U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

WASHINGTON : 

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office

Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free (866) 512–1800; DC area (202) 512–1800

Fax: (202) 512–2104 Mail: Stop IDCC, Washington, DC 20402–0001

51–348 PDF 2009

THE TENNESSEE VALLEY 

AUTHORITY’S KINGSTON ASH SLIDE: 

EVALUATION OF POTENTIAL 

CAUSES AND 

UPDATES ON CLEANUP EFFORTS 

(111–54) 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON 

WATER RESOURCES AND ENVIRONMENT 

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON 

TRANSPORTATION AND 

INFRASTRUCTURE 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

JULY 28, 2009 

Printed for the use of the 

Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure 

( 

COMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE 

JAMES L. OBERSTAR, Minnesota, Chairman 

NICK J. RAHALL, II, West Virginia, Vice 

Chair 

PETER A. DEFAZIO, Oregon 

JERRY F. COSTELLO, Illinois 

ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of 

Columbia 

JERROLD NADLER, New York 

CORRINE BROWN, Florida 

BOB FILNER, California 

EDDIE BERNICE JOHNSON, Texas 

GENE TAYLOR, Mississippi 

ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland 

LEONARD L. BOSWELL, Iowa 

TIM HOLDEN, Pennsylvania 

BRIAN BAIRD, Washington 

RICK LARSEN, Washington 

MICHAEL E. CAPUANO, Massachusetts 

TIMOTHY H. BISHOP, New York 

MICHAEL H. MICHAUD, Maine 

RUSS CARNAHAN, Missouri 

GRACE F. NAPOLITANO, California 

DANIEL LIPINSKI, Illinois 

MAZIE K. HIRONO, Hawaii 

JASON ALTMIRE, Pennsylvania 

TIMOTHY J. WALZ, Minnesota 

HEATH SHULER, North Carolina 

MICHAEL A. ARCURI, New York 

HARRY E. MITCHELL, Arizona 

CHRISTOPHER P. CARNEY, Pennsylvania 

JOHN J. HALL, New York 

STEVE KAGEN, Wisconsin 

STEVE COHEN, Tennessee 

LAURA A. RICHARDSON, California 

ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey 

DONNA F. EDWARDS, Maryland 

SOLOMON P. ORTIZ, Texas 

PHIL HARE, Illinois 

JOHN A. BOCCIERI, Ohio 

MARK H. SCHAUER, Michigan 

BETSY MARKEY, Colorado 

PARKER GRIFFITH, Alabama 

MICHAEL E. MCMAHON, New York 

THOMAS S. P. PERRIELLO, Virginia 

DINA TITUS, Nevada 

HARRY TEAGUE, New Mexico 

VACANCY 

JOHN L. MICA, Florida 

DON YOUNG, Alaska 

THOMAS E. PETRI, Wisconsin 

HOWARD COBLE, North Carolina 

JOHN J. DUNCAN, JR., Tennessee 

VERNON J. EHLERS, Michigan 

FRANK A. LOBIONDO, New Jersey 

JERRY MORAN, Kansas 

GARY G. MILLER, California 

HENRY E. BROWN, JR., South Carolina 

TIMOTHY V. JOHNSON, Illinois 

TODD RUSSELL PLATTS, Pennsylvania 

SAM GRAVES, Missouri 

BILL SHUSTER, Pennsylvania 

JOHN BOOZMAN, Arkansas 

SHELLEY MOORE CAPITO, West Virginia 

JIM GERLACH, Pennsylvania 

MARIO DIAZ-BALART, Florida 

CHARLES W. DENT, Pennsylvania 

CONNIE MACK, Florida 

LYNN A WESTMORELAND, Georgia 

JEAN SCHMIDT, Ohio 

CANDICE S. MILLER, Michigan 

MARY FALLIN, Oklahoma 

VERN BUCHANAN, Florida 

ROBERT E. LATTA, Ohio 

BRETT GUTHRIE, Kentucky 

ANH ‘‘JOSEPH’’ CAO, Louisiana 

AARON SCHOCK, Illinois 

PETE OLSON, Texas 

(II) 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON WATER RESOURCES AND ENVIRONMENT

EDDIE BERNICE JOHNSON, Texas, Chairwoman 

THOMAS S. P. PERRIELLO, Virginia 

JERRY F. COSTELLO, Illinois 

GENE TAYLOR, Mississippi 

BRIAN BAIRD, Washington 

TIMOTHY H. BISHOP, New York 

RUSS CARNAHAN, Missouri 

STEVE KAGEN, Wisconsin 

DONNA F. EDWARDS, Maryland 

SOLOMON P. ORTIZ, Texas 

PHIL HARE, Illinois 

DINA TITUS, Nevada 

HARRY TEAGUE, New Mexico 

ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of 

Columbia 

MICHAEL E. CAPUANO, Massachusetts 

GRACE F. NAPOLITANO, California 

MAZIE K. HIRONO, Hawaii 

HARRY E. MITCHELL, Arizaon 

JOHN J. HALL, New York 

PARKER GRIFFITH, Alabama 

BOB FILNER, California 

CORRINE BROWN, Florida 

VACANCY 

JAMES L. OBERSTAR, Minnesota 

(Ex Officio) 

JOHN BOOZMAN, Arkansas 

DON YOUNG, Alaska 

JOHN J. DUNCAN, JR., Tennessee 

VERNON J. EHLERS, Michigan 

FRANK A. LOBIONDO, New Jersey 

GARY G. MILLER, California 

HENRY E. BROWN, JR., South Carolina 

TODD RUSSELL PLATTS, Pennsylvania 

BILL SHUSTER, Pennsylvania 

MARIO DIAZ-BALART, Florida 

CONNIE MACK, Florida 

LYNN A WESTMORELAND, Georgia 

CANDICE S. MILLER, Michigan 

ROBERT E. LATTA, Ohio 

ANH ‘‘JOSEPH’’ CAO, Louisiana 

PETE OLSON, Texas 

(III) 

(V) 

CONTENTS Page 

Summary of Subject Matter .................................................................................... vi 

TESTIMONY 

Almes, William S., Senior Engineer and Director of Geotechnical Services, 

Marshall Miller & Associates, Incorporated ...................................................... 116 

Kilgore, Tom, President and Chief Executive Officer, Tennessee Valley Authority ................................................................................................................... 116 

Moore, Richard, Inspector General, Tennessee Valley Authority ........................ 116 

Stanislaus, Mathy, Assistant Administrator, Office of Solid Waste and Emergency Response, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, accompanied by 

Stan Meiburg, Acting Regional Administrator, Region 4 ................................. 116 

Walton, William H., Vice President and Senior Principal Engineer, AECOM ... 116 

PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS 

Cao, Hon. Anh ′′Joseph′′, of Louisiana ................................................................... 136 

Carnahan, Hon. Russ, of Missouri ......................................................................... 138 

Cohen, Hon, Steve, of Tennessee ............................................................................ 139 

Mitchell, Hon, Harry E., of Arizona ....................................................................... 142 

Oberstar, Hon. James L., of Minnesota ................................................................. 143 

PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED BY WITNESSES 

Almes, William S. .................................................................................................... 146 

Kilgore, Tom ............................................................................................................. 158 

Moore, Richard ......................................................................................................... 173 

Stanislaus, Mathy .................................................................................................... 176 

Walton, William H. .................................................................................................. 187 

SUBMISSION FOR THE RECORD 

Almes, William S., Senior Engineer and Director of Geotechnical Services, 

Marshall Miller & Associates, Incorporated, supplementaty testimony ......... 149 

Johnson, Rep. Eddie Bernice, a Representative in Congress from the State 

of Texas, ′′Inspection Report: Review of the Kingston Fossil Plant Ash 

Spill Root Cause Study and Observations about Ash Management′′ ............... 3 

vi 


Insert offset folio 1 here 51348.001
vii 


Insert offset folio 2 here 51348.002
viii 


Insert offset folio 3 here 51348.003
ix 


Insert offset folio 4 here 51348.004
x 


Insert offset folio 5 here 51348.005
xi 


Insert offset folio 6 here 51348.006
xii 


Insert offset folio 7 here 51348.007
xiii 


Insert offset folio 8 here 51348.008
xiv 


Insert offset folio 9 here 51348.009
(1) 

THE TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY’S KINGSTON ASH SLIDE: EVALUATION OF POTENTIAL CAUSES AND UPDATES ON CLEANUP 

EFFORTS 

House of Representatives 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON WATER RESOURCES AND

ENVIRONMENT, 

COMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE, 

WASHINGTON, DC. 

The Subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 10:30 a.m., in Room 

2167, Rayburn House Office Building, the Honorable Eddie Bernice 

Johnson [Chairwoman of the Subcommittee] presiding. 

Ms. JOHNSON. Good morning. The Committee will come to order. 

Today’s hearing will begin by offering the Committee’s heartfelt 

condolences to the family of Larry LaCroix of Burlington, Iowa. Mr. 

LaCroix was part of the Kingston ash spill cleanup operation and 

was killed in a worksite accident on July the 20th. The Subcommittee extends our thoughts and prayers to his family. 

This hearing is being conducted as one of several hearings that 

meet the oversight requirements under clauses 2(n), (o), and (p) of 

Rule XI of the Rules of the House of Representatives. 

As originally envisioned, today’s hearing was to focus on a technical review of the engineering analyses that evaluated the root 

causes of the December 2008 Kingston coal ash spill. However, 

since this hearing was originally planned, a number of reports have 

come to light that demand we look at the collapse, as well as the 

factors that led to it, with increased scrutiny. I have done so and 

have come to the conclusion that the causes as identified by TVA 

are, in fact, not causes at all. Rather, they are symptoms of more 

endemic issues facing the Tennessee Valley Authority. 

As such, this hearing will look to answer three basic questions: 

First, what geotechnical factors led to the spill; second, what 

human or management factors contributed to the collapse; and 

third, what actions will TVA take going forward. 

Testimony from Mr. Bill Walton from the engineering firm 

AECOM will help us answer the first question, based on the 

AECOM Root Cause Analysis Report upon which his testimony is 

formulated. We can learn the mechanisms of failure that led to the 

collapse of the Kingston storage facility. 

