NTSB/MAB-18/20

National Transportation Safety Board

Marine Accident Brief

Capsizing and Sinking of Fishing Vessel Langley Douglas

On the morning of September 11, 2017, the commercial fishing vessel Langley Douglas

developed a port list, capsized, and subsequently sank 60 miles east of Cape Charles, Virginia. A 

US Coast Guard helicopter rescued the five people on board. No injuries or pollution were 

reported. The Langley Douglas was valued at $1.95 million.

Langley Douglas at a repair facility in Newport News, Virginia, before the accident. (Photo by

crewmember)

 

1 All miles in this report are nautical miles (1.15 statute miles).

Accident no. DCA17FM027

Vessel name Langley Douglas

Accident type Capsizing

Location 60 miles1 east of Cape Charles, Virginia, 37°12.22' N, 074°31.41' W

Date September 11, 2017

Time 1117 eastern daylight time (coordinated universal time – 4 hours)

Injuries None

Damage Loss of vessel, $1.95 million est. 

Environmental

damage

No pollution reported; 6,000 gallons of diesel fuel and 700 gallons of hydraulic and

lube oil on board; some floating debris noted near the site of the sinking 

Weather Clear, visibility 8 miles, winds northeast at 20 mph, 6–8-foot seas, air temperature 

73°F, water temperature 70°F

Waterway 

information

Atlantic Ocean along the edge of the continental shelf just north of the Norfolk 

Canyon, depth 850–900 feet.
Capsizing and Sinking of Fishing Vessel Langley Douglas

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Background

The Langley Douglas, a 79-foot-long, 143-gross ton, welded-steel trawler, was built in 1979

by Quality Marine, Inc. in Bayou La Batre, Alabama.

2 The vessel was originally named the Angela 

Joy and later the Vaud J. The owner and operating company, A & D Fisheries LLC, purchased the 

vessel in May 2012 and outfitted it for squid fishing. The captain had 31 years of experience in 

the fishing industry, 5 years on the vessel and, for the last 10 years, served as captain on several 

trawlers of similar size along the US East Coast. He was credentialed as master of 100-gross-ton 

vessels.

Satellite image of the site of the sinking, 60 nautical miles east of Cape Charles, Virginia. 

(Background by Google Earth)

Accident Events

On the afternoon on September 10, the day before the sinking, the Langley Douglas departed 

the Amory’s Seafood Market pier in downtown Hampton, Virginia, with five people on board (the 

captain, a first mate, two deckhands, and a National Oceanic Atmospheric Administration [NOAA]

observer) to fish for northern shortfin Illex squid. The crew had planned a 4-day trip with a 

scheduled return to the Amory pier to offload the catch.

The transit to the fishing grounds took about 17 hours. After exiting the Chesapeake Bay 

and heading into the Atlantic Ocean, the crew extended the trawler’s outriggers and lowered the 

port and starboard paravanes into the water. Paravanes, sometimes nicknamed “fish” or “birds,”

are designed to ease the rolling motion of vessels by creating a constant downward force. Also

during the outbound voyage, the senior deckhand filled the fish holds with seawater to about waist 

depth, using an external pump.

 

2 Trawling is a fishing practice that herds and captures the target species by towing a net through the water.

Chesapeake 

Bay
Capsizing and Sinking of Fishing Vessel Langley Douglas

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Langley Douglas with its outriggers extended and paravanes stowed at the end of the outriggers. 

(Photo courtesy of Steven Collingwood)

The crew rotated watch every 3 hours. At 2100, the captain went to bed and the deckhand 

began the 2100–midnight shift. The senior deckhand took the next watch, followed by the first 

mate and then the captain. The following morning, at 0725, the captain altered the vessel’s course 

to about 030 true and reduced the vessel’s speed to 3 knots to prepare for trawling. The first mate 

stayed in the wheelhouse while the captain and crew set the trawl net. For about the next hour and 

45 minutes, the vessel towed the net with both paravanes in the water.

The Langley Douglas trackline and heading on the day of the sinking. (Screenshot courtesy of 

NOAA Fisheries Atlantic Region Vessel Monitoring System)
Capsizing and Sinking of Fishing Vessel Langley Douglas

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At 0910, the captain ordered the crew to haul in the net and prepare the main deck and hog 

pen area.3 The crew also placed scupper plates in front of the port and starboard freeing ports to 

prevent catch from going overboard.4 The captain told investigators that he remembered seeing 

the cod-end sensor flashing, indicating that catch was present in the net.5 As the net approached 

the stern, the crew noticed a 25-foot-long basking shark stuck in the cod end. The first mate stated 

that he knew the catch was large and heavy because the hydraulic winches were “a bit under 

pressure,” but the crewmembers brought the entire catch on board and emptied the net into the 

centerline hog pen. They estimated that the total catch weighed about 35,000 pounds (the shark 

about 10,000 pounds).

