IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT JACKSON

June 2000 Session

STATE OF TENNESSEE v. EUGENE A. TURNER

Appeal from the Criminal Court for McNairy County

No. 1160 Jon Kerry Blackwood, Judge

No. W1999-01866-CCA-R3-CD - Decided October 2, 2000

Defendant appeals his jury convictions on two counts of premeditated first degree murder for which

he received concurrent life sentences. The following issues are presented for our review: (1)

whether the evidence was sufficient to support the convictions; (2) whether the trial court erred in

disallowing impeachment evidence against a state witness; (3) whether the trial court erroneously

admitted evidence of defendant being a beneficiary of life insurance policies on one of the victims;

(4) whether the trial court erroneously admitted inflammatory evidence relating to the crime scene;

(5) whether the trial court erred in allowing evidence of alleged threats made by the defendant; (6)

whether the trial court erred in allowing evidence of a prior argument between the defendant and one

of the victims; and (7) whether the trial court erred in disallowing evidence of defendant's failure

to flee and avoid arrest. We affirm the judgments of the trial court. 

Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Criminal Court Affirmed.

JOE G.RILEY,J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which JOSEPH M. TIPTON and JOHN EVERETT

WILLIAMS, JJ., joined.

C. Michael Robbins, Memphis, Tennessee (on appeal), and Gary F. Antrican, District Public

Defender, Somerville, Tennessee (at trial), for the appellant, Eugene A. Turner. 

Paul G. Summers, Attorney General and Reporter; Kim R. Helper, Assistant Attorney General;

Elizabeth T. Rice, District Attorney General; James W. Freeland, Jr. and Jerry W. Norwood,

Assistant District Attorneys General, for the appellee, State of Tennessee. 

OPINION

Defendant was convicted by a McNairy County jury of the premeditated first degree murders

of his wife and stepdaughter, for which he received two concurrent life sentences. In this appeal as

of right, he presents the following issues:

(1) whether the evidence was sufficient to support the convictions; 
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(2) whether the trial court erred in disallowing impeachment

evidence against a state witness; 

(3) whether the trial court erroneously admitted evidence of

defendant being a beneficiary of life insurance policies on one

of the victims; 

(4) whether the trial court erroneously admitted inflammatory

evidence relating to the crime scene; 

(5) whether the trial court erred in allowing evidence of alleged

threats made by the defendant; 

(6) whether the trial court erred in allowing evidence of a prior

argument between the defendant and one of the victims; and

(7) whether the trial court erred in disallowing evidence of

defendant's failure to flee and avoid arrest. 

After a careful review of the record, we find no reversible error and affirm the judgments of the trial

court. 

FACTS

On December 3, 1997, at 12:41 a.m. the defendant placed a 911 call to the McNairy County

Sheriff’s Office. He told the dispatcher someone had broken into his home and shot his wife.

Officers later discovered the bodies of defendant’s wife and stepdaughter at the residence. Both had

been shot in the head with a .9mm handgun. The wife had multiple near gunshot wounds to the

head, and the stepdaughter had one near gunshot wound to the head. The family dog had also been

shot and killed. However, there was no evidence of forced entry into the mobile home and no

evidence of a struggle inside. 

Several witnesses testified that they saw the defendant with a .9mm handgun a few weeks

prior to the murder. Dewayne Scott testified that he loaned the defendant a .9mm Ruger

approximately six months prior to the murder, and the defendant never returned the weapon.

Analysis of the clothing defendant was wearing on the night of the murders revealed the presence

of gunpowder residue.

Additionally, two different individuals heard the defendant threaten to kill his wife prior to

the murders. One witness testified that the couple fought over the family dog on several occasions.

Approximately one week before the murder, the defendant stated that “if the dog gets put to sleep,

the whole damn family will get put to sleep.” Another witness testified that the defendant warned

his wife on two separate occasions that if she tried to leave him, he would kill her. Furthermore, the

couple’s babysitter stated that she witnessed a drunken altercation between the couple. She stated

the two were “fussing,” and the defendant placed an unloaded gun to his wife’s head and pulled the

trigger several times. 
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Thomas Kiracofe, the defendant’s cellmate, testified that the defendant told him he shot his

wife during an argument over the dog. Kiracofe stated defendant then told him that he shot his

stepdaughter because she was a witness to his wife’s murder. Kiracofe further testified that he and

the defendant planned to escape from prison. 

