IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Warwick Township :

:

v. : No. 2071 C.D. 2016

: Argued: June 8, 2017

Jaime Winters and Jason Winters, :

Appellants :

BEFORE: HONORABLE RENÉE COHN JUBELIRER, Judge

HONORABLE JULIA K. HEARTHWAY, Judge

HONORABLE DAN PELLEGRINI, Senior Judge

OPINION NOT REPORTED

MEMORANDUM OPINION BY

SENIOR JUDGE PELLEGRINI FILED: July 21, 2017

Jaime Winters and Jason Winters (collectively, the Winters), husband 

and wife, appeal from an order of the Court of Common Pleas of Chester County

(trial court) denying their post-trial motion and entering judgment against them for 

$19,651.49, consisting of a $500 fine, a $148.50 filing fee as well as $19,002.99 in 

attorney fees relating to their violation of the Warwick Township (Township) Zoning 

Ordinance (Ordinance).

I.

The Winters own property located at 423 Rock Run Road, Pottstown, 

Pennsylvania (property) but do not reside there. The property is located in the R-3 

residential zoning district of the Township and contains a single-family dwelling

which the Winters lease to a tenant, as well as a two-story “garage” that was 
2

renovated by a previous owner for the purpose of being used as a residence. It is 

undisputed that neither the previous owners nor the Winters obtained a zoning permit 

or variance to use the detached garage as a second dwelling.

On January 29, 2014, Township Zoning Officer Joseph Boulanger 

(Officer Boulanger) mailed the Winters a “Violation and Cease and Desist

Enforcement Notice” (Enforcement Notice)

1

alleging that they were utilizing the 

detached garage on their property as a second dwelling in violation of the Ordinance. 

(Reproduced Record (R.R.) at 394a.) As pertinent, the Enforcement Notice provides

for three zoning violations: conducting two principal uses on the same parcel in 

violation of Section 1900(C) of the Ordinance; failing to obtain a proper zoning 

permit for a change in use of land or buildings without first obtaining a proper permit

in violation of Section 2101(B)&(C) of the Ordinance; and failing to obtain a 

 

1 As pertinent, Section 616.1 of the Pennsylvania Municipalities Planning Code (MPC) 

provides, in relevant part:

(a) If it appears to the municipality that a violation of any zoning 

ordinance enacted under this act or prior enabling laws has occurred, 

the municipality shall initiate enforcement proceedings by sending an 

enforcement notice as provided in this section.

(b) The enforcement notice shall be sent to the owner of record of the 

parcel on which the violation has occurred, to any person who has 

filed a written request to receive enforcement notices regarding that 

parcel, and to any other person requested in writing by the owner of 

record.

Act of July 31, 1968, P.L. 805, as amended, 53 P.S. §§ 10101–11202; Section 616.1(a),(b) of the 

MPC was added by Section 60 of the Act of December 21, 1988, P.L. 1329, 55 P.S. § 

10616.1(a),(b).
3

certificate of occupancy in violation of Section 2104(B) of the Ordinance. The 

Enforcement Notice further advised, “Therefore you are hereby directed to cease 

and desist this activity within fifteen (15) days.” (R.R. at 395a) (emphasis in 

original). The Enforcement Notice went on to provide:

Failure to discontinue the above violations within the time 

frame specified, unless an appeal of this Notice of Violation 

has been filed with the Zoning Hearing Board, constitutes a 

violation of the Township Zoning Ordinance. Violation of 

the Zoning Ordinance may result in the institution of [a] 

civil enforcement proceeding before a District Justice where 

the district Justice may impose a Civil Penalty of up to Five 

hundred ($500.00) dollars plus court costs, including the 

Township's attorneys’ fees, incurred as a result of such

action. Each day that the violation continues shall 

constitute a separate violation and may subject you to a 

daily fine. The Township may also institute other 

appropriate action at law or in equity which may be

necessary to enforce the provisions of the Zoning 

Ordinance.

* * *

Please be advised that you have the right to appeal this 

Notice of Violation and Cease and Desist Order in writing 

to the Township Zoning Hearing Board within thirty (30) 

days if you believe that I have misinterpreted or misapplied 

the Zoning Ordinance.

(R.R. at 395a-396a.)

