U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE

WASHINGTON : 

i 

28–245 2018

[H.A.S.C. No. 115–62] 

AMPHIBIOUS WARFARE READINESS 

AND TRAINING: INTEROPERABILITY, 

SHORTFALLS, AND THE WAY AHEAD 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON READINESS 

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED FIFTEENTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

HEARING HELD 

DECEMBER 1, 2017 
(II) 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON READINESS 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina, Chairman 

ROB BISHOP, Utah 

AUSTIN SCOTT, Georgia 

STEVE RUSSELL, Oklahoma 

MIKE ROGERS, Alabama 

VICKY HARTZLER, Missouri 

ELISE M. STEFANIK, New York 

MARTHA MCSALLY, Arizona, Vice Chair 

SCOTT DESJARLAIS, Tennessee 

TRENT KELLY, Mississippi 

MIKE GALLAGHER, Wisconsin 

MADELEINE Z. BORDALLO, Guam 

JOE COURTNEY, Connecticut 

TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii 

CAROL SHEA-PORTER, New Hampshire 

A. DONALD MCEACHIN, Virginia 

SALUD O. CARBAJAL, California 

ANTHONY G. BROWN, Maryland 

STEPHANIE N. MURPHY, Florida 

RO KHANNA, California 

DREW WARREN, Professional Staff Member 

BRIAN GARRETT, Professional Staff Member 

DANIELLE STEITZ, Clerk 
(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

Page 

STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS 

Bordallo, Hon. Madeleine Z., a Delegate from Guam, Ranking Member, Subcommittee on Readiness ...................................................................................... 2 

Wilson, Hon. Joe, a Representative from South Carolina, Chairman, Subcommittee on Readiness ............................................................................................. 1 

WITNESSES 

Beaudreault, LtGen Brian D., USMC, Deputy Commandant for Plans, Policies, and Operations ............................................................................................. 3 

Lewis, VADM Andrew L., USN, Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Operations, Plans and Strategy (N3/N5) .................................................................... 4 

Russell, Cary B., Director, Defense Capabilities and Management, U.S. Government Accountability Office ............................................................................. 6 

APPENDIX 

PREPARED STATEMENTS: 

Beaudreault, LtGen Brian D. .......................................................................... 26 

Lewis, VADM Andrew L. ................................................................................. 37 

Russell, Cary B. ................................................................................................ 44 

Wilson, Hon. Joe ............................................................................................... 25 

DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD: 

[There were no Documents submitted.] 

WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING THE HEARING: 

[The information was not available at the time of printing.] 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING: 

[There were no Questions submitted post hearing.] 

(1) 

AMPHIBIOUS WARFARE READINESS AND TRAINING: 

INTEROPERABILITY, SHORTFALLS, AND 

THE WAY AHEAD 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, SUBCOMMITTEE ON READINESS, Washington, DC, Friday, December 1, 2017. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 8:01 a.m., in room 

2212, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Joe Wilson (chairman 

of the subcommittee) presiding. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JOE WILSON, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM SOUTH CAROLINA, CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE 

ON READINESS 

Mr. WILSON. Good morning. The subcommittee will come to 

order. I welcome you today to this hearing of the House Armed 

Services Committee Readiness Subcommittee on ‘‘Amphibious Warfare Readiness and Training.’’ 

Today the subcommittee will hear from the Navy and Marine 

Corps regarding the status of amphibious training and readiness, 

specifically the challenges of amphibious ship availability and Navy 

and Marine Corps interoperability. We are also pleased to have the 

Government Accountability Office present to comment on their recent study of the amphibious operations training released in September 2017. 

I ask the witnesses to do their best to describe where shortfalls 

exist and what can be done to improve the less than optimal state 

we are in, specifically how better and more consistent funding 

could help. We have held a number of readiness hearings and briefings on aviation, surface combatants, DOD [Department of Defense] infrastructure, and other topics. Every session points to the 

same grim conclusion: our services are indeed in a readiness crisis. 

Marine expeditionary units aboard U.S. Navy amphibious vessels 

are an important element of our forward deployed strategic deterrent. To be effective, the Navy-Marine Corps team must train together regularly, certainly more than they do today. Because we 

have too few ships, necessary training is not possible. 

President Ronald Reagan frequently used the phrase correctly, 

‘‘Peace through strength.’’ I agree with President Reagan and believe we have a higher level of defense funding—must be achieved 

to achieve that goal. I look forward to hearing from our witnesses 

today on how this capability can be improved. 

Before I introduce the witnesses, I am grateful to recognize 

Ranking Member Madeleine Bordallo, the distinguished gentlelady 

from Guam, for opening comments she would like to make. 
2 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Wilson can be found in the Appendix on page 25.] 

STATEMENT OF HON. MADELEINE Z. BORDALLO, A DELEGATE 

FROM GUAM, RANKING MEMBER, SUBCOMMITTEE ON READINESS 

Ms. BORDALLO. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and thank 

you to all of our witnesses for being here today. I do look forward 

to discussing the challenges that are impeding amphibious training 

and the mitigations and long-term solutions to build and sustain 

readiness in the Marine Corps and the Navy. 

Amphibious operations are complex, and they are difficult to say 

the least. There is a tremendous amount of planning and preparations required to ensure the ships, sailors, and Marines and equipment are properly coordinated to ensure the success of a training 

event or, in the event of a contingency operation, an actual amphibious landing. 

The GAO [Government Accountability Office] report clearly indicates there is currently a lack of overall strategy to allocating limited resources that are needed for amphibious training. The current 

operations tempo, as well as the limited number of ships, compound this challenge. It is clear that better coordination is required 

by the Navy and the Marine Corps to ensure this critical warfighting and skill is restored to a readiness level and is required to meet 

our operational planning needs. 

I am encouraged to see that both the Navy and the Marines have 

concurred with all three recommendations made by GAO, and I intend to monitor the progress as both services work to restore this 

amphibious operation readiness. This committee is keenly aware of 

the continuing impacts of sequestration and unpredictable funding 

on readiness in every aspect of the services. 

I encourage the witnesses to share specific examples of how unpredictable funding has impacted their ability to conduct amphibious operations training. And I look forward to the training, and 

thank you again, Mr. Chairman. I yield back. 

Mr. WILSON. Thank you, Ranking Member Bordallo. 

In connection with today’s hearing we welcome members of the 

full committee who are not members of the Readiness Subcommittee who are or will be willing to attend. I ask unanimous 

consent that these committee members be permitted to participate 

in this briefing with the understanding that all sitting subcommittee members will be recognized for questions prior to those 

not assigned to the subcommittee. Without objection. So ordered. 

I am pleased to recognize our witnesses today. I want to thank 

them for taking the time to be with us and their service to our Nation. We have Lieutenant General Brian Beaudreault, Deputy 

Commandant for Plans, Policies, and Operations, U.S. Marine 

Corps; Vice Admiral Andrew L. ‘‘Woody’’ Lewis, the Deputy Chief 

of Naval Operations for Operations, Plans, and Strategy, U.S. 

Navy; and we have Mr. Cary Russell, Director of Defense Capabilities and Management of the U.S. Government Accountability Office. 
3 

We will now ask each panel member to make brief opening remarks before we proceed to member questions under the very strict 

5-minute rule of Mr. Warren. 

We will begin with General Beaudreault. 

STATEMENT OF LTGEN BRIAN D. BEAUDREAULT, USMC, DEPUTY COMMANDANT FOR PLANS, POLICIES, AND OPERATIONS 

General BEAUDREAULT. Chairman Wilson, Ranking Member 

Bordallo, and distinguished members of the subcommittee, good 

morning, and thank you for the opportunity to testify before this 

subcommittee. 

Today Marines and sailors are at sea operating as amphibious 

ready groups [ARGs], Marine expeditionary units [MEUs]. We have 

the America ARG and the 15th MEU out in the Central Command 

region with some of its personnel about to embark on allied ships. 

We have the Bonhomme Richard and the 31st MEU out in the Pacific. The Iwo Jima ARG is off the east coast of the United States 

with the 26th MEU embarked preparing to deploy, and we have 

Black Sea rotational Marines aboard DDGs [guided-missile destroyers] getting ready to exercise in the European theater. So your expeditionary forces in readiness are postured forward and are accomplishing our national security objectives. 

The Marine Corps has reviewed the GAO report on Navy and 

Marine Corps training, and we agree with the study, its findings, 

and its recommendations. 

Today’s testimony provides the Navy and Marine Corps the opportunity to inform the Readiness Subcommittee on the challenges 

associated with amphibious operations training, discuss our shortfalls, and describe our projected way ahead. 

The current inventory of 32 amphibious warships is short of our 

need to satisfy operational requirements, which does negatively impact the naval force’s ability to generate readiness and negatively 

affects availability for training with larger scale formations. 

The amphibious force structure is projected to grow to a total of 

34 ships starting in fiscal year 2021. And the Marine Corps supports the 38-ship requirement and the requisite funding to develop 

readiness while concurrently fulfilling validated joint requirements, 

accomplishing necessary fleet maintenance, and maintaining capacity to respond to potential contingencies. And as the amphibious 

ship inventory builds toward 38 ships in fiscal year 2033, the Navy 

and Marine Corps team will continue to explore innovative ways to 

employ alternative platforms. 

So on behalf of our Marines and sailors, civilians and their families, we thank the Congress and this committee for the opportunity 

to discuss the key challenges your Navy and Marine Corps face, 

and we thank you for your support. 

The most important actions that Congress can take now is to immediately repeal the caps on defense spending in the Budget Control Act, and provide a defense appropriation that ensures sufficient, consistent, and predictable funding to train, man, and equip 

your Navy and Marine Corps. And with your help we will overcome 

these constraints and enable your Navy and Marine Corps team to 

meet the challenges of the 21st century. 
4 

Mr. Chairman, I have submitted a written statement for the 

record, and I would ask that to be accepted, and I look forward to 

answering your questions. Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of General Beaudreault can be found in 

the Appendix on page 26.] 

Mr. WILSON. General, thank you very much, and the persons who 

are here on the subcommittee certainly endorse your statement in 

regard to the Budget Control Act sequestration. I would like to now 

proceed to Admiral Lewis. 

STATEMENT OF VADM ANDREW L. LEWIS, USN, DEPUTY CHIEF 

OF NAVAL OPERATIONS FOR OPERATIONS, PLANS AND 

STRATEGY (N3/N5) 

Admiral LEWIS. Chairman Wilson, Ranking Member Bordallo, 

and distinguished members of the subcommittee, I appreciate the 

opportunity to testify before you today alongside General Beaudreault. 

The team before you is inextricably linked. In our past, I have 

commanded Marines and he has commanded sailors. We train together, deploy together, and fight together. Our bond has been 

strengthened over the centuries of our great services, and today we 

look forward to testifying how we will continue that bond in the future. I request my written statement be submitted for the record, 

and I will keep these remarks brief. 

Right now your Navy-Marine Corps team is forward deployed 

and standing the watch. Sailors and Marines are at sea aboard the 

America Amphibious Readiness Group with the 15th MEU in Central Command, USS Bonhomme Richard Amphibious Readiness 

Group with the 31st MEU in the Pacific, and the Iwo Jima Amphibious Readiness Group with the 26th MEU in the Atlantic preparing to deploy. 

We are at the tip of the spear and working every day to sharpen 

it. We reviewed the GAO report on Navy and Marine Corps amphibious operations and training and agree with the study, its findings, and its recommendations. We appreciate the opportunity to 

inform the Readiness Subcommittee of the challenges associated 

with Navy and Marine Corps amphibious operations training and 

integration, discuss our shortfalls, and lay out a projected way 

ahead. 

The GAO report finds the Navy shortage of amphibious ships to 

be detrimental to our ability to train. The 32 amphibious ships currently in the fleet are stressed to meet both combatant commander 

operational requirements, ongoing contingency operations, and disaster relief, which impacts the ability of the Navy and Marine 

Corps to improve readiness and training as an integrated force. 

Continuing resolutions and caps imposed by the Budget Control 

Act have impacted our ability to plan and implement training, ship 

maintenance, and modernization. While we have prioritized maintenance and readiness dollars, the positive effects of prioritized 

funding will not remove these deficits in the near term. Restoring 

the readiness of the fleet requires predictable, stable, and adequate 

funding over several years to ensure that we can conduct the required maintenance on our ships. This stability would help the 
5 

Navy to restore stocks of necessary parts, get more ships to sea on 

time, and better prepare sailors and Marines for deployment. 

