happened to be staying with

her at that time.

The facts of the present case reflect that there was

no factual dispute with respect to whether the victim

had the ability to identify the defendant. The victim’s

familiarity with the defendant was not a disputed issue

of fact. The victim’s ability to observe, recall, and narrate facts concerning the person that allegedly assaulted

her and held her hostage in her apartment during the

course of two days also was not a disputed issue of

fact. Accordingly, despite the fact that the record is

silent with respect to any out-of-court identification

made by the victim in the present case, the victim’s incourt identification of the defendant as the perpetrator

of the crime was permissible absent adherence to the

procedural safeguards that the court in Dickson made

applicable to first time in-court identifications.

The defendant also focuses on the state’s failure to

request permission to conduct a first time in-court identification as is required by the newly created procedural

rules announced in Dickson. See State v. Dickson,

supra, 322 Conn. 445–46. As the state correctly

observes, the victim’s in-court identification occurred

on February 29, 2016. The defendant filed the present

appeal on June 28, 2016. Our Supreme Court, however,

did not officially release its decision in Dickson until

August 9, 2016. With respect to the applicability of the

procedural rules announced in Dickson, our Supreme

Court stated that they applied ‘‘to the parties to the

present case and to all pending cases. It is important

to point out, however, that, in pending appeals involving

this issue, the suggestive in-court identification has

already occurred. Accordingly, if the reviewing court

concludes that the admission of the identification was

harmful, the only remedy that can be provided is a

remand to the trial court for the purpose of evaluating

the reliability and the admissibility of the in-court identification under the totality of the circumstances. . . .
If the trial court concludes that the identification was

sufficiently reliable, the trial court may reinstate the

conviction, and no new trial would be required.’’ (Citations omitted; emphasis in original; footnote omitted.)

Id., 451–52.

In the present case, although we would be obliged

to afford the defendant relief if he had demonstrated

a violation of his due process rights, he is not necessarily

entitled to relief arising from the prosecutor’s failure

to abide by a procedural rule that was not in existence

at the time of trial. For the reasons already discussed,

we do not conclude that the admission of the victim’s

in-court identification violated his constitutional rights.

Because there is no showing of harm, there is no need

to upset the judgment of the trial court or to remand

the case to the trial court for further proceedings with

respect to the identification.

With respect to the victim’s in-court identification

of him as the perpetrator, the defendant is unable to

demonstrate that a constitutional violation exists and

that it deprived him of a fair trial.6 Accordingly, the

claim fails under Golding’s third prong.7

III

Next, the defendant claims that the court improperly

admitted evidence of his prior felony convictions. We

disagree.

The following additional facts are relevant to the

present claim. After the state rested its case-in-chief,

defense counsel indicated to the court that the defendant intended to testify. After the court addressed the

defendant about his decision to testify, the court asked

the prosecutor to identify prior convictions of the defendant that the state intended to use for impeachment

purposes. The prosecutor replied that he intended to

ask the defendant if he had been convicted of four

felony crimes on July 13, 2001. The prosecutor stated

that, on that date, the defendant was convicted of burglary in the first degree, carrying or selling a dangerous

weapon, kidnapping in the first degree with the use of

a firearm, and kidnapping in the second degree with

the use of a firearm. The prosecutor indicated that he

did not intend to elicit the names of these felony crimes.

The prosecutor represented that the convictions

occurred in 2001, but the defendant was not discharged

to special parole until May 22, 2013. In terms of the

remoteness of the convictions, the state argued that

the fact that the defendant was not discharged to special

parole until May 22, 2013, put the convictions ‘‘well

within’’ a ten year window of the trial. Defense counsel

objected8 on the ground that the convictions were too

remote in time and that reference to the convictions

would be unduly prejudicial to the defense.

In relevant part, the court ruled: ‘‘I will allow the state

to impeach him. . . . I’m not clear what the nature of
the burglary is because there is no indication whether

there is larcenous intent in regard to that statute. But,

it’s clear [that] those offenses, the burglary first degree

and carrying a dangerous weapon, kidnapping second,

kidnapping first are all felonies and under the case law,

the felonies do go to the truth and veracity, and not as

much as crimes such as larceny or perjury. But they

still are considered admissible, and do go to truth and

veracity. I’m required at this point to weigh three factors. The extent of any prejudice likely to arise, the

significance of the commission of the particular crime

indicating on truthfulness and remoteness in time.

‘‘I’ll find that while these offenses—the convictions

are [in] July of 2001, he was not discharged. He wasn’t

released from prison until May 22, 2013. . . . I’ll indicate [that] I’m reading from a business record from

the Department of Correction indicating [that] he was

discharged from prison . . . to parole, on May 22, 2013,

and that as of the date of this incident, December 26,

2014, he was still on parole. He may even still be on

parole today, but regardless, he certainly was on parole

up until December 26th. . . .

‘‘So, as a result, I believe that the case law indicates

that this conviction, while starting on July 13, 2001, is

still, in effect, even today as we speak, but certainly

when he was discharged just approximately three years

ago. So, I find for that purpose, it’s not too remote

in time.

‘‘I also find that since it’s going to be referred to as

unnamed felonies . . . and also since the state is going

to refer to the date of conviction, which is 2001, that

the extent of the prejudice is minimal.

‘‘And as far as the significance of the commission

of the particular crimes here regarding truthfulness, it

would appear that they aren’t the type of crimes ordinarily associated with truthfulness, but the case law

indicates that because they are felonies, they . . . as

opposed to misdemeanors . . . [reflect on the defendant’s] truthfulness . . . . Obviously, less than a larceny would, but still some elements.

