### IN THE COURT OF CRIMI NAL AP PEALS OF TENNES SEE AT NAS HVILLE A ugus t 9, 200 5 S es sio n

STA TE OF TEN NES SEE v. MIC HAE L D EAN BA UGH

Direc t Appeal from the Circ uit Court for Bedf ord County No. 15535 Lee R ussell, Ju dge

No. M2004- 02796-CCA -R3-C D - F iled October 13, 2005

The a ppellant, Michae l Dean B aug h, was c onvicted by a B edfor d Countyjury

of burg lary and thef

t of property under $500. He was sentenc ed as a multipl e off ender to seven (7) y ear s, six (6) months for the bur g lary

conviction and eleve n (11) months, twe nty -nine (29) day s for the theft c onviction. The trial c ourt order ed the se ntence s to be serve d consec utively

. After the denial of a motion for new tr ia l, this app e a l e ns ue d. On app e a l, t he app ell ant arg ue s th a t th e e vid e nc e wa s in su ff ic ie nt t o
c on vic t hi m of

the c ha rg e s a g a ins t hi m a ndthat hi s se nte nc e is e xce ssi ve

. F or the fo llo wi ng re a so ns , we a ffirm the judg ment of the trial c ourt.
Tenn. R. App . P . 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgme nt of th e Trial Court Affirm ed

J ER R Y L. S MI TH , J ., delivere d the opinion of the court, in which, D AVI D G. H A Y ES and J AM ES C UR WO OD W I TT , J R ., J J ., joined.

An dr e w Ja c ks on De ari ng , I I I , Ass ist a nt Pub lic De fe nd e r, She lby vil le , T e nn e sse e , f or the app e lla nt, Michae l Dean B aug h.
Paul G. Summers, Attorney Gene ral a nd Reporter ; Seth P. K e s tn e r , A ssistant Attorney Gene ral;Mike McCown, District Attorney Gene ral; and Micha el D. Randles a n d Ann Filer , Assistant District Attorney s Gene ral, for

the appe llee, State of Te nnessee

.

OP IN ION

Wil liam C. Hay nes, a resident of Shelby ville, Tenne ssee, owned a rental house located at 103 Hopson Avenue in Shelby ville. I n Marc h of 2004, Mr. Ha y nes wa s renova ting the house to prepa re it for re ntal. Mr. Haynes wa s doing most of the work by himself, though he had one (1) helper who ha d wor ke d with him fo r ap pr oxima te ly te n (10 ) y e ars . M r. Ha y ne s o wn e d mo st o f h is o wn too ls, including a n air c ompressor a nd a y el l o w work lig ht on a stand. He kept the tools inside the residenc e while he was doing the re novations. Mr Haynes wa s approa ched by the appellant at the

re nta l ho us e aro un d M arc h 1 1, 20 04

. Th e app e lla nt sh ow e d up a t the re nta l ho us e , s pe nt s ome tim e-2-

looking a round, and asked if Mr. Hay nes had a ny work for him. Mr. Hay nes off

ere d to employ

the appellant a t a diffe rent job site wher e the a ppellant would be r equire d to fill in a ditch with soil . The appellant turne d down the job af ter Mr. H ay nes took the appe llant to the job s i t e. T he appe llant claimed tha t h e d id n o t w a n t th e jo b b e c a u s e th e d irt w a s to o h e a v y

. M r

. H a y n e s d r o pped the appellant of

f at his apartment and returned to the rental house t o complete his work for the day

. A fe w day s late r, on Ma

rc h 1 3, 20 04 , M r. Ha y ne s a rrive d a t th e re nta l ho us e to f indthat hi s a ir compre ssor and work light wer e missing from inside the house. Mr. Haynes immediately notified the Shelby ville Poli ce D epartment.

On the nig ht of Ma

rc h 1 4, the She lby vil le Pol ic e De pa rt me nt r e c e ive d a

91 1 te le ph on e c a ll from Cy nthia Rankins, the appellant’ s g irlfriend. The appellant lived with Ms. Rankins at t he time. The police arrived at Ms. Rankin and the a ppellant’s re sidence and discove red the air c ompressor and wor k light. Ms. Rankins informed the police that the items were broug ht into the house on Fr iday night, a nd that the appe llant told her that he ha d boug ht the items from someone.

