# IN THE SUPREME COURT O F TEX AS

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## N O



## . 11-0255

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# I N R E T H E 

# O F F IC E O F T H E 

# A T T O R N E Y 

# G E N E R A L

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## O N 

## P E T I T I O N F O R 

## W R I T O F 

## M A N D A M U S



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## Argued F ebruary 27, 2012

J U S T I C E 

## L E H R M A N N 

## delivere d the opinion of the Court.

“The court m ay not find a respondent i n contempt of court for failure to pay child support

if the responde nt appea

rs at the hear ing with

. . . evidenc e

. . . showing that the responde nt is curr ent

in the pay ment of child support as ordered by the court.” T E X



## . F A M



## . C O D E 

## § 157.162(d). We are

called upon to interpre t t h i s s ection of the Texas Family Code, which provides a mecha nism by

which an obligor who has violated a child support order may avoid a contempt finding

. We hold that

this lang uag e is una

mbiguous and means what it say s: an obligor must be curr ent on court-or dere d

child support pay

ments d u e at t h e time of the enfor ceme nt hear ing, reg ardle ss of whether those

pay ments hav e been pled in the motion for enfor ceme nt, in order to invoke section 157.162(d) to

avoid a finding of contempt where co n t empt uous conduct has otherwise been proper ly pled and

established. Holding otherwise would contr av en e the statute’s plain lang uag e and allow a

rec alcitra nt obligor to esca

pe a valid contempt findin g b y p ay i n g only those pay ments pled in a

## motion to enfor ce while continuing to disobey the prior order befor e the enfor ceme nt hear ing. We

there fore hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in enter ing a contempt order in this case

.

We conditionally g rant relief and instruct the court of appea ls to vacat e i t s j u d gm ent, there by

reinstating the trial cour

t’s contempt orde r.

I. F acts

Noble Ezukanma, M.D. (Noble) was order ed to pay $5,400 eac h month to Njideke L awr eta

Ezukanma (L awr eta) for the support of their six children. Noble only made partial pay ments in the

months of De cember 2007 throug h Fe bruar y 2008, and he failed to make any pay ment at all in

Marc h, April, and J une of 2008, resulting in an arrear ag e of $23,044.78 on J une 9, 2008. The

Tarr ant County Domestic Relations Offic e filed a motion to enfor ce the support order in J une 2008. 1



## The motion asser

ted six counts of contempt, specific ally alleg ing eac h pay ment failure

, the amount

of any partial pay

ments made, and the total outstanding arr ear ag e as of J une 9, 2008. I n the motion,

the Off ice r equeste d that Noble be he ld in contempt for ea ch of six violations of the support order

and that the court rec og nize the total outstanding arr ear ag e at the time of the hear ing on the motion.

Although a hear ing on the motion wa s initially set for the following month, it was not he ld

u n t i l Fe b ru ar y 2009. I n late J une 2008, Noble paid off the entire pled arr ear ag e with a lum p s u m

C h a p t e r 2 3 1 o f

t h e F a m i l y C o d e d e s i g n a t e s t h e O f f i c e o f t h e A t t o r n e y G e n e r a l a s t h e a g e n c y r e s p o n s i b l e f o r 1

i m p l e m e n t i n g f

e d e r a l T i t l e I V

- D r e q u i r e m e n t s r e g a r d i n g c h i l d s u p p o r t

. T E X

. F A M

. C O D E § 2 3 1

. 0 0 1

. T h a t c h a p t e r a l s o

a l l o w s t h e O f

f i c e t o d e l e g a t e i t s T i t l e I V

- D d u t i e s t o o t h e r a g e n c i e s

. I d

. § 2 3 1

. 0 0 2 ( c )

. C h a p t e r 2 0 3 p r o v i d e s f o r t h e

c r e a t i o n o f d o m e s t i c r e l a t i o n s o f f i c e s t o c o l l e c t
, m o n i t o r , a n d e n f o r c e c h i l d s u p p o r t i n t h e i r r e s p e c t i v e j u r i s d i c t i o n s

. I d

. § § 2 0 3

. 0 0 1

– . 0 0 7

. T h e T a r r a n t C o u n t y D o m e s t i c R e l a t i o n s O f f i c e , a c t i n g a s a T i t l e I V

- D C h i l d S u p p o r t M o n i t o r i n g P r o g r a m f

o r T a r r a n t C o u n t y , f

i l e d t h e m o t i o n t o e n f

o r c e i n t h i s c a s e o n L a w r e t a ’ s b e h a l f

, p u r s u a n t t o i t s s t a t u t o r y p o w e r s

. S e e i d

. § 2 0 3

. 0 0 4 ( a ) ( 3 ) ( B )

. U n d e r t h e t e r m s o f t h e a g r e e m e n t b e t w e e n t h e C o u n t y D o m e s t i c R e l a t i o n s O f f i c e a n d t h e A t t o r n e y G e n e r a l ’ s O f

f i c e , t h e D o m e s t i c R e l a t i o n s O f f i c e p r o v i d e s t r i a l c o u r t T i t l e I V

- D s e r v i c e s , w h i l e t h e A t t o r n e y G e n e r a l h a n d l e s b o t h t r i a l c o u r t a n d a p p e l l a t e m a t t e r s

. F o r a d i s c u s s i o n o f T i t l e I V

- D

, s e e f o o t n o t e 2 a n d a c c o m p a n y i n g
t e x t

.