Langley Douglas’ main deck during a previous voyage, with about 18,000–20,000 pounds

of squid in the hog pen. (Photo by crewmember)

 

3 The catch-processing area on the centerline main deck (about 3 feet high, 26 feet long, and 10 feet wide) is 

referred to as a hog pen. It is constructed with lumber boards (which the crew called checkerboards). The hog pen 

holds the catch for distribution to the fish holds. The boards are individually removed to funnel fish to adjacent fish 

holds via hatch openings on deck.

4 Freeing ports are openings on the lower part of the bulwarks of a vessel that allow water on deck to drain overboard.

Scupper plates block the freeing ports to keep catch from spilling overboard; the plates aboard the Langley Douglas

allowed some water to escape through the freeing ports. 

5 The cod end is the narrow end of a tapered trawl net. As fish pass through the cone-shaped opening, the net 

narrows to the cod end. The cod-end sensor is a catch-monitoring device that measures the expansion of the mesh 

netting at the cod end. As the volume of the catch increases, the mesh netting expands, triggering the cod end sensor 

to flash to alert the crew. 
Capsizing and Sinking of Fishing Vessel Langley Douglas

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The crew planned to remove the shark from the vessel using the centerline boom (the 

NOAA observer said the shark had likely died in the net). However, after the crew discharged

the shark and squid into the hog pen, the squid started to overflow the pen and spill out onto the 

port side of the deck, and the vessel immediately developed a port list. In addition, the vessel 

was beam to the 6–8-foot seas and taking waves over its port quarter, which the crew said further 

increased the list. Normally, the crew would open fish hatches on both the port and starboard side 

to distribute the squid evenly into the fish holds, but to try to counter the port list, the captain 

ordered the crew to open the hatches to the two forward starboard fish holds and commence

sweeping (with brooms) the squid from the pen into those holds. The senior deckhand and the 

deckhand started to carry out the captain’s order, but the vessel continued to take seas over its port 

quarter, heeling the vessel further to port with each passing wave.

The crew saw that the totes, bins, boards, and gear on the back deck also began to shift to 

port. The vessel now listed about 10–20 degrees and the port quarter of the vessel was submerged 

as waves continued to break over the bulwark. The crew reported that the near-20-degree port list

caused the body of the shark to shift to the port side of the hog pen and about 2,500 pounds of 

squid to slide toward the stern and collect against the aft portside bulwark, blocking the freeing 

ports and preventing release of trapped seawater on deck.

The captain raised the vessel’s portside paravane out of the water, altered course to port, 

and gave full throttle to try to counter the list, to no avail. The captain then instructed the crew to 

come up from the main deck as he proceeded to grab immersion suits that were stored in the 

wheelhouse. He instructed the crew to don their suits; however, the rough seas and continuously 

increasing port list made it difficult for the crew to don the suits on board. The first mate went 

forward to manually launch the liferaft located on the bow.

As the Langley Douglas continued taking seas over the port side, the shark rolled out of 

the hog pen and slid toward the portside bulwark. Eventually, the vessel listed 45–60 degrees and

then rolled completely onto its port side (80–90 degrees by the captain’s account). Seawater 

entered the vessel through downflooding points on deck and in the wheelhouse, resulting in loss 

of electrical power. Shortly thereafter, the vessel began to sink by its stern. At 1117, the vessel’s 

emergency position-indicating radio beacon (EPIRB) activated and alerted NOAA’s Mission 

Control Center and the Coast Guard’s Rescue Coordination Center at District 5, in Portsmouth, 

Virginia. The Coast Guard launched an MH-60 Jayhawk helicopter from Elizabeth City, North 

Carolina.

The five people on board the Langley Douglas entered the 70-degree water while holding 

on to their immersion suits. The captain grabbed the sea anchor of the deployed liferaft. The NOAA 

observer and the senior deckhand swam away from the sinking vessel off its port quarter. When 

safely away from the vessel, they donned their immersion suits in the water and then grabbed hold 

of a floating cooler that had previously been located on deck. Meanwhile, the feet of the

deckhand’s immersion suit had become tangled in the raised portside outrigger while he was trying 

to don the suit in the water. The first mate assisted the deckhand, freeing him from the tangled 

immersion suit. The first mate and the deckhand then swam toward the liferaft, where the captain

and the first mate assisted the deckhand into the liferaft. The captain then tried to swim with the 

liferaft, holding on to the sea-anchor line, toward the NOAA observer and the senior deckhand

who were floating on the cooler. However, the sea-anchor line parted and the captain then swam 

toward them and joined them on the cooler. Simultaneously, the first mate had entered the liferaft.
Capsizing and Sinking of Fishing Vessel Langley Douglas

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The bow of the Langley Douglas remained above water for about 20 minutes before 

disappearing from view. Shortly thereafter, the NOAA observer and the captain spotted the EPIRB 

floating on the surface; the first mate eventually picked it up. During the next hour, the two groups

tried to paddle and swim toward each other in the rough seas but were unsuccessful; they were 

about 30 yards apart when the Coast Guard helicopter arrived on scene. A rescue swimmer entered 

the water and swam toward the three crewmembers on the cooler. He maneuvered them toward 

the liferaft as they clung to the cooler. All three entered the liferaft and rejoined the first mate and 

the deckhand.