The Winters did not appeal the Enforcement Notice to the Township 

Zoning Hearing Board (ZHB), choosing to forego the associated costs of an appeal, 

and instead directly contacted Officer Boulanger about the alleged violations. During 
4

those discussions, the Winters repeatedly denied using the garage as a dwelling and 

insisted that there was no violation that they could “cease and desist.” However, 

Officer Boulanger was unable to confirm the veracity of the Winters’ protestations 

because they prohibited him or any other Township official from coming onto their 

property.

On July 10, 2014, almost seven months after serving the Enforcement 

Notice, the Township filed an enforcement action in the magisterial district court

seeking civil penalties and attorney fees.

2

In response, in August 2014, the Winters 

allowed Officer Boulanger onto their property, but prohibited him from taking any 

pictures. Officer Boulanger was, however, provided with photographs taken prior to 

the inspection.

The Site Visit Report (Report) generated as a result of Officer 

Boulanger’s visit provides that the property’s detached “garage” is actually a twostory accessory structure with a metered electrical system. The garage’s ground floor

is unfinished and primarily used for storage, but contains a fully functioning washing 

machine and dryer as well as a gas-fired furnace heat system that serves the upperfloor via a forced air duct system. No overhead garage door provides access to the

ground floor space.

 

2

Section 617.1 of the MPC provides that magisterial district courts “shall have initial 

jurisdiction over proceedings brought under section 617.2.” 53 P.S. § 10617.1. Section 617.2(a) of 

the MPC authorizes a municipality to commence an action seeking civil penalties for violations of a 

zoning ordinance. 53 P.S. § 10617.2(a).
5

The garage’s upper floor is accessed through stairs on the side of the 

building opposite the driveway. This floor has both electricity and heating and is

completely finished with hardwood floors, tiling and walls that are dry-walled and 

painted. There is a bathroom with a tile shower area, but no fixtures were in place at 

the time of the inspection. Adjacent to the bathroom appears to be a bedroom that 

has a built-in closet. This room contains a mattress and bed frame, several 

containers, some books and personal items, as well as an unconnected gas 

range/stove. The upper floor also has a kitchen area that contains an installed air 

conditioning unit, cabinets in an “L” shape and wire shelving containing household 

items. There appears to be a living room and/or office area, which contains two 

sofas, a large flat panel television connected to the cable wall outlet, and a folding 

table and desk chair. On the table at the time was a computer printer and stacks of 

papers. The Report further notes:

Much of the paperwork that was readily visible had 

letterhead for a company called North American Roofing. 

To the best of our knowledge, neither Mr. nor Mrs. Winters 

works for this company. During the inspection Mr. Winters 

was asked if all the items in the structure were his. He 

stated “No, most of it belongs to a friend but some of it was 

his.” There is also a Jeep Wrangler parked in the driveway 

adjacent to the structure, which Mr. Winters stated belonged 

to a friend, which is not the tenant of the main house. The

Jeep does not have a valid inspection or registration sticker 

on the license plate.

(R.R. at 146a.)

Based on Officer Boulanger’s observations and “numerous pictures that 

document someone with a white pick-up truck parked in the driveway directly 
6

adjacent to the structure on many nights until the next morning, it is difficult to 

conclude that someone isn’t using the space for sleeping and general habitation. . . . I 

believe that the citations issued against the [Winters] are valid.” (Id.)

On October 13, 2014, the magisterial district judge entered a default 

judgment against the Winters for $648.50, consisting of a $500 fine plus $148.50 in 

fees and costs. However, because the judgment failed to award reasonable attorney

fees,

3

on November 13, 2014, the Township appealed.

II.

A.

In December 2014, the Township filed a complaint, later amended, 

seeking “an amount of $500, plus court costs and attorneys’ fees, including at least 

$4,783 incurred up to the hearing before the Magisterial District Justice [sic] and all 

reasonable attorneys’ fees incurred in pursuing this appeal.” (R.R. at 49a.) In 

response, the Winters filed an Answer, New Matter and Counterclaim, denying that 

the garage was used as a second dwelling, alleging that the enforcement action was 

the result of “personal animosity” and seeking judgment in their favor, legal costs and 

fees, as well as emotional and punitive damages. (R.R. at 75a.) Following 

preliminary objections by the Township and responses thereto, on May 15, 2015, the 

trial court sustained those objections and dismissed the Winters’ New Matter and 

 

3

Section 617.2(a) of the MPC expressly provides that any person found liable for violating a 

zoning ordinance “shall . . . pay a judgment of not more than $500 plus all court costs, including 

reasonable attorney fees incurred by a municipality as a result thereof.” 53 P.S. § 10617.2(a); 

accord Township of South Whitehall v. Karoly, 891 A.2d 780, 783 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2006).
7

Counterclaim “without prejudice to replead [sic] within twenty (20) days of entry of 

this Order.” (R.R. at 125a.)