The defendant did not testify at trial but his statement to authorities was read to the jury. In

that statement the defendant stated that he had been out drinking on the night in question, did not

own a gun, and did not kill his wife and stepdaughter. Defendant also endeavored to show through

other witnesses that he was cooperative with authorities throughout the investigation and voluntarily

surrendered himself for questioning. 

The jury convicted the defendant of two counts of premeditated murder, and he received two

concurrent life sentences.

SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE

The defendant alleges the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction for first degree

murder. Specifically, the defendant claims the state failed to prove he was the perpetrator and further

failed to establish premeditation. We disagree.

A. Standard of Review

In Tennessee, great weight is given to the result reached by the jury in a criminal trial. A jury

verdict accredits the state's witnesses and resolves all conflicts in favor of the state. State v. Bigbee,

885 S.W.2d 797, 803 (Tenn. 1994). On appeal, the state is entitled to the strongest legitimate view

of the evidence and all reasonable inferences which may be drawn therefrom. Id.; State v. Cabbage,

571 S.W.2d 832, 835 (Tenn. 1978). Moreover, a guilty verdict removes the presumption of

innocence which the appellant enjoyed at trial and raises a presumption of guilt on appeal. State v.

Grace, 493 S.W.2d 474, 476 (Tenn. 1973). The appellant has the burden of overcoming this

presumption of guilt. Id.

Where sufficiency of the evidence is challenged, the relevant question for an appellate court

is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier

of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime or crimes beyond a reasonable doubt.

Tenn. R. App. P. 13(e); Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 2789, 61 L.Ed.2d 560

(1979); State v. Abrams, 935 S.W.2d 399, 401 (Tenn. 1996). The weight and credibility of the

witnesses' testimony are matters entrusted exclusively to the jury as the tries of fact. State v.

Sheffield, 676 S.W.2d 542, 547 (Tenn. 1984); State v. Brewer, 932 S.W.2d 1, 19 (Tenn. Crim. App.

1996).
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B. Premeditation

The applicable definition of first degree murder is, “[a] premeditated and intentional killing

of another.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-202(a)(1). Premeditation necessitates “a previously formed

design or intent to kill,” State v. West, 844 S.W.2d 144, 147 (Tenn. 1992)(citations omitted), and

“an act done after the exercise of reflection and judgment . . . [meaning] that the intent to kill must

have been formed prior to the act itself.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-202(d). It also requires that the

accused be “sufficiently free from excitement and passion as to be capable of premeditation.” Id.

Although the jury may not engage in speculation, it may infer premeditation from the manner

and circumstances of the killing. State v. Bland, 958 S.W.2d 651, 660 (Tenn. 1997); State v. Bordis,

905 S.W.2d 214, 222 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1995). Our Supreme Court delineated several

circumstances that may be indicative of premeditation, including declarations by the defendant of

an intent to kill, evidence of procurement of a weapon, the use of a deadly weapon upon an unarmed

victim, the fact that the killing was particularly cruel, the making of preparations before the killing

for the purpose of concealing the crime, and calmness immediately after the killing. See State v.

Nichols, ___S.W.3d___, ___ (Tenn. 2000); Bland, 958 S.W.2d at 660. 

C. Analysis

Viewing the evidence and the inferences therefrom in a light most favorable to the state, we

conclude the evidence is sufficient to sustain the jury’s finding of premeditation. Some of the

circumstances enumerated by the Supreme Court in Nichols are present in the instant case.