### 2

## pay

ment. But afte r making this pay ment, Noble immediately reve rt ed to making only partial

pay ments during the rema ining intervening months betwee n the filing of the motion and the hear ing.

By the time the hear ing was held in Fe bruar y 2009, Noble had acc umulated a new arr ear ag e of

$28,656.56, which the trial court reduc ed to a money judgme nt. The trial court also held Noble in

contempt for the failure s to make timely child support pay ments that we re d u e under the support

order on Marc h 1, 2008, April 1, 2008, and J une 1, 2008, and sentenc ed him to serve 174 day s in jail

on the sec ond and four

th weeke nds of eve ry

month.

Noble filed a petition for writ of mandamus in the court of appea ls, arg uing that section

157.162(d) of the Texas Fam i ly Code prec luded a finding of contempt by the trial court. Section

157.162(d) pr ovides:

The court may not find a responde nt in contempt of court for failure to pay child support if the respondent ap p ea rs at t he hearing with a copy of t he pay ment rec ord or other e vidence satisfac tory to the court showing that the re spondent is curre nt in the pay ment of child support as or dere d by the cour t.

3

## T E X



## . F A M



## . C O D E 

## § 157.162(d). Noble arg ued that this provision prohibits a finding of contempt for 2



## missed pay

ments alleg ed in the motion to enfor ce that, though untimely under the support order

, had

b ee n satisfied prior to the hear ing. I n a divided decision, the court of appea ls adopted thi s

interpre tation and held th at No b l e could invoke the statute at the hear ing, despite the outstanding

$28,656.56 arr ear ag e, beca use he had become “cur

rent” on the missed pa

y ments for Marc h, April,

and J une that wer e pled in the motion. The court g rante d mandamus and habea s co rp u s re l i ef

, 3



## order ing the trial court to vacate i ts con t empt order

. Both L awr eta and the Office of the Att orney

Gene ral petitione d t his Court for mandamus relief

, arg uing that the court of appea ls abused its

discretion in g ranting mandamus relief and seeking reinstateme nt of the trial court’s contempt order

.

T h i s s u b s e c t i o n i s p a r t o f a s e c t i o n o f

t h e F a m i l y C o d e d e a l i n g w i t h “ P r o o f ” a t a n e n f

o r c e m e n t h e a r i n g

. T h e 2

p r o v i s i o n f

u r t h e r p r o v i d e s , i n p e r t i n e n t p a r t :

( c ) T h e m o v a n t m a y a t t a c h t o t h e m o t i o n a c o p y o f a p a y m e n t r e c o r d

. T h e m o v a n t m a y s u b s e q u e n t l y

u p d a t e t h a t p a y m e n t r e c o r d a t t h e h e a r i n g

. I f a p a y m e n t r e c o r d w a s a t t a c h e d t o t h e m o t i o n a s

a u t h o r i z e d b y t h i s s u b s e c t i o n , t h e p a y m e n t r e c o r d

, a s u p d a t e d i f a p p l i c a b l e , i s a d m i s s i b l e t o p r o v e :

( 1 ) t h e d a t e s a n d i n w h a t a m o u n t s p a y m e n t s w e r e m a d e ; ( 2 ) t h e a m o u n t o f a n y a c c r u e d i n t e r e s t ; ( 3 ) t h e c u m u l a t i v e a r r e a r a g e o v e r t i m e ; a n d ( 4 ) t h e c u m u l a t i v e a r r e a r a g e a s o f t h e f i n a l d a t e o f t h e r e c o r d

.

( c

- 1 ) A r e s p o n d e n t m a y o f f e r e v i d e n c e c o n t r o v e r t i n g t h e c o n t e n t s o f a p a y m e n t r e c o r d u n d e r S u b s e c t i o n ( c )

.

. . .

( e ) N o t w i t h s t a n d i n g S u b s e c t i o n ( d )

, t h e c o u r t m a y a w a r d t h e p e t i t i o n e r c o s t s o f c o u r t a n d r e a s o n a b l e

a t t o r n e y ’ s f

e e s i n a p r o c e e d i n g d e s c r i b e d b y t h a t s u b s e c t i o n i f t h e c o u r t f i n d s t h a t : ( 1 ) o n t h e d a t e t h e m o t i o n f o r e n f o r c e m e n t w a s f

i l e d

, t h e r e s p o n d e n t w a s n o t c u r r e n t i n t h e
p a y m e n t o f c h i l d s u p p o r t a s o r d e r e d b y t h e c o u r t ; a n d ( 2 ) t h e r e s p o n d e n t m a d e t h e c h i l d s u p p o r t p a y m e n t s d e s c r i b e d b y S u b s e c t i o n ( d ) a f t e r t h e d a t e t h e r e s p o n d e n t w a s s e r v e d n o t i c e o f t h e m o t i o n o r o t h e r w i s e d i s c o v e r e d t h a t t h e m o t i o n f o r e n f o r c e m e n t h a d b e e n f

i l e d

.