The a ppellant was a

rre sted in connec tion with the stol en items. After being rea d his Miranda ri g hts , th e appell a nt t oldthe po lic e thr e e (3 ) d if fe re nt s torie s d e ta ili ng ho w h e c a me to b e in po sse ssi on of

the sto le n it e ms. At

fi rs t, the app e lla nt c la ime d that he receive d th e ite ms f ro m a f r i e n d
, t h e n t h e ap p e l l a n t t o l d t h e p o l i c e h e p u r c h a s e d t h e i t e m s f r o m a m a n n a m e d “ J o h n

. ” F i n a l l y, the appe llant claimed that he g ot the i tems from a ma n he did not even know . I n one ver sion of the story , the appe llant claimed that he pur chase d the items for twe nty ($20) dollar s.

The a ppellant was indicte d by

the B edfor d CountyGra nd J ury for bur gl ar y an d theft of pr op e rt y un de r $ 50 0. F oll ow ing a jury tr ia l, the app e lla nt w a s c on vic te d o f b oth bu rg lary a ndthe ft

. The trial c ourt sentenc ed the a ppellant to seven ( 7) y ear s, six (6) months for the burg lary conviction

a s a mul tip le of

fe nd e r a nde le ve n ( 11 ) m on ths a ndtw e nty -n ine (2 9) da y s f or the the ft

of pr op e rt y conviction. The tria l court orde red the sentenc es to be ser ved conse cutively

. Subsequently , the appe llant filed a motion for ne w trial whic h wa s denied. The appellant filed a timely

notice of a

ppeal. On a

ppeal, the appellant challeng es t he suff iciency of the e vidence and his sentenc e.

Sufficienc y of the Evidenc e

The a ppellant first conte nds that the weig ht of the evide nce w as aga inst the verdict and tha t the circ umstantial evidence did not ex clude e very other re asonable hypothesis. The State counte rs that th e re c or d d e mon str a te s th a t th e e vid e nc e wa s le g a lly su ff ic ie nt t o c on vic t th e app e lla nt o f b oth burg lary and thef t.

When a def

endant challeng es the sufficie ncy of the evidenc e, this Court is oblig ed to re view that claim ac cor d i ng to certain well-settled pr inciples. A ver dict of g uilty , rende red by a jury and

“ ap p r o v e d b y t h e t r i a l j u d g e , a c c r e d i t s t h e t e s t i m o n y o f t h e ” S t a t e ’ s w i t n e s s e s a n d re so lve s a ll conflicts in the testimony

in favor of

the State. S tate v. Cazes, 875 S.W .2d 253, 259 (Tenn. 1994) ;-3-

State v. Har

ris, 839 S.W .2d 54, 75 (Tenn. 1992). Thus, althoug h the accused is originally cloake d with a pre sumption of innocence , the jury verdic t of guilty remove s this presumption “and r eplac es it with one of g uilt.” State v. Tug g le, 639 S.W.2d 913, 914 (Tenn. 1982). H en ce , o n appea l, the burden of proof r ests with the defe ndant to demonstrate the insufficienc y of the c onvicting e vidence

. I d. Th e re le va nt q ue sti on the re vie wi ng c ou rt mus t a ns we r i s w he the r a ny ratio na l trie r o f f

a c t c ou ld have f ound the ac cused g uiltyof eve ry element of

the offe nse bey ond a reasonable doubt. See Tenn. R. App. P. 13(e ); Har

ris, 839 S.W .2d at 75. I n making this decision, we ar e to ac cord the State “the strong est leg itimate view of the e vidence as well as a ll reasona ble and leg itimate infere nces tha t may be dra wn there from.” See Tug g le, 639 S.W.2d at 914. As s uch, this Court is precluded from reweig hing or

rec onsidering the evidenc e when evalua ting the convicting proof. State v. Morg an, 929 S.W. 2d38 0, 38 3 (T e nn . Crim . App . 199 6) ; Stat e v. Ma tth e ws , 805 S.W. 2d 77 6, 77 9 (T e nn . Crim. App. 1990). More over, w e may not substit ute our own “infe renc es for those draw n by the trier of fac t from circ umstantial evidence .” Matthew s, 805 S.W .2d at 779.