Several witness testified the defendant threatened to kill his wife prior to her murder. Ray

Lipford, the defendant’s neighbor, testified that on at least two occasions the defendant threatened

to kill his wife. He stated these altercations occurred about one month prior to her murder. Deborah

Floyd, a family friend, testified that the couple fought about the dog. She testified that about one

week prior to the murders, the defendant stated, “if the dog gets put to sleep, the whole damn family

will be put to sleep.” The evidence revealed that the dog was shot and killed by the defendant along

with the two victims. Thomas Kiracofe, the defendant’s former cellmate, testified the defendant told

him the couple argued over the dog and he shot his wife. Kiracofe stated that the defendant claimed

he then shot his stepdaughter because she had witnessed her mother’s murder. 

Testimonial evidence revealed the defendant possessed a .9mm handgun. Dewayne Scott

testified that he loaned the defendant his .9mm Ruger handgun about six months prior to the

murders, and both Smith and Lipford testified that they had seen the defendant in possession of the

weapon less than a month before the murders. Additionally, Wanda Cobb testified that she observed

the defendant aim an unloaded gun at the victim’s head and pull the trigger. Testimony from crime

scene investigators revealed that neither victim was armed, and there was no sign of forced entry into

the mobile home or any sign of a struggle on the interior. Furthermore, analysis of the clothing worn

by the defendant revealed the presence of gunpowder residue. 
1

This issue was addressed in the trial court and in the briefs in this court under Tenn. R. Evid. 613(b). The

parties have not ad dressed the admissibility of this evidence under Tenn. R. Evid. 404(b) or 616. Likewise, we do not

(continued ...)

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Finally, in addition to taking steps to destroy evidence of his crime, the defendant exhibited

calmness immediately after the killing. He called his brother and told him that he was leaving for

Louisiana to visit another brother, and asked him to check on his family the next day. Furthermore,

he drove to a local gas station and obtained a receipt for cigarettes in order to establish a purported

alibi. He then changed his clothes and called 911. The officers who arrived on the scene stated that

once the defendant was placed in the patrol car, he fell asleep. 

We conclude there was ample evidence to support defendant’s convictions. This issue is

without merit. 

IMPEACHMENT EVIDENCE

The defendant argues the trial court erred in sustaining the state’s objection to the

introduction of extrinsic evidence to impeach Thomas Kiracofe. He claims the proper foundation

was laid under Tenn. R. Evid. 613 (b).

On cross-examination of Thomas Kirakofe, defense counsel asked the witness if he ever

asked Steven Barker to “go with him and snitch,” in order to get a “time cut”. Kirakofe replied that

he did not. To rebut Kiracofe’s assertion, the defendant sought to introduce the testimony of Steven

Barker. Barker’s proffered testimony involved an alleged incident in which Kirakofe requested

Barker “snitch” on another inmate so that Kirakofe could receive a reduction in his federal sentence.

The state objected to this testimony, arguing Kirakofe had not been given ample opportunity to admit

or deny making the statements. Therefore, the state argued the defense failed to lay a proper

foundation for extrinsic impeachment evidence under Tenn. R. Evid. 613(b). The objection was

sustained as to the specific statements regarding this incident, but the trial court stressed that defense

counsel was free to inquire into Kiracofe’s reputation for truth and veracity. 

The trial court erred in disallowing Barker’s testimony about Kiracofe’s request that he aid

him in obtaining a sentence reduction by “snitching” on a fellow inmate. The defendant laid a proper

foundation for this inquiry, and Kiracofe had an opportunity to admit or deny the statement. Once

Kiracofe denied asking Barker to corroborate his story so that he could receive a sentence reduction,

the defendant should have been given an opportunity to introduce Barker’s testimony to impeach

Kiracofe. However, we find that this error is harmless. 

Barker was allowed to testify that Kiracofe told him about sentence reductions based on

cooperation with the prosecuting authorities. Barker was also allowed to testify about Kiracofe’s

reputation for truthfulness and responded by testifying that Kiracofe was a “liar” and a "lying snitch."

In light of this testimony, the thorough cross-examination of Kiracofe and the overwhelming

evidence of guilt, the error was harmless. See Tenn. R. App. P. 36(b).1
1

(...continued)

address the admissib ility of the evidenc e under thes e two rules. H owever, if the trial c ourt erred in refusing to admit this

evidence under these rules, we con clude the err or would b e harmless fo r the same rea sons stated a bove. 

