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i 

44–996 2009

[H.A.S.C. No. 110–135] 

HEARING 

ON

NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT 

FOR FISCAL YEAR 2009 

AND

OVERSIGHT OF PREVIOUSLY AUTHORIZED 

PROGRAMS 

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

TERRORISM, UNCONVENTIONAL THREATS AND 

CAPABILITIES SUBCOMMITTEE HEARING 

ON

BUDGET REQUEST FOR THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY: RESPONDING TO THE 21ST CENTURY IRREGULAR WARFARE THREAT ENVIRONMENT 

HEARING HELD 

MARCH 13, 2008 
(II) 

TERRORISM AND UNCONVENTIONAL THREATS SUBCOMMITTEE 

ADAM SMITH, Washington, Chairman 

MIKE MCINTYRE, North Carolina 

ROBERT ANDREWS, New Jersey 

JIM COOPER, Tennessee 

JIM MARSHALL, Georgia 

MARK E. UDALL, Colorado 

BRAD ELLSWORTH, Indiana 

KIRSTEN E. GILLIBRAND, New York 

KATHY CASTOR, Florida 

MAC THORNBERRY, Texas 

ROBIN HAYES, North Carolina 

JOHN KLINE, Minnesota 

THELMA DRAKE, Virginia 

K. MICHAEL CONAWAY, Texas 

JIM SAXTON, New Jersey 

BILL SHUSTER, Pennsylvania 

TIM MCCLEES, Professional Staff Member 

JEANETTE JAMES, Professional Staff Member 

ANDREW TABLER, Staff Assistant 
(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF HEARINGS 

2008 

Page 

HEARING: 

Thursday, March 13, 2008, Fiscal Year 2009 National Defense Authorization 

Act—Budget Request for the Department of Defense Science and Technology: Responding to the 21st Century Irregular Warfare Threat Environment ...................................................................................................................... 1 

APPENDIX: 

Thursday, March 13, 2008 ...................................................................................... 33 

THURSDAY, MARCH 13, 2008 

FISCAL YEAR 2009 NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT—BUDGET REQUEST FOR THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE SCIENCE AND 

TECHNOLOGY: RESPONDING TO THE 21ST CENTURY IRREGULAR 

WARFARE THREAT ENVIRONMENT 

STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS 

Smith, Hon. Adam, a Representative from Washington, Chairman, Terrorism, 

Unconventional Threats and Capabilities Subcommittee ................................. 1 

Thornberry, Hon. Mac, a Representative from Texas, Ranking Member, Terrorism, Unconventional Threats and Capabilities Subcommittee .................... 2 

WITNESSES 

Jaggers, Terry J., SES, Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for 

Science, Technology and Engineering, Office of the Assistant Secretary 

for Acquisition ...................................................................................................... 11 

Killion, Dr. Thomas H., Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army for Research 

and Technology/Chief Scientist ........................................................................... 8 

Landay, Rear Adm. William E., III, USN, Chief of Naval Research, Assistant 

Deputy Commandant of the Marine Corps for Science and Technology Director, Test, Evaluation and Technology Requirements ................................... 9 

Schwitters, Dr. Roy, Chair, JASON Steering Committee and Professor of 

Physics, University of Texas at Austin .............................................................. 3 

Shaffer, Alan R., Principal Deputy, Director, Defense Research and Engineering, Department of Defense ................................................................................. 6 

Tether, Dr. Anthony J., Director, Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency 

(DARPA) ................................................................................................................ 13 

APPENDIX 

PREPARED STATEMENTS: 

Jaggers, Terry J. ............................................................................................... 99 

Killion, Dr. Thomas H. ..................................................................................... 73 

Landay, Rear Adm. William E., III ................................................................. 85 

Schwitters, Dr. Roy .......................................................................................... 37 

Shaffer, Alan R. ................................................................................................ 44 

Tether, Dr. Anthony J. ..................................................................................... 113 
Page

IV 

DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD: 

[There were no Documents submitted.] 

WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING THE HEARING: 

[There were no Questions asked during the hearing.] 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING: 

Mr. Smith .......................................................................................................... 155 

Mr. Ellsworth .................................................................................................... 180 
(1) 

FISCAL YEAR 2009 NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT—BUDGET REQUEST FOR THE DEPARTMENT 

OF DEFENSE SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY: RESPONDING TO THE 21ST CENTURY IRREGULAR WARFARE 

THREAT ENVIRONMENT 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, TERRORISM, UNCONVENTIONAL THREATS AND CAPABILITIES

SUBCOMMITTEE, Washington, DC, Thursday, March 13, 2008. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 10:32 a.m., in room 

2212, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Adam Smith (chairman 

of the subcommittee) presiding. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. ADAM SMITH, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM WASHINGTON, CHAIRMAN, TERRORISM, UNCONVENTIONAL THREATS AND CAPABILITIES SUBCOMMITTEE 

Mr. SMITH. Good morning. We will call the committee to order. 

Thank you all for coming. 

I would like to begin, actually, we are having a memorial service 

this morning—or had a memorial service this morning—for our 

troops who have died in Iraq and Afghanistan. And at 10:30 the 

House is observing a moment of silence, and I would like, if we 

could, to do the same here. 

So we will start by observing a moment of silence. 

Thank you. 

Well, I want to thank our panel for being here this morning. I 

have some brief opening remarks, and then I will turn it over to 

Mr. Thornberry, who will have some brief opening remarks. 

Then, actually, just for about five minutes if we could, before we 

get started with our panel, we have Dr. Schwitters, from the University of Texas, I believe it is, who has some expertise on the specific issue of managing our data. And there is a number of different 

aspects to that, but it is one of the more important issues that we 

are examining here, within the science and technology (S&T). 

Specifically, what we are focused on is the bandwidth issue, and 

the problems as information warfare becomes more and more an 

everyday part of every single one of our troops’ lives, you know, 

having them be able to access that. How can we manage all that 

is out there, take advantage of the spectrum we have? 

And then the other piece of it, of course, is just managing, you 

know, the data in general, you know, whether you are, you know, 

communicating or simply trying to go into one of our systems and 

get some information out of it. The analogy that occurred to me, 

it is like classic professor’s office that is now packed to the ceiling 
2 

with papers and files and folders, and it is great to have all that 

information, but when you need one piece of it can you reliably get 

it? 

And can you reliably get it if you are just an average everyday 

person and not some sort of computer genius? You know, basically, 

can our, you know, vast, you know, military establishment take advantage of that data and how can we better manage that? So we 

will do that in general. 

But the main purpose of this morning’s hearing is to review our 

Department of Defense’s fiscal year 2009 budget request for science 

and technology. We have five witnesses with us here today: Dr. 

Allan Shaffer, who is the Principle Deputy for the Director, Defense 

Research and Engineering; Dr. Dom—I will go back to bed and we 

will just start over—— 

[Laughter.] 

He can mispronounce last names, but when you mispronounce 

‘‘Tom,’’ you know you are off to a bad start. Dr. Tom Killion, who 

is the Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army for Research and 

Technology; Rear Admiral Bill Landay, Chief of Naval Research; 

Mr. Terry Jaggers, the Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Air Force 

for Science, Technology, and Engineering; and Dr. Tony Tether, the 

Director of Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA). 

We will take you in that order when we get started. 

And I will just say a couple quick things. We are pleased that 

the budget request for science and technology represents a four 

percent growth over the fiscal year 2008 request. We have enormous needs in this area for some of the reasons I mentioned earlier. 

As we move into a more irregular warfare environment that involves all kinds of different aspects of technology, it becomes more 

and more important that we stay on the cutting edge of that in 

order to keep up with our adversaries, to track what they are doing 

and also, you know, use those tools offensively as well. And there 

are dozens and dozens of different applications of that, which I 

won’t get into—I will leave that to our witnesses—but I will say 

it is, you know, one of the most important things that this committee does, is try to figure out how to properly fund our investment in science and technology to keep us apace with that. 

And I want to thank all of our witnesses in advance for the fine 

work that they are doing in these areas—incredibly complicated 

stuff, complicated stuff that changes moment by moment. Keeping 

up with it is definitely a fulltime job, and I think you guys are 

doing an excellent job of that, and we want to help you in any way 

we can to provide the funds to help you do the research and development that needs to be done in these areas. 

And with that I will turn it over to my ranking member, Mr. 

Thornberry, for any comments he has. 

STATEMENT OF HON. MAC THORNBERRY, A REPRESENTATIVE 

FROM TEXAS, RANKING MEMBER, TERRORISM, UNCONVENTIONAL THREATS AND CAPABILITIES SUBCOMMITTEE 

Mr. THORNBERRY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate, as 

well, the witnesses being here today. This is always a little bit of 

a frustrating hearing for me, when we have it, because there are 
3 

so many witnesses with so many issues, and I have so much to 

learn, and we have such limited time, that it just doesn’t all seem 

to fit together. 

It sounds like a cliche to say that today—that tomorrow’s national security is dependent upon today’s science and technology, 

but just because it sounds like a cliche doesn’t mean it is not true; 

and I think it is. I also think it is one of the easiest areas of the 

budget to shortchange. 

And I am not very pleased with a four percent increase. As you 

mentioned, the rate of change in the world today is extraordinary, 

and we are facing new domains of warfare; and to even hope to 

keep up with an understanding of what is happening, much less to 

do something about it, requires significant investments, I think, in 

science and technology. 

I know that the organizations represented here are all doing 

great things. I will just say that I am most interested in hearing 

about the problems that you have—the obstacles that you have. Everybody has things to brag about, justifiably, but I think we are 

here to help the country, and we have to understand the problems 

and obstacles you face as much as the things that are going well 

for you. 

So with that, I appreciate, again, all the witnesses and look forward to their testimony. I yield back. 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you. 

And with that, I will call up Dr. Schwitters. 

If you could give us just a brief overview on the data collection 

issues, and we have a statement from you as well, which is in the 

record, which we will review at our leisure, but I am interested in 

any comments you have. And if you could—I know it is a big subject—if you could try to keep it to five minutes, just because we 

have a number of people on the panel we want to hear from. 

STATEMENT OF DR. ROY SCHWITTERS, CHAIR, JASON STEERING COMMITTEE AND PROFESSOR OF PHYSICS, UNIVERSITY 

OF TEXAS AT AUSTIN 

Dr. SCHWITTERS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for this opportunity. 

If you had seen my office you probably would have had second 

thoughts about this professor’s office—— 

Mr. SMITH. Well, we are relying on your ability to manage data, 

not papers, so—— 

[Laughter.] 

Dr. SCHWITTERS. So I am pleased to discuss with the subcommittee today some observations and suggestions for managing 

the prodigious quantities of data produced by new sensor systems 

increasing being planned and deployed in national security applications. As you mentioned, I prepared a written statement for the 

record, and I will briefly summarize some of that here right now. 

Advances in microelectronics and related fabrication technologies 

enable new kinds of surveillance and monitoring systems comprising very large numbers of high-performance sensors that offer 

the promise of truly revolutionary advances in tactical intelligence 

and other pressing needs. I think everybody agrees, these are 

game-changing technologies if we can learn how to use them properly. 
4 

The potential of this technology currently is being hampered by 

inadequate analysis tools, which are not suited to handling the 

large quantities of data created by the systems. My comments 

today are drawn from interactions I have had with technical experts on new sensor systems and from discussions within my colleagues in JASON, a group of research scientists and engineers, 

largely from academia, who study technical problems related to national security for various agencies in the government. 

In recent years our group has encountered the data glut problem 

in many different forms; for example, from tactical approaches to 

help counter Improvised Explosive Device’s (IED) aimed at our 

troops in Iraq to understanding test results from prototypes of advanced systems. Several of us deal with these very similar issues 

in our own scientific work. 

For example, now, a single modern aerial reconnaissance system 

may use 100 megapixel cameras operating several frames a second. 

They can generate 10 to 100 terabytes of data. Of course, these 

are—I am always reminded of some of the TV science shows where 

they say ‘‘billions and billions.’’ 

Terabytes today are the measure of data storage; you can buy a 

one-terabyte disc and it holds a lot of information. These systems 

generate tens to hundreds of terabytes in a day of observation. 

I have been told that, for reference, that the—and this sounds 

low to me—but the estimated data rate between the Iraq theater 

and Continental United States (CONUS) is about 270 of these 

units per year, just to set the scale. So a single platform flying with 

modern sensors can easily swamp that kind of data rate in a day, 

with the kind of data we are talking about in a year of communications. 

Merely increasing the capacity of our data channels won’t do the 

job. In fact, flying modern discs on airplanes to analysis centers 

outside of theater provides pretty good bandwidth. But it is the 

analysis that must keep up with the flow of data to avoid pileup. 

And I am reminded of the hilarious TV episode of ‘‘I Love Lucy,’’ 

where Lucy and Ethel are at the chocolate factory and the chocolate just gets out of control, and you never get back in gear. The 

same kind of thing can happen. Well, discs do the same thing; they 

fall on the floor. And once you get behind, it is very difficult to 

catch up. 

Furthermore, it is the quality of the information that can be derived from the new sensors that I think is of paramount importance. Photos and videos are no longer sufficient; the human mind 

can’t keep up with that kind of information. So we need new ways 

to handle this data, and that is the issue in front of us. 

The traditional approaches, for example, of compressing data, 

like video information, actually can harm the analysis value of the 

data; you lose critical information that cannot be retrieved unless 

that data are handled properly. These are simply new things that 

we need to deal with in addition to just managing the volume of 

data. 

Now, I wanted to sort of raise with you the question of, you 

know, who is doing it right? Is anyone handling this problem in the 

science or technical community? And I think—and I would like to 

suggest—that there are good examples from the scientific research 
5 

community for handling large sensor systems that actually go back 

to before the personal computing revolution. 

In my statement I describe two current cases that I think are relevant to the discussion. One is from astronomy, called Panoramic 

Survey Telescope and Rapid Response System (Pan-STARRS), 

which is a large camera that actually has several hundred times 

the capacity of the best quality personal cameras you can buy in 

the stores today. These people are surveying the entire visible sky 

several times a month, and really revolutionizing our understanding of the cosmos. 

The other examples I brought in the paper have to do with remarkable detectors being completed right now at the CERN Large 

Hadron Collider. These devices can swamp the data rates I mentioned earlier within a few seconds of information, and their goal 

is to learn about the smallest particles of matter and energy in the 

universe. 

The sizes and data rates involved in both of these examples are 

actually much greater than those contemplated for tactical surveillance systems. They and other examples from the scientific community share important attributes, which are relevant to national security systems. 

One: Scientific systems must separate very rare events with high 

efficiency from large backgrounds of ordinary activity. It is not 

practical to do this by analysts viewing pictures anymore. Automated quantitative forms of image analysis were developed to solve 

this problem. 

Two: The quantity of data is strictly managed to maintain a viable analysis pipeline with priorities established by the science 

teams. 

Three: The teams comprise highly integrated groups of hardware 

builders, software developers, and data analysts. 

Now, what I have been describing here is essentially the business of systems engineering. And my basic point to the committee 

and to the people I talk to in the Defense Department on these 

questions is that we are facing really a new form of system integration here, and we all have to learn how to do this together. 

This is not a solved problem. There are not standard theories of 

data fusion or compression that can be applied in a more traditional sense of system engineering. We have to learn a lot from the 

data itself. 

So I would advocate that we think and try to, to the extent possible, establish integrated teams of users and builders—analysts, 

software developers, hardware experts—to understand and deal 

with the management of large data from the very design phases of 

these programs through their actual exploitation. I would like to 

see elevated support and recognition of the importance of quantitative data analysis in tactical and strategic systems. 

And I would also advocate the commitment of some fraction of 

existing tactical intelligence resources—prototype sensor exercises 

and other opportunities for the entire community to learn how to 

do this tough job. There is a lot of learning ahead of us in this. 

At this point, let me just close and recall that in fact, the World 

Wide Web was invented at CERN a generation ago to handle the 

problems of data glut and team communications in experimental 
6 

high energy physics. I believe that more such discoveries await us 

that have the potential to change tactical surveillance and other 

areas of intelligence in ways as profound as the World Wide Web. 

Thank you for your attention. 

[The prepared statement of Dr. Schwitters can be found in the 

Appendix on page 37.] 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you very much. And as we go forward, if we 

do have questions for you, when we get to the question period we 

will call you forward and deal with that. 

In the meantime, we will turn it over to Mr. Shaffer. 

STATEMENT OF ALAN R. SHAFFER, PRINCIPAL DEPUTY, DIRECTOR, DEFENSE RESEARCH AND ENGINEERING, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE 

Mr. SHAFFER. Chairman Smith, Congressman Thornberry, distinguished members of the subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today to describe the Department of 

Defense science and technology program. I ask that my written 

statement be entered into the record. 

I am honored to represent the great accomplishments of the 

thousands of dedicated DOD science and technology professionals. 

Our program has a history of developing technologies leading to superior operational capabilities employed by the men and women 

serving in our armed forces today. While we continue to deliver superior capabilities, the new challenges we face drive us to evolve 

and expand our program. 

The evolution of the national security environment, as outlined 

in the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), coupled with the 

emergence of an agile and global technology base has led to 

changes in the technology landscape for the DOD. Congress has 

recognized this evolving set of challenges and supported the DOD 

science and technology budget requests. For that, we thank you. 

In response to the evolving need, the Department has experienced a decade-long growth in the science and technology budget 

request, culminating in this year’s request of $11.5 billion, which 

is among the highest science and technology budget requests in history. Perhaps more noteworthy in the requested increase for this 

year is the requested increase for basic research, where we have an 

unprecedented 16 percent real growth in our request, to $1.7 billion. 

Secretary Gates shaped this growth to begin to posture us for the 

future. This requested increase reflects the broad professional judgment of DOD’s leadership, numerous Blue Ribbon advisory panels, 

and prominent industry executives, that our current military advantage is based on discoveries from basic research, and the belief 

that the long-running U.S. basic research leadership is in decline. 

The growth in our requests are indicative of the continued commitment we are making to develop the technologies that support 

the future needs of the men and women in uniform. They deserve 

the best we can give them. 

Over the past two years, we have begun to reshape the science 

and technology investment of the Department to increase the socalled ‘‘non-kinetic’’ capabilities by initiating or expanding programs in a number of nonconventional areas, such as biometrics; 
7 

human, social, culture, behavioral modeling; locating, tagging, and 

tracking; network science; persistent surveillance; and cyber protection. While we are currently well positioned to support the future 

force, there is still much to accomplish. We much simultaneously 

develop affordable technologies to improve current war-fighting 

systems, and address and integrate emerging technologies developed anywhere. 

I know this committee is interested in how we are responding to 

the new areas of research for irregular warfare. I will use the example of handing large data sets generated by the explosions of the 

ubiquitous sensors and expanded communication capacity, but the 

process we use is similar for the other areas of irregular warfare. 

The current projections are for the data volume of the defense 

systems to grow by as much as a factor of 1 billion over the coming 

decade, but the defense science and technology community is already planning for this growth through a multifaceted approach. 

First, in the fall of 2007, department science and technology leadership commissioned a large data handling technology focus team. 

This multidisciplinary team used a systems engineering approach to baseline the current program, and then recommended a 

way forward. The principle that emerged—and this is important— 

is that DOD large data is not just about the size and amount of 

data, but the time to act. The team recommended several actions, 

from revamped architectures to processing closer to the sensor. 

You have already heard from Dr. Schwitters, the chairman of the 

JASONs. We seek outside experts like the JASONs and the Defense Science Board (DSB) to provide independent assessments, 

which help shape our future. 

But planning is not enough. We are also expanding the infrastructure to support development and testing of new algorithms 

and software to attack the challenge systematically. 

In late 2007, we conducted a large data collection exercise called 

Bluegrass, in and around Lubbock, Texas, to simultaneously collected data from multiple types of sensors, such as radar, infrared, 

and other sensors. All this data is stored for the Department and 

Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) Lincoln Laboratory, 

who make it available for others to use. We are attacking the challenge in a disciplined way. 

Finally, we are investing in a number of large-scale demonstration programs to begin to test solutions. For example, the Large 

Data Joint Capability Technology Demonstration (JCTD) integrates 

bigger communication pipes with advanced storage systems and advanced data search and visualization software and methods. The 

first military utility assessment of this JCTD recently showed we 

could reduce tasks that used to take hours to minutes. 

In closing, Mr. Chairman, I would once again like to thank the 

committee for the support of our science and technology program, 

and seek your continued support of the programs laid out in the 

fiscal year 2009 President’s budget request. The ongoing emphasis 

of this Administration is to provide our armed forces the best technologies and capabilities we can by revitalizing our workforce and 

expanding the science and technology program into new and exciting areas. 

With your help, we will succeed. 
8 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Shaffer can be found in the Appendix on page 44.] 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you very much. 

Dr. Killion. 

STATEMENT OF DR. THOMAS H. KILLION, DEPUTY ASSISTANT 

SECRETARY OF THE ARMY FOR RESEARCH AND TECHNOLOGY/CHIEF SCIENTIST 

Dr. KILLION. Thank you, Chairman Smith, and distinguished 

members of the subcommittee, and hopefully my name won’t come 

out like ‘‘dom,’’ because I am just recovering from the flu. It might 

actually sound like that unintentionally. 

I do appreciate the opportunity to come before you today and discuss the fiscal year 2009 Army science and technology program and 

the significant role that S&T is playing in supporting the war-fighter today and in the irregular warfare environment. I have submitted a written statement and request that it be accepted for the 

record. 

I want to thank the members of this committee for your important role in supporting our soldiers who are at war, and for your 

advocacy of the Army’s S&T investments that will sustain technological preeminence for our future soldiers. Your continued support 

is vital to our success. 

The Army’s S&T investment strategy is shaped to pursue technologies that will create unmatched and unprecedented capabilities 

for our future land combat forces. Our S&T program is also dynamic and responsive to the needs of today’s soldiers by exploiting 

opportunities for near-term solutions to satisfy current operational 

needs. 

We have already provided solutions to a broad range of these 

needs that have been driven by today’s irregular warfare environment. We have developed and assisted in the fielding of passive 

armor solutions that provide tactical wheeled vehicles with ballistic 

protection that rivals that of combat vehicles; we have created improved soldier body armor that protects extremities; and we have 

provided detection and neutralization systems against improvised 

explosive devices. 

Our investments in the quest for precision guidance in artillery 

munitions have enabled the guided multiple launch rocket system 

and the Excalibur precision 155-millimeter artillery munition. 

These capabilities have been decisive during today’s irregular warfare combat operations, targeting the enemy while preventing unnecessary loss of life and harmful collateral damage. And, in a less 

materially-focused area, we have developed a training tool called 

Battlemind, which helps to prepare soldiers for the mental rigors 

of combat and aids them in preparing for reintegration when they 

return home. 