But that is only a part of the story. The second issue regarding 

management culture will be addressed by TVA’s Inspector General 

Richard Moore and Bill Almes, an engineer from the firm of Marshall Miller & Associates. 

2 

The third issue concerning what steps TVA is planing to take 

going forward, will be illuminated through this hearing. 

This morning’s testimony comes in light of today’s release of a 

TVA Office of Inspector General report. It highlights a string of 

problematic findings regarding TVA’s management culture prior to 

the spill as well as new steps TVA has made in the months following. 

Last week the TVA Board released an additional report written 

by the law firm of McKenna Long & Aldrich that identifies a management culture that, in combination with a lack of accountability, 

standards, and controls, created conditions that resulted in this 

spill. In my opinion, these management failures were equally to 

blame for the Kingston spill and are relevant to the larger debate. 

I request unanimous consent that the McKenna report be included in the record. 

[The referenced information follows:] 

3 


Insert offset folio 11 here 51348.011
4 


Insert offset folio 12 here 51348.012
5 


Insert offset folio 13 here 51348.013
6 


Insert offset folio 14 here 51348.014
7 


Insert offset folio 15 here 51348.015
8 


Insert offset folio 16 here 51348.016
9 


Insert offset folio 17 here 51348.017
10 


Insert offset folio 18 here 51348.018
11 


Insert offset folio 19 here 51348.019
12 


Insert offset folio 20 here 51348.020
13 


Insert offset folio 21 here 51348.021
14 


Insert offset folio 22 here 51348.022
15 


Insert offset folio 23 here 51348.023
16 


Insert offset folio 24 here 51348.024
17 


Insert offset folio 25 here 51348.025
18 


Insert offset folio 26 here 51348.026
19 


Insert offset folio 27 here 51348.027
20 


Insert offset folio 28 here 51348.028
21 


Insert offset folio 29 here 51348.029
22 


Insert offset folio 30 here 51348.030
23 


Insert offset folio 31 here 51348.031
24 


Insert offset folio 32 here 51348.032
25 


Insert offset folio 33 here 51348.033
26 


Insert offset folio 34 here 51348.034
27 


Insert offset folio 35 here 51348.035
28 


Insert offset folio 36 here 51348.036
29 


Insert offset folio 37 here 51348.037
30 


Insert offset folio 38 here 51348.038
31 


Insert offset folio 39 here 51348.039
32 


Insert offset folio 40 here 51348.040
33 


Insert offset folio 41 here 51348.041
34 


Insert offset folio 42 here 51348.042
35 


Insert offset folio 43 here 51348.043
36 


Insert offset folio 44 here 51348.044
37 


Insert offset folio 45 here 51348.045
38 


Insert offset folio 46 here 51348.046
39 


Insert offset folio 47 here 51348.047
40 


Insert offset folio 48 here 51348.048
41 


Insert offset folio 49 here 51348.049
42 


Insert offset folio 50 here 51348.050
43 


Insert offset folio 51 here 51348.051
44 


Insert offset folio 52 here 51348.052
45 


Insert offset folio 53 here 51348.053
46 


Insert offset folio 54 here 51348.054
47 


Insert offset folio 55 here 51348.055
48 


Insert offset folio 56 here 51348.056
49 


Insert offset folio 57 here 51348.057
50 


Insert offset folio 58 here 51348.058
51 


Insert offset folio 59 here 51348.059
52 


Insert offset folio 60 here 51348.060
53 


Insert offset folio 61 here 51348.061
54 


Insert offset folio 62 here 51348.062
55 


Insert offset folio 63 here 51348.063
56 


Insert offset folio 64 here 51348.064
57 


Insert offset folio 65 here 51348.065
58 


Insert offset folio 66 here 51348.066
59 


Insert offset folio 67 here 51348.067
60 


Insert offset folio 68 here 51348.068
61 


Insert offset folio 69 here 51348.069
62 


Insert offset folio 70 here 51348.070
63 


Insert offset folio 71 here 51348.071
64 


Insert offset folio 72 here 51348.072
65 


Insert offset folio 73 here 51348.073
66 


Insert offset folio 74 here 51348.074
67 


Insert offset folio 75 here 51348.075
68 


Insert offset folio 76 here 51348.076
69 


Insert offset folio 77 here 51348.077
70 


Insert offset folio 78 here 51348.078
71 


Insert offset folio 79 here 51348.079
72 


Insert offset folio 80 here 51348.080
73 


Insert offset folio 81 here 51348.081
74 


Insert offset folio 82 here 51348.082
75 


Insert offset folio 83 here 51348.083
76 


Insert offset folio 84 here 51348.084
77 


Insert offset folio 85 here 51348.085
78 


Insert offset folio 86 here 51348.086
79 


Insert offset folio 87 here 51348.087
80 


Insert offset folio 88 here 51348.088
81 


Insert offset folio 89 here 51348.089
82 


Insert offset folio 90 here 51348.090
83 


Insert offset folio 91 here 51348.091
84 


Insert offset folio 92 here 51348.092
85 


Insert offset folio 93 here 51348.093
86 


Insert offset folio 94 here 51348.094
87 


Insert offset folio 95 here 51348.095
88 


Insert offset folio 96 here 51348.096
89 


Insert offset folio 97 here 51348.097
90 


Insert offset folio 98 here 51348.098
91 


Insert offset folio 99 here 51348.099
92 


Insert offset folio 100 here 51348.100
93 


Insert offset folio 101 here 51348.101
94 


Insert offset folio 102 here 51348.102
95 


Insert offset folio 103 here 51348.103
96 


Insert offset folio 104 here 51348.104
97 


Insert offset folio 105 here 51348.105
98 


Insert offset folio 106 here 51348.106
99 


Insert offset folio 107 here 51348.107
100 


Insert offset folio 108 here 51348.108
101 


Insert offset folio 109 here 51348.109
102 


Insert offset folio 110 here 51348.110
103 


Insert offset folio 111 here 51348.111
104 


Insert offset folio 112 here 51348.112
105 


Insert offset folio 113 here 51348.113
106 


Insert offset folio 114 here 51348.114
107 


Insert offset folio 115 here 51348.115
108 


Insert offset folio 116 here 51348.116
109 


Insert offset folio 117 here 51348.117
110 


Insert offset folio 118 here 51348.118
111 


Insert offset folio 119 here 51348.119
112 


Insert offset folio 120 here 51348.120
113 

Ms. JOHNSON. The central thrust of this hearing, however, involves the future. Can the Tennessee Valley Authority assure Congress and the people of the Tennessee Valley region that its other 

coal ash disposal facilities are sound? In other words, can they ensure that they will not collapse, that they will not leech toxins into 

the groundwater, and that TVA facilities will not discharge carcinogenic and harmful substances into our Nation’s waters? 

This second issue, informed by the TVA OIG and McKenna reports, leads us to a subsequent line of questions that the Subcommittee must get answers to, either in this meeting or in other 

hearings in the months ahead. Can TVA provide the public with 

credible risk assessments regarding the safety of its facilities, including its coal ash impoundments? 

Will the ongoing management and organizational changes occurring within TVA produce results that address all of the McKenna 

and TVA OIG report findings? Does TVA intend to become a 

proactive environmental steward? If so, how? Does the Congress 

need to take action to ensure that TVA facilities cease to pose 

threats to public safety, human health, and the environment? 

Today’s hearing is troubling. These recently released reports indicate a management culture at TVA that is slow and sometimes 

resistant to change. Testimony from our witnesses today will help 

guide this Subcommittee to whether change must be instilled upon 

this Federal entity. It will only be through both acknowledgment 

of the issues that resulted in the Kingston collapse and an active 

effort to address these issues that TVA will be able to move forward. 

Thank you. I now recognize our Ranking Member, Mr. Boozman. 

Mr. BOOZMAN. Thank you very much, Madam Chair. Today this 

Subcommittee continues its review of coal ash storage, specifically 

the December 22nd, 2008 incident at the Tennessee Valley 

Authority’s power generating facility in Kingston, Tennessee. 

While public and private utilities have safely operated approximately 600 coal ash sites for decades with only a few documented 

failures, it is important to recognize that this spill directly impacted more than 40 property owners. Homes were rendered uninhabitable. Water mains and gas lines ruptured. Nearby neighborhoods had to be evacuated. It is my sincere hope that what occurred at the Kingston coal ash disposal site was an isolated incident. 

The witnesses today will discuss the causes of the accident and 

report on some of their observations about the Kingston site. In addition, these witnesses will address the agency culture within the 

Tennessee Valley Authority and how this may have contributed to 

the accident at Kingston. 

As George Romney once said, ‘‘Nothing is as vulnerable as entrenched success.’’ Traditionally, the Tennessee Valley Authority 

has been a good steward of the environment. Most of its employees, 

including some of the witnesses today, reside within the Tennessee 

Valley and are directly impacted by the actions taken by the agency. 

Additional laws or Federal regulations would probably not have 

prevented this terrible accident. New laws and regulations will not 

replace homes, family treasures, heirlooms, or other personal propVerDate Aug 31 2005 11:00 Nov 24, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00127 Fmt 6602 Sfmt 6602 P:\DOCS\51348 JASON
114 

erty lost as a result of the Kingston spill. However, this is little 

comfort for those property owners impacted by the Kingston spill 

who have sacrificed a great deal and who in some cases have forfeited their homes and other irreplaceable memories to this accident. 

Moving forward, it is important for the Tennessee Valley Authority, its Board of Directors, and its officers to review the agency’s 

existing ash management practices, recognize any shortcomings, 

and subsequently make changes to ensure more appropriate risk 

management at its facilities. Due to its proximity to the Emory and 

Clinch Rivers, the Kingston site carried an elevated risk. However, 

the Tennessee Valley Authority needs to take aggressive steps at 

its other coal ash storage facilities to identify and reduce risk to 

the public and to the environment. 

Compliance at all levels within the Tennessee Valley Authority 

will help restore the level of trust that is expected of one of the Nation’s largest power providers. The benefits that the Tennessee Valley Authority bring to the Nation are too important to be threatened by poor structures and poor management practices. 