‘‘So, based on all the weighing of those factors, and

the fact that [the] state is prohibited from referring

to the particular offenses and is also prohibited from

mentioning when he got off of parole, or [was] released

from prison . . . the argument could be made by the

defense that he doesn’t have a conviction since 2001.

So, I don’t think there is the prejudice that might be

associated with, you know, some reference to something more recent.

‘‘So, I am going to allow the state to impeach with

those four offenses. I will also indicate that the defendant was apparently convicted of [a] burglary charge

and was in . . . 1997, which, under . . . my reading

of the statute could possibly be used as a source of
impeachment since he has one or more offenses within

the ten years. But in discussing with the state, I urge the

state not to impeach him with that, so from a balancing

standpoint, I . . . ask the state not to do that. They

are not going to do that. So, that was something that

went into my decision to allow impeachment as I’ve

described.’’

During the state’s cross-examination of the defendant, the prosecutor asked the defendant if he was a

convicted felon in that he had been convicted of four

felony crimes on July 13, 2001. The defendant acknowledged that he had been convicted of these felony

crimes. Immediately after the prosecutor elicited this

evidence, the court provided a limiting instruction to

the jury in which it ordered the jury to consider the

evidence only with respect to an assessment of the

defendant’s credibility.9

During the state’s closing argument, the prosecutor

did not expressly rely on the defendant’s prior felony

convictions. During defense counsel’s closing argument, counsel referred briefly to the impeachment evidence at issue by reminding the jury that the testimony

with respect to the defendant’s four felony convictions

was admitted solely for use in the jury’s assessment of

his credibility generally.10 During its charge to the jury,

the court reiterated, in substance, the limiting instruction that it provided to the jury immediately after the

state elicited testimony from the defendant concerning

the four unnamed felony convictions.11

Presently, the defendant argues that, by permitting

the state to introduce evidence that, in 2001, he was

convicted of committing four felony crimes, the court

‘‘violated [his] right to due process of law and a fair

and impartial trial,’’ and, in the alternative, the court

abused its discretion, thereby undermining his defense.

Although, in his initial discussion of the present claim

in his brief, the defendant makes reference to an alleged

violation of his constitutional rights, his analysis of the

claim focuses solely on the issue of whether the court

abused its discretion in admitting the evidence and

whether its improper ruling was harmful to the defense.

Thus, the defendant abandoned any claim of constitutional magnitude with respect to the court’s ruling.

‘‘[T]he standard for the preservation of a claim alleging an improper evidentiary ruling at trial is well settled.

This court is not bound to consider claims of law not

made at the trial. . . . In order to preserve an evidentiary ruling for review, trial counsel must object properly. . . . In objecting to evidence, counsel must

properly articulate the basis of the objection so as to

apprise the trial court of the precise nature of the objection and its real purpose, in order to form an adequate

basis for a reviewable ruling. . . . Once counsel states

the authority and ground of [the] objection, any appeal

will be limited to the ground asserted. . . .
‘‘These requirements are not simply formalities. They

serve to alert the trial court to potential error while

there is still time for the court to act. . . . Assigning

error to a court’s evidentiary rulings on the basis of

objections never raised at trial unfairly subjects the

court and the opposing party to trial by ambush. . . .

Thus, because the sine qua non of preservation is fair

notice to the trial court . . . the determination of

whether a claim has been properly preserved will

depend on a careful review of the record to ascertain

whether the claim on appeal was articulated below with

sufficient clarity to place the trial court on reasonable

notice of that very same claim.’’ (Citations omitted;

internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Jorge P., 308

Conn. 740, 753–54, 66 A.3d 869 (2013).

As we discussed previously in this opinion, at the

time that defense counsel objected to the admission of

evidence related to the prior convictions, he argued

that they were too remote in time and that they were

more prejudicial than probative. To the extent that the

defendant attempts to undermine the court’s ruling by

arguing for the first time before this court that the

evidence simply was not at all relevant in an assessment

of his veracity, we decline to address that aspect of his

claim. We will review the grounds advanced before

the trial court related to the prejudicial nature of the

evidence as well as its remoteness.

‘‘It is well settled that evidence that a criminal defendant has been convicted of crimes on a prior occasion

is not generally admissible. . . . There are, however,

several well recognized exceptions to this rule, one of

which is that [a] criminal defendant who has previously

been convicted of a crime carrying a term of imprisonment of more than one year may be impeached by the

state if his credibility is in issue. . . . In its discretion

a trial court may properly admit evidence of prior convictions provided that the prejudicial effect of such

evidence does not far outweigh its probative value. . . .

[Our Supreme Court] has identified three factors which

determine whether a prior conviction may be admitted:

(1) the extent of the prejudice likely to arise; (2) the

significance of the commission of the particular crime

in indicating untruthfulness; and (3) its remoteness in

time. . . . A trial court’s decision denying a motion to

exclude a witness’ prior record, offered to attack his

credibility, will be upset only if the court abused its

discretion. . . . Those three factors have been incorporated in [the Connecticut] [C]ode of [E]vidence.

Conn. Code Evid. § 6-7 (a). . . .

‘‘There is no doubt that if evidence of a felony conviction is otherwise admissible, the name of the crime is

generally also admissible. See Conn. Code Evid. § 6-7

(c) ([i]f, for purposes of impeaching the credibility of

a witness, evidence is introduced that the witness has

been convicted of a crime, the court shall limit the
evidence to the name of the crime . . . except that

. . . the court may exclude evidence of the name of

the crime . . . .’’ (Citations omitted; emphasis in original; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Young,

174 Conn. App. 760, 768–69, 166 A.3d 704, cert. denied,

327 Conn. 976, 174 A.3d 195 (2017). ‘‘As indicated in

§ 6-7, the court has discretion to admit the prior conviction as an unnamed felony. Factors to consider include

whether the prior crime reflects directly on credibility

and whether the prejudice inherent in the name of the

crime outweighs the probative impeaching value. . . .