While the focus of our S&T investments is necessarily on the 

near and midterm futures, we have also sustained our commitment 

to basic research that seeks to enable the next generation of soldiers with paradigm-shifting capabilities to dominate in the full 

spectrum of battlespace environments. Our fiscal year 2009 budget 

request provides increased funding for new research initiatives 

such as human, social, cultural, and behavioral modeling; modeling 
9 

and analysis of complex multi-scale networks; and 

neuroergonomics. They will understand how the brain functions in 

an increasingly complex multitask environment, they enable more 

effective design, and guide enhanced training. 

In closing, I would like to thank you, Mr. Chairman, for the opportunity to testify before the subcommittee, and for your support 

to the Army’s science and technology investments. I am proud to 

represent the efforts of thousands of Army scientists and engineers 

dedicated to providing our soldiers with the best possible technology in the shortest possible time. 

I will be pleased to answer your questions and those of the subcommittee. 

[The prepared statement of Dr. Killion can be found in the Appendix on page 73.] 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you. 

Admiral Landay. 

STATEMENT OF REAR ADM. WILLIAM E. LANDAY, III, USN, 

CHIEF OF NAVAL RESEARCH, ASSISTANT DEPUTY COMMANDANT OF THE MARINE CORPS FOR SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY DIRECTOR, TEST, EVALUATION AND TECHNOLOGY 

REQUIREMENTS 

Admiral LANDAY. Chairman Smith, Congressman Thornberry, 

distinguished members of the subcommittee, it is an honor to appear here today to update you on the progress of the science and 

technology efforts within the Department of Navy and to discuss 

how the President’s budget request for 2009 supports the Navy and 

the Marine Corps team. I have also submitted a written statement 

and request that it be entered in the record. 

The Naval science and technology challenge is to enable future 

operational concepts that support the vision of the Navy and Marine Corps as laid out by the Secretary of the Navy, the Chief of 

Naval Operations, and the Commandant of the Marine Corps. They 

envision a force that is joint, expeditionary, distributed, persistent, 

forward deployed, and capable of defeating a competitor in major 

combat operations or an insurgent force in nontraditional operations. 

The President’s 2009 budget requests $1.84 billion for an S&T 

portfolio that enables that vision. This reflects a 6 percent real 

growth over the President’s 2008 budget request for the Department of Navy. 

Our Naval science and technology strategic plan identifies 13 key 

areas where science and technology investment will have high payoff in supporting the Navy and Marine Corps war-fighting visions 

and needs. In order to execute this strategy, we must continue to 

address the changing global environment in the following ways: We 

must monitor, assess, and leverage emerging science and technology in a global manner. The increasingly rapid movement of 

technology and innovation around the world demands that we be 

able to take advantage of emerging ideas in science, regardless of 

where they originate. 

We must maintain an investment portfolio that is balanced between the long-range scientific discovery that comes from basic research programs and the nearer-term focused product nature of the 
10 

advanced technology development programs. We must focus on delivering value to today’s war-fighters while ensuring that the well 

of new and novel technology development remains deep and vibrant 

in support of the next generation of sailors and Marines. 

This year, we made a major increase in our investment in basic 

research to strengthen our efforts in emerging areas of science, 

such as autonomy, cyberspace, novel materials, and cognitive 

science, among others. 

Finally, we must continue our efforts to aggressively transition 

the technology and innovative concepts to the war-fighters. 

Through our Future Naval Capabilities program, we are averaging 

over 80 percent success in moving science and technology developments into the acquisition programs, spanning the so-called ‘‘valley 

of death.’’ 

There are currently 169 Future Naval Capability products underway, in various stages of the three to 5-year development. Thirtysix are expected to complete and transition in 2008; an additional 

20 are planned to complete in 2009. The fiscal year 2009 budget 

request continues funding for the remaining projects and initiates 

an additional 28 projects. 

One of the key areas in our strategy is our ability to succeed in 

asymmetric and irregular warfare. Our goal is to enable naval 

forces to preempt or defeat nonconventional threats and forces operating within complex physical, cyber, and social terrains. 

A key aspect of this strategy is the concept of operational adaptation. What can we do to enable our Marines and sailors to adapt, 

influence, shape, and act within the decision cycle of an adversary, 

even if that adversary is what would be considered an asymmetric 

or irregular foe? 

Investments in areas such as imaging through structures; 

rivering operations; image and pattern recognition; societal, cultural, and behavioral modeling; biometrics; advanced training; and 

cultural immersion; and battlespace shaping through information 

operations will provide our Marines and sailors the ability to outthink and outadapt the enemy. This is about making the enemy 

fear us as the swift, flexible, unpredictable asymmetric threat. 

We have a strong emphasis in today’s needs, and a long-term 

focus on strengthening the Navy and Marine Corps’ ability to meet 

any challenge and to adapt to any security environment. We continue to move toward greater integration of capabilities, more effective partnership between the research and acquisition worlds, and 

an ever-strengthening ability to achieve shared goals with Director, 

Defense Research & Engineering (DDR&E), the Army, Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA), and Air Force research 

organizations. 

I believe the state of our S&T investment represents a careful 

stewardship of taxpayer dollars that will make significant contributions to our war-fighters as they serve in defense of the United 

States, both today and well into the future. I thank you and this 

committee for your continued support of naval science and technology, and am prepared to answer any questions. 

Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Admiral Landay can be found in the 

Appendix on page 85.] 
11 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you, Admiral. 

Mr. Jaggers. 

STATEMENT OF TERRY J. JAGGERS, SES, DEPUTY ASSISTANT 

SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE FOR SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY AND ENGINEERING, OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT 

SECRETARY FOR ACQUISITION 

Mr. JAGGERS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, members of the subcommittee and staff. I am pleased to have the opportunity to provide testimony on the fiscal year 2009 Air Force science and technology program. 

Last year, I spoke extensively about adapting Air Force S&T to 

the new security environment identified in the Quadrennial Defense Review. Recall, I presented our new Air Force S&T vision: to 

anticipate, find, fix, track, target, engage, and assess anything, 

anytime, anywhere as our guide for shifting investment emphasis 

from traditional conventional threats to address new unconventional threats, such as terrorism. I am proud to say that this budget continues to reflect a shift toward this vision and the new security environment. 

Also recall that in 2005 I established five guiding principles for 

the Air Force S&T investment program. These principles have provided a valuable framework in constructing this budget. 

Developing, recognizing, and ensuring competent, technical, intellectual capital exists in the laboratory and elsewhere across the 

Air Force as my number one guiding principle. As functional manager for the 15,000 scientists and engineers across the Air Force, 

my commitment to the development of the 3,300 scientists and engineers in our laboratory is paramount to maintaining our national 

aerospace power. 

My second guiding principle is to ensure a balanced portfolio of 

investments between near, mid, and far-term needs. To ensure our 

far-term needs are met, we allocate no less than 15 percent of our 

core portfolio to our 6.1 basic research efforts. To meet near-term 

needs and ensure technology solutions are transitioned to both the 

war-fighter and our acquisition programs, we allocate no less than 

30 percent of the portfolio to 6.3 advanced technology development 

efforts. 

My third guiding principle is to focus our resources on the strategic priorities of the Air Force, the Department of Defense, and 

the nation. To this end, our budget reflects significant focused investment changes to which I will speak to shortly. 

Honoring commitments is my fourth guiding principle. Collaborative research with my colleagues seated next to me, academia, industry, and our allies, as well as transition agreements with warfighters and Program Executive Officer’s (PEOs), were all protected 

in this budget. The Air Force seeks out collaboration and we stand 

by promises that we make. 

Last, but not least, of my guiding principles is to find new and 

improved ways of transitioning technologies directly to the warfighter in the field or into our acquisition weapon systems. I am 

proud to say that this year we are establishing a new Technology 

Transition Office within Headquarters Air Force. I have challenged 

this office to develop a comprehensive strategy for overcoming tran-
12 

sition obstacles related to laboratory S&T, joint capability technology demonstrations, rapid response to urgent war-fighter needs, 

small business innovative research, and partner transitions to the 

Air Force from DARPA and others. 

Our 2009 President’s budget request for Air Force S&T is ap- proximately $2.1 billion, which includes $1.9 billion in core S&T efforts, with the remaining funds supporting devolved programs to 

include high energy laser and the University Research Initiative. 

This year’s budget request includes an increase of $157 million, or 

a 6.7 percent real growth, over fiscal year 2008 core requests. Even 

taking the $40 million of Man/Tech funding that was moved into 

S&T this year out of the equation, it still represents a very health 

4.5 percent real growth and reflects the continued strong support 

of Air Force leadership for its S&T program. 

Earlier, I had mentioned some significant focused investment changes we made to this year’s budget. First, we shifted over $20 

million across the Future Year Defense Program (FYDP) from traditional investment areas to new areas that anticipate terrorist actions and tag, track, and locate these bad actors anywhere on the 

globe 24/7. Next, we shifted almost $200 million across the FYDP to increase 

focus on game-changing technologies to guarantee modernized systems have technological superiority on the battlefields of the future 

and against today’s terrorists. Specifically, we increased investments in cyberspace to help our new cyber command fight through 

network attacks, in defensive counterspace to respond to the national Space events of last year, in directed energy for both nonlethal deterrence and ultra-precision strike, in revolutionary propulsion such as hypersonics and variable-cycle engines as suggested by a National Research Council study, and in thermal management technologies in response to a Scientific Advisory Board 

study that suggested looming thermal problems for our complex 

weapon systems of the future. 

At the same time, we protected game-changing investments that 

were in the 2008 budget that support the Air Force energy strategy 

to develop alternative fuels, efficient engines, and aero-efficient 

structures, an advanced composite cargo aircraft project that provides a capstone to our Composite Aircraft initiatives to reduce 

aging aircraft sustainment issues, and sense-and-avoid technologies 

for unmanned aerial systems to operate them in theater or domestic airspace as ubiquitous as piloted vehicles are operated today. 

Mr. Chairman, this budget is aligned in three priorities of the 

Air Force: to ensure technology is transitioned to war-fighters with 

the expediency necessary to win the global war on terror, to develop our airmen as future technical leaders and ensure we have 

a competent workforce skilled in managing the complex weapon 

systems we will need for the future, and to ensure our research 

and development dollars are focused on modernizing and recapitalizing weapon systems critical to airspace and cyberspace dominance to ensure the Air Force can fly, fight, and win in any future 

conflict. 

Again, Mr. Chairman, members of the subcommittee and staff, 

thank you for allowing me to provide an opening statement, and I 

look forward to your questions. 
13 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Jaggers can be found in the Appendix on page 99.] 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you very much. 

Dr. Tether. 

STATEMENT OF DR. ANTHONY J. TETHER, DIRECTOR, 

DEFENSE ADVANCED RESEARCH PROJECTS AGENCY (DARPA) 

Dr. TETHER. Chairman Smith, Congressman Thornberry, and 

distinguished members of the subcommittee, thank you for having 

me here today to describe DARPA’s current research and our plans 

under the fiscal year 2009 budget request. 

This February was our 50th anniversary. My written testimony 

looks back over what we have done in the near past, since 2001, 

and highlights our progress in eight big deals, as well as the future. These big deals include: deny hiding in any environment and 

cultural background, providing persistent situational awareness 

and rapid strike, removing the value of using biological weapons, 

increasing the survival from life-threatening wounds. 

I enjoyed writing this testimony since it gave me a chance to explain DARPA and to brag about the accomplishments we have 

made since 2001, and those in progress and yet to come. But please 

read it when you get a chance. 

The facts are, however, that we couldn’t have done all this without a lot of outside help. But the help from the Congress, and this 

committee in particular, has been and will continue to be necessary 

for DARPA to be DARPA and to continue doing what we do. 

I heard from your staff that you are interested in large data set 

analysis. Because of that, I will spend a few minutes expanding on 

the written testimony and describe what DARPA does in this area. 

First of all, there are many levels of large data set analysis. The 

data from sensors such as Constant Hawk, and so forth, is most 

certainly large, and we do research in how to help people find targets of interest. 

But to me, a more interesting large data set problem is when you 

really don’t know a priori what you are looking for, or even if there 

is any information in the data. After all, it may be just random. 

Well, we call our most sophisticated large data set research ‘‘topological data analysis.’’ Our large or massive data sets topological 

analysis program uses very sophisticated topology and geometry to 

capture the intrinsic geometry of massive data sets, and systematically extract hidden features therein. 

All that is needed to start the mathematics is a metric, such as 

the distance between any two data points in the set. Now, the distance doesn’t have to be things like feet; it could be temperature, 

it could be density, it could be anything you want it to be. 

We have some current accomplishments. This analysis was applied to analyze massive data sets in biology—collections of heartbeat data for health and diseased patients. 

The data for healthy heartbeats appears to capture nontrivial 

higher geometric structure than those for diseased patients. In 

other words, there is a difference between the two. This work is 

just beginning, but the potential is absolutely enormous: statistical 

markers for health and disease. 
14 

It has also been applied to uncover unexpected high-dimensional 

structures in the statistics of natural images. Applications include 

novel, nonlinear compression schemes, as talked about earlier, for 

images and movies. This would greatly aid systems such as Constant Hawk in getting the data directly to the ground faster than 

possible today. 

By now, I am sure some of you are saying, ‘‘Well, there he goes 

again. Is he ever going to tell us anything relevant to, you know, 

to what is going on in the world as we know it today?’’ And the 

answer is that there is relevance to IEDs. There is great relevance, 

in fact. 

First, I cannot go into any specific details, due to the sensitivity 

of exposing countermeasures to the IED problem; but we have a 

program called Persistent Operational Surface Surveillance and 

Engagement (POSSE), joint with Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization (JIEDDO), which has been briefed to your 

staffs, whose objective is to determine if there is any difference between a facility that makes bombs and an ordinary Iraqi facility. 

To do this, we have established an experimental capability at the 

National Training Center, at Fort Irvin, where we are going to 

gather an extremely large data base on all activities—normal Iraqi 

facilities and bomb-making. We hope to use techniques such as topological analysis to determine if there is any underlying structure 

to the data, with the hope that the structure you get from data 

coming from a bomb-maker’s facility is different from an ordinary 

facility, thereby allowing us to find out where they are being made. 

This is really exciting. While I don’t know the outcome—because 

if I did, DARPA wouldn’t be doing it—I am confident that tools 

such as topological analysis will answer the question, whether it 

can be done. 

I hope I have provided you with some insight into what we are 

doing in large data analyses, and request that you scan my written 

testimony to see what we have done and will be doing elsewhere. 

Again, none of this could be possible without the support you have 

given DARPA. 

I want to thank all of you personally, and from all of the DARPA 

employees as well as all our industry and university performers, 

for your support. We hope that this support continues into the future because without it, DARPA will not make it to its 100th anniversary. 

With that, I would be glad to take your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Dr. Tether can be found in the Appendix on page 113.] 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you all very much. I appreciate it. And I appreciate the members’ patience; as Mr. Thornberry mentioned, this 

is a whole lot of information in a whole lot of different areas. We 

are going to have some hearings that drill down into some of the 

specifics here on social modeling, on strategic communications, and 

also on biometrics, which we set up to help us get down into some 

of those specifics. 

And Dr. Tether, I specifically want to thank DARPA for their 

work on health care issues. You know, many of us here saw your 

prosthetics demonstrations on the advancements that have been 
15 

made there, and some of the technologies that have been developed 

to enable battlefield survivability have been just incredible. 

And I know you are moving forward and taking the next steps 

on, you know, going beyond that and coming up with even greater 

health care advancements. I think it has been critical to our troops, 

and we appreciate that work. 

I want to ask specifically, you know, trying to follow up a little 

bit on the data management and bandwidth issue. Focusing on 

bandwidth for just a second: What does the solution look like, to 

your mind, in terms of the investments we are making? 

Because expanding the bandwidth really isn’t an option; what we 

are trying to do here is we are trying to use less of it with what 

we do. And I know there is a number of technologies—we had a 

little science fair on this. Just from your perspective, you know, 

where should we be putting our money? What technologies are 

really going to get us up around that problem so that we can make 

more of the bandwidth that we have? 

Dr. TETHER. Well, there are really two. One is that you can take 

the signal being transmitted and compress it so it takes up less 

bandwidth. That is sort of an obvious—— 

Mr. SMITH. Right. 

Dr. TETHER. And we are all working on doing that type of technology. 

The other technology, that is actually coming into being as we 

speak, is at one time we looked at the spectrum. And the spectrum, 

as you all know, is 100 percent allocated, or licensed. And we asked 

the question, ‘‘Well, how much of it is really being used?’’ 

And we did measurements, and we found that at any given 

amount of time, typically only 5 percent to 10 percent of the spectrum is being used. In other words, there is 20 times more spectrum available than what is being used right now. 

So what we have done is, over the last five, six years we have 

developed technology where radios—networks, actually—will look 

at the spectrum, find out what is not being used, and then go to 

that frequency, create itself, and then be prepared to move if something came on. This is real. I mean, I just said something that requires a lot of technology: the ability to golf in gigahertz of bandwidth, find out what is not being used, and to coordinate all of 

these nodes together. 

But it is no longer science fiction; this is actually in play. We 

have demonstrated this at AP Hill. 

We are also putting it into radios right now, which are going to 

be going into service later this year. Now, this will take place because, quite frankly, this is a commercial thing as well. Our Federal Communications Commission (FCC) believes in it. In fact, they 

call it ‘‘policy demand,’’ or something like that. They are going to 

make up rules that these systems will follow. And I know it will 

take off. 

That, I think, is the biggest gain we can get in bandwidth by effectively—the bandwidth that we are using today is 1/20th to 1/ 

10th of what we could be using, so we will get that gain. And you 

put, then, the gain on top of that—the compression techniques— 

which might give you another factor of two, of using less band-
16 

width, and I think our problem will be—well, probably never—because—— 

Mr. SMITH [continuing]. It will be much more managed. And the 

technology basically enables you to seek out and find the bandwidth that is out there and available. And, I mean, this will make 

an enormous difference for our troops in the field being able to 

communicate just by radio, and it is not even just the laptop, of, 

you know—— 

Dr. TETHER. Correct. 

Mr. SMITH [continuing]. Can you get all the data. It is just being 

able to communicate with the various different pieces of it. I—— 

Dr. TETHER. One more effect, that if we don’t know what frequency we are going to be on, neither does the enemy. Which 

means now, if we are going to be—if the enemy is going to try to 

jam us, they have to jam all the frequencies, because we will be 

on—otherwise we will be on the frequency that is not being 

jammed because the system will automatically go to—— 

Mr. SMITH. Automatically take us to where we need to go. I have 

other questions. I want to get Mr. Thornberry in before we go. We 

have, I believe, two votes. Is that correct? 

We are tabling more emotions and voting on the journal again. 

Make an argument about whether or not it is worth the trip over 

there. 

But we will go. I want to get Mr. Thornberry’s questions in, and 

then we will come back, my guess would be—being realistic—40 

minutes, probably, from the time we walk out of here to the time 

we get back. Because I do have other questions, and I know it is 

hard, but I would encourage other members to come back and we 

will get to them as soon as we do. 

Mr. Thornberry. 

Mr. THORNBERRY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I think I am going 

to wait with my questions and yield my five minutes to the former 

chairman, the gentleman from New Jersey. 

Mr. SMITH. Mr. Saxton. 

Mr. SAXTON. I believe it was Mr. Jaggers—I am not sure—that 

talked about sorting through data to find where someone we are 

looking for might be and identify potential terrorists someplace in 

the world. Recognizing this is an open session and not a closed one 

where we can talk in detail, could you enlighten us a little bit more 

on that concept? 

Mr. JAGGERS. I think I specifically said we were focused on increasing investments and shifting our investments from traditional 

threats to unconventional threats—terrorists—into the anticipate 

leadership—bad leadership—intentions, and to the tracking enemies—targets—anywhere, anyplace on the globe, 24/7. 

We have a number of areas. Three come to mind that I think I 

would like to present right now. 

One is deployed currently. It is called Angel Fire; it is being used 

by the Marine Corps. We worked very closely with them, and a 

lot—most—of the technologies on the sensor part came from the 

Air Force Research Laboratory. 

And I brought this up last year. It provides kind of a TiVo picture review. Like, you could see an electro-optical (EO) picture of 

the battlespace, and then you can rewind and do forensics to see, 
17 

if an IED went off, where the bad guy came from, to attribute the 

source and do some forensics. 

We have another effort, and that is an EO system, a day system, 

that is an all-weather system—day/night—which uses Synthetic 

Aperture Radar, SAR, technology called GOTCHA. It does basically 

the same thing, but it does it in an all-weather situation; again, to 

tag, track, and locate where these bad guys—not only where the 

event occurred, but where they came from, and go back to the 

source of the problem. 

We also have a significant investment in bio-taggants. While that 

can be used for individuals, it is specifically used for weapons of 

mass destruction—chemical, biological warfare agents—so we can 

put a biological taggant on those materials and now track and see 

where they go, in theater for sure, but hopefully anywhere in the 

world. 

Of course, I am probably causing the increased requirements in 

bandwidth as a result of this. So I am part of the solution, but part 

of the problem, too. 

Mr. SMITH. Well, as long as you are using it well, we will try to 

find ways to accommodate. 

Mr. JAGGERS. But probably the good outweighs the bad on this. 

Those were three examples, I think, that we are trying to—— 

Mr. SMITH. I think we will try to sneak one more in before we 

go. 

Ms. Castor. 

Ms. CASTOR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

With the evolving global threat turning into more of the unconventional and irregular warfare, the responsibilities of Special 

Forces will continue to grow and evolve as well. Special Operations 

Command (SOCOM), for fiscal year 2009, their S&T request is 

around $65 million; that includes $11 million in the new area designated for Special Operations Forces, information broadcast systems, advanced technology. 

Mr. Shaffer, can you briefly describe how the Special Operations 

S&T requirements fit in overall, to the overall DOD S&T requirements, and their—you know, the SOCOM procurement is tied to 

the various services, and I imagine that is—I hope that is not the 

case for scientific research. 

Mr. SHAFFER. Thank you. 

There are a number of ways, and as we have gone forward, we 

have reached out and tried to strengthen the ties between the gentleman at the table, DARPA, and also the folks in the agencies in 

SOCOM. So we have a fairly well established set of processes to 

coordinate the programs. 

I would like to give a couple of examples. One of the biggest 

problems—and Mr. Jaggers talked about it a little bit—was going 

out at finding terrorists—tagging, tracking, and locating problem. 

It gets to be very classified very quickly, but last year’s SOCOM 

and some other components worked with DDR&E and the component to develop the tagging, tracking, and locating roadmap. From 

that roadmap we, across the Department, increased our investment 

specifically in some of the special—the SOCOM science and technology program elements, and also some Army program elements, 
18 

to go out and increase basic research through product development 

in tagging, tracking, and locating. 