Although a continuing resolution may be better than no funding 

at all, the costs associated with not being able to start new work 

cannot be overstated. Delays in shipyard maintenance periods 

cause ships to either have their training pipelines compressed or 

maintenance deferred. Deferred maintenance creates an increase in 

costs due to a corresponding increase in machinery to repair. 

At the same time the value of skilled artisans is amplified when 

work is stopped due to the lack of a labor force possessing the 

qualifications to complete the repairs. Work stoppages created by 

continuing resolutions force artisans to seek alternate, more stable 

employment. Skilled shipyard workers require 2 to 4 years of training to reach journeyman certification and 5 to 10 years to reach 

master. Shipyards and skilled workers require stable, predictable 

funding to maintain their skilled workforce and invest in these critical training programs in order to maintain and grow the shipyard 

capacity we need. 

Maintaining the fleet is not enough to ensure readiness when adversary capabilities continue to improve. We need a more lethal 

and effective force, which can only be realized through modernization and new technologies. The same stable, predictable, and adequate funding required for maintenance is critical to the new programs and additional capacity we need to get better. We are working together to overcome these challenges at the direction of the 

Chief of Naval Operations and Commandant of the Marine Corps. 

Through the Naval Board, the services incorporated processes to 

posture for increased training and integration. The commander of 

the United States Fleet Forces Command and commander of the 

United States Marine Forces Command established a co-led maritime working group to provide an enduring interservice collaborative process that integrates capabilities, force development, experimentation, and emerging requirements with exercise planning, 

scheduling, and resourcing. 

The commander of the U.S. Pacific Fleet and commander of the 

U.S. Marine Forces Pacific have similarly developed the Pacific 

Naval Integration Working Group to represent the Pacific issues. 

These four commands meet together quarterly to include meeting 

at this time in Hawaii. 

On behalf of all Marines, sailors, civilians, and their families, we 

thank the Congress and this committee for your support and this 

opportunity to discuss the key challenges your Navy and Marine 

Corps face. The President’s fiscal year 2018 [budget] request and 

the recently passed National Defense Authorization Act look toward fleet wholeness and funding to man, train, and equip and organize the Navy and Marine Corps. These funds will only work if 

they are approved in a consistent, predictable, and timely manner. 

With your help, we will overcome these constraints and reshape 

your Navy and Marine Corps to meet the challenges of the 21st 

century. I look forward to your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Admiral Lewis can be found in the 

Appendix on page 37.] 

Mr. WILSON. Thank you very much, Admiral. We now proceed to 

Mr. Cary Russell. 
6 

STATEMENT OF CARY B. RUSSELL, DIRECTOR, DEFENSE CAPABILITIES AND MANAGEMENT, U.S. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE 

Mr. RUSSELL. Good morning Chairman Wilson, Ranking Member 

Bordallo, and members of the subcommittee. Thank you for having 

me here today to talk about GAO’s recent review of Navy and Marine Corps training for amphibious operations. 

The Navy and Marine Corps together maintain forces capable of 

conducting amphibious operations; that is, military operations 

launched from the sea using naval vessels to project a Marine 

Corps landing force ashore. As you know, the United States today 

faces a complex national security environment with threats ranging 

from large-scale traditional state actors to destabilizing nonstate 

actors. 

Accordingly, the Navy and Marine Corps must have fully trained 

and ready forces to address these threats in the maritime domain. 

However, each of the military services today are generally smaller 

and less combat ready than they have been in many years. For example, over the past two decades the number of Navy amphibious 

ships has decreased by 50 percent, from 62 ships in 1990 to the 32 

that we have today. 

For my statement I am going to focus on three areas that we examine in our latest report. First, the Navy and Marine Corps ability to complete training for amphibious operations and factors that 

limited that training. Second, steps taken by the Navy and Marine 

Corps to mitigate training shortfalls. And third, efforts to improve 

overall integration between the Navy and Marine Corps for amphibious operations training referred to as ‘‘naval integration.’’ 

With respect to the first area on completing amphibious training, 

we found that the Navy’s fleets of amphibious ships and associated 

Marine Corps combat units that were just about to deploy as part 

of those Marine expeditionary units had generally completed the 

needed training for amphibious operations. However, for that majority of forces not nearing a deployment, such as those conducting 

home station training to build and maintain core competencies, 

they fell considerably short of being able to complete amphibious 

training requirements. This was especially noticeable in Marine 

Corps infantry battalions and V–22 Osprey tiltrotor squadrons. 

These deficits can create a potential gap in the Marine Corps 

ready bench of units. If called on these units could be left scrambling to obtain last-minute training, risking their ability to be fully 

ready once deployed and underway. 

The most prevalent factor we found that hampered training completion was a lack of available amphibious ships on which to train. 

For example, data we collected or obtained from the 1st Marine Expeditionary Force, which operates out of the Pacific, showed that 

the Navy was unable to fulfill 93 percent of its request for Navy 

ship support for training in fiscal year 2016. 

Other significant factors we identified across the Marine Corps 

that hampered training included limited access to to range space 

and maintenance delays for amphibious ships. 

With respect to actions taken by the Navy and Marine Corps to 

mitigate training challenges, we identified some important steps 

that the services have taken. For example, the Navy in working 
7 

with the Marine Corps has assessed its needs for amphibious ships 

to support current deployments while also providing for adequate 

training and now plans to increase the number of ships in the amphibious fleet from 31 to 38. 

Also, the Marine Corps is currently evaluating its amphibious 

training requirements and the number of forces that must be 

trained and ready at any given time. However, despite these actions, we found that the service’s current approach for amphibious 

operations training does not fully incorporate strategic training in 

leading risk management practices, such as prioritizing all available training resources. 

For example, the Marine Corps relies more on an ad hoc process 

to identify units that are available for home station training when 

an amphibious ship becomes available, rather than a process that 

would deliberately align the next highest priority units with those 

ships and other resources. 

Additionally, the Navy and Marine Corps have not systematically 

evaluated a full range of alternatives to achieve training priorities 

in light of the limited availability of amphibious ships. 

Further, while the Marine Corps has endeavored to incorporate 

simulators and other virtual devices into its training activities, we 

identified gaps in its processes to effectively develop and use them; 

namely, weaknesses on the front-end planning and postfielding 

evaluation of device effectiveness. 

And finally, with respect to naval integration for training activities, the Navy and Marine Corps have taken steps to improve coordination between the two services but have not fully incorporated 

leading collaboration practices that would help drive these efforts. 

For example, the Navy and Marine Corps lack defined common outcomes that would help them create a more integrated approach to 

managing and executing their training programs. 

This completes my statement, and I would be pleased to respond 

to any questions you may have. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Russell can be found in the Appendix on page 44.] 

Mr. WILSON. Thank you very much, Mr. Russell, and thank all 

of you for your succinctness, and we will begin now on the very 

concise 5-minute rule. 

Even before we begin, yesterday, and I was really pleased, and, 

Admiral, you brought it up again, the consequence of continuing 

resolution that we have and we are facing that now. And something that would be very helpful as I mentioned, and I hope that 

both of you could provide succinct examples of what the additional 

costs are due to a continuing resolution in real world language very 

brief so that Congresswoman Bordallo and I can receive that and 

we can provide it to the rest of the subcommittee members so that 

we could actually use that to explain to our constituents what the 

consequence of a continuing resolution is. 

And it would just be very helpful because it just doesn’t come 

across as it should. And we want to make it where our constituents 

understand and also even our colleagues, it would be good for them 

to understand, too. 

Admiral Lewis, you clearly articulated in your written statement 

and in your opening remarks why it is so important to grow the 
8 

number of amphibious ships currently in the Navy’s inventory. Can 

you please comment on why you would need additional ships, particularly being challenged when the Navy has plans to take commission LSDs [dock landing ships] offline for up to 4 years at a 

time? Currently LSD–46, the USS Tortuga, does not have planned 

availability fiscal years 2016 to 2019. Can you please explain this 

further? 

Admiral LEWIS. Yes, sir. In regards to taking the ships offline for 

maintenance, so these ships are old, and they are ships that, you 

know, so it is akin to keeping a car that you have had for a long 

time that the maintenance costs become further and further. And 

we have—over time we have deferred these maintenance because 

of continuing resolutions. 

As an example of that deferred maintenance, the USS Gunston 

Hall went into maintenance deferred an entire 3-year deferral increased the costs from $44 million to $111 million. And the time 

in maintenance went from 270 days to 696 days. You know, if you 

compare that to the cost to your personal vehicle that is, you know, 

a couple months’ pay of all of us, regardless of what kind of car it 

is. So that is a big impact to those funds, those operating funds. 

That is how we fund those maintenance. 

In the case of ships that we have taken offline, as you state, we 

have really no other choice to do that because we don’t have adequate funding under continuing resolutions to do that maintenance, you know, right in quick order. If we had more funding we 

could, you know, tighten those timelines on that maintenance on 

those older ships. However, we have done the best that we can do 

with the funding that we have and spread that maintenance out 

over time. 

Mr. WILSON. I want to thank you for raising that it is not just 

cost but delay and extension of time, and so if you all could include 

that, not just costs, but the consequence of offline and delay. 

And General Beaudreault, what specific elements do the Marine 

Corps atrophy and suffer the most from the lack of amphibious 

ships and training opportunities? 

General BEAUDREAULT. Mr. Chairman, it is our ability to train 

at higher echelons above the Marine expeditionary unit and the 

amphibious ready group unit. Our forcible entry capability, core 

competency of the Marine Corps and Navy team here, is at risk 

above the MEU level. Simply we can do some training through— 

of the command elements through virtual systems, but at some 

point you have to put the ships to sea and go through a mission 

rehearsal. 

And the ability to generate the number of ships required to train 

at a Marine expeditionary brigade [MEB] level just simply isn’t 

there. So we take it in bite-size chunks, and we try to train elements of that MEB the best we can, but it is very, very difficult 

lacking the capacity to put the entire MAGTF [Marine air-ground 

task force] and Navy team together at sea. That is the greatest 

challenge we have quite honestly right now. 

Mr. WILSON. Well, and I appreciate you pointing out that virtual 

can be very helpful, but it is the actual practicality of the operation 

itself. At this time we proceed to Congresswoman Bordallo. 
9 

Ms. BORDALLO. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Russell, you identified concerns with the way the Navy and the Marine 

Corps were utilizing available training resources to conduct amphibious training. Can you please provide us with some specific examples where GAO felt the current process did not effectively 

prioritize training? 

Mr. RUSSELL. Yes, ma’am. Well, I will start out by saying with 

respect to the units that are just about to deploy for the Marine 

expeditionary units, they were able to train, and they were able to 

use those resources. 

The issues we had were with that ready bench, that group that 

was not ready to deploy, and what we found is that more often the 

assignment of Navy ships to Marine Corps units was done more ad 

hoc based on the availability of the units for the Marine Corps 

units to match up to the ship based on the availability of the ship, 

rather than having a system of prioritization to look at those Marine Corps units that were most likely to need training earlier. 

So, for example, some of those units that might be tagged to go 

as part of the special Marine task forces, the SPMAGTF [special 

purpose Marine air-ground task force], for example, or other things 

that might have a priority over others. That distinction was not 

made in the process, rather, it was more of a matching of availability. 

Ms. BORDALLO. Thank you. Thank you very much. Vice Admiral 

Lewis and Lieutenant General Beaudreault, given the concerns 

identified by GAO I am concerned that additional funding targeted 

toward readiness may not be prioritized toward the units that have 

the highest needs. In light of the GAO report, can you describe 

what controls have been put in place or that you plan to put in 

place in the coming year that will ensure readiness resources are 

properly allocated to the units with the most pressing needs? And 

you, General, first. 

General BEAUDREAULT. Thank you, ma’am. I would say that, yes, 

we do have a plan and there are controls in place, and it gets to 

what Mr. Russell just referred to. And we first ensure that we can 

meet our steady-state requirement. Those next to deploy have to be 

trained and certified to go forward and execute their missions. 26th 

MEU, for instance, right now is the priority effort to make sure 

they have got everything they need before they depart the east 

coast of the United States to go forward into the Central Command 

region. 