The Winters then filed an Amended New Matter and Amended 

Counterclaim, contending that the Township’s enforcement action is “unenforceable

and not effective,” (R.R. at 126a) and that the enforcement action was the result of 

personal animosity. Once more, they sought judgment in their favor, costs and fees 

associated with litigation, as well as emotional and punitive damages.

4

 Following 

another round of preliminary objections and responses, on November 6, 2015, the 

trial court entered an order sustaining the objections and dismissing the Amended 

New Matter and Amended Counterclaim. The trial court noted:

Defendants’ Amended New Matter and Amended 

Counterclaim attempt to allege that the Township’s 

Enforcement Action was “unenforceable and not effective”. 

However, once a landowner has been given notice of a 

zoning violation pursuant to the [MPC], that landowner can 

only contest the asserted violations by way of an appeal to 

the municipality’s zoning hearing board. Defendants failed 

to appeal the Cease and Desist Notice to the Warwick 

Township Zoning Hearing Board. In addition, with regard 

to the validity of the Notice itself, we find that it complies 

with 53 P.S. §10616.1(c). Given our resolution of 

Plaintiffs’ first Objection, we do not reach the remaining 

Objections.

 

4

The Winters do not raise any issues relating to claims of bad faith, including the allegedly 

high costs for appealing the Enforcement Notice. See Raum v. Board of Supervisors of Tredyffrin 

Township, 370 A.2d 777 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1976); see also Highway Materials, Inc. v. Board of 

Supervisors of Whitemarsh Township, 974 A.2d 539 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2009).
8

(R.R. at 209a) (internal citations omitted).

B.

On April 28, 2016, the trial court held a de novo hearing because the 

Winters refused to stipulate to limiting the de novo appeal to whether the Township 

was entitled to attorney fees “incurred in prosecuting this matter over the past two 

years, two months, and thirty days.” (R.R. at 225a.)

Before the trial court, the Township offered the testimony of Officer 

Boulanger, the Township Zoning Officer who issued the Enforcement Notice and

inspected the garage. Officer Boulanger testified that his investigation began after he 

received a complaint from the Winters’ neighbor, who later provided photographs 

relating to the garage’s use as a second dwelling. Officer Boulanger stated that after 

he issued the Enforcement Notice, Mrs. Winters called him denying the violation. At 

no time during these conversations did Officer Boulanger tell Mrs. Winters that she 

did not need to appeal the Enforcement Notice. He did, however, ask to inspect the 

property to confirm Mrs. Winters’ protestations or to see whether the activity ceased 

and desisted. Mrs. Winters denied that request.

In August 2014, Officer Boulanger finally inspected the garage. After 

testifying about his observations during this inspection, which mirror those made in 

his Report, Officer Boulanger then concluded “that the structure, to our determination 

after the site visit, was still being used as a second residence on the property.” (R.R. 

at 294a.) When asked how he could be certain that someone was living in the garage, 

Officer Boulanger explained:
9

Because it appeared that somebody was living there. There 

was a TV. There was a couch. There were chairs. There 

was a table set up with all kinds of business documentation 

that does not relate to Mr. Winters’ business. There was a 

bed and a box spring and bed frame in the bedroom. 

[There] were numerous boxes stacked up in a closet. There 

were also numerous piles of -- I'm not sure what, but for 

some reason it was felt they had to be covered up. There 

was all kinds of other stuff on the storage racks there that 

Mr. Winters stated was not his. So, there’s a separate 

electric service there. There were air conditioners in the 

windows. There’s a central heating system that doesn’t

serve the first floor, but serves the second floor only. 

There’s a washer and a dryer in the first floor. There’s a 

smoke detector, I believe. There’s functioning lighting. If

it walks like a duck and looks like a duck, usually it is a 

duck.