So, SOCOM is very much a part of our process. We recognize 

they have special needs, special types of activities. We work a lot 

with SOCOM through some of our newer offices that deal with irregular warfare. 

We have a new office in the Office of DDR&E, called the Rapid 

Reaction Technology Office, who specifically look at irregular warfare and trying to look for technology options somewhere in the 

next two years—two-year time horizon. That office has a weekly 

teleconference with members of SOCOM, the Joint Special Operations Command, and also theater commanders forward, to specifically review technology options, and specifically as that relates to 

irregular warfare. 

So we have done a lot of different things. That office got the 

DDR&E and the Department much more involved in the problem 

of biometrics. 

It has gone into areas of social, culture, behavioral modeling that 

is very important to the special operators. They have gone into 

strategic—it is called strategic multi-layer assessment, where we 

bring in folks from psychology backgrounds, anthropology backgrounds, war-fighters, put them all in a room, and ask them to redteam some problems or do some war-gaming with nontraditional 

people, who would reach out very, very carefully to SOCOM and integrate their program. 

But we don’t want to get in the way in stopping it because we 

recognize the types of special missions special operators have to do. 

We want to support them, give them the additional technology they 

need, and we get a lot of support from the components working 

with SOCOM also, directly. 

I hope that addressed your question. 

Mr. SMITH. We are down to about five minutes before we vote, 

so we will adjourn briefly. Actually, we should be able to be back, 

hopefully, in 20 to 25 minutes, and we will take some more questions from whatever members come back, and we will try to—we 

probably be adjourned no later than 12:30. 

Thank you very much. I apologize for the delay; we will be back 

as soon as we can. 

[Recess.] 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you. Quicker than I expected. That doesn’t 

happen very often around here. 

And the award for the first to return, we will turn it over to Mr. 

Kline for questions. 

Mr. KLINE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you, gentlemen, for being here, for your testimony, for 

your hard work, and all the great things that you do. 

Dr. Tether, I love this. You know, as we have been talking for 

a number of years, there has been a great need to facilitate private 

industry, small businesses—and large, but particularly small businesses—and their ability to bring ideas to you and to conduct business with you. So I am very, very pleased to see this. 

And on the same lines, I am looking at this—another really neat 

document. On page 45 in your additional information, you talk 
19 

about a special assistant for technology transition and the DARPA 

operational liaisons and representatives. 

And so, what I would like for you to do is just tell us how you 

have moved into communicating interservice, intradepartment, and 

more specifically this, and what your sense is now of how that communications is going. 

Dr. TETHER. Well, it is always very hard to measure on how it 

is going. We do try to—I have always been concerned that we 

aren’t reaching out to all the people that should know about us. It 

always still amazes me when—and this is, you know, I mean, I like 

it, but—when you have a constituent that comes to you, and your 

staff comes to us, when, why didn’t they come to us in the first 

place? Well, for the most part they didn’t know about us. But that 

bothers me. 

And it still bothers me, and that is why we work hard. We have 

this DARPATech, we work really hard on trying to get out that we 

really are a friendly place, and—but, you know, that doesn’t mean 

that, you know, we don’t enjoy your constituents that come to us 

that way, too; because quite frankly, they come with good ideas. 

You know, as I said once before, we accept—good ideas come from 

any place, even the Congress, right? I mean—— 

[Laughter.] 

Mr. SMITH. Let us not take it that far. Come on. [Laughter.] 

Dr. TETHER. On the operational liaisons—in fact, I have them 

here with me today—we have one from each service. We have one 

from National Security Agency (NSA), one from Defense Information Security Agency (DISA), and one from National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA). 

So we have one from each service and agency that does a lot of 

business with us, and their purpose is to take our program managers, who, as you know, are really only there for a short period 

of time, and they really have come from places where they sometimes they really don’t understand the government or the military, 

to make sure that that program manager, from the very beginning, 

meets an operator—not an S&T guy, you know, we get enough of 

these guys—but to go out to an operator so that program manager 

can explain what he is doing. 

That gives us two things: the operator learns that something new 

is coming; more importantly, from my viewpoint, the operator talks 

to my program manager and tells him about his problems and his 

needs, and we get that going. So when the technology then gets developed, when it is time to transition it, you know, we have already 

established, if you will, a constituency about it. 

Because quite frankly, transitioning this technology—all these 

reports, all these briefings—this is a contact sport. You know, it 

really is a contact sport on transitioning technology; it comes down 

to people on people to make that happen. And again, you know, we 

really work hard at that. 

The interns are another way that we do this. These are a group 

of people that come every 3 months—about 10 to 12 of them—from 

all walks of the services. They are picked by the chiefs of the services to come to us. 

In fact, I have them with me, too. They love to come and see 

what goes on, you know. And this is our current group. Now, we 
20 

have had almost 100 of these since we started this program, and 

these are 100, if you will, people that are now back at the services. 

They are only with us for three months, which means that they 

leave with a little DARPA stink on them—not enough to screw up 

their career, hopefully—but it is now people that we have out in 

the services who know about us. And again, it is trying to get that 

word out about DARPA. We work hard at it—— 

Mr. KLINE. Well, I appreciate it very much, because I think we 

need to do all of those things, and certainly the transition, and 

clearly there are good ideas out there, and as you know, particularly at your level, a lot of this isn’t requirements-driven so much. 

People haven’t even thought of what you are putting forward—— 

Dr. TETHER. Correct. 

Mr. KLINE [continuing]. So that communication is absolutely terrific. I am about to get the red light here, so I would just make a 

comment, and maybe we will have a chance to talk about it later. 

It is very clear that all of our services are increasingly dependent 

upon GPS for so many things—precision munitions, navigation, 

and everything. 

And I would hope that somebody—probably under the DDR&E 

hat—but somebody is constantly looking at how we are going to 

protect that and make sure that we haven’t bought into a vulnerability by making so many things depend upon it for the naval munitions, Army munitions, and across the board. I see the light is 

red; if we have another chance, I would like to have some dialogue—— 

Mr. SMITH. Yes. Hopefully we will. 

Mr. Thornberry, you had graciously passed. We want to go back 

to you. 

Mr. THORNBERRY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I guess I want to ask about a couple things, the way they work 

or not. 

Dr. Tether, I noticed in the information we had received from the 

staff, as well as from your testimony, there was comment about 

money being rescinded out of your budget in the past due to poor 

execution rates. It is something that has always bothered me, that 

if an agency doesn’t spend their money we decide they don’t really 

need it and take it away, creating the incentive to spend the money 

regardless of whether one spends it well or not. 

So I am just curious, are the rescissions that you have had something that have been not that bad? Has it had a detrimental effect? 

And how does that affect your ability to do your work? 

Dr. TETHER. Well, you know, we have a major ongoing conversation with the comptroller—I will call it a conversation. We operate 

differently than the rest of the Department in that when a—at the 

beginning of a fiscal year, if a contractor—performer—is under contract, and let us say they have a milestone halfway through the fiscal year—we call the milestones ‘‘Go/No-Go’s’’ because is sounds 

more turconian, but, you know—they will fund the whole year. 

Now that, from the comptroller’s viewpoint, that means that that 

person is 100 percent obligated. However, we don’t do that; we only 

fund the contractor up to that Go/No-Go, and hold the money. So 

from the comptroller’s viewpoint when they look at the books, we 
21 

look like we are 50 percent obligated because we are holding back 

that money. 

It causes a strange dynamic when you work it that way. If you 

have got all your money with a contractor and the contractor 

doesn’t make the milestone, then the pressure is to let them keep 

going because the money is already out there. 

In our case, the pressure is on the contractor to perform. And 

what sometimes happens is that while we had a date for them to 

do that Go/No-Go, they sometimes don’t do it on that date, they do 

it a few months later, and they don’t ask for any more money. So if you take that with a $3 billion budget and have everybody 

slip a month, you are talking a couple hundred million dollars of 

cash that you have now generated—you know, from a bean-counting viewpoint. And the comptroller looks at that as, ‘‘Hey, you 

know, I have got other things to do with this.’’ And it is okay, actually. You know? It is okay. I don’t like the trend, but it is okay because we do generate cash, because we are very frugal with the 

way we spend money. 

But what it does—DARPA’s really success has always been that 

we have the flexibility—and you guys have given us this flexibility—that if somebody walked in the door with a good idea, we 

could start a program and wouldn’t have to wait two years, which 

is what the services sometimes find themselves in. And that is the 

danger. 

But the money that has been taken so far—yes, you know, I have 

had to prematurely kill a few programs that, in reality, I figured 

weren’t going to make their Go/No-Go’s anyways. And it turned out 

that that was the case. But I never gave them the chance; I mean, 

I never gave them the chance to fail, they just failed because of the 

money being taken away. 

I hope that answered the question. 

Mr. THORNBERRY. No, it is helpful. I think it is something we 

want to continue to watch with you, because again, it sometimes 

doesn’t make sense. 

Mr. Shaffer, let me ask you—this is a broad subject; we don’t 

have time to get into it too much—but, in another hat, on the Intelligence Committee we just had a hearing about the Research & Development (R&D) efforts of that community, and I am struck not 

only by the overlap between what you all do and what the Intelligence Community does, but the overlap with the medical research, and everybody and their brother is doing cyber research of 

some sort, and, you know, you just go down the line. 

As the domains of warfare have expanded, that means the potential overlaps in—which is good; that means more people are looking 

into it—but the challenge is, how do you coordinate all that? One 

of the major concerns, I think, of this subcommittee and other subcommittees is this interagency, working together, not just having 

a teleconference every other week, but how do you really make sure 

that the money that these folks are spending on cyber fits with the 

money that other folks are spending on cyber, and other—— 

And that is too broad a question to answer fully, but let me— 

how do you evaluate the current S&T interagency coordination, if 

you had to give it a grade from ‘‘A’’ to ‘‘F’’? And are we getting better or are we getting worse? 
22 

Mr. SHAFFER. Sir, I will give you a grade, but then I want to amplify on the grade. We are probably about a ‘‘C.’’ We could do better; we could do worse. 

But I want to come back and react a little bit to something you 

said early on about, there seems to be a lot of duplication. And 

there may be some duplication, but there is a whole lot more cooperation than duplication. 

So a lot of times you go out to folks and two people will tout a 

similar thing. What is really happening is they are collaborating 

and both people are claiming credit for it, but they are sharing 

their money and working together. 

Case in point: This year it didn’t happen, but last year when we 

looked at the science and technology statements from this panel, I 

think every service claimed some success with a program called 

Angel Fire—Mr. Jaggers talked about it today. Well, the reality is, 

we all had a little skin in that game. 

We have skin in the game with Central Intelligence Agency 

(CIA)—very much in the Intel Community, coordinating our program. Dr. Tether, I know, has a liaison with the intelligence agencies; I think most of the other gentlemen do, too. And we coordinate 

our program very carefully. 

We do—I would like to tell you it is detailed program reviews; 

it is probably not as detailed as it should be. But we all get together and compare programs and pool money where we can, because while it sounds like a lot of money, $11 billion just doesn’t 

go as far as it used to; and if I can use a little bit of someone else’s 

money to make a program go better, we will do that. 

And you asked about cyber protection. Great question. Because 

we recognize that a lot of groups were jumping on the cyber protection bandwagon—and this actually came out of the Office of 

Science and Technology policy—they pulled together what effectively is a Presidential coordination committee to get the programs 

together, get them aligned, and make sure that we are leveraging 

each other’s money. 

So before calling something duplication, I would ask that we 

need to pull the string and make sure that it is really not 

leveraging and working together; because a lot of times that is the 

case. 

Mr. THORNBERRY. Yes. And I think you make a fair point, that 

marketing departments of different agencies will triumph the same 

thing. Fair point. 

On the other hand, if you get a hot trend, everybody wants to 

jump on that bandwagon and, you know, it is not necessarily a bad 

thing to have different people looking at a problem in different 

ways—I am not saying so—but on the other hand, we also have to 

make sure that it is something more than a trend and that we are 

really working together. So I appreciate it. 

Mr. Chairman, I would yield. 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you, Mr. Thornberry. 

Mrs. Gillibrand. 

Mrs. GILLIBRAND. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I want to continue the conversation about cyber security, if I 

may. One of the concerns that I have is, obviously for this subcommittee it is one of the very real threats we face, and I want to 
23 

make sure that we are committing the appropriate resources—sufficient resources—specifically for it. 

And I also want you to comment on how our recruitment is 

doing. I am concerned that if we are going to build the talent pool 

that we need to stay at the forefront of cyber-terrorism defense, 

that we may need to recruit outside the box—really looking toward 

our engineering schools very proactively and trying to create a military service training and capacity that may be different for these 

types of members of the military; because they may not be hired 

for combat missions, for example, they are hired for development 

in science and technology in their engineering background, and 

they may have a different pay grade, they may have a different 

work environment. 

And I want to hear more detail about what you have considered, 

what has worked, what hasn’t worked, and really what your fiveyear plan is. 

Mr. SHAFFER. Yes, ma’am. And I may yield a little bit of the time 

for the cyber protection to—— 

Mrs. GILLIBRAND. Whoever is the most appropriate to answer—— 

Mr. SHAFFER [continuing]. But I would like to address the cyber 

protection question first. You asked—because it is a hot area—do 

we have enough investment in it? Do we not have enough investment? Frankly, I am not sure I know right now. 

I know we have a solid program going forward, but because it is 

a new area, we have a very detailed ongoing study with members 

from each of the agencies represented at this table—and we are 

due to report this to the deputy secretary by this summer—on what 

is the right amount and shape of our science and technology program needed specifically for cyber protection? So I can’t give you 

a really finite answer right now; I can tell you, we have a due out 

to the deputy secretary to come back and tell him how much. 

So, what I would propose to say, rather than give you an answer 

right now: We are comfortable with the 2009 budget request, but 

I think that there is more—— 

Mrs. GILLIBRAND. I thought we were underfunded in science and 

technology by several millions of dollars. 

Mr. SHAFFER. In cyber protection? 

Mrs. GILLIBRAND. No, just in science and technology in general; 

so I didn’t know how much would come out of cyber protection. 

Mr. SHAFFER. Again, I don’t know how I would address your 

question about being underfunded in science and technology. 

Science and technology in general, we are at $11.5 billion, and the 

seven largest requests since we went to this budget process in 1962 

have come in the last 7 years. 

So, you know, could we use more money? I would always love 

more money. But historically, we are funded fairly well right now. 

What we have to do is make sure that what we have, and the 

money we have, is invested correctly and providing good taxpayer 

benefit. 

So that may not be exactly the answer to your question, but you 

know, we are all taxpayer stewards. And you have to go ahead and 

make sure that whatever we spend, we give something back to the 

taxpayer. And cyber protection is a hard area. 
24 

Mrs. GILLIBRAND. Yes, I think we are—under this briefing, we 

are down $20 million for advanced tactical computer science and 

sensor technology; DARPA is down $33 million; there is a number 

that are down in the high-tech region; aerospace technology development down $20 million. 

Mr. SHAFFER. Ma’am, and there are specific lines that are down; 

there are other specific lines that are up. What I will tell you, 

ma’am, is over the last three years—or last two years—we have reshaped our science and technology program over the FYDP, the Future Year Defense Program that is five or six years, by moving 

about $3 billion total assets over that time period into things like 

biometrics; human, social, culture, behavioral modeling; cyber protection. 

We did have some other funding come up in cyber protection in 

2009. So you are going to see ebbs and flows in different areas, but 

for the most part we are moving money into irregular—technologies to help us work the irregular warfare aspects. 

And to the second part of your question, you are right. That is 

calling us to go out a get a different type of person to come into 

the science and engineering career force. We are working on that; 

we have a number of programs—engineering development, most 

notably the Nation Defense Education Program, where we are 

going out and actually paying people to get undergraduate and 

graduate degrees with a payback period to come in and work for 

a Department of Defense laboratory. 

I have 134 people in the program right now. Think of it almost 

like a Reserve Officer Training Corps program for civilian scientists 

and engineers. This year we had over 1,000 people apply for roughly 100 scholarships, so we are getting good people to apply. 

Mr. SMITH. We neglected to start the clock here, but I think we 

are pretty close to five minutes. Did you have anything else quickly? I wanted to get back to Mr. Kline. 

Mrs. GILLIBRAND. I do, but I will wait my turn if we want to go 

around again. 

Mr. SMITH. I had one more question myself, but if we get back 

to Mr. Kline—you had some follow up further that you wanted to 

do? 

Mr. KLINE. Yes. And I will just limit it to the one area. 

Let me reset the stage again. Each service, with each year—arguably each day or week—has got another system, another requirement, another need, another reliance on GPS, to the point where, 

hypothetically—I am going to walk into whatever classified areas— 

but hypothetically you may be developing one of the services a gun 

that has absolutely no ballistic capability. You shoot it, and if the 

GPS doesn’t work the bullet doesn’t land there. Hypothetically. 

But the point is that we are really leaning on GPS. And so my 

question, perhaps to the DDR&E, perhaps to any of you: Are you 

confident that we are working, at any level in R&D—S&T on up— 

on making sure that we have either the correct protection or redundancy in that area? And I will just leave it at that and see what 

you have got. 

Mr. SHAFFER. Yes, sir. I will give a brief answer and then turn 

it over to the other panel members. 
25 

There are a number of programs working in GPS. The one I 

would like to highlight is one started last year by the DDR&E in 

collaboration with the Navy and the Naval Research Laboratory. 

Now, it is a program element called I-Integrity Global Positioning 

System, and what it does is combine the signal—I can’t get into 

any more detail than this—combine the signal from conventional 

GPS with commercial satellite communications to give a redundancy in case we lose some of the capacity of our GPS system. 

So yes, we are looking at different types of methods and different 

technologies to protect that very critical aspect. 

Admiral LANDAY. Yes. I would say from the Navy, you know, because of the history with submarines, we have historically looked 

at alternative ways to do navigation and position-keeping, and we 

continue to look at that. And as we see technology develop, even 

though there is right now a very heavy reliance on GPS, there is 

work going on in other ways that we can improve our accuracy not 

based on GPS, be that work that is going on on inertial measurement unit (IMU) that can be, you know, trunked down very small 

so that you can start putting those in, to different ways to fix your 

position to—just as we were able to go to GPS because we could 

more accurately measure time, does that allow us to fix our position in other ways, given that we know how to do that? 

So I think clearly there is a large reliance on GPS right now, but 

there is also a very strong effort to say, ‘‘What else is there out 

there?’’ not only because of the potential threats to GPS, but also 

in some cases, GPS doesn’t do what we want to do. Unmanned underwater vehicles are a great example of that. If I have to keep 

popping them up to get a GPS fix, we are kind of disadvantaging 

what they bring. 

So there is a strong desire to look for alternatives while GPS remains the primary one as of right now. 

Dr. TETHER. And what we have done—in fact, it is in that book 

that you held up, on page 17—is, one of the things with networks 

that we have today—these self-forming networks that basically are 

the basis of our whole future warfare, that people will be connected 

together and therefore have great situational awareness, but that 

these networks do it by themselves—the one thing that they all 

seem to have to have is a common time hack, and right now we 

use the GPS signal for time more than we do for location, in the 

network area. 

So if you look on page 17, to try to overcome that vulnerability, 

we basically took an atomic clock—which is a big thing if you have 

ever seen one, it is the size of these tables here—and we put it on 

a chip. And it exists today. Again, this is, you know, started five, 

six years ago. 

This is not science fiction. I mean, we were trying to get it down 

to one cubic centimeter; we are still working to get it down to one 

cubic centimeter using 30 milliwatts of power. We are about three 

times that in size and about three times that in power now. 

But this is on a chip which has 1 second and 10,000 years accuracy. What this means—and it is going to the Single Channel 

Ground and Airborne Radio System (SINCGARS), by the way. The 

SINCGARS network, if you tried to turn off the radio to save bat-
26 

teries, the problem is that after a few hours if you tried to get back 

on the net it would take you a long time. 

But SINCGARS is putting in even the larger version of the atomic clock because, quite frankly, they have got a lot of room to put 

it. And they will be able to turn that SINCGARS radio off, and 

then hours later turn it back on and instantly be back on the network because the time hack for the encryption will still be valid. 

So we are working that problem that way with that technology. 

Now, the IMU stuff that Bill talked about is also true, and I think 

they are doing a good job on that. 

Mr. KLINE. Okay. The clock is about to go red, and I am going 

to yield back, but I just want to say thanks. 

I knew that people were working; I hope that we have got a— 

to Mr. Thornberry’s point—sort of a coordinated effort here to make 

sure that we are covering these bases and we are not just going 

to turn around one day and radios won’t talk, ships will be lost, 

you know, bullets don’t go where we want them to and all that sort 

of thing. And it is a concern; I am glad to hear that you are on top 

of it, and for all things I will just say thanks. 

I yield back. 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you. 

I want to follow up on the data management question, try to get 

a practical example of how this works and what we are trying to 

do in terms of dealing with it. You know, we gather a lot of information for intelligence purposes from a whole wide variety of different sources, which we don’t have to get into. But basically it 

generates, you know, voice, pictures, data, you know, from, you 

know, Iraq, Afghanistan, a variety of other places as well. 

So somewhere within, you know, the Pentagon, or perhaps within the CIA, all of this information is coming back, and there is a 

lot—a lot—of it. A staggering amount of it, as a matter of fact, if 

you were to take a look at it. 

And we are looking for certain things in that data. Not just idly 

curious about everything; looking for, you know, high-value targets. 

You know, obviously we would like to see their smiling face hanging out at, you know, at a house somewhere, but certainly see them 

moving, you know, looking, you know, as we have talked about improvised explosive devices as their topographical information is 

coming back that is telling us a little bit about where they might 

be. 

So all this stuff comes back, and, you know, you could probably 

come up with your statistic for, you know, your average computer 

person. Let us imagine that there is one person sitting somewhere, 

you know, and all this stuff is coming back to him. And it would 

take him, you know, 100,000 years to look through all of it—just 

1 year’s worth. What are the various technologies and approaches 

that we employ to try to, you know, sift through the meaningless 

data that is just open landscape, people going back and forth to 

markets who we don’t care about, cell phone conversations between 

teenagers, all that stuff that we are not really interested in, to get 

down to the stuff we are interested in? 

You know, avoiding getting into any classified stuff, but just 

roughly speaking, what do we do to try to synthesize that now, and 

then, you know, in Dr. Tether’s area, you know, what are we trying 
27 

to develop? What are the most promising technologies to get better 

at that? And any one of the services that wants to take a crack at 

that—Dr. Killion—— 

Dr. KILLION. Well, certainly one class of technologies that we are 

pursuing for various applications is Intelligent Agent Technology—— 

Mr. SMITH. Right. 

Dr. KILLION [continuing]. Essentially something that is posted on 

your computer that is looking for specific aspects in the data and 

can prompt you when it finds something that you need to look at. 