‘‘[I]n evaluating the separate ingredients to be

weighed in the balancing process, there is no way to

quantify them in mathematical terms. . . . Therefore,

[t]he trial court has wide discretion in this balancing

determination and every reasonable presumption

should be given in favor of the correctness of the court’s

ruling . . . . Reversal is required only where an abuse

of discretion is manifest or where injustice appears to

have been done. . . . The burden lies with the party

objecting to the admission of evidence of prior convictions to demonstrate the prejudice that is likely to arise

from its admission. . . . The test for determining

whether evidence is unduly prejudicial is not whether

it is damaging to the defendant but whether it will

improperly arouse the emotions of the jury.’’ (Citations

omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 769–70.

‘‘[P]rior convictions that are admissible for impeachment purposes may be segregated into two general categories. First are those crimes that by their very nature

indicate dishonesty or tendency to make false statement. . . . Beyond the obvious violations such as perjury or false statement, we have recognized that crimes

involving larcenous intent imply a general disposition

toward dishonesty such that they also fall within this

category. . . . Convictions of this sort obviously bear

heavily on the credibility of one who has been convicted

of them. The probative value of such convictions, therefore, may often outweigh any prejudice engendered by

their admission.

‘‘The second category involves convictions for crimes

that do not reflect directly on the credibility of one who

has been convicted of them. . . . The theory behind

the admissibility of these convictions as evidence of

credibility posits that conviction of a crime demonstrates a bad general character, a general readiness to

do evil and that such a disposition alone supports an

inference of a readiness to lie in the particular case

. . . .

‘‘Convictions of crimes that fall within this second

category blemish the character of one so convicted. A

juror might reasonably conclude that such a witness

lacks to some degree the moral rectitude from which

a witness’s oath of honesty derives its credibility. Nevertheless, conviction of a crime not directly reflecting on
credibility clearly lacks the direct probative value of a

criminal conviction indicating dishonesty or a tendency

to make false statement. Thus, the balance used to

measure admissibility of prior convictions is weighted

less heavily toward admitting the prior conviction when

it involves a crime related only indirectly to credibility.’’

(Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.)

State v. Geyer, 194 Conn. 1, 12–13, 480 A.2d 489 (1984).

‘‘To avoid unwarranted prejudice to the witness, when

a party seeks to introduce evidence of a felony that

does not directly bear on veracity, a trial court ordinarily should permit reference only to an unspecified

crime carrying a penalty of greater than one year that

occurred at a certain time and place.’’ State v. Pinnock,

220 Conn. 765, 780, 601 A.2d 521 (1992). ‘‘That prudent

course [of permitting evidence of unnamed felony convictions] allows the jury to draw an inference of dishonesty from the prior conviction without the extraordinary

prejudice that may arise from naming the specific

offense. . . . Ultimately, [t]he trial court, because of

its intimate familiarity with the case, is in the best position to weigh the relative merits and dangers of any

proffered evidence. . . . This principle applies with

equal force to the admissibility of prior convictions.’’

(Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.)

State v. Muhammad, 91 Conn. App. 392, 401, 881 A.2d

468, cert. denied, 276 Conn. 922, 888 A.2d 90 (2005).

We first address the defendant’s claim that the court

abused its discretion in admitting evidence of the convictions because they were too remote. It appears to

be undisputed that the convictions occurred in 2001,

but that the defendant’s release from confinement in

connection with those convictions did not occur until

May 22, 2013. The defendant argues that the convictions

occurred nearly fifteen years prior to the time of trial,

which occurred in 2016. Ignoring the significance of

the date of his release from confinement, the defendant

asserts that he was serving the special parole portion

of his sentence at the time of trial and, thus, the ten

year presumptive bar to the prior convictions evidence

should have applied. The defendant correctly acknowledges in his brief that there is no legal precedent in

support of his argument.12

This court has explained: ‘‘[T]he fact that a prior

conviction is more than ten years old should greatly

increase the weight carried by the third prong in the

balancing test set forth in § 6-7 of the Connecticut Code

of Evidence, unless that prior conviction relates to the

witness’ veracity. . . . That ten year benchmark, however, does not present an absolute bar to the use of a

conviction that is more than ten years old but rather

functions as a guide to assist the court in evaluating

the conviction’s remoteness. . . . [T]he measuring

point for a remoteness determination under § 6-7 of the

Connecticut Code of Evidence is the date of conviction

or the date of release from resulting confinement,
whichever is later.’’ (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 399–400. Because the defendant was released from confinement within ten years

of the time of trial, the defendant’s argument that the

convictions were too remote is not persuasive.

With respect to the defendant’s argument that the

evidence was unduly prejudicial, he argues that because

he was facing serious felony charges in the present

case, the admission of the evidence at issue ‘‘was likely

to lead the jury to conclude [that he] was more likely

guilty in this case.’’ Observing that the jury’s assessment

of his credibility was a critical factual issue in the present case, the defendant asserts that the evidence was

‘‘unduly prejudicial and of minor probative value.’’

The court carefully applied the correct legal principles in its assessment of the evidence. The court properly recognized that the four felony convictions, which

arose from charges of burglary in the first degree, carrying or selling a dangerous weapon, kidnapping in the

first degree with the use of a firearm, and kidnapping

in the second degree with the use of a firearm, did not

reflect directly on the defendant’s credibility. The court

recognized, however, that the felony convictions nonetheless were relevant in an assessment of the defendant’s credibility. In light of the legal principles

previously discussed in this opinion, the defendant is

unable to demonstrate that the court’s determination

that the felony convictions were relevant in an assessment of his credibility was not proper, nor did he

attempt to do so at the time of trial.