I am encouraged by some of the recent statements by TVA management that indicate they get the message and intend to emerge 

from this accident a better agency. I hope that we can help them. 

I thank you, Madam Chair, for holding this hearing. I look forward to the testimony of the witnesses. With that, I yield back. 

Ms. JOHNSON. Thank you very much. 

The Chair now recognizes Mr. Duncan for an opening statement. 

Mr. DUNCAN. Thank you very much, Madam Chairwoman. I 

don’t have a formal written statement but I will say this: This spill 

was not in my district but it is 40 miles, roughly, from Knoxville. 

I sent a member of my staff very soon after this happened out 

there. A few days later I went out there and took a helicopter tour 

and got a briefing. I have mentioned before that I met with all 

kinds of people working for TVA and other Federal, State, and local 

environmental agencies. I also met with contractors. I have since 

met with others in regard to this spill, participated in a meeting 

at Senator Alexander’s office with interested parties including some 

of the victims, and have also participated in two previous hearings 

of this Subcommittee. I think I have made my views pretty well 

known on this. 

TVA has been filled for years almost entirely with environmentalists in the best sense of that word. I understand that this 

retention pond and this system of storage was built in 1985, long 

before any of the current leadership of TVA was in there. All 

through those years the environmentalists at TVA, the EPA, and 

other agencies thought that this was just fine. Nobody really said 

anything about it. 

Now, this is a terrible thing that has happened to TVA and it 

is horrible for the people who have been severely damaged. But I 

have always said that I think everything within reason that could 

be done should be done. I think it has been done. The progress that 

has been made has been amazing. 

In our last hearing it was estimated that TVA’s costs on this 

would be about $1 billion. That may be a lowball estimate, not 

counting the regulatory fines and lawsuits. Now, my feeling is that 

115 

if you disregard people who have a vested monetary interest in this 

because they are connected to some environmental group that 

wants to get contributions and make money out of this, and if you 

put aside the contractors—and all these are good people—but if you 

put aside the views of the contractors who have a vested or monetary interest in this, if you put aside all those people who are not 

tied into one of those groups, I think 95 or 98 percent of the people 

who take a look at this would say that TVA has done and is doing 

everything humanly possible to get this area cleaned up. 

The progress has been tremendous. I think in the end this area 

is going to be cleaner than a lot of other areas around the Nation. 

You can never satisfy the extremists or the kooks in any situation. 

There will be some people that we will never satisfy no matter if 

we spent the entire Federal budget on this problem. But we have 

to be reasonable. We have to have a little balance and common 

sense in this situation. I think that TVA should be commended for 

all that they have done, are doing, and will do in regard to this situation. 

Thank you very much. 

Ms. JOHNSON. Thank you very much. 

Are there any other statements? 

Mr. CAO. Yes, Madam Chairwoman. First of all, I would like to 

thank you, Madam Chairwoman, for holding this important hearing. I will keep my remarks brief but I would like to take this opportunity to make some parallels between my community and the 

community experience at Kingston in regards to the spill. 

In December of 2008, a retention wall at Kingston Fossil Plant 

failed, releasing 5.4 million cubic yards of ash and 327 million gallons of water onto the land and into the nearby rivers. The result 

of this failure was the release of five million cubic yards of coal ash 

into the Emory River and 300 acres of land being filled with 

sludge, in some places up to six feet deep. This spill caused extensive disruption to the neighboring communities with evacuations 

and the loss of power and gas, not to mention the houses that were 

destroyed in the tidal wave of ash and water. 

It is a miracle that no lives were lost at the time of the spill. 

However, we do recognize the one life that was lost during the 

cleanup earlier this month. 

As the Representative of the second Congressional district, I 

have great empathy for the communities that were directly affected 

by this unexpected and unprecedented event. I am also well aware 

of the effect failures in protective structures can have on surrounding communities. 

The damage to Orleans and Jefferson Parishes four years ago 

wasn’t because Hurricane Katrina made a direct hit on New Orleans. Instead, it was because the strength of the storm surge caused 

catastrophic failures in levees and flood walls throughout the city, 

especially in New Orleans East and the Lakeview area on the border with Navarre. The damage from these breeches included flooding in 80 percent of the city, damage to 80 percent of the buildings, 

and damage to 40 percent of our housing stock. Because of these 

failures, the city remained under water for days and in some places 

weeks. But, like the Kingston spill, the environmental hazards 

were great. We all remember the images of the waters through 

116 

which my constituents had to wade to get food and water. These 

were commonly referred to as a toxic soup because they were filled 

with sewage, gasoline, and oil, to say nothing of bacteria and disease. 

Like you, Madam Chairwoman, in the immediate aftermath of 

the catastrophic failures that occurred as a result of Hurricane 

Katrina, I sought accountability and assurances from the Federal 

Government, especially the Army Corps of Engineers, that repairs 

would be made to ensure such catastrophic failures never happen 

again. 

Through my work on this Committee and Subcommittee, I am 

closely overseeing the work of the Army Corps to ensure they are 

rebuilding our infrastructure to its former strength and beyond. 

One of my priorities is ensuring the complete rebuilding of the 17th 

Street and London Avenue Canals. I have cosponsored legislation 

which states this. I continue to work with the Army Corps and my 

delegation to ensure this protection is achieved for my constituents. 

Just like the community affected by the Kingston spill, my district 

cannot afford another disaster. 

Again, Madam Chair, thank you for holding this important hearing. I look forward to working with you as you continue your oversight of this important matter. Thank you very much. 

Ms. JOHNSON. Thank you very much. 

Testifying first is EPA’s Assistant Administrator for Solid Waste 

and Emergency Response, Mr. Mathy Stanislaus. Accompanying 

Mr. Stanislaus is the Acting Regional Administrator for EPA’s Region 4, Mr. Stan Meiburg. Mr. Meiburg will be available for questions. Our second witness is TVA’s President and CEO, Mr. Tom 

Kilgore. Following him is Mr. William Walton, Vice President and 

Senior Engineer with AECOM. 

Our fourth witness is the TVA Inspector General, Mr. Richard 

Moore. Our final witness this morning, Mr. William Almes, is a 

Senior Engineer and Director of Geotechnical Services with Marshall Miller & Associates. 

Your full statements will be placed in the record. We ask that 

you try to limit your testimony to about five minutes as a courtesy 

to the other witnesses. 

I now recognize Mr. Stanislaus. 

TESTIMONY OF MATHY STANISLAUS, ASSISTANT ADMINISTRATOR, OFFICE OF SOLID WASTE AND EMERGENCY RESPONSE, U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, ACCOMPANIED BY STAN MEIBURG, ACTING REGIONAL ADMINISTRATOR, REGION 4; TOM KILGORE, PRESIDENT AND 

CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER, TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY; WILLIAM H. WALTON, VICE PRESIDENT AND SENIOR 

PRINCIPAL ENGINEER, AECOM; RICHARD MOORE, INSPECTOR GENERAL, TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY; AND WILLIAM S. ALMES, SENIOR ENGINEER AND DIRECTOR OF 

GEOTECHNICAL SERVICES, MARSHALL MILLER & ASSOCIATES, INCORPORATED 

Mr. STANISLAUS. Madam Chairwoman and Members of the Subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to provide testimony on 

the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency’s role in the response 

117 

and cleanup of the release of coal ash from the Tennessee Valley 

Authority Kingston plant. 

Appearing with me today is Mr. Stan Meiburg, Acting Regional 

Administrator for EPA Region 4. Mr. Meiburg will be able to answer any questions you may have regarding Region 4’s efforts related to the Kingston spill response. 

I will summarize my testimony but I ask that my entire statement be submitted for the hearing record. 

As you know, Madam Chairwoman, TVA’s Kingston facility suffered a catastrophic failure, releasing an estimated 5.4 million 

cubic yards of coal ash into the Emory and Clinch Rivers and surrounding areas. Shortly after learning of the release, EPA deployed 

an on-scene coordinator to the site. EPA joined TVA, the Tennessee 

Department of Environment and Conservation, and other State and 

local agencies in a coordinated response. EPA served as the lead 

Federal agency throughout the emergency phase of the response 

and provided oversight and technical advice to TVA. 

On January 12th of 2009, the Tennessee Department of Environment and Conservation issued an order to TVA to develop a corrective action plan to address the spill and to conduct a root cause 

analysis to determine the cause of the dike failure. Over time, the 

lead Federal agency designation transitioned to TVA as cleanup efforts moved into the recovery phase. 

Subsequently, on May 11, 2009, EPA entered into an administrative order and agreement on consent, AOC, with TVA pursuant to 

EPA’s authority under the Comprehensive Environmental Response Compensation and Liability Act, CERCLA, under which 

TVA will continue to perform the response action with EPA oversight. The EPA AOC with TVA does not replace the Tennessee Department of Environment’s order, which remains in effect. EPA’s 

working relationship with the State of Tennessee has been exceptional and we will continue that partnership. 

Under the AOC, response actions will take place through time 

critical and non-time critical removal actions. The AOC will help 

ensure that the cleanup is comprehensive, fully transparent to the 

local community and public, and meets all Federal and State environmental standards. A principal objective of the time critical 

phase of the removal is to recover the major portion of coal ash in 

the Emory River to help minimize the potential for flooding and 

downstream migration of the coal ash. 

Under the Tennessee Department of Environment’s order and 

the EPA AOC, TVA was required to perform a detailed analysis of 

off-site disposal options for coal ash removed from the Emory River. 

That effort resulted in the selection of the Arrowhead Landfill in 

Perry County, Alabama as the best off-site facility to receive the 

coal ash generated from the time critical removal action. The landfill is fully lined and meets all technical requirements specified by 

State and Federal regulations. 

Another important factor in the selection was the preference for 

rail transportation. Rail transportation greatly reduced the potential for vehicle accidents, avoids local traffic burdens, and is approximately three times more fuel efficient than truck transportation. After a thorough review, EPA approved the selection of the 

Arrowhead Landfill. 