We found a need for that in some change detection work that we 

had done, where it is hard to have an analyst look at a strip map 

from the day before and the one that you just took an hour ago, 

and compare and find all the little changes that may have occurred; whereas, if the computer can say, ‘‘There is a change here, 

here, and here’’—— 

Mr. SMITH. Look at those three. 

Dr. KILLION [continuing]. He can look at those, and he doesn’t 

have to spend 12 hours poring through that strip map. He can do 

it in 10 minutes, perhaps. So that type of technology is certainly 

applicable in this domain, helps us identify where is the relevant 

portions of the data to look at, and then reduces the overload of the 

operator. 

Mr. SMITH. And how good is that? How dependable are those intelligent agents out there? I mean, it is a hard metric to measure, 

I will grant you, but how confident are you that it is picking out 

the stuff that you need to see? 

Dr. KILLION. I think it does a pretty good job, to be honest—— 

Mr. SMITH. Yes. 

Dr. KILLION [continuing]. Mainly because it is tuned to the specific domain of interest. 

Mr. SMITH. Right. 

Dr. KILLION. What we have found—I went to graduate school in 

an era when they were talking about, artificial intelligence computers were going to be just as intelligent as people any day now, 

you know, and unfortunately that was quite some time ago, they 

are not there yet. But what has been demonstrated successful since 

that time are expert systems in specific domains, and that is essentially what an intelligent agent is—something that is tuned to that 

domain and can recognize those characteristics. 

Mr. SMITH. And actually computers, based on what I have seen, 

are coming a lot closer to that day you mentioned than most of us 

would be comfortable with, as a matter of fact. And in terms of, you 

know—I guess one of the other questions is, basically it is also, I 

mean, the dependability of it, the usefulness of it is dependent 

upon the data, as always, that we put into it—the modeling when 

we decide to put in the intelligent agent, we decide what it is looking for. 

So we have got to be, you know, clever about that; and that is 

probably, from what I hear you saying, is, you know, a good 80, 90 

percent of the battle right there, is to have the intelligent agent 

know what it is looking for. And there is obvious limitations to 

that, because every once in a while something pops up that is in-
28 

teresting, that is important, that we had not planned to be looking 

for, and there is really not much you can do about that. 

That helps me. And I am about out of time, and I know Ms. Gillibrand had a couple more questions that she wanted to follow up 

on. So I am done, and I will turn it over to Ms. Gillibrand for any 

follow-up that she had. 

Mrs. GILLIBRAND. Thank you. 

I just wanted to continue to pursue the line of questioning we 

were talking about. You said the response to the need to hire more 

engineers—because in your testimony you talk about the reduction 

in the number of PhDs in this country that are being developed. 

So in response, you are recruiting at an earlier year level, trying 

to cultivate these engineers and scientists earlier. 

What else are you doing? Are you going to do anything about salaries or different facilities, different training? Are you looking at 

public-private partnerships in the meantime to have access to the 

greatest minds that may be in the private sector? Because I think 

just 150 people that you are recruiting now is probably not enough. 

Mr. SHAFFER. Fair comment, and we are looking at a lot of different things. Right now we are trying to work our way through 

as we are implementing the National Security Personnel System 

and understanding the nuance of what you can and cannot do. But 

there is also a number of authorities out there in the personnel system that we have begun to take advantage of. 

There are programs like Highly Qualified Expert, that allows us 

to go out and hire people, fairly quickly, at a higher salary structure rate. We continue to use the IPAs—Intergovernmental Personnel Act, I think is the full title—to go out and hire people, some 

of these areas that, coming in from a non-profit, not-for-profit, coming in and acting as a government person in those areas where we 

have a hard time meeting some of the salary structure. 

So we have a number of IPAs scattered throughout the science 

and engineering infrastructure. We have, I think, a fairly effective—and it is a very interesting thing—we have a fairly effective 

internship program at each of these gentlemen’s laboratories. And 

the reason I bring up the internship program: Scientists and engineers are strange people. I shouldn’t say that, but scientists and 

engineers are—— 

Mrs. GILLIBRAND. Talented people. 

Mr. SHAFFER [continuing]. Strange and talented. It is funny. Scientists and engineers are not just motivated by money. They are 

motivated by getting up in the morning and saying, ‘‘That is an interesting problem and I want to work there.’’ 

So if we can go out and reach out and bring in kids who are in, 

you know, universities and even high schools, as interns, and let 

them come in and see what the possibilities are, you can start to 

hook them. And I know that that has been very effective. We put 

some people—actually, some people have come to me—I have put 

some people over at Navy Research Laboratory because it is in D.C. 

The people come out of that loving what they are doing. 

But we have to be very creative in a very competitive job market. 

I won’t tell you, ma’am, that we have all the answers. We are looking at things. I would like to yield to some of my colleagues to—— 
29 

Mr. JAGGERS. From the Air Force, I would like to address that. 

I think the Air Force is trying to lean forward in this area. Something—— 

Mrs. GILLIBRAND. And you are also doing the cyber security mission right now, aren’t you? 

Mr. JAGGERS. Yes, ma’am, a number of cyber activities. There 

has been a legacy of information technology investment up at 

Rome, in the Air Force Research Laboratory, that has taken on a 

new dimension, new flavor, on cyber network protection, network 

defense, network attack. I can’t claim we have a completely comprehensive strategy right now, but I would like to highlight a few 

things that we are doing right now. 

First of all, we are setting up cyber command as its own command. I think that is going to do a lot to institutionalize a workforce; right now there is no centralized place for these people to go. 

The carenpeding is in a number of different functional stovepipe 

areas, so this will put a cohesive wrapper around that workforce. 

Civilians—we have been hiring them in through lab demo, lab 

demonstration programs. So they are a little bit easier to get to. 

The military—we are trying to understand the pipeline for the accessions that we have to create. We have an ongoing study with 

RAND right now to understand what that background—technical 

background—should be for those military officers. 

The struggle here is, there is not a strong academic institution 

right now. Cybernetics, for example—there is no cybernetics degrees in the nation, and we need to focus on creating those and 

putting those in place in academia so those people that we assess 

into the military, and civilians, have that background. I mentioned the $13 million that we have moved into the cyber— fighting our way through cyber attacks; I mentioned the $5 million 

that we have put into cyber defense, a cyber bot, to do defensive 

network protection. 

But more importantly, what that does is it attracts that workforce that wants to do those exciting things. In fact, we were just 

talking on Sunday—I don’t know if you saw a commercial on TV, 

but it was one of the first that the Air Force put out to entice 

young folks, military and civilian, to get into the cyber domain of 

the Air Force. And I thought that was very encouraging. We didn’t 

see jets flying on the commercial—the 30-second spot—we saw people working cyber attack, and I thought that was pretty neat. 

Mrs. GILLIBRAND. Thank you. 

Dr. KILLION. And to reinforce what Terry is saying, real quickly, 

and Al mentioned: If you go out to the laboratories today—our laboratories—you will find a lot of younger people there than there 

were five years ago. 

Mrs. GILLIBRAND. Great. 

Dr. KILLION. People who have come in because they are interested in supporting this nation’s security. They are intrigued by the 

opportunity to work in this area, and we provide an environment 

with unique tools and challenges, that they come in each day and 

have the opportunity to work on very interesting problems. Up at 

Aberdeen they can blow things up or try to keep things from being 

blown up, and elsewhere they work on the network. 

Mrs. GILLIBRAND. Thank you. 
30 

Admiral LANDAY. And I would, again, just echo all that. I think 

from a science and technology—whether it is in cyber or anywhere—one advantage we have that the commercial folks don’t 

have is we tend to still do a lot of good, basic research. 

Mrs. GILLIBRAND. Right. 

Admiral LANDAY. Industry tends to want to go more to applied, 

so you have a recruiting tool out there for young scientists to come, 

particularly at the research level, because we will let them go do 

research that is of interest to us at that basic and early applied 

level. 

In the cyber area, again, I think we are all doing, you know, very 

similar things. The services are working through that. You know, 

our network com does the cyber defense pieces of it for the Navy 

and to the Navy networks. But our SSG, our strategic studies 

group, has taken the thinking of this a little bit further. They were 

chartered by the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) last year to take 

a look at cyberspace—not cyber warfare, but the broader cyberspace—and how it is going to support, and what we need to do to 

support naval warfare and naval operations in the future. They 

had a lot of discussion about—even on the military side—a cyberenabled sailor, and what that really means. 

And so, beyond the subset of folks who are going to be skilled, 

you know, defenders or attackers within the network, there is a 

broader sense that there is a skill set that you are going to need 

to have the average sailor to have that is above, probably, where 

we are today. So I think there is a lot of thinking about this, and 

the tendency is on the defense piece of it, which I think is the nearest one to—I think there is also a lot of discussion that says, 

‘‘What, really, does this domain start to enable us to do that maybe 

in the past we hadn’t thought about?’’ More, kind of, ones and zeros 

and not cyberspace. 

But I think there is a lot of good work going on in this area. 

Thank you. 

Mrs. GILLIBRAND. Thank you. I am encouraged. Thank you. 

Mr. SMITH. And I do think that is the great advantage we have 

in recruitment, back on the original part. You know, you are doing 

some fascinating things that simply cannot be done elsewhere. And 

like you said, Mr. Shaffer, your average scientific mind is attracted 

to that kind of thing, and I think that is the great pitch that we 

have. 

I have nothing further. I wanted to see if Mr. Thornberry—— 

Mr. THORNBERRY. Mr. Chairman, I have a matter of—a question 

I want to direct to the Navy, but it will be in classified form, I am 

afraid, so I want to alert you that we will be getting that to you. 

The only other thing I would like to do is to commend you for 

improving the I.Q. and the class of the room by starting off with 

a Texas Longhorn. [Laughter.] 

But it does occur to me that it would certainly benefit me, and 

perhaps the subcommittee, if we could have periodic informal exchanges with JASONs about some of the trends that we need to be 

thinking about and focusing on. I think it would help us do our job. 

And with that, I yield. 

Mr. SMITH. I want to thank all of you for coming and testifying 

this morning, and for the great work that you do on the science and 
31 

technology issues. And we look forward to working with you on all 

of those issues. Thanks for coming in. I appreciate your time. 

We are adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 12:25 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] 

A P P E N D I X 

MARCH 13, 2008 

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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING 

MARCH 13, 2008 

(155) 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. SMITH 

Mr. SMITH. In complex irregular warfare operations, technological superiority (big 

platforms) may not be an effective force multiplier. Instead, ‘‘soft’’ skills, such as 

languages, cultural awareness, information operations/psychological operations, and 

civil affairs may be required. a. How can technology help the U.S. military rapidly 

acquire the ‘‘soft’’ skills it needs to be effective in irregular warfare operations? b. 

How does technological superiority fit within today’s threat environment? 

Admiral LANDY. a. The use of technology to develop ‘‘soft’’ skills, including language skills, cultural awareness, effective information operations/psychological operations and civil affairs, is the focus of the Office of Naval Research’s programmatic 

investments in social, cultural and behavioral sciences. The objectives of these programs are to 

• Understand and forecast human behavior in ethnically diverse societies as 

viewed from perspectives that scale from the individual to organizational and 

societal levels of understanding 

• Develop empirically informed and validated computational models of the 

socio-cultural determinants of the opinions, values, attitudes and actions of 

individuals and groups in societies of current and anticipated operational interest 

• Create the knowledge base and virtual and immersive training science that 

will provide the warfighter with the language and cultural skills necessary 

to fight effectively in the complex irregular warfare environment 

• Develop training technologies that will provide warfighters the ability to understand, exploit, and forecast the effects of information and psychological operations. 

Technologies developed in the pursuit of these objectives can be applied by Naval 

analysts, planners, trainers, combatants, and by the intelligence community for a 

variety of purposes, including: 

• Supporting the development of strategies to influence the opinions and attitudes of individuals and groups toward terrorism as a political solution and 

toward the United States and its institutions and interests 

• Forecasting terrorist activity and the likely reactions of terrorist organizations to possible US interventions 

• Understanding and more effectively combating the radicalization process 

• Developing more systematic approaches for reasoning about the likely behaviors of asymmetric agents and their networks 

• Creating training curricula for military decision makers and members of the 

intelligence community in counter-terrorism, irregular warfare, and stability, 

security, transition and reconstruction (SSTR) operations. 

The Office of Naval Research is currently supporting technology development programs to achieve these capabilities. Three examples are the Marine Corps 

Immersive Infantry Trainer at Camp Pendleton, California, the Integrated System 

for Language Education and Training (ISLET), and the NonKin (non-kinetic) Village 

program. The Immersive Infantry Trainer provides an immersive environment for 

fire teams and squads to train in a reconfigurable urban setting that combines live 

and virtual training. ISLET will provide highly-motivating education and training 

in foreign language and culture on an immersive web-based gaming platform. The 

NonKin Village program is developing a serious game that teaches COIN (counterinsurgency) theory for operations within culture-specific civilian populations. 

b. Technological superiority in future Naval concepts will not necessarily equate 

to big platforms. As we strive to create and sustain a Navy and Marine Corps that 

can be successful in both the peer competitor and asymmetric warfare environments, technological superiority requires both traditional large weapons systems 

and emerging areas of enhanced operations, effective use of cyberspace, persistent 

maritime domain awareness, etc. 
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Technological superiority is still critical, but we must expand our understanding 

of what that implies and ensure that technology development for use in irregular 

warfare is done in lock step with developing tactics, techniques, and procedures as 

well as training to wield that superiority effectively. 

Mr. SMITH. The DOD S&T Program is chartered, in part, to ensure the Department avoids technological surprise. Yet some may argue that DOD has been technologically surprised by IEDs, EFPs, and cyberwarfare. What efforts does your organization undertake to avoid technological surprise? How are these different than they 

were five years ago? 

Admiral LANDY. At the Office of Naval Research (ONR), we believe that planning 

in the face of uncertainty requires an investment in building and strengthening the 

breadth of science and technology (S&T) capacity to allow Naval S&T (and thereby 

Naval Forces) the ability to anticipate and respond to unforeseen and new threats. 

The ‘‘breadth’’ of the Discovery and Invention (D&I) portfolio is manifested through 

the diverse set of Research Areas of investment. It is these D&I investments in 

Naval relevant fields that build S&T capacity. The strength of this approach is tested when a new need arises, and the portfolio has a suite of ideas and performers 

that can in a short period develop a technology for the new threat. One key example 

of this is the Counter IED jammer work in 2006 that resulted from broad ‘‘basic 

and applied’’ research investments in Electronic Warfare. When the need arose, 

ONR was able to tap into research at The Naval Research Laboratory to very quickly develop, test, and field an electronic warfare jammer for OIF. 

In addition to a robust D&I portfolio, avoiding technological surprise requires an 

awareness of the rapid pace and direction of S&T worldwide. ONR initiated an effort in 2006 to integrate information and assessments of a range of communities 

along with the international S&T perspective and our own S&T programs to ensure 

we capitalize on the full range of opportunities as well as understand the emerging 

threats and capabilities outside of the United States. These communities come together on a quarterly basis to discuss specific S&T topics of naval relevance and ensure that our S&T investment is focused and paced accordingly. 

Finally, the mix of Research Areas within the D&I portfolio is adjusted as new 

Naval needs, emerging discoveries, make ‘‘new ideas’’ more feasible. Our list of 

emerging areas for investment is adjusted to reflect the shifting set of adversaries, 

threats and global technology trends. 

This philosophy of ‘‘breadth’’ in investments coupled with the ‘‘reach’’ to global 

communities allows Naval S&T the capacity to both anticipate and respond to technology surprise. 

Mr. SMITH. The DOD S&T Program investment strategy should balance the development of (a) technological countermeasures to perceived future threats, (b) technologies to create options for U.S. forces, and (c) technologies to shape our enemies’ 

options. Could you provide some examples of investments you are making in each 

category and could you please discuss your vision for the appropriate distribution 

of investments for each category? 

Admiral LANDY. The three stated components of the DOD S&T Program investment strategy are certainly fundamental to a sound S&T portfolio but there are additional factors that influence program priorities and decisions: 

• Technologies to address high priority, short term needs that emerge from our 

engaged forces worldwide 

• Investments that provide technology options for Navy and Marine Corps capabilities 

• Investments to guard against technological surprise 

• Technologies for affordability, maintainability, and reliability 

• Investments to reduce acquisition program risk and cost 

• Investments to ensure the future health of the scientist and engineer workforce in S&T areas critical to DOD 

Since the three components from the question are not mutually exclusive, and the 

additional factors above must also be taken into consideration, it would be difficult 

to assign a numerical percentage as a strategic goal for the DON. In fact, most DON 

S&T programs would readily support two and some all three of the components. 

Nonetheless, the DON regards each to be of equal merit for developing Naval S&T 

program priorities and to ensure future Naval warfighting dominance against envisioned and potential threats. 

(a) Technological countermeasures to perceived future threats: 

Cyberspace/Cyberwarfare: DOD is faced with increasing level and sophistication 

of hostile cyber activities and must be able to fight through successful attacks on 
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our data, systems, and networks. DON programs in information assurance and antitamper are geared to ensure high assurance software-enabled systems that are secure, affordable, sustainable, and interoperable. 

Electronic Warfare: The S&T objectives in EW are to explore and develop new and 

innovative approaches, concepts and technology to address near and far term emerging threats to Naval platforms and personnel. More specifically, to ensure naval 

platforms can rapidly detect, identify, and classify electronic emissions, to develop 

effective countermeasures to advanced infrared and focal plane array technology, to 

develop effective countermeasures to advanced radar waveforms and modulation 

techniques, and to develop reduced size/weight/power/cost of EW components. 

(b) Technologies to create options for U.S. forces 

Distributed sensor networks: Persistent, distributed, networked sensors in all domains will ensure the broadest range of warfighting options available to the fleet 

and force commander. Unambiguous and comprehensive assessment of the 

battlespace will ensure unhindered access to denied areas while putting enemy 

forces at risk. 

Lightening the load for the Marine: Current individual combat Marine loads vary 

from 97 to 135 pounds versus a recommended maximum of 50 pounds. Considerable 

information based on current combat operations indicates heavier loads severely reduce Marine effectiveness on long patrols, during close-in urban combat, and other 

adverse situations. S&T initiatives will treat the Marine as a system to develop improvements in combat load, ergonomics, power generation, nutrition and fatigue 

management to improve Marine performance and enable tailorable equipment packages. 

(c) Technologies to shape our enemies’ options 

Electromagnetic (EM) Rail Gun: The EM Rail Gun uses electromagnetic energy 

instead of chemical propellants to propel a projectile farther and faster than any 

preceding gun. The rail gun offers the potential for a transformational solution for 

volume fires and time-critical strike. 

Speed of Light Weapons: The threats to Naval forces in the open ocean and littoral regions include high-g cruise missiles, aircraft, high-speed patrol craft, jetskis, 

and floating mines. Current defensive systems require kinetic kill projectiles (bullets 

and missiles) all of which involve a finite time of flight to destroy the threat, are 

subject to countermeasures, and require a large storage magazine. The Navy Free 

Electron Laser (FEL) will allow near instantaneous engagement and destruction of 

the full range of current and projected surface and air threats while providing an 

unlimited magazine. 

Mr. SMITH. The U.S. Special Operations Command FY09 S&T request is around 

$65 million this year which includes $11 million in a new area designated for SOF 

Information and Broadcast Systems advanced Technology. Can you briefly describe 

how the Special Operations S&T requirements fit into the overall DOD S&T planning process? Will we continue to see the SOF S&T budget grow to meet their 

unique mission challenges? 

Admiral LANDY. The Office of Naval Research (ONR) is continually discussing and 

leveraging Naval Science and Technology (S&T) efforts with the U.S. Special Operations Command. While ONR coordinates on these S&T investments, it has no input 

into how they devise and plan their budget. ONR defers to the U.S. Special Operations Command in order to provide a response to this question. 

Mr. SMITH. Within the next year or so, several defense bases will begin closing 

and various activities will begin re-alignment including research and development 

activities within the defense laboratories. One of the greatest impacts of BRAC is 

loss of talented workforce. Certain key folks may not wish to uproot their families 

to move to another state. How will the affects of BRAC (workforce and others issues) 

impact your ability to provide the best capabilities for our warfighters? What mechanism have you put in place to minimize the potential impact? 

Admiral LANDY. The major 2005 Defense Base Closure and Realignment (BRAC) 

Commission recommendation impacting research and development activities and 

Navy laboratories was the creation of a Naval Integrated Weapons and Armaments 

(W&A) Research, Development & Acquisition, and Test & Evaluation (RDAT&E) 

Center, and realignment of W&A, RDAT&E functions, with some exceptions, to 

NAWC China Lake. The most significant impacts of this recommendation will be 

felt at: Naval Surface Warfare Center (NSWC) Crane, IN; NSWC Indian Head, MD; 

Naval Air Station Patuxent River, MD; Naval Base Ventura County (NBVC) Point 

Mugu, CA; Naval Weapons Station (NWS) Seal Beach, CA and NSWC Dahlgren, 

VA. This recommendation represents the bulk of the BRAC technical consolidations 

impacting Navy activities. 
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This recommendation enables technical synergy, and positions the Department of 

the Navy to exploit center-of-mass scientific, technical and acquisition expertise with 

weapons and armament Research, Development & Acquisition that resided at ten 

locations into the one Integrated RDAT&E site. The Office of Naval Research (ONR) 

believes these BRAC consolidations will improve our ability to deliver capability to 

the warfighters. Although there may be some loss of senior expertise, the centerof-mass will allow for collaboration and thus have a multiplier effect. ONR anticipates that any loss will be addressed through the use of planned successions and 

targeted recruitments. The use of retention bonuses and recruiting bonuses and 

other hiring flexibilities, approved by Congress and implemented at the technical 

laboratories will be fully utilized to ensure the required expertise is available. 

Mr. SMITH. The mission of the Military Critical Technologies Program (part of the 

International Technology Security (ITS) office in DDR&E) is, in part, to identify 

technologies which contribute to, or have a potential to threaten, U.S. national security and to evaluate trends which might affect the availability of such technology. 

In addition, each of the services has Industrial Base Planning funds, to conduct 

studies of the health of the industrial base and to determine whether or not the industrial base continues to be able to provide military critical technologies. In the 

Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Industrial Policy office also conducts studies 

to ensure technological capabilities are sustained in the industrial base. Finally, the 

Manufacturing Technology program also seeks to improve the technological capabilities of the DOD industrial base. a. How are your Industrial Base Planning activities 

coordinated with those of the DUSD (Industrial Policy)? b. How are your Industrial 

Base Planning activities coordinated with your Manufacturing Technology programs? 