(R.R. at 321a-322a.)

5

Mr. Winters also provided testimony at this hearing. As pertinent, he

testified that the garage was never used as a dwelling but instead for storage space by 

the Winters and a friend. Mr. Winters denied that anyone has ever slept in the 

garage, although he admitted to going to the garage with other people several times a 

week to “watch football games and baseball games and relax and watch TV and have 

a couple drinks.” (R.R. at 347a.) Mr. Winters explained that he and his wife refused 

an inspection following the Enforcement Notice because they “were getting ready to 

 

5 Regarding the assessment of attorney fees, the Township also offered the testimony of 

Patrick McKenna, who serves as a solicitor in a number of municipalities in Chester County, 

including Warwick Township. Mr. McKenna admitted that there were several entries in the 

itemized bill submitted for attorney fees relating to Pennsylvania Uniform Construction Code 

(UCC), 34 Pa. Code §§ 401.1–405.42, violations against the Winters that were dismissed by the 

magisterial district judge. (R.R. at 334a.)
10

go on vacation for several weeks” and did not come back until late February. (R.R. at 

344a.) He explained that they did not appeal the Enforcement Notice because “Joe 

Boulanger said that you don’t have to, and so did the supervisors.” (R.R. at 354a.) 

They also did not contact the Township after their vacation because they assumed the 

matter was “just water under the bridge.” (R.R. at 355a.) Mr. Winters admits that 

since Officer Boulanger’s visit, the garage has remained substantially the same.

On July 19, 2016, the trial court issued a verdict against the Winters for 

an amount totaling $19,651.49, consisting of a $500 fine, $148.50 in filing fees as 

well as $19,002.99 in attorney fees.6 Shortly thereafter, the Winters filed post-trial 

motions for “a new trial and/or a Judgment N.O.V. and/or limit the amount of 

attorney fees in an amount to be determined reasonable at the time of the District 

Justice Hearing.” (R.R. at 404a.) On November 22, 2016, the trial court issued an 

order denying these motions, reasoning:

The record is clear that the noticed violations by the 

Township continued past the fifteen (15) day cease and 

desist period set forth in the [Enforcement Notice]. The 

evidence presented by the Township establishes that the 

garage was used as a residence or a business office by 

someone other than the Winters in violation of Township 

ordinances after the fifteen (15) day cease and desist period.

. . . [T]here is sufficient evidence that the garage continued 

to be used in violation of the Township ordinances by 

 

6 Given that it was undisputed that the Winters did not appeal the Enforcement Notice, we 

are nonplussed as to why the Township did not file for judgment on the pleadings when the appeal 

was taken. See, e.g., Lower Mount Bethel Township v. North River Co., LLC, 41 A.3d 156, 161 (Pa. 

Cmwlth. 2012) (holding that trial court did not err when granting judgment on the pleadings where 

the property owners failed to appeal an enforcement notice to the ZHB). However, the Winters do 

not take issue with that failure.
11

someone other than the Winters after the fifteen (15) day 

cease and desist period. Evidence contrary presented by 

Jason Winters at trial was not found to be credible. After 

the issuance of the Notice of Violation, and despite 

Defendants[’] protestations that there was no ongoing

violation of the zoning ordinances as set forth in the Notice, 

the Township was denied access to the property for months 

when seeking to conduct an inspection to insure compliance 

with Township ordinances. When Township officials 

eventually were able to gain access in order to conduct the

inspection, there was evidence of habitation of the structure 

and use of it as an office by someone other than the 

Winters. . . .

In addition, the [Enforcement Notice] provided the Winters 

with fifteen (15) days within which to cease and desist the 

noticed violation activity. The Notice is sufficiently 

specific to inform the Winters that they were in violation 

and had fifteen (15) days within which to cease any activity 

in violation of Township ordinances as noticed. 