The defendant, noting that the evidence was adverse

to him, argues that the evidence was prejudicial. All

adverse evidence is prejudicial. Here, the court took

several measures to ensure that the evidence was not

unduly prejudicial. First and foremost, the court limited

the state’s inquiry to unnamed felonies that occurred

in 2001. The jury learned no details related to the crimes

which arguably might have inflamed negative feelings

toward the defendant. Additionally, the court provided

the jury with a limiting instruction immediately following its admission of the evidence at issue, and it reiterated this instruction during its charge. The defendant

does not argue that the court’s instructions were deficient and provides us with no reason to doubt that the

jury followed these instructions in its careful assessment of the evidence.

For the foregoing reasons, the defendant has failed

to demonstrate that the court abused its discretion in

admitting the prior conviction evidence.

IV

Next, the defendant argues that the court improperly

admitted a recording of a 911 call made by the victim.

We disagree.

The following additional facts are relevant to the
present claim. During the victim’s direct examination

by the state, she testified about the ordeal that she

endured in her apartment over the course of two days

and how, immediately after she fled her apartment on

December 25, 2014, she ran to Matos’ apartment and

sought assistance from him. The victim testified that,

once she was inside Matos’ apartment, she hid in a

closet. She asked Matos to call 911 for her and, after

the call was made, she spoke to a dispatcher at the 911

call center. At that juncture in the victim’s examination,

the prosecutor asked her if she recognized a CD that

the state marked as an exhibit for identification purposes. The victim testified that she recognized the CD

and had listened to portions of it at the courthouse.

She testified that it contained a recording of the conversation that she had with the 911 dispatcher on December 25, 2014.

When the prosecutor offered the recording as a full

exhibit, defense counsel objected to its admission on

the ground of hearsay. After the court excused the jury,

the prosecutor argued that the recorded statements

were not hearsay because they were the victim’s spontaneous utterances immediately following her escape

from captivity that were made while she was still experiencing the stress and excitement of the violent event.

The prosecutor argued, as well, that the recorded statements were not hearsay because they were statements

made by the victim related to her then-existing medical condition.

Initially, the court expressed concerns with respect

to the authenticity of the exhibit offered by the state,

but defense counsel stated that he was not raising an

objection based on authentication. Rather, defense

counsel stated, that his objection was based on the fact

that the recording was hearsay and it was cumulative

evidence because ‘‘this witness can clearly testify [with

respect to] all of the things that would be revealed on

the tape. What was your state of mind at the time? She

can tell us. . . . What did you tell the police? She can

tell us that. . . . So, under the circumstances, I don’t

see any need to admit the tape.’’

Noting that defense counsel was not objecting on

authentication grounds, the court asked the prosecutor

to play the recording. In the recording, the victim made

many statements, some of which were unprompted and

some of which were responsive to questions posed to

her by a 911 dispatcher. She identified herself and provided her location. She indicated that she had been

kidnapped in her apartment by a five foot, eight inch

tall black male with ‘‘long dreads’’ named ‘‘Rick,’’ who

had the street name of ‘‘Apollo.’’ The victim stated that

she knew her assailant, and that, while she was alone

with him, he stabbed her with kitchen knives and

choked, beat, and tortured her. The victim stated that

she had escaped to her current location, a neighbor’s
apartment, but that she was ‘‘bleeding all over’’ and

needed an ambulance. The victim stated her belief that

the perpetrator was still asleep in her apartment.

After the court heard the recording, defense counsel

reiterated his view that the recording was inadmissible

because it was hearsay and it was cumulative. Additionally, defense counsel argued that the recording was

more prejudicial than probative. The prosecutor replied

that the evidence, which shed light on the victim’s state

of mind in the minutes after she fled from her apartment,

was relevant to the jury’s assessment of the victim’s

credibility. Additionally, the prosecutor reiterated his

belief that the statements were not inadmissible hearsay

because they were the excited utterances of the victim.

The court ruled: ‘‘It’s not admissible for credibility.

She hasn’t been cross-examined. . . . [I]t may become

admissible under some of the case law that discusses

that, but at this point that is not why it’s admissible.

‘‘I’ve listened to the entire 911 call, which is in four

or five separate sections. It is clear, even though a

number of the . . . statements [made by the victim]

are made in response to questions [posed to her by the

911 dispatcher] which would militate against a spontaneous utterance exception, it is clear in listening to her

voice, her voice is many times hurried. She seems out

of breath during most of the conversation. It is clear

that she’s under the influence of a startling event. It’s

within minutes, if not seconds, of her being released

from, or escaping, I should say, from the house that

she was being held captive in. It’s her . . . rambling,

again, reflecting a lack of forethought in responding to

things. It’s just a spur of the moment. So, it’s clear that

most of the statements made by her are admissible for

the truth of the matter as spontaneous utterance.

‘‘To the extent that there are some things in there

that are not . . . it’s just a repeat of some previous

things that were said. Additionally, there are some

descriptions of the defendant. Those are admissible

under the identification exception to the hearsay rule.

And . . . under § 8-5 [of the Connecticut Code of Evidence], she’s available for cross-examination. So that’s

available there.

‘‘This is a 911 call and, therefore, would come in as

a business record exception if the state would lay a

foundation for that which they up to now have not

done. But, additionally, I find that under the residual

exception, it indicates a statement that is not admissible

under any of the foregoing exceptions. I think it is

admissible under a number of the foregoing exceptions.