Admiral LANDY. a. The Office of Naval Research does not have responsibility for 

Industrial Base Planning. ASN (RDA) is DUSD (Industrial Policy’s) primary interface for matters of naval industrial policy. 

b. For the Navy Manufacturing Technology (ManTech) Program, strategic planning is driven by the Navy’s current acquisition plan and priorities. Currently, the 

ManTech Program is focused on shipbuilding affordability for four primary platforms the VIRGINIA Class Submarine, CVN 21, DDG 1000, and the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS). 

The ManTech Program coordinates on an ad-hoc basis with Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Industrial Policy) when it makes sense. As an example, Navy 

ManTech jointly funded an industrial base study in 2007 which focused on the midtier shipyards, analyzing shipbuilding technology and capabilities in nine mid-tier 

U.S. shipyards and five international shipyards. The principal output is a list of proposed actions for individual shipyards, industry as a whole, and the Department of 

Defense that will improve the performance of the U.S. shipbuilding enterprise. 

Mr. SMITH. A recent DSB study on the Manufacturing Technology program recommended creating a Basic Research account for ManTech. The Navy already has 

a Manufacturing Science program. Do you agree with the DSB’s recommendation? 

How would such a Basic Research effort within the ManTech program support the 

program’s mission? 

Admiral LANDY. The Defense Science Board (DSB) study on Manufacturing Technology discusses the value of basic research in manufacturing. The report cites the 

return on even a modest investment, notes the small scale of the current investment—much less than 1% of all Department of Defense basic research funds, and 

mentions that several American universities have the capacity to conduct worldclass manufacturing research. 

We agree that a basic research program in manufacturing is valuable and should 

invest in disruptive science and technology, focusing on new scientific understanding 

of the control of physical processes for production. The DSB cited nanotechnology 

as an example disruptive technology. Nanotechnology creates new production capabilities and in some cases new alternatives that provide more potential than existing 

capabilities. ONR has a large investment in nanotechnology at the Naval Research 

Laboratory. This effort is focused on developing the ability to affordably fabricate 

structures at the nanometer scale that will enable new approaches and processes 

for manufacturing novel, more reliable, lower cost, higher performance and more 

flexible electronic, magnetic, optical, and mechanical devices. 

The Navy’s current manufacturing science program is focused on exploring potential disruptive technologies known as direct digital manufacturing (DDM). 

The transformative aspects of DDM systems include: 

• on-demand production and repair of parts and components at point-of-use, 

• mass-customization, 
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• affordable small job lots, 

• short production cycle at low-cost, and 

• real-time quality control. 

The Navy manufacturing science program supports the naval science and technology strategy focus area for Affordability, Maintainability, and Reliability. 

Mr. SMITH. From an S&T perspective, which do you perceive as the greater threat 

to national security and to our military forces—endemic infectious diseases, such as 

influenza or HIV, or weaponized bio-terror agent, such as Plague? That is, which 

represents the greater threat and the greater S&T challenge? 

Admiral LANDY. Endemic infectious diseases are more common, are as deadly as 

weaponized bio-terror agents, and may present a greater challenge to S&T because 

of their ability to constantly change and evade the vaccines and drugs developed to 

counter them. Influenza and malaria are just two examples. There are also numerous endemic agents, such as dengue and most bacteria and viruses causing 

gastroenteritis, that present a formidable S&T challenge, and for which we have not 

yet developed effective countermeasures even after many years of aggressive research and development. However, as the post 9/11 anthrax letter mailings have 

demonstrated, the threat of a deliberate release of bio-terror agents is real, and our 

national security requires a robust S&T effort to ensure the availability of strategies 

to mitigate the threat. Complicating bio-terror agent defense is the fact that they 

can be deliberately engineered to evade existing countermeasures. Thus, although 

the threat of infection with a weaponized bio-terror agent such as anthrax may be 

lower than with an endemic infectious disease agent, focusing exclusively on one of 

these agents leaves us vulnerable to the other. 

Mr. SMITH. Current DOD and service laboratory and research, development, and 

engineering center facilities are located in a large number of locations. Many of 

these facilities are aging and either poorly equipped or the equipment is out of date. 

What is your assessment of the DOD science and technology infrastructure? What 

measures are needed and what measures are being taken to maintain the DOD 

science and technology infrastructure required to support the discovery and development of advanced technologies for the Department of Defense? 

Admiral LANDY. In 2008, the Navy Research Laboratory (NRL) completed a Corporate Facilities Investment Plan that provides strategic direction for the expenditure of laboratory overhead and MILCON funds to renovate spaces to meet its evolving R&D needs in the 10-15 year time frame. Primarily through its investment of 

overhead funds, NRL has been able to maintain its status as a world-class laboratory. Unfortunately, that solution is not sustainable in the long term. 

Working Capital Fund laboratories manage their own Capital Investment Program (CIP) for infrastructure revitalization. The CIP allows the use of ‘‘internal’’ 

(vice specific appropriated) funds to revitalize infrastructure. 

Mr. SMITH. In previous years, Congress has enacted a number of pilot demonstration programs to provide more flexibility in the hiring practices, management, and 

conduct of the science and technology program in selected DOD agencies and the 

military department laboratories and research, development, and engineering centers. Have these authorities been useful? What are some of the challenges with implementing these authorities? 

Admiral LANDY. The laboratory personnel demonstration projects have demonstrably improved the ability of the laboratories to meet their mission—and at the 

same time pioneer new concepts of personnel management for the rest of the Department. Using the authorities granted by Congress in the demonstration projects, 

defense laboratories have been able to continue to both successfully compete for and 

retain top talent. The flexibility to offer more competitive compensation has greatly 

improved the ability to compete for top talent and the linkage of pay to performance 

has improved retention of top performers. 

The greatest challenge has been how to implement these authorities in such a 

manner that they maximize the benefits without greatly increasing supervisory 

workload or negatively impacting motivation for any portion of the work force. This 

requires development of defendable policies and procedures and thorough education 

of the work force on exactly how they will be implemented. The other issue has been 

that different authorities granted to the different laboratories complicates the movement of personnel across the laboratories. Consistent with NDAA 2008, using the 

shared flexibilities now allowed will alleviate the perceived inequities. 

Mr. SMITH. RADM Landay, there has been a proliferation of technology transition 

programs managed within OSD (S&T). For example, the Joint Concept Technology 

Demonstration (JCTD), Joint Experimentation, the Defense Acquisition Executive 

the Quick Reaction Fund, the Combating Terrorism Technology Task Force 

(CTTTF), the Technology Transition Initiative, the Foreign Comparative Test Pro-
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gram, and the Defense Acquisition Challenge Program. This does not include service 

specific technology transition and rapid acquisition programs. Yet, technology transition remains a perpetual challenge for the S&T community. a. What do you see 

as your top two technology transition challenges? b. Since 2001, many rapid technology development and fielding efforts have been put in place across OSD and the 

military departments. What steps have you taken to ensure that lessons learned 

from these rapid processes are being captured and institutionalized, as appropriate? 

c. Many of the efforts to rapidly transition technologies to the operational community to support the War on Terrorism have resulted in both developmental and operational test and evaluation of systems being conducted in theater. How is the S&T 

community collecting feedback from theater to ensure the appropriate improvements 

in capabilities are made and to also ensure that we don’t continue to field systems 

with the same problems or limitations? d. What is your specific role at acquisition 

milestone decisions, with respect to Technology Readiness Assessments? How has 

this role changed in the last 2–3 years or how do you envision it changing in the 

future? e. What steps should the S&T community be taking to ensure that technologies identified as ‘‘critical’’ for major acquisition programs, are in fact sufficiently mature at the Systems Design and Demonstration (SDD) milestone? 

Admiral LANDY. a. The top two technology transition challenges are (1) widespread closed/proprietary system designs and (2) the frequent encountering of a gap 

of as much as two years or more between completion of S&T and the initiation of 

an acquisition program contract. The first of these might well be addressed by the 

adoption by the DoN of an aggressive policy implementing an open system architecture (OSA) design approach in all of our acquisition programs. Without OSA we risk 

limiting the development process for many procurements to large systems houses, 

bidding against one another in ultimately a winner take all competition. The OSA 

design model, if done in particular in conjunction with an engaged Government engineering workforce, could enable the selection by potentially a better informed program manager of the best parts of the competing prototypes in the final product to 

be procured rather than having to select the overall single best value from the two 

prototypes. Furthermore, OSA development could enable engagement in the development process by a broader segment of industry since smaller and/or non-traditional suppliers might provide competitive proposed solutions for parts of the system 

being procured as opposed to having to have a viable, complete system solution. 

Strictly from a standpoint of inserting new technology into existing or under development systems, the OSA model is perceived as greatly enabling competitive innovations to be much more readily and affordably inserted into systems that might 

otherwise be locked down by a proprietary architecture controlled by one industrial 

house. The definition of open systems architecture, and Government owned interface 

standards, for a system can enable truly competitive refresh of parts or all of a system throughout its service life especially if there is a Government engineering team 

capable of performing, or at the very least, evaluating the integration and performing the test effort. 

The second challenge is due to the risk averse culture imposed on our acquisition 

workforce. The acquisition program manager, and his/her related resource sponsor 

are generally reluctant to identify funding for transition of an inherently risky S&T 

product, knowing that S&T failure to complete successfully places the programmed 

acquisition funds at risk. The perceived prudent response is to delay programming 

of transition funding until such time as the S&T product is nearly successfully completed. In this case, the planning and programming lead time can introduce as much 

as a two year gap between completion of the S&T development and initiation of 

higher category transition funding. Delays in competing and award of an acquisition 

contract can add another year to this gap. ONR works closely with acquisition PMs 

and with their resource sponsors to keep them closely informed of the risk level of 

ongoing S&T programs. This interplay can lead to some reduction in the transition 

time gap. We have, moreover, put forth requests in the past for legislative changes 

that could enable reduction of some of the delay, normally associated with the acquisition contract competition and award, by allowing (legislative relief required) inclusion of an option on an S&T contract (initiated by either BAA or RFP) for further, 

prototype, development by an acquisition PM with acquisition funds. This latter approach could cut as much as a year off of the acquisition cycle and need not supplant the requirement for competitive award of any follow-on production contract. 

b. The Office of Naval Research (ONR) has responsibility within the Department 

of the Navy (DoN) for management of many of these programs. We work closely 

with Office of the Secretary of Defense Director of Defense Research and Engineering (DDR&E) in identifying best practices across the military departments and are 

partners with OSD and the other services in a Technology Transition Executive 

Steering Group where these best practices are shared and process improvements are 
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identified. We have run several Lean Six Sigma events aimed at both streamlining 

the process used in these programs as well as in better connecting with warfighter 

inputs to ensure that the highest priority products are selected. 

c. ONR works closely with the warfighters and has had science and technology 

(S&T) members in theater for operational demonstrations of critical technologies. 

ONR requests and receives debriefs from the warfighters on the operational suitability and performance of S&T products being evaluated in theater. 

d. The Chief of Naval Research has the responsibility within the DoN for the conduct of Technology Readiness Assessments (TRA) and the certification of Technology 

Readiness Levels for major acquisition programs. This has not changed over the last 

several years, nor is any change contemplated. 

e. By the time of a TRA assessment it is too late in the process for the S&T community to address any shortfalls in the technology maturity of critical technology 

elements of a system under development. Early coordination between the acquisition 

community and the S&T community is required to avoid such problems. Recent developments, such as the assignment of Chief Technology Officer positions in the 

DoN Systems Commands have done a great deal to increase the level of communications required to avoid such problems and is expected to work to minimize them 

greatly in the future. See also notes in (a) above. 

Mr. SMITH. In complex irregular warfare operations, technological superiority (big 

platforms) may not be an effective force multiplier. Instead, ‘‘soft’’ skills, such as 

languages, cultural awareness, information operations/psychological operations, and 

civil affairs may be required. a. How can technology help the U.S. military rapidly 

acquire the ‘‘soft’’ skills it needs to be effective in irregular warfare operations? b. 

How does technological superiority fit within today’s threat environment? 

Mr. JAGGERS. The Air Force recognizes the value of ‘‘soft’’ skills in addressing today’s irregular and asymmetrical threat environment. Within its Science and Technology (S&T) Program, the Air Force has been researching and developing representations of human, social, culture, and behavior (HSCB) to determine their effects on 

aerospace operations. The intent of this research is to understand the perceptual 

and cognitive mechanisms used in an enemy’s decision making process. The objective is to provide Airmen with the decision-aids, models, and simulations needed for 

planning and executing effective air operations. Combining these ‘‘soft’’ skills with 

modeling and simulation technologies will enable better forecasting of where conflict 

is most likely to occur, allowing more time to consider options and possibly increasing the chances that conflict might be prevented. The deeper understanding of 

enemy intent gained by identifying what aspects of HSCB are pertinent to military 

operations and developing capabilities to rapidly collect, exploit, and update this information will provide Airmen with the ability to act swiftly and decisively. ‘‘Soft’’ 

skills will not replace the need for technological superiority, but they can help reduce uncertainty in today’s threat environment and enable our decision makers to 

respond with appropriate force. 

Mr. SMITH. The DOD S&T Program is chartered, in part, to ensure the Department avoids technological surprise. Yet some may argue that DOD has been technologically surprised by IEDs, EFPs, and cyber warfare. What efforts does your organization undertake to avoid technological surprise? How are these different than they 

were five years ago? 

Mr. JAGGERS. The Air Force maintains its technological superiority and adapts to 

address the new security environment of unconventional and non-traditional threats 

that faces us by continuing to rebalance and focus our core S&T competencies in 

response to these threats. The primary difference between now and five years ago 

is that we’ve modified the traditional Air Force ‘‘kill chain’’ of Find, Fix, Track, Target, Engage, and Assess to read Anticipate, Find, Fix, Track, Target, Engage, and 

Assess Anything, Anywhere, Anytime and have adopted this as our S&T vision 

to aid in focusing our efforts as we adapt to a new world environment. For example, 

we shifted investments in traditional areas to support the global war on terror by 

increasing emphasis in universal situational awareness as part of our Air Force tech 

vision to anticipate enemy actions. The goal is to develop a layered and flexible 

sensing architecture that responds to the Commander’s intent by anticipating, detecting, continuously tracking, identifying, and precisely locating high value difficult 

targets. One area of particular interest and increased investment is the use of biotaggants that could revolutionize our ability to track weapons of mass destruction 

around the globe. As previously mentioned, the Air Force also recognizes the value 

of ‘‘soft’’ skills in addressing today’s threat environment and, through such efforts 

as those in the areas of developing representations of human, social, culture, and 

behavior to better understand the enemy’s decision making process, we should be 

better able to avoid technological surprise. By investing in a balanced S&T Program 

that addresses all Air Force mission areas, the Air Force is aggressively pursuing 
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these and other high payoff technologies focused on countering the new threats of 

today, while modernizing our systems for tomorrow. These investments sustain the 

strong and balanced foundation of basic and applied research and advanced technology development needed to avoid technological surprise and support future 

warfighting capabilities. 

Mr. SMITH. The DOD S&T Program investment strategy should balance the development of (a) technological countermeasures to perceived future threats, (b) technologies to create options for U.S. forces, and (c) technologies to shape our enemies’ 

options. Could you provide some examples of investments you are making in each 

category and could you please discuss your vision for the appropriate distribution 

of investments for each category? 

Mr. JAGGERS. The Air Force Science and Technology (S&T) Program investment 

strategy supports investments that provide countermeasures to future threats, options for our warfighters, and technologies to shape our enemies’ options. 

Hypersonic technologies, such as the X–51, will provide stand off strike capabilities 

against the increasing depth of proliferating integrated air defense systems. Directed energy technologies will provide options for non-kinetic lethal (solid state 

laser) and non-lethal (active denial) capabilities needed by the warfighter in a variety of situations. Finally, Angel Fire is already providing 24x7, TiVo-like imagery 

to the warfighter impacting how our adversaries assemble, place, and detonate improvised explosive devices; increased investment in an all-weather, day-night persistent intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance technology called the GOTCHA 

Synthetic Aperture Radar will provide Angel Fire with even greater capabilities. 

The Air Force guiding principle for investment in its Science and Technology 

(S&T) Program is to ensure the portfolio is properly balanced between near- midand far-term needs. This, in turn, supports our ability to address perceived future 

threats, create options for the warfighter, and to also shape or limit our enemy’s 

options as reflected in the examples above. The proportion of basic research to applied research to advanced technology development in the S&T portfolio is largely 

driven by history and has served us well. However, keeping the right balance is always a challenge and we continually assess the S&T portfolio to ensure the right 

investment is in place. To ensure the Air Force is well-positioned to counter perceived future threats, we have set a goal of no less than 15 percent of core S&T 

funding be available for far-term basic research efforts. To address the more nearterm needs of ensuring our warfighter has the means to Anticipate, Find, Fix, 

Track, Target, Engage and Assess Anything, Anywhere, Anytime, the goal is to allocate no less than 30 percent of core S&T funding for advanced technology development efforts. Transitioning technology into fielded weapon systems quickly can help 

us maintain an advantage over our adversaries. Toward this end, the Air Force has 

established a Technology Transition Office. This office is responsible for Advanced 

Concept Technology Demonstrations/Joint Capabilities Technology Demonstrations 

(ACTDs/JCTDs) and is also placing greater emphasis on utilizing Office of the Secretary of Defense rapid reaction efforts, such as Technology Transition Initiatives, 

Quick Reaction Funds, etc. with an eye on improving Air Force participation and 

success rates. 

Mr. SMITH. The U.S. Special Operations Command FY09 S&T request is around 

$65 million this year which includes $11 million in a new area designated for SOF 

Information and Broadcast Systems advanced Technology. Can you briefly describe 

how the Special Operations S&T requirements fit into the overall DOD S&T planning process? Will we continue to see the SOF S&T budget grow to meet their 

unique mission challenges? 

Mr. JAGGERS. As the Air Force Science and Technology (S&T) Executive, I have 

no real visibility into the planning, programming, budgeting, or execution of the 

U.S. Special Operations Command and defer to the Office of the Secretary of Defense with regards to how their requirements fit within the overall Department of 

Defense S&T planning process and expectations for future funding. 

Mr. SMITH. Within the next year or so, several defense bases will begin closing 

and various activities will begin re-alignment including research and development 

activities within the defense laboratories. One of the greatest impacts of BRAC is 

loss of talented workforce. Certain key folks may not wish to uproot their families 

to move to another state. How will the affects of BRAC (workforce and others issues) 

impact your ability to provide the best capabilities for our warfighters? What mechanism have you put in place to minimize the potential impact? 

Mr. JAGGERS. The Air Force is working to minimize the effects of upcoming Base 

Realignment and Closure (BRAC) actions; however, preservation of our intellectual 

capital is a very real challenge that could impact to some degree on our ability to 

provide the best capabilities for our warfighters. Current efforts being pursued to 

reduce these impacts include proactive force shaping, active recruiting, and reten-
163 

tion initiatives. Significant new hiring of mobile personnel (i.e., personnel willing to 

relocate) is needed to allow new employees to train under the mentorship of highly 

experienced individuals who do not plan on relocating. An aggressive recruiting 

campaign is also underway to bring in a targeted set of new employees with a balanced mix of experience to fill positions ranging from bench scientists to seasoned 

technology leaders. We are focusing on university recruiting events, scientific conferences, and professional society meetings to identify key individuals fitting the 

mission, while using various intern programs to bring in undergraduate, graduate, 

and post-doctoral students to meet mission needs. 

Mr. SMITH. There has been a proliferation of technology transition programs managed within OSD (S&T). For example, the Joint Concept Technology Demonstration 

(JCTD), Joint Experimentation, the Defense Acquisition Executive the Quick Reaction Fund, the Combating Terrorism Technology Task Force (CTTTF), the Technology Transition Initiative, the Foreign Comparative Test Program, and the Defense Acquisition Challenge Program. This does not include service specific technology transition and rapid acquisition programs. Yet, technology transition remains 

a perpetual challenge for the S&T community. a. What do you see as your top two 

technology transition challenges? b. Since 2001, many rapid technology development 

and fielding efforts have been put in place across OSD and the military departments. What steps have you taken to ensure that lessons learned from these rapid 

processes are being captured and institutionalized, as appropriate? c. Many of the 

efforts to rapidly transition technologies to the operational community to support 

the War on Terrorism have resulted in both developmental and operational test and 

evaluation of systems being conducted in theater. How is the S&T community collecting feedback from theater to ensure the appropriate improvements in capabilities are made and to also ensure that we don’t continue to field systems with the 

same problems or limitations? d. What is your specific role at acquisition milestone 

decisions, with respect to Technology Readiness Assessments? How has this role 

changed in the last 2–3 years or how do you envision it changing in the future? e. 

What steps should the S&T community be taking to ensure that technologies identified as ‘‘critical’’ for major acquisition programs, are in fact sufficiently mature at 

the Systems Design and Demonstration (SDD) milestone? 

Mr. JAGGERS. Recognizing the importance of transitioning technology into fielded 

weapon systems in a timely fashion, the Air Force established a Technology Transition Office focused on developing and implementing policies to overcome transition 

obstacles and facilitate the transition of technology in support of new concepts, programs of record, and fielded systems. The following answers are provided with regards to your specific questions: 

a. The top two technology transition challenges facing the Air Force are codifying 

a strategic research and development plan and providing a sound pre-acquisition 

technical planning foundation to facilitate technology transition. There must be policies in place to address both development of technologies to support the Air Force’s 

long-term strategic objectives and the transfer of these technologies into solid programs of record. Processes that include collaborative, early acquisition planning activities involving the Science and Technology (S&T), user, and acquisition communities are necessary to ensure each is familiar with and understands the potential 

of inserting promising technologies into planned or fielded weapon systems. A comprehensive programmatic and policy strategy across all 6.2 (applied research) 

through 6.7 (operational systems development) efforts is needed to ensure successful 

transition of technology and bridge the ‘‘valley of death.’’ Our Technology Transition 

Office is currently integrating all transition assistance programs and creating seamless policy across laboratory technology development and product center acquisition 

systems engineering. 

b. As noted, the Air Force has established a Technology Transition Office that 

serves as a central focal point for addressing matters in this important area, thus 

creating a synergy in technology transition efforts that more efficiently captures and 

institutionalizes lessons learned, matches solutions to needs, and revitalizes requirements planning and technology maturation. 

c. The Air Force S&T community collects feedback from theater via our joint 

warfighting and intelligence operations. In addition, the Air Force Technology Transition Office is also directly involved with the warfighters through Joint Capabilities 

Technology Demonstrations and other rapid reaction programs, which provide additional insight into future capability needs, as well as lessons learned with regards 

to problems or limitations of fielded systems. 

d. Per Department of Defense Instruction (DODI) 5000.2, Operation of the Defense Acquisition System, and National Security Space Acquisition Policy 03-01, 

Guidance for DOD Space System Acquisition Process, the Office of the Deputy As-
164 

sistant Secretary of the Air Force (Science, Technology and Engineering) is directly 

involved in Technology Readiness Assessments (TRAs) for Milestones B and C, and 

Key Decision Points B and C, respectively. This responsibility extends to maintaining and overseeing the Air Force TRA process, and reviewing and endorsing TRA 

findings when the Milestone Decision Authority is either the Component Acquisition 

Executive or the Defense Acquisition Executive. This role has changed considerably 

over the last two to three years, as the TRAs are becoming institutionalized within 

the Air Force and I only expect it to grow in importance as TRAs are solidified as 

a critical part of the systems development process. 

e. The S&T community’s role in major acquisition programs past Milestone/Key 

Decision Point B is limited since current policy is for major acquisition programs 

to have their ‘‘critical’’ technologies at Technology Readiness Level 6 prior to Milestone/Key Decision Point B approval. However, some major Air Force acquisition 

programs are increasingly identifying technologies to be incorporated into future 

program blocks or upgrades at Milestone/Key Decision Point B, which the S&T community will help develop. In addition, the S&T community will most likely play a 

larger role in ‘‘critical’’ technologies as more major acquisition programs do a formal 

Milestone/Key Decision Point A. 