118 

As stated in previous testimony provided to the Subcommittee, 

the failure of the ash impoundment at TVA’s Kingston plant highlighted the issue of impoundment stability. EPA is currently conducting an assessment of impoundments and other management 

units which contain wet handled coal combustion residuals. We are 

finalizing our review of the responses to the CERCLA 104(e) letters 

that were sent to facilities. Overall, the assessment responses are 

from more than 200 facilities which have identified more than 500 

management units. We expect to post that information on the EPA 

website within the next six to eight weeks. 

In the meantime, EPA staff and contractors are in the field conducting on-site visits and inspections of those management units 

reported as having a high or significantly high hazard potential 

while also reviewing any current dam safety reports available from 

States or the facilities. Our goal is to complete all of the assessments for dams with high and significant hazard potential ratings 

this year. 

As to TVA’s root cause analysis of the Kingston facility failure, 

EPA staff have reviewed the currently released analysis report 

which identifies some of the factors that could have contributed to 

the Kingston facility structural failure. EPA contractors are looking 

for structural stability factors in our ongoing impoundment and 

management unit assessment efforts. Some of the factors being 

looked for include the size, age, and location of the structures; size 

of dam or dike erosion; settlement, cracks, or other signs of deterioration; seepage or leakage; and site soil, groundwater, and surface 

water characteristics. 

In addition, EPA is evaluating coal ash residual disposal practices at coal fired power plants to determine if these facilities are 

in compliance with existing Federal environmental laws. We will 

take enforcement action where appropriate to address serious violations. 

Madam Chairwoman, that concludes my prepared remarks. Either I or Stan Meiburg will be pleased to answer any questions 

that you or the Subcommittee Members may have. Thank you. 

Ms. JOHNSON. Thank you very much. 

We will now hear from Mr. Kilgore. 

Mr. KILGORE. Madam Chairwoman, Ranking Member Boozman, 

and Members of the Committee, thank you for the opportunity to 

update you on TVA’s progress in the recovery of the Kingston Fossil Plant spill. We appreciate the Committee’s oversight. Madam 

Chairwoman, we appreciate your visit to the site last June. 

We are working hard to rebuild the pubic trust. We know that 

that is going to be a difficult task but we are working to make sure 

that nothing like this happens again. 

When the event happened, I knew we had to do many things. I 

am here today to talk about what we did on root cause and to ensure that our other facilities were safe. I knew we needed technical 

answers about why Kingston happened, but even more urgently we 

needed to find out about our other sites. 

To get those answers, we commissioned two internationally recognized and respected engineering firms. AECOM was brought in 

to conduct the root cause analysis of Kingston and the spill itself. 

Stantec, another firm, was commissioned to evaluate the structural 

119 

integrity of all of TVA’s other ash ponds. We used two different 

firms because of the urgency of the situation and the size and the 

scope before each firm. 

As you will hear shortly from Mr. Walton, AECOM’s extensive forensic investigation determined that four long-evolving conditions, 

some existing since the 1950s, caused the event. I will also address 

the management and system factors that contributed to that. We 

have carefully studied AECOM’s report and accept Mr. Walton’s 

thorough and well documented assessment. 

As AECOM was conducting its work at Kingston, Stantec was 

busy at TVA’s other sites with their technical evaluation. Starting 

in January, Stantec began to inspect, test, and make recommendations on our other facilities. We have worked aggressively over the 

last six months to implement their recommended changes. 

I also wanted us to take a self-critical approach in looking at the 

hazard classifications of the storage impoundments. We were not 

among those 44 that were originally listed. I recognize that and we 

moved to correct that. Although we don’t have any indication of 

these structures being in danger of failing, we have reclassified impoundments at four of our sites as having high hazard potential. 

We are prioritizing our efforts at those sites. 

In order to fully understand what happened at Kingston, we 

needed also an analysis of TVA’s organization and culture. The 

TVA Board of Directors commissioned an independent investigation 

to examine and identify possible management and organizational 

factors that may have contributed to the Kingston spill. That work 

began in January. The investigation was led by the international 

law firm of McKenna Long & Aldrich. 

The MLA investigation that was presented to the Board by MLA 

last week and released publicly did identify shortcomings and 

missed opportunities in our organizational effectiveness and our accountability. At the Board’s direction, we are already moving quickly to remedy these shortcomings. I have initiated an agency-wide 

organizational effectiveness plan focused on culture change and improving our systems, standards, controls, and accountability. 

I am pleased that MLA report recognized that we are making 

some significant remedial progress to prevent any future pond 

spills. But I also want to tell you that I heard the word of caution 

that a comprehensive directive needed to provide assurance that 

best practices would be sustained across TVA, owned by senior 

management, and under the Board’s oversight. 

Last week I described the results of the MLA investigation to our 

employees as tough medicine. It is hard to take, but tough medicine will make us better. 

Today we have the benefit of the report done by the Office of Inspector General. Mr. Moore will testify on that shortly. 

All four reports from AECOM, Stantec, MLA, and the Inspector 

General will help us address both the technical and cultural issues 

that contributed to the Kingston spill. Importantly, these reports 

will be our road map going forward both to strengthen the integrity 

of our facilities and to forge a culture of accountability at TVA. 

Madam Chair, my written testimony to submit to the Committee 

provides more details. 

120 

While we have much more to do, with the Chair’s permission I 

would like to give you some idea of the progress we are making. 

We have a long way to go but I would like to show some photographs. 

This is the picture of the ash spill as it looks today. This is what 

it looked like shortly after the event. You can see the river is filled. 

We estimate that about three million cubic yards were beyond 

what we called Dike 2. As we have dredges in, we now have removed about a half a million cubic yards of that material and are 

continuing to work. 

This is what the railroad and the road looked like the day after 

the event. We have that restored and that road is open to the public. 

One of the sloughs nearby, this is a minor slough that we call 

Church Slough. You can see that it was filled with ash. This is an 

example of what we have to do for the rest of the site. 

As I said, we have a lot of work to do. We are not finished by 

a long shot. We look forward to continuing to work with the Committee as we move forward. 

Ms. JOHNSON. Thank you very much, Mr. Kilgore. 

We will hear from Mr. William Walton now. 

Mr. WALTON. Good morning, Madam Chairwoman and distinguished Members of the Committee. I appreciate the opportunity to 

share with you the results of our five month investigation of the 

root causes of the Kingston failure. 

On the morning of December 22nd, 2008, a massive flow side occurred. Within one hour it inundated the Watts Bar Reservoir, several sloughs, and spilled over onto private properties. There were 

no witnesses to the failure because it was nighttime. No one knew 

where it started or how it happened. Our assignment was to answer these questions and to determine the geotechnical causes of 

failure. 

We have conducted a thorough and comprehensive forensic investigation and root cause analysis presented in ten volumes with 

more than 5,400 pages. This RCA process involved frequent input 

from TDEC; the TVA OIG and their consultants; the U.S. EPA; the 

Bureau of Reclamation; the insurer’s geotechnical engineer; and 

the independent peer reviewer of Dr. Gonzalo Castro, an elected 

member of the National Academy of Engineering. We did this to 

ensure that they would all be fully informed of our discoveries and 

progress as analyses evolved. We met on eight separate occasions 

to share information and to refine the analysis methodologies. 

Our written testimony offers lessons learned that can be applied 

to other wet ash disposal facilities. I will show you several slides 

from the testimony that I have submitted that illustrate the failure 

sequence and the controlling factors. Due to the time allotment, I 

will go through these slides briskly. However, I invite your questions on any information that we have shared with you. 

This is a photograph from April of 2008 showing the confinement, the dredge cells, and the ash collection pond. Within six 

months, this tragic and catastrophic failure occurred, discharging 

more than two thirds of the contents above the ash collection pond. 

I will show you our opinion on the causation. We are looking 

from northwest to southeast. We believe failure began in the northVerDate Aug 31 2005 11:00 Nov 24, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00134 Fmt 6602 Sfmt 6602 P:\DOCS\51348 JASON
121 

west corner, originating as a deep seated failure internal to the exterior confinement. Like a pie coming out of a pie plate, this material heaved out within a very short time frame and surcharged the 

perimeter containment system, causing a overload on the outboard 

containment. That caused that outboard containment to breach, 

making the liquid contents liquify and flow out. From a 3H:1V 

slope this flowed out to an angle of repose less than one half degree. 

I will show you a few historic photographs to see the progression 

of this site. In 1949, this was a lake making up the Watts Bar Reservoir created in 1942. The dotted red line indicates the outside 

containment system hopping from island to island. Note that for 

the first three or four years of operation, from 1954 to 1958, the 

ash was released directly to the waters of the Watts Bar Reservoir. 

This system was firing power to Oak Ridge as a national defense 

facility. 

By 1958, the containment pond was established. Here again I 

will show you in green the distance that ash from the plant would 

have to travel for waters to be released back to the reservoir. It 

was over 5,200 feet, a mile. This ash would collect from the coarsest grains on the south to the most fine grains on the north. As 

we progress with time, this eventual ash pond was eventually filled 

in and the material was stacked. 

In 1984, in an effort to provide more material within the confines 

of this containment system, a dredge cell super elevated above the 

ash pond was created to store more material as the plant operated. 

By 1996, engineering plans were done to expand the facility 

vertically. 

By 2005, this photograph shows you the three cell system that 

was collecting ash was now down to two. The footprint of the disposal was getting smaller but the structure was getting higher. Notice in red is the 2003 slide event where seepage in piping occurred. 

We looked at 12 failure modes at this particular site identified 

in our work scope in late December and early January. We then 

evolved to four controlling factors. It is too hard to read all of these 

but these are a part of the testimony that are included in the 

slides. 

The point of fact is that this structure, on its way to be built to 

the year 2014, did not make it to its ultimate height. The red line 

demarks its failure. 

The underneath foundation is shown to be a material of the finest grains that had traveled the furthest early on in the progression of this particular disposal facility. It is a slime, a mining term 

meaning a material that travels the farthest, that drops out at the 

last, being the finest, loosest materials accumulating on the bottom. Those slimes were found in the upper portion, the northernmost portion, at the furthest distance from its deposition. 

Again, it was an issue of finding these with an extensive exploration program. We were able to see the slide plane and identify 

these slimes through undisturbed sampling. We were able to analyze the stability of those sections that failed on the north as well 

as those sections that did not fail to the east or were consequential 

to failure on the west. 