F urthe r, a c on vic tio n may

be ba se d e nti re ly

on c ir c ums ta nti a l e vid e nc e wh e n th e fa c ts a re “ so clea rly interwove n and conne cted that the fing er of g uilt is pointed unerringly at the defe ndant and the def endant a lone.” State v. Smith, 868 S.W .2d 561, 569 (Tenn. 1993) (quoting State v. Dunca n, 698 S.W .2d 63, 67 (Tenn. 1985) ). I f the trier of fa ct ca n determin e fr o m t h e proof that all other

rea sonable theories except that of g uilt are e x cluded, the e vidence is sufficient.

I n the ca se herein, t he appellant was convicted of burg lary and thef t of property

under $500. B u r g l ar y o c c u r s w h e n a

p e r s o n , “ w i t h o u tt h e e f

f e c t i v e c o n s e n to f

t h e p r o p e r t y

o w n e r : ( 1) e nte rs a building other

than a ha bitation not open to the public with the intent to commit a fe lony
, t h ef t or
a ssa ult ; . . . [or ] (3 ) e nte rs a

bu ild ing a ndc omm its or a tte mpt s to c omm it a fe lon y , the ft or a ssa ult

. . . . Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-14-402. I n order to convict the appe llant of burg lary , the State is not

re qu ir e d to of

fe r a wi tne ss w ho a c tua lly

sa w the app e lla nt br e a k an d en te r the bu rg lari zedpr e mis e s. Ramsey v. State, 571 S.W .2d 822, 824 (Tenn. 1978) . Further, unsatisfa ctorily explained possession of re cently

stolen property

may be suf fi ci en t i n and of itself to sustain a bur g lary conviction. See State v. J ones, 901 S.W.2d 393 (Tenn. 1995) (determining that evidenc e was sufficie nt to convict the de fe nd a nt of bu rg lary wh e re the de fe nd a nt wa s f ou ndin p os se ssi on of

a VC R w ra pp e d in a wh ite g arb a g e ba g sh ortly

a ft e r h ome ow ne r d isc ov e re d b oth the ba g a ndthe VC R mis sin g fr om his condominium where a patio door ha d been broken and the defendant’s roommate i nformed police that the def

endant did not own the VCR).

Theft of property is c ommitt ed when a person “knowing ly obtains or exercises c ontrol over the prope rty

of anothe r without the o wn er ’s eff ective c onsent” a nd with the “intent to deprive the

owner of the prope rty .” Te nn. Code Ann. § 39-14- 103.

We d e te rm ine that th e e vid e nc e he re in wa s su ff ic ie nt t o s up po rt

the app e lla nt’ s c on vic tio ns

. The testimony

est ab l i s hed that the a

ppellant visited Mr. Haynes’s re ntal property to inquire about a job ar ound the time of the bu rgl ar y

. The a ir compre ssor and lig ht stand were kept inside the residenc e that the a

ppellant visited. I n other words, in order to g ain possession of the lig ht stand and air c ompressor, the a

ppellant would have had to bre ak into the re sidence . The a ppellant was f

ound-4-

in p os se ssi on of

the sto le n a ir

c omp re sso r a ndlig ht s ta nda fe w d a y s late r. Whe n ask e d to e xpla in how he c ame into possession of the items, the appe llant presente d three (3) c onflicting stories. The evidenc e, as pr esente d, points t h e fi n ger of g uilt unerring ly

at the appe llant. The jury could have pr op e rl y inf e rr e d th a t th e app e lla nt w a s g uil ty of bo th bur g lary a nd the ft of pr op e rt y

. Th is issu e is without merit.
Sentencing
Next, the appellant complains the he should have been g rante d an alternative sente nce a nd that the trial cou rt err ed by running the sentenc es for the burg lary

and thef

t convictions

consec utively . The only

arg ument the appe llant advanc es is that the sentenc es “should have been

run concur

rently to e ach other since the Bur g lary and Theft wer e out of a c ommon scheme, de sign,

a ndc ri min a l e pis od e .” Th e Sta te re sp on ds that th e tr ia l c ou rt c or re c tly se nte nc e d th e app e lla nt.