B e c a u s e N o b l e w a s o n l y t e c h n i c a l l y i m p r i s o n e d o n s o m e w e e k e n d s , h e s o u g h t b o t h h a b e a s c o r p u s a n d 3

m a n d a m u s r e l i e f f

r o m t h e t r i a l c o u r t ’ s c o n t e m p t o r d e r

.



### 4

## II. Discussion

Child support collection is serious business; so much so that the fede ra l go vernme nt has

enac ted leg islation requiring states to abide by cer tain mandates to help strug g ling par en t s o b t ai n

child support in order to rec eive fede ral funding. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 654, 666 (2006) (ca lled Title

I V-D)

. No less serious are the rig hts of those acc used of contemptuo u s l y fa i l i ng to pay child

4



## support, invoking due proce ss protec tions when finding s of contempt are soug ht. Recog nizi ng the

importance of both, the L eg islature has car efully cra fted a fra mework for ensuring compliance with

child support order s throug h contempt and other enfor ceme nt mechanisms.

A. Contem pt as a Child Sup port Enf orce m ent Me chanism

One of the primary tools that child support enfor ceme nt ag encie s d ep en d on to encour ag e

obligor s to timely p ay ch i l d s u p p ort is the contempt power of the court. The preva lence of this

enfor ceme nt mecha

nis m h as i t s roots in the historical lineag e of child-re lated order s, which wer e

orig inally matters of equity

, enfor cea ble only by contempt rathe r than by damag es. See Marg are t M.

Mahoney

, The Enforceme nt of Child Custody Orders By Contem pt Reme dies , 68 U. P I T T



## . L

. R E V



## .

835, 843–44 (2007). Contempt is an inhere nt power of the court, Ex parte Gorena

, 595 S.W .2d 841,

843 (Tex. 1979) (orig. p ro ce ed i n g ), and chapte r 157 of the Family Code provides the statutory

framework for ut iliz ing this power as a me chanism to enfor ce c hild support orders a nd other fina l

T h e g o a l o f

t h e T i t l e I V

- D c h i l d s u p p o r t e n f o r c e m e n t p r o g r a m i s t o h e l p s i n g l e p a r e n t s o b t a i n c h i l d s u p p o r t 4

f o r t h e i r c h i l d r e n

. T h e m i s s i o n i s t o e n h a n c e t h e w e l l

- b e i n g o f c h i l d r e n b y a s s u r i n g t h a t a s s i s t a n c e i n r e c e i v i n g f i n a n c i a l

s u p p o r t i s a v a i l a b l e t h r o u g h v a r i o u s m e c h a n i s m s , i n c l u d i n g e n f o r c e m e n t o f c h i l d s u p p o r t o b l i g a t i o n s

. S e e g e n e r a l l y J a n e l l e T

. C a l h o u n , I

n t e r s t a t e C h i l d S u

p p o r t E n f o r c e m e n t S

y s t e m : J u g g e r n a u t o

f B u r e a u c r a c

y , 4 6 M E R C E R L

. R E V

. 9 2 1 ( 1 9 9 5 )

. M a n y o f

t h e p r o v i s i o n s s e t o u t i n C h a p t e r 1 5 7 o f t h e T e x a s F a m i l y C o d e w e r e a d o p t e d p u r s u a n t t o t h i s f e d e r a l

m a n d a t e

. S e e D o r e t h a S m i t h H e n d e r s o n , T i t l e I V

- D a n d C h i l d S u

p p o r t E n f o r c e m e n t : C o n

f u s i o n a n d M i s i n

f o r m a t i o n A b o u n d

, 6 5 T E X

. B

. J

. 5 0 4

, 5 0 6 ( 2 0 0 2 )

.



### 5

## order s in family court proce eding s. Chapter 157 provides for the filing of a m o t i o n to enfor ce

reque sting contempt and other relief

, T E X



## . F A M



## . C O D E 

## § 157.001, specifie s what must be included

in this reque st, id. § 157.002(b)( 2), enumer ates available aff irmative defe nses, id. § 1 5 7

. 0 08, and

explains t he proc edure s for a hear ing on the motion, id. §§ 157.061–.066.