Secondly, it is the ability to ensure of our OPLAN [operation 

plan] readiness, and that calls for units, of course, in number and 

in size greater than Marine expeditionary units or amphibious 

ready groups. So we do take a look at our OPLAN requirements 

and try to focus those units because the units change all the time 

as units deploy on their normal schedule, battalions change and 

squadrons change so we try to keep pace with the units that are 

back at home station that may be next to deploy. And that next 

to deploy focus is on those specifically that may have to meet an 

OPLAN requirement. 

Thirdly would be exercises. And with exercises comes experimentation. We can’t afford to have sets of ships that are going to exercise and then we need another set to experiment. We have inte-
10 

grated experimentation in with the exercises, and I think Dawn 

Blitz is our most recent example of that where we wanted to test 

our ability to shoot High Mobility Artillery Rocket System off of an 

amphibious platform, which proved itself. 

So I would say that is the sequence, that is the plan. It is to 

make sure that those that are next to deploy, meeting OPLAN requirements, and then exercises and experimentation in that order. 

Ms. BORDALLO. Thank you. Thank you, General. Admiral. 

Admiral LEWIS. Yes, ma’am. Really to mirror what General 

Beaudreault said, but I would—the first priority for funding, additional funding that we need, would be go toward ship maintenance, 

so as to be able to not have to defer any further maintenance and 

to keep the maintenance time and costs and to get done on time 

so they can get out and start the training cycle. 

The training cycle is about a year long, 6 months in which we 

do the basic unit level training with the Navy with Marines embarked with their basic core competencies and then the second 6 

months is a fully integrated toward the higher end training. 

The prioritization really starts with that maintenance to make 

sure we start on time and then we can have the units that we have 

in an inventory, which is not enough, but we can have the units 

we have in the inventory to train with. 

And then the third priority would be at the higher end, the exercises, the larger formation exercises where the experimentation 

takes place, as well. 

Ms. BORDALLO. So maintenance, training, and exercises in 

that—— 

Admiral LEWIS. Yes, ma’am. 

Ms. BORDALLO. Thank you very much. Mr. Chairman, I yield 

back. 

Mr. WILSON. Thank you, Ranking Member. We now proceed to 

Congressman Austin Scott of Georgia. 

Mr. SCOTT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. General, Admiral, it is 

not lost on me that between the two of you you have 66 years in 

service to the country. I think if Mattis and Kelly combined probably have over 80 years of service to the country, and as I listen 

to any of the four of you that have talked, it is pretty clear that 

the sequester and the caps have done more damage, just Mattis 

has been very direct about it, than any outside enemy to our military and our capabilities. And I want to reiterate the point that I 

made yesterday, and I want to say this as respectfully as I know 

how to do it. As long as you ask for a continuing resolution you are 

going to get a continuing resolution. 

We can put an end to this madness by the end of this year, but 

only if men like you and General Kelly and General Mattis hold 

Congress’ feet to the fire. Give us Christmas Eve, give us Christmas Day to go home to our families. There are a lot of men and 

women deployed around the world. Make us stop this madness. 

But if General Mattis comes out and says we need a continuing 

resolution, I promise you, you are going to get a continuing resolution. And from the members of HASC [House Armed Services Committee] I don’t pretend to speak for all of them, but I will tell you 

that I think among the Democrats and the Republicans on HASC 

we all want to help you solve this problem. All of us do. I believe 
11 

that to be true. It is not a partisan issue from the members who 

are on HASC. 

But I just promise you if Mattis and Kelly ask for a continuing 

resolution, you are going to have a continuing resolution, and until 

you hold Congress’ feet to the fire you are going to have to watch 

our capabilities further degrade. And so I would just ask for your 

help in speaking with them and making sure that they say no more 

continuing resolutions. If Congress has to cancel going home for 

Christmas, then Congress can cancel going home for Christmas 

just like the soldiers do. 

But, again, I respect both of you, all three of you, and thank you 

for your service, and I just hope that we can put an end to this 

madness by December 31st, but it is up to you. It is up to you all. 

Mattis can do it. Kelly can do it. They have got enough credibility 

up here. 

So Marine Corps logistics base in Albany we talked yesterday 

about the shortfalls in helicopters. Today we are talking about 

shortfalls in amphibious ships. General, you have got two Marine 

Corps logistics centers. The one in Albany is not technically in my 

district, but I have family that works there, although we don’t 

claim each other for fear of termination. The maintenance on the 

amphibious assault vehicles, who does that? Is that in Albany or 

is that in the west coast depot? 

General BEAUDREAULT. Maybe both, but I am definitely certain 

it is happening in Albany. 

Mr. SCOTT. Okay. 

General BEAUDREAULT. And we greatly appreciate the work that 

is being done there to include the recovery of the tornado effects. 

Mr. SCOTT. Absolutely. 

General BEAUDREAULT. In January of 2017 and what has been 

able to be accomplished by that workforce is nothing short of amazing. To include the reset of our equipment from Afghanistan, we 

are 94 percent—we had, I believe, almost 87,000 items that were 

rolled back from combat that needed to be reworked, and we are 

closing in on the completion of resetting that equipment back in Albany, so tremendous effort by your family members and others in 

Albany, and we greatly appreciate the support of Congress on that. 

Mr. SCOTT. I was there shortly after that storm, and we were 

very fortunate that that tornado was a little bit further to the 

south, and we would have lost some lives on that base. They did 

a tremendous job of cleaning up and getting things back in order. 

What systemic challenges do you have at the Marine Corps logistics base in Albany and what changes can we make to help you 

with any of those challenges? 

General BEAUDREAULT. Sir, I better defer that to—I can take 

that for the record if you might, and I will bring that back to our 

director for installations and logistics. That was squarely within 

his portfolio, and I can give you more accurate answers. 

[The information was not available at the time of printing.] 

Mr. SCOTT. Perfect. Thank you. And I look forward to seeing you 

December 23rd up here doing our job, and I hope that Mattis and 

Kelly will help get us out of this mess by the end of the year. 

Thank you. I yield. 
12 

Mr. WILSON. Thank you very much, Congressman Scott. I will 

now proceed to Congressman Joe Courtney of Connecticut. 

Mr. COURTNEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you to the 

witnesses for being here. I would note, as Mr. Scott said, the NDAA 

[National Defense Authorization Act] is now on its way over to the 

White House, which passed with the strongest bipartisan vote since 

2008, and part of that mark or that bill included the Seapower 

[Subcommittee] mark which increased the size of the amphibious 

fleet by one boat above what the President sent over. So there is 

some signs of intelligent life, you know, on the Hill here, but obviously even at that pace in terms of hitting the requirement of 38 

ships it still is going to take a while, and obviously in the meantime you have to figure out the most creative ways possible to boost 

training. 

And, General, a number of us were over in Australia last summer on a CODEL [congressional delegation], and they were describing the joint amphibious training exercise that the Marines did 

from Darwin in 2016. I mean, is that maybe another sort of avenue 

in terms of, again, working with allies in terms of doing joint training exercises to again sharpen people’s skills? 

General BEAUDREAULT. Sir, it is. I think you might be referring 

to Tandem Thrust. That occurs on a recurring basis down in Australia, so, yes, very much so, not just in Australia to get aboard 

their partner ships but to get aboard ships from the U.K. [United 

Kingdom], from Spain, France, the Dutch. So what we refer to as 

an allied maritime basing initiative, particularly in Europe, it is 

not uncommon to find U.S. Marines aboard our allied partners’ 

ships. 

In addition to that our use of alternative platforms, the ESDs 

[expeditionary transfer dock] and the expeditionary support bases 

like the USS Puller and soon the USS Keith provides that, you 

know, additional capability for us to get aboard a ship and still exercise our aviation elements and our command and control, so we 

are trying to be as creative as we can with not just our amphib 

ships, but alternative platforms as well as allied ships. 

Mr. COURTNEY. Thank you. Mr. Russell, again, your report kind 

of listed again sort of more creative ways to, you know, increase 

jointness, and if you had to prioritize I mean—of the recommendations—which one really that you think stands out as probably the 

most effective in the short term? 

Mr. RUSSELL. Well, I would say it is a close call between two of 

them, but certainly the idea of trying to more systematically evaluate the training priorities and establish or look at the alternatives 

to the amphibious ships, whether it is maritime prepositioning fleet 

ships or allied ships, but coming up with a strategic, thoughtful 

way to look and balance those resources amongst priorities and alternatives is probably one of the top recommendations in order to 

manage those resources that are available to the best we can. 

And then it goes back also to the second recommendation that we 

made on naval integration, and that is strategically thinking about 

how you tie together both the Navy and the Marine Corps so that 

they are looking together at some of the joint aspects of it in terms 

of leveraging availabilities and creating those compatible systems 
13 

and policies and procedures where the two are working together in 

a more cohesive way. 

Mr. COURTNEY. Thank you. I yield back. 

Mr. WILSON. I thank you very much, Congressman Courtney. We 

now proceed to Congresswoman Vicky Hartzler of Missouri. 

Mrs. HARTZLER. Good morning, gentlemen. In your report, your 

testimony, General, you talk about how in 1990 the Navy possessed 

62 amphibious ships, and we have 32 today and then how there 

was this, you know, mutually agreed 38-ship requirement. You also 

mentioned that Admiral Greenert in April of 2014 said that we 

need about 50 amphibious gray hulls. So can you give me just a 

little bit of background on how you settled for 38 and how many 

do you really think you need? 

General BEAUDREAULT. Thank you, ma’am, for that question. The 

number 38 is really centered on a look that occurred in 2009 between the Commandant of the Marine Corps and Chief of Naval 

Operations. It has held true since for the past 8 years, and that 

is our requirement to be able to have a forcible entry capability 

with two Marine expeditionary brigades. 

And so if you look at the number of 38 and then it was determined that 34 was based on the perceived funding levels for the 

future was about 34 ships is what would be fiscally affordable at 

that time, of which minus 10 percent in maintenance would leave 

you about 30 operationally available to support the lift of 2 Marine 

expeditionary brigades. So that is essentially how we got to the 38. 

We will get there in fiscal year 2033. So the risk is between now 

and fiscal year 2033 on getting that to that objective level. It is also 

the additional assumptions that was made on 10 percent of that 

fleet being in maintenance when we know that history indicates 

that we are at a higher percentage than 90 percent, less availability, in other words, than what we are finding in the ARGs, for 

instance today 14 of 32 ships are undergoing maintenance. 

Mrs. HARTZLER. Well, this is very concerning. I just returned 

from South Korea and Japan and Guam with Chairman Wilson 

and Madeleine Bordallo and others and saw what our Marines in 

the past have had to come on the shore at Okinawa and at Guam, 

and as we look at what is going on in, you know, South Korea we 

need to have this capability. 

Your testimony also refers to the concerns with the capacity gaps 

with mine countermeasures, naval surface fire support. You say we 

need a modern and capable mine—counter-mine capability facilitate access and the shortfalls. So what—that is very concerning, as 

well. Can you tell me more about what you are doing to address 

these concerns? 

General BEAUDREAULT. I can, and then I will maybe have Admiral Lewis add any additional, particularly on the mine countermeasures piece. It is a topic that was brought before the Naval 

Board, in other words, between the Commandant and the Chief of 

Naval Operations just a couple of months ago on getting a comprehensive review from the N–95, which is expeditionary warfare 

there within the OPNAV [Office of the Chief of Naval Operations] 

staff, on looking at the challenges we have and what are the proposed solutions. 
14 

We know that we don’t have sufficient capacity in that area, but 

we are looking at things that are, you know, unmanned capability 

and other technical technology improvements in that area. Naval 

surface fire support, we have addressed through the kind of experimentation you have seen again in Dawn Blitz of trying to look at 

extending the range of a naval gun, which is about 13 miles today 

to look at what kind of Marine Corps systems can we put afloat 

that will get us ranges out to 43 miles or perhaps in the future out 

to a couple hundred miles. 

And do we take an amphibious ship like an LPD–17 class that 

may be available to put a vertical launch system configuration on 

that ship and bring a rocket system aboard that isn’t there today 

at some relative cost that may not be that great with the existing 

systems we have today incorporated for shipboard use that will get 

us though ranges out to 200 and perhaps tracking what the Army 

is developing for long-range precision fires maybe ranges out to 

400-plus miles in the future. 

So these are things we are all looking at in terms of filling that 

gap on naval surface fire support and technological developments 

on the mine countermeasures. 