“When re viewing sentenc ing issues . . . , the appellate court shall conduc t a de novo r eview on the re cord of

such issues. Such re view shall be c onducted with a pr esumption that the deter minations made by the court from which the a ppeal is take n are corr ect.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-401( d). “Howe ver, the presumption of corr ectne ss w hich acc ompanies the trial court’s a ction is conditioned upon the aff irmative showing in the rec ord that the trial co u rt consi dere d the sentenc ing principles and a ll releva nt fac ts and cir cumstance s.” State v. Ashby , 823 S.W .2d 166, 169 (Tenn. 1991) . I n conducting our re view, we must consider the de fenda nt’s potential for reha bilitation, t he trial a nd sentenc ing he aring evidence, the pr e-se ntence report, the sentenc ing principles, sente ncing alternative arg uments, the nature and cha rac ter of the offe nse, the e nhancing and mitiga ting factors, and the def endant’ s statements. Tenn. Code A nn. §§ 40-35-103( 5) & -210(b) ; Ashby , 823 S.W .2d at 169. We are to also rec og nize that the defe ndant bea rs “t h e b u rden of demonstrating that the sentenc e is improper.” Ashby , 823 S.W .2d at 169.
Turning more specific ally to the fac ts of this case, the de fenda nt was convic ted of burg lary and theft of property

. Since burglary is a C lass D felony
, the rang e of punishment is not less than tw o ( 2) no r m or e tha n tw e lve (1 2) y e ars . T e nn . Co de An n. § 4 0- 35 -1 11 . U nd isp uta bly , th is defe ndant was a

Rang e I I offe nder; thus, the rang e of punishment f or the appe llant was not less than four ( 4) nor more than eig ht (8) y ear s. The trial c o u rt should consider, but is not bound by , the advisory sen t en cing g uidelines, which sug g est that “the minimum sentence within the rang e of punishment is the sentence which should be imposed bec ause the g ener al assembly set the minimum le ng th o f s e nte nc e fo r e a c h fe lon y c la ss to re fl e c t the re la tiv e se ri ou sn e ss o f e a c h c ri min a l of fe ns e in the felony

classifications.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 40- 35-210(c )(1)

.

I n balanc ing these concerns, a trial court should start a t the presumptive sente nce, e nhance the se nte nc e wi thi n th e ra ng e fo r e xistin g e nh a nc e me nt f a c tor s, a ndthe n r e du c e the se nte nc e wi thi n the ra ng e for

exis ting mitigating f

actor s. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-210( e). No particular weig ht fo r e a c h f a c tor is p re sc ri be d b y

the statut e . Se e Sta te v. Sa nti a g o, 91 4 S. W.2 d 11 6, 12 5 (T e nn . Crim. Ap p. 19 95 ). Th e we ig ht g ive n to ea c h fa c tor is le ft to the dis c re tio n of the tr ia l cou rt a s lo ng a s it-5-

comports with the sentenc ing principles and purp o s es o f o ur code and as long as its findings a re supported by

the re cord. I d.

I n reg ards t o a lt e rn a

ti v e s e n te n c in g T e n n e s s e e Co d e A n n o ta te d s e c tion 40- 35-102(5) provides

a s f oll ow s:

I n rec og nition that state prison capa cities and the f unds to build and maintain them

are limit ed, convic ted fe lons comm i t t i n g the most severe offe nses, possessing criminal histories evincing a clea r disreg ard for the la ws and mora ls of society , and evincing failure of past ef forts at reha

bilitation shall be g iven first priority reg arding sentenc ing involving incar cer ation.

A def endant who doe s no t fa l l within this class of of fende rs “a nd who is an espe cially mitigated of fe nd e r o r s ta nd ard of

fe nd e r c on vic te d of a Cla ss C, D, or E f e lon y is p re su me d to be a

fa vo ra ble candidate for a lternative se ntencing in the absenc e of evidenc e to the contra ry .” Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-102( 6). F urthermor e, unless sufficie nt e vidence rebuts the pr esumption, “[t] he trial c ourt must presume that a defenda nt sentenc ed to eig ht y ear s or l ess i s an offender for whom inca rce ration

wo uldre su lt i n suc c e ssf

ul re ha bil ita tio n .