Furthermore, the Notice also informed the Winters that they 

could challenge the zoning violation determination by 

appealing to the Township Zoning Hearing Board. A fair 

reading of the Notice suggests that any activity in violation 

of the Township zoning laws cited in the Notice outside of 

fifteen (15) days would be subject to civil enforcement 

proceedings and a civil penalty of up to $500 per day per 

violation, plus costs. The Winters’ failure to appeal 

because they took the position that there were no ongoing 

zoning ordinance violations does not preclude the Township 

from initiating enforcement proceedings. An appeal to the 

ZHB by the Winters would challenge whether there was a 

violation of the zoning ordinance as noticed, and whether 

the notice of violation was sufficient. Failure to appeal 

waives these issues. See Township of Penn v. Seymour, 708

A.2d 861 (Pa. Cmw1th 1998); Moon Township v. Cammel, 

687 A.2d 1181 (Pa. Cmwlth 1997). Therefore, the only 

question before this court is whether the penalty imposed 

was proper. The Township sought enforcement for only 1 

day of violation on only 1 noticed zoning provision ($500 

plus costs). This penalty is proper.
12

Finally, the Township’s attorneys’ fees, although significant 

when compared to the fine and costs involved, are

warranted pursuant to 53 P.S. § 10617.2 and were 

established by competent evidence. See Lower Mount 

Bethel Township v. North River Company, LLC, 41 A.3d 

156 [(Pa. Cmwlth. 2012)].

(R.R. at 497a-498a.) This appeal by the Winters followed.

7

III.

A.

On appeal, the Winters contend that the Township’s enforcement action 

is invalid because the Enforcement Notice was defective and deprived them of the 

ability to appeal to the ZHB. As best as we can discern, this is because the 

Enforcement Notice allegedly failed to inform the Winters that they needed to appeal 

to the ZHB, regardless of whether they stopped using the garage as a dwelling.

Section 616.1(c) of the MPC provides that an enforcement notice shall 

state at least the following:

(1) The name of the owner of record and any other person 

against whom the municipality intends to take action.

(2) The location of the property in violation.

 

7 When reviewing the trial court’s denial of post-trial motions, our scope of review is limited 

to determining whether the trial court abused its discretion or committed an error of law. 

Commonwealth ex rel. Corbett v. Manson, 903 A.2d 69, 73 n.4 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2006).
13

(3) The specific violation with a description of the 

requirements which have not been met, citing in each 

instance the applicable provisions of the ordinance.

(4) The date before which the steps for compliance must be 

commenced and the date before which the steps must be 

completed.

(5) That the recipient of the notice has the right to appeal to 

the zoning hearing board within a prescribed period of time 

in accordance with procedures set forth in the ordinance.

(6) That failure to comply with the notice within the time 

specified, unless extended by appeal to the zoning hearing 

board, constitutes a violation, with possible sanctions 

clearly described.

53 P.S. § 10616.1(c). We have explained that a township cannot initiate a civil 

enforcement proceeding or collect civil penalties under Section 617.2 of the MPC, 53 

P.S. § 10617.2, unless the enforcement notice satisfies these requirements. See, e.g.,

City of Erie v. Freitus, 681 A.2d 840, 842 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1996).

Contrary to the Winters’ protestations, the Enforcement Notice complies 

with all the requirements set forth in Section 616.1(c) of the MPC. It is addressed to

the Winters, identifies the garage and outlines the specific provisions of the 

Ordinance in violation. The Enforcement Notice also directs them to stop the 

violating use within 15 days or, in the alternative, advises that they had the right to 

appeal to the ZHB “within thirty (30) days if you believe that I have misinterpreted or 

misapplied the Zoning Ordinance.” (R.R. at 396.) “Failure to discontinue the above 

violations within the time frame specified, unless an appeal of this Notice of 

Violation has been filed with the Zoning Hearing Board, constitutes a violation of the 

Township Zoning Ordinance.” (R.R. at 395.)
14

In any event, the Winters cannot in good faith argue that the 

Enforcement Notice deprived them of an appeal to the ZHB. By their own 

admission, the Winters declined to appeal to the ZHB for financial reasons. 

Moreover, their adamant refusal to accept that they used the garage as a dwelling 

belies any assertion that they attempted to “cease and desist” that violation. Because 

the Winters were clearly of the belief that Officer Boulanger “misinterpreted or 

misapplied the Zoning Ordinance,” (R.R. at 396a) they were informed of their right to 

appeal to the ZHB within 30 days.

B.

The Winters also contend that the trial court abused its discretion when 

imposing a one day fine for violating the Ordinance because “[t]he overwhelming 

weight of evidence in this case is that the [garage] was not used by the Winters as a 

‘second dwelling’ after the issuance of the Notice.” (The Winters’ Brief at 20.) 