By 1246, the helicopter crew had hoisted all five persons to safety and then flew them to 

Elizabeth City. Postaccident toxicological testing was completed in accordance with regulations. 

All alcohol results were negative. The senior deckhand and the deckhand tested positive for 

marijuana; all other drug-testing results were negative.

Other Information

Investigators interviewed the crewmembers to understand the approximate weights on 

board and the prevailing conditions before the Langley Douglas sank. The captain stated that 

the waves were 6–8 feet with a wave period of 8–10 seconds, winds were 10–15 knots from 

030 degrees true, with max winds at 30 knots. He also said that 6,000 gallons of fuel (3,000 gallons

in each port and starboard saddle tank), 250–300 gallons of lube oil (83–100-percent capacity), 

3,000 gallons of freshwater (100-percent capacity), and 1,900–2,400 gallons of seawater and ice 

in the fish holds (depth of about 2.5–3 feet) were on board. The estimated weight of the catch on 

deck was 25,000–35,000 pounds (squid and the basking shark). The aft centerline boom was 

centered and secured. The cod end of the trawl net was empty and on the spool. 

Simplified top-view diagram of below-deck compartments on the Langley Douglas. (Image provided 

by the Coast Guard)
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Investigators determined that the vessel had at least five downflooding points on the main 

deck: one 36-inch access to the fish hold; two 36-inch deck vents on the stern; and the first and 

second cargo hold hatches on the starboard side, which the crew opened in an attempt to move 

cargo (squid) into those holds to correct the port list.

The last condition and valuation survey of the Langley Douglas was conducted on May 15, 

2013. The most recent Coast Guard dockside safety examination took place about a week before 

the accident, on September 6, 2017, when inspectors from Sector Hampton Roads issued a valid 

fishing vessel decal and marked the vessel as “excellent.” Safety examinations of commercial 

fishing vessels primarily address lifesaving equipment and do not include hull or other machinery 

assessments that are required for Coast Guard-inspected vessels.

Analysis

The Langley Douglas was not salvaged; therefore, a postaccident vessel examination could 

not be conducted to determine the cause or primary location of the flooding. However,

investigators interviewed the crew and reviewed the sequence of events and maintenance 

performed on board the vessel to determine any relevance to the accident. The crewmembers said 

they knew of no prior damage to the vessel. 

Investigators provided vessel information, the loading condition, wind and weather 

conditions, and crew statements to the Coast Guard Marine Safety Center (MSC). The owners of 

the Langley Douglas were not required to conduct a stability test, and therefore the vessel’s initial 

stability characteristics were not quantified. The MSC did, however, conduct a post-capsizing 

stability analysis and found the following (summarized):

1. Insufficient information was available to provide a quantitative evaluation of the vessel’s 

intact condition or the casualty scenario, but a qualitative discussion was provided. Although unable 

to determine an estimated impact to the righting energy of the vessel, it was evident that the 

combination of the external forces and the shifting internal cargo reduced vessel stability. Crew

statements appear to align with this assessment as the vessel rolled heavily, causing the cargo shift, 

and then the vessel remained heeled to port, ultimately sinking by the stern.

2. When the vessel rolled past 20 degrees to port per witness statements, the squid and shark 

spilled onto the deck. This weight shifting to the port side would have increased the vessel’s roll. 

The crew indicated that the main cargo hold was about half full of water, and the two fuel tanks 

were each about three-quarters full, while other small tanks were nearly full. In this case, when the 

vessel rolled to port, the liquid in the partially filled tanks would have displaced to the low side of 

the tank and moved the center of gravity of the liquid in the same direction as the roll. Collectively, 

weight of the cargo on deck and liquid in the tanks shifted and settled to the port side. The vessel 

was trimmed slightly by the stern; therefore, any water trapped on deck would flow toward and 

settle at the stern, as would any liquid in the vessel’s tanks.