. . .” Sta te v. B yrd , 8 61 S.W. 2d37 7, 37 9- 80 (T e nn . Crim. App. 1993); see also Tenn. Code A nn. § 40-35-303( a). T h e ap pellant her ein was c onvicted of burg lary , a Class D felony

. Thus, as a Rang e I I , multipl e off ender , the appe llant was not presume d

e lig ibl e fo r a lte rn a tiv e se nti nc ing . Se e Te nn . Co de An n. § 4 0- 35 -10 2(b ). Ev e n if a de fe nd a nt i s presumed to be a fa vorable candida te for alternative sentenc ing under Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-35- 102(6), the sta tutory presumption of an a lternative se ntence may be over come if :

(A) Confine ment is nece ssary to protect socie ty

by restra ining a defe ndant who has

a lon g his tory

of c ri min a l c on du c t; (B ) Confinement is nece ssary to avoid deprecia ting the se riousness of the of fense or
c on fi ne me nt i s p art ic ula

rl y su ite d to pr ov ide a n e ff

e c tiv e de te rr e nc e to o the rs lik e ly to commit si milar offe nses; or (C) Mea sures less re strictive than conf i nement have fre quently

or re cently

been applied unsucc essfully

to the defe ndant . . . .

Tenn. Code Ann. § 40- 35-103(1) (A)- (C). I n choosing among possible sentencing alternatives, the tr ia l cou rt sh ou ld a lso c on sid e r T e nn e sse e Cod e An no ta te d s e c tio n 4 0- 35 -1 03 (5 ), wh ic h s ta te s, in pertinent pa

rt, “[t] he potential or la ck of pote ntial for the reha bilitation or treatment of a de fenda nt should be consider ed in determining the se ntence al t ernative or leng th of a term to be imposed.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-103( 5); State v. Dowdy , 894 S.W .2d 301, 305 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1994)

. The trial c ourt may

consider a

defe ndant’s untruthfulness a nd lack of candor as they

rela te to the potential for r ehabilitation. See State v. Nunley , 22 S.W .3d 282, 289 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1999) ; see also State v. Bunc h, 646 S.W .2d 158, 160-61 (Te nn. 1983); State v. Z eolia, 928 S.W.2d 457, 463 ( T e n n

. C r i m

. A p p

. 1 9 9 6 ) ; S t a t e v

. W i l l i a m s o n , 9 1 9 S

. W

. 2 d 6 9
, 8 4 ( T e n n

. C r i m

. A p p

. 1 9 9 5 ) ; D o w d y, 894 S.W .2d at 305-06.T h e trial o f t h e c a se he re in o c c u rr e d w h e n the law in T e n n e sse e w a s still u n se ttl e d a s to th e e ff e c t t h a t B la k e ly 1

v

. W a sh ing to n , 5 4 2 U .S

. 2 9 6 (2 0 0 4 ), h a d o n the a p p lica tio n o f e n h a n c e m e n t a n d m iti g a ting fac to rs b y the tria l c o u rt. I n a r at her un i que a nd un conve nt i onal m ann er , t he t r i al co ur t her ei n conduct ed a se para t e hear i ng af t er t he appel l ant was

con v i ct ed an d al l owe d t h e j u r y t o h ea r ev i den ce a n d de t er mi n e wh et h er s ev er al of t h e en h an ce men t f ac t or s a r g u ed by
t h e St at e s h ou l d be a ppl i ed. T h e j u r y det er mi n ed t h at t h e t wo ( 2) en h an ce men t f ac t or s pr es en t ed by t h e St at e appl i ed. T he t r i al cour t us ed t he enh anc ement f act ors as det er mi ned by t he j ur y i n addi t i on t o t he appel l ant ’ s pre vi ous cr i mi nal hi st o ry t o enhance t he ap p el l ant ’ s sent ence. T he ap p el l ant do es not chal l enge t he ap p l i cat i o n o f t he enhancem ent f act o rs

o r t he met h od by wh i ch t h ei r ex i s t en ce wa s det er mi n ed. H owe v er , we fee l i t n ec es s ar y f or cl ar i t y t o men t i o n t he

se q u e n c e o f ev e n ts a s the y o c c u rr e d a t t ria l.