But, it’s certainly admissible if the court determines

there is a reasonable necessity for the admission of the

statement. This is the only time. There’s no other 911

calls, so there is a reasonable necessity for the admission of it in the statement supported by the equivalent
guarantees of trustworthiness and reliability essential

to other evidence admitted. I find it extremely trustworthy and reliable given the fact that it’s a recorded statement. It was done within seconds, or minutes, of being

released from captivity, and, therefore . . . the 911 call

in its entirety is admissible in full.’’ Thereafter, the court

summoned the jury to the courtroom and the recording

was played in the jury’s presence.

Presently, the defendant challenges the court’s ruling

by arguing that the court erred in its determination that

the victim’s statements were spontaneous utterances

and that admitting the recording was not unduly prejudicial to the defense.13 We will review these preserved

evidentiary issues, in turn.14

A

First we address the defendant’s argument that the

court improperly determined that the recording fell

within the spontaneous utterance exception to the hearsay rule. Our Supreme Court has set forth the standard

of review we are bound to utilize in hearsay claims:

‘‘To the extent a trial court’s admission of evidence is

based on an interpretation of the Code of Evidence,

our standard of review is plenary. For example, whether

a challenged statement properly may be classified as

hearsay and whether a hearsay exception properly is

identified are legal questions demanding plenary

review. They require determinations about which reasonable minds may not differ; there is no judgment call

by the trial court, and the trial court has no discretion

to admit hearsay in the absence of a provision providing

for its admissibility. . . .

‘‘We review the trial court’s decision to admit evidence, if premised on a correct view of the law, however, for an abuse of discretion. . . . In other words,

only after a trial court has made the legal determination

that a particular statement is or is not hearsay, or is

subject to a hearsay exception, is it vested with the

discretion to admit or to bar the evidence based upon

relevancy, prejudice, or other legally appropriate

grounds related to the rule of evidence under which

admission is being sought. For example, whether a

statement is truly spontaneous as to fall within the

spontaneous utterance exception will be reviewed with

the utmost deference to the trial court’s determination.

Similarly, appellate courts will defer to the trial court’s

determinations on issues dictated by the exercise of

discretion, fact finding, or credibility assessments.’’

(Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.)

State v. Saucier, 283 Conn. 207, 218–19, 926 A.2d 633

(2007).

‘‘An out-of-court statement offered to prove the truth

of the matter asserted is hearsay and is generally inadmissible unless an exception to the general rule applies.

. . . Section 8-3 of the Connecticut Code of Evidence
sets forth exceptions to the hearsay rule that apply

regardless of the availability of the declarant. Conn.

Code Evid. § 8-3. One such exception is the spontaneous

utterance exception set forth in § 8-3 (2), which applies

to: A statement relating to a startling event or condition

made while the declarant was under the stress of excitement caused by the event or condition. Under § 8-3 (2),

an out-of-court declaration will not be excluded under

the hearsay rule when the following factors are established: (1) the declaration follows a startling occurrence, (2) the declaration refers to that occurrence,

(3) the declarant observed the occurrence, and (4) the

declaration is made under circumstances that negate

the opportunity for deliberation and fabrication by the

declarant. . . .

‘‘In determining whether a declaration is admissible

as a spontaneous utterance, the court should look at

various factors, including [t]he element of time, the

circumstances and manner of the accident, the mental

and physical condition of the declarant, the shock produced, the nature of the utterance, whether against the

interest of the declarant or not, or made in response

to question, or involuntary, and any other material facts

in the surrounding circumstances . . . . The relation

of the utterance in point of time to the accident or

occurrence, while an important element to be considered in determining whether there has been opportunity

for reflection, is not decisive. . . . Instead, [t]he overarching consideration is whether the declarant made

the statement before he or she had the opportunity to

undertake a reasoned reflection of the event described

therein.’’ (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks

omitted.) State v. Daley, 161 Conn. App. 861, 883–84,

129 A.3d 190 (2015), cert. denied, 320 Conn. 919, 132

A.3d 1093 (2016).

The defendant challenges the court’s determination

that the circumstances in which the victim made the

recorded statements negated the opportunity for deliberation and fabrication by her. As set forth previously,

the court made myriad findings in this regard. After

listening to the recording, the court found that the victim sounded ‘‘hurried’’ and ‘‘out of breath’’ during most

of her conversation with the 911 dispatcher. At times,

the court found, the victim appeared to be ‘‘rambling

. . . .’’ The victim testified, and the recording reflects,

that the 911 call was made immediately after the victim

escaped from her apartment and, desperately seeking

assistance, gained access to Matos’ apartment. Thus,

the court found that the recording was made ‘‘within

minutes . . . of her . . . escaping . . . from the

house that she was being held captive in.’’ Crediting

the victim’s testimony that she had been tortured during

the course of two days and appeared at Matos’ apartment only after rushing out of her apartment when

the defendant was asleep, while still bloodied from a

plethora of stab wounds, the court observed that the
victim clearly was ‘‘under the influence of a startling

event’’ at the time the 911 call was made. The court

correctly recognized that many of the victim’s statements were made in response to questions posed to

her by the 911 dispatcher, yet found that that the circumstances reflected a ‘‘lack of forethought’’ by the victim in

responding to these questions and ‘‘spur of the moment’’

statements by her.

The defendant argues that the victim’s statements

were not spontaneous because many of them were

made in response to questions posed to her by the

911 dispatcher, the court’s assessment of the victim’s

speech pattern was insignificant to a proper analysis,

the court improperly appeared to resolve the ‘‘ultimate

issue of the case’’ that she had been held captive, and the

evidence reflected that the victim made the statements

from the safety of Matos’ apartment, at which point in

time ‘‘she was able to collect her thoughts and respond

to questions.’’