3. It was not possible to determine the relative impact of these forces on the vessel, but for 

a vessel of this size, the impact would have been dramatic and greatly reduced the righting energy 

of the vessel. If left in this condition without further wind or wave action, it is possible that the 

vessel would have righted itself or reached some angle of static heel and trim. However, at the 

time, wind and wave action continued to act on the vessel.
Capsizing and Sinking of Fishing Vessel Langley Douglas

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4. The crew indicated that the deck freeing ports were blocked by squid, thus preventing 

water or cargo runoff back to the sea. Without knowing the amplitude and period of the vessel’s 

rolls, it is not possible to fairly evaluate if the freeing ports―if not blocked by squid―could have 

allowed sufficient water runoff to prevent the sinking. Therefore, it could not be determined how

the blocked freeing ports contributed to the sinking. However, entrapment of water on deck would 

have had a negative effect on stability.

5. As the vessel listed more dramatically, water likely began to downflood into the hull

through non-watertight fittings and openings, further compounding the weight shifting aft and to 

the port side of the vessel.

6. The captain stated that he raised the portside paravane out of the water in an effort to 

counteract the list of the vessel; however, it is unlikely that doing so had any noticeable impact on 

vessel stability. Paravanes rely on a combination of forward speed, surface area, rolling, and length 

of the boom to resist or dampen rolling. If the vessel is actively rolling to port, the starboard 

paravane will resist the roll. The paravanes are generally tuned to minimize resistance and 

therefore are lightly loaded (and impart minimal moment on the vessel) if the vessel is not rolling. 

The benefit of lifting the paravane would be that rolls to starboard had less resistance. Also, 

elevating the port paravane likely did not significantly degrade stability.

The captain and crew knew that the catch was very large. They still chose to empty the 

entire catch on board, which exceeded the capacity of the hog pen, overflowed the pen, and caused 

a large weight-shift to port. Although the general intent of fishing operations is to catch as much 

as possible, crews should consider the impact on vessel stability of bringing large loads on board.

Additionally, the NTSB has previously encouraged owners and operators of fishing vessels to

consult qualified professionals to determine vessels’ overall range of stability and suitability for 

the intended service, and for senior crewmembers to have general awareness of the principles of 

stability.

Probable Cause

The National Transportation Safety Board determines that the probable cause of the 

capsizing and sinking of fishing vessel Langley Douglas was the captain’s decision to unload a 

large catch that overflowed the pen and spilled out on deck, which―coupled with trapped water 

on deck due to blocked freeing ports and shifting of liquids in partially filled tanks―caused the 

vessel to roll to port and downflood.

Precautions when Unloading Catch

Fishing vessel operators are reminded to avoid unloading large catches that exceed 

the pen height and can result in spillover and cargo on deck. Catch sliding around 

on deck has an adverse effect on vessel stability. Additionally, freeing ports

(scuppers) in the bulwarks should be kept clear for rapid draining of water on deck.

A deck filled with water creates an undesirable free-surface effect, and the weight 

of the additional water also increases the height of the vessel’s center of gravity 

and decreases its freeboard, consequently reducing overall stability.
Capsizing and Sinking of Fishing Vessel Langley Douglas

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Vessel Particulars

Vessel Langley Douglas

Owner/operator A & D Fisheries, LLC

Port of registry Scituate, Massachusetts

Flag United States

Type Fishing vessel

Year built 1979

Official number (US) 606719

IMO number 7944413

Classification society N/A

Construction Steel

Length 79.9 ft (18.2 m)

Draft 12.9 ft (1.45 m)

Beam/width 24.5 ft (6.1 m)

Gross or ITC tonnage 143 gross tons

Engine power, manufacturer 1,000 hp (380 kW) Detroit 12-149 marine diesel engine

Persons on board 5

NTSB investigators worked closely with our counterparts from Coast Guard Sector Hampton Roads

throughout this investigation.

For more details about this accident, visit www.ntsb.gov and search for NTSB accident ID 

DCA17FM027.

Issued: August 30, 2018

The NTSB has authority to investigate and establish the probable cause of any major marine casualty or any marine 

casualty involving both public and nonpublic vessels under Title 49 United States Code, Section 1131. This report is 

based on factual information either gathered by NTSB investigators or provided by the Coast Guard from its informal 

investigation of the accident.

The NTSB does not assign fault or blame for a marine casualty; rather, as specified by NTSB regulation, “[NTSB] 

investigations are fact-finding proceedings with no formal issues and no adverse parties and are not conducted for the 

purpose of determining the rights or liabilities of any person.” Title 49 Code of Federal Regulations, Section 831.4. 

Assignment of fault or legal liability is not relevant to the NTSB’s statutory mission to improve transportation safety 

by conducting investigations and issuing safety recommendations. In addition, statutory language prohibits the 

admission into evidence or use of any part of an NTSB report related to an accident in a civil action for damages 

resulting from a matter mentioned in the report. Title 49 United States Code, Section 1154(b).