Mr. SMITH. The mission of the Military Critical Technologies Program (part of the 

International Technology Security (ITS) office in DDR&E) is, in part, to identify 

technologies which contribute to, or have a potential to threaten, U.S. national security and to evaluate trends which might affect the availability of such technology. 

In addition, each of the services has Industrial Base Planning funds, to conduct 

studies of the health of the industrial base and to determine whether or not the industrial base continues to be able to provide military critical technologies. In the 

Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Industrial Policy office also conducts studies 

to ensure technological capabilities are sustained in the industrial base. Finally, the 

Manufacturing Technology program also seeks to improve the technological capabilities of the DOD industrial base. a. How are your Industrial Base Planning activities 

coordinated with those of the DUSD(Industrial Policy)? b. How are your Industrial 

Base Planning activities coordinated with your Manufacturing Technology programs? 

Mr. JAGGERS. In response to question a., Air Force Industrial Base activities are 

worked in close coordination with the Office of the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Industrial Policy (DUSD(IP)). The Air Force coordinates Title I, Defense 

Priorities and Allocations System, activities through the Joint Industrial Base 

Working Group and participates on an ad hoc basis in Priorities and Allocation of 

Industrial Resources meetings led by DUSD(IP) to deconflict competing needs for 

limited national resources among the Services. In addition, the Air Force collaborates with other Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) organizations on Title ill 

and Title VII industrial base programs. In fact, the Air Force serves as OSD’s Executive Agent for Title Ill, Defense Production Act, activities and works closely with 

the DUSD for Advanced Systems and Concepts (DUSD(AS&C)). In the case of Title 

VII, Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States, the Air Force works 

with the Defense Technology Security Administration by providing information to 

aid in determining whether the sale of U.S. firms to foreign entities may impact national security. In addition, the new Air Force Industrial Base Council (AFIBC) was 

formed to manage industrial base risks across the Air Force and to help guide industrial base investments in conjunction with DUSD(IP) studies to ensure technological capabilities are sustained in the industrial base. The AFIBC also provides 

support to the existing Department of Defense Space Industrial Base Council. Finally, the Air Force coordinates its Manufacturing Technology program with OSD 

and the other Services/Defense Agencies as a member of the Joint Defense Manufacturing Technology Panel. 

In response to question b., with regards to coordination between the Air Force Industrial Base planning activities and its Manufacturing Technology program, the 

Air Force recognizes the close connection between these activities and responsibility 

for both lies with the Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Air Force 

(Science, Technology and Engineering). 

Mr. SMITH. A recent DSB study on the Manufacturing Technology program recommended creating a Basic Research account for ManTech. The Navy already has 

a Manufacturing Science program. Do you agree with the DSB’s recommendation? 

How would such a Basic Research effort within the ManTech program support the 

program’s mission? 

Mr. JAGGERS. The Air Force does not see a need to create a separate basic research program for Manufacturing Technology. Science and Technology (S&T) efforts in support of manufacturing technologies are pervasive across the S&T port-
165 

folio to include basic research. In addition, the Air Force is currently exploring the 

possibility of expanding its manufacturing technology basic research efforts by 

teaming a university with a contractor under the Small Business Technology Transfer program 

Mr. SMITH. From an S&T perspective, which do you perceive as the greater threat 

to national security and to our military forces—endemic infectious diseases, such as 

influenza or HIV, or weaponized bio-terror agent, such as Plague? That is, which 

represents the greater threat and the greater S&T challenge? 

Mr. JAGGERS. Medical research and development is centralized within the Defense 

Health Program. As the Air Force Science and Technology (S&T) Executive, I have 

no real insight into potential threats of a medical nature and defer to the Office of 

the Secretary of Defense with regards to whether endemic infectious diseases or the 

Plague represent the greater threat to our national security; however, the S&T challenges remain the same for all threats—proactively anticipating the use, countering 

an attack, and conducting forensics post-release of any biological agent into the 

homeland population. 

Mr. SMITH. Current DOD and service laboratory and research, development, and 

engineering center facilities are located in a large number of locations. Many of 

these facilities are aging and either poorly equipped or the equipment is out of date. 

What is your assessment of the DOD science and technology infrastructure? What 

measures are needed and what measures are being taken to maintain the DOD 

science and technology infrastructure required to support the discovery and development of advanced technologies for the Department of Defense? 

Mr. JAGGERS. Overall, Air Force Science and Technology research facilities are 

adequate to accomplish the mission. Maintaining or upgrading this infrastructure 

to support continued discovery and development of advanced technologies within the 

Department is primarily addressed within the Military Construction (MILCON) program—requirements are identified and compete for funding. We also have the flexibility to utilize a small portion of our Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation 

funding to upgrade our laboratory facilities. While there are challenges in 

prioritizing MILCON requirements—especially during a time of constrained budgets—the current process works and I do not believe additional measures are required to support a viable research program at this time. 

Mr. SMITH. In previous years, Congress has enacted a number of pilot demonstration programs to provide more flexibility in the hiring practices, management, and 

conduct of the science and technology program in selected DOD agencies and the 

military department laboratories and research, development, and engineering centers. Have these authorities been useful? What are some of the challenges with implementing these authorities? 

Mr. JAGGERS. The Air Force supports the Department of Defense’s goal of one personnel system for its civilian workforce—the National Security Personnel System 

(NSPS); however, we also recognize the success the Air Force Research Laboratory 

(AFRL) has enjoyed in shaping its Scientist and Engineer (S&E) workforce through 

the flexibilities afforded by the Laboratory Personnel Demonstration System, commonly referred to as Lab Demo, and support AFRL’s efforts while the current exemption remains in effect. 

The authorities currently in use at AFRL have been extremely effective in many 

areas to include: providing management with greater control of the S&E workforce; 

generating increased levels of contribution among employees; providing management with the ability to set pay competitively when hiring highly qualified new employees; simplifying personnel processes, such as position classification; delegating 

personnel authorities to the Lab Director to speed decision making; and providing 

a positive impact on Lab culture. While AFRL initially received no hiring flexibilities through its demonstration project authority, Section 1107 of the Fiscal Year 

2008 National Defense Authorization Act allows any of the demonstration laboratories to use other available Lab Demo authorities, including hiring flexibilities. 

As AFRL and the other demonstration laboratories work with the Office of the 

Secretary of Defense (OSD) to develop a process for the laboratories to implement 

these authorities in a timely manner, the challenge lies in the sheer workload involved in developing proposals and vetting them through each of the laboratories, 

the Services, and OSD. They are also working with OSD on new initiatives that will 

enable the laboratories to continue to attract and retain much needed scientific experts. 

Mr. SMITH. The mission of the Military Critical Technologies Program (part of the 

International Technology Security (ITS) office in DDR&E) is, in part, to identify 

technologies which contribute to, or have a potential to threaten, U.S. national security and to evaluate trends which might affect the availability of such technology. 

In addition, each of the services has Industrial Base Planning funds, to conduct 
166 

studies of the health of the industrial base and to determine whether or not the industrial base continues to be able to provide military critical technologies. In the 

Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Industrial Policy office also conducts studies 

to ensure technological capabilities are sustained in the industrial base. Finally, the 

Manufacturing Technology program also seeks to improve the technological capabilities of the DOD industrial base. a. How are your Industrial Base Planning activities 

coordinated with those of the DUSD (Industrial Policy)? b. How are your Industrial 

Base Planning activities coordinated with your Manufacturing Technology programs? 

Mr. JAGGERS. In response to question a., Air Force Industrial Base activities are 

worked in close coordination with the Office of the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Industrial Policy (DUSD(IP)). The Air Force coordinates Title I, Defense 

Priorities and Allocations System, activities through the Joint Industrial Base 

Working Group and participates on an ad hoc basis in Priorities and Allocation of 

Industrial Resources meetings led by DUSD(IP) to deconflict competing needs for 

limited national resources among the Services. In addition, the Air Force collaborates with other Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) organizations on Title III 

and Title VII industrial base programs. In fact, the Air Force serves as OSD’s Executive Agent for Title III, Defense Production Act, activities and works closely with 

the DUSD for Advanced Systems and Concepts (DUSD (AS&C)). In the case of Title 

VII, Committee on Foreign hrvestment in the United States, the Air Force works 

with the Defense Technology Security Administration by providing information to 

aid in determining whether the sale of U.S. firms to foreign entities may impact national security. In addition, the new Air Force Industrial Base Council (AFIBC) was 

formed to manage industrial base risks across the Air Force and to help guide industrial base investments in conjunction with DUSD (IP) studies to ensure technological capabilities are sustained in the industrial base. The AFIBC also provides 

support to the existing Department of Defense Space Industrial Base Council. Finally, the Air Force coordinates its Manufacturing Technology program with OSD 

and the other Services/Defense Agencies as a member of the Joint Defense Manufacturing Technology Panel. 

In response to question b., with regards to coordination between the Air Force Industrial Base planning activities and its Manufacturing Technology program, the 

Air Force recognizes the close connection between these activities and responsibility 

for both lies with the Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Air Force 

(Science, Technology and Engineering). 

Mr. SMITH. The mission of the Military Critical Technologies Program (part of the 

International Technology Security (ITS) office in DDR&E) is, in part, to identify 

technologies which contribute to, or have a potential to threaten, U.S. national security and to evaluate trends which might affect the availability of such technology. 

In addition, each of the services has Industrial Base Planning funds, to conduct 

studies of the health of the industrial base and to determine whether or not the industrial base continues to be able to provide military critical technologies. In the 

Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Industrial Policy office also conducts studies 

to ensure technological capabilities are sustained in the industrial base. Finally, the 

Manufacturing Technology program also seeks to improve the technological capabilities of the DOD industrial base. a. How are your Industrial Base Planning activities 

coordinated with those of the DUSD (Industrial Policy)? b. How are your Industrial 

Base Planning activities coordinated with your Manufacturing Technology programs? 

Dr. KILLION. a. Army industrial base activities are coordinated most frequently 

with those of the DUSD (Industrial Policy) through regular staff contacts. Weekly 

and sometimes daily, staffs exchange questions and data in support of program 

managers and laboratories, as well as answering questions and developing policy in 

response to industry and congressional queries. Less frequently, the staffs meet in 

regular industrial base forums to discuss results of ongoing, more detailed studies 

and program efforts. Annually, the highlights of all of these efforts are reported to 

Congress in an OSD-prepared summary of industrial capability assessments. b. 

Army Industrial Base Planning activities are coordinated with our Manufacturing 

Technology efforts primarily at the government research laboratory level in support 

of both long range technology goals and shorter range program development activities. Critical technology events drive the development of weapons systems that lead 

to a key capability. These can originate in industry, in-house government labs, academia, or with international partners. The role of Army laboratories has been to act 

as clearing houses to ensure wide dissemination and coordination of technology efforts by: 1) collaborating with others; 2) evaluating performance of prototypes, including fixes for technical problems; 3) acting as consultants to contractors and to 
167 

the Program Managers; and 4) acting as advisors to the Army to ensure a ‘‘smart 

buyer’’ capability. 

This QFR was answered by Steven R. Linke, Army Industrial Base Policy, SAAL– 

PA 

Mr. SMITH. A recent DSB study on the Manufacturing Technology program recommended creating a Basic Research account for ManTech. The Navy already has 

a Manufacturing Science program. Do you agree with the DSB’s recommendation? 

How would such a Basic Research effort within the ManTech program support the 

program’s mission? 

Dr. KILLION. No, the Army does not agree with the DSB’s recommendation that 

a basic research account be created for ManTech. However, as manufacturing processes push the limits of scientific knowledge, basic research on manufacturing 

science becomes imperative and is included with the current basic research portfolio. 

For example, investments that we are making in the area of biotechnology, which 

include self-assembly of materials into microstructures, enables new classes of manufacturing processes that have the potential to revolutionize the efficiency of production and the performance of the resulting functional and structural materials. 

Mr. SMITH. From an S&T perspective, which do you perceive as the greater threat 

to national security and to our military forces—endemic infectious diseases, such as 

influenza or HIV, or weaponized bio-terror agent, such as Plague? That is, which 

represents the greater threat and the greater S&T challenge? 

Dr. KILLION. The S&T challenges posed by endemic infectious diseases and bioterrorism are relatively equal. Plague and other potentially weaponized disease-producing organisms are often naturally occurring pathogens. The developmental pathways for medical countermeasures (drugs or vaccines) and diagnostics are similar 

for a disease-causing organism whether it is acquired as a consequence of natural 

exposure or as the result of the deliberate release in a bio-terror event (e.g., plague 

occurs in nature and is weaponizable). With regard to which represents the greater 

threat, certainly in the case of current operations, endemic disease contributes more 

to the lack of availability of Soldiers to perform operations than engineered biothreats. 

Mr. SMITH. Current DOD and service laboratory and research, development, and 

engineering center facilities are located in a large number of locations. Many of 

these facilities are aging and either poorly equipped or the equipment is out of date. 

What is your assessment of the DOD science and technology infrastructure? What 

measures are needed and what measures are being taken to maintain the DOD 

science and technology infrastructure required to support the discovery and development of advanced technologies for the Department of Defense? 

Dr. KILLION. From a review of the Army Headquarters Installation Status Report 

greater than 82% of the laboratory facilities have either a green or amber condition 

code that indicating that they are capable of meeting the laboratory requirements. 

Legislation such as Section 2804 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008 (NDAA FY08) (PL 110–181) that amended 10 U.S.C. § 2805, and authorizes the Secretary of the Army to obligate and expend funds ($2M–$4M) for the 

revitalization and recapitalization of Army Laboratories through unspecified minor 

military construction projects, also contributes to our ability to maintain our facilities to meet future research and development needs. The rising costs of construction, 

however, will likely diminish the buying power associated with this legislation and 

require increases in the thresholds. In addition, over the last 5 years, the laboratories have spent approximately $500M for capital equipment. In the long term, the 

Army must exploit all of the authorities granted by Congress and demonstrate their 

usefulness if we are to maintain a vibrant and effective S&T infrastructure. Traditional military construction processes are unlikely to maintain technological competitiveness and are difficult for the S&T community to compete in due to operational priorities. 

Mr. SMITH. In previous years, Congress has enacted a number of pilot demonstration programs to provide more flexibility in the hiring practices, management, and 

conduct of the science and technology program in selected DOD agencies and the 

military department laboratories and research, development, and engineering centers. Have these authorities been useful? What are some of the challenges with implementing these authorities? 

Dr. KILLION. The pilot demonstration programs have been extremely useful to the 

Army laboratories and research, development and engineering centers (RDEC). The 

programs have enabled the Army to retain the best science and engineering talent 

by allowing initiatives, such as pay banding and streamlined hiring authority to enhance recruiting and reshaping of the workforce. These initiatives are unique to 

each laboratory allowing the maximum management flexibility for the laboratory directors and allowing them to be competitive with the private sector. The primary 
168 

challenge with implementation of these authorities has been ensuring that the authority is delegated down to the laboratory/RDEC directors such that they maintain 

their management flexibility. 

Mr. SMITH. Dr. Killion, there has been a proliferation of technology transition programs managed within OSD (S&T). For example, the Joint Concept Technology 

Demonstration (JCTD), Joint Experimentation, the Defense Acquisition Executive 

the Quick Reaction Fund, the Combating Terrorism Technology Task Force 

(CTTTF), the Technology Transition Initiative, the Foreign Comparative Test Program, and the Defense Acquisition Challenge Program. This does not include service 

specific technology transition and rapid acquisition programs. Yet, technology transition remains a perpetual challenge for the S&T community. a. What do you see 

as your top two technology transition challenges? b. Since 2001, many rapid technology development and fielding efforts have been put in place across OSD and the 

military departments. What steps have you taken to ensure that lessons learned 

from these rapid processes are being captured and institutionalized, as appropriate? 

c. Many of the efforts to rapidly transition technologies to the operational community to support the War on Terrorism have resulted in both developmental and operational test and evaluation of systems being conducted in theater. How is the S&T 

community collecting feedback from theater to ensure the appropriate improvements 

in capabilities are made and to also ensure that we don’t continue to field systems 

with the same problems or limitations? d. What is your specific role at acquisition 

milestone decisions, with respect to Technology Readiness Assessments? How has 

this role changed in the last 2–3 years or how do you envision it changing in the 

future? e. What steps should the S&T community be taking to ensure that technologies identified as ‘‘critical’’ for major acquisition programs, are in fact sufficiently mature at the Systems Design and Demonstration (SDD) milestone? 

Dr. KILLION. a. For transition of technology to traditional programs of record, the 

primary challenges are as follows. First, the technology developer must provide evidence of technology maturity and usefulness of the technology to satisfy a system 

requirement. Second, the acquisition program manager must have a need for the 

technology and a schedule and resources to support transitioning the technology. 

For the types of rapid transition programs mentioned above, the challenges are different. First, the technology must demonstrate sufficient robustness, safety, and efficacy to ensure that it is useful to Soldiers in the operational environment. Second, 

there must be sufficient documentation and program support to prepare Soldiers to 

use the system and to sustain its operation in theater. 

b. The Army’s Director for Technology represents Army interests in all of the OSD 

managed technology transition improvement and acceleration programs and processes. We provide input to the OSD led programs and maintain a close dialogue 

with OSD to obtain feedback on what processes work and/or how technology transition can be improved. In addition, my office maintains close working relationships 

with the technology developing commands to obtain feedback from the Lab’s and Research Development and Engineering Center’s efforts supporting fielded systems 

and the limited fielding of advanced technology. In this way we learn about issues 

related to new technology applications in current operations. Further, we have initiated a new effort to send personnel from my office to the Theater of Operations to 

provide direct assessments of issues related to fielding new technology. 

c. The S&T community obtains feedback from fielded systems testing and 

supportability issues through their matrix support to the program managers of 

those systems who rely upon Labs and Research, Development and Engineering 

Centers to provide solutions to unforeseen problems. Additionally, the Army has formal processes to assess the performance of systems accelerated to the theater of operations and make decisions regarding their potential to become formal acquisition 

programs. For example, Research Development and Engineering Command 

(RDECOM) Labs and Centers participate in a weekly Current Operations Support 

Secure Video Teleconference and the theaters’ Technology Solutions Secure Video 

Meeting. During these forums, representatives from RDECOM Labs and Centers, 

from the Navy and Air Force, and S&T advisors in-theater interface with 

warfighters in Iraq and Afghanistan to discuss materiel issues, including the performance and evaluations of recently fielded technologies. The Army Test and Evaluation Command (ATEC) is also major participant in forums that link the Army’s 

Current Operations Support community with ATEC’s Forward Operational Assessment Teams to ensure the technologies being evaluated meet operational needs, are 

supportable and safe. These operational assessments by theater provide valuable 

feedback to the developmental, acquisition and requirements generation communities. Issues and information from these venues, and others with the Training and 

Doctrine Command (TRADOC), seek to improve upon existing technologies and to 

ensure that future systems are not fielded with the similar problems or limitations. 
169 

d. My role in the acquisition milestone decisions is to evaluate program managers’ 

technology maturity assessments and provide an independent certification of technology readiness to the milestone decision authority at Milestone B and Milestone 

C. This responsibility was established within the DOD 5000 instructions in 2002. 

Over the last several years, the major change has been the increased demand for 

application of this process across the full range of acquisition programs. For the future, I anticipate that the range of assessments that are required will expand (e.g., 

manufacturing readiness, software readiness, and integration readiness) and that 

we will be asked to make these assessments ever earlier in the concept development 

and system design and development process. There is concern that the growing 

numbers of assessments levied on acquisition programs may begin to impede 

progress vice facilitate technology transition. Our challenge is always to provide the 

appropriate amount of oversight without impeding the work of our acquisition community in providing capabilities to the Warfighter. 

e. Since the requirement was established to conduct independent technology assessments, we have gained much experience in conducting these assessments and 

the program managers have implemented rigorous steps to perform their own technology maturity assessments. I believe that our current procedures are reasonably 

effective in identifying essential issues related to maturity of critical technology elements. An enduring issue is the availability of relevant data to substantiate claims 

as to the level of technology maturity. The S&T community must continue to work 

with the PEO/PMs to ensure that relevant and sufficient data are available from 

laboratory experimentation, field assessments, and formal testing. In addition, there 

needs to he clear documentation of the plans for technology development and demonstration supporting the program. In 2006, we established technology transition 

agreements as the authoritative document signed by both the technology developer 

and the acquisition program manager to align technology transition plans with systems development and demonstration schedules. 

Mr. SMITH. Dr. Killion, what enhanced capabilities do flexible electronics bring to 

future ARMY/warfighter systems and what steps are the ARMY taking to incorporate this technology? 

Dr. KILLION. Flexible electronics may enhance future Army/Warfighter systems by 

enabling novel form-factors, for example, curved focal plane arrays and sensors conformed to irregular shapes to more easily facilitate integration of electronics; larger 

size arrays, for example, sensor arrays with increased surface area giving enhanced 

capabilities for chemical and biological sensors; and lightweight and rugged electronics, for example, displays, sensors and power components. 

The Army is currently examining the business case for investing in technologies 

to enable flexible electronics. We are already investing in related technologies 

through the Flexible Display Center (FDC) at Arizona State University and the 

FlexTech Alliance, formerly known as the United States Display Consortium. Long 

term visions for flexible electronics require improvements in thin film transistors 

(and related electronic elements) with improved operating reliability for advanced 

circuitry, sensors, focal plane array detectors, and drive electronics. The FlexTech 

Alliance, a consortium comprised of industry members, is enabling materials processing and tools for flexible displays and broadening the scope of application to flexible electronics. 

Mr. SMITH. Dr. Killion, how does the S&T community synchronize the plans for 

projected systems to provide future force bandwidth needs to ensure they are sufficient to accommodate the capabilities of the systems they develop? 