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LIFE INSURANCE

The defendant contends the trial court erred in allowing the wife's mother to testify about two

insurance polies in which the defendant had a financial stake. He argues that there was no evidence

presented to demonstrate that he had knowledge of these policies. Thus, he claims this evidence did

not relate to motive and, therefore, was irrelevant under Tenn. R. Evid. 401. In addition, he claims

the prejudice resulting from the admission of this evidence outweighed any probative value it might

have. See Tenn. R. Evid. 403. 

Betty Smith testified that there was a credit life insurance policy on her daughter relating to

the mobile home she and the defendant co-owned. In addition, she stated her daughter had a life

insurance policy of $42,000 naming the defendant as primary beneficiary. However, on crossexamination she admitted she did not know whether or not the defendant was aware either policy

existed, and stated the defendant had made no claim on either policy. 

Tenn. R. Evid. 401 states that evidence is relevant if it “tends to make the existence of any

fact of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would

be without the evidence.” The existence of life insurance can certainly be relevant to prove motive.

See State v. Stephenson, 878 S.W.2d 530, 541 (Tenn. 1994). In Stephenson, however, there was

proof the defendant knew about the policy and offered the amount of the policy as payment for

killing the victim. Id. In the instant case the state failed to show the defendant was motivated by

financial gain. In fact, this appears to be contrary to the state’s theory that the defendant simply

carried out his previous threats to kill his wife for reasons unrelated to money. 

The testimony regarding the life insurance policies was brief. In light of the extensive

evidence introduced against the defendant, we find this error to be harmless. See Tenn. R. App. P.

36(b). 

CRIME SCENE EVIDENCE

The defendant alleges the trial court abused its discretion by allowing the state’s forensic

pathologist, Dr. Smith, and T.B.I. Agent Romanek to describe crime scene photographs of the

victims. He argues this evidence was cumulative and prejudicial. Furthermore, the defendant argues

the trial court erred by allowing the jury to view the video of the crime scene.

A. Description of Photographs

Although the photographs were not introduced, the defendant argues the descriptions of the

photographs by Dr. Smith and Agent Romanek were irrelevant and just as prejudicial as the
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photographs.The defendant asserts Dr. Smith was allowed to give his opinion about cause of death

and the type of injuries suffered. Thus, he argues the descriptions of the blood splatters and

gruesome details of the wounds were unnecessary and highly inflammatory. Additionally, the

defendant claims Agent Romanek could have described the position of the bodies without further

details about the “gruesome scene.”

The admissibility of photographs lies within the sound discretion of the trial court whose

ruling will not be overturned on appeal except upon a clear showing of an abuse of discretion. State

v. Banks, 564 S.W.2d 947, 949 (Tenn. 1978); State v. Lacy, 983 S.W.2d 686, 694 (Tenn. Crim. App.

1997). We conclude testimony describing crime scene photos should be analyzed under this same

standard. Nevertheless, the testimony must be relevant to an issue at trial with its probative value

outweighing any prejudicial effect that it may have upon the trier of fact. State v. Braden, 867

S.W.2d 750, 758 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1993). Relevant evidence is evidence “having any tendency

to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more

probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence.” Tenn. R. Evid. 401.

The testimony about the photographswas necessaryto corroborate the medical testimony and

to give the jury a proper description of the crime scene. The description given by Dr. Smith was

elicited in the context of corroboration for his medical conclusions. In addition, Agent Romanek

gave only a brief description with regard to the location of the wife's body. Thus, we conclude the

trial court did not abuse its discretion in allowing Dr. Smith and Agent Romanek to discuss the

content of the photographs. 

B. Videotape

The defendant argues the videotape of the crime scene depicting the stepdaughter’s body was

particularly gruesome and inflammatory. The video was edited as to the wife, but did not exclude

the stepdaughter. The defendant argues both victims should have been excluded. Additionally, he

argues the video was needlessly cumulative. He contends the medical testimony and the testimony

of crime scene investigators was sufficient to depict the injuries to the victims, placement of the

bodies, and the condition of the crime scene.