-6- Under Tenne ssee Code A nnotated sec tion 40-35-115( a), if a defenda nt is convicted of more than one ( 1) off

ens e, t h e t ri al court shall order the sentenc e to run e ither conse cutively or
concur rently

. The trial court may order the sentenc es to run conse cutively if the trial court finds by a pre pondera nce of

the evidenc e that ce rtain criteria e numera ted in Tenne ssee Code A n n o tated section 40-35- 115(b) a

re pr esent. Two ( 2) of the pr ovisions allowin g c o n s e c u ti v e s e ntencing provide that co n s ec u t i v e sente ncing is warr anted if: “ (2) The defe ndant is an off ender whose re cord of criminal ac tivityis ex tensive;” or “ (6) the de fenda nt is sentenc ed for a n offe nse committed while on probation.” Te nn. Code Ann. § 40-35- 115(b)( 2) & (6). Further, “ consec utive sentenc es ca nnot be imposed unless the terms re asonably rela te to the seve rity

of the off

enses c ommitt ed and a

re
ne c e ssa ry in o rd e r t o p ro te c t th e pu bli c fr om f urthe r s e ri ou s c ri min a l c on du c t by the de fe n d a nt. ” Sta te

v. Wil kerson, 905 S.W .2d 933, 938 (Tenn.1995) . The de cision to impose concurr ent or c onsecutive

se nte nc e s, ho we ve r, is a mat te r en trus te d to the so un d d isc re tio n o f the tr ia l c ou rt . St a te v. B lou ve t, 965 S.W .2d 489, 495 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1997)

.

I n the ca se her ein the trial c ourt determined:
Alrig ht, we took the pre caution at this jury trial of off

ering to submit all proposed

e nh a nc ing fa c tor s to the jury

. Th e de fe nd a nt,

. . . , a sk e d th a t th e iss ue of the p a st 1

c ri min a l r e c or d not be su bmi tte d to the jury

. An d for that re a so n w e didno t do that. It d o e s n o tap p e ar

u n d e r B l a k e l y t h a t i s a

m a t t e r f o r t h e j u d g e t o d e c i d e a n yw a y, althoug h I

was pre pare d, as a pr eca

ution, to subm it it t o the jury

.

. . . . The jury also found two enha ncing fac tors. They found Number 9, under 40- 35-114, a pr evious history of unwillingne ss to comply with the conditions of rele ase. And the jury

found that there was a violation of a priva te trust. My

conclusion is that the - a lth ou g h th e jury

arrive d a t the c on c lus ion abo ut the pr ivate trus t, r e sp e c tf ull y to the State, I

don’t believe that I

am convince d and could not allow that enha ncing fac tor to be found in this particular case

. There is c onsiderable ambig uity in my mind at least in the mea ning of that particula r enhancing fac tor, and I

don’t find that one to b e pr e se nt.-7- Be g inning whe re w e nee d to beg in, we f i rst need to e stablish the rang e. I don’t think t h er e’ s an y question that this, as far a s a simple burg lary is conce rned, that this ge ntlemen is a Rang e I I offe nder. . . .

There fore I

find bey ond a re as o n able doubt that ther e ar e two prior convictions that can be used as enha ncing fac tors in this case. Unde r 40-35- 114, they

are the ag g ravated burg lary , . . . . Also the robbery convicti o n o u t of Rutherfor d Cou nty

. . . . S o Ifi ndthat th e re are tho se tw o c on vic tio ns , b e y on d a re a so na ble doubt, to be used to enha nce the defe ndant in this particular c ase.

I e nh a nc e him

- w e be g in wi th the pr e su mpt ion in f a vo r o f the min imu m, wh ic h is the fo ur y e ars , a nd I e nh a nc e him up to s e ve n y e ars a ndsix mo nth s o n th a t.

. . .