Upon finding an obligor in contempt, the trial court may , in its discretion, impose a sentenc e

that is either civil or criminal, or both. See id. § 157.166 (discussing the require d contents of an

enfor ceme nt order) . Civil contempt is prospec tive, involving mea sures to enc ourag e a contemnor

to pay child support arr ear ag es, while criminal contempt is punitive, usually imposing jail time for

past failure s to pay

. See In re Ree ce , 341 S.W .3d 360, 365 (Tex. 2011). Chapter 157 also provides

a third option : a court may find an obligor in contempt and impose a jail sentenc e, but suspend

co m m i t m ent and place the obligor on community supervision. T E X



## . F A M



## . C O D E 

## § 157.165. T h e

obligor may avoid incar cer ation and rema in on community supervision so long as he or she complies

with statutorily authorized conditions set by the t rial court. Id. § 157.211. This third option is an

extremely eff

ective tool f

or the enfor ceme nt of child support beca use it (1) e ncoura g es oblig ors to

pay to avoid serving their jail sentenc es, and (2 ) keeps them out of jail, there by enabling them to

work and avoid further arrea rag es, for so long as they comply with the court order

. S ignif icantly

,

utiliz ation of this tool is depende nt upon a finding of conte mpt.

A contempt order is void if it is bey ond the power of the c ourt or violates due proce ss. Ex

parte Barnett , 600 S.W .2d 252, 254 (Tex. 1980). I f the trial court’ s contempt order in this case is

not void, there was no abuse of discretion. In re Am. Homestar of Lancaster, Inc.

, 50 S.W .3d 480,

483 (Tex. 2001).

6

## B. Th e P urging Pr ovision in S ect ion 157.162(d)

I n 2007, the L eg islature enac ted Family Code section 157.162(d), a purg ing provision that 5



## allows a c hild support obligor to esca pe a valid finding of conte mpt if the obligor de monstrates at

the enfor ceme nt hear ing that he or she is “cur rent in the pay

ment of child support as order ed by the

court.” Absent the opera tion of section 157.162(d), an obligor could be held in contempt for failing

to make pay

ments in a timely fas h i on as require d by the support order

, reg ardle ss of the obligor ' s

pay ment history since the filing of the motion to enfor ce. See Ex parte Stephens

, 734 S.W .2d 761,

764 n.5 (Tex. App.—For

t Worth 1987, orig

. proce eding ); In re Miller

, 584 S.W .2d 907, 908 (Tex.

Civ. App.—Dallas 1979, orig

. proce eding ); Ex parte Grothe

, 581 S.W .2d 296, 298 (Tex. Civ.

App.—Austin 1979, orig

. proce eding ); Ex parte Boyle

, 545 S.W .2d 25, 27 (Tex

. Civ.

App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1977, orig

. proce eding ) (“ The fa ct that re lator was not in arr ear s at t he

time of the hear ing does not rende r the court’s judgme nt void; the rela tor repe atedly failed to comply

with the time provisions of the divorce decr ee.” ). Section 157.162(d) thus offe rs a person who has

willfully disobey ed a support order a way to avoid a finding of contempt as an incentive to encour ag e

obligor s to pa

y back- due arr ear ag es. The disputed issue in this case involves the scope of conduct

that is nece ssary for an obligor to demonstrate compliance with, and there fore invoke the benef it of,

the purg ing pr ovision.

B y “ p u r g i n g p r o v i s i o n , ” w e r e f e r t o t h e f

a c t t h a t t h e s u b s e c t i o n a l l o w s a n o b l i g o r t o p u r g e h i m s e l f o r h e r s e l f 5

o f t h e c o n s e q u e n c e s o f

c o n d u c t t h a t w o u l d o t h e r w i s e b e s u b j e c t t o a f i n d i n g o f c o n t e m p t b y f

u l f i l l i n g t h e c o n d i t i o n s o f

t h e s t a t u t e

. C

f

. E x p a r t e C h a m b e r s , 8 9 8 S

. W

. 2 d 2 5 7

, 2 6 6 ( T e x

. 1 9 9 5 ) ( G o n z a l e z , J

. , d i s s e n t i n g ) ( d e s c r i b i n g t h e u s e o f

a p u r g i n g p r o v i s i o n i n a c o e r c i v e c o n t e m p t s e n t e n c e , w h e r e a c o n t e m n o r i s s e n t t o p r i s o n b u t “ c a r r i e s t h e k e y s o f [ h i s ]

p r i s o n i n [ h i s ] o w n p o c k e t ” ( q u o t i n g S h i l l i t a n i v

. U n i t e d S t a t e s , 3 8 4 U

. S

. 3 6 4

, 3 6 8 ( 1 9 6 6 ) ) ( a l t e r a t i o n i n o r i g i n a l ) )

.