Mrs. HARTZLER. Let me just ask one more question. The GAO report talked about the virtual training option, but it also—what is 

the status of your efforts to address GAO’s recommendations to develop guidance for the development and use of virtual training devices and to what extent are Marine Corps virtual training devices 

able to integrate with Navy devices for the purposes of simulating 

amphibious operations? 

General BEAUDREAULT. Within our Training and Education Command, they have really the portfolio for training in general. And 

that would reside with Lieutenant General Walsh, and I know they 

are looking hard at this. There is a Marine Corps simulated training environment concept. I think the GAO report is spot on in their 

assessment on the analysis up front and the evaluation on the back 

end, but there are some things that we are doing today through 

simulation that are definite enhancements that allow for our live 

opportunities to be more effective because we have been able to rehearse some of that, primarily command elements. 

But if you look at the comprehensive array of what is out there 

in the virtual training world, everything from a simulation system 

for a pilot to rehearse landings on a rolling ship at night in rough 

seas to the command and control capabilities we have at a place 

like Marine Corps training and operations group at Twentynine 

Palms. 

If we look at the ability of our MAGTF simulation systems on rehearsing a staff’s ability to plan in an integrated fashion with the 

Navy prior to going to sea we do that routinely with the MEUs. It 

is called R2P2, rapid response planning process. So they do use 

some simulation in virtual training to go through the preliminary 

stages. 

In terms of systems that are designed really for amphibious capabilities outside of, you know, what I have referred to in our—we 

also—I will rewind the tape a little bit there and say we also have 

some systems that are applicable to operations ashore. 
15 

When Marines finally hit the beach, we have a squad immersive 

trainer on both coasts that can be reconfigured to replicate really 

any kind of environment. It is really kind of at the squad level. So 

there are things that are applicable that we are today ashore that 

would have amphibious operations, but amphib-specific kinds of 

simulators, there aren’t a lot that we have today and perhaps none 

in the Navy that would get us to where we would want to be in 

future. So it is a system of systems that you can piece together to 

project what you need to do once the landing force is ashore. 

Mrs. HARTZLER. Thank you. Thank you. 

Mr. WILSON. Thank you, Congresswoman Hartzler. We now proceed to Congressman Trent Kelly of Mississippi. 

Mr. KELLY. Well, I broke the mike. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Leave it to a redneck to break something. You know, I want to concur in what Austin Scott said. It is critical that we not hear mixed 

messages from the military community whether that be at the 

SECDEF [Secretary of Defense] level or from our generals or our 

admirals. 

CRs [continuing resolutions] kill our readiness. I know that I currently serve in our Guard, and I can tell you it kills our readiness. 

And you will never hear me say anything other than that. It is not 

okay for a CR, not a short one, not a long one, not any one. It is 

killing our readiness. So I just hope that that message will be 

heard. 

The second part is we have gotten so focused on the COIN 

[counterinsurgency] fight for the last 16 years. I see my soldiers, 

I see young majors or sometimes a little older majors, I see E–6s 

and E–7s who do not know how to fight the real fight that we are 

here for and at the end of the day the Marine Corps is not here 

to do a COIN fight. They are real good at that, they are real good 

at a lot of things, but you guys are here to make forced landing 

on a contested beachhead to get us a foothold to go to war with our 

enemies to be able to project power from there. It is critical that 

we have the elements to do those things, we have the training to 

do those things, and we focus on those tasks that are critical to us. 

I mean, that is why we have a Marine Corps. 

And so I guess going back [to] naval surface fires, you know we 

don’t have battleships anymore. We don’t have the—we do not have 

the ability to have naval surface fire support like we had in the 

past. Tomahawks and CAS [close air support] are great, but they 

don’t do the same things as those big guns on those battleships 

used to do, and if you are making a forced landing I assure you, 

you don’t want to go where just Tomahawks and CAS have been 

because you still got a lot of fighting to do to get through that. 

How would you rate—General Beaudreault, how would you rate 

the naval surface fire’s readiness, and what are we doing to improve it? 

General BEAUDREAULT. I will defer to Admiral Lewis on any improvements to the naval surface fire support platforms. My understanding of that which is afloat is fine. What we are, just as you 

referred to, Congressman, is a range limitation. The ship’s survivability in a contested environment to close within the ranges that 

would be required to even get support from a 5-inch gun, for instance, is something we are going to have to rethink. 
16 

So the coin of the realm in the future is long-range precision 

fires, and more ships protection against missile threats and an air 

threat, which looking at our potential adversaries and our competitors out there, what they are building, stealth capability and likewise is something that we—this technological edge we used to have 

is something we are very aware of, something we are very concerned about, and something we need to counter. 

So survivabilities of the amphibious platforms to get in close is 

a big concern. We need to make them more lethal. We need to 

make them more survivable. And the lethality goes to the naval 

surface fire support piece, and the survivability gets to the missile 

defense piece. 

Mr. KELLY. Admiral, if you can talk about that, please? 

Admiral LEWIS. Yes, sir. The contested environment that you referred to years ago was in close to the beachhead. It is now everywhere. If you look throughout the maritime, all straits, Strait of 

Hormuz, Malacca Straits, wherever and further out into the maritime, so it is all the battlespace now. A priority, a very high priority for the Navy is development of long-range precision surfaceto-surface fires that is very much—and it is not just in this fight, 

it is in what we would call, you know, traditionally a blue-water 

fight, which has been very much—you know, it has been very 

blurred in that regard from the contested space. 

Where we are right now in surface fires is just over 10 nautical 

miles, and that is not far enough. Part of that, though, is the systems and the command and control systems and the ability to network our capabilities from Navy ships at sea well out to sea to in 

close to onshore. 

That networking is something that we are very focused on with 

Navy and Marine Corps first and with the Air Force and with the 

Army as we go forward. But that is something that it is a real 

need. We are not close to achieving it. We have got to get to the 

building blocks first, which is the basic units and the capability of 

the ARG and MEU. 

Mr. KELLY. I thank both of you for your answer. I think that is 

something we need to really focus on and focus on quick. The bottom line there is a lot of difference going into a beachhead or a 

hardened target that has been saturated with heavy fires than to 

go in somewhere that has kind of been just kind of hit a little bit. 

There is a lot of fighting left and we don’t want to use Marines 

when we can do that with firepower, and with that my time is expired. 

Mr. WILSON. Thank you very much, Colonel, Congressman Kelly. 

We now proceed to Congressman Mike Gallagher of Wisconsin. 

Mr. GALLAGHER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I don’t have a cool 

southern accent, but I would like to associate myself with the remarks of Mr. Kelly and Mr. Scott. I really think that now is the 

critical time to get out from under this problem from a budgetary 

perspective. I don’t think we can afford another CR, and so I think 

we have to make a stand over the next month. And I know it might 

seem absurd from your perspective for us to put the onus on you, 

given that we are a separate branch of government which provides 

you with funding, and it is our job, but we really need your help. 

Because you guys bring a credibility that Congress does not. 
17 

Congress is rocking a 12 percent approval rating right now. I 

think you guys have a 90 percent approval rating. So we are going 

to need your partnership over the next month. By the way, that approval rating is lower than cockroaches and colonoscopies to give 

you a sense of how bad the problem is right now. Because, and I 

hate to be critical since I have only been here a year, but when it 

comes to this issue, which should be the most important issue for 

all of us it just—it perplexes me as to why a year into this Congress we are still in this situation when we know how much damage the BCA [Budget Control Act] and sequester has done to our 

military and how much damage another continuing resolution 

would do as the Secretary laid out in the letter to Chairman 

McCain and some others a month ago. So I would just second the 

sentiments of Colonel Kelly and Austin Scott. 

This next month I view to be as absolutely critical, and I am not 

going to support any effort that continues to punt this problem 

down the road any further. 

It is just, I can’t look my buddies who are still on Active Duty 

in the eye, given that I am unexpectedly in this role, and do that. 

So if we have to cancel Christmas, it is fine with me. I am happy 

to stay here, and they should lock us on the House floor until we 

get this done. 

So thank you for being here and shedding light on these issues, 

and I just would ask sort of a follow-up of what Congresswoman 

Hartzler suggested. 

So we know we have gone from 61 amphibs down to 32, and the 

requirement is 38. Is that correct? Do I have that right? So can you 

just give me a sense, and forgive me if I missed this, how that impacts our OPLANs, particularly in the Pacific, and whether that 

should require us to rethink these OPLANs or rethink whether 

they are even realistic to begin with? 

General BEAUDREAULT. Congressman, just on the evaluation of 

our ability to execute any of the op plans if you would permit I will 

take that question because I think it would—I don’t want to breach 

or wander into any of the classified territory. So I think I can provide you the best most comprehensive answer in that classified 

forum. 

Mr. GALLAGHER. Sure. 

Admiral LEWIS. I echo that, but what I would mirror, and at the 

unclassified level, if there is a conflict in the Pacific that we are 

faced with right now and the scenario we are faced with right now, 

it is not going to be like what we have been faced with over the 

last 15 years. And that is a large-scale conflict with a considerable 

risk to a lot of American lives. 

And that is why—and our capacity in amphibious ships and Marines and soldiers, airmen, sailors, Coast Guardsmen is not where 

it needs to be. We are going to go to the fight and we are going 

to win, but that is a real serious thing right now. 

And the fact of passing a budget and not having a continuing 

resolution will get us one step closer to being prepared, but passing 

a continuing resolution will, as I said in my opening remarks, and 

you mirrored much better than I have, it has just stemmed the 

readiness issues. It hasn’t reversed them. And we are in a real 

need of reversing those readiness issues. 
18 

Mr. GALLAGHER. Yes. 

Admiral LEWIS. And that was the only thing I would say on top 

of that. 

Mr. GALLAGHER. Well, usually I criticize people that use their 5 

minutes to give speeches and not ask questions, but I am violating 

that today. I just want to go back to this point. You know this is 

our—this is the centennial of our entry into World War I, so I have 

been doing a kind of nerdy deep dive into Wisconsin’s history, and 

we led the opposition to the war. 

Bob La Follette, our most famous politician, was the leader of the 

progressive Republicans and fought on the Senate chamber to delay 

Army merchant vessels and all this, but notwithstanding that 

crazy debate that we had that really divided the country—we had 

a lot of German-Americans in Wisconsin—we managed to come together afterwards and do the right thing for the country, and the 

entire country mobilized in support of our troops. 

That is not to say it wasn’t without problems and we experienced 

a lot of the interesting and divisive issues on the homefront, but 

I just feel like this is the time where we got to come together, and 

I think we can. I think we can. Working with you guys, we can do 

it. Now is the decisive moment, and I believe what we do over the 

next month can really put us on the right path for the next decade 

or if not longer. So thank you guys for being here and taking the 

time to shed some light on these critical issues. 

General BEAUDREAULT. Congressman, I would like to follow up 

for just one quick note on that and that probably the greatest degradation we faced under the CR is our inability to do the new 

starts. And we talk about building ships if we can’t have new 

starts. Our adversaries and potential adversaries are cranking out 

new ships once every 6 weeks. 

So we find this again our maritime superiority edge narrowing 

through the continuing resolutions that is not allowing us to stay 

on glide path for readiness recovery and maintain a superiority on 

the sea, to be honest with you. 

Mr. GALLAGHER. My time is expired, but I yield. 

Mr. WILSON. Thank you very much, Congressman Gallagher. 

And as we conclude it is obvious to you that we really are facing 

the continuing resolution right now. You are, too. 

And I appreciate Congressman Scott so eloquently presenting it 

and backed up, of course, by Congressman Kelly, and Congressman 

Gallagher, and Congresswoman Hartzler, and then this may be 

lightning is going to strike, bipartisan with Congresswoman Bordallo, and Congressman Courtney, but it really would be helpful to 

us to have very brief, as I indicated yesterday and I will restate, 

to have examples of increased costs, to delays to the costs, and then 

you actually brought up new items that need to be in this very 

brief one-page letter, and that would be the new starts. 

And then there could be a paragraph as to the capabilities of adversaries that have a 6-week capability. That is just incredible, but 

we need to have facts and actually Congressman Gallagher was extremely correct. 

I was going to point out that we need facts that would be meritbased, but actually you have credibility and that would help us as 

we explain to our colleagues the phenomenal challenges to our 
19 

country and the risk to our country and then we can also, once we 

take some hard votes we are going to have to go home and explain 

this to our constituents, and it can best be done if we are presenting specific facts that you can provide. Again, we want to 

thank you for your service. 