122 

I will take you very quickly through the progression of failure in 

cross section as you would look west. The early portion would fail 

like the pie I explained. That material would surcharge over the 

initial containment dike, causing it to be overstressed and 

breached. Notice the issue on the right side. The flood wave from 

this event was a 47 foot flood wave above the operating pool, clearly a very dramatic failure in a very short period of time, resulting 

in the release of the materials. 

This leads us to the conclusion of four controlling factors or failure modes that led to this: The load was impacted by the ever increasing height and the constant force of ash. The containment system was discontinuous and separated. That laid on a foundation, 

and the foundation serves as the footing for the building or home 

or whatever. The foundation is important. If those three elements 

are weak and you contain a loose, wet, liquefiable ash and lose 

your containment, it then can be released in a very dramatic manner, 5.4 million yards. 

Thank you very much. 

Ms. JOHNSON. Thank you very much. 

Mr. Richard Moore. 

Mr. MOORE. Good morning, Madam Chairwoman Johnson, Ranking Member Boozman, and Members of the Subcommittee. 

I am TVA’s Inspector General, having been appointed to this position by the President in May of 2003. Prior to becoming the first 

Inspector General appointed by a President at TVA, I was a Federal prosecutor in the southern district of Alabama for approximately 18 years. 

It is a pleasure to be able to testify here today about the Office 

of Inspector General’s review of the coal ash spill at TVA’s Kingston Fossil Plant in December of 2008. I believe you have a copy 

of our report which, as you mentioned, is becoming public today. 

Mr. MOORE. The Kingston spill has brought intense scrutiny 

upon TVA, as is well known, and with it a call for more oversight 

of the agency. The conditions at TVA that led to the disaster of December 22nd, 2008 have existed for decades. It is unfortunate that 

it has taken this kind of incident to prompt changes. 

The TVA culture at fossil plants relegated ash to the status of 

garbage at a landfill rather than treating it as a potential hazard 

to the public and to the environment. We believe this culture resulted in management failures which contributed to the Kingston 

spill. 

Our report points out a number of issues that I would summarize 

into basically three categories. First are the warnings and red 

flags. Those warnings and red flags were raised by outside consultants and internal staff but were simply not addressed. Number 

two, there was an inadequate system of management controls as 

evidenced by fragmented organizational structures, a lack of policies and procedures, and inadequate training for dike inspectors. 

Number three, there were poor management practices that included a lack of maintenance of dikes and overall poor communication between organizations. Our report provides a more detailed 

discussion of each of these items. 

Madam Chairwoman, you have said that the Kingston spill was 

caused by regulatory neglect, a lack of Government oversight, and 

123 

irresponsible coal ash practices. Our report that we make public 

today supports your statement. 

TVA management knew, for example, that consultants had been 

hired by them and had urged them to perform a much needed analysis and to take specific corrective actions. TVA management knew 

that they had failed to follow the engineers’ recommendations and 

that they had failed to perform the analysis or take the corrective 

actions. TVA’s management also knew that it had a history of poor 

maintenance of its ash ponds and that it had experienced seeps or 

breeches in the past. Finally, TVA management knew that there 

were no policies or procedures for the management of coal ash. 

Documents supporting what I have just said are a matter of public 

record, have been made available by TVA through litigation. These 

facts are widely known. 

The TVA Board appears to clearly understand the gravity of the 

situation. Recently they have taken bold steps to address the problems that we have identified in our report. Also, although TVA 

management was slow to publicly discuss management failures, as 

we point out in our report, I am pleased to say that they have 

made great strides in starting a long process to not only rebuild the 

ash management program but to attempt to rebuild the trust and 

respect of Congress, the American people, and TVA’s many stakeholders. 

This will not happen without continued oversight by this Subcommittee and other oversight authorities including that of the Office of Inspector General. We are committed to devoting resources 

to monitor TVA’s new commitment to transparency and accountability. We welcome your support in that endeavor. 

In addition to the recommendations in our report, the Office of 

Inspector General recommends that Congress hold regular oversight hearings to determine number one, whether TVA’s coal ash 

facilities have either been closed properly or modified to an appropriate safety level; number two, whether TVA’s culture has in fact 

been changed to become more transparent and more accountable; 

and finally, whether TVA has fulfilled its responsibilities to the 

citizens of Roane County to clean up their community and to make 

them whole. 

Madam Chairwoman, this concludes my opening remarks. I look 

forward to answering any questions that you or the Committee 

may have. 

Ms. JOHNSON. Thank you so very much. 

Mr. William Almes. 

Mr. ALMES. Good morning. Madam Chairwoman Johnson, Ranking Member Boozman, and Members of the Subcommittee, my 

name is William Scott Almes. I am the Director of Geotechnical Engineering for Marshall Miller & Associates. I am a licensed professional engineer with a Bachelor of Science and a Master of Science 

in civil and geotechnical engineering. I have worked in the field as 

a consulting engineer for nearly 20 years. 

I was the lead project manager on a peer review of the study 

commissioned by TVA to determine the root cause of the December 

22nd, 2008 ash spill at TVA’s Kingston Fossil Plant. I appreciate 

this opportunity to testify before you regarding the results of that 

peer review and other observations about ash management pracVerDate Aug 31 2005 11:00 Nov 24, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00137 Fmt 6602 Sfmt 6602 P:\DOCS\51348 JASON
124 

tices at TVA. We prepared this work for the TVA Office of Inspector General. The details of it are incorporated into their report that 

is being made public today. 

I will now summarize the results of our work focusing on three 

important topics. First is Marshall Miller’s conclusions regarding 

the root cause analysis. Second is our general conclusions and observations of ash management practices. Third is our recommendations for moving forward. 

Our first conclusion regarding the root cause analysis is that, in 

Marshall Miller’s opinion, the four probable root causes identified 

by AECOM are technically plausible, reasonably supported by the 

data, and that all four contributed significantly to the spill. However, Marshall Miller believes that the AECOM root cause analysis 

focuses disproportionately on the significance of this thin, discontinuous soft foundation layer, which has been called a slimes 

layer or sensitive silt layer, as one of the most probable root 

causes. 

The significance of the ‘‘fill geometry’’ and the ‘‘loose wet ash’’, in 

other words, hydraulically placed or sluiced ash, indicate these factors also as probable root causes of equal or greater significance to 

the soft foundation soils factor. They should be equally emphasized. 

In Marshall Miller’s opinion, the failure was not strictly associated 

with the thin, weak, sensitive silt and slimes foundation layer and 

more associated with the ash dike geometry and the relatively low 

strength of this sluiced loose wet ash and impounded material. 

Lastly, this has significant implications for TVA and the power 

industry. Other similarly constructed TVA impoundments with or 

without the slimes layer could be at risk of failure and should also 

be investigated. 

I will now focus on our general conclusions and observations concerning ash management. As early as 1985, intrinsic problems related to the stability of Dike C, which is the original dike, were 

known by TVA. An internal memorandum included in our report 

indicated that the calculated factor of safety for stability was less 

than the minimum accepted value of 1.5. Close monitoring was recommended at that time to detect any potential signs of failure in 

lieu of changing TVA policies and procedures that would require 

that the ash pond be designed to a higher dam safety standard. No 

specific action by TVA appears to have been taken to improve the 

stability of the earthen Dike C embankment. 

In Marshall Miller’s opinion, if TVA had included its ash ponds 

in a dam safety program, as discussed in the December 1988 

memorandum when TVA decided against this policy, the probability of identifying some or all of the conditions that led to the 

failure would have increased significantly. 

The construction of successive upstream stages to an elevation of 

820 feet, which is the approximate failure elevation, above the 

original containment dike may have contributed to an additional 

decrease in the factor of safety of the containment dike system. In 

essence, at the time of failure, this increase in constructed height 

was approximately 70 feet higher than the original crest elevation 

of Dike C. 

The design of the Kingston coal ash dredge cells should have included a thorough engineering evaluation of all potential failure 

125 

modes. Our recommendations for moving forward is that, since in 

our opinion, the Kingston ash pond failure was not strictly associated with the thin, weak sensitive silt and slimes foundation layer 

and more associated with the ash dike or fill geometry and the relatively low strength of the sluiced wet ash, other similarly constructed ash impoundments could be at risk of failure and should 

be properly investigated. 

TVA and the power generation industry as a whole should 

strongly consider all the factors evaluated by AECOM as probable 

root causes of the Kingston failure when assessing the condition 

and structural integrity of wet ash disposal facilities. It is not prudent to presume that, if slimes observed in the failed section at 

Kingston do not exist at any other sites, there is adequate stability 

of these structures. On the contrary, the information developed 

from the extensive studies conducted by Stantec and AECOM indicates that there is reasonable risk of other dike failures if changes 

are not made in the design, construction, oversight, and operation 

of these facilities. 

Lastly, sound engineering practice is to design such facilities 

with features that provide a reasonable degree of redundancy or a 

second line of defense in the event that one or more of these systems become inoperable. It is important that this design philosophy 

be applied to all of TVA’s ash disposal facilities. 

This concludes my statement. I look forward to answering any 

questions you may have. Thank you very much. 

Ms. JOHNSON. Thank you very much. 

We will begin the first round of questions now. 

Mr. Kilgore, first of all, thank you for the pictures of the cleanup 

of Church Slough. I am really delighted and pleased at what this 

remediation of the Kingston spill can look like once it is all clean. 

As you noted in your testimony, I have traveled to Kingston and 

have seen the spill firsthand. Not 500 feet from the area shown us 

in the photographs is another contaminated area known as the 

embayment. Can we get a commitment from you today that you 

will restore that greater area to the same standards and the same 

conditions as you demonstrated is possible in the Church Slough? 

Mr. KILGORE. Yes, ma’am. We have made that commitment that 

we will clean up the river first, as the EPA has testified. Then we 

will move to the embayment. Then we have to move to the failed 

cell itself and fix that. So we have really three areas. We are committed to fix all three of those areas. 

Ms. JOHNSON. Now, you have seen this. I don’t know how long 

it took for the buildup to come but have you determined how often 

you might need to move this out to keep it from accumulating to 

that level again? 