However, we have explained:

If a landowner does not appeal a zoning violation notice to 

the zoning hearing board, the failure to appeal renders the 

violation notice unassailable. Therefore, in the event a 

landowner does not appeal to the zoning hearing board and 

the municipality files an enforcement action with a district 

justice, neither the district justice nor a common pleas court 

may conduct a de novo review of the question of whether 

the landowner violated the zoning ordinance. In that 

circumstance, the only question before the district justice 

and the Common Pleas Court is whether the penalty 

imposed for the violation was proper.

Township of Penn v. Seymour, 708 A.2d 861, 864–65 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1998) (emphasis 

added). Because the Winters admit to receiving the Enforcement Notice from which 
15

they never appealed, that Enforcement Notice resulted in a conclusive determination 

that their use of the garage was a violation of the Ordinance.

In any event, the evidence shows that the garage was used as a dwelling 

15 days after service of the Enforcement Notice. Officer Boulanger’s testimony, 

along with the Report and photos that he offered, all lead to the conclusion that the 

garage was being used as a dwelling well beyond the cease and desist period, and Mr. 

Winters admits that since Officer Boulanger’s visit, the garage has remained 

substantially the same. The trial court also found any contrary testimony and 

evidence provided by the Winters not to be credible. Because the “weight to accord 

to evidence is exclusively for the finder of fact, who is free to believe all, part, or 

none of the evidence and to determine the credibility of witnesses,” we will not 

disturb the trial court’s determination. Rising Sun Entertainment, Inc. v. 

Commonwealth, 829 A.2d 1214, 1219 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2003) (citing Commonwealth v. 

Small, 741 A.2d 666, 672 (Pa. 1999)).

IV.

Finally, the Winters contend that the trial court erred in awarding 

$19,002.99 in attorney fees when the Township only took the appeal to collect $4,783

in attorney fees resulting up until the de novo appeal.

8 The Winters also contend that 

“the fees collected for the violation of zoning ordinances must be a figure even lower 

than $4,783.00, because that figure included attorney time for the consultation, 

 

8 Beyond those fees resulting from the Township’s prosecution of alleged UCC violations, 

the Winters do not specifically articulate what attorney fees and costs contained in the Township’s 

invoices are unreasonable.
16

preparation of notices and pleadings, and prosecution of alleged UCC violations, 

upon which the Township did not prevail.” (The Winters’ Brief at 28-29.) We have 

explained:

Section 617.2(a) of the [MPC] provides that any person 

who has violated the provisions of a zoning ordinance 

enacted under the MPC “shall, upon being found liable 

therefor in a civil enforcement proceeding commenced by a 

municipality, pay . . . reasonable attorney fees incurred by a 

municipality as a result thereof.” 53 P.S. § 10617.2(a) 

(emphasis added). “[A]n award of costs and attorney fees 

pursuant to [s]ection 10617.2 [sic] of the MPC is not 

limited to costs and fees incurred as a result of the action 

before the district justice but includes all costs and attorney 

fees incurred as a result of the violation.” Borough of 

Bradford Woods v. Platts, 799 A.2d 984, 991 (Pa. Cmwlth. 

2002). Whether an award of attorney fees is reasonable 

depends upon “the amount of work performed, the character 

of services rendered, the difficulty of the problems 

involved, and the professional skill and standing of the 

attorney in the profession.” Township of South Whitehall v. 

Karoly, 891 A.2d 780, 784 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2006). The trial 

court has discretion to decide the reasonableness of an 

award of attorney fees, and an appellate court should not 

alter the trial court’s decision absent a clear abuse of 

discretion. Borough of Bradford Woods, 799 A.2d at 991.

Lower Mount Bethel Township v. Gacki, 150 A.3d 575, 581 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2016)

(emphasis in original).

Although a township or municipality is entitled to attorney fees incurred 

on appeal, see Platts, 799 A.2d at 991, what complicates this matter is that a de novo

appeal was made by the Township for the collection of fees that should have been 

awarded by the district judge. Notwithstanding, the appeal involved more than the 
17

recoupment of fees because the Winters refused to stipulate to a hearing solely on that 

issue and, instead, made numerous filings challenging the validity of the enforcement 

proceeding. Accordingly, the issue is when can attorney fees resulting from an 

appeal for attorney fees constitute “costs and attorney fees incurred as a result of the 

violation.” See Platts, 799 A.2d at 991; see also 53 P.S. § 10617.2(a).