It is just inspiring to me with such extraordinary individuals, 

and we appreciate your service each of you, and, Congresswoman 

Bordallo, of course, we need to represent—we need to present the 

wonderful territory of Guam. 

Ms. BORDALLO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I just want to go on 

record to say that I certainly support eliminating the CR. 

Mr. WILSON. And again just bipartisan and to address the issue 

of sequestration we keep punting, but we want to back you up for 

the defense of our country. And with this we shall be adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 9:00 a.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] 

A P P E N D I X 

DECEMBER 1, 2017 

PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD 

DECEMBER 1, 2017 

(25) 

Statement of the Honorable Joe Wilson 

Chairman, Readiness Subcommittee 

"Amphibious Warfare Readiness & Training" 

December 1, 2017 

Good morning. The subcommittee will come to order. I welcome you 

today for this hearing of the House Armed Services Committee, Readiness 

Subcommittee, on "Amphibious Warfare Readiness & Training". 

Today the subcommittee will hear from the Navy and Marine Corps 

regarding the status of Amphibious Training and Readiness-specifically the 

challenges of amphibious ship availability and Navy and Marine Corps interoperability.We are also pleased to have the Government Accountability 

Office present to comment on their recent study of Amphibious Operations 

Training, released in September 2017. I ask the witnesses do their best to 

describe where shortfalls exist and what can be done to improve the less than 

optimal state we are in, specifically how better and more consistent funding 

could help. We have held a series of readiness hearings and briefings on 

aviation, surface combatants, DoD infrastructure, and other topics. Every 

session points to the same grim conclusion ... our services are indeed in a 

readiness crisis. 

Marine Expeditionary Units aboard US Navy amphibious vessels are an 

important element of our forward deployed strategic deterrent. To be 

effective, the Navy Marine Corps team must train together regularly, certainly 

more than they do today. Because we have too few ships, necessary training 

is not possible. 

President Ronald Reagan frequently used the phrase, "Peace Through 

Strength". I agree with President Reagan and believe we need a higher level 

of defense funding to achieve that goal. 

[ look forward to hearing from our witnesses today on how this 

capability can improved. 

Before I introduce the witnesses, I tum to Ranking Member Bordallo, 

the distinguished gentlelady from Guam, for opening comments she would 

like to make. 
26 

NOT FOR PUBLICA TJON UNTIL RELEASED BY TilE 

HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON READINESS 

STATEMENT OF 

LIEUTENANT GENERAL BRIAN D. BEAUDREAUL T 

DEPUTY COMMANDANT 

PLANS, POLICIES, AND OPERATIONS 

ON 

AMPHIBIOUS WARFARE READINESS AND TRAINING- INTER OPERABILITY, 

SHORTFALLS, AND THE WAY AHEAD 

BEFORE THE 

HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON READINESS 

DECEMBER 1, 2017 

NOT FOR PUBLICATION UNTIL RELEASED BY THE 

HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON READINESS 

1 
27 

Lieutenant General Brian D. Beaudreault 

Deputy Commandant for Plans, Policies, and Operations 

Lieutenant General Beaudreau\! was commissioned in May 1983 upon graduation from the 

University of Massachusetts, Amherst and was designated as an infantry officer upon 

completion of training. 

His operational assignments include: Platoon Commander and Company Executive Off1cer, 

1st Bn, 3rd Marines, Kaneohe Bay, HI; Assistant Operations Officer, Logistics Officer, 

Maritime Special Purpose Force Commander and G Company Commander, Battalion 

Landing Team 2/9, 15th Marine Expeditionary Unit (SOC), Camp Pendleton, Ci\ (Operation 

RESTORE HOPE, Somalia); Inspector-Instructor, 3rd Battalion, 23rd Marines, Memphis, 

TN; Operations Officer, 31st MEU (SOC), Okinawa, Japan (Operation Stabilise, East 

Timor); Regimental Executive Ol11cer, lst Marine Regiment, Camp Pendleton, CA; 

Commanding Officer, Battalion Landing Team 1/l, 13th MEU (SOC)! Expeditionary Strike 

Group One (Operation Iraqi Freedom); Commanding Officer, 15th MEU(SOC), Camp 

Pendleton, CA (Operation Iraqi Freedom); Deputy Commander, Marine Forces Central 

Command/Commander MARCENT (Forward), Manama, Bahrain; Commanded Task Force 

South in support of flood relief in Sindh Province, Pakistan; and Commanding General, 2nd 

Marine Division. 

His Supporting Establishment assignments include service as Guard Officer, Marine Corps 

Security Force Company, Naval Station Roosevelt Roads, Puerto Rico and Director, 

Expeditionary Warfare School, Quantieo, VA. 

LtGen Beaudreau\! completed joint duty assignments as Ground Plans Officer (CCJ3-PP), 

Operations Directorate, US Central Command, MacDill AFB, FL; Deputy Director, Future 

Joint Force Development, Joint Staff(J7) and Deputy Director, Joint Training, Joint Staff 

(J7), Suffolk, VA; and most recently served as Director of Operations and Cyber (13), U.S. 

Africa Command. 

His professional military education includes the following: The Basic School; Amphibious 

Warfare School; US Army Command and General StafTCollege; Armed Forces Staff 

College; Naval War College (MA with Highest Distinction, National Security and Strategic 

Studies); Higher Command and Staff Course, UK Defence Academy; and CAPSTONE, 

National Defense University. 

2 
28 

Chairman Wilson, Ranking Member Bordallo, and distinguished members of the 

subcommittee, we appreciate the opportunity to testify today. 

Today, Sailors and Marines are at sea operating as Amphibious Ready Groups (ARGs) 

and Marine Expeditionmy Units (MEUs); AMERICA ARG and 15th MEU in the Central 

Command region, BONHOMME RICHARD ARG and 31st MEU in the Pacific, IWO JIMA 

ARG with 26th MEU in the Atlantic, and Black Sea Rotational Marines are aboard Allied ships 

in the European theater. Your expeditionary forces in readiness are postured forward and 

accomplishing our national security objectives. 

The Navy and Marine Corps have reviewed the GAO report GA0-17-477C "NAVY 

AND MARINE CORPS TRAINING Further Planning Needed for Amphibious Operations 

Training" and agree with the study, its findings, and its recommendations. Today's testimony 

provides the Navy and Marine Corps team the opportunity to inform the Readiness 

Subcommittee on the challenges associated with amphibious operations training, discuss our 

shortfalls, and describe our projected way ahead. 

Foremost, the GAO report finds the Navy's shortage of amphibious ships is the 

predominant factor that inhibits our ability to train for "other amphibious priorities" beyond 

Amphibious Ready Group I Marine Expeditionary Unit (ARG/MEU) requirements. While there 

are other resource shortfalls, the shortage of amphibious ships is the quintessential challenge to 

amphibious training. The Department of the Navy lacks a sutllcient number of amphibious and 

expeditionary ships to execute current operations, respond to contingency operations, and 

conduct the necessary training for both simultaneously. Ideally, the Naval Service would have 

optimally trained and equipped amphibious forces that deploy when required, with the right 

quantity of quality forces, on the designated time line, with a reservoir of non-deployed yet ready 

3 
29 

forces that could surge to meet the demands oflarge-scale contingencies. However, today the 

operational availability of the amphibious fleet is insufficient to meet the global demands and 

consequently increases risk. While the on hand number of amphibious warships falls short of the 

mutually agreed upon 38-ship requirement, the current 30-year shipbuilding plan supports a 38-

ship amphibious fleet. 

As described in the Joint Conceptfor Access and Maneuver in the Global Commons 

(JAM-GC) the joint force must maintain access to and maneuver through the global commons, 

project power, and defeat an adversary attempting to deny freedom of action via the employment 

of Anti-Access/ Area Denial (A2AD) capabilities. To meet these challenges, amphibious forces 

must be distributable, resilient and employed in sufficient scale for ample duration. Due to 

amphibious lift shortfalls, the naval force is cmTently challenged to satisfY these basic 

requirements- a situation that will only worsen over time if we cannot remedy the problems 

noted in the report. 

Today, of the 32 amphibious ships, 16 are available to support current or contingency 

operations. The Navy's 2016 Force Stmcture Assessment established a requirement of38 

amphibious warships. The Marine Corps supports the 38-ship minimum amphibious fleet and the 

requisite funding to improve the readiness of the current amphibious fleet and fulfil Combatant 

Command (CCMD) requirements and contingency response timelines. The Navy's plan for 38 

amphibious ships provides: 12 Wasp and America Class LHD/LHAs, 13 San Antonio Class 

LPDs, and 13 LX(R) warships that will replace the Whidhey Island and Harpers Ferry Class 

LSDs. The GAO report correctly points out that in 1990 the Navy possessed 62 amphibious 

ships in contrast to the 32 we possess today. The amphibious force stmcture is projected to grow 

to a total of 34 ships starting in FY21. The Navy and Marine Corps are currently operating below 

4 
30 

the 38-ship level and will continue to do so until FY33. While modern ships are more capable 

than their predecessors the Naval force lacks the capacity to conduct the necessary training when 

considering scheduled maintenance availabilities and current operational requirements. Former 

Chief of Naval Operations (CNO), ADM Greener!, stated in April2014, that "we need about 50 

amphibious gray hulls." His conclusions are supported by evidence such as registered joint 

requirements, training requirements as noted in the GAO report, the recent Heritage Foundation 

Index of Military Strength, operational requirements as noted by the Chairman in JAM-GC; as 

well as requirements identified in the National Military Strategy. Yet, we remain mindful that 

the amphibious force is but one sub-set of the overall shortfalls in fleet capacity. 

Beyond the amphibious warship shortfalls, we also are seeing significant capability and 

capacity gaps in mine counter-measures (MCM) and naval surface tire support (NSFS). The 

shortfalls in MCM and NSFS adversely impacts amphibious readiness and the Naval force's 

ability to train for operations in a contested environment. We need a modern and capable 

mine/counter-mine (MCM) capability to facilitate access to and enable power-projection 

operations throughout contested littorals/near-seas. MCM shortfalls adversely impact 

amphibious warfare readiness and may severely limit fleet access during future contingencies. 

NSFS represents another area where greater naval integration is warranted. The Marine 

Corps needs a modern naval surface fires capability that provides precision, range, and volume 

for cmTent and future threat environments. The current 13 nautical mile range of our naval guns 

produces significant risk to the amphibious task force. Along with an increased role for the F35B in supporting fleet operations and enabling the Carrier Strike Group (CSG), the Marine 

Corps encourages continued study on the potential introduction of vertical launch system (VLS) 

5 
31 

capabilities aboard the LPDs to fill fire support shortfalls and further enhance the lethality and 

resilience of the amphibious fleet. 

The Marine Corps welcomes the Navy's effort to develop an extended range munition 

that is capable of employment from the current inventory of naval guns, and we value the Navy's 

continued efforts to introduce VLS within the amphibious fleet. The desired objective 

capabilities includes an amphibious fleet that is capable of sinking enemy combatants and 

removing threats to the establishment of sea control beyond the reliance on F-35B. Of equal 

importance, improved lethality and force protection would facilitate the breaking of external 

dependencies which currently tie-down other surface combatants to protect L-class ships. 

Success in these endeavors would further mitigate the missile threat to surface combatants, 

enable a more distributable force, and provide the naval forces a new multi-mission platfom1 that 

augments surface combatants. 

Resourcing challenges are fueled by global requirements, delayed or extended ship 

maintenance cycles, competing Navy programs, the budget control act (BCA), and repetitive 

continuing resolutions (CRs ). These factors have contributed to the shortage in amphibious 

ships, which has resulted in reduced training, degraded capability and increased operational risk. 

In the current fiscal environment, we continue to prioritize deployed and preparing to deploy 

units and provide them the mission critical resources to the greatest extent possible. We will 

continue to make tough choices and balance our available resources to meet current operational 

commitments and simultaneously build the readiness of non-deployed units- our "ready bench" 

to respond to emergent crises. 