Our careful review of the recording reflects that some

of the victim’s statements in the recording at issue were

made in response to questions posed to her by the 911

dispatcher. Many others, however, were made spontaneously. Nevertheless, the central premise of the defendant’s argument is not legally correct. ‘‘[T]hat a

statement is made in response to a question does not

preclude its admission as a spontaneous utterance.’’

State v. Kirby, 280 Conn. 361, 376, 908 A.2d 506 (2006);

State v. Davis, 109 Conn. App. 187, 195 n.3, 951 A.2d

31 (same), cert. denied, 289 Conn. 929, 958 A.2d 160

(2008); State v. Nelson, 105 Conn. App. 393, 407, 937

A.2d 1249 (same), cert. denied, 286 Conn. 913, 944 A.2d

983 (2008).

The defendant does not cite any authority in support

of his argument that the court’s observations with

respect to the sound of the victim’s voice, or the hurried

nature of her speech, were irrelevant to an assessment

of whether her statements reflected a lack of forethought on her part. One of the factors relevant to an

assessment of whether a declarant spoke spontaneously or not is his mental and physical condition at the

time of the declaration at issue. In an analysis of relevant

facts, an observation that a declarant had spoken

slowly, calmly, and without emotion might support an

inference that he had carefully considered his statements. An observation that he had spoken rapidly, emotionally, or while out of breath might support an

inference that he had not carefully considered his statements. Accordingly, this court has reasoned that a

declarant’s ‘‘emotional tone of voice,’’ as reflected in a

911 call recording, was one of several factors supporting

a finding that the 911 recording was a spontaneous

utterance. State v. Silver, 126 Conn. App. 522, 537, 12

A.3d 1014, cert. denied, 300 Conn. 931, 17 A.3d 68 (2011);

see also State v. Kirby, supra, 280 Conn. 376–77 (that
declarant ‘‘ ‘sounded highly emotional’ ’’ was relevant

factor in assessment of whether declarant’s statements

were spontaneous utterances). The court properly considered the manner in which the victim spoke in its

review of all of the relevant facts surrounding the victim’s statements.

The defendant suggests impropriety in that the court

found that the statements at issue were made within

minutes after she had escaped from her apartment

because this was ‘‘the ultimate issue of the case . . . .’’

The defendant, however, did not dispute that the victim

was assaulted over the course of two days in her apartment or that she had escaped captivity, fled to Matos’

residence, and called 911 upon her arrival. Instead, the

ultimate issue in the case was the identity of the perpetrator of the crimes at issue. Accordingly, the defendant’s argument is not supported by the record.

Last, the defendant disagrees with the court’s finding

that the victim’s statements to the 911 dispatcher were

spontaneous. He argues that the evidence supported a

finding that, by the time that the 911 call was made by

the victim, she was in a safe place and was able to

collect her thoughts. There was ample evidence to the

contrary. As the court observed, the 911 call occurred

within minutes of the victim fleeing her apartment following a lengthy and violent ordeal that reasonably

would be expected to have created a high degree of

emotional disturbance in the victim. At the time that

the statements were made, the victim was hiding from

the perpetrator in her neighbor’s apartment. There was

evidence that, at the time that the victim spoke with

the 911 dispatcher, her mental condition was fearful

because she informed the dispatcher that she did not

want to go outside because ‘‘[h]e might come and find

me again.’’ In terms of her physical condition, the victim

stated that she was in need of an ambulance and that

she was ‘‘bleeding all over.’’ In light of all the relevant

circumstances surrounding the statement, the defendant is unable to demonstrate that the court abused its

discretion in finding that the declarations were made

under circumstances that negated the opportunity for

deliberation, contrivance, and misrepresentation by

the declarant.

B

The defendant argues that the admission of the 911

recording was unduly prejudicial to the defense because

it tended to arouse the jury’s emotions, hostility or

sympathy.15 We disagree.

‘‘Relevant evidence may be excluded if its probative

value is outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice

or surprise, confusion of the issues, or misleading the

jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of

time or needless presentation of cumulative evidence.’’

Conn. Code Evid. § 4-3. We note that ‘‘[a]ll adverse
evidence is damaging to one’s case, but it is inadmissible

only if it creates undue prejudice so that it threatens

an injustice were it to be admitted. . . . The test for

determining whether evidence is unduly prejudicial is

not whether it is damaging to the defendant but whether

it will improperly arouse the emotions of the jury. . . .

The court bears the primary responsibility for conducting the balancing test to determine whether the probative value outweighs the prejudicial impact, and its

conclusion will be disturbed only for a manifest abuse

of discretion.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State

v. William C., 103 Conn. App. 508, 519–20, 930 A.2d

753, cert. denied, 284 Conn. 928, 934 A.2d 244 (2007).

With respect to the issue of improperly arousing the

emotions of the jury, the defendant argues that the 911

recording had a general tendency to invoke sympathy

for the victim and that it was inflammatory because in

it the victim referred to the fact that she had been

‘‘kidnapped for two days’’ and that the defendant had

been ‘‘torturing’’ her. Additionally, the defendant argues

that the 911 recording was prejudicially cumulative:

‘‘Given the cumulative effect of the 911 call with [the

victim’s] in-court testimony, the 911 call served simply

to arouse the juror’s sympathy for [the victim] without

providing any additional substantive information that

she had not already given in her direct testimony.’’