At trial, a color videotape of the crime scene was shown to the jury. Upon defendant’s

objection, the court ordered all images of the wife be edited out of the video. However, the court

found the images of the stepdaughter “were not so gruesome as to substantially outweigh their

relevance.” The video showed the exterior and interior of the mobile home, including images of her

body as she was found by investigators.

The admissibility of a videotape of the crime scene is within the sound discretion of the trial

court, and we will not overturn its ruling on the admissibility of this evidence without a clear

showing of abuse of that discretion. State v. Hall, 976 S.W.2d 121, 151 (Tenn. 1998); State v.

Bigbee, 885 S.W.2d 797, 807 (Tenn. 1994). 
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The defense claimed someone broke into his house and committed the murders. Therefore,

the state argues the video was probative because it showed there was no sign of forced entry into

the dwelling and no sign of a struggle within the dwelling. We agree that the video is relevant to the

issues of identification and premeditation. In addition, the video aided the jury in understanding the

testimony of medical examiners and crime scene investigators. Furthermore, the portion of the video

depicting the stepdaughter was brief and was merely shown to document the position of the body

in relation to the bullet path and the shell casings that were found at the scene. Furthermore, our

review of the video does not reveal that it was inflammatory. Thus, we conclude the probative value

of the video is not outweighed by its prejudicial effect. The trial court did not abuse its discretion

in allowing the edited video to be shown to the jury. 

THREATS

The defendant contends the testimony of Ray Lipford and Debbie Floyd regarding threats

allegedly made prior to the murders was irrelevant and should have been excluded. He argues the

threats were conditional, and the state did not present evidence that the conditions were ever

satisfied. Therefore, he claims the testimony was not relevant to prove motive or state of mind. 

 In State v. Smith, 868 S.W.2d 561 (Tenn. 1993), the Tennessee Supreme Court held that

evidence of a defendant's prior acts of violence and threats against the victim is admissible under

Tenn. R. Evid. 404(b) in a murder case because the prior bad acts are relevant to showing the

defendant's hostility toward the victim, the settled purpose to harm the victim, and the intent and

motive for the killing. Id. at 574. Declarations of an intent to kill are particularly relevant to

establishing premeditation. State v. Pike, 978 S.W.2d 904, 914 (Tenn. 1998). Furthermore,

evidence of a threat is relevant and admissible even though the threat is conditional in form. 1

Wharton’s Criminal Evidence § 141 (14th ed. 1985).

It is immaterial whether the condition is in such form that the victim can avoid the

threatened harm by refraining from doing a specified act, or that the victim must do

a specified act in order to avoid the harm. Thus, a conditional threat is admissible

without regard to whether the victim did or did not do the act specified in the

condition. 

Id. 

Like the analysis required under Tenn. R. Evid. 403, the trial court must weigh, under Rule

404(b)(3), the probative value of the evidence against the danger of unfair prejudice. However, the

test for making such a determination is more stringent under Rule 404 than under Rule 403. State

v. DuBose, 953 S.W.2d 649, 654 (Tenn. 1997). Nevertheless, a trial court’s determination pursuant

to Rule 404(b) will not be overturned on appeal absent an abuse of discretion. State v. Vann, 976

S.W.2d 93, 102 (Tenn. 1998).

A. Ray Lipford
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Ray Lipford, the defendant’s neighbor, testified that on two different occasions he heard the

defendant warn the victim that if she ever tried to leave him, he would kill her. He stated the

incidents happened approximately three months prior to the murders. The trial court held the

evidence was relevant to motive and the defendant’s state of mind.

The issue of motive and the defendant’s state of mind were critical to proving premeditation,

a required element of the charged offense. We conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion

in allowing this testimony.

B. Debbie Floyd

Debbie Floyd, a friend of the wife, testified that the defendant stated that, “if the dog gets put

to sleep, the whole damn family gets put to sleep.” Again, the trial court allowed the evidence as

proof of motive and to demonstrate the defendant’s state of mind. 