If, at the outset of the appeal, the parties stipulated to limit the trial 

court’s hearing to the collection of attorney fees, it would be clear that any costs 

advanced by the Township would not be borne by the Winters because the appeal was 

not for the enforcement of a zoning violation. Notwithstanding, once the Winters 

refused to stipulate to the scope of the appeal and challenged the entire enforcement 

action, the Township was stuck with having to present the merits of the case at the de 

novo hearing.

The Winters also challenge any fees awarded for pursuit of fees incurred 

in enforcing the violations regarding the UCC. Because, under Section 617.2(a) of 

the MPC, attorney fees can only be awarded for enforcement proceedings brought to 

enforce provisions of a zoning code, to the extent that any fees were awarded to

enforce provisions of the UCC, those fees are improper.

Given all of the above, we affirm in part the trial court’s order, but 

vacate that portion of the order awarding the Township attorney fees and costs. 

Accordingly, we remand to the trial court with instruction to recalculate the amount 

of attorney fees and costs that the Township incurred as a result of the Winters’ 
18

zoning violation, excluding those fees expended solely for the purpose of collecting 

attorney fees or prosecuting alleged UCC violations.

________________________________

DAN PELLEGRINI, Senior Judge
IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Warwick Township :

:

v. : No. 2071 C.D. 2016

:

Jaime Winters and Jason Winters, :

Appellants :

O R D E R

AND NOW, this 21

st

day of July, 2017, it is hereby ordered that the

Court of Common Pleas of Chester County’s (trial court) order dated November 

22, 2016, is affirmed in part and vacated in part, and this matter is remanded to the 

trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Jurisdiction relinquished.

________________________________

DAN PELLEGRINI, Senior Judge
IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Warwick Township :

 :

v. : No. 2071 C.D. 2016

 : Argued: June 8, 2017

Jaime Winters and Jason Winters, :

Appellants :

BEFORE: HONORABLE RENÉE COHN JUBELIRER, Judge

HONORABLE JULIA K. HEARTHWAY, Judge

HONORABLE DAN PELLEGRINI, Senior Judge

OPINION NOT REPORTED

CONCURRING OPINION BY

JUDGE COHN JUBELIRER FILED: July 21, 2017

I join the Majority’s well-written opinion regarding the attorney fees and the 

adequacy of the “Violation and Cease and Desist Enforcement Notice”

(Enforcement Notice) issued by Warwick Township. I also agree with the 

Majority that a landowner’s failure to appeal an enforcement notice to the zoning 

hearing board precludes the owner from challenging whether there was a zoning 

violation on the date of the enforcement notice. I write separately because I agree 

with the Winters that the Enforcement Notice issued in this case is ambiguous 

about whether timely compliance with the Enforcement Notice would still subject 

an owner to enforcement remedies.

The Majority explains that “[i]f a landowner does not appeal a zoning 

violation notice to the zoning hearing board, the failure to appeal renders the 
RCJ - 2

violation notice unassailable,” and that “neither the district justice nor a common 

pleas court may conduct a de novo review of the question of whether the 

landowner violated the zoning ordinance.” (Majority Op. at 14 (emphasis omitted) 

(quoting Twp. of Penn v. Seymour, 708 A.2d 861, 864-65 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1998)).) 

Moreover, a landowner “can contest the asserted [zoning] violations only by way 

of appeal to the municipality’s zoning hearing board and cannot merely defend the 

charge when the municipality seeks ordinance violation fines before a district 

justice.” City of Erie v. Freitus, 681 A.2d 840, 842 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1996) (citing 

Johnston v. Upper Macungie Twp., 638 A.2d 408, 410 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1994)). 

However, Section 616.1(c)(6) of the Pennsylvania Municipalities Planning Code 

(MPC)1also requires enforcement notices to state that “failure to comply with the 

notice within the time specified, unless extended by appeal to the zoning hearing 

board, constitutes a violation.” 53 P.S. § 10616.1(c)(6) (emphasis added). This 

Court has explained that “[i]f after receiving an enforcement notice, the landowner

continues to violate the zoning ordinance without appealing the enforcement 

notice, Section 616.1(c)(6) of the MPC . . . dictates a conclusive determination of 

violation . . . .” Woll v. Monaghan Twp., 948 A.2d 933, 937 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2008) 

(bold emphasis added, italics omitted). 