### 7

## Under L awr eta’ s interpre tation, this statute would apply only if the responde nt demonstrated

he or she had strictly complied with the supp o rt o rd er by timely making all pay ments when they

beca me due. Noble, on the other hand, contends that a responde nt may invoke the purg ing provision

by showing at the hear ing that he or she has caug ht up on the specific missed pa y ments pled in the

motion to enfor ce. Thus, Noble asser ts, the time period betwee n the filing of the motion to enfor ce

and the hear ing on t h at m o t i o n ac t s as a g rac e period, allowing an obligor to avoid contempt by

pay ing all pled amounts owed, even though he or she has acc rued additional arr ear ag es by the date

of the hear ing. Finally

, the Offic e interpre ts section 157.162(d) to purg e a responde nt from contempt

for willful failure to timely make proper ly pled pay ments only if he or she is curr ent in the pay ment

o f al l amount s that have become due under the support order as of the date of the enfor ceme n t

hear ing, reg ardle ss of whether such pay ment s we re pled in the motion. We conclude that the

Offic e’s interpre tation is the only one that comports with the p l ai n l an gu age of the statute and

there fore hold that an obli go r m ay invoke the purg ing provision in section 157.162(d) by

demonstra t i n g that he or she has no outstanding child support obliga tions as of the date of the

enfor ceme nt hear ing.

C. The P lain Meanin g of S ect ion 157.162(d)

L eg islative intent is best reve aled in leg islative lang uag e: “W h er e text is clea r, text is

deter minative.” Entergy Gulf States, Inc. v. Summers

, 282 S.W .3d 433, 437 (Tex. 2009). We take

the L eg islature at its word, a nd the truest mea sure of what it intended is what it ena cted. See A lex

Sheshunoff Mgmt. Serv

s., L.P. v. Johnson

, 209 S.W .3d 644, 651–52 (Tex. 2006). This tex t-based

approa ch re quires us to study the lang uag e of the specific section at issue, a s well as t he st atute as

8

## a whole. Fitzgerald v. Advanc ed Spine Fixation Sys., Inc.

, 996 S.W .2d 864, 866 (Tex. 1999). We

must endea

vor t o rea d the s tatute contex tually

, gi v i n g ef fec t to ever

y word, clause, and sentenc e.

Tex. Dep’ t of

Ins. v. Am. Nat’l Ins. Co.

, ___ S.W .3d
___, ___ (Tex. 2012). Be cause the statute itself

is w hat constitutes the law, we have held that unambig uous text equals deter minative text (bar

ring

an absurd result). Summers

, 282 S.W .3d at 437. At this point, “t h e j u d ge’s inquiry is at an end,”

Sheshunoff

, 209 S.W

. 3 d at 652, and ex tratextual fora y s are improper: “When a st atute’s langua g e

is clea r and unambig uous, it is inappropria te to resor t to rules of construction o r ex t ri n sic aids to

construe the lang uag e.” City of Rockwall v. Hughes , 246 S.W .3d 621, 626 (Tex. 2008).

Section 157.162(d) allows a responde nt to avoid a finding of contempt when the responde nt

shows at the enfor ceme nt hear ing that he or she “is cu rr ent in the pay ment of child support as

order ed by the court.” The parties do not dispute, and we so hold, that th e date rele vant to the

application of this provision—i.e., the date on which the responde nt must demonstrate that he or she

is “cur rent” —is the date of the hear ing. I n turn, the plain lang uag e o f t h e p ro v i s i on require s the

responde nt to show that no outstanding arr ear ag e exis ts as of that date. The statute’s lang uag e does

not suppor

t N oble’s sug g estion that the “child support” on which an obligor must be curr ent at the

time of the hear ing includes only the pay ments pled in the motion to enfor ce. The statute require s 6



## that an obligor be curr ent on child support pay ments “as order ed by the court.” The only “orde r” in

N o r d o e s i t s u p p o r t L a w r e t a ’ s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , u n d e r w h i c h t h e p u r g i n g p r o v i s i o n w o u l d a p p l y o n l y i f t h e 6

r e s p o n d e n t h a d s t r i c t l y c o m p l i e d w i t h t h e s u p p o r t o r d e r b y t i m e l y m a k i n g a l l p a y m e n t s w h e n t h e y b e c a m e d u e

. B e c a u s e

a n o b l i g o r w h o h a s n o t v i o l a t e d t h e s u p p o r t o r d e r h a s n o t e n g a g e d i n c o n t e m p t u o u s c o n d u c t i n t h e f i r s t p l a c e a n d h a s n o

n e e d f o r t h e p u r g i n g p r o v i s i o n , t h i s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n w o u l d r e n d e r s e c t i o n 1 5 7

. 1 6 2 ( d ) m e a n i n g l e s s

— a r e s u l t w e m u s t a v o i d

. M i d

- C e n t u r

y I n s

. C o

. o f T e x

. v

. A d e m a

j
, 2 4 3 S

. W

. 3 d 6 1 8

, 6 2 1 ( T e x

. 2 0 0 7 ) ( “ [ W ] e r e a d t h e s t a t u t e a s a w h o l e a n d
i n t e r p r e t i t t o g i v e e f

f e c t t o e v e r y p a r t

. ” )

.



### 9

## eff

ect at the t ime of an enfor ceme nt hear ing is the prior court order setting ou t t h e o b l i go r’s child

support obliga tions. Thus, the phrase “as order ed b y t h e co urt” nece ssarily ref ers to that ear lier

order

, which specifie s all chil d s u p port pay ments owed by the obligor

, including those to be paid

afte r the motion to enfor ce is filed. Noble’s interpre tation would require us to interpre t “as order ed

by the cour t” in section 157.162(d) to ha ve no mea

ning at all, which violates the rule s of statutory

construction. See Tex. De p’t of Ins. , ___ S.W .3d at ___.

