NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential.

United States Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit ______________________ 

KARL ROBERT IRWIN,

Plaintiff-Appellant

v.

UNITED STATES,

Defendant-Appellee

______________________ 

2014-5079

______________________ 

Appeal from the United States Court of Federal 

Claims in No. 1:13-cv-00839-SGB, Judge Susan G. 

Braden.

______________________ 

Decided: August 7, 2015

______________________ 

KARL ROBERT IRWIN, Oxford, WI pro se. 

SEAN MCNAMARA, Commercial Litigation Branch, 

Civil Division, United States Department of Justice, 

Washington, DC, for defendant-appellee. Also represented 

by STUART F. DELERY, ROBERT E. KIRSCHMAN, JR.,

DEBORAH A. BYNUM. 

______________________ 

Before O’MALLEY, REYNA, and CHEN, Circuit Judges.
2 IRWIN v. US

PER CURIAM. 

Karl Irwin appeals from the final order of the United 

States Court of Federal Claims (“Court of Federal 

Claims”) dismissing his suit for filing his Fifth Amendment claim outside of the relevant statute of limitations, 

and for lack of jurisdiction over his remaining claims. 

Irwin v. United States, No. 13-839, 2014 WL 1256361 

(Fed. Cl. Mar. 21, 2014) (“Final Order”). Because we find 

that the Court of Federal Claims properly dismissed 

Irwin’s claims, we affirm. 

I. BACKGROUND

Irwin filed a complaint at the Court of Federal Claims 

on October 28, 2013. In his complaint, Irwin alleges that, 

in November 2004, the federal government seized $14,977 

in cash and a 1998 Ford pickup truck, valued at $11,125, 

from him when he was arrested. Although the government arrested Irwin on drug charges, the money and the 

truck were labeled as “non-drug evidence.” Resp’t App’x 

2–3. Irwin asserted that the forfeiture of the cash and the

truck amounted to a seizure of his personal property 

without just compensation, which was a violation of his 

Fifth Amendment rights. Irwin also contended that: (1) 

the seizure violated 21 U.S.C. § 881; (2) the seizure violated the Due Process Clause; (3) applying the statute of 

limitations to bar his claim would be a substantive due 

process violation; and (4) he is entitled to damages under 

Bivens v. Six Unknown Federal Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 

388 (1971). Irwin sought $322,240 in compensatory 

damages and $2,000,000 in punitive damages. 

On March 21, 2014, the Court of Federal Claims 

granted the government’s motion to dismiss for lack of 

jurisdiction. Because Irwin filed this complaint more 

than eight years after the government notified him of the 

forfeiture, the court found that Irwin’s claims were barred 

by the six-year statute of limitations in 28 U.S.C. § 2501 

(2012). Final Order, 2014 WL 1256361, at *3. The Court 
IRWIN v. US 3

of Federal Claims explained that the statute of limitations 

does not run afoul of a constitutional protection. Id. 

According to the court, moreover, it did not have jurisdiction to consider the rest of Irwin’s claims because the Due 

Process Clause is not a money-mandating provision, only 

United States district courts have jurisdiction over claims 

alleging a violation of 21 U.S.C. § 881, and the Court of 

Federal Claims does not have jurisdiction to adjudicate a 

Bivens claim. Id. at *4.

II. DISCUSSION

“Whether the Court of Federal Claims properly dismissed [a plaintiff’s] [] complaint for lack of subjectmatter jurisdiction is a question of law that we review de 

novo.” Folden v. United States, 379 F.3d 1344, 1354 (Fed. 

Cir. 2004). In determining whether the Court of Federal 

Claims possessed subject matter jurisdiction, “the allegations stated are taken as true and jurisdiction is decided 

on the face of the pleadings.” Shearin v. United States, 

992 F.2d 1195, 1195–96 (Fed. Cir. 1993).

On appeal, Irwin acknowledges that some of his 

claims are not within the general jurisdiction of the Court 

of Federal Claims and does not appeal the dismissal of 

those claims. Appellant’s Reply Br. 1. Instead, Irwin

argues that Congress should not have the authority to 

enact a statute to limit just compensation due under the 

Constitution. Irwin contends that the Constitution is the 

highest law of the United States, and Congress was not 

delegated with the authority to alter or limit the requirement that government must pay just compensation for a 

taking under the Fifth Amendment. 

Irwin thus argues that a congressionally created statute of limitations for takings claims against the government violates his constitutional right to just 

compensation. The Supreme Court, however, has already 

held that “[a] constitutional claim can become time-barred 

just as any other claim can. Nothing in the Constitution 
4 IRWIN v. US

requires otherwise.” Block v. North Dakota, 461 U.S. 273, 

292 (1983). Based on this holding, we determined that, 

just like any other right, a plaintiff’s right to just compensation under the Fifth Amendment is not absolute. Hair 

v. United States, 350 F.3d 1253, 1260 (Fed. Cir. 2003) 

(“The remedy afforded by the Fifth Amendment is subject 

to a reasonable time bar designed to protect other important societal values.”). Accordingly, we have already 

decided that the statute of limitations can bar a claim for 

just compensation under the Fifth Amendment and we 

are bound by that decision. Because Irwin does not 

challenge the Court of Federal Claims’s finding that his 

complaint was brought outside the six-year statute of 

limitations, we affirm the dismissal of his complaint.

III. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the decision of 

the Court of Federal Claims.

AFFIRMED