The recent post-hurricane Defense Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA) and Foreign 

Disaster Relief (FDR) operations resulted in two of the three IWO JIMA ARG ships canceling 

6 
32 

pre-deployment training, to include a sizable reduction in support for exercise BOLD 

ALLIGATOR which ultimately caused delays to their deployment schedule. The USS WASP, 

our first F-358 ready LHD, also participated in the DSCA operations and was delayed in 

deploying to the Pacific due to maintenance. CR funding levels may yield millions in increased 

readiness costs. USS GUNS TON HALL (LSD-44) had maintenance cancelled in 20 II due to CR 

restrictions. The ship is now receiving its delayed maintenance for which the operational and 

monetary costs have increased from 270 days to 696 days and from $44.7M to $111M. We will 

continue to pay these increased prices if we remain under CR constraints. The shortfall in 

amphibious lift is exemplified by the deployment of Special Purpose Marine Air-Ground Task 

Forces (SPMAGTFs) to land-based locations in Central Command (CENTCOM), Africa 

Command (AFRICOM), and Southern Command (SOUTHCOM). These shore based units 

satisfY the joint forces' demand for MAGTF capabilities but the forces do not retain the strategic 

flexibility and responsiveness of af1oat forces and are constrained by host nation permissions. 

The Navy and Marine Corps are actively integrating capabilities. synchronizing efforts, 

and moving forward as a unified force while preparing to meet challenges across the range of 

military operations. Naval integration unites Navy and Marine Corps warfighting doctrine, 

concept development, task organization, material acquisition programs, logistics, training and 

command and control. Naval integration maximizes the warfighting capabilities of the Navy 

surface, subsurface, aviation, cyber, and special warfare communities with the MAGTF to create 

a credible multi-functional Naval capability that can influence, deter, and compete in all 

domains. At the Service-level, this implies achieving a greater degree of interdependence in 

organizing, training, and equipping of the force. At the operational level, this implies a reform to 

7 
33 

theater maritime command and control (C2) architectures; and, at the tactical level, this implies 

the rapid integration of amphibious forces into larger Navy fonnations. 

Historically, sea control has been a purely Navy mission; however, integrating MAGTF 

air and ground fires capabilities with the America Class LHAs will transition this to a naval 

mission. Establishing sea control against a near peer competitor is an integrated naval and joint 

mission that leverages Marine Corps concepts and capabilities, such as the Expeditionary 

Advance Base Operations (EABO), the F-35B and precision rocket artillery. 

Doctrinal publications have advanced efforts to increase integration. A Design for 

Maintaining Maritime Superiority, the Marine Corps Operating Concept (MOC) and Littoral 

Operations in a Contested Environment (LOCE) all illustrate the importance of an integrated 

force. Specifically, LOCE describes how an integrated naval force, operating from dispersed 

locations, both ashore and afloat, will utilize its flexibility, versatility, and mobility to achieve 

sea control and power projection into contested littoral areas. 

Going forward, our integrated training programs require evaluation. We must continue to 

train as we intend to fight. The Navy and Marine Corps are establishing a Service level policy 

that prioritizes the limited amphibious assets and outlines Service responsibilities with regards to 

amphibious training, experimentation and concept development. This co-authored policy for 

Amphibious Operations Training will result in a Secretary of the Navy (SECNAV) Instruction to 

guide the Navy and Marine Corps's Campaign Plan for Amphibious Operations Training 

(CPAOT). This instruction will better leverage fleet resources to maximize unit level and 

collective amphibious training in accordance with the following priorities: ( 1) ARG/MEU 

Integrated Phase workups and deployments, (2) Expeditionary Strike Group /Marine 

Expeditionary Brigade exercises such as BOLD ALLIGATOR, DAWN BLITZ, and SSANG 

8 
34 

YONG, (3) unit level training to support operational plan readiness, and ( 4) experimentation and 

concept development. The results obtained from exercises, experiments, and operations will 

drive changes to the Navy and Marine Corps doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership 

and education, personnel, facilities, and policy (DOTMLPF-P). 

Through the CNO and CMC co-chaired Naval Board, the Services identifY gaps, 

recommend solutions, and serve as the primary fomm for future naval integration initiatives. 

Commander, U.S. Fleet Forces Command (USFLTFORCOM) and Commander, U.S. Marine 

Forces Command (MARFORCOM) established a co-led Maritime Working Group (MWG) to 

provide an enduring inter-service collaborative process that integrates capabilities, force 

development, experimentation, and emerging requirements with exercise planning, scheduling 

and resourcing to advance naval concepts and warfighting readiness. Commander, U.S. Pacific 

Fleet and Commander, U.S. Marine Forces Pacific also developed the Pacific Naval Integration 

Working Group (PNIWG) to incorporate PACOM issues into the MWG. 

Naval integration is extant today among the forward deployed 5th Fleet, Task Force 51 

where 5th Marine Expeditionary Brigade (MEB) provides operational control over the 

ARG/MEU. This integrated naval staffled by a Marine Corps Brigadier General is supporting 

Counter Violent Extremist Organization operations and ensuring the free flow of commerce 

through the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden. The integrated command ensures that regional naval 

expeditionary forces can rapidly engage threats emanating from any physical domain; land, air, 

surface or subsurface. 

Our Service level amphibious exercises are providing Expeditionary Strike Group (ESG) 

and MEB commanders with valuable opportunities for the Command Element staffs to train and 

certify. Additional ships will be required to enlarge these exercises in order to accommodate full 

9 
35 

MEB level training. As the amphibious ship inventory builds towards 38, the Navy and Marine 

Corps will continue to explore innovative ways to employ alternative platforms as a lower cost 

means to support training and fulfill joint requirements for afloat basing in the absence of 

amphibious warships. While not replacements for L-Class ships, some joint requirements in 

more permissive environments could temporarily be fulfilled by alternative shipping such as TESBs, expeditionary barges and coastal patrol boats. 

Finally, USFLTFORCOM and MARFORCOM have made a dedicated effort to 

synchronize and optimize training with available ships. For the first time in nearly ten years II 

Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) units will participate in a Type Commander Amphibious 

Training (TCA T) event this quarter. TCA T will go beyond training elements of 2d Marine 

Division's Assault Amphibian Battalion in basic crew proficiency by integrating units from 

across II MEF to increase MEB level amphibious readiness. 

In closing, we conclude the current inventory of32 amphibious warships is well short of 

the naval service's operational requirements which negatively impacts the naval forces' ability to 

generate readiness and negatively affects availability for training larger scale fonnations. The 

amphibious force structure is projected to grow to a total of 34 ships starting in FY21. The 

Marine Corps supports the 38 ship minimum amphibious fleet and the requisite funding to 

develop readiness while concurrently fulfilling validated joint requirements, accomplishing 

necessary t1ect maintenance, and maintaining capacity to respond to potential contingencies. As 

the amphibious ship inventory builds towards 38 ships in FY33, the Marine Corps and the Navy 

will continue to explore innovative ways to employ alternative platforms. 

On behalf of our Marines, Sailors, civilians and their families, we thank the Congress and 

this committee for this opportunity to discuss the key challenges your Navy and Marine Corps 

10 
36 

face. We thank you for your support. The most important actions that Congress can take now is 

to immediately repeal the caps on defense spending in the Budget Control Act and provide a 

defense appropriation that ensures sufficient, consistent, and predictable funding to train, man, 

and equip the Navy and Marine Corps. With your help, we will overcome these constraints and 

enable your Navy and Marine Corps to meet the challenges of the 2 P' century. 

11 
37 

NOT FOR PUBLICATION UNTIL RELEASED BY THE 

HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON READINESS 

STATEMENT OF 

VICE ADMIRAL ANDREW L. LEWIS 

DEPUTY CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS 

OPERATIONS, PLANS, AND STRATEGY 

ON 

AMPHIBIOUS WARFARE READINESS AND TRAINING- INTEROPERABILTTY, 

SHORTFALLS, AND THE WAY AHEAD 

BEFORE THE 

HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON READINESS 

DECEMBER 1, 2017 

NOT FOR PUBLICATION UNTIL RELEASED BY THE 

HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON READINESS 

1 
38 

Chairman Wilson, Ranking Member Bordallo, and distinguished members of the 

subcommittee, we appreciate the opportunity to testify today. 

The Navy and Marine Corps team is forward deployed and standing the watch. Today 

Sailors and Marines are at sea aboard the AMERICA ARG and 15 MEU in Central Command, 

USS ESSEX in the Pacific and IWO JIMA ARG and 26 MEU in the Atlantic. We are on the tip 

of the spear and working every day to sharpen it. 

The Navy and Marine Corps have reviewed the GAO report GA0-17-477C "NAVY 

AND MARINE CORPS TRAINING- Further Planning Needed for Amphibious Operations 

Training" and agree with the study, its findings, and its recommendations. Today's testimony 

provides the Navy and Marine Corps team the opportunity to inform the Readiness 

Subcommittee on the challenges associated with Navy and Marine Corps' amphibious operations 

training and integration, discuss our shortfalls, and layout our projected way ahead. 

The GAO report finds the Navy's shortage of amphibious ships to be detrimental to our 

ability to train for "other amphibious priorities" beyond the Amphibious Ready Group/ Marine 

Expeditionary Unit (ARG/MEU) requirements. As a result of the Budget Control Act and 

ongoing Continuing Resolutions, the shortage of amphibious ships is the primary challenge to 

our Amphibious Training. The Navy's 2016 Force Structure Assessment established a 

requirement of 38 amphibious warships. The amphibious force structure is projected to grow to a 

total of 34 ships starting in FY 2021. 

While the on hand number of amphibious warships falls short ofthe mutually agreed 

upon 38 ship requirement, the cun·ent 30-year shipbuilding plan supports a 38-ship amphibious 

fleet. The Marine Corps fully supports the 38 ship amphibious fleet and the allocation requisite 

funding to improve the readiness of the current amphibious fleet. Amphibious ships are 

2 
39 

deployed to meet both CCMD operational requirements and required contingency operations, 

such as hurricane or tsunami relief, which impacts the ability of the Navy and Marine Corps to 

train as an integrated force. Until we reach 38 ships contingency responses and extended 

shipyard availabilities have a significant potential to impact training and lead to delays in 

fulfilling enduring requirements. The JSF/CANES modernization period for the LHDs has 

grown !rom the originally planned 7-10 months to 16 months, which reduced ARG/MEU 

availability (LHD Mods will continue thru FY25). These gaps, in addition to our amphibious 

warship shortage, add layers of risk in preparing the naval service to neutralize an enemy 

lodgment in a forcible entry operation and operate in a contested environment. 

At the direction ofCNO and the CMC, through the Naval Board, the services 

incorporated processes to posture for increased training and integration. The ARG/MEU shall 

retain unity of command/effort in all employment configurations. The Joint Staff will reflect 

command relationships for an ARG/MEU such that each ARG/MEU shall be OPCON to a single 

combatant commander, as adjudicated by the Joint Staft~ that most requires its capabilities. In 

these instances, when another combatant commander requires support from that ARG/MEU, 

select forces will be provided Tactical Control (T ACON) to that combatant commander. The 

ARG/MEU command elements onboard the LHD will maintain unity of command of ARG/MEU 

elements operating T ACON across CCMD boundaries. This practice will be referred to as 

"distributed". 

To achieve a fully integrated naval force requires a new approach to training. We must 

train as we intend to fight. The Navy and Marine Corps have established service level 

agreements that prioritize limited amphibious assets and outlines service responsibilities with 

regards to amphibious training, experimentation and concept development. This requires global 

3 
40 

force management teams to align Navy and Marine Corps deployment requirements, prioritize 

critical warship resources, and maximize unit level and MAGTF amphibious training. Both 

USFF/MARFORCOM and CPF/MARFORPAC have approved Campaign Plans for Amphibious 

Operational Training (CPAOT) that are rolling 5-yr schedules of USN/USMC amphibious 

training exercises ranging from Table Top Exercises to Fleet Exercises such as BOLD 

ALLIGATOR series. 

Commander, U.S. Fleet Forces Command (USFL TFORCOM) and Commander, U.S. 

Marine Forces Command (MARFORCOM) established a co-led Maritime Working Group 

(MWG) to provide an enduring inter-service collaborative process that integrates capabilities, 

force development, experimentation, and emerging requirements with exercise planning, 

scheduling and resourcing to advance naval concepts and warfighting readiness. Commander, 

U.S. Pacific Fleet and Commander, U.S. Marine Forces Pacific also developed the Pacific Naval 

Integration Working Group (PNIWG) to incorporate PACOM issues into the MWG. 