The defendant argues this is a conditional statement, and there is no evidence the condition

was fulfilled. The evidence revealed the dog was killed by the defendant along with the two victims.

Thus, the statement by the defendant that the family would be put to sleep if the dog was put to sleep

has direct correlation to the murders. Therefore, we conclude the trial court did not abuse its

discretion in allowing the jury to hear this testimony. 

REMOTENESS OF PRIOR CONFRONTATION

The defendant asserts the trial court erred in allowing Wanda Cobb to testify about an

incident she witnessed one year prior to the murder. He argues the incident was so removed in

temporal proximity to the murders as to make any relevance it might have with regard to motive or

intent too remote; thus, its prejudicial effect outweighed its probative value.

Wanda Cobb cared for the stepdaughter when the couple was out of town or at work. At

trial, she testified that approximately one year prior to the murders, she witnessed the defendant and

victim in a drunken argument. She stated the defendant pointed an unloaded gun at his wife’s head

and pulled the trigger several times. The trial court found this evidence was relevant and further

found the probative value of the evidence was not outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. 

Although evidence may appear to be relevant, it may relate to a time so remote from the date

of the alleged crime that it ceases to have probative value. 1 Wharton’s Criminal Evidence § 92

(14th ed. 1985). No rigid rule can be stated to determine when the time interval is so great that a

given fact has no probative value. Id. However, objections to remoteness are ordinarily regarded

as affecting the weight and not the admissibility of the evidence. Smith, 868 S.W.2d at 575; see also

41 C.J.S. Homicide § 204(d) (1991). 

The incident occurred approximately one year before the murders. However, “threats, even

though remote, are competent when it appears that they were repeated from time to time, or the

hostility continued, until shortly before the commission of the offense alleged.” 41 C.J.S. Homicide
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§ 204(d) (1991). Here, two other witnesses testified they heard the defendant threaten to kill his wife

shortly before the murder. Lipford testified the defendant threatened the victim one month prior to

the murders, and Floyd testified that she heard the defendant threaten the victim the week before the

murders. Therefore, we conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion by allowing Cobb’s

testimony.

FAILURE TO FLEE

The defendant argues he should have been allowed to rebut Thomas Kiracofe’s testimony

that he and defendant intended to escape. He claims the state attempted to introduce evidence that

he had a “consciousness of guilt,” and he should have been allowed to challenge that assertion. 

At trial, the defendant sought to introduce testimony from Agent McLean of the T.B.I. that

the defendant was not arrested until approximately two months after the murders, and that he

voluntarily surrendered. He claimed this testimony negated Kirakofe’s assertion that he intended

to escape. The state objected and the trial court held that the defendant could establish that he was

cooperative and that he did not flee the jurisdiction. However, the trial court held that the length of

time between the event and arrest was irrelevant and, therefore, disallowed testimony regarding the

actual date of defendant’s arrest. 

We conclude that the failure of the defendant to flee for the two months prior to his arrest

was relevant in light of the state’s evidence. However, the defendant was given ample opportunity

to establish that he was cooperative during the investigation, and that he did not attempt to flee the

jurisdiction prior to his arrest. The fact that the jury was unaware that the actual time between the

crime and defendant’s arrest was two months did not prejudice the defendant. We, therefore,

conclude the error was harmless. See Tenn. R. App. P. 36(b). 

CONCLUSION

In summary, we conclude:

(1) the evidence was sufficient to sustain the defendant’s

convictions for premeditated murder; 

(2) the trial court’s error in disallowing the defendant to present

impeachment evidence against a state witness was harmless;

(3) the trial court’s error in admitting evidence pertaining to life

insurance policies was harmless;

(4) the crime scene evidence was properly admitted;

(5) the evidence of alleged threats made by the defendant against

his wife was properly admitted;

(6) the evidence of a prior violent argument between the

defendant and his wife was properly admitted; and 

(7) the trial court did not commit reversible error by limiting the

defendant’s testimony regarding the date of his arrest.
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Thus, we AFFIRM the defendant’s convictions for premeditated first degree murder. 

___________________________________ 

JOE G. RILEY, JUDGE