Moreove r, had the L eg islature intended to r equire pay ment only of the amounts pled in the

motion to enfor ce, it had a n u m b er o f way s to say so. I t could have require d proof that the

responde nt “is curr ent in the pay ment of ch i l d s u p p o rt pled in the motion to enfor ce” or that

responde nt “has paid all arr ear ag es listed in the motion to enfor ce.” I t did not do so, and we assume

the L eg islature meant what it said. See Fitzgerald

, 996 S.W .2d at 865–66. We there fore hold that, 7



## to be “cur rent in the pay

ment of child support as order ed by the court” and there by invoke the benef it

of the purg ing pr ovision, an obligor must be curr ent on all child support obliga tions as of the date

of the h ea ri n g

. The missed pay ments alleg ed in the motion to enfor ce serve as the basis for the 8

N o b l e c o n t e n d s t h a t h i s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n i s s u p p o r t e d b y t h e L e g i s l a t u r e ’ s e n a c t m e n t o f s e c t i o n 1 5 7

. 1 6 2 ( e )

, 7

w h i c h a u t h o r i z e s a n a t t o r n e y ’ s f e e s a w a r d t o t h e m o v a n t i f t h e r e s p o n d e n t i n v o k e s t h e p u r g i n g p r o v i s i o n i n s u b s e c t i o n ( d )

, b u t w a s n o t c u r r e n t o n h i s o r h e r s u p p o r t o b l i g a t i o n s o n t h e d a t e t h e m o t i o n w a s f i l e d a n d m a d e t h e r e q u i r e d

p a y m e n t s o n l y a f

t e r b e i n g n o t i f

i e d t h a t t h e m o t i o n h a d b e e n f i l e d

. T E X

. F A M

. C O D E § 1 5 7

. 1 6 2 ( e )

. W e d i s a g r e e

. T h i s
p r o v i s i o n m e r e l y s e r v e s t o c o m p e n s a t e t h e m o v a n t f o r s o m e o f

t h e c o s t s a s s o c i a t e d w i t h e n f o r c i n g s u p p o r t o b l i g a t i o n s

e v e n w h e r e t h e p u r g i n g p r o v i s i o n m a y b e u t i l i z e d

. I t n e i t h e r n a r r o w s n o r w i d e n s t h e s c o p e o f t h a t p r o v i s i o n

.

W e a l s o o b s e r v e t h a t
, i n m a n y s t a t e s , a n y i m p i n g e m e n t b y t h e l e g i s l a t u r e o n c o u r t s ’ i n h e r e n t c o n t e m p t p o w e r s 8

i s s e e n a s a v i o l a t i o n o f t h e s e p a r a t i o n o f p o w e r s d o c t r i n e

. S e e P a u l A

. G r o t e , N o t e , P u r g i n g C o n t e m p t : E l i m i n a t i n g t h e D i s t i n c t i o n B e t w e e n C i v i l a n d C r i m i n a l C o n t e m p t , 8 8 W A S H

. U

. L

. R E V

. 1 2 4 7

, 1 2 7 7

– 7 9 ( 2 0 1 1 ) ( d i s c u s s i n g t h e p o s i t i o n

o f v a r i o u s s t a t e s a n d t h e f e d e r a l c o u r t s o n l e g i s l a t i v e r e f o r m o f c o n t e m p t p o w e r s )

. W e h a v e r e c o g n i z e d t h e L e g i s l a t u r e ’ s

a u t h o r i t y t o e s t a b l i s h s o m e l i m i t a t i o n s o n a c o u r t ’ s c r i m i n a l c o n t e m p t p o w e r

. S e e I n r e R e e c e , 3 4 1 S

. W

. 3 d a t 3 6 6 n

. 9 ( c i t i n g T E X

. G O V ’ T C O D E § 2 1

. 0 0 2 ( b )

, w h i c h p r o v i d e s t h a t p u n i s h m e n t f o r c r i m i n a l c o n t e m p t m a y n o t e x c e e d $ 5 0 0 o r

c o n f i n e m e n t f

o r m o r e t h a n s i x m o n t h s i n j a i l )

. N e v e r t h e l e s s , t h e s e p a r a t i o n

- o f

- p o w e r s c o n c e r n s r a i s e d b y o t h e r c o u r t s f u r t h e r c o n v i n c e u s o f

t h e p r o p r i e t y o f

i n t e r p r e t i n g s u b s e c t i o n ( b ) ’ s p u r g i n g p r o v i s i o n a s b e i n g t r i g g e r e d o n l y i n n a r r o w



### 1 0

## contempt findi ng , but they d o n o t limit the pay ments that must be current to obtain the protection

of the purg ing pr ovision.