Eight years of Continuing Resolutions (CRs) and caps imposed by the Budget Control 

Act have impacted our ability to plan and schedule training, ship maintenance, and 

modernization. While we have prioritized our maintenance and readiness dollars, the positive 

effects of funding will not remove this deficit in the near term. Restoring the short-term 

readiness of the fleet requires predictable funding. This funding will ensure that we can conduct 

the required maintenance on our ships. It would also enable the Navy to restore stocks of 

necessary parts, getting more ships to sea and better preparing Sailors and Marines for 

deployment. 

CR funding threatens fleet readiness. For example, USS GUNSTON HALL (LSD-44) 

had maintenance cancelled in 20 II due to CR restrictions. The ship received its deferred 

4 
41 

maintenance, for which the operational and monetary costs increased from 270 days to 696 days 

and from $44.7M to $111M. These are days and dollars that are lost to train our amphibious 

forces 

The recent post-hurricane Defense Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA) and Foreign 

Disaster Relief (FDR) operations resulted in the TWO JIMA ARG plus USS KEARSARGE 

missing the valuable pre-deployment training exercises such as BOLD ALLIGATOR and 

operational delays to their future deployment. The USS WASP, our first F-35B ready LHD, 

which participated in the DSCA operations, has been delayed in reaching the Pacific Fleet due to 

emergent maintenance repairs, and has been forced to reschedule pre-deployment training. 

WASP is underway now for a homeport shift to Sasebo, Japan to become part of the Navy's 

Forward Deployed Naval Forces. 

The Navy and Marine Corps are working diligently to integrate capabilities, synchronize 

efforts, and move forward as a unified force, ready and able to meet all challenges across the 

range of military operations. Naval integration requires training as a single unit because we will 

tight as a single unit. A current example of this focus is the evolution of the sea control mission. 

Modern sea control against a near peer competitor is an integrated naval mission that leverages 

concepts and capabilities such as the Expeditionary Advance Base Operations (EABO) and the 

F-35B to seize and maintain sea control. 

On behalf of all of our Marines, Sailors, civilians and their families, we thank the 

Congress and this committee for this oppmiunity to discuss the key challenges your Navy and 

Marine Corps face. The President's Fiscal Year 2018 request looks toward fleet wholeness, 

funding to man, train, and equip the Navy and Marine Corps. These funds will only work if they 

5 
42 

are approved in a consistent and predictable manner. With your help, we will overcome these 

constraints and reshape your Navy and Marine Corps to meet the challenges of the 21st century. 

6 
43 

Vice Admiral Andrew L. "Woody" Lewis 

Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Operations, Plans and Strategy (N3/NS) 

Vice Adm. Andrew Lewis is a native of Los Altos, California, and a 1985 graduate of the 

U.S. Naval Academy. He was designated a naval aviator in April 1987. He is a graduate of 

Air Command and Staff College, the Anned Forces Staff College and holds a Master of 

Arts in Military History from the University of Alabama. 

His command tours include Carrier Strike Group 12 deploying with USS Theodore 

Roosevelt (CVN 71), Naval Strike and Air Warfare Center aboard Naval Air Station 

Fallon, Carrier Air Wing 3 deploying with USS Harry S. Truman (CVN 75), Strike Fighter 

Squadron (VFA) 106 aboard Naval Air Station Oceana and VFA-15 deploying on USS 

Enterprise (CVN 65) and USS Theodore Roosevelt (CVN 71 ). 

Lewis' operational sea tours include a division officer tour for Attack Squadron 72 

deploying with USS John F Kennedy (CVN 67), as an exchange pilot/tactics instructor for 

800 Naval Air Squadron deploying with HMS Invincible (R05) and as a department head 

for VF A-I92 deploying with USS Independence (CV 62). Other deployed tours have been 

as a battle director at the Combined Air Operations Center in AI Udeid Air Base, Qatar, 

and as the maritime operations center director at Naval Forces Central Command Bahrain. 

Ashore, Lewis served as an instructor pilot in Air Training Squadron 23, as a branch chief 

at the Joint Warfare Analysis Center as the executive assistant to the chief of Naval Air 

Force, and as the executive assistant for the director, Joint Staff. As a flag officer, Lewis 

has served as the vice director for operations (B) and director of fleet training (N7) at Fleet 

Forces Command. 

He has flown over I 00 combat missions in Operations Desert Shield, Desert Storm, 

Southern Watch, Deny Flight, Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom. He has accumulated 

over 5,300 flight hours and 1,100 arrested landings. He was the recipient of the Naval Air 

Forces Pacific Pilot of the Year in 1996. 

Lewis assumed duties as deputy chief of naval operations for operations, plans and strategy 

in August 2017. 

His personal awards include the Defense Superior Service Medal with oak leaf cluster, 

Legion of Merit (six awards), Bronze Star, Defense Meritorious Service Medal, 

Meritorious Service Medal, Air Medal (seven Strike Flight and four Individual with 

Combat "V"), Navy and Marine Corps Commendation Medal (three awards; two with 

Combat "V"), and the Navy and Marine Corps Achievement Medal, as well as various 

service and campaign awards. 
44 

For Release on Delivery 

Expected at 8:00a.m. ET 

Friday. December 1. 2017 

GA0-18-212T 

United States Government Accountability Office 

Testimony 

Before the Subcommittee on Readiness, 

Committee on Armed Services, 

House of Representatives 

NAVY AND MARINE 

CORPS TRAINING 

Further Planning Needed 

for Amphibious Operations 

Training 

Statement of Cary B. Russell, Director, Defense 

Capabilities and Management 
45 

Chairman Wilson, Ranking Member Bordallo, and Members of the 

Subcommittee: 

Thank you for the opportunity to be here today to discuss our recent 

report on Navy and Marine Corps training for amphibious operations. 1 As 

you know, the Navy and the Marine Corps (collectively referred to as U.S. 

naval forces) maintain forces that are capable of conducting an 

amphibious operation-a military operation that is launched from the sea 

by an amphibious force, embarked in ships or craft, with the primary 

purpose of introducing a landing force ashore to accomplish the assigned 

mission. Training forces for amphibious operations requires extensive 

coordination and integration between the Navy and Marine Corps. For 

example, the services must schedule amphibious ships to be used for 

training, develop operational concepts, and design and execute 

exercises. This training also requires significant resources, including 

access to Navy ships, and an adequate amount of range space to 

realistically conduct live-fire training exercises. The Marine Corps, as well 

as the other military services, has stated that the use of virtual trainingincluding simulators or computer-generated simulations-could help 

overcome some of the difficulties associated with training in a live-only 

environment 

According to the Department of Defense (DOD), the future security 

environment will require forces to train across the full range of military 

operations-including types of operations that have not been prioritized in 

recent years, such as amphibious operations. However, over the last 15 

years, continued operational deployments have required U.S. naval 

forces to focus training for stability and counterinsurgency operations, 

while limiting training in amphibious operations, among other areas. The 

Navy has stated that the high demand for presence has put pressure on a 

fleet that is stretched thin across the globe. Our recent testimony on Navy 

readiness highlighted that the Navy has increased deployment lengths, 

shortened training periods, and reduced or deferred maintenance to meet 

high operational demands, which has resulted in declining ship conditions 

and a worsening trend in overall readiness. 2 

1

GAO, Navy and Marine 

Operations Training. 

Training: Further Planning Needed for Amphibious 

(Washington, D.C.: Sept 26, 2017). 

2GAO, Navy Readiness.· Actions Needed to Address Persistent Maintenance, Training, 

and Other Chaffenges Affecting the Fleet, GAO-i 7-809T (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 19, 

2017). 

Page 1 GA0~18~212T Navy and Marine Corps Training 
46 

In this context, my testimony today discusses the findings from our recent 

September 2017 report on Navy and Marine Corps training for 

amphibious operations. Accordingly, this testimony addresses (1) the 

Navy and Marine Corps' ability to complete training for amphibious 

operations priorities and factors limiting that training; (2) steps taken by 

the Navy and Marine Corps to mitigate any training shortfalls, including 

the Marine Corps' use of selected virtual training devices; and (3) efforts 

to improve naval integration for amphibious operations. In addition, I will 

highlight several key actions that we recommended in our report that the 

Navy and Marine Corps could take to help mitigate training shortfalls and 

improve the integration between these services for amphibious 

operations. 

To conduct this work, we analyzed unit-level readiness data from fiscal 

year 2014 through 2016 and deployment certification reports and 

compared those data against the services' training requirements;' 

reviewed service training initiatives; interviewed a nongeneralizable 

sample of officials from 23 Marine Corps units that were selected based 

on their training plans; and selected a nongeneralizable sample of six 

Marine Corps virtual training devices to review based on factors such as 

target audience. Our September 2017 report includes a detailed 

explanation of the methods used to conduct our work. We conducted the 

work on which this testimony is based in accordance with generally 

accepted government auditing standards. 

In summary, Navy and Marine Corps units completed training for certain 

amphibious operations priorities but not others due to several factors. The 

most prevalent factor we found that hampered training completion was a 

lack of available amphibious ships on which to train. The Navy and 

Marine Corps have taken some steps to identify and address amphibious 

operations training shortfalls, but these efforts are incomplete. 

Specifically, the services' current approach does not incorporate strategic 

training and leading risk management practices. Further, the Marine 

Corps has not fully integrated virtual training devices into operational 

training. The Navy and Marine Corps have taken some steps to improve 

coordination, but the services have not fully incorporated leading 

collaboration practices that would help drive efforts to improve naval 

3

We performed data-reliability procedures on the unit-level readiness data by comparing 

the data against related documentation and surveying knowledgeable officials, and 

determined that the data were sufficiently reliable for our purposes_ 

Page 2 GA0~18-212T Navy and Marine Corps Training 
47 

Background 

integration. We made recommendations to address these issues and 

DOD concurred with them. 

An amphibious force is comprised of an (1) amphibious task force and a 

(2) landing force together with other forces that are trained, organized, 

and equipped for amphibious operations. The amphibious task force is a 

group of Navy amphibious ships, most frequently deployed as an 

Amphibious Ready Group (ARG). The landing force is a Marine AirGround Task Force-which includes certain elements, such as command, 

aviation, ground, and logistics-embarked aboard the Navy amphibious 

ships. A Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) is the most-commonly 

deployed Marine Air-Ground Task Force. Together, this amphibious force 

is referred to as an ARG-MEU. 

An ARG consists of a minimum of three amphibious ships, typically an 

amphibious assault ship, an amphibious transport dock ship, and an 

amphibious dock landing ship. Navy ships train to a list of missionessential tasks that are assigned based on the ship's required operational 

capabilities and projected operational environments. Most surface 

combatants, including cruisers, destroyers, and all amphibious ships, 

have mission-essential tasks related to amphibious operations. Figure 1 

shows the current number of amphibious ships by class and a description 

of their capabilities. 

Page 3 GA0~18~212T Navy and Marine Corps Training 
48 

Figure 1: Navy's Fleet of Amphibious Ships 

LHD 1 Wasp Class 

Landing ship, helicopter-capable, we!! deck;a large flight decks and hangar 

decks for embarking and operating numerous helicopters and vertical or 

short-takeoff-and-landing fixed-wing aircraft 

LHA 6 America 

Class 

LPD 17 San Antonio 

Class 

LSD 41 Whidbey 

Island Class 

10 

Landing ship, helicopter-capable, assault; large flight decks and hangar 

decks for embarking and operating numerous helicopters and vertical or 

short-takeoff-and-landing fixed-wing aircraft 

Landing ship. helicopter platform, well deck; smaller flight decks and hangar 

decks for embarking and operating smaller numbers of helicopters 

Landing ship, wei! deck; smaf!er flight decks for embarking and operating 

smaller numbers of helicopters 

LSD 49 Harpers 

Ferry Class 

Source Navy af1d Manne Corps (dats), Manne Corps (Images) 

Note: LHD is a multipurpose amphibious assault ship, LHA is a general-purpose amphibious assault 

ship, LPD is an amphibious transport dock, and LSD is a dock landing ship 

a A well deck is a large, garage-like space in the stern of a ship. It can be flooded with water so that 

landmg craft can leave or return to the ship 

An MEU consists of around 2,000 Marines, their aircraft, their landing 

craft, their combat equipment, and about 15 days' worth of supplies. The 

MEU includes a standing command element; a ground element consisting 

of a battalion landing team; an aviation element consisting of a composite 

aviation squadron of multiple types of aircraft; and a logistics element 

consisting of a combat logistics battalion. Marine Corps units also train to 

accomplish a set of mission-essential tasks for the designed capabilities 

of the unit. Many Marine Corps units within the command, aviation, 

ground, and logistics elements have an amphibious-related missionessential task. To be certified in the mission-essential task of amphibious 

operations, Marine Corps units must train to a standard that may require 

the use of amphibious ships. 