Mr. KILGORE. How often we might need to move this ash? 

Ms. JOHNSON. Yes. 

Mr. KILGORE. Yes, ma’am. We are designing a dry collection system there. That ash will have to be stored off-site. We intend to 

dry all of those ponds out so that we do not have wet storage onsite. As we move forward with that, as we design and implement 

that dry collection system, I anticipate all the ash will be transported off-site. 

Ms. JOHNSON. I understand you are moving it now to Alabama? 

126 

Mr. KILGORE. We are. 

Ms. JOHNSON. Is that going to be a permanent place that you 

may be able to take it? 

Mr. KILGORE. No, ma’am. I wouldn’t say that. We solicited bids 

from all locations that had the proper permits. We got several responses to that. We selected the site we did because, after we tentatively looked at that, I sent two of my senior executives down to 

look at it and talk to the community. They made sure that they 

were ready to receive it, that the pond and the permit looked in 

order, and all of that. Then we asked EPA for approval to ship 

that. We have committed to ship about three million tons out of the 

existing 5.4 million that we need to recover. We will be continuing 

to look at other sites for shipment. 

Ms. JOHNSON. Thank you very much. 

Mr. Stanislaus, in your testimony you state that EPA continues 

to evaluate coal ash disposal practices at coal-fired power plants to 

determine if these facilities are in compliance with existing environmental laws. Would you provide us a summary of the findings 

so far? Please also speak to compliance with Clean Water Act discharge permits. 

Mr. STANISLAUS. We are in the midst of doing the assessment. 

We expect to complete the assessment of the high hazards and significant hazards by the end of this year. When we complete that 

we will certainly provide that to the Committee and yourself. 

Ms. JOHNSON. Now, let me just ask this one last question to you. 

In your view, from both storage and water quality perspectives, 

should coal-fired power plants be using wet ash disposal methods 

or dry? 

Mr. STANISLAUS. Clearly, the use of wet ash is a significant risk 

that we are looking at in terms of our rule making. It has been 

identified as a risk of impact to groundwater and water quality. 

That is something that we are taking a hard look at in terms of 

our rule making, which we will be completing by the end of this 

year. 

Ms. JOHNSON. Do you plan to modify your oversight with TVA in 

view of the Inspector General’s testimony? 

Mr. STANISLAUS. TDEC, the Tennessee Department of Environment and Conservation, has a local lead of that. We are working 

with TDEC in terms of its oversight. We are in the field in terms 

of overseeing the removal of the coal ash from the river. We will 

be there throughout the removal of the coal ash. 

Ms. JOHNSON. Yes, but I mean in general. I also would like to 

say, too, that until EPA really got involved, according to the people 

in the area, they didn’t see much change. What kind of oversight 

will be performed by those persons that have that responsibility? 

Mr. STANISLAUS. EPA is on the site every day overseeing the 

work. 

Ms. JOHNSON. They are now? 

Mr. STANISLAUS. Yes, they are. 

Ms. JOHNSON. Thank you very much. 

Mr. BOOZMAN. Thank you, Madam Chair. Mr. Moore, you mentioned that you agreed with the statement about poor oversight 

and lack of regulation as a contributor. I guess my question is poor 

127 

oversight from whom? Is it the State or EPA? Your Office plays a 

role in this. 

Mr. MOORE. Certainly, as you are aware, the Kingston facility 

was licensed or permitted as a landfill. There is a question about 

how adequate that regulation was. There is also a question, and I 

believe Mr. Walton FE 

Mr. BOOZMAN. In regard to that regulation, whose fault is that? 

Mr. MOORE. I don’t necessarily want to pin fault, but I would say 

FE 

Mr. BOOZMAN. But that is your job. 

Mr. MOORE. Well, TDEC certainly was the regulating authority. 

The question would be whether there should be other regulators on 

these types of facilities. Certainly if they were regulated as dam 

structures, as I believe both Mr. Walton and Mr. Almes would recommend, there would have been more strenuous examination. If 

that had been done in this case, I am reliably told by Mr. Almes 

from Marshall Miller that it is possible that the Kingston spill 

would not have occurred. 

Mr. BOOZMAN. So EPA was doing their job? 

Mr. MOORE. Well, I don’t know what EPA’s jurisdiction would 

have been over a landfill at the time. 

Mr. BOOZMAN. You mention that lack of regulation. Was it lack 

of regulation or just failure to enforce the current regulation? I 

think that is important. I don’t know. That is why we are asking 

these questions. 

Mr. MOORE. My observations, sir, would be that even strict regulation of a landfill, when you have the combined geotechnical forces 

that were at work here, would not have been sufficient. 

Mr. BOOZMAN. Very good. Mr. Kilgore, what steps is TVA taking 

to ensure that this doesn’t happen at the other coal ash storage facilities? In particular, I know TVA utilizes wet ash storage at other 

sites, some of which are no longer in operation. While TVA is proposing to close the five operational wet coal ash disposal sites, what 

is TVA proposing to do with those sites that are no longer in operation? 

Mr. KILGORE. We have one of those sites, sir, at the Watts Bar 

Fossil Plant. We have contained it. The other five sites that are 

wet storage, besides Kingston, we are moving forward with a plan 

to take all of those to dry storage. So we are going that way. 

What we have done in the last six months is Stantec’s identification. They walked down all the facilities and they identified initial 

issues that we needed to correct. We have hauled about 82,000 tons 

of rock to shore up various places. We have cleaned out vegetation 

so that the inspectors can see better. But I think the most important thing is that we have gotten a lot more intrusive. In other 

words, instead of doing visual investigations, we have drilled holes. 

Stantec has gone out there much like AECOM did on the failed facility and drilled into these dams to ascertain what is underground 

so that they know what is underground. That gives us some more 

comfort but we will not be comforted until we know exactly what 

is down there and we take all the remedial actions. We have tried 

to unstop all the drains to make sure the drains are properly operating. We have tried to backfill, as I said, with stone. We put 

128 

piezometers down, about 250 piezometers in these ten other sites, 

so that we can see movement and see water. 

Mr. BOOZMAN. Very good. I have one final question, Mr. Walton, 

real quick. When you all were contacted to look into this and figure 

out what was going on, the root cause, were you just asked to do 

the technical aspects of it or did you get into the corporate culture 

and things like that? Were you asked to do both? 

Mr. WALTON. No. Our role was the technical review of the root 

cause for failure, the cause location and explaining the failure 

mechanism. 

Mr. BOOZMAN. Okay. Thank you all very much. Thank you, 

Madam Chair. 

Ms. JOHNSON. Thank you very much. Mr. Griffith. 

Mr. GRIFFITH. Thank you, Madam Chair. The EPA initiated a report in 2002 that has just been released in 2009 that demonstrates 

the carcinogenic effect of coal ash combustion material from coal. 

Are you familiar with that report release in 2009? 

Mr. STANISLAUS. I am not specifically familiar with it. 

Mr. GRIFFITH. Let me tell you a little bit about it. In 1775, a year 

before 1776, Dr. Percival Pott described coal combustion causing 

cancer in chimney sweeps. We have known for that many years 

that these were carcinogenic agents that we were producing. We 

have noted that all through the subsequent years. In 2009, a report 

was issued that had been ongoing since 2002 within your agency. 

It demonstrated that the increased risk of cancer around these coal 

ash deposits was significant. 

My question is this: Do you believe that, had you told Mr. Kilgore about those findings, there would have been a heightened responsibility on the part of TVA? This dump in particular was unlined and leaking into the goundwater. As far as EPA is concerned 

will this spill have far reaching consequences? The second part of 

that question is how are you going to know when you have got that 

site cleaned up, if a great majority of it has already gone 

downriver? 

Mr. STANISLAUS. With respect to your first question, clearly this 

spill is a catastrophic event that should not have occurred. Clearly 

the constituents in coal ash are something that we are taking a 

look at in terms of regulation. We will be issuing that regulation 

later this year. So we are taking this seriously, the consequence of 

the constituents in that. 

With respect to knowing when we are done, that is frankly our 

job. We have historically remediated river sites. We will ensure 

that everything is removed from the river. 

I don’t know if Mr. Meiburg wants to add to that. 

Mr. MEIBURG. I would only add to that, Congressman, that fortunately, or unfortunately depending upon your point of view, most 

of the material actually stayed in some vicinity of the site. Our 

highest priority on the cleanup has been to get the material out of 

the main stem of the Emory River to make sure that more doesn’t 

go downstream, especially during the spring flood period. That is 

why we have been pushing to accelerate the removal of the material from the river, so that we could try to get most of it out of the 

main stem before next spring. We have been making accelerated 

129 

progress on that with TVA over the last couple of months. We expect to continue that. 

Mr. GRIFFITH. Thank you. This issue really is not, I am changing 

gears a little bit, this issue is really not about cleanup. Mr. Almes, 

I think you were probably not surprised at the spill after being an 

engineer and inspecting. I don’t think anyone is faulting anyone on 

the cleanup. What we are concerned with is the multitude of areas 

in the country that are very similar to Kingston. I know that you 

have had that experience in Iowa. We have had that experience in 

Pennsylvania. 

We do know that this coal ash is as carcinogenic as nuclear 

waste. We know that arsenic, selenium and boron are chemicals 

that we are finding in the waste. And we know that they are now 

present in the drinking water in many communities. How can we 

reassure our constituents? Since the Tennessee River runs through 

my district, how can we reassure my constituents that they are 

safe, that we are keeping them safe? 

Mr. STANISLAUS. I presume that is directed at me. 

Mr. GRIFFITH. Well, anybody can chime in on that one if you 

have got a good answer. 

Mr. STANISLAUS. As Administrator Jackson has committed, we 

are going around the Country and doing an assessment of all facilities with high and significantly high hazard ratings. That will be 

done by the end of this year. We will also be taking a look at all 

of the facilities to assess where there is any risk of failure and prevent that. Also, if there are any violations, we plan to do enforcement actions. Those are the short term actions. We are simultaneously looking at the risk and the need to develop some rules to 

prevent any impact to groundwater or surface water. 