I don’t find that there are any mitigating fac tors. I don’t think that there wa s any evidenc e pre sented to sug g est that there are any mitigating fac tors.

I wa nt t o p ut o n the re c or d, that sh ou ld it be the fi nd ing of the app e lla te c ou rt s that it was appropriate to have a bifurc ated he aring like we ha d, I find b ey ond a

re a so na ble do ubt and th e jury

fo un d b e y on d a

re a so na ble do ub t th a t th e re wa s a previous history

of unwillingness to c omply with the conditions of rele ase. That was proved at trial. That was a lso - it’s clear ly set out and established be y ond a

rea sonable doubt in the pre sentenc e report. Howeve r, I am not g oing to, be cause of my re a din g of

B lake ly , I

a m no t g oin g to e nh a nc e him that la st s ix mon ths . B ut I would like for it to be cle ar on the re cord tha t if the appe llate court believes that the jury ’s finding of that enha ncing fac tor is appropria te, then I certainly would enhanc e him that final six months, up to eight y ear s.

. . . .

T h e n ex ti s s u e t o b e d ec i d ed i s wh et h er co n s ec u t i v e or co n cu rr en ts en t en ci n g, the re is a pr e su mpt ion in fa vo r o f c on c ur re nt s e nte nc ing un de r 4 0- 35 -1 15 (d ) u nle ss
on e o f t h e s e v e n f

a c t o r s i s p r e s e n t

. I t d o e s ap p e ar t o m e t h a t t h e s e c o n d f a c tor is prese nt. He ce rtainly

has an ex tensive criminal rec ord, and also it appea rs t o me that fac tor number 6 is pre sent, he c ommitt ed these crimes while on p ro b at i o n , and there fore I

am g oing to impose c onsecutive se ntencing

.
Th e ne xt qu e sti on is wh e the r he wo uld re c e ive a lte rn a tiv e se nte nc ing . H e is

ne ith e r a mit ig a te d no r a sta nd ard of fe nd e r, so he do e s n ot h a ve the pr e su mpt ion in favor of proba tion. I

find that he is an a ltoge ther inappr opriate c andidate f or any kind of alter n at i ve sente ncing beca use of his extensive rec ord, criminal recor d, both of convictions and of a fa ilure to meet the te rms of his parole and probation. And for that rea son he will not rece ive alter native sente ncing

.-8-

As stated pre viously , we r eview s en t encing issues with the presumption that the deter minations made by

the trial court are corr ect so lo n g as t h e trial c ourt followed se ntencing pr oc e du re s. Ten n. Cod e An n. § 4 0- 35 -4 01 (d ). Whil e the app e lla nt d oe s n ot c ha lle ng e the le ng th of his se ntence s, he complains that he w as not g rante d alternative sentenc ing a nd that the trial court order ed the se ntence s to be serve d consec utively . Ag ain, the appe llant, as a multiple offe nder, w as not presumed to be a candidate for an alternative sentence. Further, the recor d established that the appellant had been previously place d on both pr obation and parole and had unsuc cessf ully complied with the conditions of those alternative sentenc es. I n fac t, the rec ord indicated that the appe llant had

rec eived a t least one (1) probation violation, had absc onded fr om probation and had absconde d from parole . Moreove r, the re cord more than established th at the appe llant had an e x tensive criminal history such that conse cutive sente ncing was a ppropriate . Acc ording to the prese ntence report, the

app e lla nt h a d o ne (1 ) c on vic tio n f or c ri min a l tr espa ss, sixte e n ( 16 ) c on vic tio ns fo r p ub lic intox ication, two (2) c onvictions for theft, f our (4) convictions for va ndalism, two (2) convic tions fo r b ur g lary , a nd c on vic tio ns fo r ag g ra va te d bur g lary , rob be ry , ass a ult , r e sis tin g arr e st, makin g fa lse reports and possession of dang erous dr ug s. T h e rec ord does not pre ponderate ag ainst the deter mination of the trial court. This issue is wit hout merit.

Conclusion

For the fore g oing r easons, the judg ment of the trial c ourt is affir med.

___________________________________ J ERRY L . SMI TH, JUDGE