D. The P urging Pr ovision Does NotIm plicate Notic e Re qui rem ents

Noble ar g ues t hat t he Office’ s interpre tation of t he purging provision violates his rig hts to

notice and due pr o ce ss beca use i t allows a contempt finding to be based on a respondent’s failure

to make pay

ments that wer e not specific ally pled in the motion to enforce . We ag ree that specific

violations of a court order must be p l ed t o s u p p ort a contempt finding

. Howeve r, the purg ing

provision does not aff

ect the ba sis of the contempt finding ; rather , it provides a basis for esca ping

an otherwise valid finding of contempt. We there fore disag ree that the purg ing provision implicates

notice re quirements.

Noble’s arg ument err oneously confla tes the conduct that is the basis of a contempt finding

,

for which there must be specific notice in the motion for enfor ceme nt, a nd the conduct require d to

invoke the purg ing pr ovision to escape suc h a finding . The pleading require ments for a motion to

enfor ce ar e set out in section 157.002 of t he Family Code. This provision require s such a motion

to include the amount owed, the amount p ai d

, an d t h e amount of arr ear ag es. T E X



## . F A M



## . C O D E



## § 157.002(b)( 1). I f contempt is reque sted, the motion must also include “the portion of the order

alleg edly violated and, for each dat e o f al l eged contempt, the amount due and the amount paid, i f

any .” Id. § 157.002(b)( 2). Thus, a responde nt may be found in contempt only for violations that are

specific ally pled in the motion for enfor ceme nt under section 157.002. Telling ly

, the purg ing

c i r c u m s t a n c e s , r e s e r v i n g a s m u c h o f t h e c o u r t ’ s i n h e r e n t c o n t e m p t p o w e r a s p o s s i b l e

. S e e Q u i c k v

. C i t y o f A u s t i n , 7
S

. W

. 3 d 1 0 9

, 1 1 5 ( T e x

. 1 9 9 8 ) ( n o t i n g t h a t c o u r t s s h o u l d i n t e r p r e t s t a t u t e s t o a v o i d c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i n f i r m i t i e s )

.



### 1 1

## provision contains no such pleading requirem en t s

. T h is lack of specific ity in section 157.162(d)

makes sense beca

use specific violations do not for m t h e basis for its use. Rather, it can only be 9



## utiliz ed as a means to aver t contempt findi ng s for properly pled vi olations by becoming “cur rent”

in the pay ment of support.

I n turn, while responde nts are clea rly entitled to noti ce o f t h e s p ecif ic alleg ed conduct on

which the motion for enfor ceme nt by contempt is based, they are not entitled to notice of all the way s

they may avoid such a finding

. The purg ing provision at issue is akin to an aff irmative defe nse; as

discussed above, it allows a responde nt to avoid the conseque nces of his or her contemptuous acts,

but does not g overn the underly ing violations for which contempt fi n d i n gs are soug ht. I n the 1 0



## context of criminal proce eding s, a char g ing instrum en t l i ke an indictment must “cha rg e[] the 1 1



## commission of the offe nse in ordinary and concise lang uag e in such a manner as to enable a person

of common understanding to know what is meant, and with that deg ree of cer tainty that will g ive the

defe ndant notice of

the par ticular offense with whi ch he is c harged .” T E X



## . C O D E 

## C R I M



## . P R O C



## . art.

21.11 (empha sis added) ; see also id. art. 21.03 (“Eve ry thing should be stated in an indictment which

C f

. E x p a r t e C h a m b e r s , 8 9 8 S

. W

. 2 d a t 2 5 9 ( e x p l a i n i n g t h a t c r i m i n a l c o n t e m p t c o n v i c t i o n r e q u i r e s , i n t e r a l i a , 9

“ v i o l a t i o n ” o f “ a r e a s o n a b l y s p e c i f i c o r d e r ” )

.

W e r e c o g n i z e t h a t t h e p u r g i n g p r o v i s i o n i s n o t c o n t a i n e d i n t h e s t a t u t e e x p r e s s l y l i s t i n g a f f i r m a t i v e d e f

e n s e s 10

t o a n a l l e g a t i o n o f c o n t e m p t i n a m o t i o n f o r e n f o r c e m e n t

. S e e T E X

. F A M

. C O D E § 1 5 7

. 0 0 8

. B u t i t i s a n a l o g o u s t o a n

a f f i r m a t i v e d e f

e n s e i n t h a t i t p r e c l u d e s a c o n t e m p t f i n d i n g n o t w i t h s t a n d i n g a p r o v e n v i o l a t i o n o f a p r i o r o r d e r a n d p l a c e s
t h e b u r d e n o f p r o o f o n t h e r e s p o n d e n t t o s h o w t h a t i t a p p l i e s

. S e e B L A C K ’ S L A W D IC T IO N A R Y 4 8 2 ( 9 t h e d

. 2 0 0 9 ) ( d e f i n i n g a n a f

f i r m a t i v e d e f

e n s e a s “ [ a ] d e f

e n d a n t ’ s a s s e r t i o n o f f

a c t s a n d a r g u m e n t s t h a t
, i f t r u e , w i l l d e f e a t t h e p l a i n t i f

f ’ s

o r p r o s e c u t i o n ’ s c l a i m , e v e n i f a l l t h e a l l e g a t i o n s i n t h e c o m p l a i n t a r e t r u e , ” a n d n o t i n g t h a t “ [ t ] h e d e f e n d a n t b e a r s t h e b u r d e n o f p r o v i n g a n a f f i r m a t i v e d e f

e n s e ” )

.