The Marine Corps' use of virtual training devices has increased over time. 

and advances in technology have resulted in the acquisition of simulators 

and simulations with additional capabilities designed to help individual 

Page 4 GA0~18~212T Navy and Marine Corps Training 
49 

Navy and Marine 

Corps Units 

Completed Training 

for Certain 

Amphibious 

Operations Priorities 

but Not Others Due to 

Several Factors 

Marines and units acquire and refine skills through more concentrated 

and repetitive training. For example, the Marine Corps utilizes a 

constructive simulation that provides commanders with training for 

amphibious operations, among other missions. The Marine Corps has 

introduced other virtual training devices to prepare Marines for 

operational conditions and for emerging threats, such as devices to 

replicate a variety of vehicles for driver training and egress trainers, 

among others. The Navy stated it does not utilize virtual training devices 

that simulate amphibious operations, including ship-to-shore movement 

In our September 2017 report, we found that Navy and Marine Corps 

units deploying as part of ARG-MEUs completed required training for 

amphibious operations, but the Marine Corps has been unable to 

consistently accomplish training for other service amphibious operations 

priorities. Specifically, based on our review of deployment certification 

messages from 2014 through 2016, we found that each deploying Navy 

ARG completed training for the amphibious operations mission in 

accordance with training standards. Similarly, we found that each MEU 

completed all of its mission-essential tasks that are required during the 

predeployment training program. 4 These mission-essential tasks cover 

areas such as amphibious raid, amphibious assault, and noncombatant 

evacuation operations, among other operations. 

However, we also reported that based on our review of unit-level 

readiness data from fiscal year 2014 through 2016, Marine Corps units 

were unable to fully accomplish training for other amphibious operations 

priorities. These shortfalls include home-station unit training to support 

contingency requirements, service-level exercises, and experimentation 

and concept development for amphibious operations. For example, 

Marine Corps officials cited shortfalls in their ability to conduct servicelevel exercises that train individuals and units on amphibious operationsrelated skills, as well as provide opportunities to conduct experimentation 

and concept development for amphibious operations. 

In our September 2017 report, we identified several factors that created 

shortfalls in training for amphibious operations priorities. Based on our 

analysis of interviews with 23 Marine Corps units, we found that all 23 

4Marine Corps units that are scheduled to deploy as part of an ARG-MEU are to follow a 

standardized 6-month predep!oyment training program that gradually builds collective skill 

sets. 

Page 5 GA0·18~212T Navy and Marine Corps Training 
50 

units cited the lack of available amphibious ships as the primary factor 

limiting training for home-station units. The Navy's fleet of amphibious 

ships has declined by half in the last 25 years, from 62 in 1990 to 31 

today, with current shipbuilding plans calling for four additional 

amphibious ships to be added by fiscal year 2024, increasing the total 

number of amphibious ships to 35 (see fig. 2). 

Figure 2: Trends in the Size of the Navy's Fleet of Amphibious Ships 

Total number of ships; 125 94 63 62 39 31 35 

Source· GAO analyses of Manne Corps !nformat<on 1 GA0·1~212T 

Page 6 GA0·18~212T Navy and Marine Corps Training 
51 

The Navy and Marine 

Corps Have Taken 

Some Steps to 

Identify and Address 

Amphibious Training 

Shortfalls, but These 

Efforts Are Incomplete 

Services' Approach Does 

Not Incorporate Strategic 

Training and Leading Risk 

Management Practices 

Marine Corps officials from the 23 units we interviewed also cited other 

factors that limit opportunities for amphibious operations training, 

including the following: 

Access to range space. Seventeen of 23 Marine Corps units we 

interviewed identified access to range space as a factor that can limit 

their ability to conduct amphibious operations training. Unit officials 

told us that priority for training resources, including range access, is 

given to units that will be part of a MEU deployment, leaving little 

range time available for other units. 

Maintenance delays, bad weather, and transit time. Ten of 23 

Marine Corps units told us that changes to an amphibious ship's 

schedule resulting from maintenance overruns or bad weather have 

also reduced the time available for a ship to be used for training. The 

transit time a ship needs to reach Marine Corps units has further 

reduced the time available for training. 

High pace of deployments. Five of 23 Marine Corps units told us 

that the high pace of deployments and need to prepare for upcoming 

deployments limited their opportunity to conduct training for 

amphibious operations. 

In our September 2017 report, we identified some steps that the Navy 

and Marine Corps have taken to mitigate the training shortfall for their 

amphibious operations priorities, such as by better defining the amount of 

amphibious operations capabilities and capacity needed to achieve the 

services' wartime requirements. However, we found these efforts are 

incomplete because the services' current approach for amphibious 

operations training does not incorporate strategic training and leading 

risk-management practices. Specifically, we found that: 

Page 7 GA0·18~212T Navy and Marine Corps Training 
52 

The Marine Corps does not prioritize all available training 

resources. For Marine Corps units not scheduled for a MEU 

deployment, officials described an ad hoc process to allocate any 

remaining available amphibious ship training time among homestation units. Specifically, officials stated that the current process 

identifies units that are available for training when an amphibious ship 

becomes available rather than a process that aligns the next highestpriority units for training with available amphibious ships. 

The Navy and Marine Corps do not systematically evaluate a full 

range of training resource alternatives to achieve amphibious 

operations priorities. Given the limited availability of amphibious 

ships for training, the Navy and Marine Corps have not systematically 

incorporated selected training resource alternatives into home-station 

training plans. During our review, we identified a number of 

alternatives that could help mitigate the risk to the services' 

amphibious capability due to limited training opportunities. These 

alternatives could include utilizing additional training opportunities 

during an amphibious ship's basic phase of training; 5 using alternative 

platforms for training, such as Marine Prepositioning Force ships; 

utilizing smaller Navy craft or pier-side ships to meet training 

requirements; and leveraging developmental and operational test 

events. 

The Navy and Marine Corps have not developed a process or set 

of metrics to monitor progress toward achieving its amphibious 

operations training priorities and mitigating existing shortfalls. 

Current reporting systems do not allow officials to assess the services' 

progress in achieving amphibious operations priorities or to monitor 

efforts to establish comprehensive amphibious operations training 

programs. For example, we found that the Marine Corps does not 

capture complete data on the full demand for training time with Navy 

amphibious ships that could be used for such assessments. 

In our September 2017 report, we recommended that the Navy and 

Marine Corps develop an approach to prioritize available training 

resources, systematically evaluate among training resource alternatives 

to achieve amphibious operations priorities, and monitor progress toward 

achieving thern. DOD concurred with our recommendation and stated that 

5The training plan for amphibious ships is broken up into five phases: maintenance, basic, 

advanced, integrated, and sustainment The basic phase focuses on development of core 

capabilities and skills through the completion of basic-level inspections, assessments, and 

training requirements, among other things. 

Page 8 GA0~18~212T Navy and Marine Corps Training 
53 

The Marine Corps Has Not 

Fully Integrated Virtual 

Training Devices into 

Operational Training 

the Secretary of the Navy would develop an amphibious operations 

training construct capitalizing on the application of primary and alternative 

training resources. 

While the Marine Corps has stated that the use of virtual training could 

help mitigate some of the limitations of training in a live-only environment 

and taken some steps to integrate these devices into operational training, 

we identified gaps in its process to develop and use them. Specifically, 

based on our review of a selection of 6 virtual training devices, we found 

weaknesses in three key areas: 

Front-end planning. The Marine Corps' process for conducting frontend planning and analysis to support the acquisition of its virtual 

training devices does not include consideration of critical factors for 

integrating virtual training devices into operational training, such as 

the specific training tasks the device is intended to address, how the 

device would be used to meet proficiency goals, or available time for 

units to train with the device. As a result, the Marine Corps does not 

have a reasonable basis to ensure that it is acquiring the right number 

and type of virtual training devices to meet its operational training 

needs. 

Expected and actual usage data. The Marine Corps does not 

consistently consider expected and actual usage data for virtual 

training devices to support its investment decisions. In the absence of 

these data, the Marine Corps risks sustained investment in virtual 

training devices that do not meet operational training needs. 

Training effectiveness. The Marine Corps does not consistently 

evaluate the effectiveness of its virtual training devices to accomplish 

operational training. Without a well-defined process to consistently 

evaluate the effectiveness of virtual training devices for training, the 

Marine Corps risks investing in devices whose value to operational 

training is undetermined. 

In our September 2017 report, we recommended that the Marine Corps 

develop guidance for the development and use of virtual training devices 

to address these gaps. DOD concurred with the recommendation and 

stated it would work with the Commandant of the Marine Corps in its 

development and implementation actions associated with the use of 

virtual training devices. 

Page 9 GA0~18~212T Navy and Marine Corps Training 
54 

Incorporating 

Collaboration 

Practices would 

Further Naval 

Integration Efforts for 

Amphibious 

Operations 

The Navy and Marine Corps have taken some steps to improve 

coordination between the two services, to include issuing strategic 

documents that discuss the importance of improving naval integration and 

establishing mechanisms to coordinate their amphibious operations 

training capabilities. However, in our September 2017 report we found 

that the services have not fully incorporated leading collaboration 

practices that would help drive efforts to improve naval integration. Our 

prior work on interagency collaboration has found that certain practices 

can help enhance and sustain collaboration among federal agencies. 6 I 

would like to highlight a few practices that would especially benefit the 

Navy and Marine Corps' efforts to improve integration for amphibious 

operations. 

Common outcomes and joint strategy. The Navy and Marine Corps 

have issued strategic documents that discuss the importance of 

improving naval integration, but the services have not developed a 

joint strategy that defines and articulates common outcomes to 

achieve naval integration. This first critical step will enable them to 

fully incorporate other leading collaboration practices aimed at 

achieving a common purpose. 

Compatible policies, procedures, and systems. The Navy and 

Marine Corps have not fully established compatible policies and 

procedures, such as common training tasks and standards and 

agreed-upon roles and responsibilities, to ensure their efforts to 

achieve improved naval integration are consistent and sustained. We 

also found that some of the Navy and Marine Corps' systems for 

managing and conducting integrated training are incompatible, 

leading to inefficiencies in the process to manage unit-level training 

events. 

Leverage resources to maximize training opportunities. The 

services are looking to better leverage available training resources for 

amphibious operations. However, we identified examples of potential 

training opportunities during surface warfare tactical training and 

community relations events where enhancing the services' 

collaborative efforts could take greater advantage of available training 

time for amphibious operations. 

6GAO, Results-Oriented Government Practices That Can Help Enhance and Sustain 

Collaboration among Federal Agencies, GA0-06-15 (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 21, 2005). 

Page 10 GA0-18-212T Navy and Marine Corps Training 
55 

GAO Contact and 

Staff 

Acknowledgments 

(102377) 

Mechanisms to monitor results and reinforce accountability. The 

Navy and Marine have not developed mechanisms to monitor, 

evaluate, and report on results in improving naval integration and to 

align efforts to maximize training opportunities. Service-level strategy 

documents establish critical tasks to improve naval integration, but do 

not constitute a process or mechanism to jointly reinforce 

accountability for their naval integration efforts. 

In our September 2017 report, we recommended that the Navy and 

Marine Corps clarify the organizations responsible and set time frames to 

define and articulate common outcomes for naval integration, and use 

those outcomes to develop a joint strategy, more fully establish 

compatible policies, procedures, and systems, better leverage training 

resources, and establish mechanisms to monitor results. DOD concurred 

with the recommendation and stated it will develop mutual service naval 

integration terminology, and training resource application and 

organizational monitoring constructs to achieve common amphibious 

operations training outcomes. 

Chairman Wilson, Ranking Member Bordallo, and Members of the 

Subcommittee, this concludes my prepared statement. I would be 

pleased to respond to any questions that you may have at this time. 

For questions about this statement, please contact Cary Russell at 

(202) 512-5431, or at russellc@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of 

Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page 

of this statement. Individuals making key contributions to this testimony 

are Matt Ullengren and Russell Bryan. Other staff who made contributions 

to the report cited in this testimony are identified in the source product. 

Page 11 GA0~18~212T Navy and Marine Corps Training 
56 

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