Mr. GRIFFITH. This is just for Mr. Kilgore. My question is whether we should rely on State agencies? Should we punt the responsibility to a State agency that apparently has failed us in this area 

as far as inspections? 

In your organization, and I know you are new to the job, essentially, and inherited a great deal of this, are heads rolling? Are you 

getting anybody’s attention there? TVA is like turning around the 

Queen Mary. This will take a while. What can we look forward to 

there? 

Mr. KILGORE. Well, we have to change. If that means heads have 

to roll or people have to leave, so be it. You would find, if you go 

back from when I arrived until now, that about two thirds of the 

senior management has changed. About 90 percent of the plant 

managers have recently been rotated or, in some cases, new plant 

managers have been installed so that we have new eyes on this 

problem. 

If I have learned one lesson about this, it is to be intrusive and 

to be self-critical about things we don’t know about. That means 

that occasionally we need fresh eyes on the subject and that we 

don’t allow these waivers, if you will, from looking at things. 

I will be honest, the memorandum that was mentioned earlier in 

1985 said that the safety factor was not what it should be. But further down it said that the remedy is a daily inspection. That is not 

good enough. Knowing what we know now, it is not good enough 

that the remedy was a daily inspection. The safety factor has to be 

130 

increased. We are the first line of defense on that and we have to 

do that. 

Mr. GRIFFITH. I have one last thing, Madam Chair. I am over 

time but I am concerned that we might be allowing TVA to grade 

its own paper. In an agency that big, I know that you can’t sit 

there and watch them take the test. So my concern is that grading 

your own paper is a great danger to us. Should we have random 

independent inspections of facilities outside of the TVA organization? 

Mr. KILGORE. I think that is a question more to our regulators, 

EPA. But I will tell you that we welcome the outside. I have 

learned a lot in this. I don’t think we are grading our own papers 

since I have got EPA, TDEC, the OIG, and an outside law firm that 

the Board employed. I have got four people looking over my shoulder. We have put over 20,000 pages of documents on the website 

so that everybody else can see that. Some of those are very painful 

for me. I am both saddened and frankly a little bit mad that I 

walked into this. But it is my responsibility now that we have 

found it to clean it up and to change the culture. 

Mr. GRIFFITH. Thank you, Mr. Kilgore. Thank you, Madam 

Chair. 

Ms. JOHNSON. Thank you very much. Mr. Hare. 

Mr. HARE. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman. Mr. Kilgore, in 

early July after the release of the root cause analysis by AECOM, 

the TVA released a statement that included the following statement. It says, ‘‘TVA has asked Stantec to pay particular attention 

to the four major contributing causes of the Kingston ash spill to 

ensure the combination does not exist at any other site. To date, 

nothing has been found that indicates that this combination exists 

at other TVA facilities.’’ 

Based on the earlier statements by Mr. Walton and Mr. Almes, 

I wonder if you could explain the public statement by TVA? In my 

view, this seems to imply that because that particular combination 

does not exist, there is no viable threat of collapse at these other 

facilities. I was wondering, do you share that same plain reading 

interpretation? 

Mr. KILGORE. I do not share that interpretation. Thank you for 

asking that question. We obviously, since those four factors were 

identified, pay particular attention to them because I don’t want 

any of those four factors to catch us again. Stantec has been debriefed regularly by AECOM so that they know what is going on. 

But they have not been limited to that. What we are concerned 

about is that all the rest of these structures, frankly, may be individual. None of them may be like the other ones. So we have got 

to be, as I said earlier, intrusive in each one of them. 

AECOM drilled many, many holes. They even asked us to cut a 

slice in the old dike at Kingston so that they could see what was 

really down there. We are asking Stantec, they have already started doing that and they have completed quite a bit, to put those instruments down there. 

So the implication that if these four factors don’t exist elsewhere 

we are home free is not an implication that I agree with. We have 

to treat each one of those as its own individual structure. 

131 

Mr. HARE. In your testimony today you state, ‘‘There is no evidence of imminent failure at other TVA sites based on initial 

Stantec evaluations.’’ However, in its recent Phase I assessment report, Stantec itself states, ‘‘Due to limited record drawings and construction QA/QC documentation at any of these facilities, Stantec 

is unable to render opinions relative to overall structural integrity.’’ 

These two statements seem to be wildly inconsistent. 

So, especially in light of the findings by the McKenna and the 

TVA OIG reports concerning a broken culture of accountability, 

this seems very troubling. Can you maybe comment on this and enlighten me? 

Mr. KILGORE. I will try. Let me address the Stantec report first 

of all. What I understand from that, in talking to them and others 

of my staff, is that when they looked at our drawings they indeed 

found this culture problem. We had the drawings of how the dams 

were supposed to be built but they didn’t have as-builts. So we 

didn’t know what was changed and we didn’t know if they were 

built according to those drawings. That is why we asked them to 

go be intrusive, to drill, to find out everything they could about the 

as-built condition. 

So, yes, they can’t give me an unequivocal statement that this is 

not in danger of failing. What we are doing is following their advice, letter by letter, and trying to go frankly a little overboard 

with some of it in terms of our clearing and our progress toward 

drying it out. 

As I said earlier today, I will not be comfortable until we have 

the knowledge of what is underground on all of these. Stantec has 

a few months yet to work on this to complete their work. Even 

then, I think we still have to be self-critical and intrusive. 

Mr. HARE. I have just one last question, maybe for the panel. I 

apologize because I came in late. What was the total cost of this 

cleanup to the American taxpayers? What was the total cost? 

Mr. KILGORE. The total cost, we estimate, will be right at $1 billion. 

Mr. HARE. $1 billion? 

Mr. KILGORE. $1 billion. 

Mr. HARE. Thank you, Madam Chair. 

Ms. JOHNSON. Thank you very much. Congresswoman 

Napolitano. 

Mrs. NAPOLITANO. Thank you, Madam Chair. Of great interest to 

me especially is the area of groundwater. Mr. Kilgore, I am under 

the impression that groundwater contamination was a problem before. Where there is a combination of dams and wet ash, is there 

leakage into an aquifer underneath that might contaminate 

aquifers in the area from which people drink? 

Mr. KILGORE. We have no evidence that I know of that it is leaking into the aquifer. We have wells and we are monitoring those. 

So we have no evidence so far. I will let the EPA comment, but 

they commented also on the water and the intake structure. We 

have been monitoring FE 

Mrs. NAPOLITANO. There is no lining. 

Mr. KILGORE. Excuse me? 

Mrs. NAPOLITANO. There is no lining underneath. 

132 

Mr. KILGORE. You are right. There is no lining. This ash, though, 

settles. The metals are not all soluble so it settles. We think it 

stays there, unless we have an incident like this. So our greatest 

need is to get all of this out of the river and back onto dry land 

so it can dry out. 

Mrs. NAPOLITANO. Another area of concern, of course, is in the 

July 2009 report of TVA’s Inspector General. Appendix C includes 

an internal TVA memorandum. Point four of this memorandum, 

‘‘Because of concerns about groundwater contamination, TVA is 

moving away from wet ash disposal techniques to dry stacking.’’ I 

would like to ask if you can provide the Subcommittee with copies 

of the analysis that went into formulating these concerns about 

groundwater in 1988, 21 years ago? 

Secondly, in the 21 years since that analysis was presented to 

TVA management, what specific action or actions have been taken 

to alleviate TVA’s own concerns about groundwater contamination? 

I am into water. I am, you know, the Chair of the Subcommittee 

on Water and Power. So contaminants are something that we have 

been facing on my own Subcommittee. We have no new water 

sources. So any water that we abuse or misuse, we need to clean 

up. 

I am concerned that any of these pollutants may have leaked 

into or contaminated the reservoir next to the Kingston facility. I 

don’t know what EPA has done about making sure that contaminants are not being carried out to where effluent is being pumped 

out as fresh water. 

Mr. KILGORE. Well, I am concerned about the water, too, because 

I live there and occasionally go boating. So I share your concerns. 

We do have wells in the area that we are monitoring. TDEC looked 

at 400 wells around the area and found no groundwater contamination. That is not a reason for us to rest. I take your concerns seriously and we are going to continue to look at that. 

Mrs. NAPOLITANO. Would you provide this Committee, then, with 

the copies of that analysis that went into formulating that concern 

in 1988? 

Mr. KILGORE. I will. Let me just admit that what the Inspector 

General found was that there was not proper action on some of 

those older things. I will admit that to you right now. That is what 

I have to change. 

Mrs. NAPOLITANO. Thank you. EPA? 

Mr. STANISLAUS. I will let Mr. Stan Meiburg deal with the local 

issues. 

With respect to the impact on groundwater from impoundment, 

that is something we are looking at right now. That has been identified specifically as causing damage to groundwater and to surface 

water. We are looking at that in terms of developing new rules. 

Those rules will be developed by the end of this year. 

With respect to the specific local concerns, I would like to let Mr. 

Meiburg address that. 

Mr. MEIBURG. Yes. As Mr. Stanislaus said, groundwater contamination from these types of facilities has been a concern to EPA. 

Whether or not groundwater contamination occurs in part depends 

on the geological structure that underlays them. We have done 

pretty extensive sampling, along with the Tennessee Department of 

133 

Environment and Conservation, at this particular site. It appears 

that in this case we have been fortunate. There has not been migration of contaminants through a groundwater pathway in any of 

the samples that we have taken so far. 

Mrs. NAPOLITANO. How often do you test those areas? 

Mr. MEIBURG. We have been testing those areas very frequently 

now. 

Mrs. NAPOLITANO. Frequently meaning daily, weekly, or monthly? 

Mr. MEIBURG. No, we have not been doing daily samples. What 

we have done is gone and tested the wells, as Mr. Kilgore said, together with TDEC and TVA since the accident occurred. We have 

not yet found any movement into any of the wells that are tested. 

But it is not a regular sample. It has been a sample on request and 

demand. 

Mrs. NAPOLITANO. I have a great concern about the cost to the 

general taxpayer, number one. Number two is the health and safety of those areas. Then, of course, number three is whether or not 

it becomes an issue that then comes back to the Federal Government to clean up. I have a contaminated site that has involved 

maybe 20 years in cleanup, costing millions upon million of dollars. 