Dr. KILLION. Army Science and Technology works closely with the system developers throughout the system lifecycle. The Army S&T community continuously 

searches for better ways to meet program requirements for improved bandwidth, information throughput and spectrum usage. As new technologies emerge, the Army 

S&T community matures and demonstrates the technologies in coordination with 

the system developers and works closely to transition the technology for their use. 

Coincident with the synchronization plans, the Army S&T community is conducting 

network science research that will allow better prediction of network bandwidth 

needs and provide tools to optimize the network performance. 

Mr. SMITH. In complex irregular warfare operations, technological superiority (big 

platforms) may not be an effective force multiplier. Instead, ‘‘soft’’ skills, such as 

languages, cultural awareness, information operations/psychological operations, and 

civil affairs may be required. a. How can technology help the U.S. military rapidly 

acquire the ‘‘soft’’ skills it needs to be effective in irregular warfare operations? b. 

How does technological superiority fit within today’s threat environment? 

Dr. KILLION. a. Technology can aid the military both in providing capabilities that 

supplement the Soldiers’ abilities as well as in more rapidly and effectively preparing the Soldier for operating in such environments. For example, in terms of 
170 

supplementing the Soldiers’ abilities, the Army has worked with DARPA on language translation capabilities that reduce the need for the Soldier to have specific 

language skills. In addition, the Army is developing battle command decision support tools that enable decision makers to more effectively plan and execute operations in irregular warfare environments, taking into account factors such as religious affiliations, ethnic considerations, economic influences, etc. On the preparation 

side, an example is research at the Institute for Creative Technologies, at the University of Southern California, that focused on developing highly realistic, 

immersive environments that allow the Soldier to rapidly acquire the knowledge 

and skills such as cultural awareness and negotiation techniques needed in irregular warfare operations. 

b. Even in irregular warfare environments, technological superiority is still a 

major factor in maintaining U.S. advantage and allowing our Soldiers to operate as 

efficiently and safely as possible. As an example, new sensor technologies have provided the commanders in theater with persistent surveillance/staring capabilities 

that allow continuous monitoring and tracking of threats across the battlefield. Additional technologies allow the surveillance information to be immediately communicated inside and outside of the theater for rapid response. Technologies such as 

lightweight armor for tactical vehicles, enhancements in situational awareness, nonlethal force application systems, and advanced training methodologies are just as 

relevant for irregular warfare as they are for traditional combat operations. 

Mr. SMITH. The DOD S&T Program is chartered, in part, to ensure the Department avoids technological surprise. Yet some may argue that DOD has been technologically surprised by IEDs, EFPs, and cyberwarfare.What efforts does your organization undertake to avoid technological surprise? How are these different than they 

were five years ago? 

Dr. KILLION. The challenges presented by IEDs, EFPs, and cyber warfare do not 

represent a technological surprise, with the possible exception of the scale in which 

they have manifested themselves. 

From internal and external expertise, outside/independent studies, international 

technology mining, periodic reviews, etc., the Army has identified areas with great 

potential for developing new extraordinary and disruptive capabilities for our Soldiers. The Army S&T community works closely with Army Capabilities Integration 

Center (ARCIC), within the Army’s Training and Doctrine Command, Materiel Developers and various intelligence centers to understand current and future threats. 

Since the beginning of OEF and OIF, weekly teleconferences with S&T representatives from each theater provide firsthand experience and insights to the evolution 

of the threats. Through these exchanges the Army S&T community gains insights 

on threat migration, capability, proliferation, and helps guide investments or accelerations of technologies as appropriate. Furthermore, Army S&T supports rapid 

transition of countermeasure and protection programs to support material developer’s efforts to reduce risk to the soldiers and increase capability against emerging 

threats. 

The greatest difference in the approach from five years ago is the increased interaction with the S&T representatives from the theaters that frame the research and 

development associated with the current threat. Another significant change is both 

the willingness and the speed with which technologies are inserted into the theatre 

of operations, effectively creating crucible for the continuous evaluation and enhancement of technological capabilities. 

Mr. SMITH. The DOD S&T Program investment strategy should balance the development of (a) technological countermeasures to perceived future threats, (b) technologies to create options for U.S. forces, and (c) technologies to shape our enemies’ 

options. Could you provide some examples of investments you are making in each 

category and could you please discuss your vision for the appropriate distribution 

of investments for each category? 

Dr. KILLION. I can only speak for the Army, but examples of Army investments 

in each of these categories are as follows: 

(a) Technological countermeasures to perceived future threats. The Army S&T 

community is investing in active protection systems (APS) to protect lighter weight 

combat vehicles from tank-fired threats. Research into APS sensor, interceptor, and 

guidance technologies is ongoing. We are also investing in new technologies such as 

high energy lasers that can address multiple missions such as the defeat rockets, 

artillery and mortars or unmanned aerial systems in order to protect our troops in 

the future. We are pursuing the development of new ballistic materials and armor 

designs, validating associated models that predict the fundamental material responses and overall ballistic performance, conducting ballistic performance evaluations and developing integration and manufacturing techniques to reduce costs and 
171 

overall system weight. These armor designs are based on the projected future 

threats but also are used to address threats currently being seen in theater. 

(b) Technologies to create options for U.S. forces. We are investing in technologies 

that create options such as the electromagnetic gun which has the potential to increase the range and effectiveness of large caliber weapons and directed energy 

weapons that can render enemy sensors and electronics ineffective. In addition, we 

are creating capability that can scale in it’s delivered effects based on the situation 

encountered through our investments in non-lethal weapon technologies and 

scaleahle warhead technologies. We are exploring nano-technology which holds the 

promise of new materials for use as body armor and to increase performance. These 

nanostructures are assembled into macroscopic systems to produce materials and 

energetics with previously unattainable properties to dramatically enhance soldier 

survivability and weapon lethality. 

(c) Technologies to shape our enemies’ options. Perhaps one of the more significant game-change technologies is our commitment and investment in developing 

network centric warfare capabilities that help us better identify and address the 

threat, manned-unmanned teaming capability that enable the warfighter to extend 

his area of influence within the battlespace while reducing risk to his personal welfare, The development of wide area persistent surveillance creates a significant capability to modify the enemy’s behavior as they are constantly under observation, 

but it creates significant challenges to include the sensor systems, real time processing of vast amounts of data, the real time interpretation of information for decision-making and challenging power and energy requirements to support such demanding systems. Efforts in biotechnology research will lead to totally new sensing 

systems, new ways for the rapid processing of data into information, the development of novel sense and response systems and biologically inspired power and energy solutions for our soldiers. 

With regard to the appropriate distribution of investment across these categories, 

I believe that the majority of our investment should be in addressing the perceived/ 

projected threats, as this is a key aspect of the Army S&T mission. In this regard, 

technologies that will enhance force protection of our troops are one of our highest 

priorities and largest S&T investment areas. Technologies that create options for 

the US and shape our enemies options are equally weighted in my mind—as they 

are intimately linked in many cases. The investments that are made within the 

S&T community are focused on maintaining US dominance as the premier land 

combat force in the world. 

Mr. SMITH. The U.S. Special Operations Command FY09 S&T request is around $65 million this year which includes $11 million in a new area designated for SOF 

Information and Broadcast Systems advanced Technology.Can you briefly describe 

how the Special Operations S&T requirements fit into the overall DOD S&T planning process? Will we continue to see the SOF S&T budget grow to meet their 

unique mission challenges? 

Dr. KILLION. SOCOM and SOF S&T do not fall under my authority, therefore I 

am unable to provide a response to your questions concerning their planning process 

or planned growth in their S&T budget. I respectfully recommend that this question 

be redirected to SOCOM for response. 

Mr. SMITH. Within the next year or so, several defense bases will begin closing 

and various activities will begin re-alignment including research and development 

activities within the defense laboratories. One of the greatest impacts of BRAC is 

loss of talented workforce. Certain key folks may not wish to uproot their families 

to move to another state.How will the affects of BRAC (workforce and others issues) 

impact your ability to provide the best capabilities for our warfighters? What mechanism have you put in place to minimize the potential impact? 

Dr. KILLION. As articulated in the December 28, 2007 report to Congress, the 

Army’s move of the Communications Electronics Research, Development and Engineering Center (CERDEC) to Aberdeen Proving Ground greatly enhances operational support to the Global War On Terror (GWOT) and other contingency operations by creating a combined Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (C4ISR) technical and research facility 

with direct and valuable links to the Aberdeen Proving Ground (APG) test communities and ranges. 

In planning for and implementing the Base Realignment and Closure recommendation to close Fort Monmouth, the Army diligently analyzed the human resources, facilities, information technology, and relocation phasing required to continue supporting the GWOT and other critical contingency operations. The Army defined the risks, developed strategies to mitigate those risks, and identified imperatives necessary to resource those strategies. In particular, the Army is reviewing a 

three pronged approach: a) increase the percentage of employees who relocate to 
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APG, MD by maximizing retention and relocation incentives and ensure that there 

is equity between APG and relocated employees to minimize employee shift between 

organizations; b) shift more hiring to APG prior to the closure of Fort Monmouth, 

NJ; c) accelerate hiring to backfill vacancies after the C4ISR mission moves to APG. 

With the continued and proactive support and resources from the Department of Defense and Congress, the Army will successfully execute the relocation from Fort 

Monmouth to Aberdeen Proving Ground by September 15, 2011 with minimum disruptions. 

Mr. SMITH. A recent Defense Science Board (DSB) study on the Manufacturing 

Technology program recommended creating a Basic Research account for ManTech. 

The Navy already has a Manufacturing Science program. Do you agree with the 

DSB’s recommendation? How would such a Basic Research effort within the 

ManTech program support the program’s mission? 

Mr. SHAFFER. The Defense Science Board (DSB) had ten major recommendations 

and numerous sub-recommendations. The Department has implemented many of 

the recommendations including a new Manufacturing Science and Technology 

(MS&T) program initiated by the Director, Defense Research and Engineering, in 

Fiscal Year 2008 to invest in cross-cutting manufacturing processes and provide 

early 6.3 manufacturing investment to concurrently mature manufacturing processes for emerging technologies. The program complements the Military Department 

ManTech programs, which tend to focus on program/platform specific issues. The 

Department has no current plans to establish a dedicated 6.1 Basic Research Manufacturing effort, but we have expanded the overall basic research program budget 

request by over 16% in our Fiscal Year 2009 request, and expect that some benefits 

to long-term manufacturing capabilities. 

Mr. SMITH. From a Science and Technology (S&T) perspective, which do you perceive as the greater threat to national security and to our military forces - endemic 

infectious diseases, such as influenza or HIV, or weaponized bio-terror agent, such 

as Plague? That is, which represents the greater threat and the greater S&T challenge? 

Mr. SHAFFER. Both foreign endemic diseases of military interest and bio-terror 

agents are significant S&T challenges and the Department cannot differentiate one 

or the other as a greater national security threat. We must invest in research addressing both. A strong science and technology (S&T) program in surveillance, prevention, diagnosis and treatment of infectious agents is critical for addressing everpresent (i.e., endemic) and potential (i.e., biowarfare) threats. Developing medical 

countermeasures to either will continue to take the concerted effort of the best medical scientists available. Some of these specific challenges are: (1) developing surveillance and medical interventions when the time course for identification and mitigation of these event/diseases is unknown or compressed; (2) developing the science 

base for understanding infection and disease processes so that broader acting medical countermeasures can be developed (in contrast to chasing the ‘one bug, one 

drug’ infinite continuum), (3) quarantine technology, capacity and procedures for unpredictable outbreaks of disease is limited; (4) the commercial ’market’ for drugs and 

vaccines to counter disease pathogens that are not endemic to the US is minimal 

until an event occurs; and (5) there are significant barriers to executing human clinical trials for either threat. 

Mr. SMITH. In previous years, Congress has enacted a number of pilot demonstration programs to provide more flexibility in the hiring practices, management, and 

conduct of the science and technology program in selected DOD agencies and the 

military department laboratories and research, development, and engineering centers. Have these authorities been useful? What are some of the challenges with implementing these authorities? 

Mr. SHAFFER. The pilot demonstration authorities were useful. They have permitted the Department to evaluate alternative personnel system approaches which 

include pay banding; simplified classification; performance-based compensation; 

streamlined hiring and staffing processes; expanded development programs 

(sabbaticals and degree training); and modified reduction-in-force procedures which 

take performance into account. 

Challenges in implementing these authorities include ensuring open communication about the alternative approaches with the workforce and workforce representatives; providing comprehensive training for senior leaders, supervisors, and staff, ensuring that stakeholders are actively involved in the design, development and implementation of the program; putting in place comprehensive planning processes for 

implementation, providing mechanisms for assessing status and managing risk; and 

developing an assessment plan which will enable evaluation of the effectiveness of 

the demonstration projects and alternative personnel systems. 
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Mr. SMITH. The Department’s missions have expanded to include stability operations, humanitarian assistance, reconstruction and other activities that touch upon 

the jurisdiction of other federal agencies. Issues that are much broader than the 

scope of this subcommittee. Mr. Shaffer, how are the DOD’s S&T efforts-planning, 

developing, and transition of technologies that are supportive of the growing mission 

as I just described collaborated/integrated with other agencies such as State, DHS, 

Justice and others? 

Mr. SHAFFER. First, it is important to note that the Office of Science and Technology Policy Committee on Homeland and National Security has been reinvigorated 

this summer. This committee is co-chaired by senior DOD and Department of Homeland Security leaders, and is specially chartered to coordinate activities across government agencies. Recently, this committee gave its approval to a stability operations technology roadmap. 

But we recognize the need to focus specifically on interagency collaboration, and 

have re-chartered the science and technology component of the former Office of 

Force Transformation earlier this year to undertake interagency science and technology efforts. This is beginning to bear fruit. We will cite just a couple of examples. 

We are nearing completion of a series of interagency workshops focused on how we 

can apply a ‘‘whole of government’’ approach to dealing with transitional law enforcement operations in a stability and reconstruction environment. With DOD, Department of State, Department of Homeland Security, and Department of Justice 

participation, we will use the results to identify science and technology needs as 

well as organizational models compatible with our system of government. We have 

undertaken new interagency science and technology efforts as well. In conjunction 

with NASA, we have begun development of a prototype air vehicle which will drastically reduce fuel and infrastructure requirements needed for aerial logistics missions. With such a vehicle, our ability to conduct humanitarian assistance, both at 

home and abroad, would be significantly improved over what is available today. 

Additionally, we have redirected several of our existing programs to focus on 

interagency requirements. For instance, we recently completed a successful Caribbean drug interdiction operation in conjunction with Department of Homeland Security in which law enforcement officers embarked upon a DOD experimental vessel. 

We also recently reached agreement with the Department of Homeland Security to 

cooperatively test and develop small unit command and control capabilities in support of border security operations. 

In the areas of stability operations and reconstruction, we hosted an interagency 

workshop in June to look at the breadth of analytical tools available to aid reconstruction efforts in Afghanistan, including participants from the U.S. Army Corps 

of Engineers, United States Agency for International Development (USAID), U.S. 

Institute for Peace, the State Department, and the U.S. Geological Survey. Finally, 

we are beginning a science and technology development effort in conjunction with 

members of the interagency intelligence community to better understand the challenges of multi-platform/multi-sensor intelligence collection, fusion, and analysis. As 

we go forward, we intend to search for additional opportunities to collaborate on 

interagency science and technology projects. The results of each of the efforts highlighted above—as well as others we undertake in the future—will be available to 

all members of the interagency community for evaluation and technology transition 

in accordance with the unique requirements and processes of the individual departments and agencies. 

Mr. SMITH. Mr. Shaffer, there has been a proliferation of technology transition 

programs managed within the Office of the Secretary of Defense for Science and 

Technology. For example, the Joint Concept Technology Demonstration (JCTD), 

Joint Experimentation, the Defense Acquisition Executive the Quick Reaction Fund, 

the Combating Terrorism Technology Task Force (CTTTF), the Technology Transition Initiative, the Foreign Comparative Test Program, and the Defense Acquisition 

Challenge Program. This does not include service specific technology transition and 

rapid acquisition programs. Yet, technology transition remains a perpetual challenge for the S&T community 

a. How do you avoid duplication in these programs and why does OSD need so 

many authorities for technology transition efforts? 

b. What do you see as your top two technology transition challenges? 

c. Since 2001, many rapid technology development and fielding efforts have been 

put in place across OSD and the military departments. What steps have you taken 

to ensure that lessons learned from these rapid processes are being captured and 

institutionalized, as appropriate? 

d. Many of the efforts to rapidly transition technologies to the operational community to support the War on Terrorism have resulted in both developmental and oper-
174 

ational test and evaluation of systems being conducted in theater. How is the S&T 

community collecting feedback from theater to ensure the appropriate improvements 

in capabilities are made and to also ensure that we don’t continue to field systems 

with the same problems or limitations? 

e. What is your specific role at acquisition milestone decisions, with respect to 

Technology Readiness Assessments? How has this role changed in the last 2–3 years 

or how do you envision it changing in the future? 

f. What steps should the S&T community be taking to ensure that technologies 

identified as ‘‘critical’’ for major acquisition programs, are in fact sufficiently mature 

at the Systems Design and Demonstration (SDD) milestone? 

Mr. SHAFFER. In the Department’s 2007 Research and Engineering Strategic Plan, 

we highlighted several high-level management principles. Among the most prominent was the principle to ‘‘Transition Technology to Acquisition Programs and the 

Warfighters.’’ This principle—to mature technology for use in acquisition programs 

and, better yet, by operational units and our soldiers, sailors, airman and marines— 

is a guiding principle for the DOD research and engineering program. Unfortunately, the business processes in place within the federal government and Department sometimes lack the agility or flexibility to easily transition technology. This 

shortfall has been highlighted in numerous recent blue-ribbon panels, each of which 

has recommended alternatives to enhance transition. This proliferation of studies 

and recommendations has, I believe, resulted in a proliferation of programs to fix 

parts of the problem. This may or may not be appropriate, because the challenge 

of technology transition is complex and we have not identified a ‘‘one size fits all’’ 

solution. Consequently, the DOD has generated a number of complementary programs to address specific technology transition challenges. We self-generated some 

of these programs, such as the Joint Capabilities Technology Demonstration program and the Defense Acquisition Executive program. Some of the programs have 

been congressionally mandated, such as the Technology Transition Initiative and 

the Defense Acquisition Challenge Program. By using the different tools of the various programs, we can frequently find a more direct path to transition. 

For the most part, we have avoided unintended duplication by working to define 

unique domains, or programmatic characteristics, for each program. We will illustrate with an example. Within the Office of the Director, Defense Research and Engineering (DDR&E), we generated a program in 2003 called the Quick Reaction Special Projects (QRSP) Program. We designed this program to demonstrate capabilities 

rapidly within 12 months if possible. This 12 month cycle is important because the 

standard budget process within the DOD is 18–24 months, so QRSP works within 

the budget cycle. QRSP provides the agility needed in a world with rapid technology 

maturation. Within the QRSP, we have two complementary projects: the Rapid Reaction Fund (RRF; formerly known as the Combating Terrorism Technology Task 

Force) and Quick Reaction Fund (QRF). The Rapid Reaction Fund is used to address 

‘‘irregular Warfare,’’ while the QRF is used to address conventional capabilities. In 

those instances where high priority capability needs overlap, the programs can 

share funding. Both programs are thoroughly vetted with the Combatant Commanders, and address real world needs. Because of the short time scale and flexibility provided by these programs, they are considered as the two highest priority 

programs in DDR&E. Because we have involved the warfighters in the program and 

both deliver demonstrable capabilities, we receive real world feedback from the 

warfighters who assess the technology in a warfighting environment. 

In addition, we are in the process of rechartering the Technology Transition Executive Steering Group, made up of Science and Technology Acquisition Senior Executives from each service. The oversight from this group will also minimize unintended duplication. 

The on-going technology transition programs supplement our routine interaction 

with the acquisition community, an interaction that has been strengthened in the 

past several years. Much of this strengthened relationship has occurred because we 

are now required to provide a technology maturity—assessment of critical technology elements in conjunction with a milestone B decision. Before a program enters 

System Design and Development, the DDR&E team evaluates the technology maturity thereby enhancing transition of matured technologies. This process, as it matures, should help ensure we transition mature technology. 

Finally, it is important to also recognize that we need to continually rationalize 

the DOD technology transition effort, and have created a position to develop and 

oversee innovative approaches to Department-wide transition. This position, the Assistant Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Innovation and Technology Transition, is a Senior Executive Service level position created to examine how the Department can more effectively transition technology and to provide a policy focus to the 
175 

challenges. The ADUSD (I&TT) interacts on a routine basis with the Military Departments through the Technology Transition Executive Steering Group, which is 

made up of senior-level representatives from both the S&T and acquisition communities, to improve and strengthen the execution of technology transition to meet our 

warfighters’ needs through sharing of best practices. 

Effective technology transition has been, and remains, a contact sport. The apparent proliferation of programs cited in the question merely provides the tools to support the contact. There are challenges, and I am not comfortable citing two as the 

‘‘top two’’. Working in tandem with the acquisition and requirements community, we 

are addressing the challenges in a systemic way. 

Mr. SMITH. How can the Military Critical Technologies Program hope to be relevant if it only conducts its assessments on a three-year cycle? For example, how 

many new technologies are now in use by the mainline U.S. military that were not 

in use three years ago? 

Mr. SHAFFER. Since the pace of global technology development is accelerating, the 

Department has changed its Military Critical Technologies List (MCTL) process over 

the last two years to one of essentially continuous updating and publishing. As a 

basic management goal, all sections of the list are now updated at least every two 

years, with a desired goal of every year. This was enabled by the adoption of an 

on-line, wiki-based environment for use by our Technology Working Group (TWG) 

development teams, and the introduction of on-line publishing of the updated list 

sections via the Defense Technical Information Center (DTIC.) The rate of progress 

varies greatly in differing areas of technology, and thus a single time requirement 

is not adequate or reasonable for all technologies. Significant developments in the 

technology base of a given area can now trigger revisions regardless of the age of 

the existing sections, and publishing of revised sections is accomplished whenever 

changes are staffed and complete, rather than on an annual basis as was the previous practice. 

Mr. SMITH. What is the role of the International Technology Security (ITS) office 

in providing input to the Office of the Secretary of Defense for Policy and International Security Policy for the CFIUS (Committee on Foreign Investment in the 

United States) process? How is that contrasted with the role of the Deputy Under 

Secretary of Defense for Science & Technology? How accurate can such input be if 

it’s provided on the basis of a process with a 3-year update cycle? 