W e h a v e r e c o g n i z e d t h a t
, b e c a u s e “ c o n t e m p t p r o c e e d i n g s a r e q u a s i

- c r i m i n a l i n n a t u r e , ” s u c h p r o c e e d i n g s 11

“ s h o u l d c o n f

o r m a s n e a r l y a s p r a c t i c a b l e t o t h o s e i n c r i m i n a l c a s e s

. ” E x p a r t e S a n c h e z , 7 0 3 S

. W

. 2 d 9 5 5

, 9 5 7 ( T e x

. 1 9 8 6 )

.



### 1 2

## i s n ecessary to be proved.” ). I n contra st to these specific notice require ments with respe ct t o t h e

u nderlying offe nse, there is no require ment that a char g ing instrument provide noti ce o f t h e

aff irmative defenses that may be available to a criminal defe ndant. Simil arly

, the not ice to which

responde nts in contempt proce eding s are entitled extends only to the violations for which they may

be found in c ontempt, so that they can a dequate ly

prepa re a defe nse to such alleg ations.

Fur ther, even if our interpre tation of the purg ing provision invoked due pro cess conce rns,

which it does not, Noble’s solution—i nterpre ting the provision to require pay ment of only those

amounts alleg ed in the motion for enfor ceme nt—does not addre ss those conce rns. Such alleg ations

do not inform an obligor o f t h e nece ssary conduct—be ing curr ent on child support—that would

invoke the purg ing provision. For example, a responde nt serve d with a motion to enfor ce alleg ing

specific violations of a support order would have sufficie nt notice to rebut the alleg ed violations or

prove that he or she was unable to make the alleg ed pay ments when they wer e due. See T E X



## . F A M



## .

C O D E 

## § 157.008(c)

. But the motion would not put the obligor o n n o t ice of how to invoke the

purg ing provision e ven with r espec t to those violations that wer e spec ifically pled, as it would not

inform the obligor that he or she will not be found in contempt as long as those amounts are paid up

by the date of the hear ing. To truly put an obligor on notice of what is nece ssary to avoid contempt

under the purg ing provision, the m otion to enfor ce would need to r epeat the require ments that are

alre ady contained in the provision: that the obligor must bring “e v i d en ce s atisfac tory to the court

showing that the responde nt is curr ent in the pay ment of child support as order ed by the court.” Id.

§ 157.162(d). The statute simply does not and should not contain such a require ment. After all, the

1 3

## orig inal ord er establishing the support obliga tion, in conjunction with the statute itself, alre ady

informs the obligor of the amounts that must be paid in order to be curr ent by the date of the hear ing.

I n this case , Noble was held in contempt for the failure to make timely support pay ments due

on Marc h 1, 2008, April 1, 2008, and May 1, 200 8

— arr ear ag es that wer e specific ally pled in the

motion for enfor ceme nt and proven at the hear ing. He had the opportunity to rebut those alleg ations

and to raise the defe nse that he was unable to pay those pled arr ear ag es when they wer e due. See id.

§ 157.008(c)

. The pay

ments he missed a fter the motion for enfor ceme nt w as filed form no part of

the basis for contempt, but r ather are rele vant only in tha t the y preve nted Noble from invoking the

benef it of the purg ing provision in section 157.162(d). And since the contempt finding s comported

with due process, t he L eg islature was within its province to require full pay ment of child support,

including pay

ments not specifie d in the motion to enfor ce, for Noble or any other responde nt to

avoid the conse quence s of his contemptuous acts.

III. Conclusi on

T h e p l ai n lang uag e of section 157.162(d) of the Texas Family Code, the best g uide to th e

statute’s m eaning

, confirms that the purging provision is only activate d if an obli g or i s curr ent o n

all child support obliga tions at the time of the enfor ceme nt hear ing, not just those pled in the motion

to enfor ce. This interpre tation is consistent with the statutory fra mework for enfor ceme nt of support

order s and poses no due proce ss c oncer ns. Acc ording ly

, the trial court did not abuse its discr etion

1 4

## in holding Noble in contempt. We conditionally g rant a writ of m andamus an d order the court of

appea ls to vacate its judgme nt, t h er eb y reinstating the trial court’s contempt order

. The writ will

issue only if the cour

t of appe als fails to comply

.

_________________________________ Debr a H. L ehrma

nn J ustice

OP INION DELIVERED: Marc h 8, 2013

1 5