The defendant’s broad assessment of the 911

recording as prejudicially cumulative evidence is not

supported by the record. Before the trial court, the

defendant argued that the evidence was cumulative

because the victim could testify about the details set

forth in the 911 recording. He did not distinctly argue

that the 911 recording was prejudicial because it was

cumulative, so a claim based on that ground in not

properly before us.16 In any event, we observe that the

911 recording was introduced during the victim’s direct

examination. The victim was the first witness called by

the state in its case-in-chief. Although she related, in

detail, many specific facts concerning the episode in

her apartment, the victim did not relate all of the specific

information that she had provided to the dispatcher

during the 911 call. This information included a detailed

description of the perpetrator as well as the entire substance of the details that the victim provided to the

dispatcher. To the contrary, the victim merely had testified that she made a 911 call from Matos’ residence.

Accordingly, we reject the contention that the 911

recording was prejudicial because it was cumulative.

Although the defendant argues that the recording

was inflammatory we disagree that it was any more

inflammatory than the victim’s lengthy testimony concerning the defendant’s actions by which he prevented

her from leaving her apartment over the course of two

days and repeatedly assaulted her in a variety of ways.

This included beating, choking, kicking, and repeated
stabbings. During the recording, the victim referred to

the fact that the defendant had ‘‘tortured’’ her and ‘‘kidnapped’’ her. We are not persuaded that this strong

language was likely to have aroused the jury’s emotions

any more than the factual recitation that she set forth

in her testimony. Accordingly, we conclude that the

court did not abuse its discretion by failing to conclude

that the evidence was unduly prejudicial.

V

Finally, the defendant claims that the cumulative

effect of the court’s errors deprived him of his right to

a fair and impartial trial. This claim lacks merit.

In his brief, the defendant argues: ‘‘In the alternative

to the claims [raised previously in this opinion], assuming this court finds that, alone, none of those claims is

sufficient to state a claim for relief in the form of a

remand and new trial, then the cumulative effect of the

violations of [the] defendant’s rights and evidentiary

decisions discussed [in those claims is] together sufficient to undermine confidence in the result of [the]

defendant’s trial.’’ Beyond this conclusory statement,

the defendant merely cites to three federal cases in

support of this claim.

We observe that this claim is not adequately briefed

in that it consists of a legal assertion and is devoid of

any analysis of facts or law.17 Even if we were to consider this claim of cumulative error18 on its merits, we

would conclude that it lacks merit because we have

not concluded that any error exists with respect to the

claims previously addressed in this opinion.

The judgment is affirmed.

In this opinion the other judges concurred.

1 The defendant was charged with assault in the first degree in violation

of General Statutes § 53a-59 (a) (1). The jury returned a verdict of not guilty

with respect to that count, but found the defendant guilty of the lesser

included offense of assault in the second degree in violation of § 53a-60

(a) (2).

2 The court sentenced the defendant to a total effective term of incarceration of forty years, which includes a twenty year mandatory minimum sentence, followed by ten years of special parole.

3 Although the defendant refers to his rights under the state and federal

constitutions, he has not provided this court with an independent analysis

of his claim under the state constitution in accordance with State v. Geisler,

222 Conn. 672, 684–86, 610 A.2d 1225 (1992). Accordingly, we deem his state

constitutional claim abandoned. See, e.g., State v. Bennett, 324 Conn. 744,

748 n.1, 155 A.3d 188 (2017).

4 Alternatively, the defendant argues that reversal is warranted under

the plain error doctrine, codified in Practice Book § 60-5, which ‘‘is an

extraordinary remedy used by appellate courts to rectify errors committed

at trial that, although unpreserved [and nonconstitutional in nature], are of

such monumental proportion that they threaten to erode our system of

justice and work a serious and manifest injustice on the aggrieved party.’’

(Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Jamison, 320 Conn. 589, 595–96,

134 A.3d 560 (2016). In light of our conclusion that the present claim fails

on its merits under the bypass rule of Golding and that the court acted well

within its discretion by questioning the witnesses as it did to clarify the

testimony of both witnesses, the defendant cannot demonstrate that plain

error exists. Additionally, the defendant urges us to exercise our supervisory

authority to grant him relief. In light of our assessment of the court’s limited
and proper intervention in the presentation of evidence, we reject the defendant’s invocation of this rarely utilized doctrine. As our Supreme Court has

explained: ‘‘The exercise of our supervisory powers is an extraordinary

remedy to be invoked only when circumstances are such that the issue at

hand, while not rising to the level of a constitutional violation, is nonetheless

of utmost seriousness, not only for the integrity of a particular trial but also

for the perceived fairness of the judicial system as a whole.’’ (Emphasis

omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Lockhart, 298 Conn.

537, 576, 4 A.3d 1176 (2010).

5 To the extent that the defendant has attempted to raise a claim under

our state constitution, he has abandoned such claim by virtue of his failure

to provide this court with an independent analysis of it. See footnote 3 of

this opinion.

6

In the context of challenging the victim’s in-court identification under

Dickson, the defendant purports to raise ‘‘an additional ground of error’’

under Dickson with respect to Matos. Specifically, the defendant argues

that, despite the fact that there was no evidence that Matos had identified

the defendant previously, the court nonetheless ‘‘prompted’’ Matos to make

an in-court identification of the defendant. We have concluded in part I of

this opinion that the court’s inquiries of Matos were proper. Despite the fact

that the defendant challenges the court’s inquiries of Matos, he nonetheless

acknowledges that Matos never made an in-court identification of the defendant. Setting aside our concern that the defendant’s scant analysis of this

aspect of his unpreserved claim does not constitute adequate briefing, we

readily conclude that it fails under Golding’s third prong in light of the

undisputed fact that an in-court identification by Matos did not occur in

the present case.

7 To the extent that the defendant argues, in the alternative, that plain

error exists with respect to either aspect of the present claim under Dickson,

we conclude, in light of the reasons discussed in our Golding analysis, that

the defendant has failed to demonstrate that plain error exists. Additionally,

to the extent that the defendant requests extraordinary relief in terms of

the exercise of our supervisory authority, we conclude that our review of

the present claim does not reflect the existence of any infringement of the

defendant’s rights and does not give rise to any concerns that would warrant

the exercise of our supervisory authority.