Mr. SHAFFER. As a part of the Office of the Director of Defense Research & Engineering (DDR&E), ITS reviews and comments on all CFIUS cases, via coordination 

accomplished within the office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisitions, 

Technology and Logistics by the office of the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for 

Industrial Policy. Individual cases are reviewed by ITS for technology listed on the 

MCTL, and where listed technologies exist, ITS Technology Working Group subject 

matter experts can comment on the potential need for protection of technologies. 

Subject matter experts from the Office of the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense 

for Science & Technology, along with other appropriate organizations, also comment 

directly to the Office of the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Industrial Policy 

(IP). 

Mr. SMITH. How does the ITS office’s role differ from the role of the Office of the 

Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Industrial Policy (DUSD(Industrial Policy))? 

Mr. SHAFFER. ITS, in its role constructing the MCTL, is charged with identifying 

specific technologies of military criticality to inform the Commerce Department’s 

dual-use export control process. This task is narrowly focused, and is centered on 

protecting against the spread of technologies which may be used to harm the US 

or American interests. Industrial Policy’s (IP) focus is much broader. The IP mission 

is to sustain an environment that ensures the industrial base on which the Department of Defense (DOD) depends is reliable, cost-effective, and sufficient to meet 

DOD requirements. It does this by (1) monitoring industry readiness, competitiveness, ability to innovate, and financial stability; (2) ensuring DOD research and development, acquisition, and logistics decisions promote innovation, competition, military readiness, and national security; and (3) leveraging statutory processes (for example, the Defense Priorities and Allocations System, Hart-Scott-Rodino antitrust 

evaluations, Exon-Florio Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States 

evaluations) to promote innovation, competition, military readiness, and national security. 

Mr. SMITH. In complex irregular warfare operations, technological superiority (big 

platforms) may not be an effective force multiplier. Instead, ‘‘soft’’ skills, such as 

languages, cultural awareness, information operations/psychological operations, and 

civil affairs may be required. a. How can technology help the U.S. military rapidly 

acquire the ‘‘soft’’ skills it needs to be effective in irregular warfare operations? b. 

How does technological superiority fit within today’s threat environment? 
176 

Mr. SHAFFER. In his November 26, 2007 speech at Kansas State University, Secretary Gates called for a paradigm shift, away from solely military operations, more 

towards the ‘‘. . . civilian instruments of National Security diplomacy, strategic 

communications, foreign assistance, civic action and economic reconstruction and development.’’ In response to the direction of the Secretary, the department has increased focus on ‘‘Soft Power.’’ The Science and Technology (S&T) community is 

leading with changes in investment priorities. 

Technology superiority remains a center of gravity in current conflicts and will 

likely continue to do so in the future. However, the construct for technology superiority is expanding to include domains like sensors, information fusion, and human, 

social, culture and behavioral modeling. The Department’s S&T program has expanded in each of these areas. The concept of Irregular Warfare describes conflicts 

fought not with large military formations, but with small numbers of forces in conjunction with force multipliers that can only come through technological innovation. 

Today, with the priority given to ‘‘Soft Power,’’ technological investments are being 

made that deliver greater capability to the warfighter in the areas noted by the Secretary above. The Director, Defense Research and Engineering (DDR&E), established a multi-year ‘‘Human, Social, Cultural and Behavior’’ initiative and supporting roadmap. Fiscal Year 2008 was the first year of this initiative. 

Additionally, DDR&E is charged with developing innovative capabilities for the 

warfighter in a non-traditional, rapid manner and has been investing in ‘‘Soft 

Power’’ technologies at an ever-increasing rate. In June of this year, we sponsored 

a workshop focused on the reconstruction and stability of Afghanistan, with invitees 

such as Department of State (DoS), United States Agency for International Development (USAID), and Gallup. The rationale was to examine how DOD, DOS, Non-Governmental Organizations, and others can share the requirements of ‘‘Soft Power’’ 

and leverage resources appropriately. DDR&E also sponsors a Strategic Multi-Layer 

Assessment (SMA) program. The SMA program is charged with bringing together 

social scientists to study specific problem areas, not from a military perspective, but 

from one that brings together personnel with expertise in economics, sociology, psychology, history, culture, and other areas to reframe the problem set and recommend innovative actions that affect areas often disregarded in traditional ‘‘hard 

power’’ projection scenarios. 

Mr. SMITH. The DOD Science and Technology (S&T) Program is chartered, in 

part, to ensure the Department avoids technological surprise. Yet some may argue 

that DOD has been technologically surprised by IEDs, EFPs, and cyber warfare. 

What efforts does your organization undertake to avoid technological surprise? How 

are these different than they were five years ago? 

Mr. SHAFFER. A key mission of the DOD S&T program is to minimize technology 

surprise to the DOD, and balance with other development efforts. As such, the department made continued strides since 2003 (5 years ago) when the term disruptive 

technology was often followed by recitation of the three emerging technology pillars 

of nano-technology, bio-technology and information technology. We have matured 

our thinking about disruptive technologies, and now include application of commercial capabilities. 

At a macro level, starling in 2002 the Department took action to further reduce 

the risk of technology surprise by putting in place processes, initiatives and information technology solutions to better integrate the intelligence community into the 

DOD S&T planning process and enable rapid transition of technology where needed 

to short circuit emerging technology risks. We have used quick reaction funds to 

allow us to rapidly understand newer technology areas and matured technology intelligence analysis. Finally we are expanding our footprint in global technology 

‘‘prospecting’’ by expanding global outreach. All totaled, we are spending more time 

and effort to understand foreign technology than we did five years ago. 

Mr. SMITH. The DOD S&T Program investment strategy should balance the development of (a) technological countermeasures to perceived future threats, (b) technologies to create options for U.S. forces, and (c) technologies to shape our enemies’ 

options. Could you provide some examples of investments you are making in each 

category and could you please discuss your vision for the appropriate distribution 

of investments for each category? 

Mr. SHAFFER. DOD’s Science and Technology (S&T) program makes substantial 

investments in each of these categories and seeks to balance our program across all 

three. Examples of countermeasures include research into cyber-security to protect 

networks and information system infrastructure from attack and compromise, research on stand-off detection and neutralization of nuclear materials, and research 

on active protection systems to engage rockets and missiles fired at ground vehicles. 

Technology to provide options include research in hypersonics to enable very rapid 

interdiction at great distances, research on high energy lasers for platform defense, 
177 

and research in compact, portable electrical power sources to enable agile and sustainable operations by dismounted forces. 

In the third category, the Department is investing in research in biomedical 

sciences to develop countermeasures for contagious diseases and toxins, thereby denying terrorists one of their most threatening attack vectors, and research in energetic materials for penetration of hard and deeply buried targets to put an adversary’s underground facilities at risk. 

In an uncertain world, a balanced research investment portfolio balances efforts 

both in these categories and in other areas such as wounded warrior care, current 

threats (e.g., IEDs), and sustaining foundational sciences. DOD’s S&T enterprise 

conducts annual strategic reviews of the investment portfolio to align investment 

priorities with technological opportunities and operational needs, either current or 

projected. In addition, we have increased the emphasis on technology intelligence 

analysis to better inform the balance of threats, options for U.S., and options to 

share potential adversary options. 

Mr. SMITH. The United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) Fiscal 

Year 2009 (FY2009) Science and Technology (S&T) request is around $65 million 

this year, which includes $11 million in a new area designated for Special Operations Forces (SOF) Information and Broadcast Systems Advanced Technology. Can 

you briefly describe how the SOF S&T requirements fit into the overall Department 

of Defense S&T planning process? Will we continue to see the SOF S&T budget 

grow to meet their unique mission challenges? 

Mr. SHAFFER. The SOF Information and Broadcast Systems Advanced Technology 

program element (1160472BB) was established in Fiscal Year 2009 to separately 

capture S&T efforts related to information and broadcast technology. This program 

element contains the Psychological Operations (PSYOP) Global Reach (PGR) and 

PSYOP Modernization programs. Beginning in Fiscal Year 2009, existing PGR Advanced Concept Technology Development (ACTD) resources ($4.970 million) were realigned from Program Element 1160402BB, Special Operations Advanced Technology Development. The additional $6.020 million for PSYOP Modernization was 

resourced through internal funding realignments during the Command’s budget 

process. 

The SOF S&T process is fully integrated with the overall DOD S&T program. 

Representatives from USSOCOM are integral players in the annual comprehensive 

S&T review process, whereby all components with S&T investment brief their requirements and plan to address the capability needs. This review occurs each year 

in January as a start to the DOD budget development process. 

USSOCOM’s S&T strategy is to selectively invest and leverage available resources 

with the Military Departments and other agency laboratories, academia, and industry for the purpose of maximizing SOF capabilities. USSOCOM’s involvement in 

several ACTDs and Joint Capability Technology Demonstrations allows USSOCOM 

to leverage the resources of other organizations to create robust opportunities for 

evaluating and transforming mature technologies in a way that the command could 

not otherwise afford within its limited S&T budget. One example of partnership success was close coordination between USSOCOM and the Director, Defense Research 

& Engineering on tagging, tracking, and locating technology investments. 

Mr. SMITH. In complex irregular warfare operations, technological superiority (big 

platforms) may not be an effective force multiplier. Instead, ‘‘soft’’ skills, such as 

languages, cultural awareness, information operations/psychological operations, and 

civil affairs may be required. a. How can technology help the U.S. military rapidly 

acquire the ‘‘soft’’ skills it needs to be effective in irregular warfare operations? b. 

How does technological superiority fit within today’s threat environment? 

Dr. TETHER. I think the DOD has become more aware of the need for what you 

term ‘‘soft skills’’ in response to the irregular warfare and operations in Iraq and 

Afghanistan. People in all the Services and OSD are rethinking what is needed to 

succeed in those situations. 

But I would say that technology can help meet those challenges. It’s worth remembering that our technological capabilities are one of our asymmetric advantages. 

Much of what we work on is aimed at getting better information about the enemy 

and then acting more quickly and precisely. Better information and decision making 

will help make our use of force, when needed, more subtle and less likely to cause 

collateral damage. 

And, we have a number of programs aimed directly at soft skills: 

• Our array of language translation programs will improve our understanding 

of what is going on throughout a society and allow us to work better with the locals. 
178 

We made a language training program available that includes gestures and social 

conventions to reduce what might be called ‘‘cultural friction.’’ 

• Our ASSIST program is helping our troops on the ground better gather, store 

and share information about the neighborhoods they work in. This ‘‘cop on the beat’’ 

type of information will improve our understanding and partnerships with locals. 

• Our Integrated Crisis Early Warning System (ICEWS) program is working to 

create a system that not only helps forecast instability in a society but provides 

commanders with diplomatic, economic or military options for preventing or reducing the crisis. Softer options are an integral part of it. 

Mr. SMITH. The DOD S&T Program is chartered, in part, to ensure the Department avoids technological surprise. Yet some may argue that DOD has been technologically surprised by IEDs, EFPs, and cyberwarfare. What efforts does your organization undertake to avoid technological surprise? How are these different than they 

were five years ago? 

Dr. TETHER. I don’t agree that those items constitute technological surprises to 

DOD. Cyber warfare is something DARPA and others in DOD have been aware of 

and working to counter for many years. Similarly, EFPs are a technology DOD was 

aware of before they were used in Iraq. IEDs are an interesting case. But even here 

DOD had concepts of using smart mines which were along side the road and triggered by vehicles passing by. 

On the other hand, IEDs are definitely an operational surprise in both their effectiveness and in constraining freedom of movement. The technology needed for IEDs 

is fairly simple and commonly available—which is partly why they are so difficult 

to counter. 

But you are correct that DARPA’s mission is to prevent the technological surprise 

of the US. We have also learned that the best way to prevent surprise is to be constantly creating it. The key to this is to constantly search the technological frontier 

for new ideas and discoveries. The best way to do that is to continually bring in 

new people who are leaders in their field, know what is on the cutting edge, and 

have good ideas on how to use new discoveries. While information on technological 

and scientific developments is helpful, the real way DARPA stays on the technological frontier is through its policy of rotating program managers. Knowledgeable, 

creative, entrepreneurial people prevent technological surprise far better than just 

information. 

Our policy of rotating personnel also makes it easy for us to change focus and direction. If we want to go in a new direction, then we start hiring people in that area 

as other people leave. And, in the last several years, we have become more interested in countering asymmetric threats. 

Finally, there are plenty of good ideas overseas too. Part of what I’ve done as Director is travel to places like India, Israel, Australia, Sweden and Singapore to understand the technical developments, capabilities and opportunities in those nations. 

Preventing and creating technological surprise requires an awareness of what might 

be happening around the globe. 

Mr. SMITH. The DOD S&T Program investment strategy should balance the development of (a) technological countermeasures to perceived future threats, (b) technologies to create options for U.S. forces, and (c) technologies to shape our enemies’ 

options. Could you provide some examples of investments you are making in each 

category and could you please discuss your vision for the appropriate distribution 

of investments for each category? 

Dr. TETHER. In terms of countermeasures, perhaps our most obvious work is in 

biological warfare defense. If we succeed in finding ways to rapidly develop and 

manufacture therapies for any pathogen, including entirely new ones, it would neutralize or at least enormously limit the value of any biological attack. In our Space 

strategic thrust we developing technology to better understand what threats might 

be present on-orbit and to protect our space assets. We are looking at ways to detect 

and characterize underground structures and are very active in the area of cyber 

security. These are just a sample. 

In terms of creating new options for US forces, our research in Advanced Manned 

and Unmanned systems promises a variety of new platforms to carry out missions 

in new ways, many of them autonomously. In our Space thrust, Orbital Express 

demonstrated the autonomous refueling of satellites on-orbit. Our research in Robust, Secure Self-Forming Networks aims to let DOD reach the full potential of network-centric operations, and we continue to improve our ability to find, track and 

destroy elusive targets. The wellspring for many of these new capabilities and option is our long-standing research in core technologies like materials and information technology—the improved technologies that allow us to create systems. 
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Because armed conflict requires at least two parties, all of these options shape 

our potential enemy’s options as well, hopefully in such a way that they are dissuaded from a fight. Reducing our threats reduces their options, whereas new options for us increases the threats to them and indirectly reduces their options. But, 

as history shows, we should expect threats and countermeasures to evolve with each 

other over time. 

We have no particular rules of thumb for such investments since we really don’t 

pre-allocate funds but respond to ideas and count up the resources later. The ideas 

we fund however depend on the particular strategic environment and circumstances 

at that time. What exactly are the threats you face? What are the opportunities that 

you might seize? One cannot decide what to invest in without considering those factors and weighing them against each other—and they are always changing. 

Mr. SMITH. The U.S. Special Operations Command FY09 S&T request is around $65 million this year which includes $11 million in a new area designated for SOF 

Information and Broadcast Systems advanced Technology.Can you briefly describe 

how the Special Operations S&T requirements fit into the overall DOD S&T planning process? Will we continue to see the SOF S&T budget grow to meet their 

unique mission challenges? 

Dr. TETHER. I can’t really speak to the Special Operations Command’s 

(USSOCOM) budget and planning process, but I would like to highlight our excellent on-going partnership with USSOCOM. 

Over the past several years, DARPA has established a ‘‘special relationship’’ with 

USSOCOM. Why? I regard them as DARPA’s test lab, where we can test new technology and hear what works and what doesn’t from some of the most sophisticated 

operators in the DOD. Working with highly demanding ‘‘first adopters’’ is one the 

best ways to ensure your new technologies are indeed revolutionary. We get to hear 

their most pressing challenges, to excite our researchers to move into new areas and 

explore new solutions. On the other hand, we give then an opportunity to get insight 

into future technologies and even try some of them. 

DARPA and USSOCOM complement each other well; our missions, capabilities 

and even our cultures of being fast and flexible are an excellent fit. DARPA has had 

a full-time representative at USSOCOM in Tampa for 6 years. I sent her there to 

make sure USSOCOM hears about our technologies, has the opportunity to test and 

evaluate them, and can cherry-pick what best fits their needs. We benefit by their 

testing and use of our prototypes; when we solve USSOCOM’s challenges, we often 

meet those for the services as well. We also benefit when she brings back difficult 

challenges for our researchers at DARPA. It’s been very fruitful for all of us. 

Mr. SMITH. From an S&T perspective, which do you perceive as the greater threat 

to national security and to our military forces—endemic infectious diseases, such as 

influenza or HIV, or weaponized bio-terror agent, such as Plague? That is, which 

represents the greater threat and the greater S&T challenge? 

Dr. TETHER. Clearly, endemic infectious diseases can threaten our military effectiveness. There are many examples from history when illnesses like dysentery or 

malaria have put entire fighting units out of action. Some of what DARPA has been 

working on in our Bio-Revolution strategic thrust is applicable to preventing and 

treating endemic diseases. Our Rapid Vaccine Assessment program aims to rapidly 

identify effective vaccines; the Accelerated Manufacturing of Pharmaceuticals program is pursuing new technologies to manufacture large quantities of therapeutics 

against any pathogen within 12 weeks. Another DARPA program worked on preventing disabling diarrheal diseases. 

As part of DOD, our primary focus must be on militarily relevant threats. We 

must protect our troops against threats unique to the military and effectively treat 

them when needed. Our troops face threats from weaponized bio-agents and they 

deploy to regions where rare tropical diseases can be commonplace, so we must protect them against both exotic natural pathogens and those made highly virulent by 

our adversaries. The DOD must address those military specific threats, as no other 

organization has the responsibility or incentive to do so. Conversely, there are many 

other organizations, public and private, across the world, whose mission or market 

opportunity is to fight commonly occurring natural infectious disease. For example, 

NIH and pharmaceutical companies have either the mission or market opportunity 

to fight those common diseases. But for weaponized bio-agents and exotic diseases 

that our troops might confront, DOD must solve the problems. It’s no one else’s mission and there is not enough on-going market for most of the drugs needed to keep 

private firms interested. 

Mr. SMITH. In previous years, Congress has enacted a number of pilot demonstration programs to provide more flexibility in the hiring practices, management, and 

conduct of the science and technology program in selected DOD agencies and the 

military department laboratories and research, development, and engineering cen-
180 

ters. Have these authorities been useful? What are some of the challenges with implementing these authorities? 

Dr. TETHER. These authorities have been extremely useful and are absolutely invaluable to us. We strongly support the flexible hiring authorities DARPA has been 

using and their continuation. 

The lifeblood of DARPA is new ideas, and the best way to get new ideas is to 

bring in new people. This requires the flexibility to quickly hire great people with 

great ideas by offering competitive compensation. Without this kind of flexible hiring authority, DARPA’s access to new people and new ideas would quickly be greatly diminished. 

The landmark authority in this area for us was the ‘‘Section 1101’’ authority given 

to DARPA in the FY 99 National Defense Authorization Act and subsequently extended to other agencies; this authority expires in Sept 2011. Section 1101 was the 

model for the ‘‘Highly Qualified Experts (HQE)’’ authority (5 USC 9903) permanently given to the entire DOD as part of the National Security Personnel System. 

DARPA has used both these authorities extensively, but now emphasizes using the 

HQE authority. 

The great difficulty in implementing these authorities, particularly as they have 

become more available throughout the DOD, is resisting the constant temptation to 

make them like the standard system. At first, these authorities stand out because, 

by design, they don’t have as many of the rules, restrictions, and processes as the 

standard system. That makes some administrators uncomfortable and the natural 

inclination of large organizations will be to think, ‘‘Well this new authority doesn’t 

have this process or rule. We should add that back in as a precaution.’’ And a little 

while later, another rule or process is added back and then another and another 

until the new authority is largely encumbered with the same rules and processes 

you were originally trying to avoid. Resisting these ‘‘improvements’’ requires being 

constantly on-guard against them, because they each tend to be little things but 

they add up over time. 

Congress’s continued support for these authorities and their streamlined implementation is a big help to DARPA. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. ELLSWORTH 

Mr. ELLSWORTH. I would like to commend the Department of Defense on the comprehensive report recently delivered to the House and Senate Armed Services Committees addressing the concerns of the National Research Council Committees report on Manufacturing Trends in Printed Circuit Board Technology. DOD suggested 

establishing Executive Agent oversight by the Navy through NSWC Crane Division 

for Printed Circuit Board Technology to ensure that the recommended actions are 

executed so to sustain a robust domestic manufacturing capability. This bold approach should help insure the latest technology be available to trusted U.S. manufacturing who can deliver the warfighter mission critical technologies. This report 

addresses technology (Research & Development), legacy system support, supply 

chain management/vulnerabilitics and establishing a competing network of shops 

that can be trusted to manufacture printed circuit boards for secure defense systems. With many manufactures taking their technologies overseas as a result of the 

global environment what additional actions are being taken to protect critical needed military technologies and prevent potential defense system vulnerabilities? 

Admiral LANDAY. Protection of critical military technologies is being addressed 

under the Militarily Critical Technologies Program (MCTP) process managed by the 

Department of Defense, the Arms Control Act (22 USC 2778 and 2794), and International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR) managed by the Department of State 

and the Defense Production Act (PL 81–774). 

Mr. ELLSWORTH. I would like to commend the Department of Defense on the comprehensive report recently delivered to the House and Senate Armed Services Committees addressing the concerns of the National Research Council Committees report on Manufacturing Trends in Printed Circuit Board Technology. DOD suggested 

establishing Executive Agent oversight by the Navy through NSWC Crane Division 

for Printed Circuit Board Technology to ensure that the recommended actions are 

executed so to sustain a robust domestic manufacturing capability. This bold approach should help insure the latest technology be available to trusted U.S. manufacturing who can deliver the warfighter mission critical technologies.This report addresses technology (Research & Development), legacy system support, supply chain 

management/vulnerabilities and establishing a competing network of shops that can 

be trusted to manufacture printed circuit boards for secure defense systems. With 

many manufactures taking their technologies overseas as a result of the global envi-
181 

ronment what additional actions are being taken to protect critical needed military 

technologies and prevent potential defense system vulnerabilities? 

Dr. TETHER. In response to the concerns you note, we began our ‘‘TRUST in Integrated Circuits’’ Program in late 2007. The goal of the program is to ensure the 

trustworthiness of ICs regardless of where they are designed or manufactured. Of 

particular concern are the rapid movement of both design and fabrication offshore. 

The TRUST program is seeking ways to answer three basic questions about integrated circuits that might be purchased from a variety of places. First, determining 

if malicious features have been inserted during the design of Application Specific 

Integrated Circuits (ASIC). Second, determining if malicious features have been inserted during the fabrication of ASICs. And, third, determining if malicious features 

have been inserted during the loading of Field Programmable Gate Arrays (FPGA). 

These issues have never been addressed before in a comprehensive manner, and are 

at the forefront research in this area. 

So far we have assembled a strong team of defense contractors, commercial IC designers, small businesses, commercial IC tool developers, leading FPGA vendors and 

academics all focused on bring innovative solutions to solving the basic issues defined above. These teams have already shown impressive preliminary results to 

many of the research challenges. 

Æ