The taxpayer is paying for it because the potential responsible parties are long gone. 

I am certain that we don’t want to face anything like that, 

maybe, in the other areas where you may have these same facilities. Steps must be taken to protect the water safety, the public 

safety, and any other area that is of concern. Mr. Kilgore? 

Mr. KILGORE. Yes, ma’am. TVA does not get Government funding 

so all of this will fall to us to pay. Unfortunately, the steps that 

we didn’t take in the past will now fall on our rate payers. We will 

have to pay for that through our electric bills. We intend to try to 

stretch that out. This problem didn’t occur overnight so we are 

going to try to amortize that out over several years. Still, as you 

indicate, somebody has to pay for the oversights in the past. As I 

said, my job is to make sure it doesn’t happen again. 

Mrs. NAPOLITANO. Thank you, Madam Chair. 

Ms. JOHNSON. Thank you very much. 

Mr. Hall. 

Mr. HALL. Thank you, Madam Chair. I am sorry for being late. 

I was double-booked, as many of us are. It so happens that I was 

at the Select Committee for Energy Independence and Global 

Warming where we heard, among other things, testimony from Dr. 

Brent Constantz, a professor from Stanford University and CEO of 

Calera Corporation, who talked about a potential future solution to 

this kind of problem. 

I am just curious, Mr. Kilgore or any of the engineers, if you 

would comment on this CMAP technology, Carbonate Mineralization by Aqueous Precipitation, in which the natural carbonate mimics corals when they make their external skeleton, capturing CO2 

emissions and storing it in a stable mineral form. 

It can be used to replace or supplement traditional Portland cement, offsetting emissions that would otherwise result. It can be 

used as aggregate as well. The estimated current market demand 

134 

for cement and aggregate is over three billion tons per year in the 

United States alone and over 30 billion tons per year worldwide. 

The process has the potential to provide a positive use of the 

overwhelming majority of U.S. coal fired emissions, including solid 

waste normally bound for landfills such as fly ash, luminous smelt, 

or byproducts such as red mud and other waste products that can 

be incorporated into this process. I know we need to solve this 

problem; we need to deal with the existing old technologies. But 

this seems to me like maybe a promising road for TVA to look at. 

Mr. KILGORE. Yes, sir. I am not prepared to answer that today 

but I would like to have my research and development folks give 

me an answer for you and to file that for the record. 

I will say that as to climate change, TVA approved about a year 

ago a goal to get us to less than 50 percent carbon-based generation by the early 2020s. So we are cognizant of the issue. This 

sounds like something that I would very much like our engineers 

to look into. 

Mr. HALL. I will make sure you get a copy of it. We got all excited in the other hearing when we heard about this stuff. 

I wanted to ask about specifically what actions, this is to EPA, 

what actions have been taken at TVA’s Widows Creek, Bull Run, 

and Colbert power facilities? What enforcement actions has EPA 

engaged in? Why has EPA not enforced the Clean Water Act and 

other statutes as a result of this known pollution? 

Mr. STANISLAUS. With respect to this particular spill, the Tennessee Department of Environment and Conservation entered into 

an order with TVA to address the cleanup. EPA subsequently entered into an agreement on consent to oversee the cleanup work by 

TVA. 

With respect to Clean Water Act violations, I have to get back 

to you on that. 

Mr. HALL. In the January 2009 Senate Environment and Public 

Works Committee hearing, Mr. Kilgore, you told Chairwoman 

Boxer and Senator Merkley that you would look into the groundwater and surface water contamination issues at these three facilities, cited by EPA. Could you tell us today how these facilities are 

implicated with the contamination of water? What exactly has happened? What steps have you taken and what are you looking forward to doing to deal with these facilities? 

Mr. KILGORE. With respect to the three you talked about, I didn’t 

find any evidence that we had exceeded any groundwater emissions 

there. We still plan on going to dry storage of the ash on those 

sites. So what we are planning on doing is getting rid of the wet 

storage there. That means that the water is less and the volume 

is less. The ash is stored in a dry state. 

Mr. HALL. Thank you, Madam Chair. I yield back. 

Ms. JOHNSON. Thank you very much, Mr. Hall. 

I have one final question to Mr. Walton. You mentioned that 

there were lessons learned that are maybe applicable to other coal 

ash storage sites. Can you elaborate a little bit? 

Mr. WALTON. I would be honored to. There is a body of knowledge that has been gained through the sampling of the loose wet 

ash. There has been an awareness as to the containment systems 

using the upstream dike methods of construction, similar in the 

135 

way that mine tailings facilities are done. There have been some 

lessons learned in that the ash does not improve its density with 

higher and deeper layers placed on top of it. I think that is applicable to be used and studied at other sites. Certainly the rate of loading is important as these sites get higher and higher with the 

added influence of gravity on these structures. 

The lessons learned are that you don’t have to have slimes. You 

might have a foundation system made of clays or you may be on 

some loose sands near an earthquake zone for those facilities near 

seismic areas. There are also the issues of piping and seepage and 

water management. These structures are made by hydraulic methods, controlling the waters that pass through and are contained. So 

there is water management, seepage management, storage, and 

containment. All these factors are lessons learned. 

It is sort of an awakening in that trained engineers are able to 

get out there, inspect, assess, and take this program, through your 

guidance and others, forward so that this won’t happen again. 

Ms. JOHNSON. Thank you very much. Mr. Kilgore, what I would 

like to see is some communication between you and entities responsible for some of the other spills. See if you can come up with something of a plan for how often you have to move coal ash to prevent 

buildup. If you talk to Kentucky and some of the other places that 

have had similar issues, I would appreciate it. 

Mr. KILGORE. I will do that. 

Ms. JOHNSON. Thank you very much. This is the end of our hearing. 

[Whereupon, at 11:55 a.m., the Subcommittee was adjourned.] 

136 


Insert offset folio 121 here 51348.121
137 


Insert offset folio 122 here 51348.122
138 


Insert offset folio 123 here 51348.123
139 


Insert offset folio 124 here 51348.124
140 


Insert offset folio 125 here 51348.125
141 


Insert offset folio 126 here 51348.126
142 


Insert offset folio 127 here 51348.127
143 


Insert offset folio 128 here 51348.128
144 


Insert offset folio 129 here 51348.129
145 


Insert offset folio 130 here 51348.130
146 


Insert offset folio 131 here 51348.131
147 


Insert offset folio 132 here 51348.132
148 


Insert offset folio 133 here 51348.133
149 


Insert offset folio 134 here 51348.134
150 


Insert offset folio 135 here 51348.135
151 


Insert offset folio 136 here 51348.136
152 


Insert offset folio 137 here 51348.137
153 


Insert offset folio 138 here 51348.138
154 


Insert offset folio 139 here 51348.139
155 


Insert offset folio 140 here 51348.140
156 


Insert offset folio 141 here 51348.141
157 


Insert offset folio 142 here 51348.142
158 


Insert offset folio 143 here 51348.143
159 


Insert offset folio 144 here 51348.144
160 


Insert offset folio 145 here 51348.145
161 


Insert offset folio 146 here 51348.146
162 


Insert offset folio 147 here 51348.147
163 


Insert offset folio 148 here 51348.148
164 


Insert offset folio 149 here 51348.149
165 


Insert offset folio 150 here 51348.150
166 


Insert offset folio 151 here 51348.151
167 


Insert offset folio 152 here 51348.152
168 


Insert offset folio 153 here 51348.153
169 


Insert offset folio 154 here 51348.154
170 


Insert offset folio 155 here 51348.155
171 


Insert offset folio 156 here 51348.156
172 


Insert offset folio 157 here 51348.157
173 


Insert offset folio 158 here 51348.158
174 


Insert offset folio 159 here 51348.159
175 


Insert offset folio 160 here 51348.160
176 


Insert offset folio 161 here 51348.161
177 


Insert offset folio 162 here 51348.162
178 


Insert offset folio 163 here 51348.163
179 


Insert offset folio 164 here 51348.164
180 


Insert offset folio 165 here 51348.165
181 


Insert offset folio 166 here 51348.166
182 


Insert offset folio 167 here 51348.167
183 


Insert offset folio 168 here 51348.168
184 


Insert offset folio 169 here 51348.169
185 


Insert offset folio 170 here 51348.170
186 


Insert offset folio 171 here 51348.171
187 


Insert offset folio 172 here 51348.172
188 


Insert offset folio 173 here 51348.173
189 


Insert offset folio 174 here 51348.174
190 


Insert offset folio 175 here 51348.175
191 


Insert offset folio 176 here 51348.176
192 


Insert offset folio 177 here 51348.177
193 


Insert offset folio 178 here 51348.178
194 


Insert offset folio 179 here 51348.179
195 


Insert offset folio 180 here 51348.180
196 


Insert offset folio 181 here 51348.181
197 


Insert offset folio 182 here 51348.182
198 


Insert offset folio 183 here 51348.183
199 


Insert offset folio 184 here 51348.184
200 


Insert offset folio 185 here 51348.185
201 


Insert offset folio 186 here 51348.186
202 


Insert offset folio 187 here 51348.187
203 


Insert offset folio 188 here 51348.188
204 


Insert offset folio 189 here 51348.189
205 


Insert offset folio 190 here 51348.190
206 


Insert offset folio 191 here 51348.191
207 


Insert offset folio 192 here 51348.192
208 


Insert offset folio 193 here 51348.193
209 


Insert offset folio 194 here 51348.194
210 


Insert offset folio 195 here 51348.195
211 


Insert offset folio 196 here 51348.196
212 


Insert offset folio 197 here 51348.197
213 


Insert offset folio 198 here 51348.198
214 


Insert offset folio 199 here 51348.199
215 


Insert offset folio 200 here 51348.200
216 


Insert offset folio 201 here 51348.201
217 


Insert offset folio 202 here 51348.202
218 


Insert offset folio 203 here 51348.203
219 


Insert offset folio 204 here 51348.204
220 


Insert offset folio 205 here 51348.205
221 


Insert offset folio 206 here 51348.206
222 

Æ 


Insert offset folio 207 here 51348.207