8 The record reflects that, prior to this point in the trial, defense counsel

filed a motion in limine to preclude the state from introducing evidence

pertaining to the defendant’s criminal record. Therein, the defendant argued

that such evidence was ‘‘not probative as to any material issue in the present

case and is so highly prejudicial as to inflame the jury.’’

9 The court stated: ‘‘[T]his evidence that you’ve just heard is the defendant

was convicted in 2001 of felony charges. A felony is a crime for which a

person can be incarcerated for more than one year. The evidence of the

commission of a crime other than the one charge[d] is not admissible to

prove the guilt of the defendant in this particular case. The commission of

the other matters . . . by this defendant, has been admitted into evidence

for the sole purpose of affecting his credibility. You must weigh the testimony

and consider it along with all the other evidence in this case. You may

consider the convictions of the defendant only as they bear upon his credibility. And you should determine that credibility based on the same considerations you would give any other witness.’’

10 Defense counsel argued in relevant part: ‘‘[The defendant] admitted that

back in 2001, he was convicted of four felonies on the same date and time,

so they obviously were all a result of one incident, presumably. And I bring

your attention to that simply to alert you that the judge will tell you that

that information is admissible only on the question of [the defendant’s]

credibility. That is, you can’t use that information to say, well, if he’s been

convicted of a felony, some, now, fifteen years ago, therefore he’s guilty of

this felony. You can’t use that information in any way to draw that type of

conclusion. The only reason it’s admissible, and it was allowed here in court

today, is for your consideration as to whether or not it may affect his overall

credibility. That’s something for you to consider. But certainly you are not

to consider it with regards to whether or not he’s guilty of the crimes

charged here.’’

11 The court stated in relevant part: ‘‘In this case, evidence was introduced

to show that in 2001, the defendant was convicted of felony charges. A

felony is any crime for which a person may be incarcerated for more than

one year. Evidence of the commission of a crime, other than the one charged,

is not admissible to prove the guilt of the defendant in this particular case.
The commission of other matters by this defendant has been admitted into

evidence for the sole purpose [of] affecting his credibility. You must weigh

the testimony and consider it along with all the other evidence in the case.

You may consider the convictions of the defendant only as they bear upon

his credibility and you should determine that credibility upon the same

considerations as those given to any other witness.’’

12 At the time of oral argument before this court, the defendant’s appellate

counsel acknowledged that the defendant was released from confinement

in 2013 and that the date he was released from confinement was not insignificant in evaluating whether the convictions were admissible.

13 In his appellate brief, the defendant also argues that the court abused

its discretion in admitting the evidence because it was not authenticated.

Because, at the time of trial, the defendant expressly waived any objection

on the ground of authentication, we decline to review this aspect of his

claim. ‘‘We generally do not review unpreserved, waived claims. . . . To

reach a contrary conclusion would result in an ambush of the trial court

by permitting the defendant to raise a claim on appeal that his or her counsel

expressly had abandoned in the trial court.’’ (Citation omitted; internal

quotation marks omitted.) State v. Foster, 293 Conn. 327, 337, 977 A.2d

199 (2009).

To the extent that the defendant argues that the court erroneously relied

on the residual exception to the hearsay rule, we need not address this

aspect of his claim. Our conclusion that the court properly relied on the

spontaneous utterance exception is a sufficient basis on which to uphold

the court’s ruling that the statements at issue should not be excluded under

the hearsay rule.

14 To the extent that the defendant claims that plain error exists with

respect to this claim, we conclude, on the basis of our determination that

the court’s evidentiary ruling was a proper exercise of its discretion, that

plain error does not exist. Also, to the extent that the defendant claims that

the present claim warrants the exercise of our supervisory authority, we

conclude in light of our analysis of the court’s evidentiary ruling that such

a showing has not been made.

15 Additionally, the defendant argues that he had no reasonable ground

to anticipate the evidence, was unfairly surprised, and was unprepared to

meet it. The defendant does not explain why he had no reasonable ground

to anticipate the evidence, was unfairly surprised, or was unprepared to

meet it. Nor does he direct us to where in the record arguments of this

nature were raised before and addressed by the trial court.

16 Additionally, to the extent that the defendant argues before this court

that the evidence should have been excluded because its only purpose was

to bolster the victim’s credibility, we observe that such argument was not

advanced before the trial court and, in fact, the court stated in its ruling

that it was not admitting the evidence for the purpose of bolstering the

victim’s credibility.

17 ‘‘[W]e are not required to review claims that are inadequately briefed.

. . . We consistently have held that [a]nalysis, rather than mere abstract

assertion, is required in order to avoid abandoning an issue by failure to

brief the issue properly. . . . [F]or this court judiciously and efficiently to

consider claims of error raised on appeal . . . the parties must clearly and

fully set forth their arguments in their briefs. We do not reverse the judgment

of a trial court on the basis of challenges to its rulings that have not been

adequately briefed. . . . The parties may not merely cite a legal principle

without analyzing the relationship between the facts of the case and the

law cited.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Claudio C., 125

Conn. App. 588, 600, 11 A.3d 1086 (2010), cert. denied, 300 Conn. 910, 12

A.3d 1005 (2011).

18 The state argues that the federal cumulative error rule on which the

defendant relies is not legally cognizable in this state. Although we need

not reach the merits of this issue, we note that our Supreme Court recently

deemed it unnecessary to address a claim in which it was asked to adopt

the federal cumulative error rule. State v. Campbell, Conn. , ,

A.3d (2018).