In both Seymour and Johnston, this Court found those landowners’ failures 

to appeal to the zoning hearing board rendered their enforcement notices 

unassailable. In both cases, the landowners also failed to comply with the 

enforcement notices. In Seymour, a landowner refused to bring the number of dogs 

on his property into compliance with the zoning limit and then sought to challenge 

 

1 Act of July 31, 1968, P.L. 805, added by Section 60 of the Act of December 21, 1988, 

P.L. 1329, as amended, 53 P.S. § 10616.1(c)(6).
RCJ - 3

the ordinance’s constitutionality before the court of common pleas and before this 

Court on appeal. In Johnston, landowners failed to comply with the notice by 

continuing to use their residential property for business purposes past the specified 

deadline. Such failure to timely comply, coupled with the failure to appeal, 

rendered their enforcement notices unassailable, precluding them from the ability 

to contest the asserted violations. 

Relevant to this discussion, the Enforcement Notice here states that “you are 

in violation of [] the Warwick Township Zoning Ordinance . . . .” (R.R. at 52a.) It 

also states in large, bold print: “you are hereby directed to cease and desist this 

activity within fifteen (15) days.” (Id. at 53a.) With regard to penalties for the 

zoning violations, the Enforcement Notice provides:

Failure to discontinue the above violations within the time frame 

specified, unless an appeal of this Notice of Violation has been filed 

with the Zoning Hearing Board, constitutes a violation of the 

Township Zoning Ordinance. Violation of the Zoning Ordinance may 

result in the institution of civil enforcement proceeding before a 

District Justice where the [D]istrict Justice may impose a Civil 

Penalty of up to Five hundred ($500.00) dollars plus court costs, 

including the Township’s attorneys’ fees, incurred as a result of such 

action. Each day that the violation continues shall constitute a 

separate violation and may subject you to a daily fine. 

(Id. (emphasis added).) 

One interpretation of this Enforcement Notice is that it is the failure to 

discontinue the zoning violation that will subject the owner to sanction and that 

discontinuing the violation within the time specified will not. Thus, although a 

landowner who does not appeal the Enforcement Notice and takes the affirmative 

steps required to discontinue the violation effectually concedes that a violation 

existed on his property at the time the notice was issued, it does not appear, based 

upon the language used in the Township’s Enforcement Notice, that the landowner 
RCJ - 4

will be subject to sanction.

2

 Moreover, if he seeks to present evidence of his timely 

compliance in any subsequent enforcement action against him, it would be

inaccurate to say that he “contest[s] the asserted violations.” Freitus, 681 A.2d at

842 (emphasis added). Rather, he would contest that he has not complied with the 

Enforcement Notice. His decision to comply, and not appeal, should not preclude 

him from presenting such evidence. The magisterial district judge would then 

make a factual inquiry into whether the landowner discontinued the violation 

within the time period specified by the violation notice in order to determine 

whether the landowner is liable for continuing violations.

The ambiguity over whether timely compliance with this Enforcement 

Notice protects a landowner from sanctions does not aid the Winters in the present 

case. Here, although the Winters attempt to argue that “after receipt of the Notice, 

the Structure was not used as a dwelling,” (see Appellants’ Br. at 13), the Majority 

correctly points out that the Winters’ “adamant refusal to accept that they used the 

garage as a dwelling belies any assertion that they attempted to ‘cease and desist’ 

that violation.” (Majority Op. at 14.) The Winters do not provide any evidence or 

testimony that they took affirmative steps to change their property within the 

period outlined in the violation notice. In effect, although they did also argue that 

they “ceased and desisted,” given these facts, the Winters are really seeking to 

collaterally contest the Township’s application of the Enforcement Notice itself. 

Thus, any confusion arising from the Enforcement Notice regarding the effect of 

compliance is not applicable. 

_____________________________________

RENÉE COHN JUBELIRER, Judge

 

2 Because this Enforcement Notice involves the imposition of a penalty, I believe the 

Rule of Lenity is applicable to our interpretation.